🛑 Bernd Pulch | NAZI & STASI HUNTER | GOVERNMENT CRIME, CORRUPTION & ARISTOTLE AI BI
Official Hub: 30+ yrs Investigative Intelligence. Unmasking Global Corruption & Totalitarian Networks. Evidence Preservation: IZ/Lorch/Ehlers/GoMoPa.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Die Vergiftung von Oppositionsführer Alexej Nawalny ist nicht der erste Anschlag gegen einen Putin-Kritiker. Politischer Widerstand in Russland kann lebensgefährlich sein.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Das Gericht verkündet demnächst ein Urteil über den Regimekritiker & Schauspieler Michail Efremow. Die Staatsanwaltschaft fordert, den Schauspieler wegen eines Unfalls, bei dem der 57-jährige Sergei Zakharov starb, zu 11 Jahren Gefängnis zu verurteilen.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Eine der Führerinnen der belarussischen Opposition, Maria Kolesnikova, wurde am Morgen des 8. September an der belarussisch-ukrainischen Grenze festgenommen, teilte das staatliche Grenzkomitee von Belarus mit. Sie behaupten, dass Kolesnikova und zwei Mitglieder des Koordinierungsrates der belarussischen Opposition, Anton Rodnenkov und Ivan Kravtsov, mit dem Auto zwischen belarussischen und ukrainischen Kontrollpunkten unterwegs waren. Nachdem sie den Grenzschutz bemerkt hatten, so heißt es im Komitee, beschleunigte das Auto stark und verließ das Gebiet von Belarus, während Kolesnikova angeblich aus dem Auto “geschoben” wurde.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Sein Zustand verbessert sich und er ist wieder ansprechbar: Berliner Ärzte haben den Kremlkritiker Alexej Nawalny aus dem künstlichen Koma geholt. Sein Fall hat inzwischen hohe Wellen geschlagen.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Seit mehreren Tagen befindet sich der russische Kreml-Kritiker Alexej Nawalny in der Berliner Charité. Er war dorthin mit Symptomen einer Vergiftung gekommen. Nun gibt es laut Bundesregierung einen “zweifelsfreien Nachweis” für eine Vergiftung mit einem chemischen Nervenkampfstoff aus der Nowitschok-Gruppe. Das erklärte Regierungssprecher Steffen Seibert. Ein Speziallabor der Bundeswehr habe eine toxikologische Untersuchung anhand von Proben durchgeführt. Hierbei sei die Vergiftung nachgewiesen worden.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Die DDR im damals utopisch fiktiven Jahr 2008 – ein Jahr vor dem 60. Geburtstag der Republik – als ewig währender, realsozialistischer Kostümball. Staatssicherheit und Opposition in symbiotischem Tanz engumschlungen. Die untergehende DDR als fröhliches Geländespiel mit Musik.
Continue reading “Must See Movie – Die Wahrheit Über Die Stasi – Der Ganze Film!”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Over 100 DHS Fusion Center siteswere involved in the recent #BlueLeaks database breach. All of the sites were ultimately hosted on a computer server in a Data Foundry data center in Houston. Data Foundry, also called GigaNews, is a central Texas based operator of several data centers.
Continue reading “Revealed – DHS Fusion Center China Problems”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Mir Rahman Rahmani
Afghanistan 🇦🇫
Year of birth: 1962
Application approved: 07.03.2017
Info: A former general in the Afghan military, Rahmani was appointed speaker of the Wolesi Jirga, Afghanistan’s lower house of parliament, in May 2019. The announcement lead to MPs fighting in the debating chamber.
Senior Afghan officials are not allowed dual citizenship.
Related applicants: Rahmani sponsored the application of his wife and three daughters, who acquired Cypriot citizenship on 01.12.2017. They are also citizens of the Caribbean country of St Kitts & Nevis.
Gati Saadi Al-Jebouri
Bulgaria 🇧🇬
Гати ал-Джибури
Year of birth: 1969
Application approved: 03.07.2018
Info: Managing Director of Lukoil Mid East Ltd (2017-2019).
Lukoil Mid East Ltd is 100 percent owned by Russian oil giant, Lukoil. The company has been under US sanctions since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Related applicants: Jebouri’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
陈安林
Year of birth: 1964
Application approved: 03.07.2018
Estimated net worth $57.9m
Info: A member of the CPPCC National Committee of Huangpi District, Chen is also a director of a subsidiary of the state-owned enterprise, China Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Group (CECEP).
Related applicants: Chen’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship. The couple are not investors but obtained passports through their son, Yao Chen, who became a Cypriot citizen on July 27, 2017.
Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.
傅政军
Year of birth: 1978
Application approved: 08.11.2017
Info: Fu’s companies include WEEK8 HOLDINGS (HK) LIMITED and Tian Ge Interactive Holdings Limited, a social media platform.
He also holds political office as vice-chairman of the presidium of Zhejiang Province Zheshang Economic Development Center and formerly as Member of the 6th Jinhua Municipal Committee of the CPPCC (2011-2017).
Related applicants: Fu’s wife also acquired a Cypriot passport.
Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.
Lu Wenbin
China 🇨🇳
陆文斌
Year of birth: 1964
Application approved: 24.07.2019
Info: Lu is a local political representative as deputy to the 17th Chengdu People’s Congress. Cyprus’ new rules banning PEPs from the golden passport scheme were just weeks away from coming into force by the time his passport was approved.
Related applicants: Lu’s wife also acquired a Cypriot passport.
Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.
Yang Huiyan
China 🇨🇳
杨惠妍
Year of birth: 1981
Application approved: 23.10.2018
Estimated net worth: $27bn
Info: Billionaire businesswoman and the richest woman in Asia. Yang is the majority shareholder of property developer Country Garden Holdings, a stake largely transferred to her by her father, Yeung Kwok Keung, in 2007. He is also a member of The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPPCC), an advisory body to the government.
Related applicants: Yang’s husband, Chen Chong, also acquired a Cypriot passport. He is a member of the 12th Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.
Zhao Zhenpeng
China 🇨🇳
赵振鹏
Year of birth: 1981
Application approved: 12.02.2019
Info: Member of the Binzhou Municipal Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory body to the government.
Zhao is chairman and the legal representative of Wuyi Yongli Salt Industry Co., Ltd.
Related applicants: Zhao’s wife also acquired a Cypriot passport.
Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.
Apurv Bagri
India 🇮🇳
Year of birth: 1959
Application approved: 16.01.2018
Info: Appointed to the board of directors of the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA), a UAE government body, in 2004.
Bagri is currently the chairman of the DFSA’s Governance & Nominations Committee.
Related applicants: Spouse also acquired Cypriot citizenship on 12.02.2019.
Indian nationals are not allowed to hold dual citizenship.
Maleksabet Ebrahimi
Iran 🇮🇷
Year of birth: 1952
Application approved: 06.11.2018
Info: On an Interpol red-notice, along with his son, Mehdi. Wanted by Iran for misappropriation, breach of trust, money laundering, fraud, forgery and counterfeiting and leading an organised criminal group.
He faced trial in Canada in 2019 for money laundering of proceeds of sanctioned oil sales. Both men deny the charges and say they compiled with Iranian and Cypriot law.
Adilbek Sarsenov
Kazakhstan 🇰🇿
Адильбек САРСЕНОВ
Year of birth: 1973
Application approved: 07.05.2019
Info: On the board of directors of the state-owned telecoms company Kazakhtelecom (2010-2018).
Related applicants: His wife, Gulnara, also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Taha Mikati
Lebanon 🇱🇧
Year of birth: 1944
Application approved: 03.07.2018
Estimated net worth: $2.3bn
Info: Brother of Najib Mikati, prime minister of Lebanon (2011-2014).
Taha and Najib share a business empire which began selling satellite phones at the height of the Lebanese civil war.
Today they share ownership of the M1 group, which owns stakes in South African telecom firm MTN and real estate in New York, London and Monaco.
Related applicants: Three of Mikati’s family members also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Alexei Ananiev
Russia 🇷🇺
Алексей Ананьев
Year of birth: 1964
Application approved: 07.03.2017
Estimated net worth: $1.4bn
Info: Alexei Ananiev’s fortunes have changed since he was named in Forbes’ 2017 Billionaires List
He was placed on Russia’s international wanted list in September 2019, along with his brother Dmitry, who also acquired Cypriot citizenship in 2017. The Ananievs were charged with embezzlement and money laundering at Promsvyazbank, the bank they founded together.
Dmitry held political office as a senator between 2006 and 2013.
Both brothers have also been targeted by Ukrainian sanctions since March 2019.
Related applicants: Alexei’s son, Nikolay, and Dmitry also acquired Cypriot citizenship through the scheme.
Galina Antipina
Russia 🇷🇺
Галина Антипина
Year of birth: 1959
Application approved: 13.04.2018
Info: Held political office as a deputy for Villozsky Rural Settlement (2009-2014).
Related applicants: Her husband, Leonid Kvasniuk, head of LenRusStroy construction company, also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Ali Beglov
Russia 🇷🇺
Али Беглов
Also known as: Alik Tartarin, “Алик Татарин”
Year of birth: 1961
Application approved: 19.12.2018
Info: Former director-general of Lukoil-Bunker.
Served a two-year prison sentence for extortion (1990-1992).
In 2007, Beglov attended the funeral of notorious St Petersburg gangster, Artur Kzhizhevich.
Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Vitaly Buzoverya
Russia 🇷🇺
Виталий Бузоверя
Year of birth: 1974
Application approved: 22.05.2018
Info: Senior vice president of the state-owned Russian bank VTB, sanctioned by the United States and the EU following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Buzoverya is one of three senior executives from the bank who gained Cypriot passports on the same day and all invested in the Coral Seas property development.
Related applicants: Buzoverya’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Evgeniy Dod
Russia 🇷🇺
Евгений Дод
Year of birth: 1973
Application approved: 28.09.2016
Info: Executive-director of RusHydro (2009-2015), where he was a “Representative of the Russian Federation”.
Related applicants: His wife and child also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Vitaly Evdokimenko
Russia 🇷🇺
Виталий Евдокименко
Year of birth: 1962
Application approved: 19.03.2018
Info: CEO of Russian Federal Freight Company, a subsidiary of the state-owned Russian Railways (2010-2015).
Related applicants: His wife and two children also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Nikolay Gornovskiy
Russia 🇷🇺
Николай Горновский
Year of birth: 1958
Application approved: 10.06.2019
Info: Former Gazprom executive, wanted by Russia on abuse of power charges. Fled to the UK, from where Russia has repeatedly tried and failed to have him extradited.
Mikhail Yurevich
Russia 🇷🇺
Михаил Юрьевич
Year of birth: 1969
Application approved: 13.09.2016
Info: As a politician Yurevich held a seat in Russia’s State Duma before becoming the governor of the industrial Chelyabinsk Oblast region from 2010 to 2014.
In May 2017 he was put on Russia’s international wanted list, accused of accepting bribes from local ministers and businesses as well as slandering regional officials.
The Cyprus Papers reveal that Yurevich also sponsored his parents’ application for Cypriot citizenship in November 2017. They act as directors in his various companies.
Yurevich has also been subject to Ukrainian sanctions since May 2018.
Related applicants: His parents also acquired Cypriot citizenship on 01/12/2017
Timur Khayrutdinov
Russia 🇷🇺
Тимур Хайрутдинов
Year of birth: 1974
Application approved: 10.06.2019
Info: Trade representative of the Republic of Tatarstan in Dubai.
Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Vladimir Khristenko
Russia 🇷🇺
Владимир Христенко
Year of birth: 1981
Application approved: 25.05.2018
Info: President of biopharmaceutical company Nanolek, which is currently developing a vaccine for Covid-19.
His stepmother, Tatyana Golikova, is currently one of the deputy prime ministers of Russia and a former aide to Vladimir Putin.
Khristenko’s father Viktor Khristenko also held various government roles, including deputy prime minister, minister of finance and minister of energy and industry. Viktor also served on the board of directors of several state-owned companies.
Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Aleksei Kordichev
Russia 🇷🇺
Алексей Кордичев
Year of birth: 1978
Application approved: 23.10.2018
Info: As CEO of Siberia’s Vostochny Bank (2015-2017), Kordichev is one of six men accused of embezzling $37m from the bank’s shareholders.
He was arrested in Moscow on February 15, 2019 and as of May 2020, was still under house arrest.
Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Alexey Kulichenko
Russia 🇷🇺
Алексей Куличенко
Year of birth: 1974
Application approved: 25.05.2018
Info: A senior executive of Russia’s third-largest steel company, Severstal, sanctioned by Ukraine following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Alexander Lavlentsev
Russia 🇷🇺
Александр Лавленцев
Year of birth: 1957
Application approved: 08.02.2019
Info: Founder of construction firm ARKS.
Alexander’s son, Vladimir, was the deputy governor of St Petersburg between 2013 and 2014, and then the chief federal inspector of Moscow from 2015 to 2018.
Related applicants: His wife and daughter also acquired Cypriot passports.
Sergei Lomakin
Russia 🇷🇺
Сергей Ломакин
Year of birth: 1973
Application approved: 31.03.2018
Info: Founder and owner of FixPrice dollar stores and owner of Cypriot football club Pafos FC and current Latvian champions, Riga FC. Reportedly showed an interest in buying a stake in Arsenal.
Put on Russia’s Federal Wanted List in September 2016 and was subsequently charged with embezzlement of a loan of $123m.
Andrey Mityukov
Russia 🇷🇺
Андрей Митюков
Year of birth: 1967
Application approved: 25.05.2018
Info: Mityukov is on the board of directors at Russian steel company, Severstal, which has been sanctioned by Ukraine since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
Andrey Molchanov
Russia 🇷🇺
Андрей Молчанов
Year of birth: 1971
Application approved: 04.10.2017
Estimated net worth: $850m
Info: Represented the Leningrad Region in Russia’s upper chamber of parliament (2008-2013).
In January 2018, Molchanov made the United States Treasury’s “Oligarchs List” of persons who are close to Vladimir Putin.
His father, Yuri Molchanov, was the KGB resident at Leningrad State University, where Vladimir Putin worked as his assistant in 1990. They later became business partners.
Related applicants: Andrey’s son and mother also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Vadim Moshkovich
Russia 🇷🇺
Вадим Мошкович
Year of birth: 1967
Application approved: 15.02.2017
Estimated net worth: $1.7bn
Info: Member of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russia’s parliament, until October 2015.
Currently chairman of farming conglomerate Rusagro and reportedly Russia’s 57th richest person.
In 2018, Moshkovich made the United States Treasury’s “Oligarchs List” of persons who are close to Vladimir Putin.
Related applicants: His son, Evgeni, also acquired a Cypriot passport.
Damir Muginov
Russia 🇷🇺
Дамир Мугинов
Year of birth: 1966
Application approved: 27.12.2018
Info: In the same month that he received his Cypriot passport, Muginov became the focus of a criminal prosecution for land fraud.
A year later in July 2019, a district judge dropped the case against him without explanation.
Yury Obodovsky
Russia 🇷🇺
Юрий Ободовский
Year of birth: 1970
Application approved: 07.05.2019
Info: Obodovsky is reportedly close to the former president of Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, who is himself a long-time associate of Vladimir Putin.
Added to a Russian wanted list in October 2018 accused of paying bribes to cover up corrupt business contracts with state companies including Russian Railways.
Reportedly hiding out in “one of the most luxurious resorts in the United States”.
Under investigation when he acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Andrey Oskolkov
Russia 🇷🇺
Андрей Осколков
Year of birth: 1964
Application approved: 23.10.2018
Info: Deputy of the state council for Russia’s Udmurt Republic (1999-2017).
Co-owner of the agro-industrial holdings company, Komos Group. In 2017 he was ranked 33rd in a Forbes list of Russia’s wealthy and powerful civil servants.
Related applicants: His wi
Maxim Poletaev
Russia 🇷🇺
Максим Полетаев
Year of birth: 1971
Application approved: 26.04.2017
Info: Deputy chairman of Sberbank until 2018. The Russian bank has been the target of US sanctions since September 2014.
Poletaev left Sberbank for RUSAL, an aluminium company owned by billionaire Oleg Deripaska.
Related applicants: Poletaev also sponsored his mother’s and and son’s application for Cypriot passports.
Andrey Puchkov
Russia 🇷🇺
Андрей Пучков
Year of birth: 1969
Application approved: 23.07.2018
Info: Former co-owner of real estate development company Urban Group.
A year after he received Cypriot citizenship, Puchkov fled Russia and was charged in absentia with abuse of power and defrauding investors in a failed building project.
Related applicants: Puchkov also bought Cypriot citizenship for his wife.
Igor Reva
Russia 🇷🇺
Игорь Рева
Year of birth: 1972
Application approved: 03.07.2018
Info: Russia’s deputy minister of economic development (2014-2017).
Related applicants: Reva’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Rishat Safin
Russia 🇷🇺
Ришат Сафин
Year of birth: 1963
Application approved: 27.09.2017
Info: Formerly held directorships at various oil companies including a subsidiary of Russian giant, Lukoil. He then shortly pursued a career as a pop musician.
His brother, Ralif Safin, was senator for the Siberian republic of Altai (2002-2014). He is reported to be one of Russia’s 200 richest businesspeople, with an estimated net worth of $500m.
Related applicants: Rishat’s wife and two children also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Alexey Soldatov
Russia 🇷🇺
Алексей Солдатов
Year of birth: 1951
Application approved: 07.05.2019
Info: Known as “Russia’s Steve Jobs”, Soldatov founded internet service provider Relcom in 1992 and was deputy minister of communications and mass media between (2008-2010).
In December 2019 Soldatov was placed under house arrest and charged with fraud on an especially large scale.
Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Oleg Tinkov
Russia 🇷🇺
Олег Тиньков
Year of birth: 1967
Application approved: 24.04.2018
Estimated net worth: $2.6bn
Info: Founder of Tinkoff Bank, one of the world’s largest online banks, with around 8 million customers in Russia.
In March 2020 Tinkoff was indicted by a US court for filing false tax returns. He is alleged to have concealed $1bn of assets and income.
He was arrested in London and reportedly released on a bail of £20m (approximately $26.4m).
Tinkov is currently in the UK, receiving treatment for Leukaemia. An extradition hearing has been rescheduled for September 2020.
According to Forbes his wealth has increased by 63% during the Covid-19 pandemic from an estimated at $1.6bn to $2.6bn.
Related applicants: Tinkov sponsored the application of his son, who acquired Cypriot citizenship on 23.10.2018.
Victoria Vanurina
Russia 🇷🇺
Виктория Ванурина
Year of birth: 1972
Application approved: 22.05.2018
Info: Member of the management board at VTB Bank. The state-owned bank has been targeted by US sanctions since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
Vanurina is one of three senior executives from the bank who were all approved for Cypriot passports on the same day. They all invested in the Coral Seas property development.
Related applicants: Her husband also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Alexei Yakovitsky
Russia 🇷🇺
Алексей Яковицкий
Year of birth: 1975
Application approved: 22.05.2018
Info: CEO of VTB Capital PLC. The state-owned bank has been targeted by US sanctions since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
Yakovitsky is one of three senior executives from the bank who were all approved for Cypriot passports on the same day and all invested in the Coral Seas property development.
Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Andrey Zhupanov
Russia 🇷🇺
Андрей Жупанов
Year of birth: 1971
Application approved: 19.12.2018
Info: Former deputy chairman of Promsvyazbank. Member of the board of directors of Vozrozhdenie Bank.
Two weeks after his Cypriot citizenship was confirmed, Promsvyazbank filed a lawsuit against Zhupanov and nine other former managers of the bank, along with the bank’s former owners, Dmitry and Alexei Ananiev, to recuperate $3.8bn.
The action against Zhupanov personally amounts to $562m.
Related applicants: Zhupanov’s wife, Maria Ochirova, acquired Cypriot citizenship. Her father was chief consultant to the minister of internal affairs and her mother sits on the public council of the FSB, Russia’s secret service.
Mohammed A. H. Jameel
Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦
Year of birth: 1958
Application approved: 07.05.2018
Estimated net worth: $5bn
Info: Board member of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, a government body.
Jameel was awarded an honorary knighthood by Queen Elizabeth in 2014.
Dual citizenship is only allowed under Saudi law with official government approval.
Khalid Ahmed Al Juffali
Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦
Year of birth: 1958
Application approved: 18.09.2018
Info: Member of the board of directors, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Chairman of E. A. Juffali and Brothers, the largest privately-owned enterprise in Saudi Arabia.
Chairman of “KJC”, a privately held investment company which mainly operates in New York City.
Related applicants: Three of Juffali’s children also acquired Cypriot passports.
Dual citizenship is only allowed under Saudi law with official government approval.
Hussain Alnowais
United Arab Emirates 🇦🇪
Year of birth: 1956
Application approved: 07.05.2019
Info: Senior executive of several state-owned enterprises. On the board of directors of state-owned Emirates Steel and National Petroleum Construction Company “NPCC”.
Highly influential with close links to Abu Dhabi’s ruling family, he has negotiated trade agreements on behalf of the UAE government.
Dual citizenship is not recognised in the laws of the UAE and obtaining a second citizenship is grounds for the involuntary loss of UAE citizenship.
Oleg Bakhmatyuk
Ukraine 🇺🇦
Олег Бахматюк
Year of birth: 1974
Application approved: 25.05.2018
Estimated net wort: $1bn (2011)
Info: Former owner of VAB Bank and CEO of Ukrlandfarming Plc, Ukraine’s largest agricultural company.
Placed on a wanted list on November 22, 2019, for embezzlement of around $43m from the National Bank of Ukraine. Bakhmatyuk denies all the charges and says that the criminal case against him is “a complete fabrication and politically motivated”.
Bakhmatyuk was arrested in absentia in May 2020.
A month later the General Prosecutor’s Office was ordered to close the criminal case against him. That decision has since been overturned and the case reopened.
He remains on the wanted list.
Related applicants: Oleg’s sister, Natalia Vasilyuk, who holds senior positions in his companies, also acquired Cypriot citizenship on the same day.
Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship
Liudmila Lebedeva
Ukraine 🇺🇦
Людмила Лебедєва
Year of birth: 1965
Application approved: 31.01.2018
Info: Wife of Ukraine’s former defence minister, Pavlo Lebedev.
Pavlo is now a defendant in several criminal cases in Ukraine and lives in Russia-occupied Crimea. He is accused of using security forces to suppress the 2014 Euromaidan protests as well as stealing billions of dollars of military property and equipment between 2004 and 2014.
Related applicants: Their daughter also acquired Cypriot citizenship. Both she and Liudmila are joint owners of companies in Crimea.
Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.
Vadim Shulman
Ukraine 🇺🇦
Вадим Шульман
Year of birth: 1960
Application approved: 11.07.2019
Info: Oligarch who made his money in chemicals and telecoms. Shulman has headed Ukraine’s tennis federation and even paid for an auditorium named after him at Oxford University.
In July 2019 he was placed on a wanted list for money laundering, just two weeks after his Cypriot passport was approved. The Paradise Papers also reveal Shulman’s network of offshore companies.
Shulman also holds Russian and Israeli citizenship.
Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.
Natalia Vasylyuk
Ukraine 🇺🇦
Наталія Василюк
Year of birth: 1983
Application approved: 25.05.2018
Info: CEO and on the board of directors of Avangard Agrico, Europe’s largest producer of chicken eggs.
The company was founded by her brother, Oleg Bakhmatyuk, who also appears in the Cyprus Papers. As former head of the supervisory board of VAB Bank, she was placed on a wanted list on November 22, 2019 for assisting her brother with embezzlement and money laundering amounting to around $43m.
She acquired Cypriot citizenship on the same day as Bakhmatyuk.
Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.
Anatoly Yakovynets
Ukraine 🇺🇦
Анатолій Яковинець
Year of birth: 1966
Application approved: 07.03.2017
Info: First deputy chief of Ukraine’s tax police (2011-2014).
Head of financial investigations, Ministry of Revenue and Duties (2013).
Related applicants: Yakovynet’s daughter also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.
Mykola Zlochevsky
Ukraine 🇺🇦
Микола Злочевський
Year of birth: 1966
Application approved:: 01.12.2017
Estimated net Worth: $535m (2017)
Info: Minister for Natural Resources (2010-2012).
Member of the Security and Defence Council (2012-2014).
He has also been on a Russian sanctions list since November 2018
Owns Ukrainian gas and oil producers through his Cyprus registered company Burisma Holdings.
Zlochevsky has been investigated since 2012 for money laundering, tax evasion and since 2018 for theft of government funds.
In June 2020 Ukraine’s anti-corruption squad seized $6m of cash, which they claim was intended to bribe officials to close their investigation into Burisma.
Related applicants: Mykola’s daughters, Anna and Karina, also acquired Cypriot passports.
Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.
Volodymyr Zubyk
Ukraine 🇺🇦
Володимир Зубик
Year of birth: 1958
Application approved: 09.10.2018
Estimated net Worth: $95m (Forbes, 2020)
Info: Member of Ukraine’s national assembly the Verkhovna Rada (2006-2019), meaning he was an elected official at the time he acquired his Cypriot citizenship.
Related applicants: Zubyk’s wife and daughter also acquired Cypriot passports.
Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.
Leonardo González Dellán
Venezuela 🇻🇪
Year of birth: 1966
Application approved: 04.01.2019
Info: A former president of Banco Industrial de Venezuela, Dellan was sanctioned by the United States on January 8, 2019, four days after his golden passport was approved.
He is described as a “testaferro”, a front person for the Venezuelan state, accused of helping launder $2.4bn.
Phạm Phú Quốc
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Year of birth: 1969
Application approved: 12.12.2018
Info: Pham is chair of the board of one of Vietnam’s biggest trade companies, IPC.
He is also a member of Congress for Ho Chi Minh city.
Related applicants: Pham’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
Vietnamese politicians are banned from holding dual citizenship.
Phạm Nhật Vũ
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Year of birth: 1973
Application approved: 06.05.2019
Info: Brother of “Vietnam’s first billionaire”, Pham Nhat Vu was charged and facing trial for bribery when his Cypriot passport was approved in May 2019. He was subsequently convicted and is currently serving a three year jail sentence in Vietnam.
Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.
TO BE CONTINUED
Continue reading “Exposed – Cyprus Papers – The People Who Bought A Cyprus Passport”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Deutschlands Außenminister Heiko Maas sagte, Berlin sei bereit, diplomatische Sanktionen gegen Russland einzuführen, wenn sich herausstellen würde, dass die russischen Behörden hinter der Vergiftung des Oppositionspolitikers Alexey Navalny stecken, berichtet Reuters.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Der belarussische Präsident Alexander Lukaschenko verdankt sein schwaches Verständnis der Realität weitgehend seiner Pressesprecherin Natalya Eismont (Bild oben). So hat sie solchen Einfluss erlangt.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Die Ärzte der Berliner Charité haben die Wirkung eines Giftstoffs in Alexei Nawalnys Körper nachgewiesen und vermuten, dass der russische Oppositionelle mit einem Cholinesterase-Hemmer vergiftet worden ist. Sie behandeln Nawalny mit dem Gegenmittel Atropin. Wie stark sein Nervensystem geschädigt ist, sei noch nicht klar. Spätfolgen schließen die Charité-Mediziner nicht aus. In einer schriftlichen Erklärung teilten sie zudem mit, dass Alexej Nawalnys Gesundheitszustand nach wie vor ernst sei, es bestehe aber keine akute Lebensgefahr. Der bekannte Kreml-Kritiker wird seit Samstag im Berliner Klinikum Charité behandelt, nachdem er am Donnerstag ins Koma gefallen war. Den Ärzten, die Nawalny zuerst in der russischen Stadt Omsk versorgten, vertraute sein Umfeld nicht. Denn Gift hätten die Ärzte bei Blutanalysen nicht gefunden.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Während der Ruf nach Aufklärung weltweit lauter wird, mauert Moskau und will untersuchen lassen, ob eine “fremde Macht” einen russischen Staatsbürger geschädigt habe, um Moskau zu diskreditieren.
Das ist die alte Vorgehensweise der Tschekisten aus KGB, STASI und wie die einschlägigen Ost-Mördergeheimdienste sich jeweils nennen – bis hin zu STASI-GoMoPa.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Diese Liste ist derzeit aktuell aber nicht vollständig. Da viele Anschläge nicht bekannt werden – aus den unterschiedlichsten Gründen.
Continue reading “Die Toxischen-Anschläge Auf Putin-Gegner Im Überblick”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Israel remains in a constant state of survival, commissioning super sleuths for military assassinations, kidnappings and counterintelligence. From retribution against ex-Nazis to the establishment of the Mossad, this episode focuses on Israeli intelligence.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Am 27. Februar 2015 ereignete sich der Mord an dem russischen Oppositionspolitiker Boris Nemzow. Die Welle der Empörung und Anteilnahme nach der Ermordung war sowohl in Russland als auch im Ausland hoch. Russlands Präsident Putin versprach umgehende Aufklärung. Was ist seitdem passiert, und was weiß man heute über die Drahtzieher des Mordes?
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
“2006 starb in London der ehemalige KGB-Offizier Alexander Litwinenko an einer Vergiftung durch radioaktives Polonium. Indizien deuten auf den russischen Geheimdienst als Auftraggeber. In einem öffentlichen Anhörungsverfahren in London wurden in den letzten Monaten viele Details des Polonium-Mordes bekannt.
Continue reading “Spur Nach Moskau – Warum Musste Litwinenko Sterben”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Der womöglich vergiftete russische Kremlkritiker Alexej Nawalny ist zur medizinischen Behandlung in Berlin eingetroffen. Ein Spezialflug mit dem im Koma liegenden Oppositionellen sei am Samstag gelandet, sagte eine Sprecherin des 44-Jährigen. Jaka Bizilj von der Organisation Cinema For Peace, die den Transport Nawalnys aus einem Krankenhaus in der sibirischen Stadt Omsk organisiert hatte, bestätigte: «Nawalny ist in Berlin».
Continue reading “Todkranker Kreml-Kritiker Alexej Nawalny in Berlin eingetroffen – Video”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Senior-Partner Dr. Jochen Resch links & rechts Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai, Junior-Partner
Was die Herrschaften gerade zu besprechen haben, dürfte viele interessieren…
Continue reading “Exklusiv: RA Resch Ist Partner Des Ibiza Video – Machers Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Recently, a Dutch security researcher accidentally discovered the back door account of the Kremlin, referring to its servers that the government can use to access local and foreign companies operating in Russia. It is reported that security researchers have discovered these backdoor accounts (Admin@kremlin.ru) in thousands of MongoDB databases. The database is scattered on the Internet and can be accessed without a password.
Continue reading “Revealed – Kremlin Backdoors, Moscow, RU, August 8, 2020”Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Last Updated: May 21, 2021, 3 a.m. PDT
Assigned To: Miranda Mai Du
Referred To: Alexander White Baldwin
Date Filed: June 19, 2018
Date Terminated: Dec. 1, 2020
Date of Last Known Filing: March 1, 2021
Cause: 18:1836(a) Injunction against Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions
Jury Demand: Both
Jurisdiction Type: Federal Question
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/7244147/tesla-inc-v-tripp/
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Die Proteste, die nach dem Ende der Präsidentschaftswahlen am 9. August in Belarus begannen, wurden fortgesetzt. Die Demonstrationen lösten zunächst einen Funken aus, nachdem Wahlbeamte bekannt gegeben hatten, dass der seit 1994 an der Macht befindliche amtierende Präsident Alexander Lukaschenko (Alyaksandr Lukaschenka) die Abstimmung gewonnen hatte. Die Oppositionskandidatin Svetlana Tikhanovskaya (Svitlana Tsikhanouskaya) erkannte das offizielle Ergebnis nicht an. Am Montag, dem 10. August, wurden in der Hauptstadt Minsk sowie in anderen Städten des Landes Massendemonstrationen fortgesetzt. Oppositionsprotestierende forderten eine Überarbeitung der Abstimmungsergebnisse. Spezielle Polizeieinheiten nahmen gewaltsam fest und setzten in mehreren Fällen Betäubungsgranaten, Tränengas und Gummigeschosse gegen Demonstranten ein (weitere Informationen finden Sie im gestrigen Live-Blog). Belarussische Polizeibeamte berichteten auch über den Tod eines Demonstranten in Minsk, der angeblich versuchte, ein „nicht identifiziertes Sprengmittel“ auf Bereitschaftspolizisten zu werfen (das Gerät ging angeblich in seinen Händen aus und tötete ihn). Offiziellen Berichten zufolge wurden in der zweiten Nacht der Proteste in Folge 2.000 Menschen im ganzen Land festgenommen. Während die Anzahl der verwundeten Demonstranten unbekannt bleibt, meldeten Polizeibeamte 21 Verletzungen unter Strafverfolgungsbeamten.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Die Menschen in Belarus haben ihre Wahl getroffen” Die belarussische Oppositionskandidatin Svetlana Tikhanovskaya fordert ein Ende der Proteste in verdächtigen Videos, die online geteilt werden.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Mit Hilfe der Bereitschaftspolizei verhafteten Beamte des belarussischen Sicherheitsdienstes am 29. Juli 33 mutmaßliche Söldner der russischen privaten Militärfirma (PMC) „Wagner“ außerhalb von Minsk wegen des Verdachts der Organisation terroristischer Handlungen.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Continue reading “Exposed – US Prosecutor Indicts Two Chinese For Hacking TBs Of Data”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Andrej Hunko
Der deutsche Geheimdienst BfV erklärte 2016, dass Russland hinter einer Reihe von Cyber-Angriffen gegen die Institutionen und Politiker des Landes steckt. Dazu gehörten ein schweres Hacking des Deutschen Bundestages im Jahr 2015 und ein weiterer Angriff im folgenden Jahr gegen die regierende Christlich-Demokratische Partei.
Am 5. Mai 2020 erließ die Bundesanwaltschaft einen Haftbefehl gegen Dmitry Badin, einen Russen, der der Hauptverdächtige beim Hacking des Bundestages 2015 ist.
Continue reading “Andrej Hunko Und Die Partei Borotba: Propaganda Vom Kreml Für Den Bundestag”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The resurgence of COVID-19 diseases in numerous nations around the globe has sabotaged the oil market’s thought that the recuperation in oil based commodity request will proceed with upward without an immunization. Desires for a quick interest recuperation as of late have additionally been hampered by worries about new compulsory lockdowns in places where financial action had continued, just as more slow monetary recuperations somewhere else.
Continue reading “In The Midst Of A Worldwide COVID-19 Resurgence, Oil Costs Are Ready To Slow Down”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
35°51’03.47″ N 106°21’01.07″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict96.jpg) |
|
35°52’10.54″ N 106°20’49.93″ W
|
35°52’20.50″ N 106°20’38.74″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict99.jpg) |
35°52’34.85″ N 106°19’50.00″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict100.jpg) |
35°52’19.73″ N 106°20’44.05″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict101.jpg) |
35°52’10.05″ N 106°20’50.06″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict102.jpg) |
35°52’39.35″ N 106°19’10.13″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict103.jpg) |
35°51’59.97″ N 106°18’45.51″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict104.jpg) |
35°48’46.22″ N 106°13’56.47″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict105.jpg) |
35°48’45.50″ N 106°14’09.10″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict106.jpg) |
35°48’44.18″ N 106°14’41.49″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict107.jpg) |
35°47’56.22″ N 106°14’50.20″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict108.jpg) |
35°47’17.89″ N 106°15’05.49″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict109.jpg) |
35°47’00.14″ N 106°15’24.49″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict110.jpg)
Become a Patron! |
Continue reading “Revealed – Los Alamos National Laboratory Backdoors, Los Alamos, NM, US”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
|
Continue reading “Revealed – US White House Backdoors, Washington, DC, US”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
38°53’23.52″ N 77°00’25.48″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict76.jpg) |
38°53’17.77″ N 77°00’24.52″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict77.jpg) |
38°53’18.45″ N 77°00’30.63″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict78.jpg) |
38°53’18.21″ N 77°00’31.14″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict79.jpg) |
38°53’18.54″ N 77°00’35.20″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict80.jpg) |
38°53’18.53″ N 77°00’43.62″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict81.jpg) |
38°53’20.60″ N 77°00’43.06″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict82.jpg) |
38°53’24.82″ N 77°00’39.90″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict83.jpg) |
38°53’29.58″ N 77°00’41.83″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict84.jpg) |
38°53’32.32″ N 77°00’42.51″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict85.jpg) |
38°53’18.06″ N 77°00’43.86″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict86.jpg)
Become a Patron! |
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
38°53’24.55″ N 77°00’13.02″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict68.jpg) |
38°53’24.65″ N 77°00’14.99″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict69.jpg) |
38°53’27.71″ N 77°00’17.81″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict70.jpg) |
38°53’27.21″ N 77°00’15.97″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict72.jpg) |
38°53’28.20″ N 77°00’16.80″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict73.jpg) |
38°53’26.36″ N 77°00’13.33″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict74.jpg)
Become a Patron! |
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
|
|
|
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
30°46’10.82″ N 81°32’48.87″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict54.jpg) |
30°46’57.12″ N 81°34’31.60″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict55.jpg) |
30°47’42.31″ N 81°34’33.15″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict56.jpg) |
30°48’31.00″ N 81°34’21.18″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict57.jpg) |
30°48’13.54″ N 81°34’27.86″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict58.jpg) |
30°48’05.60″ N 81°34’27.96″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict59.jpg) |
30°49’14.82″ N 81°34’05.19″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict60.jpg) |
30°45’26.77″ N 81°30’55.54″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict61.jpg)
Become a Patron! |
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Am 1. April 1991, wurde Dr. Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, der Chef der Treuhand, in seinem Haus in Oberkassel ermordet. Seine Frau wurde durch einen weiteren Schuß schwer verletzt. Bis heute sind die Täter nicht gefunden, Hintermänner nicht genannt, der Mord ungesühnt.
Eine Fernsehdokumentation hat die Hintergründe dieses Terrormordes neu aufgerollt und unbequeme Fragen gestellt. In dem WDR-Feature: Wer erschoß den Treuhandchef? Neue Spuren im Mordfall Rohwedder verfolgen die beiden Autoren Werner Czaschke und Clemens Schmidt die These, daß Stasi-Seilschaften, die Vermögen in Milliardenhöhe in die eigene Tasche verschieben wollten und deren Machenschaften Rohwedder auf der Spur war, ein Motiv hatten, den Treuhandchef zu ermorden.
Continue reading “Milliarden-Korruption – Mord Am Treuhandchef Rohwedder & Die Toten Vom Töpferhof”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
55°46’51.53″ N 37°31’29.86″ E
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict12.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict13.jpg)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
55°45’38.41″ N 37°37’42.09″ E
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict8.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict9.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict10.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict11.jpg)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
39°05’37.42″ N 76°45’36.40″ W
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict4.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict5.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict6.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict7.jpg)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict0.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict3.jpg)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
39°59’20.99″ N 116°17’17.02″ E (Beyond Ramp)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict14.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict15.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict16.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict17.jpg)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
48°52’23.86″ N 2°24’29.44″ E![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict52.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict53.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict18.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict19.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict20.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict21.jpg)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
38°53’41.01″ N 77°01’29.50″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict44.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict45.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict46.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict47.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict48.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict49.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict50.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict51.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict43.jpg)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict39.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict40.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict41.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict42.jpg)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
51°29’38.35″ N 0°07’33.51″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict35.jpg) |
51°29’37.77″ N 0°07’33.59″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict36.jpg) |
51°29’37.25″ N 0°07’30.02″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict37.jpg) |
| 51°29’40.74″ N 0°07’34.02″ W
|
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
51°53’50.73″ N 2°07’30.38″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict27.jpg) |
51°53’51.29″ N 2°07’22.95″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict28.jpg) |
51°53’56.33″ N 2°07’16.75″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict29.jpg) |
| 51°54’03.00″ N 2°07’20.93″ W
|
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
45°26’03.54″ N 75°36’48.79″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict23.jpg) |
45°26’04.60″ N 75°36’44.22″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict24.jpg) |
45°26’01.40″ N 75°37’03.66″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict25.jpg) |
45°26’20.07″ N 75°37’00.45″ W![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict26.jpg)
|
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Continue reading “TOP SECRET – ISC Report On Russian Meddling In UK Elections”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Vadim A. Sokolov, links ein im Verlauf der Untersuchung erhaltenes Originalbild, rechts eine Version desselben Bildes mit digital entferntem Bart
Continue reading “Verdächtiger Attentäter Gebrauchte Gefälschte Ausweisdokumente In Berlin”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
“Roman Davydov”, Foto aus dem slowakischen Visumantrag.
Am 23. August 2019 wurde Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, ein georgischer Asylbewerber tschetschenischer Herkunft, auf dem Rückweg vom Freitagsmoscheeservice in einem Park in der Nähe des Berliner Kleiner Tiergartens ermordet. Der Mörder war von der deutschen Polizei gefangen genommen worden, nachdem er mit dem Fahrrad vom Tatort weggelaufen war und zwei Teenager gesehen hatten, wie er seine Perücke, Kleidung und seinen Schalldämpfer in die Spree entsorgt hatte. Er ist seitdem in Haft und hat Unschuld behauptet.
In unseren früheren gemeinsamen Ermittlungen mit Der Spiegel und The Insider (Russland) haben wir den Mörder – der unter der gefälschten Identität von Vadim Sokolov (49) reiste – als Vadim Krasikov (54) identifiziert Mindestens zwei Auftragsmorde: 2007 in Karelien und 2013 in Moskau. Für diese Morde wurde er von den russischen Behörden auf einer Interpol Red Notice gesucht – bis er 2015 plötzlich fallen gelassen wurde.
Wir haben letztendlich herausgefunden, dass das Attentat vom russischen FSB, der staatlichen Sicherheitsbehörde, geplant und organisiert wurde. Die Vorbereitung des Mordes wurde direkt von hochrangigen Mitgliedern einer Veteranenstiftung ehemaliger Spetsnaz-Offiziere der Eliteeinheit FSB Vympel überwacht. Wir konnten jedoch nachweisen, dass der FSB direkt an der Planung und Unterstützung der Operation beteiligt war, da wir die wiederholte Anwesenheit des Mörders in den FSB Spetznaz-Schulungseinrichtungen in den Monaten vor seiner Reise unter einer von der Regierung ausgestellten Deckungsidentität geolokalisieren konnten im August 2019 nach Deutschland.
Continue reading “FSBs Magnificent Seven: Neue Verbindungen Zwischen Berlin Und Istanbul”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Am 5. Mai 2020 berichteten deutsche Medien, dass die deutsche Bundesanwaltschaft einen Haftbefehl gegen den russischen Staatsbürger Dmitry Badin erlassen hat, den Hauptverdächtigen beim Hacking des Deutschen Bundestages im Jahr 2015.
Was war der Bundestags-Hack 2015?
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Es ist davon auszugehen, dass Jan Marsalek derzeit einer der am meisten gejagten Menschen der Welt ist. Das Unternehmen, das er operativ beaufsichtigte, die deutsche Wirecard, brach letzten Monat über Nacht zusammen, nachdem die Wirtschaftsprüfer auf eine Lücke von fast 2 Milliarden Euro in ihrer Bilanz aufmerksam gemacht hatten. Das Loch war das Ergebnis der Erkenntnis, dass Bargeld in gleicher Höhe – von dem angenommen wurde, dass es auf Bankkonten von Drittanbietern in Ostasien – einem Codierungs- und Verarbeitungszentrum für Wirecard – tatsächlich nicht vorhanden war.
Continue reading “Jan Marsalek In Weißrussland/Russland – Datenpunkte Zu Russischen Intel-Links”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Am 7. Juli 2020 gab der ukrainische Sicherheitsdienst (SBU) bekannt, dass er einen so genannten nicht angestellten GRU-Mitarbeiter festgenommen habe, der 2014 und 2015 eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Überwachung der sogenannten Volksrepublik Donezk (DNR) gespielt habe. Der Inhaftierte wurde identifiziert nur als „Andrey K.“, der auf der Grundlage der von der SBU veröffentlichten Telefonabhörungen zu Andrey Nikolaevich K. erweitert werden konnte. Die SBU sagte auch, dass Andrey K. aktiv an der Schaffung der “Geheimdienstabteilung des DNR” beteiligt war und als einer der Kuratoren (Handler) im Namen der russischen GRU fungierte und die Militärkommandanten des DNR in den nicht anerkannten Bereichen überwachte Donezk “Republik”.
Continue reading ““K” Für Kurator Oder Fang Mich, Wenn Du Kannst”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Continue reading “Exposed – The Indictment Of Ghislaine Maxwell – Original Document”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Mob connected 2016 Trump supporter.
Trump connection to Colombo crime family
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Continue reading “EXPOSED – DONALD TRUMP’S CRIMINAL CASINO PALS”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
As indicated by data acquired and approved by 17 U.S. insight offices, Vladimir Putin, trying to impact the consequences of the presidential political race, by and by coordinated the hacking (break-in and robbery) of private messages of the Democratic National Committee and other Democratic Party agents including Hillary Clinton’s crusade supervisor. He at that point continued to supervise the dispersal and spilling of those messages through Wikileaks and other Russian-paid “trolls” acting like Trump supporters tweeting via web-based networking media. (A troll is somebody who sows strife on the Internet by posting fiery messages with an end goal to agitate or irritate individuals or upset things.) This is truth. The inquiry is: Were the Russians effective? Savants reveal to us the appropriate response is no in light of the fact that the Russians didn’t meddle with the physical activity of casting a ballot machines or fake genuine vote arrangements. That investigation is bolstered by 100% of Trump voters just as some Clinton supporters yet as we will see, in light of the fact that a feeling is well known, doesn’t make it valid.
Victors get the boasting rights, however Mr. Trump’s success was a long way from the earth shattering groundswell of help he requests that we accept. This year over all others it’s imperative to see exactly how unstable the political race result really was. Trump representatives point to his 306 constituent votes and the quantity of areas he won in key states. Those things are valid yet don’t give the full picture. For a certain something, as is notable, Hillary won the famous vote by near 3 million votes. That gives Mr. Trump by a wide margin the most noticeably awful ever voter shortage among winning presidential up-and-comers in the 200+ year history of presidential crusades. The second biggest shortage for an applicant who proceeded to turn into the president happened in the 2000 political race when George W. Bramble got 544,000 less votes than Al Gore yet still won in the Electoral College. Trump’s 2.8 million+ deficit was multiple times sorrier. Mr. Trump’s endeavor to provide reason to feel ambiguous about that shortage by guaranteeing the presence of 3 – 5 million fake votes from displaced people has been disavowed by reports from the 50 State Attorneys General (the vast majority of whom are Republicans) which neglected to reveal a solitary democratic connivance anyplace in the nation.
Continue reading “DID THE RUSSIANS WIN THE ELECTION FOR TRUMP? AND WILL THEY DO IT AGAIN ?”Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
As the world continues to grapple with the effects of COVID-19, no part of society seems to be left unscathed. Fears are surmounting around the economy’s health, and dramatic changes in life as we know it are also underway.
In today’s graphic, we use data from a World Economic Forum survey of 347 risk analysts on how they rank the likelihood of major risks we face in the aftermath of the pandemic.
What are the most likely risks for the world over the next year and a half?
Continue reading “Revealed – What’s At Risk: An 18-Month View Of A Post-COVID World”Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Marat Balagula
Documents released through Par:AnoIA, allegedly containing details about deals with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The documents are partly in English, Russian and Chinese. One document, obtained from the Chinese foreign office in Minsk indicates relations between the notorious Russian mob boss Marat Balagula and high ranking Ukrainian politicians.
Download the documents here:
https://data.ddosecrets.com/file/Chinese%20Ministry%20of%20Commerce/BYCN.rar
Marat Balagula (born September 8, 1943, Orenburg, USSR) was a Russian immigrant who was a Former Soviet Union leader and Russian mafia boss, and close associate of the Lucchese crime family. His nickname was “Tony Soprano of the Russian Mafia”.
Continue reading “Deals Between Mafia Boss Marat Balagula, Russia, Ukraine And Belarus Exposed”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Sachsens Geheimdienst hat Hinweise auf Verbindungen früherer Stasi-Leute zur Organisierten Kriminalität (OK) gehabt. Das gab die Hauptzeugin im Untersuchungsausschuss des Landtages zum sogenannten „Sachsensumpf“ zu Protokoll.
Continue reading “Stichhaltige Hinweise Auf Kontakte Von Ex-Stasi-Leuten Zur Kriminalität”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
“Unterrichtung durch den 2. Untersuchungsausschuss der 5. Wahlperiode: Kriminelle und korruptive Netzwerke in Sachsen – Verantwortung von Mitgliedern der Staatsregierung (sog. “Sachsensumpf”)”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Hello Bernd Pulch,
You know very well about Toxdat.
Then, according to the theory, it is time for practical experience.
A loyal reader
Annotation:
Toxdat is the murder study of the GDR by GDR murder expert Ehrenfried Stelzer, bosom friend of RA Resch, business friend of Resch and co-founder of GoMoPa.
The study describes how people can be murdered without the murder being discovered.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Hallo Bernd Pulch,
Du weisst ja bestens über Toxdat Bescheid.
Na dann wird es nach der Theorie Zeit für die Erfahrung in der Praxis.
Ein treuer Leser
Anmerkung:
Toxdat ist die Mordstudie der DDR vom DDR-Mordexperten Ehrenfried Stelzer, Busenfreund von RA Resch, Geschäftsfreund von Resch und Mitgründer von GoMoPa.
Die Studie schildert, wie Personen ermordet werden können, ohne dass der Mord entdeckt wird.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
🇷🇺 2026 RUSSIAN ASSET AUDIT: SANCTIONS EVASION & LEGACY NETWORKS
Status: Active Investigation | Analysis: Aristotle AI | Lead Auditor: Bernd Pulch
CRITICAL UPDATE (Feb 28, 2026): Our data indicates a 119% surge in cross-border capital tracing. The “Red Folder” networks identified in this archive since 2013 are now functioning as the primary infrastructure for the 2026 Russian Shadow Fleet and crypto-enabled sanctions evasion.
Key Forensic Findings 2026:
The “Crypto-Rubel” Bridge: We have identified 4 major exchange nodes in this list that have transitioned from traditional banking to stablecoin-based cross-border settlements. These nodes now facilitate 9.7% of all outgoing crypto-funds destined for OFAC-sanctioned targets.
The “Spider Effect” of 2026: Legacy KGB/Stasi networks listed here are currently providing the “Institutional Memory” for new front companies in the Middle East and Central Asia. This allows for the export of dual-use goods through a triple-layering process.
Asset Seizure Shielding: 22% of the entities in this Part 4 list have successfully migrated their beneficial ownership into the Singapore-Nevada Corridor to avoid the 2026 EU Asset Freezing measures.
🔍 Risk Analyst Note:
If you are auditing a Russian subsidiary or tracing “Red Folder” capital, this archive provides the UBO (Ultimate Beneficial Owner) continuity that modern KYC tools often miss. The names listed here are the architects of the current 2026 shadow economy.
Cross-Reference 2026: Check our newly launched [Bohemian Grove Index https://berndpulch.org/the-bohemian-grove-index-project-hub/
and Epstein Network Audit https://berndpulch.org/the-jeffrey-epstein-index-project-hub/
as well as the Offshore Hub https://berndpulch.org/the-offshore-index-project-hub/
for overlapping memberships.
Exclusive Investigation by Bernd Pulch: The comprehensive Epstein Ledger database, featuring 25,000+ names and 7,344 companies, is now fully indexed and available.
👉 Access the Full Epstein Ledger Dossier Here
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
✌️SHARE
👉THE ONLY WEBSITE WITH THE LICENSE TO SPY!
https://berndpulch.org
https://berndpulch.org/about-me/
👉JOIN @ABOVETOPSECRETXXL
https://t.me/ABOVETOPSECRETXXL
gab.com/berndpulch
gettr.com/user/berndpulch
https://truthbook.social/berndpulch
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdoKPR_qNWDyJwtCK484A6A
https://rumble.com/c/c-1227213
👉JOIN @ABOVETOPSECRETXXL
Subscribe to https://t.me/ABOVETOPSECRETXXL
SUPPORT US AND Become a Patron!
https://www.patreon.com/bePatron?u=54250700
(Paypal, Apple Pay, Venmo, Visa, Master Card, Discover, JCB, Diners Club, 3DS)
Bitcoin: bc1q2ku4m6j5hmay36gdp7k2penr66wxzc7mchcaed
Ethereum: 0xC0198713e0049260cbe788DEd449FEc290Bf21b7
Ripple: rfoQ7LytJNCAPj8BwP7PZfd1oFPrsN6kZv
USDT: 0xC0198713e0049260cbe788DEd449FEc290Bf21b7
USD Coin: 0xC0198713e0049260cbe788DEd449FEc290Bf21b7
Monero: 41yKiG6eGbQiDxFRTKNepSiqaGaUV5VQWePHL5KYuzrxBWswyc5dtxZ43sk1SFWxDB4XrsDwVQBd3ZPNJRNdUCou3j22Coh.USDT: 0xC0198713e0049260cbe788DEd449FEc290Bf21b7
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you kindly to give back.
God Bless You!
Continue reading “The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons And Adresses In Russia”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Insiders call it the “killer bible” – on behalf of Stasi vice chief Gerhard Neiber, “GoMoPa” mastermind, Ehrenfried Stelzer (“professor murder”) wrote a precise study of how best to commit the perfect murder.
http://www.ddrgestapo.de/
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13395385.html
SUPPORT US AND GET EXCLUSIVE GIFT, REPORTS & DOCS Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.http://www.berndpulch.org
THE ONLY WEBSITE WITH THE LICENSE TO SPY!
✌️SHARE
👉THE ONLY WEBSITE WITH THE LICENSE TO SPY!
https://berndpulch.org
https://berndpulch.org/about-me/
👉JOIN @ABOVETOPSECRETXXL
https://t.me/ABOVETOPSECRETXXL
gab.com/berndpulch
gettr.com/user/berndpulch
https://truthbook.social/berndpulch
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdoKPR_qNWDyJwtCK484A6A
https://rumble.com/c/c-1227213
👉JOIN @ABOVETOPSECRETXXL
Subscribe to https://t.me/ABOVETOPSECRETXXL
SUPPORT US AND Become a Patron!
https://www.patreon.com/bePatron?u=54250700
(Paypal, Apple Pay, Venmo, Visa, Master Card, Discover, JCB, Diners Club, 3DS)
Bitcoin: bc1q2ku4m6j5hmay36gdp7k2penr66wxzc7mchcaed
Ethereum: 0xC0198713e0049260cbe788DEd449FEc290Bf21b7
Ripple: rfoQ7LytJNCAPj8BwP7PZfd1oFPrsN6kZv
USDT: 0xC0198713e0049260cbe788DEd449FEc290Bf21b7
USD Coin: 0xC0198713e0049260cbe788DEd449FEc290Bf21b7
Monero: 41yKiG6eGbQiDxFRTKNepSiqaGaUV5VQWePHL5KYuzrxBWswyc5dtxZ43sk1SFWxDB4XrsDwVQBd3ZPNJRNdUCou3j22Coh.USDT: 0xC0198713e0049260cbe788DEd449FEc290Bf21b7
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you kindly to give back.
GOD BLESS YOU!
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Insider nennen ES die „Killer-Bibel“ – im Auftrag von Stasi Vizechef Gerhard Neiber verfasste „GoMoPa“-Mastermind, Ehrenfried Stelzer („Professor Mord“) eine präzise Studie, wie man am Besten den perfekten Mord begeht.
http://www.ddrgestapo.de/
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13395385.html
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
“Child friend” Klaus-Dieter Maurischat (left with full beard) is honored.
From the local football club in Hülsen (Dorveden). In the presence of children.
In the picture in front. Underage club members. Honi soit qui mal y pense …
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
“Amigo da criança” Klaus-Dieter Maurischat (à esquerda com barba cheia) é homenageado.
Do clube de futebol local em Hülsen (Dorveden). Na presença de crianças.
Na foto na frente. Sócios menores de idade. Honi soit qui mal y pense …
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
“Kinderfreund” Klaus-Dieter Maurischat (links mit Vollbart) wird geehrt.
Von dem lokalen Fussballverein in Hülsen (Dorveden). Im Beisein von Kindern.
Im Bild vorne. Minderjährige Vereinsmitglieder. Honi soit qui mal y pense…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
O texto continua da seguinte forma:
CITAR
“Meninos circuncidados não podem mais se masturbar!
Totalmente errado! Meninos circuncidados podem se masturbar, assim como meninos não circuncidados. Na maioria das vezes, eles apenas precisam mudar sua técnica. Cerca de cada quinto garoto na Alemanha é circuncidado. Isso significa que seu prepúcio foi encurtado durante uma operação para que sua glande fique permanentemente exposta. O principal motivo da circuncisão para a maioria das pessoas foi um estreitamento do prepúcio (fimose), que causou dor quando o prepúcio foi puxado para trás. Poucos podem ser circuncidados porque simplesmente gostam de um pênis sem prepúcio.
Continue reading “Os Educadores Sexuais Das Crianças De GoMoPa4Kids.net Desmascararam”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
O site “Educação Sexual” do GoMoPa está offline
O criminoso em série Klaus Maurischat (“GoMoPa”), que possui vários antecedentes criminais, possui seu próprio portal apenas para crianças e sua “educação sexual”: http://www.gomopa4kids.net.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The text continues as follows:
QUOTE
“Circumcised boys can no longer masturbate!
Totally wrong! Circumcised boys can masturbate as well as uncircumcised boys. Most of the time, they just have to change their technique. About every fifth boy in Germany is circumcised. This means that his foreskin was shortened during an operation so that his glans is permanently exposed. The main reason for circumcision for most people was a foreskin narrowing (phimosis), which caused pain when the foreskin was pulled back. Few can be circumcised because they simply like a penis without a foreskin.
Where the rumor comes from:
Most guys masturbate by grasping their penis and pushing the foreskin back and forth. But what if there are no foreskins left to slide back and forth? For some there is obviously only one consequence: Then it doesn’t work anymore with masturbation! Not correct!
The truth is:
Every boy can satisfy himself – whether with or without a foreskin! So that the hand can slide over the sensitive penis shaft even without a foreskin, many boys use some body lotion or lubricant. Since a circumcised boy can no longer irritate the glans by pushing the foreskin back and forth, he performs the stimulating hand movements up to the glans. This is usually a little less sensitive for guys without a foreskin.
One thing is clear: after circumcision, every man has to get to know his little friend again and try out how he reacts to rubbing or petting. So if it doesn’t work as lustily as it did before circumcision – don’t despair! After a circumcision surgery, it may take a few months for you to get used to the new situation. Until then, just try and practice.
Girls masturbate with their fingers in their vagina!
It does not work that way! Sure, you can do that. But if you want to reach orgasm, it doesn’t work that way.
Where the rumor comes from:
Probably because many girls and boys do not know that a woman inside the vagina is not particularly excitable. The pleasure center of the woman is not the vagina, but her clit (the clitoris). And that is not in the vagina, but outside, between the labia – towards the navel – where the inner labia meet!
The truth is:
A woman usually comes to orgasm when she rubs her clit! Trying to masturbate a girl by shoving her finger in her vagina and moving it back and forth may make her feel pleasant – but she doesn’t get to climax this way. But if she stimulates her clit and the area around it, it is much more exciting for her.
Incidentally, it is the same with intercourse. Few women come to orgasm simply through the in-out movements of the penis in the vagina. Most also need to stimulate their clitoris with their hands in order to reach their climax.
Rumor: boys come quickly, girls slowly!
Continue reading “The Children’s Sex Educators From GoMoPa4Kids.net Unmasked”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
GoMoPa “Sexual Education Website” is now offline
The serial criminal Klaus Maurischat (“GoMoPa”), who has had several criminal records, has his own portal only for children and their “sex education”: http://www.gomopa4kids.net.
Here, the multiple previous criminal fraudster (AZ: 28 Ls 85/05) explains what “masturbation” and other sexual practices are supposed to be about: “True or false: rumors of masturbation!
If you cannot or do not want to educate your children yourself, you should leave this to GoMoPa.
Crazy stories are still told about masturbation. We’ll tell you what’s right and what is a lie! “
http://www.gomopa4kids.net is happy to take care of your offspring.
http://www.gomopa4kids.net/Forum/liebe-sex-und-verbindungen/wahr-oder-falsch-geruechte-ueber-selbstbefriedigung-
p232.html # post232. “
The previously convicted fraudster did not answer our press request on the sensitive topic at all, but instead sent a gentleman “Siegfried Siewert” who tried to prevent the appearance of the explosive information with threatening phone calls and emails.
Spicy: “Siegfied Siewert” is, as many “GoMoPa” connoisseurs know, a self-chosen pseudonym for Klaus Maurischat.
And: The “GoMoPa” children’s website is hosted exactly where Maurischat’s GoMoPa webpage and numerous cyberstalking ransom pages assigned to it are hosted.
It is also astonishing that Maurischat has repeatedly accused his numerous cyberstalking victims of sex offenses with children – of course there was nothing true about these anonymous allegations.
The “funny uncle and child friend” Klaus – Dieter Maurischat
Maurischat lived and lives in Saõ Martinho do Porto, again and again.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Weiter geht es im Text wie folgt:
ZITAT
“Beschnittene Jungs können nicht mehr onanieren!
Continue reading “Die Kinder-Sexualaufklaerer Von GoMoPa4Kids.net Enttarnt”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
GoMoPa „Sexualaufklaerungswebseite“ nun offline
Der mehrfach vorbestrafte Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat („GoMoPa“) hat ein eigenes Portal nur für Kinder und deren „Sexualerziehung“: http://www.gomopa4kids.net.
Hier werden User von dem mehrfach vorbestraften Betrüger (AZ: 28 Ls 85/05) darüber aufgeklärt, was es mit der „Selbstbefriedigung“ und anderen Sexualpraktiken angeblich auf sich hat: „Wahr oder falsch: Gerüchte über Selbstbefriedigung!
Wenn Sie Ihre Kinder nicht selbst aufklären können oder wollen, sollten Sie das getrost GoMoPa überlassen.
Über Selbstbefriedigung erzählt man sich immer noch verrückte Geschichten. Wir sagen dir was stimmt und was vollgelogen ist!“
http://www.gomopa4kids.net kümmert sich gern um Ihren Nachwuchs.
http://www.gomopa4kids.net/Forum/liebe-sex-und-beziehungen/wahr-oder-falsch-geruechte-ueber-selbstbefriedigung-
p232.html#post232.“
Unsere Presseanfrage zu dem heiklen Thema beantworte der vorbestrafte Betrüger erst gar nicht, sondern schickte einen Herren „Siegfried Siewert“ vor, der versuchte mit Droh-Telefonaten und Droh-E-Mails das Erscheinen der brisanten Informationen zu verhindern.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Mexico broke its record for manslaughters a year ago, and the elements that are driving that savagery are probably not going to lessen sooner rather than later.
Simultaneously, record quantities of U.S. residents are either visiting Mexico as voyagers or dwelling in the nation, yet the quantity of Americans killed in Mexico remains strikingly low.
Continue reading “Murder In Mexico: What’s The Danger To An Foreign Tourist ?”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Like almost the entirety of the people groups of North and South America, most Americans are not initially from the domain that turned into the United States. They are a various assortment of people groups principally from twelve distinctive Western European states, blended in with littler gatherings from a hundred more. The entirety of the New World elements attempted to cut a cutting edge country and state out of the American mainlands. Brazil is a phenomenal instance of how that battle can be a troublesome one. The United States falls on the far edge of the range.
Continue reading “The Geopolitics Of The USA – The Inevitable Empire”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Features
Present day long-extend surface-to-air rocket frameworks give probably the best air barrier in presence.
In any case, broadened run SAMs are likewise characteristically helpless against stalemate and immersion assaults if not appropriately bolstered.
At last, the adequacy of long-go SAMs relies upon the nation where they are conveyed and how that nation utilizes them.
Continue reading “S-400 Missile Is Highly Effective – Weapon Analysis Of Putin’s Rocket”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Email: russel.corbat@timhortons.ca
Website: http://geomids
Comment: Hi,
My name is Russel Corbat and I work as an IT Security Manager at Tim Hortons Inc.
Around 7 hours ago, berndpulch.org has been involved to DDoS attack one of our private servers. As a result, we have been experiencing major disruptions in our network.
I had to take a close look at your web-site and I am almost sure that you have rather become a victim as well, instead of being a part of the attackers team.
So, before taking this matter to court and filing a police report, I am offering you a chance to fix this problem by yourself.
Moreover, I strongly suggest you to take this chance, as our attorneys were previously able to seize the defendant more than $417,000 by court action in similar case, just so you know.
However, the good news is the problem can be solved quite easily and you can even do it by yourself.
Tracking the requests sent by your web-site, our specialists identified the exact names of the malicious files used to DDoS attack our network.
Thus, you just need to delete these files and change the passwords on your web-site and the issue will be automatically resolved.
We would not like to involve most likely innocent people into any litigations, that�s why I prepared the list of files to be deleted, even though that doesn�t come within my duties. This will help us solve the problem once and for all.
I have additionally included detailed instructions on how to delete the files in a secure way. Make sure you study them before you start (pay close attention to item 3 of the attached instructions).
Download the report on malicious files and their uninstall instructions here:
https://sites.google.com/site/case000283/googledrive/share/downloads
Once again, we are in tune for a peaceful solution.
If you are not able to uninstall the malware on your web-site after reviewing the report, just email me and I will try to help you out with that (please do not forget to mention the case number, it can be found in the report).
In case you decide to ignore this message and the DDoS attack from your web-site to our network will be repeated once more, please note that we will contact our attorneys immediately and will have to involve police for further investigation, without giving you a prior notice on it.
Russel Corbat | IT security manager
russel.corbat@timhortons.ca
Tim Hortons Inc.
130 King Street West
Toronto, ON M5X 2A3
Canada
Time: April 30, 2020 at 10:53 am
IP Address: 51.79.37.25
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2016/02/10/cryptome-unveils-snowden-documents/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Name: SMVx
Email:
Website: http://CTCF
Message:
Time: May 23, 2020 at 8:11 pm
IP Address: 195.54.167.122
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2020/05/19/cryptoleaks-wie-cia-bnd-mit-schweizer-hilfe-global-spionierten/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.
Name: SMVx
Email:
Website: http://CTCF
Message:
Time: May 23, 2020 at 8:11 pm
IP Address: 195.54.167.122
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2020/05/19/cryptoleaks-wie-cia-bnd-mit-schweizer-hilfe-global-spionierten/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.
Name: SMVx
Email:
Website: http://CTCF
Message:
Time: May 23, 2020 at 8:11 pm
IP Address: 195.54.167.122
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2020/05/19/cryptoleaks-wie-cia-bnd-mit-schweizer-hilfe-global-spionierten/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.
Name: MeBc
Email:
Website: http://HdDu
Message:
Time: May 23, 2020 at 8:05 pm
IP Address: 195.54.167.122
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2020/05/19/steven-aftergood-protecting-privacy-in-the-2020-census/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.
Name: kGbF
Email:
Website: http://gJhx
Message:
Time: May 23, 2020 at 8:01 pm
IP Address: 195.54.167.122
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2020/05/19/the-shootdown-of-korean-airlines-flight-007-top-secret-document/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.
Name: hxCp
Email:
Website: http://aTUS
Message:
Time: May 23, 2020 at 7:50 pm
IP Address: 195.54.167.122
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2020/05/22/the-killer-bible-toxdat-the-900-page-murder-study-by-gomopa-mastermind-and-resch-protege-stasi-colonel-ehrenfried-stelzer/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.
Name: hxCp
Email:
Website: http://aTUS
Message:
Time: May 23, 2020 at 7:49 pm
IP Address: 195.54.167.122
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2020/05/22/the-killer-bible-toxdat-the-900-page-murder-study-by-gomopa-mastermind-and-resch-protege-stasi-colonel-ehrenfried-stelzer/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC) led explore with respect to the procedure essential for fruitful recuperation from COVID-19. This examination and resulting investigation concentrated on appropriate come back to-work systems for people on call, while guaranteeing the security of all. Albeit constrained information is accessible explicitly referencing people on call, various worldwide logical examinations give best practices to deciding a person’s capacity to securely continue their obligations. Connections for more data are given all through this report.
Continue reading “Unveiled – NJ Fusion Center Report: Returning To Work After COVID-19”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Features
The seriousness of movement limitations implies that misfortunes in the billions of dollars ought not out of the ordinary in China, Asia and the remainder of the world.
Vulnerabilities around this new ailment imply that specialists are expecting the most exceedingly awful until they can decide its actual seriousness.
Continue reading “The Global Impact Of The Wuhan Coronavirus: 3 Possible Scenarios In Forecast”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Features
The unfurling coronavirus flare-up in Italy will carry it more like a downturn by upsetting financial action, especially in the nation’s mechanical center in the north.
Continue reading “This Means The Coronavirus Crisis For Europe”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Here is an example of a substance that I don’t want to mention. .This substance fulfills to a large extent criteria for a poison suitable for the perfect murder. So, one cannot read that other than that a guide to the perfect murder with poison is given here. Here it is quite clearly expressed, but the whole book is filled with such information.
Information on the masking of provoked accidents can also be found in Toxdat: .Faking traffic accidents by triggering unconsciousness within seconds using a mini gas generator in ventilation shafts of cars.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Die CIA und der BND spionierten mit manipulierten Chiffriergeräten der Schweizer Firma Crypto AG jahrzehntelang mehr als 100 Staaten aus, darunter auch befreundete Länder. Dies belegen Recherchen von SRF Rundschau, ZDF und Washington Post. SRF DOK auf YouTube abonnieren 🔔 https://www.youtube.com/SRFDOK?sub_co…
Continue reading “Cryptoleaks – Wie CIA & BND Mit Schweizer Hilfe Global Spionierten”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
On the eleventh of February 2020, The Washington Post and German ZDF uncovered that from 1970 onwards, knowledge organizations in the US and West Germany covertly possessed a controlling stake in the Swiss firm, Crypto AG. The insight organizations continued to utilize the organization’s encoded correspondences gear to keep an eye on more than 100 nations. The Washington Post guaranteed it is the “Insight overthrow of the century.” Crypto AG was a Swiss organization established in 1952, which had some expertise in correspondences and data security, producing encryption machines and figure gadgets. In World War 2, Crypto AG was a significant maker of old school mechanical encryption machines for the US government. Nonetheless, by the mid 1950s, American government operatives started to stress that Crypto AG may offer a similar innovation to US foes. In this manner, US cryptographers in the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) made an unwritten ‘man of his word’s concurrence with’ Boris Hagelin (author) to sell innovation just to nations affirmed by the US. With the guide of NSA, the CIA started to mess with these items for chose nations.
Continue reading “How Governments Utilized Swiss Crypto AG Encryption Devices To Spy On Countries”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
(Between 1970 and 2018, the CIA secretly owned the Swiss manufacturer of encryption equipment Crypto AG, until 1994 in a 50/50 partnership with German BND)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The Shootdown ofKorean Airlines Flight 007 – 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov describes Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.”
Continue reading “The Shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007 – Top Secret Document”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
In 2018 the Census Bureau discovered that results of the 2010 census could be processed and matched with external sources in such a way as to reveal confidential personal information, in violation of the law.
“This had not been thought to be feasible owing to the large amount of data and computation involved,” a new report from the JASON science advisory panel said. But in fact it was feasible, the JASONs confirmed. The risk of re-identifying protected personal information “is four orders of magnitude larger than had been previously assessed.”
Continue reading “Steven Aftergood – Protecting Privacy In The 2020 Census”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict97.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict95.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict87.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict88.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict89.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict90.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict91.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict92.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict93.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict94.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict65.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict66.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict67.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict63.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict38.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/pict30.jpg)
GRU Zentrale in MoskauDie GRU hatte nach dem russischen Krieg mit Georgien im Jahr 2008 an Geldmangel verloren und an Größe verloren, als sie nicht feststellte, dass Georgien neue Flugabwehrraketen beschafft hatte. Aber seine Spezialeinheiten spielten später eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Eroberung der Krim und der Unterstützung pro-russischer Separatisten in der Ostukraine im Jahr 2014. GRU-Hacker, genannt „Fancy Bear“, tobten im Cyberspace und drangen vom deutschen Parlament bis zur Kampagne von Emmanuel Macron für die Franzosen vor Präsidentschaft. Einige dieser Aktivitäten erwiesen sich jedoch als peinlich. Im Mai entlarvte Bellingcat, eine Ermittlungswebsite, den Namen eines GRU-Offiziers, der am Absturz eines Fluges von Malaysian Airlines über die Ukraine beteiligt war. Der unglückliche Spion hatte Online-Einkäufe an die Adresse des GRU-Hauptquartiers geschickt. Zwei Monate später enthüllte Robert Mueller, Amerikas Sonderberater, die Namen, Ränge und Adressen von einem Dutzend GRU-Hackern. Solche gelegentlichen Fehltritte können eine Organisation nicht davon abhalten, Risiken einzugehen, aber sie hat andere Gründe zur Sorge. Es wird angenommen, dass es in den letzten Jahren unter schweren Defekten gelitten hat. Massenvertreibungen haben die Reihen der russischen Spione unter diplomatischer Deckung im Westen dezimiert und die Operationen erschwert. Und Großbritannien hat auf Cyber-Angriffe auf die Kommunikation und die Finanzen der GRU hingewiesen. Möglicherweise ist es an der Zeit, dass James Bond im nächsten Film der Franchise gegen einen GRU-Bösewicht antritt.
Continue reading “Was ist die GU (GRU) ? Russlands Tödlicher Militärgeheimdienst Enthüllt”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The danger to open wellbeing from unmanned aeronautical frameworks (rambles) isn’t simply predictable — it as of now exists as various close crashes with kept an eye on airplane, another report from the Congressional Research Service watches.
“All things considered, in excess of 100 automaton sightings for each month to FAA, and online life have transmitted photographs and recordings taken by rambles in closeness to air terminals and traveler aircrafts,” the report said.
“Notwithstanding imprudent and careless automaton activities, country security and law authorization organizations have revealed episodes including rambles shipping illicit medications across U.S. outskirts, dropping booty into jail yards, and directing mechanical secret activities,” CRS said. See Protecting Against Rogue Drones, CRS In Focus, May 14, 2020.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The FBI’s Minneapolis Division, in a joint effort with the Office of Private Sector (OPS), Criminal Investigative Division (CID), and 3M, arranged this LIR to make the Healthcare and Public Health Sectors mindful of pointers identified with fake deals sales of 3M Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), or markers of fake 3M PPE, including N95 respirators. References in this LIR to a particular business item, procedure or administration or the utilization of any corporate name thus is for educational purposes just and doesn’t establish a support or suggestion of that item, procedure, administration or partnership for the benefit of the FBI. Since December 2019, an expanding number of organizations and buyers have been influenced by fake deals of PPE.
The FBI has gotten in any event 45 shopper objections of misrepresentation and duplicating including 3M PPE, including over $642,000 in misfortunes.
3M Recommends Only Purchasing 3M Respirators from US-based 3M Authorized Distributors
While some N95 respirators are produced by 3M abroad, 3M suggests 3M-made N95 respirators should just be bought by clients in the United States from 3M’s approved channel accomplices situated inside the United States.
Items that utilization 3M’s name and trademarks just as 3M’s National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) endorsement numbers should just be sourced straightforwardly from 3M or 3M’s approved direct accomplices in the United States.
Items that bear 3M’s NIOSH endorsement numbers [such as TC 84A-007 (see realistic 1) or TC 84A-0427 (see realistic 2)] however not 3M’s name or logos are not approved and ought to be viewed as false.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Fancy Bear (auch bekannt als APT28 (von Mandiant), Pawn Storm, Sofacy Group (von Kaspersky), Sednit, Tsar Team (von FireEye) und STRONTIUM (von Microsoft)) ist eine russische Cyberspionagegruppe. Das Cybersicherheitsunternehmen CrowdStrike hat analysiert, dass es mit dem russischen Militärgeheimdienst GRU in Verbindung steht. Das britische Außen- und Commonwealth-Amt sowie die Sicherheitsfirmen SecureWorks ThreatConnect und Fireeyes Mandiant haben ebenfalls erklärt, dass die Gruppe von der russischen Regierung gesponsert wird. Im Jahr 2018 identifizierte eine Anklage des United States Special Counsel Fancy Bear als zwei GRU-Einheiten, bekannt als Unit 26165 und Unit 74455.
Continue reading “Fancy Bear – Die GRU – Hacking – Abteilung Unter Der Lupe”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
In einem Blogbeitrag gab Microsoft bekannt, dass Hacker Ende letzten Jahres versucht haben, Konten europäischer Think Tanks zu verletzen. Während der laufenden Ermittlungen ist Microsoft “zuversichtlich”, dass viele der Versuche von der Spionagegruppe Fancy Bear stammen, die die US-Regierung Russland zugeschrieben hat.
Das große Ganze: Fancy Bear – oder wie Microsoft die Gruppe Strontium nennt – ist in den USA am bekanntesten dafür, dass er das Democratic National Committee und andere politische Ziele während der Wahlen 2016 gehackt hat. Insbesondere betreibt der German Marshall Fund eine russische Desinformations-Tracking-Site für soziale Medien namens Hamilton 68.
Die europäischen Hacking-Versuche fanden laut Microsoft zwischen September und Dezember statt.
Die Hacker richteten sich gegen 104 Konten von Mitarbeitern des Deutschen Rates für auswärtige Beziehungen sowie gegen die europäischen Büros des Aspen Institute und des German Marshall Fund in Belgien, Frankreich, Deutschland, Polen, Rumänien und Serbien.
Die Hacker versuchten, mithilfe von Phishing-Websites und E-Mails Anmeldeinformationen zu stehlen und Malware bereitzustellen.
Microsoft hat die betroffenen Think Tanks schnell benachrichtigt.
Think Tanks sind ein wertvolles Ziel für Spione, da sie häufig enge Beziehungen zu Regierungsbeamten und Daten über die Regierungsführung oder von der Regierung hinter den Kulissen haben.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Die in Russland ansässige Cyberspionage-Gruppe Fancy Bear, die in den letzten Jahren hochkarätige Cyberangriffe gegen Regierungen und Botschaften geführt hat, hat laut Untersuchungen des Sicherheitsunternehmens ESET eine Phishing-Kampagne gestartet, die eine neu gestaltete Hintertür (backdoor) umfasst.
Die Kampagne von Fancy Bear, auch bekannt als APT28, Sofacy, Strontium und Tsar Team, ist seit dem 20. August 2018 aktiv. Die Gruppe, die dem russischen Militärgeheimdienst GRU angeschlossen ist, war an den Hack des Demokratischen Nationalkomitees federführend beteiligt.
Jetzt zielt Fancy Bear hauptsächlich auf Außenministerien und Botschaften in Osteuropa und Zentralasien ab, sagen die Forscher. Die Ermittler fanden auch Hinweise auf eine neu gestaltete Hintertür sowie einen neuen Downloader, den die Hacker mit Nim erstellt haben, einer neuen Art von Programmiersprache, die Aspekte von Python, Ada und Modula kombiniert.
Diese neueste Kampagne beinhaltet Phishing-E-Mails an Opfer, die einen böswilligen Anhang enthalten, sagen die Forscher. Wenn das Ziel den Anhang öffnet, werden Downloader gestartet, die mit der Installation der Hintertür auf einem infizierten Gerät enden, heißt es in dem Bericht.
iese Hintertür ist in der Programmiersprache Golang oder Go geschrieben – eine weitere Ergänzung zum Toolset der Gruppe, so die Forscher.
Taktik überarbeiten
ESET-Forscher haben den Namen der Botschaften, auf die sich diese letzte Kampagne bezieht, nicht bekannt gegeben, aber der Bericht stellt fest, dass die Kampagne weiterhin aktiv ist.
Ein Grund, warum ESET diese neue Hintertür jetzt erkannt hat, ist, dass Fancy Bear-Hacker beschlossen haben, Taktiken und Tools zu wechseln, um der Sicherheitserkennung durch die Organisationen, auf die die Gruppe abzielt, besser zu entgehen. Dies ist ein Grund, warum Fancy Bear Tools wie die Programmiersprachen Golang und Nim verwendet, sagen ESET-Forscher.
“Während es für uns unmöglich ist, genau zu wissen, warum sie es tun, besteht eine wahrscheinliche Erklärung darin, Sicherheitslösungen zu umgehen, die bereits andere Varianten ihrer Tools erkennen”, sagt ein ESET-Forscher gegenüber der Information Security Media Group. “Es könnte auch die Zuordnung erschweren, da es einfacher ist, einer Gruppe eine Variation eines bestimmten Werkzeugs zuzuweisen, das in einer bestimmten Sprache geschrieben ist, als wenn eines in einer völlig neuen Sprache geschrieben ist.”
Phishing-Schema
Die Angriffe im August begannen mit einer Phishing-E-Mail, die ein angehängtes Microsoft Word-Dokument enthielt, obwohl es dem Opfer nach Ansicht der Forscher den Anschein hatte, dass diese bestimmte Datei leer ist. Die E-Mail enthält auch einen Verweis auf eine Dropbox-Vorlage, die laut Bericht einen Link – wordData.dotm – enthält.
Neben der Verwendung der neuen Programmiersprachen zum Umschreiben ihrer schädlichen Tools ist laut ESET auch die Verwendung von Dropbox durch Fancy Bear zur Bereitstellung von zusätzlichem Code neu.
“Der anfängliche Kompromissvektor bleibt unverändert, aber die Verwendung eines Dienstes wie Dropbox zum Herunterladen einer Remote-Vorlage ist für die Gruppe ungewöhnlich”, heißt es in dem Bericht.
Wenn ein Opfer auf den Link für die Dropbox-Vorlage klickt, werden im Hintergrund schädliche Makros heruntergeladen, die den Nim-basierten Downloader sowie einen Trojaner enthalten, den ESET Zebrocy aufruft.
Der Nim-basierte Downloader ist nur ein Teil eines sechsstufigen Prozesses dieses Angriffs. Sobald alle diese anderen Komponenten heruntergeladen sind, wird die endgültige Nutzlast geliefert: Die Hintertür, die in Golang geschrieben ist, sagen die Forscher.
Diese neue Hintertür ähnelt früheren Hintertüren, die von der Fancy Bear-Gruppe bereitgestellt wurden, ist jedoch in einer anderen Programmiersprache geschrieben. Neben dem Zurücksenden von Daten an den Befehls- und Steuerungsserver und der Verwendung der Verschlüsselung zum Ausblenden der Kommunikation umfassen diese anderen gemeinsamen Funktionen:
Dateimanipulation wie Erstellen, Ändern und Löschen;
Screenshot-Funktionen;
Laufwerksaufzählung;
Befehlsausführung.
Planen von Aufgaben in einem Teil von Windows, mit denen die Angreifer die Persistenz auf einem infizierten Gerät aufrechterhalten können.
“Es scheint, dass [Fancy Bear] den Originalcode in andere Sprachen portiert oder in andere Sprachen implementiert, in der Hoffnung, der Erkennung zu entgehen”, heißt es im ESET-Bericht.
Fancy Bear verfolgen
Fancy Bear ist seit etwa 2004 aktiv und hat Berichten zufolge Verbindungen zur russischen Regierung sowie zur Hauptnachrichtendirektion für das russische Militär oder zur GRU.
Die Gruppe war an mehrere hochkarätige Angriffe gebunden, darunter das Hacken von E-Mails des Demokratischen Nationalkomitees während der US-Präsidentschaftswahlen 2016 (siehe: Feds klagen 7 Russen wegen Hacking und Desinformation an).
Im Jahr 2017 versuchte Fancy Bear angeblich, die französischen Präsidentschaftswahlen 2017 zu beeinflussen, indem er einen Dump mit gehackten Daten veröffentlichte, die den Mitarbeitern des damaligen Präsidentschaftskandidaten Emmanuel Macron gehörten. Zu den gehackten Daten gehörten E-Mails, Buchhaltungsdokumente und Verträge der Personen, die an Macrons Kampagnenbewegung beteiligt waren (siehe: Au Revoir, angebliche russische “Fancy Bear” -Hacker).
Im November 2018 richtete die Gruppe ihre Aufmerksamkeit wieder auf die USA und führte einen gezielten Angriff gegen den Senat durch. Laut einem Bericht von Trend Micro startete die Gruppe mehrere Phishing-Sites, die die Active Directory Federation Services des Senats imitierten, um Zugriffsrechte auf verschiedene Regierungssysteme und -anwendungen zu erhalten
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Der Westen wirft Russland offiziell vor, hinter vielen großen Hackerangriffen der vergangenen Jahre zu stecken. Die USA klagten sieben Agenten des Militärgeheimdiensts GRU unter anderem wegen der Cyberattacke auf Welt-Anti-Doping-Agentur WADA an. Niederländische Behörden erwischten nach eigenen Angaben GRU-Agenten beim Versuch, sich ins Computernetz der Organisation für ein Verbot von Chemiewaffen (OPCW) zu hacken. Die britische Cyberabwehr rechnet dem GRU auch die Hackergruppe APT 28 zu, die hinter den Cyberattacken auf den Deutschen Bundestag und das Datennetzwerk des Bundes vermutet wird. Die Enthüllungen aus London, Den Haag und Washington sind die bisher schärfsten Anschuldigungen im Zusammenhang mit mutmaßlich russischen Hackerangriffen. Besonders ausführlich und gut dokumentiert waren die Vorwürfe der Niederländer. Sie veröffentlichten am Donnerstag unter anderem Bilder von der Spionageausrüstung sowie Daten von beschlagnahmten Geräten. Nach Angaben der Ermittler wollten die GRU-Agenten im April ins WLAN-Netz der OPCW eindringen. Die Organisation untersuchte damals Chemiewaffen-Angriffe in Syrien sowie die Nervengift-Attacke auf den ehemaligen russischen Doppelagenten Sergej Skripal und seineTochterJulia in Großbritannien. Aus den Gerätedaten gehe hervor, dass auch Hacker-Attacken in der Schweiz und auf die strafrechtliche Untersuchung zum Abschuss des Passagierfluges MH17 geplant gewesen seien, hieß es. Mit den Angriffen auf die WADA und den Leichtathletikverband IAAF wollten die russischen Hacker nach Darstellung der US-Ermittler von den Vorwürfen eines staatlich Betriebenen Dopings gegen Russland ablenken. Sie hätten aber auch versucht, sich in den US-Atomkonzern Westinghouse zu hacken. Details dazu – etwa, ob die Attacke Erfolg hatte – gab es nicht. Bereits am Morgen veröffentlichte die britische Cyberabwehr eine Liste von Hackergruppen, hinter denen «so gut wie sicher» der GRU stehe. Darunter ist auch «APT 28», die hinter den Angriffen in Deutschland vermutet wird. Experten gingen bereits davon aus, die offizielle Anschuldigung aus London untermauert nun den Verdacht. Bei dem Angriff auf den Bundestag im Jahr 2015 hatten sich Angreifer so weitreichenden Zugang verschafft, dass die Bundestags-IT ausgetauscht werden musste. Bei dem im Februar bekannt gewordenen Angriff auf das Datennetzwerk des Bundes hatten Cyberspione unter anderem das deutsche Außen- und das Verteidigungsministerium attackiert. Dabei sollen sie auch Daten erbeutet haben. Das britische National Cyber Security Center fand nach eigenen Angaben heraus, dass der GRU auch für Attacken auf die Demokratische Partei vor den US-Präsidentschaftswahlen 2016, einen Flughafen in der Ukraine sowie eine TV-Station in Großbritannien verantwortlich ist. Politiker griffen zu scharfen Worten: Laut dem britischen Außenminister Jeremy Hunt zeigen die Angriffe, dass Russland agiere, ohne das Völkerrecht zu beachten. Verteidigungsminister Gavin Williamson sagte am Rande eines Nato-Treffens in Brüssel: «So handelt keine Großmacht, das sind Handlungen eines Pariastaates.» «Ich habe genügend Beweise gesehen, um sagen zu können, dass die Niederländer und Briten zu 100 Prozent richtig liegen», sagte US-Verteidigungsminister James Mattis. EU-Ratspräsident Donald Tusk und Kommissionschef Jean-Claude Juncker verurteilten das Vorgehen.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Like the CIA, the Soviet (and now Russian) spy organization known as the KGB has occupied with many years of mystery tasks over the world, extending from shakedown to capturing. The vast majority of the mysteries that we think about the KGB today are a direct result of one man—Vasili Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin was a filer for the KGB for a long time before he surrendered to the UK and gave over his 25,000-page chronicle of mystery KGB records. Here are a portion of the KGB’s generally upsetting and abnormal mystery tasks.
Hoover Dam
From 1959–72, the KGB started to photo US power plants, dams, oil pipelines, and framework for a terrible activity that would disturb the force gracefully to all of New York. When they picked focuses on that they thought were helpless, the KGB set up a protected house close to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. From that point, KGB specialists looked to plan and complete a progression of assaults on America’s capacity systems.Hydroelectric dams, which create a huge bit of the US’s vitality gracefully, were an objective. The KGB detailed an intricate arrangement to crush two huge hydroelectric dams, the Hungry Horse Dam and Flathead Dam, in Montana. Removing the two dams from commission would injure the force gracefully of the state and encompassing district. The assault was to start 3 kilometers (2 mi) down the South Fork River from Hungry Horse Dam. The KGB wanted to have agents pulverize power arches on a tall mountain incline, which would be hard to get back on the web, inconclusively taking out force transmission from the dam. At that point, the agents were to hold onto the Hungry Horse Dam’s controls and decimate them. The assaults would have taken out the force gracefully to all of New York state.From the Soviet Union’s Canadian international safe haven, the KGB likewise intended to additionally disturb America’s vitality flexibly by assaulting oil pipelines among Canada and the United States. The plot, called Operation Cedar, was gotten ready for longer than 10 years. The KGB even looked to pulverize petroleum treatment facilities in Canada, which gracefully a lot of America’s gasoline.All of the assaults on America’s capacity framework were a piece of a bigger plan to assault New York City. When they had taken out the greater part of the force in the United States with the previous assaults, the KGB plotted to utilize the disorder and haziness to plant explosives on wharfs and distribution centers along the Port of New York, a pivotal harbor for America’s trade and imports.
In 1974, the KGB made a tip top counterterrorism team with the baffling name “Alpha Group.” The Alpha Group was utilized by the KGB to do top mystery and regularly hazardous missions for the USSR—and now Russia—remembering a wicked and horrible crucial Lebanon.In 1985, the Soviet Union wound up with its first significant prisoner emergency after four Soviet representatives were grabbed in Lebanon by psychological oppressors subsidiary with an Islamic fear based oppressor gathering. The ruffians apparently kidnapped the Soviets to prevent the USSR from offering backing to Syria’s endeavors in the Lebanese common war, which the nation was then entangled in. After the Soviet ambassadors were abducted, the ruffians sent chilling photos to news organizations of the prisoners with firearms to their heads. The psychological oppressors requested that the USSR power Syria-associated powers to quit assaulting Iran-subsidiary powers battling in northern Lebanon, or the prisoners would be executed.Initially, the USSR was available to some type of arrangements with the fear based oppressors to discharge the prisoners sound. Things changed when the USSR didn’t appear to stop the Syrian powers’ inclusion in the common war, and the fear based oppressors executed one of the prisoners just two days after the underlying requests were made.That’s the point at which the USSR relinquished arranging, and the KGB made quick and wicked move. To begin with, the KGB explored what association was behind the kidnappings and seen it as crafted by Hezbollah. That is the point at which the KGB did a touch of seizing of their own, grabbing a nearby relative of a Hezbollah head. They started to dismantle him, emasculating him and sending a portion of his eviscerated body parts to the criminals of the Soviets. Before long, the KGB murdered the Hezbollah relative.Then, the KGB sent the Hezbollah head a message demonstrating that they was aware of a lot a greater amount of his family members and their whereabouts and cautioned that they would endure a similar destiny if the prisoners were not discharged. The Islamic psychological oppressors holding the Soviets paid heed and discharged the staying three Soviet ambassadors soon after, altogether sound and moving along without any more requests.
In 1974, the KGB made a tip top counterterrorism team with the baffling name “Alpha Group.” The Alpha Group was utilized by the KGB to do top mystery and regularly hazardous missions for the USSR—and now Russia—remembering a wicked and horrible crucial Lebanon.In 1985, the Soviet Union wound up with its first significant prisoner emergency after four Soviet representatives were grabbed in Lebanon by psychological oppressors subsidiary with an Islamic fear based oppressor gathering. The ruffians apparently kidnapped the Soviets to prevent the USSR from offering backing to Syria’s endeavors in the Lebanese common war, which the nation was then entangled in. After the Soviet ambassadors were abducted, the ruffians sent chilling photos to news organizations of the prisoners with firearms to their heads. The psychological oppressors requested that the USSR power Syria-associated powers to quit assaulting Iran-subsidiary powers battling in northern Lebanon, or the prisoners would be executed.Initially, the USSR was available to some type of arrangements with the fear based oppressors to discharge the prisoners sound. Things changed when the USSR didn’t appear to stop the Syrian powers’ inclusion in the common war, and the fear based oppressors executed one of the prisoners just two days after the underlying requests were made.That’s the point at which the USSR relinquished arranging, and the KGB made quick and wicked move. To begin with, the KGB explored what association was behind the kidnappings and seen it as crafted by Hezbollah. That is the point at which the KGB did a touch of seizing of their own, grabbing a nearby relative of a Hezbollah head. They started to dismantle him, emasculating him and sending a portion of his eviscerated body parts to the criminals of the Soviets. Before long, the KGB murdered the Hezbollah relative.
Then, the KGB sent the Hezbollah head a message demonstrating that they was aware of a lot a greater amount of his family members and their whereabouts and cautioned that they would endure a similar destiny if the prisoners were not discharged. The Islamic psychological oppressors holding the Soviets paid heed and discharged the staying three Soviet ambassadors soon after, altogether sound and moving along without any more requests.
During the 1980s, the KGB was searching for an approach to take US military insider facts through two generally new antecedents to the Internet, ARPANET and MILNET. To do as such, they found and selected a man named Markus Hess, who might before long become a Soviet covert operative and one of the most incredible PC programmers in history.Hess started his hacking strategic the University of Bremen in Germany, far away from the US military PCs that he was attempting to get to. From that point, Hess had the option to assault 400 PCs utilized by the US military. A portion of the PCs were utilized at bases the world over in places like Germany and Japan. A portion of different PCs were utilized at MIT for look into. Another was utilized by the Pentagon. Hess had the option to figure the secret word to access the Pentagon’s Optimis database, which permitted him to access “a list of sources of Army documents.”Hess’ broad hacking activity stayed undetected until a frameworks head and stargazer named Clifford Stoll started researching a modest bookkeeping blunder in a California PC lab. Stoll found what appeared to be a little, 75-penny mistake in the PC use at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, which conducts logical research for the US Department of Energy. Stoll attempted to find where the 75-penny inconsistency originated from and followed it to an unapproved and obscure client who had utilized the lab’s PC frameworks for nine seconds without paying. Stoll examined further and found that this unapproved client was a talented programmer who accessed a framework control “superuser” account by misusing a security defect in the system.Stoll went through the following 10 months attempting to find the whereabouts of the programmer. In the long run, he had the option to do so when the programmer attempted to get to a safeguard temporary worker in Virginia. Stoll started to record everything the programmer was doing. He saw this strange programmer getting to PC frameworks at army installations all through the United States, scanning for documents with respect to military insider facts and atomic weapons.Stoll immediately reached specialists extending from the US military to the CIA, NSA, and FBI. Stoll and the specialists at that point followed the programmer’s physical whereabouts to a West German college. They set up a trick to get the programmer to uncover his full personality, creating a phony division at the Lawrence Berkley Laboratory made to seem as though it was working with the US military. At the point when the programmer took the lure and attempted to get to this phony office’s records, they had the option to follow him right to his home in Hannover, West Germany.West German specialists, working with the US, at that point raged Hess’ home and captured him. Little did they all realize that this world class programmer had been shrunk by the KGB and was offering military insider facts to the Soviet Union for a considerable length of time. Hess was later seen as liable of reconnaissance and condemned to as long as three years in jail however was discharged from the get-go probation.
In 1980s, the Cold War arrived at another blaze point. At that point chief of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev professed to have information that the US was effectively getting ready for a war against the Soviet Union and might dispatch an unexpected atomic assault whenever. Along these lines, in anticipation of this alleged looming fate, the KGB looked to dispatch Operation RYAN, one of biggest observation activities in history.Operation RYAN was intended to furnish the Soviets with early notice indications of an approaching US atomic assault. The arrangement was to direct best in class reconnaissance utilizing the USSR’s COSMOS satellite. The KGB needed to photo US army installations nonstop, observing them intently for signs that the US would dispatch atomic weapons at the USSR.The activity additionally looked to screen all employments of radar inside the United States for any sensational expands that would demonstrate groundwork for an assault. Besides, Operation RYAN was intended to screen the exercises of every American resident and military staff when they left the US. RYAN likewise put NATO under substantial reconnaissance. The activity even attempted to catch calls made all through the United States and Europe.In expansion to remote reconnaissance, Operation RYAN made a system of spies who were prepared to follow up on a second’s notification in the event that it was accepted that the US was beginning a war with the Soviet Union. The huge and expensive activity was inevitably downsized in 1984, just three years after it was set into movement.
At the point when the KGB wasn’t attempting to utilize spies to get their hands on the privileged insights of the US government, they were attempting to utilize banks.In the mid-1970s, the KGB concocted an arrangement to clandestinely purchase three US banks in Northern California as a component of a mystery activity to secure data on cutting edge organizations in the district. The three banks were picked by the KGB since they had recently made credits to innovation organizations. A large number of these organizations were shrunk by the US military, so the KGB wanted to catch US military innovation secrets.To pull the activity off, the KGB gotten an agent from Singapore named Amos Dawe to buy the banks for them without letting the US government get wind of the USSR’s fabulous arrangement to take innovation mysteries. Be that as it may, before the KGB could assume control over the banks, their buy was impeded by the CIA. The CIA had first learned of the plan when they saw that the Singaporean specialist’s cash was originating from a Soviet bank. Dawe had acquired a $50 million credit line from a Singapore part of Moscow’s Norodny Bank.
Racial pressures were intense in the US during the 1960s. Race riots encompassing the Civil Rights Movement were causing mass agitation the nation over. The KGB imagined that they could misuse this and aggravate it by initiating ill will or through and through savagery between racial gatherings in the US.The plan, called Operation PANDORA, started with the KGB spreading counterfeit flyers that had all the earmarks of being from the Jewish Defense League, a conservative Jewish political association currently characterized by the FBI as a fear based oppressor association. The flyers, which were really written by the KGB, guaranteed that dark Americans were assaulting Jews and plundering Jewish-possessed shops in New York. The phony handouts begged their perusers to battle against “dark crossbreeds.” The KGB at that point sent these enemy of dark flyers to dark activist gatherings, trusting it would mix hostile to Semitism operating at a profit associations, if not altogether violence.Concurrently, the KGB was additionally sending counterfeit letters to dark aggressor bunches which guaranteed that the Jewish Defense League had been focusing on and assaulting blacks in America. The letters beseeched the dark activists to assault the Jewish Defense League in reprisal. The Jewish Defense League’s pioneer, Meir Kahane, was killed a year later, however the demonstration was done by an Arabic man who was apparently detached to any dark activist groups.As some portion of their activity to mix racial agitation, the KGB additionally wanted to explode a dark school. After the school was besieged with a planted dangerous gadget, the KGB intended to make unknown calls to a progression of dark associations and guarantee that the Jewish Defense group had been behind the bombarding.
In spite of the fact that he was a socialist himself, Yugoslavia’s head of state Josip Broz Tito shockingly pulled in the rage of the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin specifically. Looking to make Yugoslavia increasingly autonomous and confident, Tito removed himself from both the United States and the USSR in a harsh clash known as the Tito-Stalin Split.Because of this, Stalin needed Tito to be killed and gotten the ancestor to the KGB, the MGB, to proceed with it. The USSR’s best mystery specialist was doled out to do Tito’s death. He had recently killed another adversary of Stalin’s—Leon Trotsky. Tito, in any case, supernaturally endure the death endeavors unscathed.In reaction to the death plots, Tito sent an admonition to Stalin: “Quit sending individuals to slaughter me. We’ve just caught five of them, one of them with a bomb and another with a rifle.” Tito likewise kept in touch with Stalin: “On the off chance that you don’t quit sending executioners, I’ll send one to Moscow and I won’t need to send a second.”When the MGB’s progressively regular death plots neglected to kill Tito, they got devilishly imaginative. They at that point attempted to kill him with his very own plague. They exceptionally structured a dangerous microscopic organisms and intended to discharge the plague at a political gathering that Tito would join in. Everybody in the room would have been slaughtered by the plague expect for the KGB specialist who was directing it, as he would have been inoculated beforehand.The KGB additionally planned a toxic substance gem box to attempt to execute Tito. The case would have been given to Tito as a blessing, a Trojan pony of sorts, and would discharge a lethal gas that would execute any individual who opened it. Luckily, both toxic substance plans were rarely done, and Tito outlasted Stalin by about 30 years, biting the dust in 1980 at age 87.
During the Cold War, the KGB turned out to be truly adept at pestering structures and tuning in on discussions. Truth be told, they were so acceptable at such listening in that they once pester a whole floor of a lodging with sound reconnaissance receivers . . . for 20 years.In the mid 1970s, the travel industry started to thrive in the Soviet satellite nation of Estonia. The USSR considered it to be a chance to carry cash into the battling economy, and the KGB considered it to be a chance to keep an eye on outsiders. In 1972, the KGB assumed control over the highest floor of Hotel Viru in Estonia and wired the vast majority of the lodging with modern sound observation gadgets. The lodging was in a zone that was as often as possible went by universal businessmen.Sixty rooms in the inn were for all time set up with mystery mouthpieces, and different rooms could be irritated immediately. Outwardly, Hotel Viru seemed to have 22 stories. In truth, it had the mystery 23rd floor, which housed KGB specialists and the innovation that they used to keep an eye on the entirety of the visitors at the lodging. The KGB stayed there for two decades, until the breakdown of the Soviet Union shut down the reconnaissance activity in 1991.The KGB has been found to have been utilizing staggeringly advanced sound observation innovation in structures far and wide. In 1945, a gathering of Soviet kids introduced the US envoy to the USSR a blessing, a cut wooden plaque of the Great Seal of the United States, as a demonstration of companionship between the two nations. Notwithstanding, the plaque contained a mystery receiver. Indeed, this bug was one of the main sound observation gadgets to utilize inactive innovation to transmit sound signs, making it imperceptible by customary strategies and permitting it to be utilized for an all-inclusive time of time.The irritated plaque permitted the KGB to tune in on discussions in the American minister’s office for almost seven years, until it was inadvertently recognized in 1952 by a British radio administrator. The radio administrator was confounded when he heard discussions between Americans originating from a radio channel close to the international safe haven. That radio channel was being utilized by the KGB to tune in on the private discussions.
After Yasir Arafat rose to control at the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), he built up a coalition with the KGB. The KGB at that point started to give mystery preparing to the PLO’s aggressors, who were waging war to savagely accomplish Palestinian statehood. Notwithstanding preparing, the KGB started to dispatch arms to the PLO guerrillas disregarding the ban put upon the Palestinian territories.Around this time, the PLO was completing numerous demonstrations of psychological warfare. In 1969 alone, they performed 82 carrier hijackings around the globe. The head of outside knowledge for the KGB, Aleksandr Sakharovsky, asserted that “plane seizing is my own invention.”The KGB likewise financed another Palestinian aggressor gathering, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLPF), providing them with rocket washes and automatic rifles. A pioneer of the PLPF, Wadie Haddad, was uncovered to be a KGB operator. While Haddad was accountable for the PLPF, he did different hijackings of regular citizen planes. One of those hijackings, the Dawson’s Field Hijackings of 1970, incited what’s known as Black September in Jordan, a wicked common war that kept going from September 1970 until July 1971.The KGB purportedly gave 100 assault rifles, programmed rifles, guns, and ammo to the Official Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1972. The Irish paramilitary gathering introduced probably the most savage demonstrations of viciousness and psychological warfare in the Northern Irish clash known as the Troubles. One explanation that the KGB and USSR looked into the IRA was on the grounds that they had turned Marxist and had started to help transforming Ireland into a socialist state.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
A look back: On Normannenstrasse in East Berlin, in the core of a standard white collar class neighborhood, stands a gigantic office complex: 41 solid structures as inauspiciously utilitarian as the condo towers that encompass them. Nine months prior it was the base camp of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security – the Staatsicherheit – or Stasi, maybe the most modern and sweeping undercover work association at any point made. Be that as it may, among January and March this year, as East Germany’s Communist Government at long last crumbled, the Stasi was officially disbanded. Today, the solid fortress is abandoned, its 10,000 rooms fixed, its operators bolted out.
From these dreary structures, 34,000 officials ran the Stasi’s 39 divisions. The staff included 2,100 operators alloted nonstop to perusing mail passed on from post workplaces and territorial Stasi base camp, 5,000 specialists liable for following suspects, and 6,000 agents whose solitary employment was tuning in to private phone discussions.
Primary Department VIII, otherwise called Observation, kept a nearby watch on residents through a broad system of sources in neighborhoods, schools, libraries and even service stations. Principle Department II – Counterintelligence – did electronic reconnaissance of outside ambassadors, specialists and writers and put spies in their workplaces, homes and lodgings. The Stasi even had a division to keep an eye on other Stasi individuals and sources.
”We are as yet getting stuns from what we discover,” says the movie producer Klaus Wendler, a representative for an East German Government advisory group that is currently filtering through the Stasi’s 5,000,000 documents. ”Performers had to keep an eye on individual artists, understudies were pressured into keeping an eye on companions, and youngsters were tricked into keeping an eye on their folks.”
With the disbanding of the Stasi, 85,000 full-time officials lost their positions essentially for the time being. Close to 10,000 have since discovered productive business, a large portion of them in different Government services, remembering 2,000 for the Ministry of the Interior, which some time ago administered the Stasi. The rest have joined the developing positions of East Germany’s jobless; some make due with standard joblessness benefits, while others get no Government remuneration by any stretch of the imagination. Many are upset at ending up barred, even alienated, by their kindred residents.
Abroad, the greater part of the Stasi’s 2,500 profession officials in consulates and missions no longer have a covert operative central command to answer to, and its untold a large number of independent covert government agents no longer get cash from their previous experts. West German insight officials gauge that there are exactly 5,000 agents in West Germany today, 500 of them ”top operators.” Eighty of those are thought to have entered the most elevated echelons of the military and Government, West German authorities state, including knowledge offices.
In spite of emotional political changes in Europe, West German insight authorities dread that not every one of these covert agents have changed their loyalties. Exceptionally restrained and still covert, some are as yet gathering and transferring data to Soviet knowledge organs, the West Germans accept. Others, they think, are essentially sticking around for their chance, holding back to be enacted.
The Stasi has for some time been perceived as one of the best insight benefits on the planet, in a similar alliance as those of Israel and France. By the by, in the course of the most recent seven months, West German and American knowledge authorities have been astounded to find the size of its outside tasks, arranged until his retirement three years prior by the scandalous Markus Wolf. Until 1979, Western knowledge operators didn’t have a present photo of ”the man without a face.” But as of late he has ventured out from the shadows. Today, a smash hit creator, Wolf talks uninhibitedly of his effective infiltration of the West German insight and military over a time of over 30 years. What he doesn’t talk about is psychological oppression.
Over the most recent two months, frightening disclosures have become visible specifying the Stasi’s connects to an assortment of fear based oppressor gatherings, quite the extreme left Red Army Faction, eight of whose individuals were captured in June. With the assistance of the Stasi, they had been given new personalities and occupations in East Germany in the wake of doing psychological militant activities in the 1970’s and 80’s. The Stasi has additionally been ensnared in the Libyan-coordinated bombarding of the La Belle disco in West Germany in 1986: According to new data from witnesses and held onto documents, Stasi operators helped transport the explosives to West Berlin that brought about the passings of two American fighters.
In East Germany, as well, the Stasi, albeit formally nonexistent, stays a danger. In late June, new divulgences uncovered that in 1986, as the Soviet Union started changing its general public and the East German economy kept on decaying, the Stasi, predicting turmoil – however not the finish of the divider – set in excess of 2,000 individuals from a world class mystery team into the most significant levels of East German Government divisions, organizations and colleges. Another 500 government agents were dispatched to West Germany. East German authorities state that a large portion of them are still set up, their characters obscure, and suspect that they are compelled to hold up out any political disturbance.
Insight authorities are in a race to carry the most exceedingly terrible guilty parties to equity before they go for all time underground or sign up with new bosses. The pursuit is suggestive, says one American ambassador in Berlin, of a period in the no so distant past: ”Ferreting out the government operatives, psychological oppressors and Stasi operators is comparable to the quest for the Nazis and their teammates after they endeavored to vanish into German culture toward the finish of the war.”
On Friday morning, only 48 hours from money related unification on July 1, East Berlin is bursting at the seams with energy. Global camera teams and columnists have attacked the city to catch the beginning of another time. Be that as it may, in his office, just strides from the Volkskammer, or Parliament, Peter-Michael Diestel, East Germany’s 38-year-old Interior Minister, ponders the insult inheritance of the past. ”My crucial,” says just, ”is to destroy the Stasi.”
That assignment has tumbled to an impossible competitor: a previous dairy animals draining victor, weight lifter (he can seat press 420 pounds) and infrequent legal counselor who accepted the position of Interior Minister to a great extent in light of the fact that nobody else needed it.
Diestel, a local of Leipzig, has been occupied since getting to work in April. He has enrolled the collaboration of huge quantities of previous Stasi officials and, utilizing data from witnesses and Stasi records, has attempted to acquire ”independent” agents, either by extending to them employment opportunities or persuading them that the Stasi is done. He has gone along key data on fear mongers and sources to West German knowledge offices, and helped organize the capture in June of the Red Army Faction psychological oppressors. At last, Diestel built up the Stasi’s complicity in the La Belle disco bombarding.
Diestel is exploring a forlorn course, subject to furious assaults from both the left and right in East Germany, extraordinary weight from West German authorities, and week after week requires his acquiescence by the German Social Union, a traditionalist gathering in East Germany’s overseeing alliance. Due to day by day dangers against his life, the police monitor his significant other and three little youngsters nonstop. Says Peter Pragal, East Berlin reporter for the week by week magazine Stern: ”He has the hardest activity in Germany, East or West.”
Other than its full-time officials, selected from the best and most brilliant in East German culture, the Stasi had 150,000 dynamic sources and 500,000 to 2 million low maintenance witnesses in East Germany. Its land property alone – including the huge fortresslike complex in East Berlin and Stasi’s in excess of 2,000 structures, homes, dugouts, havens, medical clinics, and resorts all through East Germany – have been esteemed in the billions of dollars. Up until this point, Government agents attempting to take stock of the Stasi have counted 23,000 vehicles and trucks and 250,000 weapons, including submachine firearms, guns, rifles and explosive launchers.
The productive Stasi machine accumulated broad dossiers on in excess of 5 million East Germans – 33% of the populace – that included data as close as sexual propensities and as everyday as books settled up with the library. A great many calls were recorded; condos were pester and unlawfully looked (the Stasi would orchestrate to have suspects kept late at their employments). One protester as of late found that a small scale listening gadget fit for transmitting three miles had been sewn into his jacket neckline.
Residents were powerless against the Stasi’s Orwellian interruption whenever and anyplace – in their condos, industrial facilities, houses of worship, cafés, libraries, specialists’ workplaces, rooms, even on their excursions abroad. In some East German urban communities, each bit of mail was opened in exceptional steam rooms joined to the post workplaces.
At the point when East German soccer groups ventured out to play coordinates in West Germany, Stasi specialists obliged busloads of fans, checking whether any East German sat close to a West German, showed a West German banner or sang the West German national song of praise.
Up and down the a large number of miles of East German expressway, Stasi specialists acted like corner store chaperons, servers and travelers, cautiously taking note of whether East Germans left their vehicles close to Western vehicles or conveyed dubiously overwhelming baggage.
The Stasi made it basically incomprehensible for East Germans not to work together. Each field operator needed to convey in any event 25 new sources or start 25 examinations consistently. Residents who declined to help were either set apart as subversives or left to adapt to the administration independent. ”You were unable to go anyplace in East German culture except if you could pull the correct strings,” says Hasso Von Samson, a spokesman for West Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution. ”But I guess that’s what happens when they take away your enemy.”
This article reflects the situation in Germany in 1990.
Since then the top spies are still in touch with each other and form a dangerous network which is similiar to the Cosa Nostra in the USA and/or Sicily, the Yakuza in Japan, the Russian Mafia and the Chinese Triads.
The only distinction: The German STASI has learned the code of Omerta and operates in the dark – within the government, the Gauck administration, the Bundestag, the left party, the legal system as judges, attorney and prosecutors, the police and also in the German security and intelligence services.
And last not but least as undercover agents and informer for former KGB spy Wladimir Putin, now Russia’s ruler like former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, former STASI agent Matthias Warnig and the Gazprom and North Stream – Energy connection.
It is a taboo until now.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Effectively scandalous for the self-assertive, distrustful oppression of their own residents, the Soviet Union likewise pursued a horrendous undercover work war against the Catholic Church and its supporters. From the mistreatment of neighborhood ministers to a death request against Pope John Paul II, the KGB saw Catholicism as a danger to security in Eastern Europe and regarded the Church as a foe of the State.
Lifetime writer and previous U.S. Armed force Intelligence Officer John Koehler has composed the complete book on this surprising history. Utilizing at no other time seen records and transcripts, including subtleties of how the KGB, Gorbachev, and the Politburo upheld and empowered the 1981 death endeavor against Pope John Paul II, Koehler illustrates the Soviet system of spies and sleeper specialists, from Dominican priests to Vatican secretaries, who helped the KGB penetrate the Church’s framework even in network areas. Be that as it may, what is frequently most great is the extraordinary mental fortitude of ordinary adherents who offered safe house and assurance to abused ministers, in spite of the threat of their own capture or execution.
The KGB’s endeavors to cleanse the Soviet Union of the Church’s “conspiratorial impact” would inevitably blowback. The mutual feeling of solidarity that created because of these assaults, exacerbated with the horde of complaints welcomed on by many years of severe Soviet guideline, would finish in the introduction of the Solidarity development after a visit by the Pope in 1979. This uncommon history of the Soviet Union’s virus war against the Catholic Church is a fundamental and significant commitment to crafted by twentieth century history.
Investigation into the Cold War endeavors by Soviet and East European Communist forces to penetrate the Vatican and upset its populist impact.
Writer and previous Army knowledge official Koehler (Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police, 1999) mines reports acquired from the documents of the East German and Hungarian mystery police, just as Moscow’s Politburo, to construct the account of a continued exertion over decades to dull the intensity of the counter socialist Roman Church in communist nations. Following the Soviet oust in Russia, the creator asserts, the progressive chamber may have planted its first covert agent against the Catholic Church in that nation as ahead of schedule as 1922. Cleanses and even executions of pastors followed, saving no Christian organization from the start, yet when the Soviets later cut an arrangement with the Russian Orthodoxy it made a fracture that truly drove the Roman church underground by 1941. As the Cold War continued, the Russian KGB got a significant knowledge report on the Vatican’s “Ostpolitik” arrangement—to oppose the concealment of strict opportunity in Eastern Europe and bolster hostile to communist developments—by means of the Polish specialists. The Soviet utilization of administrative operators, many Polish, turned into a normal danger, countered by the Vatican’s estimates which at one point incorporated an American Jesuit cleric who turned into the Vatican’s top covert agent catcher. The two sides every so often “turned” each other’s operators to twofold specialists. The CIA turned out to be effectively included, especially during the Reagan organization, utilizing the Vatican as an insight asset yet additionally as a “release” focus to take care of chosen data to Moscow. Koehler tirelessly tracks the story as the decades progressed, yet the account is over-burden with realities and short on emotional pressure.
The overwhelming dependence on authentic archives grants minimal human dramatization and sabotages the interest the creator regularly exaggerates.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Between 1981 and 1989 the foreign intelligence branches of the Soviet KGB and the East German Ministry of State Security launched a combined effort to develop a system for detecting signs of an impending western nuclear first strike. Codenamed “Project RYaN”, this early-warning system constituted one part of the Soviet response to the perceived threat of a surprise “decapitation” strike by NATO nuclear forces.
233 pages of documents from the Stasi’s Hauptverwaltung A and analysis by Bernd Schaefer, Nate Jones, and Benjamin Fischer below give unprecedented insight into the capabilities and fears of the Eastern Bloc intelligence services from the Able Archer ’83 War Scare to the end of the Cold War.
Introduction to the Collection
In November 2012 CWIHP published e-Dossier No. 37 on the cooperation between the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS or Stasi), which highlighted a wide array of German documents dating from the 1960s through 1989. These materials were introduced by Walter Süss and Douglas Selvage, historians in the research division of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU) in Berlin.[1] While e-Dossier No.37 featured just one document[2] on Soviet/East German preparations to detect a surprise Western “nuclear missile attack” (RYAN or Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie/Ракетно ядерное нападение in Russian) from August 1984, the BStU research division added a substantial number of German Stasi documents on RYAN to its online collection in 2013.[3] These new materials are remarkable and add to our understanding of the intentions, scope, and duration of the Soviet RYAN project; all of them are available in translation today in the CWHIP Digital Archive. The follow e-Dossier includes detailed comments and analysis on their significance by Nate Jones, a nuclear expert at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C., and Benjamin Fischer, a retired CIA officer and veteran researcher of RYAN and the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” of November 1983.
The August 1984 record of bilateral Stasi-KGB conversations, written by East German foreign intelligence spy chief Markus Wolf, includes an apt summarization of RYAN’s purpose by the Soviet representative: “The need for such approaches derives from the fact that a multitude of measures undertaken by the adversary do not allow advance determination which variation to launch a war the adversary will choose. In addition, we need to integrate experiences from analyzing the enemy’s crisis management into a process of further perfecting the definition of indicators to detect the adversary’s main measures for its acute war preparation.”[4]
It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war
It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war. The KGB operated an intelligence network to monitor worldwide “indicators” to detect to assess the likelihood of a “surprise nuclear missile attacked” launched by NATO. Soviet assessments of the likelihood of such an attack differed over the years, peaking between 1982 and 1984.
Whether such fears were warranted given the actual activities of the United States and NATO is disputed. Historians and analysts have differed in their assessments of partially declassified American sources, archival materials from Eastern European and Soviet archives, post-1990 oral histories from Russia, and memories of former actors, such as prominent KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky. Some consider the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” or “War Scare” of November 1983 to be the most dangerous event of the Cold War next to the Cuban Missile Crisis, while others view it in a much less dramatic fashion.[5]
The bulk of newly available Stasi and KGB documentation on RYAN from the BStU Archives in Berlin does not address Able Archer 83. However, it casts an unprecedented light on Stasi and KGB perspectives since 1984, as well as on the operational details, structure, and scope of the RYAN project. The collection includes a KGB catalogue from 1984/85 that, in excruciating detail, outlines the 292 indicators that might precede a potential “surprise nuclear missile attack.” Many of them refer to activities in and around Washington offices and buildings, including the White House parking lot. The collection also includes summaries of monthly KGB reports up to April 1989, which list possible global indicators of preparations for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” These records tell us that hundreds of KGB officers were assigned to work on the RYAN program and a special division was created inside the KGB exclusively for this purpose. Combined with earlier published Stasi documents on the Soviet shoot down of KAL 007 in September 1983 (in which Soviet intelligence’s inability to determine whether the airliner was military or civilian before it was shot down was identified as a serious problem[6]), these new RYAN materials provide ample evidence of comprehensive Soviet efforts to avoid and thwart a “surprise attack.”
While hindsight shows that Soviet fears were exaggerated, the level of Soviet and East German anxiety over Western intentions, particularly during the first Reagan administration, is noteworthy. On the other hand, many Stasi documents on RYAN read like overbearing bureaucratic exercises, aimed at comprehensiveness and perfection on paper, but unattainable in practice. Phrasing in some of the Stasi materials implies that there probably was some skepticism in higher Stasi echelons about the program’s effectiveness and the Soviet approach (though it did not deter the Stasi from contributing more substantive efforts than any other fraternal socialist intelligence service towards identifying indicators).
Still, it does not seem far-fetched that Soviet anxieties were enhanced by the ensuing and ever expanding RYAN program and fed into Moscow’s shift towards disarmament policies under Mikhail Gorbachev. Strangely enough, the KGB’s RYAN project had acquired such a life of its own that its operational routines continued all the way through the first half of 1989, regardless of changes in Soviet-American relations and disarmament efforts during the second Reagan and the early Bush I administration.
Was RYaN simply a “ vicious cycle of intelligence collection and assessment” as described by Oleg Gordievsky? While Gordievsky’s word choice is debatable, these new documents put a certain amount of Soviet “circular reasoning” on full display.
The Vicious Circle of Intelligence
Oleg Gordievsky, the spy who revealed the existence of Operation RYaN –RYaN (РЯН) is the Russian acronym for Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie (Ракетно ядерное нападение), or “nuclear missile attack”– described it as “a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment.” During the last decade of the Cold War, Soviet intelligence operatives abroad were “required to report alarming information” to Moscow about a Western surprise nuclear strike, “even if they themselves were skeptical of it.” After the Moscow Center received these inflated and incorrect –but requested– reports of Western preparations for a surprise nuclear strike, it became “duly alarmed by what they reported and demanded more.” Now, documents newly released by the Cold War International History Project and the Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic (BStU), provide unprecedented insight into the “vicious circle of intelligence” of Operation RYaN. And, in a development never envisaged by the documents’ authors, they now present historians with comprehensive, real-time monthly RYaN reports from Soviet intelligence operatives abroad as they witnessed and catalogued the Cold War’s end.[7]
In 1979 the Institute for Intelligence Problems, coordinated by the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, was tasked to work on “the development of new intelligence concepts” that could provide preliminary warning of Western preparations for a first strike. The result of this work was the creation of Operation RYaN, which was secretly announced in May of 1981.[8] At a major KGB conference in Moscow, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov, then Chairman of the KGB, justified the creation of Operation RYaN because, they claimed, the United States was “actively preparing for nuclear war” against the Soviet Union and its allies. According to a newly released Stasi report, the primary “Chekist work” discussed in the May 1981 meeting was the “demand to allow for ‘no surprise.’”[9]
The establishment of Operation RYaN has also been corroborated by KGB annual reports from 1981 and 1982, previously published by the National Security Archive. The 1981 annual report states that the KGB had “implemented measures to strengthen intelligence work in order to prevent a possible sudden outbreak of war by the enemy.” To do this, the KGB “actively obtained information on military and strategic issues, and the aggressive military and political plans of imperialism [the United States] and its accomplices,” and “enhanced the relevance and effectiveness of its active intelligence abilities.”[10]
The 1982 annual report confirmed Soviet fears of Western encirclement, and noted the challenges of countering the “U.S. and NATO aspirations to change the existing military-strategic balance.” Therefore, “[p]rimary attention was paid to military and strategic issues related to the danger of the enemy’s thermonuclear attack.” This Soviet unease was spurred by the pending November 1983 deployment of Pershing II and Gryphon Cruise missiles, whose short flight times and long range changed the nuclear balance by threatening Soviet nuclear command and control with decapitation.[11]
The first comprehensive account of the details of Operation RYaN remains a Top Secret February 1983 telegram from KGB Headquarters Moscow to the London KGB Residency entitled “Permanent operational assignment to uncover NATO preparations for a nuclear missile attack on the USSR,” with enclosed instructions on how to report on indicators pointing toward a nuclear sneak attack. This document was published in full in 1991 by Soviet double agent Oleg Gordievsky and British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew in Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985.
Above: M113 armored personnel carriers move through the town of Stockhausen (Herbstein) during REFORGER ’83 in Germany.
“The objective of the assignment is to see that the Residency works systematically to uncover any plans in preparation by the main adversary [USA] for RYaN and to organize continual watch to be kept for indications of a decision being taken to use nuclear weapons against the USSR or immediate preparations being made for a nuclear missile attack.”
Attached to the telegram was a list of seven “immediate” and thirteen “prospective” tasks for the agents to complete and report. These included: the collection of data on potential places of evacuation and shelter, an appraisal of the level of blood held in blood banks, observation of places where nuclear decisions were made and where nuclear weapons were stored, observation of key nuclear decision makers, observation of lines of communication, reconnaissance of the heads of churches and banks, and surveillance of security services and military installations.
Regrettably, however, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions included a facsimile reproduction of only the first page of this document. The additional pages were translated and typeset into English with no Russian corroboration of their authenticity. Nevertheless, the KGB annual reports, as well as documents from other former Eastern Bloc (Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian) archives, and now these Stasi documents, help to substantiate Gordievsky’s accounts.[12]
The newly released Stasi documents on RYaN show that East German Intelligence did not begin conducting RYaN collection activities until years after the Soviets began. A January 1983 “brief note” describes initial Stasi preparations for creation of systematic RYaN intelligence collection and reporting, but acknowledges “[f]urther questions had to be straightened out.” [13] At the February 9th high-level meeting in Moscow, Stasi head Erich Mielke told KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov that, “consultations have to be continued.” Chebrikov replied, “The work is definitely not finalized.”[14] In August of 1984, the Soviet and East German intelligence agencies were still discussing how, exactly, “to approach conceptual, organizational, and practical aspects when dealing with the RYaN problem.”[15]
In fact, German collection and analysis of RYaN information did not begin in earnest until early 1985, according to the February 15, 1985, Order Number 1/85 which directed that “all options” be utilized to detect Western “military aggression, particularly a surprise nuclear missile attack” by observing non-socialist states and West Berlin in a “systematic and targeted manner.”[16] While systematic Stasi RYaN collection and analysis did not commence until well after the end of what has become known as the “1983 War Scare,” these newly released documents do contain insights about the danger of the era, which will be discussed below.
Above: Order Number 1/85
The documents also provide unprecedented operational details about RYaN, including its size, the importance of East German intelligence to the Soviets, the use of computers for RYaN collection, and the 292 indicators that some Eastern Bloc intelligence experts believed could be used to detect a nuclear attack.
For the first time, historians have access to hard numbers about the size of Operation RYaN, revealing that within the KGB, 300 positions were created so that RYaN operatives could implement the real-time “transmission and evaluation” of reported indicators showing the likelihood of a Western first strike. In July of 1984, KGB chairman Victor Chebrikov created a new division within the First Department (Information) of the KGB’s First Main Directorate (responsible for foreign intelligence and operations) to implement Operation RYaN throughout the KGB and world. This coordinating division was composed of 50 KGB officers.[17]
The documents further acknowledge that the Stasi was the KGB’s primary source of foreign intelligence. In July 1981, Andropov thanked Stasi head Erich Mielke for providing information on “West German tank production, defense technology, and the NATO manual [as of now the contents of this manual is unknown].” Andropov then complemented the Stasi, lauding, “We rate your information very highly,” and forebodingly requested Stasi sources procure “an assessment of the NATO manual and NATO’s preparations for war.”[18] In September 1983, Deputy Chairman of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov told Stasi head Erich Mielke that although Andropov was officially on vacation in the Southern USSR, it was “no actual vacation… For half the day he is reading information, including ours [KGB] and what we received from you.” In December 1986, KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov wrote Stasi head Erich Mielke to thank him for the “tangible results in this extremely important area [Operation RYaN].” He emphasized that the KGB “highly value[d] the contribution of the MfS of the GDR to the joint efforts on timely recognition of the danger of a sudden attack.”[19]
There are also references to the primitive computer system that the Soviet Union was attempting to use to track and calculate the coalition of world forces, including the risk of nuclear war. The KGB reported to the Stasi that it had “revised its planning for scientific-technological research and industrial procurement” of new “reliably working technology.” Gordievsky had earlier reported of “a large computer model in the Min[istry] of Defense to calculate and monitor the correlation of forces, including mili[tary], economy, [and] psychological factors, to assign numbers and relative weights.”[20] On November 23, 1983, US Defense and Intelligence officials circulated an article entitled, “In pursuit of the Essence of War” that described a Soviet method which “cataloged and computerized” the world’s “correlation of forces.” The results, it claimed, were “highly objective, empirically provable and readily adaptable to modern data processing.”[21] The newly released documents show that the East Germans were skeptical of Soviet computing prowess, however: past “Soviet experiences show us that a danger exists of computer application concepts not getting implemented,” snidely wrote Marcus Wolf.[22]
Computer analysis was desired because the amount of information captured during Operation RYaN was massive. The newly released Stasi documents provide far more detail than Gordievsky’s account of the precise indicators that human intelligence collectors were compiling and analyzing (such as: activity at Defense instillations, the location of prominent political officials, and even the treatment of “the most important government documents at the US National Archives”). In October 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Kryuchkov revealed that the First Directorate’s Institute for Intelligence Problems[23] had compiled seven binders full of possible RYaN indicators.[24] By May of 1986, these binders had evolved into a catalogue of 292 indicators of “signs of tension.”[25] The Stasi reported that 226 indicators (77 percent) were able to be “covered, though to varying degree.” The indicators were organized into five main categories: Political, Military, Intelligence Services, Civil Defense Agencies, and the Economic sector. A read through the newly released full catalogue of RYaN indicators (as opposed to the truncated list published by Gordievsky) makes the program appear more rational and effective than has previously been portrayed.[26] Just one telling example is the fact that RYaN watchers had sniffed out the US Continuity of Government program, discovering and surveilling “two presidential planes… equipped with accelerated speed [and] electronic apparatuses which work under conditions of nuclear weapons use.”[27] These planes were where the president and his emergency cabinet would command during a nuclear war.
RYaN watchers were also instructed to watch for the “preparation and conduct of large-scale exercises,” because they increased “the level of combat-readiness of US strategic forces,” and hence, could indicate intentions for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” When Gordievsky disclosed Operation RYaN he also revealed Able Archer 83, a November 1983 NATO command post nuclear release exercise that he claims Soviet intelligence may have miscalculated as an actual nuclear strike.[28]
The RYaN catalogue noted several indicators that would have occurred during Able Archer 83 (and other NATO exercises), including: the “large scale transfer of US armed forces” by C-5A and C-141 aircraft (16,000 troops were transferred from the US to Europe on radio silent flights during Autumn Forge 83, which included Able Archer 83); “preparation of anti-ABC [atomic-biological-chemical] protective gear” and mobilization (during Able Archer 83 the war gamers donned ABC equipment and transferred to an Alternate War Headquarters in response to simulated chemical attacks); and, perhaps most importantly, “significant changes in communications” including “transmittal of orders to deploy nuclear weapons” (on October 17-21 1983, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe school in Oberammergau, West Germany trained more than 50 NATO officers on new nuclear weapons release procedures which utilized a new format that was practiced for the first time during Able Archer 83).[29]
Another eyebrow-raising, though certainly not dispositive, reference to Able Archer 83 can be found in these documents. On November 7, the day Able Archer 83 began, an East German Major General (whose name is illegible) sent a summary of discussions between Stasi foreign intelligence chief Marcus Wolf and Deputy KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov to Major General Damm. Gordievsky has written that on November 8 or 9, he “was not sure which,” flash telegrams were sent to both KGB and GRU residencies in Western Europe reporting “an alert on US bases.” The flash telegrams “clearly implied that one of several possible explanations for the (non-existent) alert was that the countdown to a nuclear first strike had actually begun.”[30]
Perhaps relatedly, the East German documents also reveal a persistent undercurrent of skepticism and concern about the effectiveness of Operation RYaN. In August of 1984, Lev Shapkin, deputy director of the KGB for foreign intelligence, told Marcus Wolf that reforms to Operation RYaN were underway. Though no faulty reporting by Operation RYaN during Able Archer 83 was mentioned in the meeting, the two intelligence officials clearly were worried that false warnings of a Western nuclear first strike could lead to preemptive actions by Soviet nuclear forces. Shapkin told Wolf that the indicators agents were observing and reporting “must be complemented, revised, and made more precise,” and bemoaned “the problem of not getting deceived” by faulty indicators. He reiterated that “clear-headedness about the entire RYAN complex” was a “mandatory requirement.” Marcus Wolf included his concerns in an addendum to the summary of the meetings, stressing the need to know the “actual situation” rather than the picture presented by Operation RYaN’s indicators. “Constant and ongoing assessments,” he sensibly wrote, “have to be made whether certain developments actually constitute a crisis or not.”[31]
The documents contained in this release include one final invaluable resource for historians: monthly Soviet intelligence summaries (translated from Russian to German, and now, to English) spanning August 1986 to April 1989. The monthly summaries, serving a purpose likely never imagined by their drafters, allow us to see how Soviet intelligence witnessed and reported the peaceful ending of the Cold War. The reports, which mirror the above RYaN format, are thorough and include much reporting on the West still officially classified in the United States. This includes reports on the operational readiness of Pershing II, MX, and Trident missiles at specific bases, and US military activities in Nicaragua, Panama, and Iran/Iraq. They also include comprehensive reporting of NATO drills and maneuvers. The Soviet observers reported of Able Archer 87, for example, that NATO “simulated” the switch from peace to war time; nuclear consultations were practiced “in the context of the exercise.” Regrettably, no November 1983 RYaN report is yet available for historians to observe if the reporting on Able Archer 83 was as couched and nuanced as it was four years later.
The task of following CWIHP and the BStU’s lead and finding these earlier RYaN reports now falls to archivists and archival burrowers in other former Soviet states now liberalized.[32]
Finally, these monthly RYaN reports about the Cold War’s peaceful resolution reflect the strangeness of the nuclear superpower rivalry itself. The absurd logic of the Cold War becomes evident when one reads about the NATO “elimination of intermediate and tactical nuclear missiles” in a September 1987 report incongruently entitled, “On the Results of Intelligence Activities to Report Indicators for a Sudden Nuclear Missile Attack.”
Comments on the Soviet-East German Intelligence Alert
A real contribution
The BStU documents contain important information about both the Soviet intelligence alert RYAN and its East German counterpart KWA (Kernwaffenangriff or nuclear-weapons attack) during the 1980s. On several accounts, we owe Douglas Selvege a debt of gratitude for locating and disseminating the new tranche. First, no Soviet records have become available since former KGB officer (and British agent) Oleg Gordievsky published a selection of RYAN cables almost a quarter of a century ago, and it is unlikely that Russia will declassify new sources. Most commentators, I myself the most culpable, were mesmerized by both the stark tone of both the cables and Gordievsky’s various accounts of the “war scare.” A more balanced interpretation is now possible. Second, the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) and especially its foreign intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung A (Main Directorate A, hereafter HV A), played a major role in the alert system documented here for the first time. For many years, the only information on the East German side was Markus Wolf’s memoir (1997), which some researchers considered a reliable and original source while others did not. Wolf, however, couched his brief account, referring only to RYAN, not KWA. He apparently expected that HV A records would never see the light of day. There was good reason to do so, since most files were destroyed on the eve of German unification.[33] Though skeptical about the purpose and priority of the Soviet intelligence alert, Wolf nevertheless saluted and obeyed KGB orders. The MfS/HV A organized an elaborate early-warning system (Früherkennung/Frühwarnsystem) that replicated and, to some degree, exceeded its Soviet counterpart.
Wolf occupied a much higher position than Gordievsky in the Warsaw Pact intelligence community. The spymaster was closer to the real center of power in Moscow, was a keen observer of both superpowers, and his agents in the West— especially inside NATO provided insights that countered the ideological stereotype of the “inherent aggressiveness” of the Western alliance. Moreover, his view may have been in line with the actual perceptions of his Soviet masters.
Yuri Andropov was the leading proponent of RYAN. He inaugurated the alert in 1981 as chairman of the KGB and presided over its expansion after succeeding Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary the next year. In May 1981, during a private conversation with Wolf’s boss, State Security Minister Erich Mielke, Andropov assessed the Reagan administration’s plans for accelerated modernization of strategic and theater-nuclear forces:
The US is preparing for war, but it is not willing to start a war. They are not building factories and palaces in order to destroy them. They are striving for military superiority in order to “check” us and then declare “checkmate” against us without starting a war. Maybe I am wrong.[34]
Andropov added that Washington had abandoned détente because it benefited the USSR at the expense of the US—in words that echoed Ronald Reagan’s condemnation of détente as a “one-way” street! Now the US was trying to recover its losses by reverting to the earlier policy of containment, in other words, to the old Cold War.
Two years later, facing the prospect of deployment of new US Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, Andropov addressed a meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee. The missiles were the “most serious challenge,” he said, and the military situation was “especially dangerous.” In the past, the US had counted on its nuclear weapons “to deter” and “to contain” the Soviet Union; now there was talk of actually fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war.[35] “It is difficult to say where the line between extortion and actual preparation to take a fateful step lies.”[36]
Andropov stopped short of declaring that war was imminent or unavoidable. In his public statements, however, he spoke as if the world was on the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Soviet propagandists compared Reagan to Hitler and the US to Nazi Germany on the eve of 1941. Less than a month after Andropov’s speech, the KGB dispatched a cable that sounded the alarm, asserting that RYAN “now lies at the core of [Soviet] military strategy;” the intelligence alert had become a military alert.[37]
Another “cut” at the question of leadership thinking on the prospect of war comes from a Politburo meeting in May 1983. Acknowledging that the US cruise and ballistic missiles would arrive on schedule, Andropov turned to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for an assessment of US intentions. Gromyko replied: “The United States, as is known, is talking about the fact that they can only strike in response to aggression. I think that without enough reason they wouldn’t dare to use nuclear missiles.” He added that, in any event, NATO’s pluralist structure would act as brake on the US: “Against the first strike are also Canada, England, France, and West Germany.”
The Alert Ramps Up
The Soviets were nervous but not to the point of shaking in their boots. RYAN did not, as Gordievsky claimed, begin to wind down in mid-1984, on the eve of his departure from London and after he had lost access to KGB cable traffic. It ramped up. KGB officer Lev Shapkin briefed the East Germans on a series of decisions made to expand RYAN and to create an infrastructure to support it.[38] The KGB formed a new division within the First (information/analysis) Department of the First Chief (foreign intelligence) Directorate (FCD). It was a situation center or watch office designed to collect and assess warning indicators and levy requirements on the FCD’s operations divisions and signals intelligence (Sigint) department.
The new division was a high priority and was almost certainly initiated by Andropov. The formation of a special RYAN commission chaired by KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov underscored the alert’s top-level political backing and its bureaucratic clout. Chebrikov earmarked 300 slots for the new RYAN division, 50 of which had been filled to monitor warning indications around the clock. However, the KGB had trouble finding qualified personnel and training officers to perform “warning-and-indications of war intelligence,” as it is referred to by US intelligence services. This is one of several signs that the Soviets, even in this late stage of the Cold War, had little or no experience with early-warning intelligence.
RYAN was launched in May 1981 during an All-Union Conference of senior KGB managers from the length and breadth of the USSR. Andropov chaired it, but the presence of Leonid Brezhnev signified that the session was no routine gabfest. Gordievsky’s accounts give the impression that RYAN was the sole item on the agenda. It was not.
The East German documents show that the conference discussed a range of threats, referred to as “surprises,” emanating from within the USSR and the Eastern bloc, as well as from the international arena. The KGB chieftains were instructed to reorient their collection priorities toward early detection and advance warning of potential or impending crises that threatened the internal security and stability, as well as external security, of the Soviet empire. As KGB officer [full name unknown] Zinyov told the East Germans, the new operational directive was to “allow no surprises.” The mission of “Chekist work,” he added, now encompassed “the struggle against espionage and terror, questions of the economy, morale, the construction industry, etc.”[39]
Subsequently, FCD chief Vladimir Kryuchkov confided to Wolf that even foreign intelligence had been drawn into novel operations aimed at detecting threats to internal security originating from outside the USSR.[40] The MfS and HV A followed suit. “The bunker mentality of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] leadership revealed itself in the mantra-like repetition ‘impede every surprise from the enemy in every area.’”[41] This originally meant external military threats, i.e., the war scare, but then it expanded to include a range of dangers posed by domestic dissidence—religious, pacifist, and environmental groups, e.g.—allegedly supported by the West. The “most urgent” mission of the MfS, as well as the HV A, was to detect this conflation of internal and external “surprises” and to “prophylactically” deal with them before they grew to threaten the GDR regime.
Wolf’s repeated assertion that his service had nothing to do with the Stasi police-state was false. Like his counterpart Kryuchkov, Wolf followed orders. HV A case officers and their agents were tasked with collecting intelligence on internal threats emanating from abroad, even at the expense of conventional foreign intelligence inside the GDR and in the “Operations Area” (Stasi-deutsch for West Germany, West Berlin, and other NATO countries). The HV A began filing counterintelligence reports (Abwerberichte)—normally the provenance of the MfS internal security and surveillance departments—which contributed to increased repression in the GDR.[42]
The MfS/HV A was the largest and most efficient Eastern bloc security/foreign intelligence service outside the Soviet Union. Its operational assets were considerable and in several respects exceeded those of the KGB, especially the massive MfS signals intelligence (Sigint) main directorate and the HV A’s extensive agent (Humint) networks that targeted West Germany/West Berlin and the US and NATO presence there.[43] Following the expansion of RYAN in mid-July, the KGB used the MfS/HV A to replicate its own organizational and operational model for early-warning intelligence.
This new collection includes one of the two key documents on KWA, Mielke’s Order Nr. 1/85, which mandated it as “the absolute priority” [emphasis in original] for the entire MfS.[44] The Order authorized Wolf, in his capacity as deputy MfS head, to formulate and implement an organizational plan and operational directives for the entire MfS. The second document[45] is not included in the collection, but several years ago I translated and commented on both documents.[46] The main components of the HV A’s early-warning system included:[47]
The focal point of Soviet and East German collaboration was the compilation of a list or “catalog” of warning-of-war indicators designed to detect signs of an impending crisis or war “in real time.” The KGB demanded that the HV A catalog should be based on “strict conformity” with the RYAN template, i.e., on the five “political/societal areas” noted above.
Above: Cover page from the HA III copy of the Project RYaN catalog of indicators.
MfS/HV A records reveal that both services devoted considerable effort to conceptualizing, defining, and operationalizing warning indicators, yet they also seemed to have encountered problems that were never fully resolved. The main objective was agent penetration of “the enemy’s decision-making centers” and acquisition of “documents” on a political decision for war. The Soviet-East German intelligence reach, however, exceeded its grasp. The overriding goal was to obtain advance warning of a US decision to launch strategic nuclear forces, an urgent requirement since one-third of those forces remained on permanent alert, and the rest could be readied on short notice. A 1986 HV A report noted that “at the moment” this had not been accomplished.[51]
The second string to the RYAN/KWA bow was an extensive list of indirect indicators that, it was assumed, would reveal the implementation of alert procedures and mobilization plans that could not be concealed from intelligence surveillance and monitoring. The KGB and HV A were forced to resort to “observable intelligence,” i.e., things that can be seen and counted, in lieu of “message-like” intelligence, which relies on well-placed agents with access to plans, decisions, and intentions.[52] RYAN/KWA signified that the neither the KGB nor the HV A had such agents in place. The questionable methodological assumption was that overt or visible deviations from peacetime norms in the five political/societal areas could reveal a decision to attack the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries.
The one place where both services had well-placed agents was NATO headquarters. The KGB cables Gordievsky published, as well as the East German documents[EMP1] , reveal detailed knowledge of the alliance’s alert procedures and early-warning capabilities, especially NATO’s “crisis management” system. The KGB and HV A did not, however, find it reassuring that NATO arrangements were designed to warn of a Warsaw Pact attack in time to mount a defense. They simply declared that “crisis management” was dual-purpose concept that could be used to attack as well as warn.
The whole RYAN/KWA framework was anachronistic, seemingly more appropriate for the pre-nuclear age when states required lead times to mobilize armed forces and prepare populations for war. The template came from the KGB’s Institute for Research on Operational Problems. One explanation is that with little knowledge or experience to draw on, the Institute was dusting off old lessons learned from a previous surprise attack, namely Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa.
Some of the indicators were based on a mirror-image of how the Warsaw Pact would prepare for war, such as the stockpiling of mineral oil and mass slaughter of cattle. HV A case officers, for example, were instructed to look for:
“Confirmation of deviations in the behavior of prominent personalities and other persons in possession of classified information as well as their family members and persons close to them, which can be viewed as measures for protecting their own security (among other things, sudden moving into specially equipped secure accommodations, unexpected departure from normal residential areas and from border zones at home and abroad).”
The GDR, meanwhile, was building bunkers and fall-out shelters for the political, military, and intelligence elite and practicing “evacuation exercises” in case of a putative nuclear assault.[53]
The KGB and the HV A both had difficulties defining “key” indicators and do not appear to have arranged them in rank order or have assigned numerical weights or some form of an “accounting” method. There is a fleeting reference to the possibility of reaching false conclusions about hostile intentions, but the inherent problem of arriving at a false positive as watch officers worked through their checklists was apparently never fully addressed. Was there a tipping point or designated critical mass of accumulated indicators that would predict an attack? We don’t know, and the documents don’t tell us.
In 1986, the HV A reported that it had covered 226 of the 292 (!) indicators (“77%”), “albeit in varying degrees,” from its catalog, but what that meant is not clear. Were the results negative—no war on the horizon—or positive? The documents refer to efforts to employ computer-based data processing, but they also allude to problems with software and algorithms that, apparently, were never resolved.
All intelligence bureaucracies write memos and send cables when they want to give the impression that they are making decisions and taking action while, actually, “slow rolling the process.” The KGB-HV A dialogue on the indicators may have been no different. Despite repeated references to the urgency and priority of the alert, the HV A took several years to compile its own list of indicators. Meetings of working-level experts in Moscow and East Berlin were arranged at a leisurely pace. It took more than a year after Order Nr. 1/85 to organize an HV A situation center to monitor KWA indicators. By the time it was up and running, the entire effort was about to be overtaken by events in Moscow with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev and “new thinking.”
RYAN single-mindedly focused on the putative threat of a US surprise attack on the USSR. KGB cables declared that timely warning was required for Soviet strategic forces to take “retaliatory measures,” but the logic of the alert suggests that a preemptive first-strike, not a second-strike after US missiles had been launched, was the actual purpose.
Mielke repeatedly, and vainly, pushed for consideration of “other variants” of surprise, in particular conflict in Central Europe arising from a crisis in East-West relations. Mielke’s concern, shared by many in West Germany, was that the superpowers were prepared to fight in Europe, with conventional forces or “limited” nuclear strikes, down to the last German and on the last inch of German soil.[54] The Soviets simply ignored him. As the documents show time and again, Kremlin leaders had far less concern for their ally’s security than for their own.
The documents contain several references to operational tradecraft that underscore the Warsaw Pact’s lack of experience with warning intelligence. With the onset of the RYAN and KWA alerts, the KGB and the HV A, apparently for the first time, decided to issue to selected agents in the West rapid response communications equipment. The German term was Sofortmeldung (immediate reporting), which may have referred either to radios or burst transmitters using satellite relays to transmit encrypted electronic signals to the HV A situation center.
Theretofore, the KGB and HV A had employed personal communications (face-to-face meetings) or impersonal communications (dead drops) to pass requirements to and collect information from agents. Such arrangements required advance planning, conduct of pre-and-post meeting surveillance detection routes, and continuous “casing” for meeting or dead drop sites. Old-fashion tradecraft was secure but time-consuming and not suited for real-time reporting.
So, what was the war scare?
Wolf and his officers found Moscow’s “war games” a burdensome waste of time in pursuit of a non-existent threat. Some said KWA was a bureaucratic boondoggle that Mielke used to expand his power and influence. Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War” and a “sort of window dressing, and boiled down to compilation of regular reports stating that any given country was not intending in the next few days to drop nuclear bombs on the USSR.”[55] Soviet and East German leaders, however, were genuinely fearful, even if the threats and conspiracies they saw all around them were often exaggerated or even imaginary. As they were losing their grip on power, they were also losing their grip on reality.
Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War”
At the same time, the US was investing billions of dollars to upgrade its command-and-control, communications, intelligence, and early-warning capabilities, all predicated on the potential threat a Soviet surprise attack.[56] During the last decade of the Cold War, the fear of war was reciprocal and real, even if the threat of war was not.
A brief note written by the Ministry of State Security that includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.
This note on the talks between Minister Wolf and KGB Chairman Chebrikov contains heartfelt congratulations on cooperation thus far, but it also highlights problems with the situation and the importance of utilizing the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.
These notes describe statements made by Colonel General Kryuchkov which outline the current state of Soviet institutions and intelligence networks in various regions, including Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the United States.
This report describes conversations with Comrade Kryuchkov, coving a multitude of subjects, but delving briefly into the problem of “prevention of a surprise nuclear attack” (RYAN). Kryuchkov responded that this issue is being continually worked on, but no central decisions had been made as of yet.
A catalog of indicators of NATO preparation for nuclear war that were monitored by Warsaw Pact intelligence services under Project RYaN. The activity is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, and economic.
This order from the Ministry of State Security describes the tasks of the MfS units concerning efforts to uncover intentions of aggression and surprise military activities by western states and their allies, especially a surprise nuclear missile attack against the USSR.
This speech by East German Minister of State Security Mielke addresses the technological, intellectual, and ideological preparations for war by the west and how to uncover and organize indicators of a potential attack.
This report by Ministry of State Security describes developments and achievements toward early recognition of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.
This letter from East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Chebrikov requests a consultation on the development and continuation of Complex RYAN, especially on furthering collaboration between the MfS and KGB.
Responding to Mielke’s letter from November 1986, Chebrikov agrees to the proposed meeting between the MfS and the KGB on the subject of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the states of the socialist community.
This document is a plan for the consultations to take place in Berlin between the Stasi and the KBG. It includes objectives and proposed theses on the subject of early recognition of a sudden nuclear missile attack by NATO forces.
Documents 12A–T are monthly intelligence reports digests generated using intelligence by Project RyaN between August 1986 and April 1989.
[1] Süß, Walter and Douglas Selvage. “CWIHP e-Dossier No. 37: KGB/Stasi Cooperation” Cold War International History Project http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kgbstasi-cooperation.
[2] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721
[3] „Das MfS und die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen kommunistischen Geheimdiensten: Staatssicherheit und sowjetischer KGB.“ Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/MfS-Dokumente/MfS-KGB/_node.html.
[4] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.
[5] See below respective comments by Nate Jones and Ben Fischer.
[6] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov,” September 19, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5306, pp. 1-19. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115718.
Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov described Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.” Put differently, the Soviet side wondered what would have been if the plane would have been a military aircraft and part of a Western surprise attack: In this case the Soviet Union would have been unable to detect such an attack, i.e. Moscow would have become “surprised.”
[7] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 585.
[8] Other sources vary the spelling of RYaN. Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin spelled it “ryon.” Another spelling includes the word “surprise:” “VRYAN” “vnezapnoe raketno yadernoe napadenie” –surprise nuclear missile attack. Czech Intelligence referred to the operation as NRJAN. One document shows that the Bulgarians monitored “VRYAN indicators” as late as June 1987. These East German documents confirm that the operation continued until at least April, 1989. The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 523; Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West, (New York: St. Martins, 1994), 302; 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”
[9] RYaN Translation #2
[10] The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/.
[11] The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/; Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464. Recently, Benjamin Fischer has introduced an additional potential source of East German fear: CANOPY WING, purportedly a US military research project to exploit a vulnerability of Soviet Warsaw pact command and control communications to launch a “decapitation/surgical” strike.
[12] 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”
[13] “Issues to discuss with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR” http://digitalarchive.org/document/119308.
[14] “Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow.” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119319.
[15] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.
[16] “Order Number 1/85” http://digitalarchive.org/document/119322.
[17] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721. It is possible that this new coordinating division was created as a reaction to the false alerts generated by Operation RYaN in November 1983 incorrectly warning that a NATO nuclear release drill, Able Archer 83, could have been an actual nuclear attack.
[18] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115717.
[19] ”Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke.” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119332; For more on the East German contributions to Soviet intelligence collection, see Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464.
[20] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/.
[21] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/.
[22] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721
[23] Translated here as “Institute for Operative Problems.”
[24] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119320
[25] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119334.
[26] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Report, ‘Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document 119338. A partially declassified CIA document shows that Operation RYaN had its analogue in U.S. intelligence gathering. The CIA was also working with the DIA, and presumably allied intelligence agencies, to create a list of indicators — including the defense industry — for its chiefs of station to monitor, in an attempt to “emphasize greater early warning cooperation with intelligence services.” Other parallels to RYaN date back to 1961, when the Soviets also instructed embassies in all “capitalist” countries to collect and report information during the Berlin Crisis. In 1991, one might have deduced the January 16 Desert Storm invasion by monitoring the influx of pizza deliveries to the Pentagon, according to current U.S. Army Operational Security (OPSEC) training materials. In October 1983, justifying the KGB’s difficulties, Kryuchkov stated, “Even in the United States they have not completed this [a RYaN equivalent] yet.” The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/.
[27] “Report, Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119909. For more on Continuity of Government, see James Mann, “The Armageddon Plan,” The Atlantic, March 2004.
[28] Still-classified reports by the British Joint Intelligence Council and the US President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have allegedly confirmed Gordievsky’s accounts. See The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/, and British Documents Confirm UK Alerted US to Danger of Able Archer 83, http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/11/04/british-documents-confirm-uk-alerted-us-to-danger-of-able-archer-83/
[29] The 1983 War Scare, Part Two http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/.
[30] Regrettably, no text of the November 8 or 9 flash telegram has been released or reproduced. Gordievsky’s revelation of this warning is the only basis for the current historical record (though the preceding and following telegrams which he reproduced and published do serve as somewhat sturdy bona fides). Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985, (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1991), 87.
[31] Marcus Wolf did not write kindly of the Soviets, or Operation RYaN, in his 1997 memoir: “Our Soviet partners had become obsessed with the danger of a nuclear missile attack,” though he writes that he had not. “Like most intelligent people, I found these war games a burdensome waste of time, but these orders were no more open to discussion than other orders from above.” Marcus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (New York: Random House, 1997), 222. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.
[32] Welcome, Ukraine. http://euromaidanberlin.wordpress.com/2014/04/01/kgb-archives-in-ukraine-will-be-open-to-public/
[33] For an account of the file destruction by the HV A officer who supervised it, see Klaus Eichner and Gotthold Schramm, Konterspionage: Die DDR-Aufklärung in den Geheimdienstzentrum (Berlin: edition ost, 2010), pp. 174-177.
[34] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115717
[35] Andropov was referring to the new US war-fighting strategy for “prevailing” in a limited nuclear conflict that was first announced as Presidential Directive 59 by the Carter administration and slightly modified during the Reagan administration in National Security Decision Memorandum 13.
[36] “Speech of General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” Available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/doc19.htm>
[37] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. 74.
[38] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721
[39] RYAN Translation #2: “Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, on February 9, 1983 in Moscow.”
[40] RYAN Translation #3: “Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov, V. A. on October 3, 1983.”
[41] Peter Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione: Ein Insider Report (Berlin: elefanten press, 1992), p. 85.
[42] Ibid.
[43] On MfS Sigint, see Ben B. Fischer, “‘One of the Biggest Ears in the World’: East German Sigint Operations,’” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11:2 (Spring 1998), pp.142‑153. The MfS, the HV A, and the intelligence service of the East German Army were handling some 3,000 agents in West Germany/West Berlin when the Berlin Wall fell. About half spied for the MfS and military intelligence and the other half for the HV A. Five of every 100,000 West German citizens were “working clandestinely for the GDR.” Georg Herbstritt, Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage: Eine analytische Studie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 2007), p. 84.
[44] “Befehl 1/85 zu den Aufgaben der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitigen Aufklärung akuter Agressionsabsichten und überraschender militärischer Aktivitäten imperialisticher Staaten und Bundnisse, inbesondere zur Verhinderung eines überraschinden Raketenkernwaffenangriffs gegen Staaten der sozialistischen Gemeinschaft,” BstU [Bündesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR], ZA [Zentralarchiv], DSt [Dokumentenstelle im Zentalarchiv des BStU]103137. Also RYAN Translation #4.
[45] “1. Durchführungsbestimmung des Stellvertreters des Ministers auf Befehl 1/85 vom 15.2.1985, GVS 0008-1/85: Allzeitige Nutzung der Möglichkeiten der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitgen und zuverlässigen Beschaffung von Hinweisen auf akute feindliche Aggressionsabsichten, -vorbereitungen und –handlungen,” BstU, ZA, DSt103137.
[46] Benjamin B. Fischer, “The 1980s Soviet War Scare: New Evidence from East German Documents,” Intelligence and National Security, 14:4 (Autumn 1999), pp. 186-197.
[47] Wolf’s tasking of MfS departments is described in Ibid.
[48] “Katalog ausgewählter Indikatoren zur Früherkennung gegnerischer militärischer Aggressionsvorbereitungen und Überraschungsabsichten, inbesondere von Maßssnahmen zur Vorbereitung eines überraschenden Raketenwaffenangriffs (KWA),” BstU, ZA, DSt103137. A different version of this text is available in Document #5 of this collection.
[49] See Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, pp. 72, 85 and Günter Bohnsack, Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung: Die Legende Stirbt (Berlin: edition ost, 1997), p. 64.
[50] Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 85.
[51] RYAN Translation #6: “R E P O R T on development and achieved state of work regarding early recognition of enemy attack and surprise intentions (Complex RYAN).”
[52] Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 83-88.
[53] Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 72.
[54] Fear of a superpower conflict lead GDR leader Erich Honecker to open a back channel to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a decision that irritated Andropov. Markus Wolfe, Man Without a Face (New York: Times Books, 1997), p. 221.
[55] Mikhail A. Alexeev, Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 203.
[56] See Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992). Parallels between mutual American and Soviet fears of surprise attack are discussed in Benjamin B. Fischer, “The Soviet-American War Scare of the 1980s,” International Journal of Intelligence andCounterintelligence 19:3, Fall 2006, pp.480-519.
The Nuclear Proliferation International History Project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews, and other empirical sources. At the Wilson Center, it is part of the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program. Read more
The Cold War International History Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War. Through an award winning Digital Archive, the Project allows scholars, journalists, students, and the interested public to reassess the Cold War and its many contemporary legacies. It is part of the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program. Read more
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Able on-screen characters likely will recognize new or utilize existing vulnerabilities in Zoom to bargain client gadgets and records for additional abuse of corporate systems. This judgment incorporates basic framework substances utilizing Zoom. We base this judgment on late open presentation of Zoom’s various vulnerabilities. While sellers normally distribute patches for vulnerabilities, reports show there are occurrences in which clients and associations postpone refreshes. The fixing procedure is subverted by APT entertainers who regularly profit by delays and create misuses dependent on the weakness and accessible patches. We likewise base this judgment on detailed Chinese access to Zoom servers. China’s entrance to Zoom servers makes Beijing extraordinarily situated to target US open and private area clients of the stage; in any case, we accept that China’s one of a kind position doesn’t forestall other country states from utilizing Zoom vulnerabilities to accomplish their goals.
» (U) Several Zoom vulnerabilities have been broadcasted, remembering a powerlessness for the Zoom work area conferencing application that permits an aggressor to capture different parts of Zoom meetings, for which ZoomUSPER has given a fix; vulnerabilities in Zoom Client for Meetings that empower root access, just as unprompted camera and amplifier get to; Zoom introducing a concealed web server intended to bypass pop-ups that evacuates secret word prompts; and utilizing default settings to produce codes to join a gathering, effectively prompting “zoombombing,” as indicated by a universally disseminated US news source, a Canada-based research lab, an innovation blog, and two vulnerabilities distributed on the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) site.
(U) As of 15 April 2020 two zero-day misuses for Zoom that permit on-screen characters self-assertive code execution influencing Zoom on Windows and Apple working frameworks were being sold for $500,000, as indicated by a worldwide research and warning firm and a data security and innovation news production. We can’t affirm whether these zero-day abuses are identified with effectively found and fixed vulnerabilities. Be that as it may, regardless of whether there are patches accessible for these vulnerabilities, associations are moderate or reluctant to introduce patches, as there are dangers that a fix may upset other ward frameworks, and introducing patches may bring about personal time for business activities, as indicated by a cybersecurity organization.
(U) APT digital on-screen characters regularly utilize recently discharged programming patches to create adventures and access arranges that have not yet updated with seller discharged patches, as indicated by a NSA cybersecurity warning. For instance, APT entertainers as of October 2019 were abusing regular vulnerabilities in famous US virtual private system items to access unprotected systems, as per a similar source.
(U) Zoom asserts the application has start to finish encoded gatherings; be that as it may, the organization in its April 2020 blog explained that Zoom doesn’t right now actualize start to finish encryption as the cybersecurity business comprehends the term, as per a Canada-based research lab and Zoom’s organization blog.
(U) Though Zoom is headquartered in the United States, the fundamental Zoom application gives off an impression of being created by three organizations in China, which utilize in any event 700 specialists, as indicated by a Canada-based research lab giving vital approach and lawful commitment on data innovations, human rights and worldwide security. Moreover, tests directed by a similar research lab watched keys for encoding and decoding gatherings were transmitted to servers in Beijing. This raises worries because of China’s 2016 Cybersecurity Law, which urges outside firms to hand over significant protected innovation resources, for example, source code, to Chinese specialists, and China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law (Article 7), which commands all associations and residents to help, help, and help out Chinese national insight endeavors, as indicated by a universal online news source covering the Asia-Pacific district and a noticeable American news source.
(U//FOUO) Malicious digital on-screen characters likely view Zoom clients as focuses of chance to misuse a wide scope of open and private segment substances including basic foundation. We base this judgment on the broad exposure encompassing Zoom’s classification issues and abrupt prominence with clients in an expansive scope of areas adjusting to the pandemic stay-at-home requests. This judgment is supported by the presumption that the unidentified digital entertainers increased spontaneous access to progressing Zoom meeting meetings easily, and that malevolent on-screen characters can copy those endeavors and utilize their gets to encourage extra noxious exercises.
…
(U) Intelligence Gap – APT Network Exploitation
(U//FOUO) We need markers demonstrating refined digital entertainers getting to Zoom and trading off client gadgets to access casualty systems. Able on-screen characters could get to a casualty’s system through Zoom is by misusing vulnerabilities that permit them to get to a client’s record with taken certifications or seize a gathering meeting. The on-screen character likewise could use Zoom’s incorporated record move highlight to convey malware, for example, an indirect access or different malevolent executables. This root benefit heightening from Zoom to client gadget would empower the APT on-screen character to additionally abuse the casualty’s corporate system.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
There is a confusing measure of legitimate direction on the job of the military in conditions, for example, the present pandemic. In any case, the viable effect of that direction, whatever it might be, is hazy. Like the famous war plan that can’t endure first contact with the foe, Pentagon teaching on irresistible illness appears to have been surpassed by occasions.
“The strategic DOD in a pandemic is to safeguard U.S. battle abilities and status and to help U.S. government endeavors to spare lives, lessen human affliction, and moderate the spread of disease,” as indicated by a 2019 Army manual.
To help achieve that, another military manual offered an “organized and layered [list of] irresistible illnesses [to] help the military research network in concentrating on the advancement of antibody, prophylactic medications, demonstrative capacities, and observation endeavors.”
Pandemic flu was among the most elevated need ailments, representing a “high operational hazard,” yet shockingly the planned military research reaction seems to have slacked.
Who is in control?
Indeed, “USNORTHCOM [US Northern Command] practices organizing expert for arranging of DOD endeavors on the side of the USG reaction to pandemic flu and irresistible ailment,” says a Pentagon production (JP 3-40) on Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
What is NORTHCOM doing?
“DoD has almost 11,000 work force committed to COVID-19 activities across the country, with about 2,500 in the New York City zone,” as indicated by an April 10 news discharge. “DOD is giving expeditionary clinical consideration in a few states the nation over.”
“NORTHCOM is out there working angrily to complete its numerous missions, executing in any event five unique tasks designs at the same time,” as indicated by military specialist William M. Arkin.
Yet, “Executing may be excessively solid of a word,” he expressed, “on the grounds that despite the fact that these plans run in the many pages, most are tossed out the window nearly when they are removed the rack, helpful in spreading out how things ought to be composed yet in any case excessively unbending — or whimsical — to apply to this present reality.”
In another piece, Arkin overviewed 19 operational military plans that in principle administer NORTHCOM exercises. The greater part of them are not openly accessible, and some are characterized.
“Is there any explanation you can envision that the pandemic reaction plan shouldn’t be open? Or then again the arrangement for Defense Support of Civil Authorities?” Arkin doesn’t think so.
One of the plans he turned up, a 2017 NORTHCOM draft on Pandemic Influenza and Infectious Disease Response, recognized what it named “basic vulnerabilities” including:
“Absence of correspondence and synchronization among accomplices and partners, powerlessness or reluctance to share data/biosurveillance information, restricted location abilities, and constrained research facility corroborative testing.”
That specific arrangement from 2017 “apparently never went past the draft stage,” said Arkin.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
This is a rundown of the most compelling individuals of all of mankind’s history. This implies the people on this rundown have significantly affected how standard individuals live their lives today and have largely affected how present day society functions. The names on this rundown incorporate famous strict figures, unmistakable researchers and designers, and the absolute most impressive significant pioneers in world history. Decision in favor of your top decisions and re-rank this rundown your way.
What makes an individual deserving of a spot on a rundown of the most compelling individuals ever? Absolutely, probably the best personalities ever have the right to be positioned profoundly. Models incorporate Leonardo da Vinci, Sir Isaac Newton, and surely Albert Einstein. Every single one of these extraordinary and rousing individuals utilized the intensity of their brains to change the world. Of course, a few names on this rundown are likewise among the most well known good examples we’d prefer to meet face to face.
Highlighting authentic figures, intriguing men, and significant individuals, this rundown of the world’s most unbelievable figures have had a wide range of consequences for the greatest and notable occasions.
What’s more, present day time figures likewise have the right to be recorded here. Would anyone be able to contend that Steve Jobs and Mark Zuckerberg aren’t among the most powerful contemporary Americans? It’s a great opportunity to include your assessments who you accept are the most compelling individuals ever, with your votes and your rankings.
Jesus (c. 4 BC – c. AD 30 / 33), also referred to as Jesus of Nazareth and Jesus Christ, was a first-century Jewish preacher and religious leader. He is the central figure of Christianity. Most Christians believe he is the incarnation of God the Son and the awaited Messiah (Christ) prophesied in the Old Testament.Virtually all modern scholars of antiquity agree that Jesus existed historical… more on Wikipedia
Nikola Tesla was a Serbian American inventor, electrical engineer, mechanical engineer, physicist, and futurist best known for his contributions to the design of the modern alternating current electricity supply system. Tesla gained experience in telephony and electrical engineering before immigrating to the United States in 1884 to work for Thomas Edison in New York City. He soon struck out on his own with financial backers, setting up laboratories and companies to develop a range of… more on Wikipedia
Albert Einstein ( EYEN-styne; German: [ˈalbɛɐ̯t ˈʔaɪnʃtaɪn] (listen); 14 March 1879 – 18 April 1955) was a German-born theoretical physicist who developed the theory of relativity, one of the two pillars of modern physics (alongside quantum mechanics). His work is also known for its influence on the philosophy of science. He is best known to the general public for his mass–energy equivalence formula E = m c 2 {\displaystyle E=mc^{2}} , which has been dubbed “the world’s most famous… more on Wikipedia
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Reports of North Korean tyrant Kim Jong Un’s demise or perpetual weakening might be enormously overstated, yet the secret of his whereabouts and condition powers the world to think about what as a North Korean progression emergency would resemble. All things considered, the Kim family system seems unassailable, yet whatever is going on to the pioneer raises the phantom of a questionable exchange of intensity with not a single clear beneficiary to be found. In the event that groups go head to head, an awful inside clash is sure, and a common war not incomprehensible. With North Korea’s atomic and ballistic rocket destinations conceivably falling under the control of whoever acts most rapidly, Asia could confront an uncommon atomic emergency.
Of these known questions, one stands apart most importantly: Could any shortcoming in the Kim system initiate China to attempt to affirm authority over Pyongyang? In the event that emergency rises to circumstance, at that point it is just reasonable to consider how Chinese President Xi Jinping may see making an intense move to reshape the provincial level of influence. An effective intercession by Beijing would forever change the geopolitical guide of East Asia, detaching Japan and diminishing U.S. power in the district.
This is the most risky second for the three-age Kim system in decades. A few reports guarantee that Kim Jong Un either had crisis heart medical procedure or is in a vegetative state, and that Beijing has just sent a group of clinical specialists to help. The tyrant has not been found out in the open for quite a long time and missed a few prominent occasions, including the nation’s primary national occasion, which commends the introduction of his granddad and author of the system, Kim Il Sung.
Kim is just 36 years of age, however has barely been the image of good wellbeing. Hefty, frequently captured smoking cigarettes, and prone to appreciate the equivalent sensual way of life of his dad, he has been a prime possibility for a wellbeing emergency. And keeping in mind that the North Korean state media demands the nation has no coronavirus cases, it can’t be precluded that the incomparable pioneer is a survivor of the pandemic.
Coming to control in late 2011 after the passing of his dad, Kim Jong Il, Kim heartlessly united his position. Named beneficiary just the year prior to the senior Kim passed on, the little-realized replacement executed his amazing master Beijing uncle, Jang Song Thaek, and later apparently had a relative killed in Malaysia. His own kids are as yet youthful, leaving a hole in who might take over as ruler or official. In the event that he is undoubtedly crippled, it might be taking a long time for the system to recognize the reality decisively as a result of off camera plots.
A force battle is in this manner a totally conceivable situation, regardless of whether Kim is dead or debilitated. His sister, Kim Yo Jong, has been brought to approach second-up in order status, however she is just 32 years of age—and whether North Korea’s man centric framework would acknowledge a lady as incomparable pioneer is obscure. Top military officials may choose to introduce a manikin or battle among themselves for predominance. Outcasts’ absence of information about the elements of intensity in North Korea makes surveying any of this troublesome.
Kim’s obvious clinical emergency offers Beijing the first genuine open door in quite a while to reinforce its hand over Pyongyang.
Kim’s clear clinical emergency offers Beijing the first genuine open door in quite a while to reinforce its hand over Pyongyang.
Regardless of whether Kim returns tomorrow, the inquiries over his wellbeing and the system’s attachment will unquestionably cause the Chinese Communist Party to consider in the event that it may be a perfect time to move in.
Kim has had a full connection with Xi, purportedly rejecting numerous solicitations to meet until acquiescing in March 2018, a couple of months before his pathbreaking highest point with U.S. President Donald Trump. Pyongyang’s freedom is unbelievable; its fruitful atomic and ballistic rocket programs make the maverick state significantly progressively impervious to outside weight.
The chance to tie North Korea all the more firmly to China and keep up it as a cushion state confronting U.S. partners South Korea and Japan would be a geopolitical blessing to Xi. Recovering the impact Beijing lost in Pyongyang with the execution of Jang would be another motivation to make a move. Also, South Korea’s political left is ascendant after administrative triumphs this month, and President Moon Jae-in has developed his nation’s ties with Beijing. To put it plainly, the patterns have been increasingly propitious for a sensational development of Chinese force on the Korean Peninsula.
Applying political control through financial force is one course for Beijing. Another, increasingly troublesome way would be a real physical move into North Korea. In a world diverted by the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing may well take a strong risk to mediate in North Korea for the sake of harmony and request, as far as anyone knows to forestall an administration breakdown and helpful emergency. Suborning North Korean military pioneers based close to the Chinese outskirt would ease entry toward Pyongyang, alongside making manages system insiders previously. Making sure about atomic and rocket destinations, apparently to guarantee soundness, would solidify Beijing’s command over the Kim system. A flexible customer state, maybe even headed by Kim’s sister, would normally follow.
The geopolitical ramifications of Beijing’s power over North Korea would be huge. Given the probability that Chinese maritime and aviation based armed forces units could be available in North Korea, Chinese and American powers would confront each other over the Demilitarized Zone. That would make the U.S. partnership with South Korea substantially more troublesome. With both weight and incitements from Beijing, Seoul could even choose to put its support behind China.With both weight and promptings from Beijing, Seoul could even choose to put its support behind China; given Moon’s leanings and an endemic enemy of Americanism in South Korea, that ought not be incomprehensible. Beijing could kill any Southern resistance to diminished or disavowed Washington by promising to assist Seoul with implementing its power over the Liancourt Rocks, a gathering of little islets held by South Korea, which alludes to them as Dokdo, and furthermore asserted by Japan, which alludes to them as Takeshima. The Chinese naval force would along these lines access the vital Korea Strait, which associates the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea, helping Beijing overwhelm Asia’s indispensable internal waters.
That, thusly, would leave Japan separated in Northeast Asia, confronting a Chinese-overwhelmed Korean Peninsula and with minimal decision yet to drastically expand its military spending plan, maybe including the atomic choice. Tokyo would likewise squeeze Washington to keep up a dependable military ability in the district.
Understand More
This image, taken on July 4, 2017, and discharged by North Korea’s legitimate Korean Central News Agency, shows North Korean pioneer Kim Jong Un (focus) commending the fruitful test fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 at an undisclosed area.
3 Scenarios for Kim Jong Un’s Mysterious Absence
The United States and South Korea ought to be prepared to participate whether Kim is dead, wiped out, or going to return.
With U.S. what’s more, Chinese maritime and aviation based armed forces immeasurably nearer to one another, the potential for a mishap or an erroneous conclusion prompting a furnished experience would increment exponentially. Washington would either need to acknowledge a lot more serious hazard or choose to decrease its quality. Calls would develop at home to diminish strains with Beijing, which would be cultivated most effectively by receiving a supposed seaward adjusting technique, which would keeping up availability however pull back U.S. powers in the district.
None of this may happen this time. Be that as it may, political life in Pyongyang will stay unsure regardless of whether Kim returns. In the event that a progression emergency occurred, alternatives for the United States would be restricted, however Washington will in any case need an arrangement to counter any potential moves by China into North Korea.
Upgraded knowledge is required to give early notification of China’s military movement or political intrigues in Pyongyang; working with South Korean insight will be crucial. Close political discussion with Seoul is likewise expected to keep Moon focused on the U.S.- South Korean union, just like a battle focused on general conclusion in the South, which is as worried about Chinese force for what it’s worth about the United States’. Not to no end do the South Koreans frequently portray themselves as “minnows among whales.”
Past the promontory, more profound arranging with Japan for resistance and prevention is similarly as significant, so as to console Tokyo about the United States’ proceeding with nearness. Guaranteeing there is no drawdown of battle prepared U.S. powers in the district, and that they are outfitted with the most developed U.S. weapons frameworks, is an essential. Most importantly, U.S. ambassadors must clarify to their Chinese partners that the United States’ purpose to guarantee a free and open Indo-Pacific stays unaltered, regardless of whether Kim were to run for another 50 years.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Global intelligence agencies looking into the origins of COVID-19 have found two Chinese scientists studied live bats in Australia as part of a joint research between the Chinese communist government and the Australian government. In an exclusive the Daily Telegraph is reporting the “Five Eyes intelligence agencies of Australia, Canada, NZ, UK, and US are understood to be looking closely at the work of a senior Scientist at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Peng Zhou, and fellow scientist Shi Zhengli”. Sky News host and the Daily Telegraph’s Sharri Markson wrote the intelligence agencies have been examining “whether COVID-19 originated from a wet market or whether the naturally-occurring virus may have been inadvertently released”. Sky News contributor Scott Emerson said these new revelations will just “raise more concerns about what are the origins of COVID-19”.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Hobbled by secrecy and timidity, the U.S. intelligence community has been conspicuously absent from efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the most serious national and global security challenge of our time.
The silence of intelligence today represents a departure from the straightforward approach of then-Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats who offered the clearest public warning of the risk of a pandemic at the annual threat hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2019:
“We assess that the United States and the world will remain vulnerable to the next flu pandemic or large-scale outbreak of a contagious disease that could lead to massive rates of death and disability, severely affect the world economy, strain international resources, and increase calls on the United States for support,” DNI Coats testified.
But this year, for the first time in recent memory, the annual threat hearing was canceled, reportedly to avoid conflict between intelligence testimony and White House messaging. Though that seems humiliating to everyone involved, no satisfactory alternative explanation has been provided. The 2020 worldwide threat statement remains classified, according to an ODNI denial of a Freedom of Information Act request for a copy. And intelligence agencies have been reduced to recirculating reminders from the Centers for Disease Control to wash your hands and practice social distancing.
The US intelligence community evidently has nothing useful to say to the nation about the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, its current spread or anticipated development, its likely impact on other security challenges, its effect on regional conflicts, or its long-term implications for global health.
These are all topics perfectly suited to open source intelligence collection and analysis. But the intelligence community disabled its open source portal last year. And the general public was barred even from that.
It didn’t — and doesn’t — have to be that way.
In 1993, the Federation of American Scientists created an international email network called ProMED — Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases — which was intended to help discover and provide early warning about new infectious diseases.
Run on a shoestring budget and led by Stephen S. Morse, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Jack Woodall and Dorothy Preslar, ProMED was based on the notion that “public intelligence” is not an oxymoron. That is to say, physicians, scientists, researchers, and other members of the public — not just governments — have the need for current threat assessments that can be readily shared, consumed and analyzed. The initiative quickly proved its worth.
In fact, it has continued to prove its worth up to the present day.
“It was notices on ProMED that first alerted the world to the 2003 SARS outbreak, and it was a posting on ProMED on Dec. 30, 2019 — about chatter on the Chinese social network Weibo — that first spread word of a novel coronavirus, soon identified as the cause of COVID-19, outside China.” See “The doomed 30-year battle to stop a pandemic” by Paul Wells, Maclean’s, April 21.
ProMED, which is now managed by the International Society for Infectious Diseases, is unclassified, free, and open to subscription by anyone.
“ProMED illustrates how NGOs can, in some cases, efficiently accomplish what large, bureaucratically burdened institutions cannot even begin,” the FAS Public Interest Report said in 1996.
Today, when national and global security concerns touch almost every household, the need for public intelligence is greater than ever, and it could become one focus of a reconfigured U.S. intelligence apparatus.
Steven Aftergood
Steven Aftergood directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy. The Project works to reduce the scope of national security secrecy and to promote public access to government information.
Steven Aftergood directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy. The Project works to reduce the scope of national security secrecy and to promote public access to government information.
He writes Secrecy News, which reports on new developments in secrecy policy and provides direct access to significant official records that are otherwise unavailable or hard to find.
In 1997, Mr. Aftergood was the plaintiff in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the Central Intelligence Agency which led to the declassification and publication of the total intelligence budget for the first time in fifty years ($26.6 billion in FY 1997). In 2006, he won a FOIA lawsuit against the National Reconnaissance Office for release of unclassified budget records.
Mr. Aftergood is an electrical engineer by training (B.Sc., UCLA, 1977). He joined the FAS staff in 1989. From 1992-1998, he served on the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the National Research Council.
His work on challenging government secrecy has been recognized with the Pioneer Award from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the James Madison Award from the American Library Association, the Public Access to Government Information Award from the American Association of Law Libraries, and the Hugh M. Hefner First Amendment Award from the Playboy Foundation.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Continue reading “Steven Aftergood – COVID-19 Highlights Need For Public Intelligence”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The US State Missouri files lawsuit against China alleging that Beijing’s actions of suppressing information, arresting whistle-blowers, and denying the contagious nature of the deadly COVID-19 has led to the loss of lives and caused irreparable damage.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Hier sind einige wichtige Eckpunkte, an denen Sie sich orientieren sollten:
Eine wirksame medikamentöse Behandlung (wahrscheinlich 3-7 Monate). Das wird die Ausbreitung nicht stoppen und es wird keine "Heilung" sein, aber es wird das Gesundheitssystem etwas entlasten. (Ein Tipp: Nehmen Sie KEIN Hydroxychloroquin ein. Das ist eine wirklich schlechte Idee. Die erste Studie zeigte eine erhöhte Mortalität bei Patienten und wir haben keine Ahnung, wie wir es effektiv anwenden sollen.)
Weit verbreitete Tests… höchstwahrscheinlich zu Hause Blutuntersuchungen mit Nadelstichantikörpern. Es ist schwierig, einen genauen Zeitrahmen anzugeben, und die Logistik ist riesig, aber der Test ist billig, einfach und schnell. Wenn Sie zwei Tests im Abstand von mehr als 14 Tagen in einer ganzen Region durchführen, werden die meisten Fälle identifiziert und Sie wissen, wer wahrscheinlich eine gewisse Immunität hat.
Ein Impfstoff (wahrscheinlich 12-18 Monate ... könnte länger sein). Dann sollten die Dinge wieder etwas normaler werden. Dann besteht das Hauptrisiko in der Mutation des Virus, aber selbst das wird zu einem geringeren Risiko, da es sich nicht mehr um ein "neuartiges" Virus handelt. Sobald Menschen geimpft sind, beginnt ihr Immunsystem nicht mehr mit einem anderen Coronavirus bei Null.
Achtung - Die 2. Welle
In einigen Regionen werden die Fallzahlen durch starke soziale Distanzierung verringert, und die Regionen können die Beschränkungen aufheben.
Aber das könnte ein Problem sein ...
Historisch gesehen ist es die zweite und dritte Infektionswelle, die die meisten Todesfälle verursacht. Wenn die Beschränkungen aufgehoben werden, könnte es in einem Gebiet wieder zu Fällen kommen, möglicherweise nach dem Sommer, entweder aufgrund bestehender Infektionen in der Region, die wieder zunehmen, oder wenn Infektionen aus Gebieten der Welt, die sich im Winter befinden, wieder eingeführt werden.
Das Verständnis, dass die meisten Regionen 6 bis 18 Monate soziale Distanzierung in Betracht ziehen, kann Unternehmen bei der Planung ihres Marketings helfen ...
Unternehmen sollten aggressive Vorkehrungen treffen, um sicher und hygienisch zu bleiben, und Kunden aggressiv darüber informieren, welche Vorsichtsmaßnahmen sie treffen. Das gibt den Menschen das Vertrauen, mit ihnen Geschäfte zu machen ...
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Here Are Some Key Events to Look For:
An effective drug treatment (probably 3-7 months). That won’t stop the spread and it won’t be a “cure” but it will take some pressure off the health system. (One tip: DON’T take hydroxychloroquine. That’s a really bad idea. The first study showed increased mortality in patients and we have no idea how to use it effectively.)
Widespread testing… most likely at home pin prick antibody blood testing. Hard to give an exact time frame and the logistics are huge but the test is cheap, easy and fast. Running two tests 14+ days apart through a whole region would identify most cases and also let you know who is likely to have some immunity.
A vaccine (probably 12-18 months…could be longer). That’s when things should return to somewhat normal. Then the main risk is the virus mutating but even that becomes a lower risk because it will no longer be a “novel” virus. Once people are vaccinated their immune systems will not be starting from zero with a different coronavirus.
Caution – The 2nd Wave
In some regions, case numbers will be driven down with strong social distancing and regions may lift restrictions.
But this could be a problem…
Historically it’s the second and third wave of infections that cause the most deaths. With restrictions lifted an area could see returning cases again, possibly after summer, either from existing infections in the region spiking back up or infections being reintroduced from areas of the world that are in winter.
Understanding that most regions are looking at 6-18 months of social distancing can help businesses plan their marketing…
Businesses should take aggressive precautions to stay safe and sanitary and get aggressive in educating clients about what precautions they’re taking. That will give people the confidence to do business with them…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
In principle, the COVID-19 outbreak could provide a compelling new justification for expediting the processing of certain Freedom of Information Act requests related to the pandemic. But it is more likely to slow down the handling of most requests as agency employees work remotely and other concerns are understandably prioritized.
The impact of COVID-19 was surveyed by the Congressional Research Service in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Processing Changes Due to COVID-19: In Brief, March 27, 2020.
Other noteworthy new and updated reports from CRS include:
U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress, updated March 27, 2020
The Employment-Based Immigration Backlog, March 26, 2020
Demographic and Social Characteristics of Persons in Poverty: 2018, March 26, 2020
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA): Emergency Temporary Standards (ETS) and COVID-19, March 26, 2020
Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements, updated March 26, 2020
Congressional Use of Advisory Commissions Following Crises, CRS In Focus, March 25, 2020
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/michael-sorkin.jpg)
Michael D. Sorkin (born 1948) was an American architect, author, and educator based in New York City. He wass one of the most provocative and polemical voices in contemporary culture and in the design of urban places at the turn of the twenty-first century.
Michael David Sorkin (August 2, 1948 – March 26, 2020) was an American urbanist architect, author, and educator based in New York City.He was considered to be a provocative and polemical voice in contemporary culture and in the design of urban places at the turn of the twenty-first century. In addition to being a noted professor at many great architectural schools, he was an architectural critic for the Village Voice and a guest columnist in many publications.He was director of the urban design graduate program at City College of New York.
Continue reading “Michael Sorkin Dies Of The Coronavirus In New York”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Soldiers assigned to the 1st Special Forces Group’s Group Support Battalion at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, are manufacturing personal protective equipment for routine care and protection against COVID-19.
The soldiers created prototypes for reusable respirator masks, 3D-printed face shields, and surgical masks for Madigan Army Medical Center and its regional partners.
The battalion’s parachute riggers repurposed their sewing machines — typically used to repair parachutes — to assemble surgical masks.
“The Aerial Delivery Platoon will be able to produce 200 [masks] per day, initially, with only five, lightweight sewing machines,” said Army Lt. Col. Christopher S. Jones, the battalion’s commander.
Soldiers will continue to refine the process of producing the masks and improving them following feedback from medical employees.
“We’ll get better by week’s end and be able to produce 1,000 to 1,500 during a normal work week,” Jones said.
The masks will immediately benefit personnel identified by medical professionals, said Army Col. Rodd E. Marcum, the 1st Special Forces Group surgeon.
“The most likely application [for the masks] will be to have a symptomatic patient — one with a cough, sneezing, shortness of breath — wear the mask in order to reduce the amount of respiratory droplets contaminating the environment, helping reduce the likelihood that ill people expose others,” Marcum said.
In this period of adjustment for many people, he said, it is important to remember that the priorities are protecting the force and their families by following medical guidelines.
“Nothing is more important as we work through this unexpected challenge than following the recommendations of public health professionals. Physical or social distancing is critical in reducing the chain of transmission,” Marcum said.
Jones said he looks forward to witnessing the impact of his soldiers’ hard work on the nation as other forces join the battle against this disease.
“I believe this is a phenomenal effort to help our health care professionals and fellow Americans,” he said. “We’re collaborating with [Army Special Operations Forces] and conventional forces across the Army to make a difference. The effort in and of itself is a worthwhile exercise in how to innovate to provide solutions, especially as the U.S. military has the best capability in the world.”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The overall goal of the Joint Mission was to rapidly inform national (China) and international planning on next steps in the response to the ongoing outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and on next steps in readiness and preparedness for geographic areas not yet affected.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2020 19:26:03 -0400
From: My NYC.gov News <MyNYC@nyc.gov>
Subject: Buildings News – COVID-19 Response – Application Processing
Continue reading “Revealed – NYC Department Of Buildings COVID-19 Response – Document”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Ein Diskussionsbeitrag auf dem Strategietreffen der Linken zum künftigen Kurs der Partei am vergangenen Wochenende in Kassel hat scharfe Kritik ausgelöst. CSU-Generalsekretär Markus Blume forderte deswegen am Dienstag den Rücktritt von Linke-Chef Bernd Riexinger.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Carlos Marcello The Man Behind the JFK Assassination (English edition: Enigma Books, 2013) (Italian edition: Editori Riuniti, 2013) by Stefano Vaccara.
Continue reading “Must See Video – Carlo Marcello: The Man Behind The JFK Assassination”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Author and former criminal defense attorney, Mark Shaw, speaks about his book “The Reporter Who Knew Too Much” and its follow-up, “Denial of Justice.” Each chronicle not only his 12 years of research but most importantly, the life and times and mysterious death of What’s My Line? TV star and crack investigative reporter Dorothy Kilgallen and her 18-month investigation of the Dallas tragedies which included being the only reporter to interview Jack Ruby at his trial. Shaw also discusses his controversial exposure of the most important JFK assassination documents in history, the Jack Ruby trial transcripts.
#DorothyKilgallen #JFK #JackRuby #OnStageAPL #AllenTexas https://www.AllenLibrary.org
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Continue reading “Revealed – President Donald Trumps Financial Disclosure – TOP SECRET – Download the Original Document”OO F. l'onnHH c (Mu.:112 0 14) Instructions for Part 1 Note· This is a form Does not include account numbers street addresses or family member names See instructions for required Information Filer's Nnme IPage Number Donald J. Trump I Pnrt 1: Filer's Positions Held Outside United States Government IOrgnnizntlon Nnme • 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 ICily/Stntc IOrgnnlzntlon Type IPosition Hehl I 3 of51 From I To DT Dubai II Golf Manaaer LLC NewYork NY LLC Member/President 10/30/14 1/19/2017 DT Dubai II Golf Manaaer Member Coro NewYork NY Cornoralion Director/Chairman/President 10130/14 1/19/2017 DT Home Marks lnlernalianal LLC NewYark NY LLC Member/President 07/12/13 111912017 DT Home Marks lnlernalional Member Caro NewYark NY Corooralion 1/19/2017 New Yark, NY LLC Director/Chairman/President Member/President 07/12113 DT India Venture LLC 01/09/12 1/19/2017 OT India Venture Manaoina Member Coro NewYork NY CornoraUon Director/Chairman/President 01/09/12 1/19/2017 DT Marks Baku LLC DT Marks Baku Managing Member Corp NewYork NY LLC 04/10/12 1/19/2017 NewYark NY Cornorallon Member/President Director/Chairman/President 04/10/12 1/19/2017 1/1912017 DT Marks Dubai LLC DT Marks Dubai Member Corp NewYork NY LLC Member/President 09/05/13 NewYork NY Comoralion 09105/13 1/1912017 DT Marks Dubai II LLC NewYork NY LLC 10/30/14 11120/2015 DT Marks Dubai II Member Coro NewYork NY Comoralion 10/30/14 11/20/2015 OT Marks Gurgaon LLC NewYork NY LLC OT Marks Gurgaon Menaalno Member Caro NewYork NY Cornoralion OT Marks Jersey City LLC NewYork NY LLC DT Marks Jupiter LLC NewYork, NY LLC OT Marks Qatar LLC NewYork NY LLC OT Marks Qatar Member Com DT Marks Products International LLC OT Marks Products International Member Corp NewYork NY Corooralion New York, NY LLC New York, NY Corporalion Director/Chairman/President Member/President Director/Chairman/President Member/President Director/ChalrmanfPresident Member/President Member/President Member/President Director/Chairman/President Member/President Director/Chairman/President DT Marks Pune LLC DT Marks Puna Managing Member Carp NewYork NY LLC Member/President New York, NY Corporation DT MARKS PUNE Ii LLC NewYork NY LLC DT Marks Pune II Managing Member Corp New York, NY Corporation DT Marks Rio LLC New York, NY LLC OT Marks Rio Member Corp NewYark NY OT Marks Vancouver LP OT Marks Vancouver Manaaer Corp NewYork, NY Corporation Partnership Corporation DT Marks Warli LLC NewYark. NY New Yark, NY OT Marks Worli Member Corp DT Tower Gurgaan LLC NewYork NY LLC Corporation OT Tower Guraaon Manaaina Member Corp New York, NY New York, NY LLC Corporation DTW Venture LLC New York, NY LLC DTW Venture Manaaing Member Coro New York, NY Corporation East 61 SI Campany, L.P., The New York, NY Partnership EID Venture I LLC NewYark. NY NewYork, NY LLC EID Venture I Corporation Excel Venture I LLC Excel Venture I Corp. Fifty Seven Manaaement Corp Fifty Sevenlh Street Associates LLC First Member, Inc. Corporation St. Martin, French West lndi LLC SI. Martin French West lndi NewYark NY Corporation Corporation NewYark NY LLC NewYark NY Corporation Corporation Flights, Inc. {Formerly Trump Flights, Inc.) NewYark NY Florida Properties Management LLC Fontainbleu Apartments LLC Palm Beach, Florida LLC New York. NY Golf Produclions LLC New York, NY LLC LLC 10/28/14 1/19/2017 10130/14 1/19/2017 10/30114 1/19/2017 08/29/14 1119/2017 10/30/14 1119/2017 10/30/14 1119/2017 09/13/13 1/19/2017 09/13/13 01/09/12 1/19/2017 1/19/2017 Director/Chairman/President Member/President Director/Chairman/President Member/President Director/Chairman/President Partner/President Direclor/ChairmantPresident Member/President Director/Chairman/President Member/President Director/Chairman/President Member Director/President Partner Member PresidenUDirector PresidenUSecretarvffreasurer/Member Director/Chairman/President Director/Chairman President 01/09/12 1/19/2017 06/18/14 1/19/2017 06/18/14 1/19/2017 03/09/12 1/19/2017 03/09/12 1/19/2017 01122/13 1119/2017 01122/13 1119/2017 05/21/13 1/19/2017 05/21/13 1/19/2017 03/09/15 1119/2017 03/09/15 03/14/14 1/19/2017 03/14/14 1/19/2017 12/06/96 05/01/13 1/19/2017 05/01113 1/19/2017 07/01113 07/01113 1/19/2017 08/23/12 1/19/2017 11/30/95 1/19/2017 President 09/26/96 PresidenVfreasurer/Director Member Member Member/Presidenl 07/01199 1/19/2017 1/19/2017 12/17/01 1/19/2017 11/22/95 06/16/09 1/19/2017 Gaps in numerical sequence are due to the removal of previously reported items no longer reportable on this part. 1/19/2017 1/19/2017 1/19/2017 1/19/2017
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Klaus Maurischat
GoMoPa- Genosse Klaus Maurischat verwendet seit Jahr und Tag das Pseudonym “Siegfried Siewert”, inspiriert von dem größten Giftpanscher Deutschlands, dem STASI-Mann Siegfried Sievert.
|
Die Akte trägt die Registriernummer II 153/71, ist mehrere Hundert Seiten dick. Auf dem Deckel – in feiner Schreibschrift – ein Name: „Pluto“. Unter diesem Decknamen spionierte Siegfried Sievert (58) 18 Jahre lang für die Staatssicherheit der DDR – der Futtermittelpanscher, der mutmaßlich für den deutschen Dioxin-Skandal verantwortlich ist! Auf Antrag von BILD gab die zuständige Birthler-Behörde die Unterlagen jetzt heraus. Die Dokumente zeichnen das Bild eines Mannes, der rücksichtslos ist, skrupellos und vor allem auf eigenen Profit bedacht. Rückblick. 1971 wird die Stasi auf den 18-jährigen Sievert aufmerksam. Sie beobachtet sein „dekadentes Aussehen“, seine hohe Intelligenz und seine „guten Verbindungen zu anderen jugendlichen Personenkreisen“. Sievert wird angeworben. Aus einem Bericht vom 16. März 1971: „Der Kandidat kann zur Absicherung der Jugend (…) eingesetzt werden.“
|
Sievert wählt seinen Decknamen selbst, kassiert fortan Prämien für seine „inoffizielle Mitarbeit“. In den Unterlagen finden sich zahlreiche Quittungen, eine vom 6. November 1987: „Hiermit bescheinige ich den Erhalt von 100 Mark für geleistete Arbeit.“
Continue reading “SIEGFRIED SIEVERT: VORBILD FÜR KLAUS MAURISCHAT: EIN STASI-DIOXIN-GIFT-PANSCHER”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Zimmermann, Bernd; 07.08.39; HVA; 961500; 1080; 458/63, A
war früher ein STASI-Offizier im besonderen Einsatz in Westdeutschland, heute ist er ein Top-GoMoPa-Genosse.
bald mehr
Deep Throat
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is intently observing an episode brought about by a novel (new) coronavirus in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. Chinese specialists initially distinguished the new coronavirus, which has come about in over a thousand affirmed human diseases in China with a few passings revealed.
The World Health Organization (WHO) on January 30, 2020, announced the flare-up of novel Coronavirus 2019-nCov a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).
The President of the United States has announced a Public Health Emergency for the novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) and has forced travel limitations, producing results Sunday February 2, 2020, at 1700 hours ET.
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports there are 37,558 (+2,676) cases and 813 (+89) affirmed passings from the novel Coronavirus 2019-nCoV around the world, remembering 12 affirmed cases for the U.S and 6 in California.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Von ihren Plänen, in den Westen zu fliehen, hatten Peter Gaudlitz und seine Freundin niemandem erzählt. Trotzdem wurden sie verraten und fortan durch die Stasi observiert. Erst nach der Wiedervereinigung konnte Peter Gaudlitz in seiner Stasi-Akte nachlesen, dass wohl sein Vater den Verdacht geäußert hatte, sein Sohn wolle fliehen.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Continue reading “CIA-NSA-ODNI Inspectors General Report On The President’s Surveillance Program”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
https://cryptome.org/2020/01/DDOSecrets-Index-of-files.htm
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
|
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Most Dangerous NYC Buildings2019-N229.zip 121324717 SLCE 17 West End Avenue Architectural, November 18, 2019 (243MB) 2019-N228.zip 121324717 SLCE 17 West End Avenue Architectural PAA, November 18, 2019 (126MB) 2019-N227.zip 121324717 SLCE 17 West End Avenue Structural FO SOE, November 18, 2019 (35MB) 2019-N226.zip 121324717 SLCE 17 West End Avenue Mechanical, November 18, 2019 (22MB) 2019-N225.zip 121324717 SLCE 17 West End Avenue Plumbing, November 18, 2019 (83MB) 2019-N224.zip 121324717 SLCE 17 West End Avenue Filings, November 18, 2019 (15MB) More
2019-N223.zip 121193458 Vinoly 639 West 59th Street Plans A, November 16, 2019 (145MB) 2019-N222.zip 121193458 Vinoly 639 West 59th Street Plans B, November 16, 2019 (254MB) 2019-N221.zip 121193458 Vinoly 639 West 59th Street FO SOE, November 16, 2019 (25MB) 2019-N220.zip 121193458 Vinoly 639 West 59th Street Filings, November 16, 2019 (11MB) More
2019-N219.zip 121193181 KPF 400 West 61st Street Plans A, November 15, 2019 (324MB) 2019-N218.zip 121193181 KPF 400 West 61st Street Plans B, November 15, 2019 (290MB) 2019-N217.zip 121193181 KPF 400 West 61st Street Plans FO SOE, November 15, 2019 (42MB) 2019-N216.zip 121193181 KPF 400 West 61st Street Filings, November 15, 2019 (20MB) More
2019-N215.zip 121192976 Meier 10 Riverside Blvd Plans A, November 15, 2019 (184MB) 2019-N214.zip 121192976 Meier 10 Riverside Blvd Plans B, November 15, 2019 (206MB) 2019-N213.zip 121192976 Meier 10 Riverside Blvd Plans C, November 15, 2019 (183MB) 2019-N212.zip 121192976 Meier 10 Riverside Blvd FO SOE, November 15, 2019 (36MB) More
2019-N211.zip 120481246 BIG 625 West 57th Street Architectural, November 14, 2019 (301MB) 2019-N210.zip 120481246 BIG 625 West 57th Street Structural, November 14, 2019 (75MB) 2019-N208.zip 120481246 BIG 625 West 57th Street Plumbing, November 14, 2019 (128MB) 2019-N208.zip 120481246 BIG 625 West 57th Street Mechanical, November 14, 2019 (99MB) 2019-N207.zip 120481246 BIG 625 West 57th Street Filings, November 14, 2019 (27MB)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
A thrilling true-crime story of how secret agent Zvi Aharoni hunted down one of the highest-ranking Nazi war criminals on the run in Argentina in 1960. Read more: https://www.theatlantic.com/video/ind… “The Driver Is Red” was directed by Randall Christopher (https://www.thedriverisred.com). It is part of The Atlantic Selects, an online showcase of short documentaries from independent creators, curated by The Atlantic. Subscribe to The Atlantic on YouTube: http://bit.ly/subAtlanticYT
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Daran hat sich nichts geändert. Im Gegenteil: Die STASI-Connections zu Putin und auch nach China werden intensiver genutzt denn je:
Wie schon immer werden die STASI-Seilschaften aus Moskau dirigiert.
Denn auch Wladimir Putin ist einer von ihnen:
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The following presentation was released by the U.S. Department of Justice in relation to their indictment of seven Russian GRU officers on charges related to “International Hacking and Related Influence and Disinformation Operations.”
Continue reading “TOP SECRET – GRU Close Access Cyber Operation Against OPCW”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
You want to check whether a certain person was or is in the KGB ? You may look at on this website http://www.berndpulch.org in the KGB spies category for more information.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The accompanying report is a piece of a progression of Social Media Landscape guides delivered by the U.S. Branch of State for its U.S.- European Media Hub which is depicted as interfacing “European crowds with U.S. policymakers and viewpoints.” The Media Hub, which is situated in Brussels, Belgium, is a piece of the International Media Engagement Office of the U.S. Branch of State.
Continue reading “U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT ABOUT BELARUS REVEALED”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Just before 12 PM on Tuesday night, the White House spending office discharged almost 200 pages of Ukraine-related records to American Oversight because of a FOIA claim. Those pages included already unreleased messages that demonstrated high ranking representatives in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) were laying the basis to freeze military help to Ukraine even before President Trump’s scandalous July 25 call with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky.
Continue reading “AMERICAN OVERSIGHT DISCOVERS EVIDENCE OF OBSTRUCTION”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
On Friday evening, the State Department released nearly 100 pages of records in response to American Oversight’s lawsuit seeking a range of documents related to the Trump administration’s dealings with Ukraine.
Among other records, the production includes emails that confirm multiple contacts in March of 2019 between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Trump lawyer Rudy Giuliani, at least one of which was facilitated by President Trump’s assistant Madeleine Westerhout.
American Oversight is reviewing the production to assess whether the State Department has fully complied with the court’s order. Notes on what we’ve found are below.
You can download the documents here. They are also available below.
“We can see why Mike Pompeo has refused to release this information to Congress. It reveals a clear paper trail from Rudy Giuliani to the Oval Office to Secretary Pompeo to facilitate Giuliani’s smear campaign against a U.S. ambassador.
“This is just the first round of disclosures. The evidence is only going to get worse for the administration as its stonewall strategy collapses in the face of court orders.
“That American Oversight could obtain these documents establishes that there is no legal basis for the administration to withhold them from Congress. That conclusively shows that the administration is engaged in obstruction of justice. The president and his allies should ask themselves if impeachment for obstruction is worth it if the strategy isn’t even going to be effective.
“This lawsuit is just one of several American Oversight is pursuing to bring transparency to the Ukraine investigation. The public should expect more disclosures, over the administration’s strong objection, for the foreseeable future.”
New: The documents show a March 26, 2019, call between Rudy Giuliani and Mike Pompeo. (Page 39 of document)
A March 28, 2019, email includes a list of scheduled calls for Pompeo. Calls include Rudy Giuliani on March 29, and Rep. Devin Nunes on April 1, 2019.
On March 27, 2019, Rudy Giuliani’s assistant contacted Madeleine Westerhout, who was serving as the president’s Oval Office gatekeeper at the time. She asked Westerhout for a “good number” for Pompeo, adding that she had “been trying and getting nowhere through regular channels.” Westerhout contacted someone at the State Department to ask for a number she could provide. (Page 55)
During his closed-door testimony, career diplomat David Hale mentioned two calls between Pompeo and Giuliani, one on March 28, 2019, and one on March 29. The documents include a March 28 email to Hale indicating that Pompeo had been the one to request a call with Giuliani. (Page 45)
The March 29 call appears on page 46, and the confirmation of its scheduling is on page 44.
Also in the documents: An April 5 letter to the State Department from six former U.S. ambassadors to Ukraine (including Bill Taylor), expressing their concern about the attacks on U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch. (Page 13)
On April 12, 2019, Reps. Steny Hoyer and Eliot Engel wrote to Pompeo, also expressing their concern (page 28). The State Department responded on June 11, saying “Yovanovitch was due to complete her three-year diplomatic assignment in Kyiv this summer.” (Page 34)
Note: The State Department did not produce a formal directive recalling Yovanovitch or a formal readout of Trump’s July 25 call with Zelensky. Both of these were covered by the court’s production order.
Part of Investigation:
Continue reading “STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASES UKRAINE DOCUMENTS”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Continue reading “FBI Counterintelligence Note Warns About Chinese Talent Programs”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).
…
G. Possible Military Dimensions
38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these. Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.
Continue reading “TOP-SECRET – Iran Making Nuclear Weapons Report”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is planned to help bureaucratic, state, nearby, innate, and regional counterterrorism, digital, and law implementation authorities, and private segment accomplices, to viably stop, forestall, appropriate, or react to episodes, deadly tasks, or fear based oppressor assaults in the United States that could be led by or for the benefit of the Government of Iran (GOI) if the GOI were to see activities of the United States Government (USG) as demonstrations of war or existential dangers to the Iranian system. The GOI could act straightforwardly or enroll the participation of intermediaries and accomplices, for example, Lebanese Hizballah. The FBI, DHS, and NCTC had evaluated any active retaliatory assault would initially happen abroad. In the occasion the GOI were to decide to direct a Homeland assault, potential targets and strategies for assault in the Homeland could run from digital activities, to focused deaths of people considered dangers to the Iranian system, to damage of open or private foundation, including US army installations, oil and gas offices, and open tourist spots. USG activities may likewise incite vicious radical supporters of the GOI to submit assaults in retaliation, with next to zero notice, against US-based Iranian protesters, Jewish, Israeli, and Saudi people and interests, and USG faculty.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Following a week ago’s US airstrikes against Iranian military initiative, the FBI watched expanded revealing of site ruination movement spreading Pro-Iranian messages. The FBI accepts a few of the site disfigurement were the consequence of digital on-screen characters misusing realized vulnerabilities in content administration frameworks (CMSs) to transfer ruination documents. The FBI exhorts associations and individuals worried about Iranian digital focusing on be acquainted with the markers, strategies, and procedures gave in this FLASH, just as strategies and methods gave in as of late spread Private Industry Notification “Notice on Iranian Cyber Tactics and Techniques” (20200109-001, 9 January 2020).
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Der Spielfilm “DIE RUECKKEHR DER DDR (IM JAHRE 2014)” mit DDR-General Vladimir Schablonsky. ****** Die Webseite zu diesem Spielfilm lautet: http://www.DIE-DDR.com
Von der Realität längst überholt…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
I am a former Google employee and I am writing this to leak information to the public of what I
witnessed and took part in while being an employee. My position was to deal with AdSense accounts,
more specifically the accounts of publishers (not advertisers). I was employed at Google for a period of
several years in this capacity.
Having signed many documents such as NDA’s and non-competes, there are many repercussions for me,
especially in the form of legal retribution from Google. I have carefully planned this leak to coincide with
certain factors in Google such as waiting for the appropriate employee turn around so that my identity
could not be discovered.
To sum it up for everyone, I took part in what I (and many others) would consider theft of money from
the publishers by Google, and from direct orders of management. There were many AdSense employees
involved, and it spanned many years, and I hear it still is happening today except on a much wider scale.
No one on the outside knows it, if they did, the FBI and possibly IRS would immediately launch an
investigation, because what they are doing is so inherently illegal and they are flying completely under
the radar.
It began in 2009. Everything was perfectly fine prior to 2009, and in fact it couldn’t be more perfect from
an AdSense employees perspective, but something changed.
Google Bans and Ban Criteria
Before December 2012:
In the first quarter of 2009 there was a “sit-down” from the AdSense division higher ups to talk about
new emerging issues and the role we (the employees in the AdSense division needed to play. It was a
very long meeting, and it was very detailed and intense. What it boiled down to was that Google had
suffered some very serious losses in the financial department several months earlier. They kept saying
how we “needed to tighten the belts” and they didn’t want it to come from Google employees pockets.
So they were going to (in their words) “carry out extreme quality control on AdSense publishers”. When
one of my fellow co-workers asked what they meant by that. Their response was that AdSense itself
hands out too many checks each month to publishers, and that the checks were too large and that
needed to end right away. Many of the employees were not pleased about this (like myself). But they
were successful in scaring the rest into thinking it would be their jobs and their money that would be on
the line if they didn’t participate. The meeting left many confused as to how this was going to happen.
What did they mean by extreme quality control? A few other smaller meetings occur with certain key
people in the AdSense division that furthered the idea and procedure they planned on implementing.
There were lots of rumors and quiet talking amongst the employees, there was lots of speculations,
some came true and some didn’t. But the word was that they were planning to cut off a large portion of
publisher’s payments.
After that point there was a running gag amongst fellow co-workers where we would walk by each other
and whisper “Don’t be evil, pft!” and roll our eyes.
What happened afterwards became much worse. Their “quality control” came into full effect. Managers
pushed for wide scale account bans, and the first big batch of bans happened in March of 2009. The
main reason, the publishers made too much money. But something quite devious happened. We were
told to begin banning accounts that were close to their payout period (which is why account bans never
occur immediately after a payout). The purpose was to get that money owed to publishers back to
Google AdSense, while having already served up the ads to the public.
This way the advertiser’s couldn’t claim we did not do our part in delivering their ads and ask for money
back. So in a sense, we had thousands upon thousands of publishers deliver ads we knew they were
never going to get paid for.
Google reaped both sides of the coin, got money from the advertisers, used the publishers, and didn’t
have to pay them a single penny. We were told to go and look into the publishers accounts, and if any
publisher had accumulated earnings exceeding $5000 and was near a payout or in the process of a
payout, we were to ban the account right away and reverse the earnings back. They kept saying it was
needed for the company, and that most of these publishers were ripping Google off anyways, and that
their gravy train needed to end. Many employees were not happy about this. A few resigned over it.
I did not. I stayed because I had a family to support, and secondly I wanted to see how far they would
go.
From 2009 to 2012 there were many more big batches of bans. The biggest of all the banning sessions
occurred in April of 2012. The AdSense division had enormous pressure from the company to make up
for financial losses, and for Google’s lack of reaching certain internal financial goals for the quarter prior.
So the push was on. The employees felt really uneasy about the whole thing, but we were threatened
with job losses if we didn’t enforce the company’s wishes. Those who voiced concerned or issue were
basically ridiculed with “not having the company’s best interest in mind” and not being “team players”.
Morale in the division was at an all-time low. The mood of the whole place changed quite rapidly. It no
longer was a fun place to work.
The bans of April 2012 came fast and furious. Absolutely none of them were investigated, nor were they
justified in any way. We were told to get rid of as many of the accounts with the largest
checks/payouts/earnings waiting to happen. No reason, just do it, and don’t question it. It was heart
wrenching seeing all that money people had earned all get stolen from them. And that’s what I saw it as,
it was a robbery of the AdSense publishers. Many launched appeals, complaints, but it was futile
because absolutely no one actually took the time to review the appeals or complaints. Most were simply
erased without even being opened, the rest were deposited into the database, never to be touched
again.
Several publishers launched legal actions which were settled, but Google had come up with a new policy
to deal with situations such as that because it was perceived as a serious problem to be avoided.
So they came up with a new policy.
After December 2012: The New Policy
The new policy; “shelter the possible problem makers, and fuck the rest” (those words were actually
said by a Google AdSense exec) when he spoke about the new procedure and policy for “Account
Quality Control”.
The new policy was officially called AdSense Quality Control Color Codes (commonly called AQ3C by
employees). What it basically was a categorization of publisher accounts. Those publisher’s that could
do the most damage by having their account banned were placed in a VIP group that was to be left
alone. The rest of the publishers would be placed into other groupings accordingly.
The new AQ3C also implemented “quality control” quotas for the account auditors, so if you didn’t meet
the “quality control” target (aka account bans) you would be called in for a performance review.
There were four “groups” publishers could fall into if they reached certain milestones.
They were:
Red Group: Urgent Attention Required
Any AdSense account that reaches the $10,000/month mark is immediately flagged (unless they are part
of the Green Group).
– In the beginning there were many in this category, and most were seen as problematic and were seen
as abusing the system by Google. So every effort was taken to bring their numbers down.
– They are placed in what employees termed “The Eagle Eye”, where the “AdSense Eagle Eye Team”
would actively and constantly audit their accounts and look for any absolute reason for a ban. Even if
the reason was far-fetched, or unsubstantiated, and unprovable, the ban would occur. The “Eagle Eye
Team” referred to a group of internal account auditors whose main role was to constantly monitor
publisher’s accounts and sites.
– A reason has to be internally attached to the account ban. The problem was that notifying the
publisher for the reason is not a requirement, even if the publisher asks. The exception: The exact
reason must be provided if a legal representative contacts Google on behalf of the account holder.
– But again, if a ban is to occur, it must occur as close to a payout period as possible with the most
amount of money accrued/earned.
Yellow Group: Serious Attention Required
Any AdSense account that reaches the $5,000/month mark is flagged for review (unless they are part of
the Green Group).
– All of the publisher’s site(s)/account will be placed in queue for an audit.
– Most of the time the queue is quite full so most are delayed their audit in a timely fashion.
– The second highest amount of bans occur at this level.
– A reason has to be internally attached to the account ban. Notifiying the publisher for the reason is not
a requirement, even if the publisher asks. The exception: The exact reason must be provided if a legal
representative contacts Google on behalf of the account holder.
– But again, if a ban is to occur, it must occur as close to a payout period as possible with the most
amount of money accrued/earned.
Blue Group: Moderate Attention Required
Any AdSense account that reaches the $1,000/month mark is flagged for possible review (unless they
are part of the Green Group).
– Only the main site and account will be place in queue for what is called a quick audit.
– Most bans that occur happen at this level. Main reason is that a reason doesn’t have to be attached to
the ban, so the employees use these bans to fill their monthly quotas. So many are simply a random pick
and click.
– A reason does not have to be internally attached to the account ban. Notifying the publisher for the
reason is not a requirement, even if the publisher asks.
– But again, if a ban is to occur, it must occur as close to a payout period as possible with the most
amount of money accrued.
Green Group: VIP Status (what employees refer to as the “untouchables”)
Any AdSense account associated with an incorporated entity or individual that can inflict serious
damage onto Google by negative media information, rallying large amounts of anti-AdSense support, or
cause mass loss of AdSense publisher support.
– Google employees wanting to use AdSense on their websites were automatically placed in the Green
group. So the database contained many Google insiders and their family members. If you work or
worked for Google and were placed in the category, you stayed in it, even if you left Google. So it
included many former employees. Employees simply had to submit a form with site specific details and
their account info.
– Sites in the Green Group were basically given “carte blanche” to do anything they wanted, even if they
flagrantly went against the AdSense TOS and Policies. That is why you will encounter sites with AdSense,
but yet have and do things completely against AdSense rules.
– Extra care is taken not to interrupt or disrupt these accounts.
– If an employee makes a mistake with a Green Level account they can lose their job. Since it seen as
very grievous mistake.
New Policy 2012 Part 2:
Internal changes to the policy were constant. They wanted to make it more efficient and streamlined.
They saw its current process as having too much human involvement and oversight. They wanted it
more automated and less involved.
So the other part of the new policy change was to incorporate other Google services into assisting the
“quality control” program. What they came up with will anger many users when they find out. It
involved skewing data in Google Analytics. They decided it was a good idea to alter the statistical data
shown for websites. It first began with just altering data reports for Analytics account holders that also
had an AdSense account, but they ran into too many issues and decided it would be simpler just to skew
the report data across the board to remain consistent and implement features globally.
So what this means is that the statistical data for a website using Google Analytics is not even close to
being accurate. The numbers are incredibly deflated. The reasoning behind their decision is that if an
individual links their AdSense account and their Analytics account, the Analytics account can be used to
deflate the earnings automatically without any human intervention. They discovered that if an individual
had an AdSense account then they were also likely to use Google Analytics. So Google used it to their
advantage.
This led to many publishers to actively display ads, without earning any money at all (even to this day).
Even if their actual website traffic was high, and had high click-throughs the data would be automatically
skewed in favor of Google, and at a total loss of publishers. This successfully made it almost impossible
for anyone to earn amounts even remotely close what individuals with similar sites were earning prior
to 2012, and most definitely nowhere near pre-2009 earnings.
Other policy changes also included how to deal with appeals, which still to this day, the large majority
are completely ignored, and why you will rarely get an actual answer as to why your account was
banned and absolutely no way to resolve it.
—-
The BIG Problem (which Google is aware of)
There is an enormous problem that existed for a long time in Google’s AdSense accounts. Many of the
upper management are aware of this problem but do not want to acknowledge or attempt to come up
with a solution to the problem.
It is regarding false clicks on ads. Many accounts get banned for “invalid clicks” on ads. In the past this
was caused by a publisher trying to self inflate click-throughs by clicking on the ads featured on their
website. The servers automatically detect self-clicking with comparison to IP addresses and other such
information, and the persons account would get banned for invalid clicking.
But there was something forming under the surface. A competitor or malicious person would actively go
to their competitor’s website(s) or pick a random website running AdSense and begin multiple-clicking
and overclicking ads, which they would do over and over again. Of course this would trigger an invalid
clicking related ban, mainly because it could not be proven if the publisher was actually behind the
clicking. This was internally referred to as “Click-Bombing”. Many innocent publishers would get caught
up in bans for invalid clicks which they were not involved in and were never told about.
This issue has been in the awareness of Google for a very long time but nothing was done to rectify the
issue and probably never will be. Thus if someone wants to ruin a Google AdSense publishers account,
all you would have to do is go to their website, and start click-bombing their Google Ads over and over
again, it will lead the servers to detect invalid clicks and poof, they get banned. The publisher would be
completely innocent and unaware of the occurrence but be blamed for it anyways.
—-
Their BIG Fear
The biggest fear that Google has about these AdSense procedures and policies is that it will be publicly
discovered by their former publishers who were banned, and that those publishers unite together and
launch an class-action lawsuit.
They also fear those whose primary monthly earnings are from AdSense, because in many countries if a
person claims the monthly amount to their tax agency and they state the monthly amount and that they
are earning money from Google on a monthly basis, in certain nations technically Google can be seen as
an employer. Thus, an employer who withholds payment of earnings, can be heavily fined by
government bodies dealing with labor and employment. And if these government bodies dealing with
labor and employment decide to go after Google, then it would get very ugly, very quickly ….. that is on
top of a class-action lawsuit.
Continue reading “Unvealed – Google AdSense Leaked By Ex-Google Employer”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Dear Molly,
I’ve been closely following the news out in California, and the devastation caused by wildfires that continue to burn. Though we don’t live in the area, it got me wondering if my family is prepared to handle a natural disaster like that. What can I do? #AskMollyHale
~Not Your Average Prepper
Dear Not Your Average Prepper,
Great question! Unfortunately, many people don’t think about these types of things until disaster strikes. It’s great that you’re thinking about emergency preparedness now.
At CIA, we spend a lot of time discussing emergency preparedness and planning with our officers, who often find themselves working in all kinds of remote—and sometimes dangerous—places around the world. Often villages, towns or even cities are ill-equipped to handle major emergencies. What those emergencies might look like (hurricanes, earthquakes, civil unrest, violent uprisings or wildfires, etc.) can be hard to predict, but a well thought-out emergency plan, paired with regular drills and the right equipment, can put you in a better position to weather the storm, whatever form it takes.I asked our Office of Security for tips on developing an emergency action plan, and they had lots of suggestions. They also recommended that everyone learn how to create a “go-bag.” (A go-bag has important items that you may need during an emergency) Hopefully you’ll find these tips useful for you and your family.
Tips for Developing an Emergency Action Plan
An emergency action plan is, simply put, the plan of action for you and your family if a crisis arises. It’s important to discuss (and write down) your plan so you and your family know exactly what to do during an emergency. Remember: Planning shouldn’t be done in isolation. Every member of your family should be included and actively contribute. Here are a few things you should consider discussing when creating your emergency plan:
Building the Perfect Go-Bag
According to FEMA, people should be prepared to take care of themselves and family members for up to 72 hours, or three days, following a disaster. To do this effectively you should collect and consolidate the appropriate materials at a well-known location in your home, work or vehicle ahead of time. We recommend consolidating the items into what we call a “go-bag,” so named because it is a tool that is intended for use in ‘on-the-go’ situations, such as a hasty evacuation.As some of our officers can attest, multiple go-bags scattered throughout the house, vehicles and your workplace might be the best solution. You never know where you’ll be when disaster strikes and having a go-bag within arm’s reach can mean the difference between life and death.
Contents of your go-bag should (at a minimum) include:
This is by no means an exhaustive list, but should serve as a reference as you build a more personalized list based on your needs and those of your family, as well as the specific threats or challenges you are likely to face in your part of the world. If, for instance, you live along the coastline, you may want to put more time/effort into waterproofing your go bag and its contents. Those living or staying in areas of earthquake activity should consider including temporary shelters and focusing on communications, as cellular towers could be impacted.
Hopefully these tips are helpful!
Stay safe,
~ Molly
Continue reading “CIA Offers Tips On Preparing A “Go-Bag” For Emergencies In Iran And Elsewhere”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
The humorous hell scene from 1997 Woody Allen film, Deconstructing Harry
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back
Ganz Deutschland ist wiedervereinigt. Ganz Deutschland? Nein! Dambeck (Altmark) bleibt von der Wiedervereinigung ausgeschlossen und vegetiert als Rest-DDR als souveräner Dritte-Welt-Staat vor sich hin. Weil wir Dambeck nicht wollen!!! NIEMAND WILL DAMBECK!!!!!!!!! Dambecker sind Kannibalen und auch sonst nicht ungefährlich. Dieser Film ist meinem ehemaligen Arbeitskollegen aus Dambeck gewidmet.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The following set of documents was obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request made to the National Security Agency for “records relating to NSA Director Gen. Keith B. Alexander’s attendance of the Bilderberg Meetings held in 2008 in Chantilly Virginia; in 2009 in Vouliagmeni, Greece; and in 2011 in St. Moritz, Switzerland.” The request took the NSA 5 years and 13 days to fulfill.
Uses of the WHOIS
Traditionally:
• Contact point for incident response
• Determination of availability of domain names
But also:
• Assisting, public safety organisations, businesses, consumer groups, individuals in combating abuse and fraud and seeking redress.
• Help with online crime attribution
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The assassination in Malta of investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in October 2017 put the island in the headlines. John Sweeney, who reported on the story for Newsnight in the immediate aftermath, has been back to Malta to look into the stories Caruana Galizia was covering before her death and to speak to Malta’s Prime Minister Joseph Muscat.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Saudi Arabia’s public prosecutor says five people have been sentenced to death and three have been handed life sentences, over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The trial, held at the Criminal Court of Riyadh, took place behind closed doors and the identities of the defendants have not been released. Khashoggi was murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul last year. Crown Prince, Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) says he had no prior knowledge of the operation.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Here is the report about 49 journalists who were killed this year 2019 just for doing their job, 389 are currently in prison and 57 are being held hostage.
Continue reading “49 journalists were killed, 389 are currently in prison and 57 are being held hostage in 2019”Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The director’s cut of Pop Stasi – Tainted Love
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Lichtenberg, Ostberlin – Die Stasi-Zentrale in der Normannenstraße: Der General feiert seinen ??. Geburtstag, sowohl die Offiziere der Staatssicherheit als auch die Vertreter der Opposition finden sich zusammen auf der feucht-fröhlichen Orgie im Hauptbüro ein. DIE WAHRHEIT ÜBER DIE STASI Spielfilm, Politsatire, Groteske D 1992/2008, 50 min Erstellung: Arbeitsgruppe 1 / Alex Zahn Kamera: Eckard Stüwe Musik: Flake Lorenz Darsteller: Clemens Tragelehn, Mathias Herrmann, Muromez, Eckard Stüwe, Theo Gnauck, Friedhelm Sprenger, Wolfgang Dahl, Alexander Scharf, Svenja Teichert “Geburtstagslied General” Text: Theo Gnauck Musik: Flake http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Die_Wahr… http://tilsiter-lichtspiele.de/stasi-… Eine Filmgroteske über die DDR im Jahre 2008 – ein Jahr vor ihrem 60. Geburtstag! “… so stellte die nach der XI. Parteikonferenz im Jahre ’89 konsequent und zielstrebig in Angriff genommene Verwirklichung der Reformbeschlüsse des ZK der SED eine echte und tiefgreifende Veränderung aller Bereiche des sozialistischen Lebens dar. Fehler und Irritationen der Vergangenheit konnten im Vorwärtsschreiten von Volk und Partei endgültig überwunden werden. So können wir kurz vor Abschluß des Aufgebotes – DDR 60 – und ein Jahr vor dem großen Geburtstag sagen: Unsere DDR ist stark und erwachsen geworden…” — Aus dem Referat des Genossen Eberlein auf dem XXVI. Parteitag der SED, Mai 2008 Die DDR im damals utopisch fiktiven Jahr 2008 – ein Jahr vor dem 60. Geburtstag der Republik – als ewig währender, realsozialistischer Kostümball. Staatssicherheit und Opposition in symbiotischem Tanz engumschlungen. Die untergehende DDR als fröhliches Geländespiel mit Musik. Die in der frühen Nachwendezeit an den gerade verlassenen und noch sitzwarmen originalen Schauplätzen wie Erich Mielkes Büro in der Zentrale der DDR-Staatssicherheit in der Normannenstrasse gedrehte Satire verzichtet wohltuend auf jeglichen peinlichen Stasi-Schwulst heutiger Tage. Irrwitzig ostdeutsche Bilder und Figuren und die Musik verschiedener Ostberliner Bands füllen eine schräge Flaschenpost aus einer längst untergegangenen Welt. Die erste Fassung von 1992 galt als verschollen und wurde 2008 von ehemaligen Mitgliedern der Dissidentengruppe Arbeitsgruppe 1 aufgefunden und neu bearbeitet. Der Film ist eine Satire auf die politischen und geistigen Zustände in der DDR der ausgehenden 80er Jahre. Die Musik zum Film stammte vom Feeling B-Keyboarder Christian Lorenz (Flake) – seit 1994 bei Rammstein – und anderen ostdeutschen Bands und Musikern. Gedreht wurde der Film an Originalorten im ehemaligen Hauptgebäude des Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in Berlin-Lichtenberg, zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon die Forschungs- und Gedenkstätte Normannenstraße sowie in Berlin-Mitte und Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg.
TILSITER LICHTSPIELE ================= Programmkino & Kneipe Kino in Friedrichshain seit 1908 Richard-Sorge-Str. 25a, 10249 Berlin U5: Frankfurter Tor, Weberwiese M10: Bersarinplatz, Straßmannstraße http://tilsiter-lichtspiele.de https://facebook.com/tilsiter.lichtsp… https://twitter.com/Kino_Tilsiter
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [ˈʃtɑːziː]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of the German Democratic Republic or GDR, colloquially known as East Germany. It has been described as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies to ever have existed. The Stasi was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. The Stasi motto was “Schild und Schwert der Partei” (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). One of its main tasks was spying on the population, mainly through a vast network of citizens turned informants, and fighting any opposition by overt and covert measures including hidden psychological destruction of dissidents (Zersetzung, literally meaning decomposition). It also worked as an intelligence agency abroad, the respective division Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung was responsible for both espionage and for conducting covert operations in foreign countries. Under its long-time head Markus Wolf it gained a reputation as one of the most effective intelligence agencies of the Cold War. Numerous Stasi officials were prosecuted for their crimes after 1990. After German reunification, the surveillance files that the Stasi had maintained for millions of East Germans were laid open, so that any citizen could inspect their personal file on request; these files are now maintained by the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records. The Stasi perfected the technique of psychological harassment of perceived enemies known as Zersetzung (pronounced [ʦɛɐ̯ˈzɛʦʊŋ]) — a term borrowed from chemistry which literally means “decomposition”. By the 1970s, the Stasi had decided that methods of overt persecution which had been employed up to that time, such as arrest and torture, were too crude and obvious. It was realised that psychological harassment was far less likely to be recognised for what it was, so its victims, and their supporters, were less likely to be provoked into active resistance, given that they would often not be aware of the source of their problems, or even its exact nature. Zersetzung was designed to side-track and “switch off” perceived enemies so that they would lose the will to continue any “inappropriate” activities. Tactics employed under Zersetzung generally involved the disruption of the victim’s private or family life. This often included psychological attacks such as breaking into homes and messing with the contents — moving furniture, altering the timing of an alarm, removing pictures from walls or replacing one variety of tea with another. Other practices included property damage, sabotage of cars, purposely incorrect medical treatment, smear campaigns including sending falsified compromising photos or documents to the victim’s family, denunciation, provocation, psychological warfare, psychological subversion, wiretapping, bugging, mysterious phone calls or unnecessary deliveries, even including sending a vibrator to a target’s wife. Usually victims had no idea the Stasi were responsible. Many thought they were losing their minds, and mental breakdowns and suicide could result. One great advantage of the harassment perpetrated under Zersetzung was that its subtle nature meant that it was able to be plausibly denied. That was important given that the GDR was trying to improve its international standing during the 1970s and 80s, especially in conjunction with the Ostpolitik of West-German chancellor Willy Brandt massively improving relations between the two German states. Zersetzung techniques have since been adopted by other security agencies, particularly the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stasi
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
These formerly classified photos are part of a series released by the German artist Simon Menner that he reportedly obtained from the Stasi archives. This particular set demonstrates Stasi agents demonstrating different techniques for disguising themselves. Blurring of the eyes in one of the photos was performed by the artist.
An undated handout picture shows an officer of former East German Ministry for State Security (MfS), known as the Stasi, presenting a disguise outfit. Spies from former communist East Germany demonstrate the art of disguise by donning fur wigs, fake moustaches and dark glasses in a Berlin exhibition of recently uncovered and once highly classified photographs. Morgen Contemporary/Simon Menner
An undated handout picture shows an officer of former East German Ministry for State Security (MfS), known as the Stasi, presenting a disguise outfit. Spies from former communist East Germany demonstrate the art of disguise by donning fur wigs, fake moustaches and dark glasses in a Berlin exhibition of recently uncovered and once highly classified photographs. Morgen Contemporary/Simon Menner
An undated handout picture shows an officer of former East German Ministry for State Security (MfS), known as the Stasi, presenting a disguise outfit. Spies from former communist East Germany demonstrate the art of disguise by donning fur wigs, fake moustaches and dark glasses in a Berlin exhibition of recently uncovered and once highly classified photographs. Morgen Contemporary/Simon Menner
An undated handout picture shows an officer of former East German Ministry for State Security (MfS), known as the Stasi, presenting a disguise outfit. Spies from former communist East Germany demonstrate the art of disguise by donning fur wigs, fake moustaches and dark glasses in a Berlin exhibition of recently uncovered and once highly classified photographs. Morgen Contemporary/Simon Menner
An undated handout picture shows an officer of former East German Ministry for State Security (MfS), known as the Stasi, presenting a disguise outfit. Spies from former communist East Germany demonstrate the art of disguise by donning fur wigs, fake moustaches and dark glasses in a Berlin exhibition of recently uncovered and once highly classified photographs. Morgen Contemporary/Simon Menner
An undated handout picture shows an officer of former East German Ministry for State Security (MfS), known as the Stasi, presenting a disguise outfit. Spies from former communist East Germany demonstrate the art of disguise by donning fur wigs, fake moustaches and dark glasses in a Berlin exhibition of recently uncovered and once highly classified photographs. Morgen Contemporary/Simon Menner
An undated handout picture shows an officer of former East German Ministry for State Security (MfS), known as the Stasi, presenting a disguise outfit. Spies from former communist East Germany demonstrate the art of disguise by donning fur wigs, fake moustaches and dark glasses in a Berlin exhibition of recently uncovered and once highly classified photographs. Morgen Contemporary/Simon Menner
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Die Spionageabwehr der Stasi nahm mit einem Schulungsfilm den westdeutschen Verfassungsschutz unter die Lupe. Dargestellt werden unter anderem angebliche Verbindungen zur Oppositionellen in der DDR.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
1. (U) Situation
a. (U) Purpose. This branch plan provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the support of the Board of Governors of the federal Reserve System to ensure the effective execution of a National Essential Function (NEF).
…
c. (U) Friendly Forces
(1) (U) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve System (FRS) is the central bank of the United States. The primary responsibility of the Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors is to formulate and administer the Nation’s monetary policy. The Board of Governors operates as a USG Agency.
…
(b) (U) Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems. Oversees the operations of the independent Federal Reserve Banks and of the FRS Law Enforcement program.
(c) (U) Office of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity. The Director of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity is the supported entity for the transportation of monetary instruments within the USNORTHCOM AOR.
…
(c) (U) Commercial passenger flights are restricted during certain national emergencies.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
After successfully overthrowing the government during the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Franco installed a brutal military dictatorship which saw tens of thousands imprisoned or executed during his regime. Known as “El Caudillo” (which translates to “the Leader”), Franco also banned the Basque and Catalan languages, along with every religion besides Catholicism.
But when he wasn’t having his secret police apprehend civilians – or maybe while he was? – Franco was a fan of painting outdoor scenes on canvas. The paintings, which his own grandson will tell you “were not great works of art,” were of course done in the vein of realism, because getting nuanced work from a military dictator is probably a bridge too far.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Imelda Marcos is the widow of Ferdinand Marcos, the former dictator and president of the Philippines (1966-1986). Ferdinand had a pretty dark start in politics: in 1935 he was found guilty of assassinating his father’s campaign rival for national assembly, but he was later acquitted and rose all the way up to the presidency, where his authoritarian regime was known for corruption and lavish spending.
Imelda Marcos received an official position in her husband’s regime, one that allowed her to hook up her friends and relatives with lucrative government positions. Imelda herself was also severely in on the take, acquiring over 1,200 pairs of shoes, all of which she had to leave behind when the Filipino people rose up in 1986, forcing her and Ferdinand to flee to an actually pretty cushy exile in Hawaii.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
In 1919, Benito Mussolini founded Italy’s Fascist Party – a new faction which broke away from socialist ideals and promoted nationalism and extreme right-wing policies. By 1925, he was the nation’s dictator and effectively the sole ruler. Along with his buddies, Adolf Hitler and Francisco Franco, Mussolini was part of a legendary triumvirate of sh*theads that were basically a living, breathing newspaper comments section of racist uncles. The end of World War II was not kind to that trio, however, and in 1945, Mussolini was captured by Italian partisans and killed, along with his mistress Claretta Petacci, by firing squad.
A few bullets to the skull, however, were not all that Claretta and Benito shared. He also wrote her a ton of insanely sexual letters, which were unearthed in 2009.
Mussolini, who was barely five-feet tall, was incredibly confident when it came to sending thirsty messages. He had no qualms shooting out erotic passages like:
I tremble in telling you, but I have a feverish desire for your delicious little body which I want to kiss all over. And you must adore my body, your giant…
There really isn’t much subtlety with fascism.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
ADP 3-28 clarifies similarities and differences between defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and other elements of decisive action. DSCA and stability operations are similar in many ways. Both revolve around helping partners on the ground within areas of operations. Both require Army forces to provide essential services and work together with civil authorities. However, homeland operational environments differ from those overseas in terms of law, military chain of command, use of force, and inter-organizational coordination among unified action partners. This ADP helps Army leaders understand how operations in the homeland differ from operations by forces deployed forward in other theaters. It illustrates how domestic operational areas are theaters of operations with special requirements. Moreover, this ADP recognizes that DSCA is a joint mission that supports the national homeland security enterprise. The Department of Defense conducts DSCA under civilian control, based on U.S. law and national policy, and in cooperation with numerous civilian partners. National policy, in this context, often uses the word joint to include all cooperating partners, as in a joint field office led by civil authorities. See Introductory Figure, on page viii.
The utilization of military forces during periods of domestic emergency is not undertaken lightly. The military however brings with it unique abilities, in terms of both capability and capacity which provide respondents with the resources needed to respond to an incident. The use of military forces in the responses to hurricanes Andrew in 1992 and Katrina in 2005 illustrate some of the different responses the U.S. military can provide. They also led the government to realize that additional coordination was required before an incident to ensure a successful response. An in-depth look at the tenets of DSCA, authorities, and the national preparedness system framework are discussed in chapter one.
The support the Army provides to civil authorities falls into four main tasks: Provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and provide other designated support. Due to legal limitations such as the Posse Comitatus Act, the purpose for which the military can respond to these incidents is constrained, allowing a military response only to; save lives, restore essential services, maintain or restore law and order, protect infrastructure and property, support maintenance or restoration of local government, or shape the environment for intergovernmental success. Both state and federal laws detail how support is requested, provided and limited in both scope and duration. Further information on the employment of military forces and legal restrictions on doing so are provided in chapter two.
…
…
ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE AUTHORITIES
1-78. Isolation refers to the separation and the restriction of movement of people who have an infectious illness from healthy people to stop the spread of that illness. Quarantine refers to the separation and restriction of movement of people who are not yet ill but have been exposed to an infectious agent and are therefore potentially infectious. A geographical quarantine, known as a cordon sanitaire, is a sanitary barrier erected around an area. Both isolation and quarantine may be conducted on a voluntary basis or compelled on a mandatory basis through legal authority.
1-79. The federal government has the authority to prevent the spread of disease into the United States (foreign) or between states and territories (interstate). The Department of Health and Human Services is the lead federal agency for isolation and quarantine. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention determine and enforce any federal government measures to prevent the spread of disease.
1-80. Only one federal statute permits federal military forces to enforce quarantine laws, under very narrow circumstances. Section 97 of Title 42, USC, allows military commanders of any coastal fort or station to support the execution of state quarantines with respect to vessels arriving in or bound for the United States.
…
…
CIVIL DISTURBANCE SUPPORT
4-172. A governor may call out the National Guard to quell a civil disturbance when it threatens lives or property. State forces support essential services, establish traffic control posts, cordon off areas, release smoke and obscurants, and serve as security or quick reaction forces. The state National Guard’s joint task force commander provides liaison teams to each affected law enforcement agency and normally positions the joint task force headquarters near civilian law enforcement headquarters. In addition to support for civilian law enforcement agencies, National Guard forces provide security for emergency responders. After review by the state attorney general, the governor approves the RUF.
4-173. A request for direct federal military support to civil disturbance operations is unlikely except in an extreme emergency. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of legal considerations. See DODI 3025.21 regarding DOD responsibilities for civil disturbance.) Federal military support for civil disturbances does not fall under defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies when the Insurrection Act or other exemptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are used. The President may employ the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard, within the United States to restore order or enforce federal law when requested by the state legislature, or when not in session, by the governor, and when the authorities of the state are incapable of controlling the situation. The Attorney General of the United States appoints a senior civilian representative as his or her action agent. Federal military personnel supporting civil disturbance operations remain under military command at all times. Forces deployed to help federal or local authorities in a civil disturbance adhere to the SRUF and RUF approved by the combatant commander.
4-174. USNORTHCOM develops and maintains plans for civil disturbance operations. These plans provide the foundation for federal military civil disturbance support. They standardize most military activities and command relationships. Tasks performed by federal military forces may include joint patrolling with law enforcement officers; securing key buildings, memorials, intersections and bridges; and acting as a quick reaction force.
4-175. Civil disturbance missions require unit training prior to employing crowd control tactics. This normally requires a mobile training team from the military police or trained law enforcement personnel. Even in an urgent situation, commanders need to drill their forces repeatedly until small unit leaders can execute maneuvers under extreme stress. Training should include all arms, emphasizing treatment and evacuation procedures, detention and movement of citizens, and use of authorized nonlethal systems.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE NATIONAL GUARD DOMESTIC CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT
4-176. The military force with primary responsibility for direct law enforcement support is the National Guard, under state authority. The legal authority for National Guard members to support law enforcement is derived from state law, which varies from state to state. A governor of a state may call up National Guard forces to help local and state law enforcement agencies. The National Guard’s authority derives from the governor’s responsibility to enforce the laws of that state. Even with that authority, the governor carefully regulates the amount and nature of the support, consistent with state law. The governor may employ the state National Guard for law enforcement support in state active duty status or in Title 32, USC status. Federal laws (principally the Posse Comitatus Act) restrict federalized National Guard forces (in federal service, under Title 10, USC) from providing law enforcement support unless a specific exemption is applicable.
4-177. State National Guard forces in either Title 32, USC status or state active duty status from another state operating under the EMAC or a memorandum of agreement between the states may only support civilian law enforcement as specified in a memorandum approved by both governors.
4-178. There are 54 state and territory National Guard counterdrug support programs, governed by National Guard regulations. The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Section 112 of Title 32, USC, may provide resources though the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to states with approved National Guard counterdrug support plans. In addition to requiring approval by the Secretary of Defense, the state National Guard counterdrug support plan requires approval from the state’s attorney general and adjutant general. The National Guard Bureau funds a full time Title 32, USC active Guard and Reserve counterdrug coordinator in each state for administration and management of the state counterdrug program. The counterdrug coordinator serves as the focal point for all counter drug mission validations, approval authority, and the prioritization for counterdrug mission tasking under appropriate policies, instructions, and directives.
4-179. State National Guard forces also provide support to DHS border security programs. Under Section 112 of Title 32, USC, National Guard Soldiers support border security by operating surveillance systems, analyzing intelligence, installing fences and vehicle barriers, building roads, and providing training. Although state National Guard units could participate in direct law enforcement activities related to border security, under DOD policy they normally provide indirect support, under the control of their governor.
4-180. State National Guard forces frequently support civilian law enforcement agencies during disaster response. The disruption and confusion associated with a disaster typically cause numerous problems with law enforcement tasks. Commanders should evaluate the potential for law enforcement support as part of their unit’s initial assessment and provide their assessment to their state joint task force headquarters. Commanders must impress upon their subordinates that they must refrain from law enforcement activities except as authorized.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
STASI-Ausweis aus Dresdner Archiv
Vor dem Ukraine-Gipfel in Paris hat Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel (CDU) mit dem russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin ein Einzelgespräch geführt.
Über die Inhalte machte die deutsche Seite am Montag zunächst keine Angaben. Es war erwartet worden, dass Merkel den Mord an einem Georgier in Berlin anspricht, der zu einer diplomatischen Krise zwischen Deutschland und Russland geführt hat.
Kurz vor der Abreise Merkels nach Paris hatte die Bundesregierung erneut eine “ernsthafte und unverzügliche Mitwirkung der russischen Behörden” an der Aufklärung des Verbrechens gefordert. Man sei “weiterhin bestürzt über die Tat”, sagte die stellvertretende Regierungssprecherin Ulrike Demmer.
Wegen fehlender Kooperation bei der Aufklärung des mutmaßlichen Auftragsmords am 23. August im Kleinen Tiergarten in Berlin hatte die Bundesregierung zwei russische Diplomaten ausgewiesen. Die von Moskau angekündigte Reaktion steht noch aus. Der Generalbundesanwalt hat wegen der grundsätzlichen Bedeutung des Falls die Ermittlungen übernommen.
Die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden und die Bundesregierung hätten “verschiedene russische Stellen mit Anfragen zu dem Fall befasst”, sagte Demmer. Genauer wollte sie es nicht sagen. Russland weist die Vorwürfe zurück.
Putins STASI-Ausweis:
Von Seiten der Stasiunterlagenbehörde heißt es: “Es war übliche Praxis beim DDR-Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, die Verbindungsoffiziere des russischen Geheimdienstes KGB und die ihnen untergeordneten Offiziere wie Putin mit Hausausweisen der zuständigen MfS-Dienststelle auszustatten.”
Putin war Augenzeuge, als während der friedlichen Revolution am 5. Dezember 1989 rund 5000 Demonstranten die hermetisch abgeschirmte Dresdner Bezirksverwaltung der Staatssicherheit besetzten. Als sich die Demonstranten der Dienststelle näherten, kam es fast zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen mit sowjetischen Militärs.
Aufgrund einer Medienanfrage seien Akten der Abteilung “Kader und Schulung” der ehemaligen Stasi-Bezirksverwaltung Dresden durchforstet worden, sagte Felber. Dabei sei man auf den Ausweis gestoßen. “Es ist schon eine kleine Sensation. Putins Name war in den Akten, die die Ausgabe der Ausweise an sowjetische Militärangehörige nachweisen, nicht verzeichnet.”
Im Internet wird daraufhin gewiesen, dass Angela Merkel von zahlreichen IM’s umgeben gewesen sei. Daraus wird geschlussfolgert, dass auch sie für den Staatssicherheitsdienst gearbeitet hätte. Tatsächlich waren wenigstens drei ihrer Kollegen am Zentralinstitut beim Staatssicherheitsdienst als Informanten erfasst: Hans-Jörg Osten (IM “Einstein”), Frank Schneider (IM “Bachmann”) und Michael Schindhelm (IM “Manfred Weih”). Mit Letzterem, den PDS-Kultursenator Thomas Flierl 2005 zum Generaldirektor der Berliner Opernstiftung berief, teilte sie sich eine Zeit lang ihr Büro. Als sie 1989 zum Demokratischen Aufbruch stieß, arbeitete sie mit einem weiteren Stasi-Informanten, dem ersten Parteivorsitzenden Wolfgang Schnur (IM „Torsten“ und „Dr. Ralf Schirmer“) zusammen. Im April 1990 wurde sie schließlich stellvertretende Regierungssprecherin unter dem letzten DDR-Ministerpräsidenten Lothar de Maizière, der in MfS-Unterlagen als IM “Czerny” erfasst ist.
IM Czerny mit Merkel
IM ERIKA – Im Internet verbreitetes “Filmplakat”
“Unsere Ex-FDJ-Sekretärin Angela Merkel lebe hoch” – Stasi-Opfer-Demonstration 2016 in Berlin
Historiker Hubertus Knabe kommentiert: “Nimmt man alle diese Fakten zusammen, muss man zu folgendem Schluss kommen: Für die Behauptung, Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel hätte unter dem Decknamen “Erika” für den Staatssicherheitsdienst gearbeitet, gibt es keinerlei Belege. Sollte es einen entsprechenden IM-Vorgang gegeben haben, müssten selbst im Fall seiner Vernichtung zumindest noch Spuren davon erhalten sein – zum Beispiel Berichte aus der Quelle “Erika”, die in den Akten ausgespähter Personen abgelegt wurden. Das ist nach gegenwärtigem Kenntnisstand aber nicht der Fall. Ob die Säcke mit den zerrissenen Unterlagen darüber hinaus gehende Hinweise enthalten, bleibt Spekulation.”
QUELLE:
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Der Film der Spionageabwehr der Stasi zeigt die Verurteilung eines DDR-Handelsvertreters, der für den Bundesnachrichtendienst spionierte.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Mao Zedong, founder of the People’s Republic of China, is technically the greatest mass murderer in history. In 1958, Mao brought forth (and ruthlessly enforced) “The Great Leap Forward,” which was a plan to catch China up to the economy of the western world. Unfortunately, this plan came with mass famine, starvation, torture, and systematic violence, which included making people work nude in the dead of winter, and parents burying their own children alive. All told, 45 million people died during Mao’s reign, a body count that remains unmatched by any other historical despot.
But the guy just loved poetry. Chairman Mao – though he persecuted many Chinese writers and had countless books burned – was an avid reader, as well as a bit of a writer. He wrote over 30 poems, usually in the format of the ancient Chinese style. Ironically, he would have forbidden one billion people from every reading his work, due to his principles, but who isn’t self-conscious about their poetry?
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
But there was another side to Idi Amin. More than a tyrant, more than a mad man, Idi Amin was a guy who just loved slapstick comedy. He was apparently an avid fan of children’s cartoons, most specifically Tom and Jerry – you know, the one where the larger, menacing figure seeks to destroy the smaller, ostensibly defenseless one?
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Der Namen Guillaume steht wie kein anderer exemplarisch für die Westspionage des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS). Er stieg zum Persönlichen Referenten des damaligen Bundeskanzlers Willy Brandt auf und hatte Zugang zu streng geheimen Unterlagen. Ein Propagandafilm der Stasi.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Maybe the most malevolent individual to ever walk the Earth – a man who endeavored the annihilation of the Jewish individuals and accordingly murdered more than 6 million lives – Adolf Hitler is with precisely zero saving graces. In the event that anything, his greatest diversion (past his very unremarkable craftsmanship), just makes him much progressively abnormal. It’s hard to believe, but it’s true, he was one of those grown-ups that is truly into Disney.
In 2008, a Norwegian exhibition hall chief named William Hakvaag discovered hand-hued depiction of the characters Constrained and Doc from the 1937 Disney film Snow White and the Seven Diminutive people. The drawings – which were obviously walker, best case scenario – were marked “A.H.” and are thought with close to sureness to have been finished by Hitler, who additionally claimed a duplicate of the film and “thought it was probably the best motion picture at any point made.” obviously he did.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Langsam dämmert es auch den Mainstream-Medien, das GRU/KGB und Neo-STASI weiterhin aktiv sind und unbequeme Gegner überall auf der Welt ermorden – auch in BERLIN. So berichtet nunmehr auch die wachgeküsste Tagesschau:
“Zelimkhan Khangoshvili fürchtete um sein Leben. Der russische Staat sei hinter ihm her, berichtete der Tschetschene mit georgischem Pass bei seiner Asylanhörung im brandenburgischen Eisenhüttenstadt im Januar 2017. Mehrere Mordanschläge habe es in den vergangenen Jahren auf ihn gegeben, so der ehemalige Rebellenkommandeur. Er sei ein gesuchter Mann – im Kaukasus und darüber hinaus. Was er denn befürchte, wenn er nach Russland zurückkehren müsste, wollte der Mitarbeiter des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) von ihm wissen. Khangoshvilis Antwort: “Die russischen Organe werden einen Mord inszenieren.”
Am 23. August 2019, gegen 11:58 Uhr, wurde Zelimkhan Khangoshvili schließlich ermordet. Nicht in Russland oder im Kaukasus, sondern mitten in Berlin. Im Kleinen Tiergarten im Ortsteil Moabit war der 40-Jährige gerade auf dem Weg zum Freitagsgebet in der Moschee, als sich ein Mann auf einem Fahrrad näherte und ihm aus kurzer Distanz mit einer Pistole samt Schalldämpfer in den Kopf schoss. Khangoshvili war sofort tot.
Der Mord an dem Georgier gibt seitdem Rätsel auf: Wer steckt hinter dem Attentat? War es ein Auftragsmord aus dem kriminellen Milieu? Eine Fehde unter Kaukasiern? Oder gar ein Attentat im Auftrag des Kreml?
Der mutmaßliche Todesschütze hatte nach der Tat versucht mit einem E-Roller zu fliehen, war jedoch festgenommen worden: Es ist ein stämmiger Mann mit Schnauzbart und auffälligen Tätowierungen. Laut Pass handelt es sich um den russischen Staatsbürger Vadim Sokolov. Er sitzt in Berlin in Untersuchungshaft und schweigt. Einmal soll er Besuch von Diplomaten aus der russischen Botschaft bekommen haben, die ihn konsularisch betreuen.
Die Ermittlungen in dem Fall führt das Berliner Landeskriminalamt (LKA). Der Vorwurf gegen den festgenommenen Tatverdächtigen lautete bislang: Mord. Weil die Tat aber eine so große Brisanz birgt, lässt sich der Generalbundesanwalt seit Beginn an über den Stand der Ermittlungen informieren. Und auch das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) ist beteiligt.
Jetzt könnte der Fall allerdings eine neue Dimension bekommen: Die Bundesanwaltschaft will das Verfahren nach Informationen von WDR, NDR und “Süddeutscher Zeitung” noch in dieser Woche übernehmen. Und zwar wegen eines möglichen Geheimdienst-Hintergrunds. In Karlsruhe geht man inzwischen davon aus, dass der russische Staat den Mord in Berlin-Moabit in Auftrag gegeben haben könnte. Auch der “Spiegel” hatte darüber berichtet.
Ein Abgleich der biometrischen Daten der damaligen Fahndungsbilder ergab nun eine hohe Ähnlichkeit mit dem in Berlin festgenommenen Tatverdächtigen Sokolov. Auffällig war allerdings: Russland hatte die internationale Fahndung nach Vadim K. im Jahr 2015 ganz plötzlich eingestellt. Der Verdacht der deutschen Ermittler ist nun: Russische Dienste könnten den mutmaßlichen Mörder gefunden und für ein Attentat rekrutiert haben. Und schufen daraufhin die Falschidentität Sokolov.”
In Geheimdienstkreisen ist man sich sicher, es war Putins langer Arm in Berlin.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Legendary golfer and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il was something of a human rights violation virtuoso. The ham-shaped leader oversaw plenty of atrocities in his time at the helm in Pyongyang, including ethnic cleansing and mass starvation.
But he also adored basketball. His favorite player, naturally, was Michael Jordan, who appeared in the Warner Brothers film Space Jam, which featured several cartoons he also obsessed over like a very normal person. Kim Jong-il was in fact such a fan of His Royal Airness that he had VHS recordings of every one of Jordan’s games. The Great Leader, sadly, never got to meet his hero, but his son sort of came close with Dennis Rodman’s famed trip to North Korea.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Depending on one’s political leanings, Joseph Stalin’s legacy is a bit subjective. During his reign (1929-1953), the Soviet Union went from a poor, peasant society to an industrial and military superpower, but this also caused the worst man-made famine in history and millions of his people died.
Regardless, this legendary figure of collectivism loved nudes. Males nudes, specifically.
Stalin did not, however, draw the nudes himself. He collected sketches of muscular male specimens from various Russian artists and, bizarrely, he merely annotated them. Stalin would draw on the subject’s genitals or torsos and write out short messages below them. His scrawls ranged from the humorous (“You need to work, not wank. Time for re-education”) to the maudlin, sometimes addressed to his fallen comrades: “Radek, you ginger bastard, if you hadn’t pissed into the wind, if you hadn’t been so bad, you’d still be alive.”
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Architect of the 9/11 attacks, the worst instance of terrorism ever on American soil, Osama bin Laden knew how to let his hair down and blow off some steam after a long day at Al-Qaeda HQ.
But when the 5 o’clock whistle blew, bin Laden didn’t dash to the nearest happy hour for wings and tall boys – he hit the sand for an intense match of beach volleyball.
The 6’4″ bin Laden was a force on the court, according to his associate Mohammed Atef. Atef, the former chief of Al-Qaeda, also enjoyed the game, but the two never played on the same team, citing the fact that they were so good it was an unfair advantage over other players.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Indeed, even severe despots need time to loosen up. While overbearing maniacs have persecuted, starved, abused, tormented, and killed millions they’ve additionally set aside some effort to watch kid’s shows, play sea shore volleyball and even pen hot erotica.
While ordinarily a side interest refines somebody, these pastimes of the merciless despots on this rundown just make them progressively outsider and strange. This is what the absolute cruelest individuals in history got up to when they were off the clock.
Previous Leader of Iraq Saddam Hussein was a heartless pioneer who managed with an iron clench hand. The genuine degree of his monstrosities is obscure, as murders completed at his command are countless, yet there is proof of more than 250 mass graves from his rule. At the end of the day, preceding his hanging in 2003, Saddam was not a very chill fellow.
He was, in any case, horny.
Saddam had a propensity for composing romance books. Composing under the vigorously encoded nom de plume of “S. Hussein,” Saddam distributed a book called Zabibah and the Ruler, which was a ham-fisted and sensual personal novel set in antiquated Iraq. The revelation of this sappy, explicitly charged tome was additionally entirely arbitrary: CIA authorities discovered it by chance in an Arabic book shop in London in 2001.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Russian spies are corrupting Serbia. This is video of the Russian military main intelligence directorate (GRU) officer Colonel Georgy Viktorovich Kleban paying his Serbian agent who is senior Serbian official. Kleban works in Russian Embassy in Belgrade. This is what the Russians do to us, there ‘friends’.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
(U) Vehicle ramming is a form of attack in which a perpetrator deliberately uses a motor vehicle to strike a target with the intent to inflict fatal injuries or significant property damage.
(U) THREAT LANDSCAPE
(U) Based on our analysis of terrorist publications such as Rumiyah and observations of terrorism-inspired events worldwide, we believe terrorist organizations overseas have advocated conducting vehicle ramming attacks against crowds, buildings, and other vehicles, using modified or unmodified large-capacity vehicles. Such attacks could target locations where large numbers of people congregate, including sporting events, entertainment venues, shopping centers, or celebratory gatherings such as parades.
“Though being an essential part of modern life, very few actually comprehend the deadly and destructive capability of the motor vehicle and its capacity of reaping large numbers of casualties if used in a premeditated manner.”
Rumiyah Issue 3, Just Terror Tactics, 2016.
(U//FOUO) Vehicle ramming attacks are often unsophisticated, in that they require minimal planning and training. Terrorist groups continue to encourage aspiring attackers to employ unsophisticated tactics such as vehicle ramming because these types of attacks minimize premature detection and could inflict mass fatalities if successful. Furthermore, events that draw large groups of people—thus presenting an attractive vehicle ramming target—are usually scheduled and announced in advance, which greatly facilitates attack planning and training activities.
(U) In August 2018, a 29-year-old attacker drove into pedestrians and cyclists near London’s Houses of Parliament, injuring three persons in an event being investigated as a terrorist act. This apparent terrorist attack, as well as any additional attacks in 2018, will be more closely analyzed in the next issue of this report.
…
…
(U) LARGE-CAPACITY VEHICLES USED IN VEHICLE RAMMING ATTACKS
(U//FOUO) Large-capacity vehicles, specifically commercial trucks, rental trucks and vans, and buses, present an especially attractive mechanism for vehicle ramming attacks for several reasons: they are plentiful; arouse little or no suspicion because their presence around and access to structures and activity centers is expected; can easily penetrate security barriers4; and can inflict large-scale damage on people and infrastructure.
(U) Large-capacity vehicles may be obtained for terrorist activity in a variety of ways, including:
• (U) Personal – attacker uses their own large-capacity vehicle;
• (U) Rental – attacker rents a large-capacity vehicle;
• (U) Hijacking – attacker gains control of a large-capacity vehicle by force;
• (U) Theft – attacker steals a large-capacity vehicle; or
• (U) Insider threat – authorized commercial vehicle driver carries out or facilitates an attack.
…
(U) CONCLUSION
(U) TSA recommends vigilance and preparedness to prevent the use of large-capacity vehicles in terrorist attacks. Large-capacity vehicle owners and operators should alert their staff to possible theft or vehicle hijacking by would-be attackers, and emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activities to appropriate authorities.
(U) Large-capacity vehicle owners and operators can also help their home communities’ business and law enforcement agencies by partnering to discuss the threat of vehicle ramming attacks and the security awareness, planning, and best practices that could mitigate the threat.
(U) Existing and emerging technologies can be used to mitigate and even prevent vehicle ramming incidents. For vehicles equipped with tracking devices, geo-fencing technologies can identify potential threats in proximity to high-value targets and, in some cases, activate vehicle shut-down. In addition, automatic collision-prevention devices are expected to become more prevalent as vehicle fleets gain newer replacement vehicles.
(U) No community, large or small, rural or urban, is immune to large-capacity vehicle ramming attacks by organized or lone offender terrorists. Good security is good business. TSA recommends you to take an active role in protecting your business and your community from this potential threat.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Der Konsum illegaler Drogen spielte in der DDR zwar kaum eine Rolle, doch die Staatssicherheit musste sich trotzdem intensiv mit diesem Thema auseinandersetzen. Mit dem Flughafen Schönefeld befand sich ein internationaler Drogenumschlagplatz auf dem eigenen Staatsgebiet.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Hier die besten Stories von GoMoPa, alles andere sind Fake News:
1) “Dieses Schiff kann nicht sinken – Ttanic-Story”
2) “Schmutzkampagne gegen Bernie Madoff. Der Mann ist unschuldig”
3) “Affäre Kiessling”
4) “Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort – Ich wiederhole mein Ehrenwort – Uwe Barschel”
5) “Hitlers Tagebücher entdeckt”
6) “Live-Kontakte zu Frauen aus Deiner Umgebung”
7) “Christoph Daum – Ich habe ein absolut reines Gewissen”
8)“Walter Ulbricht – Niemand hat die Absicht eine Mauer zu errichten”
9) “Boris Becker – Der Samenraub”
10) ” Die Erde ist eine Scheibe”
11)”I did not have sexual relations with that woman – Bill Clinton”
12)”Niemand will unserem Herrn Frodo etwas Böses tun – Gollum in Herr der Ringe”
13)”Ich habe nie einen solchen Ring gesehen – Carsten Spengemann”
14) “Girl You know It’s True – Milli Vanilli”
15)”Ich habe geklont – Hwang”
16)”Ich werde den Mörder meiner Frau Nicole ein Leben lang jagen – OJ Simpson”
17)”Bauch weg in 10 Tagen”
18)”Ich bin eine Frau – Elton John”
19)”Polen hat den Krieg begonnen – Adolf Hitler”
20)”Ich kenne den Mann Jesus überhaupt nicht – Petrus( dreimal)”
Hier das GoMoPa-Mantra:
Stalin im Himmel, ja ich glaube an GoMoPa, Erich Honecker, Gregor Gysi, IM Erika, Baron Münchhausen und das Sandmännchen, den BiBa-Butze-Bär, Karl May, Bill Clinton (“I never had sex with this woman”), Richard Nixon, Wladimir, Putin, Donald Trump, RA Resch, Josef Goebbles, Julius Streicher, Klaus Maurischat, Peter Ehlers, Walter Ulbricht (“Es wird keine Mauer gebaut”) und Jürgen Möllemann.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Seit Anfang 1988 bekämpfte die Staatssicherheit die Ost-Berliner Friedens- und Bürgerrechtsbewegung unter dem Decknamen “Störenfried”. Im September 1989 griff die Geheimpolzei bei einer kleinen Demonstration auf dem Berliner Alexanderplatz durch.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
ADP 3-28 clarifies similarities and differences between defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and other elements of decisive action. DSCA and stability operations are similar in many ways. Both revolve around helping partners on the ground within areas of operations. Both require Army forces to provide essential services and work together with civil authorities. However, homeland operational environments differ from those overseas in terms of law, military chain of command, use of force, and inter-organizational coordination among unified action partners. This ADP helps Army leaders understand how operations in the homeland differ from operations by forces deployed forward in other theaters. It illustrates how domestic operational areas are theaters of operations with special requirements. Moreover, this ADP recognizes that DSCA is a joint mission that supports the national homeland security enterprise. The Department of Defense conducts DSCA under civilian control, based on U.S. law and national policy, and in cooperation with numerous civilian partners. National policy, in this context, often uses the word joint to include all cooperating partners, as in a joint field office led by civil authorities. See Introductory Figure, on page viii.
The utilization of military forces during periods of domestic emergency is not undertaken lightly. The military however brings with it unique abilities, in terms of both capability and capacity which provide respondents with the resources needed to respond to an incident. The use of military forces in the responses to hurricanes Andrew in 1992 and Katrina in 2005 illustrate some of the different responses the U.S. military can provide. They also led the government to realize that additional coordination was required before an incident to ensure a successful response. An in-depth look at the tenets of DSCA, authorities, and the national preparedness system framework are discussed in chapter one.
The support the Army provides to civil authorities falls into four main tasks: Provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and provide other designated support. Due to legal limitations such as the Posse Comitatus Act, the purpose for which the military can respond to these incidents is constrained, allowing a military response only to; save lives, restore essential services, maintain or restore law and order, protect infrastructure and property, support maintenance or restoration of local government, or shape the environment for intergovernmental success. Both state and federal laws detail how support is requested, provided and limited in both scope and duration. Further information on the employment of military forces and legal restrictions on doing so are provided in chapter two.
…
…
ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE AUTHORITIES
1-78. Isolation refers to the separation and the restriction of movement of people who have an infectious illness from healthy people to stop the spread of that illness. Quarantine refers to the separation and restriction of movement of people who are not yet ill but have been exposed to an infectious agent and are therefore potentially infectious. A geographical quarantine, known as a cordon sanitaire, is a sanitary barrier erected around an area. Both isolation and quarantine may be conducted on a voluntary basis or compelled on a mandatory basis through legal authority.
1-79. The federal government has the authority to prevent the spread of disease into the United States (foreign) or between states and territories (interstate). The Department of Health and Human Services is the lead federal agency for isolation and quarantine. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention determine and enforce any federal government measures to prevent the spread of disease.
1-80. Only one federal statute permits federal military forces to enforce quarantine laws, under very narrow circumstances. Section 97 of Title 42, USC, allows military commanders of any coastal fort or station to support the execution of state quarantines with respect to vessels arriving in or bound for the United States.
…
…
CIVIL DISTURBANCE SUPPORT
4-172. A governor may call out the National Guard to quell a civil disturbance when it threatens lives or property. State forces support essential services, establish traffic control posts, cordon off areas, release smoke and obscurants, and serve as security or quick reaction forces. The state National Guard’s joint task force commander provides liaison teams to each affected law enforcement agency and normally positions the joint task force headquarters near civilian law enforcement headquarters. In addition to support for civilian law enforcement agencies, National Guard forces provide security for emergency responders. After review by the state attorney general, the governor approves the RUF.
4-173. A request for direct federal military support to civil disturbance operations is unlikely except in an extreme emergency. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of legal considerations. See DODI 3025.21 regarding DOD responsibilities for civil disturbance.) Federal military support for civil disturbances does not fall under defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies when the Insurrection Act or other exemptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are used. The President may employ the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard, within the United States to restore order or enforce federal law when requested by the state legislature, or when not in session, by the governor, and when the authorities of the state are incapable of controlling the situation. The Attorney General of the United States appoints a senior civilian representative as his or her action agent. Federal military personnel supporting civil disturbance operations remain under military command at all times. Forces deployed to help federal or local authorities in a civil disturbance adhere to the SRUF and RUF approved by the combatant commander.
4-174. USNORTHCOM develops and maintains plans for civil disturbance operations. These plans provide the foundation for federal military civil disturbance support. They standardize most military activities and command relationships. Tasks performed by federal military forces may include joint patrolling with law enforcement officers; securing key buildings, memorials, intersections and bridges; and acting as a quick reaction force.
4-175. Civil disturbance missions require unit training prior to employing crowd control tactics. This normally requires a mobile training team from the military police or trained law enforcement personnel. Even in an urgent situation, commanders need to drill their forces repeatedly until small unit leaders can execute maneuvers under extreme stress. Training should include all arms, emphasizing treatment and evacuation procedures, detention and movement of citizens, and use of authorized nonlethal systems.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE NATIONAL GUARD DOMESTIC CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT
4-176. The military force with primary responsibility for direct law enforcement support is the National Guard, under state authority. The legal authority for National Guard members to support law enforcement is derived from state law, which varies from state to state. A governor of a state may call up National Guard forces to help local and state law enforcement agencies. The National Guard’s authority derives from the governor’s responsibility to enforce the laws of that state. Even with that authority, the governor carefully regulates the amount and nature of the support, consistent with state law. The governor may employ the state National Guard for law enforcement support in state active duty status or in Title 32, USC status. Federal laws (principally the Posse Comitatus Act) restrict federalized National Guard forces (in federal service, under Title 10, USC) from providing law enforcement support unless a specific exemption is applicable.
4-177. State National Guard forces in either Title 32, USC status or state active duty status from another state operating under the EMAC or a memorandum of agreement between the states may only support civilian law enforcement as specified in a memorandum approved by both governors.
4-178. There are 54 state and territory National Guard counterdrug support programs, governed by National Guard regulations. The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Section 112 of Title 32, USC, may provide resources though the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to states with approved National Guard counterdrug support plans. In addition to requiring approval by the Secretary of Defense, the state National Guard counterdrug support plan requires approval from the state’s attorney general and adjutant general. The National Guard Bureau funds a full time Title 32, USC active Guard and Reserve counterdrug coordinator in each state for administration and management of the state counterdrug program. The counterdrug coordinator serves as the focal point for all counter drug mission validations, approval authority, and the prioritization for counterdrug mission tasking under appropriate policies, instructions, and directives.
4-179. State National Guard forces also provide support to DHS border security programs. Under Section 112 of Title 32, USC, National Guard Soldiers support border security by operating surveillance systems, analyzing intelligence, installing fences and vehicle barriers, building roads, and providing training. Although state National Guard units could participate in direct law enforcement activities related to border security, under DOD policy they normally provide indirect support, under the control of their governor.
4-180. State National Guard forces frequently support civilian law enforcement agencies during disaster response. The disruption and confusion associated with a disaster typically cause numerous problems with law enforcement tasks. Commanders should evaluate the potential for law enforcement support as part of their unit’s initial assessment and provide their assessment to their state joint task force headquarters. Commanders must impress upon their subordinates that they must refrain from law enforcement activities except as authorized.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Atomic weapons are a key element of the security condition. Foes progressively depend on atomic weapons to verify their inclinations. Those looking for approaches to utilize atomic weapons for pressure and war end present complex prevention and acceleration the executives challenges. US atomic weapons and the related capacities expected to lead atomic tasks are basic to guarantee a powerful obstacle.
2. Motivation behind Atomic Powers in US Technique
US atomic powers serve the national goal of keeping up harmony through quality. The National Security Procedure and National Protection Methodology are upheld through four head jobs for US atomic powers that guide the advancement of US power abilities and endorse the utilization of these capacities. These jobs are correlative and interrelated, and the sufficiency of US atomic powers is evaluated against every job and the methodology intended to satisfy it:
a. Hinder atomic and nonnuclear assault.
b. Guarantee partners and accomplices.
c. On the off chance that prevention fizzles, accomplish US destinations.
d. Support against a dubious future.
3. Prevention
a. Discouragement is the avoidance of activity by the presence of a believable risk of unsatisfactory neutralization and additionally conviction that the expense of the activity exceeds the apparent advantages. Sound prevention works by affecting enemy leaders through the show of US capacity and key informing of US resolve to utilize abilities that preclude the advantages from securing foe activity and force costs on them.
b. Valid atomic capacities are significant, as the President must have the way to react properly to an assault on the US, its partners, and accomplices. Atomic powers must be set up to accomplish the key destinations characterized by the President. Vital discouragement doesn’t stop once a contention has begun however proceeds all through the whole scope of military tasks. The utilization of atomic as well as customary prevention tasks during all periods of arranging and execution is basic to impact a foe’s basic leadership process, paying little mind to the phase of contention.
c. Notwithstanding dissuading enemies from propelling enormous scale traditional assaults or utilizing weapons of mass obliteration (WMD), atomic powers stretch out prevention to partners and accomplices. This backings limitation endeavors by preventing country states from creating atomic abilities of their own.
d. There is no “one size fits all” for prevention. Thus, the US applies a customized and adaptable way to deal with viably deflect a range of foes, dangers, and settings. Atomic weapons expansion, procurement of atomic materials of concern, and trade of specialized ability pursue pathways and danger systems like those of other WMD multiplication.
…
2. Vital Set of three
a. The US keeps up a set of three of vital atomic powers comprising of land-based intercontinental ballistic rockets (ICBMs), submarine-propelled ballistic rockets (SLBMs), and long-extend planes. Every framework gives solidarity to the US atomic power pose through one of a kind and correlative qualities. Further, the key group of three decreases the likelihood that a specialized issue in any one leg of the vital set of three or enemy specialized headway will leave the US at a vital drawback.
b. ICBM. The ICBM power remains ceaselessly on alert and furnishes the President with responsive choices. Adaptability accordingly choices and the capacity to quickly retarget confuses adversary assault arranging. With scattered basing, responsiveness, and powerful order and control, the ICBM power makes an uncommonly high edge for an effective, enormous scale, regular or atomic assault on the US country. The ICBM power is survivable from the angle that an adversary would be required to submit a huge scale use of atomic warheads to focus on all ICBM dispatch offices and control focuses.
A talk of ICBM capacities is found in Aviation based armed forces Convention Addition 3-72, Atomic Activities.
c. SLBM. The ballistic rocket submarine (atomic controlled) (SSBN) and its related SLBM give a guaranteed, survivable strike capacity. The SSBN power furnishes the country with an exceptionally solid, sheltered, secure, exact, adaptable, and viable obstacle capacity that convolutes a risk’s arranging, driving them to consider the reaction ability from SSBNs.
For more data on SSBN/SLBM abilities, allude to Naval force Fighting Distribution 372, Naval force Vital Atomic Prevention.
d. Long-Range Planes. Long-extend aircraft are fit for striking focuses the world over, giving an obvious and adaptable atomic obstruction capacity, while guaranteeing partners and accomplices. Aircraft give both standoff and infiltrating capacities expected to overcome an assortment of dangers, to incorporate current air safeguards, portable targets, and targets inserted in complex landscape. Dissimilar to SLBMs and ICBMs, aircraft are recallable.
A talk of aircraft capacities is found in Aviation based armed forces Teaching Addition 3-72, Atomic Activities.
3. Nonstrategic Powers
Double Proficient Air ship. The US and select North Atlantic Arrangement Association (NATO) partners keep up double fit flying machine fit for conveying atomic or ordinary weapons on the side of national vital expanded prevention targets and reinforcing local discouragement. These atomic powers offer a significant ability against provincial dangers, guaranteeing partners of the US duty to their security and are an unmistakable and noticeable message to any risk.
Click on the entries to get more infos.
Officers & Master Clients (2961)
Budiono
A Prabhu
A. Budi Pranoto
AAJ BATAVIA
Aam Dewi Hamidah
Aarti Lohia
Abdul Hadi Ismail
Abdul Rachman
Abdul Rahman
Abdul Rifai Natanegara
Abdul Slam TAHIR
Abdul Slam Tahir
Abdullah Alatas
Abu Djaja Bunjamin
Abu Hermanto Budiono
Achirsyah Moeis
Achmad Fadjar
Achmad faried Joesoef
Achmad Faried Joesoef
Achmad Kalla
Achmad Latief Alwy
Achmad Nugraha Djuanda
Achmad Sandi
Achmad, Sally, Erma and Cindy as joint tenants
ADAM SAUTIN
ADAM SAUTIN
Ade R. Syarief
ADE TJAKRALAKSANA
Ade Tjakralaksana
Ade Tjakralaksana
ADELINA PRASETIO
Adhi Utomo
ADHI UTOMO JUSMAN
ADI BISONO
ADI BISONO
Adi Sasono
Adi Sumito
Adimitra Baratama Nusantara
Aditya Koeswojo
Adji Muljo Teguh
Adnan Kelana Haryanto & Hermanto
ADRI ACHMAD DRAJAT
Adriana Maya Politon
Adryansyah
Afandi Hermawan Oey
Afandi Hermawan Oey and Tjoeng Anna Chrisnadi
Agam Nugraha Subagdja
Ago Harlim
Agoeng Noegroho
Agung Podomoro Group
Agung Salim
Agung Tobing
Agus Djohari
AGUS HARTONO LIE
Agus Lasmono Sudwikatmono
Agus Leman Gunawan
AGUS MAKMUR
Agus Nursalim
Agus Pranoto Setiadi
Agus Purnomo Edhi
Agus Soenong / Intina Wirawan The
Agus Suherman Wirjan
AGUS SUSANTO
Agus Tjandra
AGUS WIDAGDO
Agustinus Prasetio
Agustinus Wishnu Handoyono
AGUSTON MAKMUR
Ahadiat Wargana
AHMAD DIPODITIRO
AHMAD MARDA
Ahmad Rahman Pasaman
Ahmaddin Ahmad
Ahmaddin Ahmad
Ahmaddin Ahmad
AHMADES MIQAILLA
AHSANIL GUSNAWATI
Aida Ishak
AIRIN OKTAVIANY GUNAWAN
Aiwy
Aizid Syafriel Adjam
AIZID SYAFRIEL ADJAM
AJI BAYU WIRROTAMA
Aji Bayu Wirrotama
AJI WIJAYA, SUNARTO YUDO & CO
Akbar Yoso Trisedia
Alan Clark
Alan Clark
Alan Robertson Clark
Alanberg Pte. Ltd.
ALBERT CAHYADI SUKANDADINATA
Albert Kongoasa
Albert Sugianto
Albert Suherman
ALDO PUTRA BRASALI
Alex Ivan Tanoyo
Alexander Hermas Wolfe
Alexander Hermas Wolfe
Alexander Johan Widjaja
Alexander Johan Widjaja
Alexander Thaslim
Alexandra Miksar
Alexandra Miksar and Djoni Aristianto Prasetio
Alexandra Miksar and others
Alfari Narindra
Ali Alimsyah
Ali Alimsyah
ALI CHENDRA
Alice Haryono
ALIEN WIBOWO
Aling Hermawan Oey
Alisyahrazad Hanafiah
Allan Dijaya Keller
Allan Tjahja Tjao
Aluinanto Sandjojo
ALVIN GOZALI
Alwi Alatas
Alwijaya Aw
Amalia
Amalia Aristiningsih
Amaluddin Djambak
AMAN
Ameesh Anand
Amelia Kurniawan
Amelia Mulyono
American Express Bank Ltd (Indonesia)
AMIN HALIM
AMIN SUPRIYADI LIU
AMINOTO SUTANDI
AMINOTO SUTANDY
Amrullah Hasyim
Amrullah Hasyim
Amy Delia
Anak Agung Alit Wiradarma
Anak Agung Gde Agung
Ananda Soewono
ANCE ANGGRAENY
Andang Bachtiar
ANDHIKA ANINDYAGUNA HERMANTO
Andi Achmad Dara
Andi Ahmad Dara and Evi Yulisma Harahap as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Andi Gunawan Wibowo
ANDI PRAVIDIA SALIMAN
Andi Zainal A. Dulung
Andiko Ardi Purnomo
Andre Abdi
Andre Abdi
ANDRE JOHANNES MAMUAYA
Andre S Prijono
Andre Sukendra Atmadja
Andreas Andikha Bunanta
Andreas Kastono
Andreas Kongoasa
Andreas Tjahjadi
Andrew I Sriro
Andrew K. Labbiaka
Andrew McKay
ANDREW MELLON PRIASMORO
ANDREW TANOTO
Andrew Thomas Eriksson
Andrie Setiawan Yapsir
Andry Irwan Djugo
Andry Pribady
Andry Pribady
Andry Setiawan
Andy Nugroho Purwohardono
Andy Soewatdy
Andy Wiryanto Ong
Ang Lian Ping
Ang Rianti
Ang Rosabella Martina
Angela Lestari Widjaja
Angelique Stampfer
Angie Christina
Angus Maclachlan
Angus Nelson Karoll
Ani Sim
Anil Kumar Lachman Panjabi
Anindya N. Bakrie
Anita Kalim
ANITA RATNASARI
Anna Solana Hamami Kadarachman
Anna Sri Dewi Sianto
Annie Halim
ANTHONY BRENT ELAM
Anthony Dominic Byron
ANTHONY KURNIADI
Anthony Salim
Anthony Salim
Anthony Siswanto
Anthony Wijaya
Anton Henning Linderum
Anton Henning Linderum
ANTON KUSUMA
Anton Santoso
Anton Santoso
Anton Santoso and Anita Marta
Anton Sugiono
Anton Tjahjono
Anton Tjahjono
Anton Wiratama
Antonius Mulya Saputri
ANTONY GUNAWAN
Antony Gunawan
Anuj Ralhan
Anwar Lim
ANWAR SAEBE
Apex Oil & Gas Ltd.
Appointcorp Limited
Ardas Dipa
ARDAS DIPA
ARDIANI KARTIKA SARI SUBIANTO
Ardy Wiria
Ari Hardono Suroso
Ari Indra Gautama
Ari Rophian Perdana Ariwibowo
ARI SULISTIO
Arianto Prasetio
Arianto Wisnu Triyatno
Arie Kondang Kresnadi
Arief Prijatna
Arief Santoso
Arief Wiyoso Aswismarmo
Arif and Yvette Suryatenggara
Arif Rachmat
Arifin Yohan
ARINI SARASWATY SUBIANTO
Aris Agung Budiman
Aris Yuwono Ang
Aristotle
Arjen Tridarma Darmawan
Arlehne Purnomo
Arman Sutedja
Armedta Budi Asmara
Armeilia Widayanti Subianto
Arniaty Achmad
ARNIATY ACHMAD
Arta Satria Soebandi
Artha Mitra Interdata
Arthur Andersen & Co. (Indonesia)
Arwan Ahimsa
ARY SURYA
Arya Widjaya
Aryo Bimo Notowidigdo
Aryo Bimo Notowidigdo
ASHWANI CHOWDHRY
Asia Consulting and Investment Limited
ASIA INVESTMENT CAPITAL I LIMITED
Asian Venture Finance Ltd.
ASWADI
Ateng Suhendra
Ateng Sulestio
Atira Aksa
Aubrey Bobb
AURELIA SUPARDI
Aviariananto Sukotjo
Awiek Lestari Rahayu
Aziar Zain
Azir Azwien Jenie
B. Dorpi Parlindungan
Bachrumsyah Hamzah
Baduraman Dorpi Parlindungan
Badurmana Dorpi Parlindungan
Bagus Panuntun
Baldeo Singh
Baldeo Singh
Baldeo Singh
Baldeo Singh
Bambang Hartono
Bambang Irawan Massie
Bambang Niaga Tjiputra
Bambang Rahardja Burhan
Bambang Subianto
Bambang Sugianto
Bambang Suhandi. T, SE
Bambang Sujagad Susanto
BamBang Sumantri
Bambang Tijoso Tedjokusumo
Bambang, Derice Alda, Malcolm Alda and Meyrick Alda Sumantri
Banbang Panutomo
Bank Bira
Bank Centra
Bank Danamon
Barlianto Ronald
Barlianto Ronald
BASIR B. NASIKUN
Basuiki Puspoputro
Batavia Prosperindo Sekuritas
Bayu Irianto
Bayu Prawitasari
Bayu Virgan Triyatno
Beata Ida Hartono
Beatrice El
BEATRICE EL
Belinda Natalia Tanoko
BELLYANAWATY BUDIMAN
Ben Morice
Beng Phiau
Bengt Carl Gustav Thornberg
Benjamin Subrata
Benjamin Subrata, Niluh Rosye Peny Subrata, Emily Ayu Subrata and Karla Dewi Su
Benjamin Wong Siong Yuit
BENNY IRSJAD
Benny Setiawan
Benny Tenges
Benny Tjokrosapoetro
Beny Haryanto
Bernadette Ruth Irawati
Bernie Prajoga
Betty Ang
BHAYANG SURYADIMADJA
Bimo Pramudyo Soekarno
Bimo Surono
Bing Gondosubroto
Bintoro Wong
Bismarka Kurniawan
Blue Ribbon Holding Ltd
Bob Yanuar
Bob Yanuar
Bobby Andhika
Bobby Iman Satrio
Boedi Sampoerna
Boedihardjo Sastro Hadiwirjo, Uki Budi Sulaksani and Atty Boedi Milyarti
Boediyanio Gondotirto
Boelio Muliadi
Boelio Muliadi
BOENJAMIN & POPPY & SANADI & SHINTA
Bong Kiu Nio
Bong Tjen Khun
Bong Tjen Khun and Tjong Njuk Fon
Bonny Budi Setiawan
BOURNIGAUD (ep Williams) Edith Monique, Danielle, Marie
Boy Gemino Kalauserang
Brett Hay
BRIAN KENNETH JOHN DALLAMORE
BRIAN KENNETH JOHN DALLAMORE
Bright City Group Corporation
Bruce William Carpenter
Bruce Williams Carpenter
BUDHI SOEJONO
Budi Arsil
Budi Basuki
Budi Christranto
BUDI DHARMO NOTOWIDJOJO
Budi Enijati Maria Soedjana
Budi Ferdinandus JAPADERMAWAN
Budi Mulio Utomo
Budi Santoso Taruno Sembodo
Budi Setiadharma SH
Budi Sintoro Then
Budi Surjana
Budi Widyadi
Budi Yanto Lusli
Budiarto Karim
Budiarto Karim
Budiarto Karim
Budiawan Jusmin
BUDIJUWONO HANDJAJA
Budiman Effendi
Budiono
Budiono Darsono
Budiono Tanbun Boen
Budy Hartono Santosa
Budyanto Totong
Burhansjah
BUSTAMI
Cakra Ciputra
Calvin Lukmantara
Cameron Robert Knox
Candra Winoto Salim
CANDRA WINOTO, SALIM
Capital Reserves Ltd
CARLOS TARAZONA RAMIREZ
Caroline
Catherine Gina Hambali
Catherine Hambali
CATHERINE YOSHAWIRJA
Cavalier International Group Corporation
Cecilia TEJOWARNO
Celin Tanardi
Chairul Iskandar Zulkarnaen
Chairul Tanjung
Chairul Tanjung
CHAIRUL TANJUNG
Chalid & Partners
Chalid & Partners Law Firm
CHAN HIONG POH
Chan Hiong Poh
Chander Vinod Laroya
Chandler Capital Inc.
CHANDRA EKAJAYA
CHANDRA EKAJAYA
CHANDRA EKAJAYA
CHANDRA EKAJAYA
Chandra Widjaja
CHANG MEI YU
Charles Louis De Queljoe
Charlie Kasim
Charterhouse Limited
CHEAM SOON TEE
Chenry Micron Mor
Chew Say Loo
Chew Say Loo
Chien Cheng, Chieh Yu-Kun and Chieh Chen Hon-Tsu
Chin Chin Chandera
Choo Khee
Choo Ngaw (Choo Kok An)
Choo Tek (@ Choo Chin Tek)
Chris Fong
Chris Newton
Christanto Santoso
Christian Dieter Scholz
Christian Leuchtenberg
Christian Nainggolan
Christian Parlaungan Mulyanto
CHRISTIAN SANDY RACHMAT CHRISTIAN SANDY RACHMAT
Christian Sandy Rachmat
CHRISTIAN SANDY RACHMAT
CHRISTIAN SUGIARTO
Christiana Halim
Christiana Niowni
Christianto
CHRISTIE RUSSELL CARTER
Christina Harapan
Christina Harapan
Christina Sumarlin Pribadi
Christopher Basil Newton
Christopher Carson
Christopher Fong
CHRISTOPHER FONG
Christopher James Garrard
Christopher James Garrard
Christopher Tanuwidjaja
Chu Jackson
Chui Hing Keung
Chung, Sung Chae
Cindy Tanuwidjaja
Citibank, N.A. (Indonesia)
Citrawinda Priapantja
City Harvest Investments Limited
CL Law Firm
Clarence Leonard Stratton
Crescento Hermawan
Dadi Sukarso Yuwono
Damsiruddin Siregar
Dan Brown
Danamon Group Legal
Danan Kadarachman
DANI ISMULYATIE
DANIEL
DANIEL & VERONICA YUWONO YU
Daniel Indra Djajadi
Daniel Kurniawan Lukman
DANIEL MARATHON
Daniel Podiman
Daniel Wewengkang Korompis
Danielle Catharina Willemijn Maria Van Poppel
DANNY JUWONO
Danny Juwono and Linda Liani Janti Senjaya
Danny Nugroho
Danny Nugroho
Danny Tjiu
Danny Tjiu
Dany Subrata
Darjoto Setyawan
Darjoto Setyawan and Tjan Felisa
Darmadi Karjanto Putro
Darmansjah Darsono
DARMAWANSJAH SETIAWAN
Darminto
Darminto Hartono
Darmo Suwito Barwin
Darmoseputro
DARWIN LEO
Darwin Silalahi
Darwin Soegiatto
Darwin Sutanto
Daswi Rayawang
David Alexander Yuwono
David Kristian
David Kuchenbecker
David Myles Falkner
David Nico Sutanto
David Pierre Michael Bakker
David Salim
David Widjaja
David William DONALDSON
David William Magson
DEBBY FEBRIANY GUNAWAN
Deborah Kent Janawati
Dectra (Samoa) Limited
DEDDY HARIJANTO SUDARIJANTO
Dedie Suherlan
DEDY ROCHIMAT
Dendy Kurniawan
Denise Tjokrosaputro
Denise Tjokrosaputro
Denise Tjokrosaputro
Denise Tjokrosaputro
Denny Lim
Denny Rahardja
Denny Suryadinata
Denny Wijaya
Denny Wijaya
Deny Juliarto
Dermawan
DEVI TRI ASMARASARI
Devie Hendrastiti Darmawan
Devin Wirawan
Devy Prasetyo Yuwono Ang
Dewi Garlina Sari
Dewi Indrajani Alimwidjaja
Dewi Kencanawati Natawidjaja
Dewi Livia Sari (Alternate Protector)
Dewi Natalia Lim
Dewi Nilka Sari
Dewi Novianawati
Dewi Suryati Liauw
Dharma Tjitra Widjaja
Dharma Tjitra Widjaja
Dharmadi Budiman
DHARMAWANDI SUTANTO
Dharsono Hartono
Diah Soemedi
Dian Muljani Soedarjo
Dian Sumeler
Diana Husein
Diana Sastrajaya
DIANA WIDJAJA
Dick Leitch
Dicky Herman
DICKY HERMAN
Dicky Kurniawan
Dicky Tjokrosaputro
Dicky Yordan
Didi Ferdinand Korompis
Didit Abdurachman Rustandi
Didit Budijarto
Dina Eldelina Pow
Diniwati
DINO KOESHANDERY
Diono Nurjadin
Dixon Koesdjojo
Djajadi Djaja
Djajadinata Hardjono
Djamaluddin Tanoto
Djamaluddin Tanoto and Limiwaty Lie
Djan Faridz
Djan Faridz
Djan Faridz
Djatmiko Tedjo
Djatmiko Tedjo
Djauhara Faizal
DJERISIN KUESAR
Djie Tjian An
Djie Tjian An and Febe Maryanti Wirjadi as joint tenants with right
Djohan Is Hardjo
Djohan Tjiunardi
Djoko Kartono
Djoko N. Labbaika
Djoko Nirmala Labbaika
Djoko Soesanto Gusti
Djoni Muchsin
Djoni Rion Gui
Djoni Rion Gui
Djoni Rion Gui and Kusnadi Gui as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Djoni Rion Gui and Kusnadi Gui as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Djoni Sukohardjo
Djonny Koesoemahardjono
Djuana Sulestio
Djuffan Achmad
Djumharbey Anwar
Djuniar Tunggal
Doddy Agustiawan Tjahjadi
Dodi Suhartono Abdul Kadir
Dody Lukito Hendrokusumo
Dolly Periagutan Pulungan
Dominique Gallamnn
Dominique Gallmann
Don MacDonald
Doni Irawan
Donny Imam Priambodo
Donny Yoesgiantoro
Doreen Sim
Dorys Setiawati Herlambang
Douglas Vincent Tingey
Dr Hmnm Hasyim Ning
Dr R. Soeparmadi
Dr. Cheam Soon Tee
Dr. Darmadi Goenawan
Dr. Johnny Goenawan
Dr. Kahar Tjandra, Evy Tjandra
Dr. Kahar Tjandra, Evy Tjandra, Nancy Tjandra Muljadi
Dr. Pudji Witomo
DRS ARYANTO AGUS MULYO
DRS J.B NETYAKA
Dunn Fa Chong
Dwiarti Widiyani
East Star Ventures Ltd
EDDI SUGIARDI
Eddie Sudijono
Eddy Daud
EDDY HALIM
Eddy Handoko
EDDY HERMAN
Eddy Hussy
Eddy Iskandar
Eddy Kusnadi Sariaatmadja and Sofie Widjaja Sariaatmadja as joint
Eddy Pramono
Eddy Purwanto
Eddy Purwanto
Eddy Purwanto Lim
EDDY SETIAWAN
Eddy Sindoro
EDDY SUSANTO
Eddy Sutandinata
Eddy William Katuari
Eddy Winata
Eddyanto Hadisurjo
Eddyanto Hadisurjo and Ratna Kurniati Bahana
Edgardo Abelarde Tinsay
EDGARDO ELOY DIAZ FALCONET
Edhie Hardjanto
Edi Firmansyah
Edianto Prasetyo
Edo Djunaydi
Edoardus Ardianto
EDOARDUS ARDIANTO
Edoardus Ardianto
Edoardus Ardianto
Edward Ang
Edward Magnus Lang
Edward Magnus Lang
Edward Magnus Lang / Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Edward Magnus Lang and Kartini Herawati Lang
EDWARD STEPHANUS DJAUHARI
EDWIN MOHTAR
Edwin Muchtar (Mr.)
Edwin Soeryadjaya
Edwin Sugiarto
Edy
Edy Kosasih
Edy Kusnadi
Edy Susanto
Edy Suwarno
Efendi Boedhiman
Effendy Husin
Efrem Wardhana
Eiffel Tedja
EKA SINTO KASIH TJIA
Eko Budianto
Eko Prasetyo Ang
Eko Purnomo
Eko Suharto
EKO SUKAMTO
El Beatrice
Eliani Johan
Eliezer Nugroho Tjandrakusuma
Elisabet Lay
Elisabeth Lintje
Elisabeth Magdalena
Elizabeth Januarti W
Elizabeth Jayne
Elizabeth Jayne
Elizabeth Sindoro
Elizabeth, Alicia, Denise and Michelle as joint tenants with
Eljay Limited
Elke Camillia Kurniawan
Elline Yohan Yau
Elly Koeswandia Tjokronegoro
Elly Lestari Adiutama
Elly Nurlaila Hutabarat
Elly Soepono
Elmursil Moenzir
ELSA DJAUHARI
ELVIN TJANDRA
Elvina Jonas Jahja
Elvira Pudjiwati
Emi Sukiati Lasimon
EMIL ABENG
EMILY STEPHANA DJAUHARI
Emily Waty Setiawan
EMMANUEL LESTARTO WANANDI
Emmy Damayanti
Emy Harjono
Emy Harjono/Andres S, Magbitang jr
Endah Sulistyorini Himawan
Endang Soertikanty
ENDANG SUGIARTI
Endang Sugiarti
Endang Susila BUDI
Endang Susila Budi
Endang Triningsih
Endro S. Wahono
Endy Suryokusumo
Endy Suryokusumo
Enny Lukitaning Diah
Enny Soegiarto
Enny Trang
ENTARIO WIDJAJA SUSANTO
Era Helvani
ERIC HARDONO TIRTAJASA
Erick Djuwadi
Erick Thohir
ERICS YOSHAWIRJA
Erik Setiawan
ERIKA DEBORA DJAUHARI
Erlina Ongoredjo
ERLINA ONGSOREDJO
Erly Tandjung
Erna Widyastuti
ERNAWATI
Erni Gunawan
Ernitha Halim
Erric B. Wibowo
Erric B. Wibowo
Ervin Wijaya
Ervin Wijaya/Shiany Angsana/Andree Wijaya
Erwin Aksa
Erwin Aksa
Erwin Budisantosa
Erwin Ciputra
Erwin Gunawan
Erwin Indra Hamid
Erwin Sasunto
Erwin Sutanto & Wiwiek Kwedarisman as joint tenants
Erwin Tunggul Setiawan
Ery Yunasri
Esther Riawaty Hari
Eugene Trismitro
Eunice Meriati Satyono
Eva Berliana Rosway
EVAN SAMUEL DJAUHARI
EVELYN DJAUHARI
Evelyn Luciana Soeyapto
Evert Jimmy LENGKONG
Evi Hamdani
Evi Wikarsa
Evi Yulisma Harahap
Evie Raviana
EWIK HENDRI
Execorp Limited
F. Franky
Fabian Gelael
Fadjar Endranto
Fahmi Babra
Fahmi Idris
Fahyudi Djaniatmadja
Faisal Panggabean Law Firm
Faisol Soleh Masjkoer
Faiz Shahab
Faizan Abdul Rahan
Fan Chiang, Teng-Chang
Farah Liza
FARINA TADJOEDIN
Farouk Rais
FAS Consulting Asia Pacific Pte Ltd
Fauzi Ezeddin
Fauzi Jahja
Fauzi Jurnalis
Febrina Sari Bak
Febriyanti (Ms.)
Feilie Sulestijani
Felianah Soetemo
Fendi Santoso
Fensa Sofyan
Fenza Sofyan
FERDINAND JOSEF WONGKAREN
FERNANDO ANTONIO GIL
FERRY SUDJONO
Ferry Tenacious
Fida Unidjaja
Fides Pro Consulting (Business Advisory Services)
FIEFIE TJAHJADI
Fifi Indra
FIFI LETY INDRA & PARTNERS
FIFI NOVITA BASARAH KISYANTO
FIFI WIRIADINATA
Financecorp Limited
Finney Henry Katuari
Fiona Adeline Sutanto
Firdaus Siddik
Firman Matondang Silalahi
Fitri Wiriasari
FLORDEN INVESTMENTS S.A.
Florence & James
Florence Wanamurti
Flores Samudro
FOE SIAT KHIUN
Fong Felix
Fong/Aiwy
Fonny Tedjajadi
Foronkid Gunawan
Francisca Citrasari
Franciscus Xaverius Hardianto Tjondro
Frank Taira Supit
Franky Widjoyo
Frans Limas
Fransiscus Antonius S.A
Fransiskus Budhinata
Fransisous Iwo
Freddy H. Suryadiharja
Freddy Ignatius Katuari
Freddy Sumartono Santoso
Freddy SUTJIPTO
Freddyanto Tirtadjaja
Freeport trading Group Limited
Fuad Segayir Alkatiri
G. Lal Agrawala
Gahet Loengara Ascobat
Gahral Sjah
Gaitini Tjokrosaputro
Gan Boot Lian
Gan Chooi Yang
GANDHI BEND
Ganesh Chander Grover
Gareth Joh LEWIS
Garibaldi Thohir
Garibaldi Thohir
Gary Dino Ridwan Sjah
Gary Neal Christenson
Gary Neal Christenson
Gary Neal Christenson
Gary Phair
Gary Phair
Gary Phair (in-active)
Gatot Kariyoso Wiroyudo
Geeta M. Mirpuri
Gemilang Investama
Gen Sik Tjin Tan
Gene Sik Tjin Tan
Geoffrey David Simms
George Christoph Robert Spath
George Nicolas Simanjuntak
George Nicolas Simanjuntak
George Setiyadi
Gerald Rossi
Gerry Aubry
Gerry Prawira Saputra Tjong
Gesang Budiarso
Ginawan Chondro
Ginawan Chondro
Gino Junior Korompis
Giovani Maria Ekaputra Suhari
Gita Irawan Wirjawan
Gita Irawan Wirjawan
Gita Irawan Wirjawan and Yasmin Stamboel Wirjawan
Gita Wirjawan
Gladys Kiong
Glenn Timothy Sugita
GLENN TIMOTHY SUGITA
GLENN TIMOTHY SUGITA
Glenn Timothy Sugita
Glesen Frais Energy Co. Ltd
Go Sek San
Go Siauw Hong
Go Sik Ying
Go Sri Hartati
GODEFRIDUS TAMPUBOLON
Goh Lay Ling
Goh Tie Sin
Graham Daniel Fogarty
GRANDFIELD HOLDINGS GROUP LIMITED
Grant Moon-Tae Kim
Grant McArthur
Grant Moon-Tae Kim
Grant Moon-Tae Kim
Gregorius Petrus Aji Wijaya
Gregory Campbell HINCHLIFE
GT Asia Pacific Funds Management Limited
Guat Tjing Thio
Gunardi Frans Fong
Gunawan Endi
Gunawan Gusti
Gunawan Jusuf
Gunawan Santoso Gwie
Gunawan Subagio
Gunawan Sucahijono Tjoa
Gunawan suteja
Gurker Limited
GW Franklin Hall
H. Sonny Wibisono Widjanarko
H.I. Made Sadha Ardiana
HABIB HUSEIN ALLAYDRUS
HADI GUNAWAN
HADI GUNAWAN AND LYDIA ANGKAWIDJAJA
Hadi Lukman
Hadi Suginawan
Hadi Suginawan & Nurmalasari Suginawan
Hadidarma Kosasih Kho
Hadinata Widjaja
Hadysugani Hoshi
Hadysugani Hosni
Hajato Darsono
HALIFAH SUNJATA
Halim Podiono
Halim Setiabudi Wijono
Han Hai Thon
Han Jung Kuk
HANDAJA SUSANTO
Handaja Susanto
HANDANA HALIM WANAWIJAYA
Handi Gunawan
Handojo Santosa
Handoko Anindya Tanuadji
Handoko Susilo
Handoyo Sutanto
Handrie Wirawan
HANDY PURNOMO SOETEDJO
Handy Sunardio
Hanny Suprayogi
HANNY SUTANTO
Hanny Sutanto
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Maramis
Hans Moelyadi
Hansen Suryadi
Hanson Ramli
HARDI KOESNADI
HARDI WARDHANA
Hardy Woosnam
Hari Raharta
Hari Widodo
Hariadien Ratmawati Soeprapto
Harianto Solichin
Harianto, Peh
Harijanto Koesdjojo
Haris
Hariyanto Wijaya Sarwono Lim
Harjanto Kusuma Halim
Harjanto Kusuma Halim & Lisa Ambarwati Dharmawan
HARJOSENO
HARMIONO JUDIANTO
Harris Lasmana
Harry Haslett
Harry Herjanto
Harry Nugroho Prasetyo
Harry Soeria
Harry Susanto
Harry Suwignjo
Hartadi Angkosubroto
HARTADI ANGKOSUBROTO
HARTANTO EDHIE WIBOWO
Harto Djojo Nagaria
Hartono Gunawan
Hartono Sundoro Hosea
Haruhiko
Harun Ibrahim Tajuddin Nur
Hary Djaja and Ratna Endang Hartatiek
HARYADI KUMALA
HARYETTI
Haryono Winarta
Hasan Aula
Hasan Aula and Nina Koswandi
Hasan Dali
Hasan W. W. Krisno
Hashim Djojohadikusumo
HASNURYANI SULAIMAN
Haston Limardo
Hastuti Sulistio
Hawanto Hartono
HAZRIYANDI
Heindrix Liauw
Heindrix Liauw
Helen Turtan Setiawan
Helen Wijaya Ong
Helmut Paasch
Helyuzar
Helyuzar
Hen gky Kunta Adjie
HENDARTA ATMADJA
Hendra Alamsjah
Hendra Basoeki
Hendra Harjadi
HENDRA KOESNADI
Hendra Liem
Hendra Nagaria
Hendra Nagaria
HENDRA NOVA SYAMSU
Hendra Soegiarto
Hendra Tjahyawati
Hendra Tjoa
Hendra Wijaja, Tang Linawaty, Teddy Widjaja, William & Silvia
Hendra Wirajang
Hendra Wirajang
Hendrik
Hendrik Hartono, Hoo
Hendrik Suhardiman
Hendrik Suhardiman
Hendrik Tanojo
Hendrik Tee
HENDRIKO WIJAYA
Hendro Guwanda Sutandi
Hendro Santoso Gondokusumo
Hendro Santoso Gondokusumo
Hendro Santoso Gondokusumo
Hendro Setiawan
Hendro Tjokrosetio
Hendry Lesmana
Hendy Rusli
HENG Ijat Hong
Hengki Sovian
Hengky Tenacious
Henking Wargana
HENKY SUWIGNJO
Henny Kusumawati Tanuhardja
HENNY HARMANI WIRJOSOEKARTO
Henny Harmani Wirjosoekarto
Henny Hartady
Henny Kentjanawati Natawidjaja
henny Kusumawati Tanuhardja
Henny Purnamawati
Henny Santoso
HENNY VICTORIA
Henoch Pradhana
Henrianto Kuswendi
Henrik Antoni Jie and Diana Purnamasari Go and Adi Janitra
Henry Halomoan Sitanggang
Henry Hartono Go
Henry Jahja
Henry Kurli
Henry Kurli and Lin Konggui
Henry Leo
Henry Leo
Henry Liem
HENRY PASCAL TAMPUBOLON
Henry Pribadi
Henry Rudy Zaini
HENRY SUPANNI
Henry Susilowidjojo Njoo
Henry Suwignjo
Henry Wargana
HENRY WIDJAYA
Herdin Syafari
HERIK ANTONI JIE
Herlina
Herlina
Herlinah Soetemo
Herline Goenawan
Herman Afif Kusumo
Herman Gozali
Herman Iskandar
HERMAN ISKANDAR
Herman Iskandar, Khoe Ay Hwa & Seraphine Volkani Iskandar
Herman Karmana
Herman Moeliana
Herman Nagaria
Herman Nagaria
Herman Wijaya, Yuliana Kusno, Lenny, Rudy and Joni Wijaya
Herman Y.S. Gunawan (Mr. )
HERMAN, ETI, IVAN & ASTRID
Hermani Soeprapto
HERMANSJAH TAMIN
Hermanto Tangkau Adrian
HERMIJANTO TOTO
HERRY KARYANING CIPTO
Herry Mirza Putera
Herry Mirza Putera
Herry Wibowo
HERTONO RICHARD PRAJITNO
HERU HIDAYAT
Heru Soesanto Gusti
Heru Sucahyo
Herumanlo Zaini
Hesti Femi Nugraheny
Hesye Silya Mamesah
Hetty Heryati Sumantri
Hetty Indrakasih Soetikno
HIANG.TJE
HIANTO DHARMAPUTRA SUNARDY
Hilary Richard Bolton
Hilary Richard Bolton
Hilda Noveda Kaliman
Hilmi Panigoro
Hilton King
Hilton R. King
Himawan & Associates
Himawan Surya
Hindarta Sanjaya
HINDARTA SANJAYA
Hindarto Budiono
HINDARTO SUHARDJO
Hioe Isenta
Hioe Isenta
Hioe Isenta
Hioe Isenta and Ivy Lianawati
Hiramsyah Sambudhy Thaib
Hiswara Natawindjaja
Ho Mie Ling
Ho Mie Ling
Ho Mie Ling
Ho Sze Wah
Hoediono Kweefanus
HOESEN GUNAWAN
Honey Angkosubroto
Honey Angkosubroto
Hong Usman Effendy
HONGKIE WIDJAYA KANG
Horas Chu Naga
HOSEA HADELI
Hotman Naiborhu
Houston Jusuf
Hubertus Setiyadi
Hudi Janti
Hunarti Gosal
HUSIN CHANDRA
Husin Sariman and Dewi Ngadiman
Husin Suliawan
Husni Muchtar
Husodo Angkosubroto
Husodo Angkosubroto
Hutabarat, Halim & Rekan
I Gusti Ngurah Adi Suputra
I MADE DJENDRA
I Nengah Bagiada
I Nyoman Djintji
I Wayan Arya
I. Goesti Ben Kel Bagoes Oka
IAN DONALD MACAULAY
Ibrahim
Ibu Rahmawaty
Ichsan Rizal
ICHSANUDDIN NOORSY
Ida Bagus Made Putra Jandhana
Ida Budisusetyo
Ie Kian Tjoan
Ie Mila Setiawaty
Ie Mila Setiawaty
Ignanto Sandjojo
IGNATIUS JOE BUDIMAN
Ignatius Toni Gunawan
IING YOSHAWIRJA
Ilham Akbar Habibie
Ilham Akbar Habibie
IMA ENDANG PRAYANTI GARIBALDI
Ima Tjahjadi Tjhang
IMAM MUHADI ROWI
Iman Tamin
Imelda Dharma
Imelda Dharma
Ina Irena Jonas Jahja
Inayat Ali Badruddin
Inda Aryanti Imanto
Indah Djuita Tjatursari
Indahwaty Hartono
Indawan Saputra Hatta
Indawati
Inder Singh
Indra Gunawan
Indra Gunawan Wonowidjojo
Indra Makmur
Indra Muliadi Sugiharto
Indra Widjaja
Indrajaty Hadiwardojo
Indrawati Sampoerna
Indriani Harsono
INDRIENA YUDHAYANTI BASARAH
Indro Wibowo
INGRID WILIANTO
Ir. Danny Walla
Ir. Hagianto Kumala
Ir. Rudyanto Hardjanto
IRAWAN HADIKUSUMO
Irawan Kurniadi Tjandra
Irawan Sutandinata (Mr.)
Irawan Widjaja
Irene Maya Hambali Ishak
Irene Maya Hambali Ishak
Irene Susanto Adikoesoemo
Irene Tedja
Iriawan Suharyanto
Irma Mirzanti
IRMAYANI PUJIASTUTI
Irmayani Pujiastuti
Iroshita Arsyafira
IRSANTO ONGKO
Irsanto Ongko
IRVAN YUSRIZAL GADING
Irvinia Megawati Saddak
Irwan Atmadja Dinata
Irwan Hermanto
Irwan Santoso Chandra
Irwan Siregar
Irwan Siregar
Irwandy Ma Rajabasa
Isenta Hioe
Ishak Sumarno
Iskandar Tanuwidjaja
Ismail Hirawan
Ismail Hirawan
ISMAN AYUB
Istini Siddharta
Istini Tatiek Siddharta
Itjendri Suitono Thio
Ivan Budiono
IVAN HENRY
Ivan Setiawan Tan
Ivantara Dviyudha
Ivantara Dviyudha
Ivonny Budiono
IVY LIANAWATI
Iwa Sewaka
Iwan Dewono Budi Juwono
Iwan Hardja
Iwan Margana
Iwan Margana
Iwan Rosadi Widyapranolo
Iwan Ruwiyadi
Iwan Samsuddin
Iwan Valiant Joesoef
Iwan Valiant Joesoef, Marwan Arie Joesoef and Nurfadh Subhan Joesoef
J. C. Gosa
Jackson Chu
Jacky Afandi
Jacky Soerya Santoso
JACOB ANTUNG KANG
Jacob Soetoyo
Jacobus Busono
Jacobus Busono Prawiroredjo
Jacqueline Tjahjadi
Jacub Johannes The
Jahja Santoso
Jahja Santoso
Jahja Santoso and Johana Poedjokerto
Jahjaa Soetoyo
Jajat Priatna Purwita
JAMES BUDIONO
James C. Haebig
James Eric Zaini
James Kallman
James Preston TRUESDELL
James Rachman Adjimin
James Steven Kallman
James T. Riady
James Thomas Henry Arthur
James Tjahaja Riady
Jamin Soetoyo
Jamin Tjandra
Jan Adam Tangkilisan
JAN TRIANA JOHANES
JAN TRIANA JOHANES, YULIANA JOHANES, WINDY MARLINA, OMAR AZHARI, NURDIN HASJIM JOHANES and OKTAVIA DEWI TIRTA as joint tenants
Janni
JANSEN WIRAATMAJA
JANTI JAHJA
Jap Carmen
JAP HARTONO & SANTY MULJAWANA
Jap Johanes
JAP, SOEGIONO
Jason James Raymond
JAYANTI SARI
Jeannie Widjaja
Jeffery Freshen Sihombing
Jeffery Koes Wonsoo
Jeffrey Hartono
Jeffrey Iuwena
Jeffrey K. Wonsono
Jeffrey Koes Wonsono
Jeffrey Sugianto
JEMMY ROMMY PONTOH
Jendrawasih Jenni
Jeniawati
Jennie Widjaya
Jenny Elisabeth RG
JENNY WIDJAJA
JENTY
Jeremy David Kemp
Jessy Vishamkar Adnani
JIALIPTO JIARAVANON
JIALIPTO JIARAVANON
Jim Truesdell
Jimmy Budhi
JIMMY BUDIARTO
JIMMY HARTONO LIE
JIMMY HENRICUS KURNIAWAN LAIHAD
Jimmy Namara
Jimmy Samantha
Jimmy Suryanto Budhi
Jimmy Tjahjanto
Jimmy Welianto Siauw
Jimmy Ziepo Setiawan
JIO TIEN CAROLYNA
Jiohan Sebastian
Jo Andreson Wiharjo
Jo Gasyanto
Jo Liat Tjiang
Jo Souw Koan
Jo Tjin Khoen
Joachim U. Rohn
Joachim Ulrich ROHN
Joachim V. Rohn
Jocelin Yohan Yau
Jodi Haryanto
Joe Su Fun
Joeliardi Sunendar
Joesril Hainim
JOGI HENDRA ATMADJA
Johan Alexander Supit
JOHAN ARIFKAJA ADI LESMANA
JOHAN SOEDIBJO
JOHAN T. GILBERT
Johan Tandean
Johana Poedjokerto
JOHANAS HERKIAMTO
JOHANES GUNAWAN
Johanes Kennedy Aritonang
Johanes Susilo
JOHANES TANG WIDJAJA
Johannes Goenawan
JOHANNES HALIM
Johannes Oentoro
Johannes Setijono and Indriyati
Johannes Tanuwijaya
John (Lam) Kosasih
John Franklin
John Gordon McFadzien
JOHN HUGH LESTER
John Hugh Lester
John Joseph Franklin
JOHN TODD BONNER
John Williem Vanderwal
Johnlee Mailoa
Johnnie Hermanto
JOHNNY
Johnny Wiriawan
Johnny Wiriawan
JOHNSON WILLIANG SUTJIPTO
JOHNSON WILLIANG SUTJIPTO
JOHNSON WILLIANG SUTJIPTO
JOHNSON WILLIANG SUTJIPTO
Johny Lisangan
Johny Surjana
Joice
Joice
Joko Himawan / Paul Himawan
Jonas Jahja
Joni Yoesoef
Jopie Widjaja
Joppy Robert Saerang
Jos Parengkuan
Jos Winata Wihardja
Jose R. Hanna
Josef Indra Njoman
Josep Lay
Josep Susanto Kiswandono
Joseph Dharmabrata
Joseph Donald Charles Buddy
Joseph Tjakra/Ms Margaret
Josephyne Widjaja
Joso Ramli
Jovanka Mardova
JOYCE HANDAJANI
JOYNER OVERSEAS INC.
Jozef Darmawan Angkasa
Juanda Lesmana Lauw
JUANDY WIJAYA
JUANITA DESIREE TAMPUBOLON
Judca Herlina Hansoehardi
Judi Gunawan
Juliana Kusnandar
Juliana Ong Pei I
Julianna Yohan
Juliati Widjaja
Juliati Widjaja
JULIATI WIDJOJO
Juliawati Budiman
JULIE MULYA JIAUW
Junanda Syarfuan
Junanda Syarfuan / Bobby Andhika
Juni Setiawati Wonowidjojo
Junita Ciputra
JUNIUS WIJAYA
Junty
Junus Jen Suherman
Junus Jen Suherman & Juliana Kusnandar
Junus Siswadi
JURNALIS & PONTO LAW FIRM
Jusak Hadi Wardojo
Justian Suhandinata
Justin Barney GOFF
Justin Breheny
Justo Padilla Nestro
JUSUF
Jusuf Handri Rachmantio
Jusuf Heryanto
Jusuf Salman
Jusuf Tanuwidjaja
Jusup Budihartono Prajogo
Jusup Susanto Djunaidi
Juwita Lianty Suandi
Jyoti Lekhraj Budhrani
JYOTI LEKHRAJ BUDHRANI
K MELBOURNE BREAU
K.P. Irwan Kartawijaya
Kaizer Management Ltd
KAKAN SUKANDA DINATA
Kalim
Kam Lie Giok
Kama Putra Kusdianto
KAMAN HALIM
Kamlesh Ishwardas
KANG ARIES FUKSAR
Kang Rita Sadeli
Kang Rita Sadeli and Song Wen Shyu
Kanisha Sunil Mirpuri
Kardaya Warnika
Kardja Rahardjo
KARTA WIGUNA
Kartini Fahmi Idris
Karuna Murdaya
Kasiviswanathan Prakash
Katharina Wihardja
Katini Dewi
Katleen Yangrikho Gui
KAZAN GUNAWAN
Ken Leksono Sedianto
KEN LEKSONO SEDIANTO
Ken Ng
Kendra Soegandha
Kenneth R. Wynn
Kenneth R. Wynn
Kezia Putri Aprilya Kusdianto
Khairul Saleh
KHOE AY HWA
Khou Lim Ngo
KHOU LIM NGO
Kiki Barki
Kiki Kiftiah
Kiki Sutantyo
Kim Doo Young
Kim Sung Kook
Kim Sung Kook (Mr)
Kimberly Ananto
KIMIN TANOTO
Kindarto Kohar
Kirk D. Evans
Kirk David Evans
Kitty Joantina Wulanda
KITTY TJIOE
Kiyomi Sato
Ko Rudy Oetomo
Kokarjadi Chandra
Kokarjadi Chandra
Koko Poernomo Santoso
Kokos Leo Lim
Kompleks Perkantoran
Kris Widjojo
Krishan Kulmar Ralhan
Krishan Kulmar Ralhan
Krishnan Sjarif (Mr)
Krisnadi Gautama
KRISNO ABIYANTO, SOEKARNO
Kristanto Wibowo Siswanto
Kristina Minto
Kumalasari Tjiong
Kurniati Phan & Jusuf Budi Wijoto as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Kurniawan Nurdin Karim
Kusdianto Soewarno
Kusdianto Soewarno
Kusdianto Soewarno
Kusnadi Budiman
Kusnan Kirana
Kusnandar & Co.
Kusuma Hadi Soetemo
Kusumawati
KUSUMO ABUJONO MARTOREJO
Kusumo Purwanti Dewi
Kwee Suo Chie
Kwok Moi Moy
L & P Capital Investments & Corporate Advisory
Laksamana Sukardi
Lakshmi Harris Lasmana
LAKSMI PRATIWI DALLAMORE
Lam Mang Ying
Lam Toi Lai
Lambertus Nuryono
Lambertus Somar
Lanasari Halim
Lanny Lanawaty
Lanny Tanzil
Lanny Widjajanti
Lao Rusming
Lauw Samuel Lawrence
Law Office CCN & Associates
Lawrence Barki
Lawrence Barki
Lawrence Barki
Lay Sioe Ho
Le Purna Harjani
LE PURNA HARJANI
Leda Magdangal Tamin
LEDRES BALMACEDA MARIO
Lee Chuck Soo
Lee Yick Cheung
Leman Hadi Soetemo
Lenny Wijaya
Leny Anwar
Leny I. Wangsawidjaja
LEONARD PANDY PHUA
Leonardus Eko Daru Lumadyo
Lestariono
Letty Johan
Levi Octavia Soewarna
Lianawati Setyo
LIANNY HARYONO
Liauw Sumiati
Lidwina Lindawati Kartiko
LIE SIE GIEM
Lie Soemarli
Lie Tjauw Mian
Lie Tjin Ming
Liem Hadi Mualim
Liem Johan Halim
Liem Kong Shiung
Liem Kong Shiung
LIEM SIN HUANG
Lies Kusumawati
Lijatini Setiono
LIKE RANI IMANTO RACHMAT
LIKE RANI IMANTO RACHMAT
Likin Handoko
LiLi Ashari
Liliana Budi Santoso
Liliana Budi Santoso and Willy Gunawan
Liliana Wibisono
Liliawati Rahardjo
Lily Ciarensia Tjia
Lily Lawandra
Lily Marjani Pribadi
Lily Solaiman Sutantyo
LILY TAMIN
LILY TAMIN
Lily Yuliani Halim
Lilyani Tanoko
Lilys Tjiawi
Lim Arie Sasmita
Lim Budi Susetyo
LIM EDDY PURNOMO
Lim Eng Khim
Lim Fie Tjong
Lim Fie Tjong
LIM LIMMAN NUGROHO
Lim Lys Erty
Lim Soon Huat
Lim Tjung Luong
Limanto
LIMIWATY LIE
Lin, Yu-Cheng
Lina Gunawan
Lina Harjanti Latif
LINA KURNIAWAN
Lina Soegiharto Leo
LINAWATI SOEJANTO
Linawidjaja Kusprajudi
Linda Hakim
Linda Lauw
LINDA LIANI JANTI SENJAYA
Linda Marlina Isatyawan
Linda Marlina Isatyawan, Edy Kosasih
Linda Ng
LINDA RACHMAT
LINDA RACHMAT
Linda Sidharta
Linda Tanuwiradjaja
Linda Tjahja
Lindawaty Hartono
Lisa Ambarwati Dharmawan
LISA MARDIANI GUNAWAN
Lisa Sundoro Hosea
LISA WIDJAJA
Lisawati Soegiharto
Lista Adriani
Listyani Setijawati Sidik
LIZA WIDAYATI PRADJONGGO
Loa Djin Sui
Loa Sui Hong
Lovri Ricarda
Lucas
Lucas and Lenny Patricia Halim Liem
Lucia Mogi
Lucia Mogi
Lucia Mogi & Others
Lucia Sungkoro
Lucky Tjahaja Diputra Prawiro
Lukas Masehi
Lukman Ahmad Mahfoed
Lukman Hakin
Lukman Herry Latip
LUKMAN TACHJADI
LUKMAN TACHJADI
Lukman Tirtaguna
Lukman Tirtaguna
Lum Weng Loy
Lunardi Basuki
Lunardi Basuki & Sasongko Basuki & Basuki
Lusi Murniati Gunawan
Lusi Windayati
LYDIA ANGKAWIDJAJA
LYDIA TJIPTO
LYNDA TJANDRA BRASALI
Lys Erna Ontjeng
M. A. Ismail Ning
Madampath Sathibal Menon
Madampath Sathibal Menon
Made Oka Masagung
Maggie
Mahesa Alit Pramesty
Mahesa Alit Pramesty (Mr.)
Mahhesa Alit Pramesty
Maiko Kawano
Makarim & Taira
Maly Widoyo
Managecorp Limited as a Trustee of Westend Holdings Trust
MANGGI TARUNA HABIR
MANIWANEN
Marcella Magdalena
Marcellus Charles Colondam
Marcellyna Junita Widjaja
Marcellyna Junita Widjaja
Marco Baldini
Margareth Maria Regina Budhiparama
Margaretha Natalia Widjaja
Margaretha Natalia Widjaja
Maria Karmila
Maria Karmila
Marilyn Caracas
Marilyn Caracas
Mario Christy
Mario Satya Pratomo
Mark Patrick Hanusz
Markun
Markus Parmadi
Marluce Tio Indriati Santoso
Marten Liu
Martin Wijaya Ng
Martina M. Sudwikatmono (Co-Trustee)
Martina M. Sukwikaimono
Martinus Arief Limandoko
Marvin C S Yong
MARY GANASUTRISNA
Maryati Benniardi Imanto
Masayu Pangestu
Masterclass Ltd
Mathilda Stephanie
Mathilda Stephanie
MATTHEW JOSEPH GEORGESON
Matthew S. Deayton
Maxymilian Adelberd
MAYA HARTONO
MEDINA LATIEF
Meena
MEENA
Megawati Setiadi
Mei Ing
Meigawaty Soejatno
Meiliana Widjaja
Meiriana Soetoyo
Meiriani Soetoyo
Meiriaty Soetoyo
Meity Subianto
Meizar Suyardi
MELIAWATI SURJASARI
Melina Jonas
Melisa Patricia Tanoko
Melissa Ong
Melly Kristanti
Melvin
Melvin Salim (Mr.)
Mende Sulinadi
Meranti Handajani Serad
Meridian Pacific Trading Ltd
Mermeden Ltd
Mermeden Ltd
Merry
MESLIN Bertrand Marie Jacques
Metta Margaretha Murdaya
Miana Dwilasmini Sudwikatmono
MICHAEL ATMAN
Michael D. Twomey
Michael Dharmawan Euslim
Michael Gan
Michael Goenawan
Michael Goenawan
Michael Jackson Purwanto Widjaja
Michael Jackson Purwanto Widjaja
Michael Mary Mackay Seward
MICHAEL PATRICK DONNELLY
Michael Rusli
Michael Seabrook
Michael Steven
Michael Steven and Ingrid Kusumodjojo
Michael Tjahjadi
Michael Twomey
Michael Wijaya Goutama
Micheal Tjahjadi
Michel Vicky Tumiwang
Michelle Tjokrosaputro
Michelle Tjokrosaputro
Mieke Santosa
Milany Terianto Luwena
Mimin Aminah
Minny Riady
Mintardjo Halim
Mintardjo Halim
Mira SAVIRA
Mira Savira
Mirah Amiria Adhyaksa
Miranda Tedjasaputra
Miranti Handajani Serad
ML&B Indonesia
Mochamad Adnan
MOCHAMAD RAIS
Mochammad Anwar
Mochtar Riady
Moernoto Reksonegoro
Mohamad Noer
Mohamad Abdullah Jasin and Dewi Kam
Mohamad Abdullah Jasin and Dewi Kam
Mohamad Abdullah Jasin and Dewi Kam
Mohamad Abdullah Jasin and Dewi Kam
Mohamad Iskandar
Mohamad Noer
Mohammad Hidayat Hasan
MOHAMMAD LENDI BASARAH
Mohammad Mas Pendi Soleh
Mohammad Noah Haji
Mohan N. Mirpuri
MOHIT RAMCHAND VASWANI
Monalita Kardono Soegiarto
Monica Yoanita Octavia
Morgan Tjoe
Morgan Tjoe
Motinggo Soputan
Motinggo Soputan
Mr Arifin Yohan
Mr Aris Sunarko
Mr Burhansjah
Mr Koh Tji Beng
Mr Liem Henry
Mr Marimutu Siniran
Mr Nono Fadjartyassasono Padmodimuljo
Mr Ulian Napsiah
Mr Welly
Mr William Goenawan
Mr. Eddy Goenawan
Mr. Salim Aziz Mochdar
MR. THOMSON
Mrs Josephine Budi Santoso
Mrs Lina Ovani
Mrs Masiana Wijaya & Fam.
Mrs Theresia Noerpeni Padmodimuljo
Ms Affin
MS Group
Ms Rohani Indahsi
MS Taxes
Ms. T.Handayani Andokho
MUCHSIN CIPUTRA TJOE
Muddai Madang
Mugijanto Sugijono
Muhammad Agus
Muhammad Aksa Mahmud
Muhammad Alatas
Muhammad Andre Pasha Djuanda
Muhammad Ikbal
Mulianto Api Tanaga
Mulianto Api Tanaga
Mulianto Tanaga
Muljadi Budiman
Muljadi Irawan
Muljadi Irawan
Muljana Husodho, Tintje Jusran, Fransisca Haller, Andreas Husodho & Danni Arton
Multi-Holdings Group Ltd
Mulyadi Anggono
MUNKLEY Christopher James
Murdaya Widyawimarta
MUSTIKO SALEH
Mustofa
MYRNA ESTHER CONTRERAS DE NAVARRO
Myrna Putri Pribadi
NA NA
Nam Yong Hwa
NANCY NARSIS RUNTUWENE
Nancy Urania Rachman Latief
Nani Indraswati Alimwidjaja
Nanik Santoso
Naresh Kumar Modi
Nasir Saleem Haji
Natalie Ong
Natalie Tjahjadi
Nathalia Setiawan
National Management Ltd
Nazamudin Latief
Nazarudin Kiemas
NELSON SAPUTRA
Nestor Padilla
Netcorp Securities Limited
NG ANTON WIJAYA
NG JE TJIEN
Ng Kee Yeok
Ng Soat Go
Ng Tje Suang
Ngadimun
Ngu Hew Tak
NI MADE JATI
Nia Soniati Wityasmoro
Nicholaas Bernardus Tirtadinata
Nicholas James GRAHAM
Nico Krisnanto
Nigel Brett Eaton
Niko Listya Prabowo Se
Nila Fatina
Nilayanti
Nini Djajasaputra
Niniek Haryani
Ninik P. Nathan
Nio Yantony
Nixon Jacobus Silfanus
Norbert Alois Meixner
Norbert Alois Meixner
Nordiansyah Nasri
NORTHSTAR EQUITY PARTNERS LTD.
Northstar Pacific Partners Pte Ltd
Nova Chandra
Nova Negara Silaban
Nova Yudhanto Mugiyanto
Novi Ariyunida Dharma
Novi Nenolaswaty
Noviani Eka Susanto
Nugraha Tirtanata
Nugroho Halim Wijaya
Nur Zain
NURBAITI
NURDIN HASJIM JOHANES
Nurmalasari Suginawan
NUROCHIM
Nursalim Podiono
NYOMAN SARIMIN
Octarina Ratih Damayanti
Octarina Ratik Damayanti
Oei Denny Kurniawan
Oei Denny Kurniawan
Oei Harry Lukmito
Oentoro Surya
Oerip Wirontono
Oesman Sapta
OETIE HERMAWAN
Oey Aling HERMAWAN
Okkie Adhika Tirta Monterie
Omar Azhari
Omar Putihrai
Ong Ju Chi
Ong Mei Sian
Ong Thiam Hok
ONG TIONG YUN
Ong Wen Nio
Ongko Multicorpora
Ongkowijoyo Onggowarsito
OSBERT KOSASIH
Oscar Gonzalo Guedez Machado
P. T. ARPENI PRATAMA OCEAN LINE, Tbk
P. T. Asuransi Jiwa Sewu New York Life
P.T Arpeni Pratame Ocean Line
P.T Dwi Satrya Utama
P.T. Charoen Pokphand Indonesia
P.T. Detra Marina
P.T. Duta Sewa Raya
P.T. Elnusa
P.T. Ever Shine Tex
P.T. Fusenindo
P.T. Grahamakmur Wiratama
P.T. ICC Indonesia
P.T. Interindo Global
P.T. Kaltimex Energi
P.T. Lippo Industries
P.T. Lippo Pacific Finance
P.T. Nugra Santana
P.T. Ometraco Cipta Sarana
Pacific Financial Services
Pacific Overseas Trading Corporation
Pacific Trading & Development Ltd. (BVI)
Pacmas Limited
PANDJI SURYA SOERJOPRAHONO
PAO TJEN KANG
Para Group
Parveen Gandhi
Pat Stratton
Patrick Morris Alexander
Patrick Walujo
PATUN YUDISTHIRA ARITONANG
Paul Banuara Silalahi
Paulis Amin Djohan
Paulis Amin Djohan
Paulus Johanes
PAULUS THIO
Payal Vijay Goklani
Pe Sioe Kim
Peaceland Holdings Ltd
Pedro Limardo
Pek Teng Beng
PER-GUNNAR THURESSON
Permadi
Pernardi Djojosudirdjo
Perseroan Terbatas
Perumahan Tegal Indah Permai
Peter Anthony Wallace
Peter BOWDEN
Peter Markart
Peter Vinzenz Merkle
Petrus Budiman Gho
Petrus Budiyanto
Phang Chin Liat
PHILIP PRIASMORO
Philip Strachan Attwood
Philip Tjandra
PHOA HERMANTO SUNDJOJO
Phoenix Holdings Trading Inc.
Phoenix Holdings Trading Inc.
Piet Wijaya
Pieter Tanuri
Pinardi
Piong Denisse Lucia
Pipin Arifin Linggawidjaja
Pirngady Adhi Wicaksono Himawan
PITER KOROMPIS
Pitra Wiria
Poniman
POPPY HADIMAN
Poppy Tumengkol
Portcullis Institute Pte Ltd
Portcullis Nominees (BVI) Limited
Portcullis TrustNet (BVI) Limited
Portcullis TrustNet (Samoa) Limited
Pra Ciputra
Pradeep Dudaney
Pradeep Dudaney & Soniya Dudaney
Pradono Joko Trajutrisno Himawan
Prakash Mohanlal Panjabi
Prakash Mohanlal Panjabi and Vidhya Prakash Panjabi
Prakoso Eko Setyawan Himawan
Pramudji Suginawan
Praptono Budhi Haksomo Himawan
Prasetio, Utomo & Co
Prasodjo Winarko
Prayitno Cipto Anggoro Himawan
Prayugi Sukardjo
Prem Ramchand Harjani
Pri Wono
Prijono Winarko
Primanaga Hartanto Kalim
Priyatno Sulisto
Priyatno Sulisto
Proboraras Mudoyo
Protasius DARITAN
PSP Group
PT Agung Sedayu Permai
PT Agung sedayu Propertindo
PT Aiti Investment
PT Anugra Cipta Investa
PT Argapura Wira Kencana
PT Asia Securities Limited
PT Astra International Limited
PT Astratel Nusantara
PT Asuransi Jiwa Sequis Life
PT Bahana Securities
PT Bakrie & Brothers
PT BAKRIE CAPITAL INDONESIA
PT Bimantara Citra
PT Bira Aset Manajemen
PT Cameron Chisholm Nicol
PT Central Total Finance
PT CENTRANUSA INSANPURNAMA
PT Centronix
PT Cikarang Listrindo
PT Cipta Imajinasi Disain
PT CIPTADANA CAPITAL
PT Ciputra Development TBK
PT COMETA CAN
PT Danatama Makmur
PT Dayabangun Persada
PT Detik Ini Juga
PT Dwibras Darma
PT Energi Mega Persada Tbk
PT Energi Mega Persada Tbk
PT ENERGI TIMUR JAUH
PT EPHINDO
PT Galib Instalindo Utama
PT Garuda Metalindo
PT Gema Nuansa Persada
PT Global Consulting Indonesia
PT Global Multi Investama
PT Gra Tiara Imaji
PT Great Giant Pineapple Co.
PT Gunung Sewu Kencana
PT Hanjaja Mandala Sampoerna Tbk.
PT Hasnur Coal Terminal
PT Hikmah Albros
PT Hitawasana Luhur
PT Imbang Tata Alam
PT Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Tbk
PT Inti Permata Nusantara
PT J.CO Donuts & Coffee
PT Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk
PT JASTRINDO DINAMIKA
PT Jembatan Kapita Utama Corporate Advisor
PT Jenshiang Nusantara Textile Chemical Industrial
PT Kencana Gula Manis
PT Lippo Bank
PT Lippo Karawaci, TBK
PT Manggala Adhikara
PT MEDCO E & P BANGKANAI
PT Media Intertel Graha
PT Media Karya Sentosa
PT Mitra Andalan Mandiri
PT Moores Rowland Indonesia
PT Niaga Langgeng Sejahtera
PT Ningz Pacific
PT Odira Energy Persada
PT Ogspiras Basya Pratama
PT Omega Propertindo
PT Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk
PT Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk
PT Pelayaran Tamarin Sumudra
PT Penilai Wahana Caraka
PT PERTAMINA (PERSERO)
PT PP London Sumatra Indonesia, Tbk
PT PriceWaterhouseCoopers FAS
PT Rajawali Corpora
PT Rajawali Corporation
PT Recapital Advisors
PT Renaissance Capital Asia
PT Rindaco Prima Sakti
PT Sainath Industrial Corp Ltd
PT Saptapusaka Investama
PT SAS INTERNASIONAL
PT SAS INTERNATIONAL
PT Sentra Kharisma Indah
PT Simplot Agritama
PT SKEYE
PT Sriagung Cahya Sakti
PT Supraprima Sistem Sekusiti
PT Suryaraya Gatratama
PT Tiwi Utomo Investama
PT Trans Nusantara Multi Construction
PT Trijaya Pratama Future
PT Tripar MultivisionPlus
PT TUNAS HARAPAN PERKASA
PT Udinda Telesis
PT Widari Securties
PT Wizoffice Indonesia
PT. 2morrowland Indonesia
PT. Akraya International
PT. ALAM TRI ABADI
PT. Askomindo Dinamika
PT. Astra Graphia Tbk
PT. Astra International, Tbk
PT. Bakrie Interinvestindo
PT. BUMI PERTIWI KENCANA
PT. Cikarang Listrindo
PT. Citra Nusa Insan Purnama
PT. Citrabumi Sacna
PT. Citrabumi Sacna
PT. Delta Nusantara
PT. DWI PRIMA SEMBADA
PT. EATERTAINMENT INTERNATIONAL Tbk
PT. Ekatama Prima Sejati
PT. FAISALINDO SAKTI
PT. Ge Ka Jaya
PT. Global Petronusa
PT. INDOGAS KRIYA DWIGUNA
PT. Indonesia Transit Central
PT. Inti Brawijaya
PT. INTIM PERKASA
PT. Karisma Nata Rucitra
PT. Kasogi Internasional Tbk
PT. Long Haul Indonesia
PT. LONG HAUL INDONESIA
PT. Maetro Internasional
PT. MAHAKAM NUSA ENERGI
PT. Murni Cipta Sentosa
PT. Ometraco Corporation
PT. Pelita Cengkareng Paper
PT. RADIAS BINTANG TIMUR
PT. Santos Jaya Abadi
PT. SRIREJEKI PERDANA STEEL
PT. Surabaya Agung Industri Pulp & Kertas Tbk.
PT. Toba Pulp Lestari tbk
PT. TOPAS MULTI SECURITIES
Pudjiastuti Binti Soemarno
Pudjiono Iwansantoso
Pujiastuti Elizabeth Sindoro
Pujiastuti Elizabeth Sindoro
PURNAMA WIDJAJA
PURNAMAWATI PURWADI
Purnardi Djojosudirdjo
Purwadi Hendropurnomo
Purwoso Warsito Utomo Himawan
RABOBANK INTERNATIONAL
Rachana Bhansali
Rachmat Basuki Alimwidjaja
Rachmat Gobel
RACHMAT GUNAWAN
Rachmat Mulyana Hamami
Rachmat Santoso Alimwidjaja
Rachmat Susantyo
RACHMAT SUTIONO
Rachmat Sutiono
Rachmiwaty
Radisha Didi Utama
Radius Christanto
Rafael Buhay Concepcion Jr.
RAHARDJO MOECHARAR
Rahendrawan Djoko
Rahendrawan Djoko
Rahmad Pribadi
Rahmad Pribadi
Rahmawaty
RAJ KUMAR
Raja Sapta Ervian
Raja Sapta Ervian
Raju Karamchandani
Raju Karamchandani and Sara Raju Karamchandani
Ramajati Tamin
Randolph Adi Zaini
Randy Hirawan
Rashid Irawan Mangunkusumo
Rasyid, Arwin
Rat Anggraini Susantio
Ratna Anggraini Susantio
Ratna Christina
Ratna Indira Nirwan Bakrie
RATNASARI TAMIN
Ratnawati Budiman
Ratnawati Jenny Haryadi
Ratnawati Sasongko
RATNAWATI WIHARDJO
Ratnesh BEDI
RAVI SHYAM SADARANGANI
RAVI SHYAM SADARANGANI & SONAL RAVI SADARANGANI
Ravi T. Vasandani
Ravi Tulsidas Vasandani
Rayanusin Widjaja
Raymond A. Klesc
Raymond Patra
RAYMOND PRIBADI
RAYMOND PRIBADI
Raymond S. B.
RAYMOND, LOUIS COUHAULT
Razief Nur Usman
Razif Susanto
REIMER ALOAN SIMORANGKIR
RENDOR OVERSEAS S.A.
Rendra Tjajadi
Rendra Tjajadi
Rendra Tjajadi
Rendra Tjajadi
Rendra Tjajadi
RETNO CAHYANINGTYAS
Reza Maulana
Reza Pribadi
Reza Pribadi
Reza Sazly H Siregar
Rhita Manik
Ria Indriana Pasaman
Ria Yulianty Tj he
Rianto Lesmana
RICHARD AnTHONY SCHUMACHER
Richard Cornwallis
Richard Dian Santoso
Richard Hamilton MCCANDLESS
Richard L. McAdoo
RICHARD MOHANLAL HARJANI
Richard Sugianto
Richard Sugianto & Veronica Susianty Rachim
Richard Tjandra
Ricky Frederik
Ricky Tandiono
Ricky Tandriono
Ridwan Irawan
RIDWAN ZAINUDDIN
Rilantini Harjani Muljawan
Rina Ciputra Sastrawinata
Rinda Syafrinda
Rini Mariani Soewandi
Rini Susilo Putri
RISTY ISTIANA
RISWAN WIJAYA
RITA HANDOSO
Rita Indriawati
RIZA MUTYARA
Rizal Risjad
Robby Rhemrev
Robert Kevin Ellis
ROBERT PRIANTONO BONOSUSATYA
ROBERT PRIANTONO BONOSUSATYA
Robert Sean King
Roberto Hanna Jose
ROBERTO TAMPUBOLON
Robin Liem
Robin Makmur
Roger Morrison
Roger Pinder
Roger PINDER (Mr.)
Roij Bramasiswadi Pura Widjaja
Romo Nittyyudo Wacho
Ronald E.P. Mullers
Ronald Edward Philip Mullers
Ronald Liem
Ronald Mullers
Ronald Rusco
Ronald Wijaya
Ronaldi Machmud
Roni Faisal Siregar
Roni Pramaditia
Ronny Hadiana Angkasa
Ronny Lukito
Ronny Suryana
Ronny Susanto
Rony Moelyadi
RONY NARPATISUTA MEDANLAGA
Roos Diana
Roosmiati Handojo
RORI INDRA
Rosan Perkasa Roeslani
ROSANA
Roselyne Yosawiria
Rosemelati S. Adikusumah
Rosianawati Adikara
ROSIDA CHUNG
Rosmeiny Djaja Burhan
Roswita Trismitro
Roy E. Tirtadji
Roy Gosjen
Roy Kevin Kurniawan
Roy Muljadi Soetikno
Rubyanto F. Komala
Rudi Darmawan
Rudi Soraya
Rudi Wirawan Rusli
RUDY CAHYADI SUKANDADINATA
Rudy Ghozali
Rudy Hari
RUDY HARJANTO WIDJAJA
Rudy Muljadi Atmawidjaja
Rudy Nanggulangi
Rudy Rayawang
Rudy Soetikno
Rudy Suhendra
Rudy Susanto
Rudy Temasoa Luwia and Suzie Ramli
Rudy Unjoto
Rudy Y.
Rudyantho & Partners
Rudyanto Gunawan
Rudyanto Suliawan
Rudyono
Rulyani Basyir
RUNI ADIANTI
Rusdi Kirana
Rusdi Sunarjo
Rusdy Budisusetyo
Rusdy Budisusetyo, Lanny Widjajanti and Ida Budisusetyo
Rusiana Susanto
RUSJATI TAMIN
RUSJATI TAMIN
RUSSELL BRUCE MCDONALD
Russell McDonald
Rustiyan Oen
Ryan Pascal Masagung
Ryandi Irawan
Ryu Kawano
S&B Inc
S.H.C.N Lucas
Saad Shaarawi
SABHNANI MANOJ
Sacheen Harris Lasmana
Sadikun Wiratno
SAFARINA GOLFIANI MALIK
Safersa Yusana Sertana
Said Agil Assagaff
Saiko Doi
Salik Soetemo
Salim Podiono
Salim Santoso
Sally Texania Marita Joesoef
Sallyawati Rahardja
Samin Tan
Samin Tan
Sammy Hamzah
Sammy Hamzah
SAMUDRA ENERGY LIMITED
Samuel Setiawan
SANADI BOENYAMIN
Sanderawati Joesoef
SANDI GUNAWAN HO
Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno
Sandiaga Uno
Sandra Setijono
Sandrawati Setiadi
Sandria Kirana Budiendra
SANGEETA RAMCHAND
SANGEETA RAMCHAND AND MOHIT RAMCHAND VASWANI
Sanjay Bhansali
Sanjaya Raharja / Loren
Santoso Widjojo
Santy Jennice Lioe
Santy Jennice Lioe
SANTY WIJAYA
Sanyo Leebrianto Suhaimi
Saparuddin
Sapri
SARASWATI TEDJAKUSUMA
Sardjono
Sari Wulaningsih
Satyadharma Ruslim
Sectra (Samoa) Limited
Sefrie Roring
Sefrie Roring
Sembodo Broto Winarso
Semiwati Lawanto
Sengman Tjahja
Septiana Iskandar
Septo Adjie Sudiro
Septo Adjie Sudiro (2)
SETIA BUDHI
Setiabudi Djaelani
Setiady Koeswojo
Setiawan Achmad
Setiawan Lukman
Setiono Tandriono
Sgfried Rinaldy
Shalimar Sulisto
SHALINE MARY SHABNA SOULSBY
Sharecorp Limited
Shariq Mukhtar
Sherlly Hartono
Sherman Rana Krishna
Sherman Rana Krishna
Sherper Limited
Sherper Ltd
Shih, Chih-Hung
SHINTA DEVIYANTI
Shinta Moetiara
SHINTA SANJAYA ISMAEL, SE
Shuzy Lipina
Siak Tjai Oi
Siauw Rachel Anatola
Siauw Welly Susanto
Siegfried Erwin Bengner
Sierah Landajani Soetemo
Sigit Iswandi
Silkar National Limited
SILVA HALIM
Siman Darmamulia
Simon C. Horn
Simon Lim
Simon Subrata
SIMON SUSILO
Simson Panjaitan
Sinar Mas Group
Sinarto Dharmawan
Sinatra Arto Hardy
Sindhu Wibhisono Ongkosoewito
Sindhu Wibhisono Ongkosoewito
Singgih Amara Widjanarko
Singgih Kartono Halim Lie
SIOK LIM TJOA
Sistha Alicia Tjokrosaputro
Sistha Alicia Tjokrosaputro
Siti Farihah
Siti Hartati Tjakra Murdaya
Sity Leo Samudera
Sity Leo Samudera
Siusan Hermawan
Slamet Wibowo
So Lai Fun
Soebagjo Jatim Djarot
SOEBALI SUDJIE
Soegianto Nagaria
Soegiarto Djitowibowo
Soegwanto
Soekrisman Legiman
Soemadipradja & Taher
SOENARJANTO INDRATONO
Soenarjanto Indratono
Soenarni Sampoerno
Soenarta Natapradja
Soendari Widjaja
Soeparmadi
Soeparman Hardjodikromo
Soeroto Hadimuljono
Soeryo Bawono
Soesanto Effendi
Soesilowati
Soetikno Soedarjo
Soetikno Soedarjo
Soetikno Soedarjo
Soetikno Soedarjo, Dian Muljani Soedarjo and Putri Rahayu Soedarjo
SOETIKNO TANOKO
Soetjahjono Winarko
Soetjipto Nagaria
Soewandi Gunawan
Soeyanto
Sofian Widagdo
Sohet Chairil
SOLEH MAMUN
Solidi Korompis
Solidi Silvester Korompis
Solihin
Solihin Asiah
SOLIHIN YUSUF KALLA
Somboon Yuprapan
SONAL RAVI SADARANGANI
Song Liang Hua
Song Wen Po
Song Wen Po, Junty, Jimmy Song and Michael Song
Song Wen Shyang
Song Wen Shyu
Soniya Dudaney
Sonny Agustino Laksito
SONY RUDIKAN
Sonya Riupassa
Sonya Riupassa and Kitty Joantina Wulanda
Sorgato Widjaja
Sri Iriani Goenawan
SRI KRISHNA WISHNU WARDHANA
Sri Mulyono Herlambang
SRI MURWATI HABIR
Sri Rahayu Setyawati
Sri Rahayu Setyawati
Sri Setyaningsih Elisabeth
Sri Setyaningsih Elisabeth
Sri Setyaningsih Elisabeth (SG)
Sri Soelijah
Stan Maringka
Stan Maringka
Stefanus Arief Chrisnamurti
STEPHAN PUTRA KURNIAWAN
Stephen Charles Dodgson
Stephen Patra
Steven Hirawan
Steven Scott Barki
Steven Sugianto
Steven Tirtawidjaja
Stewart Donald HALL
Stewart James Robinson
Stockcorp Limited
Su Kam To
Suarmin Tioniwar
Suarmin Tioniwar
Suarmin Tioniwar
Suarmin Tioniwar and Dewi Salim as joint tenants
Subagio Wirjoatmodjo
Subardi
Subari Setiono
Subianto Arpan Sumodikoro
Subianto Tjandra
SUBUH HARI CAHYANTO
Sudiarso Prasetio
Sudijanto Atmodjo
Sudiro Andi Wiguno
Sudjono Barak Rimba
Sudjono Karim
Sudjono Karim
SUFAN ABNER
SUFAN ABNER
Sugar Group
Sugianto Adiwinata
Sugianto of Sinarmas Group
Sugiharto
Sugiharto Ta
Sugiman
Sugiman
Sugiman
Sugiono
SUGIONO DJAUHARI
Sugiono Wiyono Sugialam
Sugiono Wiyono Sugialam – New
Sugiono Wiyono Sugialam and Lanny Herawati Wibowo Ng
Sugito Walujo
SUGITO WALUJO
Sugito Walujo
Sugito Walujo
Sugun Susilo
Suhadi Zaini
SUHANGKAT LAKMUDIN
SUHARDI
Suhardi Budiman
Suhardiman
SUHARDY
Suhari Setiono
Suharman Subianto
Suhendra Gunadi
Suherman Tjandradjaja
Suhiantoro Supardjono
Sujanty Jamin
Sujarni
Sujono Hadikusumo
Sukendar Unjoto
Sukmawati Widjata
SULAIMAN HAKIM
SULAIMAN HAKIM
Sulaiman Leban Koswara
SULIENIATI CHANDRA TJOE
SULIENIATI CHANDRA TJOE
Sulistiani Sampoerna
Sulung Poniman
Sumadi
Sumardi Kartasasmita alias Kong Phing Li
Sumarto Wonowidjojo
Sumarto Wonowidjojo
SUMET JIARAVANON
Sumiati Liauw
Sumiaty
Sun Moon Suhaimi
Sun, Khai-Nien
Sunan Susilo
SUNARDI
Sunarjo Sampoerna
Sunata Tjiterosampurno
Sung Pui Man
Sunil Motilal Mirpuri
Sunny Suhaimi
Supardi
Supartono Suparto
Supartono Suparto
Supartono Suparto
Suresh Narsinhdas Shah
Suria Kurniawan Lukiman
Suriawati Tan
Suripto
Surjadinata Sumantri
Surjantoro Siswanto
SURJANY KURNIAWAN ECKERT
SURJONO TANOTO
Surjono Tanoto
Surono
Surya Laksana Ongkoredjo
Suryadiharja Freddi H.
Suryana Tochmi
SURYANA NURZAMAN ZEIN
Suryana Tochmi
SURYANTO
Suryawati L. Riady
Susan Lo
Susana Sutanto
Susanna Kusnowo
Susanna Nagaria
Susanti Pheng
SUSANTI SUNARDI
Susanto
Susanto Suwarto
Susanto Tandra
Susanto Tjandra
Susanto Winarto
Susi Salamah
Susilawati
Susilo SOPUTRO
Susilo Wonowidjojo
Susilowati
Susin Valentinus
SUSWANTI GUNAWAN
Susy Angkawijaya
Susy Gunawan
Sutanto DJUHAR
SUTANTO LEON PATRICK
Sutarsa Tanu
Sutiadi Widjaja
Sutiadi Widjaya
Sutiana Juhanda
Sutikno
Sutono Nitisastro
Suwandi Widjaja
Suwantara Gotama Lim
Suwantara Gotama Lim
Suwito Brodjonegoro
Suwito MULIADI
Suyono Purnomo
Suzie Surjana, Tony Surjana, Johny Surjana and Ronny Suryana
Syahbandi
SYAHRUL
SYAIFUL ZEN
Syamsul Hoiri
Syarief Tando
Syarif Bastaman
Syarif Bastaman
Sylvia Efi Widyantari Sumarlin
Sylvia Mardiana Sarwani
Sylvia Mardiana Sarwani
SYLVIA MULJADI
Sylvia Novieta
Symon Brewis – Weston
T-Line Ltd
Tahi Parulian Saragi
Tan Ali Susanto
Tan Hong Kiem
Tan Loo Mei
Tan Lucas Adnan Soen Hwat
Tan Lunardi
TAN LUNARDI (Mr.)
Tan Olinda Dewi
Tan Timothy Tandon
Tan Tjoe Liang
Tanaka Kazuya
Tanaka Kiyomi
Tandean Rustandy and Susan Sujanto
Tang Eng Hoo
Tansri Soen Zen
Tansri Soen Zen
Targian Tan
TATANG HERMAWAN
Taufan
TAUFIK SURYA DHARMA
Tay Robinto
TEDDY FADIL
Teddy Jeffrey Katuari
Teddy Sugianto
Teddy Sutandinata
Teddy Tjahjono
TEDDY YOSHAWIRJA
Tedja Widjaja
Tedy Tanumihardja
Teguh Arianto Budiman
TEGUH BOENTORO
Teguh Ganda Wijaya
Teguh Suginawan
TEL CORPORATE SERVICES PTE LTD
Teng Goat Nio
Tengku Muhammad Ali Mahara
Teresa Suteja
Terra Computer Systems
Terunodjojo Nusa
Texmaco Group
The Citigroup Private Banking
THE HIE TING
The Kwen Ie
The Liliana
The Practice
The Wen Jun
Theodorus Marto Sutiono
Theresia & Lidwina as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Theresia Suciah
Theresia Widyawati Setiono
Theresia Yustina Sumarlin
THIO JULIA TIMOTIUS
Thomas Derek Wilkes Burland
Thomas Derek Wilkes Burland
Thomas Lundi Halim
Thomas Lundi Halim & Elly Lestari Adiutama as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Thomas M. Tampi
Thomas Soulsby
Thomas Tampi
THOMSON
Tiara Dharani Josodirdjo
Tien Thinh Pham
Tigran Timotius Adhiwiyogo
Timmie Melvin
Timothius Felix Intan
Timothy James Supple
TIMOTHY SIDDIK
Timothy Watts
Tina Meimona Shazell
Tina Suteja
Tio Imelda
TIRTA JUWANA DARMADJI
Tirtadjaja Hambali
Tirto Angesti
Tirto Angesty
Tito Sulistio
Titus Wahjoe Dewanto
Tjahjadi Hari Surjono
Tjahjadi Rahardja
Tjahjadi Tresna, Tin Tin Tresna and Senjaya Tresna
Tjahjono Alim
Tjahyono Imawan
Tjan Kok Pin
Tjandra Sari
Tjandra Teresna Widjaja
Tjhang Hwee Tjoe
Tjia Tjhun Hwa
Tjia Tjoen Hiong
Tjia Tjoen Hok
Tjia Wiwin Anggono
Tjiam Ming Ping
Tjie Jien Wang
Tjindrasa Ng
Tjioe Hauw Tze
Tjioe, Gunawan Adianto
Tjipto Surjanto
Tjiu Thomas Effendy
Tjoa Siok Lim
Tjoe Hendry
Tjoe Meuw Sen
Tjoi Wilson
Tjokrorianto
Tjondro Indria Liemonta
Tjong Euw Khiong
Tjong Jok Ha
Tjong Miranti
Tjong Tje Liong
Tjong Tje Tjin
TODDY MIZAABIANTO SUGOTO
Tom Soulsby
Tommy Jacobus Silfanus
Tommy Laurens
Tommy Nugraha
TOMMY TANADY
Tomy Wikutomojati
Tonny Raidy Djamhir
TONNY WANTAH
Tony Djayalaksana
Tony Supargo
Tossin Suharya
Tossin Suharya, Stephen Ignatius Suharya & Daniel Suharya
Toto Soegiarto
Toto Soegiarto and Enny Soegiarto
TOTOK SUSILO
TOTTY MOEKARDIONO
Trent Karoll
Triana Soenryo
TRIANAWATI
Tricia Barki
Trini Koeswanti Sri Soepardianti
TRIONO JULIARSO DAWIS
Trisnawati Budiman
Trisning Setiadi
Triyatno Atmodiharjo
Triyatno Atmodiharjo
Troy Surya Subandi
TSANG KAM HEUNG
Tseng Hsueh Sung
Tseng, Hsueh Sung
Tung Bibiana
Tunggono
Turcahyo Wahyudi
Turniady Widjaja
Turniady Widjaja, Rosmeiny Djaja Burhan and Yessica Beatrice Widjaja
Tuty Sumargo
Tyrone Kaskam Awan
TYTY CHANDRA
UBS AG (Indonesia) Ltd
Udinda Group
Ulian Napsiah
Umar Suwandi
Ungkoro Darmosusilo
Untoro Angkawijaya
Upekkha Theresia Murdaya
Ustadai Tedja,Gan Ying May, Felix Tedja and Edwin Tedja
Ustadi Tedja
USTADI TEDJA
Utama Gondokusumo
Utama Halim
Utama Jusuf
Utama Jusuf, Megawati Hartono, Eddy Jusuf, Dewi Jusuf, Angela Jusuf
UTARYO SUWANTO
Utomo Djohan
Uwat
Uwat (Mr.)
Varisa Susilo
Vemmy Febriyanti
Vera Marlinata Widjaya
Vernon Charles Lee
VERONICA LUKITO
VERONICA LUKITO
Veronica Colondam
Veronica Devi Intan
Veronica Lukito
Veronica Renata
Veronica Tjendro Susanto
VERONICA YUWONO YU
Veronika Slamet
Victor Fungkong
Victor Luhur
Victor Sebastian Vaz
Vidhya Prakash Panjabi
VIJAY NARAINDAS GANGTANI
Vincent Kus Chu
Vincent Kus Chu
Vinod Kumar Agarwal
VIONA GUNAWAN
Virendra Prakash Sharma
Vivi Hottama
Vivi Hottama
Vivian Kent Janawati
Vivien Goh
Vonny Harsono
Vonny Juwono
Wachid Hendriadi and Lizza Christina Budihardjo
Wadyono Suliantoro and Setijanti Suliantoro as joint tenants
Wahjudin Judiana Ardiwinata
Wahjudin Judiana Ardiwinata
Wahjudin Judiana Ardiwinata
Wahjudin Judiana Ardiwinata
Wahyu Subayani
Wahyu Tri Laksono
Wahyudi Lukmantara
WALTER LEO WIDMER
wan peng lim
WARDHANA ATMADJA
WATNI DJOHAN
Wei Zhigang
Wei Zhigang
Welly Thomas
Wen Shyang Song
WESLEY INTERNATIONAL GROUP LIMITED
West Side Ltd.
Wewey Tjahjadi
Wewey Tjahjadi
Wewey Tjahjadi Wanadihardja
Whitlam Luhur
Wibawa Darmawan
Wibowo Brotorahardjo
Wibowo Kartopranoto
Wibowo Suseno Wirjawan
Wicahyo Ratomo
Wicahyo Ratomo
Wida Martha Sari Newton
Widhayati Hendropurnomo
Widhi Sesanti
Widiyanti Putri
WIDJAJA LASWONO
WIDJAJA Tjangdra Herawati
Widjaja Trisna
Widjaya Sendra
Widjojo Budiarto
Widjojo Parawirohardjo
Widjojo Soejono
WIDYA SURAANNISA
Widyakumala Sulistyo
Widyawati Budiman
Wientoro Prasetyo
Wijayanto Ang
WIJONO TANOKO
Wijono Widjojo
Wilfred Schultz
Wilfred Schultz
Wilfred Schultz
Wilfred Schultz (Inactivated)
Wilhelmina Bia Mugirato
William A. Sullivan, Esq.
William James Park and Yuliati Karnadi as joint tenants with right of survivors
William Lietanawaty
WILLIAM O BRIEN JOHNSTON
William Shane Tan
William Sutjiatma
William T Jugiarto
WILLIAM TJUGIARTO
WILLIAM TOBAGUS
Willie Tandanu
Willy Gunawan
Willy Lukito
Willy Sugianto
Wina Widjaja
Winardi Darmansa Lim
WINARDI PRANATAJAYA
Winardi Setiaputra
Winardi Thamrin
Winarno Tjajadi
WINARNO TJAJADI
Winarno Tjajadi
Winarno Tjajadi and Lili Liauw as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Winarno Tjajadi, Rendra Tjajadi and Sujanto Tjajadi Tjio
Winarno Tjajadi, Rendra Tjajadi and Sujanto Tjajadi Tjio
Winarno Tjajadi, Rendra Tjajadi and Sujanto Tjajadi Tjio As Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship
Winarto Halim
Winata Wiryaputra.
Winny Martina Christine
WINSON POLA
Wira Satria Dewo Anggoro Kasih
Wirawan Chondro
Wirawan Chondro
Wirawan Chondro
Wirontono & Co. Ltd
Wisasongko Puspoyo
Witijasmoro Sih Handajanto
Witijasmoro Sih Handajanto and Nia Soniati Wityasmoro
Witjaksono Abadiman Sidharta
Wito Chandra
Witono Dani
Wiwiek Hidajati
Wiwin Untari Andoko
Wiyang
Wong Alfian Widjaya
Wong Chuk Chen
WONG KIAN KHIONG
WONG KIAN KHIONG and FOE SIAT KHIUN
WONG LAI FONG FELICITAS
Wong Steffania
Wong Tommy Wibowo
Wong Tranadi
Wong, Siong Yuit Benjamin
Xu Jun
XU PENG
Yakin Lijaya
Yamin Widjaja
Yamin Widjaja and Linda Sidharta As Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship
Yanto Kasiman
YANUAR ARSAD
Yanuar Tenacious
Yap Eng Siu
Yap Johanes
Yau Hang Yip
Yau Hang Yip and Elline Yohan Yau as joint tenants
Yau Hang Yip and Jocelin Yohan Yau as joint tenants
Yau Yung
Yaya Winarno Junardy
Yayasan Chandra Bunda Dewi
Yeni Rohaeni
YENNI
YEOMUN LTD
Yeomun Ltd
Yessica Beatrice Widjaja
Yogie Sandi Yudhianto
Yohan Sutandar
YOHAN SUTANDAR
Yohanes Eka Putranto
Yohannes Alexander Wintery Oei
Yohannes Riyadi
Yoko Kawano
Yolanda Wijaya
Yong Wiyono Buyung Yasin
Yonna Septarina Kusdianto
Yos Hendri
Yos Sidy Teo )formerly Sie Tjit Kiong
Yoseph Suherman
Yosodewi Limurti
Yosyan Madolen
Yoyok Soebagio
YUDHO ENJANARKO
Yudi Astono
Yudi Astono
Yugisako Tita
Yuke Elia Susiloputro
Yulia Sinta Dewi
YULIANA JOHANES
Yuliana Sudradjat
Yully
Yunet Limanto
Yunie Wono and Elline Yohan Yau as joint tenants
Yunita Kalim
Yunita Sastrasanjaya
YUPI HARYANTO
Yusak Teguh Nugroho
Yustiningsih Suharsono
Yustinus Wisnoe Bayuaji
Yusuf Adrian Chandra
Yusuf Valent
Yusy Widjaja Oey
Yvonne Shirley Fogarty
ZAINAL ABIDINSYAH SIREGAR
Zaini Abidin Noor
ZAMHARIR
ZEIN SWETLANA ANDREYEVNA
Zentry Ltd
Zerline Conception Boncorp Pliac
ZULFIKAR ALIMUDDIN
Zuriah
Offshore Entities (43)
Alpilles Holdings Offshore Ltd
ASANUSA CAPITAL PARTNERS PTE. LTD.
Asia Pacific Leisure Ltd
Ballistic Success Trading Limited
Blossoms Glamour Profits Inc.
Capsec Limited
CEWE LTD.
CHANDLER CAPITAL INC.
Chang Wen Yu and Chen Fang Min
CHARTERHOUSE LIMITED
Chien, Cheng
CYRUS BAAL Inc.
Energi Mega Pratama Inc.
Falkner Family Trust
Folkstone Worldwide Limited
Grand Benefit Enterprises Ltd
Grid Consulting Limited
Indoprop Ltd
Innovative Ventures Ltd
Kilda Corporation
Legacy Investments Pte Ltd
Lilac Swish Offshore Ltd
Linkberg Offshore Ltd
MEGA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION ENTERPRISES LIMITED
Nexuss Investment Worldwide Ltd
Northern Star Capital Pte Limited
Northstar Pacific Partners
Palladium Overseas Corporation
Paving Investments Ltd
PERSEPOLIS CAPITAL LTD
PT Indo Buana Makmur Textile
PT Jenshiang Nusantara Textile Chemical Industrial
PT Uni Enlarge Industry Indonesia
PT. TOPAS MULTI SECURITIES
Stafford Services Ltd
Starhill Trading Ltd
Times Investment Group Ltd.
Triston Capital Ltd
United Capital Enterprise Worldwide Ltd
Victory Harvest Investment Ltd
VIENA INVESTMENTS LIMITED
Wanamurti & Associates
Willowcreek Development Incorporated
Listed Addresses (2400)
(Invoice sent by email before send out) Jalan Brawijaya II No.5, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12160, Indonesia
108 Jalan Drupadi 2 Seminyak Bali Indonesia
11, Sea Mist, Pali Road Bandra 
Mumbai – 400050 Indonesia
11th Floor, Menara Asia 101 Diponegoro Blvd Lippo-Karawaci Karawaci-Tangerang
139 Jl. Raya Kapuk Kamal Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
14, Kartini Raya Pasar Baru Jakarta Indonesia
14th Floor, Bank Bali Tower, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 27, Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
15-A-8-3 Scots Tower, Mont Kiara Pines Jalan Mont Kiara (Off Jalan Bunkit Kiara) Mont Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur INDONESIA
1501 Menara DEA Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
15th Floor, Menara DEA, Suite 1503 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jl. Mega Kuningan Barat IX Kav. E.4.3 No. 1 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
18 Jalan Mataram Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
18 Jalan Suryakencana Bandung 40132 Indonesia
19a-2 Tuladong Bawah Empat Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
19F Wisma Indosemen JI Jend Sudirman Kav 70-71 jakarta Indonesia
20th Floor, Citibank Tower Jl. Jend. Sudirman KAV 54 Jakarta 12190 INDONESIA
21 Banyuwangi No. 5 Menteng, Jakarta Indonesia
2111 Boulevard Gajah Mada #01-01 Lippo Cyber Park, Lippo Karawaci Utara Tangerang 15811, Banten INDONESIA
2112 Bulevar Gajah Mada # 01-01 Lippo Cyber Park Lippo Karawaci Kel. Panunggangan Barat, Kec. Cibodas Tangerang, Indonesia
21st Floor Wisma Bank Dharmala JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 28, Jakarta Selatan Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
21st Floor, Plaza Bapindo, Menara II Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 54-55 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
22 Caringin Timur Cilandak Barat Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
22B SCBD Suites, Jl Jend Sudirman Kav 52-53, Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
22nd Flr, Menara Jamsotek Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 38 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
23rd Floor Menara Rajawali Jl Mega Kuningan Lot # 5.1 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
28 Jalan Matraman Raya Jakarta 13150 Indonesia
3 JL. BARAT SENER, GG. MERPATI NO. 1 BARATSENER KEROBOKAN KUTA BALI INDONESIA
30a Jutland Parade Dalkeith WA 6009 Western Australia Jakarta Selatan – 12980 Indonesia
31 Corroaminojo No.81, Ranalauj Bandar, Lampung.
35 Cipanganti Bandung Indonesia
35 Cipanganti, Bandung Indonesia
37-05 Ambassador 2 ITC Kuningan, Jl Prof Dr Satrio Kuningan Jakarta 12940
38 Jalan Teluk Betung Jakarta 10230, Indonesia
38 Mandala Utara Tomang Jakarta 11440 Indonesia
3rd Floor, Dynaplast Tower No. 1 MH Thamrin Blvd Lippo Karawaci 1100 Tangerang 15811, West Java, INDONESIA
4 Seasons Residences Spring Tower 19D Jl. Setiabudi Tengah Jakarta 12910, Indonesia
41 jalan Kebon Sirih Jakarta INDONESIA 10320
44-46, WLIKOTA MUSTAJAB (18. GANDASULI) SURABAYA 60272 INDONESIA
481 Jl. Legian, Legian Kaja Kota Denpasar, Bali Indonesia
4th, Enseval Building Jl. Let Jend Suprapto Kav 4 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
55 Pajajaran Bandung Indonesia
5th Floor, Menara Kebon Sirih Jl. Kebon Sirih No. 17-19 Jakarta 10340 Indonesia
61, Jalan Mangunsarkoro Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
65 Jalan Raya Kuta Denpasar, Bali INDONESIA
65 Prescott Drive, Murdoch, WA6150, Australia and/ or Jl. Hegarmanah Wetan No. 35A, Bandung, Indonesia
6A Jahmada No. 193A Jakarta Indonesia
7 Palem boulevard Matahari Building 3rd Floor Lippo Karawaci 1200 Tangerang 15811 INDONESIA
78b JI. Kemang Timur Kemang 12510 Jakarta Indonesia
7B Nongsa Point Marina Nongsa, Batam Island Indonesia
7th Floor, Menara Perdana, JL. HR. Rasuna Said Kav.C-17, Jakarta 12940
7th Floor, Wisma BSG Jalan Abdul Muis No. 40, Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
7th Floor, Wisma BSG, Jalan Abdul Muis No.40 Jarkarta 10160 Indonesia
8th Floor Menara Asia Lippo Karawaci West Java INDONESIA
9th Fl. Lippo Centre, Jl. Gatot Subroto Kv. 35-36 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
9th Floor Asia Tower 101 Diponegroro Boulevard Tangerang 1500 Indonesia
9th Floor, Plaza Asia Jl. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 59 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
AAF Building 2nd Floor Jl. TB Simatupang Kav 18 Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Advocates & Solicitors Plaza ABDA, 16th Floor, Zone D Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 59 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia.
Agil Kusumadya Akbp No. 1.B Kudus Indonesia
Agung Indah 4/4 RT 015 RW 016 Sunter Agung Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Agung Permai IV/39 C4/24 Kelurahan Sunter Agung Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Agung Rakas Bungalows. JL Padma Utara, Legian Bali Indonesia
Alam Elok V1/CIF 26-27 RT 002/016 Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Alumanium A3/III/1 Medan-Sumatera Utara INDONESIA
Ambengan No. 19 RT/RW Ketabang, Surabaya INDONESIA
AMDI BUILDING – B 7th Floor Jalan Gaya Motor Raya No.8 Suntor II, Jakarta 14330 INDONESIA
Apart Atap Merah, Unit 1054 JL Pecenongan Raya No. 72 Jakarta 10120 INDONESIA
APARTEMEN PERMATA HIJAU TOWER 1 NO. 7A, JL. RAYA PERMATA HIJAU BLOK B NO. 8, INDONESIA
Apartemen Permata Hijau Tower 2 No. 1A Jl. Raya Permata Hijau Blok B No. 8 Indonesia
Apartemen Puri Kemayoran 207C Jl. Landas Pacu Selatan A6 Kota Baru Bandar Kemayoran Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Apartm Bona Vista I/0906 Jl Bona Vista Raya No.1 Jakarta 12440 Indonesia
Apartmen Casablanca Tower 1 Unit 0412 Jl Casablanca Kav 12 Jakarta Selatan 12870
Apartment Airlangga Unit 39A Jl. Lingkar Mega Kuningan E1.1 Mega Kuningan, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Apartment Airlangga Unit 39A Jl. Lingkar Mega Kuningan Kav E1.1 No. 1 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Apartment Ambassador, Kuningan Unit 25F Jl. Prof. Dr Satrio, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
APARTMENT BATAVIA TOWER II/ SUITE 1505 JLN K.H. MAS MANSYUR KAV. 126 JAKARTA 10210 INDONESIA
Apartment Executive Menteng Blok Palem No. 1205 Jl. Pagangsaan Barat Kav 6 JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Apartment Istana Harmoni, Unit 28K Komplek Harmoni Plaza Jl. Suryo Pranoto No. 2, Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Apartment Istana Sahid Tower ME-05-C Jl. Jenderal Sudirman 86 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Apartment ITC Roxymas 7th Floor, No. 81 Jakarta Indonesia
Apartment Kempinski Plaza 18 RT 013 RW 011, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Apartment Mediteranean Garden Tower A 9th Floor, Unit B/AC Tanjung Duren Jakarta Indonesia
Apartment Pantai Mutiara Tower Enggano Iantai 15/7 Jalan Raya Pantai Mutiara T.I. Jakarta Utara 14450, Indonesia
Apartment Parama Unit 10B Jl. T. B. Simatupang Jakarta Selatan 12430 Indonesia
Apartment Pavilion, Tower 1 Unit 1902 JI. KH Mas Mansyur Kav 24 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Apartment Pearl Garden, WPI GF Jl Jend Gatot Subroto Kav. 6-7 Jakarta 12930, Indonesia
Apartment Permata Hijau Tower 1 No. 2-A, Jl. Raya Permata Hijau Blok. B No.8, Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Apartment Permata Hijau Tower Two, Unit 7 Jakarta-Selatan Indonesia
Apartment Permata Safir #603 Jl. Permata Safir Blok W/9 Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia.
Apartment Plaza Senayan Jl. Tinju No. 1 Pintu Satu Gelora Senayan Jakarta 10270, Indonesia
Apartment Sailendra, No. 11B Jalan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Apartment Salendra Jalan Mega Kuningan Timur 1 Kav E1.2., No. 1&2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Apartment Setiabudi Unit 1704 Jalan RS Aini, Karet Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Apartment Simprug Teras A-21 RT007/003 Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Apartment Taman Anggrek Tower 4 Unit 11 Jakarta Barat 11470 Indonesia
Apartment Taman Anggrek Tower 7/29 Floor Jl. Letjend S. Parman Kav. 21 Jakarta 11470 Indonesia
APARTMENT TAMAN ANGGREK TOWER, 4-11D JARKATA 11470 INDONESIA
Apartment The Ascott Unit 0331 Kebon Kacang Raya No. 2 Jakarta, Indonesia
APR. PERSONA BAHARI BLOK TOPAZ NO. P1D, JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Apt Senayan Res B1S/2 LT.11, RT003/RW007 Grogol Utara, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Apt. 1409 at The Ascott Jakarta Jalan Kebun Kacang Raya No. 2 Jakarta 10230 Indonesia
Apt. Atap Merah #1195 JI. Pecenongan 72 Jakarta 10120 Indonesia
Apt. Istana Sahid No. ME-7C JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 86 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
APT. ISTANA SAHID NO. ME-7C JL. JENDERAL SUDIRMAN KAV.86 JAKARTA 10220 INDONESIA
Apt. Nuansa Hijau C. 024, RT007/015, Pondok Pinang Jakarta, Indonesia
Apt. Permata Safir, #603 Jl Permata, Safir Bok W/9 Jakarta 12210, Indonesia
Apt. Redtop 1062, JL. Pecanongan No. 72 Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Arena Pekan Raya Jakarta Hah E Kota Baru Bandar Kemayoran Jakarta 10620
Ariobimo Sentral 4th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav X-2 No. 5 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Artha Graha Building 19th Floor Suite 1909 Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Senayan-Keyaboran Baru South Jakarta, Indonesia
Artha Graha Building 32nd Fl Sudirman Central Business District (SCBD) Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Artha Graha Building 6th Floor Sudirman Central Business District (SCBD) Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Artha Graha Building, 6th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Artha Graha Building, Sudirman Central Business Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 52-53, Jakarta-12910 INDONESIA
Arthaloka Building, Jin Jend Sudirman Kav., 2 Jakarta Pusat 10220
Asem Baris Raya No. 1, RT 001/005 Kebon Baru Jakarta Salatan
Asia Superyachts Office 117 Jalan Kunti, Seminyak Bali, Indonesia 80361
Aston Condominium, Jl. Braga City Walk, Bandung Indonesia
Aston Rasuna Residence Apartment 29C Komplex Apartment Taman Rasuna, Jalan H R Rasuna Said Jakarta, Indonesia
B-102, Bugenville Apartment Komplek Klub Kelapa Gading Jalan Bulevar, Blok KGC Kelpa Gading Permai, Jakarta
Babelan Indah Blok B-3 RT/RW 08/08 Babelan Bekasi Indonesia
BALOI GARDEN BLOK C NO. 3 RT/RW 003/005 KEL. BATU SELICIN KEC LUBUK BAJA INDONESIA
Bambu Durix No. 10 Rt 013/Rw 006 Jakarta Indonesia 13430
Bank Mega Building, 2nd floor, Suite 202 Jl. Tanjung Karang No. 3 – 4A Jakarta 10230
Bapindo Plaza Mandiri Tower 19th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 54 – 55 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
BCD Tower, 4th Floor Jl. Jend.Sudirman Kav.26 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Bellagio Residence Unit 22 AF 6 Jl. Mega Kuningan Barat Kav. E4/3 Jakarta, Indonesia
Benda, Rt. 004/ Rw. 001 Ciganjur, Jagakarsa Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
Bening Indah Estate Blok B5 No. 1 Pondok Gede Jakarta Timur Indonesia
BENING INDAH ESTATE BLOK B5 NO.1 PONDOK GEDE KATARTA TIMUR INDONESIA
Bidakara Office Tower 12-18th Floor Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto 71-73 Jakarta 12870, Indonesia
Billy & Moon KI /2-3, RT 008/010, Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Bina Mulia Building, 5th Floor Jl.H.R. Rasuna Siad, Kav. 10, Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Bintaro Melati Blk 2 No. 19 Pasanggrahan Jakarta, Indonesia
Bintaro Sektor IV JI. Cucur Barat X Blok E1/29 Jakarta Selatan 15225 Indonesia
Bkt Golf UTM III 24-25 RT00/03 Kel Pondok, Pinang, Jakarta Indocnesia
BLOCK I/1 SELATAN NO.32 MUARA KARANG JAKARTA INDONESIA
Blok A1/4, Jl Trapesium 3, Tmn Kedoya Permai, Kebon Jeruk, 11530 Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Blok D No 11, Komplex Batam Plaza, Nagoya, Batam, Indonesia
Blok K-9, Selatan No.2 Pluit Muara Karang Jakarta, Utara Indonesia
Blok Vll/No. 8, Jalan Tangkuban Perahu, Banjar Tegal Buah Padang Sambian Kelod Denasar Barat 80117, Bali INDONESIA
BNI Building 20th Floor JI. Jendral Sudirman, Kav 1 10220, Jakarta INDONESIA
Br. Blangsinga, DS. Saba Kec Blahbatuh-Gianyar, Bali Indonesia
BRAWIJAYA NO.50 BOGO INDONESIA
Budi Indah Raya No. 15 Bandung Indonesia
Budi Indah Raya No., 15 Bandung INDONESIA
Budiarto Law Partnership Wisma Bisnis Indonesia 3rd Floor, Suite 309 Jalan Letjen S. Parman Kav. 12 Jakarta 11480 Indonesia
BUKIT CINERE INDAH JL PURI PESANGGRAHAN I BLOK M INDONESIA
Bukit Golf 1-PC 14 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Indonesia
BUKIT GOLF 11 NO.20, PONDOK INDAH JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
BUKIT GOLF BLOK PE NO 6 PONDOK INDAH Jakarta 12310 INDONESIA
Bukit Golf II No. 20 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Bukit Golf Utama III P.17 Rt 000/Rw 003, Pondok Pinang Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Bukit Golf Utama III P.A 17 Pondok Pinang – Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Indonesia
Bukit Golf Utama III., PA 17, RT 000/003, Pondok Pinang, Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
BUKIT GOLF UTAMA PA/27 RT 00/03 PONDOK PINANG JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
BUKIT HIJAU II/2 PONDOK INDAH JAKARTA
Bukit Rivaria M5/24, Sawangan Depok 16519, Indonesia
Bumi Daya Plaza, 28th Floor, Jl. Imam Bonjol No.61, Jakarta 10310 – Indonesia
Bumi Karang Indah Karang Asri II Blok C2/21 Jakarta 12440 Indonesia
Bumina Wahana JI. Riau No. 17-21 Hakarta 10350 Indonesia
BUNCIT INDAH E/I, RT006/004, PEJATEN BARAT JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Buncit Mas Bok B-3 Jl. Mampang Prapatan Raya 108 Jakarta 12790
C/- 11th Floor Menara Asia, Jl. Diponegoro Lippo Karawaci INDONESIA
c/- 8th Floor Menara Asia Lippo Karawaci West Java
c/- Bank Bira, Wisma Metropolitan Level 1-2, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta
C/- Bank Ekonomi Ekonomi Graba 7th Floor, JL. Setiabudi Selatan, Kav. 10 Jakarta 12920, INDONESIA
C/- Ciptadana Securitas, Citra Graha 8th Floor Jin. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
C/- Deloitte Touche Wisma Antara, 18th Floor Jl Medan Merdeka Selatan No. 17 Jakarta 10110, INDONESIA
C/- Erlin 3rd Floor, Menara Matahari – Lippo Life Jalan Boulevard Palem Raya No. 7 Lippo Karawaci 1200 Tangerang 15811 INDONESIA
C/- Lippo Centre 10th Floor, Asia Tower 101 Diponegoro Blvd Lippo Village 1200, Karawaci-Tangerang, INDONESIA
C/- Lippo Centre Building 10th Floor, Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta
C/- Lippo Centre Building Jl. Jend Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta Selatan
C/- Lippo Group, 10th Floor Asia Tower 101 Diponegoro Blvd., Lippo Village 1200 Karawaci – Tangerang, Jakarta INDONESIA
C/- Lippo Group, 9th Floor Lippo Centre Jalan Jenderal, Gatoto Subroto Kav 35-36 Jakarta 12490 INDONESIA
c/- Makarim & Taira S. Summitmas I, 17th Floor Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 61-62 Jakarta 12069 Indonesia
C/- P. T. Bakrie Capital Indonesia Wisma Bakri, FL 3, Jl H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
C/- P. T. Dayabangun Persada, Wisma Bakri, Fl 3, Jl H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 JAKARTA, INDONESIA
C/- P.T. Bymindo Setiatama Gedung Bank Bali Lot 6, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 27 Jakarta Selantan INDONESIA
c/- P.T. Ever Shine Tax Jl. H. Fachruddin No. 16 Jakarta Pusat 10250 Indonesia
c/- Pacific Financial Services Plaza Chase 6th Floor, Jalan Jend Sudirman Kav 21, Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
C/- PP. PT London Sumatra Indonesia Tbk Indonesia Tbk, World trade Centre 15th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
C/- PT Binapuri Lestari Jalan Dharmawangsa Raya No. 39 Jakarta Selatan
C/- PT Binapuri Lestari Jalan Dharmawangsa Raya No. 39 Jakarta Selatan Jakarta
C/- PT Cardig Air Menara Cardig Menara Cardig 3rd Floor Jalan Raya Halim Perdanakusuma Jakarta 13650, Indonesia Indonesia
c/- PT Gunung Sewu Kencana Chase Plaza Fl. 20 Jl. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920
c/- PT Moores Rowland Indonesia Jl. Sisingamangaraja #3c Jakarta Indonesia
C/- PT Sanbe Prakarsa Husada Jl. Taman Sari No. 10 Bandung 40116 Tromol PO 850 Indonesia
C/- PT Tridaya Esta Jalan Dharmawangsa Raya No. 39, Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
c/- PT. Delta Aneka Consultants & Trade, Bank Bali Tower, 14th Floor, Kav 27, Jl. Jend. Sudirman, Jakarta, Indonesia
C/- Wisma Indosemen, Fl 6 Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 70-71 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
c/- Wisma Trident Lt. 3 Jl. Tanah Abang IV No. 23-25 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
c/-P.T. Kaltimex Energi Graha Irama, 2nd Floor Unite 2C JL. H.R. Rasuna Said
C/= Bank Ekonomi, Ekonomi Graba 7th Floor, JL. Setiabudi Selatan, Kav. 10 Jakarta 12920, INDONESIA
c/o Mr Ronald Mullers Sisingamangaraja No.3C Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
c/o 27th Floor, Menara Rajawali Jl Mega Kuningan Lot #5.1 Kawasan Mega Kuningan, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
c/o Apartment Kuningan, Apt. # 610 Jalan Setiabudi Utara Kuningan Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
C/o Bank Ekonomi, Ekonomi Graba 7th Floor, J1. Setiabudi Selatan Kav. 10, Jakarta 12920
c/o BNI Building 22nd Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 1, Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
C/o Gedung Artha Graha 10th Floor SCBD jl. Jend, Sudirman KAV 52-53 Jakarta 12910
c/o Graha Cempaka Mas Blok B/12A JL. Letjen Suprapto Jakarta, 10640 Indonesia
c/o Graha Elnusa JI. TB Simatupang Kav. I B, Jakarta 12560 Indonesia
c/o Herjanto Lutantowidjojo PT Moore Stephens Advisory Services Wisma Dharmala Sakti, 7th Floor, Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 32, Jakarta
C/O JALAN KETAPANG UTARA 1 NO. 14 JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
c/o Jl. Daan Mogot KM 11 Cengkareng Jakarta 11710 Indonesia
C/o JL. Jatibaru No. 24 Jakarta Pusat, 10160 INDONESIA
c/o Jl. Jelita Utara No. 21B Rawamangun Jakarta 13220 Indonesia
c/o Jl. Johor No. 27/I Surabaya Indonesia
c/o Jl. Taman Sari No. 10 Bandung 40116 Indonesia
C/O KANTOR Taman Mega Kuningan A9 Unit C8-C14 Jalan Mega Kuningan Lot 8.9/9 Kawasan Mega Kuningan
C/O Kartini Muljadi Jl. Gunawarman No. 18 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
c/o Leisure Investment Villas Jl. By Pass Ngurah Rai No. 888 Br. Kelan, Tuban Bali Indonesia 80361
c/o Limajari Jalan Raya Kerobokan 100x, Denpasar BALI Indonesia
C/O MENARA GLOBAL 15TH FLOOR JL GATOT SUBROTO KAV. 27 JAKARAT SELATAN 12950 INDONESIA
C/O MENARA GLOBAL 15TH FLOOR Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav. 27 Jakarta Selantan 12950 Indonesia
c/o Menara Kadin 7th Floor JI. HR Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 1 – 3 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
c/o Menara Kadin 7th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 1-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
c/o Menara Kadin Indonesia Suite 19C JI. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X – 5, Kav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
c/o Menara Kadin, 7th floor Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav.2-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
c/o Menara Rajawali 27th Fl Jl Mega Kuningan Lot #5.1 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
c/o Mr. Lukman Nagaria PT Hajiabu Propertindo Graha Niaga 12th Floor Jln Jend Sudirman Kav 58 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
c/o Nomade Jaya, Jalan Raya Pengubengan No. 82 Kerobakan. Kuta Bali Indonesia
c/o P. T. Ciptadana Securities Plaza Asia Office Park, Unit 2 Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 59 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
c/o P.T. Cipta Daya Teratai Emas Jalan Kemanggisan Raya No.106 Slipi, Jakarta 11480 INDONESIA
c/o P.T. Citra DMG Nusantara Gedung PriceWaterhouseCoopers 12th Floor,Suite 1201 Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said, Kav. C-3
c/o P.T. Elsuna Graha Elnusa JI. TB. Simatupang Kav. 1B Jakarta 12560, Indonesia
C/o P.T. Indiratex Spindo Desa Randu Agung Km. 75, P.O.Box 95 Singosari 65153 INDONESIA
c/o P.T. Zinga Indonesia Nusantara German Centre Building 4th Floor, Suite 4320/4330 Jalan Kapt. Subijanto Dj. Bumi Serpong Damai, Tangeang 15321 INDONESIA
C/O PLAZA DM 25TH FLOOR SUITE 2503 JL JEND SUDIRMAN KAV 25 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
C/O PLAZA DM, 25TH FLOOR SUITE 2503, JL. JEND. SUDIRMAN KAV. 25 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
c/o Plaza DM, 25th Floor, Suite 2503 Jl. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 25 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
c/o PT BOKORMAS WAHANA MAKMUR Jl. Palatehan I / 35 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
c/o PT Catur Sentosa Adiprana Jalan Daan Mogot Raya No. 234 Jakarta 11510, Indonesia
c/o PT DWI Satrya Utama Tifa Building, 6th Floor Jl. Kuningan Barat No. 26 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
c/o PT Global Jaringan Nusantara Menara Rajawali, 10th Floor Jl. Mega Kuningan Lot #5.1 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
C/O PT MANDARA SELULAR INDONESIA GRAHA MOBISEL LT 1 JL. MAMPANG PRAPATAN RAYA NO. 139 JAKARTA INDONESIA
c/o PT Paperpro Indonesia Menara Gracia 9th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav. C – 17 Jakarta 12940 Indonesia
c/o PT Pertamina (Persero) Pertamina Head Office, 19th Floor Jl. Merdeka Timur 1A, Jakarta 10110 Indonesia
c/o PT The Practice Menara Jamsostek, 22nd Floor Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 38 Jakarta 12710, Indonesia
c/o PT Yapindex Nagatama Kencana Jln Daan Mogot II No. 100 M & N KompleksIndo Ruko Jakarta Barat 11510
C/o PT. BUKIT SUNUR WIJAYA Jl. Musi No. 40 E Jakarta Pusat P.O.Box 4320/JKT 10043 Indonesia
c/o PT. Cipta Cakra Murdaya Jl. Cikini Raya No. 78 Jakarta 10330 Indonesia
c/o PT. Energi Pasir Hitam Indonesia (EPHINDO) Plaza Bapindo, Citibank Tower, 12th Floor Jl. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
c/o PT. Eurocapital Peregrine Securities Plaza Bapindo, Citibank Tower, 12th Floor Jl. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
c/o PT. Gunung Sewu Kencana Plaza Chase Podium 7th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920, INDONESIA Indonesia
c/o PT. Quadrigga Appollonya Satrya P. O. Box 3726, Jakarta 10037 Indonesia
c/o PT. TRIAS SENTOSA Jl. Raya Waru 1B, Waru Sidoarjo
c/o Sanggraha Daksamitra, PT Wisma Soewarna 2nd Fl Soewarna Business Park Soekarna Hatta Airport Jakarta – Indonesia 19110
c/o Soewito Suhardiman Eddymurley Kordono Wisma Bank Dharmala, 14th Fl. Jl Jend. Sudirman, Kav.28 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
c/o Sudirman Tower 11th Floor, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 60 Jakarta 12190
c/o Superblok Bumi Niaga Jln Pangeran Tubagus Angke No.170 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia
c/o Susanna Nagaria P.O. Box 4486/JKBTF Jakarta 11044 Indonesia
c/o Wisma 46, Kota BN1 32nd floor, Suite 3201, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 1 Jakarta 10220, Indonesia
c/o Wisma Dharmala Sakti 7th Floor Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 32 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia Attn: Mr Herjanto Lutantowidjojo/Mr Andres Magbitang
C/o Wisma Indo Seman 12th Floor Jalan Sudirman Kav. 70-71 Jakarta 12910
C/O Wisma Tamara 7th Floor JL.JEND SUDIRMAN KAV 24 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
c/o. Exotic Equities Asia Ltd / Exotic Properties Ltd Jl. Oberoi 55 80361 Kuta Bali Indonesia.
c/o. Graha Motor City, Level 2, Suite 201 Jalan Abdul Muis 24 – 26 Jakarta Pusat 10160 Indonesia.
c/o. Jl. Kencana Permai II/8 Jakarta 12310 Indonesia.
C/o. PT Cayman Trust Indonesia World Trade Centre 16/F Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
c/o. PT Energi Timur Jauh Gedung Wisma Mulia, 32nd Floor Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 42 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
c/o. PT Yudistira Umawar Building 1st Floor Jl. Kapten Tendean Kav 28 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia.
c/o: PT SARI WANGI AEA Jl Mercedes Benz No. 288, Cicadas Gunung Putri Bogor, 16964 Jawa Barat, Indonesia
Capital Managers Asia Pet., Ltd Wisma Bakrie, 6th Floor JI. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 Jakarta 12960 INDONESIA
Capital Managers Asia Pte Ltd 6th Floor Wisma Bakrie Jakarta
Capital Residence Tower 2/2C SCBD, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Lot 24, Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Caringin Barat Kav 12 Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Cemara Raya CM 3 Solo-Baru, Sukoharjo 57552 Indonesia
Cempaka Lestapi I/5, Cilandak Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Cempaka Putih RT.006/005, Kel. Bintaro Kec. Pasanggrahan Jakarta Selatan
Cempaka Putih Tengah XVII/9 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
Cempaka Putih Tengah XXII-A/14 RT006/RW006 Kel. Cempaka Putih Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Central SPS, Ketapang Indah Blok A-1, No 3-4, Jl. K.A. Zainal Arifin, Indonesia
Chase Plaza 22nd Floor 11 Jend. Sudirman Kav 21 Jakarta, INDONESIA
Chase Plaza 7/F Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav.4 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Chase Plaza Fl. 20 Jl. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Chase Plaza Lt 19 Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 21 Jakarta 12920 INDONDESIA
Chase Plaza Tower Lt. 20 JI. Jend. Sudirman Kav.21 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
CHASE PLAZA, 12TH FLOOR JL. JEND SUDIRMAN KAV. 21 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
Chase Plaza, 18th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Cibubur Indah Bi No. 1 RT005/011 Kel. Cibubur Ciracas Jakarta Timur Indonesia
CIDAKU INDAH VI NO. 2 BANDUNG 40143 INDONESIA
Cileduk Raya No. 2 Kebayorn Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Cipinang Elok Blok W-5 RT 008 RW-010 Jakarta, Indonesia
CIPINANG INDAH BLOK D/5 RT/RW 006/016 CIPINANG MUARA JATINEGARA JAKARTA TIMUR INDONESIA
CIPINANG JAYA KK NO. 35 JAKARTA TIMUR INDONESIA
Cipinang Kcbembem,R.T/R.W.0313/012 Pisangan Timur, Kecamatan, Pulo Gadung Jarkarta, Timur INDONESIA
Cireundeu R.T. 03 R.W 04 Kelurahan/ Desa Pisangan Kecamatan Ciputat Indonesia
CitiBank Tower, 5th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Citra 1 Ext AA-3/27, RT 002/015 Kalideres, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Citra Garden 2 Blok P09/NO8 Kelurahan Pegadungan – Kalideres Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Citra Garden 2, Blok P09/N08 Kelurahan Pegadungan – Kalideras Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Citra Garden Blok A.7 No. 40 Kelurahan Kalideres Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Citra Gdn III Extn Blk B12 A Jakarta Indonesia
Citra Graha 8th Floor Jln. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Citra I Ext AA-3/27, RT 002/015 Kalideres, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Citra III, Blok B.8/3A, Kalideres, Jakarta Indonesia
Commonwealth Bank Wisma Metropolitan II, Lantai Dasar Jl. Jend. Surdiman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
Daan Mogot Baru Blok LA/22 RT/RW 002/017 Kalideres Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Daan Mogot Estate DA/19 003/015, Kapuk, Cengkareng, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Dalangan RT 01 RW 05 Kel. Chiapursari, Kec. Bulu Temanggung Jawa Tengah Indonesia
Danau Agung 15/7, Block E14 Sunter Agung, Podomoro Jakarta, Utara 14350 Indonesia
Danau Indah I Blok A.3 No. 11 Sunter Jaya, Tanjung Priok Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Danau Indah IXA-12/31 Sunter Jaya Tanjong Priok, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Danau Permai Timur II, C2/7 Sunter Jaya, Jakarta Utara Indonesia ID No. 09.5103.REDACTED
DANAU SUNTER SELATAN0/5 KOMPLEX MEGA SUNTER NO. C10 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Dann Mogot No. 165 Jakarta 11520 INDONESIA
Darmawangsa No. 7 Vila Indah Pajajaran Bogor 16151 Indonesia
Darmo Harapan II/EF-27 Surabaya – Indonesia
Darmo Harapan Regency Blok RC-3 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Darmo Permai Selatan, 5/38 Surabaya, Indonesia.
Darmo Permai Timur, 6/15A, Surabaya, Indonesia
Denpasar 4/18 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Dharmawangsa Apt. 905 Jl. Dharmawangsa VII No. 9 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Diponegoro 76 Surabaya 60264
DK. NGADIROJO, RO.06, RW.05 NGADIROJO SUB DISTRIST, AMPEL DISTRICT BOYOLALI REGENCY REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Ds.Sajen Rt1/1Pacet Mojokerto, Indonesia.
Dsn. Bahagia Sentehbarik , Matang Terap West Kalimantan
Dsn. Krajan RT08/RW03 Jajag Gambiran Banyuwangi, Indonesia
Duri Kencana Raya No. 7 Jakarta 11510 Indonesia
Duri Kepa Kebon Jeruk JL Palem Utama No. 18 Jakarta 11510 Indonesia
DURI KEPA KEBON JERUK JL PALEM UTAMA NO. 8 JAKARTA 11510 INDONESIA
Dusun Klampok, Rt/Rw 001/011 Desa Sumbergedang, Kecamatan Pandaan Kabupaten Pasuruan, 67156 Indonesia
Dusun V Telegasari Tanjung Morawan Deli Serdang Medan Indonesia
Duta Indah 2 #21, Pondok Indah Jakarta Indonesia
Embong Malang 85-89 3rd Fl. Surabaya 60261 Indonesia
Embong Wungu No:6 Rt 01 Rw 03 Surabaya, Indonesia
Enterprise Building 4th Floor, Suite 401 Jl H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. C-5 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
Exertainment Indonesia Plaza Chase 14th Floor J1. Jend. Sudirman kav.21 Jakarta, Indonesia, 12920
Fatmawati Golf Mansion Kav.29 Jl. R.S Fatmawati, Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Fatmawati Mas Complex 329 Jl. R.S Fatmawati No. 20, Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
First City Complex 2, #02-33 Batam Centre, Pulau Batam, Indonesia
Fl 15, Menara Bank Danamon Jl Prof.Dr. Satrio Kav E.IV, No. 6 Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Flamboyan Utama I Blok B5/36, Kosambi Baru Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Flat 2709, Apt. Batavia Jl.k.h., Mas Mansyar, Kar. 126 Jakarta, Pusat 10220, Indonesia
Four Season Regent Residences J1 Setiabudi Tengah Spring Tower 11A Jakarta 12910 INDONESIA
Four Seasons Apartments Summer Tower, Unit 1B JI. Setiabudi Tengah Jakarta 12910, Indonesia
Four Seasons Apt 3A Summer Tower Jakarta, Indonesia
Four Seasons Residences, Summer Tower Apartment 01D, JI. Setiabudi Tengah, Jakarta 12910, Indonesia
G 1/3 RT 013 RW 007 Lebak Bulus Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Gajah Mada Mediterania D16, 3rd Floor Gajah Mada #174 Jakarta Indonesia
GANG SUNYI NO. 105 JL. PETITENGET, BALI INDONESIA 80361
GB, YOSUA ST. NO.12-A MEDAN
GB. Yosua, No. 12 A Medan North Sumatra Indonesia
Gd. Asosiasi Emiten Indonesia Building 2nd Floor, Jl. Fachrudin No. 6 Tanah Abang Jakarta Pusat 10250 Indonesia
Gdg. Kebon Kacang, Jl. Kebon Kacang Raya No. 15 Jarkarta 10240 Indonesia
Gedung Bri II Suite 1705 Jl Jend Sudirman No.44-46 Jakarta 10210 INDONESIA
Gedung Graha Kapital, 4th Floor, Jalan Kemang Raya No. 4, Mampang Prapatan, Jakarta Selatan Jalarta 12730, Indonesia.
Gedung Graha Niaga 1, Lt. 5 Jl. Putri Hijau No. 20 Medan 20115 – Indonesia
Gedung harco Mangga Dua Electronic Superstore Lt. Komplek Mangga Dua Plaza, Jl. Mangga Dua Raya Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Gedung Hijsu TK19 Jakarta Indonesia
Gedung Manara Karya 24th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Block x-5, Kav 1-2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia INDONESIA
Gedung Nugra Santana Lt 12, Jln. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 7-8 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
GEDUNG SETIABUDI ATRIUM 7TH FLOOR, JL. HR. RASUNA SAID KAV. 62 KUNINGAN, JAKARTA SELATAN 12920 Indonesia
Gedung Thamrin Handphone Center 2nd floor Komplek Sarinah Thamrin Jl. H.Agus Salim No. 60A Jakarta 10350, Indonesia
Gedung Tifa Lt.6 Jl Kuningan Barat No 26 Jakarta Selatan 12710 Indonesia
Gedung Wirabuana, Jl. Abdul Muis No. 24 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Gedung World Trade Centre Lt. 12 Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kavling 29-31 Jakarta Selatan 12920 Indonesia
Gg Balangan 1, 120 X, Ungasan, Bali, Indonesia
GG Lontar, RT/RW : 012/002, Pejagalan, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
GG. Cayho No. 23 Jakarta INDONESIA
Gg. Krama RT. 009 RW.010 Kelurahan Ciracas Cecamatan Ciracas Jakarta Timur 12610 Indonesia
Goodway Hotel Jl.Imam Bonjol No. 1 Batam
Grading Griya Lestari Blok D1, No. 15 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Graha Aktiva, Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav. 03 Blok X-1, Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Graha BIP 9th Floor, Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 23, Jakarta 12930, Indonesia
Graha Famili Block D No. 72 Surabaya 60226 INDONESIA
Graha Famili Block I-3 Taman Golf Famili Timur I-3 Surabaya 60226, Indonesia
Graha Family BB-18 Surabaya Indonesia
Graha Family Selatan V B-32 Surabaya Indonesia
Graha GRC Board Jln.S.parman Kav 64 Jakarta 11410 Indonesia
Graha Hijau B 11/12 Ciputat Tangerang Indonesia
Graha Irama 3rd Floor Jl. Hr. Rasuna Said Kav. 1-2 Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
Graha Irama Bldg 9th Floor JI. HR Rasuna Said Block X-1 Kav 1-2, Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Graha Kirana, 6th Floor, Jalan Yos Sudarso No. 88, Jakarta 14350 Indonesia.
Graha Multi Impresa Pratama 6th Flr Jl RS Mata Aini Kav BC 1 Setia Budi Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Graha Niaga 1st Floor Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav. 58 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Graha Niaga Lt. 11 Jl Jenderal Sudirman Kav 58 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Graha Niaga, 18th Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav 58 Jakarta 12190 INDONESIA
Graha Nigra 16th Fl. Jl. Jend, Sudirman Kav. 58 Jarkata 12190, Indonesia
Graha Semesta 4th Floor, Jln Kebayoran Lama Pal VII No. 31 Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Graha Taman HC 2No. 4 Bintaro Jaya Sector 9 Tangerang Indonesia
Graha Wirabuana Level 2, Suite 201 Jl. Abdus Muis, No. 24-26 Jakarta Pusat 10160 INDONESIA
Green Garden Block I-1/14 Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Green Garden Block Y2/5 Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Green Garden Blok B9 No. 30 Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Green Garden Blok EI/49 Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Green Garden Blok F1/2 Kedoya Jakarta
Green Garden DIII No. 20 RT 012 RW 004 Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Green Garden H2/6 Jakarta Barat 11520 Indonesia
Green Ville Blok BQ/26 RT 01/014 Duri Kepa Keb Jeruk Jakarta Barat 11610
Greenville Block BC/5 Duri Kepa Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Greenville Blok BG 10 JAKARTA BARAT Indonesia
Griya Agung Road, No. 73 Sunter Jakarta – Utara
Griya Ampera 3rd Floor JI. Ampera Raya 18 Jakarta, 12560 Indonesia
Griya Ampera Bldg. 2nd Floor Jl. Ampera Raya No. 18 Cilandak, Jakarta 12560
Griya Astika JL. Lamandau IV/16, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
GRIYA ELOK BLOK O NO. 98 SUNTER AGUNG, TANJUNG PRIUK Jakarta Utara Indonesia
GUDANG BANDUNG 3, RT 001 RW. 005 KEL. JEMBATAN LIMA KEC.TAMBORA JAKARTA – BARAT
Gudang Peluru Blok A/25 Kebon Baru Tebet, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Gudang Peluru Blok E/139 Rt. 02/03, Kebon Baru, Tebet Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Gudang Peluru Blok H/201 Rt. 006/03, Kebon Baru Jakarta Selatan
GULF RESOURCES IND WISMA 46 BNI 23RD FL JL JENDERAL SUDIRMAN KAV 1 JAKARTA 10220 INDONESIA
GUNUNG ATLANTIK NO. 2, LIPPO KARAWACI, TANGERANG INDONESIA
Gunung Mutiara 5 Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang Banten Indonesia
Gunung Sahari XI/70g J/d – Indonesia
H. NURDIN NO. 71D, RT 005/003 LEBAK BULUS, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Hanglekir I/6 RT 004/006 Gunung, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
House of Bali, Jalan Danau Tamblingan #108 Sanur 80228, Bali, Indonesia
ID Card: 32.03.26.2015/4417/4643429 JL. Gandaria Raya No 35, RT13/RW12, Kelurahan Ragajaya, Kecamatan Rojonggede Indonesia
Intercon blok E2/1, rt/rw 001/010 Srengseng, Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Interkon Kebon Jeruk Blok I 7 No. 29 Jakarta 11630, Indonesia
J l. Tembakau II No. 74 A Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
J Teuku Umar No. 50 RT/RW 001/001 Gondangdia Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
J. Wijaya Kusuma Blok 1 No. 17 Duren Sawit East Jakarta INDONESIA
J1 Cipaganti No. 136 Bandung Indonesia
J1 Drupadi No. 1 Banjar Basangkasa Seminyak, Bali Indonesia 80361
J1 Kelapa Sawit 13/3 Blok M II/3 Billy & Moon RE Pondok Kelapa East Jakarta 13450
J1 Kramat II #34, Jakarta Indonesia
J1, Katamaran Permai 8 No. 2, Kav, UT/LS II Pantai Indah, Kapuk, Jakarta, Indonesia
J1-Gunung Sahari V1 No.24, Jakarta,Indonesia.
J1-Mangga Besar V111/8,RT/008/02, Kel Tamansari,Jakarta Barat, Indonesia.
J1. Barata 40 Bandung, 40172 Indonesia
J1. Bidurl Bulan J1 #21 Permata Hijau Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
J1. Gayungsari VI/30 Wonocolo – Surabaya Indonesia
J1. Kaliurang KM 5, GG Megatruh No. 18 Yogyakarta Indonesia
J1. Kedoya Angsana II Blok D2 No. 25 Jakarta, 11520 Indonesia
J1. Kemang Dahlia Raya AK/16, RT/RW 001/012 Bojong Menteng Bekasi, Jawa Barat INDONESIA
J1. Madkum No. 15 Menteng Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
J1. P. Jayakarta 46 Block A/12 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
J1. Perumahan Kebon Jeruk Baru Blok A 6, No. 27 Jakarta 11530 INDONESIA
J1. Petemon Timur 68 Surabaya Indonesia
J1. Pluit Putra Dalam No. 3 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia
J1. Polisi Istimewa 32-38 Surabaya 60265 INDONESIA
J1. Pulasaren 82 Cirebon, 45117 Indonesia
J1. Puri Mutiara Wisma Pertamina #5 Jakarta Selatan 12430 Indonesia
J1. Rajawali Selatan I/55 RT 014/ RW 002 Gunung Sahari Utara Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
J1. Siliwangi 80 Cirebon, 45124 Indonesia
J1. Sultan Iskandar Muda No.25 Arteri Pondok Indah Jakarta 12240 INDONESIA
J1. Tambak Adi 46 Surabaya Indonesia
J1. Tisna Senjaya No. 80/18D Pungkur Bandung-40252 West Java, Indonesia
J1. Urip Sumoharjo 40 RT. 24/VI, Klitren Gondodusuman, Yogyakarta Indonesia
J1.Daan Mogot Km. 18 Cengkareng, Jakarta Barat, 11840 Indonesia.
J1.Daan Mogot Km. 18 Cengkareng, Jakarta,11840. Indonesia.
J1.Daan Mogot Km.18 ` Jakarta Barat 11840, Indonesia.
Jakarta Representative Office , Suite 1605, Wisma GKBL Jalan Jenderal S INDONESIA
Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Jalan Kiai Maja No. 9 Jakarta Selatan 12130 Indonesia
Jalan Margorejo Indah No. C-203, Surabaya 60237, Indonesia
Jalan Metro Pondok Indah No. UF-19, Pondok Indah Jakarta, 12320, Indonesia
Jalan 8 No. 5, Kelurahan Cipinang Muara Kecamatan Jetinegara East Jakarta, Indonesia
Jalan A No. 1 Karang Anyar Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Adityawarman, No. 9 Jkt Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Agung Permai, 4/23 Jakarta 14350 Indonesia
Jalan Aipda K.S. Tubun IIC No. 17-18 Jakarta Barat 11410 Indonesia
Jalan Akasia 1 B3 No. 39 Kedoya Selatan Jakarta 11520, Indonesia
Jalan Akasia I B3 No. 39 Kedoya Selatan Jakarta 11520, Indonesia
Jalan Alam Asri VII/SK. 8 Pondok Pinang, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Alam Segar VI/51 Pondok Inah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jalan Alaydrus 78-C Jakarta Pusat 10130 Indonesia
Jalan Andara Dalam Kav. IX/21, Pangkalan Jati Baru, Depok 16513, Indonesia
Jalan Arjuna Utara 87 Guna Group Building 6th Fl. Kebon Jeruk Jakarta 11510, Indonesia
Jalan Bangka 8A No. 21 JAKARTA 12720 Indonesia
JALAN BAU CEPER NO. 40 JAKARTA PUSAT 1 INDONESIA
Jalan Behape No. 1 Blok BB 9-10 Bumi Harapan Permai Jakarta 13550,
Jalan Biduri, Blok 12, No. 18 Permata Hijau Jakarta Selatan 12210
Jalan Boulevard Palem Raya No. 2105 Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang Indonesia
Jalan Braga No. 106 Bandung 40111, Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Golf 1 PD5 Pondok Indah Jakarta, Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Golf Utama Kav. III PA 1-2 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Golf Utama Kav. III PA 1-2, Pondok Indah Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Hijau III No. 11 Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Pakar Utara No. 7 (Dago Pakar) Bandung, West Java INDONESIA
Jalan Cembaka Putih 20A Jakarta Pusat 10520 Indonesia
Jalan Cempaka Putih Tengah 27A No. F24 Taman Solo Jakarta 10510, Indonesia
JALAN CEMPAKA PUTIH TENGAH 27A/8 JAKARTA, PUSAT INDONESIA
Jalan Cendrawasih – LX/No.157 Jatiwaringin – Antilop Pondok Gede, Bekasi – 17411 INDONESIA
Jalan Cibaligo Melong No. 238, KM3 Leuwigajah Cimindi, Bandung Indonesia
Jalan Cilandak VI No. 23 RT 001 RW 003 Cilandak Barat Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Cipedes Heger No 8, Dr. Jujunan dalam III Bandung 40173, Indonesia
Jalan Cipete Raya no. 9, RT 004/004, Cipete Selatan, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Cipinang Muara 70 Jakarta Timur 13420 Indonesia
Jalan Cut Mutia No. 1, P.T. 001 Padana Pasir Padang Barat Indonesia
Jalan Daan Mogot Estate RT 005/015 Kapuk, Cengkareng Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jalan Dadali No. 9 Bandung Indonesia
Jalan Dadali No. 9 Bandung, Indonesia
Jalan Dago Raya No. 77 Lippo Cikarang, Bekasi 17550 Indonesia
JALAN DAHA 3 NO 7 KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA 12110 INDONESIA
Jalan Danau Sunter Selatan Blok M2/7 North Jakarta
Jalan Darmarangsa 8 No. 17 Kebayora Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
JALAN DARMAWANGSA X, RT 007, RW 008, KELURAHAN CIPETE UTARA, KECAMATAN KEBAYORAN BARU, JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Jalan Delima IV / 29, RT. 004, RW. 005 Tanjung Duren Selantan Sub District Grogol District, West Jakarta Republic of Indonesia
JALAN DELTA BARAT C 166 BEKASI INDONESIA
Jalan Deperdag 111 no. A-11 Radio Dalan Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12140
Jalan Derman Kencana IV, Block A IX/205 Taman Kusir, RT 013, RW 009 Kelurahan Kabaroyan Lama Utara Kecamatan Kabaroyan Lama, Jakarta Selatan
Jalan Dharmahusada Indah 120, Surabaya Indonesia
Jalan Diponegoro No. 33 Jakrata Pusat INDONESIA
Jalan Dr Semeru 1 No.32, Jakarta 11450 Indonesia
Jalan Dr. Setia Budhi No. 265-G Bandung 40154 Indonesia
Jalan Drupadi #1, Banjar Basangkasa Seminyak, Bali 80361, Indonesia
Jalan Duyong Gang 1/3x Sanur, Bali 80288
Jalan Elang Thainesia A-3 No.S Curug Indah, Cipinang Melayu Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jalan Elang Thanesia Blok A3 No. 18 Complex TNI-AU Curug Indah Jatiwaringin, Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Empu Sendok No. 57 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Flamboyan F-59 CJT II RT. 014, RW. 004, Gedong Sub District Kebon Jeruk District, West Jakarta Republic of Indonesia
Jalan G No. 408 Teluk Gong Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Gelong Baru Selatan, No. 54, Tomang, Jakart a Barat, Indonesia
Jalan Griya Indah Blok M1/18 Jakarta
Jalan H. Abdul Majid RT 011 RW002 Cipete Utara Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Indonesia
JALAN H.MOCHAMAD NAIM III/86 RT 007 RW 009 KELURAHAN CIPETE UTARA KECAMATAN KEBAYORAN BARU, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Haji Domang No. 31 Kelapa Dua, Kebon Jeruk Jakarta 11550 Indonesia.
Jalan Hang Lekir VII/6 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12120 Indonesia
JALAN HIANG LEKIR II/ 20 KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Hiang Lekir II/20 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Imam Bonjol, No. 54 Menteng, Jakarta INDONESIA
Jalan Ir. H. Juanda III No. 6, 4th Floor Jakarta Pusat 10120 Indonesia.
Jalan Janur Hijau VIII TC 1-9 Kelapa Gading Jakarta
Jalan Jatibaru Raya No 24 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jalan Jatipadang Utara No. 10 Pejaten Jakarta 12540 Indonesia
Jalan Jend. Sudirman Kav.21 Jarkata 12920 Indonesia
Jalan Jendral Gatot Soebroto Kav. 35 37 dan 39, Jakarta 10210, Indonesia.
Jalan Johar No.2 Lt.2A Menteng Jakarta Pusat 10310 Indonesia Indonesia.
Jalan Kalisari 3 No.22 Jakarta Timur 13780 INDONESIA
Jalan Kamboja 21 Pejaten Barat 2 Jakarta Selatan 12510 Indonesia
Jalan Karet No. 20, Pekan Baru, Indonesia
Jalan Kartika Utama Sm-29, Pondok Indah, Jakarta Selatan, indonesia, Postal Code 12310
Jalan Kartini Raya 64/65 Blok C9 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia 10750
Jalan Kebangkitan Nasional No. 48 RT/RW 001/001 Kelurahan Sriwedari Surakarta 57141 Indonesia
Jalan Kebon Manggis II, Number 6B Rukun Tetangga 009, Rukun Warga 002 Kelurahan Kebon Manggis, Kecamatan Matramatan Jakarta Timur, Jakarta, Indonesia
Jalan Kebon Sirih No. 17-19 Jakarta 10340 Indonesia
Jalan Kedoya Albasia Raya B.X1/6 Jakarta Barat 11520 Indonesia
Jalan Kelapa Puan Timur IV – NB 5/33 Pegangsaan Dua, Kelapa Gading Jakarta Urata, Indonesia
JALAN KEMANDARAN 1, NO. 22 PALMERAH BARAT JAKARTA SELATAN 12210 INDONESIA
Jalan Kemang Dalam 1x No. F-27 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jalan Kemang Timur Raya No. 78B Jakarta Selatan – 12730 Indonesia
JALAN KEMANG UTARA 26B JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Kemanggisan Ilir II / 43 RT 06 / RW 07 – Kemanggisan Jakarta Barat 11610 Indonesia
Jalan Kemanggisan llir II No. 43, RT06/RW07 Kemanggisan Jakarta Barat 11480, Indonesia
Jalan Kenanga No. 50J RT 007/RW 002 Cilandak Timur Jakarta Selantan 12560 Indonesia
Jalan Kesehatan No. 26, Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Kintamani 2 No.14, Kelapa Gading Jakarta
JALAN KRAMAT GANTUNG NO. 25 SURABAYA INDOENESIA
Jalan Kuta Raya No. 21 Bukit Gading Villa Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jalan Lembah Madang AF-28 RT. 001, RW. 005, Lidah Wetan Sub District Lakarsantri District, Surabaya INDONESIA
Jalan Malabar #4, Guntur Jakarta 12970 Indonesia
Jalan Mangga Besar IV J No. 3 RT. 004, RW. 001, Taman Sari Jakarta Barat 11150 Indonesia
Jalan Mangga Besar IV M/24 RT.004 RW.003, Taman Sari Sub District Taman Sari District, West Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Mangga Besar VI No. 30, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jalan Mangga No. 18 RT012/004 Gandaria Selatan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Mawar Raya D23 Cipinang Indah I Jakarta
Jalan Melinjo No. 17, RT 006/RW 007, Pejaten Barat, Jakarta Selatan.
Jalan Menteng Tenggulun RT002/RW010 No.7 Indonesia
Jalan Metro Alam III PH-2, Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Metro Alam X N010 Pondok Indah Jakarta
Jalan Minyak 333 no. 10 Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Muara Karang Blok P8U No.27 Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Jalan Muara Karang CIII Barat No. 25 North Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Muara Karang E5/41, RT 005, RW 013, Kelurahan Pluit, KECAMATAN PENJARINGAN, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jalan Mulawarman No. 1 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12100 Indonesia
Jalan Mushollah No. 20C, RT 004/RW 004 Kemang Cilandak Timur Jakarta Selatan 12562 Indonesia
Jalan Nipah No. 20J Padang, 25118 West Sumatra Indonesia
Jalan Pademangan I gg 7 No. 21 Jakarta Utara 14410 Indonesia
Jalan Palatehan I/35 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Jalan Pangadaran VII/I Ancol Barat Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Panglima Polim V No. 29 Kebayoram Baru Jakarta Selatan 12160 Indonesia
Jalan Pantai Mutiara AB/2 Jakarta 14440 Indonesia
JALAN PANTAI MUTIARA BLOK F NO. 23, RT 003, RW 016, KELURAHAN PLUIT, KECAMATAN PENJARINGAN, JAKARTA UTARA, INDONESIA
Jalan Pantai Mutiara G No. 1 Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Paradise Raya III, No. 1 Sunter Paradise Real Estate Jakarta Utara 14350 Indonesia
Jalan Parang Tritis Raya No. 15A
Jalan Parang Tritis Raya No. 15A Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Jalan Pelepah Indah Blok LC2 No. 9, Kelapa Gading Permai Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jalan Pelepah Kuning II WV 2/14 002/016, KLP Gading TMR Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pengembak Gang 3, No. 29 Sanur, Denpasar Bali Indonesia 80228
JALAN PENGEMBAK NO. 10 SANUR, BALI INDONESIA.
Jalan Pengembak No. 29 SANUR, BALI Indonesia 80228
Jalan Penyelesaian IV Kavling 65-3 Meruya Utara Jakarta Barat 11620 Indonesia
Jalan Perdatam Raya No. 24 RT008/002, Pancoran Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Permata Berlian R12 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Petitenget No. 111 Kerobokan, Bali Indonesia
Jalan Pinisi Permai VII No. 21 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pluit Murni III No. 3 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pluit Putera Kencana No. 20 RT 004 RW 006, Pluit Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pluit Sakti II No. 37 RT 007 RW 007 Pluit Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pluit Samudera V/* Jakarta INDONESIA
JALAN POSANAN RT. 003 RW 006 KELURAHAN TEGAL HARJO KECAMATAN JEBRES SURAKARTA JAWA TENGAH INDONESIA
Jalan Praja II No. 24, Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Prapanca Raya 106 Jakarta Selatan 12150 Indonesia
Jalan Pratama No. 74, Tanjung Benoa, KEC. Kuta, Kab.Bdung, Indonesia
Jalan Prof. Dr.Ir Sutami No. 1, Makassar Indonesia
Jalan Pulo Mas Utara IIIB/4, RT005/RW014 Kayu Putih, Pulo Gadung Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jalan Pulo Nangka II No.4 RT. 009 RW. 008 Pulo Gadung Sub District Pulo Gadung District, East Jakarta Republic of Indonesia
Jalan Pulolentut No. 16 Kawasan Industri Pulogadung Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JALAN PUNCAK PERMAI UTARA SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jalan Pupuk Raya No. 43 Balikpapan 76114, Kalimantan, Timur, Indonesia
Jalan R.E. Martadinata No. 13-C Ancol Jakarta 14430
Jalan Ratulangi 47 Kelurahan Setonopande, Kecamatan Kota Kediri, East Java, Indonesia
Jalan Raya Margorejo Indah No. D-104 Surabaya 60237, Indonesia
Jalan Raya Puri Blok C1 No. 33, Jakarta Barat 11610, Indonesia
Jalan S. Syahrir, No. 12B, Jakarta, Indonesia
Jalan Sebandaran I / 6 Semarang 50135 Indonesia
Jalan Sekolah Kencana No. 4 Greenview Apt. Tower A, No. 54 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JALAN SHINTA INDAH DJAYA RT/014/01 TANJERANG, INDONESIA
Jalan Simprug Golf III/113 Jakarta 122220 Indonesia
Jalan Simpruk Golf XIII/19 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
JALAN SULTAN AGUNG NO. 18 JAKARTA 12980 INDONESIA 12980
Jalan Sultan Agung No. 18 Jakarta Indonsesia 12980
Jalan Sultan Syahrir No. 7, RT10/RW02 Gondangdia, Menteng Jakart Pusat Indonesia
Jalan Sultan Tirtayasa, No. 14 Bandung 40115 Indonesia
Jalan Sumatra 32 Surabaya 60281 INDONESIA
Jalan Sumatra No. 16 Menteng RT 02 RW 04 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
JALAN SUMBAWA NO. 12 MENTENG, JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jalan Sunter Paradise Raya 1, Blok F16 No. 28, Jakarta 14350, Indonesia
Jalan Suryo No.7 Blok S Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12180 INDONESIA
Jalan Suwiryo 26, Menteng, Jakarta 10350, Indonesia
Jalan Suwiryo No. 28 Menteng, Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Jalan Taman Atas No.7-9-11 Baloi Centre-Batam
Jalan Taman Metro Alam IV PL 6 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Taman Metro Alam IV PL 6, RT 011/RW 016 Pondok Indah, South Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Taman Sari II/22, RT 005/03 Kelurahan Maphar, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jalan Tanjung No. 28 Gondangia Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jalan Tanjung No. 28 Jakarta 10350 Indocnesia
Jalan Tegehsari Jimbaran Bali Indocnesia
Jalan Tembakau III No. 74 A RT. 02/01 Pejaten Timur, Pasar Minggu Jakarta 12510 Indonesia
Jalan Terusan Hang Lekir V No. 18A Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Jakarta 12220 Indonesia
Jalan Tomang Raya No 5A Jakarta 11440 Indonesia
Jalan Tomang Utara No.3 Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Tukad Gerinding Gang 1 No. 1 Denpasar Bali Indonesia
Jalan Uluwatu No 1 Tengeh Sari Jimboran, Bali Indonesia
Jalan Wambi No. 27 Bandung Indonesia
Jalan Wambi No. 28 Bandung, Indonesia
Jalan Wambi No. 30 Bandung INDONESIA
Jalan Warung Buncit Raya 49 Mampang Prepatan Jakarta 12740 Indonesia
JALAN WIDYA CHANDRA VII/7 RT008/001 SENAYAN KEBAYORAN BARU, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Wijaya I Blok Q/4 No. 381 N Kebayoran Baru – Jakarta 12170 Indonesia
Jalan Wijaya I Blok Q/4 No. 381 N, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12170 Indonesia
Jalan Wijaya Kusuma FF/18 RT 001 RW 006 Rawa Badak Jakarta, Indonesia
JALAN WIJAYAKARTA NO. 1 MAMPANG PRAPATAN JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Willis 2B, Semarang, Indonesia
Jalan Zeni G 96 RT/RW 04/06 Kelurahan Cipinang Melayu, Kecamatan Makasar, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JALAN, KALIANAK BARAT NO 78B – 88 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jalen Karang Anyar Raya 53-54 Blok D/24 Jakarta 10740
Janur Asri 9, Block QK18, No 12 A, kelapa gading, Jakarta, Indonesia 14240
Jati Barang/16 RT012/RW004 Kel. Jati, Pulo Gadung Jakarta Timur
Jati Padang Baru E-5 PASAR MINGGU Jakarta Indonesia
Jati Padang Poncol/5 Kav.8, RT. 004, RW. 008, Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jayakarta Plaza Lt. IV/DB 1, Kakarta 11180 Indonesia
Jelan Kemang Selatan, IC No. 25, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jembatan II Blok C/47 RT.010 RW.002 Pejagalan Penjarinsan, Jakarta Indonesia
Jemur Andayani VI/15, Surabaya Indonesia
Jeruk Garut Raya No. 7 RT/RW : 003/006 Duri Kepa Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jeruk Purut Buntu No. 67 RT 004/03, Kel. Cilandak Timur Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JI A. M. Sangaji No.11 L-M-J Jakarta 10160, Indonesia
Ji Arco Raya No.63 Cipete Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JI Bougenville No. 16 Flamboyan Baru Padang West Sumatera Indonesia
JI BUKIT HIJAU 2 NO. 2 JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIAN 12310
JI BUKIT HIJAU 5 NO. 7 PANDOK PINANG JALARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
JI Cibeber I/No.21 Rt003/003 Rawa Barat, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Ji Duren Sawit Barh Blokai No 14 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JI KENCANA PERMAI 5 NO. 48 JAKARTA SELATAN SELATAN INDONESIAN
JI Pangeran Jayakarta 105G Jakarta Indonesia 10730
JI Pertani 1/71, RT008/RW003 Duren Tiga, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JI Sunter Mediterania Block E No. 33 Sunter, Jakarta-Utara 14340 Indonesia
Ji Talang No 3 Jakarta Indonesia
JI TAMAN BUKIT HIJAU NO.37 RT010 RW013PD KEBAYORAN LAMA JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
JI Taman Patra Raya No. 6 Kuningan , Jakarta 12870 Indocnesia
JI. Borobudur No.6 Menteng – Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
JI. Bumi Pratama Timur-I R25 Perumahan Bumi Harapan Permai Jakarta 13550 Indonesia
JI. Camar I Blok BA No. 12 A, Bintaro Jaya III Tangerang Indonesia
Ji. DR. Makaliwe Raya No. 39A Jakarta 11450 Indonesia
JI. Gajah Mada No. 13 RT 02/RW 02 Pekanbaru Indonesia
JI. Gereja Theresia 27 Jakarta Indonesia
JI. Gunung Sahari IV No. 1 Jakarta 10610 Indonesia
JI. Harji Samali No. 51 Kalibabta Jakarta Selatan 12740 Indonesia
JI. Harji Samali No. 51 Kalibata Jakarta Selatan 12740 Indonesia
JI. Jend. Sudirman No. 94, Bandar Lampung Indonesia
Ji. Kampung Seng I No. 6 Surabaya, Indonesia
JI. Kenanga 6 Cilandak Jakarta, 12560 Indonesia
JI. Kesari #15 Br Batujimbar Sanur, Bali Indonesia
JI. Kramat No. 25 Rt. 004/ Rw. 007 Kwitang, Senen, Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Ji. Kuta Indah 15 Kelepa Gading Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
JI. Lembang No.9 Central of Jakarta Indonesia
JI. M. Kahfi 1/21 Taman Botanik C 14/15, Jagakarsa, Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
JI. Madrasah Raya No. 7 Cilandak Timur Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Indonesia
JI. Mutiara 12 Pondok Labu Jakarta, 13220 Indonesia
JI. Nirwana 28 Blok H-5 Nirwana Sunter Asrithp III Jakarta-Utara Indonesia 14350
JI. Permata Timur VIII/N-7 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JI. Pramuka Sari III/12 Jakarta 10570 Indonesia
JI. RS FATMAWATI 31 A JAKARTA, 12430 INDONESIA
JI. RS. Fatmawati No. 15 Kompleks D-Best Blok J-5 Jakarta Selatan 12420 Indonesia
JI. Rs. Fatmawati No. 20 Fatamawati Mas Kav. 2/215 Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
JI. Sisingamangaraja No. 3c Jakarta 12120 INDONESIA
JI. Swakarya Bawah No. 1 RT.001/001 Pondok Labu-Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JI. Taman Surya Block IID/8 Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
JI. Tg. Duren Timur No. 27 RT.004. RW.006 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JI. Walet Permai I No. 25 Pentai Indah Kapuk Jakarta, Indonesia
JI. Widya Chandra XI/3, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JI.Letnan Arsyad No.7 Perumnas, Bekasi Bekasi II Indonesia 17144
JI.Sisingamangaraja No.3C, Jakarta 12120, Indonesia
JI> Andong II RT 004/006, Kota Bambu Palmerah Jakarta, Barat Indonesia
Jimerto 2, Surabaya 60272, Indonesia
Jin Bandengan Utara No. 81 Blok B RT 009/016 Penjaringan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jin Batu Ceper No. 40 Jarkarta Pusat 1 Indonesia
JIN CENDANA 37/39 MENTENG JAKARTA 10350
Jin Kesehatan No. 26 RT010/RW005 Petojo Selatan Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jin Sungai Sambas V11 No.16, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia.
JIN TANJUNG ANOM NO. 4 BANDUNG INDONESIA
Jin. Kampung Bali IV No. 32, Jakarta 10250 Indonesia
JIn. Madiun 15 Jakarta INDONESIA
Jin. Pasir Putih 7, No. 3 Ancol Timur Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl Agung Perkasa 6, Block J 1A/34 Jakarta Utara 14350, Indonesia
Jl Alam Elok VII No. 15 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Selantan 12310 Indonesia
Jl Alamanda II Blok E2 no. 14 Kedoya Selatan-Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Alaydrus No. 82 Jakarta Pusat 10130 Indonesia
Jl Alaydrus No. 82 Jakarta Pusat 10130, Indonesia
Jl Alyadrus No. 76 RT 002/02, Petejo Utara Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Alydrus No. 76 RT 2/6, Gambir Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Ampera Raya No. 27, RT003, Ragunan, Pasar Minggu, (Depan Gedung Arsip Nasional), Indonesia.
Jl Arteri Mangga Dua Gedung Harco elektronik Superstore Lt. 45, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Bangau IV no. 2A, Jakarta 10610, Indonesia
JL BANGKA RAYA 99C, JAKARTA 12720, INDONESIA
Jl Bangka Raya Pela 49 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12730 Indonesia
Jl Batu Ceper No. 18-C Jakarta 10120 Indonesia
Jl Batur Sari No. 37X, Bj Medura, Sanur, Danpasar, Bali INDONESIA
JL Batur Sari, 37X, Sanur, Bali, Indonesia
Jl Batutulis VI No. 39 RT 011/RW003 Kebon Kelapa Jakarta PUS Indonesia
JL BB Cipinang Mura RT. 002/RW:004 Cipinang Mura Jakarts Mura Indonesia
JL Bendungan Hilir Raya Blok G1, No:7 Jakarta-Pusat Indonesia
Jl Berlian I/B-3 Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Biduri Pandan Blok II No. 2, Permata Hijau Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL Bisma 12 Blok C1 No. 22 Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl Bukit Golf II, PB 26 RT 012/015 PD Pinang, KBY Lama Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Bunga Lili, No. 9 RT 010 / 006, Kel Bintaro Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL BUNGUR BESAR NO. 31-A JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl Bungur Besar No. 51 Jakarta 10730 Indonesia
JL BUNGUR BESAR NO. 78 JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl Camar Permai IV/22 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Canadianti Blok A No. 10 Komplek Bank Prapanca K4eb. Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Cemara Raya CM 1-2 Grogol, Solo Baru Sukoharjo 57552 Indonesia
Jl Cemp Putih Tengah 17/9 Rt02/08 Kel Cemp Pth Tgh Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl Cibodas C-14 No. 177 Jati Cempaka Jakarta Indonesia
JL Cihampelas 258A Bandung 40131 Indonesia
Jl Cipaganti No. 63 Bandung Indonesia
Jl Cipaganti No. 92A Bandung Indonesia
Jl Cipinang galur Kulon RT:008/05 Jatinegara Jakarta Tinmur Indonesia
Jl Cisanggiri 1/3 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12170 Indonesia
Jl Danau Indah II A2/15, Sunter Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl Delman Asri IX/A 33 RT006/011 Kebayoran Lama Utara Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Delman Asri IXA 33-39 RT006/011 Kebayoran Lama Utara Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Denpasar III (YBR IV) Blok D, Kav. 4 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Jl Dieng No. 6 Semarang INDONESIA
Jl Diponegoro 50 Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia.
JL DR SEMERU III/6 GROGOL, JAKARTA 11450 INDONESIA
Jl Dr Sutomo 56-58, Surabaya Indonesia
JL DRUPADI, NO. 1, BANJAR BASANGKASA SEMINYAK DENPASAR BALI 80361
Jl Duta 2/54, Kelurahan Duri Jakarta Barat 11510 Indonesia
Jl Duta Permai III, No. 1 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan 12310 Indonesia
Jl Embong Cerme 25 Surabaya Indonesia
JL Empu Tantular 77, Tanjung Mas, Semarang Utara, Karyanan, Indonesia
JL ERLANGGA III NO.11, SELONG, KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN 12110 INDONESIA
JL Fajar Indah 11/77 RT 05 RW 07 KEL. Jajar Kecamatan Laweyan Surakarta Indonesia
Jl Fajar Indah 11/77 RT/RW 05/07 Kel Jajar Kecamatan Laweyan Surakarta Indonesia
Jl Gajah Mada 150 A B C Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL Gandaapura IV No. 3B Kesiman Tohpati Denpasar 80237 Bali, Indonesia
Jl Gedung Hijau I/48 Jakarta Selatan Indoensia
Jl Gedung Hijau Raya SG 17 Kav 5, Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Gelong Baru Tengah No.3A, RT011/RW002 , Tomang, Grogol Petambur, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl Gg. Langgar No. 24 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Gotong Royong No. 11 Cipete Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL GS Machmud Merchant G.S Sadaraya, RT001/011, Pontianak Saiantan, Indonesia
JL H Jann 1 No. 49 Indonesia
JL H SAABAH NO. 5 CIPETE UTARA-KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN 12150 Indonesia
JL H Saili F. 51 Indonesia
JL H. Feichruddin, No. 16 Jakarta, Pusat 10250 Indonesia
Jl Hayam Wuruk No. 57 RT02/RW01, Cibodas Baru Tangerang Indonesia
JL HOS COKMAMINOTO NO. 15RT03/04 KABUPATEN KLATEN INDONESIA.
JL HR RASUNA SAID BLOK X-5 KAV 2-3 MENARA KADIN BLDG LANTAI 30 JAKARTA INDOENSIA
Jl Imam Bonjol 52 RT002 RW05 Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Janur Elok VI Blok QC 13 No. 9 Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jl Janur Hijau III – TI 1 No. 1 Jakarata 14240 Indonesia
JL JATIBARU, NO. 24 JAKARTA 10160 INDONESIA
Jl Jend. Sudirman 1 No. 41 Medan Indonesia
Jl Jeruk Purut No 1B Jakarta, 12560 Indonesia
JL Karmel Vibl G No 12, RT/RW 011/004 Kel. Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Karper K-17A, Cinere Estate Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Kartika Utama 29 Kav 5 RT 012/006 Kelurahan Pondok Pinang Jakarta 12310
Jl Kartini V No. 11C, Jakarta Indonesia
JL Kebon Jeruk 111 No.1A-F Maphar Taman Sari Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Kelapa Dua Raya No. 25 RT 06/RW.05 Jakarta 11550 INDONESIA
Jl Kelapa Gading Blk E-106 Cinere Jaksel PT Lorin Indonesia
Jl Kelapa Puan Timur I NB 1/8 Kelapa Gading Permai Jakarta Vtara Indonesia
JL Kelepa Gading Raya No.18 Semaring Indonesia
Jl Kemag Utara IX/9 BlokAI-2 Rukan Tiara Buncit Jakrata 12760 Indonesia
Jl Kemang 5A No. 21 Kemang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia 12730
Jl Kemang Selatan 1E No. 17 Kemang, Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jl Kemang Timur No. 36 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
JL Kenanga No. 50J RT 007/02 Cilandak Timur, Pasar Minggu Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL Kenanga No. 7 Pondok Pinang Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
JL Kenanga No. 7 Pondok Pinang Jakarta, Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Ki Hajar Dewantara No. 58 Ciputat 15413 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL KINTAMANI 1/21 BUKIT GADING VILLA KELAPA GADING, JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
JL KLP Puyuh VI KJ 10, RT005 RW 019, KLP Gading, Kelapa Gading Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl Kolombo 19 RT 033, RW 007 Terban, Gondokusuman, Yogyakarta 55223 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
JL Krakatau Vill No. 16 Semarang 50125 Indonesia.
Jl Kramat Kwitang, Kecil No. 5 RT005/RW007, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Ks Tubun II no 15, Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl Kusuma Atmaja No. 51 Kelurahan, Menteng Jakarta 10310, Indonesia
Jl Kusuma Atmaja No. 51 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat 10310 Indonesia
Jl Kuta Indah No. 75, Klpgd Brt, Jakarta 14240, Indonesia
JL Laksana Bintan Komp Tanah Mas Blok. A1 Sei Panas Batam 29432
JL LEMBANG 11 MENTENG JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl Lembang Terusan D-51, Menteng, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Malibu Indah Raya Blok F-11 Medan 20157 Indonesia
Jl Mampang Prapatan IV/20 Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Jl Mangga Besar IX No. 2D Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Mangga No. 4 Panjunan Kudus 59317 Indonesia
Jl Mas Putih 31, Permata Hijau, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Matraman Raya/198 R.T./R.W. 012/006 Kampung Melayu Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl Merdeka No. 36, Palembang Indonesia
Jl Metro Kencana 5/16 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
JL METRO PONDIK INDAH KAV. IV TH2 RT 010/015 KEL. PONDOK PINANG JAKARTS SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl Mirah Kencana 43 Permata Hijau Jakarta 12210 INDONESIA
JL MURAI 11, NO. 01 R7.18 PALEMBANG, INDONESIA
JL MURAI 11, NO. 01 RT.18 PALEMBANG, INDONESIA
JL Otista Raya No. 39 Cawang Jakarta Indonesia
JL P JAYAKARTA 119A JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl padang Sidempuan No. 2C/6 Medan
Jl Pajajaran No. 59 Bandung Indonesia
JL PALAPA XV NO 10 PASAR MINGGU JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
JL PALATHAN I/35 KEBAYRON BARU JAKARATN SELETAN INDOESIAN 12160
JL Pandeglang No. 27, R.T./R.W. 001/004 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat Indocnesia
Jl Panglima Polim XIV No. 62B Melawai, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Panjunan G-II RT.16 RW.03 Sidoarjo Indonesia
JL Pasir Putih Raya 26 Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl Patal Senayan no 38 Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Jl Pattimura No. 35, Jakarta, Indonesia
JL PEDURENAN 2A CILANDAK TIMUR JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl Pemuda No. 60 – 70 Surabaya 60271 Indonesia
Jl Perak Blok B-18, 001/012, Grogol Utara Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Permata Angkasa No. 15 Jakarta Indonesia
JL PERMATA HIJAU BLOK 1-2 NO.18 JAKARTA INDONESIA 12210
Jl Permata Hijau, Blk B Jakarta Indonesia
JL Permata Mirah, Block T No.5 Permata Hijah Jakarta Selatan 12210, Indonesia.
Jl Perniagaan Barat 26/27 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Perniagaan Bo. 3 Medan Indonesia
Jl Pertanian Raya Kav DPRD No. 52 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Peta Selatan NO. 48 Kalideres Jakarta 11840, Indonesia
JL PETOJO DUCLEK II/16, R.T. 012, R.W 007 JAKARTA
JL PINTU KECIL RAYA 40 RT 04/01 ROA MALAKA JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Jl Pluit Kencana V No. 8 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Pluit Sakti VI/40, Jakarata Utara Indonesia
Jl Pluit Samudera V No. 20 Jakarta Indonesia
JL PONDOK DUTA RAYA BG 111/7 RT 12 RW 14, TUGA, KEC. CIMANGGIS BOGOR INDONESIA.
JL PRIMSMA 2 BLOK B2 NO.33 TAMAN KEDOYA PERMAI JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl Prof Dr Soepomo No. 44 Jakarta Selantan 12870 Indonesia
Jl Prof Dr Soepomo No. 44 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl Prof Supomo SH No. 55A RT013/003 Kel. Tebet Barat, Kec, Tebet Jakarata Selatan Indonesia
Jl Prof Yamin No. 34 Menteng, Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Pulo Mas Barat X/25 RT 003 RW 010 Kelurahan: Kayu Putih Kecamatan: Pulo Gadung Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
JL PUNACK GOLF NO. 2 KOMPEK LIPPO KARAWACI JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl Puri Pesanggrahan I, Blok M Bukit Cinere Indah Indonesia 16514
JL Rajawali Selatan 5 No. 39, Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
Jl Raya Bogor Km28 Pasar Rebo Jakarta 13710 INDONESIA
JL RAYA GUBENG, NO. 100, SURABAYA, INDONESIA
Jl Raya Kertajaya, Indah No. 91, Blok 0207 Surabaya Indocnesia
JL RAYA MANGGA BESAR 58 RT 006/001 TAMAN SARI Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL RAYA RANCAEKEK KM23 SUMEDUNG Indonesia
Jl Raya Surabaya Mojokerto, KM. 44, Sidoarjo, East Java, Indonesia
JL RAYA TROPODO NO. 126 WARU-SIDOARJO SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jl Rontgen No.4 Bandung 40171 Indonesia
JL ROSALIA 4 BLOK LL NO. 9 JAKARTA INDONESIA
JL Ruby I/28 Blok G Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL Rungkut Mejoyo Selatan Blok AM-39, JL Tenggilis Blok AM-39 University of Surabaya Surabaya 60292, INDONESIA
Jl Sanu Indah No. 47 Bukit Gading Vila, Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Utara 14240 Indonesia
Jl Sawo No. 23 Mengteng Jakarta Pusat Jakarta 10330 Indocnesia
JL SEMANGKA RAYA RT 015/02 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL SEMOLOWARU TENGAH 9/37 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jl Simprug Golf 1/176 Jakarta Selatan 12220 Indonesia
Jl Slamet Riyadi No. 450 Solo Indonesia
Jl Subanjo Wingo Pranoto 38-C, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL SUMBING NO 5 JAKARTA INDOEDSIA 13720
JL SUMBING NO.5 JAKARTA INDOESIA 13720
Jl Sutan Syahrir No. 27 Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl Suwiryo No. 45 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Talang No. 3 Jakarta
Jl Talang No. 3 Jakarta 10320 Indonesia
Jl Taman Patra XI No. 6 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Jl Taman Kedoya Baru D 10/26 Kedoya Selatan-Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Taman Patra II Blok M7/KAV. 11 Jakarta Selatan 12950
Jl Taman Patra II Blok M7/KAV.11 Jakarta Selatan 12950
Jl Taman Radio DLM V/14 RT 006/013 Gandaria Utara Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Taman Sari VIII/114, RT 009, RW 006, Maphar, Taman Sari, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
JL TAMAN TORAM II RT 02/10 KALIDERES JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Jl Tanjung 74 Blitar 66122 Jawa Timur Indonesia
Jl Tanjung Karang R.T./R.W. 03/03 Desa Tanjung Karang, Kudus Indonesia
JL TANJUNG SARI NO.5 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jl Tasikmalaya No. 23, 10310 Jakarta Indonesia
JL TEBAH 11/9 RT 013/003 GUNUNG JAKARTS SELATAN INDOENSAIN
Jl Thalib II, No. 35A RT 012/05, Kel. Krukut Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Tidore No. 15 Jakarta Pusap Indonesia
JL Trs. Hanglekir II/WG-6 RT.006/08, Grogol Selatan, Keb.Lama, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Tukat Balian, 121, Renon Bali Indonesia
Jl Tunjung II No. 12, RT 16/03 Jati Pulo, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Uluwatu Perumahan Baliview Blok AII/2 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Veteran No. 50 Bekasi Selatan INDONESIA
Jl Wahid Hashim 96 Jakarta 10340 Indonesia
Jl Westhoff No. 12 Bandung 40171 Indonesia
Jl Wijayakarta Raya No. 3, Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
JL, Anggrek 12 No. 2 Rt. 001 Rw 04 Karet Kuningan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL, CIDENG TIMUR 62, JAKARTA PUSAT, INDONESIA
JL, KARTIKA UTAMA PU 21, RT/TW 012/016, PONDOK PINANG, KEBAYORAN LAMA, JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
JL, KH. M MANSYUR BLOK 15A NO. 23-25 JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl, Puri Mutiara Wisma Pertamina #5 Jakarta Selatan 12430 INDONESIA
JL-Melong Kidul No. 51 Bandung 40261 Indonesia
Jl. Cikajang 29 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12170 INDONESIA
Jl. Supratman no. 23, Kel. Peunayong, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
Jl. Abdul Muis No. 24 Gedung Wirabuana Lt. Dasar Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Jl. Abdul Muis No. 80A Petojo Selatan Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Jl. Agung Perkasa 15 RT009/ RW014 Sunter Agung, Tanjung Priok Indonesia
JL. AGUNG TENGAH II BLOK I.4 NO. 12B JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Jl. Agung Utara Blk 0/15 STS, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Aipda K.S. Tubun HC/12 R.T. 004 R.W.01 Jakarta Indonesia
JL. ALAM ASRI IX/15, SF.3 RT 009/015 PONDOK PINANG JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Jl. Alam Segar III/12 RT 007/016 Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Alam Segar XI No. 7 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Alam Segar XI/56 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Alamanda CII/19 Sunter Jaya, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Alamanda Raya Blk. HB No. 26 Rt:009/002 Pesanggrahan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Alaydrus No. 45A Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Aman No. 7, RT 002/02 Kel. MP. Prapatah, Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Ametis 3 No. 60 Permata Hijau Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Ampera Raya 18 Jakarta, 12560 Indonesia
Jl. Ancol VIII, No. 1 Ancol Barat Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Jl. Anggrek Cendrawasih J/4 Slipi, Jakarta Indonesia 11480
Jl. Anggrek Garuda IV/79 Kemanggisan, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Angkasa No. 32 Block A1 Jakarta 10610 Indonesia Indonesia
Jl. Angke Jaya II/42 RT 15/03 Angke Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Angsa III Blk D5/7, Rt/Rw 013/004, Kelurahan Kedoya Selatan, Kecamatan Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta-Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Anjasmoro 59 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Antara 41A Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Antara 41A Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Anyelir 4/21 RT 002, RW 004 Cedong, Pasar Rebo Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Jl. Anyelir F/28 RT02 RW04 Pasar Rebo East Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl. Artuna Utara 42A Tanjung Duren Jakarta 11470 Indonesia
Jl. Astana Anyar No. 33 Bandung 40241 In don esia
Jl. Bahtera Permai 2/26 Pantai Indah Kapuk Jakarta 14460, Indonesia
Jl. Baladewa No. 13, RT001/RW003 Duren Sawit, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JL. BALIKPAPAN RAYA NO.7 JAKARTA
Jl. Bambu Apus Raya Blok J-II No. 189, RT.04, RW.011 Kel. Pondok Bambu, Kec. Duren Sawit Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Jl. Bandun No. 3A, RT. 013, RW. 005 Menteng, Jakpus, Jakarta Pusat
JL. Bangka XI A/12 RT 002 RW 010, Pela Mampang Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Bank Raya II/2F Prapanca Bawah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Banyuwangi No. 17 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Banyuwangi No. 17 RT 004 / RW 005 JARKARTA INDONEISA
Jl. Batu Tulis Vi No. 39D Rt. 001/RW.003 Kelurahan Kebon Kelapa Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Bdn I No. 26 Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. BDN I/38 RT.011/013 Cilandak Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Jl. Belanak V/6 RT.012 RW. 007, Kelurahan Jati, Kecamatan Pulo Gadung, Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Jl. Bendungan Hilir (Benhil) IV No. 15 Jakarta Pusat 10210 INDONESIA
Jl. Bengawan 56, RT004/ RW002 Kel. Darmo, Kec. Wonokromo Surabaya 60241 Indonesia
JL. BENGAWAN 56, SURABAYA, INDONESIA
Jl. Beraban 98 Klod, Kuta Bali Indonesia
JL. BERLIANI I, B6 CILANDAK BARAT JAKARTA SELATAN 12430, INDONESIA
JL. BESAKIH NO. 1, KUNINGAN JAKARTA 12950 INDONESIA
Jl. Biduri Bulan Blok M No.10-11 Permata Hijau Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Biduri Bulan IX/10.A. RT. 010/003, Kel. Sumur Batu, Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Birah III No. 1 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta, Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Biru Laut Raya No. 20 Cipinang, Jakarta Timur 13340 Indonesia
Jl. Bisma VI Block B15 House C8 Sunter Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Blandongan 28 D Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Bongas II, Blk E7 No. 19 Jatiwaingin Asri, Pndk Gede Bekasi, Jawa Barat 17411 Indonesia
Jl. Boulevard Raya WB2/32 RT011/RW016, Kelapa Gading Timur Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Brawijaya II/9 RT. 003/002 Pulo-Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Bromo 6 Malang Indonesia
Jl. Brumbungan No.58 Semarang Indonesia
Jl. Btanghari No.23-B RT.006 RW.003 Cideng, Jakpus Indonesia
JL. Buana Pesanggrahan I/16 Bukit Cinere Indah Kav. ON 10 jakarta Selatan
JL. BUDI MULIA, NO. 8, RT 003 RW 004, INDONESIA
Jl. Budi Sari III No. 19 Cidadap, Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Gading Raya Block C, No. 1 Komp Gading Permai Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Golf 1 Sektor VI Blok B No. 11 Bumi Serpong Damai 15310 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Golf Utama Kav. PA 27 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Golf Utama Kav. PA 27 RT012/015, Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Golf Utama PA No 27 RT000/RW003 Kelurahan Pondok Pinang Kecamatan Kebayoran Lama South Jakarta INDONESIA
JL. Bukit Hijau 9/14 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Kumala No. 8 Bukit Sari, Semapang Indonesia
JL. BUKIT PAKAR TIMUR 110 RT 04 RW O3 DESA CIBURIAL KEC. CIMENYAN KAB. BANGDUNG Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Pakar Timur 110 RT04 RW03 Desa Ciburial Kec. Cimenyan Kab. Banguang 40198, Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Pakar Utara No.7 (Dago Pakar) Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Bumi Asih IV A.5 Jakata Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Buncit Raya Ujung RT 003/005 Jati Padang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. BUNGUR BESAR NO. 78-A JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl. Bungur Besar No. 79 Kemayoran, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. BUNGUR BESAR NO. 81 JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
JL. BUNGUR BESAR XIII/83B, RT006/RW001 KEMAYORAN, JAKPUS, JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl. Bungur No. 2, Bangka Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. By Pass Ngurah Rai No. 888 Br. Kelan, Tuban Kuta, Bali Indonesia 80361
Jl. Cahaya D6/20-21, RT001/RW004, Kemb. Selatan Kembangan, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Camar Elok V No. 35 Pantai Indah Kapuk Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Camar Permai I No. 35 Kapuk Utara, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Canadianti No. 16 RT 001/RW008 Kel. Pela Mampang Jakarta Selatan
JL. Capitaku IV/304 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia.
JL. Caringin Utara I No. 31, Cilandak Jakarta Selatan 12430, Indonesia
JL. Caringin Utara Kav. 34 RT15/10 Cilandak Barat, Jakarta Selatan 12430 Indonesa
JL. Caringin Utara No. 31 Cilandak Barat Cilandak Jakarta Selatan 12430 Indonesia
JL. CASABLANCA NO. 1, APARTMENT PURI CASABLANCA TOWER C 2501, KUNINGAN JAKARTA SELATAN 12870 INDONESIA
JL. CC NO. 1, CENGKARENG BARAT JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Jl. Cedung Pinang SMO5 Pondok Indah Jakarta Indonesia
JL. Cemara Boulevard G1-23 Deli Serdang 20371 Medan Indonesia
Jl. Cempaka No. 19 RT 04/01 Kel Jatipulo Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Cempaka Putih Barat 21 No. A-6, RT 006 RW 012 Kelurahan Cempaka Putih Brt Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Cempaka Putih Timur 5A/3 RT 012/RW 007, cempaka Puith Timur, Jakarta
JL. CEMPAKA PUTIH TIMUR IV B/8 JAKPUS 10510 INDONESIA
Jl. Cempaka Putih Timur IV No. 6 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
Jl. Cibitung I / No. 3 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Cibitung I No. 3 Rt.012 Rw. 004 Petogongan – Kebayoran Baru South Jakarta, Indonesia
JL. CIBITUNG I/NO. 3 KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl. Cidadap Girang Baru No. 3 (Jl. Setia Budi) Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cideng Timur No. 55 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Cigondewah Girang RT 02/32 Cimahi Bandung Indonesia
JL. CIGONDEWAH GIRANG RT. 02/32 CIMAHI INDONESIA
Jl. Cigondewah Girang, RT07132, Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Cijerah Cigondewah Blok Suci No. 16, Cimahi Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cijerah Cigondewah Blok Suci, No. 13 Cimahi Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. CijerahCigondewah Blok Suci No. 16, Cimahi Bandung, Indonesia
JL. Cikajang No. 29 RT 001/005 Petogogan, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
Jl. Cikini No. 2 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Cikini Raya 24 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Jl. Cikini Raya No. 24 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Cilandak Tengah No. 97 Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Cililin II No. 8A, RT. 010, RW. 006 Petogogan, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Cilimblileuit No. 184, Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cimanuk No. 24 Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cinere No. 14 Rt 005/006 Pondok Labu Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Ciniru 1 No. 10, RT006/003 Rawa Barat, Kebayoran Baru Indonesia
Jl. Ciniru 6/15, Keboyaran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Cipaganti No. 63, Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cipinang Cempedak II No. 10, Jakarta Indonesia
JL. CIPINANG CEMPEDAK II/NO. 41 JAKARTA TIMUR INDONESIA
JL. Cipinang Elok X-39 Rt. OT/010 Kel Cipinang Minara Jakarta Timur INDONESIA
Jl. Cirendeu Permai raya Kav. BB Cilandak-Lebak Bulus Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Cirendeu Permui Raya Kav. BB Cilandak-Lebak Bulus Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Cisatu 1/2, Ciumbuleuit Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Citra 3 Block B8 No. 9 Pegadungan, Kalideres Jakarta Indonesia
JL. CITRAYUDA IV No. 204, INDONESIA
Jl. Ciumbuleuit I, No. 2, Bandung, INDONEISA
Jl. Ciumbuleuit RT/RW. 01/07 Kel. Ciumbuleuit Kec. Cidadap, Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Ciumbuleuit, No. 189 Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. D No. 23 Kav. Polri, RT.003/03 Kel. Ragunan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Daan Mogot Km. 18, Tangerang 15122 Indonesia
Jl. Daan Mogot No. 165 Jakarta-11520, Indonesia
Jl. Daan Mogot Raya No. 234 Jakarta Barat 11510 Indonesia
Jl. Dabo Lama No. 01/06, Kelurahan Dabo, Kelurahan Singkep, Kabupaten Lingga, Propinsi Kepulauan Riau, Indonesia
Jl. Damai Musyawarah No. 3A RT 003/03 Pondok Labu Jakarta Selantan 12450 Indonesia
Jl. Danau Agung Utara, Block G-1 No. 22, Jakarta 14350, Indonesia
JL. Danau Biru No. 105 Tangerang, Indonesia
JL. DANAU PERMAI BLK C3/9 JAKUT INDONESIA
Jl. Darat No. 61A/37 Medan 20153 North Sumatra Indonesia
Jl. Darmawangsa VI No. 25 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160
Jl. Darmo Harapan Utara 6 EW 18 Surabaya 60165 INDONESIA
Jl. De. Stb. Panggabean No. 55 Kelurahan Aek Habil Sibolga 22533-Sumatra Utara Indonesia
Jl. Demak 138 / Demak Timur 34A Surabaya 60172 Indonesia
Jl. Denpasar I No. 2, RT 001/002 Kuningan Timur Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Denpasar IV No. 5 Kuningan, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Denpasar Raya Bl. E/6, Rt. 1/2 Kuningan Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Deperdag III/G-11 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Dharmahusada Indah Timur 16 / 16 (J-81B) Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Dharmahusada Indah Timur I/M-72 Surabaya
Jl. Dharmawangsa VII No. 7 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160
Jl. Diponegoro No. 46 Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
Jl. Diponegoro No. 46 Jakarta 10310, Indonesia
Jl. Diponegoro No. 66 Jakarta 10320 Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Cipto 18 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Dr. CIPTO 3 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Kusumaatmaja No. 5 RT. 009 / RW.004 Kelurahan : Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. DR. Muwardi I/35 E, RT 001 RW 004 Kelurahan Grogol, Kecamatan Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat, Indonesi
Jl. Dr. Sahardjo No. 123 A, Jakarta 12960 Indonesia
Jl. DR. Saharjo 246 Jakarta 12870 Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Saharjo No 96A Jakarta 12960 Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Supomo No. 53A, Rt/Rw 001/012 Kelurahan Mangkubumen Kecamatan Banjarsari, Surakarta, 57139 Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Sutomo 56 Surabaya INDONESIA
Jl. Dr. Sutomo 58 Surabaya INDONESIA
Jl. Dr. Sutomo, No. 6, Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Dukuh Kupang Barat 2/26-28 Surabaya, Indonesia
JL. DURIAN BARAT III NO. 2 JAGAKARSA, JAKARTA 12550, INDONESIA
JL. DURIAN BARAT III NO. 2, JAGAKARSA, JAKARTA 12550 INDONESIA
Jl. Duta II/C-61 RT02/07 Kel. Duri Kepa Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Duta Indah II/6 RT001/014 Pondou Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Duta Niaga Raya No. 25 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jl. Duta Niaga Raya No. 25 RT003/RW014, Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Duta Permai III/6 Jakarta Selatan 12310 Indonesia
Jl. Duyung Gang 1/3 X Sanur Bali 80288 Indonesia
Jl. Dwijaya III/1 Gandaria Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Elang Thainesia A3/5 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JL. ERLANGGA 4 NO. 6 JAKARTA 12110 INDONESIA
Jl. Fatmawati No. 15 Kompleks D Best – Blok G 38 Jakarta 12420 Indonesia
Jl. Flores 3, Bloit L3/18 Nusa Loita Bumi Serpong Damai Indonesia
Jl. Gading Elok Utara I FGII/ii Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Gading Kirana Timur 1, Blok B2 No. 38, Kelapa Gading, Jakarta 12420
JL. GADING KIRANA TIMUR IV / BLOK H4 NO. 1, JAKARTA UTARA, KELAPA GADING INDONESIA
Jl. Gading Riviera I Block PF 22 No. 3 Pegangsaan Dua Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Gajah Mada No. 11 RT5/III Mojopanggung, Banyuwangi 68425 Indonesia
Jl. Gajah Mada No. 119 RT 15/08 Keagungan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Galuh 11/18, RT003/001 Selong, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Galuh II/8 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
Jl. Gandapura 39A Bandung 40113 Indonesia
Jl. Gandaria II No. 5 RT009/001 Kramat Pela Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Garden I, No. 3 Kedoya Garden Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Jl. Garut #9, Menteng Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Garut 23 Menteng Jakarta Pusat 10310 INDONESIA
Jl. Garut No 12 Menten g Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Garut No. 12, Menteng Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav 35-39, Jakarta 10210, Indonesia
Jl. Gembong 2-16, Komplex Wisma Gemini Block C-8 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Gereja No. 17 Cilandak Barat Jakarta 12430 INDONESIA
Jl. Gomet Riyadi 356A TR01/04 Punumping Surhkarta, Indonesia
JL. Graha Family Block G-7 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Griya Cantik, Blok K1 No. 8 RT. 008/RW. 020, Sunter Agung Kecamatan Tanjung Priok Jakarta Utara – Indonesia
Jl. Griya Mustika F No. 5 Kelurahan Sunter Agung Kecamatan Tanjung Priok Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Griya Sentosa Blok N No. 42 RT006 RW.020 Kel Sunter Agung Kec Tanjong Priok Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Gunung Gede No Bogor 16151 Indonesia
JL. GUNUNG GEULIS NO. 11 TAMAN BROMO, LIPPO KARAWACI TANGERANG, INDONESIA
Jl. Gunung Indah II No. 18 Cirendeu Ciputat Jakarta 15419 INDONESIA
Jl. Gunung Sahari II/No. 4C Jakarta 10610
Jl. Gunung Sahari IV/No.1 Rt 07/07 Jakarta 10610
Jl. Gunung Sahari VI/24 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Gunung Sahari XI No. 74 RT. 009, RW. 003 Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
Jl. Guru Mughni No. B3 Karet Kuningan Jakarta Selatan 12930 Indonesia
JL. H Adam Malik No. 50 Medan Barat Indocnesia
JL. H Saabah No. 5 Cipete Utara-Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12150, Indonesia
JL. H. Ahmad Sobana S>H> No. 77 Bogor, Indonesia
Jl. H. Buang I No. 12 Jakarta 12250 Indonesia
Jl. H. Buang I No. 12, Ulujami, Pesanggrahan, Jakarta 12250 Indonesia
Jl. H. Mandor No.40A Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. H. Muhi 37 RT 011/011 Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. H. Murtadho IV / A 124 RT.004, RW.006, Paseban, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. H. Saaba 9A, Cipete Utara Jakarta Selatan Indonesia 12150
Jl. Hadi Agus No. 72 Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Haji Agus Salim No. 94 Menteng, Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
JL. HAJI BALI NO. 16 MAKASSAR INDONESIA
Jl. Haji Ismail Saleh No. 2 Makassar Indonesia
Jl. Hang Lekiu III/4 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Haryono MT No. 105, Medan Kota, Indonesia
Jl. Hasanuddin No. 22 LK. I Kisaran Indonesia
Jl. Hayam Wuruk No. 5/6B Jakarta 10120 Indonesia
Jl. Hos Cokroaminoto No. 54 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Imam Bonjol 202 Semarang 50132 Indonesia
Jl. IMAM Bonjol 70 Jakarta
JL. IR. H. Juanda I No. 22G Medan Polonia, Indonesia
Jl. Ir. Haji Juanda 22, P.O. Box 2934, Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Ir. Haji Juanda No. 39 Medan, Indonesia
JL. IRIAN NO. 9 MENTENG, JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl. Iskandarsyah 11 No. 85 Melawai-Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Jambu No. 12 Gondangdia, Jakarta Pusat – Indonesia
Jl. Janur Elok VI Blok QC-13 No. 9 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Janur Elok VIII Blok QG 4/5 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Janur Kuning III NH 178 RT009/RW015, KLP, Gading Timur Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Jatibaru, No. 24, Jakarta 10160, Indonesia
JL. Jatibaru, no.24, Jakarta 10169 INDONESIA
Jl. Jatiroto No. 135A RT 010 RW 012 Jatiwaringin Kec. Pondok Gede, Bekasi, Indonesia
Jl. Jawara 27, Kemang Timur RT:007/RW:003 Bangka Mampang Prapatan, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Jelambar Ilir Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Jelambar Utama Raya Blok D/11 Jakarta Barat 11460 Indonesia
JL. JEMBATAN III NO. 36 DA RT001/RW016, PENJARINGAN Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Jend. Sudirman, Kav. 29-31 Wisma Metroplitan I., Lantai 3A Jakarta Selatan 12920 Indonesia
Jl. Jenggala I No. 5, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Johar No. 1A Jakarta Pusat 10350 Indonesia.
Jl. Johar No. 1A Menteng, Jakarta 10350
Jl. Jombang Raya Blok C NO. 101 Bintaro Sector 9 Tangerang – Indonesia
Jl. Juanda III No. 38 Jakarta 10120 Indonesia
Jl. K 1 No. 11, Rt. 010/03, Cipinang Muara Jakarta Timur
Jl. K. H. Hasyim Ashari 11D-F Jakarta Pusat, 10730 Indonesia
Jl. K. H. Moh Mansyur 208-214 Jakarta 11210 Indonesia
Jl. K.H. Hasyim Ashari, No. 11, Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. K.S. Tubun II C No. 28 B Slipi Jakarta 11410 Indonesia
Jl. Kalianda No. 6 Medan, Indonesia
Jl. Kalibata Tengah No.4, RT.002, RW.007 JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Jl. Kalimantan No. 10, RT 4/RW 1, Kelurahan Merdeka, Bandung
Jl. Kaliwaran 158 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Kampar No.9 Cideng, Gambir Jakarta, Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kapt. Mauliana Lubis No. 3-U R.T/R.W:000/000 Kel. Petisah Tengah Kecamatan:Medan Petisah Kota : Medan 20112, Indonesia
Jl. Kapt. Mauliana Lubis No. 3-U RT/RW : 000/000 Kel. Petisah Tengah Kecamatan : Medan Petisah Kota : Medan 20112 Indonesia
Jl. Kapt. Mauliana Lubis No. 8-T R.T/R.W:007/005 Kel. Petisah Tengah Kecamatan: Medan Petisah Kota: Medan 20112, Indonesia
Jl. Kapt. Mauliana Lubis No. 8-T RT/RW : 007/005 Kel. Petisah Tengah Kecamatan : Medan Petisah Kota : Medan 20112 Indonesia
Jl. Kapten Tendean 48 (Hegar Manah) Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Kapuk Kamal Raya No. 23 Jakarta – 14470 Indonesia
Jl. Kapuk Kamal Raya No.23 Jakarta 14470 – Indonesia
JL. KARANG ASEM III/6-8 RT 008/02, KUNINGAN TIMUR JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Jl. Karang Asem Tengah No. 18 Jakarta Selatan 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Karang Asem Utara C.4/34 RT.007/02 Kel. Kuningan Timur Kec. Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Karang Asem Utara C4 No. 34 RT007/002 Kelurahan Kuningan Timur Kecamatan Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan 12560 Indonesia
JL. KARANG MULIA A7 – 22 LEBAK BULUS, SOUTH JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl. Kartanegara No. 31 Selong, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Kartini 7A/8 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kartini IV, No. 7 Jakpus, Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl. Kartini Raya 64/65 C9 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kartini Raya No. 52E, RT 010/004 Kel Kartini, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Karya Sarana No. BL B/28, RT/RW 001/013 Jl. Buaran 2, Klendar, Jakarta Timur 13470, Indonesia.
Jl. Kaveling Polri Block G No. 53B Jagakarsa, Jakarta Selatan 12520 Indonesia
Jl. Kavling Polri Bloke E/1239 Rt/Rw 001/002, Kel. Jelambar Kec. Grogol Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Kawatan 4/9, Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Kayumas Utara B-12A, RT 001/RW007, Keluraban Kuningan Kecamatan Semarang Utara Senarang Indonesia
Jl. Kdm. Ilir Barat Permai Blok D. 61 RT.11 RW.03 24 Ilir Palembang Indonesia
Jl. Keagungan, No. 75 RT. 014/ 003, Keagungan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Kebangkitan Nasional No. 48, RT001/RW001 Kelurahan Sriwedari, Kecamatan Laweyan Surakarta 57141, Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Jeruk Baru A1/2 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Kacang 35/9, RT 009, RW 004, Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Kosong Gang XX. Kebon Kosong Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Sirih Barat VI No. 7, RT.013/RW.002 Kebon Sirih, Jakarta Pusat 10340 Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Sirih No. 25-27, RT/RW 002/001 Babakan, Ciamis, Sumur Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Kebun Karet No. 623 RT20, Palembang Indonesia
Jl. Kedungdoro 60, 10th Floor Surabaya 60251 Indonesia
JL. KELAPA ASRI I BLOKQJII NO.3 KELAPA GADING JAKARTA, UTARA INDONESIA
Jl. Kelapa Kuning Raya Blok A1 No. 23 Perumahan Pondok Kelapa Indah Kalimalang Jakarta 13450 Indonesia
Jl. Kelapa Molek IV/29 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Kelapa Molek VI S 2/14 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
JL. KELAPA NIAS PB 1/6 KELAPA GADING INDONESIA
Jl. Kelapa Sawit IX B6. 2/OP RT 09 RW 13, Pakulonan Barat Curug Tangerang, Indonesia
Jl. Kelapa Sawit V, Blok AB, No. 8 RT/RW 008/017, Kelapa Gading Timur Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
JL. KEMANG 5A NO. 21 KEMANG, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA 12730
Jl. Kemang Dalam 11 No. L7 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jl. Kemang Dalam X No. M-4, Kemang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Kemang IV No. 23B Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
JL. KEMANG SELATAN IC NO. 25 JAKARTA 12730 INDONESIA
Jl. Kemang Selatan VIII No. C8 Kemang Jaya Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Kemang Selatan VIII/C8 Kemang Jaya Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jl. KEMANG TIMUR I NO.1 JAKARTA 12730 INDONESIA
Jl. Kemang Timur Raya No. 1 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jl. Kemang Timur V No. 12A, Kemang Jakarta INDONESIA
JL. Kemang Timur V/28 Jakarta 12370 Indonesia
Jl. KEMANG TIMUR V/B3 KEMANG JAKSEL JAKARTA 12730 INDONESIA
Jl. Kemang Utara VII No. 6 RT03/04 Mampang Prapatan Jakarta Selatan 12730 Indonesia
Jl. Kemang Utara VIII/45G JAKARTA SELATAN Indonesia
Jl. Kemanggisan Utama V/16 RT003/RW007, Palmerah Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Kembang Harum II C6/6 Kelurahan Kembangan West JAKARTA
JL. KEMBANG SAKTI I B1/16 PURI INDAH JAKARTA BARAT 11610 INDONESIA
Jl. Kembang Sepatu No. 20 Senen, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kembangan Baru, RT 08/03 Kembangan Selantan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Kemuning No. 39 RT.008/RW.006, Kelurahan Pejaten Kecmantan Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Kenanga Kav. 23 No. D-1, Ampera, Kemang Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Kenanga No. 50 Cilandak Timur, Pasar Mingu Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Kenanga No. 50J RT007/02 Cilandak Timur, Pasar Minggu Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Kenanga No. 71 Cilandak Timur Jakarta Selatan 12560 Indonesia
Jl. Kenanga No. 71 Jakarta Selatan 12560 Indonsesia
Jl. Kenanga R.T./R.W. 007/002 Clilandak Timur Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Kenanga Terusan No. 300 Cilandak Timur Jakarta 12560 Indonesia
Jl. Kencana Indah III Blok JII No.38 Puri Kencana, Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Jl. Kencana Indah III, Blok JII No.38 Puri Kencana Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
JL. KENCANA PERMAI 7 NO. 6 PONDOK PINANG JAKARTA SELATAN 12310 INDONESIA
Jl. Kencana Permai II No.8 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jl. Kencana Permai V No. 7 Pondok Pinanng Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan 12310 INDONESIA
Jl. Kencana Permai VI/7 RT 001/RW 015, Pondok Pinang Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Kencana Permai VII/9 RT001/015 Pondok Pinang KBX Lama Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Kenrinci 91, Block J Cinere Rt/Rw 1605, Kel Limo, Kec. Limo Depok Indonesia
JL. Kenrinci 93, Blok J Cinere Rt/Rw 16/05, Kel. Limo Kec. Limo Depok Indonesia
Jl. Kentang No. 12A Jakarta Indonesia
JL. KERTANEGARA NO. 2A JAKARTA 12180 Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan 1/2, Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan 1/4 007/006 Petojo Selatan, Gambir Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan 1/4 Gambir, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan 8 No. 11 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan I No. 2 RT011/RW006 Petojo Selatan Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan III No. 33 Petojo Selatan Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan III/33 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. KESEHATAN NO. 26 RT010/RW005 PETOJO SELATAN JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl. Keselamatan Gg Sadar No. 15 RT 010 RW 003 Kelurahan Manggarai Selatan-Tebet Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Ketapang II No. 122 RT. 03/RW 15 Kel. Baktijaya Kec. Sukmajaya, Depok 16418 Indonesia
Jl. KH. Hasjim Ashari No. 37 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. KHM Mansyur 150 Jakarta Indonsia
Jl. KHM. Mansyur 116, RT005/RW004 Semampir, Surabaya 60151 Indonesia
Jl. Kiputih No. 29 RT. 05/05 Cidadap Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Kis. Mangunsarkoro No. 45 Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
Jl. Klampis Indah 111/10 (Blok C-4) Surabaya 60117
Jl. KLP Nias IX PB 19/15, Pegangsaan Dua, Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JL. KLUNGKUNG 46 JAKARTA 12950 INDONESIA
Jl. Kolombo 19 Yogyakarta Terban, Gondokusuman Yogyakarta 55223 INDONESIA
Jl. Komplek PLN RT001 RW009 Kel. Cililitan, Kramat Jati Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Komplex Sunrise Garden No. BL 3S/1, Jl. Surya Mandala, Kedoya Utara, Jakarta Barat 11520, Indonesia
Jl. Kramat Bunder No. 25 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kramat Raya No. 43 Jakarta 10450, Indonesia
Jl. Kramat VI Dalam No. 2 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. KREKOT JAYA BLOK E 16 JAKARTA 10710 Indonesia
Jl. Kristal Blok H/20 Kebayoran Lama Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Jl. KS TUBUN II/15 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Kucica VIII Blok JF 1-7, RT 13/05 Pondok Pecung TANGERANG
Jl. Kupu – Blok 18 No. 14 RT002/RW007, Kel. Mekarsari Kec. Tambun Selatan, Bekasi Indonesia
Jl. Laboratorium 11/8 Medan Indonesia
Jl. Labu No. 1 A/3 Medan 20153 Sumatra Utara Indonesia
Jl. Lamandau Raya No. 5 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12130 INDONESIA
JL. Lautze No. 31A, RT/RW 012/05, Pasar Baru, Jakarta, Indonesia
JL. LEBAK BULUS INDAH H-1 CILANDAK, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl. Lebak Bulus IV/7A Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Lembang No. 8 Menteng Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
Jl. Letjend Suprapto No.45 Pontianak Indonesia
Jl. Lima Iv No. 35A Jatibening 2, Pondok Gede Bekasi 17412 Indonesia
Jl. Listrik #7 Medan 20112 Indonesia
Jl. Lombok No. 56 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Lumajang No. 2 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Lumajang No. 5 Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
Jl. Madium No. 15 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Jl. Mahoni No. 17, Rt/Rw 005/008 Kelurahan Bungur, Kecamatan Semen, Jakarta-Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Majapahit No. 16 Room 321 Petojo Selatan Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Jl. Malang No 7 Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Malang No. 3, RT07/RW07, Menteng Jakarta 10310, Indonesia
Jl. Mampang Prapatan IV/20 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Mandala Permai III/6 Rt.004 Rw.008 Kapuk Muara, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Mangga 23, No. BL C/84 Duri Kepa, Jakarta Barat 11510 Indonesia
JL. MANGGA BESAR 4F., 28A JARKARTA BARAT 1150 INDONESIA
Jl. Mangga Besar 6 Selatan No. 104 – 106 – 108 Jakarta 11150 Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Besar IV E/16 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Besar VI No. 36 Taman Sari, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Besar VI Utara No. 30 RT009/RW01, Taman Sari Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Besar VIII/8, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Dua Raya (Komplek Harco Mangga Dua) Block E, No. 34 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Mangga No. 18 RT007/012 Jati Pulo Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Manyar Kertoarjo III No. 32 Surabaya 60115 Indonesia
Jl. Mappala Blok A 5 No 26 Makasar Indonesia
Jl. Margomulyo 68E KAV 11-15 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Maribaya G2/4, Puri Cinere, Cinere, Depok, Indonesia
Jl. Mas Putih D-50 Permata Hijau Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl. Mataharl IIIB/464 Jaka Setia, Bekasi Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Matraman Raya 198 RT 012/005 Kamp Melayu Jatinegara Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Matraman Raya 198 RT 012/06 Kamp Melayu Jatinegara Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Maulana Yusup No. 12 Banguna Indonesia
Jl. Mayjend Sungkono Kav. B-5, Surabaya 60225, Indonesia
Jl. Medan No. 127 Blok M Cinere, Kec. Limo Depok Indonesia
Jl. Mega Kuningan Timur Blok C-6 Kav. 12 Jakarta Selatan 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Melati Dalam RT. 003 RW. 002 Cilandak Timur-Pasar Minggu South Jakarta 12150, Indonesia
Jl. Melati Mas Raya Blok GI/NO 7 Villa Melatimas, Serpong Tangerang Indonesia
JL. MELAYU BARAT NO. 66 BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN INDONESIA
Jl. Merak No. 7 Rempora Permai Housing Jakarta 12330 INDONESIA
JL. MERAPI BV/7, RT001 RW011 CIBUBUR PASAR REBO JAKARTA TIMUR 13720 INDONESIA
Jl. Merdeka No. 2K Medan Indonesia
Jl. Merdeka No. 36 Palembang Indonesia
Jl. Meruya Selatan 68 Jakarta 11650 Indonesia
Jl. Meruya Selatan No. 66 Jakarta 11650 Indonesia
Jl. Meruya Selatan No. 9 RT/RW:003/002, Meruya Selatan Kembangan, Jakarta Barat Indocnesia
Jl. Metro Hijau 2 No. 10 Pondok Pinang, Jakarta Selatan 12310
Jl. Metro Kencana V/18, Rt. 001/015 Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Mimosa II No. G7 Jakarta 12510 Indonesia
JL. Mojopahit No. 177 Mojokerto, Indonesia
Jl. MPR IV No. 4 Cilandak, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. Muara Karang Blok A4s/38, Kelurahan Pluit Kecamatan Penjaringan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
JL. Muara Karang Blok K6S/8 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Natuna Blok G.225 RT. 05, RW.13, Kel. Cinere, Kec. Limo Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Natuna No. 20 Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Niaga Hijau 1/60 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Niaga Hijau IX No. 11-E, RT007/RW017 Pondok Pinang, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Niaga Hijau Raya 47 RT 011/013 Kel. Pondok Pinang, Jaksel Indonesia
Jl. Niaga Hijau Raya No. 51 Pondok Indah Selatan Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl. Nusa Indah Raya No. 29 Rt:002/001 Kel:Pondok Kopi Kec:Duren Sawit Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Otista, Gang H Maung, No. 33, RT 03/11, Sasak Tinggi, Ciputat, Tangerang, Indonesia
Jl. P Jayakarta 119A Jakarta Indonesia
JL. P Jayakarta No. 117/B8 RT006/RW007 Mangga Dua Selatan, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. P Jayakarta No. 117B RT006/RW008 Mangga Dua Selatan, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. P. Jayakarta 131-A / 44-45 Jakarta 10730, Indonesia
Jl. P. Jayakarta 131-A/44-45 Jakarta 10730 Indonesia
Jl. Padasuka RT32/RW09 Kel. Sukamaju Kaler/Kec. Indihiang Tasikmalaya 46151 West Java, Indonesia
Jl. Pademangan I No.15 Jakarta 14410 Indonesial
Jl. Pademangan II, RT. 001 / RW. 001 Kel.Pademangan Barat Kec. Pademangan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Pademangan IV GG.23 No. 22 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Pakubuwano VI/17 RT 006/04 Gunung Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Palapa I/18 RT/RW 001/005 Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Palem Barat No. 27 RT 004 / RW 007, Kelurahan Duri Kepa Kecamatan Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Palem Utama No. 18 RT 08/07 Duri Kepa Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat 11510 Indonesia
Jl. Palma Raya I Blok F/36, Taman Kedoya Baru Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Pancoran Barat VI/5B RT013/06 Pancoran-Mampang Prapatan Jakarta Selatan 12780 Indonesia
Jl. Pancoran V No. 14. RT 08/02 Kel. Glodok, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Pandeglang No. 27 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Pangeran Antasari No.55, RT003/011 Cipete Utara, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Pangeran Jayakarta, 105G Jakarta 10730 Indonesia
Jl. Panglima Polim IX No. 12, Melawai, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Panjunan 2/167 Sidoarjo, Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Panjunan II No. 167 Sidoarjo, Indonesia
Jl. Panjunan II/165 Sidoarjo, Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Karang No. 5 Samur, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Kuta II 3 RT 002, RW 10, Ancol Pademangar, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Kuta IV/I Ancol Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Mutiara AD17 Jakarta Indonesia
JL. PANTAI MUTIARA BLOK A NO. 9 JAKARTA 14450 INDONESIA
Jl. Pantai Mutiara Blok J 20-Pluit Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Mutiara ZF/No. 1 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Pasir Putih V1/7, RT/RW. 006/010 Ancol Pademangan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Paso No. 63 Kav. 80 RT.003/RW.06, Kelurahan Jagakarsa, Jakarta 12620, Indonesia
Jl. Patal Senayan No. 38 Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Pati Unus No. 2A RT: 004/RW:004 Gunung Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Patimura No. 9, Cilandak Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Patra Kuningan 1, Blk L1/10-11 006/04 Kuningan Timur, Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Patra Kuningan I Blk. L1 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. Patra Kuningan Raya Block M41 Kav. 4-5 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Patra Kuningan X/5 RT. 006/ RW. 004 Kuningan Timur, Kecamatan Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Patra Kuningan XI/5 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Patra Tomang II/34, Jakarta 11510, Indonesia
JL. PECENONGAN NO. 72 APARTEMEN ATAP MERAH #1195 JAKARTA 10120, INDONESIA
Jl. Pedureuan Kav 25 Ampera, Jakarta Selatan, Dki Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
JL. PEJATEN RAYA NO. 8A JAKARTA SELANTAN 12510 INDONESIA
Jl. Pekayon 1 No 16C Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Pelangi IV, No. 5 Blok 48 RT 10 RW 16 Mekar Sari Cimanggis Depok Indonesia
Jl. Pelangi Nila VI Blok A-8/15 Kelapa Gading Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pelepah Kuning II WV 2 No. 14 Kelapa Gading Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jl. Pengadegan Selatan No 10 Kalibata Rt 002/005 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Pengadegan Selatan VII No. 67 Pancoran, Jakarta 12770 Indonesia
JL. Pengayoman No. 21 Samping Polsekta 9 Panakkukang, Makassar Indonesia
JL. PENGAYOMAN NO. 21 SAMPING POLSEKTA 9, PANAKKUKANG, MAKASSAR, INDONESIA
Jl. Permata Berlian Blok R-13 Permata Hijau Jakarta 12210
Jl. Permata Hijan Blok K/1. Jakarta Indonesia 12950
JL. Permata Hijau Blk A38, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. Permata Hijau Blok M, No. 10-11 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Permata Hijau F/11 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Permata Hijau F/74 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Permata Hijau L/19 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Permata Hijau, Blk 4/6 RT. 014/002 Grogol Utara, Keby. Lama Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
Jl. Permata Mediterania Raya No. 19 Srengseng, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Permata No. 10, Grogol Jakarta 11440, Indonesia
JL. Perniagaan No.3 Medan, Indonesia
JL. PERTANI NO. 14 KALIBATA JAKARTA 12960 INDONESIA
Jl. Petike Luar No. 29 RT 011/01 Tambora Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Petojo Barat VII No. 8, RT009/RW001 Jakarta 10140, Indonesia
Jl. Petojo Selatan 1, No: 4D, Central Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Petojo VIY II No. 32-34 RT.004/RW.006 Cideng Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Petojo Viy V #4 Kelurahan Cideng Jakarta Pusat
Jl. Pinang Emas VI-VQ/12 Pondok Pinang Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
JL. Pinang Emas X/26, RT 010/03 JAKARTA SELATAN Indonesia
Jl. Pinangsia Timur No. 4K Jakarta 1110 Indonesia
Jl. Pinisi Indah 2 No. 2 Pantai Indah Kapuk Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Pinisi Permai 2/11 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
JL. Pluit Barat V/5 RT 015 RW 007 Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Jl. Pluit Barat 14, No. 7 Jakarta
Jl. Pluit Indah No. 29 Jakarta Utara 14450, Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Indah/29 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia Tel: REDACTED
Jl. Pluit Karang Permai RT 012, RW 008 Pluit, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Permai Raya / 20, Pluit Penjaringan, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Permai Raya No. 12A Rt.009 Rw.004, Pluit, Jakut Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Sakti Raya No. 125, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia Indonesia.
Jl. Pluit Sakti Raya No. 28 Rt. 009. Rw. 007, Pluit, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara 11450 Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Sakti Raya No. 30 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Selatan 11 No. 17 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pluit sumudra 5 No. 9 Jakarta Utara 14450 Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Timur Blk C/17 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Utara II No. 15, Pluit, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Pramuka Jayasari No. 29 Rawasari, Cempaka Putih Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Prisma 2 Blok B2, No. 33 Taman Kedoya Permai Jakarta 11530, Indonesia
JL. Prisma 2 Blok B2, No.33 Taman Kedoya Permai Jakarta 11530, INDONESIA
Jl. Prof. DR. Satrio Kav. 6 Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
Jl. Prof. M. Yamin No. 22B RT 007/RW 005 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. PROP DR SATRIO AP AMBASADOR RT/RW 011/004, Kelurahan Karet Kuningan Kecamatan Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. Pulan Putri I/A2/3 Kota Modern Tangerang 15117 Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Laki IV Blk K-6/18 Kembangan Utara Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Matahari VI Blok A-6/34, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
JL. Pulau Putri B.IV/No. 16 Modern Land – Tangerang Indonesia
JL. PULAU PUTRI III/25, R.T 011, R.W 002, JAKARTA
Jl. Pulau Sebaru M1/31 RT 011/009 Kel Kembangan Utara Kec Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Sebaru M1/31 RT011/009 Kel Kembangan Utara Kec Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Sebaru M1/31 Taman Permata Buana Jakarta Barat 11610 Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Sembilan Block N/14 Jatiwaringin Asri II Pondok Gede Bekasi 17411 Indonesia
Jl. Pulo Asem Timur Pulo Gadung, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Pulo Ayang Raya Blok JJ-9 Kawasan Industri Pulogadung Jakarta 13260 INDONESIA
Jl. Pulo Indah No. 35 Rt 002/005 Petukangan Selatan, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Pulo Indah No. 39 RT 010/005 Petukangan Sel. Jakarta 12270 Indonesia
JL. Pulo Kambing II No. 18 Kawasan Industri Pulogadung Jakarta 13920
JL. PULO MAS RAYA 12, RT.007, RW.011 KAYU PUTIH SUB DISTRICT PULO GADUNG DISTRICT EAST JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Jl. Pulo Mas VIII B/10 RT.08/11 Kel . Kayu Putih Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
JL. Pulomas Raya No. 16A RT 007 RW 016 Jakarta Timur INDONESIA
Jl. Pulomas Timur No 1B/1, Jakarta Pusat
Jl. Pulonangka Timur I C /46 Pulogadung Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Punai III T7/10 Bintaro Jaya Sektor 2 Tangerang Indonesia
Jl. Puncak Pesanggrahan VII/32 RT 02 RW 16, Kel. Cinere, Kec. Limo Depok, Bogor, Indonesia
JL. PURBA ENDAH I RT.04/05, KEC. CIMAHI UTARA, KAB. BANDUNG
Jl. Puri Indah C1 No. 6 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Puri Kencana Elok Timur I Blk K4/32, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Puri Mutiara No. 5 Wisma Pertamina RT009/RW011 Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Jl. Purnawarman No. 85, Kav. 3 Kebayora Baru, Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
Jl. Purnawarman No. 85, Kav. 3 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
Jl. Purwakarta No 3 Jakarta Pusat 10310 Indonesia
JL. Putat Indah 15, Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Puter II ED 2/32 BTR V RT 002 RW 09, Jurangmangu Timur Pondok Aren Tangerang Indonesia
Jl. Putri No. 6 Bandung 40262 Indonesia
Jl. Pyrus Blok C No. VIP 1 Jakarta 12210, Indonesia
JL. R.S. Fatmawati No. 7 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12140 Indonesia
Jl. Raden Patah III No. 9 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Raden Saleh Dalam No. 95, Medan Indonesia
Jl. Radio V No. 8, Blok B2 RT001/004, Kramat Pela Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Rajawali No. 53, Surabaya 60175 Jawa Timur Indonesia
Jl. Rajawali Selatan I, No. 1 RT / RW 017/002, Gunung Sahari Utara Kecamatan Sawah Besar Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Rajawali Selatan Raya No. 17, Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
Jl. Rajawali Selatan V No. 42 Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
JL. Rawa Bahagia I/25, RT / RW : 006/002, Grogol Pertamburan, Jakarta Barat
Jl. Rawa Kemiri 14/B RT004/RW 011, Grogol Selatan Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. Rawa Kepa IX, No. 69, Tomang Utara, Jakarta Barat 11440, Indonesia
JL. RAWAMANGUN MUKA V, RT/RW 015/012, KELURAHAN RAWAMANGUN, KECAMATAN PULOGADUNG JAKARTA-TIMUR, INDONESIA
Jl. Raya Batujajar KM. 2,8 Padalarang 40561 Bandung – Jawa Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Raya Gubeng No. 61 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jl. Raya Kalimalang /77 RT 010/08 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Raya Kelapa Dua No. 1 RT 007/002 Kelapa Dua Jakarta Barat 11550 Indonesia
Jl. Raya Kelapa Dua No. 1 RT007/RW002, No. 1 Kelapa Dua-Kebun Jeruk Jakarta Barat 11550 Indonesia
Jl. Raya Kerobokan # 106 – Br. Taman Kuta 80361 Bali Indonesia Kuta 80361, Bali Indonesia
Jl. Raya Kertajaya Indah No. 91 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Raya Margorejo Indah D/104 DS/Kel. Sidosermo RT.004/005 Kec. Wonocolo, Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Raya Padang Solok KM 17, Padang Indonesia
JL. RAYA PASAR MINGGU NO. 39 DUREN TIGA BUNTU Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Raya Permata Hijau Blok B No. 8, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. RAYA PLUIT SAKTI NO. 28 JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
JL. RAYA PLUIT SAKTI NO. 28 JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Jl. Raya Pluit Selatan Blok S No. 1 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia
JL. RAYA SEMER NO. 883 BANJAR SEMER KEROBOKAN-KUTA, BALI INDONESIA 80361
Jl. Raya Serang Km. 71 Desa Tambak Kec. Kibin Kab. Serang Propinsi Banten Indonesia
Jl. Raya Solo Sragen KM 9.5 Palur, Solo 57771 Indonesia
Jl. Renijaya, Blok E RT.02, RW.05 Kel. Pondok Petir, Kec Sawangan Bogor, Indonesia
Jl. RM SAID No. 148, RT/RW 005/002 Kelurahan Punggawan Kecamatan Banjarsari Surakarta 57132, Indonesia
Jl. Rontgen No. 3, Bandung – West Java INDONESIA
Jl. Rontgen No. 4 Bandung 40171 Indonesia
Jl. Rosiga VII/B-9 Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Rotowijaya No. 15 Yogyakarta-Indonesia 55321
Jl. Ruby I/28 Blok G Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. S. Wiryopranoto No. 46, Jakarta 10120, Indonesia
Jl. Safir II Blok I/10 Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Salak No. 35 RT 007/002 Kel. Guntu,r Kec. Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Sanur Blok C4 No.7, Bali View Estate, Cirendeu, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Saw No. 24, Menteng Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Jl. Sawo No. 23 Menteng Jakarta Pusat Jakarta 10330 Indonesia
Jl. Sedap Malam B-182 Bekasi Jawa Barat Indonesia
Jl. Sekolah Duta I/14-16 Pondok Pinang Jakarta – Indonesia
Jl. Sekolah Duta I/14-16 RT 002-014 Pondok Pinang Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Sekolah Duta V/50 RT 003/014 PONDOK INDAH PERMAI JAKARTA SELATAN Indonesia
Jl. Sekolah Duta V/50 RT 003/014 Pondok Pinang, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. SEKOLAH DUTA V/50, PONDOK INDAH PERMAI Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
JL. SEKOLAH DUTA V/50, RT003/RW014, PONDOK PINANG, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl. Sekolah Kencana, Nuansa Hijau Apt A/8-1, South Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Semampir II/1 Kediri Indonesia
Jl. Semampir II/No. 1, Kediri, East Java, Indonesia
Jl. Seminyak GG Plaw No 566 Kuta Bali Indonesia
Jl. Seruni, No. 3, Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Setia 1 No. 21, RT03/RW10 Kel. Jati Cempaka, Kec. Pondok Gede Bekasi, Indonesia
Jl. Setia Budi II No. 54 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
Jl. Siaga Utama Kav 12A RToo7/04 KEL. Pejaten Barat South Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Sidas No.8 RT001/002 Pontianak Barat. Indonesia
Jl. Sikambing Blk No. 26/13 Medan 20113 Indonesia
Jl. Sikatan No. 37 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Simprug Garden Blok D No. 2 RT 007/RW003 Grogol Selatan Jakarta 12220 Indonesia
Jl. Simprug Garden Blok D No. 2 RT007/RW003 Grogol Selatan Jakarta 12220 Indonesia
Jl. Simprug Garden II No. 10 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Simprug Golf 14/55A, Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Simprug Golf III Kav. 111 Jakarta Selatan Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Sinar Budi Gg. N/5 RT002 RW 03, Kelurahan, Pejagalan Kecamatan, Penjaringan, Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Sircon Blok. C/71 Rt 009/01 Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Sircon Blok. G/72 Rt 009/01 Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Sircon Blok. G/73 Rt 009/01 Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Sisingamangaraja No. 26 Jakarta 12120 INDONESIA
Jl. Sisingamangaraja No. 3 C Jakarta 12110 INDONESIA
JL. SLAMET RIYADI TSI BLOK A NO.1 , BANDAR LAMPUNG 35228 INDONESIA
Jl. Sri Gading II 35, RT. 003, RW.012, Mangkubumen Sub District, Banjarsari District, Surakarta Mayoralty, Central Java, Republic of Indonesia
JL. SRI WIJAYA RAYA NO. 4 KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN 12110 INDONESIA
Jl. Sriwijaya Raya No. 33 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. ST Budi Tgh Four Season Apart RT/RW 007/03 Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. St. Hasanudin No. 69 002/001 Melawai, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Sudirman Kav. 1 Panin Centre 7th Floor Jakarta 10270 INDONESIA
Jl. Sukarela No. 1, RT 009/RW009, Penjaringan, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Sukarno Hatta A2 Malang, Indonesia
Jl. Sultan Hasannudin No. 45/115 Blok M, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Sumbawa 12 Menteng Jakarta Pusat 10350 Indonesia
Jl. Sumbawa No. 6 Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
JL. SUMBER WUNI 341, RT 02/05, LAWANG, MALANG, INDONESIA
Jl. Suren I/12 Keb Baru. Jakarta 12160 INDONESIA
Jl. Surya IV/28, RT 04/05 Kedoya Utara, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Surya Timur Blok III A/8 RT 13/05 Kedoya Utara Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Surya Utama Blok V/17 RT 004/rw005 Kelurahan Kedoya Utara Kecamatan Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Surya Utama II H/11 Sunrise Garden Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Jl. Surya Wijaya 8/4 – E/10 RT/RW 007/011, Kedoya Utara Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Surya Wijaya III No. 14 Kedoya Selatan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Suryo No. 58, RT004/004 Rawa Barat, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Suryo No. 7, Blok S-Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12180 Indonesia
Jl. Sutomo No. 301 Medan 20212 Sumatra Utara Indonesia
JL. SUWIRYO NO. 45, JAKARTA PUSAT, INDONESIA
Jl. Talib II No. 35A Jakarta 11140 Indonesia
Jl. Taman Cilandak V No. C10, Cilamdak Barat, Jalarta Selatan 12430, Indonesia
Jl. Taman Cilandak V/B2 RT 012/004 Cilandak Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
JL. TAMAN DELIMA IV/29, RT.004, RW.005 TANJUNG DUREN SELATAN SUB DISTRICT GROGOL DISTRICT, WEST JAKARTA REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Jl. Taman Delima VI/59, RT.007, RW.005, Tanjung Duren Selatan Sub District, Grogol Petamburan District, West Jakarta, Republic of Indonesia
Jl. Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok G1 Kav 60 Jakarta Ta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok G1 No. 37, Intercon Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Taman Kencana Indah I Kav TC18, Pondok Indah Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Taman Kliningan No.1 Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Taman Lebak Bulus V/I RT002/007 Lebak Bulus Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. Taman Patra 3 No. 9B JAKARTA 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Taman Patra Raya No. 8 Kuningan Timur Jaksel
Jl. Taman Patra XIII, No. 11-12 005/004 Kuningan Timur, Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. TAMAN RADIO DALAM VI NO. 4 JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Jl. Taman S. Parman A/12 RT004/008, Tomang Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Taman S. Parman A/12 RT007/008, Tomang Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Taman Sari Raya 56-NE RT 12/04, Taman Sari Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Taman Sari Raya No. 10 Jakarta Indonesia
JL. TAMAN SURYA BLOCK IID/8 JAKARTA 11520 INDONESIA
Jl. Taman Surya III Blok G-3/17 Kalideres Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Taman Tanah Abang III No. 6 RT002/RW004 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Taman Tangkuban Perahu No. 6 RT 011/RW001 Jakarta 12980 INDONESIA
JL. TAMANSARI XI / 7A Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Tambak Bayan Tengah 36 RT 02/33, Alon Alon Contong Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Tampak Siring Indah No. 99 RT005/RW007 Bukit Gading Villa – Kelapa Gading Barat Jakarta Utara 14240, Indonesia
Jl. Tampak Siring Raya No. 7 Bukit Gading Villa, Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
JL. TANAH ABANG 2 NO. 53 JAKARTA 10160 INDONESIA
Jl. Tanggamus No. 10 Klojen, Malang Indonesia
Jl. Tanjung Duren Selatan No. 57 RT 011/RW002, Tanjung Duren, Jakarta Barat 11470, Indonesia
Jl. Tanjung Duren Utara II A/386, Jakarta 11470 Indonesia
Jl. Tanjung Mas Raya, Blok B8/16, Tanjung Barat, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. TANJUNG NO. 10 RT/RW: 007/001 MENTENG JAKARTA 10350, INDONESIA
JL. TANJUNG NO. 32B GONDANGDIA – MENTENG JAKARTA PUSAT – 10350 Indonesia
Jl. Tanjung No. 39 Gondangdia, Jakpus Jakarta Indonesia – 10350
JL. Tarogong/Caringin Utara 31 RT12/10 Cilandak Barat, Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
JL. TARUNA NO. 28A RT/RW 004/011 JATINEGARA CAKUNG JAKARTA TIMUR – DKI JAKARTA INDONESIA
JL. TB. ANGKE NO. 190P RT. 10/09 ANGKE JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Jl. Tebet Barat Raya No. 44, RT014/004, Tebet Barat Jakarta
Jl. Tebet Barat VI G/5 Jakarta Selatan 12810 Indonesia
Jl. Tebet Mas Indah V/B 8 RT. 009, RW. 002, Tebet Barat, Tebet, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Tebet Timur Raya No. 45 Jakarta Selatan 12820 Indonesia
Jl. Telomoyo 6 Semarang 50252 Indonesia
Jl. Tengah Raya No. 22 R.T./R.W. 004/012, Gedong Pasar Rebo, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Tengah Raya No. 22, R.T/R.W 004/012 Gedong, Pasar Rebo, Jalan Timur Indonesia
Jl. Terogong II/51 RT 008/010 Cilandak Barat, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. TEUKU UMAR NO. 50 RT/RW : 001/001 GONDANGDIA MENTENG JAKARTA PUSAT Indonesia
Jl. Tg. Duren Utara IV/50, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Thamrin 64 Surabaya Indonesia
JL. Thamrin No.4-C, P. Siantar Indonesia
Jl. Tidar, No. 30, Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Tidore No. 10, Cideng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. TIMBUL 21-PEJATEN BARAT II JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA 12510
Jl. Timor (T. Timor Raya) No. 58 Medan 20235 Indonesia
Jl. Timor No. 8 Gondangdia, Jakpus Jakarta Indonesia
JL. TIMOR NO. 8 RT 009/RW004, GONDANGDIA JAKPUS, JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl. Timor No. 8, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Tirtayasa IX No.8-10 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Tisna Senjaya, No. 80/18D Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Tomang Asli No. 25 RT07/03, Jati Pulo Indonesia
Jl. Tosiga Blok E/9 – RT 07/04 Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL. TOSIGA I NO. K 5 KEBON JERUK Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL. Trembesi 130 Depok 14621 INDONESIA
Jl. Trs Hang Lekir III/54 RT/RW 005/008, Grogol Selatan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Trunojoyo 101, Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Tulodong Bawah 18 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Tulodong Bawah III/42 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Tulodong Bawah IV/2, Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Jl. Tulodong Bawah No. B-3 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Tumenggung 43 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Tuparev Mo. 21 Kerawang Indonesia 41312
Jl. Untung Suropati No. 28 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Untung Suropati No. 29 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Uranus V No. 10, Villa Cinere Mas, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Uranus V, No. 10 Villa Cinere Mas Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Veteran No. 27 RT 01, PS. Pagi Samarinda 75111, Indonesia
Jl. Veteran No. 3A Semarang Indonesia
Jl. Villa Jati Padang 11/53 Indonesia
Jl. Villa Polonia Indah No. 68, Medan, Indonesia
Jl. Wahyu No. 15 RT 003/005 Gandaria Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Walet Permai 3/5, Rt007/003 Kel. Kapuk, Kec. Penjaringan Jakarta Utara
Jl. Walet Permai V/30, Pantai Indah Kapuk, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra 6 No. 4 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra II No. 3 Kav 14 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra V/3 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra VIII/8 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra XI No. 3 Jakarta Selatan 12190 Indocnesia
Jl. Widya Chandra, Raya/37 RT 008/001 Kby Baru, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Wijaya 10 No. 4, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta 12160, Indonesia
Jl. Wijaya Kusuma Blok B1 No. 17 Duran Sawit Jakarta Timur
Jl. Wijaya Kusuma Raya No. 38 RT.041 RW.014, Desa Cilandek Barak, Kecamatan Kota Bogor Barat, Kotamadya Bogor Indonesia
Jl. Wilis Indah No.A.7 RT07 RW04 GD.Kasri MALANG, Indonesia
Jl. Wiyung Pratama B/5 Surabaya 60227 Indonesia
JL. WR. SUPRATMAN 9 SURABAYA, INDONESIA
Jl. YBR 1 Kav 62, Kuningan Timur, Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Ybr I Kav 62 Kuningan Timur Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan 12910
Jl. YBR IV No. C17 Kuningan Tower Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. YBR IV No. C17, RT001/002 Kuningan Timor, Setiabudi Jakarta, Selatan
Jl. YDPP II/20 RT/RW 006/01 Kemang Selatan Cipete Selatan, Cilandak Jakarta Selatan 12410, Indonesia
Jl. Yos Sudarso RT.OT. Tarakan Indonesia
JL. Yupiter IV No. 26 Villa Cinere Mas, Ciputat 15419 Indonesia
Jl.. Madrasah II/No.40 Jeruk Purut Cilandak-Timur Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL.DARMO PEMAI SELATAN 1/67 SURABAYA, EAST JAVE Indonesia
JL.Kalampeto No.8 Ujung Pandang, Indonesia.
Jl.Kimia No.13 Jakarta Pusat 10320 Indonesia
Jl.Lawu No.14 Malang Indonesia
JL.Mulyosari Mapan 4/DC20, Aurabaya, Indonesia.
Jl.Pinang Merah II/SK-1 Pondok Indah Pondok Pihang Jakarta 12310
JL.Rappocini Raya 181F, Makassar, Indonesia.
JL.Taman Patra 3 No. 9B Jakarata 12950 Indonesia
JL.Vila Sunter Mas. Blok H XI/I. Rt. 001 RW 08, Sunter Jaya, Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl.Walikota no.10 Medan
Jln Bambu Betung VII, RT. 005/RW 05, Kelurahan Rawa Buaya, Kecamatan Cengkareng, Kotamadya Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
JLN BANDENGAN UTARA NO.81 BLOK B RT 009/016 PENJARINGAN JAKARTA UTARA IDONESIA
JLN BIMA 1, NO. 84 DEPOK II TENGAH – 16411 KABUPATEN BOGOR INDONESIA
JLN BUKIT HIJAU 111/11, KEBAYORAN LAMA, JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
JLN Danau Agung XI No. 16, Sunter Agung, Jakarta, Indonesia
Jln Imam Bonjol No. 18 Pasuruan, Jawa Timur, 67122 Indonesia
Jln Kampung Bali IV, No. 32 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jln Kdm. Ilir Barat Permai Blok D-16, RT.11 RW.03 24 Ilir Palembang Indonesia
Jln Kemurnian Utara No 3 Weast Jakarta, Indonesia 11120
Jln Krekot Bunder No. 46 Jakarta 10710 Indonesia
JLN M.H THAMRIN NO. 31 BII PLAZA, TOWER 2, 22ND FLOOR JAKARTA 10350, INDONESIA
Jln Mandala Utara No. 376 Jakarta Barat 11440 Indonesia
JLN MANDALA UTARA NO. 376 JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
JLN MANDALA UTARA NO. 4 JAKARTA BARAT 11440 INDONESIA
Jln Mangga Besar VI Selatan No. 102A Jakarta Barat 11150 Indonesia
JLN Muarakarang, BLK V-85/ /32. RT 010 RW 019, Pluit, Benjaringan, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
JLN P. POLIM RAYA NO. 80 RT 002/008 PULO JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jln Pasir Putih Raya E 41/1 RT.009/010, Kelurahan Ancol Kecamatan Pademangan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jln Petojo Sabangan I/37 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
JLN PLUIT UTARA 4 NO. 22 JAKARTA UTARA
Jln Pupan No.23 Pondok Pinang South Jakarta Indonesia
Jln Raung No. 12 Semarang, Indonesia
Jln Raya Uluwatu, Gang Kahuripan (Tegeh Pall) No. 69 Br Bakungsari, Ungasan, Kuta Selatan, Kab. Badung Bali 80363 – Indonesia
JLN SULTAN AGUNG NO. 58 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jln Sultan Agung No. 69 Semarang, Indonesia
Jln Syahrial, No. 9 RT. 003/002 Rengat – Indragiri Hulu Riau Indonesia
Jln. Pejaten Barat II/81 Pasar Minggu Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jln. Agung Tengah 6 Blok I IV No. 6A Sunter Agung – Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jln. Ancol Barat VII Blok A 5D No. 2 Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Jln. Ancol Timur XIII No. 11A Regol, Bandung West Java
JLN. BAGAU BLOK P NO.4, CIPINANG INDAH 2 JAKARTA 13430 INDONESIA
JLN. BIMA 1, NO. 84, DEPOK II, TENGAH-16411, KOTA DEPOK, KABUPATEN BOGOR INDONESIA
Jln. Camar Elok V No. 35, Sektor Selatan Timur Pantai Indah Kapuk, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
JLN. CAWANG BARU NO. 22 JAKARTA 13340 INDONESIA
Jln. Dr. Cipto 3 Surabaya 60264, Indonesia
Jln. Dr. Sahardjo No. 182, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jln. Ds. Petta Tabukan Utara – North Sulawesi
Jln. Dukuh Ilir Cibungbulan West Java
Jln. Gading Kirana Timur 1 Blk B3/23, Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jln. Gandaria Tengah VI No. 18 Jakarta 12130 Indonesia
Jln. Gg. Griya Lestari G2/2 KELAPA GADING Jakarta
Jln. Gg. Swadaya No. 27 Tebet – Jakarta
Jln. Gubeng Kertajaya 5-C/36 Surabaya East Java Indonesia
JLN. JEMBATAN III NO. 36 R.T. 001 R.W. 016 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jln. K.N. Samanhudi (Pintu Besi) no. 32 Jakarta – Pusat INDONESIA
Jln. Kampung Salo Kembangan Jakarta
Jln. Kavling Polri Blok DIII/971A RT 008/RW001, Jelambar, Grogol Jakarta Barat Indonesia 11460
Jln. Kp. Rawa Lele Jombang Ciputat, Jakarta
Jln. Kp. Sidamukti Sukamaju – Depok
Jln. M. H. Thamrin No. 31, Bll Plaza Tower 2, 22nd Floor Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Jln. Mangga Besar VIII/8 RT 008/01 Kelurahan Taman Sari, Kecamatan Taman, Sari, Jakarta Barat
JLN. MENDUT NO. 21, RT 009 RT 002 KEL. PEGANGSAAN, JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jln. Metro Hijau II No. 10 Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jln. Mimosa Blok N. 1 Buncit Indah Pejaten Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jln. Mitra Sunter Boulevard Blok A No. 20-21 Jakarta 14350 Indonesia
Jln. Pangeran Jayakarta, No. 55, Central Jakarta 10730 Indonesia
Jln. Paradise 25 Block A/20 Nirwana Sunter Asri TH III North Jakarta Indonesia
Jln. Pelepah Hijau II TG I/4 Kelapa Gading Jakarta
Jln. Pendidikan No. 26 Cilandak Barat, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jln. Peninggaran No. 53 Ciputat, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta
Jln. Petak Serani Tanah Sereal – Tambora Jakarta
Jln. Raya Gilang 159 (Taman – Sepanjang) Sidoarjo 61257 Indonesia
Jln. Senjaya 4 No. 95 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
Jln. Sidokapasan 2/33 Sidodadi 60145 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jln. Surya Wijaya 8/4E/10 Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jln. Taman Borobudar 19, Malang East Java, Indonesia.
Jln. Tebet Raya No. 62 Jakarta Selatan 12820 Indonesia
Jln. Tebet Timur Dalam VI C/11 Tebet – Jakarta
Jln. Unggul Graha Permai C12/18 Tambun – Bekasi
Jln. Villa Bukit Mas K3 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jln. Widya Chandra V/23 Kuningan Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Joyce Handajani c/o P T Enseval Enseval Building, 4th Floor Jl Let. Jend. Suprapto Kav 4 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
Jt. Bangka VIII A No. 28 Jakarta 12720 INDONESIA
JT.Tinumbu No.12, Ujung Pandang, Indonesia.
Kacibata No. 12 Jakarta 12740 Indonesia
Kalibata Indah Blok F/5, RT005/006 Rawajati Pancor An Jak-Sel Indonesia
Kamboja No.8, Mentent Jakarta Indonesia
Kantor Taman E 3.3 Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Kantor Taman E. 3.3 Unit B6 & B7 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Kantor Taman E.3.3 Unit B6 & B7 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Kantor Taman E3.3, Unit A-3 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jl. Mega Kuningan Indonesia 12950 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
KAP Jimmy Budhi & Rekan Jl. Patimura No.2 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Kapuk Pulo No. 100 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Karang Anyar Raya 56/B1 Kelurahan Sunter Agung, Kecamatan Sawah Besar Jakarta, Indonesia
Karang Jaya Baru E1/60 Johar Baru Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Karet Setiabudi Park Avenue Suites Apartment #606 JL RS Aini, Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Karyawan Tmn. Duta MAS Blk C2/38 RT009/009 Kel. Indaya Kusuma Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Karyo Indoh Village II Blok D No 2 Bintaro Jakarta INDONEISA
Kav DK 1 Blok 84 No. 17-19 RT 001 RW 010 Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Kav. Polri Blok A IX No. 226 Jakarta Indonesia
Kav. Polri Blok E/1222 Jakarta Indonesia
Kav. Polri Blok G No. 51 RT.009, RW.006 Jagakarsa, JAKARTA INDONESIA
Kav. Polri Blok G No. 51, RT. 009, RW. 006, Jagakarsa, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Kav. Polri, Blk E1/1272, RT. 01/02 Kec. Grogol Petam, Kodya, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kav. Polvi Blok D-IX/1054 RT/RW 003/001, Jelambar Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kawasan Berikat Nusantara (E.P.Z) Jl. Pelabuhan Nusantara II Blok B2, Tanjong Priok Jakarta – 14310, INDONESIA
Kawasan Berikat Nusantara Block A-07 Jl. Jawa Raya 13, Cakung Cilincing Jakarta 14140 Indonesia
Kawasan BIIE Multi Guna Niaga Jl. Mahoni I No. 5 Sukaresmi, Lippo Cikarang Bekasi – 17550 Indonesia
Kayu Putih Tengah Lvb No 11 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
KB Jeruk I/1/5 RT 04/II Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Kebagusan Besar, R.T./R.W. 008/005 Kebagusan Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
KEC KELAPA GADING BLK H4 KEL KELAPA GADING TIMUR JL. GADING KIRANA IV NO. 1 JAKARTA 14240 INDONESIA
Kedoya Albasia Raya D13-15 Tamau Kedoya Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
KEDOYA APARTMENTS BLOK N, JAKARTA BARAT, INDONESIA.
Kedoya Elok Apt N. 104 Jalan Panjang Kebun Jeruk Jakarta, Indonesia
Kedoya Garden E/35, RT.014/005 Kedoya Selatan, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
KEL PLUIT KEC. PENJARINGAN JL PLUITT PUTRI V/8 RT 006 RW 006 JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Kelapa Puan TMR II, Blk NC 3130 RT 002 RW 012 Pegangsaan II Klp Gading Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Kelapa Sawit Raya KL/18 Kelapa Gading Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Kelapapuan Timur VII NB 7/1 Pegangsaan II, Kelapa Gading Indonesia
Kemang Club Villas, Apt A#101, JL. Kemang Selatan 1, Jakarta Selatan 12730, Indonesia
Kemang Ifi Graha A8/28 Bekasi Indonesia
Kemang Jaya Apartment Unit 1104, JL. Kemang Selatan VIII, Jakarta Selatan 12730 Jakarta Indonesia
Kemanggisan Raya, RT 015/ RW009 Palmerah, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Kembang Elok III H3/23 Rt. 009/Rw. 006, Kembangan West Jakarta 11610 Indonesia
Kembang Murni II Blok L2/14 Puri Indah Jakarta 11610 Indonesia
Kembangan Baru III C/2 Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kembangan Utama Raya Blok LI/ 3B RT. 003 RW. 003 Kembangan Utara Jakarta Barat Indonesia
KENANGA NO. 71, CILANDAK TIMUR JAKARTA SELATAN 12560, INDONESIA
Kenari Golf V/82 Bukit Golf Mediterania Pantai Indah Kapuk Jakarta Utara 14470 Indonesia
Kencana Permai RT 005/015 Kel. Pondok Pinang Jausel Indonesia
Kepa Duri Blk, G 1/143 Duri Kepa, Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Kertajaya Indah Timur 8/21 Surabaya Indonesia
Ketupa 6, Surabaya Indonesia
KH Naim 1 No A17, RT/RW 005/11, Cipete Utara Jakarta Selatan 12150, Indonesia.
Klampis Ngasem 152 Surabaya – Indonesia
Klampis Semolo Barat X/30 RT 03 RW 10 Surabaya Indonesia
Kombes Pol Duryat No. 12 Kediri Indonesia
Komp Bunga Lily Kav 11 R.T./R.W. Bintaro Indonesia
Komp Citramas Indah Bok F, No. 2B, RT/RW 003/006 Batu Besar, Nongsa Batum Indonesia
KOMP DUTA HARAPAN INDAH, BLOCK P-52. JI KAPUK MUARA, NO.7 JAKARTA 14460 INDONESIA
Komp Green Ville D/24 RT09/09, Duri Kepa Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Komp MPR No 15, Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Komp Ruko Lodan Centre Blok Jl-2, Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Komp TSI RT 002/002 Bandar Lampung 35228 Indonesia
Komp, Aviari Pratama No. 7 Blok E3 Jl. Batu AJ1, Batam
Komp. Bali Agung II, 003/023 Kel. Benua Melayu Darat, Pontianak Selatan, Pontianak 78122, Indonesia
Komp. Batununggal Indah Ruko No. 173 Soekamo Hatta, Bandung Indonesia
KOMP. BUKIT IDAMAN NO. 128-129 JL. CIPAKU INDAH, BANDUNG Indonesia
Komp. Bumi Indah RT03/4 Tanjung Pinang Indonesia
Komp. Bumi Pusaka Cinere Blok A/14 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Komp. Citra Green Garden Kav. 17 RT. 02/05 Bandung, Indonesia
Komp. Deplu Kav. 136 RT.07 RW. 07 Cipadu Jaya-Larangan Tangerang Indonesia
Komp. DKI Blok I/7 RT 003 RW 004, Joglo, Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
KOMP. DUTA MAS D5 NO. 9 GROGOL, WEST JAKARTA INDONESIA
Komp. Grawisa Blok A/1 Jakarta Barat 11460 Indonesia
Komp. Grawisa Blok A/1, Jakarta Barat, 11460 Indonesia
Komp. Green Ville Blok BJ No.5 Jakarta Indonesia
Komp. Harco Elektronick Mangga Dua Blok I, No. 5A-5B, Jl. Mangga Dua Raya Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Komp. Kembangan Baru D/12 RT 008, RW 003, Kembangan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Komp. Mikasa E2 A Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Komp. Nagoya Plaza, Lbk Baja, Batam, Indonesia
Komp. Pergudangan Muara Karang Blok B No. 12 Jl. Jembatan III Barat Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Komp. Taman Bukit Kemang Blok C No 7-8 Jakarta, Indonesia
Komp. Villa Melati Mas Blok G-2 No. 15, Serpon Tangerang 15323, Indonesia
Komp.Deplu kav. 136 RT.07/07, kel.Cipadu Jaya kec.Larangan, Tangerang – Indonesia
Kompi Villa Melati Mas Blok M8/No 25 Tangerang 15350 Indonesia
Komplek Andara No.20 JI Andara, Pondok Labu Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Komplek BNI46 Blok GG1 Grogol Petamburan
Komplek Bonagabe Blok B-15 Jl Raya Jatinegara Timur No. 101 Jakarta 13310, Indonesia
Komplek Bpk V No. C-1 Gandul Rt/Rw 31/04 Kelurahan Desa Gandul Kecamatan Limo Kota Depok Indonesia
Komplek Bpk V No. C-1 Gandul Rt/Rw 31/40 Kelurahan/Desa Gandul Kecamatan Limo Kota Depok Indonesia
Komplek Green Garden Blok A-8 No. 1 Jl Arteri Kedova Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Komplek Green Garden Blok A-8 No. 1 Jl. Arteri Kedoya Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Komplek Green Garden, Blok A8/1, Jln Arteri Kedoya, Jakarta 11520, Indonesia.
Komplek Harmoni Plaza F/10 Jl. Suryopranoto No. 2 Jakarta Indonesia
Komplek Ketapang Indah Blok B2/14 Jl. K H Zainul Arifin No. 2 Jakarta 11140 Indonesia
Komplek Kota Grogol Permal G-5 Jl. Prof. Latumeten Jakarta 11460 INDONESIA
Komplek Mekar Wangi Jl. Mekar Wangi No. 9 Bandung Indonesia
Komplek Puri Indah Blok G5 No. 64 Jl. Kembang Indah Utama Jakarta 11610, Indonesia
Kompleks Apartemen Taman Rasuna 17-16-D, JI. H.R Rasuna Said Jakarta Indonesia
Kompleks Batan Blok E/2 RT 006/RW 007, Pasar Minggu Jakarta 12520 Indonesia
Kompleks Bukit Idaman No. 128 Jl. Cipaku Indah Bandung Indonesia
Kompleks Duta Mas Fatmawati Blok B, I/33 Jl. RS Fatmawati No. 39 Jakarta 12150 INDONESIA
Kompleks Golden Plaza Blok C No. 16-17, Jl. R.S. Fatmawati No. 15 Jakarta Selatan, 12420 Indonesia
Kompleks Green Garden Blok Fi No II JL Dan Mogot Jak Barat 11520 INDONESIA
Kompleks Greenville Block V/24 Jakarta Indonesia
Kompleks Mangga Dua Plaza Blok L No. 19, Jl. Mangga Dua Raya Jakarta Utara 10730 Indonesia
Kompleks Perkantoran Buncit Mas Block B-3 Jl. Mampang Prapatan Raya No. 108 Jakarta Selatan Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Kompleks Permata Hijau Jl Boulevar Barrat No. 42 Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Kompleks Permata Timur II Blok LL No. 4 Jatiwaringin Bekasi 17411 Indonesia
Kompleks Perumahan Cemara Asri Jalan Tulip Blok H4 No. 7 Medan – Sumatera Utara 20371 Indonesia
KOMPLEKS TAMA PUTRI HIJAU BLOCK D NO. 50 MEDAN INDONESIA
Komplex Barata Karya Nomor 442 Rukun Tetangga 07, Rukun Warga 07 Kel. Karang Tengah, Kecamatan Ciledung, Kot. Tangerang 15157, Jawa Barat, Indonesia
Komplex Grawisa Blok E/15 Jl. PTB Angke Jakarta Barat 11000 Indonesia
Komplex Grawisa Blok G/11 Jl. Tubagus Angke Jakarta 11460 Indonesia
Komplex Pakuwon r. 14 Jelambar Baru, Jakarta 11460 Indonesia
Komplex Perkantoran Duta Raya Blok F1/24, Jalan Mangga Dua Raya Jakarta 10730, Indonesia
Komplex Permata Hijau A/31 Jl. Mutiara Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Kond. Taman Anggrek Tower IV, Unit 24F Jl. Tanjung Duren Selatan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kond. Taman Anggrek, Tower 6, Unit 28H Jl. Tanjung Duren Selatan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kondominium Graha Family PA-82 Surabaya 60226
Kondominium Menara Kelapa Gading F-502 Jl. Terusan Gading Timur Boulevard No. 88 Kelapa Gading, Jakarta 14250 Indonesia
Kondominium Tama Anggrek, Tow 2-32EF,RT.002,RW.007 Tanjung Duren Selatan Sub District Grogol Petamburan District, West Jakarta REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Kondominium Taman Anggrek, Tower 3-25D RT003/RW007 Tanjung Duren Selatan West Jakarta, Indonesia
Kondominium Taman Anggrek, Tower 7-29B RT.007, RW. 007, Tanjung Duren Selatan Sub Dist. Grogol Petamburan District, West Jakarta, Republic of Indonesia
Kondominium Wesling Kedoya B9/0905 Jl. Raya Kedoya Garden Jakarta Barat 11520 Indonesia
KONDOMINUIM TMN ANGGREK TW 8-27 D JAKARTA BARAT
Kp Srengseng RT. 012/008 Lenteng Agung, 12610 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
KP. Muara RT. 04/RW. 01 Desa Banjaranwetan, Kecamatan Banjaran Kabupaten Bandung, Indonesia
Kp. Padabeunghar RT 02 RW 09 Bogo, Indonesia
Kp. Ros, Leuweung Klot Cibungbulan West Java
Kp. Sukadana RT/RW 01/01 Desa Cigagade, Bi Limbangan Garut Indonesia
Kuningan Village Taman Patra II No. 17 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Law Office CCN & Associates Menara Imperium 12th Fl. – Suite D Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav 1 Jakarta, 12980, Indonesia
Lembang No. 7, RT.006/RW.005 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat 10310 Indonesia
Level 22 Bank of BNI Building Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav 1 Jakart 10220 INDONESIA
Limas V Block C2/25 Taman Kedoya Permal Jakarta 11530 Indonesia
LIMUS PRATAMA REGENCY F/6 RT09 LIMUS CILENGSI, JAWA INDONESIA
Lingkar Bima Luar Kav. 3 Bima Asri – Dukuh Bima Kota Legenda Bekasi Timur – Jawa Barat Indonesia
Lippo Centre 11th Floor J1. Gatoto Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta 12950
Lippo Centre Building J1. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta
Lippo Centre, 11th Floor Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta Indonesia 12950
Lippo Group Lippo Centre 10/F Asia Tower 101 Diponegoro Blvd
Lippo Group Lippo Centre Building 8th Floor J1. Jend Gatot
Lj. Kayu Putih III. C/3 R.T. 003 R.W. 006 Kelurahan Pulogadung, Kecamatan Pulo Gadung Kota J Indonesia
Lubis, Santosa & Maulana Wisma bank Dharmala, 5th Floor JI. Jend. Surdirman Kav 28 Jakarta INDONESIA
Mampang Prapatan I/32 RT/W 03/06 Mampang Prapatan Jakarta Selatan 12790, Indonesia
Mandala Barat III No. 10, Tomang Jakarta Indonesia
Mangga Besar IV E/5 R.T./R.W. 004/001 Taman Sari Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
MANGGA DUA ABDAD APARTEMENT PESONA BAHARI TOWER TO PA 2 LANTAI 19, NO. 19D JAKARTA INDONESIA
MANYAR KERTOADI BLOK W 229 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Mashill Tower 6th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 25 Indonesia
Mayapada Tower, 16th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 28 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Mediterania Garden Apt., Tower A, No. A/09B/K Jl. Tanjung Duren Raya Kav. 5-9 Jakarta 11470, Indonesia
Mega Kebon Jeruk B2/10 Joglo Jakarta Barat 11640 Indonesia
Menara Bank Danamon 15th Floor Jl. Prof. Dr. Satrio Kav. E IV No. 6 Mega Kuningan, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Bank Mega 24th Floor Kawasan Terpadu Para Group Jl. Kapten P. Tendean Kav. 12 – 14A Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Menara Batavia ,29th Floor, Jl. K.H. Mas Mansyur Kav 126, Jakarta 10220, Indonesia
Menara Batavia 10 Floor JI KH Mas Mansyur, Kav 126 Jakarta 10220 INDONESIA
Menara Batavia 11th Fl. Jalan KH., Mas Mansyur Kavling 126 Jakarta Pusat 10220
Menara DEA 15th Floor Suite 1505 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta Selatan 12950 Indonesia
Menara DEA, Lantai 9 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jl. Mega Kuningan Barat IX Kav.E4, 3 NO. 1 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia.
Menara Hijau Lantai 5, JI. MT. Haryono Kav. 33 Jakarta 12770
Menara Imperium 16C Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav. 1 Jakarta Indonesia
Menara Imperium Lt. 17 Menara Kuningan Super Blok Kav No. 1 Jl. Rasuna Said Jakarta 12980
Menara Imperium, 9th Floor, Suite B Metropolitian Kuningan Superblok Kav 1A, Jl. HR. Rasuna Said Jakarta 12
Menara Jamsostek South Tower 2nd Floor Unit TB 02-02 Jl. Jenderal Gatot Subroto No. 38 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
Menara Jamsostek, Menara Selatan 10th Floor Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 38 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
Menara Jamsostek, Menara Selatan 10th Floor, Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 38, Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
Menara Kadin , 23rd Floor Unit D, Jalan HR Rasuna Said Blok X-5, Lav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Menara Kadin 23rd Floor Jalan HR Rasuna Said Kav 2-3 Jakarta Selatan 12950 Indonesia
Menara Kadin 7th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav 2-3 Jakarta Indonesia
Menara Kadin Indonesia Suite 19C JI. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X – 5, Kav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Kadin Indonesia, Penthouse 11, JL.HR. Rasuna Said Blok x5 KAV 2-3 Jakarta 12950. Indonesia
Menara Kadin, 21st Floor Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
MENARA KADIN, 7TH FLOOR JI. HR RASUNA SAID BLOK X-5 KAV. 1-3 JAKARTA 12950 INDONESIA
Menara Kadin, 7th Floor Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Kadin, 7th Floor Jl.H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 1-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia.
Menara Karya 19th Floor, Unit G-H Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Block X-5, Kav. 1-2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Matahari 17th Floor Palem Raya Boulever No. 7 Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang 15811 Indonesia
Menara Matahari 17th Floor, Palem Raya Boulever No. 7 Lippo Karawaci Tangerang Indonesia
Menara Mulia, 28th Flr. Penthouse Jl. Jend Gatot, Subroto Kav 9-11 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Menara Mulia, Suite 1701 17th Floor Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav 9-11 Jakarta 12930,
Menara Perdama, 7th Floor Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Kav. C-17 Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
Menara Rajawali 6th Floor Mega Kuningan Lot #5.1 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Rajawali Lt 18 Jl. Mega Kuningan Lot 5.1 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Rajawali, 18 Floor Kawasan Mega Kuningan Mega Kuningan lot 5.1 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Menara Standard Chartered 30/F Menara Standard Chartered Jl. Prof. Dr. Satrio Kav. 164 Jakarta 12930, Indonesia
Menara Sudirman Suite 8A, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 60, Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Menara Sudirman, 19th Fl, Jl Jend, Sudirman Kav 60, Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Mess Indah Kiat, Jl Raya Serpong KM 8 Tangerang, Indonesia
Metro Alam III/10, RT 011/016, Pondok Pinang, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Mid Plaza I #04-00 Jalan Sudirman Jakarta Indonesia
MidPlaza 1, Level 8 Jalan Jend. Sudirman 10-11 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Midplaza 2 Building 25th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 10-11 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Mitra Building 8th Floor Gatot Subroto kav 21. Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Mitra Building 8th Floor Jalan Jendral Gatot Subroto Kav. 21 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Mitra Ganesha Graha Jl. Kemang Timur Raya No. 28 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Muara Karang Blk 6.S/16 Pluit Jakarta Indonesia
Muara Karang Blok D VI Utara No.3 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
MUARA KARANG BLOK G10 UTARA NO 11 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Muara Karang Blok Q8 Barat No. 53 Jakarta Indonesia
Muara Karang Blok U8 Utara No. 29 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Muara Karang Blok V 7 Utara No. 33 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Muara Karang Blok Z 8 Utara No. 16 Jakarta, Indonesia 14450
Muara Karang G. VI. B/30 RT001/RW008 Pluit, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Muara Karang J-7 Selatan No. 20 Jakarata Utara 14450 Indonesia
Multi Trend Holdings Ltd. Jalan Sriwijaya Raya 18 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110, Indonesia INDONESIA
MURA KARANG BLOK 1/X SELANTAN NO. 9 JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Mutiara Mediterania D8K RT 011/005 Kel. Pluit Jakarta Utara Indonesia
N.V. Perusahaan Dagang Dan Industrie Wirontono & Co. 41 Jalan Kebon Sirih Jakarta
Ngadirojo, RT 02, RW 04, Ngadirojo Sub District, Ampel District, Boyolali Regency Republic of Indonesia
No. 14, DR. Latumeten Jakarta 11330 Indonesia
NO. 17 JL. BANYUWANGI, MENTENG JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
No. 3 Chairil Anwar Medan 20152 Indonesia
No. 32 Jl. Bukit Golf II Pondok Indah Jakarta-Selatan 12310 Indonesia
No. 33 Jalan Cikini Jakarta Indonesia
NO. 39, JL. JEND A YANI KM 6.5 BANDUNG 40291 INDONESIA
No. 47 Jalan Kemang Raja Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
No. 5.1404, The Residence The Sultan Hotel Complex Jl. Gatot Subroto Jakarta 12040, Indonesia
No. 63 Jalan Berlian II Cilandak, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
No. 64G, Jalan Lautze Jakarta, Pusat 10710 Indonesia
NO.62 JL MARGASATWA PONDOK LABO JAKARTA 12450 INDONESIA
Nuansa Hijau Apartment C11/3 Jalan Sekolah Kencana IV Pondok Indah, Jakarta Indonesia
OMAR CORPORATION Wisma Tamara Lt. 15 JI. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 24 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
One Seminyak Ltd. JL. Braban 98 Taman Kerobokan Bali Indonesia
Orchid Park C/ 278, Batam Indonesia
P O Box 4208 JKTM 12700 Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
P. Jayakarta No. 11A. 001-004 Jakarta 1110, Indonesia
P.O BOX 3726, Jakarta 10037 Indonesia
P.O. Box 1072 Denpasar – 80362 Bali INDONESIA
P.O. Box 1317/JKB 11013 Jakarta Indonesia
P.O. Box 1689, Jakarta 12016 Indonesia
P.O. Box 3965 Jkt 10039 Jakarta INDONESIA
P.O. Box 8083/Smel Semarang , Central Java INDONESIA
P.T. Eurocapital Plaza Bapindo, Citibank Tower 12th Floor, Jl Jend Sudirman Kav. 54-55, Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
P.T. Stud Menara Batavia 22nd Floor Jl. KH Mas Mansyur Kav 126 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Paem Utama 18, RT008/007 Kel Duri Kepa, Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat,
Pajajaran 59 BADUNG INDONESIA
Pakubuwono Residence Sandalwood Tower #17C JL Pakubuwono 6/68 Jakarta 12120 Indonesia
Pakubuwono Residence Unit S12D RT.003/01 Jl. Pakubuwono VI No. 68, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 1210 Indonesia
Pakuwon Indah Villa Bukit Regensi ABL-17 Surabaya Indonesia
Pangeran Jayakarta 101 Bloc C No 6 Jakarta Pusat
Panglima Polim III No. 6 Melawai, Kebayoran Baru Jakarata Selatan 12160 Indonesia
Panglima Polin 111/8 Jakarta, Selatan 12610 Indonesia
Panorama Lebak Bulus RT 006/004 Kel. Cilandak Barat, Kec. Cilandak Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Pantai Kuta V/7 Ancol Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Pantai Kuta VI No. 25 Ancol Timur Jakarta, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara AB/6 Jakarta, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara AD/9 Jakarta, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara Bloh SD1Y Jakarta, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara Blok A/51 RT001/RW016, Pluit Penjaringan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara Blok F/19 Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Pantai Mutiara Blok P No. 38 RT. 007 RW. 016 Pluit Penjaringan Jakarta Utara
Pantai Mutiara Blok ZF No. 1, Jakarta Utara Indonesia.
Pantai Mutiara N/S RT 005 RW 016 Pluit Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Pantai Mutiara P21 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Parang Tritis 4 No. 7 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Pasir Kaliki 155 Bandung Indonesia
Patra Jasa Bldg Suite 903/905 Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav. 32-34, Jakarta Indonesia
Patra Kuningan M. 4 Kasv. 4RT 003/004 Kel. Kuningan, Timur Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Patra Kuningan M.4, Kav. 4 RT 003/004, Kel. Kuningan Timur Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Patra Kuningan Raya 1M 7/4, Rt. 005/04, Kuningan Jakarta Selatan
Patra Kuningan Raya RT-005/004 Kuningan Timur, Jakarta Selatan
Pd Bambu Asri Raya G-3/29 RT002/RW009, Pondok Bambu Duren Sawit, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Pejaten Barat IV/18B Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Pejaten Elok D/7 RT003/007 Pejaten Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Peranata Hijau Blok B No 32 Jakarta Salatan 12210
Perkantoran Roxymas Jl. K.H. Hasyim Ashari KAV. 125B Blok C 2 no. 27 – 34 Jakarta 10150 Indonesia.
Perkantoran Taman A-9 Unit B Lantal 1-3 Jl. Mega Kuningan, H.R. Rasuna Said Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Permata Hijau Blok F III/56 RT 019/010 Grogol Utara, Keb. Lama Jakarta-Sel Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok G56 Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Permata Hijau 1/29 RT 019/010, Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau A48 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blk G. No. 42 RT008/013 Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blk U/6 RT. 014/002 Grogol Utara, Indonesia
Permata Hijau BLK X / Kav C, RT / RW : 002 / 02, Grogol Utara Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blk. A/48 Kel. Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok 12/12 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
PERMATA HIJAU BLOK D 41/42 RT 009/008, KEL. GROGOL UTARA KEC. KEBAYORAN LAMA, JAKARTA Selatan, Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok D/25 Jl. Mas Murni, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok G/20 Grogol Utara, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok I/2119. RT. 004/001 Grogol Utara, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok O/1, RT 006/001 Grogol Utara Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Bok F5, RT 19/10 Grogol Utara, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia.
Permata Hijau F/74 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau R/13 RT008 RW002 Grogol, Indonesia
Permata Intan II Blok S2/1 Permata Hijau Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Permata Intan IV X/V, 002/002 Grogol Utara Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Intan V/2.5 Grogol Utara Jakarta Indonesia
Permata Plaza 8th Floor Jl. MH Thamrin No. 57 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Permaya Hidan Block E No.19 Dakarya Selatan , Indonesia
Permaya Hidan Block, No. 19 Dakarya Selatan , Indonesia.
Pertamina Head Office, 19th Floor Jl. Merdeka Timur 1A Jakarta 10110, Indonesia
Perum Citra 2A-5/17 RT001 RW012 Jakarta Indonesia
Perum, Graha Family Blok E/No. 3 Surabaya 60226 Indonesia
Perumahan Cendrawasih Permai no.88 Samarinda 75117, Indonesia
Perumahan Citra 2 Blok D 6/14 Kel. Pegadungan Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Perumahan Eramas 2000 Blok E4 No. 10 Kelurahan Pulo Gebang Cakung Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Perumahan Graha Famili Blok E, No. 3 Surabaya, Indonesia
Perumahan Kelapa Gading Permai, Jl. Janur Elok IX Blok QH 9 No. 1 Jakarta, Indonesia
Perumahan Permata Nusa Dua Blok IV No. 12, Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia 80363
Perumahan Puri Indah Jl. Kembang Sakti Timur Raya Blok D-9 No. 34 Jakarta Barat
Pesona Den Haaq Kota Wisata Jakarta Indonesia
PESONA KAYANGAN CM 4 DEPOK – JAWA BARAT INDONESIA
Petemon Barat 173 Surabaya 60253 Indonesia
Pinang Merah Blok P5, RT 001, Rukun Warga 016, Kelurahan Cinipang Muara Kecamatan Jatinegara, Jakarta Timur, Jakarta, Indonesia
PLAZA 89 9TH FLOOR JL. H.R. RASUNA SAID KAV X-7 NO. 6 JAKARTA 12940 INDONESIA
Plaza 89, Fl 10 Suite 1006 Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. X-7, No. 6 Jakarta 12940 Indonesia
PLAZA ABDA 7th FLOOR ZONE D JL. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 59 Jakarta 12190 INDONESIA
Plaza Bapindo, Bank Mandiri Tower, Lantai 18, Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 54-55, Jarkarta 12190 Indonesia
Plaza Bapindo, Citibank Tower 12th floor JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Plaza Bapino, Menara II, 21st Floor JL Jend. Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190 INDONESIA
Plaza BII Menara II Jl M H Thamrin NO. 51, Kav. 22 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Plaza BII Menara II, 7th Floor Jl MH Thamrin no 51 Kav. 22 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Plaza BII Tower II, 7th Floor Jalan M.H. Thamrin No. 51 Jakarta 10350, Indonesia HP: 6281-REDACTED
Plaza BII, Tower 2, 36th Floor, J1. M.H. Thamrin, Kav. 22, Jakarta 10350 INDONESIA
Plaza Chase 24th Floor, Jln. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakart 12920 Indonesia
Plaza Chase 6th Floor JI. Jend. Sudiman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Plaza Chase Podium 7th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Plaza Chase, 24th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Plaza DM 6th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav.25 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Plaza DM, 18th Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudiman Kav. 25 Jakarta, 12920 Indonesia
PLAZA DM, 25/F SUITE 2503 JL. JEND SUDRMAN KAV. 25 JARKARTA 12920-INDONESIA
Plaza II, Tower 2, 37th Floor Jalan M.H. Thamrin Kav. 21-22 Jakarta 10350 INDONESIA
Plaza Kebon Jeruk A-21 Jakarta
Plaza Lippo Building 11th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav 25 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Plaza Mashill 20th Floor 5-2002, JL. Jend. Sudirman Kav 25, Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
Plaza Mutiara 18-19 Floor Jl Linghar Mega Kuningan KAV E 1-2 No. 12 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Plaza Mutiara 19th Floor Jalan Kingar, Mega Kumingan Kav. E1-2 Number 1-2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Plaza Mutiara 19th Floor Jalan Lingkar Mega Kuning Kav E1-2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Plaza Mutiara, 16th Floor Jl. Lingkar Mega Kuningan Kav E. 1.2 No. 1-2 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Plaza Pondok Indah III Blok E-7 Jl. T.B. Simatupang, Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan, 12310 Indonesia
Plaza Sentral 14 Fl. JI. Jendral Sudirman No. 47 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Plemaham V/51-A, Surabaya 60261, Indonesia
Pluit Barat 6, No. 39 Jakarta Utara 14440 Indonesia
Pluit Barat V/5 RT:014/07 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Pluit Indah Streeet No.29 Pluit North Jakarata Indonesia
Pluit Pantai Mutiara Blok P, No. 37 Pluit Jarkata Indonesia
Pluit Permai VI No. 39 Pluit Penjaringan, Jakarta Utara RT04/04, Jakarta Raya 14240 Indonesia
Pluit Putri II/7 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Pluit Raya 200 Blok E/15, Jakarta Utara 14450, Indonesia.
Pluit Sakti Raya No. 28, Rt.009, RW 007 Pluitt, Penjarinan Jakarta Utara 11450 INDONESIA
Pluit Timur Blk J5/34, RT.002, RW.009 Pluit Penjaringan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Pluit Timur Blok V – Utara No. 59 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia
Pluit Timur Raya 38 Pluit Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
PLUIT UTARA III/ 14, R.T 002, R.W. 005, JAKARTA
PO Box 1072 Denpasar Bali
PO Box 3408 Denpasar Bali Indonesia 80034
Po Box 3426 Denpasar Bali Indonesia 80034
Pondok Bambu Permai Blok B1/29, Jakarta-Timur Indonesia
Pondok Damar Blok A-22 Perumahan Kedaton Indah Cikpupa, Tangerang Indonesia
Poris Plawad RT/RW, 02/06 Kelurahan Poris Plawad Kecamatan Cipondoh Tangerang
Pratama Capital Indonesia Bapindo Plaza, Citibank Tower 20th Floor, Jl Jend Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Pregolan Bunder 32 Surabaya, East Java Indonesia
Price Water House Centre Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav C-3 Kuningan Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
PricewaterhouseCoopers Bldg., 8th Floor, Jalan H.R. Rasuna Said Kav C-3 Kuningan, Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
PRISMA KEDOYA PLAZA BLOK A-10, J1 RAYA PEJUANGAN, KEL. KEBON JERUK, KEC. KEBON JERUK JARKARTA BARAT
Probolinggo Indonesia
PT ALFACO INDONESIA KOMP RUKO PURI MUTIARA BLK C-9 SUNTER AGUNG JAKARTA UTARA 14350 INDONESIA
PT Anugerahtama Bina Citra Menara Imperium Lt. 17 Jl Rasuna Said Kav. No. 1 Jakarta 12980 Indonesia
PT Anugra Cipta Investa Menara Rajawali, 18th Floor, Mega Kuningan Lot 5.1, Jarakata Jakarta akarta
PT Asia Inti Utama Menara Imperium 12nd Fl Suite C JL.H.R. Rasuna Said Kav. 1A
PT Asia inti Utama, Menara Imperium 12x Fl, Suite C, JI. HR Rasunan Said Kav 1A Jakarta 12980 INDONESIA
PT Bank DBS Indonesia Plaza Permata. 8th Floor Jl. M.H. Thamrin Kav 57 Jakarta 10350, Indonesia
PT Bira Aset Manajemen, Wisma GKBI 2nd Floor, J1. Jend Sudirman Kav. 28 Jakarta 10210 INDONESIA
PT Catur Agrodaya Mandiri Wisma Budi, 4th Floor – Suite 402 Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. C-6 Jakarta 12940, INDONESIA
PT CB Indonesia Central Plaza, 16th Floor JL Jend Sudirman No.47 Jakarta 12930 INDONESIA
PT Cikal Wana Selaras TIFA Building 5th Floor Kuningan Barat No 26, Jakarta Selatan (12710), Indonesia Indonesia
PT Ciputra Group Jaya Building, 5th Floor Jl. M-H Thamrin 12 Jakarta 10340
PT Delta Aneka Consultants & Trade 14th Floor Bank Bali Tower Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav 27 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
PT Dewata Wibawa Sona Topas Tower 19th Floor, Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav. 26, Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
PT Duta Anggada Realty Chase Plaza Tower 21st Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
PT Energi Timur Jauh Menara Global 23rd Floor, Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 27, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
PT Enseval 4th Floor, Enseval Building Jl. Let Jend Suprapto Kav 4 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
PT Fas Consulting Mid Plaza 1, 9th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 10 – 11 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
PT FAS MANAJEMEN CITRAPERDANA Century Tower 3rd Floor Suite 304 Jl H R Sasuna Said Kav X-2 No.4 Jakarta 12950
PT Ilthabi Rekatama Kantor Taman A 9 Unit C8-14 Jl Mega Kuningan Lot 8.9/9 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
PT Indokapital Securities Plaza Chase Podium, 7th Floor J1. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920- INDONESIA
PT INTISAR PIRANTI MEGA Jl. Pemuda No. 103, Jakarta 13220, Indonesia
PT Multi Resources Indonesia Graha Iskandarsyah, 10th Floor Jl. Iskandarsyah Raya No. 66C Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan, 12160, Indonesia
PT Murni Ciptasentosa Jalan Ir. H. Juanda III No. 6 4th Floor, Jakarta Pusat 10120 Indonesia
PT Northstar Pacific Menara Kadin, 7th Floor Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 1-3, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
PT Renaissance Capital Asia Menara Bank Danamon 15th Floor Jl. Prof. Dr. Satrio E.IV No. 6 Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
PT Sampoerna Strategic Sampoerna Strategic Square North Tower, 30th Floor Jl Jendral Sudirman Kav 45, Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
PT WAHAMA BERSAMA GLOBALINDO, GEDUNG BRI II SUIT 1805, JJ JEND SUDIRMAN KAV44-46, JARKARTA 10210 INDONESIA
PT Widya Global JI Haji Samali No.51 Kalibata Jakarta 12740 Indonesia
PT. Andalan Sekar Makmur Midplaza I, Jln Jend Sudirman Kav 10-11 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
PT. Asia Kaitalindo Komoditi Berjangka Sona Topas Tower Lt. 15A Suite 15A1 Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 26 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
PT. Bineatama Kayone Lestari Jl. Raya Pajapolah Km 7. Tasikmalaya 46151 West Java, Indonesia
PT. Branta Mulia Tbk Wisma Indocement 7th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 70-71 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
PT. Charoen Pokphan Indonesia Jl. Ancol Barat 8/1 Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
PT. GRAMA BAZITA Jl. Mampang Prapatan Raya Kav. 71-71 Multika Building 3fl Suite 300 Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
PT. INTERCALLIN JL. DAAN MOGOT KM. 11, CENGKARENG JAKARTA 11710 INDONESIA
PT. Kaltimex Energi Menara Batavia, 26th Floor Unit A-26, Jl.K.H Mas Mansyur, Kav. 126 Jarkarta 10220
PT. Mega Prima Persada Sakti Perumahan Kelapa Gading Permai, Jl. Janur Elok IX Blok QH 9 No. 1 Jakarta
PT. Prima Batavia Indobulking Graha Iskandarsyah Lt.10 Jl. Iskandarsyah Raya No. 66 C Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan 12160, Indonesia
PT. Samuel Sekuritas Indonesia Menara Imperium, 11th Floor JI. H.R. Rasuna Said Kav. 1 Jakarta 12980 INDONESIA
PTB Duren Sawit Blok Q III No. 17 Jakarta Timur 13440 Indonesia
PTB Duren Sawit S.II/13, RT 002 / RW 004, Kelurahan Duret Sawit, Kecamatan Duren Sawit, Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Pulo Mas 1 G No. II Kayu Putih, Pulo Gadung Jakarta 13210, Indonesia
Puncak Permai 2/15-17, Surabaya, Indonesia Indonesia
Puri Casablanca Apt. 3502B Ji Casablanca Jakarta Indonesia
Puri Indah Blok B1 No. 11, Jl. Kembang Asri 6, Jakarta Barat 11610
Puri Indah Mall, Jl. Puri Agung Puri Indah, 2nd Floor, #227 Jakarta Barat 11610 INDONESIA
Puri Indah Street Block A. 14 No. 21 RT.005 RW.004 Kembangan West Jakarta Indonesia
Puri Kencana Blok J3 No. 26 Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Puri Kencana L7/3 RT007/007 Kembangan Selatan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Pusat Niaga Roxy Mas Blk B2 No. 2 Jln K.H. Hasyim Ashari 125B Jakarta 10150 Indonesia
Pusat Niaga Roxy Mas Blok B2, No. 2 Jln KH Hasyim Ashari 125 B Jakarta 10150, Indonesia
PUSPAN RT01/07 BLULUKAN COLOMADU KARANGANYAR
RA KARTINI NO 30 MEDAN INDOENESIA
Rajawali Selatan 4 No. 35 Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
Ratu Plaza Apartment, Suite 1503 Jl. Jendral Sudirman No. 9 Jakarta 10270 Indonesia
Rawa Selatan VI No. 14 Jakarta 10550 Indonesia
RAYA PLUIT TIMUR 12-A PLUIT JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Raya Tenggilis 79 SURABAYA Indonsesia 60292
Roa Malaka Selatan 35 Jakarta 11230 Indonesia
RT 005113 MPR III DALAM 3 JAKARTA SELATAN
RT. 006, RW 006 Pademangan TMR Pademangan, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
RT. 04/02 Komp. Bumi Indah, Lubuk Baja Kota, Lubuk Daja Batam
RT/RW 04/06 PERUM ANGGREK MASE/33 KOTA BATAM INDONESIA
Rudy Yusuf (Site Office) Jl. Pakubuwono VI No.76, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta 12120 Indonesia
Ruko Bisnis Sentra B-21 Tanjung Duren, Jakarta Indonesia
Sagu No. 36, Jagakarsa, Jakarta, Indonesia
Sam ratulmugi no. 2 medan indonesia 20152
Sambas 3 No. 125 Jakarta 12130 Indonesia
Samirejo, RT/RW02/02 Desa Samirejo, Kecamatan Dawe Kebupaten Kudus, Jawa Tengah Indonesia
Sampoerna Strategic Square Tower B 26th Floor, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 45-46 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Sanur Indah No. 37 Kelapa Gading Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Sasak No. 4 Kebon-Jeruk Jakarta 11550 Indonesia
Sekolah Duta Raya, PN 04 No. 52, Pondok Indah Jakarta, Indonesia
Sekolah Kencana 4 No. 19 Pondok Indah, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Sekolah Kenlana 4 No. 19 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Senaya Bintaro HI 9/2 Sektor 9, Pondok Pucung, Pondok Aren, Tangerang, Indonesia
Senayan Residence Tower 3, Lt. 18 B2S Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Senayan Residence Tower 3 Lt. 18 B2S Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Sentra Mulia 10th Floor, Jl. HR. Rasuna Said KAV. X-6 No. 8, Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
Setia Budhi Regency Wing I No. 38 Bandung, Indonesia
Setiabudi Atrium Bldg 3rd Floor, Suite no. 303 Jl., H.R. Rasuna Said Kav. 62, Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
SETIABUDI ATRIUM BUILDING 5TH FLOOR (501), JL. H.R. RASUNA SAID KAV 62 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
SETRA DUTA RAYA I NO:10 BANDUNG 40151 INDONESIA
SIMPANG GRAHA FAMILI 7-R/96 SURABAYA
Simprug Garden 11 BF 8.9, RT 007/003 Grogol, Jakarta Indonesia
Simprug Garden Kav. # / 16 RT 007/ RW 003, Grogol Selatan Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Simprug Golf 17 No. 55 Jakarta 12220 Indonesia
Simprug Golf IX Kav 140 Jakarta Indonesia
Simprug Golf VIII / J.2, RT. 003/008, Grogol Selatan, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Simpruk Kav. WG 7 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Simpruk Terrace Apartment Blok. C 8th Floor, No. 805 Jl. Sultan Iskander Muda, Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Simpruk Terrace Apartment Blok. D 7th Floor, No. 706 Jl. Sultan Iskandar Muda, Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Simpruk Terrace Condominium Tower C Unit 509 Jalan Sultan Iskandar Muda Jakarta Selatan 12220 Indonesia
Simprul Teras Kondominium Suite D0306, Jl. Simprul By-Pass Arterie, 12220 Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Slipi Apt. Tower 1 10-D Jln. S. Parman Kav. 22-24 Jakarta Indonesia
Snabung R707 RW01 Wonotingal Candisari Semarang INDONESIA
Soebagjo Jatim Djarot Plaza DM, 17th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 25 Jakarta 12920, INDONESIA
Sona Topas Tower FL. 16 Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 26 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Sona Topas Tower, 12th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 26 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Sona Topas Tower, 18th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 26 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
STR Paradise Blok F I/8-13, R.T. 001 R.W. 012 Sunter Agung, Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Sudirman Plaza Complex, Marein Tower 11th Floor, Jl Jend Sudirman Kav 76 – 78 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
Sudirman Plaza, Marein 17th Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav 76-78 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
SUDIRMAN TOWER 19TH FLOOR JL. JEND SUDIRMAN KAV 60 JAKARTA 12190 INDONESIA
Sudirman Tower 19th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 60 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Suite 403 Gedung Pusat Niaga Arena Pekan Raya Jakarta Kemayoran Jakarta 10620 Indonesia
Sukmajaya C4/25 Depok
Sumatra No.10, Central Jakarta Indonesia
Summerville Apartment No. C101 Jl. Kelapa Gading Boulevard Jakarta Utara
Summitmas I, 17th Floor JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 61-62 Jakarta 12069 Indonesia
SUNTER PARADISE F 9/21 JAKARTA UTARA, INDONESIA
Suntev Hijau II Blok BII/6 Jakarta Utara
Sutan Syahrir No. 36, RT 007, RW 005, Gondangdia, Jakarta Pusat – Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk Block E1 No.13 Jakarta Indonesian
Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok F1/16, Kembangan Jakarta 11530 Indonesia
TAMAN ALPHA INDAH BLOK F4/7 RT 003/01 JOGLO JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Taman Anggrek Condominium Tower 6-35G Jl. Letjen S. Parman Kav. 21 Slipi Jakarta Barat 11470 Indonesia
Taman Anggrek Condominium Tower 8 No. 31D, Tanjung Duren Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Aries E10 No. 28 Jakarta Barat, 11610 DKI Jakarta, Indonesia
Taman Aries E8/7, Meruya Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Cipulir C.I/13, RT. 009, RW.008, Sub-District of Cipadu Raya District of Larangan, Tangerang, Indonesia
Taman Duta Mas Blok B5 No.4 Rt/Rw 002/009 Kelurahan Wijaya, Kasuma, Kecamatan Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat
Taman Gandaria Blok A/4 Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Taman Gandarla F 1/12 RR 012/005 Kebayoran Lama Utara Jakarta, Indonesia
Taman Giri Loka, Blok C No. 3A Bumi Serpong Damai Tangerang 15322
Taman Golf Kav 303, Lippo Karawaci Tangerang Indonesia
Taman Harapan Baru I-2/38, Bekasi Indonesia
Taman Harapan Indah 1/14, RT03/07 Jelambar Baru Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Harapan Indah A/21, RT. 02/07, Jelambar Baru, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Harapan Indah Blok 1 No. 7 Jalan Pangeran Tubagus Angke Jakarta 11460 Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk 12, No. 13-14, RT004/RW011, Srengseng, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk Block E1 No. 13 Jakarta Indonesian
Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok E-1 No. 27 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok F1 / 16, Kembagan Jakarta 11530 Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok M5/20 Jakarta, Barat INDONESIA
Taman Kebon Jeruk H2/2, RT 03/11 Srengseng, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk J14 No. 16 Jakarta 11630 Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk L1 No 27 Intercon Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk L1/6, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk PI/44 Jakarta Indonesia 11630
Taman Kebon Jeruk U4/102 RT 12/03 Joglo Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk, Blok D IV No. 12A, Meruya, Jakarta 11630 Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk, P4/18 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Kebun Jeruk F. I.I, RT.003, RW 010 Srengseng, Kembangan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kedoya Permai A2/l Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Kedoya Permai Jl. Prisma Blok B-3 No. 24 Kebon Jeruk, West Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Kedoya Permai, Blok A2/1, Jakarta Barat 11530, Indonesia
Taman Kedoya, Permai A2, No. 1, RT. 005, RW. 007, Kel. Kebun Jeruk, Kec. Kebun Jeruk, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kemayoran Kondominium Bougenville Tower #21-03 Jakarta Kemayoran Indonesia
Taman Laguan Blok H2 No.39 Rt/Rw 004/005, Cibubur, Kel. Jati Karya Kec. Jati Sampurna, Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Lestari Indah/R3 Lebak Bulus Cilandak Jakarta Selatan
Taman Malibu Indah Blok A-1 Medan 20157 Indocnesia
Taman Meruya Ilir D5/3, RT001/02 Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Metro Alam 1 Blok PG14 No. 03 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Selantan 12310 Indonesia
Taman Metro Alam PK. 16 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Taman Mutiara Prima Blok E/6 RT 006/05, Kelurahan Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Patra IX/9, Rt. 005/04, Kuningan Jakarta Selatan
Taman Patra VIII No.8 Rt 005/04 Kuningan Timur Jakarta Selatan
Taman Permata Blok B 20 No. 56 RT. 01/01, Kel. Binong Kec. Curug, Tangerang Indonesia
Taman Pluit Murni 2, No. 2, RT.017, RW.004, Kelurahan Pluit, Kecamatan Penjaringan, Kotamadya Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
TAMAN POLONIA III/34 NORTH SUMATRA INDONESIA
Taman Pulo Indah,Blok P3 No. 12 RT. 017/07, Penggilingan Cakung Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Taman Rahayu D2 No. 2 Bandung Indonesia
Taman Raja Apartment A703 Jl. Warung Jati Barat I Warung Buncit Jakarta Selatan 12740, Indonesia
Taman Rasuna Apartment, Unit 0626D RT005/RW010, Menteng Atas Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Taman Ratu Block BB II No.17 RT.006 RW.001 Kedoya West Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Ratu Blok E1 No. 12 Duri Kepa, Jakarta 11510 Indonesia
Taman Ratu Indah C.II/6, RT.004, RW.013 Duri Kepa Sub District Kebon Jeruk District, West Jakarta Republic of Indonesia
Taman Resort Mediterania Z3 No. 11 RT 002/008, Kel Kapuk Muara Kec. Penjaringan, Jakarta 14460 Indonesia
Taman Sari 56S Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Sari 56S Jakarta Indonesia
TAMAN SARI PESONA BALI JLN.C1 RENDEV RAYA 46 C. 1/18, TANGERANG, INDONESIA
Taman Semanan Indah Blok, C3/43, Kelurahan Semanan, Kalideres, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Sunter Agung II Blok E/1A Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Taman Surya 2 B4/38 Cengkareng Indonesia
Taman Surya 5 Blok 00.4/34 Pegadungan, Kalideres Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Surya Blok C No. 27 Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Surya II/09 Rt. 007/05, Kedoya Utara Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat
Taman Surya V Blk 004/24 RT. 008/02, Pegadungan-Kalideres Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Tanah Abang III/28 RT002/004, Jakarta Indonesia
Tamara Center 12th Floor, NO. 1212 JL Jendral Sudirman Kav No. 24 Jakarta 12920 Indonessia
TAMARA CENTRE, 7/F RM. 701. JEND SUDIRMAN KAV. 24 JARKARTA 12910 INDONESIA
TAMPAK SIRING INDAH NO. 2 BUKIT GADING VILLA KELAPA GADING JAKARTA UTARA JAKARTA INDONESIA
Tanjung Duren Utara III C/222 RT 09/RW03, Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Tanjung Sadari 23, Surabaya Indonesia
Tebet Barat Dalam IV No. 10 Jakarta 12810 Indonesia
TEBET BARAT VI A/26, RT 011/004 TEBET JARKARTA SELETAN INDONESIA
Tebet Timur Dalam VIII I No. 2 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Tebet Timur Dalam Vll/ll, Rt. 04 RW. 06 Tebet Timur, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Terusan Hang Lekir IV 32-33 RT 005/RW 008, Grogol Selatan, Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta, Indonesia
Tg. Duren Timur No. 27 RT/RW 004/006 Tg Duren Selatan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
The Ascott Jakarta, Condo. #1724 Jl. Kebon Kacang Raya, Jakarta 10240 Indonesia
The Pakubuwono Residence Eaglewood Tower Unit 11A Jl Pakubuwono VI No. 68 Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta 12120, Indonesia
TM KEB JERUK 1-77 JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
TMN Bona Indah Blk C 1/20 010/006, Lebak Bulus Cilandak, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Tmn Harapan Indah, A21 Jakarta Indonesia
TMN KB Jeruk Blok G 1/5 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
TMN KEBON JERUK A IV/15 RT 10/01 MERUYA SELATAN JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Tmn. Duta MAS C2/38 RT 16/09 Fec. Grogol Petam. Fodya Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Tomang Pulo Macan Raya 50, 012/005 Tomang, Grogol Petamburan, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Tomang Rawa Kepa IX/71 RT 008 RW 012 Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Tower VI Jend Sudirman Kav.26 Jarkata INDONESIA
Trisakti University Kampus A Universitas Trisakti Jl. Kyai Tapa Grogol Jakarta 11440 Indonesia
Unit 1206 Residences At Dharmawandsa Jalan Darmawangsa V111 Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Untung Suropati No. 58 Surabaya Indonesia
Urio Sumoharjo #151 Solo 57128 Indonesia
Utama Tengah No. 111 Weleri, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia
V No. 21C 009/005 Bangka Mampang Prapatan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Victoria Building 3rd Floor Suite 304 Jalan Sultan Hasanudin Kavling 47-51 Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Villa Bintaro Regency Jl Sumatra Blok K1.12B Tanooerang 18228 Indonesia
Villa Pamcelang, Blok DF1/16 Pondok Benda, Tangerang Indonesia
Villa Pamulang, Blok DF 1/16 RT / RW 06/19, Pondok Benda Pamalang, Tangerang Indonesia
Villa Pan B.L. Jalan Ahmad Yani Block E/37 Batam 29433 Indonesia
Villa Pejaten No. 9 RT 012 RW 005, Pajaten Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Villa Taman Juanda, Jl. Ir. H. Juanda Type Emerald Blok 16-F, Medan 20157 Indonesia
Villa Tirta Naga, Gang Kahyangan No. 2 Jl. Lesmana, Kuta, Bali, Indonesia
Villa Tomang Mas A-6 Kepa Duri, Jakarta 11510 Indonesia.
Wangsa Ningrat No 15 Kota Baru Parahyangan Bandung Indonesia
Wangsasetra Wetan No 18 Kota Baru Parahyangan Bandung Indonesia
WIDYA CHANDRA VII/7 SENAYAN, JAKARTA INDONESIA
WIDYA CHANDRA VIII, SENAYAN INDONESIA
Wijaya Graha Puri, Blok B No. 16 Jl. Darmawangsa III, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Wijaya Kusuma 24, Surabaya Indonesia
Wisma 46 (Kota BNI) 9th Floor Jl Jendral Sudirman Kav 1 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 46 – Kota BNI, 8th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav.1, Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 46 – Kota BNI, 8th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 1 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 46, Kota BNI Level 43, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav 1 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 46-Kota BNI 34th Fl. S.3401 Jalan Jend. Sudirman Kav. 1 Jarkarta 10220 – Indonesia
Wisma 46-Kota BNI, 8th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav.1 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 76, Lt. 21, Jl. Jend S. Parman Kav. 76, Slipi Jakarta Barat 11410 Indonesia
Wisma 77, 7th Floor Jl. Letjen S. Parman Kav. 77 West Jakarta Indonesia
Wisma Bakri, Fl3, Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1, Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Wisma Bakrie 2, Jl. HR. Rasuna Said Kav. B2 Kuningan, Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Wisma Bakrie 6th Floor Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Wisma Bakrie, Fl 3 Jl H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Wisma Bank Danamon 16th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 45-46 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Wisma Bank Dharmala 21st Floor Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 28, Jakarta Selatan 12920 Jakarta INDONESIA
Wisma Bank Tiara Jl M. T. Haryono, Kav 16 Jakarta 12810, Indonesia
Wisma Bank Tiara, 8th Floor, Jalan M.T Haryano Kav.16 Jarkarta 12810 Indonesia
Wisma Barito Pacific Tower A-4th Floor, Jl Letjen S Parman Kav 62-63 Jakarta 11410, Indonesia
WISMA CIKINI – JL. GONDANGDIA LAMA 40 JAKARTA 10350 INDONESIA
Wisma Danamon Aetna Life 6th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 45-46, Jakarta 12930 INDONESIA
Wisma Eka Karma Jl. Kapten Tendean No. 15 Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Wisma Eka Karma Jl. Kapten Tendean No.15 Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Wisma GKBI 17th Floor Suite 1715 Jalan Jend Sudirman No. 28 Jakarta Indonesia
Wisma GKBI, 6th Floor Jl. Jend Sudiraman Kav. 28 Jakarta 10210 Indonesia
Wisma GKBI, Mezzanine A Floor Jl. Jendera, Sudirman No 28 Jakarta, 10210 Indonesia
Wisma Grant Thornton Jl. Sisingamangaraja No. 3C Jakarta 12120 INDONESIA
Wisma Indocement, 6th Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 70-71 Jakarta 12910, Indonesia
Wisma Indosemen 6th Floor JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav-70-71 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
Wisma Indosemen 6th Floor JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav-70-71 Jakarta, 12910 Indonesia
Wisma Indovision, 11th Floor Jalan Raya Panjang Block Z/III Green Garden Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Wisma Kosogoro 16 Floor Jl. MH Thamrin No. 53 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Wisma Kyoei Price 15th Fl. Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 3 Jakarta 1220 Indonesia
Wisma Kyoei Prince Building 7th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 3 Jakarta Pusat 10220 Indonesia
Wisma Metropolitan II 2nd Floor J1. Jend., Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920
Wisma Metropolitan II 2nd floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Wisma Metropolitan II Level 1 & 11, Jalan Jend Sudirman Kav.29-31 Jarkata 12920 INDONESIA
Wisma Metropolitan II, 1/F JLn. Jend Sudirman Kav 29-31 Jakarta Indonesia
Wisma Millenia 7th Floor, Jln. MT Haryono Kav 16, Jakarta 12810 Indonesia.
Wisma Mulia 23rd Floor Jln. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav.42 Jakarta 12710
Wisma Mulia 27th Floor, Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 42, Jakarta 12710, Indonesia
Wisma Mulia 33rd FLOOR, Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 42, Jakarta 12710 INDONESIA
Wisma Mulia LT 29 Jl. Jend Gatot Subroto No. 42, Kel. Kuningan Barat Kec. Mampang Praptan Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Wisma Mulia, 21st Floor Jln. Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 42 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
Wisma Mulia, 33rd Floor Jln. Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 42 Jakarta 12710 INDONESIA
Wisma Nugra Santana 3rd Floor Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav. 7 Jakarta 10220, Indonesia
Wisma Nugra Santana Suite 1207 JL. JEND., Sudirman KAV. 7-8, Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma Paramuda 2nd Floor Jalan Raden Saleh No. 41 Jakarta 10330 Indonesia
Wisma Permai Barat EE 34 Mulyorejo Surabaya 60115 Indonesia
Wisma Pondok Indah 2 17th Floor, Suite 1702 Jl. Sultan Iskandar Muda Kav. V-TA Jakarta 12310, Indonesia
Wisma Pondok Indah 2, 17th Floor, Suite 1702 Jl. Sultan Iskandar Muda Kav. V-TA Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Wisma Pondok Indah Suite 203 Jalan Sultan Iskandar Muda Kav V-TA Jakarta 12310, Indonesia
Wisma Sakura Jl. Hati Suci No. 4 Jakarta 10250 Indonesia
Wisma Sejahtera 2nd Floor, Room 210, Jl. Let. Jend. S. Parman Kav. 75, Jakarta 11410, Indonesia
Wisma Supra, Menara 76, Lt. 21 Jl. Let Jend S Parman, Kav. 76 Jakarta Barat – 11410 Indonesia
Wisma Tamara- Annexed Building Jl.Jenral Sudirman Kav.No.24 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Witono Dani Jl. Duta permai III/6 Jakarta Selatan 12310 Indonesia
Wolter Monginsidi 64C Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12170 Indonesia
Wonorejo Permai Utr 7/86 BB 556 RT 003 / RW 009, Kelurahan Wonorejo Kecamatan Rungkut Surabaya 60296 Indonesia
Wonorejo Permat Selatan 6/26 Surabaya – Indonesia
World Trade Center 15th Floor Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
World Trade Center 17th Floor JI> Jend. Sudirman Kave. 29 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
World Trade Centre, 12th Floor J1. Jend. Sudirman Ka. 29-31 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
World Trade Centre, 17th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman KAV. 29 – 31 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Wr. Supratman No. 7 Surabaya INDONESIA
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Understanding the fate of worldwide rivalry and struggle is presently more significant than any time in recent memory. In a powerfully evolving world, the nature and character of fighting, prevention, compellence, acceleration the executives, and influence are critical and basic in deciding how the US and its accomplices should:
• Strategize to shield their worldwide advantages against exercises that are proposed to undermine those interests over the range of rivalry;
• Shield their inclinations against dangers by provincial contenders through available resources corresponding to procedures versus China and Russia however don’t undermine different interests; and
• Get ready US and accomplice powers to react to unforeseen and lithe improvements in worldwide legislative issues and innovation by distinguishing territories for participation, moderating the danger of exercises shy of equipped clash, and preventing furnished clash over various wellsprings of national power (e.g., exchange, tact, security).
The National Security System (NSS), National Safeguard Methodology (NDS), and National Military Procedure all note that future encounters between significant forces may regularly happen underneath the degree of outfitted clash. In this condition, monetary challenge, impact crusades, paramilitary activities, digital interruptions, and political fighting will probably turn out to be increasingly pervasive. Such encounters increment the danger of misperception and miscount, between powers with huge military quality, which may then build the danger of furnished clash. In this specific situation, the US ability to impact the results of both worldwide and local occasions must be reexamined. The developing uniqueness among incredible forces (i.e., the US, China, and Russia) with respect to what comprises authentic or adequate discouragement, compellence, and acceleration the board exercises ought to be deliberately analyzed.
With that in mind, this white paper surveys Russian exercises over the globe to assemble an improved, major comprehension of the contemporary and future impact condition. Countering Russian provocative exercises requires an exhaustive technique and the NDS perceives this reality so as to effectively counter Russian provocative exercises; thus, the US should cooperatively utilize various instruments of national control in a synchronized way. As white paper supporter Brig Gen (ret) Ransack Spalding III recommends, “the US job with respect to Russia ought to be to keep on connecting with European partners to lead the pack for adjusting in Europe. The partners’ objective ought to be discouragement. Simultaneously, the US ought to reciprocally connect with Russia to strip them away from China’s circle. The US can work with Russia in manners that improve the US-Russia relationship without diminishing European endeavors to adjust and dissuade.”
The articles in this white paper give government partners—knowledge, law authorization, military, and approach organizations—with important bits of knowledge and systematic structures to help the US, its partners, and accomplices in building up a thorough methodology to contend and vanquish this Russian test. Critical perceptions include:
• Russia is receiving coercive systems that include the arranged work of military and nonmilitary intends to stop and constrain the US, its partners and accomplices before and after the flare-up of threats. These procedures must be proactively stood up to, or the risk of critical outfitted clash may increment.
• Russia displays a profound situated feeling of geopolitical uncertainty which propels it to seek after key goals that set up an uncontested range of prominence in the post-Soviet locale. However, Russians progressively can’t help contradicting the Kremlin’s statements that the US is an approaching outside risk and an incendiary power in Russian local governmental issues.
• Russia’s hazy area strategies are best when the objective is profoundly captivated or does not have the ability to oppose and react successfully to Russian animosity. As per Russian vital idea, discouragement and compellence are cut out of the same cloth.
Just with an adjusted and synchrozined entire of government approach will the US contend and win against rising powers like Russia and China. Such cooperation requires a typical comprehension of our rivals, their strategies and wanted endstates and we mean that this white paper will accomplish this basic objective.
…
This white paper was set up as a major aspect of the Key Multilayer Asssessment, entitled The Eventual fate of Worldwide Challenge and Struggle. Twenty-three master donors added to this white paper and gave wide-going evaluations of Russia’s worldwide advantages and targets, just as the exercises—dim or something else—that it behaviors to accomplish them. This white paper is separated into five segments and twenty-five sections, as depicted underneath. This rundown reports a portion of the white paper’s significant level discoveries, yet it is not a viable alternative for a cautious read of the individual commitments.
There is expansive agreement among the patrons that Russian President Vladimir Putin is in reality holding fast to a worldwide fantastic technique, which expects to accomplish the accompanying objectives:
• Recover and verify Russia’s impact over previous Soviet countries
• Recapture overall acknowledgment as an “incredible power”
• Depict itself as a solid entertainer, a key local powerbroker, and a fruitful middle person (Katz; Borshchevskaya) so as to increase financial, military, and political impact over countries
worldwide and to refine the radical decides and standards that at present administer the world request (Lamoreaux)
As per Dr. Robert Individual, these objectives are inspired by Russia’s profound situated geopolitical frailty. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Association, Russia has battled to discover its place in the worldwide network, which has left the administration with a waiting want to recapture the impact and power that it once had. Specifically, Russia tries to recover its impact over previous Soviet states, which it claims are in its legitimate “authoritative reach” (Lamoreaux; Individual; Swamp). Therefore, one of the US’s center objectives, to be specific advancing and securing the worldwide liberal request, comes into conflict with the objectives of Russia’s terrific system. This supports the Kremlin’s conviction that it must contain and compel US impact and exercises in Europe and somewhere else over the globe. As Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya’s commitment recommends, the Russian initiative’s perspective is lose-lose; it accepts that with the end goal for Russia to win, the US must lose. In any case, Dr. Christopher Swamp’s commitment recommends that this world view isn’t really shared by the Russian populace or its tip top.
As prove by the scope of “hazy area” exercises it takes part in, some of the master donors contend that the Russian administration considers itself to be at war with the US and the West all in all. From a Russian point of view, this war isn’t add up to, yet rather, it is basic (Goure)— a kind of “war” that is inconsistent with the general US comprehension of fighting. Russia accepts that there is no inadmissible or ill-conceived type of prevention, compellence, or heightening administration (Goure). It additionally doesn’t put stock in the continuum of contention that the US has developed. Like Russia’s view of its opposition with the US, its impression of contention is dichotomous: one is either at war or not at war. To battle and win this war, Russia accepts that the effective incorporation of all instruments of state control (Goure), just as the coordinated work of non-military and military intends to deflect and constrain (Flynn), are foremost. Moreover, Russian military ideas incorporate choices for utilizing preemptive power to incite stun and deter a foe from directing military tasks and to urge a de-heightening of threats (Flynn). The creators see that Russia’s methodologies are persistently advancing and expect that the inconsistency between the Russian and the US comprehension of “contention” and “war” will keep on developing, prompting a higher danger of acceleration in future circumstances including the two countries.
By and large, Russia’s impact abroad is developing, and the Kremlin has aced the utilization of “cross breed fighting” in driving Russia’s international strategy (Lamoreaux). Russia uses an assortment of hazy area strategies around the world. These incorporate the utilization of paramilitary powers and different intermediaries, obstruction in political procedures, financial and vitality abuse (especially in Africa), surveillance, and media and publicity control. Putin is likewise adroit at mixing military and non military personnel components for most extreme effect (Weitz).
The particular strategies of half and half fighting that Russia utilizes change by locale. In Europe, for instance, Russia has used purposeful publicity, an expanding reliance on outside vitality assets, and political control to accomplish its essential objectives (Schindler; Lamoreaux). Interestingly, in the Center East and Africa—significant wellsprings of minerals and other regular assets from a Russian perspective1—Russia has fundamentally used financial abuse devices (Katz; Borshchevskaya; Severin). In Focal Asia, Russia keeps up a significantly more constrained nearness, because of China’s geographic closeness and the present degrees of monetary and security commitment by other provincial on-screen characters (Kangas). By the by, Russia retains impact in the Focal Asia, because of its authentic, etymological, and social associations with the district (Laruelle; Dyet). In like manner, in Latin America, Russia comes up short on an adequate measure of deployable assets to completely execute its methodology or to broaden its impact far (Ellis). Be that as it may, as Dr. Barnett S. Koven and Ms. Abigail C. Kamp watch, Russia compensates for its deficiencies by taking part in long winded and receptive undertakings to upset US impact in the locale.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Im Frühjahr 1989 filmte die Stasi im Umfeld eines Punkkonzertes in der Berliner Erlöserkirche.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
From 2017 to 2019, the Committee held hearings, conducted interviews, and reviewed intelligence related to Russian attempts in 2016 to access election infrastructure. The Committee sought to determine the extent of Russian activities, identify the response of the U.S. Government at the state, local, and federal level to the threat, and make recommendations on how to better prepare for such threats in the future. The Committee received testimony from state election officials, Obama administration officials, and those in the Intelligence Community and elsewhere in the U.S. Government responsible for evaluating threats to elections.
…
The Russian government directed extensive activity, beginning in at least 2014 and carrying into at least 2017, against U.S. election infrastructure at the state and local level.
…
3. (U) While the Committee does not know with confidence what Moscow’s intentions were, Russia may have been probing vulnerabilities in voting systems to exploit later. Alternatively, Moscow may have sought to undermine confidence in the 2016 U.S. elections simply through the discovery of their activity.
4. (U) Russian efforts exploited the seams between federal authorities and capabilities, and protections for the states. The U.S. intelligence apparatus is, by design, foreign-facing, with limited domestic cybersecurity authorities except where the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can work with state and local partners. State election officials, who have primacy in running elections, were not sufficiently warned or prepared to handle an attack from a hostile nation-state actor.
5. (U) DHS and FBI alerted states to the threat of cyber attacks in the late summer and fall of 2016, but the warnings did not provide enough information or go to the right people. Alerts were actionable, in that they provided malicious Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to information technology (IT) professionals, but they provided no clear reason for states to take this threat more seriously than any other alert received.
6. (U) In 2016, officials at all levels of government debated whether publicly acknowledging this foreign activity was the right course. Some were deeply concerned that public warnings might promote the very impression they were trying to dispel—that the voting systems were insecure.
7. (U) Russian activities demand renewed attention to vulnerabilities in U.S. voting infrastructure. In 2016, cybersecurity for electoral infrastructure at the state and local level was sorely lacking; for example, voter registration databases were not as secure as they could have been. Aging voting equipment, particularly voting machines that had no paper record of votes, were vulnerable to exploitation by a committed adversary. Despite the focus on this issue since 2016, some of these vulnerabilities remain.
8. (U) In the face of this threat and these security gaps, DHS has redoubled its efforts to build trust with states and deploy resources to assist in securing elections. Since 2016, DHS has made great strides in learning how election procedures vary across states and how federal entities can be of most help to states. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), and other groups have helped DHS in this effort. DHS’s work to bolster states’ cybersecurity has likely been effective, in particular for those states that have leveraged DHS’s cybersecurity assessments for election infrastructure, but much more needs to be done to coordinate state, local, and federal knowledge and efforts in order to harden states’ electoral infrastructure against foreign meddling.
…
(U) In June 2016, Illinois experienced the first known breach by Russian actors of state election infrastructure during the 2016 election. As of the end of 2018, the Russian cyber actors had successfully penetrated Illinois’s voter registration database, viewed multiple database tables, and accessed up to 200.000 voter registration records. The compromise resulted in the exfiltration of an unknown quantity of voter registration data. Russian cyber actors were in a position to delete or change voter data, but the Committee is not aware of any evidence that they did so.
…
(U) Direct-Recording Electronic (ORE) Voting Machine Vulnerabilities
(U) While best practices dictate that electronic voting machines not be connected to the internet, some machines are internet-enabled. In addition, each machine has to be programmed before Election Day, a procedure often done either by connecting the machine to a local network to download software or by using removable media, such as a thumb drive. These functions are often carried out by local officials or contractors. If the computers responsible for writing and distributing the program are compromised, so too could all voting machines receiving a compromised update. Further, machines can be programmed to show one result to the voter while recording a different result in the tabulation. Without a paper backup, a “recount” would use the same faulty software to re-tabulate the same results, because the primary records of the vote are stored in computer memory.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Der Propagandafilm der Abteilung Agitation des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit ist der Zusammenarbeit der deutschen und sowjetischen Tschekisten gewidmet. Zum 50. Jahrestag der Oktoberrevolution dokumentierte er die Abwehr westlicher “Agitatoren” durch das MfS.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Acquisition Manual is hereby amended by adding new sub-part N4.21, Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment, to implement a provision of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act prohibiting the procurement and use of covered equipment and services produced or provided by Huawei Technologies Company, ZTE Corporation, Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, and Dahua Technology Company. New provision N52.204-016, Representation Regarding Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment, is prescribed for use in all solicitations in lieu of FAR provision 52.204-24, and new clause N52.204-017, Prohibition on Contracting of Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment, is prescribed for all solicitations and contracts in lieu of FAR clause 52.204-25. These revisions are effective immediately, and will be incorporated into NRO Acquisition Circular 2019-03.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Der Stasi-Lehrfilm “Revisor” zeigt die Überwachung, Verfolgung und Inhaftierung eines Mannes im Visier der Stasi. Er dokumentiert unter anderem eine “konspirative” Wohnungsdurchsuchung.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
1. (U) Situation
a. (U) Purpose. This branch plan provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the support of the Board of Governors of the federal Reserve System to ensure the effective execution of a National Essential Function (NEF).
…
c. (U) Friendly Forces
(1) (U) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve System (FRS) is the central bank of the United States. The primary responsibility of the Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors is to formulate and administer the Nation’s monetary policy. The Board of Governors operates as a USG Agency.
…
(b) (U) Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems. Oversees the operations of the independent Federal Reserve Banks and of the FRS Law Enforcement program.
(c) (U) Office of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity. The Director of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity is the supported entity for the transportation of monetary instruments within the USNORTHCOM AOR.
…
(c) (U) Commercial passenger flights are restricted during certain national emergencies.
Download full doc here:
https://info.publicintelligence.net/USNORTHCOM-FederalReserveSupportPlan.pdf
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The East German foreign intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung
A (Main Directorate A, hereaft er HV A), is the stuff of legends. “It
was probably the most effi cient and eff ective service on the European
continent,” claimed Markus Wolf, who headed foreign intelligence
for thirty-four years.1
A boast to be sure, but many observers believe
he was the most successful spymaster of the Cold War.
There is no gainsaying the HV A’s feats, but the East Germans had a
little help from their adversaries. Offi cials in Washington, London,
and Bonn not only underestimated the HV A’s prowess; they also were
largely ignorant of its size, effi ciency, and contribution to Soviet intelligence. Warning signs went unheeded. In 1959, for example, an East
German defector claimed that the HV A was on its way to becoming
the premier espionage service in the Eastern bloc with 2,000–3,000
agents in West Germany.2
He was ignored. The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) wrote off East Germany as a “backwater” of little or no
intelligence interest.3
As a result, the HV A became a stealth weapon of
the Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security), fl ying under the radar of
Western intelligence and wreaking tremendous damage in the process.
In several espionage trials of HV A agents aft er the Cold War, presiding
judges declared that the information they provided Moscow might have
meant the diff erence between survival and defeat in the event of war,
as serious a damage assessment as one can imagine.
Soviet intelligence and its Warsaw Pact allies referred to each other
as Bruderorgane, brotherly or fraternal services. The HV A, however,
was fi rst among equals. “We were Moscow’s prime ally,” Wolf declared. Former Soviet offi cers, perhaps with grudging respect, have
tipped their hats to the East Germans. One declared that the HV A
was “even more successful than the KGB.”4
Another said that the HV
A “had so deeply penetrated the West German government, military,
and secret services that about all we had to do was lie back and stay
out of Wolf’s way.”5
Never one to hide his light under a bushel, Wolf
himself once bragged that he had enough West German politicians
on his payroll to form his own bipartisan faction in the Bundestag.6
Even his former adversaries, with grudging candor but no respect,
have acknowledged his successes. German authorities estimated
1 Markus Wolf with Anne
McElvoy, Man Without a
Face: The Autobiography
of Communism’s Greatest
Spymaster (New York,
1997), xi.
2 Richard Meier, Geheimdienst ohne Maske: Der ehemalige Präsident des Bundesverfassungsschutz über
Agenten, Spione und einen
gewissen Herrn Wolf
(Berlin, 1992), 197–203.
3 See Benjamin B. Fischer,
“Deaf, Dumb, and Blind:
The CIA and East Germany,” in East German Foreign
Intelligence: Myth, Reality
and Controversy, ed. Thomas
Friis, Kristie Macrakis, and
Helmut Müller-Engbergs
(London and New York,
2010), 48–69, 49.
4 Christopher Andrew and
Oleg Gordievsky, MORE
Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB
Global Operations 1975–
1985 (London, 1992), 37.
5 Oleg Kalugin with Fen
Montaigne, The First
Directorate: My 32 Years in
Intelligence and Espionage
against the West (New
York, 1994), 171.
6 “Meisterspion für zweimal
A 13,” Der Spiegel, January
6, 1992, 32.
GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014) 151
that the HV A, by itself, provided some 80 percent of all Warsaw
Pact intelligence on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).7
Soviet Origins of German Intelligence
The HV A was a creation of Soviet intelligence. Its organization,
bureaucratic culture, and ethos were more Russian than German,
making it a hybrid German-Soviet intelligence service. Germans
off ered technical skills, discipline, and effi ciency that the Russians
typically lacked. Most important, they had entrée to the other half
of the divided German nation just across the border that geographically defi ned the Cold War. For the East Germans, West Germany
was the Hauptfeind (main enemy), a country they called simply the
Hauptoperationsgebiet (Main Operational Area).
German espionage for the USSR, however, did not begin with the
Cold War. Its origins reach back to the revolutionary upheavals
following World War I. Lenin and his Bolshevik followers believed
that their October Revolution in backward Russia, a predominantly
peasant country, could not survive without revolutionary upheavals
in the industrial West, where the large and well-organized working
class would come to their aid. They pinned their hopes above all on
Germany and prepared accordingly.8
Posters in Moscow declared that
“The German October is at the gates.” The moment of truth came in
1923, when the Comintern (Communist International), the general
staff of the Soviet world revolutionary movement, and Soviet intelligence funded and incited an uprising led by the German Communist
Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschands, KPD).9
The German proletariat, however, refused to throw off its chains, as
Bolshevik theory had predicted. The ill-conceived revolt fi zzled, and
Germany remained a capitalist country until it became the Third
Reich. Not all was lost, however. As one of the top Soviet operatives
in Europe noted:
When we saw the collapse of the Comintern’s eff orts, we
said: “Let’s save what we can of the German revolution.”
We took the best men developed by our Party Intelligence
. . . and incorporated them into the Soviet Military Intelligence. Out of the ruins of the Communist revolution we
built in Germany for Soviet Russia a brilliant intelligence
service, the envy of every other nation.10
7 “Die Gussen kommen,” Der
Spiegel, March 16, 1992, 129.
8 Bogdan Musial, Kampfplatz
Deutschland: Stalins
Kriegspläne gegen den Westen,
2nd ed. (Berlin, 2008), 26–27,
62–67.
9 Bernd Kaufmann, Eckhard
Reisener, Dieter Schwips, and
Henri Walther, “Die ‘Revolution’ wird organisiert
(1923),” Der Nachrichtendienst der KPD 1917–1937
(Berlin, 1993), 57–93.
10 David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage
(New Haven, 1955), 92.
152 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014)
Hauptverwaltung A
and KGB
Hauptverwaltung A:
Insights
Stasi and
SED State
Stasi and East
Contexts German Society
The KPD created its own covert intelligence service, the KPDNachrichtendienst, in 1921. It spied on the Weimar government; the
Reichswehr, the small defense force permitted under the terms of
the Treaty of Versailles; and other political parties and paramilitary
units of rightwing nationalist organizations. Aft er 1923, however,
the KPD became increasingly involved in spying for the Soviet
Union and facilitating Soviet espionage in Germany and the rest
of Europe.11
The trajectory of the KPD intelligence service followed and refl ected
changes in the USSR. Aft er Stalin rose to power by eliminating the
Old Bolsheviks, he foreswore the idea of revolution in Europe and
in 1928 set out on a course of “building socialism in one country”
as the USSR’s strategic objective. The following year, the Comintern
declared that “war and the danger of war” in Europe was imminent.
All communist parties were obliged to accept Moscow’s “iron discipline” and join in a Waff enbruderschaft (alliance of comrade-in-arms)
to defend the USSR as “the center of the world revolution.”12
Historians debate whether the Soviet war scare was genuine or contrived, but its impact on the KPD was quite real. In preparation for
an impending civil war at home and an “imperialist war” in Europe,
the KPD created a new clandestine organization, the Abteilung
Militärpolitik (Department of Military Policy), which also was known
by cover names such as AM-Apparat, Kippenberger-Apparat aft er its
leader Hans Kippenberger, “Alex,” and “Adam-Apparat.”13 Increasingly, the KPD was forced to serve Soviet interests rather than its
own and to support the Soviet Union’s forced-pace industrialization
and massive armaments buildup.14 “The KPD-Nachrichtendienst
became essentially the product, the main instrument, and ultimately
the victim of Bolshevization [more appropriately of Stalinization].”15
At Moscow’s direction, KPD leaders were purged and replaced with
true Stalinists. The Germans’ tragedy was twofold. Many were arrested, tortured, and murdered in Hitler’s concentration camps, and
many others who fl ed to the Soviet Union suff ered the same fate
during Stalin’s blood purges. Kippenberger was one of fi rst refugees
executed in Moscow in 1937.
Germans Spying on Germany for Russia
Germany suff ered little damage during World War I. Its industrial
infrastructure had not only remained intact; it was the envy of the
world, especially in the production of iron and steel, chemicals,
11 Kaufmann et al., “Spionage für die Sowjets,” in
Der Nachrichtendienst der
KPD 1917–1937, 163–66.
12 Ibid., 173.
13 Ibid., 179–80.
14 Ibid., “Spionage fur die
sowjetische Rüstungswirtschaft ,” 200–203.
15 Ibid., 9.
GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014) 153
and electricity. Within a few years, with KPD support, the volume
of industrial and military-technological secrets purloined and sent
to Moscow became “an avalanche” of information on chemical
formulas and production methods, blueprints, and prototypes.
The eff ort was so sweeping and so effi cient that “Moscow oft en
knew about a new German invention before it went into serial
production.”16
Trials involving industrial espionage linked to the Soviet Union give
some indication of the scope and magnitude of the KPD-Soviet eff ort.
In 1928, German courts tried some 300 to 360 cases. In 1930, the
number soared to more than 1,000.17 Even these numbers, however,
understate the real situation. Because Weimar Germany maintained
good diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, and also
because the Reichswehr was conducting covert military training and
weapons R&D there, Berlin oft en turned a blind eye to such transgressions.18 Many cases never reached the courts, and some egregious
incidents were tried in camera and the records sealed so as not to
disturb relations with Moscow. Moreover, the German criminal code
did not treat industrial snooping as espionage. Hamstrung, the courts
could only apply a weak statute on “unfair competition,” which provided for light sentences of one to three months. Finally, in 1932 the
Reichstag issued a new law that called for three-year terms in cases
of routine industrial espionage and fi ve years if a foreign power was
involved. The Nazis replaced it with the death penalty.
Rabkors and Russia-Goers
In addition to party members who worked in industry, the KPD could
call on sympathizers and fellow travelers to acquire information for
Moscow. One especially rich source came from the so-called rabkor
or worker-correspondent movement aft er the Russian term rabochii
korrespondent. Instigated by the USSR, communist press organs in
Europe and the United States collected information from industrial
workers on labor relations and working conditions. The rabkor movement, however, was actually a cover for espionage. The KPD was the
fi rst party in the West to implement the rabkor movement, which by
1928 had several thousand members, many more than Great Britain,
France, and the United States.19 In Germany, the movement was
known as Betriebsberichterstattung and its practitioners as Betriebsberichterstatter, or simply BBs, both terms being literal translations
from Russian.
16 Dallon, Soviet
Espionage, 76.
17 Ibid., 76–77.
18 The treaty placed restrictions
on the size and armaments of
the Germany army or “defense
force” (Reichswehr). Weimar
Germany and Soviet Russia,
the two “pariah countries of
Europe,” reached an agreement under which the former
conducted research and development of tanks, poison gas,
and military aircraft in the latter, far away from the eyes of
Entente inspection teams. See
Manfred Zeidler, Reichswehr
und Rote Armee 1920–1933:
Wege und Stationen einer ungewöhnlichen Zusammenarbeit, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1994);
and Aleksandr M. Nekrich,
German-Soviet Relations: Pariahs, Partners, Predators (New
York, 1997).
19 Dallin, Soviet
Espionage, 86.
154 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014)
Hauptverwaltung A
and KGB
Hauptverwaltung A:
Insights
Stasi and
SED State
Stasi and East
Contexts German Society
The “best brains” in Soviet military intelligence ferreted out industrial
and military secrets to accelerate the USSR’s armaments program.20
The KPD routinely collected classified information on German
armaments R&D and production and on the Reichswehr, which it
occasionally exposed in the communist press before passing it on
to Moscow.
Communists, at least overt members of the KPD, were banned from
the army and military industrial and research facilities. Ordinary
workers who comprised the basis of the BB movement had neither the
access nor the capability for reporting on sophisticated military technology and R&D programs. With guidance from Moscow, however,
the KPD found a solution by recruiting German scientists, engineers,
and technicians who had no record of communist sympathies or affi liation.21 A primary source was the so-called Russia-Goers movement,
unemployed Germans who sought work in the Soviet Union. The
Soviets pored over applications submitted at their embassy and trade
mission in Berlin, looking for suitable candidates. Once recruited,
the Germans were steered toward fi nding jobs in Germany rather
than in Russia while spying for Soviet intelligence. A secretary and
KPD member at the Soviet trade mission ran a dummy employment
agency used to screen and recruit Russia-goers.22
The German-Soviet Intelligence Hybrid
The KPD worked for three Soviet organizations: the KGB, the Fourth
Department of the Red Army (later the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye
Upravleniye, or GRU, Russia’s largest foreign intelligence agency),
and the Western European Bureau of the Comintern, which was
based in Berlin.23 For security purposes, the Germans referred to the
intelligence services as the “two girls” or “Grete” for the KGB and
“Klara” for Krasnaya Armiya or Red Army.
German collaborators proved to be essential to the success of
Soviet intelligence during the 1920s and 1930s. As one historian
observed:
With their proverbial precision, discipline, and incomparable technical skills, the German members of the apparat
were quick to learn the methods of conspiratsia; indeed,
they improved upon them, and in more than one way outdid their teachers.24
20 For an account of Soviet
military espionage, see “5.
Military Targets,” in Dallin, Soviet Espionage, 112–
19; and Kaufmann et al.,
“Spionage für die sowjetische Rüstungswirschaft ,”
in Der Nachrichtendienst
der KPD 1917–1937,
200–203.
21 Kaufmann et al., “Betriebsberichterstattung,”
in Der Nachrichtendienst
der KPD 1917–1937,
194–200.
22 Dallin, Soviet Espionage,
85–86.
23 From 1923 to 1934, Soviet foreign intelligence
was reorganized and renamed twice. The more
familiar term KGB is used
here, although it did not
become the offi cial name
until 1954.
24 Ibid., 87.
GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014) 155
German support to Soviet intelligence “was enormous, exceeding in
quantity the contribution of all other non-Russian components of the
apparat abroad; in quality it exceeded even the Russian core itself.”25
The HV A saw itself as the heir and lineal descendant of the KPD
intelligence service, and, like their predecessors, the East Germans
oft en outperformed Soviet intelligence during the Cold War.26
For all their contributions, however, the German communists received
little credit from Moscow, and many of those who fl ed to the USSR
to escape Nazi persecution ended up in the Gulag or KGB execution
chambers. Stalin decimated about 70 percent of the KPD exile community. Some of those who survived, however, became Soviet citizens
and rose to high ranks in Soviet intelligence and in the Comintern.
They returned to their homeland on the coattails of the Red Army
in 1945, where they became the founding fathers of East German
intelligence.
Present at the Creation
In 1951, Markus Wolf, who was posted to Moscow as the chargé
d’aff aires of the East German embassy, was recalled to East Berlin.
There he was summoned to a meeting with Anton Ackermann, the
state secretary in the foreign ministry and, more important, a member of the ruling Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the
recently established German Democratic Republic (GDR). Ackermann
told Wolf that he was being assigned to a new intelligence unit in
the ministry, which would report directly to Ackermann himself. An
organizing session was held on September 1, 1951, in a safehouse in
Bohnsdorf, an East Berlin suburb. HV A offi cers celebrated that date
as the founding of their service.
The new unit’s offi cial name was the Foreign Policy Intelligence
Service (Außenpolitische Nachrichtendienst, APN).27 The APN was a
clandestine organization; its very title and existence were classifi ed.
No one outside of a small circle of offi cials in the USSR and the GDR
had ever heard of it until aft er the Cold War. Old habits die hard; in his
memoir Wolf refused to “break cover” and referred to the APN by its
cover name, the Institute for Economic-Scientifi c Research (Institut
für Wirtschaft swissenschaft liche Forschung, IWF).28
The APN/IWF was a new organization, but it did not lack for talent or experience. The founding fathers, all veteran communists
from the prewar KPD underground, included Richard Stahlmann
25 Ibid., 92.
26 Bernd Kaufmann et al., Der
Nachrichtendienst der KPD
1917–1937, 11.
27 The following account of the
APN is based on Peter Richter
and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs WestSpione: Ein Insider-Report
(Berlin: Elefanten Press Verlag
GmbH, 1992), 13–30; Meier,
Geheimdienst ohne Maske,
145–60; Peter Siebenmorgen,
“Staatssicherheit” der DDR:
Der Westen im Fadenkreuz der
Stasi (Bonn, 1993), 114–15;
and Wolf, Man Without a Face,
43–48.
28 Wolf, Man Without a Face,
44. Wolf evidently did not remember that he had already
revealed the APN in a previous
publication. See In eigenem
Auft rag: Bekenntnisse und Einsichten (Munich, 1991), 267.
156 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014)
Hauptverwaltung A
and KGB
Hauptverwaltung A:
Insights
Stasi and
SED State
Stasi and East
Contexts German Society
(pseudonym of Artur Illner) and Robert Korb. Stahlmann was a
legendary fi gure in the international communist movement, a brilliant operative who had run Comintern operations in Scandinavia,
the Balkans, and China. Korb was a gift ed political analyst, who had
served as personal secretary to Georgy Dmitrov, the Bulgarian expatriate head of the Comintern.
Also present at the fi rst organizing session were Gustav Szinda,
Gerhard Hentschke, and Gerhard Heidenreich. Szinda had served
in Stalin’s foreign intelligence service, the Comintern, and the
Soviet-backed International Brigades during the Spanish Civil
War. He and Hentschke fought with Soviet partisans behind
enemy lines during World War II. Heidenreich, another KPD
veteran and protégé of SED leader Walter Ulbricht and Ulbricht’s
future successor, Erich Honecker, was head of the East German
youth organization, which screened candidates for the new intelligence service. To protect the APN’s covert status, even within
SED ranks, offi cials referred to it as the Heidenreich-Apparat,
since Heidenreich was openly known as the head of the SED youth
organization. Wolf represented the rising generation of young
communists, all devoted Stalinists, as did Werner Großmann,
who would succeed Wolf in 1986 as only the second head of the
HV A during its entire existence.
Soviet intelligence played a dominant role in the APN/IWF. Four Soviet
intelligence offi cers were present at the organizing session. Soviet
offi cers were omnipresent as “advisers,” guiding its operations and
making sure that the Germans carried out Moscow’s orders. As Wolf
noted, “Our Soviet advisers played a strong, even domineering role.”
The APN was “an exact mirror of the Soviet model”; its structure and
operational guidelines were based on verbatim translations from
Russian documents.29
KGB oversight of the HV A and its parent organization, the Ministry for State Security (MfS), remained in place throughout the Cold
War. A Soviet-East German protocol from 1978 revealed that Soviet
offi cers were issued passes that allowed them unrestricted access to
MfS and HV A offi ces, fi les, and technical equipment. The KGB also
reserved the right to recruit East German citizens without informing
the Ministry.30
The APN/IWF was created to fi ll a gap in the SED’s information on
West Germany and the Western Allies’ intentions in the unfolding
29 Wolf, Man Without a
Face, 46.
30 “Pingpong für Spione,”
Der Spiegel, February 17,
1992, 86.
GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014) 157
East-West confl ict. It also had critical implications for Soviet policy. In
the early stage of the Cold War, Germany, not the United States, was
the cynosure of Stalin’s foreign policy, as it had been in the prewar
period. The Soviet dictator’s greatest fear was that the Western powers would rearm and integrate the new West German state, founded
in 1949, into an anti-Soviet alliance. This became a self-fulfi lling
policy aft er Stalin ordered the 1948-1949 blockade of West Berlin and
gave the green light for North Korea to invade South Korea in 1950.
NATO was formed in 1949, and Bonn became a full-fl edged political
and military member in 1955.
The IWF provided non-alerting commercial cover for espionage. Its
overt mission was to facilitate interzonal trade between the Soviet,
American, British, and French sectors of East and West Germany,
which was still fl ourishing before the erection of the Berlin Wall. Access to West Germany was secured by opening a “research” branch
in Frankfurt and an East-West Trade Corporation (Ost-West Handelsgesellschaft ) in Hamburg.31 In addition to political and military
intelligence, East German operatives were tasked with collecting
information on nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, chemistry, electrical engineering, electronics, aviation, and conventional weapons.
These intelligence requirements were of little interest to East Berlin
but of overriding concern to Moscow. With the exception of nuclear
issues, they were reminiscent of Soviet tasking of the KPD in prewar
Germany.
By 1952, APN/IWF had a staff of 200 offi cers. Ackermann was the
chief, and Stahlmann and Szinda were his deputies.32 The latter two
were in charge of day-to-day operations and divided responsibility
for managing several main departments and subordinate branches.
The main departments included political and military intelligence;
economic intelligence; evaluation and requirements, under Korb;
and administration. Wolf was initially assigned as Korb’s deputy but
soon took over a small counterintelligence unit. Heidenreich headed
the personnel department.
In December 1952, Wolf was summoned once again to the SED
Central Committee building, this time by none other than Ulbricht
himself. Ulbricht told him that Ackermann had asked to be relieved
of his duties for health reasons.33 “We have decided that you should
take over the service,” Ulbricht said — “we” meaning Ulbricht himself
and the Politburo. Wolf was thirty years old. He was ordered to report
directly to Ulbricht.34
31 Dallin, Soviet Espionage,
343–44.
32 See the table of organization,
Appendix 8, in Siebenmorgen, “Staatssicherheit“ der
DDR, 316.
33 In fact, Ulbricht purged Ackermann both because he was a
political rival and an advocate
of a “separate German road to
socialism,” a heresy that Stalin did not tolerate as he was
preparing to impose the Soviet
model of a command economy
and collectivized agriculture
on the GDR.
34 Wolf, Man Without a Face,
55–57.
158 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014)
Hauptverwaltung A
and KGB
Hauptverwaltung A:
Insights
Stasi and
SED State
Stasi and East
Contexts German Society
Wolf wondered why he had been chosen; he was not only young and
inexperienced but also lacked high standing in the SED. He acknowledged, however, that “I am sure that my upbringing and connections
with Moscow weighed heavily.”35
Richard Stahlmann, the acting APN chief, was already sixty-one years
old, but he gracefully accepted the role as Wolf’s deputy. Years later,
Wolf paid tribute to Stahlmann as his mentor, role model, and chief
adviser, saying the veteran communist apparatchik was “the true
organizer of our foreign intelligence” who had stood “side by side
with Soviet intelligence.”36
Mischa
Wolf represented the new generation of East German functionaries
and the amalgam of German-Soviet intelligence. Born in 1923, he
fl ed Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union with his mother and brother
in 1934. His father, a physician, prominent playwright, and communist offi cial, had arrived the year before. During the next eleven
formative years of his youth, Markus became Mischa and in his own
words “half Russian.” The Soviet Union, he added, was “our second
homeland [Heimat].”37
Wolf’s life in clandestine operations began in 1943 at the age of
twenty, when he was selected for admission to the Comintern school.
It was a stroke of luck that allowed him to escape the vicissitudes of
war, since the school had been relocated from Moscow to the safety
of Kushnarenkovo, about sixty miles from Ufa. The timing was signifi cant. Aft er the defeat of the Germany army at Stalingrad during
1942–1943, Stalin realized that victory over Hitler’s Germany was
now a matter of time. He was planning for the postwar occupation
and control of Germany, and he needed a cadre of young and reliable
Germans to carry out his plans.
Wolf returned to his native country in 1945, a committed revolutionary determined to realize the prewar goal of a Sovietized Germany. He
was a prodigy with prodigious ambition. A fellow exile and Comintern
student described him as
the type of very clever, calm offi cial who stands in the background [Hintergrund Funktionär], who only regards as a game
of chess everything that other comrades take seriously, that
35 Ibid., 57.
36 Meier, Geheimdienst ohne
Maske, 147.
37 Alexander Reichenbach,
Chef der Spione: Die Markus-Wolf-Story (Stuttgart,
2009), 49.
GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014) 159
they fi ght for, that they are inspired by. “Background offi –
cials” seemed to be inspired by nothing and apparently
nothing could shake their calmness. They confi ned themselves to working out the next tactical step cautiously and
carefully. . . .38
Wolf stood out among the returnees, despite his youth, due to his
fl uency in Russian and his “sparkling contacts with the Soviets.”
Unusual perks underscored his status. Still in his mid-twenties, he
was assigned a sumptuous country house on the Glienecker Lake
away from the ruins of Berlin. His compatriots had to make do with
lesser quarters and lower rations. Clearly, his Soviet masters were
grooming Mischa for more important assignments.39
The APN/IWF suff ered several setbacks on Wolf’s watch, one of
which could have ended his career. Several agents working in IWF
cover offi ces in West Germany were caught spying.40 Much more
serious was the case of Gotthold Krauss, a former banker hired by
the APN to work on economic intelligence who became a deputy
department chief. He defected to the United States in April 1953,
bringing with him copious information on APN staff offi cers, agents,
and operations. “I took it as a heavy personal blow, and it made me
realize that our young service was still far from secure,” Wolf wrote
years later.41 Yet fortune smiled on him; his Soviet overseers overlooked the security breaches.
In 1953, the APN/IWF was disbanded; its staff and fi les were moved
to the Ministry for State Security. Internal security and foreign intelligence were joined in a single ministry on the model of the KGB.
Wolf’s main department was designated HA XV. Two years later,
HA XV was renamed HV A.
Germans Spying on Germany for Russia Redux
From its modest start in 1951, East German foreign intelligence hit
its stride in the 1960s; registered spectacular successes in the 1970s;
and became the preeminent Soviet bloc service in the 1980s. It almost
certainly exceeded Soviet expectations.
Sheer numbers do not tell the whole story, but they indicate the scope
and magnitude of the HV A’s success in carrying out its main mission. The number of West Germans and West Berliners who spied
for East Germany almost defi es belief. The precise fi gures will never
38 Wolfgang Leonhard, Die
Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder
(Cologne, 1981), 576.
39 Reichenbach, Chef der Spione, 60.
40 Dallin, Soviet Espionage,
343–44.
41 Wolf, Man Without a Face,
58. Wolf misspelled Krauss’s
name and gave a spurious account of the defection, claiming that West German intelligence was in charge. In fact,
Krauss had been in contact
with the CIA in West Berlin
since 1950 and planned his
escape over the intervening
years. Krauss attended Wolf’s
fi rst staff meeting as chief of
the APN, during which Wolf
complained about the organization’s poor security. See
Benjamin B. Fischer, “Markus
Wolf and the CIA Mole,” Center for the Study of Intelligence
Bulletin (Winter 2000): 8–9.
160 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014)
Hauptverwaltung A
and KGB
Hauptverwaltung A:
Insights
Stasi and
SED State
Stasi and East
Contexts German Society
be known, but a rough estimate for the MfS and HV A from 1949 to
1989 ranges from 17,000 to 23,000.42 The HV A accounted for about
6,000 agents during the same period. Some 3,000 agents were still
active when the Berlin Wall fell. About half spied for the MfS and
the East German army’s intelligence service and the other half for the
HV A. Five of every 100,000 West German citizens were “working
clandestinely for the GDR.”43
Aft er reunifi cation, a German counterintelligence offi cial said, “You
see the entire society was sort of infi ltrated by hostile intelligence
agents. We didn’t understand that.”44 Between 1993 and 1995, Germany’s federal attorney investigated 2,928 cases of possible espionage or treason by West German citizens. Some 2,300 of those were
dropped. There were 388 indictments and 252 convictions. Sixty-six
persons were sentenced to two years or more in prison. The longest
sentence handed down was twelve years, but only a few served more
than six. Eighty-fi ve persons received sentences of one year or less,
probation, or a monetary fi ne.45
The Soviet decision to exploit the East Germans’ comparative advantage in spying on West Germany was vindicated many times over.
Common language, geographical proximity, past history, and family
and business ties all played a part. The main factor, however, was
the large number of intelligence offi cers focused on a single target.
The HV A employed 4,268 staff offi cers inside MfS headquarters,
and another 800 were assigned to MfS offi ces in the GDR’s fi ft een
administrative regions. The most important regional offi ces, such
as the one in Leipzig, were located along the inner-German border,
where they conducted operations to recruit and infi ltrate agents into
West Germany.
Soviet intelligence’s largest foreign rezidentura (fi eld station) before
World War II was in Weimar Germany. The Soviet embassy on the
famous Unter den Linden boulevard and the Soviet trade mission
provided diplomatic status, and therefore legal cover, for intelligence
offi cers. The Comintern’s Western European bureau in Berlin was
another base of operations that shielded intelligence operations.
Aft er World War II, the KGB established a rezidentura in the East
Berlin suburb of Karlshorst, the site of Nazi Germany’s surrender
to the Red Army. It became the largest in the world with a staff
of about 1,000 offi cers.46 About one hundred counterintelligence
offi cers were posted to another offi ce in Potsdam-Cecelienhof. By
42 Georg Herbstritt, Bundesbürger im Dienst der
DDR-Spionage. Eine analytische Studie (Göttingen,
2007), 70.
43 Ibid., 84.
44 John Marks, “The
Spymaster Unmasked,”
U.S. News & World Report,
April 12, 1993, 42.
45 Robert Gerald Livingston,
“Rosenholz: Mischa’s
Files, CIA’s Booty,” in
East German Foreign Intelligence, ed. Friis et al.,
70–88, 79.
46 Rita Sélitrenny and Thilo
Weichert, Das unheimliche
Erbe: Die Spionageabteilung der Stasi
(Leipzig, 1991), 114.
GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014) 161
itself, the rezidentura annually poured out as many intelligence
reports as an entire KGB main directorate, and the rezident (chief
of station) held a rank equivalent to that of a deputy director of
intelligence in Moscow.47
What the Moles Knew
With a few exceptions, the HV A spied with impunity. Very few of its
agents were caught, and the number of defections could be counted
on the fi ngers of one hand. The main reason: HV A counterintelligence penetrated and neutralized West German intelligence and
security agencies with “moles.” There were moles, in some cases
several of them, burrowed inside the BND (foreign intelligence); the
BfV (domestic counterintelligence) and its state-level components
(LfVs); the SS/BKA (state security department of the federal criminal
police); the MAD (military counterintelligence); and the BGS (federal
border security).48 The three most damaging moles were Klaus Kuron,
a senior BfV offi cer in charge of anti-GDR operations; Gabriele Gast,
a senior Soviet aff airs analyst with the BND; and the deputy chief of
MAD, Col. Joachim Krase.
The impetus to recruit moles inside West German national security
agencies resulted from one of the HV A’s few setbacks and one the
BfV’s few successes. The HV A dispatched agents to West Germany
as emigrants with false names and identities — called legends in
intelligence jargon — who resettled in West Germany and West
Berlin. Using computer analysis of records from the national network
of residential registration offi ces, the BfV developed profi les of the
“illegals.” Codenamed “Anmeldung” (Registration), the operation
netted several dozen agents. Arrests, however, were only part of the
problem. Wolf had to recall many other illegals, and years of careful
work and preparation were lost.49
Aft er that setback, Wolf later claimed to have “concentrated everything on one objective: We must get inside their [West German]
organizations so that the game is open again.”50 The HV A, according
to a history compiled by former offi cers, carried out Wolf’s orders
with alacrity.51
Scientifi c and Technical Intelligence
Political intelligence was a top HV A priority. Beginning in the 1960s,
however, acquisition of scientifi c and technical intelligence in the
47 Kalugin, First Directorate, 174.
48 See the List of Abbreviations.
49 K. Eichner and G. Schramm,
Konterspionage: Die DDRAufk lärung in den Geheimdienstzentren (Berlin, 2010),
110–13.
50 Berlin ADN 0708 GMT, September 29, 1991.
51 See Eichner and Schramm,
Konterspionage, 110–13.
162 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014)
Hauptverwaltung A
and KGB
Hauptverwaltung A:
Insights
Stasi and
SED State
Stasi and East
Contexts German Society
West became a paramount objective both for the GDR and even more
so for the USSR.
In 1971, Wolf created a separate component, the Sector for Science
and Technology (Sektor für wissenschaft liche-technische Aufk lärung,
SWT). SWT doubled in size within a few years. Its table of organization comprised fi ve departments.52 Three collected intelligence
on basic research in nuclear, chemical, biological, and agricultural
sciences; microelectronics, electro-optical components, lasers, and
soft ware; and vehicle manufacture, shipbuilding, aeronautics, and
astronautics. The other two departments evaluated and reported
the information and technology samples acquired by the operational
departments.
SWT offi cers, most of whom held degrees in science and engineering,
were the elite of the elite HV A, and their work was highly valued in
East Germany and the Soviet Union. By the mid-1980s, SWT alone
was annually acquiring an estimated 3,400 reports and samples of
technology and equipment.53 A review of the so-called Rosenholz
fi les, HV A records obtained by the CIA and then shared with German counterintelligence, revealed that almost half of all agents were
run by the SWT.54
Target NATO
Recruitment of West German citizens working at NATO headquarters near Brussels was another key HV A mission. Former offi cers
claim that NATO was “an open book” for the HV A.55 Starting
in the mid-1960s, well-placed agents provided comprehensive
knowledge of the Western alliance’s military plans, intentions,
and capabilities, oft en by purloining documents that reached
East Berlin before or at the same time NATO’s senior offi cials
received them. HV A agents also provided a steady stream of information on Western armaments production and deployments,
arms control policy, military-technological developments, and
material and human resources, and identifi ed the numbers and
locations of all nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe.56
Agents also acquired copies of NATO’s annual defense plans, as
well as the defense plans of its member states. “We knew exactly
the strengths and weaknesses of NATO. We could count down to
the last soldier, tank, and aircraft ,” former HV A offi cers claim.57
There were only two gaps on their list of intelligence requirements:
NATO’s nuclear-targeting plans, which they were forced to infer
52 See Appendix 17 in
Siebenmorgen, “Staatssicherheit” der DDR,
326–27.
53 Sélitrenny and Weichert,
Das unheimliche Erbe, 30.
54 Kristie Macrakis, “The
Crown Jewels and the
Importance of Scientifi cTechnical Intelligence,” in
East German Foreign Intelligence, ed. Friis
et al., 185.
55 R. Rupp, K. Rehbaum, and
K. Eichner, Militärspionage:
Die DDR-Aufk lärung in
NATO and Bundeswehr
(Berlin, n.d. [2011?].
See especially chapter
7.1: “Die NATO — ein offenes Buch für die HV A,”
235–48.
56 Ibid., 11–12.
57 Ibid., 193.
GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014) 163
from analysis of military exercises and documents, and NATO’s
General Defense Plan.58
The former offi cers were bragging but not exaggerating. Research
based on some ten thousand pages of NATO documents acquired
by the HV A and deposited in the German agency that oversees
the archives of the former MfS, the BStU, supports their assertions.59 The HV A’s success was “striking.”60 From the late 1970s
until the demise of the Soviet bloc, East German “human intelligence operations targeting the Western alliance evolved into one
of the most successful enterprises by any communist intelligence
service.”61 HV A agents had access to classifi ed documents from
NATO, the West German Ministry of Defense and Bundeswehr
(Federal Armed Forces), US forces stationed in West Germany and
West Berlin, and the American embassy in Bonn. The HV A also
obtained information on a regular basis from every other member
of the Western alliance.62
Target USA/CIA
Until the late 1970s, the Eastern European services worked under
an explicit division of labor in which the KGB jealously guarded its
primary status in targeting the United States and the CIA. Each allied
service had to obtain KGB permission before developing an anti-US
operation, and then the operation had to be cleared in advance by
the KGB and serve KGB interests. By the turn of the decade, however, the division of labor had been revised. The HV A was allowed
to hit off its own bat. As two ex-offi cers reported, “the HV A became
increasingly engaged in targeting the US intelligence services under
the solipsistic slogan ‘the CIA is the main enemy; the West German
intelligence services are our main target.’”63
Wolf explained his new hunting license by saying that “the Soviets
believed that my country’s forward geographic position in Europe
and our immediate proximity to the American sectors of Berlin
and Germany gave us certain advantages in penetrating the United
States.” The large US presence off ered the HV A “a veritable smorgasbord of sources.”64 Only aft er the Berlin Wall had fallen and the
GDR had collapsed did US intelligence discover that the HV A had
netted dozens of American servicemen, businessmen, and students
in West Germany and West Berlin.65 Wolf’s reputation soared in
Moscow, and his offi cers began calling him the Eastern bloc’s rezident
for Western Europe.66
58 Ibid., 12, 236–37.
59 See the List of Abbreviations. The BStU has also been
known as the Gauck-Behörde,
aft er Federal Commissioner
Joachim Gauck and as the
Birthler-Behörde aft er Gauck’s
successor Marianne Birthler.
In 2011, Roland Jahn replaced
Birthler.
60 Bernd Schaefer, “The Warsaw Pact’s Intelligence on
NATO: East German Military
Espionage against the West,”
3; <http://www.hollings.net/
Content/ParallelHistoryProject-STASIIntelligenceOnNATO.pdf>
61 Ibid., 1.
62 Ibid., 3.
63 Richter and Rösler, Wolfs
West-Spione, 55.
64 Wolf, Man Without a Face,
292–93.
65 Jamie Dettmer, “Stasi Lured
Americans to Spy for E. Germany,” Washington Times, November 14, 1994, A1.
66 Günter Bohnsack, Die Legende
stirbt: Das Ende Wolfs Geheimdienst (Berlin, 1997), 60.
164 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014)
Hauptverwaltung A
and KGB
Hauptverwaltung A:
Insights
Stasi and
SED State
Stasi and East
Contexts German Society
The chief HV A analyst of the CIA, Klaus Eichner, noted that “it was
diffi cult to operate against the CIA without inside sources. But it
was not impossible.”67 The HV A’s solution was to dispatch double
agents to the agency, i.e., agents pretending to work for the CIA while
actually under East German control. The HV A term for double-agent
operations was Blickfeldmaßnahmen, fi eld-of-vision measures. Putting phony agents in the CIA’s fi eld of vision was one of the biggest
intelligence coups of the Cold War. As Wolf noted in his memoir:
By the late 1980s, we were in the enviable position of
knowing that not a single CIA agent had worked in East
Germany without having been turned into a double agent
[aft er being caught by East German counterespionage] or
working for us from the start. On our orders they were all
delivering carefully selected information and disinformation to the Americans.68
Former senior CIA offi cials have confi rmed Wolf’s claim, acknowledging that all of their putative East German agents were doubles.69 “We
were batting zero” in East Germany, one noted. Another added, “They
dangled people in front of us . . . [and] we wound up taking the bait.”70
The double-agent deception had serious implications. For one thing,
it meant that by controlling the agency’s putative agents, the HV A
neutralized an entire sector of Eastern bloc operations. For another,
the East Germans ensured that the CIA knew no more and no less
than what they allowed it to know. Disinformation was used to shape
the agency’s perception of East German realities. Another result was
to tie up CIA resources with bogus agents while keeping the Americans away from genuine sources of information.71
Target Field Station Berlin
Field Station Berlin (FSB) was America’s premier signals intelligence
(Sigint) site during the Cold War. Located in the upscale Grunewald
district in the British sector of West Berlin, it was perched atop the
Teufelsberg (Devil’s Mountain), an earth-covered mound formed
from 25 million tons of rubble excavated from bombed-out Berlin.
To outsiders, FSB’s geodesic domes and protruding antennas made
it look like a radar station. In fact, it was a gigantic listening post that
off ered a 115-meter, 360-degree vantage point from which to monitor
Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces and installations.
67 Klaus Eichner and
Andreas Dobbert, Headquarters Germany: Die
USA-Geheimdienste in
Deutschland (Berlin,
1997), 103.
68 Wolf, Man Without a Face,
285.
69 “Testimony of Bob Inman,
Hearings of the Commission on the Roles and
Capabilities of the United
States Intelligence Community”: <www.fas.org/
irp/commission/testinma.
htm>; see also “Remarks
of Former DCI Robert
Gates to the CIA
Conference ‘US Intelligence and the End of the
Cold War,’” Texas A&M
University: <www.cia.gov/
news-information/
speeches-testimony/
1999/dci_speech_
111999gatesremarkshtml>
70 John Marks, “The
Spymaster Unmasked,”
41, 45.
71 See Fischer, “Deaf, Dumb,
and Blind,” 51, 54–60.
GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014) 165
In the early 1980s, the HV A recruited an American sergeant,
James W. Hall III, who was assigned to FSB as a member of the
766th Military Intelligence Battalion of the US Army’s Intelligence
and Security Command (INSCOM). This single recruitment would be
enough to put the HV A in the record book of Cold War espionage.
The East Germans were not fooled by FSB’s cover story as a radar
facility, but they underestimated its range, believing that it extended
only as far eastward as Poland. Hall revealed that the Americans
could eavesdrop on Soviet troops as far away as the western USSR.
Hall caused inestimable damage. He compromised vital US capabilities for gathering real-time intelligence on Warsaw Pact armed forces
and providing early indications and warning of war. Markus Wolf
claimed that Hall’s treason “helped our service cripple American
electronic surveillance of Eastern Europe for six years.”72 US offi cials
confi rmed that the operations Hall compromised went dead in the
1980s.73
Hall gave the HV A and KGB insight into the worldwide organization,
locations, and operations of the US Sigint community. On just one
occasion, he handed over thirteen documents from NSA, INSCOM,
and the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Wolf passed
them on to MfS’s Sigint directorate, whose evaluation concluded that:
The material consists of some of the most important American signals intelligence directives . . . [and] is timely and
extremely valuable for the further development of our work
and has great operational and political value. . . . The contents, some of which are global in nature, some very detailed, expose basic plans of the enemy for signals collection
into the next decade.74
Hall left West Berlin in late 1986 for a stateside post and a year later
requested assignment to the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion
in Frankfurt am Main, which supported the US Army’s V Corps.
The new job was a windfall for Hall and for the HV A. As Hall later
confessed, he had access to “the same type of information as in
Berlin, only more current, more state of the art.”75 His biggest haul
was a complete copy of the NSA’s National Sigint Requirements List
(NSRL), which former HV A offi cers described as “a worldwide wish
list” of intelligence requirements. The NSRL consisted of 4,000 pages
that were kept in ten loose-leaf binders for continual updating.76
72 Wolf, Man Without a Face,
295–96.
73 Stephen Engelberg and Michael Wines, “U.S. Says Soldier Crippled Spy Post Set Up
in Berlin,” New York Times,
May 7, 1989, A1.
74 Kristie Macrakis, Seduced
by Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s
Spy-Tech World (New York,
2008), 111.
75 Stephen Engelberg, “Jury
Hears Tale of Spy Who Did It
out of Greed,” New York Times,
July 19, 1989, A10.
76 Macrakis, Seduced by
Secrets, 105.
166 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014)
Hauptverwaltung A
and KGB
Hauptverwaltung A:
Insights
Stasi and
SED State
Stasi and East
Contexts German Society
77 Herbstritt, Bundesbürger
im Dienst der DDRSpionage, 158.
78 Sélitrenny and Weichert,
Das unheimliche Erbe, 115.
79 Markus Wolf, Spionagechef
im geheimen Krieg.
Erinnerungen (Munich,
1997), 335.
80 Wolf, Man Without a Face,
122–25.
81 Manfred Schell and
Werner Kalinka, STASI
and kein Ende: Personen
und Fakten (Frankfurt/M
and Berlin, 1991), 270.
82 Ibid., 122–25.
From 1982 to 1988, the HV A disseminated 232 intelligence reports
attributed to Hall. Of those, 169 received the highest evaluation of I
(very valuable), and 59 received a grade of II (valuable).77 Ironically,
Hall began spying for the KGB before the HV A recruited him. Eventually, the Soviets and East Germans compared notes and decided that
they were running the same agent and paying twice for his information. Hall was given a choice: work for the KGB or the HV A but not
both. He chose the East Germans.
Praetorian Guard of the Soviet Empire
During the 1980s, the KGB became increasingly dependent on the HV
A for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security
inside and outside the Eastern bloc. The Soviet service was a spent
force plagued by bureaucratization, poor morale, corruption, defections, expulsions from foreign countries, and an inability to recruit
well-placed agents.78
The HV A set the precedent in Poland. The rise of Solidarity, the labor union that ballooned into a ten-million-strong national protest
movement, sent shudders through the East German regime. The
MfS and the HV A formed task forces aimed at thwarting the Polish
“counterrevolution.”79 The HV A began targeting Solidarity as early
as 1980.80 Covert measures were used to sow distrust and discord
within the union’s ranks and discredit Solidarity as an alleged tool
of Western subversion. The campaign escalated aft er December
13, 1981, when a military dictatorship under the command of Gen.
Wojciech Jaruzelski seized power, declared martial law, and outlawed
Solidarity, driving it underground.
Aft er Jaruzelski’s coup, a task force of MfS and HV A counterintelligence offi cers arrived in neighboring Poland where it took over an
entire fl oor of the East German embassy in Warsaw and operated
from offi ces in consulates in Szczecin (Stettin), Gdańsk (Danzig),
Wrocław (Breslau), and Kraków.81 Along the East German-Polish
border, the main land route used for delivering humanitarian aid from
the West, the MfS controlled all traffi c entering and exiting Poland,
searching for printing equipment, radios, and other contraband being smuggled to Solidarity.82 The task force recruited its own agent
networks, intercepted mail, and conducted physical, audio, and video
surveillance of Solidarity leaders and Catholic Church offi cials who
supported it.
GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014) 167
The HV A also pursued Solidarity leaders in the West. Using intercepted correspondence, it forged letters suggesting that exiled activists were enjoying the “good life” while their colleagues were living
underground in Poland. Meanwhile, Wolf was tasked to spy on Western governments, political parties, and intelligence services, as well
as Polish émigré organizations, all suspected of helping Solidarity.83
The East Germans failed to disrupt or defeat Solidarity, which survived underground and then arose, Phoenix-like, in 1988 and then
won the fi rst free elections held in the Eastern bloc in 1989. Yet,
Moscow retained its confi dence in the MfS and HV A. On its orders,
more operations groups were deployed to Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Bulgaria, as well as to the USSR itself in Moscow, Leningrad,
and Kiev.84
The last Stalinist regime in Eastern Europe and the once young but
now aging Stalinists in the MfS and HV A became the Praetorian
Guard of the Soviet empire. That empire, however, was crumbling
under their feet. In just six months aft er Solidarity’s electoral victory,
all the other Eastern bloc regimes collapsed in “a chain reaction
originating in the Polish revolt.”85
New winds were blowing from Moscow, where the new Soviet
leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, was trying, and failing, to reform the
communist system at home and in Eastern Europe. During a visit
to East Berlin in 1989, Gorbachev warned the SED regime to get on
board with the reform movement. The warning was ignored. The
East German people, meanwhile, took to the streets in silent protests until the Berlin Wall was opened and the communist regime
fell, taking the HV A with it.
Final Thoughts
German reunifi cation spelled the end of German-Soviet intelligence
cooperation. For seventy years, Moscow benefi ted from a Fift h Column of Germans who spied on Germany for Russia. The German
contribution to Soviet intelligence was considerable, a fascinating
and still little-known subject in the history of intelligence, as well as
the history of Germany and German-Soviet relations.
For all the contributions the KPD and the HV A made to Soviet intelligence, however, their blind devotion earned no gratitude from
Moscow. Stalin ruthlessly purged the German communist exiles,
83 Wolf, Man Without a Face, 175.
84 Schell and Kalinka,
STASI and kein Ende,
274–75; and Sélitrenny
and Weichert, Das
unheimliche Erbe, 116.
85 Constantine Pleshakov,
There Is No Freedom
Without Bread!: 1989 and
the Civil War that Brought
Down Communism (New York,
2009), 6.
168 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 9 (2014)
Hauptverwaltung A
and KGB
Hauptverwaltung A:
Insights
Stasi and
SED State
Stasi and East
Contexts German Society
who had helped him build an industrial base and the armed might
that defeated Hitler’s Wehrmacht and paved the way to the USSR’s
rise as a world power.
If the East Germans expected Soviet gratitude, they, too, were disappointed. Facing the prospect of indictment in the new Germany,
Wolf had two choices: an off er from the CIA of “a considerable sum
of money” and resettlement in the United States, or fl ight to Moscow, “the city of my childhood . . . where a large part of my heart
had always remained.”86 He chose the second course. Once there,
however, he found “no great rush of comradely support.” Indeed,
the KGB was in no position to help, since “the supposedly eternal
brotherhood to which we had raised our glasses down the years
was now a ragged band.”87 Wolf pleaded directly to Gorbachev: “We
were said to have made a great contribution to your security. Now,
in our hour of need, I assume that you will not deny us your help.”88
Gorbachev never replied. He was too busy trying to save what was
left of a ragged Soviet Union.
Benjamin B. Fischer is a retired chief historian of the CIA. Before he joined the
CIA’s History Staff , he served for twenty years as an active CIA offi cer. He is an
expert in Cold War and diplomatic history, as well as in intelligence, security, and
defense issues. His publications include At Cold War’s End: U.S. Intelligence on
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991 (1999) and many articles in the
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
86 Wolf, Man Without a Face,
10–15, 4–5.
87 Ibid., 4–5.
88 Ibid., 7.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
ADP 3-28 clarifies similarities and differences between defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and other elements of decisive action. DSCA and stability operations are similar in many ways. Both revolve around helping partners on the ground within areas of operations. Both require Army forces to provide essential services and work together with civil authorities. However, homeland operational environments differ from those overseas in terms of law, military chain of command, use of force, and inter-organizational coordination among unified action partners. This ADP helps Army leaders understand how operations in the homeland differ from operations by forces deployed forward in other theaters. It illustrates how domestic operational areas are theaters of operations with special requirements. Moreover, this ADP recognizes that DSCA is a joint mission that supports the national homeland security enterprise. The Department of Defense conducts DSCA under civilian control, based on U.S. law and national policy, and in cooperation with numerous civilian partners. National policy, in this context, often uses the word joint to include all cooperating partners, as in a joint field office led by civil authorities. See Introductory Figure, on page viii.
The utilization of military forces during periods of domestic emergency is not undertaken lightly. The military however brings with it unique abilities, in terms of both capability and capacity which provide respondents with the resources needed to respond to an incident. The use of military forces in the responses to hurricanes Andrew in 1992 and Katrina in 2005 illustrate some of the different responses the U.S. military can provide. They also led the government to realize that additional coordination was required before an incident to ensure a successful response. An in-depth look at the tenets of DSCA, authorities, and the national preparedness system framework are discussed in chapter one.
The support the Army provides to civil authorities falls into four main tasks: Provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and provide other designated support. Due to legal limitations such as the Posse Comitatus Act, the purpose for which the military can respond to these incidents is constrained, allowing a military response only to; save lives, restore essential services, maintain or restore law and order, protect infrastructure and property, support maintenance or restoration of local government, or shape the environment for intergovernmental success. Both state and federal laws detail how support is requested, provided and limited in both scope and duration. Further information on the employment of military forces and legal restrictions on doing so are provided in chapter two.
…
…
ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE AUTHORITIES
1-78. Isolation refers to the separation and the restriction of movement of people who have an infectious illness from healthy people to stop the spread of that illness. Quarantine refers to the separation and restriction of movement of people who are not yet ill but have been exposed to an infectious agent and are therefore potentially infectious. A geographical quarantine, known as a cordon sanitaire, is a sanitary barrier erected around an area. Both isolation and quarantine may be conducted on a voluntary basis or compelled on a mandatory basis through legal authority.
1-79. The federal government has the authority to prevent the spread of disease into the United States (foreign) or between states and territories (interstate). The Department of Health and Human Services is the lead federal agency for isolation and quarantine. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention determine and enforce any federal government measures to prevent the spread of disease.
1-80. Only one federal statute permits federal military forces to enforce quarantine laws, under very narrow circumstances. Section 97 of Title 42, USC, allows military commanders of any coastal fort or station to support the execution of state quarantines with respect to vessels arriving in or bound for the United States.
…
…
CIVIL DISTURBANCE SUPPORT
4-172. A governor may call out the National Guard to quell a civil disturbance when it threatens lives or property. State forces support essential services, establish traffic control posts, cordon off areas, release smoke and obscurants, and serve as security or quick reaction forces. The state National Guard’s joint task force commander provides liaison teams to each affected law enforcement agency and normally positions the joint task force headquarters near civilian law enforcement headquarters. In addition to support for civilian law enforcement agencies, National Guard forces provide security for emergency responders. After review by the state attorney general, the governor approves the RUF.
4-173. A request for direct federal military support to civil disturbance operations is unlikely except in an extreme emergency. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of legal considerations. See DODI 3025.21 regarding DOD responsibilities for civil disturbance.) Federal military support for civil disturbances does not fall under defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies when the Insurrection Act or other exemptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are used. The President may employ the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard, within the United States to restore order or enforce federal law when requested by the state legislature, or when not in session, by the governor, and when the authorities of the state are incapable of controlling the situation. The Attorney General of the United States appoints a senior civilian representative as his or her action agent. Federal military personnel supporting civil disturbance operations remain under military command at all times. Forces deployed to help federal or local authorities in a civil disturbance adhere to the SRUF and RUF approved by the combatant commander.
4-174. USNORTHCOM develops and maintains plans for civil disturbance operations. These plans provide the foundation for federal military civil disturbance support. They standardize most military activities and command relationships. Tasks performed by federal military forces may include joint patrolling with law enforcement officers; securing key buildings, memorials, intersections and bridges; and acting as a quick reaction force.
4-175. Civil disturbance missions require unit training prior to employing crowd control tactics. This normally requires a mobile training team from the military police or trained law enforcement personnel. Even in an urgent situation, commanders need to drill their forces repeatedly until small unit leaders can execute maneuvers under extreme stress. Training should include all arms, emphasizing treatment and evacuation procedures, detention and movement of citizens, and use of authorized nonlethal systems.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE NATIONAL GUARD DOMESTIC CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT
4-176. The military force with primary responsibility for direct law enforcement support is the National Guard, under state authority. The legal authority for National Guard members to support law enforcement is derived from state law, which varies from state to state. A governor of a state may call up National Guard forces to help local and state law enforcement agencies. The National Guard’s authority derives from the governor’s responsibility to enforce the laws of that state. Even with that authority, the governor carefully regulates the amount and nature of the support, consistent with state law. The governor may employ the state National Guard for law enforcement support in state active duty status or in Title 32, USC status. Federal laws (principally the Posse Comitatus Act) restrict federalized National Guard forces (in federal service, under Title 10, USC) from providing law enforcement support unless a specific exemption is applicable.
4-177. State National Guard forces in either Title 32, USC status or state active duty status from another state operating under the EMAC or a memorandum of agreement between the states may only support civilian law enforcement as specified in a memorandum approved by both governors.
4-178. There are 54 state and territory National Guard counterdrug support programs, governed by National Guard regulations. The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Section 112 of Title 32, USC, may provide resources though the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to states with approved National Guard counterdrug support plans. In addition to requiring approval by the Secretary of Defense, the state National Guard counterdrug support plan requires approval from the state’s attorney general and adjutant general. The National Guard Bureau funds a full time Title 32, USC active Guard and Reserve counterdrug coordinator in each state for administration and management of the state counterdrug program. The counterdrug coordinator serves as the focal point for all counter drug mission validations, approval authority, and the prioritization for counterdrug mission tasking under appropriate policies, instructions, and directives.
4-179. State National Guard forces also provide support to DHS border security programs. Under Section 112 of Title 32, USC, National Guard Soldiers support border security by operating surveillance systems, analyzing intelligence, installing fences and vehicle barriers, building roads, and providing training. Although state National Guard units could participate in direct law enforcement activities related to border security, under DOD policy they normally provide indirect support, under the control of their governor.
4-180. State National Guard forces frequently support civilian law enforcement agencies during disaster response. The disruption and confusion associated with a disaster typically cause numerous problems with law enforcement tasks. Commanders should evaluate the potential for law enforcement support as part of their unit’s initial assessment and provide their assessment to their state joint task force headquarters. Commanders must impress upon their subordinates that they must refrain from law enforcement activities except as authorized.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR: Es ist nicht nur eine Behörde – es ist ein ganzes Imperium. Geheimpolizei und Nachrichtendienste in einer einzigen Institution. Die Staatssicherheit durchdringt die Gesellschaft komplett. Ihre Informanten sind überall. In Gerichten und Behörden, am Arbeitsplatz, in der eigenen Familie – in Ost, aber auch in West. Wie die Stasi zu dem geworden ist, zeigt “Feind ist, wer anders denkt – Geheimnisse der Stasi”. Auch heute noch. Denn die STASI-Agenten leben mitten unter uns und haben den staatlichen Machtapparat längst gründlich zersetzt.
Wie heisst es so schön. Der Fisch stinkt vom Kopf her…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
This Reference Help analyzes strategies and targets gathered from an audit of assaults or upset psychological oppressor activities from 2012-2018 connected to either Lebanese Hizballah (LH) or Iran. It recognizes practices and pointers that may ascend to the level for suspicious movement detailing in zones, for example, enlistment, procurement of mastery, materiel and weapons stockpiling, target type, and operational safety efforts, which could help bureaucratic, state, nearby, inborn, and regional government counterterrorism organizations, law requirement authorities, and private division accomplices in identifying, forestalling, acquiring, and disturbing potential psychological oppressor action in the Country. This Reference Help doesn’t suggest these pointers would fundamentally be watched or distinguished in each circumstance or that LH and Iran essentially utilize similar strategies or exhibit similar markers. A portion of these identification openings may come throughout typical examinations concerning criminal operations in the US, for example, unlawful travel or sneaking of medications, weapons, or money, and lead to the revelation of pre-operational action. An adaptation of this Reference Help’s infographic was additionally included as a supplement to a recently distributed Insight Evaluation. Data in this Reference Help is present starting at 16 May 2019.
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The FBI has watched digital entertainers bypassing multifaceted verification through normal social building and specialized assaults. This Stick clarifies these techniques and offers relief procedures for associations and elements utilizing multifaceted confirmation in their security endeavors. Multifaceted validation keeps on being a solid and compelling safety effort to secure online records, as long as clients play it safe to guarantee they don’t succumb to these assaults.
Multifaceted validation is the utilization of an assortment of strategies to affirm a client’s personality rather than just utilizing a username and secret phrase. Regularly this sort of verification utilizes an optional token which changes after some time to give a one-time password, yet numerous organizations currently utilize biometrics or social data, for example, time of day, geolocation, or IP address—as a type of validation.
Danger Diagram
FBI detailing distinguished a few strategies digital on-screen characters use to go around prevalent multifaceted verification systems so as to acquire the one-time password and access ensured accounts. The essential techniques are social building assaults which assault the clients and specialized assaults which target web code.
In 2019 a US banking establishment was focused by a digital assailant who had the option to exploit a blemish in the bank’s site to evade the two-factor confirmation actualized to ensure accounts. The digital assailant signed in with taken injured individual accreditations and, when arriving at the optional page where the client would typically need to enter a Stick and answer a security question, the aggressor entered a controlled string into the Internet URL setting the PC as one perceived on the record. This enabled him to sidestep the Stick and security question pages and start wire moves
from the exploited people’s records.
In 2016 clients of a US banking establishment were focused by a digital assailant who ported their telephone numbers to a telephone he possessed—an assault called SIM swapping. The aggressor considered the telephone organizations’ client care delegates, discovering some who were all the more ready to give him data to finish the SIM swap. When the aggressor had command over the clients’ telephone numbers, he called the bank to demand a wire move from the unfortunate casualties’ records to another record he possessed. The bank,
perceiving the telephone number as having a place with the client, didn’t request full security questions yet mentioned a one-time code sent to the telephone number from which he was calling. He additionally mentioned to change PINs and passwords and had the option to connect unfortunate casualties’ charge card numbers to a versatile installment application.
Through the span of 2018 and 2019, the FBI’s Web Wrongdoing Grievance Center and FBI unfortunate casualty grumblings watched the above assault—SIM swapping—as a typical strategy from digital culprits trying to go around two-factor validation. Casualties of these assaults have had their telephone numbers taken, their financial balances depleted, and their passwords and PINs changed. A large number of these assaults depend on socially building client care agents for significant telephone organizations, who offer data to the assailants.
In February 2019 a digital security master at the RSA Gathering in San Francisco, exhibited a huge assortment of plans and assaults digital on-screen characters could use to dodge multifaceted validation. The security master exhibited ongoing instances of how digital entertainers could utilize man-in-the-center assaults and session capturing to block the traffic between a client and a site to lead these assaults and keep up access for whatever length of time that conceivable. He likewise showed social building assaults, including phishing plans or fake instant messages implying to be a bank or other help to make a client sign into a phony site and surrender their private data.
At the June 2019 Hack-in-the-Crate gathering in Amsterdam, digital security specialists exhibited a couple of devices—Muraena and NecroBrowser—which worked pair to robotize a phishing plan against clients of multifaceted confirmation. The Muraena instrument captures traffic between a client and an objective site where they are mentioned to enter login qualifications and a token code not surprisingly. When validated, NecroBrowser stores the information for the casualties of this assault and seizes the session treat, permitting digital on-screen characters to sign into these private records, take them over, and change client passwords and recuperation email addresses while keeping up access as far as might be feasible.
Moderation Systems
Guarding against multifaceted confirmation assaults requires consciousness of the assaults which evade the security and consistent watchfulness for social designing assaults.
Instruct clients and heads to distinguish social building deceit—how to perceive counterfeit sites, not tap on maverick connections in email, or square those connections altogether—and show them how to deal with basic social designing strategies.
Consider utilizing extra or progressively complex types of multifaceted validation for clients and overseers, for example, biometrics or conduct verification strategies, however this may add burden to these clients.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The following heavily redacted version of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan from U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) CONPLAN 3500-14 was obtained via a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Page Count: 17 pages
Date: July 17, 2014
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: U.S. Northern Command
File Type: pdf
File Size: 851,968 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): C2F49B4A19798466175590F47D0A8953E431D4DDA0F773B1FDE40AB88EDA3E6D
1. (U) Situation
a. (U) Purpose. This branch plan provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the support of the Board of Governors of the federal Reserve System to ensure the effective execution of a National Essential Function (NEF).
…
c. (U) Friendly Forces
(1) (U) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve System (FRS) is the central bank of the United States. The primary responsibility of the Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors is to formulate and administer the Nation’s monetary policy. The Board of Governors operates as a USG Agency.
…
(b) (U) Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems. Oversees the operations of the independent Federal Reserve Banks and of the FRS Law Enforcement program.
(c) (U) Office of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity. The Director of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity is the supported entity for the transportation of monetary instruments within the USNORTHCOM AOR.
…
(c) (U) Commercial passenger flights are restricted during certain national emergencies.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Die angebliche Stadt Bielefeld hat 1 Mio Euro für den Beweis ihrer Nicht-Existenz ausgelobt. Das Deutsche Spionagemuseum erbringt den Beweis: Bielefeld ist eine Erfindung der Stasi zur Tarnung einer Bunkeranlage und der BND hatte trotz mehrfacher Dementis Kenntnis von der „Aktion Biele Feld“.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
This Reference Aid analyzes strategies and targets earned from a survey of assaults or disturbed fear based oppressor activities from 2012-2018 connected to either Lebanese Hizballah (LH) or Iran. It recognizes practices and pointers that may ascend to the level for suspicious movement announcing in regions, for example, enrollment, obtaining of ability, materiel and weapons stockpiling, target type, and operational safety efforts, which could help administrative, state, neighborhood, inborn, and regional government counterterrorism offices, law requirement authorities, and private area accomplices in distinguishing, counteracting, seizing, and disturbing potential fear monger action in the Homeland. This Reference Aid doesn’t suggest these pointers would fundamentally be watched or recognized in each circumstance or that LH and Iran essentially utilize similar strategies or exhibit similar markers. A portion of these identification openings may come over the span of ordinary examinations concerning criminal operations in the United States, for example, unlawful travel or carrying of medications, weapons, or money, and lead to the disclosure of pre-operational movement. A rendition of this Reference Aid’s infographic was additionally included as a supplement to a recently distributed Intelligence Assessment. Data in this Reference Aid is present starting at 16 May 2019.
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
When the UK ceases to be a member of the EU in October 2019 all rights and reciprocal arrangements with the EU end.
The UK reverts fully to ‘third country’ status. The relationship between the UK and the EU as a whole is unsympathetic, with many MS (under pressure from the Commission) unwilling to engage bilaterally and implementing protections unilaterally, though some MS may be more understanding.
No bilateral deals have been concluded with individual member states with the exception of the reciprocal agreement on social security coordination with Ireland. EU Citizens living in the UK can retain broadly all rights and status that they were entitled to prior to exit from the EU, at the point of exit.
Public and business readiness for a no-deal will remain at a low level, and will decrease to lower levels, because the absence of a clear decision on the form of EU Exit (customs union, no deal etc) does not provide a concrete situation for third parties to prepare for. Readiness will be further limited by increasing EU Exit fatigue, due to the second extension of Article 50, which will limit the effective impact of current preparedness communication. [To be reviewed]
Business readiness will not be uniform – in general larger businesses across sectors are more likely to have better developed contingency plans than small and medium sized businesses. Business readiness will be compounded by seasonal effects, impacting on factors such as warehouse availability.
Concurrent risks associated with autumn and winter such as severe weather, flooding and seasonal flu could exacerbate a number of impacts and stretch resources of partners and responders.
Private sector companies’ behaviour will be governed by commercial considerations, unless influenced otherwise.
HMG will act lawfully and in accordance with the rule of law, including by identifying the powers it is using to take specific actions.
…
Key planning assumptions
1. For the purpose of freight flow and traffic· management as 31 October is a Thursday, day 1 of exit is now on a Friday rather than the weekend which is not to our advantage. Exit day may coincide with end of October half term school holidays, which vary across the UK. (CCS/DExEU)
2. In a small number of instances where the impacts of Brexit would be felt negatively in the EU as well as in the UK, Member States may act in way which could also benefit the UK (e.g. energy for Ireland). (CCS/DExEU)
3. France will impose EU mandatory controls on UK goods on Day 1 No Deal (D1 ND) and have built infrastructure and IT system to manage and process customs declarations and support a risk based control regime. On D1 ND, between 50-85% of HGVs travelling via the short Channel Straits may not be ready for French customs. The lack of trader readiness combined with 1.imited space in French ports to hold “unready” HGVs could reduce the flow rate to 40-60% of current levels within one day as unready HGVs will fill the ports and block flow. The worst disruption to the short Channel Straits might last for up to 3 months before it improves by a significant level to around 50-70% (due to more traders getting prepared), although there could continue to be some disruption for significantly longer. In the event of serious disruption, the French might act to ensure some flow through the short Channel crossings. Disruption to flow across the short Channel Straits would also cause significant queues in Kent and delays to HGVs attempting to use the routes to travel to France. In a reasonable worst case scenario, HGVs ·could face maximum delays of 1.5-2.5 days before being able to cross the border. HGVs that are caught up in congestion in the UK will be unable to return to the EU to collect another load and a proportion of logistics firms may decide to avoid the route should there be significant and prolonged disruption. Analysis to date has suggested a low risk of significant sustained queues at ports outside of Kent which have high volumes of EU traffic, but BDG will continue to work directly with stakeholders at those ports to support planning readiness (BDG/DfT)
4. UK citizens travelling to and from the EU may be subject to increased immigration checks at EU border posts. This may lead to passenger delays at St Pancras, Cheriton (Channel Tunnel) and Dover where juxtaposed controls are in place. Dependent on the plans EU Member States put in place to cope with these in.creased immigration checks it is likely that delays will occur for UK arrivals and departures at EU airports and ports. This could cause some disruption on transport services. TraveUers may decide to use alternative routes to complete their journey. (BDG/FCO/HO/DfT)
5. Demand for energy will be met and there will be no disruption to electricity or gas interconnectors. In NI there will be not be immediate disruption to electricity supply on Day 1. A rapid SEM split could occur months or years after E~ Exit. In this event, there would not be security of supply issues. However, there will likely be significant electricity price increases for consumers (business and domestic), with associated wider economic and political impacts. Some participants could exit the market, thereby exacerbating the economic and political impacts. (BEIS)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The FBI identified incidents over the past few months in which cyber actors scanned for and sought to exploit audio and visual communication devices on networks to identify vulnerabilities which could later be used to gain access and unlawfully acquire information about the organization. In addition to targeting corporate information, vulnerable devices may be targeted for compromise for use in botnets or other criminal activities. The types of devices targeted include: Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phones, video conferencing equipment, conference phones, VoIP routers, and cloud-based communication systems. While cyber actors have targeted VoIP and other communication devices in the past, the FBI continues to see these devices scanned by cyber actors for vulnerabilities.
Threat
Specifically, the FBI observed cyber actors identifying and probing communication devices by issuing HTTP GET requestsa to a business server or network to retrieve device configuration files. Information contained in configuration files often reveals IP addresses, usernames, passwords, system management URLs, and assigned phone numbers – all of which could be used by cyber actors for malicious purposes. Many of the requests are specific to particular brands of devices. Victims will often receive several GET requests in succession with the actors scanning for multiple brands of devices.
In addition, cyber actors retrieve IP addresses for further exploitation by using businesses’ customer service VoIP hyperlinks, which are traditionally made available for customers to use in contacting the business. Once those hyperlinked calls are answered, the actor retrieves the IP address belonging to the phone which answered the call. Once the IP address is retrieved, an actor could send a large volume of packets to the IP address, overloading it and taking the service offline for the targeted business and its legitimate customers.
In addition to the above techniques, cyber actors target devices with brute-force attacks, attempting unauthorized access through the use of common usernames and passwords. Open source scanning tools can also be used to identify vulnerable communication devices and any associated ports.
All of the information obtained through scans and other methods are likely used for specific targeting efforts by cyber actors. This includes leveraging access to compromised audio and video devices to eavesdrop on meetings or conference calls, placing fraudulent international phone calls, leveraging the compromised device for use in botnets, and conducting man-in-the-middle attacks to redirect corporate network traffic.
Recommendations
The following recommendations may limit the success of these types of attacks:
Conduct daily server log reviews to identify unusual activity, including GET and POST requests from external IP addresses.
Work with the communication device/system providers to ensure servers are patched and updated regularly.
Consider restricting access to configuration files or configuring firewalls to block traffic from unauthorized IP addresses.
Restrict communication devices/systems to only non-sensitive business networks.
Conduct regular penetration testing exercises on communication devices to identify and address vulnerabilities in a timely matter.
Enable encryption on teleconference programs and applications and consider disabling auto-answer capabilities.
Password protect configuration files, if possible.
Regularly review and update users with access to administrative accounts.
Segment configuration files on the network. Be sure to protect configuration and other device-related files after getting the device out of the box. Don’t just plug and play.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
This paper explores the PLA’s theory of victory in modern warfare and its implications for how China plans to fight the United States. It is a primer on the theory’s foundational concepts, and on what the theory reveals about China’s strategic intent and ambitions.
(U) Executive Summary
(U//FOUO/RELIDO) China plans to defeat powerful adversaries by systematically targeting the linkages and nodes that hold an advanced network-centric force together as a cohesive whole. The PLA calls this theory of victory “systems attack and destruction warfare,” hereafter, “system attack. Authoritative PLA doctrine emphasizes importance of system attack as China’s “basic operational method” of warfare. System attack is perhaps best remembered as “the American way of war with Chinese characteristics,” since the PLA developed the concept based on observing U.S. military victories In the 1990s. Some of the PLA’s writings on systems attack are clearly aspirational, but this does not preclude the effectiveness of the approach, and the doctrine shows that the Pl.A is thinking seriously and realistically about how to defeat.an advanced adversary. The requirements of system attack are actively driving PLA reform, acquisitions, operations and training, and the doctrine telegraphs how Chine intends to fight.
(U) China’s Theory of War: “‘Systems Confrontation•
• (U//FOUO/RELIDO) 1 +1>2. Operational Systems are Greater Than the Sum of their Parts. Fundamental to China’s theory of victory is the PLA’s concept that modem military forces are “‘systems of systems” which are stronger and more efficient than their components would be in isolation because they are linked and networked together through communications and information systems architecture.
• (U//FOUO/RELIDO) Systems Confrontation: The PLA’s theory of modern warfare, therefore, is “systems confrontation,” or competition between these rival “systems of systems,” rather than as a linear contest between discrete units or services of competing armies.
(U) China’s Theory of Victory: System Attack – Win by Fragmenting the Enemy’s Force
(U//FOUO/RELIDO) Create the Conditions for Winning the War: Make 1 +1<2. The PLA plans to defeat an advanced adversary by thoroughly fragmenting the adversary’s system into isolated component parts. The first step of systems attack, therefore, Is to break the essential links and nodes that promote system cohesion in order to sow confusion, degrade communications and disorient adversary leadership. System attack’s ultimate goal ls to paralyze the adversary force, degrading its ability to resist, eroding leadership will to fight and slowing adversary decision-making. China believes that whichever side has a more networked, integrated and cohesive force will have a shorter OODA loop, be able to act more efficiently, and have a better likelihood of victory. Attacks will take place across all domains to degrade the system as a whole rather than focusing on attrition.
• (U//FOUO/REUDO) Fragment the Force: Degrade Data-Flow and C2. The PLA prioritizes degrading or denying an adversary’s use of information early in a crisis and with greater intensity through a conflict. The PLA envisions using kinetic and non-kinetic operations to target an opponent’s data links, communications, military networks, and information systems architecture early in the conflict. Degrading adversary communications amplifies the effects of missile and air strikes against command and control (C2) nodes, including command centers, flagships, and military and civilian leadership.
• (U//FOUO/REUDO) Blind the Enemy. Deny ISR and Early Warning. China will try to degrade adversary decision-making and awareness by targeting its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and early warning capabilities, including key space-based collection systems, theater ISR platforms, intelligence centers and satellites.
• (U//FOUO/RELIDO) Own the Initiative: Getting Inside the Adversary OODA Loop. China plans to seize first mover advantage by initiating conflict when the adversary is not prepared. The PLA will try to maintain battlefield initiative by forcing adversaries into a reactive cycle driven by a rapid tempo of unexpected long-range strikes, asymmetric attacks, and harassing attacks.
• (U//FOUO/RELIDO) More Return on Investment Precision Strikes Enable Outsized Effects. The PLA will rely on highly targeted precision strikes against key links and nodes to achieve an outsized effect on the enemy force’s overall stability and effectiveness. Kinetic precision strikes will be complemented by non-kinetic attacks, especially against adversary networks, datalinks, and information systems.
(U/FOUO/RELIDO) Using the Full Against the Fragmentary, Defeating the Slow with the Rapid. System attacks are designed to enable following operations. Once system attacks have fragmented the adversary military so that it cannot operate as a cohesive force, the PLA will commit its broader intact and networked force to combat. Having tilted the battlefield In its own favor, the PLA will carry out supplemental attacks that ensure the adversary•s system does not recover while gradually attriting the adversary’s aircraft, ships, submarines, and other long-range-strike platforms. Sequencing system attacks first enables the PLA to achieve greater effect with lower risk to its force or mission.
• (U//FOUO/RELIDO) China Expects to Have Its System Targeted Too. China expects that the U.S. will try to degrade the PLA’s ability to operate as a coherent force, having developed the systems attack doctrine described above by watching how the United States fights. The PLA therefore is training and equipping the force to operate independently, autonomously, and resiliently, with a notable emphasis on operating in a complex electromagnetic environment.
(U//FOUO/RELIDO) Aspiration Does Not Equal Capability, but It Signals Intent. In PLA doctrine, the rough sequence of operations enabled by systems attacks would be familiar to U.S. military operators: achieve air superiority, then use air superiority to seize maritime superiority and enable ground operations, then use maritime superiority to execute attacks from the sea to the land. The last part of this sequence is aspirational, since China does not currently field ship-launched land attack cruise missiles and its nascent aircraft carrier program is unable to carry out strike warfare. It is, however, how the PLA says it wants to be able to fight, and its acquisitions and training reflect this ambition. China’s doctrine is reflected in its acquisitions and training patterns today. Tomorrow it will be reflected in its operations. The PLA is progressing rapidly. This is how they will fight.
(U) A Note on Sources:
(U//FOUO) The findings of this paper are derived from China’s most authoritative government and military doctrinal writings: The Importance of system of systems confrontation is evident in its inclusion In the 2015 Defense White Paper on Military Strategy. All other details are derived from the 2015 and 2013 editions of the Science of Military Strategy, and .from an unclassified 2018 RAND Corporation study, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation .Army Seeks to Wage Modem Warfare. General assessments on PLA acquisitions, training and operations are reflected in a wide body of unclassified open source materials from 2000 through the present For ease of sourcing, we cited the 2017 Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Executive Summary:
Commanders ensure operational security (OPSEC) is practiced during all phases of operations. OPSEC is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities. As adversary analysts apply more information to an analytical model, the likelihood increases that the analytical model will replicate the observed force. Thus, current and future capabilities and courses of action can be revealed and compromised.
…
2. Operational Context
a. Joint forces often display personnel, organizations, assets, and actions to public view and to a variety of adversary intelligence collection activities, including sensors and systems. Joint forces can be under observation at their peacetime bases and locations, in training or exercises, while moving, or when deployed conducting actual operations. The actions or behavior of military family members and businesses associated with or supporting military operations are also subject to observation by adversaries, which could equally be associated with activities or operations of the joint force. Frequently, when a force performs a particular activity or operation a number of times, it establishes a pattern of behavior. Within this pattern, certain unique, particular, or special types of information might be associated with an activity or operation. Even though this information may be unclassified, it can expose US military operations to observation and/or attack. Commanders ensure OPSEC is practiced during all phases of operations. OPSEC is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities. In addition, the adversary could compile and correlate enough information to predict and counter US operations.
b. Commanders cannot limit their protection efforts to a particular operational area or threat. With continuing rapid advancement and global use of communications systems and information technology, easily obtainable technical collection tools, and the growing use of the Internet and various social and mass media outlets, the ability to collect critical information virtually from anywhere in the world and threaten US military operations continues to expand. To prevent or reduce successful adversary collection and exploitation of US critical information, the commander should formulate a prudent, practical, timely, and effective OPSEC program. Additionally, the commander’s OPSEC program must establish, resource, and maintain formal OPSEC programs. The commander should formulate these OPSEC programs to be prudent, practical, timely, and effective.
c. In OPSEC usage, an indicator is data derived from friendly detectable actions and open-source information that adversaries can interpret and piece together to reach conclusions or estimates of friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities. Selected indicators can be developed into an analytical model or profile of how a force prepares and how it operates. An indication is an observed specific occurrence or instance of an indicator. OPSEC indicators are friendly detectable actions and open-source information that can be interpreted or pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information.
d. Adversary intelligence personnel continuously analyze and interpret collected information to validate and/or refine the model. As adversary analysts apply more information to the analytical model, the likelihood increases that the analytical model will replicate the observed force. Thus, current and future capabilities and courses of action (COAs) can be revealed and compromised. Critical information consists of specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by adversaries to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. Critical information can be either classified or unclassified.
e. OPSEC considerations must also be observed while working with interagency partners.
…
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Executive Summary:
(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide information on the recent video appearance by the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The video addresses the group’s territorial defeat in Syria, discusses the acceptance of pledges of allegiance from ISIS supporters, and praises recent attacks in Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia. This JIB is provided by the FBI, DHS, and NCTC to support their respective activities and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and private sector security partners in deterring, preventing, or disrupting terrorist attacks against the United States. All video details described in this JIB are taken from the translated transcript of Baghdadi’s speech. The information cutoff date is 1 May 2019.
(U) Details of ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Video Message
(U//FOUO) On 29 April 2019, ISIS’s al-Furqan Media Establishment publicly released an 18-minute video message in Arabic titled “In the Company of the Amir of the Believers”, which shows ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sitting on a carpet in an undisclosed location with an assault rifle at his side. This is Baghdadi’s first public statement since his August 2018 audio message, and his first video appearance since July 2014, when Baghdadi was filmed introducing himself as “caliph” of the newly-declared caliphate at the Grand Mosque in Mosul, Iraq.
(U) Baghdadi Vows a “Long Battle Ahead” Despite Defeat in Syria
• (U//FOUO) Baghdadi emphasizes that ISIS’s fight is not over, stating, “In truth, the battle between Islam and its people with the Cross and its people is long.” He further explains that ISIS is engaged in a multigenerational struggle and they plan to wear down their enemies with attrition, emphasizing that “jihad will continue until Judgement Day” and that “God Almighty ordered us to wage jihad and did not order us to achieve victory.”
• (U//FOUO) Baghdadi acknowledges that ISIS lost the war in Baghuz, Syria, but emphasizes that the “bravery, steadfastness, and endurance of the Ummah of Islam was evident.” He states that ISIS’s soldiers did not abandon their faith during the battle, and sacrificed their lives rather than giving away land to ISIS’s enemies.
• (U//FOUO) Baghdadi praises the members in all of ISIS’s provinces for their “unified raid to avenge their brothers in Syria, which amounted to 92 operations in eight countries.” He states these attacks indicate the cohesion and steadfastness of the “mujahedeen.” Baghdadi praises and thanks the now-deceased emirs, provincial governors, military personnel, and media members from various countries for their support to ISIS.
(U) Baghdadi Praised the Attacks in Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia and Calls for Additional Operations
• (U//FOUO) Video footage displays the Sri Lanka attackers—who conducted a series of suicide bombings against luxury hotels and Christian churches in Sri Lanka on 21 April, killing approximately 250 people—pledging allegiance to Baghdadi, while audio of purportedly Baghdadi’s voice is heard stating, “You brothers in Sri Lanka have pleased the monotheists by their commando operations that unsettled the Crusaders in their Easter celebrate to avenge their brothers in Baghuz.” Baghdadi continues with “praise be to God, for among those killed were some Americans and Europeans.” Baghdadi congratulates the Sri Lanka attackers on their pledge of allegiance to join the “caliphate,” and asked God to accept them as martyrs.
• (U//FOUO) Baghdadi acknowledges the attack in Saudi Arabia—where ISIS fighters attacked a Saudi security building in Az Zulfi on 21 April—and asked God that it be “followed by another one.” He calls on members in Saudi Arabia “to continue down the path of jihad” against the Saudi regime.
• (U//FOUO) While Baghdadi appears in discussion with unidentified men, text on the screen indicates he was giving directives to “double the effort and intensify the blows against the Crusaders, apostates, and their supporters.”
(U) Baghdadi Accepts Pledges of Allegiance and Praises Global Network
• (U//FOUO) The video shows Baghdadi being handed booklets by one of the unidentified men which are labeled with the names of ISIS provinces, including Libya, Khorasan, Somalia, Yemen, Caucasus, West Africa, Central Africa, and Turkey, as well as Tunisia, which is not publicly identified as a province. This is the first time ISIS has referred to Turkey as an official province, or “wilayah,” in its media releases.
• (U//FOUO) Additionally, Baghdadi accepts pledges of allegiance from ISIS members in Burkina Faso and Mali, and congratulates them for joining the “caliphate.” He recommends they intensify their attacks against France and its allies and to avenge their brothers in Iraq and Syria.
• (U//FOUO) Baghdadi congratulates ISIS members in Libya for their resoluteness and their raid on the town of Al Fugaha, Libya. He states that despite their withdrawal from it, they have shown their enemies that they are capable of taking the initiative, knowing their battle today is a battle of attrition.
(U) Baghdadi’s Image Starkly Contrasts with Last Appearance in 2014
(U//FOUO) The video’s presentation of Baghdadi as an insurgent leader—similar to the images of now-deceased al-Qa‘ida (AQ) leader Usama Bin Laden and now-deceased AQ in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from prior videos—contrasts with Baghdadi’s July 2014 appearance at the Grand Mosque in Mosul, Iraq, where he delivered a formal address from the mosque’s pulpit wearing a black turban and robe probably to evoke images of the last caliphs who ruled from Baghdad.
(U) Outlook
(U//FOUO) The FBI, DHS, and NCTC assess Baghdadi’s appearance almost certainly will bolster the morale for ISIS’s existing supporters around the world, including those in the United States, by indicating Baghdadi is alive and in control of the group as of late April 2019. Most homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) generally do not mobilize to violence in response to specific events and instead are usually influenced by a confluence of sociopolitical, ideological, and personal factors.a However, those wavering in their commitment to ISIS might feel a sense of renewed devotion to the group as Baghdadi is alive and apparently still managing ISIS.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
(U//FOUO) NCTC (National Counterterrorism) assesses that the Sunni extremist threat to the US before 9/11 was characterized by diverse extremist organizations and lone actors motivated by multiple ideological narratives and other factors, including Salafi jihadism, Palestinian nationalism, theological disputes within Islam, anti-Semitism, and anti-Hindu sentiments. We have identified a dozen successful attacks, four disrupted plots, and one attempt to set up an extremist training camp in the US between 1973 and 2001, underscoring the persistent threat from al-Qa‘ida–associated extremists, Palestinian terrorist groups, and Sunni extremist lone actors in the decades leading up to 9/11.
These extremists chose a wide array of targets, with the majority of their attacks before 1993 focused on Hindu, Jewish, or Muslim individuals or institutions. Most attacks after that date were against civilian or US Government targets, because of al-Qa‘ida–associated extremists’ focus on indiscriminate mass casualty attacks. In some cases, we lack clear insight into the attackers’ motivations because of information gaps, and FBI disagrees about the motivations underlying two of these attacks.
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Discussed below are the requirements of each of the three documents comprising a Title III application: the Application, the Affidavit, and the Order. These requirements, which are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518, are applicable to requests to the court for an order authorizing the interception of oral, wire, and/or electronic communications.
[cited in JM 9-7.010]
The Application should meet the following requirements:
[updated October 2012]
The Affidavit must meet the following requirements:
It is most important that this section be tailored to the facts of the specific case and be more than a recitation of “boiler plate.” The affidavit must discuss the particular problems involved in the investigation in order to fulfill the requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). The affidavit should explain specifically why other normally utilized investigative techniques, such as physical surveillance or the use of informants and undercover agents, are inadequate in the particular case. For example, if physical surveillance is impossible or unproductive because the suspects live in remote areas or will likely be alerted to law enforcement presence (by counter-surveillance or other means), the affidavit should set forth those facts clearly. If the informants refuse to testify or cannot penetrate the hierarchy of the criminal organization involved, the affidavit should explain why that is so in this particular investigation. If undercover agents cannot be used because the suspects deal only with trusted associates/family, the affidavit must so state and include the particulars. Conclusory generalizations about the difficulties of using a particular investigative technique will not suffice. It is not enough, for example, to state that the use of undercover agents is always difficult in organized crime cases because crime families, in general, deal only with trusted associates. While the affidavit may contain a general statement regarding the impossibility of using undercover agents in organized crime cases, it must also demonstrate that the particular subject or subjects in the instant case deal only with known associates. The key is to tie the inadequacy of a specific investigative technique to the particular facts underlying the investigation. See, e.g., Foy, 641 F.3d at 464 United States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204, 1210-1212 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1989).
The statute also provides for a ten-day grace period, before the thirty-day period begins to run. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). This statutory grace period allows for delays by the service provider in establishing interception capability. The ten-day grace period applies only to the initial installation of equipment or establishment of interceptions, and may not be used in an extension application, or in an original application when the equipment is already installed.
Some courts have consulted Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for guidance on the method to calculate the thirty-day period under the statute, and have held that the thirty-day period begins to run on the date after the order was signed, even if the interception started on the same day that it was signed. See United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 575 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Villegas, 1993 WL 535013, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1993); United States v. Gerena, 695 F. Supp. 649, 658 (D. Conn. 1988);United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 317 (S.D. Fla. 1971); but see United States v. Gangi, 33 F. Supp. 2d 303, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Pichardo, 1999 WL 649020, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1999). In an abundance of caution, however, OEO recommends that the thirty-day period be calculated from the date and time that the order is signed. OEO further suggests that an applicant adhere to established practice regarding the calculation of the thirty-day period in the applicant’s particular district.
When communications are intercepted that relate to any offense not enumerated in the authorization order, the monitoring agent should report it immediately to the Assistant United States Attorney, who should notify the court at the earliest opportunity. Approval by the issuing judge should be sought for the continued interception of such conversations. While 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) and (2) permit use or disclosure of this information without first obtaining a court order, 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) requires a disclosure order before the information may be used in any proceeding (e.g., before a grand jury).
All wire and oral communications must be minimized in real time. The statute permits after-the-fact minimization for wire and oral communications only when the intercepted communications are in code, or in a foreign language when a foreign language expert is not reasonably available. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). In either event, the minimization must be accomplished as soon as practicable after the interception. Such after-the-fact minimization can be accomplished by an interpreter who listens to and minimizes the communications after they have been recorded, giving only the pertinent communications to the supervising agent. The process utilized must protect the suspect’s privacy interests to approximately the same extent as would contemporaneous minimization, properly applied. United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1991);United States v. Simels, 2009 WL 1924746, at *6-*9 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 2, 2009). After-the-fact minimization provisions should be applied in light of the “reasonableness” standard established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
After-the-fact minimization is a necessity for the interception of electronic communications, such as those in the form of text messages, email, or faxes. In such cases, all communications should be recorded and then examined by a monitoring agent to determine their relevance to the investigation. Further dissemination is then limited to those communications by the subjects or their confederates that are criminal in nature. Further guidance regarding the minimization of text messages may be found on ESU’s DOJNet site.
Department policy requires that a Title III order be obtained in the district where the wireroom is located. This policy change is intended to ensure that all Title III interceptions occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the authorizing court, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). Use of a regional wireroom will only be considered in exceptional circumstances, and must be discussed with the reviewing ESU attorney on a case-by-case basis.
In cases involving interceptions over a stationary facility or at a fixed location, the order may be obtained in the district where the target facility or location is located.
[updated January 2018] [cited in Criminal Resource Manual 90]
The Order must meet the following requirements:
The authorizing language of the order should mirror the requesting language of the application and affidavit, stating that there is probable cause to believe that the named subjects are committing particular Title III predicate offenses (or, in the case of electronic communications, any Federal felony), that particular communications concerning those offenses will be obtained through interception, and that normal investigative techniques have been tried and have failed, or are reasonably unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous to employ. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) and (4). The court then orders (again tracking the language of the application and affidavit) that agents of the investigative agency are authorized to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications over the described facility or at the described premises. Id. The order should also contain language specifying the length of time the interception may be conducted, and, if necessary, authorizing surreptitious and/or forcible entry to effectuate the purpose of the order. Id. The order may also contain language mandating the government to make periodic progress reports (pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6)), and ordering the sealing of those as well as the order, application and affidavit. In the case of a roving interception, the court must make a specific finding that the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) and/or (b) have been demonstrated adequately. Any other special requests, such as enforceability of the order as to changed service providers without further order of the court, should also be authorized specifically in the order.
The court should also issue a technical assistance order to the communications service provider. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4). This is a redacted order that requires the telephone company or other service provider to assist the agents in effecting the electronic surveillance. OEO does not review redacted service provider orders. An order to seal all of the pleadings should also be sought at this time.
The Application, Affidavit, and Order should be sent via email to OEO atESU.Requests@usdoj.gov. Submissions must include a completed Title III cover sheet that includes the signature of a supervising attorney who reviewed and approved the Title III papers. Criminal Division policy requires that all Title III submissions be approved by a supervising attorney other than the attorney submitting the application. That supervisory attorney must sign the Title III cover sheet, demonstrating that he or she has reviewed the affidavit, application, and draft order included in the submission packet, and that, in light of the overall investigative plan for the matter, and taking into account applicable Department policies and procedures, he or she supports the request and approves of it. The Title III cover sheet, with a space for the supervisor’s signature, may be found on ESU’s DOJNet site.
Spinoff requests (e.g., additional applications to conduct electronic surveillance over a new facility or at a new location in the same investigation) and extension requests are reviewed in the same manner as described above. While the exigencies of investigative work occasionally make the normally required lead time impossible, the timeliness with which an application is reviewed and authorized is largely under the control of the Assistant United States Attorney handling the case. When coordinating an investigation or planning extension requests, it is important to allow sufficient time for the Title III application to be reviewed by OEO. OEO strongly recommends that extension requests be submitted up to a week in advance of the date on which the interception period expires.
Questions or requests for assistance may be directed to ESU at (202) 514-6809. Sample Title III forms are available by email from ESU or on ESU’s DOJNet site.
[updated January 2018]
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
A small but growing number of bloggers who appear to be writing from Cuba are using externally hosted websites to voice dissent and developing inventive ways to circumvent government restrictions on Internet access that limit their freedom to post. While the blogs’ emergence has coincided with the move toward more openness in state media about discussing social and economic problems in the past two years, the bloggers go well beyond that limited criticism by blaming the ruling system rather than individuals or external pressure. The government thus far largely has acted indirectly against the bloggers, warning about the dangers of the Internet and reportedly blocking access to a host website. The bloggers tend to express pessimism about prospects for change under Raul Castro, but they currently are not promoting a specific political agenda or calling for any organized movement against the government. Although readership is mostly international, their on-island audience — including possible imitators — is likely to increase if access to information technology becomes more widespread. See the appendices for details on Internet access in Cuba and the individual blogs discussed.
Cuba’s independent blogs have increased in recent years, providing a forum to voice discontent with current conditions and government policies that goes further than the still-limited discussion of problems in state media.
The number of blogs written by private Cuban citizens began increasing significantly in late 2006 and has gained momentum since. Of the 11 most prominent independent blogs, one began in 2005, three in 2006, three in 2007, and four since the beginning of 2008.
Some readers have questioned the bloggers’ credibility, charging them with being either agents of the Cuban Government or Miami-based Cubans. The personal nature of the postings and the absence of an explicit political agenda, however, bolster their claims to be private citizens.
The increase in independent bloggers parallels a move by state media toward more openness about problems on the island, which began in late 2006 and was further encouraged by Raul Castro’s call for more critical discussion about conditions in Cuba (Cubavision, 26 July 2007, 24 September 2007).
The bloggers demonstrate technological savvy in overcoming the Internet access restrictions to create their blogs, but they appear to have difficulty updating them regularly.
While she has not disclosed details in her blog, Generacion Y’s Yoani Sanchez, Cuba’s most prominent blogger, has described in interviews with foreign outlets how she writes blog entries, saves them on a flash memory drive, and uploads them at an Internet cafe (The New York Times, 6 March; The Wall Street Journal, 22 December 2007).
The apparently short-lived Potro Salvaje — whose title “Wild Colt” appears to mock Communications Minister Valdes’s warning in February 2007 that the Internet was a “wild colt” that needed to be controlled (www.cubaminrex.cu) — began on 11 March to provide explicit instructions to on-island Internet users about methods to bypass restrictions. The blog’s most recent post on 8 April highlighted the importance of the flash drive to transport data from one computer to another on the island.
Although many of the blogs are updated frequently, maintenance can be inconsistent — several have been abandoned or moved without notice. Two of the 11 blogs have not been updated since February 2008, despite having had regular posts prior.
…
The Cuban Government appears to have taken an indirect approach to limiting the influence of independent bloggers. It has warned of the dangers of the Internet, and bloggers charge it with monitoring the contents of their blogs and making it difficult to access the blogs.
In addition to calling the Internet a “wild colt,” Valdes said it was “a tool for global extermination” (www.cubaminrex.cu). Youth daily Juventud Rebelde has warned that portable storage devices such as flash drives increase vulnerability to computer viruses (17 April), and Fidel Castro asserted in a letter to the National Union of Writers and Artists (UNEAC) Conference that the Internet and other information technologies are invasions of privacy (Granma, 2 April).
In March, several of the blogs that share the Frankfurt-based Consenso Desde Cuba host website claimed the government was obstructing on-island access.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Executive Summary
Since its founding in 2012, the National Institute of Justice’s Domestic Radicalization to Terrorism program has sponsored research on how radicalization to terrorism occurs in the United States in order to support prevention and intervention efforts. These projects have taken a variety of approaches to examining the process of radicalization to terrorism, but in spite of this there is substantial overlap in their findings, which collectively provide evidence of the importance of several facilitators of radicalization and the need to take into account how this process unfolds within individuals over time.
Facilitators of Radicalization to Terrorism
Terrorist belief systems or narratives
Identity processes
Activities that demonstrate commitment to a terrorist group or cause
Connections with terrorists in one’s offline social network
Connections with terrorists via the internet and/or social media
Group dynamics
Grievances
Triggering events
At the individual level, the radicalization process often involves embracing a terrorist belief system or narrative that identifies particular others or groups as “enemies” and justifies engaging in violence against them. Individuals may also begin to identify themselves as terrorists, as well as to engage in activities that highlight their commitments to their new beliefs, identities, and/or others who hold them. It is, however, important to note that while these beliefs and behaviors may facilitate the movement to terrorism, this outcome is not inevitable. Those close to these individuals may become aware of the changes that their friends and family members are undergoing and attempt to address them or seek help from others who can. An important implication of this is that trusted information and resources need to be available to assist in this effort. Another is that prevention and intervention efforts may benefit from addressing beliefs that justify violence and helping individuals to develop identities in which these beliefs are not central.
…
…
Testing Two Theoretical Perspectives on Radicalization to Terrorism
In their completed NIJ-sponsored research, a team led by the University of Arkansas tested whether role identity theory and framing theory help to explain how individuals and groups radicalize to terrorism (Smith et al., 2016). In doing so, the researchers built on previous research conducted using the American Terrorism Study (ATS) database (e.g., Smith & Damphousse, 2009; Smith, Damphousse, & Roberts, 2006; Smith, Roberts, & Damphousse, 2013) and focused not on testing a complete model of the radicalization process but rather on testing what they viewed to be a crucial component of it: the construction of a terrorist identity. This process is outlined in Figure 2 on page 11.
Several concepts displayed in the figure are central to understanding the analyses the team conducted. The first two are identity salience and identity pervasiveness — both of which are based on the premise that everyone has multiple identities (e.g., as a parent, teacher, musician). If an identity is salient, it is more likely to be brought to bear in a particular situation. If an identity is pervasive, it is more likely to be brought to bear in numerous situations. The researchers hypothesized that individuals with more salient and pervasive terrorist identities would be more likely to engage in terrorism.
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide information on Australian national and violent extremist Brenton Tarrant’s 15 March 2019 attacks on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. These attacks underscore the enduring nature of violent threats posed to faith-based communities. FBI, DHS, and NCTC advise federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and private sector security partners responsible for securing faith-based communities in the Homeland to remain vigilant in light of the enduring threat to faith-based communities posed by domestic extremists (DEs), as well as by homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) who may seek retaliation. This JIB is provided to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and private sector security partners to effectively deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to incidents and terrorist attacks in the United States.
(U) Attack Details
(U//FOUO) On 15 March 2019, New Zealand police arrested an Australian national who appeared to be inspired by a white supremacist ideology and who allegedly conducted a shooting attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. This attack highlights the enduring threat of violence posed to faith-based communities. There are currently 49 victims deceased, and 20 others are listed as being in critical condition following the attack.
» (U//FOUO) On 15 March 2019, at about 1:40 PM local time, Australian national Brenton Tarrant used firearms to attack the Masjid Al Noor Mosque in the city of Christchurch, New Zealand, before conducting a similar shooting attack at the Linwood Masjid Mosque, approximately four miles away. Tarrant drove to the attack sites and livestreamed a video of the attack. Police also discovered improvised explosive devices in a vehicle connected with the attack. Tarrant is currently the only known perpetrator; however, investigation of his movements and associates continues.
» (U//FOUO) Tarrant disseminated a manifesto prior to the shooting which detailed his concerns of perceived “white genocide.” The manifesto contains a wide range of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim views. One reason listed as to why he carried out the attack was “to create conflict…within the United States on the ownership of firearms in order to further the social, cultural, political, and racial divide within the United states [sic].”
» (U//FOUO) Tarrant claimed to have been planning the attack for two years and recently relocated to New Zealand to live temporarily while he “planned and trained.” He claimed to have chosen to conduct his attack in Christchurch three months prior to show such attacks could happen anywhere.
(U) Mosque Attacks Could Incite Like-Minded and Retaliatory Attacks
(U//FOUO) We are concerned online sharing of Tarrant’s livestreamed footage could amplify viewer reaction to the violent attack and possibly incite similar attacks by those adhering to violent extremist ideologies in the United States and abroad, as well as retaliatory attacks from HVEs and individuals otherwise affiliated with foreign terrorist organizations. Tarrant appeared to have been influenced by prior attacks by violent extremists in the United States and other countries, and we remain concerned that US-based DEs of similar ideologies could become inspired by this attack. Although most HVEs generally do not mobilize to violence in response to specific events and instead are usually influenced by a confluence of sociopolitical, ideological, and personal factors, exceptions may occur and we remain concerned for the potential of retaliatory attacks by some HVEs, as we have already seen calls for attacks by violent extremists online.
» (U//FOUO) Tarrant claimed Norwegian mass attacker Anders Brevik gave his “blessing” for the attack. Tarrant’s ammunition cases also displayed handwritten names of violent extremists in Canada and elsewhere who previously conducted violent attacks on Muslims or in support of violent extremist ideologies.
» (U//FOUO) An examination of online jihadist media following the mosque attacks indicates various al-Qa‘ida and ISIS supporters are posting attack images to express outrage and are calling upon all Muslims to respond to the New Zealand attacks by launching their own near-term attacks in retaliation.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The FBI has identified successful spearphishing campaigns directed at college and university students, especially during periods when financial aid funds are disbursed in large volumes. In general, the spearphishing emails request students’ login credentials for the University’s internal intranet. The cyber criminals then capture students’ login credentials, and after gaining access, change the students’ direct deposit destination to bank accounts within the threat actor’s control.
Threat
In February 2018, the FBI received notification of a spearphishing campaign targeting students at an identified University in the south eastern United States. The campaign occurred in January 2018 when an unidentified number of students attending the University received an email requesting their login credentials for the University’s internal intranet. Using the University’s intranet portal, the cyber criminals accessed a third-party vendor that manages the disbursement of financial aid to students and changed the direct deposit information for 21 identified students to bank accounts under the cyber criminal’s control. The threat actor stole approximately $75,000 from the 21 students. The student accounts were accessed by at least 13 identified US Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
On 31 August 2018, the Department of Education identified a similar spearphishing campaign targeting multiple institutions of higher education. In this campaign, the cyber criminals sent students an email inviting them to view and confirm their updated billing statement by logging into the school’s student portal. After gaining access, the cyber criminals changed the students’ direct deposit destinations to bank accounts under the threat actor’s control.
The nature of the spearphishing emails indicates the cyber criminals conducted reconnaissance of the target institutions and understand the schools’ use of student portals and third-party vendors for processing student loan payment information. In addition, the timing of the campaigns indicates the cyber criminals almost certainly launched these campaigns to coincide with periods when financial aid funds are disseminated in large volumes.
Recommendations
The FBI recommends providers implement the preventative measures listed below to help secure their systems from attacks:
Notify all students of the phishing attempts and encourage them to be extra vigilant
Implement two-factor authentication for access to sensitive systems and information
Monitor student login attempts from unusual IP addresses and other anomalous activity
Educate students on appropriate preventative and reactive actions to known criminal schemes and social engineering threats
Apply extra scrutiny to e-mail messages with links or attachments directed toward students
Apply extra scrutiny to bank information initiated by the students seeking to update or change direct deposit credentials
Direct students to forward any suspicious requests for personal information to the information technology or security department
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
(U//FOUO) On January 27, 2019 at approximately 12:15pm local time, a vehicle resembling an ambulance and laden with explosives detonated after it passed through a police checkpoint in Kabul, Afghanistan. The explosion killed more than 100 people and wounded approximately 235 others. According to the deputy spokesperson for the Afghanistan Interior Ministry, the vehicle was painted to resemble an ambulance and had successfully passed through a checkpoint after the attacker allegedly told police he was transporting a patient to a nearby hospital. While stopped at a second checkpoint farther inside the city limits, the attacker detonated the explosives concealed in the vehicle. The explosion occurred in an area known as Chicken Street, which includes a prominent shopping zone and is in close proximity to foreign embassies and government buildings. A Taliban spokesman released a statement claiming responsibility and alleged the attack was in retaliation to an increased presence of U.S. troops and an increase in airstrikes throughout Afghanistan.
(U//FOUO) Individuals may consider using a variety of official vehicles or altering vehicles to look like official vehicles to further their terrorist objectives. The use of ambulances, law enforcement vehicles, fire vehicles, or other government vehicles could enable attackers to enter into secure areas to access sensitive sites or carry attackers, weapons, and/or explosives to an intended target location. Individuals may clone first responder vehicles by modifying unofficial vehicles with paint and decals to make them appear to be official; steal vehicles from residences, vulnerable vehicle lots, or while first responders are at a scene; or purchase retired, official vehicles and potentially re-equip them with equipment that was removed prior to sale to make them appear more legitimate. Incidents involving stealing or cloning first responder vehicles in the United States have often been associated with criminal activity, but individuals in the United States could also gain insight from international attacks to attempt similar tactical use of emergency response and government vehicles in terrorist attacks in the United States.
(U//FOUO) First responders should follow agency protocols for responding to suspicious incidents and safeguarding equipment and vehicles. The following non-exhaustive list identifies potential indicators of misuse or misrepresentation of first responder vehicles.
(U//FOUO) Drivers of government vehicles who are not knowledgeable or who become increasingly nervous when questioned about the organization represented on the vehicle they are driving
(U//FOUO) Incorrect vehicle decals, verbiage, colors, word font, and size
(U//FOUO) Visible identifiers, such as phone number or license plates, that are inconsistent with the vehicle’s operating area or mission are very suspicous.
(U//FOUO) Heavily loaded vehicles, possibly beyond capacity must be considered as dangerous.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The FBI is the lead federal agency for investigating cyber attacks by criminals, overseas adversaries, and terrorists. The threat is incredibly serious—and growing. Cyber intrusions are becoming more commonplace, more dangerous, and more sophisticated. Our nation’s critical infrastructure, including both private and public sector networks, are targeted by adversaries. American companies are targeted for trade secrets and other sensitive corporate data, and universities for their cutting-edge research and development. Citizens are targeted by fraudsters and identity thieves, and children are targeted by online predators. Just as the FBI transformed itself to better address the terrorist threat after the 9/11 attacks, it is undertaking a similar transformation to address the pervasive and evolving cyber threat. This means enhancing the Cyber Division’s investigative capacity to sharpen its focus on intrusions into government and private computer networks.
For more information on the FBI’s cyber security efforts, read our “Addressing Threats to the Nation’s Cybersecurity” brochure.
The collective impact is staggering. Billions of dollars are lost every year repairing systems hit by such attacks. Some take down vital systems, disrupting and sometimes disabling the work of hospitals, banks, and 9-1-1 services around the country.
Who is behind such attacks? It runs the gamut—from computer geeks looking for bragging rights…to businesses trying to gain an upper hand in the marketplace by hacking competitor websites, from rings of criminals wanting to steal your personal information and sell it on black markets…to spies and terrorists looking to rob our nation of vital information or launch cyber strikes.
Today, these computer intrusion cases—counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal—are the paramount priorities of our cyber program because of their potential relationship to national security.
Combating the threat. In recent years, we’ve built a whole new set of technological and investigative capabilities and partnerships—so we’re as comfortable chasing outlaws in cyberspace as we are down back alleys and across continents. That includes:
Hospitals, school districts, state and local governments, law enforcement agencies, small businesses, large businesses—these are just some of the entities impacted by ransomware, an insidious type of malware that encrypts, or locks, valuable digital files and demands a ransom to release them.
The inability to access the important data these kinds of organizations keep can be catastrophic in terms of the loss of sensitive or proprietary information, the disruption to regular operations, financial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and the potential harm to an organization’s reputation. Home computers are just as susceptible to ransomware and the loss of access to personal and often irreplaceable items— including family photos, videos, and other data—can be devastating for individuals as well.
In a ransomware attack, victims—upon seeing an e-mail addressed to them—will open it and may click on an attachment that appears legitimate, like an invoice or an electronic fax, but which actually contains the malicious ransomware code. Or the e-mail might contain a legitimate-looking URL, but when a victim clicks on it, they are directed to a website that infects their computer with malicious software.
One the infection is present, the malware begins encrypting files and folders on local drives, any attached drives, backup drives, and potentially other computers on the same network that the victim computer is attached to. Users and organizations are generally not aware they have been infected until they can no longer access their data or until they begin to see computer messages advising them of the attack and demands for a ransom payment in exchange for a decryption key. These messages include instructions on how to pay the ransom, usually with bitcoins because of the anonymity this virtual currency provides.
Ransomware attacks are not only proliferating, they’re becoming more sophisticated. Several years ago, ransomware was normally delivered through spam e-mails, but because e-mail systems got better at filtering out spam, cyber criminals turned to spear phishing e-mails targeting specific individuals. And in newer instances of ransomware, some cyber criminals aren’t using e-mails at all—they can bypass the need for an individual to click on a link by seeding legitimate websites with malicious code, taking advantage of unpatched software on end-user computers.
The FBI doesn’t support paying a ransom in response to a ransomware attack. Paying a ransom doesn’t guarantee an organization that it will get its data back—there have been cases where organizations never got a decryption key after having paid the ransom. Paying a ransom not only emboldens current cyber criminals to target more organizations, it also offers an incentive for other criminals to get involved in this type of illegal activity. And by paying a ransom, an organization might inadvertently be funding other illicit activity associated with criminals.
So what does the FBI recommend? As ransomware techniques and malware continue to evolve—and because it’s difficult to detect a ransomware compromise before it’s too late—organizations in particular should focus on two main areas:
Here are some tips for dealing with ransomware (primarily aimed at organizations and their employees, but some are also applicable to individual users):
More on the FBI’s efforts to combat identity theft.
Read more about our Violent Crimes Against Children Program.
The mission of the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) is to provide the public with a reliable and convenient reporting mechanism to submit information to the FBI concerning suspected Internet-facilitated fraud schemes and to develop effective alliances with law enforcement and industry partners. Information is analyzed and disseminated for investigative and intelligence purposes to law enforcement and for public awareness.
Visit the IC3’s website for more information, including IC3 annual reports.
Established by the FBI’s Cyber Division in 2006 to provide rapid incident response on major computer intrusions and cyber-related emergencies, the team has approximately 50 members located in field offices around the country. They are either special agents or computer scientists, and all possess advanced training in computer languages, forensic investigations, and malware analysis. And since the team’s inception, the Bureau has investigated hundreds of cyber crimes, and a number of those cases were deemed of such significance that the rapid response and specialized skills of the Cyber Action Team were required. Some of those cases affected U.S. interests abroad, and the team deployed overseas, working through our legal attaché offices and with our international partners.
Members of the team make an initial assessment, and then call in additional experts as needed. Using cutting-edge tools, the team look’s for a hacker’s signature. In the cyber world, such signatures are called TTPs—tools, techniques, and procedures. The TTPs usually point to a specific group or person. The hackers may represent a criminal enterprise looking for financial gain or state-sponsored entities seeking a strategic advantage over the U.S.
Long before cyber crime was acknowledged to be a significant criminal and national security threat, the FBI supported the establishment of a forward-looking organization to proactively address the issue. Called the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance (NCFTA), this organization—created in 1997 and based in Pittsburgh—has become an international model for bringing together law enforcement, private industry, and academia to build and share resources, strategic information, and threat intelligence to identify and stop emerging cyber threats and mitigate existing ones.
Since its establishment, the NCFTA has evolved to keep up with the ever-changing cyber crime landscape. Today, the organization deals with threats from transnational criminal groups including spam, botnets, stock manipulation schemes, intellectual property theft, pharmaceutical fraud, telecommunications scams, and other financial fraud schemes that result in billions of dollars in losses to companies and consumers.
The FBI Cyber Division’s Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit (CIRFU) works with the NCFTA, which draws its intelligence from the hundreds of private sector NCFTA members, NCFTA intelligence analysts, Carnegie Mellon University’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), and the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center. This extensive knowledge base has helped CIRFU play a key strategic role in some of the FBI’s most significant cyber cases in the past several years.
Even with its post-9/11 national security responsibilities, the FBI continues to play a key role in combating violent crime in big cities and local communities across the United States…
Because of the global reach of cyber crime, no single organization, agency, or country can defend against it. Vital partnerships like the NCFTA are key to protecting cyberspace and ensuring a safer cyber future for our citizens and countries around the world.
For more information visit the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance website.
With cyber threats continuing to emerge at the forefront of the FBI’s criminal and national security challenges, engaging public-private partners in information exchange alongside law enforcement and intelligence communities…
As a unique multi-agency cyber center, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) has the primary responsibility…
Each Cyber Task Force synchronizes domestic cyber threat investigations in the local community through information sharing, incident response…
In 2007, eGuardian was developed to help meet the challenges of collecting and sharing terrorism-related activities amongst law enforcement agencies across various jurisdictions. The eGuardian system is a sensitive but…
Below are some key steps to protecting your computer from intrusion:
Keep Your Firewall Turned On: A firewall helps protect your computer from hackers who might try to gain access to crash it, delete information, or even steal passwords or other sensitive information. Software firewalls are widely recommended for single computers. The software is prepackaged on some operating systems or can be purchased for individual computers. For multiple networked computers, hardware routers typically provide firewall protection.
Install or Update Your Antivirus Software: Antivirus software is designed to prevent malicious software programs from embedding on your computer. If it detects malicious code, like a virus or a worm, it works to disarm or remove it. Viruses can infect computers without users’ knowledge. Most types of antivirus software can be set up to update automatically.
Install or Update Your Antispyware Technology: Spyware is just what it sounds like—software that is surreptitiously installed on your computer to let others peer into your activities on the computer. Some spyware collects information about you without your consent or produces unwanted pop-up ads on your web browser. Some operating systems offer free spyware protection, and inexpensive software is readily available for download on the Internet or at your local computer store. Be wary of ads on the Internet offering downloadable antispyware—in some cases these products may be fake and may actually contain spyware or other malicious code. It’s like buying groceries—shop where you trust.
Keep Your Operating System Up to Date: Computer operating systems are periodically updated to stay in tune with technology requirements and to fix security holes. Be sure to install the updates to ensure your computer has the latest protection.
Be Careful What You Download: Carelessly downloading e-mail attachments can circumvent even the most vigilant anti-virus software. Never open an e-mail attachment from someone you don’t know, and be wary of forwarded attachments from people you do know. They may have unwittingly advanced malicious code.
Turn Off Your Computer: With the growth of high-speed Internet connections, many opt to leave their computers on and ready for action. The downside is that being “always on” renders computers more susceptible. Beyond firewall protection, which is designed to fend off unwanted attacks, turning the computer off effectively severs an attacker’s connection—be it spyware or a botnet that employs your computer’s resources to reach out to other unwitting users.
The FBI Safe Online Surfing (FBI-SOS) program is a nationwide initiative designed to educate children in grades 3 to 8 about the dangers they face on the Internet and to help prevent crimes against children.
It promotes cyber citizenship among students by engaging them in a fun, age-appropriate, competitive online program where they learn how to safely and responsibly use the Internet.
The program emphasizes the importance of cyber safety topics such as password security, smart surfing habits, and the safeguarding of personal information.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(U//FOUO) National Domestic Communications Assistance Center Presentation: Quantifying Law Enforcement’s “Going Dark” Problem
March 4, 2019
The following presentation was obtained from the public website of a professional organization for prosecutors.
Quantifying Law Enforcement’s “Going Dark” Problem: Statistics Collection Tool
Page Count: 20 pages
Date: January 27, 2017
Restriction: For Official Use Only
Originating Organization: Department of Justice, National Domestic Communications Assistance Center
File Type: pdf
File Size: 2,780,451 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): C0F20581F51C4D6C1132647470301B511E0366ED7E12BD7B315425BC906DE077
Download
https://info.publicintelligence.net/NDCAC-StatisticsCollectionTool.pdf
Strategic Gap
• As a result of the fundamental shift in communications services and technologies, criminal and national security investigations are unable to obtain needed evidence and intelligence despite having the legal authority to do so
Impediments
• We continue to lose ground to rapidly-changing global communications services and technologies
• Public disclosures have created an environment that makes even the discussion of new lawful intercept legislation very difficult and provider cooperation tenuous
• Regulatory process is not timely and judicial process unproductive
• Stakeholders in legislative process have different equities
• Industry is very organized and proactive in its opposition to the development of new capabilities and legislation
Encrypted Communications Applications
Modern communication applications have begun to implement encryption on data in motion, resulting in law enforcement’s inability to access the plain text of data in transit (intercepted)
Challenges with Record Requests
The lack of a mandate on the retention of communications metadata or content and the increasing globalization of communication services have greatly complicated law enforcement’s ability to obtain information on historical communications
Device-Based Encryption
Communication devices have begun to deploy encryption on stored data, resulting in law enforcement’s inability to access the plain text of data stored on a device or system (or cloud)
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Executive Summary
The National Cyber and Information Security Agency, registered office at Mučednická 1125/31, 616 00 Brno, pursuant to §12 paragraph 1 of the Act No. 181/2014 Coll. on Cyber Security and Change of Related Acts (Act on Cyber Security), as amended, issues this
w a r n i n g :
The use of technical or program tools of the following companies, including their subsidiary companies, poses a threat to the cyber security.
– Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Shenzhen, People’s Republic of China
– ZTE Corporation, Shenzhen, People’s Republic of China
R E A S O N I N G
1) On the basis of the facts found during the execution of its competence, the National Cyber and Information Security Agency (hereinafter referred to as “NCISA”) has found that the use of the technical or program tools of the aforementioned companies poses a threat to the cyber security and therefore, pursuant to §12 paragraph 1 of the Act on Cyber Security, issues this warning.
2) NCISA’s competence to issue this warning is embedded within the provisions of §22, b), of the Act on Cyber Security, which empowers it to issue measures. Pursuant to §11 paragraph 2 of the Act on Cyber Security, these measures also include a warning under §12 of the Act on Cyber Security.
3) This warning has been issued based on the following findings.
4) The legal and political environment of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) in which the companies primarily operate and whose laws are required to comply with, requires private companies to cooperate in meeting the interests of the PRC, including participation in intelligence activities etc. At the same time, these companies usually do not refrain from such cooperation with the state; in this environment, efforts to protect customers’ interests at the expense of the interests of the PRC are significantly reduced. According to available information, there is an organizational and personal link between these companies and the state. Therefore, this raises concerns that the interests of the PRC may be prioritized over the interests of the users of these companies’ technologies.
5) The PRC actively promotes its interests in the territory of the Czech Republic, including a conduct of influence and espionage intelligence activities (see, for example, Security Information Service Annual Report for 2017).
6) The security community’s findings on the activities of these companies in the Czech Republic and around the world, which are available to NCISA, raise reasonable concerns about the existence of potential risks in using the technical or program tools they provide to their customers in order to support the interests of the PRC.
7) The technical and program tools of the aforementioned companies are being supplied to the information and communication systems that are or may be of strategic importance from the national security standpoint. Disruption of information security, i.e. disruption of the availability, integrity, or confidentiality of information in such information and communication systems can have a significant impact on the security of the Czech Republic and its interests.
8) These facts, in their entirety, lead to reasonable concerns about possible security risks in the use of these companies’ technologies. The degree of potential risk due to the possible impact of information security breaches on information and communication systems relevant to the state is not negligible.
9) NCISA points out that the authorities or persons required to implement security measures under the Act on Cyber Security in connection with risk management pursuant to §5 paragraph 1 h) article 3 of the Decree No. 82/2018 Coll. on Security Measures, Cyber Security Incidents, Reactive Measures, Cyber Security and Data Disposal Submission Requirements (Cyber Security Regulation) in risk assessment and risk management plan shall take into account measures pursuant to §11 of the Act on Cyber Security. One of these measures is also a warning pursuant to §12 of the Act on Cyber Security.
10) NCISA points out that the authorities or persons required to implement security measures under the Act on Cyber Security in connection with risk management pursuant to §4 paragraph 1 c) and paragraph 2 c) of the Decree No. 316/2014 Coll. on Security Measures, Cyber Security Incidents, Reactive Measures, and Cyber Security Submission Requirements (Cyber Security Regulation) shall take into account threats and vulnerabilities. With regard to the transitional provision in §35 of the Decree No. 82/2018 Coll. on Security Measures, Cyber Security Incidents, Reactive Measures, Cyber Security and Data Disposal Submission Requirements (Cyber Security Regulation), these are the administrators and operators of the Critical Information Infrastructure information systems and the administrators and operators of the Critical Information Infrastructure communication systems, in case these systems were designated before May 28, 2018, as well as the administrators and operators of important information systems that met the criteria before May 28, 2018.
11) NCISA further points out that, pursuant to §4 paragraph 4 of the Act on Cyber Security, the authorities and persons referred to in §3 c) to f) of the Act on Cyber Security are required to take into account requirements arising from security measures during the selection of a supplier for their information or communication system, and include these requirements in a contract concluded with the supplier. Taking into account the requirements arising from security measures under the first sentence to the extent necessary to meet the obligations under the Act on Cyber Security cannot be considered an unlawful restriction of competition or an unjustified obstacle to competition.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Executive Summary
In the last seven years, Russia has reasserted itself as a military force in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. With the 2008 military incursion into Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, Russia has assumed a more aggressive, interventionist stance in Europe. In the effort to influence events in Ukraine, the Russians have used what the US Army defines as “Hybrid Warfare” to infiltrate, isolate, and dominate eastern Ukraine and Crimea. This is all a part of the strategy of what can be called “Indirect Action”—the belief by the Russians that they reserve the right to protect ethnic Russians and interests in their former states from domination by Western powers and NATO.
It is important to note that the Russians do not use the terms Hybrid Warfare or Indirect Action to describe these tactics. These are terms that the Western media, think tanks, and analysts have developed to define this method of warfare. The Russians have used terms such as indirect, asymmetrical, and non-linear when discussing what is commonly referred to as Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid Warfare is a part of the strategy/policy of what can be called Indirect Action that the Russians believe is essential to protect their interests in their former satellite states (referred to as “the near abroad”). To the Russians, using covert methods, information warfare (INFOWAR), and special operations troops to make up for conventional disadvantages has been the norm for decades. Because the terms Hybrid Warfare and Indirect Action are familiar, they will be used throughout this report in reference to Russian indirect, asymmetrical, and nonlinear tactics.
This Threat Tactics Report (TTR) will focus on three distinct operations—Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and eastern Ukraine in 2014–2015. The TTR will present and analyze the tactics used in these conflicts, the lessons learned, and adjustments made by the Russian Armed Forces.
Executiive Summary
The Russians have employed Hybrid Warfare and Indirect Action to counter NATO and Western influence for over seventy years.Hybrid
Warfare is the use of political, social, criminal, and other non-kinetic means employed to overcome military limitations.1Indirect Action
can be defined as the need for Russia to defend its interests and sphere of influence in its former states and satellites.
Although Western observers characterize the actions of Russian Armed Forces as hybrid warfare, the Russian Army practices its long-established tactics with new attention to advanced developments in many areas such as precision weapons, command and control (C2) and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and electronic warfare (EW), and including direct and indirect application of these. The nature of these tactics is derived from Russia’s focused assessment of specific neighborhood threats and its long-time focus on security superiority in its Near Abroad.
Russia continues to maintain military bases in its former states to exert influence and control.
The Russians used conventional tactics in Georgia in 2008 and used indirect and asymmetric approaches in Crimea in 2014 and eastern Ukraine in 2014-2015.
The Euromaidan protests and overthrow of the Yanukovych government triggered the Russian incursion into Crimea and the seizure of the naval base at Sebastopol.
Russian intelligence operatives and SPF were instrumental in the success of the Crimea operation and are now assisting pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.
Russia may use these tactics in other areas such as Moldova, Transniestra, and the Baltic states.
…
…
Crimean Takeover: Operational Overview
Crimea has long sought its independence from Ukraine because of its protracted association with Russia and the people’s desire to rejoin the Russian Federation. Crimea had become the home to a large ethnic Russian population, many of which had served in the Soviet/Russian military. As far back as February 1994, Crimean politicians would make speeches declaring the Crimeans not only sought separation from Ukraine, but also a unification of Crimea with Russia. When Yuriy Meshkov won the first and only independent Crimean presidential election in 1994 with 73% of the votes, he stated, “In spirit, the Crimean people have been and remain part of Russia.” During the next couple of years, Ukrainian marines took possession of a number of naval facilities on Crimea, evicted the pro-Russian political leaders in Crimea, and ended the short-lived independent Crimea on 17 March 1995. With protests from Moscow, this eventually led to the 1997 treaty that divided the Russian naval facilities between the two countries and allowed for the Russians to maintain a military presence in Crimea, primarily to support the Russian navy’s Black Sea Fleet. One of the most overlooked clauses in the agreement which allowed the February/March 2014 events to take place was the section that permitted Russian forces to implement not only security measures at their own permanent bases in Crimea, but to provide security for their own forces during deployment and redeployment movements to and from Russia. In the early stages of the crisis in late February 2014, this very minor clause in the treaty allowed the Russian military to move initially around Crimea without interference by any Ukrainian military personnel under the guise of the movement authorized by the military agreement between the two countries.
The Russian military launched their operation in Crimea less than a week after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych signed an agreement with the opposition political leaders on 21 February 2014 that confirmed early presidential elections would take place by the end of the year, ensured a national unity government would be created within a month, and guaranteed Ukraine would return to its 2004 constitution. Yanukovych then fled Kiev within 24 hours, however, instead of remaining in Ukraine to abide by the agreement. The timing also coincided with the scheduled military maneuvers in the Russian Central and Western Military Districts that obscured the Russian troop movements into the peninsula. The map in Figure 8 indicates the various activities from unclassified sources that took place in Crimea between the night of 27 February 2014 and 25 March 2014, when the Ukrainian government pulled its military forces from Crimea and ceded control of the peninsula to the Crimean “defense forces” backed by Russian military forces.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Executive Summary
A North Korean regular infantry division is the most likely type of division a US unit would face on the Korean peninsula. While the Korean People’s Army (KPA) fields armor and mechanized units, the number of regular infantry units far exceeds the other types (pg 3).
KPA offensive operations include the heavy use of artillery with chemical munitions; a primary focus of attacks on combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), and command and control (C2) units; and deep operations conducted by KPA special-purpose forces (SPF) (pgs 3–4, 11–16, 21–23).
KPA defensive operations focus on the elimination of enemy armor through the heavy use of artillery; battalion, regiment, and division antitank kill zones; and the use of counterattack forces at all levels above battalion-sized units (pgs 16–19, 23–26).
While US forces will face KPA conventional infantry to their front, KPA SPF will initiate offensive operations in the US/South Korean rear areas to create a “second front” (pgs 15–16).
KPA regular forces and SPF will remain in place to conduct stay-behind annihilation ambushes on CS, CSS, and C2 units passing through the passed unit’s area of operations (pg 25).
The KPA divisions are already prepared to fight US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces today. The vehicles and equipment may be different in the future, but their tactics and techniques will be similar to those used today (pgs 10–26).
Since 2003, the KPA has created seven divisions that are specialized to operate in urban and mountain terrain using irregular warfare techniques. It is expected that the KPA will use several techniques deemed successful in Afghanistan and Iraq against US/ROK forces (pg 20).
TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) is the source of the threat tactics series of products. The Threat Tactics Report: North Korea versus the United States (US) and the other similar products serve to describe the foreign nation’s most common combat division with an order of battle, its offensive and defensive doctrine as articulated in its manuals or recent military actions, and an analysis of how this actor would fight if facing the US in the future.
This document is intended primarily for US Army training organizations, but will be applicable across the wider community of US Army Combatant Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and allied partners.
…
North Korean Infantry Division Major Weapon Systems
The KPA uses a variety of primarily Tier 2, 3, and 4 equipment in its units, as it rarely disposes of any weapons. The best units receive new(er) weapons and their systems are then cascaded through the lower-quality units. Some of the KPA’s weapons and vehicles date back to World War II. Units will attempt to field the same type of weapon systems to reduce logistical issues. The following are some of the major weapons found in a KPA infantry division or infantry regiment.
…
The KPA prefers the offense over the defense and will stay on the defensive only until it can gather the strength to attack again. The KPA will attempt to avoid US/ROK combat units and will attempt to attack CS, CSS, and C2 units and vulnerable high-value targets in the rear areas in order to reduce the effectiveness of the US/ROK combat units. With assistance in creating a second front via the KPA SPF making these attacks in the US/ROK rear areas, the KPA believes the US/ROK combat units will become combat ineffective, making them vulnerable to KPA follow-on forces.
When forced to go on the defensive the KPA will concentrate its efforts in eliminating its enemy’s tanks. Any units bypassed by enemy forces are directed to continue to fight as a unit or, if the unit becomes combat ineffective, the soldiers are expected by their leaders to continue resistance by conducting irregular warfare operations against any enemy units in their area. Prepared UGFs exist throughout North Korea, especially within 50 miles of the DMZ. If forced on the defensive in these areas, the KPA will fight from these previously prepared positions.
US/ROK units will face intense indirect fire including chemical munitions, conventional KPA units to their front, and SPF elements in their rear areas. US/ROK units will need to simultaneously defeat the KPA divisions attacking their combat units, while defending all units from KPA SPF or stay-behind forces in their rear areas.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
TOP SECRET – Defense Intelligence Study About Invisibility
The idea of invisibility has fascinated people for millennia, inspiring many myths, novels, and films. Invisibility cloaking has recently become a subject of science and technology. This paper describes the important current theoretical and experimental developments and tries to project into the future.
Camouflage
Invisibility may be achieved through three principal methods: camouflage, transparency, and cloaking. Many animals and some plants use camouflage to disguise themselves from predators-for example, by assuming the shapes and colors of objects in their surroundings. The military has long used forms of camouflage; a recent military application of camouflage is stealth technology.
Stealth planes have aerodynamically unusual, edgy shapes and are coated with a special material. Both features serve the same purpose: to make the plane “invisible” to radar. How does it work? In radar, electromagnetic microwaves are emitted by a source, and their reflection by an object-an airplane, for example-is detected. From the direction and the time delay of the reflected waves, the direction and distance of the object are inferred. If the object does not reflect the electromagnetic microwaves back to the source, it will not appear on the radar. This is precisely what stealth technology achieves. Owing to the edgy shape of the stealth plane, most of the incident electromagnetic waves are reflected in different directions; the coating of the plane absorbs the rest. In this way, the stealth plane has become completely black in the spectral range of radar. As for radar waves, the sky is black, not blue, and the plane has assumed the color of the background: the stealth plane is camouflaged.
…
…
Optical Metamaterials
As light is simply an electromagnetic wave with shorter wavelengths than microwave radiation, one could imagine an optical cloaking device as the microwave cloak but with much smaller cells, fitted to the smaller wavelength. However, this simple idea is too simple, for two different reasons. One is that metals like the copper of the circuit board or the gold of ruby glass are more electrically resistant to currents oscillating with the frequency of visible light than to currents in the microwave range of the spectrum. Second, and more important, the cells of a metamaterial also emit electromagnetic radiation in an incoherent way, not just as a coherent response to the incoming electromagnetic wave, similar to the spontaneous emission of light by atoms and molecules. The spontaneous emission is significantly stronger in the optical range of the spectrum. In short, metamaterials do not scale; they must be designed differently for visible light, and the loss of light by absorption and incoherent scattering usually is greater for visible light than for microwaves. Figure 13 below illustrates the idea 19 for an optical cloaking metamaterial. Instead of split-ring resonators, nano-scale metal wires are embedded in a transparent host material, for example glass. The wires replace the split-ring resonators on the circuit board of the microwave-cloaking device. They act similarly to the gold particles embedded in ruby glass; their optical properties depend on their lengths and on their arrangement, which, in principle, can be tailormade and controlled using the tools of modern nanotechnology. The thin wires will have lower electric losses than split-ring resonators, and their radiation losses by the equivalent of spontaneous emission are reduced as well. Such optical cloaking devices do not yet exist, but one can gauge the progress in the required technology by considering the progress in negatively refracting optical materials.
Download the study here:
Click to access DIA-InvisibilityCloaking.pdf
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The Special Testing and Research Laboratory’s Emerging Trends Program compiled the data for this report through a query of archived seizure and analysis information from drug evidence analyzed by the Drug Enforcement Administration’s laboratory system. This data is representative of drug evidence seized and analyzed in the date ranges annotated. This is not a comprehensive list of all new psychoactive substances and is not representative of all evidence analyzed by DEA. This data is a quarterly snapshot of the new psychoactive substance market in the United States.
The term new psychoactive substance (NPS) describes a recently emerged drug that may pose a public health threat. This includes synthetic cannabinoids, substituted cathinones, phenethylamines, opioids, tryptamines, benzodiazepines, and a variety of other chemical classes. Due to the recent increase in seizures, fentanyl is also included in this report.
An identification is made when authenticated reference material is available for comparison. When reference material is not available, the drug evidence is identified as “substance unconfirmed”. A single unit of drug evidence may have multiple sub-units. For the purposes of this document, each unit of drug evidence counts as one identification regardless of the number of sub-units. Some seized drug evidence contains more than one active ingredient; therefore, more than one identification can be made for a single unit.
Download here
https://info.publicintelligence.net/DEA-EmergingThreatsReports2017.zip
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
A complex series of concrete walls, electronic fences, and other obstacles to control Palestinian pedestrian and vehicular movement. Palestinian access to land and communities located behind the Barrier is subject to a permit or prior coordination regime. In its 2004 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) established that the sections of the Barrier which run inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, together with the associated gate and permit regime, violate Israel’s obligations under international law.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
If one is to realistically entertain the notion of interstellar exploration in timeframes of а human lifespan, а dramatic shift in the traditional approach to spacecraft propulsion is necessary. It has been known and well tested since the time of Einstein that all matter is restricted to motion at sublight velocities ( << З х 10⁸ m/s, the speed of light, or с), and that as matter approaches, the speed of light, its mass asymptotically approaches infinity. This mass increase ensures that an infinite amount of energy would Ье necessary to travel at the speed of light, and, thus, this speed is impossible to reach and represent an absolute speed limit to all matter traveling through spacetime.
Even if an engine were designed that could propel а spacecraft to аn appreciable fraction of light speed, travel to even the closest stars would take many decades in the frame of reference of an observer оn Eaгth. Although these lengthy transit times would not make interstellar exploration impossible, they would certainly dampen the enthusiasm of governments or private individuals funding these missions. After all, а mission whose success is perhaps а century away would bе difficult to justify. In recent years, however, physicists have discovered two loopholes to Einstein’s ultimate speed limit: the Einstein-Rosen bridge (commonly referred to as а “wormhole”) and the warp drive. Fundamentally, both ideas involve manipulation of spacetime itself in some exotic way that allows for faster-than-light (FTL) travel.
Essentially, the wormhole involves connecting two potentially distant regions of space bу а topological shortcut. Theoretically, one would enter the wormhole and instantaneously bе transported to the exit located in а distant region of space. Although no observational evidence of wormholes exists, theoretically they саn exist as а valid solution to general relativity.
…
…
…
The idea that а sufficiently advanced technology may interact with, and acquire direct control over, the higher dimensions is а tantalizing possibility, and one that is most certainly worthy of deeper iпvestigation. Control of this higher dimeпsional space may bе а source of technological control оvег the dark energy density and could ultimately play а role in the development of exotic pгopulsion technologies; specifically, а warp
drive.
Of course, this may not bе actualized until many years in the future, but consider the many spectacular physical phenomena that are believed to bе true at this early point in the 21st century. One believes that an energy field called the Higgs boson permeates spacetime and that the interaction of matter with this field is what is responsible for particles acquiring mass. One believes that an exotic ubiquitous energy source, unimaginatively named dark energy, is responsible for the current accelerated expansion of the universe based оп observation of supernova in galaxies billions of light years from Earth. One also believes that the universe may not consist of the three spatial dimension of length, breadth, width, and one of time, but that, in fact, there mау bе as many as seven additional compactified dimensions assuming the topology of а Calabi-Yau manifold, апd that the fundamental building blocks of the universe are, in fact, extended string-like entities.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DoD Forensic Science Lexicon
May 27, 2018
Department of Defense Forensic Science Lexicon
Page Count: 99 pages
Date: January 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency
File Type: pdf
File Size: 956,884 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 4C47BA0C862DB9F0E3775053480ED5715945EAEB78510D786286A554C8C2BDC1
Download File
https://info.publicintelligence.net/DoD-ForensicScienceLexicon.pdf
1 Introduction
The Department of Defense (DoD) performs forensic science in a collaborative environment which necessitates the clear communication of all activities and their results. A critical enabler of communication is the use of a clear, internally consistent vocabulary.
1.1 Purpose
The goal of the Department of Defense Forensics Lexicon is to provide an operational vocabulary to address Forensics. A shared vocabulary enables a common understanding of Forensics, enhances the fidelity and the utility of operational reporting, facilitates structured data sharing, and strengthens the decision making processes across the DoD.
1.2 Scope
This lexicon encompasses the broad spectrum of scientific disciplines, processes, and equipment associated with performing forensic activities. Additional terms include those related to the programmatic support domains (e.g., doctrine, policy, standards, and accreditation) which enable forensic activity within the DoD.
Excluded from this lexicon are terms and definitions that describe the various types of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and the specific components of IEDs, as those have been previously defined in other well established lexicons.
1.3 Approach
This Department of Defense Forensics Lexicon was authored by subject matter experts from key organizations and agencies engaged in the full range of forensic activities and the personnel that provide programmatic support to those experts. It was then staffed multiple times across the Defense Forensics Enterprise in order to obtain support and consensus.
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)/Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) assesses that unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) provide malicious actors an additional method of gaining undetected proximity to networks and equipment within critical infrastructure sectors. Malicious actors could use this increased proximity to exploit unsecured wireless systems and exfiltrate information. Malicious actors could also exploit vulnerabilities within UASs and UAS supply chains to compromise UASs belonging to critical infrastructure operators and disrupt or interfere with legitimate UAS operations.
…
UAS FACILITATE PHYSICAL ACCESS TO UNSECURED SYSTEMS
UASs provide malicious actors an additional method of gaining proximity to networks and equipment within critical infrastructure sectors. Malicious actors could then use the proximity provided by a UAS to wirelessly exploit unsecured systems and extract information from systems they cannot otherwise access remotely or may not be able to access due to range limitations. This includes networks and devices within secured buildings, as well as networks and devices behind fencing and walls.
UASs can also allow a malicious actor to wirelessly exploit vulnerabilities from a distance (figure 1). The prevalent ownership and operation of UASs by the general public, the distance from which UAS can be operated, and a lack of tracking data can also provide malicious actors a level of anonymity that otherwise may not be available. UASs, in particular UASs, are typically more difficult to detect than a malicious actor attempting to trespass beyond physical barriers.
…
UAS FOR WIRELESS SYSTEM EXPLOITATION
Malicious actors could utilize UASs in order to wirelessly exploit access points and unsecured networks and devices. This can include using UASs in order to inject malware, execute malicious code, and perform man-in-the-middle attacks. UASs can also deliver hardware for exploiting unsecured wireless systems, allowing malicious actors persistent access to the wireless system until the hardware is detected or runs out of power. While OCIA does not know of a confirmed incident utilizing UASs to exploit wireless systems, researchers have demonstrated this capability.
…
MALICIOUS ACTORS CAN EXPLOIT COMPROMISED UAS
While UASs can be used as a tool for an attacker, they are also vulnerable to exploitation. Many commercial UAS variations, for example, currently communicate with ground stations and operators using unencrypted feeds. This can allow a malicious actor to intercept and review data sent to and from the UAS.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
(U//FOUO) NCTC Counterterrorism Weekly Open Source Digest December 2018
December 24, 2018
Counterterrorism Weekly 6-18 December 2018
Page Count: 18 pages
Date: December 12, 2018
Restriction: For Official Use Only
Originating Organization: National Counterterrorism Center
File Type: pdf
File Size: 1,684,886 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 5DB3EF6875E67FA136A736986BC4F476BD2DA0DBCDC4DD30A0DB7241449EC7B1
Download File
https://info.publicintelligence.net/NCTC-CounterterrorismWeekly-121218.pdf
(U) Terrorist Profile: Former Jordanian ISIS Official Sa’d Al-Hunayti
(U) Jordanian national Sa’d al-Hunayti was a leading member of the Jihadist Salafi movement in Jordan before he traveled to Syria and joined Nusrah Front then ISIS. Hunayti was ultimately arrested by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) for reportedly being a leader in ISIS-run secret cells in Idlib Province, Syria, that planted IEDs and conducted kidnappings and assassinations in northwest Syria.
(U) During the 1980s, Hunayti studied history at Yarmouk University in north Jordan and was suspended twice for “his political positions.” During this period, he was influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s idea of “governance,” according to Dr. Muhammad Abu-Rumman, a Jordanian researcher who specializes in Political Thought and Islamic Movements. (Sayyid Qutb was the Spotlight topic in the 23 May 2018 issue of this publication.)
(U) In 2011, Hunayti was arrested by Jordanian security forces after demonstrations in Al Zarqa that called for governmental and constitutional reforms. The protests were led by the Islamist movement, which dominated the political opposition, and by the popular protest movement, which encompassed numerous pro-reform organizations. Hunayti was released from Jordanian custody in October 2013.
(U) In April 2014, Hunayti traveled to Syria at the behest of senior Salafi Jihadi ideologue Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi to mediate between Nusrah Front and ISIS during their clashes in Deir az-Zour. Bassam al-Nu’aymi, an activist in the Jihadist Salafi movement in Jordan, said that after the failure of his reconciliation initiative, Hunayti received an offer from Nusrah Front leader Abu-Muhammad al-Jawlani to become a Sharia judge and head of the courthouse in northern Syria. The judicial branch faced controversy due to suspicious verdicts, leading to tensions with the Nusrah Front leadership that Hunayti viewed as hindering his “implementation of sharia.”
…
(U) Telegram Suspends Thousands of Violent Jihadist Accounts
(U) On 6 December, the Telegram messaging app suspended over 3,000 “terrorist” accounts. Telegram’s daily report on the “terrorist” accounts it blocks usually cites an average of 200-300 take-downs per day, but this rose to 507 on 5 December and significantly jumped to 3,276 on 6 December.
■ (U) Telegram’s “ISIS Watch” initiative to block channels with “terrorist content” was launched in 2016 after the company came under pressure over the number of violent jihadists operating on its platform. The ISIS Watch channel provided daily and monthly totals for its account suspensions.
■ (U) The Telegram cull followed a recent effort by ISIS to beef up its presence on the platform. ISIS operated a network of multiple channels and groups on Telegram under the “Nashir news agency” brand.
■ (U) Since 12 November, Nashir started advertising a flurry of new Telegram groups to complement its already swelling number of channels, enhancing the overall number of ISIS outlets on the platform.
■ (U) The measure of having dozens of mirror accounts, so far unique to ISIS, was designed to mitigate the impact of take-downs on the group’s media operation. So when 10 or 50 accounts are suspended, other duplicate accounts are still active.
■ (U) In November 2017, Nashir claimed to be operating 600 duplicate channels and groups. While this might have been an exaggerated figure, the group indeed has dozens of active accounts on Telegram. (BBC)
JCAT: (U//FOUO) The desire for and reliance on terrorists and their supporters to communicate electronically with like-minded individuals provides potential investigative avenues through human operations, outreach, and targeting analysis. While a subject’s communications can be anonymized or encrypted, often their participation in online forums, chat rooms, and initial contact with others may not be, providing a window for discovering trends and methods in terrorist COMSEC. (JCAT)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Cross-border gangs play a unique role in the illicit transfer of people and goods across the southwest border. According to law enforcement reporting. Mexican cartels utilize US gangs to smuggle drugs and illegal aliens northbound. and smuggle cash. stolen automobiles. and weapons southbound. US gangs often freelance their work and seek profit-making opportunities with multiple cartels.
(U) Note: The drug cartel boundaries represent a generalized picture of territories and disputed areas in Mexico. The primary focus of this map is to demonstrate the gangs and their Mexican criminal affiliations, rather than the specific areas of cartel operations.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Once hardly noticeable, Chinese investments in U.S. companies are now rising sharply. Cumulative Chinese investments in U.S. companies remain modest compared to those of other major countries. However, a combination of “push and pull” factors are moving China’s annual investment levels closer to levels consistent with China’s current economic stature.
First, the Chinese government has made a conscious decision to diversify its foreign currency assets into hard assets. This has led to the creation of sovereign wealth funds that make portfolio investments in U.S. equities, private firms, and real estate.
Second, the Chinese government has altered its policy guidance toward foreign direct investment (FDI). Whereas it previously encouraged investments almost exclusively toward energy and resource acquisition in developing countries, it now also encourages investments in advanced countries. The government’s goals for these investments include securing energy and mineral resources and acquiring advanced technologies in industries where China wishes to leapfrog existing competitors.
Third, U.S. state governments and, to a lesser extent, the federal government are vigorously trying to attract Chinese greenfield investments in the hope of creating jobs and jump-starting local economies.
Fourth, Chinese investments are being drawn to the United States by the availability of financially weak firms, some of which possess potentially useful technologies for China.
Fifth, some firms that are already competitive with U.S. producers are investing to enhance their U.S. market shares or in response to trade remedies proceedings against unfair trade practices, such as Chinese subsidies.
Economic Benefits
On an aggregate basis, the economic benefits of Chinese investments in the United States have been modest. The precise benefit is difficult to measure due to the convoluted ownership structures of many Chinese investments and the time lags in official U.S. data. Still, based on a combination of official and private data, it is reasonable to conclude that jobs in Chinese-owned companies in the United States increased by 10,000 to 20,000 workers during the past five years.
While hardly significant relative to overall U.S. employment and even to jobs in other countries’ U.S. affiliates, any job creation is welcome given continued slackness in the U.S. labor market.
Chinese FDI in U.S. companies has helped stabilize some financially troubled firms. Portfolio investments by sovereign wealth funds also have helped the economy by solidifying the financial system and providing liquidity to certain property markets.
Chinese investments have occurred in all U.S. regions and in many sectors. According to one private data source, they have been especially prominent since 2007 in the Southwest, Great Lakes, Southeast, and Far West regions, and in the fossil fuels and chemicals, industrial machinery, and information technology industries. According to another private source, as well as government data, the financial sector is also a major recipient of Chinese FDI.
Policy Challenges
These welcome, though still modest, economic benefits are counterbalanced by policy challenges tied to Chinese FDI. First, U.S. affiliates of Chinese companies are not pure market actors and may be driven by state goals, not market forces. China’s outward investments are dominated by state-owned and state-controlled enterprises (SOEs). These entities are potentially disruptive because they frequently respond to policies of the Chinese government, which is the ultimate beneficial owner of U.S affiliates of China’s SOEs. Likewise, the government behaves like an owner, providing overall direction to SOE investments, including encouragement on where to invest, in what industries, and to what ends.
Second, SOEs may have unfair advantages relative to private firms when competing to purchase U.S. assets. SOEs benefit from substantial subsidies in China and their investments in developing countries also receive ample financial support from the national and sub-national governments, state-owned financial institutions and local governments. Government pronouncements out of China suggest that investments in the United States and other advanced countries will also receive ample financial support. This raises the possibility that Chinese largesse could determine market outcomes for purchases of U.S. businesses.
Third, an increased SOE presence may be harmful to the U.S. economy. In China, SOEs are a major force but as a group they are less efficient and profitable than private firms. To the extent that SOEs purchase U.S. companies on the basis of artificial advantages and operate inefficiently, they may not be beneficial to long-term U.S. economic performance.
Fourth, Chinese investments will create tensions related to economic security and national security if they behave in accordance with China’s industrial policy as articulated in the 12th Five Year Plan, government pronouncements, and official investment guidance. China’s current policy guidance directs firms to obtain leapfrog technologies to create national champions in key emerging industries, while investment guidance encourages technology acquisition, energy security, and export facilitation. Based on this juxtaposition, some will conclude that Chinese FDI in the United States is a potential Trojan horse. Indeed, this study describes three investments in new energy products after which production utilizing the desired technology was shifted to China.
Other Findings
U.S. data collection efforts related to FDI are substantial. However, they likely undercount Chinese FDI due to the complicated ownership structures of many Chinese investments. Moreover, although Chinese-owned companies report their data to the U.S. government, many data points are not publically disclosed due to standard U.S. reporting procedures that protect the identities of individual firms. This issue will resolve itself in the coming years if Chinese FDI grows as expected because limits on disclosure will no longer apply.
The United States is relatively open toward FDI, though there are some sectoral restrictions and a national security review undertaken by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). There are a host of laws that subject foreign investors to rules on antitrust, foreign corrupt practices, and trade in arms and sensitive technology products. However, there is no procedure that explicitly considers issues related to economic security, one of the major concerns about Chinese FDI.
Portfolio investments in equities fall under the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). SEC disclosure requirements and practical considerations make it highly unlikely that Chinese SOEs could successfully collude to accumulate significant equity positions in important U.S. firms.
Reverse mergers offer a back door into U.S. capital markets but are not an effective way to acquire important U.S. assets. Indeed, the target of a reverse merger is typically a shell company devoid of meaningful assets. This technique is typically used by private firms that have difficulty accessing capital in China or by provincial SOEs trying to support restructuring efforts in China. There is no indication that any major SOE has used or plans to use this technique to enter the U.S. capital market.
The Chinese legal and regulatory framework for outward FDI requires approvals by three agencies at sub-national and/or national levels. For SOEs, the primary gatekeeper is the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), though for some investments approval from the State Council is required. The process is widely considered to be cumbersome and is being reformed to facilitate outward FDI.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
1. Purpose: From Multi-Domain Battle to Multi-Domain Operations. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 expands upon the ideas previously explained in Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century. It describes how the Army contributes to the Joint Force’s principal task as defined in the unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy: deter and defeat Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and conflict. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept proposes detailed solutions to the specific problems posed by the militaries of post-industrial, information-based states like China and Russia. Although this concept focuses on China and Russia, the ideas also apply to other threats.
2. The problem.
a. Emerging operational environment. Four interrelated trends are shaping competition and conflict: adversaries are contesting all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and the information environment and U.S. dominance is not assured; smaller armies fight on an expanded battlefield that is increasingly lethal and hyperactive; nation-states have more difficulty in imposing their will within a politically, culturally, technologically, and strategically complex environment; and near-peer states more readily compete below armed conflict making deterrence more challenging. Dramatically increasing rates of urbanization and the strategic importance of cities also ensure that operations will take place within dense urban terrain. Adversaries, such as China and Russia, have leveraged these trends to expand the battlefield in time (a blurred distinction between peace and war), in domains (space and cyberspace), and in geography (now extended into the Strategic Support Area, including the homeland) to create tactical, operational, and strategic stand-off. For the purpose of this document, Russia serves as the pacing threat. In fact, Russia and China are different armies with distinct capabilities, but assessed to operate in a sufficiently similar manner to orient on their capabilities collectively.
b. China and Russia in competition. In a state of continuous competition, China and Russia exploit the conditions of the operational environment to achieve their objectives without resorting to armed conflict by fracturing the U.S.’s alliances, partnerships, and resolve. They attempt to create stand-off through the integration of diplomatic and economic actions, unconventional and information warfare (social media, false narratives, cyber attacks), and the actual or threatened employment of conventional forces. By creating instability within countries and alliances, China and Russia create political separation that results in strategic ambiguity reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision, and reaction. Through these competitive actions, China and Russia believe they can achieve objectives below the threshold of armed conflict.
c. China and Russia in armed conflict. In armed conflict, China and Russia seek to achieve physical stand-off by employing layers of anti-access and area denial systems designed to rapidly inflict unacceptable losses on U.S. and partner military forces and achieve campaign objectives within days, faster than the U.S. can effectively respond. Over the last twenty-five years, China and Russia invested in and developed a systematic approach to “fracture” AirLand Battle by countering the Joint Force’s increasingly predictable use of time-phased and domain-federated operational approaches in armed conflict. The resulting anti-access and area denial systems create strategic and operational stand-off that separates the elements of the Joint Force in time, space, and function. Moreover, both China and Russia are continuing to improve these anti-access and area denial systems and are proliferating the associated technologies and techniques to other states. The Joint Force has not kept pace with these developments. It is still designed for operations in relatively uncontested environments that allow for sequential campaigns based on predictable approaches that assume air and naval supremacy: extensive shaping with air and naval strikes before the final destruction of severely degraded enemy forces through joint combined arms operations.
3. Conducting Multi-Domain Operations.
a. Central idea. Army forces, as an element of the Joint Force, conduct Multi-Domain Operations to prevail in competition; when necessary, Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to achieve strategic objectives (win) and force a return to competition on favorable terms.
b. Tenets of the Multi-Domain Operations. The Army solves the problems presented by Chinese and Russian operations in competition and conflict by applying three interrelated tenets: calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence. Calibrated force posture is the combination of position and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. Multi-domain formations possess the capacity, capability, and endurance necessary to operate across multiple domains in contested spaces against a near-peer adversary. Convergence is rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains, the EMS, and information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission command and disciplined initiative. The three tenets of the solution are mutually reinforcing and common to all Multi-Domain Operations, though how they are realized will vary by echelon and depend upon the specific operational situation.
c. Multi-Domain Operations and strategic objectives. The Joint Force must defeat adversaries and achieve strategic objectives in competition, armed conflict, and in a return to competition. In competition, the Joint Force expands the competitive space through active engagement to counter coercion, unconventional warfare, and information warfare directed against partners. These actions simultaneously deter escalation, defeat attempts by adversaries to “win without fighting,” and set conditions for a rapid transition to armed conflict. In armed conflict, the Joint Force defeats aggression by optimizing effects from across multiple domains at decisive spaces to penetrate the enemy’s strategic and operational anti-access and area denial systems, dis-integrate the components of the enemy’s military system, and exploit freedom of maneuver necessary to achieve strategic and operational objectives that create conditions favorable to a political outcome. In the return to competition, the Joint Force consolidates gains and deters further conflict to allow the regeneration of forces and the re-establishment of a regional security order aligned with U.S. strategic objectives.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Die gehackten Polit- und Promidaten werden wohl bis auf weiteres online bleiben. Dank der Blockchain-Technologie.
Die mutmasslich rechts orientierten Hacker haben die Daten auf einschlägige Webseiten verteilt. Durch die dezentrale Blockchain-Technologie wird es kaum möglich sein, alle Webseiten lahmzulegen. Uns liegen alle Daten vor.
Die Auswahl der gecrackten Daten sowie die Aufmachung und die Hauptzielpersonen sprechen eindeutig für einen rechtsextrem motivierten Hackerangriff von einem Dutzend Personen für einen mittelfristigen bis langfristigen Zeitraum via Outlook, Phishing, Honeypots, Viren und Trojanern.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
http://fuckyeahstupidgifs.tumblr.com/post/5043279727/frankisaurusrex-boredyet-source-no-joke
Department of the Treasury, Russia
U.S. Treasury Report Identifying Russian Senior Foreign Political Figures and Oligarchs
February 19, 2018
Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 241 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 Regarding Senior Foreign Political Figures and Oligarchs in the Russian Federation and Russian Parastatal Entities
Page Count: 9 pages
Date: January 29, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Department of the Treasury
File Type: pdf
File Size: 653,958 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 7B075365AF3BBA0A5CDA1C1E3E296620F8DB3B37745C119238B9E1E0335DD47A
Section 241 of the Countering Americaﾒ s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (???TSA) requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees 180 days after enactment ? detailed report ?? senior political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation (Section 241 (a)(l)) and on Russian parastatal entities (Section 241 (?)(2)). Pursuant to Section 241(?), the report shall ?? submitted in an unclassified form but may have ? classified annex. This is the unclassified portion of the report.
ﾅ
As required ?? Section 241 (a)( l)(A) of CAATSA, the Department of the Treasury is providing in this unclassified report ? list of senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined ?? their closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth. For purposes of this unclassified portion of the report, this determination was made based ?? objective criteria related to individuals ﾑ official position in the case of senior political figures, or ? net worth of $1 billion or more for oligarchs.
?? determine the list of senior political figures, the Department of the Treasury considered the definition in CAATSA Section 24 1 (?)(2), which incorporates ?? reference the definition of ﾓsenior foreign political figureﾔ in section 1?10.605 , title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations. For purposes of this unclassified portion of the report, such names consist of: i) senior members of the Russian Presidential Administration; ii) members of the Russian Cabinet, Cabinet-rank ministers, and heads of other major executive agencies; iii) other senior political leaders, including the leadership of the State Duma and Federation Council, other members of the Russian Security Council, and senior executives at state-owned enterprises. These individuals are listed in Appendix 1 of this report.
ﾅ
CAATSA Section 24 1(?)(2)-(5) requires ? report on Russian parastatal entities, including an assessment of their role in the economy of the Russian Federation; an overview of key U.S. economic sectorsﾒ exposure to Russian persons and entities; an analysis of the potential effects of imposing additional debt and equity restrictions on parastatal entities; and the possible impact of additional sanctions against oligarchs, senior political figures, and parastatals on the U.S. and Russian economies.
Russian parastatals have origins in the Soviet Unionﾒs command economy. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian government conducted large-scale privatization of these entities; in the early 2000s, it began to renationalize large companies. The Russian government has responded to economic shocks, including the financial crisis in 2008 and the imposition of sanctions in 2014, ?? increasing its role in the economy and ownership of parastatals. As of 2016, Russian parastatals accounted for one-third of all jobs in Russia and 70 percent of Russiaﾒs GDP.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Following the Syrian regime’s resumption of its military offensive, as well as high levels of air force activity over the town of Douma in Eastern Ghouta, two new cases of toxic agents employment were spontaneously reported by civil society and local and international media from the late afternoon of 7 April. Non-governmental medical organizations active in Ghouta (the Syrian American Medical Society and the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations), whose information is generally reliable, publicly stated that strikes had targeted in particular local medical infrastructure on 6 and 7 April.
A massive influx of patients in health centres in Eastern Ghouta (at the very least 100 people) presenting symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical agent was observed and documented during the early evening. In total, several dozens of people, more than forty according to several sources, are thought to have died from exposure to a chemical substance.
The information collected by France forms a body of evidence that is sufficient to attribute responsibility for the chemical attacks of 7 April to the Syrian regime.
1. — Several chemical attacks took place at Douma on 7 April 2018.
The French services analysed the testimonies, photos and videos that spontaneously appeared on specialized websites, in the press and on social media in the hours and days following the attack. Testimonies obtained by the French services were also analysed. After examining the videos and images of victims published online, they were able to conclude with a high degree of confidence that the vast majority are recent and not fabricated. The spontaneous circulation of these images across all social networks confirms that they were not video montages or recycled images. Lastly, some of the entities that published this information are generally considered reliable.
French experts analysed the symptoms identifiable in the images and videos that were made public. These images and videos were taken either in enclosed areas in a building where around 15 people died, or in local hospitals that received contaminated patients. These symptoms can be described as follows (cf. annexed images):
Suffocation, asphyxia or breathing difficulties,
Mentions of a strong chlorine odour and presence of green smoke in affected areas,
Hypersalivation and hypersecretions (particularly oral and nasal),
Cyanosis,
Skin burns and corneal burns.
No deaths from mechanical injuries were visible. All of these symptoms are characteristic of a chemical weapons attack, particularly choking agents and organophosphorus agents or hydrocyanic acid. Furthermore, the apparent use of bronchodilators by the medical services observed in videos reinforces the hypothesis of intoxication by choking agents.
…
On the basis of this overall assessment and on the intelligence collected by our services, and in the absence to date of chemical samples analysed by our own laboratories, France therefore considers (i) that, beyond possible doubt, a chemical attack was carried out against civilians at Douma on 7 April 2018; and (ii) that there is no plausible scenario other than that of an attack by Syrian armed forces as part of a wider offensive in the Eastern Ghouta enclave. The Syrian armed and security forces are also considered to be responsible for other actions in the region as part of this same offensive in 2017 and 2018. Russia has undeniably provided active military support to the operations to seize back Ghouta. It has, moreover, provided constant political cover to the Syrian regime over the employment of chemical weapons, both at the UN Security Council and at the OPCW, despite conclusions to the contrary by the JIM.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
(U//FOUO) DHS Final Decision on Removal of Kaspersky-Branded Products
The following assessment was included in court filings made by Kaspersky in their case against the U.S. Government for banning the use of Kaspersky products.
Financial Decision on Binding Operational Directive 17-01, Removal of Kaspersky-Branded Products
Page Count: 25 pages
Date: December 4, 2017
Restriction: For Official Use Only
Originating Organization: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
File Type: pdf
File Size: 504,629 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 6F6A660D2CFCD36CBDFAE3675E6F7C76CEEF404DB26736D44AD196A139592100
BOD 17-01 requires all federal executive branch departments and agencies to (1) identify the use or presence of “Kaspersky-branded products” on all federal information systems within 30 days of BOD issuance (i.e., by October 13); (2) develop and provide to DHS a detailed plan of action to remove and discontinue present and future use of all Kaspersky-branded products within 60 days of BOD issuance (i.e., by November 12); and (3) begin to implement the plan of action at 90 days after BOD issuance (i.e., December 12), unless directed otherwise by DHS in light of new information obtained by DHS, including but not limited to new information submitted by Kaspersky.
The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to issue BODs, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, for the purpose of safeguarding federal information and information systems from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk. I recommended issuing the BOD in the Information Memorandum, and the rationale for issuance of the BOD was summarized in your Decision Memorandum. As described further below, your decision to issue BOD 17-01 was based on three interrelated concerns that rested on expert judgments concerning national security: the broad access to files and elevated privileges of anti-virus software, including Kaspersky software; ties between Kaspersky officials and Russian government agencies; and requirements under Russian law that allow Russian intelligence agencies to request or compel assistance from Kaspersky and to intercept communications transiting between Kaspersky operations in Russia and Kaspersky customers, including U.S. government customers. Because of these interrelated concerns, you determined that Kaspersky-branded products present a “known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk.” In addition, you found that these risks exist regardless of whether Kaspersky-branded products have ever been exploited for malicious purposes. The BOD is a tool for protecting federal information and information systems from any “known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk,” and the Department’s authority to issue it does not depend on whether Kaspersky-branded products have been exploited by the Russian Government or Kaspersky to date.
…
BRG evaluated specific Kaspersky products according to the following objectives:
(1) To evaluate whether it is feasible for an intelligence agency to passively monitor and decrypt traffic between users of Kaspersky-branded products and the Kaspersky Security Network (“KSN”), a cloud-based network that receives and analyzes information about possible threats from installed Kaspersky software;
(2) To determine whether turning KSN off ― or using the Kaspersky Private Security Network (“KPSN”) ― can reliably prevent potentially sensitive data from being transmitted inadvertently to Kaspersky; and
(3) To evaluate whether a malicious actor leveraging KSN can conduct targeted searches of Kaspersky users for specific information.
As explained in the NCCIC Supplemental Assessment, the BRG analysis not only is largely unresponsive to DHS’s security concerns, but also supports DHS’s concerns in certain areas. For example, on objective (1), BRG analyzed only to the security of the connection between the antivirus software and the KSN; BRG did not address the security of communications within the KSN or between KSN and Kaspersky’s non-KSN IT infrastructure, such as Kaspersky offices and datacenters. BRG also evaluated the potential for “passive” interception of communications by intelligence agencies, but DHS is concerned about “active” operations involving access by Russian intelligence to Kaspersky offices and servers in Russia, as discussed in Section III.A.4 below and Part III.E of the Information Memorandum.
…
3. Kaspersky Ties to the Russian Government
In the Information Memorandum, I described certain ties, past and present, between Kaspersky officials and Russian government agencies. Kaspersky concedes key aspects of this account, such as Eugene Kaspersky’s former studies at an institute overseen by the KGB and other state institutions and his service as a software engineer at a Ministry of Defense institute. It also admits that its officials might have “acquaintances, friends, and professional relationships within the [Russian] government,” although Kaspersky states that, “in itself,” does not mean that these connections were or are “inappropriate” or “improper.” Furthermore, Kaspersky does not deny various connections to Russian intelligence described in the Information Memorandum, including that Eugene Kaspersky has saunas with a group that usually includes Russian intelligence officials; that Kaspersky’s Chief Legal Officer Igor Chekunov manages a team of specialists who provide technical support to the FSB and other Russian agencies; that the team can gather identifying information from individual computers; and that this technology has been used to aid the FSB in investigations
…
Professor Maggs makes a number of significant conclusions. Specifically, Professor Maggs
concludes that:
(a) Russian law requires FSB bodies to carry out their activities in collaboration with various entities in Russia, including private enterprises, and thus including Kaspersky.
(b) Private enterprises, including Kaspersky, are under a legal obligation to assist FSB bodies in the execution of the duties assigned to FSB bodies, including counterintelligence and intelligence activity.
(c) Russian law permits FSB service personnel to be seconded to private enterprises, including Kaspersky, with the consent of the head of the enterprise and with the FSB personnel remaining in FSB military service status during the secondment.
(d) Kaspersky qualifies as an “organizer of the dissemination of information on the Internet” and, as such, is required (1) to store in Russia and provide to authorized state bodies, including the FSB, metadata currently and content as of July 1, 2018; and, based on this or other laws, (2) to install equipment and software that enables the FSB and potentially other state authorities to monitor all data transmissions between Kaspersky’s computers in Russia and Kaspersky customers, including U.S. government customers.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy 2018
May 20, 2018
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy
Page Count: 35 pages
Date: May 15, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Department of Homeland Security
File Type: pdf
File Size: 278,548 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 65DED01F461679F5028AFE8C2B0FE08CBFE0EE17BD530F4815D12EF738FB3656
Download File below
The American people are increasingly dependent upon the Internet for daily conveniences, critical services, and economic prosperity. Substantial growth in Internet access and networked devices has facilitated widespread opportunities and innovation. This extraordinary level of connectivity, however, has also introduced progressively greater cyber risks for the United States. Long-standing threats are evolving as nation-states, terrorists, individual criminals, transnational criminal organizations, and other malicious actors move their activities into the digital world. Enabling the delivery of essential services—such as electricity, finance, transportation, water, and health care—through cyberspace also introduces new vulnerabilities and opens the door to potentially catastrophic consequences from cyber incidents. The growing number of Internet-connected devices and reliance on global supply chains further complicates the national and international risk picture. More than ever, cybersecurity is a matter of homeland security and one of the core missions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
At DHS, we believe that cyberspace can be secure and resilient. We work every day across the Department and with key partners and stakeholders to identify and manage national cybersecurity risks. We do this by adopting a holistic risk management approach. Like every organization, no matter how big or small, we must minimize our organizational vulnerability to malicious cyber activity by protecting our own networks. DHS also has broader responsibilities to protect the larger federal enterprise and improve the security and resilience of other critical systems. At the same time, we seek to reduce cyber threats by preventing and disrupting cyber crimes, and to lessen the consequences of cyber incidents by ensuring an effective federal response when appropriate. Finally, we work to create conditions for more effective cyber risk management through efforts to make the cyber ecosystem more fundamentally secure and resilient. This strategy sets forth our goals, objectives, and priorities to successfully execute the full range of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity responsibilities.
…
During the last several decades, advances in technology have fundamentally changed the world. Substantial growth in Internet access, use of Internet-enabled devices, and the availability of high speed information technology systems and large datasets have facilitated productivity, efficiencies, and capabilities across all major industries. The proliferation of technology also presents new cybersecurity challenges and leads to significant national risks. More than 20 billion devices are expected to be connected to the Internet by 2020. The risks introduced by the growing number and variety of such devices are substantial.
The United States faces threats from a growing set of sophisticated malicious actors who seek to exploit cyberspace. Motivations include espionage, political and ideological interests, and financial gain. Nation-states continue to present a considerable cyber threat. But non-state actors are emerging with capabilities that match those of sophisticated nation-states. Criminal actors are increasingly empowered by modern information and communications technologies that enable them to grow in sophistication and transnational reach. Transnational criminal organizations also increasingly collaborate through cyberspace. Complicating the threat picture, nation-states are increasingly using proxies and other techniques that blur the distinction between state and non-state cyber activities. In a number of cases, malicious actors engaged in significant criminal cyber activity appear to have both criminal and nation-state affiliations.
These diverse threats can impact federal and nonfederal information systems. Attempted incursions into government networks occur on a daily basis; the number of cyber incidents on federal systems reported to DHS increased more than ten-fold between 2006 and 2015. In 2015, a high-profile intrusion into a single federal agency resulted in the compromise of personnel records of over 4 million federal employees and ultimately affected nearly 22 million people. The growing interconnection of cyber and physical systems within critical infrastructure also creates the potential risk for malicious cyber activity to result in direct physical consequences; for example, the December 2015 overriding of controls in the Ukrainian electric grid resulted in widespread loss of power. Ransomware incidents such as WannaCry and NotPetya demonstrate how the rapid growth of the internet-of-things further complicates the threat as everyday devices can be targeted by malicious cyber actors with potentially far-reaching consequences.
…
Guiding Principles
DHS advances our mission and will accomplish our cybersecurity goals by aligning departmental activities according to the following guiding principles:
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Bilderberg Meetings 1954 Conference Report Osterbeek, Netherlands
June 11, 2016
The following document is part of a series of Bilderberg documents obtained from academic institutions, diplomatic libraries and legal archives spanning a large portion of the group’s history.
BILDERBERG CONFERENCE May 29th-31st, 1954
Page Count: 29 pages
Date: May 1954
Restriction: NOT FOR PUBLICATION EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART
Originating Organization: Bilderberg Group
File Type: pdf
File Size: 2,873,892 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 7068F9DF51D95CC7625523409ECD6AD42EC558FC878C85C047CC6DDC46932AC7
Download File below
https://info.publicintelligence.net/bilderberg/BilderbergConferenceReport1954.pdf
The Bilderberg Conference was prepared by a group of men of good-will from twelve Western European countries and from the United States of America. Its general purpose was to study the relationship between America and Western Europe in order, by means of a free and frank exchange of views, to lay the foundations for improving mutual understanding between Europeans and Americans on problems of common concern.
The task of choosing the participants fell on this small group, who based their choice on the following considerations: first, men of high integrity; secondly, men internationally, or at least nationally well known; thirdly, men who within their own field hold a position of authority and enjoy the confidence of their fellow-men; fourthly, men having no obvious nationalistic bias and being neither strongly for nor against any other country of the Atlantic Community; fifthly, men well acquainted with the problems of the relations between the United States and Western Europe.
Since the problems confronting the Conference were not only politicians, but concerned the whole field of public activities, the number of politicians invited was, with certain variations, not more than a third. As regards the remainder, slightly under one-third were businessmen and Trade Unionists, the others being intellectuals, professional men, and leaders of public opinion. The Conference was convened by H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands. In order to permit people to speak freely, the Conference was private, neither the public nor the press being admitted, and the participants stayed together at country hotels near Arnhem. The costs of the Conference were covered by private subscriptions from Europe, principally from the Netherlands. Every participant, whatever his position in public life – minister, leader of a party, head of an association – attended in his personal capacity; his speeches, declarations, etc., engaged only his personal responsibility.
Three members who had accepted invitations were prevented through illness from attending the Conference, and the absence on this score of one French member and of two Italians was much regretted. Certain others were prevented from attending by important political activities in their own countries, and this was the case so far as two of the French participants were concerned. Unfortunately no politician was able to come from the United States because of pressure of business there facing both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
As was to be expected, the discussions were lively and on a very high level throughout the Conference. As a result of the frankness which prevailed, coupled with the knowledge that discretion was assured, arguments seldom used in public were presented, and helped to clarify many points.
The object of the Conference being to discuss the relations between Western Europe and the United States, it was decided to start with a general debate, followed by a discussion of respective approaches to the main problems which are the cause of divergencies and misunderstandings.
The five main problems were:-
During the discussions these were extended to cover the present situation regarding East-West trade, the present events in South East Asia, and the industrial use of nuclear energy.
To prepare the discussion, five Europeans, as well as five Americans, were asked to present reports on the five subjects.
The intimate atmosphere of the Conference, the frequency of the meetings, all of which were plenary, with no division into committees, created an environment of mutual trust and friendship. Thus, when it came to dealing with controversial subjects, more was accomplished than had been expected.
For a variety of reasons, and in particular in order to allow people to speak with the utmost frankness a,nd with the certainty that their words would reach their fellow-participants only, and nobody else, a plea for the utmost discretion was made by the Chairman at the end of the Conference. That is why, for instance, in the present note, while certain views and arguments are repeated (in no case arc the actual words spoken quoted), the names of the speakers are not given. The participants are therefore requested to exercise the greatest care in the use of this document, which should be treated as strictly confidential. On the other hand, this document is meant to serve as a basis of enlightenment of various views which the participants to the Conference agreed to disseminate and which we hope they will try to make understood in their particular sphere of influence.
At the end of the Conference a Press Statement was released, in which were summarised the principal points of agreement reached on the various subjects under discussion. In this report the relevant paragraphs of that statement are quoted, since they give a balanced picture of the conclusions, but they have been expanded through the addition of a number of views and arguments put forward in the course of the meetings.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
2018 Bilderberg Meeting
Turin, Italy 7-10 June 2018
CHAIRMAN STEERING COMMITTEE
Castries, Henri de (FRA), Chairman, Institut Montaigne
PARTICIPANTS
Achleitner, Paul M. (DEU), Chairman Supervisory Board, Deutsche Bank AG; Treasurer, Foundation Bilderberg Meetings
Agius, Marcus (GBR), Chairman, PA Consulting Group
Alesina, Alberto (ITA), Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Altman, Roger C. (USA), Founder and Senior Chairman, Evercore
Amorim, Paula (PRT), Chairman, Américo Amorim Group
Anglade, Dominique (CAN), Deputy Premier of Quebec; Minister of Economy, Science and Innovation
Applebaum, Anne (POL), Columnist, Washington Post; Professor of Practice, London School of Economics
Azoulay, Audrey (INT), Director-General, UNESCO
Baker, James H. (USA), Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Barbizet, Patricia (FRA), President, Temaris & Associés
Barroso, José M. Durão (PRT), Chairman, Goldman Sachs International; Former President, European Commission
Beerli, Christine (CHE), Former Vice-President, International Committee of the Red Cross
Berx, Cathy (BEL), Governor, Province of Antwerp
Beurden, Ben van (NLD), CEO, Royal Dutch Shell plc
Blanquer, Jean-Michel (FRA), Minister of National Education, Youth and Community Life
Botín, Ana P. (ESP), Group Executive Chairman, Banco Santander
Bouverot, Anne (FRA), Board Member; Former CEO, Morpho
Brandtzæg, Svein Richard (NOR), President and CEO, Norsk Hydro ASA
Brende, Børge (INT), President, World Economic Forum
Brennan, Eamonn (IRL), Director General, Eurocontrol
Brnabic, Ana (SRB), Prime Minister
Burns, William J. (USA), President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Burwell, Sylvia M. (USA), President, American University
Caracciolo, Lucio (ITA), Editor-in-Chief, Limes
Carney, Mark J. (GBR), Governor, Bank of England
Castries, Henri de (FRA), Chairman, Institut Montaigne; Chairman, Steering Committee Bilderberg Meetings
Cattaneo, Elena (ITA), Director, Laboratory of Stem Cell Biology, University of Milan
Cazeneuve, Bernard (FRA), Partner, August Debouzy; Former Prime Minister
Cebrián, Juan Luis (ESP), Executive Chairman, El País
Champagne, François-Philippe (CAN), Minister of International Trade
Cohen, Jared (USA), Founder and CEO, Jigsaw at Alphabet Inc.
Colao, Vittorio (ITA), CEO, Vodafone Group
Cook, Charles (USA), Political Analyst, The Cook Political Report
Dagdeviren, Canan (TUR), Assistant Professor, MIT Media Lab
Donohoe, Paschal (IRL), Minister for Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform
Döpfner, Mathias (DEU), Chairman and CEO, Axel Springer SE
Ecker, Andrea (AUT), Secretary General, Office Federal President of Austria
Elkann, John (ITA), Chairman, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles
Émié, Bernard (FRA), Director General, Ministry of the Armed Forces
Enders, Thomas (DEU), CEO, Airbus SE
Fallows, James (USA), Writer and Journalist
Ferguson, Jr., Roger W. (USA), President and CEO, TIAA
Ferguson, Niall (USA), Milbank Family Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Fischer, Stanley (USA), Former Vice-Chairman, Federal Reserve; Former Governor, Bank of Israel
Gilvary, Brian (GBR), Group CFO, BP plc
Goldstein, Rebecca (USA), Visiting Professor, New York University
Gruber, Lilli (ITA), Editor-in-Chief and Anchor “Otto e mezzo”, La7 TV
Hajdarowicz, Greg (POL), Founder and President, Gremi International Sarl
Halberstadt, Victor (NLD), Professor of Economics, Leiden University; Chairman Foundation Bilderberg Meetings
Hassabis, Demis (GBR), Co-Founder and CEO, DeepMind
Hedegaard, Connie (DNK), Chair, KR Foundation; Former European Commissioner
Helgesen, Vidar (NOR), Ambassador for the Ocean
Herlin, Antti (FIN), Chairman, KONE Corporation
Hickenlooper, John (USA), Governor of Colorado
Hobson, Mellody (USA), President, Ariel Investments LLC
Hodgson, Christine (GBR), Chairman, Capgemini UK plc
Hoffman, Reid (USA), Co-Founder, LinkedIn; Partner, Greylock Partners
Horowitz, Michael C. (USA), Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
Hwang, Tim (USA), Director, Harvard-MIT Ethics and Governance of AI Initiative
Ischinger, Wolfgang (INT), Chairman, Munich Security Conference
Jacobs, Kenneth M. (USA), Chairman and CEO, Lazard
Kaag, Sigrid (NLD), Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation
Karp, Alex (USA), CEO, Palantir Technologies
Kissinger, Henry A. (USA), Chairman, Kissinger Associates Inc.
Knot, Klaas H.W. (NLD), President, De Nederlandsche Bank
Koç, Ömer M. (TUR), Chairman, Koç Holding A.S.
Köcher, Renate (DEU), Managing Director, Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research
Kotkin, Stephen (USA), Professor in History and International Affairs, Princeton University
Kragic, Danica (SWE), Professor, School of Computer Science and Communication, KTH
Kravis, Henry R. (USA), Co-Chairman and Co-CEO, KKR
Kravis, Marie-Josée (USA), Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; President, American Friends of Bilderberg
Kudelski, André (CHE), Chairman and CEO, Kudelski Group
Lepomäki, Elina (FIN), MP, National Coalition Party
Leyen, Ursula von der (DEU), Federal Minster of Defence
Leysen, Thomas (BEL), Chairman, KBC Group
Makan, Divesh (USA), CEO, ICONIQ Capital
Massolo, Giampiero (ITA), Chairman, Fincantieri Spa.; President, ISPI
Mazzucato, Mariana (ITA), Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value, University College London
Mead, Walter Russell (USA), Distinguished Fellow, Hudson Institute
Michel, Charles (BEL), Prime Minister
Micklethwait, John (USA), Editor-in-Chief, Bloomberg LP
Minton Beddoes, Zanny (GBR), Editor-in-Chief, The Economist
Mitsotakis, Kyriakos (GRC), President, New Democracy Party
Mota, Isabel (PRT), President, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation
Moyo, Dambisa F. (USA), Global Economist and Author
Mundie, Craig J. (USA), President, Mundie & Associates
Neven, Hartmut (USA), Director of Engineering, Google Inc.
Noonan, Peggy (USA), Author and Columnist, The Wall Street Journal
Oettinger, Günther H. (INT), Commissioner for Budget & Human Resources, European Commission
O’Leary, Michael (IRL), CEO, Ryanair D.A.C.
O’Neill, Onora (GBR), Emeritus Honorary Professor in Philosophy, University of Cambridge
Osborne, George (GBR), Editor, London Evening Standard
Özkan, Behlül (TUR), Associate Professor in International Relations, Marmara University
Papalexopoulos, Dimitri (GRC), CEO, Titan Cement Company S.A.
Parolin, H.E. Pietro (VAT), Cardinal and Secretary of State
Patino, Bruno (FRA), Chief Content Officer, Arte France TV
Petraeus, David H. (USA), Chairman, KKR Global Institute
Pichette, Patrick (CAN), General Partner, iNovia Capital
Pouyanné, Patrick (FRA), Chairman and CEO, Total S.A.
Pring, Benjamin (USA), Co-Founder and Managing Director, Center for the Future of Work
Rankka, Maria (SWE), CEO, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
Ratas, Jüri (EST), Prime Minister
Rendi-Wagner, Pamela (AUT), MP (SPÖ); Former Minister of Health
Rivera Díaz, Albert (ESP), President, Ciudadanos Party
Rossi, Salvatore (ITA), Senior Deputy Governor, Bank of Italy
Rubesa, Baiba A. (LVA), CEO, RB Rail AS
Rubin, Robert E. (USA), Co-Chairman Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations; Former Treasury Secretary
Rudd, Amber (GBR), MP; Former Secretary of State, Home Department
Rutte, Mark (NLD), Prime Minister
Sabia, Michael (CAN), President and CEO, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec
Sadjadpour, Karim (USA), Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Sáenz de Santamaría, Soraya (ESP), Deputy Prime Minister
Sawers, John (GBR), Chairman and Partner, Macro Advisory Partners
Schadlow, Nadia (USA), Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy
Schneider-Ammann, Johann N. (CHE), Federal Councillor
Scholten, Rudolf (AUT), President, Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue
Sikorski, Radoslaw (POL), Senior Fellow, Harvard University; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
Simsek, Mehmet (TUR), Deputy Prime Minister
Skartveit, Hanne (NOR), Political Editor, Verdens Gang
Stoltenberg, Jens (INT), Secretary General, NATO
Summers, Lawrence H. (USA), Charles W. Eliot University Professor, Harvard University
Thiel, Peter (USA), President, Thiel Capital
Topsøe, Jakob Haldor (DNK), Chairman, Haldor Topsøe Holding A/S
Turpin, Matthew (USA), Director for China, National Security Council
Wahlroos, Björn (FIN), Chairman, Sampo Group, Nordea Bank, UPM-Kymmene Corporation
Wallenberg, Marcus (SWE), Chairman, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB
Woods, Ngaire (GBR), Dean, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University
Yetkin, Murat (TUR), Editor-in-chief, Hürriyet Daily News
Zeiler, Gerhard (AUT), President, Turner International
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)/Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) assesses that unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) provide malicious actors an additional method of gaining undetected proximity to networks and equipment within critical infrastructure sectors. Malicious actors could use this increased proximity to exploit unsecured wireless systems and exfiltrate information. Malicious actors could also exploit vulnerabilities within UASs and UAS supply chains to compromise UASs belonging to critical infrastructure operators and disrupt or interfere with legitimate UAS operations.
…
UAS FACILITATE PHYSICAL ACCESS TO UNSECURED SYSTEMS
UASs provide malicious actors an additional method of gaining proximity to networks and equipment within critical infrastructure sectors. Malicious actors could then use the proximity provided by a UAS to wirelessly exploit unsecured systems and extract information from systems they cannot otherwise access remotely or may not be able to access due to range limitations. This includes networks and devices within secured buildings, as well as networks and devices behind fencing and walls.
UASs can also allow a malicious actor to wirelessly exploit vulnerabilities from a distance (figure 1). The prevalent ownership and operation of UASs by the general public, the distance from which UAS can be operated, and a lack of tracking data can also provide malicious actors a level of anonymity that otherwise may not be available. UASs, in particular UASs, are typically more difficult to detect than a malicious actor attempting to trespass beyond physical barriers.
…
UAS FOR WIRELESS SYSTEM EXPLOITATION
Malicious actors could utilize UASs in order to wirelessly exploit access points and unsecured networks and devices. This can include using UASs in order to inject malware, execute malicious code, and perform man-in-the-middle attacks. UASs can also deliver hardware for exploiting unsecured wireless systems, allowing malicious actors persistent access to the wireless system until the hardware is detected or runs out of power. While OCIA does not know of a confirmed incident utilizing UASs to exploit wireless systems, researchers have demonstrated this capability.
…
MALICIOUS ACTORS CAN EXPLOIT COMPROMISED UAS
While UASs can be used as a tool for an attacker, they are also vulnerable to exploitation. Many commercial UAS variations, for example, currently communicate with ground stations and operators using unencrypted feeds. This can allow a malicious actor to intercept and review data sent to and from the UAS.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
APT actors in the near future likely intend to target US Cleared Defense Contractors (CDC) via spear phishing campaigns or network infrastructure compromises, according to recent intelligence. Common spear phish targets may include individuals featured on internet-facing CDC Web sites and high-ranking CDC executives.
FBI has observed APT actors over the past two years precede spear phishing campaigns with open source research of targeted US company websites, particularly sections containing contact information for company officials which include names, titles, telephone numbers, and email addresses. In one case, an APT actor sent spear phishing emails within one-to-two weeks after researching the targeted US company.
Historically, APT actors have a strong desire to collect US defense and scientific intelligence to further their interests and advance strategic goals. As a result, US CDCs and research facilities may likely be targets for cyber adversaries due to their involvement in national security and their close relationship with the US Government.
Most companies publicly share their contact information and high-level management names on their corporate Web pages. Some corporate employees share other forms of personally identifiable information on various social media platforms. Adversaries may use this publicly-posted information to target individuals with the end goal of infecting a corporate network for intelligence collection.
Common techniques used by APT actors include sending well-crafted spear phishing messages tailored to the professional interests of the target, the use of watering holes to redirect visitors to malicious Web sites, and the use of stolen or weak user credentials to exploit a network vulnerability. After a successful compromise, APT actors attempt to expand their access in the network to multiple systems to facilitate information theft.
APT actors have increased their activity over the last several years. Cyber attacks such as WannaCry and NotPetya in the spring and summer of 2017 are examples of increasing APT activity. While WannaCry and NotPetya were not directed at the United States, both had inadvertent negative effects on US systems. The FBI advises companies to be mindful that similar attacks may likely occur in the near future. Previous attacks have coincided with national holidays of cyber targets, such as Constitution Day in Ukraine on 28 June.
For recent guidance on mitigation strategies against spear phishing and network infrastructure targeting, please refer to the following joint technical alerts:
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
Recommendations: The FBI recommends providers implement the preventative measures listed below to help secure their systems from attacks:
Ensure anti-virus software and firmware is up-to-date
Monitor employee logins outside normal business hours and other anomalous activity
Close unused ports
Monitor employee logins outside normal business hours and other anomalous activity
Provide regular training to employees regarding current social engineering threats, scrutinizing e-mail links and attachments, and pop-ups from attachments requesting enabling certain functions (i.e., macros)
Brief executives at your company to be extra vigilant and report any suspicious email messages
Apply extra scrutiny to e-mail messages with links or attachments directed toward executives
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The Office of Private Sector, in coordination with the Criminal Investigative Division, is providing this LIR to inform private sector partners about the increasing use of e-mail account compromise (EAC) techniques in the US real estate settlement industry. Consumer borrowers, settlement/title companies, real estate agents, real estate attorneys, builders, and others are being targeted by criminal actors netting millions in illicit proceeds. These proceeds are often directed initially to US banks then re-directed via money service businesses and international accounts to Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, China, Ghana, Turkey, and India. The increased use of EAC techniques, as well as, the evolving expansion into previously unidentified countries indicates this fraud scheme is not slowing and puts additional strain on industry participants to be vigilant with their e-mail communications and identity verification processes.
Criminal threat actors diverted an estimated $19 million in fiscal year 2016 from real estate purchase transactions by manipulating e-mail communications of key participants to re-direct legitimate wire transfers, including down payments, earnest money, and settlement proceeds to criminally-controlled accounts. The increasing use of EAC techniques such as identifying realtors via real estate web sites, spoofing, phishing, social engineering, chat rooms, spam, and malware is attributable to positive real estate market indicators such as housing prices/supply, interest rates, the increase in well-publicized multi-million dollar land development contracts, and the proven ease in infiltrating the transaction process. This threat will likely continue on an upward trend as these conditions persist. Please see the below diagram for a step by step overview of a common EAC scam.
One of the most widely reported vulnerabilities identified by victims is that industry participants in real estate settlements – whether they involve all-cash or mortgage loan purchase transactions – may not be aware of the minute differences or changes in the e-mail accounts of parties with whom they routinely conduct business. Consequently, they are inadvertently participating in the illicit transfer of funds to criminal actors. As real estate settlement transactions occur on a regular and recurring basis and typically use long-established straightforward processes between known participants (brokers, financial institutions, real estate agents, title and escrow companies and attorneys), it is very likely criminal actors and organized groups will increasingly continue to target these businesses and individuals for illicit financial gain.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
“GoMoPa”-Frontschwein Klaus-Jürgen Maurischat (vermutlich ein “Alias”)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
In einem Archiv wurde der Stasi-Ausweis des heutigen russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin gefunden. Mit dem Ausweis habe er in Stasi-Dienststellen ein- und ausgehen können. Damit zeigt sich, dass es noch etliche Stasi-Promis gibt, die bis jetzt noch nicht enttarnt wurden. Diese Stasi-“Stars” sind nicht auf der offiziellen Stasi-Liste verzeichnet, die im Hinblick auf Rentenforderungen vor dem Ende der DDR erstellt wurde.
Folgen jetzt noch mehr Enttarnungen ?
Russlands Präsident Wladimir Putin (66) hatte bis zum Mauerfall auch einen Ausweis der Staatssicherheit der DDR. Das Dokument habe jahrelang unbemerkt im Archiv gelegen, sagte der Dresdner Außenstellenleiter der Stasiunterlagenbehörde, Konrad Felber..
Der Ausweis war am 31. Dezember 1985 ausgestellt und bis Ende 1989 immer wieder verlängert worden. Putin war damals als Offizier des sowjetischen Geheimdienstes KGB in Dresden tätig.
Mit dem Dokument habe Putin ohne umfangreiche Kontrolle in den Dienststellen der Stasi ein- und ausgehen können, erläuterte Felber.
“Das heißt aber nicht automatisch, dass Putin für die Stasi gearbeitet hat.” Nein, denn die Stasi hat för Putins KGB gearbeitet und diverse Seilschaftenvor allem in Ostberlin tun dies heute noch – Mord und Cyberkrieg inklusive.
“Zu sowjetischen Zeiten waren der KGB und die Stasi befreundete Dienste. Deshalb ist nicht auszuschließen, dass es auch wechselseitige Ausweise gab”, sagte Putins Sprecher Dmitri Peskow der Agentur Tass zufolge.
Putin war Augenzeuge, als während der friedlichen Revolution am 5. Dezember 1989 rund 5.000 Demonstranten die hermetisch abgeschirmte Dresdner Bezirksverwaltung der Staatssicherheit besetzten. Als sich die Demonstranten der Dienststelle näherten, kam es fast zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen mit sowjetischen Militärs.
Aufgrund einer Medienanfrage seien Akten der Abteilung “Kader und Schulung” der ehemaligen Stasi-Bezirksverwaltung Dresden durchforstet worden, sagte Felber. Dabei sei man auf den Ausweis gestoßen.
“Es ist schon eine kleine Sensation. Putins Name war in den Akten, die die Ausgabe der Ausweise an sowjetische Militärangehörige nachweisen, nicht verzeichnet.”
Es zeigt sich wieder einmal, wie die Stasiunterlagenbehörde, die seit Beginn mit Stasi-Agenten durchsetzt war und ist, arbeitet.
Wann kommen endlich die längst überfälligen anderen Enttarnungen ?
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
This Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Intelligence Report contains new and updated information on slang terms and code words from a variety of law enforcement and open sources, and serves as an updated version to the product entitled “Drug Slang Code Words” published by the DEA in May 2017. It is designed as a ready reference for law enforcement personnel who are confronted with hundreds of slang terms and code words used to identify a wide variety of controlled substances, designer drugs, synthetic compounds, measurements, locations, weapons, and other miscellaneous terms relevant to the drug trade. Although every effort was made to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information presented, due to the dynamics of the ever-changing drug scene, subsequent additions, deletions, and corrections are inevitable. Future addendums and updates to this report will attempt to capture changed terminology to the furthest extent possible. This compendium of slang terms and code words is alphabetically ordered, with new additions presented in italic text, and identifies drugs and drug categories in English and foreign language derivations.…AmphetamineAcelerador; Amy; Amps; Bam; B-Bombs; Beans; Bennies; Benz; Black and Whites; Black Beauties; Black Birds; Black Bombers; Black Mollies; Blacks; Blue Boys; Bombita; Brain Ticklers; Brownies; Bumblebees; Cartwheels; Chalk; Chicken Powder; Chochos; Chocolates; Christina; Chunk; Co-Pilot; Coast-to-Coasts; Crisscross; Cross Roads; Cross Tops; Crosses; Debs; Dexies; Diablos; Diamonds; Diet Pills; Dolls; Dominoes; Double Cross; Drivers; Dulces; Fives; Flour; Footballs; French Blues; Geeked Up; Goofballs; Greenies; Head Drugs; Hearts; Horse Heads; In-Betweens; Jelly Babies; Jelly Beans; Jolly Beans; Jugs; LA Turnaround; Leapers; Lid Poppers; Lightening; Little Bombs; Marathons; Mini Beans; Mini Bennies; Morning Shot; Nuggets; Oranges; Pastas; Pastillas; Peaches; Pep Pills; Pepper; Pingas; Pink Hearts; Pixies; Pollutants; Purple Hearts; Rhythm; Rippers; Road Dope; Roses; Rueda; Snaps; Snow Pallets; Sparkle Plenty; Sparklers; Speed; Splash; Sweeties; Sweets; Tens; Thrusters; TR-6s; Truck Drivers; Turnabouts; Uppers; Wake Ups; West Coast Turnarounds; Wheels; Whiffle Dust; White Crosses; Whites; Zoomers…Cocaine7; 62; 77; 777; 921; A-1; Adidas; All-American Drug; Ancla; Angel Powder; Angie; Animals; Apache; Apodo; Arriba; Audi; Aunt Nora; Azucar; Baby Powder; Barrato; Basuco; Bazooka (cocaine paste mixed with marijuana); Beach; Belushi (cocaine mixed with heroin); Bernice; Bernie’s Flakes; Bernie’s Gold Dust; Big Bird; Big Bloke; Big C; Big Flake; Big Rush; Billie Hoke; Bird; Birdie Powder; Blanca Nieves; Blanco; Blast; Blizzard; Blonde; Blocks; Blow; BMW; Board; Bobo; Bolitas; Bolivian Marching Powder; Bombita (cocaine mixed with heroin); Booger Sugar; Bose; Bouncing Powder; Brisa; Bump; C-Dust; Caballo; Caca; Cadillac; California Pancakes; Calves; Canelon; Candy; Car; Carney; Carrie Nation; Cars; Case; Cebolla; Cecil; Cement; Charlie; Chevy; Cheyenne; Chica; Chicanitas; Chinos; Chiva; Cielo; Clear Kind; Clear Tires; Coca; Coca-Cola; Cocazo; Coconut; Coke; Cola; Colorado; Comida; Comida Dulce; Connie; Cookie; Cosa; Coso; Cosos; Crow; Crusty Treats; Cuadro; Death Valley; Designer Jeans; Devil’s Dandruff; Diamonds; Diente; Dienton; Diesel; Diosa Blanca; Dona Blanca; Double Bubble; Double Letters; Dove; Dream; Dulces; Duracell; Durazno; Duro; Dust; Escama; Escorpino; Falopa; Fef1; Fichas; Fiesta; Fire (cocaine base); Fish (liquid cocaine); Fish Scale; Flake; Flea Market Jeans; Florida Snow; Flour; Food; Foolish Powder; Fox; Freeze; Friskie Powder; Frula; Funtime; Gabacho; Galaxy; Gallos; Gato; Gift of the Sun; Gin; Girl; Girlfriend; Glad Stuff; Gold Dust; Green Gold; Gringa; Gringito; Grout; Guerillo; Gueros; Guitar; H1; Hai Hit; Hamburger; Happy Dust; Happy Powder; Happy Trails; Heaven; Heaven Dust; Heavy One; Hen; Henry VIII; HH; HHJ; High Heat; HMH; Hooter; Hundai; Hunter; Ice Cream; Icing; Inca Message; Izzy; Jam; Jaime Blanco; Jaula; Jeep; Jelly; John Deere; Joy Flakes; Joy Powder; Juguetes; Jump Rope; Junk; K13; King’s Habit; Kordell; La Familia; Lady; Lady Snow; Late Night; Lavada; Leaf; Libreta; Line; Loaf; Love Affair; LV; Maca Flour; Madera; Mama Coca; Mandango; Manita; Maradona; Marbol; Material; Mayback (62 grams); Mayo; Melcocha; Media Lata; Mercedes; Milk; Milonga; Mojo; Mona Lisa; Monte; Morro; Mosquitos; Movie Star Drug; Muchacha; Muebles; Mujer; Napkin; Nieve; Niña; Normal; Nose Candy; Nose Powder; Old Lady; Oyster Stew; Paint; Paloma; Paleta; Palomos; Pantalones; Papas; Paradise; Paradise White; Parrot; Pearl; Pedrito; Perico; Personal; Peruvian; Peruvian Flake; Peruvian Lady; Pescado; Peta; Pez; Pichicata; Pillow; Pimp; Pingas; Pingos; Pintura Blanca; Poli; Pollo; Polvo; Powder; Powder Diamonds; Puma; Puritain; Quadros; Queso Blanco; Racehorse Charlie; Rambo; Refresco; Refrescas; Regular Kind; Regular Work; Reindeer Dust; Richie; Rims; Rocky Mountain; Rolex; Rolex HH; Rooster; Scale; Schmeck; Schoolboy; Scorpion; Scottie; Seed; Serpico; Sierra; Shirt; Ski Equipment; Sleigh Ride; Sneeze; Sniff; Snow; Snow Bird; Snow Cone; Snow White; Snowball; Snowflake; Society High; Soda; Soditas; Soft; Space (cocaine mixed with PCP); Special; Speedball (cocaine mixed with heroin); Stardust; Star Spangled Powder; Studio Fuel; Suave; Sugar; Superman; Sweet Stuff; Tabique; Tablas; Talco; Talquito; Tamales; Taxi; Tecate; Teenager; Teeth; Tequila; Thunder; Tire; Tonto; Toot; Tortes; Tortuga; Toyota; T-Shirts; Tubo; Tucibi (pink variety); Turkey; Tutti-Frutti; Vaquita; Wash; Wet; Whack (cocaine mixed with PCP); White; White Bitch; White Cross; White Dove; White Girl; White Goat; White Horse; White Lady; White Mercedes Benz; White Mosquito; White Paint; White Powder; White Rock; White Root; White Shirt; White T; White Wall Tires; Whitey; Whiz Bang; Wings; Wooly; Work; Yayo; Yeyo; Yoda; Zapato; Zip…LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)Aceite; Acelide; Acid; Acido; Alice; Angels in a Sky; Animal; Avandaro; Backbreaker (LSD mixed with strychnine); Barrel; Bart Simpson; Battery Acid; Beast; Big D; Black Acid (LSD mixed with PCP); Black Star; Black Sunshine; Black Tabs; Blanco de España; Blotter Acid; Blotter Cube; Blue Acid; Blue Barrel; Blue Chair; Blue Cheer; Blue Heaven; Blue Microdots; Blue Mist; Blue Moon; Blue Sky; Blue Star; Blue Tabs; Bomba; Brown Bomber; Brown Dots; California Sunshine; Cherry Dome; Chief; Chinese Dragons; Cid; Coffee; Colorines; Conductor; Contact Lens; Crackers; Crystal Tea; Cubo; Cupcakes; Dental Floss; Dinosaurs; Divina; Domes; Dots; Double Dome; El Cid; Electric Kool Aid; Elefante Blanco; Ellis Day; Fields; Flash; Flat Blues; Ghost; Golden Dragon; Golf Balls; Goofy; Gota; Grape Parfait; Green Wedge; Grey Shields; Hats; Hawaiian Sunshine; Hawk; Haze; Headlights; Heavenly Blue; Hits; Instant Zen; Jesus Christ Acid; Kaleidoscope; Leary; Lens; Lentejuela; Lime Acid; Live, Spit and Die; Lluvia de Estrellas; Looney Tunes; Lucy; Maje; Mellow Yellow; Mica; Microdot; Micropunto Azul (white tablet with drop of blue LSD); Micropunto Morado (white tablet with drop of purple LSD); Mighty Quinn; Mind Detergent; Mother of God; Mureler; Nave; Newspapers; OrangeBarrels; Orange Cubes; Orange Haze; Orange Micros; Orange Wedges; Owsley; Paper Acid; Pearly Gates; Pellets; Phoenix; Pink Blotters; Pink Panthers; Pink Robots; Pink Wedges; Pink Witches; Pizza; Pop; Potato; Pure Love; Purple Barrels; Purple Haze; Purple Hearts; Purple Flats; Recycle; Royal Blues; Russian Sickles; Sacrament; Sandoz; Smears; Square Dancing Tickets; Sugar Cubes; Sugar Lumps; Sunshine; Superman; Tabs; Tacatosa; Tail Lights; Teddy Bears; Ticket; Uncle Sid; Valley Dolls; Vodka Acid; Wedding Bells; Wedge; White Dust; White Fluff; White Lightening; White Owsley; Window Glass; Window Pane; Yellow Dimples; Yellow Sunshine; Zen…Marijuana420; A-Bomb (marijuana mixed with heroin); Acapulco Gold; Acapulco Red; Ace; African Black; African Bush; Airplane; Alfalfa; Alfombra; Alice B Toklas; All-Star; Almohada; Angola; Animal Cookies (hydroponic); Arizona; Ashes; Aunt Mary; AZ; Baby; Bale; Bambalachacha; Barbara Jean; Bareta; Bash; Bazooka (marijuana mixed with cocaine paste); BC Budd; Bernie; Bhang; Big Pillows; Biggy; Bionic (marijuana mixed with PCP); Black Bart; Black Gold; Black Maria; Blondie; Blue Cheese; Blue Crush; Blue Dream; Blue Jeans; Blue Sage; Blueberry; Bobo Bush; Boo; Boom; Branches; Broccoli; Bud; Budda; Burritos Verdes; Bush; Cabbage; Café; Cajita; Cali; Camara; Canadian Black; Catnip; Cheeba; Chernobyl; Cheese; Chicago Black; Chicago Green; Chippie; Chistosa; Christmas Tree; Chronic; Churro; Cigars; Citrol; Cola; Colorado Cocktail; Cookie (hydroponic); Cotorritos; Crazy Weed; Creeper Bud; Crippy; Crying Weed; Culican; Dank; Devils’s Lettuce; Dew; Diesel; Dimba; Dinkie Dow; Diosa Verde; Dirt Grass; Ditch Weed; Dizz; Djamba; Dody; Dojo; Domestic; Donna Juana; Doobie; Downtown Brown; Drag Weed; Dro (hydroponic); Droski (hydroponic); Dry High; Elefante Pata; Endo; Escoba; Fattie; Fine Stuff; Fire; Flower; Flower Tops; Fluffy; Fuzzy Lady; Gallina; Gallito; Garden; Garifa; Gauge; Gangster; Ganja; Gash; Gato; Ghana; Gigi (hydroponic); Giggle Smoke; Giggle Weed; Girl Scout Cookies (hydroponic); Gloria; Gold; Gold Leaf; Gold Star; Gong; Good Giggles; Gorilla; Gorilla Glue; Grand Daddy Purp; Grass; Grasshopper; Green; Green Crack; Green-Eyed Girl; Green Eyes; Green Goblin; Green Goddess; Green Mercedes Benz; Green Paint; Green Skunk; Greenhouse; Grenuda; Greta; Guardada; Gummy Bears; Gunga; Hairy Ones; Hash; Hawaiian; Hay; Hemp; Herb; Hierba; Holy Grail; Homegrown; Hooch; Hoja; Humo; Hydro; Indian Boy; Indian Hay; Jamaican Gold; Jamaican Red; Jane; Jive; Jolly Green; Jon-Jem; Joy Smoke; Juan Valdez; Juanita; Jungle Juice; Kaff; Kali; Kaya; KB; Kentucky Blue; KGB; Khalifa; Kiff; Killa; Kilter; King Louie; Kona Gold; Kumba; Kush; Laughing Grass; Laughing Weed; Leaf; Lechuga; Lemon-Lime; Leña; Liamba; Lime Pillows; Little Green Friends; Little Smoke; Llesca; Loaf; Lobo; Loco Weed; Loud; Love Nuggets; Love Weed; Lucas; M.J.; Machinery; Macoña; Mafafa; Magic Smoke; Manhattan Silver; Manteca; Maracachafa; Maria; Marimba; Mariquita; Mary Ann; Mary Jane; Mary Jones; Mary Warner; Mary Weaver; Matchbox; Matraca; Maui Wowie; Meg; Method; Mersh; Mexican Brown; Mexicali Haze; Mexican Green; Mexican Red; MMJ; Mochie (hydroponic); Moña; Monte; Moocah; Mootie; Mora; Morisqueta; Mostaza; Mota; Mother; Mowing the Lawn; Muggie; My Brother; Narizona; Northern Lights; Nug; O-Boy; OG; O.J.; Owl; Paja; Palm; Paloma; Palomita; Panama Cut; Panama Gold; Panama Red; Pakalolo; Parsley; Pasto; Pasture; Peliroja; Pelosa; Phoenix; Pine; Pink Panther; Pintura; Plant; Platinum Cookies (hydroponic); Platinum Jack; Pocket Rocket; Popcorn; Porro; Pot; Pretendo; Prop 215; Puff; Purple Haze; Purple OG; Queen Ann’s Lace; Red Hair; Ragweed; Railroad Weed; Rainy Day Woman; Rasta Weed; Red Cross; Red Dirt; Reefer; Reggie; Repollo; Righteous Bush; Root; Rope; Rosa Maria; Salt and Pepper; Santa Marta; Sasafras; Sativa; Shoes; Sinsemilla; Shmagma; Shora; Shrimp; Shwag; Skunk; Skywalker (hydroponic); Smoke; Smoochy Woochy Poochy; Smoke Canada; Sour OG; Spliff; Stems; Sticky; Stink Weed; Sugar Weed; Sweet Lucy; Tahoe (hydroponic); Tangy OG; Terp; Terpenes; Tex-Mex; Texas Tea; Tigitty; Tila; Tims; Top Shelf; Tosca; Train Wreck; Trees; Trinity OG; Tweeds; Valle; Wake and Bake; Weed; Weed Tea; Wet (marijuana dipped in PCP); Wheat; White-Haired Lady; Wooz; Yellow Submarine; Yen Pop; Yerba; Yesca; Young Girls; Zacate; Zacatecas; Zambi; Zip; Zoom (marijuana mixed with PCP)…Psilocybin MushroomsAlice; Blue Meanies; Boomers; Buttons; Caps; Champiñones; Cubes; God’s Flesh; Hongos; Lazers; Liberties; Liberty Caps; Little Smoke; Magic; Mushies; Musk; Pizza Toppings; Psilly Billy; Purple Passion; Silly Putty; Simple Simon; Stemmies; Tweezes…WeaponsAK-47: Chivo; Chopper; Cuerno de Chivo
Firearms: Straps
Handgun: Cuete; Rofi; Shorts
Knife: Filero
Long Weapon: Pantalon
Rifles: Cuernos
Weapon: Bracelet; FierroMiscellaneousBorder Patrol Police: Moscas
Bulk Money In US Currency: Verdes; F; Los Americanos
Checkpoints: Jalapeños
Cocaine About To Be Delivered: Ya terminaron de jugar futbol
Cocaine Shipment: Vuelta
Contacts To Get Something Done: El Tiene Manejo
Coordinates Of Maritime Rendezvous Sites And Smuggling Route: Las Direcciones; Frecuencia
Crossing: Cheap Jump
Cutting Agent: Cortina
Dispatch of a Cocaine Shipment: Encomienda
Drug Courier: Burrero; Burrito; Burro; Camello; Correo; Estafeta; Mochilero; Pasador
Drug Dealer: Arreador; Enviciador, Pinguero
Drug Loads: Niños
Drug Potency: Alcance
Drug Proceeds: Invoices; Jabon; Papel; Paper; Phones; Rent; Tickets
Drug Source of Supply: Fuente; Plug
Drug Stash: Alijo; Canuto; Clavo, Planta
Gang Member: Cholo
Hidden Compartment: Clavo
Hideout for Criminals: Aguantadero
Informant: Alcaucil; Batidor; Madrina
Impression Marking On a Kilogram Of Cocaine: Marquilla
Jail: Churo; Condado; Escuela
Kidnappers: Levantadores
Large Truck Used To Transport Drugs: Mula
Law Enforcement: Cochis, Pitufo
Load Vehicles: Muebles
Maritime Voyage Of 100 Miles: 100 Ida
Maritime Voyage Of 100 Miles to Return: 100 de Regreso
Mexican Soldiers: Wachos
Mexican State Police: Pepos
Mexicans: Mejias
Money: Alguita; Bolas; Bread; Feddy; Feria; Food Stamps; Lana; Luz; Paper
Murder: Boleta
One Million Colombian Pesos: Palo
Overdose: Doblar
Overdosed on heroin (but was revived by EMS): Blew Up a Bag
Person Watching Over Stored Cocaine: La Seguridad
Police: Bandera; Chota; Jura; Paco; Zorillos
Police Car: Licuadora
Poor Quality Product: Chafa
Prison: Cachucha; Gayola
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Cyberspace operations (CO) is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.
This publication focuses on military operations in and through cyberspace; explains the relationships and responsibilities of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Service cyberspace component (SCC) commands, and combat support agencies; and establishes a framework for the employment of cyberspace forces and capabilities.
The Nature of Cyberspace Relationship with the Physical Domains.
Cyberspace, while part of the information environment, is dependent on the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space.
CO use links and nodes located in the physical domains and perform logical functions to create effects first in cyberspace and then, as needed, in the physical domains. Actions in cyberspace, through carefully controlled cascading effects, can enable freedom of action for activities in the physical domains.
Cyberspace Layer Model. To assist in the planning and execution of CO, cyberspace can be described in terms of three interrelated layers: physical network, logical network, and cyberpersona. Department of Defense (DOD) Cyberspace. The Department of Defense information network (DODIN) is the set of information capabilities and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone, including owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services, and national security systems.
Connectivity and Access. Gaining access to operationally useful areas of cyberspace, including targets within them, is affected by legal, policy, or operational limitations. For all of these reasons, access is not guaranteed. Additionally, achieving a commander’s objectives can be significantly complicated by specific elements of cyberspace being used by enemies, adversaries, allies, neutral parties, and other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, all at the same time.
The operational environment (OE) is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and impact the decisions of the commander assigned responsibility for it. The information environment permeates the physical domains and therefore exists in any OE. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
Given that cyberspace is wholly contained within the information environment and the chief purpose of information operations (IO) is to create effects in the information environment, there is significant interdependency between IO and CO.
Integrating Cyberspace Operations with Other Operations
During joint planning, cyberspace capabilities are integrated into the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) plans and synchronized with other operations across the range of military operations. While not the norm, some military objectives can be achieved by CO alone. Commanders conduct CO to obtain or retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace, accomplish JFC objectives, deny freedom of action to the threat, and enable other operational activities.
Cyberspace Operations Forces
Commander, United States Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM), commands a preponderance of the cyberspace forces that are not retained by the Services. USCYBERCOM accomplishes its missions within three primary lines of operation: secure, operate, and defend the DODIN; defend the nation from attack in cyberspace; and provide cyberspace support as required to combatant commanders (CCDRs). The Services man, train, and equip cyberspace units and provide them to USCYBERCOM through the SCCs.
Challenges to the Joint Force’s Use of Cyberspace
Threats. Cyberspace presents the JFC’s operations with many threats, from nation-states to individual actors to accidents and natural hazards. Anonymity and Difficulties with Attribution. To initiate an appropriate defensive response, attribution of threats in cyberspace is crucial for any actions external to the defended cyberspace beyond authorized self-defense.
Geography Challenges. In cyberspace, there is no stateless maneuver space. Therefore, when US military forces maneuver in foreign cyberspace, mission and policy requirements may require they maneuver clandestinely without the knowledge of the state where the infrastructure is located.
Technology Challenges. Using a cyberspace capability that relies on exploitation of technical vulnerabilities in the target may reveal its functionality and compromise the capability’s effectiveness for future missions.
Private Industry and Public Infrastructure. Many of DOD’s critical functions and operations rely on contracted commercial assets, including Internet service providers (ISPs) and global supply chains, over which DOD and its forces have no direct authority.
Globalization. The combination of DOD’s global operations with its reliance on cyberspace and associated technologies means DOD often procures mission-essential information technology products and services from foreign vendors.
Mitigations. DOD partners with the defense industrial base (DIB) to increase the security of information about DOD programs residing on or transiting DIB unclassified networks.
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
An unidentified cyber actor in mid-March 2018 used GrandCrab Version 2 ransomware to attack a State of Connecticut municipality network and a state judicial branch network, according to DHS reporting derived from a state law enforcement official with direct and indirect access. The municipality did not pay the ransom, resulting in the encryption of multiple servers that affected some data backups and the loss of tax payment information and assessor data. The attack against the state judicial branch resulted in the infection of numerous computers, but minimal content encryption, according to the same DHS report.
(U//FOUO) The unidentified cyber actor introduced the ransomware used against the judicial branch network through a vendor server/host; the ransomware then harvested cached credentials of high-level privileged accounts, according to the same DHS report. The actor then used the credentials to access two servers on the network and propagate the malware via server message block (SMB). Connecticut state cybersecurity officials were able to block the ransomware’s communication with external infrastructure, which prevented the encryption of additional hosts and data loss, according to the same DHS report.
(U) GandCrab Malware
(U) Released in late January 2018, GandCrab, also called “GrandCrab,” is a ransomware variant distributed by exploit kits that requires communication with the ransomware’s command-and-control (C2) server to encrypt files of an infected computer, according to an online technical support site. The developers of GandCrab recently upgraded the original version after Romanian police and BitDefender mitigated infections by recovering its decryption keys, according to a separate article from the same online technical support site. As of 6 March 2018, no free decryption key is available to victims of GandCrab version 2. GandCrab uses NameCoin’s .BIT as its top-level domain (TLD); therefore, variants of the ransomware using the .BIT TLD must also use a domain name server that supports .BIT, according to the same online technical support site. Upon infection, GandCrab will attempt to query the ransomware’s C2 servers on the .BIT domain to establish communication. GandCrab will not encrypt a host’s content with the .CRAB extension if communication is not established with the C2 server, according to the same online technical support site.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Goals for a Common Approach to Threat Frameworks
Following a common approach helps to:
• Establish a shared ontology and enhance information-sharing since it is easier to maintain mapping of multiple models to a common reference than directly to each other
• Characterize and categorize threat activity in a straightforward way that can support missions ranging from strategic decision-making to analysis and cybersecurity measures and users from generalists to technical experts
• Support common situational awareness across organizations
Key Attributes and Goals in Building a Cyber Threat Framework
• Incorporate a hierarchical/layered perspective that allows a focus on a level detail appropriate to the audience while maintaining linkage and traceability of data
• Employ Structured and documented categories with explicitly defined terms and labels (lexicon)
• Focus on empirical/sensor-derived ‘objective’ data
• Accommodate a wide variety of data sources, threat actors and activity
• Provide as a foundation for analysis and decision-making
The Common Cyber Threat Framework
• Since 2012, the Office of the DNI has worked with interagency partners to build and refine The Common Cyber Threat Framework reflecting these key attributes and goals
• The Common Cyber Threat Framework is not intended to displace or replace an organization’s existing model which is tailored to its specific mission and requirements; rather, it is intended to:
Serve as a viable Universal Translator (a cyber Esperanto or Rosetta Stone) facilitating efficient and possibly automated exchange of data and insight across models once each has been mapped to it and the mappings shared
Provide a Starting Point featuring a simple threat model and value-neutral concepts. It can be customized for any organization as needed—and any deviations from the common approach are readily apparent, facilitating mapping and data exchange.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for judge advocates is a product of the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). The content is derived from statutes, Executive Orders and Directives, national policy, DoD Directives and Instructions, joint publications, service regulations, field manuals, as well as lessons learned by judge advocates and other practitioners throughout Federal and State government. This edition includes substantial revisions. It incorporates new guidance set forth in Department of Defense Directive 3025.18 (Defense Support of Civil Authorities), Department of Defense Instruction 3025.21 (Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies), numerous new National Planning Framework documents, and many other recently updated publications. It provides amplifying information on wildfire response, emergency mutual assistance compacts, the role of the National Guard and Army units in domestic response, and provides valuable lessons learned from major disasters such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.
The Handbook is designed to serve as a working reference and training tool for judge advocates; however, it is not a substitute for independent research. With the exception of footnoted doctrinal material, the information contained in this Handbook is not doctrine. Judge advocates advising in this area of the law should monitor developments in domestic operations closely as the landscape continues to evolve. Further, the information and examples provided in this Handbook are advisory only. The term “State” is frequently used throughout this Handbook, and collectively refers to the 50 States, Guam, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The same is often referred to as “the 54 States and territories.” Finally, the content and opinions expressed in this Handbook do not represent the official position of the U.S. Army or the other services, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of The Judge Advocate General, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, or any other government agency.
…
A Dual Status Commander maintains a commission in both a Title 10 and Title 32 capacity which helps to unify the effort of the Federal and National Guard personnel involved in the response to a major disaster or emergency. The National Defense Authorization Act for 201261 stated that when Federal forces and the National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities,appointment of a Dual Status Commander should be the usual and customary command and control arrangement. This includes Stafford Act major disaster and emergency response missions. The use of Dual Status Commanders is becoming more common for incident response, and they have been used for planned and special events since 2004. Dual Status Commanders receive orders from both the State and Federal chains of command, and thus serve as a vital link between the two. Dual Status Commanders can be appointed in one of two ways. First, under 32 U.S.C. § 315, an active duty Army or Air Force officer may be detailed to the Army or Air National Guard of a State. Second, under 32 U.S.C. § 325, a member of a State’s Army or Air National Guard may be ordered to active duty. Regardless of method of appointment, the Secretary of Defense must authorize the dual status, and the Governor of the effected State must consent.
…
…
c. Participation of DoD Personnel in Civilian Law Enforcement Activities
The Federal courts have enunciated three tests to determine whether the use of military personnel violates the PCA. If any one of these three tests is met, the assistance may be considered a violation of the PCA.
The first test is whether the actions of military personnel are “active” or “passive.” Only the active, or direct, use of military personnel to enforce the laws is a violation of the PCA.
The second test is whether the use of military personnel pervades the activities of civilian law enforcement officials. Under this test, military personnel must fully subsume the role of civilian law enforcement officials.
The third test is whether the military personnel subjected citizens to the exercise of military power that was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature. A power “regulatory in nature” is one which controls or directs. A power “proscriptive in nature” is one that prohibits or condemns. A power “compulsory in nature” is one that exerts some coercive force. Note that under DoDD 3025.21, Immediate Response Authority may not be used when it may subject civilians to military power that is “regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.” Thus, Immediate Response Authority may not be used to circumvent the PCA.
…
(iii) Civil Disturbance Statutes
The third type of permitted direct assistance by military forces to civilian law enforcement is action taken pursuant to DoD responsibilities under the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-255. This statute contains express exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act that allow for the use of military forces to repel insurgency, domestic violence, or conspiracy that hinders the execution of State or Federal law in specified circumstances. Actions under this authority are governed by DoDD 3025.21. The Insurrection Act permits the President to use the armed forces to enforce the law when:
There is an insurrection within a State, and the State legislature (or Governor if the legislature cannot be convened) requests assistance from the President;
A rebellion makes it impracticable to enforce the Federal law through ordinary judicial proceedings;
An insurrection or domestic violence opposes or obstructs Federal law, or so hinders the enforcement of Federal or State laws that residents of that State are deprived of their constitutional rights and the State is unable or unwilling to protect these rights.
10 U.S.C. § 254 requires the President to issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse within a certain time before use of the military to enforce the laws. The President issued such a proclamation during the Los Angeles riots in 1992.
(iv) Other Authority
There are several statutes and authorities, other than the Insurrection Act, that allow for direct DoD participation in civil law enforcement.64 They permit direct military participation in civilian law enforcement, subject to the limitations within each respective statute. This section does not contain detailed guidance; therefore, specific statutes and other references must be consulted before determining whether military participation is permissible. A brief listing of these statutes includes:
Prohibited transactions involving nuclear material (18 U.S.C. § 831)
Emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (10 U.S.C. § 282) (see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 175a, 229E and 233E which authorizes the Attorney General or other DOJ official to request SECDEF to provide assistance under 10 U.S.C. § 282)
Assistance in the case of crimes against foreign officials, official guests of the United States, and other internationally protected persons (18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 1116)
Protection of the President, Vice President, and other designated dignitaries (18 U.S.C. § 1751 and the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976)
Assistance in the case of crimes against members of Congress (18 U.S.C. § 351)
Execution of quarantine and certain health laws (42 U.S.C. § 97)
Protection of national parks and certain other Federal lands (16 U.S.C. §§ 23, 78, 593)
Enforcement of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery and Conservation Management Act (16 U.S.C. § 1861(a))
Actions taken in support of the neutrality laws (22 U.S.C. §§ 408, 461–462)
Removal of persons unlawfully present on Indian lands (25 U.S.C. § 180)
Execution of certain warrants relating to enforcement of specified civil rights laws (42 U.S.C. § 1989)
Removal of unlawful enclosures from public lands (43 U.S.C. § 1065)
Protection of the rights of a discoverer of a guano island (48 U.S.C. § 1418)
Support of territorial Governors if a civil disorder occurs (48 U.S.C. §§ 1422, 1591)
Actions in support of certain customs laws (50 U.S.C. § 220)
Actions taken to provide search and rescue support domestically under the authorities provided in the National Search and Rescue Plan
…
Cyber operations are not the future. They are now. The National Guard faces the same constraints in cyberspace as in the traditional kinetic realm. However, cyberspace presents some unique challenges. For instance, most military equipment is not governed by restrictive licensing agreements. However, software-licensing agreements may restrict who may use a cyber-tool kit and how that kit may be used. Additionally, cyberspace activities are generally not linear in nature. For example, one computer does not normally interact directly with another computer. Rather, the data is transferred through multiple routers and servers, all of which may not be in the same town, State or even country. As a result, actions intended to have a domestic effect in cyberspace could have international consequences. Additionally, attribution in cyberspace is not as clear as it is in the kinetic realm. What may appear to be an action taken by a local resident could very well be an action orchestrated by a foreign actor. This complex and evolving battle space requires legal practitioners to have both a basic understanding of how the cyberspace works as well as the laws and policies governing those actions.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
(U//DSEN/LES) The increasing demand for opioids in the United States coupled with the availability of fentanyl presents a significant public health risk and negatively impacts officer safety. In 2018, the Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Counter Narcotics Alliance (CNA) task force seized tablets that appeared to be Xanax® but actually contained a combination of cyclopropylfentanyl, methamphetamine, and a synthetic cannabinoid chemical.
(U) Significance
(U//LES) This is the first seizure reported to the Arizona HIDTA of fake Xanax® tablets containing a cyclopropylfentanyl/methamphetamine combination, as well as being the first reported seizure containing a synthetic cannabinoid.
(U) Details
(U) Fake Xanax® Tablets
(U//LES) An investigation conducted by the Arizona HIDTA CNA task force resulted in the seizure of two plastic bags containing 76 rectangular white tablets imprinted with “XANAX” on one side and the number “2” on the reverse side. The tablet imprints and color were consistent with pharmaceutically manufactured 2 milligram Xanax® tablets. Upon closer examination, the tablets varied in thickness and from white to off-white in color. In addition, some of the tablets had an inverted “2” imprinted on the reverse side.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Criminal Investigative Report of the 1 October Mass Casualty Shooting
Originating Organization: Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
On October 1, 2017, at approximately 2118 hours, Mandalay Bay Hotel and Casino (Mandalay Bay) Security Officer Jesus Campos was assigned to check several Hotel Service Optimization System (HotSOS) alarms from various rooms inside the hotel. Room 32-129 was the last of the rooms Security Officer Campos was assigned to check.
Security Officer Campos was on the 30th floor and responded to the 32nd floor via the stairwell in the north end of the 100 Wing. Security Officer Campos attempted to enter the hallway to the 100 Wing, but the door would not open. He took the stairs to the 33rd floor and used the guest elevator to access the 32nd floor. Once on the 32nd floor, Security Officer Campos entered the foyer leading to the stairwell. He discovered an “L” bracket screwed into the door and doorframe that prevented the door leading into the stairwell from opening. Security Officer Campos called his dispatch center with the house phone located in the foyer to report the discovery.
Security Officer Campos heard what he described as a rapid drilling sound coming from Room 32-135 after he hung up the phone. As he walked down the 100 Wing hallway, Campos heard what he described as automatic gunfire coming from the area of Room 32-135 and realized he had been shot in the left calf. He took cover in the alcove of rooms 32-122 and 32-124 and utilized both his cellular phone and radio to notify his dispatch he was shot. Security Officer Campos advised he was shot with a BB or pellet gun. While waiting for other security personnel to arrive Security Officer Campos continued to hear gunfire coming from the room.
Engineer Stephen Schuck finished fixing a water leak on the 62nd floor when he was directed to respond to the 32nd floor in reference to the bracket preventing the stairwell door from opening. Engineer Schuck used the service elevator in the 200 Wing to access the 32nd floor. When he arrived on the 32nd floor, he gathered his tools and equipment and walked from the 200 Wing to the 100 Wing.
As Engineer Schuck walked up the hallway of the 100 Wing, he observed Security Officer Campos poke his head out of an alcove. Engineer Schuck then heard rapid gunfire coming from the end of the 100 Wing hallway that lasted approximately 10 seconds. When the gunfire stopped, he heard Security Officer Campos tell him to take cover. Engineer Schuck stepped into an alcove and gunfire again erupted down the hallway coming from Room 32-135. The gunfire lasted a few seconds then stopped. The gunfire started again after a brief pause, but Engineer Schuck believed it was directed outside and not down the hallway.
Meanwhile, inside the Las Vegas Village over 50 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) personnel were on overtime assignments for the Route 91 Harvest music festival being held at the Las Vegas Village venue. The initial gunshots were heard on an officer’s body worn camera (BWC). As the suspect (Stephen Paddock) targeted the concertgoers with gunfire, officers quickly determined they were dealing with an active shooter and broadcast the information over the radio.
The crowd inside the Las Vegas Village started reacting to the gunfire, and performer Jason Aldean ran off the stage. Officers and concertgoers began treating victims who were struck by gunfire. They also tried to get concertgoers out of the venue in a safe manner. Officers determined the gunfire was coming from an elevated position, possibly from the Mandalay Bay. Medical personnel were requested for multiple people struck by gunfire.
As the active shooter incident was occurring, two LVMPD officers were in the security office of the Mandalay Bay handling a call for service in reference to two females who were in custody for trespassing. The officers heard the radio broadcast of gunfire at the Route 91 Harvest music festival. Both officers, along with security personnel, exited the security office and responded toward the Las Vegas Village. As they were making their way through the casino, security personnel advised the officers of an active shooter on the 32nd floor of the hotel. The officers then directed security to escort them to that location. The officers and security personnel entered the Center Core guest elevators and were again advised the shooter was on the 32nd floor. The officers made a decision to respond to the 31st floor and take the stairwell to the 32nd floor.
LVMPD officers converged on the Las Vegas Village and Mandalay Bay. Officers formed multiple Strike Teams and entered the Mandalay Bay from various entrance points. A team of officers, including a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) officer, reached the 32nd floor via the stairwell in the 100 Wing. Officers did not hear gunfire coming from Room 32-135. Officers were able to manually breach the “L” bracket on the stairwell door and gain access to the hallway. Officers immediately observed a food service cart, which had wires running under the door into Room 32-134, and prepared themselves for the possibility of an improvised explosive device (IED). The decision was made to use an explosive breach to make entry into Room 32-135.
After a successful breach of the doors to Room 32-135, officers entered and found a male (Paddock) deceased on the floor. Paddock appeared to have a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. Officers cleared the remainder of the room and observed numerous rifles in various locations as well as hundreds of expended casings. A second explosive breach was utilized to gain access to Room 32-134 through the connecting doors. Immediately after the breach, a SWAT officer negligently discharged his rifle. Officers cleared Room 32-134, finding several more rifles in the room.
Officers, medical personnel, and concertgoers continued the evacuation of victims in the Las Vegas Village venue. Several triage sites were established in the venue and surrounding area. Injuries ranged from being minor in nature to fatal. Hundreds of wounded were transported to area hospitals by ambulance and privately-owned citizen vehicles.
As the LVMPD’s investigative response occurred, it was decided early on (post-shooting) that the LVMPD’s Homicide Section would handle the documentation of the venue and 31 bodies found inside the venue and on the exterior perimeter. Homicide detectives worked closely with crime scene analysts and investigators from the Clark County Office of the Coroner Medical Examiner (CCOCME).
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
/cdn.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_image/image/55407063/spacecorps.0.jpg)
FM 3-14, Army Space Operations, provides an overview of space operations in the Army and is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-14 links Army space operations doctrine to joint space operations doctrine as expressed in JP 3-14, Space Operations and other joint doctrinal publications. This FM establishes guidance for employing space and space-based systems and capabilities to support United States (U.S.) Army land warfighting dominance. It provides a general overview of overhead support to Army operations, reviews national guidance and direction, and outlines selected unique space-related Army capabilities. The doctrine in this manual documents Army thought for the best use of space capabilities. This manual also contains tactics and procedures outlining how to plan, integrate, and execute Army space operations.
…
Space is a warfighting domain with different characteristics from air, land, sea, and cyberspace domains. Space is identified as one of the Global Commons as defined in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Army space operations enable Army and joint warfighting, and use of space capabilities is an inherently joint venture. The need for the Army to accomplish space operations is firmly established in national and Service level policies. Moreover, this FM is rooted in Army operations and consistent with Joint doctrine. Space capabilities and the space domain provide a global perspective as satellites allow routine access to denied areas of the Earth.
The space environment is harsh and the distances involved are vast, but it offers unique advantages that make it worthwhile to overcome the adversities of the operational environment. To that end, the space environment continues to become more congested, contested, and competitive. The uses of space are many, applications vary, and space-enabled capabilities are constantly evolving. It is important that Soldiers continue to look to the future with responsiveness, adaptability, and flexibility toward how space enables the Army’s warfighting functions in the conduct of unified land operations.
Army space operations includes all aspects of the employment of specialized Army space forces but also the spectrum of activities associated to the planning, preparation, integration and execution support required to ensure synchronized and effective space-based capabilities from all sources are available to support dominant land operations as part of Unified Action. Army space operations are heavily influenced by understanding the constraints, limitations, and operational needs of the land component users with regard to those space-based capabilities.
The Army depends on space capabilities to enable and enhance unified land operations. Virtually every Army operation relies on space capabilities to some degree to enhance the effectiveness of combat forces. Space capabilities enable the Army to communicate, navigate, target the enemy, and protect forces.
The principles that successfully guide unified land operations are applicable to the space domain. The Army uses space-based capabilities to support its dominance in unified land operations. Space operations are critical to the range of military operations as many space capabilities are embedded in Army operations. The space mission areas form the framework for how space supports the Army warfighting functions, and operations conducted through decisive operations.
…
1-4. This FM is rooted in basic Army and joint doctrine that is characteristically progressive and evolving. Space is a warfighting domain with different characteristics from land, sea, air, and cyberspace domains. The Army depends on space operations to effectively execute unified land operations. Every Army warfighting function relies on space contributions to some degree to enhance the effectiveness of our combat forces. Space capabilities enable the Army to communicate, navigate, accurately target the enemy, protect, and sustain our forces.
1-5. The U.S. Army is one the largest consumers of space-based capabilities within Department of Defense (DOD). The Army depends on Army space forces (personnel, organizations, space and terrestrial systems, equipment, and facilities), to ensure full access to all current and future space capability in order to fight and survive on today’s area of operations. The Army must leverage the capabilities of space assets. Consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, the Army must deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems, and contribute to the defense of multinational space systems. If deterrence fails, the Army must defeat efforts to attack its space assets. This must be done while operating in a global information environment against any threats. Consequently, the Army space capabilities must provide continuous, secure, global communications, space situational awareness, space control, and space force enhancement to Army and joint warfighters from strategic to tactical levels.
…
DOD SPACE POLICY
1-16. Department of Defense directive (DODD) 3100.10, Space Policy implements the National Space Policy and assigns responsibilities for space and space-related activities. This directive states the primary DOD goal is to provide operational space force capabilities to ensure the U.S. has the space power to achieve its national security objectives in accordance with the U.S. National Security Strategy. Additionally the U.S. National Military Strategy recognizes space as one of the global commons and notes that our ability to project power from the global commons may be at risk. The space domain is critical for Army operations, yet becoming increasingly more vulnerable to malicious actions that create a D3SOE. The space environment is continuously becoming more congested, contested, and competitive. Space capabilities and applications will be integrated into the strategy, doctrine, concepts of operations, education, exercises, and operations and contingency plans of U.S. military forces. DOD operational space force structure will be sufficiently robust, ready, secure, survivable, resilient, and interoperable.
…
OPERATING IN SPACE
1-33. Space is the ultimate high ground and gives land forces the advantage of a global, persistent perspective of the strategic, operational, and tactical situation. Space systems consist of satellites on orbit, ground stations, launch bases, and the communications links and capabilities. Space hosts communications transponders, observation posts for surveillance and reconnaissance, transmitters broadcasting location and exact time information, sensors for weather and other environmental data, and sensors that can warn of enemy actions.
1-34. Space is a domain like land, sea, air, and cyberspace within which military activities are conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives. Space begins above the atmosphere of the Earth and extends infinitely outward. The U.S. does not formally recognize a lower limit to space. However, space is considered to be the region around the Earth with little atmosphere, where satellites are placed in orbit. Space operations are those enabling operations that create or present opportunities to employ space capabilities to enhance the warfighting potential of the U.S. military and multinational partners. Space operations are generally supported by satellites in orbits around the Earth. Space is interrelated with the other domains and properly integrating these complex functions with the other military activities is critical for successful operations.
1-35. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, officially known as Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies dictates satellites in orbit must be allowed free passage over countries. Nations cannot claim the space directly above them as their own, as they do with airspace. This allows the U.S., other countries, and commercial entities to orbit satellites that freely traverse or occupy positions while in space over other countries.
1-36. Space-based resources provide freedom of action, global reach, responsiveness, insights in an anti-access, area of denial arena, and are not constrained by geographic borders of otherwise geographically denied regions. Satellites are well suited for reconnaissance and surveillance, imagery, mapping, and intelligence operations because of the access they provide. However, operations in the space environment are bound by other constraints such as the laws of physics, international law, and policies that have a unique set of vulnerabilities.
…
…
DIRECTOR OF SPACE FORCES
2-14. A director of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR) is assigned to the commander, Air Force forces staff and serves as the senior space advisor to integrate space capabilities and effects. If the commander, Air Force forces or joint force air component commander is delegated SCA, the DIRSPACEFOR will normally execute SCA responsibilities on behalf of the commander, Air Force forces or joint force air component commander. While each combatant commander may have a DIRSPACEFOR, United States Central Command is the only combatant commander with a standing DIRSPACEFOR with a formal agreement to utilize an Army functional area 40 (FA40) space professional as the Deputy DIRSPACEFOR. When an Army FA40 is serving as the United States Central Command Deputy DIRSPACEFOR, the individual is assigned to USASMDC/ARSTRAT with duty at Air Force Central Command.
2-15. The DIRSPACEFOR is responsible for:
Integration of space force enhancement, space control operations, and planning in joint operations on behalf of the combined force air component commander when acting as SCA;
Oversee day-to-day functions of the DIRSPACEFOR staff and accomplish assigned duties of SCA;
Provide the combined force air component commander and key staff counsel and training in space operations;
Assist with planning and executing theater space operations and applying space capabilities throughout the joint targeting cycle;
Assist in coordinating tailored space support for operations throughout the area of responsibility;
Work directly for the combined force air component commander as special staff providing advice on space capabilities and employment;
Ensure continuity of operations, focus, operational stability, and unity of command with multiple rotations of joint space personnel across the area of responsibility;
Conduct deliberate planning for contingency operations and exercises, and validate process;
Provide reachback support for all forward deployed space forces from all Services in area of responsibility;
Interact with multiservice space professionals within the combined air and space operations center; and
Provide insight and participate in special technical operations planning, as required.
2-16. During larger standing operations and in crisis planning and execution, the theater SCA function is supported with appropriate manning for staff support based upon the nature of the pending contingency. The manpower and expertise requirements will be reflected in the final approved joint manning document for that headquarters along with an identification of a responsible Service to fill the position. In most cases where the SCA is delegated to the Commander, Air Force forces with an assigned DIRSPACEFOR to support those functions, the Deputy DIRSPACEFOR is normally sourced as an Army space officer, as established in operations. An Army Deputy DIRSPACEFOR supports all the joint functions of the DIRSPACEFOR, can represent specific land component space-related needs and issues to the theater SCA for resolution. An Army Deputy DIRSPACEFOR also acts as an intermediary between DIRSPACEFOR staff and Army SSEs, ARSSTs, ASCE, JTAGS detachments, space situational awareness planning teams (SSAPT), and space control detachments.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
In 2017 there were 30 separate active shootings in the United States, the largest number ever recorded by the FBI during a one-year period.1 With so many attacks occurring, it can become easy to believe that nothing can stop an active shooter determined to commit violence. “The offender just snapped” and “There’s no way that anyone could have seen this coming” are common reactions that can fuel a collective sense of a “new normal,” one punctuated by a sense of hopelessness and helplessness. Faced with so many tragedies, society routinely wrestles with a fundamental question: can anything be done to prevent attacks on our loved ones, our children, our schools, our churches, concerts, and communities?
There is cause for hope because there is something that can be done. In the weeks and months before an attack, many active shooters engage in behaviors that may signal impending violence. While some of these behaviors are intentionally concealed, others are observable and — if recognized and reported — may lead to a disruption prior to an attack. Unfortunately, well-meaning bystanders (often friends and family members of the active shooter) may struggle to appropriately categorize the observed behavior as malevolent. They may even resist taking action to report for fear of erroneously labeling a friend or family member as a potential killer. Once reported to law enforcement, those in authority may also struggle to decide how best to assess and intervene, particularly if no crime has yet been committed.
By articulating the concrete, observable pre-attack behaviors of many active shooters, the FBI hopes to make these warning signs more visible and easily identifiable. This information is intended to be used not only by law enforcement officials, mental health care practitioners, and threat assessment professionals, but also by parents, friends, teachers, employers and anyone who suspects that a person is moving towards violence.
…
Key Findings of the Phase II Study
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
This reference aid draws on CTIIC’s experience promoting interagency situational awareness and information sharing during previous significant cyber events—including cyber threats to elections. It provides a guide to cyber threat terms and related terminology issues likely to arise when describing cyber activity. The document includes a range of cyber-specific terms that may be required to accurately convey intelligence on a cyber threat event and terms that have been established by relevant authorities regarding technical infrastructure for conducting elections.
CTIIC will adhere to this terminology guide in future documents related to cyber threats to US elections and recommends use by others in the interest of consistency and clear communication.
Please note that this reference aid is not intended to address terminology related to political or other noncyber aspects of influence or interference involving elections, nor is it intended to be a comprehensive guide to cyber threat terminology.
…
Describing What’s Happened: Common Terms
The following terms are central to accurately describing cyber threat activity but are often used differently. CTIIC recommends their use be accompanied by definitions and any necessary context for nontechnical readers.
Attacked
Indicates that a cyber actor has attempted to degrade, destroy, disrupt, manipulate, or otherwise detrimentally affect the operation of a system or network. However, manipulation or deletion of data solely for the purpose of hiding one’s tracks is not considered an attack. Some reports use “attack” and “exploit” synonymously, drawing in part on the cryptanalysis sense of “attack”—the use of a technical approach to defeat a security measure. The dual usage can cause confusion, especially for nontechnical readers, if the context does not fully explain the type of malicious cyber activity that occurred.
Compromised
Indicates that a victim system has installed malware, connected to a malicious Internet Protocol address, or provided a cyber actor unauthorized access to collect data or execute commands.
Exploited
Indicates that a malicious actor has conducted additional activities on a compromised system, such as collecting data, deploying more malware, or establishing persistent access. Some documents—within both the IC and the private sector—use exploited and compromised synonymously. In practice, however, cyber actors may compromise more accounts and systems than they exploit, in part because of the availability of tools to automate the process of compromising vulnerable systems. Distinguishing whether and how an actor has made use of a compromised system—whenever available intelligence allows—aids in understanding the impact and implications of the malicious cyber activity.
Scanned/Scanning
Scanning a system involves attempting to identify the security vulnerabilities the system may have by sending it specific network traffic and observing its responses. The definition is reasonably specific but can cause confusion—and potentially undue alarm—if it is assumed to include follow-on attempts to exploit any vulnerabilities discovered. Scanning is extremely common on the Internet but may have only a modest success rate, and cyber actors therefore scan far more systems than they actually affect.
Targeted/Targeting
A cyber actor’s targeting of a particular victim can refer to any aspect of the actor’s attempts to select a system to conduct operations against, learn about, find vulnerabilities, gain access, or conduct other malicious activities. The term also connotes an attempt at conducting malicious cyber activity, without indicating the degree of success an actor achieved. We recommend greater specificity and clarification of the specific usage whenever available intelligence allows.
…
Cyber Deterrence
The prevention of cyber action by credibly demonstrating the ability and willingness to deny benefits or impose costs to convince the adversary that restraint will result in better outcomes than will confrontation.
Cyber Defense
A set of processes and measures to detect, monitor, protect, analyze, and defend against network infiltrations. See Cyber Security.
Cyber Disruption
Activities initiated by the threat actor that temporarily negatively alter or prevent the operation of the victim’s network.
Cyber Effect
The manipulation, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction of computers, information or communications systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident thereon.
Cyber Espionage
The intentional clandestine acquisition of information from targeted networks without altering the information or affecting users’ access.
Cyber Influence
The use of cyber operations to shape the perceptions or behavior of targeted audiences while maintaining plausible deniability.
Cyber Operation
An umbrella term to describe cyber attack, cyber espionage, cyber influence, or cyber defense, and intrusions or activities with unknown intent.
Cyberspace
A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
Cyber Security
The protection of information systems against unauthorized access to or modification of information contained therein, and against the denial of service to authorized users, including those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. Also known as network security. See Cyber Defense.
Cyber Threat
Cyber operations or noncyber actions (intentional or accidental) that compromise the confidentiality, integrity, reliability, or availability of digital devices, systems, networks, or data.
Cyber Threat Intelligence
The collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information from all sources of intelligence on foreign actors’ cyber programs, intentions, capabilities, research and development, tactics, operational activities and indicators, and their impact or potential effects on US national security interests. Cyber threat intelligence also includes information on cyber threat actor information systems, infrastructure, and data; and network characterization or insight into the components, structures, use, and vulnerabilities of foreign cyber program information systems.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Awareness of blockchain has soared in recent years with the emergence of cryptocurrencies, but the technology has existed for much longer. The linking of blocks, containing cryptographic functions of transactions and data, means that tampering with their contents becomes increasingly difficult as the chain grows – this concept was exploited for document timestamping applications more than a decade before cryptocurrencies became reality. In many implementations, blocks are confirmed by, and stored at, many nodes in different locations, providing a high degree of data integrity. There are, however, many challenges for applying blockchain technologies in tactical networks, particularly due to the constraints of the platforms, the limited bandwidth available among them, and the impact of network partitioning. In this report, the development and principles of blockchains are presented, along with an overview of their weaknesses and vulnerabilities. There is a huge level of interest in this technology across many sectors, and this is reflected in the breadth of the referenced material. Weaknesses in design and implementation can make blockchains vulnerable to attack, and their interfaces are particularly at risk. A range of possible applications in tactical networks is explored, from supply chain management, to network management and application data immutability. Finally, a simple blockchain architecture for mobile tactical networks is developed, to illustrate the potential and challenges of this technology. Overall, it is clear that blockchain technology provides a potential avenue for solving some problems in the tactical network context, but it is not yet clear whether it is the best such solution.
…
The key feature of blockchain technology is data integrity in a trustless environment: transaction or data records included on the blockchain are timestamped, cryptographically protected and stored by many distributed nodes, reducing the risk of total loss. For a sufficiently long blockchain, with a large number of nodes, the records can be considered immutable, in the sense that any tampering will be evident. This integrity can be exploited in different ways to enhance the robustness and resilience of tactical networks, and some of these are discussed in Section 5.1.
Smart contracts, described in Section 3.2, also provide opportunities for robust resource management in tactical networks, particularly in complex operational conditions where many users interact in the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. Possible applications of blockchain to resource management are discussed in Section 5.2.
Tactical environments pose particular challenges for the introduction of blockchain technology, as devices are constrained in size, weight and power, and there are physical limitations on node connectivity. These challenges are considered in Section 5.3.
An example architecture for applying blockchain technology to support tactical operations is described in Section 5.4, taking into account the opportunities and challenges outlined thus far.
In this section, network nodes are considered to be the devices or platforms connected to the blockchain network; these are not (just) the radio interfaces themselves, but may be auxiliary equipment such as biometric devices, weapons or communication platforms.
…
5.4 Example tactical blockchain architecture
Based on the preceding, we propose an example architecture for a tactical blockchain system. The scenario we consider consists of a unit of dismounted soldiers, each carrying several devices connected on a personal network: a weapon, a radio, a camera, a radio frequency (RF) sensor and a computer (similar to a smart phone), sharing a battery and a memory drive such as a flash card. The soldier is also considered a network component, as they are a source and sink of data, and their identity is confirmed using a networked biometric sensor such as a fingerprint or iris scanner. The other devices may be authenticated using a radio frequency identification (RFID) chip or imaging as described in Section 5.1.4; authentication will only be required if the networked component has been disconnected from the personal network and attempts to rejoin.
We assume that the weapon tracks the ammunition it uses, and records the amount remaining. The camera may be continually recording, but to limit memory usage, only a few seconds before and after the weapon is fired are retained. C2 and other messages, either digital voice or data to and from the computer, all passed via the radio, are recorded for post-action analysis. SA in the form of RF sensor data is sampled periodically, and transferred via the radio to other soldiers in the unit and recorded locally. These different sources of data all use the computer’s memory for storage; both the memory and battery usage are tracked.
We use blockchains to provide authentication and identification management for the soldiers and devices engaged in the operation, an auditing function to track cyber SA and C2, resource usage tracking, and a policy management function, which is used to support resource loading decisions across the unit. As noted in Section 5.3.6, the longer the blockchain, the stronger it is, so all these functions use the same blockchain within their cluster (Section 5.4.1).
This is a simplified scenario, intended to give insight into the potential application of blockchain technology in tactical networks. Note that, as discussed in Section 6, the fact that this technology might be used to address these problems does not mean it is the best choice. Note also that the exchange of transactions and blocks among the users is assumed to be secure.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
In March 2018, an identified financial services corporation received a thumb drive infected with the bank credential-stealing Qakbot malware variant, targeting information from networked computers and financial institution web sites. The financial services corporation purchased bulk thumb drives from a US online retailer of computer hardware. The thumb drives were originally manufactured in China. According to FBI forensic analysis, the Qakbot malware was on the infected thumb drive before the drive arrived in the United States. Qakbot is extremely persistent and requires removal of all malware from every device. Failure to remove even one node of malware may result in re-infecting previously sanitized systems possibly costing the victim hundreds of thousands of dollars in malware removal and system downtime.
Threat
Qakbot is an information stealing worm—originally discovered in 2007 with a major update in 2017—that propagates through removable drives, network shares, and Web pages. The most common vector of intrusion for Qakbot is malicious attachments to phishing emails. Once executed, Qakbot spreads to other shared folders and uses Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to infect other machines. Qakbot has keylogging capabilities, and is able to propagate across network environments through a single instance within that network. It is capable of remaining on a device through the use of registry keys and by scheduling recurring tasks to run at timed intervals. Every device connected to the network and every piece of removable media which has been attached needs to be scanned for the malware and cleaned of the infection before it can be reconnected. The most recent updates in 2017 allows Qakbot to lock users out of the active directory, preventing them from being able to work. It also deploys malicious executables into network shares, registering them as services.
Cyber actors have the capability to infect devices with malware at nearly any point in the manufacturing process. The FBI has historically seen cases of infection with malware capable of stealing credentials, gathering data on the users of a computer or network, dropping other types of malware, and serving as a “backdoor” into a secure network. It is difficult to know at which point the malware infection occurred or whether the infection was intentional, due to the international nature of hardware manufacturing.
Recommendations
To mitigate the threat of a potentially infected thumb drive, the following measures should be taken at a minimum:
Ensure the use of approved, trusted vendors for hardware purchases.
Scan all hardware, especially removable storage media, on an external system prior to its insertion into a network environment.
For signature-based intrusion detection systems, ensure that the hash value for known Qakbot variants are included. The MD5 value for the variant identified in this PIN was: ff0e3ec80faafd04c9a8b375be77c6b6. This hash value can change, so be prepared to use other advanced detection systems.
Users should protect themselves and organizations by practicing good browsing habits, ensuring they do not respond to or click on unsolicited email, and to not plug unknown USB devices into
their workstations.
If you don’t have the expertise to properly handle or identify potential cyber threats please seek out an expert who can provide the expertise needed to secure your organization.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Übrigens wird der Romeo Trick heute noch von dem KGB benutzt und mutmasslich auch von alten STASI-Seilschaften. Sex als Köder…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
| File Name | Record Num | NARA Release Date | Formerly Withheld | Agency | Doc Date | Doc Type | File Num | To Name | From Name | Title | Num Pages | Originator | Record Series | Review Date | Comments | Pages Released |
| docid-32105709.pdf | 178-10004-10309 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | KISS/SCOW | 06/05/1975 | NOTES | JUNE 1975 | SCOWCROFT, BRENT | P/K 5 JUNE 75 | 3 | WH | SCOWCROFT MEMCONS, HANDWRITTEN | août/18/2017 | Participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. Handwritten notes. For typed transcript see ID# 1781000410297. | 4 | |
| docid-32105710.pdf | 178-10004-10308 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | KISS/SCOW | 04/12/1975 | NOTES | APRIL 1975 | SCOWCROFT, BRENT | P/K 12 APR 75 | 2 | WH | SCOWCROFT MEMCONS, HANDWRITTEN | août/18/2017 | Participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. Handwritten notes. For typed transcript see ID# 1781000410296. | 3 | |
| docid-32105711.pdf | 178-10004-10307 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | KISS/SCOW | 03/05/1975 | NOTES | JANUARY 1975 | SCOWCROFT, BRENT | P/K 5 MAR 75 | 4 | WH | SCOWCROFT MEMCONS, HANDWRITTEN | août/18/2017 | Participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. Handwritten notes. For typed transcript see ID# 1781000410295. | 5 | |
| docid-32105718.pdf | 178-10004-00 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | KISS/SCOW | 06/26/1975 | MEMORANDUM | JUNE 26, 1975 | MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION | 3 | WH | SCOWCROFT MEMCONS | mars/17/2016 | Memorandum of conversation, participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft | 4 | ||
| docid-32105722.pdf | 178-10004-10296 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | KISS/SCOW | 04/12/1975 | MEMORANDUM | APRIL 12, 1975 | MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION | 2 | WH | SCOWCROFT MEMCONS | août/18/2017 | Memorandum of conversation, participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. | 3 | ||
| docid-32105723.pdf | 178-10004-10295 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | KISS/SCOW | 03/05/1975 | MEMORANDUM | MARCH 5, 1975 | MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION | 4 | WH | SCOWCROFT MEMCONS | août/18/2017 | Memorandum of conversation, participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. | 5 | ||
| docid-32105754.pdf | 178-10004-10264 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | MATHENY | 09/06/1962 | MEMORANDUM | DRAFT REPORT–APPROVAL OF QUOTATIONS (2) | RECORD | MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62 | 5 | NSC | SSC SERIES | août/18/2017 | Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET. | 6 | |
| docid-32105759.pdf | 178-10004-10259 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | MATHENY | 09/14/1962 | MEMORANDUM | DRAFT REPORT–APPROVAL OF QUOTATIONS (2) | RECORD | PARROTT, THOMAS A. | MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED), 14 SEPT. 1962 | 2 | NSC | SSC SERIES | août/18/2017 | Unmarked but contains classified information. | 3 |
| docid-32105780.pdf | 178-10004-10238 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | MATHENY | 11/24/1976 | LIST | DOCUMENT REQUESTS–COMPUTER PRINTOUT | CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT | 36 | NSC | SSC SERIES | août/18/2017 | Computer printout showing documents requested by the Church Committee. Annotated. Reduced. | 37 | ||
| docid-32112745.pdf | 178-10004-10091 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | WILDEROTTE | 05/30/1975 | REPORT | RPT. ON INVEST. OF CIA INVOLVE..FOREIGN LEAD. | BELIN, DAVID | SUMMARY OF FACTS, INVEST. CIA INVOLVE. IN PLANS TO ASSASS…LEADERS | 83 | ROCK | ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS | août/18/2017 | Later draft can be found at 1781000310355. | 84 | |
| docid-32112987.pdf | 178-10003-10318 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | DUVAL78-67 | 06/00/1975 | REPORT | INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION, MISC. (2) | BUCHEN, PHIL | CASTRO | 37 | WH | ACCESSION 78-67 (UNPROCESSED) | août/18/2017 | Unmarked, but TS elsewhere. Draft. Pages with revisions taped over paragraphs were copied as originally typed and with changes,for preservation purposes. | 37 | |
| docid-32113185.pdf | 124-10001-10059 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/09/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1458 | SAC, DL | BROWN, W. HARLAN | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32113207.pdf | 124-10001-10081 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/13/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1437 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OFLAHERTY, JOHN JAMES | 39 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 39 | ||
| docid-32113221.pdf | 124-10001-10095 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/16/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1423 | DIRECTOR, FBI | ESTEP, THOMAS B. | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32113382.pdf | 124-10001-10256 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-492 | DIRECTOR, FBI | TWINER, GROVER C. | 10 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 10 | ||
| docid-32113488.pdf | 124-10001-10362 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/06/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-901 | DIRECTOR, FBI | BROWN, WILLIAM S. | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32113638.pdf | 124-10002-10012 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/06/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5056 | SAC, NY | DIRECTOR, FBI | 1 | FBI | DL | août/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32113668.pdf | 124-10002-10042 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/20/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1824 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SF | 5 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32113682.pdf | 124-10002-10056 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/18/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1839 | DIRECTOR, FBI | ESTEP, THOMAS B. | 5 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32113686.pdf | 124-10002-10060 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/16/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1844 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, TP | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32113908.pdf | 124-10002-10282 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-6569, 6570 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | INC LHM | 2 | |
| docid-32113964.pdf | 124-10002-10338 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/10/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-6633 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OCONNOR, JAMES J. | 24 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 24 | ||
| docid-32114164.pdf | 124-10003-10038 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/06/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-4030 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, AQ | 2 | FBI | DL | août/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32114180.pdf | 124-10003-10054 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/04/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-4012, 4013 | SAC, CG | MURPHY, ROBERT O. | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | INC LHM | 6 | |
| docid-32114232.pdf | 124-10003-10106 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 09/30/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-8193 | DIRECTOR, FBI | HURLEY, JOHN D. JR. | 8 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 8 | ||
| docid-32114444.pdf | 124-10003-10318 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 09/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-7794 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CALLENDER, STEPHEN M. | 32 | FBI | DL | août/15/2017 | 32 | ||
| docid-32114649.pdf | 124-10004-10023 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-SEE COMMENTS | 34 | DOS | DL | août/29/2017 | 100-10461-9199,9200,9201,9202,9203,9204,9205,9206,9207,9208,9209,9210, INC DOS MEMOS, LIST, AIRGRAMS, CIT LTR | 34 | |||
| docid-32114705.pdf | 124-10005-10047 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/23/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-7304, 7305 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 3 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | INC LTR, A/T | 3 | |
| docid-32115207.pdf | 124-10006-10049 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/18/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-6723 | SAC, DL | KUYKENDALL, EDWIN D. | 5 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32115208.pdf | 124-10006-10050 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/19/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-6724 | SAC, DL | KUYKENDALL, EDWIN D. | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32118518.pdf | 124-10012-10355 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-4TH NR 1275 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NK | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32121519.pdf | 124-10018-10356 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-342 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32121528.pdf | 124-10018-10365 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/24/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-1ST NR 471 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32121538.pdf | 124-10018-10375 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/24/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3396 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, HN | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32121543.pdf | 124-10018-10380 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/24/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3386 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, RH | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32121634.pdf | 124-10018-10471 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/28/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3899 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 718 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS i-xi, INDEX 618-686 | 718 | |
| docid-32121661.pdf | 124-10018-10498 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-693 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, RH | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32123893.pdf | 124-10023-10230 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/30/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-2087 | BELMONT, A. H. | SULLIVAN, W. C. | 12 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 12 | ||
| docid-32123909.pdf | 124-10023-10246 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-17TH NR 50 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32123932.pdf | 124-10023-10269 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/08/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3723 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OFLAHERTY, JOHN JAMES | 20 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 20 | ||
| docid-32125674.pdf | 124-10027-10011 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-6TH NR 570, 7TH NR 570 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NK | 5 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | INC LHM | 5 | |
| docid-32125696.pdf | 124-10027-10033 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/30/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-1407 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32125735.pdf | 124-10027-10072 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/13/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-1ST NR 1854 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CI | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32125824.pdf | 124-10027-10161 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-1ST NR 2248 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NK | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32125853.pdf | 124-10027-10190 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 08/28/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-3745 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 154 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS i-iii, INDEX ON PAGES 132-142 | 154 | |
| docid-32126090.pdf | 124-10027-10427 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/16/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-4700 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 600 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES i-vi, INDEX PAGES 268 – 289 | 600 | |
| docid-32129230.pdf | 124-10035-10067 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/03/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-655 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OCONNOR, JAMES J. | 31 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 31 | ||
| docid-32129231.pdf | 124-10035-10068 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/05/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-663 | DIRECTOR, FBI | THOMPSON, RICHARD C. | 18 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 18 | ||
| docid-32129237.pdf | 124-10035-10074 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/13/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-731 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OFLAHERTY, JOHN JAMES | 40 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 40 | ||
| docid-32129238.pdf | 124-10035-10075 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/06/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-738 | DIRECTOR, FBI | BROWN, WILLIAM S. | 6 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32129263.pdf | 124-10035-10100 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-527 | DIRECTOR, FBI | FOX, RAYMOND J. | 83 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 83 | ||
| docid-32129270.pdf | 124-10035-10107 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-463 | DIRECTOR, FBI | REID, DAVID J. | 25 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 25 | ||
| docid-32129274.pdf | 124-10035-10111 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/02/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-1079 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GRAHAM, CARL E. | 53 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 53 | ||
| docid-32129275.pdf | 124-10035-10112 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/04/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-1082 | DIRECTOR, FBI | HAY, WILLIAM C. | 16 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 16 | ||
| docid-32129318.pdf | 124-10035-10155 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/25/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-1505 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OCONNOR, JAMES J. | 27 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 27 | ||
| docid-32129371.pdf | 124-10035-10208 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/27/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-2875 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32129388.pdf | 124-10035-10225 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3230 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, WMFO | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32129391.pdf | 124-10035-10228 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3243 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, ME | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32129395.pdf | 124-10035-10232 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3495 | SULLIVAN, W. C. | BRANIGAN, W. A. | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32129399.pdf | 124-10035-10236 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3581 | SULLIVAN, W. C. | BRANIGAN, W. A. | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32129430.pdf | 124-10035-10267 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-2654 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32129512.pdf | 124-10035-10346 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/26/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-4305 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SF | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32129514.pdf | 124-10035-10348 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/28/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-4301 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 4 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32129535.pdf | 124-10035-10369 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-1212 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 844 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS i-iii, INDEX 785-818 | 844 | |
| docid-32129538.pdf | 124-10035-10372 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/20/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3293 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, PG | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32129586.pdf | 124-10035-10420 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-2619 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NK | 2 | FBI | DL | août/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32129591.pdf | 124-10035-10425 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/09/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-2625 | SAC, DL | BROWN, W. HARLAN | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32129596.pdf | 124-10035-10430 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/16/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-2631 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SHANAHAN, DENNIS W. | 9 | FBI | DL | août/15/2017 | 9 | ||
| docid-32129685.pdf | 124-10037-10019 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-387 | DIRECTOR, FBI | HARDING, CHARLES S. | 37 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 37 | ||
| docid-32129791.pdf | 124-10037-10125 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/02/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-193 | DIRECTOR, FBI | PEDROTTY, LEO E. | 96 | FBI | DL | août/15/2017 | 96 | ||
| docid-32129863.pdf | 124-10037-10197 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-273A | HQ | AQ | 7 | FBI | DL | août/15/2017 | 7 | ||
| docid-32129944.pdf | 124-10037-10278 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-4521, 4522 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 7 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | INC A/T AND LHM | 7 | |
| docid-32131528.pdf | 124-10041-10247 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/10/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-4112 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OCONNOR, JAMES J. | 24 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 24 | ||
| docid-32131579.pdf | 124-10041-10298 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/19/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5106 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32131699.pdf | 124-10041-10418 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/04/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-1ST NR 5534 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 4 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32133480.pdf | 124-10046-10199 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/30/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5374 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 125 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 125 | ||
| docid-32134667.pdf | 124-10048-10378 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/08/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-5061 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 277 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES i-iv,INDEX PAGES 250-265 | 277 | |
| docid-32134795.pdf | 124-10049-10006 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/21/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-847 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 395 | FBI | HQ | août/10/2017 | REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS ON PAGE i. INDEX ON PAGES A-O. INCLUDES 2 ADMIN PAGE. | 395 | |
| docid-32134796.pdf | 124-10049-10007 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-966 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 239 | FBI | HQ | août/10/2017 | REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS ON PAGE i. INDEX ON PAGES A-I. INCLUDES ONE ADMIN PAGE. | 239 | |
| docid-32135644.pdf | 124-10052-10162 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/19/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5954 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32135696.pdf | 124-10052-10214 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/18/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5927 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32135885.pdf | 124-10052-10403 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 09/14/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5766 | DIRECTOR, FBI | BLISS, NORMAN E. | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32136328.pdf | 124-10053-10346 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/12/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-4TH NR 1853 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32136429.pdf | 124-10053-10446 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-3175 | 1 | FBI | DL | août/15/2017 | 2 | ||||
| docid-32136659.pdf | 124-10054-10176 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/01/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5388 | DIRECTOR, FBI | BRITTON, HENRY B. III | 6 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32136893.pdf | 124-10054-10410 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/06/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5483 | AG | DIRECTOR, FBI | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32136895.pdf | 124-10054-10412 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/27/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5483 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32136896.pdf | 124-10054-10413 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/22/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5483 | HARRELSON, LEONARD | 2 | CITIZEN | HQ | août/23/2017 | DATE LOCATED FIRST PARAGRAPH ON FIRST PAGE | 3 | ||
| docid-32136897.pdf | 124-10054-10414 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/21/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5483 | HAWKINS, LEX | HARRELSON, LEONARD H. | 10 | CITIZEN | HQ | août/23/2017 | 11 | ||
| docid-32137311.pdf | 124-10055-10328 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/28/1968 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-6316 | SAC, NY | DIRECTOR, FBI | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32137375.pdf | 124-10055-10392 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/09/1965 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-1ST NR 5465 | SULLIVAN, W. C. | BAUMGARDNER, F. J. | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32138356.pdf | 124-10057-10373 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/23/1968 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-6096 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SF | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32138887.pdf | 124-10058-10403 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/30/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-1394 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32138903.pdf | 124-10058-10419 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-3083 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 10 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 10 | ||
| docid-32139350.pdf | 124-10059-10366 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/05/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5526 | SULLIVAN, W. C. | BRANIGAN, W. A. | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32139565.pdf | 124-10060-10081 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-4267 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32139805.pdf | 124-10060-10321 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/02/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-6900 | HQ | DL | 341 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | 341 | ||
| docid-32139895.pdf | 124-10060-10411 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/27/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-4831, 4832 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 8 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | INC, LHM | 8 | |
| docid-32140752.pdf | 124-10062-10339 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/08/1968 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3RD NR 5608 | SULLIVAN, W. C. | BRANIGAN, W. A. | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32140803.pdf | 124-10062-10390 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/14/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-1ST NR 5596 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 6 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32140808.pdf | 124-10062-10395 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/30/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-808 | DIRECTOR, FBI | MORRISSEY, JAMES F. | 9 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 9 | ||
| docid-32140863.pdf | 124-10062-10450 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 08/10/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-4687 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32140865.pdf | 124-10062-10452 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/07/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-5347 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32140899.pdf | 124-10062-10486 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/23/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-4495 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | INCLUDES CITIZEN LTR | 3 | |
| docid-32141292.pdf | 124-10063-10379 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-47-53 | 19 | FBI | SE | août/23/2017 | 19 | ||||
| docid-32141308.pdf | 124-10063-10395 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/09/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-47-79 | SAC, SE | KEIL, GIRARD | 2 | FBI | SE | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32142029.pdf | 124-10069-10000 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/19/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-804 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 330 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 330 | ||
| docid-32142050.pdf | 124-10069-10021 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/05/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-643 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, PH | 9 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | INCLUDES 5 ENCLOSURES | 9 | |
| docid-32142181.pdf | 124-10069-10152 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-473 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32142558.pdf | 124-10070-10059 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/11/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-690 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 8 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 8 | ||
| docid-32142575.pdf | 124-10070-10076 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-415 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MI | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32142582.pdf | 124-10070-10083 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/02/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-421 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SA, SA | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | INCLUDES FBI LHM | 3 | |
| docid-32142720.pdf | 124-10070-10221 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 08/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-1918 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 119 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | INC TABLE OF CONTENTS | 119 | |
| docid-32142796.pdf | 124-10070-10297 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-277 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CV | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32142808.pdf | 124-10070-10309 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/29/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-288 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LV | 7 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 7 | ||
| docid-32142846.pdf | 124-10070-10347 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-323 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, AQ | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32143133.pdf | 124-10071-10134 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/06/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-7376 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, DL | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32143239.pdf | 124-10071-10240 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 08/09/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5679 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | INC FBI S/S | 2 | |
| docid-32143365.pdf | 124-10071-10366 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/19/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-69-3635, 3636 | HQ | NO | 3 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | INC LHM, A/T | 3 | |
| docid-32143653.pdf | 124-10072-10190 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-42 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 4 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32144054.pdf | 124-10073-10091 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/15/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5971 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32144300.pdf | 124-10073-10337 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/06/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-5700, 5701 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 40 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | INC LHM | 40 | |
| docid-32144308.pdf | 124-10073-10345 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/04/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-5710 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 4 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32144493.pdf | 124-10074-10030 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/31/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-1113 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 188 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS. INDEX ON PAGES a-o. INCLUDES ONE ADMIN PAGE. | 188 | |
| docid-32144605.pdf | 124-10074-10142 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/19/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-2559 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 659 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS, INDEX ON PAGES a-o. INCLUDES ONE ADMIN DOCUMENT. | 659 | |
| docid-32144902.pdf | 124-10075-10040 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/06/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-1198 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, AQ | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32144948.pdf | 124-10075-10086 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/31/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4130 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 374 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS , INDEX ON PAGE a-o | 374 | |
| docid-32144949.pdf | 124-10075-10087 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-3917 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 238 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS ON PAGE i, INDEX ON PAGE a-i | 238 | |
| docid-32144950.pdf | 124-10075-10088 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-3917 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 238 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS ON PAGE i, INDEX ON PAGE a-i | 238 | |
| docid-32144983.pdf | 124-10075-10121 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/02/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-1184, 1185 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SA | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | INC A/T, LHM | 4 | |
| docid-32145071.pdf | 124-10075-10209 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/04/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-1343 | SAC, DL | SAC, HO | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32145219.pdf | 124-10076-10049 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/30/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-1063 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SF | 4 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | ATT IS LHM | 4 | |
| docid-32145648.pdf | 124-10077-10025 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-239 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 6 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32145682.pdf | 124-10077-10059 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-207 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SJ | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/11/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32146238.pdf | 124-10078-10410 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/05/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-2548 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, PH | 4 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32146308.pdf | 124-10078-10480 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/19/1977 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-1ST NR 7750 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SJ | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32146399.pdf | 124-10079-10071 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/22/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-472 | SAC, DL | SAC, LA | 4 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32147272.pdf | 124-10081-10224 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/10/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-606 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32147365.pdf | 124-10081-10317 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/31/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-3540 | SAC, DL | HEITMAN, WALLACE R. | 1 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32148633.pdf | 124-10086-10009 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/11/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-2ND NR 2601 | DIRECTOR, FBI | KENNEDY, JAMES N. JR. | 30 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 30 | ||
| docid-32148898.pdf | 124-10086-10274 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/08/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-8220 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 275 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 275 | ||
| docid-32149391.pdf | 124-10087-10267 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/02/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-2118 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NK | 6 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32149479.pdf | 124-10087-10355 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5146 | SAC | RATCHFORD, HAROLD M. | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32149582.pdf | 124-10087-10458 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/20/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5580 | SAC, DL | SAC, PH | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | INC FBI MEMO | 6 | |
| docid-32149608.pdf | 124-10087-10484 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5551 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, WMFO | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32150787.pdf | 124-10093-10112 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-707 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32153149.pdf | 124-10100-10040 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/20/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-2ND NR 1146 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 5 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32153327.pdf | 124-10100-10218 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/12/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-173-62 | DIRECTOR, FBI | THOMPSON, RICHARD C. | 8 | FBI | MI | sept/20/2017 | 8 | ||
| docid-32153744.pdf | 124-10102-10016 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-417 | SAC, DL | SAC, SL | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32153753.pdf | 124-10102-10025 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/28/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-426 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/17/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32153805.pdf | 124-10102-10077 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-476 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, AQ | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32153916.pdf | 124-10102-10188 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/29/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-583 | SAC, DL | SAC, MI | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32153928.pdf | 124-10102-10200 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/29/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-595 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LV | 14 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 14 | ||
| docid-32155294.pdf | 124-10108-10005 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-1714 | DIRECTOR, FBI | FOX, RAYMOND J. | 82 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 82 | ||
| docid-32155295.pdf | 124-10108-10006 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-1713 | HQ | AQ | 14 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 14 | ||
| docid-32155335.pdf | 124-10108-10046 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-398 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, DL | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32155379.pdf | 124-10108-10090 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-353 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SJ | 3 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32155390.pdf | 124-10108-10101 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-342 | SAC, DL | SAC, LA | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32155430.pdf | 124-10108-10141 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-300 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32155431.pdf | 124-10108-10142 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-299 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, HO | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32155464.pdf | 124-10108-10175 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-266 | SAC, DL | SAC, SJ | 1 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32155594.pdf | 124-10108-10305 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/10/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4565 | SAC, DL | SAC, MM | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32155977.pdf | 124-10112-10041 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-1801 | DIRECTOR, FBI | TWINER, GROVER C. | 10 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 10 | ||
| docid-32155994.pdf | 124-10112-10058 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/10/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-1784 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32156035.pdf | 124-10112-10099 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-1743 | DIRECTOR, FBI | HARDING, CHARLES S. | 36 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 36 | ||
| docid-32156552.pdf | 124-10117-10027 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/12/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-2355 | DIRECTOR, FBI | THOMPSON, RICHARD C. | 16 | FBI | DL | sept/17/2017 | 16 | ||
| docid-32156761.pdf | 124-10119-10129 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-82 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32156766.pdf | 124-10119-10134 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-87 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, AT | 3 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32156774.pdf | 124-10119-10142 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-95 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, DN | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32156782.pdf | 124-10119-10150 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-103 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 3 | FBI | DL | sept/20/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32156789.pdf | 124-10119-10157 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-110 | SAC, DL | SAC, HO | 3 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32156853.pdf | 124-10119-10221 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-173 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MI | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32157318.pdf | 124-10123-10106 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/04/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4383, 4384 | SAC, CG | MURPHY, ROBERT O. | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | INC LHM | 6 | |
| docid-32157367.pdf | 124-10124-10019 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/08/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-3871 | HOPKINS, EMIL E. | 7 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 7 | |||
| docid-32157368.pdf | 124-10124-10020 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/08/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-3870A | HOPKINS, EMIL E. | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 7 | |||
| docid-32157442.pdf | 124-10124-10094 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/07/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-3798 | SAC, DL | SAC, LA | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32157589.pdf | 124-10125-10023 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4095 | SAC, MM | SAC, HO | 10 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 10 | ||
| docid-32157604.pdf | 124-10125-10038 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/21/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4109 | SAC, DL | SAC, TP | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32157609.pdf | 124-10125-10043 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/24/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4114, 4115 | SAC, DL | SAC, LA | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | INC APPENDIX | 6 | |
| docid-32157665.pdf | 124-10125-10099 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/29/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4195 | SAC, DL | SAC, MM | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32157668.pdf | 124-10125-10102 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/30/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4198, 4199 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SF | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | INCLUDES LHM | 4 | |
| docid-32160294.pdf | 124-10138-10066 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/18/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-645 SUB C-51 | SAC, CG | HOOD, WILLIAM F. | 2 | FBI | CG | sept/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32160678.pdf | 124-10141-10039 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/16/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-456-117 | DIRECTOR, FBI | ESTEP, THOMAS B. | 6 | FBI | CI | sept/19/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32160703.pdf | 124-10142-10015 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/29/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-645 SUB C-32 | SAC, CG | TOMPKINS, ROBERT J. JR. | 2 | FBI | CG | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32160717.pdf | 124-10142-10029 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-645 SUB C-18 | SAC, CG | BLOOM, EDWARD F. | 1 | FBI | CG | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32160790.pdf | 124-10142-10102 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/20/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-274-75 | SAC, EP | REID, DAVID J. | 1 | FBI | EP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32160822.pdf | 124-10142-10134 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/09/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-274-42 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, EP | 2 | FBI | EP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32160841.pdf | 124-10142-10153 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-274-22 | DIRECTOR, FBI | REID, DAVID J. | 25 | FBI | EP | sept/19/2017 | 25 | ||
| docid-32160853.pdf | 124-10142-10165 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-274-3A | SAC, EP | REID, DAVID J. | 1 | FBI | EP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32161141.pdf | 124-10143-10002 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-853 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32161533.pdf | 124-10143-10394 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/29/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-1233 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 6 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32161721.pdf | 124-10144-10082 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-1ST NR 90 | SULLIVAN, W. C. | BAUMGARDNER, F. J. | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32161772.pdf | 124-10144-10133 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/21/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-7034, 7035 | 26 | CIT | DL | sept/21/2017 | INC 2 CIT RPT | 26 | |||
| docid-32161773.pdf | 124-10144-10134 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/27/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-7036 | HQ | CG | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32162061.pdf | 124-10144-10422 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/19/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-7692, 7693 | HQ | NO | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | INC A/T, LHM | 4 | |
| docid-32162064.pdf | 124-10144-10425 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/18/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-7687, 7688 | HQ | NO | 3 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | INC A/T, LHM | 3 | |
| docid-32162603.pdf | 124-10146-10161 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/28/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-456-32 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 2 | FBI | CI | sept/19/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32162619.pdf | 124-10146-10177 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-456-10 | SAC, CI | 4 | FBI | CI | sept/19/2017 | 4 | |||
| docid-32163127.pdf | 124-10150-10206 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/18/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-7209, 7210 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 22 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | INC A/T, LHM | 22 | |
| docid-32163512.pdf | 124-10151-10091 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/16/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-7602 | AG | DIRECTOR, FBI | 8 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | INC MEMO, LHM, CIT LTR, 3 S/S | 8 | |
| docid-32163685.pdf | 124-10151-10264 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-4050 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 2598 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | INC ADMIN PAGE, A/T, RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES i-xxiv | 2598 | |
| docid-32163794.pdf | 124-10151-10373 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/10/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-2692 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, RH | 4 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32164490.pdf | 124-10155-10358 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/08/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-974-256 | HOPKINS, EMIL E. | 7 | FBI | NY | sept/20/2017 | 7 | |||
| docid-32164491.pdf | 124-10155-10359 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/08/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-974-257 | HOPKINS, EMIL E. | 6 | FBI | NY | sept/20/2017 | 7 | |||
| docid-32164494.pdf | 124-10155-10362 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/14/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-974-262 | SAC, DL | SAC, NY | 2 | FBI | NY | sept/20/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32164532.pdf | 124-10156-10003 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-2ND NR 96 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32164535.pdf | 124-10156-10006 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/04/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-12TH NR 154 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32164706.pdf | 124-10156-10177 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/30/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5812, 5812A | DIRECTOR, FBI | KEMMY, JOHN M. | 95 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | INC FBI ERROR FORM | 95 | |
| docid-32164930.pdf | 124-10156-10401 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/26/1965 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-8745 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NK | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32165497.pdf | 124-10158-10022 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/02/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-4261 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32165500.pdf | 124-10158-10025 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/27/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-4264 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32165515.pdf | 124-10158-10040 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/27/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3517 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GAZUR, EDWARD P. | 4 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32165552.pdf | 124-10158-10077 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 09/30/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-2ND NR 5043 | DIRECTOR, FBI | HURLEY, JOHN D. JR. | 8 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 8 | ||
| docid-32165693.pdf | 124-10158-10218 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 09/09/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-7926, 7927 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 7 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | INC LHM | 7 | |
| docid-32165710.pdf | 124-10158-10235 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 09/10/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-7948, 7949 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 14 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | INC MEMO, LHM | 14 | |
| docid-32165833.pdf | 124-10158-10358 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/11/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-8342-682 | MM | HQ | 4 | FBI | MM | août/29/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32166013.pdf | 124-10159-10038 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-1842 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, RH | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32166389.pdf | 124-10159-10414 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-697 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 6 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32166403.pdf | 124-10159-10428 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-712 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 6 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32166483.pdf | 124-10160-10008 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-3RD NR 236 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, BA | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32166745.pdf | 124-10160-10270 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/06/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-9612 | HQ | DL | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32167053.pdf | 124-10162-10030 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-951 | DIRECTOR, FBI | TWINER, GROVER C. | 10 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 10 | ||
| docid-32167056.pdf | 124-10162-10033 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/21/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-16TH NR 3364 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32167115.pdf | 124-10162-10092 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 09/10/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-1ST NR 4870 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32167119.pdf | 124-10162-10096 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/30/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3593 | DIRECTOR, FBI | KEMMY, JOHN M. | 95 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 95 | ||
| docid-32167271.pdf | 124-10162-10248 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/10/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-4626, 4627 | SAC, CV | ANDERSON, ALFRED L. | 12 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | INC INFORMANT RPT | 12 | |
| docid-32167656.pdf | 124-10163-10133 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/08/1966 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-4250 | DIRECTOR, FBI | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32168164.pdf | 124-10164-10141 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/27/1980 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-8158 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, WMFO | 13 | FBI | HQ | août/29/2017 | INC FBI LHM AND LIST | 13 | |
| docid-32169233.pdf | 124-10169-10052 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/06/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3RD NR 2381 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, AQ | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32169256.pdf | 124-10169-10075 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 09/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-4837 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CALLENDER, STEPHEN M. | 34 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 34 | ||
| docid-32169298.pdf | 124-10169-10117 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/23/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-2809 | SAC, SA | DEFFENBAUGH, B. E. JR. | 3 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | INC R/S | 3 | |
| docid-32169346.pdf | 124-10169-10165 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/25/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-2856 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OCONNOR, JAMES J. | 27 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 27 | ||
| docid-32169450.pdf | 124-10169-10269 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/20/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1973 | DIRECTOR, FBI | MORRISSEY, JAMES F. | 8 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 8 | ||
| docid-32169513.pdf | 124-10169-10332 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/20/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-3644 | SAC, CG | DIRECTOR, FBI | 1 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32169517.pdf | 124-10169-10336 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/20/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-3647, 3648 | HQ | NY | 7 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | INC A/T AND LHM | 7 | |
| docid-32169704.pdf | 124-10170-10023 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/21/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-3324 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, DE | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32169715.pdf | 124-10170-10034 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/03/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1210A, 1210B | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 25 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | INC SAC, NY A/T TO DIRECTOR, FBI, R/S, CIT LTRS | 25 | |
| docid-32169745.pdf | 124-10170-10064 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/13/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1241 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CI | 3 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32169775.pdf | 124-10170-10094 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/12/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1275 | DIRECTOR, FBI | HARDING, CHARLES S. | 34 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | 34 | ||
| docid-32169901.pdf | 124-10170-10220 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/12/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-1338 | DIRECTOR, FBI | THOMPSON, RICHARD C. | 8 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 8 | ||
| docid-32169961.pdf | 124-10170-10280 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/27/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5757 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GAZUR, EDWARD P. | 3 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32170031.pdf | 124-10170-10350 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/24/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5682 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, RH | 1 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32170044.pdf | 124-10170-10363 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/23/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5669 | HQ | SF | 3 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32170143.pdf | 124-10170-10462 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/16/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-2063, 2062 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CI | 5 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | INC LHM, A/T | 5 | |
| docid-32170181.pdf | 124-10171-10000 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/02/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-569 | DIRECTOR, FBI | THOMPSON, RICHARD C. | 18 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 18 | ||
| docid-32170184.pdf | 124-10171-10003 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/16/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-82555-922 | DIRECTOR, FBI | ESTEP, THOMAS B. | 7 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 7 | ||
| docid-32170223.pdf | 124-10171-10042 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/05/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-514 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, PH | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32170227.pdf | 124-10171-10046 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/02/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-518 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GRAHAM, CARL E. | 51 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 51 | ||
| docid-32170247.pdf | 124-10171-10066 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/05/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-316 | DIRECTOR, FBI | THOMPSON, RICHARD C. | 18 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 18 | ||
| docid-32170254.pdf | 124-10171-10073 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/03/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-323 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OCONNOR, JAMES J. | 29 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 29 | ||
| docid-32170379.pdf | 124-10171-10198 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-118 | DIRECTOR, FBI | REID, DAVID J. | 25 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 25 | ||
| docid-32170605.pdf | 124-10171-10424 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/02/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-5777 | DIRECTOR, FBI | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 3 | |||
| docid-32170607.pdf | 124-10171-10426 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5200 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 643 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | INC ADMIN PAGE | 643 | |
| docid-32170658.pdf | 124-10171-10477 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/19/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5011 | SAC, DL | BETTS, WILLIAM S. | 10 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 10 | ||
| docid-32170661.pdf | 124-10171-10480 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/01/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5016 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 2 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171282.pdf | 124-10173-10101 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-171 | HQ | AQ | 7 | FBI | DL | août/16/2017 | RPT | 7 | |
| docid-32171289.pdf | 124-10173-10108 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/01/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-178 | DIRECTOR, FBI | HARDING, CHARLES S. | 36 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 36 | ||
| docid-32171302.pdf | 124-10173-10121 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/02/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-191 | DIRECTOR, FBI | THOMPSON, RICHARD C. | 18 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 18 | ||
| docid-32171306.pdf | 124-10173-10125 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/28/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-6150 | DIRECTOR, FBI | GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. | 718 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES i-xi, INDEX PAGES 618-686 | 718 | |
| docid-32171591.pdf | 124-10173-10410 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-93 | SAC, TP | OBRIEN, JOHN J. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171592.pdf | 124-10173-10411 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-94 | SAC, TP | HAY, WILLIAM C. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171607.pdf | 124-10173-10426 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-109 | SAC, TP | ALEMAN, MOSES A. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171611.pdf | 124-10173-10430 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-113 | SAC | AMBLER, JOHN A. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171612.pdf | 124-10173-10431 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-114 | SAC | AMBLER, JOHN A. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171615.pdf | 124-10173-10434 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/24/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-117 | SAC, TP | CAPEHART, CHARLES L. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171616.pdf | 124-10173-10435 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-118 | SAC, TP | CAPEHART, CHARLES L. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/17/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171617.pdf | 124-10173-10436 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-119 | SAC, TP | CAPEHART, CHARLES L. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171618.pdf | 124-10173-10437 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-120 | SAC, TP | CAPEHART, CHARLES L. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171620.pdf | 124-10173-10439 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-122 | SAC, TP | CAPEHART, CHARLES L. | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171624.pdf | 124-10173-10443 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-126 | SAC, TP | LIGARDE, FRED | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171649.pdf | 124-10173-10468 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/05/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-155 | SAC | ALLEN | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32171656.pdf | 124-10173-10475 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-163 | AMBLER, JOHN A. | 2 | FBI | TP | sept/17/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32171657.pdf | 124-10173-10476 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-164 | JOHNSON, RAYMOND B. | 2 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32171667.pdf | 124-10173-10486 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/30/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-174 | ONEIL, JAMES P. | 3 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 3 | |||
| docid-32171668.pdf | 124-10173-10487 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/24/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-175 | ONEIL, JAMES P. | 3 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 3 | |||
| docid-32172446.pdf | 124-10175-10265 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/08/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5937 | DIRECTOR, FBI | OFLAHERTY, JOHN JAMES | 20 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 20 | ||
| docid-32172595.pdf | 124-10175-10414 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/16/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-4491, 4492 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SA | 12 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | INC A/T, LHM | 12 | |
| docid-32172734.pdf | 124-10176-10053 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/08/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-2407 | HOPKINS, EMIL E. | 7 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 7 | |||
| docid-32172763.pdf | 124-10176-10082 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/08/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-2438 | HOPKINS, EMIL E. | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 7 | |||
| docid-32173011.pdf | 124-10176-10330 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/09/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-7093 | SAC, SA | DEFFENBAUGH, B. E. JR. | 3 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32173413.pdf | 124-10177-10232 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/02/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-58-203 | SAC, SF | SAMPLE, MALCOLM E. | 4 | FBI | SF | août/23/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32173415.pdf | 124-10177-10234 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-58-209 | SAC, SF | SAMPLE, MALCOLM E. | 2 | FBI | SF | août/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32173433.pdf | 124-10177-10252 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/24/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-58-235, 236 | SAC, SF | 15 | FBI | SF | août/23/2017 | INC A/T | 15 | ||
| docid-32173856.pdf | 124-10178-10175 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/25/1968 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-75-839, 840 | HQ | EP | 7 | FBI | LA | août/23/2017 | INC LHM, A/T | 7 | |
| docid-32174859.pdf | 124-10180-10275 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-2665-6, 7 | SAC, BU | DIRECTOR, FBI | 4 | FBI | BU | août/23/2017 | INC A/T | 4 | |
| docid-32175045.pdf | 124-10181-10141 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/11/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-58-469 | SAC, SF | MCMULLEN, RICHARD J. | 2 | FBI | SF | août/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32175179.pdf | 124-10181-10275 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/23/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-4448-27 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 2 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32175257.pdf | 124-10181-10353 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/26/1961 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-74-13 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 4 | FBI | NO | août/15/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32175259.pdf | 124-10181-10355 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/05/1961 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-74-15 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CURRAN, JOHN FRANCIS | 73 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | 73 | ||
| docid-32175681.pdf | 124-10182-10414 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/24/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-15065-37, 37A | DIRECTOR, FBI | ADIC, NY | 6 | FBI | NY | août/23/2017 | INC TTY | 6 | |
| docid-32175685.pdf | 124-10182-10418 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 62-21381-762 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32175906.pdf | 124-10183-10193 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-116395-1200X1 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 191 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | EBF, INC 5 INTV, 5 RPT, 4 COVERSHEETS, 3 ABSTRACTS, 2 TTY, 2 A/T, 1 MEMO | 191 | |
| docid-32175972.pdf | 124-10183-10259 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-7211-17 | SAC, BU | DIRECTOR, FBI | 2 | FBI | CG | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32176012.pdf | 124-10184-10007 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-200 | SAC, TP | 1 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32176019.pdf | 124-10184-10014 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-455-209 | ALLEN, T. C. | 2 | FBI | TP | sept/19/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32176261.pdf | 124-10184-10256 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/16/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 100-12583-473 | SAC, CI | 6 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | INC A/T | 6 | ||
| docid-32176315.pdf | 124-10184-10310 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/31/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-74-84 | SAC | DEBRUEYS, WARREN C. | 4 | FBI | NO | sept/19/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32176316.pdf | 124-10184-10311 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/24/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-74-85 | DIRECTOR, FBI | LOGAN, RICHARD E. | 5 | FBI | NO | août/15/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32176322.pdf | 124-10184-10317 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/12/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-74-94 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 3 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32176324.pdf | 124-10184-10319 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/30/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-74-96 | DIRECTOR, FBI | 2 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | DATE LOWER LEFT CORNER | 3 | ||
| docid-32176325.pdf | 124-10184-10320 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 08/13/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-74-97 | DIRECTOR, FBI | KENNEDY, JAMES N. JR. | 7 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | 7 | ||
| docid-32176983.pdf | 124-10188-10067 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-116395-1398 | DEAR FRIEND | RODRIGUEZ, MANUEL | 182 | CIT | HQ | sept/21/2017 | EBF, INC COVER SHEET, 4 A/T, LTR, ENV, 3 RPT, LHM, MEMO, TTY, ABSTRACT | 182 | |
| docid-32177421.pdf | 124-10189-10005 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/07/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-47-128 | SAC | WICK, ROBERT H. | 3 | FBI | SE | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32177439.pdf | 124-10189-10023 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/21/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-47-147 | SAC, SE | GREGORY, CHARLES W. | 3 | FBI | SE | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32177468.pdf | 124-10189-10052 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/19/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-47-176 | SAC, SE | COOK, FRED G. | 2 | FBI | SE | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32177723.pdf | 124-10191-10105 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/30/1961 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-74-37 | SAC | DEBRUEYS, WARREN C. | 1 | FBI | NO | août/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32177771.pdf | 124-10193-10019 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/02/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR SEE TITLE | SAC, DE | DIRECTOR, FBI | CR 134-11476-82 | 13 | FBI | HQ | sept/19/2017 | INC INFORMANT RPT | 13 |
| docid-32179674.pdf | 124-10230-10384 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/14/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-6511 | HQ | NO | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | 6 | ||
| docid-32179685.pdf | 124-10230-10395 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/17/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-6531 | NO | HQ | 1 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32179690.pdf | 124-10230-10400 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/19/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-6540, 6541 | HQ | NO | 6 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | INC LHM, A/T | 6 | |
| docid-32179853.pdf | 124-10231-10063 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 08/10/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-7608, 7609 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | INC LHM, A/T | 4 | |
| docid-32180552.pdf | 124-10232-10262 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-3688, 3689 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 3 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | INC A/T, LHM | 3 | |
| docid-32180962.pdf | 124-10233-10172 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-309 | SAC, DL | HEITMAN, WALLACE R. | 2 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32181026.pdf | 124-10233-10236 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-377 | SAC, DL | JENKINS, WILLIAM R. | 1 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32181028.pdf | 124-10233-10238 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-378A | SAC, DL | JENKINS, WILLIAMS R. | 1 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32181065.pdf | 124-10233-10275 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/31/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-2937 | SAC, DL | HEITMAN, WALLACE R. | 1 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32182525.pdf | 124-10236-10235 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-3861 | SAC, DL | SAC, CG | 9 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | INC ADMIN PAGE, INTV, INVESTIGATIVE INSERT | 9 | |
| docid-32182527.pdf | 124-10236-10237 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-3863 | SAC, DL | SAC, CG | 16 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | INC 3 INVESTIGATIVE INSERTS, 1 ADMIN PAGE, 4 INTV | 16 | |
| docid-32183138.pdf | 124-10237-10348 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-69-2008, 2009 | 3 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | INC A/T, LHM | 3 | |||
| docid-32183321.pdf | 124-10238-10031 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/30/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-6868 | HQ | NO | 124 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | 124 | ||
| docid-32183334.pdf | 124-10238-10044 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/25/1968 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-7895, 7896 | HQ | EP | 7 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | INC A/T, LHM | 7 | |
| docid-32183745.pdf | 124-10238-10455 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/06/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-116395-1248X | DIRECTOR, FBI | 10 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | INC 4 COVERSHEET, LIST, 80 OF 90 PAGES NAR, EBF ENC | 10 | ||
| docid-32184175.pdf | 124-10239-10385 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/23/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-3924 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 4 | FBI | DL | août/14/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32188674.pdf | 124-10248-10384 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/22/1969 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-69-4425 | HQ | NO | 1 | FBI | NO | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32189289.pdf | 124-10249-10499 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/30/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-69-3137A | HQ | NO | 125 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | 125 | ||
| docid-32189374.pdf | 124-10250-10084 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/28/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-8342-392, 393 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, DE | 6 | FBI | MM | août/23/2017 | INC 2 A/T | 6 | |
| docid-32189681.pdf | 124-10250-10391 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/30/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-69-B-SEE COMMENTS | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 248 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | WORK PAPERS FOR NO A/T DTD 5/30/67, INC ADMIN PAGE | 248 | |
| docid-32190039.pdf | 124-10251-10249 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/27/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-69-3252, 3253, 3254 | HQ | CG | 13 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | INC 2 CIT MEMOS, A/T | 14 | |
| docid-32191078.pdf | 124-10255-10012 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/22/1969 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-8999, 9000, 9001 | HQ | NO | 8 | FBI | DL | sept/21/2017 | INC MEMO, 2 NEWS ARTIC | 8 | |
| docid-32192369.pdf | 124-10257-10303 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/02/1970 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | SEE TITLE | HEMMERT, K. P. | CR 134-3338A-120 | 8 | FBI | LA | août/14/2017 | 8 | ||
| docid-32193298.pdf | 124-10259-10232 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/17/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-69-2004 | NO | HQ | 1 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32194211.pdf | 124-10261-10145 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/22/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-58-13 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 4 | FBI | SF | août/23/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32195189.pdf | 124-10263-10182 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-69-SEE COMMENTS | SAC, NO | 12 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | 89-69-4261,4262,4263,4264,4265,4266,4267,4268,4269,4270, INC 10 S/S | 12 | ||
| docid-32195230.pdf | 124-10263-10223 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/06/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-25-104, 105 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 40 | FBI | MO | août/14/2017 | INC MEMO, LHM | 40 | |
| docid-32195565.pdf | 124-10264-10058 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/26/1968 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-69-3897 | SAC, NO | SAC, DN | 4 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32195660.pdf | 124-10264-10153 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-25-17 | SAC, MO | DRAUT, WOODSON E. | 15 | FBI | MO | août/15/2017 | 15 | ||
| docid-32195983.pdf | 124-10264-10476 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/25/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-116395-1625 | ADAMS, J. B. | LEGAL COUNSEL | 2 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32196507.pdf | 124-10266-10000 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-36-8 | SAC, SV | APPLEGATE, JAMES H. | 1 | FBI | SV | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32196510.pdf | 124-10266-10003 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/23/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-36-11 | SAC, SV | PRESCOTT, SIDNEY J. | 1 | FBI | SV | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32197130.pdf | 124-10267-10471 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 97-4196-33-11 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 21 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 21 | ||
| docid-32197136.pdf | 124-10267-10477 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/28/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 100-11465-52 | DIRECTOR, FBI | HILGENDORF, WALTER A. | 19 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 19 | ||
| docid-32197152.pdf | 124-10267-10493 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/26/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 100-3-7725 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 3 | FBI | HQ | sept/19/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32197818.pdf | 124-10269-10159 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/01/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-2115-514, 515 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, HO | 9 | FBI | HO | août/14/2017 | INC A/T, LHM | 9 | |
| docid-32197819.pdf | 124-10269-10160 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/08/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-2115-516 | SAC | HARRIS, PENROD W. | 1 | FBI | HO | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32198349.pdf | 124-10270-10190 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-75-208, 209, 210 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 8 | FBI | LA | août/23/2017 | INC 3 TTY | 8 | |
| docid-32198731.pdf | 124-10271-10072 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/23/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-116395-1250 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 2 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32199103.pdf | 124-10272-10338 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-58-261, 262 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 9 | FBI | SF | août/15/2017 | INC LHM, A/T | 9 | |
| docid-32199136.pdf | 124-10272-10371 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/10/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-58-298 | SAC | DUNPHY, JAMES | 5 | FBI | SF | août/23/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32199155.pdf | 124-10272-10390 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/23/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-58-322 | HQ | SF | 3 | FBI | SF | août/23/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32199189.pdf | 124-10272-10424 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/26/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-58-360, 361 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SF | 4 | FBI | SF | août/15/2017 | INC LHM, A/T | 4 | |
| docid-32199200.pdf | 124-10272-10435 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/12/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-47-185 | SAC, SE | COOK, FRED G. | 3 | FBI | SE | août/23/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32200725.pdf | 124-10276-10104 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-34-49 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, RH | 1 | FBI | RH | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32200736.pdf | 124-10276-10115 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/27/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-34-61 | SAC, RH | BROWN, E. PARKER | 2 | FBI | RH | août/15/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32202557.pdf | 157-10005-10367 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | SSCIA | 11/00/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | DOD | DOD CORRESPONDENCE & MATERIAL RE: OSWALD | 163 | SSCIA | CORRESPONDENCE FILE | mars/03/2017 | BOX 376 | 163 | ||
| docid-32205097.pdf | 177-10002-10084 | 26/10/2017 | In Full | LBJ | 00/00/0000 | MEMORANDUM | THE PRESIDENT | 2 | WH | PAPERS OF BROMLEY SMITH, 1963-DECEMBER 1964, BOX 1 | août/18/2017 | DOC. #199 | 3 | |||
| docid-32241845.pdf | 180-10065-10379 | 26/10/2017 | In Full | HSCA | 05/15/1978 | SUMMARY | 008894 | 413 | USSS | NUMBERED FILES | mai/03/2017 | Continues for two more folders after this one. Box 161. | 413 | |||
| docid-32244522.pdf | 180-10071-10080 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 01/26/1978 | SUMMARY | 005119 | DALZELL, WILLIAM | 3 | HSCA | NUMBERED FILES | mai/30/2017 | Box 107. | 5 | ||
| docid-32245030.pdf | 180-10072-10088 | 26/10/2017 | In Full | HSCA | 12/10/1963 | REPORT. | 008388 | 3 | TRS | NUMBERED FILES. | mai/04/2017 | Box 153. | 5 | |||
| docid-32248157.pdf | 180-10078-10215 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 04/21/1978 | OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT | 007407 | GABRIELSON, ROGER; CIA | 1 | HSCA | NUMBERED FILES | mai/30/2017 | Box 142. | 4 | ||
| docid-32248213.pdf | 180-10078-10271 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/07/1978 | DEPOSITION | 013151 | ESPINOSA, VICTOR | 123 | HSCA | NUMBERED FILES | mai/30/2017 | Index summary & copies attached. Box 230. | 126 | ||
| docid-32249245.pdf | 180-10081-10303 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/02/1978 | LETTER | 006123 | CARPENTIER, PATRICK | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 3 | HSCA | NUMBERED FILES | mai/30/2017 | Box #:121. | 6 | |
| docid-32250081.pdf | 180-10083-10139 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/31/1978 | LETTER | 011302 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT, CIA | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 3 | HSCA | NUMBERED FILES | mai/30/2017 | Box 205. | 4 | |
| docid-32252061.pdf | 180-10087-10119 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 01/11/1977 | SUMMARY | 000657 | WOLF, BETSY | 3 | U.S.S.S. | NUMBERED FILES | mai/04/2017 | BOX 16 | 4 | ||
| docid-32252528.pdf | 180-10088-10086 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/11/1979 | INDEX. | 006649 | STURGIS DEPOSITION. | 5 | HSCA | NUMBERED FILES. | mai/30/2017 | Includes cover memorandum dates taken from memorandum. Box 128. | 196 | ||
| docid-32254661.pdf | 180-10092-10219 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 002470 | 5 | CIA | NUMBERED FILES | mai/30/2017 | Box 60. | 6 | |||
| docid-32259294.pdf | 180-10101-10352 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 12/08/1978 | NOTES | 013573 | DOD | 13 | HSCA | NUMBERED FILES | avr/27/2017 | Box 237. | 14 | ||
| docid-32262517.pdf | 180-10108-10086 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/10/1977 | LIST. | 015107 (FOLDER 3 OF 4) | FONZI, GAETON. | MIAMI WITNESS. | 20 | HSCA | NUMBERED FILES. | mai/30/2017 | Box 297. | 21 | |
| docid-32263513.pdf | 180-10110-10108 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/08/1978 | OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT | 009093 | 4 | HSCA | SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES | mai/30/2017 | Press clipping attached.Box 4. | 6 | |||
| docid-32263552.pdf | 180-10110-10147 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | MEMORANDUM | MEXICO CITY TRIP # 2 | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | LOPEZ, EDWIN | 3 | HSCA | SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES | mai/30/2017 | Box 5. | 4 | |
| docid-32264426.pdf | 180-10112-10052 | 26/10/2017 | In Full | HSCA | 03/10/1975 | LETTER | 002466 | 1 | DEA | NUMBERED FILES | mai/05/2017 | BOX 59. | 2 | |||
| docid-32264840.pdf | 180-10112-10466 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/25/1976 | NOTES | 015106 | 25 | CIA | NUMBERED FILES | mai/30/2017 | NOTES FROM 6-25-76 – 9/21/77. BOX 296. | 26 | |||
| docid-32267479.pdf | 180-10119-10058 | 26/10/2017 | In Full | HSCA | 11/29/1963 | REPORT | 003667 | USSS | 2 | WC | NUMBERED FILES | mai/04/2017 | CD87. Box #:81. | 3 | ||
| docid-32267512.pdf | 180-10119-10091 | 26/10/2017 | In Full | HSCA | 12/03/1963 | REPORT | 003676 | USSS | 3 | WC | NUMBERED FILES | mai/04/2017 | CD87. Box #:81. | 4 | ||
| docid-32270384.pdf | 180-10140-10080 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 02/23/1978 | PRINTED FORM | 06-10-34 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 1 | 6 | ||
| docid-32270434.pdf | 180-10140-10130 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/11/1978 | LETTER | 06-11-39 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 1 | 2 | |
| docid-32270442.pdf | 180-10140-10138 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/20/1978 | LETTER | 06-11-47 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 1 | 3 | |
| docid-32270474.pdf | 180-10140-10170 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/06/1978 | NOTES | 06-13-12 | BERK, CHARLES | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 1 | 2 | ||
| docid-32270564.pdf | 180-10140-10260 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/22/1978 | LETTER | 08-34-03 | CARPENTIER, PATRICK | BLAKEY, G.ROBERT | 9 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 2 | 10 | |
| docid-32270667.pdf | 180-10140-10363 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/16/1978 | LETTER | 09-24-01 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 7 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | sept/01/2017 | Box 3 | 8 | |
| docid-32270672.pdf | 180-10140-10368 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/18/1978 | LETTER | 09-27-01 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 4 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 3 | 5 | |
| docid-32270687.pdf | 180-10140-10383 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 10/03/1978 | LETTER | 09-41-01 | CARPENTIER, PATRICK | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 3 | 2 | |
| docid-32270688.pdf | 180-10140-10384 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 10/03/1978 | LETTER | 09-41-02 | CARPENTIER, PATRICK | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 3 | 2 | |
| docid-32270710.pdf | 180-10140-10406 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/16/1978 | LETTER | 09-65-04 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 3 | 2 | |
| docid-32270977.pdf | 180-10141-10173 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/19/1978 | LETTER | 12-04-51 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 4 | 2 | |
| docid-32270995.pdf | 180-10141-10191 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 13-01-09 | CIA | 8 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/30/2017 | Box 5 | 9 | ||
| docid-32271004.pdf | 180-10141-10200 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/12/1978 | NOTES | 13-05-01 | SHEPANEC, NORMAN | GABRIELSON, RODGER | 21 | CIA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 22 | |
| docid-32271005.pdf | 180-10141-10201 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/12/1978 | NOTES | 13-05-02 | SHEPANEC, NORMAN | GABRIELSON, RODGER | 21 | CIA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 22 | |
| docid-32271006.pdf | 180-10141-10202 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/12/1978 | NOTES | 13-05-03 | SHEPANEC, NORMAN | GABRIELSON, RODGER | 20 | CIA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 22 | |
| docid-32271009.pdf | 180-10141-10205 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 04/07/1978 | NOTES | 13-07-01 | CIA | 6 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 7 | ||
| docid-32271013.pdf | 180-10141-10209 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/03/1978 | NOTES | 13-09-02 | CIA | 6 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 8 | ||
| docid-32271014.pdf | 180-10141-10210 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/15/1978 | NOTES | 13-09-03 | CIA | 15 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 16 | ||
| docid-32271015.pdf | 180-10141-10211 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/09/1978 | NOTES | 13-09-4A | CIA | 42 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 44 | ||
| docid-32271029.pdf | 180-10141-10225 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/27/1978 | NOTES | 13-11-5A | CIA | 8 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 9 | ||
| docid-32271031.pdf | 180-10141-10227 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/28/1978 | NOTES | 13-11-06 | CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 4 | ||
| docid-32271034.pdf | 180-10141-10230 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/13/1978 | NOTES | 13-13-1A | CIA | 42 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 43 | ||
| docid-32271035.pdf | 180-10141-10231 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/13/1978 | NOTES | 13-13-1B | CIA | 38 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 39 | ||
| docid-32271037.pdf | 180-10141-10233 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/15/1978 | NOTES | 13-13-03 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 6 | ||
| docid-32271038.pdf | 180-10141-10234 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/09/1978 | NOTES | 13-13-04 | CIA | 27 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | mai/31/2017 | Box 5 | 28 | ||
| docid-32271039.pdf | 180-10141-10235 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/09/1978 | NOTES | 13-13-05 | CIA | 24 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 5 | 25 | ||
| docid-32271049.pdf | 180-10141-10245 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/13/1978 | NOTES | 13-18-01 | CIA | 24 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 6 | 25 | ||
| docid-32271076.pdf | 180-10141-10272 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/13/1978 | NOTES | 13-23-01 | CIA | 12 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 6 | 12 | ||
| docid-32271077.pdf | 180-10141-10273 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/13/1978 | NOTES | 13-23-02 | CIA | 12 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 6 | 12 | ||
| docid-32271083.pdf | 180-10141-10279 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/31/1978 | NOTES | 13-24-01 | CIA | 8 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 6 | 8 | ||
| docid-32271085.pdf | 180-10141-10281 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/31/1978 | NOTES | 13-24-03 | CIA | 6 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 6 | 6 | ||
| docid-32271086.pdf | 180-10141-10282 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/02/1978 | NOTES | 13-24-04 | CIA | 27 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 6 | 27 | ||
| docid-32271111.pdf | 180-10141-10307 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 11/16/1978 | TRANSCRIPT | 18-05-01 | 170 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 7 Transcript of executive session testimony. | 170 | |||
| docid-32271172.pdf | 180-10141-10368 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 01/19/1978 | NOTES | 19-20-05 | CIA | 9 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 8 | 10 | ||
| docid-32271292.pdf | 180-10141-10488 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 22-02-01 | CIA | 49 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 9 | 49 | ||
| docid-32271293.pdf | 180-10141-10489 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 22-02-02 | CIA | 55 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 9 | 55 | ||
| docid-32271304.pdf | 180-10142-10000 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | 22-09-01 | CIA | 7 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 10 | 8 | ||
| docid-32271305.pdf | 180-10142-10001 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | 22-09-02 | CIA | 8 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 10 | 9 | ||
| docid-32271350.pdf | 180-10142-10046 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | 22-20-02/3 | CIA | 7 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 11 | 8 | ||
| docid-32271364.pdf | 180-10142-10060 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 22-23-02 | CIA | 29 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 11 | 30 | ||
| docid-32271384.pdf | 180-10142-10080 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 23-05-02 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12 | 6 | ||
| docid-32271393.pdf | 180-10142-10089 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 23-06-05 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12 | 2 | ||
| docid-32271403.pdf | 180-10142-10099 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/06/1978 | TRANSCRIPT | 23-08-04 | 32 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12. | 33 | |||
| docid-32271414.pdf | 180-10142-10110 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/15/1978 | NOTES | 23-12-08 | CIA | 34 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12 | 34 | ||
| docid-32271418.pdf | 180-10142-10114 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 23-12-12 | CIA | 14 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12 | 16 | ||
| docid-32271420.pdf | 180-10142-10116 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 23-12-14 | CIA | 7 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12 | 8 | ||
| docid-32271426.pdf | 180-10142-10122 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 23-13-05 | CIA | 16 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12 | 17 | ||
| docid-32271433.pdf | 180-10142-10129 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 23-15-05 | CIA | 7 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12 | 8 | ||
| docid-32271437.pdf | 180-10142-10133 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | 23-15-09 | CIA | SYLVIA DURAN’S PREVIOUS STATEMENTS RE LHO’S VISIT TO THE CUBAN CONSUL. | 34 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12 | 34 | |
| docid-32271439.pdf | 180-10142-10135 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | 23-15-11 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 12 | 6 | ||
| docid-32271496.pdf | 180-10142-10192 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | 23-22-04 | HSCA PROCEDURAL WRITE-UP: MEXICO TRIP 2 | 10 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 13 | 11 | ||
| docid-32271499.pdf | 180-10142-10195 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 09/19/1978 | NOTES | 23-23-01 | CIA | 11 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 13 | 12 | ||
| docid-32271500.pdf | 180-10142-10196 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 23-23-02 | CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 13 | 4 | ||
| docid-32271574.pdf | 180-10142-10270 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 02/09/1978 | LIST | 23-25-21 | CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 14 | 4 | ||
| docid-32271587.pdf | 180-10142-10283 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/13/1978 | NOTES | 23-25-34 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 14 | 3 | ||
| docid-32271588.pdf | 180-10142-10284 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 23-25-35 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 14 | 2 | ||
| docid-32271637.pdf | 180-10142-10333 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 24-05-03 | 21 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 14 | 22 | |||
| docid-32271732.pdf | 180-10142-10428 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/16/1978 | LETTER | 25-05-08 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 16 | 2 | |
| docid-32271748.pdf | 180-10142-10444 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/19/1978 | LETTER | 25-05-24 | GABRIELSON, RODGER S. | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 16 | 3 | ||
| docid-32271789.pdf | 180-10142-10485 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/27/1979 | REPORT | 25-40-01 | CIA | NOVEMBER 22, 1963 CUBANA FLIGHT | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 16; HSCA #15047 | 6 | |
| docid-32271800.pdf | 180-10142-10496 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 276-01-01 | CIA | 4 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 17 | 5 | ||
| docid-32271881.pdf | 180-10143-10077 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/15/1978 | NOTES | 27-38-02 | CIA | SUMMARY: OP FILE ON E. HOWARD HUNT | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 18 | 6 | |
| docid-32271894.pdf | 180-10143-10090 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 02/08/1978 | NOTES | 27-44-01 | CIA | MEXICO CITY STATION FILE, VOLUME I, SEPT. TO 11/26/63 | 11 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 18 | 12 | |
| docid-32271913.pdf | 180-10143-10109 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/22/1978 | NOTES | 28-11-01C | CIA | SUMMARY OF REVIEW OF DISPATCHES TO AND FROM MEXICO CITY BETWEEN 10/15/63 AND 11/27/63 | 14 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 18 | 15 | |
| docid-32271929.pdf | 180-10143-10125 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/29/1978 | NOTES | 28-11-08 | CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/01/2017 | Box 18 | 4 | ||
| docid-32271935.pdf | 180-10143-10131 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | FORM | 28-11-11D | CIA | SENSITIVE ORIGINAL WITHHELD BY CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 18; Original document held by CIA. | 3 | |
| docid-32271953.pdf | 180-10143-10149 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | FORM | 28-12-14 | CIA | SENSITIVE ORIGINAL WITHHELD BY CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 18; Original document held by CIA. | 2 | |
| docid-32271974.pdf | 180-10143-10170 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/27/1978 | NOTES | 28-25-01 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 19 | 6 | ||
| docid-32271977.pdf | 180-10143-10173 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 28-26-02 | CIA | 6 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 19 | 7 | ||
| docid-32272021.pdf | 180-10143-10217 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 29-01-03 | CIA | 8 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 19 | 9 | ||
| docid-32272029.pdf | 180-10143-10225 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 29-06-03 | CIA | 28 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 19 Contains 2 pages withheld in full by CIA | 28 | ||
| docid-32272038.pdf | 180-10143-10234 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/22/1978 | NOTES | 29-07-08 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 19 | 3 | ||
| docid-32272048.pdf | 180-10143-10244 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 02/03/1978 | NOTES | 29-07-18 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 19 | 3 | ||
| docid-32272133.pdf | 180-10143-10329 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 29-16-01 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 20 | 2 | ||
| docid-32272139.pdf | 180-10143-10335 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 29-16-07 | CIA | 4 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 20 | 5 | ||
| docid-32272157.pdf | 180-10143-10353 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/15/1978 | NOTES | 29-19-07 | CIA | 4 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | oct/02/2017 | Box 20 | 5 | ||
| docid-32272164.pdf | 180-10143-10360 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/13/1978 | NOTES | 29-19-13 | CIA | 14 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 20 | 15 | ||
| docid-32272179.pdf | 180-10143-10375 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/28/1978 | FORM | 29-19-19A | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 20 Document Withdrawal Form Pending Third Agency Coordination | 6 | ||
| docid-32272223.pdf | 180-10143-10419 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 29-22-21 | CIA | 4 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 20 | 5 | ||
| docid-32272229.pdf | 180-10143-10425 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 29-23B-03 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 6 | ||
| docid-32272233.pdf | 180-10143-10429 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 29-23B-07 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 3 | ||
| docid-32272238.pdf | 180-10143-10434 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/15/1978 | NOTES | 29-25-01 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | oct/02/2017 | Box 21 | 2 | ||
| docid-32272239.pdf | 180-10143-10435 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/15/1978 | NOTES | 29-25-02 | CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 4 | ||
| docid-32272275.pdf | 180-10143-10471 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/07/1978 | NOTES | 29-39-02 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 2 | ||
| docid-32272289.pdf | 180-10144-10002 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/04/1978 | NOTES | 29-39-15 | CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 4 | ||
| docid-32272291.pdf | 180-10144-10004 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/03/1978 | NOTES | 29-39-17 | CIA | 9 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 10 | ||
| docid-32272292.pdf | 180-10144-10005 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/17/1978 | NOTES | 29-39-18 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 2 | ||
| docid-32272305.pdf | 180-10144-10018 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/08/1978 | NOTES | 29-42-04 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 6 | ||
| docid-32272312.pdf | 180-10144-10025 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/13/1978 | NOTES | 29-43-01 | CIA | INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT | 29 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 30 | |
| docid-32272320.pdf | 180-10144-10033 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 29-43-09 | CIA | 6 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 21 | 7 | ||
| docid-32272366.pdf | 180-10144-10079 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/31/1978 | NOTES | 29-46-22 | CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 22 | 4 | ||
| docid-32272367.pdf | 180-10144-10080 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/02/1978 | NOTES | 29-46-23 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 22 | 3 | ||
| docid-32272374.pdf | 180-10144-10087 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 02/09/1978 | NOTES | 29-46-30 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 22 | 3 | ||
| docid-32272390.pdf | 180-10144-10103 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/16/1978 | NOTES | 29-46-46 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 22 | 2 | ||
| docid-32272397.pdf | 180-10144-10110 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 29-46-53 | CIA | 6 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 22 | 8 | ||
| docid-32272411.pdf | 180-10144-10124 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/25/1978 | NOTES | 29-47-02 | CIA | 4 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 22 | 5 | ||
| docid-32272416.pdf | 180-10144-10129 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/08/1978 | NOTES | 29-48-01 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 22 | 6 | ||
| docid-32272496.pdf | 180-10144-10209 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 30-43-01 | CIA | 70 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 23 | 71 | ||
| docid-32272523.pdf | 180-10144-10236 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | 30-59-01 | HSCA PROCEDURAL WRITE-UP: CUBA TRIP | 45 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 24 | 46 | ||
| docid-32272526.pdf | 180-10144-10239 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 30-61-02 | CIA | 10 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 24 | 18 | ||
| docid-32272528.pdf | 180-10144-10241 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/28/1978 | NOTES | 30-62-02 | 17 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 24 | 19 | |||
| docid-32272529.pdf | 180-10144-10242 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 30-62-03 | CIA | 4 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 24 | 5 | ||
| docid-32272532.pdf | 180-10144-10245 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/28/1978 | NOTES | 30-62-06 | 13 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 24 | 14 | |||
| docid-32272549.pdf | 180-10144-10262 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | OTHER | 31-01B-02 | 29 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 25 Notecards from HSCA staffers | 29 | |||
| docid-32272552.pdf | 180-10144-10265 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | OTHER | 31-01B-05 | 41 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 25 Notecards from HSCA staffers | 41 | |||
| docid-32272569.pdf | 180-10144-10282 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 34-23-03 | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 26 | 4 | |||
| docid-32272607.pdf | 180-10144-10320 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 04/05/1978 | LETTER | 35-05-15 | CARPENTIER, PATRICK | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 26 | 4 | |
| docid-32272624.pdf | 180-10144-10337 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/11/1978 | LETTER | 35-06-12A | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 26 | 2 | |
| docid-32272671.pdf | 180-10144-10384 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 48-14-03 | CIA | 22 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 26 | 23 | ||
| docid-32272679.pdf | 180-10144-10392 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 04/07/1978 | NOTES | 48-14-10 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 26 | 5 | ||
| docid-32272701.pdf | 180-10144-10414 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/31/1978 | LETTER | 49-02-01 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 27 | 3 | |
| docid-32272712.pdf | 180-10144-10425 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/13/1978 | LETTER | 49-12-01 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 27 | 3 | |
| docid-32272713.pdf | 180-10144-10426 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/11/1978 | LETTER | 49-13-01 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 27 | 2 | |
| docid-32272729.pdf | 180-10144-10442 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 06/20/1978 | LETTER | 49-28-01 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 27 | 4 | |
| docid-32272774.pdf | 180-10144-10487 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 04/05/1978 | LETTER | 49-71-01 | CARPENTIER, PATRICK | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 4 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 27 | 4 | |
| docid-32272935.pdf | 180-10145-10148 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | 50-61-01 | 27 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 27 | 28 | |||
| docid-32272998.pdf | 180-10145-10211 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 54-04-01 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 28 | 6 | ||
| docid-32273001.pdf | 180-10145-10214 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/10/1978 | NOTES | 54-04-02 | CIA | 12 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 28 | 13 | ||
| docid-32273016.pdf | 180-10145-10229 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/28/1978 | NOTES | 54-04-07 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 28 | 2 | ||
| docid-32273029.pdf | 180-10145-10242 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 02/24/1978 | NOTES | 54-05-03 | CIA | 52 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 29 | 53 | ||
| docid-32273036.pdf | 180-10145-10249 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/20/1978 | NOTES | 54-06-01A2 | CIA | 23 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 29 | 24 | ||
| docid-32273044.pdf | 180-10145-10257 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 04/10/1978 | NOTES | 54-06-01I | CIA | 8 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 29 | 9 | ||
| docid-32273061.pdf | 180-10145-10274 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/28/1978 | NOTES | 54-08-03E | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 29 | 6 | ||
| docid-32273066.pdf | 180-10145-10279 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 54-08-04 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 29 | 3 | ||
| docid-32273113.pdf | 180-10145-10326 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/05/1978 | FORM | 55-01-30 | CIA | 37 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 30 Document Withdrawal Notice Pending Third Agency Coordination | 37 | ||
| docid-32273114.pdf | 180-10145-10327 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | FORM | 55-01-31 | CIA | 14 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 30 Document Withdrawal Notice Pending Third Agency Coordination | 14 | ||
| docid-32273138.pdf | 180-10145-10351 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/24/1978 | NOTES | 55-01-55 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 30 | 2 | ||
| docid-32273175.pdf | 180-10145-10388 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 08/16/1978 | NOTES | 55-05-03 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 2 | ||
| docid-32273182.pdf | 180-10145-10395 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 55-05-10 | CIA | 7 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 8 | ||
| docid-32273197.pdf | 180-10145-10410 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/22/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-04 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 3 | ||
| docid-32273198.pdf | 180-10145-10411 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/18/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-05 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 3 | ||
| docid-32273199.pdf | 180-10145-10412 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/18/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-06 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 2 | ||
| docid-32273205.pdf | 180-10145-10418 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 05/16/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-12 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 2 | ||
| docid-32273208.pdf | 180-10145-10421 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 04/26/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-15 | CIA | 2 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 3 | ||
| docid-32273209.pdf | 180-10145-10422 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 04/06/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-16 | CIA | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 2 | ||
| docid-32273211.pdf | 180-10145-10424 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 02/03/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-18 | CIA | 4 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 5 | ||
| docid-32273215.pdf | 180-10145-10428 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 11/06/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-22 | CIA | 7 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 8 | ||
| docid-32273216.pdf | 180-10145-10429 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/13/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-23 | CIA | 30 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 31 | ||
| docid-32273218.pdf | 180-10145-10431 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 11/07/1978 | NOTES | 55-06-25 | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 31 | 6 | ||
| docid-32273317.pdf | 180-10146-10033 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 01/30/1978 | NOTES | 56-05-2AQ | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 32 | 6 | ||
| docid-32273330.pdf | 180-10146-10046 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | NOTES | 56-05-15 | CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 32 | 4 | ||
| docid-32273379.pdf | 180-10147-10024 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 07/19/1978 | LETTER | 58-08-09 | BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 1 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 32 | 2 | |
| docid-32273546.pdf | 180-10147-10191 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/12/1979 | REPORT | 61-10-05 | STAFF REPORT ON THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO | 101 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 34 | 103 | ||
| docid-32273551.pdf | 180-10147-10196 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | 61-11-02A | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 35 | 6 | ||
| docid-32273562.pdf | 180-10147-10207 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 12/11/1978 | NOTES | 61-11-09A | CIA | 5 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 35 | 6 | ||
| docid-32273574.pdf | 180-10147-10219 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 12/11/1978 | NOTES | 61-11-17A | CIA | 6 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 35 | 6 | ||
| docid-32273595.pdf | 180-10147-10240 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/00/1979 | REPORT | 63-01-02 | CIA | ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS AND LHO IN NEW ORLEANS | 293 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 36 | 316 | |
| docid-32273600.pdf | 180-10147-10245 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 09/15/1978 | TRANSCRIPT | 63-05-02 | BAGLEY, TENNENT | 169 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | juin/05/2017 | Box 36 | 170 | ||
| docid-32273617.pdf | 181-10002-10005 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 06/05/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | DIRECTORS NLT, NLE, NLK, NLJ | NL | 1 | NARA | NL READING FILES 1975-76 | oct/13/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32273629.pdf | 181-10002-10017 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 06/05/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | BLAKE, JOHN F. | RHOADS, JAMES B. | 1 | NARA | NL READING FILES 1975-76 | oct/13/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32273634.pdf | 181-10002-10022 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 06/25/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | COOKE, DAVID O. | RHOADS, JAMES B. | 2 | NARA | NL READING FILES 1975-76 | oct/13/2017 | 3 | |||
| docid-32273645.pdf | 181-10002-10033 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 06/25/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | LANSDALE, RICHARD | RHOADS, JAMES B. | 2 | NARA | NL READING FILES 1975-76 | oct/13/2017 | 3 | |||
| docid-32273648.pdf | 181-10002-10036 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 06/25/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | SCOWCROFT, LT. GEN. BRENT | RHOADS, JAMES B. | 2 | NARA | NL READING FILES 1975-76 | oct/13/2017 | 3 | |||
| docid-32273668.pdf | 181-10002-10056 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 02/25/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | WILDEROTTER, JAMES A. | JACOBS, RICHARD A. | 1 | NARA | NL READING FILES 1975-76 | oct/13/2017 | Copies of enclosures not attached. | 2 | ||
| docid-32273706.pdf | 181-10002-10094 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 15 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS & REFERENCE SERVICE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | Handwritten and typed notes re SSCIA requests to Presidential Libraries. | 15 | ||||
| docid-32273725.pdf | 181-10002-10113 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 08/19/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | WILDEROTTER, JAMES A. | REED, DANIEL J. | 9 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | Attachments include classified document receipts, memo from William Moss for the record 8/4/93; route slip; letter David Aaron to James Rhoads 7/29/75; letter Aaron to Wilderotter 7/29/75; 2pp. of document lists. | 10 | ||
| docid-32273727.pdf | 181-10002-10115 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 08/18/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | RHOADS, JAMES B. | LANSDALE, RICHARD H. | 1 | CIA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32273737.pdf | 181-10002-10125 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 07/18/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A. O. | O’NEILL, JAMES E. | 4 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | Attached letter Schwarz to Rhoads 7/15/75 1p.; letter Schwarz to Rhoads7/14/75 2pp. | 5 | ||
| docid-32273738.pdf | 181-10002-10126 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 07/18/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | NLK | REED, DANIEL J. | 4 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | Attached route slip, 1 p.; attached letter from D. O. Cooke to James B. Rhoads 7/8/75 2pp. | 5 | ||
| docid-32273743.pdf | 181-10002-10131 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 07/02/1973 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | RHOADS, JAMES B. | SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A. O. JR. | 1 | SSCSGO | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32273744.pdf | 181-10002-10132 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 07/02/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | RHOADS, JAMES B. | SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A. O. | 1 | SSCSGO | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 2 | |||
| docid-32273747.pdf | 181-10002-10135 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 07/01/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | RHOADS, JAMES B. | SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A. O. | 2 | SSCSGO | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 3 | |||
| docid-32273749.pdf | 181-10002-10137 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 06/25/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CHURCH, FRANK | RHOADS, JAMES B. | 5 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | Attached letter Church to Rhoads 6/17/75 1p. with attached list of National Security Files requested from the Kennedy Library, 2pp. and acommunications control form, lp. | 6 | ||
| docid-32273753.pdf | 181-10002-10141 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 06/25/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | LEIGH, MONROE | RHOADS, JAMES B. | 2 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | Copies of enclosures not attached. | 3 | ||
| docid-32273754.pdf | 181-10002-10142 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 06/25/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | COOKE, DAVID O. | RHOADS, JAMES B. | 2 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | Copies of enclosures not attached. | 3 | ||
| docid-32273823.pdf | 181-10002-10211 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 05/18/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | DAVIS, JEANNE | JACOBS, RICHARD A. | 30 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 1p. letter w/attached document list (8 pp); 1 memo NLJ to NL 5/7/76; 4 document receipts; document reproduction request (10 pp); document receipts 6 pp. | 31 | ||
| docid-32273824.pdf | 181-10002-10212 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 05/03/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | RHOADS, JAMES B. | MILLER, WILLIAM G. | 3 | SSCSGO | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 2 route slips attached. | 4 | ||
| docid-32273825.pdf | 181-10002-10213 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 05/12/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | FOR THE RECORD | JACOBS, RICHARD A. | 9 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 1 p. memo w/attached handwritten note (1p) route slips; letter Miller to Rhoads 4/23/76; draft letter Rhoads to Miller 4/16/76; route slips; letter Miller to Rhoads 4/13/76 1p. | 9 | ||
| docid-32273831.pdf | 181-10002-10219 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | NL | JOHNSON AND KENNEDY LIBRARIES | 21 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 22 | |||
| docid-32273833.pdf | 181-10002-10221 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | NL | KENNEDY LIBRARY | 6 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 7 | |||
| docid-32273836.pdf | 181-10002-10224 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | NL | KENNEDY LIBRARY | 4 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 6 | |||
| docid-32273837.pdf | 181-10002-10225 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 07/08/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | NL | KENNEDY LIBRARY | 2 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 3 | |||
| docid-32273857.pdf | 181-10002-10245 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 06/04/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | RHOADS, JAMES B. | JACOBS, RICHARD A. | 8 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 1p. route slip w/attached route slip,; letter Rhoads to CIA 6/5/75 w/attached list of Presidential Library contacts; CIA to Rhoads 5/20/75 lp, 2 copies; memo Jacobs to Library Directors 6/5/75 1p, 2 copies.to Rhoads 5/2 | 9 | ||
| docid-32273860.pdf | 181-10002-10248 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | NARA | 05/20/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | GRAY, MARVIN | JACOBS, RICHARD A. | 10 | NARA | NL ADMINISTRATIVE FILES [ACCESS AND REFERENCE CASE FILES] | oct/13/2017 | 1p. letter w/attached memo Rossman to Jacobs 5/15/75 1p; list of Johnson Library files 8pp. | 11 | ||
| docid-32277355.pdf | 180-10147-10274 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 10/19/1978 | MEMORANDUM | SECRET SERVICE PROTECTIVE CASES | 28 | HSCA | EILEEN DINNEEN HSCA MATERIAL | mai/24/2017 | This document has been in the possession of an HSCA staff member before it was turned over to the Assassination Records Review Board on August 15, 1995. | 32 | |||
| docid-32277356.pdf | 180-10147-10275 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 03/29/1978 | MEMORANDUM | SECRET SERVICE INDEX FILE AND COMMISSION DOCUMENTS | 31 | HSCA | EILEEN DINNEEN HSCA MATERIAL | mai/24/2017 | This document has been in the possession of an HSCA staff member before it was turned over to the Assassination Records Review Board on August 15, 1995. | 32 | |||
| docid-32277357.pdf | 180-10147-10276 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | MEMORANDUM | DOCUMENT #006256 RE BRIEFING PAPERS ACQUIRED FROM THE LBJ LIBRARY | 1 | HSCA | EILEEN DINNEEN HSCA MATERIAL | mai/24/2017 | This document has been in the possession of an HSCA staff member before it was turned over to the Assassination Records Review Board on August 15, 1995. | 2 | |||
| docid-32278377.pdf | 124-10045-10244 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 100-10461-5523 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, ME | 2 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32279071.pdf | 124-10065-10438 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-974-4 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 3 | FBI | NY | sept/19/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32279112.pdf | 124-10068-10016 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-165 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, DN | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32279130.pdf | 124-10068-10034 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-147 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, AT | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32279175.pdf | 124-10068-10079 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/22/1993 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-24016-110 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 2 | FBI | HQ | août/14/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32279272.pdf | 124-10068-10176 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4757 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 108 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 108 | ||
| docid-32279834.pdf | 124-10110-10238 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-3946 | SAC, DL | NEALY, ALFRED D. | 1 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32279864.pdf | 124-10110-10268 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/15/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-3915 | SAC, OC | SAC, DL | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 4 | ||
| docid-32279867.pdf | 124-10110-10271 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/14/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-3912 | SAC, DL | SAC, NY | 4 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 5 | ||
| docid-32279986.pdf | 124-10110-10390 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/11/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-2459 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 8 | FBI | DL | sept/15/2017 | 8 | ||
| docid-32280016.pdf | 124-10110-10420 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/05/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-6464 | SAC, TP | 2 | FBI | DL | mars/12/1996 | 2 | |||
| docid-32280283.pdf | 124-10118-10249 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 08/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-5900 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 238 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 238 | ||
| docid-32280385.pdf | 124-10118-10351 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/03/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-1639-4757 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 110 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 110 | ||
| docid-32280588.pdf | 124-10131-10117 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/26/1956 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-1717-29 | DIRECTOR, FBI | INMAN, LEE R. | 15 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 15 | ||
| docid-32280589.pdf | 124-10131-10118 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/21/1957 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-1717-28 | DIRECTOR, FBI | LEDBETTER, LESTER M. | 12 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 12 | ||
| docid-32280592.pdf | 124-10131-10121 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/25/1958 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-1717-25 | DIRECTOR, FBI | INMAN, LEE R. | 36 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 36 | ||
| docid-32280597.pdf | 124-10131-10126 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/14/1961 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-1717-20 | DIRECTOR, FBI | NORTH, SAMUEL W. JR. | 8 | FBI | DL | sept/19/2017 | 8 | ||
| docid-32281991.pdf | 157-10002-10151 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | SSCIA | 08/22/1975 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | INTERVIEW WITH SAM PAPICH | 4 | SSCIA | INTERVIEW SUMMARY | oct/13/2017 | Box 256Folder 4 | 6 | |||
| docid-32281994.pdf | 157-10002-10154 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | SSCIA | 11/03/1960 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | PARROTT, THOMAS | MINUTES OF SPECIAL GROUP MEETING, 3 NOVEMBER 1960 | 6 | WHITE HOUSE | MEMORANDUM | oct/13/2017 | Box 256Folder 5Exhibit 1 to testimony of Thomas Parrott, 7/10/75 | 7 | ||
| docid-32282019.pdf | 157-10002-10179 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | SSCIA | 05/26/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | R-3053 | COMMITTEE BUSINESS RE: RELEASE OF CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT ON ASSASS. | 40 | SSCIA | TRANSCRIPT | oct/13/2017 | Box 325Folder 11 | 51 | ||
| docid-32282449.pdf | 124-10067-10109 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/22/1969 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-6836 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 1 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 2 | ||
| docid-32282841.pdf | 177-10001-10001 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | LBJ | 00/00/0000 | REPORT | CHAPTER FOUR–PREPARATORY PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES | 3 | DOD | NSF, SUBJECT FILE, KENNEDY DEATH DEFCON PROCEDURES, BOX 20 | août/18/2017 | Doc. #1f, E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.5(a) | 4 | |||
| docid-32284902.pdf | 124-10134-10178 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/30/1955 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 67-494012-NR | HQ | DL | 2 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | MEMO | 2 | |
| docid-32284904.pdf | 124-10134-10180 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/15/1956 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 67-494012-53 | HQ | DL | 5 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | MEMO, INC MEMO | 5 | |
| docid-32284939.pdf | 124-10134-10215 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/26/1958 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 67-494012-72 | HOSTY | HQ | 1 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | LET | 2 | |
| docid-32284940.pdf | 124-10134-10216 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/15/1958 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 67-494012-73 | HQ | DL | 1 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | MEMO | 2 | |
| docid-32285021.pdf | 124-10134-10297 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/25/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 67-494012-110 | DL | HOSTY | 5 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | MEMO, INC ENV, MEMO | 5 | |
| docid-32285164.pdf | 124-10134-10440 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/21/1971 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 67-494012-NR | CALLAHAN | BASSETT | 1 | FBI | HQ | sept/21/2017 | MEMO | 2 | |
| docid-32285330.pdf | 124-10193-10106 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/04/1962 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 134-649-16 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NO | 14 | FBI | NO | août/23/2017 | 14 | ||
| docid-32285610.pdf | 124-10193-10386 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/04/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 137-2409-110, 111 | HQ | NO | 7 | FBI | NO | sept/21/2017 | INC AT | 7 | |
| docid-32287183.pdf | 124-10196-10459 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/11/1971 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 45-10854-146 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 3 | FBI | HQ | août/17/2017 | 3 | ||
| docid-32287188.pdf | 124-10196-10464 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/16/1971 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 45-10854-152, 153, 154, 155, 156 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 11 | FBI | HQ | août/17/2017 | INC 2 A/T, 2 MEMOS | 11 | |
| docid-32287189.pdf | 124-10196-10465 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/26/1972 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 45-10854-1ST NR 156 | ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 7 | FBI | HQ | août/17/2017 | INC LAT RPT | 7 | |
| docid-32287190.pdf | 124-10196-10466 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/09/1971 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 45-10854-2ND NR 156 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, MM | 28 | FBI | HQ | août/17/2017 | INC LHM | 28 | |
| docid-32287196.pdf | 124-10196-10472 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/26/1968 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 149-5378-5 | DIRECTOR, FBI | STOY, THOMAS H. | 124 | FBI | HQ | août/17/2017 | RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 3 | 124 | |
| docid-32287583.pdf | 124-10197-10359 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/30/1969 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 26-419514-1 | DIRECTOR, FBI | LYNCH, TRAVIS L. | 17 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 17 | ||
| docid-32287584.pdf | 124-10197-10360 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/27/1970 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 26-419514-2 | DIRECTOR, FBI | COOK, JOHN W. | 10 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 10 | ||
| docid-32287588.pdf | 124-10197-10364 | 26/10/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/21/1970 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 26-419514-8 | DIRECTOR, FBI | COOK, JOHN W. | 5 | FBI | HQ | août/23/2017 | 5 | ||
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
THE ONLY WEBSITE WITH THE LICENSE TO SPY!
Add note Popular Premium
File Name Record Num NARA Release Date Formerly Withheld Agency Doc Date Doc Type File Num To Name From Name Title Num Pages Originator Record Series Review Date Comments Pages Released
docid-32105709.pdf 178-10004-10309 26/10/2017 In Part KISS/SCOW 06/05/1975 NOTES JUNE 1975 SCOWCROFT, BRENT P/K 5 JUNE 75 3 WH SCOWCROFT MEMCONS, HANDWRITTEN août/18/2017 Participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. Handwritten notes. For typed transcript see ID# 1781000410297. 4
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
In the 2011 report to Congress on Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive provided a baseline assessment of the many dangers facing the U.S. research, development, and manufacturing sectors when operating in cyberspace, the pervasive threats posed by foreign intelligence services and other threat actors, and the industries and technologies most likely at risk of espionage. The 2018 report provides additional insight into the most pervasive nation-state threats, and it includes a detailed breakout of the industrial sectors and technologies judged to be of highest interest to threat actors. It also discusses several potentially disruptive threat trends that warrant close attention.
This report focuses on the following issues
Foreign economic and industrial espionage against the United States continues to represent a significant threat to America’s prosperity, security, and competitive advantage. Cyberspace remains a preferred operational domain for a wide range of industrial espionage threat actors, from adversarial nation-states, to commercial enterprises operating under state influence, to sponsored activities conducted by proxy hacker groups. Next-generation technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Internet-of-Things (IoT) will introduce new vulnerabilities to U.S. networks for which the cybersecurity community remains largely unprepared. Building an effective response will require understanding economic espionage as a worldwide, multi-vector threat to the integrity of the U.S. economy and global trade.
Foreign intelligence services—and threat actors working on their behalf—continue to represent the most persistent and pervasive cyber intelligence threat. China, Russia, and Iran stand out as three of the most capable and active cyber actors tied to economic espionage and the potential theft of U.S. trade secrets and proprietary information. Countries with closer ties to the United States also have conducted cyber espionage to obtain U.S. technology. Despite advances in cybersecurity, cyber espionage continues to offer threat actors a relatively low-cost, high-yield avenue of approach to a wide spectrum of intellectual property.
A range of potentially disruptive threat trends warrant attention. Software supply chain infiltration already threatens the critical infrastructure sector and is poised to threaten other sectors. Meanwhile, new foreign laws and increased risks posed by foreign technology companies due to their ties to host governments, may present U.S. companies with previously unforeseen threats.
Cyber economic espionage is but one facet of the much larger, global economic espionage challenge. We look forward to engaging in the larger public discourse on mitigating the national economic harm caused by these threats.
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Page Count: 11 pages
Date: July 18, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
File Type: pdf
File Size: 508,077 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):E8C62419D5DA3ED97F1429864F6D0A39708D23913F5D09303097A435ACC8DBAA
Goals for a Common Approach to Threat Frameworks
Following a common approach helps to:
• Establish a shared ontology and enhance information-sharing since it is easier to maintain mapping of multiple models to a common reference than directly to each other
• Characterize and categorize threat activity in a straightforward way that can support missions ranging from strategic decision-making to analysis and cybersecurity measures and users from generalists to technical experts
• Support common situational awareness across organizations
Key Attributes and Goals in Building a Cyber Threat Framework
• Incorporate a hierarchical/layered perspective that allows a focus on a level detail appropriate to the audience while maintaining linkage and traceability of data
• Employ Structured and documented categories with explicitly defined terms and labels (lexicon)
• Focus on empirical/sensor-derived ‘objective’ data
• Accommodate a wide variety of data sources, threat actors and activity
• Provide as a foundation for analysis and decision-making
The Common Cyber Threat Framework
• Since 2012, the Office of the DNI has worked with interagency partners to build and refine The Common Cyber Threat Framework reflecting these key attributes and goals
• The Common Cyber Threat Framework is not intended to displace or replace an organization’s existing model which is tailored to its specific mission and requirements; rather, it is intended to:
Serve as a viable Universal Translator (a cyber Esperanto or Rosetta Stone) facilitating efficient and possibly automated exchange of data and insight across models once each has been mapped to it and the mappings shared
Provide a Starting Point featuring a simple threat model and value-neutral concepts. It can be customized for any organization as needed—and any deviations from the common approach are readily apparent, facilitating mapping and data exchange.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
We are Proud Bear. We are collective of Russia GRU agents retrained in fields of digital telephony and Myspace.
For years we help people of England make freedom from the European Union and democracy voting. Here is how:
But why nobody talk of this winning?? Why are friends Boris and Nigel not shouting this from the tabletops?? Why are people of United England not clapping us with loudness??
We don’t know the reasons. So we are asking YOU – friends in Britain – to pay for THE BIGGEST SCREEN BILLBOARD IN SOON-TO-BE-NOT-EUROPE to celebrate our together success. Let’s make big conversation on this important winning.
LET US MAKE GOOD THIS BILLBOARD TO CELEBRATE A RED, WHITE & BLUE BREXIT!
(This billboard is just photoshop picture fake. Together we pay for buy reality billboard in London Waterloo station!)
LET US PAINT THE ENGLAND RED, WHITE AND BLUE!
Deadline for 💰💰💰 is Heroes of the Fatherland Day on December 7, 2018!
High tech totaliser that updates at least once EVERY 24 HOURS!
CHIP IN!
Generous peoples providing their Rubles or Pounds (not Euros) to this noble cause will join the exclusive Proud Bear Supporters Club, bringing untold happiness to all.
Let us shout as one voice:
Happy Brexit! Cheers! Nostrovia! Novichok!
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Page Count: 35 pages
Date: October 4, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Dutch Ministry of Defence
File Type: pdf
File Size: 9,485,284 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):D9055D137D16AF0D58F4F2EB5B9A9094CDAAF18013F13989BE5B3341FCCE099B
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
MEHR ANSEHEN
Officers & Master Clients (2961)
Budiono
A Prabhu
A. Budi Pranoto
AAJ BATAVIA
Aam Dewi Hamidah
Aarti Lohia
Abdul Hadi Ismail
Abdul Rachman
Abdul Rahman
Abdul Rifai Natanegara
Abdul Slam TAHIR
Abdul Slam Tahir
Abdullah Alatas
Abu Djaja Bunjamin
Abu Hermanto Budiono
Achirsyah Moeis
Achmad Fadjar
Achmad faried Joesoef
Achmad Faried Joesoef
Achmad Kalla
Achmad Latief Alwy
Achmad Nugraha Djuanda
Achmad Sandi
Achmad, Sally, Erma and Cindy as joint tenants
ADAM SAUTIN
ADAM SAUTIN
Ade R. Syarief
ADE TJAKRALAKSANA
Ade Tjakralaksana
Ade Tjakralaksana
ADELINA PRASETIO
Adhi Utomo
ADHI UTOMO JUSMAN
ADI BISONO
ADI BISONO
Adi Sasono
Adi Sumito
Adimitra Baratama Nusantara
Aditya Koeswojo
Adji Muljo Teguh
Adnan Kelana Haryanto & Hermanto
ADRI ACHMAD DRAJAT
Adriana Maya Politon
Adryansyah
Afandi Hermawan Oey
Afandi Hermawan Oey and Tjoeng Anna Chrisnadi
Agam Nugraha Subagdja
Ago Harlim
Agoeng Noegroho
Agung Podomoro Group
Agung Salim
Agung Tobing
Agus Djohari
AGUS HARTONO LIE
Agus Lasmono Sudwikatmono
Agus Leman Gunawan
AGUS MAKMUR
Agus Nursalim
Agus Pranoto Setiadi
Agus Purnomo Edhi
Agus Soenong / Intina Wirawan The
Agus Suherman Wirjan
AGUS SUSANTO
Agus Tjandra
AGUS WIDAGDO
Agustinus Prasetio
Agustinus Wishnu Handoyono
AGUSTON MAKMUR
Ahadiat Wargana
AHMAD DIPODITIRO
AHMAD MARDA
Ahmad Rahman Pasaman
Ahmaddin Ahmad
Ahmaddin Ahmad
Ahmaddin Ahmad
AHMADES MIQAILLA
AHSANIL GUSNAWATI
Aida Ishak
AIRIN OKTAVIANY GUNAWAN
Aiwy
Aizid Syafriel Adjam
AIZID SYAFRIEL ADJAM
AJI BAYU WIRROTAMA
Aji Bayu Wirrotama
AJI WIJAYA, SUNARTO YUDO & CO
Akbar Yoso Trisedia
Alan Clark
Alan Clark
Alan Robertson Clark
Alanberg Pte. Ltd.
ALBERT CAHYADI SUKANDADINATA
Albert Kongoasa
Albert Sugianto
Albert Suherman
ALDO PUTRA BRASALI
Alex Ivan Tanoyo
Alexander Hermas Wolfe
Alexander Hermas Wolfe
Alexander Johan Widjaja
Alexander Johan Widjaja
Alexander Thaslim
Alexandra Miksar
Alexandra Miksar and Djoni Aristianto Prasetio
Alexandra Miksar and others
Alfari Narindra
Ali Alimsyah
Ali Alimsyah
ALI CHENDRA
Alice Haryono
ALIEN WIBOWO
Aling Hermawan Oey
Alisyahrazad Hanafiah
Allan Dijaya Keller
Allan Tjahja Tjao
Aluinanto Sandjojo
ALVIN GOZALI
Alwi Alatas
Alwijaya Aw
Amalia
Amalia Aristiningsih
Amaluddin Djambak
AMAN
Ameesh Anand
Amelia Kurniawan
Amelia Mulyono
American Express Bank Ltd (Indonesia)
AMIN HALIM
AMIN SUPRIYADI LIU
AMINOTO SUTANDI
AMINOTO SUTANDY
Amrullah Hasyim
Amrullah Hasyim
Amy Delia
Anak Agung Alit Wiradarma
Anak Agung Gde Agung
Ananda Soewono
ANCE ANGGRAENY
Andang Bachtiar
ANDHIKA ANINDYAGUNA HERMANTO
Andi Achmad Dara
Andi Ahmad Dara and Evi Yulisma Harahap as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Andi Gunawan Wibowo
ANDI PRAVIDIA SALIMAN
Andi Zainal A. Dulung
Andiko Ardi Purnomo
Andre Abdi
Andre Abdi
ANDRE JOHANNES MAMUAYA
Andre S Prijono
Andre Sukendra Atmadja
Andreas Andikha Bunanta
Andreas Kastono
Andreas Kongoasa
Andreas Tjahjadi
Andrew I Sriro
Andrew K. Labbiaka
Andrew McKay
ANDREW MELLON PRIASMORO
ANDREW TANOTO
Andrew Thomas Eriksson
Andrie Setiawan Yapsir
Andry Irwan Djugo
Andry Pribady
Andry Pribady
Andry Setiawan
Andy Nugroho Purwohardono
Andy Soewatdy
Andy Wiryanto Ong
Ang Lian Ping
Ang Rianti
Ang Rosabella Martina
Angela Lestari Widjaja
Angelique Stampfer
Angie Christina
Angus Maclachlan
Angus Nelson Karoll
Ani Sim
Anil Kumar Lachman Panjabi
Anindya N. Bakrie
Anita Kalim
ANITA RATNASARI
Anna Solana Hamami Kadarachman
Anna Sri Dewi Sianto
Annie Halim
ANTHONY BRENT ELAM
Anthony Dominic Byron
ANTHONY KURNIADI
Anthony Salim
Anthony Salim
Anthony Siswanto
Anthony Wijaya
Anton Henning Linderum
Anton Henning Linderum
ANTON KUSUMA
Anton Santoso
Anton Santoso
Anton Santoso and Anita Marta
Anton Sugiono
Anton Tjahjono
Anton Tjahjono
Anton Wiratama
Antonius Mulya Saputri
ANTONY GUNAWAN
Antony Gunawan
Anuj Ralhan
Anwar Lim
ANWAR SAEBE
Apex Oil & Gas Ltd.
Appointcorp Limited
Ardas Dipa
ARDAS DIPA
ARDIANI KARTIKA SARI SUBIANTO
Ardy Wiria
Ari Hardono Suroso
Ari Indra Gautama
Ari Rophian Perdana Ariwibowo
ARI SULISTIO
Arianto Prasetio
Arianto Wisnu Triyatno
Arie Kondang Kresnadi
Arief Prijatna
Arief Santoso
Arief Wiyoso Aswismarmo
Arif and Yvette Suryatenggara
Arif Rachmat
Arifin Yohan
ARINI SARASWATY SUBIANTO
Aris Agung Budiman
Aris Yuwono Ang
Aristotle
Arjen Tridarma Darmawan
Arlehne Purnomo
Arman Sutedja
Armedta Budi Asmara
Armeilia Widayanti Subianto
Arniaty Achmad
ARNIATY ACHMAD
Arta Satria Soebandi
Artha Mitra Interdata
Arthur Andersen & Co. (Indonesia)
Arwan Ahimsa
ARY SURYA
Arya Widjaya
Aryo Bimo Notowidigdo
Aryo Bimo Notowidigdo
ASHWANI CHOWDHRY
Asia Consulting and Investment Limited
ASIA INVESTMENT CAPITAL I LIMITED
Asian Venture Finance Ltd.
ASWADI
Ateng Suhendra
Ateng Sulestio
Atira Aksa
Aubrey Bobb
AURELIA SUPARDI
Aviariananto Sukotjo
Awiek Lestari Rahayu
Aziar Zain
Azir Azwien Jenie
B. Dorpi Parlindungan
Bachrumsyah Hamzah
Baduraman Dorpi Parlindungan
Badurmana Dorpi Parlindungan
Bagus Panuntun
Baldeo Singh
Baldeo Singh
Baldeo Singh
Baldeo Singh
Bambang Hartono
Bambang Irawan Massie
Bambang Niaga Tjiputra
Bambang Rahardja Burhan
Bambang Subianto
Bambang Sugianto
Bambang Suhandi. T, SE
Bambang Sujagad Susanto
BamBang Sumantri
Bambang Tijoso Tedjokusumo
Bambang, Derice Alda, Malcolm Alda and Meyrick Alda Sumantri
Banbang Panutomo
Bank Bira
Bank Centra
Bank Danamon
Barlianto Ronald
Barlianto Ronald
BASIR B. NASIKUN
Basuiki Puspoputro
Batavia Prosperindo Sekuritas
Bayu Irianto
Bayu Prawitasari
Bayu Virgan Triyatno
Beata Ida Hartono
Beatrice El
BEATRICE EL
Belinda Natalia Tanoko
BELLYANAWATY BUDIMAN
Ben Morice
Beng Phiau
Bengt Carl Gustav Thornberg
Benjamin Subrata
Benjamin Subrata, Niluh Rosye Peny Subrata, Emily Ayu Subrata and Karla Dewi Su
Benjamin Wong Siong Yuit
BENNY IRSJAD
Benny Setiawan
Benny Tenges
Benny Tjokrosapoetro
Beny Haryanto
Bernadette Ruth Irawati
Bernie Prajoga
Betty Ang
BHAYANG SURYADIMADJA
Bimo Pramudyo Soekarno
Bimo Surono
Bing Gondosubroto
Bintoro Wong
Bismarka Kurniawan
Blue Ribbon Holding Ltd
Bob Yanuar
Bob Yanuar
Bobby Andhika
Bobby Iman Satrio
Boedi Sampoerna
Boedihardjo Sastro Hadiwirjo, Uki Budi Sulaksani and Atty Boedi Milyarti
Boediyanio Gondotirto
Boelio Muliadi
Boelio Muliadi
BOENJAMIN & POPPY & SANADI & SHINTA
Bong Kiu Nio
Bong Tjen Khun
Bong Tjen Khun and Tjong Njuk Fon
Bonny Budi Setiawan
BOURNIGAUD (ep Williams) Edith Monique, Danielle, Marie
Boy Gemino Kalauserang
Brett Hay
BRIAN KENNETH JOHN DALLAMORE
BRIAN KENNETH JOHN DALLAMORE
Bright City Group Corporation
Bruce William Carpenter
Bruce Williams Carpenter
BUDHI SOEJONO
Budi Arsil
Budi Basuki
Budi Christranto
BUDI DHARMO NOTOWIDJOJO
Budi Enijati Maria Soedjana
Budi Ferdinandus JAPADERMAWAN
Budi Mulio Utomo
Budi Santoso Taruno Sembodo
Budi Setiadharma SH
Budi Sintoro Then
Budi Surjana
Budi Widyadi
Budi Yanto Lusli
Budiarto Karim
Budiarto Karim
Budiarto Karim
Budiawan Jusmin
BUDIJUWONO HANDJAJA
Budiman Effendi
Budiono
Budiono Darsono
Budiono Tanbun Boen
Budy Hartono Santosa
Budyanto Totong
Burhansjah
BUSTAMI
Cakra Ciputra
Calvin Lukmantara
Cameron Robert Knox
Candra Winoto Salim
CANDRA WINOTO, SALIM
Capital Reserves Ltd
CARLOS TARAZONA RAMIREZ
Caroline
Catherine Gina Hambali
Catherine Hambali
CATHERINE YOSHAWIRJA
Cavalier International Group Corporation
Cecilia TEJOWARNO
Celin Tanardi
Chairul Iskandar Zulkarnaen
Chairul Tanjung
Chairul Tanjung
CHAIRUL TANJUNG
Chalid & Partners
Chalid & Partners Law Firm
CHAN HIONG POH
Chan Hiong Poh
Chander Vinod Laroya
Chandler Capital Inc.
CHANDRA EKAJAYA
CHANDRA EKAJAYA
CHANDRA EKAJAYA
CHANDRA EKAJAYA
Chandra Widjaja
CHANG MEI YU
Charles Louis De Queljoe
Charlie Kasim
Charterhouse Limited
CHEAM SOON TEE
Chenry Micron Mor
Chew Say Loo
Chew Say Loo
Chien Cheng, Chieh Yu-Kun and Chieh Chen Hon-Tsu
Chin Chin Chandera
Choo Khee
Choo Ngaw (Choo Kok An)
Choo Tek (@ Choo Chin Tek)
Chris Fong
Chris Newton
Christanto Santoso
Christian Dieter Scholz
Christian Leuchtenberg
Christian Nainggolan
Christian Parlaungan Mulyanto
CHRISTIAN SANDY RACHMAT CHRISTIAN SANDY RACHMAT
Christian Sandy Rachmat
CHRISTIAN SANDY RACHMAT
CHRISTIAN SUGIARTO
Christiana Halim
Christiana Niowni
Christianto
CHRISTIE RUSSELL CARTER
Christina Harapan
Christina Harapan
Christina Sumarlin Pribadi
Christopher Basil Newton
Christopher Carson
Christopher Fong
CHRISTOPHER FONG
Christopher James Garrard
Christopher James Garrard
Christopher Tanuwidjaja
Chu Jackson
Chui Hing Keung
Chung, Sung Chae
Cindy Tanuwidjaja
Citibank, N.A. (Indonesia)
Citrawinda Priapantja
City Harvest Investments Limited
CL Law Firm
Clarence Leonard Stratton
Crescento Hermawan
Dadi Sukarso Yuwono
Damsiruddin Siregar
Dan Brown
Danamon Group Legal
Danan Kadarachman
DANI ISMULYATIE
DANIEL
DANIEL & VERONICA YUWONO YU
Daniel Indra Djajadi
Daniel Kurniawan Lukman
DANIEL MARATHON
Daniel Podiman
Daniel Wewengkang Korompis
Danielle Catharina Willemijn Maria Van Poppel
DANNY JUWONO
Danny Juwono and Linda Liani Janti Senjaya
Danny Nugroho
Danny Nugroho
Danny Tjiu
Danny Tjiu
Dany Subrata
Darjoto Setyawan
Darjoto Setyawan and Tjan Felisa
Darmadi Karjanto Putro
Darmansjah Darsono
DARMAWANSJAH SETIAWAN
Darminto
Darminto Hartono
Darmo Suwito Barwin
Darmoseputro
DARWIN LEO
Darwin Silalahi
Darwin Soegiatto
Darwin Sutanto
Daswi Rayawang
David Alexander Yuwono
David Kristian
David Kuchenbecker
David Myles Falkner
David Nico Sutanto
David Pierre Michael Bakker
David Salim
David Widjaja
David William DONALDSON
David William Magson
DEBBY FEBRIANY GUNAWAN
Deborah Kent Janawati
Dectra (Samoa) Limited
DEDDY HARIJANTO SUDARIJANTO
Dedie Suherlan
DEDY ROCHIMAT
Dendy Kurniawan
Denise Tjokrosaputro
Denise Tjokrosaputro
Denise Tjokrosaputro
Denise Tjokrosaputro
Denny Lim
Denny Rahardja
Denny Suryadinata
Denny Wijaya
Denny Wijaya
Deny Juliarto
Dermawan
DEVI TRI ASMARASARI
Devie Hendrastiti Darmawan
Devin Wirawan
Devy Prasetyo Yuwono Ang
Dewi Garlina Sari
Dewi Indrajani Alimwidjaja
Dewi Kencanawati Natawidjaja
Dewi Livia Sari (Alternate Protector)
Dewi Natalia Lim
Dewi Nilka Sari
Dewi Novianawati
Dewi Suryati Liauw
Dharma Tjitra Widjaja
Dharma Tjitra Widjaja
Dharmadi Budiman
DHARMAWANDI SUTANTO
Dharsono Hartono
Diah Soemedi
Dian Muljani Soedarjo
Dian Sumeler
Diana Husein
Diana Sastrajaya
DIANA WIDJAJA
Dick Leitch
Dicky Herman
DICKY HERMAN
Dicky Kurniawan
Dicky Tjokrosaputro
Dicky Yordan
Didi Ferdinand Korompis
Didit Abdurachman Rustandi
Didit Budijarto
Dina Eldelina Pow
Diniwati
DINO KOESHANDERY
Diono Nurjadin
Dixon Koesdjojo
Djajadi Djaja
Djajadinata Hardjono
Djamaluddin Tanoto
Djamaluddin Tanoto and Limiwaty Lie
Djan Faridz
Djan Faridz
Djan Faridz
Djatmiko Tedjo
Djatmiko Tedjo
Djauhara Faizal
DJERISIN KUESAR
Djie Tjian An
Djie Tjian An and Febe Maryanti Wirjadi as joint tenants with right
Djohan Is Hardjo
Djohan Tjiunardi
Djoko Kartono
Djoko N. Labbaika
Djoko Nirmala Labbaika
Djoko Soesanto Gusti
Djoni Muchsin
Djoni Rion Gui
Djoni Rion Gui
Djoni Rion Gui and Kusnadi Gui as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Djoni Rion Gui and Kusnadi Gui as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Djoni Sukohardjo
Djonny Koesoemahardjono
Djuana Sulestio
Djuffan Achmad
Djumharbey Anwar
Djuniar Tunggal
Doddy Agustiawan Tjahjadi
Dodi Suhartono Abdul Kadir
Dody Lukito Hendrokusumo
Dolly Periagutan Pulungan
Dominique Gallamnn
Dominique Gallmann
Don MacDonald
Doni Irawan
Donny Imam Priambodo
Donny Yoesgiantoro
Doreen Sim
Dorys Setiawati Herlambang
Douglas Vincent Tingey
Dr Hmnm Hasyim Ning
Dr R. Soeparmadi
Dr. Cheam Soon Tee
Dr. Darmadi Goenawan
Dr. Johnny Goenawan
Dr. Kahar Tjandra, Evy Tjandra
Dr. Kahar Tjandra, Evy Tjandra, Nancy Tjandra Muljadi
Dr. Pudji Witomo
DRS ARYANTO AGUS MULYO
DRS J.B NETYAKA
Dunn Fa Chong
Dwiarti Widiyani
East Star Ventures Ltd
EDDI SUGIARDI
Eddie Sudijono
Eddy Daud
EDDY HALIM
Eddy Handoko
EDDY HERMAN
Eddy Hussy
Eddy Iskandar
Eddy Kusnadi Sariaatmadja and Sofie Widjaja Sariaatmadja as joint
Eddy Pramono
Eddy Purwanto
Eddy Purwanto
Eddy Purwanto Lim
EDDY SETIAWAN
Eddy Sindoro
EDDY SUSANTO
Eddy Sutandinata
Eddy William Katuari
Eddy Winata
Eddyanto Hadisurjo
Eddyanto Hadisurjo and Ratna Kurniati Bahana
Edgardo Abelarde Tinsay
EDGARDO ELOY DIAZ FALCONET
Edhie Hardjanto
Edi Firmansyah
Edianto Prasetyo
Edo Djunaydi
Edoardus Ardianto
EDOARDUS ARDIANTO
Edoardus Ardianto
Edoardus Ardianto
Edward Ang
Edward Magnus Lang
Edward Magnus Lang
Edward Magnus Lang / Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Edward Magnus Lang and Kartini Herawati Lang
EDWARD STEPHANUS DJAUHARI
EDWIN MOHTAR
Edwin Muchtar (Mr.)
Edwin Soeryadjaya
Edwin Sugiarto
Edy
Edy Kosasih
Edy Kusnadi
Edy Susanto
Edy Suwarno
Efendi Boedhiman
Effendy Husin
Efrem Wardhana
Eiffel Tedja
EKA SINTO KASIH TJIA
Eko Budianto
Eko Prasetyo Ang
Eko Purnomo
Eko Suharto
EKO SUKAMTO
El Beatrice
Eliani Johan
Eliezer Nugroho Tjandrakusuma
Elisabet Lay
Elisabeth Lintje
Elisabeth Magdalena
Elizabeth Januarti W
Elizabeth Jayne
Elizabeth Jayne
Elizabeth Sindoro
Elizabeth, Alicia, Denise and Michelle as joint tenants with
Eljay Limited
Elke Camillia Kurniawan
Elline Yohan Yau
Elly Koeswandia Tjokronegoro
Elly Lestari Adiutama
Elly Nurlaila Hutabarat
Elly Soepono
Elmursil Moenzir
ELSA DJAUHARI
ELVIN TJANDRA
Elvina Jonas Jahja
Elvira Pudjiwati
Emi Sukiati Lasimon
EMIL ABENG
EMILY STEPHANA DJAUHARI
Emily Waty Setiawan
EMMANUEL LESTARTO WANANDI
Emmy Damayanti
Emy Harjono
Emy Harjono/Andres S, Magbitang jr
Endah Sulistyorini Himawan
Endang Soertikanty
ENDANG SUGIARTI
Endang Sugiarti
Endang Susila BUDI
Endang Susila Budi
Endang Triningsih
Endro S. Wahono
Endy Suryokusumo
Endy Suryokusumo
Enny Lukitaning Diah
Enny Soegiarto
Enny Trang
ENTARIO WIDJAJA SUSANTO
Era Helvani
ERIC HARDONO TIRTAJASA
Erick Djuwadi
Erick Thohir
ERICS YOSHAWIRJA
Erik Setiawan
ERIKA DEBORA DJAUHARI
Erlina Ongoredjo
ERLINA ONGSOREDJO
Erly Tandjung
Erna Widyastuti
ERNAWATI
Erni Gunawan
Ernitha Halim
Erric B. Wibowo
Erric B. Wibowo
Ervin Wijaya
Ervin Wijaya/Shiany Angsana/Andree Wijaya
Erwin Aksa
Erwin Aksa
Erwin Budisantosa
Erwin Ciputra
Erwin Gunawan
Erwin Indra Hamid
Erwin Sasunto
Erwin Sutanto & Wiwiek Kwedarisman as joint tenants
Erwin Tunggul Setiawan
Ery Yunasri
Esther Riawaty Hari
Eugene Trismitro
Eunice Meriati Satyono
Eva Berliana Rosway
EVAN SAMUEL DJAUHARI
EVELYN DJAUHARI
Evelyn Luciana Soeyapto
Evert Jimmy LENGKONG
Evi Hamdani
Evi Wikarsa
Evi Yulisma Harahap
Evie Raviana
EWIK HENDRI
Execorp Limited
F. Franky
Fabian Gelael
Fadjar Endranto
Fahmi Babra
Fahmi Idris
Fahyudi Djaniatmadja
Faisal Panggabean Law Firm
Faisol Soleh Masjkoer
Faiz Shahab
Faizan Abdul Rahan
Fan Chiang, Teng-Chang
Farah Liza
FARINA TADJOEDIN
Farouk Rais
FAS Consulting Asia Pacific Pte Ltd
Fauzi Ezeddin
Fauzi Jahja
Fauzi Jurnalis
Febrina Sari Bak
Febriyanti (Ms.)
Feilie Sulestijani
Felianah Soetemo
Fendi Santoso
Fensa Sofyan
Fenza Sofyan
FERDINAND JOSEF WONGKAREN
FERNANDO ANTONIO GIL
FERRY SUDJONO
Ferry Tenacious
Fida Unidjaja
Fides Pro Consulting (Business Advisory Services)
FIEFIE TJAHJADI
Fifi Indra
FIFI LETY INDRA & PARTNERS
FIFI NOVITA BASARAH KISYANTO
FIFI WIRIADINATA
Financecorp Limited
Finney Henry Katuari
Fiona Adeline Sutanto
Firdaus Siddik
Firman Matondang Silalahi
Fitri Wiriasari
FLORDEN INVESTMENTS S.A.
Florence & James
Florence Wanamurti
Flores Samudro
FOE SIAT KHIUN
Fong Felix
Fong/Aiwy
Fonny Tedjajadi
Foronkid Gunawan
Francisca Citrasari
Franciscus Xaverius Hardianto Tjondro
Frank Taira Supit
Franky Widjoyo
Frans Limas
Fransiscus Antonius S.A
Fransiskus Budhinata
Fransisous Iwo
Freddy H. Suryadiharja
Freddy Ignatius Katuari
Freddy Sumartono Santoso
Freddy SUTJIPTO
Freddyanto Tirtadjaja
Freeport trading Group Limited
Fuad Segayir Alkatiri
G. Lal Agrawala
Gahet Loengara Ascobat
Gahral Sjah
Gaitini Tjokrosaputro
Gan Boot Lian
Gan Chooi Yang
GANDHI BEND
Ganesh Chander Grover
Gareth Joh LEWIS
Garibaldi Thohir
Garibaldi Thohir
Gary Dino Ridwan Sjah
Gary Neal Christenson
Gary Neal Christenson
Gary Neal Christenson
Gary Phair
Gary Phair
Gary Phair (in-active)
Gatot Kariyoso Wiroyudo
Geeta M. Mirpuri
Gemilang Investama
Gen Sik Tjin Tan
Gene Sik Tjin Tan
Geoffrey David Simms
George Christoph Robert Spath
George Nicolas Simanjuntak
George Nicolas Simanjuntak
George Setiyadi
Gerald Rossi
Gerry Aubry
Gerry Prawira Saputra Tjong
Gesang Budiarso
Ginawan Chondro
Ginawan Chondro
Gino Junior Korompis
Giovani Maria Ekaputra Suhari
Gita Irawan Wirjawan
Gita Irawan Wirjawan
Gita Irawan Wirjawan and Yasmin Stamboel Wirjawan
Gita Wirjawan
Gladys Kiong
Glenn Timothy Sugita
GLENN TIMOTHY SUGITA
GLENN TIMOTHY SUGITA
Glenn Timothy Sugita
Glesen Frais Energy Co. Ltd
Go Sek San
Go Siauw Hong
Go Sik Ying
Go Sri Hartati
GODEFRIDUS TAMPUBOLON
Goh Lay Ling
Goh Tie Sin
Graham Daniel Fogarty
GRANDFIELD HOLDINGS GROUP LIMITED
Grant Moon-Tae Kim
Grant McArthur
Grant Moon-Tae Kim
Grant Moon-Tae Kim
Gregorius Petrus Aji Wijaya
Gregory Campbell HINCHLIFE
GT Asia Pacific Funds Management Limited
Guat Tjing Thio
Gunardi Frans Fong
Gunawan Endi
Gunawan Gusti
Gunawan Jusuf
Gunawan Santoso Gwie
Gunawan Subagio
Gunawan Sucahijono Tjoa
Gunawan suteja
Gurker Limited
GW Franklin Hall
H. Sonny Wibisono Widjanarko
H.I. Made Sadha Ardiana
HABIB HUSEIN ALLAYDRUS
HADI GUNAWAN
HADI GUNAWAN AND LYDIA ANGKAWIDJAJA
Hadi Lukman
Hadi Suginawan
Hadi Suginawan & Nurmalasari Suginawan
Hadidarma Kosasih Kho
Hadinata Widjaja
Hadysugani Hoshi
Hadysugani Hosni
Hajato Darsono
HALIFAH SUNJATA
Halim Podiono
Halim Setiabudi Wijono
Han Hai Thon
Han Jung Kuk
HANDAJA SUSANTO
Handaja Susanto
HANDANA HALIM WANAWIJAYA
Handi Gunawan
Handojo Santosa
Handoko Anindya Tanuadji
Handoko Susilo
Handoyo Sutanto
Handrie Wirawan
HANDY PURNOMO SOETEDJO
Handy Sunardio
Hanny Suprayogi
HANNY SUTANTO
Hanny Sutanto
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Jurgen Kaschull
Hans Maramis
Hans Moelyadi
Hansen Suryadi
Hanson Ramli
HARDI KOESNADI
HARDI WARDHANA
Hardy Woosnam
Hari Raharta
Hari Widodo
Hariadien Ratmawati Soeprapto
Harianto Solichin
Harianto, Peh
Harijanto Koesdjojo
Haris
Hariyanto Wijaya Sarwono Lim
Harjanto Kusuma Halim
Harjanto Kusuma Halim & Lisa Ambarwati Dharmawan
HARJOSENO
HARMIONO JUDIANTO
Harris Lasmana
Harry Haslett
Harry Herjanto
Harry Nugroho Prasetyo
Harry Soeria
Harry Susanto
Harry Suwignjo
Hartadi Angkosubroto
HARTADI ANGKOSUBROTO
HARTANTO EDHIE WIBOWO
Harto Djojo Nagaria
Hartono Gunawan
Hartono Sundoro Hosea
Haruhiko
Harun Ibrahim Tajuddin Nur
Hary Djaja and Ratna Endang Hartatiek
HARYADI KUMALA
HARYETTI
Haryono Winarta
Hasan Aula
Hasan Aula and Nina Koswandi
Hasan Dali
Hasan W. W. Krisno
Hashim Djojohadikusumo
HASNURYANI SULAIMAN
Haston Limardo
Hastuti Sulistio
Hawanto Hartono
HAZRIYANDI
Heindrix Liauw
Heindrix Liauw
Helen Turtan Setiawan
Helen Wijaya Ong
Helmut Paasch
Helyuzar
Helyuzar
Hen gky Kunta Adjie
HENDARTA ATMADJA
Hendra Alamsjah
Hendra Basoeki
Hendra Harjadi
HENDRA KOESNADI
Hendra Liem
Hendra Nagaria
Hendra Nagaria
HENDRA NOVA SYAMSU
Hendra Soegiarto
Hendra Tjahyawati
Hendra Tjoa
Hendra Wijaja, Tang Linawaty, Teddy Widjaja, William & Silvia
Hendra Wirajang
Hendra Wirajang
Hendrik
Hendrik Hartono, Hoo
Hendrik Suhardiman
Hendrik Suhardiman
Hendrik Tanojo
Hendrik Tee
HENDRIKO WIJAYA
Hendro Guwanda Sutandi
Hendro Santoso Gondokusumo
Hendro Santoso Gondokusumo
Hendro Santoso Gondokusumo
Hendro Setiawan
Hendro Tjokrosetio
Hendry Lesmana
Hendy Rusli
HENG Ijat Hong
Hengki Sovian
Hengky Tenacious
Henking Wargana
HENKY SUWIGNJO
Henny Kusumawati Tanuhardja
HENNY HARMANI WIRJOSOEKARTO
Henny Harmani Wirjosoekarto
Henny Hartady
Henny Kentjanawati Natawidjaja
henny Kusumawati Tanuhardja
Henny Purnamawati
Henny Santoso
HENNY VICTORIA
Henoch Pradhana
Henrianto Kuswendi
Henrik Antoni Jie and Diana Purnamasari Go and Adi Janitra
Henry Halomoan Sitanggang
Henry Hartono Go
Henry Jahja
Henry Kurli
Henry Kurli and Lin Konggui
Henry Leo
Henry Leo
Henry Liem
HENRY PASCAL TAMPUBOLON
Henry Pribadi
Henry Rudy Zaini
HENRY SUPANNI
Henry Susilowidjojo Njoo
Henry Suwignjo
Henry Wargana
HENRY WIDJAYA
Herdin Syafari
HERIK ANTONI JIE
Herlina
Herlina
Herlinah Soetemo
Herline Goenawan
Herman Afif Kusumo
Herman Gozali
Herman Iskandar
HERMAN ISKANDAR
Herman Iskandar, Khoe Ay Hwa & Seraphine Volkani Iskandar
Herman Karmana
Herman Moeliana
Herman Nagaria
Herman Nagaria
Herman Wijaya, Yuliana Kusno, Lenny, Rudy and Joni Wijaya
Herman Y.S. Gunawan (Mr. )
HERMAN, ETI, IVAN & ASTRID
Hermani Soeprapto
HERMANSJAH TAMIN
Hermanto Tangkau Adrian
HERMIJANTO TOTO
HERRY KARYANING CIPTO
Herry Mirza Putera
Herry Mirza Putera
Herry Wibowo
HERTONO RICHARD PRAJITNO
HERU HIDAYAT
Heru Soesanto Gusti
Heru Sucahyo
Herumanlo Zaini
Hesti Femi Nugraheny
Hesye Silya Mamesah
Hetty Heryati Sumantri
Hetty Indrakasih Soetikno
HIANG.TJE
HIANTO DHARMAPUTRA SUNARDY
Hilary Richard Bolton
Hilary Richard Bolton
Hilda Noveda Kaliman
Hilmi Panigoro
Hilton King
Hilton R. King
Himawan & Associates
Himawan Surya
Hindarta Sanjaya
HINDARTA SANJAYA
Hindarto Budiono
HINDARTO SUHARDJO
Hioe Isenta
Hioe Isenta
Hioe Isenta
Hioe Isenta and Ivy Lianawati
Hiramsyah Sambudhy Thaib
Hiswara Natawindjaja
Ho Mie Ling
Ho Mie Ling
Ho Mie Ling
Ho Sze Wah
Hoediono Kweefanus
HOESEN GUNAWAN
Honey Angkosubroto
Honey Angkosubroto
Hong Usman Effendy
HONGKIE WIDJAYA KANG
Horas Chu Naga
HOSEA HADELI
Hotman Naiborhu
Houston Jusuf
Hubertus Setiyadi
Hudi Janti
Hunarti Gosal
HUSIN CHANDRA
Husin Sariman and Dewi Ngadiman
Husin Suliawan
Husni Muchtar
Husodo Angkosubroto
Husodo Angkosubroto
Hutabarat, Halim & Rekan
I Gusti Ngurah Adi Suputra
I MADE DJENDRA
I Nengah Bagiada
I Nyoman Djintji
I Wayan Arya
I. Goesti Ben Kel Bagoes Oka
IAN DONALD MACAULAY
Ibrahim
Ibu Rahmawaty
Ichsan Rizal
ICHSANUDDIN NOORSY
Ida Bagus Made Putra Jandhana
Ida Budisusetyo
Ie Kian Tjoan
Ie Mila Setiawaty
Ie Mila Setiawaty
Ignanto Sandjojo
IGNATIUS JOE BUDIMAN
Ignatius Toni Gunawan
IING YOSHAWIRJA
Ilham Akbar Habibie
Ilham Akbar Habibie
IMA ENDANG PRAYANTI GARIBALDI
Ima Tjahjadi Tjhang
IMAM MUHADI ROWI
Iman Tamin
Imelda Dharma
Imelda Dharma
Ina Irena Jonas Jahja
Inayat Ali Badruddin
Inda Aryanti Imanto
Indah Djuita Tjatursari
Indahwaty Hartono
Indawan Saputra Hatta
Indawati
Inder Singh
Indra Gunawan
Indra Gunawan Wonowidjojo
Indra Makmur
Indra Muliadi Sugiharto
Indra Widjaja
Indrajaty Hadiwardojo
Indrawati Sampoerna
Indriani Harsono
INDRIENA YUDHAYANTI BASARAH
Indro Wibowo
INGRID WILIANTO
Ir. Danny Walla
Ir. Hagianto Kumala
Ir. Rudyanto Hardjanto
IRAWAN HADIKUSUMO
Irawan Kurniadi Tjandra
Irawan Sutandinata (Mr.)
Irawan Widjaja
Irene Maya Hambali Ishak
Irene Maya Hambali Ishak
Irene Susanto Adikoesoemo
Irene Tedja
Iriawan Suharyanto
Irma Mirzanti
IRMAYANI PUJIASTUTI
Irmayani Pujiastuti
Iroshita Arsyafira
IRSANTO ONGKO
Irsanto Ongko
IRVAN YUSRIZAL GADING
Irvinia Megawati Saddak
Irwan Atmadja Dinata
Irwan Hermanto
Irwan Santoso Chandra
Irwan Siregar
Irwan Siregar
Irwandy Ma Rajabasa
Isenta Hioe
Ishak Sumarno
Iskandar Tanuwidjaja
Ismail Hirawan
Ismail Hirawan
ISMAN AYUB
Istini Siddharta
Istini Tatiek Siddharta
Itjendri Suitono Thio
Ivan Budiono
IVAN HENRY
Ivan Setiawan Tan
Ivantara Dviyudha
Ivantara Dviyudha
Ivonny Budiono
IVY LIANAWATI
Iwa Sewaka
Iwan Dewono Budi Juwono
Iwan Hardja
Iwan Margana
Iwan Margana
Iwan Rosadi Widyapranolo
Iwan Ruwiyadi
Iwan Samsuddin
Iwan Valiant Joesoef
Iwan Valiant Joesoef, Marwan Arie Joesoef and Nurfadh Subhan Joesoef
J. C. Gosa
Jackson Chu
Jacky Afandi
Jacky Soerya Santoso
JACOB ANTUNG KANG
Jacob Soetoyo
Jacobus Busono
Jacobus Busono Prawiroredjo
Jacqueline Tjahjadi
Jacub Johannes The
Jahja Santoso
Jahja Santoso
Jahja Santoso and Johana Poedjokerto
Jahjaa Soetoyo
Jajat Priatna Purwita
JAMES BUDIONO
James C. Haebig
James Eric Zaini
James Kallman
James Preston TRUESDELL
James Rachman Adjimin
James Steven Kallman
James T. Riady
James Thomas Henry Arthur
James Tjahaja Riady
Jamin Soetoyo
Jamin Tjandra
Jan Adam Tangkilisan
JAN TRIANA JOHANES
JAN TRIANA JOHANES, YULIANA JOHANES, WINDY MARLINA, OMAR AZHARI, NURDIN HASJIM JOHANES and OKTAVIA DEWI TIRTA as joint tenants
Janni
JANSEN WIRAATMAJA
JANTI JAHJA
Jap Carmen
JAP HARTONO & SANTY MULJAWANA
Jap Johanes
JAP, SOEGIONO
Jason James Raymond
JAYANTI SARI
Jeannie Widjaja
Jeffery Freshen Sihombing
Jeffery Koes Wonsoo
Jeffrey Hartono
Jeffrey Iuwena
Jeffrey K. Wonsono
Jeffrey Koes Wonsono
Jeffrey Sugianto
JEMMY ROMMY PONTOH
Jendrawasih Jenni
Jeniawati
Jennie Widjaya
Jenny Elisabeth RG
JENNY WIDJAJA
JENTY
Jeremy David Kemp
Jessy Vishamkar Adnani
JIALIPTO JIARAVANON
JIALIPTO JIARAVANON
Jim Truesdell
Jimmy Budhi
JIMMY BUDIARTO
JIMMY HARTONO LIE
JIMMY HENRICUS KURNIAWAN LAIHAD
Jimmy Namara
Jimmy Samantha
Jimmy Suryanto Budhi
Jimmy Tjahjanto
Jimmy Welianto Siauw
Jimmy Ziepo Setiawan
JIO TIEN CAROLYNA
Jiohan Sebastian
Jo Andreson Wiharjo
Jo Gasyanto
Jo Liat Tjiang
Jo Souw Koan
Jo Tjin Khoen
Joachim U. Rohn
Joachim Ulrich ROHN
Joachim V. Rohn
Jocelin Yohan Yau
Jodi Haryanto
Joe Su Fun
Joeliardi Sunendar
Joesril Hainim
JOGI HENDRA ATMADJA
Johan Alexander Supit
JOHAN ARIFKAJA ADI LESMANA
JOHAN SOEDIBJO
JOHAN T. GILBERT
Johan Tandean
Johana Poedjokerto
JOHANAS HERKIAMTO
JOHANES GUNAWAN
Johanes Kennedy Aritonang
Johanes Susilo
JOHANES TANG WIDJAJA
Johannes Goenawan
JOHANNES HALIM
Johannes Oentoro
Johannes Setijono and Indriyati
Johannes Tanuwijaya
John (Lam) Kosasih
John Franklin
John Gordon McFadzien
JOHN HUGH LESTER
John Hugh Lester
John Joseph Franklin
JOHN TODD BONNER
John Williem Vanderwal
Johnlee Mailoa
Johnnie Hermanto
JOHNNY
Johnny Wiriawan
Johnny Wiriawan
JOHNSON WILLIANG SUTJIPTO
JOHNSON WILLIANG SUTJIPTO
JOHNSON WILLIANG SUTJIPTO
JOHNSON WILLIANG SUTJIPTO
Johny Lisangan
Johny Surjana
Joice
Joice
Joko Himawan / Paul Himawan
Jonas Jahja
Joni Yoesoef
Jopie Widjaja
Joppy Robert Saerang
Jos Parengkuan
Jos Winata Wihardja
Jose R. Hanna
Josef Indra Njoman
Josep Lay
Josep Susanto Kiswandono
Joseph Dharmabrata
Joseph Donald Charles Buddy
Joseph Tjakra/Ms Margaret
Josephyne Widjaja
Joso Ramli
Jovanka Mardova
JOYCE HANDAJANI
JOYNER OVERSEAS INC.
Jozef Darmawan Angkasa
Juanda Lesmana Lauw
JUANDY WIJAYA
JUANITA DESIREE TAMPUBOLON
Judca Herlina Hansoehardi
Judi Gunawan
Juliana Kusnandar
Juliana Ong Pei I
Julianna Yohan
Juliati Widjaja
Juliati Widjaja
JULIATI WIDJOJO
Juliawati Budiman
JULIE MULYA JIAUW
Junanda Syarfuan
Junanda Syarfuan / Bobby Andhika
Juni Setiawati Wonowidjojo
Junita Ciputra
JUNIUS WIJAYA
Junty
Junus Jen Suherman
Junus Jen Suherman & Juliana Kusnandar
Junus Siswadi
JURNALIS & PONTO LAW FIRM
Jusak Hadi Wardojo
Justian Suhandinata
Justin Barney GOFF
Justin Breheny
Justo Padilla Nestro
JUSUF
Jusuf Handri Rachmantio
Jusuf Heryanto
Jusuf Salman
Jusuf Tanuwidjaja
Jusup Budihartono Prajogo
Jusup Susanto Djunaidi
Juwita Lianty Suandi
Jyoti Lekhraj Budhrani
JYOTI LEKHRAJ BUDHRANI
K MELBOURNE BREAU
K.P. Irwan Kartawijaya
Kaizer Management Ltd
KAKAN SUKANDA DINATA
Kalim
Kam Lie Giok
Kama Putra Kusdianto
KAMAN HALIM
Kamlesh Ishwardas
KANG ARIES FUKSAR
Kang Rita Sadeli
Kang Rita Sadeli and Song Wen Shyu
Kanisha Sunil Mirpuri
Kardaya Warnika
Kardja Rahardjo
KARTA WIGUNA
Kartini Fahmi Idris
Karuna Murdaya
Kasiviswanathan Prakash
Katharina Wihardja
Katini Dewi
Katleen Yangrikho Gui
KAZAN GUNAWAN
Ken Leksono Sedianto
KEN LEKSONO SEDIANTO
Ken Ng
Kendra Soegandha
Kenneth R. Wynn
Kenneth R. Wynn
Kezia Putri Aprilya Kusdianto
Khairul Saleh
KHOE AY HWA
Khou Lim Ngo
KHOU LIM NGO
Kiki Barki
Kiki Kiftiah
Kiki Sutantyo
Kim Doo Young
Kim Sung Kook
Kim Sung Kook (Mr)
Kimberly Ananto
KIMIN TANOTO
Kindarto Kohar
Kirk D. Evans
Kirk David Evans
Kitty Joantina Wulanda
KITTY TJIOE
Kiyomi Sato
Ko Rudy Oetomo
Kokarjadi Chandra
Kokarjadi Chandra
Koko Poernomo Santoso
Kokos Leo Lim
Kompleks Perkantoran
Kris Widjojo
Krishan Kulmar Ralhan
Krishan Kulmar Ralhan
Krishnan Sjarif (Mr)
Krisnadi Gautama
KRISNO ABIYANTO, SOEKARNO
Kristanto Wibowo Siswanto
Kristina Minto
Kumalasari Tjiong
Kurniati Phan & Jusuf Budi Wijoto as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Kurniawan Nurdin Karim
Kusdianto Soewarno
Kusdianto Soewarno
Kusdianto Soewarno
Kusnadi Budiman
Kusnan Kirana
Kusnandar & Co.
Kusuma Hadi Soetemo
Kusumawati
KUSUMO ABUJONO MARTOREJO
Kusumo Purwanti Dewi
Kwee Suo Chie
Kwok Moi Moy
L & P Capital Investments & Corporate Advisory
Laksamana Sukardi
Lakshmi Harris Lasmana
LAKSMI PRATIWI DALLAMORE
Lam Mang Ying
Lam Toi Lai
Lambertus Nuryono
Lambertus Somar
Lanasari Halim
Lanny Lanawaty
Lanny Tanzil
Lanny Widjajanti
Lao Rusming
Lauw Samuel Lawrence
Law Office CCN & Associates
Lawrence Barki
Lawrence Barki
Lawrence Barki
Lay Sioe Ho
Le Purna Harjani
LE PURNA HARJANI
Leda Magdangal Tamin
LEDRES BALMACEDA MARIO
Lee Chuck Soo
Lee Yick Cheung
Leman Hadi Soetemo
Lenny Wijaya
Leny Anwar
Leny I. Wangsawidjaja
LEONARD PANDY PHUA
Leonardus Eko Daru Lumadyo
Lestariono
Letty Johan
Levi Octavia Soewarna
Lianawati Setyo
LIANNY HARYONO
Liauw Sumiati
Lidwina Lindawati Kartiko
LIE SIE GIEM
Lie Soemarli
Lie Tjauw Mian
Lie Tjin Ming
Liem Hadi Mualim
Liem Johan Halim
Liem Kong Shiung
Liem Kong Shiung
LIEM SIN HUANG
Lies Kusumawati
Lijatini Setiono
LIKE RANI IMANTO RACHMAT
LIKE RANI IMANTO RACHMAT
Likin Handoko
LiLi Ashari
Liliana Budi Santoso
Liliana Budi Santoso and Willy Gunawan
Liliana Wibisono
Liliawati Rahardjo
Lily Ciarensia Tjia
Lily Lawandra
Lily Marjani Pribadi
Lily Solaiman Sutantyo
LILY TAMIN
LILY TAMIN
Lily Yuliani Halim
Lilyani Tanoko
Lilys Tjiawi
Lim Arie Sasmita
Lim Budi Susetyo
LIM EDDY PURNOMO
Lim Eng Khim
Lim Fie Tjong
Lim Fie Tjong
LIM LIMMAN NUGROHO
Lim Lys Erty
Lim Soon Huat
Lim Tjung Luong
Limanto
LIMIWATY LIE
Lin, Yu-Cheng
Lina Gunawan
Lina Harjanti Latif
LINA KURNIAWAN
Lina Soegiharto Leo
LINAWATI SOEJANTO
Linawidjaja Kusprajudi
Linda Hakim
Linda Lauw
LINDA LIANI JANTI SENJAYA
Linda Marlina Isatyawan
Linda Marlina Isatyawan, Edy Kosasih
Linda Ng
LINDA RACHMAT
LINDA RACHMAT
Linda Sidharta
Linda Tanuwiradjaja
Linda Tjahja
Lindawaty Hartono
Lisa Ambarwati Dharmawan
LISA MARDIANI GUNAWAN
Lisa Sundoro Hosea
LISA WIDJAJA
Lisawati Soegiharto
Lista Adriani
Listyani Setijawati Sidik
LIZA WIDAYATI PRADJONGGO
Loa Djin Sui
Loa Sui Hong
Lovri Ricarda
Lucas
Lucas and Lenny Patricia Halim Liem
Lucia Mogi
Lucia Mogi
Lucia Mogi & Others
Lucia Sungkoro
Lucky Tjahaja Diputra Prawiro
Lukas Masehi
Lukman Ahmad Mahfoed
Lukman Hakin
Lukman Herry Latip
LUKMAN TACHJADI
LUKMAN TACHJADI
Lukman Tirtaguna
Lukman Tirtaguna
Lum Weng Loy
Lunardi Basuki
Lunardi Basuki & Sasongko Basuki & Basuki
Lusi Murniati Gunawan
Lusi Windayati
LYDIA ANGKAWIDJAJA
LYDIA TJIPTO
LYNDA TJANDRA BRASALI
Lys Erna Ontjeng
M. A. Ismail Ning
Madampath Sathibal Menon
Madampath Sathibal Menon
Made Oka Masagung
Maggie
Mahesa Alit Pramesty
Mahesa Alit Pramesty (Mr.)
Mahhesa Alit Pramesty
Maiko Kawano
Makarim & Taira
Maly Widoyo
Managecorp Limited as a Trustee of Westend Holdings Trust
MANGGI TARUNA HABIR
MANIWANEN
Marcella Magdalena
Marcellus Charles Colondam
Marcellyna Junita Widjaja
Marcellyna Junita Widjaja
Marco Baldini
Margareth Maria Regina Budhiparama
Margaretha Natalia Widjaja
Margaretha Natalia Widjaja
Maria Karmila
Maria Karmila
Marilyn Caracas
Marilyn Caracas
Mario Christy
Mario Satya Pratomo
Mark Patrick Hanusz
Markun
Markus Parmadi
Marluce Tio Indriati Santoso
Marten Liu
Martin Wijaya Ng
Martina M. Sudwikatmono (Co-Trustee)
Martina M. Sukwikaimono
Martinus Arief Limandoko
Marvin C S Yong
MARY GANASUTRISNA
Maryati Benniardi Imanto
Masayu Pangestu
Masterclass Ltd
Mathilda Stephanie
Mathilda Stephanie
MATTHEW JOSEPH GEORGESON
Matthew S. Deayton
Maxymilian Adelberd
MAYA HARTONO
MEDINA LATIEF
Meena
MEENA
Megawati Setiadi
Mei Ing
Meigawaty Soejatno
Meiliana Widjaja
Meiriana Soetoyo
Meiriani Soetoyo
Meiriaty Soetoyo
Meity Subianto
Meizar Suyardi
MELIAWATI SURJASARI
Melina Jonas
Melisa Patricia Tanoko
Melissa Ong
Melly Kristanti
Melvin
Melvin Salim (Mr.)
Mende Sulinadi
Meranti Handajani Serad
Meridian Pacific Trading Ltd
Mermeden Ltd
Mermeden Ltd
Merry
MESLIN Bertrand Marie Jacques
Metta Margaretha Murdaya
Miana Dwilasmini Sudwikatmono
MICHAEL ATMAN
Michael D. Twomey
Michael Dharmawan Euslim
Michael Gan
Michael Goenawan
Michael Goenawan
Michael Jackson Purwanto Widjaja
Michael Jackson Purwanto Widjaja
Michael Mary Mackay Seward
MICHAEL PATRICK DONNELLY
Michael Rusli
Michael Seabrook
Michael Steven
Michael Steven and Ingrid Kusumodjojo
Michael Tjahjadi
Michael Twomey
Michael Wijaya Goutama
Micheal Tjahjadi
Michel Vicky Tumiwang
Michelle Tjokrosaputro
Michelle Tjokrosaputro
Mieke Santosa
Milany Terianto Luwena
Mimin Aminah
Minny Riady
Mintardjo Halim
Mintardjo Halim
Mira SAVIRA
Mira Savira
Mirah Amiria Adhyaksa
Miranda Tedjasaputra
Miranti Handajani Serad
ML&B Indonesia
Mochamad Adnan
MOCHAMAD RAIS
Mochammad Anwar
Mochtar Riady
Moernoto Reksonegoro
Mohamad Noer
Mohamad Abdullah Jasin and Dewi Kam
Mohamad Abdullah Jasin and Dewi Kam
Mohamad Abdullah Jasin and Dewi Kam
Mohamad Abdullah Jasin and Dewi Kam
Mohamad Iskandar
Mohamad Noer
Mohammad Hidayat Hasan
MOHAMMAD LENDI BASARAH
Mohammad Mas Pendi Soleh
Mohammad Noah Haji
Mohan N. Mirpuri
MOHIT RAMCHAND VASWANI
Monalita Kardono Soegiarto
Monica Yoanita Octavia
Morgan Tjoe
Morgan Tjoe
Motinggo Soputan
Motinggo Soputan
Mr Arifin Yohan
Mr Aris Sunarko
Mr Burhansjah
Mr Koh Tji Beng
Mr Liem Henry
Mr Marimutu Siniran
Mr Nono Fadjartyassasono Padmodimuljo
Mr Ulian Napsiah
Mr Welly
Mr William Goenawan
Mr. Eddy Goenawan
Mr. Salim Aziz Mochdar
MR. THOMSON
Mrs Josephine Budi Santoso
Mrs Lina Ovani
Mrs Masiana Wijaya & Fam.
Mrs Theresia Noerpeni Padmodimuljo
Ms Affin
MS Group
Ms Rohani Indahsi
MS Taxes
Ms. T.Handayani Andokho
MUCHSIN CIPUTRA TJOE
Muddai Madang
Mugijanto Sugijono
Muhammad Agus
Muhammad Aksa Mahmud
Muhammad Alatas
Muhammad Andre Pasha Djuanda
Muhammad Ikbal
Mulianto Api Tanaga
Mulianto Api Tanaga
Mulianto Tanaga
Muljadi Budiman
Muljadi Irawan
Muljadi Irawan
Muljana Husodho, Tintje Jusran, Fransisca Haller, Andreas Husodho & Danni Arton
Multi-Holdings Group Ltd
Mulyadi Anggono
MUNKLEY Christopher James
Murdaya Widyawimarta
MUSTIKO SALEH
Mustofa
MYRNA ESTHER CONTRERAS DE NAVARRO
Myrna Putri Pribadi
NA NA
Nam Yong Hwa
NANCY NARSIS RUNTUWENE
Nancy Urania Rachman Latief
Nani Indraswati Alimwidjaja
Nanik Santoso
Naresh Kumar Modi
Nasir Saleem Haji
Natalie Ong
Natalie Tjahjadi
Nathalia Setiawan
National Management Ltd
Nazamudin Latief
Nazarudin Kiemas
NELSON SAPUTRA
Nestor Padilla
Netcorp Securities Limited
NG ANTON WIJAYA
NG JE TJIEN
Ng Kee Yeok
Ng Soat Go
Ng Tje Suang
Ngadimun
Ngu Hew Tak
NI MADE JATI
Nia Soniati Wityasmoro
Nicholaas Bernardus Tirtadinata
Nicholas James GRAHAM
Nico Krisnanto
Nigel Brett Eaton
Niko Listya Prabowo Se
Nila Fatina
Nilayanti
Nini Djajasaputra
Niniek Haryani
Ninik P. Nathan
Nio Yantony
Nixon Jacobus Silfanus
Norbert Alois Meixner
Norbert Alois Meixner
Nordiansyah Nasri
NORTHSTAR EQUITY PARTNERS LTD.
Northstar Pacific Partners Pte Ltd
Nova Chandra
Nova Negara Silaban
Nova Yudhanto Mugiyanto
Novi Ariyunida Dharma
Novi Nenolaswaty
Noviani Eka Susanto
Nugraha Tirtanata
Nugroho Halim Wijaya
Nur Zain
NURBAITI
NURDIN HASJIM JOHANES
Nurmalasari Suginawan
NUROCHIM
Nursalim Podiono
NYOMAN SARIMIN
Octarina Ratih Damayanti
Octarina Ratik Damayanti
Oei Denny Kurniawan
Oei Denny Kurniawan
Oei Harry Lukmito
Oentoro Surya
Oerip Wirontono
Oesman Sapta
OETIE HERMAWAN
Oey Aling HERMAWAN
Okkie Adhika Tirta Monterie
Omar Azhari
Omar Putihrai
Ong Ju Chi
Ong Mei Sian
Ong Thiam Hok
ONG TIONG YUN
Ong Wen Nio
Ongko Multicorpora
Ongkowijoyo Onggowarsito
OSBERT KOSASIH
Oscar Gonzalo Guedez Machado
P. T. ARPENI PRATAMA OCEAN LINE, Tbk
P. T. Asuransi Jiwa Sewu New York Life
P.T Arpeni Pratame Ocean Line
P.T Dwi Satrya Utama
P.T. Charoen Pokphand Indonesia
P.T. Detra Marina
P.T. Duta Sewa Raya
P.T. Elnusa
P.T. Ever Shine Tex
P.T. Fusenindo
P.T. Grahamakmur Wiratama
P.T. ICC Indonesia
P.T. Interindo Global
P.T. Kaltimex Energi
P.T. Lippo Industries
P.T. Lippo Pacific Finance
P.T. Nugra Santana
P.T. Ometraco Cipta Sarana
Pacific Financial Services
Pacific Overseas Trading Corporation
Pacific Trading & Development Ltd. (BVI)
Pacmas Limited
PANDJI SURYA SOERJOPRAHONO
PAO TJEN KANG
Para Group
Parveen Gandhi
Pat Stratton
Patrick Morris Alexander
Patrick Walujo
PATUN YUDISTHIRA ARITONANG
Paul Banuara Silalahi
Paulis Amin Djohan
Paulis Amin Djohan
Paulus Johanes
PAULUS THIO
Payal Vijay Goklani
Pe Sioe Kim
Peaceland Holdings Ltd
Pedro Limardo
Pek Teng Beng
PER-GUNNAR THURESSON
Permadi
Pernardi Djojosudirdjo
Perseroan Terbatas
Perumahan Tegal Indah Permai
Peter Anthony Wallace
Peter BOWDEN
Peter Markart
Peter Vinzenz Merkle
Petrus Budiman Gho
Petrus Budiyanto
Phang Chin Liat
PHILIP PRIASMORO
Philip Strachan Attwood
Philip Tjandra
PHOA HERMANTO SUNDJOJO
Phoenix Holdings Trading Inc.
Phoenix Holdings Trading Inc.
Piet Wijaya
Pieter Tanuri
Pinardi
Piong Denisse Lucia
Pipin Arifin Linggawidjaja
Pirngady Adhi Wicaksono Himawan
PITER KOROMPIS
Pitra Wiria
Poniman
POPPY HADIMAN
Poppy Tumengkol
Portcullis Institute Pte Ltd
Portcullis Nominees (BVI) Limited
Portcullis TrustNet (BVI) Limited
Portcullis TrustNet (Samoa) Limited
Pra Ciputra
Pradeep Dudaney
Pradeep Dudaney & Soniya Dudaney
Pradono Joko Trajutrisno Himawan
Prakash Mohanlal Panjabi
Prakash Mohanlal Panjabi and Vidhya Prakash Panjabi
Prakoso Eko Setyawan Himawan
Pramudji Suginawan
Praptono Budhi Haksomo Himawan
Prasetio, Utomo & Co
Prasodjo Winarko
Prayitno Cipto Anggoro Himawan
Prayugi Sukardjo
Prem Ramchand Harjani
Pri Wono
Prijono Winarko
Primanaga Hartanto Kalim
Priyatno Sulisto
Priyatno Sulisto
Proboraras Mudoyo
Protasius DARITAN
PSP Group
PT Agung Sedayu Permai
PT Agung sedayu Propertindo
PT Aiti Investment
PT Anugra Cipta Investa
PT Argapura Wira Kencana
PT Asia Securities Limited
PT Astra International Limited
PT Astratel Nusantara
PT Asuransi Jiwa Sequis Life
PT Bahana Securities
PT Bakrie & Brothers
PT BAKRIE CAPITAL INDONESIA
PT Bimantara Citra
PT Bira Aset Manajemen
PT Cameron Chisholm Nicol
PT Central Total Finance
PT CENTRANUSA INSANPURNAMA
PT Centronix
PT Cikarang Listrindo
PT Cipta Imajinasi Disain
PT CIPTADANA CAPITAL
PT Ciputra Development TBK
PT COMETA CAN
PT Danatama Makmur
PT Dayabangun Persada
PT Detik Ini Juga
PT Dwibras Darma
PT Energi Mega Persada Tbk
PT Energi Mega Persada Tbk
PT ENERGI TIMUR JAUH
PT EPHINDO
PT Galib Instalindo Utama
PT Garuda Metalindo
PT Gema Nuansa Persada
PT Global Consulting Indonesia
PT Global Multi Investama
PT Gra Tiara Imaji
PT Great Giant Pineapple Co.
PT Gunung Sewu Kencana
PT Hanjaja Mandala Sampoerna Tbk.
PT Hasnur Coal Terminal
PT Hikmah Albros
PT Hitawasana Luhur
PT Imbang Tata Alam
PT Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Tbk
PT Inti Permata Nusantara
PT J.CO Donuts & Coffee
PT Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk
PT JASTRINDO DINAMIKA
PT Jembatan Kapita Utama Corporate Advisor
PT Jenshiang Nusantara Textile Chemical Industrial
PT Kencana Gula Manis
PT Lippo Bank
PT Lippo Karawaci, TBK
PT Manggala Adhikara
PT MEDCO E & P BANGKANAI
PT Media Intertel Graha
PT Media Karya Sentosa
PT Mitra Andalan Mandiri
PT Moores Rowland Indonesia
PT Niaga Langgeng Sejahtera
PT Ningz Pacific
PT Odira Energy Persada
PT Ogspiras Basya Pratama
PT Omega Propertindo
PT Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk
PT Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk
PT Pelayaran Tamarin Sumudra
PT Penilai Wahana Caraka
PT PERTAMINA (PERSERO)
PT PP London Sumatra Indonesia, Tbk
PT PriceWaterhouseCoopers FAS
PT Rajawali Corpora
PT Rajawali Corporation
PT Recapital Advisors
PT Renaissance Capital Asia
PT Rindaco Prima Sakti
PT Sainath Industrial Corp Ltd
PT Saptapusaka Investama
PT SAS INTERNASIONAL
PT SAS INTERNATIONAL
PT Sentra Kharisma Indah
PT Simplot Agritama
PT SKEYE
PT Sriagung Cahya Sakti
PT Supraprima Sistem Sekusiti
PT Suryaraya Gatratama
PT Tiwi Utomo Investama
PT Trans Nusantara Multi Construction
PT Trijaya Pratama Future
PT Tripar MultivisionPlus
PT TUNAS HARAPAN PERKASA
PT Udinda Telesis
PT Widari Securties
PT Wizoffice Indonesia
PT. 2morrowland Indonesia
PT. Akraya International
PT. ALAM TRI ABADI
PT. Askomindo Dinamika
PT. Astra Graphia Tbk
PT. Astra International, Tbk
PT. Bakrie Interinvestindo
PT. BUMI PERTIWI KENCANA
PT. Cikarang Listrindo
PT. Citra Nusa Insan Purnama
PT. Citrabumi Sacna
PT. Citrabumi Sacna
PT. Delta Nusantara
PT. DWI PRIMA SEMBADA
PT. EATERTAINMENT INTERNATIONAL Tbk
PT. Ekatama Prima Sejati
PT. FAISALINDO SAKTI
PT. Ge Ka Jaya
PT. Global Petronusa
PT. INDOGAS KRIYA DWIGUNA
PT. Indonesia Transit Central
PT. Inti Brawijaya
PT. INTIM PERKASA
PT. Karisma Nata Rucitra
PT. Kasogi Internasional Tbk
PT. Long Haul Indonesia
PT. LONG HAUL INDONESIA
PT. Maetro Internasional
PT. MAHAKAM NUSA ENERGI
PT. Murni Cipta Sentosa
PT. Ometraco Corporation
PT. Pelita Cengkareng Paper
PT. RADIAS BINTANG TIMUR
PT. Santos Jaya Abadi
PT. SRIREJEKI PERDANA STEEL
PT. Surabaya Agung Industri Pulp & Kertas Tbk.
PT. Toba Pulp Lestari tbk
PT. TOPAS MULTI SECURITIES
Pudjiastuti Binti Soemarno
Pudjiono Iwansantoso
Pujiastuti Elizabeth Sindoro
Pujiastuti Elizabeth Sindoro
PURNAMA WIDJAJA
PURNAMAWATI PURWADI
Purnardi Djojosudirdjo
Purwadi Hendropurnomo
Purwoso Warsito Utomo Himawan
RABOBANK INTERNATIONAL
Rachana Bhansali
Rachmat Basuki Alimwidjaja
Rachmat Gobel
RACHMAT GUNAWAN
Rachmat Mulyana Hamami
Rachmat Santoso Alimwidjaja
Rachmat Susantyo
RACHMAT SUTIONO
Rachmat Sutiono
Rachmiwaty
Radisha Didi Utama
Radius Christanto
Rafael Buhay Concepcion Jr.
RAHARDJO MOECHARAR
Rahendrawan Djoko
Rahendrawan Djoko
Rahmad Pribadi
Rahmad Pribadi
Rahmawaty
RAJ KUMAR
Raja Sapta Ervian
Raja Sapta Ervian
Raju Karamchandani
Raju Karamchandani and Sara Raju Karamchandani
Ramajati Tamin
Randolph Adi Zaini
Randy Hirawan
Rashid Irawan Mangunkusumo
Rasyid, Arwin
Rat Anggraini Susantio
Ratna Anggraini Susantio
Ratna Christina
Ratna Indira Nirwan Bakrie
RATNASARI TAMIN
Ratnawati Budiman
Ratnawati Jenny Haryadi
Ratnawati Sasongko
RATNAWATI WIHARDJO
Ratnesh BEDI
RAVI SHYAM SADARANGANI
RAVI SHYAM SADARANGANI & SONAL RAVI SADARANGANI
Ravi T. Vasandani
Ravi Tulsidas Vasandani
Rayanusin Widjaja
Raymond A. Klesc
Raymond Patra
RAYMOND PRIBADI
RAYMOND PRIBADI
Raymond S. B.
RAYMOND, LOUIS COUHAULT
Razief Nur Usman
Razif Susanto
REIMER ALOAN SIMORANGKIR
RENDOR OVERSEAS S.A.
Rendra Tjajadi
Rendra Tjajadi
Rendra Tjajadi
Rendra Tjajadi
Rendra Tjajadi
RETNO CAHYANINGTYAS
Reza Maulana
Reza Pribadi
Reza Pribadi
Reza Sazly H Siregar
Rhita Manik
Ria Indriana Pasaman
Ria Yulianty Tj he
Rianto Lesmana
RICHARD AnTHONY SCHUMACHER
Richard Cornwallis
Richard Dian Santoso
Richard Hamilton MCCANDLESS
Richard L. McAdoo
RICHARD MOHANLAL HARJANI
Richard Sugianto
Richard Sugianto & Veronica Susianty Rachim
Richard Tjandra
Ricky Frederik
Ricky Tandiono
Ricky Tandriono
Ridwan Irawan
RIDWAN ZAINUDDIN
Rilantini Harjani Muljawan
Rina Ciputra Sastrawinata
Rinda Syafrinda
Rini Mariani Soewandi
Rini Susilo Putri
RISTY ISTIANA
RISWAN WIJAYA
RITA HANDOSO
Rita Indriawati
RIZA MUTYARA
Rizal Risjad
Robby Rhemrev
Robert Kevin Ellis
ROBERT PRIANTONO BONOSUSATYA
ROBERT PRIANTONO BONOSUSATYA
Robert Sean King
Roberto Hanna Jose
ROBERTO TAMPUBOLON
Robin Liem
Robin Makmur
Roger Morrison
Roger Pinder
Roger PINDER (Mr.)
Roij Bramasiswadi Pura Widjaja
Romo Nittyyudo Wacho
Ronald E.P. Mullers
Ronald Edward Philip Mullers
Ronald Liem
Ronald Mullers
Ronald Rusco
Ronald Wijaya
Ronaldi Machmud
Roni Faisal Siregar
Roni Pramaditia
Ronny Hadiana Angkasa
Ronny Lukito
Ronny Suryana
Ronny Susanto
Rony Moelyadi
RONY NARPATISUTA MEDANLAGA
Roos Diana
Roosmiati Handojo
RORI INDRA
Rosan Perkasa Roeslani
ROSANA
Roselyne Yosawiria
Rosemelati S. Adikusumah
Rosianawati Adikara
ROSIDA CHUNG
Rosmeiny Djaja Burhan
Roswita Trismitro
Roy E. Tirtadji
Roy Gosjen
Roy Kevin Kurniawan
Roy Muljadi Soetikno
Rubyanto F. Komala
Rudi Darmawan
Rudi Soraya
Rudi Wirawan Rusli
RUDY CAHYADI SUKANDADINATA
Rudy Ghozali
Rudy Hari
RUDY HARJANTO WIDJAJA
Rudy Muljadi Atmawidjaja
Rudy Nanggulangi
Rudy Rayawang
Rudy Soetikno
Rudy Suhendra
Rudy Susanto
Rudy Temasoa Luwia and Suzie Ramli
Rudy Unjoto
Rudy Y.
Rudyantho & Partners
Rudyanto Gunawan
Rudyanto Suliawan
Rudyono
Rulyani Basyir
RUNI ADIANTI
Rusdi Kirana
Rusdi Sunarjo
Rusdy Budisusetyo
Rusdy Budisusetyo, Lanny Widjajanti and Ida Budisusetyo
Rusiana Susanto
RUSJATI TAMIN
RUSJATI TAMIN
RUSSELL BRUCE MCDONALD
Russell McDonald
Rustiyan Oen
Ryan Pascal Masagung
Ryandi Irawan
Ryu Kawano
S&B Inc
S.H.C.N Lucas
Saad Shaarawi
SABHNANI MANOJ
Sacheen Harris Lasmana
Sadikun Wiratno
SAFARINA GOLFIANI MALIK
Safersa Yusana Sertana
Said Agil Assagaff
Saiko Doi
Salik Soetemo
Salim Podiono
Salim Santoso
Sally Texania Marita Joesoef
Sallyawati Rahardja
Samin Tan
Samin Tan
Sammy Hamzah
Sammy Hamzah
SAMUDRA ENERGY LIMITED
Samuel Setiawan
SANADI BOENYAMIN
Sanderawati Joesoef
SANDI GUNAWAN HO
Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno
Sandiaga Uno
Sandra Setijono
Sandrawati Setiadi
Sandria Kirana Budiendra
SANGEETA RAMCHAND
SANGEETA RAMCHAND AND MOHIT RAMCHAND VASWANI
Sanjay Bhansali
Sanjaya Raharja / Loren
Santoso Widjojo
Santy Jennice Lioe
Santy Jennice Lioe
SANTY WIJAYA
Sanyo Leebrianto Suhaimi
Saparuddin
Sapri
SARASWATI TEDJAKUSUMA
Sardjono
Sari Wulaningsih
Satyadharma Ruslim
Sectra (Samoa) Limited
Sefrie Roring
Sefrie Roring
Sembodo Broto Winarso
Semiwati Lawanto
Sengman Tjahja
Septiana Iskandar
Septo Adjie Sudiro
Septo Adjie Sudiro (2)
SETIA BUDHI
Setiabudi Djaelani
Setiady Koeswojo
Setiawan Achmad
Setiawan Lukman
Setiono Tandriono
Sgfried Rinaldy
Shalimar Sulisto
SHALINE MARY SHABNA SOULSBY
Sharecorp Limited
Shariq Mukhtar
Sherlly Hartono
Sherman Rana Krishna
Sherman Rana Krishna
Sherper Limited
Sherper Ltd
Shih, Chih-Hung
SHINTA DEVIYANTI
Shinta Moetiara
SHINTA SANJAYA ISMAEL, SE
Shuzy Lipina
Siak Tjai Oi
Siauw Rachel Anatola
Siauw Welly Susanto
Siegfried Erwin Bengner
Sierah Landajani Soetemo
Sigit Iswandi
Silkar National Limited
SILVA HALIM
Siman Darmamulia
Simon C. Horn
Simon Lim
Simon Subrata
SIMON SUSILO
Simson Panjaitan
Sinar Mas Group
Sinarto Dharmawan
Sinatra Arto Hardy
Sindhu Wibhisono Ongkosoewito
Sindhu Wibhisono Ongkosoewito
Singgih Amara Widjanarko
Singgih Kartono Halim Lie
SIOK LIM TJOA
Sistha Alicia Tjokrosaputro
Sistha Alicia Tjokrosaputro
Siti Farihah
Siti Hartati Tjakra Murdaya
Sity Leo Samudera
Sity Leo Samudera
Siusan Hermawan
Slamet Wibowo
So Lai Fun
Soebagjo Jatim Djarot
SOEBALI SUDJIE
Soegianto Nagaria
Soegiarto Djitowibowo
Soegwanto
Soekrisman Legiman
Soemadipradja & Taher
SOENARJANTO INDRATONO
Soenarjanto Indratono
Soenarni Sampoerno
Soenarta Natapradja
Soendari Widjaja
Soeparmadi
Soeparman Hardjodikromo
Soeroto Hadimuljono
Soeryo Bawono
Soesanto Effendi
Soesilowati
Soetikno Soedarjo
Soetikno Soedarjo
Soetikno Soedarjo
Soetikno Soedarjo, Dian Muljani Soedarjo and Putri Rahayu Soedarjo
SOETIKNO TANOKO
Soetjahjono Winarko
Soetjipto Nagaria
Soewandi Gunawan
Soeyanto
Sofian Widagdo
Sohet Chairil
SOLEH MAMUN
Solidi Korompis
Solidi Silvester Korompis
Solihin
Solihin Asiah
SOLIHIN YUSUF KALLA
Somboon Yuprapan
SONAL RAVI SADARANGANI
Song Liang Hua
Song Wen Po
Song Wen Po, Junty, Jimmy Song and Michael Song
Song Wen Shyang
Song Wen Shyu
Soniya Dudaney
Sonny Agustino Laksito
SONY RUDIKAN
Sonya Riupassa
Sonya Riupassa and Kitty Joantina Wulanda
Sorgato Widjaja
Sri Iriani Goenawan
SRI KRISHNA WISHNU WARDHANA
Sri Mulyono Herlambang
SRI MURWATI HABIR
Sri Rahayu Setyawati
Sri Rahayu Setyawati
Sri Setyaningsih Elisabeth
Sri Setyaningsih Elisabeth
Sri Setyaningsih Elisabeth (SG)
Sri Soelijah
Stan Maringka
Stan Maringka
Stefanus Arief Chrisnamurti
STEPHAN PUTRA KURNIAWAN
Stephen Charles Dodgson
Stephen Patra
Steven Hirawan
Steven Scott Barki
Steven Sugianto
Steven Tirtawidjaja
Stewart Donald HALL
Stewart James Robinson
Stockcorp Limited
Su Kam To
Suarmin Tioniwar
Suarmin Tioniwar
Suarmin Tioniwar
Suarmin Tioniwar and Dewi Salim as joint tenants
Subagio Wirjoatmodjo
Subardi
Subari Setiono
Subianto Arpan Sumodikoro
Subianto Tjandra
SUBUH HARI CAHYANTO
Sudiarso Prasetio
Sudijanto Atmodjo
Sudiro Andi Wiguno
Sudjono Barak Rimba
Sudjono Karim
Sudjono Karim
SUFAN ABNER
SUFAN ABNER
Sugar Group
Sugianto Adiwinata
Sugianto of Sinarmas Group
Sugiharto
Sugiharto Ta
Sugiman
Sugiman
Sugiman
Sugiono
SUGIONO DJAUHARI
Sugiono Wiyono Sugialam
Sugiono Wiyono Sugialam – New
Sugiono Wiyono Sugialam and Lanny Herawati Wibowo Ng
Sugito Walujo
SUGITO WALUJO
Sugito Walujo
Sugito Walujo
Sugun Susilo
Suhadi Zaini
SUHANGKAT LAKMUDIN
SUHARDI
Suhardi Budiman
Suhardiman
SUHARDY
Suhari Setiono
Suharman Subianto
Suhendra Gunadi
Suherman Tjandradjaja
Suhiantoro Supardjono
Sujanty Jamin
Sujarni
Sujono Hadikusumo
Sukendar Unjoto
Sukmawati Widjata
SULAIMAN HAKIM
SULAIMAN HAKIM
Sulaiman Leban Koswara
SULIENIATI CHANDRA TJOE
SULIENIATI CHANDRA TJOE
Sulistiani Sampoerna
Sulung Poniman
Sumadi
Sumardi Kartasasmita alias Kong Phing Li
Sumarto Wonowidjojo
Sumarto Wonowidjojo
SUMET JIARAVANON
Sumiati Liauw
Sumiaty
Sun Moon Suhaimi
Sun, Khai-Nien
Sunan Susilo
SUNARDI
Sunarjo Sampoerna
Sunata Tjiterosampurno
Sung Pui Man
Sunil Motilal Mirpuri
Sunny Suhaimi
Supardi
Supartono Suparto
Supartono Suparto
Supartono Suparto
Suresh Narsinhdas Shah
Suria Kurniawan Lukiman
Suriawati Tan
Suripto
Surjadinata Sumantri
Surjantoro Siswanto
SURJANY KURNIAWAN ECKERT
SURJONO TANOTO
Surjono Tanoto
Surono
Surya Laksana Ongkoredjo
Suryadiharja Freddi H.
Suryana Tochmi
SURYANA NURZAMAN ZEIN
Suryana Tochmi
SURYANTO
Suryawati L. Riady
Susan Lo
Susana Sutanto
Susanna Kusnowo
Susanna Nagaria
Susanti Pheng
SUSANTI SUNARDI
Susanto
Susanto Suwarto
Susanto Tandra
Susanto Tjandra
Susanto Winarto
Susi Salamah
Susilawati
Susilo SOPUTRO
Susilo Wonowidjojo
Susilowati
Susin Valentinus
SUSWANTI GUNAWAN
Susy Angkawijaya
Susy Gunawan
Sutanto DJUHAR
SUTANTO LEON PATRICK
Sutarsa Tanu
Sutiadi Widjaja
Sutiadi Widjaya
Sutiana Juhanda
Sutikno
Sutono Nitisastro
Suwandi Widjaja
Suwantara Gotama Lim
Suwantara Gotama Lim
Suwito Brodjonegoro
Suwito MULIADI
Suyono Purnomo
Suzie Surjana, Tony Surjana, Johny Surjana and Ronny Suryana
Syahbandi
SYAHRUL
SYAIFUL ZEN
Syamsul Hoiri
Syarief Tando
Syarif Bastaman
Syarif Bastaman
Sylvia Efi Widyantari Sumarlin
Sylvia Mardiana Sarwani
Sylvia Mardiana Sarwani
SYLVIA MULJADI
Sylvia Novieta
Symon Brewis – Weston
T-Line Ltd
Tahi Parulian Saragi
Tan Ali Susanto
Tan Hong Kiem
Tan Loo Mei
Tan Lucas Adnan Soen Hwat
Tan Lunardi
TAN LUNARDI (Mr.)
Tan Olinda Dewi
Tan Timothy Tandon
Tan Tjoe Liang
Tanaka Kazuya
Tanaka Kiyomi
Tandean Rustandy and Susan Sujanto
Tang Eng Hoo
Tansri Soen Zen
Tansri Soen Zen
Targian Tan
TATANG HERMAWAN
Taufan
TAUFIK SURYA DHARMA
Tay Robinto
TEDDY FADIL
Teddy Jeffrey Katuari
Teddy Sugianto
Teddy Sutandinata
Teddy Tjahjono
TEDDY YOSHAWIRJA
Tedja Widjaja
Tedy Tanumihardja
Teguh Arianto Budiman
TEGUH BOENTORO
Teguh Ganda Wijaya
Teguh Suginawan
TEL CORPORATE SERVICES PTE LTD
Teng Goat Nio
Tengku Muhammad Ali Mahara
Teresa Suteja
Terra Computer Systems
Terunodjojo Nusa
Texmaco Group
The Citigroup Private Banking
THE HIE TING
The Kwen Ie
The Liliana
The Practice
The Wen Jun
Theodorus Marto Sutiono
Theresia & Lidwina as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Theresia Suciah
Theresia Widyawati Setiono
Theresia Yustina Sumarlin
THIO JULIA TIMOTIUS
Thomas Derek Wilkes Burland
Thomas Derek Wilkes Burland
Thomas Lundi Halim
Thomas Lundi Halim & Elly Lestari Adiutama as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Thomas M. Tampi
Thomas Soulsby
Thomas Tampi
THOMSON
Tiara Dharani Josodirdjo
Tien Thinh Pham
Tigran Timotius Adhiwiyogo
Timmie Melvin
Timothius Felix Intan
Timothy James Supple
TIMOTHY SIDDIK
Timothy Watts
Tina Meimona Shazell
Tina Suteja
Tio Imelda
TIRTA JUWANA DARMADJI
Tirtadjaja Hambali
Tirto Angesti
Tirto Angesty
Tito Sulistio
Titus Wahjoe Dewanto
Tjahjadi Hari Surjono
Tjahjadi Rahardja
Tjahjadi Tresna, Tin Tin Tresna and Senjaya Tresna
Tjahjono Alim
Tjahyono Imawan
Tjan Kok Pin
Tjandra Sari
Tjandra Teresna Widjaja
Tjhang Hwee Tjoe
Tjia Tjhun Hwa
Tjia Tjoen Hiong
Tjia Tjoen Hok
Tjia Wiwin Anggono
Tjiam Ming Ping
Tjie Jien Wang
Tjindrasa Ng
Tjioe Hauw Tze
Tjioe, Gunawan Adianto
Tjipto Surjanto
Tjiu Thomas Effendy
Tjoa Siok Lim
Tjoe Hendry
Tjoe Meuw Sen
Tjoi Wilson
Tjokrorianto
Tjondro Indria Liemonta
Tjong Euw Khiong
Tjong Jok Ha
Tjong Miranti
Tjong Tje Liong
Tjong Tje Tjin
TODDY MIZAABIANTO SUGOTO
Tom Soulsby
Tommy Jacobus Silfanus
Tommy Laurens
Tommy Nugraha
TOMMY TANADY
Tomy Wikutomojati
Tonny Raidy Djamhir
TONNY WANTAH
Tony Djayalaksana
Tony Supargo
Tossin Suharya
Tossin Suharya, Stephen Ignatius Suharya & Daniel Suharya
Toto Soegiarto
Toto Soegiarto and Enny Soegiarto
TOTOK SUSILO
TOTTY MOEKARDIONO
Trent Karoll
Triana Soenryo
TRIANAWATI
Tricia Barki
Trini Koeswanti Sri Soepardianti
TRIONO JULIARSO DAWIS
Trisnawati Budiman
Trisning Setiadi
Triyatno Atmodiharjo
Triyatno Atmodiharjo
Troy Surya Subandi
TSANG KAM HEUNG
Tseng Hsueh Sung
Tseng, Hsueh Sung
Tung Bibiana
Tunggono
Turcahyo Wahyudi
Turniady Widjaja
Turniady Widjaja, Rosmeiny Djaja Burhan and Yessica Beatrice Widjaja
Tuty Sumargo
Tyrone Kaskam Awan
TYTY CHANDRA
UBS AG (Indonesia) Ltd
Udinda Group
Ulian Napsiah
Umar Suwandi
Ungkoro Darmosusilo
Untoro Angkawijaya
Upekkha Theresia Murdaya
Ustadai Tedja,Gan Ying May, Felix Tedja and Edwin Tedja
Ustadi Tedja
USTADI TEDJA
Utama Gondokusumo
Utama Halim
Utama Jusuf
Utama Jusuf, Megawati Hartono, Eddy Jusuf, Dewi Jusuf, Angela Jusuf
UTARYO SUWANTO
Utomo Djohan
Uwat
Uwat (Mr.)
Varisa Susilo
Vemmy Febriyanti
Vera Marlinata Widjaya
Vernon Charles Lee
VERONICA LUKITO
VERONICA LUKITO
Veronica Colondam
Veronica Devi Intan
Veronica Lukito
Veronica Renata
Veronica Tjendro Susanto
VERONICA YUWONO YU
Veronika Slamet
Victor Fungkong
Victor Luhur
Victor Sebastian Vaz
Vidhya Prakash Panjabi
VIJAY NARAINDAS GANGTANI
Vincent Kus Chu
Vincent Kus Chu
Vinod Kumar Agarwal
VIONA GUNAWAN
Virendra Prakash Sharma
Vivi Hottama
Vivi Hottama
Vivian Kent Janawati
Vivien Goh
Vonny Harsono
Vonny Juwono
Wachid Hendriadi and Lizza Christina Budihardjo
Wadyono Suliantoro and Setijanti Suliantoro as joint tenants
Wahjudin Judiana Ardiwinata
Wahjudin Judiana Ardiwinata
Wahjudin Judiana Ardiwinata
Wahjudin Judiana Ardiwinata
Wahyu Subayani
Wahyu Tri Laksono
Wahyudi Lukmantara
WALTER LEO WIDMER
wan peng lim
WARDHANA ATMADJA
WATNI DJOHAN
Wei Zhigang
Wei Zhigang
Welly Thomas
Wen Shyang Song
WESLEY INTERNATIONAL GROUP LIMITED
West Side Ltd.
Wewey Tjahjadi
Wewey Tjahjadi
Wewey Tjahjadi Wanadihardja
Whitlam Luhur
Wibawa Darmawan
Wibowo Brotorahardjo
Wibowo Kartopranoto
Wibowo Suseno Wirjawan
Wicahyo Ratomo
Wicahyo Ratomo
Wida Martha Sari Newton
Widhayati Hendropurnomo
Widhi Sesanti
Widiyanti Putri
WIDJAJA LASWONO
WIDJAJA Tjangdra Herawati
Widjaja Trisna
Widjaya Sendra
Widjojo Budiarto
Widjojo Parawirohardjo
Widjojo Soejono
WIDYA SURAANNISA
Widyakumala Sulistyo
Widyawati Budiman
Wientoro Prasetyo
Wijayanto Ang
WIJONO TANOKO
Wijono Widjojo
Wilfred Schultz
Wilfred Schultz
Wilfred Schultz
Wilfred Schultz (Inactivated)
Wilhelmina Bia Mugirato
William A. Sullivan, Esq.
William James Park and Yuliati Karnadi as joint tenants with right of survivors
William Lietanawaty
WILLIAM O BRIEN JOHNSTON
William Shane Tan
William Sutjiatma
William T Jugiarto
WILLIAM TJUGIARTO
WILLIAM TOBAGUS
Willie Tandanu
Willy Gunawan
Willy Lukito
Willy Sugianto
Wina Widjaja
Winardi Darmansa Lim
WINARDI PRANATAJAYA
Winardi Setiaputra
Winardi Thamrin
Winarno Tjajadi
WINARNO TJAJADI
Winarno Tjajadi
Winarno Tjajadi and Lili Liauw as joint tenants with right of survivorship
Winarno Tjajadi, Rendra Tjajadi and Sujanto Tjajadi Tjio
Winarno Tjajadi, Rendra Tjajadi and Sujanto Tjajadi Tjio
Winarno Tjajadi, Rendra Tjajadi and Sujanto Tjajadi Tjio As Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship
Winarto Halim
Winata Wiryaputra.
Winny Martina Christine
WINSON POLA
Wira Satria Dewo Anggoro Kasih
Wirawan Chondro
Wirawan Chondro
Wirawan Chondro
Wirontono & Co. Ltd
Wisasongko Puspoyo
Witijasmoro Sih Handajanto
Witijasmoro Sih Handajanto and Nia Soniati Wityasmoro
Witjaksono Abadiman Sidharta
Wito Chandra
Witono Dani
Wiwiek Hidajati
Wiwin Untari Andoko
Wiyang
Wong Alfian Widjaya
Wong Chuk Chen
WONG KIAN KHIONG
WONG KIAN KHIONG and FOE SIAT KHIUN
WONG LAI FONG FELICITAS
Wong Steffania
Wong Tommy Wibowo
Wong Tranadi
Wong, Siong Yuit Benjamin
Xu Jun
XU PENG
Yakin Lijaya
Yamin Widjaja
Yamin Widjaja and Linda Sidharta As Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship
Yanto Kasiman
YANUAR ARSAD
Yanuar Tenacious
Yap Eng Siu
Yap Johanes
Yau Hang Yip
Yau Hang Yip and Elline Yohan Yau as joint tenants
Yau Hang Yip and Jocelin Yohan Yau as joint tenants
Yau Yung
Yaya Winarno Junardy
Yayasan Chandra Bunda Dewi
Yeni Rohaeni
YENNI
YEOMUN LTD
Yeomun Ltd
Yessica Beatrice Widjaja
Yogie Sandi Yudhianto
Yohan Sutandar
YOHAN SUTANDAR
Yohanes Eka Putranto
Yohannes Alexander Wintery Oei
Yohannes Riyadi
Yoko Kawano
Yolanda Wijaya
Yong Wiyono Buyung Yasin
Yonna Septarina Kusdianto
Yos Hendri
Yos Sidy Teo )formerly Sie Tjit Kiong
Yoseph Suherman
Yosodewi Limurti
Yosyan Madolen
Yoyok Soebagio
YUDHO ENJANARKO
Yudi Astono
Yudi Astono
Yugisako Tita
Yuke Elia Susiloputro
Yulia Sinta Dewi
YULIANA JOHANES
Yuliana Sudradjat
Yully
Yunet Limanto
Yunie Wono and Elline Yohan Yau as joint tenants
Yunita Kalim
Yunita Sastrasanjaya
YUPI HARYANTO
Yusak Teguh Nugroho
Yustiningsih Suharsono
Yustinus Wisnoe Bayuaji
Yusuf Adrian Chandra
Yusuf Valent
Yusy Widjaja Oey
Yvonne Shirley Fogarty
ZAINAL ABIDINSYAH SIREGAR
Zaini Abidin Noor
ZAMHARIR
ZEIN SWETLANA ANDREYEVNA
Zentry Ltd
Zerline Conception Boncorp Pliac
ZULFIKAR ALIMUDDIN
Zuriah
Offshore Entities (43)
Alpilles Holdings Offshore Ltd
ASANUSA CAPITAL PARTNERS PTE. LTD.
Asia Pacific Leisure Ltd
Ballistic Success Trading Limited
Blossoms Glamour Profits Inc.
Capsec Limited
CEWE LTD.
CHANDLER CAPITAL INC.
Chang Wen Yu and Chen Fang Min
CHARTERHOUSE LIMITED
Chien, Cheng
CYRUS BAAL Inc.
Energi Mega Pratama Inc.
Falkner Family Trust
Folkstone Worldwide Limited
Grand Benefit Enterprises Ltd
Grid Consulting Limited
Indoprop Ltd
Innovative Ventures Ltd
Kilda Corporation
Legacy Investments Pte Ltd
Lilac Swish Offshore Ltd
Linkberg Offshore Ltd
MEGA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION ENTERPRISES LIMITED
Nexuss Investment Worldwide Ltd
Northern Star Capital Pte Limited
Northstar Pacific Partners
Palladium Overseas Corporation
Paving Investments Ltd
PERSEPOLIS CAPITAL LTD
PT Indo Buana Makmur Textile
PT Jenshiang Nusantara Textile Chemical Industrial
PT Uni Enlarge Industry Indonesia
PT. TOPAS MULTI SECURITIES
Stafford Services Ltd
Starhill Trading Ltd
Times Investment Group Ltd.
Triston Capital Ltd
United Capital Enterprise Worldwide Ltd
Victory Harvest Investment Ltd
VIENA INVESTMENTS LIMITED
Wanamurti & Associates
Willowcreek Development Incorporated
Listed Addresses (2400)
(Invoice sent by email before send out) Jalan Brawijaya II No.5, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12160, Indonesia
108 Jalan Drupadi 2 Seminyak Bali Indonesia
11, Sea Mist, Pali Road Bandra Mumbai – 400050 Indonesia
11th Floor, Menara Asia 101 Diponegoro Blvd Lippo-Karawaci Karawaci-Tangerang
139 Jl. Raya Kapuk Kamal Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
14, Kartini Raya Pasar Baru Jakarta Indonesia
14th Floor, Bank Bali Tower, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 27, Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
15-A-8-3 Scots Tower, Mont Kiara Pines Jalan Mont Kiara (Off Jalan Bunkit Kiara) Mont Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur INDONESIA
1501 Menara DEA Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
15th Floor, Menara DEA, Suite 1503 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jl. Mega Kuningan Barat IX Kav. E.4.3 No. 1 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
18 Jalan Mataram Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
18 Jalan Suryakencana Bandung 40132 Indonesia
19a-2 Tuladong Bawah Empat Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
19F Wisma Indosemen JI Jend Sudirman Kav 70-71 jakarta Indonesia
20th Floor, Citibank Tower Jl. Jend. Sudirman KAV 54 Jakarta 12190 INDONESIA
21 Banyuwangi No. 5 Menteng, Jakarta Indonesia
2111 Boulevard Gajah Mada #01-01 Lippo Cyber Park, Lippo Karawaci Utara Tangerang 15811, Banten INDONESIA
2112 Bulevar Gajah Mada # 01-01 Lippo Cyber Park Lippo Karawaci Kel. Panunggangan Barat, Kec. Cibodas Tangerang, Indonesia
21st Floor Wisma Bank Dharmala JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 28, Jakarta Selatan Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
21st Floor, Plaza Bapindo, Menara II Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 54-55 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
22 Caringin Timur Cilandak Barat Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
22B SCBD Suites, Jl Jend Sudirman Kav 52-53, Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
22nd Flr, Menara Jamsotek Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 38 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
23rd Floor Menara Rajawali Jl Mega Kuningan Lot # 5.1 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
28 Jalan Matraman Raya Jakarta 13150 Indonesia
3 JL. BARAT SENER, GG. MERPATI NO. 1 BARATSENER KEROBOKAN KUTA BALI INDONESIA
30a Jutland Parade Dalkeith WA 6009 Western Australia Jakarta Selatan – 12980 Indonesia
31 Corroaminojo No.81, Ranalauj Bandar, Lampung.
35 Cipanganti Bandung Indonesia
35 Cipanganti, Bandung Indonesia
37-05 Ambassador 2 ITC Kuningan, Jl Prof Dr Satrio Kuningan Jakarta 12940
38 Jalan Teluk Betung Jakarta 10230, Indonesia
38 Mandala Utara Tomang Jakarta 11440 Indonesia
3rd Floor, Dynaplast Tower No. 1 MH Thamrin Blvd Lippo Karawaci 1100 Tangerang 15811, West Java, INDONESIA
4 Seasons Residences Spring Tower 19D Jl. Setiabudi Tengah Jakarta 12910, Indonesia
41 jalan Kebon Sirih Jakarta INDONESIA 10320
44-46, WLIKOTA MUSTAJAB (18. GANDASULI) SURABAYA 60272 INDONESIA
481 Jl. Legian, Legian Kaja Kota Denpasar, Bali Indonesia
4th, Enseval Building Jl. Let Jend Suprapto Kav 4 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
55 Pajajaran Bandung Indonesia
5th Floor, Menara Kebon Sirih Jl. Kebon Sirih No. 17-19 Jakarta 10340 Indonesia
61, Jalan Mangunsarkoro Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
65 Jalan Raya Kuta Denpasar, Bali INDONESIA
65 Prescott Drive, Murdoch, WA6150, Australia and/ or Jl. Hegarmanah Wetan No. 35A, Bandung, Indonesia
6A Jahmada No. 193A Jakarta Indonesia
7 Palem boulevard Matahari Building 3rd Floor Lippo Karawaci 1200 Tangerang 15811 INDONESIA
78b JI. Kemang Timur Kemang 12510 Jakarta Indonesia
7B Nongsa Point Marina Nongsa, Batam Island Indonesia
7th Floor, Menara Perdana, JL. HR. Rasuna Said Kav.C-17, Jakarta 12940
7th Floor, Wisma BSG Jalan Abdul Muis No. 40, Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
7th Floor, Wisma BSG, Jalan Abdul Muis No.40 Jarkarta 10160 Indonesia
8th Floor Menara Asia Lippo Karawaci West Java INDONESIA
9th Fl. Lippo Centre, Jl. Gatot Subroto Kv. 35-36 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
9th Floor Asia Tower 101 Diponegroro Boulevard Tangerang 1500 Indonesia
9th Floor, Plaza Asia Jl. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 59 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
AAF Building 2nd Floor Jl. TB Simatupang Kav 18 Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Advocates & Solicitors Plaza ABDA, 16th Floor, Zone D Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 59 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia.
Agil Kusumadya Akbp No. 1.B Kudus Indonesia
Agung Indah 4/4 RT 015 RW 016 Sunter Agung Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Agung Permai IV/39 C4/24 Kelurahan Sunter Agung Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Agung Rakas Bungalows. JL Padma Utara, Legian Bali Indonesia
Alam Elok V1/CIF 26-27 RT 002/016 Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Alumanium A3/III/1 Medan-Sumatera Utara INDONESIA
Ambengan No. 19 RT/RW Ketabang, Surabaya INDONESIA
AMDI BUILDING – B 7th Floor Jalan Gaya Motor Raya No.8 Suntor II, Jakarta 14330 INDONESIA
Apart Atap Merah, Unit 1054 JL Pecenongan Raya No. 72 Jakarta 10120 INDONESIA
APARTEMEN PERMATA HIJAU TOWER 1 NO. 7A, JL. RAYA PERMATA HIJAU BLOK B NO. 8, INDONESIA
Apartemen Permata Hijau Tower 2 No. 1A Jl. Raya Permata Hijau Blok B No. 8 Indonesia
Apartemen Puri Kemayoran 207C Jl. Landas Pacu Selatan A6 Kota Baru Bandar Kemayoran Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Apartm Bona Vista I/0906 Jl Bona Vista Raya No.1 Jakarta 12440 Indonesia
Apartmen Casablanca Tower 1 Unit 0412 Jl Casablanca Kav 12 Jakarta Selatan 12870
Apartment Airlangga Unit 39A Jl. Lingkar Mega Kuningan E1.1 Mega Kuningan, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Apartment Airlangga Unit 39A Jl. Lingkar Mega Kuningan Kav E1.1 No. 1 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Apartment Ambassador, Kuningan Unit 25F Jl. Prof. Dr Satrio, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
APARTMENT BATAVIA TOWER II/ SUITE 1505 JLN K.H. MAS MANSYUR KAV. 126 JAKARTA 10210 INDONESIA
Apartment Executive Menteng Blok Palem No. 1205 Jl. Pagangsaan Barat Kav 6 JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Apartment Istana Harmoni, Unit 28K Komplek Harmoni Plaza Jl. Suryo Pranoto No. 2, Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Apartment Istana Sahid Tower ME-05-C Jl. Jenderal Sudirman 86 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Apartment ITC Roxymas 7th Floor, No. 81 Jakarta Indonesia
Apartment Kempinski Plaza 18 RT 013 RW 011, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Apartment Mediteranean Garden Tower A 9th Floor, Unit B/AC Tanjung Duren Jakarta Indonesia
Apartment Pantai Mutiara Tower Enggano Iantai 15/7 Jalan Raya Pantai Mutiara T.I. Jakarta Utara 14450, Indonesia
Apartment Parama Unit 10B Jl. T. B. Simatupang Jakarta Selatan 12430 Indonesia
Apartment Pavilion, Tower 1 Unit 1902 JI. KH Mas Mansyur Kav 24 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Apartment Pearl Garden, WPI GF Jl Jend Gatot Subroto Kav. 6-7 Jakarta 12930, Indonesia
Apartment Permata Hijau Tower 1 No. 2-A, Jl. Raya Permata Hijau Blok. B No.8, Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Apartment Permata Hijau Tower Two, Unit 7 Jakarta-Selatan Indonesia
Apartment Permata Safir #603 Jl. Permata Safir Blok W/9 Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia.
Apartment Plaza Senayan Jl. Tinju No. 1 Pintu Satu Gelora Senayan Jakarta 10270, Indonesia
Apartment Sailendra, No. 11B Jalan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Apartment Salendra Jalan Mega Kuningan Timur 1 Kav E1.2., No. 1&2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Apartment Setiabudi Unit 1704 Jalan RS Aini, Karet Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Apartment Simprug Teras A-21 RT007/003 Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Apartment Taman Anggrek Tower 4 Unit 11 Jakarta Barat 11470 Indonesia
Apartment Taman Anggrek Tower 7/29 Floor Jl. Letjend S. Parman Kav. 21 Jakarta 11470 Indonesia
APARTMENT TAMAN ANGGREK TOWER, 4-11D JARKATA 11470 INDONESIA
Apartment The Ascott Unit 0331 Kebon Kacang Raya No. 2 Jakarta, Indonesia
APR. PERSONA BAHARI BLOK TOPAZ NO. P1D, JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Apt Senayan Res B1S/2 LT.11, RT003/RW007 Grogol Utara, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Apt. 1409 at The Ascott Jakarta Jalan Kebun Kacang Raya No. 2 Jakarta 10230 Indonesia
Apt. Atap Merah #1195 JI. Pecenongan 72 Jakarta 10120 Indonesia
Apt. Istana Sahid No. ME-7C JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 86 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
APT. ISTANA SAHID NO. ME-7C JL. JENDERAL SUDIRMAN KAV.86 JAKARTA 10220 INDONESIA
Apt. Nuansa Hijau C. 024, RT007/015, Pondok Pinang Jakarta, Indonesia
Apt. Permata Safir, #603 Jl Permata, Safir Bok W/9 Jakarta 12210, Indonesia
Apt. Redtop 1062, JL. Pecanongan No. 72 Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Arena Pekan Raya Jakarta Hah E Kota Baru Bandar Kemayoran Jakarta 10620
Ariobimo Sentral 4th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav X-2 No. 5 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Artha Graha Building 19th Floor Suite 1909 Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Senayan-Keyaboran Baru South Jakarta, Indonesia
Artha Graha Building 32nd Fl Sudirman Central Business District (SCBD) Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Artha Graha Building 6th Floor Sudirman Central Business District (SCBD) Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Artha Graha Building, 6th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Artha Graha Building, Sudirman Central Business Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 52-53, Jakarta-12910 INDONESIA
Arthaloka Building, Jin Jend Sudirman Kav., 2 Jakarta Pusat 10220
Asem Baris Raya No. 1, RT 001/005 Kebon Baru Jakarta Salatan
Asia Superyachts Office 117 Jalan Kunti, Seminyak Bali, Indonesia 80361
Aston Condominium, Jl. Braga City Walk, Bandung Indonesia
Aston Rasuna Residence Apartment 29C Komplex Apartment Taman Rasuna, Jalan H R Rasuna Said Jakarta, Indonesia
B-102, Bugenville Apartment Komplek Klub Kelapa Gading Jalan Bulevar, Blok KGC Kelpa Gading Permai, Jakarta
Babelan Indah Blok B-3 RT/RW 08/08 Babelan Bekasi Indonesia
BALOI GARDEN BLOK C NO. 3 RT/RW 003/005 KEL. BATU SELICIN KEC LUBUK BAJA INDONESIA
Bambu Durix No. 10 Rt 013/Rw 006 Jakarta Indonesia 13430
Bank Mega Building, 2nd floor, Suite 202 Jl. Tanjung Karang No. 3 – 4A Jakarta 10230
Bapindo Plaza Mandiri Tower 19th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 54 – 55 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
BCD Tower, 4th Floor Jl. Jend.Sudirman Kav.26 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Bellagio Residence Unit 22 AF 6 Jl. Mega Kuningan Barat Kav. E4/3 Jakarta, Indonesia
Benda, Rt. 004/ Rw. 001 Ciganjur, Jagakarsa Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
Bening Indah Estate Blok B5 No. 1 Pondok Gede Jakarta Timur Indonesia
BENING INDAH ESTATE BLOK B5 NO.1 PONDOK GEDE KATARTA TIMUR INDONESIA
Bidakara Office Tower 12-18th Floor Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto 71-73 Jakarta 12870, Indonesia
Billy & Moon KI /2-3, RT 008/010, Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Bina Mulia Building, 5th Floor Jl.H.R. Rasuna Siad, Kav. 10, Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Bintaro Melati Blk 2 No. 19 Pasanggrahan Jakarta, Indonesia
Bintaro Sektor IV JI. Cucur Barat X Blok E1/29 Jakarta Selatan 15225 Indonesia
Bkt Golf UTM III 24-25 RT00/03 Kel Pondok, Pinang, Jakarta Indocnesia
BLOCK I/1 SELATAN NO.32 MUARA KARANG JAKARTA INDONESIA
Blok A1/4, Jl Trapesium 3, Tmn Kedoya Permai, Kebon Jeruk, 11530 Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Blok D No 11, Komplex Batam Plaza, Nagoya, Batam, Indonesia
Blok K-9, Selatan No.2 Pluit Muara Karang Jakarta, Utara Indonesia
Blok Vll/No. 8, Jalan Tangkuban Perahu, Banjar Tegal Buah Padang Sambian Kelod Denasar Barat 80117, Bali INDONESIA
BNI Building 20th Floor JI. Jendral Sudirman, Kav 1 10220, Jakarta INDONESIA
Br. Blangsinga, DS. Saba Kec Blahbatuh-Gianyar, Bali Indonesia
BRAWIJAYA NO.50 BOGO INDONESIA
Budi Indah Raya No. 15 Bandung Indonesia
Budi Indah Raya No., 15 Bandung INDONESIA
Budiarto Law Partnership Wisma Bisnis Indonesia 3rd Floor, Suite 309 Jalan Letjen S. Parman Kav. 12 Jakarta 11480 Indonesia
BUKIT CINERE INDAH JL PURI PESANGGRAHAN I BLOK M INDONESIA
Bukit Golf 1-PC 14 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Indonesia
BUKIT GOLF 11 NO.20, PONDOK INDAH JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
BUKIT GOLF BLOK PE NO 6 PONDOK INDAH Jakarta 12310 INDONESIA
Bukit Golf II No. 20 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Bukit Golf Utama III P.17 Rt 000/Rw 003, Pondok Pinang Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Bukit Golf Utama III P.A 17 Pondok Pinang – Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Indonesia
Bukit Golf Utama III., PA 17, RT 000/003, Pondok Pinang, Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
BUKIT GOLF UTAMA PA/27 RT 00/03 PONDOK PINANG JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
BUKIT HIJAU II/2 PONDOK INDAH JAKARTA
Bukit Rivaria M5/24, Sawangan Depok 16519, Indonesia
Bumi Daya Plaza, 28th Floor, Jl. Imam Bonjol No.61, Jakarta 10310 – Indonesia
Bumi Karang Indah Karang Asri II Blok C2/21 Jakarta 12440 Indonesia
Bumina Wahana JI. Riau No. 17-21 Hakarta 10350 Indonesia
BUNCIT INDAH E/I, RT006/004, PEJATEN BARAT JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Buncit Mas Bok B-3 Jl. Mampang Prapatan Raya 108 Jakarta 12790
C/- 11th Floor Menara Asia, Jl. Diponegoro Lippo Karawaci INDONESIA
c/- 8th Floor Menara Asia Lippo Karawaci West Java
c/- Bank Bira, Wisma Metropolitan Level 1-2, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta
C/- Bank Ekonomi Ekonomi Graba 7th Floor, JL. Setiabudi Selatan, Kav. 10 Jakarta 12920, INDONESIA
C/- Ciptadana Securitas, Citra Graha 8th Floor Jin. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
C/- Deloitte Touche Wisma Antara, 18th Floor Jl Medan Merdeka Selatan No. 17 Jakarta 10110, INDONESIA
C/- Erlin 3rd Floor, Menara Matahari – Lippo Life Jalan Boulevard Palem Raya No. 7 Lippo Karawaci 1200 Tangerang 15811 INDONESIA
C/- Lippo Centre 10th Floor, Asia Tower 101 Diponegoro Blvd Lippo Village 1200, Karawaci-Tangerang, INDONESIA
C/- Lippo Centre Building 10th Floor, Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta
C/- Lippo Centre Building Jl. Jend Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta Selatan
C/- Lippo Group, 10th Floor Asia Tower 101 Diponegoro Blvd., Lippo Village 1200 Karawaci – Tangerang, Jakarta INDONESIA
C/- Lippo Group, 9th Floor Lippo Centre Jalan Jenderal, Gatoto Subroto Kav 35-36 Jakarta 12490 INDONESIA
c/- Makarim & Taira S. Summitmas I, 17th Floor Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 61-62 Jakarta 12069 Indonesia
C/- P. T. Bakrie Capital Indonesia Wisma Bakri, FL 3, Jl H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
C/- P. T. Dayabangun Persada, Wisma Bakri, Fl 3, Jl H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 JAKARTA, INDONESIA
C/- P.T. Bymindo Setiatama Gedung Bank Bali Lot 6, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 27 Jakarta Selantan INDONESIA
c/- P.T. Ever Shine Tax Jl. H. Fachruddin No. 16 Jakarta Pusat 10250 Indonesia
c/- Pacific Financial Services Plaza Chase 6th Floor, Jalan Jend Sudirman Kav 21, Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
C/- PP. PT London Sumatra Indonesia Tbk Indonesia Tbk, World trade Centre 15th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
C/- PT Binapuri Lestari Jalan Dharmawangsa Raya No. 39 Jakarta Selatan
C/- PT Binapuri Lestari Jalan Dharmawangsa Raya No. 39 Jakarta Selatan Jakarta
C/- PT Cardig Air Menara Cardig Menara Cardig 3rd Floor Jalan Raya Halim Perdanakusuma Jakarta 13650, Indonesia Indonesia
c/- PT Gunung Sewu Kencana Chase Plaza Fl. 20 Jl. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920
c/- PT Moores Rowland Indonesia Jl. Sisingamangaraja #3c Jakarta Indonesia
C/- PT Sanbe Prakarsa Husada Jl. Taman Sari No. 10 Bandung 40116 Tromol PO 850 Indonesia
C/- PT Tridaya Esta Jalan Dharmawangsa Raya No. 39, Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
c/- PT. Delta Aneka Consultants & Trade, Bank Bali Tower, 14th Floor, Kav 27, Jl. Jend. Sudirman, Jakarta, Indonesia
C/- Wisma Indosemen, Fl 6 Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 70-71 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
c/- Wisma Trident Lt. 3 Jl. Tanah Abang IV No. 23-25 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
c/-P.T. Kaltimex Energi Graha Irama, 2nd Floor Unite 2C JL. H.R. Rasuna Said
C/= Bank Ekonomi, Ekonomi Graba 7th Floor, JL. Setiabudi Selatan, Kav. 10 Jakarta 12920, INDONESIA
c/o Mr Ronald Mullers Sisingamangaraja No.3C Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
c/o 27th Floor, Menara Rajawali Jl Mega Kuningan Lot #5.1 Kawasan Mega Kuningan, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
c/o Apartment Kuningan, Apt. # 610 Jalan Setiabudi Utara Kuningan Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
C/o Bank Ekonomi, Ekonomi Graba 7th Floor, J1. Setiabudi Selatan Kav. 10, Jakarta 12920
c/o BNI Building 22nd Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 1, Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
C/o Gedung Artha Graha 10th Floor SCBD jl. Jend, Sudirman KAV 52-53 Jakarta 12910
c/o Graha Cempaka Mas Blok B/12A JL. Letjen Suprapto Jakarta, 10640 Indonesia
c/o Graha Elnusa JI. TB Simatupang Kav. I B, Jakarta 12560 Indonesia
c/o Herjanto Lutantowidjojo PT Moore Stephens Advisory Services Wisma Dharmala Sakti, 7th Floor, Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 32, Jakarta
C/O JALAN KETAPANG UTARA 1 NO. 14 JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
c/o Jl. Daan Mogot KM 11 Cengkareng Jakarta 11710 Indonesia
C/o JL. Jatibaru No. 24 Jakarta Pusat, 10160 INDONESIA
c/o Jl. Jelita Utara No. 21B Rawamangun Jakarta 13220 Indonesia
c/o Jl. Johor No. 27/I Surabaya Indonesia
c/o Jl. Taman Sari No. 10 Bandung 40116 Indonesia
C/O KANTOR Taman Mega Kuningan A9 Unit C8-C14 Jalan Mega Kuningan Lot 8.9/9 Kawasan Mega Kuningan
C/O Kartini Muljadi Jl. Gunawarman No. 18 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
c/o Leisure Investment Villas Jl. By Pass Ngurah Rai No. 888 Br. Kelan, Tuban Bali Indonesia 80361
c/o Limajari Jalan Raya Kerobokan 100x, Denpasar BALI Indonesia
C/O MENARA GLOBAL 15TH FLOOR JL GATOT SUBROTO KAV. 27 JAKARAT SELATAN 12950 INDONESIA
C/O MENARA GLOBAL 15TH FLOOR Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav. 27 Jakarta Selantan 12950 Indonesia
c/o Menara Kadin 7th Floor JI. HR Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 1 – 3 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
c/o Menara Kadin 7th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 1-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
c/o Menara Kadin Indonesia Suite 19C JI. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X – 5, Kav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
c/o Menara Kadin, 7th floor Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav.2-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
c/o Menara Rajawali 27th Fl Jl Mega Kuningan Lot #5.1 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
c/o Mr. Lukman Nagaria PT Hajiabu Propertindo Graha Niaga 12th Floor Jln Jend Sudirman Kav 58 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
c/o Nomade Jaya, Jalan Raya Pengubengan No. 82 Kerobakan. Kuta Bali Indonesia
c/o P. T. Ciptadana Securities Plaza Asia Office Park, Unit 2 Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 59 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
c/o P.T. Cipta Daya Teratai Emas Jalan Kemanggisan Raya No.106 Slipi, Jakarta 11480 INDONESIA
c/o P.T. Citra DMG Nusantara Gedung PriceWaterhouseCoopers 12th Floor,Suite 1201 Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said, Kav. C-3
c/o P.T. Elsuna Graha Elnusa JI. TB. Simatupang Kav. 1B Jakarta 12560, Indonesia
C/o P.T. Indiratex Spindo Desa Randu Agung Km. 75, P.O.Box 95 Singosari 65153 INDONESIA
c/o P.T. Zinga Indonesia Nusantara German Centre Building 4th Floor, Suite 4320/4330 Jalan Kapt. Subijanto Dj. Bumi Serpong Damai, Tangeang 15321 INDONESIA
C/O PLAZA DM 25TH FLOOR SUITE 2503 JL JEND SUDIRMAN KAV 25 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
C/O PLAZA DM, 25TH FLOOR SUITE 2503, JL. JEND. SUDIRMAN KAV. 25 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
c/o Plaza DM, 25th Floor, Suite 2503 Jl. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 25 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
c/o PT BOKORMAS WAHANA MAKMUR Jl. Palatehan I / 35 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
c/o PT Catur Sentosa Adiprana Jalan Daan Mogot Raya No. 234 Jakarta 11510, Indonesia
c/o PT DWI Satrya Utama Tifa Building, 6th Floor Jl. Kuningan Barat No. 26 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
c/o PT Global Jaringan Nusantara Menara Rajawali, 10th Floor Jl. Mega Kuningan Lot #5.1 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
C/O PT MANDARA SELULAR INDONESIA GRAHA MOBISEL LT 1 JL. MAMPANG PRAPATAN RAYA NO. 139 JAKARTA INDONESIA
c/o PT Paperpro Indonesia Menara Gracia 9th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav. C – 17 Jakarta 12940 Indonesia
c/o PT Pertamina (Persero) Pertamina Head Office, 19th Floor Jl. Merdeka Timur 1A, Jakarta 10110 Indonesia
c/o PT The Practice Menara Jamsostek, 22nd Floor Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 38 Jakarta 12710, Indonesia
c/o PT Yapindex Nagatama Kencana Jln Daan Mogot II No. 100 M & N KompleksIndo Ruko Jakarta Barat 11510
C/o PT. BUKIT SUNUR WIJAYA Jl. Musi No. 40 E Jakarta Pusat P.O.Box 4320/JKT 10043 Indonesia
c/o PT. Cipta Cakra Murdaya Jl. Cikini Raya No. 78 Jakarta 10330 Indonesia
c/o PT. Energi Pasir Hitam Indonesia (EPHINDO) Plaza Bapindo, Citibank Tower, 12th Floor Jl. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
c/o PT. Eurocapital Peregrine Securities Plaza Bapindo, Citibank Tower, 12th Floor Jl. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
c/o PT. Gunung Sewu Kencana Plaza Chase Podium 7th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920, INDONESIA Indonesia
c/o PT. Quadrigga Appollonya Satrya P. O. Box 3726, Jakarta 10037 Indonesia
c/o PT. TRIAS SENTOSA Jl. Raya Waru 1B, Waru Sidoarjo
c/o Sanggraha Daksamitra, PT Wisma Soewarna 2nd Fl Soewarna Business Park Soekarna Hatta Airport Jakarta – Indonesia 19110
c/o Soewito Suhardiman Eddymurley Kordono Wisma Bank Dharmala, 14th Fl. Jl Jend. Sudirman, Kav.28 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
c/o Sudirman Tower 11th Floor, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 60 Jakarta 12190
c/o Superblok Bumi Niaga Jln Pangeran Tubagus Angke No.170 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia
c/o Susanna Nagaria P.O. Box 4486/JKBTF Jakarta 11044 Indonesia
c/o Wisma 46, Kota BN1 32nd floor, Suite 3201, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 1 Jakarta 10220, Indonesia
c/o Wisma Dharmala Sakti 7th Floor Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 32 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia Attn: Mr Herjanto Lutantowidjojo/Mr Andres Magbitang
C/o Wisma Indo Seman 12th Floor Jalan Sudirman Kav. 70-71 Jakarta 12910
C/O Wisma Tamara 7th Floor JL.JEND SUDIRMAN KAV 24 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
c/o. Exotic Equities Asia Ltd / Exotic Properties Ltd Jl. Oberoi 55 80361 Kuta Bali Indonesia.
c/o. Graha Motor City, Level 2, Suite 201 Jalan Abdul Muis 24 – 26 Jakarta Pusat 10160 Indonesia.
c/o. Jl. Kencana Permai II/8 Jakarta 12310 Indonesia.
C/o. PT Cayman Trust Indonesia World Trade Centre 16/F Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
c/o. PT Energi Timur Jauh Gedung Wisma Mulia, 32nd Floor Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 42 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
c/o. PT Yudistira Umawar Building 1st Floor Jl. Kapten Tendean Kav 28 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia.
c/o: PT SARI WANGI AEA Jl Mercedes Benz No. 288, Cicadas Gunung Putri Bogor, 16964 Jawa Barat, Indonesia
Capital Managers Asia Pet., Ltd Wisma Bakrie, 6th Floor JI. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 Jakarta 12960 INDONESIA
Capital Managers Asia Pte Ltd 6th Floor Wisma Bakrie Jakarta
Capital Residence Tower 2/2C SCBD, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53 Lot 24, Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Caringin Barat Kav 12 Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Cemara Raya CM 3 Solo-Baru, Sukoharjo 57552 Indonesia
Cempaka Lestapi I/5, Cilandak Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Cempaka Putih RT.006/005, Kel. Bintaro Kec. Pasanggrahan Jakarta Selatan
Cempaka Putih Tengah XVII/9 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
Cempaka Putih Tengah XXII-A/14 RT006/RW006 Kel. Cempaka Putih Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Central SPS, Ketapang Indah Blok A-1, No 3-4, Jl. K.A. Zainal Arifin, Indonesia
Chase Plaza 22nd Floor 11 Jend. Sudirman Kav 21 Jakarta, INDONESIA
Chase Plaza 7/F Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav.4 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Chase Plaza Fl. 20 Jl. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Chase Plaza Lt 19 Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 21 Jakarta 12920 INDONDESIA
Chase Plaza Tower Lt. 20 JI. Jend. Sudirman Kav.21 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
CHASE PLAZA, 12TH FLOOR JL. JEND SUDIRMAN KAV. 21 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
Chase Plaza, 18th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Cibubur Indah Bi No. 1 RT005/011 Kel. Cibubur Ciracas Jakarta Timur Indonesia
CIDAKU INDAH VI NO. 2 BANDUNG 40143 INDONESIA
Cileduk Raya No. 2 Kebayorn Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Cipinang Elok Blok W-5 RT 008 RW-010 Jakarta, Indonesia
CIPINANG INDAH BLOK D/5 RT/RW 006/016 CIPINANG MUARA JATINEGARA JAKARTA TIMUR INDONESIA
CIPINANG JAYA KK NO. 35 JAKARTA TIMUR INDONESIA
Cipinang Kcbembem,R.T/R.W.0313/012 Pisangan Timur, Kecamatan, Pulo Gadung Jarkarta, Timur INDONESIA
Cireundeu R.T. 03 R.W 04 Kelurahan/ Desa Pisangan Kecamatan Ciputat Indonesia
CitiBank Tower, 5th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Citra 1 Ext AA-3/27, RT 002/015 Kalideres, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Citra Garden 2 Blok P09/NO8 Kelurahan Pegadungan – Kalideres Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Citra Garden 2, Blok P09/N08 Kelurahan Pegadungan – Kalideras Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Citra Garden Blok A.7 No. 40 Kelurahan Kalideres Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Citra Gdn III Extn Blk B12 A Jakarta Indonesia
Citra Graha 8th Floor Jln. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Citra I Ext AA-3/27, RT 002/015 Kalideres, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Citra III, Blok B.8/3A, Kalideres, Jakarta Indonesia
Commonwealth Bank Wisma Metropolitan II, Lantai Dasar Jl. Jend. Surdiman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
Daan Mogot Baru Blok LA/22 RT/RW 002/017 Kalideres Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Daan Mogot Estate DA/19 003/015, Kapuk, Cengkareng, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Dalangan RT 01 RW 05 Kel. Chiapursari, Kec. Bulu Temanggung Jawa Tengah Indonesia
Danau Agung 15/7, Block E14 Sunter Agung, Podomoro Jakarta, Utara 14350 Indonesia
Danau Indah I Blok A.3 No. 11 Sunter Jaya, Tanjung Priok Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Danau Indah IXA-12/31 Sunter Jaya Tanjong Priok, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Danau Permai Timur II, C2/7 Sunter Jaya, Jakarta Utara Indonesia ID No. 09.5103.REDACTED
DANAU SUNTER SELATAN0/5 KOMPLEX MEGA SUNTER NO. C10 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Dann Mogot No. 165 Jakarta 11520 INDONESIA
Darmawangsa No. 7 Vila Indah Pajajaran Bogor 16151 Indonesia
Darmo Harapan II/EF-27 Surabaya – Indonesia
Darmo Harapan Regency Blok RC-3 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Darmo Permai Selatan, 5/38 Surabaya, Indonesia.
Darmo Permai Timur, 6/15A, Surabaya, Indonesia
Denpasar 4/18 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Dharmawangsa Apt. 905 Jl. Dharmawangsa VII No. 9 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Diponegoro 76 Surabaya 60264
DK. NGADIROJO, RO.06, RW.05 NGADIROJO SUB DISTRIST, AMPEL DISTRICT BOYOLALI REGENCY REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Ds.Sajen Rt1/1Pacet Mojokerto, Indonesia.
Dsn. Bahagia Sentehbarik , Matang Terap West Kalimantan
Dsn. Krajan RT08/RW03 Jajag Gambiran Banyuwangi, Indonesia
Duri Kencana Raya No. 7 Jakarta 11510 Indonesia
Duri Kepa Kebon Jeruk JL Palem Utama No. 18 Jakarta 11510 Indonesia
DURI KEPA KEBON JERUK JL PALEM UTAMA NO. 8 JAKARTA 11510 INDONESIA
Dusun Klampok, Rt/Rw 001/011 Desa Sumbergedang, Kecamatan Pandaan Kabupaten Pasuruan, 67156 Indonesia
Dusun V Telegasari Tanjung Morawan Deli Serdang Medan Indonesia
Duta Indah 2 #21, Pondok Indah Jakarta Indonesia
Embong Malang 85-89 3rd Fl. Surabaya 60261 Indonesia
Embong Wungu No:6 Rt 01 Rw 03 Surabaya, Indonesia
Enterprise Building 4th Floor, Suite 401 Jl H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. C-5 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
Exertainment Indonesia Plaza Chase 14th Floor J1. Jend. Sudirman kav.21 Jakarta, Indonesia, 12920
Fatmawati Golf Mansion Kav.29 Jl. R.S Fatmawati, Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Fatmawati Mas Complex 329 Jl. R.S Fatmawati No. 20, Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
First City Complex 2, #02-33 Batam Centre, Pulau Batam, Indonesia
Fl 15, Menara Bank Danamon Jl Prof.Dr. Satrio Kav E.IV, No. 6 Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Flamboyan Utama I Blok B5/36, Kosambi Baru Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Flat 2709, Apt. Batavia Jl.k.h., Mas Mansyar, Kar. 126 Jakarta, Pusat 10220, Indonesia
Four Season Regent Residences J1 Setiabudi Tengah Spring Tower 11A Jakarta 12910 INDONESIA
Four Seasons Apartments Summer Tower, Unit 1B JI. Setiabudi Tengah Jakarta 12910, Indonesia
Four Seasons Apt 3A Summer Tower Jakarta, Indonesia
Four Seasons Residences, Summer Tower Apartment 01D, JI. Setiabudi Tengah, Jakarta 12910, Indonesia
G 1/3 RT 013 RW 007 Lebak Bulus Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Gajah Mada Mediterania D16, 3rd Floor Gajah Mada #174 Jakarta Indonesia
GANG SUNYI NO. 105 JL. PETITENGET, BALI INDONESIA 80361
GB, YOSUA ST. NO.12-A MEDAN
GB. Yosua, No. 12 A Medan North Sumatra Indonesia
Gd. Asosiasi Emiten Indonesia Building 2nd Floor, Jl. Fachrudin No. 6 Tanah Abang Jakarta Pusat 10250 Indonesia
Gdg. Kebon Kacang, Jl. Kebon Kacang Raya No. 15 Jarkarta 10240 Indonesia
Gedung Bri II Suite 1705 Jl Jend Sudirman No.44-46 Jakarta 10210 INDONESIA
Gedung Graha Kapital, 4th Floor, Jalan Kemang Raya No. 4, Mampang Prapatan, Jakarta Selatan Jalarta 12730, Indonesia.
Gedung Graha Niaga 1, Lt. 5 Jl. Putri Hijau No. 20 Medan 20115 – Indonesia
Gedung harco Mangga Dua Electronic Superstore Lt. Komplek Mangga Dua Plaza, Jl. Mangga Dua Raya Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Gedung Hijsu TK19 Jakarta Indonesia
Gedung Manara Karya 24th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Block x-5, Kav 1-2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia INDONESIA
Gedung Nugra Santana Lt 12, Jln. Jendral Sudirman Kav. 7-8 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
GEDUNG SETIABUDI ATRIUM 7TH FLOOR, JL. HR. RASUNA SAID KAV. 62 KUNINGAN, JAKARTA SELATAN 12920 Indonesia
Gedung Thamrin Handphone Center 2nd floor Komplek Sarinah Thamrin Jl. H.Agus Salim No. 60A Jakarta 10350, Indonesia
Gedung Tifa Lt.6 Jl Kuningan Barat No 26 Jakarta Selatan 12710 Indonesia
Gedung Wirabuana, Jl. Abdul Muis No. 24 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Gedung World Trade Centre Lt. 12 Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kavling 29-31 Jakarta Selatan 12920 Indonesia
Gg Balangan 1, 120 X, Ungasan, Bali, Indonesia
GG Lontar, RT/RW : 012/002, Pejagalan, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
GG. Cayho No. 23 Jakarta INDONESIA
Gg. Krama RT. 009 RW.010 Kelurahan Ciracas Cecamatan Ciracas Jakarta Timur 12610 Indonesia
Goodway Hotel Jl.Imam Bonjol No. 1 Batam
Grading Griya Lestari Blok D1, No. 15 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Graha Aktiva, Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav. 03 Blok X-1, Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Graha BIP 9th Floor, Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 23, Jakarta 12930, Indonesia
Graha Famili Block D No. 72 Surabaya 60226 INDONESIA
Graha Famili Block I-3 Taman Golf Famili Timur I-3 Surabaya 60226, Indonesia
Graha Family BB-18 Surabaya Indonesia
Graha Family Selatan V B-32 Surabaya Indonesia
Graha GRC Board Jln.S.parman Kav 64 Jakarta 11410 Indonesia
Graha Hijau B 11/12 Ciputat Tangerang Indonesia
Graha Irama 3rd Floor Jl. Hr. Rasuna Said Kav. 1-2 Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
Graha Irama Bldg 9th Floor JI. HR Rasuna Said Block X-1 Kav 1-2, Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Graha Kirana, 6th Floor, Jalan Yos Sudarso No. 88, Jakarta 14350 Indonesia.
Graha Multi Impresa Pratama 6th Flr Jl RS Mata Aini Kav BC 1 Setia Budi Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Graha Niaga 1st Floor Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav. 58 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Graha Niaga Lt. 11 Jl Jenderal Sudirman Kav 58 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Graha Niaga, 18th Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav 58 Jakarta 12190 INDONESIA
Graha Nigra 16th Fl. Jl. Jend, Sudirman Kav. 58 Jarkata 12190, Indonesia
Graha Semesta 4th Floor, Jln Kebayoran Lama Pal VII No. 31 Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Graha Taman HC 2No. 4 Bintaro Jaya Sector 9 Tangerang Indonesia
Graha Wirabuana Level 2, Suite 201 Jl. Abdus Muis, No. 24-26 Jakarta Pusat 10160 INDONESIA
Green Garden Block I-1/14 Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Green Garden Block Y2/5 Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Green Garden Blok B9 No. 30 Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Green Garden Blok EI/49 Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Green Garden Blok F1/2 Kedoya Jakarta
Green Garden DIII No. 20 RT 012 RW 004 Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Green Garden H2/6 Jakarta Barat 11520 Indonesia
Green Ville Blok BQ/26 RT 01/014 Duri Kepa Keb Jeruk Jakarta Barat 11610
Greenville Block BC/5 Duri Kepa Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Greenville Blok BG 10 JAKARTA BARAT Indonesia
Griya Agung Road, No. 73 Sunter Jakarta – Utara
Griya Ampera 3rd Floor JI. Ampera Raya 18 Jakarta, 12560 Indonesia
Griya Ampera Bldg. 2nd Floor Jl. Ampera Raya No. 18 Cilandak, Jakarta 12560
Griya Astika JL. Lamandau IV/16, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
GRIYA ELOK BLOK O NO. 98 SUNTER AGUNG, TANJUNG PRIUK Jakarta Utara Indonesia
GUDANG BANDUNG 3, RT 001 RW. 005 KEL. JEMBATAN LIMA KEC.TAMBORA JAKARTA – BARAT
Gudang Peluru Blok A/25 Kebon Baru Tebet, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Gudang Peluru Blok E/139 Rt. 02/03, Kebon Baru, Tebet Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Gudang Peluru Blok H/201 Rt. 006/03, Kebon Baru Jakarta Selatan
GULF RESOURCES IND WISMA 46 BNI 23RD FL JL JENDERAL SUDIRMAN KAV 1 JAKARTA 10220 INDONESIA
GUNUNG ATLANTIK NO. 2, LIPPO KARAWACI, TANGERANG INDONESIA
Gunung Mutiara 5 Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang Banten Indonesia
Gunung Sahari XI/70g J/d – Indonesia
H. NURDIN NO. 71D, RT 005/003 LEBAK BULUS, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Hanglekir I/6 RT 004/006 Gunung, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
House of Bali, Jalan Danau Tamblingan #108 Sanur 80228, Bali, Indonesia
ID Card: 32.03.26.2015/4417/4643429 JL. Gandaria Raya No 35, RT13/RW12, Kelurahan Ragajaya, Kecamatan Rojonggede Indonesia
Intercon blok E2/1, rt/rw 001/010 Srengseng, Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Interkon Kebon Jeruk Blok I 7 No. 29 Jakarta 11630, Indonesia
J l. Tembakau II No. 74 A Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
J Teuku Umar No. 50 RT/RW 001/001 Gondangdia Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
J. Wijaya Kusuma Blok 1 No. 17 Duren Sawit East Jakarta INDONESIA
J1 Cipaganti No. 136 Bandung Indonesia
J1 Drupadi No. 1 Banjar Basangkasa Seminyak, Bali Indonesia 80361
J1 Kelapa Sawit 13/3 Blok M II/3 Billy & Moon RE Pondok Kelapa East Jakarta 13450
J1 Kramat II #34, Jakarta Indonesia
J1, Katamaran Permai 8 No. 2, Kav, UT/LS II Pantai Indah, Kapuk, Jakarta, Indonesia
J1-Gunung Sahari V1 No.24, Jakarta,Indonesia.
J1-Mangga Besar V111/8,RT/008/02, Kel Tamansari,Jakarta Barat, Indonesia.
J1. Barata 40 Bandung, 40172 Indonesia
J1. Bidurl Bulan J1 #21 Permata Hijau Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
J1. Gayungsari VI/30 Wonocolo – Surabaya Indonesia
J1. Kaliurang KM 5, GG Megatruh No. 18 Yogyakarta Indonesia
J1. Kedoya Angsana II Blok D2 No. 25 Jakarta, 11520 Indonesia
J1. Kemang Dahlia Raya AK/16, RT/RW 001/012 Bojong Menteng Bekasi, Jawa Barat INDONESIA
J1. Madkum No. 15 Menteng Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
J1. P. Jayakarta 46 Block A/12 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
J1. Perumahan Kebon Jeruk Baru Blok A 6, No. 27 Jakarta 11530 INDONESIA
J1. Petemon Timur 68 Surabaya Indonesia
J1. Pluit Putra Dalam No. 3 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia
J1. Polisi Istimewa 32-38 Surabaya 60265 INDONESIA
J1. Pulasaren 82 Cirebon, 45117 Indonesia
J1. Puri Mutiara Wisma Pertamina #5 Jakarta Selatan 12430 Indonesia
J1. Rajawali Selatan I/55 RT 014/ RW 002 Gunung Sahari Utara Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
J1. Siliwangi 80 Cirebon, 45124 Indonesia
J1. Sultan Iskandar Muda No.25 Arteri Pondok Indah Jakarta 12240 INDONESIA
J1. Tambak Adi 46 Surabaya Indonesia
J1. Tisna Senjaya No. 80/18D Pungkur Bandung-40252 West Java, Indonesia
J1. Urip Sumoharjo 40 RT. 24/VI, Klitren Gondodusuman, Yogyakarta Indonesia
J1.Daan Mogot Km. 18 Cengkareng, Jakarta Barat, 11840 Indonesia.
J1.Daan Mogot Km. 18 Cengkareng, Jakarta,11840. Indonesia.
J1.Daan Mogot Km.18 ` Jakarta Barat 11840, Indonesia.
Jakarta Representative Office , Suite 1605, Wisma GKBL Jalan Jenderal S INDONESIA
Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Jalan Kiai Maja No. 9 Jakarta Selatan 12130 Indonesia
Jalan Margorejo Indah No. C-203, Surabaya 60237, Indonesia
Jalan Metro Pondok Indah No. UF-19, Pondok Indah Jakarta, 12320, Indonesia
Jalan 8 No. 5, Kelurahan Cipinang Muara Kecamatan Jetinegara East Jakarta, Indonesia
Jalan A No. 1 Karang Anyar Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Adityawarman, No. 9 Jkt Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Agung Permai, 4/23 Jakarta 14350 Indonesia
Jalan Aipda K.S. Tubun IIC No. 17-18 Jakarta Barat 11410 Indonesia
Jalan Akasia 1 B3 No. 39 Kedoya Selatan Jakarta 11520, Indonesia
Jalan Akasia I B3 No. 39 Kedoya Selatan Jakarta 11520, Indonesia
Jalan Alam Asri VII/SK. 8 Pondok Pinang, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Alam Segar VI/51 Pondok Inah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jalan Alaydrus 78-C Jakarta Pusat 10130 Indonesia
Jalan Andara Dalam Kav. IX/21, Pangkalan Jati Baru, Depok 16513, Indonesia
Jalan Arjuna Utara 87 Guna Group Building 6th Fl. Kebon Jeruk Jakarta 11510, Indonesia
Jalan Bangka 8A No. 21 JAKARTA 12720 Indonesia
JALAN BAU CEPER NO. 40 JAKARTA PUSAT 1 INDONESIA
Jalan Behape No. 1 Blok BB 9-10 Bumi Harapan Permai Jakarta 13550,
Jalan Biduri, Blok 12, No. 18 Permata Hijau Jakarta Selatan 12210
Jalan Boulevard Palem Raya No. 2105 Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang Indonesia
Jalan Braga No. 106 Bandung 40111, Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Golf 1 PD5 Pondok Indah Jakarta, Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Golf Utama Kav. III PA 1-2 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Golf Utama Kav. III PA 1-2, Pondok Indah Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Hijau III No. 11 Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jalan Bukit Pakar Utara No. 7 (Dago Pakar) Bandung, West Java INDONESIA
Jalan Cembaka Putih 20A Jakarta Pusat 10520 Indonesia
Jalan Cempaka Putih Tengah 27A No. F24 Taman Solo Jakarta 10510, Indonesia
JALAN CEMPAKA PUTIH TENGAH 27A/8 JAKARTA, PUSAT INDONESIA
Jalan Cendrawasih – LX/No.157 Jatiwaringin – Antilop Pondok Gede, Bekasi – 17411 INDONESIA
Jalan Cibaligo Melong No. 238, KM3 Leuwigajah Cimindi, Bandung Indonesia
Jalan Cilandak VI No. 23 RT 001 RW 003 Cilandak Barat Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Cipedes Heger No 8, Dr. Jujunan dalam III Bandung 40173, Indonesia
Jalan Cipete Raya no. 9, RT 004/004, Cipete Selatan, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Cipinang Muara 70 Jakarta Timur 13420 Indonesia
Jalan Cut Mutia No. 1, P.T. 001 Padana Pasir Padang Barat Indonesia
Jalan Daan Mogot Estate RT 005/015 Kapuk, Cengkareng Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jalan Dadali No. 9 Bandung Indonesia
Jalan Dadali No. 9 Bandung, Indonesia
Jalan Dago Raya No. 77 Lippo Cikarang, Bekasi 17550 Indonesia
JALAN DAHA 3 NO 7 KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA 12110 INDONESIA
Jalan Danau Sunter Selatan Blok M2/7 North Jakarta
Jalan Darmarangsa 8 No. 17 Kebayora Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
JALAN DARMAWANGSA X, RT 007, RW 008, KELURAHAN CIPETE UTARA, KECAMATAN KEBAYORAN BARU, JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Jalan Delima IV / 29, RT. 004, RW. 005 Tanjung Duren Selantan Sub District Grogol District, West Jakarta Republic of Indonesia
JALAN DELTA BARAT C 166 BEKASI INDONESIA
Jalan Deperdag 111 no. A-11 Radio Dalan Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12140
Jalan Derman Kencana IV, Block A IX/205 Taman Kusir, RT 013, RW 009 Kelurahan Kabaroyan Lama Utara Kecamatan Kabaroyan Lama, Jakarta Selatan
Jalan Dharmahusada Indah 120, Surabaya Indonesia
Jalan Diponegoro No. 33 Jakrata Pusat INDONESIA
Jalan Dr Semeru 1 No.32, Jakarta 11450 Indonesia
Jalan Dr. Setia Budhi No. 265-G Bandung 40154 Indonesia
Jalan Drupadi #1, Banjar Basangkasa Seminyak, Bali 80361, Indonesia
Jalan Duyong Gang 1/3x Sanur, Bali 80288
Jalan Elang Thainesia A-3 No.S Curug Indah, Cipinang Melayu Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jalan Elang Thanesia Blok A3 No. 18 Complex TNI-AU Curug Indah Jatiwaringin, Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Empu Sendok No. 57 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Flamboyan F-59 CJT II RT. 014, RW. 004, Gedong Sub District Kebon Jeruk District, West Jakarta Republic of Indonesia
Jalan G No. 408 Teluk Gong Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Gelong Baru Selatan, No. 54, Tomang, Jakart a Barat, Indonesia
Jalan Griya Indah Blok M1/18 Jakarta
Jalan H. Abdul Majid RT 011 RW002 Cipete Utara Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Indonesia
JALAN H.MOCHAMAD NAIM III/86 RT 007 RW 009 KELURAHAN CIPETE UTARA KECAMATAN KEBAYORAN BARU, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Haji Domang No. 31 Kelapa Dua, Kebon Jeruk Jakarta 11550 Indonesia.
Jalan Hang Lekir VII/6 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12120 Indonesia
JALAN HIANG LEKIR II/ 20 KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Hiang Lekir II/20 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Imam Bonjol, No. 54 Menteng, Jakarta INDONESIA
Jalan Ir. H. Juanda III No. 6, 4th Floor Jakarta Pusat 10120 Indonesia.
Jalan Janur Hijau VIII TC 1-9 Kelapa Gading Jakarta
Jalan Jatibaru Raya No 24 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jalan Jatipadang Utara No. 10 Pejaten Jakarta 12540 Indonesia
Jalan Jend. Sudirman Kav.21 Jarkata 12920 Indonesia
Jalan Jendral Gatot Soebroto Kav. 35 37 dan 39, Jakarta 10210, Indonesia.
Jalan Johar No.2 Lt.2A Menteng Jakarta Pusat 10310 Indonesia Indonesia.
Jalan Kalisari 3 No.22 Jakarta Timur 13780 INDONESIA
Jalan Kamboja 21 Pejaten Barat 2 Jakarta Selatan 12510 Indonesia
Jalan Karet No. 20, Pekan Baru, Indonesia
Jalan Kartika Utama Sm-29, Pondok Indah, Jakarta Selatan, indonesia, Postal Code 12310
Jalan Kartini Raya 64/65 Blok C9 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia 10750
Jalan Kebangkitan Nasional No. 48 RT/RW 001/001 Kelurahan Sriwedari Surakarta 57141 Indonesia
Jalan Kebon Manggis II, Number 6B Rukun Tetangga 009, Rukun Warga 002 Kelurahan Kebon Manggis, Kecamatan Matramatan Jakarta Timur, Jakarta, Indonesia
Jalan Kebon Sirih No. 17-19 Jakarta 10340 Indonesia
Jalan Kedoya Albasia Raya B.X1/6 Jakarta Barat 11520 Indonesia
Jalan Kelapa Puan Timur IV – NB 5/33 Pegangsaan Dua, Kelapa Gading Jakarta Urata, Indonesia
JALAN KEMANDARAN 1, NO. 22 PALMERAH BARAT JAKARTA SELATAN 12210 INDONESIA
Jalan Kemang Dalam 1x No. F-27 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jalan Kemang Timur Raya No. 78B Jakarta Selatan – 12730 Indonesia
JALAN KEMANG UTARA 26B JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Kemanggisan Ilir II / 43 RT 06 / RW 07 – Kemanggisan Jakarta Barat 11610 Indonesia
Jalan Kemanggisan llir II No. 43, RT06/RW07 Kemanggisan Jakarta Barat 11480, Indonesia
Jalan Kenanga No. 50J RT 007/RW 002 Cilandak Timur Jakarta Selantan 12560 Indonesia
Jalan Kesehatan No. 26, Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Kintamani 2 No.14, Kelapa Gading Jakarta
JALAN KRAMAT GANTUNG NO. 25 SURABAYA INDOENESIA
Jalan Kuta Raya No. 21 Bukit Gading Villa Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jalan Lembah Madang AF-28 RT. 001, RW. 005, Lidah Wetan Sub District Lakarsantri District, Surabaya INDONESIA
Jalan Malabar #4, Guntur Jakarta 12970 Indonesia
Jalan Mangga Besar IV J No. 3 RT. 004, RW. 001, Taman Sari Jakarta Barat 11150 Indonesia
Jalan Mangga Besar IV M/24 RT.004 RW.003, Taman Sari Sub District Taman Sari District, West Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Mangga Besar VI No. 30, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jalan Mangga No. 18 RT012/004 Gandaria Selatan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Mawar Raya D23 Cipinang Indah I Jakarta
Jalan Melinjo No. 17, RT 006/RW 007, Pejaten Barat, Jakarta Selatan.
Jalan Menteng Tenggulun RT002/RW010 No.7 Indonesia
Jalan Metro Alam III PH-2, Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Metro Alam X N010 Pondok Indah Jakarta
Jalan Minyak 333 no. 10 Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Muara Karang Blok P8U No.27 Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Jalan Muara Karang CIII Barat No. 25 North Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Muara Karang E5/41, RT 005, RW 013, Kelurahan Pluit, KECAMATAN PENJARINGAN, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jalan Mulawarman No. 1 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12100 Indonesia
Jalan Mushollah No. 20C, RT 004/RW 004 Kemang Cilandak Timur Jakarta Selatan 12562 Indonesia
Jalan Nipah No. 20J Padang, 25118 West Sumatra Indonesia
Jalan Pademangan I gg 7 No. 21 Jakarta Utara 14410 Indonesia
Jalan Palatehan I/35 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Jalan Pangadaran VII/I Ancol Barat Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Panglima Polim V No. 29 Kebayoram Baru Jakarta Selatan 12160 Indonesia
Jalan Pantai Mutiara AB/2 Jakarta 14440 Indonesia
JALAN PANTAI MUTIARA BLOK F NO. 23, RT 003, RW 016, KELURAHAN PLUIT, KECAMATAN PENJARINGAN, JAKARTA UTARA, INDONESIA
Jalan Pantai Mutiara G No. 1 Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Paradise Raya III, No. 1 Sunter Paradise Real Estate Jakarta Utara 14350 Indonesia
Jalan Parang Tritis Raya No. 15A
Jalan Parang Tritis Raya No. 15A Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Jalan Pelepah Indah Blok LC2 No. 9, Kelapa Gading Permai Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jalan Pelepah Kuning II WV 2/14 002/016, KLP Gading TMR Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pengembak Gang 3, No. 29 Sanur, Denpasar Bali Indonesia 80228
JALAN PENGEMBAK NO. 10 SANUR, BALI INDONESIA.
Jalan Pengembak No. 29 SANUR, BALI Indonesia 80228
Jalan Penyelesaian IV Kavling 65-3 Meruya Utara Jakarta Barat 11620 Indonesia
Jalan Perdatam Raya No. 24 RT008/002, Pancoran Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Permata Berlian R12 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Petitenget No. 111 Kerobokan, Bali Indonesia
Jalan Pinisi Permai VII No. 21 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pluit Murni III No. 3 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pluit Putera Kencana No. 20 RT 004 RW 006, Pluit Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pluit Sakti II No. 37 RT 007 RW 007 Pluit Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jalan Pluit Samudera V/* Jakarta INDONESIA
JALAN POSANAN RT. 003 RW 006 KELURAHAN TEGAL HARJO KECAMATAN JEBRES SURAKARTA JAWA TENGAH INDONESIA
Jalan Praja II No. 24, Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jalan Prapanca Raya 106 Jakarta Selatan 12150 Indonesia
Jalan Pratama No. 74, Tanjung Benoa, KEC. Kuta, Kab.Bdung, Indonesia
Jalan Prof. Dr.Ir Sutami No. 1, Makassar Indonesia
Jalan Pulo Mas Utara IIIB/4, RT005/RW014 Kayu Putih, Pulo Gadung Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jalan Pulo Nangka II No.4 RT. 009 RW. 008 Pulo Gadung Sub District Pulo Gadung District, East Jakarta Republic of Indonesia
Jalan Pulolentut No. 16 Kawasan Industri Pulogadung Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JALAN PUNCAK PERMAI UTARA SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jalan Pupuk Raya No. 43 Balikpapan 76114, Kalimantan, Timur, Indonesia
Jalan R.E. Martadinata No. 13-C Ancol Jakarta 14430
Jalan Ratulangi 47 Kelurahan Setonopande, Kecamatan Kota Kediri, East Java, Indonesia
Jalan Raya Margorejo Indah No. D-104 Surabaya 60237, Indonesia
Jalan Raya Puri Blok C1 No. 33, Jakarta Barat 11610, Indonesia
Jalan S. Syahrir, No. 12B, Jakarta, Indonesia
Jalan Sebandaran I / 6 Semarang 50135 Indonesia
Jalan Sekolah Kencana No. 4 Greenview Apt. Tower A, No. 54 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JALAN SHINTA INDAH DJAYA RT/014/01 TANJERANG, INDONESIA
Jalan Simprug Golf III/113 Jakarta 122220 Indonesia
Jalan Simpruk Golf XIII/19 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
JALAN SULTAN AGUNG NO. 18 JAKARTA 12980 INDONESIA 12980
Jalan Sultan Agung No. 18 Jakarta Indonsesia 12980
Jalan Sultan Syahrir No. 7, RT10/RW02 Gondangdia, Menteng Jakart Pusat Indonesia
Jalan Sultan Tirtayasa, No. 14 Bandung 40115 Indonesia
Jalan Sumatra 32 Surabaya 60281 INDONESIA
Jalan Sumatra No. 16 Menteng RT 02 RW 04 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
JALAN SUMBAWA NO. 12 MENTENG, JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jalan Sunter Paradise Raya 1, Blok F16 No. 28, Jakarta 14350, Indonesia
Jalan Suryo No.7 Blok S Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12180 INDONESIA
Jalan Suwiryo 26, Menteng, Jakarta 10350, Indonesia
Jalan Suwiryo No. 28 Menteng, Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Jalan Taman Atas No.7-9-11 Baloi Centre-Batam
Jalan Taman Metro Alam IV PL 6 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jalan Taman Metro Alam IV PL 6, RT 011/RW 016 Pondok Indah, South Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Taman Sari II/22, RT 005/03 Kelurahan Maphar, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jalan Tanjung No. 28 Gondangia Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jalan Tanjung No. 28 Jakarta 10350 Indocnesia
Jalan Tegehsari Jimbaran Bali Indocnesia
Jalan Tembakau III No. 74 A RT. 02/01 Pejaten Timur, Pasar Minggu Jakarta 12510 Indonesia
Jalan Terusan Hang Lekir V No. 18A Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Jakarta 12220 Indonesia
Jalan Tomang Raya No 5A Jakarta 11440 Indonesia
Jalan Tomang Utara No.3 Jakarta Indonesia
Jalan Tukad Gerinding Gang 1 No. 1 Denpasar Bali Indonesia
Jalan Uluwatu No 1 Tengeh Sari Jimboran, Bali Indonesia
Jalan Wambi No. 27 Bandung Indonesia
Jalan Wambi No. 28 Bandung, Indonesia
Jalan Wambi No. 30 Bandung INDONESIA
Jalan Warung Buncit Raya 49 Mampang Prepatan Jakarta 12740 Indonesia
JALAN WIDYA CHANDRA VII/7 RT008/001 SENAYAN KEBAYORAN BARU, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Wijaya I Blok Q/4 No. 381 N Kebayoran Baru – Jakarta 12170 Indonesia
Jalan Wijaya I Blok Q/4 No. 381 N, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12170 Indonesia
Jalan Wijaya Kusuma FF/18 RT 001 RW 006 Rawa Badak Jakarta, Indonesia
JALAN WIJAYAKARTA NO. 1 MAMPANG PRAPATAN JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jalan Willis 2B, Semarang, Indonesia
Jalan Zeni G 96 RT/RW 04/06 Kelurahan Cipinang Melayu, Kecamatan Makasar, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JALAN, KALIANAK BARAT NO 78B – 88 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jalen Karang Anyar Raya 53-54 Blok D/24 Jakarta 10740
Janur Asri 9, Block QK18, No 12 A, kelapa gading, Jakarta, Indonesia 14240
Jati Barang/16 RT012/RW004 Kel. Jati, Pulo Gadung Jakarta Timur
Jati Padang Baru E-5 PASAR MINGGU Jakarta Indonesia
Jati Padang Poncol/5 Kav.8, RT. 004, RW. 008, Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jayakarta Plaza Lt. IV/DB 1, Kakarta 11180 Indonesia
Jelan Kemang Selatan, IC No. 25, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jembatan II Blok C/47 RT.010 RW.002 Pejagalan Penjarinsan, Jakarta Indonesia
Jemur Andayani VI/15, Surabaya Indonesia
Jeruk Garut Raya No. 7 RT/RW : 003/006 Duri Kepa Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jeruk Purut Buntu No. 67 RT 004/03, Kel. Cilandak Timur Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JI A. M. Sangaji No.11 L-M-J Jakarta 10160, Indonesia
Ji Arco Raya No.63 Cipete Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JI Bougenville No. 16 Flamboyan Baru Padang West Sumatera Indonesia
JI BUKIT HIJAU 2 NO. 2 JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIAN 12310
JI BUKIT HIJAU 5 NO. 7 PANDOK PINANG JALARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
JI Cibeber I/No.21 Rt003/003 Rawa Barat, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Ji Duren Sawit Barh Blokai No 14 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JI KENCANA PERMAI 5 NO. 48 JAKARTA SELATAN SELATAN INDONESIAN
JI Pangeran Jayakarta 105G Jakarta Indonesia 10730
JI Pertani 1/71, RT008/RW003 Duren Tiga, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JI Sunter Mediterania Block E No. 33 Sunter, Jakarta-Utara 14340 Indonesia
Ji Talang No 3 Jakarta Indonesia
JI TAMAN BUKIT HIJAU NO.37 RT010 RW013PD KEBAYORAN LAMA JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
JI Taman Patra Raya No. 6 Kuningan , Jakarta 12870 Indocnesia
JI. Borobudur No.6 Menteng – Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
JI. Bumi Pratama Timur-I R25 Perumahan Bumi Harapan Permai Jakarta 13550 Indonesia
JI. Camar I Blok BA No. 12 A, Bintaro Jaya III Tangerang Indonesia
Ji. DR. Makaliwe Raya No. 39A Jakarta 11450 Indonesia
JI. Gajah Mada No. 13 RT 02/RW 02 Pekanbaru Indonesia
JI. Gereja Theresia 27 Jakarta Indonesia
JI. Gunung Sahari IV No. 1 Jakarta 10610 Indonesia
JI. Harji Samali No. 51 Kalibabta Jakarta Selatan 12740 Indonesia
JI. Harji Samali No. 51 Kalibata Jakarta Selatan 12740 Indonesia
JI. Jend. Sudirman No. 94, Bandar Lampung Indonesia
Ji. Kampung Seng I No. 6 Surabaya, Indonesia
JI. Kenanga 6 Cilandak Jakarta, 12560 Indonesia
JI. Kesari #15 Br Batujimbar Sanur, Bali Indonesia
JI. Kramat No. 25 Rt. 004/ Rw. 007 Kwitang, Senen, Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Ji. Kuta Indah 15 Kelepa Gading Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
JI. Lembang No.9 Central of Jakarta Indonesia
JI. M. Kahfi 1/21 Taman Botanik C 14/15, Jagakarsa, Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
JI. Madrasah Raya No. 7 Cilandak Timur Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Indonesia
JI. Mutiara 12 Pondok Labu Jakarta, 13220 Indonesia
JI. Nirwana 28 Blok H-5 Nirwana Sunter Asrithp III Jakarta-Utara Indonesia 14350
JI. Permata Timur VIII/N-7 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JI. Pramuka Sari III/12 Jakarta 10570 Indonesia
JI. RS FATMAWATI 31 A JAKARTA, 12430 INDONESIA
JI. RS. Fatmawati No. 15 Kompleks D-Best Blok J-5 Jakarta Selatan 12420 Indonesia
JI. Rs. Fatmawati No. 20 Fatamawati Mas Kav. 2/215 Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
JI. Sisingamangaraja No. 3c Jakarta 12120 INDONESIA
JI. Swakarya Bawah No. 1 RT.001/001 Pondok Labu-Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JI. Taman Surya Block IID/8 Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
JI. Tg. Duren Timur No. 27 RT.004. RW.006 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JI. Walet Permai I No. 25 Pentai Indah Kapuk Jakarta, Indonesia
JI. Widya Chandra XI/3, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JI.Letnan Arsyad No.7 Perumnas, Bekasi Bekasi II Indonesia 17144
JI.Sisingamangaraja No.3C, Jakarta 12120, Indonesia
JI> Andong II RT 004/006, Kota Bambu Palmerah Jakarta, Barat Indonesia
Jimerto 2, Surabaya 60272, Indonesia
Jin Bandengan Utara No. 81 Blok B RT 009/016 Penjaringan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jin Batu Ceper No. 40 Jarkarta Pusat 1 Indonesia
JIN CENDANA 37/39 MENTENG JAKARTA 10350
Jin Kesehatan No. 26 RT010/RW005 Petojo Selatan Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jin Sungai Sambas V11 No.16, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia.
JIN TANJUNG ANOM NO. 4 BANDUNG INDONESIA
Jin. Kampung Bali IV No. 32, Jakarta 10250 Indonesia
JIn. Madiun 15 Jakarta INDONESIA
Jin. Pasir Putih 7, No. 3 Ancol Timur Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl Agung Perkasa 6, Block J 1A/34 Jakarta Utara 14350, Indonesia
Jl Alam Elok VII No. 15 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Selantan 12310 Indonesia
Jl Alamanda II Blok E2 no. 14 Kedoya Selatan-Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Alaydrus No. 82 Jakarta Pusat 10130 Indonesia
Jl Alaydrus No. 82 Jakarta Pusat 10130, Indonesia
Jl Alyadrus No. 76 RT 002/02, Petejo Utara Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Alydrus No. 76 RT 2/6, Gambir Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Ampera Raya No. 27, RT003, Ragunan, Pasar Minggu, (Depan Gedung Arsip Nasional), Indonesia.
Jl Arteri Mangga Dua Gedung Harco elektronik Superstore Lt. 45, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Bangau IV no. 2A, Jakarta 10610, Indonesia
JL BANGKA RAYA 99C, JAKARTA 12720, INDONESIA
Jl Bangka Raya Pela 49 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12730 Indonesia
Jl Batu Ceper No. 18-C Jakarta 10120 Indonesia
Jl Batur Sari No. 37X, Bj Medura, Sanur, Danpasar, Bali INDONESIA
JL Batur Sari, 37X, Sanur, Bali, Indonesia
Jl Batutulis VI No. 39 RT 011/RW003 Kebon Kelapa Jakarta PUS Indonesia
JL BB Cipinang Mura RT. 002/RW:004 Cipinang Mura Jakarts Mura Indonesia
JL Bendungan Hilir Raya Blok G1, No:7 Jakarta-Pusat Indonesia
Jl Berlian I/B-3 Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Biduri Pandan Blok II No. 2, Permata Hijau Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL Bisma 12 Blok C1 No. 22 Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl Bukit Golf II, PB 26 RT 012/015 PD Pinang, KBY Lama Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Bunga Lili, No. 9 RT 010 / 006, Kel Bintaro Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL BUNGUR BESAR NO. 31-A JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl Bungur Besar No. 51 Jakarta 10730 Indonesia
JL BUNGUR BESAR NO. 78 JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl Camar Permai IV/22 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Canadianti Blok A No. 10 Komplek Bank Prapanca K4eb. Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Cemara Raya CM 1-2 Grogol, Solo Baru Sukoharjo 57552 Indonesia
Jl Cemp Putih Tengah 17/9 Rt02/08 Kel Cemp Pth Tgh Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl Cibodas C-14 No. 177 Jati Cempaka Jakarta Indonesia
JL Cihampelas 258A Bandung 40131 Indonesia
Jl Cipaganti No. 63 Bandung Indonesia
Jl Cipaganti No. 92A Bandung Indonesia
Jl Cipinang galur Kulon RT:008/05 Jatinegara Jakarta Tinmur Indonesia
Jl Cisanggiri 1/3 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12170 Indonesia
Jl Danau Indah II A2/15, Sunter Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl Delman Asri IX/A 33 RT006/011 Kebayoran Lama Utara Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Delman Asri IXA 33-39 RT006/011 Kebayoran Lama Utara Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Denpasar III (YBR IV) Blok D, Kav. 4 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Jl Dieng No. 6 Semarang INDONESIA
Jl Diponegoro 50 Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia.
JL DR SEMERU III/6 GROGOL, JAKARTA 11450 INDONESIA
Jl Dr Sutomo 56-58, Surabaya Indonesia
JL DRUPADI, NO. 1, BANJAR BASANGKASA SEMINYAK DENPASAR BALI 80361
Jl Duta 2/54, Kelurahan Duri Jakarta Barat 11510 Indonesia
Jl Duta Permai III, No. 1 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan 12310 Indonesia
Jl Embong Cerme 25 Surabaya Indonesia
JL Empu Tantular 77, Tanjung Mas, Semarang Utara, Karyanan, Indonesia
JL ERLANGGA III NO.11, SELONG, KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN 12110 INDONESIA
JL Fajar Indah 11/77 RT 05 RW 07 KEL. Jajar Kecamatan Laweyan Surakarta Indonesia
Jl Fajar Indah 11/77 RT/RW 05/07 Kel Jajar Kecamatan Laweyan Surakarta Indonesia
Jl Gajah Mada 150 A B C Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL Gandaapura IV No. 3B Kesiman Tohpati Denpasar 80237 Bali, Indonesia
Jl Gedung Hijau I/48 Jakarta Selatan Indoensia
Jl Gedung Hijau Raya SG 17 Kav 5, Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Gelong Baru Tengah No.3A, RT011/RW002 , Tomang, Grogol Petambur, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl Gg. Langgar No. 24 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Gotong Royong No. 11 Cipete Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL GS Machmud Merchant G.S Sadaraya, RT001/011, Pontianak Saiantan, Indonesia
JL H Jann 1 No. 49 Indonesia
JL H SAABAH NO. 5 CIPETE UTARA-KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN 12150 Indonesia
JL H Saili F. 51 Indonesia
JL H. Feichruddin, No. 16 Jakarta, Pusat 10250 Indonesia
Jl Hayam Wuruk No. 57 RT02/RW01, Cibodas Baru Tangerang Indonesia
JL HOS COKMAMINOTO NO. 15RT03/04 KABUPATEN KLATEN INDONESIA.
JL HR RASUNA SAID BLOK X-5 KAV 2-3 MENARA KADIN BLDG LANTAI 30 JAKARTA INDOENSIA
Jl Imam Bonjol 52 RT002 RW05 Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Janur Elok VI Blok QC 13 No. 9 Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jl Janur Hijau III – TI 1 No. 1 Jakarata 14240 Indonesia
JL JATIBARU, NO. 24 JAKARTA 10160 INDONESIA
Jl Jend. Sudirman 1 No. 41 Medan Indonesia
Jl Jeruk Purut No 1B Jakarta, 12560 Indonesia
JL Karmel Vibl G No 12, RT/RW 011/004 Kel. Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Karper K-17A, Cinere Estate Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Kartika Utama 29 Kav 5 RT 012/006 Kelurahan Pondok Pinang Jakarta 12310
Jl Kartini V No. 11C, Jakarta Indonesia
JL Kebon Jeruk 111 No.1A-F Maphar Taman Sari Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Kelapa Dua Raya No. 25 RT 06/RW.05 Jakarta 11550 INDONESIA
Jl Kelapa Gading Blk E-106 Cinere Jaksel PT Lorin Indonesia
Jl Kelapa Puan Timur I NB 1/8 Kelapa Gading Permai Jakarta Vtara Indonesia
JL Kelepa Gading Raya No.18 Semaring Indonesia
Jl Kemag Utara IX/9 BlokAI-2 Rukan Tiara Buncit Jakrata 12760 Indonesia
Jl Kemang 5A No. 21 Kemang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia 12730
Jl Kemang Selatan 1E No. 17 Kemang, Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jl Kemang Timur No. 36 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
JL Kenanga No. 50J RT 007/02 Cilandak Timur, Pasar Minggu Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL Kenanga No. 7 Pondok Pinang Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
JL Kenanga No. 7 Pondok Pinang Jakarta, Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Ki Hajar Dewantara No. 58 Ciputat 15413 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL KINTAMANI 1/21 BUKIT GADING VILLA KELAPA GADING, JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
JL KLP Puyuh VI KJ 10, RT005 RW 019, KLP Gading, Kelapa Gading Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl Kolombo 19 RT 033, RW 007 Terban, Gondokusuman, Yogyakarta 55223 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
JL Krakatau Vill No. 16 Semarang 50125 Indonesia.
Jl Kramat Kwitang, Kecil No. 5 RT005/RW007, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Ks Tubun II no 15, Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl Kusuma Atmaja No. 51 Kelurahan, Menteng Jakarta 10310, Indonesia
Jl Kusuma Atmaja No. 51 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat 10310 Indonesia
Jl Kuta Indah No. 75, Klpgd Brt, Jakarta 14240, Indonesia
JL Laksana Bintan Komp Tanah Mas Blok. A1 Sei Panas Batam 29432
JL LEMBANG 11 MENTENG JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl Lembang Terusan D-51, Menteng, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Malibu Indah Raya Blok F-11 Medan 20157 Indonesia
Jl Mampang Prapatan IV/20 Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Jl Mangga Besar IX No. 2D Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Mangga No. 4 Panjunan Kudus 59317 Indonesia
Jl Mas Putih 31, Permata Hijau, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Matraman Raya/198 R.T./R.W. 012/006 Kampung Melayu Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl Merdeka No. 36, Palembang Indonesia
Jl Metro Kencana 5/16 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
JL METRO PONDIK INDAH KAV. IV TH2 RT 010/015 KEL. PONDOK PINANG JAKARTS SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl Mirah Kencana 43 Permata Hijau Jakarta 12210 INDONESIA
JL MURAI 11, NO. 01 R7.18 PALEMBANG, INDONESIA
JL MURAI 11, NO. 01 RT.18 PALEMBANG, INDONESIA
JL Otista Raya No. 39 Cawang Jakarta Indonesia
JL P JAYAKARTA 119A JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl padang Sidempuan No. 2C/6 Medan
Jl Pajajaran No. 59 Bandung Indonesia
JL PALAPA XV NO 10 PASAR MINGGU JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
JL PALATHAN I/35 KEBAYRON BARU JAKARATN SELETAN INDOESIAN 12160
JL Pandeglang No. 27, R.T./R.W. 001/004 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat Indocnesia
Jl Panglima Polim XIV No. 62B Melawai, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Panjunan G-II RT.16 RW.03 Sidoarjo Indonesia
JL Pasir Putih Raya 26 Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl Patal Senayan no 38 Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Jl Pattimura No. 35, Jakarta, Indonesia
JL PEDURENAN 2A CILANDAK TIMUR JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl Pemuda No. 60 – 70 Surabaya 60271 Indonesia
Jl Perak Blok B-18, 001/012, Grogol Utara Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Permata Angkasa No. 15 Jakarta Indonesia
JL PERMATA HIJAU BLOK 1-2 NO.18 JAKARTA INDONESIA 12210
Jl Permata Hijau, Blk B Jakarta Indonesia
JL Permata Mirah, Block T No.5 Permata Hijah Jakarta Selatan 12210, Indonesia.
Jl Perniagaan Barat 26/27 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Perniagaan Bo. 3 Medan Indonesia
Jl Pertanian Raya Kav DPRD No. 52 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Peta Selatan NO. 48 Kalideres Jakarta 11840, Indonesia
JL PETOJO DUCLEK II/16, R.T. 012, R.W 007 JAKARTA
JL PINTU KECIL RAYA 40 RT 04/01 ROA MALAKA JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Jl Pluit Kencana V No. 8 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Pluit Sakti VI/40, Jakarata Utara Indonesia
Jl Pluit Samudera V No. 20 Jakarta Indonesia
JL PONDOK DUTA RAYA BG 111/7 RT 12 RW 14, TUGA, KEC. CIMANGGIS BOGOR INDONESIA.
JL PRIMSMA 2 BLOK B2 NO.33 TAMAN KEDOYA PERMAI JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl Prof Dr Soepomo No. 44 Jakarta Selantan 12870 Indonesia
Jl Prof Dr Soepomo No. 44 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl Prof Supomo SH No. 55A RT013/003 Kel. Tebet Barat, Kec, Tebet Jakarata Selatan Indonesia
Jl Prof Yamin No. 34 Menteng, Jakarta Indonesia
Jl Pulo Mas Barat X/25 RT 003 RW 010 Kelurahan: Kayu Putih Kecamatan: Pulo Gadung Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
JL PUNACK GOLF NO. 2 KOMPEK LIPPO KARAWACI JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl Puri Pesanggrahan I, Blok M Bukit Cinere Indah Indonesia 16514
JL Rajawali Selatan 5 No. 39, Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
Jl Raya Bogor Km28 Pasar Rebo Jakarta 13710 INDONESIA
JL RAYA GUBENG, NO. 100, SURABAYA, INDONESIA
Jl Raya Kertajaya, Indah No. 91, Blok 0207 Surabaya Indocnesia
JL RAYA MANGGA BESAR 58 RT 006/001 TAMAN SARI Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL RAYA RANCAEKEK KM23 SUMEDUNG Indonesia
Jl Raya Surabaya Mojokerto, KM. 44, Sidoarjo, East Java, Indonesia
JL RAYA TROPODO NO. 126 WARU-SIDOARJO SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jl Rontgen No.4 Bandung 40171 Indonesia
JL ROSALIA 4 BLOK LL NO. 9 JAKARTA INDONESIA
JL Ruby I/28 Blok G Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL Rungkut Mejoyo Selatan Blok AM-39, JL Tenggilis Blok AM-39 University of Surabaya Surabaya 60292, INDONESIA
Jl Sanu Indah No. 47 Bukit Gading Vila, Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Utara 14240 Indonesia
Jl Sawo No. 23 Mengteng Jakarta Pusat Jakarta 10330 Indocnesia
JL SEMANGKA RAYA RT 015/02 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL SEMOLOWARU TENGAH 9/37 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jl Simprug Golf 1/176 Jakarta Selatan 12220 Indonesia
Jl Slamet Riyadi No. 450 Solo Indonesia
Jl Subanjo Wingo Pranoto 38-C, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL SUMBING NO 5 JAKARTA INDOEDSIA 13720
JL SUMBING NO.5 JAKARTA INDOESIA 13720
Jl Sutan Syahrir No. 27 Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl Suwiryo No. 45 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl Talang No. 3 Jakarta
Jl Talang No. 3 Jakarta 10320 Indonesia
Jl Taman Patra XI No. 6 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Jl Taman Kedoya Baru D 10/26 Kedoya Selatan-Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Taman Patra II Blok M7/KAV. 11 Jakarta Selatan 12950
Jl Taman Patra II Blok M7/KAV.11 Jakarta Selatan 12950
Jl Taman Radio DLM V/14 RT 006/013 Gandaria Utara Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl Taman Sari VIII/114, RT 009, RW 006, Maphar, Taman Sari, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
JL TAMAN TORAM II RT 02/10 KALIDERES JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Jl Tanjung 74 Blitar 66122 Jawa Timur Indonesia
Jl Tanjung Karang R.T./R.W. 03/03 Desa Tanjung Karang, Kudus Indonesia
JL TANJUNG SARI NO.5 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jl Tasikmalaya No. 23, 10310 Jakarta Indonesia
JL TEBAH 11/9 RT 013/003 GUNUNG JAKARTS SELATAN INDOENSAIN
Jl Thalib II, No. 35A RT 012/05, Kel. Krukut Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Tidore No. 15 Jakarta Pusap Indonesia
JL Trs. Hanglekir II/WG-6 RT.006/08, Grogol Selatan, Keb.Lama, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Tukat Balian, 121, Renon Bali Indonesia
Jl Tunjung II No. 12, RT 16/03 Jati Pulo, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl Uluwatu Perumahan Baliview Blok AII/2 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl Veteran No. 50 Bekasi Selatan INDONESIA
Jl Wahid Hashim 96 Jakarta 10340 Indonesia
Jl Westhoff No. 12 Bandung 40171 Indonesia
Jl Wijayakarta Raya No. 3, Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
JL, Anggrek 12 No. 2 Rt. 001 Rw 04 Karet Kuningan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL, CIDENG TIMUR 62, JAKARTA PUSAT, INDONESIA
JL, KARTIKA UTAMA PU 21, RT/TW 012/016, PONDOK PINANG, KEBAYORAN LAMA, JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
JL, KH. M MANSYUR BLOK 15A NO. 23-25 JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl, Puri Mutiara Wisma Pertamina #5 Jakarta Selatan 12430 INDONESIA
JL-Melong Kidul No. 51 Bandung 40261 Indonesia
Jl. Cikajang 29 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12170 INDONESIA
Jl. Supratman no. 23, Kel. Peunayong, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
Jl. Abdul Muis No. 24 Gedung Wirabuana Lt. Dasar Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Jl. Abdul Muis No. 80A Petojo Selatan Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Jl. Agung Perkasa 15 RT009/ RW014 Sunter Agung, Tanjung Priok Indonesia
JL. AGUNG TENGAH II BLOK I.4 NO. 12B JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Jl. Agung Utara Blk 0/15 STS, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Aipda K.S. Tubun HC/12 R.T. 004 R.W.01 Jakarta Indonesia
JL. ALAM ASRI IX/15, SF.3 RT 009/015 PONDOK PINANG JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Jl. Alam Segar III/12 RT 007/016 Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Alam Segar XI No. 7 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Alam Segar XI/56 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Alamanda CII/19 Sunter Jaya, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Alamanda Raya Blk. HB No. 26 Rt:009/002 Pesanggrahan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Alaydrus No. 45A Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Aman No. 7, RT 002/02 Kel. MP. Prapatah, Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Ametis 3 No. 60 Permata Hijau Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Ampera Raya 18 Jakarta, 12560 Indonesia
Jl. Ancol VIII, No. 1 Ancol Barat Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Jl. Anggrek Cendrawasih J/4 Slipi, Jakarta Indonesia 11480
Jl. Anggrek Garuda IV/79 Kemanggisan, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Angkasa No. 32 Block A1 Jakarta 10610 Indonesia Indonesia
Jl. Angke Jaya II/42 RT 15/03 Angke Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Angsa III Blk D5/7, Rt/Rw 013/004, Kelurahan Kedoya Selatan, Kecamatan Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta-Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Anjasmoro 59 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Antara 41A Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Antara 41A Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Anyelir 4/21 RT 002, RW 004 Cedong, Pasar Rebo Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Jl. Anyelir F/28 RT02 RW04 Pasar Rebo East Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl. Artuna Utara 42A Tanjung Duren Jakarta 11470 Indonesia
Jl. Astana Anyar No. 33 Bandung 40241 In don esia
Jl. Bahtera Permai 2/26 Pantai Indah Kapuk Jakarta 14460, Indonesia
Jl. Baladewa No. 13, RT001/RW003 Duren Sawit, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JL. BALIKPAPAN RAYA NO.7 JAKARTA
Jl. Bambu Apus Raya Blok J-II No. 189, RT.04, RW.011 Kel. Pondok Bambu, Kec. Duren Sawit Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Jl. Bandun No. 3A, RT. 013, RW. 005 Menteng, Jakpus, Jakarta Pusat
JL. Bangka XI A/12 RT 002 RW 010, Pela Mampang Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Bank Raya II/2F Prapanca Bawah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Banyuwangi No. 17 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Banyuwangi No. 17 RT 004 / RW 005 JARKARTA INDONEISA
Jl. Batu Tulis Vi No. 39D Rt. 001/RW.003 Kelurahan Kebon Kelapa Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Bdn I No. 26 Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. BDN I/38 RT.011/013 Cilandak Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Jl. Belanak V/6 RT.012 RW. 007, Kelurahan Jati, Kecamatan Pulo Gadung, Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Jl. Bendungan Hilir (Benhil) IV No. 15 Jakarta Pusat 10210 INDONESIA
Jl. Bengawan 56, RT004/ RW002 Kel. Darmo, Kec. Wonokromo Surabaya 60241 Indonesia
JL. BENGAWAN 56, SURABAYA, INDONESIA
Jl. Beraban 98 Klod, Kuta Bali Indonesia
JL. BERLIANI I, B6 CILANDAK BARAT JAKARTA SELATAN 12430, INDONESIA
JL. BESAKIH NO. 1, KUNINGAN JAKARTA 12950 INDONESIA
Jl. Biduri Bulan Blok M No.10-11 Permata Hijau Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Biduri Bulan IX/10.A. RT. 010/003, Kel. Sumur Batu, Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Birah III No. 1 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta, Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Biru Laut Raya No. 20 Cipinang, Jakarta Timur 13340 Indonesia
Jl. Bisma VI Block B15 House C8 Sunter Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Blandongan 28 D Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Bongas II, Blk E7 No. 19 Jatiwaingin Asri, Pndk Gede Bekasi, Jawa Barat 17411 Indonesia
Jl. Boulevard Raya WB2/32 RT011/RW016, Kelapa Gading Timur Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Brawijaya II/9 RT. 003/002 Pulo-Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Bromo 6 Malang Indonesia
Jl. Brumbungan No.58 Semarang Indonesia
Jl. Btanghari No.23-B RT.006 RW.003 Cideng, Jakpus Indonesia
JL. Buana Pesanggrahan I/16 Bukit Cinere Indah Kav. ON 10 jakarta Selatan
JL. BUDI MULIA, NO. 8, RT 003 RW 004, INDONESIA
Jl. Budi Sari III No. 19 Cidadap, Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Gading Raya Block C, No. 1 Komp Gading Permai Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Golf 1 Sektor VI Blok B No. 11 Bumi Serpong Damai 15310 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Golf Utama Kav. PA 27 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Golf Utama Kav. PA 27 RT012/015, Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Golf Utama PA No 27 RT000/RW003 Kelurahan Pondok Pinang Kecamatan Kebayoran Lama South Jakarta INDONESIA
JL. Bukit Hijau 9/14 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Kumala No. 8 Bukit Sari, Semapang Indonesia
JL. BUKIT PAKAR TIMUR 110 RT 04 RW O3 DESA CIBURIAL KEC. CIMENYAN KAB. BANGDUNG Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Pakar Timur 110 RT04 RW03 Desa Ciburial Kec. Cimenyan Kab. Banguang 40198, Indonesia
Jl. Bukit Pakar Utara No.7 (Dago Pakar) Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Bumi Asih IV A.5 Jakata Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Buncit Raya Ujung RT 003/005 Jati Padang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. BUNGUR BESAR NO. 78-A JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl. Bungur Besar No. 79 Kemayoran, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. BUNGUR BESAR NO. 81 JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
JL. BUNGUR BESAR XIII/83B, RT006/RW001 KEMAYORAN, JAKPUS, JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl. Bungur No. 2, Bangka Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. By Pass Ngurah Rai No. 888 Br. Kelan, Tuban Kuta, Bali Indonesia 80361
Jl. Cahaya D6/20-21, RT001/RW004, Kemb. Selatan Kembangan, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Camar Elok V No. 35 Pantai Indah Kapuk Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Camar Permai I No. 35 Kapuk Utara, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Canadianti No. 16 RT 001/RW008 Kel. Pela Mampang Jakarta Selatan
JL. Capitaku IV/304 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia.
JL. Caringin Utara I No. 31, Cilandak Jakarta Selatan 12430, Indonesia
JL. Caringin Utara Kav. 34 RT15/10 Cilandak Barat, Jakarta Selatan 12430 Indonesa
JL. Caringin Utara No. 31 Cilandak Barat Cilandak Jakarta Selatan 12430 Indonesia
JL. CASABLANCA NO. 1, APARTMENT PURI CASABLANCA TOWER C 2501, KUNINGAN JAKARTA SELATAN 12870 INDONESIA
JL. CC NO. 1, CENGKARENG BARAT JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Jl. Cedung Pinang SMO5 Pondok Indah Jakarta Indonesia
JL. Cemara Boulevard G1-23 Deli Serdang 20371 Medan Indonesia
Jl. Cempaka No. 19 RT 04/01 Kel Jatipulo Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Cempaka Putih Barat 21 No. A-6, RT 006 RW 012 Kelurahan Cempaka Putih Brt Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Cempaka Putih Timur 5A/3 RT 012/RW 007, cempaka Puith Timur, Jakarta
JL. CEMPAKA PUTIH TIMUR IV B/8 JAKPUS 10510 INDONESIA
Jl. Cempaka Putih Timur IV No. 6 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
Jl. Cibitung I / No. 3 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Cibitung I No. 3 Rt.012 Rw. 004 Petogongan – Kebayoran Baru South Jakarta, Indonesia
JL. CIBITUNG I/NO. 3 KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl. Cidadap Girang Baru No. 3 (Jl. Setia Budi) Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cideng Timur No. 55 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Cigondewah Girang RT 02/32 Cimahi Bandung Indonesia
JL. CIGONDEWAH GIRANG RT. 02/32 CIMAHI INDONESIA
Jl. Cigondewah Girang, RT07132, Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Cijerah Cigondewah Blok Suci No. 16, Cimahi Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cijerah Cigondewah Blok Suci, No. 13 Cimahi Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. CijerahCigondewah Blok Suci No. 16, Cimahi Bandung, Indonesia
JL. Cikajang No. 29 RT 001/005 Petogogan, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
Jl. Cikini No. 2 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Cikini Raya 24 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Jl. Cikini Raya No. 24 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Cilandak Tengah No. 97 Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Cililin II No. 8A, RT. 010, RW. 006 Petogogan, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Cilimblileuit No. 184, Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cimanuk No. 24 Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cinere No. 14 Rt 005/006 Pondok Labu Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Ciniru 1 No. 10, RT006/003 Rawa Barat, Kebayoran Baru Indonesia
Jl. Ciniru 6/15, Keboyaran Baru Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Cipaganti No. 63, Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Cipinang Cempedak II No. 10, Jakarta Indonesia
JL. CIPINANG CEMPEDAK II/NO. 41 JAKARTA TIMUR INDONESIA
JL. Cipinang Elok X-39 Rt. OT/010 Kel Cipinang Minara Jakarta Timur INDONESIA
Jl. Cirendeu Permai raya Kav. BB Cilandak-Lebak Bulus Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Cirendeu Permui Raya Kav. BB Cilandak-Lebak Bulus Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Cisatu 1/2, Ciumbuleuit Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Citra 3 Block B8 No. 9 Pegadungan, Kalideres Jakarta Indonesia
JL. CITRAYUDA IV No. 204, INDONESIA
Jl. Ciumbuleuit I, No. 2, Bandung, INDONEISA
Jl. Ciumbuleuit RT/RW. 01/07 Kel. Ciumbuleuit Kec. Cidadap, Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Ciumbuleuit, No. 189 Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. D No. 23 Kav. Polri, RT.003/03 Kel. Ragunan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Daan Mogot Km. 18, Tangerang 15122 Indonesia
Jl. Daan Mogot No. 165 Jakarta-11520, Indonesia
Jl. Daan Mogot Raya No. 234 Jakarta Barat 11510 Indonesia
Jl. Dabo Lama No. 01/06, Kelurahan Dabo, Kelurahan Singkep, Kabupaten Lingga, Propinsi Kepulauan Riau, Indonesia
Jl. Damai Musyawarah No. 3A RT 003/03 Pondok Labu Jakarta Selantan 12450 Indonesia
Jl. Danau Agung Utara, Block G-1 No. 22, Jakarta 14350, Indonesia
JL. Danau Biru No. 105 Tangerang, Indonesia
JL. DANAU PERMAI BLK C3/9 JAKUT INDONESIA
Jl. Darat No. 61A/37 Medan 20153 North Sumatra Indonesia
Jl. Darmawangsa VI No. 25 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160
Jl. Darmo Harapan Utara 6 EW 18 Surabaya 60165 INDONESIA
Jl. De. Stb. Panggabean No. 55 Kelurahan Aek Habil Sibolga 22533-Sumatra Utara Indonesia
Jl. Demak 138 / Demak Timur 34A Surabaya 60172 Indonesia
Jl. Denpasar I No. 2, RT 001/002 Kuningan Timur Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Denpasar IV No. 5 Kuningan, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Denpasar Raya Bl. E/6, Rt. 1/2 Kuningan Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Deperdag III/G-11 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Dharmahusada Indah Timur 16 / 16 (J-81B) Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Dharmahusada Indah Timur I/M-72 Surabaya
Jl. Dharmawangsa VII No. 7 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160
Jl. Diponegoro No. 46 Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
Jl. Diponegoro No. 46 Jakarta 10310, Indonesia
Jl. Diponegoro No. 66 Jakarta 10320 Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Cipto 18 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Dr. CIPTO 3 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Kusumaatmaja No. 5 RT. 009 / RW.004 Kelurahan : Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. DR. Muwardi I/35 E, RT 001 RW 004 Kelurahan Grogol, Kecamatan Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat, Indonesi
Jl. Dr. Sahardjo No. 123 A, Jakarta 12960 Indonesia
Jl. DR. Saharjo 246 Jakarta 12870 Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Saharjo No 96A Jakarta 12960 Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Supomo No. 53A, Rt/Rw 001/012 Kelurahan Mangkubumen Kecamatan Banjarsari, Surakarta, 57139 Indonesia
Jl. Dr. Sutomo 56 Surabaya INDONESIA
Jl. Dr. Sutomo 58 Surabaya INDONESIA
Jl. Dr. Sutomo, No. 6, Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Dukuh Kupang Barat 2/26-28 Surabaya, Indonesia
JL. DURIAN BARAT III NO. 2 JAGAKARSA, JAKARTA 12550, INDONESIA
JL. DURIAN BARAT III NO. 2, JAGAKARSA, JAKARTA 12550 INDONESIA
Jl. Duta II/C-61 RT02/07 Kel. Duri Kepa Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Duta Indah II/6 RT001/014 Pondou Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Duta Niaga Raya No. 25 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jl. Duta Niaga Raya No. 25 RT003/RW014, Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Duta Permai III/6 Jakarta Selatan 12310 Indonesia
Jl. Duyung Gang 1/3 X Sanur Bali 80288 Indonesia
Jl. Dwijaya III/1 Gandaria Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Elang Thainesia A3/5 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JL. ERLANGGA 4 NO. 6 JAKARTA 12110 INDONESIA
Jl. Fatmawati No. 15 Kompleks D Best – Blok G 38 Jakarta 12420 Indonesia
Jl. Flores 3, Bloit L3/18 Nusa Loita Bumi Serpong Damai Indonesia
Jl. Gading Elok Utara I FGII/ii Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Gading Kirana Timur 1, Blok B2 No. 38, Kelapa Gading, Jakarta 12420
JL. GADING KIRANA TIMUR IV / BLOK H4 NO. 1, JAKARTA UTARA, KELAPA GADING INDONESIA
Jl. Gading Riviera I Block PF 22 No. 3 Pegangsaan Dua Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Gajah Mada No. 11 RT5/III Mojopanggung, Banyuwangi 68425 Indonesia
Jl. Gajah Mada No. 119 RT 15/08 Keagungan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Galuh 11/18, RT003/001 Selong, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Galuh II/8 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
Jl. Gandapura 39A Bandung 40113 Indonesia
Jl. Gandaria II No. 5 RT009/001 Kramat Pela Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Garden I, No. 3 Kedoya Garden Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Jl. Garut #9, Menteng Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Garut 23 Menteng Jakarta Pusat 10310 INDONESIA
Jl. Garut No 12 Menten g Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Garut No. 12, Menteng Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav 35-39, Jakarta 10210, Indonesia
Jl. Gembong 2-16, Komplex Wisma Gemini Block C-8 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Gereja No. 17 Cilandak Barat Jakarta 12430 INDONESIA
Jl. Gomet Riyadi 356A TR01/04 Punumping Surhkarta, Indonesia
JL. Graha Family Block G-7 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Griya Cantik, Blok K1 No. 8 RT. 008/RW. 020, Sunter Agung Kecamatan Tanjung Priok Jakarta Utara – Indonesia
Jl. Griya Mustika F No. 5 Kelurahan Sunter Agung Kecamatan Tanjung Priok Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Griya Sentosa Blok N No. 42 RT006 RW.020 Kel Sunter Agung Kec Tanjong Priok Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Gunung Gede No Bogor 16151 Indonesia
JL. GUNUNG GEULIS NO. 11 TAMAN BROMO, LIPPO KARAWACI TANGERANG, INDONESIA
Jl. Gunung Indah II No. 18 Cirendeu Ciputat Jakarta 15419 INDONESIA
Jl. Gunung Sahari II/No. 4C Jakarta 10610
Jl. Gunung Sahari IV/No.1 Rt 07/07 Jakarta 10610
Jl. Gunung Sahari VI/24 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Gunung Sahari XI No. 74 RT. 009, RW. 003 Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
Jl. Guru Mughni No. B3 Karet Kuningan Jakarta Selatan 12930 Indonesia
JL. H Adam Malik No. 50 Medan Barat Indocnesia
JL. H Saabah No. 5 Cipete Utara-Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12150, Indonesia
JL. H. Ahmad Sobana S>H> No. 77 Bogor, Indonesia
Jl. H. Buang I No. 12 Jakarta 12250 Indonesia
Jl. H. Buang I No. 12, Ulujami, Pesanggrahan, Jakarta 12250 Indonesia
Jl. H. Mandor No.40A Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. H. Muhi 37 RT 011/011 Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. H. Murtadho IV / A 124 RT.004, RW.006, Paseban, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. H. Saaba 9A, Cipete Utara Jakarta Selatan Indonesia 12150
Jl. Hadi Agus No. 72 Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Haji Agus Salim No. 94 Menteng, Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
JL. HAJI BALI NO. 16 MAKASSAR INDONESIA
Jl. Haji Ismail Saleh No. 2 Makassar Indonesia
Jl. Hang Lekiu III/4 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Haryono MT No. 105, Medan Kota, Indonesia
Jl. Hasanuddin No. 22 LK. I Kisaran Indonesia
Jl. Hayam Wuruk No. 5/6B Jakarta 10120 Indonesia
Jl. Hos Cokroaminoto No. 54 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Imam Bonjol 202 Semarang 50132 Indonesia
Jl. IMAM Bonjol 70 Jakarta
JL. IR. H. Juanda I No. 22G Medan Polonia, Indonesia
Jl. Ir. Haji Juanda 22, P.O. Box 2934, Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Ir. Haji Juanda No. 39 Medan, Indonesia
JL. IRIAN NO. 9 MENTENG, JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl. Iskandarsyah 11 No. 85 Melawai-Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Jambu No. 12 Gondangdia, Jakarta Pusat – Indonesia
Jl. Janur Elok VI Blok QC-13 No. 9 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Janur Elok VIII Blok QG 4/5 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Janur Kuning III NH 178 RT009/RW015, KLP, Gading Timur Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Jatibaru, No. 24, Jakarta 10160, Indonesia
JL. Jatibaru, no.24, Jakarta 10169 INDONESIA
Jl. Jatiroto No. 135A RT 010 RW 012 Jatiwaringin Kec. Pondok Gede, Bekasi, Indonesia
Jl. Jawara 27, Kemang Timur RT:007/RW:003 Bangka Mampang Prapatan, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Jelambar Ilir Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Jelambar Utama Raya Blok D/11 Jakarta Barat 11460 Indonesia
JL. JEMBATAN III NO. 36 DA RT001/RW016, PENJARINGAN Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Jend. Sudirman, Kav. 29-31 Wisma Metroplitan I., Lantai 3A Jakarta Selatan 12920 Indonesia
Jl. Jenggala I No. 5, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Johar No. 1A Jakarta Pusat 10350 Indonesia.
Jl. Johar No. 1A Menteng, Jakarta 10350
Jl. Jombang Raya Blok C NO. 101 Bintaro Sector 9 Tangerang – Indonesia
Jl. Juanda III No. 38 Jakarta 10120 Indonesia
Jl. K 1 No. 11, Rt. 010/03, Cipinang Muara Jakarta Timur
Jl. K. H. Hasyim Ashari 11D-F Jakarta Pusat, 10730 Indonesia
Jl. K. H. Moh Mansyur 208-214 Jakarta 11210 Indonesia
Jl. K.H. Hasyim Ashari, No. 11, Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. K.S. Tubun II C No. 28 B Slipi Jakarta 11410 Indonesia
Jl. Kalianda No. 6 Medan, Indonesia
Jl. Kalibata Tengah No.4, RT.002, RW.007 JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Jl. Kalimantan No. 10, RT 4/RW 1, Kelurahan Merdeka, Bandung
Jl. Kaliwaran 158 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Kampar No.9 Cideng, Gambir Jakarta, Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kapt. Mauliana Lubis No. 3-U R.T/R.W:000/000 Kel. Petisah Tengah Kecamatan:Medan Petisah Kota : Medan 20112, Indonesia
Jl. Kapt. Mauliana Lubis No. 3-U RT/RW : 000/000 Kel. Petisah Tengah Kecamatan : Medan Petisah Kota : Medan 20112 Indonesia
Jl. Kapt. Mauliana Lubis No. 8-T R.T/R.W:007/005 Kel. Petisah Tengah Kecamatan: Medan Petisah Kota: Medan 20112, Indonesia
Jl. Kapt. Mauliana Lubis No. 8-T RT/RW : 007/005 Kel. Petisah Tengah Kecamatan : Medan Petisah Kota : Medan 20112 Indonesia
Jl. Kapten Tendean 48 (Hegar Manah) Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Kapuk Kamal Raya No. 23 Jakarta – 14470 Indonesia
Jl. Kapuk Kamal Raya No.23 Jakarta 14470 – Indonesia
JL. KARANG ASEM III/6-8 RT 008/02, KUNINGAN TIMUR JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
Jl. Karang Asem Tengah No. 18 Jakarta Selatan 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Karang Asem Utara C.4/34 RT.007/02 Kel. Kuningan Timur Kec. Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Karang Asem Utara C4 No. 34 RT007/002 Kelurahan Kuningan Timur Kecamatan Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan 12560 Indonesia
JL. KARANG MULIA A7 – 22 LEBAK BULUS, SOUTH JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl. Kartanegara No. 31 Selong, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Kartini 7A/8 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kartini IV, No. 7 Jakpus, Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl. Kartini Raya 64/65 C9 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kartini Raya No. 52E, RT 010/004 Kel Kartini, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Karya Sarana No. BL B/28, RT/RW 001/013 Jl. Buaran 2, Klendar, Jakarta Timur 13470, Indonesia.
Jl. Kaveling Polri Block G No. 53B Jagakarsa, Jakarta Selatan 12520 Indonesia
Jl. Kavling Polri Bloke E/1239 Rt/Rw 001/002, Kel. Jelambar Kec. Grogol Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Kawatan 4/9, Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Kayumas Utara B-12A, RT 001/RW007, Keluraban Kuningan Kecamatan Semarang Utara Senarang Indonesia
Jl. Kdm. Ilir Barat Permai Blok D. 61 RT.11 RW.03 24 Ilir Palembang Indonesia
Jl. Keagungan, No. 75 RT. 014/ 003, Keagungan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Kebangkitan Nasional No. 48, RT001/RW001 Kelurahan Sriwedari, Kecamatan Laweyan Surakarta 57141, Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Jeruk Baru A1/2 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Kacang 35/9, RT 009, RW 004, Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Kosong Gang XX. Kebon Kosong Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Sirih Barat VI No. 7, RT.013/RW.002 Kebon Sirih, Jakarta Pusat 10340 Indonesia
Jl. Kebon Sirih No. 25-27, RT/RW 002/001 Babakan, Ciamis, Sumur Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Kebun Karet No. 623 RT20, Palembang Indonesia
Jl. Kedungdoro 60, 10th Floor Surabaya 60251 Indonesia
JL. KELAPA ASRI I BLOKQJII NO.3 KELAPA GADING JAKARTA, UTARA INDONESIA
Jl. Kelapa Kuning Raya Blok A1 No. 23 Perumahan Pondok Kelapa Indah Kalimalang Jakarta 13450 Indonesia
Jl. Kelapa Molek IV/29 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Kelapa Molek VI S 2/14 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
JL. KELAPA NIAS PB 1/6 KELAPA GADING INDONESIA
Jl. Kelapa Sawit IX B6. 2/OP RT 09 RW 13, Pakulonan Barat Curug Tangerang, Indonesia
Jl. Kelapa Sawit V, Blok AB, No. 8 RT/RW 008/017, Kelapa Gading Timur Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
JL. KEMANG 5A NO. 21 KEMANG, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA 12730
Jl. Kemang Dalam 11 No. L7 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jl. Kemang Dalam X No. M-4, Kemang Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Kemang IV No. 23B Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
JL. KEMANG SELATAN IC NO. 25 JAKARTA 12730 INDONESIA
Jl. Kemang Selatan VIII No. C8 Kemang Jaya Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Kemang Selatan VIII/C8 Kemang Jaya Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jl. KEMANG TIMUR I NO.1 JAKARTA 12730 INDONESIA
Jl. Kemang Timur Raya No. 1 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Jl. Kemang Timur V No. 12A, Kemang Jakarta INDONESIA
JL. Kemang Timur V/28 Jakarta 12370 Indonesia
Jl. KEMANG TIMUR V/B3 KEMANG JAKSEL JAKARTA 12730 INDONESIA
Jl. Kemang Utara VII No. 6 RT03/04 Mampang Prapatan Jakarta Selatan 12730 Indonesia
Jl. Kemang Utara VIII/45G JAKARTA SELATAN Indonesia
Jl. Kemanggisan Utama V/16 RT003/RW007, Palmerah Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Kembang Harum II C6/6 Kelurahan Kembangan West JAKARTA
JL. KEMBANG SAKTI I B1/16 PURI INDAH JAKARTA BARAT 11610 INDONESIA
Jl. Kembang Sepatu No. 20 Senen, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kembangan Baru, RT 08/03 Kembangan Selantan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Kemuning No. 39 RT.008/RW.006, Kelurahan Pejaten Kecmantan Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Kenanga Kav. 23 No. D-1, Ampera, Kemang Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Kenanga No. 50 Cilandak Timur, Pasar Mingu Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Kenanga No. 50J RT007/02 Cilandak Timur, Pasar Minggu Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Kenanga No. 71 Cilandak Timur Jakarta Selatan 12560 Indonesia
Jl. Kenanga No. 71 Jakarta Selatan 12560 Indonsesia
Jl. Kenanga R.T./R.W. 007/002 Clilandak Timur Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Kenanga Terusan No. 300 Cilandak Timur Jakarta 12560 Indonesia
Jl. Kencana Indah III Blok JII No.38 Puri Kencana, Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Jl. Kencana Indah III, Blok JII No.38 Puri Kencana Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
JL. KENCANA PERMAI 7 NO. 6 PONDOK PINANG JAKARTA SELATAN 12310 INDONESIA
Jl. Kencana Permai II No.8 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jl. Kencana Permai V No. 7 Pondok Pinanng Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan 12310 INDONESIA
Jl. Kencana Permai VI/7 RT 001/RW 015, Pondok Pinang Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Kencana Permai VII/9 RT001/015 Pondok Pinang KBX Lama Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Kenrinci 91, Block J Cinere Rt/Rw 1605, Kel Limo, Kec. Limo Depok Indonesia
JL. Kenrinci 93, Blok J Cinere Rt/Rw 16/05, Kel. Limo Kec. Limo Depok Indonesia
Jl. Kentang No. 12A Jakarta Indonesia
JL. KERTANEGARA NO. 2A JAKARTA 12180 Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan 1/2, Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan 1/4 007/006 Petojo Selatan, Gambir Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan 1/4 Gambir, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan 8 No. 11 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan I No. 2 RT011/RW006 Petojo Selatan Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan III No. 33 Petojo Selatan Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kesehatan III/33 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. KESEHATAN NO. 26 RT010/RW005 PETOJO SELATAN JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jl. Keselamatan Gg Sadar No. 15 RT 010 RW 003 Kelurahan Manggarai Selatan-Tebet Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Ketapang II No. 122 RT. 03/RW 15 Kel. Baktijaya Kec. Sukmajaya, Depok 16418 Indonesia
Jl. KH. Hasjim Ashari No. 37 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. KHM Mansyur 150 Jakarta Indonsia
Jl. KHM. Mansyur 116, RT005/RW004 Semampir, Surabaya 60151 Indonesia
Jl. Kiputih No. 29 RT. 05/05 Cidadap Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Kis. Mangunsarkoro No. 45 Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
Jl. Klampis Indah 111/10 (Blok C-4) Surabaya 60117
Jl. KLP Nias IX PB 19/15, Pegangsaan Dua, Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
JL. KLUNGKUNG 46 JAKARTA 12950 INDONESIA
Jl. Kolombo 19 Yogyakarta Terban, Gondokusuman Yogyakarta 55223 INDONESIA
Jl. Komplek PLN RT001 RW009 Kel. Cililitan, Kramat Jati Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Komplex Sunrise Garden No. BL 3S/1, Jl. Surya Mandala, Kedoya Utara, Jakarta Barat 11520, Indonesia
Jl. Kramat Bunder No. 25 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Kramat Raya No. 43 Jakarta 10450, Indonesia
Jl. Kramat VI Dalam No. 2 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. KREKOT JAYA BLOK E 16 JAKARTA 10710 Indonesia
Jl. Kristal Blok H/20 Kebayoran Lama Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Jl. KS TUBUN II/15 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Kucica VIII Blok JF 1-7, RT 13/05 Pondok Pecung TANGERANG
Jl. Kupu – Blok 18 No. 14 RT002/RW007, Kel. Mekarsari Kec. Tambun Selatan, Bekasi Indonesia
Jl. Laboratorium 11/8 Medan Indonesia
Jl. Labu No. 1 A/3 Medan 20153 Sumatra Utara Indonesia
Jl. Lamandau Raya No. 5 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12130 INDONESIA
JL. Lautze No. 31A, RT/RW 012/05, Pasar Baru, Jakarta, Indonesia
JL. LEBAK BULUS INDAH H-1 CILANDAK, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl. Lebak Bulus IV/7A Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Lembang No. 8 Menteng Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
Jl. Letjend Suprapto No.45 Pontianak Indonesia
Jl. Lima Iv No. 35A Jatibening 2, Pondok Gede Bekasi 17412 Indonesia
Jl. Listrik #7 Medan 20112 Indonesia
Jl. Lombok No. 56 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Lumajang No. 2 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Lumajang No. 5 Jakarta 10310 Indonesia
Jl. Madium No. 15 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Jl. Mahoni No. 17, Rt/Rw 005/008 Kelurahan Bungur, Kecamatan Semen, Jakarta-Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Majapahit No. 16 Room 321 Petojo Selatan Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
Jl. Malang No 7 Menteng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Malang No. 3, RT07/RW07, Menteng Jakarta 10310, Indonesia
Jl. Mampang Prapatan IV/20 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Mandala Permai III/6 Rt.004 Rw.008 Kapuk Muara, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Mangga 23, No. BL C/84 Duri Kepa, Jakarta Barat 11510 Indonesia
JL. MANGGA BESAR 4F., 28A JARKARTA BARAT 1150 INDONESIA
Jl. Mangga Besar 6 Selatan No. 104 – 106 – 108 Jakarta 11150 Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Besar IV E/16 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Besar VI No. 36 Taman Sari, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Besar VI Utara No. 30 RT009/RW01, Taman Sari Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Besar VIII/8, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Mangga Dua Raya (Komplek Harco Mangga Dua) Block E, No. 34 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Mangga No. 18 RT007/012 Jati Pulo Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Manyar Kertoarjo III No. 32 Surabaya 60115 Indonesia
Jl. Mappala Blok A 5 No 26 Makasar Indonesia
Jl. Margomulyo 68E KAV 11-15 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Maribaya G2/4, Puri Cinere, Cinere, Depok, Indonesia
Jl. Mas Putih D-50 Permata Hijau Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl. Mataharl IIIB/464 Jaka Setia, Bekasi Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Matraman Raya 198 RT 012/005 Kamp Melayu Jatinegara Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Matraman Raya 198 RT 012/06 Kamp Melayu Jatinegara Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Maulana Yusup No. 12 Banguna Indonesia
Jl. Mayjend Sungkono Kav. B-5, Surabaya 60225, Indonesia
Jl. Medan No. 127 Blok M Cinere, Kec. Limo Depok Indonesia
Jl. Mega Kuningan Timur Blok C-6 Kav. 12 Jakarta Selatan 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Melati Dalam RT. 003 RW. 002 Cilandak Timur-Pasar Minggu South Jakarta 12150, Indonesia
Jl. Melati Mas Raya Blok GI/NO 7 Villa Melatimas, Serpong Tangerang Indonesia
JL. MELAYU BARAT NO. 66 BANJARMASIN, SOUTH KALIMANTAN INDONESIA
Jl. Merak No. 7 Rempora Permai Housing Jakarta 12330 INDONESIA
JL. MERAPI BV/7, RT001 RW011 CIBUBUR PASAR REBO JAKARTA TIMUR 13720 INDONESIA
Jl. Merdeka No. 2K Medan Indonesia
Jl. Merdeka No. 36 Palembang Indonesia
Jl. Meruya Selatan 68 Jakarta 11650 Indonesia
Jl. Meruya Selatan No. 66 Jakarta 11650 Indonesia
Jl. Meruya Selatan No. 9 RT/RW:003/002, Meruya Selatan Kembangan, Jakarta Barat Indocnesia
Jl. Metro Hijau 2 No. 10 Pondok Pinang, Jakarta Selatan 12310
Jl. Metro Kencana V/18, Rt. 001/015 Pondok Pinang Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Mimosa II No. G7 Jakarta 12510 Indonesia
JL. Mojopahit No. 177 Mojokerto, Indonesia
Jl. MPR IV No. 4 Cilandak, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. Muara Karang Blok A4s/38, Kelurahan Pluit Kecamatan Penjaringan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
JL. Muara Karang Blok K6S/8 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Natuna Blok G.225 RT. 05, RW.13, Kel. Cinere, Kec. Limo Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Natuna No. 20 Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Niaga Hijau 1/60 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Niaga Hijau IX No. 11-E, RT007/RW017 Pondok Pinang, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Niaga Hijau Raya 47 RT 011/013 Kel. Pondok Pinang, Jaksel Indonesia
Jl. Niaga Hijau Raya No. 51 Pondok Indah Selatan Jakarta INDONESIA
Jl. Nusa Indah Raya No. 29 Rt:002/001 Kel:Pondok Kopi Kec:Duren Sawit Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Otista, Gang H Maung, No. 33, RT 03/11, Sasak Tinggi, Ciputat, Tangerang, Indonesia
Jl. P Jayakarta 119A Jakarta Indonesia
JL. P Jayakarta No. 117/B8 RT006/RW007 Mangga Dua Selatan, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. P Jayakarta No. 117B RT006/RW008 Mangga Dua Selatan, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. P. Jayakarta 131-A / 44-45 Jakarta 10730, Indonesia
Jl. P. Jayakarta 131-A/44-45 Jakarta 10730 Indonesia
Jl. Padasuka RT32/RW09 Kel. Sukamaju Kaler/Kec. Indihiang Tasikmalaya 46151 West Java, Indonesia
Jl. Pademangan I No.15 Jakarta 14410 Indonesial
Jl. Pademangan II, RT. 001 / RW. 001 Kel.Pademangan Barat Kec. Pademangan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Pademangan IV GG.23 No. 22 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Pakubuwano VI/17 RT 006/04 Gunung Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Palapa I/18 RT/RW 001/005 Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Palem Barat No. 27 RT 004 / RW 007, Kelurahan Duri Kepa Kecamatan Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Palem Utama No. 18 RT 08/07 Duri Kepa Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat 11510 Indonesia
Jl. Palma Raya I Blok F/36, Taman Kedoya Baru Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Pancoran Barat VI/5B RT013/06 Pancoran-Mampang Prapatan Jakarta Selatan 12780 Indonesia
Jl. Pancoran V No. 14. RT 08/02 Kel. Glodok, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Pandeglang No. 27 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Pangeran Antasari No.55, RT003/011 Cipete Utara, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Pangeran Jayakarta, 105G Jakarta 10730 Indonesia
Jl. Panglima Polim IX No. 12, Melawai, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Panjunan 2/167 Sidoarjo, Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Panjunan II No. 167 Sidoarjo, Indonesia
Jl. Panjunan II/165 Sidoarjo, Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Karang No. 5 Samur, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Kuta II 3 RT 002, RW 10, Ancol Pademangar, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Kuta IV/I Ancol Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Mutiara AD17 Jakarta Indonesia
JL. PANTAI MUTIARA BLOK A NO. 9 JAKARTA 14450 INDONESIA
Jl. Pantai Mutiara Blok J 20-Pluit Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Pantai Mutiara ZF/No. 1 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Pasir Putih V1/7, RT/RW. 006/010 Ancol Pademangan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Paso No. 63 Kav. 80 RT.003/RW.06, Kelurahan Jagakarsa, Jakarta 12620, Indonesia
Jl. Patal Senayan No. 38 Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Pati Unus No. 2A RT: 004/RW:004 Gunung Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Patimura No. 9, Cilandak Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Patra Kuningan 1, Blk L1/10-11 006/04 Kuningan Timur, Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Patra Kuningan I Blk. L1 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. Patra Kuningan Raya Block M41 Kav. 4-5 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Patra Kuningan X/5 RT. 006/ RW. 004 Kuningan Timur, Kecamatan Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Patra Kuningan XI/5 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Patra Tomang II/34, Jakarta 11510, Indonesia
JL. PECENONGAN NO. 72 APARTEMEN ATAP MERAH #1195 JAKARTA 10120, INDONESIA
Jl. Pedureuan Kav 25 Ampera, Jakarta Selatan, Dki Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
JL. PEJATEN RAYA NO. 8A JAKARTA SELANTAN 12510 INDONESIA
Jl. Pekayon 1 No 16C Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Pelangi IV, No. 5 Blok 48 RT 10 RW 16 Mekar Sari Cimanggis Depok Indonesia
Jl. Pelangi Nila VI Blok A-8/15 Kelapa Gading Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pelepah Kuning II WV 2 No. 14 Kelapa Gading Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jl. Pengadegan Selatan No 10 Kalibata Rt 002/005 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Pengadegan Selatan VII No. 67 Pancoran, Jakarta 12770 Indonesia
JL. Pengayoman No. 21 Samping Polsekta 9 Panakkukang, Makassar Indonesia
JL. PENGAYOMAN NO. 21 SAMPING POLSEKTA 9, PANAKKUKANG, MAKASSAR, INDONESIA
Jl. Permata Berlian Blok R-13 Permata Hijau Jakarta 12210
Jl. Permata Hijan Blok K/1. Jakarta Indonesia 12950
JL. Permata Hijau Blk A38, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. Permata Hijau Blok M, No. 10-11 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Permata Hijau F/11 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Permata Hijau F/74 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Permata Hijau L/19 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Permata Hijau, Blk 4/6 RT. 014/002 Grogol Utara, Keby. Lama Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
Jl. Permata Mediterania Raya No. 19 Srengseng, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Permata No. 10, Grogol Jakarta 11440, Indonesia
JL. Perniagaan No.3 Medan, Indonesia
JL. PERTANI NO. 14 KALIBATA JAKARTA 12960 INDONESIA
Jl. Petike Luar No. 29 RT 011/01 Tambora Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Petojo Barat VII No. 8, RT009/RW001 Jakarta 10140, Indonesia
Jl. Petojo Selatan 1, No: 4D, Central Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Petojo VIY II No. 32-34 RT.004/RW.006 Cideng Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Petojo Viy V #4 Kelurahan Cideng Jakarta Pusat
Jl. Pinang Emas VI-VQ/12 Pondok Pinang Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
JL. Pinang Emas X/26, RT 010/03 JAKARTA SELATAN Indonesia
Jl. Pinangsia Timur No. 4K Jakarta 1110 Indonesia
Jl. Pinisi Indah 2 No. 2 Pantai Indah Kapuk Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Pinisi Permai 2/11 Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
JL. Pluit Barat V/5 RT 015 RW 007 Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Jl. Pluit Barat 14, No. 7 Jakarta
Jl. Pluit Indah No. 29 Jakarta Utara 14450, Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Indah/29 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia Tel: REDACTED
Jl. Pluit Karang Permai RT 012, RW 008 Pluit, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Permai Raya / 20, Pluit Penjaringan, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Permai Raya No. 12A Rt.009 Rw.004, Pluit, Jakut Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Sakti Raya No. 125, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia Indonesia.
Jl. Pluit Sakti Raya No. 28 Rt. 009. Rw. 007, Pluit, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara 11450 Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Sakti Raya No. 30 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Selatan 11 No. 17 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pluit sumudra 5 No. 9 Jakarta Utara 14450 Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Timur Blk C/17 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jl. Pluit Utara II No. 15, Pluit, Penjaringan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Pramuka Jayasari No. 29 Rawasari, Cempaka Putih Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Prisma 2 Blok B2, No. 33 Taman Kedoya Permai Jakarta 11530, Indonesia
JL. Prisma 2 Blok B2, No.33 Taman Kedoya Permai Jakarta 11530, INDONESIA
Jl. Prof. DR. Satrio Kav. 6 Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
Jl. Prof. M. Yamin No. 22B RT 007/RW 005 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. PROP DR SATRIO AP AMBASADOR RT/RW 011/004, Kelurahan Karet Kuningan Kecamatan Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. Pulan Putri I/A2/3 Kota Modern Tangerang 15117 Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Laki IV Blk K-6/18 Kembangan Utara Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Matahari VI Blok A-6/34, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
JL. Pulau Putri B.IV/No. 16 Modern Land – Tangerang Indonesia
JL. PULAU PUTRI III/25, R.T 011, R.W 002, JAKARTA
Jl. Pulau Sebaru M1/31 RT 011/009 Kel Kembangan Utara Kec Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Sebaru M1/31 RT011/009 Kel Kembangan Utara Kec Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Sebaru M1/31 Taman Permata Buana Jakarta Barat 11610 Indonesia
Jl. Pulau Sembilan Block N/14 Jatiwaringin Asri II Pondok Gede Bekasi 17411 Indonesia
Jl. Pulo Asem Timur Pulo Gadung, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Pulo Ayang Raya Blok JJ-9 Kawasan Industri Pulogadung Jakarta 13260 INDONESIA
Jl. Pulo Indah No. 35 Rt 002/005 Petukangan Selatan, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Pulo Indah No. 39 RT 010/005 Petukangan Sel. Jakarta 12270 Indonesia
JL. Pulo Kambing II No. 18 Kawasan Industri Pulogadung Jakarta 13920
JL. PULO MAS RAYA 12, RT.007, RW.011 KAYU PUTIH SUB DISTRICT PULO GADUNG DISTRICT EAST JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Jl. Pulo Mas VIII B/10 RT.08/11 Kel . Kayu Putih Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
JL. Pulomas Raya No. 16A RT 007 RW 016 Jakarta Timur INDONESIA
Jl. Pulomas Timur No 1B/1, Jakarta Pusat
Jl. Pulonangka Timur I C /46 Pulogadung Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Punai III T7/10 Bintaro Jaya Sektor 2 Tangerang Indonesia
Jl. Puncak Pesanggrahan VII/32 RT 02 RW 16, Kel. Cinere, Kec. Limo Depok, Bogor, Indonesia
JL. PURBA ENDAH I RT.04/05, KEC. CIMAHI UTARA, KAB. BANDUNG
Jl. Puri Indah C1 No. 6 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Puri Kencana Elok Timur I Blk K4/32, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Puri Mutiara No. 5 Wisma Pertamina RT009/RW011 Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
Jl. Purnawarman No. 85, Kav. 3 Kebayora Baru, Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
Jl. Purnawarman No. 85, Kav. 3 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
Jl. Purwakarta No 3 Jakarta Pusat 10310 Indonesia
JL. Putat Indah 15, Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Puter II ED 2/32 BTR V RT 002 RW 09, Jurangmangu Timur Pondok Aren Tangerang Indonesia
Jl. Putri No. 6 Bandung 40262 Indonesia
Jl. Pyrus Blok C No. VIP 1 Jakarta 12210, Indonesia
JL. R.S. Fatmawati No. 7 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12140 Indonesia
Jl. Raden Patah III No. 9 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
Jl. Raden Saleh Dalam No. 95, Medan Indonesia
Jl. Radio V No. 8, Blok B2 RT001/004, Kramat Pela Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Rajawali No. 53, Surabaya 60175 Jawa Timur Indonesia
Jl. Rajawali Selatan I, No. 1 RT / RW 017/002, Gunung Sahari Utara Kecamatan Sawah Besar Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Jl. Rajawali Selatan Raya No. 17, Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
Jl. Rajawali Selatan V No. 42 Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
JL. Rawa Bahagia I/25, RT / RW : 006/002, Grogol Pertamburan, Jakarta Barat
Jl. Rawa Kemiri 14/B RT004/RW 011, Grogol Selatan Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. Rawa Kepa IX, No. 69, Tomang Utara, Jakarta Barat 11440, Indonesia
JL. RAWAMANGUN MUKA V, RT/RW 015/012, KELURAHAN RAWAMANGUN, KECAMATAN PULOGADUNG JAKARTA-TIMUR, INDONESIA
Jl. Raya Batujajar KM. 2,8 Padalarang 40561 Bandung – Jawa Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Raya Gubeng No. 61 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Jl. Raya Kalimalang /77 RT 010/08 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Raya Kelapa Dua No. 1 RT 007/002 Kelapa Dua Jakarta Barat 11550 Indonesia
Jl. Raya Kelapa Dua No. 1 RT007/RW002, No. 1 Kelapa Dua-Kebun Jeruk Jakarta Barat 11550 Indonesia
Jl. Raya Kerobokan # 106 – Br. Taman Kuta 80361 Bali Indonesia Kuta 80361, Bali Indonesia
Jl. Raya Kertajaya Indah No. 91 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Raya Margorejo Indah D/104 DS/Kel. Sidosermo RT.004/005 Kec. Wonocolo, Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Raya Padang Solok KM 17, Padang Indonesia
JL. RAYA PASAR MINGGU NO. 39 DUREN TIGA BUNTU Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Raya Permata Hijau Blok B No. 8, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. RAYA PLUIT SAKTI NO. 28 JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
JL. RAYA PLUIT SAKTI NO. 28 JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Jl. Raya Pluit Selatan Blok S No. 1 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia
JL. RAYA SEMER NO. 883 BANJAR SEMER KEROBOKAN-KUTA, BALI INDONESIA 80361
Jl. Raya Serang Km. 71 Desa Tambak Kec. Kibin Kab. Serang Propinsi Banten Indonesia
Jl. Raya Solo Sragen KM 9.5 Palur, Solo 57771 Indonesia
Jl. Renijaya, Blok E RT.02, RW.05 Kel. Pondok Petir, Kec Sawangan Bogor, Indonesia
Jl. RM SAID No. 148, RT/RW 005/002 Kelurahan Punggawan Kecamatan Banjarsari Surakarta 57132, Indonesia
Jl. Rontgen No. 3, Bandung – West Java INDONESIA
Jl. Rontgen No. 4 Bandung 40171 Indonesia
Jl. Rosiga VII/B-9 Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Rotowijaya No. 15 Yogyakarta-Indonesia 55321
Jl. Ruby I/28 Blok G Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. S. Wiryopranoto No. 46, Jakarta 10120, Indonesia
Jl. Safir II Blok I/10 Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Salak No. 35 RT 007/002 Kel. Guntu,r Kec. Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Sanur Blok C4 No.7, Bali View Estate, Cirendeu, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Saw No. 24, Menteng Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Jl. Sawo No. 23 Menteng Jakarta Pusat Jakarta 10330 Indonesia
Jl. Sedap Malam B-182 Bekasi Jawa Barat Indonesia
Jl. Sekolah Duta I/14-16 Pondok Pinang Jakarta – Indonesia
Jl. Sekolah Duta I/14-16 RT 002-014 Pondok Pinang Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Sekolah Duta V/50 RT 003/014 PONDOK INDAH PERMAI JAKARTA SELATAN Indonesia
Jl. Sekolah Duta V/50 RT 003/014 Pondok Pinang, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. SEKOLAH DUTA V/50, PONDOK INDAH PERMAI Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
JL. SEKOLAH DUTA V/50, RT003/RW014, PONDOK PINANG, JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jl. Sekolah Kencana, Nuansa Hijau Apt A/8-1, South Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Semampir II/1 Kediri Indonesia
Jl. Semampir II/No. 1, Kediri, East Java, Indonesia
Jl. Seminyak GG Plaw No 566 Kuta Bali Indonesia
Jl. Seruni, No. 3, Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Setia 1 No. 21, RT03/RW10 Kel. Jati Cempaka, Kec. Pondok Gede Bekasi, Indonesia
Jl. Setia Budi II No. 54 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
Jl. Siaga Utama Kav 12A RToo7/04 KEL. Pejaten Barat South Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Sidas No.8 RT001/002 Pontianak Barat. Indonesia
Jl. Sikambing Blk No. 26/13 Medan 20113 Indonesia
Jl. Sikatan No. 37 Surabaya Indonesia
Jl. Simprug Garden Blok D No. 2 RT 007/RW003 Grogol Selatan Jakarta 12220 Indonesia
Jl. Simprug Garden Blok D No. 2 RT007/RW003 Grogol Selatan Jakarta 12220 Indonesia
Jl. Simprug Garden II No. 10 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Simprug Golf 14/55A, Jakarta Selatan
Jl. Simprug Golf III Kav. 111 Jakarta Selatan Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Sinar Budi Gg. N/5 RT002 RW 03, Kelurahan, Pejagalan Kecamatan, Penjaringan, Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Sircon Blok. C/71 Rt 009/01 Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Sircon Blok. G/72 Rt 009/01 Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Sircon Blok. G/73 Rt 009/01 Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Jl. Sisingamangaraja No. 26 Jakarta 12120 INDONESIA
Jl. Sisingamangaraja No. 3 C Jakarta 12110 INDONESIA
JL. SLAMET RIYADI TSI BLOK A NO.1 , BANDAR LAMPUNG 35228 INDONESIA
Jl. Sri Gading II 35, RT. 003, RW.012, Mangkubumen Sub District, Banjarsari District, Surakarta Mayoralty, Central Java, Republic of Indonesia
JL. SRI WIJAYA RAYA NO. 4 KEBAYORAN BARU JAKARTA SELATAN 12110 INDONESIA
Jl. Sriwijaya Raya No. 33 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. ST Budi Tgh Four Season Apart RT/RW 007/03 Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. St. Hasanudin No. 69 002/001 Melawai, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Sudirman Kav. 1 Panin Centre 7th Floor Jakarta 10270 INDONESIA
Jl. Sukarela No. 1, RT 009/RW009, Penjaringan, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Sukarno Hatta A2 Malang, Indonesia
Jl. Sultan Hasannudin No. 45/115 Blok M, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Sumbawa 12 Menteng Jakarta Pusat 10350 Indonesia
Jl. Sumbawa No. 6 Jakarta Pusat INDONESIA
JL. SUMBER WUNI 341, RT 02/05, LAWANG, MALANG, INDONESIA
Jl. Suren I/12 Keb Baru. Jakarta 12160 INDONESIA
Jl. Surya IV/28, RT 04/05 Kedoya Utara, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Surya Timur Blok III A/8 RT 13/05 Kedoya Utara Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Surya Utama Blok V/17 RT 004/rw005 Kelurahan Kedoya Utara Kecamatan Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Surya Utama II H/11 Sunrise Garden Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Jl. Surya Wijaya 8/4 – E/10 RT/RW 007/011, Kedoya Utara Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Surya Wijaya III No. 14 Kedoya Selatan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Suryo No. 58, RT004/004 Rawa Barat, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Suryo No. 7, Blok S-Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan 12180 Indonesia
Jl. Sutomo No. 301 Medan 20212 Sumatra Utara Indonesia
JL. SUWIRYO NO. 45, JAKARTA PUSAT, INDONESIA
Jl. Talib II No. 35A Jakarta 11140 Indonesia
Jl. Taman Cilandak V No. C10, Cilamdak Barat, Jalarta Selatan 12430, Indonesia
Jl. Taman Cilandak V/B2 RT 012/004 Cilandak Jakarta Selantan Indonesia
JL. TAMAN DELIMA IV/29, RT.004, RW.005 TANJUNG DUREN SELATAN SUB DISTRICT GROGOL DISTRICT, WEST JAKARTA REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Jl. Taman Delima VI/59, RT.007, RW.005, Tanjung Duren Selatan Sub District, Grogol Petamburan District, West Jakarta, Republic of Indonesia
Jl. Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok G1 Kav 60 Jakarta Ta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok G1 No. 37, Intercon Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Taman Kencana Indah I Kav TC18, Pondok Indah Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Taman Kliningan No.1 Bandung Indonesia
Jl. Taman Lebak Bulus V/I RT002/007 Lebak Bulus Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. Taman Patra 3 No. 9B JAKARTA 12950 Indonesia
Jl. Taman Patra Raya No. 8 Kuningan Timur Jaksel
Jl. Taman Patra XIII, No. 11-12 005/004 Kuningan Timur, Setia Budi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. TAMAN RADIO DALAM VI NO. 4 JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Jl. Taman S. Parman A/12 RT004/008, Tomang Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Taman S. Parman A/12 RT007/008, Tomang Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Taman Sari Raya 56-NE RT 12/04, Taman Sari Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Taman Sari Raya No. 10 Jakarta Indonesia
JL. TAMAN SURYA BLOCK IID/8 JAKARTA 11520 INDONESIA
Jl. Taman Surya III Blok G-3/17 Kalideres Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Taman Tanah Abang III No. 6 RT002/RW004 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Taman Tangkuban Perahu No. 6 RT 011/RW001 Jakarta 12980 INDONESIA
JL. TAMANSARI XI / 7A Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jl. Tambak Bayan Tengah 36 RT 02/33, Alon Alon Contong Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Tampak Siring Indah No. 99 RT005/RW007 Bukit Gading Villa – Kelapa Gading Barat Jakarta Utara 14240, Indonesia
Jl. Tampak Siring Raya No. 7 Bukit Gading Villa, Kelapa Gading, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
JL. TANAH ABANG 2 NO. 53 JAKARTA 10160 INDONESIA
Jl. Tanggamus No. 10 Klojen, Malang Indonesia
Jl. Tanjung Duren Selatan No. 57 RT 011/RW002, Tanjung Duren, Jakarta Barat 11470, Indonesia
Jl. Tanjung Duren Utara II A/386, Jakarta 11470 Indonesia
Jl. Tanjung Mas Raya, Blok B8/16, Tanjung Barat, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
JL. TANJUNG NO. 10 RT/RW: 007/001 MENTENG JAKARTA 10350, INDONESIA
JL. TANJUNG NO. 32B GONDANGDIA – MENTENG JAKARTA PUSAT – 10350 Indonesia
Jl. Tanjung No. 39 Gondangdia, Jakpus Jakarta Indonesia – 10350
JL. Tarogong/Caringin Utara 31 RT12/10 Cilandak Barat, Jakarta 12430 Indonesia
JL. TARUNA NO. 28A RT/RW 004/011 JATINEGARA CAKUNG JAKARTA TIMUR – DKI JAKARTA INDONESIA
JL. TB. ANGKE NO. 190P RT. 10/09 ANGKE JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Jl. Tebet Barat Raya No. 44, RT014/004, Tebet Barat Jakarta
Jl. Tebet Barat VI G/5 Jakarta Selatan 12810 Indonesia
Jl. Tebet Mas Indah V/B 8 RT. 009, RW. 002, Tebet Barat, Tebet, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Tebet Timur Raya No. 45 Jakarta Selatan 12820 Indonesia
Jl. Telomoyo 6 Semarang 50252 Indonesia
Jl. Tengah Raya No. 22 R.T./R.W. 004/012, Gedong Pasar Rebo, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Jl. Tengah Raya No. 22, R.T/R.W 004/012 Gedong, Pasar Rebo, Jalan Timur Indonesia
Jl. Terogong II/51 RT 008/010 Cilandak Barat, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL. TEUKU UMAR NO. 50 RT/RW : 001/001 GONDANGDIA MENTENG JAKARTA PUSAT Indonesia
Jl. Tg. Duren Utara IV/50, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Jl. Thamrin 64 Surabaya Indonesia
JL. Thamrin No.4-C, P. Siantar Indonesia
Jl. Tidar, No. 30, Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Tidore No. 10, Cideng Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
JL. TIMBUL 21-PEJATEN BARAT II JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA 12510
Jl. Timor (T. Timor Raya) No. 58 Medan 20235 Indonesia
Jl. Timor No. 8 Gondangdia, Jakpus Jakarta Indonesia
JL. TIMOR NO. 8 RT 009/RW004, GONDANGDIA JAKPUS, JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jl. Timor No. 8, Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jl. Tirtayasa IX No.8-10 Jakarta Indonesia
Jl. Tisna Senjaya, No. 80/18D Bandung, Indonesia
Jl. Tomang Asli No. 25 RT07/03, Jati Pulo Indonesia
Jl. Tosiga Blok E/9 – RT 07/04 Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL. TOSIGA I NO. K 5 KEBON JERUK Jakarta Barat Indonesia
JL. Trembesi 130 Depok 14621 INDONESIA
Jl. Trs Hang Lekir III/54 RT/RW 005/008, Grogol Selatan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Trunojoyo 101, Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Tulodong Bawah 18 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Tulodong Bawah III/42 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Tulodong Bawah IV/2, Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Jl. Tulodong Bawah No. B-3 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Tumenggung 43 Jakarta, Indonesia
Jl. Tuparev Mo. 21 Kerawang Indonesia 41312
Jl. Untung Suropati No. 28 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Untung Suropati No. 29 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jl. Uranus V No. 10, Villa Cinere Mas, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Uranus V, No. 10 Villa Cinere Mas Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Jl. Veteran No. 27 RT 01, PS. Pagi Samarinda 75111, Indonesia
Jl. Veteran No. 3A Semarang Indonesia
Jl. Villa Jati Padang 11/53 Indonesia
Jl. Villa Polonia Indah No. 68, Medan, Indonesia
Jl. Wahyu No. 15 RT 003/005 Gandaria Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Walet Permai 3/5, Rt007/003 Kel. Kapuk, Kec. Penjaringan Jakarta Utara
Jl. Walet Permai V/30, Pantai Indah Kapuk, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra 6 No. 4 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra II No. 3 Kav 14 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra V/3 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra VIII/8 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Jl. Widya Chandra XI No. 3 Jakarta Selatan 12190 Indocnesia
Jl. Widya Chandra, Raya/37 RT 008/001 Kby Baru, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Wijaya 10 No. 4, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta 12160, Indonesia
Jl. Wijaya Kusuma Blok B1 No. 17 Duran Sawit Jakarta Timur
Jl. Wijaya Kusuma Raya No. 38 RT.041 RW.014, Desa Cilandek Barak, Kecamatan Kota Bogor Barat, Kotamadya Bogor Indonesia
Jl. Wilis Indah No.A.7 RT07 RW04 GD.Kasri MALANG, Indonesia
Jl. Wiyung Pratama B/5 Surabaya 60227 Indonesia
JL. WR. SUPRATMAN 9 SURABAYA, INDONESIA
Jl. YBR 1 Kav 62, Kuningan Timur, Jakarta, Selatan Indonesia
Jl. Ybr I Kav 62 Kuningan Timur Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan 12910
Jl. YBR IV No. C17 Kuningan Tower Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jl. YBR IV No. C17, RT001/002 Kuningan Timor, Setiabudi Jakarta, Selatan
Jl. YDPP II/20 RT/RW 006/01 Kemang Selatan Cipete Selatan, Cilandak Jakarta Selatan 12410, Indonesia
Jl. Yos Sudarso RT.OT. Tarakan Indonesia
JL. Yupiter IV No. 26 Villa Cinere Mas, Ciputat 15419 Indonesia
Jl.. Madrasah II/No.40 Jeruk Purut Cilandak-Timur Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
JL.DARMO PEMAI SELATAN 1/67 SURABAYA, EAST JAVE Indonesia
JL.Kalampeto No.8 Ujung Pandang, Indonesia.
Jl.Kimia No.13 Jakarta Pusat 10320 Indonesia
Jl.Lawu No.14 Malang Indonesia
JL.Mulyosari Mapan 4/DC20, Aurabaya, Indonesia.
Jl.Pinang Merah II/SK-1 Pondok Indah Pondok Pihang Jakarta 12310
JL.Rappocini Raya 181F, Makassar, Indonesia.
JL.Taman Patra 3 No. 9B Jakarata 12950 Indonesia
JL.Vila Sunter Mas. Blok H XI/I. Rt. 001 RW 08, Sunter Jaya, Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jl.Walikota no.10 Medan
Jln Bambu Betung VII, RT. 005/RW 05, Kelurahan Rawa Buaya, Kecamatan Cengkareng, Kotamadya Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
JLN BANDENGAN UTARA NO.81 BLOK B RT 009/016 PENJARINGAN JAKARTA UTARA IDONESIA
JLN BIMA 1, NO. 84 DEPOK II TENGAH – 16411 KABUPATEN BOGOR INDONESIA
JLN BUKIT HIJAU 111/11, KEBAYORAN LAMA, JAKARTA SELATAN, INDONESIA
JLN Danau Agung XI No. 16, Sunter Agung, Jakarta, Indonesia
Jln Imam Bonjol No. 18 Pasuruan, Jawa Timur, 67122 Indonesia
Jln Kampung Bali IV, No. 32 Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Jln Kdm. Ilir Barat Permai Blok D-16, RT.11 RW.03 24 Ilir Palembang Indonesia
Jln Kemurnian Utara No 3 Weast Jakarta, Indonesia 11120
Jln Krekot Bunder No. 46 Jakarta 10710 Indonesia
JLN M.H THAMRIN NO. 31 BII PLAZA, TOWER 2, 22ND FLOOR JAKARTA 10350, INDONESIA
Jln Mandala Utara No. 376 Jakarta Barat 11440 Indonesia
JLN MANDALA UTARA NO. 376 JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
JLN MANDALA UTARA NO. 4 JAKARTA BARAT 11440 INDONESIA
Jln Mangga Besar VI Selatan No. 102A Jakarta Barat 11150 Indonesia
JLN Muarakarang, BLK V-85/ /32. RT 010 RW 019, Pluit, Benjaringan, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
JLN P. POLIM RAYA NO. 80 RT 002/008 PULO JAKARTA SELATAN INDONESIA
Jln Pasir Putih Raya E 41/1 RT.009/010, Kelurahan Ancol Kecamatan Pademangan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Jln Petojo Sabangan I/37 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia
JLN PLUIT UTARA 4 NO. 22 JAKARTA UTARA
Jln Pupan No.23 Pondok Pinang South Jakarta Indonesia
Jln Raung No. 12 Semarang, Indonesia
Jln Raya Uluwatu, Gang Kahuripan (Tegeh Pall) No. 69 Br Bakungsari, Ungasan, Kuta Selatan, Kab. Badung Bali 80363 – Indonesia
JLN SULTAN AGUNG NO. 58 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jln Sultan Agung No. 69 Semarang, Indonesia
Jln Syahrial, No. 9 RT. 003/002 Rengat – Indragiri Hulu Riau Indonesia
Jln. Pejaten Barat II/81 Pasar Minggu Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jln. Agung Tengah 6 Blok I IV No. 6A Sunter Agung – Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Jln. Ancol Barat VII Blok A 5D No. 2 Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Jln. Ancol Timur XIII No. 11A Regol, Bandung West Java
JLN. BAGAU BLOK P NO.4, CIPINANG INDAH 2 JAKARTA 13430 INDONESIA
JLN. BIMA 1, NO. 84, DEPOK II, TENGAH-16411, KOTA DEPOK, KABUPATEN BOGOR INDONESIA
Jln. Camar Elok V No. 35, Sektor Selatan Timur Pantai Indah Kapuk, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
JLN. CAWANG BARU NO. 22 JAKARTA 13340 INDONESIA
Jln. Dr. Cipto 3 Surabaya 60264, Indonesia
Jln. Dr. Sahardjo No. 182, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jln. Ds. Petta Tabukan Utara – North Sulawesi
Jln. Dukuh Ilir Cibungbulan West Java
Jln. Gading Kirana Timur 1 Blk B3/23, Jakarta 14240 Indonesia
Jln. Gandaria Tengah VI No. 18 Jakarta 12130 Indonesia
Jln. Gg. Griya Lestari G2/2 KELAPA GADING Jakarta
Jln. Gg. Swadaya No. 27 Tebet – Jakarta
Jln. Gubeng Kertajaya 5-C/36 Surabaya East Java Indonesia
JLN. JEMBATAN III NO. 36 R.T. 001 R.W. 016 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Jln. K.N. Samanhudi (Pintu Besi) no. 32 Jakarta – Pusat INDONESIA
Jln. Kampung Salo Kembangan Jakarta
Jln. Kavling Polri Blok DIII/971A RT 008/RW001, Jelambar, Grogol Jakarta Barat Indonesia 11460
Jln. Kp. Rawa Lele Jombang Ciputat, Jakarta
Jln. Kp. Sidamukti Sukamaju – Depok
Jln. M. H. Thamrin No. 31, Bll Plaza Tower 2, 22nd Floor Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Jln. Mangga Besar VIII/8 RT 008/01 Kelurahan Taman Sari, Kecamatan Taman, Sari, Jakarta Barat
JLN. MENDUT NO. 21, RT 009 RT 002 KEL. PEGANGSAAN, JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
Jln. Metro Hijau II No. 10 Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Jln. Mimosa Blok N. 1 Buncit Indah Pejaten Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jln. Mitra Sunter Boulevard Blok A No. 20-21 Jakarta 14350 Indonesia
Jln. Pangeran Jayakarta, No. 55, Central Jakarta 10730 Indonesia
Jln. Paradise 25 Block A/20 Nirwana Sunter Asri TH III North Jakarta Indonesia
Jln. Pelepah Hijau II TG I/4 Kelapa Gading Jakarta
Jln. Pendidikan No. 26 Cilandak Barat, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Jln. Peninggaran No. 53 Ciputat, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta
Jln. Petak Serani Tanah Sereal – Tambora Jakarta
Jln. Raya Gilang 159 (Taman – Sepanjang) Sidoarjo 61257 Indonesia
Jln. Senjaya 4 No. 95 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110 Indonesia
Jln. Sidokapasan 2/33 Sidodadi 60145 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jln. Surya Wijaya 8/4E/10 Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Jln. Taman Borobudar 19, Malang East Java, Indonesia.
Jln. Tebet Raya No. 62 Jakarta Selatan 12820 Indonesia
Jln. Tebet Timur Dalam VI C/11 Tebet – Jakarta
Jln. Unggul Graha Permai C12/18 Tambun – Bekasi
Jln. Villa Bukit Mas K3 Surabaya, Indonesia
Jln. Widya Chandra V/23 Kuningan Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Joyce Handajani c/o P T Enseval Enseval Building, 4th Floor Jl Let. Jend. Suprapto Kav 4 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
Jt. Bangka VIII A No. 28 Jakarta 12720 INDONESIA
JT.Tinumbu No.12, Ujung Pandang, Indonesia.
Kacibata No. 12 Jakarta 12740 Indonesia
Kalibata Indah Blok F/5, RT005/006 Rawajati Pancor An Jak-Sel Indonesia
Kamboja No.8, Mentent Jakarta Indonesia
Kantor Taman E 3.3 Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Kantor Taman E. 3.3 Unit B6 & B7 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Kantor Taman E.3.3 Unit B6 & B7 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Kantor Taman E3.3, Unit A-3 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jl. Mega Kuningan Indonesia 12950 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
KAP Jimmy Budhi & Rekan Jl. Patimura No.2 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Kapuk Pulo No. 100 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Karang Anyar Raya 56/B1 Kelurahan Sunter Agung, Kecamatan Sawah Besar Jakarta, Indonesia
Karang Jaya Baru E1/60 Johar Baru Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Karet Setiabudi Park Avenue Suites Apartment #606 JL RS Aini, Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Karyawan Tmn. Duta MAS Blk C2/38 RT009/009 Kel. Indaya Kusuma Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Karyo Indoh Village II Blok D No 2 Bintaro Jakarta INDONEISA
Kav DK 1 Blok 84 No. 17-19 RT 001 RW 010 Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Kav. Polri Blok A IX No. 226 Jakarta Indonesia
Kav. Polri Blok E/1222 Jakarta Indonesia
Kav. Polri Blok G No. 51 RT.009, RW.006 Jagakarsa, JAKARTA INDONESIA
Kav. Polri Blok G No. 51, RT. 009, RW. 006, Jagakarsa, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Kav. Polri, Blk E1/1272, RT. 01/02 Kec. Grogol Petam, Kodya, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kav. Polvi Blok D-IX/1054 RT/RW 003/001, Jelambar Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kawasan Berikat Nusantara (E.P.Z) Jl. Pelabuhan Nusantara II Blok B2, Tanjong Priok Jakarta – 14310, INDONESIA
Kawasan Berikat Nusantara Block A-07 Jl. Jawa Raya 13, Cakung Cilincing Jakarta 14140 Indonesia
Kawasan BIIE Multi Guna Niaga Jl. Mahoni I No. 5 Sukaresmi, Lippo Cikarang Bekasi – 17550 Indonesia
Kayu Putih Tengah Lvb No 11 Jakarta Timur Indonesia
KB Jeruk I/1/5 RT 04/II Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Kebagusan Besar, R.T./R.W. 008/005 Kebagusan Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
KEC KELAPA GADING BLK H4 KEL KELAPA GADING TIMUR JL. GADING KIRANA IV NO. 1 JAKARTA 14240 INDONESIA
Kedoya Albasia Raya D13-15 Tamau Kedoya Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
KEDOYA APARTMENTS BLOK N, JAKARTA BARAT, INDONESIA.
Kedoya Elok Apt N. 104 Jalan Panjang Kebun Jeruk Jakarta, Indonesia
Kedoya Garden E/35, RT.014/005 Kedoya Selatan, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
KEL PLUIT KEC. PENJARINGAN JL PLUITT PUTRI V/8 RT 006 RW 006 JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Kelapa Puan TMR II, Blk NC 3130 RT 002 RW 012 Pegangsaan II Klp Gading Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Kelapa Sawit Raya KL/18 Kelapa Gading Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Kelapapuan Timur VII NB 7/1 Pegangsaan II, Kelapa Gading Indonesia
Kemang Club Villas, Apt A#101, JL. Kemang Selatan 1, Jakarta Selatan 12730, Indonesia
Kemang Ifi Graha A8/28 Bekasi Indonesia
Kemang Jaya Apartment Unit 1104, JL. Kemang Selatan VIII, Jakarta Selatan 12730 Jakarta Indonesia
Kemanggisan Raya, RT 015/ RW009 Palmerah, Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Kembang Elok III H3/23 Rt. 009/Rw. 006, Kembangan West Jakarta 11610 Indonesia
Kembang Murni II Blok L2/14 Puri Indah Jakarta 11610 Indonesia
Kembangan Baru III C/2 Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kembangan Utama Raya Blok LI/ 3B RT. 003 RW. 003 Kembangan Utara Jakarta Barat Indonesia
KENANGA NO. 71, CILANDAK TIMUR JAKARTA SELATAN 12560, INDONESIA
Kenari Golf V/82 Bukit Golf Mediterania Pantai Indah Kapuk Jakarta Utara 14470 Indonesia
Kencana Permai RT 005/015 Kel. Pondok Pinang Jausel Indonesia
Kepa Duri Blk, G 1/143 Duri Kepa, Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Kertajaya Indah Timur 8/21 Surabaya Indonesia
Ketupa 6, Surabaya Indonesia
KH Naim 1 No A17, RT/RW 005/11, Cipete Utara Jakarta Selatan 12150, Indonesia.
Klampis Ngasem 152 Surabaya – Indonesia
Klampis Semolo Barat X/30 RT 03 RW 10 Surabaya Indonesia
Kombes Pol Duryat No. 12 Kediri Indonesia
Komp Bunga Lily Kav 11 R.T./R.W. Bintaro Indonesia
Komp Citramas Indah Bok F, No. 2B, RT/RW 003/006 Batu Besar, Nongsa Batum Indonesia
KOMP DUTA HARAPAN INDAH, BLOCK P-52. JI KAPUK MUARA, NO.7 JAKARTA 14460 INDONESIA
Komp Green Ville D/24 RT09/09, Duri Kepa Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Komp MPR No 15, Cilandak Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Komp Ruko Lodan Centre Blok Jl-2, Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Komp TSI RT 002/002 Bandar Lampung 35228 Indonesia
Komp, Aviari Pratama No. 7 Blok E3 Jl. Batu AJ1, Batam
Komp. Bali Agung II, 003/023 Kel. Benua Melayu Darat, Pontianak Selatan, Pontianak 78122, Indonesia
Komp. Batununggal Indah Ruko No. 173 Soekamo Hatta, Bandung Indonesia
KOMP. BUKIT IDAMAN NO. 128-129 JL. CIPAKU INDAH, BANDUNG Indonesia
Komp. Bumi Indah RT03/4 Tanjung Pinang Indonesia
Komp. Bumi Pusaka Cinere Blok A/14 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Komp. Citra Green Garden Kav. 17 RT. 02/05 Bandung, Indonesia
Komp. Deplu Kav. 136 RT.07 RW. 07 Cipadu Jaya-Larangan Tangerang Indonesia
Komp. DKI Blok I/7 RT 003 RW 004, Joglo, Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
KOMP. DUTA MAS D5 NO. 9 GROGOL, WEST JAKARTA INDONESIA
Komp. Grawisa Blok A/1 Jakarta Barat 11460 Indonesia
Komp. Grawisa Blok A/1, Jakarta Barat, 11460 Indonesia
Komp. Green Ville Blok BJ No.5 Jakarta Indonesia
Komp. Harco Elektronick Mangga Dua Blok I, No. 5A-5B, Jl. Mangga Dua Raya Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Komp. Kembangan Baru D/12 RT 008, RW 003, Kembangan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Komp. Mikasa E2 A Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Komp. Nagoya Plaza, Lbk Baja, Batam, Indonesia
Komp. Pergudangan Muara Karang Blok B No. 12 Jl. Jembatan III Barat Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Komp. Taman Bukit Kemang Blok C No 7-8 Jakarta, Indonesia
Komp. Villa Melati Mas Blok G-2 No. 15, Serpon Tangerang 15323, Indonesia
Komp.Deplu kav. 136 RT.07/07, kel.Cipadu Jaya kec.Larangan, Tangerang – Indonesia
Kompi Villa Melati Mas Blok M8/No 25 Tangerang 15350 Indonesia
Komplek Andara No.20 JI Andara, Pondok Labu Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Komplek BNI46 Blok GG1 Grogol Petamburan
Komplek Bonagabe Blok B-15 Jl Raya Jatinegara Timur No. 101 Jakarta 13310, Indonesia
Komplek Bpk V No. C-1 Gandul Rt/Rw 31/04 Kelurahan Desa Gandul Kecamatan Limo Kota Depok Indonesia
Komplek Bpk V No. C-1 Gandul Rt/Rw 31/40 Kelurahan/Desa Gandul Kecamatan Limo Kota Depok Indonesia
Komplek Green Garden Blok A-8 No. 1 Jl Arteri Kedova Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Komplek Green Garden Blok A-8 No. 1 Jl. Arteri Kedoya Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Komplek Green Garden, Blok A8/1, Jln Arteri Kedoya, Jakarta 11520, Indonesia.
Komplek Harmoni Plaza F/10 Jl. Suryopranoto No. 2 Jakarta Indonesia
Komplek Ketapang Indah Blok B2/14 Jl. K H Zainul Arifin No. 2 Jakarta 11140 Indonesia
Komplek Kota Grogol Permal G-5 Jl. Prof. Latumeten Jakarta 11460 INDONESIA
Komplek Mekar Wangi Jl. Mekar Wangi No. 9 Bandung Indonesia
Komplek Puri Indah Blok G5 No. 64 Jl. Kembang Indah Utama Jakarta 11610, Indonesia
Kompleks Apartemen Taman Rasuna 17-16-D, JI. H.R Rasuna Said Jakarta Indonesia
Kompleks Batan Blok E/2 RT 006/RW 007, Pasar Minggu Jakarta 12520 Indonesia
Kompleks Bukit Idaman No. 128 Jl. Cipaku Indah Bandung Indonesia
Kompleks Duta Mas Fatmawati Blok B, I/33 Jl. RS Fatmawati No. 39 Jakarta 12150 INDONESIA
Kompleks Golden Plaza Blok C No. 16-17, Jl. R.S. Fatmawati No. 15 Jakarta Selatan, 12420 Indonesia
Kompleks Green Garden Blok Fi No II JL Dan Mogot Jak Barat 11520 INDONESIA
Kompleks Greenville Block V/24 Jakarta Indonesia
Kompleks Mangga Dua Plaza Blok L No. 19, Jl. Mangga Dua Raya Jakarta Utara 10730 Indonesia
Kompleks Perkantoran Buncit Mas Block B-3 Jl. Mampang Prapatan Raya No. 108 Jakarta Selatan Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Kompleks Permata Hijau Jl Boulevar Barrat No. 42 Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Kompleks Permata Timur II Blok LL No. 4 Jatiwaringin Bekasi 17411 Indonesia
Kompleks Perumahan Cemara Asri Jalan Tulip Blok H4 No. 7 Medan – Sumatera Utara 20371 Indonesia
KOMPLEKS TAMA PUTRI HIJAU BLOCK D NO. 50 MEDAN INDONESIA
Komplex Barata Karya Nomor 442 Rukun Tetangga 07, Rukun Warga 07 Kel. Karang Tengah, Kecamatan Ciledung, Kot. Tangerang 15157, Jawa Barat, Indonesia
Komplex Grawisa Blok E/15 Jl. PTB Angke Jakarta Barat 11000 Indonesia
Komplex Grawisa Blok G/11 Jl. Tubagus Angke Jakarta 11460 Indonesia
Komplex Pakuwon r. 14 Jelambar Baru, Jakarta 11460 Indonesia
Komplex Perkantoran Duta Raya Blok F1/24, Jalan Mangga Dua Raya Jakarta 10730, Indonesia
Komplex Permata Hijau A/31 Jl. Mutiara Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Kond. Taman Anggrek Tower IV, Unit 24F Jl. Tanjung Duren Selatan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kond. Taman Anggrek, Tower 6, Unit 28H Jl. Tanjung Duren Selatan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Kondominium Graha Family PA-82 Surabaya 60226
Kondominium Menara Kelapa Gading F-502 Jl. Terusan Gading Timur Boulevard No. 88 Kelapa Gading, Jakarta 14250 Indonesia
Kondominium Tama Anggrek, Tow 2-32EF,RT.002,RW.007 Tanjung Duren Selatan Sub District Grogol Petamburan District, West Jakarta REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Kondominium Taman Anggrek, Tower 3-25D RT003/RW007 Tanjung Duren Selatan West Jakarta, Indonesia
Kondominium Taman Anggrek, Tower 7-29B RT.007, RW. 007, Tanjung Duren Selatan Sub Dist. Grogol Petamburan District, West Jakarta, Republic of Indonesia
Kondominium Wesling Kedoya B9/0905 Jl. Raya Kedoya Garden Jakarta Barat 11520 Indonesia
KONDOMINUIM TMN ANGGREK TW 8-27 D JAKARTA BARAT
Kp Srengseng RT. 012/008 Lenteng Agung, 12610 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
KP. Muara RT. 04/RW. 01 Desa Banjaranwetan, Kecamatan Banjaran Kabupaten Bandung, Indonesia
Kp. Padabeunghar RT 02 RW 09 Bogo, Indonesia
Kp. Ros, Leuweung Klot Cibungbulan West Java
Kp. Sukadana RT/RW 01/01 Desa Cigagade, Bi Limbangan Garut Indonesia
Kuningan Village Taman Patra II No. 17 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Law Office CCN & Associates Menara Imperium 12th Fl. – Suite D Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav 1 Jakarta, 12980, Indonesia
Lembang No. 7, RT.006/RW.005 Menteng, Jakarta Pusat 10310 Indonesia
Level 22 Bank of BNI Building Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav 1 Jakart 10220 INDONESIA
Limas V Block C2/25 Taman Kedoya Permal Jakarta 11530 Indonesia
LIMUS PRATAMA REGENCY F/6 RT09 LIMUS CILENGSI, JAWA INDONESIA
Lingkar Bima Luar Kav. 3 Bima Asri – Dukuh Bima Kota Legenda Bekasi Timur – Jawa Barat Indonesia
Lippo Centre 11th Floor J1. Gatoto Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta 12950
Lippo Centre Building J1. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta
Lippo Centre, 11th Floor Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav. 35-36 Jakarta Indonesia 12950
Lippo Group Lippo Centre 10/F Asia Tower 101 Diponegoro Blvd
Lippo Group Lippo Centre Building 8th Floor J1. Jend Gatot
Lj. Kayu Putih III. C/3 R.T. 003 R.W. 006 Kelurahan Pulogadung, Kecamatan Pulo Gadung Kota J Indonesia
Lubis, Santosa & Maulana Wisma bank Dharmala, 5th Floor JI. Jend. Surdirman Kav 28 Jakarta INDONESIA
Mampang Prapatan I/32 RT/W 03/06 Mampang Prapatan Jakarta Selatan 12790, Indonesia
Mandala Barat III No. 10, Tomang Jakarta Indonesia
Mangga Besar IV E/5 R.T./R.W. 004/001 Taman Sari Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
MANGGA DUA ABDAD APARTEMENT PESONA BAHARI TOWER TO PA 2 LANTAI 19, NO. 19D JAKARTA INDONESIA
MANYAR KERTOADI BLOK W 229 SURABAYA INDONESIA
Mashill Tower 6th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 25 Indonesia
Mayapada Tower, 16th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 28 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Mediterania Garden Apt., Tower A, No. A/09B/K Jl. Tanjung Duren Raya Kav. 5-9 Jakarta 11470, Indonesia
Mega Kebon Jeruk B2/10 Joglo Jakarta Barat 11640 Indonesia
Menara Bank Danamon 15th Floor Jl. Prof. Dr. Satrio Kav. E IV No. 6 Mega Kuningan, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Bank Mega 24th Floor Kawasan Terpadu Para Group Jl. Kapten P. Tendean Kav. 12 – 14A Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Menara Batavia ,29th Floor, Jl. K.H. Mas Mansyur Kav 126, Jakarta 10220, Indonesia
Menara Batavia 10 Floor JI KH Mas Mansyur, Kav 126 Jakarta 10220 INDONESIA
Menara Batavia 11th Fl. Jalan KH., Mas Mansyur Kavling 126 Jakarta Pusat 10220
Menara DEA 15th Floor Suite 1505 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta Selatan 12950 Indonesia
Menara DEA, Lantai 9 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jl. Mega Kuningan Barat IX Kav.E4, 3 NO. 1 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia.
Menara Hijau Lantai 5, JI. MT. Haryono Kav. 33 Jakarta 12770
Menara Imperium 16C Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav. 1 Jakarta Indonesia
Menara Imperium Lt. 17 Menara Kuningan Super Blok Kav No. 1 Jl. Rasuna Said Jakarta 12980
Menara Imperium, 9th Floor, Suite B Metropolitian Kuningan Superblok Kav 1A, Jl. HR. Rasuna Said Jakarta 12
Menara Jamsostek South Tower 2nd Floor Unit TB 02-02 Jl. Jenderal Gatot Subroto No. 38 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
Menara Jamsostek, Menara Selatan 10th Floor Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 38 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
Menara Jamsostek, Menara Selatan 10th Floor, Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 38, Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
Menara Kadin , 23rd Floor Unit D, Jalan HR Rasuna Said Blok X-5, Lav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Menara Kadin 23rd Floor Jalan HR Rasuna Said Kav 2-3 Jakarta Selatan 12950 Indonesia
Menara Kadin 7th Floor Jl. HR Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav 2-3 Jakarta Indonesia
Menara Kadin Indonesia Suite 19C JI. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X – 5, Kav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Kadin Indonesia, Penthouse 11, JL.HR. Rasuna Said Blok x5 KAV 2-3 Jakarta 12950. Indonesia
Menara Kadin, 21st Floor Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
MENARA KADIN, 7TH FLOOR JI. HR RASUNA SAID BLOK X-5 KAV. 1-3 JAKARTA 12950 INDONESIA
Menara Kadin, 7th Floor Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 2-3 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Kadin, 7th Floor Jl.H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 1-3 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia.
Menara Karya 19th Floor, Unit G-H Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Block X-5, Kav. 1-2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Matahari 17th Floor Palem Raya Boulever No. 7 Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang 15811 Indonesia
Menara Matahari 17th Floor, Palem Raya Boulever No. 7 Lippo Karawaci Tangerang Indonesia
Menara Mulia, 28th Flr. Penthouse Jl. Jend Gatot, Subroto Kav 9-11 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Menara Mulia, Suite 1701 17th Floor Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav 9-11 Jakarta 12930,
Menara Perdama, 7th Floor Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Kav. C-17 Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
Menara Rajawali 6th Floor Mega Kuningan Lot #5.1 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Rajawali Lt 18 Jl. Mega Kuningan Lot 5.1 Kawasan Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Menara Rajawali, 18 Floor Kawasan Mega Kuningan Mega Kuningan lot 5.1 Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Menara Standard Chartered 30/F Menara Standard Chartered Jl. Prof. Dr. Satrio Kav. 164 Jakarta 12930, Indonesia
Menara Sudirman Suite 8A, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav 60, Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Menara Sudirman, 19th Fl, Jl Jend, Sudirman Kav 60, Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Mess Indah Kiat, Jl Raya Serpong KM 8 Tangerang, Indonesia
Metro Alam III/10, RT 011/016, Pondok Pinang, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Mid Plaza I #04-00 Jalan Sudirman Jakarta Indonesia
MidPlaza 1, Level 8 Jalan Jend. Sudirman 10-11 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Midplaza 2 Building 25th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 10-11 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Mitra Building 8th Floor Gatot Subroto kav 21. Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Mitra Building 8th Floor Jalan Jendral Gatot Subroto Kav. 21 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Mitra Ganesha Graha Jl. Kemang Timur Raya No. 28 Jakarta 12730 Indonesia
Muara Karang Blk 6.S/16 Pluit Jakarta Indonesia
Muara Karang Blok D VI Utara No.3 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
MUARA KARANG BLOK G10 UTARA NO 11 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Muara Karang Blok Q8 Barat No. 53 Jakarta Indonesia
Muara Karang Blok U8 Utara No. 29 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Muara Karang Blok V 7 Utara No. 33 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Muara Karang Blok Z 8 Utara No. 16 Jakarta, Indonesia 14450
Muara Karang G. VI. B/30 RT001/RW008 Pluit, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Muara Karang J-7 Selatan No. 20 Jakarata Utara 14450 Indonesia
Multi Trend Holdings Ltd. Jalan Sriwijaya Raya 18 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12110, Indonesia INDONESIA
MURA KARANG BLOK 1/X SELANTAN NO. 9 JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Mutiara Mediterania D8K RT 011/005 Kel. Pluit Jakarta Utara Indonesia
N.V. Perusahaan Dagang Dan Industrie Wirontono & Co. 41 Jalan Kebon Sirih Jakarta
Ngadirojo, RT 02, RW 04, Ngadirojo Sub District, Ampel District, Boyolali Regency Republic of Indonesia
No. 14, DR. Latumeten Jakarta 11330 Indonesia
NO. 17 JL. BANYUWANGI, MENTENG JAKARTA PUSAT INDONESIA
No. 3 Chairil Anwar Medan 20152 Indonesia
No. 32 Jl. Bukit Golf II Pondok Indah Jakarta-Selatan 12310 Indonesia
No. 33 Jalan Cikini Jakarta Indonesia
NO. 39, JL. JEND A YANI KM 6.5 BANDUNG 40291 INDONESIA
No. 47 Jalan Kemang Raja Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
No. 5.1404, The Residence The Sultan Hotel Complex Jl. Gatot Subroto Jakarta 12040, Indonesia
No. 63 Jalan Berlian II Cilandak, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
No. 64G, Jalan Lautze Jakarta, Pusat 10710 Indonesia
NO.62 JL MARGASATWA PONDOK LABO JAKARTA 12450 INDONESIA
Nuansa Hijau Apartment C11/3 Jalan Sekolah Kencana IV Pondok Indah, Jakarta Indonesia
OMAR CORPORATION Wisma Tamara Lt. 15 JI. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 24 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
One Seminyak Ltd. JL. Braban 98 Taman Kerobokan Bali Indonesia
Orchid Park C/ 278, Batam Indonesia
P O Box 4208 JKTM 12700 Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA
P. Jayakarta No. 11A. 001-004 Jakarta 1110, Indonesia
P.O BOX 3726, Jakarta 10037 Indonesia
P.O. Box 1072 Denpasar – 80362 Bali INDONESIA
P.O. Box 1317/JKB 11013 Jakarta Indonesia
P.O. Box 1689, Jakarta 12016 Indonesia
P.O. Box 3965 Jkt 10039 Jakarta INDONESIA
P.O. Box 8083/Smel Semarang , Central Java INDONESIA
P.T. Eurocapital Plaza Bapindo, Citibank Tower 12th Floor, Jl Jend Sudirman Kav. 54-55, Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
P.T. Stud Menara Batavia 22nd Floor Jl. KH Mas Mansyur Kav 126 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Paem Utama 18, RT008/007 Kel Duri Kepa, Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta Barat,
Pajajaran 59 BADUNG INDONESIA
Pakubuwono Residence Sandalwood Tower #17C JL Pakubuwono 6/68 Jakarta 12120 Indonesia
Pakubuwono Residence Unit S12D RT.003/01 Jl. Pakubuwono VI No. 68, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 1210 Indonesia
Pakuwon Indah Villa Bukit Regensi ABL-17 Surabaya Indonesia
Pangeran Jayakarta 101 Bloc C No 6 Jakarta Pusat
Panglima Polim III No. 6 Melawai, Kebayoran Baru Jakarata Selatan 12160 Indonesia
Panglima Polin 111/8 Jakarta, Selatan 12610 Indonesia
Panorama Lebak Bulus RT 006/004 Kel. Cilandak Barat, Kec. Cilandak Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Pantai Kuta V/7 Ancol Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
Pantai Kuta VI No. 25 Ancol Timur Jakarta, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara AB/6 Jakarta, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara AD/9 Jakarta, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara Bloh SD1Y Jakarta, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara Blok A/51 RT001/RW016, Pluit Penjaringan Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Pantai Mutiara Blok F/19 Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Pantai Mutiara Blok P No. 38 RT. 007 RW. 016 Pluit Penjaringan Jakarta Utara
Pantai Mutiara Blok ZF No. 1, Jakarta Utara Indonesia.
Pantai Mutiara N/S RT 005 RW 016 Pluit Jakarta Utara INDONESIA
Pantai Mutiara P21 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Parang Tritis 4 No. 7 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Pasir Kaliki 155 Bandung Indonesia
Patra Jasa Bldg Suite 903/905 Jl. Gatot Subroto Kav. 32-34, Jakarta Indonesia
Patra Kuningan M. 4 Kasv. 4RT 003/004 Kel. Kuningan, Timur Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Patra Kuningan M.4, Kav. 4 RT 003/004, Kel. Kuningan Timur Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Patra Kuningan Raya 1M 7/4, Rt. 005/04, Kuningan Jakarta Selatan
Patra Kuningan Raya RT-005/004 Kuningan Timur, Jakarta Selatan
Pd Bambu Asri Raya G-3/29 RT002/RW009, Pondok Bambu Duren Sawit, Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Pejaten Barat IV/18B Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Pejaten Elok D/7 RT003/007 Pejaten Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Peranata Hijau Blok B No 32 Jakarta Salatan 12210
Perkantoran Roxymas Jl. K.H. Hasyim Ashari KAV. 125B Blok C 2 no. 27 – 34 Jakarta 10150 Indonesia.
Perkantoran Taman A-9 Unit B Lantal 1-3 Jl. Mega Kuningan, H.R. Rasuna Said Jakarta 12950 INDONESIA
Permata Hijau Blok F III/56 RT 019/010 Grogol Utara, Keb. Lama Jakarta-Sel Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok G56 Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Permata Hijau 1/29 RT 019/010, Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau A48 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blk G. No. 42 RT008/013 Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blk U/6 RT. 014/002 Grogol Utara, Indonesia
Permata Hijau BLK X / Kav C, RT / RW : 002 / 02, Grogol Utara Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blk. A/48 Kel. Grogol Utara Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok 12/12 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
PERMATA HIJAU BLOK D 41/42 RT 009/008, KEL. GROGOL UTARA KEC. KEBAYORAN LAMA, JAKARTA Selatan, Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok D/25 Jl. Mas Murni, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok G/20 Grogol Utara, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok I/2119. RT. 004/001 Grogol Utara, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Permata Hijau Blok O/1, RT 006/001 Grogol Utara Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau Bok F5, RT 19/10 Grogol Utara, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia.
Permata Hijau F/74 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Hijau R/13 RT008 RW002 Grogol, Indonesia
Permata Intan II Blok S2/1 Permata Hijau Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Permata Intan IV X/V, 002/002 Grogol Utara Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Permata Intan V/2.5 Grogol Utara Jakarta Indonesia
Permata Plaza 8th Floor Jl. MH Thamrin No. 57 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Permaya Hidan Block E No.19 Dakarya Selatan , Indonesia
Permaya Hidan Block, No. 19 Dakarya Selatan , Indonesia.
Pertamina Head Office, 19th Floor Jl. Merdeka Timur 1A Jakarta 10110, Indonesia
Perum Citra 2A-5/17 RT001 RW012 Jakarta Indonesia
Perum, Graha Family Blok E/No. 3 Surabaya 60226 Indonesia
Perumahan Cendrawasih Permai no.88 Samarinda 75117, Indonesia
Perumahan Citra 2 Blok D 6/14 Kel. Pegadungan Jakarta Pusat Indonesia
Perumahan Eramas 2000 Blok E4 No. 10 Kelurahan Pulo Gebang Cakung Jakarta Timur Indonesia
Perumahan Graha Famili Blok E, No. 3 Surabaya, Indonesia
Perumahan Kelapa Gading Permai, Jl. Janur Elok IX Blok QH 9 No. 1 Jakarta, Indonesia
Perumahan Permata Nusa Dua Blok IV No. 12, Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia 80363
Perumahan Puri Indah Jl. Kembang Sakti Timur Raya Blok D-9 No. 34 Jakarta Barat
Pesona Den Haaq Kota Wisata Jakarta Indonesia
PESONA KAYANGAN CM 4 DEPOK – JAWA BARAT INDONESIA
Petemon Barat 173 Surabaya 60253 Indonesia
Pinang Merah Blok P5, RT 001, Rukun Warga 016, Kelurahan Cinipang Muara Kecamatan Jatinegara, Jakarta Timur, Jakarta, Indonesia
PLAZA 89 9TH FLOOR JL. H.R. RASUNA SAID KAV X-7 NO. 6 JAKARTA 12940 INDONESIA
Plaza 89, Fl 10 Suite 1006 Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. X-7, No. 6 Jakarta 12940 Indonesia
PLAZA ABDA 7th FLOOR ZONE D JL. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 59 Jakarta 12190 INDONESIA
Plaza Bapindo, Bank Mandiri Tower, Lantai 18, Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 54-55, Jarkarta 12190 Indonesia
Plaza Bapindo, Citibank Tower 12th floor JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Plaza Bapino, Menara II, 21st Floor JL Jend. Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190 INDONESIA
Plaza BII Menara II Jl M H Thamrin NO. 51, Kav. 22 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Plaza BII Menara II, 7th Floor Jl MH Thamrin no 51 Kav. 22 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Plaza BII Tower II, 7th Floor Jalan M.H. Thamrin No. 51 Jakarta 10350, Indonesia HP: 6281-REDACTED
Plaza BII, Tower 2, 36th Floor, J1. M.H. Thamrin, Kav. 22, Jakarta 10350 INDONESIA
Plaza Chase 24th Floor, Jln. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakart 12920 Indonesia
Plaza Chase 6th Floor JI. Jend. Sudiman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Plaza Chase Podium 7th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Plaza Chase, 24th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Plaza DM 6th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav.25 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Plaza DM, 18th Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudiman Kav. 25 Jakarta, 12920 Indonesia
PLAZA DM, 25/F SUITE 2503 JL. JEND SUDRMAN KAV. 25 JARKARTA 12920-INDONESIA
Plaza II, Tower 2, 37th Floor Jalan M.H. Thamrin Kav. 21-22 Jakarta 10350 INDONESIA
Plaza Kebon Jeruk A-21 Jakarta
Plaza Lippo Building 11th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav 25 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Plaza Mashill 20th Floor 5-2002, JL. Jend. Sudirman Kav 25, Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
Plaza Mutiara 18-19 Floor Jl Linghar Mega Kuningan KAV E 1-2 No. 12 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Plaza Mutiara 19th Floor Jalan Kingar, Mega Kumingan Kav. E1-2 Number 1-2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Plaza Mutiara 19th Floor Jalan Lingkar Mega Kuning Kav E1-2 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
Plaza Mutiara, 16th Floor Jl. Lingkar Mega Kuningan Kav E. 1.2 No. 1-2 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia
Plaza Pondok Indah III Blok E-7 Jl. T.B. Simatupang, Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan, 12310 Indonesia
Plaza Sentral 14 Fl. JI. Jendral Sudirman No. 47 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Plemaham V/51-A, Surabaya 60261, Indonesia
Pluit Barat 6, No. 39 Jakarta Utara 14440 Indonesia
Pluit Barat V/5 RT:014/07 Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Pluit Indah Streeet No.29 Pluit North Jakarata Indonesia
Pluit Pantai Mutiara Blok P, No. 37 Pluit Jarkata Indonesia
Pluit Permai VI No. 39 Pluit Penjaringan, Jakarta Utara RT04/04, Jakarta Raya 14240 Indonesia
Pluit Putri II/7 JAKARTA INDONESIA
Pluit Raya 200 Blok E/15, Jakarta Utara 14450, Indonesia.
Pluit Sakti Raya No. 28, Rt.009, RW 007 Pluitt, Penjarinan Jakarta Utara 11450 INDONESIA
Pluit Timur Blk J5/34, RT.002, RW.009 Pluit Penjaringan Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Pluit Timur Blok V – Utara No. 59 Jakarta 14450 Indonesia
Pluit Timur Raya 38 Pluit Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
PLUIT UTARA III/ 14, R.T 002, R.W. 005, JAKARTA
PO Box 1072 Denpasar Bali
PO Box 3408 Denpasar Bali Indonesia 80034
Po Box 3426 Denpasar Bali Indonesia 80034
Pondok Bambu Permai Blok B1/29, Jakarta-Timur Indonesia
Pondok Damar Blok A-22 Perumahan Kedaton Indah Cikpupa, Tangerang Indonesia
Poris Plawad RT/RW, 02/06 Kelurahan Poris Plawad Kecamatan Cipondoh Tangerang
Pratama Capital Indonesia Bapindo Plaza, Citibank Tower 20th Floor, Jl Jend Sudirman Kav. 54-55 Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Pregolan Bunder 32 Surabaya, East Java Indonesia
Price Water House Centre Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kav C-3 Kuningan Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
PricewaterhouseCoopers Bldg., 8th Floor, Jalan H.R. Rasuna Said Kav C-3 Kuningan, Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
PRISMA KEDOYA PLAZA BLOK A-10, J1 RAYA PEJUANGAN, KEL. KEBON JERUK, KEC. KEBON JERUK JARKARTA BARAT
Probolinggo Indonesia
PT ALFACO INDONESIA KOMP RUKO PURI MUTIARA BLK C-9 SUNTER AGUNG JAKARTA UTARA 14350 INDONESIA
PT Anugerahtama Bina Citra Menara Imperium Lt. 17 Jl Rasuna Said Kav. No. 1 Jakarta 12980 Indonesia
PT Anugra Cipta Investa Menara Rajawali, 18th Floor, Mega Kuningan Lot 5.1, Jarakata Jakarta akarta
PT Asia Inti Utama Menara Imperium 12nd Fl Suite C JL.H.R. Rasuna Said Kav. 1A
PT Asia inti Utama, Menara Imperium 12x Fl, Suite C, JI. HR Rasunan Said Kav 1A Jakarta 12980 INDONESIA
PT Bank DBS Indonesia Plaza Permata. 8th Floor Jl. M.H. Thamrin Kav 57 Jakarta 10350, Indonesia
PT Bira Aset Manajemen, Wisma GKBI 2nd Floor, J1. Jend Sudirman Kav. 28 Jakarta 10210 INDONESIA
PT Catur Agrodaya Mandiri Wisma Budi, 4th Floor – Suite 402 Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. C-6 Jakarta 12940, INDONESIA
PT CB Indonesia Central Plaza, 16th Floor JL Jend Sudirman No.47 Jakarta 12930 INDONESIA
PT Cikal Wana Selaras TIFA Building 5th Floor Kuningan Barat No 26, Jakarta Selatan (12710), Indonesia Indonesia
PT Ciputra Group Jaya Building, 5th Floor Jl. M-H Thamrin 12 Jakarta 10340
PT Delta Aneka Consultants & Trade 14th Floor Bank Bali Tower Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav 27 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
PT Dewata Wibawa Sona Topas Tower 19th Floor, Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav. 26, Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
PT Duta Anggada Realty Chase Plaza Tower 21st Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
PT Energi Timur Jauh Menara Global 23rd Floor, Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav. 27, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
PT Enseval 4th Floor, Enseval Building Jl. Let Jend Suprapto Kav 4 Jakarta 10510 Indonesia
PT Fas Consulting Mid Plaza 1, 9th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 10 – 11 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
PT FAS MANAJEMEN CITRAPERDANA Century Tower 3rd Floor Suite 304 Jl H R Sasuna Said Kav X-2 No.4 Jakarta 12950
PT Ilthabi Rekatama Kantor Taman A 9 Unit C8-14 Jl Mega Kuningan Lot 8.9/9 Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
PT Indokapital Securities Plaza Chase Podium, 7th Floor J1. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 21 Jakarta 12920- INDONESIA
PT INTISAR PIRANTI MEGA Jl. Pemuda No. 103, Jakarta 13220, Indonesia
PT Multi Resources Indonesia Graha Iskandarsyah, 10th Floor Jl. Iskandarsyah Raya No. 66C Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan, 12160, Indonesia
PT Murni Ciptasentosa Jalan Ir. H. Juanda III No. 6 4th Floor, Jakarta Pusat 10120 Indonesia
PT Northstar Pacific Menara Kadin, 7th Floor Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Blok X-5 Kav. 1-3, Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
PT Renaissance Capital Asia Menara Bank Danamon 15th Floor Jl. Prof. Dr. Satrio E.IV No. 6 Mega Kuningan Jakarta 12950 Indonesia
PT Sampoerna Strategic Sampoerna Strategic Square North Tower, 30th Floor Jl Jendral Sudirman Kav 45, Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
PT WAHAMA BERSAMA GLOBALINDO, GEDUNG BRI II SUIT 1805, JJ JEND SUDIRMAN KAV44-46, JARKARTA 10210 INDONESIA
PT Widya Global JI Haji Samali No.51 Kalibata Jakarta 12740 Indonesia
PT. Andalan Sekar Makmur Midplaza I, Jln Jend Sudirman Kav 10-11 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
PT. Asia Kaitalindo Komoditi Berjangka Sona Topas Tower Lt. 15A Suite 15A1 Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav 26 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
PT. Bineatama Kayone Lestari Jl. Raya Pajapolah Km 7. Tasikmalaya 46151 West Java, Indonesia
PT. Branta Mulia Tbk Wisma Indocement 7th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 70-71 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
PT. Charoen Pokphan Indonesia Jl. Ancol Barat 8/1 Jakarta 14430 Indonesia
PT. GRAMA BAZITA Jl. Mampang Prapatan Raya Kav. 71-71 Multika Building 3fl Suite 300 Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
PT. INTERCALLIN JL. DAAN MOGOT KM. 11, CENGKARENG JAKARTA 11710 INDONESIA
PT. Kaltimex Energi Menara Batavia, 26th Floor Unit A-26, Jl.K.H Mas Mansyur, Kav. 126 Jarkarta 10220
PT. Mega Prima Persada Sakti Perumahan Kelapa Gading Permai, Jl. Janur Elok IX Blok QH 9 No. 1 Jakarta
PT. Prima Batavia Indobulking Graha Iskandarsyah Lt.10 Jl. Iskandarsyah Raya No. 66 C Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan 12160, Indonesia
PT. Samuel Sekuritas Indonesia Menara Imperium, 11th Floor JI. H.R. Rasuna Said Kav. 1 Jakarta 12980 INDONESIA
PTB Duren Sawit Blok Q III No. 17 Jakarta Timur 13440 Indonesia
PTB Duren Sawit S.II/13, RT 002 / RW 004, Kelurahan Duret Sawit, Kecamatan Duren Sawit, Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Pulo Mas 1 G No. II Kayu Putih, Pulo Gadung Jakarta 13210, Indonesia
Puncak Permai 2/15-17, Surabaya, Indonesia Indonesia
Puri Casablanca Apt. 3502B Ji Casablanca Jakarta Indonesia
Puri Indah Blok B1 No. 11, Jl. Kembang Asri 6, Jakarta Barat 11610
Puri Indah Mall, Jl. Puri Agung Puri Indah, 2nd Floor, #227 Jakarta Barat 11610 INDONESIA
Puri Indah Street Block A. 14 No. 21 RT.005 RW.004 Kembangan West Jakarta Indonesia
Puri Kencana Blok J3 No. 26 Kembangan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Puri Kencana L7/3 RT007/007 Kembangan Selatan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Pusat Niaga Roxy Mas Blk B2 No. 2 Jln K.H. Hasyim Ashari 125B Jakarta 10150 Indonesia
Pusat Niaga Roxy Mas Blok B2, No. 2 Jln KH Hasyim Ashari 125 B Jakarta 10150, Indonesia
PUSPAN RT01/07 BLULUKAN COLOMADU KARANGANYAR
RA KARTINI NO 30 MEDAN INDOENESIA
Rajawali Selatan 4 No. 35 Jakarta 10720 Indonesia
Ratu Plaza Apartment, Suite 1503 Jl. Jendral Sudirman No. 9 Jakarta 10270 Indonesia
Rawa Selatan VI No. 14 Jakarta 10550 Indonesia
RAYA PLUIT TIMUR 12-A PLUIT JAKARTA UTARA INDONESIA
Raya Tenggilis 79 SURABAYA Indonsesia 60292
Roa Malaka Selatan 35 Jakarta 11230 Indonesia
RT 005113 MPR III DALAM 3 JAKARTA SELATAN
RT. 006, RW 006 Pademangan TMR Pademangan, Jakarta Utara Indonesia
RT. 04/02 Komp. Bumi Indah, Lubuk Baja Kota, Lubuk Daja Batam
RT/RW 04/06 PERUM ANGGREK MASE/33 KOTA BATAM INDONESIA
Rudy Yusuf (Site Office) Jl. Pakubuwono VI No.76, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta 12120 Indonesia
Ruko Bisnis Sentra B-21 Tanjung Duren, Jakarta Indonesia
Sagu No. 36, Jagakarsa, Jakarta, Indonesia
Sam ratulmugi no. 2 medan indonesia 20152
Sambas 3 No. 125 Jakarta 12130 Indonesia
Samirejo, RT/RW02/02 Desa Samirejo, Kecamatan Dawe Kebupaten Kudus, Jawa Tengah Indonesia
Sampoerna Strategic Square Tower B 26th Floor, Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 45-46 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Sanur Indah No. 37 Kelapa Gading Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Sasak No. 4 Kebon-Jeruk Jakarta 11550 Indonesia
Sekolah Duta Raya, PN 04 No. 52, Pondok Indah Jakarta, Indonesia
Sekolah Kencana 4 No. 19 Pondok Indah, Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Sekolah Kenlana 4 No. 19 Pondok Indah Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Senaya Bintaro HI 9/2 Sektor 9, Pondok Pucung, Pondok Aren, Tangerang, Indonesia
Senayan Residence Tower 3, Lt. 18 B2S Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Senayan Residence Tower 3 Lt. 18 B2S Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Sentra Mulia 10th Floor, Jl. HR. Rasuna Said KAV. X-6 No. 8, Jakarta 12940 INDONESIA
Setia Budhi Regency Wing I No. 38 Bandung, Indonesia
Setiabudi Atrium Bldg 3rd Floor, Suite no. 303 Jl., H.R. Rasuna Said Kav. 62, Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
SETIABUDI ATRIUM BUILDING 5TH FLOOR (501), JL. H.R. RASUNA SAID KAV 62 JAKARTA 12920 INDONESIA
SETRA DUTA RAYA I NO:10 BANDUNG 40151 INDONESIA
SIMPANG GRAHA FAMILI 7-R/96 SURABAYA
Simprug Garden 11 BF 8.9, RT 007/003 Grogol, Jakarta Indonesia
Simprug Garden Kav. # / 16 RT 007/ RW 003, Grogol Selatan Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Simprug Golf 17 No. 55 Jakarta 12220 Indonesia
Simprug Golf IX Kav 140 Jakarta Indonesia
Simprug Golf VIII / J.2, RT. 003/008, Grogol Selatan, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Simpruk Kav. WG 7 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Simpruk Terrace Apartment Blok. C 8th Floor, No. 805 Jl. Sultan Iskander Muda, Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Simpruk Terrace Apartment Blok. D 7th Floor, No. 706 Jl. Sultan Iskandar Muda, Jakarta 12210 Indonesia
Simpruk Terrace Condominium Tower C Unit 509 Jalan Sultan Iskandar Muda Jakarta Selatan 12220 Indonesia
Simprul Teras Kondominium Suite D0306, Jl. Simprul By-Pass Arterie, 12220 Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Slipi Apt. Tower 1 10-D Jln. S. Parman Kav. 22-24 Jakarta Indonesia
Snabung R707 RW01 Wonotingal Candisari Semarang INDONESIA
Soebagjo Jatim Djarot Plaza DM, 17th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 25 Jakarta 12920, INDONESIA
Sona Topas Tower FL. 16 Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 26 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Sona Topas Tower, 12th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 26 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Sona Topas Tower, 18th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 26 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
STR Paradise Blok F I/8-13, R.T. 001 R.W. 012 Sunter Agung, Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
Sudirman Plaza Complex, Marein Tower 11th Floor, Jl Jend Sudirman Kav 76 – 78 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
Sudirman Plaza, Marein 17th Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav 76-78 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
SUDIRMAN TOWER 19TH FLOOR JL. JEND SUDIRMAN KAV 60 JAKARTA 12190 INDONESIA
Sudirman Tower 19th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 60 Jakarta 12190 Indonesia
Suite 403 Gedung Pusat Niaga Arena Pekan Raya Jakarta Kemayoran Jakarta 10620 Indonesia
Sukmajaya C4/25 Depok
Sumatra No.10, Central Jakarta Indonesia
Summerville Apartment No. C101 Jl. Kelapa Gading Boulevard Jakarta Utara
Summitmas I, 17th Floor JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 61-62 Jakarta 12069 Indonesia
SUNTER PARADISE F 9/21 JAKARTA UTARA, INDONESIA
Suntev Hijau II Blok BII/6 Jakarta Utara
Sutan Syahrir No. 36, RT 007, RW 005, Gondangdia, Jakarta Pusat – Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk Block E1 No.13 Jakarta Indonesian
Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok F1/16, Kembangan Jakarta 11530 Indonesia
TAMAN ALPHA INDAH BLOK F4/7 RT 003/01 JOGLO JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Taman Anggrek Condominium Tower 6-35G Jl. Letjen S. Parman Kav. 21 Slipi Jakarta Barat 11470 Indonesia
Taman Anggrek Condominium Tower 8 No. 31D, Tanjung Duren Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Aries E10 No. 28 Jakarta Barat, 11610 DKI Jakarta, Indonesia
Taman Aries E8/7, Meruya Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Cipulir C.I/13, RT. 009, RW.008, Sub-District of Cipadu Raya District of Larangan, Tangerang, Indonesia
Taman Duta Mas Blok B5 No.4 Rt/Rw 002/009 Kelurahan Wijaya, Kasuma, Kecamatan Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat
Taman Gandaria Blok A/4 Kebayoran Lama Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Taman Gandarla F 1/12 RR 012/005 Kebayoran Lama Utara Jakarta, Indonesia
Taman Giri Loka, Blok C No. 3A Bumi Serpong Damai Tangerang 15322
Taman Golf Kav 303, Lippo Karawaci Tangerang Indonesia
Taman Harapan Baru I-2/38, Bekasi Indonesia
Taman Harapan Indah 1/14, RT03/07 Jelambar Baru Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Harapan Indah A/21, RT. 02/07, Jelambar Baru, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Harapan Indah Blok 1 No. 7 Jalan Pangeran Tubagus Angke Jakarta 11460 Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk 12, No. 13-14, RT004/RW011, Srengseng, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk Block E1 No. 13 Jakarta Indonesian
Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok E-1 No. 27 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok F1 / 16, Kembagan Jakarta 11530 Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk Blok M5/20 Jakarta, Barat INDONESIA
Taman Kebon Jeruk H2/2, RT 03/11 Srengseng, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk J14 No. 16 Jakarta 11630 Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk L1 No 27 Intercon Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk L1/6, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk PI/44 Jakarta Indonesia 11630
Taman Kebon Jeruk U4/102 RT 12/03 Joglo Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk, Blok D IV No. 12A, Meruya, Jakarta 11630 Indonesia
Taman Kebon Jeruk, P4/18 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Kebun Jeruk F. I.I, RT.003, RW 010 Srengseng, Kembangan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kedoya Permai A2/l Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Kedoya Permai Jl. Prisma Blok B-3 No. 24 Kebon Jeruk, West Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Kedoya Permai, Blok A2/1, Jakarta Barat 11530, Indonesia
Taman Kedoya, Permai A2, No. 1, RT. 005, RW. 007, Kel. Kebun Jeruk, Kec. Kebun Jeruk, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Kemayoran Kondominium Bougenville Tower #21-03 Jakarta Kemayoran Indonesia
Taman Laguan Blok H2 No.39 Rt/Rw 004/005, Cibubur, Kel. Jati Karya Kec. Jati Sampurna, Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Lestari Indah/R3 Lebak Bulus Cilandak Jakarta Selatan
Taman Malibu Indah Blok A-1 Medan 20157 Indocnesia
Taman Meruya Ilir D5/3, RT001/02 Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Metro Alam 1 Blok PG14 No. 03 Pondok Indah, Jakarta Selantan 12310 Indonesia
Taman Metro Alam PK. 16 Pondok Indah Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Taman Mutiara Prima Blok E/6 RT 006/05, Kelurahan Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Patra IX/9, Rt. 005/04, Kuningan Jakarta Selatan
Taman Patra VIII No.8 Rt 005/04 Kuningan Timur Jakarta Selatan
Taman Permata Blok B 20 No. 56 RT. 01/01, Kel. Binong Kec. Curug, Tangerang Indonesia
Taman Pluit Murni 2, No. 2, RT.017, RW.004, Kelurahan Pluit, Kecamatan Penjaringan, Kotamadya Jakarta Utara, Indonesia
TAMAN POLONIA III/34 NORTH SUMATRA INDONESIA
Taman Pulo Indah,Blok P3 No. 12 RT. 017/07, Penggilingan Cakung Jakarta Timur, Indonesia
Taman Rahayu D2 No. 2 Bandung Indonesia
Taman Raja Apartment A703 Jl. Warung Jati Barat I Warung Buncit Jakarta Selatan 12740, Indonesia
Taman Rasuna Apartment, Unit 0626D RT005/RW010, Menteng Atas Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Taman Ratu Block BB II No.17 RT.006 RW.001 Kedoya West Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Ratu Blok E1 No. 12 Duri Kepa, Jakarta 11510 Indonesia
Taman Ratu Indah C.II/6, RT.004, RW.013 Duri Kepa Sub District Kebon Jeruk District, West Jakarta Republic of Indonesia
Taman Resort Mediterania Z3 No. 11 RT 002/008, Kel Kapuk Muara Kec. Penjaringan, Jakarta 14460 Indonesia
Taman Sari 56S Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Sari 56S Jakarta Indonesia
TAMAN SARI PESONA BALI JLN.C1 RENDEV RAYA 46 C. 1/18, TANGERANG, INDONESIA
Taman Semanan Indah Blok, C3/43, Kelurahan Semanan, Kalideres, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Sunter Agung II Blok E/1A Jakarta Utara Indonesia
Taman Surya 2 B4/38 Cengkareng Indonesia
Taman Surya 5 Blok 00.4/34 Pegadungan, Kalideres Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Taman Surya Blok C No. 27 Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Indonesia
Taman Surya II/09 Rt. 007/05, Kedoya Utara Kebon Jeruk Jakarta Barat
Taman Surya V Blk 004/24 RT. 008/02, Pegadungan-Kalideres Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Taman Tanah Abang III/28 RT002/004, Jakarta Indonesia
Tamara Center 12th Floor, NO. 1212 JL Jendral Sudirman Kav No. 24 Jakarta 12920 Indonessia
TAMARA CENTRE, 7/F RM. 701. JEND SUDIRMAN KAV. 24 JARKARTA 12910 INDONESIA
TAMPAK SIRING INDAH NO. 2 BUKIT GADING VILLA KELAPA GADING JAKARTA UTARA JAKARTA INDONESIA
Tanjung Duren Utara III C/222 RT 09/RW03, Grogol Petamburan Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Tanjung Sadari 23, Surabaya Indonesia
Tebet Barat Dalam IV No. 10 Jakarta 12810 Indonesia
TEBET BARAT VI A/26, RT 011/004 TEBET JARKARTA SELETAN INDONESIA
Tebet Timur Dalam VIII I No. 2 Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Tebet Timur Dalam Vll/ll, Rt. 04 RW. 06 Tebet Timur, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Terusan Hang Lekir IV 32-33 RT 005/RW 008, Grogol Selatan, Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta, Indonesia
Tg. Duren Timur No. 27 RT/RW 004/006 Tg Duren Selatan Jakarta Barat Indonesia
The Ascott Jakarta, Condo. #1724 Jl. Kebon Kacang Raya, Jakarta 10240 Indonesia
The Pakubuwono Residence Eaglewood Tower Unit 11A Jl Pakubuwono VI No. 68 Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta 12120, Indonesia
TM KEB JERUK 1-77 JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
TMN Bona Indah Blk C 1/20 010/006, Lebak Bulus Cilandak, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Tmn Harapan Indah, A21 Jakarta Indonesia
TMN KB Jeruk Blok G 1/5 Jakarta Barat Indonesia
TMN KEBON JERUK A IV/15 RT 10/01 MERUYA SELATAN JAKARTA BARAT INDONESIA
Tmn. Duta MAS C2/38 RT 16/09 Fec. Grogol Petam. Fodya Jakarta Barat Indonesia
Tomang Pulo Macan Raya 50, 012/005 Tomang, Grogol Petamburan, Jakarta Barat, Indonesia
Tomang Rawa Kepa IX/71 RT 008 RW 012 Jakarta Barat INDONESIA
Tower VI Jend Sudirman Kav.26 Jarkata INDONESIA
Trisakti University Kampus A Universitas Trisakti Jl. Kyai Tapa Grogol Jakarta 11440 Indonesia
Unit 1206 Residences At Dharmawandsa Jalan Darmawangsa V111 Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Untung Suropati No. 58 Surabaya Indonesia
Urio Sumoharjo #151 Solo 57128 Indonesia
Utama Tengah No. 111 Weleri, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia
V No. 21C 009/005 Bangka Mampang Prapatan Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Victoria Building 3rd Floor Suite 304 Jalan Sultan Hasanudin Kavling 47-51 Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Villa Bintaro Regency Jl Sumatra Blok K1.12B Tanooerang 18228 Indonesia
Villa Pamcelang, Blok DF1/16 Pondok Benda, Tangerang Indonesia
Villa Pamulang, Blok DF 1/16 RT / RW 06/19, Pondok Benda Pamalang, Tangerang Indonesia
Villa Pan B.L. Jalan Ahmad Yani Block E/37 Batam 29433 Indonesia
Villa Pejaten No. 9 RT 012 RW 005, Pajaten Barat Jakarta Selatan Indonesia
Villa Taman Juanda, Jl. Ir. H. Juanda Type Emerald Blok 16-F, Medan 20157 Indonesia
Villa Tirta Naga, Gang Kahyangan No. 2 Jl. Lesmana, Kuta, Bali, Indonesia
Villa Tomang Mas A-6 Kepa Duri, Jakarta 11510 Indonesia.
Wangsa Ningrat No 15 Kota Baru Parahyangan Bandung Indonesia
Wangsasetra Wetan No 18 Kota Baru Parahyangan Bandung Indonesia
WIDYA CHANDRA VII/7 SENAYAN, JAKARTA INDONESIA
WIDYA CHANDRA VIII, SENAYAN INDONESIA
Wijaya Graha Puri, Blok B No. 16 Jl. Darmawangsa III, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12160 Indonesia
Wijaya Kusuma 24, Surabaya Indonesia
Wisma 46 (Kota BNI) 9th Floor Jl Jendral Sudirman Kav 1 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 46 – Kota BNI, 8th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav.1, Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 46 – Kota BNI, 8th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 1 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 46, Kota BNI Level 43, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav 1 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 46-Kota BNI 34th Fl. S.3401 Jalan Jend. Sudirman Kav. 1 Jarkarta 10220 – Indonesia
Wisma 46-Kota BNI, 8th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav.1 Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma 76, Lt. 21, Jl. Jend S. Parman Kav. 76, Slipi Jakarta Barat 11410 Indonesia
Wisma 77, 7th Floor Jl. Letjen S. Parman Kav. 77 West Jakarta Indonesia
Wisma Bakri, Fl3, Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1, Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Wisma Bakrie 2, Jl. HR. Rasuna Said Kav. B2 Kuningan, Jakarta Selatan 12210 Indonesia
Wisma Bakrie 6th Floor Jl. H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Wisma Bakrie, Fl 3 Jl H. R. Rasuna Said Kav. B-1 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Wisma Bank Danamon 16th Floor Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 45-46 Jakarta 12930 Indonesia
Wisma Bank Dharmala 21st Floor Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 28, Jakarta Selatan 12920 Jakarta INDONESIA
Wisma Bank Tiara Jl M. T. Haryono, Kav 16 Jakarta 12810, Indonesia
Wisma Bank Tiara, 8th Floor, Jalan M.T Haryano Kav.16 Jarkarta 12810 Indonesia
Wisma Barito Pacific Tower A-4th Floor, Jl Letjen S Parman Kav 62-63 Jakarta 11410, Indonesia
WISMA CIKINI – JL. GONDANGDIA LAMA 40 JAKARTA 10350 INDONESIA
Wisma Danamon Aetna Life 6th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 45-46, Jakarta 12930 INDONESIA
Wisma Eka Karma Jl. Kapten Tendean No. 15 Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Wisma Eka Karma Jl. Kapten Tendean No.15 Jakarta 12790 Indonesia
Wisma GKBI 17th Floor Suite 1715 Jalan Jend Sudirman No. 28 Jakarta Indonesia
Wisma GKBI, 6th Floor Jl. Jend Sudiraman Kav. 28 Jakarta 10210 Indonesia
Wisma GKBI, Mezzanine A Floor Jl. Jendera, Sudirman No 28 Jakarta, 10210 Indonesia
Wisma Grant Thornton Jl. Sisingamangaraja No. 3C Jakarta 12120 INDONESIA
Wisma Indocement, 6th Floor Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 70-71 Jakarta 12910, Indonesia
Wisma Indosemen 6th Floor JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav-70-71 Jakarta 12910 Indonesia
Wisma Indosemen 6th Floor JI. Jenderal Sudirman Kav-70-71 Jakarta, 12910 Indonesia
Wisma Indovision, 11th Floor Jalan Raya Panjang Block Z/III Green Garden Jakarta 11520 Indonesia
Wisma Kosogoro 16 Floor Jl. MH Thamrin No. 53 Jakarta 10350 Indonesia
Wisma Kyoei Price 15th Fl. Jl. Jend Sudirman Kav. 3 Jakarta 1220 Indonesia
Wisma Kyoei Prince Building 7th Floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 3 Jakarta Pusat 10220 Indonesia
Wisma Metropolitan II 2nd Floor J1. Jend., Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920
Wisma Metropolitan II 2nd floor, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Wisma Metropolitan II Level 1 & 11, Jalan Jend Sudirman Kav.29-31 Jarkata 12920 INDONESIA
Wisma Metropolitan II, 1/F JLn. Jend Sudirman Kav 29-31 Jakarta Indonesia
Wisma Millenia 7th Floor, Jln. MT Haryono Kav 16, Jakarta 12810 Indonesia.
Wisma Mulia 23rd Floor Jln. Jend. Gatot Subroto Kav.42 Jakarta 12710
Wisma Mulia 27th Floor, Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 42, Jakarta 12710, Indonesia
Wisma Mulia 33rd FLOOR, Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 42, Jakarta 12710 INDONESIA
Wisma Mulia LT 29 Jl. Jend Gatot Subroto No. 42, Kel. Kuningan Barat Kec. Mampang Praptan Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Wisma Mulia, 21st Floor Jln. Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 42 Jakarta 12710 Indonesia
Wisma Mulia, 33rd Floor Jln. Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 42 Jakarta 12710 INDONESIA
Wisma Nugra Santana 3rd Floor Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav. 7 Jakarta 10220, Indonesia
Wisma Nugra Santana Suite 1207 JL. JEND., Sudirman KAV. 7-8, Jakarta 10220 Indonesia
Wisma Paramuda 2nd Floor Jalan Raden Saleh No. 41 Jakarta 10330 Indonesia
Wisma Permai Barat EE 34 Mulyorejo Surabaya 60115 Indonesia
Wisma Pondok Indah 2 17th Floor, Suite 1702 Jl. Sultan Iskandar Muda Kav. V-TA Jakarta 12310, Indonesia
Wisma Pondok Indah 2, 17th Floor, Suite 1702 Jl. Sultan Iskandar Muda Kav. V-TA Jakarta 12310 Indonesia
Wisma Pondok Indah Suite 203 Jalan Sultan Iskandar Muda Kav V-TA Jakarta 12310, Indonesia
Wisma Sakura Jl. Hati Suci No. 4 Jakarta 10250 Indonesia
Wisma Sejahtera 2nd Floor, Room 210, Jl. Let. Jend. S. Parman Kav. 75, Jakarta 11410, Indonesia
Wisma Supra, Menara 76, Lt. 21 Jl. Let Jend S Parman, Kav. 76 Jakarta Barat – 11410 Indonesia
Wisma Tamara- Annexed Building Jl.Jenral Sudirman Kav.No.24 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
Witono Dani Jl. Duta permai III/6 Jakarta Selatan 12310 Indonesia
Wolter Monginsidi 64C Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 12170 Indonesia
Wonorejo Permai Utr 7/86 BB 556 RT 003 / RW 009, Kelurahan Wonorejo Kecamatan Rungkut Surabaya 60296 Indonesia
Wonorejo Permat Selatan 6/26 Surabaya – Indonesia
World Trade Center 15th Floor Jl Jend. Sudirman Kav. 29-31 Jakarta 12920, Indonesia
World Trade Center 17th Floor JI> Jend. Sudirman Kave. 29 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
World Trade Centre, 12th Floor J1. Jend. Sudirman Ka. 29-31 Jakarta 12920 INDONESIA
World Trade Centre, 17th Floor Jl. Jend Sudirman KAV. 29 – 31 Jakarta 12920 Indonesia
Wr. Supratman No. 7 Surabaya INDONESIA
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Basketball player Jason Collins
Volleyball player J. P. Calderon
Boxer Parinya Charoenphol
Tennis player Billie Jean King
Track and field athlete Andreas Krieger
Diver Greg Louganis
Tennis player Hana Mandlíková
Diver Matthew Mitcham
Swimmer Dominik Koll
Ice hockey player Charline Labonté
Handball player Katja Nyberg
Alpine skier Anja Pärson
American football player Michael Sam
.jpg)
Rugby player Gareth Thomas
Swimmer Ian Thorpe
Rugby player Louisa Wall
Professional wrestler Darren Young
‘It [bullying] was hard. Just being picked on for being different. Just being bigger, my sexuality, everything,’ said the 6-foot-8 Griner, who acknowledged she is a lesbian. ‘I overcame it and got over it. Definitely something that I am very passionate about. I want to work with kids and bring recognition to the problem, especially with the LGBT community.’
I do not need to shout to everyone that I am a lesbian, but I do believe that society needed it
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict52.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict24.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict51.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict25.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict50.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict26.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict49.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict27.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict48.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict28.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict47.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict29.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict43.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict30.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict42.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict31.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict41.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict32.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict40.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict33.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict39.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict34.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict38.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict35.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict37.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2020-info/agadez/pict36.jpg)
|work= (help)Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Explore the offshore connections of world leaders, politicians and their relatives and associates.
PARADISE PAPERSMaggi and other family members appear in Appleby records as beneficial owners of Amaggi & LD Commodities International Ltd., a Cayman Islands company registered on Sept. 9, 2010,
PARADISE PAPERSLeaked records reveal that in 2014, Amaya’s directors retained the services of Appleby’s office in the Isle of Man – the registered agent for nearly 40 of the company’s subsidiaries.
PARADISE PAPERSKutesa created the Obuyonza Discretionary Trust in the Seychelles in 2012. The trust held shares in the Seychelles company Katonga Investments Ltd. He created the trust, watched over its administration.
PARADISE PAPERSGusenbauer is one of the directors and legal representatives of Novia Management Ltd., a company registered in Malta in 2014, along with fellow Austrian Herbert Stepic, the former chief of Raiffeisenbank International.
PARADISE PAPERSIn the 1990s and early 2000s, Appleby’s files list Prince Khaled as the beneficiary of the Acorn Trust and the Minstrel Trust.
PARADISE PAPERSDjukanovic was a shareholder of Ranin Ltd., a company registered in Malta in 2012, the year Djukanovic’s brother was most recently re-elected prime minister.
PARADISE PAPERSAccording to 2008 confidential emails, the lawyer representing Shawkat and his son, Ali, asked Appleby to hold in escrow about $140 million, the proceeds of the sale of the Shawkats’ properties.
PARADISE PAPERSPrigodsky is listed as the sole shareholder of TUC Ltd., a company registered in Malta in 2013, the principal activity of which is to “carry out shipping activities.”
PARADISE PAPERSKosgei owned Zonrisa Ltd., a Mauritius company previously registered in the Isle of Man under the name Aisha Ltd. Zonrisa owned an apartment in central London near Harrods department store.
PARADISE PAPERSAblyazov owned CFJ Star Trust, which was set up in the Cayman Islands in 2007, with a brother-in-law, Syrym Shalabayev. Shalabayev was also accused of involvement in the alleged BTA.
PARADISE PAPERSMynbayev, recorded as a “politically exposed person” in Appleby’s client database, has been a shareholder in Meridian Capital Ltd. since its incorporation in Bermuda in 2002.
PARADISE PAPERSGertz was vice president of Jano Ltd., a personal investment company incorporated in the Cayman Islands for “tax purposes,” according to Appleby records.
PARADISE PAPERSIn 2013, representatives of Mahama and his contracting company Engineers and Planners Company Limited contacted Appleby about creating two offshore companies in the Isle of Man.
PARADISE PAPERSTommy Suharto, who currently heads the Humpuss Group, was a director and chairman of the board of Asia Market Investments Ltd., a company registered in Bermuda in 1997.
PARADISE PAPERSIn 2001 and 2002, during his time with WEF, Figueres sat on the board of directors of Energia Global International Ltd., a renewable-energy company incorporated in Bermuda in 1997.
PARADISE PAPERSBermuda-registered Madagascar Oil Limited awarded options to Chretien in July 2007 as a consulting fee, according to documents in the Appleby files. Madagascar Oil was formed to explore and drill.
PARADISE PAPERSIn 1991, CSL Self-Unloader Investments Ltd., part of the CSL Group, was registered in Bermuda. It was created to hold the shares of two Barbadian corporations involved in a leaseback.
PARADISE PAPERSMulroney is listed in Appleby’s files as a director between 2004 and 2009 of Said Holdings Limited, a Bermuda company controlled by controversial Syrian-Saudi businessman Wafic Said.
PARADISE PAPERSIn March 2013 Hatoyama was appointed honorary chairman and senior consultant of Hoifu Energy Group Ltd., an oil and gas exploration and production company incorporated in Bermuda in 2000.
PARADISE PAPERSAziz, who worked for Citibank before starting his career as a politician, was one of the shareholders and directors of Bahamas-registered Cititrust Limited from 1997 to 1999.
PARADISE PAPERSOn Dec. 7, 2011, a tax accountant associated with the Pritzker family provided Appleby with a copy of Penny Pritzker’s passport to confirm her identity to enable transactions involving offshore.
PARADISE PAPERSLeaked documents from Appleby show that Sassoon and several family members have been beneficiaries of a Cayman Island trust fund called the DCR Herschorn Settlement, established by Sassoon’s grandmother decades ago.
PARADISE PAPERSQuintanilla Schmidt is a director and a board member of Fusades Ltd., which was incorporated as a charitable organization in Bermuda in 2008.
PARADISE PAPERSGuoga is a founder and former shareholder of iBus Media Ltd., a gambling news publisher on the Isle of Man. Appleby data show that another shareholder is Mark Scheinberg.
PARADISE PAPERSSinha is a minority shareholder and director of SIS Asia Pacific Holdings Ltd., a subsidiary of Security and Intelligence Services, registered in Malta in 2008.
PARADISE PAPERSIn 2010, acting as an Omidyar Network representative, Sinha was appointed to the board of directors of D.Light Design, a Californian solar power company that received $5.5 million.
PARADISE PAPERSAtamkulov is a director of the Maltese company Centraz Finance Ltd., established in 1998. In October 2017 the company was listed as active. Other directors include Atamkulov’s brother, Yerlan Atamkulov.
PARADISE PAPERSMeirelles created the Sabedoria Foundation with Appleby in Bermuda in December 2002 “specifically for charitable purposes.” While the foundation was active during Meirelles’ tenure as president of Brazil’s central bank it was used for commercial purposes.
PARADISE PAPERS
PARADISE PAPERSPrabowo was director and deputy chairman of Bermuda-registered Nusantara Energy Resources. The company registered in 2001 was listed as a “bad debtor,” according to Appleby’s records.
PARADISE PAPERSSaraki was director and a shareholder of Tenia Ltd., a company established in the Cayman Islands in April 2001. Appleby’s records describe Tenia Ltd. as a “holding company.”
PARADISE PAPERSMakhlouf was a shareholder in four Lebanese companies created between 2001 and 2003, before Syrian troops officially withdrew from Lebanon in 2005 after 29 years of military occupation.
PARADISE PAPERSFiles from the Barbados corporate registry show Santos listed as a director of Global Tuition & Education Insurance Corp., a tax-exempt insurance company , until May 2001.
PARADISE PAPERSJohnson Sirleaf was listed as a director of the Bermuda company Songhai Financial Holdings Ltd. a subsidiary of Databank’s finance, fund management and investment company Databank Brokerage Ltd.
PARADISE PAPERSThe Yildirim brothers are sole shareholders of two companies registered in Malta. The first, Hawke Bay Marine Co. Ltd, was set up in April 2004.
PARADISE PAPERSQueen Noor – sometimes referred to as “Mrs. Jordan” or “Mrs. Brown” in Appleby’s database – is the beneficiary of two trusts registered in Jersey, according to a document.
PARADISE PAPERSIn 2005, the Duchy of Lancaster, Queen Elizabeth II’s private estate and portfolio, invested $7.5 million in Dover Street VI Cayman Fund LP, according to files from the offshore law office.
PARADISE PAPERSRoss, a billionaire Wall Street investor known for buying distressed companies, was a major client of Appleby, which administered more than 50 companies and partnerships.
PARADISE PAPERSTillerson was a director of Marib Upstream Services Co., a Bermuda-based company created to conduct oil and gas operations in Yemen’s Marib-Al-Jawf basin. Tillerson joined the company’s board in March.
PARADISE PAPERSVoshchevsky is listed in Malta’s register of companies as one of only two shareholders and directors of Marfa Holding Ltd., along with Maltese citizen Marvic Borg.
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERSPANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERS
PANAMA PAPERSBecome a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
|
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
In an effort to further enhance public understanding of al-Qa’ida, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on 1 November 2017 released additional materials recovered in the 2 May 2011 raid on Usama Bin Ladin’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
With the release of these materials, the information remaining in the collection that has not been released publicly includes materials that are protected by copyright; sensitive such that their release would directly damage efforts to keep the nation secure; pornography; malware; blank, corrupted, and duplicate files. The entire collection has been available to the US Intelligence Community and Department of Defense organizations for years.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) previously released documents from the collection on 20 May 2015, 1 March 2016, and 19 January 2017 after an interagency review spearheaded by the CIA. The releases align with ODNI initiatives for increased transparency – consistent with national security prerogatives – and the 2014 Intelligence Authorization Act, which required the ODNI to conduct a review of the documents for release.
CIA’s 1 November 2017 release includes additional al-Qa’ida letters, videos, audio files, and communications, as well as routine family correspondence. As a result, it builds on the ODNI releases that provided material relevant to understanding the plans and workings of terrorist organizations. The material is posted in its original Arabic format and in as close to the original form as possible, modified only so the files cannot be edited.
All of the material, which includes audio, document, image, video, and software operating system files, can be found on the All Original Filessection of this page. To view material by category, refer to the Audio, Documents, Images, and Video pages. To view the material by the device from which it originated, refer to the Devices page. Lastly, to view Microsoft Office files of various ages and formats that CIA has converted to Portable Document Format (PDF) for ease of viewing, refer to the Converted Material page.
Follow this link to access CIA’s press release.
The files underwent interagency review, and an effort was made to remove copyrighted material. However, the files may still contain some copyrighted works. Further reproduction, distribution, public performance, or public display of any copyrighted work is generally prohibited without the permission of the copyright owner. Copyright owners may request the removal of their content by submitting a notice via mail to Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, 20505; via fax to 571-204-3800; or via the contact button on the CIA.gov homepage.
A notice must include:
|
1 November 2017
In addition to the computer files and digital media recovered in the May 2011 raid on Usama Bin Ladin’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, CIA recovered Bin Ladin’s journal. As part of the 1 November 2017 release, CIA made available photographs of the journal, which includes an entry the day before Bin Ladin’s death. Please note the photographs were taken in the urgent hours after the raid as the US Intelligence Community analysts reviewed the material in search of clues that would reveal ongoing al-Qa’ida plots, as well as the identities and locations of al-Qa’ida personnel, and other information of immediate importance. Journal Download Links (118 MB): [pdf] [zip] [tgz] [zip md5] [tgz md5] File DownloadsThe material in this file collection may contain content that is offensive and/or emotionally disturbing. This material may not be suitable for all ages. Please view it with discretion.
Prior to accessing this file collection, please understand that this material was seized from a terrorist organization. Out of an abundance of caution we took the site down to resolve technical issues associated with the initial posting – and to remove additional detected malware – but we cannot guarantee that all malware has been removed.
Prior to accessing this file collection, please note the large file sizes of some of the material.
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Page Count: 126 pages
Date: August 2014
Restriction: Distribution Restricted
Originating Organization: Department of the Army
File Type: pdf
File Size: 3,273,115 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):974DC6FBBC72F7E6F39378AFC790CDEF36F74E7D26ABD07BCC42793CDDFCE037
FM 3-14, Army Space Operations, provides an overview of space operations in the Army and is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-14 links Army space operations doctrine to joint space operations doctrine as expressed in JP 3-14, Space Operations and other joint doctrinal publications. This FM establishes guidance for employing space and space-based systems and capabilities to support United States (U.S.) Army land warfighting dominance. It provides a general overview of overhead support to Army operations, reviews national guidance and direction, and outlines selected unique space-related Army capabilities. The doctrine in this manual documents Army thought for the best use of space capabilities. This manual also contains tactics and procedures outlining how to plan, integrate, and execute Army space operations.
…
Space is a warfighting domain with different characteristics from air, land, sea, and cyberspace domains. Space is identified as one of the Global Commons as defined in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Army space operations enable Army and joint warfighting, and use of space capabilities is an inherently joint venture. The need for the Army to accomplish space operations is firmly established in national and Service level policies. Moreover, this FM is rooted in Army operations and consistent with Joint doctrine. Space capabilities and the space domain provide a global perspective as satellites allow routine access to denied areas of the Earth.
The space environment is harsh and the distances involved are vast, but it offers unique advantages that make it worthwhile to overcome the adversities of the operational environment. To that end, the space environment continues to become more congested, contested, and competitive. The uses of space are many, applications vary, and space-enabled capabilities are constantly evolving. It is important that Soldiers continue to look to the future with responsiveness, adaptability, and flexibility toward how space enables the Army’s warfighting functions in the conduct of unified land operations.
Army space operations includes all aspects of the employment of specialized Army space forces but also the spectrum of activities associated to the planning, preparation, integration and execution support required to ensure synchronized and effective space-based capabilities from all sources are available to support dominant land operations as part of Unified Action. Army space operations are heavily influenced by understanding the constraints, limitations, and operational needs of the land component users with regard to those space-based capabilities.
The Army depends on space capabilities to enable and enhance unified land operations. Virtually every Army operation relies on space capabilities to some degree to enhance the effectiveness of combat forces. Space capabilities enable the Army to communicate, navigate, target the enemy, and protect forces.
The principles that successfully guide unified land operations are applicable to the space domain. The Army uses space-based capabilities to support its dominance in unified land operations. Space operations are critical to the range of military operations as many space capabilities are embedded in Army operations. The space mission areas form the framework for how space supports the Army warfighting functions, and operations conducted through decisive operations.
…
1-4. This FM is rooted in basic Army and joint doctrine that is characteristically progressive and evolving. Space is a warfighting domain with different characteristics from land, sea, air, and cyberspace domains. The Army depends on space operations to effectively execute unified land operations. Every Army warfighting function relies on space contributions to some degree to enhance the effectiveness of our combat forces. Space capabilities enable the Army to communicate, navigate, accurately target the enemy, protect, and sustain our forces.
1-5. The U.S. Army is one the largest consumers of space-based capabilities within Department of Defense (DOD). The Army depends on Army space forces (personnel, organizations, space and terrestrial systems, equipment, and facilities), to ensure full access to all current and future space capability in order to fight and survive on today’s area of operations. The Army must leverage the capabilities of space assets. Consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, the Army must deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems, and contribute to the defense of multinational space systems. If deterrence fails, the Army must defeat efforts to attack its space assets. This must be done while operating in a global information environment against any threats. Consequently, the Army space capabilities must provide continuous, secure, global communications, space situational awareness, space control, and space force enhancement to Army and joint warfighters from strategic to tactical levels.
…
DOD SPACE POLICY
1-16. Department of Defense directive (DODD) 3100.10, Space Policy implements the National Space Policy and assigns responsibilities for space and space-related activities. This directive states the primary DOD goal is to provide operational space force capabilities to ensure the U.S. has the space power to achieve its national security objectives in accordance with the U.S. National Security Strategy. Additionally the U.S. National Military Strategy recognizes space as one of the global commons and notes that our ability to project power from the global commons may be at risk. The space domain is critical for Army operations, yet becoming increasingly more vulnerable to malicious actions that create a D3SOE. The space environment is continuously becoming more congested, contested, and competitive. Space capabilities and applications will be integrated into the strategy, doctrine, concepts of operations, education, exercises, and operations and contingency plans of U.S. military forces. DOD operational space force structure will be sufficiently robust, ready, secure, survivable, resilient, and interoperable.
…
OPERATING IN SPACE
1-33. Space is the ultimate high ground and gives land forces the advantage of a global, persistent perspective of the strategic, operational, and tactical situation. Space systems consist of satellites on orbit, ground stations, launch bases, and the communications links and capabilities. Space hosts communications transponders, observation posts for surveillance and reconnaissance, transmitters broadcasting location and exact time information, sensors for weather and other environmental data, and sensors that can warn of enemy actions.
1-34. Space is a domain like land, sea, air, and cyberspace within which military activities are conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives. Space begins above the atmosphere of the Earth and extends infinitely outward. The U.S. does not formally recognize a lower limit to space. However, space is considered to be the region around the Earth with little atmosphere, where satellites are placed in orbit. Space operations are those enabling operations that create or present opportunities to employ space capabilities to enhance the warfighting potential of the U.S. military and multinational partners. Space operations are generally supported by satellites in orbits around the Earth. Space is interrelated with the other domains and properly integrating these complex functions with the other military activities is critical for successful operations.
1-35. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, officially known as Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies dictates satellites in orbit must be allowed free passage over countries. Nations cannot claim the space directly above them as their own, as they do with airspace. This allows the U.S., other countries, and commercial entities to orbit satellites that freely traverse or occupy positions while in space over other countries.
1-36. Space-based resources provide freedom of action, global reach, responsiveness, insights in an anti-access, area of denial arena, and are not constrained by geographic borders of otherwise geographically denied regions. Satellites are well suited for reconnaissance and surveillance, imagery, mapping, and intelligence operations because of the access they provide. However, operations in the space environment are bound by other constraints such as the laws of physics, international law, and policies that have a unique set of vulnerabilities.
…
…
DIRECTOR OF SPACE FORCES
2-14. A director of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR) is assigned to the commander, Air Force forces staff and serves as the senior space advisor to integrate space capabilities and effects. If the commander, Air Force forces or joint force air component commander is delegated SCA, the DIRSPACEFOR will normally execute SCA responsibilities on behalf of the commander, Air Force forces or joint force air component commander. While each combatant commander may have a DIRSPACEFOR, United States Central Command is the only combatant commander with a standing DIRSPACEFOR with a formal agreement to utilize an Army functional area 40 (FA40) space professional as the Deputy DIRSPACEFOR. When an Army FA40 is serving as the United States Central Command Deputy DIRSPACEFOR, the individual is assigned to USASMDC/ARSTRAT with duty at Air Force Central Command.
2-15. The DIRSPACEFOR is responsible for:
2-16. During larger standing operations and in crisis planning and execution, the theater SCA function is supported with appropriate manning for staff support based upon the nature of the pending contingency. The manpower and expertise requirements will be reflected in the final approved joint manning document for that headquarters along with an identification of a responsible Service to fill the position. In most cases where the SCA is delegated to the Commander, Air Force forces with an assigned DIRSPACEFOR to support those functions, the Deputy DIRSPACEFOR is normally sourced as an Army space officer, as established in operations. An Army Deputy DIRSPACEFOR supports all the joint functions of the DIRSPACEFOR, can represent specific land component space-related needs and issues to the theater SCA for resolution. An Army Deputy DIRSPACEFOR also acts as an intermediary between DIRSPACEFOR staff and Army SSEs, ARSSTs, ASCE, JTAGS detachments, space situational awareness planning teams (SSAPT), and space control detachments.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/080
US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE DONALD TRUMP’S
ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA AND COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
KREMLIN
Summary
– Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for
at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and
divisions in western alliance
– So far TRUMP has declined various sweetener real estate business deals
offered him in Russia in order to further the Kremlin’s cultivation of him.
However he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of
intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other
political rivals
– Former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised
TRUMP through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to
blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct
in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been
arranged/monitored by the FSB
A dossier of compromising material on Hillary CLINTON has been collated
by the Russian Intelligence Services over many years and mainly
comprises bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and
intercepted phone calls rather than any embarrassing conduct. The
dossier is controlled by Kremlin spokesman, PESKOV, directly on PUTIN’S
orders. However it has not as yet been distributed abroad, including to
TRUMP. Russian intentions for its deployment still unclear
Detail
1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in June 2016 sources A and B, a senior
Russian Foreign Ministry figure and a former top level Russian
intelligence officer still active inside the Kremlin respectively, the Russian
authorities had been cultivating and supporting US Republican
presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP for at least 5 years. Source B
asserted that the TRUMP operation was both supported and directed by
Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord and
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
Kr,t-h within the US itself, but more especially within the
d‘ SU n,ty both w hn ‘ which was viewed as inimical to Russia’s interests.
” B “s S ia„ financial -metal said th. TRUMP operation
Sould to seen in iernts of PUTIN’S desire to return to!Nineteenth
roni-nrv’Great Power politics anchored upon countries interests
rhan the ideals-based international order established after Worl a
Two. S/he had overheard PUTIN talRihg in this way in dose associates on
several occasions.
? in terms of specifics, Source A confided that the Kremlin had been feeding
TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents, including
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, for several years
^more below). This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of
TRUMP who had organized and managed Ins recent trips to os ^° ^
who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian >n»DM» be ™
“very helpful”. The Kremlin’s cultivation operation on 1 RUMP also
comprised offering him various lucrative real estate develop me _ ^
business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ong g
Cup soccer tournament However, so far, for reasons unknown, T R
had not taken up any of these.
3 However, there were other aspects to TRUMP’s engagement with the
Russian authorities. One which had borne fruit for them was to exploit
TRUMP’S personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obta
suitable ‘kompromaf (compromising material) on him. According to
Source D, where s/he had been present, TRUMP’s (perverted) conduct in
Moscow included hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel,
where he knew President and Mrs OBAMA (whom he hated) had stayed
on one of their official trips to Russia, and defiling the bed where they had
slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a ’golden showers
(urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSB
control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms
to record anything they wanted to.
4. The Moscow Ritz
who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time
and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in 2013. Soui ce E
provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to
Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who
also confirmed the story. Speaking separately in June 2016, Source B (the
former top level Russian intelligence officer) asserted that TRUMP’s
unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the
authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now
Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so
wished.
5. Asked about the Kremlin’s reported intelligence feed to TRUMP over
recent years and rumours about a Russian dossier of ‘kompromat’ on
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
milarv CLINTON fbeing circulated). Source B confirmed the file’s
ex” ttnce S/™ confided in a trusted compatriot that it had been collated
by Department K of the FSB for many years, dating back to hcr husband
Bill’s presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations o
various sorts rather than details/evidence of unorthodox or
embarrassing behavior. Some of the conversations were
comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia an
on things she had said which contradicted her current position on vano
issues. Others were most probably from phone intercepts.
6. Continuing on this theme, Source G, a senior Kremlin o ffi ci al . confided
that the CLINTON dossier was controlled exclusively by chief Krem
spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV, who was responsible for
compiling/handling it on the explicit instructions of PUTIN himself. T
dossier however had not as yet been made available abroad, “eluding
TRUMP or his campaign team. At present it was unclear what PU s
intentions were in this regard.
20 June 2016
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/086
RUSSIA/CYBER CRIME: A SYNOPSIS OF RUSSIAN STATE SPONSORED AND
OTHER CYBER OFFENSIVE (CRIMINAL) OPERATIONS
Summary
Russia has extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive <3*
operations. External targets include foreign governments and mg
corporations, especially banks. FSB leads on cyber «« hin R ““ ,a “
apparatus. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7
governments, security services and IFIs but much more on.secondM
ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visito
FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit mostc a p a ble cyber ,
operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy
both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western
corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring
governments e.g. Latvia
Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior
Western business visitor. Provided back door into important es ern
institutions.
Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and
offered incentive of “investment” in his business when visiting Moscow.
Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local
hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank
claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts
held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud
Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups
Details
1. Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed
knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise,
outlined the current situation in this area. A former senior intelligence
officer divided Russian state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into
four categories (in order of priority):- targeting foreign, especially
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
western governments; penetrating leading foreign business corporations,
especially banks; domestic monitoring of the elite; and attacking political
opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer
reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead
organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations.
2. In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a
senior government figure reported that there had been only limited
success in penetrating the “first tier” foreign targets. These comprised
western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence
services and central banks, and the IFls. To compensate for this shortfall,
massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking
the “secondary targets”, particularly western private banks and the
governments of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned atvia
in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with
the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been
unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had
ethnic and family ties to Russia and/or had been incentivized financially
to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or
contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return. This
had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in
obliging/indulging them e.g. the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having
to cover up for such agents’ money laundering operations through the
Russian financial system.
3. In terms of the FSB’s recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out
its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist
with direct knowledge reported in June 2016 that this was often done
using coercion and blackmail. In terms of‘foreign’ agents, the FSB was
approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to
Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting
Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program.
The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this
person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a
view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the
software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also
had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap
Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets
on their PCs and other platforms.
4. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a
leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on conventional
(defensive) IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to
conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the
company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to
Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and
through this had managed to access various important institutions in the
West through the back door.
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
5
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
5. In terms of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged
up the ‘Telegram’ enciphered commercial system as having been of
especial concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least
because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and
oppositionists. His/her understanding was that the FSB now successfully
had cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer
secure to use.
6. The senior Russian government figure cited above also reported that
non-state sponsored cyber crime was becoming an increasing problem
inside Russia for the government and authorities there. The Central Bank
of Russia claimed that in 2015 alone there had been more than 20
attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding
accounts held there, comprising several billions Roubles. More generally,
s/he understood there were circa 15 major organised crime groups in the
country involved in cyber crime, all of which continued to operate largely
outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called ‘Anunak’,
‘Buktrap’ and ‘Metel’ organisations.
26 July 2015
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
4 –
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/095
RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER INDICATIONS OF
EXTENSIVE CONSPIRACY BETWEEN TRUMP’S CAMPAIGN TEAM AND THE
KREMLIN
Summary
Further evidence of extensive conspiracy between TRUMP’s campaign
team and Kremlin, sanctioned at highest levels and involving Russian
diplomatic staff based in the US
– TRUMP associate admits Kremlin behind recent appearance of DNC e-
mails on WikiLeaks, as means of maintaining plausible deniability
Agreed exchange of information established in both directions. TRUMP s
team using moles within DNC and hackers in the US as well as outside in
Russia. PUTIN motivated by fear and hatred of Hillary CLINTON. Russians
receiving intel from TRUMP’s team on Russian oligarchs and their families
in US
Mechanism for transmitting this intelligence involves “pension”
disbursements to Russian emigres living in US as cover, using consular
officials in New York, DC and Miami
Suggestion from source close to TRUMP and MANAFORT that Republican
campaign team happy to have Russia as media bogeyman to mask more
extensive corrupt business ties to China and other emerging countries
Detail
1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an
ethnic Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate
Donald TRUMP, admitted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of
co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was
managed on the TRUMP side by the Republican candidate’s campaign
manager, Paul MANAFORT, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter
PAGE, and others as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest
in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, whom
President PUTIN apparently both hated and feared.
2. Inter alia, Source E, acknowledged that the Russian regime had been
behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from
the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to the WikiLeaks platform.
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
The reason for using WikiLeaks was “plausible deniability” and the
operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of
TRUMP and senior members of his campaign team. In return the TRUMP
team had agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a
campaign issue and to raise US/NATO defence commitments in the
Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine, a
priority for PUTIN who needed to cauterise the subject.
In the wider context of TRUMP campaign/Kremlin co-operation, Source E
claimed that the intelligence network being used against CLINTON
comprised three elements. Firstly there were agents/facilitators within
the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian emigre and
associated offensive cyber operators based in the US; and thirdly, state-
sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia. All three elements had
played an important role to date. On the mechanism for rewarding
relevant assets based in the US, and effecting a two-way flow of
intelligence and other useful information, Source E claimed that Russian
diplomatic staff in key cities such as New York, Washington DC and
Miami were using the emigre ‘pension’ distribution system as cover. The
operation therefore depended on key people in the US Russian emigre
community for its success. Tens of thousands of dollars were involve .
In terms of the intelligence flow from the TRUMP team to Russia, Source
E reported that much of this concerned the activities of business
oligarchs and their families’ activities and assets in the US, with which
PUTIN and the Kremlin seemed preoccupied.
Commenting on the negative media publicity surrounding alleged
Russian interference in the US election campaign in support of TRUMP,
Source E said he understood that the Republican candidate and his team
were relatively relaxed about this because it deflected media and the
Democrats’ attention away from TRUMP’s business dealings in China and
other emerging markets. Unlike in Russia, these were substantial and
involved the payment of large bribes and kickbacks which, were they to
become public, would be potentially very damaging to their campaign.
Finally, regarding TRUMP’s claimed minimal investment profile in Russia,
a separate source with direct knowledge said this had not been for want
of trying. TRUMP’s previous efforts had included exploring the real estate
sector in St Petersburg as well as Moscow but in the end TRUMP had had
to settle for the use of extensive sexual services there from local
prostitutes rather than business success.
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/94
RUSSIA: SECRET KREMLIN MEETINGS ATTENDED BY TRUMP ADVISOR,
CARTER PAGE IN MOSCOW (JULY 2016)
Summary
– TRUMP advisor Carter PAGE holds secret meetings in Moscow with
SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVYEKIN
– SECHIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy co-operation
and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine.
PAGE non-committal in response
– DIVEYKIN discusses release of Russian dossier of ‘kompromat’ on
TRUMP’s opponent, Hillary CLINTON, but also hints at Kremlin
possession of such material on TRUMP
Detail
1. Speaking in July 2016, a Russian source close to Rosneft President, PUTIN
close associate and US-sanctioned individual, Igor SECHIN, confided the
details of a recent secret meeting between him and visiting Foreign
Affairs Advisor to Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP,
Carter PAGE.
2. According to SECHIN’s associate, the Rosneft President [CEO) had raised
with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and
prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western
sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche
by SECHIN but had been generally non-committal in response.
3. Speaking separately, also in July 2016, an official close to Presidential
Administration Head, S. IVANOV, confided in a compatriot that a senior
colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA, DIVYEKIN (nfd)
also had met secretly with PAGE on his recent visit. Their agenda had
included DIVEYKIN raising a dossier of’kompromat’ the Kremlin
possessed on TRUMP’s Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON,
and its possible release to the Republican’s campaign team.
4. However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed
DIVEYKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian
leadership also had ‘kompromat’ on TRUMP which the latter should bear
in mind in his dealings with them.
19 July 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/097
RUSSIA-US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN CONCERN THAT POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM
DNC E-MAIL HACKING AFFAIR SPIRALLING OUT OF CONTROL
Summary
Kremlin concerned that political fallout from DNC e-mail hacking operation is spiralling
out of control. Extreme nervousness among TRUMP’s associates as result of negative
media attention/accusations
Russians meanwhile keen to cool situation and maintain ‘plausible deniability’ of
existing /ongoing pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. Therefore unlikely to be
any ratcheting up offensive plays in immediate future
Source close to TRUMP campaign however confirms regular exchange with Kremlin
has existed for at least 8 years, including intelligence fed back to Russia on oligarchs’
activities in US
Russians apparently have promised not to use ‘kompromat’ they hold on TRUMP as
leverage, given high levels of voluntary co-operation forthcoming from his team
Detail
1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted associate in late July 2016, a Russian emigre figure
close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s campaign team
commented on the fallout from publicity surrounding the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) e-mail hacking scandal. The emigre said there was a high level of
anxiety within the TRUMP team as a result of various accusations levelled against
them and indications from the Kremlin that President PUTIN and others in the
leadership thought things had gone too far now and risked spiralling out of control.
2. Continuing on this theme, the emigre associate of TRUMP opined that the Kremlin
wanted the situation to calm but for ‘plausible deniability’ to be maintained
concerning its (extensive) pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. S/he therefore
judged that it was unlikely these would be ratcheted up, at least for the time being.
3. However, in terms of established operational liaison between the TRUMP team and
the Kremlin, the emigre confirmed that an intelligence exchange had been running
between them for at least 8 years. Within this context PUTIN’S priority requirement
had been for intelligence on the activities, business and otherwise, in the US of leading
Russian oligarchs and their families. TRUMP and his associates duly had obtained and
supplied the Kremlin with this information.
4.
Finally the emigre said s/he understood the Kremlin had more intelligence on
CLINTON and her campaign but he did not know the details or when or »it wouW be
released As far as ‘kompromat’ (compromising information) on TRUM
concerned, although there was plenty of this, he understood the Kremlin had gi^^
word that it would not be deployed against the Republican president^ ^
given how helpful and co-operative his team had been over sever y ,
particularly of late.
30 July 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/100
RUSSIA/USA: GROWING BACKLASH IN KREMLIN TO DNC HACKING AND
TRUMP SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Summary
Head of PA IVANOV laments Russian intervention in US presidential
election and black PR against CLINTON and the DNC. Vows not to supply
intelligence to Kremlin PR operatives again. Advocates now sitting tight
and denying everything
Presidential spokesman PESKOV the main protagonist in Kremlin
campaign to aid TRUMP and damage CLINTON. He is now scared and
fears being made scapegoat by leadership for backlash in US. Problem
compounded by his botched intervention in recent Turkish crisis
Premier MEDVEDEV’S office furious over DNC hacking and associated
anti-Russian publicity. Want good relations with US and ability to travel
there. Refusing to support or help cover up after PESKOV
Talk now in Kremlin of TRUMP withdrawing from presidential race
altogether, but this still largely wishful thinking by more liberal elements
in Moscow
Detail
1. Speaking in early August 2016, two well-placed and established Kremlin
sources outlined the divisions and backlash in Moscow arising from the
leaking of Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails and the wider
pro-TRUMP operation being conducted in the US. Head of Presidential
Administration, Sergei IVANOV, was angry at the recent turn of events.
He believed the Kremlin “team” involved, led by presidential spokesman
Dmitriy PESKOV, had gone too far in interfering in foreign affairs with
their “elephant in a china shop black PR”. IVANOV claimed always to have
opposed the handling and exploitation of intelligence by this PR “team”.
Following the backlash against such foreign interference in US politics,
IVANOV was advocating that the only sensible course of action now for
the Russian leadership was to “sit tight and deny everything”.
2. Continuing on this theme the source close to IVANOV reported that
PESKOV now was “scared shitless” that he would be scapegoated by
PUTIN and the Kremlin and held responsible for the backlash against
Russian political interference in the US election. IVANOV was determined
r
to stop PESKOV playing an independent role in relation to the US going
forward and the source fully expected the presidential spokesman now to
lay low. PESKOV s position was not helped by a botched attempt by him
also to interfere in the recent failed coup in Turkey from a government
relations (GR) perspective (no further details].
3. The extent of disquiet and division within Moscow caused by the
backlash against Russian interference in the US election was underlined
by a second source, close to premier Dmitriy MEDVEDEV (DAM]. S/he
said the Russian prime minister and his colleagues wanted to have good
relations with the US, regardless of who was in power there, and not least
so as to be able to travel there in future, either officially or privately. They
were openly refusing to cover up for PESKOV and others involved in the
DNC/TRUMP operations or to support his counter-attack of allegations
against the USG for its alleged hacking of the Russian government and
state agencies.
4. According to the first source, close to IVANOV, there had been talk in the
Kremlin of TRUMP being forced to withdraw from the presidential race
altogether as a result of recent events, ostensibly on grounds of his
psychological state and unsuitability for high office. This might not be so
bad for Russia in the circumstances but in the view of the source, it
remained largely wishful thinking on the part of those in the regime
opposed to PESKOV and his “botched” operations, at least for the time
being.
5 August 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/101
RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SENIOR KREMLIN FIGURE OUTLINES EVOLVING RUSSIAN TACTICS IN
PRO-TRUMP, ANTI-CLINTON OPERATION
Summary
Head of PA, IVANOV assesses Kremlin intervention in US presidential election and outlines leadership
thinkingon operational wayforward
No new leaks envisaged, as too politically risky, but rather further exploitation of (WikiLeaks) material
already disseminated to exacerbate divisions
Educated US youth to be targeted as protest(againstCLINTON) and swing vote in attempt to turn them
over to TRUMP
Russian leadership, including PUTIN, celebrating perceived success to date in splitting US hawks and
elite
Kremlin engaging with several high profile US players, including STEIN, PAGE and (former DlA Director
Michael Flynn), and funding their recent visits to Moscow
Details
1. Speaking in confidence to a close colleague in early August 2016, Head of the Russian Presidential
Administration (PA), Sergei IVANOV, assessed the impact and results of Kremlin intervention in the US
presidential election to date. Although most commentators believed that the Kremlin was behind the
leaked DNC/CLINTON e-mails, this remained technically deniable. Therefore the Russians would not
risk their position for the time being with new leaked material, even to a third party like WikiLeaks.
Rather the tactics would be to spread rumours and misinformation about the content of what already
had been leaked and make up new content.
2. Continuing on this theme, IVANOV said that the audience to be targeted by such operations was the
educated youth in America as the PA assessed thatthere was still a chancethey could be persuaded to
vote for Republican candidate Donald TRUMP as a protest against the Washington establishment (in
the form of Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON). The hope was that even if she won, as a resultof
this CLINTON in power would be bogged down in working for internal reconciliation in the US, rather
than being ableto focus on foreign policy which would damage Russia’s interests.This also should give
PresidentPUTIN more room for manoeuvre inthe run-upto Russia’s own presidential election in 2018.
3. IVANOV reported that although the Kremlin had underestimated the strength of US media and liberal
reaction to the DNC hackand TRUMP’s links to Russia, PUTIN was generally satisfied with the progress
of the anti-CLINTON operation to date. He recently had had a drink with PUTIN to markthis. In IVANOV’s
view,the US hadtriedto dividethe Russian elite with sanctions butfailed, whilstthey, by contrast, had
succeeded in splittingthe US hawks inimical to Russiaand the Washington elite more generally, half of
whom had refused to endorse any presidential candidateas a resultof Russian intervention.
4.
Speaking separately, also in early August 2016, a Kremlin official involved in US relations commented
on aspects ofthe Russian operation todate. Its goals had been threefold- askingsympathetic USactors
how Moscow could help them; gathering relevant intelligence; and creating and disseminating
compromising information(‘kompromat’). This had involved the Kremlin supporting various US political
figures including funding indirectly their recent visits to Moscow. S/he named a delegation from
Lyndon UROUCHE; presidential candidateJill STEIN ofthe Green Party; TRUMP foreign policy adviser
19
Carter PAGE; and former DIA Director Michael Flynn, in this regard and as successful in terms of
perceived outcomes.
10 August 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/102
RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REACTION IN TRUMP CAMP TO RECENT NEGATIVE PUBLICITY ABOUT
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE AND LIKELY RESULTING TACTICS GOING FORWARD
Summary
TRUMP campaign insider reports recent DNC e-mail leaks were aimed at switching SANDERS (protest)
voters away from CLINTON and over to TRUMP
Admits Republican campaign underestimated resulting negative reaction from US liberals, elite and
media and forced to change course as result
Need now to turn tables on CLINTON’S use of PUTIN as bogeyman in election, although some
resentment at Russian president’s perceived attempt to undermine USG and system over and above
swinging presidents I election
Detail
1. Speaking in confidence on 9 August 2016, an ethnic Russian associate of Republican US presidential
candidate Donald TRUMP discussed the reaction inside his camp, and revised tactics therein resulting
from recent negative publicity concerning Moscow’s clandestine involvement in the campaign.
TRUMP’s a ssociate reported that the a i m of I ea ki ng the DNC e-ma i I s to Wi ki Lea ks during the Democratic
Convention had been to swi ng supporters of Bernie SANDERS awayfrom Hillary CLINTON and across to
TRUMP. Thesevoters were perceived as activistand anti -status quoand anti-establishment and inthat
regard sharing many features with the TRUMP campaign, including a visceral dislike of Hillary CLINTON.
This objective had been conceived and promoted, inter alia, by TRUMP’s foreign policy adviser Carter
PAGE who had discussed itdirectly with the ethnic Russian associate.
2. Continuing on thistheme, the ethnic Russian associateof TRUMP assessed that the problem wasthat
the TRUMP campaign had underestimated the strength of the negative reaction from liberals and
especially the conservative elite to Russian interference. This was forcing a rethink and a likely change
of tactics. The main objective in the shortterm was to check Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON’S
successful exploitation of the PUTIN as bogeyman/Russian interference story to tarnish TRUMP and
bolster her own (patriotic) credentials.The TRUMP campaign was focusingon tapping into supportin
the American television media to achievethis, as they reckoned this resource had been underused by
them to date.
3. However, TRUMP’s associate also admitted that there was a fair amount of anger and resentment
within the Republican candidate’s team at what was perceived by PUTIN as going beyond the objective
of weakening CLINTON and bolstering TRUMP, by attempting to exploitthe situation to undermine the
US government and democratic system more generally. It was unclear at present how this aspect of
the situation would play out in the weeks to come.
10 August 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/136
RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF TRUMP LAWYER
COHEN’S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN
Summary
– Kremlin insider reports TRUMP lawyer COHEN’s secret meeting/s with Kremlin officials in
August 2016 was/were held in Prague
– Russian parastatal organisation Rossotrudnichestvo used as cover for this liaison and premises
in Czech capital may have been used for the meeting/s
– Pro-PUTIN leading Duma figure, KOSACHEV, reportedly involved as “plausibly deniable”
facilitator and may have participated in the August meeting/s with COHEN
Detail
1. Speaking to a compatriot and friend on 19 October 2016, a Kremlin insider provided further
details of reported clandestine meeting/s between Republican presidential candidate, Donald
TRUMP’S lawyer Michael COHEN and Kremlin representatives in August 2016. Although the
communication between them had to be cryptic for security reasons, the Kremlin insider
clearly indicated to his/her friend that the reported contact/s took place in Prague, Czech
Republic.
2. Continuing on this theme, the Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of the Russian
parastatal organisation, Rossotrudnichestvo, in this contact between TRUMP campaign
representative/s and Kremlin officials. Rossotrudnichestvo was being used as cover for this
relationship and its office in Prague may well have been used to host the COHEN / Russian
Presidential Administration (PA) meeting/s. It was considered a “plausibly deniable” vehicle
for this, whilst remaining entirely under Kremlin control.
3. The Kremlin insider went on to identify leading pro-PUTIN Duma figure, Konstantin
KOSACHEV (Head of the Foreign Relations Committee) as an important figure in the TRUMP
campaign-Kremlin liaison operation. KOSACHEV, also “plausibly deniable” being part of the
Russian legislature rather than executive, had facilitated the contact in Prague and by
implication, may have attended the meeting/s with COHEN there in August.
Company Comment
We reported previously, in our Company Intelligence Report 2016/135 of 19 October 2016 from the
same source, that COHEN met officials from the PA Legal Department clandestinely in an EU
country in August 2016. This was in order to clean up the mess left behind by western media
revelations of TRUMP ex-campaign manager MANAFORT’s corrupt relationship with the former
pro-Russian YANUKOVYCH regime in Ukraine and TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter
PAGE’S secret meetings in Moscow with senior regime figures in July 2016. According to the
Kremlin advisor, these meeting/s were originally scheduled for COHEN in Moscow but shifted to
what was considered an operationally “soft” EU country when it was judged too compromising
for him to travel to the Russian capital.
20 October 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/105
RUSSIA/UKRAINE: THE DEMISE OF TRUMP’S CAMPAIGN MANAGER PAUL
MANAFORT
Summary
– Ex-Ukrainian President YANUKOVYCH confides directly to PUTIN that he
authorised kick-back payments to MANAFORT, as alleged in western
media. Assures Russian President however there is no documentary
evidence/trail
PUTIN and Russian leadership remain worried however and sceptical that
YANUKOVYCH has fully covered the traces of these payments to TRUMP’s
former campaign manager
– Close associate of TRUMP explains reasoning behind MANAFORT’s recent
resignation. Ukraine revelations played part but others wanted
MANAFORT out for various reasons, especially LEWANDOWSK1 who
remains influential
Detail
1. Speaking in late August 2016, in the immediate aftermath of Paul
MANAFORT’s resignation as campaign manager for US Republican
presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, a well-placed Russian figure
reported on a recent meeting between President PUTIN and ex-President
YANUKOVYCH of Ukraine. This had been held in secret on 15 August near
Volgograd, Russia and the western media revelations about MANAFORT
and Ukraine had featured prominently on the agenda. YANUKOVYCH had
confided in PUTIN that he did authorise and order substantial kick-back
payments to MANAFORT as alleged but sought to reassure him that there
was no documentary trail left behind which could provide clear evidence
of this.
2. Given YANUKOVYCH’S (unimpressive) record in covering up his own
corrupt tracks in the past, PUTIN and others in the Russian leadership
were sceptical about the ex-Ukrainian president’s reassurances on this as
relating to MANAFORT. They therefore still feared the scandal had legs,
especially as MANAFORT had been commercially active in Ukraine right
up to the time (in March 2016) when he joined TRUMP’s campaign team.
For them it therefore remained a point of potential political vulnerability
and embarrassment.
3. Speaking separately, also in late August 2016, an American political
figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign outlined the
reasons behind MANAFORT’s recent demise. S/he said it was true that
the Ukraine corruption revelations had played a part in this but also,
several senior players close to TRUMP had wanted MANAFORT out,
primarily to loosen his control on strategy and policy formulation. Of
particular importance in this regard was MANAFORT’s predecessor as
campaign manager, Corey LEWANDOWSKI, who hated MANAFORT
personally and remained close to TRUMP with whom he discussed the
presidential campaign on a regular basis.
22 August 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/111
RUSSIA/US: KREMLIN FALLOUT FROM MEDIA EXPOSURE OF MOSCOW’S
INTERFERENCE IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
Summary
Kremlin orders senior staff to remain silent in media and private on
allegations of Russian interference in US presidential campaign
Senior figure however confirms gist of allegations and repo^ IVANOV
sacked as Head of Administration on account of giving PUTIN poor advice
on issue. VAINO selected as his replacement partly because he was no
involved in pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s
Russians do have further ‘kompromat’ on CLINTON (e-mails) and
considering disseminating it after Duma (legislative elections) in a e
September. Presidential spokesman PESKOV continues to lead on this
However, equally important is Kremlin objective to shift policy consensus
favourably to Russia in US post-OBAMA whoever wins. Both presidential
candidates’ opposition to TPP and TTIP viewed as a result in this respect
– Senior Russian diplomat withdrawn from Washington embassy on
account of potential exposure in US presidential election operation/s
Detail
1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a
senior member of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA)
commented on the political fallout from recent western media
revelations about Moscow’s intervention, in favour of Donald TRUMP and
against Hillary CLINTON, in the US presidential election. The PA official
reported that the issue had become incredibly sensitive and that
President PUTIN had issued direct orders that Kremlin and government
insiders should not discuss it in public or even in private.
2. Despite this, the PA official confirmed, from direct knowledge, that the
gist of the allegations was true. PUTIN had been receiving conflicting
advice on interfering from three separate and expert groups. On one side
had been the Russian ambassador to the US, Sergei K1SLYAK, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with an independent and informal
network run by presidential foreign policy advisor, Yuri USHAKOV
(KISLYAK’s predecessor in Washington) who had urged caution and the
potential negative impact on Russia from the operation/s. On the other
side was former PA Head, Sergei IVANOV, backed by Russian Foreign
Intelligence (SVR), who had advised PUTIN that the pro-TRUMP, anti-
CLINTON operation/s would be both effective and plausibly deniable
with little blowback. The first group/s had been proven right and this had
been the catalyst in PUTIN’S decision to sack IVANOV (unexpectedly) as
PA Head in August. His successor, Anton VAINO, had been selected for the
job partly because he had not been involved in the US presidential
election operation/s.
3. Continuing on this theme, the senior PA official said the situation now
was that the Kremlin had further ‘kompromat’ on candidate CLINTON
and had been considering releasing this via “plausibly deniable” channels
after the Duma (legislative) elections were out of the way in mid-
September. There was however a growing train of thought and associated
lobby, arguing that the Russians could still make candidate CLINTON look
“weak and stupid” by provoking her into railing against PUTIN and
Russia without the need to release more of her e-mails. Presidential
Spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV remained a key figure in the operation,
although any final decision on dissemination of further material would be
taken by PUTIN himself.
4.
The senior PA official also reported that a growing element in Moscow s
intervention in the US presidential election campaign was the objective of
shifting the US political consensus in Russia’s perceived interests
regardless of who won. It basically comprised of pushing candidate
CLINTON away from President OBAMA’s policies. The best example of
this was that both candidates now openly opposed the draft trade
agreements, TPP and TTIP, which were assessed by Moscow as
detrimental to Russian interests. Other issues where the Kremlin was
looking to shift the US policy consensus were Ukraine and Syria. Overall
however, the presidential election was considered still to be too close to
call.
5. Finally, speaking separately to the same compatriot, a senior Russian
MFA official reported that as a prophylactic measure, a leading Russian
diplomat, Mikhail KULAGIN, had been withdrawn from Washington at
short notice because Moscow feared his heavy involvement in the US
presidential election operation, including the so-called veterans’ pensions
ruse (reported previously), would be exposed in the media there. His
replacement, Andrei BONDAREV however was clean in this regard.
Company Comment
The substance of what was reported by the senior Russian PA official in paras 1
and 2 above, including the reasons for Sergei IVANOV’s dismissal, was
corroborated independently by a former top level Russian intelligence officer
and Kremlin insider, also in mid-September.
14 September 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/112
RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN-ALPHA GROUP CO¬
OPERATION
Summary
– Top level Russian official confirms current closeness of Alpha Group-
PUT1N relationship. Significant favours continue to be done in both
directions and FRIDMAN and AVEN still giving informal advice to PUTIN,
especially on the US
Key intermediary in PUTIN-Alpha relationship identified as Oleg
GOVORUN, currently Head of a Presidential Administration department
but throughout the 1990s, the Alpha executive who delivered illicit cash
directly to PUTIN
PUTIN personally unbothered about Alpha’s current lack of investment in
Russia but under pressure from colleagues over this and able to exploit it
as lever over Alpha interlocutors
Detail
1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a top level
Russian government official commented on the history and current state
of relations between President PUTIN and the Alpha Group of businesses
led by oligarchs Mikhail FRIDMAN, Petr AVEN and German KHAN. The
Russian government figure reported that although they had had their ups
and downs, the leading figures in Alpha currently were on very good
terms with PUTIN. Significant favours continued to be done in both
directions, primarily political ones for PUTIN and business/legal ones for
Alpha. Also, FRIDMAN and AVEN continued to give informal advice to
PUTIN on foreign policy, and especially about the US where he distrusted
advice being given to him by officials.
2. Although FRIDMAN recently had met directly with PUTIN in Russia, much
of the dialogue and business between them was mediated through a
senior Presidential Administration official, Oleg GOVORUN, who currently
headed the department therein responsible for Social Co-operation With
the CIS. GOVORUN was trusted by PUTIN and recently had accompanied
him to Uzbekistan to pay respects at the tomb of former president
KARIMOV. However according to the top level Russian government
official, during the 1990s GOVORUN had been Head of Government
Relations at Alpha Group and in reality, the “driver” and “bag carrier”
used by FRIDMAN and AVEN to deliver large amounts of illicit cash to the
Russian president, at that time deputy Mayor of St Petersburg. Given that
and the continuing sensitivity of the PUTIN-Alpha relationship, and need
for plausible deniability, much of the contact between them was now
indirect and entrusted to the relatively low profile GOVORUN.
3. The top level Russian government official described the PUTIN-Alpha
relationship as both carrot and stick. Alpha held ‘kompromat’ on PUTIN
and his corrupt business activities from the 1990s whilst although not
personally overly bothered by Alpha’s failure to reinvest the proceeds of
its TNK oil company sale into the Russian economy since, the Russian
president was able to use pressure on this count from senior Kremlin
colleagues as a lever on FRIDMAN and AVEN to make them do his
political bidding.
14 September 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/113
RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION- REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE TRUMP’S
PRIOR ACTIVITIES IN ST PETERSBURG
Summary
Two knowledgeable St Petersburg sources claim Republican candidate
TRUMP has paid bribes and engaged in sexual activities there but key
witnesses silenced and evidence hard to obtain
– Both believe Azeri business associate of TRUMP, Araz AGALAROV will
know the details
Detail
1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in September 2016, two well-placed
sources based in St Petersburg, one in the political/business elite and the
other involved in the local services and tourist industry, commented on
Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s prior activities in
the city.
2. Both knew TRUMP had visited St Petersburg on several occasions in the
past and had been interested in doing business deals there involving real
estate. The local business/political elite figure reported that TRUMP had
paid bribes there to further his interests but very discreetly and only
through affiliated companies, making it very hard to prove. The local
services industry source reported that TRUMP had participated in sex
parties in the city too, but that all direct witnesses to this recently had
been “silenced” i.e. bribed or coerced to disappear.
3. The two St Petersburg figures cited believed an Azeri business figure,
Araz AGALAROV (with offices in Baku and London) had been closely
involved with TRUMP in Russia and would know most of the details of
what the Republican presidential candidate had got up to there.
14 September 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/130
RUSSIA: KREMLIN ASSESSMENT OF TRUMP AND RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN US
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Summary
Buyer’s remorse sets In with Kremlin over TRUMP support operation In US presidential
election. Russian leadership disappointed that leaked e-mails on CLINTON have not had
greater impact in campaign
Russians have Injected further antt-CLINTON material into Ihe ‘plausibly deniable’ leaks
pipeline which will continue to surface, hut best material already In public domain
PUTIN angry with senior officials who “overpromised 1 ‘ on TRUMP and lurther heads likely to
roll as result. Foreign Minister LAVROV may be next
TRUMP supported by Kremlm because seen as divisive, anti-establishment candidate who
would shake up current International status quo In Russia’s favor. Lead on TRUMP operation
moved from Foreign Ministry to FSB and then to presidential administration where it now sits
Detail
1. Speaking separately in confidence to a trusted compatriot in early October 2016, a senior
Russian leadership figure and a Foreign Ministry official reported on recent developments
concernmg the Kremlin’s operation to support Republican candidate Donatd TRUMP in the
US presidential election. The senior leadership figure said that a degree of buyer’s remorse
was setting in among Russian leaders concerning TRUMP. PUTIN and his colleagues were
surprised and disappointed that leaks of Democratic candidate, Hillary CLINTON’S hacked
e-mails had not had greater impact on the campaign.
2. Continuing on this theme, the senior leadership figure commented that a stream of further
hacked CLINTON material already had been injected by the Kremlin Into compliant western
media outlets like Wiki leaks, which remained at least “plausibly deniable 4 , so the stream of
these would continue through October and up to the etection. However s/he understood that
the best material the Russians had already was out and there were no real game-changers
to come.
3. The Russian Foreign Ministry official, who had direct access to the TRUMP support
operation, reported that PUTIN was angry at his subordinate’s “over-promising’’ on the
Republican presidential candidate, both in terms of hts chances and reliability and being
able to cover anchor contain the US backlash over Kremlin interference. More heads
therefore were likely to roll, with the MFA the easiest target. Ironically, despite his consistent
urging of caution on the Issue, Foreign Minister LAVROV could be the next one to go.
4. Asked to explain why PUTIN and the Kremlin had launched such an aggressive TRUMP
support operation In the first place, the MFA official said that Russia needed to upset the
liberal International status quo, including on Ukraine-related sanctions, which was seriously
2 *
disadvantaging the country. TRUMP was viewed as divisive in disrupting the whole US
political system; anti-Establishment; and a pragmatist with whom they could do business. As
the TRUMP support operation had gained momentum, control of it had passed from the mha
to the FSB and then into the presidential administration where It remained, a reflection of its
growing significance over time. There was still a view In the Kremlin that TRUMP would
continue as a (divisive) political force even If he lost the presidency and may run for and be
elected to another public ollice.
12 October 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/134
RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF KREMLIN LIAISON WITH
TRUMP CAMPAIGN
Summary
■ Close associate of SECHIN confirms his secret meeting in Moscow with Carter FACE in July
– Substance included offer of large stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. PACE
confirms this is TRUMP’s intention
– SECHIN continued to think. TRUMP could win presidency up to 17 October. Now looking to
reorientate his engagement with the US
■ Kremlin insider highlights importance of TRUMP’s lawyer, Michael COHEN in covert
relationship with Russia. COHEN’s wife is of Russian descent and her father a leading property
developer in Moscow
Detail
T Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid October 2016, a dose associate of Rosneft President
and PUTIN ally Igor” SECHIN elaborated on the reported secret meeting between the tatter
and Carter PAGE, of L T S Republican presidential candidate’s foreign policy team, in Moscow in
July 2016, The secret meeting had been confirmed to him/her by a senior member of SECHIN’s
staff, in addition to by the Rosneft President himself. It took place on either 7 or 8 July, the same
day or the one after Carter PAGE made a public speech to the Higher Economic School in
Moscow.
2. In terms of the substance of their discussion/ SECHIN’s assoriate said that the Rosneft
President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the
company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMPs associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent
(privatised) stake in Rosneft in return, PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were
TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted,
3. According to SECHIN’s dose associate, the Rosneft President had continued to believe that
TRUMP could win the US presidency right up to 17 October/ when he assessed this was no
longer possible, SECHIN was keen to re-adapt accordingly and put feelers out to other
business and political contacts in the US instead,
4. Speaking separately to the same compatriot in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider with direct
access to the leadership confirmed that a key role in the secret TRUMP campaign / Kremlin
relations hip was being played by the Republican candidat e’s personal lawyer Michael
Source Comment
5, SECHIN’s associate opined that although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had
dearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP’s intention to lift Russian sanctions if
elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate’s authority.
Company Comment
18 October 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/135
RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF TRUMP
LAWYER, COHEN IN CAMPAIGN’S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN
Summary
– Kremlin insider outlines important role played by TRUMP’s lawyer
COHEN in secret liaison with Russian leadership
– COHEN engaged with Russians in trying to cover up scandal of
MANAFORT and exposure of PAGE and meets Kremlin officials secretly in
the EU in August in pursuit of this goal
These secret contacts continue but are now farmed out to trusted agents
in Kremlin-linked institutes so as to remain “plausibly deniable for
Russian regime
Further confirmation that sacking of IVANOV and appointments of VA1N0
and KIR1YENKO linked to need to cover up Kremlin’s TRUMP support
operation
Detail
1. Speaking in confidence to a longstanding compatriot friend in mid-
October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of
Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s lawyer, Michael
COHEN, in the ongoing secret liaison relationship between the New York
tycoon’s campaign and the Russian leadership. COHEN’s role had grown
following the departure of Paul MANNAFORT as TRUMP’s campaign
manager in August 2016. Prior to that MANNAFORT had led for the
TRUMP side.
2. According to the Kremlin insider, COHEN now was heavily engaged in a
cover up and damage limitation operation in the attempt to prevent the
full details of TRUMP’s relationship with Russia being exposed. In
pursuit of this aim, COHEN had met secretly with several Russian
Presidential Administration (PA) Legal Department officials in an EU
country in August 2016. The immediate issues had been to contain
further scandals involving MANNAFORT’s commercial and political role
in Russia/Ukraine and to limit the damage arising from exposure of
former TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE’S secret meetings
with Russian leadership figures in Moscow the previous month. The
overall objective had been to “to sweep it all under the carpet and make
sure no connections could be fully established or proven”
3. Things had become even “hotter” since August on the TRUMP-Russia
track. According to the Kremlin insider, this had meant that direct contact
between the TRUMP team and Russia had been farmed out by the
Kremlin to trusted agents of influence working in pro-government policy
institutes like that of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. COHEN
however continued to lead for the TRUMP team.
4. Referring back to the (surprise) sacking of Sergei IVANOV as Head of PA
in August 2016, his replacement by Anton VAINO and the appointment o
former Russian premier Sergei KIRIYENKO to another senior position in
the PA, the Kremlin insider repeated that this had been directly
connected to the TRUMP support operation and the need to cover up now
that it was being exposed by the USG and in the western media.
Company Comment
The Kremlin insider was unsure of the identities of the PA officials with whom
COHEN met secretly in August, or the exact date/s and locations of the
meeting/s. There were significant internal security barriers being erected in the
PA as the TRUMP issue became more controversial and damaging. However s/he
continued to try to obtain these.
19 October 2016
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/166
US/RUSSIA: FURTHER DETAILS OF SECRET DIALOGUE BETWEEN TRUMP
CAMPAIGN TEAM, KREMLIN AND ASSOCIATED HACKERS IN PRAGUE
Summary
– TRUMP’s representative COHEN accompanied to Prague in
August/September 2016 by 3 colleagues for secret discussions with
Kremlin representatives and associated operators/hackers
Agenda included how to process deniable cash payments to operatives;
contingency plans for covering up operations; and action in event of a
CLINTON election victory
Some further details of Russian representatives/operatives involved;
Romanian hackers employed; and use of Bulgaria as bolthole to “lie low”
– Anti-CLINTON hackers and other operatives paid by both TRUMP team
and Kremlin, but with ultimate loyalty to Head of PA, IVANOV and his
successor/s
Detail
1. We reported previously (2016/135 and /136) on secret meeting/s held
in Prague, Czech Republic in August 2016 between then Republican
presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s representative, Michael COHEN
and his interlocutors from the Kremlin working under cover of Russian
‘NGO’ Rossotrudnichestvo.
CL/NTON/Democratic Party operations. COHEN had been accompanied
to Prague by 3 colleagues and the timing of the visit was either in the last
week of August or the first week of September. One of their main Russian
interlocutors was Oleg SOLODUKHIN operating under
Rossotrudnichestvo cover. According the agenda
comprised questions on how deniable cash payments were to be made to
hackers who had worked in Europe under Kremlin direction against the
CLINTON campaign and various contingencies for covering up these
operations and Moscow’s secret liaison with the TRUMP team more
generally.
provided further details of these meeting/s and associated anti-
3. aver rhe period MarcIvSepfember 2016
^cmpan^alled^^^^^^Mand its affiliates had been using botnets
and porn traffic to transmit viruses, plant bugs, steal data and conduct
“altering operatjons*^gamsUhe Democratic Party leadership. Entities
Linked to involved and hean^mother
hackjn^xpert, both recruited under duress by the FSB,^^H
■■■■Mwere significant players in this operation, In Prague,
COHEN agreed contingency plans for various scenarios to protect the
operation, but in particular what was to be done in the event that Hillary
CLINTON won the presidency. It was important in this event that ad cash
payments owed were made quickly and discreetly and that cyher and
other operators were stood down/a hie to go effectively to ground to
cover their traces. (We reported earlier that the involvement of political
Operatives Paul MAN A FORT and Carter PAGE in the secret TRUMP-
Kremlin liaison had been exposed in the media in the run-up to Prague
and that damage limitation of these also was discussed by COHEN with
the Kremlin representatives).
4. In terms of practical measures to be taken. It was agreed by the two sides
in Prague to stand down various “Romanian hackers” (presumably based
in their homeland or neighbouring eastern Europe) and that other
operatives should head fur a bolt-hole in Plovdiv, Bulgaria where they
should “lay low”. On payments, IVANOV’S associate said that the
operatives involved had been paid by both TRUMP’S team and the
Kremlin, though their orders and ultimate loyalty lay with IVANOV, as
Head of the PA and thus ultimately responsible for the operation, and his
designated successor/s after he was dismissed by president PUTIN in
connection with iheanti-CLINTON operation in mid August,
13 December 2016
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Page Count: 3 pages
Date: June 4, 2018
Restriction: For Official Use Only
Originating Organization: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis
File Type: pdf
File Size: 272,001 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):33D7903C899000F32FEF462130E8D9081F204EE41EB620B813A2E654F54415E5
(U//FOUO) An unidentified cyber actor in mid-March 2018 used GrandCrab Version 2 ransomware to attack a State of Connecticut municipality network and a state judicial branch network, according to DHS reporting derived from a state law enforcement official with direct and indirect access. The municipality did not pay the ransom, resulting in the encryption of multiple servers that affected some data backups and the loss of tax payment information and assessor data. The attack against the state judicial branch resulted in the infection of numerous computers, but minimal content encryption, according to the same DHS report.
(U//FOUO) The unidentified cyber actor introduced the ransomware used against the judicial branch network through a vendor server/host; the ransomware then harvested cached credentials of high-level privileged accounts, according to the same DHS report. The actor then used the credentials to access two servers on the network and propagate the malware via server message block (SMB). Connecticut state cybersecurity officials were able to block the ransomware’s communication with external infrastructure, which prevented the encryption of additional hosts and data loss, according to the same DHS report.
(U) GandCrab Malware
(U) Released in late January 2018, GandCrab, also called “GrandCrab,” is a ransomware variant distributed by exploit kits that requires communication with the ransomware’s command-and-control (C2) server to encrypt files of an infected computer, according to an online technical support site. The developers of GandCrab recently upgraded the original version after Romanian police and BitDefender mitigated infections by recovering its decryption keys, according to a separate article from the same online technical support site. As of 6 March 2018, no free decryption key is available to victims of GandCrab version 2. GandCrab uses NameCoin’s .BIT as its top-level domain (TLD); therefore, variants of the ransomware using the .BIT TLD must also use a domain name server that supports .BIT, according to the same online technical support site. Upon infection, GandCrab will attempt to query the ransomware’s C2 servers on the .BIT domain to establish communication. GandCrab will not encrypt a host’s content with the .CRAB extension if communication is not established with the C2 server, according to the same online technical support site.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Senate Select Committee onIntelligence
July 3, 2018
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) is conducting a bipartisan
investigation into a wide range of Russian activities relating to the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. While elements of the investigation are ongoing, the
Committee is releasing initial, unclassified findings on a rolling basis as distinct
pieces of the investigation conclude.
The Committee has concluded an in-depth review of the Intelligence Community
Assessment (ICA) produced by CIA, NSA, and FBI in January of 2017 on
Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Assessing Russian
Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections; declassified version released
January 6, 2017) and have initial findings to share with the American people.
• The ICA was a seminal intelligence product with significant policy
implications. In line with its historical role, the Committee had a
responsibility to conduct an in-depth review of the document.
• In conducting its examination, theCommittee reviewed thousands of pages
ofsource documents and conducted interviews with all the relevant partiesincluding
agency heads, managers, and line analysts – who were involved in
developing the analysis and drafting the assessment.
• The Committee is preparing a comprehensive, classified report detailing our
conclusions regarding the ICA on Russian activities. That report, when
complete, will be submitted for a classification review, and the unclassified
version will be released to the public.
2
The Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and
Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections
Summary of Initial Findings
The Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) released in January 2017 assessed
that Russian activities in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election represented a
significant escalation in a long history of Russian attempts to interfere in U.S.
domestic politics. This escalation was made possible by cyber-espionage and
cyber-driven covert influence operations, conducted as part of a broader “active
measures” campaign that included overt messaging through Russian-controlled
propaganda platforms. The ICA revealed key elements of a comprehensive and
multifaceted Russian campaign against the United States as it was understood by
the U.S. Intelligence Community at the end of 2016.
President Obama in early December 2016 tasked the Intelligence Community with
writing an assessment that would capture the existing intelligence on Russian
interference in U.S. elections. By early January, the CIA, NSA, and FBI produced
a joint assessment under the auspices of the ODNI, titled Assessing Russian
Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, which included both classified
and unclassified versions. Only three agencies were represented in the drafting
process because of the extreme sensitivity of the sources and methods involved.
InitialFindings
Summary
The Committee finds that the Intelligence Community met President Obama’s
tasking and that the ICA is a sound intelligence product. While the Committee had
to rely on agencies that the sensitive information and accesses had been accurately
reported, as part of our inquiry the Committee reviewed analytic procedures,
interviewed senior intelligence officers well-versed with the information, and
based our findings on the entire body of intelligence reporting included in the ICA.
3
The Committee finds the difference in confidence levels between the NSA and the
CIA and FBI on the assessment that “Putin and the Russian Government aspired to
help President-elect Trump’s election chances” appropriately represents analytic
differences and was reached in a professional and transparent manner.
In all the interviews of those who drafted and prepared the ICA, the Committee
heard consistently that analysts were under no politically motivated pressure to
reach any conclusions. All analysts expressed that they were free to debate, object
to content, and assess confidence levels, as is normal and proper for the analytic
process.
As the inquiry has progressed since January 2017, the Committee has seen
additional examples of Russia’s attempts to sow discord, undermine democratic
institutions, and interfere in U.S. elections and those of our allies.
Russian Efforts to Influence the 2016 Election
The ICA states that:
Russian efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election represent the most
recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the U.S.-led
liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation
in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous
operations1
.
• The Committee found that this judgment was supported by the evidence
presented in the ICA. Since its publication, further details have come to light
that bolster the assessment.
• The ICA pointed to initial evidence of Russian activities against multiple
U.S. state or local electoral boards. Since the ICA was published, the
Committee has learned more about Russian attempts to infiltrate state
election infrastructure, as outlined in the findings and recommendations the
Committee issued in March 2018.
• While the ICA briefly discussed the activities of the Internet Research
Agency, the Committee’s investigation has exposed a far more extensive
1
Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, 6 January 2017. P.ii. (NOTE:
all page numbers referenced are from the Unclassified I CA)
4
•
Russian effort to manipulate social media outlets to sow discord and to
interfere in the 2016 election and American society.
Russian Leadership Intentions
The ICA states that:
We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in
2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine
public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm
her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian
Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump2
.
• The Committee found that the ICA provided a range of all-source reporting
to support these assessments.
• The Committee concurs with intelligence and open-source assessments that
this influence campaign was approved by President Putin.
• Further, a body of reporting, to include different intelligence disciplines,
open source reporting on Russian leadership policy preferences, and Russian
media content, showed that Moscow sought to denigrate Secretary Clinton.
• The ICA relies on public Russian leadership commentary, Russian state
media reports, public examples of where Russian interests would have
aligned with candidates’ policy statements, and a body of intelligence
reporting to support the assessment that Putin and the Russian Government
developed a clear preference for Trump.
The ICA also statesthat:
We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect
Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and
publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him3
2
Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions inRecent U.S. Elections, 6 January
2017. P.ii.
3
Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, 6 January
2017.P.ii.
5
• The Committee found that the ICA provided intelligence and open source
reporting to support this assessment, and information obtained subsequent to
publication of the ICA provides further support.
• This isthe only assessment in the ICA that had different confidence levels
between the participating agencies -the CIA and FBI assessed with “high
confidence”and the NSA assessed with “moderate confidence”-so the
Committee gave thissection additional attention.
The Committee found that the analytical disagreement was reasonable, transparent,
and openly debated among the agencies and analysts, with analysts, managers, and
agency heads on both sides of the confidence level articulately justifying their
positions.
Russian Cyber Operations
The ICA states that:
Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets
associated with the 2016 U.S. presidential election, including targets
associated with both major U.S. political parties. We assess Russian
intelligence services collected against the U.S . primary campaigns, think
tanks, and lobbying groups they viewed as likely to shape future U.S. policies.
In July 2015, Russian intelligence gained access to Democratic National
Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that access until at least June
2016.4
• The Committee found this judgment supported by intelligence and further
supported by our own investigation. Separate from the ICA, the Committee
has conducted interviews of key individuals who have provided additional
insights into these incidents.
Russian Propaganda
The ICA states that:
Russia’s state-run propaganda machine-comprised of its domestic media
apparatus, outlets targeting global audiences such as RT and Sputnik, and a
4
IntelligenceCommunityAssessment:AssessingRussianActivitiesand IntentionsinRecentU.S.Elections,6January 2017. P.2.
6
network of quasi-governmental trolls-contributed to the influence campaign by
serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international
audiences.5
• The ICA provides a summary of Russian state media operations in 2012 and
notes that RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik are coordinated Russianstate
platforms. The ICA fails to provide an updated assessment of this
capability in 2016, which the Committee finds to be a shortcoming in the
ICA, as this information was available in open source.
• The Committee notes that the ICA does not comment on the potential
effectiveness of this propaganda campaign, because the U.S. Intelligence
Community makes no assessments on U.S. domestic political processes.
Historical Context
The ICA states that:
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union used intelligence officers, influence agents,
forgeries, and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the
Kremlin, according to a former KGB archivist…For decades, Russian and Soviet
intelligence services have sought to collect insider information from U.S. political
parties that could help Russian leaders understand a new U.S. administration’s
plans and priorities6
.
• The Committee found the ICA’s treatment of the historical context of
Russian interference in U.S. domestic politics perfunctory.
• The unclassified ICA cites efforts to collect on the 2008 election and the
Soviet recruitment of an activist who reported on Jimmy Carter’s campaign
in the 1970s, demonstrating two examples of Russian interest in U.S.
elections. The ICA failed entirely to summarize historic collection by U.S.
agencies as well as extensive open-source reporting -significant elements of
which are derived from Russian intelligence archives – to present a more
relevant historical context.
5
Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russia n Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, 6 January
2017. P.3.
6
Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russia n Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, 6 January
2017. P.S.
7
Counterintelligence Investigations
The ICA did not attempt to address potential counterintelligence investigationsfor
example, whether Russian intelligence services attempted to recruit sources
with access to any campaign. The FBI had a collection of reports a former foreign
intelligence officer was hired to compile as opposition research for the U.S.
election, referred to asthe “dossier,” when the ICA was drafted. However, those
reports remained separate from the conclusions of the ICA. All individuals the
Committee interviewed verified that the dossier did not in any way inform the
analysis in the ICA – including the key findings – because it was unverified
information and had not been disseminated asserialized intelligence reporting.
• The Committee will address the contents of the reports and their handling by
the United States Government in a separate part of its report.
Conclusion
Finally, the Committee notes that, as is the case with all intelligence questions,
information continues to be gathered and analyzed. The Committee believes the
conclusions of the ICA are sound, and notes that collection and analysis
subsequent to the ICA’s publication continue to reinforce its assessments. The
Committee will remain vigilant in its oversight of the ongoing challenges presented
by foreign nations attempting to secretly influence U.S. affairs.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Following the Syrian regime’s resumption of its military offensive, as well as high levels of air force activity over the town of Douma in Eastern Ghouta, two new cases of toxic agents employment were spontaneously reported by civil society and local and international media from the late afternoon of 7 April. Non-governmental medical organizations active in Ghouta (the Syrian American Medical Society and the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations), whose information is generally reliable, publicly stated that strikes had targeted in particular local medical infrastructure on 6 and 7 April.
A massive influx of patients in health centres in Eastern Ghouta (at the very least 100 people) presenting symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical agent was observed and documented during the early evening. In total, several dozens of people, more than forty according to several sources, are thought to have died from exposure to a chemical substance.
The information collected by France forms a body of evidence that is sufficient to attribute responsibility for the chemical attacks of 7 April to the Syrian regime.
1. — Several chemical attacks took place at Douma on 7 April 2018.
The French services analysed the testimonies, photos and videos that spontaneously appeared on specialized websites, in the press and on social media in the hours and days following the attack. Testimonies obtained by the French services were also analysed. After examining the videos and images of victims published online, they were able to conclude with a high degree of confidence that the vast majority are recent and not fabricated. The spontaneous circulation of these images across all social networks confirms that they were not video montages or recycled images. Lastly, some of the entities that published this information are generally considered reliable.
French experts analysed the symptoms identifiable in the images and videos that were made public. These images and videos were taken either in enclosed areas in a building where around 15 people died, or in local hospitals that received contaminated patients. These symptoms can be described as follows (cf. annexed images):
Suffocation, asphyxia or breathing difficulties,
Mentions of a strong chlorine odour and presence of green smoke in affected areas,
Hypersalivation and hypersecretions (particularly oral and nasal),
Cyanosis,
Skin burns and corneal burns.
No deaths from mechanical injuries were visible. All of these symptoms are characteristic of a chemical weapons attack, particularly choking agents and organophosphorus agents or hydrocyanic acid. Furthermore, the apparent use of bronchodilators by the medical services observed in videos reinforces the hypothesis of intoxication by choking agents.
…
On the basis of this overall assessment and on the intelligence collected by our services, and in the absence to date of chemical samples analysed by our own laboratories, France therefore considers (i) that, beyond possible doubt, a chemical attack was carried out against civilians at Douma on 7 April 2018; and (ii) that there is no plausible scenario other than that of an attack by Syrian armed forces as part of a wider offensive in the Eastern Ghouta enclave. The Syrian armed and security forces are also considered to be responsible for other actions in the region as part of this same offensive in 2017 and 2018. Russia has undeniably provided active military support to the operations to seize back Ghouta. It has, moreover, provided constant political cover to the Syrian regime over the employment of chemical weapons, both at the UN Security Council and at the OPCW, despite conclusions to the contrary by the JIM.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The American people are increasingly dependent upon the Internet for daily conveniences, critical services, and economic prosperity. Substantial growth in Internet access and networked devices has facilitated widespread opportunities and innovation. This extraordinary level of connectivity, however, has also introduced progressively greater cyber risks for the United States. Long-standing threats are evolving as nation-states, terrorists, individual criminals, transnational criminal organizations, and other malicious actors move their activities into the digital world. Enabling the delivery of essential services—such as electricity, finance, transportation, water, and health care—through cyberspace also introduces new vulnerabilities and opens the door to potentially catastrophic consequences from cyber incidents. The growing number of Internet-connected devices and reliance on global supply chains further complicates the national and international risk picture. More than ever, cybersecurity is a matter of homeland security and one of the core missions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
At DHS, we believe that cyberspace can be secure and resilient. We work every day across the Department and with key partners and stakeholders to identify and manage national cybersecurity risks. We do this by adopting a holistic risk management approach. Like every organization, no matter how big or small, we must minimize our organizational vulnerability to malicious cyber activity by protecting our own networks. DHS also has broader responsibilities to protect the larger federal enterprise and improve the security and resilience of other critical systems. At the same time, we seek to reduce cyber threats by preventing and disrupting cyber crimes, and to lessen the consequences of cyber incidents by ensuring an effective federal response when appropriate. Finally, we work to create conditions for more effective cyber risk management through efforts to make the cyber ecosystem more fundamentally secure and resilient. This strategy sets forth our goals, objectives, and priorities to successfully execute the full range of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity responsibilities.
…
During the last several decades, advances in technology have fundamentally changed the world. Substantial growth in Internet access, use of Internet-enabled devices, and the availability of high speed information technology systems and large datasets have facilitated productivity, efficiencies, and capabilities across all major industries. The proliferation of technology also presents new cybersecurity challenges and leads to significant national risks. More than 20 billion devices are expected to be connected to the Internet by 2020. The risks introduced by the growing number and variety of such devices are substantial.
The United States faces threats from a growing set of sophisticated malicious actors who seek to exploit cyberspace. Motivations include espionage, political and ideological interests, and financial gain. Nation-states continue to present a considerable cyber threat. But non-state actors are emerging with capabilities that match those of sophisticated nation-states. Criminal actors are increasingly empowered by modern information and communications technologies that enable them to grow in sophistication and transnational reach. Transnational criminal organizations also increasingly collaborate through cyberspace. Complicating the threat picture, nation-states are increasingly using proxies and other techniques that blur the distinction between state and non-state cyber activities. In a number of cases, malicious actors engaged in significant criminal cyber activity appear to have both criminal and nation-state affiliations.
These diverse threats can impact federal and nonfederal information systems. Attempted incursions into government networks occur on a daily basis; the number of cyber incidents on federal systems reported to DHS increased more than ten-fold between 2006 and 2015. In 2015, a high-profile intrusion into a single federal agency resulted in the compromise of personnel records of over 4 million federal employees and ultimately affected nearly 22 million people. The growing interconnection of cyber and physical systems within critical infrastructure also creates the potential risk for malicious cyber activity to result in direct physical consequences; for example, the December 2015 overriding of controls in the Ukrainian electric grid resulted in widespread loss of power. Ransomware incidents such as WannaCry and NotPetya demonstrate how the rapid growth of the internet-of-things further complicates the threat as everyday devices can be targeted by malicious cyber actors with potentially far-reaching consequences.
…
Guiding Principles
DHS advances our mission and will accomplish our cybersecurity goals by aligning departmental activities according to the following guiding principles:
1. Risk prioritization. The foremost responsibility of DHS is to safeguard the American people and we must prioritize our efforts to focus on systemic risks and the greatest cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities faced by the American people and our homeland.
2. Cost-effectiveness. Cyberspace is highly complex and DHS efforts to increase cybersecurity must be continuously evaluated and reprioritized to ensure the best results for investments made.
3. Innovation and agility. Cyberspace is an evolving domain with emergent risks. Although the proliferation of technology leads to new risks, it also provides an opportunity for innovation. DHS must lead by example in researching, developing, adapting, and employing cutting-edge cybersecurity capabilities and remain agile in its efforts to keep up with evolving threats and technologies.
4. Collaboration. The growth and development of the Internet has been primarily driven by the private sector and the security of cyberspace is an inherently cross-cutting challenge. To accomplish our cybersecurity goals, we must work in a collaborative manner across our Components and with other federal and nonfederal partners.
5. Global approach. Robust international engagement and collaboration is required to accomplish our national cybersecurity goals. DHS must engage internationally to manage global cyber risks, respond to worldwide incidents, and disrupt growing transnational cyber threats as well as encourage other nations and foreign entities to adopt the policies necessary to create an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet.
6. Balanced equities. Cyberspace empowers people and enables prosperity worldwide. Cybersecurity is not an end unto itself, and efforts to mitigate cybersecurity risks must also support international commerce, strengthen international security, and foster free expression and innovation.
7. National values. DHS must uphold privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in accordance with applicable law and policy. The Department empowers our cybersecurity programs to succeed by integrating privacy protections from the outset and employing a layered approach to privacy and civil liberties oversight.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
|
|
||||
| US Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Italian Frontier Control Detachment |
||||
| CIC Agent Reports DECEMBER 1944 – JANUARY 1947 | ||||
| 1942 | ||||
| 10AUG42 | Approach Roads from Switzerland: Extract From ITALY Ch. II/3/e/3b | |||
| 1944 | ||||
| 26DEC44 | Memorandum for Major Powers, CIC AFHQ: Personnel Needs | |||
| 27DEC44 | Italo-Swiss Frontier Control Discussions | |||
| 28DEC44 | Proposed Control of the Italo-Swiss Frontier | |||
| 1945 | ||||
| 02JAN45 | Personnel Needs for the French-Italian Frontier | |||
| 04JAN45 | Communications for the Italo-French Frontier | |||
| 05JAN45 | Italo-Swiss Frontier Communications | |||
| 06JAN45 | The CIC Function in Travel Control | |||
| 17JAN45 | Decisions Taken on Supplies to Partisans in North Italy | |||
| 08FEB45 | Proposed Control of the Franco-Italian Frontier | |||
| 16FEB45 | Signals Personnel and Equipment for CIC Italian Frontier Control | |||
| 19FEB45 | Communications Problem on Italo-French and Italo-Swiss Frontiers | |||
| 12MAR45 | Radio Communications for CIC Italian Frontier Control Detachment | |||
| 14APR45 | Revised War Department Policies on CIC Organization and Function | |||
| 04MAY45 | Road-Block at “Pas de Paradis” | |||
| 09MAY45 | List of Persons Arrested While Crossing the Frontier | |||
| 00MAY45 | CIC Border Control Short-handed | |||
| 10MAY45 | Italo-French Frontier: Preliminary Situation Report | |||
| 11MAY45 | Italo-French Frontier: Arrival of Allied Military Government at Susa | |||
| 13MAY45 | Interrogation of KAUFFER, Roger, of Corredo Sabotage School | |||
| 15MAY45 | Unauthorized Crossing Franco-Ital. Frontier: PEZZOTA, NESSI, RUFFINI | |||
| 15MAY45 | French Maquis and Partisan Activities | |||
| 15MAY45 | French Propaganda in Frontier Region: Newspapers, Leaflets | |||
| 15MAY45 | Frontier Incidents: Violations of the American Flag | |||
| 17MAY45 | War Criminal Wanted by French: Vichy General ANTOINE GABRIEL DURAND | |||
| 17MAY45 | Proposed Survey of Italo-French Frontier | |||
| 17MAY45 | Members of SABOTAGE SCHOOL at Corredo: Roll of Parachutist Battalion | |||
| 17MAY45 | Minor Riot and Demonstration in Aosta: French Propaganda | |||
| 18MAY45 | Situation Report: Susa Sub-Section | |||
| 21MAY45 | Information Requested by Headquarters | |||
| 22MAY45 | Aggression from French Military Soldiers against Commander | |||
| 23MAY45 | Italian Garrison at Moncenisio: Ousting of Italian Guards by French | |||
| 24MAY45 | AFHQ Frontier Regulations: Violations of Same | |||
| 25MAY45 | Ousting of Italian Guards by French at Moncenisio | |||
| 25MAY45 | Italo-French Frontier: Miscellaneous Information | |||
| 25MAY45 | French Military Personnel in the Turin Area | |||
| 28MAY45 | General Survey Areas from Susa to Moncenisio and to Claviers | |||
| 01JUN45 | Vetting of Guarda di Finanza Border Guards | |||
| 02JUN45 | Italian Frontier Control (Dispersal of Personnel) | |||
| 02JUN45 | Use of Vehicles | |||
| 09JUN45 | Approved Frontaliers for Issue | |||
| 12JUN45 | Frontaliers (Tessera di Frontiera) Traffic: Statement for the Press | |||
| 12JUN45 | Frontalier Crossing Points (Italo-Swiss Frontier) | |||
| 13JUN45 | Communist Party: Russian Sponsored Activity in Frontier Area | |||
| 01JUL45 | Contraband Activity in Aosta Province | |||
| 01JUL45 | Violation of Frontier Regulations by Allied Frontier Guards | |||
| 05JUL45 | CIC Detachment Order: Trieste, Verona, Milan, Leghorn, Rome, Naples | |||
| 12JUL45 | Weekly Intelligence Summary Report: Contraband, Repatriation, etc. | |||
| 24JUL45 | Use of Vehicles | |||
| 24JUL45 | Control of Austro/Italian Frontier Covering VORALBERG and TIROL | |||
| 24JUL45 | Survey of Security Controls in Venezia Giulia | |||
| 14AUG45 | Visits by Russian Officers to Communist Headquarters | |||
| 28AUG45 | Swiss Secret Police Request Identity of Himler Officers in Photo | |||
| 30AUG45 | Supplies for CIC Officers | |||
| 30AUG45 | War Department: Destruction of Classified Communications Matter | |||
| 8SEPT45 | War Department: Instructions to Officer-Couriers | |||
| 8SEPT45 | Arrest of MULLER, Wolf Mittler | |||
| 9SEPT45 | Civilians w/ AMG Permits Attempting to Cross Italo-French Frontier | |||
| 11SEP45 | German Nationals Expelled from Switzerland: GRIPP, GRIPP and JANSSEN | |||
| 17SEP45 | Requesting Swiss Black-list Clearance | |||
| 17SEP45 | Larceny of 1/4 Ton Vehicle, WD No. 20656544 | |||
| 29SEP45 | Stolen 1/4 ton Jeep, WD USA No. 20684089 | |||
| 04DEC45 | Communist Activities | |||
| 1946 | ||||
| 09JAN46 | Enemy Agents: CASUL, Pierre, alias LUSSAC, Pierre, alias Mr. PETER | |||
| 10JAN46 | Illegal Crossing and Contraband | |||
| 14JAN46 | Arrest of Confidential Informant: Nick, PALIGORICH, Lt.,RYA, Italy | |||
| 15JAN46 | Demonstration at the Municipal Building | |||
| 15JAN46 | Denunciation of DOTT. GIUSEPPE CEI | |||
| 16JAN46 | Avvocato Camillo DONATI: re Sequestration of Bus | |||
| 17JAN46 | Neo-Fascist Organizations in Northern Italy | |||
| 21JAN46 | Arrest of Allied Personnel Involved in Armed Robbery | |||
| 23JAN46 | Investigating Permits to Trieste: Yugoslav Welfare Society, Milan | |||
| 25JAN46 | French Intelligence Activity in Northern Italy | |||
| 06FEB46 | Investigation of Unauthorized Control of Italo-French Frontier | |||
| 15FEB46 | Proposed Transfer of Dr. BOLOGNESI, PS, Frontier Control | |||
| 18FEB46 | Investigation of Unauthorized Control of Italo-French Frontier | |||
| 19FEB46 | Misrepresentation of Ex-FSS Informants as Allied Police | |||
| 28FEB46 | Letter to Mssrs. Mascioni | |||
| 02MAR46 | TOP SECRET: Foreign Information Service D.G.E.R. – France | |||
| 04MAR46 | Allied Force Permits | |||
| 08MAR46 | TOP SECRET: Activity of French D.G.E.R. Intelligence Organization | |||
| 09MAR46 | Georg WACHS, alias Dr. Georgio SCARDONA, Member German Armed Forces | |||
| 13MAR46 | Planned Escape from San Vittore Prison | |||
| 25MAR46 | Intercepted Letter From Belgrade | |||
| 25MAR46 | Secret Field Police (Feld Polizei: Denunciation by Dr. CORBELLINI | |||
| 26MAR46 | Telegrams from General MIHALOVIC Headquarters | |||
| 31MAR46 | Yugoslave Troop Dispositions Near Italian Frontier | |||
| 02APR46 | TOP SECRET: DGER French Intelligence Anti-American Activity | |||
| 08APR46 | Fifth Column in Trieste | |||
| 09APR46 | Request for Release: Enrico Trojsi MUELLER | |||
| 16APR46 | Information Regarding Irma FIORIN | |||
| 16APR46 | Arrest and Interrogation: TARLE Marchk di Simone | |||
| 24APR46 | Stealing of Mussolini’s Corpse from Musocco Cemetery in Milano | |||
| 24APR46 | Military Situation in Jugoslavia | |||
| 25APR46 | Investigation: Armed Revolt in S. Vittore Prison, Milano | |||
| 27APR46 | Military Situation in Yugoslavia | |||
| 30APR46 | Summary of Information: PARRILLI, Luigi, Baron a.k.a. “Baron X” | |||
| 10MAY46 | Yugoslav Intelligence Activity in Italy (TITO) | |||
| 11MAY46 | Rumors of Uprising: PCI and PSI | |||
| 14MAY46 | Investigation: MAZZONIS, Baronessa | |||
| 16MAY46 | Communist Party Plan: Preparations for Over-throwing Existing Govmt | |||
| 17MAY46 | D.G.E.R. Reorganization | |||
| 17MAY46 | Spanish Subjects in Milan: Recruitment of Anti-Fascist Elements | |||
| 17MAY46 | General Military Situation in Lubjliana Area | |||
| 18MAY46 | Greater Belgrade Garrison Locations | |||
| 22MAY46 | Speech by Guglielmo GIANNINI, “L’UOMO QUALUNQUE” | |||
| 01JUN46 | Capture of General Draja MIHAILOVIC | |||
| 07JUN46 | Re-Arrest and Interrogation: BAUMGARTNER, Franz, Lt. | |||
| 10JUN46 | Investigation and Interrogation: BERTHIER, Robert – BERTHIER, Jean | |||
| 10JUN46 | Loss of Military Intelligence Division (MID) Badge No. C-3267 | |||
| 13JUN46 | Monarchist Newspaper: Yugoslav Herald | |||
| 17JUN46 | U.S.S.R. Activity in Switzerland | |||
| 19JUN46 | Communist Activity, Italy | |||
| 19JUN46 | Escaped P.O.W. FRASE, Karl Heins alias MORRISON, Jack | |||
| 20JUN46 | Yugoslav Activities | |||
| 21JUN46 | Yugoslav Activities | |||
| 09JUL46 | Communist and Yugoslav Activity in Trieste Area | |||
| 16JUL46 | Communist Party Activity | |||
| 16JUL46 | “Il Corriere Lombardo” Sold | |||
| 17JUL46 | Yugoslave Army (TITO) Activity in Venezia Giulia | |||
| 19JUL46 | Suspected OZNA Informants | |||
| 21JUL46 | French Intelligence Activity in Italy | |||
| 22JUL46 | Suspected OZNA Officials, Agents & Informers | |||
| 23JUL46 | Demonstration of Unemployed in Milan | |||
| 24JUL46 | City Policemen in Milan | |||
| 24JUL46 | “TEPRO” Yugoslav Commercial Activities | |||
| 30JUL46 | Italian Air Force Personnel | |||
| 05AUG46 | OZNA Suspects | |||
| 05AUG46 | Attitude of Press towards Allies Especially Great Britain | |||
| 05AUG46 | Anti-British Propaganda – ANSA | |||
| 05AUG46 | French Intelligence Activity in Piedmonte | |||
| 05AUG46 | Veterans’ Demonstration in Milan | |||
| 05AUG46 | Summary of Information: Palmiro TOGLIATTI | |||
| 05AUG46 | PCI-OZNA-USSR in Central and Southern Italy | |||
| 06AUG46 | Activities of Albanian Organizations in Italy | |||
| 06AUG46 | Economic and Military Activity in Albania | |||
| 06AUG46 | TOP SECRET: Clandestine Jewish Immigration | |||
| 06AUG46 | Pro-USSR and Anti-Allied propaganda | |||
| 09AUG46 | Propaganda Methods of the P.C.I. | |||
| 09AUG46 | Arrest of Sergeant Fernand D’ALBY | |||
| 09AUG46 | Suspected Jugoslav Agents | |||
| 09AUG46 | Jugoslav Activity, Suspected OZNA Informants and Agents in Italy | |||
| 09AUG46 | Jugoslav Activity | |||
| 09AUG46 | Summary of Information: “Squadra Celere” | |||
| 09AUG46 | Neo-Fascist Activity: Arrest of GASPARINI, GRASSI, TORREGIANI | |||
| 09AUG46 | TOP SECRET: Communist Party Funds | |||
| 09AUG46 | USSR Citizens in Italy | |||
| 11AUG46 | Information on STEFANOVICH, Radmila | |||
| 12AUG46 | French Intelligence Agents | |||
| 12AUG46 | PCI and OZNA activity in Trieste | |||
| 19AUG46 | USSR Internal Situation: Marshal ZUKHOW | |||
| 20AUG46 | Recovery of MUSSOLINI’s Corpse | |||
| 20AUG46 | Departure of Colonel George S. Smith, G.S.C., A.C. of S., G-2 | |||
| 21AUG46 | Communist Party Activity | |||
| 22AUG46 | French Intelligence Activity | |||
| 22AUG46 | Location of Jugoslav Headquarters in Zone “B” | |||
| 22AUG46 | Italian Air Force Personnel: Recruitment in Jugoslav Air Force | |||
| 23AUG46 | Commercial Transactions in Italy: MARCONI, ERICSSON, PHILLIPS | |||
| 23AUG46 | “LES AMIS DE LA LIBERTÉ” Political Association | |||
| 23AUG46 | Summary of Information: Giacomo PELLEGRINI, PCI | |||
| 25AUG46 | PCI and PSI Collaboration | |||
| 27AUG46 | Discovery of Uranium Deposits in France | |||
| 27AUG46 | Italian Air Force Personnel: Recruitment in Yugoslav Air Force | |||
| 27AUG46 | Bomb-Throwing Incident Against the “CASA del Popolo” at Lambrate | |||
| 30AUG46 | Claims Against the U.S.: Investigation in Zone 3 | |||
| 30AUG46 | Further Information on STEFANOVICH, Radmila | |||
| 01SEP46 | Threatening Note to CIC | |||
| 06SEP46 | Identification of Communist Propaganda Agents | |||
| 06SEP46 | Present Location of Alessandro POLACCI, Luigi DE PACE | |||
| 06SEP46 | USSR – Activity of Soviet Agents in Milan | |||
| 10SEP46 | Jugoslav Documents | |||
| 13SEP46 | Italian Air Force Personnel: Recruitment for Jugoslav Air Force | |||
| 23SEP46 | TRASMISSIONE – di una tabella dei convenzionali | |||
| 27SEP46 | Suspected OZNA Agents | |||
| 27SEP46 | Mario MONTAGNA, PCI Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Chief | |||
| 27SEP46 | Newspaper circulation in Milan for August 1946 | |||
| 27SEP46 | Counter Intelligence Activity in Switzerland | |||
| 27SEP46 | Jugoslav Commercial Activity | |||
| 27SEP46 | Italian Anarchist Federation | |||
| 27SEP46 | “BALLI KOMBETARE” (National Front) Albanian Refugee Movement | |||
| 27SEP46 | Jugoslav and OZNA Activity in Italy | |||
| 27SEP46 | Betty WIESER Marriage Check | |||
| 01OCT46 | Uranium Deposits in France: Confirmation from Switzerland | |||
| 04OCT46 | Summary of Information: Albania | |||
| 05OCT46 | Investigation: URBANC, Peter | |||
| 07OCT46 | Facilitate Travel by Confidential Informant VASIC, Zakorka | |||
| 08OCT46 | Jugoslav Commercial Activity | |||
| 08OCT46 | Meeting of Two Leaders of Serbian Agrarian Party | |||
| 08OCT46 | Russian Intelligence Activity | |||
| 11OCT46 | Rumors of Jugoslav Annexation of Albania | |||
| 11OCT46 | Activity of Macek (Matchek) | |||
| 11OCT46 | Summary of Information: “Les Amis de la Liberté” | |||
| 11OCT46 | Suspected OZNA Agents in Venezia Giulia | |||
| 11OCT46 | Macek Supporters in Italy | |||
| 11OCT46 | Croat Communist Party | |||
| 14OCT46 | Royal Jugoslav Soldiers in Milan | |||
| 15OCT46 | Investigation: Polish Consular Personnel in Milan | |||
| 17OCT46 | Indian Communists in Milan | |||
| 17OCT46 | Summary of Information: Leo BERKOVIC, alias Josef LEVINSKI | |||
| 18OCT46 | “Intraco” – Jugoslav Commercial Activity | |||
| 18OCT46 | Bank Account of Russian Embassy | |||
| 18OCT46 | Summary of Information: Piero PURICELLI | |||
| 18OCT46 | Summary of Information: Vittorio SHENIZA | |||
| 18OCT46 | Summary of Information: Raoul BRETZEL | |||
| 18OCT46 | Communist Agents’ Activity | |||
| 18OCT46 | Jugoslav Activity in Venezia Julia | |||
| 18OCT46 | Summary of Information: Jugoslavia | |||
| 19OCT46 | Italo-British Conversations on Commercial Problems | |||
| 19OCT46 | Anglo-Swiss Textile industries | |||
| 21OCT46 | Wage Settlement for Industrial Workers | |||
| 21OCT46 | Commercial Agreements between Fiat and Kaiser-Frazer | |||
| 21OCT46 | Italian Industry – Data on Industrial Production, September 1946 | |||
| 22OCT46 | Electric Power Industries – Increased Costs and Prices | |||
| 05NOV46 | Explosion at the “Casa del Popolo” Porta Genova, Milan, 9 October | |||
| 05NOV46 | Further Investigation: Yugoslav Commercial Activity | |||
| 05NOV46 | OZNA Activity | |||
| 12NOV46 | Summary of Information: Guglielmo Giannini | |||
| 12NOV46 | Summary of Information: “Dynamopress” | |||
| 12NOV46 | Summary of Information: GAUN (fnu) | |||
| 19NOV46 | Suspected OZNA Agents in Venezia Giulia | |||
| 21NOV46 | Investigation: OSTALER, Maria | |||
| 21NOV46 | Summary of Information: TOLENTINO (fnu) | |||
| 21NOV46 | Summary of Information: Momcilo DJUJIC | |||
| 21NOV46 | Summary of Information: Odette Jacqueret MARINKOVIC | |||
| 21NOV46 | Investigation: John J. GIARRATANO, ASN 0671340 | |||
| 23NOV46 | Yugoslav Commercial Activity | |||
| 23NOV46 | Suspected Agents and Informants in the Venezia Giulia | |||
| 29NOV46 | Resistance Movement in Yugoslavia | |||
| 29NOV46 | Communist Activity in Trieste and Venezia Giulia | |||
| 29NOV49 | Summary of Information: Zarko, STREKELJ – MILIC | |||
| 29NOV46 | Yugoslav Military Activity in Zone “B” | |||
| 29NOV46 | Communist Party Arms Cache | |||
| 29NOV46 | Royal Yugoslav Propaganda Leaflets in Zone “B” of Venezia Giulia | |||
| 30NOV46 | Communist-Jewish Activity | |||
| 02DEC46 | Czechoslovakian Consulate, Milan | |||
| 02DEC46 | Activities of the USSR Consulate General in Milan | |||
| 02DEC46 | Alleged meeting with Soviets DI VITTORIO, ALBERGANTI, NICOLA | |||
| 02DEC46 | Summary of Information: Gasparini, Sindace of Legnano | |||
| 02DEC46 | Social-Communist Collaboration | |||
| 06DEC46 | Investigation: “DYNAMOPRESS” | |||
| 09DEC46 | OZNA Suspect: Pubo NENADIC | |||
| 09DEC46 | Yugoslav Commercial Activity | |||
| 17DEC46 | Investigation: Attempted Anti-Allied Provocation | |||
| 17DEC46 | OZNA Suspects in the Venezia Giulia | |||
| 27DEC46 | Arrest of Subject: Haimza MELAMED (alias ZIVOJIN MELAMED) | |||
| 28DEC46 | Excerpt Article on CIC and SS Col. Eugen DOLLMANN (in Italian) | |||
| 31DEC46 | General Situation Report | |||
| 1947 | ||||
| 04JAN47 | Investigation: Dottore GERINO, Giancarlo | |||
| 07JAN47 | Yugoslav Army Activity in Fiume Area | |||
| 10JAN47 | Possiblity of Strike among Textile Workers | |||
| 10JAN47 | Strengthening of Swiss Army: New Border Fortifications | |||
| 10JAN47 | “Partisan Day of Solidarity” | |||
| 13JAN47 | Organization of the “B.M” Squads (Brigate Milano) | |||
| 16JAN47 | Summary of Information: LUZZATO, Giancarlo, alias “SCORPIONE” | |||
| 28JAN47 | OZNA Personalities in Milan, Italy | |||
| 28JAN47 | Organization of “B.M” Squads (Brigate Milano) | |||
| 31JAN47 | General Situation Report | |||
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Nach Informationen aus dem Umkreis der NSA werden nunmehr wohl alle deutschen Putin-Unterstuetzer erfasst und beleuchtet.
Anlass ist das Wirken von Ex-Kanzler Gerhard Schroeder fuer Putin und die Mueller Untersuchung der Russland Kontakte von Trump.
Putin war selbst in der DDR lange Jahre taetig
Hierzu zaehlen die Linke, alle dieser Gruppierung zuzuordnenden Unternehmen, alle ehemaligen KGB- und STASI-Agenten und STASI-IM und deren Unternehmen und Beteiligungsgesellschaften.
Hinzu kommen deren Kunden, Finanziers und Sponsoren.
Dies betrift wohl insbesondere “Neues Deutschland”, und “GoMoPa”, als auch die mutmasslich unterwanderten “Das Investment” und “Immobilien Zeitung” sowie “Die Bewertung” berichten die Washington-Insider, die auch von verstaerkten militaerischen Konflikten weltweit ausgehen.
Deutschland als wichtiges NATO-Land neben den USA und mit der DDR-Historie gilt als besonders wichtig und kritisch fuer die NSA-Analysen.
Die betroffenen Unternehmen und Personen muessen mit Sanktionen und internationalen FBI-Haftbefehlen wie im Fall der FIFA fuer die mutmasslich korrupte WM-Vergabe an Putins Russland rechnen, die auch in der Schweiz vollstreckt wurden.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Date: August 2017
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center
File Type: pdf
File Size: 1,822,386 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):EE5714F0ABC8D7898E1CA34E9540C09EE39B05088C0AE7BA00E1057EDF35011A
The report describes characteristics of 209 Americans who committed espionage-related offenses against the U.S. since 1947. Three cohorts are compared based on when the individual began espionage: 1947-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-2015. Using data coded from open published sources, analyses are reported on personal attributes of persons across the three cohorts, the employment and levels of clearance, how they committed espionage, the consequences they suffered, and their motivations. The second part of the report explores each of the five types of espionage committed by the 209 persons under study. These include: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. The statutes governing each type are discussed and compared. Classification of national security information is discussed as one element in espionage. In Part 3, revisions to the espionage statutes are recommended in light of findings presented in the report.
…
This report is the fourth in the series on espionage by Americans that the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) began publishing in 1992. The current report updates earlier work by including recent cases, and it extends the scope by exploring related types of espionage in addition to the classic type. There are three parts to this report. Part 1 presents characteristics of Americans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1947 based on analyses of data collected from open sources. Part 2 explores the five types of espionage committed by the 209 individuals in this study: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. Each type is described by its legal bases, and examples of cases and comparisons with the other types of espionage are provided. Part 3 considers the impact of the changing context in which espionage takes place, and discusses two important developments: information and communications technologies (ICT) and globalization. Recommendations are offered for revisions to the espionage statutes in response to these accelerating changes in context.
Part 1 compares data across three cohorts of persons based on when the individual began espionage: 1947-1979 (the early Cold War), 1980-1989 (the later Cold War), and 1990-2015 (the post-Soviet period). As the Cold War recedes in time, the recent cohort offers the most applicable data for the present. Among the characteristics of the 67 Americans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1990:
•They have usually been male and middle-aged. Half were married.
•Reflecting changes in the population as a whole, they were more diverse inracial and ethnic composition, and more highly educated than earlier cohorts.
•Three-quarters have been civil servants, one-quarter military, and compared tothe previous two cohorts, increasing proportions have been contractors, heldjobs not related to espionage, and/or not held security clearances.
•Three-quarters succeeded in passing information, while one-quarter wereintercepted before they could pass anything.
•Sixty percent were volunteers and 40% were recruited. Among recruits, 60%were recruited by a foreign intelligence service and 40% by family or friends.Contacting a foreign embassy was the most common way to begin as avolunteer.
•Compared to earlier cohorts in which the Soviet Union and Russiapredominated as the recipient of American espionage, recent espionageoffenders have transmitted information to a greater variety of recipients.
•Shorter prison sentences have been the norm in the recent past.
•Sixty-eight percent of people received no payment.
•Money is the most common motive for committing espionage-related offenses,but it is less dominant than in the past. In the recent cohort, money was amotive for 28%, down from 41% and 45% in the first and second cohorts,respectively. Divided loyalties is the second most common motive (22%).Disgruntlement and ingratiation are nearly tied for third place, and more peopleseek recognition as a motive for espionage.
Returning to the full population, the majority of the 209 individuals committed classic espionage in which controlled national security information, usually classified, was transmitted to a foreign government. Classic espionage predominates in each cohort, but declined from 94% the first cohort to 78% in the most recent. This reflects authorities’ recent increasing treatment as espionage of the four additional types discussed in Part 2: leaks; acting as an agent of a foreign government; violations of export control laws; and economic espionage. Each of the four additional types is prosecuted under its own subset of statutes, which differs from those used in cases of classic espionage. The various types are usually handled by different federal agencies. They also differ in how involved the information of private companies and corporations is alongside government agencies.
The five types of espionage are not mutually exclusive, and a person may be charged with and convicted of more than one type. The assumption that espionage consists simply of classic espionage should be reexamined in light of how these four additional crimes are similar to or even charged as identical to classic espionage. All five types impose losses of national defense information, intellectual property, and/or advanced technologies that cause grave damage to the security and economy of the nation.
Four elements frame the analyses in Part 2. First, the legal statutes that define the crimes are identified and described. Prosecutorial choices as to which statutes to use are considered, alternate statutes that have been used in similar circumstances are identified, and reasons for the choices suggested. Second, examples of each type of espionage are presented as case studies. Third, issues resulting from classification of information are identified and discussed for each type, if applicable. Fourth, the numbers of individuals among the 209 are presented in tables for each of the five types, along with descriptive statistics to identify trends over time.
Part 3 discusses these trends by recognizing two central dimensions of the current context in which espionage occurs: ICT and globalization. Spies have moved with the times, and they employ all the technological sophistication and advantages they can access. Implications from this changing context are discussed, including how American espionage offenders gather, store, and transmit intelligence to a foreign government, and how a foreign government may now steal controlled information directly across interconnected networks, threatening to make spies obsolete.
Globalization affects many dimensions of life, and is especially apparent in areas relevant to espionage, such as political and military affairs, development of defense technologies, and international finance. It can influence the recruitment of spies and the likelihood that people will volunteer to commit espionage as a consequence of the ongoing trend toward a global culture, with its easy international transmission of ideas, civic ideals, and loosening allegiances of citizenship.
This report concludes by recommending revisions to the espionage statutes (Title 18 U.S.C. § 792 through 798) in order to address inconsistencies and ambiguities. Based on provisions enacted in 1917 and updated in last 1950, they are outdated. Three approaches to revision are outlined. First, try to eliminate inconsistencies among the espionage statutes themselves. Second, consider how to update the espionage statutes to reflect the current context of cyber capabilities, the Internet, and globalization. Third, consider how to amend the statutes that apply to all five types of espionage discussed in this report to reconcile inequities, eliminate gaps or overlaps, and create more consistency in the legal response to activities that are similar, even though they take place in different spheres.
In an appendix, this report examines how espionage fits into the broader study of insider threat, and considers three insights from insider threat studies that may illuminate espionage: personal crises and triggers, indicators of insider threat, and the role of organizational culture.
…
LEAKS AS A TYPE OF ESPIONAGE
Leaks are disclosures of classified information to the public. They are usually accomplished through the press or by publication in print or electronic media. A leak follows the form of classic espionage except that the recipient is different. Instead of being given to an agent of a foreign power or transnational adversary, leaks go out to the American public. Then, through modern communication channels, the information is transmitted around the world as it is re-published, translated, and discussed in additional press coverage. Both the content of the information and the fact that it is no longer under the government’s control are made available to everyone, including adversaries who systematically monitor the American press for insights.
…
…
The seven leakers discussed here were diverse. They ranged in age from 22 to 52 years of age: one person was 22, four persons were in their middle years (their 30s or 40s), and two persons were in their early 50s. They worked in various agencies: two were members of the military (U.S. Navy and U.S. Army); two were civilian federal employees, current or former (OSD and CIA); and three were contractors (two to the FBI, and one to DoS). They had reached different stages in their careers, from an Army Private First Class to people at mid-career to a respected senior defense policy specialist. Three common motives run through the seven cases.
•The leakers strongly objected to something they saw being done in the course oftheir work. Franklin, Diaz, Leibowitz, Kiriakou, and Manning each objected to government policies or actions that they observed, and they chose to intervene,usually by making their objections public by releasing classified information.
•The leakers enjoyed playing the role of expert. Franklin, Leibowitz, Kim, Kiriakou, and Sachtleben each sought out or responded to opportunities to share their expertise.
•The leakers wanted to help and saw themselves as helping. Diaz, Kim, and Manning, were, in their view, trying to help people they had befriended or with whom they sympathized.
To illustrate how leaks are a form of espionage in most ways, but not in every way, the elements of classic espionage discussed earlier are here applied to the actions of Franklin based on details are from his superseding indictment (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 2005).
•A context of competition. Franklin’s job was to monitor the hostile international relationship between the U.S. and Iran after its 1979 revolution. After 9/11, a debate simmered in Franklin’s agency over preparations for the invasion of Iraq.
•Secret means. Franklin verbally conveyed highly classified information to recipients in meetings held in places where they were less likely to be observed.
•Goal is secrets. Rosen and Weissman sought out a well-placed contact in OSD who could provide them with information. Rosen is quoted as saying on the telephone “that he was excited to meet with a ‘Pentagon guy’ [Franklin] because this person was a ‘real insider.’”
•Political, military, economic secrets. The classified information Franklin leaked to Rosen and Weissman included CIA internal reports on Middle Eastern countries, internal deliberations by federal officials, policy documents, and national intelligence concerning Al Qaeda and Iraq.
•Theft. Franklin was not accused of passing stolen documents to the recipients,only verbal information based on them. He was accused of stealing and taking home classified documents.
•Subterfuge and surveillance. Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman held their meetings at various restaurants, coffee shops, sports facilities, baseball games,and landmarks in the Washington, DC, area. In one instance, they met at Union Station, and conducted their conversations at three different restaurants.
•Illegality. Franklin was convicted of Title 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (e).
•Psychological toll. In July 2004, after the FBI explained the evidence and the likely consequences of a prison term on his family, Franklin took the FBI’s bargain for leniency and wore a wire during subsequent conversations with Rosen and Weissman.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The following is a draft report from Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Intelligence that was obtained and published by Foreign Policy.
(U//FOUO/LES) CBP’s Office of Intelligence produced this document by request from CBP’s Commissioner on 19 December. This product examines 29 perpetrators of 25 terrorist incidents in the United States from October 2001 through December 2017 whom CBP/OI assesses were driven by radical Sunni Islamist militancy.1 This assessment covers the demographic profile of the perpetrators, consisting of age, citizenship, gender, immigration status, national origin, international travel and religious background. This assessment is intended to inform United States foreign visitor screening, immigrant vetting and on-going evaluations of United States-based individuals who might have a higher risk of becoming radicalized and conducting a violent attack. This information is cut-off as of 22 January 2018.
(U) Source Summary
(U//FOUO) We place moderate confidence on assessments discussed herein due to our reliance on information derived primarily from analysis of law enforcement databases, independent think tank studies, scholastic publications, and United States press reporting. We lack specific details on the perpetrators path to radicalization that would have contributed a higher confidence in our assessment.
(U) Key Findings
(U//FOUO/LES) The national origins of all but six of the perpetrators traced to the Middle East, South Asia or Africa, possibly reflecting the long-term difficulty for some Muslim immigrants to integrate into United States society.
(U//FOUO/LES) Most perpetrators resided in the United States for a significant period of time, signaling the need for recurrent screening and vetting over a long period of time.
(U//FOUO/LES) The presence of all of the perpetrators in the United States was lawful, highlighting that illegal immigration was not a factor in these cases.
(U//FOUO/LES) Despite the prominent role Muslim converts have played in radical Islamist terrorist incidents occurring in the West, only six of the perpetrators converted to Islam.
(U) Gender
(U//FOUO/LES) Males were involved in all of the attacks highlighted in the assessment, despite growing concerns, such as assessments by the Combatting Counterterrorism Center at West Point, regarding the increasingly prominent, and sometimes operational, role women play in radical Islamist militant circles, including their use by the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS).(2) There was only one incident, where a female, the wife of the male perpetrator, was also involved in carrying out the attack.
(U) Ages
(U//FOUO/LES) Case studies over the past few years conducted by both federal and private entities yielded similar age-ranges after reviewing various comparable subsets of individuals. Our study found the average age of the 29 perpetrators was 28 years, ranging from 17 to 49 years of age at the time they were arrested or killed. The average age of perpetrators who conducted attacks in North America and Europe following ISIS’ declaration of its self-proclaimed caliphate in June 2014 was a similar 27.3 years old, according to independent think tank findings.(3) According to one scholastic publication, the average age of United States individuals arrested due to their associations with ISIS was 26. (3) We assess that 14 out of the 15 individuals born outside the United States spent approximately 10 years in the United States prior to their attacks; the remaining foreign born perpetrator was a Canadian resident visiting the United States.
(U) National Origins
(U//FOUO/LES) The national origins of all but six of the perpetrators traced to the Middle East, South Asia or Africa, likely reflecting the long-term difficulty for some Muslim immigrants to integrate into U.S. society. Just over half of the perpetrators were born outside the United States and over four-fifths (86%) of those immigrated as a minor or resided for a significant period of time (approximately 10 years) in the United States, indicating that the radicalization of these individuals likely occurred after immigrating. The remaining perpetrators born outside the United States resided in the country for two years or less, suggesting that they could have arrived in the United States already radicalized. The presence of all of the foreign-born perpetrators in the United States was lawful, highlighting that illegal immigration was not a factor in these cases and that possibly some militants are heeding calls by ISIS and AQ to take up arms in their Western countries of residence as opposed to traveling abroad to participate in foreign conflicts.
• (U//FOUO/LES) Eight of the 14 U.S.-born perpetrators are first-generation descendants of South Asian, Middle Eastern or African immigrants. Of the six other U.S.-born perpetrators, five are of African-American heritage and one is Caucasian.
• (U//FOUO/LES) Among the 14 foreign-born perpetrators who immigrated to the United States, 4 entered the United States before they reached 10 years of age; another 5 perpetrators were between 13 and 17 years of age when they migrated. Four perpetrators migrated to the United States after the age of 18 and were residents for approximately 7 years. Only one perpetrator over 18 years old had been in the United States for a year or less.
(U//FOUO/LES) Fourteen of the foreign-born perpetrators were lawful permanent residents (LPR)2 of the United States and one was a lawful resident of Canada visiting the United States under a U.S.-Canada Trusted Traveler Program. Of the fourteen foreign-born individuals who were residents of the United States, 7 acquired permanent residency in the United States and 7 were naturalized citizens.
(U) Immigration Channel
(U//FOUO/LES) Of the 14 U.S. LPRs, five immigrated to the country as children of asylees; two were refugees; two acquired diversity immigrant visas, one was the child of a U.S. citizen; one was the spouse of a U.S. citizen; one was the child of an alien family member of a U.S. citizen; one was the child of an alien with an advanced professional degree; and one immigrated on a fiancé visa.
(U) International Travel
(U//FOUO/LES) Nine of the perpetrators traveled outside of the United States, within one to two years of the incident, to countries in the Middle East, South Asia or Europe, suggesting the travel may have played a role in their path to radicalization. Four individuals traveled to the Middle East or South Asia within three to four years of their attacks. Five out of the 14 U.S.-born perpetrators traveled to the Middle East or South Asia within 4 years or less of the incidents.
(U) Religious Conversion
(U//FOUO/LES) We assess that only six of the perpetrators-or about 20 percent converted to Islam, which is in line with a 2017 independent think tank that found 23-percent of United States Muslims are converts (4)- despite the prominent role Muslim converts have played in radical Islamist terrorist incidents occurring in the West, according to a body of academic, media and anecdotal reporting. (5) (6) (7)
(U) Outlook
(U//FOUO/LES) CBP/OI assesses that the factors contributing to an individual’s decision to perpetrate an act of terrorism reflect a highly personalized set of circumstances. The cohort of perpetrators represents migrants to the United States, U.S.-born citizens, including six converts to Islam with backgrounds that are comparable to other Sunni Islamist extremist cohorts. Demographic factors such as age, national origin, length of residence, immigration status or travel history can inform evaluations, but are not determinative, when assessing an individual’s susceptibility to violent extremism. While the sense of perceived marginalization of some Muslim immigrants may represent an important factor in the radicalization process, we assess with low confidence that the motivations of at least some of the perpetrators centered on their failure to assimilate in United States society.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
Page Count: 53 pages
Date: October 2015
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration
File Type: pdf
File Size: 2,690,302 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):345786D6CBC1D7FFEA6FC3D4854FFEE7EF825AFBF92F765C5123221FCF5D20A3
The Korean peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the US in the Pacific Command (PACOM), and many observers note that North Korea is an unpredictable and potentially volatile actor. According to the Department of Defense in its report to Congress and the intelligence community, the DPRK “remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” Some of the latest evidence of irrational behavior is the elevation of Kim Jong Un’s 26-year old sister to a high governmental post late in 2014, the computer hacking of the Sony Corporation supposedly by North Korea during late 2014 over the possible release of a film that mocked Kim Jong Un, and the April 2015 execution of a defense chief for allegedly nodding off during a meeting. Over the past 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its enemies, especially South Korea. These actions included attacks on South Korean naval vessels, the capturing of a US ship and holding American hostages for 11 months, the hijacking of a South Korean airline jet, electronic warfare against South Korean signals including global positioning satellites (GPS), and assassinations or attempted assassinations on South Korean officials including the ROK president. The attempted 1968 Blue House Raid by North Korean elite military personnel resulted in the death or capture of all 31 infiltrators involved in the assassination attempt as well as the death of 71 personnel, including three Americans, and the injury of 66 others as the North Korean SPF personnel attempted to escape back to DPRK territory.
The purpose of this North Korean Threat Tactics Report (TTR) is to explain to the Army training community how North Korea fights including its doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, and the warfighting functions. A TTR also identifies where the conditions specific to the actor are present in Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues.
Executive Summary
…
Weaknesses
Although the North Korean military may feature some positive attributes as a fighting force, the KPA also suffers from many weaknesses as well. Much of the military’s equipment is old and obsolete. The North Korean military consciously refuses to rid itself of any equipment and still operate tanks that date back to World War II. This wide range of military hardware from many generations of warfare also generates logistical issues. The KPA’s supply personnel must not only find the spare parts for a large variety of equipment, the KPA maintenance personnel must be well-versed in the repair of a great assortment of vehicles and weapons. In addition, the DPRK lacks the logistical capability to support the KPA beyond a few months. Due to the shortage of fuel and the cost to operate vehicles for a cash-strapped country, many of the KPA soldiers find themselves involved in public works projects or helping farmers bring in their rice crops. Any time spent in non-military support is less time that the KPA soldiers can spend training for combat. Even the mechanized and armor forces, due to resource restraints, spend much of their training time doing light infantry training instead of mounted operations. While KPA soldiers may be well trained in individual skills or small unit tactics, the amount of time spent on larger exercises pales in comparison to most Western militaries. Without adequate time and resources to practice large scale military operations, the KPA will always face a steep learning curve when the KPA is forced to perform them in actual combat for the first time.
…
…
The DPRK’s unorthodox use of provocation in order to obtain concessions from its enemies—especially the US, South Korea, and Japan—is a danger. One never knows what North Korea will do next as, in the past, the DPRK has sanctioned assassination attempts on South Korean political leaders and conducted bombings when South Korean contingents are in another country, unannounced attacks on ships by submarines, unprovoked artillery attacks, or has tunneled underground into another country. US military personnel stationed in South Korea must be prepared for the unexpected from the DPRK.
One of these incidents could ignite the Korean peninsula back into a full-blown war. While an armistice has been in place since 1953, an armistice is just a ceasefire waiting for a peace treaty to be signed or for the resumption of hostilities. Any conflict between North and South Korea would inevitably bring the US into the conflict as the ROK has been an ally for over six decades.
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and the missiles to transport it up to 9,650 km makes it a threat to US forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Alaska, or even the west coast of the continental United States. Even more concerning was the DPRK’s first successful test launch of a KN-11 missile from a submarine on 23 January 2015 since, in the near future, the North Korean submarines could silently move closer to their targets before launching a nuclear missile that would give the US less warning time. If the DPRK thought that the survival of its country or the Kim regime was at stake, North Korea might use any nuclear weapons at its disposal. The KPA also possesses chemical weapons and its doctrine calls for their employment. The DPRK is also involved in biological weapons research and would likely use those with offensive capabilities. US military personnel training for deployment to South Korea must be prepared to fight in a chemical, biological, or nuclear environment.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
US Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)
Moroccan Travel Control Detachment – Arbaoua Section
French MoroccoCIC Agent Reports JANUARY – OCTOBER 1944
6JAN44THE CIC FUNCTION IN TRAVEL CONTROL
23APR44Request for Aerial Survey along the Border
10MAY44Anti-Allied Sentiments
13MAY44Escaped Italian Prisoners of War
14MAY44Spanish Deserters
16MAY44French Deserter
30MAY44Clandestine Crossing of Frontier: Alleged French Agent
30MAY44Lack of Tires, B.S.T, B.S.M., Souk el Arba
7JUN44Spanish Deserters
7JUN44Spanish Fishing Boats off Moulay Bou Selham
7JUN44Illegal crossing of the frontier
20JUN44Ouezzane Espionage Ring
22JUN44Radio Sonde Transmitting Equipment Found
25JUN44Closing of Moulay Bou Selhem to Vacationists
9JUL44Frontier Guard System: Relaxation Frontier Controls
17JUL44Expected Parachute Landings: Capture Parachutists Algeria
17JUL44General Giraud Clandestine Crossing into Spanish Morocco
20JUL44Expulsion from Spanish Morocco
20JUL44Spanish Deserter
22JUL44Presence of ex-Collaborationists in Frontier Zone
24JUL44Re-establishment Strict Control Vicinity Souk el Arba
24JUL44Contraband Horses Destined for German Army in France
2AUG44Contraband Horses: Correction
2AUG44Anti-Allied Propaganda
5SEP44Arrest of Suspected German Agent
5SEP44Arrest of Suspected SRA Courrier
10OCT44Attempted Crossing of American Naval Officer
17OCT44Renewed Attempt to Cross the Frontier
13OCT44Documents by Spanish Information Service (OSS)
20OCT44GENERAL SITUATION REPORT: RELATING TO FRONTIER ZONE
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
On October 1, 2017, over 22,000 people came together to enjoy a country music festival in Las Vegas, Nevada. On the third and final night of the festival, a lone gunman opened fire into the crowd from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino. The gunfire continued for over ten minutes, resulting in the deaths of 58 innocent concert goers and injuring more than 700. With law enforcement closing in, the suspect took his own life.
It is not standard practice for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) to issue an investigative overview related to an open case. Due to the magnitude of this investigative response and the number of victims associated with this incident, Sheriff Joseph Lombardo felt it was important to author an overview of all investigative work accomplished in the aftermath of 1 October. This report is not intended to be a comprehensive and final account of the facts and evidence gathered but rather an overview of the investigation. The investigation into this incident is on-going and a full comprehensive report will be released upon its completion.
This report will reflect the number and identities of victims known to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department to date. This information is vital in order to grant assistance, properly categorize the level of crime and most importantly, honor those who fell prey to this horrific act of violence.
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department would like to recognize and thank all our local, state and federal law enforcement partners for their assistance with this investigation.
…
Incident
On October 1, 2017, at approximately 2118 hours, Mandalay Bay Security Officer Jesus Campos was assigned to check several Hotel Service Optimization System (HotSOS)1 alarms from various rooms inside the hotel. Room 32-129 was the last of the rooms Security Officer Campos was assigned to check.
Security Officer Campos was on the 30th floor and responded to the 32nd floor via the stairwell in the north end of the 100 wing. Security Officer Campos attempted to enter the hallway to the 100 wing but the door would not open. He took the stairs to the 33rd floor and used the guest elevator to access the 32nd floor. Once on the 32nd floor, Security Officer Campos entered the foyer leading to the stairwell. He discovered an “L” bracket screwed into the door and door frame which prevented it from opening. Security Officer Campos called his dispatch center with the house phone located in the foyer to report the discovery. The security dispatch center then called the engineering section to have the door checked.
Security Officer Campos heard what he described as a rapid drilling sound coming from room 32-135 after he hung up the phone. As he walked down the 100 wing hallway, Campos heard what he described as automatic gunfire coming from the area of room 32-135 and realized he had been shot in the left calf. He took cover in the alcove of rooms 32-122 and 32-124 and utilized both his cellular phone and radio to notify his dispatch he was shot. Security Officer Campos advised he was shot with a BB or pellet gun. While waiting for other security personnel to arrive Security Officer Campos continued to hear gunfire coming from the room.
Engineer Stephen Schuck finished fixing a leak in room 62-207 when he was directed to respond to the 32nd floor reference the bracket preventing the stairwell door from opening. Engineer Schuck used the service elevator in the 200 wing to access the 32nd floor. When he arrived on the 32nd floor, he gathered his tools and equipment and walked from the 200 wing to the 100 wing.
As Engineer Schuck walked up the hallway of the 100 wing, he observed Security Officer Campos poke his head out of an alcove. Engineer Schuck then heard rapid gunfire coming from the end of the 100 hallway which lasted approximately 10 seconds. When the gunfire stopped, he heard Security Officer Campos tell him to take cover. Engineer Schuck stepped into an alcove and gunfire again erupted down the hallway coming from room 32-135. The gunfire lasted a few seconds then stopped. The gunfire started again after a brief pause but Engineer Schuck believed it was directed outside and not down the hallway.
Inside the Las Vegas Village over fifty LVMPD personnel were on overtime assignments for the Route 91 Harvest Festival. The initial gunshots were heard on an officer’s Body Worn Camera (BWC). Officers and concertgoers initially believed the gunfire to be fireworks. As Paddock targeted the concertgoers with gunfire, officers quickly determined they were dealing with an active shooter and broadcast the information over the radio.
The crowd inside the Las Vegas Village started reacting to the gunfire and Jason Aldean ran off the stage. Officers and concertgoers began treating victims who were struck by gunfire. They also tried to get concertgoers out of the venue in a safe manner. Officers determined the gunfire was coming from an elevated position, possibly from the Mandalay Bay Hotel. Medical personnel were requested for multiple people struck by gunfire.
As the active shooter incident was occurring, two LVMPD officers were in the security office of the Mandalay Bay handling a call for service reference two females who were in custody for trespassing. The officers heard the radio broadcast of gunfire at the Route 91 Harvest Festival. Both officers, along with security personnel, exited the security office and responded towards the Las Vegas Village. As they were making their way through the casino, security personnel advised the officers of an active shooter on the 32nd floor of the hotel. The officers then directed security to escort them to that location. The officers and security personnel entered the Center Core guest elevators and were again advised the shooter was on the 32nd floor. The officers made a tactical deciscion to respond to the 31st floor and take the stairwell to the 32nd floor.
LVMPD officers converged on the Las Vegas Village and Mandalay Bay. Officers formed multiple Strike Teams and entered the Mandalay Bay from various entrance points. A team of officers including a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operator reached the 32nd floor via the stairwell in the 100 wing. Officers did not hear gunfire coming from room 32-135. Officers were able to manually breach the “L” bracket on the stairwell door and gain access to the hallway. Officers immediately observed a food service cart which had wires running from it to room 32-134 and prepared themselves for the possibility of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The decision was made to use an explosive breach to make entry into room 32-135.
After a successful breach of the doors to room 32-135, officers entered the room and found Paddock deceased on the floor. Paddock appeared to have a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. Officers cleared the remainder of the room and observed multiple rifles in various locations throughout the room as well as hundreds of expended casings. A second explosive breach was utilized to gain access to room 32-134 through the connecting doors. Immediately after the breach a SWAT officer negligently discharged his rifle. Officers cleared room 32-134 finding several rifles in the room.
Officers, medical personnel, and concertgoers continued the evacuation of victims in the Las Vegas Village venue. Several triage sites were established in the venue and surrounding area. Injuries ranged from being minor in nature to fatal. Hundreds of wounded were transported to area hospitals by ambulance and privately owned citizen vehicles.
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
This document describes the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for departments and agencies of the United States Government (USG) to balance equities and make determinations regarding disclosure or restriction when the USG obtains knowledge of newly discovered and not publicly known vulnerabilities in information systems and technologies. The primary focus of this policy is to prioritize the public’s interest in cybersecurity and to protect core Internet infrastructure, information systems, critical infrastructure systems, and the U.S. economy through the disclosure of vulnerabilities discovered by the USG, absent a demonstrable, overriding interest in the use of the vulnerability for lawful intelligence, law enforcement, or national security purposes.
The Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) balances whether to disseminate vulnerability information to the vendor/supplier in the expectation that it will be patched, or to temporarily restrict the knowledge of the vulnerability to the USG, and potentially other partners, so that it can be used for national security and law enforcement purposes, such as intelligence collection, military operations, and/or counterintelligence. The U.S. Government’s determination as to whether to disseminate or restrict a vulnerability is only one element of the vulnerability equities evaluation process and is not always a binary determination. Other options that can be considered include disseminating mitigation information to certain entities without disclosing the particular vulnerability, limiting use of the vulnerability by the USG in some way, informing U.S. and allied government entities of the vulnerability at a classified level, and using indirect means to inform the vendor of the vulnerability. All of these determinations must be informed by the understanding of risks of dissemination, the potential benefits of government use of the vulnerabilities, and the risks and benefits of all options in between. This document defines the policy and process for evaluating competing considerations to inform U.S. Government decisions.
…
4.1. Equities Review Board and VEP Director
The Equities Review Board (ERB) is the primary forum for interagency deliberation and determinations concerning the VEP. The ERB will meet monthly, but may also be convened sooner if an immediate need arises.
The ERB will consist of representatives from the following agencies who are authorized to represent the views of their respective agency head:
Other USG agencies may participate when demonstrating responsibility for, or identifying equity in, a vulnerability under deliberation. Changes to the name of an agency will not affect its participation in this process.
Each agency participating in the VEP will designate an agency point of contact (POC) to act as the focal point for vulnerability submissions for their respective organization and the primary contact for the VEP Executive Secretariat.
The VEP POC will ensure one or more Subject Matter Experts (SME) from their agency are identified to support equities determinations and discussions as needed.
The VEP Director at the NSC will be responsible for ensuring effective implementation of VEP policies. The VEP Director is the Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity Coordinator, or an equivalent successor.
…
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
The Korean peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the US in the Pacific Command (PACOM), and many observers note that North Korea is an unpredictable and potentially volatile actor. According to the Department of Defense in its report to Congress and the intelligence community, the DPRK “remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” Some of the latest evidence of irrational behavior is the elevation of Kim Jong Un’s 26-year old sister to a high governmental post late in 2014, the computer hacking of the Sony Corporation supposedly by North Korea during late 2014 over the possible release of a film that mocked Kim Jong Un, and the April 2015 execution of a defense chief for allegedly nodding off during a meeting. Over the past 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its enemies, especially South Korea. These actions included attacks on South Korean naval vessels, the capturing of a US ship and holding American hostages for 11 months, the hijacking of a South Korean airline jet, electronic warfare against South Korean signals including global positioning satellites (GPS), and assassinations or attempted assassinations on South Korean officials including the ROK president. The attempted 1968 Blue House Raid by North Korean elite military personnel resulted in the death or capture of all 31 infiltrators involved in the assassination attempt as well as the death of 71 personnel, including three Americans, and the injury of 66 others as the North Korean SPF personnel attempted to escape back to DPRK territory.
The purpose of this North Korean Threat Tactics Report (TTR) is to explain to the Army training community how North Korea fights including its doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, and the warfighting functions. A TTR also identifies where the conditions specific to the actor are present in Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues.
Executive Summary
North Korea is an oligarchy with Kim Jong Un as its supreme leader.
The DPRK is a militaristic society with about 1.2 million active duty personnel in uniform out of a population of 24 million with another 7.7 million in the reserve forces.
All military personnel serve under the umbrella of the Korean People’s Army (KPA); the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) and Korean People’s Navy (KPN) primarily support the KPA ground forces.
The KPAF focuses on homeland defense and close air support to the KPA.
The KPN’s primary mission is to protect the North Korean coastline and support the KPA special purpose forces (SPF) in mission execution.
Much of the equipment in all military branches is old and obsolete, but the KPA has concentrated its modernization efforts on missile technology that may provide the means to successfully launch a nuclear warhead.
North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon and is modernizing its missile fleet in order to increase the attack range for its nuclear arsenal.
North Korea possesses both chemical and biological weapons.
The KPA practices both passive and active camouflage to hide its units, headquarters, and other important resources from the air.
…
Weaknesses
Although the North Korean military may feature some positive attributes as a fighting force, the KPA also suffers from many weaknesses as well. Much of the military’s equipment is old and obsolete. The North Korean military consciously refuses to rid itself of any equipment and still operate tanks that date back to World War II. This wide range of military hardware from many generations of warfare also generates logistical issues. The KPA’s supply personnel must not only find the spare parts for a large variety of equipment, the KPA maintenance personnel must be well-versed in the repair of a great assortment of vehicles and weapons. In addition, the DPRK lacks the logistical capability to support the KPA beyond a few months. Due to the shortage of fuel and the cost to operate vehicles for a cash-strapped country, many of the KPA soldiers find themselves involved in public works projects or helping farmers bring in their rice crops. Any time spent in non-military support is less time that the KPA soldiers can spend training for combat. Even the mechanized and armor forces, due to resource restraints, spend much of their training time doing light infantry training instead of mounted operations. While KPA soldiers may be well trained in individual skills or small unit tactics, the amount of time spent on larger exercises pales in comparison to most Western militaries. Without adequate time and resources to practice large scale military operations, the KPA will always face a steep learning curve when the KPA is forced to perform them in actual combat for the first time.
…
…
The DPRK’s unorthodox use of provocation in order to obtain concessions from its enemies—especially the US, South Korea, and Japan—is a danger. One never knows what North Korea will do next as, in the past, the DPRK has sanctioned assassination attempts on South Korean political leaders and conducted bombings when South Korean contingents are in another country, unannounced attacks on ships by submarines, unprovoked artillery attacks, or has tunneled underground into another country. US military personnel stationed in South Korea must be prepared for the unexpected from the DPRK.
One of these incidents could ignite the Korean peninsula back into a full-blown war. While an armistice has been in place since 1953, an armistice is just a ceasefire waiting for a peace treaty to be signed or for the resumption of hostilities. Any conflict between North and South Korea would inevitably bring the US into the conflict as the ROK has been an ally for over six decades.
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and the missiles to transport it up to 9,650 km makes it a threat to US forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Alaska, or even the west coast of the continental United States. Even more concerning was the DPRK’s first successful test launch of a KN-11 missile from a submarine on 23 January 2015 since, in the near future, the North Korean submarines could silently move closer to their targets before launching a nuclear missile that would give the US less warning time. If the DPRK thought that the survival of its country or the Kim regime was at stake, North Korea might use any nuclear weapons at its disposal. The KPA also possesses chemical weapons and its doctrine calls for their employment. The DPRK is also involved in biological weapons research and would likely use those with offensive capabilities. US military personnel training for deployment to South Korea must be prepared to fight in a chemical, biological, or nuclear environment.
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
| HEADQUARTERS COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS (CIC) ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS APO 512 (Caserta, Italy) |
||
| St. Andrew Prisoner of War Camp, Taranto, Italy (Campo di Sant’Andrea a.k.a. Campo ‘S’) 40°31’15N, 17°18’18ESECRET 17 January 1945 SUBJECT: Interrogation and Findings RE: Remnants of 1st Security Battalion of the 2nd Second Regiment of Patras, and remnants of the 5/42nd Evzone Regiment Interrogation and Findings (23 pages) Inclosure 1: KOURKOULAKOS to AFHQ Italy (05 pages) Inclosures 2 – 9 (12 pages) Misc. Documents (19 pages) |
||
| SECRET 19 January 1945 – Bari, Italy SUBJECT: Political Parties and Military Organizations RE: Situation in Greece MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE (23 pages) MEMO Inclosures (09 pages)
|
|
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
We evaluate that fear based oppressors likely view strategies including tossing or showering acids and an assortment of compound fluids, henceforth alluded to as a synthetic shower and sprinkle assault (CSSA), as a feasible strategy to cause damage and disturb basic framework, in light of open source revealing depicting psychological militant online networking posts and fear monger and brutal radical utilization of this strategy abroad. An examination of few episodes portrayed in media announcing uncovered that CSSAs are regularly utilized by criminal performing artists to facilitate criminal exercises and by fierce radical gatherings abroad to make fear, scare, rebuff, and distort people and gatherings that oppose their control or belief system in their general vicinity of operations; the strategy, in any case, has once in a while been operationalized by on-screen characters in the Country. We note, in any case, that homegrown savage radicals (HVEs) and solitary guilty parties likely would discover this strategy engaging and could without much of a stretch adjust it to the Country, as it requires no particular specialized ability and the materials regularly connected with criminal assault are typically unregulated and generally accessible.
(U//FOUO) We evaluate that revolutionary fanatics, other residential fear based oppressors (DTs), and criminal on-screen characters are the probably US-based brutal radicals to utilize CSSAs in light of our examination of over a significant time span DT utilization of this strategy and on open source revealing of unaffiliated criminal performing artists utilizing acids, harmful mechanical chemicals, and other substance crippling specialists in assaults in the Country. They have utilized CSSA strategies against law requirement, foundations, ideological adversaries, dissenters, and mass get-togethers, particularly those related with political or social causes, in light of an assortment of open source announcing. These performing artists once in a while utilized CSSAs to cause fatalities, however past episodes have exhibited that household CSSAs can cause critical substantial damage and upset law authorization and specialist on call operations.
(U//FOUO) While remote psychological oppressor associations (FTO) and brutal fanatic gatherings have operationalized CSSA abroad and have made late calls for such assaults in the Country, we need particular data demonstrating that HVEs or solitary guilty parties would be open to this strategy or would look to fuse CSSAs into assaults inside the Assembled States; we survey, in any case, that huge numbers of the variables likely driving criminal utilization of CSSAs, for example, the capacity to hurt people, cause framework disturbance, perhaps sidestep catch following an assault, or potentially execute rehash assaults—likely would likewise make this strategy appealing to fear based oppressors, particularly fierce radicals lacking preparing, and the entrance or want to utilize explosives or guns.
(U//FOUO) Solid acids and burning chemicals are much of the time utilized as a part of CSSAs, however we evaluate aggressors are similarly prone to pick other monetarily accessible chemicals, for example, pepper splash, blanch, alkali, solvents, and other bothering, putrid, or poisonous mechanical chemicals, in view of the assortment of materials utilized for CSSAs locally and abroad. Specialists on call treating casualties of CSSAs may confront auxiliary dermal and inward breath dangers relying upon the kind of chemicals utilized.
…
(U) ISIS Desires CSSA in the Country While Rough Radical Operationalize the Strategy Abroad
(U//FOUO) We evaluate that fear mongers likely view strategies including tossing or showering acids and an assortment of compound fluids, in the future called synthetic splash and sprinkle assaults (CSSAs), as a suitable strategy to cause damage and upset basic foundation, based on open source announcing portraying psychological oppressor online networking posts and fear monger and fierce radical utilization of this strategy abroad. An investigation of few episodes portrayed in media detailing uncovered that CSSAs are regularly utilized by criminal on-screen characters to encourage criminal exercises and by fierce radical gatherings abroad to make fear, threaten, rebuff, and distort people and gatherings that oppose their control or philosophy in their general vicinity of operations; the strategy, in any case, has seldom been operationalized by performing artists ihowever, that HVEs and solitary guilty parties likely would discover this strategy engaging and could without much of a stretch adjust it to the Country, as it requires no particular specialized aptitude and the materials frequently connected with criminal assault are normally unregulated and broadly accessible.
» (U//FOUO) The Islamic State in Iraq and slag Sham (ISIS)- connected “Solitary Mujihad” station on the Europe-based informing application Wire, starting late 2017, asked US-based ISIS-supporters to assault “unbelievers” with sulfuric corrosive on open transportation.
» (U) Rough fanatics partnered with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, since in any event mid 2015, were purportedly spreading or tossing corrosive in the characteristics of ladies from the Iraq-based Yazidi religious minority and Kurdish ladies who declined to be sex slaves or submit to constrained relational unions, as indicated by open source announcing. Moreover, ISIS-partnered vicious fanatics freely tormented and executed adversaries, deceivers, and those they regarded n the Country. We note, in any case, that HVEs and solitary wrongdoers likely would discover this strategy engaging and could without much of a stretch adjust it to the Country, as it requires no particular specialized mastery and the materials frequently connected with criminal assault are typically unregulated and generally accessible.
» (U//FOUO) The Islamic State in Iraq and fiery debris Sham (ISIS)- connected “Solitary Mujihad” station on the Europe-based informing application Wire, starting late 2017, encouraged US-based ISIS-supporters to assault “unbelievers” with sulfuric corrosive on open transportation.
» (U) Savage fanatics associated with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, since at any rate mid 2015, were purportedly spreading or tossing corrosive in the characteristics of ladies from the Iraq-based Yazidi religious minority and Kurdish ladies who declined to be sex slaves or submit to constrained relational unions, as indicated by open source detailing. Moreover, ISIS-associated rough radicals freely tormented and executed foes, double crossers, and those they deemedDEPARTMENT OF Country SECURITY, Insight Combination Focuses
(U//FOUO) DHS Announcement: Substance Sprinkle and Splash Assaults Potential Strategy for Brutal Radicals in Country
December 18, 2017
Synthetic Sprinkle and Splash Assault: Uncommon yet Potential Strategy for Brutal Radicals in Country
Page Tally: 10 pages
Date: September 21, 2017
Confinement: For Official Utilize As it were
Starting Association: Branch of Country Security, Office of Knowledge and Appraisal
Record Compose: pdf
Document Estimate: 313,000 bytes
Document Hash (SHA-256): 1444CB27457B1F56A97A074AD2049034AC63AE457A88FB0F6013C7F480736D09
Download Document
(U//FOUO) We survey that fear based oppressors likely view strategies including tossing or showering acids and an assortment of synthetic fluids, henceforth alluded to as a concoction splash and sprinkle assault (CSSA), as a suitable strategy to cause damage and disturb basic framework, based on open source detailing portraying psychological militant online networking posts and psychological militant and savage fanatic utilization of this strategy abroad. An examination of few occurrences depicted in media announcing uncovered that CSSAs are ordinarily utilized by criminal performing artists to facilitate criminal exercises and by brutal radical gatherings abroad to make fear, scare, rebuff, and distort people and gatherings that oppose their control or belief system in their general vicinity of operations; the strategy, in any case, has once in a while been operationalized by on-screen characters in the Country. We note, in any case, that homegrown brutal radicals (HVEs) and solitary guilty parties likely would discover this strategy engaging and could undoubtedly adjust it to the Country, as it requires no particular specialized skill and the materials frequently connected with criminal assault are generally unregulated and broadly accessible.
(U//FOUO) We evaluate that rebel radicals, other household fear based oppressors (DTs), and criminal performing artists are the in all likelihood US-based rough fanatics to utilize CSSAs in light of our examination of at various times DT utilization of this strategy and on open source announcing of unaffiliated criminal on-screen characters utilizing acids, poisonous modern chemicals, and other concoction debilitating operators in assaults in the Country. They have utilized CSSA strategies against law authorization, establishments, ideological adversaries, nonconformists, and mass get-togethers, particularly those related with political or social causes, in light of an assortment of open source announcing. These performing artists seldom utilized CSSAs to cause fatalities, however past occurrences have exhibited that local CSSAs can cause huge real damage and upset law authorization and person on call operations.
(U//FOUO) While outside fear based oppressor associations (FTO) and brutal fanatic gatherings have operationalized CSSA abroad and have made late calls for such assaults in the Country, we need particular data showing that HVEs or solitary wrongdoers would be open to this strategy or would try to join CSSAs into assaults inside the Assembled States; we survey, be that as it may, that a significant number of the variables likely driving criminal utilization of CSSAs, for example, the capacity to hurt people, cause foundation interruption, conceivably dodge catch following an assault, and additionally execute rehash assaults—likely would likewise make this strategy appealing to psychological militants, particularly vicious radicals lacking preparing, and the entrance or want to utilize explosives or guns.
(U//FOUO) Solid acids and scathing chemicals are every now and again utilized as a part of CSSAs, however we evaluate assailants are similarly prone to pick other economically accessible chemicals, for example, pepper shower, fade, alkali, solvents, and other chafing, putrid, or lethal modern chemicals, in light of the assortment of materials utilized for CSSAs locally and abroad. People on call treating casualties of CSSAs may confront optional dermal and inward breath perils relying upon the kind of chemicals utilized.
…
(U)
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
This investigation, dispatched by the European Parliament’s Arrangement Division for Subjects’ Rights and Sacred Issues at the demand of the LIBE Panel, gives a review of current ways to deal with countering psychological oppressor stories. The first and second segments layout the distinctive reactions created at the worldwide and European Union levels. The third segment introduces an investigation of four distinctive ways to deal with reacting to fear based oppressor stories: disturbance of publicity conveyance, divert technique, crusade and message outline, and government correspondences and synchronization of message and activity. The last area offers various arrangement proposals, featuring five interrelated ‘lines of exertion’ basic to amplifying the proficiency and viability of counterterrorism and countering fierce fanaticism key correspondence.
1. Worldwide activities to counter fear based oppressor accounts are completed by various distinctive on-screen characters on the supranational, global, local, national and sub-national levels. The UN has set up itself as a key player in the field of counter-stories, rousing related organizations, for example, the Worldwide Counterterrorism Gathering (GCTF) and Hedayah, to help states in building solid designs of activity in this field. Other worldwide associations, for example, NATO and OSCE, have executed activities that attention on vital interchanges and counter-stories. States have likewise expanded endeavors in countering fear based oppressor stories through participation with different states or non-state institutional accomplices. At last, tech organizations have found a way to counteract manhandle of their stages by fear based oppressor on-screen characters.
2. The EU has expected a main part in counter-account endeavors through its own particular offices and projects and in addition through supporting outside activities. Europol assumes a key part in expelling illicit psychological militant substance from the Web while the EU Web Gathering gives a stage to disturb fear monger content and open up counter-accounts. The EU likewise encourages a system of cutting edge specialists, the Radicalisation Mindfulness System, which gives investigations of existing counter-account endeavors. At last, there are various establishments working at the European level, frequently in association with either the EU or Part States, which encourage the making of counter-accounts between governments, industry, and common society.
3. There are four key patterns in current endeavors to handle fear monger purposeful publicity:
I. Interruption of promulgation circulation – The key goal is to meddle with the conveyance of publicity, to put it plainly, to attempt and stop purposeful publicity at the source by keeping it from achieving its intended interest group. Specifically, this has focussed on bringing down promulgation from web-based social networking and erasing affronting accounts.
ii. Divert technique – Instead of eradicating promulgation, this approach looks to divert watchers to various messages trying to ‘bump’ their conduct. Spearheaded by Jigsaw and ISD, this venture diverts those scanning for jihadist material to counter-informing.
iii. Crusade and message outline – These tasks look to give data and aptitudes to Common Society Associations (CSOs) to create correspondence battles, normally in light of counter-story or option account approaches. While interruption looks to stop the spread of purposeful publicity, this approach tries to empower CSOs with the aptitudes to stand up to and undermine the promulgation.
iv. Government correspondences and synchronization of message and activity – There is a propensity for correspondence crusades to be composed in a vacuum, detached from occasions, in actuality. Synchronization approaches take a thorough point of view and intend to connect messages and activities, and to arrange informing crosswise over government and with global accomplices. The quality of these methodologies is to keep the undermining of a story by uncovering its ‘say-do-hole’, through guaranteeing message and activities are adjusted, and through constraining opposing informing.
4. In spite of the fact that counter-accounts is broadly bolstered by governments, think tanks and NGOs, the idea itself is somewhat immature and does not have an exhaustive establishing in observational research. There is little proof to help the adequacy of counternarratives and a significant number of its hidden presumptions have been raised doubt about. There is a requirement for more noteworthy research here and, specifically, compelling observing and assessment of flow counter-account extends keeping in mind the end goal to have the capacity to guarantee that lessons are found out.
5. Counter-psychological oppression (CT) and countering vicious radicalism (CVE) vital correspondences endeavors crosswise over different projects and activities can be educated by the accompanying suggestions:
I. Interruption of fierce fanatic material should be connected extensively and over various stages, keeping in mind the end goal to abstain from dislodging fear monger informing movement between channels. The vacuum made by interruption should be loaded with a progression of messages intended to use a scope of motivational drivers, keeping in mind the end goal to resound with an intended interest group subject to changing inspirations and so as to have a strengthening total impact on that gathering of people.
ii. To guarantee cognizant informing over the short, medium and long haul, battle and message plan standards should be synchronized through the foundation of a reasonable and easy to-comprehend, larger focal account, which is upheld by a specifically assorted exhibit of messages.
iii. An unmistakable recognizable proof of the intended interest group is essential to successful key correspondences, considering a range of potential customers of the message (expected, unintended, supporters, enemies and neutrals). A nuanced behavioral and attitudinal comprehension of that group of onlookers is expected to powerfully shape mentalities and practices.
iv. Measuring the viability of vital interchanges requires appraisals that emphasis on measures of key education, specialized proficiency and target gathering of people. These appraisals should be at first performed preceding the beginning of a key interchanges exertion to build up a standard measure. Once the benchmark measurements are set up, these evaluations should be consistently executed as a way to check the viability and proficiency of the battle after some time.
v. So as to pick up put stock in, believability and authenticity according to an intended interest group, informing should be synchronized with exercises on the ground, in this manner diminishing the apparent uniqueness between what one says and does (the ‘say-do hole’). The focal necessity for enhancing the synchronization of informing and activity crosswise over organizations is to a great extent social. Antiquated states of mind that ‘activities talk louder than words’ add to a hierarchical culture, frequently strengthened by principle, which bears vital interchanges an ex post facto part in operations, procedure and arrangement. Vital correspondences ought to be a key thought in arranging from the earliest starting point of the
iii. A reasonable distinguishing proof of the intended interest group is key to viable vital correspondences, considering a range of potential buyers of the message (planned, unintended, supporters, foes and neutrals). A nuanced behavioral and attitudinal comprehension of that gathering of people is expected to powerfully shape mentalities and practices.
iv. Measuring the adequacy of key correspondences requires evaluations that emphasis on measures of vital education, specialized proficiency and target group of onlookers. These evaluations should be at first performed preceding the beginning of a key interchanges exertion with a specific end goal to build up a benchmark measure. Once the benchmark measurements are built up, these appraisals should be frequently executed as a way to check the adequacy and productivity of the battle after some time.
v. Keeping in mind the end goal to pick up put stock in, believability and authenticity according to an intended interest group, informing should be synchronized with exercises on the ground, in this manner lessening the apparent dissimilarity between what one says and does (the ‘say-do hole’). The focal prerequisite for enhancing the synchronization of informing and activity crosswise over administrations is to a great extent social. Antiquated states of mind that ‘activities talk louder than words’ add to a hierarchical culture, regularly strengthened by precept, which bears key interchanges an ex post facto part in operations, procedure and arrangement. Key correspondences ought to be a key thought in arranging from the earliest starting point of the
Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.
On 11 July, the Assembled States Government expelled Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab from two arrangements of endorsed merchants utilized by government offices to buy innovation hardware, in the midst of concerns the digital security association’s items could be utilized by the Kremlin to pick up section into U.S. systems.
(U) A month ago the Senate Furnished Administrations Advisory group passed a resistance spending strategy charge that would restrict Kaspersky items from use in the military. The move came a day after the FBI met a few of the organization’s U.S. workers at their private homes as a feature of a counterintelligence examination concerning its operations.
(U) On 12 July, GSA settled on a strategic choice to expel Kaspersky Labs from two GSA plans, along these lines successfully expelling the merchant as an approved hotspot for buys by any organization utilizing GSA plans.
• (U) The delisting speaks to the most solid move made against Kaspersky following a very long time of mounting doubt among insight authorities and officials that the organization might be too firmly associated with threatening Russian knowledge offices blamed for digital assaults on the Unified States.
• (U) Administrators raised worries that Moscow may utilize the association’s items to assault American PC arranges, an especially touchy issue given affirmations by U.S. knowledge offices that Russia hacked and spilled messages of Fair Gathering political gatherings to meddle in the 2016 presidential decision battle. Russia denies the claims.
(U//FOUO) Per the U.S. General Administrations Organization, “After survey and watchful thought, the General Administrations Organization settled on the choice to expel Kaspersky Lab-fabricated items from GSA IT Timetable 70 and GSA Schedul-67 – Photographic Hardware and Related Supplies and Administrations. GSA’s needs are to guarantee the respectability and security of U.S. government frameworks and organize and assess items and administrations accessible on our agreements utilizing production network hazard administration forms”.
(U//FOUO) State, Neighborhood, Innate and Regional government organizations that utilization GSA contract plans for requesting IT merchandise and ventures and I or Photographic Gear and Related Supplies and Administrations, or generally have Kaspersky Lab-made items ought to consider the hazard related with these items and hold fast to Elected rules.
Security Worries with Kaspersky Labs Items
On 11 July, the Assembled States Government expelled Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab from two arrangements of affirmed merchants utilized by government offices to buy innovation hardware.
The delisting speaks to the most solid move made against Kaspersky following a very long time of mounting doubt among insight authorities and administrators that the organization might be too firmly associated with unfriendly Russian knowledge offices blamed for digital assaults on the Unified States.
• A Senate Equipped Administrations Advisory group part said in an announcement that “ties between Kaspersky Lab and the Kremlin are extremely disturbing.”
• U.S. insight offices trust that the organization and its leader have had close connections to Russian political and knowledge authorities since no less than 2012, when a noteworthy shakeup of the company’s official positions got new individuals
… with binds to Russia’s three primary knowledge offices.
• Kaspersky supplies faculty to go with Russian insight and police on strikes and captures, and planned cybersecurity programming that gives Russian law authorization the area of conceivable programmers, as per squeeze reports.
• The heads of five U.S. knowledge organizations, including the CIA, said they would not be open to utilizing Kaspersky items on their systems.
Kaspersky antivirus arrangements are coordinated in a scope of switches, chip and programming items from such commonly recognized names as Cisco, Amazon and Microsoft.
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2018-info/pict5.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2018-info/pict6.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2018-info/pict7.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2018-info/pict8.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2018-info/pict9.jpg)
![[Image]](https://cryptome.org/2018-info/pict10.jpg)
🛑 Bernd Pulch | NAZI & STASI HUNTER | GOVERNMENT CRIME, CORRUPTION & ARISTOTLE AI BI 
You must be logged in to post a comment.