Revealed – The Litvinenko Inquiry – Full Report – Original Document

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Litvinenko endorsed statement accusing Putin, inquiry told | Financial Times
Vladimir Putin poses with new Kalashnikov sniper rifle - ABC News
Stasi-Ausweis von Wladimir Putin in Dresden gefunden - Politik -- VOL.AT

Revealed – CIA Assassination Plot Targeted Cuba’s Raul Castro

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In the earliest known CIA assassination plot against leaders of the Cuban revolution, high agency officials offered the pilot of a plane carrying Raul Castro from Prague to Havana “payment after successful completion of ten thousand dollars” to “incur risks in arranging accident” during the flight, according to formally TOP SECRET documents posted today by the National Security Archive. The pilot, who the CIA had earlier recruited as an intelligence asset in Cuba, “asked for assurance that in event of his [own] death the U.S. would see that his two sons were given a college education.” “This assurance was given,” his CIA handler in Havana, William J. Murray, reported.

According to TOP SECRET cables between the CIA headquarters and the CIA Havana station, and debriefings Murray later provided on “questionable activities,” the plot quickly evolved after the Cuban pilot, Jose Raul Martinez, advised Murray that he had been selected to fly a chartered Cubana Airlines plane to Prague to pick up Raul Castro and other high-ranking Cuban leaders on July 21, 1960. When Murray informed his superiors at Langley headquarters, as he later told the Rockefeller Commission on the CIA, “headquarters cabled back that it was considering the possibility of a fatal accident and asked whether the pilot would be interested.”

The cable, classified “TOP SECRET RYBAT OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE” and signed by CIA Deputy Director of Plans Tracy Barnes, and J.C. King, the head of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division, informed Murray that “possible removal of top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at HQS” and asked if the pilot had “motivation sufficient to incur risks of arranging accident during return trip” from Prague. To provide sufficient motivation, Barnes and King offered $10,000, or “a reasonable demand in excess of that” as well as to arrange rescue facilities for the pilot after the “accident” took place.

The CIA Report “New Facts About Kennedy’s Murder” – Original Document

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Assassination of John F. Kennedy - Facts, Investigation, Photos | HISTORY -  HISTORY
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Die Spur Der Mörder Von Journalistin Daphne Caruana Galizia Führt Nach China

Daphne Caruana Galizia: Urteil nach Mord an Journalistin in Malta: 15 Jahre  Haft - Politik - Westfälische Nachrichten
Daphne Caruana Galizias Arbeit zur Aufdeckung von Korruption in Malta befasste sich mit Visa-zum-Verkauf-Programmen, Energieverträgen und karibischen Offshore-Unternehmen, die für maltesische Politiker gegründet wurden. Eine Untersuchung hat nun ergeben, dass all diese Geschichten zusammenkommen - in China.

Wichtigste Ergebnisse:

Macbridge, ein mysteriöses Unternehmen, das im Rahmen eines von Daphne Caruana Galizia untersuchten Kickback-Programms benannt wurde, ist mit einem chinesischen Berater verbunden, der einen wichtigen Energievertrag in Malta ausgehandelt hat.
Macbridge wurde von der Schwiegermutter des Beraters Chen Cheng gegründet, einem leitenden Angestellten der chinesischen Niederlassung des multinationalen Beratungsunternehmens Accenture.
Sowohl Chen als auch seine Schwiegermutter sind mit Unternehmen und Geschäftsleuten verbunden, die den Verkauf von maltesischen Aufenthaltsvisa in China erleichtern.
Chen bat einen anderen Verwandten, eine Firma zu gründen, die eine Zahlung von einer Million Euro von 17 Black erhielt, einer Firma, die bekanntermaßen dem maltesischen Tycoon Yorgen Fenech gehört, der wegen Mordes an Caruana Galizia angeklagt ist.

Hintergrund:

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daphne_Caruana_Galizia

Mord an Journalistin - Weitere Anklagen im Fall Daphne Caruana Galizia -  Wiener Zeitung Online
Der Tatort des Mordes

Für ein winziges Land hat die Mittelmeerinsel Malta eine Vielzahl von Korruptionsskandalen ausgelöst - und die maltesische investigative Journalistin Daphne Caruana Galizia hat die meisten davon in ihrem Kreuzzugsblog Running Commentary behandelt.

Sie war eine der ersten, die über 17 Black berichtete, eine mysteriöse Firma in Dubai, von der sie glaubte, dass sie mit hochrangigen maltesischen Beamten in Verbindung steht. Sie befasste sich auch mit zweifelhaften Umständen im Zusammenhang mit einer Vereinbarung von 2014, eine größere Beteiligung an Maltas einzigem Elektrizitätsunternehmen an ein chinesisches Staatsunternehmen zu verkaufen, und einer verdächtigen späteren Investition in einen Windpark in Montenegro. Und 2016 griff sie einen chinesischen Medienbericht auf, in dem behauptet wurde, Malta würde Aufenthaltsvisa an wohlhabende chinesische Bürger verkaufen - ohne Fragen zur Quelle der Mittel der Antragsteller.

Aber Caruana Galizia hat das Ende dieser Geschichten nicht erlebt, obwohl ihre Arbeit dazu führte, dass sie in Malta zu wichtigen politischen Themen wurden, was zu mehreren Korruptionsfällen und sogar zu Strafanzeigen gegen Mitglieder der politischen Elite des Landes führte.

Im Oktober 2017, nur wenige Stunden nach der Veröffentlichung eines letzten Blogposts - „Es gibt überall Gauner, wo man jetzt hinschaut“ - warnte Caruana Galizia durch eine Autobombe. Ihre Ermordung löste einen Skandal aus, der Korruption im Herzen der maltesischen Regierung aufdeckte, ihren Premierminister stürzte und Schockwellen in der gesamten Europäischen Union auslöste.

Im Zusammenhang mit dem Mord wurden seitdem drei Personen inhaftiert. In einem Gericht in Valletta sagte einer von ihnen, ein angeheuerter Killer, Caruana Galizia sei getötet worden, weil sie "einige Details" zu einem nicht näher bezeichneten Thema veröffentlichen wollte. Der mutmaßliche Vordenker des Bombenanschlags, der maltesische Tycoon Yorgen Fenech, befandt sich im Gefängnis und wartete auf den Prozess, wurde nun aber wieder freigelassen.

Yorgen Fenech. Photo: Mark Zammit Cordina

Yorgen Fenech

Jetzt sind Journalisten von OCCRP und Partnern einer Spur von Hinweisen gefolgt, die Caruana Galizia von Malta nach China entdeckt hat, wo sie zwei Personen entdeckten, die diese Geschichten, die sie verfolgt hatte, miteinander verbinden - den 17-Korruptionsskandal der Schwarzen, die zweifelhaften Energieverträge und die Residenz Visa-for-Sale-Programm.

"Durch diese Skandale wurde deutlich, dass sie immer wieder zur Beteiligung derselben Personengruppen führen", sagte ihr Sohn Matthew Caruana Galizia gegenüber OCCRP, nachdem er die Ergebnisse der neuen Untersuchung überprüft hatte.

"Es ist ein klarer Hinweis darauf, wie es einigen Einzelpersonen in kürzester Zeit gelungen ist, den gesamten Staatsapparat eines EU-Landes zu übernehmen und ihn zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil in ein Piratenschiff zu verwandeln."
Nachdem Caruana Galizia getötet worden war, rannten Journalisten auf der ganzen Welt, um sich mit den Themen zu befassen, die sie behandelt hatte, darunter 17 Schwarze. Sie hatte wiederholt über das Unternehmen geschrieben und vorgeschlagen, dass es an Spitzenpolitiker gebunden sei, aber es gelang ihr nie, die Behauptung zu beweisen.


Im Jahr 2018 enthüllten Reuters und die Times of Malta, dass 17 Black im Besitz von Fenech war, einem auffälligen lokalen Geschäftsmann mit einem angeblichen Geschmack für Kokain und Rennpferde. Er stand einigen der mächtigsten politischen Persönlichkeiten Maltas nahe - darunter Premierminister Joseph Muscat und sein Stabschef Keith Schembri - und leitete ein Konglomerat, das Teil eines Konsortiums war, das 2013 eine große Konzession für den Bau eines 450-Millionen-Konzerns erhielt. Euro-Kraftwerk.

Fenech benutzte offenbar 17 Black, um Bestechungsgelder an Politiker weiterzuleiten. Die Geschichte zitierte einen kritischen Beweis: eine durchgesickerte E-Mail von 2015, die von der maltesischen Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft Nexia BT gesendet wurde und besagt, dass 17 Black voraussichtlich bis zu 2 Millionen US-Dollar an Shell-Unternehmen senden wird, die von zwei hochrangigen maltesischen Politikern in Panama gegründet wurden: Schembri und Energieminister Konrad Mizzi.

Was jedoch nicht allgemein berichtet wurde, war, dass in der E-Mail ein anderes mysteriöses Unternehmen als Geldquelle für die Unternehmen von Mizzi und Schembri genannt wurde. Es wurde in der Presse nur als "Macbridge" bezeichnet.

Die 2015 von Nexia BT an die panamaische Anwaltskanzlei Mossack Fonseca gesendete E-Mail über die Gründung von Shell-Unternehmen für Keith Schembri und Konrad Mizzi.

Caruana Galizia hatte sich ebenfalls leise in das Unternehmen eingegraben, nachdem sie 2016 von derselben E-Mail erfahren hatte und von einer Quelle gehört hatte, dass Macbridge und 17 Black laut ihrem Sohn und Aufzeichnungen ihrer Arbeit, die von Reportern gesehen wurden, „entscheidend für die Entschlüsselung des Webs“ waren .

Macbridge war jedoch schwerer zu finden als 17 schwarze und maltesische Beamte, die sich geweigert haben, Fragen zur Existenz des Unternehmens zu beantworten. Als der damalige Finanzminister Edward Scicluna letztes Jahr von einem Reporter gefragt wurde, dem Macbridge gehörte, erwiderte er: "Sehen Sie, wenn Sie sensationell sein wollen, fahren Sie fort." Journalisten glaubten, es handele sich um ein Unternehmen der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate wie 17 Black, aber dort wurde nie eine Spur davon gefunden.

Dies liegt daran, dass die Wurzeln des Unternehmens tatsächlich auf der halben Welt liegen. OCCRP und seine Berichtspartner haben dies in Hongkong entdeckt. Das Unternehmen ist dort als "Macbridge International Development Co Ltd" registriert, zusammen mit einem chinesischen Namen, der die Zeichen für "Malta" und "China" kombiniert.

Reporter stellten außerdem fest, dass 17 Black Mitte 2016 1 Million Euro an ein anderes Unternehmen in Hongkong, Dow's Media Co Ltd, sandte, das eine sehr ähnliche Struktur und Struktur wie Macbridge aufweist.

Dow’s Media wurde im Oktober 2014, nur wenige Wochen nach Macbridge, unter Verwendung des gleichen in Hongkong ansässigen Formationsagenten und der gleichen registrierten Adressen in Hongkong und Shanghai gegründet. Beide Unternehmen wurden im Januar 2019 innerhalb einer Woche voneinander aufgelöst.

Die Ermittler in Malta suchten 2018 im Rahmen einer Untersuchung zu „möglicher Korruption und Geldwäsche“ nach Einzelheiten zu beiden Unternehmen aus Hongkong und China.

Macbridge und Dow’s Media sind so eingerichtet, dass es schwierig ist festzustellen, wem sie tatsächlich gehören. Sie werden von Shell-Unternehmen auf den Seychellen bzw. den Marshallinseln kontrolliert.

Reporter stellten jedoch fest, dass beide von Vertretern mit familiären Bindungen zu einem Mann geleitet werden: einem chinesischen Berater, der im Mittelpunkt wichtiger Geschäfte mit dem von Maltas Regierung unterstützten Energieversorger Enemalta steht.

Caruana Galizia hatte ausführlich über diesen Mann, Chen Cheng, einen Geschäftsführer der chinesischen Energiesparte des globalen Beratungsunternehmens Accenture, geschrieben. Chen war einer der Hauptakteure bei den Verhandlungen über einen Deal 2014 für Chinas staatseigenes Unternehmen Shanghai Electric Power, ein Drittel von Enemalta zu kaufen.


Das Geschäft hatte einen Wert von 320 Millionen Euro, die größte Auslandsinvestition des Landes, wurde jedoch in Malta und auf dem Blog von Caruana Galizia kritisiert, weil es dem chinesischen Unternehmen zu günstigen Konditionen gewährt hatte.

Accenture hat Shanghai Electric Power bei dem Deal beraten, und Chen hat ihn in den chinesischen Medien als wegweisendes Belt-and-Road-Projekt angepriesen, das vom chinesischen Ministerpräsidenten Li Keqiang gebilligt wurde.

Caruana Galizia berichtete, dass eine Quelle ihr sagte, Chen sei "dem Energieminister Konrad Mizzi besonders nahe", der die Verhandlungen auf maltesischer Seite beaufsichtigte. (Bei einer anschließenden Untersuchung wurden E-Mails zwischen Chen, Mizzi und anderen über einen Plan zur Gründung einer Agentur in China im selben Jahr zur Förderung von Investitionen in Malta aufgedeckt.)

Sie enthüllte auch ein wichtiges Detail über Chen: Als die Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft Nexia BT Schembri und Mizzi half, Geheimfirmen in Panama zu registrieren, gründete sie auch eine Firma für Chen auf den Britischen Jungferninseln.


Was Daphne jedoch nicht wusste, war, dass Chen im Zusammenhang mit dem Kickback-Skandal, den sie entwirrte, auch mit den Offshore-Unternehmen verbunden war - und mit den Aufenthaltsvisa-Systemen, über die sie seit langem Verdacht hegte.


Macbridge und Dow's Media wurden beide ungefähr zur gleichen Zeit in Hongkong gegründet, als Chen an dem Enemalta-Deal arbeitete, und zwar von zwei seiner Familienmitglieder: Tang Zhaomin, seiner 65-jährigen Schwiegermutter, und Wang Rui, seiner Cousine der Schwiegermutter.

Reporter verfolgten Wang in die ostchinesische Stadt Nanjing, wo sie und Tang eine Firma besitzen, die lokale Niederlassungen der Fast-Food-Kette KFC betreibt.

In einem Telefoninterview sagte sie, Chen habe sie gebeten, Dows Medien zu öffnen, weil die Verbindung zu einem chinesischen Staatsunternehmen es ihm "unpraktisch" machte, dies selbst zu tun. Sie sagte, sie wisse nichts über die Geschäftstätigkeit oder den Erhalt von 1 Million Euro von 17 Black.

Tang konnte nicht für einen Kommentar erreicht werden. Die neuen Beweise, die das von ihr geleitete Unternehmen Macbridge mit ihrem Familienmitglied Chen verbinden, deuten jedoch darauf hin, dass der chinesische Geschäftsmann eine Rolle bei der Weiterleitung von Geldern an die geheimen Panama-Unternehmen Schembri und Mizzi gespielt hat.



Geld von was? Es ist unklar, aber nach der erfolgreichen Investition von Shanghai Electric Power in Enemalta wurde Chen einer der Hauptförderer einer anschließenden Investition von Enemalta 2015 in das Windparkprojekt Mozura in Montenegro.

Laut einer internen Enemalta-Untersuchung hat Accenture diese Investition im Dezember 2014 beraten, wobei Chen Enemalta in einer PowerPoint-Präsentation die Idee vorstellte.

Die Untersuchung warf ernsthafte Bedenken hinsichtlich des Deals auf, bei dem auch Fenech eine Rolle spielte.

Seine 17 Black halfen heimlich dabei, den Kauf einer Mehrheitsbeteiligung an Enemalta im Dezember 2015 für 2,9 Millionen Euro über ein Darlehen an einen Seychellen-Vermittler namens Cifidex Limited zu finanzieren. Das Unternehmen, das Chen in den Deal einbezogen hatte, verkaufte seine Projektanteile nur zwei Wochen später für 10,3 Millionen Euro an Enemalta und erzielte einen enormen Gewinn.

Cifidex hat das Darlehen dann an 17 Black zurückgezahlt, zusammen mit einem Gewinn von 4,6 Millionen Euro aus dem Deal. 17 Black wiederum schickte von Mai bis Juli 2016 ungefähr zur gleichen Zeit 1 Million Euro an Dow's Media.

Obwohl OCCRP keinen endgültigen Beweis dafür gefunden hat, dass dies dasselbe Geld war, deuten die neuen Beweise darauf hin, dass Chen nicht nur an der Erleichterung geheimer Geldflüsse für maltesische Spitzenpolitiker beteiligt war, sondern auch von der 17 Black-Pipeline profitierte.



Ein Sprecher von Enemalta sagte per E-Mail, dass der interne Bericht über das Abkommen zwischen Montenegro und Mozura „an die Polizei weitergeleitet wurde, um bei Ermittlungen behilflich zu sein. Weitere Kommentare zu diesem Zeitpunkt wären unklug. “

In einer Erklärung zu Chens angeblichen Aktivitäten im Zusammenhang mit Energiegeschäften und Offshore-Unternehmen sowie zu seinen offensichtlichen Interessenkonflikten sagte Accenture: „Wir nehmen diese Angelegenheit sehr ernst und prüfen diese Anschuldigungen sorgfältig, da sie sich auf einen unserer Mitarbeiter beziehen. Wir halten uns in jedem Markt, in dem wir tätig sind, an die höchsten ethischen Standards und tolerieren keine Abweichungen von diesen Standards. “ Chen selbst antwortete nicht auf Anfragen nach Kommentaren.

Mizzi sagte per E-Mail, dass er "keine Informationen" über Macbridge oder irgendjemanden habe, der damit verbunden sei, und fügte hinzu, dass er "die Behauptung, dass eine direkte oder sonstige Verbindung besteht", zwischen seinem Unternehmen und Macbridge "konsequent zurückgewiesen" habe.

"Ich lehne auch den Vorschlag ab, Geschäftspläne mit Macbridge zu haben oder ein persönliches Interesse an einem öffentlichen Projekt zu haben", sagte er. "Ich kenne Chen Cheng als Berater, der [Shanghai Electric Power] bei mehreren Initiativen unterstützt, und meine Interaktionen mit ihm fanden in diesem offiziellen Kontext statt."

Schembri antwortete nicht auf eine Bitte um Kommentar. In den letzten Tagen haben maltesische Staatsanwälte ihn, seinen Vater und neun Geschäftspartner, darunter Mitarbeiter von Nexia BT, wegen Betrugs und Geldwäsche in einem nicht verwandten Fall angeklagt.

Chen und seine Schwiegermutter sind nicht nur an Offshore-Unternehmen und Energiegeschäften beteiligt. Reporter stellten fest, dass sie auch Verbindungen zu einem der größten Unternehmen Maltas haben: dem Verkauf von Staatsbürgerschafts- und Aufenthaltsvisa an wohlhabende Ausländer, die die Insel als Hintertür in die Europäische Union nutzen können.

Diese Verbindungen laufen über einen Geschäftsmann aus Shanghai, der den Verkauf von maltesischen Aufenthaltsvisa in China effektiv kontrolliert - über dieselbe Firma, die Caruana Galizia in ihrem Blogbeitrag 2016 hervorgehoben hat.

Zu dieser Zeit hatte sie kaum mehr zu tun als einen einzigen Medienbericht und ein Foto, das eine Unterzeichnungszeremonie für den Start des Malta Residence and Visa-Programms in China zeigt, das von Konrad Mizzis Frau Sai Mizzi Liang geleitet wird. Aber „Instinkt, Erfahrung und die Nase für eine Geschichte“ sagten ihr, dass die Situation mehr zu bieten hatte.



Ein Foto von der Eröffnungsfeier 2016 des MRVP-Programms. Sai Mizzi Liang, die Frau von Konrad Mizzi, steht im Hintergrund, vierte von rechts.
„Der nächste Schritt, der hier unternommen werden muss - bitte, andere Journalisten steigen in diesen ein -, besteht darin, einen Weg zu finden, um die Beteiligungen und Beteiligungen dieses Unternehmens in China zu überprüfen, was sehr schwierig, aber notwendig sein wird. " Sie schrieb.

Caruana Galizia hatte Recht, dass es schwierig ist, Unternehmen in China aufzuspüren. Obwohl das Land über ein Unternehmensregistrierungssystem verfügt, sind die darin enthaltenen Informationen häufig unstrukturiert oder unvollständig und können nur von Personen navigiert werden, die fließend Chinesisch sprechen.

Nach monatelangen Nachforschungen stellten Reporter jedoch fest, dass die Shanghai Overseas Exit-Entry Services Co. Ltd., die die offizielle Konzession für den Verkauf von Visa für maltesische Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen in China besitzt, von einem Geschäftsmann namens Mao Haibin, auch bekannt als Kevin Mao, betrieben wird.

Chinesische Aufzeichnungen zeigen, dass Mao Verbindungen zu Chen und seiner Schwiegermutter hat - der Frau, die Macbridge leitet.

Mao und Chen waren Partner in mindestens zwei Unternehmen, darunter Shanghai Visabao Network Technology Co. Ltd., die in mehreren großen chinesischen Städten tätig ist und chinesischen Bürgern bei der Beschaffung von Visa im Ausland hilft.

Chens Schwiegermutter ist Managerin und Aktionärin einer von Mao kontrollierten Werbeagentur in Shanghai, die wiederum ein wichtiger Sponsor der Veranstaltungen des Malta Residence and Visa Program in China war.

Mao, der nicht auf Anfragen nach Kommentaren geantwortet hat, hat mehrere andere Geschäftsinteressen im Zusammenhang mit der Erleichterung chinesischer Investitionen im Ausland - und speziell in Malta.




Aldo Cutajar (zweiter von rechts) und Mao Haibin (ganz rechts) sind bei einem Treffen im Jahr 2018 in den Büros von Shanghai Bangyi zu sehen, einem von Mao kontrollierten Unternehmen.

In den letzten Jahren hat er eine wichtige Rolle bei Maltas Bemühungen gespielt, wohlhabende chinesische Staatsangehörige für sein Visa-Verkaufsprogramm zu gewinnen. Er trat bei mehreren Veranstaltungen in Shanghai auf, um für das Programm zu werben, zusammen mit hochrangigen maltesischen Vertretern wie John Aquilina, Maltas Botschafter in China, und Aldo Cutajar, Maltas ehemaligem Generalkonsul in Shanghai. Einige dieser Veranstaltungen beinhalteten aufwendige Bankette, an denen hochrangige maltesische Diplomaten teilnahmen, mit zahlreichen warmen Zeugnissen über Maltas Status als „Schlüsselknoten“ in Chinas „Seidenstraße“.

Die maltesische Staatsbürgerschaftsbranche wurde jedoch kontrovers diskutiert. Im August 2020 wurde Aldo Cutajar von den maltesischen Behörden festgenommen und beschuldigt, illegal vom Verkauf von Visa in China profitiert und den Erlös gewaschen zu haben. Bei einer Durchsuchung seines Hauses fanden sie mehr als 540.000 Euro in bar und vier Rolex-Uhren. Im folgenden Monat wurde Schembri ebenfalls verhaftet, weil er angeblich Rückschläge vom Verkauf maltesischer Pässe an wohlhabende Russen erhalten hatte.

Mao hat mehrere andere Visa- und Immobilienunternehmen, die sich an wohlhabende chinesische Bürger richten, die im Ausland investieren möchten. Einige davon überschneiden sich mit seiner Arbeit, maltesische Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen zu verkaufen. Dazu gehören Shanghai Bangyi, ein Unternehmen für Visa- und Einwanderungsdienste, und Grandstone Investment, das Vermögensverwaltungsdienste für chinesische Staatsangehörige anbietet, die Geld ins Ausland transferieren möchten.

Die Website bietet ein Portal für direkte Anträge auf das Malta Residence and Visa Program. Er ist sogar Miteigentümer eines maltesischen Unternehmens, Asiatica Corporate Services Ltd, zusammen mit Mizzis persönlichem Anwalt, Aron Mifsud Bonnici, der auch eine Rolle bei der Aushandlung der Windparkinvestitionen von Enemalta spielte. Auf Fragen antwortete Mifsud Bonnici, er kenne Mao “in seiner Eigenschaft als CEO der Shanghai Overseas Exit Entry Services” und habe in seiner Rolle als Anwalt Visumanträge über offizielle Einwanderungssysteme bearbeitet. Mifsud Bonnici sagte, Asiatica sei eröffnet worden, um Visumantragstellern Unternehmensdienstleistungen anzubieten, habe aber nie ein Geschäft generiert. “Daher hat es nie funktioniert und steht jetzt vor der Liquidation”, sagte er.

Er sagte, er kenne Chen als Berater von Shanghai Electric Power und habe ihn “einige Zeit nach meiner Amtszeit als Enemalta-Vorstandssekretär” getroffen. Im Jahr 2019 gründete Maos jüngerer Bruder Mao Haichun zwei maltesische Unternehmen zusammen mit Roderick Cutajar, dem ehemaligen Leiter der Malta Residence Visa Agency, die den weltweiten Verkauf von Aufenthaltsvisa überwacht. Eines ihrer Joint Ventures verkauft seinen Wohnsitz in Malta und anderen europäischen Ländern an chinesische und internationale Käufer. Das andere ist ein verbundenes Immobilienunternehmen. Roderick Cutajar sagte Reportern, dass die Visafirma immVest nicht mit Mao Haibins Shanghai Overseas Entry Exit Service Ltd. verbunden ist.

“Meine Beziehung ist ausschließlich mit immVest International”, sagte er. “Darüber hinaus können Sie sicher sein, dass ich weder mit Aldo Cutajar, Chen Cheng noch mit Macbridge eine persönliche oder geschäftliche Beziehung habe.” In einer Rede, die im Januar dieses Jahres in chinesischen Videoblogs veröffentlicht wurde, äußerte sich Roderick Cutajar lyrisch über Maltas Bestreben, weiterhin chinesisches Kapital und neue Bürger anzuziehen. Er behauptete, China über 40 Mal besucht zu haben und sagte, das Geschäft boomte.

“Unsere Absicht ist es, weiter zu wachsen”, sagte er.

In einer Welt außerhalb Chinas trauert die Familie von Caruana Galizia immer noch um ihren Verlust und sucht nach Gerechtigkeit. Matthew Caruana Galizia sagte, seine Mutter wäre über die neuen Informationen über das Nest der Unternehmen, die sie untersucht hatte, zufrieden gewesen. „Die neuen Enthüllungen bestätigen, was sie wusste und versucht hatte, andere zu erkennen – dass die kriminelle Verstrickung politischer und geschäftlicher Interessen ein wesentliches bestimmendes Problem unserer Zeit ist. Korruption kostet Leben, genauso wie es meine Mutter kostet “, sagte er. “Ich denke, wenn sie am Leben wäre, um dies zu sehen, würde sie ein Gefühl der Erleichterung empfinden, dass ihre Arbeit bestätigt wird und dass sie in ihrem Kampf nicht allein ist.”

Sergei Korolev – First Deputy Director Of The Federal Security Service (FSB) – Ties To Russian Mafia

Federal Security Service - Cheka 2.0 | Warsaw Institute

Vladimir Putin had a meeting with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshkin and Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov. 

The Kremlin, concerned that Alexei Navalny could be an additional source of friction in a system already beginning to grind and groan, is looking for ruthless enforcers. Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin designated a man named Sergei Korolev as first delegate head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the country’s fundamental security office.

Preceding acquiring this significant level position, Korolev headed the FSB’s Economic Security Service, and before that, the office’s Directorate of Internal Security. That is the place where the authority variant of his life story closes.

Yet, iStories talked with Korolev’s colleagues — who can’t be named in this story for security reasons — and analyzed records from a few prominent criminal cases in which his name showed up.

Incidentally, he has individual associations with a few notable heads of the Russian criminal hidden world who have been blamed for kidnappings and agreement murders. Despite the fact that a few insights regarding these connections have showed up in the press, this appeared to have no impact on his vocation. In fact, his associates’ regard for him appears just to have developed.

Korolev was brought into the world in 1962 in Frunze, the Soviet name for the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek.

As per a few of his colleagues, he came from a military family with great associations: His late dad was chasing pals with Viktor Zubkov, who worked with Vladimir Putin in the St. Petersburg city hall leader’s office in the mid 1990s, later filled in as head administrator, and now seats the leading group of the state oil goliath Gazprom.

Korolev’s previous partners, just as individuals from other law implementation organizations who encountered him, say that, notwithstanding his associations, Korolev’s own profession was based on being “a keen usable” — a high type of recognition in law requirement circles.

In any case, Korolev’s vocation has likewise been interspersed by numerous public disclosures that he has associations with hidden world figures. On the off chance that these clearly affected his ascent to the top, he may have Putin’s group of friends to thank for it.

One such emergency happened in 2004. That March, criminal agents from the St. Petersburg police confined Oleg Makovoz, a financial specialist from Irkutsk, an area in Siberia, who introduces himself as an individual of note and lawmaker. He even ran for parliament at a certain point. Yet, as indicated by the police examination, Makovoz was an individual from a criminal gathering situated in his home area.

The gathering Makovoz had a place with was established in the city of Bratsk in the Irkutsk district, however after some time it extended to different areas of Russia, including St. Petersburg. Russian media, including state outlets, distinguished its chief as a money manager named Vladimir Tyurin — nicknamed “Tyurik.” The United States endorsed him for his crimes in 2017.

In St. Petersburg, Makovoz ran a security firm that utilized previous uncommon powers faculty who had been associated with a progression of prominent agreement murders. (He was subsequently condemned to 23 years in jail for seizing, exotortion, and the homicide of another criminal chief.)

At the time the relationship arose, Korolev was working in the FSB’s Economic Security Service for St. Petersburg and the encompassing area, where his undertakings included battling coordinated wrongdoing and administering law implementation organizations. However, police agents discovered he was additionally speaking with Makovoz during this period. The relationship had all the earmarks of being a commonly valuable one.

With all due respect, Korolev’s associates say that Makovoz was an important wellspring of data, and that the connection among agents and their sources is quite possibly the most perplexing, even philosophical, parts of insight work. To get significant data, one should offer something as a trade off — and it’s not in every case simple to adhere to a meaningful boundary in the perfect spot.

Also, sources said, the Makovoz case was important for a bigger conflict of impact between the police and the FSB in St. Petersburg. At that point, they said, Korolev was fighting with Vladislav Piotrovsky, who headed the city’s criminal police power. In such conflicts, it’s basic for rival sides to dishonor each other by intentionally misrepresenting current realities or introducing them in an uneven manner.

Regardless, because of the Makovoz case, Korolev was moved to the Federal Tax Service. Its head at the time was Anatoly Serdyukov — the child in-law of Korolev’s dad’s old chasing accomplice, Viktor Zubkov. Afterward, Serdyukov became safeguard pastor and Korolev turned into his counsel. Be that as it may, as additional occasions appeared, Korolev kept up his binds with the criminal hidden world of St. Petersburg.

In 2008, Spanish police directed an enormous scope exceptional activity called Troika that brought about the capture of “heads of the Russian mafia,” as the Spanish media portrayed them. Among those captured was Gennady Petrov, a notable St. Petersburg money manager.

In 2010, Spanish specialists delivered Petrov on bail. A brief timeframe later, he and another suspect, Leonid Khristoforov, got back to their local St. Petersburg for clinical treatment and never returned to Spain, regardless of promising to do as such. They were put on a worldwide needed rundown, however the case flamed out. Russian specialists answered to the Spanish court that they don’t had anything to accuse them of, and they were never compelled to return.

Russian law implementation had their purposes behind not aiding their Spanish partners, as indicated by insightful materials seen by columnists.

As per wiretaps of Petrov’s telephone discussions, the supposed coordinated wrongdoing figure was in contact with a portion of Russia’s most elevated positioning authorities, including then-Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, and numerous others. In his discussions, Petrov alluded to Zubkov and Serdyukov naturally as “Vitya” and “Tolik.”

Petrov was likewise on close footing with high-positioning law implementation authorities. One champion among them was a man who shows up in the wiretaps simply by the epithets “Boltai-Noga” or “Gulai-Noga” (which could be interpreted as “Shakefoot” or “Wanderfoot”).

As indicated by wiretaps distributed in 2019 by The Insider, this strange Shakefoot worked for Defense Minister Serdyukov, and worked with him to help Petrov push through the arrangement of specific individuals to key government positions.

For instance, Petrov effectively examined with his conversationalists the arrangement of Alexander Bastrykin to seat the Investigative Committee, Russia’s top law authorization body. In 2007, the day Bastrykin’s nomination was affirmed by the Federation Council, Petrov called Leonid Khristoforov, who had been captured alongside him in Spain:

“The man has been selected,” he said. “Keep in mind, I advised you? So that is it — he’s been designated. Exceptionally high up,” Petrov boasted.

“Gracious, great!” Khristoforov answered.

Around the same time, Petrov got a call from a man alluded to as “Nikolaevich.”

“You found out about Sasha [Alexander Bastrykin], right?” Nikolaevich advised him. “That is it, they’ve designated him.”

“Great, my gosh,” Petrov cheered.

This “Nikolayevich” ended up being Nikolay Aulov, at that point a senior Interior Ministry official. Materials from the Spanish criminal case show that a similar Shakefoot had helped Aulov himself get advanced. The year after this discussion occurred, in 2008, Aulov became representative overseer of the Federal Service for Drug Control.

So who was the puzzling and powerful Shakefoot, who assisted Petrov with getting individuals delegated to the most noteworthy government positions? The Insider proposed that he was, indeed, Sergei Korolev. This end depended on a few bits of proof:

Like Korolev, Shakefoot filled in as a counsel to Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov.

Like Korolev, Shakefoot’s first name is Sergei.

Like Korolev, Shakefoot was associated with the FSB: Petrov reminded his child not to neglect to compliment Shakefoot on December 20, State Security Agents’ Day.

Like Korolev, Shakefoot’s birthday is July 25.

iStories discovered extra pieces of information that the man behind the moniker “Shakefoot” could be Korolev. In November 2007, Gennady Petrov called his child Anton:

“Recently I went to see Shakefoot. There was this… Minaev, a shooter, a rifleman,” Petrov said to his child.

“That is his appointee,” Anton Petrov reacted.

“Ok, I didn’t have the foggiest idea. I asked him: ‘Is he a general?’ He says: ‘No, a rifleman.'”

“He chooses a ton of things for him. His right-hand man. They say he knows nothing about the work, yet he’s his correct hand,” Petrov’s child said.

In this discussion, Gennady Petrov in all likelihood stirred up the last name of the individual he met when he saw Shakefoot. Scarcely any individuals fit the depiction of the marksman he met just as Igor Medoev, who filled in as Sergei Korolev’s delegate in the Defense Ministry. Before that he had procured popularity as probably the best expert sharpshooter in the country as an individual from the FSB’s Special Purpose Center, a counter-psychological oppression unit.

SergeiKorolev1

Sergei Korolev

Shakefoot was a wary man. He liked to determine issues in eye to eye gatherings with Petrov, not on the telephone. In any case, on one event, Spanish law authorization specialists figured out how to record his voice. In July 2007, as indicated by the wiretap distributed by The Insider, the more youthful Petrov called his dad, at that point gave the collector to Shakefoot so he could actually welcome him to his birthday celebration:

“Good tidings, Sergei,” Petrov advised him. “I have a major solicitation, that for my 60th birthday celebration, you should be there.”

“I will be there,” Shakefoot answered.

Columnists played this chronicle to two individuals who know Korolev, and both affirmed decisively that it was his voice on the tape. They said that Korolev and Petrov keep on imparting right up ’til the present time, “as all of St. Petersburg knows.”

In 2018, Austria removed to Russia a man named Aslan Gagiev, who is blamed by Russian law authorization for heading a coordinated criminal gathering and requesting murders. As per Russian agents, “the criminal association made and headed by Gagiev started its exercises in 2004 and had in excess of 50 members. Because of crime, 60 individuals were slaughtered in Moscow, the Moscow locale, and the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania.”

Notwithstanding, as Novaya Gazeta detailed in 2018, Gagiyev’s gathering was not a commonplace criminal affiliation. Calling themselves “The Family,” they considered themselves to be an arm of the equity framework that filled in when Russian law implementation organizations didn’t take care of their responsibilities. A few individuals from the “Family” even truly accepted that they were a characterized unit of the FSB.

They did in some cases give a type of equity — though vicious and extrajudicial — to casualties of wrongdoings overlooked by the state. For instance, the Family focused on individuals from a posse that kidnapped youngsters in North Ossetia during the 2000s. The head of this pack was politically associated, which clearly loaned them a level of assurance from law authorization. In any case, when the Family took up the case and began killing gangsters, the kidnappings halted.

In any case, they didn’t just execute rough crooks. Spectators and individuals made up for lost time in monetary debates were additionally focused by The Family. Gangsters likewise turned on one another, dreading disloyalty from the inside.

In any case, Gagiev was famous and regarded in North and South Ossetia, where he was known as Big Brother. He participated in the raging of the school seized by fear mongers in Beslan in 2004, battled close by his “Family” in the 2008 conflict in Georgia, and accomplished cause work.

At the point when Russia looked for his removal from Austria, Gagiyev and his legal advisors demanded that he would be in extraordinary peril there on the grounds that he had been recently tormented by FSB agents. (An autonomous Austrian master affirmed this subsequent to inspecting Gagiyev’s wounds).

There is just a single positive reference to a Russian government employee in Gagiyev’s declaration to the Austrian court. Gagiyev didn’t give his last name, however depicted the man with appreciation and regard.

Aslan Gagiev

“I was removed from Russia by the top of the 10th help of the FSB. He said there was no way to help me. He said: ‘There is an answer.’ He gave me 10,000 dollars and concluded that this was the solitary thing he could assist me with,” Gagiev told the Austrian court, as per records acquired by journalists.

By the “10th help” of the FSB, Gagiyev doubtlessly implied the Directorate of Internal Security, which at the time was going by Korolev. A few sources affirmed to correspondents that Korolev and Gagiev knew each other well.

For what reason would Korolev help Big Brother? As indicated by sources, Korolev owed something to Gagiyev, who once helped him in a basic circumstance. The idea of that circumstance is obscure, however Gagiyev frequently took a chance with his life to save others. For instance, on one event he intentionally submitted himself as a prisoner to Chechen contenders who had captured a young lady to acquire a payoff from her family. The guerrillas let the young lady go, and Big Brother sat in a pit for ten days until they were paid off.

The FSB initiative knew that Gagiev and Korolev knew one another. At the point when the Gagiev case was being examined in the media, Korolev was purportedly brought by the head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, as per one of Korolev’s associates.

“Another person would have begun to mess about, to attempt to create something, however [Korolev] clarified everything clearly. He acted like a man,” his associate reviewed proudly.

Furthermore, this is the primary secret of Korolev’s character. At whatever point his bargaining associations became visible, he appeared to pull off them, however emerged from the circumstance with a far and away superior standing among his partners.

While chipping away at this story, columnists more than once asked Korolev’s associates: “How is it possible that he would be designated representative FSB chief while having such countless associations among hidden world pioneers?”

Both Korolev’s companions and previous adversaries addressed generally similarly: “Who isn’t without wrongdoing? In any event [Korolev] has never sold out anybody. The president likes such individuals.”

In this sense, Putin’s work force strategy bears little likeness to the standards of law and order. Maybe, it all the more intently takes after the rationale of criminal supervisors, for whom faithfulness is a competitor’s principle advantage.

Korolev didn’t react to demands for input.

Berlin Murder – New Intel On FSB Involvement Exposed

  • In a series of investigations in 2019 and 2020, Bellingcat, along with its investigative partners The Insider and Der Spiegel, identified the person suspected in the August 2019 assassination of Georgian asylum seeker Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Berlin. The suspected assassin, who traveled to Berlin under the name of Vadim Sokolov, a Russian citizen, was arrested by Berlin police shortly after the killing and is currently on trial at the Berlin appellate court (Kammergericht).
  • Our initial investigation found that the passport on which the arrested suspect traveled was state-issued, but linked to an inauthentic identity; and that a man with the particulars of “Vadim Sokolov” did not exist in Russian registries prior to 2019. We concluded that this cover identity – which had obtained a full set of matching presence in all kinds of Russian registries, including the tax registry, in 2019 – could only have been issued by the Russian authorities.
  • Subsequently, we were able to match the suspect to the real identity of Vadim Krasikov, 56, a person whom Russian investigators placed on an international search in connection with a 2013 murder. The Interpol search warrant had been withdrawn in 2015. Our identification was based largely on geographically overlapping use of telephones used by “Vadim Sokolov” and Vadim Krasikov as well as on facial comparison of a black-and-white photograph of Krasikov to the arrest mugshots and visa application photos of “Vadim Sokolov”.
  • Based on analysis of telephone metadata, we found that prior to his trip to Berlin, Vadim Krasikov had been communicating intensively with members of the Vympel group of companies – comprised primarily of former FSB Spetsnaz officers – and had visited secure FSB training facilities in the immediate eve of his trip to Germany.
  • Largely in reliance of Bellingcat’s investigations, German prosecutors have indicted Vadim Krasikov as a killer who acted on behalf of the Russian state, and in particular the country’s security service – the FSB. The case is currently in trial phase at first-instance court in Berlin, and a verdict is expected in the first half of 2021. The prosecution believes that there is overwhelming forensic evidence that the detained suspect is in fact the assassin – including DNA match with items disposed of by the killer in the Spree river. However, the killing’s connection to Russian state largely hinges on the case that “Vadim Sokolov” and Vadim Krasikov are the same person. 
  • The accused maintains that his name is Vadim Sokolov, that he was a tourist in Berlin, and that he is not aware of a Vadim Krasikov. The defense lawyers argue that the evidence of identity of the two personas is inconclusive, and is based solely on a facial comparison.

New data freshly obtained by Ukrainian law enforcement and passed on to German investigators strongly supports the key premise of Bellingcat’s identification, and removes more or less any residual uncertainty that “Sokolov” and Krasikov are the same person. This data was obtained during a special operation of Ukrainian law enforcement in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city and the hometown of Vadim Krasikov’s wife. According to sources of our investigative partner Spiegel, the new data has been passed to German law enforcement in the last few days. Spiegel obtained some of the documents and photographs from the new data set and shared them with Bellingcat.

Тhe new data includes photographs from what appears to be a 2010 wedding album of Vadim Krasikov and his current wife. They also include a marriage certificate, showing the husband’s name as “Vadim Krasikov”.

The color photographs, which have been reviewed by us, provide multiple new samples of Vadim Krasikov’s face from different perspectives, making a facial comparison significantly more reliable than by use of the original black-and-white photos that we previously obtained. The identity match using the new photographs in Microsoft’s Azure tool is even higher, with a matching factor of 0.88902 (this factor is very high given the 10 year difference between the photographs and the facial hair changes; similar comparisons using photos with a 10-year gap of the of the same person yield results between 0.75 and 0.9).

A screen grab of facial comparison results using the Microsoft Azure tool.

Crucially, the newly obtained collection of photographs includes an image of Vadim Krasikov sitting on a beach in a baseball cap and a tank top. Visible in the photograph is a large tattoo on his left shoulder. This tattoo is identical to the tattoo seen on the shoulder of “Vadim Sokolov”, from a police custody photograph obtained previously by the Dossier Center.

Left, a tattoo on the arm of Vadim Sokolov. Right, a picture of Vadim Krasikov.

The near-perfect match is not only based on the exact same pattern of the tattoo and its identical placement on the same spot on the left upper arm in both photographs. A close-up comparison of the skin under the tattoo shows multiple overlapping skin artefacts, such as freckles, moles and scars.

A comparison of tattoos detailed in pictures of Vadim Sokolov and Vadim Krasikov.

Importantly, the German indictment documents as well as a police file describing the arrested “Sokolov” refer to a second tattoo – of a snake – on his lower right arm. This is compatible with a tattoo partially visible on the lower right arm of Krasikov’s beach photo.

A second tattoo on the arm of Vadim Krasikov.

The new photographs provided by Ukrainian authorities to German prosecutors present a new set of data points that make the identification of the accused as Vadim Krasikov even more robust than before. Furthermore, they provide an important second independent source for this verification. Notably, many of the wedding album photographs show Krasikov in the presence of his wife, his parents and in-laws – thus linking the person from the photographs to the name of Vadim Krasikov that is seen in the marriage certificate.

New Indications of an FSB link

As reported in our previous investigations, in the months following the killing of Khangoshvili and the arrest of Vadim Krasikov, metadata of the telephone previously used by Krasikov shows that that number continued communicating with a burner number which had not called Krasikov before the Berlin trip.

Our working hypothesis was that following his departure, Krasikov’s number was used by his wife – this was corroborated by the geolocation data that showed the phone stayed within the home base of Krasikov’s apartment, and occasionally moved in sync with his wife’s phone number. Krasikov’s telephone moved in the direction of Domodedovo airport on 6 December 2019 and was turned off permanently at approximately noon on that day. Our assumption was that the burner number belonged to one of Krasikov’s supervisors from the Vympel group – Evgeny Eroshkin, a senior former FSB special operations officer.

By tracing the burner number’s geolocation on that day, we discovered that it also moved towards Domodedovo airport, and later that day reappeared in Simferopol – the main city and airport on the Crimean peninsula.

By analysing the flights between Domodedovo and Simferopol airports on that day, we were able to narrow down the potential flights to only one that matched the switch-off and switch-on times of the burner number. We then obtained the passenger manifest of this flight.

In the passenger list, we discovered, as we suspected, Evgeny Eroshkin – confirming our hypothesis that he was the owner of the burner number. We also identified two other passengers – appearing to be a woman and her daughter. The woman and the child’s first names matched those of Krasikov’s wife and daughter, however the last name was different (per our editorial policy we do not publish names of relatives of our investigation subjects).

Notably, the birth date of the woman was exactly one year older than that of Krasikov’s wife.

This is a pattern of false-identity creation that appears to be preferred by the FSB; and we have previously identified and reported on this in the case of the FSB poison squad that tailed Alexei Navalny. The passport number on which the woman traveled had a prefix of 45 that means that it would have been issued in Moscow.

We verified if a person with this name and birthdate exists in any Russian databases, and the result was negative. This, together with the naming and birthdate pattern, plus the full match of the child’s birthdate with that of Krasikov’s child, corroborated our hypothesis that the Russian authorities had issued a new identity to Vadim Krasikov’s family, and had provided them with an FSB “handler”. Indeed, travel data for Mr. Eroshkin shows that he traveled from Moscow to Crimea at least once every month since that initial trip in December 2019, and used this burner phone almost exclusively for communication with a new burner number that we believe is used by Ms. Krasikova.

Notably, the passport number issued for the new, fake identity of Vadim Krasikov’s wife shows that it is not a regular number issued in 2019. The numbering of the passport (45044201**) indicates that it was issued in Moscow in 2004 or early 2005 (long before Ms. Krasikova moved from Ukraine to Russia in 2009). More importantly, the passport number appears to be from a series of sequentially numbered passports issued to FSB undercover operatives. For instance, a number from the same series and only a few numbers apart was used by “Sergey Lukashevich”, a cover persona who in 2015 served as Minister of State Security of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. Multiple media reports and witness testimony confirm that the so-called Ministry of State Security was staffed by FSB undercover operatives.

A screengrab showing travel details and passport number of “Sergey Lukashevich”.

Other passports from the same numbering range belong to other non-existing personas, some of which flew on joint bookings with members of the closest entourage of former Ukrainian president Yanukovich.

These new findings corroborate even further our previous conclusion that the FSB had a direct involvement in the preparation and commissioning of the Berlin assassination, and in the cover-up of the evidence after the killing. This, apparently, includes issuing cover identities for Krasikov’s family members and moving them to Crimea, where they appear to be in direct contact with an FSB handler.

The FSB Handler

Based on leaked 2017 employment data, Evgeny Eroshkin, born 1963, is an employee of Vympel Sodeystvie, one of the many Vympel-named private security companies formally owned by Eduard Bendersky. As written earlier, Bendersky is a former FSB Spetsnaz commander who owns a cluster of security-themed companies that boast of being able to “resolve any issue as complex as it may be” and being incorporated by former FSB special service officers. A review of recent airline travel data shows that in 2015 and 2016 Bendersky flew on joint bookings with Col. Gen. Alexey Sedov, Director of FSB’s 2nd Service.

Evgeny Eroshkin, photo from visa application.

In the months before the Khangoshvili assassination, Evgeny Eroshkin communicated by phone intensively with two of the suspects in the murder case: the accused, Vadim Krasikov, and the second suspect Roman Demyanchenko. As described above, our findings indicate that he also communicated frequently and traveled with Krasikov’s presumed wife after Krasikov was detained in Germany, implying that he had at least some degree of involvement in the preparation and clean-up operation after the Berlin attack.

However, data from a 2019 visa application submitted by Eroshkin suggests he may have had plans for more than just a remote involvement in this operation. Data from Schengen’s visa database seen by us shows that on 27 February 2019 Eroshkin applied – under his real name – for a Schengen visa at the Consulate of Greece in Moscow. He requested a multi-entry visa to travel to Europe in the period from 26 April 2019 until 26 October 2019.

However, the Greek consulate did not honor this request, and on the following day – 28 February 2019 – granted him a one-time visa valid only for 17 days during the period from 26 April to 27 May 2019.

Travel records for Eroshkin show that he chose not to use this visa, and did not travel to the Schengen area. Instead, on the day he received the shorter-than-expected visa, he initiated his first phone call to Vadim Krasikov. They had 28 phone interactions in the following five months, the last one just days before his trip to Berlin.

Relevance of Findings

The newly obtained data provided by Ukrainian authorities to the German investigators may become a crucial component in the prosecution’s case. If the new data makes its way to the evidence file of the ongoing court case – which is nearing its final phase – it may be enough to convince the court that “Vadim Sokolov” does not exist, and that on the eve of the assassination, the Russian state issued fake identity documents to Vadim Krasikov. This would strengthen the prosecution’s case that the killing was commissioned by the Russian state. The court will then have to weigh the voluminous – while circumstantial – evidence that Krasikov acted on behalf of the Russian state against the defendant’s continued silence.

In the latest court hearing , the court heard from a police officer to whom the defendant had earlier said that his mother could confirm his identity as “Sokolov”. The presiding judge offered the accused to provide name and contact details for his mother so she could be contacted to testify that he is who he says he is. The defendant’s lawyer quickly intervened and said that his client will continue to use his legal right to remain silent.

If a court verdict does corroborate the prosecution’s indictment, a new set of diplomatic sanctions from Germany are expected. The German government has already committed to further, harsher sanctions against Russia if the court verdict confirms the accusation of state involvement in Khangoshvili’s assassination.

Source:Bellingcat

Colombia Sentences Guerilla Killer of 3 El Comercio Journalists to 29 Years in Prison

Colombia Identifies Bodies Of Murdered El Comercio Staff | News | teleSUR  English

A Colombian court tracked down an individual from a guerilla bunch blameworthy of taking part in the abducting and the homicide of a writer team and sent him in the slammer for almost 29 years, the country’s Prosecution Office reported.

Journalist Javier Ortega, picture taker Paúl Rivas and driver Efraín Segarra were revealing for the El Comercio paper when they were confined in 2018 in the Ecuadorian region of Esmeraldas by individuals from “Oliver Sinisterra,” a group that split from the FARC guerrillas in 2016, the year that agitator bunch marked a harmony manage the Colombian government.

The court condemned Jesús Vargas Cuajiboy, false name Reinel, an individual from the “Olivier Sinisterra,” to 28 years and 8 months in jail, Javier García Trochez of the Prosecution Office’s coordinated violations office said at a public interview.

Reinel watched the casualties during the kidnapping until nom de plume Guacho, the then head of the dissenter structure, requested their murdering. The groups of the three were discovered days after the fact.

Confronted with overpowering proof, Reinel acknowledged his duty regarding the killings and appologized to the casualty’s families from the Cómbita greatest security jail in Boyacá.

The case will probably see more suspects in court, including Gustavo Angulo Arboleda, moniker Cherry, and Gustavo Ospina Hernández, false name Barbas.

In Berlin Putin’s Deputy Kadyrov Terrorizes Chechen Refugees

Germany has a populace of a huge number of Chechens. The greater part of them have shown up in the course of recent years looking for refuge. Meduza has distributed a report on how Chechens endeavor getting to the European Union by intersection the line among Belarus and Poland. At Meduza’s solicitation, Dmitry Vachedin, a columnist presently dwelling in Germany, has examined the existence of Berlin’s Chechen people group and learned of an outfitted posse, the individuals from which undermine their comrades with death for indecent lead.

On a late September evening in 2016, bare photos of twenty-year-old Madina* were messaged as once huge mob from her taken cellphone to each individual on her contact list. After an hour, the telephone rang in her loft in a calm private piece of Berlin.

Madina was the one to reply; she perceived her uncle’s voice. The incensed uncle proclaimed that he would not talk with “the whore” and requested that she call her mom and father to the telephone. The young lady woke her folks. In her quality, the family led a gathering on her destiny. The uncle, who lived in another European nation, recommended that the issue be addressed “inside the family” and that the young lady be returned to their country and executed there. The uncle by and by elected to submit the homicide and surprisingly offered to come to Chechnya, however the whole family had needed to escape the republic back in 2010 because of a contention with nearby specialists. Thus, it was settled that Madina and her mom would take a trip to Chechnya that very morning to meet her uncle, who might play out the execution.

While her uncle got down to booking tickets, her mom was to monitor Madina in order to guarantee that the youngster didn’t flee. Her mom gathered and concealed Madina’s papers and afterward hit the hay in the kid’s room; her uncle intended to call before the morning namaz, which was around six o’clock. The ladies spent the remainder of the night peacefully; Madina’s mom wouldn’t converse with her. The two of them faked rest. At around six, her uncle called and educated them that he had purchased morning tickets from Berlin to Grozny with an exchange in Moscow.

At 6:31 AM sharp, when her mom left the space to wake her dad, Madina snatched her mom’s cellphone and called the police. She disclosed to the administrator that she was a Muslim whose guardians had quite recently discovered that she had a sweetheart (in fact, this was false, yet she was shy of time) and now needed to kill her. She gave her location and hung up. police were at their doorstep with seven minutes. Madina reviews that, after seeing the police, her mom began embracing her. In her nightgown, without her assets or papers, Madina left for a ladies’ home for survivors of misuse.

She didn’t call her folks for seven days. They addressed her benevolent, saying they were sorry to have terrified her. After fourteen days, she got back. When she entered her loft, her mom beat her up, trim her hair, made her put on a burqa and took her to see a gynecologist. After the gynecologist expressed that Madina was as yet a virgin, the family chose to secure her until the seniors made up their brains about her destiny. After seven days, the young lady figured out how to get away – again with the assistance of police – who removed her on the guise of exploring the robbery of her cellphone.

This, nonetheless, was not the finish of her difficulty. At the point when Madina ventured out from home, her case quit being a familial issue and turned into a shared one. As indicated by Madina, it is presently the obligation of any Chechen man, paying little mind to his connections to her of her family or scarcity in that department, to discover her and rebuff her. In Berlin, there is has a pack of Chechens professing to be accountable for such matters. “There is no such law; it is not their issue to worry about,” says Madina. “Yet, it’s an unwritten set of principles.”

“Having sworn on the Quran, we go out onto the roads”

Toward the beginning of May, a video was dispersed across WhatsApp channels utilized by Germany’s Chechen people group. The video comprised of a foundation photograph of an equipped, concealed man with his weapon pointing at the camera. A male voice conveyed the accompanying message in Chechen: “As-salamu alaykum, Muslim siblings and sisters. Here, in Europe, certain Chechen ladies and men who appear as though ladies do unspeakable things. You know it; I know it; everyone knows it. This is the reason we thusly pronounce: For now, there are around 80 of us. [More] individuals will join. The individuals who have lost their nohchalla (note: public character or attitude), who play with men of other ethnic gatherings and wed them, Chechen ladies who have picked some unacceptable way and those [creatures] who call themselves Chechen men – given a large portion of an opportunity, we will sort every one of them out. Having sworn on the Quran, we go out onto the roads. This is our statement of plan; don’t say that you were not cautioned; don’t say that you didn’t have the foggiest idea. May Allah award us harmony and set our feet on the way towards equity.”

As indicated by sources, this statement was perused by an agent of a Berlin-based group of around 100 individuals, headed by previous partners in crime of Dzhokhar Dudayev – a Chechen dissident pioneer. The “activists” have thrashed at any rate two Chechen young ladies in the previous fourteen days alone. (One of them is an occupant of the Berlin ward of Neukölln). All Berliners of Chechen cause met know about the pack’s presence.

Our interviewees have conceded that in any event half of populace of neighborhood single Chechen young ladies have sufficient data on their cellphones to be considered “liable”. Partner with men of different identities, smoking, drinking liquor, visiting hookah parlors, discotheques, or even open pools can cause mutual rage. A solitary photo in a public WhatsApp talk can pariah a whole family and the remainder of the local area would be obliged to stop all correspondence with them. With everybody under doubt and everybody answerable for each other, Chechen young ladies say they are here and there drew nearer by outsiders in the road who reprimand them for their appearance, including for wearing splendid lipstick. The burglary of a cellphone and the ensuing posting of bargaining material is a hard blow; the shamed individual has nobody to go to and the person who posted the casualty’s photographs doesn’t hazard anything.

Meduza’s interviewees have noted on numerous events that assumptions for conduct are more unbending and exacting in Chechen traveler networks than in Chechnya itself, where young ladies are even permitted to wear short skirts. This marvel has been named “an opposition in uprightness” between the counter Kadyrov European exile local area and Kadyrov-managed Chechnya: each gathering looks for demonstrate that they address “equitable” Chechens. In any case, their implicit rules share a ton practically speaking. “On the off chance that Kadyrov discovers, he will send his men to take me to Chechnya,” fears a Chechen young lady who lives in Berlin and is dating an outsider.

In the fall of 2016, a youthful Chechen lady who later imparted her story to Meduza was recorded on record while strolling down the road and chatting conversing with a non-Chechen man. That very evening, two or three dozen obscure Chechen men drove up to her home in northern Berlin. The man she had the dauntlessness to be seen with was severely beaten; he had practically the entirety of his teeth took out. The young lady figured out how to stow away.

“So here I am figuring: for what reason does my private life concern [them] by any stretch of the imagination? I don’t have any acquaintance with them. I would prefer not to. I’m not their sister or girl. My private life is nobody else’s business,” says the interviewee. As indicated by her and different Chechens, disregarding these dangers, there are to an ever increasing extent “violators” of the ethical code: Chechen young ladies go to German schools, whose educational programs remember classes for sexual training, or German language courses, where they meet individuals of different societies.

Two young ladies disclosed to Meduza that they took a stab at wearing a hijab and sticking to Chechen customs, yet proved unable “stand the pietism of having a twofold existence.” “Even in a hijab, I was known as a whore, for example, for wearing eye make-up. Also, I thought: ‘Who am I attempting to please?'” said one of the young ladies. “To acquire everybody’s regard, you need to put on a headscarf, bring down your eyes, and never venture out from home. In any case, who might need such a day to day existence?” ponders the other.

Following her second getaway from her family, Madina is sequestered from everything from the Chechen people group. She has shaved her head and wears hued contact focal points; she expects to change her name and go through plastic medical procedure. “In the event that you don’t change your name and your face, they will chase you down and execute you,” she says. There is basically no chance to get out for her: to change her name, she needs to apply to a Russian enlistment office, which would be just about as great as handing herself over. In spite of the fact that she moved on from a German secondary school without a hitch, the young lady barely at any point leaves her condo. It is essentially risky. “I would prefer not to be Chechen any longer,” she says.

It is difficult to evaluate the genuine number of Chechens living in Berlin. As per paper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany has acknowledged 36,000 Chechens in the previous five years alone. Most of them have remained in Berlin and the encompassing province of Brandenburg, notwithstanding specialists’ endeavors to urge their resettlement to Bavaria. In 2013, the city organization even took a stab at “excepting”

Berlin for Chechen outcasts to forestall the arrangement of an excessively huge ethnic local area nearby. According to the current circumstance, this endeavor was a long way from effective. Despite the fact that Chechen evacuees have a genuinely slim likelihood of being allowed refuge – in 2016, just 2.8 percent of shelter demands were conceded – the local area isn’t becoming any more modest. As per Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, mass removals to Poland (the central matter of passage for Chechens to Germany) or Russia are not normal: in 2016, just 110 Chechen.

How Russia Goes After Its Critics & Citizens Abroad

When it comes to carrying out repressions, the Russian government’s reach isn’t limited by its own borders. The Kremlin is known for going after perceived enemies abroad — especially former “insiders” and members of the political opposition. In recent years, high-profile assassinations linked to Russian agents have made headlines around the world, and Moscow has developed a reputation for abusing the Interpol notice system.

At the same time, those who flee Russia’s Chechen Republic are particularly at risk. Under regional leader Ramzan Kadyrov, this sub-national regime has carried out a unique and concerted campaign to control the Chechen diaspora. Moreover, asylum seekers from the Russian North Caucasus who seek refuge in European countries are now faced with rising xenophobia, as well as tightening migration policies that threaten to send them back to Russia.

To find out more about how the Russian — and Chechen — authorities carry out repressive activities beyond Russia’s borders, “The Naked Pravda” spoke to Nate Schenkkan, director for research strategy at Freedom House, and Kateryna Sergatskova, the editor-in-chief of Zaborona Media.

“The Naked Pravda” comes out on Saturdays (or sometimes Fridays). Catch every new episode by subscribing at Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Google Podcasts, or other platforms. If you have a question or comment about the show, please write to Kevin Rothrock at kevin@meduza.io with the subject line: “The Naked Pravda.”

Suleiman Gezmakhmaev – “I Served in the Chechen Police and Didn’t Want to Kill People.”

Wedding in the Caucasus: The US Ambassador Learns that Cognac Is Like Wine  - DER SPIEGEL
Ramzan Kadyrov

On Monday, March 15, the paper Novaya Gazeta distributed a report by columnist Elena Milashina, named “I Served in the Chechen Police and Didn’t Want to Kill People.” The story highlights disclosures from Suleiman Gezmakhmaev, a previous official in Chechnya’s Akhmat Kadyrov Police Patrol Service Regiment, about how his unit executed a few local people in mid 2017. He says he helped capture and investigate a portion of these individuals, however he denies taking part in their torment and murder. Prior to distributing Gezmakhmaev’s story, Novaya Gazeta and its accomplices encouraged him and his family escape Russia. In the article, Milashina portrays in detail how she associated with Gezmakhmaev, what he did in the Chechen police, how the executions occurred, and which job high-positioning police authorities supposedly played in the killings.

Columnist Elena Milashina says she got a letter in September 2017 through her companion Musa Lomaev from a Chechen man who’d escaped Russia and was presently looking for haven in Germany. In the letter, the man depicted the torment and murder of prisoners in January 2017 at a base for the Akhmat Kadyrov Police Patrol Service Regiment. Milashina mentioned a gathering with the letter’s creator, and he concurred, incredibly. They initially met in Hamburg in September 2017. That is the way Milashina got familiar with Suleiman Gezmakhmaev.

In April 2017, along with his significant other and their two kids, Gezmakhmaev escaped Chechnya for the European Union through Belarus. At that point, his previous partners in the police were searching for him. The family shown up first in Poland and afterward arrived at Germany. In June 2017, German relocation authorities talked with Gezmakhmaev about his explanations behind leaving Russia. He portrayed the executions in Chechnya however declined to name the authorities capable, stressed that his declaration could arrive at Russian authorities and become an issue in the event that he was denied refuge and compelled to get back to Russia. At last, Germany dismissed his refuge application on the detail that he expected to apply in Poland, where he and his family previously entered the EU. (The Gezmakhmaevs proceeded onward from Poland since it’s by and large a lot harder to get refuge there.)

Novaya Gazeta consented to help them discover asylum elsewhere, however this implied the family required first to get back to Russia.

For eighteen months, Gezmakhmaev and his family did precisely that, living covertly in an asylum given by common liberties activists, never leaving their home, never speaking with family members, and living altogether without the Internet. All through this time, attorneys at the Committee Against Torture recorded long periods of video interviews with Gezmakhmaev. Novaya Gazeta underscores that he gave declaration about the killings not in return for shelter abroad but rather on the grounds that “this horrendous wrongdoing, wherein he was additionally included, burdened him.”

Suleiman Gezmakhmaev was brought into the world in 1989 in the Chechen town of Achkhoy-Martan, around 30 miles southwest of Grozny. After grade school, he began working and never headed off to college. In 2011, he joined the police power. “The military was far off for Chechens. Development, driving a taxi, or the police — those were the alternatives,” he says. Gezmakhmaev turned into an expert rifleman in a police unit named after Akhmat Kadyrov and partook in purported “counterterrorist tasks” (KTOs).

In the help, Gezmakhmaev says he discovered that Chechen police polish off injured agitators in the field. “No one in Chechnya needs a genuine, breathing radical — under torment, they can say excessively,” he clarified. Officials informally gathered their weapons and utilized them to incite augmentations of their counterterrorist tasks by discharging at police designated spots or military units. Gezmakhmaev says law requirement depend on KTOs for subsidizing and execution pointers. The police even killed guiltless onlookers, once in a while during a genuine counterterrorist activity, however it’s simpler “just to abduct somebody and hold him in a cellar until his facial hair growth becomes out, prior to bringing him into the woodland dressed as a guerilla and dispensing with him,” clarifies Gezmakhmaev.

In 2012, Gezmakhmaev saw one of these killings firsthand. During a routine KTO, one of his kindred officials was on night obligation when he heard a man shout. The following morning, there was the sound of shots. Gezmakhmaev and a few different officials were subsequently educated that a radical had been killed in the wake of opposing the police, however Gezmakhmaev says he perceived the dead man: “It was a similar person they brought to our storm cellar a month prior. He was exceptionally pale and totally shaggy.” After this episode, Gezmakhmaev says he began keeping away from KTO tasks.

Lawfully, the Akhmat Kadyrov Police Patrol Service Regiment does not have the position to capture individuals and hold them in confinement on the unit’s own grounds, yet officials did it in any case, wearing the emblem of other police branches. “Every one of the men in the regiment have an entire arrangement of bars and stripes from various divisions, including the exceptional powers, the mob police, Russia’s Interior Ministry, and their own unit,” Gezmakhmaev revealed to Novaya Gazeta. While he was in the help, Gezmakhmaev says the regiment completed mass captures only twice before January 2017: once in 2015 (when nobody was murdered) and again in 2016 (when the police purportedly beat at any rate two detainees to death).

Toward the beginning of January 2017, Gezmakhmaev’s regiment was requested to gather together people associated with arranging an assault against the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division military station on the edges of the Chechen city of Shali. Authorities before long acquired in any event 56 individuals, a large portion of whom were imprisoned in the police unit’s rec center storm cellar. The regiment’s officials, alongside “Terek” exceptional powers troops and police from different regions, beat the prisoners with elastic hoses and clubs, tormenting them with power and bringing down them into barrels of water. The torment halted just when a detainee admitted or kicked the bucket.

Starting on January 14, Gezmakhmaev was doled out to watch the detainees being held in the exercise center storm cellar. Along with another official, his companion Suleiman Saraliev, he says they used to carry the prisoners to the shower whenever the situation allows and sneak them cleanser. They’d likewise allowed the men to ask and asked the regiment’s cafeteria laborers for additional food. Proportioned only a couple of slices of bread a day, in addition to perhaps a saltine, the detainees were purposely starved and kept feeble. “They couldn’t walk and would implode,” reviews Gezmakhmaev, who says his discussions with the prisoners persuaded him that they were honest.

There were in excess of twelve assumed “guerilla administrators” among the detainees, everything except one of whom wound up dead. Gezmakhmaev says he actually addressed “amir” Makhma Muskiev, who later sobbed under torment and admitted to each wrongdoing his abusers recommended. Adam Dasaev, another alleged administrator, “shouted around evening time like a crazy individual.” The police additionally captured his cousin, Imran Dasaev, imprisoning him in the cellar with a shot injury in his leg, which they would not treat, to guarantee gangrene.

As indicated by Gezmakhmaev, Dasaev said his leg injury happened when Chechen pioneer Ramzan Kadyrov coincidentally shot him. (Various different sources affirmed this record to Novaya Gazeta.)

In late January, officials constrained the 13 “amirs” to sign revelations that they wouldn’t leave the district and afterward moved them to another cellar on the compound. As Novaya Gazeta announced beforehand, the men were arranged against the dividers of a diversion room where Shalinsky District Police Chief Tamerlan Musaev and Akhmat Kadyrov Regiment Commander Aslan Iraskhanov were playing table tennis. The detainees were then taken to an adjoining room, where Turpal-Ali Ibragimov, the Shali region organization’s head of staff, was hanging tight for them. Behind the entryway into the room, Gezmakhmaev says he and individual official Suleiman Saraliev saw dead bodies. Saraliev was then arranged to acquire Makhma Muskiev. At the point when Gezmakhmaev understood that he was next to fill in as killer, he pardoned himself from obligation and got back to the sleeping quarters.

The following morning, Saraliev depicted what had happened the earlier evening: first, Ibragimov shot a couple of the “amirs,” before Commander Iraskhanov concluded that it is smarter to execute the detainees without staining the floor and dividers with blood. Eventually, Ibragimov’s watchmen choked the leftover detainees with practice ropes. Saraliev said he had to help execute Muskiev.

Saraliev had just been with the Akhmat Kadyrov Police Regiment for a couple of months when he was requested to participate in the January 2015 executions. The experience transformed him, reviews Gezmakhmaev, who says his companion began experiencing a sleeping disorder and bad dreams about Makhma Muskiev. He started taking Lyrica (an anticonvulsant mainstream among drug addicts in Chechnya) and stressing that Muskiev’s family members may look for retribution against him. Gezmakhmaev says Saraliev eventually chose to discuss the killings to his companion who worked either in the head prosecutor’s office or the insightful council.

The gathering occurred toward the beginning of March 2017. Saraliev’s companion tuned in to his story and requested seven days to consult with his administrators, however that was the last he knew about him. Gezmakhmaev at that point went on wiped out leave and didn’t see Saraliev once more. After one more week, he got a call from Saraliev, who was currently remaining with a cousin. “Try not to accept what they’re saying about me,” he asked Gezmakhmaev. At that point Saraliev quit noting his telephone. Gezmakhmaev learned later that “Terek” uncommon powers administrator Abuzaid Vismuradov (allegedly one of Ramzan Kadyrov’s beloved companions) had visited the regiment joined by “some addict” who guaranteed that Saraliev is gay.

A short time later, says Gezmakhmaev, Vismuradov brought Saraliev’s cousin to the regiment’s military quarters and asked him clearly: “Are you going to kill him or ought to we get it done ourselves?” In its report, Novaya Gazeta doesn’t explain who killed Suleiman Saraliev, yet we realize he was covered the following day, “practically stealthily,” without even a burial service. Gezmakhmaev and his family left Chechnya before long.

The state specialist who inspected Novaya Gazeta’s police report reasoned that Saraliev is as yet alive “yet his area is obscure.” Novaya Gazeta, then, has photos of his grave.

This is what Suleiman Gezmakhmaev wrote in his letter, which Elena Milashina read before she at any point met him in Germany:

“I also want to note that Abuzaid Vismuradov — the [“Terek”] special forces commander and “Akhmat” sports club president, nicknamed “Patriot” — is friends with [Akhmat Kadyrov Police Regiment commander] Aslan Iriskhanov and rarely visits our regiment. At that time, for about three weeks, beginning on January 12 [in 2017] […] Vismuradov came by almost every day. […] I doubt Iriskhanov would have dared to execute prisoners without direct orders from above, since Vismuradov was aware of all that was happening. It was clear that Vismuradov was in charge of everything, from the arrests to the executions. Also, Vismuradov couldn’t have ordered the killings without approval from Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic.”

Proof – Marian Kočner, Suspected Murderer of Slovak Journalist Jan Kuciak Controlled Judges

Ján Kuciak, a youthful Slovak insightful columnist who was killed three years prior, never made quick work of what might have been the greatest story of his life.

Since quite a while ago receptive to monetary misrepresentation and defilement, he was intently following the doings of Marian Kočner, a reckless money manager who much of the time showed up on TV and in the sensationalist newspapers to boast about his manors and sports vehicles.

In 2017, Kuciak had gone over Kočner’s most recent plan: an endeavor to get an adjudicator to grant him almost 70 million euros from the coffers of a mainstream TV slot on the rear of deceitful archives.

Kuciak just had conditional proof to go on, yet in May 2017 he distributed an article portraying how an adjudicator had overlooked key proof to administer in support of Kočner. After nine months, the youthful writer was killed.

The incredible finance manager was very much aware of Kuciak’s detailing and had undermined him previously. In March 2019, he was accused of getting sorted out the homicide of Kuciak and his fiancee, dispatching a fight in court that grasped Slovakia’s consideration for quite a long time.

Unexpectedly, however Kočner was absolved of that charge (a decision investigators are engaging), he wound up accepting a heavy jail sentence for the fake plan Kuciak had been attempting to uncover.

The youthful correspondent could never recount that full story himself. Yet, utilizing court records, a huge number of instant messages, and meetings with police agents, OCCRP and its Czech part community, investigace.cz, would now be able to show precisely what Kočner did — and how he nearly pulled off it.

The plan was basic, even “unsophisticated,” as the possible liable decision put it. What Kočner depended on was not splendor, but rather his associations inside Slovakia’s legal framework. Utilizing pay-offs, terrorizing, and an amazing delegate, he directed the results for this situation and others that were essential to him.

“What he was doing was made conceivable by the framework,” said Jaroslav Láska, the police specialist who drove the criminal examination concerning Kočner’s phony reports. “The framework and the political pioneers that were here. It was his association with legislative issues, to equity, to everything — that is the thing that made him so solid.”

In a previous examination, OCCRP showed how, for quite a long time, Kočner utilized money and kompromat to twist the country’s legal framework to his will.

It was solely after Slovaks shouted out for equity in the wake of Kuciak’s homicide that Kočner confronted lawful results after numerous long stretches of exemption.

What’s more, it wasn’t just him. Following up on proof from Kočner’s held onto wireless, the police have done a few significant debasement examinations that have captured above and beyond twelve adjudicators, investigators, and police authorities. Presently, only three years after his demise, the string that Kuciak began pulling has disentangled, uncovering a framework that was no good.

In light of solicitations for input, Kočner’s attorney Marek Para said that his legitimate group would claim the conviction, and called a portion of the proof against his customer “not real and controlled.”

To extricate 70 million euros from TV Markiza, a mainstream TV channel, Kočner went to Pavol Rusko, a desperate youth colleague who likewise turned out to be the station’s long-lasting co-proprietor and chief.

In 2005 Rusko unexpectedly sold his keep going offers for next to nothing and thusly experienced monetary challenges, bowing out of all financial obligations in 2012. Kočner assisted his old associate by purchasing the bank’s case on his home and allowing him to continue to live there. In a matter of seconds a short time later, their conspiring started.

Kočner got tightly to a printer and paper made around the year 2000. He utilized them to make bogus promissory notes showing that he had lent Rusko almost 70 million euros that year. The notes said the obligation was “ensured” by TV Markiza.

As the station’s previous chief, Rusko marked the notes and vouched for their veracity. But since he was bankrupt and had no reserve funds, the commitment to follow through on the phony obligation would tumble to TV Markíza. Kočner sued the station in 2016 for declining to pay.

His case didn’t appear to be solid. Kočner was requesting the reimbursement of a gigantic advance that had probably been given without anybody yet him and Rusko truly thinking about it. Television Markíza’s overall chief affirmed that its bookkeepers had discovered no proof of any arrangement having been made with Kočner. The station’s legal counselors likewise called attention to that Rusko’s mark on the promissory notes was altogether different from the one he utilized on different reports in 2000.

Police examiners would later discover at any rate six master experts who affirmed that the promissory notes were phony.

Kočner expected to guarantee that such proof would not be heard in court. He went to Monika Jankovská, a previous appointed authority who had ascended to the situation of agent equity serve. With her senior position, broad associations, and love of extravagance extras, she was the ideal switch.

Jankovská would later deny any relationship with Kočner. “I don’t know him, I did not communicate with him, neither directly nor indirectly,” she said at a press conference. “Not in person, nor through a middleman. In no way.”

But the evidence says otherwise. Encrypted text messages extracted by the police from an app used by Kočner show that Jankovská was an invaluable ally and intermediary. In the ten months leading up to Kočner’s arrest in June 2018, he and Jankovská exchanged over 6,000 calls and messages.

Jankovská also happened to be the mentor and former supervisor of Zuzana Maruniaková, a new and inexperienced judge at Bratislava’s fifth district court who had just been assigned to hear one of Kočner’s suits against TV Markiza.

Later, after being detained by police, Judge Maruniaková described Jankovská’s insistent campaign to pressure her to rule in Kočner’s favor.

“She helped me many times, especially when she found doctors for my seriously ill mother,” Maruniaková said. “I always respected her instructions, though I sometimes disagreed.”

Maruniaková said Jankovská first approached her shortly after she was assigned the Kočner suit. The case was easy, her former boss assured her, and the promissory notes genuine. “I won’t trick you into some bullshit,” Maruniaková recalled her saying.

Kočner’s messages show that Jankovská was acting on his instructions.

JZuza [Zuzana Maruniaková] isn’t replying. Might be working.Jankovska02.11.2017 13:45:21KOK. Hopefully she’ll reply. I guess she won’t work until tonight. Try to manage it before you leave [on holiday].Kočner02.11.2017 14:09:13JSure.Jankovska02.11.2017 14:43:39

Fearing a less auspicious hearing for his claims after the 2020 parliamentary elections, he wanted to rush the trial.KWe need to push hard with Zuza to achieve at least something, because this won’t be possible after the elections.Kočner5.11.2017 09:48:01

Kočner believed he had everything ready, including bulletproof evidence.KToday, there was an expert analysis done by the department of chemical and alimentary technology of [Slovak Technical University]. … They made an analysis of the [promissory notes] papers. … So far the result is the promissory note is AT LEAST 15 YEARS OLD!Kočner27.09.2017 15:02:32KThis might convince Zuzka to move! What do you think?Kočner27.09.2017 15:10:11

“Jankovská urged me to set a hearing date as soon as possible, preferably for September 2017, and to make the ruling at this first hearing,” Maruniaková later testified. “I didn’t feel ready, so we agreed to set up the first hearing on February 8.”

Three days before the hearing, Kočner wrote Jankovská again.KSHE MUST NOT POSTPONE.Kočner05.02.2018 18:50:34JNo, or I will fuck her myself 👊👊👊👊. She promised. Multiple times. I made her what she is, so it is time to pay the debt!!!!!Jankovská05.02.2018 18:51:19

Jankovská then paid a visit to Maruniaková’s office. “She was very upset and unpleasant,” Maruniaková said. “She said that she always helped me and my family. And that, depending on what I do on February 8, she’ll decide whether she’ll turn the page and forget about my ‘misbehavior.’”

“I told her that I was scared. And she answered that I should be scared only after [the ruling].”

Jankovská’s messages to Kočner confirm that the two were waging a campaign of intimidation.JYesterday she [Maruniaková] was sitting in a cafe and saw you in a car. She almost shit herself, thinking that you were following her.Jankovská31.01.2018 16:50:38JShe can shit or pee herself for what I care!!! She’s supposed to do what she promised! Otherwise I will end [things] with her.Jankovská06.02.2018 15:44:43

But despite the pressure, Maruniaková did not issue a ruling at the first hearing on February 8, later explaining that it was not her “normal practice” to do so. Kočner had to wait until the next hearing, which was scheduled for Thursday, February 22.

That morning, an anonymous bomb threat forced all the courts in Bratislava to be evacuated. TV cameras captured Kočner pacing in front of the building and talking on his cell phone.

Prosecutors would later establish that, by that time, he’d known for several hours what the rest of the country would not learn until the following week: The previous evening, Ján Kuciak, the young investigative reporter who had been hot on his trail, had been murdered along with his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová.

When their bodies were found four days later, the news made international headlines. Growing protests would eventually lead to the resignation of the prime minister and other officials.

But Kočner was still thinking of his promissory notes.KHello. Is Zuza ok?Kočner26.2.2018 21:07:45JFor now, she is. A bit scared after today 😂😂😂Jankovská26.2.2018 21:10:39KShe should do what she is required to do. Or she will end up like Kuciak 😜😜😜.Kočner26.2.2018 21:15:19

In the end, his case took four more hearings to conclude. But on April 26, Maruniaková finally ruled in Kočner’s favor, declaring the promissory notes genuine.

The businessman was elated.JHurrayyyy we got rid of oneJankovská26.04.2018 13:28:15KFinally some success, I believe the tables have turned.Kočner26.04.2018 13:28:20

But TV Markiza’s defense team was adamant that the trial had been conducted unfairly, pointing to Maruniaková’s failure to admit key witnesses and expert testimony that would have contradicted Kočner and Rusko’s claims. Instead, she had relied on the analysis of a single forensic expert provided by Kočner himself.

Maruniaková later conceded that she had caved. “I do admit that during the trial, I was influenced by Dr. Jankovska, I was acting under her pressure,” she told police.

“As a young new judge, I didn’t handle the situation well. I succumbed to pressure and wasn’t acting rationally,” she said. But Maruniaková was adamant that her decisions had not been influenced by the promise of financial reward.

Messages between Kočner and Jankovská suggest otherwise.KI suppose you’re going to split Zuza’s reward also with Denisa.Kočner21.02.2018 18:46:24JNo, Deni will get part of mine. I promised that cunt something and now I must keep it.Jankovská21.02.2018 18:46:50“Denisa” is another judge, Denisa Cviková, who allegedly helped Maruniaková write her judgement.

In an appeal to the Regional Court in Bratislava, the TV Markiza team challenged the fairness of the trial. They also filed a criminal complaint against Kočner and Rusko. The case was assigned to an experienced investigator, Jaroslav Láska.

He had little idea what he was getting into.

On a freezing February morning, Láska met an OCCRP reporter in a park in the historic central Slovak town of Banská Bystrica to recount his experience. The tall, thin man was animated, his eyes sparkling, as he spoke about the Kočner case, which he says changed his life. But he’s glad that difficult period is over.

As he set to work, methodically collecting evidence to expose Kočner’s forgery, he realized he was being targeted himself.

“It happened to my son that he was followed by a car all the way from school to home,” he said. “He called me [when I was] in Bratislava, and he was alone there at home.”

Kočner had hired private detectives to track his family.

“I was just telling myself, you idiot, you put him in danger!”

Láska said that Kočner also hatched a plot to compromise him. “I was asked to meet someone,” he said. “This someone came with Para [Kočner’s lawyer].” Láska understood that the idea was for someone to publish a photo of the two men together to suggest that he was leaking information to Kočner. “I immediately turned and walked away,” he said. “That probably saved me.”

“I underestimated his influence and how far he was willing to go,” Láska said.

But he continued his work. On June 20, 2018, Rusko and Kočner were charged with counterfeiting, falsification, unauthorized production of money and securities, and obstruction of justice.

“We got intel that he was planning an escape, had a boat ready in Croatia,” Láska said. “We needed to act immediately.”

Commandos tracked Kočner down and handcuffed him as he was eating with friends at a Caribbean-themed bar on the shores of a lake outside Bratislava.

“Was he surprised? Well, you never know with Kočner. He has this poker face,” Láska said.

At their criminal trial, Kočner and Rusko’s legal teams continued arguing that the promissory notes were genuine, and had been confirmed as such by expert analysis.

Jankovská, arrested on March 11, 2020, along with Maruniaková and 11 other judges, denied intimidating her former subordinate. But Maruniaková started cooperating with police, admitting that she had made her decision under Jankovská’s influence.Credit: David Ištok/Aktuality.skZuzana Maruniaková is brought in for questioning by National Crime Agency officers on March 11, 2020.

Jankovská’s lawyer, Peter Erdős, declined to comment for this article, citing the ongoing court case. However, he noted that his client was not serving as a public official at the time of the promissory notes case.

In early 2020, Kočner was found guilty and sentenced to 19 years in prison. The sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court on January 12, marking the first time the businessman had faced consequences in his long years of pulling the strings. His co-conspirator, Rusko, was sentenced to 19 years in prison.

Though Kočner is now sitting in a Bratislava prison, he has more court appearances in his future. He faces four more criminal and corruption charges, including ordering the murder of Kuciak and Kušnírová. (He was acquitted of that charge in September 2020, but prosecutors have appealed.)

Meanwhile, his arrest had a ripple effect across Slovakia’s judicial system. Police found text messages on his phone that went far beyond his exchanges with Jankovská. They led investigators to another senior judge, Vladimír Sklenka, whose communications with Kočner reveal the extent of his connections within Slovakia’s judicial system. After his office was searched, Sklenka decided to cooperate — and his testimony led to that network’s unraveling.

As the deputy president of the Bratislava’s First District Court, Sklenka was useful to Kočner because he could influence a number of business disputes in which Kočner was embroiled. In 2019, Kočner’s phone contained over 9,000 messages he’d exchanged with Sklenka.

The judge was introduced to Kočner by an acquaintance, a businessman named Ladislav Mojžíš who promised him an informal meeting with the influential operator. Sklenka agreed.Credit: TASRVladimír Sklenka.

The two men met in an empty conference room of a hotel in the forested outskirts of Bratislava. As they chatted about politics, Kočner gave Sklenka a scrap of paper with four case numbers on it. As a favor, he asked Sklenka to check on the status of the proceedings. Sklenka agreed, and was rewarded for his trouble — to the tune of 5,000 euros in cash.

“See, I told you he’s cool,” Mojžíš said of Kočner.

In another meeting at the same hotel, Kočner proposed a solution for secure communication.

“He asked me what kind of telephone I have, so I showed him my old Nokia,” Sklenka told investigators. “And he told me I need a different phone.” In short order, Kočner brought a used silver iPhone 6 from his car and helped Sklenka install Threema, his preferred secure text messaging application. From that point on, it was the only way the two men communicated, Sklenka said.

Early in his useful new friendship, Kočner asked only for small favors. Sometimes he wanted to know which judge would be in charge of which case, or check on the status of court filings.

Sklenka seemed happy to oblige. In fact, he was such a font of information that Kočner sometimes felt overwhelmed.KSlow down! I am fucking losing the thread of conversation!!!Kočner17.11.2017 19:43:45

Requests for larger favors soon followed, such as ruling in Kočner’s favor or asking other judges to do so. Soon Kočner was not just telling Sklenka how to rule, but bringing him the reasoning he should use, already written and saved on USB sticks.

“I was very busy and the reasoning was well written, so I took it and let it upload it into the judicial software,” Sklenka confessed.

In exchange, Sklenka received payments ranging from a few thousand to 100,000 euros per ruling, part of which was laundered through a company belonging to Sklenka’s wife.

“Unlike other judges, I had no fixed rate,” he said. “I never asked about the money in advance.” In total, he admitted to accepting around 170,000 euros from Kočner.

Sklenka was also the one who distributed Kočner’s bribes to other judges — not just cash, but also luxury items such as perfumes and handbags. And since his usefulness to Kočner was proportional to his popularity, Kočner came up with the idea of having him distribute gift boxes to his colleagues on Christmas.KHow many women do you have in the office who should get a gift? I’ll have Christmas boxes made. As if they were from you.Kočner07.12.2017 18:05:13KThe box: a bit of tea, chocolate, candy, small sweet wine, cookie. … I want you to have an unshakeable position there [at the court].Kočner07.12.2017 18:15:01

The boxes were well received and Sklenka informed Kočner that his colleagues were grateful.

In his testimony, Sklenka exposed not only himself, but also 14 other judges whose decisions Kočner attempted to influence. But it went further than Kočner.

In 2020, the police launched three major operations — “Storm,” “Thunderstorm,” and “Weed” — in which they arrested 21 prominent judges, including the deputy head of the Supreme Court. They were accused of corruption and infringement on the independence of the courts, charges which in some cases also involved dealings with Kočner. Another constitutional judge resigned as a result of public pressure.Credit: David Ištok/Aktuality.skNational Crime Agency officers conduct a mass operation to arrest allegedly corrupt judges on March 11, 2020.

It wasn’t only the judges and courts. In November and December 2020, two former police presidents were also charged with heading an organized criminal group, abuse of power, extortion, and corruption. One later committed suicide in his jail cell.

The head and deputy head of the financial crime unit within the Financial Administration were also slapped with serious charges, including abuse of power, extortion, and support of a criminal group. Top prosecutor Dušan Kováčik, who earned the nickname “61:0” for failing to issue any indictments in the 61 cases he was assigned, was charged with organized criminal activity, corruption, and failing to prosecute men who were plotting the assassination of a police investigator.

These revelations took place in a Slovakia that had radically transformed. After the outrage caused by Kuciak’s murder, those who had once made Kočner untouchable started to turn away from him. By failing to keep his encrypted conversations with judges and prosecutors hidden, Kočner took down some of the most influential people in the country’s judiciary.

Meanwhile, Láska has moved on from the police force and is now working for Slovakia’s Judicial Council as an investigator of judicial corruption. Asked whether he thought the anti-corruption crackdown would continue, he said he didn’t know.

“But I hope it will,” Láska said. “I still have a few tips.”

FBI Shows How Azerbaijan Sabotaged Investigation Into Journalist’s Death

Azeri leader orders swift probe into journalist's death

The murderer ?

Darkness had fallen on the Azerbaijani capital of Baku when investigative journalist Elmar Huseynov arrived home from work on March 2, 2005. It wasn’t uncommon for Huseynov to stay at the offices of The Monitor, the magazine he edited, until after sundown.

The stairwell was especially dark that evening because a light above his apartment door wasn’t working. As Huseynov made his way to the third floor, an assassin armed with a semi-automatic pistol emerged out of the darkness above him. Seven shots rang out. Six bullets found their target. The fatal one pierced the top left-hand side of Huseynov’s chest, ripping through blood vessels and puncturing a lung.

Huseynov managed to stagger to his apartment, where his wife, father, and sister had been waiting for him. As the door swung open, he collapsed in the entryway.

As news of the attack spread, TV journalist Chingiz Sultansoy, a friend of Huseynov’s, hurried to the scene after taking a call from a concerned colleague. Police officers stood outside the building, and a crowd was gathering. Suddenly, Sultanoy remembers, Huseynov’s wife Rushaniya flung open a window. “They’ve killed him,” she screamed.Credit: MonitorJournalist Elmar Huseynov was gunned down on March 2, 2005, as he returned home from work.

The police moved aside, letting journalists, neighbors, and friends enter and leave. Sultansoy climbed the same stairs Huseynov had ascended not long before and saw the apartment door ajar. His friend was lying a few feet inside, his belly poking out from his sweater, blood smeared on his face. Sultansoy knelt and took Huseynov’s still-warm hand. Seeing for himself that his friend was dead, he kissed him and left.

Huseynov’s reporting had targeted Azerbaijan’s elite, from politicians to big business. Long before his death, he had been subjected to intimidation and threats on his life. Since that night, his friends and family have speculated about whether powerful individuals had sought to neutralize him.

“The pattern of pressure against Elmar in the run-up to his assassination bears similar hallmarks to many cases we have seen in other countries, in which journalists were deliberately targeted,” said Rebecca Vincent, a former U.S. diplomat posted to Baku in the aftermath of Huseynov’s murder and now director of international campaigns for Reporters Without Borders (RSF).

On the 16th anniversary of Huseynov’s murder, OCCRP can shine new light on the murky investigation into the killing. Drawing on court filings and other documents obtained via freedom-of-information requests, our reporting includes an examination of a previously unpublished file from the FBI, which had been called in to help investigate.

The information lays out a catalogue of obfuscations and missteps since 2005, largely made by the Azerbaijani authorities who were meant to be responsible for bringing Huseynov’s killer or killers to justice. As the case remains unsolved, OCCRP has found that a key suspect remains at liberty, while Azerbaijan has appeared to mislead Husyenov’s family on the investigation’s status. As a result, an already troubling affair may have even graver implications for Azerbaijan’s steadily shrinking space for press freedom.

By March 2005, press freedom in Azerbaijan had already come under significant pressure from President Ilham Aliyev, who’d taken the reins of the South Caucasus nation from his father a year and a half earlier. Eight journalists had been arrested since the younger Aliyev had come to power, and with a parliamentary election due in November 2005, the media was bracing for further confrontation. That year, Azerbaijan ranked 141st of 167 countries on RSF’s Worldwide Press Freedom Index.

Elmar Huseynov (@MonitorJournal) | Twitter

The Monitor, Huseynov’s outlet, was known for its stinging reporting on corruption, which included taking aim at the president and his family. When rumors swirled that Huseynov had been silenced by powerful people, Aliyev strongly refuted suggestions that his family or its allies were involved. Decrying the crime as a “black spot” on Azerbaijan’s history, he promised a robust investigation, and put a call in to the then-U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Reno Harnish, to enlist expert help from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

“This crime must be investigated thoroughly and the criminals must be called to account,” he said the day after the murder.

On the ground in Baku, the FBI would later meet with the lead investigators and Azerbaijani ministers, visit the crime scene, review the existing evidence and initial autopsy reports, and gather evidence themselves.

But from the start, the investigation was dogged by an apparent unwillingness by Azerbaijani officials to focus on whether Huseynov had been killed because of his journalism. Instead, ministers in charge of the probe fixated on unsubstantiated claims that Armenia had ordered the killing to harm Azerbaijan’s government.Credit: MonitorFriends and colleagues of Elmar Huseynov (pictured) wonder whether powerful people set out to silence him.

Sixteen years later, one of the murder suspects appears to live freely in Georgia, acquiring property interests in Tbilisi and a plot of land in Marneuli, in the country’s south. And although Azerbaijan’s Ministry for National Security insisted to Rushaniya Huseynova that its inquiries were ongoing, officials were telling the FBI, over the same time period, that the case was stalled.

While authorities were getting nowhere, Huseynov’s killing had an instant impact, according to RSF’s Vincent. The murder of one of the country’s best-known reporters sparked fear among other probing journalists that they could be next.

“Elmar’s case was particularly emblematic, not only in Azerbaijan, but throughout the region,” she said. “His targeting was no doubt intended to send a clear signal not to cross certain red lines, and was effective in creating a chilling effect that can still be felt to this day.”

The FBI case file into the murder, which the agency noted was so serious that “it could topple” the government, was compiled between 2005 and 2008. Seen by OCCRP, it reveals serious misgivings on the part of Legal Attaché Bryan Paarmann, who noted missed opportunities right from the start.

Paarmann pointed to basic failures in crime scene control on the night of the killing, when police failed to stop members of the public from laying a trail of flowers on the blood in the stairwell, destroying any possibility that tread or footwear evidence could be gathered.

Crime scene photographs seemed to have been taken long after any evidence was removed, a “very poor procedural error,” Paarmann wrote. The recovery team, he added, did not even wear gloves when recovering a key piece of evidence.

After discovering that Huseynov’s hallway had been darker than usual that night because a lightbulb above his door was not sitting properly in its socket, Paarmann noted that local investigators had failed to test that area for prints.

“[I] inquired as to whether this bulb had been processed for latent fingerprints and was informed that too many people had touched it therefore this was deemed as non productive,” he wrote.

In regard to Huseynov’s autopsy, Paarmann asked whether fingernail scrapings had been taken to check for skin samples that could identify the killer. He was told yes, this had been done, but the results had come back negative. However, he could find “no mention of this procedure” in initial reports provided by the Azerbaijanis.

Despite all this, some leads did appear promising.Credit: European Court of Human Rights/fileA gun that was recovered from a planter after the murder of Elmar Huseynov.

The day after the murder, a 5.45mm Baikal PSM semi-automatic pistol was found, sitting in plain view in a planter in front of Huseynov’s building. It still bore all its serial markings, which indicated it had been manufactured in Russia. Shortly afterwards, a dark-colored knit skullcap was recovered from another planter nearby.

The murder seemed “hasty and sloppily executed,” Paarmann wrote, the marksmanship poor. The weapon was found where it was “sure to be discovered,” with its markings clearly legible. The government of Azerbaijan felt the hit was carried out by a “skilled individual,” but a professional would have destroyed the markings and disassembled the gun, Paarmann reasoned.

But if he took hope from the fact that investigators were dealing with, in his words, “a possible amateur,” the FBI attaché was concerned by the attitude of Azerbaijani ministers.

Though they admitted there were several possible avenues of investigation, Paarmann appeared to grow frustrated as they obsessed over a theory that a foreign country had ordered a hit on Huseynov to sow chaos in Azerbaijan. At the top of the ministers’ list of possible perpetrators was Armenia, with Russia and Iran considered possibilities.

“The assembled ministers did acknowledge that the motive for this murder could have been purely personal or retaliation for Huseynov’s inflammatory journalistic positions, but spent a vast majority of their time enumerating why they believed it to be a coordinated, foreign-sponsored assassination aimed at destabilizing the government,” he wrote.

Paarmann wrote that government officials were doing “several things correctly,” but his early conclusions were damning.

“[I am] concerned with the premature focus on one theory of the crime and that it may lead to an attempt to make the facts fit that theory instead of a reasoned, methodical and unbiased investigation with utilization of logical, deductive reasoning towards a defensible conclusion,” he wrote.

When he made a raft of recommendations to Azerbaijan’s investigators, he was told they would “take them into consideration.” Instead, the FBI found itself slowly sidelined

Two months into the investigation, authorities had identified two suspects: Tahir Khubanov and Teimuraz Aliyev. Both citizens of neighboring Georgia, they had rented an apartment near Huseynov’s home in the period before the killing, and later crossed back over the Azerbaijan-Georgia border.

When Azerbaijani investigators recovered two pillowcases and clothing from their Baku apartment, the FBI matched DNA from these items with the cap found at the crime scene, which authorities said linked both men to the murder. The FBI described the evidence against the men as “strong,” but nothing has emerged to indicate that either man had a connection to the subjects of Huseynov’s journalism, leaving any possible motive a mystery.

A search was launched, but Azerbaijani authorities seemed reluctant to run images of the two men online. A July 2005 report from news agency Turan quoted officials as saying there was “no necessity in placing pictures of these people on the internet.”

Aliyev was finally located in Georgia, and denied involvement when interrogated by Georgian authorities in September 2006. The waters had been muddied, too, after former Azerbaijan Ministry of Interior official Haji Mamedov, on trial for several unrelated killings, claimed in the summer of 2006 that his hit squad had killed Huseynov. To help clear things up, in January 2007 the FBI offered to perform a polygraph test on Aliyev.

An FBI assistant legal attaché wrote to Azerbaijan’s then-Minister of National Security Eldar Mahmudov, saying Aliyev and the other suspect were likely still in Georgia and that Georgian authorities would probably cooperate.

An internal letter from the FBI to U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Anne Derse, however, suggests the FBI saw Azerbaijan’s cooperation as a “hurdle” to getting the polygraph done. The FBI case file contains no evidence that it ever took place, and the investigation stagnated.

After the attaché met with the Ministry of National Security in September 2008, he wrote: “The [ministry] advised that their investigation has stalled and they do not have further need of FBI assistance.” Yet just a few months earlier, in July, ministry officials had told Rushaniya they were working tirelessly to bring the killers to justice. A senior official wrote to her lawyer: “At the moment a total, comprehensive and objective investigation of the case is being carried out.”

In March 2009, as Rushaniya persisted with her inquiries, she received another letter of response from a senior ministry official. Once more, he confirmed the investigation was ongoing. But he added, too, that the “preliminary investigation” had been extended to September 2009. This last detail is significant because by law, Rushaniya was only entitled to see case materials after any preliminary investigation was finished. Her lawyer would later point out that it seemed strange, four years after the murder and long after Azerbaijani authorities identified key suspects, that they would claim that the preliminary investigation was still ongoing. Writing a court submission, he said that this was “not likely” to be the case.

RSF’s Vincent said authorities in Azerbaijan “appear to have intentionally obstructed the pursuit of justice,” adding that the new documents “show, at best, a lack of political will to secure justice — or perhaps worse, a more sinister attempt to distract, deflect, and obstruct the criminal investigation.”

Though officials in Azerbaijan told Rushaniya in a 2009 letter that they were still looking for Khubanov and Aliyev, there were at least clues to the latter man’s location.

A simple public records search by OCCRP showed that somebody using Aliyev’s ID bought two apartments in Tbilisi, one in May 2008 and another in June 2008. The apartments were in a building occupied by several members of his immediate family, including his mother. OCCRP asked Azerbaijani authorities if they pursued this lead, but the request for comment went unanswered. Aliyev did not respond to written questions from OCCRP, which were hand-delivered to the building and received by a relative.

And on March 17, 2009, the same day the Ministry of National Security wrote to Rushaniya, Interpol wrote to the ministry with information that Aliyev was based in Tbilisi. Of Khubanov, there was no news.

It remains unclear from case files whether Azeri authorities relayed this information to Rushaniya, who declined to comment for this article.

She eventually brought a case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2010. In their responses to her allegations in that case file, Azeri authorities pointed out that they had in fact asked for the extradition of Aliyev and Khubanov, but claimed that Georgia refused because they were Georgian citizens. The filings indicate Azerbaijan made this request to Georgia in 2005.Credit: MonitorElmar Huseynov’s murder remains unsolved, 16 years after his death.

Azerbaijani authorities did not respond to a question on whether they ever made further requests. However, the ECHR’s 2017 ruling pointed out that Georgia’s Deputy Prosecutor General had told Azerbaijan in 2005 that he was willing to start criminal proceedings against Aliyev within the Georgian justice system.

In other words, Aliyev could have been prosecuted if Azerbaijan had transferred the case to Georgia. Documents show that Georgia appears to have begun initial proceedings, but nothing came of them.

investigations/Ilham-Aliyev.jpg

Credit: Government of AzerbaijanAfter Ilham Aliyev took power in Azerbaijan, a crackdown against media was soon underway.

Rushaniya’s lawyer, Knut Rognlien, told the ECHR that when Azerbaijani authorities insisted that the suspects were foreigners who couldn’t be found or spoken to, they were simply avoiding uncomfortable questions. The same types of questions, according to the FBI file, that ministers had dodged right from the start.

“Had they been apprehended, Teimuraz Aliyev and Tahir Khubanov could also have been interrogated regarding possible contact with authorities and their motive for the murder,” Rognlien wrote.

Those who knew Huseynov say the impunity surrounding the case continues to do serious damage to press freedom in Azerbaijan.

Steinar Gil, Norway’s ambassador to Azerbaijan at the time of the killing, called it “a warning that journalists who want to criticize openly and stand for the values of the free press would be at risk.”

Aliyev is still going about his life today, while no trace of Khubanov has been found. The only person ever jailed in relation to the murder, Turgay Bayramov, was sentenced to two years in prison for buying a phone for the two men.

In response to a request for further information from OCCRP, Georgian prosecutors referred reporters back to the ECHR’s ruling. Azerbaijani prosecutors did not respond to a similar request.

Even as the investigation has stalled, three more reporters have died in the line of duty in Azerbaijan since Huseynov was gunned down on the darkened steps to his apartment. Azerbaijan has dropped to 168th of 180 countries on RSF’s World Press Freedom Index.

“There is no media freedom in Azerbaijan today,” Gil said. “It’s zero, none. After this, people would think ‘If this happened to Elmar, it could happen to anyone.’”

Eleanor Rose is an investigative journalist based in London who specializes in human rights and has written for the Guardian, the Evening Standard, and the Independent, among other publications.

Aidan Iusubova (iFact) contributed reporting.

EXPOSED – SOVIET PLAN TO ASSASSINATE TITO

 

NKVD plan to assassinate Josip Broz Tito by a Soviet covert agent, codenamed “Max.” The plan envisions assassinating Tito during a private audience during Tito’s forthcoming visit to London, or at a diplomatic reception in Belgrade. This document was not dated.

CREATORS

  • STALIN, JOSEPH, 1879-1953

    GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

    SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
    Tito, Josip Broz, 1892-1980
    Soviet Union–Foreign relations–Yugoslavia
    Intelligence service–Soviet Union
    LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
    Soviet Union
    Yugoslavia

 

The MGB USSR requests permission to prepare a terrorist act (terakt) against Tito, by the illegal agent ‘Max’,” Comrade I.R. Grigulevich, a Soviet citizen and member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1950.

1. “Max” was placed in Italy on a Costa Rican passport, where he was able to gain the confidence and enter the circles of South American diplomats as well as well-known Costa Rican political and trade figures visiting Italy.

Using these connections, “Max”, on our orders, obtained an appointment as the special plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Italy and Yugoslavia. In the course of his diplomatic duties, in the second half of 1952, he visited Yugoslavia twice. He was well received there, with official welcoming into circles close to Tito’s clique; he was promised a personal audience with Tito.

“Max’s” present position offers us opportunities to carry out active measures (aktivnye deistviia) against Tito.
In early February of this year, we summoned “Max” to Vienna for a secret meeting. While discussing options, “Max” was asked how he thought he could be most useful, considering his position. “Max” proposed some kind of active measure against Tito personally.

In relation to this proposal, there was a discussion with him [Max] about how he imagined all of this and as a result, the following options for a terrorist act against Tito were presented.

1. To order “Max” to arrange a private audience with Tito, during which a soundless mechanism concealed in his clothes would release a dose of pulmonary plague bacteria that would guarantee death to Tito and all present. “Max” himself would not be informed of the substance’s nature, but with the goal of saving “Max’s” life, he would be given an anti-plague serum in advance.

2. In connection with Tito’s expected visit to London, to send “Max” there to use his official position and good personal relations with the Yugoslav ambassador in England, [Vladimir] Velebit, to obtain an invitation to the expected Yugoslav embassy reception in Tito’s honor.

The terrorist act could be accomplished by shooting with a silent mechanism concealed as a personal item, while simultaneously releasing tear gas to create panic among the crowd, allowing “Max” to escape and cover up all traces.

3. To use one of the official receptions in Belgrade to which members of the diplomatic corps are invited. The terrorist act could be implemented in the same way as the second option, to be carried out by “Max” who as a diplomat, accredited by the Yugoslav government, would be invited to such a reception.

In addition, to assign “Max” to work out an option whereby one of the Costa Rican representatives will give Tito some jewelry in a box, which when opened would release an instantaneously-effective poisonous substance.

We asked Max to once again think the operation over and to make suggestions on how he could realize, in the most efficient way, actions against Tito. Means of contact were established and it was agreed that further instructions would follow.


It seems appropriate to use “Max” to implement a terrorist act against Tito. “Max’s” personal qualities and intelligence experience make him suitable for such an assignment. We ask for your approval.

 

 

 

Doctor at Omsk clinic who treated Navalny has surrendered

The appointee head doctor at the Omsk clinic that quickly treated resistance figure Alexey Navalny in August has surrendered “for individual reasons,” as per the news office RIA Novosti. Anatoly Kalinichenko told the site Ngs55.ru that his choice to take an occupation somewhere else is unopinionated and due basically to the way that he’d developed worn out on managerial work. He simply needs to re-visitation of medical procedure, he says.

Navalny was hospitalized at Kalinichenko’s office on August 20 after his departure from Tomsk to Moscow made a crisis arrival in Omsk. While he stayed at the Omsk clinic until the night of August 21, Kalinichenko was the essential wellspring of data for writers giving an account of Navalny’s ailment.

Kalinichenko was one of the medical clinic authorities who asserted that specialists found no hints of toxin in Navalny’s framework and contended that the legislator’s delicate state forestalled his prompt exchange to a superior prepared facility in Berlin.

On Film: The Execution of Amon Goeth, SS Murderer & Monster

Amon Goeth was a Nazi Officer who headed a German forced labor camp in Poland during WWII. He was ruthless and “a monster”. His life became somewhat famous because of Ralph Fiennes portrayal of him in the movie SCHINDLER’S LIST by Steven Spielberg. How Amon Goeth died was not accurately presented in the film. Here is the historical presentation of his execution. For all that say this isn’t him….would be interested in hearing your comments concerning this Wikipedia page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amon_Goeth and the pictures posted on the page which are the same as the person who is executed in the video. Also, see http://www.auschwitz.dk/goeth.htm. WARNING: This video contains extremely graphic material that is not suitable for all (especially young) viewers. Disclaimer: I do not own or profess any rights to the movie SCHINDLER’S LIST, but use the short film clip included as historical comparison to the actual event. The video of the actual event is located at the WFDiF Archieves from Warsaw, Poland. —- DISCLAIMER! —- Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for “fair use” for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing. Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favor of fair use.

Deadly – The Chilling Way Vladimir Putin Deals With His Enemies

“The Russian state goes after enemies, traitors, opponents, critics, journalists,” Buzzfeed News’ Heidi Blake told InsideEdition.com. The results are chilling, and often deadly. Blake is the author of “From Russia, With Blood: the Kremlin’s Ruthless Assassination Program and Vladimir Putin’s Secret War on the West.” Her investigative team found Russian links to over a dozen mysterious deaths on English soil, including that of exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky.

Revealed – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Mail-In Voting in 2020

Presidential Election Day USA 2020. Vote In USA, Banner Design.. Royalty  Free Cliparts, Vectors, And Stock Illustration. Image 142112824.

Page Count: 11 pages
Date: July 28, 2020
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security
File Type: pdf
File Size: 577,002 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 4018616B3963268F457A9A294BF1A3A04EB90025898BC3C54B4785B048C873BB

Download File

All forms of voting – in this case mail-in voting – bring a variety of cyber and infrastructure risks. Risks to mail-in voting can be managed through various policies, procedures, and controls.
The outbound and inbound processing of mail-in ballots introduces additional infrastructure and technology, which increases the potential scalability of cyber attacks. Implementation of mail-in voting infrastructure and processes within a compressed timeline may also introduce new risk. To address this risk, election officials should focus on cyber risk management activities, including access controls and authentication best practices when implementing expanded mail-in voting.

Integrity attacks on voter registration data and systems represent a comparatively higher risk in a mail-in voting environment when compared to an in-person voting environment. This is because the voter is not present at the time of casting the ballot and cannot help to answer questions regarding their eligibility or identity verification.

Operational risk management responsibility differs with mail-in voting and in-person voting processes. For mail-in voting, some of the risk under the control of election officials during in-person voting shifts to outside entities, such as ballot printers, mail processing facilities, and the United States Postal Service (USPS).

Physical access at election offices and warehouses represents a risk in a mail-in voting environment. Completed ballots are returned to the election office and must be securely stored for days or weeks before processing through voter authentication and tabulation processes. Managing risks to these processes requires implementing secure procedures for storage, access controls, and chain of custody, such as ballot accounting.
Inbound mail-in ballot processes and tabulation take longer than in-person processing, causing tabulation of results to occur more slowly and resulting in more ballots to tabulate following election night. Media, candidates, and voters should expect less comprehensive results on election night, which creates additional risk of electoral uncertainty and confidence in results.

Disinformation risk to mail-in voting infrastructure and processes is similar to that of in-person voting while utilizing different content. Threat actors may leverage limited understanding regarding mail-in voting processes to mislead and confuse the public.

Election infrastructure includes a diverse set of systems, networks, and processes. Mail-in voting is a method of administering elections. When voting by mail, authorized voters receive a ballot in the mail, either automatically or after the application process. In most implementations, the voter marks the ballot, puts the ballot in an envelope, signs an affidavit, and returns the package via mail or by dropping off at a ballot drop box or other designated location.

Currently, five states (Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah, and Washington) automatically send every registered voter a ballot by mail. At least 21 other states have laws that allow at least some elections to be conducted by mail. In addition to the five states that send every voter a ballot, five states (Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, and New Jersey) and the District of Columbia (D.C.) allow a voter to apply to receive a mail-in ballot permanently, so that voters do not have to apply each election.1 Currently, 34 states and D.C. allow any registered voter to request a mail-in ballot. There are 16 states that require voters to have an excuse such as temporary absence from the voting district, illness, or disability or require voters to be of a certain age (typically 65+) to be eligible to receive a ballot by mail. Some states are recognizing COVID-19 as a valid excuse.

Although they perform similar functions, mail-in voting processes and infrastructure vary from state to state and often differ even between counties, parishes, towns, or cities within a state or territory. While each state manages and conducts mail-in elections differently based on state and local legal requirements, common risks and mitigations exist across states and implementations.

Voter registration and mail ballot application processing collects data used to determine voter eligibility, the type of ballot a voter receives, the location or address for mailing the ballot to the voter, and whether election officials can accept the ballot. Either an integrity attack or an availability attack on a voter registration system could result in a voter not being able to cast a ballot or a voter’s ballot not being counted. Integrity attacks on voter registration data and systems represents a comparatively higher risk in a mail-in voting environment than an in-person voting environment. This is because the voter is not present at the time of casting the ballot and cannot help to resolve questions regarding eligibility or verification. Mail-in voters whose registration records are altered or deleted in an integrity attack do not have the opportunity to be issued a provisional ballot, which are available to in-person voters.

  • An integrity attack that removed a voter from the voter registration, permanent mail, or absentee ballot request list could result in the voter not receiving a ballot, unless the voter proactively followed up to re-register, re-apply, or if the election official received the ballot as undeliverable and contacted the voter. The impact is that a voter may not receive a ballot or receipt of a ballot may be delayed, resulting in a jurisdiction potentially not accepting a voted ballot. The voter would still possess the ability to vote in person provisionally.
  • An integrity attack on a voter’s name could result in the voter receiving a ballot package that is not addressed to the proper individual. If there was an integrity attack on a voter’s identifying information (i.e., date of birth [DOB], driver’s license number [DL], last four digits of Social Security number [SSN], etc.), the voter’s proof of ID, where required, would not match the voter’s record. The voter would either need to inform the election official and update his or her voter record (assuming that the voter registration deadline has not passed), or risk having their voted ballot rejected upon receipt.
  • An integrity attack on a voter’s ballot mailing address may result in the voter not receiving a ballot, unless the voter proactively updated his or her registration with the correct address, or the election official received the ballot as undeliverable and contacted the voter. This assumes that the voter registration or ballot application deadline has not passed, allowing the voter to update his or her information. The impact is that a voter may not receive a ballot, or receipt of a ballot is delayed.
  • An integrity attack on a voter’s signature on file could result in the voter having the ballot package rejected and their ballot uncounted. If the state is one of the 19 that requires a voter to receive notification when there is a discrepancy with their signature or the signature on the return ballot envelope is missing (a.k.a. “cure process”), the voter may have an opportunity to correct the situation by being notified that the ballot was rejected and taking action to resolve the issue. This can be done by an election official notifying the voter or a voter checking a ballot tracking system, if available.
  • An availability attack on the voter registration database or specific information, such as a list of mail voters, voter names, or addresses could result in the delay of voters receiving their ballots, and further impact voters’ ability to return ballots on time to ensure they are counted. In most states, a ballot may be returned in person, in which case the impact of an availability attack may only affect the outbound process providing a measure of resilience.

Video – Russland: Der Fall Nawalny – Opposition in Gefahr

Die Vergiftung von Oppositionsführer Alexej Nawalny ist nicht der erste Anschlag gegen einen Putin-Kritiker. Politischer Widerstand in Russland kann lebensgefährlich sein.

Nawalny-Mordanschag: Moskau mauert – und dreht den Spieß um

Während der Ruf nach Aufklärung weltweit lauter wird, mauert Moskau und will untersuchen lassen, ob eine “fremde Macht” einen russischen Staatsbürger geschädigt habe, um Moskau zu diskreditieren.

Das ist die alte Vorgehensweise der Tschekisten aus KGB, STASI und wie die einschlägigen Ost-Mördergeheimdienste sich jeweils nennen – bis hin zu STASI-GoMoPa.

Die toxischen-Anschläge auf Putin-Gegner im Überblick

Die beiden Freundinnen und ihr Giftmord (Archiv)

Diese Liste ist derzeit aktuell aber nicht vollständig. Da viele Anschläge nicht bekannt werden – aus den unterschiedlichsten Gründen.

So habe auch ich Anschläge auf mein Leben erdulden müssen, diese aber bislang nicht publiziert, um weitere Schutzmaßnahmen treffen zu können. (Stichwort Toxdat). Dies werde ich zu gegebener Zeit nachholen.

olitik in Russland ist eine toxische Angelegenheit, oft auch im Wortsinne. Was auch immer der Grund für Alexej Nawalnys Vergiftung war, wer auch immer dahinter stehen mag: Es ist wichtig, dass die Umstände umgehend, sorgfältig und unvoreingenommen aufgeklärt werden. So sollte es sein, doch in der Realität bleiben die vielfältigen Gewaltakte gegen Vertreter der politischen Opposition und gegen Bürgeraktivisten zu oft folgenlos. Das ist einer der Hauptgründe dafür, dass die Toleranz gegenüber politischer Gewalt in Russland extrem hoch ist, und derzeit deutet nichts darauf hin, dass sie sinken wird.

Nawalny wurde im Flugzeug übel, als er am 20. August morgens von Tomsk Richtung Moskau flog. Wie seine Sprecherin Kira Jarmysch berichtete, die Nawalny auf der Reise begleitet hatte, hat er während des Flugs nichts zu sich genommen, er hatte nur zuvor eine Tasse Tee im Flughafencafé getrunken. Das Flugzeug landete in Omsk zwischen, Nawalny wurde im bewusstlosen Zustand auf die Intensivstation des örtlichen Krankenhaus gebracht und dort künstlich beatmet. Er liegt im Koma, die Ärzte in Omsk bewerten seinen Zustand als ernst, aber stabil. Wie Kira Jarmysch mitteilt, ist aus Sicht der Ärzte eine Verlegung in eine andere Klinik derzeit unmöglich. Nawalnys Kollegen glauben, dass der Gründer des Fonds für Korruptionsbekämpfung mit Absicht vergiftet wurde. Sie nehmen an, dass der Giftstoff im Tee gewesen sein könnte. Die Ärzte halten eine Vergiftung für möglich, eine abschließende Diagnose gibt es bislang allerdings nicht.

Das ist nicht die erste ernsthafte Attacke auf Nawalnys Gesundheit. Es ist bezeichnend und auf jeden Fall äußerst gefährlich, dass der Grad der Gewalt zunimmt.

Im Frühjahr 2017 hatte man Nawalny Seljonka ins Gesicht gespritzt (womöglich gemischt mit Säure). Die Folgen der schweren Verätzungen im Auge mussten lange behandelt werden. Der Angreifer ist untergetaucht, ob er gestellt und bestraft wurde, ist nicht bekannt.
Im Sommer 2019 wurde Nawalny während einer Haftstrafe, die er aufgrund einer Ordnungswidrigkeit absaß, mit einer starken allergischen Reaktion in ein Krankenhaus eingeliefert, obwohl er nie zuvor unter Allergien gelitten hatte. Der Allergieauslöser wurde nicht gefunden. (In derselben Zelle hatte zuvor auch Nawalnys Mitstreiter Leonid Wolkow gesessen, bei ihm zeigten sich unmittelbar nach Freilassung ebenfalls Anzeichen einer plötzlichen starken Allergie.)

Vergiftungen von politischen und anderen Aktivisten mit ähnlichen Symptomen wie bei Nawalny sind leider auch keine Seltenheit mehr. [Mediazona-Herausgeber und Pussy Riot-Aktivist – dek] Pjotr Wersilow kam 2018 mit Anzeichen einer schweren Vergiftung ins Krankenhaus, er wurde schließlich zur Behandlung nach Deutschland ausgeflogen. Er hat bereits geäußert, dass ihn das, was mit Nawalny geschehen ist, an seine eigene Geschichte erinnert. Wersilow hatte die Vergiftung damals in Verbindung gebracht zu seinen Recherchen zum Mord an russischen Journalisten in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik. Der Giftagent wurde nicht gestellt. Der stellvertretende Vorsitzende von Open Russia, Wladimir Kara-Mursa junior, wurde zweifach mit ungeklärten Substanzen vergiftet – 2015 und 2017. Er selbst sprach von einem Mordversuch an ihm, aus Rache für seinen Einsatz für den Magnitski-Akt in den USA und in Europa.
Die Journalistin Anna Politkowskaja hatte 2004 im Flugzeug einen Tee getrunken und wurde daraufhin mit Vergiftungserscheinungen ins Krankenhaus eingeliefert. Sie war damals auf dem Weg nach Beslan, zu der von den Terroristen besetzten Schule. Kollegen der 2006 ermordeten Politkowskaja sehen ebenfalls Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den Vergiftungserscheinungen bei der Journalistin damals und bei Nawalny heute.

In keinem der Vergiftungsfälle wurde je ein Täter identifiziert, Ermittlungen wurden quasi gar nicht aufgenommen oder nie abgeschlossen.

Die Regelmäßigkeit solcher Vergiftungen und die Straffreiheit der Täter ist beängstigend. Durch die Häufigkeit und die ständig wachsende Gefahrenlage sinkt in der Gesellschaft die Sensibilität für derartige Verbrechen. Gewalt gegen Regierungsgegner oder lediglich unzufriedene Bürger wird zur Routine. Zweifellos festigt sich auch bei denen, die missliebige Personen auf die ein oder andere Art „bestrafen“ wollen, das Gefühl, dass ihnen alles erlaubt ist. Im Fall von Nawalny gibt es von solchen Leuten potentiell sehr viele, angefangen bei den Protagonisten seiner Korruptions-Enthüllungen (darunter sind auch hochrangige Silowiki und Vertreter der Elite) bis hin zu inoffiziellen Helfern der Staatsmacht, die so auf ihre Art mit „Bedrohungen für die Stabilität“ des Regimes umgehen.

Ein Attentat auf einen Staatsvertreter oder eine Person des öffentlichen Lebens (Artikel 277 des Strafrechts der Russischen Föderation) wird in Russland hart bestraft: 12 bis 20 Jahre Freiheitsentzug (die in dem Paragraphen ebenfalls vorgesehene Todesstrafe wird nicht angewendet). Aber solche Fälle sind eine Seltenheit. Nach Angaben der Rechtsdienststelle am Obersten Gericht wurden in den vergangenen zehn Jahren nach diesem Paragraphen drei Menschen verurteilt.

Nawalnys Kollegen haben sich bereits an das Ermittlungskomitee gewendet mit der Forderung, ein Verfahren nach Paragraph 277 Strafgesetzbuch zu eröffnen. Wie die Strafverfolgungsbehörde darauf reagierte, ist bislang nicht bekannt – außer, dass im Omsker Krankenhaus ziemlich viele Vertreter der unterschiedlichsten staatlichen Sicherheits- und Strafverfolgungsbehörden versammelt sind. Indes sind das Hinauszögern der Untersuchung, die Imitation von Ermittlungen, das Abbremsen des ganzen Falls das schlimmste Signal, das die Regierung der Gesellschaft jetzt geben kann. Jetzt, da es um den Anführer der russischen Opposition geht – dessen Namen sein größter Rivale – Wladimir Putin – lieber gar nicht erst laut ausspricht. Es ist zynisch darüber zu diskutieren, wem eine Vergiftung Nawalnys nutzen könnte, aber eine gründliche und professionelle Untersuchung des Vorgangs würde zweifellos auch der Regierung nutzen.

Ja, die Politik ist eine toxische Angelegenheit, aber der politische Kampf darf niemals in politischen Terror ausarten, wenn der Staat nicht selbst zu einem Terrorstaat werden soll.

Milliarden-Korruption – Mord am Treuhandchef Rohwedder & Die Toten vom Töpferhof

 


Am 1. April 1991, wurde Dr. Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, der Chef der Treuhand, in seinem Haus in Oberkassel ermordet. Seine Frau wurde durch einen weiteren Schuß schwer verletzt. Bis heute sind die Täter nicht gefunden, Hintermänner nicht genannt, der Mord ungesühnt.

Eine Fernsehdokumentation hat die Hintergründe dieses Terrormordes neu aufgerollt und unbequeme Fragen gestellt. In dem WDR-Feature: Wer erschoß den Treuhandchef? Neue Spuren im Mordfall Rohwedder verfolgen die beiden Autoren Werner Czaschke und Clemens Schmidt die These, daß Stasi-Seilschaften, die Vermögen in Milliardenhöhe in die eigene Tasche verschieben wollten und deren Machenschaften Rohwedder auf der Spur war, ein Motiv hatten, den Treuhandchef zu ermorden.

Noch am Gründonnerstag 1991, vier Tage vor den tödlichen Schüssen, hatte Rohwedders Ehefrau um verstärkten Polizeischutz gebeten. “Hier zieht sich etwas zusammen”, klagte sie bei der Düsseldorfer Polizei – vergeblich. In den Wochen vor der Tat hatten sich die Morddrohungen gegen ihren Mann gehäuft: Anonyme Briefschreiber und Anrufer meldeten sich.

Am Karfreitag wird auf die Berliner Treuhandfiliale an der Schneeglöckchenstraße ein Brandanschlag verübt. Verantwortlich dafür bekennt sich eine Gruppe mit dem Namen “Thomas Münzers wilder Haufen”. Entscheidend dabei ist, daß Rohwedders Name in dem Bekennerschreiben erwähnt ist, diese Information aber nicht rechtzeitig an die für Rohwedders Sicherheit zuständigen Dienststellen gelangt.

In Berlin hatte Rohwedder Sicherheitsstufe 1, in Düsseldorf wurde ihm jedoch nur Stufe 2 gegeben. Im Rahmen der Schutzmaßnahmen hatte man nur die Fenster im Erdgeschoß seines Hauses mit Panzerglas versehen, nicht aber im ersten Stock. Ein fataler Fehler.

Schon seit geraumer Zeit wurden damals von Altkadern der SED, aber auch verstärkt in der allgemeinen Öffentlichkeit, die wachsenden wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten im Wiedervereinigungsprozeß zu Unrecht der Treuhand und speziell ihrem Vorsitzenden Rohwedder angelastet; besonders die giftigen Angriffe aus den Gewerkschaften und seiner eigenen Partei, der SPD, verletzten Rohwedder sehr.

Im Ausland, insbesondere in Großbritannien und von französischen Kreisen um Mitterrand, wurde seit dem Fall der Mauer das Gespenst des “Vierten Reichs” an die Wand gemalt. Im Juli 1990 – nach der deutschen Währungsunion und im Blick auf die von Kohl betriebene Europäische Währungsunion – hatte der britische Industrieminister Nicholas Ridley im Spectator Äußerungen getan, die so empörend waren, daß er seinen Hut nehmen mußte. Allerdings hatte Ridley nur öffentlich ausgesprochen, was viele der geopolitisch fixierten Eliten dachten: Die deutschen Vorstöße in Richtung einer Europäischen Währungsunion seien “ein verbrecherisches deutsches Unterfangen zur Übernahme ganz Europas. Das muß vereitelt werden. Diese übereilte Machtübernahme der Deutschen auf der schlimmstmöglichen Grundlage, wobei die Franzosen sich den Deutschen gegenüber wie Pudel benehmen, ist absolut unerträglich. Ich bin nicht prinzipiell dagegen, Souveränität abzutreten, aber nicht an dieses Pack. Dann hätten wir sie, offen gesagt, gleich an Adolf Hitler abtreten können.”

In dieser innen und außen aufgeputschten Stimmungslage traf der Mordanschlag, anderthalb Jahre nach der Ermordung des Chefs der Deutschen Bank Alfred Herrhausen, den entscheidenden Mann, der mit größter Leidenschaft einen sozialverträglichen Umbau der verrotteten DDR-Wirtschaft angepackt hatte. Erst nach Jahren wird wirklich deutlich, daß der gewaltsame Tod der beiden herausragenden Männer nicht nur eine für die gesamtdeutsche Entwicklung unersetzliche Lücke gerissen hat, sondern auch den Niedergang der deutschen Industrieelite massiv beschleunigte.

Am 16. November 1989 traf Rohwedder, damals Chef des Stahlriesen Hoesch, Professor Albert Jugel aus Dresden, der ihm in einem langen Gespräch schonungslos die wirtschaftliche Lage der DDR darstellt und ihn um Hilfe bittet, u.a. beim Aufbau eines Technologieparks in Dresden. Rohwedder bildet in seinem Unternehmen eine Arbeitsgruppe Deutschland (“Chefsache”). Jugel notiert sich: “Dr. Rohwedder bildet unter seiner persönlichen Leitung ab 20.11.89 eine konzerninterne AG DDR-Kooperation zur Umsetzung der vorgeschlagenen Zusammenarbeit. Er beabsichtigt, am 18.12.1989 zu weiteren Kooperationsgesprächen nach Dresden zu kommen.”

Jugel faßt die Gespräche zusammen und übergibt dieses Papier dem damaligen Ministerpräsidenten der DDR Hans Modrow. U.a. schreibt er: “Es wurden erörtert Möglichkeiten der Lohnarbeit von DDR-Betrieben für Hoesch sowie Kapitalbeteiligungen von Hoesch in der DDR. Dr. Rohwedder sagte hier jede erdenkliche Unterstützung zu, falls der demokratische Prozeß in der DDR in Richtung einer pluralistischen, demokratischen Gesellschaft läuft… Verlagerung in die DDR ist einfacher und billiger als Aufbau von Kapazitäten in Portugal.”

Am 16. Dezember 1989 wird in Dresden der Grundstein für das Technologiezentrum gelegt. Einen Tag später trifft Rohwedder – er ist mit Sohn Philipp und seinem Freund Lothar Loewe auf einer Wanderung “auf den Spuren des Siebenjährigen Krieges” – einen Vertreter des oppositionellen Neuen Forums. Das nächtliche Gespräch vermittelt ihm für die zukünftige Treuhand-Arbeit unersetzliches Wissen und Gespür für die Umbruchslage.

Am 1. März 1990 wird die Verordnung zur “Umwandlung von volkseigenen Kombinaten, Betrieben und Einrichtungen in Kapitalgesellschaften” im DDR-Ministerrat verabschiedet und die Gründung einer Anstalt zur treuhänderischen Verwaltung des Volkseigentums beschlossen; vier Tage nach Beginn der Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion der beiden deutschen Staaten wird Rohwedder am 4. Juni 1990 zum Vorsitzenden des Verwaltungsrates der Treuhandanstalt berufen. Zum Präsidenten der Treuhand wird wenige Tage später Bundesbahnchef Dr. Reiner Maria Gohlke ernannt, der aber bereits am 20. August das Handtuch wirft. Am 29. August wird Rohwedder Präsident der Treuhandanstalt.

In seiner Rede vor der Volkskammer hatte Rohwedder etwas für ihn sehr Typisches gesagt: “Erst kommen die Menschen, dann die Paragraphen.” Damit begründete er seine Absicht, gegen das Treuhandgesetz zu verstoßen und keine branchenübergreifenden Aktiengesellschaften in den zukünftigen neuen Bundesländern aufzubauen. Erste Zwischenbilanz: 8000 VEBs sind umgewandelt in AGs und GmbHs. Am 3. Januar 1991 sind von den knapp 8000 Betrieben 500 privatisiert.

Man hätte sicher keinen besseren Manager für die größte Industrieholding der Welt finden können als Rohwedder. Aufgewachsen im thüringischen Gotha, hat er dann im Westen Deutschlands 16 Jahre in politischer Verantwortung gestanden. 1972 wurde Rohwedder Mitglied der SPD, bei den Ministern Schmidt, Friedrichs und Lambsdorff stand er als Staatssekretär in Diensten. 1979 übernahm er den Job bei Hoesch und sanierte Anfang der 80er Jahre erfolgreich die krankende Stahlindustrie

Später meinte Rohwedder zu diesem Umgestaltungsprozeß im Kontext der wegbrechenden Ostmärkte (immerhin waren von den 4 Mio. Jobs, über die er zu entscheiden hatte, 1,5 Mio. vom Ostexport abhängig): “Ich habe eine hundertprozentige Privatisierung nie für möglich gehalten. Viele Unternehmen würden mit einer hohen staatlichen Beteiligungsquote aus dem Privatisierungsprozeß hervorgehen… Eine reinrassige, gedanklich saubere und schnörkellose Marktwirtschaft” sei für Rohwedder im Osten nicht denkbar, war in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung zu lesen.

Solche Grundüberzeugungen – ähnlich wie die von Alfred Herrhausen kurz vor seiner Ermordung vorgeschlagene Entwicklungsbank für Polen (einschließlich begrenzter Schuldenmoratoria) – stießen auf erbitterten Widerstand geopolitisch fixierter Kreise der Finanzoligarchie. Typische Kritik kam z.B. von der britischen Unternehmensberatung Economic Finance LTD, die den “Dilettantismus”, “die Etablierung neuer, westlich orientierter Seilschaften” und “brutales Eigeninteresse” der Deutschen monierte. Economic-Finance-Geschäftsführer Peter Stähli beklagte sich, daß britische Investoren im Osten Deutschlands nicht so recht zum Zuge kämen. Solche Angriffe nutzten meist das wohlfeile Argument, insbesondere würden Bürokratismus und Hindernisse wie die Frage der Übernahme ökologischer Altlasten neue Investitionen hemmen.

Die Probleme waren Rohwedder durchaus bewußt. Er wollte von vorne herein sicherstellen, daß Korruption und Seilschaften unmöglich, zumindest eingedämmt wurden. In einer Vorstandssitzung sagte er: “Hier wird mit härtesten Bandagen gefochten. Hier wird, was die Treuhandanstalt und die Verwirklichung kommerzieller Interessen angeht, nun aber auch wirklich jede Scham beiseite gelegt. Manche Leute nehmen sich gegenüber der Treuhandanstalt Unverschämtheiten heraus, die in Westdeutschland schlechthin unmöglich wären.” Dabei zielt er nicht nur auf die ostdeutschen Seilschaften ab: “Es gibt große Auswüchse an Wirtschaftskriminalität. Das sind aber alte und neue Seilschaften. Westdeutsche Geschäftemacher und alte Generaldirektoren. Das geht bis in die höchsten Etagen der deutschen Wirtschaft.”

Aus diesen Gründen sucht sich Rohwedder auch für seine Stabsstelle “Recht” den geeigneten Mann, der solche Korruption entdecken und bekämpfen soll: Staatsanwalt Hans Richter aus Stuttgart.

In dem WDR-Film wird Richter in einem Kommentar über den vier Tage vor dem Rohwedder-Mord erfolgten Anschlag auf die Berliner Treuhandfiliale zitiert: “Ein Anschlag auf dieses Büro eines solchen Bürgerbeauftragten, das waren renommierte unabhängige Persönlichkeiten, das ist abstrus gewesen. Und das ist es, was mich damals dazu gebracht hat, daß… Leute, die verhindern wollen, daß Stasi-Seilschaften aufgedeckt werden, viel eher in Betracht kommen. Wir haben Anhaltspunkte dafür, daß bestimmte Unterlagen in dieser Niederlassung von Interesse sein könnten für Leute, die eine Aufdeckung von Vermögensverschiebungen verhindern wollen.”

Der Film entwickelt die These, daß Rohwedder durch politischen Auftragsmord von bestimmten Stasi-Seilschaften umgebracht wurde, denen er das Handwerk legen wollte: “Fest steht: In der Endphase des SED-Staates haben ehemalige DDR-Wirtschaftskreise einen Großteil des alten Staats- und Parteivermögens beiseite geschafft und in alten DDR-Betrieben versteckt. Insgesamt geht es um rund sechs Milliarden Mark. Rohwedder hatte dieses System der Schiebung und der Geldwäsche durchschaut und bereitete Schritte vor, um effizient gegenzusteuern. Er wollte verhindern, daß verdächtige Firmen von alten Seilschaften weitergeführt werden, und bot diese Betriebe statt dessen auf den internationalen Märkten an.”

Der Film zitiert dann erneut den Treuhand-Sonderermittler Hans Richter: “Ich denke, daß es die Stasi in dieser Zeit als Organisation nicht mehr gegeben hat. Aber es hat Gruppen gegeben, die eng mit der Stasi verbunden waren, in verschiedenen Wirtschaftsbranchen, die schon vorher mit dem Ausland zu tun gehabt haben, die ja ganz eng gehalten wurden, etwa die Außenhandelsbetriebe.” Unserer Auffassung nach kommt Richter damit einer wichtigen Spur näher, die aber der Film nicht wirklich substantiiert.

Die WDR-Autoren fokussieren auf einen geheimen Treffpunkt an der damaligen Grenze der DDR zu Bayern, Römhild. Sie beziehen sich dabei auf Recherchen des Bürgerrechtlers und Stasi-Auflösers Hans Schwenke. 1995 hat Schwenke unter dem Titel: Die Spur der Toten oder Der geordnete Rückzug einige seiner Vermutungen über die Rolle der Treffen auf dem Töpferhof in Römhild niedergeschrieben. Mit Recht verweist er auf die Tatsache, daß die Regierung und interessierte Kreise Versuche, die wirtschaftlichen Verflechtungen zwischen Ost und West seit dem Krieg aufzudecken, meist blockieren oder unterlaufen. Darum erfreuen sich Schlüsselfiguren im Ost-West-Geschäft wie Schalck-Golodkowsky oder auch Richard “Moneten”-Müller eines feinen Lebens im Westen, zum Ärger des Normalbürgers.

Schwenke beschreibt den interessanten Umstand, daß sich laut Aufzeichnungen der Sekretärin des Kombinatsdirektors Gramann (beide zur Unzeit MYSTERIÖS verstorben BEVOR SIE VOR DEM BUNDESTAG AUSSAGEN KONNTEN) auf dem Töpferhof seit Mitte der 80er Jahre eine illustre Gesellschaft traf: mal Alexander Schalck-Golodkowsky, Markus Wolf, Wolfgang Berghofer und mal andere DDR-Prominente. Schwenke wirft die Frage auf: “Welche Rolle spielten die Kontakte dieser Prominenz zu Emissären aus Nahost, Zypern und Griechenland, oder Österreich, Schweiz, Niederlanden oder auch aus der Bundesrepublik?”

Den Bürgerrechtlern, schreibt Schwenke, wurde nach der Wende erzählt, bei dem Töpferhof handele es sich um eine Agentenschleuse, man zeigte ihnen ein “Schminkstudio” und “geheimnisumwitterte” Bunkeranlagen und verwies auf Besuche von Günter Guillaume und Ursel Lorenzen (alias Topas). Ein Papier, das über eine Unternehmensgründung Auskunft gibt, an der die Koko-Firma INTRAC und Töpferhof beteiligt sind, “blieb achtlos liegen”. Ein interessanter Hinweis auf ein dunkles Kapitel des internationalen Waffenkartells im KoKo-Netz von Schalck-Golodkowskys Mann Ottokar Hermann.

Verdächtiger Attentäter gebrauchte gefälschte Ausweisdokumente in Berlin

Vadim A. Sokolov, links ein im Verlauf der Untersuchung erhaltenes Originalbild, rechts eine Version desselben Bildes mit digital entferntem Bart

Am Freitag, 23. August 2019, wurde der in Deutschland lebende georgische Staatsbürger Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in der Berliner Innenstadt ermordet, als er auf dem Weg zu einer Moschee zum Freitagsgebet zu Mittag aß. Khangoshvili wurde mit drei Kugeln ermordet, von denen zwei aus nächster Nähe auf seinen Kopf abgefeuert wurden. Der Mörder, der sich in den nahe gelegenen Büschen versteckte, eilte mit einem Elektrofahrrad auf das Opfer zu und schoss das Opfer – einmal in die Schulter und zweimal in den Kopf – mit einer 9-mm-Glock 26 mit angebrachtem Schalldämpfer. Nachdem der Attentäter einige hundert Meter entlang der Spree vom Tatort weggerast war, hielt er an und warf das Elektrofahrrad, eine Plastiktüte mit der Mordwaffe und eine Perücke, die er benutzte, in den Fluss. Dabei wurde er von zwei Teenagern beobachtet, die die Polizei alarmierten. Ihre Tipps führen dazu, dass der Mörder einige Minuten später gefasst wird, als er in einer Menge von Touristen verschwindet – jetzt mit einem rasierten Kopf, einem Gesicht mit Schnurrbart, einem rosa T-Shirt und einem touristischen Beutel, der seinen Pass hält und etwas Bargeld hing an seinem Hals.

Medien berichteten, dass der Verdächtige, der bisher öffentlich als Vadim S, 49, bezeichnet wurde, zunächst mit einem von Frankreich ausgestellten Visum mit dem Flugzeug von Moskau nach Paris reiste, bevor er sechs Tage vor dem Mord nach Deutschland einreiste. Berichten zufolge hat er jegliche Beteiligung an dem Mord bestritten und um ein Treffen mit russischen Konsularbeamten gebeten.

Das Opfer war ein ethnisch tschetschenischer georgischer Staatsbürger, der schon lange auf der Liste der erklärten Feinde Moskaus stand. Nachdem er sich 1999-2002 freiwillig zum Kampf gegen die zentralrussischen Streitkräfte im zweiten Tschetschenienkrieg gemeldet hatte, unterstützte er in den folgenden Jahren weiterhin tschetschenische Separatisten, während er in seinem Heimatland Pankisi Valley in Georgien stationiert war. Er rekrutierte und bewaffnete auch eine Freiwilligeneinheit, um 2008 gegen den russischen Krieg in Georgien zu kämpfen, obwohl es keine Beweise dafür gibt, dass seine Einheit jemals vor Kriegsende Maßnahmen ergriffen hat. Im Jahr 2012 spielte Khangoshvili Berichten zufolge die wichtige Rolle des Vermittlers während des Vorfalls in Lapota, als eine Gruppe bewaffneter Tschetschenen mehrere Menschen in einer abgelegenen Bergregion Georgiens als Geiseln nahm. Obwohl es keine Beweise dafür gibt, dass Khangoshvili sich für eine islamistische Ideologie einsetzt oder islamistische Anliegen unterstützt, hat Russland ihn wiederholt als islamische terroristische Bedrohung gebrandmarkt. Khangoshvili kämpfte in der frühen Phase des Zweiten Tschetschenienkrieges mit Islamisten und war später Aslan Maskhadov nahe, dem ehemaligen tschetschenischen Präsidenten (2005 getötet), der eher als gemäßigter und nationalistischer als als als islamistischer Mensch bekannt war.

Zum Zeitpunkt seines Mordes wartete Khangoshvili auf das Ergebnis seiner Berufung auf ein Abschiebungsverfahren in Deutschland, wo er mit seiner Familie politisches Asyl beantragte, nachdem er zwei Attentate in Georgien verübt hatte (der letzte im Mai 2015, als er es war) erschossen in Tiflis) und mehrere Drohungen erhalten, während sie vorübergehend Zuflucht in der Ukraine suchten. Russland hat offiziell jegliche Verbindung zu den Attentaten abgelehnt.

Fotos auf Khangoshvilis Facebook-Profil. Das linke Bild wurde während des Zweiten Tschetschenienkrieges aufgenommen und zeigt ihn zusammen mit Aslan Maskhadov, dem letzten Präsidenten eines de facto unabhängigen Tschetscheniens

Eine gemeinsame Untersuchung zwischen Bellingcat, der deutschen Zeitung Der Spiegel und The Insider (Russland) hat ergeben, dass der Attentäter unter einem gültigen, nicht biometrischen russischen Pass im Namen des im August geborenen Vadim Andreevich Sokolov über Frankreich nach Berlin gereist ist 1970. Trotz der Tatsache, dass er einen legitimen Pass verwendet hat, haben wir festgestellt, dass in der umfangreichen nationalen Bürgerdatenbank Russlands keine solche Person existiert. Darüber hinaus gibt es keine Spur einer solchen Person in einer Fundgrube von Hunderten von durchgesickerten Wohndatenbanken, die zuvor von Bellingcat erhalten und aggregiert wurden. Diese Entdeckung macht Russlands Behauptung, der Mörder sei nicht mit dem russischen Staat verbunden, unplausibel, da keine Person in Russland in der Lage ist, einen gültigen russischen Pass unter einer gefälschten Identität ohne Beteiligung des staatlichen Bürokratie- und Sicherheitsapparats zu erhalten.

Darüber hinaus haben wir festgestellt, dass die Adresse, die der Mörder in seinem Visumantrag als Wohnsitz in St. Petersburg angegeben hat, nicht existiert. Diese offensichtliche Inkonsistenz und der allgemein leere digitale und datenbezogene Fußabdruck des russischen „Geisterreisenden“ werfen ernsthafte Fragen auf, wie und warum er ein vom französischen Konsulat in Moskau ausgestelltes Schengen-Visum für die mehrfache Einreise erhalten konnte.

Ein Phantomtourist
Anhand der Passdaten aus Sokolovs in Russland eingereichten und von unserem Team erhaltenen Visumantragspapieren haben wir versucht, die Anwesenheit dieser Person in verschiedenen russischen Live- und Offline-Datenbanken zu identifizieren. Wir haben über zwei separate Quellen mit direktem Zugriff auf die russische Passdatenbank überprüft, dass in dieser Datenbank keine Person mit dem Namen Vadim Andreevich Sokolov und dem in seinem Pass verwendeten Geburtsdatum vorhanden ist.

Foto von Vadim A. Sokolov aus seinen Visumantragspapieren

Die russische Passdatenbank ist eine zentralisierte, umfassende Datenbank mit Wohnadressen und Passdaten aller russischen Staatsbürger – einschließlich der vollständigen Geschichte früherer persönlicher Ausweisdokumente -, die vom russischen Innenministerium verwaltet wird. Ebenso wurde weder in einer anderen von der Polizei gepflegten Datenbank, in der nationale und internationale Reisen aller russischen Bürger erfasst werden, noch in der Datenbank der Verkehrspolizei mit Führerscheininhabern eine Anwesenheit dieser Person festgestellt. Wir haben auch Hunderte von zuvor durchgesickerten Offline-Pass-, Wohnadress-, Versicherungs- und Beschäftigungsdatenbanken durchsucht, einschließlich Datenbanken mit Daten aus dem Jahr 2018, und keine Hinweise auf eine Person mit solchen personenbezogenen Daten gefunden.

Damit dieser Mann mit einem normalen Pass mit dem Flugzeug von Moskau nach Paris gereist wäre, hätte er gleichzeitig die Passkontrolle durchlaufen müssen, bei der sein Pass gescannt und automatisch mit der russischen Passdatenbank verglichen worden wäre. Jede Inkonsistenz – wie ein fehlender Datensatz in dieser Datenbank – hätte das Alarmsystem des Grenzbeamten ausgelöst, und die Person wäre nicht zum Fortfahren berechtigt gewesen. Es kann nur zwei mögliche Szenarien geben, die diese Inkonsistenz erklären: Entweder war „Vadim Sokolov“ den Grenzbeamten als Undercover-Agent bekannt, und sie wurden angewiesen, ihn fortfahren zu lassen, oder alternativ zum Zeitpunkt der Reise – das heißt am 31. Juli 2019 – Sokolov befand sich noch in der Russland-Passdatenbank.

Beide Szenarien sind technisch möglich. Das russische Einwanderungssystem (Grenzkontrollsystem) wird vom Bundessicherheitsdienst (FSB) überwacht. Daher hätten besondere Vorkehrungen getroffen werden können, damit „Sokolov“ das routinemäßige Verfahren zur Überprüfung des Flughafens umgeht, insbesondere wenn der Mitarbeiter mit dem FSB verbunden ist.

Ebenso möglich und konsistenter mit der bisherigen Praxis wäre das zweite Szenario, in dem eine Deckungsidentität für „Sokolov“ vollständig erstellt wurde – einschließlich eines Datenbankeintrags im russischen Passsystem -, der jedoch kurz nach den Nachrichten aus den russischen Regierungsdatenbanken gelöscht wurde Die Verhaftung in Berlin brach ab. Im Fall von Skripal-verbundenen GRU-Beamten, die zuvor von Bellingcat identifiziert worden waren, waren die drei verdeckten GRU-Mitarbeiter ursprünglich doppelt in der Russia Passport-Datenbank vertreten: sowohl unter ihrer tatsächlichen als auch unter ihrer Deckungsidentität. Kurz nach ihrem öffentlichen Ausflug durch Bellingcat wurden jedoch sowohl ihre verdeckte als auch ihre wahre Identität (einschließlich der Daten ihrer unmittelbaren Familienmitglieder) aus dem russischen Pass und anderen von der Regierung geführten Datenbanken gelöscht, wodurch mehrere „Geister“ -Familien ohne Pass und Wohneigentum entstanden oder sogar Steuerinformationen (tatsächlich werden Wohnungen, die zuvor von uns als Eigentum von Col. Chepiga und Col. Mishkin, den Hauptverdächtigen von Skripal, bestätigt wurden, jetzt als Eigentum des „russischen Staates“ aufgeführt).

Ob das erste oder das zweite Szenario im Fall von „Sokolov“ verwendet wurde, könnte einen Hinweis darauf geben, welcher der beiden wichtigsten und häufig konkurrierenden Sicherheitsdienste mit dieser dreisten Attentatsoperation verbunden ist. Wie nachstehend dargelegt, hätten sich beide Agenturen, der FSB und die GRU, berechtigt gefühlt, eine solche außergerichtliche Tötung durchzuführen, wenn auch aus unterschiedlichen Gründen.

icher ist jedoch, dass die Cover-Identität hinter „Vadim Sokolov“ erst vor kurzem erstellt wurde und höchstwahrscheinlich für den jeweiligen Betrieb in Berlin maßgeschneidert wurde. Dies lässt sich aus dem Fehlen eines digitalen Fußabdrucks dieser Identität in zuvor durchgesickerten Datenbanken ableiten (zum Vergleich tauchten sowohl „Boshirov“ als auch „Petrov“ – die Deckungsidentitäten hinter den Skripal-Verdächtigen – in älteren Offline-Datenbanken auf). Diese Schlussfolgerung steht auch im Einklang mit dem ungewöhnlich jüngsten Ausstellungsdatum für den Pass von „Sokolov“ – dem 18. Juli 2019, nur zehn Tage vor der geplanten Reise. Wir haben außerdem – über Quellen mit Zugang zu nicht russischen Flugbuchungsdatenbanken – überprüft, dass eine Person mit diesem Namen und Geburtsdatum in den letzten 6 Jahren weder zu einem europäischen Ziel gereist ist noch Visa für Schengen-Staaten erhalten hat. All dies impliziert entweder eine Ad-hoc-Operation nach neu erhaltenen Informationen über den Aufenthaltsort des Ziels oder die Verwendung eines “Einmal-Attentäters”, der kein Mitarbeiter ist. Wie weiter unten erläutert, kann sich diese letztere Hypothese aufgrund der besonderen Besonderheiten des Mannes, der sich derzeit in deutscher Haft befindet, als wahr erweisen.

Passhinweise
In früheren Untersuchungen hat Bellingcat Chargen von fortlaufenden Passnummern identifiziert, die in verschiedenen Jahren an GRU-Beamte ausgegeben wurden. Die für Sokolovs Pass verwendete Passnummer kann nicht mit diesen Chargen abgeglichen werden, da sie erst im Juli 2019 ausgestellt wurde und wir keine empirischen Daten von anderen GRU-Beamten mit neuen Pässen haben. Diese Chargen wurden jedoch alle von derselben Moskauer „Zentraleinheit“ des Bundesmigrationsdienstes (jetzt in das Innenministerium integriert) ausgestellt, die anscheinend den Pass von „Sokolov“ ausgestellt hat.

Die Nummer von “Sokolov” ähnelt auch in anderer Hinsicht den Pässen der anderen GRU-Beamten: Es handelt sich um einen Pass vom “alten” Typ – d. H. Ohne eingebettete biometrische Daten. Während Russland 2009 biometrische Pässe einführte und diese bei der Beantragung eines neuen Reisedokuments die Standardwahl sind, werden auf Anfrage Pässe im „alten Stil“ ausgestellt, normalerweise in Notsituationen, in denen der Antragsteller keine Zeit hat, auf die Verschlüsselung der Fingerabdrücke zu warten Druckprozess. Alle bisher von uns identifizierten international tätigen GRU-Beamten (mehr als 20) und „Sokolov“ entschieden sich für den „Papier“ -Pass im alten Stil, höchstwahrscheinlich aufgrund des Risikos eines Konflikts zwischen den Fingerabdrücken der Undercover-Person und dem bereits vorhandenen Fingerabdruck Daten der realen Person. Im Fall von „Sokolov“ war dies möglicherweise auch der Grund oder die unvermeidliche Folge einer überstürzten Operation, da die Vorlaufzeit für den Erhalt eines biometrischen Passes mindestens eine Woche beträgt.

Ein Express-Visum für einen Geist

Unser gemeinsames Untersuchungsteam konnte die meisten Passdaten des Verdächtigen aus einer Quelle mit Zugang zu visumgebundenen Dokumenten abrufen, die von „Vadim Sokolov“ in Russland eingereicht wurden. Das Dokument zeigt, dass der Verdächtige am 29. Juli 2019 beim französischen Konsulat in Moskau ein Expressvisum beantragte – nur 11 Tage nachdem er seinen nicht biometrischen Pass erhalten hatte. Er beantragte ein 6-Monats-Visum für die mehrfache Einreise, mit dem er uneingeschränkten Zugang zu allen 26 Ländern des Schengen-Raums erhalten konnte. Ungewöhnlich und kühn gab er an, dass sein geplantes Reisedatum der 30. Juli 2019 ist – buchstäblich der Tag nach seinem Visumantragsdatum. Darüber hinaus gab er an, dass er während seines sechsmonatigen Visums für den maximal zulässigen Zeitraum von 90 Tagen in Frankreich bleiben wolle und erklärte, er plane, bis zum 25. Januar 2020 nach Frankreich und zurück zu reisen.

Trotz dieser kühnen Bestrebungen – die beantragte Visumdauer und die Wiedereintrittsbedingungen sind das Maximum, das einem Erstreisenden ausgestellt werden kann, und die Vorlaufzeit für Reisen ist ungewöhnlich kurz – hatte „Sokolov“ in Bezug auf einen nachvollziehbaren Hintergrund in Russland wenig zu zeigen . Sein Reisepass zeigte, dass er in der sibirischen Stadt Irkursk geboren wurde, aber er gab seinen Wohnort als „Alpiyskaya Street 37“ in Sankt Petersburg an. In St. Petersburg gibt es keine „Alpiyskaya-Straße“, obwohl es eine „Alpiyskiy Pereulok“ (Alpiysky-Straße) gibt, und auf Nummer 37 dieser Straße befinden sich drei gehobene Wohnhauscluster, von denen jeder eine separate Unteradresse hat ( Korpus 1, 2 oder 3), der normalerweise bei der Angabe einer Adresse angegeben wird.

Foto eines der drei Wohnblockcluster in der Alpiyskiy Lane in St. Petersburg, wie in Yandex Maps zu sehen

Der einzige Ort in der Nähe von St. Petersburg, an dem es tatsächlich eine „Alpiyskaya-Straße“ gibt, ist eine nahe gelegene Stadt namens Kudrovo, etwas außerhalb der Stadtgrenzen. Es gibt jedoch auch keine Nummer 37 in dieser Straße.

Satellitenansicht der Alpiyska-Straße in Kudrovo mit allen Hausnummern

In seiner Bewerbung führte der Verdächtige auch seinen Beruf als „leitender Angestellter des Unternehmens“ an, obwohl das vom Untersuchungsteam überprüfte Dokument nicht den Namen des Unternehmens enthielt, bei dem er angeblich beschäftigt war. Es ist nicht klar, ob er dem französischen Konsulat den Namen des Unternehmens mitgeteilt hat.

Als Ansprechpartner in Frankreich – was für Visumantragsteller aus Russland obligatorisch ist – führte der Verdächtige den Namen des Mittelklassepraktikums in Paris an. Zum Zeitpunkt der Drucklegung konnten wir keine Rückmeldung von der Hotelleitung erhalten, ob sie mit dieser Person in Kontakt stand oder sie kannte oder ob sie das Hotel während ihrer Reise nach Frankreich als beabsichtigten Wohnort genutzt hat. Als eine Hotelrezeptionistin ein Foto des Verdächtigen zeigte, sagte sie, sie habe diese Person im Hotel nicht gesehen.

Angesichts der Tatsache, dass der Verdächtige in Russland keinen digitalen oder datenbezogenen Fußabdruck hat, eine unvollständige oder falsche Adresse und Beschäftigungsdaten aufführt, einen frisch ausgestellten Pass besitzt und mindestens seit 2013 nicht nach Europa gereist ist, ist es verwirrend, dass das französische Ministerium für Foreign Affairs, das letztendlich für die Entscheidung über Visumanträge zuständig war, beschloss, dem Antrag vollständig nachzukommen, und erteilte das Mehrfachvisum ohne detaillierte Prüfung und ohne Wartezeit. Bellingcat hat zuvor über das nominell drakonische, aber empirisch durchlässige Visumantragssystem für Westeuropa berichtet, das es russischen Spionen mit gefälschten Identitäten und ohne Datenabdruck ermöglicht, fast ein Jahrzehnt lang Visa für die mehrfache Einreise und uneingeschränkte europäische Reisen zu erhalten.

Ein ungewöhnlicher Verdächtiger
Der Bericht über den inhaftierten Verdächtigen beschreibt ihn laut deutschen Sicherheitsquellen, die von unserem gemeinsamen Team befragt wurden, als 176 cm groß und 86 kg schwer. In dem Bericht heißt es außerdem, dass der Verdächtige drei Tätowierungen auf seinem Körper hat: eine Krone und einen Panther auf seinem linken Oberarm und eine Schlange auf dem rechten Unterarm.

Das Vorhandensein von Tätowierungen auf dem Körper eines Attentäters ist im Zusammenhang mit einer russischen Sicherheitsdienstoperation ungewöhnlich. Russische Sicherheitsdienste erlauben ihren Stabsoffizieren nicht, sich so zu schmücken. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass der Verdächtige kein Stabsoffizier ist oder dass er Tätowierungen im Rahmen einer langfristigen eingebetteten Undercover-Operation erhalten durfte. Eine mögliche Erklärung könnte sein, dass der Verdächtige ein ehemaliger Verurteilter war, der von einem der Geheimdienste kooptiert wurde, da der Stil der beschriebenen Tätowierungen mit einer speziellen und streng „regulierten“ Körperdekorationsnomenklatur übereinstimmt, die als „Gefängnistattoos“ bekannt ist. Ohne weitere Informationen oder Bilder der Tätowierungen – beispielsweise ob sie monochrom oder farbig sind – wäre es jedoch unmöglich zu beurteilen, ob die Körperkunst des Verdächtigen von der Art „Gefängnistätowierung“ ist.

Es ist nicht beispiellos, dass die russischen Sicherheitsdienste auf Freiberufler oder sogar Ex-Sträflinge als Attentäter zurückgreifen, wie mindestens zwei aktuelle Beispiele für (versuchte) extraterritoriale Morde in der Ukraine zeigen. In einem Fall wurde ein ehemaliger FSB-Beamter, der wegen Korruption angeklagt worden war, in die Ukraine geschickt, um ein Attentat auf ein Mitglied des ukrainischen Militärgeheimdienstes zu organisieren. In einem anderen Fall wurde ein ukrainischer Gefängnisbeamter von der russischen GRU angeworben, um einen ehemaligen ukrainischen Artillerieoffizier zu ermorden, der die georgischen Streitkräfte während des russisch-georgischen Krieges 2008 beraten hatte. Es wäre jedoch ein Präzedenzfall für einen russischen Sicherheitsdienst, einen Freiberufler in Westeuropa einzusetzen.

Wer hat den Befehl gegeben?
Die komplexe Vergangenheit des Opfers führt zu der Möglichkeit, dass er bei einer Operation des FSB, der GRU oder sogar des eigenen Sicherheitsapparats von Ramzan Kadyrov ermordet wurde. Aufgrund seiner Beteiligung am russisch-tschetschenischen Krieg und der jüngeren Qualifikation als „islamische Bedrohung“ wäre er im Fadenkreuz der FSB-Eroberungs- oder Tötungsliste gestanden.

Andererseits hätte ihn seine Beteiligung am Krieg und seine Unterstützung für Georgier im russisch-georgischen Krieg zu einem Rachemordziel für die GRU gemacht, parallel zu anderen Attentaten auf ehemalige Gegner bewaffneter Konflikte aus der Nähe Russlands. im Ausland – was in den Augen des russischen Militärs gleichbedeutend mit Verrat ist. Unabhängig davon hätte sein tschetschenischer Hintergrund und die Tatsache, dass er während des Tschetschenienkrieges auf der Seite von Aslan Mashadov stand, Khangoshvili gegen Ramzan Kadyrovs Clique ausgespielt.

In der Tat wurden die meisten Attentate auf ethnische Tschetschenen in Übersee in den letzten 10 Jahren von tschetschenischen Abgesandten begangen, die manchmal im Namen von Kadyrow handelten – wie im Fall des Attentats auf die ukrainische Staatsbürgerin Amina Okueva (die nicht überlebte) im Juni 2017 ein nachfolgendes Attentat im selben Jahr) in Kiew – Reisen unter Deckung, nicht tschetschenische Identität.

Was auch immer die Antwort sein mag, der Zugang zu einem gültigen, von Moskau ausgestellten Pass und die sofortige und umfassende Löschung aller Daten, die mit der Deckungsidentität „Vadim Sokolov“ in Verbindung stehen, sind ein klarer Hinweis auf die staatliche Beteiligung an diesem extraterritorialen Attentat, ähnlich wie in Kühnheit und mangelnde plausible Verleugnung des Skripal-Falls.

Bellingcat und seine Ermittlungspartner werden diese Geschichte weiter untersuchen, um die tatsächliche Identität der Person zu ermitteln, die unter der Person „Sokolov“ reist.

AGAIN: A MURDER THREAT FOR THE PUBLICATION OF THE STASI LISTS WITH CLEAR NAMES

Hello Bernd Pulch,

You know very well about Toxdat.

Then, according to the theory, it is time for practical experience.

A loyal reader

Annotation:

Toxdat is the murder study of the GDR by GDR murder expert Ehrenfried Stelzer, bosom friend of RA Resch, business friend of Resch and co-founder of GoMoPa.

The study describes how people can be murdered without the murder being discovered.

WIEDER EINMAL: MORD-DROHUNG WG PUBLIKATION DER STASI-LISTEN MIT KLARNAMEN

Hallo Bernd Pulch,

Du weisst ja bestens über Toxdat Bescheid.

Na dann wird es nach der Theorie Zeit für die Erfahrung in der Praxis.

Ein treuer Leser

 

Anmerkung:

Toxdat ist die Mordstudie der DDR vom DDR-Mordexperten Ehrenfried Stelzer, Busenfreund von RA Resch, Geschäftsfreund von Resch und Mitgründer von GoMoPa.

Die Studie schildert, wie Personen ermordet werden können, ohne dass der Mord entdeckt wird.

Murder in Mexico: What’s the Danger to an Foreign Tourist?

Full Coverage: Murder in Mexico

Mexico broke its record for manslaughters a year ago, and the elements that are driving that savagery are probably not going to lessen sooner rather than later.

Simultaneously, record quantities of U.S. residents are either visiting Mexico as voyagers or dwelling in the nation, yet the quantity of Americans killed in Mexico remains strikingly low.

All things considered, vicious wrongdoing stays an issue in Mexico, and guests and inhabitants should take measures to moderate the hazard.

With spring break directly around the bend, our Threat Lens group is by and by popular, as customers — alongside a wide exhibit of loved ones — are for the most part pondering about the security of a Mexican escape for some spring sun. Obviously, the worry is justifiable. As our 2019 Mexico cartel conjecture detailed, kills in the nation hit their most noteworthy rate ever a year ago and, worryingly, there’s nothing to propose that this year will be any extraordinary.

The Big Picture

Topography, financial aspects and history have brought about the United States and Mexico getting firmly interlaced, with Mexico’s fabricated products profiting the U.S. market and U.S. visitors helping Mexico’s economy. Mexico’s nearness to the United States, nonetheless, has likewise brought forth incredible and fatal wrongdoing south of the Rio Grande — some of which can entrap Americans.

See The Importance of Mexico

Mexico’s climbing murder rate still can’t seem to deflect American sightseers from visiting their southern neighbor. A year ago’s U.S. traveler figures are not yet accessible, however it’s sheltered to accept that the count will come in higher than the 35 million that visited the nation in 2017. The U.S. Branch of State has given alerts encouraging against movement to five Mexican states: Colima, Michoacan, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas and Guerrero — the remainder of which is home to the hotel city of Acapulco. In spite of this, the hotels of Cancun, Cozumel and Cabo San Lucas are as of now brimming with American travelers in 2019, and I expect they will be close to limit over spring break.

Somebody as of late contacted me on Twitter, saying they had quit visiting Mexico subsequent to turning into a Stratfor endorser. Presently, that is surely not our purpose recorded as a hard copy on this theme; all things considered, we want to take a “go, however” way to deal with movement security instead of certainly advise anybody not to go. It’s a similar story for Mexico, which is an extraordinary nation to visit with amazing things to see and do. In any case, as anyplace else, there are dangers, a large number of which can be kept away from or relieved. For the occasion, however, how about we investigate the conjunction of Mexico’s developing homicide rate and the increasing number of American vacationers deciding to visit the nation. Since, at last, the danger may not be as incredible as dreaded.

A graph showing the cause of deaths for Americans in Mexico from June 2017 to June 2018.

American Deaths in Mexico

Between June 2017 and June 2018, 238 Americans passed on in Mexico, adding up to 29 percent of all U.S. residents who died abroad during the period, as indicated by the U.S. Branch of State. Be that as it may, as far as manslaughter, Mexico lingers a lot bigger in the figures: Of the 152 who were killed abroad during the a year being referred to, precisely half passed on in Mexico. Normally, be that as it may, the topic of scale is foremost in deciphering the figures. The 35 million U.S. vacationers who visit Mexico predominate the quantity of their countrymen (1.5 million) who go to close by goals, for example, Jamaica. And keeping in mind that only six Americans succumbed to crime in the last mentioned, the homicide rate for U.S. residents is, per capita, higher on the Caribbean island than it is in Mexico.

To put things further into viewpoint, Chicago has a populace of 2.7 million — about equivalent to the quantity of Americans that live in Mexico (to avoid anything related to the 35 million that visited a year ago). A year ago, in any case, 561 individuals passed on in manslaughters in the Windy City, in excess of multiple times the quantity of Americans who were killed in Mexico.

A diagram indicating the reason for passings for Americans in Mexico from June 2017 to June 2018.

At long last, the 76 American manslaughter casualties are a small detail within a bigger landscape as far as Mexico’s general aggregate: 33,341. In addition, a decent segment of those homicides happened in outskirt urban communities in which there are dynamic cartel wars, for example, Tijuana, Juarez and Reynosa. Interestingly, only four happened in visitor hotspots like Cancun, La Paz in Baja California Sur and Puerto Penasco in Sonora. Besides, a considerable lot of the Americans killed in places like Tijuana and Juarez were double residents or occupants of Mexico who were engaged with crime — that isn’t planned to limit their demises, however simply demonstrates that such killings make little difference to the American vacationers who visit Mexican retreats. What’s more, even in states with critical hotels in which the homicide rate has expanded, for example, Quintana Roo (which is home to Cancun), the quantity of American sightseers slaughtered there remains very little. Viciousness in Cancun, for instance, is very normal — an assault on a bar there on Feb. 16 murdered five individuals — however the majority of the brutality happens a long way from the vacationer zones along the sea shore. At last, Mexico’s homicide rate may have increased to around 27 for each 100,000, yet its crime rate is still just about a large portion of that of Honduras or El Salvador.

Evading the Danger

That in any case, Mexico obviously has a difficult issue with vicious wrongdoing, as confirm by the numerous cartels that are battling each other for control of the nation’s rewarding medication creation regions, dealing halls and household opiates deals. And afterward there are auxiliary, fierce crimes, for example, fuel burglary, payload robbery, capturing and human dealing. Cartel individuals additionally will in general use military-grade weapons, which they don’t spare a moment to use on rival groups or security powers, regularly bringing about inadvertent blow-back.

Savagery in Cancun is very normal — an assault on a bar there on Feb. 16 slaughtered five individuals — yet the majority of the brutality happens a long way from the vacationer zones along the sea shore.

Along these lines, the most ideal approach to abstain from falling prey to criminal brutality is to evade puts in which it is well on the way to happen, for example, strip bars and undesirable clubs in which medicate selling happens. In addition, numerous remote survivors of wrongdoing in Mexico were toasting abundance, utilizing drugs or remaining out late around evening time. We suggest that voyagers visiting Mexico remain at their inn or resort grounds after dull and abstain from toasting abundance or utilizing drugs. In a portion of the drinking-related occurrences, aggressors spiked refreshments with incapacitants, for example, GHB, Rohypnol or fentanyl, so we suggest you not acknowledge drinks from obscure individuals or leave your beverage unattended. In addition, it’s a smart thought to abstain from going onto the sea shore after dull.

What’s more, talking about the dim, abstain from driving around evening time, even on the expressways. That implies that in case you’re flying into Mexico, plan your trips to show up during the day and use pre-organized transportation to get to your lodging or resort, as Mexican taxicabs, especially the unlawful ones, can some of the time be utilized for express kidnappings and rapes.

Before you go, limit what you take with you on your outing, so you can diminish your misfortunes on the off chance that you are ransacked and decrease your compulsion to oppose a furnished crook. Furthermore, if, notwithstanding the entirety of your safety measures, furnished burglars do defy you, do as is commonly said, for they won’t stop for a second to utilize unwarranted savagery on the off chance that you neglect to agree. At long last, your watch or your wallet is essentially not worth your life.

As the familiar proverb goes, you’re bound to bite the dust or endure injury in a car crash (or fire or other mishap) than you are to endure hurt because of a lawbreaker. That is the reason it’s basic to pack a stop-the-drain unit and other emergency treatment gear, a decent quality electric lamp and smoke hoods, as these things can truly be lifelines. For the remainder of the time, practice legitimate situational mindfulness and good judgment security and you’re probably not going to experience numerous issues on your outing south.

The Shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007 – Top Secret Document

Target is Destroyed | Korean Air Lines Flight 007 - YouTube

The Shootdown ofKorean Airlines Flight 007 – 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov describes Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.”

 

Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke]
with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Comrade V. A.
Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin
Citation:
“Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke] with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB,
Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin,” September 19, 1983, History and Public
Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU),
MfS, ZAIG 5306, pp. 1-19. Translated by Bernd Schaefer.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115718
Summary:
Meeting between KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov and East German Minister for State Security
Mielke, including discussion of the shootdown of Korean Airlines (KAL) Flight 007.
Credits:
This document was made possible with support from the Blavatnik Family Foundation and the Leon
Levy Foundation.
Original Language:
German
Contents:
English Translation
N o t e
About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke] with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB,
Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin
[Additional] Participants:
From the KGB:
Comrade Lieutenant General Shumilov
Comrade Captain Ryabinnikov (Interpreter)
From the MfS:
Comrade Major General Grossmann
Comrade Major General Damm
Comrade Lieutenant Colonel Salevsky (Interpreter)
Comrade Mielke:
Welcome.
It’s a great pleasure. I understand how the difficult situation makes it hard for you [Kryuchkov] to
leave the Soviet Union temporarily. We are happy that it worked out nonetheless.
I have to convey greetings from Comrade [Markus] Wolf [the Deputy Minister for State Security].
He will return from Hungary on 1 October 1983 and come [for a further bilateral MfS-KGB meeting]
to Tabarz [in the Thuringian Forest in the GDR where Kryuchkov will stay for vacation]. Then we
can already talk there about some issues and return to Berlin during the course of Sunday, 2
October 1983. We will have time on 3 and 4 October to discuss some more issues and requests for
mutual cooperation, possibly to be forwarded later to Comrade [CPSU General Secretary] Y. V.
Andropov. [Your] return to Moscow is scheduled for 5 October.
I have some requests to hear from you Moscow’s perspectives concerning assessments of the
following issues:
– What is the perspective on [Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) disarmament] talks in Geneva?
(West German newspaper “Die Welt” says there is no more optimism left, just hope!)
– What does this mean in terms of concrete assignments to the MfS, how should we proceed?
(Maybe you could also outline problems for us to forward Comrade E. Honecker.)
– Regarding the entire complex of heightened tensions after the plane incident (South Korea) and
ensuing boycott measures: What are the assessments? What does this mean for the future?
Which counter-measures are planned?
[1]
– [CSCE follow-up conference in] Madrid
Even elements from the FRG [West German] bourgeoisie are talking about the option to continue
disarmament negotiations after the buildup [of INF in Western Europe]. There have been several
statements in this regard (Vogel/SPD, Weizsäcker/CDU, even Strauss/CSU).
They all believe something is going to happen, and that even after missile deployment the
negotiations will continue. Even Strauss said in his first two election campaign speeches that we
must avoid a nuclear world war; otherwise the world will perish.
You can view him as you like, but in a certain regard he is a realist. He believes the balance of
forces to be such that there can be no winner. This does not yet make him our friend. You have to
analyze this thoroughly.
I also still want to talk to you later about other issues in private.
There are many who believe there will be a continuation of talks even after an INF deployment. In
addition, there are the full impacts of the boycott in effect.
We are interested in the actual [KGB] assessments of the situation, in addition to what is known at
the Politburo level.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Many thanks for the welcome.
I am grateful for the invitation to spend parts of my vacation here in the GDR. My apologies that I
was not able to come on 10 September already. Yet there were a couple of issues preventing me
from doing do. The most important one was the plane incident. You do not shoot down such a type
of airplane once a month.
Thus I messed up all of our comrades’ schedules to a certain degree. This has created some
problems.
Comrade Mielke:
We have solved this in an effective fashion. Just come when you are able to come.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
I am tasked to convey cordial greetings from Y. V. Andropov and his best wishes. He again thanks
you for the joint work done for state security.
He rates meetings and talks with you very highly, in particular your cordial and focused
development of cooperation with the USSR.
It is his special pleasure to greet you again cordially. Now he is on vacation in the South. For
politicians like him, there is no actual vacation. Once in a while he has visitors.
For a half day he is reading information, including ours [KGB] and what we received from you. Also
I convey cordial greetings from [KGB Chairman] V. M. Chebrikov and his deputies. They all know
you very well. Almost all of them have worked with you in the past, and all of them have very fond
memories.
Now to the concrete questions you have raised.
These are questions discussed at the highest level. I myself am not placed so highly.
Hence I will do my best to respond to these questions based on my state of knowledge and
responsibilities.
Obviously I will not be able to answer them in full. Yet since we are all part of the process to
determine policy and concrete measures, issues of detail included, I can explain at least some
aspects and inform you accordingly.
On the Plane Incident
Some issues have been already explained at the [9 September 1983] press conference. Now one
can outline how the story happened and unfolded in its entirety.
During the first days we were reluctant to provide information. From the beginning, however, there
were no reasons to keep the incident secret. We wanted to wait to see what the West had to say.
Reagan’s initial reaction was very important to us. The full timeline about what happened to the
plane was meanwhile published in our press. Yet we have not yet published everything we have.
We did not know that the downed plane was a civilian airliner. Our pilots were not aware of that.
We were convinced that it was a military aircraft. When the regional ground command issued its
orders, it did not know it was a civilian airliner. We are not going to make this public, but this was
just how it was. We were convinced that this was a special aircraft on a specific reconnaissance
mission.
Our radar detected the plane prior to its violation of our airspace, about 600 to 800 kilometers
before Kamchatka. The dot on the radar approached Kamchatka, i.e. the area where we have
military bases. Some of them are nuclear bases.
Our services were to a certain extent shocked that the plane headed directly towards Kamchatka.
Such a brazen incident had never happened before. Thousands of planes fly through the air
corridors there. Previous violations were just about between 1 and 5 kilometers. Yet until 1
September 1983, there had been no single incident involving a direct flight over Kamchatka.
The plane was detected by ground radar and by our military aircraft. We decided to do nothing
against the plane. We were in doubt what kind of plane it was, and whether it really was an aircraft
flying over Kamchatka for intelligence monitoring.
The plane left Soviet airspace over the Sea of Okhotsk. A large part of this ocean consists of open,
international waters. There our radar lost the plane. Sometime later the plane showed up in
Sakhalin airspace. In Sakhalin they already knew that an airplane had violated airspace over
Kamchatka.
We again undertook measures to identify this plane. 4 aircraft went up (2 SU-15, 2 MIG-23). They
tried to establish connection; various signals were given. No response. More than 120 [warning]
shots were fired.
There were still a few kilometers left for the plane before its departure from our airspace. Our pilots
said this is not a passenger plane. It was especially relevant that this plane flew around our antiaircraft defenses. One SU-15 was especially close, just about 2 kilometers away. The speed of the
[KAL] Boeing was 800 kilometers [per hour]; the SU-15 had [a speed of] 2,400 kilometers [per
hour], the MIG-23 [had a speed of] 2,000 kilometers [per hour].
For reasons of speed they could not get closer to each other. At the plane, windows were not
illuminated and position lights not turned on. We fired special tracer bullets parallel to the plane’s
course of direction. Some of them were shot right in front of its nose. The plane’s pilots must have
noticed this. The plane maneuvered and changed its altitude to evade our aircraft. Then, on the
instructions of ground control, two missiles were fired. The shootdown occurred over the territory of
Sakhalin.
After the firing of the missiles the plane still flew for 11 minutes. It lost altitude, went down to 5,000
meters, and then it fell into the sea 9 to 11 nautical miles from the coast. In the morning we noticed
an oil spot on the ocean. Parts from the plane were found near Moneron Island (near Nevelsk).
Ocean currents carried other parts to the Japanese coast at Hokkaido. The spot of the crash has
been located quite exactly. Now Soviets, Americans, and Japanese are searching there for the
wreck. Everybody is attempting to find the flight recorder. Until my departure it had not been found.
The plane had deviated from the air corridor towards Sakhalin by about 600 kilometers, altogether
by an average of between 200 and 500 kilometers. There were four American and four Japanese
air control points along the regular corridor. None of them had issued a signal.
We were completely convinced that this plane was on a reconnaissance mission. If we would have
known that this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down. Yet everything pointed in
another direction. We have recordings of exchanges between ground control and our aircraft.
So far not everything has been published. Why should we make everything available right away?
We have posed and forwarded 11 questions to the Americans and Japanese. They have not
responded to any of them.
We have still more details about this [KAL] flight. Reagan declared that mankind will unfortunately
never know who entered the wrong programming [at the KAL plane]. You could say, this way he
conceded this mistake; since mankind wants to know who did that, and why.
Just among us: We have received very interesting information from an American source. He
informs how, and by whom, this airliner was prepared for its flight. In the coming days we will
provide this information to the Americans without making all of it public. In this way this American
will be “sacrificed” as a source. We have to wait for a couple of more days.
Obviously there are still a couple of other facts. There are people who have consciously sent this
plane to its demise. Sooner or later everything will come out.
Reactions in individual countries were very different; in some there were very tough, in others,
rather irrelevant. The saying goes that such events do not “live” for more than 2 weeks. The
Americans will exploit this further when the parts of the plane and the dead are recovered. Some
dead bodies have already been found at the Northern shore of Hokkaido. All this will be exploited
propagandistically. In the Western press you always find the question raised over and over
whether this is beneficial to Reagan.
We [KGB] want to contribute with our active measures towards the revelation of all causes and
links of this plane incident. We hope that our friends from the MfS will support us in this regard.
For the first time, [on 9 September 1983] a large press conference was held with the First Deputy
Foreign Minister and the Chief of the General Staff [Marshal Nikolai Orgarkov]. Everything had
been thoroughly prepared.
In a few days an article will follow by Air Force Marshal [Pyotr S.] Kirsanov, featuring new facts that
this [KAL] flight was not a normal one. It will be proven that simultaneously to this flight a US
satellite crossed the flight route three times. The Americans knew that we were preparing missiles
for launch on this territory at that time. The launch had to be postponed. Also telling is the following
episode: On the downed plane there was a well-known US Senator [sic] who initially did not want
to board this flight.
[2] He decided to book only at the last minut e.
Still some “white spots” remain. After the incident, US Senator [Henry “Scoop”] Jackson [D-WA]
delivered a very strong anti-Soviet speech demanding further tough sanctions against the Soviet
Union. When he left the podium, he fell and dropped dead. He was an extremely strong anti-Soviet
(a pathological case).
We express our deep regrets for the victims but do not accept responsibility. Our Foreign Minister,
Comrade Gromyko, did not travel to the U.N. General Assembly in New York. He stayed home
since the US did not give guarantees for the safety of his plane.
We will also not participate in the IPU [International Parliamentary Union] Meeting in Seoul (but not
because Kim Il Sung has asked us to do so).
It was also because of the plane incident that I was not able to come earlier [to the GDR].
Comrade Mielke:
I have the following questions.
I said from the beginning one has to be more on the offensive, based on the fact that this was an
organized provocation. You have to declare that the Americans use other nations to cover their own
provocations. They apply this method frequently.
You have to say immediately that this is a provocation in order to go on the offensive. You should
have done that right away. This is my only critical remark. I did not have any other alternative
thoughts.
This argumentation was lacking right from the onset. There are plenty of examples how they
operate here at our place. They exploit other nations, and simultaneously use the opportunity to
drag others in whom they actually want to get rid of. I said so immediately when this happened.
The issue is now evident. In [our central newspaper] Neues Deutschland we published the full
transcript of your press conference. We also broadcasted it on television.
You should have gone on the offensive somewhat faster. Sure, you should listen to what the
enemy has to say. Yet everything else you could have added later. You have to work out additional
arguments that this was a targeted provocation together with South Korea. It is not so much about
the issue of the shootdown. Yet that you could not identify the airliner as a passenger plane – I do
not think this is good.
This event had exceptional elements of surprise. I said so also to Comrade E. Honecker. What
could have come out of this? We have to be extraordinarily vigilant. Nobody can say in advance
what is going to happen; whether this plane incident could lead to a provocation transforming into a
war. I note the problem of surprise over and over again. This surprise can lead to a war.
It is quite uncomfortable to say that one did not recognize it. It can happen. Everyone is human.
Yet there lies a great risk also for other issues.
Everything you say is correct, but the Western press says you were not able to identify the type of
plane since your aircraft were flying below. They also say the flight recorder has already been
found. If you do not have it, you have to search for it further. They [in the West] sense the danger
coming from the flight recorder. We are in complete agreement with you and will continue our
measures.
A captain from [the West German airline] Lufthansa has written a wonderful article with sound
arguments:
1. This is how they [the US] operate
2. Why did they not guide the plane on a correct course if the US and Japan were aware of this?
Arguments are on the table. You just have to use them for the fight against Reagan. It is interesting
that Reagan can get into trouble when a part of the bourgeoisie disagrees. If [CNN Chairman Ted]
Turner is saying he will not “swear on a bible” that the [KAL] flight was not a spy mission, he
therefore argues against Reagan. They provide the arguments themselves. This is why some
countries will not join the boycott. We have to continue our work.
I have no further questions. Only if there are new arguments coming up; but then so we can
respond quickly. This is important to the entire world, to your good friends, to those who waver, but
also to the enemies who are smart and realists. More timely information would have been better:
This just privately since you asked.
There are also comrades who say: Did you really have to shoot down the civilian airliner?! Were
they not in a position to recognize this?
This is why the argument that you were not able to identify the type of plane is so dangerous.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
They were not able to recognize it.
Comrade Mielke:
Of course, those two plane types look similar. Honest specialists from the West are saying this, too.
They also say: Why were there so many RC planes flying at that time in this area?
Comrade Kryuchkov:
The entire incident occurred at 7:00 hours [A.M.] local time. In Moscow it was midnight. Already at
the evening of 1 September all issues were discussed, and a first brief news report issued on [state
TV newscast] “Vremya.” The same day we established a large commission and send them to the
East. On 3 September they provided a comprehensive report.
Comrade Mielke:
We already exchanged our opinions on 2 September. Please understand why I was so arrogant
and told V. T. Shumilov: Tell Moscow this was a specially prepared South Korean plane for spying;
the most important thing is missing in your public statement!
Comrade Kryuchkov:
I can only say: If we had released our second statement 24 hours earlier, the slander would not be
this harsh. We did not see through everything right after the incident.
Comrade Mielke:
Tomorrow the Central Committee secretaries in charge will meet in Moscow. There we will submit
our proposal accordingly.
The adversary immediately coordinated its measures aimed at you and us.
That is why it was necessary to strike immediately and not just release 5 lines. This may suffice at
the parochial level, but not for the global public.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
It is alright what you say. I completely agree with you. But there is one problem: As a Politburo
member you know that such issues first have to be discussed by party leaders. So – 10:0 for them.
Comrade Mielke:
No, 10:1 – since you shot down the plane.
I just want to say: There must not be any moments of being surprised. You have to go on the
offensive. This is important for future incidents.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
In his talks with you, Comrade Y. V. Andropov always agreed with you on issues of how to focus on
operative impacts of events.
Comrade Mielke:
We can now see how he reacts, how he has got Marxism-Leninism to move again, like for instance
concerning
– the national [ethnic] problem
– agriculture
– the class question
This is an enhancement of the [Marxist-Leninist] theory!
Comrade Kryuchkov:
On Geneva [Arms Negotiations]
Reagan has imposed sanctions against us that will not damage him as a president. He wants to
run again in the next election. You could say, these are “hollow sanctions.” He proposed areas that
do not play any major role in bilateral relations between both countries. We had expected sanctions
on grain exports or the pipeline deals. As far as Geneva is concerned, he immediately stated the
US will [continue to] negotiate.
Still, the question looms for us: Why do we have to continue to discuss these issues when the
missile deployment in Western Europe goes forward? Reagan would be delighted to abandon
negotiations and act even more impertinent. Yet this would not yield any benefits for him. So he will
not walk away from negotiations. Yet those negotiations conducted by the US are a deception of
the common people.
These are the facts. However, the USSR cannot abandon negotiation. Otherwise, the common
folks will say, the Soviet Union does not want peace.
The issue is very serious. There exist different opinions. Some comrades say: Does it really make
sense to continue negotiations?
Comrade Mielke:
One has to continue negotiations.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Some are proposing to maybe do something to placate the public. This is a very important issue –
to undertake a step of this kind. Our leading comrades are currently discussing this. We attempt to
find paths leading to an agreement, like our recent proposal on the SS-20.
Yet in the West there is NATO, in the East there is China, and Japan is ascending. We are ready to
destroy SS-20 missiles. This is a very courageous step. It means really destroying them, not a
relocation to the East of the USSR. This is why government circles are contemplating that our side
will have to move somewhat further.
There are very important issues to consider. Our proposal has divided Western allies to a certain
extent. We must exploit this. We are discussing an idea to maybe merge negotiations over both
strategic arms and medium-range missile limitations. We have to do so thorough calculations. On
the one hand, you would gain allies, but on the other side, the problem gets more complicated.
France and England currently have 200 nuclear-capable missiles. Yet in a few years that will rise to
600. This is why we have to include them in our calculations.
Comrade Mielke:
A major number of politicians are already in favor of including them.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
The aggravation of the international situation is continuing. The military-industrial complex, of which
Reagan is a representative, believes in exploiting the latter for its purposes. In light of such a tense
situation, they hope to succeed in liquidating the liberation movement in Central America. Likewise
in Africa and Asia. They do everything to win in the Middle East. If the global economy does not
change, there is no expectation for any changes of US administration policy.
In this context, we in the KGB has undertaken multiple measures through the international press
and other channels; also we do a lot jointly [with the MfS] after respective coordination.
As far as the FRG is concerned – a very important topic – I will certainly have the chance to talk
with Comrade Wolf in detail. On Strauss our perspective is essentially shaped by your position.
Comrade Mielke:
I will have to say something on this issue.
I still remember your face, Vladimir Alexandrovich, when I talked with [KGB Chairman] V. M.
Chebrikov about Strauss. Comrade E. Honecker authorized me to become active in this matter. We
will talk about this separately later.
As a party, we are performing a gigantic work. V. T. Shumilov, with whom we have talked, has
seen the document. You have to talk with everybody and argue against the missile deployment.
Everybody, even the biggest enemy, has to be addressed in order to make it clear that a nuclear
inferno will leave nothing behind of him.
This is always linked to issues of “surprise” [attacks].
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Will we continue to negotiate if the West deploys INF? We do not view the struggle for peace as
over. Obviously this struggle is very difficult as a completely new situation will eventually arise. We
have to work out new positions. We conduct a very large propaganda campaign. It is a fact that
through INF deployment the Americans turn the Western European countries into “hostages.” In
any case, it will result in the end of Europe. This is fully clear. How can you make this
understandable to the Western Europeans (getting it into their heads) so that no politician can deny
it? This is the task. We must jointly contribute to that.
Concerning the question of war: We say that currently its foundations are laid. Whether there
actually will be a war, depends on both sides. But we can say that the weak will have no influence
here. Our strength is the most important factor, e.g. in Afghanistan. There the struggle is between
socialism and capitalism. If we are weak, we will be defeated there. We can say it already now:
Afghanistan remains a Soviet-friendly country. Basic changes have been made there.
[The CSCE follow-up conference in] Madrid was a major success. This is how you can propagate
it. The plane story has already receded somewhat to the background. Madrid will resume its place
in the global campaign. In January 1984 there will be the next round of negotiations on an entirely
different level. Then we will see. Madrid is an example for solving problems through negotiations.
We have used the neutrals very well. Malta’s position is quite strange. It results from opinions held
by Prime Minister [Dom] Mintoff. Basket III depends on our interpretation, and how we will fill it out
through practical steps by the party and security services. Basket III provides nobody with the
opportunity to interfere with the internal affairs of another state. It contains very many references to
domestic legislation.
Comrade Mielke:
On Madrid I hold a somewhat different opinion. Not regarding the overall assessment, or issues of
disarmament and peace – but on Basket III.
Moscow is 1,600 kilometers from Berlin. The situation looks quite different from just 1 kilometer of
distance (GDR vs. FRG; Germans vs. Germans). We are not Chinese in favor of [Western INF]
deployment. Yet FRG citizens are Germans and not Chinese.
We will talk about Madrid later again when Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov is rested.
Today I talked about this issue before the [internal MfS] party meeting with extraordinary stridency.
The issues of “peace” and methods in the struggle about “peace” have unmitigated impacts in the
GDR. Among us, almost every week we arrest about 150 people. There is no end in sight. Thus we
will have to talk about this.
At the party meeting I talked about the political relevance, and about what we will have to focus on
in our work. I talked about the Church, and about the “Greens.” Marx himself has commissioned us
communists to take care that the world gets preserved for our descendants once we are no longer
around. For that, we do not need any “Greens.”
Intentionally, we also published the Madrid Document in full. If they [in the West] publish it, it will be
wrongfully interpreted. Footnotes are also included. One thing we already did.
On 27 September our state legal bulletin will publish a decree about marriages and family meetings
[between GDR and FRG] coming into effect from 15 October 1983. Simultaneously there will be an
unpublished decree issued about its concrete handling.
Yet I am not as happy about Madrid as you from the Soviet Union.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Our comrades cooperated in Madrid very well with your comrades. [GDR Foreign Minister]
Comrade [Oskar] Fischer has invited Comrade Kondrashov to the GDR for that reason.
Comrade Mielke:
Still, Comrade Fischer does not think differently than I do. Compromises had to be made. Yet the
GDR is hit hardest since we are a divided country. Germans vs. Germans.If you are a united
nation, then it is a different story.
Many thanks for your statements. I am glad I provided the correct line at our party meeting. Even
the term “hostages” for the Western Europeans was used in my speech.
Our problems are somewhat different from those of other countries. This is a consequence of our
special location.
I am proud we assessed the situation correctly, including the plane incident. I am pleased with your
assessment. Like [when talking] with Y. V. Andropov.
Many thanks.
Thank you for the wonderful greetings [from Andropov], and that he still remembers me this well.
We will continue to work in the same vein we collaborated with him over all those years; like a true
combat unit of the Cheka that puts its ideas into the joint struggle.
Many thanks for the greetings from V. M. Chebrikov. About the “Batashov” question we will talk
later.
Many thanks also for the greetings from all deputies of the KGB chairman. How is G. Karpovich
doing?
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Many thanks. He is doing according to his age. His health is not great.
Comrade Mielke:
Again heartfelt thanks. Some of your information has confirmed our assessments, including on
Afghanistan.
Your remarks about Geneva were important. Hence we will continue our talks with all [Western]
politicians. The CPSU leadership has to decide how to continue and make use of this.
Tomorrow we have the meeting of Central Committee secretaries in Moscow. Then these issues
will be discussed as well.
[1] Referring to the Soviet shoot down of Korean Airlines Lines Flight 007 on1 September 1983.
[2]
It was actually Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald (D-Georgia).

Must See Video – Carlo Marcello: The Man Behind the JFK Assassination

The One Paragraph You Need to Read from the JFK ...

 

Carlos Marcello The Man Behind the JFK Assassination (English edition: Enigma Books, 2013) (Italian edition: Editori Riuniti, 2013) by Stefano Vaccara.

New Orleans is the true birthplace of the Sicilian mafia in America. Carlos Marcello controlled organized crime in Louisiana and across the Southeast in the 1950s and ’60s. He was untouchable until he met the Kennedy Brothers. Once Robert Kennedy became attorney general, Marcello was deported to Guatemala and swore to seek revenge. It became a duel to the death. Marcello found his “patsy,” a former marine with a Russian wife. Lee Harvey Oswald was the perfect fall guy but he never pulled the trigger.

The author in conversation with: Joseph LaPalombara, Yale University George De Stefano, author Casa Italiana Zerilli-Marimò New York University February 26, 2014

Kid’s shows, Erotica And Other Odd Diversions Of History’s Most Ruthless Men – Francisco Franco Loved To Paint Nature Scenes

After successfully overthrowing the government during the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Franco installed a brutal military dictatorship which saw tens of thousands imprisoned or executed during his regime. Known as “El Caudillo” (which translates to “the Leader”), Franco also banned the Basque and Catalan languages, along with every religion besides Catholicism.

But when he wasn’t having his secret police apprehend civilians – or maybe while he was? – Franco was a fan of painting outdoor scenes on canvas. The paintings, which his own grandson will tell you “were not great works of art,” were of course done in the vein of realism, because getting nuanced work from a military dictator is probably a bridge too far.

Kid’s shows, Erotica And Other Odd Diversions Of History’s Most Ruthless Women – Imelda Marcos Had A Ridiculous Shoe Fetish

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Imelda Marcos is the widow of Ferdinand Marcos, the former dictator and president of the Philippines (1966-1986). Ferdinand had a pretty dark start in politics: in 1935 he was found guilty of assassinating his father’s campaign rival for national assembly, but he was later acquitted and rose all the way up to the presidency, where his authoritarian regime was known for corruption and lavish spending.

Imelda Marcos received an official position in her husband’s regime, one that allowed her to hook up her friends and relatives with lucrative government positions. Imelda herself was also severely in on the take, acquiring over 1,200 pairs of shoes, all of which she had to leave behind when the Filipino people rose up in 1986, forcing her and Ferdinand to flee to an actually pretty cushy exile in Hawaii.

Kid’s shows, Erotica And Other Odd Diversions Of History’s Most Ruthless Men – Benito Mussolini Penned Bad Erotica

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In 1919, Benito Mussolini founded Italy’s Fascist Party – a new faction which broke away from socialist ideals and promoted nationalism and extreme right-wing policies. By 1925, he was the nation’s dictator and effectively the sole ruler. Along with his buddies, Adolf Hitler and Francisco Franco, Mussolini was part of a legendary triumvirate of sh*theads that were basically a living, breathing newspaper comments section of racist uncles. The end of World War II was not kind to that trio, however, and in 1945, Mussolini was captured by Italian partisans and killed, along with his mistress Claretta Petacci, by firing squad.

A few bullets to the skull, however, were not all that Claretta and Benito shared. He also wrote her a ton of insanely sexual letters, which were unearthed in 2009.

Mussolini, who was barely five-feet tall, was incredibly confident when it came to sending thirsty messages. He had no qualms shooting out erotic passages like:

I tremble in telling you, but I have a feverish desire for your delicious little body which I want to kiss all over. And you must adore my body, your giant…

There really isn’t much subtlety with fascism.

Kid’s shows, Erotica And Other Odd Diversions Of History’s Most Ruthless Men – Mao Zedong Was A Classical Poet

Mao Zedong is listed (or ranked) 7 on the list Cartoons, Erotica And Other Bizarre Hobbies Of History's Most Brutal Leaders

Mao Zedong, founder of the People’s Republic of China, is technically the greatest mass murderer in history. In 1958, Mao brought forth (and ruthlessly enforced) “The Great Leap Forward,” which was a plan to catch China up to the economy of the western world. Unfortunately, this plan came with mass famine, starvation, torture, and systematic violence, which included making people work nude in the dead of winter, and parents burying their own children alive. All told, 45 million people died during Mao’s reign, a body count that remains unmatched by any other historical despot.

But the guy just loved poetry. Chairman Mao – though he persecuted many Chinese writers and had countless books burned – was an avid reader, as well as a bit of a writer. He wrote over 30 poems, usually in the format of the ancient Chinese style. Ironically, he would have forbidden one billion people from every reading his work, due to his principles, but who isn’t self-conscious about their poetry?

Kid’s shows, Erotica And Other Odd Diversions Of History’s Most Ruthless Men – Idi Amin Loved Children’s Cartoons

Idi Amin is listed (or ranked) 6 on the list Cartoons, Erotica And Other Bizarre Hobbies Of History's Most Brutal Leaders

In 1971, Idi Amin overthrew the Ugandan government and installed himself as leader. During his eight-year reign, he would massacre over 400,000 civilians, often by forcing them to bludgeon one another to death with sledgehammers at the hands of his death squads. In 1979, Amin fled to Saudi Arabia, where he lived the rest of his days in exile – never facing any consequences for his crimes against humanity – before passing away in 2003.

But there was another side to Idi Amin. More than a tyrant, more than a mad man, Idi Amin was a guy who just loved slapstick comedy. He was apparently an avid fan of children’s cartoons, most specifically Tom and Jerry – you know, the one where the larger, menacing figure seeks to destroy the smaller, ostensibly defenseless one?

Kid’s shows, Erotica And Other Odd Diversions Of History’s Most Ruthless Men – Saddam Hussein Wrote Steamy Romance Novels

 

Saddam Hussein's daughter now designs jewellery inspired ...

Indeed, even severe despots need time to loosen up. While overbearing maniacs have persecuted, starved, abused, tormented, and killed millions they’ve additionally set aside some effort to watch kid’s shows, play sea shore volleyball and even pen hot erotica.

While ordinarily a side interest refines somebody, these pastimes of the merciless despots on this rundown just make them progressively outsider and strange. This is what the absolute cruelest individuals in history got up to when they were off the clock.

Previous Leader of Iraq Saddam Hussein was a heartless pioneer who managed with an iron clench hand. The genuine degree of his monstrosities is obscure, as murders completed at his command are countless, yet there is proof of more than 250 mass graves from his rule. At the end of the day, preceding his hanging in 2003, Saddam was not a very chill fellow.

He was, in any case, horny.

Saddam had a propensity for composing romance books. Composing under the vigorously encoded nom de plume of “S. Hussein,” Saddam distributed a book called Zabibah and the Ruler, which was a ham-fisted and sensual personal novel set in antiquated Iraq. The revelation of this sappy, explicitly charged tome was additionally entirely arbitrary: CIA authorities discovered it by chance in an Arabic book shop in London in 2001.

Final Report About Mass Shootings In Las Vegas

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Criminal Investigative Report of the 1 October Mass Casualty Shooting

Originating Organization: Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

On October 1, 2017, at approximately 2118 hours, Mandalay Bay Hotel and Casino (Mandalay Bay) Security Officer Jesus Campos was assigned to check several Hotel Service Optimization System (HotSOS) alarms from various rooms inside the hotel. Room 32-129 was the last of the rooms Security Officer Campos was assigned to check.

Security Officer Campos was on the 30th floor and responded to the 32nd floor via the stairwell in the north end of the 100 Wing. Security Officer Campos attempted to enter the hallway to the 100 Wing, but the door would not open. He took the stairs to the 33rd floor and used the guest elevator to access the 32nd floor. Once on the 32nd floor, Security Officer Campos entered the foyer leading to the stairwell. He discovered an “L” bracket screwed into the door and doorframe that prevented the door leading into the stairwell from opening. Security Officer Campos called his dispatch center with the house phone located in the foyer to report the discovery.

Security Officer Campos heard what he described as a rapid drilling sound coming from Room 32-135 after he hung up the phone. As he walked down the 100 Wing hallway, Campos heard what he described as automatic gunfire coming from the area of Room 32-135 and realized he had been shot in the left calf. He took cover in the alcove of rooms 32-122 and 32-124 and utilized both his cellular phone and radio to notify his dispatch he was shot. Security Officer Campos advised he was shot with a BB or pellet gun. While waiting for other security personnel to arrive Security Officer Campos continued to hear gunfire coming from the room.

Engineer Stephen Schuck finished fixing a water leak on the 62nd floor when he was directed to respond to the 32nd floor in reference to the bracket preventing the stairwell door from opening. Engineer Schuck used the service elevator in the 200 Wing to access the 32nd floor. When he arrived on the 32nd floor, he gathered his tools and equipment and walked from the 200 Wing to the 100 Wing.

As Engineer Schuck walked up the hallway of the 100 Wing, he observed Security Officer Campos poke his head out of an alcove. Engineer Schuck then heard rapid gunfire coming from the end of the 100 Wing hallway that lasted approximately 10 seconds. When the gunfire stopped, he heard Security Officer Campos tell him to take cover. Engineer Schuck stepped into an alcove and gunfire again erupted down the hallway coming from Room 32-135. The gunfire lasted a few seconds then stopped. The gunfire started again after a brief pause, but Engineer Schuck believed it was directed outside and not down the hallway.

Meanwhile, inside the Las Vegas Village over 50 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) personnel were on overtime assignments for the Route 91 Harvest music festival being held at the Las Vegas Village venue. The initial gunshots were heard on an officer’s body worn camera (BWC). As the suspect (Stephen Paddock) targeted the concertgoers with gunfire, officers quickly determined they were dealing with an active shooter and broadcast the information over the radio.

The crowd inside the Las Vegas Village started reacting to the gunfire, and performer Jason Aldean ran off the stage. Officers and concertgoers began treating victims who were struck by gunfire. They also tried to get concertgoers out of the venue in a safe manner. Officers determined the gunfire was coming from an elevated position, possibly from the Mandalay Bay. Medical personnel were requested for multiple people struck by gunfire.

As the active shooter incident was occurring, two LVMPD officers were in the security office of the Mandalay Bay handling a call for service in reference to two females who were in custody for trespassing. The officers heard the radio broadcast of gunfire at the Route 91 Harvest music festival. Both officers, along with security personnel, exited the security office and responded toward the Las Vegas Village. As they were making their way through the casino, security personnel advised the officers of an active shooter on the 32nd floor of the hotel. The officers then directed security to escort them to that location. The officers and security personnel entered the Center Core guest elevators and were again advised the shooter was on the 32nd floor. The officers made a decision to respond to the 31st floor and take the stairwell to the 32nd floor.

LVMPD officers converged on the Las Vegas Village and Mandalay Bay. Officers formed multiple Strike Teams and entered the Mandalay Bay from various entrance points. A team of officers, including a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) officer, reached the 32nd floor via the stairwell in the 100 Wing. Officers did not hear gunfire coming from Room 32-135. Officers were able to manually breach the “L” bracket on the stairwell door and gain access to the hallway. Officers immediately observed a food service cart, which had wires running under the door into Room 32-134, and prepared themselves for the possibility of an improvised explosive device (IED). The decision was made to use an explosive breach to make entry into Room 32-135.

After a successful breach of the doors to Room 32-135, officers entered and found a male (Paddock) deceased on the floor. Paddock appeared to have a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. Officers cleared the remainder of the room and observed numerous rifles in various locations as well as hundreds of expended casings. A second explosive breach was utilized to gain access to Room 32-134 through the connecting doors. Immediately after the breach, a SWAT officer negligently discharged his rifle. Officers cleared Room 32-134, finding several more rifles in the room.

Officers, medical personnel, and concertgoers continued the evacuation of victims in the Las Vegas Village venue. Several triage sites were established in the venue and surrounding area. Injuries ranged from being minor in nature to fatal. Hundreds of wounded were transported to area hospitals by ambulance and privately-owned citizen vehicles.

As the LVMPD’s investigative response occurred, it was decided early on (post-shooting) that the LVMPD’s Homicide Section would handle the documentation of the venue and 31 bodies found inside the venue and on the exterior perimeter. Homicide detectives worked closely with crime scene analysts and investigators from the Clark County Office of the Coroner Medical Examiner (CCOCME).

FBI – Study About Active Shooters Cause Massacres

 

 

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In 2017 there were 30 separate active shootings in the United States, the largest number ever recorded by the FBI during a one-year period.1 With so many attacks occurring, it can become easy to believe that nothing can stop an active shooter determined to commit violence. “The offender just snapped” and “There’s no way that anyone could have seen this coming” are common reactions that can fuel a collective sense of a “new normal,” one punctuated by a sense of hopelessness and helplessness. Faced with so many tragedies, society routinely wrestles with a fundamental question: can anything be done to prevent attacks on our loved ones, our children, our schools, our churches, concerts, and communities?

There is cause for hope because there is something that can be done. In the weeks and months before an attack, many active shooters engage in behaviors that may signal impending violence. While some of these behaviors are intentionally concealed, others are observable and — if recognized and reported — may lead to a disruption prior to an attack. Unfortunately, well-meaning bystanders (often friends and family members of the active shooter) may struggle to appropriately categorize the observed behavior as malevolent. They may even resist taking action to report for fear of erroneously labeling a friend or family member as a potential killer. Once reported to law enforcement, those in authority may also struggle to decide how best to assess and intervene, particularly if no crime has yet been committed.

By articulating the concrete, observable pre-attack behaviors of many active shooters, the FBI hopes to make these warning signs more visible and easily identifiable. This information is intended to be used not only by law enforcement officials, mental health care practitioners, and threat assessment professionals, but also by parents, friends, teachers, employers and anyone who suspects that a person is moving towards violence.

Key Findings of the Phase II Study

  1. The 63 active shooters examined in this study did not appear to be uniform in any way such that they could be readily identified prior to attacking based on demographics alone.
  2. Active shooters take time to plan and prepare for the attack, with 77% of the subjects spending a week or longer planning their attack and 46% spending a week or longer actually preparing (procuring the means) for the attack.
  3. A majority of active shooters obtained their firearms legally, with only very small percentages obtaining a firearm illegally.
  4. The FBI could only verify that 25% of active shooters in the study had ever been diagnosed with a mental illness. Of those diagnosed, only three had been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.
  5. Active shooters were typically experiencing multiple stressors (an average of 3.6 separate stressors) in the year before they attacked.
  6. On average, each active shooter displayed 4 to 5 concerning behaviors over time that were observable to others around the shooter. The most frequently occurring concerning behaviors were related to the active shooter’s mental health, problematic interpersonal interactions, and leakage of violent intent.
  7. For active shooters under age 18, school peers and teachers were more likely to observe concerning behaviors than family members. For active shooters 18 years old and over, spouses/domestic partners were the most likely to observe concerning behaviors.
  8. When concerning behavior was observed by others, the most common response was to communicate directly to the active shooter (83%) or do nothing (54%). In 41% of the cases the concerning behavior was reported to law enforcement. Therefore, just because concerning behavior was recognized does not necessarily mean that it was reported to law enforcement.
  9. In those cases where the active shooter’s primary grievance could be identified, the most common grievances were related to an adverse interpersonal or employment action against the shooter (49%).
  10. In the majority of cases (64%) at least one of the victims was specifically targeted by the active shooter. 

Top Secret – New Documents Downloadable About JFK Assasination

File Name Record Num NARA Release Date Formerly Withheld Agency Doc Date Doc Type File Num To Name From Name Title Num Pages Originator Record Series Review Date Comments Pages Released
docid-32105709.pdf 178-10004-10309 26/10/2017 In Part KISS/SCOW 06/05/1975 NOTES JUNE 1975 SCOWCROFT, BRENT P/K 5 JUNE 75 3 WH SCOWCROFT MEMCONS, HANDWRITTEN août/18/2017 Participants:  Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft.  Handwritten notes.  For typed transcript see ID# 1781000410297. 4
docid-32105710.pdf 178-10004-10308 26/10/2017 In Part KISS/SCOW 04/12/1975 NOTES APRIL 1975 SCOWCROFT, BRENT P/K 12 APR 75 2 WH SCOWCROFT MEMCONS, HANDWRITTEN août/18/2017 Participants:  Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft.  Handwritten notes.  For typed transcript see ID# 1781000410296. 3
docid-32105711.pdf 178-10004-10307 26/10/2017 In Part KISS/SCOW 03/05/1975 NOTES JANUARY 1975 SCOWCROFT, BRENT P/K 5 MAR 75 4 WH SCOWCROFT MEMCONS, HANDWRITTEN août/18/2017 Participants:  Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft.  Handwritten notes.  For typed transcript see ID# 1781000410295. 5
docid-32105718.pdf 178-10004-00 26/10/2017 In Part KISS/SCOW 06/26/1975 MEMORANDUM JUNE 26, 1975 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 3 WH SCOWCROFT MEMCONS mars/17/2016 Memorandum of conversation, participants:  Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft 4
docid-32105722.pdf 178-10004-10296 26/10/2017 In Part KISS/SCOW 04/12/1975 MEMORANDUM APRIL 12, 1975 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 2 WH SCOWCROFT MEMCONS août/18/2017 Memorandum of conversation, participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. 3
docid-32105723.pdf 178-10004-10295 26/10/2017 In Part KISS/SCOW 03/05/1975 MEMORANDUM MARCH 5, 1975 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 4 WH SCOWCROFT MEMCONS août/18/2017 Memorandum of conversation, participants:  Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. 5
docid-32105754.pdf 178-10004-10264 26/10/2017 In Part MATHENY 09/06/1962 MEMORANDUM DRAFT REPORT–APPROVAL OF QUOTATIONS (2) RECORD MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62 5 NSC SSC SERIES août/18/2017 Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET. 6
docid-32105759.pdf 178-10004-10259 26/10/2017 In Part MATHENY 09/14/1962 MEMORANDUM DRAFT REPORT–APPROVAL OF QUOTATIONS (2) RECORD PARROTT, THOMAS A. MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED), 14 SEPT. 1962 2 NSC SSC SERIES août/18/2017 Unmarked but contains classified information. 3
docid-32105780.pdf 178-10004-10238 26/10/2017 In Part MATHENY 11/24/1976 LIST DOCUMENT REQUESTS–COMPUTER PRINTOUT CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT 36 NSC SSC SERIES août/18/2017 Computer printout showing documents requested by the Church Committee. Annotated.  Reduced. 37
docid-32112745.pdf 178-10004-10091 26/10/2017 In Part WILDEROTTE 05/30/1975 REPORT RPT. ON INVEST. OF CIA INVOLVE..FOREIGN LEAD. BELIN, DAVID SUMMARY OF FACTS, INVEST. CIA INVOLVE. IN PLANS TO ASSASS…LEADERS 83 ROCK ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS août/18/2017 Later draft can be found at 1781000310355. 84
docid-32112987.pdf 178-10003-10318 26/10/2017 In Part DUVAL78-67 06/00/1975 REPORT INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION, MISC. (2) BUCHEN, PHIL CASTRO 37 WH ACCESSION 78-67 (UNPROCESSED) août/18/2017 Unmarked, but TS elsewhere.  Draft.  Pages with revisions taped over paragraphs were copied as originally typed and with changes,for preservation purposes. 37
docid-32113185.pdf 124-10001-10059 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/09/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1458 SAC, DL BROWN, W. HARLAN 2 FBI DL sept/19/2017 3
docid-32113207.pdf 124-10001-10081 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/13/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1437 DIRECTOR, FBI OFLAHERTY, JOHN JAMES 39 FBI DL sept/19/2017 39
docid-32113221.pdf 124-10001-10095 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/16/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1423 DIRECTOR, FBI ESTEP, THOMAS B. 6 FBI DL sept/19/2017 6
docid-32113382.pdf 124-10001-10256 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-492 DIRECTOR, FBI TWINER, GROVER C. 10 FBI DL sept/19/2017 10
docid-32113488.pdf 124-10001-10362 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/06/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-901 DIRECTOR, FBI BROWN, WILLIAM S. 6 FBI DL sept/19/2017 6
docid-32113638.pdf 124-10002-10012 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/06/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5056 SAC, NY DIRECTOR, FBI 1 FBI DL août/15/2017 2
docid-32113668.pdf 124-10002-10042 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/20/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1824 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SF 5 FBI DL sept/19/2017 5
docid-32113682.pdf 124-10002-10056 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/18/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1839 DIRECTOR, FBI ESTEP, THOMAS B. 5 FBI DL sept/19/2017 5
docid-32113686.pdf 124-10002-10060 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/16/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1844 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, TP 2 FBI DL sept/19/2017 2
docid-32113908.pdf 124-10002-10282 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/03/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-6569, 6570 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MM 2 FBI DL sept/19/2017 INC LHM 2
docid-32113964.pdf 124-10002-10338 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/10/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-6633 DIRECTOR, FBI OCONNOR, JAMES J. 24 FBI DL sept/19/2017 24
docid-32114164.pdf 124-10003-10038 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/06/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-4030 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, AQ 2 FBI DL août/15/2017 3
docid-32114180.pdf 124-10003-10054 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/04/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-4012, 4013 SAC, CG MURPHY, ROBERT O. 6 FBI DL sept/19/2017 INC LHM 6
docid-32114232.pdf 124-10003-10106 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 09/30/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-8193 DIRECTOR, FBI HURLEY, JOHN D. JR. 8 FBI DL sept/19/2017 8
docid-32114444.pdf 124-10003-10318 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 09/03/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-7794 DIRECTOR, FBI CALLENDER, STEPHEN M. 32 FBI DL août/15/2017 32
docid-32114649.pdf 124-10004-10023 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-SEE COMMENTS 34 DOS DL août/29/2017 100-10461-9199,9200,9201,9202,9203,9204,9205,9206,9207,9208,9209,9210, INC DOS MEMOS, LIST, AIRGRAMS, CIT LTR 34
docid-32114705.pdf 124-10005-10047 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 07/23/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-7304, 7305 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 3 FBI DL sept/19/2017 INC LTR, A/T 3
docid-32115207.pdf 124-10006-10049 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/18/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-6723 SAC, DL KUYKENDALL, EDWIN D. 5 FBI DL sept/19/2017 5
docid-32115208.pdf 124-10006-10050 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/19/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-6724 SAC, DL KUYKENDALL, EDWIN D. 2 FBI DL sept/19/2017 2
docid-32118518.pdf 124-10012-10355 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-4TH NR 1275 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NK 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32121519.pdf 124-10018-10356 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-342 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 2 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32121528.pdf 124-10018-10365 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/24/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-1ST NR 471 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32121538.pdf 124-10018-10375 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/24/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3396 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, HN 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32121543.pdf 124-10018-10380 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/24/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3386 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, RH 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32121634.pdf 124-10018-10471 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/28/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3899 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 718 FBI HQ août/14/2017 REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS i-xi, INDEX 618-686 718
docid-32121661.pdf 124-10018-10498 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-693 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, RH 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32123893.pdf 124-10023-10230 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/30/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-2087 BELMONT, A. H. SULLIVAN, W. C. 12 FBI HQ août/14/2017 12
docid-32123909.pdf 124-10023-10246 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-17TH NR 50 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 3 FBI HQ août/14/2017 3
docid-32123932.pdf 124-10023-10269 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/08/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3723 DIRECTOR, FBI OFLAHERTY, JOHN JAMES 20 FBI HQ août/14/2017 20
docid-32125674.pdf 124-10027-10011 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-6TH NR 570, 7TH NR 570 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NK 5 FBI HQ août/23/2017 INC LHM 5
docid-32125696.pdf 124-10027-10033 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/30/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-1407 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 3 FBI HQ août/23/2017 3
docid-32125735.pdf 124-10027-10072 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/13/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-1ST NR 1854 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CI 3 FBI HQ août/23/2017 3
docid-32125824.pdf 124-10027-10161 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/15/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-1ST NR 2248 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NK 2 FBI HQ août/23/2017 3
docid-32125853.pdf 124-10027-10190 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 08/28/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-3745 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 154 FBI HQ août/23/2017 REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS i-iii, INDEX ON PAGES 132-142 154
docid-32126090.pdf 124-10027-10427 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 07/16/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-4700 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 600 FBI DL août/14/2017 RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES i-vi, INDEX PAGES 268 – 289 600
docid-32129230.pdf 124-10035-10067 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/03/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-655 DIRECTOR, FBI OCONNOR, JAMES J. 31 FBI HQ août/14/2017 31
docid-32129231.pdf 124-10035-10068 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/05/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-663 DIRECTOR, FBI THOMPSON, RICHARD C. 18 FBI HQ août/14/2017 18
docid-32129237.pdf 124-10035-10074 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/13/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-731 DIRECTOR, FBI OFLAHERTY, JOHN JAMES 40 FBI HQ août/14/2017 40
docid-32129238.pdf 124-10035-10075 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/06/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-738 DIRECTOR, FBI BROWN, WILLIAM S. 6 FBI HQ août/14/2017 6
docid-32129263.pdf 124-10035-10100 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-527 DIRECTOR, FBI FOX, RAYMOND J. 83 FBI HQ août/14/2017 83
docid-32129270.pdf 124-10035-10107 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-463 DIRECTOR, FBI REID, DAVID J. 25 FBI HQ août/14/2017 25
docid-32129274.pdf 124-10035-10111 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/02/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-1079 DIRECTOR, FBI GRAHAM, CARL E. 53 FBI HQ août/14/2017 53
docid-32129275.pdf 124-10035-10112 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/04/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-1082 DIRECTOR, FBI HAY, WILLIAM C. 16 FBI HQ août/14/2017 16
docid-32129318.pdf 124-10035-10155 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/25/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-1505 DIRECTOR, FBI OCONNOR, JAMES J. 27 FBI HQ août/14/2017 27
docid-32129371.pdf 124-10035-10208 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/27/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-2875 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 3
docid-32129388.pdf 124-10035-10225 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3230 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, WMFO 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32129391.pdf 124-10035-10228 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3243 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, ME 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 3
docid-32129395.pdf 124-10035-10232 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/15/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3495 SULLIVAN, W. C. BRANIGAN, W. A. 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32129399.pdf 124-10035-10236 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3581 SULLIVAN, W. C. BRANIGAN, W. A. 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32129430.pdf 124-10035-10267 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-2654 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 3
docid-32129512.pdf 124-10035-10346 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/26/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-4305 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SF 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32129514.pdf 124-10035-10348 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/28/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-4301 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 4 FBI HQ août/14/2017 4
docid-32129535.pdf 124-10035-10369 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-1212 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 844 FBI HQ août/14/2017 RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS i-iii, INDEX 785-818 844
docid-32129538.pdf 124-10035-10372 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/20/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3293 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, PG 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32129586.pdf 124-10035-10420 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/15/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-2619 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NK 2 FBI DL août/15/2017 3
docid-32129591.pdf 124-10035-10425 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/09/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-2625 SAC, DL BROWN, W. HARLAN 2 FBI DL sept/19/2017 3
docid-32129596.pdf 124-10035-10430 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/16/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-2631 DIRECTOR, FBI SHANAHAN, DENNIS W. 9 FBI DL août/15/2017 9
docid-32129685.pdf 124-10037-10019 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-387 DIRECTOR, FBI HARDING, CHARLES S. 37 FBI HQ août/14/2017 37
docid-32129791.pdf 124-10037-10125 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/02/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-193 DIRECTOR, FBI PEDROTTY, LEO E. 96 FBI DL août/15/2017 96
docid-32129863.pdf 124-10037-10197 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-273A HQ AQ 7 FBI DL août/15/2017 7
docid-32129944.pdf 124-10037-10278 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-4521, 4522 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 7 FBI DL sept/19/2017 INC A/T AND LHM 7
docid-32131528.pdf 124-10041-10247 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/10/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-4112 DIRECTOR, FBI OCONNOR, JAMES J. 24 FBI HQ août/14/2017 24
docid-32131579.pdf 124-10041-10298 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/19/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5106 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32131699.pdf 124-10041-10418 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/04/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-1ST NR 5534 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 4 FBI HQ août/14/2017 4
docid-32133480.pdf 124-10046-10199 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/30/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5374 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 125 FBI HQ août/23/2017 125
docid-32134667.pdf 124-10048-10378 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 10/08/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-5061 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 277 FBI HQ août/14/2017 RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES i-iv,INDEX PAGES 250-265 277
docid-32134795.pdf 124-10049-10006 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/21/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-847 DIRECTOR, FBI CLEMENTS, MANNING C. 395 FBI HQ août/10/2017 REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS ON PAGE i.  INDEX ON PAGES A-O.  INCLUDES 2 ADMIN PAGE. 395
docid-32134796.pdf 124-10049-10007 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-966 DIRECTOR, FBI CLEMENTS, MANNING C. 239 FBI HQ août/10/2017 REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS ON PAGE i.  INDEX ON PAGES A-I.  INCLUDES ONE ADMIN PAGE. 239
docid-32135644.pdf 124-10052-10162 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/19/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5954 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32135696.pdf 124-10052-10214 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/18/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5927 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32135885.pdf 124-10052-10403 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 09/14/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5766 DIRECTOR, FBI BLISS, NORMAN E. 3 FBI HQ août/23/2017 3
docid-32136328.pdf 124-10053-10346 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/12/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-4TH NR 1853 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32136429.pdf 124-10053-10446 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-3175 1 FBI DL août/15/2017 2
docid-32136659.pdf 124-10054-10176 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/01/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5388 DIRECTOR, FBI BRITTON, HENRY B. III 6 FBI HQ août/23/2017 6
docid-32136893.pdf 124-10054-10410 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 07/06/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5483 AG DIRECTOR, FBI 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32136895.pdf 124-10054-10412 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/27/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5483 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32136896.pdf 124-10054-10413 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/22/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5483 HARRELSON, LEONARD 2 CITIZEN HQ août/23/2017 DATE LOCATED FIRST PARAGRAPH ON FIRST PAGE 3
docid-32136897.pdf 124-10054-10414 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/21/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5483 HAWKINS, LEX HARRELSON, LEONARD H. 10 CITIZEN HQ août/23/2017 11
docid-32137311.pdf 124-10055-10328 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/28/1968 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-6316 SAC, NY DIRECTOR, FBI 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32137375.pdf 124-10055-10392 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/09/1965 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-1ST NR 5465 SULLIVAN, W. C. BAUMGARDNER, F. J. 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 3
docid-32138356.pdf 124-10057-10373 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/23/1968 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-6096 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SF 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32138887.pdf 124-10058-10403 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/30/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-1394 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 6 FBI DL sept/21/2017 6
docid-32138903.pdf 124-10058-10419 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/15/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-3083 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 10 FBI HQ août/23/2017 10
docid-32139350.pdf 124-10059-10366 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 07/05/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5526 SULLIVAN, W. C. BRANIGAN, W. A. 3 FBI HQ août/23/2017 3
docid-32139565.pdf 124-10060-10081 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/03/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-4267 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MM 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32139805.pdf 124-10060-10321 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 07/02/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-6900 HQ DL 341 FBI DL août/16/2017 341
docid-32139895.pdf 124-10060-10411 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/27/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-4831, 4832 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 8 FBI DL août/16/2017 INC, LHM 8
docid-32140752.pdf 124-10062-10339 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/08/1968 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3RD NR 5608 SULLIVAN, W. C. BRANIGAN, W. A. 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32140803.pdf 124-10062-10390 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/14/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-1ST NR 5596 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MM 6 FBI HQ août/14/2017 6
docid-32140808.pdf 124-10062-10395 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/30/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-808 DIRECTOR, FBI MORRISSEY, JAMES F. 9 FBI HQ août/14/2017 9
docid-32140863.pdf 124-10062-10450 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 08/10/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-4687 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32140865.pdf 124-10062-10452 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/07/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-5347 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32140899.pdf 124-10062-10486 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 07/23/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-4495 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 3 FBI HQ août/14/2017 INCLUDES CITIZEN LTR 3
docid-32141292.pdf 124-10063-10379 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-47-53 19 FBI SE août/23/2017 19
docid-32141308.pdf 124-10063-10395 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/09/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-47-79 SAC, SE KEIL, GIRARD 2 FBI SE août/23/2017 2
docid-32142029.pdf 124-10069-10000 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/19/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-804 DIRECTOR, FBI CLEMENTS, MANNING C. 330 FBI HQ août/11/2017 330
docid-32142050.pdf 124-10069-10021 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/05/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-643 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, PH 9 FBI HQ août/11/2017 INCLUDES 5 ENCLOSURES 9
docid-32142181.pdf 124-10069-10152 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-473 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 3 FBI HQ août/11/2017 3
docid-32142558.pdf 124-10070-10059 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/11/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-690 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 8 FBI HQ août/11/2017 8
docid-32142575.pdf 124-10070-10076 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-415 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MI 2 FBI HQ août/11/2017 2
docid-32142582.pdf 124-10070-10083 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/02/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-421 DIRECTOR, FBI SA, SA 3 FBI HQ août/11/2017 INCLUDES FBI LHM 3
docid-32142720.pdf 124-10070-10221 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 08/03/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-1918 DIRECTOR, FBI CLEMENTS, MANNING C. 119 FBI HQ août/11/2017 INC TABLE OF CONTENTS 119
docid-32142796.pdf 124-10070-10297 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-277 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CV 2 FBI HQ août/11/2017 2
docid-32142808.pdf 124-10070-10309 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/29/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-288 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LV 7 FBI HQ août/11/2017 7
docid-32142846.pdf 124-10070-10347 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-323 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, AQ 2 FBI HQ août/11/2017 3
docid-32143133.pdf 124-10071-10134 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 10/06/1975 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-7376 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, DL 3 FBI HQ août/23/2017 3
docid-32143239.pdf 124-10071-10240 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 08/09/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5679 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 2 FBI HQ août/23/2017 INC FBI S/S 2
docid-32143365.pdf 124-10071-10366 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/19/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-69-3635, 3636 HQ NO 3 FBI NO sept/21/2017 INC LHM, A/T 3
docid-32143653.pdf 124-10072-10190 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-42 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 4 FBI HQ août/11/2017 4
docid-32144054.pdf 124-10073-10091 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/15/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5971 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32144300.pdf 124-10073-10337 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/06/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-5700, 5701 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MM 40 FBI DL août/14/2017 INC LHM 40
docid-32144308.pdf 124-10073-10345 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/04/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-5710 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 4 FBI DL août/14/2017 4
docid-32144493.pdf 124-10074-10030 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/31/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-1113 DIRECTOR, FBI CLEMENTS, MANNING C. 188 FBI HQ août/11/2017 REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS.  INDEX ON PAGES a-o.  INCLUDES ONE ADMIN PAGE. 188
docid-32144605.pdf 124-10074-10142 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/19/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-2559 DIRECTOR, FBI CLEMENTS, MANNING C. 659 FBI DL sept/15/2017 REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS, INDEX ON PAGES a-o. INCLUDES ONE ADMIN DOCUMENT. 659
docid-32144902.pdf 124-10075-10040 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/06/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-1198 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, AQ 2 FBI HQ août/11/2017 3
docid-32144948.pdf 124-10075-10086 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/31/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-4130 DIRECTOR, FBI CLEMENTS, MANNING C. 374 FBI DL sept/15/2017 REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS , INDEX ON PAGE a-o 374
docid-32144949.pdf 124-10075-10087 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-3917 DIRECTOR, FBI CLEMENTS, MANNING C. 238 FBI DL sept/15/2017 REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS ON PAGE i, INDEX ON PAGE a-i 238
docid-32144950.pdf 124-10075-10088 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-3917 DIRECTOR, FBI CLEMENTS, MANNING C. 238 FBI DL sept/15/2017 REPORT, TABLE OF CONTENTS ON PAGE i, INDEX ON PAGE a-i 238
docid-32144983.pdf 124-10075-10121 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/02/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-1184, 1185 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SA 4 FBI DL sept/15/2017 INC A/T, LHM 4
docid-32145071.pdf 124-10075-10209 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/04/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-1343 SAC, DL SAC, HO 4 FBI DL sept/15/2017 4
docid-32145219.pdf 124-10076-10049 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/30/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-1063 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SF 4 FBI HQ août/11/2017 ATT IS LHM 4
docid-32145648.pdf 124-10077-10025 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-239 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 6 FBI HQ août/11/2017 6
docid-32145682.pdf 124-10077-10059 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-207 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SJ 3 FBI HQ août/11/2017 3
docid-32146238.pdf 124-10078-10410 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/05/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-2548 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, PH 4 FBI DL août/14/2017 5
docid-32146308.pdf 124-10078-10480 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/19/1977 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-1ST NR 7750 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SJ 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32146399.pdf 124-10079-10071 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/22/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-472 SAC, DL SAC, LA 4 FBI DL août/14/2017 5
docid-32147272.pdf 124-10081-10224 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/10/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-606 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32147365.pdf 124-10081-10317 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/31/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-3540 SAC, DL HEITMAN, WALLACE R. 1 FBI DL sept/15/2017 2
docid-32148633.pdf 124-10086-10009 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/11/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-2ND NR 2601 DIRECTOR, FBI KENNEDY, JAMES N. JR. 30 FBI HQ août/14/2017 30
docid-32148898.pdf 124-10086-10274 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 10/08/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-8220 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 275 FBI DL sept/19/2017 275
docid-32149391.pdf 124-10087-10267 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/02/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-2118 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NK 6 FBI DL août/14/2017 6
docid-32149479.pdf 124-10087-10355 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/03/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5146 SAC RATCHFORD, HAROLD M. 4 FBI DL sept/19/2017 4
docid-32149582.pdf 124-10087-10458 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/20/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5580 SAC, DL SAC, PH 6 FBI DL sept/19/2017 INC FBI MEMO 6
docid-32149608.pdf 124-10087-10484 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5551 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, WMFO 2 FBI DL sept/19/2017 2
docid-32150787.pdf 124-10093-10112 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-707 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 4 FBI DL sept/19/2017 4
docid-32153149.pdf 124-10100-10040 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/20/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-24016-2ND NR 1146 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MM 5 FBI HQ août/14/2017 5
docid-32153327.pdf 124-10100-10218 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/12/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-173-62 DIRECTOR, FBI THOMPSON, RICHARD C. 8 FBI MI sept/20/2017 8
docid-32153744.pdf 124-10102-10016 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-417 SAC, DL SAC, SL 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 2
docid-32153753.pdf 124-10102-10025 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/28/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-426 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 2 FBI DL sept/17/2017 3
docid-32153805.pdf 124-10102-10077 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-476 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, AQ 4 FBI DL sept/15/2017 5
docid-32153916.pdf 124-10102-10188 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/29/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-583 SAC, DL SAC, MI 6 FBI DL sept/15/2017 6
docid-32153928.pdf 124-10102-10200 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/29/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-595 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LV 14 FBI DL sept/15/2017 14
docid-32155294.pdf 124-10108-10005 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-1714 DIRECTOR, FBI FOX, RAYMOND J. 82 FBI DL sept/15/2017 82
docid-32155295.pdf 124-10108-10006 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-1713 HQ AQ 14 FBI DL sept/19/2017 14
docid-32155335.pdf 124-10108-10046 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-398 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, DL 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 2
docid-32155379.pdf 124-10108-10090 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-353 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SJ 3 FBI DL sept/15/2017 3
docid-32155390.pdf 124-10108-10101 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-342 SAC, DL SAC, LA 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 3
docid-32155430.pdf 124-10108-10141 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-300 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 4 FBI DL sept/15/2017 4
docid-32155431.pdf 124-10108-10142 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-299 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, HO 2 FBI DL sept/19/2017 2
docid-32155464.pdf 124-10108-10175 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-266 SAC, DL SAC, SJ 1 FBI DL sept/15/2017 2
docid-32155594.pdf 124-10108-10305 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/10/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-4565 SAC, DL SAC, MM 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 3
docid-32155977.pdf 124-10112-10041 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-1801 DIRECTOR, FBI TWINER, GROVER C. 10 FBI DL sept/15/2017 10
docid-32155994.pdf 124-10112-10058 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/10/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-1784 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 3
docid-32156035.pdf 124-10112-10099 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-1743 DIRECTOR, FBI HARDING, CHARLES S. 36 FBI DL sept/15/2017 36
docid-32156552.pdf 124-10117-10027 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/12/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-2355 DIRECTOR, FBI THOMPSON, RICHARD C. 16 FBI DL sept/17/2017 16
docid-32156761.pdf 124-10119-10129 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-82 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 6 FBI DL sept/15/2017 6
docid-32156766.pdf 124-10119-10134 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-87 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, AT 3 FBI DL sept/15/2017 3
docid-32156774.pdf 124-10119-10142 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-95 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, DN 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 2
docid-32156782.pdf 124-10119-10150 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-103 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 3 FBI DL sept/20/2017 3
docid-32156789.pdf 124-10119-10157 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-110 SAC, DL SAC, HO 3 FBI DL sept/15/2017 3
docid-32156853.pdf 124-10119-10221 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-173 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MI 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 2
docid-32157318.pdf 124-10123-10106 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/04/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-4383, 4384 SAC, CG MURPHY, ROBERT O. 6 FBI DL sept/15/2017 INC LHM 6
docid-32157367.pdf 124-10124-10019 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/08/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-3871 HOPKINS, EMIL E. 7 FBI DL sept/15/2017 7
docid-32157368.pdf 124-10124-10020 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/08/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-3870A HOPKINS, EMIL E. 6 FBI DL sept/15/2017 7
docid-32157442.pdf 124-10124-10094 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/07/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-3798 SAC, DL SAC, LA 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 3
docid-32157589.pdf 124-10125-10023 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-4095 SAC, MM SAC, HO 10 FBI DL sept/15/2017 10
docid-32157604.pdf 124-10125-10038 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/21/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-4109 SAC, DL SAC, TP 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 3
docid-32157609.pdf 124-10125-10043 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/24/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-4114, 4115 SAC, DL SAC, LA 6 FBI DL sept/15/2017 INC APPENDIX 6
docid-32157665.pdf 124-10125-10099 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/29/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-4195 SAC, DL SAC, MM 2 FBI DL sept/15/2017 3
docid-32157668.pdf 124-10125-10102 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/30/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-1639-4198, 4199 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SF 4 FBI DL sept/15/2017 INCLUDES LHM 4
docid-32160294.pdf 124-10138-10066 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/18/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-645 SUB C-51 SAC, CG HOOD, WILLIAM F. 2 FBI CG sept/15/2017 3
docid-32160678.pdf 124-10141-10039 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/16/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-456-117 DIRECTOR, FBI ESTEP, THOMAS B. 6 FBI CI sept/19/2017 6
docid-32160703.pdf 124-10142-10015 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/29/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-645 SUB C-32 SAC, CG TOMPKINS, ROBERT J. JR. 2 FBI CG sept/19/2017 2
docid-32160717.pdf 124-10142-10029 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-645 SUB C-18 SAC, CG BLOOM, EDWARD F. 1 FBI CG sept/19/2017 2
docid-32160790.pdf 124-10142-10102 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/20/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-274-75 SAC, EP REID, DAVID J. 1 FBI EP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32160822.pdf 124-10142-10134 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/09/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-274-42 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, EP 2 FBI EP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32160841.pdf 124-10142-10153 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-274-22 DIRECTOR, FBI REID, DAVID J. 25 FBI EP sept/19/2017 25
docid-32160853.pdf 124-10142-10165 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-274-3A SAC, EP REID, DAVID J. 1 FBI EP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32161141.pdf  124-10143-10002 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-853 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 4 FBI DL sept/21/2017 4
docid-32161533.pdf 124-10143-10394 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/29/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-1233 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MM 6 FBI DL août/14/2017 6
docid-32161721.pdf 124-10144-10082 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-1ST NR 90 SULLIVAN, W. C. BAUMGARDNER, F. J. 2 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32161772.pdf 124-10144-10133 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/21/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-7034, 7035 26 CIT DL sept/21/2017 INC 2 CIT RPT 26
docid-32161773.pdf 124-10144-10134 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/27/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-7036 HQ CG 2 FBI DL sept/21/2017 3
docid-32162061.pdf 124-10144-10422 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/19/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-7692, 7693 HQ NO 4 FBI DL sept/21/2017 INC A/T, LHM 4
docid-32162064.pdf 124-10144-10425 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/18/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-7687, 7688 HQ NO 3 FBI DL sept/21/2017 INC A/T, LHM 3
docid-32162603.pdf 124-10146-10161 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/28/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-456-32 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 2 FBI CI sept/19/2017 3
docid-32162619.pdf 124-10146-10177 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-456-10 SAC, CI 4 FBI CI sept/19/2017 4
docid-32163127.pdf 124-10150-10206 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 07/18/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-7209, 7210 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 22 FBI DL sept/21/2017 INC A/T, LHM 22
docid-32163512.pdf 124-10151-10091 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/16/1976 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-7602 AG DIRECTOR, FBI 8 FBI HQ août/23/2017 INC MEMO, LHM, CIT LTR, 3 S/S 8
docid-32163685.pdf 124-10151-10264 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/15/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-4050 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 2598 FBI DL sept/21/2017 INC ADMIN PAGE, A/T, RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES i-xxiv 2598
docid-32163794.pdf 124-10151-10373 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/10/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-2692 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, RH 4 FBI DL août/14/2017 4
docid-32164490.pdf 124-10155-10358 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/08/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-974-256 HOPKINS, EMIL E. 7 FBI NY sept/20/2017 7
docid-32164491.pdf 124-10155-10359 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/08/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-974-257 HOPKINS, EMIL E. 6 FBI NY sept/20/2017 7
docid-32164494.pdf 124-10155-10362 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/14/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 44-974-262 SAC, DL SAC, NY 2 FBI NY sept/20/2017 3
docid-32164532.pdf 124-10156-10003 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-2ND NR 96 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 3 FBI HQ août/14/2017 3
docid-32164535.pdf 124-10156-10006 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/04/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-12TH NR 154 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CG 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32164706.pdf 124-10156-10177 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/30/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5812, 5812A DIRECTOR, FBI KEMMY, JOHN M. 95 FBI DL août/16/2017 INC FBI ERROR FORM 95
docid-32164930.pdf 124-10156-10401 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/26/1965 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-8745 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NK 2 FBI DL sept/19/2017 2
docid-32165497.pdf 124-10158-10022 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/02/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-4261 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32165500.pdf 124-10158-10025 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/27/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-4264 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32165515.pdf 124-10158-10040 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/27/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3517 DIRECTOR, FBI GAZUR, EDWARD P. 4 FBI HQ août/14/2017 4
docid-32165552.pdf 124-10158-10077 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 09/30/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-2ND NR 5043 DIRECTOR, FBI HURLEY, JOHN D. JR. 8 FBI HQ août/14/2017 8
docid-32165693.pdf 124-10158-10218 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 09/09/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-7926, 7927 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 7 FBI DL sept/19/2017 INC LHM 7
docid-32165710.pdf 124-10158-10235 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 09/10/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-7948, 7949 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 14 FBI DL août/16/2017 INC MEMO, LHM 14
docid-32165833.pdf 124-10158-10358 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/11/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-8342-682 MM HQ 4 FBI MM août/29/2017 5
docid-32166013.pdf 124-10159-10038 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-1842 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, RH 2 FBI DL sept/21/2017 2
docid-32166389.pdf 124-10159-10414 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-697 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 6 FBI DL août/14/2017 6
docid-32166403.pdf 124-10159-10428 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-712 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 6 FBI DL août/14/2017 6
docid-32166483.pdf 124-10160-10008 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-3RD NR 236 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, BA 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32166745.pdf 124-10160-10270 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 10/06/1975 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-9612 HQ DL 6 FBI DL sept/21/2017 6
docid-32167053.pdf 124-10162-10030 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-951 DIRECTOR, FBI TWINER, GROVER C. 10 FBI HQ août/14/2017 10
docid-32167056.pdf 124-10162-10033 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/21/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-16TH NR 3364 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32167115.pdf 124-10162-10092 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 09/10/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-1ST NR 4870 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 3
docid-32167119.pdf 124-10162-10096 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/30/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3593 DIRECTOR, FBI KEMMY, JOHN M. 95 FBI HQ août/14/2017 95
docid-32167271.pdf 124-10162-10248 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/10/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-4626, 4627 SAC, CV ANDERSON, ALFRED L. 12 FBI DL sept/19/2017 INC INFORMANT RPT 12
docid-32167656.pdf 124-10163-10133 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/08/1966 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-4250 DIRECTOR, FBI 1 FBI HQ août/23/2017 2
docid-32168164.pdf 124-10164-10141 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/27/1980 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-8158 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, WMFO 13 FBI HQ août/29/2017 INC FBI LHM AND LIST 13
docid-32169233.pdf 124-10169-10052 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/06/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3RD NR 2381 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, AQ 2 FBI HQ août/14/2017 3
docid-32169256.pdf 124-10169-10075 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 09/03/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-4837 DIRECTOR, FBI CALLENDER, STEPHEN M. 34 FBI HQ août/14/2017 34
docid-32169298.pdf 124-10169-10117 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/23/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-2809 SAC, SA DEFFENBAUGH, B. E. JR. 3 FBI DL sept/19/2017 INC R/S 3
docid-32169346.pdf 124-10169-10165 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/25/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-2856 DIRECTOR, FBI OCONNOR, JAMES J. 27 FBI DL sept/19/2017 27
docid-32169450.pdf 124-10169-10269 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/20/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1973 DIRECTOR, FBI MORRISSEY, JAMES F. 8 FBI DL sept/19/2017 8
docid-32169513.pdf 124-10169-10332 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/20/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-3644 SAC, CG DIRECTOR, FBI 1 FBI DL août/16/2017 2
docid-32169517.pdf 124-10169-10336 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/20/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-3647, 3648 HQ NY 7 FBI DL août/16/2017 INC A/T AND LHM 7
docid-32169704.pdf 124-10170-10023 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/21/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-3324 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, DE 1 FBI HQ août/14/2017 2
docid-32169715.pdf 124-10170-10034 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/03/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1210A, 1210B DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 25 FBI DL août/16/2017 INC SAC, NY A/T TO DIRECTOR, FBI, R/S, CIT LTRS 25
docid-32169745.pdf 124-10170-10064 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/13/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1241 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CI 3 FBI DL août/16/2017 3
docid-32169775.pdf 124-10170-10094 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/12/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1275 DIRECTOR, FBI HARDING, CHARLES S. 34 FBI DL août/16/2017 34
docid-32169901.pdf 124-10170-10220 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/12/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-1338 DIRECTOR, FBI THOMPSON, RICHARD C. 8 FBI DL sept/19/2017 8
docid-32169961.pdf 124-10170-10280 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/27/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5757 DIRECTOR, FBI GAZUR, EDWARD P. 3 FBI DL août/16/2017 3
docid-32170031.pdf 124-10170-10350 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/24/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5682 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, RH 1 FBI DL sept/19/2017 2
docid-32170044.pdf 124-10170-10363 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/23/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5669 HQ SF 3 FBI DL août/16/2017 3
docid-32170143.pdf 124-10170-10462 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/16/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-2063, 2062 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, CI 5 FBI DL août/16/2017 INC LHM, A/T 5
docid-32170181.pdf 124-10171-10000 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/02/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-569 DIRECTOR, FBI THOMPSON, RICHARD C. 18 FBI HQ août/14/2017 18
docid-32170184.pdf 124-10171-10003 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/16/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-82555-922 DIRECTOR, FBI ESTEP, THOMAS B. 7 FBI HQ août/14/2017 7
docid-32170223.pdf 124-10171-10042 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/05/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-514 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, PH 2 FBI DL sept/19/2017 3
docid-32170227.pdf 124-10171-10046 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/02/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-518 DIRECTOR, FBI GRAHAM, CARL E. 51 FBI DL sept/19/2017 51
docid-32170247.pdf 124-10171-10066 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/05/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-316 DIRECTOR, FBI THOMPSON, RICHARD C. 18 FBI DL sept/19/2017 18
docid-32170254.pdf 124-10171-10073 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/03/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-323 DIRECTOR, FBI OCONNOR, JAMES J. 29 FBI DL sept/19/2017 29
docid-32170379.pdf 124-10171-10198 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-118 DIRECTOR, FBI REID, DAVID J. 25 FBI DL sept/19/2017 25
docid-32170605.pdf 124-10171-10424 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 10/02/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-109060-5777 DIRECTOR, FBI 2 FBI HQ août/23/2017 3
docid-32170607.pdf 124-10171-10426 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/15/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5200 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 643 FBI DL août/16/2017 INC ADMIN PAGE 643
docid-32170658.pdf 124-10171-10477 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/19/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5011 SAC, DL BETTS, WILLIAM S. 10 FBI DL sept/19/2017 10
docid-32170661.pdf 124-10171-10480 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/01/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5016 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 2 FBI DL août/16/2017 2
docid-32171282.pdf 124-10173-10101 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-171 HQ AQ 7 FBI DL août/16/2017 RPT 7
docid-32171289.pdf 124-10173-10108 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/01/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-178 DIRECTOR, FBI HARDING, CHARLES S. 36 FBI DL sept/19/2017 36
docid-32171302.pdf 124-10173-10121 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/02/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-191 DIRECTOR, FBI THOMPSON, RICHARD C. 18 FBI DL sept/19/2017 18
docid-32171306.pdf 124-10173-10125 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/28/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-6150 DIRECTOR, FBI GEMBERLING, ROBERT P. 718 FBI DL sept/19/2017 RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES i-xi, INDEX PAGES 618-686 718
docid-32171591.pdf 124-10173-10410 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-93 SAC, TP OBRIEN, JOHN J. 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171592.pdf 124-10173-10411 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-94 SAC, TP HAY, WILLIAM C. 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171607.pdf 124-10173-10426 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-109 SAC, TP ALEMAN, MOSES A. 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171611.pdf 124-10173-10430 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-113 SAC AMBLER, JOHN A. 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171612.pdf 124-10173-10431 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-114 SAC AMBLER, JOHN A. 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171615.pdf 124-10173-10434 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/24/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-117 SAC, TP CAPEHART, CHARLES L. 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171616.pdf 124-10173-10435 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-118 SAC, TP CAPEHART, CHARLES L. 1 FBI TP sept/17/2017 2
docid-32171617.pdf 124-10173-10436 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-119 SAC, TP CAPEHART, CHARLES L. 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171618.pdf 124-10173-10437 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-120 SAC, TP CAPEHART, CHARLES L. 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171620.pdf 124-10173-10439 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-122 SAC, TP CAPEHART, CHARLES L. 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171624.pdf 124-10173-10443 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-126 SAC, TP LIGARDE, FRED 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171649.pdf 124-10173-10468 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/05/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-155 SAC ALLEN 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171656.pdf 124-10173-10475 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-163 AMBLER, JOHN A. 2 FBI TP sept/17/2017 2
docid-32171657.pdf 124-10173-10476 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-164 JOHNSON, RAYMOND B. 2 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32171667.pdf 124-10173-10486 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/30/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-174 ONEIL, JAMES P. 3 FBI TP sept/19/2017 3
docid-32171668.pdf 124-10173-10487 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/24/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-175 ONEIL, JAMES P. 3 FBI TP sept/19/2017 3
docid-32172446.pdf 124-10175-10265 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/08/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-5937 DIRECTOR, FBI OFLAHERTY, JOHN JAMES 20 FBI DL sept/19/2017 20
docid-32172595.pdf 124-10175-10414 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/16/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-4491, 4492 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SA 12 FBI DL août/14/2017 INC A/T, LHM 12
docid-32172734.pdf 124-10176-10053 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/08/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-2407 HOPKINS, EMIL E. 7 FBI DL sept/19/2017 7
docid-32172763.pdf 124-10176-10082 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/08/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-2438 HOPKINS, EMIL E. 6 FBI DL sept/19/2017 7
docid-32173011.pdf 124-10176-10330 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 07/09/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-7093 SAC, SA DEFFENBAUGH, B. E. JR. 3 FBI DL sept/19/2017 3
docid-32173413.pdf 124-10177-10232 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/02/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-58-203 SAC, SF SAMPLE, MALCOLM E. 4 FBI SF août/23/2017 4
docid-32173415.pdf 124-10177-10234 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/03/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-58-209 SAC, SF SAMPLE, MALCOLM E. 2 FBI SF août/15/2017 2
docid-32173433.pdf 124-10177-10252 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/24/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-58-235, 236 SAC, SF 15 FBI SF août/23/2017 INC A/T 15
docid-32173856.pdf 124-10178-10175 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/25/1968 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-75-839, 840 HQ EP 7 FBI LA août/23/2017 INC LHM, A/T 7
docid-32174859.pdf 124-10180-10275 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1975 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-2665-6, 7 SAC, BU DIRECTOR, FBI 4 FBI BU août/23/2017 INC A/T 4
docid-32175045.pdf 124-10181-10141 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/11/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-58-469 SAC, SF MCMULLEN, RICHARD J. 2 FBI SF août/15/2017 2
docid-32175179.pdf 124-10181-10275 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/23/1975 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-4448-27 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 2 FBI NO sept/21/2017 3
docid-32175257.pdf 124-10181-10353 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/26/1961 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 97-74-13 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 4 FBI NO août/15/2017 4
docid-32175259.pdf 124-10181-10355 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/05/1961 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 97-74-15 DIRECTOR, FBI CURRAN, JOHN FRANCIS 73 FBI NO sept/21/2017 73
docid-32175681.pdf 124-10182-10414 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/24/1976 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-15065-37, 37A DIRECTOR, FBI ADIC, NY 6 FBI NY août/23/2017 INC TTY 6
docid-32175685.pdf 124-10182-10418 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CR 62-21381-762 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 2 FBI HQ août/23/2017 3
docid-32175906.pdf 124-10183-10193 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-116395-1200X1 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MM 191 FBI HQ sept/21/2017 EBF, INC 5 INTV, 5 RPT, 4 COVERSHEETS, 3 ABSTRACTS, 2 TTY, 2 A/T, 1 MEMO 191
docid-32175972.pdf 124-10183-10259 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/25/1975 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-7211-17 SAC, BU DIRECTOR, FBI 2 FBI CG août/23/2017 3
docid-32176012.pdf 124-10184-10007 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-200 SAC, TP 1 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32176019.pdf 124-10184-10014 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-455-209 ALLEN, T. C. 2 FBI TP sept/19/2017 2
docid-32176261.pdf 124-10184-10256 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/16/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CR 100-12583-473 SAC, CI 6 FBI HQ août/23/2017 INC A/T 6
docid-32176315.pdf 124-10184-10310 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/31/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 97-74-84 SAC DEBRUEYS, WARREN C. 4 FBI NO sept/19/2017 4
docid-32176316.pdf 124-10184-10311 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/24/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 97-74-85 DIRECTOR, FBI LOGAN, RICHARD E. 5 FBI NO août/15/2017 5
docid-32176322.pdf 124-10184-10317 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/12/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 97-74-94 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MM 3 FBI NO sept/21/2017 3
docid-32176324.pdf 124-10184-10319 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 07/30/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 97-74-96 DIRECTOR, FBI 2 FBI NO sept/21/2017 DATE LOWER LEFT CORNER 3
docid-32176325.pdf 124-10184-10320 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 08/13/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 97-74-97 DIRECTOR, FBI KENNEDY, JAMES N. JR. 7 FBI NO sept/21/2017 7
docid-32176983.pdf 124-10188-10067 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-116395-1398 DEAR FRIEND RODRIGUEZ, MANUEL 182 CIT HQ sept/21/2017 EBF, INC COVER SHEET, 4 A/T, LTR, ENV, 3 RPT, LHM, MEMO, TTY, ABSTRACT 182
docid-32177421.pdf 124-10189-10005 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/07/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-47-128 SAC WICK, ROBERT H. 3 FBI SE août/23/2017 3
docid-32177439.pdf 124-10189-10023 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/21/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-47-147 SAC, SE GREGORY, CHARLES W. 3 FBI SE août/23/2017 3
docid-32177468.pdf 124-10189-10052 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/19/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-47-176 SAC, SE COOK, FRED G. 2 FBI SE août/23/2017 2
docid-32177723.pdf 124-10191-10105 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 10/30/1961 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 97-74-37 SAC DEBRUEYS, WARREN C. 1 FBI NO août/15/2017 2
docid-32177771.pdf 124-10193-10019 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/02/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CR SEE TITLE SAC, DE DIRECTOR, FBI CR 134-11476-82 13 FBI HQ sept/19/2017 INC INFORMANT RPT 13
docid-32179674.pdf 124-10230-10384 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/14/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-6511 HQ NO 6 FBI DL sept/21/2017 6
docid-32179685.pdf 124-10230-10395 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/17/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-6531 NO HQ 1 FBI DL sept/21/2017 2
docid-32179690.pdf 124-10230-10400 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/19/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-6540, 6541 HQ NO 6 FBI DL sept/21/2017 INC LHM, A/T 6
docid-32179853.pdf 124-10231-10063 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 08/10/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 100-10461-7608, 7609 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 4 FBI DL sept/19/2017 INC LHM, A/T 4
docid-32180552.pdf 124-10232-10262 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/03/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-3688, 3689 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 3 FBI DL août/14/2017 INC A/T, LHM 3
docid-32180962.pdf 124-10233-10172 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-309 SAC, DL HEITMAN, WALLACE R. 2 FBI DL août/14/2017 3
docid-32181026.pdf 124-10233-10236 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-377 SAC, DL JENKINS, WILLIAM R. 1 FBI DL août/14/2017 2
docid-32181028.pdf 124-10233-10238 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-378A SAC, DL JENKINS, WILLIAMS R. 1 FBI DL août/14/2017 2
docid-32181065.pdf 124-10233-10275 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/31/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-2937 SAC, DL HEITMAN, WALLACE R. 1 FBI DL août/14/2017 2
docid-32182525.pdf 124-10236-10235 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/15/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-3861 SAC, DL SAC, CG 9 FBI DL sept/21/2017 INC ADMIN PAGE, INTV, INVESTIGATIVE INSERT 9
docid-32182527.pdf 124-10236-10237 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/15/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-3863 SAC, DL SAC, CG 16 FBI DL août/14/2017 INC 3 INVESTIGATIVE INSERTS, 1 ADMIN PAGE,  4 INTV 16
docid-32183138.pdf 124-10237-10348 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-69-2008, 2009 3 FBI NO sept/21/2017 INC A/T, LHM 3
docid-32183321.pdf 124-10238-10031 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/30/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-6868 HQ NO 124 FBI DL sept/21/2017 124
docid-32183334.pdf 124-10238-10044 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/25/1968 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-7895, 7896 HQ EP 7 FBI DL sept/21/2017 INC A/T, LHM 7
docid-32183745.pdf 124-10238-10455 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/06/1976 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-116395-1248X DIRECTOR, FBI 10 FBI HQ sept/21/2017 INC 4 COVERSHEET, LIST, 80 OF 90 PAGES NAR, EBF ENC 10
docid-32184175.pdf 124-10239-10385 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/23/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-3924 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 4 FBI DL août/14/2017 4
docid-32188674.pdf 124-10248-10384 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/22/1969 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-69-4425 HQ NO 1 FBI NO août/23/2017 2
docid-32189289.pdf 124-10249-10499 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/30/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-69-3137A HQ NO 125 FBI NO sept/21/2017 125
docid-32189374.pdf 124-10250-10084 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/28/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 105-8342-392, 393 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, DE 6 FBI MM août/23/2017 INC 2 A/T 6
docid-32189681.pdf 124-10250-10391 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/30/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-69-B-SEE COMMENTS DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 248 FBI NO sept/21/2017 WORK PAPERS FOR NO A/T DTD 5/30/67, INC ADMIN PAGE 248
docid-32190039.pdf 124-10251-10249 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 06/27/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-69-3252, 3253, 3254 HQ CG 13 FBI NO sept/21/2017 INC 2 CIT MEMOS, A/T 14
docid-32191078.pdf 124-10255-10012 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/22/1969 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-43-8999, 9000, 9001 HQ NO 8 FBI DL sept/21/2017 INC MEMO, 2 NEWS ARTIC 8
docid-32192369.pdf 124-10257-10303 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/02/1970 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT SEE TITLE HEMMERT, K. P. CR 134-3338A-120 8 FBI LA août/14/2017 8
docid-32193298.pdf 124-10259-10232 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/17/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-69-2004 NO HQ 1 FBI NO sept/21/2017 3
docid-32194211.pdf 124-10261-10145 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/22/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-58-13 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 4 FBI SF août/23/2017 4
docid-32195189.pdf 124-10263-10182 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 00/00/0000 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-69-SEE COMMENTS SAC, NO 12 FBI NO sept/21/2017 89-69-4261,4262,4263,4264,4265,4266,4267,4268,4269,4270, INC 10 S/S 12
docid-32195230.pdf 124-10263-10223 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/06/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-25-104, 105 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, MM 40 FBI MO août/14/2017 INC MEMO, LHM 40
docid-32195565.pdf 124-10264-10058 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/26/1968 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-69-3897 SAC, NO SAC, DN 4 FBI NO sept/21/2017 4
docid-32195660.pdf 124-10264-10153 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-25-17 SAC, MO DRAUT, WOODSON E. 15 FBI MO août/15/2017 15
docid-32195983.pdf 124-10264-10476 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/25/1976 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-116395-1625 ADAMS, J. B. LEGAL COUNSEL 2 FBI HQ sept/21/2017 3
docid-32196507.pdf 124-10266-10000 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-36-8 SAC, SV APPLEGATE, JAMES H. 1 FBI SV août/23/2017 2
docid-32196510.pdf 124-10266-10003 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/23/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-36-11 SAC, SV PRESCOTT, SIDNEY J. 1 FBI SV août/23/2017 2
docid-32197130.pdf 124-10267-10471 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 10/25/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CR 97-4196-33-11 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 21 FBI HQ août/23/2017 21
docid-32197136.pdf 124-10267-10477 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 01/28/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CR 100-11465-52 DIRECTOR, FBI HILGENDORF, WALTER A. 19 FBI HQ août/23/2017 19
docid-32197152.pdf 124-10267-10493 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/26/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CR 100-3-7725 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NY 3 FBI HQ sept/19/2017 3
docid-32197818.pdf 124-10269-10159 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/01/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-2115-514, 515 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, HO 9 FBI HO août/14/2017 INC A/T, LHM 9
docid-32197819.pdf 124-10269-10160 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 02/08/1967 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-2115-516 SAC HARRIS, PENROD W. 1 FBI HO août/14/2017 2
docid-32198349.pdf 124-10270-10190 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-75-208, 209, 210 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 8 FBI LA août/23/2017 INC 3 TTY 8
docid-32198731.pdf 124-10271-10072 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 12/23/1975 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 62-116395-1250 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, NO 2 FBI HQ sept/21/2017 3
docid-32199103.pdf 124-10272-10338 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/17/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-58-261, 262 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, LA 9 FBI SF août/15/2017 INC LHM, A/T 9
docid-32199136.pdf 124-10272-10371 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/10/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-58-298 SAC DUNPHY, JAMES 5 FBI SF août/23/2017 5
docid-32199155.pdf 124-10272-10390 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 04/23/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-58-322 HQ SF 3 FBI SF août/23/2017 4
docid-32199189.pdf 124-10272-10424 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 05/26/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-58-360, 361 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, SF 4 FBI SF août/15/2017 INC LHM, A/T 4
docid-32199200.pdf 124-10272-10435 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 03/12/1964 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-47-185 SAC, SE COOK, FRED G. 3 FBI SE août/23/2017 3
docid-32200725.pdf 124-10276-10104 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-34-49 DIRECTOR, FBI SAC, RH 1 FBI RH août/23/2017 2
docid-32200736.pdf 124-10276-10115 26/10/2017 In Part FBI 11/27/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 89-34-61 SAC, RH BROWN, E. PARKER 2 FBI RH août/15/2017 3
docid-32202557.pdf 157-10005-10367 26/10/2017 In Part SSCIA 11/00/1963 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT DOD DOD CORRESPONDENCE & MATERIAL RE: OSWALD 163 SSCIA CORRESPONDENCE FILE mars/03/2017 BOX 376 163
docid-32205097.pdf 177-10002-10084 26/10/2017 In Full LBJ 00/00/0000 MEMORANDUM THE PRESIDENT 2 WH PAPERS OF BROMLEY SMITH, 1963-DECEMBER 1964, BOX 1 août/18/2017 DOC. #199 3
docid-32241845.pdf 180-10065-10379 26/10/2017 In Full HSCA 05/15/1978 SUMMARY 008894 413 USSS NUMBERED FILES mai/03/2017 Continues for two more folders after this one.  Box 161. 413
docid-32244522.pdf 180-10071-10080 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 01/26/1978 SUMMARY 005119 DALZELL, WILLIAM 3 HSCA NUMBERED FILES mai/30/2017 Box 107. 5
docid-32245030.pdf 180-10072-10088 26/10/2017 In Full HSCA 12/10/1963 REPORT. 008388 3 TRS NUMBERED FILES. mai/04/2017 Box 153. 5
docid-32248157.pdf 180-10078-10215 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 04/21/1978 OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT 007407 GABRIELSON, ROGER; CIA 1 HSCA NUMBERED FILES mai/30/2017 Box 142. 4
docid-32248213.pdf 180-10078-10271 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/07/1978 DEPOSITION 013151 ESPINOSA, VICTOR 123 HSCA NUMBERED FILES mai/30/2017 Index summary & copies attached. Box 230. 126
docid-32249245.pdf 180-10081-10303 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/02/1978 LETTER 006123 CARPENTIER, PATRICK BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 3 HSCA NUMBERED FILES mai/30/2017 Box #:121. 6
docid-32250081.pdf 180-10083-10139 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/31/1978 LETTER 011302 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT, CIA BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 3 HSCA NUMBERED FILES mai/30/2017 Box 205. 4
docid-32252061.pdf 180-10087-10119 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 01/11/1977 SUMMARY 000657 WOLF, BETSY 3 U.S.S.S. NUMBERED FILES mai/04/2017 BOX 16 4
docid-32252528.pdf 180-10088-10086 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 05/11/1979 INDEX. 006649 STURGIS DEPOSITION. 5 HSCA NUMBERED FILES. mai/30/2017 Includes cover memorandum dates taken from memorandum.  Box 128. 196
docid-32254661.pdf 180-10092-10219 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 002470 5 CIA NUMBERED FILES mai/30/2017 Box 60. 6
docid-32259294.pdf 180-10101-10352 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 12/08/1978 NOTES 013573 DOD 13 HSCA NUMBERED FILES avr/27/2017 Box 237. 14
docid-32262517.pdf 180-10108-10086 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 05/10/1977 LIST. 015107 (FOLDER 3 OF 4) FONZI, GAETON. MIAMI WITNESS. 20 HSCA NUMBERED FILES. mai/30/2017 Box 297. 21
docid-32263513.pdf 180-10110-10108 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/08/1978 OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT 009093 4 HSCA SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES mai/30/2017 Press clipping attached.Box 4. 6
docid-32263552.pdf 180-10110-10147 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 MEMORANDUM MEXICO CITY TRIP # 2 BLAKEY, G. ROBERT LOPEZ, EDWIN 3 HSCA SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES mai/30/2017 Box 5. 4
docid-32264426.pdf 180-10112-10052 26/10/2017 In Full HSCA 03/10/1975 LETTER 002466 1 DEA NUMBERED FILES mai/05/2017 BOX  59. 2
docid-32264840.pdf 180-10112-10466 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/25/1976 NOTES 015106 25 CIA NUMBERED FILES mai/30/2017 NOTES FROM 6-25-76  –  9/21/77.  BOX  296. 26
docid-32267479.pdf 180-10119-10058 26/10/2017 In Full HSCA 11/29/1963 REPORT 003667 USSS 2 WC NUMBERED FILES mai/04/2017 CD87.  Box #:81. 3
docid-32267512.pdf 180-10119-10091 26/10/2017 In Full HSCA 12/03/1963 REPORT 003676 USSS 3 WC NUMBERED FILES mai/04/2017 CD87.  Box #:81. 4
docid-32270384.pdf 180-10140-10080 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 02/23/1978 PRINTED FORM 06-10-34 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 1 6
docid-32270434.pdf 180-10140-10130 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/11/1978 LETTER 06-11-39 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 1 2
docid-32270442.pdf 180-10140-10138 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/20/1978 LETTER 06-11-47 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 1 3
docid-32270474.pdf 180-10140-10170 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/06/1978 NOTES 06-13-12 BERK, CHARLES 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 1 2
docid-32270564.pdf 180-10140-10260 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/22/1978 LETTER 08-34-03 CARPENTIER, PATRICK BLAKEY, G.ROBERT 9 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 2 10
docid-32270667.pdf 180-10140-10363 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/16/1978 LETTER 09-24-01 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 7 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION sept/01/2017 Box 3 8
docid-32270672.pdf 180-10140-10368 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/18/1978 LETTER 09-27-01 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 4 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 3 5
docid-32270687.pdf 180-10140-10383 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 10/03/1978 LETTER 09-41-01 CARPENTIER, PATRICK BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 3 2
docid-32270688.pdf 180-10140-10384 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 10/03/1978 LETTER 09-41-02 CARPENTIER, PATRICK BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 3 2
docid-32270710.pdf 180-10140-10406 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/16/1978 LETTER 09-65-04 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 3 2
docid-32270977.pdf 180-10141-10173 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/19/1978 LETTER 12-04-51 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 4 2
docid-32270995.pdf 180-10141-10191 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 13-01-09 CIA 8 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/30/2017 Box 5 9
docid-32271004.pdf 180-10141-10200 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/12/1978 NOTES 13-05-01 SHEPANEC, NORMAN GABRIELSON, RODGER 21 CIA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 22
docid-32271005.pdf 180-10141-10201 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/12/1978 NOTES 13-05-02 SHEPANEC, NORMAN GABRIELSON, RODGER 21 CIA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 22
docid-32271006.pdf 180-10141-10202 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/12/1978 NOTES 13-05-03 SHEPANEC, NORMAN GABRIELSON, RODGER 20 CIA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 22
docid-32271009.pdf 180-10141-10205 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 04/07/1978 NOTES 13-07-01 CIA 6 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 7
docid-32271013.pdf 180-10141-10209 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/03/1978 NOTES 13-09-02 CIA 6 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 8
docid-32271014.pdf 180-10141-10210 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/15/1978 NOTES 13-09-03 CIA 15 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 16
docid-32271015.pdf 180-10141-10211 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/09/1978 NOTES 13-09-4A CIA 42 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 44
docid-32271029.pdf 180-10141-10225 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/27/1978 NOTES 13-11-5A CIA 8 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 9
docid-32271031.pdf 180-10141-10227 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/28/1978 NOTES 13-11-06 CIA 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 4
docid-32271034.pdf 180-10141-10230 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/13/1978 NOTES 13-13-1A CIA 42 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 43
docid-32271035.pdf 180-10141-10231 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/13/1978 NOTES 13-13-1B CIA 38 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 39
docid-32271037.pdf 180-10141-10233 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/15/1978 NOTES 13-13-03 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 6
docid-32271038.pdf 180-10141-10234 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/09/1978 NOTES 13-13-04 CIA 27 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION mai/31/2017 Box 5 28
docid-32271039.pdf 180-10141-10235 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/09/1978 NOTES 13-13-05 CIA 24 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 5 25
docid-32271049.pdf 180-10141-10245 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/13/1978 NOTES 13-18-01 CIA 24 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 6 25
docid-32271076.pdf 180-10141-10272 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/13/1978 NOTES 13-23-01 CIA 12 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 6 12
docid-32271077.pdf 180-10141-10273 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/13/1978 NOTES 13-23-02 CIA 12 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 6 12
docid-32271083.pdf 180-10141-10279 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 05/31/1978 NOTES 13-24-01 CIA 8 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 6 8
docid-32271085.pdf 180-10141-10281 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 05/31/1978 NOTES 13-24-03 CIA 6 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 6 6
docid-32271086.pdf 180-10141-10282 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/02/1978 NOTES 13-24-04 CIA 27 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 6 27
docid-32271111.pdf 180-10141-10307 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 11/16/1978 TRANSCRIPT 18-05-01 170 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 7  Transcript of executive session testimony. 170
docid-32271172.pdf 180-10141-10368 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 01/19/1978 NOTES 19-20-05 CIA 9 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 8 10
docid-32271292.pdf 180-10141-10488 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 22-02-01 CIA 49 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 9 49
docid-32271293.pdf 180-10141-10489 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 22-02-02 CIA 55 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 9 55
docid-32271304.pdf 180-10142-10000 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 REPORT 22-09-01 CIA 7 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 10 8
docid-32271305.pdf 180-10142-10001 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 REPORT 22-09-02 CIA 8 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 10 9
docid-32271350.pdf 180-10142-10046 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 REPORT 22-20-02/3 CIA 7 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 11 8
docid-32271364.pdf 180-10142-10060 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 22-23-02 CIA 29 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 11 30
docid-32271384.pdf 180-10142-10080 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 23-05-02 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12 6
docid-32271393.pdf 180-10142-10089 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 23-06-05 CIA 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12 2
docid-32271403.pdf 180-10142-10099 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/06/1978 TRANSCRIPT 23-08-04 32 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12. 33
docid-32271414.pdf 180-10142-10110 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 05/15/1978 NOTES 23-12-08 CIA 34 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12 34
docid-32271418.pdf 180-10142-10114 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 23-12-12 CIA 14 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12 16
docid-32271420.pdf 180-10142-10116 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 23-12-14 CIA 7 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12 8
docid-32271426.pdf 180-10142-10122 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 23-13-05 CIA 16 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12 17
docid-32271433.pdf 180-10142-10129 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 23-15-05 CIA 7 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12 8
docid-32271437.pdf 180-10142-10133 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 REPORT 23-15-09 CIA SYLVIA DURAN’S PREVIOUS STATEMENTS RE LHO’S VISIT TO THE CUBAN CONSUL. 34 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12 34
docid-32271439.pdf 180-10142-10135 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 REPORT 23-15-11 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 12 6
docid-32271496.pdf 180-10142-10192 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 REPORT 23-22-04 HSCA PROCEDURAL WRITE-UP: MEXICO TRIP 2 10 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 13 11
docid-32271499.pdf 180-10142-10195 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 09/19/1978 NOTES 23-23-01 CIA 11 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 13 12
docid-32271500.pdf 180-10142-10196 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 23-23-02 CIA 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 13 4
docid-32271574.pdf 180-10142-10270 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 02/09/1978 LIST 23-25-21 CIA 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 14 4
docid-32271587.pdf 180-10142-10283 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/13/1978 NOTES 23-25-34 CIA 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 14 3
docid-32271588.pdf 180-10142-10284 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 23-25-35 CIA 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 14 2
docid-32271637.pdf 180-10142-10333 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 24-05-03 21 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 14 22
docid-32271732.pdf 180-10142-10428 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/16/1978 LETTER 25-05-08 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 16 2
docid-32271748.pdf 180-10142-10444 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 05/19/1978 LETTER 25-05-24 GABRIELSON, RODGER S. 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 16 3
docid-32271789.pdf 180-10142-10485 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/27/1979 REPORT 25-40-01 CIA NOVEMBER 22, 1963 CUBANA FLIGHT 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 16; HSCA #15047 6
docid-32271800.pdf 180-10142-10496 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 276-01-01 CIA 4 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 17 5
docid-32271881.pdf 180-10143-10077 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/15/1978 NOTES 27-38-02 CIA SUMMARY: OP FILE ON E. HOWARD HUNT 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 18 6
docid-32271894.pdf 180-10143-10090 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 02/08/1978 NOTES 27-44-01 CIA MEXICO CITY STATION FILE, VOLUME I, SEPT. TO 11/26/63 11 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 18 12
docid-32271913.pdf 180-10143-10109 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/22/1978 NOTES 28-11-01C CIA SUMMARY OF REVIEW OF DISPATCHES TO AND FROM MEXICO CITY BETWEEN 10/15/63 AND 11/27/63 14 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 18 15
docid-32271929.pdf 180-10143-10125 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/29/1978 NOTES 28-11-08 CIA 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/01/2017 Box 18 4
docid-32271935.pdf 180-10143-10131 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 FORM 28-11-11D CIA SENSITIVE ORIGINAL WITHHELD BY CIA 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 18; Original document held by CIA. 3
docid-32271953.pdf 180-10143-10149 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 FORM 28-12-14 CIA SENSITIVE ORIGINAL WITHHELD BY CIA 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 18; Original document held by CIA. 2
docid-32271974.pdf 180-10143-10170 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/27/1978 NOTES 28-25-01 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 19 6
docid-32271977.pdf 180-10143-10173 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 28-26-02 CIA 6 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 19 7
docid-32272021.pdf 180-10143-10217 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 29-01-03 CIA 8 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 19 9
docid-32272029.pdf 180-10143-10225 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 29-06-03 CIA 28 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 19  Contains 2 pages withheld in full by CIA 28
docid-32272038.pdf 180-10143-10234 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 05/22/1978 NOTES 29-07-08 CIA 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 19 3
docid-32272048.pdf 180-10143-10244 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 02/03/1978 NOTES 29-07-18 CIA 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 19 3
docid-32272133.pdf 180-10143-10329 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 29-16-01 CIA 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 20 2
docid-32272139.pdf 180-10143-10335 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 29-16-07 CIA 4 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 20 5
docid-32272157.pdf 180-10143-10353 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/15/1978 NOTES 29-19-07 CIA 4 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION oct/02/2017 Box 20 5
docid-32272164.pdf 180-10143-10360 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/13/1978 NOTES 29-19-13 CIA 14 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 20 15
docid-32272179.pdf 180-10143-10375 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/28/1978 FORM 29-19-19A CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 20 Document Withdrawal Form Pending Third Agency Coordination 6
docid-32272223.pdf 180-10143-10419 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 29-22-21 CIA 4 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 20 5
docid-32272229.pdf 180-10143-10425 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 29-23B-03 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 6
docid-32272233.pdf 180-10143-10429 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 29-23B-07 CIA 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 3
docid-32272238.pdf 180-10143-10434 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/15/1978 NOTES 29-25-01 CIA 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION oct/02/2017 Box 21 2
docid-32272239.pdf 180-10143-10435 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/15/1978 NOTES 29-25-02 CIA 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 4
docid-32272275.pdf 180-10143-10471 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/07/1978 NOTES 29-39-02 CIA 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 2
docid-32272289.pdf 180-10144-10002 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/04/1978 NOTES 29-39-15 CIA 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 4
docid-32272291.pdf 180-10144-10004 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/03/1978 NOTES 29-39-17 CIA 9 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 10
docid-32272292.pdf 180-10144-10005 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/17/1978 NOTES 29-39-18 CIA 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 2
docid-32272305.pdf 180-10144-10018 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/08/1978 NOTES 29-42-04 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 6
docid-32272312.pdf 180-10144-10025 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/13/1978 NOTES 29-43-01 CIA INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT 29 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 30
docid-32272320.pdf 180-10144-10033 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 29-43-09 CIA 6 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 21 7
docid-32272366.pdf 180-10144-10079 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 05/31/1978 NOTES 29-46-22 CIA 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 22 4
docid-32272367.pdf 180-10144-10080 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/02/1978 NOTES 29-46-23 CIA 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 22 3
docid-32272374.pdf 180-10144-10087 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 02/09/1978 NOTES 29-46-30 CIA 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 22 3
docid-32272390.pdf 180-10144-10103 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/16/1978 NOTES 29-46-46 CIA 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 22 2
docid-32272397.pdf 180-10144-10110 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 29-46-53 CIA 6 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 22 8
docid-32272411.pdf 180-10144-10124 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/25/1978 NOTES 29-47-02 CIA 4 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 22 5
docid-32272416.pdf 180-10144-10129 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 08/08/1978 NOTES 29-48-01 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 22 6
docid-32272496.pdf 180-10144-10209 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 30-43-01 CIA 70 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 23 71
docid-32272523.pdf 180-10144-10236 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 REPORT 30-59-01 HSCA PROCEDURAL WRITE-UP: CUBA TRIP 45 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 24 46
docid-32272526.pdf 180-10144-10239 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 30-61-02 CIA 10 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 24 18
docid-32272528.pdf 180-10144-10241 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/28/1978 NOTES 30-62-02 17 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 24 19
docid-32272529.pdf 180-10144-10242 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 30-62-03 CIA 4 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 24 5
docid-32272532.pdf 180-10144-10245 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/28/1978 NOTES 30-62-06 13 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 24 14
docid-32272549.pdf 180-10144-10262 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 OTHER 31-01B-02 29 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 25  Notecards from HSCA staffers 29
docid-32272552.pdf 180-10144-10265 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 OTHER 31-01B-05 41 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 25  Notecards from HSCA staffers 41
docid-32272569.pdf 180-10144-10282 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 34-23-03 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 26 4
docid-32272607.pdf 180-10144-10320 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 04/05/1978 LETTER 35-05-15 CARPENTIER, PATRICK BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 26 4
docid-32272624.pdf 180-10144-10337 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/11/1978 LETTER 35-06-12A BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 26 2
docid-32272671.pdf 180-10144-10384 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 48-14-03 CIA 22 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 26 23
docid-32272679.pdf 180-10144-10392 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 04/07/1978 NOTES 48-14-10 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 26 5
docid-32272701.pdf 180-10144-10414 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/31/1978 LETTER 49-02-01 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 27 3
docid-32272712.pdf 180-10144-10425 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/13/1978 LETTER 49-12-01 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 2 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 27 3
docid-32272713.pdf 180-10144-10426 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 07/11/1978 LETTER 49-13-01 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 27 2
docid-32272729.pdf 180-10144-10442 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 06/20/1978 LETTER 49-28-01 BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 3 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 27 4
docid-32272774.pdf 180-10144-10487 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 04/05/1978 LETTER 49-71-01 CARPENTIER, PATRICK BLAKEY, G. ROBERT 4 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 27 4
docid-32272935.pdf 180-10145-10148 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 REPORT 50-61-01 27 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 27 28
docid-32272998.pdf 180-10145-10211 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 00/00/0000 NOTES 54-04-01 CIA 5 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 28 6
docid-32273001.pdf 180-10145-10214 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/10/1978 NOTES 54-04-02 CIA 12 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 28 13
docid-32273016.pdf 180-10145-10229 26/10/2017 In Part HSCA 03/28/1978 NOTES 54-04-07 CIA 1 HSCA CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION juin/05/2017 Box 28 2