TOP SECRET – GRU Close Access Cyber Operation Against OPCW

TOP SECRET – GRU Close Access Cyber Operation Against OPCW

The following presentation was released by the U.S. Department of Justice in relation to their indictment of seven Russian GRU officers on charges related to “International Hacking and Related Influence and Disinformation Operations.”


Page Count: 35 pages
Date: October 4, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Dutch Ministry of Defence
File Type: pdf
File Size: 9,485,284 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): D9055D137D16AF0D58F4F2EB5B9A9094CDAAF18013F13989BE5B3341FCCE099B

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Unvealed – Records Related to Former NSA Director Keith Alexander’s Attendance of Bilderberg Meetings in 2008, 2009, 2011

The following set of documents was obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request made to the National Security Agency for “records relating to NSA Director Gen. Keith B. Alexander’s attendance of the Bilderberg Meetings held in 2008 in Chantilly Virginia; in 2009 in Vouliagmeni, Greece; and in 2011 in St. Moritz, Switzerland.” The request took the NSA 5 years and 13 days to fulfill.

File Contents

  • FOIA request response letter from June 27, 2016
  • Military leave information for NSA Director Keith Alexander to attend the 2008 Bilderberg Meeting in Chantilly, Virginia
  • Military leave information for NSA Director Keith Alexander to attend the 2009 Bilderberg Meeting in Vouliagmeni, Greece
  • Military leave information for NSA Director Keith Alexander to attend the 2011 Bilderberg Meeting in St. Moritz, Switzerland
  • Request to Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to attend the 2009 Bilderberg Meeting in Vouliagmeni, Greece
  • Second request to Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to attend the 2009 Bilderberg Meeting in Vouliagmeni, Greece
  • Action Memo approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to attend the 2008 Bilderberg Meeting in Chantilly, Virginia
  • Bilderberg Temporary Duty (TDY) Itinerary
  • Travel authorization form for Request to Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to attend the 2011 Bilderberg Meeting in St. Moritz, Switzerland
  • Request to Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to attend the 2011 Bilderberg Meeting in St. Moritz, Switzerland


TOP SECRET – U.S. Northern Command Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan

TOP SECRET – U.S. Northern Command Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Purpose. This branch plan provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the support of the Board of Governors of the federal Reserve System to ensure the effective execution of a National Essential Function (NEF).

c. (U) Friendly Forces

(1) (U) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve System (FRS) is the central bank of the United States. The primary responsibility of the Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors is to formulate and administer the Nation’s monetary policy. The Board of Governors operates as a USG Agency.

(b) (U) Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems. Oversees the operations of the independent Federal Reserve Banks and of the FRS Law Enforcement program.

(c) (U) Office of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity. The Director of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity is the supported entity for the transportation of monetary instruments within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(c) (U) Commercial passenger flights are restricted during certain national emergencies.

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Revealed – Top Secret – U.S. Northern Command Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan

Revealed – Top Secret – U.S. Northern Command Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan

The following heavily redacted version of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan from U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) CONPLAN 3500-14 was obtained via a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Tab H to Appendix 1 to Annex C to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500 – 14: Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan

Page Count: 17 pages
Date: July 17, 2014
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: U.S. Northern Command
File Type: pdf
File Size: 851,968 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): C2F49B4A19798466175590F47D0A8953E431D4DDA0F773B1FDE40AB88EDA3E6D

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1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Purpose. This branch plan provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the support of the Board of Governors of the federal Reserve System to ensure the effective execution of a National Essential Function (NEF).

c. (U) Friendly Forces

(1) (U) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve System (FRS) is the central bank of the United States. The primary responsibility of the Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors is to formulate and administer the Nation’s monetary policy. The Board of Governors operates as a USG Agency.

(b) (U) Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems. Oversees the operations of the independent Federal Reserve Banks and of the FRS Law Enforcement program.

(c) (U) Office of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity. The Director of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity is the supported entity for the transportation of monetary instruments within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(c) (U) Commercial passenger flights are restricted during certain national emergencies.


UK Yellowhammer No-Deal Brexit – Worst Case Scenario Revealed

When the UK ceases to be a member of the EU in October 2019 all rights and reciprocal arrangements with the EU end.

The UK reverts fully to ‘third country’ status. The relationship between the UK and the EU as a whole is unsympathetic, with many MS (under pressure from the Commission) unwilling to engage bilaterally and implementing protections unilaterally, though some MS may be more understanding.

No bilateral deals have been concluded with individual member states with the exception of the reciprocal agreement on social security coordination with Ireland. EU Citizens living in the UK can retain broadly all rights and status that they were entitled to prior to exit from the EU, at the point of exit.

Public and business readiness for a no-deal will remain at a low level, and will decrease to lower levels, because the absence of a clear decision on the form of EU Exit (customs union, no deal etc) does not provide a concrete situation for third parties to prepare for. Readiness will be further limited by increasing EU Exit fatigue, due to the second extension of Article 50, which will limit the effective impact of current preparedness communication. [To be reviewed]

Business readiness will not be uniform – in general larger businesses across sectors are more likely to have better developed contingency plans than small and medium sized businesses. Business readiness will be compounded by seasonal effects, impacting on factors such as warehouse availability.

Concurrent risks associated with autumn and winter such as severe weather, flooding and seasonal flu could exacerbate a number of impacts and stretch resources of partners and responders.

Private sector companies’ behaviour will be governed by commercial considerations, unless influenced otherwise.

HMG will act lawfully and in accordance with the rule of law, including by identifying the powers it is using to take specific actions.

Key planning assumptions

1. For the purpose of freight flow and traffic· management as 31 October is a Thursday, day 1 of exit is now on a Friday rather than the weekend which is not to our advantage. Exit day may coincide with end of October half term school holidays, which vary across the UK. (CCS/DExEU)

2. In a small number of instances where the impacts of Brexit would be felt negatively in the EU as well as in the UK, Member States may act in way which could also benefit the UK (e.g. energy for Ireland). (CCS/DExEU)

3. France will impose EU mandatory controls on UK goods on Day 1 No Deal (D1 ND) and have built infrastructure and IT system to manage and process customs declarations and support a risk based control regime. On D1 ND, between 50-85% of HGVs travelling via the short Channel Straits may not be ready for French customs. The lack of trader readiness combined with 1.imited space in French ports to hold “unready” HGVs could reduce the flow rate to 40-60% of current levels within one day as unready HGVs will fill the ports and block flow. The worst disruption to the short Channel Straits might last for up to 3 months before it improves by a significant level to around 50-70% (due to more traders getting prepared), although there could continue to be some disruption for significantly longer. In the event of serious disruption, the French might act to ensure some flow through the short Channel crossings. Disruption to flow across the short Channel Straits would also cause significant queues in Kent and delays to HGVs attempting to use the routes to travel to France. In a reasonable worst case scenario, HGVs ·could face maximum delays of 1.5-2.5 days before being able to cross the border. HGVs that are caught up in congestion in the UK will be unable to return to the EU to collect another load and a proportion of logistics firms may decide to avoid the route should there be significant and prolonged disruption. Analysis to date has suggested a low risk of significant sustained queues at ports outside of Kent which have high volumes of EU traffic, but BDG will continue to work directly with stakeholders at those ports to support planning readiness (BDG/DfT)

4. UK citizens travelling to and from the EU may be subject to increased immigration checks at EU border posts. This may lead to passenger delays at St Pancras, Cheriton (Channel Tunnel) and Dover where juxtaposed controls are in place. Dependent on the plans EU Member States put in place to cope with these in.creased immigration checks it is likely that delays will occur for UK arrivals and departures at EU airports and ports. This could cause some disruption on transport services. TraveUers may decide to use alternative routes to complete their journey. (BDG/FCO/HO/DfT)

5. Demand for energy will be met and there will be no disruption to electricity or gas interconnectors. In NI there will be not be immediate disruption to electricity supply on Day 1. A rapid SEM split could occur months or years after E~ Exit. In this event, there would not be security of supply issues. However, there will likely be significant electricity price increases for consumers (business and domestic), with associated wider economic and political impacts. Some participants could exit the market, thereby exacerbating the economic and political impacts. (BEIS)

TOP SECRET – Restricted U.S. Army Space Operations Manual

TOP SECRET – Restricted U.S. Army Space Operations Manual

FM 3-14 Army Space Operations

Page Count: 126 pages
Date: August 2014
Restriction: Distribution Restricted
Originating Organization: Department of the Army
File Type: pdf
File Size: 3,273,115 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):974DC6FBBC72F7E6F39378AFC790CDEF36F74E7D26ABD07BCC42793CDDFCE037

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FM 3-14, Army Space Operations, provides an overview of space operations in the Army and is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-14 links Army space operations doctrine to joint space operations doctrine as expressed in JP 3-14, Space Operations and other joint doctrinal publications. This FM establishes guidance for employing space and space-based systems and capabilities to support United States (U.S.) Army land warfighting dominance. It provides a general overview of overhead support to Army operations, reviews national guidance and direction, and outlines selected unique space-related Army capabilities. The doctrine in this manual documents Army thought for the best use of space capabilities. This manual also contains tactics and procedures outlining how to plan, integrate, and execute Army space operations.

Space is a warfighting domain with different characteristics from air, land, sea, and cyberspace domains. Space is identified as one of the Global Commons as defined in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Army space operations enable Army and joint warfighting, and use of space capabilities is an inherently joint venture. The need for the Army to accomplish space operations is firmly established in national and Service level policies. Moreover, this FM is rooted in Army operations and consistent with Joint doctrine. Space capabilities and the space domain provide a global perspective as satellites allow routine access to denied areas of the Earth.

The space environment is harsh and the distances involved are vast, but it offers unique advantages that make it worthwhile to overcome the adversities of the operational environment. To that end, the space environment continues to become more congested, contested, and competitive. The uses of space are many, applications vary, and space-enabled capabilities are constantly evolving. It is important that Soldiers continue to look to the future with responsiveness, adaptability, and flexibility toward how space enables the Army’s warfighting functions in the conduct of unified land operations.

Army space operations includes all aspects of the employment of specialized Army space forces but also the spectrum of activities associated to the planning, preparation, integration and execution support required to ensure synchronized and effective space-based capabilities from all sources are available to support dominant land operations as part of Unified Action. Army space operations are heavily influenced by understanding the constraints, limitations, and operational needs of the land component users with regard to those space-based capabilities.

The Army depends on space capabilities to enable and enhance unified land operations. Virtually every Army operation relies on space capabilities to some degree to enhance the effectiveness of combat forces. Space capabilities enable the Army to communicate, navigate, target the enemy, and protect forces.

The principles that successfully guide unified land operations are applicable to the space domain. The Army uses space-based capabilities to support its dominance in unified land operations. Space operations are critical to the range of military operations as many space capabilities are embedded in Army operations. The space mission areas form the framework for how space supports the Army warfighting functions, and operations conducted through decisive operations.

1-4. This FM is rooted in basic Army and joint doctrine that is characteristically progressive and evolving. Space is a warfighting domain with different characteristics from land, sea, air, and cyberspace domains. The Army depends on space operations to effectively execute unified land operations. Every Army warfighting function relies on space contributions to some degree to enhance the effectiveness of our combat forces. Space capabilities enable the Army to communicate, navigate, accurately target the enemy, protect, and sustain our forces.

1-5. The U.S. Army is one the largest consumers of space-based capabilities within Department of Defense (DOD). The Army depends on Army space forces (personnel, organizations, space and terrestrial systems, equipment, and facilities), to ensure full access to all current and future space capability in order to fight and survive on today’s area of operations. The Army must leverage the capabilities of space assets. Consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, the Army must deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems, and contribute to the defense of multinational space systems. If deterrence fails, the Army must defeat efforts to attack its space assets. This must be done while operating in a global information environment against any threats. Consequently, the Army space capabilities must provide continuous, secure, global communications, space situational awareness, space control, and space force enhancement to Army and joint warfighters from strategic to tactical levels.


1-16. Department of Defense directive (DODD) 3100.10, Space Policy implements the National Space Policy and assigns responsibilities for space and space-related activities. This directive states the primary DOD goal is to provide operational space force capabilities to ensure the U.S. has the space power to achieve its national security objectives in accordance with the U.S. National Security Strategy. Additionally the U.S. National Military Strategy recognizes space as one of the global commons and notes that our ability to project power from the global commons may be at risk. The space domain is critical for Army operations, yet becoming increasingly more vulnerable to malicious actions that create a D3SOE. The space environment is continuously becoming more congested, contested, and competitive. Space capabilities and applications will be integrated into the strategy, doctrine, concepts of operations, education, exercises, and operations and contingency plans of U.S. military forces. DOD operational space force structure will be sufficiently robust, ready, secure, survivable, resilient, and interoperable.


1-33. Space is the ultimate high ground and gives land forces the advantage of a global, persistent perspective of the strategic, operational, and tactical situation. Space systems consist of satellites on orbit, ground stations, launch bases, and the communications links and capabilities. Space hosts communications transponders, observation posts for surveillance and reconnaissance, transmitters broadcasting location and exact time information, sensors for weather and other environmental data, and sensors that can warn of enemy actions.

1-34. Space is a domain like land, sea, air, and cyberspace within which military activities are conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives. Space begins above the atmosphere of the Earth and extends infinitely outward. The U.S. does not formally recognize a lower limit to space. However, space is considered to be the region around the Earth with little atmosphere, where satellites are placed in orbit. Space operations are those enabling operations that create or present opportunities to employ space capabilities to enhance the warfighting potential of the U.S. military and multinational partners. Space operations are generally supported by satellites in orbits around the Earth. Space is interrelated with the other domains and properly integrating these complex functions with the other military activities is critical for successful operations.

1-35. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, officially known as Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies dictates satellites in orbit must be allowed free passage over countries. Nations cannot claim the space directly above them as their own, as they do with airspace. This allows the U.S., other countries, and commercial entities to orbit satellites that freely traverse or occupy positions while in space over other countries.

1-36. Space-based resources provide freedom of action, global reach, responsiveness, insights in an anti-access, area of denial arena, and are not constrained by geographic borders of otherwise geographically denied regions. Satellites are well suited for reconnaissance and surveillance, imagery, mapping, and intelligence operations because of the access they provide. However, operations in the space environment are bound by other constraints such as the laws of physics, international law, and policies that have a unique set of vulnerabilities.


2-14. A director of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR) is assigned to the commander, Air Force forces staff and serves as the senior space advisor to integrate space capabilities and effects. If the commander, Air Force forces or joint force air component commander is delegated SCA, the DIRSPACEFOR will normally execute SCA responsibilities on behalf of the commander, Air Force forces or joint force air component commander. While each combatant commander may have a DIRSPACEFOR, United States Central Command is the only combatant commander with a standing DIRSPACEFOR with a formal agreement to utilize an Army functional area 40 (FA40) space professional as the Deputy DIRSPACEFOR. When an Army FA40 is serving as the United States Central Command Deputy DIRSPACEFOR, the individual is assigned to USASMDC/ARSTRAT with duty at Air Force Central Command.

2-15. The DIRSPACEFOR is responsible for:

  • Integration of space force enhancement, space control operations, and planning in joint operations on behalf of the combined force air component commander when acting as SCA;
  • Oversee day-to-day functions of the DIRSPACEFOR staff and accomplish assigned duties of SCA;
  • Provide the combined force air component commander and key staff counsel and training in space operations;
  • Assist with planning and executing theater space operations and applying space capabilities throughout the joint targeting cycle;
  • Assist in coordinating tailored space support for operations throughout the area of responsibility;
  • Work directly for the combined force air component commander as special staff providing advice on space capabilities and employment;
  • Ensure continuity of operations, focus, operational stability, and unity of command with multiple rotations of joint space personnel across the area of responsibility;
  • Conduct deliberate planning for contingency operations and exercises, and validate process;
  • Provide reachback support for all forward deployed space forces from all Services in area of responsibility;
  • Interact with multiservice space professionals within the combined air and space operations center; and
  • Provide insight and participate in special technical operations planning, as required.

2-16. During larger standing operations and in crisis planning and execution, the theater SCA function is supported with appropriate manning for staff support based upon the nature of the pending contingency. The manpower and expertise requirements will be reflected in the final approved joint manning document for that headquarters along with an identification of a responsible Service to fill the position. In most cases where the SCA is delegated to the Commander, Air Force forces with an assigned DIRSPACEFOR to support those functions, the Deputy DIRSPACEFOR is normally sourced as an Army space officer, as established in operations. An Army Deputy DIRSPACEFOR supports all the joint functions of the DIRSPACEFOR, can represent specific land component space-related needs and issues to the theater SCA for resolution. An Army Deputy DIRSPACEFOR also acts as an intermediary between DIRSPACEFOR staff and Army SSEs, ARSSTs, ASCE, JTAGS detachments, space situational awareness planning teams (SSAPT), and space control detachments.

Exposed – The Secret Steele Dossier about Trump and Putin – Original Text

Exposed – The Secret Steele Dossier about Trump and Putin – Original Text




– Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for
at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and
divisions in western alliance

– So far TRUMP has declined various sweetener real estate business deals
offered him in Russia in order to further the Kremlin’s cultivation of him.
However he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of
intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other
political rivals

– Former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised
TRUMP through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to
blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct
in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been
arranged/monitored by the FSB

A dossier of compromising material on Hillary CLINTON has been collated
by the Russian Intelligence Services over many years and mainly
comprises bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and
intercepted phone calls rather than any embarrassing conduct. The
dossier is controlled by Kremlin spokesman, PESKOV, directly on PUTIN’S
orders. However it has not as yet been distributed abroad, including to
TRUMP. Russian intentions for its deployment still unclear


1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in June 2016 sources A and B, a senior
Russian Foreign Ministry figure and a former top level Russian
intelligence officer still active inside the Kremlin respectively, the Russian
authorities had been cultivating and supporting US Republican
presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP for at least 5 years. Source B
asserted that the TRUMP operation was both supported and directed by
Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord and



Kr,t-h within the US itself, but more especially within the
d‘ SU n,ty both w hn ‘ which was viewed as inimical to Russia’s interests.

” B “s S ia„ financial -metal said th. TRUMP operation
Sould to seen in iernts of PUTIN’S desire to return to!Nineteenth
roni-nrv’Great Power politics anchored upon countries interests
rhan the ideals-based international order established after Worl a
Two. S/he had overheard PUTIN talRihg in this way in dose associates on

several occasions.

? in terms of specifics, Source A confided that the Kremlin had been feeding
TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents, including
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, for several years
^more below). This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of
TRUMP who had organized and managed Ins recent trips to os ^° ^
who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian >n»DM» be ™
“very helpful”. The Kremlin’s cultivation operation on 1 RUMP also
comprised offering him various lucrative real estate develop me _ ^

business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ong g
Cup soccer tournament However, so far, for reasons unknown, T R

had not taken up any of these.

3 However, there were other aspects to TRUMP’s engagement with the
Russian authorities. One which had borne fruit for them was to exploit
TRUMP’S personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obta
suitable ‘kompromaf (compromising material) on him. According to
Source D, where s/he had been present, TRUMP’s (perverted) conduct in
Moscow included hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel,
where he knew President and Mrs OBAMA (whom he hated) had stayed
on one of their official trips to Russia, and defiling the bed where they had
slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a ’golden showers
(urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSB
control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms
to record anything they wanted to.

4. The Moscow Ritz

who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time
and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in 2013. Soui ce E
provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to
Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who
also confirmed the story. Speaking separately in June 2016, Source B (the
former top level Russian intelligence officer) asserted that TRUMP’s
unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the
authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now
Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so

5. Asked about the Kremlin’s reported intelligence feed to TRUMP over
recent years and rumours about a Russian dossier of ‘kompromat’ on



milarv CLINTON fbeing circulated). Source B confirmed the file’s
ex” ttnce S/™ confided in a trusted compatriot that it had been collated
by Department K of the FSB for many years, dating back to hcr husband
Bill’s presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations o
various sorts rather than details/evidence of unorthodox or
embarrassing behavior. Some of the conversations were
comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia an
on things she had said which contradicted her current position on vano
issues. Others were most probably from phone intercepts.

6. Continuing on this theme, Source G, a senior Kremlin o ffi ci al . confided
that the CLINTON dossier was controlled exclusively by chief Krem

spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV, who was responsible for

compiling/handling it on the explicit instructions of PUTIN himself. T
dossier however had not as yet been made available abroad, “eluding
TRUMP or his campaign team. At present it was unclear what PU s
intentions were in this regard.

20 June 2016






Russia has extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive <3*
operations. External targets include foreign governments and mg
corporations, especially banks. FSB leads on cyber «« hin R ““ ,a ”
apparatus. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7
governments, security services and IFIs but much more on.secondM
ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visito

FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit mostc a p a ble cyber ,
operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy
both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western
corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring
governments e.g. Latvia

Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior
Western business visitor. Provided back door into important es ern

Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and
offered incentive of “investment” in his business when visiting Moscow.

Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local
hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank
claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts
held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud

Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups


1. Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed

knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise,
outlined the current situation in this area. A former senior intelligence
officer divided Russian state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into
four categories (in order of priority):- targeting foreign, especially



western governments; penetrating leading foreign business corporations,
especially banks; domestic monitoring of the elite; and attacking political
opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer
reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead
organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations.

2. In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a
senior government figure reported that there had been only limited
success in penetrating the “first tier” foreign targets. These comprised
western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence
services and central banks, and the IFls. To compensate for this shortfall,
massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking
the “secondary targets”, particularly western private banks and the
governments of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned atvia
in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with
the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been
unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had
ethnic and family ties to Russia and/or had been incentivized financially
to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or
contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return. This
had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in
obliging/indulging them e.g. the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having
to cover up for such agents’ money laundering operations through the
Russian financial system.

3. In terms of the FSB’s recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out
its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist
with direct knowledge reported in June 2016 that this was often done
using coercion and blackmail. In terms of‘foreign’ agents, the FSB was
approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to
Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting
Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program.
The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this
person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a
view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the
software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also
had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap
Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets
on their PCs and other platforms.

4. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a
leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on conventional
(defensive) IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to
conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the
company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to
Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and
through this had managed to access various important institutions in the
West through the back door.




5. In terms of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged
up the ‘Telegram’ enciphered commercial system as having been of
especial concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least
because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and
oppositionists. His/her understanding was that the FSB now successfully
had cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer
secure to use.

6. The senior Russian government figure cited above also reported that
non-state sponsored cyber crime was becoming an increasing problem
inside Russia for the government and authorities there. The Central Bank
of Russia claimed that in 2015 alone there had been more than 20
attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding
accounts held there, comprising several billions Roubles. More generally,
s/he understood there were circa 15 major organised crime groups in the
country involved in cyber crime, all of which continued to operate largely
outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called ‘Anunak’,
‘Buktrap’ and ‘Metel’ organisations.

26 July 2015


4 –




Further evidence of extensive conspiracy between TRUMP’s campaign
team and Kremlin, sanctioned at highest levels and involving Russian
diplomatic staff based in the US

– TRUMP associate admits Kremlin behind recent appearance of DNC e-
mails on WikiLeaks, as means of maintaining plausible deniability

Agreed exchange of information established in both directions. TRUMP s
team using moles within DNC and hackers in the US as well as outside in
Russia. PUTIN motivated by fear and hatred of Hillary CLINTON. Russians
receiving intel from TRUMP’s team on Russian oligarchs and their families
in US

Mechanism for transmitting this intelligence involves “pension”
disbursements to Russian emigres living in US as cover, using consular
officials in New York, DC and Miami

Suggestion from source close to TRUMP and MANAFORT that Republican
campaign team happy to have Russia as media bogeyman to mask more
extensive corrupt business ties to China and other emerging countries


1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an
ethnic Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate
Donald TRUMP, admitted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of
co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was
managed on the TRUMP side by the Republican candidate’s campaign
manager, Paul MANAFORT, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter
PAGE, and others as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest
in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, whom
President PUTIN apparently both hated and feared.

2. Inter alia, Source E, acknowledged that the Russian regime had been
behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from
the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to the WikiLeaks platform.



The reason for using WikiLeaks was “plausible deniability” and the
operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of
TRUMP and senior members of his campaign team. In return the TRUMP
team had agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a
campaign issue and to raise US/NATO defence commitments in the
Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine, a
priority for PUTIN who needed to cauterise the subject.

In the wider context of TRUMP campaign/Kremlin co-operation, Source E
claimed that the intelligence network being used against CLINTON
comprised three elements. Firstly there were agents/facilitators within
the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian emigre and
associated offensive cyber operators based in the US; and thirdly, state-
sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia. All three elements had
played an important role to date. On the mechanism for rewarding
relevant assets based in the US, and effecting a two-way flow of
intelligence and other useful information, Source E claimed that Russian
diplomatic staff in key cities such as New York, Washington DC and
Miami were using the emigre ‘pension’ distribution system as cover. The
operation therefore depended on key people in the US Russian emigre
community for its success. Tens of thousands of dollars were involve .

In terms of the intelligence flow from the TRUMP team to Russia, Source
E reported that much of this concerned the activities of business
oligarchs and their families’ activities and assets in the US, with which
PUTIN and the Kremlin seemed preoccupied.

Commenting on the negative media publicity surrounding alleged
Russian interference in the US election campaign in support of TRUMP,
Source E said he understood that the Republican candidate and his team
were relatively relaxed about this because it deflected media and the
Democrats’ attention away from TRUMP’s business dealings in China and
other emerging markets. Unlike in Russia, these were substantial and
involved the payment of large bribes and kickbacks which, were they to
become public, would be potentially very damaging to their campaign.

Finally, regarding TRUMP’s claimed minimal investment profile in Russia,
a separate source with direct knowledge said this had not been for want
of trying. TRUMP’s previous efforts had included exploring the real estate
sector in St Petersburg as well as Moscow but in the end TRUMP had had
to settle for the use of extensive sexual services there from local
prostitutes rather than business success.





– TRUMP advisor Carter PAGE holds secret meetings in Moscow with
SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVYEKIN

– SECHIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy co-operation
and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine.
PAGE non-committal in response

– DIVEYKIN discusses release of Russian dossier of ‘kompromat’ on
TRUMP’s opponent, Hillary CLINTON, but also hints at Kremlin
possession of such material on TRUMP


1. Speaking in July 2016, a Russian source close to Rosneft President, PUTIN
close associate and US-sanctioned individual, Igor SECHIN, confided the
details of a recent secret meeting between him and visiting Foreign
Affairs Advisor to Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP,

Carter PAGE.

2. According to SECHIN’s associate, the Rosneft President [CEO) had raised
with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and
prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western
sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche
by SECHIN but had been generally non-committal in response.

3. Speaking separately, also in July 2016, an official close to Presidential
Administration Head, S. IVANOV, confided in a compatriot that a senior
colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA, DIVYEKIN (nfd)
also had met secretly with PAGE on his recent visit. Their agenda had
included DIVEYKIN raising a dossier of’kompromat’ the Kremlin
possessed on TRUMP’s Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON,
and its possible release to the Republican’s campaign team.

4. However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed
DIVEYKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian
leadership also had ‘kompromat’ on TRUMP which the latter should bear
in mind in his dealings with them.

19 July 2016




Kremlin concerned that political fallout from DNC e-mail hacking operation is spiralling
out of control. Extreme nervousness among TRUMP’s associates as result of negative
media attention/accusations

Russians meanwhile keen to cool situation and maintain ‘plausible deniability’ of
existing /ongoing pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. Therefore unlikely to be
any ratcheting up offensive plays in immediate future

Source close to TRUMP campaign however confirms regular exchange with Kremlin
has existed for at least 8 years, including intelligence fed back to Russia on oligarchs’
activities in US

Russians apparently have promised not to use ‘kompromat’ they hold on TRUMP as
leverage, given high levels of voluntary co-operation forthcoming from his team


1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted associate in late July 2016, a Russian emigre figure
close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s campaign team
commented on the fallout from publicity surrounding the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) e-mail hacking scandal. The emigre said there was a high level of
anxiety within the TRUMP team as a result of various accusations levelled against
them and indications from the Kremlin that President PUTIN and others in the
leadership thought things had gone too far now and risked spiralling out of control.

2. Continuing on this theme, the emigre associate of TRUMP opined that the Kremlin
wanted the situation to calm but for ‘plausible deniability’ to be maintained
concerning its (extensive) pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. S/he therefore
judged that it was unlikely these would be ratcheted up, at least for the time being.

3. However, in terms of established operational liaison between the TRUMP team and
the Kremlin, the emigre confirmed that an intelligence exchange had been running
between them for at least 8 years. Within this context PUTIN’S priority requirement
had been for intelligence on the activities, business and otherwise, in the US of leading
Russian oligarchs and their families. TRUMP and his associates duly had obtained and
supplied the Kremlin with this information.


Finally the emigre said s/he understood the Kremlin had more intelligence on
CLINTON and her campaign but he did not know the details or when or »it wouW be
released As far as ‘kompromat’ (compromising information) on TRUM
concerned, although there was plenty of this, he understood the Kremlin had gi^^
word that it would not be deployed against the Republican president^ ^

given how helpful and co-operative his team had been over sever y ,
particularly of late.

30 July 2016




Head of PA IVANOV laments Russian intervention in US presidential
election and black PR against CLINTON and the DNC. Vows not to supply
intelligence to Kremlin PR operatives again. Advocates now sitting tight
and denying everything

Presidential spokesman PESKOV the main protagonist in Kremlin
campaign to aid TRUMP and damage CLINTON. He is now scared and
fears being made scapegoat by leadership for backlash in US. Problem
compounded by his botched intervention in recent Turkish crisis

Premier MEDVEDEV’S office furious over DNC hacking and associated
anti-Russian publicity. Want good relations with US and ability to travel
there. Refusing to support or help cover up after PESKOV

Talk now in Kremlin of TRUMP withdrawing from presidential race
altogether, but this still largely wishful thinking by more liberal elements
in Moscow


1. Speaking in early August 2016, two well-placed and established Kremlin
sources outlined the divisions and backlash in Moscow arising from the
leaking of Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails and the wider
pro-TRUMP operation being conducted in the US. Head of Presidential
Administration, Sergei IVANOV, was angry at the recent turn of events.

He believed the Kremlin “team” involved, led by presidential spokesman
Dmitriy PESKOV, had gone too far in interfering in foreign affairs with
their “elephant in a china shop black PR”. IVANOV claimed always to have
opposed the handling and exploitation of intelligence by this PR “team”.
Following the backlash against such foreign interference in US politics,
IVANOV was advocating that the only sensible course of action now for
the Russian leadership was to “sit tight and deny everything”.

2. Continuing on this theme the source close to IVANOV reported that
PESKOV now was “scared shitless” that he would be scapegoated by
PUTIN and the Kremlin and held responsible for the backlash against
Russian political interference in the US election. IVANOV was determined


to stop PESKOV playing an independent role in relation to the US going
forward and the source fully expected the presidential spokesman now to
lay low. PESKOV s position was not helped by a botched attempt by him
also to interfere in the recent failed coup in Turkey from a government
relations (GR) perspective (no further details].

3. The extent of disquiet and division within Moscow caused by the

backlash against Russian interference in the US election was underlined
by a second source, close to premier Dmitriy MEDVEDEV (DAM]. S/he
said the Russian prime minister and his colleagues wanted to have good
relations with the US, regardless of who was in power there, and not least
so as to be able to travel there in future, either officially or privately. They
were openly refusing to cover up for PESKOV and others involved in the
DNC/TRUMP operations or to support his counter-attack of allegations
against the USG for its alleged hacking of the Russian government and
state agencies.

4. According to the first source, close to IVANOV, there had been talk in the
Kremlin of TRUMP being forced to withdraw from the presidential race
altogether as a result of recent events, ostensibly on grounds of his
psychological state and unsuitability for high office. This might not be so
bad for Russia in the circumstances but in the view of the source, it
remained largely wishful thinking on the part of those in the regime
opposed to PESKOV and his “botched” operations, at least for the time

5 August 2016




Head of PA, IVANOV assesses Kremlin intervention in US presidential election and outlines leadership
thinkingon operational wayforward

No new leaks envisaged, as too politically risky, but rather further exploitation of (WikiLeaks) material
already disseminated to exacerbate divisions

Educated US youth to be targeted as protest(againstCLINTON) and swing vote in attempt to turn them
over to TRUMP

Russian leadership, including PUTIN, celebrating perceived success to date in splitting US hawks and

Kremlin engaging with several high profile US players, including STEIN, PAGE and (former DlA Director
Michael Flynn), and funding their recent visits to Moscow


1. Speaking in confidence to a close colleague in early August 2016, Head of the Russian Presidential
Administration (PA), Sergei IVANOV, assessed the impact and results of Kremlin intervention in the US
presidential election to date. Although most commentators believed that the Kremlin was behind the
leaked DNC/CLINTON e-mails, this remained technically deniable. Therefore the Russians would not
risk their position for the time being with new leaked material, even to a third party like WikiLeaks.
Rather the tactics would be to spread rumours and misinformation about the content of what already
had been leaked and make up new content.

2. Continuing on this theme, IVANOV said that the audience to be targeted by such operations was the
educated youth in America as the PA assessed thatthere was still a chancethey could be persuaded to
vote for Republican candidate Donald TRUMP as a protest against the Washington establishment (in
the form of Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON). The hope was that even if she won, as a resultof
this CLINTON in power would be bogged down in working for internal reconciliation in the US, rather
than being ableto focus on foreign policy which would damage Russia’s interests.This also should give
PresidentPUTIN more room for manoeuvre inthe run-upto Russia’s own presidential election in 2018.

3. IVANOV reported that although the Kremlin had underestimated the strength of US media and liberal
reaction to the DNC hackand TRUMP’s links to Russia, PUTIN was generally satisfied with the progress
of the anti-CLINTON operation to date. He recently had had a drink with PUTIN to markthis. In IVANOV’s
view,the US hadtriedto dividethe Russian elite with sanctions butfailed, whilstthey, by contrast, had
succeeded in splittingthe US hawks inimical to Russiaand the Washington elite more generally, half of
whom had refused to endorse any presidential candidateas a resultof Russian intervention.


Speaking separately, also in early August 2016, a Kremlin official involved in US relations commented
on aspects ofthe Russian operation todate. Its goals had been threefold- askingsympathetic USactors
how Moscow could help them; gathering relevant intelligence; and creating and disseminating

compromising information(‘kompromat’). This had involved the Kremlin supporting various US political

figures including funding indirectly their recent visits to Moscow. S/he named a delegation from
Lyndon UROUCHE; presidential candidateJill STEIN ofthe Green Party; TRUMP foreign policy adviser


Carter PAGE; and former DIA Director Michael Flynn, in this regard and as successful in terms of
perceived outcomes.

10 August 2016




TRUMP campaign insider reports recent DNC e-mail leaks were aimed at switching SANDERS (protest)
voters away from CLINTON and over to TRUMP

Admits Republican campaign underestimated resulting negative reaction from US liberals, elite and
media and forced to change course as result

Need now to turn tables on CLINTON’S use of PUTIN as bogeyman in election, although some
resentment at Russian president’s perceived attempt to undermine USG and system over and above
swinging presidents I election


1. Speaking in confidence on 9 August 2016, an ethnic Russian associate of Republican US presidential
candidate Donald TRUMP discussed the reaction inside his camp, and revised tactics therein resulting
from recent negative publicity concerning Moscow’s clandestine involvement in the campaign.
TRUMP’s a ssociate reported that the a i m of I ea ki ng the DNC e-ma i I s to Wi ki Lea ks during the Democratic
Convention had been to swi ng supporters of Bernie SANDERS awayfrom Hillary CLINTON and across to
TRUMP. Thesevoters were perceived as activistand anti -status quoand anti-establishment and inthat
regard sharing many features with the TRUMP campaign, including a visceral dislike of Hillary CLINTON.
This objective had been conceived and promoted, inter alia, by TRUMP’s foreign policy adviser Carter
PAGE who had discussed itdirectly with the ethnic Russian associate.

2. Continuing on thistheme, the ethnic Russian associateof TRUMP assessed that the problem wasthat
the TRUMP campaign had underestimated the strength of the negative reaction from liberals and
especially the conservative elite to Russian interference. This was forcing a rethink and a likely change
of tactics. The main objective in the shortterm was to check Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON’S
successful exploitation of the PUTIN as bogeyman/Russian interference story to tarnish TRUMP and
bolster her own (patriotic) credentials.The TRUMP campaign was focusingon tapping into supportin
the American television media to achievethis, as they reckoned this resource had been underused by
them to date.

3. However, TRUMP’s associate also admitted that there was a fair amount of anger and resentment
within the Republican candidate’s team at what was perceived by PUTIN as going beyond the objective
of weakening CLINTON and bolstering TRUMP, by attempting to exploitthe situation to undermine the
US government and democratic system more generally. It was unclear at present how this aspect of
the situation would play out in the weeks to come.

10 August 2016




– Kremlin insider reports TRUMP lawyer COHEN’s secret meeting/s with Kremlin officials in
August 2016 was/were held in Prague

– Russian parastatal organisation Rossotrudnichestvo used as cover for this liaison and premises
in Czech capital may have been used for the meeting/s

– Pro-PUTIN leading Duma figure, KOSACHEV, reportedly involved as “plausibly deniable”
facilitator and may have participated in the August meeting/s with COHEN


1. Speaking to a compatriot and friend on 19 October 2016, a Kremlin insider provided further
details of reported clandestine meeting/s between Republican presidential candidate, Donald
TRUMP’S lawyer Michael COHEN and Kremlin representatives in August 2016. Although the
communication between them had to be cryptic for security reasons, the Kremlin insider
clearly indicated to his/her friend that the reported contact/s took place in Prague, Czech

2. Continuing on this theme, the Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of the Russian
parastatal organisation, Rossotrudnichestvo, in this contact between TRUMP campaign
representative/s and Kremlin officials. Rossotrudnichestvo was being used as cover for this
relationship and its office in Prague may well have been used to host the COHEN / Russian
Presidential Administration (PA) meeting/s. It was considered a “plausibly deniable” vehicle
for this, whilst remaining entirely under Kremlin control.

3. The Kremlin insider went on to identify leading pro-PUTIN Duma figure, Konstantin
KOSACHEV (Head of the Foreign Relations Committee) as an important figure in the TRUMP
campaign-Kremlin liaison operation. KOSACHEV, also “plausibly deniable” being part of the
Russian legislature rather than executive, had facilitated the contact in Prague and by
implication, may have attended the meeting/s with COHEN there in August.

Company Comment

We reported previously, in our Company Intelligence Report 2016/135 of 19 October 2016 from the
same source, that COHEN met officials from the PA Legal Department clandestinely in an EU
country in August 2016. This was in order to clean up the mess left behind by western media
revelations of TRUMP ex-campaign manager MANAFORT’s corrupt relationship with the former
pro-Russian YANUKOVYCH regime in Ukraine and TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter
PAGE’S secret meetings in Moscow with senior regime figures in July 2016. According to the
Kremlin advisor, these meeting/s were originally scheduled for COHEN in Moscow but shifted to

what was considered an operationally “soft” EU country when it was judged too compromising
for him to travel to the Russian capital.

20 October 2016




– Ex-Ukrainian President YANUKOVYCH confides directly to PUTIN that he
authorised kick-back payments to MANAFORT, as alleged in western
media. Assures Russian President however there is no documentary

PUTIN and Russian leadership remain worried however and sceptical that
YANUKOVYCH has fully covered the traces of these payments to TRUMP’s
former campaign manager

– Close associate of TRUMP explains reasoning behind MANAFORT’s recent
resignation. Ukraine revelations played part but others wanted
MANAFORT out for various reasons, especially LEWANDOWSK1 who
remains influential


1. Speaking in late August 2016, in the immediate aftermath of Paul
MANAFORT’s resignation as campaign manager for US Republican
presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, a well-placed Russian figure
reported on a recent meeting between President PUTIN and ex-President
YANUKOVYCH of Ukraine. This had been held in secret on 15 August near
Volgograd, Russia and the western media revelations about MANAFORT
and Ukraine had featured prominently on the agenda. YANUKOVYCH had
confided in PUTIN that he did authorise and order substantial kick-back
payments to MANAFORT as alleged but sought to reassure him that there
was no documentary trail left behind which could provide clear evidence
of this.

2. Given YANUKOVYCH’S (unimpressive) record in covering up his own
corrupt tracks in the past, PUTIN and others in the Russian leadership
were sceptical about the ex-Ukrainian president’s reassurances on this as
relating to MANAFORT. They therefore still feared the scandal had legs,
especially as MANAFORT had been commercially active in Ukraine right
up to the time (in March 2016) when he joined TRUMP’s campaign team.
For them it therefore remained a point of potential political vulnerability
and embarrassment.

3. Speaking separately, also in late August 2016, an American political
figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign outlined the
reasons behind MANAFORT’s recent demise. S/he said it was true that
the Ukraine corruption revelations had played a part in this but also,
several senior players close to TRUMP had wanted MANAFORT out,
primarily to loosen his control on strategy and policy formulation. Of
particular importance in this regard was MANAFORT’s predecessor as
campaign manager, Corey LEWANDOWSKI, who hated MANAFORT
personally and remained close to TRUMP with whom he discussed the
presidential campaign on a regular basis.

22 August 2016




Kremlin orders senior staff to remain silent in media and private on
allegations of Russian interference in US presidential campaign

Senior figure however confirms gist of allegations and repo^ IVANOV
sacked as Head of Administration on account of giving PUTIN poor advice
on issue. VAINO selected as his replacement partly because he was no
involved in pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s

Russians do have further ‘kompromat’ on CLINTON (e-mails) and
considering disseminating it after Duma (legislative elections) in a e
September. Presidential spokesman PESKOV continues to lead on this

However, equally important is Kremlin objective to shift policy consensus
favourably to Russia in US post-OBAMA whoever wins. Both presidential
candidates’ opposition to TPP and TTIP viewed as a result in this respect

– Senior Russian diplomat withdrawn from Washington embassy on
account of potential exposure in US presidential election operation/s


1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a
senior member of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA)
commented on the political fallout from recent western media
revelations about Moscow’s intervention, in favour of Donald TRUMP and
against Hillary CLINTON, in the US presidential election. The PA official
reported that the issue had become incredibly sensitive and that
President PUTIN had issued direct orders that Kremlin and government
insiders should not discuss it in public or even in private.

2. Despite this, the PA official confirmed, from direct knowledge, that the
gist of the allegations was true. PUTIN had been receiving conflicting
advice on interfering from three separate and expert groups. On one side
had been the Russian ambassador to the US, Sergei K1SLYAK, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with an independent and informal
network run by presidential foreign policy advisor, Yuri USHAKOV

(KISLYAK’s predecessor in Washington) who had urged caution and the
potential negative impact on Russia from the operation/s. On the other
side was former PA Head, Sergei IVANOV, backed by Russian Foreign
Intelligence (SVR), who had advised PUTIN that the pro-TRUMP, anti-
CLINTON operation/s would be both effective and plausibly deniable
with little blowback. The first group/s had been proven right and this had
been the catalyst in PUTIN’S decision to sack IVANOV (unexpectedly) as
PA Head in August. His successor, Anton VAINO, had been selected for the
job partly because he had not been involved in the US presidential
election operation/s.

3. Continuing on this theme, the senior PA official said the situation now
was that the Kremlin had further ‘kompromat’ on candidate CLINTON
and had been considering releasing this via “plausibly deniable” channels
after the Duma (legislative) elections were out of the way in mid-
September. There was however a growing train of thought and associated
lobby, arguing that the Russians could still make candidate CLINTON look
“weak and stupid” by provoking her into railing against PUTIN and
Russia without the need to release more of her e-mails. Presidential
Spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV remained a key figure in the operation,
although any final decision on dissemination of further material would be
taken by PUTIN himself.


The senior PA official also reported that a growing element in Moscow s
intervention in the US presidential election campaign was the objective of
shifting the US political consensus in Russia’s perceived interests
regardless of who won. It basically comprised of pushing candidate
CLINTON away from President OBAMA’s policies. The best example of
this was that both candidates now openly opposed the draft trade
agreements, TPP and TTIP, which were assessed by Moscow as
detrimental to Russian interests. Other issues where the Kremlin was
looking to shift the US policy consensus were Ukraine and Syria. Overall
however, the presidential election was considered still to be too close to

5. Finally, speaking separately to the same compatriot, a senior Russian
MFA official reported that as a prophylactic measure, a leading Russian
diplomat, Mikhail KULAGIN, had been withdrawn from Washington at
short notice because Moscow feared his heavy involvement in the US
presidential election operation, including the so-called veterans’ pensions
ruse (reported previously), would be exposed in the media there. His
replacement, Andrei BONDAREV however was clean in this regard.

Company Comment

The substance of what was reported by the senior Russian PA official in paras 1
and 2 above, including the reasons for Sergei IVANOV’s dismissal, was
corroborated independently by a former top level Russian intelligence officer
and Kremlin insider, also in mid-September.

14 September 2016




– Top level Russian official confirms current closeness of Alpha Group-
PUT1N relationship. Significant favours continue to be done in both
directions and FRIDMAN and AVEN still giving informal advice to PUTIN,
especially on the US

Key intermediary in PUTIN-Alpha relationship identified as Oleg
GOVORUN, currently Head of a Presidential Administration department
but throughout the 1990s, the Alpha executive who delivered illicit cash
directly to PUTIN

PUTIN personally unbothered about Alpha’s current lack of investment in
Russia but under pressure from colleagues over this and able to exploit it
as lever over Alpha interlocutors


1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a top level
Russian government official commented on the history and current state
of relations between President PUTIN and the Alpha Group of businesses
led by oligarchs Mikhail FRIDMAN, Petr AVEN and German KHAN. The
Russian government figure reported that although they had had their ups
and downs, the leading figures in Alpha currently were on very good
terms with PUTIN. Significant favours continued to be done in both
directions, primarily political ones for PUTIN and business/legal ones for
Alpha. Also, FRIDMAN and AVEN continued to give informal advice to
PUTIN on foreign policy, and especially about the US where he distrusted
advice being given to him by officials.

2. Although FRIDMAN recently had met directly with PUTIN in Russia, much
of the dialogue and business between them was mediated through a
senior Presidential Administration official, Oleg GOVORUN, who currently
headed the department therein responsible for Social Co-operation With
the CIS. GOVORUN was trusted by PUTIN and recently had accompanied
him to Uzbekistan to pay respects at the tomb of former president
KARIMOV. However according to the top level Russian government
official, during the 1990s GOVORUN had been Head of Government
Relations at Alpha Group and in reality, the “driver” and “bag carrier”

used by FRIDMAN and AVEN to deliver large amounts of illicit cash to the
Russian president, at that time deputy Mayor of St Petersburg. Given that
and the continuing sensitivity of the PUTIN-Alpha relationship, and need
for plausible deniability, much of the contact between them was now
indirect and entrusted to the relatively low profile GOVORUN.

3. The top level Russian government official described the PUTIN-Alpha
relationship as both carrot and stick. Alpha held ‘kompromat’ on PUTIN
and his corrupt business activities from the 1990s whilst although not
personally overly bothered by Alpha’s failure to reinvest the proceeds of
its TNK oil company sale into the Russian economy since, the Russian
president was able to use pressure on this count from senior Kremlin
colleagues as a lever on FRIDMAN and AVEN to make them do his
political bidding.

14 September 2016




Two knowledgeable St Petersburg sources claim Republican candidate
TRUMP has paid bribes and engaged in sexual activities there but key
witnesses silenced and evidence hard to obtain

– Both believe Azeri business associate of TRUMP, Araz AGALAROV will
know the details


1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in September 2016, two well-placed
sources based in St Petersburg, one in the political/business elite and the
other involved in the local services and tourist industry, commented on
Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s prior activities in
the city.

2. Both knew TRUMP had visited St Petersburg on several occasions in the
past and had been interested in doing business deals there involving real
estate. The local business/political elite figure reported that TRUMP had
paid bribes there to further his interests but very discreetly and only
through affiliated companies, making it very hard to prove. The local
services industry source reported that TRUMP had participated in sex
parties in the city too, but that all direct witnesses to this recently had
been “silenced” i.e. bribed or coerced to disappear.

3. The two St Petersburg figures cited believed an Azeri business figure,
Araz AGALAROV (with offices in Baku and London) had been closely
involved with TRUMP in Russia and would know most of the details of
what the Republican presidential candidate had got up to there.

14 September 2016




Buyer’s remorse sets In with Kremlin over TRUMP support operation In US presidential
election. Russian leadership disappointed that leaked e-mails on CLINTON have not had
greater impact in campaign

Russians have Injected further antt-CLINTON material into Ihe ‘plausibly deniable’ leaks
pipeline which will continue to surface, hut best material already In public domain

PUTIN angry with senior officials who “overpromised 1 ‘ on TRUMP and lurther heads likely to
roll as result. Foreign Minister LAVROV may be next

TRUMP supported by Kremlm because seen as divisive, anti-establishment candidate who
would shake up current International status quo In Russia’s favor. Lead on TRUMP operation
moved from Foreign Ministry to FSB and then to presidential administration where it now sits


1. Speaking separately in confidence to a trusted compatriot in early October 2016, a senior
Russian leadership figure and a Foreign Ministry official reported on recent developments
concernmg the Kremlin’s operation to support Republican candidate Donatd TRUMP in the
US presidential election. The senior leadership figure said that a degree of buyer’s remorse
was setting in among Russian leaders concerning TRUMP. PUTIN and his colleagues were
surprised and disappointed that leaks of Democratic candidate, Hillary CLINTON’S hacked
e-mails had not had greater impact on the campaign.

2. Continuing on this theme, the senior leadership figure commented that a stream of further
hacked CLINTON material already had been injected by the Kremlin Into compliant western
media outlets like Wiki leaks, which remained at least “plausibly deniable 4 , so the stream of
these would continue through October and up to the etection. However s/he understood that
the best material the Russians had already was out and there were no real game-changers
to come.

3. The Russian Foreign Ministry official, who had direct access to the TRUMP support
operation, reported that PUTIN was angry at his subordinate’s “over-promising’’ on the
Republican presidential candidate, both in terms of hts chances and reliability and being
able to cover anchor contain the US backlash over Kremlin interference. More heads
therefore were likely to roll, with the MFA the easiest target. Ironically, despite his consistent
urging of caution on the Issue, Foreign Minister LAVROV could be the next one to go.

4. Asked to explain why PUTIN and the Kremlin had launched such an aggressive TRUMP
support operation In the first place, the MFA official said that Russia needed to upset the
liberal International status quo, including on Ukraine-related sanctions, which was seriously

2 *

disadvantaging the country. TRUMP was viewed as divisive in disrupting the whole US
political system; anti-Establishment; and a pragmatist with whom they could do business. As
the TRUMP support operation had gained momentum, control of it had passed from the mha
to the FSB and then into the presidential administration where It remained, a reflection of its
growing significance over time. There was still a view In the Kremlin that TRUMP would
continue as a (divisive) political force even If he lost the presidency and may run for and be
elected to another public ollice.

12 October 2016




■ Close associate of SECHIN confirms his secret meeting in Moscow with Carter FACE in July

– Substance included offer of large stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. PACE
confirms this is TRUMP’s intention

– SECHIN continued to think. TRUMP could win presidency up to 17 October. Now looking to

reorientate his engagement with the US

■ Kremlin insider highlights importance of TRUMP’s lawyer, Michael COHEN in covert

relationship with Russia. COHEN’s wife is of Russian descent and her father a leading property
developer in Moscow


T Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid October 2016, a dose associate of Rosneft President
and PUTIN ally Igor” SECHIN elaborated on the reported secret meeting between the tatter
and Carter PAGE, of L T S Republican presidential candidate’s foreign policy team, in Moscow in
July 2016, The secret meeting had been confirmed to him/her by a senior member of SECHIN’s
staff, in addition to by the Rosneft President himself. It took place on either 7 or 8 July, the same
day or the one after Carter PAGE made a public speech to the Higher Economic School in

2. In terms of the substance of their discussion/ SECHIN’s assoriate said that the Rosneft
President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the
company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMPs associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent
(privatised) stake in Rosneft in return, PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were
TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted,

3. According to SECHIN’s dose associate, the Rosneft President had continued to believe that
TRUMP could win the US presidency right up to 17 October/ when he assessed this was no
longer possible, SECHIN was keen to re-adapt accordingly and put feelers out to other
business and political contacts in the US instead,

4. Speaking separately to the same compatriot in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider with direct
access to the leadership confirmed that a key role in the secret TRUMP campaign / Kremlin
relations hip was being played by the Republican candidat e’s personal lawyer Michael

Source Comment

5, SECHIN’s associate opined that although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had
dearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP’s intention to lift Russian sanctions if
elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate’s authority.

Company Comment

18 October 2016




– Kremlin insider outlines important role played by TRUMP’s lawyer
COHEN in secret liaison with Russian leadership

– COHEN engaged with Russians in trying to cover up scandal of
MANAFORT and exposure of PAGE and meets Kremlin officials secretly in
the EU in August in pursuit of this goal

These secret contacts continue but are now farmed out to trusted agents
in Kremlin-linked institutes so as to remain “plausibly deniable for
Russian regime

Further confirmation that sacking of IVANOV and appointments of VA1N0
and KIR1YENKO linked to need to cover up Kremlin’s TRUMP support


1. Speaking in confidence to a longstanding compatriot friend in mid-
October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of
Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s lawyer, Michael
COHEN, in the ongoing secret liaison relationship between the New York
tycoon’s campaign and the Russian leadership. COHEN’s role had grown
following the departure of Paul MANNAFORT as TRUMP’s campaign
manager in August 2016. Prior to that MANNAFORT had led for the
TRUMP side.

2. According to the Kremlin insider, COHEN now was heavily engaged in a
cover up and damage limitation operation in the attempt to prevent the
full details of TRUMP’s relationship with Russia being exposed. In
pursuit of this aim, COHEN had met secretly with several Russian
Presidential Administration (PA) Legal Department officials in an EU
country in August 2016. The immediate issues had been to contain
further scandals involving MANNAFORT’s commercial and political role
in Russia/Ukraine and to limit the damage arising from exposure of
former TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE’S secret meetings
with Russian leadership figures in Moscow the previous month. The

overall objective had been to “to sweep it all under the carpet and make
sure no connections could be fully established or proven”

3. Things had become even “hotter” since August on the TRUMP-Russia
track. According to the Kremlin insider, this had meant that direct contact
between the TRUMP team and Russia had been farmed out by the
Kremlin to trusted agents of influence working in pro-government policy
institutes like that of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. COHEN
however continued to lead for the TRUMP team.

4. Referring back to the (surprise) sacking of Sergei IVANOV as Head of PA
in August 2016, his replacement by Anton VAINO and the appointment o
former Russian premier Sergei KIRIYENKO to another senior position in
the PA, the Kremlin insider repeated that this had been directly
connected to the TRUMP support operation and the need to cover up now
that it was being exposed by the USG and in the western media.

Company Comment

The Kremlin insider was unsure of the identities of the PA officials with whom
COHEN met secretly in August, or the exact date/s and locations of the
meeting/s. There were significant internal security barriers being erected in the
PA as the TRUMP issue became more controversial and damaging. However s/he
continued to try to obtain these.

19 October 2016




– TRUMP’s representative COHEN accompanied to Prague in

August/September 2016 by 3 colleagues for secret discussions with
Kremlin representatives and associated operators/hackers

Agenda included how to process deniable cash payments to operatives;
contingency plans for covering up operations; and action in event of a
CLINTON election victory

Some further details of Russian representatives/operatives involved;
Romanian hackers employed; and use of Bulgaria as bolthole to “lie low”

– Anti-CLINTON hackers and other operatives paid by both TRUMP team
and Kremlin, but with ultimate loyalty to Head of PA, IVANOV and his


1. We reported previously (2016/135 and /136) on secret meeting/s held
in Prague, Czech Republic in August 2016 between then Republican
presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s representative, Michael COHEN
and his interlocutors from the Kremlin working under cover of Russian
‘NGO’ Rossotrudnichestvo.

CL/NTON/Democratic Party operations. COHEN had been accompanied
to Prague by 3 colleagues and the timing of the visit was either in the last
week of August or the first week of September. One of their main Russian
interlocutors was Oleg SOLODUKHIN operating under
Rossotrudnichestvo cover. According the agenda

comprised questions on how deniable cash payments were to be made to
hackers who had worked in Europe under Kremlin direction against the
CLINTON campaign and various contingencies for covering up these
operations and Moscow’s secret liaison with the TRUMP team more

provided further details of these meeting/s and associated anti-

3. aver rhe period MarcIvSepfember 2016

^cmpan^alled^^^^^^Mand its affiliates had been using botnets
and porn traffic to transmit viruses, plant bugs, steal data and conduct
“altering operatjons*^gamsUhe Democratic Party leadership. Entities
Linked to involved and hean^mother

hackjn^xpert, both recruited under duress by the FSB,^^H
■■■■Mwere significant players in this operation, In Prague,
COHEN agreed contingency plans for various scenarios to protect the
operation, but in particular what was to be done in the event that Hillary
CLINTON won the presidency. It was important in this event that ad cash
payments owed were made quickly and discreetly and that cyher and
other operators were stood down/a hie to go effectively to ground to
cover their traces. (We reported earlier that the involvement of political
Operatives Paul MAN A FORT and Carter PAGE in the secret TRUMP-
Kremlin liaison had been exposed in the media in the run-up to Prague
and that damage limitation of these also was discussed by COHEN with
the Kremlin representatives).

4. In terms of practical measures to be taken. It was agreed by the two sides
in Prague to stand down various “Romanian hackers” (presumably based
in their homeland or neighbouring eastern Europe) and that other
operatives should head fur a bolt-hole in Plovdiv, Bulgaria where they
should “lay low”. On payments, IVANOV’S associate said that the
operatives involved had been paid by both TRUMP’S team and the
Kremlin, though their orders and ultimate loyalty lay with IVANOV, as
Head of the PA and thus ultimately responsible for the operation, and his
designated successor/s after he was dismissed by president PUTIN in
connection with iheanti-CLINTON operation in mid August,

13 December 2016