NSA – Scope Of Treasure Map – Map Of Every Router & Device On The Global Internet – Original Document

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TOP SECRET – Harry S. Truman – “Communications Intelligence Activities” – Original Document

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Harry S. Truman Biography - Childhood, Life Achievements ...
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TOP SECRET – CIA Instructions For Negotiations With Castro – Original Document

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El intento de homicidio de Fidel Castro por la CIA | Don Jubi
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Revealed – List Of Past And Present Freemasons In Guernsey

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Provincial Grand Master & Jurat David Hodgetts said he felt a “list of members should not be published”

E. J. ABERCROMBY.
D J ADAMS.
M C AIRETON.
J C ALDER.
G E ALLARD.
A W ALLEN.
D V ALLEN.
J M ALFLATT.
D G ARCHER.
I H ASHTON.
A E ASLETT.
K V AUSTIN.
A P AYRES.

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Denmark Inter-Ministerial Working Group, Inquiry Into Secret CIA Flights in Denmark, Greenland & Faroe Islands – Original Document

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Top Secret – Nixon’s 1972 Top Secret Memo To Henry Kissinger

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CIA Report – “Soviet Controll Mechanism In Germany” – Original Document

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Exposed – Operation Moongoose Files – Original Document

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Kennedy and Cuba: Operation Mongoose | National Security Archive
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The Cuban Project, also known as Operation Mongoose, was an extensive campaign of terrorist attacks against civilians, and covert operations, carried out by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Cuba.[10] It was officially authorized on November 30, 1961 by American President Kennedy. The name Operation Mongoose had been agreed at a prior White House meeting on November 4, 1961. The operation was run out of JM/WAVE, a major secret United States covert operations and intelligence gathering station established a year earlier in Miami, Florida,[11][12] and led by United States Air Force General Edward Lansdale on the military side and William King Harvey at the CIA and went into effect after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion.

Operation Mongoose was a secret program against Cuba aimed at removing the Communists from power, which was a prime focus of the Kennedy administration.[4] A document from the United States Department of State confirms that the project aimed to “help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime,” including its leader Fidel Castro, and it aimed “for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962”. US policymakers also wanted to see “a new government with which the United States can live in peace”.[13] Operation Mongoose is distinct from Operation Northwoods, a Department of Defense plan to conduct real and/or simulated false flag attacks on US and Cuban civilians inside the US and in Cuba in order to discredit the Castro regime.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mongoose

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Revealed – The Mitrokhin Inquiry – Original Document

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Mitrokhin was photographed by a British intelligence officer at his first meeting with the Secret Intelligence Service in 1992. His appearance was intentionally shabby to deter border guards from opening his suitcase, which contained some of his top-secret archive. Right: Mitrokhin's handwritten copy of the KGB First Chief Directorate Lexicon.

For years KGB operative Vasili Mitrokhin risked his life hiding top-secret material from Russian secret service archives beneath his family dacha. When he was exfiltrated to the West he took with him what the FBI called ‘the most complete and extensive intelligence ever received from any source’.

Vasili Nikitich Mitrokhin (Russian: Васи́лий Ники́тич Митро́хин; March 3, 1922 – January 23, 2004) was a major and senior archivist for the Soviet Union‘s foreign intelligence service, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, who defected to the United Kingdom in 1992 after providing the British embassy in Riga with a vast collection of his notes purporting to be written copies of KGB files. These became known as the Mitrokhin Archive.[1] The intelligence files given by Mitrokhin to the MI6 exposed an unknown number of Soviet agents, including Melita Norwood.[1]

He was co-author with Christopher Andrew of The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, a massive account of Soviet intelligence operations based on copies of material from the archive. The second volume, The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, was published in 2005, soon after Mitrokhin’s death.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasili_Mitrokhin

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TOP SECRET – The Secret Contract Between EU And BioNTech/Pfizer – Original Document Unveiled

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Revealed – The Secret Contract Between EU And AstraZeneca – Original Document Revealed

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Grünes Licht für Corona-Impfstoff von Astra Zeneca - Europa -  derStandard.at › International
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U.S. Conspiracy Indictment Against GRU Agents – Original Document

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List Of Moon – Unification “Church” Leaders & Members In Korea & Africa Exposed – Original Document

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moonies-gun-getty-960x540

“Moonies In The Church”

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WEF List Of Global Leaders (“Führer”) Of Tomorrow – Germany Until 2002

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Bill Gates & Angela Merkel, both were together in 1992 as WEF’s Global Leader – “Globale Führer”

The older WEF “Leader (Führer)” Lists have been deleted from their info material, website etc pp.

Mathias DoepfnerChief Executive OfficerAxel Springer Verlag AGGermany
Ralph DommermuthChief Executive Officer1&1 AG & Co. KG&AGermany
Andrea FischerMember of the Federal Assembly of Germany  
Sebastian FreitagManaging DirectorFreitag, Gellert & Co.Germany
Thomas GanswindtPresident, ICN BoardSiemens AGGermany
Reinhard GoehnerMember of the German BundestagFederal Assembly of GermanyGermany
Jürgen R. GrossmannOwner and Chief Executive OfficerGeorgsmarienhütte Holding GmbHGermany
David KamenetzkyHead, Corporate CommunicationsThe Goldman Sachs Group Inc.Germany
Susanne KohoutManaging DirectorNovartis Consumer Health GmbHGermany
Franz-Josef KortümChairmanWebasto AGGermany
Wolfgang KubickiMember of the AssemblyState of Schleswig-HolsteinGermany
Barbara KuxExecutive DirectorFord Motor CompanyGermany
Christine LieberknechtMinister of Federal AffairsState of Thuringia (Land Thüringen)Germany
Ernst-Moritz LippManaging PartnerOdewald & Compagnie GmbHGermany
Stefan LippeChief Executive OfficerSwiss Re GermanyGermany
Sandra MaischbergerModeratorN-TVGermany
Jost A. MassenbergMember of the Executive BoardThyssen Krupp StahlGermany
Angela MerkelChairwoman, CDU, Germany  
Stefan QuandtMember of the Supervisory BoardBMW Bayerische Motoren Werke AGGermany
Tim RennerChairman and Chief Executive OfficerUniversal Entertainment GmbhGermany
Andreas RenschlerSenior Vice-PresidentDaimlerChrysler AGGermany
Wolfgang RiehleVice-President, Chief Financial Officer and Member of the Management BoardWacker Siltronic Gesellschaft für Halbleitermaterialien AGGermany
Christiane zu SalmChief Executive OfficerEuvia Media AGGermany
Stefan SchörghuberChief Executive OfficerSchorghuber Stiftung & Co Holding KGGermany
Ulrich SchumacherPresident and Chief Executive OfficerInfineon Technologies AGGermany
Britta SteilmannChief Executive OfficerSteilmann GroupGermany
Jost StollmannFounder and Chairmancreate.it Services AGGermany
Sabriye TenberkenFounder, Blindenzentrum Tibet, Germany  
Martin VarsavskyPresidentEINSTEINetGermany
Stefan VilsmeierChief Executive Officer and FounderBrainLAB AGGermany
Frank-Detlef WendePresidentPro-De Project Development GmbHGermany
Guido WesterwelleChairman, Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), Germany  
Wendelin WiedekingPresident and Chief Executive OfficerDr. Ing. H. C. F. Porsche AGGermany
Margrit WieduwiltManaging PartnerDWG Gesellschaft für Beratung und Beteiligung GmbH & Co. KGGermany
Lars WindhorstChairman of the BoardWindhorst AGGermany
Christian WulffChairmanCDU NiedersachsenGermany
Jochen ZeitzChairman of the Board of ManagementPuma AG Rudolf Dassler SportGermany

Revealed – House Republicans Investigation Report On Origins of COVID-19 In Wuhan Lab – August 2021 – Original Document

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WikiLeaks – US Spy Order In France – Original Document

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France rejects asylum request by Wikileaks founder Assange - World News
Julian Assange
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FBI’s Investigation Into Hillary Clinton’s Private Email Server – Original Document

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Former FBI Director Comey & Hillary Clinton
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Exclusive – Satellite Photos Show Cover Up Actions At The Wuhan Lab – Original Images

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Top Secret Internal KGB Document – “Adviser” – Survey Of The Topic False-Flag Recruitment – Original Document

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Er setzte einen DDR-Professor unter Druck: Zu seiner Zeit als KGB-Agent:  Putin wollte alles über tödliche Gifte wissen - FOCUS Online

Comrade Putin

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Internal KGB Document Exposed – Top Secret In Russian Language

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Putin and his former KGB Boss in Dresden, Lasar Matwejew
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Revealed – The CIA West Europe Report – Top Secret – Original Document

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The CIA Campus
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Leaked – Medical Cases From EMA About Children Who Suffer From Covid19Vaccine Treatment – Original Documents

Delivering life-saving vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic | UNICEF

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The EMA database of adverse drug reactions contains a number of entries that indicate that young children from the age of one were vaccinated. If everything had gone well, you would not find any entries there – but in addition to facial paralysis, uncontrolled twitching, fever and more, there have apparently been several deaths. Another shocking finding is that the vaccine can be passed on to the infant through breast milk, which can lead to serious side effects.

Our editorial team regularly evaluates the available databases for side effects for drugs. Be it the VigiBase of the WHO, the VAERS in the USA or the Yellow Card System in Great Britain. An informant pointed out the numerous cases in the EMA database relating to children from infancy.

Now it is getting very difficult to say that all of these cases have nothing to do with the vaccines. In addition, the question arises whether not every single one of these cases should be considered a crime, because no vaccine is even remotely approved for children. Incidentally, study data such as that of the child vaccination study from Great Britain are expressly not included in the EMA database.

TOP SECRET – Who Killed Olof Palme – The CIA Investigation Report – Original Document

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The Murder Of Olof Palme – Investigated By The CIA

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TOP SECRET – CIA Report About The Russian Chinese Relations Revealed – Original Document

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China's Xi Jinping visits 'best friend' Vladimir Putin | Vladimir Putin  News | Al Jazeera
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Global Futures Report der US-Luftwaffe -Alternative Futures Des Geopolitischen Wettbewerbs In Einer Welt Nach COVID-19 – Original Dokument

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Seitenzahl: 46 Seiten

Datum: Juni 2020

Ursprungsorganisation: US-Luftwaffe, Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC)

Executive Summary:

“Wir entwickeln vier übergreifende globale Szenarien, die Transformation, Zusammenbruch, Disziplin und kontinuierliche Wachstumsergebnisse beinhalten. Diese globalen Szenarien stellen nicht die unwahrscheinlichsten oder wahrscheinlichsten Ergebnisse dar. Vielmehr nutzt der Bericht aufkommende schwache Signale aus der Umwelt-Scan-Analyse (die heute wahrscheinlich unwahrscheinlich erscheinen) und verwebt sie in die mögliche Zukunft einer Post-COVID-Welt.

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TOP SECRET – U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Presentation On Chinese Tech Landscape – Original Document

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NSCAI Report: US Can Gain Leading Edge on AI With This Plan
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TOP-SECRET – Legal Expertise About The Exemption Clauses In The COVID19-Vaccines Contracts By De Bandt

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TOP SECRET – The Secret Contract Between EU And AstraZeneca – Original Document Revealed

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TOP SECRET – The Secret Contract Between EU And BioNTech/Pfizer – Original Document Unveiled

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U.S. Secretary of State – The Elements of the China Challenge – Top Secret Original Document

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Revealed – TOP SECRET – EU And UK Agreement For Exchanging And Protecting Classified Information

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Brexit certainty at last? An overview of the new EU-UK trading relationship  - Allen & Overy

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Exposed – Complaint/Arrest Warrant for Emma Coronel Aispuro, El Chapo’s Wife

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El Chapo's wife Emma Coronel Aispuro no-shows trial

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Exposed – Cyprus Papers – The People Who Bought A Cyprus Passport

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Mir Rahman Rahmani

Afghanistan 🇦🇫

 

Year of birth: 1962

Application approved: 07.03.2017

Info: A former general in the Afghan military, Rahmani was appointed speaker of the Wolesi Jirga, Afghanistan’s lower house of parliament, in May 2019. The announcement lead to MPs fighting in the debating chamber.

Senior Afghan officials are not allowed dual citizenship.

Related applicants: Rahmani sponsored the application of his wife and three daughters, who acquired Cypriot citizenship on 01.12.2017. They are also citizens of the Caribbean country of St Kitts & Nevis.

 

Gati Saadi Al-Jebouri

Bulgaria 🇧🇬

Гати ал-Джибури

Year of birth: 1969

Application approved: 03.07.2018

Info: Managing Director of Lukoil Mid East Ltd (2017-2019).

Lukoil Mid East Ltd is 100 percent owned by Russian oil giant, Lukoil. The company has been under US sanctions since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Related applicants: Jebouri’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

 

陈安林

Year of birth: 1964

Application approved: 03.07.2018

Estimated net worth $57.9m

Info: A member of the CPPCC National Committee of Huangpi District, Chen is also a director of a subsidiary of the state-owned enterprise, China Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Group (CECEP).

Related applicants: Chen’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship. The couple are not investors but obtained passports through their son, Yao Chen, who became a Cypriot citizen on July 27, 2017.

Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.

 

 

傅政军

Year of birth: 1978

Application approved: 08.11.2017

Info: Fu’s companies include WEEK8 HOLDINGS (HK) LIMITED and Tian Ge Interactive Holdings Limited, a social media platform.

He also holds political office as vice-chairman of the presidium of Zhejiang Province Zheshang Economic Development Center and formerly as Member of the 6th Jinhua Municipal Committee of the CPPCC (2011-2017).

Related applicants: Fu’s wife also acquired a Cypriot passport.

Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.

Lu Wenbin

China 🇨🇳

 

陆文斌

Year of birth: 1964

Application approved: 24.07.2019

Info: Lu is a local political representative as deputy to the 17th Chengdu People’s Congress. Cyprus’ new rules banning PEPs from the golden passport scheme were just weeks away from coming into force by the time his passport was approved.

Related applicants: Lu’s wife also acquired a Cypriot passport.

Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.

Yang Huiyan

China 🇨🇳

  

杨惠妍

Year of birth: 1981

Application approved: 23.10.2018

Estimated net worth: $27bn

Info: Billionaire businesswoman and the richest woman in Asia. Yang is the majority shareholder of property developer Country Garden Holdings, a stake largely transferred to her by her father, Yeung Kwok Keung, in 2007. He is also a member of The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPPCC), an advisory body to the government.

Related applicants: Yang’s husband, Chen Chong, also acquired a Cypriot passport. He is a member of the 12th Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.

Zhao Zhenpeng

China 🇨🇳

 

赵振鹏

Year of birth: 1981

Application approved: 12.02.2019

Info: Member of the Binzhou Municipal Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory body to the government.

Zhao is chairman and the legal representative of Wuyi Yongli Salt Industry Co., Ltd.

Related applicants: Zhao’s wife also acquired a Cypriot passport.

Second citizenships are not allowed under Chinese law and can result in the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship.

Apurv Bagri

India 🇮🇳

 

Year of birth: 1959

Application approved: 16.01.2018

Info: Appointed to the board of directors of the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA), a UAE government body, in 2004.

Bagri is currently the chairman of the DFSA’s Governance & Nominations Committee.

Related applicants: Spouse also acquired Cypriot citizenship on 12.02.2019.

Indian nationals are not allowed to hold dual citizenship.

Maleksabet Ebrahimi

Iran 🇮🇷

 

Year of birth: 1952

Application approved: 06.11.2018

Info: On an Interpol red-notice, along with his son, Mehdi. Wanted by Iran for misappropriation, breach of trust, money laundering, fraud, forgery and counterfeiting and leading an organised criminal group.

He faced trial in Canada in 2019 for money laundering of proceeds of sanctioned oil sales. Both men deny the charges and say they compiled with Iranian and Cypriot law.

Adilbek Sarsenov

Kazakhstan 🇰🇿

 

Адильбек САРСЕНОВ

Year of birth: 1973

Application approved: 07.05.2019

Info: On the board of directors of the state-owned telecoms company Kazakhtelecom (2010-2018).

Related applicants: His wife, Gulnara, also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Taha Mikati

Lebanon 🇱🇧

  

Year of birth: 1944

Application approved: 03.07.2018

Estimated net worth: $2.3bn

Info: Brother of Najib Mikati, prime minister of Lebanon (2011-2014).

Taha and Najib share a business empire which began selling satellite phones at the height of the Lebanese civil war.

Today they share ownership of the M1 group, which owns stakes in South African telecom firm MTN and real estate in New York, London and Monaco.

Related applicants: Three of Mikati’s family members also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Alexei Ananiev

Russia 🇷🇺

    

Алексей Ананьев

Year of birth: 1964

Application approved: 07.03.2017

Estimated net worth: $1.4bn

Info: Alexei Ananiev’s fortunes have changed since he was named in Forbes’ 2017 Billionaires List

He was placed on Russia’s international wanted list in September 2019, along with his brother Dmitry, who also acquired Cypriot citizenship in 2017. The Ananievs were charged with embezzlement and money laundering at Promsvyazbank, the bank they founded together.

Dmitry held political office as a senator between 2006 and 2013.

Both brothers have also been targeted by Ukrainian sanctions since March 2019.

Related applicants: Alexei’s son, Nikolay, and Dmitry also acquired Cypriot citizenship through the scheme.

Galina Antipina

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Галина Антипина

Year of birth: 1959

Application approved: 13.04.2018

Info: Held political office as a deputy for Villozsky Rural Settlement (2009-2014).

Related applicants: Her husband, Leonid Kvasniuk, head of LenRusStroy construction company, also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Ali Beglov

Russia 🇷🇺

  

Али Беглов

Also known as: Alik Tartarin, “Алик Татарин”

Year of birth: 1961

Application approved: 19.12.2018

Info: Former director-general of Lukoil-Bunker.

Served a two-year prison sentence for extortion (1990-1992).

In 2007, Beglov attended the funeral of notorious St Petersburg gangster, Artur Kzhizhevich.

Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Vitaly Buzoverya

Russia 🇷🇺

   

Виталий Бузоверя

Year of birth: 1974

Application approved: 22.05.2018

Info: Senior vice president of the state-owned Russian bank VTB, sanctioned by the United States and the EU following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Buzoverya is one of three senior executives from the bank who gained Cypriot passports on the same day and all invested in the Coral Seas property development.

Related applicants: Buzoverya’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Evgeniy Dod

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Евгений Дод

Year of birth: 1973

Application approved: 28.09.2016

Info: Executive-director of RusHydro (2009-2015), where he was a “Representative of the Russian Federation”.

Related applicants: His wife and child also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Vitaly Evdokimenko

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Виталий Евдокименко

Year of birth: 1962

Application approved: 19.03.2018

Info: CEO of Russian Federal Freight Company, a subsidiary of the state-owned Russian Railways (2010-2015).

Related applicants: His wife and two children also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Nikolay Gornovskiy

Russia 🇷🇺

Николай Горновский

Year of birth: 1958

Application approved: 10.06.2019

Info: Former Gazprom executive, wanted by Russia on abuse of power charges. Fled to the UK, from where Russia has repeatedly tried and failed to have him extradited.

Mikhail Yurevich

Russia 🇷🇺

   

Михаил Юрьевич

Year of birth: 1969

Application approved: 13.09.2016

Info: As a politician Yurevich held a seat in Russia’s State Duma before becoming the governor of the industrial Chelyabinsk Oblast region from 2010 to 2014.

In May 2017 he was put on Russia’s international wanted list, accused of accepting bribes from local ministers and businesses as well as slandering regional officials.

The Cyprus Papers reveal that Yurevich also sponsored his parents’ application for Cypriot citizenship in November 2017. They act as directors in his various companies.

Yurevich has also been subject to Ukrainian sanctions since May 2018.

Related applicants: His parents also acquired Cypriot citizenship on 01/12/2017

Timur Khayrutdinov

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Тимур Хайрутдинов

Year of birth: 1974

Application approved: 10.06.2019

Info: Trade representative of the Republic of Tatarstan in Dubai.

Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Vladimir Khristenko

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Владимир Христенко

Year of birth: 1981

Application approved: 25.05.2018

Info: President of biopharmaceutical company Nanolek, which is currently developing a vaccine for Covid-19.

His stepmother, Tatyana Golikova, is currently one of the deputy prime ministers of Russia and a former aide to Vladimir Putin.

Khristenko’s father Viktor Khristenko also held various government roles, including deputy prime minister, minister of finance and minister of energy and industry. Viktor also served on the board of directors of several state-owned companies.

Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Aleksei Kordichev

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Алексей Кордичев

Year of birth: 1978

Application approved: 23.10.2018

Info: As CEO of Siberia’s Vostochny Bank (2015-2017), Kordichev is one of six men accused of embezzling $37m from the bank’s shareholders.

He was arrested in Moscow on February 15, 2019 and as of May 2020, was still under house arrest.

Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Alexey Kulichenko

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Алексей Куличенко

Year of birth: 1974

Application approved: 25.05.2018

Info: A senior executive of Russia’s third-largest steel company, Severstal, sanctioned by Ukraine following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Alexander Lavlentsev

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Александр Лавленцев

Year of birth: 1957

Application approved: 08.02.2019

Info: Founder of construction firm ARKS.

Alexander’s son, Vladimir, was the deputy governor of St Petersburg between 2013 and 2014, and then the chief federal inspector of Moscow from 2015 to 2018.

Related applicants: His wife and daughter also acquired Cypriot passports.

Sergei Lomakin

Russia 🇷🇺

Сергей Ломакин

Year of birth: 1973

Application approved: 31.03.2018

Info: Founder and owner of FixPrice dollar stores and owner of Cypriot football club Pafos FC and current Latvian champions, Riga FC. Reportedly showed an interest in buying a stake in Arsenal.

Put on Russia’s Federal Wanted List in September 2016 and was subsequently charged with embezzlement of a loan of $123m.

Andrey Mityukov

Russia 🇷🇺

Андрей Митюков

Year of birth: 1967

Application approved: 25.05.2018

Info: Mityukov is on the board of directors at Russian steel company, Severstal, which has been sanctioned by Ukraine since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Andrey Molchanov

Russia 🇷🇺

  

Андрей Молчанов

Year of birth: 1971

Application approved: 04.10.2017

Estimated net worth: $850m

Info: Represented the Leningrad Region in Russia’s upper chamber of parliament (2008-2013).

In January 2018, Molchanov made the United States Treasury’s “Oligarchs List” of persons who are close to Vladimir Putin.

His father, Yuri Molchanov, was the KGB resident at Leningrad State University, where Vladimir Putin worked as his assistant in 1990. They later became business partners.

Related applicants: Andrey’s son and mother also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Vadim Moshkovich

Russia 🇷🇺

  

Вадим Мошкович

Year of birth: 1967

Application approved: 15.02.2017

Estimated net worth: $1.7bn

Info: Member of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russia’s parliament, until October 2015.

Currently chairman of farming conglomerate Rusagro and reportedly Russia’s 57th richest person.

In 2018, Moshkovich made the United States Treasury’s “Oligarchs List” of persons who are close to Vladimir Putin.

Related applicants: His son, Evgeni, also acquired a Cypriot passport.

Damir Muginov

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Дамир Мугинов

Year of birth: 1966

Application approved: 27.12.2018

Info: In the same month that he received his Cypriot passport, Muginov became the focus of a criminal prosecution for land fraud.

A year later in July 2019, a district judge dropped the case against him without explanation.

Yury Obodovsky

Russia 🇷🇺

Юрий Ободовский

Year of birth: 1970

Application approved: 07.05.2019

Info: Obodovsky is reportedly close to the former president of Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, who is himself a long-time associate of Vladimir Putin.

Added to a Russian wanted list in October 2018 accused of paying bribes to cover up corrupt business contracts with state companies including Russian Railways.

Reportedly hiding out in “one of the most luxurious resorts in the United States”.

Under investigation when he acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Andrey Oskolkov

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Андрей Осколков

Year of birth: 1964

Application approved: 23.10.2018

Info: Deputy of the state council for Russia’s Udmurt Republic (1999-2017).

Co-owner of the agro-industrial holdings company, Komos Group. In 2017 he was ranked 33rd in a Forbes list of Russia’s wealthy and powerful civil servants.

Related applicants: His wi

Maxim Poletaev

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Максим Полетаев

Year of birth: 1971

Application approved: 26.04.2017

Info: Deputy chairman of Sberbank until 2018. The Russian bank has been the target of US sanctions since September 2014.

Poletaev left Sberbank for RUSAL, an aluminium company owned by billionaire Oleg Deripaska.

Related applicants: Poletaev also sponsored his mother’s and and son’s application for Cypriot passports.

Andrey Puchkov

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Андрей Пучков

Year of birth: 1969

Application approved: 23.07.2018

Info: Former co-owner of real estate development company Urban Group.

A year after he received Cypriot citizenship, Puchkov fled Russia and was charged in absentia with abuse of power and defrauding investors in a failed building project.

Related applicants: Puchkov also bought Cypriot citizenship for his wife.

Igor Reva

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Игорь Рева

Year of birth: 1972

Application approved: 03.07.2018

Info: Russia’s deputy minister of economic development (2014-2017).

Related applicants: Reva’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Rishat Safin

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Ришат Сафин

Year of birth: 1963

Application approved: 27.09.2017

Info: Formerly held directorships at various oil companies including a subsidiary of Russian giant, Lukoil. He then shortly pursued a career as a pop musician.

His brother, Ralif Safin, was senator for the Siberian republic of Altai (2002-2014). He is reported to be one of Russia’s 200 richest businesspeople, with an estimated net worth of $500m.

Related applicants: Rishat’s wife and two children also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Alexey Soldatov

Russia 🇷🇺

 

Алексей Солдатов

Year of birth: 1951

Application approved: 07.05.2019

Info: Known as “Russia’s Steve Jobs”, Soldatov founded internet service provider Relcom in 1992 and was deputy minister of communications and mass media between (2008-2010).

In December 2019 Soldatov was placed under house arrest and charged with fraud on an especially large scale.

Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Oleg Tinkov

Russia 🇷🇺

  

Олег Тиньков

Year of birth: 1967

Application approved: 24.04.2018

Estimated net worth: $2.6bn

Info: Founder of Tinkoff Bank, one of the world’s largest online banks, with around 8 million customers in Russia.

In March 2020 Tinkoff was indicted by a US court for filing false tax returns. He is alleged to have concealed $1bn of assets and income.

He was arrested in London and reportedly released on a bail of £20m (approximately $26.4m).

Tinkov is currently in the UK, receiving treatment for Leukaemia. An extradition hearing has been rescheduled for September 2020.

According to Forbes his wealth has increased by 63% during the Covid-19 pandemic from an estimated at $1.6bn to $2.6bn.

Related applicants: Tinkov sponsored the application of his son, who acquired Cypriot citizenship on 23.10.2018.

Victoria Vanurina

Russia 🇷🇺

   

Виктория Ванурина

Year of birth: 1972

Application approved: 22.05.2018

Info: Member of the management board at VTB Bank. The state-owned bank has been targeted by US sanctions since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Vanurina is one of three senior executives from the bank who were all approved for Cypriot passports on the same day. They all invested in the Coral Seas property development.

Related applicants: Her husband also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Alexei Yakovitsky

Russia 🇷🇺

   

Алексей Яковицкий

Year of birth: 1975

Application approved: 22.05.2018

Info: CEO of VTB Capital PLC. The state-owned bank has been targeted by US sanctions since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Yakovitsky is one of three senior executives from the bank who were all approved for Cypriot passports on the same day and all invested in the Coral Seas property development.

Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Andrey Zhupanov

Russia 🇷🇺

  

Андрей Жупанов

Year of birth: 1971

Application approved: 19.12.2018

Info: Former deputy chairman of Promsvyazbank. Member of the board of directors of Vozrozhdenie Bank.

Two weeks after his Cypriot citizenship was confirmed, Promsvyazbank filed a lawsuit against Zhupanov and nine other former managers of the bank, along with the bank’s former owners, Dmitry and Alexei Ananiev, to recuperate $3.8bn.

The action against Zhupanov personally amounts to $562m.

Related applicants: Zhupanov’s wife, Maria Ochirova, acquired Cypriot citizenship. Her father was chief consultant to the minister of internal affairs and her mother sits on the public council of the FSB, Russia’s secret service.

Mohammed A. H. Jameel

Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦

 

Year of birth: 1958

Application approved: 07.05.2018

Estimated net worth: $5bn

Info: Board member of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, a government body.

Jameel was awarded an honorary knighthood by Queen Elizabeth in 2014.

Dual citizenship is only allowed under Saudi law with official government approval.

Khalid Ahmed Al Juffali

Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦

  

Year of birth: 1958

Application approved: 18.09.2018

Info: Member of the board of directors, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Chairman of E. A. Juffali and Brothers, the largest privately-owned enterprise in Saudi Arabia.

Chairman of “KJC”, a privately held investment company which mainly operates in New York City.

Related applicants: Three of Juffali’s children also acquired Cypriot passports.

Dual citizenship is only allowed under Saudi law with official government approval.

Hussain Alnowais

United Arab Emirates 🇦🇪

 

Year of birth: 1956

Application approved: 07.05.2019

Info: Senior executive of several state-owned enterprises. On the board of directors of state-owned Emirates Steel and National Petroleum Construction Company “NPCC”.

Highly influential with close links to Abu Dhabi’s ruling family, he has negotiated trade agreements on behalf of the UAE government.

Dual citizenship is not recognised in the laws of the UAE and obtaining a second citizenship is grounds for the involuntary loss of UAE citizenship.

Oleg Bakhmatyuk

Ukraine 🇺🇦

  

Олег Бахматюк

Year of birth: 1974

Application approved: 25.05.2018

Estimated net wort: $1bn (2011)

Info: Former owner of VAB Bank and CEO of Ukrlandfarming Plc, Ukraine’s largest agricultural company.

Placed on a wanted list on November 22, 2019, for embezzlement of around $43m from the National Bank of Ukraine. Bakhmatyuk denies all the charges and says that the criminal case against him is “a complete fabrication and politically motivated”.

Bakhmatyuk was arrested in absentia in May 2020.

A month later the General Prosecutor’s Office was ordered to close the criminal case against him. That decision has since been overturned and the case reopened.

He remains on the wanted list.

Related applicants: Oleg’s sister, Natalia Vasilyuk, who holds senior positions in his companies, also acquired Cypriot citizenship on the same day.

Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship

Liudmila Lebedeva

Ukraine 🇺🇦

 

Людмила Лебедєва

Year of birth: 1965

Application approved: 31.01.2018

Info: Wife of Ukraine’s former defence minister, Pavlo Lebedev.

Pavlo is now a defendant in several criminal cases in Ukraine and lives in Russia-occupied Crimea. He is accused of using security forces to suppress the 2014 Euromaidan protests as well as stealing billions of dollars of military property and equipment between 2004 and 2014.

Related applicants: Their daughter also acquired Cypriot citizenship. Both she and Liudmila are joint owners of companies in Crimea.

Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.

Vadim Shulman

Ukraine 🇺🇦

  

Вадим Шульман

Year of birth: 1960

Application approved: 11.07.2019

Info: Oligarch who made his money in chemicals and telecoms. Shulman has headed Ukraine’s tennis federation and even paid for an auditorium named after him at Oxford University.

In July 2019 he was placed on a wanted list for money laundering, just two weeks after his Cypriot passport was approved. The Paradise Papers also reveal Shulman’s network of offshore companies.

Shulman also holds Russian and Israeli citizenship.

Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.

Natalia Vasylyuk

Ukraine 🇺🇦

 

Наталія Василюк

Year of birth: 1983

Application approved: 25.05.2018

Info: CEO and on the board of directors of Avangard Agrico, Europe’s largest producer of chicken eggs.

The company was founded by her brother, Oleg Bakhmatyuk, who also appears in the Cyprus Papers. As former head of the supervisory board of VAB Bank, she was placed on a wanted list on November 22, 2019 for assisting her brother with embezzlement and money laundering amounting to around $43m.

She acquired Cypriot citizenship on the same day as Bakhmatyuk.

Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.

Anatoly Yakovynets

Ukraine 🇺🇦

Анатолій Яковинець

Year of birth: 1966

Application approved: 07.03.2017

Info: First deputy chief of Ukraine’s tax police (2011-2014).

Head of financial investigations, Ministry of Revenue and Duties (2013).

Related applicants: Yakovynet’s daughter also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.

Mykola Zlochevsky

Ukraine 🇺🇦

    

Микола Злочевський

Year of birth: 1966

Application approved:: 01.12.2017

Estimated net Worth: $535m (2017)

Info: Minister for Natural Resources (2010-2012).
Member of the Security and Defence Council (2012-2014).

He has also been on a Russian sanctions list since November 2018

Owns Ukrainian gas and oil producers through his Cyprus registered company Burisma Holdings.

Zlochevsky has been investigated since 2012 for money laundering, tax evasion and since 2018 for theft of government funds.

In June 2020 Ukraine’s anti-corruption squad seized $6m of cash, which they claim was intended to bribe officials to close their investigation into Burisma.

Related applicants: Mykola’s daughters, Anna and Karina, also acquired Cypriot passports.

Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.

Volodymyr Zubyk

Ukraine 🇺🇦

  

Володимир Зубик

Year of birth: 1958

Application approved: 09.10.2018

Estimated net Worth: $95m (Forbes, 2020)

Info: Member of Ukraine’s national assembly the Verkhovna Rada (2006-2019), meaning he was an elected official at the time he acquired his Cypriot citizenship.

Related applicants: Zubyk’s wife and daughter also acquired Cypriot passports.

Under Ukrainian law it is illegal to hold a second citizenship.

Leonardo González Dellán

Venezuela 🇻🇪

 

Year of birth: 1966

Application approved: 04.01.2019

Info: A former president of Banco Industrial de Venezuela, Dellan was sanctioned by the United States on January 8, 2019, four days after his golden passport was approved.

He is described as a “testaferro”, a front person for the Venezuelan state, accused of helping launder $2.4bn.

Phạm Phú Quốc

Vietnam 🇻🇳

 

Year of birth: 1969

Application approved: 12.12.2018

Info: Pham is chair of the board of one of Vietnam’s biggest trade companies, IPC.

He is also a member of Congress for Ho Chi Minh city.

Related applicants: Pham’s wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

Vietnamese politicians are banned from holding dual citizenship.

Phạm Nhật Vũ

Vietnam 🇻🇳

   

Year of birth: 1973

Application approved: 06.05.2019

Info: Brother of “Vietnam’s first billionaire”, Pham Nhat Vu was charged and facing trial for bribery when his Cypriot passport was approved in May 2019. He was subsequently convicted and is currently serving a three year jail sentence in Vietnam.

Related applicants: His wife also acquired Cypriot citizenship.

TO BE CONTINUED

Continue reading “Exposed – Cyprus Papers – The People Who Bought A Cyprus Passport”

Revealed – Los Alamos National Laboratory Backdoors, Los Alamos, NM, US

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35°52’10.54″ N 106°20’49.93″ W

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35°47’00.14″ N 106°15’24.49″ W[Image]

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Continue reading “Revealed – Los Alamos National Laboratory Backdoors, Los Alamos, NM, US”

Revealed – US White House Backdoors, Washington, DC, US

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38°53’43.84″ N 77°02’05.37″ W[Image]

38°53’49.40″ N 77°02’01.72″ W (Reportedly Through Treasury Department Building)

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38°54’00.34″ N 77°02’04.09″ W (Reportedly Underground Through H Street NW Building)[Image]
38°53’57.92″ N 77°02’22.08″ W (Reportedly Underground Through H Street NW Building)[Image]
38°53’54.58″ N 77°02’20.63″ W (Through Eisenhower Executive Office Building)[Image]
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38°53’46.72″ N 77°02’17.99″ W[Image]
38°53’43.04″ N 77°02’17.98″ W[Image]

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Continue reading “Revealed – US White House Backdoors, Washington, DC, US”

Revealed – US Congress Backdoors, Washington, DC, US

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38°53’23.52″ N 77°00’25.48″ W[Image]
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38°53’18.06″ N 77°00’43.86″ W[Image]

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Revealed – US Supreme Court Backdoors, Washington, DC, US

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38°53’24.55″ N 77°00’13.02″ W[Image]
38°53’24.65″ N 77°00’14.99″ W[Image]
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38°53’26.36″ N 77°00’13.33″ W[Image]

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Revealed – Bangor Trident Submarine Base Bckdoors, Kitsap, WA, US

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47°42’04.63″ N 122°41’41.56″ W[Image]
47°42’41.12″ N 122°41’32.80″ W[Image]
47°44’15.70″ N 122°41’35.38″ W[Image]
47°42’43.85″ N 122°44’32.65″ W[Image]
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Revealed – Kings Bay Submarine Base Backdoors, Kings Bay, Georgia, US

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30°46’10.82″ N 81°32’48.87″ W[Image]
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30°49’14.82″ N 81°34’05.19″ W[Image]
30°45’26.77″ N 81°30’55.54″ W[Image]

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Revealed – Russian GRU Backdoors, Moscow, Russia

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55°46’51.53″ N 37°31’29.86″ E

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Revealed – Lubyanka FSB Backdoor, Moscow, Russia

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55°45’38.41″ N 37°37’42.09″ E

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Revealed – NSA Backdoors, Savage, MD

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39°05’37.42″ N 76°45’36.40″ W

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Revealed – People’s Republic of China Ministry of State Security (MSS) Entrance, Beijing, PRC

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39°59’20.99″ N 116°17’17.02″ E (Beyond Ramp)

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Revealed – Directorate-General for External Security Backdoors (DGES), Paris, FR

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48°52’23.86″ N 2°24’29.44″ E[Image]

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Revealed – FBI Headquarters Backdoors, Washington, DC, US

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38°53’41.01″ N 77°01’29.50″ W[Image]

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Revealed – MI5 Security Service Backdoors, London, UK

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51°29’38.35″ N 0°07’33.51″ W[Image]
51°29’37.77″ N 0°07’33.59″ W[Image]
51°29’37.25″ N 0°07’30.02″ W[Image]
51°29’40.74″ N 0°07’34.02″ W

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Revealed – GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters Backdoors, Cheltenham, UK

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51°53’50.73″ N 2°07’30.38″ W[Image]
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51°54’03.00″ N 2°07’20.93″ W

 

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Revealed – Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) And Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) Backdoors, Ottowa, CA

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45°26’03.54″ N 75°36’48.79″ W[Image]
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45°26’01.40″ N 75°37’03.66″ W[Image]
45°26’20.07″ N 75°37’00.45″ W[Image]

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TOP SECRET – GRU Close Access Cyber Operation Against OPCW

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The following presentation was released by the U.S. Department of Justice in relation to their indictment of seven Russian GRU officers on charges related to “International Hacking and Related Influence and Disinformation Operations.”

Page Count: 35 pages
Date: October 4, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Dutch Ministry of Defence
File Type: pdf
File Size: 9,485,284 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): D9055D137D16AF0D58F4F2EB5B9A9094CDAAF18013F13989BE5B3341FCCE099B
 

Continue reading “TOP SECRET – GRU Close Access Cyber Operation Against OPCW”

Unvealed – Records Related to Former NSA Director Keith Alexander’s Attendance of Bilderberg Meetings in 2008, 2009, 2011

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The following set of documents was obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request made to the National Security Agency for “records relating to NSA Director Gen. Keith B. Alexander’s attendance of the Bilderberg Meetings held in 2008 in Chantilly Virginia; in 2009 in Vouliagmeni, Greece; and in 2011 in St. Moritz, Switzerland.” The request took the NSA 5 years and 13 days to fulfill.

 

Continue reading “Unvealed – Records Related to Former NSA Director Keith Alexander’s Attendance of Bilderberg Meetings in 2008, 2009, 2011”

TOP SECRET – U.S. Northern Command Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan

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1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Purpose. This branch plan provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the support of the Board of Governors of the federal Reserve System to ensure the effective execution of a National Essential Function (NEF).

c. (U) Friendly Forces

(1) (U) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve System (FRS) is the central bank of the United States. The primary responsibility of the Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors is to formulate and administer the Nation’s monetary policy. The Board of Governors operates as a USG Agency.

(b) (U) Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems. Oversees the operations of the independent Federal Reserve Banks and of the FRS Law Enforcement program.

(c) (U) Office of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity. The Director of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity is the supported entity for the transportation of monetary instruments within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(c) (U) Commercial passenger flights are restricted during certain national emergencies.

Download full doc here:

https://info.publicintelligence.net/USNORTHCOM-FederalReserveSupportPlan.pdf

Revealed – Top Secret – U.S. Northern Command Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan

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The following heavily redacted version of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan from U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) CONPLAN 3500-14 was obtained via a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Tab H to Appendix 1 to Annex C to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500 – 14: Federal Reserve System (FRS) Support Branch Plan

Page Count: 17 pages
Date: July 17, 2014
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: U.S. Northern Command
File Type: pdf
File Size: 851,968 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): C2F49B4A19798466175590F47D0A8953E431D4DDA0F773B1FDE40AB88EDA3E6D

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1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Purpose. This branch plan provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the support of the Board of Governors of the federal Reserve System to ensure the effective execution of a National Essential Function (NEF).

c. (U) Friendly Forces

(1) (U) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve System (FRS) is the central bank of the United States. The primary responsibility of the Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors is to formulate and administer the Nation’s monetary policy. The Board of Governors operates as a USG Agency.

(b) (U) Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems. Oversees the operations of the independent Federal Reserve Banks and of the FRS Law Enforcement program.

(c) (U) Office of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity. The Director of National Cash Operations and Business Continuity is the supported entity for the transportation of monetary instruments within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(c) (U) Commercial passenger flights are restricted during certain national emergencies.

 

UK Yellowhammer No-Deal Brexit – Worst Case Scenario Revealed

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When the UK ceases to be a member of the EU in October 2019 all rights and reciprocal arrangements with the EU end.

The UK reverts fully to ‘third country’ status. The relationship between the UK and the EU as a whole is unsympathetic, with many MS (under pressure from the Commission) unwilling to engage bilaterally and implementing protections unilaterally, though some MS may be more understanding.

No bilateral deals have been concluded with individual member states with the exception of the reciprocal agreement on social security coordination with Ireland. EU Citizens living in the UK can retain broadly all rights and status that they were entitled to prior to exit from the EU, at the point of exit.

Public and business readiness for a no-deal will remain at a low level, and will decrease to lower levels, because the absence of a clear decision on the form of EU Exit (customs union, no deal etc) does not provide a concrete situation for third parties to prepare for. Readiness will be further limited by increasing EU Exit fatigue, due to the second extension of Article 50, which will limit the effective impact of current preparedness communication. [To be reviewed]

Business readiness will not be uniform – in general larger businesses across sectors are more likely to have better developed contingency plans than small and medium sized businesses. Business readiness will be compounded by seasonal effects, impacting on factors such as warehouse availability.

Concurrent risks associated with autumn and winter such as severe weather, flooding and seasonal flu could exacerbate a number of impacts and stretch resources of partners and responders.

Private sector companies’ behaviour will be governed by commercial considerations, unless influenced otherwise.

HMG will act lawfully and in accordance with the rule of law, including by identifying the powers it is using to take specific actions.

Key planning assumptions

1. For the purpose of freight flow and traffic· management as 31 October is a Thursday, day 1 of exit is now on a Friday rather than the weekend which is not to our advantage. Exit day may coincide with end of October half term school holidays, which vary across the UK. (CCS/DExEU)

2. In a small number of instances where the impacts of Brexit would be felt negatively in the EU as well as in the UK, Member States may act in way which could also benefit the UK (e.g. energy for Ireland). (CCS/DExEU)

3. France will impose EU mandatory controls on UK goods on Day 1 No Deal (D1 ND) and have built infrastructure and IT system to manage and process customs declarations and support a risk based control regime. On D1 ND, between 50-85% of HGVs travelling via the short Channel Straits may not be ready for French customs. The lack of trader readiness combined with 1.imited space in French ports to hold “unready” HGVs could reduce the flow rate to 40-60% of current levels within one day as unready HGVs will fill the ports and block flow. The worst disruption to the short Channel Straits might last for up to 3 months before it improves by a significant level to around 50-70% (due to more traders getting prepared), although there could continue to be some disruption for significantly longer. In the event of serious disruption, the French might act to ensure some flow through the short Channel crossings. Disruption to flow across the short Channel Straits would also cause significant queues in Kent and delays to HGVs attempting to use the routes to travel to France. In a reasonable worst case scenario, HGVs ·could face maximum delays of 1.5-2.5 days before being able to cross the border. HGVs that are caught up in congestion in the UK will be unable to return to the EU to collect another load and a proportion of logistics firms may decide to avoid the route should there be significant and prolonged disruption. Analysis to date has suggested a low risk of significant sustained queues at ports outside of Kent which have high volumes of EU traffic, but BDG will continue to work directly with stakeholders at those ports to support planning readiness (BDG/DfT)

4. UK citizens travelling to and from the EU may be subject to increased immigration checks at EU border posts. This may lead to passenger delays at St Pancras, Cheriton (Channel Tunnel) and Dover where juxtaposed controls are in place. Dependent on the plans EU Member States put in place to cope with these in.creased immigration checks it is likely that delays will occur for UK arrivals and departures at EU airports and ports. This could cause some disruption on transport services. TraveUers may decide to use alternative routes to complete their journey. (BDG/FCO/HO/DfT)

5. Demand for energy will be met and there will be no disruption to electricity or gas interconnectors. In NI there will be not be immediate disruption to electricity supply on Day 1. A rapid SEM split could occur months or years after E~ Exit. In this event, there would not be security of supply issues. However, there will likely be significant electricity price increases for consumers (business and domestic), with associated wider economic and political impacts. Some participants could exit the market, thereby exacerbating the economic and political impacts. (BEIS)

TOP SECRET – Restricted U.S. Army Space Operations Manual

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FM 3-14 Army Space Operations

Page Count: 126 pages
Date: August 2014
Restriction: Distribution Restricted
Originating Organization: Department of the Army
File Type: pdf
File Size: 3,273,115 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):974DC6FBBC72F7E6F39378AFC790CDEF36F74E7D26ABD07BCC42793CDDFCE037

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FM 3-14, Army Space Operations, provides an overview of space operations in the Army and is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-14 links Army space operations doctrine to joint space operations doctrine as expressed in JP 3-14, Space Operations and other joint doctrinal publications. This FM establishes guidance for employing space and space-based systems and capabilities to support United States (U.S.) Army land warfighting dominance. It provides a general overview of overhead support to Army operations, reviews national guidance and direction, and outlines selected unique space-related Army capabilities. The doctrine in this manual documents Army thought for the best use of space capabilities. This manual also contains tactics and procedures outlining how to plan, integrate, and execute Army space operations.

Space is a warfighting domain with different characteristics from air, land, sea, and cyberspace domains. Space is identified as one of the Global Commons as defined in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Army space operations enable Army and joint warfighting, and use of space capabilities is an inherently joint venture. The need for the Army to accomplish space operations is firmly established in national and Service level policies. Moreover, this FM is rooted in Army operations and consistent with Joint doctrine. Space capabilities and the space domain provide a global perspective as satellites allow routine access to denied areas of the Earth.

The space environment is harsh and the distances involved are vast, but it offers unique advantages that make it worthwhile to overcome the adversities of the operational environment. To that end, the space environment continues to become more congested, contested, and competitive. The uses of space are many, applications vary, and space-enabled capabilities are constantly evolving. It is important that Soldiers continue to look to the future with responsiveness, adaptability, and flexibility toward how space enables the Army’s warfighting functions in the conduct of unified land operations.

Army space operations includes all aspects of the employment of specialized Army space forces but also the spectrum of activities associated to the planning, preparation, integration and execution support required to ensure synchronized and effective space-based capabilities from all sources are available to support dominant land operations as part of Unified Action. Army space operations are heavily influenced by understanding the constraints, limitations, and operational needs of the land component users with regard to those space-based capabilities.

The Army depends on space capabilities to enable and enhance unified land operations. Virtually every Army operation relies on space capabilities to some degree to enhance the effectiveness of combat forces. Space capabilities enable the Army to communicate, navigate, target the enemy, and protect forces.

The principles that successfully guide unified land operations are applicable to the space domain. The Army uses space-based capabilities to support its dominance in unified land operations. Space operations are critical to the range of military operations as many space capabilities are embedded in Army operations. The space mission areas form the framework for how space supports the Army warfighting functions, and operations conducted through decisive operations.

1-4. This FM is rooted in basic Army and joint doctrine that is characteristically progressive and evolving. Space is a warfighting domain with different characteristics from land, sea, air, and cyberspace domains. The Army depends on space operations to effectively execute unified land operations. Every Army warfighting function relies on space contributions to some degree to enhance the effectiveness of our combat forces. Space capabilities enable the Army to communicate, navigate, accurately target the enemy, protect, and sustain our forces.

1-5. The U.S. Army is one the largest consumers of space-based capabilities within Department of Defense (DOD). The Army depends on Army space forces (personnel, organizations, space and terrestrial systems, equipment, and facilities), to ensure full access to all current and future space capability in order to fight and survive on today’s area of operations. The Army must leverage the capabilities of space assets. Consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, the Army must deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems, and contribute to the defense of multinational space systems. If deterrence fails, the Army must defeat efforts to attack its space assets. This must be done while operating in a global information environment against any threats. Consequently, the Army space capabilities must provide continuous, secure, global communications, space situational awareness, space control, and space force enhancement to Army and joint warfighters from strategic to tactical levels.

DOD SPACE POLICY

1-16. Department of Defense directive (DODD) 3100.10, Space Policy implements the National Space Policy and assigns responsibilities for space and space-related activities. This directive states the primary DOD goal is to provide operational space force capabilities to ensure the U.S. has the space power to achieve its national security objectives in accordance with the U.S. National Security Strategy. Additionally the U.S. National Military Strategy recognizes space as one of the global commons and notes that our ability to project power from the global commons may be at risk. The space domain is critical for Army operations, yet becoming increasingly more vulnerable to malicious actions that create a D3SOE. The space environment is continuously becoming more congested, contested, and competitive. Space capabilities and applications will be integrated into the strategy, doctrine, concepts of operations, education, exercises, and operations and contingency plans of U.S. military forces. DOD operational space force structure will be sufficiently robust, ready, secure, survivable, resilient, and interoperable.

OPERATING IN SPACE

1-33. Space is the ultimate high ground and gives land forces the advantage of a global, persistent perspective of the strategic, operational, and tactical situation. Space systems consist of satellites on orbit, ground stations, launch bases, and the communications links and capabilities. Space hosts communications transponders, observation posts for surveillance and reconnaissance, transmitters broadcasting location and exact time information, sensors for weather and other environmental data, and sensors that can warn of enemy actions.

1-34. Space is a domain like land, sea, air, and cyberspace within which military activities are conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives. Space begins above the atmosphere of the Earth and extends infinitely outward. The U.S. does not formally recognize a lower limit to space. However, space is considered to be the region around the Earth with little atmosphere, where satellites are placed in orbit. Space operations are those enabling operations that create or present opportunities to employ space capabilities to enhance the warfighting potential of the U.S. military and multinational partners. Space operations are generally supported by satellites in orbits around the Earth. Space is interrelated with the other domains and properly integrating these complex functions with the other military activities is critical for successful operations.

1-35. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, officially known as Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies dictates satellites in orbit must be allowed free passage over countries. Nations cannot claim the space directly above them as their own, as they do with airspace. This allows the U.S., other countries, and commercial entities to orbit satellites that freely traverse or occupy positions while in space over other countries.

1-36. Space-based resources provide freedom of action, global reach, responsiveness, insights in an anti-access, area of denial arena, and are not constrained by geographic borders of otherwise geographically denied regions. Satellites are well suited for reconnaissance and surveillance, imagery, mapping, and intelligence operations because of the access they provide. However, operations in the space environment are bound by other constraints such as the laws of physics, international law, and policies that have a unique set of vulnerabilities.

DIRECTOR OF SPACE FORCES

2-14. A director of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR) is assigned to the commander, Air Force forces staff and serves as the senior space advisor to integrate space capabilities and effects. If the commander, Air Force forces or joint force air component commander is delegated SCA, the DIRSPACEFOR will normally execute SCA responsibilities on behalf of the commander, Air Force forces or joint force air component commander. While each combatant commander may have a DIRSPACEFOR, United States Central Command is the only combatant commander with a standing DIRSPACEFOR with a formal agreement to utilize an Army functional area 40 (FA40) space professional as the Deputy DIRSPACEFOR. When an Army FA40 is serving as the United States Central Command Deputy DIRSPACEFOR, the individual is assigned to USASMDC/ARSTRAT with duty at Air Force Central Command.

2-15. The DIRSPACEFOR is responsible for:

  • Integration of space force enhancement, space control operations, and planning in joint operations on behalf of the combined force air component commander when acting as SCA;
  • Oversee day-to-day functions of the DIRSPACEFOR staff and accomplish assigned duties of SCA;
  • Provide the combined force air component commander and key staff counsel and training in space operations;
  • Assist with planning and executing theater space operations and applying space capabilities throughout the joint targeting cycle;
  • Assist in coordinating tailored space support for operations throughout the area of responsibility;
  • Work directly for the combined force air component commander as special staff providing advice on space capabilities and employment;
  • Ensure continuity of operations, focus, operational stability, and unity of command with multiple rotations of joint space personnel across the area of responsibility;
  • Conduct deliberate planning for contingency operations and exercises, and validate process;
  • Provide reachback support for all forward deployed space forces from all Services in area of responsibility;
  • Interact with multiservice space professionals within the combined air and space operations center; and
  • Provide insight and participate in special technical operations planning, as required.

2-16. During larger standing operations and in crisis planning and execution, the theater SCA function is supported with appropriate manning for staff support based upon the nature of the pending contingency. The manpower and expertise requirements will be reflected in the final approved joint manning document for that headquarters along with an identification of a responsible Service to fill the position. In most cases where the SCA is delegated to the Commander, Air Force forces with an assigned DIRSPACEFOR to support those functions, the Deputy DIRSPACEFOR is normally sourced as an Army space officer, as established in operations. An Army Deputy DIRSPACEFOR supports all the joint functions of the DIRSPACEFOR, can represent specific land component space-related needs and issues to the theater SCA for resolution. An Army Deputy DIRSPACEFOR also acts as an intermediary between DIRSPACEFOR staff and Army SSEs, ARSSTs, ASCE, JTAGS detachments, space situational awareness planning teams (SSAPT), and space control detachments.

Exposed – The Secret Steele Dossier about Trump and Putin – Original Text

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COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/080

US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE DONALD TRUMP’S
ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA AND COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
KREMLIN

Summary

– Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for
at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and
divisions in western alliance

– So far TRUMP has declined various sweetener real estate business deals
offered him in Russia in order to further the Kremlin’s cultivation of him.
However he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of
intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other
political rivals

– Former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised
TRUMP through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to
blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct
in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been
arranged/monitored by the FSB

A dossier of compromising material on Hillary CLINTON has been collated
by the Russian Intelligence Services over many years and mainly
comprises bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and
intercepted phone calls rather than any embarrassing conduct. The
dossier is controlled by Kremlin spokesman, PESKOV, directly on PUTIN’S
orders. However it has not as yet been distributed abroad, including to
TRUMP. Russian intentions for its deployment still unclear

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in June 2016 sources A and B, a senior
Russian Foreign Ministry figure and a former top level Russian
intelligence officer still active inside the Kremlin respectively, the Russian
authorities had been cultivating and supporting US Republican
presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP for at least 5 years. Source B
asserted that the TRUMP operation was both supported and directed by
Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord and

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

Kr,t-h within the US itself, but more especially within the
d‘ SU n,ty both w hn ‘ which was viewed as inimical to Russia’s interests.

” B “s S ia„ financial -metal said th. TRUMP operation
Sould to seen in iernts of PUTIN’S desire to return to!Nineteenth
roni-nrv’Great Power politics anchored upon countries interests
rhan the ideals-based international order established after Worl a
Two. S/he had overheard PUTIN talRihg in this way in dose associates on

several occasions.

? in terms of specifics, Source A confided that the Kremlin had been feeding
TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents, including
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, for several years
^more below). This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of
TRUMP who had organized and managed Ins recent trips to os ^° ^
who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian >n»DM» be ™
“very helpful”. The Kremlin’s cultivation operation on 1 RUMP also
comprised offering him various lucrative real estate develop me _ ^

business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ong g
Cup soccer tournament However, so far, for reasons unknown, T R

had not taken up any of these.

3 However, there were other aspects to TRUMP’s engagement with the
Russian authorities. One which had borne fruit for them was to exploit
TRUMP’S personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obta
suitable ‘kompromaf (compromising material) on him. According to
Source D, where s/he had been present, TRUMP’s (perverted) conduct in
Moscow included hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel,
where he knew President and Mrs OBAMA (whom he hated) had stayed
on one of their official trips to Russia, and defiling the bed where they had
slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a ’golden showers
(urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSB
control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms
to record anything they wanted to.

4. The Moscow Ritz

who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time
and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in 2013. Soui ce E
provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to
Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who
also confirmed the story. Speaking separately in June 2016, Source B (the
former top level Russian intelligence officer) asserted that TRUMP’s
unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the
authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now
Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so
wished.

5. Asked about the Kremlin’s reported intelligence feed to TRUMP over
recent years and rumours about a Russian dossier of ‘kompromat’ on

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

milarv CLINTON fbeing circulated). Source B confirmed the file’s
ex” ttnce S/™ confided in a trusted compatriot that it had been collated
by Department K of the FSB for many years, dating back to hcr husband
Bill’s presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations o
various sorts rather than details/evidence of unorthodox or
embarrassing behavior. Some of the conversations were
comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia an
on things she had said which contradicted her current position on vano
issues. Others were most probably from phone intercepts.

6. Continuing on this theme, Source G, a senior Kremlin o ffi ci al . confided
that the CLINTON dossier was controlled exclusively by chief Krem

spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV, who was responsible for

compiling/handling it on the explicit instructions of PUTIN himself. T
dossier however had not as yet been made available abroad, “eluding
TRUMP or his campaign team. At present it was unclear what PU s
intentions were in this regard.

20 June 2016

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/086

RUSSIA/CYBER CRIME: A SYNOPSIS OF RUSSIAN STATE SPONSORED AND
OTHER CYBER OFFENSIVE (CRIMINAL) OPERATIONS

Summary

Russia has extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive <3*
operations. External targets include foreign governments and mg
corporations, especially banks. FSB leads on cyber «« hin R ““ ,a “
apparatus. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7
governments, security services and IFIs but much more on.secondM
ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visito

FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit mostc a p a ble cyber ,
operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy
both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western
corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring
governments e.g. Latvia

Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior
Western business visitor. Provided back door into important es ern
institutions.

Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and
offered incentive of “investment” in his business when visiting Moscow.

Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local
hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank
claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts
held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud

Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups

Details

1. Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed

knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise,
outlined the current situation in this area. A former senior intelligence
officer divided Russian state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into
four categories (in order of priority):- targeting foreign, especially

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

western governments; penetrating leading foreign business corporations,
especially banks; domestic monitoring of the elite; and attacking political
opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer
reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead
organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations.

2. In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a
senior government figure reported that there had been only limited
success in penetrating the “first tier” foreign targets. These comprised
western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence
services and central banks, and the IFls. To compensate for this shortfall,
massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking
the “secondary targets”, particularly western private banks and the
governments of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned atvia
in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with
the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been
unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had
ethnic and family ties to Russia and/or had been incentivized financially
to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or
contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return. This
had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in
obliging/indulging them e.g. the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having
to cover up for such agents’ money laundering operations through the
Russian financial system.

3. In terms of the FSB’s recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out
its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist
with direct knowledge reported in June 2016 that this was often done
using coercion and blackmail. In terms of‘foreign’ agents, the FSB was
approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to
Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting
Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program.
The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this
person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a
view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the
software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also
had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap
Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets
on their PCs and other platforms.

4. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a
leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on conventional
(defensive) IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to
conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the
company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to
Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and
through this had managed to access various important institutions in the
West through the back door.

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

5

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

5. In terms of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged
up the ‘Telegram’ enciphered commercial system as having been of
especial concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least
because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and
oppositionists. His/her understanding was that the FSB now successfully
had cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer
secure to use.

6. The senior Russian government figure cited above also reported that
non-state sponsored cyber crime was becoming an increasing problem
inside Russia for the government and authorities there. The Central Bank
of Russia claimed that in 2015 alone there had been more than 20
attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding
accounts held there, comprising several billions Roubles. More generally,
s/he understood there were circa 15 major organised crime groups in the
country involved in cyber crime, all of which continued to operate largely
outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called ‘Anunak’,
‘Buktrap’ and ‘Metel’ organisations.

26 July 2015

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

4 –

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/095

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER INDICATIONS OF
EXTENSIVE CONSPIRACY BETWEEN TRUMP’S CAMPAIGN TEAM AND THE
KREMLIN

Summary

Further evidence of extensive conspiracy between TRUMP’s campaign
team and Kremlin, sanctioned at highest levels and involving Russian
diplomatic staff based in the US

– TRUMP associate admits Kremlin behind recent appearance of DNC e-
mails on WikiLeaks, as means of maintaining plausible deniability

Agreed exchange of information established in both directions. TRUMP s
team using moles within DNC and hackers in the US as well as outside in
Russia. PUTIN motivated by fear and hatred of Hillary CLINTON. Russians
receiving intel from TRUMP’s team on Russian oligarchs and their families
in US

Mechanism for transmitting this intelligence involves “pension”
disbursements to Russian emigres living in US as cover, using consular
officials in New York, DC and Miami

Suggestion from source close to TRUMP and MANAFORT that Republican
campaign team happy to have Russia as media bogeyman to mask more
extensive corrupt business ties to China and other emerging countries

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an
ethnic Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate
Donald TRUMP, admitted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of
co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was
managed on the TRUMP side by the Republican candidate’s campaign
manager, Paul MANAFORT, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter
PAGE, and others as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest
in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, whom
President PUTIN apparently both hated and feared.

2. Inter alia, Source E, acknowledged that the Russian regime had been
behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from
the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to the WikiLeaks platform.

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

The reason for using WikiLeaks was “plausible deniability” and the
operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of
TRUMP and senior members of his campaign team. In return the TRUMP
team had agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a
campaign issue and to raise US/NATO defence commitments in the
Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine, a
priority for PUTIN who needed to cauterise the subject.

In the wider context of TRUMP campaign/Kremlin co-operation, Source E
claimed that the intelligence network being used against CLINTON
comprised three elements. Firstly there were agents/facilitators within
the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian emigre and
associated offensive cyber operators based in the US; and thirdly, state-
sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia. All three elements had
played an important role to date. On the mechanism for rewarding
relevant assets based in the US, and effecting a two-way flow of
intelligence and other useful information, Source E claimed that Russian
diplomatic staff in key cities such as New York, Washington DC and
Miami were using the emigre ‘pension’ distribution system as cover. The
operation therefore depended on key people in the US Russian emigre
community for its success. Tens of thousands of dollars were involve .

In terms of the intelligence flow from the TRUMP team to Russia, Source
E reported that much of this concerned the activities of business
oligarchs and their families’ activities and assets in the US, with which
PUTIN and the Kremlin seemed preoccupied.

Commenting on the negative media publicity surrounding alleged
Russian interference in the US election campaign in support of TRUMP,
Source E said he understood that the Republican candidate and his team
were relatively relaxed about this because it deflected media and the
Democrats’ attention away from TRUMP’s business dealings in China and
other emerging markets. Unlike in Russia, these were substantial and
involved the payment of large bribes and kickbacks which, were they to
become public, would be potentially very damaging to their campaign.

Finally, regarding TRUMP’s claimed minimal investment profile in Russia,
a separate source with direct knowledge said this had not been for want
of trying. TRUMP’s previous efforts had included exploring the real estate
sector in St Petersburg as well as Moscow but in the end TRUMP had had
to settle for the use of extensive sexual services there from local
prostitutes rather than business success.

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE SOURCE

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/94

RUSSIA: SECRET KREMLIN MEETINGS ATTENDED BY TRUMP ADVISOR,
CARTER PAGE IN MOSCOW (JULY 2016)

Summary

– TRUMP advisor Carter PAGE holds secret meetings in Moscow with
SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVYEKIN

– SECHIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy co-operation
and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine.
PAGE non-committal in response

– DIVEYKIN discusses release of Russian dossier of ‘kompromat’ on
TRUMP’s opponent, Hillary CLINTON, but also hints at Kremlin
possession of such material on TRUMP

Detail

1. Speaking in July 2016, a Russian source close to Rosneft President, PUTIN
close associate and US-sanctioned individual, Igor SECHIN, confided the
details of a recent secret meeting between him and visiting Foreign
Affairs Advisor to Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP,

Carter PAGE.

2. According to SECHIN’s associate, the Rosneft President [CEO) had raised
with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and
prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western
sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche
by SECHIN but had been generally non-committal in response.

3. Speaking separately, also in July 2016, an official close to Presidential
Administration Head, S. IVANOV, confided in a compatriot that a senior
colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA, DIVYEKIN (nfd)
also had met secretly with PAGE on his recent visit. Their agenda had
included DIVEYKIN raising a dossier of’kompromat’ the Kremlin
possessed on TRUMP’s Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON,
and its possible release to the Republican’s campaign team.

4. However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed
DIVEYKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian
leadership also had ‘kompromat’ on TRUMP which the latter should bear
in mind in his dealings with them.

19 July 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/097

RUSSIA-US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN CONCERN THAT POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM
DNC E-MAIL HACKING AFFAIR SPIRALLING OUT OF CONTROL

Summary

Kremlin concerned that political fallout from DNC e-mail hacking operation is spiralling
out of control. Extreme nervousness among TRUMP’s associates as result of negative
media attention/accusations

Russians meanwhile keen to cool situation and maintain ‘plausible deniability’ of
existing /ongoing pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. Therefore unlikely to be
any ratcheting up offensive plays in immediate future

Source close to TRUMP campaign however confirms regular exchange with Kremlin
has existed for at least 8 years, including intelligence fed back to Russia on oligarchs’
activities in US

Russians apparently have promised not to use ‘kompromat’ they hold on TRUMP as
leverage, given high levels of voluntary co-operation forthcoming from his team

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted associate in late July 2016, a Russian emigre figure
close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s campaign team
commented on the fallout from publicity surrounding the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) e-mail hacking scandal. The emigre said there was a high level of
anxiety within the TRUMP team as a result of various accusations levelled against
them and indications from the Kremlin that President PUTIN and others in the
leadership thought things had gone too far now and risked spiralling out of control.

2. Continuing on this theme, the emigre associate of TRUMP opined that the Kremlin
wanted the situation to calm but for ‘plausible deniability’ to be maintained
concerning its (extensive) pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. S/he therefore
judged that it was unlikely these would be ratcheted up, at least for the time being.

3. However, in terms of established operational liaison between the TRUMP team and
the Kremlin, the emigre confirmed that an intelligence exchange had been running
between them for at least 8 years. Within this context PUTIN’S priority requirement
had been for intelligence on the activities, business and otherwise, in the US of leading
Russian oligarchs and their families. TRUMP and his associates duly had obtained and
supplied the Kremlin with this information.

4.

Finally the emigre said s/he understood the Kremlin had more intelligence on
CLINTON and her campaign but he did not know the details or when or »it wouW be
released As far as ‘kompromat’ (compromising information) on TRUM
concerned, although there was plenty of this, he understood the Kremlin had gi^^
word that it would not be deployed against the Republican president^ ^

given how helpful and co-operative his team had been over sever y ,
particularly of late.

30 July 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/100

RUSSIA/USA: GROWING BACKLASH IN KREMLIN TO DNC HACKING AND
TRUMP SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Summary

Head of PA IVANOV laments Russian intervention in US presidential
election and black PR against CLINTON and the DNC. Vows not to supply
intelligence to Kremlin PR operatives again. Advocates now sitting tight
and denying everything

Presidential spokesman PESKOV the main protagonist in Kremlin
campaign to aid TRUMP and damage CLINTON. He is now scared and
fears being made scapegoat by leadership for backlash in US. Problem
compounded by his botched intervention in recent Turkish crisis

Premier MEDVEDEV’S office furious over DNC hacking and associated
anti-Russian publicity. Want good relations with US and ability to travel
there. Refusing to support or help cover up after PESKOV

Talk now in Kremlin of TRUMP withdrawing from presidential race
altogether, but this still largely wishful thinking by more liberal elements
in Moscow

Detail

1. Speaking in early August 2016, two well-placed and established Kremlin
sources outlined the divisions and backlash in Moscow arising from the
leaking of Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails and the wider
pro-TRUMP operation being conducted in the US. Head of Presidential
Administration, Sergei IVANOV, was angry at the recent turn of events.

He believed the Kremlin “team” involved, led by presidential spokesman
Dmitriy PESKOV, had gone too far in interfering in foreign affairs with
their “elephant in a china shop black PR”. IVANOV claimed always to have
opposed the handling and exploitation of intelligence by this PR “team”.
Following the backlash against such foreign interference in US politics,
IVANOV was advocating that the only sensible course of action now for
the Russian leadership was to “sit tight and deny everything”.

2. Continuing on this theme the source close to IVANOV reported that
PESKOV now was “scared shitless” that he would be scapegoated by
PUTIN and the Kremlin and held responsible for the backlash against
Russian political interference in the US election. IVANOV was determined

r

to stop PESKOV playing an independent role in relation to the US going
forward and the source fully expected the presidential spokesman now to
lay low. PESKOV s position was not helped by a botched attempt by him
also to interfere in the recent failed coup in Turkey from a government
relations (GR) perspective (no further details].

3. The extent of disquiet and division within Moscow caused by the

backlash against Russian interference in the US election was underlined
by a second source, close to premier Dmitriy MEDVEDEV (DAM]. S/he
said the Russian prime minister and his colleagues wanted to have good
relations with the US, regardless of who was in power there, and not least
so as to be able to travel there in future, either officially or privately. They
were openly refusing to cover up for PESKOV and others involved in the
DNC/TRUMP operations or to support his counter-attack of allegations
against the USG for its alleged hacking of the Russian government and
state agencies.

4. According to the first source, close to IVANOV, there had been talk in the
Kremlin of TRUMP being forced to withdraw from the presidential race
altogether as a result of recent events, ostensibly on grounds of his
psychological state and unsuitability for high office. This might not be so
bad for Russia in the circumstances but in the view of the source, it
remained largely wishful thinking on the part of those in the regime
opposed to PESKOV and his “botched” operations, at least for the time
being.

5 August 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/101

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SENIOR KREMLIN FIGURE OUTLINES EVOLVING RUSSIAN TACTICS IN
PRO-TRUMP, ANTI-CLINTON OPERATION

Summary

Head of PA, IVANOV assesses Kremlin intervention in US presidential election and outlines leadership
thinkingon operational wayforward

No new leaks envisaged, as too politically risky, but rather further exploitation of (WikiLeaks) material
already disseminated to exacerbate divisions

Educated US youth to be targeted as protest(againstCLINTON) and swing vote in attempt to turn them
over to TRUMP

Russian leadership, including PUTIN, celebrating perceived success to date in splitting US hawks and
elite

Kremlin engaging with several high profile US players, including STEIN, PAGE and (former DlA Director
Michael Flynn), and funding their recent visits to Moscow

Details

1. Speaking in confidence to a close colleague in early August 2016, Head of the Russian Presidential
Administration (PA), Sergei IVANOV, assessed the impact and results of Kremlin intervention in the US
presidential election to date. Although most commentators believed that the Kremlin was behind the
leaked DNC/CLINTON e-mails, this remained technically deniable. Therefore the Russians would not
risk their position for the time being with new leaked material, even to a third party like WikiLeaks.
Rather the tactics would be to spread rumours and misinformation about the content of what already
had been leaked and make up new content.

2. Continuing on this theme, IVANOV said that the audience to be targeted by such operations was the
educated youth in America as the PA assessed thatthere was still a chancethey could be persuaded to
vote for Republican candidate Donald TRUMP as a protest against the Washington establishment (in
the form of Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON). The hope was that even if she won, as a resultof
this CLINTON in power would be bogged down in working for internal reconciliation in the US, rather
than being ableto focus on foreign policy which would damage Russia’s interests.This also should give
PresidentPUTIN more room for manoeuvre inthe run-upto Russia’s own presidential election in 2018.

3. IVANOV reported that although the Kremlin had underestimated the strength of US media and liberal
reaction to the DNC hackand TRUMP’s links to Russia, PUTIN was generally satisfied with the progress
of the anti-CLINTON operation to date. He recently had had a drink with PUTIN to markthis. In IVANOV’s
view,the US hadtriedto dividethe Russian elite with sanctions butfailed, whilstthey, by contrast, had
succeeded in splittingthe US hawks inimical to Russiaand the Washington elite more generally, half of
whom had refused to endorse any presidential candidateas a resultof Russian intervention.

4.

Speaking separately, also in early August 2016, a Kremlin official involved in US relations commented
on aspects ofthe Russian operation todate. Its goals had been threefold- askingsympathetic USactors
how Moscow could help them; gathering relevant intelligence; and creating and disseminating

compromising information(‘kompromat’). This had involved the Kremlin supporting various US political

figures including funding indirectly their recent visits to Moscow. S/he named a delegation from
Lyndon UROUCHE; presidential candidateJill STEIN ofthe Green Party; TRUMP foreign policy adviser

19

Carter PAGE; and former DIA Director Michael Flynn, in this regard and as successful in terms of
perceived outcomes.

10 August 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/102

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REACTION IN TRUMP CAMP TO RECENT NEGATIVE PUBLICITY ABOUT
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE AND LIKELY RESULTING TACTICS GOING FORWARD

Summary

TRUMP campaign insider reports recent DNC e-mail leaks were aimed at switching SANDERS (protest)
voters away from CLINTON and over to TRUMP

Admits Republican campaign underestimated resulting negative reaction from US liberals, elite and
media and forced to change course as result

Need now to turn tables on CLINTON’S use of PUTIN as bogeyman in election, although some
resentment at Russian president’s perceived attempt to undermine USG and system over and above
swinging presidents I election

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence on 9 August 2016, an ethnic Russian associate of Republican US presidential
candidate Donald TRUMP discussed the reaction inside his camp, and revised tactics therein resulting
from recent negative publicity concerning Moscow’s clandestine involvement in the campaign.
TRUMP’s a ssociate reported that the a i m of I ea ki ng the DNC e-ma i I s to Wi ki Lea ks during the Democratic
Convention had been to swi ng supporters of Bernie SANDERS awayfrom Hillary CLINTON and across to
TRUMP. Thesevoters were perceived as activistand anti -status quoand anti-establishment and inthat
regard sharing many features with the TRUMP campaign, including a visceral dislike of Hillary CLINTON.
This objective had been conceived and promoted, inter alia, by TRUMP’s foreign policy adviser Carter
PAGE who had discussed itdirectly with the ethnic Russian associate.

2. Continuing on thistheme, the ethnic Russian associateof TRUMP assessed that the problem wasthat
the TRUMP campaign had underestimated the strength of the negative reaction from liberals and
especially the conservative elite to Russian interference. This was forcing a rethink and a likely change
of tactics. The main objective in the shortterm was to check Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON’S
successful exploitation of the PUTIN as bogeyman/Russian interference story to tarnish TRUMP and
bolster her own (patriotic) credentials.The TRUMP campaign was focusingon tapping into supportin
the American television media to achievethis, as they reckoned this resource had been underused by
them to date.

3. However, TRUMP’s associate also admitted that there was a fair amount of anger and resentment
within the Republican candidate’s team at what was perceived by PUTIN as going beyond the objective
of weakening CLINTON and bolstering TRUMP, by attempting to exploitthe situation to undermine the
US government and democratic system more generally. It was unclear at present how this aspect of
the situation would play out in the weeks to come.

10 August 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/136

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF TRUMP LAWYER
COHEN’S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

– Kremlin insider reports TRUMP lawyer COHEN’s secret meeting/s with Kremlin officials in
August 2016 was/were held in Prague

– Russian parastatal organisation Rossotrudnichestvo used as cover for this liaison and premises
in Czech capital may have been used for the meeting/s

– Pro-PUTIN leading Duma figure, KOSACHEV, reportedly involved as “plausibly deniable”
facilitator and may have participated in the August meeting/s with COHEN

Detail

1. Speaking to a compatriot and friend on 19 October 2016, a Kremlin insider provided further
details of reported clandestine meeting/s between Republican presidential candidate, Donald
TRUMP’S lawyer Michael COHEN and Kremlin representatives in August 2016. Although the
communication between them had to be cryptic for security reasons, the Kremlin insider
clearly indicated to his/her friend that the reported contact/s took place in Prague, Czech
Republic.

2. Continuing on this theme, the Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of the Russian
parastatal organisation, Rossotrudnichestvo, in this contact between TRUMP campaign
representative/s and Kremlin officials. Rossotrudnichestvo was being used as cover for this
relationship and its office in Prague may well have been used to host the COHEN / Russian
Presidential Administration (PA) meeting/s. It was considered a “plausibly deniable” vehicle
for this, whilst remaining entirely under Kremlin control.

3. The Kremlin insider went on to identify leading pro-PUTIN Duma figure, Konstantin
KOSACHEV (Head of the Foreign Relations Committee) as an important figure in the TRUMP
campaign-Kremlin liaison operation. KOSACHEV, also “plausibly deniable” being part of the
Russian legislature rather than executive, had facilitated the contact in Prague and by
implication, may have attended the meeting/s with COHEN there in August.

Company Comment

We reported previously, in our Company Intelligence Report 2016/135 of 19 October 2016 from the
same source, that COHEN met officials from the PA Legal Department clandestinely in an EU
country in August 2016. This was in order to clean up the mess left behind by western media
revelations of TRUMP ex-campaign manager MANAFORT’s corrupt relationship with the former
pro-Russian YANUKOVYCH regime in Ukraine and TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter
PAGE’S secret meetings in Moscow with senior regime figures in July 2016. According to the
Kremlin advisor, these meeting/s were originally scheduled for COHEN in Moscow but shifted to

what was considered an operationally “soft” EU country when it was judged too compromising
for him to travel to the Russian capital.

20 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/105

RUSSIA/UKRAINE: THE DEMISE OF TRUMP’S CAMPAIGN MANAGER PAUL
MANAFORT

Summary

– Ex-Ukrainian President YANUKOVYCH confides directly to PUTIN that he
authorised kick-back payments to MANAFORT, as alleged in western
media. Assures Russian President however there is no documentary
evidence/trail

PUTIN and Russian leadership remain worried however and sceptical that
YANUKOVYCH has fully covered the traces of these payments to TRUMP’s
former campaign manager

– Close associate of TRUMP explains reasoning behind MANAFORT’s recent
resignation. Ukraine revelations played part but others wanted
MANAFORT out for various reasons, especially LEWANDOWSK1 who
remains influential

Detail

1. Speaking in late August 2016, in the immediate aftermath of Paul
MANAFORT’s resignation as campaign manager for US Republican
presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, a well-placed Russian figure
reported on a recent meeting between President PUTIN and ex-President
YANUKOVYCH of Ukraine. This had been held in secret on 15 August near
Volgograd, Russia and the western media revelations about MANAFORT
and Ukraine had featured prominently on the agenda. YANUKOVYCH had
confided in PUTIN that he did authorise and order substantial kick-back
payments to MANAFORT as alleged but sought to reassure him that there
was no documentary trail left behind which could provide clear evidence
of this.

2. Given YANUKOVYCH’S (unimpressive) record in covering up his own
corrupt tracks in the past, PUTIN and others in the Russian leadership
were sceptical about the ex-Ukrainian president’s reassurances on this as
relating to MANAFORT. They therefore still feared the scandal had legs,
especially as MANAFORT had been commercially active in Ukraine right
up to the time (in March 2016) when he joined TRUMP’s campaign team.
For them it therefore remained a point of potential political vulnerability
and embarrassment.

3. Speaking separately, also in late August 2016, an American political
figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign outlined the
reasons behind MANAFORT’s recent demise. S/he said it was true that
the Ukraine corruption revelations had played a part in this but also,
several senior players close to TRUMP had wanted MANAFORT out,
primarily to loosen his control on strategy and policy formulation. Of
particular importance in this regard was MANAFORT’s predecessor as
campaign manager, Corey LEWANDOWSKI, who hated MANAFORT
personally and remained close to TRUMP with whom he discussed the
presidential campaign on a regular basis.

22 August 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/111

RUSSIA/US: KREMLIN FALLOUT FROM MEDIA EXPOSURE OF MOSCOW’S
INTERFERENCE IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Summary

Kremlin orders senior staff to remain silent in media and private on
allegations of Russian interference in US presidential campaign

Senior figure however confirms gist of allegations and repo^ IVANOV
sacked as Head of Administration on account of giving PUTIN poor advice
on issue. VAINO selected as his replacement partly because he was no
involved in pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s

Russians do have further ‘kompromat’ on CLINTON (e-mails) and
considering disseminating it after Duma (legislative elections) in a e
September. Presidential spokesman PESKOV continues to lead on this

However, equally important is Kremlin objective to shift policy consensus
favourably to Russia in US post-OBAMA whoever wins. Both presidential
candidates’ opposition to TPP and TTIP viewed as a result in this respect

– Senior Russian diplomat withdrawn from Washington embassy on
account of potential exposure in US presidential election operation/s

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a
senior member of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA)
commented on the political fallout from recent western media
revelations about Moscow’s intervention, in favour of Donald TRUMP and
against Hillary CLINTON, in the US presidential election. The PA official
reported that the issue had become incredibly sensitive and that
President PUTIN had issued direct orders that Kremlin and government
insiders should not discuss it in public or even in private.

2. Despite this, the PA official confirmed, from direct knowledge, that the
gist of the allegations was true. PUTIN had been receiving conflicting
advice on interfering from three separate and expert groups. On one side
had been the Russian ambassador to the US, Sergei K1SLYAK, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with an independent and informal
network run by presidential foreign policy advisor, Yuri USHAKOV

(KISLYAK’s predecessor in Washington) who had urged caution and the
potential negative impact on Russia from the operation/s. On the other
side was former PA Head, Sergei IVANOV, backed by Russian Foreign
Intelligence (SVR), who had advised PUTIN that the pro-TRUMP, anti-
CLINTON operation/s would be both effective and plausibly deniable
with little blowback. The first group/s had been proven right and this had
been the catalyst in PUTIN’S decision to sack IVANOV (unexpectedly) as
PA Head in August. His successor, Anton VAINO, had been selected for the
job partly because he had not been involved in the US presidential
election operation/s.

3. Continuing on this theme, the senior PA official said the situation now
was that the Kremlin had further ‘kompromat’ on candidate CLINTON
and had been considering releasing this via “plausibly deniable” channels
after the Duma (legislative) elections were out of the way in mid-
September. There was however a growing train of thought and associated
lobby, arguing that the Russians could still make candidate CLINTON look
“weak and stupid” by provoking her into railing against PUTIN and
Russia without the need to release more of her e-mails. Presidential
Spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV remained a key figure in the operation,
although any final decision on dissemination of further material would be
taken by PUTIN himself.

4.

The senior PA official also reported that a growing element in Moscow s
intervention in the US presidential election campaign was the objective of
shifting the US political consensus in Russia’s perceived interests
regardless of who won. It basically comprised of pushing candidate
CLINTON away from President OBAMA’s policies. The best example of
this was that both candidates now openly opposed the draft trade
agreements, TPP and TTIP, which were assessed by Moscow as
detrimental to Russian interests. Other issues where the Kremlin was
looking to shift the US policy consensus were Ukraine and Syria. Overall
however, the presidential election was considered still to be too close to
call.

5. Finally, speaking separately to the same compatriot, a senior Russian
MFA official reported that as a prophylactic measure, a leading Russian
diplomat, Mikhail KULAGIN, had been withdrawn from Washington at
short notice because Moscow feared his heavy involvement in the US
presidential election operation, including the so-called veterans’ pensions
ruse (reported previously), would be exposed in the media there. His
replacement, Andrei BONDAREV however was clean in this regard.

Company Comment

The substance of what was reported by the senior Russian PA official in paras 1
and 2 above, including the reasons for Sergei IVANOV’s dismissal, was
corroborated independently by a former top level Russian intelligence officer
and Kremlin insider, also in mid-September.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/112

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN-ALPHA GROUP CO¬
OPERATION

Summary

– Top level Russian official confirms current closeness of Alpha Group-
PUT1N relationship. Significant favours continue to be done in both
directions and FRIDMAN and AVEN still giving informal advice to PUTIN,
especially on the US

Key intermediary in PUTIN-Alpha relationship identified as Oleg
GOVORUN, currently Head of a Presidential Administration department
but throughout the 1990s, the Alpha executive who delivered illicit cash
directly to PUTIN

PUTIN personally unbothered about Alpha’s current lack of investment in
Russia but under pressure from colleagues over this and able to exploit it
as lever over Alpha interlocutors

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a top level
Russian government official commented on the history and current state
of relations between President PUTIN and the Alpha Group of businesses
led by oligarchs Mikhail FRIDMAN, Petr AVEN and German KHAN. The
Russian government figure reported that although they had had their ups
and downs, the leading figures in Alpha currently were on very good
terms with PUTIN. Significant favours continued to be done in both
directions, primarily political ones for PUTIN and business/legal ones for
Alpha. Also, FRIDMAN and AVEN continued to give informal advice to
PUTIN on foreign policy, and especially about the US where he distrusted
advice being given to him by officials.

2. Although FRIDMAN recently had met directly with PUTIN in Russia, much
of the dialogue and business between them was mediated through a
senior Presidential Administration official, Oleg GOVORUN, who currently
headed the department therein responsible for Social Co-operation With
the CIS. GOVORUN was trusted by PUTIN and recently had accompanied
him to Uzbekistan to pay respects at the tomb of former president
KARIMOV. However according to the top level Russian government
official, during the 1990s GOVORUN had been Head of Government
Relations at Alpha Group and in reality, the “driver” and “bag carrier”

used by FRIDMAN and AVEN to deliver large amounts of illicit cash to the
Russian president, at that time deputy Mayor of St Petersburg. Given that
and the continuing sensitivity of the PUTIN-Alpha relationship, and need
for plausible deniability, much of the contact between them was now
indirect and entrusted to the relatively low profile GOVORUN.

3. The top level Russian government official described the PUTIN-Alpha
relationship as both carrot and stick. Alpha held ‘kompromat’ on PUTIN
and his corrupt business activities from the 1990s whilst although not
personally overly bothered by Alpha’s failure to reinvest the proceeds of
its TNK oil company sale into the Russian economy since, the Russian
president was able to use pressure on this count from senior Kremlin
colleagues as a lever on FRIDMAN and AVEN to make them do his
political bidding.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/113

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION- REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE TRUMP’S
PRIOR ACTIVITIES IN ST PETERSBURG

Summary

Two knowledgeable St Petersburg sources claim Republican candidate
TRUMP has paid bribes and engaged in sexual activities there but key
witnesses silenced and evidence hard to obtain

– Both believe Azeri business associate of TRUMP, Araz AGALAROV will
know the details

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in September 2016, two well-placed
sources based in St Petersburg, one in the political/business elite and the
other involved in the local services and tourist industry, commented on
Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s prior activities in
the city.

2. Both knew TRUMP had visited St Petersburg on several occasions in the
past and had been interested in doing business deals there involving real
estate. The local business/political elite figure reported that TRUMP had
paid bribes there to further his interests but very discreetly and only
through affiliated companies, making it very hard to prove. The local
services industry source reported that TRUMP had participated in sex
parties in the city too, but that all direct witnesses to this recently had
been “silenced” i.e. bribed or coerced to disappear.

3. The two St Petersburg figures cited believed an Azeri business figure,
Araz AGALAROV (with offices in Baku and London) had been closely
involved with TRUMP in Russia and would know most of the details of
what the Republican presidential candidate had got up to there.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/130

RUSSIA: KREMLIN ASSESSMENT OF TRUMP AND RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN US
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Summary

Buyer’s remorse sets In with Kremlin over TRUMP support operation In US presidential
election. Russian leadership disappointed that leaked e-mails on CLINTON have not had
greater impact in campaign

Russians have Injected further antt-CLINTON material into Ihe ‘plausibly deniable’ leaks
pipeline which will continue to surface, hut best material already In public domain

PUTIN angry with senior officials who “overpromised 1 ‘ on TRUMP and lurther heads likely to
roll as result. Foreign Minister LAVROV may be next

TRUMP supported by Kremlm because seen as divisive, anti-establishment candidate who
would shake up current International status quo In Russia’s favor. Lead on TRUMP operation
moved from Foreign Ministry to FSB and then to presidential administration where it now sits

Detail

1. Speaking separately in confidence to a trusted compatriot in early October 2016, a senior
Russian leadership figure and a Foreign Ministry official reported on recent developments
concernmg the Kremlin’s operation to support Republican candidate Donatd TRUMP in the
US presidential election. The senior leadership figure said that a degree of buyer’s remorse
was setting in among Russian leaders concerning TRUMP. PUTIN and his colleagues were
surprised and disappointed that leaks of Democratic candidate, Hillary CLINTON’S hacked
e-mails had not had greater impact on the campaign.

2. Continuing on this theme, the senior leadership figure commented that a stream of further
hacked CLINTON material already had been injected by the Kremlin Into compliant western
media outlets like Wiki leaks, which remained at least “plausibly deniable 4 , so the stream of
these would continue through October and up to the etection. However s/he understood that
the best material the Russians had already was out and there were no real game-changers
to come.

3. The Russian Foreign Ministry official, who had direct access to the TRUMP support
operation, reported that PUTIN was angry at his subordinate’s “over-promising’’ on the
Republican presidential candidate, both in terms of hts chances and reliability and being
able to cover anchor contain the US backlash over Kremlin interference. More heads
therefore were likely to roll, with the MFA the easiest target. Ironically, despite his consistent
urging of caution on the Issue, Foreign Minister LAVROV could be the next one to go.

4. Asked to explain why PUTIN and the Kremlin had launched such an aggressive TRUMP
support operation In the first place, the MFA official said that Russia needed to upset the
liberal International status quo, including on Ukraine-related sanctions, which was seriously

2 *

disadvantaging the country. TRUMP was viewed as divisive in disrupting the whole US
political system; anti-Establishment; and a pragmatist with whom they could do business. As
the TRUMP support operation had gained momentum, control of it had passed from the mha
to the FSB and then into the presidential administration where It remained, a reflection of its
growing significance over time. There was still a view In the Kremlin that TRUMP would
continue as a (divisive) political force even If he lost the presidency and may run for and be
elected to another public ollice.

12 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/134

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF KREMLIN LIAISON WITH
TRUMP CAMPAIGN

Summary

■ Close associate of SECHIN confirms his secret meeting in Moscow with Carter FACE in July

– Substance included offer of large stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. PACE
confirms this is TRUMP’s intention

– SECHIN continued to think. TRUMP could win presidency up to 17 October. Now looking to

reorientate his engagement with the US

■ Kremlin insider highlights importance of TRUMP’s lawyer, Michael COHEN in covert

relationship with Russia. COHEN’s wife is of Russian descent and her father a leading property
developer in Moscow

Detail

T Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid October 2016, a dose associate of Rosneft President
and PUTIN ally Igor” SECHIN elaborated on the reported secret meeting between the tatter
and Carter PAGE, of L T S Republican presidential candidate’s foreign policy team, in Moscow in
July 2016, The secret meeting had been confirmed to him/her by a senior member of SECHIN’s
staff, in addition to by the Rosneft President himself. It took place on either 7 or 8 July, the same
day or the one after Carter PAGE made a public speech to the Higher Economic School in
Moscow.

2. In terms of the substance of their discussion/ SECHIN’s assoriate said that the Rosneft
President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the
company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMPs associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent
(privatised) stake in Rosneft in return, PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were
TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted,

3. According to SECHIN’s dose associate, the Rosneft President had continued to believe that
TRUMP could win the US presidency right up to 17 October/ when he assessed this was no
longer possible, SECHIN was keen to re-adapt accordingly and put feelers out to other
business and political contacts in the US instead,

4. Speaking separately to the same compatriot in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider with direct
access to the leadership confirmed that a key role in the secret TRUMP campaign / Kremlin
relations hip was being played by the Republican candidat e’s personal lawyer Michael

Source Comment

5, SECHIN’s associate opined that although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had
dearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP’s intention to lift Russian sanctions if
elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate’s authority.

Company Comment

18 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/135

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF TRUMP
LAWYER, COHEN IN CAMPAIGN’S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

– Kremlin insider outlines important role played by TRUMP’s lawyer
COHEN in secret liaison with Russian leadership

– COHEN engaged with Russians in trying to cover up scandal of
MANAFORT and exposure of PAGE and meets Kremlin officials secretly in
the EU in August in pursuit of this goal

These secret contacts continue but are now farmed out to trusted agents
in Kremlin-linked institutes so as to remain “plausibly deniable for
Russian regime

Further confirmation that sacking of IVANOV and appointments of VA1N0
and KIR1YENKO linked to need to cover up Kremlin’s TRUMP support
operation

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a longstanding compatriot friend in mid-
October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of
Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s lawyer, Michael
COHEN, in the ongoing secret liaison relationship between the New York
tycoon’s campaign and the Russian leadership. COHEN’s role had grown
following the departure of Paul MANNAFORT as TRUMP’s campaign
manager in August 2016. Prior to that MANNAFORT had led for the
TRUMP side.

2. According to the Kremlin insider, COHEN now was heavily engaged in a
cover up and damage limitation operation in the attempt to prevent the
full details of TRUMP’s relationship with Russia being exposed. In
pursuit of this aim, COHEN had met secretly with several Russian
Presidential Administration (PA) Legal Department officials in an EU
country in August 2016. The immediate issues had been to contain
further scandals involving MANNAFORT’s commercial and political role
in Russia/Ukraine and to limit the damage arising from exposure of
former TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE’S secret meetings
with Russian leadership figures in Moscow the previous month. The

overall objective had been to “to sweep it all under the carpet and make
sure no connections could be fully established or proven”

3. Things had become even “hotter” since August on the TRUMP-Russia
track. According to the Kremlin insider, this had meant that direct contact
between the TRUMP team and Russia had been farmed out by the
Kremlin to trusted agents of influence working in pro-government policy
institutes like that of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. COHEN
however continued to lead for the TRUMP team.

4. Referring back to the (surprise) sacking of Sergei IVANOV as Head of PA
in August 2016, his replacement by Anton VAINO and the appointment o
former Russian premier Sergei KIRIYENKO to another senior position in
the PA, the Kremlin insider repeated that this had been directly
connected to the TRUMP support operation and the need to cover up now
that it was being exposed by the USG and in the western media.

Company Comment

The Kremlin insider was unsure of the identities of the PA officials with whom
COHEN met secretly in August, or the exact date/s and locations of the
meeting/s. There were significant internal security barriers being erected in the
PA as the TRUMP issue became more controversial and damaging. However s/he
continued to try to obtain these.

19 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/166

US/RUSSIA: FURTHER DETAILS OF SECRET DIALOGUE BETWEEN TRUMP
CAMPAIGN TEAM, KREMLIN AND ASSOCIATED HACKERS IN PRAGUE

Summary

– TRUMP’s representative COHEN accompanied to Prague in

August/September 2016 by 3 colleagues for secret discussions with
Kremlin representatives and associated operators/hackers

Agenda included how to process deniable cash payments to operatives;
contingency plans for covering up operations; and action in event of a
CLINTON election victory

Some further details of Russian representatives/operatives involved;
Romanian hackers employed; and use of Bulgaria as bolthole to “lie low”

– Anti-CLINTON hackers and other operatives paid by both TRUMP team
and Kremlin, but with ultimate loyalty to Head of PA, IVANOV and his
successor/s

Detail

1. We reported previously (2016/135 and /136) on secret meeting/s held
in Prague, Czech Republic in August 2016 between then Republican
presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s representative, Michael COHEN
and his interlocutors from the Kremlin working under cover of Russian
‘NGO’ Rossotrudnichestvo.

CL/NTON/Democratic Party operations. COHEN had been accompanied
to Prague by 3 colleagues and the timing of the visit was either in the last
week of August or the first week of September. One of their main Russian
interlocutors was Oleg SOLODUKHIN operating under
Rossotrudnichestvo cover. According the agenda

comprised questions on how deniable cash payments were to be made to
hackers who had worked in Europe under Kremlin direction against the
CLINTON campaign and various contingencies for covering up these
operations and Moscow’s secret liaison with the TRUMP team more
generally.

provided further details of these meeting/s and associated anti-

3. aver rhe period MarcIvSepfember 2016

^cmpan^alled^^^^^^Mand its affiliates had been using botnets
and porn traffic to transmit viruses, plant bugs, steal data and conduct
“altering operatjons*^gamsUhe Democratic Party leadership. Entities
Linked to involved and hean^mother

hackjn^xpert, both recruited under duress by the FSB,^^H
■■■■Mwere significant players in this operation, In Prague,
COHEN agreed contingency plans for various scenarios to protect the
operation, but in particular what was to be done in the event that Hillary
CLINTON won the presidency. It was important in this event that ad cash
payments owed were made quickly and discreetly and that cyher and
other operators were stood down/a hie to go effectively to ground to
cover their traces. (We reported earlier that the involvement of political
Operatives Paul MAN A FORT and Carter PAGE in the secret TRUMP-
Kremlin liaison had been exposed in the media in the run-up to Prague
and that damage limitation of these also was discussed by COHEN with
the Kremlin representatives).

4. In terms of practical measures to be taken. It was agreed by the two sides
in Prague to stand down various “Romanian hackers” (presumably based
in their homeland or neighbouring eastern Europe) and that other
operatives should head fur a bolt-hole in Plovdiv, Bulgaria where they
should “lay low”. On payments, IVANOV’S associate said that the
operatives involved had been paid by both TRUMP’S team and the
Kremlin, though their orders and ultimate loyalty lay with IVANOV, as
Head of the PA and thus ultimately responsible for the operation, and his
designated successor/s after he was dismissed by president PUTIN in
connection with iheanti-CLINTON operation in mid August,

13 December 2016

TOP SECRET – The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by Americans, 1947–2015

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The report describes characteristics of 209 Americans who committed espionage-related offenses against the U.S. since 1947. Three cohorts are compared based on when the individual began espionage: 1947-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-2015. Using data coded from open published sources, analyses are reported on personal attributes of persons across the three cohorts, the employment and levels of clearance, how they committed espionage, the consequences they suffered, and their motivations. The second part of the report explores each of the five types of espionage committed by the 209 persons under study. These include: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. The statutes governing each type are discussed and compared. Classification of national security information is discussed as one element in espionage. In Part 3, revisions to the espionage statutes are recommended in light of findings presented in the report.

This report is the fourth in the series on espionage by Americans that the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) began publishing in 1992. The current report updates earlier work by including recent cases, and it extends the scope by exploring related types of espionage in addition to the classic type. There are three parts to this report. Part 1 presents characteristics of Americans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1947 based on analyses of data collected from open sources. Part 2 explores the five types of espionage committed by the 209 individuals in this study: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. Each type is described by its legal bases, and examples of cases and comparisons with the other types of espionage are provided. Part 3 considers the impact of the changing context in which espionage takes place, and discusses two important developments: information and communications technologies (ICT) and globalization. Recommendations are offered for revisions to the espionage statutes in response to these accelerating changes in context.

Part 1 compares data across three cohorts of persons based on when the individual began espionage: 1947-1979 (the early Cold War), 1980-1989 (the later Cold War), and 1990-2015 (the post-Soviet period). As the Cold War recedes in time, the recent cohort offers the most applicable data for the present. Among the characteristics of the 67 Americans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1990:

•They have usually been male and middle-aged. Half were married.

•Reflecting changes in the population as a whole, they were more diverse inracial and ethnic composition, and more highly educated than earlier cohorts.

•Three-quarters have been civil servants, one-quarter military, and compared tothe previous two cohorts, increasing proportions have been contractors, heldjobs not related to espionage, and/or not held security clearances.

•Three-quarters succeeded in passing information, while one-quarter wereintercepted before they could pass anything.

•Sixty percent were volunteers and 40% were recruited. Among recruits, 60%were recruited by a foreign intelligence service and 40% by family or friends.Contacting a foreign embassy was the most common way to begin as avolunteer.

•Compared to earlier cohorts in which the Soviet Union and Russiapredominated as the recipient of American espionage, recent espionageoffenders have transmitted information to a greater variety of recipients.

•Shorter prison sentences have been the norm in the recent past.

•Sixty-eight percent of people received no payment.

•Money is the most common motive for committing espionage-related offenses,but it is less dominant than in the past. In the recent cohort, money was amotive for 28%, down from 41% and 45% in the first and second cohorts,respectively. Divided loyalties is the second most common motive (22%).Disgruntlement and ingratiation are nearly tied for third place, and more peopleseek recognition as a motive for espionage.

Returning to the full population, the majority of the 209 individuals committed classic espionage in which controlled national security information, usually classified, was transmitted to a foreign government. Classic espionage predominates in each cohort, but declined from 94% the first cohort to 78% in the most recent. This reflects authorities’ recent increasing treatment as espionage of the four additional types discussed in Part 2: leaks; acting as an agent of a foreign government; violations of export control laws; and economic espionage. Each of the four additional types is prosecuted under its own subset of statutes, which differs from those used in cases of classic espionage. The various types are usually handled by different federal agencies. They also differ in how involved the information of private companies and corporations is alongside government agencies.

The five types of espionage are not mutually exclusive, and a person may be charged with and convicted of more than one type. The assumption that espionage consists simply of classic espionage should be reexamined in light of how these four additional crimes are similar to or even charged as identical to classic espionage. All five types impose losses of national defense information, intellectual property, and/or advanced technologies that cause grave damage to the security and economy of the nation.

Four elements frame the analyses in Part 2. First, the legal statutes that define the crimes are identified and described. Prosecutorial choices as to which statutes to use are considered, alternate statutes that have been used in similar circumstances are identified, and reasons for the choices suggested. Second, examples of each type of espionage are presented as case studies. Third, issues resulting from classification of information are identified and discussed for each type, if applicable. Fourth, the numbers of individuals among the 209 are presented in tables for each of the five types, along with descriptive statistics to identify trends over time.

Part 3 discusses these trends by recognizing two central dimensions of the current context in which espionage occurs: ICT and globalization. Spies have moved with the times, and they employ all the technological sophistication and advantages they can access. Implications from this changing context are discussed, including how American espionage offenders gather, store, and transmit intelligence to a foreign government, and how a foreign government may now steal controlled information directly across interconnected networks, threatening to make spies obsolete.

Globalization affects many dimensions of life, and is especially apparent in areas relevant to espionage, such as political and military affairs, development of defense technologies, and international finance. It can influence the recruitment of spies and the likelihood that people will volunteer to commit espionage as a consequence of the ongoing trend toward a global culture, with its easy international transmission of ideas, civic ideals, and loosening allegiances of citizenship.

This report concludes by recommending revisions to the espionage statutes (Title 18 U.S.C. § 792 through 798) in order to address inconsistencies and ambiguities. Based on provisions enacted in 1917 and updated in last 1950, they are outdated. Three approaches to revision are outlined. First, try to eliminate inconsistencies among the espionage statutes themselves. Second, consider how to update the espionage statutes to reflect the current context of cyber capabilities, the Internet, and globalization. Third, consider how to amend the statutes that apply to all five types of espionage discussed in this report to reconcile inequities, eliminate gaps or overlaps, and create more consistency in the legal response to activities that are similar, even though they take place in different spheres.

In an appendix, this report examines how espionage fits into the broader study of insider threat, and considers three insights from insider threat studies that may illuminate espionage: personal crises and triggers, indicators of insider threat, and the role of organizational culture.

LEAKS AS A TYPE OF ESPIONAGE

Leaks are disclosures of classified information to the public. They are usually accomplished through the press or by publication in print or electronic media. A leak follows the form of classic espionage except that the recipient is different. Instead of being given to an agent of a foreign power or transnational adversary, leaks go out to the American public. Then, through modern communication channels, the information is transmitted around the world as it is re-published, translated, and discussed in additional press coverage. Both the content of the information and the fact that it is no longer under the government’s control are made available to everyone, including adversaries who systematically monitor the American press for insights.

The seven leakers discussed here were diverse. They ranged in age from 22 to 52 years of age: one person was 22, four persons were in their middle years (their 30s or 40s), and two persons were in their early 50s. They worked in various agencies: two were members of the military (U.S. Navy and U.S. Army); two were civilian federal employees, current or former (OSD and CIA); and three were contractors (two to the FBI, and one to DoS). They had reached different stages in their careers, from an Army Private First Class to people at mid-career to a respected senior defense policy specialist. Three common motives run through the seven cases.

•The leakers strongly objected to something they saw being done in the course oftheir work. Franklin, Diaz, Leibowitz, Kiriakou, and Manning each objected to government policies or actions that they observed, and they chose to intervene,usually by making their objections public by releasing classified information.

•The leakers enjoyed playing the role of expert. Franklin, Leibowitz, Kim, Kiriakou, and Sachtleben each sought out or responded to opportunities to share their expertise.

•The leakers wanted to help and saw themselves as helping. Diaz, Kim, and Manning, were, in their view, trying to help people they had befriended or with whom they sympathized.

To illustrate how leaks are a form of espionage in most ways, but not in every way, the elements of classic espionage discussed earlier are here applied to the actions of Franklin based on details are from his superseding indictment (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 2005).

•A context of competition. Franklin’s job was to monitor the hostile international relationship between the U.S. and Iran after its 1979 revolution. After 9/11, a debate simmered in Franklin’s agency over preparations for the invasion of Iraq.

•Secret means. Franklin verbally conveyed highly classified information to recipients in meetings held in places where they were less likely to be observed.

•Goal is secrets. Rosen and Weissman sought out a well-placed contact in OSD who could provide them with information. Rosen is quoted as saying on the telephone “that he was excited to meet with a ‘Pentagon guy’ [Franklin] because this person was a ‘real insider.’”

•Political, military, economic secrets. The classified information Franklin leaked to Rosen and Weissman included CIA internal reports on Middle Eastern countries, internal deliberations by federal officials, policy documents, and national intelligence concerning Al Qaeda and Iraq.

•Theft. Franklin was not accused of passing stolen documents to the recipients,only verbal information based on them. He was accused of stealing and taking home classified documents.

•Subterfuge and surveillance. Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman held their meetings at various restaurants, coffee shops, sports facilities, baseball games,and landmarks in the Washington, DC, area. In one instance, they met at Union Station, and conducted their conversations at three different restaurants.

•Illegality. Franklin was convicted of Title 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (e).

•Psychological toll. In July 2004, after the FBI explained the evidence and the likely consequences of a prison term on his family, Franklin took the FBI’s bargain for leniency and wore a wire during subsequent conversations with Rosen and Weissman.

TOP SECRET – U.S. Army Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

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The Korean peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the US in the Pacific Command (PACOM), and many observers note that North Korea is an unpredictable and potentially volatile actor. According to the Department of Defense in its report to Congress and the intelligence community, the DPRK “remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” Some of the latest evidence of irrational behavior is the elevation of Kim Jong Un’s 26-year old sister to a high governmental post late in 2014, the computer hacking of the Sony Corporation supposedly by North Korea during late 2014 over the possible release of a film that mocked Kim Jong Un, and the April 2015 execution of a defense chief for allegedly nodding off during a meeting. Over the past 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its enemies, especially South Korea. These actions included attacks on South Korean naval vessels, the capturing of a US ship and holding American hostages for 11 months, the hijacking of a South Korean airline jet, electronic warfare against South Korean signals including global positioning satellites (GPS), and assassinations or attempted assassinations on South Korean officials including the ROK president. The attempted 1968 Blue House Raid by North Korean elite military personnel resulted in the death or capture of all 31 infiltrators involved in the assassination attempt as well as the death of 71 personnel, including three Americans, and the injury of 66 others as the North Korean SPF personnel attempted to escape back to DPRK territory.

The purpose of this North Korean Threat Tactics Report (TTR) is to explain to the Army training community how North Korea fights including its doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, and the warfighting functions. A TTR also identifies where the conditions specific to the actor are present in Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues.

Executive Summary

  • North Korea is an oligarchy with Kim Jong Un as its supreme leader.
  • The DPRK is a militaristic society with about 1.2 million active duty personnel in uniform out of a population of 24 million with another 7.7 million in the reserve forces.
  • All military personnel serve under the umbrella of the Korean People’s Army (KPA); the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) and Korean People’s Navy (KPN) primarily support the KPA ground forces.
  • The KPAF focuses on homeland defense and close air support to the KPA.
  • The KPN’s primary mission is to protect the North Korean coastline and support the KPA special purpose forces (SPF) in mission execution.
  • Much of the equipment in all military branches is old and obsolete, but the KPA has concentrated its modernization efforts on missile technology that may provide the means to successfully launch a nuclear warhead.
  • North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon and is modernizing its missile fleet in order to increase the attack range for its nuclear arsenal.
  • North Korea possesses both chemical and biological weapons.
  • The KPA practices both passive and active camouflage to hide its units, headquarters, and other important resources from the air.

Weaknesses

Although the North Korean military may feature some positive attributes as a fighting force, the KPA also suffers from many weaknesses as well. Much of the military’s equipment is old and obsolete. The North Korean military consciously refuses to rid itself of any equipment and still operate tanks that date back to World War II. This wide range of military hardware from many generations of warfare also generates logistical issues. The KPA’s supply personnel must not only find the spare parts for a large variety of equipment, the KPA maintenance personnel must be well-versed in the repair of a great assortment of vehicles and weapons. In addition, the DPRK lacks the logistical capability to support the KPA beyond a few months. Due to the shortage of fuel and the cost to operate vehicles for a cash-strapped country, many of the KPA soldiers find themselves involved in public works projects or helping farmers bring in their rice crops. Any time spent in non-military support is less time that the KPA soldiers can spend training for combat. Even the mechanized and armor forces, due to resource restraints, spend much of their training time doing light infantry training instead of mounted operations. While KPA soldiers may be well trained in individual skills or small unit tactics, the amount of time spent on larger exercises pales in comparison to most Western militaries. Without adequate time and resources to practice large scale military operations, the KPA will always face a steep learning curve when the KPA is forced to perform them in actual combat for the first time.

The DPRK’s unorthodox use of provocation in order to obtain concessions from its enemies—especially the US, South Korea, and Japan—is a danger. One never knows what North Korea will do next as, in the past, the DPRK has sanctioned assassination attempts on South Korean political leaders and conducted bombings when South Korean contingents are in another country, unannounced attacks on ships by submarines, unprovoked artillery attacks, or has tunneled underground into another country. US military personnel stationed in South Korea must be prepared for the unexpected from the DPRK.

One of these incidents could ignite the Korean peninsula back into a full-blown war. While an armistice has been in place since 1953, an armistice is just a ceasefire waiting for a peace treaty to be signed or for the resumption of hostilities. Any conflict between North and South Korea would inevitably bring the US into the conflict as the ROK has been an ally for over six decades.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and the missiles to transport it up to 9,650 km makes it a threat to US forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Alaska, or even the west coast of the continental United States. Even more concerning was the DPRK’s first successful test launch of a KN-11 missile from a submarine on 23 January 2015 since, in the near future, the North Korean submarines could silently move closer to their targets before launching a nuclear missile that would give the US less warning time. If the DPRK thought that the survival of its country or the Kim regime was at stake, North Korea might use any nuclear weapons at its disposal. The KPA also possesses chemical weapons and its doctrine calls for their employment. The DPRK is also involved in biological weapons research and would likely use those with offensive capabilities. US military personnel training for deployment to South Korea must be prepared to fight in a chemical, biological, or nuclear environment.

EXPOSED – U.S. Army Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

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The Korean peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the US in the Pacific Command (PACOM), and many observers note that North Korea is an unpredictable and potentially volatile actor. According to the Department of Defense in its report to Congress and the intelligence community, the DPRK “remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” Some of the latest evidence of irrational behavior is the elevation of Kim Jong Un’s 26-year old sister to a high governmental post late in 2014, the computer hacking of the Sony Corporation supposedly by North Korea during late 2014 over the possible release of a film that mocked Kim Jong Un, and the April 2015 execution of a defense chief for allegedly nodding off during a meeting. Over the past 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its enemies, especially South Korea. These actions included attacks on South Korean naval vessels, the capturing of a US ship and holding American hostages for 11 months, the hijacking of a South Korean airline jet, electronic warfare against South Korean signals including global positioning satellites (GPS), and assassinations or attempted assassinations on South Korean officials including the ROK president. The attempted 1968 Blue House Raid by North Korean elite military personnel resulted in the death or capture of all 31 infiltrators involved in the assassination attempt as well as the death of 71 personnel, including three Americans, and the injury of 66 others as the North Korean SPF personnel attempted to escape back to DPRK territory.

The purpose of this North Korean Threat Tactics Report (TTR) is to explain to the Army training community how North Korea fights including its doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, and the warfighting functions. A TTR also identifies where the conditions specific to the actor are present in Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues.

Executive Summary

North Korea is an oligarchy with Kim Jong Un as its supreme leader.
The DPRK is a militaristic society with about 1.2 million active duty personnel in uniform out of a population of 24 million with another 7.7 million in the reserve forces.
All military personnel serve under the umbrella of the Korean People’s Army (KPA); the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) and Korean People’s Navy (KPN) primarily support the KPA ground forces.
The KPAF focuses on homeland defense and close air support to the KPA.
The KPN’s primary mission is to protect the North Korean coastline and support the KPA special purpose forces (SPF) in mission execution.
Much of the equipment in all military branches is old and obsolete, but the KPA has concentrated its modernization efforts on missile technology that may provide the means to successfully launch a nuclear warhead.
North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon and is modernizing its missile fleet in order to increase the attack range for its nuclear arsenal.
North Korea possesses both chemical and biological weapons.
The KPA practices both passive and active camouflage to hide its units, headquarters, and other important resources from the air.

Weaknesses

Although the North Korean military may feature some positive attributes as a fighting force, the KPA also suffers from many weaknesses as well. Much of the military’s equipment is old and obsolete. The North Korean military consciously refuses to rid itself of any equipment and still operate tanks that date back to World War II. This wide range of military hardware from many generations of warfare also generates logistical issues. The KPA’s supply personnel must not only find the spare parts for a large variety of equipment, the KPA maintenance personnel must be well-versed in the repair of a great assortment of vehicles and weapons. In addition, the DPRK lacks the logistical capability to support the KPA beyond a few months. Due to the shortage of fuel and the cost to operate vehicles for a cash-strapped country, many of the KPA soldiers find themselves involved in public works projects or helping farmers bring in their rice crops. Any time spent in non-military support is less time that the KPA soldiers can spend training for combat. Even the mechanized and armor forces, due to resource restraints, spend much of their training time doing light infantry training instead of mounted operations. While KPA soldiers may be well trained in individual skills or small unit tactics, the amount of time spent on larger exercises pales in comparison to most Western militaries. Without adequate time and resources to practice large scale military operations, the KPA will always face a steep learning curve when the KPA is forced to perform them in actual combat for the first time.

The DPRK’s unorthodox use of provocation in order to obtain concessions from its enemies—especially the US, South Korea, and Japan—is a danger. One never knows what North Korea will do next as, in the past, the DPRK has sanctioned assassination attempts on South Korean political leaders and conducted bombings when South Korean contingents are in another country, unannounced attacks on ships by submarines, unprovoked artillery attacks, or has tunneled underground into another country. US military personnel stationed in South Korea must be prepared for the unexpected from the DPRK.

One of these incidents could ignite the Korean peninsula back into a full-blown war. While an armistice has been in place since 1953, an armistice is just a ceasefire waiting for a peace treaty to be signed or for the resumption of hostilities. Any conflict between North and South Korea would inevitably bring the US into the conflict as the ROK has been an ally for over six decades.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and the missiles to transport it up to 9,650 km makes it a threat to US forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Alaska, or even the west coast of the continental United States. Even more concerning was the DPRK’s first successful test launch of a KN-11 missile from a submarine on 23 January 2015 since, in the near future, the North Korean submarines could silently move closer to their targets before launching a nuclear missile that would give the US less warning time. If the DPRK thought that the survival of its country or the Kim regime was at stake, North Korea might use any nuclear weapons at its disposal. The KPA also possesses chemical weapons and its doctrine calls for their employment. The DPRK is also involved in biological weapons research and would likely use those with offensive capabilities. US military personnel training for deployment to South Korea must be prepared to fight in a chemical, biological, or nuclear environment.

 

Exposed ´´US War with North Korea Is No Joke At All`

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War with North Korea: No Joke By John Stanton The 20th Century Korean War from 1950-1953 pitting US-led United Nations coalition forces against the North Korean and Chinese militaries has been in pause mode for 64 years. The Korean Armistice was signed on July 27, 1953 by the United States, China and North Korea. It called for a cessation of hostilities until a lasting peace agreement between the warring parties could be negotiated and signed. That, of course, has not happened due as much to North Korea’s rationally maniacal behavior and ruthless treatment of its citizens, as to its role as a useful pawn of the Chinese and American governments. The Chinese feel compelled to let the incendiary North Korean government in Pyongyang irritate and provoke the United States and much of the world community, and the Americans don’t mind having a large military presence to deter North Korea but also to keep an eye on the China and the Southeast Asian region. China has apparently reinforced its military forces on its border with North Korea. Russia has a short land and maritime border with North Korea. In 2015 officials from the two countries signed an agreement to construct a road connection between the two neighbors during their “Year of Friendship.” According to NK.News.org, North Korea and Russia envisioned “closer collaboration between the two states in political, economic and humanitarian spheres.” As tensions ratchet up in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests, Russia has apparently shored up its military forces near the bustling Russian port city of Vladivostok, home to Russia’s Pacific Fleet and within range of North Korean missiles. US-Led Coalition These military moves by China and Russia make sense if war breaks out between a US-led coalition including South Korea, Japan, Canada, and Australia (for starters) and North Korean forces. The extra forces would likely be used to stanch the tide of North Koreans expected to stream out of North Korea. In the unfortunate circumstance that sees North Korea’s first use of a nuclear weapon, a US retaliatory strike would ensure that the radiologically damaged would seek care in China and Russia, care that China and Russia can ill-afford to provide on a large scale. During a protracted conventional conflict, it seems likely that enterprising organizations in China and Russia would attempt to funnel weapons and aid to the North Koreans to keep the US-led coalition occupied while they ponder their strategic and tactical options. With the US bogged down in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, there are many moves that the Chinese and Russians could make contrary to US interests. The political and pundit classes in New York City and Washington, DC believe that the Trump Administration will just kick the Kim Jong-Un tin can down the road for another US president. The same elites told us all that Hillary Clinton would, with great certainty, win the 2016 presidential election. After 100 days of the Trump presidency, they still shake their heads in disbelief. Yet, they seemed to believe fully in President Trump’s punitive April cruise missile strikes in Syria undertaken after a Bashar Al Assad use of a nerve agent on his own citizens. But Trump’s people say that the time for “strategic patience” with North Korea is over. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the Perry Como of the US State Department, declared as much during a recent visit to South Korea. Has America’s new Ken and Barbie, Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump, been advising President Trump on the matter? As for China’s influence, it has warned North Korea not to test Trump even as it recently resumed flights to North Korea from Beijing. Time will tell if China is serious in assisting the US or not. Intellectuals? Beyond the political and pundit classes who grace the world with their intellectual acumen are those across the spectrum who think that North Korea is the way it is because of the policies and practices of the US government. Those outlandish claims should not be seriously entertained. Kim Jong-Un is seen in this video smoking a cigarette and, at one point, sitting at a desk not far from an aircraft runway watching his air force and army in action. It looks a lot like a Monty Python skit until you realize that the North Koreans really believe they are a competent military power. And then there is the North Korean Army’s recent live fire exercise. What kind of commanders and political leaders think that the alignment of this artillery on a beach? The commanders are essentially giving their troops a death sentence as US standoff weapons systems would mostly obliterate such massed artillery. North Korean military doctrine is as obsolete as much of its weaponry is. Still, war is horrible and North Korea would, initially, likely cause a lot of pain to the northern portions of Seoul, South Korea. US, South and North Korean civilian casualties would certainly follow. Pain reduction, not elimination, depends on the lethality of US preemptive missile, bomber and cyber-attacks designed to neutralize what the US-led coalition’s intelligence believes to be the targets most important to hit first. Most likely, both North Korean nuclear weapons testing and medium-long range missile sites would be targeted, simultaneously with other North Korean conventional military assets. Before such a conflict de-confliction lines with China and Russia would have to be opened. The Fight North Korea has to know that if it moves any weapons systems into the open, the heat or electronic emissions will get them killed. US intelligence services have tried hard to anticipate how quickly the North Koreans can load and reload artillery and the extent of their ammunition supplies. Then there are the diesel submarines North Korea has in operation. US military antisubmarine warfare aircraft and detection is the best in the world and the Navy would be quick to begin the search for North Korean submarines. US attack class submarines would have to eliminate the DPRK’s undersea threat very quickly, just as US air forces would be called upon to clear the airspace above North Korea as rapidly as possible. North Korean surface vessels would not do well against US anti-ship weaponry with its advanced guidance systems. On the ground and from the sea, the situation is less clear. North Korea is vulnerable to amphibious landings on both its coastlines on the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. The US Navy and Marine Corps would not attempt such landings until many days into a conflict though. North Korea is said to have sleeper cells in South Korea that would be activated to destroy key communications nodes and other critical infrastructure. North Korean Special Forces are said to be a dangerous threat as in any conflict they would be tasked with infiltrating South Korea to engage in sabotage. It is not known how the North Korean civilian population would respond to an attack. The nation is home to 25 million people who have mostly known nothing but privation and austerity. Of course, that’s the view from the outside. There are tantalizing hints that the civilians there might stay away from the fighting to a limited degree. Books smuggled out of North Korea like The Accusation give a hint of some of the thinking of the well-educated and economically better positioned denizens. But the US experience with insurgencies from Vietnam until the present have not been pleasant, successful affairs. At any rate, the “will” of the North Korean population would play a significant role in a protracted conflict. Some argue that the US should learn from its 20th Century Korean War experience. But comparisons are invalid. The conflict took place as the US was drawing down from World War II and cold political winds were blowing. Since that time the North Koreans have spent a lot of time training to fight but have not been engaged in protracted conflicts for the last two decades as the US has been. There is no substitute for training but when military forces have experience in combat operations and maintain a training regime there is going to be a mismatch at some point favoring the US. Yet another consideration is the Joint Force capabilities of the North Korean military versus the UScoalition interoperability and joint force training. There is no evidence to suggest that North Korea has “networked” its fighting forces to wage war in the cross domains of sea, undersea, land, air, space and cyber. Nor has North Korea conducted extensive training exercises with partner or allies equivalent to Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea. No One Knows and that Unfinished Business Thing A long term conflict in which the US-led coalition fails to bring North Korea to its knees would allow other nations to make risky moves. Would Russia invade Eastern Ukraine and move up to the Dnieper River? Would China move on Taiwan? Would Turkey move further into Syria? Would Iran move further into Syria and Iraq? Would Russia get more aggressive in Libya? Would Europe further splinter as some members of the European Union back the US while others do not (the UK would fight with the US)? Would the American public support a longer term war effort? Unfortunately, the US, North and South Korea issue is unfinished business. Not too many people on the planet want to see a video of the Kim Jong-Un of the future sitting at his portable desk smoking a cigarette while watching the North Korean “Death to America” ICBM successfully launched and carrying a nuke toward the United States. If that ICBM made in through US missile defenses, the United States nuclear retaliatory response would turn North Korea into a radiological waste-land for decades. No one in the world wants to see that happen either. John Stanton can be reached at jstantonarchangel@gmail.com

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