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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

(U//FOUO) DHS Final Decision on Removal of Kaspersky-Branded Products

The following assessment was included in court filings made by Kaspersky in their case against the U.S. Government for banning the use of Kaspersky products.

Financial Decision on Binding Operational Directive 17-01, Removal of Kaspersky-Branded Products

Page Count: 25 pages

Date: December 4, 2017

Restriction: For Official Use Only

Originating Organization: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Cybersecurity and Communications

File Type: pdf

File Size: 504,629 bytes

File Hash (SHA-256): 6F6A660D2CFCD36CBDFAE3675E6F7C76CEEF404DB26736D44AD196A139592100

BOD 17-01 requires all federal executive branch departments and agencies to (1) identify the use or presence of “Kaspersky-branded products” on all federal information systems within 30 days of BOD issuance (i.e., by October 13); (2) develop and provide to DHS a detailed plan of action to remove and discontinue present and future use of all Kaspersky-branded products within 60 days of BOD issuance (i.e., by November 12); and (3) begin to implement the plan of action at 90 days after BOD issuance (i.e., December 12), unless directed otherwise by DHS in light of new information obtained by DHS, including but not limited to new information submitted by Kaspersky.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to issue BODs, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, for the purpose of safeguarding federal information and information systems from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk. I recommended issuing the BOD in the Information Memorandum, and the rationale for issuance of the BOD was summarized in your Decision Memorandum. As described further below, your decision to issue BOD 17-01 was based on three interrelated concerns that rested on expert judgments concerning national security: the broad access to files and elevated privileges of anti-virus software, including Kaspersky software; ties between Kaspersky officials and Russian government agencies; and requirements under Russian law that allow Russian intelligence agencies to request or compel assistance from Kaspersky and to intercept communications transiting between Kaspersky operations in Russia and Kaspersky customers, including U.S. government customers. Because of these interrelated concerns, you determined that Kaspersky-branded products present a “known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk.” In addition, you found that these risks exist regardless of whether Kaspersky-branded products have ever been exploited for malicious purposes. The BOD is a tool for protecting federal information and information systems from any “known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk,” and the Department’s authority to issue it does not depend on whether Kaspersky-branded products have been exploited by the Russian Government or Kaspersky to date.

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BRG evaluated specific Kaspersky products according to the following objectives:

(1) To evaluate whether it is feasible for an intelligence agency to passively monitor and decrypt traffic between users of Kaspersky-branded products and the Kaspersky Security Network (“KSN”), a cloud-based network that receives and analyzes information about possible threats from installed Kaspersky software;

(2) To determine whether turning KSN off ― or using the Kaspersky Private Security Network (“KPSN”) ― can reliably prevent potentially sensitive data from being transmitted inadvertently to Kaspersky; and

(3) To evaluate whether a malicious actor leveraging KSN can conduct targeted searches of Kaspersky users for specific information.

As explained in the NCCIC Supplemental Assessment, the BRG analysis not only is largely unresponsive to DHS’s security concerns, but also supports DHS’s concerns in certain areas. For example, on objective (1), BRG analyzed only to the security of the connection between the antivirus software and the KSN; BRG did not address the security of communications within the KSN or between KSN and Kaspersky’s non-KSN IT infrastructure, such as Kaspersky offices and datacenters. BRG also evaluated the potential for “passive” interception of communications by intelligence agencies, but DHS is concerned about “active” operations involving access by Russian intelligence to Kaspersky offices and servers in Russia, as discussed in Section III.A.4 below and Part III.E of the Information Memorandum.

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3. Kaspersky Ties to the Russian Government

In the Information Memorandum, I described certain ties, past and present, between Kaspersky officials and Russian government agencies. Kaspersky concedes key aspects of this account, such as Eugene Kaspersky’s former studies at an institute overseen by the KGB and other state institutions and his service as a software engineer at a Ministry of Defense institute. It also admits that its officials might have “acquaintances, friends, and professional relationships within the [Russian] government,” although Kaspersky states that, “in itself,” does not mean that these connections were or are “inappropriate” or “improper.” Furthermore, Kaspersky does not deny various connections to Russian intelligence described in the Information Memorandum, including that Eugene Kaspersky has saunas with a group that usually includes Russian intelligence officials; that Kaspersky’s Chief Legal Officer Igor Chekunov manages a team of specialists who provide technical support to the FSB and other Russian agencies; that the team can gather identifying information from individual computers; and that this technology has been used to aid the FSB in investigations

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Professor Maggs makes a number of significant conclusions. Specifically, Professor Maggs

concludes that:

(a) Russian law requires FSB bodies to carry out their activities in collaboration with various entities in Russia, including private enterprises, and thus including Kaspersky.

(b) Private enterprises, including Kaspersky, are under a legal obligation to assist FSB bodies in the execution of the duties assigned to FSB bodies, including counterintelligence and intelligence activity.

(c) Russian law permits FSB service personnel to be seconded to private enterprises, including Kaspersky, with the consent of the head of the enterprise and with the FSB personnel remaining in FSB military service status during the secondment.

(d) Kaspersky qualifies as an “organizer of the dissemination of information on the Internet” and, as such, is required (1) to store in Russia and provide to authorized state bodies, including the FSB, metadata currently and content as of July 1, 2018; and, based on this or other laws, (2) to install equipment and software that enables the FSB and potentially other state authorities to monitor all data transmissions between Kaspersky’s computers in Russia and Kaspersky customers, including U.S. government customers.

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy 2018
May 20, 2018

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy
Page Count: 35 pages
Date: May 15, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Department of Homeland Security
File Type: pdf
File Size: 278,548 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 65DED01F461679F5028AFE8C2B0FE08CBFE0EE17BD530F4815D12EF738FB3656

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The American people are increasingly dependent upon the Internet for daily conveniences, critical services, and economic prosperity. Substantial growth in Internet access and networked devices has facilitated widespread opportunities and innovation. This extraordinary level of connectivity, however, has also introduced progressively greater cyber risks for the United States. Long-standing threats are evolving as nation-states, terrorists, individual criminals, transnational criminal organizations, and other malicious actors move their activities into the digital world. Enabling the delivery of essential services—such as electricity, finance, transportation, water, and health care—through cyberspace also introduces new vulnerabilities and opens the door to potentially catastrophic consequences from cyber incidents. The growing number of Internet-connected devices and reliance on global supply chains further complicates the national and international risk picture. More than ever, cybersecurity is a matter of homeland security and one of the core missions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

At DHS, we believe that cyberspace can be secure and resilient. We work every day across the Department and with key partners and stakeholders to identify and manage national cybersecurity risks. We do this by adopting a holistic risk management approach. Like every organization, no matter how big or small, we must minimize our organizational vulnerability to malicious cyber activity by protecting our own networks. DHS also has broader responsibilities to protect the larger federal enterprise and improve the security and resilience of other critical systems. At the same time, we seek to reduce cyber threats by preventing and disrupting cyber crimes, and to lessen the consequences of cyber incidents by ensuring an effective federal response when appropriate. Finally, we work to create conditions for more effective cyber risk management through efforts to make the cyber ecosystem more fundamentally secure and resilient. This strategy sets forth our goals, objectives, and priorities to successfully execute the full range of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity responsibilities.

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During the last several decades, advances in technology have fundamentally changed the world. Substantial growth in Internet access, use of Internet-enabled devices, and the availability of high speed information technology systems and large datasets have facilitated productivity, efficiencies, and capabilities across all major industries. The proliferation of technology also presents new cybersecurity challenges and leads to significant national risks. More than 20 billion devices are expected to be connected to the Internet by 2020. The risks introduced by the growing number and variety of such devices are substantial.

The United States faces threats from a growing set of sophisticated malicious actors who seek to exploit cyberspace. Motivations include espionage, political and ideological interests, and financial gain. Nation-states continue to present a considerable cyber threat. But non-state actors are emerging with capabilities that match those of sophisticated nation-states. Criminal actors are increasingly empowered by modern information and communications technologies that enable them to grow in sophistication and transnational reach. Transnational criminal organizations also increasingly collaborate through cyberspace. Complicating the threat picture, nation-states are increasingly using proxies and other techniques that blur the distinction between state and non-state cyber activities. In a number of cases, malicious actors engaged in significant criminal cyber activity appear to have both criminal and nation-state affiliations.

These diverse threats can impact federal and nonfederal information systems. Attempted incursions into government networks occur on a daily basis; the number of cyber incidents on federal systems reported to DHS increased more than ten-fold between 2006 and 2015. In 2015, a high-profile intrusion into a single federal agency resulted in the compromise of personnel records of over 4 million federal employees and ultimately affected nearly 22 million people. The growing interconnection of cyber and physical systems within critical infrastructure also creates the potential risk for malicious cyber activity to result in direct physical consequences; for example, the December 2015 overriding of controls in the Ukrainian electric grid resulted in widespread loss of power. Ransomware incidents such as WannaCry and NotPetya demonstrate how the rapid growth of the internet-of-things further complicates the threat as everyday devices can be targeted by malicious cyber actors with potentially far-reaching consequences.

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Guiding Principles

DHS advances our mission and will accomplish our cybersecurity goals by aligning departmental activities according to the following guiding principles:

1. Risk prioritization. The foremost responsibility of DHS is to safeguard the American people and we must prioritize our efforts to focus on systemic risks and the greatest cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities faced by the American people and our homeland.
2. Cost-effectiveness. Cyberspace is highly complex and DHS efforts to increase cybersecurity must be continuously evaluated and reprioritized to ensure the best results for investments made.
3. Innovation and agility. Cyberspace is an evolving domain with emergent risks. Although the proliferation of technology leads to new risks, it also provides an opportunity for innovation. DHS must lead by example in researching, developing, adapting, and employing cutting-edge cybersecurity capabilities and remain agile in its efforts to keep up with evolving threats and technologies.
4. Collaboration. The growth and development of the Internet has been primarily driven by the private sector and the security of cyberspace is an inherently cross-cutting challenge. To accomplish our cybersecurity goals, we must work in a collaborative manner across our Components and with other federal and nonfederal partners.
5. Global approach. Robust international engagement and collaboration is required to accomplish our national cybersecurity goals. DHS must engage internationally to manage global cyber risks, respond to worldwide incidents, and disrupt growing transnational cyber threats as well as encourage other nations and foreign entities to adopt the policies necessary to create an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet.
6. Balanced equities. Cyberspace empowers people and enables prosperity worldwide. Cybersecurity is not an end unto itself, and efforts to mitigate cybersecurity risks must also support international commerce, strengthen international security, and foster free expression and innovation.
7. National values. DHS must uphold privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in accordance with applicable law and policy. The Department empowers our cybersecurity programs to succeed by integrating privacy protections from the outset and employing a layered approach to privacy and civil liberties oversight.

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Cyberspace operations (CO) is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.

This publication focuses on military operations in and through cyberspace; explains the relationships and responsibilities of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Service cyberspace component (SCC) commands, and combat support agencies; and establishes a framework for the employment of cyberspace forces and capabilities.

The Nature of Cyberspace Relationship with the Physical Domains.

Cyberspace, while part of the information environment, is dependent on the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space.

CO use links and nodes located in the physical domains and perform logical functions to create effects first in cyberspace and then, as needed, in the physical domains. Actions in cyberspace, through carefully controlled cascading effects, can enable freedom of action for activities in the physical domains.

Cyberspace Layer Model. To assist in the planning and execution of CO, cyberspace can be described in terms of three interrelated layers: physical network, logical network, and cyberpersona. Department of Defense (DOD) Cyberspace. The Department of Defense information network (DODIN) is the set of information capabilities and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone, including owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services, and national security systems.

Connectivity and Access. Gaining access to operationally useful areas of cyberspace, including targets within them, is affected by legal, policy, or operational limitations. For all of these reasons, access is not guaranteed. Additionally, achieving a commander’s objectives can be significantly complicated by specific elements of cyberspace being used by enemies, adversaries, allies, neutral parties, and other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, all at the same time.

The operational environment (OE) is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and impact the decisions of the commander assigned responsibility for it. The information environment permeates the physical domains and therefore exists in any OE. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

Given that cyberspace is wholly contained within the information environment and the chief purpose of information operations (IO) is to create effects in the information environment, there is significant interdependency between IO and CO.

Integrating Cyberspace Operations with Other Operations

During joint planning, cyberspace capabilities are integrated into the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) plans and synchronized with other operations across the range of military operations. While not the norm, some military objectives can be achieved by CO alone. Commanders conduct CO to obtain or retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace, accomplish JFC objectives, deny freedom of action to the threat, and enable other operational activities.

Cyberspace Operations Forces

Commander, United States Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM), commands a preponderance of the cyberspace forces that are not retained by the Services. USCYBERCOM accomplishes its missions within three primary lines of operation: secure, operate, and defend the DODIN; defend the nation from attack in cyberspace; and provide cyberspace support as required to combatant commanders (CCDRs). The Services man, train, and equip cyberspace units and provide them to USCYBERCOM through the SCCs.

Challenges to the Joint Force’s Use of Cyberspace

Threats. Cyberspace presents the JFC’s operations with many threats, from nation-states to individual actors to accidents and natural hazards. Anonymity and Difficulties with Attribution. To initiate an appropriate defensive response, attribution of threats in cyberspace is crucial for any actions external to the defended cyberspace beyond authorized self-defense.

Geography Challenges. In cyberspace, there is no stateless maneuver space. Therefore, when US military forces maneuver in foreign cyberspace, mission and policy requirements may require they maneuver clandestinely without the knowledge of the state where the infrastructure is located.

Technology Challenges. Using a cyberspace capability that relies on exploitation of technical vulnerabilities in the target may reveal its functionality and compromise the capability’s effectiveness for future missions.

Private Industry and Public Infrastructure. Many of DOD’s critical functions and operations rely on contracted commercial assets, including Internet service providers (ISPs) and global supply chains, over which DOD and its forces have no direct authority.

Globalization. The combination of DOD’s global operations with its reliance on cyberspace and associated technologies means DOD often procures mission-essential information technology products and services from foreign vendors.

Mitigations. DOD partners with the defense industrial base (DIB) to increase the security of information about DOD programs residing on or transiting DIB unclassified networks.

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