die letzte Post hat die Genossen von der Gomopa-Stasi unter dem mutmasslichen Capo Jochen Resch und seinem Luca Brasi aus dem Haeuschen gebracht. Denn sie zielt ins Herz der Neo-Stasi.
Der getroffene KGB-Stasi-Genosse bellt und manipuliert die Suchmaschine Google…
Eine alte Falschmeldung aus 2011 bzgl. eines angeblichen Haftbefehls von Frau Beate Porten, Frau von IZ-Gesellschafter Thomas Porten (der meine Anteile an der IZ kaufte) wird wieder im Netz hochgespielt.
Herrschaften: Mich werdet Ihr nicht wie Heinz Gerlach ausschalten !
Page Count: 37 pages Date: November 22, 2020 Restriction: None Originating Organization: Department of Defense, Department of Health and Human Services File Type: pdf File Size: 988,362 bytes File Hash (SHA-256): 84C91E504D1097677DE9078D83160245ADF8D244F9E1788B3915756BDEA0E7F6
This playbook is intended to support sites interested in administering COVID-19 treatment under EUA including: • Existing hospital or community-based infusion centers • Existing clinical space (e.g. urgent care, emergency depts) • Ad hoc new infusion sites (e.g. “hospitals without walls”) • Long-term care facilities or home infusions with infusion delivery capability
Initial version of playbook focused on: • Monoclonal antibody treatment • Delivery via infusion • Outpatient setting
This playbook will continue to evolve as other treatments and administration methods become available. We hope this playbook will be used to help healthcare facilities to implement monoclonal antibody treatment in an outpatient setting for those with COVID-19.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY The CC BCP Politburo approves the protocol for cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi), agreed upon at a September meeting in Berlin.
CREATORS TSANKOV, GEORGI
CHERVENKOV, VULKO
SUBJECTS DISCUSSED Bulgarian Communist Party. Central Committee Intelligence operations Germany (East). Ministry for State Security (Stasi) Intelligence service–Bulgaria Bulgaria. Ministry of Internal Affairs Bulgaria–Foreign relations–Communist countries More … LOCATIONS DISCUSSED Bulgaria East Germany
DOCUMENT SUMMARY This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”
CREATOR AKHROMEYEV, SERGEI
SUBJECTS DISCUSSED Nuclear disarmament North Atlantic Treaty Organization–Military policy Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy Nuclear weapons–North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear nonproliferation Arms race Nuclear weapons–United States Military doctrine–Poland Military doctrine–Soviet Union Poland–Military relations–Soviet Union Nuclear weapons–Warsaw Treaty Organization More … LOCATIONS DISCUSSED Poland Soviet Union United States
[stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw HQ Silesian Military District – Staff [top of stamp invisible] UNRESTRICTED 1 [handwritten] First Department No. 2838 RESTRICTED No. 9F 579/I [handwritten] No. 72248 UNRESTRICTED 1988 – 06-07 19__ Received 1988 – 06- 14 50-984 Wrocław Annex 1 Sheet 27 GOC/CHIEF 9 [?]U [?] 2838 [handwritten] [handwritten diagonally across the page and very hard to read] Comrade Lieutenant Colonel [illegible] Based on this material carry out training of cadres and staff and [?] with a view to [rest illegible]. Signed [illegible signature] 15.06.88 On the instructions of the Chief of Staff of the Silesian Military District I am sending for official use a translation of a lecture by the Chief of the General Staff, the first Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, given on 14.04.1988 at the Polish Army General Staff College. Annex 1 on 27 sheets. CHIEF [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw Colonel Dr. Stanisław KOZIEJ Printed Silesian Military District [illegible] 876/88 I confirm conformity with the original 13 ii 2008 [illegible] Wojciech [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw Annex To outgoing letter No. 7[?]2248 [illegible] incoming 7.06.1988 No. 1 dated 1988 – 06.14 Working translation from Russian UNRESTRICTED 2 [handwritten] RESTRICTED Copy no. 12 [illegible stamp] THE CURRENT STATE OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE (a lecture given by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR at the Polish Army General Staff College.) I confirm conformity with the original Honored Comrade Lieutenant General Józef Użycki, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army! Honored Comrade Major General Władysław Mróz, Commandant of the Polish Army General Staff College! Honored Polish comrades! Permit me, first of all, to thank everyone most sincerely for the privilege of appearing before you and to transmit greetings, as well as best wishes to the College’s team from the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Army General Comrade Dimitri Yazov, from the generals, admirals and officers of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. In my talk I should like to present the fundamentals of Soviet military doctrine closely linked to the principal directions of the military doctrines of the nations of the Warsaw Pact. It is no accident that currently much is written and said throughout the whole world about military doctrines. Everyone is threatened by the danger of nuclear war. Mankind’s greatest task is to survive in an era of space flight and nuclear power. New political thinking requires also new attitudes in military thinking.
[illegible] [illegible stamp] [an identical copy of the previous page] [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] -2- 3 [handwritten] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw It was emphasized at the meeting of the Annual [illegible handwritten word] Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact Countries in Berlin that, in the current situation, there is a greater need to understand correctly the aims and intentions in the military sphere of countries, as well as of political-military alliances, as embodied in other military doctrines. For it is in military doctrines that we find a reflection of the real essence of military policy, the thrust of weapons’ development, of production and of the armed forces’ preparations. [underlined by hand] Allow me in this lecture to focus on a few current issues, first of all of Soviet military doctrine. [stamp] I confirm conformity with the original _ IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I. CONTENT AND THRUST OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE What do we mean by military doctrine? Why, in addition to the study of war, do we also have the concept of military doctrine? Well, in the study of war we can find various views on the issues of national defense and military matters. From a theoretical point of view this is both good and desirable. After all, the process of the clash of ideas leads to truth, based on defensible premises. However, some disputes can be never-ending, while the practical work of strengthening a country’s defenses requires legally-sanctioned views on the most pressing issues of the armed forces’ development and preparations. Military doctrine – is not simply a collection of theoretical views, but a system of decisions, which firstly: reflects officially-accepted views, which are binding on military personnel; secondly – military doctrine does not encompass the whole of military-political and military-technical knowledge, but only the most important, basic [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 4 [handwritten]
3 – conclusions indicating the key thrust of the armed forces’ development and preparations. From the scientific point of view the military doctrine of socialist countries is based on Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, military thought, as well as on the whole system of knowledge about war and the army. Military doctrine selects from the whole system of knowledge and sanctions in official documents the most important, key decisions emanating from specific military-political tasks in the current phase, from intentions to ensure the socialist countries’ security and defense at the present level of military threat, and from our country’s and the socialist countries’ economic and military potential. The Warsaw Pact’s military doctrine was drawn up by the combined efforts of the political leadership of the allied countries and adopted by the Advisory Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact. The ministers of defense and general staffs of the fraternal armies are responsible for specifying its military-technical dimension. In the USSR military doctrine is drawn up, ratified and implemented by the Defense Committee of the USSR, the Soviet government and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. The military doctrine of the countries of the Warsaw Pact reflects the commonality of the socialist countries’ military-political defensive goals. Each of our socialist countries has its own national defense doctrine. Our common military doctrine in no way interferes with or contradicts any country’s national interests. These doctrines organically reinforce and permeate one another, representing an expression of the general, basic tenets of the defense of socialism. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 5 [handwritten]
4 – While the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Organization covers defense issues basically applicable to Europe, Soviet military doctrine also embraces a set of national goals dealing with the use of nuclear weapons, the country’s defense in the East and elsewhere, in other words with the defense of the achievements of socialism, on more or less a global scale. [underlined by hand] This indicates the scale, the complexity, the many-sidedness and mutual connections of the defense problems which we have to solve. Of course, we solve these problems in consultation with our allies both in Europe and elsewhere. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw The Warsaw Pact countries’ adoption of common, agreed guidelines for military doctrine is of great significance. In the international context it allows us to eliminate the mutual suspicions and lack of trust, accumulated over many decades, between countries with different systems, to achieve a better understanding of fears and mutual goals. From the point of view of solving the defense problems facing the socialist countries this represents a unified approach to understanding military doctrine as well as co-ordinating our efforts on behalf of our socialist homeland. Summing up the issues, it is possible to state that current Soviet military doctrine represents a system of officially-accepted, basic views on the issue of preventing war, the development of armed forces, the preparation of countries and armed forces to repel aggression as well as to conduct military operations in defense of socialism. While our earlier military doctrine was seen as a system of thoughts about preparations for war and its conduct, its current fundamental thrust is to prevent war. The task of preventing war is the primary objective, [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 6 [handwritten]
5 – the essence of military doctrine, the fundamental function of a nation and its armed forces. Obviously, preventing a world war is primarily a political issue. But politics, in their purest form, do not exist. They can be realistic only when they take into account the close interconnection of a country’s social, economic, ideological and defense interests. In this connection, the Ministry of Defense, as well as the General Staff, must focus ever more vigorously on solving problems connected to preventing war, arms reduction, strengthening trust between countries based on the document of the Stockholm Agreement and others. In order more effectively to deter aggression, constant analysis, especially by higher-ranking officers, of the current state and potential development of armaments and military equipment of one’s own and one’s adversary’s armed forces is essential. At the same time, one should act in such a way as not to create an intensification of the arms race. This is a cardinal principle, which has become the basis for the emergence in our military doctrine and strategy of a new direction relating to the problems of preventing war. [underlined by hand] For the General Staff in the Soviet Union it is this very principle which is probably the reason for its reconstruction. Our military doctrine has a political and a military-technical side. Military doctrine’s political side has a leading role. It defines the attitude towards the problem of war and its prevention in the nuclear age, the thrust of tasks associated with strengthening the defense and ensuring the security of a country based on Lenin’s statement that: “a revolution is only worthwhile if it can defend itself.” [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 7 [handwritten]
6 – The essence of our military doctrine’s political side depends on the fact that the socialist countries unhesitatingly reject war as a means of solving political, economic and ideological differences between countries. They treat no country, no nation as an enemy and make no territorial claims on any nation. The socialist countries resolutely oppose nuclear war and any other war. In current conditions world war has ceased to be the continuation of rational politics [underlined by hand] by the use of other – forceful means. Nuclear war, should it be begun, could lead to the destruction of mankind. Likewise a conventional war can take a much more destructive and murderous form. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw A system of international security can be created only as part of a whole network of accomplishments in the military, political, economic and humanitarian fields. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have suggested a number of concrete proposals along these lines. We attach great importance to the initiative of the People’s Republic of Poland proposed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, Comrade W. JARUZELSKI, on the 8th of May 1987 at the Second Congress of the Patriotic Movement for National Revival. As you know, this initiative envisages:
in the area of nuclear weapons – a gradual withdrawal and reduction of jointly-agreed categories of nuclear weapons (operational, tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons);
in the area of conventional weapons – a gradual withdrawal and reduction of jointly-agreed categories of conventional weapons, initially the most powerful ones used for sudden assault (at present negotiations on this subject are taking place); [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 8 [handwritten]
7 –
in the area of military doctrines – giving all military doctrines an exclusively defensive character so that, accompanied by a ceaseless maintenance of military parity, one could aim to achieve a level of armaments on either side which would not permit of a sudden attack. The objective of this evolution would be the mutual recognition of military doctrines as purely defensive;
in the area of accompanying measures of trust and security – defining security and confidence-building measures going further than the Stockholm ones; adopting undertakings not to use nuclear weapons first; a prohibition on concentrating large numbers of forces or carrying out military exercises along the demarcation line between the military blocks; a ceiling on the size of permitted military exercises. Detailed control mechanisms would be worked out. Expressing their support for these proposals the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries believe extending confidence-building measures to naval and air exercises to be appropriate. The meeting of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail GORBACHEV, with the President of the United States, Ronald REAGAN, the diligent efforts of the Soviet leadership have brought the first positive results which have an historical significance. The signing of the agreement on the decommissioning of medium and short-range missiles represents in practical terms the beginning of a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations are being conducted on a radical (50%) reduction of offensive strategic weapons while maintaining the terms of the agreement on anti-missile systems. The essential characteristic of the military doctrine of the countries of the Warsaw Pact is that it is entirely defensive in nature. These countries have confirmed that there are no circumstances under which they would start [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 9 [handwritten]
8 – a war, be it nuclear or conventional, against any country unless they are the object of an attack. They will never use nuclear weapons first. It would be in the interest of the countries of the Warsaw Pact to achieve the lowest possible level of military confrontation between nations. Under the present circumstances the lowest possible level of armaments guarantees mutual security. However, since this level is limited by the military preparations of the imperialist countries, the defensive strength of the socialist countries should be so calculated that between the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, it be even, similar; their security be mutual and, on the international scale, universal. The socialist countries do not insist on greater security, but they will not settle for less. Out of concern for their security, the countries of the Warsaw Pact are forced continually to improve their defensive capabilities so as not to be at a military disadvantage. The military-technical side of our military doctrine, starting from military-political premises, identifies a basic potential opponent and the nature of the military threat (for what kind of war should the armed forces be preparing); what armed forces are indispensable for conducting such a war and what should be their dispositions; methods of employment; thrust of preparations. Examining the nature of the military threat one can state that an analysis of the factors defining the development of the political-military situation confirms that we are facing a military threat. We still are. As [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 10 [handwritten]
9 – Mikhail GORBACHEV emphasized at a ceremony on November 2, 1987 commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution, despite some changes on the part of capitalism, its very being represents the principal threat of war. This is a function of the NATO countries’ aggressive policies. In its military doctrine the USA officially outlines and sanctions the notion of eradicating socialism as a socio-political system, using military means if necessary. Accordingly, the USA has adopted the doctrine of ‘direct confrontation’ calculated to impose American hegemony throughout the world, while the NATO doctrine of ‘flexible response’ anticipates war being waged using nuclear, as well as conventional weapons. In the current conditions of military-strategic parity, the imperialists are continually seeking ways to achieve their objectives both without war as well as by means of war. Nor, in their military doctrine, do they exclude the use of nuclear war whose aim is thus to achieve victory through sudden, incapacitating attacks aimed at weakening our strategic forces, using in this nuclear attack munitions and explosives which do not produce (dangerous to them) nuclear radiation, as well as launching attacks from space with weapons based on new principles of physics. This all emphasizes a strategy of using nuclear weapons first. Recently, the USA and its allies have come to the conclusion that their current strategic nuclear arsenal does not allow them to achieve military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. The USA is [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 11 [handwritten]
10 – attempting to get out of this blind alley by means of the SDI program: deploying an anti-missile system for national defense with some weapons based in space, with an offensive weapons system launched from space, and with the accelerated development of new, more effective conventional weapons. In its offensive strategic arsenal the USA is developing the MX ballistic missile and the B-1B strategic bomber. It continues to build OHIO-class nuclear submarines carrying TRIDENT 2 missiles. New guided weaponry for the strategic air force is planned. Work is being carried out on the new MIDGETMAN ballistic missile and the STEALTH bomber, which are to be introduced in the 90s. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw With reference to NATO’s general maneuver forces, we see a continuing increase in their combat effectiveness in line with the 20-year development plan adopted by the NATO leadership in December 1985. This involves equipping the ground forces, air forces and naval forces with new tanks, artillery, aircraft and other longrange weapons systems, with precision targeting capabilities and capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear munitions. There has been an increase in the scale and intensity of different exercises involving NATO armed forces, during which large forces are deployed near the socialist countries’ borders. NATO military doctrine anticipates that its armed forces will operate mainly in a sudden, polite [‘uprzedzający’, likely a typo or a mis-translation from the original Russian.] manner deep into the Theater of Operations, carrying out attacks on the command and control elements of our strategic nuclear forces and key Army, Air Defense and Naval assets, second echelon forces, reserves and lines of communication. This [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 12 [handwritten]
11 – can be clearly seen in the concepts of ‘the air-land war’ and ‘engagement of second-echelon forces’. NATO combined forces, by virtue of their composition, location and operational deployment (including numerous forward bases and naval forces), their high level of readiness, have clearly crossed the line of what is necessary for their own defense and are in reality offensive forces. In the Central European theater of operations alone we can count in peacetime 42 divisions and 2,500 military aircraft. During major maneuvers these forces are increased 1½ to 2 times. The danger increases of the enemy launching a surprise attack, which by the way is NATO commanders’ principal objective. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw The outcome of the NATO Council’s meetings in Brussels earlier this year (March 2-3) proves that the Western countries not only do not intend to reduce preparations for war, but are intending to expand them. The agreement on medium and short-range missiles has yet to be ratified, and already there is talk of compensating for them in Europe. This position on the part of the leadership of NATO combined forces was also confirmed at a meeting between the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Army General Dimitri YAZOV, and the US Secretary of Defense, Frank CARLUCCI. If the implementation of all these military programs and the imperialist countries’ preparations are not countered, they could lead to a heightened military threat to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. This is objective reality which cannot be discounted. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 13 [handwritten]
12 – Therefore, at this stage it is particularly important to raise the effectiveness of the armed forces’ development and their equipment levels, while taking very much into account the military-economic viewpoint, a general increase in vigilance, organization and discipline, the combat readiness of command and control assets and of the armed forces, and raising qualitative indices in the area of operational and combat training. It is precisely on solving these issues that the leadership and entire personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces are currently working. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw The task of the military-technical side of military doctrine is not only to identify the nature of the military threat but also to provide a precise answer to the question: for responding to what attack should the armed forces be prepared? In the current situation we accept as an initial premise the possibility of both conventional and nuclear world war. Thus the armed forces need to be equally prepared for both kinds of war. The need to prepare for nuclear war derives from the fact that there is a continual threat of nuclear war and in the event that the imperialist countries unleash it, our armed forces should carry out retaliatory-interception and retaliatory strikes, in other words execute their responsibility to defend the socialist homeland, depending on which kind of means are used to unleash war and what are its consequences. It is essential to prepare the land forces and navy for conventional warfare since, given the catastrophic [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 14 [handwritten]
13 – effects of nuclear war, the possibility of conducting a conventional war becomes greater. In recent years our enemy has ever more frequently emphasized starting war using conventional means. Therefore, if the aggressor starts such a war, we shall have to respond using similar means, without having recourse to using nuclear weapons first. In the military-political sphere our military doctrine has always been defensive in nature. Today this feature is being expanded and deepened. In the current existing conditions, our forces’ vigorous retaliatory measures aimed at repelling aggression represent realistic variants of military countermeasures against an aggressor. Just such operational methods allow us to fight effectively to prevent war and assure an effective national defense. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw II. The armed forces’ development and preparations taking into account our military doctrine’s defensive nature. In the area of the armed forces’ development our military doctrine is based on the need to achieve the lowest possible level of military rivalry between nations. However, since the level of armaments depends in the first instance on the imperialist countries’ military preparations, then the defensive might of the USSR and the other socialist countries should be such as to assure an effective defense of our country and of our allies. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 15 [handwritten]
14 – The principle of adequate force, if examined in general terms, is based on the fact that, within certain parameters of force deployment on the part of the countries (the coalition) and the quantity and type of armaments as well as operational readiness, has reflected closely the level of military threat, has ensured military parity between the opposing sides and has assured the effective defense of the countries (the coalition). A reasonable level of adequate defensive force can be defined as that level which guarantees that an aggressor, whatever the circumstances in which he initiates war, will be repelled and crushingly defeated. [underlined by hand] We agree that neither side be able to conduct long-term offensive operations with clear objectives, unless the other side also agrees to establishing talks about them. In realistic terms, an adequate level of defense means that it is essential that we have armed forces which would allow us effectively to prevent imperialism from starting a war and, in the event of an attack on the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, to repel aggression. Our armed forces in Europe should be capable of repelling aggression in the course of defensive operations (which will require time), but if the aggression does not cease, of moving over to the counter-offensive and inflicting a defeat on the aggressor. [underlined by hand] In recent times, in the countries of Western Europe intensive work has been conducted (especially in opposition circles) on the theory of the so-called ‘unprovocative defense’ or the ‘inoffensive defense’. The essence of this idea is that the armed forces’ structure, training, material-technical support and strategy should be such that they would be unable to conduct large-scale offensive operations, but would be adequate to conduct simultaneously [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 16 [handwritten]
15 – a ‘credible defense’. It coincides, on the face of it, with our views. However, in comparison to our conception of the adequate defense the essential difference is that the whole system of the ‘unprovocative defense’ is based on the premise that nuclear weapons should be the principal element of a retaliatory strike. We are against that. [underlined by hand] Summing up, the defensive nature of our military doctrine creates more favorable conditions to prevent war in the context of an economical solution to the problems of developing the armed forces and national defense, accepting military parity and adequate defense as a given. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw Our military doctrine’s defensive nature sets higher standards for the army’s (armed forces’) battle preparedness and readiness to mobilize. The organization and directions of the armed forces’ strategic development and their achievement of higher states of military readiness should be formulated taking into account the aggressor’s growing ability to launch a surprise attack. It could be carried out in new, more diverse and dangerous forms, including sudden attacks using large formations and means, under the guise of large-scale maneuvers and without an initial build-up of forces in the vicinity of the border. In this situation the role of the army’s (armed forces’) intelligence and constant readiness to deter aggression is even more important. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 17 [handwritten]
16 – The defensive nature of our military doctrine also has a significant influence on the manner of deploying all types of armed forces in the initial phase of an operation and throughout the operational system. The following elements belong in the modern operational system: strategic operations directed at repelling an enemy’s strike from space, strategic nuclear forces’ operations, strategic operations in the continental theater of operations, operations in the oceanic theatre of operations . In the event of war being launched against the USSR and the other socialist countries, the principal task will be to repel the enemy’s attack, break up the assault of his forces in the land theaters of operations and in the oceanic (sea) theaters of operation, and defeat them. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw A decisive factor in our modern military doctrine is that an essential feature of our forces’ operations in the initial phase of a war will be all-arms retaliatory operations involved in repelling the attack. Given the defensive nature of our military doctrine, in the period preceding hostilities and in their initial phase the concept of flexible strategic deployment gains added significance (above all moving the economy and the armed forces onto a war footing). It is also anticipated that earlier, in proportion to the threat level, the armed forces’ state of readiness would be raised, as well as their immediate ability to be tasked at short notice in the event of a surprise enemy attack. Given the defensive nature of our military doctrine, both in the conventional and the nuclear context, the role of strategic operations involved in repelling an enemy strike from space assumes greater [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 18 [handwritten]
17 – importance. It fully conforms to the defensive nature of our military doctrine and it plays an important role in our overall system of warfare devoted to repelling enemy aggression. This operation is planned and implemented at the desired level still during peacetime (intelligence, communication of a missile attack, space assets, duty air defense units). [underlined by hand] In the event of war, the forces and assets involved in this operation will be the first to see action. In a nuclear war the strategic use of nuclear forces is decisive, since, in the event of initial aggression, they should be ready to carry out retaliatory-interception or retaliatory strikes. The assured effectiveness of the system of communications concerning a missile strike is of exceptional importance, as is improving the durability of strategic nuclear assets. In a conventional war, in order to paralyze the enemy’s offensive forces’ key strategic assets, air force, air defense forces, command and control infrastructure and economy we might have to conduct strategic air operations. [underlined by hand] The naval forces’ key efforts in a war’s initial phase will be focused on: 1) ensuring the development and combat readiness of their ballistic missile submarines; 2) carrying out strikes on the enemy’s naval forces; 3) conducting combat operations along the enemy’s oceanic and sea lines of communication; 4) co-operating with forces operating in coastal theaters, conducting amphibious and anti-amphibious operations. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 19 [handwritten]
18 – One of the most important forms of warfare are strategic operations in the continental theater of operations. Given the defensive nature of our military doctrine, in the initial phases of a war this will usually be a strategic defensive operation. Within the context of the above-mentioned strategic operations, operational elements from all the armed forces will conduct all-arms, combined and independent operations. Contrary to previous dispositions, our current military doctrine presents the problem of defense and attack in a new light. We see both these forms of military operations as basic. The role of the defense for the formations of our armed forces in the theatre of operations expands during a war’s initial phase. It ceases to be exclusively a secondary element of our operations and it will be conducted deliberately in the theater of operations. The relationship between defensive and offensive operations in the overall battle plan is changing. On the one hand, we are aware that our armed forces have always been trained in a spirit of vigorous and decisive offense. This was developed as a result of our experience in the Second World War. Nor do we intend to devote less attention to problems of the offense in present conditions. At the same time, we must remember Lenin’s assertion that: ‘…Marxism must take into account true life and real facts and not just cling to yesterday’s ideas…’ He emphasized that in military matters taking into account the true correlation of forces has enormous significance. During a conventional war both sides will be forced constantly to adjust their strategic goals and actions to prevent them turning it into a nuclear war. There will be a need to define precisely the critical moments in the [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 20 [handwritten]
19 – development of an operation, to assess in a responsible manner the eventual consequences of specific decisions, in other words, if war is unleashed, the political leadership will still retain numerous levers to affect its scale and character. This analysis leads us to the statement that in a war using conventional weapons, in the initial stage of the war an essential element in the operations of the Soviet armed forces and their allied armies will be to repel aggression in all theatres, leading to strategic defensive action. At the same time, defense alone cannot lead to the complete destruction of the enemy. That is why our military doctrine takes into account the need to transition (after having repelled the enemy’s aggression or even during it) to vigorous, decisive, offensive operations. In this connection, in the war’s initial phase the counter-attack becomes a basic element in conducting offensive operations. It should be prepared during stubborn defensive fighting. In connection with the foregoing, let us assume that a basic objective of the counter-attack in current conditions will be to destroy the enemy’s assault formations, as well as to seize the frontiers, thus permitting further operations appropriate to the given situation. The counter-attack will probably end when the situation is stabilized and the frontier is seized. [underlined by hand] [illegible handwriting in left margin] Sometimes two completely different concepts are confused: the first one – concerning the defensive nature of our doctrine consists in the fact that we shall not be the first to start any war; the second one – concerning the nature of our operations at the start of and during a war. At the start of a war we shall indeed be forced to defend ourselves, but in the course of it [underlined by hand] our armed forces will act vigorously and decisively, [underlined by hand] [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 21 [handwritten]
20 – both during the defensive fighting and particularly during the offensive phase, the counter-attack and especially during the transition to the counter-attack. There is no contradiction here. In the current conditions we also have to count on the possibility of the enemy making a surprise attack. Based on our experience of 1941, the Israeli attack on Syria in 1982, the USA on Libya in 1986, it emerges that the enemy, through disinformation and diverting attention, and through the use of unexpected means can achieve surprise, even when war and hostilities are apparently inevitable. Hence the armed forces should always be prepared to repel an enemy attack. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw In connection with the foregoing, during their1988 training cycle the armed forces of the USSR will devote 50% of their time to the subject of defense. The defensive nature of our military doctrine does not imply passivity while conducting the defense. Naturally, earlier preparations and the choice of the moment to attack give the enemy specific advantages and, at the outset of hostilities, he will have the strategic initiative. However, our retaliatory operations should be vigorous and so calculated that from the very outset we shall be fighting for the strategic initiative [underlined by hand] and to thwart the enemy’s plans with decisive action, and to impose our will on him. While during the Second World War the first stage of the real breakthrough in the war was achieved only after half a year (before Moscow), in current conditions we shall need to achieve this breakthrough within a few weeks. [underlined by hand] A deliberate transition to the defense can in this regard afford considerable advantages, as it did at Kursk in 1943, during Polish First Army’s defense on the Magnuszew bridgehead in 1944, and in Pomerania in 1945. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 22 [handwritten]
21 – It is our contention that in current circumstances the defense must be organized, and defensive operations carried out, so as to inflict a defeat on the enemy at the very outset of an attack and prevent him from making a deep penetration, leading to a considerable loss of territory on our part. Given the present balance of forces in Europe, the task of repelling an attack can in general be left to firstechelon forces, without involving larger forces further back. In order to transition to the counter-attack we shall need to involve additional forces. Taking into account the Polish Army’s strategic dispositions, it would probably be appropriate to prepare both for defensive as well as offensive operations. Taking into account all these factors, we in fact plan and implement preparations for the initial defensive operations in peacetime. Preparations for defensive operations involve: taking the decision; planning the operation; giving the forces their objectives; preparing a fire plan; making arrangements for co-operation; preparing the command and control elements as well as the forces to achieve their military objectives; using engineers to prepare the terrain; organizing political work; organizing all-round protection for military operations; organizing command; deploying forces to their defensive positions; checking the forces’ readiness for combat operations. In the event of a sudden enemy attack, we shall not have the necessary time to complete preparations for defensive operations. Therefore, everything possible should be done beforehand. Most of the tasks outlined here can be carried out in peacetime. This is in fact currently taking place in all branches and operational formations of [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 23 [handwritten]
22 – the armed forces. Yet, as was demonstrated in army front staff exercises carried out in March earlier this year involving the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the preparations for such operations require an in-depth approach. In particular, in addition to planning and studying objectives on maps and on the ground, one can carry out a number of practical tasks (training with commanders and staff using maps and on the ground; reconnaissance and establishing the topographical lines of defensive positions; preparing command posts and the like). It is also essential to organize the defense and carry out defensive operations so as to defeat the enemy at the very start of his assault, to prevent his forces making a deep penetration and us losing a great deal of territory. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw For this reason, a defensive belt (an advanced [forward [handwritten] position) should be created to a depth of no greater than 10-15 kilometers. [handwritten underlined exclamation mark in right margin] From experience gained during exercises, it clearly emerges that our deployment of defensive lines, belts and positions is similar to that of the last war, while the army’s organization, as well as its operational deployment, its line of battle, have changed radically. In this connection, it is not always understood the same way by everyone: who should occupy which positions, which belts, which defensive lines; who, and using which forces, should prepare them. The weakest area is the tactical defensive zone, because it does not provide forces or resources to defend the secondary belt. [underlined by hand] It is anticipated that a main belt, at a distance of 70-80 and 100- 120 km., will be established for army defensive lines, and then, at a depth of 150-200 to 300 km., for front [underlined by hand] defensive lines. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 24 [handwritten]
23 – The experience of war teaches us that if the tactical zone is breached, it is difficult, and at times even impossible, to re-stabilize the whole defensive situation. The obverse of this is that , if the stability of the principal belt and of the whole tactical zone is maintained, then even specific enemy breaches are not dangerous. In this connection, it would seem appropriate to have a principal defensive belt to a depth of 20-25 km.. The depth of positions – 2-2.5 km; the distance between positions should be 2-4 km.. A second defensive belt must be established at all costs, so that the tactical defensive zone’s depth should be about 40-60 km.. [illegible handwriting in left margin] Accordingly, army lines should be established to a depth of about 70-80 km., depending on the terrain, and front lines – 150-200 km and 250 km.. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw Defensive lines should not be established theoretically, but for specific formations and arms. The decisions should identify who is to prepare the lines, to occupy them and what he will do there, what are his objectives. The second echelons should be located in one of the suitable areas in preparation for a counter-attack or to occupy the defensive lines. Other variants are permissible. These problems should be solved taking into account the specific situation, the assigned tasks, the defensive front’s breadth, available forces and assets, the nature of the terrain. As far as Europe and other areas are concerned, it is important, when setting up the defense, to integrate small, and especially large towns into it. They should be prepared for all-round defense, as key strongpoints. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 25 [handwritten]
24 – An important element in the resilience of a tactical defense zone is the all-arms fire plan, air strikes and engineered obstacles. It is well-known that in war commanders of fronts and armies personally worked on their fire plan, and tactical commanders at all levels selected positions for all types of anti-tank weapons or machine guns. We should not now forget this. Once the enemy has launched his attack, an immediate response is of enormous importance. In the event of his sudden attack, one must be ready to carry out an assault, using those units on duty, against those targets to be hit first. However, as a rule, we should aim at an earlier secret deployment of firepower assets and at the moment when the enemy launches his strike, we should be able immediately to lay down powerful retaliatory fire using all possible force and means. In the event of a breach or a breakthrough, we should carry out counter-attacks and counter-strikes. Several problems involved in conducting defensive operations. In order to conduct an effective defensive operation well-organized intelligence, able to detect in good time enemy preparations for an attack, plays a decisive role. Once permission has been granted, one should secretly stop operational preparations, deploy forces to their designated lines, sectors and areas; move to defensive positions; develop a fire plan and use engineers to prepare the ground. There will not always be enough time to accomplish this. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 26 [handwritten]
25 – Experience gained from exercises shows that 2 days are needed to prepare a defense in a divisional belt, together with immediate engineering works, while full preparations require 5-6 days. Experience suggests that counter-attacks and counter-strikes can be successful only when they are well prepared, launched unexpectedly and at the most favorable moment, with good air-cover, as well as strong air and artillery support. Given the current nature of armed conflict the effectiveness of all kinds of operation, of strategic and operational activities will depend even more on army command elements’ stamina and on force protection. An issue of prime importance is raising the combat readiness of command elements, the effectiveness of their work, the durability of command posts and communications systems, the widespread use of automated command and communications systems. Exercises involving the Group of Soviet Forces in German demonstrate yet again the cardinal importance of raising the armed forces’ levels of combat readiness and discipline, of competent troop-handling and of maintaining a consistent ability to combat every effort to infringe the sovereignty of the socialist countries. At present we are conducting a stubborn effort to eliminate from the process of command an academic and formalist approach and giving a realistic and practical character to the work of commanders and staff. We feel it appropriate to reduce the amount and scope of planning documents and to devote more time to mastering practical subjects dealing with preparing for combat operations, effectively taking advantage of communications and automated command systems. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 27 [handwritten]
26 – In the area of party-political work we anticipate devoting particular attention to developing among the soldiers a new way of thinking, taking into account the defensive nature of our military doctrine. In our work with the soldiers of our armed forces we need to explain in a clear and well-prepared manner that the defensive nature of our military doctrine requires not passivity, but vigorous and decisive action, a high level of alertness and combat readiness. There are more problems relating to the defensive nature of our military doctrine which we shall need to analyze and develop practically in a detailed manner. In particular, we intend to update the combat manual, [underlined by hand] the training programs, both in military schools and throughout the armed forces, commission academic studies on solutions to the large number of emerging problems. We are also, in line with a joint decision taken at a meeting held within the walls of your academy under the direction of General F. SIWICKI, now finishing a work on the socialist science of war. Conclusions from academic research work focusing on operational-strategic issues are being ever more widely introduced into the theoretical side of things. With the aim of a more detailed analysis of these issues and in order to co-ordinate research we have created in the General Staff a center for the study of operational-strategic issues, and in the different branches of the armed forces operational-tactical research centers. Work continues on a second edition of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and a ten-volume history of the Second World War. One of the most important lessons of the war is that only with the effort of the whole nation, under the [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw I confirm conformity with the original 28 [handwritten]
27 – leadership of the Party, can one assure a successful defense of the socialist Motherland. The reconstruction in our country, outlined at the 27th Congress of the CPSU and now being implemented, and the profound socio-economic, spiritual and cultural changes taking place within Soviet society have a great significance for the further strengthening of the country’s defenses. This is being followed appropriately by a restructuring of the development and preparations of the Soviet Armed Forces. We are solving the task of raising further the Army and Navy’s combat readiness in close cooperation with the leadership of the Polish Army and of the other fraternal countries of the Warsaw Pact. We are conscious that the Polish Army, together with the Soviet Armed Forces, accumulated its greatest experience during the Second World War and, in terms of combat, these are battle-hardened armies. The essence of this experience has not lost its meaning today. Our good co-operation in the post-war years means much to us and we shall continue not to spare any effort to deepen and develop further our friendship and co-operation between the Soviet Armed Forces and the Polish Army, with a view to ensuring the peace and security of the countries of the socialist commonwealth. Allow me to wish you every success in strengthening the defense of the Polish People’s Republic. [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw Printed. Silesian Military District no. 877/88 The following have taken note of letter no. 72248 [most of the initials are illegible; most of the page is hard to decipher]
Chief of staff 13. Head of communications
Deputy, political 14. Head of [?]
Deputy, operations 15. Head of armor and [?]
Head of technical services 16. Head of engineering [?]
Quartermaster 17. Head of chemical services [?]
Head operational section 18. Head of [?] services
Head of intelligence [?] section 19. Head of [?] services Kaleta
Head of organization and training 20. Head of special services [?]
Head of [?] 21. Head of medical services
Head of cadre [?] section 22. Head of finance and banking [?]
Head of [?] 23. Legal advisor
Head of [?] 24. Secretary [?] lecture [?] staff cadres [?] on 04.07.88[ handwritten] [stamp] IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents] Warsaw Translated thanks to a generous contribution from John A. Adams and the John A. Adams Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis at the Virginia Military Institute.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY This document describes Warsaw Pact military exercises conducted between 25 May and 2 June 1988. Summarized in detail, the comprehensive exercise brought all facets of the combined forces to “wartime strength” in response to a theoretical threat posed by NATO.
SUBJECTS DISCUSSED Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces Warsaw Treaty Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization LOCATIONS DISCUSSED Czechoslovakia East Germany Eastern Europe Poland Russia
[Source: Institute of National Remembrance (IPNBU) 1408/2. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.] [letterhead] GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES Deliver at 0800 2 June SECRET Copy Nº 4 Exercise [Original Polish receipt and declassification stamps] OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Nº 1 (for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988) Warsaw 1988 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Nº 1 for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988
In accordance with the growing threat of the “BLUES”, the “REDS” performed a covert operational deployment of selected formations and units in [their] armed forces. The following measures were performed within the framework of general preparations:
the dispatch of servicemen and reserves to military schools, courses, retraining, and command-staff training has been stopped; servicemen in courses are being recalled to their units;
troops in temporary locations are being recalled to their garrisons with the exception of formations at wartime strength and undergoing training (exercises) at training areas;
at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the formation of detachments for engineer preparation of the terrain began on 1 June and which will be made ready to carry out work on behalf of the 3rd Front beginning [inserted by hand: 2] June.
[the following] have been deployed at field control posts: by 1 June, the staff of the 3rd Front, by 0800 2 June, the staffs of the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies;
by 26 May formations and units have been inspected for the deployment of elements of the mobilization base;
the discharge of reservists being trained has been halted. Equipment received from the economy has been left in the units;
since 1 June aircraft and helicopters received from the economy are being accepted and reequipped;
beginning 26 May a 24-hour watch has been established in all the armed forces and also in military commissariats; [there are] full shifts in national air defense troops and at the remaining HQs – reduced [shifts];
the border forces and selected units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have increased security at the border, airfields, and seaports.
According to a 25 May directive of the GK OVS in the Western TVD he has planned a frontal defensive operation for 1 June. In response to the actions of the “BLUES” the forces allocated from the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Armies and also the engineer troops are preparing defensive positions in the main defensive zone. At the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the allocated combined-arms units, air forces, navy, missile troops and artillery, and REhB, intelligence, and communications have been brought up to wartime strength under the guise of an exercise and work on behalf of the economy and into full combat readiness in permanently deployed locations or contingency [neplanovye] areas. A. The 2nd Army (GDR Peoples Army)
by 25 May the 11th msd had been brought up to wartime strength and beginning on 31 May together with a battalion of engineer vehicles it began engineer preparations of the 2nd and 3rd positions of the main defensive zone in the sector south of SZCZECIN and BARLINEK;
on 25 May the Druzhba-88 exercise began at the DRAWSKI training area in which the 18th msd, 25th td (of the 8th Army), and missile troops and artillery of the Army are participating;
[the following] have been brought up to wartime strength under the guise of preparations for an exercise: by 28 May, the 19th td; by 30 May, the 30th msd. The formations are being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations and are undergoing training in combat teamwork [slazhivanie] in garrison training centers.
the 29th msd was brought up to wartime strength by 2 June; after regrouping it is beginning to prepare the defense of the coastline in the sector DZIWNÓW, KOLOBRZEG. B. The 6th Army (USSR Armed Forces)
under the guise of preparations to carry out work on behalf of the economy the 2nd msd was brought up to strength by 25 May; together with the allocated engineer forces it is making engineering preparations of the second and third positions in the main defensive zone in the sector ZAGAN, PIENSK;
the 1st td was brought up to wartime strength starting 23 May and is training at the ZAGAN Training Area;
on 26 May the 3rd msd and on 30 May the 4th msd were brought up to wartime strength and brought into readiness at permanently deployed areas. C. The 3rd Army (Czechoslovak National Army)
the 31st td was brought up to wartime strength on 25 May and beginning 30 May it is making engineering preparations of positions in the main defensive zone together with a battalion of engineer vehicles of the 3rd isbr in the sector SLUBICE, GUBIN;
beginning 24 May the 33rd msd is conducting planned training at the WEDRZYN Training Area;
on 28 May the 32nd msd and on 31 May the 34th msd were brought up to wartime strength and began training in garrison areas to be brought into readiness for operations. D. The 8th Army (Polish Armed Forces)
at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces by 26 May the system of mobilization expansion of Army formations and units was inspected and mobilization documentation amplified;
under the guise of a planned exercise formations and units of the missile troops, air defense, REhB, and intelligence have been brought up to wartime strength and control posts have been provided; beginning 25 May they have been brought into readiness in reserve assembly areas or in training areas;
the 25th td has been brought up to wartime strength and is taking part in the Druzhba88 exercise at the DRAWSKI Training Area;
the training of the 21st td is underway at the Orzysz Training Area. E. The 11th vdbr
after the brigade was brought up to wartime strength it was brought into readiness at the reserve assembly area. F. The 12th Coastal Defense Brigade
it was brought up to wartime strength by 25 May under the guise of joint exercises with the Navy and is being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations. G. The 41st rmd [expansion unknown, but presumably a division, possibly a reserve mechanized division]
the formation of two mechanized regiments, communications, and air defense subunits began on 2 June. In reconnaissance forces Electronic intelligence units are reconnoitering the armed forces of the “BLUES” at the indicated lines [rubezhakh]. Special reconnaissance units and subunits are conducting training in combat teamwork and are being brought into readiness for action. Reconnaissance aircraft are conducting intensified reconnaissance along the coastline and the western border of Poland. In REhB forces The 24th op-N [expansion unknown] and 8th op-N have been conducting training in combat teamwork at the MUSZAKI Training Area since 26 May. The remaining REhB units are conducting intensified training in garrison. Ten percent of REhB resources are on a round-the-clock watch. In Missile Troops and Artillery The formations of operational tactical missiles, field missile technical bases, the 8th apabr [Army Field Gun Artillery Brigade], the 21st ap BM [Heavy Artillery Regiment], and the 15th aiptap [Army Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment] in permanently deployed locations were brought up to wartime strength by 28 May. [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and deployed by 29 May:
the 15th apabr and the 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Regiment (oapr) in border regions in the zone of the 2nd Army;
the 6th apabr and the 6th apar in border regions in the zone of the 6th Army;
the 3rd apar in firing positions west of Rzepin. [The following] are undergoing training in training areas:
the 3rd apabr and 3rd adnar [possibly “Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion”] since 27 May at the Wedrzyn Training Area;
the 6th orap [Independent Aerial Reconnaissance Regiment] has been at the Zagan Training Area since 26 May;
the 15th orap is taking part in the Druzhba-88 exercise. The remaining missile and artillery frontal and Army formations and units are being brought into readiness by 2 June for operations in permanently deployed locations and assembly areas. 9K714 [Oka tactical] missile battalions have been on alert since 25 May in garrison training areas. Tactical missile battalions and reconnaissance/strike and fire groups of first echelon formations are being brought into readiness in assembly areas. Conventionally-armed missiles will be delivered to rendezvous points (PV) by 0400 4 June in order to train the allocated forces of the missile troop and artillery for a air defense operation:
to PV-1 – WEGORZEWO – four operational-tactical [missiles] and 16 tactical (4 [of them] “T”);
to PV-4 – RUDNA – 27, including 11 operational-tactical and 16 tactical (4 [of them] “T”). In the air forces Training in the combat teamwork of the operations of tactical groups is being conducted in formations and units. Airborne command posts were rebased from army aviation units to the landing fields of the respective HQs by 2 June where they are being kept in combat readiness Nº 2. The preparation of AUD [airfield sections of roads] for the dispersion of aircraft has been completed. The forward ground support echelons at all airfields have been brought into readiness for regrouping at the indicated airfields or at intermediate assembly areas. The second echelons are providing support to the air regiments’ missions. Aviation ammunition has been stored up to full scale in aircraft parking areas in readiness for immediate mounting. In the air defense troops By 2 June the air forces and air defense forces SKP [possibly “launch command post”] of the front and the SKP of Army aviation and air defense had been regrouped to the designated areas and maintained in readiness. First echelon SAM and radiotechnical units of the Front and armies have been regrouped from permanently deployed locations to designated areas and brought into readiness in accordance with decisions made in the Front, armies, and formations. The 8th zrp and air defense units of the 8th Army have been brought up to wartime strength and brought into readiness at permanently deployed locations. The radiotechnical troops of the air defense of the ground forces began to work on wartime radio frequencies beginning at 0800 2 June. [The following] are on combat alert in the air defense system:
in SAM regiments (zenap) – one battery each in readiness Nº 2 and one battery each in readiness Nº 3;
in SAM brigades [and] the Krug zrp – one battalion each (less two batteries) in readiness Nº 2 and one battalion (less two batteries) in readiness Nº 3. In engineer troops By 26 May engineer units which were performing work on behalf of the economy had returned to their garrisons. [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and into readiness at permanently deployed locations under the guise of preparations for an exercise:
by 30 May, the 6th and 15th isbr’s, the 6th and 15th pomp’s, the 6th itp [Engineering and Technical Regiment], the 29th ib PU [Engineer Battalion for Equipping Control Posts], and the 220th Fortification Regiment;
by 2 June, the 3rd and 21st isbr’s and the 3rd itp. Minelaying equipment and mines are being issued and distributed from centrallysubordinate depots. Subunits of engineer vehicles of first echelon armies together with combined-arms formations began the fortification of lines in the main defense zone beginning 31 May. The 220th Fortification Regiment together with detachments for engineer preparation of the terrain began the engineering preparation of blocking positions and front line positions. The 283rd maskb [Camouflage Battalion] was brought into readiness by 26 May and began the construction of dummy areas in accordance with the Front plan. In the chemical troops [The following] have been brought into readiness under the guise of preparations for exercises:
the RAST [computation and analysis station] and rear RAST of the Front and armies in areas where Front and army control posts are deployed, by 26 May;
radiation and chemical reconnaissance subunits were brought up to wartime strength and into readiness for operations in assembly areas by 29 May. The peacetime system of radiation and chemical reconnaissance began operating in the country beginning 1 June. In signal troops Under the guise of preparations for exercises signals troops regrouped in areas where Front, army, and formation control posts are deployed by 28 May. Communications centers were ready for operation by 31 May. Radio, radiorelay, and cable communications have been organized. Satellite and troposphere communications have been readied for operation. Communications on wartime frequencies have been organized in all troop arms. In the services of the rear Planned measures are being carried out for the timely and complete deployment of the men and equipment of the operational rear and the organization of a field system of supply on behalf of the troops of the 3rd Front. The rear control posts of the 3rd Front, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies, and the rear formations and units of the 3rd Army (3rd omo [Independent Medical Detachment], and 6th Army (6th mbu [Medical Reinforcement Brigade] were deployed by 0800 2 June. Full-scale mobile and operational reserves have been stockpiled in line units [v voyskakh]. Current supply of the troops is done from working stocks at garrison depots. Materiel resources are loaded onto combat vehicles and the transport vehicles of first echelon formations. Preparatory measures are being taken at military depots and the bases of the economy for a mass issue, loading, and distribution of material resources. Readiness to carry out missions to ensure the survivability of the transportation system (transshipment points, ports, approaches to crossings] has been verified. The preparedness of transportation resources (vehicles, trailers, rolling stock, ships) has been inspected and the priority of their movement (transfer by the armed forces) when making massive military shipments has been verified. The technical documentation of the construction of parallel bridges and crossings has been checked as well as the technical condition of bridges. Organizational measures for a continuous supply of nurses for the military medical service have been completed. Evacuation hospital equipment has been supplemented. Restrictions on the use of fuel have been introduced in the economy. Blood bank supplies at civilian donor stations intended for immediate delivery to the armed forces have been inspected. In the technical services The 23rd FRB was brought up to strength within the framework of planned exercises by 24 May and sent to the TORUN Training Area where it is undergoing training in combat teamwork and special training. The organizational nucleus [orgyadro] for the 22nd FRB and 21st GFRB [expansion unknown] was called up by 28 May. Equipment received from the economy is being inspected. The 225th and 228th orpdn [Independent Missile Transportation Battalion] have been brought into readiness to receive missiles and to leave for the designated areas. Beginning 2 June under the guise of preparations for exercises, it began to be brought up to wartime strength at the location of permanent deployment of the 6th ARB. THE COMBINED BALTIC FLEET In accordance with a directive of the Commander of the OBF, the headquarters of the USSR BF [Baltic Fleet], Polish Navy, and GDR Peoples Navy have updated [utochnili] plans to defend the coastline. The allocated strike, anti-mine, and other support forces returned to their bases by 2000 1 June after completing exercises and training launches of missiles. It is intended to complete the training of a combined ship squadron by 5 June. The plans for the coordination between the HQs of fleets and concerned formations have been updated. Naval reconnaissance forces (ship, aircraft, and radioelectronic) have been conducting continuous tracking of the operations of groups of ships of the Western Baltic fleet. Twenty-five percent of the water crossing equipment [plavsredstva] has been received from the economy. Sixty percent of the preparatory work on them has been done. Work is being done to rapidly deploy ships undergoing repair. Fifty percent of the ships have been demothballed by the crews. Work is continuing on the rest. Crews are being urgently trained for ships coming on line. The forces that perform verification trawling of coastal channels and the PLO forces to search and track submarines of the Western Baltic fleet have been augmented. Rear and technical support formations and units are being brought into readiness and are distributing reserves of material resources. They are deploying a system of temporary basing, supply, repair, and support to the forces in the areas in which they are serving. Internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
At the instruction of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Country, the internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs achieved readiness for operation by 30 May. Beginning 1 June the defense of seaports and airports was strengthened, as well as [these] borders:
northern – by the forces of the Baltic Border Troops Brigade (Baltic br PV);
western – by the forces of the Maritime, [Liubuski], and [Lurzicki] br PV.
southern – by the forces of the Sudety and [Gornoslenski] br PV. The border troops were subordinated to the Commanding General of the 3rd Front by 2 June. Units of the internal troops and territorial defense troops had returned to MPD [their permanently deployed locations] by 26 May and are undergoing training in combat teamwork exercises in barracks-like [prikazarmennye] training grounds.
Beginning at 1900 4 June, the BLUES, performing an operational deployment of troops under the guise of preparations for a strategic defensive exercise, began to create strike groupings in the immediate proximity to the border with the REDS.
By 0800 6 June selected missile troops, artillery, and air units were brought into readiness at launch and firing positions. Reserve airfields and road sections designated as runways have been prepared to accept aircraft.
Units assigned to protect the border have begun to form march columns in the areas they occupy.
At 1900 6 June a full combat alert was declared in all the armed forces.
In response to the measures by the BLUES, the REDS accelerated the operational development of troops, especially the occupation of more advantageous areas and operational deployment areas.
The resources designed to launch a retaliatory missile and air strike were brought into full combat readiness at alternate launch and firing positions by 0800 6 June.
Large formations, formations, and units of the 3rd Front are at permanently deployed locations, alert assembly areas, and operational deployment and defensive areas. Beginning 1900 6 June they have been brought into readiness in accordance with mobilization and operational deployment plans and the decisions of the commanders and chiefs of the troop arms and services taking part in the exercise.
EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF
DOCUMENT SUMMARY This document describes a Warsaw Pact military exercise known as Shield-88. The exercise addresses a theoretical scenario in which NATO forces suddenly prepare to launch an attack on Warsaw Pact territory.
Ministry of state security Berlin, 23 September 1970
No. 993/70
According to a reliable source, the attitude of the Federal Government towards the afore-mentioned stations was described by leading SPD officials at the beginning of September 1970 as follows:
The attacks by the Soviet Union, the GDR and some other socialist countries against the activities of the stations are harsh, and they could call into question the Olympic Games. The Federal Government is aware from various, not just official, sources that some of the socialist countries are relatively serious in their threat to boycott the Olympic Games in Munich if the stations do not terminate their activities.
The Federal Government is in a difficult situation on this issue, because it cannot afford to antagonize the Americans, who are running these stations. On the other hand it is not necessarily uncomfortable for the Federal Government to see mounting pressure from the East against the activities of the stations, as this would open certain possibilities for the Federal Government to raise this issue with the Americans and suggest that the stations might work from outside the Federal Republic. The current situation is that the Federal Government has recently extended the contractual licenses for both stations under pressure from the Americans. The contractual licenses are valid for 2 years, and can be canceled at the earliest after one year, with a year’s notice. This means that the stations would be still active by the time of the 1972 Olympic Games. The Federal Government is at the moment not in a position to do anything against the activities of the stations.
This assessment was confirmed by the Bundespost [Federal Post Office], which however pointed out that besides the broadcasting license, which is granted by the Foreign Ministry, there is also a technical license. This technical license, which regulates the use of frequencies, is granted by the Bundespost. It is not attached to longer-term contracts, but can be canceled with six months’ notice. The next possible date for cancellation is 31 December 1970, with a deadline [for terminating operations] at the end of June 1971. Withdrawing the technical license is thus a possible way of cutting off the activities of the stations at an earlier date than though the license awarded by the Foreign Ministry.
From SPD circles it was stated in this regard that this situation opened up a new perspective. It was hoped that, at the next frequency conference, the frequencies used by the two stations for the Federal Republic could be canceled under pressure from the East bloc countries, possibly even from the neutral countries. In any case, it would not necessarily be uncomfortable for the federal government if a solution could be found that was bearable for the federal government.
Due to security concerns regarding this source, this information cannot be publicized.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This GDR intelligence report, based on information from SPD officials in Bonn, describes the concern of Brandt Government officials about the continued operation of RFE and RL in Germany, and claims that some officials would conditionally welcome Soviet bloc pressure on this issue.
CREATOR
This GDR intelligence report, based on information from SPD officials in Bonn, describes the concern of Brandt Government officials about the continued operation of RFE and RL in Germany, and claims that some officials would conditionally welcome Soviet bloc pressure on this issue.
CREATOR GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)
SUBJECTS DISCUSSED Radio Liberty Radio broadcasting Radio Free Europe Brandt, Willy, 1913-1992 LOCATIONS DISCUSSED East Germany West Germany
Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson’s recent election in the United States, Khrushchev’s ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.
CREATORS GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)
MIELKE, ERICH
SEMICHASTNY, V.
WOLF, MARKUS
SUBJECTS DISCUSSED Nuclear weapons–China European Economic Community National liberation movements–Africa Germany (East). Ministry for State Security (Stasi) Soviet Union. Committee for State Security (KGB)
Berlin, 2 December 1964
2 copies
R e p o r t
On Meetings with the KGB of the USSR on 30 November and 1 December 1964
Participants at these meetings initiated by the MfS [Ministry of State Security.] of the GDR were the following:
Soviet side:
Comrade Semichastny, Chairman of the Committee
Comrade Sakharovsky, Head of Main Department 1
Comrade Pavlov, Deputy Head of Main Department 1
Comrade Skomorokhin, Division Head of Main Department 1
Comrade Beskrovny, Head of KGB apparatus in the GDR
MfS of the GDR:
Comrade Mielke[Minister for State Security]
Comrade Wolf [Deputy Minister, Head of HVA [Foreign Intelligence Division]
On both days there was one exchange held by the individuals listed above. In addition, there were individual talks with the Deputy Head of Main Department 2, Comrade Babkov, the Deputy Head of the Mobilization Department, Comrade Piskunov, and with Comrade Sakharovsky, joined by the Head of the Africa Department, Comrade Vinogradov, and the Deputy Head of the Information Department, Comrade Zitnikov.
In response to a questionnaire forwarded by us, Comrade Semichastny discussed the following issues:
On the international situation
Assessment of US Government Policy
Currently the Johnson Administration is reviewing the basis of its foreign policy. Johnson’s electoral victory is the largest ever by an American president. However, the 20 million votes for Goldwater must not be overlooked. The US government will have to consider the changes at the top in the Soviet Union, the changes in Great Britain, the nuclear test explosion in China, and the attitudes of de Gaulle.
Probably the US administration will put in place a couple of tougher measures. This shows, for instance, through its campaign against the alleged Soviet debt towards UN organizations. This is to exert pressure on the non-aligned states and Secretary General U Thant. There is no chance for a compromise on this issue. The US pursues a tough line, and it looks like they are ready to go to extremes. A similar line becomes evident in the Congo and in Vietnam.
Yet even if US election results have somewhat strengthened right-wing forces, the US still understands that acute tensions are unhelpful. It would only lead to closer cooperation between the socialist states and others. Therefore, the US has to maneuver.
The people in charge in the United States are fully aware that a nuclear war will be deadly for them. Yet they make efforts to influence the balance of power according to their own interests. Thus we have to expect an (albeit slower) continuation of the arms race, as well as attempts to further strengthen NATO and divide the socialist camp. In the latter regard, the US is banking on certain nationalist tendencies there.
During his visit to the US, [British Prime Minister Harold] Wilson talked in particular about how nationalist tendencies in European socialist countries might be better exploited.
The United States is moving one to two additional divisions to South Vietnam, and they conduct air strikes against the liberation movement’s bases outside of South Vietnam. The communiqué about the Johnson/Taylor meeting does not state anything about intentions, yet in fact the US is embarking on a course of escalation. However, sooner or later the US will have to agree to the neutralization of South Vietnam. There are also tendencies to negotiate in this regard within the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV]. Yet Beijing is against it and demands, at the expense of the Vietnamese people, to fight until total victory. The DRV leadership sometimes openly expresses to the Chinese its dissatisfaction with Chinese aid, especially in economic regard. The war places a major burden on the DRV.
Concerning Cuba, there are no expectations for an open attack by the US with forces of its own. However, the Cuban counter-revolution, though basically destroyed within Cuba itself, is actively supported by the US from outside of Cuba. The United States tightens its economic blockade to create dissatisfaction within Cuba. One cannot exclude the possibility of aggressive actions by a group of other Latin American countries, triggered by certain provocations. Such a plan was already discussed by military representatives from some of these countries.
Regarding relations with the USSR, the US makes efforts to negotiate in order to reach agreements on certain issues. In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador [Dobrynin in Washington] Vice President [Hubert] Humphrey has made very positive comments that are, however, of relative value only. The US wants to improve relations. Yet its position on the funding of the UN is counter to this intention.
The conference held in Moscow with a large number of influential US business people and mega capitalists, as well as other facts, demonstrates that the US is currently reviewing its options to expand trade relations. It is their official line to do so without haste. In early 1965 we will probably sign a consular agreement. The Americans value highly the recently signed agreement on the extraction of fresh water from the ocean. Negotiations about direct flights between the USSR and the US are very tedious. All this shows how the US wants to avoid raising tensions but undertakes only a few practical steps in this regard.
Major difficulties are to be expected, and major efforts are required, on issues like disarmament, the solution of postwar problems in Europe, the prevention of West Germany’s nuclear armament, and on other European questions. No rapid progress is to be expected here.
On the Position of the British Labour Government
The Wilson government operates to a certain extent on the basis of détente. Its main tactics are: Flexibility and firmness. It supports peaceful coexistence, in particular with regard to trade. It stresses its own position and measures. In the interest of détente, it is their opinion that the Western alliance must be strengthened.
Before the elections Wilson had his own position concerning the GDR. Yet it is not known whether this will have actual consequences.
There is a certain interest in détente where the Labour government sees some opportunities for solutions on individual issues. The Labour government is against any form of nuclear war and supports in principle the creation of nuclear-free zones – also with the inclusion of both German states.
In contrast to its positions before the elections, the Labour government now conditionally supports the MLF [Multilateral Force]. Probably it is pursuing certain tactics here; in fact it does not believe in the realization of the MLF, and therefore slows it down.
On de Gaulle’s Position
It is well known and openly promulgated. His main objective is the elimination of American hegemony and the formation of a Western European defense union with a French-German alliance at its core. De Gaulle’s plans are threatened by decisive countermeasures from the US and West Germany. The US does not want to share its leadership, nor do they want France to gain influence. De Gaulle is angry about [FRG Chancellor Ludwig] Erhard for his support of American positions. According to reliable information, the French government will absolutely advocate against building the MLF and all its consequences. The British government’s position is also directed against de Gaulle’s plans.
The West German government is against a pro-French line and clearly supports the US course.
A sharp breach between France and the other Western powers has emerged and created a complicated situation within NATO. De Gaulle’s visit to Latin America is interesting. For now, France’s efforts have not led to results. France is in a difficult economic situation and undertakes certain efforts towards rapprochement with the Soviet Union in particular in economic regards. It has also showed an interest in joint ventures concerning production of passenger airplanes for high altitudes, and also in cooperation on color television systems. The visit by [Gaston] Palewski, [French] Minister of Information [sic], to the Soviet Union was interesting.[1] He expressed the same policy when meeting with leading government representatives from Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia in Paris. There also is a certain interest in trade with the GDR. France was one of the first countries to sign trade and loan agreements with the USSR.
This French policy is not innocent when it comes to exploiting nationalist tendencies in order to create fissures in the socialist camp. It is unknown what they actually talked with Romania. What has been leaked, however, displays this tendency. It also shows with regard to ideological subversion.
On Positions of the West German Government
(Comrade Semichastny remarked here that we [the MfS] are more knowledgeable on this.)
No initiative is to be expected from the Western powers to settle postwar European issues, especially with regard to West Berlin. The West German government wants to force the Western powers to negotiate about the German question based on the FRG concept of “self-determination.” This leads to the discomfort of the other Western powers, as became evident during the leadership change in the Soviet Union. For instance, the West German position has also created problems for the preparation of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The Western powers were afraid the Soviet Union might fully withdraw from it.
The West German government plans to increase activities regarding its relations with the People’s Republic of China and the European socialist countries. It wants to exploit Soviet-Sino differences and China’s interest in normalizing its relations with the Federal Republic.
The [FRG] Federal Government also reviews its position vis-à-vis the GDR. Devious methods are to be expected from that.
Due to increasing contradictions within NATO, the West German government is pleading for US favors, e.g. by making financial concessions. Contradictions mount with France and England, for instance because of the British proposals concerning the MLF. De Gaulle’s pressure has created a difficult situation. Hence the West German government currently still weighs its options on all those issues.
The NATO council meeting in December will be of major importance. The agenda features: An assessment of the international situation by [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk coupled with expert presentations; a report by General Secretary [Manlio] Brosio about the state of cooperation within NATO with regard to proposals for NATO’s reorganization; a statement by the chairman of NATO’s Standing Military Committee on the socialist countries’ military potential; reports by the NATO commanders and the Military Committee on NATO’s combat readiness in 1964; a report by Brosio on the strategic concept; a presentation by the US commission to prepare for the MLF; a statement on cooperation in areas of scientific-technological and military-technological research; the confirmation of NATO’s annual report; and votes on corresponding proposals.
The contradictions within NATO become most evident on the issue of NATO strategy. Extensive explanation [by Semichastny] of the American strategy of flexible response (already known to us [the MfS]). This is creating the main point of dissent from France which holds the opinion that the US will not actually defend Europe by using its strategic nuclear potential.
West Germany supports the French concept in principle but wants to integrate with the US positions.
The American concept envisages the option of local wars with the US reserving the right to determine the location, time, and means of war efforts. This concept is based on an increase in all types of armaments, and of course the growth of strategic nuclear potential as well. Particular emphasis is placed on special forces to conduct “guerrilla wars.” Their numbers have increased six-fold between 1961 and 1964. We have to take this into consideration in order not to allow surprises and to implement appropriate countermeasures.
On Contradictions within the European Economic Community (EEC)
Efforts to reach a common trade policy vis-à-vis the socialist camp are not supported by all EEC member states. In part, they even violate their obligations towards the EEC. West Germany is strenuously opposing loans for socialist countries especially because of Soviet positions on the German and West Berlin question. Vis-à-vis the GDR, the FRG attempts to trade loans for political concessions.
Italy is against any restrictions and granted to the Soviet Union a small 5-year bank loan. France has granted loans for 7 years. England is against any restrictions in this area. Belgium, for instance, opposes any restrictions on imports from the socialist camp while some of its industrial branches are in danger of getting crippled. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Benelux countries are imminent.
In the context of problems regarding the common agricultural market and the uniform grain price, France is even reviewing whether to leave the EEC.
The US is expecting an increase in exports during the Kennedy Round negotiations in November. Johnson is considering whether to move towards bilateral negotiations if there are no results in November. France strongly opposes an increase of imports from the United States. Major differences were created by the 15 percent increase of import tariffs by Great Britain.
On Covert and Subversive Activities of the Imperialist Powers and their Intelligence Services against the Socialist Camp
This activity is planned as a long-term strategy to divide the socialist camp and to create a hostile atmosphere towards the socialist order in individual countries. Offensive actions by the Chinese facilitate the emergence of favorable conditions for this kind of activity. NATO experts assess that the Chinese attitude will be the main lever used by the West to instigate nationalist positions [in socialist countries].
Important aspects consist in plans to target economic relations between socialist countries within Comecon. There have been consultations within NATO on how to sell goods and equipment to individual socialist countries that previously received them from other socialist countries. This is objectively directed against the purpose and intentions of Comecon. Economic subversion is undertaken through loans and technological exports to develop economic sectors in individual socialist countries that are not really essential. Yet those sectors create competition with other socialist countries and result in overproduction, and thus in additional problems and differences.
Ideological subversion is primarily directed at praising the Western lifestyle, standard of living, democracy, and so on – and compromising the socialist order by portraying certain economic weaknesses and deficiencies as a consequence of the socialist order. It is directed against alleged flaws of the [socialist] democratic system, and it exaggerates both real and nonexistent conflicts. The West is acting as a promoter of national independence for socialist countries and speaks out against alleged pressure on them by the USSR.
On plans for covert activities.
The US hardly counts on solutions through armed domestic counterrevolution. Besides economic and ideological subversion, the US therefore emphasizes in its covert activities the improvement of spy networks and the build-up of small counter-revolutionary groups. It aims at asserting itself through gaining a capacity to stifle unrest in case of international complications. Through these activities the US keeps its own hopes for potential change alive.
More than in previous times, the US intelligence services focus on gathering internal and economic information, such as on difficulties, contradictions, and problems within Comecon; but also obviously about the combat strength of the socialist armies and Soviet arms deployed in socialist countries and the Soviet Union itself, etc.
In part, intelligence agencies are tasked with disseminating rumors, sending anonymous letters, and distributing leaflets especially in case of domestic troubles.
In the context of strengthening the US special forces (Rangers), the US services have created a special operative group in Europe to prepare for sabotage and the activities of gangs in socialist countries.
After the changes in the Soviet leadership no particular attempts by the adversary were noted to exploit the situation inside the Soviet Union. The NTS [National Alliance of Russian Solidarists] attempted to create false impressions abroad concerning the existence of certain resistance groups within the Soviet Union.[2] Yet all this must not make us complacent. In certain reviews, we sometimes noted a dangerous overconfidence on the side of our counterintelligence services despite the fact that there are still many open channels left for the infiltration of enemies into the Soviet Union (he [Semichastny] explained this by giving examples of opportunities exploited by criminals).
On this entire complex of issues we [MfS] made extensive comments during our second meeting. Drawing on differences within the FRG leadership, we outlined how it does not make much sense to simply talk about a rejection of the French and a clear support of American concepts by the West German government. There are noteworthy differences within the West German leadership on core issues regarding NATO, MLF, and other problems. The leading exponents of West German imperialism have one thing in common: They are eager to exploit differences between other NATO members in order to pursue their revanchist concept and related strategic positions, and to gain larger concessions and rights pertaining to nuclear arms. We see the different options involved but currently the MLF is the biggest danger. In stressing this line of argumentation, we also noted that due to differences within NATO especially favorable opportunities exist to stall this project by mobilizing all our political forces. We explained the connection, and emanating danger, between West German imperialism’s basic concept of its own positions on forward-based strategies and the issue of “covert war” and its respective preparation. We also emphasized the link between this dangerous particular West German concept and undertakings of political and economic subversion.
Comrade Semichastny agreed with our opinions and stressed the high value of our information for the KGB.
[Semichastny said:] Everything must be done in order to prevent West German access to nuclear weapons in any form. If West Germany receives nuclear weapons or gets just one finger on the trigger, anything can be expected from the West German revanchists. A lot is depending on us to prevent this in any form. The Soviet Union’s line is clear: No proliferation or transfer of nuclear weapons to anybody.
As far as the US is concerned, they do not currently count on the possibility of armed insurrections. They hardly infiltrate major forces from outside or deploy them, not even in Cuba.
If West Germany is training its own special forces, the possibility of provocations and perhaps the deployment of larger forces cannot be dismissed outright. There are no certain indications but politically you can expect them to undertake anything. They might have interests in creating preconditions by way of provocations to involve other NATO states in their plans. They might also have interests in demonstrating domestic instability in the GDR to keep hopes alive for realizing their plans.
On 30 November 1964, “Pravda” published an article about West Germany’s options to build its own nuclear weapons. The KGB provided us [MfS] with an assessment of the military potential of West German nuclear research based on our information and other sources.
Comrade Semichastny does not attribute any significance to the postponement by one month of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee meeting requested by the GDR.
Comrade Semichastny added here that the US and Great Britain do not want a nuclear war and that the BND [West German foreign intelligence service] is aware of this. De Gaulle uses his nuclear weapons to exert pressure on the other European countries but he will not start a nuclear war either. West Germany knows this as well. However, West Germany is a different case. From them you can expect an initiation [of nuclear war] as soon as they have the means to do it.
Regarding our statement on the effects of [Nikita Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei] Adzhubei’s visit to West Germany in increasing political subversion, the Soviet comrades responded: When this information arrived [in Moscow], the Chairman of the KGB approached the Presidium of the [CPSU] Central Committee. This question played an essential role [in the Soviet leadership change].
Furthermore, the KGB raised the issue that other Soviet institutions, especially academic ones, are often too passive towards hostile subversion and underestimate the impact of the adversary. It is necessary not only to be reactive but also to act offensively and outline our own position.
When dealing with this question [Adzhubei’s visit to West Germany], Comrade Semichastny stated that the KGB leadership takes every piece of information seriously and follows through on this line. He reiterated his statement, and he again expressed his thanks for the information and important hints provided by the MfS.
On Relations with China and Albania
On this issue raised by Comrade Mielke there was the following response by Comrade Semichastny:
The relationship with the Chinese is complicated, and it remains that way. With their visit [to Moscow] on 7 November the Chinese wanted to demonstrate that they have taken the initiative. It became clear during the talks in Moscow that the Chinese insist on the precondition to annul the decisions of the XX and XXII CPSU Party Congress; otherwise talks would make no sense. They pretended to have come to establish contacts and clear this issue but had no authority to negotiate. To every proposal by the Soviet comrades they just responded that they would report it back to Beijing. Yet in fact they rejected everything. Since the CPSU sticks to its line on basic questions, there is no real basis for talks with the Chinese.
During the meeting they [USSR] offered to meet with the Chinese on any level and at any location. They just responded that they would report this back.
Before, during, and after this stay in Moscow the Chinese press constantly published statements from Albanian, Japanese, and New Zealand newspapers with heavy attacks on the Soviet Union and repetitions of previous Chinese positions. The speeches by Comrades Brezhnev and Kosygin were published but typeset in such a way that the Chinese position became evident. An editorial published in [the Chinese newspaper] “Red Flag” reiterated all the old attacks and confirmed their insistence on maintaining their previous line. The “Red Flag” article was constantly re-broadcasted on radio.
The Soviet proposal for mutual cessation of interferences in internal affairs was met without any reaction. The Chinese press printed the nefarious attacks by the Japanese Communist Party, containing the demand that Khrushchev was just the tip of the iceberg and now the entire CPSU leadership has to be eliminated.
In the context of a CPSU proposal to move the preparatory meeting of the parties to March 1965, a corresponding letter by the CPSU Central Committee was supposed to be delivered to Mao Zedong or Liu Shaoqi. However, the Soviet ambassador [in Beijing] was only received by Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Xiao who commented himself on the letter’s contents and rejected it; though he was told the letter was addressed to the CCP Central Committee. He argued against any consultations and just repeated the same old attacks.
Thus there is nothing indicating an improvement in relations; not even the slightest hint in this direction exists. Countering our proposal to cede public polemics, the Chinese openly declared that they considered polemics useful.
For half a year, a Soviet delegation conducted negotiations in Beijing on border issues. Now these negotiations have been moved to Moscow where they are scheduled to resume on 15 November. Yet until now there has been no Chinese response to this proposal. The Chinese side demands the inclusion of a provision in the border treaty which states that 2.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory were unjustly and violently incorporated by Tsarist Russia. They declare they do not want this territory returned, only this injustice recognized. Concerning concrete issues, they are demanding, for instance, to have the borderline running next to Khabarovsk at the Amur River, i.e. right along the city.
The Soviet inquiry about Mao Zedong’s statement on the border made to the Japanese socialists has so far not received any response.
Currently there are fewer incidents along the border. However, winter has to be considered here. Until recently the situation was not normal: Constant border transgressions, impudent demeanor. This represents a major challenge to the nerves of the Soviet border units.
A similar picture exists in other fields of bilateral relations like trade and culture. Here as well there is no ray of hope, everything stands as it was.
During our [MfS] stay [in Moscow] the following incident occurred:
A Chinese doctoral student working with a Soviet professor had indicated he probably would not want to return to China. Subsequently he was ordered to come to the Chinese embassy and was supposed to be returned to China against his will. He fled from the embassy, and since then the Chinese are searching for him. Since they assume he is staying in his professor’s house, the Chinese have basically blocked this house and monitor it constantly. A Soviet protest was filed to the Chinese ambassador [in Moscow].
In China the atmosphere is further fueled by a strong anti-Soviet campaign. The splittist activities against other parties are continuing. The Communist Party of India has basically split apart. The Communist Party of Japan is treated as a vanguard, a progressive group has been excluded. Similar phenomena occur in Ceylon, Burma, Belgium, and so on. The splittist groups are officially supported by China.
The future perspective:
The Soviet Union is undertaking steps to find ways to come to at least decent bilateral relations. It is hard to say what the result will be. The CPSU leadership has to stand tall vis-à-vis the party and cannot tolerate letting the authority of the CPSU be constantly dragged through the mud.
On the Chinese atomic bomb:
It is impossible to assess whether this was a real bomb or a propagandistic one (laboratory experiment). One can hardly talk at the moment about a serious military production. The Chinese statement that they will not be the first to use the bomb seems to indicate this line of interpretation. Yet new problems are to be expected due to the course of the Chinese leadership.
On the Albanians:
Nothing is changing here. They did not send a delegation to the 47th anniversary [of the October Revolution] and also rejected a corresponding suggestion of the Chinese to do so. According to Comrade Semichastny’s personal opinion, the joint Albanian article that used the pretext to comment on [Italian Communist leader Palmiro] Togliatti’s memorandum was not drafted by the Albanians but by the Chinese. One week after the ouster of Comrade Khrushchev this was to serve as a trial balloon.
The Albanians demand an apology from the Soviet comrades, a concession of their mistakes, and the cessation of decisions by the XX and XXII CPSU Party Congress.
They may consider inviting the Albanians to the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee and to the Comecon meeting in order to test their reaction and deprive them of arguments [against the Soviet Union].
Inside Albania everything is repressed, they bolster security measures and the police apparatus. They hold trials, but people also disappear without trials. Albania’s economic situation is difficult. A message was sent to them on the 20th anniversary of liberation.
Concerning the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: It is hard to come up with detailed information. They are sailing along Chinese straits. Yet they are less polemical towards the Soviet Union. The same can be said about the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Characteristic of the attitude of the Chinese regarding Vietnam are their constant exhortations to others to fight without exposing themselves. They are eager to drag the Soviet Union into conflicts with the United States. When Vietnam demanded and received from the Soviet Union aircraft for certain types of combat the Chinese were asked to provide pilots, yet they refused. As a result, some Soviet pilots had to expose themselves in a very risky manner.
The main Chinese demand leveled against the Soviet Union is to provide evidence for a decisive struggle against US imperialism. They basically demand this conflict.
On Liberation Movements in Africa
Our questions regarding this subject were answered by Comrade Semichastny in principle, and in more detail by Comrade Sakharovsky in a separate meeting.
The work in Africa is complicated. The adversary has major Africa experiences and a strong intelligence base. We are just at the beginning. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations by socialist countries, and the improved opportunities resulting from those, the adversary undertakes active measures to diminish our influence. The struggle for the African continent is a tough fight conducted with high stakes and corresponding means. In particular the US and West Germany have recently increased the number of experienced agents. There are strong contradictions between the Western powers. They fight over influence, but they are united against the socialist countries. In order to prevent the establishment of progressive beachheads, institutions or socialist associations, they resort to every conceivable provocation and lie. In part they were successful with this, like in Guinea where relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated due to French and American efforts. Now there have been disappointments in Guinea, and a delegation has come to the Soviet Union with a long list of requests.
The Soviet Union supports the liberation movement and progressive forces in their unforgiving struggle against imperialism. Soviet foreign intelligence maintains contacts with the leaders of various liberation movements and conducts extensive political work to counter the influence of imperialist forces.
Following our submitted questionnaire, a general Soviet assessment was given on the various liberation movements and basic information provided about which organizations are pushed and supported by the Soviet Union.
Noted as most deserving of support were:
the MPLA of Angola;
the FRELIMO headed by Dr. [Eduardo] Mondlane of Mozambique;
the UPC under Mussaga in Cameroon;
in Congo the group around [Gaston] Soumialot (i.e. also [Antoine] Gizenga and [Pierre] Mulele).
Concerning the liberation movements of Mocambique and South Rhodesia which currently lack a firm base in the country, and whose current leaders cannot be vouched for with certainty, it is now particularly important to identify and study positive individuals in order to develop leaders who are actually capable and can guarantee a proper utilization of our aid and support.
Concerning the Tanzanian Union:
The Union is a victory of Western powers and [President Julius] Nyerere. The latter has played an extraordinarily negative role in all this. The Union exerts strong pressure against any preservation of Zanzibar’s independent rights. Tanganyika has built a volunteer reserve of 4,000 men and in October issued a decree pertaining to the armed forces. Zanzibar has little prospect of an autonomous development. Nyerere will not establish diplomatic relations with the GDR and has given corresponding guarantees to the Western powers.
In our meeting with Comrade Sakharovsky this assessment was based on our statements regarding this issue. Zanzibar must be supported as a base for progress and a fist within Tanzania. It has to be strengthened against all efforts of restoration by colonial and neo-colonial powers. All attacks by imperialist powers must be parried. Zanzibar needs economic support.
Another threat emanates from plans for an East African federation, and also must not be allowed.
MfS activities on Zanzibar are rated positively. All expenses for Zanzibar are justified. It is now particularly important to solidify the personal contacts with, and influence on, [President Abeid] Karume, to always make accurate assessments of the domestic situation in Zanzibar, and to study also the policy of the Union closely. The activities by our security services [in Zanzibar] have to be legally certified and covered in order not to deliver a pretext for an outside intervention.
It is crucial to have exact knowledge of English and American plans concerning the Union and against Zanzibar.
We reached agreement about our assessment of [Abdullah] Hanga and [Abdulrahman] Babu, also about the need to influence them.
Coordination measures were agreed upon, especially in light of the upcoming delegation of KGB representatives [to Zanzibar].
On the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), Ghana:
In principle the Soviet Union supports all wishes expressed by President [Kwame] Nkrumah, though they are frequently complicated and difficult. Nkrumah sees himself as a leader for all of Africa and harbors corresponding plans.
After the first attack on Nkrumah, the Soviet Union provided support by sending an adviser to help with building a personal security service. It also provided equipment and arms for a Guard Battalion including the delivery of heavy armaments. The KGB has also sent an officer to help with the creation of intelligence services. He is still on site in Ghana but can hardly become active. The security apparatus is not yet purged of imperialist elements. Support is also given for the build-up of border guard units. Ten people are to be trained in the Soviet Union for the struggle of liberation movements.
Our information concerning the tasks of the Bureau of African Affairs were confirmed. Information was given about which liberation movements are supported by this office, and which are not. The head of the office, [A.K.] Barden, is a confidant of Nkrumah. Information exists according to which Barden is involved in financial machinations and arms smuggling. In this context, some express opinions that he discredits the liberation movements and Ghana’s prestige. African leaders, like those of Zambia, are said to have stated their displeasure with the office’s activities.
The BAA has requested and received a Soviet instructor for the camps it is running to train fighters for Angola. They were trained for six months. Now they asked for equipment, arms, and education material for an alleged training center. There is the assumption that in fact they want to build up a special force capable of being deployed abroad as well as inside Ghana.
The Czechoslovak comrades have had experiences with similar requests from Guinea and Mali. They provided their knowledge as advisers but they were never shown anything. Afterwards they were pushed out.
Concerning such type of work, it is important in general to recognize that the influence of imperialist intelligence and corruption are still quite strong. From Soviet remarks we [MfS] could fathom that requests ought to be met when there is a direct confirmation by Nkrumah. Arms shipments to Ghana will also be supported.
On Assessing the Situation of the Cuban Security Services:
The security services have existed since 1959 and are part of the Ministry of Interior. The heads of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and personal security are basically autonomous and report directly to the leadership. Mostly they are young, good, and energetic people, former members of the 26th of July movement or Cuban communists. They do not have much experience. There are no party cells within the organization.
A noteworthy element is a certain guerilla mentality and the desire to instigate revolutions in other Latin American countries without taking practical conditions there into consideration. Foreign Intelligence has existed since 1961 and is kept very busy with such issues.
Counterintelligence has done great work against the counterrevolution, achieved good success in 1961-62, and pushed back the active underground. Soviet advisers gave support to the struggle against banditry. According to Cuban assessments there are currently only 70 to 80 active bandits left.
Since 1960 our relationship with the KGB has been close. There is solid cooperation, constant support through specialists, training in the Soviet Union, delivery of operative technology, and informational exchanges. The large Cuban requests in the field of technology are not always justifiable. [KGB] advisers on Cuba are also working with [Cuban] Foreign Intelligence. The [Cuban] comrades have problems keeping contact with [foreign] agents [abroad]. Sometimes they do not know where they are, and what they are doing.
The Soviet comrades help with information about regime questions, documentation issues, information on objects in the US, and support the struggle against agents from capitalist states in Cuba. The Cuban comrades are attentive and apply their advice. Working with them requires major diligence, support, and insights into their problems.
Concerning our questions about certain phenomena in Cuba, Comrade Sakharovsky explained: Fidel decides everything in Cuba. This leads to discontent. Incorrect decisions are taken, and then subordinate leaders are held responsible for subsequent deficits and problems. There are difficulties in building party organizations. There are no party cells yet in the security services. There are problems and tensions based on different origins of members coming from the 26th of July movement, the Directorate, and the communists. The leadership’s position is unclear in context of the [Anibal] Escalante affair, the [Heriberto] Rodriguez trial and the current investigation against Ordoka. It is not clear whether this represents, intentionally or inadvertently, an anti-communist tendency of Fidel. The political situation is complicated and indeed major discontent exists.
We were asked [by the KGB] to establish, according to our interests, official contact between the MfS and the Cuban services. We ought to emphasize our interest in supporting anti-American tendencies in Latin America through our activity. Concrete cases [unofficial agents] must not be uncovered.
On Questions of Mobilization Work
Comrade Semichastny agreed that a meeting will be held by experts on this issue.
On Registration and Operative Evaluation of Tourism
[Based on a] meeting with Comrade Babkov, a visit to the electronic center, and to the news center in the 2nd Main Directorate. Registration is currently done according to the following criteria:
Entry and exit by foreigners from non-socialist states;
Travel routes and geography of travel activity;
Agents and suspicious foreigners;
Diplomatic travel.
Entry and exit stubs have replaced the visa and contain a photo. Currently we [MfS] are working with the Institute of Criminology on the problem of picture registration and analysis. In the long run registration is envisaged of important links with information from mail control, of suspicious Soviet citizens, and of repercussions concerning confidential information that was revealed to the adversary.
Varia
Joint measures against the statute of limitations of war crimes.
The Soviet comrades will forward a proposal to the GDR State Prosecutor via the Soviet Embassy in Berlin in the name of the USSR State Prosecutor to delegate GDR experts to USSR archives to study Nazi documents. After a review and selection of related material, the latter will be officially and publicly handed over to the GDR. The USSR will issue a statement by the Committee of War Veterans or the Soviet government. Also there will be an appeal by Soviet lawyers filing an appropriate protest.
The Soviet comrades expect the MfS to be involved in this. They expect a delegation of 5 or 6 individuals to come to the USSR soon, preferably with Russian language skills.
The Soviet comrades are preparing information on the contents of existing documents to be used for the unmasking of Nazi diplomats.
The comrades returned to the issue of the International Seminar to expose the Nazi generals in the West German army.
The KGB attributes major importance to measures revealing the cooperation between the West German Federal Republic and Israel. Previous measures were already successful, and the efforts of the MfS in this regard were recognized. The Soviet comrades have certain opportunities in Syria. They have already resulted in an extensive evaluation by the Syrian Foreign Ministry for the [Syrian] government on West German-Israeli cooperation confirming the information we provided beforehand. The Syrian Foreign Ministry noted in this context that FRG attitudes [toward Israel] might lead to the establishment of [Syrian] diplomatic relations with the GDR, which will automatically result in breaking off relations with West Germany. All state bodies in Syria are requested to conduct an exact analysis of relations with the GDR and FRG, and reflect on expected consequences in case relations with the FRG might be severed.
The Soviet services have information about a former assistant of [Adolf] Eichmann residing in Syria. He was supposed to be liquidated by the BND since he knows too much.
Comrade Semichastny reiterated the special interest of the KGB in the cases of St. and Ch. We agreed that the KGB will forward any new information to the MfS.
Concerning the question by Comrade Minister Mielke about experiences with the subordination of border guard units under the KGB, Comrade Semichastny stated that this subordination has turned out fully satisfactory like in similar earlier cases. The border guard units share this opinion. Border service is not just simple guard duty. It is about guaranteeing operative security at the border using agents and all available means. Working with agents is necessary on both sides of the border. Thus the KGB has to be active along the border anyway, and maintaining parallel responsibilities and authorities would make no sense. Any other line of authority would make principal and practical decisions in dealing with border violations much more complicated. The same applies to dealing with border crossings by foreigners at the checkpoints. This way a close and uncomplicated cooperation between counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, and border units is guaranteed. The Ministry of Defense, in contrast, has completely different assignments. This becomes especially relevant when dealing with incidents at the Chinese border. All issues are flexibly and correctly decided by the KGB which functions as a political body. Border guard units are best associated with the KGB. They are not a major burden but a big help for counterintelligence and foreign intelligence.
Concerning the “Tag [Day]” case, Comrade Semichastny said it is very possible that the US have such equipment. The Soviet Union does not have such portable apparatuses. In this context we also discussed issues of secure codes and deciphering by the adversary. Applying these means, the latter gains major insights in particular on military data. An employee of the US deciphering agency is said to have received an award of 100,000 dollars.
Following our request, the Soviet comrades handed over a number of scientific-technological information as well as documentation on scientific-technological intelligence in the areas of chemistry, in particular the production of artificial plastics and fibers.
Comrade Semichastny rated the relationship with the MfS as good. He thanked us in particular for our good information and emphasized some of the sites where this information was obtained. This type of information is of great help for the orientation of the party and government of the Soviet Union.
Information in the field of scientific-technological foreign intelligence is also very valuable and important. He thanked us for this in particular.
A great and valuable help is also the work of the MfS concerning the support of Soviet military counter-intelligence to safeguard the Soviet Army on GDR territory.
Therefore the Soviet comrades would like to present, at the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the MfS [1965], awards to a large number of MfS employees who have distinguished themselves in the acquisition of political and scientific-technological information; and also for merit in security issues concerning the Soviet Army. They ask for our consent on this and expect appropriate suggestions of names.
At the end of the meeting Comrade Mielke thanked us for the valuable information provided during the course of our talks.
He noted a full agreement of views and praised the value of this kind of meeting. They offer the opportunity to achieve rapid clarifications and solutions for general and practical issues of operative work. He again reiterated the consent reached regarding certain issues concerning an aggravation of the overall situation, and the need to apply respective countermeasures. Comrade Mielke thanked us for the openness and cordiality of our relations. He stressed our good cooperation with the KGB apparatus in the GDR and invited Comrade Semichastny to visit the GDR.
Comrade Mielke forwarded greetings from Comrades Ulbricht and Honecker to Comrade Semichastny and the leading comrades of the KGB.
Comrade Semichastny shared his assessment about the value of the meeting. He was grateful for the good cooperation with the KGB and its apparatus in the GDR. He thanked for the greetings from Comrades Ulbricht and Honecker and asked to return his own warm greetings.
[1] Palewski was actually Minister of State in charge of Scientific Research, Atomic Energy and Space Questions.
[2] NTS, the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists, an anti-communist Russian exile organization.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY
Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson’s recent election in the United States, Khrushchev’s ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.
