KGB SECRETS 15/19 – Former KGB Spy Rates 9 Russian Spy Scenes In Movies – How Real Is It?

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Jack Barsky is a former sleeper agent of the KGB who spied on the US from 1978 to 1988. After being exposed, he turned FBI informant and has since stayed in the United States, becoming a published author of “Deep Undercover” and an expert on espionage and Russian intelligence.

He was recruited into the KGB after being approached by a member of the East German secret police at the University of Jena in 1969. Barsky rates the realism of Russian spying tactics such as message interception, surveillance, and sleeper cells in “The Fourth Protocol” (1987), “Anna” (2019), “Bridge of Spies” (2015), “Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy” (2011), and the popular TV show “The Americans” (2013-2018).

He also breaks down physical training and spies’ backgrounds in “Red Sparrow” (2018), “Salt” (2010), and Black Widow’s first on-screen appearance in “Iron Man 2” (2010). He also discusses the Bond movie franchise and its depiction of Russian spies in “From Russia With Love” (1963).

Stasi-Dioxin – The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” Searching For the Perfect Murder

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Evidence shows that such a perfect murder plotted by former Stasi agents is the cause of the death of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.

The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [ˈʃtaziː]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of East Germany. The MfS was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. It was widely regarded as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies in the world. The MfS motto was “Schild und Schwert der Partei” (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).

According to the confessions of an informer, Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch writes most of the “articles” of the communist “STASI” agency “GoMoPa” himself or it is done by lawyers of his firm. The whistleblower states that lawyer Resch is the mastermind behind the “CYBER-STASI” called “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”. Bizarre enough they use Jewish names of non-existing Jewish lawyers by the name of “Goldman, Morgenstern and Partner” to stage their bogus “firm”.  Further involved in their complots are a “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber and “STASI”-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer, “the first crime expert” in the former communist East-Germany.
According to London based Meridian Capital hundreds and thousands of wealthy people and companies have paid to the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” to avoid their cyberstalking (see article below).
Finally the German criminal police started their investigations (case number ST/0148943/2011).
The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” is also involved in the death of the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach who died under strange circumstances in July 2010.
Only hours after his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” was spreading the news that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution and set the stage for a fairy tale. Months before his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” started a campaign to ruin his reputation and presumably was also responsable for cyberattacks to bring his website down. In fact they presumably used the same tactics also against our servers. Therefore we investigated all internet details of them and handed the facts to the FBI and international authorities.

Story background:
Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.

The serial betrayer and  cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders  say they  have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of  “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions,  individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011
In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.

Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.

The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.

This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.

Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.

Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover  the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers  named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment section.

-“Worse than the Gestapo.” —Simon Wiesenthal, Nazi hunter said about the notorious “Stasi”.

Less than a month after German demonstrators began to tear down the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, irate East German citizens stormed the Leipzig district office of the Ministry for State Security (MfS)—the Stasi, as it was more commonly called. Not a shot was fired, and there was no evidence of “street justice” as Stasi officers surrendered meekly and were peacefully led away. The following month, on January 15, hundreds of citizens sacked Stasi headquarters in Berlin. Again there was no bloodshed. The last bit of unfinished business was accomplished on May 31 when the Stasi radioed its agents in West Germany to fold their tents and come home.
The intelligence department of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), the People’s Army, had done the same almost a week earlier, but with what its members thought was better style. In-stead of sending the five-digit code groups that it had used for decades to message its spies in West Germany, the army group broadcast a male choir singing a children’s ditty about a duck swimming on a lake. There was no doubt that the singing spymasters had been drowning their sorrow over losing the Cold War in schnapps. The giggling, word-slurring songsters repeated the refrain three times: “Dunk your little head in the water and lift your little tail.” This was the signal to agents under deep cover that it was time to come home.
With extraordinary speed and political resolve, the divided nation was reunified a year later. The collapse of the despotic regime was total. It was a euphoric time for Germans, but reunification also produced a new national dilemma. Nazi war crimes were still being tried in West Germany, forty-six years after World War II. Suddenly the German government was faced with demands that the communist officials who had ordered, executed, and abetted crimes against their own people—crimes that were as brutal as those perpetrated by their Nazi predecessors—also be prosecuted.
The people of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), the German Democratic Republic, as the state had called itself for forty years, were clamoring for instant revenge. Their wrath was directed primarily against the country’s communist rulers—the upper echelon of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei (SED), the Socialist Unity Party. The tens of thousands of second-echelon party functionaries who had enriched themselves at the expense of their cocitizens were also prime targets for retribution.
Particularly singled out were the former members of the Stasi, the East German secret police, who previously had considered themselves the “shield and sword” of the party. When the regime collapsed, the Stasi had 102,000 full-time officers and noncommissioned personnel on its rolls, including 11,000 members of the ministry’s own special guards regiment. Between 1950 and 1989, a total of 274,000 persons served in the Stasi.
The people’s ire was running equally strong against the regular Stasi informers, the inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs). By 1995, 174,000 had been identified as IMs, or 2.5 percent of the total population between the ages of 18 and 60. Researchers were aghast when they found that about 10,000 IMs, or roughly 6 percent of the total, had not yet reached the age of 18. Since many records were destroyed, the exact number of IMs probably will never be determined; but 500,000 was cited as a realistic figure. Former Colonel Rainer Wiegand, who served in the Stasi counterintelligence directorate, estimated that the figure could go as high as 2 million, if occasional stool pigeons were included.
“The Stasi was much, much worse than the Gestapo, if you consider only the oppression of its own people,” according to Simon Wiesenthal of Vienna, Austria, who has been hunting Nazi criminals for half a century. “The Gestapo had 40,000 officials watching a country of 80 million, while the Stasi employed 102,000 to control only 17 million.” One might add that the Nazi terror lasted only twelve years, whereas the Stasi had four decades in which to perfect its machinery of oppression, espionage, and international terrorism and subversion.
To ensure that the people would become and remain submissive, East German communist leaders saturated their realm with more spies than had any other totalitarian government in recent history. The Soviet Union’s KGB employed about 480,000 full-time agents to oversee a nation of 280 million, which means there was one agent per 5,830 citizens. Using Wiesenthal’s figures for the Nazi Gestapo, there was one officer for 2,000 people. The ratio for the Stasi was one secret policeman per 166 East Germans. When the regular informers are added, these ratios become much higher: In the Stasi’s case, there would have been at least one spy watching every 66 citizens! When one adds in the estimated numbers of part-time snoops, the result is nothing short of monstrous: one informer per 6.5 citizens. It would not have been unreasonable to assume that at least one Stasi informer was present in any party of ten or twelve dinner guests.

THE STASI OCTOPUS

Like a giant octopus, the Stasi’s tentacles probed every aspect of life. Full-time officers were posted to all major industrial plants. Without exception, one tenant in every apartment build-ing was designated as a watchdog reporting to an area representative of the Volkspolizei (Vopo), the People’s Police. In turn, the police officer was the Stasi’s man. If a relative or friend came to stay overnight, it was reported. Schools, universities, and hospitals were infiltrated from top to bottom. German academe was shocked to learn that Heinrich Fink, professor of theology and vice chancellor at East Berlin’s Humboldt University, had been a Stasi informer since 1968. After Fink’s Stasi connections came to light, he was summarily fired. Doctors, lawyers, journalists, writers, actors, and sports figures were co-opted by Stasi officers, as were waiters and hotel personnel. Tapping about 100,000 telephone lines in West Germany and West Berlin around the clock was the job of 2,000 officers.
Stasi officers knew no limits and had no shame when it came to “protecting the party and the state.” Churchmen, including high officials of both Protestant and Catholic denomina-tions, were recruited en masse as secret informers. Their offices and confessionals were infested with eavesdropping devices. Even the director of Leipzig’s famous Thomas Church choir, Hans-Joachim Rotch, was forced to resign when he was unmasked as a Spitzel, the people’s pejorative for a Stasi informant.
Absolutely nothing was sacred to the secret police. Tiny holes were bored in apartment and hotel room walls through which Stasi agents filmed their “suspects” with special video cam-eras. Even bathrooms were penetrated by the communist voyeurs.8 Like the Nazi Gestapo, the Stasi was the sinister side of deutsche Gründlichkeit (German thoroughness).
After the Berlin wall came down, the victims of the DDR regime demanded immediate retribution. Ironically, their demands were countered by their fellow Germans in the West who, living in freedom, had diligently built einen demokratischen Rechtsstaat, a democratic state governed by the rule of law. The challenge of protecting the rights of both the victims and the accused was immense, given the emotions surrounding the issue. Government leaders and democratic politicians recognized that there could be no “quick fix” of communist injustices without jeopardizing the entire system of democratic jurisprudence. Moving too rapidly merely to satisfy the popular thirst for revenge might well have resulted in acquittals or mistrials. Intricate jurisdictional questions needed to be resolved with both alacrity and meticulousness. No German government could afford to allow a perpetrator to go free because of a judicial error. The political fallout from any such occurrence, especially in the East, could prove fatal to whatever political party occupied the chancellor’s office in Bonn at the time.
Politicians and legal scholars of the “old federal states,” or West Germany, counseled patience, pointing out that even the prosecution of Nazi criminals had not yet been completed. Before unification, Germans would speak of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to grips with the past”) when they discussed dealing with Nazi crimes. In the reunited Germany, this word came to imply the communist past as well. The two were considered comparable especially in the area of human rights violations. Dealing with major Nazi crimes, however, was far less complicated for the Germans: Adolf Hitler and his Gestapo and Schutzstaffel (SS) chief, Heinrich Himmler, killed themselves, as did Luftwaffe chief and Vice Chancellor Hermann Göring, who also had been the first chief of the Gestapo. The victorious Allies prosecuted the rest of the top leadership at the International War Crimes Tribunal in Nürnberg. Twelve were hanged, three received life terms, four were sentenced to lesser terms of imprisonment (up to twenty years), and three were acquitted.
The cases of communist judges and prosecutors accused of Rechtsbeugung (perversion of justice) are more problematic. According to Franco Werkenthin, a Berlin legal expert charged with analyzing communist crimes for the German parliament, those sitting in judgment of many of the accused face a difficult task because of the general failure of German justice after World War II. Not a single judge or prosecutor who served the Nazi regime was brought to account for having perverted justice—even those who had handed down death sentences for infringements that in a democracy would have been considered relatively minor offenses. Werkenthin called this phenomenon die Jauche der Justiz, the cesspool of justice.
Of course, the crimes committed by the communists were not nearly as heinous as the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews, or the mass murders in Nazi-occupied territories. However, the communists’ brutal oppression of the nation by means including murder alongside legal execution put the SED leadership on a par with Hitler’s gang. In that sense, Walter Ulbricht or Erich Honecker (Ulbricht’s successor as the party’s secretary-general and head of state) and secret police chief Erich Mielke can justifiably be compared to Hitler and Himmler, respectively.
Arrest warrants were issued for Honecker and Mielke. The Soviet government engineered Honecker’s escape to Moscow, where he became the ward of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gor-bachev. When the Soviet Union crumbled, the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin expelled Honecker. He was arrested on his return to Germany, but a court decided against a trial when he was diagnosed with liver cancer. Honecker flew to Chile with his wife Margot to live with their daughter, a Chilean citizen by marriage. His exile was short, and he died in 1994. Mielke was not so fortunate: His KGB friends turned their backs on him. He was tried in Germany for the 1931 murder of two police officers, found guilty, and sentenced to six years in prison. Other charges, including manslaughter, were dismissed because of his advanced age and poor health.
Three other members of the twenty-one-member ruling Politburo also have been tried. Former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler was convicted of manslaughter in connection with the order to kill people who were trying to escape to the West. He received a seven-and-a-half-year term. Two others, members of the Central Committee and the National Defense Council, were tried with Kessler and sentenced to seven and a half years and five years, respectively. Politburo member Harry Tisch, who was also head of the communist trade union, was found guilty of embezzlement and served eighteen months. Six others, including Egon Krenz (Honecker’s successor as party chief), were charged with manslaughter. Krenz was found guilty, and on August 25, 1997, was sentenced to six and a half years in prison.
However, eight years after reunification, many of the 165 members of the Central Committee have not yet been put under investigation. In 1945, Nazis holding comparable or lesser positions were subject to automatic arrest by the Allies. They spent months or even years in camps while their cases were adjudicated. Moreover, the Nürnberg Tribunal branded the Reich and its Corps of Political Leaders, SS, Security Service (SD), Secret State Police (Gestapo), SA (Storm Troopers), and Armed Forces High Command criminal organizations. Similarly sweeping actions against communist leaders and functionaries such as Stasi officers were never contemplated, even though tens of thousands of political trials and human rights abuses have been documented. After the East German regime fell, German judicial authorities scrupulously avoided the appearance of waging witch-hunts or using the law as a weapon of vengeance. Prosecutors and judges made great efforts to be fair, often suspending legal action while requesting rulings from the supreme court on possible constitutional conflicts.
The victims of oppression clamored for revenge and demanded speedy prosecution of the erstwhile tyrants. They had little patience for a judicial system that was handicapped by a lack of unblemished and experienced criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges. Despite these handicaps, the Berlin Central Police Investigations Group for Government Criminality, mindful that the statute of limitations for most communist crimes would expire at the end of 1999, made significant progress under its director Manfred Kittlaus, the able former director of the West Berlin state police. Kittlaus’s major task in 1998 was to investigate wrongful deaths, including 73 murders, 30 attempted murders, 583 cases of manslaughter, 2,938 instances of attempted manslaughter, and 425 other suspicious deaths. Of the 73 murders, 22 were classified as contract murders.
One of those tried and convicted for attempted contract murder was former Stasi collaborator Peter Haak, who was sentenced to six and a half years in prison. The fifty-two-year-old Haak took part in the Stasi’s 1981 Operation Scorpion, which was designed to pursue people who helped East Germans escape to the West. Proceedings against former General Gerhard Neiber, whose Stasi directorate was responsible for preventing escapes and for wreaking vengeance, were still pending in 1998.
Peter Haak’s murder plot was hatched after he befriended Wolfgang Welsch and his family. Welsch was a thorn in the side of the Stasi because of his success in smuggling people out of the DDR. Haak joined Welsch and the latter’s wife and seven-year-old daughter on a vacation in Israel, where he mixed a gram of thallium, a highly poisonous metallic chemical element used in rat poison, into the hamburgers he was preparing for a meal. Welsch’s wife and daughter vomited immediately after ingesting the poison and recovered quickly. Welsch suffered severe aftereffects, but eventually recovered: He had consumed a large amount of beer with the meal, and an expert testified that the alcohol had probably flushed the poison from his system.
Berlin Prosecutor General Christoph Schäfgen revealed that after the DDR’s demise 15,200 investigations had been launched, of which more than 9,000 were still active at the beginning of 1995. Indictments were handed down in 153 cases, and 73 perpetrators were convicted. Among those convicted were the aforementioned Politburo members as well as a number of border guards who had killed people who were trying to escape to the West.
Despite widespread misgivings about the judicial failures in connection with some Nazi crimes, a number of judges and prosecutors were convicted and jailed for up to three years for perversion of justice. In collusion with the Stasi, they had requested or handed down more severe sentences in political cases so that the state could collect greater amounts when the “convicts” were ransomed by the West German government. {The amount of ransom paid was governed by the time a prisoner had been sentenced to serve.)
The enormity of the task facing judicial authorities in reunified Germany becomes starkly evident when one examines the actions they have taken in all five former East German prov-inces and in East Berlin. From the end of 1990 to July 1996, 52,050 probes were launched into charges of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, election fraud, and per-version of justice. A total of 29,557 investigations were halted for various reasons including death, severe illness, old age, or insufficient evidence. In those five and a half years, there were only 139 convictions.
The problem is even more staggering when cases of espionage are included. Between 1990 and 1996, the office of the federal prosecutor general launched 6,641 probes, of which 2,431 were terminated before trial—most due to the statute of limitations. Of 175 indictments on charges of espionage, 95 resulted in convictions. In addition to the cases handled at the federal level, the prosecutor general referred 3,926 investigations to state authorities, who terminated 3,344 without trial. State courts conducted 356 trials, resulting in 248 convictions. Because the statute of limitations for espionage is five years, the prosecutor general’s office told me in 1997 it was unlikely that more espionage trials would be conducted.
It is important to emphasize the difference between the statute’s application to so-called government crimes committed in East Germany before the collapse and to crimes, such as es-pionage, committed in West Germany. The Unification Treaty specifically permits the belated prosecution of individuals who committed acts that were punishable under the East German criminal code and who due to official connivance were not prosecuted earlier. There is no statute of limitations for murder. For most other crimes the limit is five years; however, due to the obstacles created by previous government connivance, the German parliament in 1993 doubled this time limit for prosecution of the more serious crimes. At the same time, the par-liament decreed that all cases must be adjudicated by the end of 2002. For less serious offenses, the statute would have run out on December 31, 1997, but the parliament extended it to 2000.
A number of politicians, jurists, and liberal journalists pleaded for a general amnesty for crimes committed by former DDR leaders and Communist Party functionaries. A former West German supreme court judge, Ernst Mahrenholz, said the “sharp sword of justice prevents reconciliation.” Schäfgen, the Berlin prosecutor general, had this answer for the former high court judge and other amnesty advocates:

I cannot agree. We are raising no special, sharp sword against East Germans. We must pursue state-sponsored injustice in exactly the same manner as we do when a thief steals or when one human being kills another. If one wants to change that, then we would have to do away with the entire criminal justice system, because punishment always hurts. We are not criminalizing an entire people but only an ever shrinking, small portion.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who was West Germany’s minister of justice when the nation was unified, said this at a session of parliament in September 1991: “We must punish the perpetrators. This is not a matter of a victor’s justice. We owe it to the ideal of justice and to the victims. All of those who ordered injustices and those who executed the orders must be punished; the top men of the SED as well as the ones who shot [people] at the wall.” Aware that the feelings against communists were running high among their victims, Kinkel pointed to past revolutions after which the representatives of the old system were collectively liquidated. In the same speech before parliament, he said:

Such methods are alien to a state ruled by law. Violence and vengeance are incompatible with the law in any case. At the same time, we cannot tolerate that the problems are swept under the rug as a way of dealing with a horrible past, because the results will later be disastrous for society. We Germans know from our own experience where this leads. Jewish philosophy formulates it in this way: “The secret of redemption is called remembering.”

Defense attorneys for communist officials have maintained that the difficulty lies in the fact that hundreds of thousands of political opponents were tried under laws of the DDR. Although these laws were designed to smother political dissent and grossly violated basic human rights and democratic norms, they were nonetheless laws promulgated by a sovereign state. How could one justly try individual Stasi officers, prosecutors, and judges who had simply been fulfilling their legal responsibility to pursue and punish violators of the law?
Opinions varied widely on whether and how the Stasi and other perpetrators of state-sponsored crimes should be tried. Did the laws of the DDR, as they existed before reunification, still apply in the east? Or was the criminal code of the western part of the country the proper instrument of justice in reunified Germany? However, these questions were moot: As Rupert Scholz, professor of law at the University of Munich and a Christian Democratic member of parliament, pointed out, the Unification Treaty specifies that the penal code of the DDR and not that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) shall be applied to offenses committed in East Germany. Scholz’s view was upheld by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the supreme court. Most offenses committed by party functionaries and Stasi officers—murder, kidnapping, torture, illegal wiretapping, mail robbery, and fraud—were subject to prosecution in reunified Germany under the DDR’s penal code. But this would not satisfy the tens of thousands of citizens who had been sent to prison under East German laws covering purely political offenses for which there was no West German equivalent.
Nevertheless, said Scholz, judicial authorities were by no means hamstrung, because West Germany had never recognized the East German state according to international law. “We have always said that we are one nation; that the division of Germany led neither to full recognition under international law nor, concomitantly, to a recognition of the legal system of the DDR,” Scholz said. Accordingly, West German courts have consistently maintained that West German law protects all Germans equally, including those living in the East. Therefore, no matter where the crimes were committed, whether in the East or the West, all Germans have always been subject to West German laws. Applying this logic, East German border guards who had either killed or wounded persons trying to escape to the West could be tried under the jurisdiction of West Germany.
The “one nation” principle was not upheld by the German supreme court. Prior to the court’s decision, however, Colonel General Markus Wolf, chief of the Stasi’s foreign espionage directorate, and some of his officers who personally controlled agents from East Berlin had been tried for treason and convicted. Wolf had been sentenced to six years in prison. The su-preme court ruling overturned that verdict and those imposed on Wolf’s cohorts, even though they had obtained the most closely held West German secrets and handed them over to the KGB. The maximum penalty for Landesverrat, or treason, is life imprisonment. In vacating Wolf’s sentence, the court said he could not be convicted because he operated only from East German territory and under East German law.
However, Wolf was reindicted on charges of kidnapping and causing bodily harm, crimes also punishable under East German law. The former Stasi three-star general, on March 24, 1955, had approved in writing a plan to kidnap a woman who worked for the U.S. mission in West Berlin. The woman and her mother were tricked by a Stasi agent whom the woman had been teaching English, and voluntarily got into his car. He drove them into the Soviet sector of the divided city, where they were seized by Stasi officers. The woman was subjected to psychological torture and threatened with imprisonment unless she signed an agreement to spy for the Stasi. She agreed. On her return to the American sector, however, the woman reported the incident to security officials. Wolf had committed a felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment in West Germany. He was found guilty in March 1977 and sentenced to two years’ probation.
Those who have challenged the application of the statute of limitations to communist crimes, especially to the executions of citizens fleeing to the West, have drawn parallels to the notorious executive orders of Adolf Hitler. Hitler issued orders mandating the summary execution of Soviet Army political commissars upon their capture and initiating the extermination of Jews. An early postwar judicial decision held that these orders were equivalent to law. When that law was declared illegal and retroactively repealed by the West German Bundestag, the statute of limitations was suspended—that is, it never took effect. Many of those convicted in subsequent trials of carrying out the Führer’s orders were executed by the Allies. The German supreme court has ruled the same way as the Bundestag on the order to shoot people trying to escape to West Germany, making the statute of limitations inapplicable to such cases. The ruling made possible the trial of members of the National Defense Council who took part in formulating or promulgating the order. A number of border guards who had shot would-be escapees also have been tried and convicted.
Chief Prosecutor Heiner Sauer, former head of the West German Central Registration Office for Political Crimes, was particularly concerned with the border shootings. His office, located in Salzgitter, West Germany, was established in 1961 as a direct consequence of the Berlin Wall, which was erected on August 13 of that year. Willy Brandt, at the time the city’s mayor (later federal chancellor) had decided that crimes committed by East German border guards should be recorded. At his behest, a central registry of all shootings and other serious border incidents was instituted. Between August 13, 1961 and the opening of the borders on November 9, 1989, 186 border killings were registered. But when the Stasi archives were opened, investigators found that at least 825 people had paid with their lives for trying to escape to the West. This figure was reported to the court that was trying former members of the National Defense Council. In addition to these border incidents, the registry also had recorded a number of similar political offenses committed in the interior of the DDR: By fall 1991, Sauer’s office had registered 4,444 cases of actual or attempted killings and about 40,000 sentences handed down by DDR courts for “political offenses.”
During the early years of Sauer’s operation, the details of political prosecutions became known only when victims were ransomed by West Germany or were expelled. Between 1963 and 1989, West Germany paid DM5 billion (nearly US$3 billion) to the communist regime for the release of 34,000 political prisoners. The price per head varied according to the importance of the person or the length of the sentence. In some cases the ransom amounted to more than US$56,000. The highest sum ever paid to the East Germans appears to have been DM450,000 (US$264,705 using an exchange rate of US$1.70 to the mark). The ransom “object” in this case was Count Benedikt von Hoensbroech. A student in his early twenties, von Hoensbroech was attending a West Berlin university when the wall went up. He was caught by the Stasi while trying to help people escape and was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. The case at-tracted international attention because his family was related to Queen Fabiola of Belgium, who interceded with the East Germans. Smelling money, the East German government first demanded the equivalent of more than US$1 million from the young man’s father as ransom. In the end, the parties settled on the figure of DM450,000, of which the West German gov-ernment paid DM40,000 (about $23,529). Such ransom operations were fully controlled by the Stasi.
Political prisoners released in the DDR could not be registered by the West Germans because their cases remained secret. The victims were admonished to keep quiet or face another prison term. Nonetheless, in the first year after reunification, Sauer’s office added another 20,000 documented cases, for a total of 60,000. Sauer said he believed the final figure of all political prosecutions would be somewhere around 300,000. In every case, the Stasi was involved either in the initial arrest or in pretrial interrogations during which “confessions” were usually extracted by physical or psychological torture, particularly between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s.
Until 1987, the DDR imposed the death penalty for a number of capital crimes, including murder, espionage, and economic offenses. But after the mid-1950s, nearly all death sentences were kept quiet and executions were carried out in the strictest secrecy, initially by guillotine and in later years by a single pistol shot to the neck. In most instances, the relatives of those killed were not informed either of the sentence or of the execution. The corpses were cremated and the ashes buried secretly, sometimes at construction sites. In reporting about one executioner who shot more than twenty persons to death, the Berlin newspaper Bildzeitung said that a total of 170 civilians had been executed in East Germany. However, Franco Werkenthin, the Berlin official investigating DDR crimes, said he had documented at least three hundred executions. He declined to say how many were for political offenses, because he had not yet submitted his report to parliament. “But it was substantial,” he told me. The true number of executions may never be known because no complete record of death sentences meted out by civil courts could be found. Other death sentences were handed down by military courts, and many records of those are also missing. In addition, German historian Günther Buch believes that about two hundred members of the Stasi itself were executed for various crimes, including attempts to escape to the West.

SAFEGUARDING HUMAN DIGNITY?

The preamble to the East German criminal code stated that the purpose of the code was to “safeguard the dignity of humankind, its freedom and rights under the aegis of the criminal code of the socialist state,” and that “a person can be prosecuted under the criminal code only in strictest concurrence with the law.” However, many of the codified offenses for which East German citizens were prosecuted and imprisoned were unique to totalitarian regimes, both fascist and communist.
Moreover, certain sections of the code, such as those on “Treasonable Relaying of Information” and “Treasonable Agent Activity,” were perversely applied, landing countless East Germans in maximum security penitentiaries. The victims of this perversion of justice usually were persons who had requested legal exit permits from the DDR authorities and had been turned down. In many cases, their “crime” was having contacted a Western consulate to inquire about immigration procedures. Sentences of up to two and a half years’ hard labor were not unusual as punishment for such inquiries.
Engaging in “propaganda hostile to the state” was another punishable offense. In one such case, a young man was arrested and prosecuted for saying that it was not necessary to station tanks at the border and for referring to border fortifications as “nonsense.” During his trial, he “admitted” to owning a television set on which he watched West German programs and later told friends what he saw. One of those “friends” had denounced him to the Stasi. The judge considered the accused’s actions especially egregious and sentenced him to a year and a half at hard labor.
Ironically, another part of this section of the criminal code decreed that “glorifying militarism” also was a punishable offense, although the DDR itself “glorified” its People’s Army beyond any Western norm. That army was clad in uniforms and insignia identical to those of the Nazi Wehrmacht, albeit without eagles and swastikas. The helmets, too, were differently shaped, but the Prussian goose step was regulation during parades.
A nineteen-year-old who had placed a sign in an apartment window reading “When justice is turned into injustice, resistance becomes an obligation!” was rewarded with twenty-two months in the penitentiary. Earlier, the youth had applied for an exit visa and had been turned down. A thirty-four-year-old father of two who also had been denied permission to leave the “workers’ and peasants’ state” with his family similarly advertised that fact with a poster reading “We want to leave, but they won’t let us.” The man went to prison for sixteen months. The “crimes” of both men were covered by a law on “Interference in Activities of the State or Society.”
Two letters—one to a friend in West Germany, seeking assistance to legally emigrate to the West, and another containing a similar appeal to Chief of State Honecker—brought a four-year sentence to their writer, who was convicted under two laws: those on “establishing illegal contacts” (writing to his friend) and on “public denigration” (writing to Honecker). The Stasi had illegally intercepted both letters.
The East German party chiefs were not content to rely only on the Stasi’s millions of informers to ferret out antistate sentiments. Leaving nothing to chance, they created a law that made the failure to denounce fellow citizens a crime punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. One man was sentenced to twenty-three months for failing to report that a friend of his was preparing to escape to the West. The mandatory denunciation law had its roots in the statutes of the Socialist Unity Party, which were published in the form of a little red booklet. I picked up a copy of this booklet that had been discarded by its previous owner, a Stasi chauffeur, who had written “Ha, Ha” next to the mandate to “report any misdeeds, regardless of the person responsible, to leading party organs, all the way up to the Central Committee.”
Rupert Scholz, member of parliament and professor of law at the University of Munich, said many East Germans feel there is little determination among their Western brethren to bring the Stasi criminals to trial. “In fact, we already have heard many of them say that the peaceful revolution should have been a bloody one instead so they could have done away with their tormentors by hanging them posthaste,” Scholz told me.
The Reverend Joachim Gauck, minister to a Lutheran parish in East Germany, shared the people’s pessimism that justice would be done. Following reunification, Gauck was appointed by the Bonn government as its special representative for safeguarding and maintaining the Stasi archives. “We must at least establish a legal basis for finding the culprits in our files,” Gauck told me. “But it will not be easy. If you stood the millions of files upright in one line, they would stretch for 202 kilometers [about 121 miles]. In those files you can find an unbe-lievable number of Stasi victims and their tormentors.”
Gauck was given the mandate he needed in November 1991, when the German parliament passed a law authorizing file searches to uncover Stasi perpetrators and their informants. He viewed this legislation as first step in the right direction. With the evidence from Stasi files, the perpetrators could be removed from their public service jobs without any formal legal pro-ceedings. Said Gauck: “We needed this law badly. It is not reasonable that persons who served this apparatus of oppression remain in positions of trust. We need to win our people over to accepting that they are now free and governed by the rule of law. To achieve that, we must build up their confidence and trust in the public service.”
Searching the roughly six million files will take years. A significant number of the dossiers are located in repositories of the Stasi regional offices, sprinkled throughout eastern Germany. To put the files at the Berlin central repository in archival order would take one person 128 years. The job might have been made easier had the last DDR government not ordered the burning of thousands of Stasi computer tapes, ostensibly to forestall a witch-hunt. Thousands of files dealing with espionage were shredded and packed into 17,200 paper sacks. These were discovered when the Stasi headquarters was stormed on January 15, 1990. The contents of all of these bags now have been inspected. It took two workers between six and eight weeks to go through one bag. Then began the work of the puzzlers, putting the shredded pieces together. By the middle of 1997, fewer than 500 bags of shredded papers had been reconstructed—into about 200,000 pages. Further complicating matters was the lack of trained archivists and experts capable of organizing these files—to say nothing of the 37.5 million index cards bearing the names of informers as well as persons under Stasi surveillance—and interpreting their contents. Initially, funding for a staff of about 550 individuals was planned, at a total of about DM24.5 million annually (about US$15 million using an exchange rate of US$1.60). By 1997, the budget had grown to US$137 million and the staff to 3,100.
Stasi victims and citizens who had been under surveillance were allowed to examine their Stasi files. Within four years of reunification, about 860,000 persons had asked to inspect their case files, with 17,626 of those requests being received in December 1994 alone. By 1997, 3.4 million people had asked to see their files. Countless civil suits were launched when victims found the names of those who had denounced and betrayed them, and many family relationships and friendships were destroyed.
The rehabilitation of Stasi victims and financial restitution to them was well under way; but Gauck believed that criminal prosecution of the perpetrators would continue to be extremely difficult. “We can already see that leading SED functionaries who bear responsibility for the inhumane policies, for which they should be tried, are instead accused of lesser offenses such as corruption. It is actually an insult to democracy that a man like Harry Tisch is tried for embezzlement and not for being a member of the Politburo, where the criminal policies originated.”
The “Stasi files law,” as it is popularly known, also made it possible to vet parliamentarians for Stasi connections. Hundreds were fired or resigned—and a few committed suicide—when it was discovered that they had been Stasi informants. Among those who resigned was Lothar de Maiziere, the last premier of the DDR, who signed the unification agreement with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He was a member of the East German version of the Christian Democratic Union, which like all noncommunist parties in the Eastern bloc had been totally co-opted by the regime. After reunification, he moved into parliament and was awarded the vice chairmanship of Kohl’s Christian Democratic Union. A lawyer, De Maiziere had functioned for years as an IM, an informer, under the cover name Cerny. De Maiziere at first denied he was Cerny, but the evidence was overwhelming. It was De Maiziere’s government that had ordered the destruction of the Stasi computer tapes.

THE COMMUNISTS’ POLITICAL SURVIVAL

De Maiziere, who had been a driving force behind prompt reunification, soon passed into oblivion; but twenty members of the old Communist Party, the SED, are still members of parliament. The SED changed its name in late 1989, when the DDR was collapsing, to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Its new leadership arrogantly dismissed their bloody past as irrelevant now that the word democratic had been adopted as part of their party’s name. If the elections of summer 1990 had taken place just a few months later and thus had been conducted under the law of reunified Germany, these individuals would not have won parliamentary seats. The West German electoral rules governing the proportional representation system require that a party garner at least 5 percent of the vote before it may enter parliament. In addition to choosing a party, voters cast a second ballot for a specific person. This is called a direct mandate. If any party falls below 5 percent but gets at least three direct mandates, that party is seated in parliament. As a one-time compromise in consideration of East Germany’s smaller population, the Bonn government accepted a 3-percent margin of party votes. Even so, the PDS barely made it into parliament.
In the 1994 general election, the first after reunification, the party polled 4.4 percent. Had it not been for the votes electing four persons by direct mandate, the PDS would have been excluded. The direct mandates all came from East Berlin districts heavily populated by unemployed, former Communist Party and government officials. One of the men elected directly was Gregor Gysi, a communist lawyer who had been accused of informing on his clients to the Stasi. Gysi denied the allegations and had obtained a temporary injunction barring a former East German dissident from making the assertion. However, a Hamburg court lifted the injunction in December 1994 on the basis of Stasi documents that indicated Gysi had no case.
Another candidate directly elected to parliament was Stefan Heym, a German-born writer who had emigrated to the United States after Hitler came to power, had changed his name from Helmut Flieg, and had become a U.S. citizen. He served in the U.S. Army as an officer during World War II, but switched sides in 1952 to live in East Germany, forfeiting his U.S. citizenship in order to become an East German citizen and a member of the Communist Party. A year later, on June 17, 1953, the East German people rose up in a revolt that was crushed by the Red Army. Had it not been for the intervention of the Soviets, Heym wrote afterward in the communist daily newspaper Berliner Zeitung, “the American bombing would have already begun. The shots against the rebels were fired to prevent war, rather than to begin one.” And when Stalin died, just four months earlier, Heym used the same newspaper to mourn the butcher of an estimated twenty million people as the “most loved man of our times.” Finally, in a speech on January 31, 1995, at a demonstration marking the 62nd anniversary of the Nazi takeover, the unrepentant Heym, now eighty-two years old, had the gall to say that the present climate in Germany was “very similar to that in 1933, and this frightens me.” It was a grotesque spectacle when Heym was accorded the “honor” of delivering the opening address of the 1965 parliamentary session traditionally reserved for the body’s oldest member. Despite vehement protests, parliamentary president Rita Süssmuth ruled to uphold the tradition.
One of the PDS members also retaining his seat was Hans Modrow. Modrow, a veteran communist, was SED district secretary in Dresden. It was a most powerful communal political position. Modrow was a vital cog in the apparatus of state repression. The local Stasi chief, Major General Horst Böhm, reported directly to him. Modrow was the one who ordered the Vopo, the People’s Police, to resort to violence in putting down massive protests during the turbulent days in fall 1989, just before the Berlin Wall fell. Hundreds of protesters were severely beaten and jailed. Böhm, the Dresden Stasi boss, was found shot dead in his office in early 1990, just before he was to appear before a commission that had been convened to settle the future of the communist state. His death was listed as a suicide. However, an unsubstantiated rumor has it that he was murdered to prevent him from testifying about Modrow’s despotic rule. Modrow was found guilty of election fraud in May 1993. The DDR hierarchy, according to the evidence, had ordered that the number of votes opposing the official slate in the 1989 election had to be fewer than in 1985. Modrow reported that only 2.5 percent of the ballots in his district were cast in opposition; but the true number was at least four times higher. The judge issued him a mere rebuke, refusing to imprison or fine him. The federal high court, which reviews sentences, ordered in November 1994 that Modrow stand trial again because the sentence “was too mild.” After a new trial in 1996 on charges of perjury, Modrow was sentenced to six months’ probation. A year later, parliament was still considering whether he should be deprived of his seat.
Unlike the Nazi Party’s finances and property, which were confiscated by the victorious Allies and turned over to the first West German government in 1949, the SED’s millions were inherited by the PDS, which spirited part of those funds out of the country when the East German government collapsed. The PDS also became custodian of the archives of the SED and refused anyone outside the party access to them. Shortly after reunification, in 1990, the courts ruled that the archives were state property. Judicial authorities as well as scholars were permitted to research them. Nevertheless, the SED archives were almost lost. In 1994, the German news magazine Focus discovered a letter dated March 1991, sent by Gregor Gysi in the capacity of PDS party chief to Vladimir A. Ivashko, assistant secretary-general of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party. In this letter, Gysi pleaded with Soviet leaders either to put pressure on German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to return the archive to the PDS, or if Kohl felt this was politically impossible, to destroy it. The opening of the archive, Gysi wrote, was a “genuine catastrophe,” because it contained many secret documents. Publication of the documents would have “extremely unpleasant results not only for the PDS but for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well,” Gysi wrote. But his Soviet friends were no longer able to help him. The archive holds documents on Politburo decisions and directives that might prove crucial in prosecuting the former East German party hierarchy. In the end, the PDS offered to settle for 20 percent of the SED’s ill-gotten funds, forfeiting the rest as a gesture of goodwill toward the new state.
Not all observers were impressed by this compromise. Peter Gauweiler, Bavaria’s minister for development and ecological affairs at the time of reunification, and a member of the Christian Democratic Party, demanded that the PDS and the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, the West German Communist Party), be outlawed: “Every month we learn of new crimes committed by the SED—terrible things, gruesome things,” Gauweiler said. “We cannot tolerate a successor organization to such an extremely criminal gang.”

STASI – East Germany’s Secret Police – Targeted By The STASI

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The Stasi spied on Silke Orphal and Ilona Seeber for years – after they applied to go to the West. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, they both look back at their Stasi files. The Stasi files of Silke Orphal and Ilona Seeber include intercepted letters, official documents and countless reports by spies who meticulously noted everything about their lives, including the turning on and off of lights.

When Silke Orphal and Ilona Seeber, who were both ordinary typists at Neues Deutschland – the official newspaper of the Socialist Unity Party – applied to leave the GDR, it was considered scandalous. They were ostracized at work, threatened and subjected to interrogations that lasted hours. What did the experience do to them? How do they look back on that time today? A report by Axel Rowohlt.

STAS – East Germany’s Secret Police -East Germany’s Stasi Files

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In a musty room somewhere inside a maze of offices in east Berlin, two women are working patiently on what may be the biggest puzzle the world has ever seen – more than half a billion pieces that together detail innumerable actions committed by East Germany’s secret police.

Continue reading “STAS – East Germany’s Secret Police -East Germany’s Stasi Files”

Der „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „GoMoPA“ – DIE CYBER-STASI DES 21. JAHRHUNDERTS

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“Worse than the Gestapo.” — Simon Wiesenthal, Nazi hunter

Lauschen, spähen, schnüffeln: Vor 60 Jahren wurde die DDR-Staatssicherheit gegründet. Mehr als 91.000 hauptamtliche und doppelt so viele inoffizielle Mitarbeiter garantierten der SED die Macht. Ein Geheimdienst im klassischen Sinn war der Apparat nie, eher schon eine kriminelle Vereinigung mit tödlichen Methoden“, schreibt die angesehene Tageszeitung „DIE WELT“.

„Genau so verfährt auch der „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „ GoMoPa“ , erläutert Rainer W. (Name wurde aus Sicherheitsgründen anonymisiert). Er war über mehrere Monate „inoffizieller“ Mitarbeiter des „NACHRICHTENDIENSTES“ „GoMoPa“, einem angeblichen Zusammenschluss jüdischer US-Rechtsanwälte namens Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner LLC, die noch nie jemand gesehen hat. Stattdessen sehen die Personen, die sich mit „GoMoPa“ beschäftigen nur die Totenkopfmaske stalinistischer STASI-Hacker, Erpresser und Cyberstalker.

Rainer W.: „Die eigentlichen Köpfe von „GoMoPa“ sind meiner Meinung nach wohl RA Jochen Resch und STASI-Oberst Ehrenfried Stelzer. Maurischat (ein Deckname) hat nicht das Format so eine Organisation aufzuziehen.“

Seit Jahren schon vesuchen die vorbestraften Serien-Kriminellen um das „Aushängeschild“ Klaus-Dieter Maurischat die deutsche Wirtschaft zu infiltrieren. Doch erst seit dem mutmasslichen Mord an Heinz Gerlach und den monatelangen Attacken gegen unser Haus sind viele Fakten recherchiert und zu Tage gekommen.

Vor allem über die Methoden des „NACHRICHTENDIENSTES“ – aber auch über dessen Hintermänner in Berlin, denn in New York existiert sowieso nur eine Briefkastenadresse und auch das „Büro“ in Berlin ist ein „virtuelles Regus-Büro“.

Die Fassade soll den „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ tarnen.

„DIE WELT“ schreibt: „40 Jahre lang, von der Gründung bis zu ihrer schrittweisen Auflösung zwischen Dezember 1989 und März 1990, war die Staatssicherheit der wichtigste Machtgarant der SED-Herrschaft. In dieser Zeit wucherte der Apparat immer mehr, bis schließlich mehr als 91.000 hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter für das MfS tätig waren.

Dieses Heer betreute eine Schattenarmee mit 189.000 „Inoffiziellen Mitarbeitern“ (IM). Statistisch gesehen kam in der DDR auf 55 erwachsene Bürger ein Vollzeit- oder Teilzeit-Stasi-Mann. Zum Vergleich: Im kommunistischen Polen lag das Verhältnis bei 1500 zu eins.

Der Apparat hat ungezählte Verbrechen zu verantworten. Darin folgte er seinen sowjetischen Vorbildern, der Tscheka (stolz nannten sich Stasi-Leute „Tschekisten“) und dem KGB. Vor allem aber prägte ein Mann das kriminelle Gebaren des MfS: Erich Mielke hatte sich schon als junger Mann 1931 als Attentäter in Berlin bewährt, als er im Auftrag der KPD zusammen mit einem Mittäter zwei Berliner Polizeioffiziere erschoss.

Der Doppelmörder konnte flüchten und führte im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg stalinistische Säuberungen in den eigenen Reihen durch. Im Sommer 1945 kehrte er nach Berlin zurück und übernahm sofort eine führende Position in der neu eingerichteten Polizei – interessanterweise in jenem Gebäude, das bis 1990 Sitz und Postanschrift der Staatssicherheit sein sollte.“

Zu den ungezählten Verrechen zählen Morde, Entführungen, Raub, Erpressung, Bespitzelung und jahrelange Gefängnishaft für Regime-Kritiker.

Jörg Berger flüchtete 1979 aus der DDR. Auch im Westen blieb die Stasi sein ständiger Begleiter. Jörg Berger berichtete vor seinem frühen Tod: „Nehmen wir den Fall des Spielers Lutz Eigendorf. Der war kurz vor mir geflüchtet und hat dann durch viel Medienpräsenz noch selbst dazu beigetragen, den Rummel anzufachen. Er starb bei einem Unfall auf der Autobahn, höchstwahrscheinlich hat ihn die Stasi vor seinem Tod geblendet. Entsprechendes findet sich jedenfalls in seiner Akte. Die Leute um Eigendorf waren die Leute, die ich auch um mich versammelt hatte. Dazu war er ein junger Spieler, ich ein gestandener Trainer. So hat man mir die Autoreifen zerstochen, auf der Autobahn löste sich ein Rad – und monatelang hatte ich Lähmungserscheinungen. Vermutlich von einer Bleivergiftung, die die Stasi initiiert hatte. Die haben mir wohl etwas in ein Getränk gemischt.“

„Der „Blitz“ traf Wilhelm van Ackern am 24. März 1955, kurz nach 22.30 Uhr – in Form von K.-o.-Tropfen in frisch gebrühtem Bohnenkaffee. Der vermeintliche Informant Fritz Weidmann hatte den 39-jährigen Fotohändler in eine konspirative Wohnung in der Kreuzberger Gneisenaustraße gelockt und ihm dort den vergifteten Kaffee serviert.

Nach wenigen Minuten wurde van Ackern übel; gestützt von Weidmann, verließ er die Wohnung. Doch auf der Straße erwartete ein weiterer Mann die beiden mit einem Wagen. Wilhelm van Ackern wurde im Schutz der Dunkelheit hineingestoßen und über die noch offene Sektorengrenze von West- nach Ost-Berlin ins Untersuchungsgefängnis Hohenschönhausen gefahren. Erst neuneinhalb Jahre später, teilweise verbüßt in der berüchtigten DDR-Sonderhaftanstalt Bautzen II, kam er frei und durfte zurück nach West-Berlin.“

Von Arsen bis Zyankali:
Der Giftschrank der Staatssicherheit

   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
     
 
     
 

Dieter Baumann ist nicht totzukriegen. Nach einer zweijährigen Dopingsperre geht er jetzt wieder an den Start. 1999 eine positive Dopingprobe. Dass er sich selbst gedopt hat, glauben heute nur noch seine Feinde. Und Feinde aus der ehemaligen DDR hatte er genug:

Dieter Baumann 1991:
„Trainer, die eben mit solchen Dingen zu tun hatten, mit Doping, die können vom DLV nicht weiter beschäftigt werden.“

Dieter Baumann 1994:
„Aber die Trainer und die Funktionäre, die haben es nämlich entschieden, dass man es macht. Und diese Leute hat man jetzt wieder.“

Dieter Baumann 1998:
„Für mich als Athlet, das beanspruche ja auch ich für mich selber, gilt als Nachweis eine positive Probe oder ein Geständnis.“

In Baumanns Zahnpasta fanden Kontrolleure das Dopingmittel Norandrostendion. Wie man Zahnpasta-Tuben mit Gift präpariert, kann man in den Stasiakten nachlesen: mit einem Glasröhrchen im hinteren Teil der Z-Tube.

Die Zeitschrift „Laufzeit“ im Osten Berlins fragte ein Jahr vor Baumanns Dopingtest nach einem „Messias“ der Antidopingbewegung und beendete den Kommentar mit dem Satz: „Muß man sich angesichts morgendlicher Hochform eines Tages gar fragen: Ist meine Zahnpasta noch sauber?“

Laufzeit-Chef Wolfgang Weising, früher Leichtathletikautor bei der NVA-Zeitung „Volksarmee“ – sagte gegenüber report AUS MÜNCHEN, diese Formulierung sei Zufall gewesen. Baumann, das Opfer eines Komplotts? Selbst die Tübinger Kriminalpolizei schließt heute aus, dass sich Baumann selbst gedopt hat. Auch wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen belegen: Er konnte seine Zahnpasta nicht nachträglich manipuliert haben. Baumanns größte Entlastung: die Dosis war niemals leistungssteigernd.

Baumann selbst will nicht öffentlich spekulieren, wer ihm das Dopingmittel unterjubelte. Es müsse aber jemand aus seinem engen Umfeld sein.

Dieter Baumann, Olympiasieger 1992:
„Ich glaube schon, dass die Täter sich verrechnet haben. Ich glaube, der Wunsch der Täter, soviel kann ich sagen, ist mein Eindruck, dass es mich überhaupt nicht mehr gibt im Sport. Und ich hab’ dann so ein Naturell, wo ich denke: Nee, wenn jemand so einen innigen Wunsch hat, dann sollte man den nicht erfüllen.“

Die Existenz von Kritikern vernichten, das war eine Aufgabe der Stasi. Der Rechtsmediziner Prof. Thomas Daldrup von der Universität Düsseldorf hat die sogenannte „Toxdat“-Studie der DDR untersucht – eine 900 Seiten starke Datenbank über Giftmordmöglichkeiten. Hier ist detailliert beschrieben wie sich selbst Laien Gifte beschaffen können und wie man einen Mord am besten verschleiert.

Prof. Thomas Daldrup, Präsident Gesellschaft für Toxikologische und Forensische Chemie:
“Hier ist so ein Beispiel für einen Stoff, den will ich nicht erwähnen. ‚Dieser Stoff erfüllt in hohem Maße Kriterien für ein zum perfekten Mord geeignetes Gift.’ Also, das kann man doch gar nicht anders lesen, als dass hier eine Anleitung zum perfektem Mord mit Gift gegeben wird. Hier ist es mal ganz klar ausgedrückt, aber das ganze Buch ist gefüllt mit solchen Informationen.“

Hinweise auf die Verschleierung provozierter Unfälle finden sich ebenfalls in Toxdat: „Vortäuschung von Verkehrsunfällen durch Auslösung von sekundenschneller Bewusstlosigkeit mittels Minigasgenerator in Belüftungsschächten von PKW.“

Da ist zum Beispiel der rätselhafte Verkehrsunfall des ehemaligen DDR-Fußballspielers Lutz Eigendorf im Jahr 1983. Vier Jahre zuvor war er nach einem Spiel in der Bundesrepublik nicht in die DDR zurückgekehrt. Er war ein leidenschaftlicher Autofahrer, seine Fahrweise risikovoll, das notierten die Spitzel der Stasi im Westen. Kurz vor seinem Verkehrsunfall stoppt die Stasi seine Fahrtzeit und die genaue Streckenführung seines täglichen Wegs vom Stadion nach Hause.

Zum Unfallhergang tauchen vor zwei Jahren neue Hinweise auf. Wurde Eigendorf gezielt geblendet? In den Giftakten der Stasi heißt es: „verblitzen, Eigendorf“. Hatte man Eigendorf heimlich ein pupillenerweiterndes Mittel verabreicht?

Die Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin kann Fragen dazu nicht beantworten, da eine Obduktion nicht angeordnet wurde, auch nach Auftauchen der neuen Stasidokumente nicht.

Ein weiterer Fall: Fußballtrainer Jörg Berger liest seine Stasiakten. Nach seiner Flucht aus der DDR wurde der Star-Trainer ´79 zum Staatsfeind.

Jörg Berger, Fußballtrainer Alemannia Aachen:
„Hier ist alles gesagt!“

Die Stasi wusste, dass Berger Angst hatte vor einem möglichen Auftragsmord, um weitere Fußballer vor einer Flucht abzuhalten:

„BERGER bekundete angeblich (…), daß es ihm nicht so ergehen soll wie EIGENDORF.“

Die Stasi glaubte, dass Berger der Drahtzieher war für die Republikflucht mehrerer Fußballer. Als Berger dann Mitte der 80er Jahre als Trainer auf dem Sprung in die 1. Bundesliga war und sich die DDR-Sportler Falko Götz und Dirk Schlegel nach Westdeutschland absetzten, schien Berger für die DDR unerträglich zu werden.

„Im operativen Vorgang ‚Ball’ wurde operativ herausgearbeitet, daß BERGER wesentlichen Anteil am Verrat von GÖTZ und SCHLEGEL hatte.“

Jörg Berger, Fußballtrainer, Alemannia Aachen:
„Es ist auch in diesen Aussagen zu erkennen, dass man mich berufsunfähig machen wollte oder dass man mich kaltstellen wollte in der Richtung, dass ich nicht mehr als Trainer arbeite, um da vielleicht auch nicht mehr die Einflüsse auf Spieler oder vielleicht sogar auf Trainer zu haben.“

1986 litt Berger unter rätselhaften Lähmungserscheinungen. Der Erklärungsversuch damals: eine Virusinfektion. Im Auftrag von report AUS MÜNCHEN hat der Rechtsmediziner Prof. Wolfgang Eisenmenger vor dem Hintergrund von Toxdat Bergers Krankenakten analysiert. Jetzt scheint festzustehen: Berger wurde vergiftet.

Prof. Wolfgang Eisenmenger, Klinikum Innenstadt der Universität München, Institut für Rechtsmedizin:
„Wenn man die laborchemischen Befunde aus dem Krankenhaus kritisch würdigt, muss man sagen, es spricht in Nachhinein nichts für eine durchgemachte Virusentzündung. Da die Schwermetallvergiftungen nicht gezielt untersucht worden sind, kann man sie aufgrund der Laborbefunde nicht ausschließen. (…) Es kommen – wenn man das Krankheitsbild würdigt – vor allem Schwermetalle aus der Gruppe der Bleiverbindungen und der Arsenverbindungen in Betracht.“

Die Anleitung, eine Arsenikvergiftung zu verschleiern – liefert ebenfalls wieder die DDR-Giftstudie Toxdat.

Frühere Stasi-Mitarbeiter wollten auch ihn ausschalten, das glaubt der Bundestagsabgeordnete Hartmut Büttner aus Hannover. 1995 hatte er einen mysteriösen Autounfall, der ihn beinahe das Leben kostete. Nach der Wiedervereinigung hatte der Abgeordnete zu den Hintermännern der „Toxdat“-Studie recherchiert und sich sehr für die Offenlegung der Stasi-Akten durch die Gauck-Behörde eingesetzt.

Hartmut Büttner, CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneter 1991:
„Ich halte es für skandalös, dass der mit dem Sektglas parlierende Altsozialist den Insassen von Bautzen völlig verdrängt hat.”

Als Büttner ´95 auf gerader, staubtrockener Straße verunglückte, findet keine Filigranuntersuchung des Wagens statt. Während er im Koma liegt, gibt die Polizei das Schrottauto frei. Eine Speditionsfirma zahlt dafür eilig das Sechsfache seines Werts. Büttner wurde mitgeteilt:

Hartmut Büttner, CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneter:
“Dieses Auto ist in der Tat ins ‚solvente Ausland’ – in diesem Fall nach Polen – geschickt worden. Und in Polen wurde dieser Wagen nach einer Woche als gestohlen gemeldet.“

Viele Unfälle und Erkrankungen von ehemaligen DDR-Systemkritikern scheinen noch lange nicht geklärt.

Ebenso wie der Todesfall Heinz Gerlach zur Gänze aufgeklärt werden muss

„DIE WELT“ berichtet: „Mielkes Leute pfuschten in das Leben von Millionen DDR-Bürgern hinein, zerstörten berufliche oder private Hoffnungen und zersetzten routinemäßig ganze Familien. Außerdem schädigte die Stasi im Laufe der Jahrzehnte Hunderttausende Menschen in der SED-Diktatur vorsätzlich, brach unangepasste Charaktere mit psychischem Druck.

In jedem DDR-Bezirk unterhielt das MfS eigene Untersuchungshaftanstalten, in Potsdam zum Beispiel in der Lindenstraße 54/55. In Berlin gab es neben der Zentrale in Lichtenberg die Stasi-Bezirksverwaltung Berlin, die bis 1985 in einem ehemaligen Krankenhaus an der Prenzlauer Allee und danach in einem 100 Millionen DDR-Mark teuren Neubau am Tierpark Friedrichsfelde amtierte, und das große Sperrgebiet in Hohenschönhausen, wo neben einem Gefängnis auch das streng geheime NS-Archiv der Stasi und technische Abteilungen saßen.

Neben der alltäglichen Unterdrückung stehen die schweren Gewalttaten des MfS; sie umfassen praktisch alle Paragrafen des DDR-Strafgesetzbuchs. So verschleppten Stasi-Kommandos im Laufe der Zeit mindestens 500, vielleicht aber auch bis zu tausend Menschen in die DDR – westliche Agenten, Überläufer aus den eigenen Reihen und SED-Kritiker vor allem. Einige von ihnen, zum Beispiel der vormalige Volkspolizei-Chef Robert Bialek, überlebten die Verschleppung nicht; andere, wie die „Verräter“ Paul Rebenstock und Sylvester Murau, wurden nach manipulierten Prozessen hingerichtet.

Ein juristisch verbrämter Mord war die Hinrichtung des MfS-Hauptmanns Werner Teske 1981. Er hatte mit dem Gedanken gespielt, in den Westen überzulaufen, allerdings nie einen konkreten Versuch dazu unternommen. Obwohl selbst das scharfe DDR-Strafrecht die Todesstrafe nur für vollendeten schweren Landesverrat vorsah, den Teske unzweifelhaft nicht begangen hatte, wurde er im Leipziger Gefängnis durch Genickschuss getötet.

Auch direkte Mordanschläge beging die Stasi. So lauerte 1976 ein Spezialkommando der Stasi, die „Einsatzkompanie der Hauptabteilung I“, auf westlicher Seite der innerdeutschen Grenze dem Fluchthelfer Michael Gartenschläger auf. Er wollte dort eine Splittermine vom Typ SM-70 abmontieren, die berüchtigte „Selbstschussanlage“. Vier Männer der Einsatzkompanie erwarteten ihn und eröffneten sofort das Feuer, als der langjährige politische Gefangene an den Grenzzaun heranschlich. MfS-Generalleutnant Karl Kleinjung, der Chef der Hauptabteilung I, hatte zuvor befohlen, „den oder die Täter festzunehmen bzw. zu vernichten“.

Auch der Schweizer Fluchthelfer Hans Lenzlinger wurde wohl im Auftrag des MfS 1979 in seiner Züricher Wohnung erschossen. Vielleicht war Bruno Beater, der ranghöchste Stellvertreter Mielkes und Experte für „nasse Jobs“, in den Anschlag verwickelt; aufgeklärt wurde dieser Mord aber nie.

Nicht das befohlene Ziel erreichten dagegen Mordanschläge gegen andere Fluchthelfer. Kay Mierendorff, der Hunderten DDR-Bürgern gegen fünfstellige Summen in die Freiheit verhalf, bekam im Februar 1982 eine Briefbombe zugeschickt, die ihn schwer verletzte und bleibende Schäden hervorrief.

Einen anderen „Hauptfeind“ der SED, den Fluchthelfer Wolfgang Welsch, vergiftete ein in seinen Kreis eingeschleuster Stasi-Agent im Sommer 1981 mit dem extrem toxischen Schwermetall Thallium; den Tod von Welschs Ehefrau und ihrer Tochter nahm der Stasi-IM billigend in Kauf.

Geplant, aber wohl nicht ausgeführt worden sind Mordanschläge auf Rainer Hildebrandt, den Kopf der DDR-kritischen „Arbeitsgemeinschaft 13. August“, die von ihrem Haus am Checkpoint Charlie aus das Unrecht der Mauer unnachgiebig anprangerte, und auf den Friedrichshainer Pfarrer Rainer Eppelmann, der unter Erich Honecker zeitweise als „Staatsfeind Nummer eins“ der SED galt. Umstritten ist dagegen, ob der DDR-Fußballstar Lutz Eigendorf 1983 von der Stasi durch einen vorsätzlich herbeigeführten Autounfall ermordet wurde. Vieles spricht dafür; der letzte Beweis ist in den allerdings bisher nur zum Teil sachgerecht erschlossenen Akten der Birthler-Behörde nicht aufgetaucht.

Noch öfter als potenziell tödliche Methoden wandten die Stasi-Experten allerdings das Mittel der Erpressung an. In verschiedenen Hotels für westliche Touristen in der ganzen DDR waren über den Betten Kameras eingebaut; auf interessante Ausländer wurden gezielt Prostituierte der Stasi angesetzt, um sie später mit kompromittierenden Fotos erpressen zu können. Das Gleiche versuchte das MfS auch mit Heinrich Lummer, dem West-Berliner CDU-Politiker. Über Jahre hinweg pflegte er eine geheime Beziehung zu einer Ost-Berlinerin, die in Wirklichkeit wohl von Anfang an als Spitzel auf ihn angesetzt war. 1981/82 versuchte das MfS, Lummer zu erpressen, was aber misslang.

Rund 40 Jahre lang garantierte die Stasi als „Schild und Schwert der Partei“ die Existenz der SED-Diktatur. Doch manches misslang Mielkes Mannen auch. So erwies sich beispielsweise die Suche nach den Autoren eines anonymen, kritischen Aufrufs als erfolglos, der 1969 an der Humboldt-Universität auftauchte. Trotz enormen Aufwandes und Kosten von rund einer Million DDR-Mark konnte das MfS die Verantwortlichen, die Studenten Rainer Schottländer und Michael Müller, nie überführen. So wurde ihr Protest zum „teuersten Flugblatt der Welt“.“

Insider Rainer W.:“Genau diese Methodenw erden heute von „GoMoPa“ und deren Hintermännern weider angewandt – natürlich verfeinert und mit Internet-Cyberstalking-Taktiken garniert.

Hinzu kommt der systematische Rufmord via Google und mit falschen Gerüchten, Erpresseranrufen, Morddrohungen, Cyberattacken, Kontoplünderungen und die Zerstörung von Geschäftsbeziehung durch

Systematisch gestreutes Misstrauen. Nehmen Sie all dies zusammen, dann haben Sie die STASI von heute: den „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „GoMoPa“.“

RA Resch / SGK Schutzgemeinschaft Für Geschädigte Kapitalanleger e.V. / Mandantenfang? Teil 1

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A German Source says:  Inform yourself about Berlin Lawyer Jochen Resch and whether the so-called “institutions to protect the investors” are a scam….

And which rolle plays the so-called “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa” ?

Überprüfen Sie selbst die allgemein zugänglichen Informationen die hier zusammengestellt sind und machen sich selbst ein Bild über
1. Die Rechtsanwaltskanzlei Resch und Kollegen aus Berlin und ihren Gründer Rechtsanwalt Jochen Resch
2. Dem Deutschen Institut für Anlegerschutz e.V., kurz DIAS e.V. und ihren Vorständen sowie ihrem Gründer Rechtsanwalt Jochen Resch, der den Verein in den Kanzleiräumen der Rechtsanwaltskanzlei Resch und Kollegen gründete
3. Die Schutzgemeinschaft für geschädige Kapitalanleger e.V. und ihrem ehemaligen Vorstand Rechtsanwalt Jochen Resch sowie dem nachfolgenden Vorstand mit Stasivergangenheit.

Die Rechtsanwaltskanzlei Resch und ihr Gründer Rechtsanwalt Jochen Resch sind in den uns vorliegenden Dokumenten oben stehender Vereine oder “Verbraucherschutzinstitutionen” als Gründer, Initiator und Geldgeber, genannt.

Vor diesem Hintergrund haben sich bereits namhafte Journalisten die Frage gestellt:
“Dienen diese Institutionen, die in der Aussenwahrnehmung als unabhängig und verbrauchernah gelten, als triviales Mandantenfang-Instrumentarium?

Und welche Rolle spielt dabei der selbsternannte “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa” ?

King Kong vs Godzilla – Full Sci-Fi Action Movie – Michael Keith

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Watch #KingKongVsGodzilla Hollywood epic movie. Starring Michael Keith, Harry Holcombe, James Yagi, Tadao Takashima and Keji Sahaka. Directed by Ishirō Hondatch

The Nurse (1997) | Hollywood Thriller Movie – Lisa Zane, John Stockwell

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Watch #TheNurse 1997 Thriller movie. Starring Lisa Zane, John Stockwell, John Stockwell, Nancy Dussault and Sherrie Rose. Directed by Robert Malenfant. Music by Richard Bowers Produced by Richard Brandes #ActionThrillerMovie #HollywoodActionMovie #HollywoodThrillerMovie Synopsis A traumatized nurse plots revenge against a catatonic businessman, whom she blames for the death of her father. She integrates herself in to his family as his personal nurse and plots revenge by killing off his family members one by one.

The Front Page -Steamboat Bill, Jr. (1928) | Silent Comedy Movie – Buster Keaton, Ernest Torrence

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Watch #SteamboatBill,Jr. 1928 Silent Comedy Movie. Starring Buster Keaton and Ernest Torrence, Directed by Charles Reisner, Produced by Joseph M. Schenck. #BusterKeatonMovie #ComedyMovie #LatestHollywoodMovies #HollywoodMovies #ActionThrillerMovie

How to Murder Your Wife (1965) – Romantic Comedy Movie – Jack Lemmon, Virna Lisi

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Watch #HowtoMurderYourWife 1965 Romantic Comedy movie.

Starring Jack Lemmon, Virna Lisi, Terry-Thomas, Claire Trevor, Sidney Blackmer and Max Showalter. Directed by Richard Quine Music by Neal Hefti Produced by George Axelrod

The Front Page – Chai Bisket Stories – Suhas

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An aspiring filmmaker narrates a highly complex story to a producer. As his story unfolds, we will find out if the narrator is successful in getting his story approved.

Starring Suhas & Sridhar

Directed by Filmian

Produced by Anurag & Sharath

Music by Karthik Rodriguez

Cinematography by Shreekar Khajandar

Editing by Pavan Kalyan

The Front Page – Full Movie

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A crusading newspaper editor tricks his retiring star reporter into covering one last case. Director: Lewis Milestone Writers: Ben Hecht, Charles MacArthur Stars: Adolphe Menjou, Pat O’Brien, Mary Brian Genres: Classics, Comedy, Crime, Drama, Romance

Analysis of Chinese Investments in the USA

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Image result for yuan

Once hardly noticeable, Chinese investments in U.S. companies are now rising sharply. Cumulative Chinese investments in U.S. companies remain modest compared to those of other major countries. However, a combination of “push and pull” factors are moving China’s annual investment levels closer to levels consistent with China’s current economic stature.

First, the Chinese government has made a conscious decision to diversify its foreign currency assets into hard assets. This has led to the creation of sovereign wealth funds that make portfolio investments in U.S. equities, private firms, and real estate.

Second, the Chinese government has altered its policy guidance toward foreign direct investment (FDI). Whereas it previously encouraged investments almost exclusively toward energy and resource acquisition in developing countries, it now also encourages investments in advanced countries. The government’s goals for these investments include securing energy and mineral resources and acquiring advanced technologies in industries where China wishes to leapfrog existing competitors.

Third, U.S. state governments and, to a lesser extent, the federal government are vigorously trying to attract Chinese greenfield investments in the hope of creating jobs and jump-starting local economies.

Fourth, Chinese investments are being drawn to the United States by the availability of financially weak firms, some of which possess potentially useful technologies for China.

Fifth, some firms that are already competitive with U.S. producers are investing to enhance their U.S. market shares or in response to trade remedies proceedings against unfair trade practices, such as Chinese subsidies.

Economic Benefits

On an aggregate basis, the economic benefits of Chinese investments in the United States have been modest. The precise benefit is difficult to measure due to the convoluted ownership structures of many Chinese investments and the time lags in official U.S. data. Still, based on a combination of official and private data, it is reasonable to conclude that jobs in Chinese-owned companies in the United States increased by 10,000 to 20,000 workers during the past five years.

While hardly significant relative to overall U.S. employment and even to jobs in other countries’ U.S. affiliates, any job creation is welcome given continued slackness in the U.S. labor market.

Chinese FDI in U.S. companies has helped stabilize some financially troubled firms. Portfolio investments by sovereign wealth funds also have helped the economy by solidifying the financial system and providing liquidity to certain property markets.

Chinese investments have occurred in all U.S. regions and in many sectors. According to one private data source, they have been especially prominent since 2007 in the Southwest, Great Lakes, Southeast, and Far West regions, and in the fossil fuels and chemicals, industrial machinery, and information technology industries. According to another private source, as well as government data, the financial sector is also a major recipient of Chinese FDI.

Policy Challenges

These welcome, though still modest, economic benefits are counterbalanced by policy challenges tied to Chinese FDI. First, U.S. affiliates of Chinese companies are not pure market actors and may be driven by state goals, not market forces. China’s outward investments are dominated by state-owned and state-controlled enterprises (SOEs). These entities are potentially disruptive because they frequently respond to policies of the Chinese government, which is the ultimate beneficial owner of U.S affiliates of China’s SOEs. Likewise, the government behaves like an owner, providing overall direction to SOE investments, including encouragement on where to invest, in what industries, and to what ends.

Second, SOEs may have unfair advantages relative to private firms when competing to purchase U.S. assets. SOEs benefit from substantial subsidies in China and their investments in developing countries also receive ample financial support from the national and sub-national governments, state-owned financial institutions and local governments. Government pronouncements out of China suggest that investments in the United States and other advanced countries will also receive ample financial support. This raises the possibility that Chinese largesse could determine market outcomes for purchases of U.S. businesses.

Third, an increased SOE presence may be harmful to the U.S. economy. In China, SOEs are a major force but as a group they are less efficient and profitable than private firms. To the extent that SOEs purchase U.S. companies on the basis of artificial advantages and operate inefficiently, they may not be beneficial to long-term U.S. economic performance.

Fourth, Chinese investments will create tensions related to economic security and national security if they behave in accordance with China’s industrial policy as articulated in the 12th Five Year Plan, government pronouncements, and official investment guidance. China’s current policy guidance directs firms to obtain leapfrog technologies to create national champions in key emerging industries, while investment guidance encourages technology acquisition, energy security, and export facilitation. Based on this juxtaposition, some will conclude that Chinese FDI in the United States is a potential Trojan horse. Indeed, this study describes three investments in new energy products after which production utilizing the desired technology was shifted to China.
Other Findings

U.S. data collection efforts related to FDI are substantial. However, they likely undercount Chinese FDI due to the complicated ownership structures of many Chinese investments. Moreover, although Chinese-owned companies report their data to the U.S. government, many data points are not publically disclosed due to standard U.S. reporting procedures that protect the identities of individual firms. This issue will resolve itself in the coming years if Chinese FDI grows as expected because limits on disclosure will no longer apply.

The United States is relatively open toward FDI, though there are some sectoral restrictions and a national security review undertaken by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). There are a host of laws that subject foreign investors to rules on antitrust, foreign corrupt practices, and trade in arms and sensitive technology products. However, there is no procedure that explicitly considers issues related to economic security, one of the major concerns about Chinese FDI.

Portfolio investments in equities fall under the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). SEC disclosure requirements and practical considerations make it highly unlikely that Chinese SOEs could successfully collude to accumulate significant equity positions in important U.S. firms.

Reverse mergers offer a back door into U.S. capital markets but are not an effective way to acquire important U.S. assets. Indeed, the target of a reverse merger is typically a shell company devoid of meaningful assets. This technique is typically used by private firms that have difficulty accessing capital in China or by provincial SOEs trying to support restructuring efforts in China. There is no indication that any major SOE has used or plans to use this technique to enter the U.S. capital market.

The Chinese legal and regulatory framework for outward FDI requires approvals by three agencies at sub-national and/or national levels. For SOEs, the primary gatekeeper is the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), though for some investments approval from the State Council is required. The process is widely considered to be cumbersome and is being reformed to facilitate outward FDI.

 

Unveiled – WikiLeaks Setting Another Trap for Journalists, NGOs

A sends:

I tasted that poison today. It was strange, the feeling of having the privilege to information that was only made available to “a select few” was overwhelming, I don’t have the vocabulary to describe what the poison tastes like, but I can understand how some people could become addicted to it, even if it meant their death.

You are right, WL is setting “Terms and Conditions” to the access to stolen property, and attempting to force Journalists into an “Agreement” to those “Conditions, however unenforceable.

Your thoughts and counsel were welcomed, they snapped me out of that trance that I found myself in.

The only thing to do is, publish everything that I’ve learned over the last many hours about this whole affair.

 


2012-00414 WikiLeaks Partner for Global Intelligence Files June 26, 2012 (copy below) via Google Search

[Image]

Cryptome rejects this proprietary publishing manipulation. Again, WikiLeaks is inducing participation in a crime covered with pseudo-journalistic exculpation. Again excluding open public access in favor of contractual marketing of stolen material and aiding its profitable commercialization.

It’s a trap, don’t do it, don’t encourage others to take the bait.

Don’t send anything to me you don’t want published. This note will be published .

_____

At 06:24 PM 6/26/2012, you wrote:

Please Do Not Post, still working on getting us access.

Below if the terms and conditions that WL is sending to everyone.

 


_Terms and Conditions for access to the Global Intelligence Files

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1. WikiLeaks will provide access to the data known as Project Rock Guitar through WikiLeaks’ search database. You will use the search database as per instructions on the site and will not use robots on the system.

2. The decision what to publish in news articles and papers will remain at your discretion. You will credit WikiLeaks in the following manner: “investigative partnership organised by WikiLeaks” and refer to the data as having been “obtained by WikiLeaks”.

3. You will refer clearly on your website to the document(s) provided by WikiLeaks that were used in preparation of these news articles or papers and link from your publication to the data on WikiLeaks’ website.

4. You will treat any alleged and/or suspected WikiLeaks sources for the Global Intelligence Files as confidential sources of your own, with all the ethical and legal protections such sources are entitled to. You, in accordance with journalistic and professional ethics, will not speculate as to their identities. In relation to WikiLeaks’ provision of confidential information to you, you will treat WikiLeaks as a confidential journalistic source. Although you will publicly describe the information has having been “obtained by WikiLeaks” you will not, for the protection of WikiLeaks, you and the WikiLeaks sources, say that the information was “given” to you by WikiLeaks.

5. When publishing any story or material based on the Global Intelligence Files you understand that in relation to exclusivity you must inform WikiLeaks of the identification number of the data informing your publication and will submit this number to WikiLeaks’ release platform before the story is to first appear in any of your publishing mediums, so that WikiLeaks can publish the original data at the same time. You will also provide a URL link to where the story or material will appear on your site. Instructions for this release system are on the GI Files site and must be read and followed once you have access to the site. You understand that the release system provided by WikiLeaks must be treated in a reputable manner: there is to be no playing of the system to schedule large quantities of data in advance to reserve them, or using robots on the system. Scheduling must reflect true intentions to publish at the date and time you list on the release system.

6. You will treat each of the documents made available to you by WikiLeaks as confidential unless and until a story based on their content is published. You will exercise care in ensuring that the materials will not be vulnerable to hacking or other efforts to discover their content.

7. WikiLeaks journalists, employees, consultants and infrastructure are the subject of State and private intelligence activity and politicised financial blockades. To protect its continued ability to publish effectively, various WikiLeaks methods, people and locations need to be kept confidential. Unless otherwise stated, these include, but are not limited to: identifying details of all WikiLeaks personnel, security methods, communication systems or methods, locations, strategic plans, information on threats against WikiLeaks, the number of WikiLeaks personnel, the number of WikiLeaks personnel in different areas, usernames, passwords, transportation and financial arrangements including financial transportation methods.

8. Trading, selling, sharing or giving away your account is prohibited, as is trading and selling invites or offering them in public.

9. You understand that any breach of these Terms and Conditions or mismanagement of the search database or release platform will result in your access being withdrawn, along with the access of the anyone that invited you and anyone you invite. You are responsible for your own account and for the people you invite.

By ticking this box you agree to abide by all of the above Terms and Conditions

Your login and password will be sent by mail.

 


GIFiles Signup Instructions

Becoming a WikiLeaks Partner for the Global Intelligence Files

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Public Intelligence – Ohio Fusion Center Report: Bath Salts and Officer Safety

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/OHSP-BathSalts.png

(U//FOUO) The Ohio State Highway Patrol Criminal Intelligence Unit recently partnered with the Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) and gathered information regarding bath salts via a survey. The objective of the study was to assist Law Enforcement by creating an officer safety awareness product relating to the dangers of encountering people on bath salts.

(U//FOUO) A survey was distributed to law enforcement and 5 agencies responded back with pertinent information regarding the use and possession of bath salts. The agencies which contributed to this analysis are as follows:

Barberton Police Department, OH; Ohio State Highway Patrol; Powell Police Department, OH; Reynoldsburg Division of Police; and West Virginia State Police – Wheeling Division (Parcel Interdiction).

(U//FOUO) Information was obtained on 161 incidents involving bath salts.

(U//FOUO) OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS:

  • Out of the 161 incidents reported, officers made 77 arrests involving bath salt use/possession. Many of the incidents occurred before legislation was passed; therefore mere possession was not criminal at the time of many of these reports.
  • There were 27 use of force reports involving bath salts.
  • There were 3 incidents that involved fleeing of suspects.
  • 7 suspects were taken to hospital associated with bath salt use.
  • 7 offenders were pinked slipped and taken to mental health facilities.
  • There were 4 reports of deaths associated with bath salt use (Note: cause of death results did NOT find that bath salts use was the sole contributor in any of these deaths).
  • There was 1 report of suicide; 2 suicide attempts; and 1 suicide threat involving bath salt use.
  • Suspects reported paying approximately $20-$25 for bath salts.
  • The offenders reported multiple ways of using bath salts including: snorting, injection with a needle syringe, and drinking the bath salts by mixing it with fluid.
  • Many offenders admitted to combining bath salts with other drugs.
  • When reported, most people said they got the bath salts from independently owned convenient stores and drive-thrus, gas stations or markets. A WV State Police (parcel narcotics interdiction) Officer reported that a prominent internet company is: Southern Burn LLC from South Carolina.

(U//FOUO) OFFICER SAFETY CONCERNS

  • Use of force incidents included: use of Taser (3 incidents), hands on, escorts, restrained by medical professionals, and bean bag use.
  • One “officer in trouble” call was reported, involving an officer fighting with a person on bath salts.
  • Both officers in a Reynoldsburg Police case were surprised after a Taser was used on a suspect. They explained that the Taser was shot and the probes penetrated in the torso of the suspect, however it had minimal effects; the suspect fought through the electric current and rose to his feet.
  • Injuries sustained to suspects included: bruises, cuts, Taser punctures, and minimal injuries from bean bag rounds.
  • Officers sustained injuries including: injury to knee, injury to back, injury to groin, ankles, scrapes and bruises, and multiple injuries from strikes to the face.
  • 2 officers and 7 offenders were taken to the hospital resulting from physical force.
  • One incident involved the use of the SWAT team and another involved escalated use of force involving bean bag rounds.

(U//FOUO) PHYSIOLOGICAL REACTIONS FROM BATH SALT USE

  • Suspects showed the following physical reactions to bath salts: Hyperventilation, cramps, dehydration, vomiting, shaking, loss of memory, pale, emaciated, jittery, lethargy, incoherent speech, rambling, rapid movement, rapid speech, disoriented, itchy skin, and several suspect admitted to a lack of sleep for multiple days.
  • An offender described bath salts as giving him a “cocaine rush” and it being a very “intense” high.
  • Witnesses described bath salt users as:
    • Hostile, violent, unpredictable, out of control, paranoid, and reckless.
  • Additional reports by Law Enforcement involving people on bath salts:
    • Officer described one suspect as having unusual superhuman strength.
    • Officer described suspect as shooting off the ground like a “flash of light.”
    • One suspect bent the hinged handcuffs during the arrest.
  • The following hallucinations were reported:
    • A hit-skip offender said he saw a brick wall, which in turn caused a crash.
    • A male, using bath salts, reported raccoons setting fire inside his home. As a result, he proceeded to destroy his home and used a hatchet to cut up his deck, while attempting to locate the fire-setting raccoons. He also believed the raccoons stole his cell phone.
    • A male, using bath salts, believed he was being followed by police helicopters and police officers were using mirrors, snipers and different types of scopes to look through his walls. He called police requesting to negotiate with them, however there were no police at the residence when the call was made.
    • During the course of speaking to an offender and officer reported, he yelled, “AT&T calling, may I help you, AT&T is calling, a million dollars, two black guys……it’s not a racial thing, it’s not a racial thing.”
    • A bath salt user reported he hears voices; one voice was going to beat him with a ball bat.
    • The domestic violence offender using bath salts reported his mother was practicing demonology & witchcraft and she was poisoning his food. He was arrested for choking her.
    • DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:
    • OHSP-BathSalts

Unveiled – Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate and the Euro InterBank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty

WASHINGTON—Barclays Bank PLC, a financial institution headquartered in London, has entered into an agreement with the Department of Justice to pay a $160 million penalty to resolve violations arising from Barclays’ submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR), which are benchmark interest rates used in financial markets around the world, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and Assistant Director in Charge James W. McJunkin of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

As part of the agreement with the Department of Justice, Barclays has admitted and accepted responsibility for its misconduct set forth in a statement of facts that is incorporated into the agreement. According to the agreement, Barclays provided LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that, at various times, were false because they improperly took into account the trading positions of its derivative traders, or reputational concerns about negative media attention relating to its LIBOR submissions. The Justice Department’s criminal investigation into the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR by other financial institutions and individuals is ongoing. The agreement requires Barclays to continue cooperating with the department in its ongoing investigation.

“LIBOR and EURIBOR are critically important benchmark interest rates,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. “Because mortgages, student loans, financial derivatives, and other financial products rely on LIBOR and EURIBOR as reference rates, the manipulation of submissions used to calculate those rates can have significant negative effects on consumers and financial markets worldwide. For years, traders at Barclays encouraged the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions in order to benefit their financial positions; and, in the midst of the financial crisis, Barclays management directed that U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions be artificially lowered. For this illegal conduct, Barclays is paying a significant price. To the bank’s credit, Barclays also took a significant step toward accepting responsibility for its conduct by being the first institution to provide extensive and meaningful cooperation to the government. Its efforts have substantially assisted the Criminal Division in our ongoing investigation of individuals and other financial institutions in this matter.”

“Barclays Bank’s illegal activity involved manipulating its submissions for benchmark interest rates in order to benefit its trading positions and the media’s perception of the bank’s financial health,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “Today’s announcement is the result of the hard work of the FBI special agents, financial analysts, and forensic accountants as well as the prosecutors who dedicated significant time and resources to investigating this case.”

Barclays was one of the financial institutions that contributed rates used in the calculation of LIBOR and EURIBOR. The contributed rates are generally meant to reflect each bank’s assessment of the rates at which it could borrow unsecured interbank funds. For LIBOR, the highest and lowest 25 percent of contributed rates are excluded from the calculation and the remaining rates are averaged to calculate the fixed rates. For EURIBOR, the highest and lowest 15 percent are excluded, and the remaining 70 percent are averaged to calculate the fixed rates.

Futures, options, swaps, and other derivative financial instruments traded in the over-the-counter market and on exchanges worldwide are settled based on LIBOR. Further, mortgages, credit cards, student loans, and other consumer lending products often use LIBOR as a reference rate. According to the agreement, an individual bank’s LIBOR or EURIBOR submission cannot appropriately be influenced by the financial positions of its derivatives traders or the bank’s concerns about public perception of its financial health due to its LIBOR submissions.

According to the agreement, between 2005 and 2007, and then occasionally thereafter through 2009, certain Barclays traders requested that the Barclays LIBOR and EURIBOR submitters contribute rates that would benefit the financial positions held by those traders. The requests were made by traders in New York and London, via electronic messages, telephone conversations, and in-person conversations. The employees responsible for the LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions accommodated those requests on numerous occasions in submitting the bank’s contributions. On some occasions, Barclays’s submissions affected the fixed rates.

In addition, between August 2005 and May 2008, certain Barclays traders communicated with traders at other financial institutions, including other banks on the LIBOR and EURIBOR panels, to request LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that would be favorable to their or their counterparts’ trading positions, according to the agreement.

When the requests of traders for favorable LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions were taken into account by the rate submitters, Barclays’ rate submissions were false and misleading.

Further, according to the agreement, between approximately August 2007 and January 2009, in response to initial and ongoing press speculation that Barclays’ high U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions at the time might reflect liquidity problems at Barclays, members of Barclays management directed that Barclays’ dollar LIBOR submissions be lowered. This management instruction often resulted in Barclays’ submission of false rates that did not reflect its perceived cost of obtaining interbank funds. While the purpose of this particular conduct was to influence Barclays’ rate submissions, as opposed to the resulting fixes, there were some occasions when Barclays’ submissions affected the fixed rates.

The agreement and monetary penalty recognize Barclays’ extraordinary cooperation. Barclays made timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of its misconduct. After government authorities began investigating allegations that banks had engaged in manipulation of benchmark interest rates, Barclays was the first bank to cooperate in a meaningful way in disclosing its conduct relating to LIBOR and EURIBOR. Barclays’ disclosure included relevant facts that at the time were not known to the government. Barclays’s cooperation has been extensive, in terms of the quality and type of information and assistance provided, and has been of substantial value in furthering the department’s ongoing criminal investigation. Barclays has made a commitment to future cooperation with the department and other government authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Assistant Attorney General Breuer further stated, “As today’s agreement reflects, we are committed to holding companies accountable for their misconduct while, at the same time, giving meaningful credit to companies that provide full and valuable cooperation in our investigations.”

In addition, Barclays has implemented a series of compliance measures and will implement additional internal controls regarding its submission of LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, as required by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Barclays will also continue to be supervised and monitored by the FSA.

The agreement and monetary penalty further recognize certain mitigating factors to Barclays’ misconduct. At times, Barclays employees raised concerns with the British Bankers’ Association, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in late 2007 and in 2008 that the Dollar LIBOR rates submitted by contributing banks, including Barclays, were too low and did not accurately reflect the market. Further, during this time, notwithstanding Barclays’s improperly low dollar LIBOR submissions, those submissions were often higher than the contributions used in the calculation of the fixed rates.

As a result of Barclays’s admission of its misconduct, its extraordinary cooperation, its remediation efforts and certain mitigating and other factors, the department agreed not to prosecute Barclays for providing false LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, provided that Barclays satisfies its ongoing obligations under the agreement for a period of two years. The non-prosecution agreement applies only to Barclays and not to any employees or officers of Barclays or any other individuals.

In a related matter, the CFTC brought attempted manipulation and false reporting charges against Barclays, which the bank agreed to settle. The CFTC imposed a $200 million penalty and required Barclays to implement detailed measures designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of its benchmark interest rate submissions.

The FSA issued a final notice regarding its enforcement action against Barclays and has imposed a penalty of £59.5 million against it.

The case is being handled by Deputy Chief Daniel Braun, Assistant Chiefs Rebecca Rohr and Robertson Park, Trial Attorney Alexander Berlin, and Special Trial Attorney Luke Marsh of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section. The investigation is being conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, jointly with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.

The Department acknowledges and expresses its appreciation for the significant assistance provided by the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement, which referred the conduct to the department, as well as the FSA’s Enforcement and Financial Crime Division.

This agreement is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch and, with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task force visit: http://www.stopfraud.gov.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Texas Resident Convicted on Charge of Attempted Use of Weapon of Mass Destruction

AMARILLO, TX—Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, 22, a citizen of Saudi Arabia and resident of Lubbock, Texas, was convicted by a federal jury today on an indictment charging one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary to make an improvised explosive device (IED) and his research of potential U.S. targets, including persons and infrastructure.

The verdict, which was reached in the Northern District of Texas, was announced by Sarah R. Saldaña, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Diego G. Rodriguez, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Dallas Field Division.

Sentencing has been scheduled for October 9, 2012, in Amarillo. Aldawsari, who was lawfully admitted into the United States in 2008 on a student visa and was enrolled at South Plains College near Lubbock, faces a maximum sentence of life in prison and a $250,000 fine. He was arrested on February 23, 2011 on a criminal complaint and later charged in a March 9, 2011 federal indictment with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.

According to court documents and evidence presented during trial, at the time of his arrest last year, Aldawsari had been researching online how to construct an IED using several chemicals as ingredients. He had also acquired or taken a substantial step toward acquiring most of the ingredients and equipment necessary to construct an IED, and he had conducted online research of several potential U.S. targets, the affidavit alleges. In addition, he had allegedly described his desire for violent jihad and martyrdom in blog postings and a personal journal.

“While many people are responsible for thwarting Aldawsari’s threat and bringing him to justice, we owe a debt of gratitude to all the members of the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force, and especially to the hundreds of hardworking and dedicated FBI agents, analysts, linguists, and others,” said U.S. Attorney Saldaña. “Their efforts, coupled with the hard work and excellent cooperation from the Lubbock Police Department and the Texas Tech Police Department, are the reason we were able to stop this defendant from carrying out a catastrophic act of terrorism.”

“As this trial demonstrated, Aldawsari purchased ingredients to construct an explosive device and was actively researching potential targets in the United States. Thanks to the efforts of many agents, analysts, and prosecutors, this plot was thwarted before it could advance further,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco. “This case serves as another reminder of the need for continued vigilance both at home and abroad.”

“Today’s guilty verdict shows how individuals in the United States with the intent to do harm can acquire the knowledge and materials necessary to carry out an attack,” said SAC Rodriguez. “Our success in locating and preventing Mr. Aldawsari from carrying out an attack is a result of cooperation within the law enforcement and intelligence communities, particularly, the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Texas Tech Police Department, the Lubbock Police Department, and the Lubbock County Sheriff’s Office, but also a demonstration of information sharing across FBI divisions, as well as assistance from the community. I want to thank the dedicated agents, officers, and analysts; the computer forensics team; and linguists that worked diligently on this investigation, as well as prosecutors serving in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Northern District.”

The government presented evidence that on February 1, 2011, a chemical supplier reported to the FBI a suspicious attempted purchase of concentrated phenol by a man identifying himself as Khalid Aldawsari. Phenol is a toxic chemical with legitimate uses, but it can also be used to make the explosive trinitrophenol, also known as T.N.P., or picric acid. Ingredients typically used with phenol to make picric acid, or T.N.P., are concentrated sulfuric and nitric acids.

Aldawsari attempted to have the phenol order shipped to a freight company so it could be held for him there, but the freight company told Aldawsari that the order had been returned to the supplier and called the police. Later, Aldawsari falsely told the supplier he was associated with a university and wanted the phenol for “off-campus, personal research.” Frustrated by questions being asked over his phenol order, Aldawsari cancelled his order, placed an order with another company, and later e-mailed himself instructions for producing phenol. In December 2010, he had successfully purchased concentrated nitric and sulfuric acids.

Aldawsari used various e-mail accounts in researching explosives and targets and often sent e-mails to himself as part of this process. He e-mailed himself a recipe for picric acid, which was described in the e-mail as a “military explosive” and also e-mailed himself instructions on how to convert a cell phone into a remote detonator and how to prepare a booby-trapped vehicle using household items. Aldawsari also purchased many other items, including a Hazmat suit, a soldering iron kit, glass beakers and flasks, a stun gun, clocks, and a battery tester.

Excerpts from a journal found at Aldawsari’s residence indicated that he had been planning to commit a terrorist attack in the United States for years. One entry describes how Aldawsari sought and obtained a particular scholarship because it allowed him to come directly to the United States and helped him financially, which he said “will help tremendously in providing me with the support I need for Jihad.” The entry continues, “And now, after mastering the English language, learning how to build explosives and continuous planning to target the infidel Americans, it is time for Jihad.”

In another entry, Aldawsari wrote that he was near to reaching his goal and near to getting weapons to use against infidels and their helpers. He also listed a “synopsis of important steps” that included obtaining a forged U.S. birth certificate; renting a car; using different driver’s licenses for each car rented; putting bombs in cars and taking them to different places during rush hour; and leaving the city for a safe place.

Aldawsari conducted research on various targets and e-mailed himself information on these locations and people. One of the documents he sent himself, with the subject line listed as “Targets,” contained the names and home addresses of three American citizens who had previously served in the U.S. military and had been stationed for a time at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In others, Aldawsari sent himself the names of 12 reservoir dams in Colorado and California and listed two categories of targets: hydroelectric dams and nuclear power plants. He also sent himself an e-mail titled “Tyrant’s House,” in which he listed the Dallas address for former President George W. Bush. Aldawsari also conducted research that indicated he considered using infant dolls to conceal explosives and the possible targeting of a nightclub with an explosive concealed in a backpack.

This case was investigated by the FBI’s Dallas Joint Terrorism Task Force, with assistance from the Lubbock Police Department and the Texas Tech Police Department. The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jeffrey R. Haag, Denise Williams, James T. Jacks, and Matthew J. Kacsmaryk and Trial Attorney David Cora from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

TOP-SECRET – The Creation of the U.S. Spy Satellites

In September 1992 the Department of Defense acknowledged the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency established in 1961 to manage the development and operation of the nation’s reconnaissance satellite systems.  The creation of the NRO was the result of a number of factors.

On May 1, 1960 Francis Gary Powers took off from Peshawar, Pakistan on the U-2 mission designated Operation GRAND SLAM.  The flight was planned to take him over the heart of the Soviet Union and terminate at Bodo, Norway.  The main target was Plesetsk, which communications intercepts had indicated might be the site of an ICBM facility.1  When the Soviet Union shot down his plane and captured him alive, they also forced President Dwight Eisenhower to halt aerial overflights of Soviet territory.

At that time the U.S. had two ongoing programs to produce satellite vehicles that could photograph Soviet territory.  Such vehicles would allow far more frequent coverage than possible with manned aircraft.  In addition, they would avoid placing the lives of pilots at risk and eliminate the risks of international incidents resulting from overflights.

The Air Force program, designated SAMOS, sought to develop a number of different satellite systems–including one that would radio its imagery back to earth and another that would return film capsules.  The CIA program, CORONA, focused solely on developing a film return satellite.

However, both the CIA and Air Force programs were in trouble.  Launch after launch in the CORONA program, eleven in all by May 1, 1960, eight of which carried cameras, had resulted in failure–the only variation was in the cause.  Meanwhile, the SAMOS program was also experiencing difficulties, both with regard to hardware and program definition.2

Concerns over SAMOS led President Eisenhower to direct two groups to study both the technical aspects of the program as well as how the resulting system would be employed.  The ultimate result was a joint report presented to the President and NSC on August 25, 1960.3

As a result of that meeting Eisenhower approved a first SAMOS launch in September, as well as reorientation of the program, with the development of high-resolution film-return systems being assigned highest priority while the electronic readout system would be pursued as a research project.  With regard to SAMOS management, he ordered that the Air Force institute special management arrangements, which would involve a direct line of authority between the SAMOS project office and the Office of the Air Force Secretary, bypassing the Air Staff and any other intermediate layers of bureaucracy.4

Secretary of the Air Force Dudley C. Sharp wasted little time creating the recommended new structure and procedures.  On August 31st Sharp signed Secretary of the Air Force Order 115.1, establishing the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems within his own office to help him manage the SAMOS project. With Order 116.1, Sharp created a SAMOS project office at the Los Angeles headquarters of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD) as a field extension of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out development of the satellite.5

The impact of the orders, in practice, was that the director of the SAMOS project would report directly to Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charyk, who would manage it in the Secretary’s name. In turn, Charyk would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.6

The changes would not stop there.  The urgency attached to developing a successful reconnaissance satellite led, ultimately, to the creation of a top secret program and organization to coordinate the entire national reconnaissance effort.

Several of the documents listed below also appear in either of two National Security Archive microfiche collections on U.S. intelligence.  The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations and Management: 1947-1989 (1990) and U.S. Espionage and Intelligence: Organization, Operations, and Management, 1947-1996 (1997) publish together for the first time recently declassified documents pertaining to the organizational structure, operations and management of the U.S. Intelligence Community over the last fifty years, cross-indexed for maximum accessibility.  Together, these two sets reproduce on microfiche over 2,000 organizational histories, memoranda, manuals, regulations, directives, reports, and studies, totaling more than 50,000 pages of documents from the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, military service intelligence organizations, National Security Council, and other official government agencies and organizations.

 


Document 1
Joseph Charyk, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
24 July 1961
Top Secret
1 p.

The organizational changes resulting from the decisions of August 25, 1960 and their implementation left some unsatisfied.  In particular, James Killian and Edwin Land, influential members of the President’s intelligence advisory board pushed for permanent and institutionalized collaboration between the CIA and Air Force.  After the Kennedy administration took office the push to establish a permanent reconnaissance organization took on additional life.  There was a strong feeling in the new administration, particularly by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, that a better, more formalized relationship was required.7

On July 24, 1961, Air Force Undersecretary Joseph Charyk sent a memorandum to McNamara attaching two possible memoranda of agreement for creation of a National Reconnaissance Program, along with some additional material.

Document 2
Memorandum of Understanding
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program (Draft)
20 July 1961
Top Secret
5 pp.

This memo specified establishment of a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) consisting of “all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert,” and including “all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence.”

To manage the NRP, a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) would be established on a covert basis. The NRO director (DNRO) would be the Deputy Director for Plans, CIA (at the time, Richard Bissell) while the Under Secretary of the Air Force would serve as Deputy Director (DDNRO). The DNRO would be responsible for the management of CIA activities, the DDNRO and the Air Force for Defense Department activities.  The DoD, specifically the Air Force acting as executive agent, would be primarily responsible for technical program management, scheduling, vehicle operations, financial management and overt contract administration, while the CIA would be primarily responsible for targeting each satellite.  The office would operate under streamlined management procedures similar to those established in August 1960 for SAMOS.

Document 3
Memorandum of Understanding
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program (Draft)
21 July 1961
Top Secret
4 pp.

This secondary memorandum was prepared at the suggestion of Defense Department General Counsel Cyrus Vance.  It offered a quite different solution to the problem.  As with the primary memo, it established a NRP covering both satellite and aerial reconnaissance operations.  But rather than a jointly run program, it placed responsibility for management solely in the hands of a covertly appointed Special Assistant for Reconnaissance, to be selected by the Secretary of Defense.  The office of the Special Assistant would handle the responsibilities assigned to the NRO in the other MOU.  The CIA would “assist the Department of Defense by providing support as required in areas of program security, communications, and covert contract administration.”

Document 4
Memorandum
Pros and Cons of Each Solution
Not dated
Top Secret
2 pp.

The assessment of pros and cons favored the July 20 memorandum, listing five pros for the first solution and only two for the second.  The first solution would consolidate responsibilities into a single program with relatively little disruption of established management, represented a proven solution, would require no overt organizational changes, would allow both agencies to retain authoritative voices in their areas of expertise, and provided a simplified management structure.  The two cons noted were the division of program responsibility between two people, and that “successful program management depends upon mutual understanding and trust of the two people in charge of the NRO.”  It would not be too long before that later observation would take on great significance.

In contrast, there were more cons than pros specified for the second solution.  The only two points in its favor were the consolidation of reconnaissance activities into a single program managed by a single individual and the assignment of complete responsibility to the agency (DoD) with the most resources.  Foremost of the six cons was the need for DoD to control and conduct large-scale covert operations, in as much as it was an entity “whose normal methods are completely foreign to this task.”

Document 5
Roswell Gilpatric, Letter to Allen Dulles
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
6 September 1961
Top Secret
4 pp.

On July 28, 1961, four days after receiving Charyk’s memorandum and draft memoranda of understanding, McNamara instructed Air Force Undersecretary Joseph Charyk to continue discussions with the key officials and advisers in order to resolve any organizational difficulties that threatened to impede the satellite reconnaissance effort.  The ultimate result was this letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to Dulles, which confirmed “our agreement with respect to the setting up of the National Reconnaissance Program.”

The letter specified the creation of a NRP.  It also established the NRO, a uniform security control system, and specified that the NRO would be directly responsive to the intelligence requirements and priorities specified by the United States Intelligence Board.  It specified implementation of NRP programs assigned to the CIA through the Deputy Director for Plans.  It designated the Undersecretary of the Air Force as the Defense Secretary’s Special Assistant for Reconnaissance, with full authority in DoD reconnaissance matters.

The letter contained no specific assignment of responsibilities to either the CIA or Defense Department, stating only that “The Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office will … insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in this program.”

The letter provided for the NRO to be managed jointly by the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the CIA Deputy Director for Plans (at the time, still Richard Bissell).  A May 1962 agreement between the CIA and Defense Department established a single NRO director.  Joseph Charyk was named to the directorship shortly afterward.

Document 6
Joseph Charyk
Memorandum for NRO Program Directors/Director, NRO Staff
Organization and Functions of the NRO
23 July 1962
Top Secret
11 pp.

This memorandum represents the fundamental directive on the organization and functions of the NRO.  In addition to the Director (there was no provision for a deputy director), there were four major elements to the NRO–the NRO staff and three program elements, designated A, B, and C.  The staff’s functions included assisting the director in dealing with the USIB and the principal consumers of the intelligence collected.

The Air Force Office of Special Projects (the successor to the SAMOS project office) became NRO’s Program A.  The CIA reconnaissance effort was designated Program B, while the Navy’s space reconnaissance effort, at the time consisting of the Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB) satellite, whose radar ferret mission involved the collection of Soviet radar signals, became Program C.  Although the GRAB effort was carried out by the Naval Research Laboratory, the director of the Office of Naval Intelligence would serve as Program C director until 1971.8

Document 7
Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
13 March 1963
Top Secret
6 pp.

In December 1962, Joseph Charyk decided to leave government to become president of the COMSAT Corporation.  By that time a number of disputes between the CIA and NRO had contributed to Charyk’s view that the position of the NRO and its director should be strengthened.  During the last week of February 1963, his last week in office, he completed a revision of a CIA draft of a new reconnaissance agreement to replace the May 1962 agreement (which had replaced the September 6, 1961 agreement).  Charyk took the revision to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric.  It appears that some CIA-suggested changes were incorporated sometime after Charyk left office.  On March 13, Gilpatric signed the slightly modified version on behalf of DoD.  It was sent to the CIA that day and immediately approved by DCI John McCone, who had replaced Allen Dulles in November 1961.9

The new agreement, while it did not include all the elements Charyk considered important, did substantially strengthen the authority of the NRO and its director.  It named the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for the NRP.  The program would be “developed, managed, and conducted in accordance with policies and guidance jointly agreed to by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.”

The NRO would manage the NRP “under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.”  The NRO’s director would be selected by the Defense Secretary with the concurrence of the DCI, and report to the Defense Secretary.  The NRO director was charged with presenting to the Secretary of Defense “all projects” for intelligence collection and mapping and geodetic information via overflights and the associated budgets, scheduling all overflight missions in the NRP, as well as engineering analysis to correct problems with collection systems.  With regard to technical management, the DNRO was to “assign all project tasks such as technical management, contracting etc., to appropriate elements of the DoD and CIA, changing such assignments, and taking any such steps he may determine necessary to the efficient management of the NRP.”

Document 8
Department of Defense Directive Number TS 5105.23
Subject: National Reconnaissance Office
27 March 1964
Top Secret
4 pp.

This directive replaced the original June 1962 DoD Directive on the NRO, and remains in force today. The directive specifies the role of the Director of the NRO, the relationships between the NRO and other organizations, the director’s authorities, and security. It specified that documents or other material concerning National Reconnaissance Program matters would be handled within a special security system (known as the BYEMAN Control System).

Document 9
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Memorandum for the President
Subject: National Reconnaissance Program
2 May 1964
Top Secret
11 pp.

The 1963 CIA-DoD agreement on the NRP did not end the battles between the CIA and NRO–as some key CIA officials, including ultimately DCI John McCone, sought to reestablish a major role for the CIA in the satellite reconnaissance effort.  The continuing conflict was examined by the PFIAB.

The board concluded that “the National Reconnaissance Program despite its achievements, has not yet reached its full potential.”  The fundamental cause for the NRP’s shortcomings was “inadequacies in organizational structure.”  In addition, there was no clear division of responsibilities and roles between the Defense Department, CIA, and the DCI.

The recommendations of the board represented a clear victory for the NRO and its director.  The DCI should have a “large and important role” in establishing intelligence collection requirements and in ensuring that the data collected was effectively exploited, according to the board.  In addition, his leadership would be a key factor in the work of the United States Intelligence Board relating to the scheduling of space and airborne reconnaissance missions.

But the board also recommended that President Johnson sign a directive which would assign to NRO’s Air Force component (the Air Force Office of Special Projects) systems engineering, procurement, and operation of all satellite reconnaissance systems.

Document 10
Agreement for Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Program
13 August 1965
Top Secret
6 pp.

Despite the recommendations of the May 2, 1964 PFIAB report, which were challenged by DCI John McCone, no action was taken to solidify the position of the NRO and its director.  Instead prolonged discussions over a new agreement continued into the summer of 1965.  During this period the CIA continued work on what would become two key satellite programs–the HEXAGON/KH-9 imaging and RHYOLITE signals intelligence satellites.

In early August, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance and CIA official John Bross reached an understanding on a new agreement, and it was signed by Vice Adm. William F. Raborn (McCone’s successor) and Vance on August 13, 1965.  It represented a significant victory for the CIA, assigning key decision-making authority to an executive committee, authority that was previously the prerogative of the NRO director as the agent of the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense was to have “the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP,” and have the final power to approve the NRP budget.  The Secretary also was empowered to make decisions when the executive committee could not reach agreement.

The DCI was to establish collection priorities and requirements for targeting NRP operations, as well as establish frequency of coverage, review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend steps for improving its results if necessary, serve on the executive committee, review and approve the NRP budget, and provide security policy guidance.

The NRP Executive Committee established by the agreement would consist of the DCI, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.  The committee was to recommend to the Secretary of Defense the “appropriate level of effort for the NRP,” approve or modify the consolidated NRP and its budget, approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems.  It was instructed to insure that funds would be adequate to pursue a vigorous research and development program, involving both CIA and DoD.  The executive committee was to assign development of sensors to the agency best equipped to handle the task.

The Director of the NRO would manage the NRO and execute the NRP “subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee.”  His authority to initiate, improve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP, would be subject to review by the executive committee.  He could demand that all agencies keep him informed about all programs undertaken as part of the NRP.

Document 11
Analysis of “A $1.5 Billion Secret in Sky” Washington Post, December 9, 1973
Not dated
Top Secret
33 pp.

Throughout the 1960s, the United States operation of reconnaissance satellites was officially classified, but well known among specialists and the press.  However, it was not until January 1971 that the NRO’s existence was first disclosed by the media, when it was briefly mentioned in a New York Times article on intelligence and foreign policy.

A much more extensive discussion of the NRO appeared in the December 9, 1973 Washington Post as a result of the inadvertent mention of the reconnaissance office in a Congressional report.  The NRO prepared this set of classified responses to the article, clearly intended for those in Congress who might be concerned about the article’s purported revelations about the NRO’s cost overruns and avoidance of Congressional oversight.

Document 12
E.C. Aldridge, Jr. (Director, NRO)
Letter to David L. Boren, Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
21 November 1988
Secret
3 pp.

The late 1980s saw the beginning of what eventually would be a wide-ranging restructuring of the NRO.  In November 1988 NRO director Edward “Pete” Aldridge wrote to Senator David Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, concerning the findings of an extensive study (the NRO Restructure Study) of the organizational structure of the NRO.

Aldridge proceeded to report that, after having discussed the study’s recommendations with Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Director of Central Intelligence William Webster, he was directing the development of plans to implement the recommendations.  Specific changes would include the creation of a centralized systems analysis function “to conduct cross-system trades and simulations within the NRO,” creation of a “User Support” function to improve NRO support to intelligence community users as well as to the growing number of operational military users, and the dispersal of the NRO Staff to the new units, with the staff being replaced by a group of policy advisers.  In addition, Aldridge foresaw the establishment of an interim facility “to house the buildup of the new functions and senior management.”  The ultimate goal, projected for the 1991-92 period, would be the “collocation of all NRO elements [including the Los Angeles-based Air Force Office of Special Projects] . . . in the Washington, D.C. area.”

Document 13
Memorandum of Agreement
Subject: Organizational Restructure of the National Reconnaissance Office
15 December 1988
Secret
2 pp.

This memorandum of agreement, signed by the Director of the NRO and the directors of the NRO’s three programs commits them to the restructuring discussed in Edward Aldridge’s November 21 letter to Senator Boren.

Many changes recommended by Aldridge, who left office at the end of 1988, were considered by a 1989 NRO-sponsored review group and subsequently adopted.

Document 14
Report to the Director of Central Intelligence
DCI Task Force on The National Reconnaissance Office, Final Report
April 1992
Secret
35 pp.

This report was produced by a panel chaired by former Lockheed Corporation CEO Robert Fuhrman, whose members included both former and serving intelligence officials.  It focused on a variety of issues other than current and possible future NRO reconnaissance systems.  Among the issues it examined were mission, organizational structure, security and classification.

One of its most significant conclusions was that the Program A,B,C structure that had been instituted in 1962 (see Document 6) “does not enhance mission effectiveness” but “leads to counterproductive competition and makes it more difficult to foster loyalty and to maintain focus on the NRO mission.”  As a result, the panel recommended that the NRO be restructured along functional lines with imagery and SIGINT directorates.  This change was made even before the final version of the report was issued.

The report also noted that while the NRO’s existence was officially classified it was an “open secret” and that seeking to attempt to maintain such “open secrets … weakens the case for preserving ‘real’ secrets.”  In addition, such secrecy limited the NRO’s ability to interact with customers and users.  The group recommended declassifying the “fact of” the NRO, as well as providing information about the NRO’s mission, the identities of senior officials, headquarters locations, and the NRO as a joint Intelligence Community-Defense Department activity.

Document 15
National Security Directive 67
Subject: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005
30 March 1992
Secret
2 pp.

NSD 67 directed a number of changes in U.S. intelligence organization and operations.  Among those was implementation of the plan to restructure the NRO along functional lines–eliminating the decades old Program A (Air Force), B (CIA), and C (Navy) structure and replacing it with directorates for imaging, signals intelligence, and communication systems acquisition and operations–as recommended by the Fuhrman panel.  As a result, Air Force, CIA, and Navy personnel involved in such activities would now work together rather than as part of distinct NRO components.

Document 16
Email message
Subject: Overt-Covert-DOS-REP-INPUT
27 July 1992
Secret
1 p.

In addition to the internal restructuring of the NRO, 1992 saw the declassification of the organization, as recommended by the Fuhrman report (Document 14), for a number of reasons–to facilitate interaction with other parts of the government, to make it easier for the NRO to support military operations, and in response to Congressional pressure to acknowledge the obvious.  As part of the process of considering declassification NRO consulted Richard Curl, head of the Office of Intelligence Resources of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research–the office which provides INR with expertise and support concerning technical collection systems.  Curl recommended a low-key approach to declassification.

Document 17
Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Changing the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to an Overt Organization
30 July 1992
Secret
3 pp.

w/ attachments:
Document 17a: Mission of the NRO, 1 p.

Document 17b:  Implications of Proposed Changes, 4 pp. (Two versions)
 Version One
 Version Two

These memos, from Director of the NRO Martin Faga, represent key documents in the declassification of the NRO. The memo noted Congressional pressure for declassification and that Presidential certification that declassification would result in “grave damage to the nation … would be difficult in this case.”

Faga reported that as a result of an NRO review he recommended declassifying the fact of NRO’s existence, issuing a brief mission statement, acknowledging the NRO as a joint DCI-Secretary of Defense endeavor, and identifying top level NRO officials. He also noted that his recommendations attempted to balance concerns about classifying information that realistically could not be protected, while maintaining an ability to protect matters believed to require continued protection.

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, DCI Robert Gates, and President Bush approved the recommendations in September and a three-paragraph memorandum to correspondents acknowledging the NRO and NRP was issued on September 18, 1992.

Document 17b comes in two versions, representing different security reviews.  Material redacted from the first version includes provisions of National Security Directive 30 on space policy, expression of concern over “derived disclosures,” and the assessment that the “high degree of foreign acceptance of satellite reconnaissance, and the fact that we are not disclosing significant new data,” would not lead to any significant foreign reaction.  Another redacted statement stated that “legislation . . . exempting all NRO operational files from [Freedom of Information Act] searches” was required.

Document 18
Final Report: National Reconnaissance Program Task Force for the Director of Central Intelligence
September 1992
Top Secret
15 pp.

The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union required the U.S. intelligence community and NRO to reconsider how U.S. overhead reconnaissance systems were employed and what capabilities future systems should possess.  To consider these questions DCI Robert Gates appointed a task force, chaired by his eventual successor, R. James Woolsey.

The final report considers future needs and collection methods, industrial base considerations, procurement policy considerations, international industrial issues, and transition considerations.  Its recommendations included elimination of both some collection tasks as well as some entire types of present and planned collection systems.

Document 19
NRO Protection Review, “What is [BYEMAN]?”
6 November 1992
Top Secret
18 pp.

Traditionally, the designations of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) compartments–such as UMBRA to indicate particularly sensitive communications intelligence and RUFF to intelligence based on satellite imagery–have themselves been classified.  In recent years, however, the NSA and CIA have declassified a number of such terms and their meaning. One exception has been the term “BYEMAN”– the BYEMAN Control System being the security system used to protect information related to NRO collection systems (in contrast to their products) and other aspects of NRO activities, including budget and structure.  Thus, the term BYEMAN has been deleted in the title of the document and throughout the study–although the term and its meaning has become known by specialists and conveys no information beyond the text of any particular document.

This study addresses the use of the BYEMAN classification within the NRO, its impact on contractors and other government personnel, and the consequences of the current application of the BYEMAN system.  The study concludes that placing information in the highly restrictive BYEMAN channels (in contrast to classifying the information at a lower level) may unduly restrict its dissemination to individuals who have a legitimate need to know.

Document 20
NRO Strategic Plan
18 January 1993
Secret
19 pp.

A study headed by James Woolsey (Document 18), President Clinton’s first DCI, heavily influenced the contents of this early 1993 document.  The plan’s introduction notes that while some collection tasks will no longer be handled by overhead reconnaissance the “uncertain nature of the world that is emerging from the end of the ‘cold war’ places a heavy premium on overhead reconnaissance.”  At the same time, “this overhead reconnaissance challenge must be met in an era of a likely reduced national security budget.”

The strategic plan is described in the introduction, as “the ‘game plan’ to transition current overhead collection architectures into a more integrated, end-to-end architecture for improved global access and tasking flexibility.”

The document goes on to examine the strategic context for future NRO operations, NRO strategy, strategic objectives, and approaches to implementation.  Strategic objectives include improving the responsiveness of NRO systems by developing an architecture that spans the entire collection and dissemination process, from the identification of requirements to dissemination of the data collected.

Document 21
National Reconnaissance Office: Collocation Construction Project, Joint DOD and CIA Review Report
November 1994
Unclassified
28 pp.

In an August 8, 1994 press conference, Senators Dennis DeConcini (D-Az.) and John Warner (R-Va.), the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence accused the NRO of concealing from Congress the cost involved in building a new headquarters to house government and contractor employees.  Previously NRO activities in the Washington area were conducted from the Pentagon and rented space in the Washington metropolitan area.  The collocation and restructuring decisions of the late 1980s and early 1990s had resulted in a requirement for a new headquarters facility.10

The accusations were followed by hearings before both the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees–with House committee members defending the NRO and criticizing their Senate colleagues.  While they noted that some of the documents presented by the NRO covering total costs were not presented with desirable clarity, the House members were more critical of the Senate committee for inattention to their committee work.11

This joint DoD and CIA review of the project, found “no intent to mislead Congress” but that “the NRO failed to follow Intelligence Community budgeting guidelines, applicable to all the intelligence agencies,” that would have caused the project to be presented as a “New Initiative,” and that the cost data provided by the NRO “were not presented in a consistent fashion and did not include a level of detail comparable to submissions for . . . intelligence community construction.”

Document 22
Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Small Satellite Review Panel
Unclassified
July 1996

The concept of employing significantly smaller satellites for imagery collection was strongly advocated by Rep. Larry Combest during his tenure (1995-97) as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.  As a result the DCI was instructed to appoint a panel of experts to review the issue.12

Panel members included former NRO directors Robert Hermann and Martin Faga; former NRO official and NSA director Lew Allen; scientist Sidney Drell and four others.  The panel’s report supported a radical reduction in the size of most U.S. imagery satellites.  The panel concluded that “now is an appropriate time to make a qualitative change in the systems architecture of the nation’s reconnaissance assets,” in part because “the technology and industrial capabilities of the country permit the creation of effective space systems that are substantially smaller and less costly than current systems.”  Thus, the panel saw “the opportunity to move towards an operational capability for . . . imagery systems, that consists of an array of smaller, cheaper spacecraft in larger number with a total capacity which is at least as useful as those currently planned and to transport them to space with substantially smaller and less costly launch vehicles.”13

The extent to which those recommendations have influenced NRO’s Future Imagery Architecture plan is uncertain–although plans for large constellations of small satellites have not usually survived the budgetary process.

Document 23
Defining the Future of the NRO for the 21st Century, Final Report, Executive Summary
August 26, 1996
Unclassified
30 pp.

This report was apparently the first major outside review of the NRO conducted during the Clinton administration, and the first conducted after the NRO’s transformation to an overt institution and its restructuring were firmly in place.

Among those conducting the review were former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. David E. Jeremiah, former NRO director Martin Faga, and former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon.  Issues studied by the panel included, inter alia, the existence of a possible alternative to the NRO, NRO’s mission in the 21st Century, support to military operations, security, internal organization, and the relationship with NRO’s customers.

After reviewing a number of alternatives, the panel concluded that no other arrangement was superior for carrying out the NRO mission.  It did, however, recommend, changes with regards to NRO’s mission and internal organization.  The panel concluded that where the NRO’s current mission is “worldwide intelligence,” its future mission should be “global information superiority,” which “demands intelligence capabilities unimaginable just a few years ago.”  The panel also recommended creation of a fourth NRO directorate, which was subsequently established, to focus solely on the development of advanced systems, in order to “increase the visibility and stature of technology innovation in the NRO.”

 

Notes
1. Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp.241-42; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, From Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 319; Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), pp. 170-93.2. Kenneth Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement 17, Spring 1973 in Kevin C. Ruffner (Ed.), CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), pp. 3-40; Gen. Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff to General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, June 29, 1960, Thomas D. White Papers, Library of Congress, Box 34, Folder “2-15 SAC.”

3. “Special Meeting of the National Security Council to be held in the Conference Room of the White House from 8:30 a.m. to 10 a.m., Thursday, August 25, 1960, undated, National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61, Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 15, Reconnaissance Satellites [1960], DDEL.

4. “Reconnaissance Satellite Program,” Action No.1-b at Special NSC Meeting on August 25, 1960, transmitted to the Secretary of Defense by Memo of September 1, 1960; G.B. Kistiakowsky to Allen Dulles, August 25, 1960, Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Box No. 15, Space [July-Dec 1960], DDEL.

5. Carl Berger, The Air Force in Space Fiscal Year 1961, (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Historical Liaison Office, 1966), pp.41-42; Secretary of the Air Force Order 115.1, “Organization and Functions of the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems,” August 31, 1960; Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program, 1960-1965, (Washington, D.C., NRO, 1969), p. 20; Secretary of the Air Force Order 116.1, “The Director of the SAMOS Project,” August 31, 1960.

6. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 20.

7. Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Undercover in Outer Space: The Creation and Evolution of the NRO,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 13, 3 (Fall 2000): 301-344.

8. Ibid.; GRAB: Galactic Radiation and Background (Washington, D.C.: NRL, 1997); Dwayne A. Day, “Listening from Above: The First Signals Intelligence Satellite,” Spaceflight, August 1999, pp. 339-347; NRO, Program Directors of the NRO: ABC&D, 1999.

9. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, pp. 93, 96-97.

10. Pierre Thomas, “Spy Unit’s Spending Stuns Hill,” Washington Post, August 9, 1994, pp. A1, A6.

11. Walter Pincus, “Spy Agency Defended by House Panel,” Washington Post, August 12, 1994, p. A21; U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, NRO Headquarters Project (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 3-4.

12. Walter Pincus, “Congress Debates Adding Smaller Spy Satellites to NRO’s Menu,” Washington Post, October 5, 1995, p. A14; Joseph C. Anselmo, “House, Senate at Odds Over Intel Small Sats,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 1, 1996, p. 19.

13. Small Satellite Review Panel, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Small Satellite Review Panel, July 1996.

Revealed – Former CIA Officer Kiriakou Calls Leak Prosecution Selective, Vindictive

Former CIA officer John Kiriakou, who is charged with unauthorized disclosure of a covert officer’s identity and other classified information, says that the case against him is driven by government animosity, and that he is a target of selective prosecution.

“When White House aides leaked stories about the heroes who killed Osama Bin Laden, they were not prosecuted.  When the Washington Post was granted access to the covert director of the CTC for a profile of those directing America’s ‘war on terror,’ no one was prosecuted,” his attorneys wrote in a newly disclosed motion for dismissal.

“But when John Kiriakou gave an interview where he admitted the United States used waterboarding and when he further opined that waterboarding was ineffective, the government went after him,” the motion stated.

“The United States has improperly selected him for prosecution based on his exercise of his constitutional rights and on the animus the United States holds toward him” while “the government has tolerated other disclosures because they resulted in press favorable to the government.”

A copy of the June 12 defense motion was cleared for public release yesterday.

In a separate motion for dismissal, Mr. Kiriakou’s attorneys challenged the constitutionality of the statutes under which he is being prosecuted, including the Intelligence Identities Protection Act and section 793(d) of the Espionage Act, which they argued are “unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”

Furthermore, because overclassification is rampant, they said, the classification status of any particular information is not a reliable index of its sensitivity.

“The government’s acknowledged practice of over-classification means that not all classified information actually has the potential to damage national security if released….  The fact that information is classified does not actually clarify whether its disclosure… could cause any injury to the United States.”

A government response to the defense motions is due by July 2.

Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary, 1972 – TOP-SECRET from the NSA


click for full sizeFirst trip with Gorbachev. Chernyaev in Belgium, October 1972.

Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary, 1972

Soviet government official Anatoly Chernyaev records an insider’s view of the Brezhnev era

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 379

Translated and edited by Anna Melyakova and Svetlana Savranskaya “Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary is one of the great internal records of the Gorbachev years, a trove of irreplaceable observations about a turning point in history. There is nothing else quite like it, allowing the reader to sit at Gorbachev’s elbow at the time of perestroika and glasnost, experiencing the breakthroughs and setbacks. It is a major contribution to our understanding of this momentous period.”
— David E. Hoffman, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Dead Hand

“Remarkable diary …”
— Historian Amy Knight, New York Review of Books, April 6, 2012


click for full sizeChernyaev, Anatoly Kovalev and Alexander Bovin in Zavidovo.

click for full sizeChernyaev and Georgy Arbatov in Zavidovo.

Washington, D.C., May 25, 2012 – Today the National Security Archive publishes excerpts from Anatoly S. Chernyaev’s diary of 1972 for the first time in English translation with edits and postscript by the author. While the diary for the Gorbachev years, 1985-1991, published before and widely used in scholarly work on the end of the Cold War provided a major source on the Gorbachev reforms, the earlier years of the diary give the reader a very rare window into the workings of the Brezhnev inner circle in the 1970s.

The portrait of the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, whom most Americans remember from his later years as frail and incomprehensible, emerges very differently from the earliest in the series of diaries donated by Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev to the National Security Archive. In 1972, Chernyaev, deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee, started keeping a systematic diary, recording his attendance at Politburo meetings, his participation in meetings at the state dacha in Zavidovo (where the experts and speechwriters met to draft speeches and reports for the General Secretary), visits abroad, and the daily life of a high-level Soviet apparatchik.

In 1972, Brezhnev is a skillful negotiator, who prepares seriously for Richard Nixon’s first visit to Moscow, who discusses texts of his speeches with leading Moscow intellectuals whom he brought into his inner circle as speechwriters and consultants, who is essentially non-ideological in his dealings with foreign leaders-negotiating arms control and economic agreements with Nixon while the U.S. forces are bombing the Soviet communist ally Vietnam, preferring Georges Pompidou to the leader of French communists Georges Marchais, and”brainwashing” Pakistani leader Bhutto. The two most striking differences between the aging Brezhnev of the late 1970s-early 1980s and the Brezhnev of this diary are that the General Secretary is clearly in charge of the Politburo sessions and that he actively consults with leading experts and intellectuals, such as Georgy Arbatov, Nikolai Inozemtsev, Alexander Bovin and Chernyaev himself.

Chernyaev’s daily duties are centered around the international communist movement, interactions with representatives from European communist parties. The reader sees Chernyaev’s emerging disillusionment with his work, which in comparison to real foreign policy, like preparation for Nixon’s visit, feels meaningless. Chernyaev comes to believe that “the Communist Movement right now is nothing more than an ideological addendum to our foreign policy,” and that the Soviet authority in the progressive movements in the world is shrinking: “nobody believes us anymore, no matter how we portray the Chinese and try to explain our Marxist-Leninist purity.”

He sees the future in a different direction. After Nixon’s visit, Chernyaev is asked to draft Brezhnev’s speech on Soviet-American relations and thus is allowed to see all the materials from the meeting, including all transcripts of conversation. Impressed with the quality of interaction and the non-ideological spirit of it, Chernyaev anticipates a new era: “Be that as it may, but we’ve crossed the Rubicon. The great Rubicon of world history. These weeks of May 1972 will go down in history as the beginning of an era of convergence.”

But the new era will only come thirteen years later. In 1972, he sees the first almost imperceptible sign from the future. In October 1972, he is asked to accompany first secretary of the Stavropol region on a trip to Belgium. This is where Chernyaev meets and spends time with Mikhail Gorbachev for the first time. Astonishingly, as Chernyaev later admits, he did not record this meeting in the diary at the time. Only photographs documented this auspicious meeting where Chernyaev sits on the left hand of the future Soviet leader, whose right hand he was destined to become in the late 1980s.

 


SECRET from Cryptome – FAA Sets Large ND Drone Training Airspace

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 119 (Wednesday, June 20, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 36907-36914]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-15008]

========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents 
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed 
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published 
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========================================================================

Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 119 / Wednesday, June 20, 2012 / 
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 36907]]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 73

[Docket No. FAA-2011-0117; Airspace Docket No. 09-AGL-31]

Establishment of Restricted Areas R-5402, R-5403A, R-5403B, R-
5403C, R-5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F; Devils Lake, ND

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action establishes restricted area airspace within the 
Devils Lake Military Operations Area (MOA), overlying Camp Grafton 
Range, in the vicinity of Devils Lake, ND. The new restricted areas 
permit realistic training in modern tactics to be conducted at Camp 
Grafton Range while ensuring the safe and efficient use of the National 
Airspace System (NAS) in the Devils Lake, ND, area. Unlike restricted 
areas which are designated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 
(14 CFR) part 73, MOAs are not regulatory airspace. However, since the 
restricted areas overlap the Devils Lake East MOA, the FAA is including 
a description of the Devils Lake East MOA change in this rule. The MOA 
change described herein will be published in the National Flight Data 
Digest (NFDD).

DATES: Effective Dates: Effective date 0901 UTC, July 26, 2012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Colby Abbott, Airspace, Regulations 
and ATC Procedures Group, Office of Airspace Services, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone: (202) 267-8783.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

History

    On November 28, 2011, the FAA published in the Federal Register a 
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to establish Restricted Areas R-
5402, R-5403A, R-5403B, R-5403C, R-5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F in the 
vicinity of Devils Lake, ND (76 FR 72869). Interested parties were 
invited to participate in this rulemaking effort by submitting written 
comments on the proposal. In response to public request, the FAA 
extended the comment period for 30 additional days (77 FR 1656; January 
11, 2012). There were 43 comments received in response to the NPRM with 
42 opposing various aspects of the proposal and one comment supporting 
the proposal as published. All comments received were considered before 
making a determination on this final rule. The following is a 
discussion of the substantive comments received and the agency's 
response.

Discussion of Comments

    One commenter contended that the 500 feet above ground level (AGL) 
base for R-5402 would impact low level, aerial operations such as crop 
dusters, wildlife and agricultural surveys, and emergency medical 
access. The FAA recognizes that when active, R-5402 would restrict 
nonparticipating aircraft from operating within its boundaries. To 
mitigate impacts to the aviation activities described above, the United 
States Air Force (USAF) has agreed to implement scheduling coordination 
measures to de-conflict laser operations and accommodate access by 
local farming, ranching, survey, and medical aviation interests when 
they need to fly in or through R-5402, when it is active.
    Another commenter noted that VFR traffic would have to 
circumnavigate active restricted airspace resulting in increased time 
and distances flown. The FAA acknowledges restricted area airspace 
segregates nonparticipating aircraft from hazardous activities 
occurring inside the restricted area and that, on occasion, 
nonparticipating aircraft affected by the restricted area will have to 
deviate from preferred routings to remain clear. The lateral boundaries 
and altitudes of the restricted area complex were defined to minimize 
impacts to nonparticipant aircraft, yet still support the military in 
accomplishing its training mission. The subdivided configuration of the 
restricted area complex, the altitude stratifications, and the entire 
restricted area complex designated as ``joint use,'' affords 
nonparticipant aircraft access to the portions of restricted area 
airspace not in use by the military to the greatest extent possible.
    One commenter expressed concern that segregating airspace for new 
types of aircraft sets a dangerous precedent. The FAA agrees and 
maintains its policy to establish restricted area airspace when 
determined necessary to confine or segregate activities considered 
hazardous to nonparticipating aircraft. The FAA considers UAS 
operations to be non-hazardous. However, the FAA recognizes that some 
UAS platforms have the ability to employ hazardous ordnance or sensors. 
Since the MQ-1 Predator [UAS] laser is non-eye safe and will be used 
during training sorties flown by the military, its use constitutes a 
hazardous activity that must be confined within restricted area 
airspace to protect nonparticipating aircraft.
    Two commenters suggested that Special Use Airspace (SUA) should be 
ceded back to civil control when not in use. The FAA proposed that the 
restricted areas be designated as ``joint use'' airspace, specifically 
to afford the highest level of access to NAS users and limit this 
access only when necessary. This rule provides that when the restricted 
areas are not needed by the using agency, the airspace will be returned 
to the controlling agency, Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control 
Center, for access by other NAS users.
    Another commenter recommended that the proposed restricted area 
airspace be developed for concurrent use. The FAA considered the 
commenters use of ``concurrent use'' to mean ``sharing the same 
airspace, at the same time, between participating and nonparticipating 
aircraft.'' As noted previously, restricted areas are established to 
confine or segregate activities considered hazardous to 
nonparticipating aircraft; such as dropping bombs, firing guns/
missiles/rockets, or lasing with a non-eye safe laser. Concurrent use, 
as described above, would not be prudent in such an environment as it 
constitutes an unacceptable risk to nonparticipating aircraft.
    Twenty-two commenters stated that the proposed restricted areas 
should

[[Page 36908]]

have been developed in conjunction with the North Dakota Airspace 
Integration Team (NDAIT), a group formed to find solutions to UAS 
integration into the NAS, as well as coordinate UAS activities state-
wide. To clarify, the focus of this proposed action is consideration of 
establishing restricted areas to support hazardous military training 
activities, not UAS integration into the NAS. The FAA notes that the 
NDAIT was not established until after the USAF airspace proposal was 
submitted to the FAA and many of the NDAIT members took the opportunity 
to submit comments on the proposal.
    One commenter stated that the proposed airspace should be 
environmentally assessed for the broad array of military aircraft that 
would be expected to employ in conjunction with UAS. The FAA agrees and 
has confirmed that the Environmental Impact Statement for the bed down 
of the MQ-1 Predator at Grand Forks Air Force Base (AFB) addresses 
other aircraft that would likely train with the UAS in the proposed 
restricted area airspace complex.
    Another commenter stated that the proposed restricted area airspace 
would eventually be activated almost full time as is the current 
Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) over Grand Forks AFB. The TFR 
referred to by the commenter is contained in the Special Security 
Instruction authorized under 14 CFR 99.7 for Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) UAS operations conducted from Grand Forks AFB. 
Although the TFR is active while the CBP UAS is flying, it allows 
airspace access by non-participant aircraft using procedural separation 
rules. The restricted areas proposed by this action are being 
established with specific times of designation, to support the 
hazardous non-eye safe laser training conducted by the USAF. The times 
are described by ``core hours'' and also may be activated by NOTAM to 
allow for training periods outside the core hours, i.e. at night.
    Twenty commenters argued that the proposal is contrary to FAA 
policy, in that it is designed for the sole purpose of separating non-
hazardous types of VFR aircraft. The FAA has established this 
restricted area airspace to confine the MQ-1 Predator employment of a 
non-eye safe targeting laser, which is hazardous to nonparticipating 
pilots. This laser training for UAS pilots must be contained in 
restricted areas to confine the hazardous activity, as well as protect 
non-participating aircraft flying in the vicinity of the restricted 
areas. Even though the Predator operations in the restricted areas will 
normally occur in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), the UAS will 
be on an IFR flight plan in accordance with U.S. Air Force 
requirements.
    Two commenters requested that the FAA establish a formal, annual 
review process and public report on the use and impacts of any 
designated airspace associated with UAS activity in Grand Forks, ND. 
The request to establish a formal annual review process with public 
reporting on use and impacts falls outside the scope of this proposed 
action. However, the FAA has a Restricted Area Annual Utilization 
reporting program already established to assist the FAA in managing 
special use airspace areas established throughout the NAS. These annual 
utilization reports provide objective information regarding the types 
of activities being conducted, as well as the times scheduled, 
activated, and actual use, which the FAA uses to assess the appropriate 
use of the restricted areas.
    Nineteen commenters recommended that proposed restricted airspace 
have a ``sunset'' date. The restricted areas are established to confine 
hazardous non-eye safe laser training, which will continue as long as 
the Predator UAS are operating from Grand Forks AFB. Technology 
developments to integrate UAS into the NAS with manned aircraft, as 
well as military Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) maturation 
may provide an opportunity to reconfigure the restricted area airspace 
at a future date, but the requirement for restricted area airspace will 
exist as long as the non-eye safe laser training is conducted.
    One commenter recommended a requirement for equipping the UAS with 
forward viewing sensors that would enable the UAS to comply with 14 CFR 
part 91 see-and-avoid rules. While the FAA is working with the industry 
to develop see-and-avoid solutions for the safe and eventual seamless 
integration of UAS into the NAS, this suggestion is outside the scope 
of this action.
    One commenter asked that the proposal be tabled until the FAA 
publishes its final Order/Advisory Circular regarding UAS operations in 
the NAS. The Order/Advisory Circular address the integration of UAS in 
the NAS, which is separate from the action of establishing restricted 
area airspace to confine hazardous non-eye safe laser training 
activities. This action is necessary to support the military's training 
requirement beginning this summer. The FAA is completing this airspace 
action separate from its UAS NAS integration guidance development 
efforts.
    Several commenters recommended that instead of creating new SUA for 
these activities that the USAF use existing restricted areas or the 
airspace subject to flight restrictions under Sec.  99.7 SSI and used 
by the Customs & Border Protection Agency (CBP) at Grand Forks AFB. The 
FAA advocates the use of existing SUA and requires proponents to 
examine all reasonable alternatives, prior to considering the need to 
establish new SUA. In this case, the USAF conducted an extensive 
analysis of alternatives and considered criteria including proximity to 
Grand Forks AFB, existence of a suitable air-to-ground range for laser 
targeting, and air traffic density both en route and at the training 
complex. The Beaver MOA in north central Minnesota is approximately 
three times as far as the proposed airspace, has much heavier air 
traffic density, and has no air-to-ground gunnery range. The Tiger MOAs 
in north central North Dakota are the same distance as the proposed 
airspace, have favorable air traffic density, but have no air-to-ground 
gunnery range. The airspace in the vicinity of the existing CBP Sec.  
99.7 SSI flight restriction would be closer, but has much higher 
traffic density and complexity, and has no air-to-ground range. 
Additionally, there were no useable restricted areas within reasonable 
distance of Grand Forks AFB for consideration. The FAA believes the 
USAF considered and analyzed the alternatives to this action and that 
establishing new SUA is the only reasonable option.
    One commenter suggested that the restricted area complex be moved 
north of Devils Lake. The FAA notes that the USAF studied an 
alternative of establishing restricted areas in the Tiger North and 
Tiger South MOAs, located north of Devils Lake, ND. While proximity to 
Grand Forks AFB and the air traffic density compared favorably to the 
proposed airspace area, the lack of an air-to-ground gunnery range 
suitable for hazardous laser training made this option operationally 
unfeasible. The FAA accepted the USAF's consideration and analysis of 
this alternative and proposed establishing the restricted areas set 
forth in this action.
    One commenter recommended that the proposed airspace be moved to 
another state as it would impact flying training in the vicinity of 
Grand Forks. This airspace proposal resulted from Congress' Base 
Realignment and Closure Commission of 2005 decision to retain Grand 
Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota for an emerging UAS mission. As 
addressed previously, Beaver MOA in north central Minnesota is the 
nearest SUA outside of North Dakota. It was approximately three times 
the distance from Grand Forks AFB, has much higher

[[Page 36909]]

air traffic density airspace, and has no air-to-ground gunnery range 
for hazardous laser training. The FAA recognizes the proposed 
restricted areas could impact civil flight training, largely conducted 
by the University of North Dakota and east of the proposed complex. 
Additionally, nearly all civil flight training activity that currently 
occurs in the vicinity of the restricted areas would take place below 
the proposed R-5403 footprint. Whereas the floor of R-5402 goes down to 
500 feet above ground level (AGL), its cylinder footprint was reduced 
to a 7 NM radius around R-5401 and the Camp Grafton Range to mitigate 
impacts to these civil operations. This airspace action provides a 
reasonable balance between military training requirements and 
accommodation of non-participant flight training.
    Three commenters stated that the vast size of the restricted area 
complex is not necessary. The restricted areas being established by 
this action provide the minimum vertical and lateral tactical 
maneuvering airspace required for UAS operators to accomplish target 
acquisition prior to attack, and then contain the non-eye safe laser 
during firing. The restricted area complex was configured to confine 
two UAS operating on independent mission profiles at the same time, 
while minimizing airspace impacts to non-participating aircraft. As the 
UAS training flight transitions from one phase of the mission profiles 
to another, unused segments will be deactivated and returned to the NAS 
consistent with the FAA's Joint Use Airspace policy. The subdivided and 
stratified configuration of the restricted area complex enables the 
USAF to only activate the restricted areas needed for their training 
sorties while leaving the rest of the complex inactive and available 
for NAS users. The FAA believes the segmentation and stratification of 
the complex will enhance civil access to those parts of the complex not 
activated for USAF training requirements. Actual procedures for 
restricted area activation and deactivation will be defined in a Letter 
of Procedure between the using and controlling agencies.
    Two commenters asked if the USAF could find a less cluttered area 
with more suitable weather for MQ-1 Predator operations. The FAA 
acknowledges that weather challenges will exist for the MQ-1 Predator 
operations at Grand Forks AFB. The decision to base Predator UAS at 
Grand Forks AFB, however, was mandated by Congress. The restricted 
areas proposed by this action were situated and proposed in the only 
location that met the USAF's operational requirements of proximity to 
launch/recovery base, low air traffic density, and availability of an 
existing air-to-ground gunnery range suitable for the hazardous non-eye 
safe laser training activities.
    One commenter contended that Alert Areas are more appropriate for 
UAS training activity. Alert Areas are designated to inform 
nonparticipating pilots of areas that contain a high volume of pilot 
training operations, or an unusual type of aeronautical activity, that 
they might not otherwise expect to encounter. However, only those 
activities that do not pose a hazard to other aircraft may be conducted 
in an Alert Area. Since employment of the non-eye safe laser carried by 
the MQ-1 Predator UAS is an activity hazardous to non-participants, an 
Alert Area is not an appropriate airspace solution.
    Two commenters stated that the Air Force is proposing restricted 
areas as a means to mitigate for lack of see-and-avoid capability for 
UAS operations. They noted, correctly, that the Air Force could use 
ground-based or airborne assets to provide see-and-avoid compliance 
instead. FAA policy dictates that restricted areas are established to 
confine activities considered hazardous to non-participating aircraft. 
As mentioned previously, the focus of this action is establishing 
restricted areas to support hazardous military training activities, not 
UAS integration into the NAS. As such, the FAA does not support 
establishing restricted areas as a solution to overcome UAS inability 
to comply with 14 CFR Part 91 see-and-avoid requirements. The FAA is 
establishing the restricted areas addressed in this action to confine 
the hazardous non-eye safe laser training activities conducted by the 
USAF.
    One commenter stated that new restricted airspace should be offset 
by reallocation of unused SUA elsewhere in the NAS. The proposed 
restricted areas fall almost entirely within the existing Devils Lake 
East MOA. When activated, the new restricted areas will be, in effect, 
replacing existing SUA. Although the regulatory and non-regulatory 
process for establishing SUA is not directly linked to the restricted 
area and MOA annual utilization reporting process, the FAA does review 
restricted area and MOA utilization annually. If candidate SUA areas 
are identified, the FAA works with the military service to 
appropriately return that airspace to the NAS.
    Seventeen commenters stated that Predator pilots can get the same 
training through simulation. The FAA cannot determine for the USAF the 
value of simulated UAS operator training over actual flying activities. 
The USAF is heavily investing in Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) 
training options. As the commenters infer, the migration to a virtual 
training environment would be expected to reduce the demand for 
activating R-5402 and R-5403A-F. However, actual employment of the non-
eye safe laser will still be required for both training proficiency and 
equipment validation. This action balances the training airspace 
requirements identified by the USAF as it matures its UAS capabilities 
with the airspace access requirements of other NAS users.
    Twenty commenters addressed the increased collision hazard due to 
air traffic compression at lower altitudes and around the periphery of 
the proposed complex. The FAA recognizes that compression could occur 
when the restricted areas are active; however, the actual impact will 
be minimal. The FAA produced traffic counts for the 5 busiest summer 
days and 5 busiest winter days of 2011 during the proposed times of 
designation (0700-2200L) from 8,000 feet MSL to 14,000 feet MSL. Totals 
for all IFR and known VFR aircraft ranged between 4 and 22 aircraft 
over the 17-hour span. Volumes such as this are easily managed by 
standard ATC procedures. To enhance non-radar service in the far 
western part of the proposed complex, the FAA is considering a separate 
rulemaking action to modify V-170 so that it will remain clear of R-
5402 to the west. On average, four aircraft file V-170 over a 24-hour 
day. Lastly, the FAA is nearing completion of a project to add three 
terminal radar feeds, from Bismarck, Fargo, and Minot AFB, covering the 
restricted area airspace area into Minneapolis ARTCC. These feeds will 
improve low altitude radar surveillance and enhance flight safety 
around the proposed restricted areas.
    One commenter argued that the proposed airspace should be limited 
to daylight hours only. While daytime flying is usually safer in a 
visual see-and-avoid environment; when it comes to the military 
training for combat operations, darkness provides a significant 
tactical advantage and UAS must be capable of operating both day and 
night. While the USAF has a valid and recurring requirement to train 
during hours of darkness, the USAF was able to accept a 2-hour 
reduction in the published times of designation core hours from ``0700-
2200 daily, by NOTAM 6 hours in advance,'' to ``0700-2000 daily, by 
NOTAM 6 hours in advance.''

[[Page 36910]]

    Another commenter sought details on the UAS lost link plan. 
Although the lost link plan is not within the scope of this action, the 
FAA does require detailed procedures for UAS lost link situations for 
all UAS operations. These procedures will be similar to those in place 
today for UAS operations across the NAS. The servicing ATC facility and 
UAS operators closely coordinate lost link procedures and will 
incorporate them into the implementing Letters of Procedure (LOP) for 
the restricted areas established in this rule.
    Two commenters commented that the proposed restricted area complex 
stratification and segmentation was confusing and would lead to SUA 
airspace incursions. The FAA promotes stratifications and segmentation 
of large SUA complexes to maximize the safety and efficiency of the NAS 
and to enable more joint use opportunities to access the same airspace 
by non-participating aircraft. Sub-dividing the complex permits 
activation of a small percentage of the overall complex at any one time 
while still providing for a diverse set of training profiles during UAS 
sorties, which is especially well-suited for long duration UAS training 
missions. Additionally, enhanced joint use access eases compression of 
air traffic in the local area; thus, increasing flight safety.
    Nineteen commenters noted that UAS will not be able to see-and-
avoid large flocks of birds using migratory flyways, which could create 
a hazard for personnel on the ground. Both Grand Forks AFB and the 
University of North Dakota flight school, located at the Grand Forks 
International Airport, have conducted extensive research into bird 
strike potential and prevention. Their research found that more than 90 
percent of bird strikes occur below 3,500 feet AGL and that there are 
predictable windows for migratory bird activity, which are adjusted 
year-to-year based on historical and forecast weather patterns. Also, 
bird strikes are nearly twice as likely to occur at night compared to 
the day. The USAF has long standing bird strike avoidance procedures 
specifically customized for Grand Forks AFB, which will be optimized 
for UAS operations. Other mitigations include having the bases of the 
restricted airspace well above most bird activity, conducting most 
training during daylight hours, and adjusting UAS operations during 
seasonal migratory activity. These mitigations conform to both civil 
and military standard bird strike avoidance measures that are in place 
across the NAS.
    Eighteen commenters contended that persons and property under the 
proposed airspace would not be protected from the non-eye safe laser 
training. The USAF conducted a laser safety study in 2009 for the Camp 
Grafton Air-to-Ground Range. This range, where the laser targets will 
be placed, lies within the existing R-5401. The study examined laser 
and aircraft characteristics, topography, target composition, and 
employment parameters, and determined that the proposed airspace would 
adequately protect persons and property outside the footprint of R-
5401. Personnel working at the range will use proper protective gear 
should they need to access the target areas during laser employment 
periods. The FAA has reviewed and accepts the USAF's laser safety 
study. The restricted areas established by this action are designed to 
allow laser employment without hazard to persons and property in the 
vicinity of R-5401.
    Two commenters stated that it is dangerous to mix UAS with visual 
flight rules (VFR) air traffic. UAS are permitted to fly outside 
restricted area airspace in the NAS today and in the vicinity of VFR 
aircraft, under FAA approved Certificate of Waiver or Authorization 
(COA). Specific to this action, UAS operations will be occurring inside 
restricted area airspace that is established to confine the hazardous 
non-eye safe laser training activities; thus, segregated from 
nonparticipating aircraft.
    One commenter said that VFR pilot violations will increase and 
those less informed will pose a safety hazard. The FAA interpreted the 
commenters use ``violations'' to mean SUA airspace incursions. VFR 
pilots must conduct thorough pre-flight planning and are encouraged to 
seek airborne updates from ATC on the status of SUA. The FAA finds that 
the restricted areas established by this action pose no more risk of 
incursion or safety hazard than other restricted areas that exist in 
the NAS.
    Two commenters observed that the NPRM failed to identify how UAS 
would transit from Grand Forks AFB to the proposed restricted areas. 
The FAA considers UAS transit and climb activities to be non-hazardous; 
therefore, establishing new restricted areas for transit and climb 
purposes is inappropriate. While UAS transit and climb activities are 
non-hazardous, they are presently atypical. Therefore, specifics on 
transit and climb ground tracks, corridor altitudes and widths, and 
activation procedures will be accomplished procedurally and consistent 
with existing COA mitigation alternatives available today. The 
establishment of restricted areas airspace is focused on the hazardous 
non-eye safe laser training activities.
    Twenty four commenters noted that the proposed restricted areas 
would block V-170 & V-55 and impact V-169 & V-561. The FAA acknowledges 
that the proposed restricted area complex will have a minimal impact on 
three of the four Victor airways mentioned, depending on the restricted 
areas activated. The airway analysis began with V-170, which runs 
between Devils Lake, ND, and Jamestown, ND, with a Minimum En route 
Altitude (MEA) of 3,500 feet MSL along the effected segment of the 
airway. An average of four aircraft per day filed for V-170. R-5402, 
when active, impacts V-170 from 1200 feet AGL to 10,000 feet MSL. The 
FAA is considering a separate rulemaking action to modify V-170 by 
creating a slight ``dogleg'' to the west, which would allow unimpeded 
use of V-170 below 8,000 feet MSL regardless of the status of R-5402. 
Impacts to V-170 above 8,000 feet MSL are dependent upon which 
restricted areas are active.
    V-55 runs between Grand Forks, ND, and Bismarck, ND, with an MEA of 
8,000 feet MSL along the affected segment of the airway. An average of 
7 aircraft per day filed for V-55. Activation of R-5402, R-5403A, R-
5403B, or R-5403C would have no impact on V-55. The FAA raised the 
floor of R-5403D to 10,000 feet MSL and reduced the blocks for R-5403D 
and R-5403E to 2,000 feet each to allow ATC more flexibility to climb/
descend IFR traffic on V-55. The FAA is also considering establishing a 
Global Positioning Satellite MEA along the affected segment of V-55 to 
allow properly equipped non-participating aircraft to fly the V-55 
ground track, but at a lower altitude.
    V-561 runs between Grand Forks, ND, and Jamestown, ND, with an MEA 
of 4,000 feet MSL along this segment of the airway. An average of two 
aircraft per day filed for V-561. When activated, the southeast corner 
of R-5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F encroach upon V-561 from 10,000 feet 
MSL-11,999 feet MSL, 12,000 feet MSL-13,999 feet MSL, or 14,000 feet 
MSL-17,999 feet MSL, respectively.
    V-169 runs between Devils Lake, ND, and Bismarck, ND, with an MEA 
of 3,500 feet MSL along this segment. The nearest point of any 
restricted area is 5 nautical miles (NM) from the centerline of V-169. 
Since Victor airways are 4 NM wide; the restricted areas do not 
encumber the use of V-169.
    The FAA acknowledges potential impacts to users on Victor airways 
V-55, V-170, and V-651 by the restricted areas established in this 
action.

[[Page 36911]]

However, based on the 13 total average daily flights filing for V-55, 
V-170, and V-651 in the same airspace as the proposed restricted area 
complex (V-169 is not affected by the proposed airspace), the impacts 
of the restricted areas on the three affected airways is considered 
minimal. These aircraft have air traffic control procedural 
alternatives available to include vectoring, altitude change, or re-
routing as appropriate.
    Nineteen commenters found that transcontinental and local area 
flights would be forced to deviate around restricted areas, increasing 
cost and flight time. The FAA understands that when the restricted 
areas are active, non-participation aircraft will have to accomplish 
course deviations or altitude changes for avoidance, which can increase 
distances flown and costs incurred. For this action, the FAA and USAF 
worked together to define the minimum airspace volume necessary to meet 
USAF training mission requirements and maximize airspace access to 
other users of the NAS. Reducing the overall size and internally 
segmenting and stratifying the complex have reduced course deviation 
distances and altitude changes required by non-participants to avoid 
active restricted areas. Additionally, the USAF as agreed to 
temporarily release active restricted airspace back to ZMP for non-
participant transit during non-routine/contingency events (i.e. due to 
weather, icing, aircraft malfunction, etc.). Air traffic in this part 
of the NAS is relatively light and the level of impact associated with 
establishing the restricted areas in this action is considered minimal 
when balanced against valid military training requirements.
    Twenty-four comments were received stating that four hours prior 
notice is insufficient lead time for activation by NOTAM, with most 
recommending that the prior notification time be increased to six 
hours. The FAA recognizes that many aircraft today have flight 
durations long enough that flight planning before takeoff may occur 
outside of the 4-hour window. Restricted areas provide protected 
airspace for hazardous operations with no option to transit when 
active, so changes in airspace status after flight planning would have 
an impact on routing or altitude. These impacts could be reduced by 
increasing the NOTAM notification time; therefore the proposed time of 
designation for R-5402 and R-5403A-F is amended to ``0700-2000 daily, 
by NOTAM 6 hours in advance; other times by NOTAM.''
    One commenter stated that the SUA should be limited to published 
times of designation or times that can be obtained through an Automated 
Flight Service Station (AFSS) or ZMP. The times of designation for the 
restricted areas conforms to FAA policy and provides military users the 
operational flexibility to adjust for unpredictable, yet expected 
events, such as poor weather conditions or aircraft maintenance delays. 
By establishing the restricted areas with a ``By NOTAM'' provision for 
activations, the AFSS will receive scheduled activation times at least 
6 hours in advance and can provide activation information when 
requested. Additionally, ZMP can provide the most current restricted 
areas status to airborne aircraft, workload permitting, as an 
additional service to any requesting IFR or VFR aircraft.
    Nineteen commenters contended that local and transient pilots would 
avoid the restricted areas regardless of the activation status. The FAA 
understands that some pilots may opt to avoid the vicinity of this 
proposed airspace complex; however, pilots have multiple ways to obtain 
SUA schedule information during preflight planning and while airborne 
to aid their situational awareness. Daily SUA schedules will be 
available on the sua.faa.gov Web site, NOTAMs will be issued at least 6 
hours prior to activating the restricted areas, and AFSS will brief SUA 
NOTAMS upon request. Airborne updates will also be available through 
ZMP or AFSS. Lastly, the USAF will provide a toll-free phone number for 
inclusion on aeronautical charts that will enable NAS users to contact 
the scheduling agency for SUA status information; similar to what is in 
place for the Adirondack SUA complex in New York.
    Two commenters requested that the FAA chart an ATC frequency for 
updates on the restricted areas. The FAA has frequencies listed on both 
the L-14 IFR Enroute Low Altitude Chart and the Twin Cities Sectional 
Aeronautical Chart already. Upon review, the VHF frequency listed on 
the IFR Enroute Low Altitude Chart near where R-5402 and R-5403A-F 
restricted areas will be established was found to be different than the 
frequency listed on the Sectional Aeronautical Chart listing of SUA for 
the existing R-5401 (which R-5402 and R-5403A-F will overlay). The FAA 
is taking action to correct the discrepancy so that matching 
frequencies are charted.
    Seventeen commenters stated that the NOTAM system is generally 
inadequate to inform users of SUA status, and the number of components 
to this restricted airspace would lead to intricate and confusing 
NOTAMs. The restricted area complex is comprised of 7 individual areas 
and structured to minimize complexity and maximize nonparticipant 
access when not required for military use during certain phases of a 
training mission. The overall complex configuration, with seven sub 
areas, is a reasonable balance between efficiency, complexity, and 
military requirements. The NOTAM system is designed to disseminate many 
types of aeronautical information, including restricted area status 
when activation is ``By NOTAM'' or outside published times of 
designation. Because of the ``By NOTAM'' provision in the legal 
description times of designation, activation NOTAMs for R-5402 and R-
5403A-F will be included in verbal briefings from AFSS, upon pilot 
request.

The Rule

    The FAA is amending 14 CFR part 73 to expand the vertical and 
lateral limits of restricted area airspace over the Camp Grafton Range 
to contain hazardous non-eye safe laser training operations being 
conducted by the emerging UAS mission at Grand Forks Air Force Base 
(AFB); thus, transforming the range into a viable non-eye safe laser 
training location. Camp Grafton Range is currently surrounded by R-
5401; however, the lateral boundaries and altitude are insufficient to 
contain the laser training mission profiles and tactics flown in combat 
operations today. This action supplements R-5401 by establishing 
additional restricted areas, R-5402, R-5403A, R-5403B, R-5403C, R-
5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F, to provide the vertical and lateral 
tactical maneuver airspace needed for UAS target acquisition prior to 
attack, and to contain the non-eye safe laser during laser target 
designation training operations from medium to high altitudes.
    The restricted area R-5402 is defined by a 7 nautical mile (NM) 
radius around the center of R-5401, with the northern boundary adjusted 
to lie along the 47[deg]45'00'' N latitude. The restricted area 
altitude is upward from 500 feet above ground level to, but not 
including 10,000 feet MSL. This new restricted area provides a pathway 
for the non-eye safe laser beam to transit from R-5403A, R-5403B, and 
R-5403C (described below) through the existing R-5401 and onto Camp 
Grafton Range.
    The restricted areas R-5403A, R-5403B, and R-5403C share the same 
lateral boundaries, overlying R-5402 and layered in ascending order. 
The northern boundary of these R-5403 areas, as described in the 
regulatory text, share the same northern boundary as R-5402, the 
47[deg]45'00'' N latitude. The

[[Page 36912]]

western boundary lies approximately 14 NM west of R-5402 along the 
99[deg]15'00'' W longitude and the eastern boundary lies approximately 
7 NM east of R-5402 along the 98[deg]15'00'' W longitude. Finally, the 
southern boundary is established to remain north of the protected 
airspace for V-55. The restricted area altitudes, in ascending order, 
are defined upward from 8,000 feet MSL to, but not including 10,000 
feet MSL for R-5403A; upward from 10,000 feet MSL to, but not including 
14,000 feet MSL for R-5403B; and upward from 14,000 feet MSL to, but 
not including Flight Level (FL) 180 for R-5403C. The additional lateral 
and vertical dimensions provided by these restricted areas, in 
conjunction with R-5401, R-5402, R-5403D, R-5403E, R-5403F, establish 
the maneuvering airspace needed for UAS aircraft to practice the 
tactical maneuvering and standoff target acquisition training 
requirements necessary for the combat tactics and mission profiles 
flown today and to contain the hazardous non-eye safe laser, when 
employed, completely within restricted airspace.
    The areas R-5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F also share the same lateral 
boundaries, adjacent to and southeast of R-5403A, R-5403B, and R-5403C, 
and are also layered in ascending order. The northern boundary of these 
R-5403 areas, as described in the regulatory text, shares the southern 
boundary of R-5403A, R-5403B, and R-5403C. The western boundary point 
reaches to the 99[deg]15'00'' W longitude and the eastern boundary lies 
along the 98[deg]15'00'' W longitude. Finally, the southern boundary is 
established to lie along the 47[deg]15'00'' N latitude. The restricted 
area altitudes, in ascending order, are defined upward from 10,000 feet 
MSL to, but not including 12,000 feet MSL for R-5403D; upward from 
12,000 feet MSL to, but not including 14,000 feet MSL for R-5403E; and 
upward from 14,000 feet MSL to, but not including Flight Level (FL) 180 
for R-5403F. The additional lateral and vertical dimensions provided by 
these restricted areas, in conjunction with R-5401, R-5402, R-5403A, R-
5403B, R-5403C, and the Camp Grafton Range, establish the maneuvering 
airspace, standoff target acquisition, and hazardous non-eye safe laser 
employment training completely within restricted airspace, as noted 
above.
    During the NPRM public comment period, it was realized that the 
proposal section of the NPRM preamble described the southern boundary 
for the proposed R-5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F to lay along the 
47[deg]30'00'' N latitude, in error. However, the regulatory text in 
the NPRM correctly described the southern boundary for these proposed 
restricted areas to lie along the 47[deg]15'00'' N latitude. This 
action confirms the southern boundary for R-5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F 
is along the 47[deg]15'00'' N latitude.
    Restricted areas R-5402, R-5403A, R-5403B, R-5403C, R-5403D, R-
5403E, and R-5403F are all designated as ``joint-use'' airspace. This 
means that, during periods when any of the restricted airspace areas 
are not needed by the using agency for its designated purposes, the 
airspace will be returned to the controlling agency for access by other 
NAS users. The Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center is the 
controlling agency for the restricted areas.
    Lastly, to prevent confusion and conflict by establishing the new 
restricted areas in an existing MOA, and having both SUA areas active 
in the same volume of airspace at the same time, the Devils Lake East 
MOA legal description is being amended in the NFDD. The Devils Lake 
East MOA amendment will exclude R-5401, R-5402, R-5403A, R-5403B, R-
5403C, R-5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F when the restricted areas are 
active. The intent is to exclude the restricted areas in Devils Lake 
East MOA individually as they are activated. This MOA amendment will 
prevent airspace conflict with overlapping special use airspace areas.

Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct 
that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon 
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. 
L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of 
regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act 
(Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create 
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In 
developing U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider 
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis 
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of 
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that 
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, 
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with 
base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's 
analysis of the economic impacts of this final rule.
    Department of Transportation Order DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies 
and procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations. 
If the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule 
does not warrant a full evaluation, this order permits that a statement 
to that effect and the basis for it to be included in the preamble if a 
full regulatory evaluation of the cost and benefits is not prepared. 
Such a determination has been made for this final rule. The reasoning 
for this determination follows:
    As presented in the discussion of comments section of this 
preamble, commenters stated that there could be the following potential 
adverse economic impacts from implementing this final rule: the rule 
will block V-170 and V-55 and limit the use of V-169 and V-561; VFR and 
local area flights will be forced to deviate around restricted areas, 
increasing cost and flight time; and the 500 feet AGL floor for R-5402 
will affect low level aerial operations such as crop dusters, wildlife 
and agricultural surveys, and emergency medical access.
    With respect to the first potential impact, as discussed in the 
preamble, the FAA acknowledges that users of Victor airways V-55, V-
170, and V-561 could be potentially affected when the restricted areas 
established in this action are active; however users of V-169 will not 
be affected at all. Users of V-170 from 1200 feet AGL to 8,000 feet MSL 
would be affected only when R-5402 is active. The FAA's has determined 
that there is an average of 4 flights per day between Devils Lake, ND, 
and Jamestown, ND. Of these flights, 90 percent are general aviation 
flights (many of them University of North Dakota training flights) and 
10 percent are military or air taxi flights. The potential effect on 
users of V-170 could be offset by several actions. One action would be 
to modify V-170 by creating a slight ``dogleg'' further west of R-5402 
to allow unimpeded use of V-170 below 8,000 feet MSL regardless of the 
status of R-5402. The FAA estimates that this ``dogleg'' would add 
about 5 miles to the length of the flight between Devils Lake and 
Jamestown. Another action would be for air traffic control to either 
vector the aircraft west of R-5402 or climb the aircraft to 8,000 feet 
MSL to avoid R-5402. V-170 above 8,000 feet MSL, V-55, and V-561 can 
still be used by the public, even during military training

[[Page 36913]]

operations, if the nonparticipant aircraft flies at a different 
altitude than the altitudes the military is using at that time. The FAA 
has determined that these adjustments will result in minimal cost to 
the affected operators.
    With respect to the second potential impact, with the exception of 
R-5402, the public will not be required to deviate around the 
restricted areas, even during military operations, as long as the 
nonparticipating aircraft flies at an altitude above or below the 
altitudes that the military is using at that time. The FAA has 
determined that these altitude adjustments will have a minimal effect 
on cost.
    With respect to the third potential impact, the USAF has agreed to 
implement scheduling coordination measures for R-5402 that will 
accommodate access by local farming, ranching, survey, and medical 
aviation interests. Further, when any of the restricted areas are not 
needed by the USAF for its intended purposes, the airspace will be 
returned to the controlling agency, Minneapolis Air Route Traffic 
Control Center, for access by other NAS users; providing considerable 
time for these interests to perform most of their aviation activities 
in a timely manner. The FAA has determined that these potential 
disruptions in public aviation will have a minimal effect on cost.
    The FAA has, therefore, determined that this final rule is not a 
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866, and is not ``significant'' as defined in DOT's 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA) 
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall 
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable 
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale 
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions 
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required 
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain 
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given 
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities, 
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small 
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must 
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the 
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not 
required. The certification must include a statement providing the 
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    The FAA received two comments from small business owners and a 
comment from the North Dakota Agricultural Aviation Association 
(NDAAA), representing agricultural aviation operators. The comments 
from the business owners expressed concerns about the availability of 
airspace and that they would be diverted from their normal flight 
plans, thereby increasing their costs. As previously stated in this 
preamble, however, these routes will not be closed even during military 
operations--they can be flown by nonparticipant aircraft so long as 
those aircraft are not at the altitudes being used by the military. The 
NDAAA comment that agricultural aircraft are frequently ferried at 
altitudes greater than 500 feet applies only to those aircraft in R-
5402--not in any of the other areas. As previously noted, the agreement 
with the USAF and the fact that there are no restrictions in R-5402 
when it is not being used by the military will minimize the potential 
economic impact to agricultural aviation operations in this airspace.
    While the FAA believes that one air taxi operator, a few small 
business operators, and a few agricultural aviation operators 
constitute a substantial number of small entities, based on the 
previous analysis, the FAA determined that the final rule will have a 
minimal economic impact.
    Therefore, as the acting FAA Administrator, I certify that this 
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.

International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic 
objective, such the protection of safety, and does not operate in a 
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has 
assessed the potential effect of this final rule and determined that it 
will have only a domestic impact and therefore no effect on 
international trade.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $143.1 million in lieu of $100 
million. This final rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore, 
the requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

Environmental Review

    Pursuant to Section 102(2) of the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969 (NEPA), the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations 
implementing NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), and other applicable law, 
the USAF prepared and published The BRAC Beddown and Flight Operations 
of Remotely Piloted Aircraft at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North 
Dakota'' dated July 2010 (hereinafter the FEIS) that analyzed the 
potential for environmental impacts associated with the proposed 
creation of Restricted Areas R-5402, R-5403A, R-5403B, R-5403C, R-
5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F. In September 2010, the USAF issued a 
Record of Decision based on the results of the FEIS. In accordance with 
applicable CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1501.6) and the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between FAA and Department of Defense (DOD) dated 
October 2005, the FAA was a cooperating agency on the FEIS. The FAA has 
conducted an independent review of the FEIS and found that it is an 
adequate statement. Pursuant to 40 CFR 1506.3(a) and (c), the FAA is 
adopting the portions of the FEIS for this action that support the 
establishment of the above named restricted areas. The FAA has 
documented its partial adoption in a separate document entitled 
``Partial Adoption of Final EIS and Record of

[[Page 36914]]

Decision for the Establishment of Restricted Areas R-5402 and 5403.'' 
This final rule, which establishes restricted areas R-5402, R-5403A, R-
5403B, R-5403C, R-5403D, R-5403E, and R-5403F, will not result in 
significant environmental impacts. A copy of the FAA Partial Adoption 
of FEIS and ROD has been placed in the public docket for this 
rulemaking and is incorporated by reference.

FAA Authority

    The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is 
found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's 
authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section, the 
FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of the 
airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient 
use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that authority 
as it establishes restricted area airspace at Camp Grafton Range, near 
Devils Lake, ND, to enhance safety and accommodate essential military 
training.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 73

    Airspace, Prohibited areas, Restricted areas.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends 14 CFR part 73 as follows:

PART 73--SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE

0
1. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40113, 40120; E.O. 10854, 
24 FR 9565, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 389.

Sec.  73.54  [Amended]

0
2. Section 73.54 is amended as follows:
* * * * *

R-5402 Devils Lake, ND [New]

    Boundaries. Beginning at lat. 47[deg]45'00'' N., long. 
98[deg]47'19'' W.; to lat. 47[deg]45'00'' N., long. 98[deg]31'25'' 
W.; then clockwise on a 7 NM arc centered on lat. 47[deg]40'31'' N., 
long. 98[deg]39'22'' W.; to the point of beginning, excluding the 
airspace within R-5401 when active, and R-5403A when active.
    Designated altitudes. 500 feet AGL to, but not including, 10,000 
feet MSL.
    Time of designation. 0700-2000 daily, by NOTAM 6 hours in 
advance; other times by NOTAM.
    Controlling agency. FAA, Minneapolis ARTCC.
    Using agency. U.S. Air Force, 119th Operations Support Squadron, 
Hector International Airport, Fargo, ND.
* * * * *

R-5403A Devils Lake, ND [New]

    Boundaries. Beginning at lat. 47[deg]45'00'' N., long. 
99[deg]15'00'' W.; to lat. 47[deg]45'00'' N., long. 98[deg]15'00'' 
W.; to lat. 47[deg]35'39'' N., long. 98[deg]15'00'' W.; to lat. 
47[deg]15'00'' N., long. 99[deg]15'00'' W.; to the point of 
beginning.
    Designated altitudes. 8,000 feet MSL to, but not including, 
10,000 feet MSL.
    Time of designation. 0700-2000 daily, by NOTAM 6 hours in 
advance; other times by NOTAM.
    Controlling agency. FAA, Minneapolis ARTCC.
    Using agency. U.S. Air Force, 119th Operations Support Squadron, 
Hector International Airport, Fargo, ND.

R-5403B Devils Lake, ND [New]

    Boundaries. Beginning at lat. 47[deg]45'00'' N., long. 
99[deg]15'00'' W.; to lat. 47[deg]45'00'' N., long. 98[deg]15'00'' 
W.; to lat. 47[deg]35'39'' N., long. 98[deg]15'00'' W.; to lat. 
47[deg]15'00'' N., long. 99[deg]15'00'' W.; to the point of 
beginning.
    Designated altitudes. 10,000 feet MSL to, but not including, 
14,000 feet MSL.
    Time of designation. 0700-2000 daily, by NOTAM 6 hours in 
advance; other times by NOTAM.
    Controlling agency. FAA, Minneapolis ARTCC.
    Using agency. U.S. Air Force, 119th Operations Support Squadron, 
Hector International Airport, Fargo, ND.

R-5403C Devils Lake, ND [New]

    Boundaries. Beginning at lat. 47[deg]45'00'' N., long. 
99[deg]15'00'' W.; to lat. 47[deg]45'00'' N., long. 98[deg]15'00'' 
W.; to lat. 47[deg]35'39'' N., long. 98[deg]15'00'' W.; to lat. 
47[deg]15'00'' N., long. 99[deg]15'00'' W.; to the point of 
beginning.
    Designated altitudes. 14,000 feet MSL to, but not including, FL 
180.
    Time of designation. 0700-2000 daily, by NOTAM 6 hours in 
advance; other times by NOTAM.
    Controlling agency. FAA, Minneapolis ARTCC.
    Using agency. U.S. Air Force, 119th Operations Support Squadron, 
Hector International Airport, Fargo, ND.

R-5403D Devils Lake, ND [New]

    Boundaries. Beginning at lat. 47[deg]35'39'' N., long. 
98[deg]15'00'' W.; to lat. 47[deg]15'00'' N., long. 98[deg]15'00'' 
W.; to lat. 47[deg]15'00'' N., long. 99[deg]15'00'' W.; to the point 
of beginning.
    Designated altitudes. 10,000 feet MSL to, but not including, 
12,000 feet MSL.
    Time of designation. 0700-2000 daily, by NOTAM 6 hours in 
advance; other times by NOTAM.
    Controlling agency. FAA, Minneapolis ARTCC.
    Using agency. U.S. Air Force, 119th Operations Support Squadron, 
Hector International Airport, Fargo, ND.

R-5403E Devils Lake, ND [New]

    Boundaries. Beginning at lat. 47[deg]35'39'' N., long. 
98[deg]15'00'' W.; to lat. 47[deg]15'00'' N., long. 98[deg]15'00'' 
W.; to lat. 47[deg]15'00'' N., long. 99[deg]15'00'' W.; to the point 
of beginning.
    Designated altitudes. 12,000 feet MSL to, but not including, 
14,000 feet MSL.
    Time of designation. 0700-2000 daily, by NOTAM 6 hours in 
advance; other times by NOTAM.
    Controlling agency. FAA, Minneapolis ARTCC.
    Using agency. U.S. Air Force, 119th Operations Support Squadron, 
Hector International Airport, Fargo, ND.

R-5403F Devils Lake, ND [New]

    Boundaries. Beginning at lat. 47[deg]35'39'' N., long. 
98[deg]15'00'' W.; to lat. 47[deg]15'00'' N., long. 98[deg]15'00'' 
W.; to lat. 47[deg]15'00'' N., long. 99[deg]15'00'' W.; to the point 
of beginning.
    Designated altitudes. 14,000 feet MSL to, but not including, FL 
180.
    Time of designation. 0700-2000 daily, by NOTAM 6 hours in 
advance; other times by NOTAM.
    Controlling agency. FAA, Minneapolis ARTCC.
    Using agency. U.S. Air Force, 119th Operations Support Squadron, 
Hector International Airport, Fargo, ND.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on June 14, 2012.
Paul Gallant,
Acting Manager, Airspace, Regulations and ATC Procedures Group.
[FR Doc. 2012-15008 Filed 6-19-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P