Weite Bereiche der bundesdeutschen Gesellschaft wurden von der Stasi unterwandert. Ihre “Quellen” in Politik, Militär, Wirtschaft, Medien oder Wissenschaft … Wie die Financial Times Deutschland berichtet, arbeiten noch immer rund 17.000 ehemalige Mitarbeiter des DDR-Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit im Öffentlichen Dienst der Bundesrepublik. Die Überprüfungen nach der Wende seien zu standardisiert und oberflächlich.
Die Stasi und ihr Bürokraten-Deutsch. In den Akten finden sich verschiedene Varianten von Inoffiziellen Mitarbeitern (IM). Darunter sind die IMA („Ausländer”, „Arbeitsakte”), IMB („mit Feindberührung”), IME („im besonderen Einsatz”), IMK („Sicherung der Konspiration”), IMS („beauftragt mit der Sicherung eines gesellschaftlichen Bereichs”), IMV („vertrauliche Beziehungen zur bearbeitenden Person”), FIM („Führungs-IM”) PIM („Perspektiv-IM”), SIM („Sicherungs-IM”). Auch andere Abkürzungen bedürfen der Übersetzung. DB „Durchführungsbestimmung”), LAP („legal abgedeckte Position”), KgU („Kampftruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit”), KPA („Kontaktperson-Akte”), KW („konspirative Wohnung”), OibE („Offizier im besonderen Einsatz”), Tb („Tonband”), VVS („Vertrauliche Verschlusssache”). Sogar die Stasi selbst bekommt von MfSMitarbeitern einen eigenen Namen. Bei ihnen heißt sie ganz einfach „Firma”.
Besonders betroffen: Die Finanz- und Immobilienbranche
German intelligence is sharing large swathes of telecommunications data with the US – according to latest revelations published in Der Spiegel magazine. Documents provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden show that the degree of surveillance cooperation between Berlin and Washington is higher than officials would like to admit. READ MORE: http://on.rt.com/ar77zw
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Instruction O-5100.94: Oversight, Coordination, Assessment, and Reporting of DoD Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Sensitive Activities
- 9 pages
- For Official Use Only
- September 27, 2011
1. USD(I). The USD(I) shall provide a quarterly report to the congressional intelligence, appropriations, and armed services committees, including the information required by section 8062 of Public Law 112-10 (Reference (m)); DoD oversight and senior Executive Branch officials; and designated leaders of the Intelligence Community. This report is commonly referred to as the “Clandestine Quarterly Activities Report” (CQ) and is comprised of information from DoD Components regarding intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities conducted during the previous fiscal quarter.
2. DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (DUSD(I&S)). The DUSD(I&S), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), shall:
a. Develop and coordinate policy and oversee policy implementation for DoD intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities in accordance with References (a), (b), (c), and this Instruction.
b. Coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)) for sensitive special operations CQ submissions and other staff actions related to intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.
c. Coordinate with the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Special Operations and Counterterrorism (J37) for staff actions related to intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.
d. Review and edit CQ submissions, to include the counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) CQ submissions from the Defense CI and HUMINT Center (DCHC); compile and distribute the CQ to meet congressional and DoD requirements.
e. Assess the effectiveness of activities in the CQ and provide recommendations to senior leaders.
f. Monitor all ongoing and planned DoD intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.
g. Conduct oversight reviews of DoD cover programs in accordance with Reference (c) and participate in oversight reviews of other DoD intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.
h. Establish procedures to fulfill the duties and responsibilities outlined in this Instruction that facilitate reviews across classification compartments.
i. Develop and maintain the automated architecture and processes to archive, rapidly retrieve, and coordinate information related to DoD intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.
j. Develop and coordinate agreements with other U.S. Government agencies to facilitate DoD intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.
k. Implement procedures to allow Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) functional directorates to review and comment on CQ submissions as part of the editing process.
3. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA). The Director, DIA, under the authority, direction, and control of USD(I) and through the Director, DCHC, shall:
a. Compile and review DoD Component CI and HUMINT CQ submissions.
b. Forward a consolidated CQ submission for the preceding fiscal quarter simultaneously to the OUSD(I) Sensitive Activities Directorate and the OUSD(I) HUMINT and CI Directorate not later than February 8, May 8, August 8, and November 8, respectively. Submit reports in the format outlined in the appendix to this enclosure.
4. ASD(SO/LIC&IC). The ASD(SO/LIC&IC), under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall prepare and submit a report summarizing DoD theater special operations forces sensitive activities for the preceding fiscal quarter to the OUSD(I) Sensitive Activities Directorate not later than January 18, April 18, July 18, and October 18, respectively. Submit reports in the format outlined in the appendix to this enclosure.
5. ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (ATSD(IO)). The ATSD(IO) shall exercise oversight responsibilities for intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities in accordance with References (g), (i), and (j).
6. HEADS OF THE DoD COMPONENTS. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
a. Report DoD intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities, other than CI and HUMINT activities, for the preceding fiscal quarter to the OUSD(I) Sensitive Activities Directorate not later than January 18, April 18, July 18, and October 18, respectively. Submit reports in the format outlined in the appendix to this enclosure.
b. Report CI and HUMINT CQ activities to the Director, DCHC, in accordance with Reference (c) and DoD Instructions S-5240.09 and S-5200.42 (References (n) and (o)). Submit reports to the Director, DCHC, in the format outlined in the appendix to this enclosure not later than January 18, April 18, July 18, and October 18, respectively.
c. Report significant changes that may emerge in the interval between CQ reports simultaneously to the DCHC and the OUSD(I) Sensitive Activities Directorate as soon as they are identified.
The Camorra, the Naples mafia, is Italy’s bloodiest organised crime syndicate. It has killed thousands and despite suffering many setbacks is as strong as ever. It is into drug trafficking, racketeering, business, politics, toxic waste and even the garbage disposal industry. Naples’s recent waste crisis was in part blamed on the crime syndicate. Its grip on the city is far reaching.
Talking to Camorra insiders who have never spoken to the media before, and drawing on interviews with Camorra victims who are fighting back, reporter Mark Franchetti investigates Italy’s deadliest mafia to learn how it has survived so long in a country at the heart of Europe and what it will take to defeat it.
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
- 446 pages
- June 2011
This study evaluates the oversight of national security and intelligence agencies by parliaments and specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies, with a view to identifying good practices that can inform the European Parliament’s approach to strengthening the oversight of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and, to a lesser extent, Sitcen. The study puts forward a series of detailed recommendations (including in the field of access to classified information) that are formulated on the basis of in-depth assessments of: (1) the current functions and powers of these four bodies; (2) existing arrangements for the oversight of these bodies by the European Parliament, the Joint Supervisory Bodies and national parliaments; and (3) the legal and institutional frameworks for parliamentary and specialised oversight of security and intelligence agencies in EU Member States and other major democracies.
Access to and the protection of classified information by the European Parliament
As this study’s analysis of oversight of intelligence agencies at the national level demonstrates, information is the oxygen that sustains oversight; a mandate to oversee an agency’s work is of limited use unless it is accompanied by access to the relevant information. It will be extremely difficult to strengthen parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ bodies without clear and predictable rules and procedures for the EP to access relevant information from these bodies, the Commission and the Council. While access to relevant information is fundamental to oversight, the professional handling of this information by overseers is also crucial for effective oversight. Accordingly, improved access to classified information by the EP will need to be accompanied by the development of appropriate procedures for the protection of this information, as well as an ongoing commitment from MEPs to handle classified information in a professional manner.
Improving the European Parliament’s access to classified information in the AFSJ
The development of an appropriate legal and institutional framework for parliamentary access to classified information is of fundamental importance to strengthening the EP’s oversight of the AFSJ bodies. The discussion of the EP’s access to classified information must take place alongside deliberations on the evolution of the EP’s mandate to oversee the AFSJ bodies; indeed, we have argued throughout this study that an oversight body’s information needs are inextricably linked to its mandate. Yet, regardless of which aspects of the AFSJ bodies’ work the EP wishes to oversee and which institutional mechanism is chosen to carry out this oversight (see below for a discussion of these mechanisms), access to relevant classified information will be crucial. This is because various aspects of the work of AFSJ bodies are classified and/or involve the processing or creation of classified information.
Parliamentary access to classified information is currently being discussed in the context of deliberations regarding the revision of Regulation 1049—legislation which is ostensibly about public access to information from EU entities. The EP’s rapporteur on this matter, Michael Cashman, has opted to include provisions on parliamentary access to information in the broader draft legal framework for public access to EU documents. This approach has several advantages. First, it is aimed at ensuring that there is a general framework for the EP’s access to classified information from all EU entities and across all policy domains. This may be preferable to a fragmented legal framework for parliamentary access to information based on inter-institutional agreements across different fields. The effects of this current framework are that the EP has access to classified information from, e.g., the Council, in some fields but not others and that different modalities apply to access classified information in different policy domains. Second, the inclusion of provisions on the EP’s access to classified information as part of broader legislation on public access to information could help to ensure that these rules have the status of legislation rather than being enshrined in inter-institutional agreements, which are of a subordinate legal status. In spite of these advantages, we are of the view that parliamentary access to classified information should be decoupled from provisions on public access to information. This is supported by practice on the national level, where freedom of/access to information laws are separated entirely from regulations on parliamentary access to information. Parliamentary access to classified information implies access to the specific categories of information which are justifiably exempt from public access, e.g., information regarding the work of intelligence agencies. It is precisely because such information is beyond the reach of public access that it must be available to certain parliamentarians and institutions established by parliaments for overseeing, inter alia, intelligence agencies. In almost every state analysed in this study, parliaments have privileged access to classified information to, among other things, enable to them oversee intelligence activities. This is premised on the notion that parliamentarians are elected by a population to hold governments and their agencies to account. In order to do this, they require privileged access to information which is not necessarily available to members of the public. Therefore, rules governing parliamentary access to classified information are set out in law and are disconnected for general freedom of/access to information laws.
Recommendation 11: New regulations on the European Parliament’s access to classified information should be decoupled from legislation on public access to information.
4.1.1. The rationale for oversight of intelligence agencies
Many states created parliamentary and other specialised bodies to oversee intelligence agencies in light of revelations about their involvement in illegal and/or improper activities, e.g., Canada, the Czech Republic, Norway, Poland, South Africa, and the US. Notably, during or immediately after the Cold War, it became clear that in many Western states, governments had used intelligence agencies to surveil and disrupt persons involved in legitimate expressions of the rights to freedom of association, assembly and expression. Elsewhere, intelligence agencies were found to have exceeded their legal mandates and powers in tackling domestic terrorism. Perhaps the egregious violations of human rights by intelligence agencies took place in communist/authoritarian regimes, where intelligence agencies were an integral part of the repressive state apparatuses which permeated all areas of society. Against this backdrop, effective oversight (and legal regulation) of intelligence agencies came to be seen as essential for ensuring that they contribute to the security of the populations they serve without undermining democratic processes and human rights. That is, to ‘secure democracy against internal and external enemies without destroying democracy in the process’. Needless to say, the development of oversight of the EU’s AFSJ bodies is taking place in a vastly different climate from the types of conditions that led to the establishment of oversight bodies on the national level. Arguments for robust oversight of intelligence agencies can be distilled into five main areas.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the law gives most intelligence agencies powers that permit them to restrict human rights and which, if misused, could result in the violation of human rights. Indeed, as Canada’s Justice O’Connor stated in the Arar Inquiry: ‘national security activities involve the most intrusive powers of the state: electronic surveillance; search, seizure and forfeiture of property; information collection and exchange with domestic and foreign security intelligence and law enforcement agencies; and, potentially, the detention of and prosecution of individuals’. Intelligence agencies are necessarily given a considerable amount of discretion in their use of intelligence collection powers, which increases the scope for such powers to be misused. In view of this, oversight is necessary to help ensure that such powers are used in accordance with national and international law.
Second, on a national level, the political misuse of intelligence agencies has always been a risk, primarily because these agencies can be used to unlawfully gather information about political opponents. Oversight is seen to be an essential safeguard against incumbent governments using intelligence agencies to protect or promote party political interests. This is less of a concern at the EU level because there is not the same direct relationship of control between the executive and the agencies. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that 27 Member States, the Commission and Council are all involved in the political control of these agencies means that there are in-built checks and balances against there (mis)use by any one party or interest group.
Third, the secrecy surrounding national intelligence agencies shields them from the processes of public accountability which apply to public bodies in democracies. For example, these agencies are not usually particularly open with the media and are often exempt from freedom of information legislation. This makes it difficult for the media, civil society organisations and the public more generally to scrutinise the intelligence agencies’ work. This further increases the need for oversight by independent bodies that have access to information not available to the general public.
Fourth, in common with all public bodies, intelligence agencies are funded with public money and should therefore be held to account for their use of this money. There is particular need for oversight given that intelligence agencies are normally authorised to make secret payments to covert agents. The potential for the inappropriate use of money is heightened in this area. Robust oversight is necessary to ensure that intelligence agencies use public money lawfully and efficiently.
Finally, while oversight is often seen as necessary to guard against the misuse of, and abuse by, intelligence agencies, it also helps to ensure that these agencies fulfil their mandates effectively. Intelligence agencies are, inter alia, entrusted with collecting, analysing and disseminating information about very serious threats to national security and public safety, such as terrorism. The executive and other agencies, such as the police, rely on the information provided by intelligence agencies to take action to combat these threats. Failures by intelligence agencies to perform such functions effectively, e.g., by missing information indicating a terrorist attack, can have catastrophic consequences.
Independent oversight of the work of intelligence agencies helps to ensure that they are as effective as possible.
Adventurer and journalist Simon Reeve heads to Cuba to find a communist country in the middle of a capitalist revolution. Two years ago Cuba announced the most sweeping and radical economic reforms the country has seen in decades. From ending state rationing to cutting one million public-sector jobs, one of the last communist bastions in the world has begun rolling back the state on an unprecedented scale. Simon Reeve meets ordinary Cubans whose lives are being transformed, from the owners of fledgling businesses to the newly rich estate agents selling properties worth up to 750,000 pounds.
In this hour-long documentary for the BBC’s award-winning This World strand, Simon gets under the skin of a colourful and vibrant country famous for its hospitality and humour and asks if this new economic openness could lead to political liberalisation in a totalitarian country with a poor human rights record. Will Cuba be able to maintain the positive aspects of its long isolation under socialism – low crime, top-notch education and one of the best health systems in the world – while embracing what certainly looks like capitalism? Is this the last chance to see Cuba before it becomes just like any other country?
ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
- 23 pages
- August 9, 2013
This white paper explains the Government’s legal basis for an intelligence collection program under which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains court orders directing certain telecommunications service providers to produce telephony metadata in bulk. The bulk metadata is stored, queried and analyzed by the National Security Agency (NSA) for counterterrorism purposes. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“the FISC” or “the Court”) authorizes this program under the “business records” provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1861, enacted as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 215). The Court first authorized the program in 2006, and it has since been renewed thirty-four times under orders issued by fourteen different FISC judges. This paper explains why the telephony metadata collection program, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Court, is consistent with the Constitution and the standards set forth by Congress in Section 215. Because aspects of this program remain classified, there are limits to what can be said publicly about the facts underlying its legal authorization. This paper is an effort to provide as much information as possible to the public concerning the legal authority for this program, consistent with the need to protect national security, including intelligence sources and methods. While this paper summarizes the legal basis for the program, it is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the program or the legal arguments or authorities in support of it.
Under the telephony metadata collection program, telecommunications service providers, as required by court orders issued by the FISC, produce to the Government certain information about telephone calls, principally those made within the United States and between the United States and foreign countries. This information is limited to telephony metadata, which includes information about what telephone numbers were used to make and receive the calls, when the calls took place, and how long the calls lasted. Importantly, this information does not include any information about the content of those calls—the Government cannot, through this program, listen to or record any telephone conversations.
This telephony metadata is important to the Government because, by analyzing it, the Government can determine whether known or suspected terrorist operatives have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in terrorist activities, including persons and activities within the United States. The program is carefully limited to this purpose: it is not lawful for anyone to query the bulk telephony metadata for any purpose other than counterterrorism, and Court-imposed rules strictly limit all such queries. The program includes internal oversight mechanisms to prevent misuse, as well as external reporting requirements to the FISC and Congress.
Multiple FISC judges have found that Section 215 authorizes the collection of telephony metadata in bulk. Section 215 permits the FBI to seek a court order directing a business or other entity to produce records or documents when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation of international terrorism. Courts have held in the analogous contexts of civil discovery and criminal and administrative investigations that “relevance” is a broad standard that permits discovery of large volumes of data in circumstances where doing so is necessary to identify much smaller amounts of information within that data that directly bears on the matter being investigated. Although broad in scope, the telephony metadata collection program meets the “relevance” standard of Section 215 because there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that this category of data, when queried and analyzed consistent with the Court-approved standards, will produce information pertinent to FBI investigations of international terrorism, and because certain analytic tools used to accomplish this objective require the collection and storage of a large volume of telephony metadata. This does not mean that Section 215 authorizes the collection and storage of all types of information in bulk: the relevance of any particular data to investigations of international terrorism depends on all the facts and circumstances. For example, communications metadata is different from many other kinds of records because it is inter-connected and the connections between individual data points, which can be reliably identified only through analysis of a large volume of data, are particularly important to a broad range of investigations of international terrorism.
Moreover, information concerning the use of Section 215 to collect telephony metadata in bulk was made available to all Members of Congress, and Congress reauthorized Section 215 without change after this information was provided. It is significant to the legal analysis of the statute that Congress was on notice of this activity and of the source of its legal authority when the statute was reauthorized.
The telephony metadata collection program also complies with the Constitution. Supreme Court precedent makes clear that participants in telephone calls lack a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment in the telephone numbers used to make and receive their calls. Moreover, particularly given the Court-imposed restrictions on accessing and disseminating the data, any arguable privacy intrusion arising from the collection of telephony metadata would be outweighed by the public interest in identifying suspected terrorist operatives and thwarting terrorist plots, rendering the program reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, the program does not violate the First Amendment, particularly given that the telephony metadata is collected to serve as an investigative tool in authorized investigations of international terrorism.
Instruction 5110.11: Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)
For Official Use Only
October 4, 2010
a. (FOUO) The mission of RRMC is to support the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, select DoD Components and, as appropriate, non-DoD agencies of the Federal Government, and to enable the execution of DoD mission-essential functions (MEFs) in accordance with Reference (c), DoDD S-5100.44 (Reference (g)), and continuity of operations (COOP) plans and operational orders. (See Glossary for definition of RRMC.)
b. (FOUO) Facility, information technology (IT), security, and other supporting capabilities at RRMC shall be managed in accordance with the policies and procedures established for operation and management of the Pentagon Reservation under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, through the Director of Administration and Management (DA&M).
c. (FOUO) The RRMC concept of operations (CONOPS), including the required capabilities and priorities for RRMC support to DoD MEFs, shall be established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
d. RRMC shall be commanded by a commissioned officer in the grade of Colonel, or Captain in the Navy. The position shall be filled on a rotational basis by the Military Departments as set forth in Enclosure 2.
e. RRMC tenants shall coordinate their use of allocated space, including facility and IT plans and requirements, with the Commander, RRMC, and the Director, WHS, to ensure the consistent and effective implementation of DoD COOP policies and plans, and the efficient use of RRMC space and infrastructure.
f. All personnel present on RRMC, including tenant personnel, visitors, and contractors, shall be subject to the orders of the Commander, RRMC, consistent with the Commander’s assigned responsibilities in accordance with section 2 of Enclosure 2.
1. DIRECTOR, WHS. The Director, WHS, under the authority, direction, and control of the DA&M, shall:
a. (FOUO) Provide oversight for the operation, management, renovation, and construction of RRMC and shall exercise the authorities of the Secretary of Defense relating to RRMC, as delegated to the DA&M, in accordance with References (a) and (b).
b. Provide for the ongoing transformation and improvement of RRMC into a fully integrated, unified DoD enterprise that provides dedicated support to DoD MEFs.
c. Maintain an RRMC Annex to the Pentagon Reservation Master Plan. This plan shall serve as a guide for future RRMC modifications and shall reflect the WHS Capital Investment Strategy for RRMC.
d. Select the Commander, RRMC in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
e. Develop guidance for RRMC space allocation and use in accordance with the RRMC CONOPS and in coordination with the USD(P) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
f. Provide oversight, direction, and control of RRMC space allocation and use.
g. Approve budgetary resources for RRMC to include operating and capital budgets, capital equipment purchases, capital improvement projects, and military construction projects for inclusion in the RRMC Annex to the Pentagon Reservation Master Plan.
h. Provide full-service industrial hygiene program support to RRMC in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6055.05 (Reference (h)) and food safety and sanitation services in accordance with DoDI 1338.10 (Reference (i)).
2. COMMANDER, RRMC. The Commander, RRMC, under the authority, direction, and control of the Director, WHS, shall command RRMC and organize and manage its assigned military and civilian personnel, units, and other resources to ensure RRMC is postured to accomplish its mission, responsibilities, and functions prescribed in this Instruction, and shall:
a. Manage the organizational and staff elements of RRMC, consistent with regulations and with policies and procedures established for the operation, management, and security of the Pentagon Reservation.
b. Exercise overall authority and responsibility for the operation, management, IT, information management (IM), security, and force protection of RRMC for RRMC tenants.
c. Collaborate with the Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA), to develop, coordinate, and execute comprehensive planning, training, and exercises necessary to protect RRMC. Planning shall include security force requirements, to include augmentation forces, and contingency plans for hostage situations, bomb threats, civil disturbances, and actions to withstand or repel penetration and seizure efforts by militants, terrorists, unlawful demonstrators, or other criminal elements.
d. (FOUO) Develop, coordinate, and execute comprehensive planning, training, and exercises necessary to achieve and maintain the capability to support the execution of DoD MEFs in an all-hazards threat environment.
e. (FOUO) On order, perform joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI).
f. (FOUO) Exercise overall on-site responsibility for antiterrorism and force protection, physical security, fire protection and emergency services, law enforcement, and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) defense to ensure that RRMC can continue operations in the event of a national security emergency.
g. Plan, program, and budget for the operation and management of RRMC in accordance with guidance provided by the WHS Financial Management Directorate. Coordinate RRMC common IT, IM, and telecommunications infrastructure and systems budgetary requirements through the Director, RRMC IT, and the OSD Chief Information Officer (CIO) and in coordination with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (ASD(NII))/DoD CIO).
h. Exercise overall on-site responsibility for common IT support and IM services. This includes but shall not be limited to telecommunications, automation, visual information, IM control, and related information systems security.
i. (FOUO) Provide goods and services in accordance with the standards in the WHS RRMC publication (Reference (j)) in support of RRMC tenants. Acquire support from other DoD activities when in-house capabilities do not exist or when support can be obtained more efficiently or effectively from other existing DoD capabilities. Provide and maintain installation food service operations capable of supporting all military and civilian personnel in an all-hazards threat environment, to include all contingency situations, surges, operations, and exercises.
j. Coordinate with the Director, PFPA, in:
(1) Selecting the Director of RRMC Force Protection and Emergency Services (FP&ES) and rating the performance of that official. (The Director, PFPA, shall review the performance of that official pursuant to paragraph 5.d. of this enclosure.)
(2) Resourcing and staffing the PFPA detachment.
k. Provide intermediate rater input to the Army on the performance of the Director, RRMC IT.
l. Provide base operations support to elements of the PFPA detachment assigned to perform the force protection mission at RRMC in accordance with Reference (j).
m. Provide base operations support to Operating Location Alpha, Air Force Operations Group (OL-A, AFOG), and provide sufficient internal and external workspaces to allow OL-A, AFOG, to meet weather support requirements.