KGB – Microwaves Harassment & Mind-Control Experimentation – Original Document

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Scientists Believe US Embassy Staff and CIA Officers Were Hit With  High-Power Microwaves – Here's How the Weapons Work
Page 318 of Pages from WALTMAN.pdf
Continue reading “KGB – Microwaves Harassment & Mind-Control Experimentation – Original Document”

US Intelligence Report About Soviet Use Of Assassination & Kidnapping – Original Document

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

The Trotsky Assassination - HISTORY
The Trotzki Murder
Page 1 of ITEM PREPARED FOR THE WARREN COMMISSION BY SR/CI/RESEARCH ENTITLED "SOVIET USE OF ASSASSINATION AND KIDNAPPING."
Continue reading “US Intelligence Report About Soviet Use Of Assassination & Kidnapping – Original Document”

Stasi Note On Meeting Between Minister Mielke And KGB Chairman Andropov – Original Document

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Continue reading “Stasi Note On Meeting Between Minister Mielke And KGB Chairman Andropov – Original Document”

Top Secret Internal KGB Document – “Adviser” – Survey Of The Topic False-Flag Recruitment – Original Document

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

Er setzte einen DDR-Professor unter Druck: Zu seiner Zeit als KGB-Agent:  Putin wollte alles über tödliche Gifte wissen - FOCUS Online

Comrade Putin

Continue reading “Top Secret Internal KGB Document – “Adviser” – Survey Of The Topic False-Flag Recruitment – Original Document”

Internal KGB Document Exposed – Top Secret In Russian Language

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

Putin and his former KGB Boss in Dresden, Lasar Matwejew
Continue reading “Internal KGB Document Exposed – Top Secret In Russian Language”

Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 6 – Merkel & Schnur Under Pressure

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

Why Has Angela Merkel Staked Her Legacy on the Refugees? - DER SPIEGEL

„Der Zorn des nach staatlicher Einheit schreienden Volkes entlud sich daher erneut gegen jene, deren »Schild und Schwert« einmal das MfS gewesen war und die nun in den nicht unbegründeten Verdacht gerieten, dass dies jetzt nicht anders sein würde. In den Städten des ganzen Landes demonstrierten Anfang Januar wiederum Hunderttausende und verlangten den Rücktritt des SED-Vorsitzenden Gysi. »Säuberungen«, denen die letzten Parteifunktionäre aus der Honecker-Ära zum Opfer fielen, änderten nichts am Unmut der Bevölkerung. Erst als – vom Neuen Forum organisiert – am 15. Januar Bürgerbewegte, darunter auch Aktivisten des Demokratischen Aufbruchs, die Berliner Stasizentrale stürmten und das Fernsehen der DDR darüber mit Sondersendungen berichtete, beruhigte sich die Volksseele wieder. Was die Menschen damals nicht wussten: Es war alles nur eine Inszenierung.[49] Tatsächlich arbeitete der Geheimdienst bis tief in den Sommer 1990 hinein unbehelligt weiter.“

Auszug aus: Reuth, Ralf Georg. „Das erste Leben der Angela M. (German Edition).“

“The anger of the people, who were crying out for national unity, was therefore once again discharged against those whose“ shield and sword ”had once been the Stasi and who now came under the not unfounded suspicion that this would not be any different now. Hundreds of thousands again demonstrated in cities across the country at the beginning of January and demanded the resignation of SED chairman Gysi. “Purges”, to which the last party functionaries from the Honecker era fell victim, did nothing to change the resentment of the population. It was only when, on January 15, organized by the New Forum, citizens’ movements, including activists of the Democratic Awakening, stormed the Berlin Stasi headquarters and the GDR television reported about it with special programs, did the people’s soul calm down again. What people didn’t know at the time: It was all just a production. [49] In fact, the secret service continued to work well into the summer of 1990. “

Excerpt from: Reuth, Ralf Georg. “The first life of Angela M. (German Edition).”

Continue reading “Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 6 – Merkel & Schnur Under Pressure”

Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – Von Geheimnissen Verführt: In Der Spy-Tech-Welt Der Stasi – 1

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

More fascinating than fiction, Seduced by Secrets takes the reader inside the real world of one of the most effective and feared spy agencies in history. The book reveals, for the first time, the secret technical methods and sources of the Stasi (East German Ministry for State Security) as it stole secrets from abroad and developed gadgets at home, employing universal, highly guarded techniques often used by other spy and security agencies. Seduced by Secrets draws on secret files from the Stasi archives, including CIA-acquired material, interviews and friendships, court documents, and unusual visits to spy sites, including “breaking into” a prison, to demonstrate that the Stasi overestimated the power of secrets to solve problems and created an insular spy culture more intent on securing its power than protecting national security. It recreates the Stasi’s secret world of technology through biographies of agents, defectors, and officers and by visualizing James Bond–like techniques and gadgets. In this highly original book, Kristie Macrakis adds a new dimension to our understanding of the East German Ministry for State Security by bringing the topic into the realm of espionage history and exiting the political domain.

• Reveals previously secret methods and sources used by all spy agencies
• Includes visits to spy sites
• Reveals formulas and methods for invisible ink for the first time

Seduced by Secrets ist faszinierender als Fiktion und entführt den Leser in die reale Welt einer der effektivsten und gefürchtetsten Spionageagenturen der Geschichte. Das Buch enthüllt zum ersten Mal die geheimen technischen Methoden und Quellen der Stasi (Ostdeutsches Ministerium für Staatssicherheit), die Geheimnisse aus dem Ausland stahl und Geräte im Inland entwickelte, wobei universelle, streng gehütete Techniken eingesetzt wurden, die häufig von anderen Spionen und Spionage-Agenturen verwendet werden. Seduced by Secrets stützt sich auf geheime Akten aus den Stasi-Archiven, darunter von der CIA erworbenes Material, Interviews und Freundschaften, Gerichtsdokumente und ungewöhnliche Besuche bei Spionagestellen, einschließlich des “Einbruchs” in ein Gefängnis, um zu demonstrieren, dass die Stasi die Macht der Geheimnisse überschätzt hat, Probleme zu lösen und eine Inselspionagekultur zu schaffen, die mehr darauf abzielt, ihre Macht zu sichern als die nationale Sicherheit zu schützen. Es stellt die geheime Technologiewelt der Stasi durch Biografien von Agenten, Überläufern und Offizieren sowie durch Visualisierung von James-Bond-ähnlichen Techniken und Geräten wieder her. In diesem höchst originellen Buch fügt Kristie Macrakis unserem Verständnis des ostdeutschen Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit eine neue Dimension hinzu, indem sie das Thema in den Bereich der Spionagegeschichte bringt und den politischen Bereich verlässt.

• Enthüllt zuvor geheime Methoden und Quellen, die von allen Spionageagenturen verwendet werden
• Beinhaltet Besuche von Spionageseiten
• Enthüllt zum ersten Mal Formeln und Methoden für unsichtbare Tinte

Continue reading “Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – Von Geheimnissen Verführt: In Der Spy-Tech-Welt Der Stasi – 1”

Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 3 – Merkel Als “Patriotin” – “Merkel The Patriot”

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Meinung: Wenn Angela Merkel wegen Corona die Fassung verliert | Kommentare  | DW | 26.01.2021

„Die beiden Systeme waren in keiner Weise miteinander vereinbar. Ein bisschen was von diesem, ein bisschen was von jenem, das ging nicht. Das konnte man mit einiger Intelligenz sehr gut durchschauen«, äußerte Angela Merkel, als Deutschland längst vereinigt war.[23]

„Wenn Sie noch an die Zukunft des Sozialismus glauben, dann wäre es notwendig gewesen, einen Entwurf für dessen Realisierung voranzustellen und nicht lediglich zu polemisieren. “

In Sorge um die Zukunft der DDR. Ausriss aus dem Offenen Brief von Angela Merkel und Erika Hoentsch an Christa Wolf.

Auszug aus: Reuth, Ralf Georg. „Das erste Leben der Angela M. (German Edition).“

Continue reading “Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 3 – Merkel Als “Patriotin” – “Merkel The Patriot””

Revealed – The Litvinenko Inquiry – Full Report – Original Document

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Continue reading “Revealed – The Litvinenko Inquiry – Full Report – Original Document”

Revealed – Dossier Center List Of Kremlin Organized Criminal Association

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Become a Patron!

Quote: “On April 6, 2018, the US Treasury Department introduced new sanctions against 24 Russians, including entrepreneurs and government officials from Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. We believe it would be wrong to rely solely on the opinion of a foreign government. The Dossier Center publishes its own list of possible organizers of the Kremlin organized criminal organization and their likely accomplices with short profiles. “

Continue reading “Revealed – Dossier Center List Of Kremlin Organized Criminal Association”

Enthüllt – Dossier Center Liste Der Von Kreml Organisierten Kriminellen Vereinigung

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Become a Patron!

Zitat:”Am 6. April 2018 führte das US-Finanzministerium neue Sanktionen gegen 24 Russen ein, darunter Unternehmer und Regierungsbeamte aus dem inneren Kreis von Wladimir Putin. Wir glauben, dass es falsch wäre, sich nur auf die Meinung einer ausländischen Regierung zu verlassen. Das Dossier Center veröffentlicht eine eigene Liste möglicher Organisatoren der von Kreml organisierten kriminellen Vereinigung und ihrer wahrscheinlichen Komplizen mit kurzen Profilen.”

Continue reading “Enthüllt – Dossier Center Liste Der Von Kreml Organisierten Kriminellen Vereinigung”

Exil-Russen-Tycoon Chodorkowski Sagt Aus: “KGB / FSB Drangen in Merkels „Inneren Kreis“ Ein.”

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Become a Patron!

Russland hat Agenten in den „internen Kreis“ der deutschen Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und in die österreichischen Geheimdienste aufgenommen, hat der im Exil lebende russische Tycoon Michail Chodorkowski enthüllt.

Sie seien jedoch nur Teil eines umfassenderen kremlfreundlichen Netzwerks in EU-Staaten, darunter die Tschechische Republik, Zypern, Frankreich, Griechenland, Lettland, Litauen und Polen.

Continue reading “Exil-Russen-Tycoon Chodorkowski Sagt Aus: “KGB / FSB Drangen in Merkels „Inneren Kreis“ Ein.””

KGB/FSB Penetrated Merkel’s ‘Inner Circle’, Khodorkovsky Says

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Treffen im Kreml: Merkel sucht in Moskau Putins Unterstützung
Merkel & Putin

Become a Patron!

Russia has enrolled agents in German chancellor Angela Merkel’s “internal circle” and in Austrian intelligence administrations, exiled Russian tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky has revealed.

But they are just part of a wider pro-Kremlin network in EU states, including the Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, he said.

Continue reading “KGB/FSB Penetrated Merkel’s ‘Inner Circle’, Khodorkovsky Says”

TOP SECRET – Who Killed Olof Palme – The CIA Investigation Report – Original Document

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

The Murder Of Olof Palme – Investigated By The CIA

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Continue reading “TOP SECRET – Who Killed Olof Palme – The CIA Investigation Report – Original Document”

How Russia Goes After Its Critics & Citizens Abroad

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

When it comes to carrying out repressions, the Russian government’s reach isn’t limited by its own borders. The Kremlin is known for going after perceived enemies abroad — especially former “insiders” and members of the political opposition. In recent years, high-profile assassinations linked to Russian agents have made headlines around the world, and Moscow has developed a reputation for abusing the Interpol notice system.

Continue reading “How Russia Goes After Its Critics & Citizens Abroad”

Check Out The KGB Database Of Spies On This Website

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

How Russian Cops Utilize Compromised Informers To Imprison Innocent Individuals

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

K.G.B. Museum Closes; Lipstick Gun and Other Spy Relics Go on Sale - The  New York Times
A KGB Office in the KGB Museum, New York City, NYC, USA

Correspondents from iStories and Meduza inspected Moscow court archives and discovered more than 140 “proficient observers” — individuals who consistently affirm in legal disputes identified with drug charges. The training is unmitigatedly illicit, however judges send individuals to jail for quite a long time dependent on these observers’ declarations.

Continue reading “How Russian Cops Utilize Compromised Informers To Imprison Innocent Individuals”

Top Secret KGB Agent Lists Leaked

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Dutch Govt Removes Two Russians Utilizing Political Cover

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

The Dutch minister of the Interior, Kajsa Ollongren, sent a letter (in Dutch) to the House of Representatives to educate the parliament about the disturbance regarding a Russian reconnaissance activity.

Two Russians utilizing a conciliatory cover to submit undercover work for the Russian common unfamiliar knowledge organization SVR have been ousted from the Netherlands. Both were certify as representative at the Russian government office in The Hague. The clergyman says the SVR insight official assembled a “generous” organization of sources (i.e., he was a case official) working in the Dutch innovative area. He sought after data about AI, semiconductors and nano innovation; information that has both common and military applications. At times the sources got paid for their participation.

Continue reading “Dutch Govt Removes Two Russians Utilizing Political Cover”

MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL VASILII CHUIKOV, PAVEL YUDIN, AND IVAN IL’ICHEV TO GEORGII MALENKOV CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN THE GDR

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Quellbild anzeigen

SECRET
Copy No.

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

18 May 1953
pg. 00195

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to Comrade G.M. Malenkov

Continue reading “MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL VASILII CHUIKOV, PAVEL YUDIN, AND IVAN IL’ICHEV TO GEORGII MALENKOV CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN THE GDR”

NOTES BY WILHELM PIECK ON THE DISCUSSION WITH STALIN

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Final Discussion on 7 April 1952–11:20 p.m. in Moscow

St[alin]: up to now all proposals rejected
Situation:
no compromises
Creation of a European Army–not against the SU [Soviet Union] but rather about power in Europe

Atlantic Treaty–independent state in the West
Demarcation line dangerous borders
1st Line Germans (Stasi), behind [it] Soviet soldiers
We must consider terrorist acts.

Continue reading “NOTES BY WILHELM PIECK ON THE DISCUSSION WITH STALIN”

MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL VASILII CHUIKOV, PAVEL YUDIN, AND IVAN IL’ICHEV TO GEORGII MALENKOV CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN THE GDR

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Georgy Malenkov: what “heir” of Stalin went to Church – The Global Domain  News

Malenkov

MAY 18, 1953
MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL VASILII CHUIKOV, PAVEL YUDIN, AND IVAN IL’ICHEV TO GEORGII MALENKOV CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN THE GDR

SECRET
Copy No.

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

18 May 1953
pg. 00195

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to Comrade G.M. Malenkov

Continue reading “MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL VASILII CHUIKOV, PAVEL YUDIN, AND IVAN IL’ICHEV TO GEORGII MALENKOV CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN THE GDR”

WORKING NOTES FROM THE SESSION OF THE CPSU CC PRESIDIUM ON 30 OCTOBER 1956 – CHINESE COMRADES

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

 

(Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)(2)
Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov

On the Situation in Hungary
Information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Serov is read aloud.(3)

Cde. Zhukov provides information about the concentration of mil.-transport aircraft in the Vienna region.(4) Nagy is playing a double game (in Malinin’s opinion). Cde. Konev is to be sent to Budapest.(5)

On Discussions with the Chinese comrades. (6)
(Khrushchev)

We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people’s democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based. The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position. One document for the Hungarians, and another for the participants of the Warsaw Pact. On Rokossowski—I said to Gomulka that this matter is for you (the Poles) to decide.(7)

Cde. Bulganin—The Chinese cdes. have an incorrect impression of our relations with the countries of people’s democracy. On our appeal to the Hungarians—we should prepare it. A declaration should be prepared.

Cde. Molotov—Today an appeal must be written to the Hungarian people so that they promptly enter into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops. There is the Warsaw Pact. This must be considered with other countries. On the view of the Chinese comrades—they suggest that relations with the countries of the socialist camp be built on the principles of Pancha Shila.(8) Relations along interstate lines are on one basis and interparty relations on another.

Continue reading “WORKING NOTES FROM THE SESSION OF THE CPSU CC PRESIDIUM ON 30 OCTOBER 1956 – CHINESE COMRADES”

STASI REPORT ON MEETINGS WITH THE KGB, 30 NOVEMBER-1 DECEMBER 1964

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson’s recent election in the United States, Khrushchev’s ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.

CREATORS
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

MIELKE, ERICH

SEMICHASTNY, V.

WOLF, MARKUS

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Nuclear weapons–China
European Economic Community
National liberation movements–Africa
Germany (East). Ministry for State Security (Stasi)
Soviet Union. Committee for State Security (KGB)

Continue reading “STASI REPORT ON MEETINGS WITH THE KGB, 30 NOVEMBER-1 DECEMBER 1964”

EXPOSED – SOVIET PLAN TO ASSASSINATE TITO

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

 

NKVD plan to assassinate Josip Broz Tito by a Soviet covert agent, codenamed “Max.” The plan envisions assassinating Tito during a private audience during Tito’s forthcoming visit to London, or at a diplomatic reception in Belgrade. This document was not dated.

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

 

Maria Kolesnikova Nach Ihrem Verschwinden Von Lukaschenko-KGB-Schergen Festgenommen

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Belarus protests: UK says release of 'abducted' Maria Kolesnikova must be  'highest priority' | World News | Sky News
Eine der Führerinnen der belarussischen Opposition, Maria Kolesnikova, wurde am Morgen des 8. September an der belarussisch-ukrainischen Grenze festgenommen, teilte das staatliche Grenzkomitee von Belarus mit. Sie behaupten, dass Kolesnikova und zwei Mitglieder des Koordinierungsrates der belarussischen Opposition, Anton Rodnenkov und Ivan Kravtsov, mit dem Auto zwischen belarussischen und ukrainischen Kontrollpunkten unterwegs waren. Nachdem sie den Grenzschutz bemerkt hatten, so heißt es im Komitee, beschleunigte das Auto stark und verließ das Gebiet von Belarus, während Kolesnikova angeblich aus dem Auto “geschoben” wurde.

Continue reading “Maria Kolesnikova Nach Ihrem Verschwinden Von Lukaschenko-KGB-Schergen Festgenommen”

Nawalny-Mordanschag: Moskau Mauert – Und Luegt Weiter

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Während der Ruf nach Aufklärung weltweit lauter wird, mauert Moskau und will untersuchen lassen, ob eine “fremde Macht” einen russischen Staatsbürger geschädigt habe, um Moskau zu diskreditieren.

Das ist die alte Vorgehensweise der Tschekisten aus KGB, STASI und wie die einschlägigen Ost-Mördergeheimdienste sich jeweils nennen – bis hin zu STASI-GoMoPa.

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Video – Boris Nemzow – Tod An Der Kremlmauer

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Am 27. Februar 2015 ereignete sich der Mord an dem russischen Oppositionspolitiker Boris Nemzow. Die Welle der Empörung und Anteilnahme nach der Ermordung war sowohl in Russland als auch im Ausland hoch. Russlands Präsident Putin versprach umgehende Aufklärung. Was ist seitdem passiert, und was weiß man heute über die Drahtzieher des Mordes?

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

The Shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007 – Top Secret Document

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

The Shootdown ofKorean Airlines Flight 007 – 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov describes Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.”

Continue reading “The Shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007 – Top Secret Document”

The 10 Top Secret Most Notorious Operations Of The KGB Revealed

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

Biggest Secret Reveal || India & The KGB - The Blunt Social - Medium

Like the CIA, the Soviet (and now Russian) spy organization known as the KGB has occupied with many years of mystery tasks over the world, extending from shakedown to capturing. The vast majority of the mysteries that we think about the KGB today are a direct result of one man—Vasili Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin was a filer for the KGB for a long time before he surrendered to the UK and gave over his 25,000-page chronicle of mystery KGB records. Here are a portion of the KGB’s generally upsetting and abnormal mystery tasks.

10 The Attacks On America’s Infrastructure

Hoover DamHoover-Damm wird zu gigantischem Energiespeicher | en:former

From 1959–72, the KGB started to photo US power plants, dams, oil pipelines, and framework for a terrible activity that would disturb the force gracefully to all of New York. When they picked focuses on that they thought were helpless, the KGB set up a protected house close to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. From that point, KGB specialists looked to plan and complete a progression of assaults on America’s capacity systems.Hydroelectric dams, which create a huge bit of the US’s vitality gracefully, were an objective. The KGB detailed an intricate arrangement to crush two huge hydroelectric dams, the Hungry Horse Dam and Flathead Dam, in Montana. Removing the two dams from commission would injure the force gracefully of the state and encompassing district. The assault was to start 3 kilometers (2 mi) down the South Fork River from Hungry Horse Dam. The KGB wanted to have agents pulverize power arches on a tall mountain incline, which would be hard to get back on the web, inconclusively taking out force transmission from the dam. At that point, the agents were to hold onto the Hungry Horse Dam’s controls and decimate them. The assaults would have taken out the force gracefully to all of New York state.From the Soviet Union’s Canadian international safe haven, the KGB likewise intended to additionally disturb America’s vitality flexibly by assaulting oil pipelines among Canada and the United States. The plot, called Operation Cedar, was gotten ready for longer than 10 years. The KGB even looked to pulverize petroleum treatment facilities in Canada, which gracefully a lot of America’s gasoline.All of the assaults on America’s capacity framework were a piece of a bigger plan to assault New York City. When they had taken out the greater part of the force in the United States with the previous assaults, the KGB plotted to utilize the disorder and haziness to plant explosives on wharfs and distribution centers along the Port of New York, a pivotal harbor for America’s trade and imports.

9 The Hostage Crisis Retribution

Senate hostage crisis | Wookieepedia | Fandom

In 1974, the KGB made a tip top counterterrorism team with the baffling name “Alpha Group.” The Alpha Group was utilized by the KGB to do top mystery and regularly hazardous missions for the USSR—and now Russia—remembering a wicked and horrible crucial Lebanon.In 1985, the Soviet Union wound up with its first significant prisoner emergency after four Soviet representatives were grabbed in Lebanon by psychological oppressors subsidiary with an Islamic fear based oppressor gathering. The ruffians apparently kidnapped the Soviets to prevent the USSR from offering backing to Syria’s endeavors in the Lebanese common war, which the nation was then entangled in. After the Soviet ambassadors were abducted, the ruffians sent chilling photos to news organizations of the prisoners with firearms to their heads. The psychological oppressors requested that the USSR power Syria-associated powers to quit assaulting Iran-subsidiary powers battling in northern Lebanon, or the prisoners would be executed.Initially, the USSR was available to some type of arrangements with the fear based oppressors to discharge the prisoners sound. Things changed when the USSR didn’t appear to stop the Syrian powers’ inclusion in the common war, and the fear based oppressors executed one of the prisoners just two days after the underlying requests were made.That’s the point at which the USSR relinquished arranging, and the KGB made quick and wicked move. To begin with, the KGB explored what association was behind the kidnappings and seen it as crafted by Hezbollah. That is the point at which the KGB did a touch of seizing of their own, grabbing a nearby relative of a Hezbollah head. They started to dismantle him, emasculating him and sending a portion of his eviscerated body parts to the criminals of the Soviets. Before long, the KGB murdered the Hezbollah relative.Then, the KGB sent the Hezbollah head a message demonstrating that they was aware of a lot a greater amount of his family members and their whereabouts and cautioned that they would endure a similar destiny if the prisoners were not discharged. The Islamic psychological oppressors holding the Soviets paid heed and discharged the staying three Soviet ambassadors soon after, altogether sound and moving along without any more requests.

8 The Blackmail With Sex Tapes

Watch The Secret KGB Sex Files | Prime Video

In 1974, the KGB made a tip top counterterrorism team with the baffling name “Alpha Group.” The Alpha Group was utilized by the KGB to do top mystery and regularly hazardous missions for the USSR—and now Russia—remembering a wicked and horrible crucial Lebanon.In 1985, the Soviet Union wound up with its first significant prisoner emergency after four Soviet representatives were grabbed in Lebanon by psychological oppressors subsidiary with an Islamic fear based oppressor gathering. The ruffians apparently kidnapped the Soviets to prevent the USSR from offering backing to Syria’s endeavors in the Lebanese common war, which the nation was then entangled in. After the Soviet ambassadors were abducted, the ruffians sent chilling photos to news organizations of the prisoners with firearms to their heads. The psychological oppressors requested that the USSR power Syria-associated powers to quit assaulting Iran-subsidiary powers battling in northern Lebanon, or the prisoners would be executed.Initially, the USSR was available to some type of arrangements with the fear based oppressors to discharge the prisoners sound. Things changed when the USSR didn’t appear to stop the Syrian powers’ inclusion in the common war, and the fear based oppressors executed one of the prisoners just two days after the underlying requests were made.That’s the point at which the USSR relinquished arranging, and the KGB made quick and wicked move. To begin with, the KGB explored what association was behind the kidnappings and seen it as crafted by Hezbollah. That is the point at which the KGB did a touch of seizing of their own, grabbing a nearby relative of a Hezbollah head. They started to dismantle him, emasculating him and sending a portion of his eviscerated body parts to the criminals of the Soviets. Before long, the KGB murdered the Hezbollah relative.

ABC Presents Probably Fake Russian "Sex Tape" Of American Diplomat

Then, the KGB sent the Hezbollah head a message demonstrating that they was aware of a lot a greater amount of his family members and their whereabouts and cautioned that they would endure a similar destiny if the prisoners were not discharged. The Islamic psychological oppressors holding the Soviets paid heed and discharged the staying three Soviet ambassadors soon after, altogether sound and moving along without any more requests.

7 The KGB Hacker Accesses 400 US Military Computers

Disney | File 770

During the 1980s, the KGB was searching for an approach to take US military insider facts through two generally new antecedents to the Internet, ARPANET and MILNET. To do as such, they found and selected a man named Markus Hess, who might before long become a Soviet covert operative and one of the most incredible PC programmers in history.Hess started his hacking strategic the University of Bremen in Germany, far away from the US military PCs that he was attempting to get to. From that point, Hess had the option to assault 400 PCs utilized by the US military. A portion of the PCs were utilized at bases the world over in places like Germany and Japan. A portion of different PCs were utilized at MIT for look into. Another was utilized by the Pentagon. Hess had the option to figure the secret word to access the Pentagon’s Optimis database, which permitted him to access “a list of sources of Army documents.”Hess’ broad hacking activity stayed undetected until a frameworks head and stargazer named Clifford Stoll started researching a modest bookkeeping blunder in a California PC lab. Stoll found what appeared to be a little, 75-penny mistake in the PC use at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, which conducts logical research for the US Department of Energy. Stoll attempted to find where the 75-penny inconsistency originated from and followed it to an unapproved and obscure client who had utilized the lab’s PC frameworks for nine seconds without paying. Stoll examined further and found that this unapproved client was a talented programmer who accessed a framework control “superuser” account by misusing a security defect in the system.Stoll went through the following 10 months attempting to find the whereabouts of the programmer. In the long run, he had the option to do so when the programmer attempted to get to a safeguard temporary worker in Virginia. Stoll started to record everything the programmer was doing. He saw this strange programmer getting to PC frameworks at army installations all through the United States, scanning for documents with respect to military insider facts and atomic weapons.Stoll immediately reached specialists extending from the US military to the CIA, NSA, and FBI. Stoll and the specialists at that point followed the programmer’s physical whereabouts to a West German college. They set up a trick to get the programmer to uncover his full personality, creating a phony division at the Lawrence Berkley Laboratory made to seem as though it was working with the US military. At the point when the programmer took the lure and attempted to get to this phony office’s records, they had the option to follow him right to his home in Hannover, West Germany.West German specialists, working with the US, at that point raged Hess’ home and captured him. Little did they all realize that this world class programmer had been shrunk by the KGB and was offering military insider facts to the Soviet Union for a considerable length of time. Hess was later seen as liable of reconnaissance and condemned to as long as three years in jail however was discharged from the get-go probation.

6 The Operation RYAN

The KGB's 3 most sensational operations - Russia Beyond

In 1980s, the Cold War arrived at another blaze point. At that point chief of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev professed to have information that the US was effectively getting ready for a war against the Soviet Union and might dispatch an unexpected atomic assault whenever. Along these lines, in anticipation of this alleged looming fate, the KGB looked to dispatch Operation RYAN, one of biggest observation activities in history.Operation RYAN was intended to furnish the Soviets with early notice indications of an approaching US atomic assault. The arrangement was to direct best in class reconnaissance utilizing the USSR’s COSMOS satellite. The KGB needed to photo US army installations nonstop, observing them intently for signs that the US would dispatch atomic weapons at the USSR.The activity additionally looked to screen all employments of radar inside the United States for any sensational expands that would demonstrate groundwork for an assault. Besides, Operation RYAN was intended to screen the exercises of every American resident and military staff when they left the US. RYAN likewise put NATO under substantial reconnaissance. The activity even attempted to catch calls made all through the United States and Europe.In expansion to remote reconnaissance, Operation RYAN made a system of spies who were prepared to follow up on a second’s notification in the event that it was accepted that the US was beginning a war with the Soviet Union. The huge and expensive activity was inevitably downsized in 1984, just three years after it was set into movement.

5 The Buying Of US Banks

Big Banks Reverse Course, Stop Buying Own Shares | Global Finance ...

At the point when the KGB wasn’t attempting to utilize spies to get their hands on the privileged insights of the US government, they were attempting to utilize banks.In the mid-1970s, the KGB concocted an arrangement to clandestinely purchase three US banks in Northern California as a component of a mystery activity to secure data on cutting edge organizations in the district. The three banks were picked by the KGB since they had recently made credits to innovation organizations. A large number of these organizations were shrunk by the US military, so the KGB wanted to catch US military innovation secrets.To pull the activity off, the KGB gotten an agent from Singapore named Amos Dawe to buy the banks for them without letting the US government get wind of the USSR’s fabulous arrangement to take innovation mysteries. Be that as it may, before the KGB could assume control over the banks, their buy was impeded by the CIA. The CIA had first learned of the plan when they saw that the Singaporean specialist’s cash was originating from a Soviet bank. Dawe had acquired a $50 million credit line from a Singapore part of Moscow’s Norodny Bank.

4 The Operation PANDORA

Top 5 KGB operations on U.S. soil - Big Think

Racial pressures were intense in the US during the 1960s. Race riots encompassing the Civil Rights Movement were causing mass agitation the nation over. The KGB imagined that they could misuse this and aggravate it by initiating ill will or through and through savagery between racial gatherings in the US.The plan, called Operation PANDORA, started with the KGB spreading counterfeit flyers that had all the earmarks of being from the Jewish Defense League, a conservative Jewish political association currently characterized by the FBI as a fear based oppressor association. The flyers, which were really written by the KGB, guaranteed that dark Americans were assaulting Jews and plundering Jewish-possessed shops in New York. The phony handouts begged their perusers to battle against “dark crossbreeds.” The KGB at that point sent these enemy of dark flyers to dark activist gatherings, trusting it would mix hostile to Semitism operating at a profit associations, if not altogether violence.Concurrently, the KGB was additionally sending counterfeit letters to dark aggressor bunches which guaranteed that the Jewish Defense League had been focusing on and assaulting blacks in America. The letters beseeched the dark activists to assault the Jewish Defense League in reprisal. The Jewish Defense League’s pioneer, Meir Kahane, was killed a year later, however the demonstration was done by an Arabic man who was apparently detached to any dark activist groups.As some portion of their activity to mix racial agitation, the KGB additionally wanted to explode a dark school. After the school was besieged with a planted dangerous gadget, the KGB intended to make unknown calls to a progression of dark associations and guarantee that the Jewish Defense group had been behind the bombarding.

3 The Project To Kill Josip Broz Tito

Josip Broz Tito, a Yugoslavian leaders letter to Stalin.. Boss 100 ...

In spite of the fact that he was a socialist himself, Yugoslavia’s head of state Josip Broz Tito shockingly pulled in the rage of the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin specifically. Looking to make Yugoslavia increasingly autonomous and confident, Tito removed himself from both the United States and the USSR in a harsh clash known as the Tito-Stalin Split.Because of this, Stalin needed Tito to be killed and gotten the ancestor to the KGB, the MGB, to proceed with it. The USSR’s best mystery specialist was doled out to do Tito’s death. He had recently killed another adversary of Stalin’s—Leon Trotsky. Tito, in any case, supernaturally endure the death endeavors unscathed.In reaction to the death plots, Tito sent an admonition to Stalin: “Quit sending individuals to slaughter me. We’ve just caught five of them, one of them with a bomb and another with a rifle.” Tito likewise kept in touch with Stalin: “On the off chance that you don’t quit sending executioners, I’ll send one to Moscow and I won’t need to send a second.”When the MGB’s progressively regular death plots neglected to kill Tito, they got devilishly imaginative. They at that point attempted to kill him with his very own plague. They exceptionally structured a dangerous microscopic organisms and intended to discharge the plague at a political gathering that Tito would join in. Everybody in the room would have been slaughtered by the plague expect for the KGB specialist who was directing it, as he would have been inoculated beforehand.The KGB additionally planned a toxic substance gem box to attempt to execute Tito. The case would have been given to Tito as a blessing, a Trojan pony of sorts, and would discharge a lethal gas that would execute any individual who opened it. Luckily, both toxic substance plans were rarely done, and Tito outlasted Stalin by about 30 years, biting the dust in 1980 at age 87.

2 The Listening Floor

Pay No Attention to the Spies on the 23rd Floor | History ...

During the Cold War, the KGB turned out to be truly adept at pestering structures and tuning in on discussions. Truth be told, they were so acceptable at such listening in that they once pester a whole floor of a lodging with sound reconnaissance receivers . . . for 20 years.In the mid 1970s, the travel industry started to thrive in the Soviet satellite nation of Estonia. The USSR considered it to be a chance to carry cash into the battling economy, and the KGB considered it to be a chance to keep an eye on outsiders. In 1972, the KGB assumed control over the highest floor of Hotel Viru in Estonia and wired the vast majority of the lodging with modern sound observation gadgets. The lodging was in a zone that was as often as possible went by universal businessmen.Sixty rooms in the inn were for all time set up with mystery mouthpieces, and different rooms could be irritated immediately. Outwardly, Hotel Viru seemed to have 22 stories. In truth, it had the mystery 23rd floor, which housed KGB specialists and the innovation that they used to keep an eye on the entirety of the visitors at the lodging. The KGB stayed there for two decades, until the breakdown of the Soviet Union shut down the reconnaissance activity in 1991.The KGB has been found to have been utilizing staggeringly advanced sound observation innovation in structures far and wide. In 1945, a gathering of Soviet kids introduced the US envoy to the USSR a blessing, a cut wooden plaque of the Great Seal of the United States, as a demonstration of companionship between the two nations. Notwithstanding, the plaque contained a mystery receiver. Indeed, this bug was one of the main sound observation gadgets to utilize inactive innovation to transmit sound signs, making it imperceptible by customary strategies and permitting it to be utilized for an all-inclusive time of time.The irritated plaque permitted the KGB to tune in on discussions in the American minister’s office for almost seven years, until it was inadvertently recognized in 1952 by a British radio administrator. The radio administrator was confounded when he heard discussions between Americans originating from a radio channel close to the international safe haven. That radio channel was being utilized by the KGB to tune in on the private discussions.

1 The Financing Of Terrorism

ENERGY AS A FINANCIAL SOURCE FOR TERRORISM | Energy Policy Turkey

After Yasir Arafat rose to control at the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), he built up a coalition with the KGB. The KGB at that point started to give mystery preparing to the PLO’s aggressors, who were waging war to savagely accomplish Palestinian statehood. Notwithstanding preparing, the KGB started to dispatch arms to the PLO guerrillas disregarding the ban put upon the Palestinian territories.Around this time, the PLO was completing numerous demonstrations of psychological warfare. In 1969 alone, they performed 82 carrier hijackings around the globe. The head of outside knowledge for the KGB, Aleksandr Sakharovsky, asserted that “plane seizing is my own invention.”The KGB likewise financed another Palestinian aggressor gathering, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLPF), providing them with rocket washes and automatic rifles. A pioneer of the PLPF, Wadie Haddad, was uncovered to be a KGB operator. While Haddad was accountable for the PLPF, he did different hijackings of regular citizen planes. One of those hijackings, the Dawson’s Field Hijackings of 1970, incited what’s known as Black September in Jordan, a wicked common war that kept going from September 1970 until July 1971.The KGB purportedly gave 100 assault rifles, programmed rifles, guns, and ammo to the Official Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1972. The Irish paramilitary gathering introduced probably the most savage demonstrations of viciousness and psychological warfare in the Northern Irish clash known as the Troubles. One explanation that the KGB and USSR looked into the IRA was on the grounds that they had turned Marxist and had started to help transforming Ireland into a socialist state.

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

Where Have All The Communist KGB and STASI Spies Gone ?

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

Fallout 4 - RED SCARE - FULL QUEST Mod Playthrough - COMMUNIST SPY ...

A look back: On Normannenstrasse in East Berlin, in the core of a standard white collar class neighborhood, stands a gigantic office complex: 41 solid structures as inauspiciously utilitarian as the condo towers that encompass them. Nine months prior it was the base camp of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security – the Staatsicherheit – or Stasi, maybe the most modern and sweeping undercover work association at any point made. Be that as it may, among January and March this year, as East Germany’s Communist Government at long last crumbled, the Stasi was officially disbanded. Today, the solid fortress is abandoned, its 10,000 rooms fixed, its operators bolted out.

From these dreary structures, 34,000 officials ran the Stasi’s 39 divisions. The staff included 2,100 operators alloted nonstop to perusing mail passed on from post workplaces and territorial Stasi base camp, 5,000 specialists liable for following suspects, and 6,000 agents whose solitary employment was tuning in to private phone discussions.

Primary Department VIII, otherwise called Observation, kept a nearby watch on residents through a broad system of sources in neighborhoods, schools, libraries and even service stations. Principle Department II – Counterintelligence – did electronic reconnaissance of outside ambassadors, specialists and writers and put spies in their workplaces, homes and lodgings. The Stasi even had a division to keep an eye on other Stasi individuals and sources.

”We are as yet getting stuns from what we discover,” says the movie producer Klaus Wendler, a representative for an East German Government advisory group that is currently filtering through the Stasi’s 5,000,000 documents. ”Performers had to keep an eye on individual artists, understudies were pressured into keeping an eye on companions, and youngsters were tricked into keeping an eye on their folks.”

With the disbanding of the Stasi, 85,000 full-time officials lost their positions essentially for the time being. Close to 10,000 have since discovered productive business, a large portion of them in different Government services, remembering 2,000 for the Ministry of the Interior, which some time ago administered the Stasi. The rest have joined the developing positions of East Germany’s jobless; some make due with standard joblessness benefits, while others get no Government remuneration by any stretch of the imagination. Many are upset at ending up barred, even alienated, by their kindred residents.

Abroad, the greater part of the Stasi’s 2,500 profession officials in consulates and missions no longer have a covert operative central command to answer to, and its untold a large number of independent covert government agents no longer get cash from their previous experts. West German insight officials gauge that there are exactly 5,000 agents in West Germany today, 500 of them ”top operators.” Eighty of those are thought to have entered the most elevated echelons of the military and Government, West German authorities state, including knowledge offices.

In spite of emotional political changes in Europe, West German insight authorities dread that not every one of these covert agents have changed their loyalties. Exceptionally restrained and still covert, some are as yet gathering and transferring data to Soviet knowledge organs, the West Germans accept. Others, they think, are essentially sticking around for their chance, holding back to be enacted.

Communist Spy Illustrations, Royalty-Free Vector Graphics & Clip ...

The Stasi has for some time been perceived as one of the best insight benefits on the planet, in a similar alliance as those of Israel and France. By the by, in the course of the most recent seven months, West German and American knowledge authorities have been astounded to find the size of its outside tasks, arranged until his retirement three years prior by the scandalous Markus Wolf. Until 1979, Western knowledge operators didn’t have a present photo of ”the man without a face.” But as of late he has ventured out from the shadows. Today, a smash hit creator, Wolf talks uninhibitedly of his effective infiltration of the West German insight and military over a time of over 30 years. What he doesn’t talk about is psychological oppression.

Over the most recent two months, frightening disclosures have become visible specifying the Stasi’s connects to an assortment of fear based oppressor gatherings, quite the extreme left Red Army Faction, eight of whose individuals were captured in June. With the assistance of the Stasi, they had been given new personalities and occupations in East Germany in the wake of doing psychological militant activities in the 1970’s and 80’s. The Stasi has additionally been ensnared in the Libyan-coordinated bombarding of the La Belle disco in West Germany in 1986: According to new data from witnesses and held onto documents, Stasi operators helped transport the explosives to West Berlin that brought about the passings of two American fighters.

In East Germany, as well, the Stasi, albeit formally nonexistent, stays a danger. In late June, new divulgences uncovered that in 1986, as the Soviet Union started changing its general public and the East German economy kept on decaying, the Stasi, predicting turmoil – however not the finish of the divider – set in excess of 2,000 individuals from a world class mystery team into the most significant levels of East German Government divisions, organizations and colleges. Another 500 government agents were dispatched to West Germany. East German authorities state that a large portion of them are still set up, their characters obscure, and suspect that they are compelled to hold up out any political disturbance.

Insight authorities are in a race to carry the most exceedingly terrible guilty parties to equity before they go for all time underground or sign up with new bosses. The pursuit is suggestive, says one American ambassador in Berlin, of a period in the no so distant past: ”Ferreting out the government operatives, psychological oppressors and Stasi operators is comparable to the quest for the Nazis and their teammates after they endeavored to vanish into German culture toward the finish of the war.”

On Friday morning, only 48 hours from money related unification on July 1, East Berlin is bursting at the seams with energy. Global camera teams and columnists have attacked the city to catch the beginning of another time. Be that as it may, in his office, just strides from the Volkskammer, or Parliament, Peter-Michael Diestel, East Germany’s 38-year-old Interior Minister, ponders the insult inheritance of the past. ”My crucial,” says just, ”is to destroy the Stasi.”

That assignment has tumbled to an impossible competitor: a previous dairy animals draining victor, weight lifter (he can seat press 420 pounds) and infrequent legal counselor who accepted the position of Interior Minister to a great extent in light of the fact that nobody else needed it.

Diestel, a local of Leipzig, has been occupied since getting to work in April. He has enrolled the collaboration of huge quantities of previous Stasi officials and, utilizing data from witnesses and Stasi records, has attempted to acquire ”independent” agents, either by extending to them employment opportunities or persuading them that the Stasi is done. He has gone along key data on fear mongers and sources to West German knowledge offices, and helped organize the capture in June of the Red Army Faction psychological oppressors. At last, Diestel built up the Stasi’s complicity in the La Belle disco bombarding.

Diestel is exploring a forlorn course, subject to furious assaults from both the left and right in East Germany, extraordinary weight from West German authorities, and week after week requires his acquiescence by the German Social Union, a traditionalist gathering in East Germany’s overseeing alliance. Due to day by day dangers against his life, the police monitor his significant other and three little youngsters nonstop. Says Peter Pragal, East Berlin reporter for the week by week magazine Stern: ”He has the hardest activity in Germany, East or West.”

Other than its full-time officials, selected from the best and most brilliant in East German culture, the Stasi had 150,000 dynamic sources and 500,000 to 2 million low maintenance witnesses in East Germany. Its land property alone – including the huge fortresslike complex in East Berlin and Stasi’s in excess of 2,000 structures, homes, dugouts, havens, medical clinics, and resorts all through East Germany – have been esteemed in the billions of dollars. Up until this point, Government agents attempting to take stock of the Stasi have counted 23,000 vehicles and trucks and 250,000 weapons, including submachine firearms, guns, rifles and explosive launchers.

The productive Stasi machine accumulated broad dossiers on in excess of 5 million East Germans – 33% of the populace – that included data as close as sexual propensities and as everyday as books settled up with the library. A great many calls were recorded; condos were pester and unlawfully looked (the Stasi would orchestrate to have suspects kept late at their employments). One protester as of late found that a small scale listening gadget fit for transmitting three miles had been sewn into his jacket neckline.

Residents were powerless against the Stasi’s Orwellian interruption whenever and anyplace – in their condos, industrial facilities, houses of worship, cafés, libraries, specialists’ workplaces, rooms, even on their excursions abroad. In some East German urban communities, each bit of mail was opened in exceptional steam rooms joined to the post workplaces.

At the point when East German soccer groups ventured out to play coordinates in West Germany, Stasi specialists obliged busloads of fans, checking whether any East German sat close to a West German, showed a West German banner or sang the West German national song of praise.

Igor Gouzenko, The Soviet Defector Who Started the Cold War

Up and down the a large number of miles of East German expressway, Stasi specialists acted like corner store chaperons, servers and travelers, cautiously taking note of whether East Germans left their vehicles close to Western vehicles or conveyed dubiously overwhelming baggage.

The Stasi made it basically incomprehensible for East Germans not to work together. Each field operator needed to convey in any event 25 new sources or start 25 examinations consistently. Residents who declined to help were either set apart as subversives or left to adapt to the administration independent. ”You were unable to go anyplace in East German culture except if you could pull the correct strings,” says Hasso Von Samson, a spokesman for West Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution. ”But I guess that’s what happens when they take away your enemy.”

This article reflects the situation in Germany in 1990.

Since then the top spies are still in touch with each other and form a dangerous network which is similiar to the Cosa Nostra in the USA and/or Sicily, the Yakuza in Japan, the Russian Mafia and the Chinese Triads.

The only distinction: The German STASI has learned the code of Omerta and operates in the dark – within the government, the Gauck administration, the Bundestag, the left party, the legal system as judges, attorney and prosecutors, the police and also in the German security and intelligence services.

And last not but least as undercover agents and informer for former KGB spy Wladimir Putin, now Russia’s ruler like former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, former STASI agent Matthias Warnig and the Gazprom and North Stream – Energy connection.

It is a taboo until now.

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

STASI/KGB Intelligence Cooperation Under Project RYaN Exposed – TOP SECRET

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

Ehemaliger BND-Chef kann geplante Ablösung Honeckers 1987 nicht ...

Between 1981 and 1989 the foreign intelligence branches of the Soviet KGB and the East German Ministry of State Security launched a combined effort to develop a system for detecting signs of an impending western nuclear first strike. Codenamed “Project RYaN”, this early-warning system constituted one part of the Soviet response to the perceived threat of a surprise “decapitation” strike by NATO nuclear forces.

233 pages of documents from the Stasi’s Hauptverwaltung A and analysis by Bernd Schaefer, Nate Jones, and Benjamin Fischer below give unprecedented insight into the capabilities and fears of the Eastern Bloc intelligence services from the Able Archer ’83 War Scare to the end of the Cold War.

Introduction to the Collection

by Bernd Schaefer

In November 2012 CWIHP published e-Dossier No. 37 on the cooperation between the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS or Stasi), which highlighted a wide array of German documents dating from the 1960s through 1989. These materials were introduced by Walter Süss and Douglas Selvage, historians in the research division of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU) in Berlin.[1] While e-Dossier No.37 featured just one document[2] on Soviet/East German preparations to detect a surprise Western “nuclear missile attack” (RYAN or Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie/Ракетно ядерное нападение in Russian) from August 1984, the BStU research division added a substantial number of German Stasi documents on RYAN to its online collection in 2013.[3] These new materials are remarkable and add to our understanding of the intentions, scope, and duration of the Soviet RYAN project; all of them are available in translation today in the CWHIP Digital Archive. The follow e-Dossier includes detailed comments and analysis on their significance by Nate Jones, a nuclear expert at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C., and Benjamin Fischer, a retired CIA officer and veteran researcher of RYAN and the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” of November 1983.

The August 1984 record of bilateral Stasi-KGB conversations, written by East German foreign intelligence spy chief Markus Wolf, includes an apt summarization of RYAN’s purpose by the Soviet representative: “The need for such approaches derives from the fact that a multitude of measures undertaken by the adversary do not allow advance determination which variation to launch a war the adversary will choose. In addition, we need to integrate experiences from analyzing the enemy’s crisis management into a process of further perfecting the definition of indicators to detect the adversary’s main measures for its acute war preparation.”[4]

It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war

It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war. The KGB operated an intelligence network to monitor worldwide “indicators” to detect to assess the likelihood of a “surprise nuclear missile attacked” launched by NATO. Soviet assessments of the likelihood of such an attack differed over the years, peaking between 1982 and 1984.

KGB/Stasi Cooperation | Wilson Center

Whether such fears were warranted given the actual activities of the United States and NATO is disputed. Historians and analysts have differed in their assessments of partially declassified American sources, archival materials from Eastern European and Soviet archives, post-1990 oral histories from Russia, and memories of former actors, such as prominent KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky. Some consider the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” or “War Scare” of November 1983 to be the most dangerous event of the Cold War next to the Cuban Missile Crisis, while others view it in a much less dramatic fashion.[5]

The bulk of newly available Stasi and KGB documentation on RYAN from the BStU Archives in Berlin does not address Able Archer 83. However, it casts an unprecedented light on Stasi and KGB perspectives since 1984, as well as on the operational details, structure, and scope of the RYAN project. The collection includes a KGB catalogue from 1984/85 that, in excruciating detail, outlines the 292 indicators that might precede a potential “surprise nuclear missile attack.” Many of them refer to activities in and around Washington offices and buildings, including the White House parking lot. The collection also includes summaries of monthly KGB reports up to April 1989, which list possible global indicators of preparations for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” These records tell us that hundreds of KGB officers were assigned to work on the RYAN program and a special division was created inside the KGB exclusively for this purpose. Combined with earlier published Stasi documents on the Soviet shoot down of KAL 007 in September 1983 (in which Soviet intelligence’s inability to determine whether the airliner was military or civilian before it was shot down was identified as a serious problem[6]), these new RYAN materials provide ample evidence of comprehensive Soviet efforts to avoid and thwart a “surprise attack.”

While hindsight shows that Soviet fears were exaggerated, the level of Soviet and East German anxiety over Western intentions, particularly during the first Reagan administration, is noteworthy. On the other hand, many Stasi documents on RYAN read like overbearing bureaucratic exercises, aimed at comprehensiveness and perfection on paper, but unattainable in practice. Phrasing in some of the Stasi materials implies that there probably was some skepticism in higher Stasi echelons about the program’s effectiveness and the Soviet approach (though it did not deter the Stasi from contributing more substantive efforts than any other fraternal socialist intelligence service towards identifying indicators).

Still, it does not seem far-fetched that Soviet anxieties were enhanced by the ensuing and ever expanding RYAN program and fed into Moscow’s shift towards disarmament policies under Mikhail Gorbachev. Strangely enough, the KGB’s RYAN project had acquired such a life of its own that its operational routines continued all the way through the first half of 1989, regardless of changes in Soviet-American relations and disarmament efforts during the second Reagan and the early Bush I administration.

Was RYaN simply a “ vicious cycle of intelligence collection and assessment” as described by Oleg Gordievsky? While Gordievsky’s word choice is debatable, these new documents put a certain amount of Soviet “circular reasoning” on full display.


The Vicious Circle of Intelligence

by Nate Jones

Oleg Gordievsky, the spy who revealed the existence of Operation RYaN –RYaN (РЯН) is the Russian acronym for Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie (Ракетно ядерное нападение), or “nuclear missile attack”– described it as “a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment.” During the last decade of the Cold War, Soviet intelligence operatives abroad were “required to report alarming information” to Moscow about a Western surprise nuclear strike, “even if they themselves were skeptical of it.” After the Moscow Center received these inflated and incorrect –but requested– reports of Western preparations for a surprise nuclear strike, it became “duly alarmed by what they reported and demanded more.” Now, documents newly released by the Cold War International History Project and the Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic (BStU), provide unprecedented insight into the “vicious circle of intelligence” of Operation RYaN. And, in a development never envisaged by the documents’ authors, they now present historians with comprehensive, real-time monthly RYaN reports from Soviet intelligence operatives abroad as they witnessed and catalogued the Cold War’s end.[7]

In 1979 the Institute for Intelligence Problems, coordinated by the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, was tasked to work on “the development of new intelligence concepts” that could provide preliminary warning of Western preparations for a first strike. The result of this work was the creation of Operation RYaN, which was secretly announced in May of 1981.[8] At a major KGB conference in Moscow, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov, then Chairman of the KGB, justified the creation of Operation RYaN because, they claimed, the United States was “actively preparing for nuclear war” against the Soviet Union and its allies. According to a newly released Stasi report, the primary “Chekist work” discussed in the May 1981 meeting was the “demand to allow for ‘no surprise.’”[9]

The establishment of Operation RYaN has also been corroborated by KGB annual reports from 1981 and 1982, previously published by the National Security Archive. The 1981 annual report states that the KGB had “implemented measures to strengthen intelligence work in order to prevent a possible sudden outbreak of war by the enemy.” To do this, the KGB “actively obtained information on military and strategic issues, and the aggressive military and political plans of imperialism [the United States] and its accomplices,” and “enhanced the relevance and effectiveness of its active intelligence abilities.”[10]

The 1982 annual report confirmed Soviet fears of Western encirclement, and noted the challenges of countering the “U.S. and NATO aspirations to change the existing military-strategic balance.” Therefore, “[p]rimary attention was paid to military and strategic issues related to the danger of the enemy’s thermonuclear attack.” This Soviet unease was spurred by the pending November 1983 deployment of Pershing II and Gryphon Cruise missiles, whose short flight times and long range changed the nuclear balance by threatening Soviet nuclear command and control with decapitation.[11]

The first comprehensive account of the details of Operation RYaN remains a Top Secret February 1983 telegram from KGB Headquarters Moscow to the London KGB Residency entitled “Permanent operational assignment to uncover NATO preparations for a nuclear missile attack on the USSR,” with enclosed instructions on how to report on indicators pointing toward a nuclear sneak attack. This document was published in full in 1991 by Soviet double agent Oleg Gordievsky and British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew in Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985.

Above: M113 armored personnel carriers move through the town of Stockhausen (Herbstein) during REFORGER ’83 in Germany.

“The objective of the assignment is to see that the Residency works systematically to uncover any plans in preparation by the main adversary [USA] for RYaN and to organize continual watch to be kept for indications of a decision being taken to use nuclear weapons against the USSR or immediate preparations being made for a nuclear missile attack.”

Attached to the telegram was a list of seven “immediate” and thirteen “prospective” tasks for the agents to complete and report. These included: the collection of data on potential places of evacuation and shelter, an appraisal of the level of blood held in blood banks, observation of places where nuclear decisions were made and where nuclear weapons were stored, observation of key nuclear decision makers, observation of lines of communication, reconnaissance of the heads of churches and banks, and surveillance of security services and military installations.

Regrettably, however, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions included a facsimile reproduction of only the first page of this document. The additional pages were translated and typeset into English with no Russian corroboration of their authenticity. Nevertheless, the KGB annual reports, as well as documents from other former Eastern Bloc (Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian) archives, and now these Stasi documents, help to substantiate Gordievsky’s accounts.[12]

The newly released Stasi documents on RYaN show that East German Intelligence did not begin conducting RYaN collection activities until years after the Soviets began. A January 1983 “brief note” describes initial Stasi preparations for creation of systematic RYaN intelligence collection and reporting, but acknowledges “[f]urther questions had to be straightened out.” [13] At the February 9th high-level meeting in Moscow, Stasi head Erich Mielke told KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov that, “consultations have to be continued.” Chebrikov replied, “The work is definitely not finalized.”[14] In August of 1984, the Soviet and East German intelligence agencies were still discussing how, exactly, “to approach conceptual, organizational, and practical aspects when dealing with the RYaN problem.”[15]

In fact, German collection and analysis of RYaN information did not begin in earnest until early 1985, according to the February 15, 1985, Order Number 1/85 which directed that “all options” be utilized to detect Western “military aggression, particularly a surprise nuclear missile attack” by observing non-socialist states and West Berlin in a “systematic and targeted manner.”[16] While systematic Stasi RYaN collection and analysis did not commence until well after the end of what has become known as the “1983 War Scare,” these newly released documents do contain insights about the danger of the era, which will be discussed below.

Above: Order Number 1/85

The documents also provide unprecedented operational details about RYaN, including its size, the importance of East German intelligence to the Soviets, the use of computers for RYaN collection, and the 292 indicators that some Eastern Bloc intelligence experts believed could be used to detect a nuclear attack.

For the first time, historians have access to hard numbers about the size of Operation RYaN, revealing that within the KGB, 300 positions were created so that RYaN operatives could implement the real-time “transmission and evaluation” of reported indicators showing the likelihood of a Western first strike. In July of 1984, KGB chairman Victor Chebrikov created a new division within the First Department (Information) of the KGB’s First Main Directorate (responsible for foreign intelligence and operations) to implement Operation RYaN throughout the KGB and world. This coordinating division was composed of 50 KGB officers.[17]

The documents further acknowledge that the Stasi was the KGB’s primary source of foreign intelligence. In July 1981, Andropov thanked Stasi head Erich Mielke for providing information on “West German tank production, defense technology, and the NATO manual [as of now the contents of this manual is unknown].” Andropov then complemented the Stasi, lauding, “We rate your information very highly,” and forebodingly requested Stasi sources procure “an assessment of the NATO manual and NATO’s preparations for war.”[18] In September 1983, Deputy Chairman of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov told Stasi head Erich Mielke that although Andropov was officially on vacation in the Southern USSR, it was “no actual vacation… For half the day he is reading information, including ours [KGB] and what we received from you.” In December 1986, KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov wrote Stasi head Erich Mielke to thank him for the “tangible results in this extremely important area [Operation RYaN].” He emphasized that the KGB “highly value[d] the contribution of the MfS of the GDR to the joint efforts on timely recognition of the danger of a sudden attack.”[19]

There are also references to the primitive computer system that the Soviet Union was attempting to use to track and calculate the coalition of world forces, including the risk of nuclear war. The KGB reported to the Stasi that it had “revised its planning for scientific-technological research and industrial procurement” of new “reliably working technology.” Gordievsky had earlier reported of “a large computer model in the Min[istry] of Defense to calculate and monitor the correlation of forces, including mili[tary], economy, [and] psychological factors, to assign numbers and relative weights.”[20] On November 23, 1983, US Defense and Intelligence officials circulated an article entitled, “In pursuit of the Essence of War” that described a Soviet method which “cataloged and computerized” the world’s “correlation of forces.” The results, it claimed, were “highly objective, empirically provable and readily adaptable to modern data processing.”[21] The newly released documents show that the East Germans were skeptical of Soviet computing prowess, however: past “Soviet experiences show us that a danger exists of computer application concepts not getting implemented,” snidely wrote Marcus Wolf.[22]

Computer analysis was desired because the amount of information captured during Operation RYaN was massive. The newly released Stasi documents provide far more detail than Gordievsky’s account of the precise indicators that human intelligence collectors were compiling and analyzing (such as: activity at Defense instillations, the location of prominent political officials, and even the treatment of “the most important government documents at the US National Archives”). In October 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Kryuchkov revealed that the First Directorate’s Institute for Intelligence Problems[23] had compiled seven binders full of possible RYaN indicators.[24] By May of 1986, these binders had evolved into a catalogue of 292 indicators of “signs of tension.”[25] The Stasi reported that 226 indicators (77 percent) were able to be “covered, though to varying degree.” The indicators were organized into five main categories: Political, Military, Intelligence Services, Civil Defense Agencies, and the Economic sector. A read through the newly released full catalogue of RYaN indicators (as opposed to the truncated list published by Gordievsky) makes the program appear more rational and effective than has previously been portrayed.[26] Just one telling example is the fact that RYaN watchers had sniffed out the US Continuity of Government program, discovering and surveilling “two presidential planes… equipped with accelerated speed [and] electronic apparatuses which work under conditions of nuclear weapons use.”[27] These planes were where the president and his emergency cabinet would command during a nuclear war.

RYaN watchers were also instructed to watch for the “preparation and conduct of large-scale exercises,” because they increased “the level of combat-readiness of US strategic forces,” and hence, could indicate intentions for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” When Gordievsky disclosed Operation RYaN he also revealed Able Archer 83, a November 1983 NATO command post nuclear release exercise that he claims Soviet intelligence may have miscalculated as an actual nuclear strike.[28]

The RYaN catalogue noted several indicators that would have occurred during Able Archer 83 (and other NATO exercises), including: the “large scale transfer of US armed forces” by C-5A and C-141 aircraft (16,000 troops were transferred from the US to Europe on radio silent flights during Autumn Forge 83, which included Able Archer 83); “preparation of anti-ABC [atomic-biological-chemical] protective gear” and mobilization (during Able Archer 83 the war gamers donned ABC equipment and transferred to an Alternate War Headquarters in response to simulated chemical attacks); and, perhaps most importantly, “significant changes in communications” including “transmittal of orders to deploy nuclear weapons” (on October 17-21 1983, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe school in Oberammergau, West Germany trained more than 50 NATO officers on new nuclear weapons release procedures which utilized a new format that was practiced for the first time during Able Archer 83).[29]

Another eyebrow-raising, though certainly not dispositive, reference to Able Archer 83 can be found in these documents. On November 7, the day Able Archer 83 began, an East German Major General (whose name is illegible) sent a summary of discussions between Stasi foreign intelligence chief Marcus Wolf and Deputy KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov to Major General Damm. Gordievsky has written that on November 8 or 9, he “was not sure which,” flash telegrams were sent to both KGB and GRU residencies in Western Europe reporting “an alert on US bases.” The flash telegrams “clearly implied that one of several possible explanations for the (non-existent) alert was that the countdown to a nuclear first strike had actually begun.”[30]

Perhaps relatedly, the East German documents also reveal a persistent undercurrent of skepticism and concern about the effectiveness of Operation RYaN. In August of 1984, Lev Shapkin, deputy director of the KGB for foreign intelligence, told Marcus Wolf that reforms to Operation RYaN were underway. Though no faulty reporting by Operation RYaN during Able Archer 83 was mentioned in the meeting, the two intelligence officials clearly were worried that false warnings of a Western nuclear first strike could lead to preemptive actions by Soviet nuclear forces. Shapkin told Wolf that the indicators agents were observing and reporting “must be complemented, revised, and made more precise,” and bemoaned “the problem of not getting deceived” by faulty indicators. He reiterated that “clear-headedness about the entire RYAN complex” was a “mandatory requirement.” Marcus Wolf included his concerns in an addendum to the summary of the meetings, stressing the need to know the “actual situation” rather than the picture presented by Operation RYaN’s indicators. “Constant and ongoing assessments,” he sensibly wrote, “have to be made whether certain developments actually constitute a crisis or not.”[31]

The documents contained in this release include one final invaluable resource for historians: monthly Soviet intelligence summaries (translated from Russian to German, and now, to English) spanning August 1986 to April 1989. The monthly summaries, serving a purpose likely never imagined by their drafters, allow us to see how Soviet intelligence witnessed and reported the peaceful ending of the Cold War. The reports, which mirror the above RYaN format, are thorough and include much reporting on the West still officially classified in the United States. This includes reports on the operational readiness of Pershing II, MX, and Trident missiles at specific bases, and US military activities in Nicaragua, Panama, and Iran/Iraq. They also include comprehensive reporting of NATO drills and maneuvers. The Soviet observers reported of Able Archer 87, for example, that NATO “simulated” the switch from peace to war time; nuclear consultations were practiced “in the context of the exercise.” Regrettably, no November 1983 RYaN report is yet available for historians to observe if the reporting on Able Archer 83 was as couched and nuanced as it was four years later.

The task of following CWIHP and the BStU’s lead and finding these earlier RYaN reports now falls to archivists and archival burrowers in other former Soviet states now liberalized.[32]

Finally, these monthly RYaN reports about the Cold War’s peaceful resolution reflect the strangeness of the nuclear superpower rivalry itself. The absurd logic of the Cold War becomes evident when one reads about the NATO “elimination of intermediate and tactical nuclear missiles” in a September 1987 report incongruently entitled, “On the Results of Intelligence Activities to Report Indicators for a Sudden Nuclear Missile Attack.”


Comments on the Soviet-East German Intelligence Alert

by Benjamin Fischer

A real contribution

The BStU documents contain important information about both the Soviet intelligence alert RYAN and its East German counterpart KWA (Kernwaffenangriff or nuclear-weapons attack) during the 1980s. On several accounts, we owe Douglas Selvege a debt of gratitude for locating and disseminating the new tranche. First, no Soviet records have become available since former KGB officer (and British agent) Oleg Gordievsky published a selection of RYAN cables almost a quarter of a century ago, and it is unlikely that Russia will declassify new sources. Most commentators, I myself the most culpable, were mesmerized by both the stark tone of both the cables and Gordievsky’s various accounts of the “war scare.” A more balanced interpretation is now possible. Second, the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) and especially its foreign intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung A (Main Directorate A, hereafter HV A), played a major role in the alert system documented here for the first time. For many years, the only information on the East German side was Markus Wolf’s memoir (1997), which some researchers considered a reliable and original source while others did not. Wolf, however, couched his brief account, referring only to RYAN, not KWA. He apparently expected that HV A records would never see the light of day. There was good reason to do so, since most files were destroyed on the eve of German unification.[33] Though skeptical about the purpose and priority of the Soviet intelligence alert, Wolf nevertheless saluted and obeyed KGB orders. The MfS/HV A organized an elaborate early-warning system (Früherkennung/Frühwarnsystem) that replicated and, to some degree, exceeded its Soviet counterpart.

How scary was the war scare?

Wolf occupied a much higher position than Gordievsky in the Warsaw Pact intelligence community. The spymaster was closer to the real center of power in Moscow, was a keen observer of both superpowers, and his agents in the West— especially inside NATO provided insights that countered the ideological stereotype of the “inherent aggressiveness” of the Western alliance. Moreover, his view may have been in line with the actual perceptions of his Soviet masters.

Yuri Andropov was the leading proponent of RYAN. He inaugurated the alert in 1981 as chairman of the KGB and presided over its expansion after succeeding Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary the next year. In May 1981, during a private conversation with Wolf’s boss, State Security Minister Erich Mielke, Andropov assessed the Reagan administration’s plans for accelerated modernization of strategic and theater-nuclear forces:

The US is preparing for war, but it is not willing to start a war. They are not building factories and palaces in order to destroy them. They are striving for military superiority in order to “check” us and then declare “checkmate” against us without starting a war. Maybe I am wrong.[34]

Andropov added that Washington had abandoned détente because it benefited the USSR at the expense of the US—in words that echoed Ronald Reagan’s condemnation of détente as a “one-way” street! Now the US was trying to recover its losses by reverting to the earlier policy of containment, in other words, to the old Cold War.

Two years later, facing the prospect of deployment of new US Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, Andropov addressed a meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee. The missiles were the “most serious challenge,” he said, and the military situation was “especially dangerous.” In the past, the US had counted on its nuclear weapons “to deter” and “to contain” the Soviet Union; now there was talk of actually fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war.[35] “It is difficult to say where the line between extortion and actual preparation to take a fateful step lies.”[36]

Andropov stopped short of declaring that war was imminent or unavoidable. In his public statements, however, he spoke as if the world was on the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Soviet propagandists compared Reagan to Hitler and the US to Nazi Germany on the eve of 1941. Less than a month after Andropov’s speech, the KGB dispatched a cable that sounded the alarm, asserting that RYAN “now lies at the core of [Soviet] military strategy;” the intelligence alert had become a military alert.[37]

Another “cut” at the question of leadership thinking on the prospect of war comes from a Politburo meeting in May 1983. Acknowledging that the US cruise and ballistic missiles would arrive on schedule, Andropov turned to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for an assessment of US intentions. Gromyko replied: “The United States, as is known, is talking about the fact that they can only strike in response to aggression. I think that without enough reason they wouldn’t dare to use nuclear missiles.” He added that, in any event, NATO’s pluralist structure would act as brake on the US: “Against the first strike are also Canada, England, France, and West Germany.”

The Alert Ramps Up

The Soviets were nervous but not to the point of shaking in their boots. RYAN did not, as Gordievsky claimed, begin to wind down in mid-1984, on the eve of his departure from London and after he had lost access to KGB cable traffic. It ramped up. KGB officer Lev Shapkin briefed the East Germans on a series of decisions made to expand RYAN and to create an infrastructure to support it.[38] The KGB formed a new division within the First (information/analysis) Department of the First Chief (foreign intelligence) Directorate (FCD). It was a situation center or watch office designed to collect and assess warning indicators and levy requirements on the FCD’s operations divisions and signals intelligence (Sigint) department.

The new division was a high priority and was almost certainly initiated by Andropov. The formation of a special RYAN commission chaired by KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov underscored the alert’s top-level political backing and its bureaucratic clout. Chebrikov earmarked 300 slots for the new RYAN division, 50 of which had been filled to monitor warning indications around the clock. However, the KGB had trouble finding qualified personnel and training officers to perform “warning-and-indications of war intelligence,” as it is referred to by US intelligence services. This is one of several signs that the Soviets, even in this late stage of the Cold War, had little or no experience with early-warning intelligence.

Warning and Surprise

RYAN was launched in May 1981 during an All-Union Conference of senior KGB managers from the length and breadth of the USSR. Andropov chaired it, but the presence of Leonid Brezhnev signified that the session was no routine gabfest. Gordievsky’s accounts give the impression that RYAN was the sole item on the agenda. It was not.

The East German documents show that the conference discussed a range of threats, referred to as “surprises,” emanating from within the USSR and the Eastern bloc, as well as from the international arena. The KGB chieftains were instructed to reorient their collection priorities toward early detection and advance warning of potential or impending crises that threatened the internal security and stability, as well as external security, of the Soviet empire. As KGB officer [full name unknown] Zinyov told the East Germans, the new operational directive was to “allow no surprises.” The mission of “Chekist work,” he added, now encompassed “the struggle against espionage and terror, questions of the economy, morale, the construction industry, etc.”[39]

Subsequently, FCD chief Vladimir Kryuchkov confided to Wolf that even foreign intelligence had been drawn into novel operations aimed at detecting threats to internal security originating from outside the USSR.[40] The MfS and HV A followed suit. “The bunker mentality of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] leadership revealed itself in the mantra-like repetition ‘impede every surprise from the enemy in every area.’”[41] This originally meant external military threats, i.e., the war scare, but then it expanded to include a range of dangers posed by domestic dissidence—religious, pacifist, and environmental groups, e.g.—allegedly supported by the West. The “most urgent” mission of the MfS, as well as the HV A, was to detect this conflation of internal and external “surprises” and to “prophylactically” deal with them before they grew to threaten the GDR regime.

Wolf’s repeated assertion that his service had nothing to do with the Stasi police-state was false. Like his counterpart Kryuchkov, Wolf followed orders. HV A case officers and their agents were tasked with collecting intelligence on internal threats emanating from abroad, even at the expense of conventional foreign intelligence inside the GDR and in the “Operations Area” (Stasi-deutsch for West Germany, West Berlin, and other NATO countries). The HV A began filing counterintelligence reports (Abwerberichte)—normally the provenance of the MfS internal security and surveillance departments—which contributed to increased repression in the GDR.[42]

KWA and the Frühwarnsystem

The MfS/HV A was the largest and most efficient Eastern bloc security/foreign intelligence service outside the Soviet Union. Its operational assets were considerable and in several respects exceeded those of the KGB, especially the massive MfS signals intelligence (Sigint) main directorate and the HV A’s extensive agent (Humint) networks that targeted West Germany/West Berlin and the US and NATO presence there.[43] Following the expansion of RYAN in mid-July, the KGB used the MfS/HV A to replicate its own organizational and operational model for early-warning intelligence.

This new collection includes one of the two key documents on KWA, Mielke’s Order Nr. 1/85, which mandated it as “the absolute priority” [emphasis in original] for the entire MfS.[44] The Order authorized Wolf, in his capacity as deputy MfS head, to formulate and implement an organizational plan and operational directives for the entire MfS. The second document[45] is not included in the collection, but several years ago I translated and commented on both documents.[46] The main components of the HV A’s early-warning system included:[47]

  • A “catalog” of warning indicators that was based on the RYAN template of five “political/societal areas” (US/NATO political and military leaderships, intelligence services, civil defense organizations, and economic institutions); it also included targets covered by MfS Sigint and HV A agent networks in West Germany/West Berlin, as well as US/NATO diplomatic, military, and intelligence sites in West Germany;[48]
  • A centralized situation center (Lagezentrum) to constantly monitor KWA indicators on a global basis;
  • A dedicated communications link to the KGB’s situation center;
  • Annual alert drills and military exercises for HV A officers that simulated conditions of a surprise attack;[49]
  • Emergency communications plans and safe houses in West Germany for agents selected to report on KWA;[50]
  • Coordination of operations and intelligence sharing with East German military intelligence on the Soviet model of KGB-GRU cooperation under RYAN guidelines.

A Catalog of Warning Indicators

The focal point of Soviet and East German collaboration was the compilation of a list or “catalog” of warning-of-war indicators designed to detect signs of an impending crisis or war “in real time.” The KGB demanded that the HV A catalog should be based on “strict conformity” with the RYAN template, i.e., on the five “political/societal areas” noted above.

Above: Cover page from the HA III copy of the Project RYaN catalog of indicators.

MfS/HV A records reveal that both services devoted considerable effort to conceptualizing, defining, and operationalizing warning indicators, yet they also seemed to have encountered problems that were never fully resolved. The main objective was agent penetration of “the enemy’s decision-making centers” and acquisition of “documents” on a political decision for war. The Soviet-East German intelligence reach, however, exceeded its grasp. The overriding goal was to obtain advance warning of a US decision to launch strategic nuclear forces, an urgent requirement since one-third of those forces remained on permanent alert, and the rest could be readied on short notice. A 1986 HV A report noted that “at the moment” this had not been accomplished.[51]

The second string to the RYAN/KWA bow was an extensive list of indirect indicators that, it was assumed, would reveal the implementation of alert procedures and mobilization plans that could not be concealed from intelligence surveillance and monitoring. The KGB and HV A were forced to resort to “observable intelligence,” i.e., things that can be seen and counted, in lieu of “message-like” intelligence, which relies on well-placed agents with access to plans, decisions, and intentions.[52] RYAN/KWA signified that the neither the KGB nor the HV A had such agents in place. The questionable methodological assumption was that overt or visible deviations from peacetime norms in the five political/societal areas could reveal a decision to attack the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries.

The one place where both services had well-placed agents was NATO headquarters. The KGB cables Gordievsky published, as well as the East German documents[EMP1] , reveal detailed knowledge of the alliance’s alert procedures and early-warning capabilities, especially NATO’s “crisis management” system. The KGB and HV A did not, however, find it reassuring that NATO arrangements were designed to warn of a Warsaw Pact attack in time to mount a defense. They simply declared that “crisis management” was dual-purpose concept that could be used to attack as well as warn.

The whole RYAN/KWA framework was anachronistic, seemingly more appropriate for the pre-nuclear age when states required lead times to mobilize armed forces and prepare populations for war. The template came from the KGB’s Institute for Research on Operational Problems. One explanation is that with little knowledge or experience to draw on, the Institute was dusting off old lessons learned from a previous surprise attack, namely Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa.

Some of the indicators were based on a mirror-image of how the Warsaw Pact would prepare for war, such as the stockpiling of mineral oil and mass slaughter of cattle. HV A case officers, for example, were instructed to look for:

“Confirmation of deviations in the behavior of prominent personalities and other persons in possession of classified information as well as their family members and persons close to them, which can be viewed as measures for protecting their own security (among other things, sudden moving into specially equipped secure accommodations, unexpected departure from normal residential areas and from border zones at home and abroad).”

The GDR, meanwhile, was building bunkers and fall-out shelters for the political, military, and intelligence elite and practicing “evacuation exercises” in case of a putative nuclear assault.[53]

The KGB and the HV A both had difficulties defining “key” indicators and do not appear to have arranged them in rank order or have assigned numerical weights or some form of an “accounting” method. There is a fleeting reference to the possibility of reaching false conclusions about hostile intentions, but the inherent problem of arriving at a false positive as watch officers worked through their checklists was apparently never fully addressed. Was there a tipping point or designated critical mass of accumulated indicators that would predict an attack? We don’t know, and the documents don’t tell us.

In 1986, the HV A reported that it had covered 226 of the 292 (!) indicators (“77%”), “albeit in varying degrees,” from its catalog, but what that meant is not clear. Were the results negative—no war on the horizon—or positive? The documents refer to efforts to employ computer-based data processing, but they also allude to problems with software and algorithms that, apparently, were never resolved.

All intelligence bureaucracies write memos and send cables when they want to give the impression that they are making decisions and taking action while, actually, “slow rolling the process.” The KGB-HV A dialogue on the indicators may have been no different. Despite repeated references to the urgency and priority of the alert, the HV A took several years to compile its own list of indicators. Meetings of working-level experts in Moscow and East Berlin were arranged at a leisurely pace. It took more than a year after Order Nr. 1/85 to organize an HV A situation center to monitor KWA indicators. By the time it was up and running, the entire effort was about to be overtaken by events in Moscow with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev and “new thinking.”

Mielke’s Variant

RYAN single-mindedly focused on the putative threat of a US surprise attack on the USSR. KGB cables declared that timely warning was required for Soviet strategic forces to take “retaliatory measures,” but the logic of the alert suggests that a preemptive first-strike, not a second-strike after US missiles had been launched, was the actual purpose.

Mielke repeatedly, and vainly, pushed for consideration of “other variants” of surprise, in particular conflict in Central Europe arising from a crisis in East-West relations. Mielke’s concern, shared by many in West Germany, was that the superpowers were prepared to fight in Europe, with conventional forces or “limited” nuclear strikes, down to the last German and on the last inch of German soil.[54] The Soviets simply ignored him. As the documents show time and again, Kremlin leaders had far less concern for their ally’s security than for their own.

Tradecraft and the war scare

The documents contain several references to operational tradecraft that underscore the Warsaw Pact’s lack of experience with warning intelligence. With the onset of the RYAN and KWA alerts, the KGB and the HV A, apparently for the first time, decided to issue to selected agents in the West rapid response communications equipment. The German term was Sofortmeldung (immediate reporting), which may have referred either to radios or burst transmitters using satellite relays to transmit encrypted electronic signals to the HV A situation center.

Theretofore, the KGB and HV A had employed personal communications (face-to-face meetings) or impersonal communications (dead drops) to pass requirements to and collect information from agents. Such arrangements required advance planning, conduct of pre-and-post meeting surveillance detection routes, and continuous “casing” for meeting or dead drop sites. Old-fashion tradecraft was secure but time-consuming and not suited for real-time reporting.

So, what was the war scare?

Wolf and his officers found Moscow’s “war games” a burdensome waste of time in pursuit of a non-existent threat. Some said KWA was a bureaucratic boondoggle that Mielke used to expand his power and influence. Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War” and a “sort of window dressing, and boiled down to compilation of regular reports stating that any given country was not intending in the next few days to drop nuclear bombs on the USSR.”[55] Soviet and East German leaders, however, were genuinely fearful, even if the threats and conspiracies they saw all around them were often exaggerated or even imaginary. As they were losing their grip on power, they were also losing their grip on reality.

Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War”

At the same time, the US was investing billions of dollars to upgrade its command-and-control, communications, intelligence, and early-warning capabilities, all predicated on the potential threat a Soviet surprise attack.[56] During the last decade of the Cold War, the fear of war was reciprocal and real, even if the threat of war was not.


Document Appendix

Document 1: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Brief Note, ‘Issues to Discuss with the Leadership of the KGB of the USSR’. 14 January 1983

A brief note written by the Ministry of State Security that includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

Document 2: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow’. 9 February 1983

This note on the talks between Minister Wolf and KGB Chairman Chebrikov contains heartfelt congratulations on cooperation thus far, but it also highlights problems with the situation and the importance of utilizing the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.

Document 3: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov’. 3 October 1983

These notes describe statements made by Colonel General Kryuchkov which outline the current state of Soviet institutions and intelligence networks in various regions, including Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the United States.

Document 4: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov’. 7 November 1983

This report describes conversations with Comrade Kryuchkov, coving a multitude of subjects, but delving briefly into the problem of “prevention of a surprise nuclear attack” (RYAN). Kryuchkov responded that this issue is being continually worked on, but no central decisions had been made as of yet.

Document 5: Committee for State Security (KGB), ‘Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’. 26 November 1984

A catalog of indicators of NATO preparation for nuclear war that were monitored by Warsaw Pact intelligence services under Project RYaN. The activity is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, and economic.

Document 6: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Order Number 1/85. 15 February 1985

This order from the Ministry of State Security describes the tasks of the MfS units concerning efforts to uncover intentions of aggression and surprise military activities by western states and their allies, especially a surprise nuclear missile attack against the USSR.

Document 7:Speech, East German Minister of State Security Mielke, ‘At the Enlarged Collegium Meeting on 7 June 1985 about Further Preparation of the XI SED Party Congress’. 10 June 1985

This speech by East German Minister of State Security Mielke addresses the technological, intellectual, and ideological preparations for war by the west and how to uncover and organize indicators of a potential attack.

Document 8: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)’. 6 May 1985

This report by Ministry of State Security describes developments and achievements toward early recognition of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

Document 9: Letter, East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov. 10 November 1986

This letter from East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Chebrikov requests a consultation on the development and continuation of Complex RYAN, especially on furthering collaboration between the MfS and KGB.

Document 10: Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke. 24 December 1986

Responding to Mielke’s letter from November 1986, Chebrikov agrees to the proposed meeting between the MfS and the KGB on the subject of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the states of the socialist community.

Document 11: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Plan for Consultations with the Delegation of the KGB. 20 January 1987.

This document is a plan for the consultations to take place in Berlin between the Stasi and the KBG. It includes objectives and proposed theses on the subject of early recognition of a sudden nuclear missile attack by NATO forces.

Documents 12 A–T: Committee for State Security (KGB), ‘About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’.

Documents 12A–T are monthly intelligence reports digests generated using intelligence by Project RyaN between August 1986 and April 1989.

[1] Süß, Walter and Douglas Selvage. “CWIHP e-Dossier No. 37: KGB/Stasi Cooperation” Cold War International History Project http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kgbstasi-cooperation.

[2]  “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721

[3] „Das MfS und die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen kommunistischen Geheimdiensten: Staatssicherheit und sowjetischer KGB.“ Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.  http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/MfS-Dokumente/MfS-KGB/_node.html.

[4] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.

[5] See below respective comments by Nate Jones and Ben Fischer.

[6] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov,” September 19, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5306, pp. 1-19. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115718.

Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov described Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.” Put differently, the Soviet side wondered what would have been if the plane would have been a military aircraft and part of a Western surprise attack: In this case the Soviet Union would have been unable to detect such an attack, i.e. Moscow would have become “surprised.”

[7] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 585.

[8] Other sources vary the spelling of RYaN. Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin spelled it “ryon.” Another spelling includes the word “surprise:” “VRYAN” “vnezapnoe raketno yadernoe napadenie” –surprise nuclear missile attack. Czech Intelligence referred to the operation as NRJAN.  One document shows that the Bulgarians monitored “VRYAN indicators” as late as June 1987.  These East German documents confirm that the operation continued until at least April, 1989.  The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 523; Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West, (New York: St. Martins, 1994), 302; 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”

[9] RYaN Translation #2

[10] The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/.

[11] The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/; Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464. Recently, Benjamin Fischer has introduced an additional potential source of East German fear: CANOPY WING, purportedly a US military research project to exploit a vulnerability of Soviet Warsaw pact command and control communications to launch a “decapitation/surgical” strike.

[12] 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”

[13] “Issues to discuss with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR” http://digitalarchive.org/document/119308.

[14] “Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow.” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119319.

[15] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.

[16] “Order Number 1/85” http://digitalarchive.org/document/119322.

[17] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721. It is possible that this new coordinating division was created as a reaction to the false alerts generated by Operation RYaN in November 1983 incorrectly warning that a NATO nuclear release drill, Able Archer 83, could have been an actual nuclear attack.

[18] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115717.

[19] ”Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke.” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119332; For more on the East German contributions to Soviet intelligence collection, see Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464.

[20] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/.

[21] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/.

[22] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721

[23] Translated here as “Institute for Operative Problems.”

[24] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119320

[25] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)”  http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119334.

[26] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Report, ‘Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document 119338. A partially declassified CIA document shows that Operation RYaN had its analogue in U.S. intelligence gathering. The CIA was also working with the DIA, and presumably allied intelligence agencies, to create a list of indicators — including the defense industry — for its chiefs of station to monitor, in an attempt to “emphasize greater early warning cooperation with intelligence services.”  Other parallels to RYaN date back to 1961, when the Soviets also instructed embassies in all “capitalist” countries to collect and report information during the Berlin Crisis. In 1991, one might have deduced the January 16 Desert Storm invasion by monitoring the influx of pizza deliveries to the Pentagon, according to current U.S. Army Operational Security (OPSEC) training materials.  In October 1983, justifying the KGB’s difficulties, Kryuchkov stated, “Even in the United States they have not completed this [a RYaN equivalent] yet.” The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/.

[27]  “Report, Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119909. For more on Continuity of Government, see James Mann, “The Armageddon Plan,” The Atlantic, March 2004.

[28] Still-classified reports by the British Joint Intelligence Council and the US President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have allegedly confirmed Gordievsky’s accounts.  See The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/, and British Documents Confirm UK Alerted US to Danger of Able Archer 83, http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/11/04/british-documents-confirm-uk-alerted-us-to-danger-of-able-archer-83/

[29] The 1983 War Scare, Part Two http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/.

[30] Regrettably, no text of the November 8 or 9 flash telegram has been released or reproduced. Gordievsky’s revelation of this warning is the only basis for the current historical record (though the preceding and following telegrams which he reproduced and published do serve as somewhat sturdy bona fides).  Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985, (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1991), 87.

[31] Marcus Wolf did not write kindly of the Soviets, or Operation RYaN, in his 1997 memoir:  “Our Soviet partners had become obsessed with the danger of a nuclear missile attack,” though he writes that he had not. “Like most intelligent people, I found these war games a burdensome waste of time, but these orders were no more open to discussion than other orders from above.” Marcus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (New York: Random House, 1997), 222.   http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.

[32] Welcome, Ukraine.  http://euromaidanberlin.wordpress.com/2014/04/01/kgb-archives-in-ukraine-will-be-open-to-public/

[33] For an account of the file destruction by the HV A officer who supervised it, see Klaus Eichner and Gotthold Schramm, Konterspionage: Die DDR-Aufklärung in den Geheimdienstzentrum (Berlin: edition ost, 2010), pp. 174-177.

[34] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115717

[35] Andropov was referring to the new US war-fighting strategy for “prevailing” in a limited nuclear conflict that was first announced as Presidential Directive 59 by the Carter administration and slightly modified during the Reagan administration in National Security Decision Memorandum 13.

[36] “Speech of General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” Available at   <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/doc19.htm&gt;

[37] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. 74.

[38] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721

[39] RYAN Translation #2: “Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, on February 9, 1983 in Moscow.”

[40] RYAN Translation #3: “Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov, V. A. on October 3, 1983.”

[41] Peter Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione: Ein Insider Report (Berlin: elefanten press, 1992), p. 85.

[42] Ibid.

[43] On MfS Sigint, see Ben B. Fischer, “‘One of the Biggest Ears in the World’: East German Sigint Operations,’” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11:2 (Spring 1998), pp.142‑153.  The MfS, the HV A, and the intelligence service of the East German Army were handling some 3,000 agents in West Germany/West Berlin when the Berlin Wall fell.  About half spied for the MfS and military intelligence and the other half for the HV A. Five of every 100,000 West German citizens were “working clandestinely for the GDR.” Georg Herbstritt, Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage: Eine analytische Studie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 2007), p. 84.

[44] “Befehl 1/85 zu den Aufgaben der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitigen Aufklärung akuter Agressionsabsichten und überraschender militärischer Aktivitäten imperialisticher Staaten und Bundnisse, inbesondere zur Verhinderung eines überraschinden Raketenkernwaffenangriffs gegen Staaten der sozialistischen Gemeinschaft,” BstU [Bündesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR], ZA [Zentralarchiv], DSt [Dokumentenstelle im Zentalarchiv des BStU]103137. Also RYAN Translation #4.

[45] “1. Durchführungsbestimmung des Stellvertreters des Ministers auf Befehl 1/85 vom 15.2.1985, GVS 0008-1/85: Allzeitige Nutzung der Möglichkeiten der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitgen und zuverlässigen Beschaffung von Hinweisen auf akute feindliche Aggressionsabsichten, -vorbereitungen und –handlungen,” BstU, ZA, DSt103137.

[46] Benjamin B. Fischer, “The 1980s Soviet War Scare: New Evidence from East German Documents,” Intelligence and National Security, 14:4 (Autumn 1999), pp. 186-197.

[47] Wolf’s tasking of MfS departments is described in Ibid.

[48] “Katalog ausgewählter Indikatoren zur Früherkennung gegnerischer militärischer Aggressionsvorbereitungen und Überraschungsabsichten, inbesondere von Maßssnahmen zur Vorbereitung eines überraschenden Raketenwaffenangriffs (KWA),” BstU, ZA, DSt103137. A different version of this text is available in Document #5 of this collection.

[49] See Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, pp. 72, 85 and Günter Bohnsack, Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung: Die Legende Stirbt  (Berlin: edition ost, 1997), p. 64.

[50] Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 85.

[51] RYAN Translation #6: “R E P O R T on development and achieved state of work regarding early recognition of enemy attack and surprise intentions (Complex RYAN).”

[52] Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 83-88.

[53] Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 72.

[54] Fear of a superpower conflict lead GDR leader Erich Honecker to open a back channel to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a decision that irritated Andropov. Markus Wolfe, Man Without a Face (New York: Times Books, 1997), p. 221.

[55] Mikhail A. Alexeev, Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 203.

[56] See Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992). Parallels between mutual American and Soviet fears of surprise attack are discussed in Benjamin B. Fischer, “The Soviet-American War Scare of the 1980s,” International Journal of Intelligence andCounterintelligence 19:3, Fall 2006, pp.480-519.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Bernd Schaefer

Bernd Schaefer

Global Fellow, Former Senior Scholar;
Professional Lecturer, The George Washington University
Nate Jones

Nate Jones

Director, Freedom of Information Act Project, National Security Archive

Benjamin B. Fischer

Former Chief Historian of the Central Intelligence Agency

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Nuclear Proliferation International History Project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews, and other empirical sources. At the Wilson Center, it is part of the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program.  Read more

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War. Through an award winning Digital Archive, the Project allows scholars, journalists, students, and the interested public to reassess the Cold War and its many contemporary legacies. It is part of the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program.  Read more

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back

49 journalists were killed, 389 are currently in prison and 57 are being held hostage in 2019

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Here is the report about 49 journalists who were killed this year 2019 just for doing their job, 389 are currently in prison and 57 are being held hostage.

Continue reading “49 journalists were killed, 389 are currently in prison and 57 are being held hostage in 2019”

GRU-KGB Mord an Putin-Feind mitten in Berlin – die Spur führt nach Moskau

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Langsam dämmert es auch den Mainstream-Medien, das GRU/KGB und Neo-STASI weiterhin aktiv sind und unbequeme Gegner überall auf der Welt ermorden – auch in BERLIN. So berichtet nunmehr auch die wachgeküsste Tagesschau:

“Zelimkhan Khangoshvili fürchtete um sein Leben. Der russische Staat sei hinter ihm her, berichtete der Tschetschene mit georgischem Pass bei seiner Asylanhörung im brandenburgischen Eisenhüttenstadt im Januar 2017. Mehrere Mordanschläge habe es in den vergangenen Jahren auf ihn gegeben, so der ehemalige Rebellenkommandeur. Er sei ein gesuchter Mann – im Kaukasus und darüber hinaus. Was er denn befürchte, wenn er nach Russland zurückkehren müsste, wollte der Mitarbeiter des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) von ihm wissen. Khangoshvilis Antwort: “Die russischen Organe werden einen Mord inszenieren.”

Am 23. August 2019, gegen 11:58 Uhr, wurde Zelimkhan Khangoshvili schließlich ermordet. Nicht in Russland oder im Kaukasus, sondern mitten in Berlin. Im Kleinen Tiergarten im Ortsteil Moabit war der 40-Jährige gerade auf dem Weg zum Freitagsgebet in der Moschee, als sich ein Mann auf einem Fahrrad näherte und ihm aus kurzer Distanz mit einer Pistole samt Schalldämpfer in den Kopf schoss. Khangoshvili war sofort tot.

Der Mord an dem Georgier gibt seitdem Rätsel auf: Wer steckt hinter dem Attentat? War es ein Auftragsmord aus dem kriminellen Milieu? Eine Fehde unter Kaukasiern? Oder gar ein Attentat im Auftrag des Kreml?

Der mutmaßliche Todesschütze hatte nach der Tat versucht mit einem E-Roller zu fliehen, war jedoch festgenommen worden: Es ist ein stämmiger Mann mit Schnauzbart und auffälligen Tätowierungen. Laut Pass handelt es sich um den russischen Staatsbürger Vadim Sokolov. Er sitzt in Berlin in Untersuchungshaft und schweigt. Einmal soll er Besuch von Diplomaten aus der russischen Botschaft bekommen haben, die ihn konsularisch betreuen.

Die Ermittlungen in dem Fall führt das Berliner Landeskriminalamt (LKA). Der Vorwurf gegen den festgenommenen Tatverdächtigen lautete bislang: Mord. Weil die Tat aber eine so große Brisanz birgt, lässt sich der Generalbundesanwalt seit Beginn an über den Stand der Ermittlungen informieren. Und auch das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) ist beteiligt.

Jetzt könnte der Fall allerdings eine neue Dimension bekommen: Die Bundesanwaltschaft will das Verfahren nach Informationen von WDR, NDR und “Süddeutscher Zeitung” noch in dieser Woche übernehmen. Und zwar wegen eines möglichen Geheimdienst-Hintergrunds. In Karlsruhe geht man inzwischen davon aus, dass der russische Staat den Mord in Berlin-Moabit in Auftrag gegeben haben könnte. Auch der “Spiegel” hatte darüber berichtet.

Ein Abgleich der biometrischen Daten der damaligen Fahndungsbilder ergab nun eine hohe Ähnlichkeit mit dem in Berlin festgenommenen Tatverdächtigen Sokolov. Auffällig war allerdings: Russland hatte die internationale Fahndung nach Vadim K. im Jahr 2015 ganz plötzlich eingestellt. Der Verdacht der deutschen Ermittler ist nun: Russische Dienste könnten den mutmaßlichen Mörder gefunden und für ein Attentat rekrutiert haben. Und schufen daraufhin die Falschidentität Sokolov.”

In Geheimdienstkreisen ist man sich sicher, es war Putins langer Arm in Berlin.

Under Surveillance – Ex-Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroeder is a Suspect for Trading Top NATO Secrets for Money

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Coming soon – Former Chancellor Schroeder is a Suspect in trading NATO Secrets for Money

 

Stay tuned

 

Must See Video – Sex Espionage A Secret Weapon for the KGB

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Sex-espionage A Secret Weapon Of The Kgb, Sex Espionage Book, Sex Espionage And Love, Espionage Sex Education, Espionage Sex Change, Sex Lies And Espionage, Sex-espionage A Secret Weapon Of The Kgb, Sex Espionage And Love, Sex And Espionage, Sex Lies And Espionage, Sex Espionage Book, Espionage Sex Change, Espionage Sex Education, Sex Espionage And Love, Sex-espionage A Secret Weapon Of The Kgb, Sex-espionage A Secret Weapon Of The Kgb, Sex-espionage A Secret Weapon Of The Kgb

Putins Netzwerk in Europa – Wie Moskau rechte Parteien sponsert und unterwandert – Video

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Putin Wife,Putin News,Putin Net Worth,Putin Height,Putin Bay,Putin Memes,Putin Trump,Putin On The Ritz,Putin Age,Putin Trump Meeting,Putin And Trump,Putin Age,Putin And Trump Meeting,Putin Approval Rating,Putin And Obama,Putin Ally Crossword,Putin Assad,Putin And North Korea,Putin And Reagan,Putin As A Child,Putin Bay,Putin Bear,Putin Birthday,Putin Biography,Putin Bay Hotels,Putin Badass,Putin Bay Weather,Putin Blueberry Hill,Putin Bay Ferry,Putin Black Belt,Putin Children,Putin Calendar,Putin Clown,Putin Cartoon,Putin Chechnya,Putin Crying,Putin Canada,Putin Crimea,Putin Corruption,Putin Clinton,Putin Daughters,Putin Dog,Putin Documentary,Putin Dead,Putin Dog Merkel,Putin Definition,Putin Dancing,Putin Dolphins,Putin Drawing,Putin Dancing Gif,Putin Election,Putin Eating Popcorn,Putin English,Putin Election Results,Putin Erdogan,Putin Education,Putin Economy,Putin Eyes,Putin Exxon Deal,Putin Eye Color,Putin Family,Putin Food,Putin Funny,Putin Face,Putin Facts,Putin French,Putin Fishing,Poutine Fries,Putin Fascist,Putin Funny Face,Putin Gif,Putin Genocide,Putin Global Warming,Putin Gymnast,Putin Wife,Putin Gun,Putin Glasses,Putin Gangster,Putin Government,Putin Gorbachev,Putin Height,Putin Horse,Putin House,Putin Horseback,Putin Hockey,Putin History,Putin Hunting,Putin Hillary,Putin Human Rights,Putin Home,Putin Interview,Putin Images,Putin Israel,Putin Iq,Putin Isis,Putin In French,Putin Island,Putin Inauguration,Putin In Power,Putin Instagram,Putin Judo,Putin Jill Stein,Putin Journalists,Putin John Oliver,Putin Jehovah,Putin Jw,Putin Judo Gif,Putin Jesus,Putin James Bond,Putin Jehovah Witness,Putin Kgb,Putin Korea,Putin Karate,Putin Kremlin,Putin Kleptocracy,Putin Kim Jong Un,Putin Kraft Ring,Putin Kabaeva,Putin Khuilo,Putin Kid,Putin Laughing,Putin Laughing Gif,Putin Le Pen,Putin Languages,Putin Latest News,Putin Loves Trump,Putin Lollipop,Putin Likes Trump,Putin Limo,Putin Leadership,Putin Memes,Putin Merkel Dog,Putin Married,Putin Merkel,Putin Makeup,Putin Mask,Putin Martial Arts,Putin Meaning,Putin Macron,Putin Mansion,Putin News,Putin Net Worth,Putin North Korea,Putin New Wife,Putin Netanyahu,Putin Nato,Putin Net Worth Wiki,Putin Name Meaning,Putin Nickname,Putin Nuclear War,Putin On The Ritz,Putin On A Horse,Putin On Trump,Putin On North Korea,Putin Obama,Putin On The Ritz Gif,Putin On Syria,Putin Opposition,Putin On Snl,Putin On The Ritz Meme,Putin President,Putin Piano,Putin Palace,Putin Political Party,Putin Picture,Putin Poison,Putin Propaganda,Putin Puns,Putin Pop Song,Putin Popularity,Putin Quotes,Putin Quotes On Obama,Putin Queen Elizabeth,Putin Quotes Funny,Putin Quizlet,Putin Queen Elizabeth Stairs,Putin Quotes On Trump,Putin Quora,Putin Quote Immigrants,Putin Quebec,Putin Russia,Putin Reagan,Putin Riding Trump,Putin Rise To Power,Putin Reelection,Putin Richest Man In The World,Putin Riding A Ritz Cracker,Putin Response,Putin Ritz,Putin Rainbow,Putin Snl,Putin Syria,Putin Song,Putin Smiling,Putin Speech,Putin Shirt,Putin Speaking English,Putin Singing,Putin Salary,Putin Super Bowl Ring,Putin Trump,Putin Trump Meeting,Putin Twitter,Putin Trump Meme,Putin Trump Horse,Putin Trump Kiss,Putin Term Limit,Putin Trump Gif,Putin Term,Putin Today,Putin Ukraine,Putin Ussr,Putin Us Visit,Putin Unicorn,Putin Us Elections,Putin Un,Putin Undercover,Putin Urban Dictionary,Putin United Nations,Putin Us Relations,Putin Vs Trump,Putin Vs Obama,Putin Vladimir,Putin Video,Putin Vodka,Putin Vs Stalin,Putin Visits Trump,Putin Visit To White House,Putin Vampire,Putin Vs Obama Meme,Putin Wife,Putin Wiki,Putin Wealth,Putin Wink,Putin War,Putin Ww3,Putin Watch,Putin Winking Gif,Putin With Animals,Putin Walking,Putin Xi Jinping,Putin X Obama,Putin X Reader,Putin Xi,Putin And Trump,Putin And Obama,Putin And Assad,Putin And North Korea,Putin And Reagan,Putin And The Ritz,Putin Young,Putin Youtube,Putin Yacht,Putin Youth,Putin Yeltsin,Putin Yume,Putin Years As President,Putin Young Pictures,Putin Youth Army,Putin Yarmulke,Putin Zodiac Sign,Putin Zakaria,Putin Zassal,Putin Zassal Lyrics,Putin Zero Hedge,Putin Zeman,Putin Zil Limousine,Putin Zuma,Putin Za Makedonija,Putin Zapretio Albancima,

The Polonium plot: The Litvinenko Murder revealed

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

In the aftermath of a British Public Inquiry, this is the dramatic full story of how the Russian State was involved in the radioactive poisoning murder in London of Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB agent.

Litvinenko Poison, Litvinenko Book, Litvinenko Putin, Litvinenko Documentary, Litvinenko Miss Usa, Litvinenko Movie, Litvinenko Greenwich Ct, Litvinenko Politkovskaya, Litvinenko Trump, Litvinenko Report, Litvinenko Assassination, Litvinenko Alexander, Litvinenko Autopsy, Litvinenko Abc, Litvinenko Apartment Bombings, Litvinenko Autopsy Report, Litvinenko Armenia, Litvinenko Anatoly, Litvinenko Anna, Litvinenko Article, Litvinenko Book, Litvinenko Before After, Litvinenko Bbc, Litvinenko Blowing Up Russia, Litvinenko Buried, Litvinenko Burial, Litvinenko Book Pdf, Litvinenko Bbc News, Litvinenko Bbc Documentary, Litvinenko Book Amazon, Litvinenko Channel 4, Litvinenko Cause Of Death, Litvinenko Contamination, Litvinenko Channel 4 Documentary, Litvinenko Chechnya, Litvinenko Corbyn, Litvinenko Cctv, Litvinenko Cnn, Litvinenko Cameron, Litvinenko Coroner, Litvinenko Death, Litvinenko Documentary, Litvinenko Documentary Bbc, Litvinenko Documentary Channel 4, Litvinenko Documentary Bbc 2017, Litvinenko Death Documentary, Litvinenko Dose, Litvinenko Daily Mail, Litvinenko David West, Litvinenko Diagnosis, Litvinenko Funeral, Litvinenko Family, Litvinenko Film, Litvinenko Father, Litvinenko File, Litvinenko False Flag, Litvinenko Foundation, Litvinenko Frontline Club, Litvinenko First Wife, Litvinenko Facts, Litvinenko Greenwich Ct, Litvinenko Guardian, Litvinenko Google Scholar, Litvinenko Gif, Litvinenko Geometria, Litvinenko Guzzanti, Litvinenko Grinda, Galina Litvinenko, George Litvinenko, Gq Litvinenko, Litvinenko Hotel, Litvinenko Highgate Cemetery, Litvinenko Hearing, Litvinenko House, Litvinenko History, Litvinenko Historia, Litvinenko Hitman Agent 47, Litvinenko Harbottle, Helena Litvinenko, Litvinenko Itsu, Litvinenko Inquest, Litvinenko Islam, Litvinenko Inquiry Cost, Litvinenko Interview, Litvinenko Images, Litvinenko Independent, Litvinenko Imdb, Litvinenko Justice Foundation, Litvinenko Judge, Litvinenko Jokes, Litvinenko Julia, Jane Litvinenko, Jurijs Litvinenko, Juliana Litvinenko, Julija Litvinenko, Jordan Litvinenko, Marina Litvinenko Jersey, Litvinenko Killer, Litvinenko Kgb, Litvinenko Kaust, Litvinenko Kovtun, Litvinenko Killed Himself, Konstantin Litvinenko, Ksenia Litvinenko, Katya Litvinenko, Kristina Litvinenko, Kirk Litvenenko, Litvinenko Lawyer, Litvinenko Lugovoi, Litvinenko Last Words, Litvinenko London, Litvinenko Latest News, Litvinenko Live, Litvinenko Letter, Litvinenko Miss Usa, Litvinenko Movie, Litvinenko Marina, Litvinenko Mi6, Litvinenko Muswell Hill, Litvinenko Millennium Hotel, Litvinenko Mayfair Hotel, Litvinenko News, Litvinenko Net Worth, Litvinenko New York Times, Litvinenko Nsa, Litvinenko Nemtsov, Litvinenko Nobu, Litvinenko New Yorker, Litvinenko Nyt, Litvinenko Nationality, Litvinenko Natal Chart, Litvinenko Olga, Litvinenko Osier Crescent, Litvinenko Oksana, Litvinenko On Putin, Litvinenko Obama, Oleg Litvinenko, Olga Litvinenko Watercolor, Olga Litvinenko Model, Olga Litvinenko Instagram, Oxana Litvinenko, Litvinenko Poison, Litvinenko Putin, Litvinenko Politkovskaya, Litvinenko Pronunciation, Litvinenko Poisoned Twice, Litvinenko Poisoning Bbc, Litvinenko Poisoning Documentary, Litvinenko Program, Litvinenko Poisoning Channel 4, Litvinenko Poison Hotel, Litvinenko Qc, Litvinenko Quotes, Alexander Litvinenko Quotes, Alexander Litvinenko Quien Es, Litvinenko Report, Litvinenko Rt, Litvinenko Russian Spy, Litvinenko Radiation, Litvinenko Reuters, Litvinenko Reddit, Litvinenko Radiation Trail, Litvinenko Reaction, Litvinenko Report Guardian, Litvinenko Son, Litvinenko Sushi, Litvinenko Spy, Litvinenko Sheraton Park Lane, Litvinenko Statement, Litvinenko Spain, Litvinenko Sky News, Litvinenko Scotland Yard, Litvinenko Solicitor, Litvinenko Sievert, Litvinenko Trump, Litvinenko Tv, Litvinenko Tv Programme, Litvinenko Tv Program, Litvinenko Teapot, Litvinenko Tea, Litvinenko Timeline, Litvinenko Truth, Litvinenko Umbrella, Litvinenko Uk, Litvinenko Usa, Litvinenko Ukraine, Litvinenko Ukrainian, Uri Litvinenko, Uk Litvinenko Report, Uri Litvinenko Fibre Centre, Alexander Litvinenko Umbrella, Litvinenko Blowing Up Russia, Litvinenko Verdict, Litvinenko Video, Litvinenko Vanity Fair, Litvinenko V Secretary Of State, Litvinenko Vs Putin, Vladimir Litvinenko, Victor Litvinenko, Valter Litvinenko, Viktoria Litvinenko, Victoria Litvinenko, Litvinenko Wikileaks, Litvinenko Wiki, Litvinenko Wife, Litvinenko Waterstones, Litvinenko Where Was He Poisoned, Litvinenko Widow, Litvinenko Website, Litvinenko Waiter Recounts Polonium Poisoning, Litvinenko Washington Post, Litvinenko Whitehaven, Xander Litvinenko, Ksenia Litvinenko, Litvinenko Youtube, Litvinenko Yo Sushi, Yuri Litvinenko, Yulia Litvinenko, Yuriy Litvinenko, Yelena Litvinenko, Yuliya Litvinenko, Alexander Litvinenko Youtube, Litvinenko New York Times, Litvinenko Scotland Yard, Litvinenko Zawahiri, Litvinenko Zionist, Litvinenko Zdf, Litvinenko Zomrel, Alexander Litvinenko Zawahiri, Zdf Litvinenko Film, Litvinenko Zastrupitev, Litvinenko Zivotopis, Zdf Litvinenko Putin

Aktuelle Morddrohung von dubiosen Figuren mit Russland-Backgound

Become a Patron!
True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

PULCH

WIR MACHEN DICH KALT; UND SPÜLEN DEINE ASCHE IN DIE TOILETTE

Die weiteren Details sind Gegenstand forensischer Untersuchung

Morddrohung, Mord Drohung Stgb, Mord Drohung Strafe, Morddrohung Was Tun, Morddrohung Strafbar, Morddrohung Anzeige, Morddrohung Anzeige, Drohung Mit Mord, Pegida Mord Drohung, Mord Drohung Strafe, Mord Drohung Stgb, Morddrohung Strafbar, Traumdeutung Mord Drohung, Morddrohung Was Tun, Morddrohung Was Tun