Maria Kolesnikova nach ihrem Verschwinden von Lukaschenko-KGB-Schergen festgenommen

Belarus protests: UK says release of 'abducted' Maria Kolesnikova must be  'highest priority' | World News | Sky News
Eine der Führerinnen der belarussischen Opposition, Maria Kolesnikova, wurde am Morgen des 8. September an der belarussisch-ukrainischen Grenze festgenommen, teilte das staatliche Grenzkomitee von Belarus mit. Sie behaupten, dass Kolesnikova und zwei Mitglieder des Koordinierungsrates der belarussischen Opposition, Anton Rodnenkov und Ivan Kravtsov, mit dem Auto zwischen belarussischen und ukrainischen Kontrollpunkten unterwegs waren. Nachdem sie den Grenzschutz bemerkt hatten, so heißt es im Komitee, beschleunigte das Auto stark und verließ das Gebiet von Belarus, während Kolesnikova angeblich aus dem Auto “geschoben” wurde.


Der ukrainische Grenzdienst teilte mit, dass Kravtsov und Rodnenkov am ukrainischen Kontrollpunkt angekommen waren und die Grenzkontrolle durchliefen. Das belarussische Staatsgrenzkomitee erklärte, Kravtsov und Rodnenkov seien angeblich inhaftiert worden, aber die ukrainische Seite bestreitet dies.

Sie versuchten, Maria Kolesnikova gewaltsam aus Weißrussland zu deportieren, aber sie riss ihren Pass auf, und die Grenzschutzbeamten ließen sie nicht herein, schreibt “Interfax-Ukraine” unter Berufung auf eine Quelle. Der stellvertretende Innenminister der Ukraine, Anton Gerashchenko, schrieb auf Facebook, dass Rodnenkov und Kravtsov, die Kolesnikova begleiteten, aus Weißrussland ausgewiesen wurden. „Es war keine freiwillige Abreise. Es war eine gewaltsame Vertreibung aus dem Heimatland “, sagt Gerashchenko. Ihm zufolge hat Maria Kolesnikova ihre Deportation verhindert. Gerashchenko hat nicht angegeben, was Kolesnikova getan hat.

Am Tag vor der Verhaftung, am 7. September, hörten Kolesnikova, Rodnenkov und Kravtsov auf zu kommunizieren. Augenzeugen zufolge haben Menschen in Zivil und in Masken Kolesnikova im Zentrum von Minsk gepackt und in einen dunklen Kleinbus mit dem Schild “Kommunikation” gezogen, wonach sie in eine unbekannte Richtung gebracht wurden. Das Innenministerium, der Untersuchungsausschuss und der staatliche Kontrollausschuss gaben an, dass sie nichts über die Inhaftierung von Kolesnikova wüssten. Der belarussische KGB hat dies nicht kommentiert.

Nawalny-Mordanschag: Moskau mauert – und dreht den Spieß um

Während der Ruf nach Aufklärung weltweit lauter wird, mauert Moskau und will untersuchen lassen, ob eine “fremde Macht” einen russischen Staatsbürger geschädigt habe, um Moskau zu diskreditieren.

Das ist die alte Vorgehensweise der Tschekisten aus KGB, STASI und wie die einschlägigen Ost-Mördergeheimdienste sich jeweils nennen – bis hin zu STASI-GoMoPa.

Video – Boris Nemzow – Tod an der Kremlmauer

Am 27. Februar 2015 ereignete sich der Mord an dem russischen Oppositionspolitiker Boris Nemzow. Die Welle der Empörung und Anteilnahme nach der Ermordung war sowohl in Russland als auch im Ausland hoch. Russlands Präsident Putin versprach umgehende Aufklärung. Was ist seitdem passiert, und was weiß man heute über die Drahtzieher des Mordes?

The Shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007 – Top Secret Document

Target is Destroyed | Korean Air Lines Flight 007 - YouTube

The Shootdown ofKorean Airlines Flight 007 – 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov describes Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.”


Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke]
with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Comrade V. A.
Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin
“Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke] with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB,
Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin,” September 19, 1983, History and Public
Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU),
MfS, ZAIG 5306, pp. 1-19. Translated by Bernd Schaefer.
Meeting between KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov and East German Minister for State Security
Mielke, including discussion of the shootdown of Korean Airlines (KAL) Flight 007.
This document was made possible with support from the Blavatnik Family Foundation and the Leon
Levy Foundation.
Original Language:
English Translation
N o t e
About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke] with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB,
Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin
[Additional] Participants:
From the KGB:
Comrade Lieutenant General Shumilov
Comrade Captain Ryabinnikov (Interpreter)
From the MfS:
Comrade Major General Grossmann
Comrade Major General Damm
Comrade Lieutenant Colonel Salevsky (Interpreter)
Comrade Mielke:
It’s a great pleasure. I understand how the difficult situation makes it hard for you [Kryuchkov] to
leave the Soviet Union temporarily. We are happy that it worked out nonetheless.
I have to convey greetings from Comrade [Markus] Wolf [the Deputy Minister for State Security].
He will return from Hungary on 1 October 1983 and come [for a further bilateral MfS-KGB meeting]
to Tabarz [in the Thuringian Forest in the GDR where Kryuchkov will stay for vacation]. Then we
can already talk there about some issues and return to Berlin during the course of Sunday, 2
October 1983. We will have time on 3 and 4 October to discuss some more issues and requests for
mutual cooperation, possibly to be forwarded later to Comrade [CPSU General Secretary] Y. V.
Andropov. [Your] return to Moscow is scheduled for 5 October.
I have some requests to hear from you Moscow’s perspectives concerning assessments of the
following issues:
– What is the perspective on [Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) disarmament] talks in Geneva?
(West German newspaper “Die Welt” says there is no more optimism left, just hope!)
– What does this mean in terms of concrete assignments to the MfS, how should we proceed?
(Maybe you could also outline problems for us to forward Comrade E. Honecker.)
– Regarding the entire complex of heightened tensions after the plane incident (South Korea) and
ensuing boycott measures: What are the assessments? What does this mean for the future?
Which counter-measures are planned?
– [CSCE follow-up conference in] Madrid
Even elements from the FRG [West German] bourgeoisie are talking about the option to continue
disarmament negotiations after the buildup [of INF in Western Europe]. There have been several
statements in this regard (Vogel/SPD, Weizsäcker/CDU, even Strauss/CSU).
They all believe something is going to happen, and that even after missile deployment the
negotiations will continue. Even Strauss said in his first two election campaign speeches that we
must avoid a nuclear world war; otherwise the world will perish.
You can view him as you like, but in a certain regard he is a realist. He believes the balance of
forces to be such that there can be no winner. This does not yet make him our friend. You have to
analyze this thoroughly.
I also still want to talk to you later about other issues in private.
There are many who believe there will be a continuation of talks even after an INF deployment. In
addition, there are the full impacts of the boycott in effect.
We are interested in the actual [KGB] assessments of the situation, in addition to what is known at
the Politburo level.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Many thanks for the welcome.
I am grateful for the invitation to spend parts of my vacation here in the GDR. My apologies that I
was not able to come on 10 September already. Yet there were a couple of issues preventing me
from doing do. The most important one was the plane incident. You do not shoot down such a type
of airplane once a month.
Thus I messed up all of our comrades’ schedules to a certain degree. This has created some
Comrade Mielke:
We have solved this in an effective fashion. Just come when you are able to come.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
I am tasked to convey cordial greetings from Y. V. Andropov and his best wishes. He again thanks
you for the joint work done for state security.
He rates meetings and talks with you very highly, in particular your cordial and focused
development of cooperation with the USSR.
It is his special pleasure to greet you again cordially. Now he is on vacation in the South. For
politicians like him, there is no actual vacation. Once in a while he has visitors.
For a half day he is reading information, including ours [KGB] and what we received from you. Also
I convey cordial greetings from [KGB Chairman] V. M. Chebrikov and his deputies. They all know
you very well. Almost all of them have worked with you in the past, and all of them have very fond
Now to the concrete questions you have raised.
These are questions discussed at the highest level. I myself am not placed so highly.
Hence I will do my best to respond to these questions based on my state of knowledge and
Obviously I will not be able to answer them in full. Yet since we are all part of the process to
determine policy and concrete measures, issues of detail included, I can explain at least some
aspects and inform you accordingly.
On the Plane Incident
Some issues have been already explained at the [9 September 1983] press conference. Now one
can outline how the story happened and unfolded in its entirety.
During the first days we were reluctant to provide information. From the beginning, however, there
were no reasons to keep the incident secret. We wanted to wait to see what the West had to say.
Reagan’s initial reaction was very important to us. The full timeline about what happened to the
plane was meanwhile published in our press. Yet we have not yet published everything we have.
We did not know that the downed plane was a civilian airliner. Our pilots were not aware of that.
We were convinced that it was a military aircraft. When the regional ground command issued its
orders, it did not know it was a civilian airliner. We are not going to make this public, but this was
just how it was. We were convinced that this was a special aircraft on a specific reconnaissance
Our radar detected the plane prior to its violation of our airspace, about 600 to 800 kilometers
before Kamchatka. The dot on the radar approached Kamchatka, i.e. the area where we have
military bases. Some of them are nuclear bases.
Our services were to a certain extent shocked that the plane headed directly towards Kamchatka.
Such a brazen incident had never happened before. Thousands of planes fly through the air
corridors there. Previous violations were just about between 1 and 5 kilometers. Yet until 1
September 1983, there had been no single incident involving a direct flight over Kamchatka.
The plane was detected by ground radar and by our military aircraft. We decided to do nothing
against the plane. We were in doubt what kind of plane it was, and whether it really was an aircraft
flying over Kamchatka for intelligence monitoring.
The plane left Soviet airspace over the Sea of Okhotsk. A large part of this ocean consists of open,
international waters. There our radar lost the plane. Sometime later the plane showed up in
Sakhalin airspace. In Sakhalin they already knew that an airplane had violated airspace over
We again undertook measures to identify this plane. 4 aircraft went up (2 SU-15, 2 MIG-23). They
tried to establish connection; various signals were given. No response. More than 120 [warning]
shots were fired.
There were still a few kilometers left for the plane before its departure from our airspace. Our pilots
said this is not a passenger plane. It was especially relevant that this plane flew around our antiaircraft defenses. One SU-15 was especially close, just about 2 kilometers away. The speed of the
[KAL] Boeing was 800 kilometers [per hour]; the SU-15 had [a speed of] 2,400 kilometers [per
hour], the MIG-23 [had a speed of] 2,000 kilometers [per hour].
For reasons of speed they could not get closer to each other. At the plane, windows were not
illuminated and position lights not turned on. We fired special tracer bullets parallel to the plane’s
course of direction. Some of them were shot right in front of its nose. The plane’s pilots must have
noticed this. The plane maneuvered and changed its altitude to evade our aircraft. Then, on the
instructions of ground control, two missiles were fired. The shootdown occurred over the territory of
After the firing of the missiles the plane still flew for 11 minutes. It lost altitude, went down to 5,000
meters, and then it fell into the sea 9 to 11 nautical miles from the coast. In the morning we noticed
an oil spot on the ocean. Parts from the plane were found near Moneron Island (near Nevelsk).
Ocean currents carried other parts to the Japanese coast at Hokkaido. The spot of the crash has
been located quite exactly. Now Soviets, Americans, and Japanese are searching there for the
wreck. Everybody is attempting to find the flight recorder. Until my departure it had not been found.
The plane had deviated from the air corridor towards Sakhalin by about 600 kilometers, altogether
by an average of between 200 and 500 kilometers. There were four American and four Japanese
air control points along the regular corridor. None of them had issued a signal.
We were completely convinced that this plane was on a reconnaissance mission. If we would have
known that this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down. Yet everything pointed in
another direction. We have recordings of exchanges between ground control and our aircraft.
So far not everything has been published. Why should we make everything available right away?
We have posed and forwarded 11 questions to the Americans and Japanese. They have not
responded to any of them.
We have still more details about this [KAL] flight. Reagan declared that mankind will unfortunately
never know who entered the wrong programming [at the KAL plane]. You could say, this way he
conceded this mistake; since mankind wants to know who did that, and why.
Just among us: We have received very interesting information from an American source. He
informs how, and by whom, this airliner was prepared for its flight. In the coming days we will
provide this information to the Americans without making all of it public. In this way this American
will be “sacrificed” as a source. We have to wait for a couple of more days.
Obviously there are still a couple of other facts. There are people who have consciously sent this
plane to its demise. Sooner or later everything will come out.
Reactions in individual countries were very different; in some there were very tough, in others,
rather irrelevant. The saying goes that such events do not “live” for more than 2 weeks. The
Americans will exploit this further when the parts of the plane and the dead are recovered. Some
dead bodies have already been found at the Northern shore of Hokkaido. All this will be exploited
propagandistically. In the Western press you always find the question raised over and over
whether this is beneficial to Reagan.
We [KGB] want to contribute with our active measures towards the revelation of all causes and
links of this plane incident. We hope that our friends from the MfS will support us in this regard.
For the first time, [on 9 September 1983] a large press conference was held with the First Deputy
Foreign Minister and the Chief of the General Staff [Marshal Nikolai Orgarkov]. Everything had
been thoroughly prepared.
In a few days an article will follow by Air Force Marshal [Pyotr S.] Kirsanov, featuring new facts that
this [KAL] flight was not a normal one. It will be proven that simultaneously to this flight a US
satellite crossed the flight route three times. The Americans knew that we were preparing missiles
for launch on this territory at that time. The launch had to be postponed. Also telling is the following
episode: On the downed plane there was a well-known US Senator [sic] who initially did not want
to board this flight.
[2] He decided to book only at the last minut e.
Still some “white spots” remain. After the incident, US Senator [Henry “Scoop”] Jackson [D-WA]
delivered a very strong anti-Soviet speech demanding further tough sanctions against the Soviet
Union. When he left the podium, he fell and dropped dead. He was an extremely strong anti-Soviet
(a pathological case).
We express our deep regrets for the victims but do not accept responsibility. Our Foreign Minister,
Comrade Gromyko, did not travel to the U.N. General Assembly in New York. He stayed home
since the US did not give guarantees for the safety of his plane.
We will also not participate in the IPU [International Parliamentary Union] Meeting in Seoul (but not
because Kim Il Sung has asked us to do so).
It was also because of the plane incident that I was not able to come earlier [to the GDR].
Comrade Mielke:
I have the following questions.
I said from the beginning one has to be more on the offensive, based on the fact that this was an
organized provocation. You have to declare that the Americans use other nations to cover their own
provocations. They apply this method frequently.
You have to say immediately that this is a provocation in order to go on the offensive. You should
have done that right away. This is my only critical remark. I did not have any other alternative
This argumentation was lacking right from the onset. There are plenty of examples how they
operate here at our place. They exploit other nations, and simultaneously use the opportunity to
drag others in whom they actually want to get rid of. I said so immediately when this happened.
The issue is now evident. In [our central newspaper] Neues Deutschland we published the full
transcript of your press conference. We also broadcasted it on television.
You should have gone on the offensive somewhat faster. Sure, you should listen to what the
enemy has to say. Yet everything else you could have added later. You have to work out additional
arguments that this was a targeted provocation together with South Korea. It is not so much about
the issue of the shootdown. Yet that you could not identify the airliner as a passenger plane – I do
not think this is good.
This event had exceptional elements of surprise. I said so also to Comrade E. Honecker. What
could have come out of this? We have to be extraordinarily vigilant. Nobody can say in advance
what is going to happen; whether this plane incident could lead to a provocation transforming into a
war. I note the problem of surprise over and over again. This surprise can lead to a war.
It is quite uncomfortable to say that one did not recognize it. It can happen. Everyone is human.
Yet there lies a great risk also for other issues.
Everything you say is correct, but the Western press says you were not able to identify the type of
plane since your aircraft were flying below. They also say the flight recorder has already been
found. If you do not have it, you have to search for it further. They [in the West] sense the danger
coming from the flight recorder. We are in complete agreement with you and will continue our
A captain from [the West German airline] Lufthansa has written a wonderful article with sound
1. This is how they [the US] operate
2. Why did they not guide the plane on a correct course if the US and Japan were aware of this?
Arguments are on the table. You just have to use them for the fight against Reagan. It is interesting
that Reagan can get into trouble when a part of the bourgeoisie disagrees. If [CNN Chairman Ted]
Turner is saying he will not “swear on a bible” that the [KAL] flight was not a spy mission, he
therefore argues against Reagan. They provide the arguments themselves. This is why some
countries will not join the boycott. We have to continue our work.
I have no further questions. Only if there are new arguments coming up; but then so we can
respond quickly. This is important to the entire world, to your good friends, to those who waver, but
also to the enemies who are smart and realists. More timely information would have been better:
This just privately since you asked.
There are also comrades who say: Did you really have to shoot down the civilian airliner?! Were
they not in a position to recognize this?
This is why the argument that you were not able to identify the type of plane is so dangerous.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
They were not able to recognize it.
Comrade Mielke:
Of course, those two plane types look similar. Honest specialists from the West are saying this, too.
They also say: Why were there so many RC planes flying at that time in this area?
Comrade Kryuchkov:
The entire incident occurred at 7:00 hours [A.M.] local time. In Moscow it was midnight. Already at
the evening of 1 September all issues were discussed, and a first brief news report issued on [state
TV newscast] “Vremya.” The same day we established a large commission and send them to the
East. On 3 September they provided a comprehensive report.
Comrade Mielke:
We already exchanged our opinions on 2 September. Please understand why I was so arrogant
and told V. T. Shumilov: Tell Moscow this was a specially prepared South Korean plane for spying;
the most important thing is missing in your public statement!
Comrade Kryuchkov:
I can only say: If we had released our second statement 24 hours earlier, the slander would not be
this harsh. We did not see through everything right after the incident.
Comrade Mielke:
Tomorrow the Central Committee secretaries in charge will meet in Moscow. There we will submit
our proposal accordingly.
The adversary immediately coordinated its measures aimed at you and us.
That is why it was necessary to strike immediately and not just release 5 lines. This may suffice at
the parochial level, but not for the global public.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
It is alright what you say. I completely agree with you. But there is one problem: As a Politburo
member you know that such issues first have to be discussed by party leaders. So – 10:0 for them.
Comrade Mielke:
No, 10:1 – since you shot down the plane.
I just want to say: There must not be any moments of being surprised. You have to go on the
offensive. This is important for future incidents.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
In his talks with you, Comrade Y. V. Andropov always agreed with you on issues of how to focus on
operative impacts of events.
Comrade Mielke:
We can now see how he reacts, how he has got Marxism-Leninism to move again, like for instance
– the national [ethnic] problem
– agriculture
– the class question
This is an enhancement of the [Marxist-Leninist] theory!
Comrade Kryuchkov:
On Geneva [Arms Negotiations]
Reagan has imposed sanctions against us that will not damage him as a president. He wants to
run again in the next election. You could say, these are “hollow sanctions.” He proposed areas that
do not play any major role in bilateral relations between both countries. We had expected sanctions
on grain exports or the pipeline deals. As far as Geneva is concerned, he immediately stated the
US will [continue to] negotiate.
Still, the question looms for us: Why do we have to continue to discuss these issues when the
missile deployment in Western Europe goes forward? Reagan would be delighted to abandon
negotiations and act even more impertinent. Yet this would not yield any benefits for him. So he will
not walk away from negotiations. Yet those negotiations conducted by the US are a deception of
the common people.
These are the facts. However, the USSR cannot abandon negotiation. Otherwise, the common
folks will say, the Soviet Union does not want peace.
The issue is very serious. There exist different opinions. Some comrades say: Does it really make
sense to continue negotiations?
Comrade Mielke:
One has to continue negotiations.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Some are proposing to maybe do something to placate the public. This is a very important issue –
to undertake a step of this kind. Our leading comrades are currently discussing this. We attempt to
find paths leading to an agreement, like our recent proposal on the SS-20.
Yet in the West there is NATO, in the East there is China, and Japan is ascending. We are ready to
destroy SS-20 missiles. This is a very courageous step. It means really destroying them, not a
relocation to the East of the USSR. This is why government circles are contemplating that our side
will have to move somewhat further.
There are very important issues to consider. Our proposal has divided Western allies to a certain
extent. We must exploit this. We are discussing an idea to maybe merge negotiations over both
strategic arms and medium-range missile limitations. We have to do so thorough calculations. On
the one hand, you would gain allies, but on the other side, the problem gets more complicated.
France and England currently have 200 nuclear-capable missiles. Yet in a few years that will rise to
600. This is why we have to include them in our calculations.
Comrade Mielke:
A major number of politicians are already in favor of including them.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
The aggravation of the international situation is continuing. The military-industrial complex, of which
Reagan is a representative, believes in exploiting the latter for its purposes. In light of such a tense
situation, they hope to succeed in liquidating the liberation movement in Central America. Likewise
in Africa and Asia. They do everything to win in the Middle East. If the global economy does not
change, there is no expectation for any changes of US administration policy.
In this context, we in the KGB has undertaken multiple measures through the international press
and other channels; also we do a lot jointly [with the MfS] after respective coordination.
As far as the FRG is concerned – a very important topic – I will certainly have the chance to talk
with Comrade Wolf in detail. On Strauss our perspective is essentially shaped by your position.
Comrade Mielke:
I will have to say something on this issue.
I still remember your face, Vladimir Alexandrovich, when I talked with [KGB Chairman] V. M.
Chebrikov about Strauss. Comrade E. Honecker authorized me to become active in this matter. We
will talk about this separately later.
As a party, we are performing a gigantic work. V. T. Shumilov, with whom we have talked, has
seen the document. You have to talk with everybody and argue against the missile deployment.
Everybody, even the biggest enemy, has to be addressed in order to make it clear that a nuclear
inferno will leave nothing behind of him.
This is always linked to issues of “surprise” [attacks].
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Will we continue to negotiate if the West deploys INF? We do not view the struggle for peace as
over. Obviously this struggle is very difficult as a completely new situation will eventually arise. We
have to work out new positions. We conduct a very large propaganda campaign. It is a fact that
through INF deployment the Americans turn the Western European countries into “hostages.” In
any case, it will result in the end of Europe. This is fully clear. How can you make this
understandable to the Western Europeans (getting it into their heads) so that no politician can deny
it? This is the task. We must jointly contribute to that.
Concerning the question of war: We say that currently its foundations are laid. Whether there
actually will be a war, depends on both sides. But we can say that the weak will have no influence
here. Our strength is the most important factor, e.g. in Afghanistan. There the struggle is between
socialism and capitalism. If we are weak, we will be defeated there. We can say it already now:
Afghanistan remains a Soviet-friendly country. Basic changes have been made there.
[The CSCE follow-up conference in] Madrid was a major success. This is how you can propagate
it. The plane story has already receded somewhat to the background. Madrid will resume its place
in the global campaign. In January 1984 there will be the next round of negotiations on an entirely
different level. Then we will see. Madrid is an example for solving problems through negotiations.
We have used the neutrals very well. Malta’s position is quite strange. It results from opinions held
by Prime Minister [Dom] Mintoff. Basket III depends on our interpretation, and how we will fill it out
through practical steps by the party and security services. Basket III provides nobody with the
opportunity to interfere with the internal affairs of another state. It contains very many references to
domestic legislation.
Comrade Mielke:
On Madrid I hold a somewhat different opinion. Not regarding the overall assessment, or issues of
disarmament and peace – but on Basket III.
Moscow is 1,600 kilometers from Berlin. The situation looks quite different from just 1 kilometer of
distance (GDR vs. FRG; Germans vs. Germans). We are not Chinese in favor of [Western INF]
deployment. Yet FRG citizens are Germans and not Chinese.
We will talk about Madrid later again when Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov is rested.
Today I talked about this issue before the [internal MfS] party meeting with extraordinary stridency.
The issues of “peace” and methods in the struggle about “peace” have unmitigated impacts in the
GDR. Among us, almost every week we arrest about 150 people. There is no end in sight. Thus we
will have to talk about this.
At the party meeting I talked about the political relevance, and about what we will have to focus on
in our work. I talked about the Church, and about the “Greens.” Marx himself has commissioned us
communists to take care that the world gets preserved for our descendants once we are no longer
around. For that, we do not need any “Greens.”
Intentionally, we also published the Madrid Document in full. If they [in the West] publish it, it will be
wrongfully interpreted. Footnotes are also included. One thing we already did.
On 27 September our state legal bulletin will publish a decree about marriages and family meetings
[between GDR and FRG] coming into effect from 15 October 1983. Simultaneously there will be an
unpublished decree issued about its concrete handling.
Yet I am not as happy about Madrid as you from the Soviet Union.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Our comrades cooperated in Madrid very well with your comrades. [GDR Foreign Minister]
Comrade [Oskar] Fischer has invited Comrade Kondrashov to the GDR for that reason.
Comrade Mielke:
Still, Comrade Fischer does not think differently than I do. Compromises had to be made. Yet the
GDR is hit hardest since we are a divided country. Germans vs. Germans.If you are a united
nation, then it is a different story.
Many thanks for your statements. I am glad I provided the correct line at our party meeting. Even
the term “hostages” for the Western Europeans was used in my speech.
Our problems are somewhat different from those of other countries. This is a consequence of our
special location.
I am proud we assessed the situation correctly, including the plane incident. I am pleased with your
assessment. Like [when talking] with Y. V. Andropov.
Many thanks.
Thank you for the wonderful greetings [from Andropov], and that he still remembers me this well.
We will continue to work in the same vein we collaborated with him over all those years; like a true
combat unit of the Cheka that puts its ideas into the joint struggle.
Many thanks for the greetings from V. M. Chebrikov. About the “Batashov” question we will talk
Many thanks also for the greetings from all deputies of the KGB chairman. How is G. Karpovich
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Many thanks. He is doing according to his age. His health is not great.
Comrade Mielke:
Again heartfelt thanks. Some of your information has confirmed our assessments, including on
Your remarks about Geneva were important. Hence we will continue our talks with all [Western]
politicians. The CPSU leadership has to decide how to continue and make use of this.
Tomorrow we have the meeting of Central Committee secretaries in Moscow. Then these issues
will be discussed as well.
[1] Referring to the Soviet shoot down of Korean Airlines Lines Flight 007 on1 September 1983.
It was actually Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald (D-Georgia).

The 10 Top Secret Most Notorious Operations Of The KGB Revealed

Biggest Secret Reveal || India & The KGB - The Blunt Social - Medium

Like the CIA, the Soviet (and now Russian) spy organization known as the KGB has occupied with many years of mystery tasks over the world, extending from shakedown to capturing. The vast majority of the mysteries that we think about the KGB today are a direct result of one man—Vasili Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin was a filer for the KGB for a long time before he surrendered to the UK and gave over his 25,000-page chronicle of mystery KGB records. Here are a portion of the KGB’s generally upsetting and abnormal mystery tasks.

10 The Attacks On America’s Infrastructure

Hoover DamHoover-Damm wird zu gigantischem Energiespeicher | en:former

From 1959–72, the KGB started to photo US power plants, dams, oil pipelines, and framework for a terrible activity that would disturb the force gracefully to all of New York. When they picked focuses on that they thought were helpless, the KGB set up a protected house close to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. From that point, KGB specialists looked to plan and complete a progression of assaults on America’s capacity systems.Hydroelectric dams, which create a huge bit of the US’s vitality gracefully, were an objective. The KGB detailed an intricate arrangement to crush two huge hydroelectric dams, the Hungry Horse Dam and Flathead Dam, in Montana. Removing the two dams from commission would injure the force gracefully of the state and encompassing district. The assault was to start 3 kilometers (2 mi) down the South Fork River from Hungry Horse Dam. The KGB wanted to have agents pulverize power arches on a tall mountain incline, which would be hard to get back on the web, inconclusively taking out force transmission from the dam. At that point, the agents were to hold onto the Hungry Horse Dam’s controls and decimate them. The assaults would have taken out the force gracefully to all of New York state.From the Soviet Union’s Canadian international safe haven, the KGB likewise intended to additionally disturb America’s vitality flexibly by assaulting oil pipelines among Canada and the United States. The plot, called Operation Cedar, was gotten ready for longer than 10 years. The KGB even looked to pulverize petroleum treatment facilities in Canada, which gracefully a lot of America’s gasoline.All of the assaults on America’s capacity framework were a piece of a bigger plan to assault New York City. When they had taken out the greater part of the force in the United States with the previous assaults, the KGB plotted to utilize the disorder and haziness to plant explosives on wharfs and distribution centers along the Port of New York, a pivotal harbor for America’s trade and imports.

9 The Hostage Crisis Retribution

Senate hostage crisis | Wookieepedia | Fandom

In 1974, the KGB made a tip top counterterrorism team with the baffling name “Alpha Group.” The Alpha Group was utilized by the KGB to do top mystery and regularly hazardous missions for the USSR—and now Russia—remembering a wicked and horrible crucial Lebanon.In 1985, the Soviet Union wound up with its first significant prisoner emergency after four Soviet representatives were grabbed in Lebanon by psychological oppressors subsidiary with an Islamic fear based oppressor gathering. The ruffians apparently kidnapped the Soviets to prevent the USSR from offering backing to Syria’s endeavors in the Lebanese common war, which the nation was then entangled in. After the Soviet ambassadors were abducted, the ruffians sent chilling photos to news organizations of the prisoners with firearms to their heads. The psychological oppressors requested that the USSR power Syria-associated powers to quit assaulting Iran-subsidiary powers battling in northern Lebanon, or the prisoners would be executed.Initially, the USSR was available to some type of arrangements with the fear based oppressors to discharge the prisoners sound. Things changed when the USSR didn’t appear to stop the Syrian powers’ inclusion in the common war, and the fear based oppressors executed one of the prisoners just two days after the underlying requests were made.That’s the point at which the USSR relinquished arranging, and the KGB made quick and wicked move. To begin with, the KGB explored what association was behind the kidnappings and seen it as crafted by Hezbollah. That is the point at which the KGB did a touch of seizing of their own, grabbing a nearby relative of a Hezbollah head. They started to dismantle him, emasculating him and sending a portion of his eviscerated body parts to the criminals of the Soviets. Before long, the KGB murdered the Hezbollah relative.Then, the KGB sent the Hezbollah head a message demonstrating that they was aware of a lot a greater amount of his family members and their whereabouts and cautioned that they would endure a similar destiny if the prisoners were not discharged. The Islamic psychological oppressors holding the Soviets paid heed and discharged the staying three Soviet ambassadors soon after, altogether sound and moving along without any more requests.

8 The Blackmail With Sex Tapes

Watch The Secret KGB Sex Files | Prime Video

In 1974, the KGB made a tip top counterterrorism team with the baffling name “Alpha Group.” The Alpha Group was utilized by the KGB to do top mystery and regularly hazardous missions for the USSR—and now Russia—remembering a wicked and horrible crucial Lebanon.In 1985, the Soviet Union wound up with its first significant prisoner emergency after four Soviet representatives were grabbed in Lebanon by psychological oppressors subsidiary with an Islamic fear based oppressor gathering. The ruffians apparently kidnapped the Soviets to prevent the USSR from offering backing to Syria’s endeavors in the Lebanese common war, which the nation was then entangled in. After the Soviet ambassadors were abducted, the ruffians sent chilling photos to news organizations of the prisoners with firearms to their heads. The psychological oppressors requested that the USSR power Syria-associated powers to quit assaulting Iran-subsidiary powers battling in northern Lebanon, or the prisoners would be executed.Initially, the USSR was available to some type of arrangements with the fear based oppressors to discharge the prisoners sound. Things changed when the USSR didn’t appear to stop the Syrian powers’ inclusion in the common war, and the fear based oppressors executed one of the prisoners just two days after the underlying requests were made.That’s the point at which the USSR relinquished arranging, and the KGB made quick and wicked move. To begin with, the KGB explored what association was behind the kidnappings and seen it as crafted by Hezbollah. That is the point at which the KGB did a touch of seizing of their own, grabbing a nearby relative of a Hezbollah head. They started to dismantle him, emasculating him and sending a portion of his eviscerated body parts to the criminals of the Soviets. Before long, the KGB murdered the Hezbollah relative.

ABC Presents Probably Fake Russian "Sex Tape" Of American Diplomat

Then, the KGB sent the Hezbollah head a message demonstrating that they was aware of a lot a greater amount of his family members and their whereabouts and cautioned that they would endure a similar destiny if the prisoners were not discharged. The Islamic psychological oppressors holding the Soviets paid heed and discharged the staying three Soviet ambassadors soon after, altogether sound and moving along without any more requests.

7 The KGB Hacker Accesses 400 US Military Computers

Disney | File 770

During the 1980s, the KGB was searching for an approach to take US military insider facts through two generally new antecedents to the Internet, ARPANET and MILNET. To do as such, they found and selected a man named Markus Hess, who might before long become a Soviet covert operative and one of the most incredible PC programmers in history.Hess started his hacking strategic the University of Bremen in Germany, far away from the US military PCs that he was attempting to get to. From that point, Hess had the option to assault 400 PCs utilized by the US military. A portion of the PCs were utilized at bases the world over in places like Germany and Japan. A portion of different PCs were utilized at MIT for look into. Another was utilized by the Pentagon. Hess had the option to figure the secret word to access the Pentagon’s Optimis database, which permitted him to access “a list of sources of Army documents.”Hess’ broad hacking activity stayed undetected until a frameworks head and stargazer named Clifford Stoll started researching a modest bookkeeping blunder in a California PC lab. Stoll found what appeared to be a little, 75-penny mistake in the PC use at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, which conducts logical research for the US Department of Energy. Stoll attempted to find where the 75-penny inconsistency originated from and followed it to an unapproved and obscure client who had utilized the lab’s PC frameworks for nine seconds without paying. Stoll examined further and found that this unapproved client was a talented programmer who accessed a framework control “superuser” account by misusing a security defect in the system.Stoll went through the following 10 months attempting to find the whereabouts of the programmer. In the long run, he had the option to do so when the programmer attempted to get to a safeguard temporary worker in Virginia. Stoll started to record everything the programmer was doing. He saw this strange programmer getting to PC frameworks at army installations all through the United States, scanning for documents with respect to military insider facts and atomic weapons.Stoll immediately reached specialists extending from the US military to the CIA, NSA, and FBI. Stoll and the specialists at that point followed the programmer’s physical whereabouts to a West German college. They set up a trick to get the programmer to uncover his full personality, creating a phony division at the Lawrence Berkley Laboratory made to seem as though it was working with the US military. At the point when the programmer took the lure and attempted to get to this phony office’s records, they had the option to follow him right to his home in Hannover, West Germany.West German specialists, working with the US, at that point raged Hess’ home and captured him. Little did they all realize that this world class programmer had been shrunk by the KGB and was offering military insider facts to the Soviet Union for a considerable length of time. Hess was later seen as liable of reconnaissance and condemned to as long as three years in jail however was discharged from the get-go probation.

6 The Operation RYAN

The KGB's 3 most sensational operations - Russia Beyond

In 1980s, the Cold War arrived at another blaze point. At that point chief of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev professed to have information that the US was effectively getting ready for a war against the Soviet Union and might dispatch an unexpected atomic assault whenever. Along these lines, in anticipation of this alleged looming fate, the KGB looked to dispatch Operation RYAN, one of biggest observation activities in history.Operation RYAN was intended to furnish the Soviets with early notice indications of an approaching US atomic assault. The arrangement was to direct best in class reconnaissance utilizing the USSR’s COSMOS satellite. The KGB needed to photo US army installations nonstop, observing them intently for signs that the US would dispatch atomic weapons at the USSR.The activity additionally looked to screen all employments of radar inside the United States for any sensational expands that would demonstrate groundwork for an assault. Besides, Operation RYAN was intended to screen the exercises of every American resident and military staff when they left the US. RYAN likewise put NATO under substantial reconnaissance. The activity even attempted to catch calls made all through the United States and Europe.In expansion to remote reconnaissance, Operation RYAN made a system of spies who were prepared to follow up on a second’s notification in the event that it was accepted that the US was beginning a war with the Soviet Union. The huge and expensive activity was inevitably downsized in 1984, just three years after it was set into movement.

5 The Buying Of US Banks

Big Banks Reverse Course, Stop Buying Own Shares | Global Finance ...

At the point when the KGB wasn’t attempting to utilize spies to get their hands on the privileged insights of the US government, they were attempting to utilize banks.In the mid-1970s, the KGB concocted an arrangement to clandestinely purchase three US banks in Northern California as a component of a mystery activity to secure data on cutting edge organizations in the district. The three banks were picked by the KGB since they had recently made credits to innovation organizations. A large number of these organizations were shrunk by the US military, so the KGB wanted to catch US military innovation secrets.To pull the activity off, the KGB gotten an agent from Singapore named Amos Dawe to buy the banks for them without letting the US government get wind of the USSR’s fabulous arrangement to take innovation mysteries. Be that as it may, before the KGB could assume control over the banks, their buy was impeded by the CIA. The CIA had first learned of the plan when they saw that the Singaporean specialist’s cash was originating from a Soviet bank. Dawe had acquired a $50 million credit line from a Singapore part of Moscow’s Norodny Bank.

4 The Operation PANDORA

Top 5 KGB operations on U.S. soil - Big Think

Racial pressures were intense in the US during the 1960s. Race riots encompassing the Civil Rights Movement were causing mass agitation the nation over. The KGB imagined that they could misuse this and aggravate it by initiating ill will or through and through savagery between racial gatherings in the US.The plan, called Operation PANDORA, started with the KGB spreading counterfeit flyers that had all the earmarks of being from the Jewish Defense League, a conservative Jewish political association currently characterized by the FBI as a fear based oppressor association. The flyers, which were really written by the KGB, guaranteed that dark Americans were assaulting Jews and plundering Jewish-possessed shops in New York. The phony handouts begged their perusers to battle against “dark crossbreeds.” The KGB at that point sent these enemy of dark flyers to dark activist gatherings, trusting it would mix hostile to Semitism operating at a profit associations, if not altogether violence.Concurrently, the KGB was additionally sending counterfeit letters to dark aggressor bunches which guaranteed that the Jewish Defense League had been focusing on and assaulting blacks in America. The letters beseeched the dark activists to assault the Jewish Defense League in reprisal. The Jewish Defense League’s pioneer, Meir Kahane, was killed a year later, however the demonstration was done by an Arabic man who was apparently detached to any dark activist groups.As some portion of their activity to mix racial agitation, the KGB additionally wanted to explode a dark school. After the school was besieged with a planted dangerous gadget, the KGB intended to make unknown calls to a progression of dark associations and guarantee that the Jewish Defense group had been behind the bombarding.

3 The Project To Kill Josip Broz Tito

Josip Broz Tito, a Yugoslavian leaders letter to Stalin.. Boss 100 ...

In spite of the fact that he was a socialist himself, Yugoslavia’s head of state Josip Broz Tito shockingly pulled in the rage of the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin specifically. Looking to make Yugoslavia increasingly autonomous and confident, Tito removed himself from both the United States and the USSR in a harsh clash known as the Tito-Stalin Split.Because of this, Stalin needed Tito to be killed and gotten the ancestor to the KGB, the MGB, to proceed with it. The USSR’s best mystery specialist was doled out to do Tito’s death. He had recently killed another adversary of Stalin’s—Leon Trotsky. Tito, in any case, supernaturally endure the death endeavors unscathed.In reaction to the death plots, Tito sent an admonition to Stalin: “Quit sending individuals to slaughter me. We’ve just caught five of them, one of them with a bomb and another with a rifle.” Tito likewise kept in touch with Stalin: “On the off chance that you don’t quit sending executioners, I’ll send one to Moscow and I won’t need to send a second.”When the MGB’s progressively regular death plots neglected to kill Tito, they got devilishly imaginative. They at that point attempted to kill him with his very own plague. They exceptionally structured a dangerous microscopic organisms and intended to discharge the plague at a political gathering that Tito would join in. Everybody in the room would have been slaughtered by the plague expect for the KGB specialist who was directing it, as he would have been inoculated beforehand.The KGB additionally planned a toxic substance gem box to attempt to execute Tito. The case would have been given to Tito as a blessing, a Trojan pony of sorts, and would discharge a lethal gas that would execute any individual who opened it. Luckily, both toxic substance plans were rarely done, and Tito outlasted Stalin by about 30 years, biting the dust in 1980 at age 87.

2 The Listening Floor

Pay No Attention to the Spies on the 23rd Floor | History ...

During the Cold War, the KGB turned out to be truly adept at pestering structures and tuning in on discussions. Truth be told, they were so acceptable at such listening in that they once pester a whole floor of a lodging with sound reconnaissance receivers . . . for 20 years.In the mid 1970s, the travel industry started to thrive in the Soviet satellite nation of Estonia. The USSR considered it to be a chance to carry cash into the battling economy, and the KGB considered it to be a chance to keep an eye on outsiders. In 1972, the KGB assumed control over the highest floor of Hotel Viru in Estonia and wired the vast majority of the lodging with modern sound observation gadgets. The lodging was in a zone that was as often as possible went by universal businessmen.Sixty rooms in the inn were for all time set up with mystery mouthpieces, and different rooms could be irritated immediately. Outwardly, Hotel Viru seemed to have 22 stories. In truth, it had the mystery 23rd floor, which housed KGB specialists and the innovation that they used to keep an eye on the entirety of the visitors at the lodging. The KGB stayed there for two decades, until the breakdown of the Soviet Union shut down the reconnaissance activity in 1991.The KGB has been found to have been utilizing staggeringly advanced sound observation innovation in structures far and wide. In 1945, a gathering of Soviet kids introduced the US envoy to the USSR a blessing, a cut wooden plaque of the Great Seal of the United States, as a demonstration of companionship between the two nations. Notwithstanding, the plaque contained a mystery receiver. Indeed, this bug was one of the main sound observation gadgets to utilize inactive innovation to transmit sound signs, making it imperceptible by customary strategies and permitting it to be utilized for an all-inclusive time of time.The irritated plaque permitted the KGB to tune in on discussions in the American minister’s office for almost seven years, until it was inadvertently recognized in 1952 by a British radio administrator. The radio administrator was confounded when he heard discussions between Americans originating from a radio channel close to the international safe haven. That radio channel was being utilized by the KGB to tune in on the private discussions.

1 The Financing Of Terrorism


After Yasir Arafat rose to control at the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), he built up a coalition with the KGB. The KGB at that point started to give mystery preparing to the PLO’s aggressors, who were waging war to savagely accomplish Palestinian statehood. Notwithstanding preparing, the KGB started to dispatch arms to the PLO guerrillas disregarding the ban put upon the Palestinian territories.Around this time, the PLO was completing numerous demonstrations of psychological warfare. In 1969 alone, they performed 82 carrier hijackings around the globe. The head of outside knowledge for the KGB, Aleksandr Sakharovsky, asserted that “plane seizing is my own invention.”The KGB likewise financed another Palestinian aggressor gathering, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLPF), providing them with rocket washes and automatic rifles. A pioneer of the PLPF, Wadie Haddad, was uncovered to be a KGB operator. While Haddad was accountable for the PLPF, he did different hijackings of regular citizen planes. One of those hijackings, the Dawson’s Field Hijackings of 1970, incited what’s known as Black September in Jordan, a wicked common war that kept going from September 1970 until July 1971.The KGB purportedly gave 100 assault rifles, programmed rifles, guns, and ammo to the Official Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1972. The Irish paramilitary gathering introduced probably the most savage demonstrations of viciousness and psychological warfare in the Northern Irish clash known as the Troubles. One explanation that the KGB and USSR looked into the IRA was on the grounds that they had turned Marxist and had started to help transforming Ireland into a socialist state.


Where Have All The Communist KGB and STASI Spies Gone ?

Fallout 4 - RED SCARE - FULL QUEST Mod Playthrough - COMMUNIST SPY ...

A look back: On Normannenstrasse in East Berlin, in the core of a standard white collar class neighborhood, stands a gigantic office complex: 41 solid structures as inauspiciously utilitarian as the condo towers that encompass them. Nine months prior it was the base camp of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security – the Staatsicherheit – or Stasi, maybe the most modern and sweeping undercover work association at any point made. Be that as it may, among January and March this year, as East Germany’s Communist Government at long last crumbled, the Stasi was officially disbanded. Today, the solid fortress is abandoned, its 10,000 rooms fixed, its operators bolted out.

From these dreary structures, 34,000 officials ran the Stasi’s 39 divisions. The staff included 2,100 operators alloted nonstop to perusing mail passed on from post workplaces and territorial Stasi base camp, 5,000 specialists liable for following suspects, and 6,000 agents whose solitary employment was tuning in to private phone discussions.

Primary Department VIII, otherwise called Observation, kept a nearby watch on residents through a broad system of sources in neighborhoods, schools, libraries and even service stations. Principle Department II – Counterintelligence – did electronic reconnaissance of outside ambassadors, specialists and writers and put spies in their workplaces, homes and lodgings. The Stasi even had a division to keep an eye on other Stasi individuals and sources.

”We are as yet getting stuns from what we discover,” says the movie producer Klaus Wendler, a representative for an East German Government advisory group that is currently filtering through the Stasi’s 5,000,000 documents. ”Performers had to keep an eye on individual artists, understudies were pressured into keeping an eye on companions, and youngsters were tricked into keeping an eye on their folks.”

With the disbanding of the Stasi, 85,000 full-time officials lost their positions essentially for the time being. Close to 10,000 have since discovered productive business, a large portion of them in different Government services, remembering 2,000 for the Ministry of the Interior, which some time ago administered the Stasi. The rest have joined the developing positions of East Germany’s jobless; some make due with standard joblessness benefits, while others get no Government remuneration by any stretch of the imagination. Many are upset at ending up barred, even alienated, by their kindred residents.

Abroad, the greater part of the Stasi’s 2,500 profession officials in consulates and missions no longer have a covert operative central command to answer to, and its untold a large number of independent covert government agents no longer get cash from their previous experts. West German insight officials gauge that there are exactly 5,000 agents in West Germany today, 500 of them ”top operators.” Eighty of those are thought to have entered the most elevated echelons of the military and Government, West German authorities state, including knowledge offices.

In spite of emotional political changes in Europe, West German insight authorities dread that not every one of these covert agents have changed their loyalties. Exceptionally restrained and still covert, some are as yet gathering and transferring data to Soviet knowledge organs, the West Germans accept. Others, they think, are essentially sticking around for their chance, holding back to be enacted.

Communist Spy Illustrations, Royalty-Free Vector Graphics & Clip ...

The Stasi has for some time been perceived as one of the best insight benefits on the planet, in a similar alliance as those of Israel and France. By the by, in the course of the most recent seven months, West German and American knowledge authorities have been astounded to find the size of its outside tasks, arranged until his retirement three years prior by the scandalous Markus Wolf. Until 1979, Western knowledge operators didn’t have a present photo of ”the man without a face.” But as of late he has ventured out from the shadows. Today, a smash hit creator, Wolf talks uninhibitedly of his effective infiltration of the West German insight and military over a time of over 30 years. What he doesn’t talk about is psychological oppression.

Over the most recent two months, frightening disclosures have become visible specifying the Stasi’s connects to an assortment of fear based oppressor gatherings, quite the extreme left Red Army Faction, eight of whose individuals were captured in June. With the assistance of the Stasi, they had been given new personalities and occupations in East Germany in the wake of doing psychological militant activities in the 1970’s and 80’s. The Stasi has additionally been ensnared in the Libyan-coordinated bombarding of the La Belle disco in West Germany in 1986: According to new data from witnesses and held onto documents, Stasi operators helped transport the explosives to West Berlin that brought about the passings of two American fighters.

In East Germany, as well, the Stasi, albeit formally nonexistent, stays a danger. In late June, new divulgences uncovered that in 1986, as the Soviet Union started changing its general public and the East German economy kept on decaying, the Stasi, predicting turmoil – however not the finish of the divider – set in excess of 2,000 individuals from a world class mystery team into the most significant levels of East German Government divisions, organizations and colleges. Another 500 government agents were dispatched to West Germany. East German authorities state that a large portion of them are still set up, their characters obscure, and suspect that they are compelled to hold up out any political disturbance.

Insight authorities are in a race to carry the most exceedingly terrible guilty parties to equity before they go for all time underground or sign up with new bosses. The pursuit is suggestive, says one American ambassador in Berlin, of a period in the no so distant past: ”Ferreting out the government operatives, psychological oppressors and Stasi operators is comparable to the quest for the Nazis and their teammates after they endeavored to vanish into German culture toward the finish of the war.”

On Friday morning, only 48 hours from money related unification on July 1, East Berlin is bursting at the seams with energy. Global camera teams and columnists have attacked the city to catch the beginning of another time. Be that as it may, in his office, just strides from the Volkskammer, or Parliament, Peter-Michael Diestel, East Germany’s 38-year-old Interior Minister, ponders the insult inheritance of the past. ”My crucial,” says just, ”is to destroy the Stasi.”

That assignment has tumbled to an impossible competitor: a previous dairy animals draining victor, weight lifter (he can seat press 420 pounds) and infrequent legal counselor who accepted the position of Interior Minister to a great extent in light of the fact that nobody else needed it.

Diestel, a local of Leipzig, has been occupied since getting to work in April. He has enrolled the collaboration of huge quantities of previous Stasi officials and, utilizing data from witnesses and Stasi records, has attempted to acquire ”independent” agents, either by extending to them employment opportunities or persuading them that the Stasi is done. He has gone along key data on fear mongers and sources to West German knowledge offices, and helped organize the capture in June of the Red Army Faction psychological oppressors. At last, Diestel built up the Stasi’s complicity in the La Belle disco bombarding.

Diestel is exploring a forlorn course, subject to furious assaults from both the left and right in East Germany, extraordinary weight from West German authorities, and week after week requires his acquiescence by the German Social Union, a traditionalist gathering in East Germany’s overseeing alliance. Due to day by day dangers against his life, the police monitor his significant other and three little youngsters nonstop. Says Peter Pragal, East Berlin reporter for the week by week magazine Stern: ”He has the hardest activity in Germany, East or West.”

Other than its full-time officials, selected from the best and most brilliant in East German culture, the Stasi had 150,000 dynamic sources and 500,000 to 2 million low maintenance witnesses in East Germany. Its land property alone – including the huge fortresslike complex in East Berlin and Stasi’s in excess of 2,000 structures, homes, dugouts, havens, medical clinics, and resorts all through East Germany – have been esteemed in the billions of dollars. Up until this point, Government agents attempting to take stock of the Stasi have counted 23,000 vehicles and trucks and 250,000 weapons, including submachine firearms, guns, rifles and explosive launchers.

The productive Stasi machine accumulated broad dossiers on in excess of 5 million East Germans – 33% of the populace – that included data as close as sexual propensities and as everyday as books settled up with the library. A great many calls were recorded; condos were pester and unlawfully looked (the Stasi would orchestrate to have suspects kept late at their employments). One protester as of late found that a small scale listening gadget fit for transmitting three miles had been sewn into his jacket neckline.

Residents were powerless against the Stasi’s Orwellian interruption whenever and anyplace – in their condos, industrial facilities, houses of worship, cafés, libraries, specialists’ workplaces, rooms, even on their excursions abroad. In some East German urban communities, each bit of mail was opened in exceptional steam rooms joined to the post workplaces.

At the point when East German soccer groups ventured out to play coordinates in West Germany, Stasi specialists obliged busloads of fans, checking whether any East German sat close to a West German, showed a West German banner or sang the West German national song of praise.

Igor Gouzenko, The Soviet Defector Who Started the Cold War

Up and down the a large number of miles of East German expressway, Stasi specialists acted like corner store chaperons, servers and travelers, cautiously taking note of whether East Germans left their vehicles close to Western vehicles or conveyed dubiously overwhelming baggage.

The Stasi made it basically incomprehensible for East Germans not to work together. Each field operator needed to convey in any event 25 new sources or start 25 examinations consistently. Residents who declined to help were either set apart as subversives or left to adapt to the administration independent. ”You were unable to go anyplace in East German culture except if you could pull the correct strings,” says Hasso Von Samson, a spokesman for West Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution. ”But I guess that’s what happens when they take away your enemy.”

This article reflects the situation in Germany in 1990.

Since then the top spies are still in touch with each other and form a dangerous network which is similiar to the Cosa Nostra in the USA and/or Sicily, the Yakuza in Japan, the Russian Mafia and the Chinese Triads.

The only distinction: The German STASI has learned the code of Omerta and operates in the dark – within the government, the Gauck administration, the Bundestag, the left party, the legal system as judges, attorney and prosecutors, the police and also in the German security and intelligence services.

And last not but least as undercover agents and informer for former KGB spy Wladimir Putin, now Russia’s ruler like former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, former STASI agent Matthias Warnig and the Gazprom and North Stream – Energy connection.

It is a taboo until now.

STASI/KGB Intelligence Cooperation under Project RYaN Exposed – TOP SECRET

Ehemaliger BND-Chef kann geplante Ablösung Honeckers 1987 nicht ...

Between 1981 and 1989 the foreign intelligence branches of the Soviet KGB and the East German Ministry of State Security launched a combined effort to develop a system for detecting signs of an impending western nuclear first strike. Codenamed “Project RYaN”, this early-warning system constituted one part of the Soviet response to the perceived threat of a surprise “decapitation” strike by NATO nuclear forces.

233 pages of documents from the Stasi’s Hauptverwaltung A and analysis by Bernd Schaefer, Nate Jones, and Benjamin Fischer below give unprecedented insight into the capabilities and fears of the Eastern Bloc intelligence services from the Able Archer ’83 War Scare to the end of the Cold War.

Introduction to the Collection

by Bernd Schaefer

In November 2012 CWIHP published e-Dossier No. 37 on the cooperation between the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS or Stasi), which highlighted a wide array of German documents dating from the 1960s through 1989. These materials were introduced by Walter Süss and Douglas Selvage, historians in the research division of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU) in Berlin.[1] While e-Dossier No.37 featured just one document[2] on Soviet/East German preparations to detect a surprise Western “nuclear missile attack” (RYAN or Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie/Ракетно ядерное нападение in Russian) from August 1984, the BStU research division added a substantial number of German Stasi documents on RYAN to its online collection in 2013.[3] These new materials are remarkable and add to our understanding of the intentions, scope, and duration of the Soviet RYAN project; all of them are available in translation today in the CWHIP Digital Archive. The follow e-Dossier includes detailed comments and analysis on their significance by Nate Jones, a nuclear expert at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C., and Benjamin Fischer, a retired CIA officer and veteran researcher of RYAN and the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” of November 1983.

The August 1984 record of bilateral Stasi-KGB conversations, written by East German foreign intelligence spy chief Markus Wolf, includes an apt summarization of RYAN’s purpose by the Soviet representative: “The need for such approaches derives from the fact that a multitude of measures undertaken by the adversary do not allow advance determination which variation to launch a war the adversary will choose. In addition, we need to integrate experiences from analyzing the enemy’s crisis management into a process of further perfecting the definition of indicators to detect the adversary’s main measures for its acute war preparation.”[4]

It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war

It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war. The KGB operated an intelligence network to monitor worldwide “indicators” to detect to assess the likelihood of a “surprise nuclear missile attacked” launched by NATO. Soviet assessments of the likelihood of such an attack differed over the years, peaking between 1982 and 1984.

KGB/Stasi Cooperation | Wilson Center

Whether such fears were warranted given the actual activities of the United States and NATO is disputed. Historians and analysts have differed in their assessments of partially declassified American sources, archival materials from Eastern European and Soviet archives, post-1990 oral histories from Russia, and memories of former actors, such as prominent KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky. Some consider the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” or “War Scare” of November 1983 to be the most dangerous event of the Cold War next to the Cuban Missile Crisis, while others view it in a much less dramatic fashion.[5]

The bulk of newly available Stasi and KGB documentation on RYAN from the BStU Archives in Berlin does not address Able Archer 83. However, it casts an unprecedented light on Stasi and KGB perspectives since 1984, as well as on the operational details, structure, and scope of the RYAN project. The collection includes a KGB catalogue from 1984/85 that, in excruciating detail, outlines the 292 indicators that might precede a potential “surprise nuclear missile attack.” Many of them refer to activities in and around Washington offices and buildings, including the White House parking lot. The collection also includes summaries of monthly KGB reports up to April 1989, which list possible global indicators of preparations for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” These records tell us that hundreds of KGB officers were assigned to work on the RYAN program and a special division was created inside the KGB exclusively for this purpose. Combined with earlier published Stasi documents on the Soviet shoot down of KAL 007 in September 1983 (in which Soviet intelligence’s inability to determine whether the airliner was military or civilian before it was shot down was identified as a serious problem[6]), these new RYAN materials provide ample evidence of comprehensive Soviet efforts to avoid and thwart a “surprise attack.”

While hindsight shows that Soviet fears were exaggerated, the level of Soviet and East German anxiety over Western intentions, particularly during the first Reagan administration, is noteworthy. On the other hand, many Stasi documents on RYAN read like overbearing bureaucratic exercises, aimed at comprehensiveness and perfection on paper, but unattainable in practice. Phrasing in some of the Stasi materials implies that there probably was some skepticism in higher Stasi echelons about the program’s effectiveness and the Soviet approach (though it did not deter the Stasi from contributing more substantive efforts than any other fraternal socialist intelligence service towards identifying indicators).

Still, it does not seem far-fetched that Soviet anxieties were enhanced by the ensuing and ever expanding RYAN program and fed into Moscow’s shift towards disarmament policies under Mikhail Gorbachev. Strangely enough, the KGB’s RYAN project had acquired such a life of its own that its operational routines continued all the way through the first half of 1989, regardless of changes in Soviet-American relations and disarmament efforts during the second Reagan and the early Bush I administration.

Was RYaN simply a “ vicious cycle of intelligence collection and assessment” as described by Oleg Gordievsky? While Gordievsky’s word choice is debatable, these new documents put a certain amount of Soviet “circular reasoning” on full display.

The Vicious Circle of Intelligence

by Nate Jones

Oleg Gordievsky, the spy who revealed the existence of Operation RYaN –RYaN (РЯН) is the Russian acronym for Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie (Ракетно ядерное нападение), or “nuclear missile attack”– described it as “a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment.” During the last decade of the Cold War, Soviet intelligence operatives abroad were “required to report alarming information” to Moscow about a Western surprise nuclear strike, “even if they themselves were skeptical of it.” After the Moscow Center received these inflated and incorrect –but requested– reports of Western preparations for a surprise nuclear strike, it became “duly alarmed by what they reported and demanded more.” Now, documents newly released by the Cold War International History Project and the Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic (BStU), provide unprecedented insight into the “vicious circle of intelligence” of Operation RYaN. And, in a development never envisaged by the documents’ authors, they now present historians with comprehensive, real-time monthly RYaN reports from Soviet intelligence operatives abroad as they witnessed and catalogued the Cold War’s end.[7]

In 1979 the Institute for Intelligence Problems, coordinated by the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, was tasked to work on “the development of new intelligence concepts” that could provide preliminary warning of Western preparations for a first strike. The result of this work was the creation of Operation RYaN, which was secretly announced in May of 1981.[8] At a major KGB conference in Moscow, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov, then Chairman of the KGB, justified the creation of Operation RYaN because, they claimed, the United States was “actively preparing for nuclear war” against the Soviet Union and its allies. According to a newly released Stasi report, the primary “Chekist work” discussed in the May 1981 meeting was the “demand to allow for ‘no surprise.’”[9]

The establishment of Operation RYaN has also been corroborated by KGB annual reports from 1981 and 1982, previously published by the National Security Archive. The 1981 annual report states that the KGB had “implemented measures to strengthen intelligence work in order to prevent a possible sudden outbreak of war by the enemy.” To do this, the KGB “actively obtained information on military and strategic issues, and the aggressive military and political plans of imperialism [the United States] and its accomplices,” and “enhanced the relevance and effectiveness of its active intelligence abilities.”[10]

The 1982 annual report confirmed Soviet fears of Western encirclement, and noted the challenges of countering the “U.S. and NATO aspirations to change the existing military-strategic balance.” Therefore, “[p]rimary attention was paid to military and strategic issues related to the danger of the enemy’s thermonuclear attack.” This Soviet unease was spurred by the pending November 1983 deployment of Pershing II and Gryphon Cruise missiles, whose short flight times and long range changed the nuclear balance by threatening Soviet nuclear command and control with decapitation.[11]

The first comprehensive account of the details of Operation RYaN remains a Top Secret February 1983 telegram from KGB Headquarters Moscow to the London KGB Residency entitled “Permanent operational assignment to uncover NATO preparations for a nuclear missile attack on the USSR,” with enclosed instructions on how to report on indicators pointing toward a nuclear sneak attack. This document was published in full in 1991 by Soviet double agent Oleg Gordievsky and British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew in Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985.

Above: M113 armored personnel carriers move through the town of Stockhausen (Herbstein) during REFORGER ’83 in Germany.

“The objective of the assignment is to see that the Residency works systematically to uncover any plans in preparation by the main adversary [USA] for RYaN and to organize continual watch to be kept for indications of a decision being taken to use nuclear weapons against the USSR or immediate preparations being made for a nuclear missile attack.”

Attached to the telegram was a list of seven “immediate” and thirteen “prospective” tasks for the agents to complete and report. These included: the collection of data on potential places of evacuation and shelter, an appraisal of the level of blood held in blood banks, observation of places where nuclear decisions were made and where nuclear weapons were stored, observation of key nuclear decision makers, observation of lines of communication, reconnaissance of the heads of churches and banks, and surveillance of security services and military installations.

Regrettably, however, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions included a facsimile reproduction of only the first page of this document. The additional pages were translated and typeset into English with no Russian corroboration of their authenticity. Nevertheless, the KGB annual reports, as well as documents from other former Eastern Bloc (Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian) archives, and now these Stasi documents, help to substantiate Gordievsky’s accounts.[12]

The newly released Stasi documents on RYaN show that East German Intelligence did not begin conducting RYaN collection activities until years after the Soviets began. A January 1983 “brief note” describes initial Stasi preparations for creation of systematic RYaN intelligence collection and reporting, but acknowledges “[f]urther questions had to be straightened out.” [13] At the February 9th high-level meeting in Moscow, Stasi head Erich Mielke told KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov that, “consultations have to be continued.” Chebrikov replied, “The work is definitely not finalized.”[14] In August of 1984, the Soviet and East German intelligence agencies were still discussing how, exactly, “to approach conceptual, organizational, and practical aspects when dealing with the RYaN problem.”[15]

In fact, German collection and analysis of RYaN information did not begin in earnest until early 1985, according to the February 15, 1985, Order Number 1/85 which directed that “all options” be utilized to detect Western “military aggression, particularly a surprise nuclear missile attack” by observing non-socialist states and West Berlin in a “systematic and targeted manner.”[16] While systematic Stasi RYaN collection and analysis did not commence until well after the end of what has become known as the “1983 War Scare,” these newly released documents do contain insights about the danger of the era, which will be discussed below.

Above: Order Number 1/85

The documents also provide unprecedented operational details about RYaN, including its size, the importance of East German intelligence to the Soviets, the use of computers for RYaN collection, and the 292 indicators that some Eastern Bloc intelligence experts believed could be used to detect a nuclear attack.

For the first time, historians have access to hard numbers about the size of Operation RYaN, revealing that within the KGB, 300 positions were created so that RYaN operatives could implement the real-time “transmission and evaluation” of reported indicators showing the likelihood of a Western first strike. In July of 1984, KGB chairman Victor Chebrikov created a new division within the First Department (Information) of the KGB’s First Main Directorate (responsible for foreign intelligence and operations) to implement Operation RYaN throughout the KGB and world. This coordinating division was composed of 50 KGB officers.[17]

The documents further acknowledge that the Stasi was the KGB’s primary source of foreign intelligence. In July 1981, Andropov thanked Stasi head Erich Mielke for providing information on “West German tank production, defense technology, and the NATO manual [as of now the contents of this manual is unknown].” Andropov then complemented the Stasi, lauding, “We rate your information very highly,” and forebodingly requested Stasi sources procure “an assessment of the NATO manual and NATO’s preparations for war.”[18] In September 1983, Deputy Chairman of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov told Stasi head Erich Mielke that although Andropov was officially on vacation in the Southern USSR, it was “no actual vacation… For half the day he is reading information, including ours [KGB] and what we received from you.” In December 1986, KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov wrote Stasi head Erich Mielke to thank him for the “tangible results in this extremely important area [Operation RYaN].” He emphasized that the KGB “highly value[d] the contribution of the MfS of the GDR to the joint efforts on timely recognition of the danger of a sudden attack.”[19]

There are also references to the primitive computer system that the Soviet Union was attempting to use to track and calculate the coalition of world forces, including the risk of nuclear war. The KGB reported to the Stasi that it had “revised its planning for scientific-technological research and industrial procurement” of new “reliably working technology.” Gordievsky had earlier reported of “a large computer model in the Min[istry] of Defense to calculate and monitor the correlation of forces, including mili[tary], economy, [and] psychological factors, to assign numbers and relative weights.”[20] On November 23, 1983, US Defense and Intelligence officials circulated an article entitled, “In pursuit of the Essence of War” that described a Soviet method which “cataloged and computerized” the world’s “correlation of forces.” The results, it claimed, were “highly objective, empirically provable and readily adaptable to modern data processing.”[21] The newly released documents show that the East Germans were skeptical of Soviet computing prowess, however: past “Soviet experiences show us that a danger exists of computer application concepts not getting implemented,” snidely wrote Marcus Wolf.[22]

Computer analysis was desired because the amount of information captured during Operation RYaN was massive. The newly released Stasi documents provide far more detail than Gordievsky’s account of the precise indicators that human intelligence collectors were compiling and analyzing (such as: activity at Defense instillations, the location of prominent political officials, and even the treatment of “the most important government documents at the US National Archives”). In October 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Kryuchkov revealed that the First Directorate’s Institute for Intelligence Problems[23] had compiled seven binders full of possible RYaN indicators.[24] By May of 1986, these binders had evolved into a catalogue of 292 indicators of “signs of tension.”[25] The Stasi reported that 226 indicators (77 percent) were able to be “covered, though to varying degree.” The indicators were organized into five main categories: Political, Military, Intelligence Services, Civil Defense Agencies, and the Economic sector. A read through the newly released full catalogue of RYaN indicators (as opposed to the truncated list published by Gordievsky) makes the program appear more rational and effective than has previously been portrayed.[26] Just one telling example is the fact that RYaN watchers had sniffed out the US Continuity of Government program, discovering and surveilling “two presidential planes… equipped with accelerated speed [and] electronic apparatuses which work under conditions of nuclear weapons use.”[27] These planes were where the president and his emergency cabinet would command during a nuclear war.

RYaN watchers were also instructed to watch for the “preparation and conduct of large-scale exercises,” because they increased “the level of combat-readiness of US strategic forces,” and hence, could indicate intentions for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” When Gordievsky disclosed Operation RYaN he also revealed Able Archer 83, a November 1983 NATO command post nuclear release exercise that he claims Soviet intelligence may have miscalculated as an actual nuclear strike.[28]

The RYaN catalogue noted several indicators that would have occurred during Able Archer 83 (and other NATO exercises), including: the “large scale transfer of US armed forces” by C-5A and C-141 aircraft (16,000 troops were transferred from the US to Europe on radio silent flights during Autumn Forge 83, which included Able Archer 83); “preparation of anti-ABC [atomic-biological-chemical] protective gear” and mobilization (during Able Archer 83 the war gamers donned ABC equipment and transferred to an Alternate War Headquarters in response to simulated chemical attacks); and, perhaps most importantly, “significant changes in communications” including “transmittal of orders to deploy nuclear weapons” (on October 17-21 1983, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe school in Oberammergau, West Germany trained more than 50 NATO officers on new nuclear weapons release procedures which utilized a new format that was practiced for the first time during Able Archer 83).[29]

Another eyebrow-raising, though certainly not dispositive, reference to Able Archer 83 can be found in these documents. On November 7, the day Able Archer 83 began, an East German Major General (whose name is illegible) sent a summary of discussions between Stasi foreign intelligence chief Marcus Wolf and Deputy KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov to Major General Damm. Gordievsky has written that on November 8 or 9, he “was not sure which,” flash telegrams were sent to both KGB and GRU residencies in Western Europe reporting “an alert on US bases.” The flash telegrams “clearly implied that one of several possible explanations for the (non-existent) alert was that the countdown to a nuclear first strike had actually begun.”[30]

Perhaps relatedly, the East German documents also reveal a persistent undercurrent of skepticism and concern about the effectiveness of Operation RYaN. In August of 1984, Lev Shapkin, deputy director of the KGB for foreign intelligence, told Marcus Wolf that reforms to Operation RYaN were underway. Though no faulty reporting by Operation RYaN during Able Archer 83 was mentioned in the meeting, the two intelligence officials clearly were worried that false warnings of a Western nuclear first strike could lead to preemptive actions by Soviet nuclear forces. Shapkin told Wolf that the indicators agents were observing and reporting “must be complemented, revised, and made more precise,” and bemoaned “the problem of not getting deceived” by faulty indicators. He reiterated that “clear-headedness about the entire RYAN complex” was a “mandatory requirement.” Marcus Wolf included his concerns in an addendum to the summary of the meetings, stressing the need to know the “actual situation” rather than the picture presented by Operation RYaN’s indicators. “Constant and ongoing assessments,” he sensibly wrote, “have to be made whether certain developments actually constitute a crisis or not.”[31]

The documents contained in this release include one final invaluable resource for historians: monthly Soviet intelligence summaries (translated from Russian to German, and now, to English) spanning August 1986 to April 1989. The monthly summaries, serving a purpose likely never imagined by their drafters, allow us to see how Soviet intelligence witnessed and reported the peaceful ending of the Cold War. The reports, which mirror the above RYaN format, are thorough and include much reporting on the West still officially classified in the United States. This includes reports on the operational readiness of Pershing II, MX, and Trident missiles at specific bases, and US military activities in Nicaragua, Panama, and Iran/Iraq. They also include comprehensive reporting of NATO drills and maneuvers. The Soviet observers reported of Able Archer 87, for example, that NATO “simulated” the switch from peace to war time; nuclear consultations were practiced “in the context of the exercise.” Regrettably, no November 1983 RYaN report is yet available for historians to observe if the reporting on Able Archer 83 was as couched and nuanced as it was four years later.

The task of following CWIHP and the BStU’s lead and finding these earlier RYaN reports now falls to archivists and archival burrowers in other former Soviet states now liberalized.[32]

Finally, these monthly RYaN reports about the Cold War’s peaceful resolution reflect the strangeness of the nuclear superpower rivalry itself. The absurd logic of the Cold War becomes evident when one reads about the NATO “elimination of intermediate and tactical nuclear missiles” in a September 1987 report incongruently entitled, “On the Results of Intelligence Activities to Report Indicators for a Sudden Nuclear Missile Attack.”

Comments on the Soviet-East German Intelligence Alert

by Benjamin Fischer

A real contribution

The BStU documents contain important information about both the Soviet intelligence alert RYAN and its East German counterpart KWA (Kernwaffenangriff or nuclear-weapons attack) during the 1980s. On several accounts, we owe Douglas Selvege a debt of gratitude for locating and disseminating the new tranche. First, no Soviet records have become available since former KGB officer (and British agent) Oleg Gordievsky published a selection of RYAN cables almost a quarter of a century ago, and it is unlikely that Russia will declassify new sources. Most commentators, I myself the most culpable, were mesmerized by both the stark tone of both the cables and Gordievsky’s various accounts of the “war scare.” A more balanced interpretation is now possible. Second, the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) and especially its foreign intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung A (Main Directorate A, hereafter HV A), played a major role in the alert system documented here for the first time. For many years, the only information on the East German side was Markus Wolf’s memoir (1997), which some researchers considered a reliable and original source while others did not. Wolf, however, couched his brief account, referring only to RYAN, not KWA. He apparently expected that HV A records would never see the light of day. There was good reason to do so, since most files were destroyed on the eve of German unification.[33] Though skeptical about the purpose and priority of the Soviet intelligence alert, Wolf nevertheless saluted and obeyed KGB orders. The MfS/HV A organized an elaborate early-warning system (Früherkennung/Frühwarnsystem) that replicated and, to some degree, exceeded its Soviet counterpart.

How scary was the war scare?

Wolf occupied a much higher position than Gordievsky in the Warsaw Pact intelligence community. The spymaster was closer to the real center of power in Moscow, was a keen observer of both superpowers, and his agents in the West— especially inside NATO provided insights that countered the ideological stereotype of the “inherent aggressiveness” of the Western alliance. Moreover, his view may have been in line with the actual perceptions of his Soviet masters.

Yuri Andropov was the leading proponent of RYAN. He inaugurated the alert in 1981 as chairman of the KGB and presided over its expansion after succeeding Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary the next year. In May 1981, during a private conversation with Wolf’s boss, State Security Minister Erich Mielke, Andropov assessed the Reagan administration’s plans for accelerated modernization of strategic and theater-nuclear forces:

The US is preparing for war, but it is not willing to start a war. They are not building factories and palaces in order to destroy them. They are striving for military superiority in order to “check” us and then declare “checkmate” against us without starting a war. Maybe I am wrong.[34]

Andropov added that Washington had abandoned détente because it benefited the USSR at the expense of the US—in words that echoed Ronald Reagan’s condemnation of détente as a “one-way” street! Now the US was trying to recover its losses by reverting to the earlier policy of containment, in other words, to the old Cold War.

Two years later, facing the prospect of deployment of new US Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, Andropov addressed a meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee. The missiles were the “most serious challenge,” he said, and the military situation was “especially dangerous.” In the past, the US had counted on its nuclear weapons “to deter” and “to contain” the Soviet Union; now there was talk of actually fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war.[35] “It is difficult to say where the line between extortion and actual preparation to take a fateful step lies.”[36]

Andropov stopped short of declaring that war was imminent or unavoidable. In his public statements, however, he spoke as if the world was on the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Soviet propagandists compared Reagan to Hitler and the US to Nazi Germany on the eve of 1941. Less than a month after Andropov’s speech, the KGB dispatched a cable that sounded the alarm, asserting that RYAN “now lies at the core of [Soviet] military strategy;” the intelligence alert had become a military alert.[37]

Another “cut” at the question of leadership thinking on the prospect of war comes from a Politburo meeting in May 1983. Acknowledging that the US cruise and ballistic missiles would arrive on schedule, Andropov turned to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for an assessment of US intentions. Gromyko replied: “The United States, as is known, is talking about the fact that they can only strike in response to aggression. I think that without enough reason they wouldn’t dare to use nuclear missiles.” He added that, in any event, NATO’s pluralist structure would act as brake on the US: “Against the first strike are also Canada, England, France, and West Germany.”

The Alert Ramps Up

The Soviets were nervous but not to the point of shaking in their boots. RYAN did not, as Gordievsky claimed, begin to wind down in mid-1984, on the eve of his departure from London and after he had lost access to KGB cable traffic. It ramped up. KGB officer Lev Shapkin briefed the East Germans on a series of decisions made to expand RYAN and to create an infrastructure to support it.[38] The KGB formed a new division within the First (information/analysis) Department of the First Chief (foreign intelligence) Directorate (FCD). It was a situation center or watch office designed to collect and assess warning indicators and levy requirements on the FCD’s operations divisions and signals intelligence (Sigint) department.

The new division was a high priority and was almost certainly initiated by Andropov. The formation of a special RYAN commission chaired by KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov underscored the alert’s top-level political backing and its bureaucratic clout. Chebrikov earmarked 300 slots for the new RYAN division, 50 of which had been filled to monitor warning indications around the clock. However, the KGB had trouble finding qualified personnel and training officers to perform “warning-and-indications of war intelligence,” as it is referred to by US intelligence services. This is one of several signs that the Soviets, even in this late stage of the Cold War, had little or no experience with early-warning intelligence.

Warning and Surprise

RYAN was launched in May 1981 during an All-Union Conference of senior KGB managers from the length and breadth of the USSR. Andropov chaired it, but the presence of Leonid Brezhnev signified that the session was no routine gabfest. Gordievsky’s accounts give the impression that RYAN was the sole item on the agenda. It was not.

The East German documents show that the conference discussed a range of threats, referred to as “surprises,” emanating from within the USSR and the Eastern bloc, as well as from the international arena. The KGB chieftains were instructed to reorient their collection priorities toward early detection and advance warning of potential or impending crises that threatened the internal security and stability, as well as external security, of the Soviet empire. As KGB officer [full name unknown] Zinyov told the East Germans, the new operational directive was to “allow no surprises.” The mission of “Chekist work,” he added, now encompassed “the struggle against espionage and terror, questions of the economy, morale, the construction industry, etc.”[39]

Subsequently, FCD chief Vladimir Kryuchkov confided to Wolf that even foreign intelligence had been drawn into novel operations aimed at detecting threats to internal security originating from outside the USSR.[40] The MfS and HV A followed suit. “The bunker mentality of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] leadership revealed itself in the mantra-like repetition ‘impede every surprise from the enemy in every area.’”[41] This originally meant external military threats, i.e., the war scare, but then it expanded to include a range of dangers posed by domestic dissidence—religious, pacifist, and environmental groups, e.g.—allegedly supported by the West. The “most urgent” mission of the MfS, as well as the HV A, was to detect this conflation of internal and external “surprises” and to “prophylactically” deal with them before they grew to threaten the GDR regime.

Wolf’s repeated assertion that his service had nothing to do with the Stasi police-state was false. Like his counterpart Kryuchkov, Wolf followed orders. HV A case officers and their agents were tasked with collecting intelligence on internal threats emanating from abroad, even at the expense of conventional foreign intelligence inside the GDR and in the “Operations Area” (Stasi-deutsch for West Germany, West Berlin, and other NATO countries). The HV A began filing counterintelligence reports (Abwerberichte)—normally the provenance of the MfS internal security and surveillance departments—which contributed to increased repression in the GDR.[42]

KWA and the Frühwarnsystem

The MfS/HV A was the largest and most efficient Eastern bloc security/foreign intelligence service outside the Soviet Union. Its operational assets were considerable and in several respects exceeded those of the KGB, especially the massive MfS signals intelligence (Sigint) main directorate and the HV A’s extensive agent (Humint) networks that targeted West Germany/West Berlin and the US and NATO presence there.[43] Following the expansion of RYAN in mid-July, the KGB used the MfS/HV A to replicate its own organizational and operational model for early-warning intelligence.

This new collection includes one of the two key documents on KWA, Mielke’s Order Nr. 1/85, which mandated it as “the absolute priority” [emphasis in original] for the entire MfS.[44] The Order authorized Wolf, in his capacity as deputy MfS head, to formulate and implement an organizational plan and operational directives for the entire MfS. The second document[45] is not included in the collection, but several years ago I translated and commented on both documents.[46] The main components of the HV A’s early-warning system included:[47]

  • A “catalog” of warning indicators that was based on the RYAN template of five “political/societal areas” (US/NATO political and military leaderships, intelligence services, civil defense organizations, and economic institutions); it also included targets covered by MfS Sigint and HV A agent networks in West Germany/West Berlin, as well as US/NATO diplomatic, military, and intelligence sites in West Germany;[48]
  • A centralized situation center (Lagezentrum) to constantly monitor KWA indicators on a global basis;
  • A dedicated communications link to the KGB’s situation center;
  • Annual alert drills and military exercises for HV A officers that simulated conditions of a surprise attack;[49]
  • Emergency communications plans and safe houses in West Germany for agents selected to report on KWA;[50]
  • Coordination of operations and intelligence sharing with East German military intelligence on the Soviet model of KGB-GRU cooperation under RYAN guidelines.

A Catalog of Warning Indicators

The focal point of Soviet and East German collaboration was the compilation of a list or “catalog” of warning-of-war indicators designed to detect signs of an impending crisis or war “in real time.” The KGB demanded that the HV A catalog should be based on “strict conformity” with the RYAN template, i.e., on the five “political/societal areas” noted above.

Above: Cover page from the HA III copy of the Project RYaN catalog of indicators.

MfS/HV A records reveal that both services devoted considerable effort to conceptualizing, defining, and operationalizing warning indicators, yet they also seemed to have encountered problems that were never fully resolved. The main objective was agent penetration of “the enemy’s decision-making centers” and acquisition of “documents” on a political decision for war. The Soviet-East German intelligence reach, however, exceeded its grasp. The overriding goal was to obtain advance warning of a US decision to launch strategic nuclear forces, an urgent requirement since one-third of those forces remained on permanent alert, and the rest could be readied on short notice. A 1986 HV A report noted that “at the moment” this had not been accomplished.[51]

The second string to the RYAN/KWA bow was an extensive list of indirect indicators that, it was assumed, would reveal the implementation of alert procedures and mobilization plans that could not be concealed from intelligence surveillance and monitoring. The KGB and HV A were forced to resort to “observable intelligence,” i.e., things that can be seen and counted, in lieu of “message-like” intelligence, which relies on well-placed agents with access to plans, decisions, and intentions.[52] RYAN/KWA signified that the neither the KGB nor the HV A had such agents in place. The questionable methodological assumption was that overt or visible deviations from peacetime norms in the five political/societal areas could reveal a decision to attack the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries.

The one place where both services had well-placed agents was NATO headquarters. The KGB cables Gordievsky published, as well as the East German documents[EMP1] , reveal detailed knowledge of the alliance’s alert procedures and early-warning capabilities, especially NATO’s “crisis management” system. The KGB and HV A did not, however, find it reassuring that NATO arrangements were designed to warn of a Warsaw Pact attack in time to mount a defense. They simply declared that “crisis management” was dual-purpose concept that could be used to attack as well as warn.

The whole RYAN/KWA framework was anachronistic, seemingly more appropriate for the pre-nuclear age when states required lead times to mobilize armed forces and prepare populations for war. The template came from the KGB’s Institute for Research on Operational Problems. One explanation is that with little knowledge or experience to draw on, the Institute was dusting off old lessons learned from a previous surprise attack, namely Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa.

Some of the indicators were based on a mirror-image of how the Warsaw Pact would prepare for war, such as the stockpiling of mineral oil and mass slaughter of cattle. HV A case officers, for example, were instructed to look for:

“Confirmation of deviations in the behavior of prominent personalities and other persons in possession of classified information as well as their family members and persons close to them, which can be viewed as measures for protecting their own security (among other things, sudden moving into specially equipped secure accommodations, unexpected departure from normal residential areas and from border zones at home and abroad).”

The GDR, meanwhile, was building bunkers and fall-out shelters for the political, military, and intelligence elite and practicing “evacuation exercises” in case of a putative nuclear assault.[53]

The KGB and the HV A both had difficulties defining “key” indicators and do not appear to have arranged them in rank order or have assigned numerical weights or some form of an “accounting” method. There is a fleeting reference to the possibility of reaching false conclusions about hostile intentions, but the inherent problem of arriving at a false positive as watch officers worked through their checklists was apparently never fully addressed. Was there a tipping point or designated critical mass of accumulated indicators that would predict an attack? We don’t know, and the documents don’t tell us.

In 1986, the HV A reported that it had covered 226 of the 292 (!) indicators (“77%”), “albeit in varying degrees,” from its catalog, but what that meant is not clear. Were the results negative—no war on the horizon—or positive? The documents refer to efforts to employ computer-based data processing, but they also allude to problems with software and algorithms that, apparently, were never resolved.

All intelligence bureaucracies write memos and send cables when they want to give the impression that they are making decisions and taking action while, actually, “slow rolling the process.” The KGB-HV A dialogue on the indicators may have been no different. Despite repeated references to the urgency and priority of the alert, the HV A took several years to compile its own list of indicators. Meetings of working-level experts in Moscow and East Berlin were arranged at a leisurely pace. It took more than a year after Order Nr. 1/85 to organize an HV A situation center to monitor KWA indicators. By the time it was up and running, the entire effort was about to be overtaken by events in Moscow with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev and “new thinking.”

Mielke’s Variant

RYAN single-mindedly focused on the putative threat of a US surprise attack on the USSR. KGB cables declared that timely warning was required for Soviet strategic forces to take “retaliatory measures,” but the logic of the alert suggests that a preemptive first-strike, not a second-strike after US missiles had been launched, was the actual purpose.

Mielke repeatedly, and vainly, pushed for consideration of “other variants” of surprise, in particular conflict in Central Europe arising from a crisis in East-West relations. Mielke’s concern, shared by many in West Germany, was that the superpowers were prepared to fight in Europe, with conventional forces or “limited” nuclear strikes, down to the last German and on the last inch of German soil.[54] The Soviets simply ignored him. As the documents show time and again, Kremlin leaders had far less concern for their ally’s security than for their own.

Tradecraft and the war scare

The documents contain several references to operational tradecraft that underscore the Warsaw Pact’s lack of experience with warning intelligence. With the onset of the RYAN and KWA alerts, the KGB and the HV A, apparently for the first time, decided to issue to selected agents in the West rapid response communications equipment. The German term was Sofortmeldung (immediate reporting), which may have referred either to radios or burst transmitters using satellite relays to transmit encrypted electronic signals to the HV A situation center.

Theretofore, the KGB and HV A had employed personal communications (face-to-face meetings) or impersonal communications (dead drops) to pass requirements to and collect information from agents. Such arrangements required advance planning, conduct of pre-and-post meeting surveillance detection routes, and continuous “casing” for meeting or dead drop sites. Old-fashion tradecraft was secure but time-consuming and not suited for real-time reporting.

So, what was the war scare?

Wolf and his officers found Moscow’s “war games” a burdensome waste of time in pursuit of a non-existent threat. Some said KWA was a bureaucratic boondoggle that Mielke used to expand his power and influence. Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War” and a “sort of window dressing, and boiled down to compilation of regular reports stating that any given country was not intending in the next few days to drop nuclear bombs on the USSR.”[55] Soviet and East German leaders, however, were genuinely fearful, even if the threats and conspiracies they saw all around them were often exaggerated or even imaginary. As they were losing their grip on power, they were also losing their grip on reality.

Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War”

At the same time, the US was investing billions of dollars to upgrade its command-and-control, communications, intelligence, and early-warning capabilities, all predicated on the potential threat a Soviet surprise attack.[56] During the last decade of the Cold War, the fear of war was reciprocal and real, even if the threat of war was not.

Document Appendix

Document 1: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Brief Note, ‘Issues to Discuss with the Leadership of the KGB of the USSR’. 14 January 1983

A brief note written by the Ministry of State Security that includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

Document 2: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow’. 9 February 1983

This note on the talks between Minister Wolf and KGB Chairman Chebrikov contains heartfelt congratulations on cooperation thus far, but it also highlights problems with the situation and the importance of utilizing the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.

Document 3: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov’. 3 October 1983

These notes describe statements made by Colonel General Kryuchkov which outline the current state of Soviet institutions and intelligence networks in various regions, including Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the United States.

Document 4: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov’. 7 November 1983

This report describes conversations with Comrade Kryuchkov, coving a multitude of subjects, but delving briefly into the problem of “prevention of a surprise nuclear attack” (RYAN). Kryuchkov responded that this issue is being continually worked on, but no central decisions had been made as of yet.

Document 5: Committee for State Security (KGB), ‘Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’. 26 November 1984

A catalog of indicators of NATO preparation for nuclear war that were monitored by Warsaw Pact intelligence services under Project RYaN. The activity is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, and economic.

Document 6: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Order Number 1/85. 15 February 1985

This order from the Ministry of State Security describes the tasks of the MfS units concerning efforts to uncover intentions of aggression and surprise military activities by western states and their allies, especially a surprise nuclear missile attack against the USSR.

Document 7:Speech, East German Minister of State Security Mielke, ‘At the Enlarged Collegium Meeting on 7 June 1985 about Further Preparation of the XI SED Party Congress’. 10 June 1985

This speech by East German Minister of State Security Mielke addresses the technological, intellectual, and ideological preparations for war by the west and how to uncover and organize indicators of a potential attack.

Document 8: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)’. 6 May 1985

This report by Ministry of State Security describes developments and achievements toward early recognition of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

Document 9: Letter, East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov. 10 November 1986

This letter from East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Chebrikov requests a consultation on the development and continuation of Complex RYAN, especially on furthering collaboration between the MfS and KGB.

Document 10: Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke. 24 December 1986

Responding to Mielke’s letter from November 1986, Chebrikov agrees to the proposed meeting between the MfS and the KGB on the subject of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the states of the socialist community.

Document 11: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Plan for Consultations with the Delegation of the KGB. 20 January 1987.

This document is a plan for the consultations to take place in Berlin between the Stasi and the KBG. It includes objectives and proposed theses on the subject of early recognition of a sudden nuclear missile attack by NATO forces.

Documents 12 A–T: Committee for State Security (KGB), ‘About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’.

Documents 12A–T are monthly intelligence reports digests generated using intelligence by Project RyaN between August 1986 and April 1989.


[1] Süß, Walter and Douglas Selvage. “CWIHP e-Dossier No. 37: KGB/Stasi Cooperation” Cold War International History Project

[2]  “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16.

[3] „Das MfS und die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen kommunistischen Geheimdiensten: Staatssicherheit und sowjetischer KGB.“ Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.

[4] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16.

[5] See below respective comments by Nate Jones and Ben Fischer.

[6] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov,” September 19, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5306, pp. 1-19.

Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov described Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.” Put differently, the Soviet side wondered what would have been if the plane would have been a military aircraft and part of a Western surprise attack: In this case the Soviet Union would have been unable to detect such an attack, i.e. Moscow would have become “surprised.”

[7] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 585.

[8] Other sources vary the spelling of RYaN. Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin spelled it “ryon.” Another spelling includes the word “surprise:” “VRYAN” “vnezapnoe raketno yadernoe napadenie” –surprise nuclear missile attack. Czech Intelligence referred to the operation as NRJAN.  One document shows that the Bulgarians monitored “VRYAN indicators” as late as June 1987.  These East German documents confirm that the operation continued until at least April, 1989.  The 1983 War Scare, Part One; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 523; Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West, (New York: St. Martins, 1994), 302; 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”

[9] RYaN Translation #2

[10] The 1983 War Scare, Part One

[11] The 1983 War Scare, Part One; Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464. Recently, Benjamin Fischer has introduced an additional potential source of East German fear: CANOPY WING, purportedly a US military research project to exploit a vulnerability of Soviet Warsaw pact command and control communications to launch a “decapitation/surgical” strike.

[12] 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”

[13] “Issues to discuss with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR”

[14] “Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow.”

[15] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,”

[16] “Order Number 1/85”

[17] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” It is possible that this new coordinating division was created as a reaction to the false alerts generated by Operation RYaN in November 1983 incorrectly warning that a NATO nuclear release drill, Able Archer 83, could have been an actual nuclear attack.

[18] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19.

[19] ”Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke.”; For more on the East German contributions to Soviet intelligence collection, see Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464.

[20] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three,

[21] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three,

[22] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,”

[23] Translated here as “Institute for Operative Problems.”

[24] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov”

[25] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)”

[26] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Report, ‘Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” 119338. A partially declassified CIA document shows that Operation RYaN had its analogue in U.S. intelligence gathering. The CIA was also working with the DIA, and presumably allied intelligence agencies, to create a list of indicators — including the defense industry — for its chiefs of station to monitor, in an attempt to “emphasize greater early warning cooperation with intelligence services.”  Other parallels to RYaN date back to 1961, when the Soviets also instructed embassies in all “capitalist” countries to collect and report information during the Berlin Crisis. In 1991, one might have deduced the January 16 Desert Storm invasion by monitoring the influx of pizza deliveries to the Pentagon, according to current U.S. Army Operational Security (OPSEC) training materials.  In October 1983, justifying the KGB’s difficulties, Kryuchkov stated, “Even in the United States they have not completed this [a RYaN equivalent] yet.” The 1983 War Scare, Part One

[27]  “Report, Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” For more on Continuity of Government, see James Mann, “The Armageddon Plan,” The Atlantic, March 2004.

[28] Still-classified reports by the British Joint Intelligence Council and the US President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have allegedly confirmed Gordievsky’s accounts.  See The 1983 War Scare, Part Three,, and British Documents Confirm UK Alerted US to Danger of Able Archer 83,

[29] The 1983 War Scare, Part Two

[30] Regrettably, no text of the November 8 or 9 flash telegram has been released or reproduced. Gordievsky’s revelation of this warning is the only basis for the current historical record (though the preceding and following telegrams which he reproduced and published do serve as somewhat sturdy bona fides).  Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985, (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1991), 87.

[31] Marcus Wolf did not write kindly of the Soviets, or Operation RYaN, in his 1997 memoir:  “Our Soviet partners had become obsessed with the danger of a nuclear missile attack,” though he writes that he had not. “Like most intelligent people, I found these war games a burdensome waste of time, but these orders were no more open to discussion than other orders from above.” Marcus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (New York: Random House, 1997), 222.

[32] Welcome, Ukraine.

[33] For an account of the file destruction by the HV A officer who supervised it, see Klaus Eichner and Gotthold Schramm, Konterspionage: Die DDR-Aufklärung in den Geheimdienstzentrum (Berlin: edition ost, 2010), pp. 174-177.

[34] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.

[35] Andropov was referring to the new US war-fighting strategy for “prevailing” in a limited nuclear conflict that was first announced as Presidential Directive 59 by the Carter administration and slightly modified during the Reagan administration in National Security Decision Memorandum 13.

[36] “Speech of General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” Available at   <;

[37] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. 74.

[38] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.

[39] RYAN Translation #2: “Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, on February 9, 1983 in Moscow.”

[40] RYAN Translation #3: “Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov, V. A. on October 3, 1983.”

[41] Peter Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione: Ein Insider Report (Berlin: elefanten press, 1992), p. 85.

[42] Ibid.

[43] On MfS Sigint, see Ben B. Fischer, “‘One of the Biggest Ears in the World’: East German Sigint Operations,’” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11:2 (Spring 1998), pp.142‑153.  The MfS, the HV A, and the intelligence service of the East German Army were handling some 3,000 agents in West Germany/West Berlin when the Berlin Wall fell.  About half spied for the MfS and military intelligence and the other half for the HV A. Five of every 100,000 West German citizens were “working clandestinely for the GDR.” Georg Herbstritt, Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage: Eine analytische Studie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 2007), p. 84.

[44] “Befehl 1/85 zu den Aufgaben der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitigen Aufklärung akuter Agressionsabsichten und überraschender militärischer Aktivitäten imperialisticher Staaten und Bundnisse, inbesondere zur Verhinderung eines überraschinden Raketenkernwaffenangriffs gegen Staaten der sozialistischen Gemeinschaft,” BstU [Bündesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR], ZA [Zentralarchiv], DSt [Dokumentenstelle im Zentalarchiv des BStU]103137. Also RYAN Translation #4.

[45] “1. Durchführungsbestimmung des Stellvertreters des Ministers auf Befehl 1/85 vom 15.2.1985, GVS 0008-1/85: Allzeitige Nutzung der Möglichkeiten der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitgen und zuverlässigen Beschaffung von Hinweisen auf akute feindliche Aggressionsabsichten, -vorbereitungen und –handlungen,” BstU, ZA, DSt103137.

[46] Benjamin B. Fischer, “The 1980s Soviet War Scare: New Evidence from East German Documents,” Intelligence and National Security, 14:4 (Autumn 1999), pp. 186-197.

[47] Wolf’s tasking of MfS departments is described in Ibid.

[48] “Katalog ausgewählter Indikatoren zur Früherkennung gegnerischer militärischer Aggressionsvorbereitungen und Überraschungsabsichten, inbesondere von Maßssnahmen zur Vorbereitung eines überraschenden Raketenwaffenangriffs (KWA),” BstU, ZA, DSt103137. A different version of this text is available in Document #5 of this collection.

[49] See Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, pp. 72, 85 and Günter Bohnsack, Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung: Die Legende Stirbt  (Berlin: edition ost, 1997), p. 64.

[50] Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 85.

[51] RYAN Translation #6: “R E P O R T on development and achieved state of work regarding early recognition of enemy attack and surprise intentions (Complex RYAN).”

[52] Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 83-88.

[53] Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 72.

[54] Fear of a superpower conflict lead GDR leader Erich Honecker to open a back channel to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a decision that irritated Andropov. Markus Wolfe, Man Without a Face (New York: Times Books, 1997), p. 221.

[55] Mikhail A. Alexeev, Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 203.

[56] See Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992). Parallels between mutual American and Soviet fears of surprise attack are discussed in Benjamin B. Fischer, “The Soviet-American War Scare of the 1980s,” International Journal of Intelligence andCounterintelligence 19:3, Fall 2006, pp.480-519.


Bernd Schaefer

Bernd Schaefer

Global Fellow, Former Senior Scholar;
Professional Lecturer, The George Washington University
Nate Jones

Nate Jones

Director, Freedom of Information Act Project, National Security Archive

Benjamin B. Fischer

Former Chief Historian of the Central Intelligence Agency


The Nuclear Proliferation International History Project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews, and other empirical sources. At the Wilson Center, it is part of the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program.  Read more


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49 journalists were killed, 389 are currently in prison and 57 are being held hostage in 2019

49 journalists were killed, 389 are currently in prison and 57 are being held hostage in 2019

Here is the report about 49 journalists who were killed this year 2019 just for doing their job, 389 are currently in prison and 57 are being held hostage.

Currently I am on a top spot globally for the next assassination as I am the only one who dares to publish the KGB/FSB/GRU and STASI lists worldwide since more than 10 years.

I was nearly killed this year and also last year by poison – assassinated  twice for publishing the KGB/FSB/GRU and STASI Agent lists – not to mention all financial and reputation losses – orchestered by Putin’s henchmen.

I am not connected to any organisation neither intelligence or media or otherwise. This would bring me into even bigger danger.

I  was extremely lucky. Others not.

So I expect from you, dear readers, pr “journalists” and slimy editors of main stream media,  old “friends”, or former business partners, NOTHING  – as my experience taught me and I don’t blame you at all.

You are mostly WEAK and/or CORRUPT.

You will only eventually show some crocodile’s tears for my dead friends and surely no action at all and use them as an alibi for your “courageous work”.

Consequently I think your state of mind is pretty vacant.

You need a holiday in Cambodia.

I do it MY WAY.


Here is the list




GRU-KGB Mord an Putin-Feind mitten in Berlin – die Spur führt nach Moskau

GRU-KGB Mord an Putin-Feind mitten in Berlin – die Spur führt nach Moskau

Langsam dämmert es auch den Mainstream-Medien, das GRU/KGB und Neo-STASI weiterhin aktiv sind und unbequeme Gegner überall auf der Welt ermorden – auch in BERLIN. So berichtet nunmehr auch die wachgeküsste Tagesschau:

“Zelimkhan Khangoshvili fürchtete um sein Leben. Der russische Staat sei hinter ihm her, berichtete der Tschetschene mit georgischem Pass bei seiner Asylanhörung im brandenburgischen Eisenhüttenstadt im Januar 2017. Mehrere Mordanschläge habe es in den vergangenen Jahren auf ihn gegeben, so der ehemalige Rebellenkommandeur. Er sei ein gesuchter Mann – im Kaukasus und darüber hinaus. Was er denn befürchte, wenn er nach Russland zurückkehren müsste, wollte der Mitarbeiter des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) von ihm wissen. Khangoshvilis Antwort: “Die russischen Organe werden einen Mord inszenieren.”

Am 23. August 2019, gegen 11:58 Uhr, wurde Zelimkhan Khangoshvili schließlich ermordet. Nicht in Russland oder im Kaukasus, sondern mitten in Berlin. Im Kleinen Tiergarten im Ortsteil Moabit war der 40-Jährige gerade auf dem Weg zum Freitagsgebet in der Moschee, als sich ein Mann auf einem Fahrrad näherte und ihm aus kurzer Distanz mit einer Pistole samt Schalldämpfer in den Kopf schoss. Khangoshvili war sofort tot.

Der Mord an dem Georgier gibt seitdem Rätsel auf: Wer steckt hinter dem Attentat? War es ein Auftragsmord aus dem kriminellen Milieu? Eine Fehde unter Kaukasiern? Oder gar ein Attentat im Auftrag des Kreml?

Der mutmaßliche Todesschütze hatte nach der Tat versucht mit einem E-Roller zu fliehen, war jedoch festgenommen worden: Es ist ein stämmiger Mann mit Schnauzbart und auffälligen Tätowierungen. Laut Pass handelt es sich um den russischen Staatsbürger Vadim Sokolov. Er sitzt in Berlin in Untersuchungshaft und schweigt. Einmal soll er Besuch von Diplomaten aus der russischen Botschaft bekommen haben, die ihn konsularisch betreuen.

Die Ermittlungen in dem Fall führt das Berliner Landeskriminalamt (LKA). Der Vorwurf gegen den festgenommenen Tatverdächtigen lautete bislang: Mord. Weil die Tat aber eine so große Brisanz birgt, lässt sich der Generalbundesanwalt seit Beginn an über den Stand der Ermittlungen informieren. Und auch das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) ist beteiligt.

Jetzt könnte der Fall allerdings eine neue Dimension bekommen: Die Bundesanwaltschaft will das Verfahren nach Informationen von WDR, NDR und “Süddeutscher Zeitung” noch in dieser Woche übernehmen. Und zwar wegen eines möglichen Geheimdienst-Hintergrunds. In Karlsruhe geht man inzwischen davon aus, dass der russische Staat den Mord in Berlin-Moabit in Auftrag gegeben haben könnte. Auch der “Spiegel” hatte darüber berichtet.

Ein Abgleich der biometrischen Daten der damaligen Fahndungsbilder ergab nun eine hohe Ähnlichkeit mit dem in Berlin festgenommenen Tatverdächtigen Sokolov. Auffällig war allerdings: Russland hatte die internationale Fahndung nach Vadim K. im Jahr 2015 ganz plötzlich eingestellt. Der Verdacht der deutschen Ermittler ist nun: Russische Dienste könnten den mutmaßlichen Mörder gefunden und für ein Attentat rekrutiert haben. Und schufen daraufhin die Falschidentität Sokolov.”

In Geheimdienstkreisen ist man sich sicher, es war Putins langer Arm in Berlin.