Georgy Malenkov: what “heir” of Stalin went to Church – The Global Domain  News



MAY 18, 1953


Copy No.

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

18 May 1953
pg. 00195

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to Comrade G.M. Malenkov

In accordance with instructions from the CPSU CC, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany presents this report on the reasons for the departure of the population from the German Democratic Republic to West Germany, and also on proposals to end these departures.

In its note to the CPSU CC of 15 March 1953, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany delivered a detailed analysis of the economic and political situation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite the general economic improvements and political strengthening of the GDR, the departure of the population from the GDR to West Germany is growing, as is confirmed by the data furnished below:



4 mo. of 1953

1. In all, number who left the GDR




Left illegally




Moved with permission




2. Arrived in the GDR from West Germany





By their social composition, those who have left the GDR fall into the following categories:



4 mo. of 1953





White-collar workers













No data



Other categories and family members





Detailed data on social and age composition are contained in Appendix No. 1.
Of this number, 320 persons exited across maritime and zonal borders during the [first] four months of 1953; the rest left through Berlin.
The increase in the number of persons moving from the GDR to West Germany can be explained by an intensification of the class struggle in the city and the countryside, and also by the fact that in the practical work of implementing major economic and political measures, administration often is substituted for political mass work, and certain ministries [and] local party and state organs commit gross errors and excesses in regard to different strata of the population.
After the Second Conference of the SED [in 1952], the government of the GDR and the SED CC took a number of important decisions aimed at limiting capitalist elements in industry and trade, as well as the kulak class in the countryside.
The most important measures on limiting capitalist elements in the city are:

– limiting the supply of raw materials, electric power, and fuel to private industrial enterprises, and goods to private commerce, as well as ending the sale of new industrial equipment, freight vehicles, vessels, and transport and fishing fleets to private enterprises;
– liquidating the majority of large private wholesale firms by administrative procedure under the pretext that they were violating the laws of the GDR;
– implementing special measures to combat speculation and [cutting off] links between private entrepreneurs and firms in West Berlin and West Germany, as well as forcibly closing the branches of West German and West Berlin firms in the democratic sector of Berlin and the GDR;
– canceling some tax advantages earlier granted to large private industrial enterprises on the basis of laws enacted before 1945, as well as intensifying the recovery of [tax] arrears;
– transferring the owners of enterprises employing more than five workers, rather than the existing [cut-off point of] 10 workers, from the category of artisans to the category of industrial enterprises, which has led to a significant increase in the tax burden on this group and to their exclusion from membership in the artisan guilds.

The most important measures to limit capitalist elements in the countryside are:

– raising the norms on compulsory supplies of meat as compared to 1952 and sharply increasing measures on forcible collections of all arrears, going as far as criminal indictments and the confiscation of property;
– kulak farms are the last to be given access to MTS vehicles, and tariffs on them are raised to the level of actual cost of the service [uroven’ sebestoimosti], which is twice what is paid by farms of under 20 hectares;
– supplying mineral fertilizers to kulak farms only after the needs of agricultural cooperatives and the working peasantry have been met in full, which in practice has led to a sharp reduction in the supply of phosphorous fertilizer to these farms;
– ending grants of long-term credits to kulaks and limiting grants of short-term credits;
– farms having 20 or more acres of land and two or more full-time workers are not accepted as members of agricultural production cooperatives.

In 1953, the compulsory use through MTSs of kulak farms’ tractors and agricultural machines (after they had finished their work in the fields) on other peasant farms, which has deprived large farms of the opportunity to lease their tractors and agricultural machines on terms that are profitable for them.
Excluding kulaks from the governing board[s] of peasant mutual-aid committees and agriculture trade cooperatives, where they had significant economic and political influence.
The Politburo of the SED CC passed a resolution on accepting land from kulak farmers who wish to give it to the state, while leaving 6-7 hectares at their [i.e. the farmers’] disposal, if these peasants so desire. This resolution, announced by Ulbricht at a congress of peasants at the beginning of February this year, was taken as an indication of increased pressure on the kulak class.
All of this led a portion of the peasantry, chiefly large [peasants], to begin to give up their land. On 1 April 1953, 442,8 thousand ha., or 7.3% of the entire arable agricultural area of all peasant farms, including 393,0 thousand ha. from farms having over 20 ha. land, or 26% of the agricultural area of these sorts of farms, were abandoned and vacant.
It should be noted that the measures to limit capitalist elements in the city and the countryside in many cases are implemented without sufficient political and economic preparation, as a result of which some party and governmental measures have found insufficient support among a significant portion of the populace.


With the general rise in the standard of living of the populace, a disjunction between the growth of the populace’s money income and the growth of commodity circulation developed toward the beginning of 1953. The fund of wages paid out in the first quarter of 1953 was 17.3% greater than that of the first quarter of the previous year; the volume of commodity circulation over this period rose by only 10% at comparable prices, while commodity circulation in the first quarter of 1953 compared with the fourth quarter of 1952 shrank and consisted of 6.030 million marks against 7.361 million marks in the fourth quarter of 1952.
The under-fulfillment of the production plan for consumer goods in the absence of corresponding reserves and the non-fulfillment of the export-import plan, led to an acute shortage of goods in the commercial network. In this way, the elevated requirements of the population were not wholly satisfied.
Data about the fulfillment of the plan by industry in the first quarter is shown in Appendix No.2.
The autumn and winter of 1952-1953, which were difficult for the GDR, and the weak organization of harvest work led to a significant drop in the harvest of sugar beets, oil crops, potatoes and vegetables. Besides this, the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the plan for stockpiles and purchases of agricultural goods in 1952 led to difficulties in the supply of food to the populace.
This made it necessary to halt commercial sales of fats and sugar in the first quarter of 1953, to substitute partially rationed fats and sugar with other goods, to abolish ration cards for private-capitalist elements and persons of free professions (this affected about 500,000 people), to abolish some additional ration cards for the intelligentsia, and also to raise the prices for meat given out through ration cards by 10-15%, and for commercially sold confectioneries by 12-50%.
With the cancellation of ration cards for footwear and for knitted goods, the fixed price level [uroven’ edinykh tsen] was left close to the previously effective commercial prices. Prices were raised on a significant portion of imported consumer goods.
In the course of the entire winter period, interruptions in the supply of coal and electricity to the populace in the republic occurred, as a result of which many schools, residential buildings, and socio-cultural [kul’turno-bytovye] establishments often went unheated.


Recently the government of the GDR made a series of decisions on strengthening punitive policies in the struggle against the theft of people’s property, on criminal sanctions for evading state agricultural quotas and taxes, on limiting the activity of private wholesale firms, and on purging certain regions of dubious elements of questionable class. These decisions are basically correct. However, during the implementation of these decisions manifold excesses are being committed, as is expressed in the intensification of different sorts of repressive measures in relation to the populace. As a result of [these actions] the number of arrests of citizens and convicted persons significantly increased: if in the first half-year of 1952, 11,346 arrests were carried out, [and] in the second half-year 17,471, then during just the first quarter of 1953, 14,348 arrests were carried out.
Detailed data are provided in Appendices No. 3, 4, and 5.
By the directive adopted by the GEC on 23 September 1948, “On punishments for violations of economic order,” which is currently in effect, the police are given the right broadly to carry out arrests and searches on the grounds of only suspicion of economic crimes. On the basis of this directive, in 1952, 16,482 proceedings were instituted and 4,185 persons were arrested. In 1953, in only the first quarter, 5,094 proceedings were instituted and 2,548 persons were arrested.
There are many cases of incorrect arrests, unlawful and groundless searches in apartments and offices, [and] violations of the established arrest and custody procedure.
On 1 April 1953, there were 54,876 persons in the jails of the GDR; of these, up to 13,141 had not yet had their cases reviewed by the courts.


Within the SED CC and in local party organs, there is an underestimation of the political significance of the populace’s departure from the GDR to West Germany. This underestimation has manifested itself, in particular, in the directives of the SED CC. Thus, in letters from 6 January and 30 April of this year, no political evaluation was made of the issue and no measures are planned which would help bring about a fundamental change in the situation. In CC directives, the departure of party members from the GDR is not characterized as a party crime. Meanwhile, 2,718 members and candidates of the SED, and of these, 175 functionaries, were counted among those who left the GDR during the [first] four months of 1953. In addition, over that period, 2,610 members of the Union of Youth [FDJ] left.
Party organs exert almost no influence over the mass democratic organs–labor unions, the Union of Youth, and the Women’s League–in inducing them to carry out work to prevent the departure of the population from the GDR.
The press and radio of the GDR weakly expose the slanderous propaganda emanating from West Germany about the refugees, weakly publicize the measures taken by the government of the GDR to accommodate refugees who have returned to the Republic, by giving them work [and] living quarters, and guaranteeing other rights to them, [and they] rarely organize statements by persons who have returned from West Germany. Newspapers, as a rule, remain silent about the facts of the migration of residents of West Germany to the GDR, and do not use their statements for propaganda purposes.
Party and governmental organs commit serious distortions in the implementation of the SED’s policy with regard to the intelligentsia.
In the second half of 1952, the SED CC and the GDR government undertook a series of economic and political measures aimed at drawing the intelligentsia into active participation in cultural and economic construction. From 1 July 1952, the pay for engineering-technical and scientific workers was significantly increased, and for the most outstanding scientific and technical personnel, high personal salaries of up to 15,000 marks a month were established.
Despite this, the role of the intelligentsia in building the Republic and the necessity of involving the old intelligentsia is still underestimated within the party and the country. In a significant portion of enterprises, a sectarian relationship to the intelligentsia has still not been overcome. The intelligentsia is not drawn into active participation in the productive and social life of the enterprise.
There are serious drawbacks in the way ideological work with the intelligentsia is handled. In a crude and clumsy manner, demands are made for the reconstruction of all scientific work on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Due to this, scholars of the old school consider that, insofar as they are not Marxists, they have no prospects in the GDR.
Little attention is paid by the SED to organizing scientific discussions, to the free exchange of opinions, [and] the discussion of different problems in advanced science and practice, in the intelligentsia’s milieu.
To date, the linking and exchange of scientific activity between scientists of the GDR and scientists of the Soviet Union and social democratic countries is still insufficiently developed.
A feeling of anxiety for their personal safety is evident among broad circles of the intelligentsia and most of all among the technical intelligentsia. The instances of groundless accusations of sabotage constitute the reason for this sort of mood. The absence of the necessary explanatory work on this issue creates favorable conditions for the activity of enemies and the broad dissemination of all sorts of slanders.


West German and Anglo-American authorities are carrying out economic and political diversions aimed at disrupting the five-year plan and at discrediting the policy of the GDR government before the populace. They have worked out a system of measures to entice engineering-technical, scientific and highly-qualified workers from the enterprises and establishments of the GDR.
In West Berlin, a high exchange rate of the Western mark in relation to the Eastern mark is being artificially maintained, making it profitable for the West Berlin population to buy food in the GDR. On the other hand, the acute shortage of high-quality consumer goods in the GDR and their presence in West Berlin attracts a large mass of the residents of the GDR into the Western sector[s] of Berlin. Providing West Berlin with a high level of supply of every imaginable good and lower prices for goods compared to the rest of West Germany has the aim of creating the impression among the population that a high standard of living in West Germany exists in comparison with the GDR.
One of the methods of enemy activity is to dispatch special recruiters to the GDR who entice qualified workers, engineers and technicians, and teachers of secondary and higher schools, to the West.
The West German authorities, the Americans, English, and French, systematically conduct propaganda on the radio in favor of the GDR population’s departure for the West, send large quantities of provocative letters, and give provocative telephone warnings of allegedly imminent arrests of GDR citizens.


The church, especially of late, is displaying an active role in enemy propaganda against the GDR. The leaders of the Protestant and Catholic Churches located in West Germany have taken the path of open struggle against the GDR; in sermons and in multiple letters, the clergy calls upon the populace to flee to the West.
The SED CC is committing some mistakes in its relations with the church.
On 27 January 1953, the SED CC made a decision on exposing the anti-democratic activity of the church youth organization “Junge Gemeinde.” It was proposed not to begin to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” through broad propaganda work among the populace, but through the organization of trials. In connection with this instruction, the organs of the MfS [Stasi] carried out the arrests of some clergymen and members of “Junge Gemeinde” in February and March. Due to the inadequacy and unconvincing character of the material, however, the trials have not yet been held. Then the SED CC gave an order to begin unmasking “Junge Gemeinde” in the youth press. During the implementation of these instructions, the accusation was made across the board that all of the members of “Junge Gemeinde” were members of the terrorist West German youth organization (BDJ). As a result of this the campaign to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” has currently exacerbated relations between the church and the state.
At one of the meetings with the first secretaries of the SED district committees, W. Ulbricht gave the order that open meetings were to be held in all institutions of higher learning and 12-grade schools of the League of FDJ to expose the “Junge Gemeinde,” in the course of which the expulsion of the leaders and most active members of “Junge Gemeinde” from schools and educational institutions was to be demanded. In certain schools the number of those expelled reaches 20-30 persons, and in each institution of higher education, the number of expelled students ranges from 5 to 20 persons; this in particular, has led to the fact that in March and April of this year alone, 250 people from 39 12-grade schools have fled to the West.


In the interest of halting the departure of the population to West Germany, it seems expedient to recommend the implementation of the following measures to the leadership of the GDR:

On economic issues:

1. To take measures toward the unconditional fulfillment of the industrial production plan for 1953, which is decisive for the fulfillment of the five-year plan. To liquidate the lag which took place from the beginning of the year and especially to devote attention to assuring the fulfillment of the plan for machine-building [industry], the introduction of electric power, and the development of [the] metallurgy [industry].
2. Over the course of a month, to work out measures to increase the 1953 consumer goods production plan and the development of commodity circulation.
For this purpose, the government of the GDR must take additional measures to import necessary raw materials: cotton–15-20,000 tons, wool–3,000 tons, heavy leather—2,500 tons. To increase imports of food stuffs (fats, fruits, and others) and some high-quality manufactured consumer goods. For this purpose, to assign additional output of high-quality production for export, in particular to capitalist countries, having found the necessary raw materials locally, using the free [industrial] capacities at hand, especially in precision mechanics and optics.
The GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade makes insufficient use of the possibilities of trade with capitalist countries. It is desirable to render necessary aid to the GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade through the trade representatives of the USSR and the people’s democracies in capitalist countries.
3. To oblige local organs of power to improve the leadership of local industry significantly. To oblige the GDR Gosplan [State Planning Commission] to re-examine within a month the 1953 production plans for local industry with a view to expanding them significantly.
4. In noting the underestimation of the role of manufacture in supplying the population with consumer goods, it is necessary to take governmental measures in support of crafts production. It is expedient, in keeping with the realization of artisans’ cooperatives, to organize supplies of raw materials for them on a contractual basis on the condition that they hand over their completed products to the state commercial network; to work out measures to offer artisans tax and credit advantages, and also to equip artisans’ cooperatives and individual enterprises with industrial equipment.
5. Considering that one of the reasons for the departure of peasants from the GDR to West Germany is the high norms for quotas of agricultural deliveries to the state, to reduce by 5-10% the differentiated norms in effect in 1953 for compulsory supplies of grain crops and meat by peasant farms.
6. To cancel ration cards for meat, fats and sugar from the autumn of 1953, thereby completing the elimination of the rationing system in the GDR, keeping in mind that the per-capita consumption norms that have been attained furnish the possibility of a transition to free commerce.
7. To work out a three-year plan on mechanizing agriculture, developing the MTS network, and equipping it with tractors and agricultural machinery in order to have the possibility of fulfilling the needs for mechanized cultivation of the land not only of agricultural cooperatives, but also of individual peasant farms.
8. To halt the practice of using tractors and agricultural machines from private cultivators through the MTS for work on other farms.
9. To work out a three-year plan to develop animal husbandry and to create a fodder base, assuming the need for future improvements in supplies to the populace from their own resources.
10. To work out a production plan for fertilizer in quantities that will meet in full the needs of agriculture, including large private farms.
11. To concentrate the attention of state and party organs on the organizational-economic strengthening of the agricultural production cooperatives which have been created in order to ensure, even this year, a harvest in the cooperatives that is larger than that of the best individual agricultural farms, and an income for cooperative members [that] exceeds the incomes of individual peasant farms.
12. In carrying out measures on limiting private-capitalist elements, to differentiate between attitudes toward large and small retailers and other small entrepreneurs (proprietors of small restaurants, hairdressers, bakers, and so on) with regard to taxes, credits, issuing food ration cards, supplying goods to merchants; and to use private commerce in the capacity of a commodity distribution network to serve the population.
13. Considering the populace’s great demand for construction materials, [as well as] agricultural and gardening equipment, to organize a broad trade in them, both in the city and the countryside, having ensured a portion of additional funds for cement, saw-timber, tiles and machine-manufactured articles; to increase the production of agricultural and gardening equipment.

On administrative issues:

1. In the near future, to carry out a broad amnesty both with regard to persons convicted in the first period for Nazi crimes, and, in particular, persons convicted in the most recent period, with the exception of persons convicted for espionage, terrorist acts, diversions, premeditated murder and for large thefts of the people’s property. 15-17,000 persons could be freed from prisons by the amnesty.
2. To take measures quickly toward the introduction of strict order and the observance of lawfulness in procedures for arresting and detaining citizens.
3. To organize expediently social courts [obshchestvennye sudy] in enterprises, in institutions, and at people’s estates [narodnye imeniia] to examine minor economic and administrative violations.
4. To re-examine the current criminal code to remove those articles of criminal law which permit their application to even the most inconsequential violations.
5. To cancel all criminal-legal orders containing the directives and circulars of separate ministries. Henceforward, to establish a procedure by which criminal-legal sanctions can be stipulated only in laws of the People’s Chamber, and in exceptional cases, in a decree by the government of the GDR.
6. To consider it crucial to carry out a reorganization of the communities [obshchiny] in the direction of enlarging and strengthening local authorities.
7. To carry out, in 1953, an exchange of passports for the entire population of the GDR and, first and foremost, for the population of the democratic sector of Berlin and its surrounding districts.
8. To re-examine the GDR government’s decree of 5 March 1953 on mass criminal indictments for the non-fulfillment of supply quotas [postavki] [to the state] and taxes.
9. In view of the fact that the migration of the population from the GDR to the West is taking place through Berlin, to consider it expedient to require GDR citizens to have passes [spravki] and business travel papers [komandirovochnye udostovereniia] from local institutions or organs of power upon entry into Berlin.

On political questions:

1. To end the political underestimation of the significance of the issue surrounding the departure of GDR citizens to West Germany that currently exists in party and state organs and among party workers. To oblige party organs and primary party organizations to analyze with care and to study all cases of departure and to take effective measures to ascertain the reasons influencing the population’s migration to West Germany.
To view the departure of members of the SED as a betrayal of the party. To investigate according to party procedure each case of departure by members of the SED to the West and to discuss [these cases] at general meetings of the party organizations and regional committees of the SED.
2. To commit the party and the mass democratic organizations of the GDR to conduct systematic explanatory work among the GDR populace against leaving for West Germany, exposing with concrete examples the slanderous fabrications, [and] the essence and methods of the subversive work which is being carried out by West German agents.
3. To take concrete measures to strengthen counter-propaganda, organizing it in such ways that the press and radio of the GDR systematically expose the mendacious Western propaganda on the issue of refugees from the GDR. To set aside the necessary resources for this.
4. In the interests of an effective struggle against the reactionary broadcasts of “RIAS,” to ensure the completion in 1953 of the construction of powerful radio stations in Magdeburg, Schwerin, and Dresden. To build 15 medium-wave low-power radio stations with up to 5 kilowatts of power and 10 short wave stations each with up to 2-3 kilowatts of power. To manufacture and deploy 400-600 “Gebor” radio sets.
5. In the interests of strengthening counter-propaganda, to organize through the KPD the systematic collection of information about the refugees’ difficult conditions and the poor material and legal conditions of different strata of the West German populace.
6. In order to expose the reactionary propaganda of the church, to explain in a detailed and systematic way through the press and in oral propaganda that the government of the GDR unswervingly observes freedom of conscience, of religion, and of religious observance, as provided for in the GDR constitution. To explain that the actions of the authorities are directed only against those church officials and leaders of “Junge Gemeinde” who conduct hostile subversive work against the democratic tradition of the GDR.
7. To take measures to correct the excesses which have been committed with regard to students expelled from school and from institutions of higher learning for belonging to the “Junge Gemeinde.”
8. For the SED CC to examine in particular the issue of improving work among the intelligentsia and to correct the mistakes that have been committed.
9. To take measures to improve scientific and cultural links between scholars in the GDR and in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies, as well as to supply the GDR intelligentsia with foreign scientific and technical literature.

V. Chuikov
P. Yudin
I. Il’ichev

18 May 1953.


Appendix No. 1

on the social and age composition and party affiliation of those who left the GDR for West Germany

1. By social composition:

Second half of 1952

Four months of 1953

1. Workers



2. White-collar workers



3. Kulaks



4. Medium peasants



5. Small peasants



6. Scientific workers



7. Workers in the arts


8. Engineering-technical workers



9. Doctors



10. Lawyers

no data


11. Teachers and instructors in secondary and higher institutions of learning



12. Students



13. Church Employees



14. Artisans

no data


15. Owners of a commercial enterprise

no data


16. Owners of a private enterprise

no data


17. Pensioners

no data


18. Persons without definite occupation

no data


19. Housewives

no data


2. By age

Second half-year of 1952

Four months of 1953

Children up to 15



[Persons] from 15 to 18



from 18 to 25



from 25 to 40



from 40 to 50



from 50 to 60



over 60



3. By party affiliation: (only over 4 months of 1953)

Members and candidates of the SED


of them, functionaries


Members of the LDP


of them, functionaries


Members of the CDU


of them, functionaries


Members of the NDP


of them, functionaries


Members of the DKP


of them, functionaries


Members of the SSNM


of them, functionaries


4. By place of work (only over 4 months of 1953).

1. From state institutions and communal enterprises


2. From people’s enterprises


3. From enterprises under wardship


4. From large private enterprises


5. From small private enterprises


6. From “SAO” enterprises


7. From MTS [machine-tractor stations]


8. From agricultural food cooperatives


9. Individual peasants


10. From peasant mutual-aid enterprises, commercial organizations and konzumy


11. From party, union and mass organizations


Of the refugees:

1. Leaders of enterprises


2. Division heads



[Appendix No. II not included in original]


Appendix No. 3

on persons convicted for 1951-1953
by punishment


1951 1st half

2nd half

1952 1st half

2nd half

1953 1st quarter

Death penalty






Life imprisonment






Convict prison [katorzhnaia tur ‘ma] for over 10 years






from 5 to 10 years






up to 5 years






Imprisonment for 3 to 5 years






Imprisonment for 1 to 3 years






Imprisonment for up to 1 year






Short-term arrest






Monetary fine






Educational measures for adolescents






Other sanctions






Total convicted







Appendix No. 4

on arrested persons under investigation
from 1952-1953 by types of crime

Types of crimes

First half of 1952

Second half of 1952

First quarter of 1953

Proceedings instituted

Persons arrested

Proceedings instituted

Persons arrested

Proceedings instituted

Persons arrested

1. Anti-democratic crimes







2. Espionage (Included in 1. above)







3. Possession of weapons







4. Opposition to authorities







5. SVAG Decree No. 160 (sabotage and diversions)







6. Law on preserving internal-German trade







7. Unlawful import and export of goods, as defined by 1948 decree of the NEK







8. Non-fulfillment of state deliveries







9. Crimes against the people’s property







10. Murder and maiming







11. Crimes against morality







12. Theft of private property







13. Violation of borders





13. Others















Appendix No. 5

on arrested persons by their most recent
arrest from 1949-1953

Arrests over the second half of 1949

11,425 persons

Arrests over the first half of 1950

12,911 persons

Arrests over the second half of 1950

13,860 persons

Arrests over the first half of 1951

13,587 persons

Arrests over the second half of 1951

14,689 persons

Arrests over the first half of 1952

11,346 persons

Arrests over the second half of 1952

17,471 persons

Arrests over the first quarter of 1953

14,348 persons

The Soviet Control Commission in Germany reports statistics and a detailed assessment to Malenkov, analyzing the migration of the East German population to West Germany. It also includes proposals for implementing measures to prevent further departure from the GDR.




Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Soviet Union
Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Germany (West)
Germany (East)–History–Uprising, 1953
East Germany
West Germany





Culture | Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Zhdanov,  Beria, Shvernik, Malenkov, Bulgarin,Shcherbakov Shkiryatov,Budyonny,  Loktinov and Mikhailov at the air show in Tushino (August 18, 1939)

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 1956(1)

(Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)(2)
Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov

On the Situation in Hungary
Information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Serov is read aloud.(3)

Cde. Zhukov provides information about the concentration of mil.-transport aircraft in the Vienna region.(4) Nagy is playing a double game (in Malinin’s opinion). Cde. Konev is to be sent to Budapest.(5)

On Discussions with the Chinese comrades. (6)

We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people’s democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based. The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position. One document for the Hungarians, and another for the participants of the Warsaw Pact. On Rokossowski—I said to Gomulka that this matter is for you (the Poles) to decide.(7)

Cde. Bulganin—The Chinese cdes. have an incorrect impression of our relations with the countries of people’s democracy. On our appeal to the Hungarians—we should prepare it. A declaration should be prepared.

Cde. Molotov—Today an appeal must be written to the Hungarian people so that they promptly enter into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops. There is the Warsaw Pact. This must be considered with other countries. On the view of the Chinese comrades—they suggest that relations with the countries of the socialist camp be built on the principles of Pancha Shila.(8) Relations along interstate lines are on one basis and interparty relations on another.

Cde. Voroshilov: We must look ahead. Declarations must be composed so that we aren’t placed into an onerous position. We must criticize ourselves—but justly.

Cde. Kaganovich—Pancha Shila, but I don’t think they should propose that we build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila. Two documents—an appeal to the Hungarians and a Declaration. In this document we don’t need to provide self-criticism. There’s a difference between party and state relations.

Cde. Shepilov—The course of events reveals the crisis in our relations with the countries of people’s democracy. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. The underlying reasons must be revealed. The foundations remain unshakable. Eliminate the elements of diktat, not giving play in this situation to a number of measures to be considered in our relations. The declaration is the first step. There is no need for an appeal to the Hungarians. On the armed forces: We support the principles of non-interference. With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. We’ll have to keep up a struggle with national- Communism for a long time.

Cde. Zhukov—Agrees with what Cde. Shepilov has said. The main thing is to decide in Hungary. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole. This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere.

Cde. Zhukov—With regard to troops in the GDR and in Poland, the question is more serious. It must be considered at the Consultative Council.(9) The Consultative Council is to be convened. To persist further—it is unclear what will come of this. A quick decision, the main thing is to declare it today.

Cde. Furtseva—We should adopt a general declaration, not an appeal to the Hungarians. Not a cumbersome declaration. The second thing is important for the internal situation. We must search for other modes of relations with the countries of people’s democracy.
About meetings with leaders of the people’s democracies (concerning relations). We should convene a CC plenum (for informational purposes).(10)

Cde. Saburov: Agrees about the need for a Declaration and withdrawal of troops. At the XX Congress we did the correct thing, but then did not keep control of the unleashed initiative of the masses. It’s impossible to lead against the will of the people. We failed to stand for genuine Leninist principles of leadership. We might end up lagging behind events. Agrees with Cde. Furtseva. The ministers are asking; so are members of the CC.(11) With regard to Romania—they owe us 5 billion rubles for property created by the people.(12) We must reexamine our relations. Relations must be built on an equal basis.

Cde. Khrushchev: We are unanimous. As a first step we will issue a Declaration.

Cde. Khrushchev—informs the others about his conversation with Cde. Mikoyan. Kadar is behaving well. 5 of the 6 are firmly hanging in there.(13) A struggle is going on inside the [HWP— trans.] Presidium about the withdrawal of troops. The minister of defense will issue a directive about the suppression of insurgents in the cinema, using the armed forces. (Malinin, apparently, became nervous and left the session.) Officers from the state security (Hungarian) are with our troops.(14)

Consideration of the Draft Declaration
(Shepilov, Molotov, Bulganin)

Cde. Bulganin—we should say in what connection the question of a Declaration arose. Page 2, Par. 2, don’t soften the self-criticism. Mistakes were committed. Much use should be made of “Leninist principles.”

Cde. Khrushchev—expresses agreement. We should say we are guided by Leninist principles. Page 2, Par. 5—we should say we are making a statement, not an explanation.
Page 3—we should speak about economic equity, make it the main thing. We should say that no troops are stationed in the majority of countries. We should say that on the territory of the Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian states the stationing of troops is done with the consent of their governments and in the interests of these gov’ts and peoples.(15) We should express our view of the government of Hungary. Measures to support them. About support for the party and HWP CC and for the gov’t. We should refer specifically to Nagy and Kadar.

Cde. Kaganovich, Cde. Molotov, Cde.

Zhukov: We should mention the Potsdam agreement and the treaties with every country. (16)

Cde. Zhukov—We should express sympathy with the people. We should call for an end to the bloodshed. Page 2, Par. 2: We should say the XX Congress condemned the disregard for principles of equality.

Cde. Zhukov—we should speak about economics. Restructuring was thwarted after the XX Congress.

(Cde. Khrushchev)
We are turning to the member-states of the Warsaw Pact to consider the question of our advisers.(17) We are ready to withdraw them. Further editing.(18) Transmitted via high frequency to Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov.

Information from Cde. Yudin on Negotiations with the Chinese Comrades.
What’s the situation: Will Hungary leave our camp? Who is Nagy? Can he be trusted? About the advisers.Those taking part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Saburov, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Brezhnev, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin. Chinese comrades.

On the Situation in Hungary
(Cde. Khrushchev, Cde. Liu Shaoqi)

Cde. Liu Shaoqi indicates on behalf of the CPC CC that troops must remain in Hungary and in Budapest.(19)

Cde. Khrushchev—there are two paths. A military path—one of occupation. A peaceful path—the withdrawal of troops, negotiations.

Cde. Molotov—the political situation has taken clearer shape. An anti-revol. gov’t has been formed, a transitional gov’t.(20) We should issue the Declaration and explain our position. We should clarify our relationship with the new gov’t. We are entering into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops.

Nagy—the prime minister.
Kadar—a state minister.
Tildy Zoltan— “
Kovacs Bela—
Losonczy—a Communist and a supporter of Nagy(21)

Translator’s Notes

1 As with the previous session, the pages in the original file were slightly out of sequence. The order has been corrected in the translation.

2 Protocol No. 49 encompasses both this session and the session on the following day (see Document No. 8) under the rubric “On the Situation in Hungary” (O polozhenii v Vengrii). Point 1 (from 30 October) covers the Soviet declaration on ties with socialist countries, whereas Point 6 (from 31 October) covers the decision to invade. The relevant extracts from Protocol No. 49 are now stored in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 25-30 and APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41, respectively.

3 Presumably, the reference here is to three documents: one that arrived on the morning of 30 October, and two that arrived late at night on 29 October. The item that arrived on the morning of 30 October was a secure, high-frequency telephone message from Mikoyan and Suslov, which gave a bleak portrayal of the latest events. See “TsK KPSS,” 30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F.89, Op.45, D.12, Ll.1-3. Of the two documents that arrived late at night on the 29th, one was a ciphered telegram from Mikoyan and Suslov reporting that they had attended a session of the HWP Presidium earlier that evening. They also commented on the takeover of the Szabad Nep building by a group of unarmed students and writers. Mikoyan and Suslov asserted that the Hungarian “comrades have failed to win over the masses,” and that “the anti-Communist elements are behaving impudently.” In addition, they expressed concern about what would happen to former agents of the Hungarian State Security (AVH) forces in the wake of Nagy’s decision to disband the AVH. See “Shifrtelegramma: TsK KPSS,” 29 October 1956 (Strictly Secret- Urgent), from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, in AVPRF, F.059a, Op.4, P.6, D.5, Ll.13-14. The other document that arrived late on the 29th was a situation report from Ivan Serov, dated 29 October, which Mikoyan and Suslov ordered to be transmitted to Moscow via secure telephone. Serov’s report gave an updated overview of the insurgency and expressed deep concern about the likely repercussions from the dissolution of the AVH. See “Telefonogramma,” 29 October 1956, from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, relaying I. Serov’s memorandum, in APRF, F.3, Op.64, D.484, Ll.158-161.

4 British military transport aircraft were flying into the Vienna airport with supplies of humanitarian aid, which were then being conveyed to Budapest. It is unclear whether Zhukov knew why these planes were concentrated there. It is possible that he believed the aircraft were ferrying in military supplies or were preparing for a military operation.

5 As commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ivan Konev assumed direct command of Soviet military operations in Hungary in November 1956. In a telephone message on the morning of 30 October (see Note 78 supra), Mikoyan and Suslov had urged that Konev be dispatched to Hungary “immediately” as a precautionary step. One of Konev’s top aides during the invasion was General Mikhail Malinin, a first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, who commanded Soviet troops during the initial intervention on 23 October. As indicated in the previous line, Soviet leaders frequently consulted Malinin in the leadup to the invasion.

6 The “Chinese comrades” with whom Khrushchev had discussions were the members of the delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi (see Note 25 supra). Liu Shaoqi was in direct touch with Mao Zedong several times during the delegation’s stay in Moscow, and thus he was able to keep Khrushchev apprised of the Chinese leader’s views of the situation in Poland and Hungary.

7 Rokossowski had been removed from the Polish Politburo on 19 October. On 13 November he was replaced as Polish national defense minister by a Polish officer, Marshal Marian Spychalski. Rokossowski was then recalled to the Soviet Union, where he was appointed a deputy defense minister. Evidently, Khrushchev had spoken with Gomulka by phone that morning.

8 The five principles of Pancha Shila—(1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence—were endorsed in a joint statement by Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The principles were intended to “guide relations between the two countries” as well as “relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world.” For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China’s Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949- 1962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.

9 Zhukov is referring here to the Political Consultative Committee (PKK) of the recently-created Warsaw Treaty Organization. The PKK convened only seven times between 1955 and 1966, despite its statutory requirement to meet at least twice a year.

10 During major international crises in the post- Stalin period, the Soviet Presidium/Politburo occasionally would convene a Central Committee plenum to give the CC members a sense of involvement in decision-making and to ensure that the leadership’s policies would be firmly obeyed at lower levels.

11 Saburov is referring here to Furtseva’s suggestion that a CPSU CC plenum be convened for informational purposes.

12 This presumably refers to Soviet property transferred to Romania during World War II, rather than to Romania’s war reparations, which by 1956 were no longer of great magnitude.

13 Khrushchev is referring here to the six-member HWP Presidium. The only holdout was Nagy.

14 The State Security Department (Allam-Vedelmi Osztaly, or AVO), which was reorganized in 1949 and renamed the State Security Authority (Allam- Vedelmi Hatosag, or AVH), was reincorporated into the Hungarian Internal Affairs Ministry in the autumn of 1953. Formally, the agency was given back its old name of AVO, but it was still almost always known as the AVH. One of the earliest and most vigorous demands of the protesters in October 1956 was for the dissolution of the AVH. On 28 October, Nagy promised to fulfill this demand, and the Hungarian government approved the dissolution of the state security organs the following day. Because the AVH had been instrumental in carrying out repression and terror in the late 1940s and 1950s, some state security agents became the targets of lynchings and other violent reprisals during the 1956 uprising. Hungarian state security officers would have joined up with Soviet troops mainly to seek protection, not to assist in counterinsurgency operations. On this matter, see the documents transmitted by Suslov and Mikoyan on 29 October, cited in Note 78 supra.

15 It is interesting that, when referring to Soviet troops deployed in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev does not mention the Soviet troops in East Germany, implying that they were not necessarily there “with the consent of the [East German] government and in the interests of the [East German] government and people.”

16 The final Declaration noted that “Soviet units are in the Hungarian and Romanian republics in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and governmental agreements. Soviet military units are in the Polish republic on the basis of the Potsdam four-power agreement and the Warsaw Treaty.” The Declaration then claimed that “Soviet military units are not in the other people’s democracies,” omitting any mention of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in East Germany.

17 Khrushchev presumably is referring here to both the military advisers and the state security (KGB) advisers.

18 When this editing was completed, the Presidium formally adopted Resolution No. P49/1 (“Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” 30 October 1956, in APRF, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30) stating that it would “approve the text, with changes made at the CPSU CC Presidium session, of a Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the foundations of development and the further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.” The resolution ordered that the “text of the Declaration be broadcast on radio on 30 October and published in the press on 31 October 1956.” For the published text, see “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya I dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby I sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, p. 1.

19 It is unclear precisely when the Chinese changed their position from non-interventionist to pro-intervention. The statement recorded here, if correctly transcribed, would suggest that the change occurred before the final Soviet decision on 31 October, but almost all other evidence (including subsequent Presidium meetings recorded by Malin) suggests that it came after, not before, the Soviet decision. In any case, if the change did occur before, it did not have any discernible effect on the Soviet decision at this meeting to eschew intervention.

20 Molotov is referring here to major developments in Hungary. On 30 October, at 2:30 p.m. Budapest time, Nagy announced the formal restoration of a multi-party state and the establishment of an “inner cabinet” of the national government. The new cabinet consisted of Nagy, Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Erdei, Janos Kadar, Geza Losonczy, and Anna Kethly (from the Social Democratic Party). That same day, a “revolutionary national defense council” of the Hungarian armed forces was set up, which supported the demands of “the revolutionary councils of the working youth and intellectuals,” and called for the “immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and their withdrawal from the entire territory of Hungary within the shortest possible time.” The new Council also promised to disarm all agents from Hungary’s disbanded state security forces (AVH), who had been notorious agents of repression during the Stalin era. A Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee also was formed on 31 October, and it was empowered by the government to create a new army.

21 These are five of the seven members of Nagy’s new “inner cabinet.” Anna Kethly’s name is not listed here because she had not yet been appointed. (Nagy mentioned in his speech on 30 October that “a person to be nominated by the Social Democratic Party” would be in the inner cabinet, and Kethly later turned out to be that person.) It is unclear why Malin did not list Ferenc Erdei’s name here.

The Presidium decides to promulgate a declaration on Hungary in which Soviet withdrawal and relations with the new government will be addressed. Members discuss the language of the new declaration and the advice of the CPC CC regarding the status of Soviet troops. The declaration is also intended to address the broader crisis in Soviet relations with people’s democracies.


Communist countries–Internal relations
Communist countries
Soviet Union. Army
Warsaw Treaty Organization
Hungary–History–Revolution, 1956
Soviet Union–Foreign policy
More …
East Germany
Eastern Europe
Soviet Union


























Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson’s recent election in the United States, Khrushchev’s ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.





Nuclear weapons–China
European Economic Community
National liberation movements–Africa
Germany (East). Ministry for State Security (Stasi)
Soviet Union. Committee for State Security (KGB)

Berlin, 2 December 1964

2 copies

R e p o r t

On Meetings with the KGB of the USSR on 30 November and 1 December 1964

Participants at these meetings initiated by the MfS [Ministry of State Security.] of the GDR were the following:

  • Soviet side:

Comrade Semichastny, Chairman of the Committee

Comrade Sakharovsky, Head of Main Department 1

Comrade Pavlov, Deputy Head of Main Department 1

Comrade Skomorokhin, Division Head of Main Department 1

Comrade Beskrovny, Head of KGB apparatus in the GDR

  • MfS of the GDR:

Comrade Mielke[Minister for State Security]

Comrade Wolf [Deputy Minister, Head of HVA [Foreign Intelligence Division]

On both days there was one exchange held by the individuals listed above. In addition, there were individual talks with the Deputy Head of Main Department 2, Comrade Babkov, the Deputy Head of the Mobilization Department, Comrade Piskunov, and with Comrade Sakharovsky, joined by the Head of the Africa Department, Comrade Vinogradov, and the Deputy Head of the Information Department, Comrade Zitnikov.

In response to a questionnaire forwarded by us, Comrade Semichastny discussed the following issues:

  1. On the international situation

Assessment of US Government Policy

Currently the Johnson Administration is reviewing the basis of its foreign policy. Johnson’s electoral victory is the largest ever by an American president. However, the 20 million votes for Goldwater must not be overlooked. The US government will have to consider the changes at the top in the Soviet Union, the changes in Great Britain, the nuclear test explosion in China, and the attitudes of de Gaulle.

Probably the US administration will put in place a couple of tougher measures. This shows, for instance, through its campaign against the alleged Soviet debt towards UN organizations. This is to exert pressure on the non-aligned states and Secretary General U Thant. There is no chance for a compromise on this issue. The US pursues a tough line, and it looks like they are ready to go to extremes. A similar line becomes evident in the Congo and in Vietnam.

Yet even if US election results have somewhat strengthened right-wing forces, the US still understands that acute tensions are unhelpful. It would only lead to closer cooperation between the socialist states and others. Therefore, the US has to maneuver.

The people in charge in the United States are fully aware that a nuclear war will be deadly for them. Yet they make efforts to influence the balance of power according to their own interests. Thus we have to expect an (albeit slower) continuation of the arms race, as well as attempts to further strengthen NATO and divide the socialist camp. In the latter regard, the US is banking on certain nationalist tendencies there.

During his visit to the US, [British Prime Minister Harold] Wilson talked in particular about how nationalist tendencies in European socialist countries might be better exploited.

The United States is moving one to two additional divisions to South Vietnam, and they conduct air strikes against the liberation movement’s bases outside of South Vietnam. The communiqué about the Johnson/Taylor meeting does not state anything about intentions, yet in fact the US is embarking on a course of escalation. However, sooner or later the US will have to agree to the neutralization of South Vietnam. There are also tendencies to negotiate in this regard within the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV]. Yet Beijing is against it and demands, at the expense of the Vietnamese people, to fight until total victory. The DRV leadership sometimes openly expresses to the Chinese its dissatisfaction with Chinese aid, especially in economic regard. The war places a major burden on the DRV.

Concerning Cuba, there are no expectations for an open attack by the US with forces of its own. However, the Cuban counter-revolution, though basically destroyed within Cuba itself, is actively supported by the US from outside of Cuba. The United States tightens its economic blockade to create dissatisfaction within Cuba. One cannot exclude the possibility of aggressive actions by a group of other Latin American countries, triggered by certain provocations. Such a plan was already discussed by military representatives from some of these countries.

Regarding relations with the USSR, the US makes efforts to negotiate in order to reach agreements on certain issues. In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador [Dobrynin in Washington] Vice President [Hubert] Humphrey has made very positive comments that are, however, of relative value only. The US wants to improve relations. Yet its position on the funding of the UN is counter to this intention.

The conference held in Moscow with a large number of influential US business people and mega capitalists, as well as other facts, demonstrates that the US is currently reviewing its options to expand trade relations. It is their official line to do so without haste. In early 1965 we will probably sign a consular agreement. The Americans value highly the recently signed agreement on the extraction of fresh water from the ocean. Negotiations about direct flights between the USSR and the US are very tedious. All this shows how the US wants to avoid raising tensions but undertakes only a few practical steps in this regard.

Major difficulties are to be expected, and major efforts are required, on issues like disarmament, the solution of postwar problems in Europe, the prevention of West Germany’s nuclear armament, and on other European questions. No rapid progress is to be expected here.

On the Position of the British Labour Government

The Wilson government operates to a certain extent on the basis of détente. Its main tactics are: Flexibility and firmness. It supports peaceful coexistence, in particular with regard to trade. It stresses its own position and measures. In the interest of détente, it is their opinion that the Western alliance must be strengthened.

Before the elections Wilson had his own position concerning the GDR. Yet it is not known whether this will have actual consequences.

There is a certain interest in détente where the Labour government sees some opportunities for solutions on individual issues. The Labour government is against any form of nuclear war and supports in principle the creation of nuclear-free zones – also with the inclusion of both German states.

In contrast to its positions before the elections, the Labour government now conditionally supports the MLF [Multilateral Force]. Probably it is pursuing certain tactics here; in fact it does not believe in the realization of the MLF, and therefore slows it down.

On de Gaulle’s Position

It is well known and openly promulgated. His main objective is the elimination of American hegemony and the formation of a Western European defense union with a French-German alliance at its core. De Gaulle’s plans are threatened by decisive countermeasures from the US and West Germany. The US does not want to share its leadership, nor do they want France to gain influence. De Gaulle is angry about [FRG Chancellor Ludwig] Erhard for his support of American positions. According to reliable information, the French government will absolutely advocate against building the MLF and all its consequences. The British government’s position is also directed against de Gaulle’s plans.

The West German government is against a pro-French line and clearly supports the US course.

A sharp breach between France and the other Western powers has emerged and created a complicated situation within NATO. De Gaulle’s visit to Latin America is interesting. For now, France’s efforts have not led to results. France is in a difficult economic situation and undertakes certain efforts towards rapprochement with the Soviet Union in particular in economic regards. It has also showed an interest in joint ventures concerning production of passenger airplanes for high altitudes, and also in cooperation on color television systems. The visit by [Gaston] Palewski, [French] Minister of Information [sic], to the Soviet Union was interesting. [1] He expressed the same policy when meeting with leading government representatives from Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia in Paris. There also is a certain interest in trade with the GDR. France was one of the first countries to sign trade and loan agreements with the USSR.

This French policy is not innocent when it comes to exploiting nationalist tendencies in order to create fissures in the socialist camp. It is unknown what they actually talked with Romania. What has been leaked, however, displays this tendency. It also shows with regard to ideological subversion.

On Positions of the West German Government

(Comrade Semichastny remarked here that we [the MfS] are more knowledgeable on this.)

No initiative is to be expected from the Western powers to settle postwar European issues, especially with regard to West Berlin. The West German government wants to force the Western powers to negotiate about the German question based on the FRG concept of “self-determination.” This leads to the discomfort of the other Western powers, as became evident during the leadership change in the Soviet Union. For instance, the West German position has also created problems for the preparation of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The Western powers were afraid the Soviet Union might fully withdraw from it.

The West German government plans to increase activities regarding its relations with the People’s Republic of China and the European socialist countries. It wants to exploit Soviet-Sino differences and China’s interest in normalizing its relations with the Federal Republic.

The [FRG] Federal Government also reviews its position vis-à-vis the GDR. Devious methods are to be expected from that.

Due to increasing contradictions within NATO, the West German government is pleading for US favors, e.g. by making financial concessions. Contradictions mount with France and England, for instance because of the British proposals concerning the MLF. De Gaulle’s pressure has created a difficult situation. Hence the West German government currently still weighs its options on all those issues.

The NATO council meeting in December will be of major importance. The agenda features: An assessment of the international situation by [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk coupled with expert presentations; a report by General Secretary [Manlio] Brosio about the state of cooperation within NATO with regard to proposals for NATO’s reorganization; a statement by the chairman of NATO’s Standing Military Committee on the socialist countries’ military potential; reports by the NATO commanders and the Military Committee on NATO’s combat readiness in 1964; a report by Brosio on the strategic concept; a presentation by the US commission to prepare for the MLF; a statement on cooperation in areas of scientific-technological and military-technological research; the confirmation of NATO’s annual report; and votes on corresponding proposals.

The contradictions within NATO become most evident on the issue of NATO strategy. Extensive explanation [by Semichastny] of the American strategy of flexible response (already known to us [the MfS]). This is creating the main point of dissent from France which holds the opinion that the US will not actually defend Europe by using its strategic nuclear potential.

West Germany supports the French concept in principle but wants to integrate with the US positions.

The American concept envisages the option of local wars with the US reserving the right to determine the location, time, and means of war efforts. This concept is based on an increase in all types of armaments, and of course the growth of strategic nuclear potential as well. Particular emphasis is placed on special forces to conduct “guerrilla wars.” Their numbers have increased six-fold between 1961 and 1964. We have to take this into consideration in order not to allow surprises and to implement appropriate countermeasures.

On Contradictions within the European Economic Community (EEC)

Efforts to reach a common trade policy vis-à-vis the socialist camp are not supported by all EEC member states. In part, they even violate their obligations towards the EEC. West Germany is strenuously opposing loans for socialist countries especially because of Soviet positions on the German and West Berlin question. Vis-à-vis the GDR, the FRG attempts to trade loans for political concessions.

Italy is against any restrictions and granted to the Soviet Union a small 5-year bank loan. France has granted loans for 7 years. England is against any restrictions in this area. Belgium, for instance, opposes any restrictions on imports from the socialist camp while some of its industrial branches are in danger of getting crippled. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Benelux countries are imminent.

In the context of problems regarding the common agricultural market and the uniform grain price, France is even reviewing whether to leave the EEC.

The US is expecting an increase in exports during the Kennedy Round negotiations in November. Johnson is considering whether to move towards bilateral negotiations if there are no results in November. France strongly opposes an increase of imports from the United States. Major differences were created by the 15 percent increase of import tariffs by Great Britain.

On Covert and Subversive Activities of the Imperialist Powers and their Intelligence Services against the Socialist Camp

This activity is planned as a long-term strategy to divide the socialist camp and to create a hostile atmosphere towards the socialist order in individual countries. Offensive actions by the Chinese facilitate the emergence of favorable conditions for this kind of activity. NATO experts assess that the Chinese attitude will be the main lever used by the West to instigate nationalist positions [in socialist countries].

Important aspects consist in plans to target economic relations between socialist countries within Comecon. There have been consultations within NATO on how to sell goods and equipment to individual socialist countries that previously received them from other socialist countries. This is objectively directed against the purpose and intentions of Comecon. Economic subversion is undertaken through loans and technological exports to develop economic sectors in individual socialist countries that are not really essential. Yet those sectors create competition with other socialist countries and result in overproduction, and thus in additional problems and differences.

Ideological subversion is primarily directed at praising the Western lifestyle, standard of living, democracy, and so on – and compromising the socialist order by portraying certain economic weaknesses and deficiencies as a consequence of the socialist order. It is directed against alleged flaws of the [socialist] democratic system, and it exaggerates both real and nonexistent conflicts. The West is acting as a promoter of national independence for socialist countries and speaks out against alleged pressure on them by the USSR.

On plans for covert activities.

The US hardly counts on solutions through armed domestic counterrevolution. Besides economic and ideological subversion, the US therefore emphasizes in its covert activities the improvement of spy networks and the build-up of small counter-revolutionary groups. It aims at asserting itself through gaining a capacity to stifle unrest in case of international complications. Through these activities the US keeps its own hopes for potential change alive.

More than in previous times, the US intelligence services focus on gathering internal and economic information, such as on difficulties, contradictions, and problems within Comecon; but also obviously about the combat strength of the socialist armies and Soviet arms deployed in socialist countries and the Soviet Union itself, etc.

In part, intelligence agencies are tasked with disseminating rumors, sending anonymous letters, and distributing leaflets especially in case of domestic troubles.

In the context of strengthening the US special forces (Rangers), the US services have created a special operative group in Europe to prepare for sabotage and the activities of gangs in socialist countries.

After the changes in the Soviet leadership no particular attempts by the adversary were noted to exploit the situation inside the Soviet Union. The NTS [National Alliance of Russian Solidarists] attempted to create false impressions abroad concerning the existence of certain resistance groups within the Soviet Union. [2] Yet all this must not make us complacent. In certain reviews, we sometimes noted a dangerous overconfidence on the side of our counterintelligence services despite the fact that there are still many open channels left for the infiltration of enemies into the Soviet Union (he [Semichastny] explained this by giving examples of opportunities exploited by criminals).

On this entire complex of issues we [MfS] made extensive comments during our second meeting. Drawing on differences within the FRG leadership, we outlined how it does not make much sense to simply talk about a rejection of the French and a clear support of American concepts by the West German government. There are noteworthy differences within the West German leadership on core issues regarding NATO, MLF, and other problems. The leading exponents of West German imperialism have one thing in common: They are eager to exploit differences between other NATO members in order to pursue their revanchist concept and related strategic positions, and to gain larger concessions and rights pertaining to nuclear arms. We see the different options involved but currently the MLF is the biggest danger. In stressing this line of argumentation, we also noted that due to differences within NATO especially favorable opportunities exist to stall this project by mobilizing all our political forces. We explained the connection, and emanating danger, between West German imperialism’s basic concept of its own positions on forward-based strategies and the issue of “covert war” and its respective preparation. We also emphasized the link between this dangerous particular West German concept and undertakings of political and economic subversion.

Comrade Semichastny agreed with our opinions and stressed the high value of our information for the KGB.

[Semichastny said:] Everything must be done in order to prevent West German access to nuclear weapons in any form. If West Germany receives nuclear weapons or gets just one finger on the trigger, anything can be expected from the West German revanchists. A lot is depending on us to prevent this in any form. The Soviet Union’s line is clear: No proliferation or transfer of nuclear weapons to anybody.

As far as the US is concerned, they do not currently count on the possibility of armed insurrections. They hardly infiltrate major forces from outside or deploy them, not even in Cuba.

If West Germany is training its own special forces, the possibility of provocations and perhaps the deployment of larger forces cannot be dismissed outright. There are no certain indications but politically you can expect them to undertake anything. They might have interests in creating preconditions by way of provocations to involve other NATO states in their plans. They might also have interests in demonstrating domestic instability in the GDR to keep hopes alive for realizing their plans.

On 30 November 1964, “Pravda” published an article about West Germany’s options to build its own nuclear weapons. The KGB provided us [MfS] with an assessment of the military potential of West German nuclear research based on our information and other sources.

Comrade Semichastny does not attribute any significance to the postponement by one month of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee meeting requested by the GDR.

Comrade Semichastny added here that the US and Great Britain do not want a nuclear war and that the BND [West German foreign intelligence service] is aware of this. De Gaulle uses his nuclear weapons to exert pressure on the other European countries but he will not start a nuclear war either. West Germany knows this as well. However, West Germany is a different case. From them you can expect an initiation [of nuclear war] as soon as they have the means to do it.

Regarding our statement on the effects of [Nikita Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei] Adzhubei’s visit to West Germany in increasing political subversion, the Soviet comrades responded: When this information arrived [in Moscow], the Chairman of the KGB approached the Presidium of the [CPSU] Central Committee. This question played an essential role [in the Soviet leadership change].

Furthermore, the KGB raised the issue that other Soviet institutions, especially academic ones, are often too passive towards hostile subversion and underestimate the impact of the adversary. It is necessary not only to be reactive but also to act offensively and outline our own position.

When dealing with this question [Adzhubei’s visit to West Germany], Comrade Semichastny stated that the KGB leadership takes every piece of information seriously and follows through on this line. He reiterated his statement, and he again expressed his thanks for the information and important hints provided by the MfS.

  1. On Relations with China and Albania

On this issue raised by Comrade Mielke there was the following response by Comrade Semichastny:

The relationship with the Chinese is complicated, and it remains that way. With their visit [to Moscow] on 7 November the Chinese wanted to demonstrate that they have taken the initiative. It became clear during the talks in Moscow that the Chinese insist on the precondition to annul the decisions of the XX and XXII CPSU Party Congress; otherwise talks would make no sense. They pretended to have come to establish contacts and clear this issue but had no authority to negotiate. To every proposal by the Soviet comrades they just responded that they would report it back to Beijing. Yet in fact they rejected everything. Since the CPSU sticks to its line on basic questions, there is no real basis for talks with the Chinese.

During the meeting they [USSR] offered to meet with the Chinese on any level and at any location. They just responded that they would report this back.

Before, during, and after this stay in Moscow the Chinese press constantly published statements from Albanian, Japanese, and New Zealand newspapers with heavy attacks on the Soviet Union and repetitions of previous Chinese positions. The speeches by Comrades Brezhnev and Kosygin were published but typeset in such a way that the Chinese position became evident. An editorial published in [the Chinese newspaper] “Red Flag” reiterated all the old attacks and confirmed their insistence on maintaining their previous line. The “Red Flag” article was constantly re-broadcasted on radio.

The Soviet proposal for mutual cessation of interferences in internal affairs was met without any reaction. The Chinese press printed the nefarious attacks by the Japanese Communist Party, containing the demand that Khrushchev was just the tip of the iceberg and now the entire CPSU leadership has to be eliminated.

In the context of a CPSU proposal to move the preparatory meeting of the parties to March 1965, a corresponding letter by the CPSU Central Committee was supposed to be delivered to Mao Zedong or Liu Shaoqi. However, the Soviet ambassador [in Beijing] was only received by Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Xiao who commented himself on the letter’s contents and rejected it; though he was told the letter was addressed to the CCP Central Committee. He argued against any consultations and just repeated the same old attacks.

Thus there is nothing indicating an improvement in relations; not even the slightest hint in this direction exists. Countering our proposal to cede public polemics, the Chinese openly declared that they considered polemics useful.

For half a year, a Soviet delegation conducted negotiations in Beijing on border issues. Now these negotiations have been moved to Moscow where they are scheduled to resume on 15 November. Yet until now there has been no Chinese response to this proposal. The Chinese side demands the inclusion of a provision in the border treaty which states that 2.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory were unjustly and violently incorporated by Tsarist Russia. They declare they do not want this territory returned, only this injustice recognized. Concerning concrete issues, they are demanding, for instance, to have the borderline running next to Khabarovsk at the Amur River, i.e. right along the city.

The Soviet inquiry about Mao Zedong’s statement on the border made to the Japanese socialists has so far not received any response.

Currently there are fewer incidents along the border. However, winter has to be considered here. Until recently the situation was not normal: Constant border transgressions, impudent demeanor. This represents a major challenge to the nerves of the Soviet border units.

A similar picture exists in other fields of bilateral relations like trade and culture. Here as well there is no ray of hope, everything stands as it was.

During our [MfS] stay [in Moscow] the following incident occurred:

A Chinese doctoral student working with a Soviet professor had indicated he probably would not want to return to China. Subsequently he was ordered to come to the Chinese embassy and was supposed to be returned to China against his will. He fled from the embassy, and since then the Chinese are searching for him. Since they assume he is staying in his professor’s house, the Chinese have basically blocked this house and monitor it constantly. A Soviet protest was filed to the Chinese ambassador [in Moscow].

In China the atmosphere is further fueled by a strong anti-Soviet campaign. The splittist activities against other parties are continuing. The Communist Party of India has basically split apart. The Communist Party of Japan is treated as a vanguard, a progressive group has been excluded. Similar phenomena occur in Ceylon, Burma, Belgium, and so on. The splittist groups are officially supported by China.

The future perspective:

The Soviet Union is undertaking steps to find ways to come to at least decent bilateral relations. It is hard to say what the result will be. The CPSU leadership has to stand tall vis-à-vis the party and cannot tolerate letting the authority of the CPSU be constantly dragged through the mud.

On the Chinese atomic bomb:

It is impossible to assess whether this was a real bomb or a propagandistic one (laboratory experiment). One can hardly talk at the moment about a serious military production. The Chinese statement that they will not be the first to use the bomb seems to indicate this line of interpretation. Yet new problems are to be expected due to the course of the Chinese leadership.

On the Albanians:

Nothing is changing here. They did not send a delegation to the 47th anniversary [of the October Revolution] and also rejected a corresponding suggestion of the Chinese to do so. According to Comrade Semichastny’s personal opinion, the joint Albanian article that used the pretext to comment on [Italian Communist leader Palmiro] Togliatti’s memorandum was not drafted by the Albanians but by the Chinese. One week after the ouster of Comrade Khrushchev this was to serve as a trial balloon.

The Albanians demand an apology from the Soviet comrades, a concession of their mistakes, and the cessation of decisions by the XX and XXII CPSU Party Congress.

They may consider inviting the Albanians to the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee and to the Comecon meeting in order to test their reaction and deprive them of arguments [against the Soviet Union].

Inside Albania everything is repressed, they bolster security measures and the police apparatus. They hold trials, but people also disappear without trials. Albania’s economic situation is difficult. A message was sent to them on the 20th anniversary of liberation.

Concerning the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: It is hard to come up with detailed information. They are sailing along Chinese straits. Yet they are less polemical towards the Soviet Union. The same can be said about the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Characteristic of the attitude of the Chinese regarding Vietnam are their constant exhortations to others to fight without exposing themselves. They are eager to drag the Soviet Union into conflicts with the United States. When Vietnam demanded and received from the Soviet Union aircraft for certain types of combat the Chinese were asked to provide pilots, yet they refused. As a result, some Soviet pilots had to expose themselves in a very risky manner.

The main Chinese demand leveled against the Soviet Union is to provide evidence for a decisive struggle against US imperialism. They basically demand this conflict.

  1. On Liberation Movements in Africa

Our questions regarding this subject were answered by Comrade Semichastny in principle, and in more detail by Comrade Sakharovsky in a separate meeting.

The work in Africa is complicated. The adversary has major Africa experiences and a strong intelligence base. We are just at the beginning. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations by socialist countries, and the improved opportunities resulting from those, the adversary undertakes active measures to diminish our influence. The struggle for the African continent is a tough fight conducted with high stakes and corresponding means. In particular the US and West Germany have recently increased the number of experienced agents. There are strong contradictions between the Western powers. They fight over influence, but they are united against the socialist countries. In order to prevent the establishment of progressive beachheads, institutions or socialist associations, they resort to every conceivable provocation and lie. In part they were successful with this, like in Guinea where relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated due to French and American efforts. Now there have been disappointments in Guinea, and a delegation has come to the Soviet Union with a long list of requests.

The Soviet Union supports the liberation movement and progressive forces in their unforgiving struggle against imperialism. Soviet foreign intelligence maintains contacts with the leaders of various liberation movements and conducts extensive political work to counter the influence of imperialist forces.

Following our submitted questionnaire, a general Soviet assessment was given on the various liberation movements and basic information provided about which organizations are pushed and supported by the Soviet Union.

Noted as most deserving of support were:

  • the MPLA of Angola;
  • the FRELIMO headed by Dr. [Eduardo] Mondlane of Mozambique;
  • the UPC under Mussaga in Cameroon;
  • in Congo the group around [Gaston] Soumialot (i.e. also [Antoine] Gizenga and [Pierre] Mulele).

Concerning the liberation movements of Mocambique and South Rhodesia which currently lack a firm base in the country, and whose current leaders cannot be vouched for with certainty, it is now particularly important to identify and study positive individuals in order to develop leaders who are actually capable and can guarantee a proper utilization of our aid and support.

Concerning the Tanzanian Union:

The Union is a victory of Western powers and [President Julius] Nyerere. The latter has played an extraordinarily negative role in all this. The Union exerts strong pressure against any preservation of Zanzibar’s independent rights. Tanganyika has built a volunteer reserve of 4,000 men and in October issued a decree pertaining to the armed forces. Zanzibar has little prospect of an autonomous development. Nyerere will not establish diplomatic relations with the GDR and has given corresponding guarantees to the Western powers.

In our meeting with Comrade Sakharovsky this assessment was based on our statements regarding this issue. Zanzibar must be supported as a base for progress and a fist within Tanzania. It has to be strengthened against all efforts of restoration by colonial and neo-colonial powers. All attacks by imperialist powers must be parried. Zanzibar needs economic support.

Another threat emanates from plans for an East African federation, and also must not be allowed.

MfS activities on Zanzibar are rated positively. All expenses for Zanzibar are justified. It is now particularly important to solidify the personal contacts with, and influence on, [President Abeid] Karume, to always make accurate assessments of the domestic situation in Zanzibar, and to study also the policy of the Union closely. The activities by our security services [in Zanzibar] have to be legally certified and covered in order not to deliver a pretext for an outside intervention.

It is crucial to have exact knowledge of English and American plans concerning the Union and against Zanzibar.

We reached agreement about our assessment of [Abdullah] Hanga and [Abdulrahman] Babu, also about the need to influence them.

Coordination measures were agreed upon, especially in light of the upcoming delegation of KGB representatives [to Zanzibar].

On the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), Ghana:

In principle the Soviet Union supports all wishes expressed by President [Kwame] Nkrumah, though they are frequently complicated and difficult. Nkrumah sees himself as a leader for all of Africa and harbors corresponding plans.

After the first attack on Nkrumah, the Soviet Union provided support by sending an adviser to help with building a personal security service. It also provided equipment and arms for a Guard Battalion including the delivery of heavy armaments. The KGB has also sent an officer to help with the creation of intelligence services. He is still on site in Ghana but can hardly become active. The security apparatus is not yet purged of imperialist elements. Support is also given for the build-up of border guard units. Ten people are to be trained in the Soviet Union for the struggle of liberation movements.

Our information concerning the tasks of the Bureau of African Affairs were confirmed. Information was given about which liberation movements are supported by this office, and which are not. The head of the office, [A.K.] Barden, is a confidant of Nkrumah. Information exists according to which Barden is involved in financial machinations and arms smuggling. In this context, some express opinions that he discredits the liberation movements and Ghana’s prestige. African leaders, like those of Zambia, are said to have stated their displeasure with the office’s activities.

The BAA has requested and received a Soviet instructor for the camps it is running to train fighters for Angola. They were trained for six months. Now they asked for equipment, arms, and education material for an alleged training center. There is the assumption that in fact they want to build up a special force capable of being deployed abroad as well as inside Ghana.

The Czechoslovak comrades have had experiences with similar requests from Guinea and Mali. They provided their knowledge as advisers but they were never shown anything. Afterwards they were pushed out.

Concerning such type of work, it is important in general to recognize that the influence of imperialist intelligence and corruption are still quite strong. From Soviet remarks we [MfS] could fathom that requests ought to be met when there is a direct confirmation by Nkrumah. Arms shipments to Ghana will also be supported.

On Assessing the Situation of the Cuban Security Services:

The security services have existed since 1959 and are part of the Ministry of Interior. The heads of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and personal security are basically autonomous and report directly to the leadership. Mostly they are young, good, and energetic people, former members of the 26th of July movement or Cuban communists. They do not have much experience. There are no party cells within the organization.

A noteworthy element is a certain guerilla mentality and the desire to instigate revolutions in other Latin American countries without taking practical conditions there into consideration. Foreign Intelligence has existed since 1961 and is kept very busy with such issues.

Counterintelligence has done great work against the counterrevolution, achieved good success in 1961-62, and pushed back the active underground. Soviet advisers gave support to the struggle against banditry. According to Cuban assessments there are currently only 70 to 80 active bandits left.

Since 1960 our relationship with the KGB has been close. There is solid cooperation, constant support through specialists, training in the Soviet Union, delivery of operative technology, and informational exchanges. The large Cuban requests in the field of technology are not always justifiable. [KGB] advisers on Cuba are also working with [Cuban] Foreign Intelligence. The [Cuban] comrades have problems keeping contact with [foreign] agents [abroad]. Sometimes they do not know where they are, and what they are doing.

The Soviet comrades help with information about regime questions, documentation issues, information on objects in the US, and support the struggle against agents from capitalist states in Cuba. The Cuban comrades are attentive and apply their advice. Working with them requires major diligence, support, and insights into their problems.

Concerning our questions about certain phenomena in Cuba, Comrade Sakharovsky explained: Fidel decides everything in Cuba. This leads to discontent. Incorrect decisions are taken, and then subordinate leaders are held responsible for subsequent deficits and problems. There are difficulties in building party organizations. There are no party cells yet in the security services. There are problems and tensions based on different origins of members coming from the 26th of July movement, the Directorate, and the communists. The leadership’s position is unclear in context of the [Anibal] Escalante affair, the [Heriberto] Rodriguez trial and the current investigation against Ordoka. It is not clear whether this represents, intentionally or inadvertently, an anti-communist tendency of Fidel. The political situation is complicated and indeed major discontent exists.

We were asked [by the KGB] to establish, according to our interests, official contact between the MfS and the Cuban services. We ought to emphasize our interest in supporting anti-American tendencies in Latin America through our activity. Concrete cases [unofficial agents] must not be uncovered.

  1. On Questions of Mobilization Work

Comrade Semichastny agreed that a meeting will be held by experts on this issue.

  1. On Registration and Operative Evaluation of Tourism

[Based on a] meeting with Comrade Babkov, a visit to the electronic center, and to the news center in the 2nd Main Directorate. Registration is currently done according to the following criteria:

  1. Entry and exit by foreigners from non-socialist states;
  2. Travel routes and geography of travel activity;
  3. Agents and suspicious foreigners;
  4. Diplomatic travel.

Entry and exit stubs have replaced the visa and contain a photo. Currently we [MfS] are working with the Institute of Criminology on the problem of picture registration and analysis. In the long run registration is envisaged of important links with information from mail control, of suspicious Soviet citizens, and of repercussions concerning confidential information that was revealed to the adversary.

  1. Varia
  2. Joint measures against the statute of limitations of war crimes.

The Soviet comrades will forward a proposal to the GDR State Prosecutor via the Soviet Embassy in Berlin in the name of the USSR State Prosecutor to delegate GDR experts to USSR archives to study Nazi documents. After a review and selection of related material, the latter will be officially and publicly handed over to the GDR. The USSR will issue a statement by the Committee of War Veterans or the Soviet government. Also there will be an appeal by Soviet lawyers filing an appropriate protest.

The Soviet comrades expect the MfS to be involved in this. They expect a delegation of 5 or 6 individuals to come to the USSR soon, preferably with Russian language skills.

  1. The Soviet comrades are preparing information on the contents of existing documents to be used for the unmasking of Nazi diplomats.
  2. The comrades returned to the issue of the International Seminar to expose the Nazi generals in the West German army.
  3. The KGB attributes major importance to measures revealing the cooperation between the West German Federal Republic and Israel. Previous measures were already successful, and the efforts of the MfS in this regard were recognized. The Soviet comrades have certain opportunities in Syria. They have already resulted in an extensive evaluation by the Syrian Foreign Ministry for the [Syrian] government on West German-Israeli cooperation confirming the information we provided beforehand. The Syrian Foreign Ministry noted in this context that FRG attitudes [toward Israel] might lead to the establishment of [Syrian] diplomatic relations with the GDR, which will automatically result in breaking off relations with West Germany. All state bodies in Syria are requested to conduct an exact analysis of relations with the GDR and FRG, and reflect on expected consequences in case relations with the FRG might be severed.
  4. The Soviet services have information about a former assistant of [Adolf] Eichmann residing in Syria. He was supposed to be liquidated by the BND since he knows too much.
  5. Comrade Semichastny reiterated the special interest of the KGB in the cases of St. and Ch. We agreed that the KGB will forward any new information to the MfS.
  6. Concerning the question by Comrade Minister Mielke about experiences with the subordination of border guard units under the KGB, Comrade Semichastny stated that this subordination has turned out fully satisfactory like in similar earlier cases. The border guard units share this opinion. Border service is not just simple guard duty. It is about guaranteeing operative security at the border using agents and all available means. Working with agents is necessary on both sides of the border. Thus the KGB has to be active along the border anyway, and maintaining parallel responsibilities and authorities would make no sense. Any other line of authority would make principal and practical decisions in dealing with border violations much more complicated. The same applies to dealing with border crossings by foreigners at the checkpoints. This way a close and uncomplicated cooperation between counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, and border units is guaranteed. The Ministry of Defense, in contrast, has completely different assignments. This becomes especially relevant when dealing with incidents at the Chinese border. All issues are flexibly and correctly decided by the KGB which functions as a political body. Border guard units are best associated with the KGB. They are not a major burden but a big help for counterintelligence and foreign intelligence.
  7. Concerning the “Tag [Day]” case, Comrade Semichastny said it is very possible that the US have such equipment. The Soviet Union does not have such portable apparatuses. In this context we also discussed issues of secure codes and deciphering by the adversary. Applying these means, the latter gains major insights in particular on military data. An employee of the US deciphering agency is said to have received an award of 100,000 dollars.
  8. Following our request, the Soviet comrades handed over a number of scientific-technological information as well as documentation on scientific-technological intelligence in the areas of chemistry, in particular the production of artificial plastics and fibers.

Comrade Semichastny rated the relationship with the MfS as good. He thanked us in particular for our good information and emphasized some of the sites where this information was obtained. This type of information is of great help for the orientation of the party and government of the Soviet Union.

Information in the field of scientific-technological foreign intelligence is also very valuable and important. He thanked us for this in particular.

A great and valuable help is also the work of the MfS concerning the support of Soviet military counter-intelligence to safeguard the Soviet Army on GDR territory.

Therefore the Soviet comrades would like to present, at the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the MfS [1965], awards to a large number of MfS employees who have distinguished themselves in the acquisition of political and scientific-technological information; and also for merit in security issues concerning the Soviet Army. They ask for our consent on this and expect appropriate suggestions of names.

At the end of the meeting Comrade Mielke thanked us for the valuable information provided during the course of our talks.

He noted a full agreement of views and praised the value of this kind of meeting. They offer the opportunity to achieve rapid clarifications and solutions for general and practical issues of operative work. He again reiterated the consent reached regarding certain issues concerning an aggravation of the overall situation, and the need to apply respective countermeasures. Comrade Mielke thanked us for the openness and cordiality of our relations. He stressed our good cooperation with the KGB apparatus in the GDR and invited Comrade Semichastny to visit the GDR.

Comrade Mielke forwarded greetings from Comrades Ulbricht and Honecker to Comrade Semichastny and the leading comrades of the KGB.

Comrade Semichastny shared his assessment about the value of the meeting. He was grateful for the good cooperation with the KGB and its apparatus in the GDR. He thanked for the greetings from Comrades Ulbricht and Honecker and asked to return his own warm greetings.

[1] Palewski was actually Minister of State in charge of Scientific Research, Atomic Energy and Space Questions.

[2] NTS, the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists, an anti-communist Russian exile organization.


Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson’s recent election in the United States, Khrushchev’s ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.



NKVD plan to assassinate Josip Broz Tito by a Soviet covert agent, codenamed “Max.” The plan envisions assassinating Tito during a private audience during Tito’s forthcoming visit to London, or at a diplomatic reception in Belgrade. This document was not dated.


  • STALIN, JOSEPH, 1879-1953


    Tito, Josip Broz, 1892-1980
    Soviet Union–Foreign relations–Yugoslavia
    Intelligence service–Soviet Union
    Soviet Union


The MGB USSR requests permission to prepare a terrorist act (terakt) against Tito, by the illegal agent ‘Max’,” Comrade I.R. Grigulevich, a Soviet citizen and member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1950.

1. “Max” was placed in Italy on a Costa Rican passport, where he was able to gain the confidence and enter the circles of South American diplomats as well as well-known Costa Rican political and trade figures visiting Italy.

Using these connections, “Max”, on our orders, obtained an appointment as the special plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Italy and Yugoslavia. In the course of his diplomatic duties, in the second half of 1952, he visited Yugoslavia twice. He was well received there, with official welcoming into circles close to Tito’s clique; he was promised a personal audience with Tito.

“Max’s” present position offers us opportunities to carry out active measures (aktivnye deistviia) against Tito.
In early February of this year, we summoned “Max” to Vienna for a secret meeting. While discussing options, “Max” was asked how he thought he could be most useful, considering his position. “Max” proposed some kind of active measure against Tito personally.

In relation to this proposal, there was a discussion with him [Max] about how he imagined all of this and as a result, the following options for a terrorist act against Tito were presented.

1. To order “Max” to arrange a private audience with Tito, during which a soundless mechanism concealed in his clothes would release a dose of pulmonary plague bacteria that would guarantee death to Tito and all present. “Max” himself would not be informed of the substance’s nature, but with the goal of saving “Max’s” life, he would be given an anti-plague serum in advance.

2. In connection with Tito’s expected visit to London, to send “Max” there to use his official position and good personal relations with the Yugoslav ambassador in England, [Vladimir] Velebit, to obtain an invitation to the expected Yugoslav embassy reception in Tito’s honor.

The terrorist act could be accomplished by shooting with a silent mechanism concealed as a personal item, while simultaneously releasing tear gas to create panic among the crowd, allowing “Max” to escape and cover up all traces.

3. To use one of the official receptions in Belgrade to which members of the diplomatic corps are invited. The terrorist act could be implemented in the same way as the second option, to be carried out by “Max” who as a diplomat, accredited by the Yugoslav government, would be invited to such a reception.

In addition, to assign “Max” to work out an option whereby one of the Costa Rican representatives will give Tito some jewelry in a box, which when opened would release an instantaneously-effective poisonous substance.

We asked Max to once again think the operation over and to make suggestions on how he could realize, in the most efficient way, actions against Tito. Means of contact were established and it was agreed that further instructions would follow.

It seems appropriate to use “Max” to implement a terrorist act against Tito. “Max’s” personal qualities and intelligence experience make him suitable for such an assignment. We ask for your approval.




Maria Kolesnikova nach ihrem Verschwinden von Lukaschenko-KGB-Schergen festgenommen

Belarus protests: UK says release of 'abducted' Maria Kolesnikova must be  'highest priority' | World News | Sky News
Eine der Führerinnen der belarussischen Opposition, Maria Kolesnikova, wurde am Morgen des 8. September an der belarussisch-ukrainischen Grenze festgenommen, teilte das staatliche Grenzkomitee von Belarus mit. Sie behaupten, dass Kolesnikova und zwei Mitglieder des Koordinierungsrates der belarussischen Opposition, Anton Rodnenkov und Ivan Kravtsov, mit dem Auto zwischen belarussischen und ukrainischen Kontrollpunkten unterwegs waren. Nachdem sie den Grenzschutz bemerkt hatten, so heißt es im Komitee, beschleunigte das Auto stark und verließ das Gebiet von Belarus, während Kolesnikova angeblich aus dem Auto “geschoben” wurde.


Der ukrainische Grenzdienst teilte mit, dass Kravtsov und Rodnenkov am ukrainischen Kontrollpunkt angekommen waren und die Grenzkontrolle durchliefen. Das belarussische Staatsgrenzkomitee erklärte, Kravtsov und Rodnenkov seien angeblich inhaftiert worden, aber die ukrainische Seite bestreitet dies.

Sie versuchten, Maria Kolesnikova gewaltsam aus Weißrussland zu deportieren, aber sie riss ihren Pass auf, und die Grenzschutzbeamten ließen sie nicht herein, schreibt “Interfax-Ukraine” unter Berufung auf eine Quelle. Der stellvertretende Innenminister der Ukraine, Anton Gerashchenko, schrieb auf Facebook, dass Rodnenkov und Kravtsov, die Kolesnikova begleiteten, aus Weißrussland ausgewiesen wurden. „Es war keine freiwillige Abreise. Es war eine gewaltsame Vertreibung aus dem Heimatland “, sagt Gerashchenko. Ihm zufolge hat Maria Kolesnikova ihre Deportation verhindert. Gerashchenko hat nicht angegeben, was Kolesnikova getan hat.

Am Tag vor der Verhaftung, am 7. September, hörten Kolesnikova, Rodnenkov und Kravtsov auf zu kommunizieren. Augenzeugen zufolge haben Menschen in Zivil und in Masken Kolesnikova im Zentrum von Minsk gepackt und in einen dunklen Kleinbus mit dem Schild “Kommunikation” gezogen, wonach sie in eine unbekannte Richtung gebracht wurden. Das Innenministerium, der Untersuchungsausschuss und der staatliche Kontrollausschuss gaben an, dass sie nichts über die Inhaftierung von Kolesnikova wüssten. Der belarussische KGB hat dies nicht kommentiert.

Nawalny-Mordanschag: Moskau mauert – und dreht den Spieß um

Während der Ruf nach Aufklärung weltweit lauter wird, mauert Moskau und will untersuchen lassen, ob eine “fremde Macht” einen russischen Staatsbürger geschädigt habe, um Moskau zu diskreditieren.

Das ist die alte Vorgehensweise der Tschekisten aus KGB, STASI und wie die einschlägigen Ost-Mördergeheimdienste sich jeweils nennen – bis hin zu STASI-GoMoPa.

Video – Boris Nemzow – Tod an der Kremlmauer

Am 27. Februar 2015 ereignete sich der Mord an dem russischen Oppositionspolitiker Boris Nemzow. Die Welle der Empörung und Anteilnahme nach der Ermordung war sowohl in Russland als auch im Ausland hoch. Russlands Präsident Putin versprach umgehende Aufklärung. Was ist seitdem passiert, und was weiß man heute über die Drahtzieher des Mordes?

The Shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007 – Top Secret Document

Target is Destroyed | Korean Air Lines Flight 007 - YouTube

The Shootdown ofKorean Airlines Flight 007 – 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov describes Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.”


Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke]
with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Comrade V. A.
Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin
“Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke] with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB,
Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin,” September 19, 1983, History and Public
Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU),
MfS, ZAIG 5306, pp. 1-19. Translated by Bernd Schaefer.
Meeting between KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov and East German Minister for State Security
Mielke, including discussion of the shootdown of Korean Airlines (KAL) Flight 007.
This document was made possible with support from the Blavatnik Family Foundation and the Leon
Levy Foundation.
Original Language:
English Translation
N o t e
About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke] with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB,
Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin
[Additional] Participants:
From the KGB:
Comrade Lieutenant General Shumilov
Comrade Captain Ryabinnikov (Interpreter)
From the MfS:
Comrade Major General Grossmann
Comrade Major General Damm
Comrade Lieutenant Colonel Salevsky (Interpreter)
Comrade Mielke:
It’s a great pleasure. I understand how the difficult situation makes it hard for you [Kryuchkov] to
leave the Soviet Union temporarily. We are happy that it worked out nonetheless.
I have to convey greetings from Comrade [Markus] Wolf [the Deputy Minister for State Security].
He will return from Hungary on 1 October 1983 and come [for a further bilateral MfS-KGB meeting]
to Tabarz [in the Thuringian Forest in the GDR where Kryuchkov will stay for vacation]. Then we
can already talk there about some issues and return to Berlin during the course of Sunday, 2
October 1983. We will have time on 3 and 4 October to discuss some more issues and requests for
mutual cooperation, possibly to be forwarded later to Comrade [CPSU General Secretary] Y. V.
Andropov. [Your] return to Moscow is scheduled for 5 October.
I have some requests to hear from you Moscow’s perspectives concerning assessments of the
following issues:
– What is the perspective on [Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) disarmament] talks in Geneva?
(West German newspaper “Die Welt” says there is no more optimism left, just hope!)
– What does this mean in terms of concrete assignments to the MfS, how should we proceed?
(Maybe you could also outline problems for us to forward Comrade E. Honecker.)
– Regarding the entire complex of heightened tensions after the plane incident (South Korea) and
ensuing boycott measures: What are the assessments? What does this mean for the future?
Which counter-measures are planned?
– [CSCE follow-up conference in] Madrid
Even elements from the FRG [West German] bourgeoisie are talking about the option to continue
disarmament negotiations after the buildup [of INF in Western Europe]. There have been several
statements in this regard (Vogel/SPD, Weizsäcker/CDU, even Strauss/CSU).
They all believe something is going to happen, and that even after missile deployment the
negotiations will continue. Even Strauss said in his first two election campaign speeches that we
must avoid a nuclear world war; otherwise the world will perish.
You can view him as you like, but in a certain regard he is a realist. He believes the balance of
forces to be such that there can be no winner. This does not yet make him our friend. You have to
analyze this thoroughly.
I also still want to talk to you later about other issues in private.
There are many who believe there will be a continuation of talks even after an INF deployment. In
addition, there are the full impacts of the boycott in effect.
We are interested in the actual [KGB] assessments of the situation, in addition to what is known at
the Politburo level.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Many thanks for the welcome.
I am grateful for the invitation to spend parts of my vacation here in the GDR. My apologies that I
was not able to come on 10 September already. Yet there were a couple of issues preventing me
from doing do. The most important one was the plane incident. You do not shoot down such a type
of airplane once a month.
Thus I messed up all of our comrades’ schedules to a certain degree. This has created some
Comrade Mielke:
We have solved this in an effective fashion. Just come when you are able to come.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
I am tasked to convey cordial greetings from Y. V. Andropov and his best wishes. He again thanks
you for the joint work done for state security.
He rates meetings and talks with you very highly, in particular your cordial and focused
development of cooperation with the USSR.
It is his special pleasure to greet you again cordially. Now he is on vacation in the South. For
politicians like him, there is no actual vacation. Once in a while he has visitors.
For a half day he is reading information, including ours [KGB] and what we received from you. Also
I convey cordial greetings from [KGB Chairman] V. M. Chebrikov and his deputies. They all know
you very well. Almost all of them have worked with you in the past, and all of them have very fond
Now to the concrete questions you have raised.
These are questions discussed at the highest level. I myself am not placed so highly.
Hence I will do my best to respond to these questions based on my state of knowledge and
Obviously I will not be able to answer them in full. Yet since we are all part of the process to
determine policy and concrete measures, issues of detail included, I can explain at least some
aspects and inform you accordingly.
On the Plane Incident
Some issues have been already explained at the [9 September 1983] press conference. Now one
can outline how the story happened and unfolded in its entirety.
During the first days we were reluctant to provide information. From the beginning, however, there
were no reasons to keep the incident secret. We wanted to wait to see what the West had to say.
Reagan’s initial reaction was very important to us. The full timeline about what happened to the
plane was meanwhile published in our press. Yet we have not yet published everything we have.
We did not know that the downed plane was a civilian airliner. Our pilots were not aware of that.
We were convinced that it was a military aircraft. When the regional ground command issued its
orders, it did not know it was a civilian airliner. We are not going to make this public, but this was
just how it was. We were convinced that this was a special aircraft on a specific reconnaissance
Our radar detected the plane prior to its violation of our airspace, about 600 to 800 kilometers
before Kamchatka. The dot on the radar approached Kamchatka, i.e. the area where we have
military bases. Some of them are nuclear bases.
Our services were to a certain extent shocked that the plane headed directly towards Kamchatka.
Such a brazen incident had never happened before. Thousands of planes fly through the air
corridors there. Previous violations were just about between 1 and 5 kilometers. Yet until 1
September 1983, there had been no single incident involving a direct flight over Kamchatka.
The plane was detected by ground radar and by our military aircraft. We decided to do nothing
against the plane. We were in doubt what kind of plane it was, and whether it really was an aircraft
flying over Kamchatka for intelligence monitoring.
The plane left Soviet airspace over the Sea of Okhotsk. A large part of this ocean consists of open,
international waters. There our radar lost the plane. Sometime later the plane showed up in
Sakhalin airspace. In Sakhalin they already knew that an airplane had violated airspace over
We again undertook measures to identify this plane. 4 aircraft went up (2 SU-15, 2 MIG-23). They
tried to establish connection; various signals were given. No response. More than 120 [warning]
shots were fired.
There were still a few kilometers left for the plane before its departure from our airspace. Our pilots
said this is not a passenger plane. It was especially relevant that this plane flew around our antiaircraft defenses. One SU-15 was especially close, just about 2 kilometers away. The speed of the
[KAL] Boeing was 800 kilometers [per hour]; the SU-15 had [a speed of] 2,400 kilometers [per
hour], the MIG-23 [had a speed of] 2,000 kilometers [per hour].
For reasons of speed they could not get closer to each other. At the plane, windows were not
illuminated and position lights not turned on. We fired special tracer bullets parallel to the plane’s
course of direction. Some of them were shot right in front of its nose. The plane’s pilots must have
noticed this. The plane maneuvered and changed its altitude to evade our aircraft. Then, on the
instructions of ground control, two missiles were fired. The shootdown occurred over the territory of
After the firing of the missiles the plane still flew for 11 minutes. It lost altitude, went down to 5,000
meters, and then it fell into the sea 9 to 11 nautical miles from the coast. In the morning we noticed
an oil spot on the ocean. Parts from the plane were found near Moneron Island (near Nevelsk).
Ocean currents carried other parts to the Japanese coast at Hokkaido. The spot of the crash has
been located quite exactly. Now Soviets, Americans, and Japanese are searching there for the
wreck. Everybody is attempting to find the flight recorder. Until my departure it had not been found.
The plane had deviated from the air corridor towards Sakhalin by about 600 kilometers, altogether
by an average of between 200 and 500 kilometers. There were four American and four Japanese
air control points along the regular corridor. None of them had issued a signal.
We were completely convinced that this plane was on a reconnaissance mission. If we would have
known that this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down. Yet everything pointed in
another direction. We have recordings of exchanges between ground control and our aircraft.
So far not everything has been published. Why should we make everything available right away?
We have posed and forwarded 11 questions to the Americans and Japanese. They have not
responded to any of them.
We have still more details about this [KAL] flight. Reagan declared that mankind will unfortunately
never know who entered the wrong programming [at the KAL plane]. You could say, this way he
conceded this mistake; since mankind wants to know who did that, and why.
Just among us: We have received very interesting information from an American source. He
informs how, and by whom, this airliner was prepared for its flight. In the coming days we will
provide this information to the Americans without making all of it public. In this way this American
will be “sacrificed” as a source. We have to wait for a couple of more days.
Obviously there are still a couple of other facts. There are people who have consciously sent this
plane to its demise. Sooner or later everything will come out.
Reactions in individual countries were very different; in some there were very tough, in others,
rather irrelevant. The saying goes that such events do not “live” for more than 2 weeks. The
Americans will exploit this further when the parts of the plane and the dead are recovered. Some
dead bodies have already been found at the Northern shore of Hokkaido. All this will be exploited
propagandistically. In the Western press you always find the question raised over and over
whether this is beneficial to Reagan.
We [KGB] want to contribute with our active measures towards the revelation of all causes and
links of this plane incident. We hope that our friends from the MfS will support us in this regard.
For the first time, [on 9 September 1983] a large press conference was held with the First Deputy
Foreign Minister and the Chief of the General Staff [Marshal Nikolai Orgarkov]. Everything had
been thoroughly prepared.
In a few days an article will follow by Air Force Marshal [Pyotr S.] Kirsanov, featuring new facts that
this [KAL] flight was not a normal one. It will be proven that simultaneously to this flight a US
satellite crossed the flight route three times. The Americans knew that we were preparing missiles
for launch on this territory at that time. The launch had to be postponed. Also telling is the following
episode: On the downed plane there was a well-known US Senator [sic] who initially did not want
to board this flight.
[2] He decided to book only at the last minut e.
Still some “white spots” remain. After the incident, US Senator [Henry “Scoop”] Jackson [D-WA]
delivered a very strong anti-Soviet speech demanding further tough sanctions against the Soviet
Union. When he left the podium, he fell and dropped dead. He was an extremely strong anti-Soviet
(a pathological case).
We express our deep regrets for the victims but do not accept responsibility. Our Foreign Minister,
Comrade Gromyko, did not travel to the U.N. General Assembly in New York. He stayed home
since the US did not give guarantees for the safety of his plane.
We will also not participate in the IPU [International Parliamentary Union] Meeting in Seoul (but not
because Kim Il Sung has asked us to do so).
It was also because of the plane incident that I was not able to come earlier [to the GDR].
Comrade Mielke:
I have the following questions.
I said from the beginning one has to be more on the offensive, based on the fact that this was an
organized provocation. You have to declare that the Americans use other nations to cover their own
provocations. They apply this method frequently.
You have to say immediately that this is a provocation in order to go on the offensive. You should
have done that right away. This is my only critical remark. I did not have any other alternative
This argumentation was lacking right from the onset. There are plenty of examples how they
operate here at our place. They exploit other nations, and simultaneously use the opportunity to
drag others in whom they actually want to get rid of. I said so immediately when this happened.
The issue is now evident. In [our central newspaper] Neues Deutschland we published the full
transcript of your press conference. We also broadcasted it on television.
You should have gone on the offensive somewhat faster. Sure, you should listen to what the
enemy has to say. Yet everything else you could have added later. You have to work out additional
arguments that this was a targeted provocation together with South Korea. It is not so much about
the issue of the shootdown. Yet that you could not identify the airliner as a passenger plane – I do
not think this is good.
This event had exceptional elements of surprise. I said so also to Comrade E. Honecker. What
could have come out of this? We have to be extraordinarily vigilant. Nobody can say in advance
what is going to happen; whether this plane incident could lead to a provocation transforming into a
war. I note the problem of surprise over and over again. This surprise can lead to a war.
It is quite uncomfortable to say that one did not recognize it. It can happen. Everyone is human.
Yet there lies a great risk also for other issues.
Everything you say is correct, but the Western press says you were not able to identify the type of
plane since your aircraft were flying below. They also say the flight recorder has already been
found. If you do not have it, you have to search for it further. They [in the West] sense the danger
coming from the flight recorder. We are in complete agreement with you and will continue our
A captain from [the West German airline] Lufthansa has written a wonderful article with sound
1. This is how they [the US] operate
2. Why did they not guide the plane on a correct course if the US and Japan were aware of this?
Arguments are on the table. You just have to use them for the fight against Reagan. It is interesting
that Reagan can get into trouble when a part of the bourgeoisie disagrees. If [CNN Chairman Ted]
Turner is saying he will not “swear on a bible” that the [KAL] flight was not a spy mission, he
therefore argues against Reagan. They provide the arguments themselves. This is why some
countries will not join the boycott. We have to continue our work.
I have no further questions. Only if there are new arguments coming up; but then so we can
respond quickly. This is important to the entire world, to your good friends, to those who waver, but
also to the enemies who are smart and realists. More timely information would have been better:
This just privately since you asked.
There are also comrades who say: Did you really have to shoot down the civilian airliner?! Were
they not in a position to recognize this?
This is why the argument that you were not able to identify the type of plane is so dangerous.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
They were not able to recognize it.
Comrade Mielke:
Of course, those two plane types look similar. Honest specialists from the West are saying this, too.
They also say: Why were there so many RC planes flying at that time in this area?
Comrade Kryuchkov:
The entire incident occurred at 7:00 hours [A.M.] local time. In Moscow it was midnight. Already at
the evening of 1 September all issues were discussed, and a first brief news report issued on [state
TV newscast] “Vremya.” The same day we established a large commission and send them to the
East. On 3 September they provided a comprehensive report.
Comrade Mielke:
We already exchanged our opinions on 2 September. Please understand why I was so arrogant
and told V. T. Shumilov: Tell Moscow this was a specially prepared South Korean plane for spying;
the most important thing is missing in your public statement!
Comrade Kryuchkov:
I can only say: If we had released our second statement 24 hours earlier, the slander would not be
this harsh. We did not see through everything right after the incident.
Comrade Mielke:
Tomorrow the Central Committee secretaries in charge will meet in Moscow. There we will submit
our proposal accordingly.
The adversary immediately coordinated its measures aimed at you and us.
That is why it was necessary to strike immediately and not just release 5 lines. This may suffice at
the parochial level, but not for the global public.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
It is alright what you say. I completely agree with you. But there is one problem: As a Politburo
member you know that such issues first have to be discussed by party leaders. So – 10:0 for them.
Comrade Mielke:
No, 10:1 – since you shot down the plane.
I just want to say: There must not be any moments of being surprised. You have to go on the
offensive. This is important for future incidents.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
In his talks with you, Comrade Y. V. Andropov always agreed with you on issues of how to focus on
operative impacts of events.
Comrade Mielke:
We can now see how he reacts, how he has got Marxism-Leninism to move again, like for instance
– the national [ethnic] problem
– agriculture
– the class question
This is an enhancement of the [Marxist-Leninist] theory!
Comrade Kryuchkov:
On Geneva [Arms Negotiations]
Reagan has imposed sanctions against us that will not damage him as a president. He wants to
run again in the next election. You could say, these are “hollow sanctions.” He proposed areas that
do not play any major role in bilateral relations between both countries. We had expected sanctions
on grain exports or the pipeline deals. As far as Geneva is concerned, he immediately stated the
US will [continue to] negotiate.
Still, the question looms for us: Why do we have to continue to discuss these issues when the
missile deployment in Western Europe goes forward? Reagan would be delighted to abandon
negotiations and act even more impertinent. Yet this would not yield any benefits for him. So he will
not walk away from negotiations. Yet those negotiations conducted by the US are a deception of
the common people.
These are the facts. However, the USSR cannot abandon negotiation. Otherwise, the common
folks will say, the Soviet Union does not want peace.
The issue is very serious. There exist different opinions. Some comrades say: Does it really make
sense to continue negotiations?
Comrade Mielke:
One has to continue negotiations.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Some are proposing to maybe do something to placate the public. This is a very important issue –
to undertake a step of this kind. Our leading comrades are currently discussing this. We attempt to
find paths leading to an agreement, like our recent proposal on the SS-20.
Yet in the West there is NATO, in the East there is China, and Japan is ascending. We are ready to
destroy SS-20 missiles. This is a very courageous step. It means really destroying them, not a
relocation to the East of the USSR. This is why government circles are contemplating that our side
will have to move somewhat further.
There are very important issues to consider. Our proposal has divided Western allies to a certain
extent. We must exploit this. We are discussing an idea to maybe merge negotiations over both
strategic arms and medium-range missile limitations. We have to do so thorough calculations. On
the one hand, you would gain allies, but on the other side, the problem gets more complicated.
France and England currently have 200 nuclear-capable missiles. Yet in a few years that will rise to
600. This is why we have to include them in our calculations.
Comrade Mielke:
A major number of politicians are already in favor of including them.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
The aggravation of the international situation is continuing. The military-industrial complex, of which
Reagan is a representative, believes in exploiting the latter for its purposes. In light of such a tense
situation, they hope to succeed in liquidating the liberation movement in Central America. Likewise
in Africa and Asia. They do everything to win in the Middle East. If the global economy does not
change, there is no expectation for any changes of US administration policy.
In this context, we in the KGB has undertaken multiple measures through the international press
and other channels; also we do a lot jointly [with the MfS] after respective coordination.
As far as the FRG is concerned – a very important topic – I will certainly have the chance to talk
with Comrade Wolf in detail. On Strauss our perspective is essentially shaped by your position.
Comrade Mielke:
I will have to say something on this issue.
I still remember your face, Vladimir Alexandrovich, when I talked with [KGB Chairman] V. M.
Chebrikov about Strauss. Comrade E. Honecker authorized me to become active in this matter. We
will talk about this separately later.
As a party, we are performing a gigantic work. V. T. Shumilov, with whom we have talked, has
seen the document. You have to talk with everybody and argue against the missile deployment.
Everybody, even the biggest enemy, has to be addressed in order to make it clear that a nuclear
inferno will leave nothing behind of him.
This is always linked to issues of “surprise” [attacks].
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Will we continue to negotiate if the West deploys INF? We do not view the struggle for peace as
over. Obviously this struggle is very difficult as a completely new situation will eventually arise. We
have to work out new positions. We conduct a very large propaganda campaign. It is a fact that
through INF deployment the Americans turn the Western European countries into “hostages.” In
any case, it will result in the end of Europe. This is fully clear. How can you make this
understandable to the Western Europeans (getting it into their heads) so that no politician can deny
it? This is the task. We must jointly contribute to that.
Concerning the question of war: We say that currently its foundations are laid. Whether there
actually will be a war, depends on both sides. But we can say that the weak will have no influence
here. Our strength is the most important factor, e.g. in Afghanistan. There the struggle is between
socialism and capitalism. If we are weak, we will be defeated there. We can say it already now:
Afghanistan remains a Soviet-friendly country. Basic changes have been made there.
[The CSCE follow-up conference in] Madrid was a major success. This is how you can propagate
it. The plane story has already receded somewhat to the background. Madrid will resume its place
in the global campaign. In January 1984 there will be the next round of negotiations on an entirely
different level. Then we will see. Madrid is an example for solving problems through negotiations.
We have used the neutrals very well. Malta’s position is quite strange. It results from opinions held
by Prime Minister [Dom] Mintoff. Basket III depends on our interpretation, and how we will fill it out
through practical steps by the party and security services. Basket III provides nobody with the
opportunity to interfere with the internal affairs of another state. It contains very many references to
domestic legislation.
Comrade Mielke:
On Madrid I hold a somewhat different opinion. Not regarding the overall assessment, or issues of
disarmament and peace – but on Basket III.
Moscow is 1,600 kilometers from Berlin. The situation looks quite different from just 1 kilometer of
distance (GDR vs. FRG; Germans vs. Germans). We are not Chinese in favor of [Western INF]
deployment. Yet FRG citizens are Germans and not Chinese.
We will talk about Madrid later again when Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov is rested.
Today I talked about this issue before the [internal MfS] party meeting with extraordinary stridency.
The issues of “peace” and methods in the struggle about “peace” have unmitigated impacts in the
GDR. Among us, almost every week we arrest about 150 people. There is no end in sight. Thus we
will have to talk about this.
At the party meeting I talked about the political relevance, and about what we will have to focus on
in our work. I talked about the Church, and about the “Greens.” Marx himself has commissioned us
communists to take care that the world gets preserved for our descendants once we are no longer
around. For that, we do not need any “Greens.”
Intentionally, we also published the Madrid Document in full. If they [in the West] publish it, it will be
wrongfully interpreted. Footnotes are also included. One thing we already did.
On 27 September our state legal bulletin will publish a decree about marriages and family meetings
[between GDR and FRG] coming into effect from 15 October 1983. Simultaneously there will be an
unpublished decree issued about its concrete handling.
Yet I am not as happy about Madrid as you from the Soviet Union.
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Our comrades cooperated in Madrid very well with your comrades. [GDR Foreign Minister]
Comrade [Oskar] Fischer has invited Comrade Kondrashov to the GDR for that reason.
Comrade Mielke:
Still, Comrade Fischer does not think differently than I do. Compromises had to be made. Yet the
GDR is hit hardest since we are a divided country. Germans vs. Germans.If you are a united
nation, then it is a different story.
Many thanks for your statements. I am glad I provided the correct line at our party meeting. Even
the term “hostages” for the Western Europeans was used in my speech.
Our problems are somewhat different from those of other countries. This is a consequence of our
special location.
I am proud we assessed the situation correctly, including the plane incident. I am pleased with your
assessment. Like [when talking] with Y. V. Andropov.
Many thanks.
Thank you for the wonderful greetings [from Andropov], and that he still remembers me this well.
We will continue to work in the same vein we collaborated with him over all those years; like a true
combat unit of the Cheka that puts its ideas into the joint struggle.
Many thanks for the greetings from V. M. Chebrikov. About the “Batashov” question we will talk
Many thanks also for the greetings from all deputies of the KGB chairman. How is G. Karpovich
Comrade Kryuchkov:
Many thanks. He is doing according to his age. His health is not great.
Comrade Mielke:
Again heartfelt thanks. Some of your information has confirmed our assessments, including on
Your remarks about Geneva were important. Hence we will continue our talks with all [Western]
politicians. The CPSU leadership has to decide how to continue and make use of this.
Tomorrow we have the meeting of Central Committee secretaries in Moscow. Then these issues
will be discussed as well.
[1] Referring to the Soviet shoot down of Korean Airlines Lines Flight 007 on1 September 1983.
It was actually Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald (D-Georgia).

The 10 Top Secret Most Notorious Operations Of The KGB Revealed

Biggest Secret Reveal || India & The KGB - The Blunt Social - Medium

Like the CIA, the Soviet (and now Russian) spy organization known as the KGB has occupied with many years of mystery tasks over the world, extending from shakedown to capturing. The vast majority of the mysteries that we think about the KGB today are a direct result of one man—Vasili Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin was a filer for the KGB for a long time before he surrendered to the UK and gave over his 25,000-page chronicle of mystery KGB records. Here are a portion of the KGB’s generally upsetting and abnormal mystery tasks.

10 The Attacks On America’s Infrastructure

Hoover DamHoover-Damm wird zu gigantischem Energiespeicher | en:former

From 1959–72, the KGB started to photo US power plants, dams, oil pipelines, and framework for a terrible activity that would disturb the force gracefully to all of New York. When they picked focuses on that they thought were helpless, the KGB set up a protected house close to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. From that point, KGB specialists looked to plan and complete a progression of assaults on America’s capacity systems.Hydroelectric dams, which create a huge bit of the US’s vitality gracefully, were an objective. The KGB detailed an intricate arrangement to crush two huge hydroelectric dams, the Hungry Horse Dam and Flathead Dam, in Montana. Removing the two dams from commission would injure the force gracefully of the state and encompassing district. The assault was to start 3 kilometers (2 mi) down the South Fork River from Hungry Horse Dam. The KGB wanted to have agents pulverize power arches on a tall mountain incline, which would be hard to get back on the web, inconclusively taking out force transmission from the dam. At that point, the agents were to hold onto the Hungry Horse Dam’s controls and decimate them. The assaults would have taken out the force gracefully to all of New York state.From the Soviet Union’s Canadian international safe haven, the KGB likewise intended to additionally disturb America’s vitality flexibly by assaulting oil pipelines among Canada and the United States. The plot, called Operation Cedar, was gotten ready for longer than 10 years. The KGB even looked to pulverize petroleum treatment facilities in Canada, which gracefully a lot of America’s gasoline.All of the assaults on America’s capacity framework were a piece of a bigger plan to assault New York City. When they had taken out the greater part of the force in the United States with the previous assaults, the KGB plotted to utilize the disorder and haziness to plant explosives on wharfs and distribution centers along the Port of New York, a pivotal harbor for America’s trade and imports.

9 The Hostage Crisis Retribution

Senate hostage crisis | Wookieepedia | Fandom

In 1974, the KGB made a tip top counterterrorism team with the baffling name “Alpha Group.” The Alpha Group was utilized by the KGB to do top mystery and regularly hazardous missions for the USSR—and now Russia—remembering a wicked and horrible crucial Lebanon.In 1985, the Soviet Union wound up with its first significant prisoner emergency after four Soviet representatives were grabbed in Lebanon by psychological oppressors subsidiary with an Islamic fear based oppressor gathering. The ruffians apparently kidnapped the Soviets to prevent the USSR from offering backing to Syria’s endeavors in the Lebanese common war, which the nation was then entangled in. After the Soviet ambassadors were abducted, the ruffians sent chilling photos to news organizations of the prisoners with firearms to their heads. The psychological oppressors requested that the USSR power Syria-associated powers to quit assaulting Iran-subsidiary powers battling in northern Lebanon, or the prisoners would be executed.Initially, the USSR was available to some type of arrangements with the fear based oppressors to discharge the prisoners sound. Things changed when the USSR didn’t appear to stop the Syrian powers’ inclusion in the common war, and the fear based oppressors executed one of the prisoners just two days after the underlying requests were made.That’s the point at which the USSR relinquished arranging, and the KGB made quick and wicked move. To begin with, the KGB explored what association was behind the kidnappings and seen it as crafted by Hezbollah. That is the point at which the KGB did a touch of seizing of their own, grabbing a nearby relative of a Hezbollah head. They started to dismantle him, emasculating him and sending a portion of his eviscerated body parts to the criminals of the Soviets. Before long, the KGB murdered the Hezbollah relative.Then, the KGB sent the Hezbollah head a message demonstrating that they was aware of a lot a greater amount of his family members and their whereabouts and cautioned that they would endure a similar destiny if the prisoners were not discharged. The Islamic psychological oppressors holding the Soviets paid heed and discharged the staying three Soviet ambassadors soon after, altogether sound and moving along without any more requests.

8 The Blackmail With Sex Tapes

Watch The Secret KGB Sex Files | Prime Video

In 1974, the KGB made a tip top counterterrorism team with the baffling name “Alpha Group.” The Alpha Group was utilized by the KGB to do top mystery and regularly hazardous missions for the USSR—and now Russia—remembering a wicked and horrible crucial Lebanon.In 1985, the Soviet Union wound up with its first significant prisoner emergency after four Soviet representatives were grabbed in Lebanon by psychological oppressors subsidiary with an Islamic fear based oppressor gathering. The ruffians apparently kidnapped the Soviets to prevent the USSR from offering backing to Syria’s endeavors in the Lebanese common war, which the nation was then entangled in. After the Soviet ambassadors were abducted, the ruffians sent chilling photos to news organizations of the prisoners with firearms to their heads. The psychological oppressors requested that the USSR power Syria-associated powers to quit assaulting Iran-subsidiary powers battling in northern Lebanon, or the prisoners would be executed.Initially, the USSR was available to some type of arrangements with the fear based oppressors to discharge the prisoners sound. Things changed when the USSR didn’t appear to stop the Syrian powers’ inclusion in the common war, and the fear based oppressors executed one of the prisoners just two days after the underlying requests were made.That’s the point at which the USSR relinquished arranging, and the KGB made quick and wicked move. To begin with, the KGB explored what association was behind the kidnappings and seen it as crafted by Hezbollah. That is the point at which the KGB did a touch of seizing of their own, grabbing a nearby relative of a Hezbollah head. They started to dismantle him, emasculating him and sending a portion of his eviscerated body parts to the criminals of the Soviets. Before long, the KGB murdered the Hezbollah relative.

ABC Presents Probably Fake Russian "Sex Tape" Of American Diplomat

Then, the KGB sent the Hezbollah head a message demonstrating that they was aware of a lot a greater amount of his family members and their whereabouts and cautioned that they would endure a similar destiny if the prisoners were not discharged. The Islamic psychological oppressors holding the Soviets paid heed and discharged the staying three Soviet ambassadors soon after, altogether sound and moving along without any more requests.

7 The KGB Hacker Accesses 400 US Military Computers

Disney | File 770

During the 1980s, the KGB was searching for an approach to take US military insider facts through two generally new antecedents to the Internet, ARPANET and MILNET. To do as such, they found and selected a man named Markus Hess, who might before long become a Soviet covert operative and one of the most incredible PC programmers in history.Hess started his hacking strategic the University of Bremen in Germany, far away from the US military PCs that he was attempting to get to. From that point, Hess had the option to assault 400 PCs utilized by the US military. A portion of the PCs were utilized at bases the world over in places like Germany and Japan. A portion of different PCs were utilized at MIT for look into. Another was utilized by the Pentagon. Hess had the option to figure the secret word to access the Pentagon’s Optimis database, which permitted him to access “a list of sources of Army documents.”Hess’ broad hacking activity stayed undetected until a frameworks head and stargazer named Clifford Stoll started researching a modest bookkeeping blunder in a California PC lab. Stoll found what appeared to be a little, 75-penny mistake in the PC use at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, which conducts logical research for the US Department of Energy. Stoll attempted to find where the 75-penny inconsistency originated from and followed it to an unapproved and obscure client who had utilized the lab’s PC frameworks for nine seconds without paying. Stoll examined further and found that this unapproved client was a talented programmer who accessed a framework control “superuser” account by misusing a security defect in the system.Stoll went through the following 10 months attempting to find the whereabouts of the programmer. In the long run, he had the option to do so when the programmer attempted to get to a safeguard temporary worker in Virginia. Stoll started to record everything the programmer was doing. He saw this strange programmer getting to PC frameworks at army installations all through the United States, scanning for documents with respect to military insider facts and atomic weapons.Stoll immediately reached specialists extending from the US military to the CIA, NSA, and FBI. Stoll and the specialists at that point followed the programmer’s physical whereabouts to a West German college. They set up a trick to get the programmer to uncover his full personality, creating a phony division at the Lawrence Berkley Laboratory made to seem as though it was working with the US military. At the point when the programmer took the lure and attempted to get to this phony office’s records, they had the option to follow him right to his home in Hannover, West Germany.West German specialists, working with the US, at that point raged Hess’ home and captured him. Little did they all realize that this world class programmer had been shrunk by the KGB and was offering military insider facts to the Soviet Union for a considerable length of time. Hess was later seen as liable of reconnaissance and condemned to as long as three years in jail however was discharged from the get-go probation.

6 The Operation RYAN

The KGB's 3 most sensational operations - Russia Beyond

In 1980s, the Cold War arrived at another blaze point. At that point chief of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev professed to have information that the US was effectively getting ready for a war against the Soviet Union and might dispatch an unexpected atomic assault whenever. Along these lines, in anticipation of this alleged looming fate, the KGB looked to dispatch Operation RYAN, one of biggest observation activities in history.Operation RYAN was intended to furnish the Soviets with early notice indications of an approaching US atomic assault. The arrangement was to direct best in class reconnaissance utilizing the USSR’s COSMOS satellite. The KGB needed to photo US army installations nonstop, observing them intently for signs that the US would dispatch atomic weapons at the USSR.The activity additionally looked to screen all employments of radar inside the United States for any sensational expands that would demonstrate groundwork for an assault. Besides, Operation RYAN was intended to screen the exercises of every American resident and military staff when they left the US. RYAN likewise put NATO under substantial reconnaissance. The activity even attempted to catch calls made all through the United States and Europe.In expansion to remote reconnaissance, Operation RYAN made a system of spies who were prepared to follow up on a second’s notification in the event that it was accepted that the US was beginning a war with the Soviet Union. The huge and expensive activity was inevitably downsized in 1984, just three years after it was set into movement.

5 The Buying Of US Banks

Big Banks Reverse Course, Stop Buying Own Shares | Global Finance ...

At the point when the KGB wasn’t attempting to utilize spies to get their hands on the privileged insights of the US government, they were attempting to utilize banks.In the mid-1970s, the KGB concocted an arrangement to clandestinely purchase three US banks in Northern California as a component of a mystery activity to secure data on cutting edge organizations in the district. The three banks were picked by the KGB since they had recently made credits to innovation organizations. A large number of these organizations were shrunk by the US military, so the KGB wanted to catch US military innovation secrets.To pull the activity off, the KGB gotten an agent from Singapore named Amos Dawe to buy the banks for them without letting the US government get wind of the USSR’s fabulous arrangement to take innovation mysteries. Be that as it may, before the KGB could assume control over the banks, their buy was impeded by the CIA. The CIA had first learned of the plan when they saw that the Singaporean specialist’s cash was originating from a Soviet bank. Dawe had acquired a $50 million credit line from a Singapore part of Moscow’s Norodny Bank.

4 The Operation PANDORA

Top 5 KGB operations on U.S. soil - Big Think

Racial pressures were intense in the US during the 1960s. Race riots encompassing the Civil Rights Movement were causing mass agitation the nation over. The KGB imagined that they could misuse this and aggravate it by initiating ill will or through and through savagery between racial gatherings in the US.The plan, called Operation PANDORA, started with the KGB spreading counterfeit flyers that had all the earmarks of being from the Jewish Defense League, a conservative Jewish political association currently characterized by the FBI as a fear based oppressor association. The flyers, which were really written by the KGB, guaranteed that dark Americans were assaulting Jews and plundering Jewish-possessed shops in New York. The phony handouts begged their perusers to battle against “dark crossbreeds.” The KGB at that point sent these enemy of dark flyers to dark activist gatherings, trusting it would mix hostile to Semitism operating at a profit associations, if not altogether violence.Concurrently, the KGB was additionally sending counterfeit letters to dark aggressor bunches which guaranteed that the Jewish Defense League had been focusing on and assaulting blacks in America. The letters beseeched the dark activists to assault the Jewish Defense League in reprisal. The Jewish Defense League’s pioneer, Meir Kahane, was killed a year later, however the demonstration was done by an Arabic man who was apparently detached to any dark activist groups.As some portion of their activity to mix racial agitation, the KGB additionally wanted to explode a dark school. After the school was besieged with a planted dangerous gadget, the KGB intended to make unknown calls to a progression of dark associations and guarantee that the Jewish Defense group had been behind the bombarding.

3 The Project To Kill Josip Broz Tito

Josip Broz Tito, a Yugoslavian leaders letter to Stalin.. Boss 100 ...

In spite of the fact that he was a socialist himself, Yugoslavia’s head of state Josip Broz Tito shockingly pulled in the rage of the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin specifically. Looking to make Yugoslavia increasingly autonomous and confident, Tito removed himself from both the United States and the USSR in a harsh clash known as the Tito-Stalin Split.Because of this, Stalin needed Tito to be killed and gotten the ancestor to the KGB, the MGB, to proceed with it. The USSR’s best mystery specialist was doled out to do Tito’s death. He had recently killed another adversary of Stalin’s—Leon Trotsky. Tito, in any case, supernaturally endure the death endeavors unscathed.In reaction to the death plots, Tito sent an admonition to Stalin: “Quit sending individuals to slaughter me. We’ve just caught five of them, one of them with a bomb and another with a rifle.” Tito likewise kept in touch with Stalin: “On the off chance that you don’t quit sending executioners, I’ll send one to Moscow and I won’t need to send a second.”When the MGB’s progressively regular death plots neglected to kill Tito, they got devilishly imaginative. They at that point attempted to kill him with his very own plague. They exceptionally structured a dangerous microscopic organisms and intended to discharge the plague at a political gathering that Tito would join in. Everybody in the room would have been slaughtered by the plague expect for the KGB specialist who was directing it, as he would have been inoculated beforehand.The KGB additionally planned a toxic substance gem box to attempt to execute Tito. The case would have been given to Tito as a blessing, a Trojan pony of sorts, and would discharge a lethal gas that would execute any individual who opened it. Luckily, both toxic substance plans were rarely done, and Tito outlasted Stalin by about 30 years, biting the dust in 1980 at age 87.

2 The Listening Floor

Pay No Attention to the Spies on the 23rd Floor | History ...

During the Cold War, the KGB turned out to be truly adept at pestering structures and tuning in on discussions. Truth be told, they were so acceptable at such listening in that they once pester a whole floor of a lodging with sound reconnaissance receivers . . . for 20 years.In the mid 1970s, the travel industry started to thrive in the Soviet satellite nation of Estonia. The USSR considered it to be a chance to carry cash into the battling economy, and the KGB considered it to be a chance to keep an eye on outsiders. In 1972, the KGB assumed control over the highest floor of Hotel Viru in Estonia and wired the vast majority of the lodging with modern sound observation gadgets. The lodging was in a zone that was as often as possible went by universal businessmen.Sixty rooms in the inn were for all time set up with mystery mouthpieces, and different rooms could be irritated immediately. Outwardly, Hotel Viru seemed to have 22 stories. In truth, it had the mystery 23rd floor, which housed KGB specialists and the innovation that they used to keep an eye on the entirety of the visitors at the lodging. The KGB stayed there for two decades, until the breakdown of the Soviet Union shut down the reconnaissance activity in 1991.The KGB has been found to have been utilizing staggeringly advanced sound observation innovation in structures far and wide. In 1945, a gathering of Soviet kids introduced the US envoy to the USSR a blessing, a cut wooden plaque of the Great Seal of the United States, as a demonstration of companionship between the two nations. Notwithstanding, the plaque contained a mystery receiver. Indeed, this bug was one of the main sound observation gadgets to utilize inactive innovation to transmit sound signs, making it imperceptible by customary strategies and permitting it to be utilized for an all-inclusive time of time.The irritated plaque permitted the KGB to tune in on discussions in the American minister’s office for almost seven years, until it was inadvertently recognized in 1952 by a British radio administrator. The radio administrator was confounded when he heard discussions between Americans originating from a radio channel close to the international safe haven. That radio channel was being utilized by the KGB to tune in on the private discussions.

1 The Financing Of Terrorism


After Yasir Arafat rose to control at the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), he built up a coalition with the KGB. The KGB at that point started to give mystery preparing to the PLO’s aggressors, who were waging war to savagely accomplish Palestinian statehood. Notwithstanding preparing, the KGB started to dispatch arms to the PLO guerrillas disregarding the ban put upon the Palestinian territories.Around this time, the PLO was completing numerous demonstrations of psychological warfare. In 1969 alone, they performed 82 carrier hijackings around the globe. The head of outside knowledge for the KGB, Aleksandr Sakharovsky, asserted that “plane seizing is my own invention.”The KGB likewise financed another Palestinian aggressor gathering, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLPF), providing them with rocket washes and automatic rifles. A pioneer of the PLPF, Wadie Haddad, was uncovered to be a KGB operator. While Haddad was accountable for the PLPF, he did different hijackings of regular citizen planes. One of those hijackings, the Dawson’s Field Hijackings of 1970, incited what’s known as Black September in Jordan, a wicked common war that kept going from September 1970 until July 1971.The KGB purportedly gave 100 assault rifles, programmed rifles, guns, and ammo to the Official Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1972. The Irish paramilitary gathering introduced probably the most savage demonstrations of viciousness and psychological warfare in the Northern Irish clash known as the Troubles. One explanation that the KGB and USSR looked into the IRA was on the grounds that they had turned Marxist and had started to help transforming Ireland into a socialist state.