Month: October 2012
Crying Freeman – Full Movie
Crying Freeman is a 1995 French and Canadian produced action film, directed by Christophe Gans, based on the “Portrait of a Killer” arc of the best-selling manga of the same name by Kazuo Koike and Ryoichi Ikegami.
Despite being heavily promoted by Viz Media on Animerica magazine and reprints of the Crying Freeman graphic novel, the film was never released in the United States.
A lethal assassin for a secret Chinese organisation, who sheds tears of regret each time he kills, is seen swiftly and mercilessly executing three Yakuza gangsters by a beautiful artist. She is captivated by the grace of his kill and later falls in love with him. An intense power struggle for the leadership of the Yakuza Clans ensues as they seek vengeance for the death of their leader. They soon realise the fatal mistake of underestimating the deadly skills of the Crying Freeman.
Starring;
Mark Dacascos
Julie Condra
Tchéky Karyo
Byron Mann
Yoko Shimada
Masaya Kato
Rae Dawn Chong
Mako
Secrecy News – Intelligence Spending drops for a second year
For the second year in a row and for only the second time in the post-9/11 era, total intelligence spending declined last year to $75.4 billion, according to figures released yesterday by the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense. http://www.fas.org/irp/budget/index.html Total spending had peaked in FY2010 at $80.1 billion, and declined in FY2011 to $78.6 billion. "We are looking at some pretty steep budget cuts across the board in the Intelligence Community," DNI James Clapper told the Senate Intelligence Committee last January. "Never before has the Intelligence Community been called upon to master such complexity on so many issues in such a resource-constrained environment," he said then. "We're rising to the challenge by continuing to integrate the Intelligence Community, ... taking advantage of new technologies, implementing new efficiencies, and, as always, simply working hard. But, candidly, maintaining the world's premier intelligence enterprise in the face of shrinking budgets will be difficult. We'll be accepting and managing risk more so than we've had to do in the last decade." http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/threat.pdf But while intelligence budgets are shrinking, they remain very high by historical standards, having more than doubled over the past decade. Total intelligence spending is comprised of two budget constructs: the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The large defense intelligence agencies -- including NSA, NRO, and NGA -- receive funding through both budget programs. For the first time ever in FY2012, both the budget request for the NIP ($55 billion) and the subsequent budget appropriation ($53.9 billion) have been disclosed. (The MIP request was disclosed for FY2013, but not for FY2012.) This is something of a breakthrough in intelligence classification policy. Hypothetically (or so it was long asserted), a hostile intelligence analyst could derive valuable insight from the gap between each year's budget appropriation, or between the appropriation and the request, to the detriment of U.S. security. "Disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security in several ways," wrote Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet in 1999 in a successful effort to keep the budget secret at that time. "First, disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of its intelligence capabilities and weaknesses. The difference between the appropriation for one year and the Administration's budget request for the next provides a measure of the Administration's unique, critical assessment of its own intelligence programs. A requested budget decrease reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are more than adequate to meet the national security needs of the United States. A requested budget increase reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are insufficient to meet our national security needs. A budget request with no change in spending reflects a decision that existing programs are just adequate to meet our needs." http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/tenet499.html But this longstanding official position has now lost any semblance of cogency. "In my view, this argument does not stand up to even a few minutes of serious analysis," wrote former 9/11 Commission executive director (and Romney campaign adviser) Philip Zelikow in the latest issue of the CIA journal Studies in Intelligence. But with serious analysis evidently in short supply, total intelligence budget secrecy remained the norm for many decades until recently. _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood@fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood
Wie die “GoMoPa”-Fälschungen die eigentlichen Täter enttarnen
ANONYME STASI-SCHEI**HAUS-FLIEGEN – NOMEN EST OMEN
Liebe Leser,
trotz serienmässiger Vorstrafen wegen Betruges und der zahlreicher anderer LKA, Kripo-,FBI-Ermittlungen werden die organisierten GoMoPa-STASI-Gangster Ihre unwahren Lügen gegen mich nicht löschen und stellen diese immer wieder neu ins Netz: Kein Wunder, denn ich habe die Verbrechen dieser organisierten Kriminellen aufgedeckt und werde dies weiter tun – im Interesse aller anständigen Mitglieder der menschlichen Gesellschaft !
Wie dumm diese STASI-Verbrecher zeigt sich in deren eigenen Texten: “Wie kann ein Magister eine Diplomarbeit schreiben” ? – wie in deren “Shithouse Fly Blog auf mich falsch dargelegt und natürlich haben die STASI-Kriminellen nicht den Hauch eines Beweises für irgendeine Behauptung – wir dagegen jede Menge und auch jede Menge Aktenzeichen gegen sie:
Zum Beispiel:
Klaus Maurischat ( Aktenzeichen Krefeld vom 24. April 2006; AZ: 28 Ls 85/05 – Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05, Klaus Maurischat, Lange Straße 38, 27313 Dörverden)
FAKT IST: Klaus Maurischat ist vorbestraft
Aktenzeichen Krefeld vom 24. April 2006; AZ: 28 Ls 85/05 – Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05, Klaus Maurischat, Lange Straße 38, 27313 Dörverden)
Sie wollen mich zwingen, mit ihren Lügen meine Berichterstattung gegen sie einzustellen – wie hier ersichtlich:
So wollte der Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat uns zwingen, die Berichterstattung über “GoMoPa” zu stoppen
Unser Bildtext: Klaus Maurischat: There is no Place like home
So wollte der Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat uns zwingen die Berichterstattung über den “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa” einzustellen
Meine Anmerkung: Sie lesen
den Original-Text mit den Original-Rechtschreibfehlern von Maurischat in chronologischer Reihenfolge von unten nach oben. “Unter den Linden” ist die Regus-Tarnadresse für den untergetauchten Serienbetrüger und Stasi-Ganoven. “SUMA” steht im Sprach-Jargon des “GoMoPa”-”NACHRICHTENDIENSTLERS” für Suchmaschine.
Zitat:
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)
> Was anderes fällt einem Hilfsschüler auch nicht ein! Wenn ich dich
> schnappe, dann haue ich dir die Fresse ein – mein Lieber! Merk dir
> das gut, du Kinderficker!
>
> Was sagt denn dein Freund Dr. XXX zu deinem handeln, Schwuchtel?
>
> > HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)
> >
> > > Geiles Google Suchergebniss hast du mittlerweile. Das ist sowas von
> > > geil. Am besten ist dieser Beitrag zu Deiner Magisterarbeit, du
> > > Spinner:
> > >
> > > http://scheisshausfliege.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/die-diplomarbeit-des-magisters-bernd-pulch-ein-haufen-scheisse/
> > >
> > > Wenn du nicht aufhörst, wird niemand mehr ein Stück Brot von dir
> > > nehmen. Dein Name ist dan absolut durch. Glaub mir, wir verstehen da
> > > mehr von als du Schwachkopf!
> > >
> > > Im Übrigen kannst du mich stets gern persönlich treffen. Unter den
> > > Linden 21, Berlin – habe immer für dich Feigling Zeit! (TARN-ADRESSE)
> > >
> > > So – und nun überle wann du die Artikel über uns löschen willst,
> > > sonst mache ich die erste Seite der SUMA Ergebnisse mit deinen
> > > Einträgen voll.
Weitere Info zu den Verbrechen der organisierten Kriminellen der STASI “GoMoPa” aus Erich Mielkes Kloake auf http://www.victims-opfer.com
Und natürlich können die STASI-“GoMoPa” auch dumm-dreist fälschen:
Sports Illustrated Swimsuit: Marisa Miller Cover Model
TMZ – Paris Hilton Caught in Halloween Brawl!
Charlies Angels (HD) – Full Movie
Die Presselounge der “GoMoPa”-Opfer
TOP-SECRET – California State Prisons Mexican Mafia (La eMe) Membership Chart
The Enforcer – Jet Li – Full Movie
Die absurd-lächerlichen Fälschungen der STASI-“GoMoPa”
Hier sind die Links
TMZ- Kate Upton — Responsible for Tigers’ Blowout Loss?
Fans of the Detroit Tigers are pretty bummed that their team got BLOWN OUT in Game 1… and it probably won’t help their morale to learn that is was all Kate Upton’s fault!!!
Cryptome unveils – NRC Tightens Access to Radioactive Material
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6. Has been convicted of a crime(s) which, in the Reviewing Official's opinion, indicate poor judgment, unreliability, or untrustworthiness. These indicators are not meant to be all inclusive nor intended to be disqualifying factors. Licensees can also consider how recent such indicators occurred and other extenuating or mitigating factors in their determinations. Section 149.c.(2)(B) of the AEA requires that the information obtained as a result of fingerprinting be used solely for the purposes of making a determination as to unescorted access suitability. Unescorted access suitability is not a hiring decision, and the NRC does not intend for licensees to use this guidance as such. Because a particular individual may not be suitable for unescorted access does not necessarily mean that he is not suitable for escorted access or some other position that does not involve NRC-regulated activities. Process To Challenge NRC Denials or Revocations of Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Material 1. Policy. This policy establishes a process for individuals whom NRC licensees nominate [[Page 65231]] as Reviewing Officials to challenge and appeal NRC denials or revocations of access to certain radioactive material. Any individual designated as a licensee Reviewing Official whom the NRC has determined may not have unescorted access to certain radioactive material shall, to the extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to challenge and appeal the NRC's determination. This policy shall not be construed to create a liberty or property interest of any kind in the unescorted access of any individual to certain radioactive material. 2. Applicability. This policy applies solely to those employees of licensees who are designated as a Reviewing Official, and who are thus to be considered by the NRC for initial or continued unescorted access to certain radioactive material in that position. 3. Unescorted Access Determination Criteria. Determinations for granting a designated Reviewing Official unescorted access to certain radioactive material will be made by the NRC staff. Unescorted access shall be denied or revoked whenever it is determined that an individual does not meet the applicable standards. Any doubt about an individual's eligibility for initial or continued unescorted access to certain radioactive material shall be resolved in favor of national security and result in denial or revocation of unescorted access. 4. Procedures to Challenge the Contents of Records Obtained from the FBI. Prior to a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief that an individual designated as a Reviewing Official is denied or revoked unescorted access to certain radioactive material, the individual shall: a. Be provided the contents of records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures include either direct application by the individual challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 C.F.R. Sec. 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the agency that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. b. Be afforded 10 days to initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI criminal history records check (described in (a), above) after the record is made available for the individual's review. If such a challenge is initiated, the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief may make a determination based upon the criminal history record only upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the record. 5. Procedures to Provide Additional Information. Prior to a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief that an individual designated as a Reviewing Official is denied or revoked access to certain radioactive material, the individual shall be afforded an opportunity to submit information relevant to the individual's trustworthiness and reliability. The NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief shall, in writing, notify the individual of this opportunity, and any deadlines for submitting this information. The NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief may make a determination of unescorted access to certain radioactive material only upon receipt of the additional information submitted by the individual, or, if no such information is submitted, when the deadline to submit such information has passed. 6. Procedures to Notify an Individual of the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief Determination to Deny or Revoke Access to Certain Radioactive Material. Upon a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief that an individual nominated as a Reviewing Official is denied or revoked access to certain radioactive material, the individual shall be provided a written explanation of the basis for this determination. 7. Procedures to Appeal an NRC Determination to Deny or Revoke Access to Certain Radioactive Material. Upon a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is denied or revoked access to certain radioactive material, the individual shall be afforded an opportunity to appeal this determination to the Director, Division of Facilities and Security. The determination must be appealed within 20 days of receipt of the written notice of the determination by the Facilities Security Branch Chief, and may either be in writing or in person. Any appeal made in person shall take place at the NRC's headquarters, and shall be at the individual's own expense. The determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, shall be rendered within 60 days after receipt of the appeal. 8. Procedures to Notify an Individual of the Determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, Upon an Appeal. A determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, shall be provided to the individual in writing and include an explanation of the basis for this determination. A determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, to affirm the Facilities Branch Chief's determination to deny or revoke an individual's access to certain radioactive material is final and not subject to further administrative appeals. [FR Doc. 2012-26299 Filed 10-24-12; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P [Federal Register Volume 77, Number 207 (Thursday, October 25, 2012)] [Notices] [Pages 65210-65215] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2012-26292] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2012-0255; EA-12-148] In the Matter of Licensee Identified in Attachment 1 and all Other Persons Who Seek or Obtain Access to Safeguards Information Described Herein; Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards Information (Effective Immediately) I The Licensee identified in Attachment 1\1\ to this Order, holds a license issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission), authorizing them to engage in an activity subject to regulation by the Commission or Agreement States. In accordance with Section 149 of the AEA, fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records check are required of any person who is to be permitted to have access to Safeguards Information (SGI).\2\ The AEA permits the Commission by rule to except certain categories of individuals from the fingerprinting requirement, which the Commission has done (see 10 CFR 73.59, 71 FR 33989; June 13, 2006). Individuals relieved from fingerprinting and criminal history records checks [[Page 65211]] under the relief rule include Federal, State, and local officials and law enforcement personnel; Agreement State inspectors who conduct security inspections on behalf of the NRC; members of Congress and certain employees of members of Congress or Congressional Committees, and representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or certain foreign government organizations. In addition, individuals who have a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within the last five (5) years, or individuals who have active Federal security clearances (provided in either case that they make available the appropriate documentation), have satisfied the AEA fingerprinting requirement and need not be fingerprinted again. Therefore, in accordance with Section 149 of the AEA the Commission is imposing additional requirements for access to SGI, as set forth by this Order, so that affected licensees can obtain and grant access to SGI. This Order also imposes requirements for access to SGI by any person, from any person,\3\ whether or not a Licensee, Applicant, or Certificate Holder of the Commission or Agreement States. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be released to the public. \2\ Safeguards Information is a form of sensitive, unclassified, security-related information that the Commission has the authority to designate and protect under section 147 of the AEA. \3\ Person means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government agency other than the Commission or the Department of Energy, except that the Department of Energy shall be considered a person with respect to those facilities of the Department of Energy specified in section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1244), any State or any political subdivision of, or any political entity within a State, any foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of any such government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- II The Commission has broad statutory authority to protect and prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of SGI. Section 147 of the AEA grants the Commission explicit authority to issue such Orders as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of SGI. Furthermore, Section 149 of the AEA requires fingerprinting and an FBI identification and a criminal history records check of each individual who seeks access to SGI. In addition, no person may have access to SGI unless the person has an established need-to-know the information and satisfies the trustworthy and reliability requirements described in Attachment 3 to Order EA-12-147. In order to provide assurance that the Licensee identified in Attachment 1 to this Order is implementing appropriate measures to comply with the fingerprinting and criminal history records check requirements for access to SGI, the Licensee identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall implement the requirements of this Order. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that in light of the common defense and security matters identified above, which warrant the issuance of this Order, the public health, safety and interest require that this Order be effective immediately. III Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Parts 30 and 73, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that the licensee identified in attachment 1 to this order and all other persons who seek or obtain access to safeguards information, as described above, shall comply with the requirements set forth in this order. A. 1. No person may have access to SGI unless that person has a need-to-know the SGI, has been fingerprinted or who has a favorably- decided FBI identification and criminal history records check, and satisfies all other applicable requirements for access to SGI. Fingerprinting and the FBI identification and criminal history records check are not required, however, for any person who is relieved from that requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 (71 Fed. Reg. 33,989 (June 13, 2006)), or who has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within the last five (5) years, or who has an active Federal security clearance, provided in the latter two cases that the appropriate documentation is made available to the Licensee's NRC- approved reviewing official described in paragraph III.C.2 of this Order. 2. No person may have access to any SGI if the NRC has determined, based on fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records check, that the person may not have access to SGI. B. No person may provide SGI to any other person except in accordance with Condition III.A. above. Prior to providing SGI to any person, a copy of this Order shall be provided to that person. C. The Licensee identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall comply with the following requirements: 1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, establish and maintain a fingerprinting program that meets the requirements of Attachment 2 to this Order. 2. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, submit the fingerprints of one (1) individual who a) the Licensee nominates as the ``reviewing official'' for determining access to SGI by other individuals, and b) has an established need-to-know the information and has been determined to be trustworthy and reliable in accordance with the requirements described in Attachment 3 to Order EA- 12-147. The NRC will determine whether this individual (or any subsequent reviewing official) may have access to SGI and, therefore, will be permitted to serve as the Licensee's reviewing official.\4\ The Licensee may, at the same time or later, submit the fingerprints of other individuals to whom the Licensee seeks to grant access to SGI or designate an additional reviewing official(s). Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with the procedures described in Attachment 2 of this Order. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ The NRC's determination of this individual's access to SGI in accordance with the process described in Enclosure 5 to the transmittal letter of this Order is an administrative determination that is outside the scope of this Order. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. The Licensee shall, in writing, within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if it is unable to comply with any of the requirements described in this Order, including Attachment 2 to this Order, or (2) if compliance with any of the requirements is unnecessary in its specific circumstances. The notification shall provide the Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or variation of any specific requirement. Licensee responses to C.1., C.2., and C.3. above shall be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. In addition, Licensee responses shall be marked as ``Security-Related Information--Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390.'' The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good cause by the Licensee. IV In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this Order within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. In addition, the Licensee and any other person adversely affected by this Order may request a hearing of this Order within twenty (20) days of the [[Page 65212]] date of the Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made, in writing, to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. If the answer includes a request for a hearing, it shall, under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which the Licensee relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d). All documents filed in the NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in accordance with the procedures described below. To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic docket. Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/ e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance in using unlisted software. If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance available on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e- submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document via the E-Filing system. A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E- Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays. Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from use of E-Filing no longer exists. Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the [[Page 65213]] adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in their submission. If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to requesting a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or error. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been received. AN ANSWER OR A REQUEST FOR HEARING SHALL NOT STAY THE IMMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ORDER. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of October, 2012. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mark A. Satorius, Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs. Attachment 1: Applicable Materials Licensees Redacted Attachment 2: Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official is Determining Access to Safeguards Information General Requirements Licensees shall comply with the requirements of this attachment. A. 1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment shall fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted access to Safeguards Information (SGI). The Licensee shall review and use the information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained in the subject Order and this attachment are satisfied. 2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' section of this attachment. 3. Fingerprints need not be taken if an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting requirement by 10 CFR 73.59, has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within the last five (5) years, or has an active Federal security clearance. Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which granted the Federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history records check must be provided. The Licensee must retain this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the date the individual no longer requires access to SGI associated with the Licensee's activities. 4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this Order must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI. 5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the FBI and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and reliability requirements included in Attachment 3 to NRC Order EA- 08-161, in making a determination whether to grant access to SGI to individuals who have a need-to-know the SGI. 6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an individual's suitability for access to SGI. 7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination whether to grant access to SGI. B. The Licensee shall notify the NRC of any desired change in reviewing officials. The NRC will determine whether the individual nominated as the new reviewing official may have access to SGI based on a previously-obtained or new criminal history check and, therefore, will be permitted to serve as the Licensee's reviewing official. Prohibitions A Licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an individual access to SGI solely on the basis of information received from the FBI involving: An arrest more than one (1) year old for which there is no information of the disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal. A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use the information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age. Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees shall, using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed, legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual seeking access to Safeguards Information, to the Director of the Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of the Division's Criminal History Check Section. Copies of these forms may be obtained by writing the Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555- 0001, by calling 301-415-7232, or by email to forms.resource@nrc.gov. Practicable alternative formats are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The Licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible or incomplete cards. The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness. Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one re-submission if the initial submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified. The one free re-submission must have the FBI Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as initial submittals and will require a second payment of the processing fee. Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. Licensees shall submit payment with the application for processing fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check, or money order, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at 301-415-7404.] Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The application fee (currently $36) is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by the NRC on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify Licensees who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes. The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's application(s) for criminal history records checks, including the FBI fingerprint record. Right To Correct and Complete Information Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall make available to the individual the contents of any criminal records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of one (1) year from the date of the notification. If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures include either direct application by the individual challenging the record to [[Page 65214]] the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the agency that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an individual to initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI criminal history records check after the record is made available for his/her review. The Licensee may make a final SGI access determination based upon the criminal history record only upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the record. Upon a final adverse determination on access to SGI, the Licensee shall provide the individual its documented basis for denial. Access to SGI shall not be granted to an individual during the review process. Protection of Information 1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal information from unauthorized disclosure. 2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining access to Safeguards Information. No individual authorized to have access to the information may re- disseminate the information to any other individual who does not have a need-to-know. 3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if the Licensee holding the criminal history record check receives the individual's written request to re-disseminate the information contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for identification purposes. 4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under this section, available for examination by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws. 5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file has been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of employment or determination of access to SGI (whether access was approved or denied). After the required three (3) year period, these documents shall be destroyed by a method that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or in part. Guidance for Licensee's Evaluation of Access to Safeguards Information With the Inclusion of Criminal History Records (Fingerprint) Checks When a Licensee submits fingerprints to the NRC pursuant to an NRC Order, it will receive a criminal history summary of information, provided in Federal records, since the individual's eighteenth birthday. Individuals retain the right to correct and complete information and to initiate challenge procedures described in Attachment 2 of Enclosure 1. The Licensee will receive the information from the criminal history records check of those individuals requiring access to Safeguards Information, and the reviewing official should evaluate that information using the guidance below. Furthermore, the requirements of all Orders which apply to the information and material to which access is being granted must be met. The Licensee's reviewing official is required to evaluate all pertinent and available information in making a determination of access to SGI, including the criminal history information pertaining to the individual as required by the NRC Order. The criminal history records check is used in the determination of whether the individual has a record of criminal activity that indicates that the individual should not have access to SGI. Each determination of access to SGI, which includes a review of criminal history information, must be documented to include the basis for the decision made. (i) If negative information is discovered that was not provided by the individual, or which is different in any material respect from the information provided by the individual, this information should be considered, and decisions made based on these findings, must be documented. (ii) Any record containing a pattern of behaviors which indicates that the behaviors could be expected to recur or continue, or recent behaviors which cast questions on whether an individual should have access to SGI, should be carefully evaluated prior to any authorization of access to SGI. It is necessary for a Licensee to resubmit fingerprints only under two conditions: (1) the FBI has determined that the fingerprints cannot be classified due to poor quality in the mechanics of taking the initial impressions; or (2) the initial submission has been lost. If the FBI advises that six sets of fingerprints are unclassifiable based on conditions other than poor quality, the licensee may submit a request to NRC for alternatives. When those search results are received from the FBI, no further search is necessary. Process To Challenge NRC Denials or Revocations of Access to Safeguards Information 1. Policy. This policy establishes a process for individuals whom NRC licensees nominate as reviewing officials to challenge and appeal NRC denials or revocations of access to Safeguards Information (SGI). Any individual nominated as a licensee reviewing official whom the NRC has determined may not have access to SGI shall, to the extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to challenge and appeal the NRC's determination. This policy shall not be construed to require the disclosure of SGI to any person, nor shall it be construed to create a liberty or property interest of any kind in the access of any individual to SGI. 2. Applicability. This policy applies solely to those employees of licensees who are nominated as a reviewing official, and who are thus to be considered by the NRC for initial or continued access to SGI in that position. 3. SGI Access Determination Criteria. Determinations for granting a nominated reviewing official access to SGI will be made by the NRC staff. Access to SGI shall be denied or revoked whenever it is determined that an individual does not meet the applicable standards. Any doubt about an individual's eligibility for initial or continued access to SGI shall be resolved in favor of the national security and access will be denied or revoked. 4. Procedures to Challenge the Contents of Records Obtained from the FBI. a. Prior to a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is denied or revoked access to SGI, the individual shall: (i) Be provided the contents of records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures include either direct application by the individual challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the agency that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. (ii) Be afforded 10 days to initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI criminal history records check (described in (i), above) after the record is made available for the individual's review. If such a challenge is initiated, the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief may make a determination based upon the criminal history record only upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the record. 5. Procedures to Provide Additional Information. [[Page 65215]] a. Prior to a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is denied or revoked access to SGI, the individual shall: (i) Be afforded an opportunity to submit information relevant to the individual's trustworthiness and reliability. The NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief shall, in writing, notify the individual of this opportunity, and any deadlines for submitting this information. The NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief may make a determination of access to SGI only upon receipt of the additional information submitted by the individual, or, if no such information is submitted, when the deadline to submit such information has passed. 6. Procedures to Notify an Individual of the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief Determination to Deny or Revoke Access to SGI. a. Upon a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is denied or revoked access to SGI, the individual shall be provided a written explanation of the basis for this determination. 7. Procedures to Appeal an NRC Determination to Deny or Revoke Access to SGI. a. Upon a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is denied or revoked access to SGI, the individual shall be afforded an opportunity to appeal this determination to the Director, Division of Facilities and Security. The determination must be appealed within 20 days of receipt of the written notice of the determination by the Facilities Security Branch Chief, and may either be in writing or in person. Any appeal made in person shall take place at the NRC's headquarters, and shall be at the individual's own expense. The determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, shall be rendered within 60 days after receipt of the appeal. 8. Procedures to Notify an Individual of the Determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, Upon an Appeal. a. A determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, shall be provided to the individual in writing and include an explanation of the basis for this determination. A determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, to affirm the Facilities Branch Chief's determination to deny or revoke an individual's access to SGI is final and not subject to further administrative appeals. [FR Doc. 2012-26292 Filed 10-24-12; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P [Federal Register Volume 77, Number 207 (Thursday, October 25, 2012)] [Notices] [Pages 65215-65220] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2012-26288] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2012-0254; EA-12-147] In the Matter of Licensee Identified in Attachment 1 and all Other Persons Who Obtain Safeguards Information Described Herein; Order Imposing Requirements for the Protection of Certain Safeguards Information (Effective Immediately) I The Licensee, identified in Attachment 1 \1\ to this Order, holds a license issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, (AEA) by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission), authorizing it to possess, use, and transfer items containing radioactive material quantities of concern. The NRC intends to issue a security Order to this Licensee in the near future. The Order will require compliance with specific Additional Security Measures to enhance the security for certain radioactive material quantities of concern. The Commission has determined that these documents will contain Safeguards Information, will not be released to the public, and must be protected from unauthorized disclosure. Therefore, the Commission is imposing the requirements, as set forth in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order and in Order EA-12-148, so that the Licensee can receive these documents. This Order also imposes requirements for the protection of Safeguards Information in the hands of any person,\2\ whether or not a licensee of the Commission, who produces, receives, or acquires Safeguards Information. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be released to the public. \2\ Person means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government agency other than the Commission or the Department of Energy, except that the Department of Energy shall be considered a person with respect to those facilities of the Department of Energy specified in section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1244), any State or any political subdivision of, or any political entity within a State, any foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of any such government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- II The Commission has broad statutory authority to protect and prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information. Section 147 of the AEA grants the Commission explicit authority to ``* * * issue such orders, as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of safeguards information * * *.'' This authority extends to information concerning the security measures for the physical protection of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material. Licensees and all persons who produce, receive, or acquire Safeguards Information must ensure proper handling and protection of Safeguards Information to avoid unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the specific requirements for the protection of Safeguards Information contained in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order. The Commission hereby provides notice that it intends to treat violations of the requirements contained in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order, applicable to the handling and unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information, as serious breaches of adequate protection of the public health and safety and the common defense and security of the United States. Access to Safeguards Information is limited to those persons who have established the need-to-know the information and are considered to be trustworthy and reliable, and meet the requirements of Order EA-12- 148. A need-to-know means a determination by a person having responsibility for protecting Safeguards Information that a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards Information is necessary in the performance of official, contractual, or licensee duties of employment. The Licensee and all other persons who obtain Safeguards Information must ensure that they develop, maintain and implement strict policies and procedures for the proper handling of Safeguards Information to prevent unauthorized disclosure, in accordance with the requirements in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order. The Licensee must ensure that all contractors whose employees may have access to Safeguards Information either adhere to the Licensee's policies and procedures on Safeguards Information or develop, or maintain and implement their own acceptable policies and procedures. The Licensee remains responsible for the conduct of their contractors. The policies and procedures necessary to ensure compliance with applicable requirements contained in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order must address, at a minimum, the following: the general performance requirement that each person who produces, receives, or acquires Safeguards Information shall ensure that Safeguards Information is protected against unauthorized disclosure; protection of Safeguards Information at fixed sites, in use and in storage, and while in transit; correspondence containing Safeguards [[Page 65216]] Information; access to Safeguards Information; preparation, marking, reproduction and destruction of documents; external transmission of documents; use of automatic data processing systems; removal of the Safeguards Information category; the need-to-know the information; and background checks to determine access to the information. In order to provide assurance that the Licensee is implementing prudent measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information, the Licensee shall implement the requirements identified in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order. In addition, pursuant to Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order, I find that in light of the common defense and security matters identified above, which warrant the issuance of this Order, the public health, safety and interest require that this Order be effective immediately. III Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 147, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Part 30, 10 CFR Part 32, 10 CFR Part 35, 10 CFR Part 70, and 10 CFR Part 73, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that the licensee identified in attachment 1 to this order and all other persons who produce, receive, or acquire the additional security measures identified above (whether draft or final) or any related safeguards information shall comply with the requirements of attachments 2 and 3. The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good cause by the Licensee. IV In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this Order within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. In addition, the Licensee and any other person adversely affected by this Order may request a hearing of this Order within twenty (20) days of the date of the Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made, in writing, to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. If the answer includes a request for a hearing, it shall, under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which the Licensee relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d). Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee or any other person adversely affected by this Order may, in addition to requesting a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, ungrounded allegations or error. All documents filed in the NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in accordance with the procedures described below. To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic docket. Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/ e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance in using unlisted software. If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance available on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/ e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative) must [[Page 65217]] apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document via the E-Filing system. A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E- Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays. Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from use of E-Filing no longer exists. Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at http://ehd1.nrc.gov/EHD/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in their submission. If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to requesting a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or error. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of October, 2012. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mark A. Satorius, Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs. Attachment 1: Applicable Materials Licensees Redacted Attachment 2--Modified Handling Requirements for the Protection of Certain Safeguards Information (SGI-M) General Requirement Information and material that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determines are safeguards information must be protected from unauthorized disclosure. In order to distinguish information needing modified protection requirements from the safeguards information for reactors and fuel cycle facilities that require a higher level of protection, the term ``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' (SGI-M) is being used as the distinguishing marking for certain materials licensees. Each person who produces, receives, or acquires SGI-M shall ensure that it is protected against unauthorized disclosure. To meet this requirement, licensees and persons shall establish and maintain an information protection system that includes the measures specified below. Information protection procedures employed by State and local police forces are deemed to meet these requirements. Persons Subject to These Requirements Any person, whether or not a licensee of the NRC, who produces, receives, or acquires SGI-M is subject to the requirements (and sanctions) of this document. Firms and their employees that supply services or equipment to materials licensees would fall under this requirement if they possess facility SGI-M. A licensee must inform contractors and suppliers of the existence of these requirements and the need for proper protection. (See more under Conditions for Access) State or local police units who have access to SGI-M are also subject to these requirements. However, these organizations are deemed to have adequate information protection systems. The conditions for transfer of information to a third party, i.e., need-to-know, would still apply to the police organization as would sanctions for unlawful disclosure. Again, it would be prudent for licensees who have arrangements with local police to advise them of the existence of these requirements. Criminal and Civil Sanctions The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, explicitly provides that any person, ``whether or not a licensee of the Commission, who violates any regulations adopted under this section shall be subject to the civil monetary penalties of section 234 of this Act.'' Furthermore, willful violation of any regulation or order governing safeguards information is a felony subject to criminal penalties in the form of fines or imprisonment, or both. See sections 147b. and 223 of the Act. Conditions for Access Access to SGI-M beyond the initial recipients of the order will be governed by the background check requirements imposed by the order. Access to SGI-M by licensee employees, agents, or contractors must include both an appropriate need-to-know determination by the licensee, as well as a determination concerning the trustworthiness of individuals having access to the information. Employees of an organization affiliated with the licensee's company (e.g., a parent company), may be considered as [[Page 65218]] employees of the licensee for access purposes. Need-to-Know Need-to-know is defined as a determination by a person having responsibility for protecting SGI-M that a proposed recipient's access to SGI-M is necessary in the performance of official, contractual, or licensee duties of employment. The recipient should be made aware that the information is SGI-M and those having access to it are subject to these requirements as well as criminal and civil sanctions for mishandling the information. Occupational Groups Dissemination of SGI-M is limited to individuals who have an established need-to-know and who are members of certain occupational groups. These occupational groups are: A. An employee, agent, or contractor of an applicant, a licensee, the Commission, or the United States Government; B. A member of a duly authorized committee of the Congress; C. The Governor of a State or his designated representative; D. A representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement who has been certified by the NRC; E. A member of a State or local law enforcement authority that is responsible for responding to requests for assistance during safeguards emergencies; or F. A person to whom disclosure is ordered pursuant to Section 2.744(e) of Part 2 of Part 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. G. State Radiation Control Program Directors (and State Homeland Security Directors) or their designees. In a generic sense, the individuals described above in (A) through (G) are considered to be trustworthy by virtue of their employment status. For non-governmental individuals in group (A) above, a determination of reliability and trustworthiness is required. Discretion must be exercised in granting access to these individuals. If there is any indication that the recipient would be unwilling or unable to provide proper protection for the SGI-M, they are not authorized to receive SGI-M. Information Considered for Safeguards Information Designation Information deemed SGI-M is information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage of materials or facilities subject to NRC jurisdiction. SGI-M identifies safeguards information which is subject to these requirements. These requirements are necessary in order to protect quantities of nuclear material significant to the health and safety of the public or common defense and security. The overall measure for consideration of SGI-M is the usefulness of the information (security or otherwise) to an adversary in planning or attempting a malevolent act. The specificity of the information increases the likelihood that it will be useful to an adversary. Protection While in Use While in use, SGI-M shall be under the control of an authorized individual. This requirement is satisfied if the SGI-M is attended by an authorized individual even though the information is in fact not constantly being used. SGI-M, therefore, within alarm stations, continuously manned guard posts or ready rooms need not be locked in file drawers or storage containers. Under certain conditions the general control exercised over security zones or areas would be considered to meet this requirement. The primary consideration is limiting access to those who have a need- to-know. Some examples would be: Alarm stations, guard posts and guard ready rooms; Engineering or drafting areas if visitors are escorted and information is not clearly visible; Plant maintenance areas if access is restricted and information is not clearly visible; Administrative offices (e.g., central records or purchasing) if visitors are escorted and information is not clearly visible. Protection While in Storage While unattended, SGI-M shall be stored in a locked file drawer or container. Knowledge of lock combinations or access to keys protecting SGI-M shall be limited to a minimum number of personnel for operating purposes who have a ``need-to-know'' and are otherwise authorized access to SGI-M in accordance with these requirements. Access to lock combinations or keys shall be strictly controlled so as to prevent disclosure to an unauthorized individual. Transportation of Documents and Other Matter Documents containing SGI-M when transmitted outside an authorized place of use or storage shall be enclosed in two sealed envelopes or wrappers. The inner envelope or wrapper shall contain the name and address of the intended recipient, and be marked both sides, top and bottom with the words ``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling.'' The outer envelope or wrapper must be addressed to the intended recipient, must contain the address of the sender, and must not bear any markings or indication that the document contains SGI-M. SGI-M may be transported by any commercial delivery company that provides nation-wide overnight service with computer tracking features, US first class, registered, express, or certified mail, or by any individual authorized access pursuant to these requirements. Within a facility, SGI-M may be transmitted using a single opaque envelope. It may also be transmitted within a facility without single or double wrapping, provided adequate measures are taken to protect the material against unauthorized disclosure. Individuals transporting SGI-M should retain the documents in their personal possession at all times or ensure that the information is appropriately wrapped and also secured to preclude compromise by an unauthorized individual. Preparation and Marking of Documents While the NRC is the sole authority for determining what specific information may be designated as ``SGI-M,'' originators of documents are responsible for determining whether those documents contain such information. Each document or other matter that contains SGI-M shall be marked ``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' in a conspicuous manner on the top and bottom of the first page to indicate the presence of protected information. The first page of the document must also contain (i) the name, title, and organization of the individual authorized to make a SGI-M determination, and who has determined that the document contains SGI-M, (ii) the date the document was originated or the determination made, (iii) an indication that the document contains SGI-M, and (iv) an indication that unauthorized disclosure would be subject to civil and criminal sanctions. Each additional page shall be marked in a conspicuous fashion at the top and bottom with letters denoting [[Page 65219]] ``Safeguards Information Modified Handling.'' In additional to the ``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' markings at the top and bottom of each page, transmittal letters or memoranda which do not in themselves contain SGI-M shall be marked to indicate that attachments or enclosures contain SGI-M but that the transmittal does not (e.g., ``When separated from SGI-M enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled''). In addition to the information required on the face of the document, each item of correspondence that contains SGI-M shall, by marking or other means, clearly indicate which portions (e.g., paragraphs, pages, or appendices) contain SGI-M and which do not. Portion marking is not required for physical security and safeguards contingency plans. All documents or other matter containing SGI-M in use or storage shall be marked in accordance with these requirements. A specific exception is provided for documents in the possession of contractors and agents of licensees that were produced more than one year prior to the effective date of the order. Such documents need not be marked unless they are removed from file drawers or containers. The same exception applies to old documents stored away from the facility in central files or corporation headquarters. Since information protection procedures employed by state and local police forces are deemed to meet NRC requirements, documents in the possession of these agencies need not be marked as set forth in this document. Removal From SGI-M Category Documents containing SGI-M shall be removed from the SGI-M category (decontrolled) only after the NRC determines that the information no longer meets the criteria of SGI-M. Licensees have the authority to make determinations that specific documents which they created no longer contain SGI-M information and may be decontrolled. Consideration must be exercised to ensure that any document decontrolled shall not disclose SGI-M in some other form or be combined with other unprotected information to disclose SGI-M. The authority to determine that a document may be decontrolled may be exercised only by, or with the permission of, the individual (or office) who made the original determination. The document shall indicate the name and organization of the individual removing the document from the SGI-M category and the date of the removal. Other persons who have the document in their possession should be notified of the decontrolling of the document. Reproduction of Matter Containing SGI-M SGI-M may be reproduced to the minimum extent necessary consistent with need without permission of the originator. Newer digital copiers which scan and retain images of documents represent a potential security concern. If the copier is retaining SGI-M information in memory, the copier cannot be connected to a network. It should also be placed in a location that is cleared and controlled for the authorized processing of SGI-M information. Different copiers have different capabilities, including some which come with features that allow the memory to be erased. Each copier would have to be examined from a physical security perspective. Use of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems SGI-M may be processed or produced on an ADP system provided that the system is assigned to the licensee's or contractor's facility and requires the use of an entry code/password for access to stored information. Licensees are encouraged to process this information in a computing environment that has adequate computer security controls in place to prevent unauthorized access to the information. An ADP system is defined here as a data processing system having the capability of long term storage of SGI-M. Word processors such as typewriters are not subject to the requirements as long as they do not transmit information offsite. (Note: if SGI-M is produced on a typewriter, the ribbon must be removed and stored in the same manner as other SGI-M information or media.) The basic objective of these restrictions is to prevent access and retrieval of stored SGI-M by unauthorized individuals, particularly from remote terminals. Specific files containing SGI-M will be password protected to preclude access by an unauthorized individual. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) maintains a listing of all validated encryption systems at http://csrc.nist.gov/ cryptval/1401/1401val.htm. SGI-M files may be transmitted over a network if the file is encrypted. In such cases, the licensee will select a commercially available encryption system that NIST has validated as conforming to Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). SGI-M files shall be properly labeled as ``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' and saved to removable media and stored in a locked file drawer or cabinet. Telecommunications SGI-M may not be transmitted by unprotected telecommunications circuits except under emergency or extraordinary conditions. For the purpose of this requirement, emergency or extraordinary conditions are defined as any circumstances that require immediate communications in order to report, summon assistance for, or respond to a security event (or an event that has potential security significance). This restriction applies to telephone, telegraph, teletype, facsimile circuits, and to radio. Routine telephone or radio transmission between site security personnel, or between the site and local police, should be limited to message formats or codes that do not disclose facility security features or response procedures. Similarly, call-ins during transport should not disclose information useful to a potential adversary. Infrequent or non-repetitive telephone conversations regarding a physical security plan or program are permitted provided that the discussion is general in nature. Individuals should use care when discussing SGI-M at meetings or in the presence of others to insure that the conversation is not overheard by persons not authorized access. Transcripts, tapes or minutes of meetings or hearings that contain SGI-M shall be marked and protected in accordance with these requirements. Destruction Documents containing SGI-M should be destroyed when no longer needed. They may be destroyed by tearing into small pieces, burning, shredding or any other method that precludes reconstruction by means available to the public at large. Piece sizes one half inch or smaller composed of several pages or documents and thoroughly mixed would be considered completely destroyed. Attachment 3--Trustworthiness and Reliability Requirements for Individuals Handling Safeguards Information In order to ensure the safe handling, use, and control of information designated as Safeguards Information, each licensee shall control and limit access to the information to only those individuals who have established the need-to-know the information, and are considered to be trustworthy and reliable. Licensees shall document the basis for concluding that there is reasonable assurance that individuals [[Page 65220]] granted access to Safeguards Information are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk for malevolent use of the information. The Licensee shall comply with the requirements of this attachment: 1. The trustworthiness and reliability of an individual shall be determined based on a background investigation: (a) The background investigation shall address at least the past three (3) years, and, at a minimum, include verification of employment, education, and personal references. The licensee shall also, to the extent possible, obtain independent information to corroborate that provided by the employee (i.e., seeking references not supplied by the individual). (b.) If an individual's employment has been less than the required three (3) year period, educational references may be used in lieu of employment history. The licensee's background investigation requirements may be satisfied for an individual that has an active Federal security clearance. 2. The licensee shall retain documentation regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of individual employees for three years after the individual's employment ends. In order for an individual to be granted access to Safeguards Information, the individual must be determined to be trustworthy and reliable, as describe in requirement 1 above, and meet the requirements of NRC Order EA-12-148. DG-SGI-1, Designation Guide for Safeguards Information Redacted [FR Doc. 2012-26288 Filed 10-24-12; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P |
Jet Li – Born To Defense – Full Movie
TOP-SECRET-U.S. Special Operations Command Terms of Reference
This directive provides Terms of Reference (TOR) for United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC); Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM); Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC), and Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). The TOR for Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is addressed in SM 801-88, JSOC Charter.
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FEMEN storm the French Ministry of Justice – Video – UNCUT and UNCENSORED
DER BEWEIS AUS DEM JAHR 2000: SO REGTE GRUNER und JAHR-TOCHTER, IPV, MICH AN, DEN TITEL “INVESTMENT” ZU LANCIEREN
TOP-SECRET – US National Spy Budget FY2013: $52.6 Billion
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Rob-B-Hood – Jackie Chan – Full Movie
TOP-SECRET – U.S. Marine Corps Infantry Battalion Operations in Afghanistan
The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Task Force 2/7) deployed to southern Afghanistan from April to October 2008, on short notice in order to fill a critical request for forces in support of U.S. Central Command.
Bottom Line Up Front: The mission of training and mentoring Afghani police was complicated by (1) the need to establish and occupy nine forward operating bases (FOBs) spread over an area of approximately 28,700 square kilometers, while (2) simultaneously maintaining a level of security that (3) permitted identification of suitable candidates for police and training them, since a police force did not exist yet in the areas in which 2/7 operated and (4) accomplishing this without any established support network. The operational environment was more kinetic and austere than conditions generally experienced by recent veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Companies and platoons were widely dispersed and follow-on units deploying to such areas in Afghanistan must be prepared to operate in a semi-autonomous manner. Training and organization need to be tailored to those conditions and their specific area of operations (AO), and consideration should be given to the proven utility of the MAGTF in such an environment. Battalion operations were viewed as effective in establishing a foundation for follow-on units in the following areas: FOB construction, logistics processes, communications infrastructure, initiation of civil military operations, a mentoring and training process, and disrupting insurgent control of areas previously unoccupied by coalition forces.
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Police mentoring and training efforts were hampered by ongoing anti-coalition activities. “It’s like doing Fallujah before Al Fajr. We’re in the midst of it and trying to fight Taliban while doing civil-military operations (CMO) and while trying to train police and mentor them, because they’re learning as they go. You’re doing everything concurrently. The mantra is ‘clear, hold, build.’ We’re trying to do it all at the same time. …We should be clearing. … certainly to a point of creating a stable, more secured, environment. When you bring in a police force, that’s the building piece. When you’re doing CMO, that’s building, but you’ve got to hold your ground. We don’t really hold much ground outside of our FOB. We go out there and influence it. We disrupt, but we don’t hold it. And the reason we don’t hold it is because we haven’t cleared it, and by providing that security buffer through clearing and then establishing the security footprint to hold it, you’re more able to effectively build. However, during that transition piece, you’re going to get the willing assistance of the people themselves. … I use the term, ‘turning four into forty’, and a four-man fire team now become 40 local citizens in addition to them, that’s now enabling security and taking an interest in their own prosperity.”
The command relationship for 2/7 was in line with their mentoring mission, which placed them under Afghan Regional Security Integration Command (ARSIC) who is under TF Phoenix which reported to CSTC-A, who in turn reported to CENTCOM. This command structure was outside International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) control. Most of the warfighting capabilities in Afghanistan resided with ISAF, which reported to NATO. The CSTC-A command relationship had significant consequences for 2/7 and impacted on their operations and logistics. “ISAF has the ability to source equipment. ISAF has the priority for all the capabilities whether it is air support, air assets in particular, ISR assets; they are the operational arm. CSTCA is … a train and mentor organization and there is a mindset – because of how they’ve operated in the last few years – that CSTCA will go to established FOBs. They will benefit from the battle space manager’s generosity to host them at their FOBs and then they will take the mission of training that Army and police force. That hasn’t been 2/7’s experience. …. We went to the most austere location of the country … and established a footprint where there wasn’t one previously. That puts us in kind of a problem there because … the equipment, the air support, the war fighting capabilities – exist in ISAF and we were not an ISAF unit, we were a CSTCA unit. A lot of people in the beginning felt ‘You’re just training and mentoring Army and police. Why do you need close air support? Why do you need Predator feeds? Why do you need ISR capabilities? Why do you need all this ammo? This doesn’t make sense. This isn’t how CSTCA has operated’ …We turned to our higher headquarters and said ‘I need you to be a source of supply for me for ammunition, for more equipment, for better force protection measures’ – camera systems, new technologies whatever it may be – as we determined our requirements.” The logistics officer stated that they quickly learned that TF Phoenix and CSTCA had little of the support capabilities needed, and approached the U.S. Army Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB) 189 at Kandahar, part of Combined Joint Task Force 101 in the ISAF chain of command, who provided them common item support such as water, fuel, construction materials, and medical supplies. The Army CSSB also served as an ammunition supply point for USMC provided ammunition, but the CSSB did not have other USMC unique items, which in many cases had to be ordered from CONUS.
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Secrecy News – Court orders FBI to release withheld information
COURT ORDERS FBI TO RELEASE WITHHELD INFORMATION As often happens, the Federal Bureau of Investigation invoked national security a few years ago to justify withholding certain information from a Freedom of Information Act requester named Deirdre McKiernan Hetzler. But as rarely happens, a court last month critically assessed the FBI national security claim and ordered the Bureau to release some of the withheld information. Ms. Hetzler, acting pro se (i.e. without an attorney), had requested records concerning her deceased father, who had once been the subject of an FBI investigation. The FBI provided her with some records but withheld others, stating that they remained classified in order to protect an intelligence activity. But after reviewing the withheld records in camera, Judge Michael A. Telesca of the Western District of New York determined that some of the information contained in them was not exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The FBI had been withholding it under the FOIA's national security exemption even though it was actually unclassified or declassified. "The Court is not persuaded that Defendants [the FBI and the Justice Department] have carried their burden of showing that disclosure of this information could cause serious damage to national security," Judge Telesca wrote in a September 6, 2012 opinion. He therefore ordered the FBI to reprocess the request and to release the information to Ms. Hetzler as specified in his ruling. http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/hetzler.pdf The Court here acted as a check on the normally unconstrained official tendency to classify and withhold information. That is what judicial review is supposed to do, though it doesn't happen very often. Earlier this year, Judge Richard W. Roberts of the DC District ordered the U.S. Trade Representative to release a classified document to the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) because he found that the document was not properly classified. The USTR "failed to provide a plausible or logical explanation of why disclosure of [the document] reasonably could be expected to damage United States foreign relations," he wrote in his opinion ordering release. http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/03/not_logical.html The government has appealed that ruling. Judge Roberts "inappropriately second-guessed the Executive's expertise in the uniquely sensitive area of foreign relations," the government said in its September 17 appeals brief. http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/09/ciel_appeal_brief.html No, on the contrary, CIEL responded in its own brief to the appeals court this week, Judge Roberts did exactly what the FOIA requires. "A district court reviewing [an agency claim that a document is classified and exempt from disclosure] must give substantial weight to the agency's explanations, but must not simply acquiesce in the agency's determination," CIEL attorneys wrote. http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/ciel/102412-app.pdf "Congress explicitly 'stressed the need for an objective, independent judicial determination, and insisted that judges could be trusted to approach the national security determinations with common sense, and without jeopardy to national security'," they wrote, citing prior FOIA case law. The document that is being contested in this case is a one-page memorandum that presents the US government's legal interpretation of the phrase "in like circumstances." The government says that because the document was shared confidentially with other governments as part of a (now-concluded) free trade negotiation, its involuntary disclosure would undermine the confidentiality of diplomatic negotiations. Judge Roberts said this argument was not compelling "since the United States would be revealing its own position only" and would not be disclosing foreign government information that had been provided in confidence. Indeed, "There is no expectation that a government is required to keep its own negotiating positions confidential from its own citizens," said former US trade negotiator Daniel Magraw in a statement cited by CIEL. CIEL said that "Under USTR's interpretation, USTR could withhold any document -- even a document whose release would otherwise cause absolutely no harm -- simply by entering into a confidentiality arrangement and arguing that the breach of that arrangement would undermine trust and cause damage to US foreign relations; the withholding would be insulated from judicial review." "Fortunately, FOIA limits what an agency can make confidential," CIEL wrote in its appeals brief. A date for oral argument before the DC Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet been set. AN UPDATED CATALOG OF ARMY WEAPON SYSTEMS The U.S. Army has just published the 2013 edition of its annual Weapon Systems Handbook, which is filled with updated information on dozens of weapon systems, the military contractors who produce them, and the foreign countries that purchase them. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh2013/index.html So one learns, for example, that the RQ-11B Raven Small Unmanned Aircraft System is marketed to Denmark, Estonia, Lebanon, and Uganda, while the United States sells artillery ammunition both to Israel and to Lebanon. An appendix provides an informative breakdown of military industry contractors by weapon system and by the state where the contractor is located. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh2013/app.pdf "The systems listed in this book are not isolated, individual products. Rather, they are part of an integrated Army system of systems designed to equip the Army of the future to successfully face any challenges," according to the Handbook introduction. "After 10 years of combat, today's Army is significantly more capable than the Army of 2001. As we draw down from Iraq and Afghanistan, we must remain flexible, adaptable, and agile enough to respond and meet the needs of the combatant commanders." "Our objective is to equip and maintain an Army with the latest most advanced weaponry to win and return home quickly." _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood@fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood
DIE BESTEN DAS INVESTMENT- DAS ORIGINAL Cover seit dem Jahre 2000
The Story of FEMEN – Full Movie
Die “GoMoPa”-Wirecard-Lüge
The FBI – Whiteagle Sentenced to 10 Years in Federal Prison in Ho-Chunk Bribery Case
MADISON, WI—John W. Vaudreuil, United States Attorney for the Western District of Wisconsin, announced that Timothy Whiteagle, 61, Black River Falls, Wisconsin, was sentenced today by Chief U.S. District Judge William M. Conley to 10 years in federal prison for his central role in a bribery and scheme involving contracts awarded by the Ho-Chunk Nation. He was also ordered to serve three years of supervised release following his prison sentence and to pay $162,854 in taxes to the IRS.
On August 1, 2012, following a jury trial on bribery, tax, and obstruction charges, Whiteagle was convicted on all 12 counts.
According to the evidence presented at the trial, the Ho-Chunk Nation, an Indian tribal government, operates casinos in the Western District of Wisconsin and annually receives federal grants well in excess of $10,000. Whiteagle is a Ho-Chunk tribal member. From 2002 to 2009, Whiteagle, at times with the assistance of Deborah H. Atherton, 55, Black River Falls, acted covertly as a behind-the-scenes consultant for clients seeking to do business with the Ho-Chunk Nation. The clients included companies that provided cash access services (such as check cashing and ATMs) at Ho-Chunk casinos and a company that sought to provide mortgages and housing for tribal members. Whiteagle received over $3 million dollars from the clients.
Whiteagle gave Clarence Pettibone, an elected legislator of the Ho-Chunk Nation, money and valuables, and Whiteagle and Atherton solicited clients seeking Ho-Chunk business to do the same. The valuables included checks; money orders; payments to a martial arts studio operated by Pettibone; a Pontiac Firebird; contributions for Pettibone’s re-election campaign; a job for a relative of Pettibone; golf outings; tickets to an NFL football game; visits to adult entertainment venues; auto body work on a car owned by a relative of Pettibone; and vacations for Pettibone and his family members.
Whiteagle and Atherton offered and gave the money and valuables to Pettibone to influence and reward him for helping certain clients do business with the Nation. Pettibone knew the money and valuables were given to him to influence and reward him for assisting the clients. Whiteagle and Pettibone consulted with each other about how to use Pettibone’s official position to assist the clients in obtaining and keeping contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation; and Pettibone, in his official capacity as an elected legislator, took steps to help the clients do business with the Ho-Chunk Nation, such as scheduling of clients’ proposals on the legislature’s agenda, making motions for the nation to enter into contracts with the clients, delaying legislative action, and opposing proposed contracts between the nation and competitors of the clients.
Co-defendants Pettibone and Atherton were previously convicted and sentenced. Pettibone pleaded guilty to a bribery offense based on his receipt of the Firebird, along with money and other valuables, and was sentenced to five years in federal prison on July 11, 2012. Atherton was sentenced on October 10, 2012, to four years and two months in prison for her role in the bribery scheme and a separate loan fraud scheme. In a related case, Brian Johnson, 42, Shakopee, Minnesota, was sentenced to four months in prison for lying to federal agents during the course of the bribery investigation.
Whiteagle argued at trial, and again at sentencing, that the money and other things of value that he gave to Pettibone were not bribes but merely gifts given in the Ho-Chunk tradition. Judge Conley found that Whiteagle was “the center” of the scheme and profited immensely from businesses wanting to do business with the Ho-Chunk Nation. The judge found that Whiteagle showed a “willingness to engage in any behavior to benefit himself,” including bribery, telling a witness to lie, failing to pay taxes, and lying under oath. In rejecting Whiteagle’s arguments, Judge Conley said, “It is offensive to the court and to the Ho-Chunk Nation to suggest that bribery was part of ‘the Ho-Chunk way.’…Bribery and blatant lying is not the Ho-Chunk way; it is the farthest thing from the Ho-Chunk way.”
United States Attorney Vaudreuil stated, “This prosecution demonstrates the commitment by this office and the U.S. Department of Justice to vigorously investigate and prosecute corruption in tribal governments.”
The charges against Atherton, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and Johnson resulted from a joint investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and IRS Criminal Investigation, with assistance from the Ho-Chunk Nation, the Wisconsin Department of Administration-Division of Gaming, and the U.S. Department of Interior-Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Inspector General. The prosecutions have been handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Stephen P. Sinnott and Laura Przybylinski Finn.
Cryptome unveils CIA Proprietary Agencies & Agents Worldwide
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DAS “GoMoPa”-“KINDERPORTAL” MIT “SEXUALAUFKLÄRUNG”
Secret – Historical Pre-Election Terrorist Attacks Analysis
In light of the upcoming 2012 US presidential election, NYSIC is providing a snapshot of four historical cases where terrorists conducted attacks in conjunction with upcoming local or national elections, including the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used and how the attacks met or failed to meet the terrorists’ goals of altering the outcome of the election.
Studies have highlighted possible theories, most often supported by historical cases, of why terrorists attempt to use attacks to influence the outcome of the election:
- Terrorist attacks greatly increase the probability that the incumbent government will lose re-election.
- Rightist parties are viewed as less conciliatory toward terrorist demands, while leftist parties are viewed as more likely to negotiate or give concessions. In general, relative support for rightist parties is expected to increase after terrorist attacks and to decrease after periods of inactivity.
Historically, terrorist violence has been used more often to extract direct concessions through negotiations after an attack. One such example is the February 9, 1996, Docklands Bombing in Northern Ireland: the Irish Republican Army (IRA) put an end to its 17-month ceasefire experiment by detonating an explosives-laden truck near a plaza where three office towers, a light-railway station and a hotel converge. The bombing successfully forced the British government back to the negotiating table without the precondition that the Provisional Irish Republican Army decommission all its weapons.
In 2004, al-Qa’ida was able to indirectly extract concessions from the Spanish government by influencing the election outcome after the Madrid train bombings, securing a Spanish withdrawal of troops from Iraq.
Implications for New York:
At this time, there is no known credible intelligence suggesting an attack against New York State during the 2012 election period. However, considering the overall security environment, threats could emanate from a variety of actors wanting to influence US policy, including: al-Qa’ida and affiliates; state-sponsored groups; homegrown violent extremists; or anti-government domestic terrorists. Law enforcement and first responders throughout New York State should remain vigilant and consider proactive outreach regarding suspicious activity at or near potential targets in their jurisdictions, including campaign facilities, upcoming political event venues, and previously targeted locations such as shopping centers, recruiting centers, transportation hubs, and social/recreation venues.
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Collateral Murder – Wikileaks – Iraq – Video
Wikileaks has obtained and decrypted this previously unreleased video footage from a US Apache helicopter in 2007. It shows Reuters journalist Namir Noor-Eldeen, driver Saeed Chmagh, and several others as the Apache shoots and kills them in a public square in Eastern Baghdad. They are apparently assumed to be insurgents. After the initial shooting, an unarmed group of adults and children in a minivan arrives on the scene and attempts to transport the wounded. They are fired upon as well. The official statement on this incident initially listed all adults as insurgents and claimed the US military did not know how the deaths ocurred. Wikileaks released this video with transcripts and a package of supporting documents on April 5th 2010 onhttp://collateralmurder.com
STERN zu Cyberstalking – Wer verfolgt wird, muss sich wehren
FAZ über die kriminellen Cyberstalker der “GoMoPa” und deren Auftraggeber
TMZ – Sofia Vergara’s SEXY Halloween Costume
Former CIA Officer John Kirakou Pleads Guilty to Disclosing Classified Information About CIA Officer
ALEXANDRIA, VA—Former CIA Officer John Kiriakou, 48, of Arlington, Virginia, pleaded guilty today to disclosing to a journalist the name of a covert CIA officer and also admitted to disclosing information revealing the role of another CIA employee in classified activities.
Neil H. MacBride, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office, made the announcement after the plea was accepted by U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.
Kiriakou pleaded guilty today to one count of intentionally disclosing information identifying a covert agent. As part of the plea agreement, the United States and Kiriakou agree that a sentence of 30 months in prison is the appropriate disposition of this case. Sentencing has been scheduled for January 25, 2013.
“The government has a vital interest in protecting the identities of those involved in covert operations,” said U.S. Attorney MacBride. “Leaks of highly sensitive, closely held, and classified information compromise national security and can put individual lives in danger.”
“Disclosing classified information, including the names of CIA officers, to unauthorized individuals is a clear violation of the law,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “Today’s plea would not be possible without the hard work of the prosecutors and FBI special agents and analysts who brought this case to justice and who will continue to pursue those who ignore their obligations to protect national security secrets.”
According to court records, the case is a result of an investigation triggered by a classified filing in January 2009 by defense counsel for high-value detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This filing contained classified information the defense had not been given through official government channels, including photographs of certain government employees and contractors. The investigation revealed that on multiple occasions, one of the journalists to whom Kiriakou illegally disclosed classified information, in turn, disclosed that information to a defense team investigator. This information was reflected in the classified defense filing and enabled the defense team to take or obtain surveillance photographs of government personnel. The government has made no allegations of criminal activity by any members of the defense team for the detainees.
Kiriakou was a CIA intelligence officer between 1990 and 2004, serving at headquarters and in various classified overseas assignments. Upon joining the CIA in 1990 and on multiple occasions in following years, Kiriakou signed secrecy and non-disclosure agreements not to disclose classified information to unauthorized individuals. In a statement of facts filed with his plea agreement, Kiriakou admitted that he made illegal disclosures about two CIA employees and their involvement in classified operations to two journalists (referenced as “Journalist A” and “Journalist B” in court records) on multiple occasions between 2007 and 2009.
Kiriakou admitted that, through a series of e-mails with Journalist A, he disclosed the full name of a CIA officer (referred to as “Officer A” in court records) whose association with the CIA had been classified for more than two decades. In addition to identifying the officer for the journalist, Kiriakou also provided information that helped the journalist link the officer to a particular classified operation.
In addition, Kiriakou admitted that he disclosed to Journalists A and B the name and contact information of a CIA analyst, identified in court records as “Officer B,” along with his association with an operation to capture terrorism subject Abu Zubaydah in 2002. Kiriakou knew that the association of Officer B with the Abu Zubaydah operation was classified. Based in part on this information, Journalist B subsequently published a June 2008 front-page story in The New York Times disclosing Officer B’s alleged role in the Abu Zubaydah operation.
Without Kiriakou’s knowledge, Journalist A passed the information he obtained from Kiriakou to an investigator assisting in the defense of high-value detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
Kiriakou also admitted that he lied to the CIA regarding the existence and use of a classified technique, referred to as a “magic box,” while seeking permission from the CIA’s Publications Review Board to include the classified technique in a book.
This case was investigated by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, with assistance from the CIA and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Iris Lan of the Southern District of New York; Mark E. Schneider and Ryan Fayhee of the Northern District of Illinois; and W. Neil Hammerstrom, Jr. of the Eastern District of Virginia are prosecuting the case on behalf of the United States.
Movie -Cold Case Files – One Night on the Bayou/The Buckeye Misdemeanor
SECRET-Joint Publication 3-13.3 Operations Security January 2012
The following Joint Publication is unavailable from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website. Though it does not have any markings indicating a distribution restriction, the DTIC website lists the document has being available through the Joint Doctrine, Education, & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) which is restricted to U.S. military personnel.
Joint forces often display personnel, organizations, assets, and actions to public view and to a variety of adversary intelligence collection activities, including sensors and systems. Joint forces can be under observation at their peacetime bases and locations, in training or exercises, while moving, or when deployed to the field conducting actual operations. In addition, the adversary could compile and correlate enough information to facilitate predicting and countering US operations.
The purpose of operations security (OPSEC) is to reduce the vulnerability of US and multinational forces from successful adversary exploitation of critical information. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces. The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control, and protect critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions associated with military operations.
Tailored to the OPSEC process, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment is a useful methodology for intelligence professionals to support the OPSEC planner. The intelligence professional will perform mission analysis on friendly operations. This provides great insight into potential areas where the adversary could collect information and the identity of essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs). Identification of EEFIs will assist the OPSEC planner in ensuring all OPSEC-related critical unclassified information is included in the critical information list.
OPSEC’s most important characteristic is that it is a process. It is an analytical process that can be applied to any operation or activity for the purpose of denying critical information to an adversary. Unlike security programs that seek to protect classified information and controlled unclassified information, OPSEC is concerned with identifying, controlling, and protecting unclassified information that is associated with specific military operations and activities.
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3. Purpose of Operations Security
a. The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of US and multinational forces from successful adversary exploitation of critical information. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces.
b. The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control, and protect critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions associated with military operations and other activities to:
(1) Identify those actions that may be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
(2) Determine what specific indications could be collected, analyzed, and interpreted to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
(3) Select countermeasures that eliminate or reduce vulnerability or indicators to observation and exploitation.
(4) Avoid patterns of behavior, whenever feasible, and thus preclude the possibility of adversary intelligence constructing an accurate model.
(5) Prevent the display or collection of critical information, especially during preparation for and execution of actual operations.
(6) Avoid drastic changes as OPSEC countermeasures are implemented. Changes in procedures alone will indicate to the adversary that there is an operation or exercise starting.
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6. Operations Security and Information Operations
OPSEC as a capability of information operations (IO) denies the adversary the information needed to correctly assess friendly capabilities and intentions. It is also a tool, hampering the adversary’s use of its own information systems and processes and providing the necessary support to all friendly IO capabilities. In particular, OPSEC complements military deception (MILDEC) by denying an adversary information required to both assess a real plan and to disprove a deception plan. OPSEC and MILDEC have the same ultimate goal—affecting the adversary’s decision-making process and leading it to an erroneous decision. OPSEC does it by concealing important information, and MILDEC does it by putting misleading information into the environment. These are two related processes. For IO capabilities that exploit new opportunities and vulnerabilities, such as electronic warfare and computer network attack, OPSEC is essential to ensure friendly capabilities that might be easily countered are not compromised. The process of identifying critical information and applying measures to mask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a defense in-depth approach to securing friendly information. To be effective, other types of security must complement OPSEC. Examples of other types of security include physical security, programs in IA, computer network defense, and personnel programs that screen personnel and limit authorized access. In particular, COMSEC plays a vital role in OPSEC. While COMSEC’s primary purpose is to protect classified materials, it can assist with identifying vulnerabilities to loss of critical information through monitoring communications within legal constraints.
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5. Risk Assessment
a. This action has three components. First, planners analyze the vulnerabilities identified in the previous action and identify possible OPSEC countermeasures for each vulnerability. Second, the commander and staff estimate the impact to operations such as cost in time, resources, personnel or interference with other operations associated with implementing each possible OPSEC countermeasure versus the potential harmful effects on mission accomplishment resulting from an adversary’s exploitation of a particular vulnerability. Third, the commander and staff select specific OPSEC countermeasures for execution based upon a risk assessment done by the commander and staff.
b. OPSEC countermeasures reduce the probability of the adversary either observing indicators or exploiting vulnerabilities, being able to correctly analyze the information obtained, and being able to act on this information in a timely manner.
(1) OPSEC countermeasures can be used to prevent the adversary from detecting an indicator or exploiting a vulnerability, provide an alternative analysis of a vulnerability or an indicator (prevent the adversary from correctly interpreting the indicator), and/or attack the adversary’s collection system.
(2) OPSEC countermeasures include, among other actions, cover, concealment, camouflage, deception, intentional deviations from normal patterns, and direct strikes against the adversary’s intelligence system.
(3) More than one possible measure may be identified for each vulnerability. Conversely, a single measure may be used for more than one vulnerability. The most desirable OPSEC countermeasures are those that combine the highest possible protection with the least adverse effect on operational effectiveness. Chapter III, “Operations Security Planning,” provides a detailed discussion of OPSEC countermeasures.
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Secrecy News – Liberties Oversight Board invites Public Input
The long-dormant Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) announced that it will hold its first public meeting next week and it invited members of the public to provide input to help shape the Board's near-term agenda. "In anticipation of setting the agenda of issues on which the Board will focus its attention, the Board would welcome the views of nongovernmental organizations and members of the public," stated a notice in the October 23 Federal Register. http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2012/10/pclob.html The PCLOB was created in response to a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that "there should be a board within the executive branch to oversee... the commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties." By statute, the PCLOB is mandated to "(1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism." In response to the announcement of next week's meeting, we wrote in to propose that the PCLOB should review the government's problematic use of Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. "The use of Section 215, the so-called 'business records' provision, is the subject of intense and unresolved controversy that warrants the Board's attention," we suggested. http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2012/10/pclob-let.pdf Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall have stated that "most Americans would be stunned to learn the details of how these secret court opinions have interpreted section 215 of the Patriot Act." If so, the members of the PCLOB can be stunned on behalf of most Americans by virtue of the security clearances and right of access that they possess. For background on the origins and development of the PCLOB, see "Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status," Congressional Research Service, August 27, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34385.pdf FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH, AND MORE FROM CRS Newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has not made publicly available include the following. Federal Support for Academic Research, October 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41895.pdf Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, Impact, and Issues, October 22, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40957.pdf Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress, October 19, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power, October 19, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34234.pdf U.S. Sanctions on Burma, October 19, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41336.pdf Burma's Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions, October 19, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42363.pdf Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, October 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32109.pdf Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, October 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, October 19, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41526.pdf Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress, October 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22373.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood@fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood
Opfer: DIE STASI-FÄLSCHER UND DER BEWEIS: WIE MERIDIAN CAPITAL VON “GoMoPa” ERPRESST WURDE
BILD: Studie zum Tatort Internet :Jeder Dritte wurde schon gemobbt
Sports Illustrated Swimsuit : SI Swimsuit – Jeisa
SECRET-Joint Publication 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations
The following Joint Publication is unavailable from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website. Though it does not have any markings indicating a distribution restriction, the DTIC website lists the document has being available through the Joint Doctrine, Education, & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) which is restricted to U.S. military personnel.
Today’s global information environment is complex, rapidly changing, and requires integrated and synchronized application of the instruments of national power to ensure responsiveness to national goals and objectives. In the current operational environment, effective influence is gained by unity of effort in what we say and do, and how well we understand the conditions, target audiences (TAs), and operational environment. Within the military and informational instruments of national power, the Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States Government (USG) communications strategy. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts must inherently support the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG activities.
Military information support operations (MISO) play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses.
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b. Within the military and informational instruments of national power, the Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States Government (USG) communications strategy. DOD communications strategy and the separate and unique capabilities of military information support operations (MISO), public affairs (PA) (to include visual information), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) address a variety of communication roles and specific audiences as permitted by operational parameters and policy. DOD informational activities can be used to inform, direct, or persuade. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts must inherently support the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG activities.
c. MISO play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses. It is important not to confuse psychological impact with MISO. Actions of the joint force, such as strikes or shows of force, have psychological impact but they are not MISO unless their primary purpose is to influence the perceptions and subsequent behavior of a TA. Regardless of the mission set, all MISO are conducted within carefully reviewed and approved programs and under mission-tailored product approval guidelines that flow from national-level authorities.
d. MISO contribute to the success of both peacetime engagements and major operations. The combatant commander (CCDR) receives functional and theater strategic planning guidance from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Unified Command Plan (UCP), and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). These documents are derived from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) National Defense Strategy, which interprets the President’s national security policy and strategy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy.
(1) In peacetime, MISO are planned and integrated to further national defense strategies through the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater campaign plan (TCP). CCDRs incorporate MISO programs and integrate them into the broad range of activities required for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence (i.e., Phase 0). For example, in steady-state geographic combatant command TCPs, MIS units can deploy to support approved counterinsurgency (COIN), demining, or foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) programs under either a joint force commander (JFC) or US diplomatic control.
(2) MISO reinforce US policies that center on preventing hostilities and advocating peaceful resolutions when possible. MISO are key in furthering US endeavors to deter aggression and to maximize the JFC’s efforts to shape the operational environment. MIS units communicate well-orchestrated and planned information to international audiences to clarify intent, prevent escalation of tension, ease concerns, and mitigate the potential effects and capabilities of adversary information activities.
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4. Support of Irregular Warfare
a. General. Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”
(1) Some of the operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW are insurgency; COIN; unconventional warfare (UW); terrorism; CT; FID; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations; MISO; CMO; intelligence and counterintelligence activities; transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW; and law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries. (Some IW activities, such as terrorism and transnational crime, violate international law. US law and national policy prohibit US military forces or other government departments and agencies from engaging in or supporting such activities. However, since our adversaries employ terrorism and transnational criminal activities against the interests of the US and its partners, these activities are included below as examples of the range of operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW.) IW provides a logical, long-term framework for analyzing the
irregular threat and is both a form of armed conflict and warfare.(2) IW is complex and focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. Ultimately, IW is a political struggle for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. The factions involved in the conflict seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and their external supporters. At the same time, they also seek to strengthen their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population.
(3) When MISO occur in IW, their role usually is much greater than during major operations and campaigns. They impact directly on the operational focus of IW in ways unlike that of combat operations.
b. Approaches. Conducting IW focuses on two approaches—direct and indirect. A JFC will often conduct both approaches simultaneously to defeat our adversaries and those of our partners.
(1) Direct Approach. The direct approach addresses the requirement to pursue adversaries and their infrastructure and resources. Some adversaries, such as terrorists and insurgents fighting for a religious or tribal cause, may be so committed that they simply cannot be persuaded or coerced into laying down their arms; these individuals must be either killed or captured.
(2) Indirect Approach. MISO are key supporting operations to each contextual application of indirect approaches to executing IW.
(a) Focus on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population, rather than on applying military power directly against the military and paramilitary forces of adversaries. Both approaches are necessary, but the direct application of military power is unlikely to be decisive.
(b) Disturb, disrupt, and displace adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than attacking where they are strongest or in the manner they expect.
(c) Empower, enable, and leverage interagency and other partners to attack adversaries militarily or confront them nonmilitarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral military confrontation by US joint forces.
(d) Take actions with or against third-party states or armed groups to influence adversaries, rather than taking actions to influence adversaries directly.
(e) Attack adversaries using a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods and means rather than relying only on conventional military forces. Nonconventional methods and means might include clandestine or covert actions, operations in combination with irregular forces, or the nonconventional use of conventional capabilities.
(f) Subvert the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant populations by isolating them physically and psychologically from their local and international support through the use of MISO, public diplomacy, and PA activities; security operations; population and resource control measures; and other means.
c. Military Information Support Operations and IW. The ideological and political factors associated with IW create a fertile field for MISO. Examples of MISO applications to selected activities within IW are:
(1) FID. MISO are used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between HN armed forces and the civilian populace. MISO also may be used to modify the behavior of selected TAs toward US and multinational capabilities. The main objectives of MISO during FID are to build and maintain support for the host government while decreasing support for insurgents.
(2) CT. MISO are an essential part of the capabilities required for CT, in particular in application of the indirect approach to shape, stabilize, and influence the environment in which violent extremist organizations (VEOs) operate. CT focuses on populations, and in some operational areas, the information presented can determine which side will gain the favor of public opinion. Terrorist groups have gained sympathy and support of moderate audiences through disinformation partly based on their propaganda focusing on miscues of the friendly forces. In CT operations, TA identification and the use of MISO to influence the TAs’ behavior are important. Within an operational area there may be several TAs and multiple synchronized themes, messages, and means of delivery required for each. The intent of MISO in CT operations is to shape and influence the terrorist network’s informational environment.
(3) Stability Operations. Successful execution of stability operations tasks depends on informing the local populace and influencing attitudes to secure the trust and confidence of the population. MISO exerts significant influence on foreign TAs.
(4) COIN Operations. MISO can influence foreign populations through information to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or noninterference with friendly joint operations. In addition, MIS units may conduct information activities such as recruit for security forces, legitimize HN governments, and establish and maintain popular support for the HN programs and activities. MISO can provide public information to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order. MISO can serve as the supported commander’s voice to foreign populations by conveying the JFC’s intent.
(5) UW. UW involves ideological, religious, political, economic, and social factors which promote intense, emotional partisanship. These human factors, associated with armed resistance activity, create a situation that MIS units are uniquely suited to engage. MIS units support all phases of UW; therefore, MISO planning is immediately integrated into the planning process.
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TMZ – Christina Aguilera — Targeted by Fatty Website
Kiriakou pleads guilty in leak case
KIRIAKOU PLEADS GUILTY IN LEAK CASE This morning former CIA officer John Kiriakou pleaded guilty to one count of disclosure of information identifying a covert agent, a violation of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. "When KIRIAKOU disclosed the identity of Officer A to Journalist A, KIRIAKOU acted willfully in that defendant knew the disclosure was illegal," according to a Statement of Facts approved and signed by Mr. Kiriakou today. http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/kiriakou/facts.pdf Under the terms of a plea agreement, the parties agreed that a prison term of 30 months would be "the appropriate sentence in this case." Other charges against him, including several counts under the Espionage Act, would be dismissed. http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/kiriakou/plea.pdf By foregoing a trial, Mr. Kiriakou loses an opportunity to try and persuade a jury that his motives were benign, and that the harm to national security resulting from his disclosure was negligible and insignificant. But he gains an early resolution of the case, which could otherwise drag on for months and years, as well as a sentence that would likely be much shorter than if he were to be found guilty at trial. "NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY" EMERGES IN THE SECURITY CLEARANCE SYSTEM In the world of security clearances for access to classified information, the term "reciprocity" is used to indicate that one executive branch agency should ordinarily recognize and accept a security clearance that has been granted by another executive branch agency. This is not just a nice, cost-efficient thing to do, it is actually a requirement of law. Under the 2004 intelligence reform law, "all security clearance background investigations and determinations... shall be accepted by all agencies." This requirement for mutual recognition and acceptance applies equally to the higher order clearances of the intelligence community, where reciprocity is intended to promote employee "mobility" throughout the intelligence system, according to the 2009 Intelligence Community Directive 709. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-709.pdf So possessing a clearance from one agency should simplify the process of access approval at another agency. But the opposite is not supposed to be true. If an agency refuses for some reason to recognize the clearance granted by another agency, that refusal is not supposed to incur loss of clearance in the original agency. Officially, such "negative reciprocity" is not an authorized, legitimate security clearance practice. And yet there are signs that it is being adopted within the Department of Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), which rules on contested security clearance cases. A new paper by attorney Sheldon I. Cohen describes a series of DOHA rulings in which a perverse form of negative reciprocity has been used to justify the denial or revocation of a security clearance, to the obvious detriment of due process. http://www.sheldoncohen.com/ "While the burden of proof has always been placed on the employee by the DOHA Appeal Board to show why he or she should be granted a security clearance, until now there was a modicum of a right to confrontation, and a right to challenge the evidence presented by the government," Mr. Cohen wrote. But in a ruling he describes, "anonymous redacted reports and other agency's decision are enough to deny or revoke a DoD clearance regardless of contrary evidence." In a series of recent decisions, the DOHA Appeal Board "has accepted unsigned, unsworn, summary statements from unidentified persons in government agencies [that are] in direct conflict with live testimony at a hearing to deprive or revoke security clearances of government contractor employees." To avoid or limit the fallout of negative reciprocity, Mr. Cohen advises DoD employees and contractors to immediately appeal any adverse clearance decision, "at least to get [their] side of the issues on the record." Left unchallenged, it appears that adverse decisions by other agencies will be presumed reliable by DOHA and that any later attempt to rebut them "will most probably be rejected." See "Has the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Become a Star Chamber Court?" by Sheldon I. Cohen, October 19, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/doha-cohen.pdf The Department of Defense last week published a three-volume "DoD Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative Security Manual," DoD Manual 5105.21, October 19, 2012. A copy is available here: http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/index.html CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, AND MORE FROM CRS Newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service which Congress has not made publicly available include the following. Congressional Oversight, October 17, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-936.pdf Contemporary Developments in Presidential Elections, October 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42139.pdf U.S. International Trade: Trends and Forecasts, October 19, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33577.pdf President of the United States: Compensation, October 17, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20115.pdf Peru in Brief: Political and Economic Conditions and Relations with the United States, October 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42523.pdf Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, October 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities -- Background and Issues for Congress, October 17, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, October 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood@fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood
FEMEN concquer Paris – Uncensored Video
DOC – Cold Case Files – Death to a Deacon/A Wifes Mission
Börse-Online berichtet über die Organisierten Kriminellen der “GoMoPa” und wie sie die Finanzbranche bedrohen
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Sports Illustrated – Swimsuit – Sneak Peak
Unveiled by Cryptome – CIA Camp Peary 2012
BÖRSE ONLINE warnt vor den wegen Betruges am eigenen Anleger vorbestraften “GoMoPa”
Secrecy News – Intelligence Imagery set to be disclosed
A massive quantity of historical intelligence satellite imagery from the KH-9 HEXAGON program is being declassified and will be made public in a series of releases that are scheduled over the coming year, intelligence community officials say. Declassification of intelligence satellite imagery languished for years after President Clinton ordered the release of product from the Corona, Argon and Lanyard missions in the 1995 executive order 12951. Although the Clinton order also required the periodic review of imagery from other missions, that requirement was effectively ignored by intelligence agencies and neglected by congressional oversight. But in a May 2010 memorandum Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair ordered the "re-establishment" of the declassification review of intelligence imagery -- though it had never been officially disestablished -- with a particular focus on imagery from satellite systems that were deemed obsolete. http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/imagery.pdf In January 2011, DNI James R. Clapper formally declared that the KH-9 HEXAGON program was obsolete, and that declassification review of all program imagery should therefore commence. KH-9 HEXAGON was operational from 1971 to 1984. http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/dni012011.pdf "The process to declassify imagery pursuant to EO 12951 began shortly after DNI Blair's May 26, 2010 memorandum and has been ongoing, in earnest, with the goal of releasing as much imagery as possible to the public, consistent with national security," said Michael G. Birmingham of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Accordingly, The KH-9/HEXAGON system was declared obsolete in January 2011 and a phased declassification of its imagery has ensued." More than two years after the Blair memorandum, however, next to nothing has yet been made public. "The notable challenges to this effort are the sheer volume of imagery and the logistics involved in cataloging the imagery and moving it to archive," Mr. Birmingham told Secrecy News. "For context, and to grasp the scope of the project, the KH-9/HEXAGON system provided coverage over hundreds of millions of square miles of territory during its 19 successful missions spanning 1971-1984. It is a daunting issue to address declassification of the program specifics associated with an obsolete system such as the KH-9, which involves the declassification of huge volumes of intelligence information gathered on thousands of targets worldwide during a 13 year time period." Daunting or not, the large bulk of the KH-9 imagery is expected to be released, with only perhaps 5% or so remaining classified. "There is a schedule of multiple deliveries with final delivery of imagery scheduled for September 2013," Mr. Birmingham said. Within the intelligence community, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the executive agent for imagery declassification. NGA public affairs did not respond to questions about its declassification program. HISTORIAN ANNA K. NELSON, RIP We were sad to learn that Professor Anna K. Nelson, a tenacious and effective advocate for improved public access to national security records, passed away last month. For decades, Prof. Nelson argued for improved declassification practices in almost every venue imaginable, from congressional hearings to the most obscure and transient advisory bodies. As a professor of history at American University, she insisted that government records were public property and that access to such records was one of the foundations of good citizenship. http://www.american.edu/cas/faculty/anelson.cfm Among many other posts, she served as a presidentially-appointed member of the JFK Assassination Records Review Board, which was tasked to oversee the declassification of records concerning the assassination of President Kennedy. Because of the perseverance of Dr. Nelson and her colleagues, that Board was uniquely productive in overcoming longstanding barriers to declassification, particularly those pertaining to intelligence agency records. Nevertheless, she was habitually pessimistic about the prospects for meaningful secrecy reform. "Given past performance, it is highly unrealistic to assume that agencies, particularly Defense and the CIA, will be completely forthcoming or that the Archives will ever question agency decisions," she wrote in a 2000 letter to Congress. "Agency declassification of selected, heavily redacted records will not serve the public interest. It will only breed more suspicion." http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2000/02/nelson.html Prof. Nelson also spoke out in defense of robust investigative reporting on national security matters. In 2008, for example, she submitted a declaration of behalf of New York Times reporter James Risen, arguing that a grand jury subpoena against him in the pending leak case against former CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling should be quashed. http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/sterling/risen-nelson.pdf "If Mr. Risen and other investigative journalists are unable to report effectively on matters of intelligence, the historical record will be incomplete, if not erroneous," Dr. Nelson wrote. "Although our own books and articles are stuffed with footnotes, we historians understand that investigative journalists, as observers of the present, must protect their sources. If they do not, the American people will never learn about corruption, incompetence, excessive government secrecy, flaws in homeland security, or disastrous decisions made by policy makers who are advised by their intelligence chiefs," she wrote. "We must depend upon journalists and journalists must be permitted to depend upon confidential sources." _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists.
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Public Intelligence – Joint Publication 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare February 2012
The following Joint Publication is unavailable from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website. Though it does not have any markings indicating a distribution restriction, the DTIC website lists the document as being available through the Joint Doctrine, Education, & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) which is restricted to U.S. military personnel. A previous version of this publication from January 2007 was made available by the Federation of American Scientists
All modern forces depend on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, the EMS is the key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as the focus of operations themselves. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS throughout the operational environment.
JEMSO are the coordinated efforts of EW and joint electromagnetic spectrum management operations (JEMSMO) to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). The impact of an EMOE upon the operational capability of military forces, equipment, systems, and platforms is referred to as electromagnetic environmental effects. It encompasses all electromagnetic (EM) disciplines to include electromagnetic compatibility; electromagnetic interference; EM vulnerability; electromagnetic pulse (EMP); electronic protection (EP); hazards of EM radiation to personnel, ordnance, and volatile materials; and natural phenomena effects such as sunspots, lightning, and precipitation static.
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At the national level, organizations and agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency are constantly seeking to identify, catalog, and update the electronic order of battle (EOB) of identified or potential adversaries. The joint intelligence operations center responds to theater-level EW-related intelligence requirements and forwards requests that require national level assets to the defense collection coordination center or other national-level organizations according to established procedures. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) [at the subordinate joint force level] normally assigns one or more members of the staff to act as a liaison between the J-2 section and the IO cell where EW planners are normally assigned.
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At combatant commands and subordinate unified commands, the J-3 is primarily responsible for the EW coordination function. The EW division of the J-3 staff should engage in the full range of EW functions to include deliberate planning; day-to-day planning and monitoring of routine theater EW activities in conjunction with the combatant command’s theater campaign plan; and crisis action planning in preparation for EW as part of emergent joint operations. Since EW is concerned with attacking personnel, facilities, or equipment (EA); protecting capabilities and EMS access (EP); and monitoring, exploiting, and targeting use of the EMS (ES), EW staff personnel have a role in the dynamic management of the EMS, via tools and processes, during operations. A comprehensive and well-thought-out joint restricted frequency list and emission control plan are two significant tools that permit flexibility of EW actions during an operation without compromising friendly EMS use. The electronic warfare control authority, the senior EA authority in the operational area, develops guidance for performing EA on behalf of the JFC.
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Military operations are executed in an environment complicated by increasingly complex demands on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). All modern forces depend on the EMS. The EMS is the entire range of electromagnetic (EM) radiation. At one end of the spectrum are gamma rays, which have the shortest wavelengths and high frequencies. At the other end are radio waves, which have the longest wavelengths and low frequencies. The EMS is used to organize and explain the types of EM energy that exist in our world and throughout the universe. Devices whose functions depend upon the EMS are used by both civilian and military organizations and individuals for intelligence; communications; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); sensing; command and control (C2); attack; ranging; data transmission; and information storage and processing. The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, the EMS is the key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as the focus of operations themselves. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS throughout the operational environment (OE).
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TOP-SECRET – Joint Publication 3-13.4 Military Deception January 2012
The following Joint Publication is unavailable from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website. Though it does not have any markings indicating a distribution restriction, the DTIC website lists the document as being available only through the Joint Doctrine, Education & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) which is restricted to U.S. military personnel.
Specific guidance from the joint force commander (JFC) or higher authority during planning will determine the military deception (MILDEC) role in a joint operation. MILDEC is intended to deter hostile actions, increase the success of friendly defensive actions, or to improve the success of any potential friendly offensive action. Use of
MILDEC during any phase of an operation should help to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. In combat situations, the focus is on driving the adversary to culmination and achieving the objectives defined by the JFC. In noncombat situations, the JFC seeks to dominate the situation with decisive operations designed to establish conditions for an early, favorable conclusion.…
The MILDEC goal is the commander’s statement of the purpose of the MILDEC as it contributes to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. It is important for the commander to first envision the deception goal in terms of its specific contribution to accomplishing the designated mission. The MILDEC objective is a concise statement of what the MILDEC will cause the adversary to do or not do. It is expressed in terms of the adversary’s action or inaction that directly leads to the purpose or condition stated in the MILDEC goal.
MILDEC Targets
The deception target is the adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. The deception target or targets are the key individuals on whom the entire deception operation will be focused.
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Function of MILDEC include:
• Causing ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding in adversary perceptions of friendly critical information.
• Causing the adversary to misallocate personnel, fiscal, and material resources in ways that are advantageous to the friendly force.
• Causing the adversary to reveal strengths, dispositions, and future intentions.
• Conditioning the adversary to particular patterns of friendly behavior to induce adversary perceptions that can be exploited by the joint force.
• Causing the adversary to waste combat power with inappropriate or delayed actions.…
The MILDEC Planning Process
Deception planning is an iterative process that requires continual reexamination of its objectives, target, stories, and means throughout the planning and execution phases. A key factor that must be considered during MILDEC planning is risk. The overriding consideration in risk analysis is the comparison between the risk taken and the possible benefits of the deception. The MILDEC planning process consists of six steps: deception mission analysis, deception planning guidance; staff deception estimate; commander’s deception estimate; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate review; deception plan development; and deception plan review and approval.
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Bowery at Midnight – Bela Lugosi – Full Movie
A criminology professor (Lugosi) operates a charitable mission by day, and leads a gang of master thieves by night. Anyone who dares get in his way ends up buried in his cellar—until a mad doctor reanimates the corpses to exact their revenge!
Bowery at Midnight casts Bela Lugosi as Professor Brenner, a psychology instructor at New York University (which looks a lot like Berkeley in the exterior shots!). When not enlightening his students — most of them buxom Monogram starlets — Brenner is engaged in charitable work, running a mission in the Bowery. In truth, however, the kindly professor is a fiend in human form, who uses his mission as a front for a vast criminal empire. When Judy (Wanda McKay), one of Brenner’s students, stumbles onto the truth, she’s targeted for extermination by the Dr. Jekyll-and-Mr. Hyde prof.
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TOP-SECRET-Los Angeles Fusion Center: Liquid Carbon Dioxide Leaks Pose Risks to Public
(U) Within the past year, first responders and members of the public have died of asphyxiation, or fallen ill, following accidental inhalation of concentrated carbon dioxide (CO2) gas in public locations. At least two recent incidents are connected with significant gas leaks caused by the failure of liquid CO2 lines connected to beverage dispensers in commercial facilities. Emergency personnel responding to medical or service calls can use signs and symptoms to determine possible CO2 exposure and correspondent risks to first responders.
(U) Dangers Result from Change in Technology
(U) In the past, compressed CO2 tanks were generally stored close to the point of use, and connected directly to equipment via short pipes or hoses (lines). New technologies make it possible to store liquid CO2 tanks at external servicing points, in basements, or other locations far from the point of use, delivering gas via long lines concealed within walls and ceilings. Leaks in these lines can place patrons, employees, and first responders at risk for exposure to the gas.
(U) Leaking liquid CO2 evaporates into a rapidly expanding gas that is heavier than air; it can displace enough oxygen in small, poorly ventilated rooms, basements, and other low-lying areas to create “Immediately Dangerous Life Hazard” (IDLH) environments. (See the accompanying appendix for specific/technical aspects.) Building codes require sensors near CO2 tanks to monitor oxygen levels; however, if these are not present along delivery lines, leaks in locations away from the tanks may go undetected. Sensors may be susceptible to failure or tampering.
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(U) Indicators of Possible CO2 Exposure
(U) Obvious shortness of breath with visible symptoms will occur as the body compensates for lack of oxygen. The effects of oxygen deficiency, combined with the effects of CO2 toxicity, may cause an individual to feel ill, potentially showing signs such as headache, nausea, dizziness, or mental confusion. Most individuals will begin to show signs and symptoms when exposed to concentrations of CO2, starting as low as seven percent, for approximately 15 minutes; symptoms may vary according to the level of CO2 concentration and length of exposure.
(U) Signs and symptoms indicating possible exposure to CO2 include:
- (U) Shortness of breath
- (U) Dizziness
- (U) Headaches and drowsiness
- (U) Stinging of nose and throat
- (U) Nausea and vomiting
- (U) Excitation, excess salivation, rapid breathing
- (U) Confusion
- (U) Unconsciousness
- (U) Frostbite or frozen skin from contact with escaping liquid or vapor cloud
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Experten in Wikipedia über Cyberstalking
28.000 people disappeared in Syria

Fighting between government forces and rebels is continuing in the city of Aleppo
Human rights groups working in Syria say at least 28,000 people have disappeared after being abducted by soldiers or militia.
They say they have the names of 18,000 people missing since anti-government protests began 18 months ago and know of another 10,000 cases.
Online activist group Avaaz says “nobody is safe” from a deliberate government campaign of terror.
It intends to give the UN Human Rights Council a dossier for investigation.
The Syrian government has so far not commented on the claims but has in the past strenuously denied reports of human rights abuses.
Avaaz said it had gathered testimony from Syrians who say husbands, sons and daughters were forcibly abducted by pro-government forces.
They include Fayzeh al-Masri, from a suburb of Homs, whose 26-year-old son Ahmad Ghassan Ibrahim disappeared in February – the last number he called them from was traced to a military security branch.
The family were told by someone who answered his phone that he had died, but they have been unable to confirm this.
Counting the disappeared in the real time of a conflict is extremely difficult. It’s almost impossible for outsiders to double-check claims independently.
Recent history shows that accurate counts of those kidnapped and abducted can only begin once a conflict has finished.
Activists in Iraq are still trying work out how many people were killed or went missing during the country’s peak years of violence after 2003. In Latin America, it took Chile almost 20 years to count the exact number of its disappeared during the military coup of 1973.
But the numbers currently suggested by Syrian opposition activists do give a sense of both the scale of the country’s conflict and the uncertainty surrounding the fate of many of its citizens.
“We are certain that he would not have left us or his wife – who is expecting twins. We only want to know his fate,” Mrs Masri told Avaaz.
The brother of Hussein Eisso, a 62-year-old Syrian-Kurdish activist, said he was taken from outside his home in Hasaka after attempting to stage a sit-in over the arrest of other activists.
He said his brother had since been moved between security branches, and had had serious health problems, including a stroke.
The BBC’s James Reynolds, close to the Syrian border in Turkey, says it is often hard to establish real disappearance figures until a conflict is over, but the scale of the figures is an indication of the severity of the conflict in Syria.
‘Breeding fear’
Alice Jay, campaign director at Avaaz, said Syrians were being “plucked off the street by security forces and paramilitaries and being ‘disappeared’ into torture cells”.
“Whether it is women buying groceries or farmers going for fuel, nobody is safe.”
She said it was a deliberate strategy to “terrorise families and communities”, and that each case must be investigated.
“The panic of not knowing whether your husband or child is alive breeds such fear that it silences dissent,” she said.
Other Syrian rights groups backed the allegations. Fadel Abdulghani, of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, estimated that 28,000 people had disappeared since unrest against the government of President Bashar al-Assad began last year.
Muhannad al-Hasani, of human rights organisation Sawasya, said the figure could be as high as 80,000.
“People are being snatched at night, on the street and when no-one is looking,” he said.
Muhammad Khalil, a human rights lawyer from the Syrian city of Hassaka, said the Syrian government had two reasons for carrying out the abductions: “To directly get rid of the rebels and activists, and to intimidate the society so that it won’t oppose the regime.”
Avaaz collected its statistics through a network of independent human rights lawyers and local activist groups in Syria.
The scale of the work and the current instability meant the organisation could not independently verify each disappearance, but it confirmed to the BBC that none of the detentions listed had been official arrests.
Most of the people Avaaz spoke to had personally witnessed a friend or relative being taken from home or the street
The UN says more than 18,000 people have been killed in the conflict with 170,000 fleeing abroad and 2.5 million in need of aid within the country. Opposition and human rights activists put the death toll at more than 30,000.
As violence continues, UN and Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is due to arrive in Syria on Saturday for talks with Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, Damascus told AFP news agency.
Mr Brahimi has proposed a truce over the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha, which starts on 25 October, to “allow a political process to develop”.
The Syrian government has recently indicated that it is interested in exploring a temporary ceasefire – and opposition groups have said they would match this.
Calls for the truce come as the conflict threatens to spill over Syria’s borders.
Turkey’s armed forces have several times returned fire across the border into Syria after Syrian mortar shells landed inside its territory.
Turkish TV reported further cross-border exchanges on Thursday morning. Our correspondent says smoke could be seen rising from the Syrian border village of Haram, while explosions and small arms fire could be heard.
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The NSA – The Alexeyeva File
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![]() Sergei Kovalev with Alexeyeva, 2011. ![]() Arsenii Roginsky of the Memorial Society with Alexeyeva.
Photos by Svetlana Savranskaya. Related Links
The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary |
Moscow, Russian Federation, October 17, 2012 – Marking the 85thbirthday of Russian human rights legend Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the National Security Archive today published on the Web a digital collection of documents covering Alexeyeva’s brilliant career, from the mid-1970s founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group (which she now heads) to the current challenges posed by the Putin regime’s crackdown on civil society.Today’s posting includes declassified U.S. documents from the Carter Presidential Library on Soviet dissident movements of the 1970s including the Moscow Helsinki Group, and KGB and Soviet Communist Party Central Committee documents on the surveillance and repression of the Group.
With the generous cooperation of the Memorial Society’s invaluable Archive of the History of Dissent, the posting also features examples of Alexeyeva’s own letters to officials (on behalf of other dissidents) and to friends, her Congressional testimony and reports, scripts she produced for Radio Liberty, and numerous photographs. Also highlighted in today’s publication are multiple media articles by and about Alexeyeva including her analysis of the current attack on human righters in Russia. As Alexeyeva’s colleagues, friends, and admirers gather today in Moscow to celebrate her 85th birthday, the illustrious history documented in today’s posting will gain a new chapter. The party-goers will not only toast Lyudmila Alexeyeva, but also debate the appropriate responses to the new Putin-inspired requirement that any civil society group receiving any international support should register as a “foreign agent” and undergo frequent “audits.” No doubt Alexeyeva will have something to say worth listening to. She has seen worse. BiographyLyudmila Mikhailovna Alexeyeva was born on July 20, 1927 in Yevpatoria, a Black Sea port town in the Crimea (now in Ukraine). Her parents came from modest backgrounds, but both received graduate degrees; her father was an economist and her mother a mathematician. She was a teenager in Moscow during the war, and she attributes her decision to come back and live in Russia after more than a decade of emigration to the attachment to her country and her city formed during those hungry and frozen war years. Alexeyeva originally studied to be an archaeologist, entering Moscow State University in 1945, and graduating with a degree in history in 1950. She received her graduate degree from the Moscow Institute of Economics and Statistics in 1956. She married Valentin Alexeyev in 1945 and had two sons, Sergei and Mikhail. Already in the university she began to question the policies of the regime, and decided not to go to graduate school in the history of the CPSU, which at the time would have guaranteed a successful career in politics. She did join the Communist Party, hoping to reform it from the inside, but very soon she became involved in publishing, copying and disseminating samizdat with the very first human rights movements in the USSR. In 1959 through 1962 she worked as an editor in the academic publishing house Nauka of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1966, she joined friends and fellow samizdat publishers in protesting the imprisonment and unfair trial of two fellow writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. For her involvement with the dissident movement, she lost her job as an editor and was expelled from the Party. Later, in 1970, she found an editorial position at the Institute of Information on Social Sciences, where she worked until her forced emigration in 1977. From 1968 to 1972, she worked as a typist for the first dissident periodical in the USSR, The Chronicle of Current Events. As the 1960s progressed, Alexeyeva became more and more involved in the emerging human rights movement. Her apartment in Moscow became a meeting place and a storage site for samizdat materials. She built up a large network of friends involved in samizdat and other forms of dissent. Many of her friends were harassed by the police and later arrested. She and her close friends developed a tradition of celebrating incarcerated friends’ birthdays at their relatives’ houses, and they developed a tradition of “toast number two” dedicated to those who were far away. Her apartment was constantly bugged and surveilled by the KGB. Founding the Moscow Helsinki GroupIn the spring of 1976, the physicist Yuri Orlov – by then an experienced dissident surviving only by his connection to the Armenian Academy of Sciences– asked her to meet him in front of the Bolshoi Ballet. These benches infamously served as the primary trysting site in downtown Moscow, thus guaranteeing the two some privacy while they talked. Orlov shared his idea of creating a group that would focus on implementing the human rights protections in the Helsinki Accords – the 1975 Final Act was published in full in Pravda, and the brilliant idea was simply to hold the Soviet government to the promises it had signed and was blatantly violating. Orlov had the idea, but he needed someone who could make it happen – a typist, an editor, a writer, a historian – Lyudmila Alexeyeva. In May 1976, she became one of the ten founding members of the Moscow Helsinki Group with the formal announcement reported by foreign journalists with some help from Andrei Sakharov, despite KGB disruption efforts. The government started harassment of the group even before it was formally announced, and very quickly, the group became a target for special attention by Yuri Andropov and his organization – the KGB. Alexeyeva produced (typed, edited, wrote) many early MHG documents. One of her early – and characteristically remarkable – assignments was a fact-finding mission to investigate charges of sexual harassment against a fellow dissident in Lithuania. Several high school boys who would not testify against their teacher were expelled from school. She arranged a meeting with the Lithuanian Minister of Education, who did not know what the Moscow Helsinki Group was but anything from Moscow sounded prestigious enough to command his attention, and convinced him to return the boys to school. It was only when some higher-up called the Minister to explain what the Helsinki Group really was that he reconsidered his decision. As one of ten original members of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Alexeyeva received even greater scrutiny from the Soviet government, including the KGB. Over the course of 1976, she was under constant surveillance, including phone taps and tails in public. She had her apartment searched by the KGB and many of her samizdat materials confiscated. In early February 1977, KGB agents burst into her apartment searching for Yuri Orlov, saying “We’re looking for someone who thinks like you do.” A few days later, she and her second husband, the mathematician Nikolai Williams, were forced to leave the Soviet Union under the threat of arrest. Her departure was very painful – she was convinced that she would never be able to return, and her youngest son had to stay behind. Alexeyeva in ExileAlexeyeva briefly stopped over in the UK, where she participated in human rights protests, before she eventually settled in northern Virginia, and became the Moscow Helsinki Group spokesperson in the United States. She testified before the U.S. Congressional Helsinki Commission, worked with NGOs such as the International Helsinki Federation, wrote reports on the CSCE conferences in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna, which she attended, and became actively involved in the issue of political abuse of psychiatry in the USSR. She soon met her best-friend-to-be, Larisa Silnicky of Radio Liberty (formerly from Odessa and Prague), who had founded the prominent dissident journal Problems of Eastern Europe, with her husband, Frantisek Silnicky. Alexeyeva started working for the journal as an editor in 1981 (initially an unpaid volunteer!). Meanwhile, she returned to her original calling as a historian and wrote the single most important volume on the movements of which she had been such a key participant. Her book, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights, which was published in the United States in 1984 by Wesleyan University Press, remains the indispensable source on Soviet dissent. The book was not the only evidence of the way Alexeyeva’s talents blossomed in an atmosphere where she could engage in serious research without constant fear of searches and arrest. She worked for Voice of America and for Radio Liberty during the 1980s covering a wide range of issues in her broadcasts, especially in the programs “Neformalam o Neformalakh” and “Novye dvizheniya, novye lyudi,” which she produced together with Larisa Silnicky. These and other programs that she produced for the RL were based mainly on samizdat materials that she was getting though dissident channels, and taken together they provide a real encyclopedia of developments in Soviet society in the 1980s. The depth and perceptiveness of her analysis are astounding, especially given the fact that she was writing her scripts from Washington. Other U.S. institutions ranging from the State Department to the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute also asked her for analyses of the Gorbachev changes in the USSR, among other subjects. In the late 1980s-early 1990s, she was especially interested in new labor movements in the Soviet Union, hoping that a Solidarity-type organization could emerge to replace the old communist labor unions. Back in the USSRThe Moscow Helsinki Group had to be disbanded in 1982 after a campaign of persecution that left only three members free within the Soviet Union. When the Group was finally reestablished in 1989 by Larisa Bogoraz, Alexeyeva was quick to rejoin it from afar, and she never stopped speaking out. She had longed to return to Russia, but thought it would never be possible. She first came back to the USSR in May 1990 (after being denied a visa six times previously by the Soviet authorities) with a group of the International Helsinki Federation members to investigate if conditions were appropriate for convening a conference on the “human dimension” of the Helsinki process. She also attended the subsequent November 1991 official CSCE human rights conference in Moscow, where the human righters could see the end of the Soviet Union just weeks away. She was an early supporter of the idea of convening the conference in Moscow – in order to use it as leverage to make the Soviet government fulfill its obligations – while many Western governments and Helsinki groups were skeptical about holding the conference in the Soviet capital. In 1992-1993 she made numerous trips to Russia, spending more time there than in the United States. She and her husband Nikolai Williams returned to Russia to stay in 1993, where she resumed her constant activism despite having reached retirement age. She became chair of the new Moscow Helsinki Group in 1996, only 20 years after she and Yuri Orlov discussed the idea and first made it happen; and in that spirit, in the 1990s, she facilitated several new human rights groups throughout Russia. When Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, Lyudmila Alexeyeva agreed to become part of a formal committee that would advise him on the state of human rights in Russia, while continuing her protest activities. The two did not go well together in Putin’s mind, and soon she was under as much suspicion as ever. By this time, though, her legacy as a lifelong dissident was so outsized that it was harder to persecute her. Even state-controlled television felt compelled to give her air-time on occasion, and she used her standing as a human rights legend to bring public attention to abuses ranging from the mass atrocities in the Chechen wars to the abominable conditions in Russian prisons. When the Moscow Helsinki Group celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2006, with Lyudmila Alexeyeva presiding, Yuri Orlov came back from his physics professorship at Cornell University to join her on stage. Also paying tribute were dozens of present and former public officials from the rank of ex-Prime Minister on down, as well the whole range of opposition politicians and non-governmental activists, for whom she served as the unique convenor and den mother. The Challenge in Russia TodayIn 2009, Alexeyeva became an organizer of Strategy 31, the campaign to hold peaceful protests on the 31st of every month that has a 31st, in support of Article 31 of the Russian constitution, which guarantees freedom of assembly. Everyone remembers the protest on December 31, 2009, when Lyudmila Alexeyeva went dressed as the Snow Maiden (Snegurochka in the fairy tales) where dozens of other people were also arrested. But when officials realized they had the Lyudmila Alexeyeva in custody, they returned to the bus where she was being held, personally apologized for the inconvenience and offered her immediate release from custody. She refused until all were released. The video and photographs of the authorities arresting the Snow Maiden and then apologizing went viral on the Internet and made broadcast news all over the world. The “31st” protests have ended in arrests multiple times, but that has yet to deter the protesters, who provided a key spark for the mass protests in December 2011. The darker side of the authorities’ attitude was evident in March 2010, when she was assaulted at the Park Kultury metro station where she was paying her respects to the victims of the subway bombings a few days earlier. She had been vilified by the state media so often that the attacker called himself a “Russian patriot” and asserted (correctly, so far) that he would not be charged for his actions. In 2012, the chauvinistic assault became institutional and government-wide, with a new law proposed by the Putin regime and approved by the Duma, requiring any organization that received support from abroad to register as a “foreign agent” and submit to multiple audits by the authorities. The intent was clearly to stigmatize NGOs like the Moscow Helsinki Group that have international standing and raise money from around the world. Earlier this month, Lyudmila Alexeyeva announced that the Group would not register as a foreign agent and would no longer accept foreign support once the law goes into effect in November 2012. Other Russian human righters say they are used to being tagged as foreign agents. In fact, humorous signs appeared at the mass protests in late 2011 asking the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Hillary! Where’s my check? I never got my money!” So the debate over strategy, over how best to deal with and to push back against the new repression, will likely dominate the conversation at Lyudmila Mikhailovna’s 85th birthday party today (July 20). Yet again, when she is one of the few original Soviet dissidents still alive, she is at the center of the storm, committed to freedom in Russia today, and leading the discussion about how to achieve human rights for all. DocumentsDocument 1: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, “Biography,” November 1977. This modest biographical note presents Alexeyeva’s own summary of her life as of the year she went into exile. She prepared this note as part of her presentation to the International Sakharov Hearing in Rome, Italy, on 26 November 1977, which was the second in a series named after the distinguished Soviet physicist and activist (the first was in Copenhagen in 1975) that brought together scholars, analysts and dissidents in exile to discuss human rights in the Soviet bloc. [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6] Document 2: Lyudmila Alexeyeva to Senator Jacob K. Javits, 4 July, 1975. Even before she co-founded the Moscow Helsinki Group, Lyudmila Alexeyeva actively worked to defend dissidents and political prisoners in the USSR. In this 1975 letter preserved in the Archive of the History of Dissent, the irreplaceable collections of the Memorial Society in Moscow, she is writing from Moscow to a prominent U.S. Senator, Jacob Javits, a Republican from New York and himself Jewish, who was outspoken in supporting not only the right of Jews to emigrate from the USSR to Israel, but also the Soviet dissident cause in general. The case she presents to Javits is that of Anatoly Marchenko, who asked for political emigration (not to Israel) and as punishment was sent to Siberia for four years’ exile – on top of the 11 years he had already spent as a political prisoner on trumped-up charges. Tragically, Marchenko would die in prison in the fall of 1986, just as Gorbachev began releasing the political prisoners. [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6] Document 3: Yuri Andropov, Chairman of the KGB, Memorandum to the Politburo, 29 December, 1975. Yuri Andropov gives the Politburo an alarming report on dissent in the USSR in connection with criticism of Soviet human rights abuses by the French and Italian Communist parties. The main thrust of Andropov’ report is how to keep the internal opposition in check in the aftermath of the signing of the Helsinki agreement and the following increase of international pressure on the USSR. He gives the number of political prisoners as 860, people who received the “prophylactic treatment” in 1971-74 as 63,108 and states that there are many more “hostile elements” in the country, and that “these people number in the hundreds of thousands.” Andropov concluded that the authorities would have to continue to persecute and jail the dissidents notwithstanding the foreign attention. This document sets the stage and gives a good preview of what would happen after the Moscow Helsinki Group was founded in May 1976. [Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 18, Container 28] Document 4: Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, “Evaluation of the Influence of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the Quality of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.,” 1 August 1975-1 August 1976. (Summary of the document) This document was written during a time of relative calm, when surprisingly, for the first six months of the existence of the MHG, the authorities did not undertake any repressions against members of the group, and allowed it to function. The document sounds more positive and optimistic than the group’s subsequent assessments of the effect of the Helsinki Accords. The report points out that the Soviet government was sensitive to pressure from foreign governments and groups and that several other objective factors such as the end of the war in Vietnam and increasing Soviet grain purchases made the USSR more open to external influences. Under such pressure, the Soviet government released the mathematician Leonid Plyusch, allowed some refuseniks to emigrate and generally relaxed the restrictions somewhat. The report also lists continuing violations of human rights but concludes that the Helskinki Accords did and probably would play a positive role. [See the Russian page for the original] [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6] Document 5: KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, “About the Hostile Actions of the So-called Group for Assistance of Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR,” 15 November 1976. The KGB informed the Politburo about the activities of the MHG for the first time six months after its founding. The report gives a brief history of the human rights movement in the USSR as seen from the KGB. Andropov names each founding member of the group and charges the group with efforts to put the Soviet sincerity in implementing the Helsinki Accords in doubt. The document also alleges MHG efforts to receive official recognition from the United States and reports on its connections with the American embassy. [Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 18, Container 28] Document 6: Helsinki Monitoring Group, “Special Notice,” 2 December, 1976. This notice, one of a series by the MHG publicizing official misconduct, testifies to the increasing harassment of members of the group by the KGB. This time it is the son of Malva Landa who has been warned that he might lose his job. The document is signed by Alexeyeva, Orlov and other leading MHG members. [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6] Document 7: KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, “On the Provocative Demonstration by Antisocial Elements on Pushkin Square in Moscow and at the Pushkin Monument in Leningrad,” 6 December, 1976. This KGB report informs the Politburo about silent rallies in Moscow and Leningrad to celebrate Constitution Day by dissidents including members of the MHG. Nobody was arrested. [Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 16, Container 24] Document 8: Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, “On the Exclusion of Seven Students From the Vienuolis Middle School (Vilnius),” 8 December, 1976. This is a report of the first fact-finding mission undertaken by Lyudmila Alexeyeva with Lithuanian human rights activist and member of the Helsinki Group Thomas Ventslov to investigate charges of sexual harassment against a member of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group Viktoras Petkus. Seven boys were expelled from the school and pressured by the KGB to say that they had spent time at Petkus’ apartment, where he engaged in illegal activities with them. The boys’ families were told that they were expelled on the basis of a school board decision that the parents were not allowed to see. The report concludes that the KGB was behind the charges and that the only reason for the expulsions was the refusal of the boys to give false testimony against their teacher. Alexeyeva met with the Lithuanian Minister of Education to discuss the situation, and he initially agreed to remedy it but then changed his mind upon finding out who his visitor was. [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6] Document 9: Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU, “About Measures to End the Hostile Activity of Members of the So-called “Group for Assistance in the Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR,” 5 January, 1977. After the two informational reports above, the KGB started to get serious about terminating the activities of the MHG. This report charges that the group was capable of inflicting serious damage to Soviet interests, that in recent months group members have stepped up their subversive activities, especially through the dissemination of samizdat documents (and particularly the MHG reports), undermining Soviet claims to be implementing the Helsinki Final Act. The Procuracy would later develop measures to put an end to these activities. [Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 18, Container 28] Document 10: Resolution of Secretariat of CC of CPSU, “On Measures for the Curtailment of the Criminal Activities of Orlov, Ginsburg, Rudenko and Ventslova,” 20 January, 1977. Following the recommendations of the KGB report above, and another report submitted by Andropov on January 20, the CC CPSU Secretariat decides to “intercept and curtail the activities” of Orlov, Ginzburg, Rudenko and Ventslov of the MHG, Ukrainian and Lithuanian Helsinki groups. All four would be arrested soon after the resolution. [Source: The Bukovsky Archive, Soviet Archives at INFO-RUSS http://psi.ece.jhu.edu/~kaplan/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/buk.html, Folder 3.2] Document 11: Extract from CC CPSU Politburo Meeting, “About the Instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington for His Conversation with Vance on the Question of “Human Rights,” 18 February, 1977. After Orlov and Ginzburg are arrested and Lyudmila Alexeyeva goes into exile, and anticipating the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow in March, the Politburo discusses a rebuff to the Carter administration on human rights issues. Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin is instructed to meet with Vance and inform him of Soviet “bewilderment” regarding Carter administration attempts to raise the issue of Ginsburg’s arrest. Dobrynin should explain to administration officials that human rights is not an issue of inter-state relations but an internal matter in which the United States should not interfere. [Source: TsKhSD (Central Archive of Contemporary Documents) Fond 89, Opis list 25, Document 44] Document 12: “Dignity or Death: How they Plant Dirty Pictures and Dollars on Men Who Fight for Freedom,” The Daily Mail, London, 21 March, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Nicholas Bethell. Documents 12-16 comprise a series of articles in the Western media printed soon after Lyudmila Alexeyeva’s emigration from the USSR. In interviews she described the deteriorating human rights situation in the Soviet Union, including the increased repression and arrests of Helsinki groups members in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Georgia, and calls on the West to put pressure on the Soviet government to comply with the Helsinki Accords. Document 13: “Dignity or Death: My Phone was Dead and All Night the KGB Waited Silently at My Door,” The Daily Mail, London, 22 March, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Nicholas Bethell. Document 14: “Why Brezhnev Must Never be Believed,” The Daily Mail, London, 23 March, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Nicholas Bethell. Document 15: “Soviet Human Rights from Mrs. Lyudmila Alexeyeva and others,” The Times, London, 26 April, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Andrey Amalrik, Vadimir Bukovsky. Document 16: “Soviet Dissidents on the Run,” The Washington Post, 2 June, 1977, by Joseph Kraft. Document 17: “Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords,” Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session; on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords; Volume IV: Soviet Helsinki Watch Reports on Repression June 3, 1977; U.S. Policy and the Belgrade Conference, 6 June, 1977. Document 18: National Security Council, Global Issues [staff], to Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Advisor, “Evening Report,” June 7, 1977. This report to their boss by the staff of the Global Issues directorate of the National Security Council on their daily activities includes a remarkable initial paragraph describing internal U.S. government discussions of the Moscow Helsinki Group (called here “the Orlov Committee”). Staffer Jessica Tuchman says a State Department-hosted group of experts all agreed that “the hidden bombshell in the whole human rights debate with the USSR” was the fact that the nationalist movements in the Soviet Union all saw human rights activism as just the “first step” to autonomy – thus the real threat to the Soviet government. [Source: Carter Presidential Library, FOIA case NLC 10-3-2-7-8, 2008] Document 19: Central Intelligence Agency, “The Evolution of Soviet Reaction to Dissent,” 15 July, 1977. This document traces the Soviet government’s response to dissident activity especially in light of their agreement to the human rights provisions outlined in Basket III of the Helsinki Accords. The CIA notes that the Soviet Union signed the accords assuming it would not result in an increase in internal opposition, but that instead the Basket III provisions have provided a rallying point for dissent. It also suggests that internal protests sparked by food shortages and open criticism of the Eurocommunists, including the French and Spanish communist parties, are further causes for the current Soviet crackdown on the opposition. It also mentions political unrest in Eastern Europe and the Unites States new human rights campaign, which has prompted dissidents to make their appeals directly to the U.S. government as reasons for Soviet anxiety. Next, it outlines the Soviet government’s much harsher measures against dissidents in the wake of the Helsinki Accords. These include arrests of members of the Helsinki group, cutting off Western access, and accusing dissidents of espionage. Further, it concludes that the Soviet government’s increased apparent anxiety over dissent is the result of a variety of factors, including the approach of the Belgrade conference and their general fears of increased Western contact leading to discontent and a variety of social vices. [Source: The Carter Presidential Library] Document 20: American Embassy Belgrade to Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, Text of Speech Given by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg at the Belgrade Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Meeting, November 1977 (excerpt). This text, the second half of the U.S. Embassy Belgrade cable reporting the speech made by U.S. ambassador Arthur Goldberg to the Belgrade review conference, specifically raises the cases of Orlov, Scharansky and Ginsberg – three of the founding members, with Alexeyeva, of the Moscow Helsinki Group – in the face of major objections from the Soviet delegation, and no small amount of disquiet from other diplomats present. While considered “timid” by the outside human righters like Alexeyeva, this initiative by the U.S. delegation created a breakthrough of sorts that would heighten the human rights dialogue at upcoming Helsinki review conferences and in the media. [Source: The Carter Presidential Library] Document 21: Secretary of State, to American Embassy Moscow, “Statement on Orlov,” 18 May, 1978. This public statement from the State Deparment’s noon press briefing, sent by cable to the U.S. Embassy Moscow and Consulate Leningrad, uses the strongest language to date on the Orlov case, no doubt informed by Alexeyeva and other Orlov colleagues in exile. Here, the U.S. “strongly deplores” Orlov’s conviction and calls it a “gross distortion of internationally accepted standards,” since the activities for which he was being punished were simply the monitoring of Soviet performance under the Helsinki Final Act. [Source: The Carter Presidential Library] Document 22: Joseph Aragon, to Hamilton Jordan, “Carter on Human Rights,” 7 July, 1978. This memorandum from White House staff member Joe Aragon to the president’s chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan, discusses the Soviet Union’s treatment of dissidents, as monitored by another White House staffer, Joyce Starr. Aragon notes that the overall Soviet campaign against dissidents continues despite Carter’s forceful public stance on human rights. He notes that if anything dissidents have become further shut out of Soviet society since Carter came to office. He specifically mentions the Helsinki group, and Slepak, Orlov, Scharansky, Nadel and Ginzburg as dissidents in need of United States help. He goes in depth into the Slepak case and the state of his family, characterizing Slepak as the Soviet equivalent of a Martin Luther King Jr. However, he writes that the administration so far has made public statements in support of the dissidents, but failed to act on the diplomatic level. Aragon concludes that Carter cares deeply about human rights, but that his reputation is at risk due to the failure of low-level officials to follow through the initiatives outlined in the Helsinki Final Act. Aragon calls for a meeting in which he and other will discuss a course of action for the president. [Source: The Carter Presidential Library] Document 23: Central Intelligence Agency, “Human Rights Review,” 18-31 August, 1978. This document contains a general overview of human rights throughout the world, but begins with a discussion of the condition of dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It notes that the most recent dissident activity has been in their statements of support for the Czech Charter 77 dissident movement. It also discusses the Soviet Union’s fear of East European and Soviet dissidents forming a united front of opposition. It also mentions an incident in which dissident Aleksandr Lyapin attempted to commit suicide by self-immolation in protest of Helsinki group leader Yuri Orlov’s court sentence, and that he has since been confined to a mental institution. [Source: The Carter Presidential Library] Document 24: Senator Henry M. Jackson, Remarks at the Coalition for a Democratic Majority Human Rights Dinner, September 30, 1978. Document 25: “Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords,” Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session; on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords; Volume X: Aleksandr Ginzburg on the Human Rights Situation in the U.S.S.R., 11 May, 1979. Document 26: “A Helsinki Clue to Moscow’s Salt II Intentions,” The New York Times, June 18, 1979, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Aleksandr Ginzberg, Petr Grigorenko, Yuri Mnyukh, and Valentin Turchin. Document 27: Jimmy Carter and Cyrus Vance, “Major Executive Statements on Behalf of Anatoliy Scharanskiy,” 16 July, 1979. Document 28: Peter Tarnoff, Department of State, to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “U.S. Government Initiatives on Behalf of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.” 17 April, 1980. This memorandum from State Department Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski contains a list of actions and statements by the U.S. government on human rights and protection of dissidents in the USSR. The list covers the years 1977 through 1980. The actions include reports on the Soviet Union’s implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, as well as discussions of these matters at international conferences. Another area of action has to do with investigating denials of exit visas to Jews and prisoners of conscience attempting to leave the Soviet Union. It also comprises various efforts to help imprisoned dissidents by sending observers to attend their trials and providing special aid to some families, including the Ginzburg/Shibayev and Sakharov/Yankelevich families. The document also includes a list of Carter’s addresses in which he voices concerns over human rights or the treatment of Soviet dissidents. Document 29: Helsinki Monitoring Group [members of the Moscow Helsinki group in exile], “On the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,” c. summer 1980. These recommendations were prepared by members of Helsinki groups in exile before the Madrid review conference of November 1980. The dissidents call the efforts of Western delegations at the earlier Belgrade conference “timid” and chide the lack of pressure on Moscow to observe the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The report describes the worsening human rights situation in the USSR after the Belgrade conference of 1977-78, arrests of the Helsinki Group members, persecution of religious believers, and restrictions on emigration. Recommendations include that the Madrid conference delegates demand that political prisoners, including Helsinki group members, be released, and that an international commission be created consisting of representatives of member-states to keep the pressure on the Soviets between the review conferences. Similar concerns, the report indicates, were raised by the MHG in its recommendations for the Belgrade conference in 1977. Document 30: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, letter to friends in Moscow, undated, circa summer 1984. This extraordinary personal letter provides a unique vista of Alexeyeva’s life in exile and her thinking about dissent. Here she describes how she found her calling as a historian (a “personal harbor” which is essential for enduring exile), came to write the book on Soviet dissent, and struggled to reform the radios (Liberty, Free Europe, Voice of America) against the nationalist-authoritarian messages provided from “Vermont and Paris” – meaning Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Vladimir Bukovsky, respectively – or, the Bolsheviks versus her own Mensheviks within the dissident movement, in her striking analogy. Also here are the personal details, the open window in the woods for the cats, the ruminations on the very process of writing letters (like cleaning house, do it regularly and it comes easily, otherwise it’s never done or only with great difficulty). Here she pleads for activation as opposed to liquidation of the Helsinki Groups, because “we have nothing else to replace them.” [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6] Document 31: Liudmila Alexeyeva, edited by Yuri Orlov, Documents and People, “What Gorbachev took from samizdat.” In this draft script prepared for a Radio Liberty show in 1987 together with Yuri Orlov, Alexeyeva traces the roots of Gorbachev’s new thinking to samizdat materials as far back as the 1960s. She finds an amazing continuity in terms of ideals and goals, especially in foreign policy-thinking about the primacy of human rights and an interdependent world. [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2] Document 32: Lyudmila Alexeyeva’s handwritten draft paper on informal associations in the USSR. This unique handwritten draft written for Alexeyeva on the emergence of informal organizations – the first NGOs – in the Soviet Union. The draft is undated but was most likely written in 1990 or early 1991. The main question is whether Gorbachev will stay in power and therefore whether the changes he brought about will stick. She sees the importance of informal organizations in reviving civil society in the Soviet Union and creating conditions for democratization. [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2] Document 33: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Trip to Nizhny Novgorod, 9 November, 1992. Lyudmila Alexeyeva visited Nizhny Novgorod on August 29, 1992, and met with members of Dialogue Club and the independent trade union at the ship-building plant Krasnoe Sormovo. Semen Bulatkin, her main contact, talked to her about the political club they founded at the plant, whose outside member was governor Boris Nemtsov, and the difficulties of organizing a free trade union there. The independent trade union was founded in February 1992, with an initial membership of about 250-300 people. Two weeks later, threatened by the plant’s administration with the loss of jobs or social benefits, membership declined to 157. Alexeyeva also met with Governor Nemtsov – a radical reformer and close supporter of President Boris Yeltsin – who told her he had read her book on Soviet dissent and was an active listener of Radio Liberty. [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2] Document 34: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Trip to Moscow Report, 10-20 December, 1992. Alexeyeva visited Russia in December 1992, just a year after the Soviet collapse, at the behest of the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute, which had been a key international backer of Solidarity in Poland and sought to support similar independent union development in post-Soviet Russia. Alexeyeva’s trip report does not provide much cause for optimism. In it, she describes democratic reformers’ complaints about President Yeltsin and the lack of alternative progressive leadership; the resistance to change by older Party-dominated union structures; the lack of access to television by new, more democratic unions to make their case; and the effective transformation of Communist Party elites into quasi-capitalist owners and managers of the means of production – not because they are true reformers or effective producers, but because they know how to boss. Dozens of intriguing details and provocative conversation summaries fill the report, including a newspaper story alleging that Yeltsin was now privatizing his own appointment schedule with an outside company, selling access at $30,000 per meeting. [Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2] |
TMZ-Paul Ryan’s SHAMELESS Photo Op
Unveiled – Cuban Missile Crisis Communications
Cuban Missile Crisis Communications
A response to the National Security Archive release on October 12, 2012: “Cuban Missile Crisis Reveleations: Kennedy’s Secret Approach to Castro — Declassified RFK Documents Yield New Information on Back-Channel to Fidel Castro to Avoid Nuclear War.”
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB395/
Related on Russian SIGINT:
http://cryptome.org/jya/rusigint.htm
http://cryptome.org/conus-sigint.htm
To: coldwarcomms[at]yahoogroups.com
From: “OZOB99” <ozob99[at]yahoo.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Oct 2012 13:54:33 -0000
Subject: [coldwarcomms] Cuban Missile Crisis Comms
As the 50th anniversery of this event approaches, here is an update to a post I made 10 years ago,with anecdotes of activities at the AT&T Norfolk Central Office, arguably the epicenter of military telco circuit activity for this crisis.
“Norfolk probably had more involvment in telecommunications than Washington because it was the STC (serving test center) for CINCLANT/SACLANT, TAC HQ Langley AFB, and CONARC Ft. Monroe; with augmented circuits to their subordinate commands and bases, as well to the NCA and other NS/EP entities.
An unusual increase in expedited new circuits,mainly to Southern bases, was evident in the week or so prior to 10-22-62; but we had no way of knowing the nature or gravity of the situation, just that South Florida was a “hotspot”, & Cuba was likely involved due to previous sabre rattling in the news.
By the time Kennedy made his announcement we had established a hand-picked 24/7 “task force” of tech’s (including many additional brought in) expediting circuit provisioning (C&P Telco had similar groups installing on local channels and the customer premises). Circuits that normally had a 3-5 week interval were being established in 3 days or less!; all circuit info & engineering (with the Government Communications sales & engineering folks on an unprecedented 24/7 schedule also) was phoned/TTY in day & night, & posted on a large status chalk board, with the various workgroups copying their portion & running with it; an unbelievable beehive of activity that actually worked well considering the confusion, because we all knew now this was possibly a doomsday scenario without being told so specifically.
The small AT&T office at Key West, along with Homestead, were overwhelmed with circuits from TAC & CINCLANT; these normally “sleepy” little offices had never seen anything like this! The quantities of circuits weren’t as great as Norfolk but the intensity of activities certainly was. Naturally there were additional employees brought in to handle the workload.
In the space of a few weeks hundreds of new circuits were established radiating out of Norfolk, most to Southeastern military bases. A large number of the voice circuits were “C2” conditioned (amplitude & envelope delay) for KY9 encryption, utilizing strings of delay equalizers at various points on the layout. Despite lengthy & detailed calculations for these equalizers many circuits would not support encrypted voice (going green) due to having to use any channel available and many sections in tandem. These were re-engineered by trial & error/SWAG on the spot as they were being installed, some would only work with no equalization! (an anomaly explained by a chance combo of facilities that happened to have the right characteristics of delay. There were a few circuits on C carrier(open wire) that never could be conditioned for encryption.
Many existing voice circuits were upgraded to C2 conditioning for encryption; some of the voice grade data circuits required C2 conditioning but were more forgiving.
Many of the telegraph grade circuits were encrypted for KW-8 et al; these didn’t require conditioning but were difficult to trouble shoot.
A portable “Quick Start” package of Lenkurt 76 radio and 45B carrier was shipped in for additional local channels to the Norfolk Naval Base in case cable pairs ran out; also a wide band Quick Start package of LMX modems & 303 data sets for additional wide band channels to the Naval Base, presumably for KY-3 encryption.
AT&T also loaned DOD (Army I believe) some transportable microwave to fill in some gaps in their networks. (I’ve never found out whether it was TD-2,TE or the Lenkurt Quick start; nor where it was needed.)
In the course of implementing & troubleshooting these circuits we overheard some scary dialog, along with some intense salty curses & oaths.
Being “insiders” to a degree, we were more scared than the general public, and more relieved than most when the Russians blinked.
If asked ahead of time if that quantity of circuits could be established in those few days I think everyone would have said “no way”!; it seems even a stodgy heirarchy can do anything when you have to, replacing the bell shaped heads with virtual helmets.”
Public Intelligence – Obama and Romney 2012 Debates Memorandum of Understanding
The following is the memorandum of understanding between the Obama and Romney campaigns detailing rules and standards for the four arranged Presidential and Vice Presidential debates.
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Secrecy News – The Purpose of National Security Policy declassified
THE PURPOSE OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, DECLASSIFIED The most fundamental purpose of national security policy is not to keep the nation safe from physical attack but to defend the constitutional order. At least, that is what President Reagan wrote in a Top Secret 1986 directive. "The primary objective of U.S. foreign and security policy is to protect the integrity of our democratic institutions and promote a peaceful global environment in which they can thrive," President Reagan wrote in National Security Decision Directive 238 on "Basic National Security Strategy," which was partially declassified in 2005. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-238.pdf In a list of national security objectives, the directive does note the imperative "to protect the United States... from military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack." But that is not the primary objective, according to the Reagan directive. Defense of the Constitution evidently takes precedence. The first purpose of national security policy is "to preserve the political identity, framework and institutions of the United States as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution," President Reagan wrote. This is a remarkable statement, for several reasons. First, it recognizes that the political identity and institutions of the United States are not simply a given, but that they are vulnerable to many types of threats and must be actively defended and sustained. This task is not normally assigned the urgency or the priority given to "national security." Second, the directive distinguishes between constitutional governance and physical security. Not every measure intended to promote security is constitutional. And not every act in defense of democratic self-governance is likely to promote public safety. (The American Revolution was not calculated to increase "homeland security." Quite the opposite.) Sometimes a choice between the two is required. President Reagan indicated what he thought the choice should be. And third, the directive is remarkable because its rhetoric was so imperfectly realized by the Reagan Administration (and egregiously defied in the Iran-Contra Affair) and has been largely abandoned by its successors. "Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government," wrote President George W. Bush in his 2002 National Security Strategy, skipping over President Reagan's "primary" objective. Likewise, "As President, I have often said that I have no greater responsibility than protecting the American people," President Obama wrote in his National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The Reagan directive invites reflection on what U.S. national security policy would look like if it were truly structured above all "to protect the integrity of our democratic institutions." In a section of the directive that was only classified Confidential, President Reagan contrasted the U.S. with the Soviet Union, which was described as its polar opposite. "Our way of life, founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual, depends on a stable and pluralistic world order within which freedom and democratic institutions can thrive. Yet, the greatest threat to the Soviet system, in which the State controls the destiny of the individual, is the concept of freedom itself." "The survival of the Soviet system depends to a significant extent upon the persistent and exaggerated representation of foreign threats, through which it seeks to justify both the subjugation of its own people and the expansion of Soviet military capabilities well beyond those required for self-defense," President Reagan wrote. Numerous Presidential directives from the Reagan Administration have been declassified in recent years and have released by the Reagan Library, though others still remain partially or completely classified. Many of the declassified directives provide a fascinating account that enlarges and enriches the public record of events of the time. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html Only last year, for example, a 1985 directive (NSDD-172) on "Presenting the Strategic Defense Initiative" was finally declassified. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-172.pdf This year, NSDD 159 on "Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination Procedures" (1985) was declassified. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-159.pdf NSDD 207 on "The National Program for Combatting Terrorism" (1986) was declassified in 2008. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-207.pdf Among other things, that directive ordered the Attorney General to "Review the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and determine whether terrorist movements or organizations are abusing its provisions." JOB GROWTH DURING THE RECOVERY, AND MORE FROM CRS New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has not made available to the public include the following. Job Growth During the Recovery, updated October 16, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41434.pdf The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): Funding Issues After a Decade of Implementation, FY2004-FY2013, October 10, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42776.pdf Statutes of Limitation in Federal Criminal Cases: An Overview, updated October 1, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31253.pdf Venezuela: Issues for Congress, updated October 16, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf Georgia's October 2012 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications, October 15, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42777.pdf Iran Sanctions, updated October 15, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood@fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood
Cold Case Files – Rear Window/The Peeper – Full Documentary Movie
Opfer berichten über die mutmaßlichen Rufmordtatktiken der GoMoPa
The Devil Bat – Full Movie – Bela Lugosi
Dr. Carruthers plots his revenge on his employers who are making a profit off of his invention. He electrically enlarges bats and sends them out to kill his employers’ family by instilling in the bats a hatred for a particular perfume he has discovered, which he gets his victims to apply before going outdoors. Johnny Layton, a reporter, eventually figures out Carruthers is the killer. He puts the perfume on himself and Carruthers in the hopes he will reveal himself, but the bats swoop on in before he get a confession.
This campy, entertaining cheapie from PRC Pictures features Bela Lugosi as a chemist who plots an elaborate revenge scheme on his business partners, whom he feels have cheated him out of his share. To this end he develops a mutant breed of vicious, oversized bats and trains several of this breed to home in on a special chemical which he then blends with shaving lotion. Presenting gifts of the lotion to his partners as a peace offering (and browbeating them into splashing it on themselves while in his presence), he subsequently unleashes his monstrous pets to tear them to pieces. Believe it or not, this was one of PRC’s more successful horror programmers, spawning a the sequel Devil Bat’s Daughter.
SI Swimsuit Ana Paula Video
Revealed – Fordow Nuclear Plant Qom, Iran in Winter
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