Crying Freeman – Full Movie

Crying Freeman is a 1995 French and Canadian produced action film, directed by Christophe Gans, based on the “Portrait of a Killer” arc of the best-selling manga of the same name by Kazuo Koike and Ryoichi Ikegami.

Despite being heavily promoted by Viz Media on Animerica magazine and reprints of the Crying Freeman graphic novel, the film was never released in the United States.

A lethal assassin for a secret Chinese organisation, who sheds tears of regret each time he kills, is seen swiftly and mercilessly executing three Yakuza gangsters by a beautiful artist. She is captivated by the grace of his kill and later falls in love with him. An intense power struggle for the leadership of the Yakuza Clans ensues as they seek vengeance for the death of their leader. They soon realise the fatal mistake of underestimating the deadly skills of the Crying Freeman.

Starring;

Mark Dacascos
Julie Condra
Tchéky Karyo
Byron Mann
Yoko Shimada
Masaya Kato
Rae Dawn Chong
Mako

Secrecy News – Intelligence Spending drops for a second year


For the second year in a row and for only the second time in the post-9/11
era, total intelligence spending declined last year to $75.4 billion,
according to figures released yesterday by the Director of National
Intelligence and the Department of Defense.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/budget/index.html

Total spending had peaked in FY2010 at $80.1 billion, and declined in
FY2011 to $78.6 billion.

"We are looking at some pretty steep budget cuts across the board in the
Intelligence Community," DNI James Clapper told the Senate Intelligence
Committee last January.

"Never before has the Intelligence Community been called upon to master
such complexity on so many issues in such a resource-constrained
environment," he said then. "We're rising to the challenge by continuing to
integrate the Intelligence Community, ... taking advantage of new
technologies, implementing new efficiencies, and, as always, simply working
hard. But, candidly, maintaining the world's premier intelligence
enterprise in the face of shrinking budgets will be difficult. We'll be
accepting and managing risk more so than we've had to do in the last
decade."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/threat.pdf

But while intelligence budgets are shrinking, they remain very high by
historical standards, having more than doubled over the past decade.

Total intelligence spending is comprised of two budget constructs:  the
National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program
(MIP).  The large defense intelligence agencies -- including NSA, NRO, and
NGA -- receive funding through both budget programs.

For the first time ever in FY2012, both the budget request for the NIP
($55 billion) and the subsequent budget appropriation ($53.9 billion) have
been disclosed.  (The MIP request was disclosed for FY2013, but not for
FY2012.)  This is something of a breakthrough in intelligence
classification policy.

Hypothetically (or so it was long asserted), a hostile intelligence
analyst could derive valuable insight from the gap between each year's
budget appropriation, or between the appropriation and the request, to the
detriment of U.S. security.

"Disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably
could be expected to cause damage to the national security in several
ways," wrote Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet in 1999 in a
successful effort to keep the budget secret at that time. "First,
disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide
foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of its
intelligence capabilities and weaknesses. The difference between the
appropriation for one year and the Administration's budget request for the
next provides a measure of the Administration's unique, critical assessment
of its own intelligence programs. A requested budget decrease reflects a
decision that existing intelligence programs are more than adequate to meet
the national security needs of the United States. A requested budget
increase reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are
insufficient to meet our national security needs. A budget request with no
change in spending reflects a decision that existing programs are just
adequate to meet our needs."

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/tenet499.html

But this longstanding official position has now lost any semblance of
cogency.

"In my view, this argument does not stand up to even a few minutes of
serious analysis," wrote former 9/11 Commission executive director (and
Romney campaign adviser) Philip Zelikow in the latest issue of the CIA
journal Studies in Intelligence.

But with serious analysis evidently in short supply, total intelligence
budget secrecy remained the norm for many decades until recently.

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

ANONYME STASI-SCHEI**HAUS-FLIEGEN – NOMEN EST OMEN

Liebe Leser,

trotz serienmässiger Vorstrafen wegen Betruges und der zahlreicher anderer LKA, Kripo-,FBI-Ermittlungen werden die organisierten GoMoPa-STASI-Gangster Ihre unwahren Lügen gegen mich nicht löschen und stellen diese immer wieder neu ins Netz: Kein Wunder, denn ich habe die Verbrechen dieser organisierten Kriminellen aufgedeckt und werde dies weiter tun – im Interesse aller anständigen Mitglieder der menschlichen Gesellschaft !

Wie dumm diese STASI-Verbrecher zeigt sich in deren eigenen  Texten: “Wie kann ein Magister eine Diplomarbeit schreiben” ? – wie in deren “Shithouse Fly Blog auf mich falsch dargelegt und natürlich haben die STASI-Kriminellen nicht den Hauch eines Beweises für irgendeine Behauptung – wir dagegen jede Menge und auch jede Menge Aktenzeichen gegen sie:

Zum Beispiel:

Klaus Maurischat ( Aktenzeichen Krefeld vom 24. April 2006; AZ: 28 Ls 85/05 – Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05, Klaus Maurischat, Lange Straße 38, 27313 Dörverden)

FAKT IST: Klaus Maurischat ist vorbestraft

Aktenzeichen Krefeld vom 24. April 2006; AZ: 28 Ls 85/05 – Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05, Klaus Maurischat, Lange Straße 38, 27313 Dörverden)

Sie wollen mich zwingen, mit ihren Lügen meine Berichterstattung gegen sie einzustellen – wie hier ersichtlich:

So wollte der Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat uns zwingen, die Berichterstattung über “GoMoPa” zu stoppen

Unser Bildtext: Klaus Maurischat: There is no Place like home

So wollte der Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat uns zwingen die Berichterstattung über den “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa” einzustellen

Meine Anmerkung:  Sie lesen

den Original-Text mit den Original-Rechtschreibfehlern von Maurischat  in chronologischer Reihenfolge von unten nach oben. “Unter den Linden” ist die Regus-Tarnadresse für den untergetauchten Serienbetrüger und Stasi-Ganoven. “SUMA” steht im Sprach-Jargon des “GoMoPa”-”NACHRICHTENDIENSTLERS” für Suchmaschine.

Zitat:

HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)

> Was anderes fällt einem Hilfsschüler auch nicht ein! Wenn ich dich
> schnappe, dann haue ich dir die Fresse ein – mein Lieber! Merk dir
> das gut, du Kinderficker!
>
> Was sagt denn dein Freund Dr. XXX  zu deinem handeln, Schwuchtel?
>
> > HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)
> >
> > > Geiles Google Suchergebniss hast du mittlerweile. Das ist sowas von
> > > geil. Am besten ist dieser Beitrag zu Deiner Magisterarbeit, du
> > > Spinner:
> > >
> > > http://scheisshausfliege.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/die-diplomarbeit-des-magisters-bernd-pulch-ein-haufen-scheisse/
> > >
> > > Wenn du nicht aufhörst, wird niemand mehr ein Stück Brot von dir
> > > nehmen. Dein Name ist dan absolut durch. Glaub mir, wir verstehen da
> > > mehr von als du Schwachkopf!
> > >
> > > Im Übrigen kannst du mich stets gern persönlich treffen. Unter den
> > > Linden 21, Berlin –  habe immer für dich Feigling Zeit! (TARN-ADRESSE)
> > >
> > > So – und nun überle wann du die Artikel über uns löschen willst,
> > > sonst mache ich die erste Seite der SUMA Ergebnisse mit deinen
> > > Einträgen voll.

Weitere Info zu den Verbrechen der organisierten Kriminellen der STASI  “GoMoPa” aus Erich Mielkes Kloake auf http://www.victims-opfer.com

Und natürlich können die STASI-“GoMoPa” auch dumm-dreist fälschen:

http://www.victims-opfer.com/?p=26325

TOP-SECRET – California State Prisons Mexican Mafia (La eMe) Membership Chart

The following chart was compiled by the Institutional Gang Investigators at Pelican Bay State Prison, California State Prison – Corcoran and San Quentin in November 2011.

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

Download

Die absurd-lächerlichen Fälschungen der STASI-“GoMoPa”

Hier sind die Links

http://www.meridiancapital.wordpress.com/

http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/aktien/aktien-im-fokus/wirecard-kurssturz-wenn-short-seller-jojo-spielen/3402446.html

http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/boerse-maerkte/boerse-inside/marktgeruechte-finanzaufsicht-untersucht-kursachterbahn-bei-wirecard/3406252.html

Cryptome unveils – NRC Tightens Access to Radioactive Material

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 207 (Thursday, October 25, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65220-65231]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-26299]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2012-0257; EA-12-062]

Certain Licensees Requesting Unescorted Access to Radioactive 
Material; Order Imposing Trustworthiness and Reliability Requirements 
for Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Material (Effective 
Immediately)

I

    The Licensee identified in Attachment 1 \1\ to this Order holds a 
license issued by an Agreement State, in accordance with the Atomic 
Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. The license authorizes it to 
perform services on devices containing certain radioactive material for 
customers licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or 
an Agreement State to possess and use certain quantities of the 
radioactive materials listed in Attachment 2 to this Order. Commission 
regulations at 10 CFR 20.1801 or equivalent Agreement State regulations 
require Licensees to secure, from unauthorized removal or access, 
licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas. 
Commission regulations at 10 CFR 20.1802 or equivalent Agreement State 
regulations require Licensees to control and maintain constant 
surveillance of licensed material that is in a controlled or 
unrestricted area and that is not in storage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be 
released to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II

    Subsequent to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
issued immediately effective security Orders to NRC and Agreement State 
Licensees under the Commission's authority to protect the common 
defense and security of the nation. The Orders required certain 
manufacturing and distribution (M&D) Licensees to implement Additional 
Security Measures (ASMs) for the radioactive materials listed in 
Attachment 2 to this Order (the radionuclides of concern), to 
supplement the existing regulatory requirements. The ASMs included 
requirements for determining the trustworthiness and reliability of 
individuals that require unescorted access to the radionuclides of 
concern. Section 652 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which became law 
on August 8, 2005, amended Section 149 of the AEA to require 
fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
identification and criminal history records check for ``any individual 
who is permitted unescorted access to radioactive materials or other 
property subject to regulation by the Commission that the Commission 
determines to be of such significance to the public health and safety 
or the common defense and security as to warrant fingerprinting and 
background checks.'' Section 149 of the AEA also requires that ``all 
fingerprints obtained by a Licensee or applicant* * *shall be submitted 
to the Attorney General of the United States through the Commission for 
identification and a criminal history records check.'' As a result, the 
trustworthiness and reliability requirements of the ASMs were updated 
and the M&D Licensees were issued additional Orders imposing the new 
fingerprinting requirements.
    In late 2005, the NRC and the Agreement States began issuing 
Increased Controls (IC) Orders or other legally binding requirements to 
Licensees who are authorized to possess the radionuclides of concern. 
Paragraph IC 1.c of the IC requirements stated that ``service providers 
shall be escorted unless determined to be trustworthy and reliable by 
an NRC-required background investigation as an employee of a 
Manufacturing and Distribution Licensee.'' Starting in December 2007, 
the NRC and the Agreement States began issuing additional Orders or 
other legally binding requirements to the IC Licensees, imposing the 
new fingerprinting requirements. In the December 2007 Fingerprinting 
Order, Paragraph IC 1.c of the IC requirements was superseded by the 
requirement that ``Service provider Licensee employees shall be 
escorted unless determined to be trustworthy and reliable by an NRC-
required background investigation.'' However, NRC did not require 
background investigations for non-M&D service provider Licensees. 
Consequently, only service representatives of certain M&D Licensees may 
be granted unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern at an IC 
Licensee facility, even though non-M&D service provider Licensees 
provide similar services and have the same degree of knowledge of the 
devices they service as M&D Licensees. To maintain appropriate access 
control to the radionuclides of concern, and to allow M&D Licensees and 
non-M&D service provider Licensees to have the same level of access at 
customers' facilities, NRC is imposing trustworthiness and reliability 
requirements for unescorted access to radionuclides of concern, as set 
forth in this Order. These requirements apply to non-M&D service 
provider Licensees that request and have a need for unescorted access 
by their representatives to the radionuclides of concern at IC Licensee 
facilities. These trustworthiness and reliability requirements are 
equivalent to the requirements for M&D Licensees who perform services 
requiring unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern.
    In order to provide assurance that non-M&D service provider 
Licensees are implementing prudent measures to achieve a consistent 
level of protection for service providers requiring unescorted access 
to the radionuclides of concern at IC Licensee facilities, the Licensee 
identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall implement the 
requirements of this Order. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, 
because of potentially significant adverse impacts associated with a 
deliberate malevolent act by an individual with unescorted

[[Page 65221]]

access to the radionuclides of concern, I find that the public health, 
safety, and interest require this Order to be effective immediately.

III

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, 
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Parts 20, 30 and 33, 
it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that the licensee 
identified in attachment 1 to this order comply with the requirements 
set forth in this order.
    A.1. The Licensee shall establish and maintain a fingerprinting 
program that meets the requirements of Attachment 3 to this Order for 
individuals that require unescorted access to the radionuclides of 
concern. The Licensee shall complete implementation of the requirements 
of Attachment 3 to this Order within one hundred eighty (180) days of 
the date of this Order, or before providing written verification to 
another Licensee subject to the IC requirements, or attesting to or 
certifying the trustworthiness and reliability of a service provider 
for unescorted access to the radionuclides of concern at a customer's 
facility.
    A.2. Within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order, the 
Licensee shall designate a ``Reviewing Official'' for determining 
unescorted access to the radioactive materials as listed in Attachment 
2 to this Order by other individuals. The designated Reviewing Official 
shall be determined to be trustworthy and reliable by the Licensee in 
accordance with the requirements described in Attachment 3 to this 
Order and must be authorized to have unescorted access to the 
radioactive materials listed in Attachment 2 to this Order as part of 
his or her job duties.
    A.3. Fingerprints for unescorted access need not be taken if a 
designated Reviewing Official is relieved from the fingerprinting 
requirement by 10 CFR 73.61, or has been favorably adjudicated by a 
U.S. Government program involving fingerprinting and a FBI 
identification and criminal history records check \2\ within the last 
five (5) years, or for any person who has an active Federal security 
clearance (provided in the latter two cases that they make available 
the appropriate documentation \3\). The Licensee may provide, for NRC 
review, written confirmation from the agency/employer which granted the 
Federal security clearance or reviewed the FBI identification and 
criminal history records results based upon a fingerprint 
identification check. The NRC will determine whether, based on the 
written confirmation, the designated Reviewing Official may have 
unescorted access to the radioactive materials listed in Attachment 2 
to this Order, and therefore, be permitted to serve as the Licensee's 
Reviewing Official.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Examples of such programs include (1) National Agency Check, 
(2) Transportation Worker Identification Credentials in accordance 
with 49 CFR Part 1572, (3) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and 
Explosives background checks and clearances in accordance with 27 
CFR Part 555, (4) Health and Human Services security risk 
assessments for possession and use of select agents and toxins in 
accordance with 42 CFR Part 73, and (5) Hazardous Material security 
threat assessment for hazardous material endorsement to commercial 
drivers license in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572, Customs and 
Border Patrol's Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program. The FAST 
program is a cooperative effort between the Bureau of Customs and 
Border Patrol and the governments of Canada and Mexico to coordinate 
processes for the clearance of commercial shipments at the U.S.-
Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders. Participants in the FAST program, 
which requires successful completion of a background records check, 
may receive expedited entrance privileges at the northern and 
southern borders.
    \3\ This documentation must allow the NRC or NRC-approved 
Reviewing Official to verify that the individual has fulfilled the 
unescorted access requirements of Section 149 of the AEA by 
submitting to fingerprinting and a FBI identification and criminal 
history records check.
    \4\ The NRC's determination of this individual's unescorted 
access to the radionuclides of concern in accordance with the 
process described in Enclosure 4 to the transmittal letter of this 
Order is an administrative determination that is outside the scope 
of this Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A.4. A designated Reviewing Official may not review the results 
from the FBI identification and criminal history records checks or make 
unescorted access determinations until the NRC has approved the 
individual as the Licensee's Reviewing Official.
    A.5. The NRC will determine whether this individual (or any 
subsequent Reviewing Official) may have unescorted access to the 
radionuclides of concern, and therefore, will be permitted to serve as 
the Licensee's Reviewing Official. The NRC-approved Reviewing Official 
shall be the recipient of the results of the FBI identification and 
criminal history records check of the other Licensee employees 
requiring unescorted access to the radioactive materials listed in 
Attachment 2 to this Order, and shall control such information as 
specified in the ``Protection of Information'' section of Attachment 3 
to this Order.
    A.6. The NRC-approved Reviewing Official shall determine whether an 
individual may have unescorted access to radioactive materials that 
equal or exceed the quantities in Attachment 2 to this Order, in 
accordance with the requirements described in Attachment 3 to this 
Order.
    B. Prior to requesting fingerprints from a Licensee employee, a 
copy of this Order shall be provided to that person.
    C.1. The Licensee shall, in writing, within twenty-five (25) days 
of the date of this Order, notify the Commission (1) if it is unable to 
comply with any of the requirements described in this Order, including 
Attachment 3 to this Order, (2) if compliance with any of the 
requirements is unnecessary in its specific circumstances, or (3) if 
implementation of any of the requirements would cause the Licensee to 
be in violation of the provisions of any Commission or Agreement State 
regulation or its license. The notification shall provide the 
Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or variation of any 
specific requirement.
    C.2. The Licensee shall complete implementation of the requirements 
of Attachment 3 to this Order within one hundred eighty (180) days of 
the date of this Order.
    C.3. The Licensee shall report to the Commission when they have 
achieved full compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 
3 to this Order. The report shall be made within twenty-five (25) days 
after full compliance has been achieved.
    C.4. If during the implementation period of this Order, the 
Licensee is unable, due to circumstances beyond its control, to meet 
the requirements of this Order by [December 3, 2012], the Licensee 
shall request, in writing, that the Commission grant an extension of 
time to implement the requirements. The request shall provide the 
Licensee's justification for seeking additional time to comply with the 
requirements of this Order.
    C.5. Licensees shall notify the NRC's Headquarters Operations 
Office at 301-816-5100 within 24 hours if the results from a FBI 
identification and criminal history records check indicate that an 
individual is identified on the FBI's Terrorist Screening Data Base.
    Licensee responses to C.1, C.2., C.3., and C.4. above shall be 
submitted in writing to the Director, Office of Federal and State 
Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Licensee responses shall 
be marked as ``Security-Related Information--Withhold Under 10 CFR 
2.390.''
    The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind 
any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good cause by the 
Licensee.

[[Page 65222]]

IV

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order within twenty-five (25) days of the date of this Order. In 
addition, the Licensee and any other person adversely affected by this 
Order may request a hearing of this Order within twenty-five (25) days 
of the date of the Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will 
be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for 
extension of time must be made, in writing, to the Director, Division 
of Materials Safety and State Agreements, Office of Federal and State 
Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of 
good cause for the extension.
    The answer may consent to this Order. If the answer includes a 
request for a hearing, it shall, under oath or affirmation, 
specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which the 
Licensee relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have 
been issued. If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, 
that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his 
interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the 
criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).
    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a 
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139, 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by 
telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID) 
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal 
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise 
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or 
petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or 
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID 
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish 
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the 
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help
/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for 
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the NRC's public Web 
site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but 
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted 
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer 
assistance in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, 
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's 
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, 
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on 
the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance 
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/
e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any 
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition 
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document 
via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's public 
Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email to 
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call to 1-866-672-7640. The 
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., 
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants 
filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the 
document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by 
first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, 
express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the 
document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having 
granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded

[[Page 65223]]

pursuant to an order of the Commission, or the presiding officer. 
Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information, 
such as social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers 
in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires 
submission of such information. With respect to copyrighted works, 
except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory 
filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are 
requested not to include copyrighted materials in their submission.
    If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose 
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order 
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held the 
issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order 
should be sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to 
requesting a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move 
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the 
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section III above shall be (final twenty-five (25) days) 
from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an 
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the 
provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a 
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this 
order.

    Dated this 16th day of October, 2012.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mark A. Satorius,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 
Management Programs.
Attachments:
1. Applicable Materials Licensee
2. Table 1: Radionuclides of Concern
3. Requirements for Service Provider Licensees Providing Written 
VerificationAttesting to or Certifying the Trustworthiness and 
Reliability of Service Providers forUnescorted Access to Certain 
Radioactive Material at Customer Facilities, including Requirements for 
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Checks

Attachment 1: Applicable Materials Licensee Redacted

Attachment 2: Order Imposing Trustworthiness and Reliability 
Requirements for Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Material

                    Table 1--Radionuclides of Concern
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Quantity of concern     Quantity of
          Radionuclide                 \1\ (TBq)       concern \2\ (Ci )
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Am-241..........................  0.6................                 16
Am-241/Be.......................  0.6................                 16
Cf-252..........................  0.2................                5.4
Cm-244..........................  0.5................                 14
Co-60...........................  0.3................                8.1
Cs-137..........................  1..................                 27
Gd-153..........................  10.................                270
Ir-192..........................  0.8................                 22
Pm-147..........................  400................             11,000
Pu-238..........................  0.6................                 16
Pu-239/Be.......................  0.6................                 16
Ra-226 \3\......................  0.4................                 11
Se-75...........................  2..................                 54
Sr-90 (Y-90)....................  10.................                270
Tm-170..........................  200................              5,400
Yb-169..........................  3..................                 81
Combinations of radioactive       See Footnote Below
 materials listed above \4\.       \5\.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of the same
  radionuclide should be included when the total activity equals or
  exceeds the quantity of concern.
\2\ The primary values used for compliance with this Order are TBq. The
  curie (Ci) values are rounded to two significant figures for
  informational purposes only.
\3\ The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
  authorizes NRC to regulate Ra-226 and NRC is in the process of
  amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra-226.
\4\ Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated
  if breaching a common physical security barrier (e.g., a locked door
  at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the
  radioactive material or devices containing the radioactive material.
\5\ If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of
  the activity of each source, i of radionuclide, n, A(i,n), to the
  quantity of concern for radionuclide n, Q(n), listed for that
  radionuclide equals or exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for
  radionuclide A) / (quantity of concern for radionuclide A)] +
  [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) / (quantity of
  concern for radionuclide B)] + etc.* * * >1.

Guidance for Aggregation of Sources

    NRC supports the use of the International Atomic Energy 
Association's (IAEA) source categorization methodology as defined in 
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.9, ``Categorization of 
Radioactive Sources,'' (2005) (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf) and as endorsed by the agency's 
Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, 
January 2004 (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/
Code-2004_web.pdf). The Code defines a three-tiered source 
categorization scheme. Category 1 corresponds to the largest source 
strength (equal to or greater than 100 times the quantity of concern 
values listed in Table 1) and Category 3, the smallest (equal or 
exceeding one-tenth the quantity of concern values listed in Table 
1. Additional security measures apply to sources that are equal to 
or greater than the quantity of concern values listed in Table 1, 
plus aggregations of smaller sources that are equal to or greater 
than the quantities in Table 1. Aggregation only applies to sources 
that are collocated.
    Licensees who possess individual sources in total quantities 
that equal or exceed the Table 1 quantities are required to 
implement additional security measures. Where there are many small 
(less than the quantity of concern values) collocated sources whose 
total aggregate activity equals or exceeds the Table 1 values, 
licensees are to implement additional security measures.

[[Page 65224]]

    Some source handling or storage activities may cover several 
buildings, or several locations within specific buildings. The 
question then becomes, ``When are sources considered collocated for 
purposes of aggregation''? For purposes of the additional controls, 
sources are considered collocated if breaching a single barrier 
(e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow 
access to the sources. Sources behind an outer barrier should be 
aggregated separately from those behind an inner barrier (e.g., a 
locked source safe inside the locked storage room). However, if both 
barriers are simultaneously open, then all sources within these two 
barriers are considered to be collocated. This logic should be 
continued for other barriers within or behind the inner barrier.
    The following example illustrates the point: A lockable room has 
sources stored in it. Inside the lockable room, there are two 
shielded safes with additional sources in them. Inventories are as 
follows:
    The room has the following sources outside the safes: Cf-252, 
0.12 TBq (3.2 Ci); Co-60, 0.18 TBq (4.9 Ci), and Pu-238, 0.3 TBq 
(8.1 Ci). Application of the unity rule yields: (0.12 / 0.2) + (0.18 
/ 0.3) + (0.3 / 0.6) = 0.6 + 0.6 + 0.5 = 1.7. Therefore, the sources 
would require additional security measures.
    Shielded safe 1 has a 1.9 TBq (51 Ci) Cs-137 source and 
a 0.8 TBq (22 Ci) Am-241 source. In this case, the sources would 
require additional security measures, regardless of location, 
because they each exceed the quantities in Table 1.
    Shielded safe 2 has two Ir-192 sources, each having an 
activity of 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci). In this case, the sources would not 
require additional security measures while locked in the safe. The 
combined activity does not exceed the threshold quantity 0.8 TBq (22 
Ci).
    Because certain barriers may cease to exist during source 
handling operations (e.g., a storage location may be unlocked during 
periods of active source usage), licensees should, to the extent 
practicable, consider two modes of source usage --``operations'' 
(active source usage) and ``shutdown'' (source storage mode). 
Whichever mode results in the greatest inventory (considering 
barrier status) would require additional security measures for each 
location.
    Use the following method to determine which sources of 
radioactive material require implementation of the Additional 
Security Measures:
     Include any single source equal to or greater than the 
quantity of concern in Table 1
     Include multiple collocated sources of the same 
radionuclide when the combined quantity equals or exceeds the 
quantity of concern
     For combinations of radionuclides, include multiple 
collocated sources of different radionuclides when the aggregate 
quantities satisfy the following unity rule: [(amount of 
radionuclide A) / (quantity of concern of radionuclide A)] + 
[(amount of radionuclide B) / (quantity of concern of radionuclide 
B)] + etc. * * * >= 1

Attachment 3: Requirements for Service Provider Licensees Providing 
Written Verification Attesting to or Certifying the Trustworthiness and 
Reliability of Service Providers for Unescorted Access to Certain 
Radioactive Material at Customer Facilities, Including Requirements for 
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Checks

A. General Requirements

    Licensees subject to the provisions of this Order shall comply 
with the requirements of this attachment. The term ``certain 
radioactive material'' means the radionuclides in quantities equal 
to or greater than the quantities listed in Attachment 2 to this 
Order.
    1. The Licensee shall provide the customer's facility written 
verification attesting to or certifying the trustworthiness and 
reliability of an individual as a service provider only for 
employees the Licensee has approved in writing (see requirement A.3 
below). The Licensee shall request unescorted access to certain 
radioactive material at customer licensee facilities only for 
approved service providers that require the unescorted access in 
order to perform a job duty.
    2. The trustworthiness, reliability, and true identity of a 
service provider shall be determined based on a background 
investigation. The background investigation shall address at least 
the past three (3) years, and as a minimum, include fingerprinting 
and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history records 
check as required in Section B, verification of employment history, 
education, and personal references. If a service provider's 
employment has been less than the required three (3) year period, 
educational references may be used in lieu of employment history.
    3. The Licensee shall document the basis for concluding that 
there is reasonable assurance that a service provider requiring 
unescorted access to certain radioactive material at a customer 
facility is trustworthy and reliable, and does not constitute an 
unreasonable risk for unauthorized use of the radioactive material. 
The Licensee shall maintain a list of service providers approved for 
unescorted access to certain radioactive material.
    4. The Licensee shall retain documentation regarding the 
trustworthiness and reliability of approved service providers for 
(3) years after the individual no longer requires unescorted access 
to certain radioactive material associated with the Licensee's 
activities.
    5. Each time the Licensee revises the list of approved service 
providers (see requirement 3 above), the Licensee shall retain the 
previous list for three (3) years after the revision.
    6. The Licensee shall provide to a customer written 
certification for each service provider for whom unescorted access 
to certain radioactive material at the customer's facility is 
required and requested. The written certification shall be dated and 
signed by the Reviewing Official. A new written certification is not 
required if an individual service provider returns to the customer 
facility within three (3) years, provided the customer has retained 
the prior certification.

B. Specific Requirements Pertaining to Fingerprinting and Criminal 
History Records Checks

    1. The Licensee shall fingerprint each service provider to be 
approved for unescorted access to certain radioactive materials 
following the procedures outlined in Enclosure 3 of the transmittal 
letter. The Licensee shall review and use the information received 
from the FBI identification and criminal history records check and 
ensure that the provisions contained in the subject Order and this 
attachment are satisfied.
    2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the 
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal 
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for 
revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as 
specified in the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' 
section of this attachment.
    3. Fingerprints for unescorted access need not be taken if an 
employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, 
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting 
requirement by 10 CFR 73.61, or any person who has been favorably-
decided by a U.S. Government program involving fingerprinting and an 
FBI identification and criminal history records check (e.g., 
National Agency Check, Transportation Worker Identification 
Credentials in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572, Bureau of Alcohol 
Tobacco Firearms and Explosives background checks and clearances in 
accordance with 27 CFR Part 555, Health and Human Services security 
risk assessments for possession and use of select agents and toxins 
in accordance with 42 CFR Part 73, Hazardous Material security 
threat assessment for hazardous material endorsement to commercial 
drivers license in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572, Customs and 
Border Patrol's Free and Secure Trade Program \5\) within the last 
five (5) years, or any person who has an active Federal Security 
Clearance (provided in the latter two cases that they make available 
the appropriate documentation \6\). Written confirmation from the 
Agency/employer which granted the Federal Security Clearance or 
reviewed the FBI criminal history records results based upon a 
fingerprint identification check must be provided. The Licensee must 
retain this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the 
date the

[[Page 65225]]

individual no longer requires unescorted access to certain 
radioactive material associated with the Licensee's activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ The FAST program is a cooperative effort between the Bureau 
of Customs and Border Patrol and the governments of Canada and 
Mexico to coordinate processes for the clearance of commercial 
shipments at the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders. Participants 
in the FAST program, which requires successful completion of a 
background records check, may receive expedited entrance privileges 
at the northern and southern borders.
    \6\ This documentation must allow the Reviewing Official to 
verify that the individual has fulfilled the unescorted access 
requirements of Section 149 of the AEA by submitting to 
fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history 
records check.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this 
Order must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the 
FBI.
    5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the 
FBI and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthiness and 
reliability requirements of Section A of this attachment, in making 
a determination whether to approve and certify the individual for 
unescorted access to certain radioactive materials.
    6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a 
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining 
an individual's suitability for unescorted access to certain 
radioactive materials.
    7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination 
whether to approve the individual for unescorted access to certain 
radioactive materials.

C. Prohibitions

    A Licensee shall not base a final determination to not provide 
certification for unescorted access to certain radioactive material 
for an individual solely on the basis of information received from 
the FBI involving: an arrest more than one (1) year old for which 
there is no information of the disposition of the case, or an arrest 
that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.
    A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal 
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would 
infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use 
the information in any way which would discriminate among 
individuals on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or 
age.

D. Right to Correct and Complete Information

    Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall 
make available to the individual the contents of any criminal 
records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct 
and complete information. Written confirmation by the individual of 
receipt of this notification must be maintained by the Licensee for 
a period of one (1) year from the date of the notification. If, 
after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is 
incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, 
correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter 
in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. 
These procedures include either direct application by the individual 
challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) 
that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as 
to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history 
record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 
28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards 
the challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests 
that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt 
of an Official communication directly from the agency that 
contributed the original information, the FBI Identification 
Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with the 
information supplied by that agency. The Licensee must provide at 
least ten (10) days for an individual to initiate an action 
challenging the results of an FBI identification and criminal 
history records check after the record is made available for his/her 
review. The Licensee may make a final unescorted access to certain 
radioactive material determination based upon the criminal history 
record only upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or 
correction of the record. Upon a final adverse determination on 
unescorted access to certain radioactive material, the Licensee 
shall provide the individual its documented basis for denial. 
Unescorted access to certain radioactive material shall not be 
granted to an individual during the review process.

E. Protection of Information

    1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an 
individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a 
system of files and procedures for protecting the record and the 
personal information from unauthorized disclosure.
    2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal 
information collected and maintained to persons other than the 
subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have a 
need to access the information in performing assigned duties in the 
process of determining whether to verify the individual for 
unescorted access to certain radioactive material. No individual 
authorized to have access to the information may re-disseminate the 
information to any other individual who does not have a need-to-
know.
    3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a 
criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee 
if the Licensee holding the criminal history record check receives 
the individual's written request to re-disseminate the information 
contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies 
information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social 
security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics 
for identification purposes.
    4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained 
under this section, available for examination by an authorized 
representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the 
regulations and laws.
    5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprints and criminal 
history records from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file has 
been transferred:
    a. for three (3) years after the individual no longer requires 
unescorted access, or
    b. for three (3) years after unescorted access to certain 
radioactive material was denied.

After the required three (3) year period, these documents shall be 
destroyed by a method that will prevent reconstruction of the 
information in whole or in part.

Implementing Guidance for Service Provider Licensees That are not 
Manufacturers or Distributors

A. Initial Actions

    1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 
Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS 2007-15) informing all NRC licensees 
that are non-manufacturer and distributor (non-M&D) service 
providers, and all Agreement State Radiation Control Program 
Directors and State Liaison Officers about the non-M&D Service 
Provider Order.
    2. Each non-M&D service provider licensee should review the RIS 
and determine if a need exists for its service representatives to 
have unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of 
concern at client facilities.
    3. If the licensee determines that unescorted access is required 
the licensee must request, in writing, that NRC issue the Order.

B. NRC Issues Order in Response to the Licensee's Request

    1. After receiving the Order, the licensee selects a candidate 
Reviewing Official. As part of the selection, the licensee must 
perform a trustworthiness and reliability review per the 
requirements in Attachment 3 of the Order. Note: the Reviewing 
Official MUST BE an individual that requires unescorted access to 
radioactive material in quantities of concern as part of his/her job 
duties.
    2. The licensee designates the Reviewing Official to NRC by 
submitting the individual's fingerprints and processing fee.
    3. NRC processes the fingerprints through the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and reviews the results of the criminal history 
investigation. If the investigation does not find disqualifying 
information, NRC will authorize the designated individual to serve 
as the licensees Reviewing Official.
    4. The Reviewing Official performs the trustworthiness and 
reliability reviews for other licensee service representatives that 
require unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of 
concern. The Reviewing Official must submit the fingerprints of the 
service representatives to NRC and receive the criminal history 
investigation results. The reviews must be performed per the 
requirements in Attachment 3 of the Order and Enclosure 4 of the 
transmittal letter. Based on the information and investigation 
results, the Reviewing Official determines if the service 
representative is trustworthy and reliable and that the service 
representative may be granted unescorted access to radioactive 
materials in quantities of concern.
    5. The Reviewing Official prepares, on company letterhead, an 
attestation or certification that indicates the service 
representative (by name) has been determined to be trustworthy and 
reliable in accordance with the NRC security Order for non-M&D 
Service Providers. The Reviewing Official signs and dates this 
document.
    6. Client licensees may accept the signed and dated document in 
lieu of conducting their own trustworthiness and reliability review 
of the named service representative.

[[Page 65226]]

C. NRC Actions During Future Inspections

    1. During future inspections, both the service provider licensee 
and the client licensee will be audited to assure compliance with 
the Order requirements and the implementation process.

Questions and Answers With Regards to Fingerprinting and FBI Criminal 
History Records Checks

    1. Information on how I would be required to respond to this 
notice when I receive it does not appear to be included with the 
implementing guidance? Will my response include sensitive 
information?
    The information on how to respond to the NRC Order requiring 
implementation of the fingerprinting requirements is contained in 
the Order itself. The NRC Orders are not considered sensitive 
information. Examples of previous Orders can be found by searching 
ADAMS or NRC's Web site.
    Licensee responses to the Order are considered sensitive 
information and should be marked appropriately at the top of the 
page with ``Security Related Information--Withhold Under 10 CFR 
2.390.''
    2. Does a National Agency Check (NAC) satisfy the provisions of 
the Order?
    If the NAC has been conducted within the past five (5) calendar 
years and the employee can provide documentation of favorable 
results to the NRC or licensee's Reviewing Official, as appropriate, 
then this would satisfy the provisions of the Order.
    3. Can the Human Resources department be designated as the 
licensee's Reviewing Official to review criminal history records? Do 
they have to be fingerprinted to be able to review and approve 
others?
    The requirements for fingerprinting and criminal history records 
should be incorporated into the licensee's current program of 
reviewing and approving background information of its employees. The 
duties of a Reviewing Official can be delegated to the Human 
Resources department or any other appropriate department as long as 
the individual(s) involved in the determining of an employee's 
trustworthiness and reliability have been determined themselves to 
be trustworthy and reliable by the licensee, are permitted to have 
unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of concern 
as part of their job duties, and have been approved by the NRC to be 
the licensee's Reviewing Official.
    4. What is a Reviewing Official? Who can be a Reviewing 
Official?
    A Reviewing Official is an NRC-approved individual that requires 
unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of concern 
as part of his/her job duties, and who shall make the 
trustworthiness and reliability determinations of other Licensee 
employees to determine whether the individual may have, or continue 
to have, unescorted access.
    5. I was only provided a few fingerprint cards, where can I get 
more?
    You can request more fingerprint cards by writing to the Office 
of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555, by calling (301) 492-3531, or by email to 
forms@nrc.gov.
    6. What information do I need to include on the card?
    Incomplete fingerprint cards will not be processed and will be 
returned to the licensee. Licensees need to include the following 
information on each card:

a. Last name, first name, middle name
b. Signature of person being fingerprinted
c. Residence of person being fingerprinted
d. Date
e. Signature of official taking the fingerprints
f. Employer and address
g. Reason for being fingerprinted
h. Aliases
i. Citizenship
j. Social security number and any of the other corresponding numbers 
requested on the card if applicable
k. Date of birth
l. Place of birth
m. Sex
n. Race
o. Height
p. Weight
q. Eye color
r. Hair color
    7. I was able to get more fingerprint cards from my local law 
enforcement agency, can I use those instead?
    No, because of problems that have been experienced in the past 
with some of the cards.
    8. Who do I send my fingerprints to?
    A completed fingerprint card should be sent to: Director, 
Division of Facilities and Security, U.S. NRC, Two White Flint 
North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, ATTN: 
Criminal History Program, Mail Stop TWB-05B32M.
    9. Is there a fee associated with the NRC processing the 
fingerprints?
    The current fee to process each fingerprint card is a $26.00 per 
card. Additional fees may be charged by the entity taking the 
fingerprints.
    10. What method of payment does the NRC accept?
    NRC's preferred method of payment is electronic payment through 
http://www.pay.gov. Please refer to the instructions (in Enclosure 
3) included with the transmittal letter of the Order for details on 
how to pay electronically. NRC also accepts checks, cashier checks 
or money orders made out to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
along with the submission of fingerprint cards. Fingerprint cards 
along with checks, cashier checks or money orders should be sent to: 
Director, Division of Facilities and Security, U.S. NRC, Two White 
Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, Attn: 
Criminal History Program, Mail Stop TWB-05B32M.
    11. When are licensees required to submit fingerprints to the 
NRC?
    Licensees are required to fingerprint and review the criminal 
history results for all materials quantities of concern to the NRC 
within 90 days after the Order is issued.
    12. Will guidance be provided on how to determine 
trustworthiness and reliability based on FBI identification and 
criminal history records checks?
    Guidance is included with the Order documents; however, it will 
ultimately be the decision of the licensee's Reviewing Official to 
determine whether an individual should be granted unescorted access 
to the radioactive material, based on the results of the criminal 
records history check, and the other trustworthiness and reliability 
requirements of the Order.
    13. My fingerprints have been returned several times as 
unclassifiable, can I get an extension to submit my fingerprints?
    On a rare case that a licensee needs additional time to 
implement the fingerprinting requirements beyond the implementation 
time, the NRC will consider granting extensions only on a case by 
case basis. Licensees must take the appropriate actions to minimize 
any potential impacts in delays from receiving the criminal history 
results from the NRC. In a rare case that an extension is needed, 
the request must be date-stamped before the deadline to implement 
the requirements and must include the licensee's justification as to 
why additional time is needed beyond the implementation period and 
the appropriate compensatory actions that will be implemented until 
the fingerprints are processed.
    14. What does unescorted access to the material mean?
    Unescorted access to the material means that an individual can 
exert some physical control over the material or device while they 
are alone.
    15. If I decide that based on a Federal criminal records history 
check one of my employees previously granted unescorted access 
should not have unescorted access to radioactive material what 
actions can I take?
    The licensee is ultimately responsible to determine the best 
course of action.
    16. Does the denial of unescorted access create legal liability 
for the licensee?
    The NRC acknowledges that employer liability potentially exists 
through the process for determining trustworthiness and reliability, 
just as employer liability potentially exists throughout the hiring 
process. A finding that results in denying someone employment may be 
actionable on the part of the employee/employee candidate, and this 
is no different.
    17. How far back do the criminal history record checks go? Can 
the NRC provide guidance on what types of information could be 
considered when granting unescorted access?
    The criminal history records check provides information on all 
arrests since the individual's eighteenth birthday. Guidance on 
criminal offenses that could be considered is included in Enclosure 
4 of the transmittal letter. However, the list of offenses is not 
inclusive. There may be additional offenses not listed in the 
guidance that the licensee wants to consider as part of unescorted 
access approval process. It is the licensee's ultimate business 
decision as to what criteria it uses for the bases of the 
trustworthiness and reliability determination.
    18. Is there a process to request an exemption from 
fingerprinting? Do employees that have been fingerprinted in the 
past need to be fingerprinted again?
    Fingerprints for unescorted access need not be taken if an 
employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, 
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting 
requirement by 10 CFR 73.61,

[[Page 65227]]

or any person who has been favorably-decided by a U.S. Government 
program involving fingerprinting and an FBI identification and 
criminal history records check (e.g., National Agency Check, 
Transportation Worker Identification Credentials in accordance with 
49 CFR Part 1572, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives 
background checks and clearances in accordance with 27 CFR Part 555, 
Health and Human Services security risk assessments for possession 
and use of select agents and toxins in accordance with 42 CFR Part 
73, Hazardous Material security threat assessment for hazardous 
material endorsement to commercial drivers license in accordance 
with 49 CFR Part 1572, Customs and Border Patrol's Free and Secure 
Trade Program \7\) within the last five (5) years, or any person who 
has an active Federal Security Clearance (provided in the latter two 
cases that they make available the appropriate documentation).
    Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which granted the 
Federal security clearance or reviewed the FBI criminal history 
records results based upon a fingerprint identification check must 
be provided. The Licensee must retain this documentation for a 
period of three (3) years from the date the individual no longer 
requires unescorted access to certain radioactive material 
associated with the Licensee's activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The FAST program is a cooperative effort between the Bureau 
of Customs and Border Patrol and the governments of Canada and 
Mexico to coordinate processes for the clearance of commercial 
shipments at the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders. Participants 
in the FAST program, which requires successful completion of a 
background records check, may receive expedited entrance privileges 
at the northern and southern borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    19. Is fingerprinting meant to replace the trustworthiness and 
reliability determination?
    No, fingerprinting is only one component of the trustworthiness 
and reliability determination. A trustworthiness and reliability 
determination should be based, at a minimum, by verifying employment 
history, education, personal references and a federal criminal 
history check. All four of these components need to be considered 
when making a trustworthiness and reliability determination.
    20. How will compliance with the fingerprinting component be 
verified?
    Compliance will be verified at the time the licensee's 
trustworthiness and reliability program is inspected by the NRC.
    21. Is there financial aid or funding available to assist in the 
implementation of the fingerprinting requirements? Will the 
licensees be compensated in any way?
    The NRC will not provide financial aid and there is no funding 
available to assist in the implementation of the fingerprinting 
requirements.
    22. Will there be a reevaluation period?
    At the moment there is no reevaluation period. The reevaluation 
of criminal history records will be addressed during the NRC's 
rulemaking process.
    23. The Order requires that the licensee shall provide under 
oath or affirmation a certification that the Reviewing Official is 
deemed trustworthy and reliable. What does it mean to submit 
documents to the NRC ``under oath or affirmation''?
    The requirement to submit documents to the NRC under oath or 
affirmation may be satisfied by using a notary public to 
authenticate oaths or affirmations and to certify that the 
information provided is correct and true. An alternate method for 
complying with the oath or affirmation requirement is presented in 
the United States Code, Title 28, Section 1746 (28 U.S.C. 1746). 
This method allows use of the following unsworn declaration to 
satisfy the oath or affirmation requirement:

I declare [or certify, verify, state] under penalty of perjury that 
the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on [date] [Signature]

When applying this declaration, it must be used verbatim. Licensing 
documents accompanied by this unsworn declaration satisfy the 
requirement that such documents be submitted under oath or 
affirmation.

    24. Can additional employees (e.g., new hires or existing 
employees changing positions within the company who did NOT have 
unescorted access prior to the date of the Order) be granted 
unescorted access to radioactive materials quantities of concern 
prior to the establishment of a fingerprinting program and 
certification that the Reviewing Official is deemed trustworthy and 
reliable?
    No. Prior to being granted unescorted access to material, all 
additional employees the licensee identifies after the date of the 
Order as requiring unescorted access, must be determined to be 
trustworthy and reliable based upon the requirements of the Order 
and the review of their FBI identification and criminal history 
records. The Order also requires that within 180 days of the date of 
the Order that licensees establish a fingerprinting program and 
within 90 days of the date of the Order provide under oath or 
affirmation a certification that the Reviewing Official is deemed 
trustworthy and reliable by the licensee.
    Only after the Reviewing Official has been certified to be 
trustworthy and reliable by the licensee and approved by the NRC, 
can the Reviewing Official make trustworthiness and reliability 
determinations for any employee who requires unescorted access after 
the date of the Order. For administrative purposes, each submittal 
of fingerprints to the NRC should be accompanied by the name and 
address of the Reviewing Official to whom the criminal history 
records should be returned.
    25. Who can perform the task of fingerprinting for my employees?
    Licensees must have their fingerprints taken by an authorized 
official, such as a representative from a local law enforcement 
agency. However, an authorized official, for the purposes of taking 
fingerprints, could be available through private entities, 
contractors, or an established on-site fingerprinting program. If a 
licensee has fingerprints taken at a facility other than that of a 
recognized Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, the 
licensee should ensure that the prints are taken legibly and match 
the identity of the individual named on the fingerprint card.
    In these cases, the individual taking fingerprints should at a 
minimum:
    (1) Be trained to take fingerprints (Training to take 
fingerprints is offered through the FBI, or may be available from 
local law enforcement agencies and some professional associations.);
    (2) Verify the identity of the individual being fingerprinted by 
checking a government-issued picture identification (e.g., a 
passport or driver's license) and that the name on the card matches 
the government issued identification.
    (3) Sign the block on the fingerprint card labeled ``SIGNATURE 
OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS.''
    The licensee must ensure that complete and accurate information 
is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 30.9. available at: http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part030/part030-0009.html
    26. How is the initial trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) 
determination and certification made (based on fingerprints and a 
criminal history record check) if the individual to be designated as 
the Reviewing Official is also the license custodian, initiator, or 
applicant, and has unescorted access?
    In most cases, there will be no one within an organization or 
company, above the custodian or initiator of a license 
(``licensee''), previously determined trustworthy and reliable for 
purposes of evaluating background check and criminal history 
information and making the initial determination as to whether a 
designated Reviewing Official is trustworthy and reliable.
    Within the licensing process, there are a series of screening 
criteria used by the reviewer to assess information regarding the 
applicant. The purpose of the screening criteria is to provide 
reasonable assurance that radioactive material will be used as 
intended. The fact that a regulatory authority, using established 
processes, has authorized the individual applicant to provide 
services to devices containing radioactive material quantities of 
concern provides the basis for allowing the applicant to appoint 
Reviewing Officials.
    Where the licensee or applicant requires unescorted access and 
intends to designate himself or herself as the Reviewing Official, 
the licensee or applicant should submit fingerprints to the NRC for 
approval. Once approved by the NRC, the licensee or applicant can 
then make T&R determinations for other employees who require 
unescorted access subject to the fingerprinting requirements.
    27. When completing the fingerprint cards, NRC Licensees should 
use their NRC docket number in the field ``YOUR NO. OCA.'' Since 
Agreement State Licensees do not have NRC docket numbers, what 
should they use to complete the field?
    Agreement State Licensees should use their two letter State 
abbreviation followed by a dash and the Licensee's license number 
(e.g., CA-123456).
    28. When making a payment to the NRC through Pay.gov for 
processing of

[[Page 65228]]

fingerprints, Pay.gov requires a TCN. What is a TCN and what 
information should go in this field?
    TCN stands for ``Transaction Control Number'' and it identifies 
payment for the processing of fingerprints for any given individual. 
The TCN is a tool for Licensees to track their submissions and may 
include any number of identifying information that would be useful 
for that purpose. For instance, Licensees can include the names of 
one or more individuals for whom payment is being made, Licensee's 
name and/or date of submittal.
    29. Can I submit my fingerprints electronically to the NRC?
    Yes. Some Licensees may choose to make arrangement with the NRC 
to submit fingerprints electronically to the NRC. However, for many 
Licensees this option may be prohibitive, due to the cost associated 
with the purchase of electronic fingerprinting equipment. To 
establish an electronic fingerprinting program with the NRC, please 
contact NRC's Facility Security Branch at 301-492-3531. Please note 
that electronic submission of fingerprints to the NRC must come 
directly from the Licensee.
    30. What happens to the fingerprint cards after the NRC receives 
it from the Licensee?
    The NRC scans the fingerprint cards to transmit to the FBI 
electronically. The cards are retained and secured for approximately 
a month after which time they are destroyed in accordance with 
Federal guidelines.
    31. How should large companies that are licensed in multiple 
jurisdictions respond to the fingerprinting requirements?
    The fingerprinting requirements are imposed based on the 
license, not the company. If a company holds multiple licenses 
subject to the fingerprinting requirements, it must respond for each 
license. For example, if a company holds two NRC licenses, it must 
respond for both licenses. If convenient, the company may submit a 
combined response covering both licenses, but the response must 
address each of the licenses (i.e., ``Joe Smith, RSO for both of our 
licenses, will serve as the Reviewing Official for both licenses XX-
XXXXX-01 and XX-XXXXX-02.'').
    32. The implementation deadline has passed and I have not 
completed the trustworthiness and reliability adjudication process 
for certain individuals because I have not received classifiable 
fingerprint/FBI criminal history check results. Should I submit a 
request for relief from the implementation deadline?
    A request for relief from the implementation deadline is not 
necessary if the initial fingerprint submissions for individuals 
requiring unescorted access to radioactive materials in quantities 
of concern were submitted to the (NRC) by the implementation 
deadline. For these individuals, the trustworthiness and reliability 
adjudication process should be completed within a maximum of 35 days 
from the date of receipt of classifiable fingerprints and criminal 
history reports.
    33. What are the next steps in the process if the FBI rejects a 
Form FD-258 (fingerprint card) because the fingerprints are not 
classifiable? What options are available to licensees if an 
individual's fingerprints cannot be classified based on conditions 
other than poor quality after multiple attempts?
    The overwhelming majority of fingerprint cards are returned as 
classifiable (i.e., can be read by the FBI and used to identify the 
individual). If the initial fingerprint submission is returned by 
the FBI because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified, 
the fingerprints may be retaken and resubmitted (i.e., new Form-258 
or submission) for a second attempt. The licensee will not be 
charged for the resubmission if the licensee provides a copy of the 
FBI response indicating the fingerprints could not be classified.
    If the FBI is unable to classify the second submission of 
fingerprints, the licensee can submit additional fingerprint 
impressions for the individual, as follows:
    1. The third fingerprint card submission will require payment of 
an additional $26 processing fee.
    2. If the third submission is also returned as unclassifiable, 
the licensee may submit a fourth set of fingerprints. An additional 
fee is not required because the fee for the third submission 
includes one resubmission. As with the second submission, the FBI 
response should be included, or the submission may be treated as a 
new request and an additional fee may be charged.
    Please note that a licensee can opt to take and submit the third 
and fourth sets of fingerprints together to avoid a potential delay 
in the response. If the third set is returned as unclassifiable, NRC 
will automatically resubmit the fourth set.
    3. If the fourth submission is returned as unclassifiable, the 
licensee should submit six (6) additional fingerprint cards for the 
individual. All six cards will be forwarded to the FBI, who will 
take what they believe to be the best quality prints from each card 
to make a complete set of fingerprints. An additional $26 processing 
fee is required and covers the processing of all six fingerprint 
cards, but does not include an additional resubmission.
    4. If the FBI is unable to obtain classifiable fingerprints from 
the six cards, based on conditions other than poor quality (e.g., 
medical conditions or physical anomalies that prevent the taking of 
readable prints), then the NRC will automatically request a check 
based on a name search for the individual, and will forward the 
results to the licensee.
    5. No further submissions will be required, and the licensee can 
consider the results of the name search-FBI identification and 
criminal history records check as a component in determining 
trustworthiness and reliability in accordance with the Order.
    The NRC will consider licensee requests for deviation from the 
above process for good cause (e.g., a demonstrated history of 
difficulty providing classifiable fingerprints during other 
fingerprinting programs or a documented medical condition or 
physical anomaly that can prevent the taking of readable prints). 
Licensees may submit a request for consideration of alternatives, 
and provide the basis for the need for an alternative process to 
NRC's Facilities Security Branch in the Division of Facilities and 
Security (requests may be made by phone at 301-492-3531, mailed to 
the mailing address in Enclosure 3 to the Order, by FAX to the 
attention of Doreen Turner at 301-492-3448 with a cover sheet 
attached, or emailed to Doreen.turner@nrc.gov). Please note that 
requests for an alternative to the above process will not affect a 
licensee's responsibility to fingerprint individuals for unescorted 
access or to comply with the trustworthiness and reliability 
requirements of the Order.
    Licensees should be aware that Steps 3 and 4 do not occur often, 
and should take notice that Step 4 may only occur in instances where 
the FBI has determined that the fingerprints cannot be classified 
based on conditions other than poor quality. Failure to provide 
quality fingerprint impressions may result in the individual not 
able to be considered for unescorted access.
    Fingerprints may be unclassifiable for a number of reasons, 
including:
    1. Incomplete impressions (fingers not completely rolled from 
one side of the nail to the other).
    2. Left and right hands reversed on the fingerprint card.
    3. The same hand or finger printed twice on the card.
    4. Fingerprints are not clear and distinct (smudged, uneven, too 
dark or light, etc.).
    5. Fingers on the card are missing or partially missing without 
an explanation.
    To avoid rejection of fingerprints by the FBI as 
``unclassifiable,'' the person taking the prints should ensure they 
are of good quality and do not include any of these deficiencies, 
and follow the instructions on the back of the fingerprint card. 
Also, fingerprint cards with incomplete or missing information will 
be returned to the licensee to provide complete information, 
resulting in a delay in processing.
    The FBI has provided guidance on the taking of fingerprints for 
submission to the FBI at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/takingfps.html. 
This guidance also discusses special situations, such as 
fingerprinting an individual with abnormalities of the fingers, 
thumbs or hands, and the appropriate way to identify such situations 
on the fingerprint card. A checklist to verify that the fingerprint 
impressions meet the FBI's requirements is also included.
    34. Will guidance be provided on what determines trustworthiness 
and reliability?
    No, however, IC1(b) provides the minimum basis upon which a 
determination may be made. Alternative sources may be used depending 
on the information available to the licensee. It is the licensee's 
responsibility to make a trustworthiness and reliability 
determination for an employee granted unescorted access. This is a 
licensee's business decision as to what criteria it uses for the 
bases of the trustworthiness and reliability determination.
    The trustworthy and reliability determination is designed to 
identify past actions to help verify one's character and reputation 
which provide reasonable assurance of an individual's future 
reliability.
    The following are some indicators that licensees may want to 
consider for what may be a trustworthiness and reliability concern:

[[Page 65229]]

    1. Impaired performance attributable to psychological or other 
disorders.
    2. Conduct that warrants referral for criminal investigation or 
results in arrest or conviction.
    3. Indication of deceitful or delinquent behavior.
    4. Attempted or threatened destruction of property or life.
    5. Suicidal tendencies or attempted suicide.
    6. Illegal drug use or the abuse of legal drugs.
    7. Alcohol abuse disorders.
    8. Recurring financial irresponsibility.
    9. Irresponsibility performing assigned duties.
    10. Inability to deal with stress, or having the appearance of 
being under unusual stress.
    11. Failure to comply with work directives.
    12. Hostility or aggression toward fellow workers or authority.
    13. Uncontrolled anger, violation of safety or security 
procedures, or repeated absenteeism.
    14. Significant behavioral changes, moodiness or depression.
    These indicators are not meant to be all inclusive or intended 
to be disqualifying factors. Licensees can also consider extenuating 
or mitigating factors in their determinations.

Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks

    For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees should:
    1. Submit one completed, legible standard fingerprint card (Form 
FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) for each individual seeking unescorted access 
to certain radioactive material to the Director, Division of 
Facilities and Security.
    2. Include a cover letter with the name and address of the NRC-
approved Reviewing Official to whom the criminal history records 
should be returned.
    3. Mail applications to the following address (overnight mail is 
preferred): Director, Division of Facilities and Security, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 
20852-2738, ATTN: CRIMINAL HISTORY PROGRAM, MAIL STOP TWB-05B32M.
    4. Fingerprints for unescorted access need not be taken if an 
employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, 
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting 
requirement by 10 CFR 73.61, or any person who has been favorably-
decided by a U.S. Government program involving fingerprinting and an 
FBI identification and criminal history records check (e.g., 
National Agency Check, Transportation Worker Identification 
Credentials in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572, Bureau of Alcohol 
Tobacco Firearms and Explosives background checks and clearances in 
accordance with 27 CFR Part 555, Health and Human Services security 
risk assessments for possession and use of select agents and toxins 
in accordance with 42 CFR Part 73, Hazardous Material security 
threat assessment for hazardous material endorsement to commercial 
drivers license in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1572, Customs and 
Border Patrol's Free and Secure Trade Program \8\) within the last 
five (5) years, or any person who has an active Federal security 
clearance (provided in the latter two cases that they make available 
the appropriate documentation \9\). Written confirmation from the 
Agency/employer which granted the federal security clearance or 
reviewed the FBI criminal history records results based upon a 
fingerprint identification check must be provided. The Licensee must 
retain this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the 
date the individual no longer requires unescorted access to certain 
radioactive material associated with the Licensee's activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ The FAST program is a cooperative effort between the Bureau 
of Customs and Border Patrol and the governments of Canada and 
Mexico to coordinate processes for the clearance of commercial 
shipments at the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders. Participants 
in the FAST program, which requires successful completion of a 
background records check, may receive expedited entrance privileges 
at the northern and southern borders.
    \9\ This documentation must allow the Reviewing Official to 
verify that the individual has fulfilled the unescorted access 
requirements of Section 149 of the AEA by submitting to 
fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history 
records check.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additional copies of Form FD-258 may be obtained by writing the 
Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling (301) 492-3531, or by email to 
forms@nrc.gov. The Licensee should establish procedures to ensure 
that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in minimizing the 
rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible or incomplete 
cards.
    Licensees must have their fingerprints taken by an official 
authorized to take fingerprints, such as a representative from a 
local law enforcement agency or a private entity qualified to take 
fingerprints, because the official must certify the identity of the 
person being fingerprinted.
    The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for 
completeness. Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing 
omissions or evident errors will be returned to the Licensee for 
corrections.
    The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one re-
submission if the initial submission is returned by the FBI because 
the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified (e.g., due to poor 
quality, incomplete impressions, or other errors in the taking of 
the fingerprints). The licensee will not be charged for the one re-
submission if the licensee provides the FBI Transaction Control 
Number (TCN) or a copy of the FBI response indicating the 
fingerprints could not be classified. If additional re-submissions 
are necessary, they will be treated as initial submittals and will 
require an additional payment of the processing fee.
    Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application 
(Note: local law enforcement agencies or contractors taking the 
fingerprints may charge an additional fee for this service). 
Licensees should submit payments electronically via http://www.pay.gov. 
Payments through Pay.gov can be made directly from the 
Licensee's credit/debit card. Licensees will need to establish a 
password and user ID before they can access Pay.gov. To establish an 
account, Licensees should send a request for an account to 
paygo@nrc.gov. The request must include the Licensee's name, 
address, point of contact, email address, and contact phone number. 
The NRC will forward each request to Pay.gov and Pay.gov will 
contact the Licensee with all of the necessary account information. 
Licensees without a credit or debit card that can be linked to 
Pay.gov can pay the fees by check, cashier check or money order made 
out to the NRC and submitted with the fingerprint cards.
    The payment of the fees for processing fingerprints must be made 
before or with the submission of applications to the NRC. Combined 
payment for multiple applications is acceptable. Licensees should 
include the Pay.gov payment receipt(s), or a check, cashier check, 
or money order for the fee(s) along with the application(s). For 
additional guidance on making electronic payments, contact the 
Facilities Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at 
(301) 492-3531. The application fee (currently $26) is the sum of 
the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint card or other 
fingerprint record submitted by the NRC on behalf of a Licensee, and 
an NRC processing fee, which covers administrative costs associated 
with NRC handling of Licensee fingerprint applications. The 
Commission will directly notify Licensees subject to this 
requirement of any fee changes.
    It is necessary for a Licensee to resubmit fingerprints only 
under two conditions:
    1. The FBI has determined that the fingerprints cannot be 
classified due to poor quality in the mechanics of taking the 
initial impressions.
    2. The initial submission has been lost.
    If the FBI advises the fingerprints are unclassifiable based on 
conditions other than poor quality, the Licensee may submit a 
request to NRC for alternatives. The Commission will receive and 
forward to the submitting Licensee all data from the FBI as a result 
of the Licensee's application(s) for criminal history records 
checks, including the FBI fingerprint record(s). When the results 
are received from the FBI, no further fingerprint-related search is 
necessary.

Guidance for Evaluating FBI Identification and Criminal History Records 
Checks for Allowing Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Material

    Each Licensee is responsible for determining whether to grant an 
individual unescorted access to certain radioactive materials. The 
Licensee shall allow only trustworthy and reliable individuals, 
approved in writing by the Licensee, to have unescorted access to 
radioactive material quantities of concern (listed in Attachment 2 
of the Order) and devices containing that radioactive material. The 
trustworthiness and reliability determination, to grant an 
individual unescorted access to certain radioactive materials, is 
made by the Licensee's Reviewing Official, based on information 
gathered from all four elements of the background check and 
evaluated by the Reviewing Official. The minimum four background 
check elements are: (1)

[[Page 65230]]

Fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
identification and criminal history records check, (2) verifying 
employment history, (3) verifying education, and 4) personal 
references. The purpose of this guidance is to address the 
fingerprinting component of the determination.
    Unescorted access determinations require an evaluation of a 
person's trustworthiness and reliability. When a person's life 
history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness, 
questions arise whether the person can be relied on and trusted to 
exercise the responsibility necessary for working with risk-
significant radioactive materials. The purpose of the 
trustworthiness and reliability determination requirement, for 
unescorted access, is to provide reasonable assurance that those 
individuals are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an 
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety, including the 
potential to commit or aid theft and/or radiological sabotage. This 
is a Licensee's business decision as to what criteria it uses for 
the bases of the trustworthiness and reliability determination. Some 
indicators that Licensees should consider for what may be a 
trustworthiness and reliability concern can be found in Increased 
Control guidance in Q and A 34 (Enclosure 2 to the 
transmittal letter of this Order).
    In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the 
Reviewing Official should consider the following factors:
    (1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
    (2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include 
knowledgeable participation;
    (3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
    (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the 
conduct;
    (5) The extent to which participation is voluntary;
    (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other 
permanent behavioral changes;
    (7) The motivation for the conduct;
    (8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and
    (9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
    Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final 
determination remains the responsibility of the Licensee. In every 
case, the Reviewing Official should evaluate trustworthiness and 
reliability based on an accumulation of information which supports a 
positive finding, prior to granting unescorted access. Items to 
consider include:
    1. The Reviewing Official should evaluate the information 
collected for consistency and adequacy.
    2. True identity should be evaluated by comparing applicant 
provided identification and personal history data to pertinent 
information from the background check, and other data sources.
    3. The Reviewing Official should determine whether 
inconsistencies determined through review or investigation, are 
intentional, innocent, or an oversight. Willful or intentional acts 
of omission or untruthfulness could be grounds for denial of 
unescorted access.
    When a Licensee submits fingerprints to the NRC pursuant to an 
NRC Order, it will receive a FBI identification and criminal history 
record since the individual's eighteenth birthday. The Licensee will 
receive the information from the criminal history check of those 
individuals requiring unescorted access to radioactive materials, 
and the Licensee's Reviewing Official should evaluate that 
information using the guidance below.
    The Licensee's Reviewing Official is required to evaluate all 
available information in making a T&R determination for unescorted 
access to radioactive materials, including the criminal history 
records information pertaining to the individual as required by the 
NRC Order. The FBI identification and criminal history records check 
is used in the determination of whether the individual has a record 
of criminal activity that indicates that the individual should not 
have unescorted access to radioactive materials subject to this 
Order. Each determination of trustworthiness and reliability for 
unescorted access to radioactive materials, which includes a review 
of criminal history information, must be documented to include the 
basis for the decision made.
    Licensees shall not make a final determination solely on the 
basis of criminal history checks information involving an arrest 
more than 1 year old for which there is not information on the 
disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of 
the charge or an acquittal.
    All information collected is to be considered by the Licensee in 
making a trustworthiness or reliability determination for unescorted 
access. Potentially disqualifying information obtained from 
confidential/unnamed sources must be substantiated and documented, 
and should not be used as a sole basis to deny access authorization 
unless corroborated. Licensees should establish criteria in writing 
that would disqualify someone from being granted authorized access.
    The FBI identification and criminal history records check is 
used to evaluate whether the individual has a record of criminal 
activity that may compromise his or her trustworthiness and 
reliability. Identification of a criminal history through the FBI 
criminal history records check does not automatically indicate 
unreliability or lack of trustworthiness of the employee. The 
licensee will have to judge the nature of the criminal activity, 
length of employment, and recency of the criminal activity. The 
licensee can authorize individuals with criminal records for 
unescorted access to radioactive materials, based on a documented 
evaluation of the basis for determining that the employee was 
reliable and trustworthy notwithstanding his or her criminal 
history. Each evaluation conducted in review of criminal history and 
other background checks information, should be documented to include 
the decision making basis.
    At a minimum, the Licensee should consider the following 
elements when evaluating the results of the FBI Identification and 
Criminal History Records check:
    1. Committed, attempted to commit, aided, or abetted another who 
committed or attempted to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, 
treason, sedition, or terrorism.
    2. Publicly or privately advocated actions that may be inimical 
to the interest of the United States, or publicly or privately 
advocated the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government 
of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of 
the United States by unconstitutional means.
    3. Knowingly established or continued a sympathetic association 
with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, or 
revolutionist, or with an espionage agent or other secret agent or 
representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical 
to the interests of the United States, or with any person who 
advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government 
of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of 
the United States by unconstitutional means. (Ordinarily, the 
Licensee should not consider chance or casual meetings or contacts 
limited to normal business or official relations.)
    4. Joined or engaged in any activity knowingly in sympathy with 
or in support of any foreign or domestic organization, association, 
movement, group, or combination of persons which unlawfully 
advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence 
to prevent others from exercising their rights under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or any State or any 
subdivisions thereof by unlawful means, or which advocate the use of 
force and violence to overthrow the Government of the United States 
or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by 
unconstitutional means. (Ordinarily, the Licensee should not 
consider chance or casual meetings or contacts limited to normal 
business or official relations.)
    5. Deliberately misrepresented, falsified or omitted relevant 
and material facts from documentation provided to the Licensee.
6. Has been convicted of a crime(s) which, in the Reviewing 
Official's opinion, indicate poor judgment, unreliability, or 
untrustworthiness.
    These indicators are not meant to be all inclusive nor intended 
to be disqualifying factors. Licensees can also consider how recent 
such indicators occurred and other extenuating or mitigating factors 
in their determinations. Section 149.c.(2)(B) of the AEA requires 
that the information obtained as a result of fingerprinting be used 
solely for the purposes of making a determination as to unescorted 
access suitability. Unescorted access suitability is not a hiring 
decision, and the NRC does not intend for licensees to use this 
guidance as such. Because a particular individual may not be 
suitable for unescorted access does not necessarily mean that he is 
not suitable for escorted access or some other position that does 
not involve NRC-regulated activities.

Process To Challenge NRC Denials or Revocations of Unescorted Access to 
Certain Radioactive Material

    1. Policy.
    This policy establishes a process for individuals whom NRC 
licensees nominate

[[Page 65231]]

as Reviewing Officials to challenge and appeal NRC denials or 
revocations of access to certain radioactive material. Any 
individual designated as a licensee Reviewing Official whom the NRC 
has determined may not have unescorted access to certain radioactive 
material shall, to the extent provided below, be afforded an 
opportunity to challenge and appeal the NRC's determination. This 
policy shall not be construed to create a liberty or property 
interest of any kind in the unescorted access of any individual to 
certain radioactive material.
    2. Applicability.
    This policy applies solely to those employees of licensees who 
are designated as a Reviewing Official, and who are thus to be 
considered by the NRC for initial or continued unescorted access to 
certain radioactive material in that position.
    3. Unescorted Access Determination Criteria.
    Determinations for granting a designated Reviewing Official 
unescorted access to certain radioactive material will be made by 
the NRC staff. Unescorted access shall be denied or revoked whenever 
it is determined that an individual does not meet the applicable 
standards. Any doubt about an individual's eligibility for initial 
or continued unescorted access to certain radioactive material shall 
be resolved in favor of national security and result in denial or 
revocation of unescorted access.
    4. Procedures to Challenge the Contents of Records Obtained from 
the FBI.
    Prior to a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch 
Chief that an individual designated as a Reviewing Official is 
denied or revoked unescorted access to certain radioactive material, 
the individual shall:
    a. Be provided the contents of records obtained from the FBI for 
the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. If, after 
reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is incorrect or 
incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct, or update 
the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the 
individual may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures 
include either direct application by the individual challenging the 
record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed 
the questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy 
or completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the 
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification 
Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 C.F.R. Sec.  
16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the 
challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that 
agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an 
official communication directly from the agency that contributed the 
original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any 
changes necessary in accordance with the information supplied by 
that agency.
    b. Be afforded 10 days to initiate an action challenging the 
results of an FBI criminal history records check (described in (a), 
above) after the record is made available for the individual's 
review. If such a challenge is initiated, the NRC Facilities 
Security Branch Chief may make a determination based upon the 
criminal history record only upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate 
confirmation or correction of the record.
    5. Procedures to Provide Additional Information.
    Prior to a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch 
Chief that an individual designated as a Reviewing Official is 
denied or revoked access to certain radioactive material, the 
individual shall be afforded an opportunity to submit information 
relevant to the individual's trustworthiness and reliability. The 
NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief shall, in writing, notify the 
individual of this opportunity, and any deadlines for submitting 
this information. The NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief may make 
a determination of unescorted access to certain radioactive material 
only upon receipt of the additional information submitted by the 
individual, or, if no such information is submitted, when the 
deadline to submit such information has passed.
    6. Procedures to Notify an Individual of the NRC Facilities 
Security Branch Chief Determination to Deny or Revoke Access to 
Certain Radioactive Material.
    Upon a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief 
that an individual nominated as a Reviewing Official is denied or 
revoked access to certain radioactive material, the individual shall 
be provided a written explanation of the basis for this 
determination.
    7. Procedures to Appeal an NRC Determination to Deny or Revoke 
Access to Certain Radioactive Material.
    Upon a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief 
that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is denied or 
revoked access to certain radioactive material, the individual shall 
be afforded an opportunity to appeal this determination to the 
Director, Division of Facilities and Security. The determination 
must be appealed within 20 days of receipt of the written notice of 
the determination by the Facilities Security Branch Chief, and may 
either be in writing or in person. Any appeal made in person shall 
take place at the NRC's headquarters, and shall be at the 
individual's own expense. The determination by the Director, 
Division of Facilities and Security, shall be rendered within 60 
days after receipt of the appeal.
    8. Procedures to Notify an Individual of the Determination by 
the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, Upon an Appeal.
    A determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and 
Security, shall be provided to the individual in writing and include 
an explanation of the basis for this determination. A determination 
by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, to affirm the 
Facilities Branch Chief's determination to deny or revoke an 
individual's access to certain radioactive material is final and not 
subject to further administrative appeals.

[FR Doc. 2012-26299 Filed 10-24-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 207 (Thursday, October 25, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65210-65215]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-26292]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2012-0255; EA-12-148]

In the Matter of Licensee Identified in Attachment 1 and all 
Other Persons Who Seek or Obtain Access to Safeguards Information 
Described Herein; Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History 
Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards Information 
(Effective Immediately)

I

    The Licensee identified in Attachment 1\1\ to this Order, holds a 
license issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, 
as amended, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the 
Commission), authorizing them to engage in an activity subject to 
regulation by the Commission or Agreement States. In accordance with 
Section 149 of the AEA, fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records check 
are required of any person who is to be permitted to have access to 
Safeguards Information (SGI).\2\ The AEA permits the Commission by rule 
to except certain categories of individuals from the fingerprinting 
requirement, which the Commission has done (see 10 CFR 73.59, 71 FR 
33989; June 13, 2006). Individuals relieved from fingerprinting and 
criminal history records checks

[[Page 65211]]

under the relief rule include Federal, State, and local officials and 
law enforcement personnel; Agreement State inspectors who conduct 
security inspections on behalf of the NRC; members of Congress and 
certain employees of members of Congress or Congressional Committees, 
and representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or 
certain foreign government organizations. In addition, individuals who 
have a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history records check 
within the last five (5) years, or individuals who have active Federal 
security clearances (provided in either case that they make available 
the appropriate documentation), have satisfied the AEA fingerprinting 
requirement and need not be fingerprinted again. Therefore, in 
accordance with Section 149 of the AEA the Commission is imposing 
additional requirements for access to SGI, as set forth by this Order, 
so that affected licensees can obtain and grant access to SGI. This 
Order also imposes requirements for access to SGI by any person, from 
any person,\3\ whether or not a Licensee, Applicant, or Certificate 
Holder of the Commission or Agreement States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be 
released to the public.
    \2\ Safeguards Information is a form of sensitive, unclassified, 
security-related information that the Commission has the authority 
to designate and protect under section 147 of the AEA.
    \3\ Person means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, 
firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, 
group, government agency other than the Commission or the Department 
of Energy, except that the Department of Energy shall be considered 
a person with respect to those facilities of the Department of 
Energy specified in section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974 (88 Stat. 1244), any State or any political subdivision of, or 
any political entity within a State, any foreign government or 
nation or any political subdivision of any such government or 
nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, 
representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II

    The Commission has broad statutory authority to protect and 
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of SGI. Section 147 of the AEA 
grants the Commission explicit authority to issue such Orders as 
necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of SGI. Furthermore, 
Section 149 of the AEA requires fingerprinting and an FBI 
identification and a criminal history records check of each individual 
who seeks access to SGI. In addition, no person may have access to SGI 
unless the person has an established need-to-know the information and 
satisfies the trustworthy and reliability requirements described in 
Attachment 3 to Order EA-12-147.
    In order to provide assurance that the Licensee identified in 
Attachment 1 to this Order is implementing appropriate measures to 
comply with the fingerprinting and criminal history records check 
requirements for access to SGI, the Licensee identified in Attachment 1 
to this Order shall implement the requirements of this Order. In 
addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that in light of the common 
defense and security matters identified above, which warrant the 
issuance of this Order, the public health, safety and interest require 
that this Order be effective immediately.

III

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 
182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Parts 30 and 73, it is 
hereby ordered, effective immediately, that the licensee identified in 
attachment 1 to this order and all other persons who seek or obtain 
access to safeguards information, as described above, shall comply with 
the requirements set forth in this order.
    A. 1. No person may have access to SGI unless that person has a 
need-to-know the SGI, has been fingerprinted or who has a favorably-
decided FBI identification and criminal history records check, and 
satisfies all other applicable requirements for access to SGI. 
Fingerprinting and the FBI identification and criminal history records 
check are not required, however, for any person who is relieved from 
that requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 (71 Fed. Reg. 33,989 (June 13, 2006)), 
or who has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history records 
check within the last five (5) years, or who has an active Federal 
security clearance, provided in the latter two cases that the 
appropriate documentation is made available to the Licensee's NRC-
approved reviewing official described in paragraph III.C.2 of this 
Order.
    2. No person may have access to any SGI if the NRC has determined, 
based on fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history 
records check, that the person may not have access to SGI.
    B. No person may provide SGI to any other person except in 
accordance with Condition III.A. above. Prior to providing SGI to any 
person, a copy of this Order shall be provided to that person.
    C. The Licensee identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall 
comply with the following requirements:
    1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this 
Order, establish and maintain a fingerprinting program that meets the 
requirements of Attachment 2 to this Order.
    2. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this 
Order, submit the fingerprints of one (1) individual who a) the 
Licensee nominates as the ``reviewing official'' for determining access 
to SGI by other individuals, and b) has an established need-to-know the 
information and has been determined to be trustworthy and reliable in 
accordance with the requirements described in Attachment 3 to Order EA-
12-147. The NRC will determine whether this individual (or any 
subsequent reviewing official) may have access to SGI and, therefore, 
will be permitted to serve as the Licensee's reviewing official.\4\ The 
Licensee may, at the same time or later, submit the fingerprints of 
other individuals to whom the Licensee seeks to grant access to SGI or 
designate an additional reviewing official(s). Fingerprints shall be 
submitted and reviewed in accordance with the procedures described in 
Attachment 2 of this Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ The NRC's determination of this individual's access to SGI 
in accordance with the process described in Enclosure 5 to the 
transmittal letter of this Order is an administrative determination 
that is outside the scope of this Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. The Licensee shall, in writing, within twenty (20) days of the 
date of this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if it is unable to 
comply with any of the requirements described in this Order, including 
Attachment 2 to this Order, or (2) if compliance with any of the 
requirements is unnecessary in its specific circumstances. The 
notification shall provide the Licensee's justification for seeking 
relief from or variation of any specific requirement.
    Licensee responses to C.1., C.2., and C.3. above shall be submitted 
to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555. In addition, Licensee responses shall be marked 
as ``Security-Related Information--Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390.''
    The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind 
any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good cause by the 
Licensee.

IV

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. In addition, 
the Licensee and any other person adversely affected by this Order may 
request a hearing of this Order within twenty (20) days of the

[[Page 65212]]

date of the Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be 
given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for 
extension of time must be made, in writing, to the Director, Office of 
Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and include a 
statement of good cause for the extension.
    The answer may consent to this Order. If the answer includes a 
request for a hearing, it shall, under oath or affirmation, 
specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which the 
Licensee relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have 
been issued. If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, 
that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his 
interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the 
criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).
    All documents filed in the NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including 
a request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139; 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by 
telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID) 
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal 
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise 
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or 
petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or 
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID 
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish 
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the 
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/
e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for 
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the NRC's public Web 
site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but 
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted 
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer 
assistance in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, 
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's 
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, 
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on 
the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance 
available on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-
submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any 
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition 
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document 
via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's Web site 
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at 
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The 
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., 
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants 
filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the 
document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by 
first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, 
express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the 
document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having 
granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to 
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, 
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC 
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With 
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve 
the purpose of the

[[Page 65213]]

adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, 
participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in 
their submission.
    If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose 
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order 
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held the 
issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order 
should be sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to 
requesting a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move 
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the 
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the 
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an 
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the 
provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received. AN ANSWER OR A 
REQUEST FOR HEARING SHALL NOT STAY THE IMMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS 
ORDER.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of October, 2012.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mark A. Satorius,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 
Management Programs.

Attachment 1: Applicable Materials Licensees Redacted

Attachment 2: Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History 
Records Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official is 
Determining Access to Safeguards Information

General Requirements

    Licensees shall comply with the requirements of this attachment.
    A. 1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment 
shall fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted access 
to Safeguards Information (SGI). The Licensee shall review and use 
the information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained in the subject Order 
and this attachment are satisfied.
    2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the 
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal 
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for 
revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as 
specified in the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' 
section of this attachment.
    3. Fingerprints need not be taken if an employed individual 
(e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, manufacturer, or supplier) 
is relieved from the fingerprinting requirement by 10 CFR 73.59, has 
a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history records check 
within the last five (5) years, or has an active Federal security 
clearance. Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which 
granted the Federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal 
history records check must be provided. The Licensee must retain 
this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the date the 
individual no longer requires access to SGI associated with the 
Licensee's activities.
    4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this 
Order must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the 
FBI.
    5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the 
FBI and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and 
reliability requirements included in Attachment 3 to NRC Order EA-
08-161, in making a determination whether to grant access to SGI to 
individuals who have a need-to-know the SGI.
    6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a 
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining 
an individual's suitability for access to SGI.
    7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination 
whether to grant access to SGI.
    B. The Licensee shall notify the NRC of any desired change in 
reviewing officials. The NRC will determine whether the individual 
nominated as the new reviewing official may have access to SGI based 
on a previously-obtained or new criminal history check and, 
therefore, will be permitted to serve as the Licensee's reviewing 
official.

Prohibitions

    A Licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an 
individual access to SGI solely on the basis of information received 
from the FBI involving: An arrest more than one (1) year old for 
which there is no information of the disposition of the case, or an 
arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.
    A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal 
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would 
infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use 
the information in any way which would discriminate among 
individuals on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or 
age.

Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks

    For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees shall, 
using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the 
NRC's Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one 
completed, legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, 
ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable, other fingerprint records for 
each individual seeking access to Safeguards Information, to the 
Director of the Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the 
attention of the Division's Criminal History Check Section. Copies 
of these forms may be obtained by writing the Office of Information 
Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, by calling 301-415-7232, or by email to 
forms.resource@nrc.gov. Practicable alternative formats are set 
forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The Licensee shall establish procedures to 
ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in 
minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible 
or incomplete cards.
    The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for 
completeness. Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing 
omissions or evident errors will be returned to the Licensee for 
corrections. The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one 
re-submission if the initial submission is returned by the FBI 
because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified. The one 
free re-submission must have the FBI Transaction Control Number 
reflected on the re-submission. If additional submissions are 
necessary, they will be treated as initial submittals and will 
require a second payment of the processing fee.
    Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. 
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for processing 
fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check, 
or money order, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For guidance on 
making electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security Branch, 
Division of Facilities and Security, at 301-415-7404.] Combined 
payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The application fee 
(currently $36) is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for 
each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by the 
NRC on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which covers 
administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee 
fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify 
Licensees who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes. The 
Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data received 
from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's application(s) for 
criminal history records checks, including the FBI fingerprint 
record.

Right To Correct and Complete Information

    Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall 
make available to the individual the contents of any criminal 
records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct 
and complete information. Written confirmation by the individual of 
receipt of this notification must be maintained by the Licensee for 
a period of one (1) year from the date of the notification.
    If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it 
is incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, 
correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter 
in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. 
These procedures include either direct application by the individual 
challenging the record to

[[Page 65214]]

the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed the 
questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or 
completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the 
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification 
Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 
through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge 
to the agency that submitted the data and requests that agency to 
verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official 
communication directly from the agency that contributed the original 
information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes 
necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that 
agency. The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an 
individual to initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI 
criminal history records check after the record is made available 
for his/her review. The Licensee may make a final SGI access 
determination based upon the criminal history record only upon 
receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the 
record. Upon a final adverse determination on access to SGI, the 
Licensee shall provide the individual its documented basis for 
denial. Access to SGI shall not be granted to an individual during 
the review process.

Protection of Information

    1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an 
individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a 
system of files and procedures for protecting the record and the 
personal information from unauthorized disclosure.
    2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal 
information collected and maintained to persons other than the 
subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have a 
need to access the information in performing assigned duties in the 
process of determining access to Safeguards Information. No 
individual authorized to have access to the information may re-
disseminate the information to any other individual who does not 
have a need-to-know.
    3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a 
criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee 
if the Licensee holding the criminal history record check receives 
the individual's written request to re-disseminate the information 
contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies 
information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social 
security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics 
for identification purposes.
    4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained 
under this section, available for examination by an authorized 
representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the 
regulations and laws.
    5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal 
history records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's 
file has been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of 
employment or determination of access to SGI (whether access was 
approved or denied). After the required three (3) year period, these 
documents shall be destroyed by a method that will prevent 
reconstruction of the information in whole or in part.

Guidance for Licensee's Evaluation of Access to Safeguards Information 
With the Inclusion of Criminal History Records (Fingerprint) Checks

    When a Licensee submits fingerprints to the NRC pursuant to an 
NRC Order, it will receive a criminal history summary of 
information, provided in Federal records, since the individual's 
eighteenth birthday. Individuals retain the right to correct and 
complete information and to initiate challenge procedures described 
in Attachment 2 of Enclosure 1. The Licensee will receive the 
information from the criminal history records check of those 
individuals requiring access to Safeguards Information, and the 
reviewing official should evaluate that information using the 
guidance below. Furthermore, the requirements of all Orders which 
apply to the information and material to which access is being 
granted must be met.
    The Licensee's reviewing official is required to evaluate all 
pertinent and available information in making a determination of 
access to SGI, including the criminal history information pertaining 
to the individual as required by the NRC Order. The criminal history 
records check is used in the determination of whether the individual 
has a record of criminal activity that indicates that the individual 
should not have access to SGI. Each determination of access to SGI, 
which includes a review of criminal history information, must be 
documented to include the basis for the decision made.
    (i) If negative information is discovered that was not provided 
by the individual, or which is different in any material respect 
from the information provided by the individual, this information 
should be considered, and decisions made based on these findings, 
must be documented.
    (ii) Any record containing a pattern of behaviors which 
indicates that the behaviors could be expected to recur or continue, 
or recent behaviors which cast questions on whether an individual 
should have access to SGI, should be carefully evaluated prior to 
any authorization of access to SGI.
    It is necessary for a Licensee to resubmit fingerprints only 
under two conditions:
    (1) the FBI has determined that the fingerprints cannot be 
classified due to poor quality in the mechanics of taking the 
initial impressions; or
    (2) the initial submission has been lost.
    If the FBI advises that six sets of fingerprints are 
unclassifiable based on conditions other than poor quality, the 
licensee may submit a request to NRC for alternatives. When those 
search results are received from the FBI, no further search is 
necessary.

Process To Challenge NRC Denials or Revocations of Access to Safeguards 
Information

    1. Policy.
    This policy establishes a process for individuals whom NRC 
licensees nominate as reviewing officials to challenge and appeal 
NRC denials or revocations of access to Safeguards Information 
(SGI). Any individual nominated as a licensee reviewing official 
whom the NRC has determined may not have access to SGI shall, to the 
extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to challenge and 
appeal the NRC's determination. This policy shall not be construed 
to require the disclosure of SGI to any person, nor shall it be 
construed to create a liberty or property interest of any kind in 
the access of any individual to SGI.
    2. Applicability.
    This policy applies solely to those employees of licensees who 
are nominated as a reviewing official, and who are thus to be 
considered by the NRC for initial or continued access to SGI in that 
position.
    3. SGI Access Determination Criteria.
    Determinations for granting a nominated reviewing official 
access to SGI will be made by the NRC staff. Access to SGI shall be 
denied or revoked whenever it is determined that an individual does 
not meet the applicable standards. Any doubt about an individual's 
eligibility for initial or continued access to SGI shall be resolved 
in favor of the national security and access will be denied or 
revoked.
    4. Procedures to Challenge the Contents of Records Obtained from 
the FBI.
    a. Prior to a determination by the NRC Facilities Security 
Branch Chief that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is 
denied or revoked access to SGI, the individual shall:
    (i) Be provided the contents of records obtained from the FBI 
for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. If, 
after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is 
incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, 
correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter 
in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. 
These procedures include either direct application by the individual 
challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) 
that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as 
to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history 
record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 
28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards 
the challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests 
that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt 
of an official communication directly from the agency that 
contributed the original information, the FBI Identification 
Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with the 
information supplied by that agency.
    (ii) Be afforded 10 days to initiate an action challenging the 
results of an FBI criminal history records check (described in (i), 
above) after the record is made available for the individual's 
review. If such a challenge is initiated, the NRC Facilities 
Security Branch Chief may make a determination based upon the 
criminal history record only upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate 
confirmation or correction of the record.
    5. Procedures to Provide Additional Information.

[[Page 65215]]

    a. Prior to a determination by the NRC Facilities Security 
Branch Chief that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is 
denied or revoked access to SGI, the individual shall:
    (i) Be afforded an opportunity to submit information relevant to 
the individual's trustworthiness and reliability. The NRC Facilities 
Security Branch Chief shall, in writing, notify the individual of 
this opportunity, and any deadlines for submitting this information. 
The NRC Facilities Security Branch Chief may make a determination of 
access to SGI only upon receipt of the additional information 
submitted by the individual, or, if no such information is 
submitted, when the deadline to submit such information has passed.
    6. Procedures to Notify an Individual of the NRC Facilities 
Security Branch Chief Determination to Deny or Revoke Access to SGI.
    a. Upon a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch 
Chief that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is denied 
or revoked access to SGI, the individual shall be provided a written 
explanation of the basis for this determination.
    7. Procedures to Appeal an NRC Determination to Deny or Revoke 
Access to SGI.
    a. Upon a determination by the NRC Facilities Security Branch 
Chief that an individual nominated as a reviewing official is denied 
or revoked access to SGI, the individual shall be afforded an 
opportunity to appeal this determination to the Director, Division 
of Facilities and Security. The determination must be appealed 
within 20 days of receipt of the written notice of the determination 
by the Facilities Security Branch Chief, and may either be in 
writing or in person. Any appeal made in person shall take place at 
the NRC's headquarters, and shall be at the individual's own 
expense. The determination by the Director, Division of Facilities 
and Security, shall be rendered within 60 days after receipt of the 
appeal.
    8. Procedures to Notify an Individual of the Determination by 
the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, Upon an Appeal.
    a. A determination by the Director, Division of Facilities and 
Security, shall be provided to the individual in writing and include 
an explanation of the basis for this determination. A determination 
by the Director, Division of Facilities and Security, to affirm the 
Facilities Branch Chief's determination to deny or revoke an 
individual's access to SGI is final and not subject to further 
administrative appeals.

[FR Doc. 2012-26292 Filed 10-24-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 207 (Thursday, October 25, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65215-65220]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-26288]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2012-0254; EA-12-147]

In the Matter of Licensee Identified in Attachment 1 and all 
Other Persons Who Obtain Safeguards Information Described Herein; Order 
Imposing Requirements for the Protection of Certain Safeguards 
Information (Effective Immediately)

I

    The Licensee, identified in Attachment 1 \1\ to this Order, holds a 
license issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended, (AEA) by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the 
Commission), authorizing it to possess, use, and transfer items 
containing radioactive material quantities of concern. The NRC intends 
to issue a security Order to this Licensee in the near future. The 
Order will require compliance with specific Additional Security 
Measures to enhance the security for certain radioactive material 
quantities of concern. The Commission has determined that these 
documents will contain Safeguards Information, will not be released to 
the public, and must be protected from unauthorized disclosure. 
Therefore, the Commission is imposing the requirements, as set forth in 
Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order and in Order EA-12-148, so that the 
Licensee can receive these documents. This Order also imposes 
requirements for the protection of Safeguards Information in the hands 
of any person,\2\ whether or not a licensee of the Commission, who 
produces, receives, or acquires Safeguards Information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be 
released to the public.
    \2\ Person means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, 
firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, 
group, government agency other than the Commission or the Department 
of Energy, except that the Department of Energy shall be considered 
a person with respect to those facilities of the Department of 
Energy specified in section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974 (88 Stat. 1244), any State or any political subdivision of, or 
any political entity within a State, any foreign government or 
nation or any political subdivision of any such government or 
nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, 
representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II

    The Commission has broad statutory authority to protect and 
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information. Section 
147 of the AEA grants the Commission explicit authority to ``* * * 
issue such orders, as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure 
of safeguards information * * *.'' This authority extends to 
information concerning the security measures for the physical 
protection of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct 
material. Licensees and all persons who produce, receive, or acquire 
Safeguards Information must ensure proper handling and protection of 
Safeguards Information to avoid unauthorized disclosure in accordance 
with the specific requirements for the protection of Safeguards 
Information contained in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order. The 
Commission hereby provides notice that it intends to treat violations 
of the requirements contained in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order, 
applicable to the handling and unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards 
Information, as serious breaches of adequate protection of the public 
health and safety and the common defense and security of the United 
States.
    Access to Safeguards Information is limited to those persons who 
have established the need-to-know the information and are considered to 
be trustworthy and reliable, and meet the requirements of Order EA-12-
148. A need-to-know means a determination by a person having 
responsibility for protecting Safeguards Information that a proposed 
recipient's access to Safeguards Information is necessary in the 
performance of official, contractual, or licensee duties of employment.
    The Licensee and all other persons who obtain Safeguards 
Information must ensure that they develop, maintain and implement 
strict policies and procedures for the proper handling of Safeguards 
Information to prevent unauthorized disclosure, in accordance with the 
requirements in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order. The Licensee must 
ensure that all contractors whose employees may have access to 
Safeguards Information either adhere to the Licensee's policies and 
procedures on Safeguards Information or develop, or maintain and 
implement their own acceptable policies and procedures. The Licensee 
remains responsible for the conduct of their contractors. The policies 
and procedures necessary to ensure compliance with applicable 
requirements contained in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order must 
address, at a minimum, the following: the general performance 
requirement that each person who produces, receives, or acquires 
Safeguards Information shall ensure that Safeguards Information is 
protected against unauthorized disclosure; protection of Safeguards 
Information at fixed sites, in use and in storage, and while in 
transit; correspondence containing Safeguards

[[Page 65216]]

Information; access to Safeguards Information; preparation, marking, 
reproduction and destruction of documents; external transmission of 
documents; use of automatic data processing systems; removal of the 
Safeguards Information category; the need-to-know the information; and 
background checks to determine access to the information.
    In order to provide assurance that the Licensee is implementing 
prudent measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to 
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information, the 
Licensee shall implement the requirements identified in Attachments 2 
and 3 to this Order. In addition, pursuant to Attachments 2 and 3 to 
this Order, I find that in light of the common defense and security 
matters identified above, which warrant the issuance of this Order, the 
public health, safety and interest require that this Order be effective 
immediately.

III

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 147, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Part 30, 10 CFR Part 
32, 10 CFR Part 35, 10 CFR Part 70, and 10 CFR Part 73, it is hereby 
ordered, effective immediately, that the licensee identified in 
attachment 1 to this order and all other persons who produce, receive, 
or acquire the additional security measures identified above (whether 
draft or final) or any related safeguards information shall comply with 
the requirements of attachments 2 and 3.
    The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind 
any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good cause by the 
Licensee.

IV

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. In addition, 
the Licensee and any other person adversely affected by this Order may 
request a hearing of this Order within twenty (20) days of the date of 
the Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to 
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of 
time must be made, in writing, to the Director, Office of Federal and 
State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and include a 
statement of good cause for the extension.
    The answer may consent to this Order. If the answer includes a 
request for a hearing, it shall, under oath or affirmation, 
specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which the 
Licensee relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have 
been issued. If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, 
that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his 
interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the 
criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d). Pursuant to 10 CFR 
2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee or any other person adversely affected by 
this Order may, in addition to requesting a hearing, at the time the 
answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the 
immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, 
including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on 
adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, ungrounded allegations or 
error.
    All documents filed in the NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including 
a request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139; 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by 
telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID) 
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal 
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise 
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or 
petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or 
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID 
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish 
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the 
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/
e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for 
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the NRC's public Web 
site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but 
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted 
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer 
assistance in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, 
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's 
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, 
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on 
the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance 
available on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/
e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any 
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must

[[Page 65217]]

apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing 
request/petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access 
to the document via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site 
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at 
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The 
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., 
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for 
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered 
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or 
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing 
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, 
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/EHD/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to 
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, 
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC 
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With 
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve 
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use 
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted 
materials in their submission.
    If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose 
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order 
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held the 
issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order 
should be sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to 
requesting a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move 
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the 
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the 
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an 
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the 
provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a 
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this 
order.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of October, 2012.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mark A. Satorius,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 
Management Programs.

Attachment 1: Applicable Materials Licensees Redacted

Attachment 2--Modified Handling Requirements for the Protection of 
Certain Safeguards Information (SGI-M) General Requirement

    Information and material that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) determines are safeguards information must be 
protected from unauthorized disclosure. In order to distinguish 
information needing modified protection requirements from the 
safeguards information for reactors and fuel cycle facilities that 
require a higher level of protection, the term ``Safeguards 
Information--Modified Handling'' (SGI-M) is being used as the 
distinguishing marking for certain materials licensees. Each person who 
produces, receives, or acquires SGI-M shall ensure that it is protected 
against unauthorized disclosure. To meet this requirement, licensees 
and persons shall establish and maintain an information protection 
system that includes the measures specified below. Information 
protection procedures employed by State and local police forces are 
deemed to meet these requirements.

Persons Subject to These Requirements

    Any person, whether or not a licensee of the NRC, who produces, 
receives, or acquires SGI-M is subject to the requirements (and 
sanctions) of this document. Firms and their employees that supply 
services or equipment to materials licensees would fall under this 
requirement if they possess facility SGI-M. A licensee must inform 
contractors and suppliers of the existence of these requirements and 
the need for proper protection. (See more under Conditions for Access) 
State or local police units who have access to SGI-M are also subject 
to these requirements. However, these organizations are deemed to have 
adequate information protection systems. The conditions for transfer of 
information to a third party, i.e., need-to-know, would still apply to 
the police organization as would sanctions for unlawful disclosure. 
Again, it would be prudent for licensees who have arrangements with 
local police to advise them of the existence of these requirements.

Criminal and Civil Sanctions

    The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, explicitly provides that 
any person, ``whether or not a licensee of the Commission, who violates 
any regulations adopted under this section shall be subject to the 
civil monetary penalties of section 234 of this Act.'' Furthermore, 
willful violation of any regulation or order governing safeguards 
information is a felony subject to criminal penalties in the form of 
fines or imprisonment, or both. See sections 147b. and 223 of the Act.

Conditions for Access

    Access to SGI-M beyond the initial recipients of the order will be 
governed by the background check requirements imposed by the order. 
Access to SGI-M by licensee employees, agents, or contractors must 
include both an appropriate need-to-know determination by the licensee, 
as well as a determination concerning the trustworthiness of 
individuals having access to the information. Employees of an 
organization affiliated with the licensee's company (e.g., a parent 
company), may be considered as

[[Page 65218]]

employees of the licensee for access purposes.

Need-to-Know

    Need-to-know is defined as a determination by a person having 
responsibility for protecting SGI-M that a proposed recipient's access 
to SGI-M is necessary in the performance of official, contractual, or 
licensee duties of employment. The recipient should be made aware that 
the information is SGI-M and those having access to it are subject to 
these requirements as well as criminal and civil sanctions for 
mishandling the information.

Occupational Groups

    Dissemination of SGI-M is limited to individuals who have an 
established need-to-know and who are members of certain occupational 
groups. These occupational groups are:
    A. An employee, agent, or contractor of an applicant, a licensee, 
the Commission, or the United States Government;
    B. A member of a duly authorized committee of the Congress;
    C. The Governor of a State or his designated representative;
    D. A representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement who has been certified by the NRC;
    E. A member of a State or local law enforcement authority that is 
responsible for responding to requests for assistance during safeguards 
emergencies; or
    F. A person to whom disclosure is ordered pursuant to Section 
2.744(e) of Part 2 of Part 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
    G. State Radiation Control Program Directors (and State Homeland 
Security Directors) or their designees.
    In a generic sense, the individuals described above in (A) through 
(G) are considered to be trustworthy by virtue of their employment 
status. For non-governmental individuals in group (A) above, a 
determination of reliability and trustworthiness is required. 
Discretion must be exercised in granting access to these individuals. 
If there is any indication that the recipient would be unwilling or 
unable to provide proper protection for the SGI-M, they are not 
authorized to receive SGI-M.

Information Considered for Safeguards Information Designation

    Information deemed SGI-M is information the disclosure of which 
could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on 
the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security 
by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, diversion, or 
sabotage of materials or facilities subject to NRC jurisdiction.
    SGI-M identifies safeguards information which is subject to these 
requirements. These requirements are necessary in order to protect 
quantities of nuclear material significant to the health and safety of 
the public or common defense and security.
    The overall measure for consideration of SGI-M is the usefulness of 
the information (security or otherwise) to an adversary in planning or 
attempting a malevolent act. The specificity of the information 
increases the likelihood that it will be useful to an adversary.

Protection While in Use

    While in use, SGI-M shall be under the control of an authorized 
individual. This requirement is satisfied if the SGI-M is attended by 
an authorized individual even though the information is in fact not 
constantly being used. SGI-M, therefore, within alarm stations, 
continuously manned guard posts or ready rooms need not be locked in 
file drawers or storage containers.
    Under certain conditions the general control exercised over 
security zones or areas would be considered to meet this requirement. 
The primary consideration is limiting access to those who have a need-
to-know. Some examples would be:

Alarm stations, guard posts and guard ready rooms;
Engineering or drafting areas if visitors are escorted and information 
is not clearly visible;
Plant maintenance areas if access is restricted and information is not 
clearly visible;
Administrative offices (e.g., central records or purchasing) if 
visitors are escorted and information is not clearly visible.

Protection While in Storage

    While unattended, SGI-M shall be stored in a locked file drawer or 
container. Knowledge of lock combinations or access to keys protecting 
SGI-M shall be limited to a minimum number of personnel for operating 
purposes who have a ``need-to-know'' and are otherwise authorized 
access to SGI-M in accordance with these requirements. Access to lock 
combinations or keys shall be strictly controlled so as to prevent 
disclosure to an unauthorized individual.

Transportation of Documents and Other Matter

    Documents containing SGI-M when transmitted outside an authorized 
place of use or storage shall be enclosed in two sealed envelopes or 
wrappers. The inner envelope or wrapper shall contain the name and 
address of the intended recipient, and be marked both sides, top and 
bottom with the words ``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling.'' 
The outer envelope or wrapper must be addressed to the intended 
recipient, must contain the address of the sender, and must not bear 
any markings or indication that the document contains SGI-M.
    SGI-M may be transported by any commercial delivery company that 
provides nation-wide overnight service with computer tracking features, 
US first class, registered, express, or certified mail, or by any 
individual authorized access pursuant to these requirements. Within a 
facility, SGI-M may be transmitted using a single opaque envelope. It 
may also be transmitted within a facility without single or double 
wrapping, provided adequate measures are taken to protect the material 
against unauthorized disclosure. Individuals transporting SGI-M should 
retain the documents in their personal possession at all times or 
ensure that the information is appropriately wrapped and also secured 
to preclude compromise by an unauthorized individual.

Preparation and Marking of Documents

    While the NRC is the sole authority for determining what specific 
information may be designated as ``SGI-M,'' originators of documents 
are responsible for determining whether those documents contain such 
information. Each document or other matter that contains SGI-M shall be 
marked ``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' in a conspicuous 
manner on the top and bottom of the first page to indicate the presence 
of protected information. The first page of the document must also 
contain (i) the name, title, and organization of the individual 
authorized to make a SGI-M determination, and who has determined that 
the document contains SGI-M, (ii) the date the document was originated 
or the determination made, (iii) an indication that the document 
contains SGI-M, and (iv) an indication that unauthorized disclosure 
would be subject to civil and criminal sanctions. Each additional page 
shall be marked in a conspicuous fashion at the top and bottom with 
letters denoting

[[Page 65219]]

``Safeguards Information Modified Handling.''
    In additional to the ``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' 
markings at the top and bottom of each page, transmittal letters or 
memoranda which do not in themselves contain SGI-M shall be marked to 
indicate that attachments or enclosures contain SGI-M but that the 
transmittal does not (e.g., ``When separated from SGI-M enclosure(s), 
this document is decontrolled'').
    In addition to the information required on the face of the 
document, each item of correspondence that contains SGI-M shall, by 
marking or other means, clearly indicate which portions (e.g., 
paragraphs, pages, or appendices) contain SGI-M and which do not. 
Portion marking is not required for physical security and safeguards 
contingency plans.
    All documents or other matter containing SGI-M in use or storage 
shall be marked in accordance with these requirements. A specific 
exception is provided for documents in the possession of contractors 
and agents of licensees that were produced more than one year prior to 
the effective date of the order. Such documents need not be marked 
unless they are removed from file drawers or containers. The same 
exception applies to old documents stored away from the facility in 
central files or corporation headquarters.
    Since information protection procedures employed by state and local 
police forces are deemed to meet NRC requirements, documents in the 
possession of these agencies need not be marked as set forth in this 
document.

Removal From SGI-M Category

    Documents containing SGI-M shall be removed from the SGI-M category 
(decontrolled) only after the NRC determines that the information no 
longer meets the criteria of SGI-M. Licensees have the authority to 
make determinations that specific documents which they created no 
longer contain SGI-M information and may be decontrolled. Consideration 
must be exercised to ensure that any document decontrolled shall not 
disclose SGI-M in some other form or be combined with other unprotected 
information to disclose SGI-M.
    The authority to determine that a document may be decontrolled may 
be exercised only by, or with the permission of, the individual (or 
office) who made the original determination. The document shall 
indicate the name and organization of the individual removing the 
document from the SGI-M category and the date of the removal. Other 
persons who have the document in their possession should be notified of 
the decontrolling of the document.

Reproduction of Matter Containing SGI-M

    SGI-M may be reproduced to the minimum extent necessary consistent 
with need without permission of the originator. Newer digital copiers 
which scan and retain images of documents represent a potential 
security concern. If the copier is retaining SGI-M information in 
memory, the copier cannot be connected to a network. It should also be 
placed in a location that is cleared and controlled for the authorized 
processing of SGI-M information. Different copiers have different 
capabilities, including some which come with features that allow the 
memory to be erased. Each copier would have to be examined from a 
physical security perspective.

Use of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems

    SGI-M may be processed or produced on an ADP system provided that 
the system is assigned to the licensee's or contractor's facility and 
requires the use of an entry code/password for access to stored 
information. Licensees are encouraged to process this information in a 
computing environment that has adequate computer security controls in 
place to prevent unauthorized access to the information. An ADP system 
is defined here as a data processing system having the capability of 
long term storage of SGI-M. Word processors such as typewriters are not 
subject to the requirements as long as they do not transmit information 
offsite. (Note: if SGI-M is produced on a typewriter, the ribbon must 
be removed and stored in the same manner as other SGI-M information or 
media.) The basic objective of these restrictions is to prevent access 
and retrieval of stored SGI-M by unauthorized individuals, particularly 
from remote terminals. Specific files containing SGI-M will be password 
protected to preclude access by an unauthorized individual. The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) maintains a 
listing of all validated encryption systems at http://csrc.nist.gov/
cryptval/1401/1401val.htm. SGI-M files may be transmitted over a 
network if the file is encrypted. In such cases, the licensee will 
select a commercially available encryption system that NIST has 
validated as conforming to Federal Information Processing Standards 
(FIPS). SGI-M files shall be properly labeled as ``Safeguards 
Information--Modified Handling'' and saved to removable media and 
stored in a locked file drawer or cabinet.

Telecommunications

    SGI-M may not be transmitted by unprotected telecommunications 
circuits except under emergency or extraordinary conditions. For the 
purpose of this requirement, emergency or extraordinary conditions are 
defined as any circumstances that require immediate communications in 
order to report, summon assistance for, or respond to a security event 
(or an event that has potential security significance).
    This restriction applies to telephone, telegraph, teletype, 
facsimile circuits, and to radio. Routine telephone or radio 
transmission between site security personnel, or between the site and 
local police, should be limited to message formats or codes that do not 
disclose facility security features or response procedures. Similarly, 
call-ins during transport should not disclose information useful to a 
potential adversary. Infrequent or non-repetitive telephone 
conversations regarding a physical security plan or program are 
permitted provided that the discussion is general in nature.
    Individuals should use care when discussing SGI-M at meetings or in 
the presence of others to insure that the conversation is not overheard 
by persons not authorized access. Transcripts, tapes or minutes of 
meetings or hearings that contain SGI-M shall be marked and protected 
in accordance with these requirements.

Destruction

    Documents containing SGI-M should be destroyed when no longer 
needed. They may be destroyed by tearing into small pieces, burning, 
shredding or any other method that precludes reconstruction by means 
available to the public at large. Piece sizes one half inch or smaller 
composed of several pages or documents and thoroughly mixed would be 
considered completely destroyed.

Attachment 3--Trustworthiness and Reliability Requirements for 
Individuals Handling Safeguards Information

    In order to ensure the safe handling, use, and control of 
information designated as Safeguards Information, each licensee shall 
control and limit access to the information to only those individuals 
who have established the need-to-know the information, and are 
considered to be trustworthy and reliable. Licensees shall document the 
basis for concluding that there is reasonable assurance that 
individuals

[[Page 65220]]

granted access to Safeguards Information are trustworthy and reliable, 
and do not constitute an unreasonable risk for malevolent use of the 
information.
    The Licensee shall comply with the requirements of this attachment:
    1. The trustworthiness and reliability of an individual shall be 
determined based on a background investigation:
    (a) The background investigation shall address at least the past 
three (3) years, and, at a minimum, include verification of employment, 
education, and personal references. The licensee shall also, to the 
extent possible, obtain independent information to corroborate that 
provided by the employee (i.e., seeking references not supplied by the 
individual).
    (b.) If an individual's employment has been less than the required 
three (3) year period, educational references may be used in lieu of 
employment history.

The licensee's background investigation requirements may be satisfied 
for an individual that has an active Federal security clearance.
    2. The licensee shall retain documentation regarding the 
trustworthiness and reliability of individual employees for three years 
after the individual's employment ends. In order for an individual to 
be granted access to Safeguards Information, the individual must be 
determined to be trustworthy and reliable, as describe in requirement 1 
above, and meet the requirements of NRC Order EA-12-148.

DG-SGI-1, Designation Guide for Safeguards Information Redacted

[FR Doc. 2012-26288 Filed 10-24-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

TOP-SECRET-U.S. Special Operations Command Terms of Reference

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/USSOCOM-TOR.png

 

This directive provides Terms of Reference (TOR) for United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC); Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM); Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC), and Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). The TOR for Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is addressed in SM 801-88, JSOC Charter.

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

USSOCOM-TOR

TOP-SECRET – U.S. Marine Corps Infantry Battalion Operations in Afghanistan

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/MCCLL-AfghanInfantryOps.png

 

The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Task Force 2/7) deployed to southern Afghanistan from April to October 2008, on short notice in order to fill a critical request for forces in support of U.S. Central Command.

Bottom Line Up Front: The mission of training and mentoring Afghani police was complicated by (1) the need to establish and occupy nine forward operating bases (FOBs) spread over an area of approximately 28,700 square kilometers, while (2) simultaneously maintaining a level of security that (3) permitted identification of suitable candidates for police and training them, since a police force did not exist yet in the areas in which 2/7 operated and (4) accomplishing this without any established support network. The operational environment was more kinetic and austere than conditions generally experienced by recent veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Companies and platoons were widely dispersed and follow-on units deploying to such areas in Afghanistan must be prepared to operate in a semi-autonomous manner. Training and organization need to be tailored to those conditions and their specific area of operations (AO), and consideration should be given to the proven utility of the MAGTF in such an environment. Battalion operations were viewed as effective in establishing a foundation for follow-on units in the following areas: FOB construction, logistics processes, communications infrastructure, initiation of civil military operations, a mentoring and training process, and disrupting insurgent control of areas previously unoccupied by coalition forces.

Police mentoring and training efforts were hampered by ongoing anti-coalition activities. “It’s like doing Fallujah before Al Fajr. We’re in the midst of it and trying to fight Taliban while doing civil-military operations (CMO) and while trying to train police and mentor them, because they’re learning as they go. You’re doing everything concurrently. The mantra is ‘clear, hold, build.’ We’re trying to do it all at the same time. …We should be clearing. … certainly to a point of creating a stable, more secured, environment. When you bring in a police force, that’s the building piece. When you’re doing CMO, that’s building, but you’ve got to hold your ground. We don’t really hold much ground outside of our FOB. We go out there and influence it. We disrupt, but we don’t hold it. And the reason we don’t hold it is because we haven’t cleared it, and by providing that security buffer through clearing and then establishing the security footprint to hold it, you’re more able to effectively build. However, during that transition piece, you’re going to get the willing assistance of the people themselves. … I use the term, ‘turning four into forty’, and a four-man fire team now become 40 local citizens in addition to them, that’s now enabling security and taking an interest in their own prosperity.”

The command relationship for 2/7 was in line with their mentoring mission, which placed them under Afghan Regional Security Integration Command (ARSIC) who is under TF Phoenix which reported to CSTC-A, who in turn reported to CENTCOM. This command structure was outside International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) control. Most of the warfighting capabilities in Afghanistan resided with ISAF, which reported to NATO. The CSTC-A command relationship had significant consequences for 2/7 and impacted on their operations and logistics. “ISAF has the ability to source equipment. ISAF has the priority for all the capabilities whether it is air support, air assets in particular, ISR assets; they are the operational arm. CSTCA is … a train and mentor organization and there is a mindset – because of how they’ve operated in the last few years – that CSTCA will go to established FOBs. They will benefit from the battle space manager’s generosity to host them at their FOBs and then they will take the mission of training that Army and police force. That hasn’t been 2/7’s experience. …. We went to the most austere location of the country … and established a footprint where there wasn’t one previously. That puts us in kind of a problem there because … the equipment, the air support, the war fighting capabilities – exist in ISAF and we were not an ISAF unit, we were a CSTCA unit. A lot of people in the beginning felt ‘You’re just training and mentoring Army and police. Why do you need close air support? Why do you need Predator feeds? Why do you need ISR capabilities? Why do you need all this ammo? This doesn’t make sense. This isn’t how CSTCA has operated’ …We turned to our higher headquarters and said ‘I need you to be a source of supply for me for ammunition, for more equipment, for better force protection measures’ – camera systems, new technologies whatever it may be – as we determined our requirements.” The logistics officer stated that they quickly learned that TF Phoenix and CSTCA had little of the support capabilities needed, and approached the U.S. Army Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB) 189 at Kandahar, part of Combined Joint Task Force 101 in the ISAF chain of command, who provided them common item support such as water, fuel, construction materials, and medical supplies. The Army CSSB also served as an ammunition supply point for USMC provided ammunition, but the CSSB did not have other USMC unique items, which in many cases had to be ordered from CONUS.

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

MCCLL-AfghanInfantryOps

Secrecy News – Court orders FBI to release withheld information

COURT ORDERS FBI TO RELEASE WITHHELD INFORMATION

As often happens, the Federal Bureau of Investigation invoked national
security a few years ago to justify withholding certain information from a
Freedom of Information Act requester named Deirdre McKiernan Hetzler.

But as rarely happens, a court last month critically assessed the FBI
national security claim and ordered the Bureau to release some of the
withheld information.

Ms. Hetzler, acting pro se (i.e. without an attorney), had requested
records concerning her deceased father, who had once been the subject of an
FBI investigation.  The FBI provided her with some records but withheld
others, stating that they remained classified in order to protect an
intelligence activity.

But after reviewing the withheld records in camera, Judge Michael A.
Telesca of the Western District of New York determined that some of the
information contained in them was not exempt from disclosure under FOIA. 
The FBI had been withholding it under the FOIA's national security
exemption even though it was actually unclassified or declassified.

"The Court is not persuaded that Defendants [the FBI and the Justice
Department] have carried their burden of showing that disclosure of this
information could cause serious damage to national security," Judge Telesca
wrote in a September 6, 2012 opinion.  He therefore ordered the FBI to
reprocess the request and to release the information to Ms. Hetzler as
specified in his ruling.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/hetzler.pdf

The Court here acted as a check on the normally unconstrained official
tendency to classify and withhold information.  That is what judicial
review is supposed to do, though it doesn't happen very often.

Earlier this year, Judge Richard W. Roberts of the DC District ordered the
U.S. Trade Representative to release a classified document to the Center
for International Environmental Law (CIEL) because he found that the
document was not properly classified.  

The USTR "failed to provide a plausible or logical explanation of why
disclosure of [the document] reasonably could be expected to damage United
States foreign relations," he wrote in his opinion ordering release.

        http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/03/not_logical.html

The government has appealed that ruling.  Judge Roberts "inappropriately
second-guessed the Executive's expertise in the uniquely sensitive area of
foreign relations," the government said in its September 17 appeals brief.

        http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/09/ciel_appeal_brief.html

No, on the contrary, CIEL responded in its own brief to the appeals court
this week, Judge Roberts did exactly what the FOIA requires.

"A district court reviewing [an agency claim that a document is classified
and exempt from disclosure] must give substantial weight to the agency's
explanations, but must not simply acquiesce in the agency's determination,"
CIEL attorneys wrote.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/ciel/102412-app.pdf

"Congress explicitly 'stressed the need for an objective, independent
judicial determination, and insisted that judges could be trusted to
approach the national security determinations with common sense, and
without jeopardy to national security'," they wrote, citing prior FOIA case
law.

The document that is being contested in this case is a one-page memorandum
that presents the US government's legal interpretation of the phrase "in
like circumstances."

The government says that because the document was shared confidentially
with other governments as part of a (now-concluded) free trade negotiation,
its involuntary disclosure would undermine the confidentiality of
diplomatic negotiations.

Judge Roberts said this argument was not compelling "since the United
States would be revealing its own position only" and would not be
disclosing foreign government information that had been provided in
confidence.

Indeed, "There is no expectation that a government is required to keep its
own negotiating positions confidential from its own citizens," said former
US trade negotiator Daniel Magraw in a statement cited by CIEL.

CIEL said that "Under USTR's interpretation, USTR could withhold any
document -- even a document whose release would otherwise cause absolutely
no harm -- simply by entering into a confidentiality arrangement and
arguing that the breach of that arrangement would undermine trust and cause
damage to US foreign relations; the withholding would be insulated from
judicial review."

"Fortunately, FOIA limits what an agency can make confidential," CIEL
wrote in its appeals brief.

A date for oral argument before the DC Circuit Court of Appeals has not
yet been set.

AN UPDATED CATALOG OF ARMY WEAPON SYSTEMS

The U.S. Army has just published the 2013 edition of its annual Weapon
Systems Handbook, which is filled with updated information on dozens of
weapon systems, the military contractors who produce them, and the foreign
countries that purchase them.

        http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh2013/index.html

So one learns, for example, that the RQ-11B Raven Small Unmanned Aircraft
System is marketed to Denmark, Estonia, Lebanon, and Uganda, while the
United States sells artillery ammunition both to Israel and to Lebanon.

An appendix provides an informative breakdown of military industry
contractors by weapon system and by the state where the contractor is
located.

        http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh2013/app.pdf

"The systems listed in this book are not isolated, individual products.
Rather, they are part of an integrated Army system of systems designed to
equip the Army of the future to successfully face any challenges,"
according to the Handbook introduction.

"After 10 years of combat, today's Army is significantly more capable than
the Army of 2001. As we draw down from Iraq and Afghanistan, we must remain
flexible, adaptable, and agile enough to respond and meet the needs of the
combatant commanders."

"Our objective is to equip and maintain an Army with the latest most
advanced weaponry to win and return home quickly."

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

The FBI – Whiteagle Sentenced to 10 Years in Federal Prison in Ho-Chunk Bribery Case

MADISON, WI—John W. Vaudreuil, United States Attorney for the Western District of Wisconsin, announced that Timothy Whiteagle, 61, Black River Falls, Wisconsin, was sentenced today by Chief U.S. District Judge William M. Conley to 10 years in federal prison for his central role in a bribery and scheme involving contracts awarded by the Ho-Chunk Nation. He was also ordered to serve three years of supervised release following his prison sentence and to pay $162,854 in taxes to the IRS.

On August 1, 2012, following a jury trial on bribery, tax, and obstruction charges, Whiteagle was convicted on all 12 counts.

According to the evidence presented at the trial, the Ho-Chunk Nation, an Indian tribal government, operates casinos in the Western District of Wisconsin and annually receives federal grants well in excess of $10,000. Whiteagle is a Ho-Chunk tribal member. From 2002 to 2009, Whiteagle, at times with the assistance of Deborah H. Atherton, 55, Black River Falls, acted covertly as a behind-the-scenes consultant for clients seeking to do business with the Ho-Chunk Nation. The clients included companies that provided cash access services (such as check cashing and ATMs) at Ho-Chunk casinos and a company that sought to provide mortgages and housing for tribal members. Whiteagle received over $3 million dollars from the clients.

Whiteagle gave Clarence Pettibone, an elected legislator of the Ho-Chunk Nation, money and valuables, and Whiteagle and Atherton solicited clients seeking Ho-Chunk business to do the same. The valuables included checks; money orders; payments to a martial arts studio operated by Pettibone; a Pontiac Firebird; contributions for Pettibone’s re-election campaign; a job for a relative of Pettibone; golf outings; tickets to an NFL football game; visits to adult entertainment venues; auto body work on a car owned by a relative of Pettibone; and vacations for Pettibone and his family members.

Whiteagle and Atherton offered and gave the money and valuables to Pettibone to influence and reward him for helping certain clients do business with the Nation. Pettibone knew the money and valuables were given to him to influence and reward him for assisting the clients. Whiteagle and Pettibone consulted with each other about how to use Pettibone’s official position to assist the clients in obtaining and keeping contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation; and Pettibone, in his official capacity as an elected legislator, took steps to help the clients do business with the Ho-Chunk Nation, such as scheduling of clients’ proposals on the legislature’s agenda, making motions for the nation to enter into contracts with the clients, delaying legislative action, and opposing proposed contracts between the nation and competitors of the clients.

Co-defendants Pettibone and Atherton were previously convicted and sentenced. Pettibone pleaded guilty to a bribery offense based on his receipt of the Firebird, along with money and other valuables, and was sentenced to five years in federal prison on July 11, 2012. Atherton was sentenced on October 10, 2012, to four years and two months in prison for her role in the bribery scheme and a separate loan fraud scheme. In a related case, Brian Johnson, 42, Shakopee, Minnesota, was sentenced to four months in prison for lying to federal agents during the course of the bribery investigation.

Whiteagle argued at trial, and again at sentencing, that the money and other things of value that he gave to Pettibone were not bribes but merely gifts given in the Ho-Chunk tradition. Judge Conley found that Whiteagle was “the center” of the scheme and profited immensely from businesses wanting to do business with the Ho-Chunk Nation. The judge found that Whiteagle showed a “willingness to engage in any behavior to benefit himself,” including bribery, telling a witness to lie, failing to pay taxes, and lying under oath. In rejecting Whiteagle’s arguments, Judge Conley said, “It is offensive to the court and to the Ho-Chunk Nation to suggest that bribery was part of ‘the Ho-Chunk way.’…Bribery and blatant lying is not the Ho-Chunk way; it is the farthest thing from the Ho-Chunk way.”

United States Attorney Vaudreuil stated, “This prosecution demonstrates the commitment by this office and the U.S. Department of Justice to vigorously investigate and prosecute corruption in tribal governments.”

The charges against Atherton, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and Johnson resulted from a joint investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and IRS Criminal Investigation, with assistance from the Ho-Chunk Nation, the Wisconsin Department of Administration-Division of Gaming, and the U.S. Department of Interior-Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Inspector General. The prosecutions have been handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Stephen P. Sinnott and Laura Przybylinski Finn.

Cryptome unveils CIA Proprietary Agencies & Agents Worldwide

A sends:

CIA Proprietary Agencies & Agents Worldwide

A

AALC, see Afro-American Labor Center
Acrus Technology
ADEP, see Popular Democratic Action
Advertising Center, Inc.
Aero Service Corp. of Philadelphia
Aero Systems, Inc.
Aero Systems Pvt. Ltd
AFME, see American Friends of the Middle East
“African Report”
African-American Institute
Afro-American Labor Center (AALC) of
Agencia Orbe Latinoamericano
Agency for International Development (AID)
Agribusiness Development, Inc.
AIFLD, see American Institute for Free Labor Development
Air America
Air Asia Co., Ltd.
Air Proprietary Company
All Ceylon Youth Council Movement
Alliance for Anti-totalitarian Education
America Fore Insurance Group
American Association of the Middle East
American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc.
American Committee for the Liberation of the People of Russia
American Committee for the International Commission of Jurists
American Economic Foundation
American Federation for Fundemental Research
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)
American Foundation for the Middle East
American Friends of the Middle East
American Friends of the Russian Freedom
American Friends Service Committee
American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees
American Fund For Free Jurists
American Historical Society
American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)
American Machine & Foundry
American Mutual Insurance Company
American Newspaper Guild
Association American Oriental Society
American Political Science Association
American Research Center in Egypt, Inc.
American Society of African Culture
American Institute of Cairo
American University – Special Operations Research Office
Ames Research Center
M.D. Anderson Foundation
ANSA (Italian Wire Service)
Antell, Wright & Nagel
Anti-Communist Christian Front
Anti-Communist Liberation Movement
Anti-Totalitarian Board of Solidarity with the People of Vietnam
Anti-Totalitarian Youth movement
Appalachian Fund
Arabian-American Oil Company
Area Tourist Association
Arrow Air
Ashland Oil and Refining Company
Asia Foundation
Association of American Geographers
Association of Computing Machinery
Association of Friends of Venezuela
Association of Preparatory Students
Assoziation ungarischer Studenten in Nordamerika
Atomics, Physics & Science Fund, Inc.
Atwater Research Program in North Africa

B

Bank of Lisle
Bankers Trust Company
Basic Resources
Beacon Fund
Berliner Verein
Berliner Verein zur Forderung der Bildungshilfe in Entwicklungslandern
Berliner Verein zur Forderung der Publizistik in Entwicklungslandern
Berico Technologies.
Blackwater
Blythe & Company, Inc.
Boni, Watkins, Jason & Company
Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (IBAD)
Broad and High Foundation
J. Frederick Brown Foundation
Burgerkomitee fur AuBenpolitik
Bulgarisches Nationales Zentrum
Burndy Corporation
Butte Pipe Line Company

C

Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl
Cahill & Wilinski
CALANAIS
California Shipbuilding Corporation
Caribean Marine Area Corporation
(Caramar) James Carlisle Trust
Caspian Pipeline Consortium
Catherwood Foundation
CBS Television Network
(CRESS) Center for Strategic Studies
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Center of Studies and Social Action
(CEAS) CEOSL, see Ecuadorean Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations
Chesapeake Foundation
Cipher Exchange Corporation
Civil Air Transport (CAT)
Clothing and Textiles Workers Union COG, see Guayana Workers Confederation
CloudShield
Colt’s Patent Fire Arms Company
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
Columbian Financial Development Company
Combate
“EL Commercio” Com. Suisse d’Aide aux Patrgrols
Committee for Free Albania
Committee for Liberty of Peoples
Communications Workers of America (CWA)
Confederation for an Independent Poland
Conference of the Atlantic
Community Congress for Cultural Freedom
Continental Press
Continental Shelf Explorations, Inc.,
Cooperative League of America
Coordinating Committee of Free Trade Unionists of Ecuador
Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students (cosec), see International Student Conference (ISC)
Cosden Petroleum Corporation
Combat Military Ordinances Ltd.
Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs, Inc.
Cox, Langford, Stoddard & Cutler
CRC, see Cuban Revolutionary Council
CROCLE, see Regional Confederation of Ecuadorian
Coastal Trade Unions Cross, Murphy and Smith
Crossroads of Africa
Crusade for Freedom
CSU, see Uruguayan Labor Conference
CTM, see Mexican Worker Confederation
Cuban Portland Cement Company
Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC, Cuban Exile)
Cummings and Seller
Curtis Publishing Company
CUT, see Uruguayan Confederation of Workers

D

Daddario & Burns
Dane Aviation Supply
Danet
Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates (West)
Deutscher Kunstlerbund
Dominion Rubber Company
Double Chek Corporation
DRE, see Revolutionary Student Directorate in Exile

E

Eagleton Institute of Politics – Princeton University East Asian Institute
Eagan, McAllister Associates, Inc
EAI Corporation
East-West Center
Ecuadorean Anti-Communist Action
Ecuadorean Anti-Communist Front
Ecuadorean Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (CEOSL)
Ecuadorean Federation of Telecommunications Workers (FENETEL)
Editors Press Service
Edsel Fund
Electric Storage Battery Company
El Gheden Mining Corporation
End Kadhmir Dispute Committee
Ensayos
ERC International, Inc.
Enstnischer Nationalrat
Enstnischer Weltzentralrat
Estrella Company
Europe Assembly of Captive Nations
Exeter Banking Company

F

Farfield Foundation, Inc.
Federal League for Ruralist Action (Ruralistas)
Federation for a Democratic Germany in Free Europe
Fed. Inte. des Journalistes de Tourisme
FENETEL, see Ecuadorean Federation of Telecommunications Workers
First Florida Resource Corporation
Food, Drink and Plantation Workers Union
Ford Foundation
Foreign News Service
Foreign Press Association B.C.
Forest Products, Ltd.
Fortune
“Forum” (Wein)
Foundation for International and Social Behavior
Foundation for Student Affairs
Franklin Broadcasting Company
Free Africa Organization of Colored People
Free Europe Committee, Inc.
Free Europe Exile Relations
Free Europe Press Division
Freie Universitat (FU)
Frente Departmental de Compensinos de Puno
FSS International
Fund for International, Social and Economic Development

G

Gambia National Youth Council
Geological Society of America
Georgia Council on Human Relations
Gibraltar Steamship Corporation
Global International Airways
Glore, Forgan & Company
Goldstein, Judd & Gurfein
Gotham Foundation
Government Affairs Institute
W.R. Grace and Company
Granary Fund
Grey Advertising Agency
Guyana Workers Confederation (COG)
Gulf Oil Corporation

H

Andrew Hamilton Fund
HBGary
Heights Fund
Joshua Hendy Iron Works
Hicks & Associates
Hierax
Hill and Knowlton
Himalayan Convention
Histadrut – The Federation of Labor in Israel
Hiwar
Hoblitzelle Foundation
Hodson Corporation
Hogan & Hartson Holmes Foundation, Inc.
Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace
Hutchins Advertising Company of Canada
Huyck Corporation

I

IBAD, see Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action
Independence Foundation
Independent Research Service
Industrial Research Service
Information Security International Inc.,.,
Institut zur Erforschung der USSR e.V.
Institute Battelle Memorial
Institute of Historical Review
Institute of International Education
Institute of International Labor Research Education
Institute of Political Education
Institute of Public Administration
International-American Center of Economic and Social Studies
International-American Federation of Journalists
International-American Federation of Working Newspapermen (IFWN)
International-American Labor College
International-American Police Academy, see International Police Academy
International-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT)
Intercontinental Finance Corporation
Intercontinental Research Corporation
Intermountain Aviation
International Armament Corporation (INTERARMCO) International Air Tours of Nigeria
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (IFCTU)
International Cooperation Administration (ICA)
International Development Foundation, Inc.
International Fact Finding Institute
International Federation of Christian Trade Unions IFCTU, see World Confederation of Labor
International Federation of Journalists
International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW)
International Federation of Plantation, Agriculture and Allied Workers (IFPAAW)
International Federation of Women Lawyers (IFWL)
International Geographical Union
International Journalists Conference
International Labor Research Institute
International Police Services School
International Press Institute
International Rescue Committee
International Secretatiate of the Pax Romana
International Student Conference (ISC)
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT)
International Trade Services
International Trade Secretariats
International Trading and Investment Guaranty Corp., Ltd.,
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF)
International Union Officials Trade Organizations
International Union of Young Christian Democrats
International Youth Center
Internationale Federation der Mittel- und Osteuropas
Internationale Organization zur Erforschung kommunistischer Nethoden
Internationaler Bund freier Journalisten
Internationales Hilfskomitee

J

Japan Cultural Forum

K

KAMI
Kentfield Fund J.M.
Kaplan Fund, Inc.
Kennedy & Sinclaire, Inc.
Kenya Federation of Labour
Khmer Airlines
Kimberly-Clark Corporation
Komittee fur internationale Beziehungen
Komittee fur Selbstbestimmung
Komittee fur die Unabhangigkeit des Kaukasus
Korean C.I.A.
Korean Freedom and Cultural Foundation, Inc.

L

Labor Committee for Democratic Action
Lawyer’s Constitutional Defense Committee
League for Industrial Democracy
League for International Social and Cooperative Development
Ligue de la Liberte
Litton Industrial Company
London American

M

Manhattan Coffee Company
Marconi Telegraph-Cable Company
Maritime Support Unit
Martin Marietta Company
Marshall Foundation Center for International Studies (MIT-CIS)
Mathieson Chemical Corporation
McCann-Erikson, Inc.
Megadyne Electronics
Charles E. Merrill Trust
Merex
Mexican Workers Confederation (CTM)
Miner & Associates
Mineral Carriers, Ltd.
Mobil Oil Company
Molden-Verlag
Monroe Fund
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.
Moral Majority
Moral Rearmament
Movement
Mount Pleasant Trust
Movement for Integrated University Action
Robert Mullen Company

N

Narodno Trudouoj Sojus (NTS)
National Academy of Sciences
National Research Council
National Board for Defense of Sovereignty and Continental Solidarity
National Council of Churches
National Defense Front
National Educational Films, Inc.
National Education Association
National Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers of Ecuador
National Feminist Movement for the Defense of Uruguay
National Student Press Council of India
National Students Association (NSA)
National Union of Journalists of Ecuador
Newsweek
New York Times
Norman Fund
North American Rockwell Corporation
North American Uranium, Inc.
Norwich Pharmaceutical Company

O

Oceanic Cargo
Oil Workers International Union
Operations and Policy Research, Inc.
Organix. Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN)
ORIT, see International-American Regional Labor Organization
Overseas New Agency

P

Pacifica Foundation
Pacific Life Insurance
Paderewski Foundation
Pan-American Foundation
Pan Aviation
Pappas Charitable Trust
Parvus
Jere Patterson & Associates
Pax Romana
Peace and Freedom
Penobscot Land & Investment Company
Plant Protection, Inc.
Plenary of Democratic Civil Organizations of Uruguay
Pope & Ballard
Popular Democratic Action (ADEP)
Press Institute of India
Price Fund
Public Service International (PSI)
Publisher’s Council

R

Rabb Charitable Foundation
Radio Free Asia Radio
Free Europe
Radio Liberation
Radio Liberty Committee, Inc.
Radio Swan
Rand Corporation
Regional Confederation of Ecuadorean Coastal Trade Unions (CROCLE)
Research Foundation for Foreign Affairs
Retail Clerk’s International Association
Reveal
Revolutionary Democratic Front (RFD, Cuban exile)
Reynolds Metal Company
Rubicon Foundation
Rumanisches Nationalkomitee
Russian and East European Institute
Russian Institute
Russian Research Center

S

Safir
Science Applications International Corporation
St. Lucia Airways
Saman
San Jacinto Foundation
San Miguel Fund
SBONR
Sentinels of Liberty
Sith & Company
Social Christian Movement of Ecuador
Sociedade Anomima de Radio Retransmissao (RARETSA)
Society for Defense of Freedom in Asia
SODECO (Sakhalin Oil Development Cooperation Co)
SODIMAC Southern Air Transport
Standard Electronics, Inc.
Standish Ayer & McKay, Inc.
Sterling Chemical Co.
Strauss Fund
Student Movement for Democratic Action
Sur International
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.
Synod of Bishops of the Russian Church Outside of Russia
Systems Development Corporation

T

Tarantel Press
Tetra Tech International
Thai-Pacific Services Company
Tibet Convention
Tower Fund
Transmaritania
Twentieth Century Fund

U

Unabhangiger Forschugsdienst
Ungarischer Nationalrat
U.S. News and World Report
United States Youth Council
U.S.-Russian Commercial Energy Working Group
United Ukrainian American Relief Committee
Universal Service Corporation
Untersuchungsausschub freiheitlicher Juristen (UfJ)
Uruguayan Committee for Free Detention of Peoples
Uruguayan Confederation of Workers (CUT)
Uruguayan Labor Confederation (CSU)

V

Vangard Service Company
Varec
Varicon, Inc

W

Wainwright and Matthews Joseph Walter & Sons
Warden Trust
Erwim Wasey, Ruthrauff & Ryan, Inc.
Wexton Advertising Agency
Whitten Trust
Williford-Telford Corporation
World Assembly of Youth (WAY)
World Confederation of Labor
Wynnewood Fund

Y

York Research Corporation

Z

Zenith Technical Enterprises, Ltd
Zenith Technical Enterprises University
Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sorengo (Zangakuren)
Zentrale for Studien und Dokumentation
Zweites deutschen Fernsehen (ZDF)




 

Secret – Historical Pre-Election Terrorist Attacks Analysis

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/NYSIC-ElectionAttacks.png

 

In light of the upcoming 2012 US presidential election, NYSIC is providing a snapshot of four historical cases where terrorists conducted attacks in conjunction with upcoming local or national elections, including the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used and how the attacks met or failed to meet the terrorists’ goals of altering the outcome of the election.

Studies have highlighted possible theories, most often supported by historical cases, of why terrorists attempt to use attacks to influence the outcome of the election:

  • Terrorist attacks greatly increase the probability that the incumbent government will lose re-election.
  • Rightist parties are viewed as less conciliatory toward terrorist demands, while leftist parties are viewed as more likely to negotiate or give concessions. In general, relative support for rightist parties is expected to increase after terrorist attacks and to decrease after periods of inactivity.

Historically, terrorist violence has been used more often to extract direct concessions through negotiations after an attack. One such example is the February 9, 1996, Docklands Bombing in Northern Ireland: the Irish Republican Army (IRA) put an end to its 17-month ceasefire experiment by detonating an explosives-laden truck near a plaza where three office towers, a light-railway station and a hotel converge. The bombing successfully forced the British government back to the negotiating table without the precondition that the Provisional Irish Republican Army decommission all its weapons.

In 2004, al-Qa’ida was able to indirectly extract concessions from the Spanish government by influencing the election outcome after the Madrid train bombings, securing a Spanish withdrawal of troops from Iraq.

Implications for New York:

At this time, there is no known credible intelligence suggesting an attack against New York State during the 2012 election period. However, considering the overall security environment, threats could emanate from a variety of actors wanting to influence US policy, including: al-Qa’ida and affiliates; state-sponsored groups; homegrown violent extremists; or anti-government domestic terrorists. Law enforcement and first responders throughout New York State should remain vigilant and consider proactive outreach regarding suspicious activity at or near potential targets in their jurisdictions, including campaign facilities, upcoming political event venues, and previously targeted locations such as shopping centers, recruiting centers, transportation hubs, and social/recreation venues.

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

NYSIC-ElectionAttacks

Collateral Murder – Wikileaks – Iraq – Video

Wikileaks has obtained and decrypted this previously unreleased video footage from a US Apache helicopter in 2007. It shows Reuters journalist Namir Noor-Eldeen, driver Saeed Chmagh, and several others as the Apache shoots and kills them in a public square in Eastern Baghdad. They are apparently assumed to be insurgents. After the initial shooting, an unarmed group of adults and children in a minivan arrives on the scene and attempts to transport the wounded. They are fired upon as well. The official statement on this incident initially listed all adults as insurgents and claimed the US military did not know how the deaths ocurred. Wikileaks released this video with transcripts and a package of supporting documents on April 5th 2010 onhttp://collateralmurder.com

Former CIA Officer John Kirakou Pleads Guilty to Disclosing Classified Information About CIA Officer

 

ALEXANDRIA, VA—Former CIA Officer John Kiriakou, 48, of Arlington, Virginia, pleaded guilty today to disclosing to a journalist the name of a covert CIA officer and also admitted to disclosing information revealing the role of another CIA employee in classified activities.

Neil H. MacBride, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office, made the announcement after the plea was accepted by U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.

Kiriakou pleaded guilty today to one count of intentionally disclosing information identifying a covert agent. As part of the plea agreement, the United States and Kiriakou agree that a sentence of 30 months in prison is the appropriate disposition of this case. Sentencing has been scheduled for January 25, 2013.

“The government has a vital interest in protecting the identities of those involved in covert operations,” said U.S. Attorney MacBride. “Leaks of highly sensitive, closely held, and classified information compromise national security and can put individual lives in danger.”

“Disclosing classified information, including the names of CIA officers, to unauthorized individuals is a clear violation of the law,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “Today’s plea would not be possible without the hard work of the prosecutors and FBI special agents and analysts who brought this case to justice and who will continue to pursue those who ignore their obligations to protect national security secrets.”

According to court records, the case is a result of an investigation triggered by a classified filing in January 2009 by defense counsel for high-value detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This filing contained classified information the defense had not been given through official government channels, including photographs of certain government employees and contractors. The investigation revealed that on multiple occasions, one of the journalists to whom Kiriakou illegally disclosed classified information, in turn, disclosed that information to a defense team investigator. This information was reflected in the classified defense filing and enabled the defense team to take or obtain surveillance photographs of government personnel. The government has made no allegations of criminal activity by any members of the defense team for the detainees.

Kiriakou was a CIA intelligence officer between 1990 and 2004, serving at headquarters and in various classified overseas assignments. Upon joining the CIA in 1990 and on multiple occasions in following years, Kiriakou signed secrecy and non-disclosure agreements not to disclose classified information to unauthorized individuals. In a statement of facts filed with his plea agreement, Kiriakou admitted that he made illegal disclosures about two CIA employees and their involvement in classified operations to two journalists (referenced as “Journalist A” and “Journalist B” in court records) on multiple occasions between 2007 and 2009.

Kiriakou admitted that, through a series of e-mails with Journalist A, he disclosed the full name of a CIA officer (referred to as “Officer A” in court records) whose association with the CIA had been classified for more than two decades. In addition to identifying the officer for the journalist, Kiriakou also provided information that helped the journalist link the officer to a particular classified operation.

In addition, Kiriakou admitted that he disclosed to Journalists A and B the name and contact information of a CIA analyst, identified in court records as “Officer B,” along with his association with an operation to capture terrorism subject Abu Zubaydah in 2002. Kiriakou knew that the association of Officer B with the Abu Zubaydah operation was classified. Based in part on this information, Journalist B subsequently published a June 2008 front-page story in The New York Times disclosing Officer B’s alleged role in the Abu Zubaydah operation.

Without Kiriakou’s knowledge, Journalist A passed the information he obtained from Kiriakou to an investigator assisting in the defense of high-value detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

Kiriakou also admitted that he lied to the CIA regarding the existence and use of a classified technique, referred to as a “magic box,” while seeking permission from the CIA’s Publications Review Board to include the classified technique in a book.

This case was investigated by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, with assistance from the CIA and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Iris Lan of the Southern District of New York; Mark E. Schneider and Ryan Fayhee of the Northern District of Illinois; and W. Neil Hammerstrom, Jr. of the Eastern District of Virginia are prosecuting the case on behalf of the United States.

 



	

SECRET-Joint Publication 3-13.3 Operations Security January 2012

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/JCS-OPSEC.png

 

The following Joint Publication is unavailable from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website. Though it does not have any markings indicating a distribution restriction, the DTIC website lists the document has being available through the Joint Doctrine, Education, & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) which is restricted to U.S. military personnel.

Joint forces often display personnel, organizations, assets, and actions to public view and to a variety of adversary intelligence collection activities, including sensors and systems. Joint forces can be under observation at their peacetime bases and locations, in training or exercises, while moving, or when deployed to the field conducting actual operations. In addition, the adversary could compile and correlate enough information to facilitate predicting and countering US operations.

The purpose of operations security (OPSEC) is to reduce the vulnerability of US and multinational forces from successful adversary exploitation of critical information. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces. The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control, and protect critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions associated with military operations.

Tailored to the OPSEC process, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment is a useful methodology for intelligence professionals to support the OPSEC planner. The intelligence professional will perform mission analysis on friendly operations. This provides great insight into potential areas where the adversary could collect information and the identity of essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs). Identification of EEFIs will assist the OPSEC planner in ensuring all OPSEC-related critical unclassified information is included in the critical information list.

OPSEC’s most important characteristic is that it is a process. It is an analytical process that can be applied to any operation or activity for the purpose of denying critical information to an adversary. Unlike security programs that seek to protect classified information and controlled unclassified information, OPSEC is concerned with identifying, controlling, and protecting unclassified information that is associated with specific military operations and activities.

3. Purpose of Operations Security

a. The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of US and multinational forces from successful adversary exploitation of critical information. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces.

b. The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control, and protect critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions associated with military operations and other activities to:

(1) Identify those actions that may be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

(2) Determine what specific indications could be collected, analyzed, and interpreted to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.

(3) Select countermeasures that eliminate or reduce vulnerability or indicators to observation and exploitation.

(4) Avoid patterns of behavior, whenever feasible, and thus preclude the possibility of adversary intelligence constructing an accurate model.

(5) Prevent the display or collection of critical information, especially during preparation for and execution of actual operations.

(6) Avoid drastic changes as OPSEC countermeasures are implemented. Changes in procedures alone will indicate to the adversary that there is an operation or exercise starting.

6. Operations Security and Information Operations

OPSEC as a capability of information operations (IO) denies the adversary the information needed to correctly assess friendly capabilities and intentions. It is also a tool, hampering the adversary’s use of its own information systems and processes and providing the necessary support to all friendly IO capabilities. In particular, OPSEC complements military deception (MILDEC) by denying an adversary information required to both assess a real plan and to disprove a deception plan. OPSEC and MILDEC have the same ultimate goal—affecting the adversary’s decision-making process and leading it to an erroneous decision. OPSEC does it by concealing important information, and MILDEC does it by putting misleading information into the environment. These are two related processes. For IO capabilities that exploit new opportunities and vulnerabilities, such as electronic warfare and computer network attack, OPSEC is essential to ensure friendly capabilities that might be easily countered are not compromised. The process of identifying critical information and applying measures to mask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a defense in-depth approach to securing friendly information. To be effective, other types of security must complement OPSEC. Examples of other types of security include physical security, programs in IA, computer network defense, and personnel programs that screen personnel and limit authorized access. In particular, COMSEC plays a vital role in OPSEC. While COMSEC’s primary purpose is to protect classified materials, it can assist with identifying vulnerabilities to loss of critical information through monitoring communications within legal constraints.

5. Risk Assessment

a. This action has three components. First, planners analyze the vulnerabilities identified in the previous action and identify possible OPSEC countermeasures for each vulnerability. Second, the commander and staff estimate the impact to operations such as cost in time, resources, personnel or interference with other operations associated with implementing each possible OPSEC countermeasure versus the potential harmful effects on mission accomplishment resulting from an adversary’s exploitation of a particular vulnerability. Third, the commander and staff select specific OPSEC countermeasures for execution based upon a risk assessment done by the commander and staff.

b. OPSEC countermeasures reduce the probability of the adversary either observing indicators or exploiting vulnerabilities, being able to correctly analyze the information obtained, and being able to act on this information in a timely manner.

(1) OPSEC countermeasures can be used to prevent the adversary from detecting an indicator or exploiting a vulnerability, provide an alternative analysis of a vulnerability or an indicator (prevent the adversary from correctly interpreting the indicator), and/or attack the adversary’s collection system.

(2) OPSEC countermeasures include, among other actions, cover, concealment, camouflage, deception, intentional deviations from normal patterns, and direct strikes against the adversary’s intelligence system.

(3) More than one possible measure may be identified for each vulnerability. Conversely, a single measure may be used for more than one vulnerability. The most desirable OPSEC countermeasures are those that combine the highest possible protection with the least adverse effect on operational effectiveness. Chapter III, “Operations Security Planning,” provides a detailed discussion of OPSEC countermeasures.

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

JCS-OPSEC

Secrecy News – Liberties Oversight Board invites Public Input


The long-dormant Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB)
announced that it will hold its first public meeting next week and it
invited members of the public to provide input to help shape the Board's
near-term agenda.

"In anticipation of setting the agenda of issues on which the Board will
focus its attention, the Board would welcome the views of nongovernmental
organizations and members of the public," stated a notice in the October 23
Federal Register.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2012/10/pclob.html

The PCLOB was created in response to a recommendation of the 9/11
Commission that "there should be a board within the executive branch to
oversee... the commitment the government makes to defend our civil
liberties."

By statute, the PCLOB is mandated to "(1) analyze and review actions the
executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that
the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and
civil liberties; and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately
considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and
policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism."

In response to the announcement of next week's meeting, we wrote in to
propose that the PCLOB should review the government's problematic use of
Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. "The use of Section 215, the so-called
'business records' provision, is the subject of intense and unresolved
controversy that warrants the Board's attention," we suggested.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2012/10/pclob-let.pdf

Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall have stated that "most Americans would
be stunned to learn the details of how these secret court opinions have
interpreted section 215 of the Patriot Act."  If so, the members of the
PCLOB can be stunned on behalf of most Americans by virtue of the security
clearances and right of access that they possess.

For background on the origins and development of the PCLOB, see "Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status,"
Congressional Research Service, August 27, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34385.pdf

FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH, AND MORE FROM CRS

Newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has not made publicly available include the following.

Federal Support for Academic Research, October 18, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41895.pdf

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, Impact, and Issues, October 22,
2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40957.pdf

Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress,
October 19, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf

Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global
Access to Nuclear Power, October 19, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34234.pdf

U.S. Sanctions on Burma, October 19, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41336.pdf

Burma's Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions, October 19, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42363.pdf

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, October 18, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32109.pdf

Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, October 18, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf

Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background
and Issues for Congress, October 19, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41526.pdf

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and
Issues for Congress, October 18, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22373.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

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     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

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     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Opfer: DIE STASI-FÄLSCHER UND DER BEWEIS: WIE MERIDIAN CAPITAL VON “GoMoPa” ERPRESST WURDE

 

 

 

 UND HIER DIE STASI-FÄLSCHUNG UM EINEN “GoMoPa”-GEGNER ZU BELASTEN:
Der Beweis: Erpressungsversuch des „NACHRICHTENDIENSTES“ GoMoPa“ an Meridian Capital (Nachfolgend bringen wir eine Original-Pressemeldung von „GoMoPa“, dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ mit dem Meridian Capital, London, erpresst werden sollte. Der Artikel strotzt nur von Fehlern. Damit ist deutlich, dass „GoMoPa“ tatsäch Meridian Capital erpresst hat und die Aktionen von Meridian Capital sich gegen „GoMoPa“ gerichtet haben.
Die gefälschte Pressemitteilung von Meridian Capital in Bezug auf unser Haus soll von dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „GoMoPa“ ablenken.„GoMopa“ schreibt:08.09.2008
Weltweite Finanzierungen mit Widersprüchen

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.

Der Firmensitz

Der Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“.

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos.

Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“

Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt.
Martin Kraeter: „ Ein ‚britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. So etwas gibt es schlicht und ergreifend nicht! Der Nahostkonflikt schwelt schon seit mehr als 50 Jahren. Hier in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) werden Israelis erst gar nicht ins Land gelassen. Israelische Produkte sind gebannt. Es gibt nicht einmal direkte Telefonverbindungen. Die VAE haben fast 70% der Wiederaufbaukosten des Libanon geschultert, nachdem Israel dort einmarschiert ist.“

Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome.

Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich.

Der Webauftritt

Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai.

Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln.

Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“

Zitatende

Dies ist das altbekannte Muster des „NACHRCHTENDIENSTES“ „GoMoPa“ und seiner Berliner und Hamburger Komplizen Falschmeldungen zu verbreiten, um Firmen und Personen erpressen oder ausschalten zu können.

 

SIEHE

 

http://www.google.de/#hl=de&safe=off&output=search&sclient=psy-ab&q=DER+BEWEIS:+WIE+MERIDIAN+CAPITAL+VON+%22GoMoPa%22+ERPRESST+WURDE&oq=DER+BEWEIS:+WIE+MERIDIAN+CAPITAL+VON+%22GoMoPa%22+ERPRESST+WURDE&gs_l=hp.3…20004.20004.1.20777.1.1.0.0.0.0.85.85.1.1.0…0.0…1c.1.NfThx6kPTBA&psj=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.&fp=c4affe4f526437d4&bpcl=35466521&biw=1248&bih=899

SECRET-Joint Publication 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/JCS-MISO.png

 

The following Joint Publication is unavailable from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website. Though it does not have any markings indicating a distribution restriction, the DTIC website lists the document has being available through the Joint Doctrine, Education, & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) which is restricted to U.S. military personnel.

 

Today’s global information environment is complex, rapidly changing, and requires integrated and synchronized application of the instruments of national power to ensure responsiveness to national goals and objectives. In the current operational environment, effective influence is gained by unity of effort in what we say and do, and how well we understand the conditions, target audiences (TAs), and operational environment. Within the military and informational instruments of national power, the Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States Government (USG) communications strategy. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts must inherently support the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG activities.

Military information support operations (MISO) play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses.

b. Within the military and informational instruments of national power, the Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States Government (USG) communications strategy. DOD communications strategy and the separate and unique capabilities of military information support operations (MISO), public affairs (PA) (to include visual information), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) address a variety of communication roles and specific audiences as permitted by operational parameters and policy. DOD informational activities can be used to inform, direct, or persuade. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts must inherently support the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG activities.

c. MISO play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses. It is important not to confuse psychological impact with MISO. Actions of the joint force, such as strikes or shows of force, have psychological impact but they are not MISO unless their primary purpose is to influence the perceptions and subsequent behavior of a TA. Regardless of the mission set, all MISO are conducted within carefully reviewed and approved programs and under mission-tailored product approval guidelines that flow from national-level authorities.

d. MISO contribute to the success of both peacetime engagements and major operations. The combatant commander (CCDR) receives functional and theater strategic planning guidance from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Unified Command Plan (UCP), and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). These documents are derived from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) National Defense Strategy, which interprets the President’s national security policy and strategy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy.

(1) In peacetime, MISO are planned and integrated to further national defense strategies through the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater campaign plan (TCP). CCDRs incorporate MISO programs and integrate them into the broad range of activities required for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence (i.e., Phase 0). For example, in steady-state geographic combatant command TCPs, MIS units can deploy to support approved counterinsurgency (COIN), demining, or foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) programs under either a joint force commander (JFC) or US diplomatic control.

(2) MISO reinforce US policies that center on preventing hostilities and advocating peaceful resolutions when possible. MISO are key in furthering US endeavors to deter aggression and to maximize the JFC’s efforts to shape the operational environment. MIS units communicate well-orchestrated and planned information to international audiences to clarify intent, prevent escalation of tension, ease concerns, and mitigate the potential effects and capabilities of adversary information activities.

4. Support of Irregular Warfare

a. General. Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

(1) Some of the operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW are insurgency; COIN; unconventional warfare (UW); terrorism; CT; FID; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations; MISO; CMO; intelligence and counterintelligence activities; transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW; and law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries. (Some IW activities, such as terrorism and transnational crime, violate international law. US law and national policy prohibit US military forces or other government departments and agencies from engaging in or supporting such activities. However, since our adversaries employ terrorism and transnational criminal activities against the interests of the US and its partners, these activities are included below as examples of the range of operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW.) IW provides a logical, long-term framework for analyzing the
irregular threat and is both a form of armed conflict and warfare.

(2) IW is complex and focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. Ultimately, IW is a political struggle for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. The factions involved in the conflict seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and their external supporters. At the same time, they also seek to strengthen their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population.

(3) When MISO occur in IW, their role usually is much greater than during major operations and campaigns. They impact directly on the operational focus of IW in ways unlike that of combat operations.

b. Approaches. Conducting IW focuses on two approaches—direct and indirect. A JFC will often conduct both approaches simultaneously to defeat our adversaries and those of our partners.

(1) Direct Approach. The direct approach addresses the requirement to pursue adversaries and their infrastructure and resources. Some adversaries, such as terrorists and insurgents fighting for a religious or tribal cause, may be so committed that they simply cannot be persuaded or coerced into laying down their arms; these individuals must be either killed or captured.

(2) Indirect Approach. MISO are key supporting operations to each contextual application of indirect approaches to executing IW.

(a) Focus on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population, rather than on applying military power directly against the military and paramilitary forces of adversaries. Both approaches are necessary, but the direct application of military power is unlikely to be decisive.

(b) Disturb, disrupt, and displace adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than attacking where they are strongest or in the manner they expect.

(c) Empower, enable, and leverage interagency and other partners to attack adversaries militarily or confront them nonmilitarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral military confrontation by US joint forces.

(d) Take actions with or against third-party states or armed groups to influence adversaries, rather than taking actions to influence adversaries directly.

(e) Attack adversaries using a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods and means rather than relying only on conventional military forces. Nonconventional methods and means might include clandestine or covert actions, operations in combination with irregular forces, or the nonconventional use of conventional capabilities.

(f) Subvert the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant populations by isolating them physically and psychologically from their local and international support through the use of MISO, public diplomacy, and PA activities; security operations; population and resource control measures; and other means.

c. Military Information Support Operations and IW. The ideological and political factors associated with IW create a fertile field for MISO. Examples of MISO applications to selected activities within IW are:

(1) FID. MISO are used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between HN armed forces and the civilian populace. MISO also may be used to modify the behavior of selected TAs toward US and multinational capabilities. The main objectives of MISO during FID are to build and maintain support for the host government while decreasing support for insurgents.

(2) CT. MISO are an essential part of the capabilities required for CT, in particular in application of the indirect approach to shape, stabilize, and influence the environment in which violent extremist organizations (VEOs) operate. CT focuses on populations, and in some operational areas, the information presented can determine which side will gain the favor of public opinion. Terrorist groups have gained sympathy and support of moderate audiences through disinformation partly based on their propaganda focusing on miscues of the friendly forces. In CT operations, TA identification and the use of MISO to influence the TAs’ behavior are important. Within an operational area there may be several TAs and multiple synchronized themes, messages, and means of delivery required for each. The intent of MISO in CT operations is to shape and influence the terrorist network’s informational environment.

(3) Stability Operations. Successful execution of stability operations tasks depends on informing the local populace and influencing attitudes to secure the trust and confidence of the population. MISO exerts significant influence on foreign TAs.

(4) COIN Operations. MISO can influence foreign populations through information to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or noninterference with friendly joint operations. In addition, MIS units may conduct information activities such as recruit for security forces, legitimize HN governments, and establish and maintain popular support for the HN programs and activities. MISO can provide public information to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order. MISO can serve as the supported commander’s voice to foreign populations by conveying the JFC’s intent.

(5) UW. UW involves ideological, religious, political, economic, and social factors which promote intense, emotional partisanship. These human factors, associated with armed resistance activity, create a situation that MIS units are uniquely suited to engage. MIS units support all phases of UW; therefore, MISO planning is immediately integrated into the planning process.

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

JCS-MISO

Kiriakou pleads guilty in leak case

KIRIAKOU PLEADS GUILTY IN LEAK CASE

This morning former CIA officer John Kiriakou pleaded guilty to one count
of disclosure of information identifying a covert agent, a violation of the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act.

"When KIRIAKOU disclosed the identity of Officer A to Journalist A,
KIRIAKOU acted willfully in that defendant knew the disclosure was
illegal," according to a Statement of Facts approved and signed by Mr.
Kiriakou today.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/kiriakou/facts.pdf

Under the terms of a plea agreement, the parties agreed that a prison term
of 30 months would be "the appropriate sentence in this case."  Other
charges against him, including several counts under the Espionage Act,
would be dismissed.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/kiriakou/plea.pdf

By foregoing a trial, Mr. Kiriakou loses an opportunity to try and
persuade a jury that his motives were benign, and that the harm to national
security resulting from his disclosure was negligible and insignificant. 
But he gains an early resolution of the case, which could otherwise drag on
for months and years, as well as a sentence that would likely be much
shorter than if he were to be found guilty at trial.

"NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY" EMERGES IN THE SECURITY CLEARANCE SYSTEM

In the world of security clearances for access to classified information,
the term "reciprocity" is used to indicate that one executive branch agency
should ordinarily recognize and accept a security clearance that has been
granted by another executive branch agency.

This is not just a nice, cost-efficient thing to do, it is actually a
requirement of law.  Under the 2004 intelligence reform law, "all security
clearance background investigations and determinations... shall be accepted
by all agencies."

This requirement for mutual recognition and acceptance applies equally to
the higher order clearances of the intelligence community, where
reciprocity is intended to promote employee "mobility" throughout the
intelligence system, according to the 2009 Intelligence Community Directive
709.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-709.pdf

So possessing a clearance from one agency should simplify the process of
access approval at another agency.  But the opposite is not supposed to be
true.  If an agency refuses for some reason to recognize the clearance
granted by another agency, that refusal is not supposed to incur loss of
clearance in the original agency.

Officially, such "negative reciprocity" is not an authorized, legitimate
security clearance practice.  And yet there are signs that it is being
adopted within the Department of Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA), which rules on contested security clearance cases.

A new paper by attorney Sheldon I. Cohen describes a series of DOHA
rulings in which a perverse form of negative reciprocity has been used to
justify the denial or revocation of a security clearance, to the obvious
detriment of due process.

        http://www.sheldoncohen.com/

"While the burden of proof has always been placed on the employee by the
DOHA Appeal Board to show why he or she should be granted a security
clearance, until now there was a modicum of a right to confrontation, and a
right to challenge the evidence presented by the government," Mr. Cohen
wrote.

But in a ruling he describes, "anonymous redacted reports and other
agency's decision are enough to deny or revoke a DoD clearance regardless
of contrary evidence."

In a series of recent decisions, the DOHA Appeal Board "has accepted
unsigned, unsworn, summary statements from unidentified persons in
government agencies [that are] in direct conflict with live testimony at a
hearing to deprive or revoke security clearances of government contractor
employees."

To avoid or limit the fallout of negative reciprocity, Mr. Cohen advises
DoD employees and contractors to immediately appeal any adverse clearance
decision, "at least to get [their] side of the issues on the record."  Left
unchallenged, it appears that adverse decisions by other agencies will be
presumed reliable by DOHA and that any later attempt to rebut them "will
most probably be rejected."

See "Has the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Become a Star Chamber
Court?" by Sheldon I. Cohen, October 19, 2012.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/doha-cohen.pdf

The Department of Defense last week published a three-volume "DoD
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative Security Manual,"
DoD Manual 5105.21, October 19, 2012.  A copy is available here:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/index.html

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, AND MORE FROM CRS

Newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service which
Congress has not made publicly available include the following.

Congressional Oversight, October 17, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-936.pdf

Contemporary Developments in Presidential Elections, October 18, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42139.pdf

U.S. International Trade: Trends and Forecasts, October 19, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33577.pdf

President of the United States: Compensation, October 17, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20115.pdf

Peru in Brief: Political and Economic Conditions and Relations with the
United States, October 18, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42523.pdf

Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, October 18, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities --
Background and Issues for Congress, October 17, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for
Congress, October 18, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

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Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Secrecy News – Intelligence Imagery set to be disclosed


A massive quantity of historical intelligence satellite imagery from the
KH-9 HEXAGON program is being declassified and will be made public in a
series of releases that are scheduled over the coming year, intelligence
community officials say.

Declassification of intelligence satellite imagery languished for years
after President Clinton ordered the release of product from the Corona,
Argon and Lanyard missions in the 1995 executive order 12951.  Although the
Clinton order also required the periodic review of imagery from other
missions, that requirement was effectively ignored by intelligence agencies
and neglected by congressional oversight.

But in a May 2010 memorandum Director of National Intelligence Dennis C.
Blair ordered the "re-establishment" of the declassification review of
intelligence imagery -- though it had never been officially disestablished
-- with a particular focus on imagery from satellite systems that were
deemed obsolete.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/imagery.pdf

In January 2011, DNI James R. Clapper formally declared that the KH-9
HEXAGON program was obsolete, and that declassification review of all
program imagery should therefore commence.  KH-9 HEXAGON was operational
from 1971 to 1984.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/dni012011.pdf

"The process to declassify imagery pursuant to EO 12951 began shortly
after DNI Blair's May 26, 2010 memorandum and has been ongoing, in earnest,
with the goal of releasing as much imagery as possible to the public,
consistent with national security," said Michael G. Birmingham of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Accordingly, The
KH-9/HEXAGON system was declared obsolete in January 2011 and a phased
declassification of its imagery has ensued."

More than two years after the Blair memorandum, however, next to nothing
has yet been made public.

"The notable challenges to this effort are the sheer volume of imagery and
the logistics involved in cataloging the imagery and moving it to archive,"
Mr. Birmingham told Secrecy News.

"For context, and to grasp the scope of the project, the KH-9/HEXAGON
system provided coverage over hundreds of millions of square miles of
territory during its 19 successful missions spanning 1971-1984.  It is a
daunting issue to address declassification of the program specifics
associated with an obsolete system such as the KH-9, which involves the
declassification of huge volumes of intelligence information gathered on
thousands of targets worldwide during a 13 year time period."

Daunting or not, the large bulk of the KH-9 imagery is expected to be
released, with only perhaps 5% or so remaining classified.

"There is a schedule of multiple deliveries with final delivery of imagery
scheduled for September 2013," Mr. Birmingham said.

Within the intelligence community, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency is the executive agent for imagery declassification.  NGA public
affairs did not respond to questions about its declassification program.

HISTORIAN ANNA K. NELSON, RIP

We were sad to learn that Professor Anna K. Nelson, a tenacious and
effective advocate for improved public access to national security records,
passed away last month.

For decades, Prof. Nelson argued for improved declassification practices
in almost every venue imaginable, from congressional hearings to the most
obscure and transient advisory bodies.  As a professor of history at
American University, she insisted that government records were public
property and that access to such records was one of the foundations of good
citizenship.

        http://www.american.edu/cas/faculty/anelson.cfm

Among many other posts, she served as a presidentially-appointed member of
the JFK Assassination Records Review Board, which was tasked to oversee the
declassification of records concerning the assassination of President
Kennedy.  Because of the perseverance of Dr. Nelson and her colleagues,
that Board was uniquely productive in overcoming longstanding barriers to
declassification, particularly those pertaining to intelligence agency
records.

Nevertheless, she was habitually pessimistic about the prospects for
meaningful secrecy reform.

"Given past performance, it is highly unrealistic to assume that agencies,
particularly Defense and the CIA, will be completely forthcoming or that
the Archives will ever question agency decisions," she wrote in a 2000
letter to Congress. "Agency declassification of selected, heavily redacted
records will not serve the public interest. It will only breed more
suspicion."

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2000/02/nelson.html

Prof. Nelson also spoke out in defense of robust investigative reporting
on national security matters.  In 2008, for example, she submitted a
declaration of behalf of New York Times reporter James Risen, arguing that
a grand jury subpoena against him in the pending leak case against former
CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling should be quashed.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/sterling/risen-nelson.pdf

"If Mr. Risen and other investigative journalists are unable to report
effectively on matters of intelligence, the historical record will be
incomplete, if not erroneous," Dr. Nelson wrote.

"Although our own books and articles are stuffed with footnotes, we
historians understand that investigative journalists, as observers of the
present, must protect their sources. If they do not, the American people
will never learn about corruption, incompetence, excessive government
secrecy, flaws in homeland security, or disastrous decisions made by policy
makers who are advised by their intelligence chiefs," she wrote. "We must
depend upon journalists and journalists must be permitted to depend upon
confidential sources."

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

Public Intelligence – Joint Publication 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare February 2012

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/JCS-EW.png

 

The following Joint Publication is unavailable from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website. Though it does not have any markings indicating a distribution restriction, the DTIC website lists the document as being available through the Joint Doctrine, Education, & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) which is restricted to U.S. military personnel.  A previous version of this publication from January 2007 was made available by the Federation of American Scientists

All modern forces depend on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, the EMS is the key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as the focus of operations themselves. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS throughout the operational environment.

JEMSO are the coordinated efforts of EW and joint electromagnetic spectrum management operations (JEMSMO) to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). The impact of an EMOE upon the operational capability of military forces, equipment, systems, and platforms is referred to as electromagnetic environmental effects. It encompasses all electromagnetic (EM) disciplines to include electromagnetic compatibility; electromagnetic interference; EM vulnerability; electromagnetic pulse (EMP); electronic protection (EP); hazards of EM radiation to personnel, ordnance, and volatile materials; and natural phenomena effects such as sunspots, lightning, and precipitation static.

At the national level, organizations and agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency are constantly seeking to identify, catalog, and update the electronic order of battle (EOB) of identified or potential adversaries. The joint intelligence operations center responds to theater-level EW-related intelligence requirements and forwards requests that require national level assets to the defense collection coordination center or other national-level organizations according to established procedures. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) [at the subordinate joint force level] normally assigns one or more members of the staff to act as a liaison between the J-2 section and the IO cell where EW planners are normally assigned.

At combatant commands and subordinate unified commands, the J-3 is primarily responsible for the EW coordination function. The EW division of the J-3 staff should engage in the full range of EW functions to include deliberate planning; day-to-day planning and monitoring of routine theater EW activities in conjunction with the combatant command’s theater campaign plan; and crisis action planning in preparation for EW as part of emergent joint operations. Since EW is concerned with attacking personnel, facilities, or equipment (EA); protecting capabilities and EMS access (EP); and monitoring, exploiting, and targeting use of the EMS (ES), EW staff personnel have a role in the dynamic management of the EMS, via tools and processes, during operations. A comprehensive and well-thought-out joint restricted frequency list and emission control plan are two significant tools that permit flexibility of EW actions during an operation without compromising friendly EMS use. The electronic warfare control authority, the senior EA authority in the operational area, develops guidance for performing EA on behalf of the JFC.

Military operations are executed in an environment complicated by increasingly complex demands on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). All modern forces depend on the EMS. The EMS is the entire range of electromagnetic (EM) radiation. At one end of the spectrum are gamma rays, which have the shortest wavelengths and high frequencies. At the other end are radio waves, which have the longest wavelengths and low frequencies. The EMS is used to organize and explain the types of EM energy that exist in our world and throughout the universe. Devices whose functions depend upon the EMS are used by both civilian and military organizations and individuals for intelligence; communications; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); sensing; command and control (C2); attack; ranging; data transmission; and information storage and processing. The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, the EMS is the key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as the focus of operations themselves. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS throughout the operational environment (OE).

 

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

JCS-EW

TOP-SECRET – Joint Publication 3-13.4 Military Deception January 2012

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/JCS-MILDEC.png

 

The following Joint Publication is unavailable from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website.  Though it does not have any markings indicating a distribution restriction, the DTIC website lists the document as being available only through the Joint Doctrine, Education & Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) which is restricted to U.S. military personnel.

Specific guidance from the joint force commander (JFC) or higher authority during planning will determine the military deception (MILDEC) role in a joint operation. MILDEC is intended to deter hostile actions, increase the success of friendly defensive actions, or to improve the success of any potential friendly offensive action. Use of
MILDEC during any phase of an operation should help to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. In combat situations, the focus is on driving the adversary to culmination and achieving the objectives defined by the JFC. In noncombat situations, the JFC seeks to dominate the situation with decisive operations designed to establish conditions for an early, favorable conclusion.

The MILDEC goal is the commander’s statement of the purpose of the MILDEC as it contributes to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. It is important for the commander to first envision the deception goal in terms of its specific contribution to accomplishing the designated mission. The MILDEC objective is a concise statement of what the MILDEC will cause the adversary to do or not do. It is expressed in terms of the adversary’s action or inaction that directly leads to the purpose or condition stated in the MILDEC goal.

MILDEC Targets

The deception target is the adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. The deception target or targets are the key individuals on whom the entire deception operation will be focused.

Function of MILDEC include:

• Causing ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding in adversary perceptions of friendly critical information.
• Causing the adversary to misallocate personnel, fiscal, and material resources in ways that are advantageous to the friendly force.
• Causing the adversary to reveal strengths, dispositions, and future intentions.
• Conditioning the adversary to particular patterns of friendly behavior to induce adversary perceptions that can be exploited by the joint force.
• Causing the adversary to waste combat power with inappropriate or delayed actions.

The MILDEC Planning Process

Deception planning is an iterative process that requires continual reexamination of its objectives, target, stories, and means throughout the planning and execution phases. A key factor that must be considered during MILDEC planning is risk. The overriding consideration in risk analysis is the comparison between the risk taken and the possible benefits of the deception. The MILDEC planning process consists of six steps: deception mission analysis, deception planning guidance; staff deception estimate; commander’s deception estimate; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate review; deception plan development; and deception plan review and approval.

 

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

JCS-MILDEC

Bowery at Midnight – Bela Lugosi – Full Movie

A criminology professor (Lugosi) operates a charitable mission by day, and leads a gang of master thieves by night. Anyone who dares get in his way ends up buried in his cellar—until a mad doctor reanimates the corpses to exact their revenge!

Bowery at Midnight casts Bela Lugosi as Professor Brenner, a psychology instructor at New York University (which looks a lot like Berkeley in the exterior shots!). When not enlightening his students — most of them buxom Monogram starlets — Brenner is engaged in charitable work, running a mission in the Bowery. In truth, however, the kindly professor is a fiend in human form, who uses his mission as a front for a vast criminal empire. When Judy (Wanda McKay), one of Brenner’s students, stumbles onto the truth, she’s targeted for extermination by the Dr. Jekyll-and-Mr. Hyde prof.

TOP-SECRET-Los Angeles Fusion Center: Liquid Carbon Dioxide Leaks Pose Risks to Public

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/LAJRIC-CO2-Leaks.png

 

(U) Within the past year, first responders and members of the public have died of asphyxiation, or fallen ill, following accidental inhalation of concentrated carbon dioxide (CO2) gas in public locations. At least two recent incidents are connected with significant gas leaks caused by the failure of liquid CO2 lines connected to beverage dispensers in commercial facilities. Emergency personnel responding to medical or service calls can use signs and symptoms to determine possible CO2 exposure and correspondent risks to first responders.

(U) Dangers Result from Change in Technology

(U) In the past, compressed CO2 tanks were generally stored close to the point of use, and connected directly to equipment via short pipes or hoses (lines). New technologies make it possible to store liquid CO2 tanks at external servicing points, in basements, or other locations far from the point of use, delivering gas via long lines concealed within walls and ceilings. Leaks in these lines can place patrons, employees, and first responders at risk for exposure to the gas.

(U) Leaking liquid CO2 evaporates into a rapidly expanding gas that is heavier than air; it can displace enough oxygen in small, poorly ventilated rooms, basements, and other low-lying areas to create “Immediately Dangerous Life Hazard” (IDLH) environments. (See the accompanying appendix for specific/technical aspects.) Building codes require sensors near CO2 tanks to monitor oxygen levels; however, if these are not present along delivery lines, leaks in locations away from the tanks may go undetected. Sensors may be susceptible to failure or tampering.

(U) Indicators of Possible CO2 Exposure

(U) Obvious shortness of breath with visible symptoms will occur as the body compensates for lack of oxygen. The effects of oxygen deficiency, combined with the effects of CO2 toxicity, may cause an individual to feel ill, potentially showing signs such as headache, nausea, dizziness, or mental confusion. Most individuals will begin to show signs and symptoms when exposed to concentrations of CO2, starting as low as seven percent, for approximately 15 minutes; symptoms may vary according to the level of CO2 concentration and length of exposure.

(U) Signs and symptoms indicating possible exposure to CO2 include:

  • (U) Shortness of breath
  • (U) Dizziness
  • (U) Headaches and drowsiness
  • (U) Stinging of nose and throat
  • (U) Nausea and vomiting
  • (U) Excitation, excess salivation, rapid breathing
  • (U) Confusion
  • (U) Unconsciousness
  • (U) Frostbite or frozen skin from contact with escaping liquid or vapor cloud

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

LAJRIC-CO2-Leaks

28.000 people disappeared in Syria

Fighting in Aleppo 17 Oct 2012
Fighting between government forces and rebels is continuing in the city of Aleppo

Human rights groups working in Syria say at least 28,000 people have disappeared after being abducted by soldiers or militia.

They say they have the names of 18,000 people missing since anti-government protests began 18 months ago and know of another 10,000 cases.

Online activist group Avaaz says “nobody is safe” from a deliberate government campaign of terror.

It intends to give the UN Human Rights Council a dossier for investigation.

The Syrian government has so far not commented on the claims but has in the past strenuously denied reports of human rights abuses.

Avaaz said it had gathered testimony from Syrians who say husbands, sons and daughters were forcibly abducted by pro-government forces.

They include Fayzeh al-Masri, from a suburb of Homs, whose 26-year-old son Ahmad Ghassan Ibrahim disappeared in February – the last number he called them from was traced to a military security branch.

The family were told by someone who answered his phone that he had died, but they have been unable to confirm this.

Counting the disappeared in the real time of a conflict is extremely difficult. It’s almost impossible for outsiders to double-check claims independently.

Recent history shows that accurate counts of those kidnapped and abducted can only begin once a conflict has finished.

Activists in Iraq are still trying work out how many people were killed or went missing during the country’s peak years of violence after 2003. In Latin America, it took Chile almost 20 years to count the exact number of its disappeared during the military coup of 1973.

But the numbers currently suggested by Syrian opposition activists do give a sense of both the scale of the country’s conflict and the uncertainty surrounding the fate of many of its citizens.

“We are certain that he would not have left us or his wife – who is expecting twins. We only want to know his fate,” Mrs Masri told Avaaz.

The brother of Hussein Eisso, a 62-year-old Syrian-Kurdish activist, said he was taken from outside his home in Hasaka after attempting to stage a sit-in over the arrest of other activists.

He said his brother had since been moved between security branches, and had had serious health problems, including a stroke.

The BBC’s James Reynolds, close to the Syrian border in Turkey, says it is often hard to establish real disappearance figures until a conflict is over, but the scale of the figures is an indication of the severity of the conflict in Syria.

‘Breeding fear’

Alice Jay, campaign director at Avaaz, said Syrians were being “plucked off the street by security forces and paramilitaries and being ‘disappeared’ into torture cells”.

“Whether it is women buying groceries or farmers going for fuel, nobody is safe.”

She said it was a deliberate strategy to “terrorise families and communities”, and that each case must be investigated.

“The panic of not knowing whether your husband or child is alive breeds such fear that it silences dissent,” she said.

Other Syrian rights groups backed the allegations. Fadel Abdulghani, of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, estimated that 28,000 people had disappeared since unrest against the government of President Bashar al-Assad began last year.

Muhannad al-Hasani, of human rights organisation Sawasya, said the figure could be as high as 80,000.

“People are being snatched at night, on the street and when no-one is looking,” he said.

Muhammad Khalil, a human rights lawyer from the Syrian city of Hassaka, said the Syrian government had two reasons for carrying out the abductions: “To directly get rid of the rebels and activists, and to intimidate the society so that it won’t oppose the regime.”

Avaaz collected its statistics through a network of independent human rights lawyers and local activist groups in Syria.

The scale of the work and the current instability meant the organisation could not independently verify each disappearance, but it confirmed to the BBC that none of the detentions listed had been official arrests.

Most of the people Avaaz spoke to had personally witnessed a friend or relative being taken from home or the street

The UN says more than 18,000 people have been killed in the conflict with 170,000 fleeing abroad and 2.5 million in need of aid within the country. Opposition and human rights activists put the death toll at more than 30,000.

As violence continues, UN and Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is due to arrive in Syria on Saturday for talks with Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, Damascus told AFP news agency.

Mr Brahimi has proposed a truce over the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha, which starts on 25 October, to “allow a political process to develop”.

The Syrian government has recently indicated that it is interested in exploring a temporary ceasefire – and opposition groups have said they would match this.

Calls for the truce come as the conflict threatens to spill over Syria’s borders.

Turkey’s armed forces have several times returned fire across the border into Syria after Syrian mortar shells landed inside its territory.

Turkish TV reported further cross-border exchanges on Thursday morning. Our correspondent says smoke could be seen rising from the Syrian border village of Haram, while explosions and small arms fire could be heard.

The NSA – The Alexeyeva File


Sergei Kovalev with Alexeyeva, 2011.
Arsenii Roginsky of the Memorial Society with Alexeyeva.


Kovalev and Alexeyeva.


Roginsky toasting Alexeyeva.


Alexeyeva with colleagues of the Helsinki Group.


Alexeyeva discussing the Helsinki Final Act with Ambassador Kashlev, one of the Soviet negotiators, at an Archive summer school in Gelendzhik.

Photos by Svetlana Savranskaya.


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The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary
From the Secret Files


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Moscow, Russian Federation, October 17, 2012 – Marking the 85thbirthday of Russian human rights legend Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the National Security Archive today published on the Web a digital collection of documents covering Alexeyeva’s brilliant career, from the mid-1970s founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group (which she now heads) to the current challenges posed by the Putin regime’s crackdown on civil society.Today’s posting includes declassified U.S. documents from the Carter Presidential Library on Soviet dissident movements of the 1970s including the Moscow Helsinki Group, and KGB and Soviet Communist Party Central Committee documents on the surveillance and repression of the Group.

With the generous cooperation of the Memorial Society’s invaluable Archive of the History of Dissent, the posting also features examples of Alexeyeva’s own letters to officials (on behalf of other dissidents) and to friends, her Congressional testimony and reports, scripts she produced for Radio Liberty, and numerous photographs. Also highlighted in today’s publication are multiple media articles by and about Alexeyeva including her analysis of the current attack on human righters in Russia.

As Alexeyeva’s colleagues, friends, and admirers gather today in Moscow to celebrate her 85th birthday, the illustrious history documented in today’s posting will gain a new chapter. The party-goers will not only toast Lyudmila Alexeyeva, but also debate the appropriate responses to the new Putin-inspired requirement that any civil society group receiving any international support should register as a “foreign agent” and undergo frequent “audits.” No doubt Alexeyeva will have something to say worth listening to. She has seen worse.

Biography

Lyudmila Mikhailovna Alexeyeva was born on July 20, 1927 in Yevpatoria, a Black Sea port town in the Crimea (now in Ukraine). Her parents came from modest backgrounds, but both received graduate degrees; her father was an economist and her mother a mathematician. She was a teenager in Moscow during the war, and she attributes her decision to come back and live in Russia after more than a decade of emigration to the attachment to her country and her city formed during those hungry and frozen war years. Alexeyeva originally studied to be an archaeologist, entering Moscow State University in 1945, and graduating with a degree in history in 1950. She received her graduate degree from the Moscow Institute of Economics and Statistics in 1956. She married Valentin Alexeyev in 1945 and had two sons, Sergei and Mikhail. Already in the university she began to question the policies of the regime, and decided not to go to graduate school in the history of the CPSU, which at the time would have guaranteed a successful career in politics.

She did join the Communist Party, hoping to reform it from the inside, but very soon she became involved in publishing, copying and disseminating samizdat with the very first human rights movements in the USSR. In 1959 through 1962 she worked as an editor in the academic publishing house Nauka of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1966, she joined friends and fellow samizdat publishers in protesting the imprisonment and unfair trial of two fellow writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. For her involvement with the dissident movement, she lost her job as an editor and was expelled from the Party. Later, in 1970, she found an editorial position at the Institute of Information on Social Sciences, where she worked until her forced emigration in 1977. From 1968 to 1972, she worked as a typist for the first dissident periodical in the USSR, The Chronicle of Current Events.

As the 1960s progressed, Alexeyeva became more and more involved in the emerging human rights movement. Her apartment in Moscow became a meeting place and a storage site for samizdat materials. She built up a large network of friends involved in samizdat and other forms of dissent. Many of her friends were harassed by the police and later arrested. She and her close friends developed a tradition of celebrating incarcerated friends’ birthdays at their relatives’ houses, and they developed a tradition of “toast number two” dedicated to those who were far away. Her apartment was constantly bugged and surveilled by the KGB.

Founding the Moscow Helsinki Group

In the spring of 1976, the physicist Yuri Orlov – by then an experienced dissident surviving only by his connection to the Armenian Academy of Sciences– asked her to meet him in front of the Bolshoi Ballet. These benches infamously served as the primary trysting site in downtown Moscow, thus guaranteeing the two some privacy while they talked. Orlov shared his idea of creating a group that would focus on implementing the human rights protections in the Helsinki Accords – the 1975 Final Act was published in full in Pravda, and the brilliant idea was simply to hold the Soviet government to the promises it had signed and was blatantly violating.

Orlov had the idea, but he needed someone who could make it happen – a typist, an editor, a writer, a historian – Lyudmila Alexeyeva. In May 1976, she became one of the ten founding members of the Moscow Helsinki Group with the formal announcement reported by foreign journalists with some help from Andrei Sakharov, despite KGB disruption efforts. The government started harassment of the group even before it was formally announced, and very quickly, the group became a target for special attention by Yuri Andropov and his organization – the KGB.

Alexeyeva produced (typed, edited, wrote) many early MHG documents. One of her early – and characteristically remarkable – assignments was a fact-finding mission to investigate charges of sexual harassment against a fellow dissident in Lithuania. Several high school boys who would not testify against their teacher were expelled from school. She arranged a meeting with the Lithuanian Minister of Education, who did not know what the Moscow Helsinki Group was but anything from Moscow sounded prestigious enough to command his attention, and convinced him to return the boys to school. It was only when some higher-up called the Minister to explain what the Helsinki Group really was that he reconsidered his decision.

As one of ten original members of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Alexeyeva received even greater scrutiny from the Soviet government, including the KGB. Over the course of 1976, she was under constant surveillance, including phone taps and tails in public. She had her apartment searched by the KGB and many of her samizdat materials confiscated. In early February 1977, KGB agents burst into her apartment searching for Yuri Orlov, saying “We’re looking for someone who thinks like you do.” A few days later, she and her second husband, the mathematician Nikolai Williams, were forced to leave the Soviet Union under the threat of arrest. Her departure was very painful – she was convinced that she would never be able to return, and her youngest son had to stay behind.

Alexeyeva in Exile

Alexeyeva briefly stopped over in the UK, where she participated in human rights protests, before she eventually settled in northern Virginia, and became the Moscow Helsinki Group spokesperson in the United States. She testified before the U.S. Congressional Helsinki Commission, worked with NGOs such as the International Helsinki Federation, wrote reports on the CSCE conferences in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna, which she attended, and became actively involved in the issue of political abuse of psychiatry in the USSR.

She soon met her best-friend-to-be, Larisa Silnicky of Radio Liberty (formerly from Odessa and Prague), who had founded the prominent dissident journal Problems of Eastern Europe, with her husband, Frantisek Silnicky. Alexeyeva started working for the journal as an editor in 1981 (initially an unpaid volunteer!). Meanwhile, she returned to her original calling as a historian and wrote the single most important volume on the movements of which she had been such a key participant. Her book, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights, which was published in the United States in 1984 by Wesleyan University Press, remains the indispensable source on Soviet dissent.

The book was not the only evidence of the way Alexeyeva’s talents blossomed in an atmosphere where she could engage in serious research without constant fear of searches and arrest. She worked for Voice of America and for Radio Liberty during the 1980s covering a wide range of issues in her broadcasts, especially in the programs “Neformalam o Neformalakh” and “Novye dvizheniya, novye lyudi,” which she produced together with Larisa Silnicky. These and other programs that she produced for the RL were based mainly on samizdat materials that she was getting though dissident channels, and taken together they provide a real encyclopedia of developments in Soviet society in the 1980s. The depth and perceptiveness of her analysis are astounding, especially given the fact that she was writing her scripts from Washington. Other U.S. institutions ranging from the State Department to the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute also asked her for analyses of the Gorbachev changes in the USSR, among other subjects. In the late 1980s-early 1990s, she was especially interested in new labor movements in the Soviet Union, hoping that a Solidarity-type organization could emerge to replace the old communist labor unions.

Back in the USSR

The Moscow Helsinki Group had to be disbanded in 1982 after a campaign of persecution that left only three members free within the Soviet Union. When the Group was finally reestablished in 1989 by Larisa Bogoraz, Alexeyeva was quick to rejoin it from afar, and she never stopped speaking out. She had longed to return to Russia, but thought it would never be possible. She first came back to the USSR in May 1990 (after being denied a visa six times previously by the Soviet authorities) with a group of the International Helsinki Federation members to investigate if conditions were appropriate for convening a conference on the “human dimension” of the Helsinki process. She also attended the subsequent November 1991 official CSCE human rights conference in Moscow, where the human righters could see the end of the Soviet Union just weeks away. She was an early supporter of the idea of convening the conference in Moscow – in order to use it as leverage to make the Soviet government fulfill its obligations – while many Western governments and Helsinki groups were skeptical about holding the conference in the Soviet capital.

In 1992-1993 she made numerous trips to Russia, spending more time there than in the United States. She and her husband Nikolai Williams returned to Russia to stay in 1993, where she resumed her constant activism despite having reached retirement age. She became chair of the new Moscow Helsinki Group in 1996, only 20 years after she and Yuri Orlov discussed the idea and first made it happen; and in that spirit, in the 1990s, she facilitated several new human rights groups throughout Russia.

When Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, Lyudmila Alexeyeva agreed to become part of a formal committee that would advise him on the state of human rights in Russia, while continuing her protest activities. The two did not go well together in Putin’s mind, and soon she was under as much suspicion as ever. By this time, though, her legacy as a lifelong dissident was so outsized that it was harder to persecute her. Even state-controlled television felt compelled to give her air-time on occasion, and she used her standing as a human rights legend to bring public attention to abuses ranging from the mass atrocities in the Chechen wars to the abominable conditions in Russian prisons.

When the Moscow Helsinki Group celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2006, with Lyudmila Alexeyeva presiding, Yuri Orlov came back from his physics professorship at Cornell University to join her on stage. Also paying tribute were dozens of present and former public officials from the rank of ex-Prime Minister on down, as well the whole range of opposition politicians and non-governmental activists, for whom she served as the unique convenor and den mother.

The Challenge in Russia Today

In 2009, Alexeyeva became an organizer of Strategy 31, the campaign to hold peaceful protests on the 31st of every month that has a 31st, in support of Article 31 of the Russian constitution, which guarantees freedom of assembly. Everyone remembers the protest on December 31, 2009, when Lyudmila Alexeyeva went dressed as the Snow Maiden (Snegurochka in the fairy tales) where dozens of other people were also arrested. But when officials realized they had the Lyudmila Alexeyeva in custody, they returned to the bus where she was being held, personally apologized for the inconvenience and offered her immediate release from custody. She refused until all were released. The video and photographs of the authorities arresting the Snow Maiden and then apologizing went viral on the Internet and made broadcast news all over the world. The “31st” protests have ended in arrests multiple times, but that has yet to deter the protesters, who provided a key spark for the mass protests in December 2011.

The darker side of the authorities’ attitude was evident in March 2010, when she was assaulted at the Park Kultury metro station where she was paying her respects to the victims of the subway bombings a few days earlier. She had been vilified by the state media so often that the attacker called himself a “Russian patriot” and asserted (correctly, so far) that he would not be charged for his actions.

In 2012, the chauvinistic assault became institutional and government-wide, with a new law proposed by the Putin regime and approved by the Duma, requiring any organization that received support from abroad to register as a “foreign agent” and submit to multiple audits by the authorities. The intent was clearly to stigmatize NGOs like the Moscow Helsinki Group that have international standing and raise money from around the world. Earlier this month, Lyudmila Alexeyeva announced that the Group would not register as a foreign agent and would no longer accept foreign support once the law goes into effect in November 2012.

Other Russian human righters say they are used to being tagged as foreign agents. In fact, humorous signs appeared at the mass protests in late 2011 asking the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Hillary! Where’s my check? I never got my money!” So the debate over strategy, over how best to deal with and to push back against the new repression, will likely dominate the conversation at Lyudmila Mikhailovna’s 85th birthday party today (July 20). Yet again, when she is one of the few original Soviet dissidents still alive, she is at the center of the storm, committed to freedom in Russia today, and leading the discussion about how to achieve human rights for all.


Documents

Document 1: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, “Biography,” November 1977.

This modest biographical note presents Alexeyeva’s own summary of her life as of the year she went into exile. She prepared this note as part of her presentation to the International Sakharov Hearing in Rome, Italy, on 26 November 1977, which was the second in a series named after the distinguished Soviet physicist and activist (the first was in Copenhagen in 1975) that brought together scholars, analysts and dissidents in exile to discuss human rights in the Soviet bloc.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 2: Lyudmila Alexeyeva to Senator Jacob K. Javits, 4 July, 1975.

Even before she co-founded the Moscow Helsinki Group, Lyudmila Alexeyeva actively worked to defend dissidents and political prisoners in the USSR. In this 1975 letter preserved in the Archive of the History of Dissent, the irreplaceable collections of the Memorial Society in Moscow, she is writing from Moscow to a prominent U.S. Senator, Jacob Javits, a Republican from New York and himself Jewish, who was outspoken in supporting not only the right of Jews to emigrate from the USSR to Israel, but also the Soviet dissident cause in general. The case she presents to Javits is that of Anatoly Marchenko, who asked for political emigration (not to Israel) and as punishment was sent to Siberia for four years’ exile – on top of the 11 years he had already spent as a political prisoner on trumped-up charges. Tragically, Marchenko would die in prison in the fall of 1986, just as Gorbachev began releasing the political prisoners.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 3: Yuri Andropov, Chairman of the KGB, Memorandum to the Politburo, 29 December, 1975.

Yuri Andropov gives the Politburo an alarming report on dissent in the USSR in connection with criticism of Soviet human rights abuses by the French and Italian Communist parties. The main thrust of Andropov’ report is how to keep the internal opposition in check in the aftermath of the signing of the Helsinki agreement and the following increase of international pressure on the USSR. He gives the number of political prisoners as 860, people who received the “prophylactic treatment” in 1971-74 as 63,108 and states that there are many more “hostile elements” in the country, and that “these people number in the hundreds of thousands.” Andropov concluded that the authorities would have to continue to persecute and jail the dissidents notwithstanding the foreign attention. This document sets the stage and gives a good preview of what would happen after the Moscow Helsinki Group was founded in May 1976.

[Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 18, Container 28]

Document 4: Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, “Evaluation of the Influence of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the Quality of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.,” 1 August 1975-1 August 1976. (Summary of the document)

This document was written during a time of relative calm, when surprisingly, for the first six months of the existence of the MHG, the authorities did not undertake any repressions against members of the group, and allowed it to function. The document sounds more positive and optimistic than the group’s subsequent assessments of the effect of the Helsinki Accords. The report points out that the Soviet government was sensitive to pressure from foreign governments and groups and that several other objective factors such as the end of the war in Vietnam and increasing Soviet grain purchases made the USSR more open to external influences. Under such pressure, the Soviet government released the mathematician Leonid Plyusch, allowed some refuseniks to emigrate and generally relaxed the restrictions somewhat. The report also lists continuing violations of human rights but concludes that the Helskinki Accords did and probably would play a positive role. [See the Russian page for the original]

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 5: KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, “About the Hostile Actions of the So-called Group for Assistance of Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR,” 15 November 1976.

The KGB informed the Politburo about the activities of the MHG for the first time six months after its founding. The report gives a brief history of the human rights movement in the USSR as seen from the KGB. Andropov names each founding member of the group and charges the group with efforts to put the Soviet sincerity in implementing the Helsinki Accords in doubt. The document also alleges MHG efforts to receive official recognition from the United States and reports on its connections with the American embassy.

[Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 18, Container 28]

Document 6: Helsinki Monitoring Group, “Special Notice,” 2 December, 1976.

This notice, one of a series by the MHG publicizing official misconduct, testifies to the increasing harassment of members of the group by the KGB. This time it is the son of Malva Landa who has been warned that he might lose his job.   The document is signed by Alexeyeva, Orlov and other leading MHG members.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 7: KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, “On the Provocative Demonstration by Antisocial Elements on Pushkin Square in Moscow and at the Pushkin Monument in Leningrad,” 6 December, 1976.

This KGB report informs the Politburo about silent rallies in Moscow and Leningrad to celebrate Constitution Day by dissidents including members of the MHG. Nobody was arrested.

[Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 16, Container 24]

Document 8: Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, “On the Exclusion of Seven Students From the Vienuolis Middle School (Vilnius),” 8 December, 1976.

This is a report of the first fact-finding mission undertaken by Lyudmila Alexeyeva with Lithuanian human rights activist and member of the Helsinki Group Thomas Ventslov to investigate charges of sexual harassment against a member of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group Viktoras Petkus. Seven boys were expelled from the school and pressured by the KGB to say that they had spent time at Petkus’ apartment, where he engaged in illegal activities with them. The boys’ families were told that they were expelled on the basis of a school board decision that the parents were not allowed to see. The report concludes that the KGB was behind the charges and that the only reason for the expulsions was the refusal of the boys to give false testimony against their teacher. Alexeyeva met with the Lithuanian Minister of Education to discuss the situation, and he initially agreed to remedy it but then changed his mind upon finding out who his visitor was.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 9: Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU, “About Measures to End the Hostile Activity of Members of the So-called “Group for Assistance in the Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR,” 5 January, 1977.

After the two informational reports above, the KGB started to get serious about terminating the activities of the MHG. This report charges that the group was capable of inflicting serious damage to Soviet interests, that in recent months group members have stepped up their subversive activities, especially through the dissemination of samizdat documents (and particularly the MHG reports), undermining Soviet claims to be implementing the Helsinki Final Act. The Procuracy would later develop measures to put an end to these activities.

[Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 18, Container 28]

Document 10: Resolution of Secretariat of CC of CPSU, “On Measures for the Curtailment of the Criminal Activities of Orlov, Ginsburg, Rudenko and Ventslova,” 20 January, 1977.

Following the recommendations of the KGB report above, and another report submitted by Andropov on January 20, the CC CPSU Secretariat decides to “intercept and curtail the activities” of Orlov, Ginzburg, Rudenko and Ventslov of the MHG, Ukrainian and Lithuanian Helsinki groups. All four would be arrested soon after the resolution.

[Source: The Bukovsky Archive, Soviet Archives at INFO-RUSS http://psi.ece.jhu.edu/~kaplan/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/buk.html, Folder 3.2]

Document 11: Extract from CC CPSU Politburo Meeting, “About the Instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington for His Conversation with Vance on the Question of “Human Rights,” 18 February, 1977.

After Orlov and Ginzburg are arrested and Lyudmila Alexeyeva goes into exile, and anticipating the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow in March, the Politburo discusses a rebuff to the Carter administration on human rights issues. Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin is instructed to meet with Vance and inform him of Soviet “bewilderment” regarding Carter administration attempts to raise the issue of Ginsburg’s arrest. Dobrynin should explain to administration officials that human rights is not an issue of inter-state relations but an internal matter in which the United States should not interfere.

[Source: TsKhSD (Central Archive of Contemporary Documents) Fond 89, Opis list 25, Document 44]

Document 12: “Dignity or Death: How they Plant Dirty Pictures and Dollars on Men Who Fight for Freedom,” The Daily Mail, London, 21 March, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Nicholas Bethell.

Documents 12-16 comprise a series of articles in the Western media printed soon after Lyudmila Alexeyeva’s emigration from the USSR. In interviews she described the deteriorating human rights situation in the Soviet Union, including the increased repression and arrests of Helsinki groups members in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Georgia, and calls on the West to put pressure on the Soviet government to comply with the Helsinki Accords.

Document 13: “Dignity or Death: My Phone was Dead and All Night the KGB Waited Silently at My Door,” The Daily Mail, London, 22 March, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Nicholas Bethell.

Document 14: “Why Brezhnev Must Never be Believed,” The Daily Mail, London, 23 March, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Nicholas Bethell.

Document 15: “Soviet Human Rights from Mrs. Lyudmila Alexeyeva and others,” The Times, London, 26 April, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Andrey Amalrik, Vadimir Bukovsky.

Document 16: “Soviet Dissidents on the Run,” The Washington Post, 2 June, 1977, by Joseph Kraft.

Document 17: “Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords,” Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session; on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords; Volume IV: Soviet Helsinki Watch Reports on Repression June 3, 1977; U.S. Policy and the Belgrade Conference, 6 June, 1977.

Document 18: National Security Council, Global Issues [staff], to Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Advisor, “Evening Report,” June 7, 1977.

This report to their boss by the staff of the Global Issues directorate of the National Security Council on their daily activities includes a remarkable initial paragraph describing internal U.S. government discussions of the Moscow Helsinki Group (called here “the Orlov Committee”). Staffer Jessica Tuchman says a State Department-hosted group of experts all agreed that “the hidden bombshell in the whole human rights debate with the USSR” was the fact that the nationalist movements in the Soviet Union all saw human rights activism as just the “first step” to autonomy – thus the real threat to the Soviet government.

[Source: Carter Presidential Library, FOIA case NLC 10-3-2-7-8, 2008]

Document 19: Central Intelligence Agency, “The Evolution of Soviet Reaction to Dissent,” 15 July, 1977.

This document traces the Soviet government’s response to dissident activity especially in light of their agreement to the human rights provisions outlined in Basket III of the Helsinki Accords. The CIA notes that the Soviet Union signed the accords assuming it would not result in an increase in internal opposition, but that instead the Basket III provisions have provided a rallying point for dissent. It also suggests that internal protests sparked by food shortages and open criticism of the Eurocommunists, including the French and Spanish communist parties, are further causes for the current Soviet crackdown on the opposition. It also mentions political unrest in Eastern Europe and the Unites States new human rights campaign, which has prompted dissidents to make their appeals directly to the U.S. government as reasons for Soviet anxiety. Next, it outlines the Soviet government’s much harsher measures against dissidents in the wake of the Helsinki Accords. These include arrests of members of the Helsinki group, cutting off Western access, and accusing dissidents of espionage. Further, it concludes that the Soviet government’s increased apparent anxiety over dissent is the result of a variety of factors, including the approach of the Belgrade conference and their general fears of increased Western contact leading to discontent and a variety of social vices.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 20: American Embassy Belgrade to Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, Text of Speech Given by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg at the Belgrade Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Meeting, November 1977 (excerpt).

This text, the second half of the U.S. Embassy Belgrade cable reporting the speech made by U.S. ambassador Arthur Goldberg to the Belgrade review conference, specifically raises the cases of Orlov, Scharansky and Ginsberg – three of the founding members, with Alexeyeva, of the Moscow Helsinki Group – in the face of major objections from the Soviet delegation, and no small amount of disquiet from other diplomats present. While considered “timid” by the outside human righters like Alexeyeva, this initiative by the U.S. delegation created a breakthrough of sorts that would heighten the human rights dialogue at upcoming Helsinki review conferences and in the media.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 21: Secretary of State, to American Embassy Moscow, “Statement on Orlov,” 18 May, 1978.

This public statement from the State Deparment’s noon press briefing, sent by cable to the U.S. Embassy Moscow and Consulate Leningrad, uses the strongest language to date on the Orlov case, no doubt informed by Alexeyeva and other Orlov colleagues in exile. Here, the U.S. “strongly deplores” Orlov’s conviction and calls it a “gross distortion of internationally accepted standards,” since the activities for which he was being punished were simply the monitoring of Soviet performance under the Helsinki Final Act.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 22: Joseph Aragon, to Hamilton Jordan, “Carter on Human Rights,” 7 July, 1978.

This memorandum from White House staff member Joe Aragon to the president’s chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan, discusses the Soviet Union’s treatment of dissidents, as monitored by another White House staffer, Joyce Starr. Aragon notes that the overall Soviet campaign against dissidents continues despite Carter’s forceful public stance on human rights. He notes that if anything dissidents have become further shut out of Soviet society since Carter came to office. He specifically mentions the Helsinki group, and Slepak, Orlov, Scharansky, Nadel and Ginzburg as dissidents in need of United States help. He goes in depth into the Slepak case and the state of his family, characterizing Slepak as the Soviet equivalent of a Martin Luther King Jr. However, he writes that the administration so far has made public statements in support of the dissidents, but failed to act on the diplomatic level. Aragon concludes that Carter cares deeply about human rights, but that his reputation is at risk due to the failure of low-level officials to follow through the initiatives outlined in the Helsinki Final Act. Aragon calls for a meeting in which he and other will discuss a course of action for the president.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 23: Central Intelligence Agency, “Human Rights Review,” 18-31 August, 1978.

This document contains a general overview of human rights throughout the world, but begins with a discussion of the condition of dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It notes that the most recent dissident activity has been in their statements of support for the Czech Charter 77 dissident movement. It also discusses the Soviet Union’s fear of East European and Soviet dissidents forming a united front of opposition. It also mentions an incident in which dissident Aleksandr Lyapin attempted to commit suicide by self-immolation in protest of Helsinki group leader Yuri Orlov’s court sentence, and that he has since been confined to a mental institution.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 24: Senator Henry M. Jackson, Remarks at the Coalition for a Democratic Majority Human Rights Dinner, September 30, 1978.

Document 25: “Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords,” Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session; on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords; Volume X: Aleksandr Ginzburg on the Human Rights Situation in the U.S.S.R., 11 May, 1979.

Document 26: “A Helsinki Clue to Moscow’s Salt II Intentions,” The New York Times, June 18, 1979, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Aleksandr Ginzberg, Petr Grigorenko, Yuri Mnyukh, and Valentin Turchin.

Document 27: Jimmy Carter and Cyrus Vance, “Major Executive Statements on Behalf of Anatoliy Scharanskiy,” 16 July, 1979.

Document 28: Peter Tarnoff, Department of State, to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “U.S. Government Initiatives on Behalf of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.” 17 April, 1980.

This memorandum from State Department Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski contains a list of actions and statements by the U.S. government on human rights and protection of dissidents in the USSR. The list covers the years 1977 through 1980. The actions include reports on the Soviet Union’s implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, as well as discussions of these matters at international conferences. Another area of action has to do with investigating denials of exit visas to Jews and prisoners of conscience attempting to leave the Soviet Union. It also comprises various efforts to help imprisoned dissidents by sending observers to attend their trials and providing special aid to some families, including the Ginzburg/Shibayev and Sakharov/Yankelevich families. The document also includes a list of Carter’s addresses in which he voices concerns over human rights or the treatment of Soviet dissidents.

Document 29: Helsinki Monitoring Group [members of the Moscow Helsinki group in exile], “On the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,” c. summer 1980.

These recommendations were prepared by members of Helsinki groups in exile before the Madrid review conference of November 1980. The dissidents call the efforts of Western delegations at the earlier Belgrade conference “timid” and chide the lack of pressure on Moscow to observe the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The report describes the worsening human rights situation in the USSR after the Belgrade conference of 1977-78, arrests of the Helsinki Group members, persecution of religious believers, and restrictions on emigration. Recommendations include that the Madrid conference delegates demand that political prisoners, including Helsinki group members, be released, and that an international commission be created consisting of representatives of member-states to keep the pressure on the Soviets between the review conferences. Similar concerns, the report indicates, were raised by the MHG in its recommendations for the Belgrade conference in 1977.

Document 30: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, letter to friends in Moscow, undated, circa summer 1984.

This extraordinary personal letter provides a unique vista of Alexeyeva’s life in exile and her thinking about dissent. Here she describes how she found her calling as a historian (a “personal harbor” which is essential for enduring exile), came to write the book on Soviet dissent, and struggled to reform the radios (Liberty, Free Europe, Voice of America) against the nationalist-authoritarian messages provided from “Vermont and Paris” – meaning Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Vladimir Bukovsky, respectively – or, the Bolsheviks versus her own Mensheviks within the dissident movement, in her striking analogy. Also here are the personal details, the open window in the woods for the cats, the ruminations on the very process of writing letters (like cleaning house, do it regularly and it comes easily, otherwise it’s never done or only with great difficulty). Here she pleads for activation as opposed to liquidation of the Helsinki Groups, because “we have nothing else to replace them.”

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 31: Liudmila Alexeyeva, edited by Yuri Orlov, Documents and People, “What Gorbachev took from samizdat.”

In this draft script prepared for a Radio Liberty show in 1987 together with Yuri Orlov, Alexeyeva traces the roots of Gorbachev’s new thinking to samizdat materials as far back as the 1960s. She finds an amazing continuity in terms of ideals and goals, especially in foreign policy-thinking about the primacy of human rights and an interdependent world.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2]

Document 32: Lyudmila Alexeyeva’s handwritten draft paper on informal associations in the USSR.

This unique handwritten draft written for Alexeyeva on the emergence of informal organizations – the first NGOs – in the Soviet Union. The draft is undated but was most likely written in 1990 or early 1991. The main question is whether Gorbachev will stay in power and therefore whether the changes he brought about will stick. She sees the importance of informal organizations in reviving civil society in the Soviet Union and creating conditions for democratization.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2]

Document 33: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Trip to Nizhny Novgorod, 9 November, 1992.

Lyudmila Alexeyeva visited Nizhny Novgorod on August 29, 1992, and met with members of Dialogue Club and the independent trade union at the ship-building plant Krasnoe Sormovo. Semen Bulatkin, her main contact, talked to her about the political club they founded at the plant, whose outside member was governor Boris Nemtsov, and the difficulties of organizing a free trade union there. The independent trade union was founded in February 1992, with an initial membership of about 250-300 people. Two weeks later, threatened by the plant’s administration with the loss of jobs or social benefits, membership declined to 157. Alexeyeva also met with Governor Nemtsov – a radical reformer and close supporter of President Boris Yeltsin – who told her he had read her book on Soviet dissent and was an active listener of Radio Liberty.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2]

Document 34: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Trip to Moscow Report, 10-20 December, 1992.

Alexeyeva visited Russia in December 1992, just a year after the Soviet collapse, at the behest of the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute, which had been a key international backer of Solidarity in Poland and sought to support similar independent union development in post-Soviet Russia. Alexeyeva’s trip report does not provide much cause for optimism. In it, she describes democratic reformers’ complaints about President Yeltsin and the lack of alternative progressive leadership; the resistance to change by older Party-dominated union structures; the lack of access to television by new, more democratic unions to make their case; and the effective transformation of Communist Party elites into quasi-capitalist owners and managers of the means of production – not because they are true reformers or effective producers, but because they know how to boss. Dozens of intriguing details and provocative conversation summaries fill the report, including a newspaper story alleging that Yeltsin was now privatizing his own appointment schedule with an outside company, selling access at $30,000 per meeting.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2]

Unveiled – Cuban Missile Crisis Communications

Cuban Missile Crisis Communications

A response to the National Security Archive release on October 12, 2012: “Cuban Missile Crisis Reveleations: Kennedy’s Secret Approach to Castro — Declassified RFK Documents Yield New Information on Back-Channel to Fidel Castro to Avoid Nuclear War.”

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB395/

Related on Russian SIGINT:
http://cryptome.org/jya/rusigint.htm

http://cryptome.org/conus-sigint.htm


To: coldwarcomms[at]yahoogroups.com
From: “OZOB99” <ozob99[at]yahoo.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Oct 2012 13:54:33 -0000
Subject: [coldwarcomms] Cuban Missile Crisis Comms

As the 50th anniversery of this event approaches, here is an update to a post I made 10 years ago,with anecdotes of activities at the AT&T Norfolk Central Office, arguably the epicenter of military telco circuit activity for this crisis.

“Norfolk probably had more involvment in telecommunications than Washington because it was the STC (serving test center) for CINCLANT/SACLANT, TAC HQ Langley AFB, and CONARC Ft. Monroe; with augmented circuits to their subordinate commands and bases, as well to the NCA and other NS/EP entities.

An unusual increase in expedited new circuits,mainly to Southern bases, was evident in the week or so prior to 10-22-62; but we had no way of knowing the nature or gravity of the situation, just that South Florida was a “hotspot”, & Cuba was likely involved due to previous sabre rattling in the news.

By the time Kennedy made his announcement we had established a hand-picked 24/7 “task force” of tech’s (including many additional brought in) expediting circuit provisioning (C&P Telco had similar groups installing on local channels and the customer premises). Circuits that normally had a 3-5 week interval were being established in 3 days or less!; all circuit info & engineering (with the Government Communications sales & engineering folks on an unprecedented 24/7 schedule also) was phoned/TTY in day & night, & posted on a large status chalk board, with the various workgroups copying their portion & running with it; an unbelievable beehive of activity that actually worked well considering the confusion, because we all knew now this was possibly a doomsday scenario without being told so specifically.

The small AT&T office at Key West, along with Homestead, were overwhelmed with circuits from TAC & CINCLANT; these normally “sleepy” little offices had never seen anything like this! The quantities of circuits weren’t as great as Norfolk but the intensity of activities certainly was. Naturally there were additional employees brought in to handle the workload.

In the space of a few weeks hundreds of new circuits were established radiating out of Norfolk, most to Southeastern military bases. A large number of the voice circuits were “C2” conditioned (amplitude & envelope delay) for KY9 encryption, utilizing strings of delay equalizers at various points on the layout. Despite lengthy & detailed calculations for these equalizers many circuits would not support encrypted voice (going green) due to having to use any channel available and many sections in tandem. These were re-engineered by trial & error/SWAG on the spot as they were being installed, some would only work with no equalization! (an anomaly explained by a chance combo of facilities that happened to have the right characteristics of delay. There were a few circuits on C carrier(open wire) that never could be conditioned for encryption.

Many existing voice circuits were upgraded to C2 conditioning for encryption; some of the voice grade data circuits required C2 conditioning but were more forgiving.

Many of the telegraph grade circuits were encrypted for KW-8 et al; these didn’t require conditioning but were difficult to trouble shoot.

A portable “Quick Start” package of Lenkurt 76 radio and 45B carrier was shipped in for additional local channels to the Norfolk Naval Base in case cable pairs ran out; also a wide band Quick Start package of LMX modems & 303 data sets for additional wide band channels to the Naval Base, presumably for KY-3 encryption.

AT&T also loaned DOD (Army I believe) some transportable microwave to fill in some gaps in their networks. (I’ve never found out whether it was TD-2,TE or the Lenkurt Quick start; nor where it was needed.)

In the course of implementing & troubleshooting these circuits we overheard some scary dialog, along with some intense salty curses & oaths.

Being “insiders” to a degree, we were more scared than the general public, and more relieved than most when the Russians blinked.

If asked ahead of time if that quantity of circuits could be established in those few days I think everyone would have said “no way”!; it seems even a stodgy heirarchy can do anything when you have to, replacing the bell shaped heads with virtual helmets.”



	

Public Intelligence – Obama and Romney 2012 Debates Memorandum of Understanding

The following is the  memorandum of understanding between the Obama and Romney campaigns detailing rules and standards for the four arranged Presidential and Vice Presidential debates.

 

Download

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

ObamaRomneyDebateMOU

.

Secrecy News – The Purpose of National Security Policy declassified

THE PURPOSE OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, DECLASSIFIED

The most fundamental purpose of national security policy is not to keep
the nation safe from physical attack but to defend the constitutional
order.  At least, that is what President Reagan wrote in a Top Secret 1986
directive.

"The primary objective of U.S. foreign and security policy is to protect
the integrity of our democratic institutions and promote a peaceful global
environment in which they can thrive," President Reagan wrote in National
Security Decision Directive 238 on "Basic National Security Strategy,"
which was partially declassified in 2005.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-238.pdf

In a list of national security objectives, the directive does note the
imperative "to protect the United States... from military, paramilitary, or
terrorist attack."

But that is not the primary objective, according to the Reagan directive. 
Defense of the Constitution evidently takes precedence.

The first purpose of national security policy is "to preserve the
political identity, framework and institutions of the United States as
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution,"
President Reagan wrote.

This is a remarkable statement, for several reasons.  First, it recognizes
that the political identity and institutions of the United States are not
simply a given, but that they are vulnerable to many types of threats and
must be actively defended and sustained.  This task is not normally
assigned the urgency or the priority given to "national security."

Second, the directive distinguishes between constitutional governance and
physical security. Not every measure intended to promote security is
constitutional.  And not every act in defense of democratic self-governance
is likely to promote public safety.  (The American Revolution was not
calculated to increase "homeland security." Quite the opposite.)  Sometimes
a choice between the two is required.  President Reagan indicated what he
thought the choice should be.

And third, the directive is remarkable because its rhetoric was so
imperfectly realized by the Reagan Administration (and egregiously defied
in the Iran-Contra Affair) and has been largely abandoned by its
successors.

"Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental
commitment of the Federal Government," wrote President George W. Bush in
his 2002 National Security Strategy, skipping over President Reagan's
"primary" objective.

Likewise, "As President, I have often said that I have no greater
responsibility than protecting the American people," President Obama wrote
in his National Strategy for Counterterrorism.

The Reagan directive invites reflection on what U.S. national security
policy would look like if it were truly structured above all "to protect
the integrity of our democratic institutions."

In a section of the directive that was only classified Confidential,
President Reagan contrasted the U.S. with the Soviet Union, which was
described as its polar opposite.

"Our way of life, founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual,
depends on a stable and pluralistic world order within which freedom and
democratic institutions can thrive.  Yet, the greatest threat to the Soviet
system, in which the State controls the destiny of the individual, is the
concept of freedom itself."

"The survival of the Soviet system depends to a significant extent upon
the persistent and exaggerated representation of foreign threats, through
which it seeks to justify both the subjugation of its own people and the
expansion of Soviet military capabilities well beyond those required for
self-defense," President Reagan wrote.

Numerous Presidential directives from the Reagan Administration have been
declassified in recent years and have released by the Reagan Library,
though others still remain partially or completely classified.

Many of the declassified directives provide a fascinating account that
enlarges and enriches the public record of events of the time.  

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html

Only last year, for example, a 1985 directive (NSDD-172) on "Presenting
the Strategic Defense Initiative" was finally declassified.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-172.pdf

This year, NSDD 159 on "Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination
Procedures" (1985) was declassified.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-159.pdf

NSDD 207 on "The National Program for Combatting Terrorism" (1986) was
declassified in 2008.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-207.pdf

Among other things, that directive ordered the Attorney General to "Review
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and determine whether terrorist
movements or organizations are abusing its provisions."

JOB GROWTH DURING THE RECOVERY, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has not made available to the public include the following.

Job Growth During the Recovery, updated October 16, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41434.pdf

The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): Funding Issues
After a Decade of Implementation, FY2004-FY2013, October 10, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42776.pdf

Statutes of Limitation in Federal Criminal Cases: An Overview, updated
October 1, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31253.pdf

Venezuela: Issues for Congress, updated October 16, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf

Georgia's October 2012 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications,
October 15, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42777.pdf

Iran Sanctions, updated October 15, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

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     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

The Devil Bat – Full Movie – Bela Lugosi

Dr. Carruthers plots his revenge on his employers who are making a profit off of his invention. He electrically enlarges bats and sends them out to kill his employers’ family by instilling in the bats a hatred for a particular perfume he has discovered, which he gets his victims to apply before going outdoors. Johnny Layton, a reporter, eventually figures out Carruthers is the killer. He puts the perfume on himself and Carruthers in the hopes he will reveal himself, but the bats swoop on in before he get a confession.

 

This campy, entertaining cheapie from PRC Pictures features Bela Lugosi as a chemist who plots an elaborate revenge scheme on his business partners, whom he feels have cheated him out of his share. To this end he develops a mutant breed of vicious, oversized bats and trains several of this breed to home in on a special chemical which he then blends with shaving lotion. Presenting gifts of the lotion to his partners as a peace offering (and browbeating them into splashing it on themselves while in his presence), he subsequently unleashes his monstrous pets to tear them to pieces. Believe it or not, this was one of PRC’s more successful horror programmers, spawning a the sequel Devil Bat’s Daughter.