Stasi Plan To Overtake Berlin – Blue Print For Germany – Stasi – Plan Zur Übernahme Von Berlin – Blaupause Für Deutschland – Original Document

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Young Communist Party (SED) Bureaucrat Angela Merkel, allegedly Stasi-member “IM Erika”

FDJ-Kader Angela Merkel mutmasslich “IM Erika”

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Tagesschau-Artikel Zu GoMoPa Zensiert – Noch Hier & Im Internet-Archiv Lesbar – Original Dokument

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Der “Kinderfreund”, Zeitreisende, Gestaltwandler, Wundermann und “President” & “CEO” Von “GoMoPa” “Klaus-Dieter Maurischat” Aka “Siegfried Siewert” ETC PP…Live In Action

https://web.archive.org/web/20150410074455/https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/gomopa-101.html

Welche Seilschaften, da wohl wieder am Werk waren ? “IM Erika” ?

Video Of The Day | Betrayal In East And West

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Born in communist East Germany,Evelin Senarclens de Grancy fled to the West after facing increasing harassment from the secret police,the Stasi. But the author also faced repression in the West. Her second husband was a spy and as a double-agent he was passing information on to her former persecutors – the Stasi.

1961 – Walter Ulbricht – Berlin -“Niemand hat die Absicht- eine Mauer zu errichten” – Remastered

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Edit 1961 - Walter Ulbricht - Berlin Niemand hat die Absicht- eine Mauer zu errichten - Remastered

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Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – 4

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Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World

Gorbachev was the most important Western agent employed by the oper- ational unit for the “protection of the economy,” known as Department XVIII, and provided the lion’s share of all scientific and technical mate- rial collected there. The reason for this bureaucratic anomaly was that the precursor department (Department III – renamed and reorganized in 1964) for protecting the economy had been responsible for company espionage in the West as well as economic security. Some of Department III’s agents were transferred to HV A, but Gorbachev was not.20 He was

Agent Gorbachev 17

recruited during a time of bureaucratic flux before foreign intelligence and domestic security/counterintelligence merged under the common roof of the Ministry for State Security.

Of course, most scientific and technical espionage was the responsibility of another division of the Stasi, the HV A’s Sector for Science and Tech- nology. This was the group from which Werner Stiller defected in 1979, and also the group to which all Gorbachev’s documents were referred for evaluation.

Gorbachev provided the Stasi with blueprints, plans, scientific docu- ments, and some prototypes from two leading West German firms. Between 1957 and 1959 he worked at Telefunken as head of the Depart- ment for Small Transmitters and passed on material related to radios and transmitters. After that, he headed up the Department of Automation at AEG until his retirement in 1977. He had the key to the company archive both times.

The MfS had a systematic method for collection and evaluation based on the state’s economic plan. Industrial representatives could give the MfS a wish list of plans or hardware needed, and it would attempt to acquire the material. The evaluation department played the important role of intermediary between industry and agent. Not only did it funnel the industry wish lists to its agents, keeping in mind the country’s economic needs and each agent’s capabilities, but it also analyzed each item collected by the agents, “neutralized” them (in MfS lingo) so that the source would not be known, and passed the information back to industry or to research institutes. Agents could also bring unsolicited material if they thought it would be of interest, but this material was separated from the requested material.

Gorbachev delivered an unusually copious amount of material. The height of his cooperation seems to have been from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. In 1960, the year before the Wall was built, a case officer reported that Gorbachev delivered 505 documents. This seems to have been his record; in most years, unless meetings ceased for operational reasons, he averaged about 200. In 1968 he contributed 202 of the 289 documents acquired by Department XVIII. As he approached retirement in 1977, Gorbachev’s deliveries dropped significantly. In the 1980s he was still working for the MfS, but instead of passing on secret documents, he was intercepting Western intelligence’s radio messages and finding out their broadcast frequencies.21

The material Gorbachev delivered received high marks. In the Stasi’s meticulously organized system, the evaluation department graded every piece of material on a scale of I to V, with I being the highest rating: “very

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Stasi Note On Meeting Between Minister Mielke And KGB Chairman Andropov – Original Document

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Spiegel TV Video – Die Röntgen-Stasi

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Es war nur ein Verdacht. Sollte er jedoch Gewissheit werden, würde er alles in den Schatten stellen, was man bis zum Frühjahr 1999 über die Machenschaften der DDR-Staatssicherheit wusste. Verhaftete Bürgerrechtler sollen während ihres Gefängnisaufenthaltes in der DDR wiederholt und in voller Absicht mit Röntgenstrahlen verseucht worden sein. Im Mai 1999 starb der Schriftsteller und DDR-Kritiker Jürgen Fuchs an Krebs. Wie zuvor schon zwei andere Dissidenten.

East German KGB – Rise of Stasi – Documentary

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Our historical documentary series on the history of the Cold War continues with a video on the East German Ministry for State Security, more commonly known as Stasi. This East German version of the KGB was a staple of the Cold War period and was known for its brutal methods.

Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 7 – Merkel & “IM Czerny” Alias Lothar De Maiziere

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„Angela Merkels politische Karriere schien auf den ersten Blick schon beendet zu sein, bevor sie noch richtig begonnen hatte. Denn die 0,92 Prozent, mit denen der Demokratische Aufbruch aus der Volkskammerwahl vom 18. März 1990 hervorging, hätten kaum Ansprüche auf Posten in der künftigen Regierung zugelassen. Doch auf den zweiten Blick stellten sich die Dinge anders dar: Noch in der Wahlnacht suchte die Pressesprecherin des Demokratischen Aufbruchs die Nähe zum Sieger, genauer gesagt zum Überraschungssieger, denn niemand hatte erwartet, dass Lothar de Maizière 40,8 Prozent der Stimmen bekommen würde.[1] Vorausgesagt worden war ein Triumph der Sozialdemokraten unter Ibrahim Böhme, der bald von seiner Stasivergangenheit eingeholt werden sollte. Sogar von einer absoluten Mehrheit sprachen die Demoskopen. Doch nun erhielten die Sozialdemokraten gerade einmal 21,9 Prozent. Die Menschen hatten de Maizière gewählt und den Bundeskanzler gemeint, der wie kein anderer für Deutschlands schnelle Vereinigung stand.
Angela Merkel harrte nicht bei den Verlierern vom Demokratischen Aufbruch aus. Eigentlich hatten sie in der Gaststätte »Zur Mühle« auf dem Prenzlauer Berg ein ganz anderes Ergebnis feiern wollen, ehe die Schnur-Affäre alles zunichtegemacht hatte. Sie fuhr stattdessen mit dem Journalisten und Politikberater Claus Detjen zum Palast der Republik, dem Sitz der Volkskammer, wo[…]“

Auszug aus: Reuth, Ralf Georg. „Das erste Leben der Angela M. (German Edition).“

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IM “Anna Holik” Und IM “Hermann Reimer ” Nehmen Jägerheim Dortmund Ins Visier – Original Dokument

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Regierungskriminalität – Der Koeppe Bericht Über Die Machenschaften Der Stasi – Mysteriöse Todesfälle – Personenregister – Original Dokument

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Ingrid Köppe – Wikipedia
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Stasi OPK “Vogel” – Die Werbung des Konzernlenkersohnes Durch “IM Sebastian”, – Original Dokument

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Stasi Akte OPK “Illusion” – IM “Uwe Wenzel” “IM Paul Stenke” – Original Dokument – Deutsch

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The declassified fashions of East German spies - The Verge
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Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – Von Geheimnissen Verführt: In Der Spy-Tech-Welt Der Stasi – 3

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Ingenious gadgets, real-world quandaries at Washington's all-new Spy Museum

Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World

For his first two years as a spy, Rehder did not know he was selling secrets to the MfS, believing he was selling them to representatives of the Ministry for Machine Building. Stasi agents had been using a cover story. Cover stories or “false-flag” operations – when intelligence officers tell a potential agent that they come from another country – were often em- ployed when there was a sense that the potential recruit was hostile toward communist countries. It was not until January 1959 that Rehder’s case officers, including Major Pape, apparently revealed to Rehder who they were. The files contain no description of Rehder’s reaction to this news; he simply continued, apparently with great eagerness, to pass on company secrets for money. Perhaps the best clue that the Stasi had him in their pocket had come a few weeks earlier, when Gorbatschow that he had made an imprint of the key to the company archive. “With this key,” he told the officers, “I am in the position to access all company secrets.”

In seinen ersten zwei Jahren als Spion wusste Rehder nicht, dass er dem MfS Geheimnisse verkaufte, weil er glaubte, sie an Vertreter des Ministeriums für Maschinenbau zu verkaufen. Stasi-Agenten hatten eine Titelgeschichte verwendet. Coverstorys oder „False-Flag“-Operationen – wenn Geheimdienstoffiziere einem potenziellen Agenten mitteilen, dass er aus einem anderen Land kommt – wurden oft eingesetzt, wenn man den Eindruck hatte, dass der potenzielle Rekrut kommunistischen Ländern feindselig gegenüberstand. Erst im Januar 1959 verrieten Rehders Sachbearbeiter, darunter Major Pape, Rehder offenbar, wer sie waren. Die Akten enthalten keine Beschreibung von Rehders Reaktion auf diese Nachricht; er fuhr einfach fort, offenbar mit großem Eifer, Firmengeheimnisse gegen Geld weiterzugeben. Der vielleicht beste Hinweis darauf, dass die Stasi ihn in der Tasche hatte, war ein paar Wochen zuvor gekommen, als Gorbatschow damit prahlte, den Schlüssel zum Firmenarchiv abgedruckt zu haben. „Mit diesem Schlüssel“, sagte er den Beamten, „bin ich in der Lage, auf alle Betriebsgeheimnisse zuzugreifen.“

Continue reading “Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – Von Geheimnissen Verführt: In Der Spy-Tech-Welt Der Stasi – 3”

Stasi File OPK File “Illusion” – IM “Uwe Wenzel” – “IM Paul Stenke” Original Document – English Translation

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Can You Tell I'm a Stasi Spy? The Crazy Disguises of a Feared Security  State (Photos)
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Stasi Observation Report Of “Zange” By General Gaebel & Lieutenant Colonel Fritsch In Frankfurt/Oder

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Stasiland now: Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the author  of 'Stasiland' reveals the ongoing power of the former East German regime,  not just in politics and business but
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Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 6 – Merkel & Schnur Under Pressure

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Why Has Angela Merkel Staked Her Legacy on the Refugees? - DER SPIEGEL

„Der Zorn des nach staatlicher Einheit schreienden Volkes entlud sich daher erneut gegen jene, deren »Schild und Schwert« einmal das MfS gewesen war und die nun in den nicht unbegründeten Verdacht gerieten, dass dies jetzt nicht anders sein würde. In den Städten des ganzen Landes demonstrierten Anfang Januar wiederum Hunderttausende und verlangten den Rücktritt des SED-Vorsitzenden Gysi. »Säuberungen«, denen die letzten Parteifunktionäre aus der Honecker-Ära zum Opfer fielen, änderten nichts am Unmut der Bevölkerung. Erst als – vom Neuen Forum organisiert – am 15. Januar Bürgerbewegte, darunter auch Aktivisten des Demokratischen Aufbruchs, die Berliner Stasizentrale stürmten und das Fernsehen der DDR darüber mit Sondersendungen berichtete, beruhigte sich die Volksseele wieder. Was die Menschen damals nicht wussten: Es war alles nur eine Inszenierung.[49] Tatsächlich arbeitete der Geheimdienst bis tief in den Sommer 1990 hinein unbehelligt weiter.“

Auszug aus: Reuth, Ralf Georg. „Das erste Leben der Angela M. (German Edition).“

“The anger of the people, who were crying out for national unity, was therefore once again discharged against those whose“ shield and sword ”had once been the Stasi and who now came under the not unfounded suspicion that this would not be any different now. Hundreds of thousands again demonstrated in cities across the country at the beginning of January and demanded the resignation of SED chairman Gysi. “Purges”, to which the last party functionaries from the Honecker era fell victim, did nothing to change the resentment of the population. It was only when, on January 15, organized by the New Forum, citizens’ movements, including activists of the Democratic Awakening, stormed the Berlin Stasi headquarters and the GDR television reported about it with special programs, did the people’s soul calm down again. What people didn’t know at the time: It was all just a production. [49] In fact, the secret service continued to work well into the summer of 1990. “

Excerpt from: Reuth, Ralf Georg. “The first life of Angela M. (German Edition).”

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Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 5 – Merkel, Moskau & Macht

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Der Autor Jürgen Meyer analysiert: “In Moskau lernt Angela Merkel auch Ulrich Merkel kennen, den sie 1977 heiratet und bis 1981 zusammenlebt. Demnach muss sie 1977 und auch 1981 als privilegierter Reisekader in der Sowjetunion und Prag gewesen sein. Gleichzeitig 1978 unterzeichnete ihr späterer Freund Michael Schindhelm eine Verpflichtungserklärung als Mitarbeiter der Stasi der DDR bzw. des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit im Rahmen eines Studienaufenthaltes im russischen Woronesh.

The author Jürgen Meyer analyzes: “In Moscow, Angela Merkel also met Ulrich Merkel, whom she married in 1977 and lived together until 1981. According to this, she must have been a privileged travel cadre in the Soviet Union and Prague in 1977 and 1981 as well. Later friend Michael Schindhelm made a declaration of commitment as an employee of the Stasi of the GDR and the Ministry for State Security as part of a study visit to Woronesh, Russia.

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Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – Von Geheimnissen Verführt: In Der Spy-Tech-Welt Der Stasi – 2

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Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World

This book tells the story of how a spy and security agency was seduced by the power of technological secrets to solve intelligence and national problems, and, conversely, how it overestimated the power of stolen tech- nology from the West to boost its own technological capacities. By doing so it challenges the myth of an effective spy agency. By the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the system had become so bankrupt that the spy-tech props of the cloak-and-dagger world had increasingly been brought or bought from the West. Other writers have covered the Stasi’s repressive arm – its structures and function as the handmaiden of the state – and other topics such as the churches, the media, and politics.2 Seduced by Secrets concentrates on the spy game, on its methods and sources and on its technology.

Dieses Buch erzählt die Geschichte, wie eine Spionage- und Sicherheitsagentur von der Macht der technologischen Geheimnisse verführt wurde, um Geheimdienste und nationale Probleme zu lösen, und umgekehrt, wie sie die Macht der gestohlenen Technologie aus dem Westen überschätzte, um ihre eigenen technologischen Kapazitäten zu stärken . Auf diese Weise wird der Mythos einer effektiven Spionageagentur in Frage gestellt. Zum Zeitpunkt des Mauerfalls war das System so bankrott geworden, dass die Spionagetechniken der Welt der Umhänge und Dolche zunehmend aus dem Westen gebracht oder gekauft wurden. Andere Autoren haben über den repressiven Arm der Stasi – ihre Strukturen und ihre Funktion als Magd des Staates – und andere Themen wie Kirchen, Medien und Politik berichtet.2 Verführt von Secrets konzentriert sich auf das Spionagespiel, seine Methoden und Quellen und auf seine Technologie.

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Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 4 – Merkel & STASI

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Persiflage

Stasi-Opfer und Kenner Adam Lauks schreibt: “Angela Merkel hat 1978 nach ihrem Studium als Diplom-Physikerin ( bei einer Bewerbung an der Hochschule in Ilmenau eine Stasi-Verpflichtungserklärung von der Stasi in einem Büro vorgetragen bekommen)*, die sie nicht unterschrieben haben will. Die Unterbreitung dieses Angebots bestreitet sie auch nicht. Jetzt wird aber immer deutlicher, dass sie danach in der DDR Kariere machte.

Stasi victim and connoisseur Adam Lauks writes: “After completing her degree in physics in 1978, Angela Merkel (when she applied to the university in Ilmenau received a declaration of commitment from the Stasi in an office) * that she did not sign according to her statements. She does not deny the submission of this offer, but now it is becoming increasingly clear that she then made a career in the GDR.

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Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – Von Geheimnissen Verführt: In Der Spy-Tech-Welt Der Stasi – 1

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More fascinating than fiction, Seduced by Secrets takes the reader inside the real world of one of the most effective and feared spy agencies in history. The book reveals, for the first time, the secret technical methods and sources of the Stasi (East German Ministry for State Security) as it stole secrets from abroad and developed gadgets at home, employing universal, highly guarded techniques often used by other spy and security agencies. Seduced by Secrets draws on secret files from the Stasi archives, including CIA-acquired material, interviews and friendships, court documents, and unusual visits to spy sites, including “breaking into” a prison, to demonstrate that the Stasi overestimated the power of secrets to solve problems and created an insular spy culture more intent on securing its power than protecting national security. It recreates the Stasi’s secret world of technology through biographies of agents, defectors, and officers and by visualizing James Bond–like techniques and gadgets. In this highly original book, Kristie Macrakis adds a new dimension to our understanding of the East German Ministry for State Security by bringing the topic into the realm of espionage history and exiting the political domain.

• Reveals previously secret methods and sources used by all spy agencies
• Includes visits to spy sites
• Reveals formulas and methods for invisible ink for the first time

Seduced by Secrets ist faszinierender als Fiktion und entführt den Leser in die reale Welt einer der effektivsten und gefürchtetsten Spionageagenturen der Geschichte. Das Buch enthüllt zum ersten Mal die geheimen technischen Methoden und Quellen der Stasi (Ostdeutsches Ministerium für Staatssicherheit), die Geheimnisse aus dem Ausland stahl und Geräte im Inland entwickelte, wobei universelle, streng gehütete Techniken eingesetzt wurden, die häufig von anderen Spionen und Spionage-Agenturen verwendet werden. Seduced by Secrets stützt sich auf geheime Akten aus den Stasi-Archiven, darunter von der CIA erworbenes Material, Interviews und Freundschaften, Gerichtsdokumente und ungewöhnliche Besuche bei Spionagestellen, einschließlich des “Einbruchs” in ein Gefängnis, um zu demonstrieren, dass die Stasi die Macht der Geheimnisse überschätzt hat, Probleme zu lösen und eine Inselspionagekultur zu schaffen, die mehr darauf abzielt, ihre Macht zu sichern als die nationale Sicherheit zu schützen. Es stellt die geheime Technologiewelt der Stasi durch Biografien von Agenten, Überläufern und Offizieren sowie durch Visualisierung von James-Bond-ähnlichen Techniken und Geräten wieder her. In diesem höchst originellen Buch fügt Kristie Macrakis unserem Verständnis des ostdeutschen Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit eine neue Dimension hinzu, indem sie das Thema in den Bereich der Spionagegeschichte bringt und den politischen Bereich verlässt.

• Enthüllt zuvor geheime Methoden und Quellen, die von allen Spionageagenturen verwendet werden
• Beinhaltet Besuche von Spionageseiten
• Enthüllt zum ersten Mal Formeln und Methoden für unsichtbare Tinte

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Video – Juricon – Stasi-GoMoPa – Analyse Samt Auszug der Strafverfahren – Original Dokument

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Video – Quellen – Ein STASI-Mord An “Die Bewertung”-Thomas Bremer-EEV-Geschäfts”freund” Eisenhauer

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Edit Quellen – Ein STASI-Mord An “Die Bewertung”-Thomas Bremer-EEV-Geschäfts”freund” Eisenhauer

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Enthüllt – Die Stasi-Akte Des IM “Hermann Reimer” – Original Dokument

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Nach “Recherche” Über Journalisten – Datenschutzverfahren Gegen die Stasi-Behörde

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In der Aktenaffäre mit Tausenden von illegal veröffentlichten Seiten mit Stasi-Informationen über Journalisten und Gewerkschafter hat der Bundesbeauftragte für Datenschutz ein Verfahren gegen den Bundesbeauftragten für die Stasi-Akten eröffnet. Der Datenschutzbeauftragte bestätigte dies auf Anfrage von BuzzFeed News und Übermedien.

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After “Research” Of Journalists – Data Protection Proceedings Against The Stasi Records Authority

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In the file affair involving thousands of illegally published pages containing Stasi information about journalists and trade unionists, the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection has opened proceedings against the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi files. The data protection officer confirmed this at the request of BuzzFeed News and Übermedien.

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Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 2 – Schnur & Merkel & KGB

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Merkel: Von Kohls Mädchen zur ewigen Kanzlerin - Politik - SZ.de

Merkel & Kohl

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„Angela Merkel schrieb eine etwa 50 Seiten lange Arbeit zum Thema »Was ist sozialistische Lebensweise?«. Die Arbeit ist heute verschollen.
Angela Merkel hat dafür eine Erklärung: Sie habe die Arbeit ohne Durchschlag getippt. »Ich habe kein Exemplar. Wenn ich es hätte, würde ich es sofort herausgeben. So gerät man sofort in den Verdacht, hier werde etwas vertuscht, und das nur, weil sich heute niemand mehr vorstellen kann, wie es ist, wenn kein Kopierer da ist und man seinen Text auf einer alten Adler-Maschine schreibt, in der sich das Blaupapier nur verheddert«, sagt sie.[146]“

Auszug aus: Reuth, Ralf Georg. „Das erste Leben der Angela M. (German Edition).“

“Angela Merkel wrote a 50-page paper on the subject of” What is a socialist way of life? ” The work is lost today.
Angela Merkel has an explanation for this: she typed the work without a carbon copy. “I don’t have a copy. If I had it, I would give it out right away. So one immediately suspects that something is being hushed up here, and that only because today nobody can imagine what it is like when there is no copier and you write your text on an old Adler machine in which that is Blue paper just tangled, “she says. [146]”

Excerpt from: Reuth, Ralf Georg. “The first life of Angela M. (German Edition).”

Continue reading “Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 2 – Schnur & Merkel & KGB”

Naked Panic In Stasi – Stadl – Hundreds Of Fake GSA Websites Are Supposed To Cover Up The Real Website Berndpulch.org

With the help of the Rostock Black-Hat – GSA tools, the Neo-Stasi are trying to cover up the original posts of this blog.

This has been the case for years. But now the action has almost assumed pandemic proportions, a Stasi-GoMoPa-Corona-Nonsense-Blog-Pandemic, so to speak.

Compliments, dear Neo-Stasi troops, there is no better testimony for the effectiveness of this website http://www.berndpulch.org.

For this a big thank you!

And don’t forget: keep producing more nonsense websites.

I have another suggestion: How about plastics and elastics from Zschopau? Or my nonsense is biological?

In this sense. Forward into the abyss of lies!

Angela Merkel: Im Internet am liebsten nackt? | InTouch

A little bedtime treat – keep dreaming …

Sincerely yours

Bernd Pulch

Magister Artium in Journalism, German Studies and Comparative Studies

Juricon – Stasi-GoMoPa – Analyse Samt Auszug der Strafverfahren – Original Dokument

“Klaus-Dieter Maurischat”, Kinderfreund, Zeitreisender und Wundermann

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Insider – Ein STASI-Mord An “Die Bewertung”-Thomas Bremer-EEV-Geschäfts”freund” Eisenhauer

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Eine dunkle Truppe aus Ostberlin und Leipzig treibt weiter ihr Unwesen. Wer mag das bloss sein ?

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Doch der Reihe nach: Könnern, Ostdeutschland –  Es stürzte bei Edlau (Sachsen-Anhalt) ein Kleinflugzeug ab. Der Pilot kam ums Leben. Bei ihren Ermittlungen untersuchen die Kriminalisten jedes Detail besonders gründlich.

Denn der Tote war ein Multimillionär. Ein Geschäftsmann, der umstritten, aber auch sehr erfolgreich war. Ein Mann mit Feinden.

Günter Eisenhauer († 52) war auf dem Weg zu einem Geschäftstermin in Sachen-Anhalt. Er wollte mit seiner Privatmaschine am Vormittag auf dem Flugplatz Merseburg landen.

Doch die einmotorige „Beechcraft Sierra“ stürzte 30 Kilometer entfernt über einem Feld ab.

Der gelernte Altenpfleger und Selfmade-Unternehmer Eisenhauer war seit den 90er-Jahren in der Windpark-Branche aktiv. Seine Offshore-Windparks in der Nord- und Ostsee brachten dem Geschäftsmann Millionen ein. Und viel Ärger.

Denn mehrere frühere Geschäftspartner erstatteten Strafanzeige gegen Eisenhauer, unterstellten ihm, er habe sie um 150 Mio. Euro gebracht. Vor wenigen Wochen eröffnete die Staatsanwaltschaft in Oldenburg ein Strafverfahren gegen den Windpark-Pionier.

Polizeisprecher Marco Kopitz bestätigt auf Anfrage: „Es wird in alle Richtungen ermittelt.“ Auch Sabotage oder ein Suizid schließen die Ermittler nicht aus.

Kopitz: „Nach Aussagen des Luftfahrtbundesamtes wird ein erstes – vorläufiges – Untersuchungsergebnis voraussichtlich in sechs bis acht Wochen vorliegen. Die Obduktion der Leiche soll in dieser Woche erfolgen.“

Die Kripo sucht weiter nach Augenzeugen. Polizeisprecher Kopitz: „Bisher hat sich nur ein Zeuge gemeldet und das ist der Mann, der die abgestürzte Maschine entdeckte.“

Seit dem Tod von Eisenhauer sind 6 Jahre vergangen – OFFIZIELL ohne Erkenntnisgewinn…

Der mysteriöse Tod des “GoMoPa”- und Thomas Bremer-Geschäftsfreundes hat eine bemerkenswerte Beinote.

Der Leipziger “GoMoPa”-IM “Thomas Bremer” weiß vor der Familie von dem “Unglückstod”.

Bei dem Tod durch “Blutvergiftung” im Falle von Heinz Gerlach, wusste dies “GoMoPa” vor allen anderen Medien.

Woher kommt nur dieses prekäre Insiderwissen ?!

Und: Eisenhauer war mutmaßlich zu einem Termin mit Thomas Bremer unterwegs. Ein Rendezvous mit dem Tod ?!

Kein Wunder, dass jetzt EEV-Agitator Thomas Bremer über “Verschwörungstheorien” herzieht.

Das ist keine Theorie. Das ist mutmaßlich die Praxis der Verschwörung mit letalem Ausgang, wie sie  “GoMoPa”- Mastermind und STASI-Oberst Ehrenfried Stelzer in seiner Killer-Bibel “Toxdat” beschreibt: Morde ohne Spuren, die nie aufgeklärt werden können. Eine Spezialität des KGB und der STASI.

Siehe Uwe Barschel u.v.a.



Wie so viele andere mysteriöse Todesfälle auch in jüngster Zeit etc., denen wir uns in Kürze widmen werden, bleibt in der Ära Merkel auch hier die Todesursache ungeklärt…

Und die Aufklärer müssen um Ihr Leben fürchten. Zuvor wird allerdings versucht – wie im Falle Bremer/Eisenhauer die Reputation der Stasi-Gegner zu zerstören und Nebelkerzen zu zünden (Daum vs Pulch) oder falsche Webseiten zu lancieren (berndpulch.com), negative SEO anzuwenden, Hunderte von falschen Webseiten mit angeblichen Stasi-Listen in Google zu platzieren – ein enormer Aufwand nur damit die Seilschaften weiter ihren trüben Geschäften nachgehen können.

Dabei ändert dies im Ergebnis nichts. Die Tage der Stasi-Seilschaften gehen ihrem Ende entgegen, sobald Ihren Opfern klar wird, mit wem sie es in Wahrheit zu tun haben.



Über Thomas Bremer und seine Machenschaften lesen Sie hier mehr:

https://diebewertercom.wordpress.com/2017/01/05/erster-beitrag/



https://www.hoecker.eu/news/schweizer-investor-geht-erfolgreich-gegen-thomas-bremer-von-diebewertung-de-vor

http://verbraucherschutzforum.net/?p=47

Über den mutmasslichen Mord an Günter Eisenhauer:

https://www.bild.de/regional/leipzig/flugzeugabsturz/der-todesflug-des-multimillionaers-42590194.bild.html

P.S. Bremer rühmt sich wohl damit, Geschäftsfelder und Daten von Heinz Gerlach übernommen zu haben.

Cui Bono ?

Quellen – Ein STASI-Mord An “Die Bewertung”-Thomas Bremer-EEV-Geschäfts”freund” Eisenhauer

Doch der Reihe nach: Könnern, Ostdeutschland –  Es stürzte bei Edlau (Sachsen-Anhalt) ein Kleinflugzeug ab. Der Pilot kam ums Leben. Bei ihren Ermittlungen untersuchen die Kriminalisten jedes Detail besonders gründlich.

Denn der Tote war ein Multimillionär. Ein Geschäftsmann, der umstritten, aber auch sehr erfolgreich war. Ein Mann mit Feinden.

Günter Eisenhauer († 52) war auf dem Weg zu einem Geschäftstermin in Sachen-Anhalt. Er wollte mit seiner Privatmaschine am Vormittag auf dem Flugplatz Merseburg landen.

Doch die einmotorige „Beechcraft Sierra“ stürzte 30 Kilometer entfernt über einem Feld ab.

Der gelernte Altenpfleger und Selfmade-Unternehmer Eisenhauer war seit den 90er-Jahren in der Windpark-Branche aktiv. Seine Offshore-Windparks in der Nord- und Ostsee brachten dem Geschäftsmann Millionen ein. Und viel Ärger.

Denn mehrere frühere Geschäftspartner erstatteten Strafanzeige gegen Eisenhauer, unterstellten ihm, er habe sie um 150 Mio. Euro gebracht. Vor wenigen Wochen eröffnete die Staatsanwaltschaft in Oldenburg ein Strafverfahren gegen den Windpark-Pionier.

Polizeisprecher Marco Kopitz bestätigt auf Anfrage: „Es wird in alle Richtungen ermittelt.“ Auch Sabotage oder ein Suizid schließen die Ermittler nicht aus.

Kopitz: „Nach Aussagen des Luftfahrtbundesamtes wird ein erstes – vorläufiges – Untersuchungsergebnis voraussichtlich in sechs bis acht Wochen vorliegen. Die Obduktion der Leiche soll in dieser Woche erfolgen.“

Die Kripo sucht weiter nach Augenzeugen. Polizeisprecher Kopitz: „Bisher hat sich nur ein Zeuge gemeldet und das ist der Mann, der die abgestürzte Maschine entdeckte.“

Seit dem Tod von Eisenhauer sind 6 Jahre vergangen – OFFIZIELL ohne Erkenntnisgewinn…

Der mysteriöse Tod des “GoMoPa”- und Thomas Bremer-Geschäftsfreundes hat eine bemerkenswerte Beinote.

Der Leipziger “GoMoPa”-IM “Thomas Bremer” weiß vor der Familie von dem “Unglückstod”.

Bei dem Tod durch “Blutvergiftung” im Falle von Heinz Gerlach, wusste dies “GoMoPa” vor allen anderen Medien.

Woher kommt nur dieses prekäre Insiderwissen ?!

Und: Eisenhauer war mutmaßlich zu einem Termin mit Thomas Bremer unterwegs. Ein Rendezvous mit dem Tod ?!

Kein Wunder, dass jetzt EEV-Agitator Thomas Bremer über “Verschwörungstheorien” herzieht.

Das ist keine Theorie. Das ist mutmaßlich die Praxis der Verschwörung mit letalem Ausgang, wie sie  “GoMoPa”- Mastermind und STASI-Oberst Ehrenfried Stelzer in seiner Killer-Bibel “Toxdat” beschreibt: Morde ohne Spuren, die nie aufgeklärt werden können. Eine Spezialität des KGB und der STASI.

Siehe Uwe Barschel u.v.a.

Wie so viele andere mysteriöse Todesfälle auch in jüngster Zeit etc., denen wir uns in Kürze widmen werden, bleibt in der Ära Merkel auch hier die Todesursache ungeklärt…

Und die Aufklärer müssen um Ihr Leben fürchten. Zuvor wird allerdings versucht – wie im Falle Bremer/Eisenhauer die Reputation der Stasi-Gegner zu zerstören und Nebelkerzen zu zünden (Daum vs Pulch) oder falsche Webseiten zu lancieren (berndpulch.com), negative SEO anzuwenden, Hunderte von falschen Webseiten mit angeblichen Stasi-Listen in Google zu platzieren – ein enormer Aufwand nur damit die Seilschaften weiter ihren trüben Geschäften nachgehen können.

Dabei ändert dies im Ergebnis nichts. Die Tage der Stasi-Seilschaften gehen ihrem Ende entgegen, sobald Ihren Opfern klar wird, mit wem sie es in Wahrheit zu tun haben.

Über Thomas Bremer und seine Machenschaften lesen Sie hier mehr:

https://diebewertercom.wordpress.com/2017/01/05/erster-beitrag/

https://www.hoecker.eu/news/schweizer-investor-geht-erfolgreich-gegen-thomas-bremer-von-diebewertung-de-vor

http://verbraucherschutzforum.net/?p=47

Über den mutmasslichen Mord an Günter Eisenhauer:

https://www.bild.de/regional/leipzig/flugzeugabsturz/der-todesflug-des-multimillionaers-42590194.bild.html

P.S. Bremer rühmt sich wohl damit, Geschäftsfelder und Daten von Heinz Gerlach übernommen zu haben.

Cui Bono ?

Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – Teil 1 “Die FDJ Sekretärin”

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Continue reading “Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – Teil 1 “Die FDJ Sekretärin””

DDR-Geheimpolizei – So Arbeitet Die STASI – Brandaktuell – Sie Sind Immer Im Geschäft

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Die SED schuf mit dem Ministerium für Staatssicherheit einen Überwachungsapparat in der DDR. Die “Stasi” hatte den Auftrag, über alles Bescheid zu wissen. Wer einmal unter Verdacht geriet, wurde genauestens kontrolliert – jenseits von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechten. Um verdächtige Bürger zu observieren, setzte die Stasi Wanzen und Kameras ein, kontrollierte Post und Telefon und durchsuchte Wohnungen. Der Staatssicherheitsdienst hatte aber auch die Befugnis, Menschen zu verhaften und zu verhören. Neben den hauptamtlichen Stasi-Mitarbeitern gab es auch inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, die verdeckt arbeiteten. Ob es auch Spitzel im eigenen Umfeld gab? Auf diese Frage kann heute der Einblick in die Stasi-Akten BEDINGT eine Antwort geben…

Auf dieser Seite indes haben Sie die Namen von 99% aller Stasi-Agenten.

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GoMoPa4Kids – Reminiszenz In der “Welt” – “Kinderpornographie: Stasi erpresste Politiker”

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Kinder-Sexualaufklärung” unter falscher Flagge – “GoMoPa 4 Kids” – Over and  Out ! – BERNDPULCH.ORG – BERND-PULCH.ORG – TOXDAT, STASI List, STASI  SLEEPER List, KGB List, BDVP List, STASI Names A-Z, DDR-EAST

https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article378210/Kinderpornographie-Stasi-erpresste-Politiker.html

Kinderpornographie: Stasi erpresste Politiker

Veröffentlicht am 10.02.2003 | Lesedauer: 2 Minuten

Von Dirk Banse, Michael Behrendt

Ex-Geheimdienst-Offizier stellt Verbindung zum Fall des vermissten Berliner Jungen Manuel her.

Continue reading “GoMoPa4Kids – Reminiszenz In der “Welt” – “Kinderpornographie: Stasi erpresste Politiker””

Darum Hat Das Stasimuseum Die Geplante Wiedereröffnung Abgesagt: Datenwut

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Merkel in Stasi-Gedenkstätte: Die Gegenwart ist Geschichte - Politik -  Tagesspiegel
Merkel vor Ort in der Stasi-Gedenkstätte…Weiss Jemand Zuviel Über IM Erika ?

Das Stasimuseum in Berlin-Lichtenberg sagt die geplante Wiedereröffnung ab. Das Stasimuseum im Haus 1 der ehemaligen Stasizentrale in Berlin-Lichtenberg wird nicht, wie geplant, am Karfreitag öffnen. Der Grund ist die kürzlich erlassene Corona-Verordnung. Die neuen Vorschriften machen in der Summe den Betrieb des Museums am historischen Ort der ehemaligen Zentrale der Staatssicherheit der DDR unmöglich.

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Der Unheimliche Einfluss Von Ex-Stasi-Leuten

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Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, kurz: Stasi, war in der DDR die zentrale Institution zur Überwachung der Bevölkerung. Die Mitarbeiter der Stasi wurden gefürchtet – vor allem deshalb, weil sie meistens im Geheimen operierten. Heute ist das alles Geschichte. Wirklich? Wir zeigen, welchen Einfluss ehemalige Stasi-Leute teilweise immer noch haben …

Video – Geheimnisse Der Stasi – Gegen Den Klassenfeind

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Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR: Es ist nicht nur eine Behörde – es ist ein ganzes Imperium. Geheimpolizei und Nachrichtendienste in einer einzigen Institution. Die Staatssicherheit durchdringt die Gesellschaft komplett. Ihre Informanten sind überall. In Gerichten und Behörden, am Arbeitsplatz, in der eigenen Familie – in Ost, aber auch in West. Wie die Stasi zu dem geworden ist, zeigt “Feind ist, wer anders denkt – Geheimnisse der Stasi”.

GoMoPa – Stasi – KGB – Toxdat – Ehrenfried Stelzer – Resch – Alles Dr. Mabuse Oder Was ?

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GoMoPa – Financal “Intelligence Service” oder was ? Resch in Moskau 1989 oder was ? Stelzer Autor von “Toxdat” oder was ?

Continue reading “GoMoPa – Stasi – KGB – Toxdat – Ehrenfried Stelzer – Resch – Alles Dr. Mabuse Oder Was ?”

Beware Of The Fake Stasi Lists Of The Neo-Stasi – Visit Berndpulch.org

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THE CIA’s “WHO IS WHO OF THE EAST GERMAN DDR OFFICIALS DIRECTORY & INDEX” – ROSENHOLZ LIGHT

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Continue reading “THE CIA’s “WHO IS WHO OF THE EAST GERMAN DDR OFFICIALS DIRECTORY & INDEX” – ROSENHOLZ LIGHT”

TOP SECRET – THE CIA’s “WHO IS WHO OF THE EAST GERMAN DDR OFFICIALS DIRECTORY & INDEX”

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DDR Leaders in Berlin, October 7th 1989 at the 40 years birthday of the DDR

Continue reading “TOP SECRET – THE CIA’s “WHO IS WHO OF THE EAST GERMAN DDR OFFICIALS DIRECTORY & INDEX””

MUTMASSLICHER GOMOPA-DRAHTZIEHER DR JOCHEN RESCH AUF DER WARNLISTE VON STIFTUNG WARENTEST

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https://www.test.de/Anlegeranwalt-Etwas-zu-vielseitig-5662824-0/

ALLES DR MABUSE ODER WAS ?

Gomopa-Stasi-Opfer: “Darum Ist Jochen Resch Der Erfundene “GoMoPa”-Goldman & Manfred Resch Der Erfundene “Morgenstern”

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Hallo Herr Pulch,

KGB-Spion Jochen Resch war 1989 monatelang in Moskau, einerseits aus Angst andererseits, um seine neue Rolle vorzubereiten. Dann hat er mit Stasi-Oberst Ehrenfried Stelzer die deutsch-russische Gesellschaft gegründet und parallel dazu Gomopa den Financial Intelligence Service, Intelligence steht für Geheimdienst wie Insider genauestens bestätigen können. Anschließend wurde Stelzer Reschs Strohmann bei der DIA und Maurischat Reschs Strohmann bei Gomopa.

Der Luca-Brasi-Brutalo der Gomopa hat keinerlei Bildung, ist wie “eine Flasche leer”, kann kein Englisch und keine Orthographie und ist leicht lenkbar für seinen Führungsoffizier Resch.

Continue reading “Gomopa-Stasi-Opfer: “Darum Ist Jochen Resch Der Erfundene “GoMoPa”-Goldman & Manfred Resch Der Erfundene “Morgenstern””

NOTES BY WILHELM PIECK ON THE DISCUSSION WITH STALIN

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Final Discussion on 7 April 1952–11:20 p.m. in Moscow

St[alin]: up to now all proposals rejected
Situation:
no compromises
Creation of a European Army–not against the SU [Soviet Union] but rather about power in Europe

Atlantic Treaty–independent state in the West
Demarcation line dangerous borders
1st Line Germans (Stasi), behind [it] Soviet soldiers
We must consider terrorist acts.

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Der Unheimliche Einfluss Von Ex-Stasi-Leuten

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Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, kurz: Stasi, war in der DDR die zentrale Institution zur Überwachung der Bevölkerung. Die Mitarbeiter der Stasi wurden gefürchtet – vor allem deshalb, weil sie meistens im Geheimen operierten. Heute ist das alles Geschichte. Wirklich? Wir zeigen, welchen Einfluss ehemalige Stasi-Leute teilweise immer noch haben … Die Gedenkstätte Berlin Hohenschönhausen – https://www.stiftung-hsh.de Das Stasimuseum in Berlin – https://www.stasimuseum.de Vereine, in denen frühere Stasimitarbeiter tätig sind: https://www.okv-ev.de https://www.isor-sozialverein.de/cms/… https://www.mfs-insider.de

CC BCP POLITBURO RESOLUTION “B” PROTOCOL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND STASI

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Quellbild anzeigen

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
The CC BCP Politburo approves the protocol for cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi), agreed upon at a September meeting in Berlin.

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ABOUT THE LAST OPERATION/ OPERATIONAL MISSION OF COMRADE [REDACTED]

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Schah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi | corona

About the last operation/ operational mission of comrade [redacted]

Between 1979 and 1981 comrade [redacted] was stationed as a resident in Teheran.

In 1981 the Soviet- Iranian relations heated up (Mass persecutions, arrests and executions of operatives of the Tudeh- Party; temporary occupation of the UdSSR- Embassy by the revolutionary- guards, mysterious disappearance (probably treason) of the soviet counselor [redacted]).

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GDR-IRAN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS

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1979 hatte der Iran einen blutigen Machtwechsel erlebt. Die Islamische  Revolution zwang Schah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

1. GDR-Iran Exchange of Opinions

On February 12, 1981, a government delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran was staying in the GDR under the leadership of the Minister of Education, Dr. Mohammed Javad Bahonar. He indicated to Comrade Oskar Fischer that his goal was find out the GDR’s position toward Iran’s Islamic revolution, the Iraqi invasion of Iran, and the preparedness of the GDR for further cooperation between the two countries.

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INFORMATION [ABOUT] ACTIVITIES OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY IRANIAN FORCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE AMERICAN AND WEST GERMAN SECRET SERVICE

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Mohammad Reza Pahlavi - DER SPIEGEL

Main Department XX
Strictly Secret

Berlin, 7.7.1981
8 copies

Information

[about]

Activities of counterrevolutionary Iranian forces in connection with the American and West German secret service

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ON THE REPORT FROM INFORMAL COLLABORATOR (IC) “REZA” FROM 26.7.78

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DOCUMENT SUMMARY
Report from informal collaborator on personal conflicts among Tudeh Party leaders in Leipzig.

CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
People’s Party of Iran (Tudeh)
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
East Germany
Iran

Continue reading “ON THE REPORT FROM INFORMAL COLLABORATOR (IC) “REZA” FROM 26.7.78″

STASI REPORT ON WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT’S ATTITUDE TO RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY

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CITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD

Ministry of state security
Berlin, 23 September 1970

No. 993/70

According to a reliable source, the attitude of the Federal Government towards the afore-mentioned stations was described by leading SPD officials at the beginning of September 1970 as follows:

The attacks by the Soviet Union, the GDR and some other socialist countries against the activities of the stations are harsh, and they could call into question the Olympic Games. The Federal Government is aware from various, not just official, sources that some of the socialist countries are relatively serious in their threat to boycott the Olympic Games in Munich if the stations do not terminate their activities.

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STASI REPORT ON MEETINGS WITH THE KGB, 30 NOVEMBER-1 DECEMBER 1964

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Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson’s recent election in the United States, Khrushchev’s ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.

CREATORS
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

MIELKE, ERICH

SEMICHASTNY, V.

WOLF, MARKUS

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Nuclear weapons–China
European Economic Community
National liberation movements–Africa
Germany (East). Ministry for State Security (Stasi)
Soviet Union. Committee for State Security (KGB)

Continue reading “STASI REPORT ON MEETINGS WITH THE KGB, 30 NOVEMBER-1 DECEMBER 1964”

‘BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE INVESTIGATION RESULTS ACHIEVED IN 1961 IN WORK ON CRIMES OF ESPIONAGE’

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Assessment by the Stasi of the espionage of the main Western secret services in East Germany based on its investigation of cases of spying in 1961.

CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Berlin (Germany)–International status
Espionage, American
Berlin Crisis, 1961
Espionage, French
Espionage, German

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EAST GERMAN MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY, ‘NEW METHODS OF OPERATION OF WESTERN SECRET SERVICES

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Assessment by the Stasi of changes to operations made by the main Western secret services in response to Khrushchev’s November 1958 diplomatic note to the United States, Britain, and France demanding an end to the occupation of West Berlin.

CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Berlin (Germany)–International status
Espionage, American
Berlin Crisis, 1961
Espionage, French
Espionage, German

Main Department IX/1

New methods of operation of Western secret services

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Die Miesen Tricks Der Stasi-Agenten – Die Romeo-Falle

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Während des kalten Krieges versuchte das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit über viele Wege an geheime Informationen und Dokumente zu gelangen. Ein Mittel waren sogenannte “Romeo-Agenten”. Diese Männer wurden von der Stasi, teilweise bereits während des Studiums, angeworben und hatten es auf die Büroleiterinnen von Ministerien und Botschaften in Westdeutschland abgesehen. Sie verführten die jungen Frauen und nutzten deren Vertrauen gnadenlos aus. Mit welchen Tricks die Stasi noch gearbeitet hat, erfahrt Ihr in der Doku “Die Krake – Die Geschichte der Stasi”: https://www.zdf.de/dokumentation/zdf-…

Die Karriere Des STASI-Agenten Hans Wax – Lizenz Zum Toeten

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Hans Wax ist der Name eines Stasi-Agenten, dessen vermeintliche Heldentaten im Dienste des Sozialismus Drehbuchschreiber jenseits des Eisernen Vorhangs inspirierten. Von Erich Mielke hatte er eine Lizenz zum Töten, Kidnappen und Bomben legen.

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GoMoPa-Scheisshausfliegen Von der Krise Gebeutelt Im Letzten Kampf-Einsatz Aus Dem Stasi-Bunker

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Die Oberscheisshausfliege Klaus-Dieter Maurischat oder wie auch immer der Kinderfreund, Gestaltenwanderer und Zeitreisende heissen mag. Ein ganz schräger Fürst.

Offensicht setzt die Corona-Krise den GoMoPa-Scheisshausfliegen, laut Eigenbezeichnung, und deren IM besonders zu, anders sind die letzten verzweifelten Kampfeinsaetze der Ostberliner Erich Mielke-Epigonen nicht zu erklaeren.

Immer weniger Opfer fallen auf die alten Stasi-Tricks herein, dies zeigen auch die Rekord-Verleumdungen, Morddrohungen und dubiosen Meeting-Einladungen an mich in den letzten Wochen und Tagen.

Zuvor musste ja schon der mutmassliche Pate RA Resch vom noblen Kranzlereck an den Reuterplatz umziehen und seine Mannschaft drastisch reduzieren.

Auch die toedlichen Attentate durch Putins Schergen schaden den alten Stasi-Kaempen der GoMoPa nun zunehmend, da immer mehr Menschen die Zusammenhaenge erkennen.

Hier noch einmal die Highlights aus der Feder der Scheisshausfliegen:

https://berndpulch.org/bernd-pulch-der-beweis-%E2%80%93-so-wollte-der-serienbetruger-klaus-maurischat-uns-zwingen-die-berichterstattung-uber-den-%E2%80%9Cnachrichtendienst%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%9Cgomopa%E2%80%9D-einzustellen/
https://berndpulch.org/2011/02/24/weitere-erpressung-des-vorbestraften-serienbetrugers-klaus-maurischat-gomopa/

Mutmasslich Tödliche Falle der STASI-GoMoPa für Mich

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Kriminalität in der DDR: Geheimsache Mord: Wie die Stasi Verbrechen  vertuschte - Seite 0 - Reportageseite - Tagesspiegel

Sehr geehrter Herr Bernd Pulch,

die krimin. Enteignung durch SED/Stasi meines Eigentums mit Betrug, Filegrundstück in Weißig, hat das Landgericht Dresden mich parteriloser Arbeiter Rehabilitiert,Beschluss BSRH 128/11 v. 30.7.12 mit Haftbefehlaufhebung RS II 113/86 wegen Rechtsstaatswidrigkeit.

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Must See Movie – Die Wahrheit Über Die Stasi – Der Ganze Film!

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Die DDR im damals utopisch fiktiven Jahr 2008 – ein Jahr vor dem 60. Geburtstag der Republik – als ewig währender, realsozialistischer Kostümball. Staatssicherheit und Opposition in symbiotischem Tanz engumschlungen. Die untergehende DDR als fröhliches Geländespiel mit Musik.

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Exklusiv: RA Resch Ist Partner Des Ibiza Video – Machers Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai

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Coup Teil 86: Wie man Parteien unterwandert | Ceiberweiber

Senior-Partner Dr. Jochen Resch links & rechts Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai, Junior-Partner 

  • Quelle: Facebook Account von Dr. Resch

Was die Herrschaften gerade zu besprechen haben, dürfte viele interessieren…

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Milliarden-Korruption – Mord Am Treuhandchef Rohwedder & Die Toten Vom Töpferhof

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Am 1. April 1991, wurde Dr. Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, der Chef der Treuhand, in seinem Haus in Oberkassel ermordet. Seine Frau wurde durch einen weiteren Schuß schwer verletzt. Bis heute sind die Täter nicht gefunden, Hintermänner nicht genannt, der Mord ungesühnt.

Eine Fernsehdokumentation hat die Hintergründe dieses Terrormordes neu aufgerollt und unbequeme Fragen gestellt. In dem WDR-Feature: Wer erschoß den Treuhandchef? Neue Spuren im Mordfall Rohwedder verfolgen die beiden Autoren Werner Czaschke und Clemens Schmidt die These, daß Stasi-Seilschaften, die Vermögen in Milliardenhöhe in die eigene Tasche verschieben wollten und deren Machenschaften Rohwedder auf der Spur war, ein Motiv hatten, den Treuhandchef zu ermorden.

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Stichhaltige Hinweise Auf Kontakte Von Ex-Stasi-Leuten Zur Kriminalität

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Von Alexander Fröhlich: Brandenburgs Makler mit Stasi-Makel ...

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Sachsens Geheimdienst hat Hinweise auf Verbindungen früherer Stasi-Leute zur Organisierten Kriminalität (OK) gehabt. Das gab die Hauptzeugin im Untersuchungsausschuss des Landtages zum sogenannten „Sachsensumpf“ zu Protokoll.

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“The Killer Bible” Toxdat – The 900 Page Murder Study By “GoMoPa” – Mastermind And Resch-Protege´ STASI Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer

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Here is an example of a substance that I don’t want to mention. .This substance fulfills to a large extent criteria for a poison suitable for the perfect murder. So, one cannot read that other than that a guide to the perfect murder with poison is given here. Here it is quite clearly expressed, but the whole book is filled with such information.
Information on the masking of provoked accidents can also be found in Toxdat: .Faking traffic accidents by triggering unconsciousness within seconds using a mini gas generator in ventilation shafts of cars.

Continue reading ““The Killer Bible” Toxdat – The 900 Page Murder Study By “GoMoPa” – Mastermind And Resch-Protege´ STASI Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer”

The Shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007 – Top Secret Document

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The Shootdown ofKorean Airlines Flight 007 – 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov describes Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.”

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Where Have All The Communist KGB and STASI Spies Gone ?

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Fallout 4 - RED SCARE - FULL QUEST Mod Playthrough - COMMUNIST SPY ...

A look back: On Normannenstrasse in East Berlin, in the core of a standard white collar class neighborhood, stands a gigantic office complex: 41 solid structures as inauspiciously utilitarian as the condo towers that encompass them. Nine months prior it was the base camp of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security – the Staatsicherheit – or Stasi, maybe the most modern and sweeping undercover work association at any point made. Be that as it may, among January and March this year, as East Germany’s Communist Government at long last crumbled, the Stasi was officially disbanded. Today, the solid fortress is abandoned, its 10,000 rooms fixed, its operators bolted out.

From these dreary structures, 34,000 officials ran the Stasi’s 39 divisions. The staff included 2,100 operators alloted nonstop to perusing mail passed on from post workplaces and territorial Stasi base camp, 5,000 specialists liable for following suspects, and 6,000 agents whose solitary employment was tuning in to private phone discussions.

Primary Department VIII, otherwise called Observation, kept a nearby watch on residents through a broad system of sources in neighborhoods, schools, libraries and even service stations. Principle Department II – Counterintelligence – did electronic reconnaissance of outside ambassadors, specialists and writers and put spies in their workplaces, homes and lodgings. The Stasi even had a division to keep an eye on other Stasi individuals and sources.

”We are as yet getting stuns from what we discover,” says the movie producer Klaus Wendler, a representative for an East German Government advisory group that is currently filtering through the Stasi’s 5,000,000 documents. ”Performers had to keep an eye on individual artists, understudies were pressured into keeping an eye on companions, and youngsters were tricked into keeping an eye on their folks.”

With the disbanding of the Stasi, 85,000 full-time officials lost their positions essentially for the time being. Close to 10,000 have since discovered productive business, a large portion of them in different Government services, remembering 2,000 for the Ministry of the Interior, which some time ago administered the Stasi. The rest have joined the developing positions of East Germany’s jobless; some make due with standard joblessness benefits, while others get no Government remuneration by any stretch of the imagination. Many are upset at ending up barred, even alienated, by their kindred residents.

Abroad, the greater part of the Stasi’s 2,500 profession officials in consulates and missions no longer have a covert operative central command to answer to, and its untold a large number of independent covert government agents no longer get cash from their previous experts. West German insight officials gauge that there are exactly 5,000 agents in West Germany today, 500 of them ”top operators.” Eighty of those are thought to have entered the most elevated echelons of the military and Government, West German authorities state, including knowledge offices.

In spite of emotional political changes in Europe, West German insight authorities dread that not every one of these covert agents have changed their loyalties. Exceptionally restrained and still covert, some are as yet gathering and transferring data to Soviet knowledge organs, the West Germans accept. Others, they think, are essentially sticking around for their chance, holding back to be enacted.

Communist Spy Illustrations, Royalty-Free Vector Graphics & Clip ...

The Stasi has for some time been perceived as one of the best insight benefits on the planet, in a similar alliance as those of Israel and France. By the by, in the course of the most recent seven months, West German and American knowledge authorities have been astounded to find the size of its outside tasks, arranged until his retirement three years prior by the scandalous Markus Wolf. Until 1979, Western knowledge operators didn’t have a present photo of ”the man without a face.” But as of late he has ventured out from the shadows. Today, a smash hit creator, Wolf talks uninhibitedly of his effective infiltration of the West German insight and military over a time of over 30 years. What he doesn’t talk about is psychological oppression.

Over the most recent two months, frightening disclosures have become visible specifying the Stasi’s connects to an assortment of fear based oppressor gatherings, quite the extreme left Red Army Faction, eight of whose individuals were captured in June. With the assistance of the Stasi, they had been given new personalities and occupations in East Germany in the wake of doing psychological militant activities in the 1970’s and 80’s. The Stasi has additionally been ensnared in the Libyan-coordinated bombarding of the La Belle disco in West Germany in 1986: According to new data from witnesses and held onto documents, Stasi operators helped transport the explosives to West Berlin that brought about the passings of two American fighters.

In East Germany, as well, the Stasi, albeit formally nonexistent, stays a danger. In late June, new divulgences uncovered that in 1986, as the Soviet Union started changing its general public and the East German economy kept on decaying, the Stasi, predicting turmoil – however not the finish of the divider – set in excess of 2,000 individuals from a world class mystery team into the most significant levels of East German Government divisions, organizations and colleges. Another 500 government agents were dispatched to West Germany. East German authorities state that a large portion of them are still set up, their characters obscure, and suspect that they are compelled to hold up out any political disturbance.

Insight authorities are in a race to carry the most exceedingly terrible guilty parties to equity before they go for all time underground or sign up with new bosses. The pursuit is suggestive, says one American ambassador in Berlin, of a period in the no so distant past: ”Ferreting out the government operatives, psychological oppressors and Stasi operators is comparable to the quest for the Nazis and their teammates after they endeavored to vanish into German culture toward the finish of the war.”

On Friday morning, only 48 hours from money related unification on July 1, East Berlin is bursting at the seams with energy. Global camera teams and columnists have attacked the city to catch the beginning of another time. Be that as it may, in his office, just strides from the Volkskammer, or Parliament, Peter-Michael Diestel, East Germany’s 38-year-old Interior Minister, ponders the insult inheritance of the past. ”My crucial,” says just, ”is to destroy the Stasi.”

That assignment has tumbled to an impossible competitor: a previous dairy animals draining victor, weight lifter (he can seat press 420 pounds) and infrequent legal counselor who accepted the position of Interior Minister to a great extent in light of the fact that nobody else needed it.

Diestel, a local of Leipzig, has been occupied since getting to work in April. He has enrolled the collaboration of huge quantities of previous Stasi officials and, utilizing data from witnesses and Stasi records, has attempted to acquire ”independent” agents, either by extending to them employment opportunities or persuading them that the Stasi is done. He has gone along key data on fear mongers and sources to West German knowledge offices, and helped organize the capture in June of the Red Army Faction psychological oppressors. At last, Diestel built up the Stasi’s complicity in the La Belle disco bombarding.

Diestel is exploring a forlorn course, subject to furious assaults from both the left and right in East Germany, extraordinary weight from West German authorities, and week after week requires his acquiescence by the German Social Union, a traditionalist gathering in East Germany’s overseeing alliance. Due to day by day dangers against his life, the police monitor his significant other and three little youngsters nonstop. Says Peter Pragal, East Berlin reporter for the week by week magazine Stern: ”He has the hardest activity in Germany, East or West.”

Other than its full-time officials, selected from the best and most brilliant in East German culture, the Stasi had 150,000 dynamic sources and 500,000 to 2 million low maintenance witnesses in East Germany. Its land property alone – including the huge fortresslike complex in East Berlin and Stasi’s in excess of 2,000 structures, homes, dugouts, havens, medical clinics, and resorts all through East Germany – have been esteemed in the billions of dollars. Up until this point, Government agents attempting to take stock of the Stasi have counted 23,000 vehicles and trucks and 250,000 weapons, including submachine firearms, guns, rifles and explosive launchers.

The productive Stasi machine accumulated broad dossiers on in excess of 5 million East Germans – 33% of the populace – that included data as close as sexual propensities and as everyday as books settled up with the library. A great many calls were recorded; condos were pester and unlawfully looked (the Stasi would orchestrate to have suspects kept late at their employments). One protester as of late found that a small scale listening gadget fit for transmitting three miles had been sewn into his jacket neckline.

Residents were powerless against the Stasi’s Orwellian interruption whenever and anyplace – in their condos, industrial facilities, houses of worship, cafés, libraries, specialists’ workplaces, rooms, even on their excursions abroad. In some East German urban communities, each bit of mail was opened in exceptional steam rooms joined to the post workplaces.

At the point when East German soccer groups ventured out to play coordinates in West Germany, Stasi specialists obliged busloads of fans, checking whether any East German sat close to a West German, showed a West German banner or sang the West German national song of praise.

Igor Gouzenko, The Soviet Defector Who Started the Cold War

Up and down the a large number of miles of East German expressway, Stasi specialists acted like corner store chaperons, servers and travelers, cautiously taking note of whether East Germans left their vehicles close to Western vehicles or conveyed dubiously overwhelming baggage.

The Stasi made it basically incomprehensible for East Germans not to work together. Each field operator needed to convey in any event 25 new sources or start 25 examinations consistently. Residents who declined to help were either set apart as subversives or left to adapt to the administration independent. ”You were unable to go anyplace in East German culture except if you could pull the correct strings,” says Hasso Von Samson, a spokesman for West Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution. ”But I guess that’s what happens when they take away your enemy.”

This article reflects the situation in Germany in 1990.

Since then the top spies are still in touch with each other and form a dangerous network which is similiar to the Cosa Nostra in the USA and/or Sicily, the Yakuza in Japan, the Russian Mafia and the Chinese Triads.

The only distinction: The German STASI has learned the code of Omerta and operates in the dark – within the government, the Gauck administration, the Bundestag, the left party, the legal system as judges, attorney and prosecutors, the police and also in the German security and intelligence services.

And last not but least as undercover agents and informer for former KGB spy Wladimir Putin, now Russia’s ruler like former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, former STASI agent Matthias Warnig and the Gazprom and North Stream – Energy connection.

It is a taboo until now.

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STASI/KGB Intelligence Cooperation Under Project RYaN Exposed – TOP SECRET

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Ehemaliger BND-Chef kann geplante Ablösung Honeckers 1987 nicht ...

Between 1981 and 1989 the foreign intelligence branches of the Soviet KGB and the East German Ministry of State Security launched a combined effort to develop a system for detecting signs of an impending western nuclear first strike. Codenamed “Project RYaN”, this early-warning system constituted one part of the Soviet response to the perceived threat of a surprise “decapitation” strike by NATO nuclear forces.

233 pages of documents from the Stasi’s Hauptverwaltung A and analysis by Bernd Schaefer, Nate Jones, and Benjamin Fischer below give unprecedented insight into the capabilities and fears of the Eastern Bloc intelligence services from the Able Archer ’83 War Scare to the end of the Cold War.

Introduction to the Collection

by Bernd Schaefer

In November 2012 CWIHP published e-Dossier No. 37 on the cooperation between the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS or Stasi), which highlighted a wide array of German documents dating from the 1960s through 1989. These materials were introduced by Walter Süss and Douglas Selvage, historians in the research division of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU) in Berlin.[1] While e-Dossier No.37 featured just one document[2] on Soviet/East German preparations to detect a surprise Western “nuclear missile attack” (RYAN or Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie/Ракетно ядерное нападение in Russian) from August 1984, the BStU research division added a substantial number of German Stasi documents on RYAN to its online collection in 2013.[3] These new materials are remarkable and add to our understanding of the intentions, scope, and duration of the Soviet RYAN project; all of them are available in translation today in the CWHIP Digital Archive. The follow e-Dossier includes detailed comments and analysis on their significance by Nate Jones, a nuclear expert at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C., and Benjamin Fischer, a retired CIA officer and veteran researcher of RYAN and the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” of November 1983.

The August 1984 record of bilateral Stasi-KGB conversations, written by East German foreign intelligence spy chief Markus Wolf, includes an apt summarization of RYAN’s purpose by the Soviet representative: “The need for such approaches derives from the fact that a multitude of measures undertaken by the adversary do not allow advance determination which variation to launch a war the adversary will choose. In addition, we need to integrate experiences from analyzing the enemy’s crisis management into a process of further perfecting the definition of indicators to detect the adversary’s main measures for its acute war preparation.”[4]

It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war

It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war. The KGB operated an intelligence network to monitor worldwide “indicators” to detect to assess the likelihood of a “surprise nuclear missile attacked” launched by NATO. Soviet assessments of the likelihood of such an attack differed over the years, peaking between 1982 and 1984.

KGB/Stasi Cooperation | Wilson Center

Whether such fears were warranted given the actual activities of the United States and NATO is disputed. Historians and analysts have differed in their assessments of partially declassified American sources, archival materials from Eastern European and Soviet archives, post-1990 oral histories from Russia, and memories of former actors, such as prominent KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky. Some consider the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” or “War Scare” of November 1983 to be the most dangerous event of the Cold War next to the Cuban Missile Crisis, while others view it in a much less dramatic fashion.[5]

The bulk of newly available Stasi and KGB documentation on RYAN from the BStU Archives in Berlin does not address Able Archer 83. However, it casts an unprecedented light on Stasi and KGB perspectives since 1984, as well as on the operational details, structure, and scope of the RYAN project. The collection includes a KGB catalogue from 1984/85 that, in excruciating detail, outlines the 292 indicators that might precede a potential “surprise nuclear missile attack.” Many of them refer to activities in and around Washington offices and buildings, including the White House parking lot. The collection also includes summaries of monthly KGB reports up to April 1989, which list possible global indicators of preparations for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” These records tell us that hundreds of KGB officers were assigned to work on the RYAN program and a special division was created inside the KGB exclusively for this purpose. Combined with earlier published Stasi documents on the Soviet shoot down of KAL 007 in September 1983 (in which Soviet intelligence’s inability to determine whether the airliner was military or civilian before it was shot down was identified as a serious problem[6]), these new RYAN materials provide ample evidence of comprehensive Soviet efforts to avoid and thwart a “surprise attack.”

While hindsight shows that Soviet fears were exaggerated, the level of Soviet and East German anxiety over Western intentions, particularly during the first Reagan administration, is noteworthy. On the other hand, many Stasi documents on RYAN read like overbearing bureaucratic exercises, aimed at comprehensiveness and perfection on paper, but unattainable in practice. Phrasing in some of the Stasi materials implies that there probably was some skepticism in higher Stasi echelons about the program’s effectiveness and the Soviet approach (though it did not deter the Stasi from contributing more substantive efforts than any other fraternal socialist intelligence service towards identifying indicators).

Still, it does not seem far-fetched that Soviet anxieties were enhanced by the ensuing and ever expanding RYAN program and fed into Moscow’s shift towards disarmament policies under Mikhail Gorbachev. Strangely enough, the KGB’s RYAN project had acquired such a life of its own that its operational routines continued all the way through the first half of 1989, regardless of changes in Soviet-American relations and disarmament efforts during the second Reagan and the early Bush I administration.

Was RYaN simply a “ vicious cycle of intelligence collection and assessment” as described by Oleg Gordievsky? While Gordievsky’s word choice is debatable, these new documents put a certain amount of Soviet “circular reasoning” on full display.


The Vicious Circle of Intelligence

by Nate Jones

Oleg Gordievsky, the spy who revealed the existence of Operation RYaN –RYaN (РЯН) is the Russian acronym for Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie (Ракетно ядерное нападение), or “nuclear missile attack”– described it as “a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment.” During the last decade of the Cold War, Soviet intelligence operatives abroad were “required to report alarming information” to Moscow about a Western surprise nuclear strike, “even if they themselves were skeptical of it.” After the Moscow Center received these inflated and incorrect –but requested– reports of Western preparations for a surprise nuclear strike, it became “duly alarmed by what they reported and demanded more.” Now, documents newly released by the Cold War International History Project and the Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic (BStU), provide unprecedented insight into the “vicious circle of intelligence” of Operation RYaN. And, in a development never envisaged by the documents’ authors, they now present historians with comprehensive, real-time monthly RYaN reports from Soviet intelligence operatives abroad as they witnessed and catalogued the Cold War’s end.[7]

In 1979 the Institute for Intelligence Problems, coordinated by the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, was tasked to work on “the development of new intelligence concepts” that could provide preliminary warning of Western preparations for a first strike. The result of this work was the creation of Operation RYaN, which was secretly announced in May of 1981.[8] At a major KGB conference in Moscow, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov, then Chairman of the KGB, justified the creation of Operation RYaN because, they claimed, the United States was “actively preparing for nuclear war” against the Soviet Union and its allies. According to a newly released Stasi report, the primary “Chekist work” discussed in the May 1981 meeting was the “demand to allow for ‘no surprise.’”[9]

The establishment of Operation RYaN has also been corroborated by KGB annual reports from 1981 and 1982, previously published by the National Security Archive. The 1981 annual report states that the KGB had “implemented measures to strengthen intelligence work in order to prevent a possible sudden outbreak of war by the enemy.” To do this, the KGB “actively obtained information on military and strategic issues, and the aggressive military and political plans of imperialism [the United States] and its accomplices,” and “enhanced the relevance and effectiveness of its active intelligence abilities.”[10]

The 1982 annual report confirmed Soviet fears of Western encirclement, and noted the challenges of countering the “U.S. and NATO aspirations to change the existing military-strategic balance.” Therefore, “[p]rimary attention was paid to military and strategic issues related to the danger of the enemy’s thermonuclear attack.” This Soviet unease was spurred by the pending November 1983 deployment of Pershing II and Gryphon Cruise missiles, whose short flight times and long range changed the nuclear balance by threatening Soviet nuclear command and control with decapitation.[11]

The first comprehensive account of the details of Operation RYaN remains a Top Secret February 1983 telegram from KGB Headquarters Moscow to the London KGB Residency entitled “Permanent operational assignment to uncover NATO preparations for a nuclear missile attack on the USSR,” with enclosed instructions on how to report on indicators pointing toward a nuclear sneak attack. This document was published in full in 1991 by Soviet double agent Oleg Gordievsky and British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew in Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985.

Above: M113 armored personnel carriers move through the town of Stockhausen (Herbstein) during REFORGER ’83 in Germany.

“The objective of the assignment is to see that the Residency works systematically to uncover any plans in preparation by the main adversary [USA] for RYaN and to organize continual watch to be kept for indications of a decision being taken to use nuclear weapons against the USSR or immediate preparations being made for a nuclear missile attack.”

Attached to the telegram was a list of seven “immediate” and thirteen “prospective” tasks for the agents to complete and report. These included: the collection of data on potential places of evacuation and shelter, an appraisal of the level of blood held in blood banks, observation of places where nuclear decisions were made and where nuclear weapons were stored, observation of key nuclear decision makers, observation of lines of communication, reconnaissance of the heads of churches and banks, and surveillance of security services and military installations.

Regrettably, however, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions included a facsimile reproduction of only the first page of this document. The additional pages were translated and typeset into English with no Russian corroboration of their authenticity. Nevertheless, the KGB annual reports, as well as documents from other former Eastern Bloc (Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian) archives, and now these Stasi documents, help to substantiate Gordievsky’s accounts.[12]

The newly released Stasi documents on RYaN show that East German Intelligence did not begin conducting RYaN collection activities until years after the Soviets began. A January 1983 “brief note” describes initial Stasi preparations for creation of systematic RYaN intelligence collection and reporting, but acknowledges “[f]urther questions had to be straightened out.” [13] At the February 9th high-level meeting in Moscow, Stasi head Erich Mielke told KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov that, “consultations have to be continued.” Chebrikov replied, “The work is definitely not finalized.”[14] In August of 1984, the Soviet and East German intelligence agencies were still discussing how, exactly, “to approach conceptual, organizational, and practical aspects when dealing with the RYaN problem.”[15]

In fact, German collection and analysis of RYaN information did not begin in earnest until early 1985, according to the February 15, 1985, Order Number 1/85 which directed that “all options” be utilized to detect Western “military aggression, particularly a surprise nuclear missile attack” by observing non-socialist states and West Berlin in a “systematic and targeted manner.”[16] While systematic Stasi RYaN collection and analysis did not commence until well after the end of what has become known as the “1983 War Scare,” these newly released documents do contain insights about the danger of the era, which will be discussed below.

Above: Order Number 1/85

The documents also provide unprecedented operational details about RYaN, including its size, the importance of East German intelligence to the Soviets, the use of computers for RYaN collection, and the 292 indicators that some Eastern Bloc intelligence experts believed could be used to detect a nuclear attack.

For the first time, historians have access to hard numbers about the size of Operation RYaN, revealing that within the KGB, 300 positions were created so that RYaN operatives could implement the real-time “transmission and evaluation” of reported indicators showing the likelihood of a Western first strike. In July of 1984, KGB chairman Victor Chebrikov created a new division within the First Department (Information) of the KGB’s First Main Directorate (responsible for foreign intelligence and operations) to implement Operation RYaN throughout the KGB and world. This coordinating division was composed of 50 KGB officers.[17]

The documents further acknowledge that the Stasi was the KGB’s primary source of foreign intelligence. In July 1981, Andropov thanked Stasi head Erich Mielke for providing information on “West German tank production, defense technology, and the NATO manual [as of now the contents of this manual is unknown].” Andropov then complemented the Stasi, lauding, “We rate your information very highly,” and forebodingly requested Stasi sources procure “an assessment of the NATO manual and NATO’s preparations for war.”[18] In September 1983, Deputy Chairman of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov told Stasi head Erich Mielke that although Andropov was officially on vacation in the Southern USSR, it was “no actual vacation… For half the day he is reading information, including ours [KGB] and what we received from you.” In December 1986, KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov wrote Stasi head Erich Mielke to thank him for the “tangible results in this extremely important area [Operation RYaN].” He emphasized that the KGB “highly value[d] the contribution of the MfS of the GDR to the joint efforts on timely recognition of the danger of a sudden attack.”[19]

There are also references to the primitive computer system that the Soviet Union was attempting to use to track and calculate the coalition of world forces, including the risk of nuclear war. The KGB reported to the Stasi that it had “revised its planning for scientific-technological research and industrial procurement” of new “reliably working technology.” Gordievsky had earlier reported of “a large computer model in the Min[istry] of Defense to calculate and monitor the correlation of forces, including mili[tary], economy, [and] psychological factors, to assign numbers and relative weights.”[20] On November 23, 1983, US Defense and Intelligence officials circulated an article entitled, “In pursuit of the Essence of War” that described a Soviet method which “cataloged and computerized” the world’s “correlation of forces.” The results, it claimed, were “highly objective, empirically provable and readily adaptable to modern data processing.”[21] The newly released documents show that the East Germans were skeptical of Soviet computing prowess, however: past “Soviet experiences show us that a danger exists of computer application concepts not getting implemented,” snidely wrote Marcus Wolf.[22]

Computer analysis was desired because the amount of information captured during Operation RYaN was massive. The newly released Stasi documents provide far more detail than Gordievsky’s account of the precise indicators that human intelligence collectors were compiling and analyzing (such as: activity at Defense instillations, the location of prominent political officials, and even the treatment of “the most important government documents at the US National Archives”). In October 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Kryuchkov revealed that the First Directorate’s Institute for Intelligence Problems[23] had compiled seven binders full of possible RYaN indicators.[24] By May of 1986, these binders had evolved into a catalogue of 292 indicators of “signs of tension.”[25] The Stasi reported that 226 indicators (77 percent) were able to be “covered, though to varying degree.” The indicators were organized into five main categories: Political, Military, Intelligence Services, Civil Defense Agencies, and the Economic sector. A read through the newly released full catalogue of RYaN indicators (as opposed to the truncated list published by Gordievsky) makes the program appear more rational and effective than has previously been portrayed.[26] Just one telling example is the fact that RYaN watchers had sniffed out the US Continuity of Government program, discovering and surveilling “two presidential planes… equipped with accelerated speed [and] electronic apparatuses which work under conditions of nuclear weapons use.”[27] These planes were where the president and his emergency cabinet would command during a nuclear war.

RYaN watchers were also instructed to watch for the “preparation and conduct of large-scale exercises,” because they increased “the level of combat-readiness of US strategic forces,” and hence, could indicate intentions for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” When Gordievsky disclosed Operation RYaN he also revealed Able Archer 83, a November 1983 NATO command post nuclear release exercise that he claims Soviet intelligence may have miscalculated as an actual nuclear strike.[28]

The RYaN catalogue noted several indicators that would have occurred during Able Archer 83 (and other NATO exercises), including: the “large scale transfer of US armed forces” by C-5A and C-141 aircraft (16,000 troops were transferred from the US to Europe on radio silent flights during Autumn Forge 83, which included Able Archer 83); “preparation of anti-ABC [atomic-biological-chemical] protective gear” and mobilization (during Able Archer 83 the war gamers donned ABC equipment and transferred to an Alternate War Headquarters in response to simulated chemical attacks); and, perhaps most importantly, “significant changes in communications” including “transmittal of orders to deploy nuclear weapons” (on October 17-21 1983, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe school in Oberammergau, West Germany trained more than 50 NATO officers on new nuclear weapons release procedures which utilized a new format that was practiced for the first time during Able Archer 83).[29]

Another eyebrow-raising, though certainly not dispositive, reference to Able Archer 83 can be found in these documents. On November 7, the day Able Archer 83 began, an East German Major General (whose name is illegible) sent a summary of discussions between Stasi foreign intelligence chief Marcus Wolf and Deputy KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov to Major General Damm. Gordievsky has written that on November 8 or 9, he “was not sure which,” flash telegrams were sent to both KGB and GRU residencies in Western Europe reporting “an alert on US bases.” The flash telegrams “clearly implied that one of several possible explanations for the (non-existent) alert was that the countdown to a nuclear first strike had actually begun.”[30]

Perhaps relatedly, the East German documents also reveal a persistent undercurrent of skepticism and concern about the effectiveness of Operation RYaN. In August of 1984, Lev Shapkin, deputy director of the KGB for foreign intelligence, told Marcus Wolf that reforms to Operation RYaN were underway. Though no faulty reporting by Operation RYaN during Able Archer 83 was mentioned in the meeting, the two intelligence officials clearly were worried that false warnings of a Western nuclear first strike could lead to preemptive actions by Soviet nuclear forces. Shapkin told Wolf that the indicators agents were observing and reporting “must be complemented, revised, and made more precise,” and bemoaned “the problem of not getting deceived” by faulty indicators. He reiterated that “clear-headedness about the entire RYAN complex” was a “mandatory requirement.” Marcus Wolf included his concerns in an addendum to the summary of the meetings, stressing the need to know the “actual situation” rather than the picture presented by Operation RYaN’s indicators. “Constant and ongoing assessments,” he sensibly wrote, “have to be made whether certain developments actually constitute a crisis or not.”[31]

The documents contained in this release include one final invaluable resource for historians: monthly Soviet intelligence summaries (translated from Russian to German, and now, to English) spanning August 1986 to April 1989. The monthly summaries, serving a purpose likely never imagined by their drafters, allow us to see how Soviet intelligence witnessed and reported the peaceful ending of the Cold War. The reports, which mirror the above RYaN format, are thorough and include much reporting on the West still officially classified in the United States. This includes reports on the operational readiness of Pershing II, MX, and Trident missiles at specific bases, and US military activities in Nicaragua, Panama, and Iran/Iraq. They also include comprehensive reporting of NATO drills and maneuvers. The Soviet observers reported of Able Archer 87, for example, that NATO “simulated” the switch from peace to war time; nuclear consultations were practiced “in the context of the exercise.” Regrettably, no November 1983 RYaN report is yet available for historians to observe if the reporting on Able Archer 83 was as couched and nuanced as it was four years later.

The task of following CWIHP and the BStU’s lead and finding these earlier RYaN reports now falls to archivists and archival burrowers in other former Soviet states now liberalized.[32]

Finally, these monthly RYaN reports about the Cold War’s peaceful resolution reflect the strangeness of the nuclear superpower rivalry itself. The absurd logic of the Cold War becomes evident when one reads about the NATO “elimination of intermediate and tactical nuclear missiles” in a September 1987 report incongruently entitled, “On the Results of Intelligence Activities to Report Indicators for a Sudden Nuclear Missile Attack.”


Comments on the Soviet-East German Intelligence Alert

by Benjamin Fischer

A real contribution

The BStU documents contain important information about both the Soviet intelligence alert RYAN and its East German counterpart KWA (Kernwaffenangriff or nuclear-weapons attack) during the 1980s. On several accounts, we owe Douglas Selvege a debt of gratitude for locating and disseminating the new tranche. First, no Soviet records have become available since former KGB officer (and British agent) Oleg Gordievsky published a selection of RYAN cables almost a quarter of a century ago, and it is unlikely that Russia will declassify new sources. Most commentators, I myself the most culpable, were mesmerized by both the stark tone of both the cables and Gordievsky’s various accounts of the “war scare.” A more balanced interpretation is now possible. Second, the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) and especially its foreign intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung A (Main Directorate A, hereafter HV A), played a major role in the alert system documented here for the first time. For many years, the only information on the East German side was Markus Wolf’s memoir (1997), which some researchers considered a reliable and original source while others did not. Wolf, however, couched his brief account, referring only to RYAN, not KWA. He apparently expected that HV A records would never see the light of day. There was good reason to do so, since most files were destroyed on the eve of German unification.[33] Though skeptical about the purpose and priority of the Soviet intelligence alert, Wolf nevertheless saluted and obeyed KGB orders. The MfS/HV A organized an elaborate early-warning system (Früherkennung/Frühwarnsystem) that replicated and, to some degree, exceeded its Soviet counterpart.

How scary was the war scare?

Wolf occupied a much higher position than Gordievsky in the Warsaw Pact intelligence community. The spymaster was closer to the real center of power in Moscow, was a keen observer of both superpowers, and his agents in the West— especially inside NATO provided insights that countered the ideological stereotype of the “inherent aggressiveness” of the Western alliance. Moreover, his view may have been in line with the actual perceptions of his Soviet masters.

Yuri Andropov was the leading proponent of RYAN. He inaugurated the alert in 1981 as chairman of the KGB and presided over its expansion after succeeding Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary the next year. In May 1981, during a private conversation with Wolf’s boss, State Security Minister Erich Mielke, Andropov assessed the Reagan administration’s plans for accelerated modernization of strategic and theater-nuclear forces:

The US is preparing for war, but it is not willing to start a war. They are not building factories and palaces in order to destroy them. They are striving for military superiority in order to “check” us and then declare “checkmate” against us without starting a war. Maybe I am wrong.[34]

Andropov added that Washington had abandoned détente because it benefited the USSR at the expense of the US—in words that echoed Ronald Reagan’s condemnation of détente as a “one-way” street! Now the US was trying to recover its losses by reverting to the earlier policy of containment, in other words, to the old Cold War.

Two years later, facing the prospect of deployment of new US Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, Andropov addressed a meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee. The missiles were the “most serious challenge,” he said, and the military situation was “especially dangerous.” In the past, the US had counted on its nuclear weapons “to deter” and “to contain” the Soviet Union; now there was talk of actually fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war.[35] “It is difficult to say where the line between extortion and actual preparation to take a fateful step lies.”[36]

Andropov stopped short of declaring that war was imminent or unavoidable. In his public statements, however, he spoke as if the world was on the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Soviet propagandists compared Reagan to Hitler and the US to Nazi Germany on the eve of 1941. Less than a month after Andropov’s speech, the KGB dispatched a cable that sounded the alarm, asserting that RYAN “now lies at the core of [Soviet] military strategy;” the intelligence alert had become a military alert.[37]

Another “cut” at the question of leadership thinking on the prospect of war comes from a Politburo meeting in May 1983. Acknowledging that the US cruise and ballistic missiles would arrive on schedule, Andropov turned to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for an assessment of US intentions. Gromyko replied: “The United States, as is known, is talking about the fact that they can only strike in response to aggression. I think that without enough reason they wouldn’t dare to use nuclear missiles.” He added that, in any event, NATO’s pluralist structure would act as brake on the US: “Against the first strike are also Canada, England, France, and West Germany.”

The Alert Ramps Up

The Soviets were nervous but not to the point of shaking in their boots. RYAN did not, as Gordievsky claimed, begin to wind down in mid-1984, on the eve of his departure from London and after he had lost access to KGB cable traffic. It ramped up. KGB officer Lev Shapkin briefed the East Germans on a series of decisions made to expand RYAN and to create an infrastructure to support it.[38] The KGB formed a new division within the First (information/analysis) Department of the First Chief (foreign intelligence) Directorate (FCD). It was a situation center or watch office designed to collect and assess warning indicators and levy requirements on the FCD’s operations divisions and signals intelligence (Sigint) department.

The new division was a high priority and was almost certainly initiated by Andropov. The formation of a special RYAN commission chaired by KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov underscored the alert’s top-level political backing and its bureaucratic clout. Chebrikov earmarked 300 slots for the new RYAN division, 50 of which had been filled to monitor warning indications around the clock. However, the KGB had trouble finding qualified personnel and training officers to perform “warning-and-indications of war intelligence,” as it is referred to by US intelligence services. This is one of several signs that the Soviets, even in this late stage of the Cold War, had little or no experience with early-warning intelligence.

Warning and Surprise

RYAN was launched in May 1981 during an All-Union Conference of senior KGB managers from the length and breadth of the USSR. Andropov chaired it, but the presence of Leonid Brezhnev signified that the session was no routine gabfest. Gordievsky’s accounts give the impression that RYAN was the sole item on the agenda. It was not.

The East German documents show that the conference discussed a range of threats, referred to as “surprises,” emanating from within the USSR and the Eastern bloc, as well as from the international arena. The KGB chieftains were instructed to reorient their collection priorities toward early detection and advance warning of potential or impending crises that threatened the internal security and stability, as well as external security, of the Soviet empire. As KGB officer [full name unknown] Zinyov told the East Germans, the new operational directive was to “allow no surprises.” The mission of “Chekist work,” he added, now encompassed “the struggle against espionage and terror, questions of the economy, morale, the construction industry, etc.”[39]

Subsequently, FCD chief Vladimir Kryuchkov confided to Wolf that even foreign intelligence had been drawn into novel operations aimed at detecting threats to internal security originating from outside the USSR.[40] The MfS and HV A followed suit. “The bunker mentality of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] leadership revealed itself in the mantra-like repetition ‘impede every surprise from the enemy in every area.’”[41] This originally meant external military threats, i.e., the war scare, but then it expanded to include a range of dangers posed by domestic dissidence—religious, pacifist, and environmental groups, e.g.—allegedly supported by the West. The “most urgent” mission of the MfS, as well as the HV A, was to detect this conflation of internal and external “surprises” and to “prophylactically” deal with them before they grew to threaten the GDR regime.

Wolf’s repeated assertion that his service had nothing to do with the Stasi police-state was false. Like his counterpart Kryuchkov, Wolf followed orders. HV A case officers and their agents were tasked with collecting intelligence on internal threats emanating from abroad, even at the expense of conventional foreign intelligence inside the GDR and in the “Operations Area” (Stasi-deutsch for West Germany, West Berlin, and other NATO countries). The HV A began filing counterintelligence reports (Abwerberichte)—normally the provenance of the MfS internal security and surveillance departments—which contributed to increased repression in the GDR.[42]

KWA and the Frühwarnsystem

The MfS/HV A was the largest and most efficient Eastern bloc security/foreign intelligence service outside the Soviet Union. Its operational assets were considerable and in several respects exceeded those of the KGB, especially the massive MfS signals intelligence (Sigint) main directorate and the HV A’s extensive agent (Humint) networks that targeted West Germany/West Berlin and the US and NATO presence there.[43] Following the expansion of RYAN in mid-July, the KGB used the MfS/HV A to replicate its own organizational and operational model for early-warning intelligence.

This new collection includes one of the two key documents on KWA, Mielke’s Order Nr. 1/85, which mandated it as “the absolute priority” [emphasis in original] for the entire MfS.[44] The Order authorized Wolf, in his capacity as deputy MfS head, to formulate and implement an organizational plan and operational directives for the entire MfS. The second document[45] is not included in the collection, but several years ago I translated and commented on both documents.[46] The main components of the HV A’s early-warning system included:[47]

  • A “catalog” of warning indicators that was based on the RYAN template of five “political/societal areas” (US/NATO political and military leaderships, intelligence services, civil defense organizations, and economic institutions); it also included targets covered by MfS Sigint and HV A agent networks in West Germany/West Berlin, as well as US/NATO diplomatic, military, and intelligence sites in West Germany;[48]
  • A centralized situation center (Lagezentrum) to constantly monitor KWA indicators on a global basis;
  • A dedicated communications link to the KGB’s situation center;
  • Annual alert drills and military exercises for HV A officers that simulated conditions of a surprise attack;[49]
  • Emergency communications plans and safe houses in West Germany for agents selected to report on KWA;[50]
  • Coordination of operations and intelligence sharing with East German military intelligence on the Soviet model of KGB-GRU cooperation under RYAN guidelines.

A Catalog of Warning Indicators

The focal point of Soviet and East German collaboration was the compilation of a list or “catalog” of warning-of-war indicators designed to detect signs of an impending crisis or war “in real time.” The KGB demanded that the HV A catalog should be based on “strict conformity” with the RYAN template, i.e., on the five “political/societal areas” noted above.

Above: Cover page from the HA III copy of the Project RYaN catalog of indicators.

MfS/HV A records reveal that both services devoted considerable effort to conceptualizing, defining, and operationalizing warning indicators, yet they also seemed to have encountered problems that were never fully resolved. The main objective was agent penetration of “the enemy’s decision-making centers” and acquisition of “documents” on a political decision for war. The Soviet-East German intelligence reach, however, exceeded its grasp. The overriding goal was to obtain advance warning of a US decision to launch strategic nuclear forces, an urgent requirement since one-third of those forces remained on permanent alert, and the rest could be readied on short notice. A 1986 HV A report noted that “at the moment” this had not been accomplished.[51]

The second string to the RYAN/KWA bow was an extensive list of indirect indicators that, it was assumed, would reveal the implementation of alert procedures and mobilization plans that could not be concealed from intelligence surveillance and monitoring. The KGB and HV A were forced to resort to “observable intelligence,” i.e., things that can be seen and counted, in lieu of “message-like” intelligence, which relies on well-placed agents with access to plans, decisions, and intentions.[52] RYAN/KWA signified that the neither the KGB nor the HV A had such agents in place. The questionable methodological assumption was that overt or visible deviations from peacetime norms in the five political/societal areas could reveal a decision to attack the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries.

The one place where both services had well-placed agents was NATO headquarters. The KGB cables Gordievsky published, as well as the East German documents[EMP1] , reveal detailed knowledge of the alliance’s alert procedures and early-warning capabilities, especially NATO’s “crisis management” system. The KGB and HV A did not, however, find it reassuring that NATO arrangements were designed to warn of a Warsaw Pact attack in time to mount a defense. They simply declared that “crisis management” was dual-purpose concept that could be used to attack as well as warn.

The whole RYAN/KWA framework was anachronistic, seemingly more appropriate for the pre-nuclear age when states required lead times to mobilize armed forces and prepare populations for war. The template came from the KGB’s Institute for Research on Operational Problems. One explanation is that with little knowledge or experience to draw on, the Institute was dusting off old lessons learned from a previous surprise attack, namely Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa.

Some of the indicators were based on a mirror-image of how the Warsaw Pact would prepare for war, such as the stockpiling of mineral oil and mass slaughter of cattle. HV A case officers, for example, were instructed to look for:

“Confirmation of deviations in the behavior of prominent personalities and other persons in possession of classified information as well as their family members and persons close to them, which can be viewed as measures for protecting their own security (among other things, sudden moving into specially equipped secure accommodations, unexpected departure from normal residential areas and from border zones at home and abroad).”

The GDR, meanwhile, was building bunkers and fall-out shelters for the political, military, and intelligence elite and practicing “evacuation exercises” in case of a putative nuclear assault.[53]

The KGB and the HV A both had difficulties defining “key” indicators and do not appear to have arranged them in rank order or have assigned numerical weights or some form of an “accounting” method. There is a fleeting reference to the possibility of reaching false conclusions about hostile intentions, but the inherent problem of arriving at a false positive as watch officers worked through their checklists was apparently never fully addressed. Was there a tipping point or designated critical mass of accumulated indicators that would predict an attack? We don’t know, and the documents don’t tell us.

In 1986, the HV A reported that it had covered 226 of the 292 (!) indicators (“77%”), “albeit in varying degrees,” from its catalog, but what that meant is not clear. Were the results negative—no war on the horizon—or positive? The documents refer to efforts to employ computer-based data processing, but they also allude to problems with software and algorithms that, apparently, were never resolved.

All intelligence bureaucracies write memos and send cables when they want to give the impression that they are making decisions and taking action while, actually, “slow rolling the process.” The KGB-HV A dialogue on the indicators may have been no different. Despite repeated references to the urgency and priority of the alert, the HV A took several years to compile its own list of indicators. Meetings of working-level experts in Moscow and East Berlin were arranged at a leisurely pace. It took more than a year after Order Nr. 1/85 to organize an HV A situation center to monitor KWA indicators. By the time it was up and running, the entire effort was about to be overtaken by events in Moscow with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev and “new thinking.”

Mielke’s Variant

RYAN single-mindedly focused on the putative threat of a US surprise attack on the USSR. KGB cables declared that timely warning was required for Soviet strategic forces to take “retaliatory measures,” but the logic of the alert suggests that a preemptive first-strike, not a second-strike after US missiles had been launched, was the actual purpose.

Mielke repeatedly, and vainly, pushed for consideration of “other variants” of surprise, in particular conflict in Central Europe arising from a crisis in East-West relations. Mielke’s concern, shared by many in West Germany, was that the superpowers were prepared to fight in Europe, with conventional forces or “limited” nuclear strikes, down to the last German and on the last inch of German soil.[54] The Soviets simply ignored him. As the documents show time and again, Kremlin leaders had far less concern for their ally’s security than for their own.

Tradecraft and the war scare

The documents contain several references to operational tradecraft that underscore the Warsaw Pact’s lack of experience with warning intelligence. With the onset of the RYAN and KWA alerts, the KGB and the HV A, apparently for the first time, decided to issue to selected agents in the West rapid response communications equipment. The German term was Sofortmeldung (immediate reporting), which may have referred either to radios or burst transmitters using satellite relays to transmit encrypted electronic signals to the HV A situation center.

Theretofore, the KGB and HV A had employed personal communications (face-to-face meetings) or impersonal communications (dead drops) to pass requirements to and collect information from agents. Such arrangements required advance planning, conduct of pre-and-post meeting surveillance detection routes, and continuous “casing” for meeting or dead drop sites. Old-fashion tradecraft was secure but time-consuming and not suited for real-time reporting.

So, what was the war scare?

Wolf and his officers found Moscow’s “war games” a burdensome waste of time in pursuit of a non-existent threat. Some said KWA was a bureaucratic boondoggle that Mielke used to expand his power and influence. Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War” and a “sort of window dressing, and boiled down to compilation of regular reports stating that any given country was not intending in the next few days to drop nuclear bombs on the USSR.”[55] Soviet and East German leaders, however, were genuinely fearful, even if the threats and conspiracies they saw all around them were often exaggerated or even imaginary. As they were losing their grip on power, they were also losing their grip on reality.

Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War”

At the same time, the US was investing billions of dollars to upgrade its command-and-control, communications, intelligence, and early-warning capabilities, all predicated on the potential threat a Soviet surprise attack.[56] During the last decade of the Cold War, the fear of war was reciprocal and real, even if the threat of war was not.


Document Appendix

Document 1: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Brief Note, ‘Issues to Discuss with the Leadership of the KGB of the USSR’. 14 January 1983

A brief note written by the Ministry of State Security that includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

Document 2: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow’. 9 February 1983

This note on the talks between Minister Wolf and KGB Chairman Chebrikov contains heartfelt congratulations on cooperation thus far, but it also highlights problems with the situation and the importance of utilizing the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.

Document 3: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov’. 3 October 1983

These notes describe statements made by Colonel General Kryuchkov which outline the current state of Soviet institutions and intelligence networks in various regions, including Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the United States.

Document 4: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov’. 7 November 1983

This report describes conversations with Comrade Kryuchkov, coving a multitude of subjects, but delving briefly into the problem of “prevention of a surprise nuclear attack” (RYAN). Kryuchkov responded that this issue is being continually worked on, but no central decisions had been made as of yet.

Document 5: Committee for State Security (KGB), ‘Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’. 26 November 1984

A catalog of indicators of NATO preparation for nuclear war that were monitored by Warsaw Pact intelligence services under Project RYaN. The activity is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, and economic.

Document 6: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Order Number 1/85. 15 February 1985

This order from the Ministry of State Security describes the tasks of the MfS units concerning efforts to uncover intentions of aggression and surprise military activities by western states and their allies, especially a surprise nuclear missile attack against the USSR.

Document 7:Speech, East German Minister of State Security Mielke, ‘At the Enlarged Collegium Meeting on 7 June 1985 about Further Preparation of the XI SED Party Congress’. 10 June 1985

This speech by East German Minister of State Security Mielke addresses the technological, intellectual, and ideological preparations for war by the west and how to uncover and organize indicators of a potential attack.

Document 8: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)’. 6 May 1985

This report by Ministry of State Security describes developments and achievements toward early recognition of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

Document 9: Letter, East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov. 10 November 1986

This letter from East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Chebrikov requests a consultation on the development and continuation of Complex RYAN, especially on furthering collaboration between the MfS and KGB.

Document 10: Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke. 24 December 1986

Responding to Mielke’s letter from November 1986, Chebrikov agrees to the proposed meeting between the MfS and the KGB on the subject of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the states of the socialist community.

Document 11: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Plan for Consultations with the Delegation of the KGB. 20 January 1987.

This document is a plan for the consultations to take place in Berlin between the Stasi and the KBG. It includes objectives and proposed theses on the subject of early recognition of a sudden nuclear missile attack by NATO forces.

Documents 12 A–T: Committee for State Security (KGB), ‘About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’.

Documents 12A–T are monthly intelligence reports digests generated using intelligence by Project RyaN between August 1986 and April 1989.

[1] Süß, Walter and Douglas Selvage. “CWIHP e-Dossier No. 37: KGB/Stasi Cooperation” Cold War International History Project http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kgbstasi-cooperation.

[2]  “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721

[3] „Das MfS und die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen kommunistischen Geheimdiensten: Staatssicherheit und sowjetischer KGB.“ Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.  http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/MfS-Dokumente/MfS-KGB/_node.html.

[4] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.

[5] See below respective comments by Nate Jones and Ben Fischer.

[6] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov,” September 19, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5306, pp. 1-19. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115718.

Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov described Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.” Put differently, the Soviet side wondered what would have been if the plane would have been a military aircraft and part of a Western surprise attack: In this case the Soviet Union would have been unable to detect such an attack, i.e. Moscow would have become “surprised.”

[7] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 585.

[8] Other sources vary the spelling of RYaN. Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin spelled it “ryon.” Another spelling includes the word “surprise:” “VRYAN” “vnezapnoe raketno yadernoe napadenie” –surprise nuclear missile attack. Czech Intelligence referred to the operation as NRJAN.  One document shows that the Bulgarians monitored “VRYAN indicators” as late as June 1987.  These East German documents confirm that the operation continued until at least April, 1989.  The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 523; Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West, (New York: St. Martins, 1994), 302; 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”

[9] RYaN Translation #2

[10] The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/.

[11] The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/; Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464. Recently, Benjamin Fischer has introduced an additional potential source of East German fear: CANOPY WING, purportedly a US military research project to exploit a vulnerability of Soviet Warsaw pact command and control communications to launch a “decapitation/surgical” strike.

[12] 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”

[13] “Issues to discuss with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR” http://digitalarchive.org/document/119308.

[14] “Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow.” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119319.

[15] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.

[16] “Order Number 1/85” http://digitalarchive.org/document/119322.

[17] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721. It is possible that this new coordinating division was created as a reaction to the false alerts generated by Operation RYaN in November 1983 incorrectly warning that a NATO nuclear release drill, Able Archer 83, could have been an actual nuclear attack.

[18] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115717.

[19] ”Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke.” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119332; For more on the East German contributions to Soviet intelligence collection, see Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464.

[20] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/.

[21] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/.

[22] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721

[23] Translated here as “Institute for Operative Problems.”

[24] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119320

[25] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)”  http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119334.

[26] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Report, ‘Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document 119338. A partially declassified CIA document shows that Operation RYaN had its analogue in U.S. intelligence gathering. The CIA was also working with the DIA, and presumably allied intelligence agencies, to create a list of indicators — including the defense industry — for its chiefs of station to monitor, in an attempt to “emphasize greater early warning cooperation with intelligence services.”  Other parallels to RYaN date back to 1961, when the Soviets also instructed embassies in all “capitalist” countries to collect and report information during the Berlin Crisis. In 1991, one might have deduced the January 16 Desert Storm invasion by monitoring the influx of pizza deliveries to the Pentagon, according to current U.S. Army Operational Security (OPSEC) training materials.  In October 1983, justifying the KGB’s difficulties, Kryuchkov stated, “Even in the United States they have not completed this [a RYaN equivalent] yet.” The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/.

[27]  “Report, Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119909. For more on Continuity of Government, see James Mann, “The Armageddon Plan,” The Atlantic, March 2004.

[28] Still-classified reports by the British Joint Intelligence Council and the US President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have allegedly confirmed Gordievsky’s accounts.  See The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/, and British Documents Confirm UK Alerted US to Danger of Able Archer 83, http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/11/04/british-documents-confirm-uk-alerted-us-to-danger-of-able-archer-83/

[29] The 1983 War Scare, Part Two http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/.

[30] Regrettably, no text of the November 8 or 9 flash telegram has been released or reproduced. Gordievsky’s revelation of this warning is the only basis for the current historical record (though the preceding and following telegrams which he reproduced and published do serve as somewhat sturdy bona fides).  Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985, (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1991), 87.

[31] Marcus Wolf did not write kindly of the Soviets, or Operation RYaN, in his 1997 memoir:  “Our Soviet partners had become obsessed with the danger of a nuclear missile attack,” though he writes that he had not. “Like most intelligent people, I found these war games a burdensome waste of time, but these orders were no more open to discussion than other orders from above.” Marcus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (New York: Random House, 1997), 222.   http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.

[32] Welcome, Ukraine.  http://euromaidanberlin.wordpress.com/2014/04/01/kgb-archives-in-ukraine-will-be-open-to-public/

[33] For an account of the file destruction by the HV A officer who supervised it, see Klaus Eichner and Gotthold Schramm, Konterspionage: Die DDR-Aufklärung in den Geheimdienstzentrum (Berlin: edition ost, 2010), pp. 174-177.

[34] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115717

[35] Andropov was referring to the new US war-fighting strategy for “prevailing” in a limited nuclear conflict that was first announced as Presidential Directive 59 by the Carter administration and slightly modified during the Reagan administration in National Security Decision Memorandum 13.

[36] “Speech of General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” Available at   <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/doc19.htm&gt;

[37] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. 74.

[38] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721

[39] RYAN Translation #2: “Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, on February 9, 1983 in Moscow.”

[40] RYAN Translation #3: “Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov, V. A. on October 3, 1983.”

[41] Peter Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione: Ein Insider Report (Berlin: elefanten press, 1992), p. 85.

[42] Ibid.

[43] On MfS Sigint, see Ben B. Fischer, “‘One of the Biggest Ears in the World’: East German Sigint Operations,’” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11:2 (Spring 1998), pp.142‑153.  The MfS, the HV A, and the intelligence service of the East German Army were handling some 3,000 agents in West Germany/West Berlin when the Berlin Wall fell.  About half spied for the MfS and military intelligence and the other half for the HV A. Five of every 100,000 West German citizens were “working clandestinely for the GDR.” Georg Herbstritt, Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage: Eine analytische Studie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 2007), p. 84.

[44] “Befehl 1/85 zu den Aufgaben der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitigen Aufklärung akuter Agressionsabsichten und überraschender militärischer Aktivitäten imperialisticher Staaten und Bundnisse, inbesondere zur Verhinderung eines überraschinden Raketenkernwaffenangriffs gegen Staaten der sozialistischen Gemeinschaft,” BstU [Bündesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR], ZA [Zentralarchiv], DSt [Dokumentenstelle im Zentalarchiv des BStU]103137. Also RYAN Translation #4.

[45] “1. Durchführungsbestimmung des Stellvertreters des Ministers auf Befehl 1/85 vom 15.2.1985, GVS 0008-1/85: Allzeitige Nutzung der Möglichkeiten der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitgen und zuverlässigen Beschaffung von Hinweisen auf akute feindliche Aggressionsabsichten, -vorbereitungen und –handlungen,” BstU, ZA, DSt103137.

[46] Benjamin B. Fischer, “The 1980s Soviet War Scare: New Evidence from East German Documents,” Intelligence and National Security, 14:4 (Autumn 1999), pp. 186-197.

[47] Wolf’s tasking of MfS departments is described in Ibid.

[48] “Katalog ausgewählter Indikatoren zur Früherkennung gegnerischer militärischer Aggressionsvorbereitungen und Überraschungsabsichten, inbesondere von Maßssnahmen zur Vorbereitung eines überraschenden Raketenwaffenangriffs (KWA),” BstU, ZA, DSt103137. A different version of this text is available in Document #5 of this collection.

[49] See Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, pp. 72, 85 and Günter Bohnsack, Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung: Die Legende Stirbt  (Berlin: edition ost, 1997), p. 64.

[50] Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 85.

[51] RYAN Translation #6: “R E P O R T on development and achieved state of work regarding early recognition of enemy attack and surprise intentions (Complex RYAN).”

[52] Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 83-88.

[53] Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 72.

[54] Fear of a superpower conflict lead GDR leader Erich Honecker to open a back channel to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a decision that irritated Andropov. Markus Wolfe, Man Without a Face (New York: Times Books, 1997), p. 221.

[55] Mikhail A. Alexeev, Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 203.

[56] See Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992). Parallels between mutual American and Soviet fears of surprise attack are discussed in Benjamin B. Fischer, “The Soviet-American War Scare of the 1980s,” International Journal of Intelligence andCounterintelligence 19:3, Fall 2006, pp.480-519.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Bernd Schaefer

Bernd Schaefer

Global Fellow, Former Senior Scholar;
Professional Lecturer, The George Washington University
Nate Jones

Nate Jones

Director, Freedom of Information Act Project, National Security Archive

Benjamin B. Fischer

Former Chief Historian of the Central Intelligence Agency

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Nuclear Proliferation International History Project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews, and other empirical sources. At the Wilson Center, it is part of the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program.  Read more

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War. Through an award winning Digital Archive, the Project allows scholars, journalists, students, and the interested public to reassess the Cold War and its many contemporary legacies. It is part of the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program.  Read more

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LESERBRIEF: BERND ZIMMERMANN, STASI-OFFIZIER UND “GoMoPa”-TOP-GENOSSE

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image002 LESERBRIEF: BERND ZIMMERMANN, STASI OFFIZIER UND GoMoPa TOP GENOSSE

Zimmermann, Bernd; 07.08.39; HVA; 961500; 1080; 458/63, A

war früher ein STASI-Offizier im besonderen Einsatz in Westdeutschland, heute ist er ein Top-GoMoPa-Genosse.

bald mehr

Deep Throat

Peter Gaudlitz: Plötzlich Staatsfeind – Video

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Von ihren Plänen, in den Westen zu fliehen, hatten Peter Gaudlitz und seine Freundin niemandem erzählt. Trotzdem wurden sie verraten und fortan durch die Stasi observiert. Erst nach der Wiedervereinigung konnte Peter Gaudlitz in seiner Stasi-Akte nachlesen, dass wohl sein Vater den Verdacht geäußert hatte, sein Sohn wolle fliehen.

 

 

Der STASI Verräter Unter Uns

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STILL ALIVE AND KICKING – DIE STASI SEILSCHAFTEN 2020

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https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article134309778/Auf-die-SED-Seilschaften-ist-noch-immer-Verlass.html

Daran hat sich nichts geändert. Im Gegenteil: Die STASI-Connections zu Putin und auch nach China werden intensiver genutzt denn je:

  • für Subventionsbetrug
  • Energie-Pipelines
  • Gazprom Deutschland
  • Cybercrime
  • Zersetzung der deutschen und europäischen Politik, Justiz, Medien und Wirtschaft

Wie schon immer werden die STASI-Seilschaften aus Moskau dirigiert.

Denn auch Wladimir Putin ist einer von ihnen:

Quellbild anzeigen