ABOUT THE LAST OPERATION/ OPERATIONAL MISSION OF COMRADE [REDACTED]

 

Schah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi | corona

About the last operation/ operational mission of comrade [redacted]

Between 1979 and 1981 comrade [redacted] was stationed as a resident in Teheran.

In 1981 the Soviet- Iranian relations heated up (Mass persecutions, arrests and executions of operatives of the Tudeh- Party; temporary occupation of the UdSSR- Embassy by the revolutionary- guards, mysterious disappearance (probably treason) of the soviet counselor [redacted]).

For security reasons comrade [redacted] had to leave Teheran in this situation. (Shortly after his mission started, his successor was declared a persona non grata alongside other soviet diplomats).

During his operation in Teheran comrade [redacted] was in contact with the resident of the MfS. He widely supported our resident, a.m.

– with the assessment of the situation

– with the retransition/ return of a DDR- citizen (f) recruited by the enemy (overland to the Caspian sea and from there with a soviet ship to the UdSSR);

– with the preparation of an outward transfer of a DDR- citizen (m) (IMES- employee), who resided in the DDR- Embassy and against whom the Iranian authorities filed a request for extradition (outward transfer should take place with the help of a Bulgarian- Iranian transportation company, to which the comrade [redacted] had operational ties).

Comrade [redacted] wasn’t in the DDR so far. According to synopses at hand he did not receive an award by the MfS yet.

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
Description of the work of an East German agent in Iran who worked with the Stasi (MfS).

CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Iran–Politics and government
Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Iran
People’s Party of Iran (Tudeh)
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
East Germany

GDR-IRAN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS

1979 hatte der Iran einen blutigen Machtwechsel erlebt. Die Islamische  Revolution zwang Schah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

 

 

1. GDR-Iran Exchange of Opinions

On February 12, 1981, a government delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran was staying in the GDR under the leadership of the Minister of Education, Dr. Mohammed Javad Bahonar. He indicated to Comrade Oskar Fischer that his goal was find out the GDR’s position toward Iran’s Islamic revolution, the Iraqi invasion of Iran, and the preparedness of the GDR for further cooperation between the two countries.

Bahonar said that the Islamic revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini would be led to victory. The GDR was among the first countries that supported and recognized the Islamic revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran would like to develop close relations for the mutual benefit with all countries and governments that recognize the goals and the outcomes of the revolution.

On international problems, Bahonar explained that Iran is interested in securing freedom, ending the arms race, and ensuring popular national independence. He condemned the “spiral” of the arms race and interference in the domestic affairs of nations. He said that Iran is concerned about the presence of the “superpowers” in the Persian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean. He said that the Islamic Republic of Iran supports allowing the nations of this region taking responsibility for its security. According to him, the Iranian people are unconcerned about the increased military presence of the USA in the region. They would not like for “another power to take the place of the USA” in the struggle to remove this danger.

Regarding the Iran-Iraq conflict Iran shares the view of the GDR, that it only serves the purposes of imperialism and must be ended as soon as possible. This is of great significance for the continuation of the revolution in Iran. The Iranian government does not expect for the GDR to give up its friendly relations with Iraq. But it asks the question of who is the aggressor. Iran would like for the GDR to influence Iraq and pull it back. The position on the Iran-Iraq conflict for Iran is an important point for the development of further relations.

On Afghanistan Bahonar stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran condemns any interference of imperialism, particularly by the USA, in this country. This however does not mean that they accept the “presence” of another country. A “government that is forced on the people” can make no decisions that the people do not support.

Iran advocates for all peoples of the region to decide their own fate, without external influence and pressure.

Bahonar emphasized that Iran is prepared to expand and deepen bilateral cooperation with the GDR in political, economic, and cultural spheres.

Bahonar invited the GDR Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as the Vice President of the National Council to visit Iran. He welcomed proposals to conclude further treaties and demonstrated particular interest in the use of the GDR’s experience in the area of public education and higher education, as well as the cooperation of social forces united in the National Front. He requested the sharing of comprehensive informational materials on the GDR’s education system.

Comrade Oskar Fischer elaborated on the peace policy of the GDR and the principle standpoint of the GDR toward the Iranian popular revolution. He indicated that the imperialists are preparing new actions against the peace efforts of the people and that the international situation is coming to a dangerous point. The imperialist course of heavy armament, the acceleration of the arms race, the long-term armament program of NATO, the Brussels missile decision, the so-called new nuclear strategy of the USA, and not least the neutron weapon plans of the USA endanger the peace of the entire world. In this connection Comrade Oskar Fischer emphasized the role of the USSR and the countries of the Socialist community in the struggle for peace, security, detente, and disarmament.

The Foreign Minister of the GDR assessed the good relations that have developed between the GDR and Iran in many areas, particularly the economy and trade. He declared the preparedness of the GDR to further develop and deepen the relations between both countries, as well as to extend them into other areas. On this point he presented a number of suggestions, which were positively received by the Iranian partners.

Comrade Oskar Fischer presented the position of the GDR on the Iran-Iran conflict and Afghanistan.

Comrade Kirchhoff informed the delegation about the experiences of the National Front during the democratic transformation and the creation of the developed Socialist society of the GDR.

The conversations are the first political exchange of opinion between the two governments and have created starting points for further development of political relations.

They took place in a sober, open-minded, and constructive atmosphere.

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
Representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran discuss the arms race, the presence of superpowers in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the potential for bilateral cooperation between East Germany and Iran.

CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Afghanistan–History–Soviet occupation, 1979-1989
Iran–History–Revolution, 1979
Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Iran
Iran–Foreign relations–Iraq
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Iran

INFORMATION [ABOUT] ACTIVITIES OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY IRANIAN FORCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE AMERICAN AND WEST GERMAN SECRET SERVICE

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi - DER SPIEGEL

 

Main Department XX
Strictly Secret

Berlin, 7.7.1981
8 copies

Information

[about]

Activities of counterrevolutionary Iranian forces in connection with the American and West German secret service

A reliable source has made it known that [redacted], the former employee of the Iranian secret service SAVAK in West Berlin, has left his home in Nuernberg, telephone number [redacted]. From there he has been organizing news service activity. Presently, [redacted] is in West Berlin and recording personal contacts from his former agents. His recordings portray the following main points on future work:

-The “National Iranian Front,” which consists of Iranian citizens and active Shah adherents, is assiduously preparing a counterrevolution in Iran. One may presume that all preparations will be completed by the middle of 1982, and that great support for this is coming from the American and West German secret services.

The military actions are being prepared by former Iranian General [redacted] and the former Iranian Admiral [redacted], formerly of the Iranian Navy.

-The “National Iranian Front” has reportedly gone so far as to carry out intensified terror acts against Khomeini’s regime and the Tudeh Party. In their view, only by terror acts can the way be made clear for a counterrevolution. Particular credit in this area is given to General [redacted], who lives in Frankfurt/Main.

[redacted] considers a first success to be the bomb attack on the seat of the ruling Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in Iran at the end of June 1981, where 64 victims were lost.

A simultaneous attack aimed at the center of the Tudeh Party reportedly failed for reasons that are not yet clear.

-Surveillance of the Tudeh Party is being intensively continued, particularly its functionaries, as well as their contacts in the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries.

The struggle against the Tudeh Party is reportedly important so that the Soviet Union does not gain firm positions in Iran. Surveillance of the Tudeh Party they also reportedly had great help from the American and West German intelligence services.

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
People’s Party of Iran (Tudeh)
Iran–Foreign relations–United States
Germany (West)–Foreign relations–Iran
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
East Germany
Iran

ON THE REPORT FROM INFORMAL COLLABORATOR (IC) “REZA” FROM 26.7.78

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
Report from informal collaborator on personal conflicts among Tudeh Party leaders in Leipzig.

CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
People’s Party of Iran (Tudeh)
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
East Germany
Iran

On the report from informal collaborator (IC) “Reza” from 26.7.78

The IC shared that there are widespread personal conflicts in the office of the Tudeh Party in Leipzig between Eskandary and Kianouri and their current supporters. In order to now strengthen the leadership of the Tudeh Party Gen. Safari was appointed as its Third Secretary, whose primary focus is work on propaganda. S. had been previously active in Prague, and works here at the magazine “For Peace and Socialism.”

The IC considers him a decent and honest comrade, although he will have a difficult time asserting himself under the current circumstances in the office.

The IC further shared that two other Iranians have come from Moscow who will work in the office. The name one is [redacted]. The IC does not know the other by name.

The IC also shared that the Maoist magazine “Tufan” is circulating among Lebanese students. A Lebanese student with the first name of [redacted], for instance, had this magazine. Apparently this magazine ist sent from West Berlin, and he has been tasked by his Party with making a translation, in order to evaluate its content.

Dreier
Major

STASI REPORT ON WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT’S ATTITUDE TO RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY

CITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD

Ministry of state security
Berlin, 23 September 1970

No. 993/70

According to a reliable source, the attitude of the Federal Government towards the afore-mentioned stations was described by leading SPD officials at the beginning of September 1970 as follows:

The attacks by the Soviet Union, the GDR and some other socialist countries against the activities of the stations are harsh, and they could call into question the Olympic Games. The Federal Government is aware from various, not just official, sources that some of the socialist countries are relatively serious in their threat to boycott the Olympic Games in Munich if the stations do not terminate their activities.

The Federal Government is in a difficult situation on this issue, because it cannot afford to antagonize the Americans, who are running these stations. On the other hand it is not necessarily uncomfortable for the Federal Government to see mounting pressure from the East against the activities of the stations, as this would open certain possibilities for the Federal Government to raise this issue with the Americans and suggest that the stations might work from outside the Federal Republic. The current situation is that the Federal Government has recently extended the contractual licenses for both stations under pressure from the Americans. The contractual licenses are valid for 2 years, and can be canceled at the earliest after one year, with a year’s notice. This means that the stations would be still active by the time of the 1972 Olympic Games. The Federal Government is at the moment not in a position to do anything against the activities of the stations.

This assessment was confirmed by the Bundespost [Federal Post Office], which however pointed out that besides the broadcasting license, which is granted by the Foreign Ministry, there is also a technical license. This technical license, which regulates the use of frequencies, is granted by the Bundespost. It is not attached to longer-term contracts, but can be canceled with six months’ notice. The next possible date for cancellation is 31 December 1970, with a deadline [for terminating operations] at the end of June 1971. Withdrawing the technical license is thus a possible way of cutting off the activities of the stations at an earlier date than though the license awarded by the Foreign Ministry.

From SPD circles it was stated in this regard that this situation opened up a new perspective. It was hoped that, at the next frequency conference, the frequencies used by the two stations for the Federal Republic could be canceled under pressure from the East bloc countries, possibly even from the neutral countries. In any case, it would not necessarily be uncomfortable for the federal government if a solution could be found that was bearable for the federal government.

Due to security concerns regarding this source, this information cannot be publicized.

DOCUMENT SUMMARY

This GDR intelligence report, based on information from SPD officials in Bonn, describes the concern of Brandt Government officials about the continued operation of RFE and RL in Germany, and claims that some officials would conditionally welcome Soviet bloc pressure on this issue.

CREATOR

This GDR intelligence report, based on information from SPD officials in Bonn, describes the concern of Brandt Government officials about the continued operation of RFE and RL in Germany, and claims that some officials would conditionally welcome Soviet bloc pressure on this issue.

CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Radio Liberty
Radio broadcasting
Radio Free Europe
Brandt, Willy, 1913-1992
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
East Germany
West Germany

STASI REPORT ON MEETINGS WITH THE KGB, 30 NOVEMBER-1 DECEMBER 1964

Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson’s recent election in the United States, Khrushchev’s ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.

CREATORS
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

MIELKE, ERICH

SEMICHASTNY, V.

WOLF, MARKUS

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Nuclear weapons–China
European Economic Community
National liberation movements–Africa
Germany (East). Ministry for State Security (Stasi)
Soviet Union. Committee for State Security (KGB)

Berlin, 2 December 1964

2 copies

R e p o r t

On Meetings with the KGB of the USSR on 30 November and 1 December 1964

Participants at these meetings initiated by the MfS [Ministry of State Security.] of the GDR were the following:

  • Soviet side:

Comrade Semichastny, Chairman of the Committee

Comrade Sakharovsky, Head of Main Department 1

Comrade Pavlov, Deputy Head of Main Department 1

Comrade Skomorokhin, Division Head of Main Department 1

Comrade Beskrovny, Head of KGB apparatus in the GDR

  • MfS of the GDR:

Comrade Mielke[Minister for State Security]

Comrade Wolf [Deputy Minister, Head of HVA [Foreign Intelligence Division]

On both days there was one exchange held by the individuals listed above. In addition, there were individual talks with the Deputy Head of Main Department 2, Comrade Babkov, the Deputy Head of the Mobilization Department, Comrade Piskunov, and with Comrade Sakharovsky, joined by the Head of the Africa Department, Comrade Vinogradov, and the Deputy Head of the Information Department, Comrade Zitnikov.

In response to a questionnaire forwarded by us, Comrade Semichastny discussed the following issues:

  1. On the international situation

Assessment of US Government Policy

Currently the Johnson Administration is reviewing the basis of its foreign policy. Johnson’s electoral victory is the largest ever by an American president. However, the 20 million votes for Goldwater must not be overlooked. The US government will have to consider the changes at the top in the Soviet Union, the changes in Great Britain, the nuclear test explosion in China, and the attitudes of de Gaulle.

Probably the US administration will put in place a couple of tougher measures. This shows, for instance, through its campaign against the alleged Soviet debt towards UN organizations. This is to exert pressure on the non-aligned states and Secretary General U Thant. There is no chance for a compromise on this issue. The US pursues a tough line, and it looks like they are ready to go to extremes. A similar line becomes evident in the Congo and in Vietnam.

Yet even if US election results have somewhat strengthened right-wing forces, the US still understands that acute tensions are unhelpful. It would only lead to closer cooperation between the socialist states and others. Therefore, the US has to maneuver.

The people in charge in the United States are fully aware that a nuclear war will be deadly for them. Yet they make efforts to influence the balance of power according to their own interests. Thus we have to expect an (albeit slower) continuation of the arms race, as well as attempts to further strengthen NATO and divide the socialist camp. In the latter regard, the US is banking on certain nationalist tendencies there.

During his visit to the US, [British Prime Minister Harold] Wilson talked in particular about how nationalist tendencies in European socialist countries might be better exploited.

The United States is moving one to two additional divisions to South Vietnam, and they conduct air strikes against the liberation movement’s bases outside of South Vietnam. The communiqué about the Johnson/Taylor meeting does not state anything about intentions, yet in fact the US is embarking on a course of escalation. However, sooner or later the US will have to agree to the neutralization of South Vietnam. There are also tendencies to negotiate in this regard within the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV]. Yet Beijing is against it and demands, at the expense of the Vietnamese people, to fight until total victory. The DRV leadership sometimes openly expresses to the Chinese its dissatisfaction with Chinese aid, especially in economic regard. The war places a major burden on the DRV.

Concerning Cuba, there are no expectations for an open attack by the US with forces of its own. However, the Cuban counter-revolution, though basically destroyed within Cuba itself, is actively supported by the US from outside of Cuba. The United States tightens its economic blockade to create dissatisfaction within Cuba. One cannot exclude the possibility of aggressive actions by a group of other Latin American countries, triggered by certain provocations. Such a plan was already discussed by military representatives from some of these countries.

Regarding relations with the USSR, the US makes efforts to negotiate in order to reach agreements on certain issues. In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador [Dobrynin in Washington] Vice President [Hubert] Humphrey has made very positive comments that are, however, of relative value only. The US wants to improve relations. Yet its position on the funding of the UN is counter to this intention.

The conference held in Moscow with a large number of influential US business people and mega capitalists, as well as other facts, demonstrates that the US is currently reviewing its options to expand trade relations. It is their official line to do so without haste. In early 1965 we will probably sign a consular agreement. The Americans value highly the recently signed agreement on the extraction of fresh water from the ocean. Negotiations about direct flights between the USSR and the US are very tedious. All this shows how the US wants to avoid raising tensions but undertakes only a few practical steps in this regard.

Major difficulties are to be expected, and major efforts are required, on issues like disarmament, the solution of postwar problems in Europe, the prevention of West Germany’s nuclear armament, and on other European questions. No rapid progress is to be expected here.

On the Position of the British Labour Government

The Wilson government operates to a certain extent on the basis of détente. Its main tactics are: Flexibility and firmness. It supports peaceful coexistence, in particular with regard to trade. It stresses its own position and measures. In the interest of détente, it is their opinion that the Western alliance must be strengthened.

Before the elections Wilson had his own position concerning the GDR. Yet it is not known whether this will have actual consequences.

There is a certain interest in détente where the Labour government sees some opportunities for solutions on individual issues. The Labour government is against any form of nuclear war and supports in principle the creation of nuclear-free zones – also with the inclusion of both German states.

In contrast to its positions before the elections, the Labour government now conditionally supports the MLF [Multilateral Force]. Probably it is pursuing certain tactics here; in fact it does not believe in the realization of the MLF, and therefore slows it down.

On de Gaulle’s Position

It is well known and openly promulgated. His main objective is the elimination of American hegemony and the formation of a Western European defense union with a French-German alliance at its core. De Gaulle’s plans are threatened by decisive countermeasures from the US and West Germany. The US does not want to share its leadership, nor do they want France to gain influence. De Gaulle is angry about [FRG Chancellor Ludwig] Erhard for his support of American positions. According to reliable information, the French government will absolutely advocate against building the MLF and all its consequences. The British government’s position is also directed against de Gaulle’s plans.

The West German government is against a pro-French line and clearly supports the US course.

A sharp breach between France and the other Western powers has emerged and created a complicated situation within NATO. De Gaulle’s visit to Latin America is interesting. For now, France’s efforts have not led to results. France is in a difficult economic situation and undertakes certain efforts towards rapprochement with the Soviet Union in particular in economic regards. It has also showed an interest in joint ventures concerning production of passenger airplanes for high altitudes, and also in cooperation on color television systems. The visit by [Gaston] Palewski, [French] Minister of Information [sic], to the Soviet Union was interesting. [1] He expressed the same policy when meeting with leading government representatives from Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia in Paris. There also is a certain interest in trade with the GDR. France was one of the first countries to sign trade and loan agreements with the USSR.

This French policy is not innocent when it comes to exploiting nationalist tendencies in order to create fissures in the socialist camp. It is unknown what they actually talked with Romania. What has been leaked, however, displays this tendency. It also shows with regard to ideological subversion.

On Positions of the West German Government

(Comrade Semichastny remarked here that we [the MfS] are more knowledgeable on this.)

No initiative is to be expected from the Western powers to settle postwar European issues, especially with regard to West Berlin. The West German government wants to force the Western powers to negotiate about the German question based on the FRG concept of “self-determination.” This leads to the discomfort of the other Western powers, as became evident during the leadership change in the Soviet Union. For instance, the West German position has also created problems for the preparation of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The Western powers were afraid the Soviet Union might fully withdraw from it.

The West German government plans to increase activities regarding its relations with the People’s Republic of China and the European socialist countries. It wants to exploit Soviet-Sino differences and China’s interest in normalizing its relations with the Federal Republic.

The [FRG] Federal Government also reviews its position vis-à-vis the GDR. Devious methods are to be expected from that.

Due to increasing contradictions within NATO, the West German government is pleading for US favors, e.g. by making financial concessions. Contradictions mount with France and England, for instance because of the British proposals concerning the MLF. De Gaulle’s pressure has created a difficult situation. Hence the West German government currently still weighs its options on all those issues.

The NATO council meeting in December will be of major importance. The agenda features: An assessment of the international situation by [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk coupled with expert presentations; a report by General Secretary [Manlio] Brosio about the state of cooperation within NATO with regard to proposals for NATO’s reorganization; a statement by the chairman of NATO’s Standing Military Committee on the socialist countries’ military potential; reports by the NATO commanders and the Military Committee on NATO’s combat readiness in 1964; a report by Brosio on the strategic concept; a presentation by the US commission to prepare for the MLF; a statement on cooperation in areas of scientific-technological and military-technological research; the confirmation of NATO’s annual report; and votes on corresponding proposals.

The contradictions within NATO become most evident on the issue of NATO strategy. Extensive explanation [by Semichastny] of the American strategy of flexible response (already known to us [the MfS]). This is creating the main point of dissent from France which holds the opinion that the US will not actually defend Europe by using its strategic nuclear potential.

West Germany supports the French concept in principle but wants to integrate with the US positions.

The American concept envisages the option of local wars with the US reserving the right to determine the location, time, and means of war efforts. This concept is based on an increase in all types of armaments, and of course the growth of strategic nuclear potential as well. Particular emphasis is placed on special forces to conduct “guerrilla wars.” Their numbers have increased six-fold between 1961 and 1964. We have to take this into consideration in order not to allow surprises and to implement appropriate countermeasures.

On Contradictions within the European Economic Community (EEC)

Efforts to reach a common trade policy vis-à-vis the socialist camp are not supported by all EEC member states. In part, they even violate their obligations towards the EEC. West Germany is strenuously opposing loans for socialist countries especially because of Soviet positions on the German and West Berlin question. Vis-à-vis the GDR, the FRG attempts to trade loans for political concessions.

Italy is against any restrictions and granted to the Soviet Union a small 5-year bank loan. France has granted loans for 7 years. England is against any restrictions in this area. Belgium, for instance, opposes any restrictions on imports from the socialist camp while some of its industrial branches are in danger of getting crippled. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Benelux countries are imminent.

In the context of problems regarding the common agricultural market and the uniform grain price, France is even reviewing whether to leave the EEC.

The US is expecting an increase in exports during the Kennedy Round negotiations in November. Johnson is considering whether to move towards bilateral negotiations if there are no results in November. France strongly opposes an increase of imports from the United States. Major differences were created by the 15 percent increase of import tariffs by Great Britain.

On Covert and Subversive Activities of the Imperialist Powers and their Intelligence Services against the Socialist Camp

This activity is planned as a long-term strategy to divide the socialist camp and to create a hostile atmosphere towards the socialist order in individual countries. Offensive actions by the Chinese facilitate the emergence of favorable conditions for this kind of activity. NATO experts assess that the Chinese attitude will be the main lever used by the West to instigate nationalist positions [in socialist countries].

Important aspects consist in plans to target economic relations between socialist countries within Comecon. There have been consultations within NATO on how to sell goods and equipment to individual socialist countries that previously received them from other socialist countries. This is objectively directed against the purpose and intentions of Comecon. Economic subversion is undertaken through loans and technological exports to develop economic sectors in individual socialist countries that are not really essential. Yet those sectors create competition with other socialist countries and result in overproduction, and thus in additional problems and differences.

Ideological subversion is primarily directed at praising the Western lifestyle, standard of living, democracy, and so on – and compromising the socialist order by portraying certain economic weaknesses and deficiencies as a consequence of the socialist order. It is directed against alleged flaws of the [socialist] democratic system, and it exaggerates both real and nonexistent conflicts. The West is acting as a promoter of national independence for socialist countries and speaks out against alleged pressure on them by the USSR.

On plans for covert activities.

The US hardly counts on solutions through armed domestic counterrevolution. Besides economic and ideological subversion, the US therefore emphasizes in its covert activities the improvement of spy networks and the build-up of small counter-revolutionary groups. It aims at asserting itself through gaining a capacity to stifle unrest in case of international complications. Through these activities the US keeps its own hopes for potential change alive.

More than in previous times, the US intelligence services focus on gathering internal and economic information, such as on difficulties, contradictions, and problems within Comecon; but also obviously about the combat strength of the socialist armies and Soviet arms deployed in socialist countries and the Soviet Union itself, etc.

In part, intelligence agencies are tasked with disseminating rumors, sending anonymous letters, and distributing leaflets especially in case of domestic troubles.

In the context of strengthening the US special forces (Rangers), the US services have created a special operative group in Europe to prepare for sabotage and the activities of gangs in socialist countries.

After the changes in the Soviet leadership no particular attempts by the adversary were noted to exploit the situation inside the Soviet Union. The NTS [National Alliance of Russian Solidarists] attempted to create false impressions abroad concerning the existence of certain resistance groups within the Soviet Union. [2] Yet all this must not make us complacent. In certain reviews, we sometimes noted a dangerous overconfidence on the side of our counterintelligence services despite the fact that there are still many open channels left for the infiltration of enemies into the Soviet Union (he [Semichastny] explained this by giving examples of opportunities exploited by criminals).

On this entire complex of issues we [MfS] made extensive comments during our second meeting. Drawing on differences within the FRG leadership, we outlined how it does not make much sense to simply talk about a rejection of the French and a clear support of American concepts by the West German government. There are noteworthy differences within the West German leadership on core issues regarding NATO, MLF, and other problems. The leading exponents of West German imperialism have one thing in common: They are eager to exploit differences between other NATO members in order to pursue their revanchist concept and related strategic positions, and to gain larger concessions and rights pertaining to nuclear arms. We see the different options involved but currently the MLF is the biggest danger. In stressing this line of argumentation, we also noted that due to differences within NATO especially favorable opportunities exist to stall this project by mobilizing all our political forces. We explained the connection, and emanating danger, between West German imperialism’s basic concept of its own positions on forward-based strategies and the issue of “covert war” and its respective preparation. We also emphasized the link between this dangerous particular West German concept and undertakings of political and economic subversion.

Comrade Semichastny agreed with our opinions and stressed the high value of our information for the KGB.

[Semichastny said:] Everything must be done in order to prevent West German access to nuclear weapons in any form. If West Germany receives nuclear weapons or gets just one finger on the trigger, anything can be expected from the West German revanchists. A lot is depending on us to prevent this in any form. The Soviet Union’s line is clear: No proliferation or transfer of nuclear weapons to anybody.

As far as the US is concerned, they do not currently count on the possibility of armed insurrections. They hardly infiltrate major forces from outside or deploy them, not even in Cuba.

If West Germany is training its own special forces, the possibility of provocations and perhaps the deployment of larger forces cannot be dismissed outright. There are no certain indications but politically you can expect them to undertake anything. They might have interests in creating preconditions by way of provocations to involve other NATO states in their plans. They might also have interests in demonstrating domestic instability in the GDR to keep hopes alive for realizing their plans.

On 30 November 1964, “Pravda” published an article about West Germany’s options to build its own nuclear weapons. The KGB provided us [MfS] with an assessment of the military potential of West German nuclear research based on our information and other sources.

Comrade Semichastny does not attribute any significance to the postponement by one month of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee meeting requested by the GDR.

Comrade Semichastny added here that the US and Great Britain do not want a nuclear war and that the BND [West German foreign intelligence service] is aware of this. De Gaulle uses his nuclear weapons to exert pressure on the other European countries but he will not start a nuclear war either. West Germany knows this as well. However, West Germany is a different case. From them you can expect an initiation [of nuclear war] as soon as they have the means to do it.

Regarding our statement on the effects of [Nikita Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei] Adzhubei’s visit to West Germany in increasing political subversion, the Soviet comrades responded: When this information arrived [in Moscow], the Chairman of the KGB approached the Presidium of the [CPSU] Central Committee. This question played an essential role [in the Soviet leadership change].

Furthermore, the KGB raised the issue that other Soviet institutions, especially academic ones, are often too passive towards hostile subversion and underestimate the impact of the adversary. It is necessary not only to be reactive but also to act offensively and outline our own position.

When dealing with this question [Adzhubei’s visit to West Germany], Comrade Semichastny stated that the KGB leadership takes every piece of information seriously and follows through on this line. He reiterated his statement, and he again expressed his thanks for the information and important hints provided by the MfS.

  1. On Relations with China and Albania

On this issue raised by Comrade Mielke there was the following response by Comrade Semichastny:

The relationship with the Chinese is complicated, and it remains that way. With their visit [to Moscow] on 7 November the Chinese wanted to demonstrate that they have taken the initiative. It became clear during the talks in Moscow that the Chinese insist on the precondition to annul the decisions of the XX and XXII CPSU Party Congress; otherwise talks would make no sense. They pretended to have come to establish contacts and clear this issue but had no authority to negotiate. To every proposal by the Soviet comrades they just responded that they would report it back to Beijing. Yet in fact they rejected everything. Since the CPSU sticks to its line on basic questions, there is no real basis for talks with the Chinese.

During the meeting they [USSR] offered to meet with the Chinese on any level and at any location. They just responded that they would report this back.

Before, during, and after this stay in Moscow the Chinese press constantly published statements from Albanian, Japanese, and New Zealand newspapers with heavy attacks on the Soviet Union and repetitions of previous Chinese positions. The speeches by Comrades Brezhnev and Kosygin were published but typeset in such a way that the Chinese position became evident. An editorial published in [the Chinese newspaper] “Red Flag” reiterated all the old attacks and confirmed their insistence on maintaining their previous line. The “Red Flag” article was constantly re-broadcasted on radio.

The Soviet proposal for mutual cessation of interferences in internal affairs was met without any reaction. The Chinese press printed the nefarious attacks by the Japanese Communist Party, containing the demand that Khrushchev was just the tip of the iceberg and now the entire CPSU leadership has to be eliminated.

In the context of a CPSU proposal to move the preparatory meeting of the parties to March 1965, a corresponding letter by the CPSU Central Committee was supposed to be delivered to Mao Zedong or Liu Shaoqi. However, the Soviet ambassador [in Beijing] was only received by Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Xiao who commented himself on the letter’s contents and rejected it; though he was told the letter was addressed to the CCP Central Committee. He argued against any consultations and just repeated the same old attacks.

Thus there is nothing indicating an improvement in relations; not even the slightest hint in this direction exists. Countering our proposal to cede public polemics, the Chinese openly declared that they considered polemics useful.

For half a year, a Soviet delegation conducted negotiations in Beijing on border issues. Now these negotiations have been moved to Moscow where they are scheduled to resume on 15 November. Yet until now there has been no Chinese response to this proposal. The Chinese side demands the inclusion of a provision in the border treaty which states that 2.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory were unjustly and violently incorporated by Tsarist Russia. They declare they do not want this territory returned, only this injustice recognized. Concerning concrete issues, they are demanding, for instance, to have the borderline running next to Khabarovsk at the Amur River, i.e. right along the city.

The Soviet inquiry about Mao Zedong’s statement on the border made to the Japanese socialists has so far not received any response.

Currently there are fewer incidents along the border. However, winter has to be considered here. Until recently the situation was not normal: Constant border transgressions, impudent demeanor. This represents a major challenge to the nerves of the Soviet border units.

A similar picture exists in other fields of bilateral relations like trade and culture. Here as well there is no ray of hope, everything stands as it was.

During our [MfS] stay [in Moscow] the following incident occurred:

A Chinese doctoral student working with a Soviet professor had indicated he probably would not want to return to China. Subsequently he was ordered to come to the Chinese embassy and was supposed to be returned to China against his will. He fled from the embassy, and since then the Chinese are searching for him. Since they assume he is staying in his professor’s house, the Chinese have basically blocked this house and monitor it constantly. A Soviet protest was filed to the Chinese ambassador [in Moscow].

In China the atmosphere is further fueled by a strong anti-Soviet campaign. The splittist activities against other parties are continuing. The Communist Party of India has basically split apart. The Communist Party of Japan is treated as a vanguard, a progressive group has been excluded. Similar phenomena occur in Ceylon, Burma, Belgium, and so on. The splittist groups are officially supported by China.

The future perspective:

The Soviet Union is undertaking steps to find ways to come to at least decent bilateral relations. It is hard to say what the result will be. The CPSU leadership has to stand tall vis-à-vis the party and cannot tolerate letting the authority of the CPSU be constantly dragged through the mud.

On the Chinese atomic bomb:

It is impossible to assess whether this was a real bomb or a propagandistic one (laboratory experiment). One can hardly talk at the moment about a serious military production. The Chinese statement that they will not be the first to use the bomb seems to indicate this line of interpretation. Yet new problems are to be expected due to the course of the Chinese leadership.

On the Albanians:

Nothing is changing here. They did not send a delegation to the 47th anniversary [of the October Revolution] and also rejected a corresponding suggestion of the Chinese to do so. According to Comrade Semichastny’s personal opinion, the joint Albanian article that used the pretext to comment on [Italian Communist leader Palmiro] Togliatti’s memorandum was not drafted by the Albanians but by the Chinese. One week after the ouster of Comrade Khrushchev this was to serve as a trial balloon.

The Albanians demand an apology from the Soviet comrades, a concession of their mistakes, and the cessation of decisions by the XX and XXII CPSU Party Congress.

They may consider inviting the Albanians to the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee and to the Comecon meeting in order to test their reaction and deprive them of arguments [against the Soviet Union].

Inside Albania everything is repressed, they bolster security measures and the police apparatus. They hold trials, but people also disappear without trials. Albania’s economic situation is difficult. A message was sent to them on the 20th anniversary of liberation.

Concerning the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: It is hard to come up with detailed information. They are sailing along Chinese straits. Yet they are less polemical towards the Soviet Union. The same can be said about the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Characteristic of the attitude of the Chinese regarding Vietnam are their constant exhortations to others to fight without exposing themselves. They are eager to drag the Soviet Union into conflicts with the United States. When Vietnam demanded and received from the Soviet Union aircraft for certain types of combat the Chinese were asked to provide pilots, yet they refused. As a result, some Soviet pilots had to expose themselves in a very risky manner.

The main Chinese demand leveled against the Soviet Union is to provide evidence for a decisive struggle against US imperialism. They basically demand this conflict.

  1. On Liberation Movements in Africa

Our questions regarding this subject were answered by Comrade Semichastny in principle, and in more detail by Comrade Sakharovsky in a separate meeting.

The work in Africa is complicated. The adversary has major Africa experiences and a strong intelligence base. We are just at the beginning. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations by socialist countries, and the improved opportunities resulting from those, the adversary undertakes active measures to diminish our influence. The struggle for the African continent is a tough fight conducted with high stakes and corresponding means. In particular the US and West Germany have recently increased the number of experienced agents. There are strong contradictions between the Western powers. They fight over influence, but they are united against the socialist countries. In order to prevent the establishment of progressive beachheads, institutions or socialist associations, they resort to every conceivable provocation and lie. In part they were successful with this, like in Guinea where relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated due to French and American efforts. Now there have been disappointments in Guinea, and a delegation has come to the Soviet Union with a long list of requests.

The Soviet Union supports the liberation movement and progressive forces in their unforgiving struggle against imperialism. Soviet foreign intelligence maintains contacts with the leaders of various liberation movements and conducts extensive political work to counter the influence of imperialist forces.

Following our submitted questionnaire, a general Soviet assessment was given on the various liberation movements and basic information provided about which organizations are pushed and supported by the Soviet Union.

Noted as most deserving of support were:

  • the MPLA of Angola;
  • the FRELIMO headed by Dr. [Eduardo] Mondlane of Mozambique;
  • the UPC under Mussaga in Cameroon;
  • in Congo the group around [Gaston] Soumialot (i.e. also [Antoine] Gizenga and [Pierre] Mulele).

Concerning the liberation movements of Mocambique and South Rhodesia which currently lack a firm base in the country, and whose current leaders cannot be vouched for with certainty, it is now particularly important to identify and study positive individuals in order to develop leaders who are actually capable and can guarantee a proper utilization of our aid and support.

Concerning the Tanzanian Union:

The Union is a victory of Western powers and [President Julius] Nyerere. The latter has played an extraordinarily negative role in all this. The Union exerts strong pressure against any preservation of Zanzibar’s independent rights. Tanganyika has built a volunteer reserve of 4,000 men and in October issued a decree pertaining to the armed forces. Zanzibar has little prospect of an autonomous development. Nyerere will not establish diplomatic relations with the GDR and has given corresponding guarantees to the Western powers.

In our meeting with Comrade Sakharovsky this assessment was based on our statements regarding this issue. Zanzibar must be supported as a base for progress and a fist within Tanzania. It has to be strengthened against all efforts of restoration by colonial and neo-colonial powers. All attacks by imperialist powers must be parried. Zanzibar needs economic support.

Another threat emanates from plans for an East African federation, and also must not be allowed.

MfS activities on Zanzibar are rated positively. All expenses for Zanzibar are justified. It is now particularly important to solidify the personal contacts with, and influence on, [President Abeid] Karume, to always make accurate assessments of the domestic situation in Zanzibar, and to study also the policy of the Union closely. The activities by our security services [in Zanzibar] have to be legally certified and covered in order not to deliver a pretext for an outside intervention.

It is crucial to have exact knowledge of English and American plans concerning the Union and against Zanzibar.

We reached agreement about our assessment of [Abdullah] Hanga and [Abdulrahman] Babu, also about the need to influence them.

Coordination measures were agreed upon, especially in light of the upcoming delegation of KGB representatives [to Zanzibar].

On the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), Ghana:

In principle the Soviet Union supports all wishes expressed by President [Kwame] Nkrumah, though they are frequently complicated and difficult. Nkrumah sees himself as a leader for all of Africa and harbors corresponding plans.

After the first attack on Nkrumah, the Soviet Union provided support by sending an adviser to help with building a personal security service. It also provided equipment and arms for a Guard Battalion including the delivery of heavy armaments. The KGB has also sent an officer to help with the creation of intelligence services. He is still on site in Ghana but can hardly become active. The security apparatus is not yet purged of imperialist elements. Support is also given for the build-up of border guard units. Ten people are to be trained in the Soviet Union for the struggle of liberation movements.

Our information concerning the tasks of the Bureau of African Affairs were confirmed. Information was given about which liberation movements are supported by this office, and which are not. The head of the office, [A.K.] Barden, is a confidant of Nkrumah. Information exists according to which Barden is involved in financial machinations and arms smuggling. In this context, some express opinions that he discredits the liberation movements and Ghana’s prestige. African leaders, like those of Zambia, are said to have stated their displeasure with the office’s activities.

The BAA has requested and received a Soviet instructor for the camps it is running to train fighters for Angola. They were trained for six months. Now they asked for equipment, arms, and education material for an alleged training center. There is the assumption that in fact they want to build up a special force capable of being deployed abroad as well as inside Ghana.

The Czechoslovak comrades have had experiences with similar requests from Guinea and Mali. They provided their knowledge as advisers but they were never shown anything. Afterwards they were pushed out.

Concerning such type of work, it is important in general to recognize that the influence of imperialist intelligence and corruption are still quite strong. From Soviet remarks we [MfS] could fathom that requests ought to be met when there is a direct confirmation by Nkrumah. Arms shipments to Ghana will also be supported.

On Assessing the Situation of the Cuban Security Services:

The security services have existed since 1959 and are part of the Ministry of Interior. The heads of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and personal security are basically autonomous and report directly to the leadership. Mostly they are young, good, and energetic people, former members of the 26th of July movement or Cuban communists. They do not have much experience. There are no party cells within the organization.

A noteworthy element is a certain guerilla mentality and the desire to instigate revolutions in other Latin American countries without taking practical conditions there into consideration. Foreign Intelligence has existed since 1961 and is kept very busy with such issues.

Counterintelligence has done great work against the counterrevolution, achieved good success in 1961-62, and pushed back the active underground. Soviet advisers gave support to the struggle against banditry. According to Cuban assessments there are currently only 70 to 80 active bandits left.

Since 1960 our relationship with the KGB has been close. There is solid cooperation, constant support through specialists, training in the Soviet Union, delivery of operative technology, and informational exchanges. The large Cuban requests in the field of technology are not always justifiable. [KGB] advisers on Cuba are also working with [Cuban] Foreign Intelligence. The [Cuban] comrades have problems keeping contact with [foreign] agents [abroad]. Sometimes they do not know where they are, and what they are doing.

The Soviet comrades help with information about regime questions, documentation issues, information on objects in the US, and support the struggle against agents from capitalist states in Cuba. The Cuban comrades are attentive and apply their advice. Working with them requires major diligence, support, and insights into their problems.

Concerning our questions about certain phenomena in Cuba, Comrade Sakharovsky explained: Fidel decides everything in Cuba. This leads to discontent. Incorrect decisions are taken, and then subordinate leaders are held responsible for subsequent deficits and problems. There are difficulties in building party organizations. There are no party cells yet in the security services. There are problems and tensions based on different origins of members coming from the 26th of July movement, the Directorate, and the communists. The leadership’s position is unclear in context of the [Anibal] Escalante affair, the [Heriberto] Rodriguez trial and the current investigation against Ordoka. It is not clear whether this represents, intentionally or inadvertently, an anti-communist tendency of Fidel. The political situation is complicated and indeed major discontent exists.

We were asked [by the KGB] to establish, according to our interests, official contact between the MfS and the Cuban services. We ought to emphasize our interest in supporting anti-American tendencies in Latin America through our activity. Concrete cases [unofficial agents] must not be uncovered.

  1. On Questions of Mobilization Work

Comrade Semichastny agreed that a meeting will be held by experts on this issue.

  1. On Registration and Operative Evaluation of Tourism

[Based on a] meeting with Comrade Babkov, a visit to the electronic center, and to the news center in the 2nd Main Directorate. Registration is currently done according to the following criteria:

  1. Entry and exit by foreigners from non-socialist states;
  2. Travel routes and geography of travel activity;
  3. Agents and suspicious foreigners;
  4. Diplomatic travel.

Entry and exit stubs have replaced the visa and contain a photo. Currently we [MfS] are working with the Institute of Criminology on the problem of picture registration and analysis. In the long run registration is envisaged of important links with information from mail control, of suspicious Soviet citizens, and of repercussions concerning confidential information that was revealed to the adversary.

  1. Varia
  2. Joint measures against the statute of limitations of war crimes.

The Soviet comrades will forward a proposal to the GDR State Prosecutor via the Soviet Embassy in Berlin in the name of the USSR State Prosecutor to delegate GDR experts to USSR archives to study Nazi documents. After a review and selection of related material, the latter will be officially and publicly handed over to the GDR. The USSR will issue a statement by the Committee of War Veterans or the Soviet government. Also there will be an appeal by Soviet lawyers filing an appropriate protest.

The Soviet comrades expect the MfS to be involved in this. They expect a delegation of 5 or 6 individuals to come to the USSR soon, preferably with Russian language skills.

  1. The Soviet comrades are preparing information on the contents of existing documents to be used for the unmasking of Nazi diplomats.
  2. The comrades returned to the issue of the International Seminar to expose the Nazi generals in the West German army.
  3. The KGB attributes major importance to measures revealing the cooperation between the West German Federal Republic and Israel. Previous measures were already successful, and the efforts of the MfS in this regard were recognized. The Soviet comrades have certain opportunities in Syria. They have already resulted in an extensive evaluation by the Syrian Foreign Ministry for the [Syrian] government on West German-Israeli cooperation confirming the information we provided beforehand. The Syrian Foreign Ministry noted in this context that FRG attitudes [toward Israel] might lead to the establishment of [Syrian] diplomatic relations with the GDR, which will automatically result in breaking off relations with West Germany. All state bodies in Syria are requested to conduct an exact analysis of relations with the GDR and FRG, and reflect on expected consequences in case relations with the FRG might be severed.
  4. The Soviet services have information about a former assistant of [Adolf] Eichmann residing in Syria. He was supposed to be liquidated by the BND since he knows too much.
  5. Comrade Semichastny reiterated the special interest of the KGB in the cases of St. and Ch. We agreed that the KGB will forward any new information to the MfS.
  6. Concerning the question by Comrade Minister Mielke about experiences with the subordination of border guard units under the KGB, Comrade Semichastny stated that this subordination has turned out fully satisfactory like in similar earlier cases. The border guard units share this opinion. Border service is not just simple guard duty. It is about guaranteeing operative security at the border using agents and all available means. Working with agents is necessary on both sides of the border. Thus the KGB has to be active along the border anyway, and maintaining parallel responsibilities and authorities would make no sense. Any other line of authority would make principal and practical decisions in dealing with border violations much more complicated. The same applies to dealing with border crossings by foreigners at the checkpoints. This way a close and uncomplicated cooperation between counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, and border units is guaranteed. The Ministry of Defense, in contrast, has completely different assignments. This becomes especially relevant when dealing with incidents at the Chinese border. All issues are flexibly and correctly decided by the KGB which functions as a political body. Border guard units are best associated with the KGB. They are not a major burden but a big help for counterintelligence and foreign intelligence.
  7. Concerning the “Tag [Day]” case, Comrade Semichastny said it is very possible that the US have such equipment. The Soviet Union does not have such portable apparatuses. In this context we also discussed issues of secure codes and deciphering by the adversary. Applying these means, the latter gains major insights in particular on military data. An employee of the US deciphering agency is said to have received an award of 100,000 dollars.
  8. Following our request, the Soviet comrades handed over a number of scientific-technological information as well as documentation on scientific-technological intelligence in the areas of chemistry, in particular the production of artificial plastics and fibers.

Comrade Semichastny rated the relationship with the MfS as good. He thanked us in particular for our good information and emphasized some of the sites where this information was obtained. This type of information is of great help for the orientation of the party and government of the Soviet Union.

Information in the field of scientific-technological foreign intelligence is also very valuable and important. He thanked us for this in particular.

A great and valuable help is also the work of the MfS concerning the support of Soviet military counter-intelligence to safeguard the Soviet Army on GDR territory.

Therefore the Soviet comrades would like to present, at the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the MfS [1965], awards to a large number of MfS employees who have distinguished themselves in the acquisition of political and scientific-technological information; and also for merit in security issues concerning the Soviet Army. They ask for our consent on this and expect appropriate suggestions of names.

At the end of the meeting Comrade Mielke thanked us for the valuable information provided during the course of our talks.

He noted a full agreement of views and praised the value of this kind of meeting. They offer the opportunity to achieve rapid clarifications and solutions for general and practical issues of operative work. He again reiterated the consent reached regarding certain issues concerning an aggravation of the overall situation, and the need to apply respective countermeasures. Comrade Mielke thanked us for the openness and cordiality of our relations. He stressed our good cooperation with the KGB apparatus in the GDR and invited Comrade Semichastny to visit the GDR.

Comrade Mielke forwarded greetings from Comrades Ulbricht and Honecker to Comrade Semichastny and the leading comrades of the KGB.

Comrade Semichastny shared his assessment about the value of the meeting. He was grateful for the good cooperation with the KGB and its apparatus in the GDR. He thanked for the greetings from Comrades Ulbricht and Honecker and asked to return his own warm greetings.

[1] Palewski was actually Minister of State in charge of Scientific Research, Atomic Energy and Space Questions.

[2] NTS, the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists, an anti-communist Russian exile organization.

DOCUMENT SUMMARY

Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson’s recent election in the United States, Khrushchev’s ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.

‘BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE INVESTIGATION RESULTS ACHIEVED IN 1961 IN WORK ON CRIMES OF ESPIONAGE’

Assessment by the Stasi of the espionage of the main Western secret services in East Germany based on its investigation of cases of spying in 1961.

CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Berlin (Germany)–International status
Espionage, American
Berlin Crisis, 1961
Espionage, French
Espionage, German

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JANUARY 09, 1962

EAST GERMAN MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY, ‘BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE INVESTIGATION RESULTS ACHIEVED IN 1961 IN WORK ON CRIMES OF ESPIONAGE’

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                                                                                  Berlin, 9.1.1962

                                                                                  Copies: 5/Ho. III. Copy

Brief assessment of the investigation results achieved in 1961 in work on crimes of espionage

The investigation results achieved in 1961 in work on cases of agents of the American, English, and French secret service as well as the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) prove again that until 13.8.1961 West Berlin was the main base for the organization of espionage against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the other Socialist states. New agent connections were, as a rule, created by means of threats and blackmail using people who had left the territory of the GDR illegally, during visits by citizens of the GDR to relatives in West Berlin during trips to West Berlin to take care of personal matters. Controlling, training, giving instructions, and remunerating agents likewise took place at meetings in restaurants, hotels, and safehouses in West Berlin.

While, compared with 1960, an increase in the number of arrests of BND agents has been recorded, the numbers of agents of foreign secret services fell, which obviously resulted from a change in their methods of operation or an improvement in their intelligence connections.

As could be determined by work on spy cases, particularly those of the BND and American secret service, the main focus of the increased subversive activity carried out from West Berlin is directed at putting into effect the aggressive plans of the Bonn Ultras and the most aggressive imperialist circles of the USA and other NATO states to undermine the power of workers and peasants so as to create prerequisites for a military attack on the GDR.

Thus it should be recognized that the agents of the most active imperialist secret services – the American services and the BND – are being prepared to a particularly large degree for their employment in war.

This finds expression in the increased tasking to gather information of a military-strategic nature, such as determining the load-bearing capacity of bridges, the significance of railway junctions, the flow capacity of streets, railways, and waterways, as well as the extent and employment of transport space.

Without exception, the agents of the American, English, and French secret service, as well as the BND, have been employed to inquire thoroughly into the military potential and the defence measures taken by the government of the GDR. The focus of the military spying in the activity of the American secret service and the Federal Intelligence Service lies above all in the collection of intelligence about the units of the Soviet army temporarily stationed on the territory of the GDR. In this their agents predominantly concentrate on spying on missile units and on the construction of air defence bases and storage depots.

For example, the agent of the American secret service [name blacked out] and the BND spy [name blacked out] tried to find out such information in a large number of towns on the territory of the GDR.

The concentration of the secret services, particularly the American services and the BND, on creating agent groups must also be evaluated in connection with the preparations for war against the GDR of the West German militarists, in combination with NATO, were intensified in 1961.

In accordance with the instructions and general orders which were obtained, these groups, predominantly equipped with radio-technical aids, were, among other things, to report on the mood and condition of the population, signs of discontent, starting fires as well as other acts of sabotage and subversion, imbalances in the people’s economy, particularly shortages in the provision of goods, and on the situation in agriculture.

The main task of the agent groups created consists of collecting and transmitting intelligence about troop movements and other military operations to increase the defence preparedness and striking power of the armed forces of the GDR. Closely connected with that are orders to ascertain the situation among the civilian population, the provision of goods, and the readiness of the population to support the armed forces.

Thus it was possible to liquidate a large number of groups, above all of the BND, in whose possession were, altogether, 22 high-performance radio sets and converters suitable for war conditions, which would serve to transmit information in case of war. Most of the radio-technical devices seized in the course of investigative actions were smuggled into the territory of the GDR from West Berlin by couriers like the arrested BND spies [name blacked out] and [name blacked out]. Some were deposited in so-called far and near hiding places. Some of the radio sets meant for use in war were transported into the GDR by the agent radio operators using means of transport made specifically for this purpose. Musical instruments, liquid containers, and tools were chosen as hiding places for transporting the radio sets. Until 13.8.1961 these agent groups transmitted the information they gathered to their controllers almost exclusively at personal meetings as well as using invisible ink and prepared paper via covert addresses in West Germany.

While only a small proportion of the arrested radio agents transmitted the information collected by radio, most, however, regularly received instructions using converters and, in the case of the American secret services[1], by means of the shortwave frequency of radio sets.

The fact that it was only possible in one case to find a radio set in the possession of an agent of the American secret service is evidently to be put down to the smashing of the courier department in 1960 and to the not-yet-completed supplying of new sets connected with that. While none of the arrested agents of the French secret service had been equipped with radio-technical aids, it was possible to seize a radio set and two converters of the English secret service.

The fact that people who have left the GDR illegally are recruited for spying in West Berlin and West Germany and sent back to their hometowns to gather information on defence preparedness is also to be evaluated in connection with the concentration of the secret services on preparing an attack on the German Democratic Republic. Since mid-1959 the American secret service has to a greater extent gone over to recruiting people in West Germany for the purpose of conducting espionage against the GDR and other Socialist states, training them thoroughly, equipping them with forged identify papers, and, abusing the air corridor, flying them from West Germany to West Berlin and from there infiltrating them into the territory of the GDR.

More agents were smuggled over the Western state border into the territory of the GDR and likewise told to gather information of a military-strategic character. These conclusions are based on the investigative results reached in the cases against the agents of the American secret service [three names blacked out] among others.

In 1961, though, it was possible to arrest a series of agents of the American and British secret services as well as BND agents, who had managed, owing to negligent cadre work, to infiltrate state and social institutions and gather information on the defence preparedness, foreign policy measures of the government of the GDR, and other political tasks, as well as on key political-economic elements of the Seven Year Plan.

The arrestees [name blacked out] and [name blacked out], exploiting their work, respectively, as Head of Secretariat and member of the Criminal Police in People’s Police district offices, stole secret instructions, analyses, and other material, which, among other things, provided information on the training, equipment, and defence preparedness of the Kampfgruppen[2], as well as the Order Groups of the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend – Free German Youth movement). These they photographed or copied and passed on to their controller, the American secret service, using their wives. These documents also enabled these secret service headquarters to alter the work of the Military Mission on the territory of the GDR as well as the smuggling of agents and the exploitation of revanchist events in West Berlin to recruit agents.

Furthermore, they handed over information about the MfS, of which they had obtained knowledge by reason of their work for the police.

As the results of the investigations into agents of the American secret service prove, the organization of extensive spying in the political sphere is a very important element in the subversive activity of this secret service.

This year, the agents of the American secret service [name blacked out], [name blacked out], and [name blacked out] were arrested, from whose testimony the tasking of the American secret service with regard to inquiring into the political situation in the GDR is clearly identifiable.

Therefore, the American secret service is particularly interested in finding out about the international connections of all GDR state and social organizations and institutions, about the political, economic, and cultural connections of the GDR with other countries, in particular with the independent national-democratic states, about the work of central institutions of the democratic parties and mass organizations in the GDR, about central state offices, and about the mood of the population concerning particular political events.

Similar conclusions were likewise reached in handling cases of spies of the Federal Intelligence Service.

The aim of this work of the American secret service and the BND is to undermine the moral-political unity of the population of our state.

Among the imperialist secret services, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) especially concerns itself with the activity of democratic[3] parties and mass organizations on the territory of the GDR so as to obstruct all-German contacts and their all-German work.

In the course of last year it was possible to prove that the Iranian secret service, exploiting Iran’s diplomatic representations in West Germany, is engaging in intensive agitation and subversion against the elements of the Tudeh Party which have emigrated to the GDR; this it does in close collaboration with organs of the West German BfV.

For the purpose of organizing measures of ideological subversion, the BfV’s work also focuses on inquiring into the political situation in the border areas and the mood of various strata of the population.

With the same intensity as last year, the secret services are concentrating on finding out about the economic potential of the GDR.

By way of example, as appears from the cases of the agents of the American secret service [name blacked out], of the English secret service [name blacked out], and of the BND spies [two names blacked out], the main focus of the economic spying is inquiring into the key economic sectors of the GDR, like energy, mechanical engineering, and the chemical industry. Both the American secret service and the BND are very interested in these industrial sectors. Substantial attacks of the hostile secret services are also directed at central institutions of the GDR economy. For example, the agent of the English secret service [name blacked out] had the task of handing over or photocopying all the research papers on economically significant projects, in particular on electronic devices and other important instruments, which were available to him in the Institute for Instrument Construction of the German Academy of Sciences and which were in the economic and political interest of the GDR to be kept secret.

Under the cover of academic consultations and interviews to research academic studies, the CIA agent [name blacked out] made a wealth of contacts with leading economic officials in the GDR in order to compromise them through the betrayal of matters to be kept secret and to blackmail them into cooperating with the American secret service.

The spying of [name blacked out] extended to a considerable degree to the entire foreign trade activity of the GDR, particularly to investigating important matters and interrelations concerning trade relations between the foreign trade organs of the GDR and trading companies of capitalist and socialist countries.

The aim of this extensive spying is the preparation of an economic blockade of the GDR in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The protection measures taken by the government of the GDR on 13.8.1961 on the state border with West Berlin gave rise to a considerable obstruction to the subversive work of the secret services, particularly owing to the substantial elimination of West Berlin as a base for spying on the German Democratic Republic.

The change in the situation brought about after 13.8.1961 caused the imperialist secret services to adapt and reorganize their working methods.

It was not possible to reach any conclusions on the basis of investigative proceedings about the activity of the English and French secret service in this period.

In their spying after 13.8.1961, the American secret service and BND give their main attention – apart from renewing connections which had been broken off and making new contacts – to greater inquiring into any military movements on the territory of the GDR and to the investigation of the opinion of the population about the security measures of the government, about the border incidents and provocations on the state border with West Berlin which have been organized by the Bonn Ultras in conjunction with the West Berlin Senate and USA Occupiers, and about difficulties which have arisen supplying the population with consumer goods. The aim of this work is the creation of prerequisites for the organization of counter-revolutionary activities, as a reason for an aggressive war by Bonn militarists and NATO against the GDR.

Characteristic of the uncertainty and mood of panic which has set in in the offices of the secret services in West Berlin in connection with the measures of 13.8.1961 is the fact that – according to the testimony of the CIA spy [name blacked out] – American citizens living in West Berlin have been sent into Democratic Berlin to observe troop movements, gatherings of people, and unrest expected by the American secret service in Democratic Berlin.

Over and above that, for example, the instruction and training of the arrested agent of the American secret service [name blacked out] was broken off prematurely and precipitately after the security measures came into force. [Name blacked out] was smuggled illegally into the GDR and received instructions to inquire into the military situation on the territory of the GDR.

It is to be concluded that the number of spies of the American secret service smuggled over the state border (West) increased.

According to investigative results of cases of spies of the American and West German secret service, the main method of maintaining the connection is radio activity.

Basically, tasks and spying instructions are transmitted by radio, whereby the American secret service uses the “Ilmenau 210” radio sets which are available for purchase [in the GDR] and the BND uses shortwave converters which are specifically meant for radio reception.

Some of the arrested radio agents of the BND were already reporting by radio the observations they had made to the regional radio headquarters of the Federal Intelligence Service.

A further method of reporting to the secret service is the exploitation of the post using cover addresses and varied means of secret writing.

This method is – as the cases [three names blacked out] and others prove – used both by the BND and the American secret service.

In proceedings against two agents of the American secret service, a married couple, it was possible to obtain facts on additional new methods of cooperation.

Thus the agents are supplied with money and spying aids from West Berlin by couriers via so-called dead letter boxes which are only used once and the location of which is made known to the agents by radio.

With regard to the majority of its agents, the BND planned to supply money and so-called barter goods as well as spying aids by exploiting the parcel traffic between West Germany and the GDR, whereby the goods were to be hidden in foodstuffs and pieces of clothing.

The American secret service in particular is interested in meeting its agents in capitalist and other socialist countries.

[1] This is, above all, a reference to the main American secret services running spies in East Germany; the CIA and the two services of the US Army, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the Counter-intelligence Corps (CIC).

[2] Workers’ militia.

EAST GERMAN MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY, ‘NEW METHODS OF OPERATION OF WESTERN SECRET SERVICES

Assessment by the Stasi of changes to operations made by the main Western secret services in response to Khrushchev’s November 1958 diplomatic note to the United States, Britain, and France demanding an end to the occupation of West Berlin.

CREATOR
GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Berlin (Germany)–International status
Espionage, American
Berlin Crisis, 1961
Espionage, French
Espionage, German

Main Department IX/1

New methods of operation of Western secret services

NOVEMBER, 1958

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy FoundationCITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD

Main Department IX/1

New methods of operation of Western secret services

I. The following material is based on experience of investigative work of the last few months as well as information obtained from the exchange of information with other responsible departments.

Applies to all secret services: [they] react to the political situation in each case – party and government.

For example:

      –  chemistry conference

      –  proposals USSR and GDR for the resolution of the West Berlin question

Characteristic:

Immediate reaction on the part of all intelligence services to proposals – particularly Americans and Federal Intelligence Service –

Officers worried, confused – however, unlike politicians of the Western Powers they assessed the situation relatively realistically; that is to say: comprehensive re-ordering of their work.

       (a) foreigners and officers of the Federal Intelligence Service go to West Germany

       (b) general conversion to radio and preparation for war
important: not only specialist radio operators;

       (c) use of the most modern technology;

       (d) covert addresses [in] West Germany, dead drop boxes, and smuggling routes on the Western state border and the sectoral borders.

II. American secret service:

Yank dealt heavy blows in 1956, work completely re-ordered, agents switched off[1], German employees dismissed.

Lie detector – extensive questionnaires stating parents, siblings, home – [two words blacked out]

Recruitment on mass basis.

Work transferred from West Berlin to West Germany. Already various offices transferred to Frankfurt/Main and Kassel.

[handwritten note: [illegible name] and others – Kassel office with telephone numbers from West Berlin

New methods in recruitment, cooperation, communication of intelligence –

Equipping for war

Sails under other flags. [handwritten note: Schütz [name]]

Recruitment methods:

Recruitment – refugee GDR-citizens; West German citizens, who come as asylum-seekers to the GDR; 5th Column;

Railway-workers, lorry drivers, and sailors on internal waterways, who are employed in interzonal travel;

Scientists and GDR citizens, who visit West Germany.

Sailors who dock in West German ports;

Refugees ask acquaintances and relatives to visit them in West Berlin, there introduce them to secret service.

Poles and Czechs who are staying in West Germany are supplied with forged travel visas.

[handwritten note: name blacked out – Visa. Border region – DLB store for documents and technical aids]

Cooperation:

Personal meetings are no longer carried out in bars, only in cars and safehouses which are mostly unknown to the agents.

Permanent change (wechsel) of safehouses – personal meetings are limited as much as possible – for example: Brehmer – one year

Meetings in West Berlin with “PM 12”[2] or plane from West Berlin to West Germany

Tasks: transmitted by radio [handwritten note: no radio traffic [illegible word] Brehmer]

For example: Brehmer

Courier connection via DLB.

Communication of intelligence:

West German covert addresses have been given out to almost all agents.

Addresses do not exist, post office workers take them out, spy reports written with invisible ink (tablets – almost all tablets suited to making invisible ink) are also encoded. [handwritten note: and typewritten]

To a greater degree agents are equipped with radio sets – deadline 28 May 1959[3], replacement sets stored in DLBs.

With the radio sets – tape recorders, radio signals are transmitted on to these, tape plays at ten times normal speed over the transmitter – therefore hard to locate.

Along the sectoral borders and Western state border smuggling routes for people and DLBs

Resident agents are equipped with radio-telephones – for example: [name of agent blacked out] [handwritten note: Schneeberg [illegible word] Aue]

Regional radio headquarters: Frankfurt/Main, Fulda, Offenbach.

[Handwritten note: radio with tape and pencil – then illegible]

Technical aids:

Beyond those already stated:

       (a) Cameras:
       built into glasses case, into wristwatch, cigarette lighter, and fountain pen.
       Chiefly the Minox is used – automatic camera with telephoto lens for railway junction – for example: [name of agent blacked out]

       (b) Bugging equipment: BASA/microphone – e.g. [name of agent blacked out]
       Tapping of telephone cables on roads and in telephone exchange, bugging devices are attached to tape recorders which run for 24 hours. Bugging devices which are equipped with a transmitter have been installed in chandeliers and pocket torches. For example: [name of spy blacked out].

       (c) Devices which record radioactive emissions fixed to railway tracks so as to detect uranium transports – for example: [name of spy blacked out]

       (d) Transport of technical devices, codes, and instructions takes places in packaging materials which are in common use in the GDR, e.g. cans of beef, tins of paint, bars of chocolate, accordions, vacuum cleaners.

III. British secret service:

is divided in West Berlin into:

12 Berlin Intelligence Staff (BIS)[4] carries out only military espionage – mostly groups, partly using army officers without experience of secret service work as members

and

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) – carries out:

       (a) military espionage

       (b) economic[5] and political espionage

Fundamentally rejects the creation of espionage groups.

Base of both departments of the British secret service on the premises of the Reich sports ground (Olympic Stadium Prohibited Zone).

They are directly responsible to the Prime Minister.[6]

Recruitment methods:

Utterly rejects mass recruitment, chiefly makes use of refugees who write to their circle of acquaintances and relatives. [handwritten note: compare with [name blacked out] – direct work on the person in the GDR – summoned[7] by means of letters.

In making recruitments the officers speak openly of the British secret service and as evidence that cooperation will be secure state that no British agents have yet been sentenced on the territory of the GDR, otherwise there would have been articles in the democratic[8] press.

[They] eagerly recruit GM [Geheime Mitarbeiter: secret co-workers], GI [Geheime Informatoren: secret informants] or contacts of the MfS, tell agents to join the SED. [handwritten note: strongly working for “P-sources”[9]]

Maintaining the connection:

The agents are mainly given telephone numbers 93 51 40 or 45.

When calling these numbers from a public telephone in West Berlin the caller’s money is returned after the conversation ends.

[handwritten note: respect when calling – call from [then illegible]]

When the exchange answers, the agent asks for an extension number given to him by the intelligence officer. However, these are agent numbers.

Meeting places: safehouses; cars; car-parks at night; [handwritten note: lorries – with perfectly installed meeting rooms – drive around Berlin – illegible word (cover)]; occasionally also in barracks and in the Olympic Stadium – meetings in bars are ruled out.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that the British secret service uses the wives of agents as couriers.

The conduct of espionage:

Infiltrates agents on long-term basis into state apparatus and party organizations and mass organizations; tells them to appear progressive[10], to join the SED.

Lets agents report orally using microphones,

Information written on Japanese tissue paper, original documents in briefcases with secret compartments.

Gives agents radio sets, however they are not yet in operation, only in case of war, DLBs also only for case of war.

Cover addresses have not yet appeared. [handwritten note: West Germany]

Camera built into petrol cans and briefcases.

IV. French secret service:

Sûreté National – organizes counter-espionage – above all [against the] MfS – [Unger [name]] West Berlin, Müllerstraße, uses violence in interrogations.

DR[11]/Marine – works on Baltic coast – chiefly via Hamburg.

DR/SR[12]: (a) army (b) air force (c) political and economic espionage

Strict seperation of responsibility.

Main base in Germany: Baden-Baden.

West Berlin Quartier Napoleon – Reinickendorf, Kurt-Schumacher-Damm –

Use German employees for recruitment and introduction

Cooperation chiefly with French officers.

Since [Soviet] Note on Berlin[13] use of German employees on a greater scale.

French are making preparations for withdrawal.

Equipping agents with radio sets.

Recruitment methods:

Zoo Station[14] – black market dealer in optical goods – [handwritten note: House of the East German Homeland] – refugee camps about refugees (Fluchtlingslager uber Republikfluchtige) – [two words blacked out] – [handwritten note: exploitation of “Heimatverbände” – revanche[15]].

Aids:

Japanese tissue paper (Seidenpapier)– shoes with hollow sole – radio sets – winder and board which opens out as well as Morse key. [handwritten note: [agent ] does not need to be a radio operator]

Radio sets with tape just like the Americans.

Communication of intelligence:

DLBs, covert addresses in West Germany, couriers – personal meetings in safehouses and bars – radio connections.

Characteristic features:

French secret service is currently generous with financial resources – pays in advance monthly salary for one year, makes agents buy motorbikes and radio sets.

V. Federal Intelligence Service (BND):

1. Structure:

Change in the structure (1. Intelligence collection, 2. Sabotage – Subversion and 3. Counter-espionage)

Now: 1. Spying [handwritten note: Near intelligence collection: GDR; Deep intelligence collection: People’s Democracies; Far intelligence collection: USSR]; 2. War; 3. Intelligence collection and work on hostile intelligence services.

[handwritten note: that is a more prominent feature of the BND’s character]

That is to say: concentration now on war and hostile intelligence services.

Structure of offices (organization) remained as known up to now Headquarters (GD – Geheimdienst), general agencies (GV – Generalvertretungen), district agencies (BV – Bezirksvertretungen), sub-agencies (UV – Untervertretungen), local branches (FL – Filialen), and agent controllers (VMF – Vertrauensmannführer).

Cover: as up to now (firms, trade representatives, and suchlike.)

[handwritten note: without (official) guard – only porters]

The BND’s methods of activity:

       (a) research[16] and recruitment: main territory of research: West Germany, returnees, visitors to West Germany
       Post and foreign offices – surveillance – collecting addresses
       partly West Berlin – exploitation of offices which GDR citizens call at, e.g. Federal Support Offices (131-type pensions[17]) etc.

Selection of recruitment candidates:

Up to now – chiefly Fascists, Wehrmacht and police officers

Today – still the case – but Federal Intelligence Service seeks so-called “party faithful” – people who outwardly support the policy of the Party and state.
[handwritten note: compare [name blacked out] – exploitation of grievance and compromising material]

Recruitment:

Known up to now – German theme – reunification of Germany among other phrases – activity in Nazi Germany revealed

New line: activity in Nazi Germany not revealed – if it is, then flag[18] not revealed.

[handwritten note: general testing by means of 08 tasks, then P-sources (Weinderlich [name])]

       (b) Working methods with agent networks:

       1953-1956 offices (Fl[19]) in West Berlin – severe blows by MfS
       Transfer of all official offices to West Germany “to the secure hinterland.”
       Officers of the Federal Intelligence Service only now come to West Berlin for meetings.[20]
       Constant changing of meeting places (hotels), e.g. [name blacked out]
       Transfer to city districts located far from one another, only now partly in bars. [handwritten note: drives in taxis of more [illegible word]]
Instruction:
meetings also in West Germany
reduce number of meetings.
That is to say: the work from West Germany of the Federal Intelligence Service will increase in future.

       (c) Methods of communicating intelligence:

Secret text [(ST)] process – covert addresses – [handwritten note: ST – Blue]
particularly covert addresses in West Germany/water pressure process, drying process with prepared paper.
The peculiarities of covert addresses in West Germany: addresses of people who do not exist or second address (forwarding job) covert address passes on all messages to a second address – post office boxes and storage card – likewise second address.
– giving of instructions by means of films
13 points – economic spy.
15 points – political spy.
19 points – military spy.
21 points – military/economic spy.
– warning calendar (Warnkalender) handed over on films.
– increased laying of DLBs round Berlin and above all towards West Germany
(motorway, railway lines)
[handwritten note: compare [deleted] telephone smuggling, secret service smuggling (channels and [illegible word])
– dispatch of parcels (parcel of biscuits) with money and intelligence on type-through paper (ST process) to second person.

       Particular novelty – supplying all agents with radio sets – that is to say:
       transmitter – extremely small – with a winder/figures – duration of a normal transmission 20-30 seconds – “radio operator” does not need to be a radio expert.
       reception devices: (shortwave converter) – attachment to radio with headphones – to receive instructions, whereby each operator receives: key, date, time of day, and time when headquarters will repeat [message].
       (speech traffic – not machine)
       Types of radio sets: “Eisenach,” “Rema/800,” “Dominante,” “Stradivari/E9” and all sets with 2 loudspeakers.

Transports and hiding places:

Transport concealed in tins of preserved food from HO [Handelsorganisation: a state-owned network of shops and hotels], even unopened, has been maintained up to recent instructions.
Children’s toy – like cars and toy railway sets etc.
Utensils (pocket mirror) and cigarettes etc.
[Handwritten note: petrol cans – paint tins and some use with set
parcel with pieces of clothing
pieces of clothing in general]

Couriers:

There are specific instructions for selection and collaboration
For example: people who travel a lot (professionally), long-distance drivers, sailors, and suchlike, sales representatives, courier material not to be concealed on body, concealment during transport must offer the chance of abandoning the material easily.

       (e) Other technical aids:

       MINOX cameras
       – Robot Star and Robot Junior with cable release and powerful telephoto lens. Particularly during observation of  MfS offices and officers.

3. Particular installations under attack:

Economic espionage against key parts of the people’s economy (for example: chemistry, coal, energy, or big construction sites – Rostock harbour)

[handwritten note: see in connection with returnees]

Military espionage – all installations of the Soviet army and NVA [Nationale Volksarmee: the East German army.]

Stepped-up activity against the MfS and the organs subordinate to it.

Aim: to penetrate, study, spy, “play games,” smash existing IM [Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter: informants] groups.
Also spying on officers of MfS by means of observations, investigations, conversations, bar visits, drinking bouts, and suchlike.

Introduction of compromised MfS employees to secret service.

Conclusions:

             1. consistent political instruction of officers; each officer – each department must [form] from this corresponding conclusions for investigative work.

             2. increases sharing of experience – give more attention to operational evaluation.

             3. evaluation of investigation cases – more attention to presentation of evidence.
Counter-espionage uses too little operational technology to obtain official evidence.
             for example: photographing meetings by means of an observer.
             Case [name blacked out] – operational combination tank –
             Case [name blacked out] – [handwritten: (photographed handing over spying equipment)]
             therefore important: as the intelligence service now instructs its agents in interrogations to require evidence to be presented [handwritten: e.g. arrest order e.g. [name blacked out]] – no basis for arrest without confession.
             [handwritten: informants’ information: show evidence – otherwise no confession]
             previously: MfS would make use of beatings and other physical means – agents thereby intimidated – the interrogator impressed by correct behaviour – confession.

             4. All members of Departments IX, VII, M, XIV to be instructed about opportunities for concealment –
             most meticulous inspection of all objects found on spies – more use to be made of Department K – [handwritten note: quartz lamp, magnets, X-rays]
             personal participation of interrogators in house searches.

             5. In the future more agent radio operators (every spy can possess a radio set) – question every agent about knowledge of radio – conversations about this with controllers, training and technical devices received – if it is suspected that the agents possess a radio, search with a detection device.

             6. Question migrants from West Germany whether they have been recruited.
             Experiences of the last few months – increase in number of people recruited and sent into the GDR.
             See also Yank method.

particularly Department IX[21] to Western state border – acquisition by some officers of English and French language skills.

[1] This is intelligence jargon for suspending or ending cooperation with agents. [author’s note: Abgeschalten, meaning “swiched off” i.e. agent becomes inactive].

[2] This was a visa issued by the East German People’s Police (the Volkspolizei), permitting East Germans to visit West Germany or West Berlin.

[3] This was when Khrushchev’s ultimatum expired.

[4] The number 12 was a legacy of Occupation days, when each of the various intelligence staffs in cities occupied by the British had different numbers. The intelligence staff in Berlin had the number 12.

[5] For the MfS, economic espionage included scientific espionage, since scientific institutions (the research departments of the big nationalized enterprises and research laboratories and institutes) formed part of the economic complex. Scientific espionage was a key part of the tasking of SIS and the other major Western services.

[6] Translator’s note: The Berlin Intelligence Staff, as a military staff, was under the control of the Secretary of State for Defence. The Secret Intelligence Service is responsible to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[7] meaning: to West Berlin.

[8] In communist jargon “democratic” means “Communist.”

[9] The term used in the text is “P-Quellen.” This means “Penetrierungs-Quellen”: penetration sources.

[10] The term “progressive,” in the Communist lexicon, meant either Communist or sympathetic to Communism.

[11] “DR” probably stands for “Direction de Renseignements” (intelligence directorate).

[12] “SR” stands for “Service de Renseignements” (intelligence service).

[13] Meaning the Soviet Government’s Note of 27 November 1958 to the United States, Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

[14] This is a reference to the Zoologischer Garten railway and subway station in West Berlin.

[15] The “Heimatverbände” were the associations of German expellees from lost German territories in Central and Eastern Europe. The French secret service was exploiting their “revanchisme.”

[16] “Research” here means identifying people who were likely to be good spies and finding out as much as possible about them.

[17] This clearly refers to a type of pension.

[18] “Flag” here means the recruiting secret service.

[19] “Filialen”. See note 39.

[20] Meant here are meetings with their agents.

[21] This being the Investigation Branch, which created this document.

DOCUMENT SUMMARY

Assessment by the Stasi of changes to operations made by the main Western secret services in response to Khrushchev’s November 1958 diplomatic note to the United States, Britain, and France demanding an end to the occupation of West Berlin.

Die miesen Tricks der Stasi-Agenten – Die Romeo-Falle

Während des kalten Krieges versuchte das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit über viele Wege an geheime Informationen und Dokumente zu gelangen. Ein Mittel waren sogenannte “Romeo-Agenten”. Diese Männer wurden von der Stasi, teilweise bereits während des Studiums, angeworben und hatten es auf die Büroleiterinnen von Ministerien und Botschaften in Westdeutschland abgesehen. Sie verführten die jungen Frauen und nutzten deren Vertrauen gnadenlos aus. Mit welchen Tricks die Stasi noch gearbeitet hat, erfahrt Ihr in der Doku “Die Krake – Die Geschichte der Stasi”: https://www.zdf.de/dokumentation/zdf-…