[House Report 112-445]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
112th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 112-445
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CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT
_______
April 17, 2012.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Rogers of Michigan, from the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 3523]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 3523) to provide for the sharing of
certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information
between the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities,
and for other purposes, having considered the same, report
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill
as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Cyber Intelligence Sharing and
Protection Act''.
SEC. 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``cyber threat intelligence and information sharing
``Sec. 1104. (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber Threat
Intelligence With Private Sector.--
``(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall establish procedures to allow elements of the
intelligence community to share cyber threat intelligence with
private-sector entities and to encourage the sharing of such
intelligence.
``(2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The
procedures established under paragraph (1) shall provide that
classified cyber threat intelligence may only be--
``(A) shared by an element of the intelligence
community with--
``(i) certified entities; or
``(ii) a person with an appropriate security
clearance to receive such cyber threat
intelligence;
``(B) shared consistent with the need to protect the
national security of the United States; and
``(C) used by a certified entity in a manner which
protects such cyber threat intelligence from
unauthorized disclosure.
``(3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing that the head of
an element of the intelligence community may, as the head of
such element considers necessary to carry out this subsection--
``(A) grant a security clearance on a temporary or
permanent basis to an employee or officer of a
certified entity;
``(B) grant a security clearance on a temporary or
permanent basis to a certified entity and approval to
use appropriate facilities; and
``(C) expedite the security clearance process for a
person or entity as the head of such element considers
necessary, consistent with the need to protect the
national security of the United States.
``(4) No right or benefit.--The provision of information to a
private-sector entity under this subsection shall not create a
right or benefit to similar information by such entity or any
other private-sector entity.
``(b) Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing of
Cyber Threat Information.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, a cybersecurity provider, with
the express consent of a protected entity for which
such cybersecurity provider is providing goods or
services for cybersecurity purposes, may, for
cybersecurity purposes--
``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify
and obtain cyber threat information to protect
the rights and property of such protected
entity; and
``(ii) share such cyber threat information
with any other entity designated by such
protected entity, including, if specifically
designated, the Federal Government.
``(B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, a self-protected entity may,
for cybersecurity purposes--
``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify
and obtain cyber threat information to protect
the rights and property of such self-protected
entity; and
``(ii) share such cyber threat information
with any other entity, including the Federal
Government.
``(2) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat
information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
``(A) shall only be shared in accordance with any
restrictions placed on the sharing of such information
by the protected entity or self-protected entity
authorizing such sharing, including appropriate
anonymization or minimization of such information;
``(B) may not be used by an entity to gain an unfair
competitive advantage to the detriment of the protected
entity or the self-protected entity authorizing the
sharing of information; and
``(C) if shared with the Federal Government--
``(i) shall be exempt from disclosure under
section 552 of title 5, United States Code;
``(ii) shall be considered proprietary
information and shall not be disclosed to an
entity outside of the Federal Government except
as authorized by the entity sharing such
information; and
``(iii) shall not be used by the Federal
Government for regulatory purposes.
``(3) Exemption from liability.--No civil or criminal cause
of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal or State court
against a protected entity, self-protected entity,
cybersecurity provider, or an officer, employee, or agent of a
protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity
provider, acting in good faith--
``(A) for using cybersecurity systems or sharing
information in accordance with this section; or
``(B) for not acting on information obtained or
shared in accordance with this section.
``(4) Relationship to other laws requiring the disclosure of
information.--The submission of information under this
subsection to the Federal Government shall not satisfy or
affect any requirement under any other provision of law for a
person or entity to provide information to the Federal
Government.
``(c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
``(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber
threat information shared with the Federal Government in
accordance with subsection (b) for any lawful purpose only if--
``(A) the use of such information is not for a
regulatory purpose; and
``(B) at least one significant purpose of the use of
such information is--
``(i) a cybersecurity purpose; or
``(ii) the protection of the national
security of the United States.
``(2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal Government
may not affirmatively search cyber threat information shared
with the Federal Government under subsection (b) for a purpose
other than a purpose referred to in paragraph (1)(B).
``(3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to permit the Federal Government to--
``(A) require a private-sector entity to share
information with the Federal Government; or
``(B) condition the sharing of cyber threat
intelligence with a private-sector entity on the
provision of cyber threat information to the Federal
Government.
``(d) Report on Information Sharing.--
``(1) Report.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall annually submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing a review of the use
of information shared with the Federal Government under this
section, including--
``(A) a review of the use by the Federal Government
of such information for a purpose other than a
cybersecurity purpose;
``(B) a review of the type of information shared with
the Federal Government under this section;
``(C) a review of the actions taken by the Federal
Government based on such information;
``(D) appropriate metrics to determine the impact of
the sharing of such information with the Federal
Government on privacy and civil liberties, if any; and
``(E) any recommendations of the Inspector General
for improvements or modifications to the authorities
under this section.
``(2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
``(e) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any statute of a
State or political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise
expressly regulates an activity authorized under subsection (b).
``(f) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit any other authority to use a cybersecurity system or to identify,
obtain, or share cyber threat intelligence or cyber threat information.
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Certified entity.--The term `certified entity' means a
protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity
provider that--
``(A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a security
clearance, as determined by the Director of National
Intelligence; and
``(B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of
National Intelligence that such provider or such entity
can appropriately protect classified cyber threat
intelligence.
``(2) Cyber threat information.--The term `cyber threat
information' means information directly pertaining to a
vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a
government or private entity, including information pertaining
to the protection of a system or network from--
``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such
system or network; or
``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or
government information, intellectual property, or
personally identifiable information.
``(3) Cyber threat intelligence.--The term `cyber threat
intelligence' means information in the possession of an element
of the intelligence community directly pertaining to a
vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a
government or private entity, including information pertaining
to the protection of a system or network from--
``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such
system or network; or
``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or
government information, intellectual property, or
personally identifiable information.
``(4) Cybersecurity provider.--The term `cybersecurity
provider' means a non-governmental entity that provides goods
or services intended to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
``(5) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term `cybersecurity
purpose' means the purpose of ensuring the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguarding, a system
or network, including protecting a system or network from--
``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such
system or network; or
``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or
government information, intellectual property, or
personally identifiable information.
``(6) Cybersecurity system.--The term `cybersecurity system'
means a system designed or employed to ensure the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguard, a system or
network, including protecting a system or network from--
``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such
system or network; or
``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or
government information, intellectual property, or
personally identifiable information.
``(7) Protected entity.--The term `protected entity' means an
entity, other than an individual, that contracts with a
cybersecurity provider for goods or services to be used for
cybersecurity purposes.
``(8) Self-protected entity.--The term `self-protected
entity' means an entity, other than an individual, that
provides goods or services for cybersecurity purposes to
itself.''.
(b) Procedures and Guidelines.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall--
(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, establish procedures under paragraph (1) of section
1104(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a) of this section, and issue guidelines under
paragraph (3) of such section 1104(a); and
(2) following the establishment of such procedures and the
issuance of such guidelines, expeditiously distribute such
procedures and such guidelines to appropriate Federal
Government and private-sector entities.
(c) Initial Report.--The first report required to be submitted under
subsection (d) of section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by subsection (a) of this section, shall be submitted not later
than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(d) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at
the end the following new item:
``Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.''.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 3523 is to provide for the sharing of
certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information
between the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities,
and other purposes.
Committee Statement and Views
At the beginning of the 112th Congress, the Committee,
under the direction of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member
Ruppersberger, began a bipartisan effort to examine the issue
of cybersecurity.\1\ The goal of this effort was to better
understand the threats facing the nation in cyberspace--with
respect to both the government and in the private sector--and
to determine what the Intelligence Community could do to help
better protect the nation. The results of this review were
stunning: a number of advanced nation-state actors are actively
engaged in a series of wide-ranging, aggressive efforts to
penetrate American computer systems and networks; these efforts
extend well beyond government networks, and reach deep into
nearly every sector of the American economy, including
companies serving critical infrastructure needs.
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\1\This effort involved a series of briefings and hearings,
including one open hearing, to inform Committee members and, where
possible, the public, about the serious national security threat posed
by nation-state actors and other adversaries in the cyber realm. These
meetings, briefings, and hearings were in turn supported by numerous
meetings and briefings conducted by Committee staff with agencies and
individuals from the Executive Branch including, among others, the
White House, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department
of Defense, including the National Security Agency, and with experts
from the academic and think-tank communities. The Committee staff also
held numerous meetings with private sector companies and trade groups
in industries including technology, telecommunications, financial
services, utilities, aerospace, and defense. And the Committee staff
met with representatives of privacy and civil liberties organizations
including the Center for Democracy and Technology, the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Constitution
Project, and the CATO Institute, among others. In total, the Committee
members and staff met with dozens of organizations in conducting its
review over a nearly one-year period.
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Perhaps most troubling, these efforts are targeted not only
at sensitive national security and infrastructure information,
but are also often aimed at stealing the corporate research and
development information that forms the very lifeblood of the
American economy. China, in particular, is engaged in an
extensive, day-in, day-out effort to pillage American corporate
and government information. There can be no question that in
today's modern world, economic security is national security,
and the government must help the private sector protect itself.
The Committee's review also revealed that while the
government is already doing much to provide support and
assistance to the private sector to address this threat, in
particular through DHS and the FBI, more can and should be done
in the immediate future. In particular, the Committee
determined that the Intelligence Community is currently in
possession of tremendously valuable intelligence and strategic
insights derived from its extensive overseas intelligence
collection efforts that can and should be provided--in both
classified and unclassified form (when possible)--to the
private sector in order to help the owners and operators of the
vast majority of America's information infrastructure better
protect themselves. The Committee believes that the recent
Defense Industrial Base Pilot project (``DIB Pilot'') is a good
model for demonstrating how sensitive government threat
intelligence can be shared with the private sector in an
operationally usable manner. Under the DIB Pilot, the
government provides classified threat intelligence to key
Internet Service Providers, who use the information to protect
a limited number of companies in the defense industrial base,
all on a voluntary basis.
The Committee's review also determined that while much
cybersecurity monitoring and threat information sharing takes
place today within the private sector, real and perceived legal
barriers substantially hamper the efforts of the private sector
to protect itself. The Committee determined that these issues
are best resolved in the first instance by providing clear,
positive authority to permit the monitoring--by the private
sector--of privately-owned and operated networks and systems
for the purpose of detecting cybersecurity threats and to
permit the voluntary sharing of information about those threats
and vulnerabilities with others, including entities within the
private sector and with the federal government.
While some have suggested that the private sector needs
more regulation or that the government ought to directly help
defend certain portions of the private sector, the Committee's
view is that the protection of the private sector is best left
in private hands and that the government ought to provide as
much intelligence as possible to the private sector before
reaching for a regulatory ``stick.'' In the view of the
Committee, such an approach--voluntary, private sector defense
of private sector systems and networks informed by government
intelligence information--best protects individual privacy and
takes advantage of the natural incentives built into our
economic system, including harnessing private sector drive and
innovation.
The Committee's review revealed that America's cyber
infrastructure is distressingly vulnerable to espionage and
attacks by nation-states and others with advanced capabilities.
The Committee believes that immediate and serious action is
necessary to staunch the bleeding of American corporate
research and development information and to better protect our
national security. In particular, the Committee believes that
the Intelligence Community must take immediate and decisive
action to provide intelligence to the private sector to help it
better protect itself. In turn, the private sector must act
aggressively to better monitor its own systems and to share
information--both within the private sector and with the
federal government on a purely voluntary basis. The Committee
recognizes that because it focused on the issues within its
jurisdiction, this legislation does not address many of the
other issues facing the nation with respect to cybersecurity.
At the same time, however, the Committee firmly believes that
this legislation is an important first step in the effort to
better protect the nation from advanced cyber threat actors.
Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes
On December 1, 2011, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill H.R. 3523 favorably reported, as amended.
OPEN SESSION
In open session, the Committee considered the text of the
bill H.R. 3523.
Chairman Rogers offered an amendment. The amendment places
additional restrictions on the use by the government of
information obtained pursuant to the bill. The amendment was
agreed to by voice vote.
Mr. Thompson offered an amendment. The amendment requires
an annual report by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community reviewing the use of cyber threat information
provided to the government pursuant to the bill. The amendment
was agreed to by voice vote.
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment providing that the
Director of National Intelligence shall develop and
periodically review policies and procedures governing the
acquisition, retention, use, and disclosure of information
obtained by the intelligence community pursuant to the bill.
Subsequently, Ms. Schakowsky asked for and received unanimous
consent to withdraw the amendment.
The Committee then adopted a motion by the Chairman to
favorably report the bill H.R. 3523 to the House, as amended.
The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 17 ayes to 1 no:
Voting Aye: Chairman Rogers, Mr. Thornberry, Mrs. Myrick,
Mr. Miller, Mr. Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Nunes, Mr.
Westmoreland, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr.
Thompson, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Boren, Mr. Chandler.
Voting No: Ms. Schakowsky.
Section-by-Section Analysis
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
The short title of the Act is the Cyber Intelligence
Sharing and Protection Act.
SECTION 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING
Section 2(a): In General
This subsection of the Act amends Title XI of the National
Security Act of 1947 by adding a new section, Section 1104.
Section 1104(a) of Title 50: Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber
Threat Intelligence with Private Sector
Subsection (a) of new Section 1104 provides for the sharing
of cyber threat intelligence--both classified and
unclassified--by elements of the Intelligence Community with
entities in the private sector. It is the view of the Committee
that the routine and fulsome sharing of such intelligence
information with appropriate cleared entities and individuals
within the private sector is critically important to protecting
the nation from advanced cyber threats. It is critical that as
much information as possible be shared at machine-speed, in
real-time, and in a manner that the information--whether
classified or not--is operationally usable by entities within
the private sector.
This subsection seeks to set forth a general framework and
requires the establishment of specific procedures and
guidelines to make such sharing happen in the immediate future
and to permit such sharing to continue so long as the nation
faces this significant threat to our national security. The
Committee intends to engage in vigorous oversight of the
Intelligence Community use of the authorities under this
section and, in particular, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), which is charged with
promulgating appropriate procedures and guidelines under this
subsection. The Committee expects to be consulted by ODNI in
the formulation of these procedures and guidelines to ensure
that the Committee's intent is achieved by them.
While the term ``private sector'' is not defined in the
legislation, the Committee intends that term to be given the
broadest possible meaning and specifically intends the term to
include utilities, whether organized as public, private, or
quasi-public entities, to ensure at the entities that provide
Americans with access to power, water, gas, and other critical
services are also provided with access to critical federal
government intelligence regarding cyber threats.
In addition, the Committee expects that private sector
entities receiving classified intelligence pursuant to this
subsection will use this information not only to protect their
own systems and networks, but also, where they find appropriate
as a business matter, to sell cybersecurity goods and services
appropriately incorporating this information to protect other
corporate customers.
Paragraph 1: In General
Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) requires the Director of
National Intelligence to establish procedures to allow
intelligence community elements to share cyber threat
intelligence with the private sector and to encourage the
sharing of such intelligence. The Committee intends the DNI's
procedures to create a sea change in the current intelligence
sharing practices of the Intelligence Community with respect to
the private sector.
First, the DNI's procedures should ensure that as much
cyber threat intelligence as possible is downgraded to the
lowest classification level possible, including
declassification where appropriate, and made available to as
broad an audience in the private sector as possible, consistent
with the need to protect the national security.
Second, the DNI's procedures should ensure that cyber
threat intelligence, including classified information, is
routinely and consistently provided out to entities and
individuals in the private sector with the appropriate
clearances.
Paragraph 2: Sharing and Use of Classified Information
Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) requires that the DNI's
procedures with respect to classified cyber threat intelligence
require that classified information only be shared with
certified entities, as defined by the legislation, or with
individuals who possess appropriate security clearances, and be
consistent with the need to protect national security.
Certified entities are cybersecurity providers, protected
entities, or self-protected entities that possess or are
eligible to obtain a security clearance and can demonstrate to
the Director of National Intelligence that they are able to
appropriately protect such classified cyber threat
intelligence.
Paragraph (2) also requires that the DNI's procedures
provide that classified cyber threat intelligence only be used
by certified entities in a manner that protects the classified
information from unauthorized disclosure. This provision
ensures that when certified entities employ classified
intelligence to protect unclassified systems or networks, they
do so in a way that does not reveal classified information
directly or indirectly.
The Committee expects that the DNI's procedures will be
flexible in nature and will take account of private sector
innovation and incorporate current and future information
sharing and security best practices. As a result, the Committee
expects the DNI to work closely with the private sector to
establish these procedures, to work with the private sector to
meet the requirements of the procedures, and to ensure that
these procedures result in the routine and consistent sharing
of operationally-usable cyber threat intelligence. The
Committee also expects the DNI to review and revise these
procedures on a regular basis, at least annually, and to
conduct such review in cooperation with the private sector, as
well as to account for new technologies developed by the
private sector in each set of revised procedures. The DNI
should also strongly consider the establishment of a private-
sector advisory committee composed of senior executives at key
private companies to advise on these procedures on a regular
basis.
Paragraph (3): Security Clearance Approvals
Paragraph (3) requires the DNI to issue guidelines allowing
the head of intelligence community elements to grant temporary
or permanent security clearances to certified entities and
their employees and officers (including non-employee officers
such as board members) in order to allow the government to
share classified cyber security threat intelligence with those
certified entities. The Committee's intent is that the
intelligence community grant security clearances to entities
that are involved in protecting their own and their corporate
customers' networks from cyber threats and that the
intelligence community share cyber threat intelligence to
protect the nation from advanced cyber threat actors. In
particular, the Committee wishes to ensure that the private
sector be able to receive highly classified cyber threat
intelligence, including at the Top Secret/Sensitive
Compartmented Information level, as appropriate to protect
national security. The Committee is concerned that certain
industries and entities may currently lack sufficient
clearances at the appropriate level.
Paragraph (3) also requires the DNI's guidelines to allow
intelligence community elements to grant approval for the use
of appropriate facilities and to expedite security clearances
as necessary, consistent with the need to protect national
security. The Committee's intent is that the approval process
for the granting of security clearances and the use of
facilities for the handling of classified information be
expedited and broadened by these provisions.
Because additional security clearances or facility
approvals may be necessary to effectuate the goals of this
legislation, it is further the Committee's intent that the cost
for these security clearances and facility approvals, as well
as the underlying investigations and adjudications necessary to
obtain and maintain them, be fully borne by the private sector.
As noted above, it is the Committee's intent that private
sector entities that become certified entities will be able to
better protect themselves, as well as to sell cybersecurity
goods and services appropriately incorporating this information
to protect other corporate customers in the private sector. It
is therefore the Committee's view that these entities should
bear the full cost of obtaining access to the valuable cyber
threat intelligence the government will provide under the
legislation to certified entities. The Committee therefore
expects that the DNI's guidelines authorized by the legislation
will provide for full payment of such costs by the private
sector entity obtaining the security clearances or facility
approvals.
Paragraph 4: No Right or Benefit
Paragraph (4) makes clear that while the Committee expects
the Intelligence Community to work with private sector entities
to help them meet the requirements to serve as a certified
entity, no private sector entity is entitled to receive cyber
threat intelligence from the government and that no right or
benefit to cyber threat intelligence is created by the
provision of such intelligence to a particular private sector
entity or group of entities.
Section 1104(b) of Title 50: Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity
Systems and Sharing of Cyber Threat Information
Subsection (b) of new Section 1104 provides clear, positive
authority, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to
private sector entities to monitor their own systems and
networks or those of their corporate customers through the use
of cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain cyber threat
information, and to mitigate threat or vulnerabilities to their
own systems or networks or those of their corporate customers.
The Committee intends the notwithstanding clauses contained in
subsection (b), as applied to this authority, to have the
effect of removing any prohibition, real or perceived, to the
monitoring, for cybersecurity purposes, of private sector
systems and networks by the private sector entities that own
the systems or networks or by security companies contracted by
the system or network owner to protect those networks and
systems. Potential barriers to such cybersecurity monitoring
include federal laws governing electronic surveillance.
Subsection (b) also provides clear, positive authority,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the private
sector to share cyber threat information identified and
obtained through such cybersecurity monitoring with other
entities within the private sector, as well as with the Federal
Government on a purely voluntary basis, at the discretion of
the private sector entities whose systems or networks are being
protected. The Committee intends the notwithstanding clauses
contained in subsection (b), as applied to this authority, to
have the effect of removing any prohibition, real or perceived,
to the sharing of cyber threat information within the private
sector, as well as with the Federal Government. Potential
barriers to such sharing that would be addressed by this
provision include, but are not limited to, provisions of
federal antitrust law, which some believe may limit sharing of
cyber threat information between competitors in the private
sector, as well as provisions of other federal laws including
the telecommunications laws. The Committee's intent in
addressing antitrust issues, amongst others, is to permit
information sharing about cyber threats that might be hampered
by such laws, not to permit inappropriate and unlawful
activity, such as the coordinated fixing of prices.
The Committee notes that the protections related to the
authorities provided in this section are fairly robust, even
standing alone. First, as noted below, only cyber threat
information--that is information about a threat to, or
vulnerability of government or private systems or networks--may
be identified, obtained, or shared. And any such monitoring or
sharing may only take place for cybersecurity purposes. And
finally, the liability protection provided in this subsection
only applies when an entity is acting in good faith. These
provisions, taken together and building on top of one another,
in the Committee's view, are a strong step towards protecting
the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.
Paragraph 1: In General
Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) provides the twin
authorities discussed above to cybersecurity providers, who
provide goods and services to their corporate customers for
cybersecurity purposes and to self-protected entities, who
provide such cybersecurity goods and services for themselves.
In providing these authorities, the legislation makes clear
that the monitoring and sharing of information either by a
cybersecurity provider or a self-protected entity may only take
place for cybersecurity purposes, a defined term that, as
discussed below, limits the identification, obtaining, and
sharing of cyber threat information to the protection of
private or government systems or networks from threat to, or
vulnerabilities, of those systems or networks.
Similarly, the identification and obtaining of cyber threat
information by a provider or a self-protected entity may only
take place as part of an effort to protect the rights and
properties of the provider's corporate customer or the self-
protected entity itself, as the case may be. In this context,
it is the Committee's intent that the protection of the rights
and property of a corporate entity includes, but is not limited
to, the protection of the systems and networks that make up its
own corporate internal and external information systems but
also the systems and networks over which it provides services
to its customers. For example, the Committee expects that an
internet service provider or telecommunications company may
seek to protect not only its own corporate networks but also
the backbone communications systems and networks over which it
provides services to its customers. Similarly, for example, the
Committee expects that a utility may seek not only to protect
its corporate network but may seek to protect the systems and
networks over which it provides electricity, water, or gas
services to its customers. The Committee specifically intends
the authorities provided in subsection (b) to permit private
sector entities to protect such systems and networks.
Paragraph (1) also requires that a cybersecurity provider
obtain the express consent, whether in writing, electronically,
orally, or otherwise, of its corporate customer before
conducting any cybersecurity monitoring or sharing under these
authorities. It is the Committee's intent that express consent
may be provided on a going-forward basis by a corporate
customer to a provider for a specified period of time, to be
determined by the corporate customer.
In addition, paragraph (1) makes clear that the sharing of
information either by a cybersecurity provider or a self-
protected entity is to be purely voluntary and at the
discretion of the entity whose systems or networks are being
protected. Moreover, the legislation requires that where a
provider is doing the sharing on behalf of a corporate
customer, the customer must designate the entities or group of
entities it wishes to share information with, and that it must
specifically designate the Federal Government if it wishes to
share information with the government.
It is the Committee's expectation that many entities will
be able to take advantage of the authorities provided in
paragraph (1) when acting both as a cybersecurity provider and
as a self-protected entity. For example, an entity such as an
internet service provider may act as a cybersecurity provider
when providing managed security services to a corporate
customer and may simultaneously be acting as a self-protected
entity when protecting its own corporate systems and networks
as well as the systems and networks over which it provides
services to its customers. The Committee's intent is that
private sector entities will be able to simultaneously take
advantage of multiple authorities provided within the
legislation.
Paragraph 2: Use and Protection of Information
Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) provides protections to
promote the robust sharing of cyber threat information both
within the private sector as well as from the private sector to
the government on a purely voluntary basis.
Paragraph (2) provides that cyber threat information shared
pursuant to paragraph (1) may only be shared in accordance with
restrictions placed upon such sharing by the protected entity
or the self-protected entity whose systems and networks are
being protected and who therefore authorized the sharing.
Paragraph (2) further provides that these restrictions may
include the appropriate anonymization or minimization as
determined by the protected entity or self-protected entity
authorizing the sharing.
The Committee's intent is that through paragraph (1) and
paragraph (2), a private sector entity choosing to share cyber
threat information under these provisions has complete control
over whom it shares with and what information it shares,
including whether the information it shares is anonymized or
minimized. The Committee believes that leaving the decision to
share and the execution of desired anonymization and
minimization in the hands of the private sector entities whose
systems and networks are being protected, rather than in the
hands of the party receiving the information, including the
government, helps enhance privacy and civil liberties.
Paragraph (2) also provides that information shared
pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be used by a receiving entity
to gain an unfair competitive advantage to the detriment of the
entity sharing the information. The Committee intends this
provision to highlight that cybersecurity is enhanced by robust
threat information sharing within the private sector, both
amongst partners and competitors, without fear that a
competitor will use the cyber threat or vulnerability
information to unfairly obtain greater market share rather than
simply to protect itself. The situation the Committee intends
this provision to address is best demonstrated by an example:
Company A shares information about a cyber vulnerability in one
of its products with Company B, a competitor in the same
marketplace; Company B the next day puts out an advertisement
saying, ``Don't buy Company A's product because it has the
following vulnerability . . . instead, buy our product which
doesn't have the same vulnerabilities.'' This example would, in
the Committee's view, constitute gaining an unfair competitive
advantage at the expense of the entity sharing the information.
This provision does not prevent any company from obtaining a
fair competitive advantage by, for example, using the shared
information to build a better, more secure product that can be
marketed without reference to a vulnerability shared by a
particular entity.
Paragraph (2) further provides that cyber threat
information voluntarily shared with the Federal Government
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be exempt from disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act, shall be considered proprietary
information, shall not be disclosed by the Federal Government
to an entity outside the Federal Government except as
authorized by the entity sharing the information, and shall not
be used by the Federal Government for regulatory purposes. The
Committee intends this provision to address the key concerns
expressed by the private sector regarding the sharing of their
sensitive information with the federal government: first, that
the government might expose its most sensitive threat and
vulnerability information to a wide audience either through
FOIA or by publishing the information, thereby providing a
roadmap for attacks by cyber threat actors; second, that the
government might take the information provided by the private
sector and use it to regulate or impose sanctions upon them.
The Committee determined that the best way to address these
concerns and incentivize the sharing of cyber threat
information with the government was to explicitly and clearly
protect the information provided in this cybersecurity channel
from being disclosed under FOIA, to require the government to
carefully protect the information, and finally, to prohibit the
government from using information provided in this
cybersecurity channel from being used for regulatory purposes.
The Committee was cognizant of the fact that cyber threat
information provided to the government under these authorities
might also be required to be provided by certain private sector
entities to their regulators and therefore provided elsewhere
in the legislation that the mere classification of the
information as cyber threat information or its provision to the
government under this mechanism does not satisfy those
regulatory requirements nor override any appropriate regulation
that may take place based on the provision of such information
to the government through other channels. Nor would these
provisions prevent a third party from obtaining appropriate
information through an otherwise appropriate FOIA request to a
regulator who obtained the information under other regulatory
authorities. Rather, the limitations here were designed to
provide a safe harbor where private sector entities could
provide real-time cyber threat information to the government
without fear that that particular information would be used to
regulate them directly or be exploited by bad actors.
Paragraph 3: Exemption from Liability
Paragraph (3) provides a bar to civil or criminal causes of
action being brought or maintained in federal or state court
against an entity or its officers, employees, or agents acting
in good faith to use cybersecurity systems for monitoring to
identify and obtain cyber threat information in accordance with
the provisions of the legislation. The Committee's intent is to
provide strong liability protection for private sector entities
when they act to take advantage of the authorities provided
under paragraph (1) of subsection (b) to do what the statute
seeks to encourage them to do: robustly monitor their own
systems and networks and those of their corporate customers and
share information about threats and vulnerabilities to better
protect their systems. Specifically, the Committee intends that
civil or criminal actions based on the use of cybersecurity
systems to monitor systems or networks to identify and obtain
cyber threat information using the authorities of this statute
shall be dismissed immediately by the courts and prior to
significant discovery and extensive motion practice.
Paragraph (3) also provides an identical bar to actions
against such entities acting in good faith for not acting on
information obtained or shared in accordance with the
provisions of the legislation. The Committee's intent is
likewise to provide strong liability protection to entities
when they engage in robust cyber threat information sharing so
that they are not held liable for not acting on every piece of
cyber threat intelligence provided by the government or every
piece of cyber threat information that they detect or receive
from another private sector entity. The Committee believes that
if information sharing does become truly robust, the amount of
cyber threat information and the speed with which such
information will be shared will make it nearly impossible to
always protect against every threat in real-time and, as such,
private sector entities ought not be held liable for such
actions. Similarly, the Committee recognizes that particular
entities may engage in a cost-benefit analysis with respect to
implementing protections against particular threats and the
Committee intends this provision to help ensure that a private
sector entity making such a judgment not be held liable for
making such reasonable determinations.
At the same time, the Committee was fully cognizant of the
concern that it not create a moral hazard by providing too
broad a liability protection provision and that it not
incentivize bad acts. As a result, Paragraph (3) requires that
the entity be acting in good faith to obtain the benefits of
this liability protection. That is, where an entity acts in bad
faith, it does not receive the benefit of the strong liability
protection provided by the legislation. Of course, where an
entity is seeking to take advantage of specific statutory
authority provided by Congress and where Congress is seeking to
incentivize cybersecurity activities, as with government action
taken pursuant to statutory authority and the presumption of
regularity that attaches to such actions, the Committee expects
that good faith will be presumed in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary.
Paragraph 4: Relationship to Other Laws Requiring the
Disclosure of Information
Paragraph (4) provides that the provision of cyber threat
information to the government under the voluntary system
established by this statute does not satisfy or affect any
requirement under other provisions of law to provide
information to the Federal Government. As noted briefly
earlier, the Committee intends this provision to ensure that
while information provided to the government under this
legislation is protected from use by the government for
regulatory purposes, that information otherwise required to be
provided to the government must still be provided and that such
information--required by other law to be provided to the
government--may still be used for all lawful purposes,
including, as required by law, for regulatory purposes.
Section 1104(c) of Title 50: Federal Government Use of Information
Subsection (c) of new Section 1104 provides certain
limitations on the government's use of information provided by
the private sector and ensures that the private sector's
provision of information to the government is purely voluntary.
The Committee intends these provisions, along with others in
the legislation, to help protect the privacy and civil
liberties of Americans.
Paragraph (1): Limitation
Paragraph (1) of subsection (c) limits the Federal
Government's use of information shared with the government by
the private sector by requiring at least one significant
purpose of the government's use of such information to be
either a cybersecurity purpose or the protection of the
national security of the United States. As such, the Committee
intends this provision not to create a wall between
cybersecurity and national security uses of information on one
hand and all other lawful government uses on the other, rather
it intends this provision simply to ensure that the government
is using the information at least for cybersecurity or national
security, amongst the other uses it might make of the
information.
Paragraph (2): Affirmative Search Restriction
Paragraph (2) limits the Federal Government's affirmative
searching of data provided exclusively under this legislation
to the government by the private sector to only conducting such
searches for cybersecurity purposes or the protection of the
national security. The Committee intends this provision to
ensure that information provided under this authority not be
affirmatively searched by the government for evidence of
garden-variety crimes like tax evasion or money laundering.
Paragraph 3: Anti-Tasking Restrictions
Paragraph (3) makes clear that nothing in this legislation
permits the government to require a private sector entity to
share with the Federal Government nor to condition the sharing
of cyber threat intelligence under subsection (a) on the
provision of cyber threat information back to the Federal
Government under subsection (b). The Committee intends this
provision to ensure that cyber threat information sharing by
the private sector with the Federal Government remains purely
voluntary and that the government not attempt to compel such
sharing by withholding valuable cyber threat intelligence. The
Committee believes that this provision also prevents the
government from ``tasking'' the collection of information as
the government might do under appropriate criminal or foreign
intelligence surveillance authority because it ensures that the
private sector cannot be required to provide information back
to the government.
Section 1104(d) of Title 50: Report on Information Sharing
Subsection (d) of new Section 1104 requires the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community to report annually to the
Congressional intelligence committees, in unclassified form
accompanied by a classified annex as needed, on the use of the
information shared with the Federal Government under this
legislation. The report on the use of information shared with
the Federal Government will include: (1) a review of the use of
such information for purposes other than cybersecurity; (2) a
review of the type of information shared with the Federal
Government; (3) a review of the actions taken by the Federal
Government based on the information shared; (4) appropriate
metrics to determine the impact of such sharing on privacy and
civil liberties, if any such impact exists; and (5) any
recommendations of the Inspector General for improvements or
modifications to the authorities provided under this
legislation. It is the Committee's intent that this report
provide the Committee with the information it needs to ensure
that the privacy and civil liberties of Americans are being
appropriately protected.
Section 1104(e) of Title 50: Federal Preemption
Subsection (e) of new Section 1104 provides that the
legislation supersedes any provision of state or local law that
may prohibit the activities authorized by this legislation. The
Committee's intent is to ensure, as with the federal provisions
discussed above, that state and local law on wiretapping,
antitrust, and public disclosure, to name but a few, do not
stand as a bar to the kind of robust cyber threat intelligence
and information sharing that the Committee hopes to engender
through the process of legislation.
Section 1104(f) of Title 50: Savings Clause
Subsection (f) of new Section 1104 makes clear that nothing
in this legislation trumps existing laws or authorities
permitting the use of cybersecurity systems or efforts to
identify, obtain, or share cyber threat information. Many
private sector entities today take advantage of certain
provisions of federal law to conduct the limited monitoring for
cybersecurity purposes. While this legislation provides much
more robust authorities, the Committee believed it important to
ensure that existing authorities remained in place and that
those authorities could continue to be used by the appropriate
government agencies and entities.
Section 1104(g) of Title 50: Definitions
Subsection (g) of the new Section 1104 provides important
definitions for the purpose of this legislation. The Committee
notes that much of the work on limiting the scope and breadth
of this legislation is done by the definitions and commends
those interested in this legislation to carefully review these
definitions in the context of the legislation.
Paragraph 1: Certified Entity
As noted briefly above, a certified entity is defined as a
cybersecurity provider, a protected entity, or a self-protected
entity that also possesses or is eligible to obtain a security
clearance at the level appropriate to receive classified cyber
threat intelligence, as determined by the DNI, and can
demonstrate to the Director of National Intelligence that it
can appropriately protect that classified information.
Paragraph 2: Cyber Threat Information
Cyber threat information is defined to mean information
that directly pertains to a vulnerability of, or threat to, a
system or network of a government or private entity. Such
information includes, but is not limited to, information
pertaining to the protection of a system or network from
efforts to degrade, disrupt or destroy the network, as well as
the protection of a system or network from the theft or
misappropriation of private or government information, among
other things.
Paragraph 3: Cyber Threat Intelligence
The definition of cyber threat intelligence is consistent
with the definition of cyber threat information except that
cyber threat intelligence is information that is originally in
the possession of an element of the intelligence community. The
Committee used different terms in this legislation with similar
definitions in order to distinguish the origin of information.
Cyber threat intelligence thus originates with the government
while cyber threat information originates with the private
sector.
Paragraph 4: Cybersecurity Provider
A cybersecurity provider is defined to be a non-
governmental entity that provides goods or services intended to
be used for cybersecurity purposes. The Committee intentionally
excluded governmental entities from this construct to avoid any
concern that government agencies might serve as cybersecurity
providers to private sector entities.
Paragraph 5: Cybersecurity Purpose
A cybersecurity purpose is defined as the purpose of
ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of,
or safeguarding, a system or network. This includes, but is not
limited to, the protection of a system or network from efforts
to degrade, disrupt or destroy the network, as well as the
protection of a system or network from the theft or
misappropriation of private or government information, among
other things.
Paragraph 6: Cybersecurity System
A cybersecurity system is defined as a system designed or
employed to ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and
availability of, or safeguard, a system or network. This
includes, but is not limited to, a system designed or employed
to protect a system or network from efforts to degrade, disrupt
or destroy the network, as well as a system designed or
employed to protect a system or network from the theft or
misappropriation of private or government information, among
other things.
Paragraph 7: Protected Entity
A protected entity is defined as an entity, other than an
individual, that contracts with a cybersecurity provider for
goods or services to be used for cybersecurity purposes. The
Committee intentionally excluded individuals from this
definition so as to limit the direct scope of the legislation
to the protection of corporate entities.
Paragraph 8: Self-Protected Entity
A self-protected entity is defined as an entity, other than
an individual, that provides goods or services for
cybersecurity purposes to itself. As with the definition of a
protected entity, the Committee intentionally excluded
individuals from this definition so as to limit the direct
scope of the legislation to the protection of corporate
entities.
Section 2(b): Procedures and Guidelines
This subsection of the Act requires the DNI to establish
the procedures for sharing of cyber threat intelligence and to
issue the guidelines for granting security clearances within 60
days of the date of enactment of the Act. This subsection of
the Act also requires the DNI to expeditiously distribute the
procedures and guidelines to appropriate federal government and
private sector entities. The Committee intends to require the
DNI to meet these deadlines and to broadly distribute the
procedures and guidelines. As previously noted, the Committee
expects the DNI to work closely with the private sector in
developing these procedures and guidelines.
Section 2(c): Initial Report
This subsection of the Act requires the first report to be
provided to the Congressional intelligence committees by the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community under new
subsection (d) of section 1104 to be provided no later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 2(d): Table of Contents Amendment
This subsection of the Act provides for amendments to the
table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947.
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee held two closed
hearings, one open hearing, and four informal meetings or
briefings relating to the subject matter of the legislation.
The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects conclusions
reached by the Committee in light of this oversight activity.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
In accordance with clause 3(c) of House rule XIII, the
Committee's performance goals and objectives are reflected in
the descriptive portions of this report.
Unfunded Mandate Statement
Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office
included herein.
Statement on Congressional Earmarks
Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the Committee states that the bill as
reported contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits.
Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office
Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to requirements of 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the following
cost estimate for H.R. 3523 from the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, December 16, 2011.
Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3523, the Cyber
Intelligence Sharing Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason
Wheelock.
Sincerely,
Douglas W. Elmendorf.
Enclosure.
H.R. 3523--Cyber Intelligence Sharing Act
H.R. 3523 would amend the National Security Act of 1947 to
require the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to
establish procedures to promote the sharing of information
about cyberthreats between intelligence agencies and the
private sector. The DNI also would be directed to establish
guidelines for granting security clearances to employees of the
private-sector entities with which the government shares such
information. CBO estimates that implementing the bill would
have a discretionary cost of $15 million over the 2012-2016
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.
Enacting H.R. 3523 would not affect direct spending or
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
CBO anticipates additional personnel would be needed to
administer the program and to manage the exchange of
information between intelligence agencies and the private
sector. Based on information from the DNI and the Office of
Personnel Management, CBO estimates that those activities would
cost approximately $3 million annually over the 2012-2016
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.
The bill would impose intergovernmental and private-sector
mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA), by extending civil and criminal liability protection to
entities and cybersecurity providers that share or use
cyberthreat information. The bill also would impose additional
intergovernmental mandates by preempting state laws. Because
CBO is uncertain about the number of cases that would be
limited and any forgone compensation that would result, CBO
cannot determine whether the costs of the mandate would exceed
the annual threshold established in UMRA for private-sector
mandates ($142 million in 2011, adjusted annually for
inflation). However, CBO estimates that the aggregate costs of
the mandates on public entities would fall below the threshold
for intergovernmental mandates ($71 million in 2011, adjusted
annually for inflation).
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Jason Wheelock
(for federal costs), J'nell J. Blanco (for the
intergovernmental impact), and Elizabeth Bass (for the private-
sector impact). This estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo,
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is
printed in italic and existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
SHORT TITLE
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING
Sec. 1104. (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber Threat
Intelligence With Private Sector.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish procedures to allow
elements of the intelligence community to share cyber
threat intelligence with private-sector entities and to
encourage the sharing of such intelligence.
(2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The
procedures established under paragraph (1) shall
provide that classified cyber threat intelligence may
only be--
(A) shared by an element of the intelligence
community with--
(i) certified entities; or
(ii) a person with an appropriate
security clearance to receive such
cyber threat intelligence;
(B) shared consistent with the need to
protect the national security of the United
States; and
(C) used by a certified entity in a manner
which protects such cyber threat intelligence
from unauthorized disclosure.
(3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing
that the head of an element of the intelligence
community may, as the head of such element considers
necessary to carry out this subsection--
(A) grant a security clearance on a temporary
or permanent basis to an employee or officer of
a certified entity;
(B) grant a security clearance on a temporary
or permanent basis to a certified entity and
approval to use appropriate facilities; and
(C) expedite the security clearance process
for a person or entity as the head of such
element considers necessary, consistent with
the need to protect the national security of
the United States.
(4) No right or benefit.--The provision of
information to a private-sector entity under this
subsection shall not create a right or benefit to
similar information by such entity or any other
private-sector entity.
(b) Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing
of Cyber Threat Information.--
(1) In general.--
(A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, a cybersecurity
provider, with the express consent of a
protected entity for which such cybersecurity
provider is providing goods or services for
cybersecurity purposes, may, for cybersecurity
purposes--
(i) use cybersecurity systems to
identify and obtain cyber threat
information to protect the rights and
property of such protected entity; and
(ii) share such cyber threat
information with any other entity
designated by such protected entity,
including, if specifically designated,
the Federal Government.
(B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, a self-protected
entity may, for cybersecurity purposes--
(i) use cybersecurity systems to
identify and obtain cyber threat
information to protect the rights and
property of such self-protected entity;
and
(ii) share such cyber threat
information with any other entity,
including the Federal Government.
(2) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat
information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
(A) shall only be shared in accordance with
any restrictions placed on the sharing of such
information by the protected entity or self-
protected entity authorizing such sharing,
including appropriate anonymization or
minimization of such information;
(B) may not be used by an entity to gain an
unfair competitive advantage to the detriment
of the protected entity or the self-protected
entity authorizing the sharing of information;
and
(C) if shared with the Federal Government--
(i) shall be exempt from disclosure
under section 552 of title 5, United
States Code;
(ii) shall be considered proprietary
information and shall not be disclosed
to an entity outside of the Federal
Government except as authorized by the
entity sharing such information; and
(iii) shall not be used by the
Federal Government for regulatory
purposes.
(3) Exemption from liability.--No civil or criminal
cause of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal
or State court against a protected entity, self-
protected entity, cybersecurity provider, or an
officer, employee, or agent of a protected entity,
self-protected entity, or cybersecurity provider,
acting in good faith--
(A) for using cybersecurity systems or
sharing information in accordance with this
section; or
(B) for not acting on information obtained or
shared in accordance with this section.
(4) Relationship to other laws requiring the
disclosure of information.--The submission of
information under this subsection to the Federal
Government shall not satisfy or affect any requirement
under any other provision of law for a person or entity
to provide information to the Federal Government.
(c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber
threat information shared with the Federal Government
in accordance with subsection (b) for any lawful
purpose only if--
(A) the use of such information is not for a
regulatory purpose; and
(B) at least one significant purpose of the
use of such information is--
(i) a cybersecurity purpose; or
(ii) the protection of the national
security of the United States.
(2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal
Government may not affirmatively search cyber threat
information shared with the Federal Government under
subsection (b) for a purpose other than a purpose
referred to in paragraph (1)(B).
(3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this
section shall be construed to permit the Federal
Government to--
(A) require a private-sector entity to share
information with the Federal Government; or
(B) condition the sharing of cyber threat
intelligence with a private-sector entity on
the provision of cyber threat information to
the Federal Government.
(d) Report on Information Sharing.--
(1) Report.--The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall annually submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report
containing a review of the use of information shared
with the Federal Government under this section,
including--
(A) a review of the use by the Federal
Government of such information for a purpose
other than a cybersecurity purpose;
(B) a review of the type of information
shared with the Federal Government under this
section;
(C) a review of the actions taken by the
Federal Government based on such information;
(D) appropriate metrics to determine the
impact of the sharing of such information with
the Federal Government on privacy and civil
liberties, if any; and
(E) any recommendations of the Inspector
General for improvements or modifications to
the authorities under this section.
(2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(e) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any statute
of a State or political subdivision of a State that restricts
or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under
subsection (b).
(f) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit any other authority to use a cybersecurity
system or to identify, obtain, or share cyber threat
intelligence or cyber threat information.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Certified entity.--The term ``certified entity''
means a protected entity, self-protected entity, or
cybersecurity provider that--
(A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a
security clearance, as determined by the
Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of
National Intelligence that such provider or
such entity can appropriately protect
classified cyber threat intelligence.
(2) Cyber threat information.--The term ``cyber
threat information'' means information directly
pertaining to a vulnerability of, or threat to, a
system or network of a government or private entity,
including information pertaining to the protection of a
system or network from--
(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy
such system or network; or
(B) theft or misappropriation of private or
government information, intellectual property,
or personally identifiable information.
(3) Cyber threat intelligence.--The term ``cyber
threat intelligence'' means information in the
possession of an element of the intelligence community
directly pertaining to a vulnerability of, or threat
to, a system or network of a government or private
entity, including information pertaining to the
protection of a system or network from--
(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy
such system or network; or
(B) theft or misappropriation of private or
government information, intellectual property,
or personally identifiable information.
(4) Cybersecurity provider.--The term ``cybersecurity
provider'' means a non-governmental entity that
provides goods or services intended to be used for
cybersecurity purposes.
(5) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term ``cybersecurity
purpose'' means the purpose of ensuring the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguarding, a
system or network, including protecting a system or
network from--
(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy
such system or network; or
(B) theft or misappropriation of private or
government information, intellectual property,
or personally identifiable information.
(6) Cybersecurity system.--The term ``cybersecurity
system'' means a system designed or employed to ensure
the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of, or
safeguard, a system or network, including protecting a
system or network from--
(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy
such system or network; or
(B) theft or misappropriation of private or
government information, intellectual property,
or personally identifiable information.
(7) Protected entity.--The term ``protected entity''
means an entity, other than an individual, that
contracts with a cybersecurity provider for goods or
services to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
(8) Self-protected entity.--The term ``self-protected
entity'' means an entity, other than an individual,
that provides goods or services for cybersecurity
purposes to itself.
MINORITY VIEWS
Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523
As members of the Intelligence Committee, it is our
responsibility to ensure that intelligence support to the
cybersecurity of our nation is focused and robust. The
Intelligence Community's unique insight and knowledge of
cyberspace are critical to our nation's ability to defend, not
only U.S. Government information technology, but also our
Critical Infrastructure and Defense Industrial Base.
This Bill is the culmination of a strong bipartisan effort
and provides an innovative, yet pragmatic, approach to
cybersecurity. It leverages the Intelligence Community's
expertise and incentivizes the private sector to share cyber
threat information in order to build an enduring private-public
partnership for this strategic threat to our nation's security.
Specifically, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act
provides the authority for the Intelligence Community to share
classified cyber threat intelligence with properly-vetted
industry partners and encourages the voluntary sharing of cyber
threat information with the U.S. Government.
It is the Minority's strong intent in supporting this Bill
to facilitate this private-public sharing of information
regarding malevolent cyber activity in a way that ensures that
the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons are respected
and protected. An equitable and ethical balance between
flexible information sharing and privacy must be established,
maintained and vigilantly reviewed.
We express continued interest in working with the Majority
to further address concerns raised by the Administration and
civil liberties organizations.
We believe that this Bill and its amendments strike this
delicate balance by requiring that any shared information used
by the Government meet a cybersecurity or national security
threshold and by prohibiting the Government's use of shared
information for regulatory purposes. Moreover, in recognition
that this Bill is a pioneering effort, this Committee is fully
committed to diligent oversight of the parties' conduct
pursuant to this Bill.
The Bill directs the Intelligence Community Inspector
General to be alert to and review any U.S. Government activity
or use of shared information that goes beyond the cybersecurity
focus of this Bill. Should that oversight identify significant
concerns or abuse, the Minority is committed to working with
the Majority to take all appropriate and timely action to
further enhance privacy protections.
To repeat: the Minority supported this Bill in the
expectation that, both the participating private companies and
the Government, will appreciate and not abuse the flexibility
and liability protection afforded by this Bill. With the
dedicated support of both government and industry--overlaid
with Congressional oversight--we are optimistic that this Bill
will work as envisioned to strengthen cybersecurity in a manner
that respects American values.
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.
Mike Thompson.
Jim Langevin.
Adam B. Schiff.
Dan Boren.
Ben Chandler.
MINORITY VIEWS
Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523
The intent of this Bill is to authorize the U.S. Government
to share classified cybersecurity intelligence with the private
sector in a secure manner and to enable the private sector to
share cybersecurity information with the U.S. Government in
real-time, without fear of liability if acting in good faith.
I agree that we are facing serious cyber threats and that
all Americans will benefit from strong cybersecurity
protections for our critical infrastructure. However, I believe
we need to balance those concerns with measures to protect the
privacy and civil liberties that Americans also deserve. While
I appreciate the efforts of authors of this bipartisan bill and
its focus on cybersecurity, I believe that balance has not yet
been achieved.
Although the Bill includes adequate protections for
classified information and corporate proprietary information,
its language does not provide commensurate protection for the
personal accounts of U.S. persons or personal identifiable
information (PII). For example, the Bill's language does not
restrict the nature or volume of the information that the
private sector can share with the Government, does not provide
for mandatory minimization of PII, does not significantly
curtail the Government's use of shared information, and does
not include most of the privacy protections recommended by the
White House in its proposed cybersecurity legislation.
I am also concerned that the new liability shield provided
in the Bill is overly broad and is less protective of consumers
than similar shields provided under many state laws. We should
be very careful whenever we limit injured consumers' ability to
seek legal redress. If a good faith requirement is to be used,
it should be based on clear and objective criteria. In no
event, however, should cybersecurity entities be protected if
injuries are the result of neglect, recklessness or misconduct.
Accordingly, while I strongly agree with the need to enact
effective cybersecurity legislation, and commend the
constructive bipartisan effort underlying this Bill, I
respectively dissent because the Bill does not sufficiently
protect individual privacy rights and civil liberties.
Janice D. Schakowsky.
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Modified Humvee vehicles from the 1st Battalion 200th Air Defense Artillery of the New Mexico National Guard are shown Friday, July 30, 2004, at the unit’s headquarters in Roswell, N.M. About 200 Guard members soon will bolster air defenses near Washington, D.C., in these modified vehicles, carrying up to 288 Stinger missiles. Each Humvee has a turret with 8 missile launchers on top, and there are 36 of the vehicles to be used under the Avenger weapons system, Air Defense Artillery, Maj. Ken Nava said Friday. (AP Photo/Roswell Daily Record, Andrew Poertner)![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/eyeball/wny-mb/pict6.jpg)
Modified Humvee vehicles from the 1st Battalion 200th Air Defense Artillery of the New Mexico National Guard are shown Friday, July 30, 2004, at the unit’s headquarters in Roswell, N.M. About 200 Guard members soon will bolster air defenses near Washington, D.C., in these modified vehicles, carrying up to 288 Stinger missiles. Each Humvee has a turret with 8 missile launchers on top, and there are 36 of the vehicles to be used under the Avenger weapons system, Air Defense Artillery, Maj. Ken Nava said Friday. (AP Photo/Roswell Daily Record, Andrew Poertner)![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/eyeball/wny-mb/pict7.jpg)
A military Humvee with an Avenger anti-aircraft missile launcher on top sits parked near the Pentagon Wednesday, Sept. 11, 2002. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ordered the launchers placed around Washignton as a “prudent precaution” on the first anniversary of the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)![[Image]](https://i0.wp.com/cryptome.org/eyeball/wny-mb/pict18.jpg)
Security and construction underway to enhance security is seen on Capitol Hill Wednesday, Feb. 12, 2003. Avenger anti-aircraft missiles have been stationed around Washington, along with extra radars, and the Air Force has stepped up its combat air patrols over the capital. (AP Photo/Terry Ashe)
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