Eva Braun dans l’intimité d’Hitler – TV

 

Eva Braun fut la maîtresse d’Adolf Hitler de 1932 à leur suicide commun en avril 1945. De 1937 à 1944, elle tourne des films amateurs au chalet d’Hitler, le Berghof, dans les Alpes Bavaroises, véritable centre de décision du nazisme, où il aimait recevoir son entourage. Des images en couleur qui nous font entrer dans l’intimité du Führer et les coulisses du IIIème Reich. Pour la première fois, ces documents historiques ont été réunis dans un documentaire qui porte un regard unique sur la vie privée et les crimes publics du dictateur allemand…

Nuremberg Trials – Full Movie

Relive the gripping events of the tribunal that gave birth to the trial procedure paradigm for decades of state criminal cases as rare archival materials and firsthand accounts combine to offer a compelling account of the historical Nuremburg trials. When former head of the Nazi Air Force Hermann Goring and other surviving members of the Nazi elite went on trial on November 20, 1945, the world watched with bated breath to witness the outcome of the groundbreaking case. Charged with the murder of millions of innocent civilians and set before the world to face judgment, the Nuremburg Trials offered a brief glimmer of justice to those lives had been affected by Hitler’s atrocities, and in this release history buffs are afforded a closer look than ever before at the trial that held the attention of an entire planet.

 

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Former BP Engineer Arrested for Obstruction of Justice in Connection with the Deepwater Horizon Criminal Investigation

WASHINGTON—Kurt Mix, a former engineer for BP plc, was arrested today on charges of intentionally destroying evidence requested by federal criminal authorities investigating the April 20, 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, announced Attorney General Eric Holder; Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney Jim Letten of the Eastern District of Louisiana; and Kevin Perkins, Acting Executive Assistant Director for the FBI’s Criminal Cyber Response and Services Branch.

Mix, 50, of Katy, Texas, was charged with two counts of obstruction of justice in a criminal complaint filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana and unsealed today.

“The department has filed initial charges in its investigation into the Deepwater Horizon disaster against an individual for allegedly deleting records relating to the amount of oil flowing from the Macondo well after the explosion that led to the devastating tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico,” said Attorney General Holder. “The Deepwater Horizon Task Force is continuing its investigation into the explosion and will hold accountable those who violated the law in connection with the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history.”

According to the affidavit in support of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant, on April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig experienced an uncontrolled blowout and related explosions while finishing the Macondo well. The catastrophe killed 11 men on board and resulted in the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history.

According to court documents, Mix was a drilling and completions project engineer for BP. Following the blowout, Mix worked on internal BP efforts to estimate the amount of oil leaking from the well and was involved in various efforts to stop the leak. Those efforts included, among others, Top Kill, the failed BP effort to pump heavy mud into the blown out wellhead to try to stop the oil flow. BP sent numerous notices to Mix requiring him to retain all information concerning Macondo, including his text messages.

On or about October 4, 2010, after Mix learned that his electronic files were to be collected by a vendor working for BP’s lawyers, Mix allegedly deleted on his iPhone a text string containing more than 200 text messages with a BP supervisor. The deleted texts, some of which were recovered forensically, included sensitive internal BP information collected in real-time as the Top Kill operation was occurring, which indicated that Top Kill was failing. Court documents allege that, among other things, Mix deleted a text he had sent on the evening of May 26, 2010, at the end of the first day of Top Kill. In the text, Mix stated, among other things, “Too much flowrate—over 15,000.” Before Top Kill commenced, Mix and other engineers had concluded internally that Top Kill was unlikely to succeed if the flow rate was greater than 15,000 barrels of oil per day (BOPD). At the time, BP’s public estimate of the flow rate was 5,000 BOPD—three times lower than the minimum flow rate indicated in Mix’s text.

In addition, on or about August 19, 2011, after learning that his iPhone was about to be imaged by a vendor working for BP’s outside counsel, Mix allegedly deleted a text string containing more than 100 text messages with a BP contractor with whom Mix had worked on various issues concerning how much oil was flowing from the Macondo well after the blowout. By the time Mix deleted those texts, he had received numerous legal hold notices requiring him to preserve such data and had been communicating with a criminal defense lawyer in connection with the pending grand jury investigation of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

A complaint is merely a charge, and a defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

If convicted, Mix faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000 as to each count.‪

The Deepwater Horizon Task Force, based in New Orleans, is supervised by Assistant Attorney General Breuer and led by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John D. Buretta, who serves as the director of the task force. The task force includes prosecutors from the Criminal Division and the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice; the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana and other U.S. Attorneys’ Offices; and investigating agents from the FBI, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Interior, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and other federal law enforcement agencies.

The task force’s investigation of this and other matters concerning the Deepwater Horizon disaster is ongoing.

The case is being prosecuted by task force Deputy Directors Derek Cohen and Avi Gesser of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; task force prosecutors Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Pickens, II of the Eastern District of Louisiana; and Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott Cullen of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Adolf Hitler’s Last Days – Full Movie

Adolf Hitler took up residence in the Führerbunker in January 1945 and until the last week of the war it became the epicentre of the Nazi regime. It was here during the last week of April 1945 that Hitler married Eva Braun shortly before they both committed suicide

Confidential – Caderock Missile Battery Eyeball

Caderock Missile Battery

Eyeball

The site is the Navy’s David Taylor Model Basin of the Naval Surface Warfare Carderock Division.
http://maps.live.com/default.aspx?v=2&FORM=LMLTCP&cp=38.972693~-77.18664
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The Hunt For Hitler HD – Full Movie

 

History’s Secrets : The Hunt for Adolf Hitler

” At the end of World War II, Adolf Hitler faced the reality of defeat and committed suicide in a Berlin bunker beneath the Reich Chancellery. Then his body mysteriously disappeared. The FBI spent years tracking false leads and sightings of Hitler. What happened to the German leader’s remains? Without remains, can we really be sure what became of the man? “

SECRET – Unveild by Cryptome – Washington Naval Yard Missile Battery Eyeball

Washington Naval Yard Missile Battery

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[Image]Modified Humvee vehicles from the 1st Battalion 200th Air Defense Artillery of the New Mexico National Guard are shown Friday, July 30, 2004, at the unit’s headquarters in Roswell, N.M. About 200 Guard members soon will bolster air defenses near Washington, D.C., in these modified vehicles, carrying up to 288 Stinger missiles. Each Humvee has a turret with 8 missile launchers on top, and there are 36 of the vehicles to be used under the Avenger weapons system, Air Defense Artillery, Maj. Ken Nava said Friday. (AP Photo/Roswell Daily Record, Andrew Poertner) [Image]Modified Humvee vehicles from the 1st Battalion 200th Air Defense Artillery of the New Mexico National Guard are shown Friday, July 30, 2004, at the unit’s headquarters in Roswell, N.M. About 200 Guard members soon will bolster air defenses near Washington, D.C., in these modified vehicles, carrying up to 288 Stinger missiles. Each Humvee has a turret with 8 missile launchers on top, and there are 36 of the vehicles to be used under the Avenger weapons system, Air Defense Artillery, Maj. Ken Nava said Friday. (AP Photo/Roswell Daily Record, Andrew Poertner)
[Image]A military Humvee with an Avenger anti-aircraft missile launcher on top sits parked near the Pentagon Wednesday, Sept. 11, 2002. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ordered the launchers placed around Washignton as a “prudent precaution” on the first anniversary of the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite) [Image]Security and construction underway to enhance security is seen on Capitol Hill Wednesday, Feb. 12, 2003. Avenger anti-aircraft missiles have been stationed around Washington, along with extra radars, and the Air Force has stepped up its combat air patrols over the capital. (AP Photo/Terry Ashe)
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TOP-SECRET – U.S. Navy Fleet Telecommunications Procedures NTP-4 Echo

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The focus of NTP-4 Echo (Naval Communications) is to provide a basic manual addressing C4I concepts and capabilities in the U.S. Navy. Due to increased proliferation of Information Technology (IT) within DoN and the high demand for information dominance within the battle space, the need for a “primary source” C4I document has never been greater. To that end, Naval Network Warfare Command initiated a major revision to this publication reflecting the latest C4I equipment/systems in use today. This document was developed through a collaborative effort with Fleet, Numbered Fleet, Type Commanders, and other components of the Naval Netwar Forcenet Enterprise (NNFE) and serves to meet the following objectives:

1. Outline Navy communications shore/afloat organization.
2. Identify automated systems ashore and afloat to support Navy messaging.
3. Provide guidance for message processing procedures.
4. Identify Communications Security (COMSEC) measures and controls.
5. Identify satellite communications capabilities, systems, and equipment.
6. Identify submarine communications capabilities, systems, and equipment.
7. Outline Navy communications ship/shore circuit modes of operation.
8. Identify Allied/coalition communications capabilities, systems, and equipment.
9. Identify collaboration tools for use on Navy/Joint enterprise networks.
10.Provide guidance for operating and defending afloat and shore network communications systems (to include Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) and computer incident reporting).
11.Provide guidance for Communications Spot (COMSPOT) reporting.
12.Provide sample C4I drill packages (used in conjunction with FXP-3).

 

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Confidential from Cryptome – White House Missile Battery

Shepherd Johnson sends:I found the White House missile battery. It’s on top of the New Executive Office building.

“A rare glimpse of the missile battery on the roof of the “New Executive Office Building” [Eisenhower Executive Office Building], which is next to the White House, being checked by a soldier after a small airplane apparently strayed into restricted White House airspace in Washington, DC, USA 22 November 2010 – AP.” [AP has removed its photo of the battery from its archive, and apparently tracking down all postings of it to successfully demand removal.]

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Missile battery on top of a U.S. government building is secured after the all clear is given following a White House lockdown in Washington, November 22, 2010. Reuters

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August 28, 2010 Google Earth

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http://www.emforum.org/vforum/lc051116.htmLet’s hypothesize that there is a surface-to-air missile battery (shown as a light blue symbol in the upper left) and that this battery is a method of protecting the annotated facilities. So knowledge of it might be “useful” to an adversary and the annotated image passes the “usefulness” test. On to the “uniqueness” part of the test.

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It turns out, however, that the battery is not hypothetical and our geospatial data are not the only source of this information. In fact, as illustrated by the newspaper clippings, the information is quite well known and is readily observable. (If you’re ever walking north on 17th Street in front of the Old Executive Office Building, look up.) So the annotated image fails the “uniqueness” test and safeguards are not justified.

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Push – Full Feauture Film

Push is a 2009 American science fiction thriller film directed by Paul McGuigan. The film stars Chris Evans, Dakota Fanning, Camilla Belle, Cliff Curtis, Joel Gretsch and Djimon Hounsou. The film centers on a group of people born with various superhuman abilities who band together in order to take down a government agency that is using a dangerous drug to enhance their powers in hopes of creating an army of super soldiers.

narrator (Cassie) describes how people with psychic abilities have been involved with the United States government since 1945. Two “Movers”, Nick Gant and his father, are on the run from the “Division”. Realizing that escape is impossible, Nick’s father tells him of a vision he received from a “Watcher”; a girl will give him a flower and he is to help her in order to help all the people with powers. Nick’s father throws Nick into an air vent as Agent Henry Carver of the Division arrives. Nick’s father is killed.

10 years later, the American Division tests a power boosting drug on a “Pusher” (someone who can implant thoughts in others’ minds), named Kira. Hundreds of subjects died from the drug before her; she is the first to survive. Rendering the doctor unconscious, Kira steals his security clearance card and an augmentation drug-filled syringe and escapes.

In Hong Kong, Nick is hiding from the Division as an expatriate. He attempts to use his ability to make a living, but his poor skills at “moving” at a dice game leave him indebted to a local Triad controlled by “Bleeders”, bred by the now-defunct Chinese Division. A young girl named Cassie Holmes arrives at Nick’s apartment, explaining that she is a “Watcher” and that they are going to find a case containing 6 million dollars. They are attacked by Triad Bleeders but escape.

Nick and Cassie go to a nightclub on a hint from Cassie’s predictions. Nick sees an old friend, “Hook” Waters, who is a “Shifter”. He uses his abilities to make a replica of the clue in Cassie’s drawing and tells them to go to Emily Hu, a “Sniff” who can help them find Kira. Nick and Cassie find Kira, who had a romantic relationship with Nick. They recruit a “Shadow” named “Pinky” Stein to hide Kira from the “Sniffs”. Cassie finds the key in her shoe to a locker in which Kira hid a case. With the aid of Cassie’s visions, they piece together the events that led them to meet; Cassie’s mother used her visions to set a complex plan in motion that will destroy Division. Nick devises a plan that involves seven envelopes in which he places instructions; each person in the group is entrusted with one red envelope, and none are to be opened until the right time. While Kira and Pinky leave, Nick and Cassie share a goodbye. Cassie tells him to “take an umbrella, it’s going to rain”, he replies with “you be careful too”.

Nick uses a “Wiper” to erase his memories of the plan, ensuring that Watchers from both Division and the Triads will not be able to interfere. Hook retrieves the case, which has the syringe Kira stole, and brings it to Cassie. Hook shifts another case to match the case with the syringe. Cassie takes the shifted case to Nick’s apartment and waits. Nick regains consciousness: he has no memory of the envelopes or his plan. He opens his envelope, which tells him to return home. He finds the case in his room but Carver introduces himself to Kira as a friend, stating that her memories are false; she is a Division agent who volunteered to take the augmentation injection and suffered amnesia as a side-effect. Carver shows Kira her badge.

Before bidding bye, Nick assures a worried Cassie that she will survive and everything is going to be fine. He asks her to go ahead with everything and instead of thinking too much face it as it may. She leaves as the Hong-Kong watcher tracks her to finally kill her, however at the last moment the “Wiper” appears (the same who helped Nick remove his memory) and erases her memory, thereby saving Cassie.

Nick goes to retrieve the augmentation drug and confronts Carver and Kira. Carver tells Kira and Nick that their relationship never happened; it was a “push” memory. Kira reveals she has been using Nick and Nick takes the three to the building that contains the lockers and the case. Carver locks Nick in his car’s hood and goes to retrieve the case. They are ambushed by the Triads. In the midst of the fight, Nick is released from the hood. He goes to find Kira and is confronted by Victor, another “Mover” and Division agent who works for Carver. During Nick-Victor fight, two of the “Bleeders” screams killing Victor while Nick saves himself by closing his ears. Carver injures Nick. Nick grabs the case and jams the syringe into his arm, which “kills” him. After the fights ends and Carver leaves with Kira, Nick wakes up. Cassie appears with an umbrella and smiles at him. “I told you to bring an umbrella” she tells him, revealing it was part of the plan. Cassie retrieves the true case, revealing that Nick injected himself with soy sauce, as they planned. Asked whether they will see Kira again, Cassie tells Nick that they will see “Miss Trouble soon enough”.

Flying back to America with a sleeping Agent Carver, Kira opens her purse, finding her red envelope. She remembers Nick telling her to open it when “she started doubting the truth” and opens it. She finds a photograph of herself and Nick obviously in a relationship, which means that their relationship was true, and a message written on the photograph that says “KILL HIM” on the upper left corner and “See U soon, Nick” on the lower right. Kira “pushes” Carver, commanding him to put his gun in his mouth and pull the trigger. The screen fades to black, followed by the sound of a gunshot.
[edit] Types of Superhumans

Watchers

Watchers have the ability to foresee the future to varying degrees. As knowledge of the future invariably causes that future to change, Watchers’ visions of the future in their direct sphere of influence are subject to frequent shifting. Watchers visions are like a sense of deja vu. Watchers can get visions at will. Drinking alcoholic beverages can temporarily enhance a Watcher’s abilities (as shown by Cassie). Cassie and Pop Girl are Watchers, and Cassie’s mother is also an advanced Watcher.

Movers

Movers are powerful telekinetics who are trained to identify the specific atomic frequency of a given material and alter the gravitational field around it, usually causing the nearby air to appear warped. This allows them to move both animate and inanimate objects. Advanced Movers can work at the molecular level, creating Energy shields in the air around them or create Power Fists and kicks, a strike that delivers 3x the power than a punch delivered normally. Nick is a Mover, but not a very advanced one, unlike Victor, Carver’s right hand man.

Pushers

Pushers have the ability to implant memories, thoughts and emotions into the minds of other people in order to manipulate them. The skill level of the Pusher determines how many people the Pusher is able to control at one time, and how vivid the implanted memories are. A powerful Pusher can push a large group of people at the same time, basically creating a personal army. A Pusher is able to make a person do anything the Pusher desires, even commit suicide. A Pusher’s eyes indicate how powerful they are: their pupils will dilate to certain degrees depending on how powerful the push is (for example, Henry Carver’s eyes are rendered completely black, signifying that he is an extremely able and effective Pusher). Carver is a trained Pusher, and Kira as well.

Bleeders

Bleeders have the ability to emit high-pitched sonic vibrations that cause ruptures in a target’s blood vessels. While using this ability, their pupils turn into vertical slits, like a snake’s, because of synthetic materials implanted in them to protect the blood vessels from the effects of their own ability. They are also sometimes known as Screechers or Screamers. Pop Girl’s brothers and father, the Triads, are Bleeders.

Sniffs

Sniffs are highly developed psychometrics who can track the location of people or objects over varying distances. Like bloodhounds, their ability is increased if they have tactile access to an object that has been in direct contact with the subject. Sniffs receive information in the form of images, which is why identifiable landmarks help increase their effectiveness. Emily Hu is a highly trained Sniff, and she uses her powers for money. Carver’s associates who kidnapped Kira are also Sniffs.

Shifters

Shifters can temporarily alter the appearance of an object by manipulating patterns of light interacting with it. Once the illusion is established, it remains with the object for a short period of time. For example, a Shifter could touch a one dollar bill and alter it to appear as a one hundred dollar bill until the effect expires. The object shifted must have roughly the same dimensions as the object it is shifted into. The length of time that the effect will last is based on the Shifter’s experience. Hook Waters, an ex-Division agent and Nick’s friend is a highly experienced Shifter.

Wipers

Wipers are skilled at either temporarily or permanently erasing memories, an invaluable asset in espionage. Experience will dictate the accuracy of their wipes, though there is always the danger that they will eliminate a desired memory. Wo Chiang, a fisherman who lives on a dock, is a Wiper who uses his powers for those who need for money; he also erases part of Nick’s and Kira’s memory, and saves Cassie from Pop Girl by sneaking behind her and wiping her entire memory.

Shadows

Shadows are trained to block the vision of other clairvoyants such as Sniffs, making any subject within their target radius appear “dark”. Experience will enhance the size of the area they can shadow and the intensity of their shielding effect. Shadows need to be awake to manifest their ability, so it is common for a detail of two Shadows to operate in shifts while protecting a person or object for extended periods. Most Shadows are effective only against Sniffs, but some extremely powerful Shadows are able to block even Watchers. Pinky, a friend of Nick’s, is a Shadow, and he is effective only against Sniffs. Like other characters, he also uses his powers for money. An old woman hired by Kira to hide the syringe has the ability to shadow an entire building, even from watchers.

Stitches

Stitches are psychic surgeons trained to quickly reconstruct cells to their previous or healthy state. Using only their hands, they can heal and even “unheal” whatever they have done. For more detailed work, Stitches use a silver based cream on their hands which acts as a conductor for their ability.

SECRET – Surface to Air Missiles for 2012 Olympics Site

The former Bryant and May match factory in Fairfield Road, Bow, East London – now a private gated community of exclusive apartments known as Bow Quarter.

The roofs of two towers (converted for lift shafts for the apartments) have been chosen by the Ministry of Defence to site surface-to-air high-velocity missile systems.

Surface to Air Missiles for 2012 Olympics Site

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SECRET – Space Station Expedition 30 Soyuz Capsule Landing

Space Station Expedition 30 Soyuz Capsule Landing

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Dan Burbank Extracted[Image]

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Anatoly Ivanishin Extracted[Image]

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Hitlers Manager – Ferdinand Porsche – Ganzer Film

Im Jahr 1934 legte Ferdinand Porsche auf Drängen Hitlers die tschechoslowakische Staatsangehörigkeit ab und nahm die deutsche an. 1938 wurde er zusammen mit Ernst Heinkel, Willy Messerschmitt und Fritz Todt mit dem 1937 von Hitler neu gestifteten Deutschen Nationalpreis für Kunst und Wissenschaft ausgezeichnet. 1938 erhielt er das Ehrenband der Burschenschaft Bruna Sudetia Wien. Auch er hatte den „Anschluss” Österreichs befürwortet. 1940 wurde Porsche zum Honorarprofessor an der Technischen Hochschule Stuttgart ernannt und 1942 zum Oberführer der Allgemeinen SS, was ihn nicht daran hinderte, bei allen Anlässen nur in Zivil gekleidet zu sein.
Porsche, 1939 zum Wehrwirtschaftsführer ernannt, engagierte sich stark in der Kriegsindustrie. Von 1941 bis 1943 wurde er zum Vorsitzenden der Panzerkommission – eine Spitzenposition in der Kriegswirtschaft – bestellt. Später wurde er in den Rüstungsrat berufen. Als Hitlers Lieblingsingenieur entwickelte er den nach ihm benannten Panzerjäger Ferdinand und den Panzerkampfwagen Maus. Der lediglich in Kleinserie produzierte Ferdinand war zu schwer für den von Porsche konzipierten petro-elektrischen Antrieb, dessen Störanfälligkeit dazu führte, dass mehr Exemplare aufgegeben als im Kampf zerstört wurden. Der Panzerkampfwagen Maus kam über das Stadium zweier Prototypen nicht hinaus.

TOP-SECRET – U.S. Marine Corps Tentative Manual for Partnering Operations

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In warfighting and counterinsurgency operations, partnering is a command arrangement between a US security force and a host nation (HN) security force in which both forces operate together to achieve mission success and to build the capacity and capability of the HN force. Partnering is not an end, but a deliberate process, a means to an end. A near-term goal might be the standup and development of a HN force increasingly capable of independent operations and decreasingly dependent upon US partnered support. An intermediate objective might be the transition of lead security responsibility from US to HN force. But the ultimate goal is to become “un”-partnered, to enable the HN force to assume full responsibility for security and stability. In warfighting and counterinsurgency partnering, divorce is not a bad ending, it is the desired outcome.

Partnering should be a real union between the two partnered organizations, with a common purpose, in which the whole of the partnership becomes greater than the sum of its parts. Real partnering is total immersion. It cannot be done on occasion, when convenient, or as time permits. Nor should it be limited to periodic or occasional combined combat operations. Real partnering is instead a continuous, collective, and collaborative effort on tasks both large and small toward the common goal. It is full throttle engagement, warts and all.

Be culturally aware but not overly-sensitive.

a. Help the HN understand our perspective, our culture, and our values. Our values will most likely not be theirs so do not impose your values upon their culture; however, do not jeopardize your own morals and beliefs by being overly sensitive to theirs. The key is to ensure that the HN has a basic understanding of our values, especially the delicate balance of honesty vs. saving face.

b. HN forces understand that there may be times when the cultural strain is too great to overcome “living amongst” their personnel, but we must promote the sharing of common areas (dining area, COCs (within classification parameters), etc.) and activities (meals, PT, weapons/vehicle maintenance) which will ultimately help bridge cultural differences without encroaching on each other.

Encourage HN forces to build relationships with the local leaders

a. Positive interaction with the people builds trust – build this trust above all else!

b. Encourage local recruiting for security forces, especially police. In the United States, local police have to live in the communities that they work in; yet, in many places, national police are moved throughout the country where they have no ties to the community and are often viewed as outsiders. This may be an expedient method to restore law and order, but it should only be used in the most extreme circumstances. Locally recruited forces will have the backing of that community – “their community” – and their training by Marines and HN military units serves to reinforce the ties among Marines, the HN forces, and the communities that they operate in. Until the police force is made up of ‘local sons’ there will be no real security or trust in an area.

c. Encourage the HN force to develop an information operations (IO) plan and effective methods to convey key messages to the people. HN forces should be the primary executers of information operations and they should be on hand to explain it to the people. Perception is important to the success of the partnership and its goals.

Embrace the chaos of the environment

a. Do not allow frustration with the HN to show – do it in private away from the partnering force members – never display direct frustration in front of your partnered force.

Do not hesitate to deviate from doctrine when needed.

a. The intent here is to “be doctrinally sound, not doctrinally bound”. “A force engaged in small wars operations, irrespective of its size, is usually independent or semi-independent and, in such a campaign, assumes strategically, tactical, and territorial functions” (SWM 2-10, pg 11). “In short, the force must be prepared to exercise those functions of command, supply, and territorial control which are required of the supreme command or its major subdivisions in regular warfare…For these reason, it is obvious that a force undertaking a small wars campaign must be adequately staffed for independent operations even if the tables of organization do not specify a full staff complement” (SWM 2-11, pg 12).

Das geheime Filmarchiv der Eva Braun… -The Secret Movies of Eva Braun – Ganzer Film – Full Movie

Original 16mm-Filmaufnahmen von Eva Braun in Farbe und schwarzweiß. Eva Braun, die Frau an Hitlers Seite, hat mit ihrer 16-mm-Filmkamera das Leben auf dem Berghof und ihre privaten Reisen festgehalten. Die Aufnahmen, die heute im amerikanischen Nationalarchiv liegen, waren nie für die Öffentlichkeit bestimmt. Nach ihrem Freitod am 30. April 1945 im Bunker der Reichskanzlei galten die Filmrollen lange als verschollen, ehe sie in den USA wieder auftauchten. Diese DVD zeigt erstmals einen umfassenden Zusammenschnitt des gesamten geheimen Archivs. Zeitzeugen aus der engsten Umgebung von Eva Braun und Adolf Hitler kommentieren die einzigartigen Filmaufnahmen, die das Leben der Mächtigen des Dritten Reiches jenseits der Propaganda zeigen. Die DVD bietet als Extras einen 15-minütigen Bonusfilm mit nicht verwendeten Aufnahmen sowie Biographien etc.

Company K – Full Movie – Ganzer Film

 

USA | 2004 | 98 Min.

River Run Film Festival 2009 – Bester Spielfilm

Der Amerikaner Joe Delaney kämpfte auf den Schlachtfeldern des Ersten Weltkriegs für sein Land. 15 Jahre nach dem Ende des Kriegs schrieb er ein Buch über seine Erfahrungen als Mitglied des US-Marine Corps. Doch was er erzählt, ist nicht die Geschichte eines großen Krieges und heldenhafter Soldaten. Es ist die Geschichte eines Mannes, der erkennen muss, dass es einzelne Momente im Leben sind, die den wahren Charakter eines Menschen definieren. Und er erinnert sich an den deutschen Soldaten, den er tötete und der ihn in seinen Träumen heimsuchte.

Stalingrad – Ganzer Film

 

Stalingrad ist ein deutscher Anti-Kriegsfilm aus dem Jahr 1993. Thematischer Hintergrund ist die Schlacht von Stalingrad Ende 1942/Anfang 1943 während des Zweiten Weltkriegs aus der Sicht eines deutschen Sturmpionier-Bataillons. Regie führte Joseph Vilsmaier. Der Film startete am 21. Januar 1993 in den bundesdeutschen Kinos.

SECRET – DDCI Statement about the Watergate Case

Citation: DDCI Statement about the Watergate Case
[Central Intelligence Agency Employee Bulletin Containing Vernon Walter’s Statement on CIA Involvement in Watergate; Best Available Copy] , [Classification Unknown], Newsletter, 359, May 21, 1973, 3 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00031
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Cushman, Robert E., Jr.; Dean, John Wesley III; Democratic National Committee (U.S.); Ehrlichman, John D.; Gray, L. Patrick; Haldeman, H.R.; Helms, Richard M.; Hunt, E. Howard; Nixon, Richard M.; Schlesinger, James R.; United States. Department of Justice; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. White House; Walters, Vernon A.
Subjects: Congressional hearings | Covert operations | Government appropriations and expenditures | Mexico | Watergate Affair (1972-1974)
Abstract: Disseminates Vernon Walter’s statement to congressional committee about his communications with John Dean and Patrick Gray on Central Intelligence Agency involvement in Watergate and CIA’s issuance of equipment to Howard Hunt.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (156 KB)

Durable URL for this record

SECRET – Former BP Engineer Arrested for Obstruction of Justice

WASHINGTON—Kurt Mix, a former engineer for BP plc, was arrested today on charges of intentionally destroying evidence requested by federal criminal authorities investigating the April 20, 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, announced Attorney General Eric Holder; Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney Jim Letten of the Eastern District of Louisiana; and Kevin Perkins, Acting Executive Assistant Director for the FBI’s Criminal Cyber Response and Services Branch.

Mix, 50, of Katy, Texas, was charged with two counts of obstruction of justice in a criminal complaint filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana and unsealed today.

“The department has filed initial charges in its investigation into the Deepwater Horizon disaster against an individual for allegedly deleting records relating to the amount of oil flowing from the Macondo well after the explosion that led to the devastating tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico,” said Attorney General Holder. “The Deepwater Horizon Task Force is continuing its investigation into the explosion and will hold accountable those who violated the law in connection with the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history.”

According to the affidavit in support of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant, on April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig experienced an uncontrolled blowout and related explosions while finishing the Macondo well. The catastrophe killed 11 men on board and resulted in the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history.

According to court documents, Mix was a drilling and completions project engineer for BP. Following the blowout, Mix worked on internal BP efforts to estimate the amount of oil leaking from the well and was involved in various efforts to stop the leak. Those efforts included, among others, Top Kill, the failed BP effort to pump heavy mud into the blown out wellhead to try to stop the oil flow. BP sent numerous notices to Mix requiring him to retain all information concerning Macondo, including his text messages.

On or about October 4, 2010, after Mix learned that his electronic files were to be collected by a vendor working for BP’s lawyers, Mix allegedly deleted on his iPhone a text string containing more than 200 text messages with a BP supervisor. The deleted texts, some of which were recovered forensically, included sensitive internal BP information collected in real-time as the Top Kill operation was occurring, which indicated that Top Kill was failing. Court documents allege that, among other things, Mix deleted a text he had sent on the evening of May 26, 2010, at the end of the first day of Top Kill. In the text, Mix stated, among other things, “Too much flowrate—over 15,000.” Before Top Kill commenced, Mix and other engineers had concluded internally that Top Kill was unlikely to succeed if the flow rate was greater than 15,000 barrels of oil per day (BOPD). At the time, BP’s public estimate of the flow rate was 5,000 BOPD—three times lower than the minimum flow rate indicated in Mix’s text.

In addition, on or about August 19, 2011, after learning that his iPhone was about to be imaged by a vendor working for BP’s outside counsel, Mix allegedly deleted a text string containing more than 100 text messages with a BP contractor with whom Mix had worked on various issues concerning how much oil was flowing from the Macondo well after the blowout. By the time Mix deleted those texts, he had received numerous legal hold notices requiring him to preserve such data and had been communicating with a criminal defense lawyer in connection with the pending grand jury investigation of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

A complaint is merely a charge, and a defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

If convicted, Mix faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000 as to each count.‪

The Deepwater Horizon Task Force, based in New Orleans, is supervised by Assistant Attorney General Breuer and led by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John D. Buretta, who serves as the director of the task force. The task force includes prosecutors from the Criminal Division and the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice; the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana and other U.S. Attorneys’ Offices; and investigating agents from the FBI, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Interior, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and other federal law enforcement agencies.

The task force’s investigation of this and other matters concerning the Deepwater Horizon disaster is ongoing.

The case is being prosecuted by task force Deputy Directors Derek Cohen and Avi Gesser of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; task force prosecutors Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Pickens, II of the Eastern District of Louisiana; and Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott Cullen of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Unveiled – Nuclear WMD Accident Training


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Following: Overhead photos from Google Earth, dated 4 February 2011. Oblique photos from Bing Maps, unknown date.
http://maps.google.com/?t=h&ie=UTF8&ll=35.019664,-106.531205&spn=0.032861,0.068665&z=15&vpsrc=6[Image]

TS-1 (Active)

These appear to be wrecks of motor vehicles

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TS-2 (Active)

These appear to be fragments of a B-52 bomber

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TS-3 (Active)

These appear to be fragments of a B-52 bomber

[Image]

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TS-4 (Active)

This appears to be an earth penetration of an object, perhaps simulation of unexploded nuclear weapon

[Image]

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TS-5 (Inactive)  (TR-5 to TR-8 comprise Installation Restoration Plan OT-10)

[Image]

TS-6 (Inactive)

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TS-7 (Inactive)

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TS-8 (Appears Converted to Other Use, But May Be Active)

[Image]

 


	

War Fighter – Grozovye Vorota / Grozovue Vorota / Грозовые ворота / The Storm Gate / War Fighter – Full Movie

Grozovye Vorota / Grozovue Vorota / Грозовые ворота / The Storm Gate / War Fighter

War Fighter is a DVD release ( German audio, German subs) of the
russian TV movie “Grozovye Vorota” it’s about a battle durring 2nd Chechen war,
where 200 russian soldiers fights against 2000 terrorists, only 9 survive

U.S. Army Regulation 190-56 Civilian Police and Security Guard Program

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/USArmy-CivilianPolice.png

 

This regulation establishes the Department of the Army Civilian Police and Security Guard (DACP/SG) Program. It assigns responsibilities and establishes policy, standards, and procedures for the effective implementation of the DACP/SG Program. This regulation applies to all Department of the Army civilian personnel in career series 0083 and 0085 and contract security personnel employed by the U.S. Army and involved in the safeguarding and protection of personnel and property.

 

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/USArmy-CivilianPolice-badge.png

 

 

World War 3 – Full Movie

Soviet paratroopers drop into Alaska to sabotage the oil pipeline in retaliation against a United States grain embargo. A skirmish occurs at a pumping station, lightly defended by Col. Jake Caffey and a National Guard reckon unit. A stalemate ensues while the possibility of World War III hangs in the balance. The danger escalates as the Russian leaders and the American President play a cat-and-mouse game

ISRAEL DEFENSE – Preparing for Fires and Structural Collapse

Water rescue exercise (Photo: Fire Service)
Water rescue exercise

The defining event that changed the face of firefighting in Israel was the December 2010 fire in the Carmel Mountains. Forty-four people died, and 6,177 acres of woods were destroyed.

Four months after the devastation, the air force established a firefighting squadron whose six aircraft are presently maintained by Elbit Systems. In addition, Israel Fire and Rescue Service ordered 88 firefighting vehicles. “There are several types of firefighting vehicles,” says Fire Service Commissioner, Chief Shahar Ayalon.

“Some of the vehicles are undergoing supply processes and need to undergo several changes. We’ve also published a tender worth 12 million NIS for personal fireman protection equipment including fireproof proximity suits, helmets, shoes, and coats. Additionally, we bought equipment from around the world, and are working with four to five international companies. We’re going to change the firefighter uniform, and even have a new symbol for the firefighters. We are also currently testing the simulators that exist around the world, and have allocated a sum of more than $10 million. In addition, we are constructing a new instruction facility in Rishon LeZion.

Following the 2010 fire, Shahar Ayalon came to head the Fire Service after serving in the Israeli Police as district commander and deputy inspector general. According to Ayalon, the far-reaching changes within the fire service are also intended for firefighters participating in mass disaster relief, such as wide-ranging missile attacks and natural disasters.

In his opinion, the situation is far from satisfactory. Ayalon notes that during the 2011 rocket attacks from Gaza, it was impossible to send a vehicle from Ashkelon to handle a fire that burst out in the nearby town of Gan Yavneh, which was a result of administrative problems (the town belonged to the more distant district of Rehovot). It took a fire vehicle no less than 20 minutes to make it from there. According to him, there remains a severe shortage in firefighting stations across the country.

“We’ve conducted a threat reference with Israel’s Technion and the National Emergency Authority on how many firefighting vehicles and how many firefighters are needed to provide a response for Israel,” says Ayalon. “The interim statement indicates that an additional 40-60 stations are needed on top of the 100 that already exist. We want to lower the response time. In 2010, our average response time was 14 minutes. In the US, the standard is five minutes for the first team, and an additional five minutes for a second team. In Europe, it’s between 8-10 minutes – we want to approach this time.”

“Our current budget is 700 million NIS. I assume that after the reform, the budget will cross the one billion NIS mark. There won’t be any choice but to construct 50 more stations, and this will have to be planned in the framework of the multi-year budget.”

War Scenarios

“The firefighting system responds to 80,000 situations a year, nearly half of which are tied to rescue and extraction missions,” explains Ayalon. “We have 15 urban rescue units that can enter wreckage sites and rescue people from buildings, including two new units in Be’er Sheva and Netanya. These units are comprised of young and well-trained firefighters. We conduct the courses with RESQ1, a company of military veterans who have run these training exercises around the world for years.

“We also send 15 fighters each year to France to undergo advanced studies in rescuing people trapped in stormy weather. The scope of rescue is the same as the scope of firefighting, even though people think we only extinguish fires. In reality, we engage in rescues, deal with dangerous substances, and also fight fires.”

What will happen during a war? After all, it’s the IDF’s Rear-Area Headquarters that primarily deal with search and rescue.

“In a period of emergency and war, the Rear-Area HQ is also responsible for the Fire Service. The threat to the home front switched to a threat of missiles, and we are preparing for a state of demolished buildings in which the firefighters will have to handle both fires and structural collapses.

“We also take into account damage to strategic factories that house dangerous materials, and we intensively practice situations of container and fuel reserve impacts. We carry out risk assessments with the factories and introduce them to the forces. We have an organized doctrine that is also suitable for missile scenarios.

“We built an operations branch that works, practices, and immediately responds to events, reinforces units, and does all the required operations that are similar to a military system.

“For emergency scenarios, we purchased 24 containers equipped with clothing, food, and water. It costs a lot of money, but we placed these types of emergency containers at each station. As soon as there’s a war, we can increase our number of fire departments and our launches by 40% by taking out fire trucks to all sorts of launch points, thus bringing the firefighters closer to response locations. We settle in well-known locations and are capable of emergency deployment that increases manpower by having 1,200 firefighters in the reserve forces join the regular military.

“In emergency scenarios, we are the first ones alerted and the first to reach the scene. If it’s wreckage, we focus on rescuing lives and extracting whoever we can out of the rubble. Once the Rear-Area HQ’s rescue unit arrives, we pass the responsibility on to them and leave the scene. We are the immediate response for the golden hour – the time when the chances of finding survivors is the highest.”

** Photos: The fire extinguishing squad by Fire Service; Chief Shahar Ayalon by Fire Service

TOP-SECRET – (U//FOUO) U.S. Army Regulation 190-56 Civilian Police and Security Guard Program

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/USArmy-CivilianPolice.png

 

This regulation establishes the Department of the Army Civilian Police and Security Guard (DACP/SG) Program. It assigns responsibilities and establishes policy, standards, and procedures for the effective implementation of the DACP/SG Program. This regulation applies to all Department of the Army civilian personnel in career series 0083 and 0085 and contract security personnel employed by the U.S. Army and involved in the safeguarding and protection of personnel and property.

 

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/USArmy-CivilianPolice-badge.png

 

 

The Day After (1983) – American Nuclear Holocaust – Full Movie

“I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.” Albert Einstein.

This movie is dedicated to all the war-loving couch-potatoes, media whores, and psychopathic politicians.

Revealed – Patent Office Weighs Patent Secrecy for “Economic Security”

In response to congressional direction, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is considering whether to expand the scope of patent secrecy orders — which prohibit the publication of affected patent applications — in order to enhance “economic security” and to protect newly developed inventions against exploitation by foreign competitors.

Currently, patent secrecy orders are applied only to patent applications whose disclosure could be “detrimental to national security” as prescribed by the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951.  At the end of Fiscal Year 2011, there were 5,241 such national security secrecy orders in effect.

But now the Patent Office is weighing the possibility of expanding national security patent secrecy into the “economic security” domain.

“The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is seeking comments as to whether the United States should identify and bar from publication and issuance certain patent applications as detrimental to the nation’s economic security,” according to a notice that was published in the Federal Register on April 20.

That would be a mistake, I wrote in my own comments submitted to the Patent Office yesterday.

Economic security — which could conceivably implicate all new inventions — is not analogous to the more limited domain of national security-related inventions, “so the use of secrecy orders is inappropriate to protect economic security,” I suggested.

Instead, the existing option for an applicant to request nonpublication of his or her patent application up to the point that the patent is issued is a superior alternative to a mandatory secrecy order, I wrote.  “The inventor is likely to be better qualified than any third party to assess the economic significance of the invention, and is also likely to be best motivated to protect his or her own financial interests.”

“The USPTO has not taken a position” on these questions, the Patent Office said in its April 20 notice, “nor is it predisposed to any particular views.”

Confidential – Govt Appeals Court-Ordered Release of Classified Document

Government attorneys said yesterday that they would appeal an extraordinary judicial ruling that required the release of a classified document in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

The document in question is a one-page position paper produced by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) concerning the U.S. negotiating position in free trade negotiations.  It was classified Confidential and was not supposed to be disclosed before 2013.

But immediate disclosure of the document could not plausibly cause damage to the national security, said DC District Judge Richard W. Roberts in a February 29, 2012 opinion, and so its continued classification, he said, is not “logical.”  He ordered the government to release the document to the Center for International Environmental Law, which had requested it under FOIA.  (Court Says Agency Classification Decision is Not ‘Logical’, Secrecy News, March 2, 2012.)

This kind of independent review of the validity of classification decisions, which is something that judges normally refrain from doing, offers one way to curb galloping overclassification.

While the substance of the USTR document is likely to be of little general interest, the court’s willingness to disregard the document’s ill-founded classification and to require its disclosure seems like a dream come true to critics of classification policy.  If the decision serves as a precedent and a spur to a more broadly skeptical judicial approach to classification matters, so much the better.

But what may be a dream to some is a nightmare to others.  The bare possibility of such an emerging challenge to executive classification authority was evidently intolerable to the Obama Administration, which will now seek to overturn Judge Roberts’ ruling in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals.

Unveiled – Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act

[House Report 112-445]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]


112th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     112-445

======================================================================



 
             CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT

                                _______
                                

 April 17, 2012.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Rogers of Michigan, from the Permanent Select Committee on 
                 Intelligence, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 3523]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 3523) to provide for the sharing of 
certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information 
between the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities, 
and for other purposes, having considered the same, report 
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill 
as amended do pass.
    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Cyber Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act''.

SEC. 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING.

  (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
          ``cyber threat intelligence and information sharing
  ``Sec. 1104.  (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber Threat 
Intelligence With Private Sector.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
        shall establish procedures to allow elements of the 
        intelligence community to share cyber threat intelligence with 
        private-sector entities and to encourage the sharing of such 
        intelligence.
          ``(2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The 
        procedures established under paragraph (1) shall provide that 
        classified cyber threat intelligence may only be--
                  ``(A) shared by an element of the intelligence 
                community with--
                          ``(i) certified entities; or
                          ``(ii) a person with an appropriate security 
                        clearance to receive such cyber threat 
                        intelligence;
                  ``(B) shared consistent with the need to protect the 
                national security of the United States; and
                  ``(C) used by a certified entity in a manner which 
                protects such cyber threat intelligence from 
                unauthorized disclosure.
          ``(3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing that the head of 
        an element of the intelligence community may, as the head of 
        such element considers necessary to carry out this subsection--
                  ``(A) grant a security clearance on a temporary or 
                permanent basis to an employee or officer of a 
                certified entity;
                  ``(B) grant a security clearance on a temporary or 
                permanent basis to a certified entity and approval to 
                use appropriate facilities; and
                  ``(C) expedite the security clearance process for a 
                person or entity as the head of such element considers 
                necessary, consistent with the need to protect the 
                national security of the United States.
          ``(4) No right or benefit.--The provision of information to a 
        private-sector entity under this subsection shall not create a 
        right or benefit to similar information by such entity or any 
        other private-sector entity.
  ``(b) Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing of 
Cyber Threat Information.--
          ``(1) In general.--
                  ``(A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding any 
                other provision of law, a cybersecurity provider, with 
                the express consent of a protected entity for which 
                such cybersecurity provider is providing goods or 
                services for cybersecurity purposes, may, for 
                cybersecurity purposes--
                          ``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify 
                        and obtain cyber threat information to protect 
                        the rights and property of such protected 
                        entity; and
                          ``(ii) share such cyber threat information 
                        with any other entity designated by such 
                        protected entity, including, if specifically 
                        designated, the Federal Government.
                  ``(B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding any 
                other provision of law, a self-protected entity may, 
                for cybersecurity purposes--
                          ``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify 
                        and obtain cyber threat information to protect 
                        the rights and property of such self-protected 
                        entity; and
                          ``(ii) share such cyber threat information 
                        with any other entity, including the Federal 
                        Government.
          ``(2) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat 
        information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
                  ``(A) shall only be shared in accordance with any 
                restrictions placed on the sharing of such information 
                by the protected entity or self-protected entity 
                authorizing such sharing, including appropriate 
                anonymization or minimization of such information;
                  ``(B) may not be used by an entity to gain an unfair 
                competitive advantage to the detriment of the protected 
                entity or the self-protected entity authorizing the 
                sharing of information; and
                  ``(C) if shared with the Federal Government--
                          ``(i) shall be exempt from disclosure under 
                        section 552 of title 5, United States Code;
                          ``(ii) shall be considered proprietary 
                        information and shall not be disclosed to an 
                        entity outside of the Federal Government except 
                        as authorized by the entity sharing such 
                        information; and
                          ``(iii) shall not be used by the Federal 
                        Government for regulatory purposes.
          ``(3) Exemption from liability.--No civil or criminal cause 
        of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal or State court 
        against a protected entity, self-protected entity, 
        cybersecurity provider, or an officer, employee, or agent of a 
        protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
        provider, acting in good faith--
                  ``(A) for using cybersecurity systems or sharing 
                information in accordance with this section; or
                  ``(B) for not acting on information obtained or 
                shared in accordance with this section.
          ``(4) Relationship to other laws requiring the disclosure of 
        information.--The submission of information under this 
        subsection to the Federal Government shall not satisfy or 
        affect any requirement under any other provision of law for a 
        person or entity to provide information to the Federal 
        Government.
  ``(c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
          ``(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber 
        threat information shared with the Federal Government in 
        accordance with subsection (b) for any lawful purpose only if--
                  ``(A) the use of such information is not for a 
                regulatory purpose; and
                  ``(B) at least one significant purpose of the use of 
                such information is--
                          ``(i) a cybersecurity purpose; or
                          ``(ii) the protection of the national 
                        security of the United States.
          ``(2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal Government 
        may not affirmatively search cyber threat information shared 
        with the Federal Government under subsection (b) for a purpose 
        other than a purpose referred to in paragraph (1)(B).
          ``(3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this section 
        shall be construed to permit the Federal Government to--
                  ``(A) require a private-sector entity to share 
                information with the Federal Government; or
                  ``(B) condition the sharing of cyber threat 
                intelligence with a private-sector entity on the 
                provision of cyber threat information to the Federal 
                Government.
  ``(d) Report on Information Sharing.--
          ``(1) Report.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
        Community shall annually submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees a report containing a review of the use 
        of information shared with the Federal Government under this 
        section, including--
                  ``(A) a review of the use by the Federal Government 
                of such information for a purpose other than a 
                cybersecurity purpose;
                  ``(B) a review of the type of information shared with 
                the Federal Government under this section;
                  ``(C) a review of the actions taken by the Federal 
                Government based on such information;
                  ``(D) appropriate metrics to determine the impact of 
                the sharing of such information with the Federal 
                Government on privacy and civil liberties, if any; and
                  ``(E) any recommendations of the Inspector General 
                for improvements or modifications to the authorities 
                under this section.
          ``(2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
  ``(e) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any statute of a 
State or political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise 
expressly regulates an activity authorized under subsection (b).
  ``(f) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
limit any other authority to use a cybersecurity system or to identify, 
obtain, or share cyber threat intelligence or cyber threat information.
  ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Certified entity.--The term `certified entity' means a 
        protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
        provider that--
                  ``(A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a security 
                clearance, as determined by the Director of National 
                Intelligence; and
                  ``(B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of 
                National Intelligence that such provider or such entity 
                can appropriately protect classified cyber threat 
                intelligence.
          ``(2) Cyber threat information.--The term `cyber threat 
        information' means information directly pertaining to a 
        vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a 
        government or private entity, including information pertaining 
        to the protection of a system or network from--
                  ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such 
                system or network; or
                  ``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, or 
                personally identifiable information.
          ``(3) Cyber threat intelligence.--The term `cyber threat 
        intelligence' means information in the possession of an element 
        of the intelligence community directly pertaining to a 
        vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a 
        government or private entity, including information pertaining 
        to the protection of a system or network from--
                  ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such 
                system or network; or
                  ``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, or 
                personally identifiable information.
          ``(4) Cybersecurity provider.--The term `cybersecurity 
        provider' means a non-governmental entity that provides goods 
        or services intended to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
          ``(5) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term `cybersecurity 
        purpose' means the purpose of ensuring the integrity, 
        confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguarding, a system 
        or network, including protecting a system or network from--
                  ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such 
                system or network; or
                  ``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, or 
                personally identifiable information.
          ``(6) Cybersecurity system.--The term `cybersecurity system' 
        means a system designed or employed to ensure the integrity, 
        confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguard, a system or 
        network, including protecting a system or network from--
                  ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such 
                system or network; or
                  ``(B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, or 
                personally identifiable information.
          ``(7) Protected entity.--The term `protected entity' means an 
        entity, other than an individual, that contracts with a 
        cybersecurity provider for goods or services to be used for 
        cybersecurity purposes.
          ``(8) Self-protected entity.--The term `self-protected 
        entity' means an entity, other than an individual, that 
        provides goods or services for cybersecurity purposes to 
        itself.''.
  (b) Procedures and Guidelines.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall--
          (1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
        this Act, establish procedures under paragraph (1) of section 
        1104(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
        subsection (a) of this section, and issue guidelines under 
        paragraph (3) of such section 1104(a); and
          (2) following the establishment of such procedures and the 
        issuance of such guidelines, expeditiously distribute such 
        procedures and such guidelines to appropriate Federal 
        Government and private-sector entities.
  (c) Initial Report.--The first report required to be submitted under 
subsection (d) of section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
added by subsection (a) of this section, shall be submitted not later 
than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
  (d) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at 
the end the following new item:

``Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.''.

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 3523 is to provide for the sharing of 
certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information 
between the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities, 
and other purposes.

                     Committee Statement and Views

    At the beginning of the 112th Congress, the Committee, 
under the direction of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger, began a bipartisan effort to examine the issue 
of cybersecurity.\1\ The goal of this effort was to better 
understand the threats facing the nation in cyberspace--with 
respect to both the government and in the private sector--and 
to determine what the Intelligence Community could do to help 
better protect the nation. The results of this review were 
stunning: a number of advanced nation-state actors are actively 
engaged in a series of wide-ranging, aggressive efforts to 
penetrate American computer systems and networks; these efforts 
extend well beyond government networks, and reach deep into 
nearly every sector of the American economy, including 
companies serving critical infrastructure needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\This effort involved a series of briefings and hearings, 
including one open hearing, to inform Committee members and, where 
possible, the public, about the serious national security threat posed 
by nation-state actors and other adversaries in the cyber realm. These 
meetings, briefings, and hearings were in turn supported by numerous 
meetings and briefings conducted by Committee staff with agencies and 
individuals from the Executive Branch including, among others, the 
White House, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department 
of Defense, including the National Security Agency, and with experts 
from the academic and think-tank communities. The Committee staff also 
held numerous meetings with private sector companies and trade groups 
in industries including technology, telecommunications, financial 
services, utilities, aerospace, and defense. And the Committee staff 
met with representatives of privacy and civil liberties organizations 
including the Center for Democracy and Technology, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Constitution 
Project, and the CATO Institute, among others. In total, the Committee 
members and staff met with dozens of organizations in conducting its 
review over a nearly one-year period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Perhaps most troubling, these efforts are targeted not only 
at sensitive national security and infrastructure information, 
but are also often aimed at stealing the corporate research and 
development information that forms the very lifeblood of the 
American economy. China, in particular, is engaged in an 
extensive, day-in, day-out effort to pillage American corporate 
and government information. There can be no question that in 
today's modern world, economic security is national security, 
and the government must help the private sector protect itself.
    The Committee's review also revealed that while the 
government is already doing much to provide support and 
assistance to the private sector to address this threat, in 
particular through DHS and the FBI, more can and should be done 
in the immediate future. In particular, the Committee 
determined that the Intelligence Community is currently in 
possession of tremendously valuable intelligence and strategic 
insights derived from its extensive overseas intelligence 
collection efforts that can and should be provided--in both 
classified and unclassified form (when possible)--to the 
private sector in order to help the owners and operators of the 
vast majority of America's information infrastructure better 
protect themselves. The Committee believes that the recent 
Defense Industrial Base Pilot project (``DIB Pilot'') is a good 
model for demonstrating how sensitive government threat 
intelligence can be shared with the private sector in an 
operationally usable manner. Under the DIB Pilot, the 
government provides classified threat intelligence to key 
Internet Service Providers, who use the information to protect 
a limited number of companies in the defense industrial base, 
all on a voluntary basis.
    The Committee's review also determined that while much 
cybersecurity monitoring and threat information sharing takes 
place today within the private sector, real and perceived legal 
barriers substantially hamper the efforts of the private sector 
to protect itself. The Committee determined that these issues 
are best resolved in the first instance by providing clear, 
positive authority to permit the monitoring--by the private 
sector--of privately-owned and operated networks and systems 
for the purpose of detecting cybersecurity threats and to 
permit the voluntary sharing of information about those threats 
and vulnerabilities with others, including entities within the 
private sector and with the federal government.
    While some have suggested that the private sector needs 
more regulation or that the government ought to directly help 
defend certain portions of the private sector, the Committee's 
view is that the protection of the private sector is best left 
in private hands and that the government ought to provide as 
much intelligence as possible to the private sector before 
reaching for a regulatory ``stick.'' In the view of the 
Committee, such an approach--voluntary, private sector defense 
of private sector systems and networks informed by government 
intelligence information--best protects individual privacy and 
takes advantage of the natural incentives built into our 
economic system, including harnessing private sector drive and 
innovation.
    The Committee's review revealed that America's cyber 
infrastructure is distressingly vulnerable to espionage and 
attacks by nation-states and others with advanced capabilities. 
The Committee believes that immediate and serious action is 
necessary to staunch the bleeding of American corporate 
research and development information and to better protect our 
national security. In particular, the Committee believes that 
the Intelligence Community must take immediate and decisive 
action to provide intelligence to the private sector to help it 
better protect itself. In turn, the private sector must act 
aggressively to better monitor its own systems and to share 
information--both within the private sector and with the 
federal government on a purely voluntary basis. The Committee 
recognizes that because it focused on the issues within its 
jurisdiction, this legislation does not address many of the 
other issues facing the nation with respect to cybersecurity. 
At the same time, however, the Committee firmly believes that 
this legislation is an important first step in the effort to 
better protect the nation from advanced cyber threat actors.

               Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes

    On December 1, 2011, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill H.R. 3523 favorably reported, as amended.

                              OPEN SESSION

    In open session, the Committee considered the text of the 
bill H.R. 3523.
    Chairman Rogers offered an amendment. The amendment places 
additional restrictions on the use by the government of 
information obtained pursuant to the bill. The amendment was 
agreed to by voice vote.
    Mr. Thompson offered an amendment. The amendment requires 
an annual report by the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community reviewing the use of cyber threat information 
provided to the government pursuant to the bill. The amendment 
was agreed to by voice vote.
    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment providing that the 
Director of National Intelligence shall develop and 
periodically review policies and procedures governing the 
acquisition, retention, use, and disclosure of information 
obtained by the intelligence community pursuant to the bill. 
Subsequently, Ms. Schakowsky asked for and received unanimous 
consent to withdraw the amendment.
    The Committee then adopted a motion by the Chairman to 
favorably report the bill H.R. 3523 to the House, as amended. 
The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 17 ayes to 1 no:
    Voting Aye: Chairman Rogers, Mr. Thornberry, Mrs. Myrick, 
Mr. Miller, Mr. Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Nunes, Mr. 
Westmoreland, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. 
Thompson, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Boren, Mr. Chandler.
    Voting No: Ms. Schakowsky.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis


                         SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

    The short title of the Act is the Cyber Intelligence 
Sharing and Protection Act.

      SECTION 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

Section 2(a): In General

    This subsection of the Act amends Title XI of the National 
Security Act of 1947 by adding a new section, Section 1104.

Section 1104(a) of Title 50: Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber 
        Threat Intelligence with Private Sector

    Subsection (a) of new Section 1104 provides for the sharing 
of cyber threat intelligence--both classified and 
unclassified--by elements of the Intelligence Community with 
entities in the private sector. It is the view of the Committee 
that the routine and fulsome sharing of such intelligence 
information with appropriate cleared entities and individuals 
within the private sector is critically important to protecting 
the nation from advanced cyber threats. It is critical that as 
much information as possible be shared at machine-speed, in 
real-time, and in a manner that the information--whether 
classified or not--is operationally usable by entities within 
the private sector.
    This subsection seeks to set forth a general framework and 
requires the establishment of specific procedures and 
guidelines to make such sharing happen in the immediate future 
and to permit such sharing to continue so long as the nation 
faces this significant threat to our national security. The 
Committee intends to engage in vigorous oversight of the 
Intelligence Community use of the authorities under this 
section and, in particular, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI), which is charged with 
promulgating appropriate procedures and guidelines under this 
subsection. The Committee expects to be consulted by ODNI in 
the formulation of these procedures and guidelines to ensure 
that the Committee's intent is achieved by them.
    While the term ``private sector'' is not defined in the 
legislation, the Committee intends that term to be given the 
broadest possible meaning and specifically intends the term to 
include utilities, whether organized as public, private, or 
quasi-public entities, to ensure at the entities that provide 
Americans with access to power, water, gas, and other critical 
services are also provided with access to critical federal 
government intelligence regarding cyber threats.
    In addition, the Committee expects that private sector 
entities receiving classified intelligence pursuant to this 
subsection will use this information not only to protect their 
own systems and networks, but also, where they find appropriate 
as a business matter, to sell cybersecurity goods and services 
appropriately incorporating this information to protect other 
corporate customers.
            Paragraph 1: In General
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) requires the Director of 
National Intelligence to establish procedures to allow 
intelligence community elements to share cyber threat 
intelligence with the private sector and to encourage the 
sharing of such intelligence. The Committee intends the DNI's 
procedures to create a sea change in the current intelligence 
sharing practices of the Intelligence Community with respect to 
the private sector.
    First, the DNI's procedures should ensure that as much 
cyber threat intelligence as possible is downgraded to the 
lowest classification level possible, including 
declassification where appropriate, and made available to as 
broad an audience in the private sector as possible, consistent 
with the need to protect the national security.
    Second, the DNI's procedures should ensure that cyber 
threat intelligence, including classified information, is 
routinely and consistently provided out to entities and 
individuals in the private sector with the appropriate 
clearances.
            Paragraph 2: Sharing and Use of Classified Information
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) requires that the DNI's 
procedures with respect to classified cyber threat intelligence 
require that classified information only be shared with 
certified entities, as defined by the legislation, or with 
individuals who possess appropriate security clearances, and be 
consistent with the need to protect national security. 
Certified entities are cybersecurity providers, protected 
entities, or self-protected entities that possess or are 
eligible to obtain a security clearance and can demonstrate to 
the Director of National Intelligence that they are able to 
appropriately protect such classified cyber threat 
intelligence.
    Paragraph (2) also requires that the DNI's procedures 
provide that classified cyber threat intelligence only be used 
by certified entities in a manner that protects the classified 
information from unauthorized disclosure. This provision 
ensures that when certified entities employ classified 
intelligence to protect unclassified systems or networks, they 
do so in a way that does not reveal classified information 
directly or indirectly.
    The Committee expects that the DNI's procedures will be 
flexible in nature and will take account of private sector 
innovation and incorporate current and future information 
sharing and security best practices. As a result, the Committee 
expects the DNI to work closely with the private sector to 
establish these procedures, to work with the private sector to 
meet the requirements of the procedures, and to ensure that 
these procedures result in the routine and consistent sharing 
of operationally-usable cyber threat intelligence. The 
Committee also expects the DNI to review and revise these 
procedures on a regular basis, at least annually, and to 
conduct such review in cooperation with the private sector, as 
well as to account for new technologies developed by the 
private sector in each set of revised procedures. The DNI 
should also strongly consider the establishment of a private-
sector advisory committee composed of senior executives at key 
private companies to advise on these procedures on a regular 
basis.
            Paragraph (3): Security Clearance Approvals
    Paragraph (3) requires the DNI to issue guidelines allowing 
the head of intelligence community elements to grant temporary 
or permanent security clearances to certified entities and 
their employees and officers (including non-employee officers 
such as board members) in order to allow the government to 
share classified cyber security threat intelligence with those 
certified entities. The Committee's intent is that the 
intelligence community grant security clearances to entities 
that are involved in protecting their own and their corporate 
customers' networks from cyber threats and that the 
intelligence community share cyber threat intelligence to 
protect the nation from advanced cyber threat actors. In 
particular, the Committee wishes to ensure that the private 
sector be able to receive highly classified cyber threat 
intelligence, including at the Top Secret/Sensitive 
Compartmented Information level, as appropriate to protect 
national security. The Committee is concerned that certain 
industries and entities may currently lack sufficient 
clearances at the appropriate level.
    Paragraph (3) also requires the DNI's guidelines to allow 
intelligence community elements to grant approval for the use 
of appropriate facilities and to expedite security clearances 
as necessary, consistent with the need to protect national 
security. The Committee's intent is that the approval process 
for the granting of security clearances and the use of 
facilities for the handling of classified information be 
expedited and broadened by these provisions.
    Because additional security clearances or facility 
approvals may be necessary to effectuate the goals of this 
legislation, it is further the Committee's intent that the cost 
for these security clearances and facility approvals, as well 
as the underlying investigations and adjudications necessary to 
obtain and maintain them, be fully borne by the private sector. 
As noted above, it is the Committee's intent that private 
sector entities that become certified entities will be able to 
better protect themselves, as well as to sell cybersecurity 
goods and services appropriately incorporating this information 
to protect other corporate customers in the private sector. It 
is therefore the Committee's view that these entities should 
bear the full cost of obtaining access to the valuable cyber 
threat intelligence the government will provide under the 
legislation to certified entities. The Committee therefore 
expects that the DNI's guidelines authorized by the legislation 
will provide for full payment of such costs by the private 
sector entity obtaining the security clearances or facility 
approvals.
            Paragraph 4: No Right or Benefit
    Paragraph (4) makes clear that while the Committee expects 
the Intelligence Community to work with private sector entities 
to help them meet the requirements to serve as a certified 
entity, no private sector entity is entitled to receive cyber 
threat intelligence from the government and that no right or 
benefit to cyber threat intelligence is created by the 
provision of such intelligence to a particular private sector 
entity or group of entities.

Section 1104(b) of Title 50: Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity 
        Systems and Sharing of Cyber Threat Information

    Subsection (b) of new Section 1104 provides clear, positive 
authority, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to 
private sector entities to monitor their own systems and 
networks or those of their corporate customers through the use 
of cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain cyber threat 
information, and to mitigate threat or vulnerabilities to their 
own systems or networks or those of their corporate customers. 
The Committee intends the notwithstanding clauses contained in 
subsection (b), as applied to this authority, to have the 
effect of removing any prohibition, real or perceived, to the 
monitoring, for cybersecurity purposes, of private sector 
systems and networks by the private sector entities that own 
the systems or networks or by security companies contracted by 
the system or network owner to protect those networks and 
systems. Potential barriers to such cybersecurity monitoring 
include federal laws governing electronic surveillance.
    Subsection (b) also provides clear, positive authority, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the private 
sector to share cyber threat information identified and 
obtained through such cybersecurity monitoring with other 
entities within the private sector, as well as with the Federal 
Government on a purely voluntary basis, at the discretion of 
the private sector entities whose systems or networks are being 
protected. The Committee intends the notwithstanding clauses 
contained in subsection (b), as applied to this authority, to 
have the effect of removing any prohibition, real or perceived, 
to the sharing of cyber threat information within the private 
sector, as well as with the Federal Government. Potential 
barriers to such sharing that would be addressed by this 
provision include, but are not limited to, provisions of 
federal antitrust law, which some believe may limit sharing of 
cyber threat information between competitors in the private 
sector, as well as provisions of other federal laws including 
the telecommunications laws. The Committee's intent in 
addressing antitrust issues, amongst others, is to permit 
information sharing about cyber threats that might be hampered 
by such laws, not to permit inappropriate and unlawful 
activity, such as the coordinated fixing of prices.
    The Committee notes that the protections related to the 
authorities provided in this section are fairly robust, even 
standing alone. First, as noted below, only cyber threat 
information--that is information about a threat to, or 
vulnerability of government or private systems or networks--may 
be identified, obtained, or shared. And any such monitoring or 
sharing may only take place for cybersecurity purposes. And 
finally, the liability protection provided in this subsection 
only applies when an entity is acting in good faith. These 
provisions, taken together and building on top of one another, 
in the Committee's view, are a strong step towards protecting 
the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.
            Paragraph 1: In General
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) provides the twin 
authorities discussed above to cybersecurity providers, who 
provide goods and services to their corporate customers for 
cybersecurity purposes and to self-protected entities, who 
provide such cybersecurity goods and services for themselves.
    In providing these authorities, the legislation makes clear 
that the monitoring and sharing of information either by a 
cybersecurity provider or a self-protected entity may only take 
place for cybersecurity purposes, a defined term that, as 
discussed below, limits the identification, obtaining, and 
sharing of cyber threat information to the protection of 
private or government systems or networks from threat to, or 
vulnerabilities, of those systems or networks.
    Similarly, the identification and obtaining of cyber threat 
information by a provider or a self-protected entity may only 
take place as part of an effort to protect the rights and 
properties of the provider's corporate customer or the self-
protected entity itself, as the case may be. In this context, 
it is the Committee's intent that the protection of the rights 
and property of a corporate entity includes, but is not limited 
to, the protection of the systems and networks that make up its 
own corporate internal and external information systems but 
also the systems and networks over which it provides services 
to its customers. For example, the Committee expects that an 
internet service provider or telecommunications company may 
seek to protect not only its own corporate networks but also 
the backbone communications systems and networks over which it 
provides services to its customers. Similarly, for example, the 
Committee expects that a utility may seek not only to protect 
its corporate network but may seek to protect the systems and 
networks over which it provides electricity, water, or gas 
services to its customers. The Committee specifically intends 
the authorities provided in subsection (b) to permit private 
sector entities to protect such systems and networks.
    Paragraph (1) also requires that a cybersecurity provider 
obtain the express consent, whether in writing, electronically, 
orally, or otherwise, of its corporate customer before 
conducting any cybersecurity monitoring or sharing under these 
authorities. It is the Committee's intent that express consent 
may be provided on a going-forward basis by a corporate 
customer to a provider for a specified period of time, to be 
determined by the corporate customer.
    In addition, paragraph (1) makes clear that the sharing of 
information either by a cybersecurity provider or a self-
protected entity is to be purely voluntary and at the 
discretion of the entity whose systems or networks are being 
protected. Moreover, the legislation requires that where a 
provider is doing the sharing on behalf of a corporate 
customer, the customer must designate the entities or group of 
entities it wishes to share information with, and that it must 
specifically designate the Federal Government if it wishes to 
share information with the government.
    It is the Committee's expectation that many entities will 
be able to take advantage of the authorities provided in 
paragraph (1) when acting both as a cybersecurity provider and 
as a self-protected entity. For example, an entity such as an 
internet service provider may act as a cybersecurity provider 
when providing managed security services to a corporate 
customer and may simultaneously be acting as a self-protected 
entity when protecting its own corporate systems and networks 
as well as the systems and networks over which it provides 
services to its customers. The Committee's intent is that 
private sector entities will be able to simultaneously take 
advantage of multiple authorities provided within the 
legislation.
            Paragraph 2: Use and Protection of Information
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) provides protections to 
promote the robust sharing of cyber threat information both 
within the private sector as well as from the private sector to 
the government on a purely voluntary basis.
    Paragraph (2) provides that cyber threat information shared 
pursuant to paragraph (1) may only be shared in accordance with 
restrictions placed upon such sharing by the protected entity 
or the self-protected entity whose systems and networks are 
being protected and who therefore authorized the sharing. 
Paragraph (2) further provides that these restrictions may 
include the appropriate anonymization or minimization as 
determined by the protected entity or self-protected entity 
authorizing the sharing.
    The Committee's intent is that through paragraph (1) and 
paragraph (2), a private sector entity choosing to share cyber 
threat information under these provisions has complete control 
over whom it shares with and what information it shares, 
including whether the information it shares is anonymized or 
minimized. The Committee believes that leaving the decision to 
share and the execution of desired anonymization and 
minimization in the hands of the private sector entities whose 
systems and networks are being protected, rather than in the 
hands of the party receiving the information, including the 
government, helps enhance privacy and civil liberties.
    Paragraph (2) also provides that information shared 
pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be used by a receiving entity 
to gain an unfair competitive advantage to the detriment of the 
entity sharing the information. The Committee intends this 
provision to highlight that cybersecurity is enhanced by robust 
threat information sharing within the private sector, both 
amongst partners and competitors, without fear that a 
competitor will use the cyber threat or vulnerability 
information to unfairly obtain greater market share rather than 
simply to protect itself. The situation the Committee intends 
this provision to address is best demonstrated by an example: 
Company A shares information about a cyber vulnerability in one 
of its products with Company B, a competitor in the same 
marketplace; Company B the next day puts out an advertisement 
saying, ``Don't buy Company A's product because it has the 
following vulnerability . . . instead, buy our product which 
doesn't have the same vulnerabilities.'' This example would, in 
the Committee's view, constitute gaining an unfair competitive 
advantage at the expense of the entity sharing the information. 
This provision does not prevent any company from obtaining a 
fair competitive advantage by, for example, using the shared 
information to build a better, more secure product that can be 
marketed without reference to a vulnerability shared by a 
particular entity.
    Paragraph (2) further provides that cyber threat 
information voluntarily shared with the Federal Government 
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be exempt from disclosure under 
the Freedom of Information Act, shall be considered proprietary 
information, shall not be disclosed by the Federal Government 
to an entity outside the Federal Government except as 
authorized by the entity sharing the information, and shall not 
be used by the Federal Government for regulatory purposes. The 
Committee intends this provision to address the key concerns 
expressed by the private sector regarding the sharing of their 
sensitive information with the federal government: first, that 
the government might expose its most sensitive threat and 
vulnerability information to a wide audience either through 
FOIA or by publishing the information, thereby providing a 
roadmap for attacks by cyber threat actors; second, that the 
government might take the information provided by the private 
sector and use it to regulate or impose sanctions upon them.
    The Committee determined that the best way to address these 
concerns and incentivize the sharing of cyber threat 
information with the government was to explicitly and clearly 
protect the information provided in this cybersecurity channel 
from being disclosed under FOIA, to require the government to 
carefully protect the information, and finally, to prohibit the 
government from using information provided in this 
cybersecurity channel from being used for regulatory purposes.
    The Committee was cognizant of the fact that cyber threat 
information provided to the government under these authorities 
might also be required to be provided by certain private sector 
entities to their regulators and therefore provided elsewhere 
in the legislation that the mere classification of the 
information as cyber threat information or its provision to the 
government under this mechanism does not satisfy those 
regulatory requirements nor override any appropriate regulation 
that may take place based on the provision of such information 
to the government through other channels. Nor would these 
provisions prevent a third party from obtaining appropriate 
information through an otherwise appropriate FOIA request to a 
regulator who obtained the information under other regulatory 
authorities. Rather, the limitations here were designed to 
provide a safe harbor where private sector entities could 
provide real-time cyber threat information to the government 
without fear that that particular information would be used to 
regulate them directly or be exploited by bad actors.
            Paragraph 3: Exemption from Liability
    Paragraph (3) provides a bar to civil or criminal causes of 
action being brought or maintained in federal or state court 
against an entity or its officers, employees, or agents acting 
in good faith to use cybersecurity systems for monitoring to 
identify and obtain cyber threat information in accordance with 
the provisions of the legislation. The Committee's intent is to 
provide strong liability protection for private sector entities 
when they act to take advantage of the authorities provided 
under paragraph (1) of subsection (b) to do what the statute 
seeks to encourage them to do: robustly monitor their own 
systems and networks and those of their corporate customers and 
share information about threats and vulnerabilities to better 
protect their systems. Specifically, the Committee intends that 
civil or criminal actions based on the use of cybersecurity 
systems to monitor systems or networks to identify and obtain 
cyber threat information using the authorities of this statute 
shall be dismissed immediately by the courts and prior to 
significant discovery and extensive motion practice.
    Paragraph (3) also provides an identical bar to actions 
against such entities acting in good faith for not acting on 
information obtained or shared in accordance with the 
provisions of the legislation. The Committee's intent is 
likewise to provide strong liability protection to entities 
when they engage in robust cyber threat information sharing so 
that they are not held liable for not acting on every piece of 
cyber threat intelligence provided by the government or every 
piece of cyber threat information that they detect or receive 
from another private sector entity. The Committee believes that 
if information sharing does become truly robust, the amount of 
cyber threat information and the speed with which such 
information will be shared will make it nearly impossible to 
always protect against every threat in real-time and, as such, 
private sector entities ought not be held liable for such 
actions. Similarly, the Committee recognizes that particular 
entities may engage in a cost-benefit analysis with respect to 
implementing protections against particular threats and the 
Committee intends this provision to help ensure that a private 
sector entity making such a judgment not be held liable for 
making such reasonable determinations.
    At the same time, the Committee was fully cognizant of the 
concern that it not create a moral hazard by providing too 
broad a liability protection provision and that it not 
incentivize bad acts. As a result, Paragraph (3) requires that 
the entity be acting in good faith to obtain the benefits of 
this liability protection. That is, where an entity acts in bad 
faith, it does not receive the benefit of the strong liability 
protection provided by the legislation. Of course, where an 
entity is seeking to take advantage of specific statutory 
authority provided by Congress and where Congress is seeking to 
incentivize cybersecurity activities, as with government action 
taken pursuant to statutory authority and the presumption of 
regularity that attaches to such actions, the Committee expects 
that good faith will be presumed in the absence of substantial 
evidence to the contrary.
            Paragraph 4: Relationship to Other Laws Requiring the 
                    Disclosure of Information
    Paragraph (4) provides that the provision of cyber threat 
information to the government under the voluntary system 
established by this statute does not satisfy or affect any 
requirement under other provisions of law to provide 
information to the Federal Government. As noted briefly 
earlier, the Committee intends this provision to ensure that 
while information provided to the government under this 
legislation is protected from use by the government for 
regulatory purposes, that information otherwise required to be 
provided to the government must still be provided and that such 
information--required by other law to be provided to the 
government--may still be used for all lawful purposes, 
including, as required by law, for regulatory purposes.

Section 1104(c) of Title 50: Federal Government Use of Information

    Subsection (c) of new Section 1104 provides certain 
limitations on the government's use of information provided by 
the private sector and ensures that the private sector's 
provision of information to the government is purely voluntary. 
The Committee intends these provisions, along with others in 
the legislation, to help protect the privacy and civil 
liberties of Americans.
            Paragraph (1): Limitation
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (c) limits the Federal 
Government's use of information shared with the government by 
the private sector by requiring at least one significant 
purpose of the government's use of such information to be 
either a cybersecurity purpose or the protection of the 
national security of the United States. As such, the Committee 
intends this provision not to create a wall between 
cybersecurity and national security uses of information on one 
hand and all other lawful government uses on the other, rather 
it intends this provision simply to ensure that the government 
is using the information at least for cybersecurity or national 
security, amongst the other uses it might make of the 
information.
            Paragraph (2): Affirmative Search Restriction
    Paragraph (2) limits the Federal Government's affirmative 
searching of data provided exclusively under this legislation 
to the government by the private sector to only conducting such 
searches for cybersecurity purposes or the protection of the 
national security. The Committee intends this provision to 
ensure that information provided under this authority not be 
affirmatively searched by the government for evidence of 
garden-variety crimes like tax evasion or money laundering.
            Paragraph 3: Anti-Tasking Restrictions
    Paragraph (3) makes clear that nothing in this legislation 
permits the government to require a private sector entity to 
share with the Federal Government nor to condition the sharing 
of cyber threat intelligence under subsection (a) on the 
provision of cyber threat information back to the Federal 
Government under subsection (b). The Committee intends this 
provision to ensure that cyber threat information sharing by 
the private sector with the Federal Government remains purely 
voluntary and that the government not attempt to compel such 
sharing by withholding valuable cyber threat intelligence. The 
Committee believes that this provision also prevents the 
government from ``tasking'' the collection of information as 
the government might do under appropriate criminal or foreign 
intelligence surveillance authority because it ensures that the 
private sector cannot be required to provide information back 
to the government.

Section 1104(d) of Title 50: Report on Information Sharing

    Subsection (d) of new Section 1104 requires the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community to report annually to the 
Congressional intelligence committees, in unclassified form 
accompanied by a classified annex as needed, on the use of the 
information shared with the Federal Government under this 
legislation. The report on the use of information shared with 
the Federal Government will include: (1) a review of the use of 
such information for purposes other than cybersecurity; (2) a 
review of the type of information shared with the Federal 
Government; (3) a review of the actions taken by the Federal 
Government based on the information shared; (4) appropriate 
metrics to determine the impact of such sharing on privacy and 
civil liberties, if any such impact exists; and (5) any 
recommendations of the Inspector General for improvements or 
modifications to the authorities provided under this 
legislation. It is the Committee's intent that this report 
provide the Committee with the information it needs to ensure 
that the privacy and civil liberties of Americans are being 
appropriately protected.

Section 1104(e) of Title 50: Federal Preemption

    Subsection (e) of new Section 1104 provides that the 
legislation supersedes any provision of state or local law that 
may prohibit the activities authorized by this legislation. The 
Committee's intent is to ensure, as with the federal provisions 
discussed above, that state and local law on wiretapping, 
antitrust, and public disclosure, to name but a few, do not 
stand as a bar to the kind of robust cyber threat intelligence 
and information sharing that the Committee hopes to engender 
through the process of legislation.

Section 1104(f) of Title 50: Savings Clause

    Subsection (f) of new Section 1104 makes clear that nothing 
in this legislation trumps existing laws or authorities 
permitting the use of cybersecurity systems or efforts to 
identify, obtain, or share cyber threat information. Many 
private sector entities today take advantage of certain 
provisions of federal law to conduct the limited monitoring for 
cybersecurity purposes. While this legislation provides much 
more robust authorities, the Committee believed it important to 
ensure that existing authorities remained in place and that 
those authorities could continue to be used by the appropriate 
government agencies and entities.

Section 1104(g) of Title 50: Definitions

    Subsection (g) of the new Section 1104 provides important 
definitions for the purpose of this legislation. The Committee 
notes that much of the work on limiting the scope and breadth 
of this legislation is done by the definitions and commends 
those interested in this legislation to carefully review these 
definitions in the context of the legislation.
            Paragraph 1: Certified Entity
    As noted briefly above, a certified entity is defined as a 
cybersecurity provider, a protected entity, or a self-protected 
entity that also possesses or is eligible to obtain a security 
clearance at the level appropriate to receive classified cyber 
threat intelligence, as determined by the DNI, and can 
demonstrate to the Director of National Intelligence that it 
can appropriately protect that classified information.
            Paragraph 2: Cyber Threat Information
    Cyber threat information is defined to mean information 
that directly pertains to a vulnerability of, or threat to, a 
system or network of a government or private entity. Such 
information includes, but is not limited to, information 
pertaining to the protection of a system or network from 
efforts to degrade, disrupt or destroy the network, as well as 
the protection of a system or network from the theft or 
misappropriation of private or government information, among 
other things.
            Paragraph 3: Cyber Threat Intelligence
    The definition of cyber threat intelligence is consistent 
with the definition of cyber threat information except that 
cyber threat intelligence is information that is originally in 
the possession of an element of the intelligence community. The 
Committee used different terms in this legislation with similar 
definitions in order to distinguish the origin of information. 
Cyber threat intelligence thus originates with the government 
while cyber threat information originates with the private 
sector.
            Paragraph 4: Cybersecurity Provider
    A cybersecurity provider is defined to be a non-
governmental entity that provides goods or services intended to 
be used for cybersecurity purposes. The Committee intentionally 
excluded governmental entities from this construct to avoid any 
concern that government agencies might serve as cybersecurity 
providers to private sector entities.
            Paragraph 5: Cybersecurity Purpose
    A cybersecurity purpose is defined as the purpose of 
ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of, 
or safeguarding, a system or network. This includes, but is not 
limited to, the protection of a system or network from efforts 
to degrade, disrupt or destroy the network, as well as the 
protection of a system or network from the theft or 
misappropriation of private or government information, among 
other things.
            Paragraph 6: Cybersecurity System
    A cybersecurity system is defined as a system designed or 
employed to ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and 
availability of, or safeguard, a system or network. This 
includes, but is not limited to, a system designed or employed 
to protect a system or network from efforts to degrade, disrupt 
or destroy the network, as well as a system designed or 
employed to protect a system or network from the theft or 
misappropriation of private or government information, among 
other things.
            Paragraph 7: Protected Entity
    A protected entity is defined as an entity, other than an 
individual, that contracts with a cybersecurity provider for 
goods or services to be used for cybersecurity purposes. The 
Committee intentionally excluded individuals from this 
definition so as to limit the direct scope of the legislation 
to the protection of corporate entities.
            Paragraph 8: Self-Protected Entity
    A self-protected entity is defined as an entity, other than 
an individual, that provides goods or services for 
cybersecurity purposes to itself. As with the definition of a 
protected entity, the Committee intentionally excluded 
individuals from this definition so as to limit the direct 
scope of the legislation to the protection of corporate 
entities.

Section 2(b): Procedures and Guidelines

    This subsection of the Act requires the DNI to establish 
the procedures for sharing of cyber threat intelligence and to 
issue the guidelines for granting security clearances within 60 
days of the date of enactment of the Act. This subsection of 
the Act also requires the DNI to expeditiously distribute the 
procedures and guidelines to appropriate federal government and 
private sector entities. The Committee intends to require the 
DNI to meet these deadlines and to broadly distribute the 
procedures and guidelines. As previously noted, the Committee 
expects the DNI to work closely with the private sector in 
developing these procedures and guidelines.

Section 2(c): Initial Report

    This subsection of the Act requires the first report to be 
provided to the Congressional intelligence committees by the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community under new 
subsection (d) of section 1104 to be provided no later than one 
year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Section 2(d): Table of Contents Amendment

    This subsection of the Act provides for amendments to the 
table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947.

                 Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee held two closed 
hearings, one open hearing, and four informal meetings or 
briefings relating to the subject matter of the legislation. 
The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects conclusions 
reached by the Committee in light of this oversight activity.

                General Performance Goals and Objectives

    In accordance with clause 3(c) of House rule XIII, the 
Committee's performance goals and objectives are reflected in 
the descriptive portions of this report.

                       Unfunded Mandate Statement

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of 
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded 
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee 
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office 
included herein.

                  Statement on Congressional Earmarks

    Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, the Committee states that the bill as 
reported contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax 
benefits, or limited tariff benefits.

           Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office 
                             Cost Estimate

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule 
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect 
to requirements of 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the following 
cost estimate for H.R. 3523 from the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                 Washington, DC, December 16, 2011.
Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3523, the Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason 
Wheelock.
            Sincerely,
                                              Douglas W. Elmendorf.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 3523--Cyber Intelligence Sharing Act

    H.R. 3523 would amend the National Security Act of 1947 to 
require the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
establish procedures to promote the sharing of information 
about cyberthreats between intelligence agencies and the 
private sector. The DNI also would be directed to establish 
guidelines for granting security clearances to employees of the 
private-sector entities with which the government shares such 
information. CBO estimates that implementing the bill would 
have a discretionary cost of $15 million over the 2012-2016 
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. 
Enacting H.R. 3523 would not affect direct spending or 
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
    CBO anticipates additional personnel would be needed to 
administer the program and to manage the exchange of 
information between intelligence agencies and the private 
sector. Based on information from the DNI and the Office of 
Personnel Management, CBO estimates that those activities would 
cost approximately $3 million annually over the 2012-2016 
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.
    The bill would impose intergovernmental and private-sector 
mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
(UMRA), by extending civil and criminal liability protection to 
entities and cybersecurity providers that share or use 
cyberthreat information. The bill also would impose additional 
intergovernmental mandates by preempting state laws. Because 
CBO is uncertain about the number of cases that would be 
limited and any forgone compensation that would result, CBO 
cannot determine whether the costs of the mandate would exceed 
the annual threshold established in UMRA for private-sector 
mandates ($142 million in 2011, adjusted annually for 
inflation). However, CBO estimates that the aggregate costs of 
the mandates on public entities would fall below the threshold 
for intergovernmental mandates ($71 million in 2011, adjusted 
annually for inflation).
    The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Jason Wheelock 
(for federal costs), J'nell J. Blanco (for the 
intergovernmental impact), and Elizabeth Bass (for the private-
sector impact). This estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, 
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is 
printed in italic and existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947


                              SHORT TITLE

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
     * * * * * * *

                       TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

  Sec. 1104. (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber Threat 
Intelligence With Private Sector.--
          (1) In general.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall establish procedures to allow 
        elements of the intelligence community to share cyber 
        threat intelligence with private-sector entities and to 
        encourage the sharing of such intelligence.
          (2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The 
        procedures established under paragraph (1) shall 
        provide that classified cyber threat intelligence may 
        only be--
                  (A) shared by an element of the intelligence 
                community with--
                          (i) certified entities; or
                          (ii) a person with an appropriate 
                        security clearance to receive such 
                        cyber threat intelligence;
                  (B) shared consistent with the need to 
                protect the national security of the United 
                States; and
                  (C) used by a certified entity in a manner 
                which protects such cyber threat intelligence 
                from unauthorized disclosure.
          (3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of 
        National Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing 
        that the head of an element of the intelligence 
        community may, as the head of such element considers 
        necessary to carry out this subsection--
                  (A) grant a security clearance on a temporary 
                or permanent basis to an employee or officer of 
                a certified entity;
                  (B) grant a security clearance on a temporary 
                or permanent basis to a certified entity and 
                approval to use appropriate facilities; and
                  (C) expedite the security clearance process 
                for a person or entity as the head of such 
                element considers necessary, consistent with 
                the need to protect the national security of 
                the United States.
          (4) No right or benefit.--The provision of 
        information to a private-sector entity under this 
        subsection shall not create a right or benefit to 
        similar information by such entity or any other 
        private-sector entity.
  (b) Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing 
of Cyber Threat Information.--
          (1) In general.--
                  (A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding 
                any other provision of law, a cybersecurity 
                provider, with the express consent of a 
                protected entity for which such cybersecurity 
                provider is providing goods or services for 
                cybersecurity purposes, may, for cybersecurity 
                purposes--
                          (i) use cybersecurity systems to 
                        identify and obtain cyber threat 
                        information to protect the rights and 
                        property of such protected entity; and
                          (ii) share such cyber threat 
                        information with any other entity 
                        designated by such protected entity, 
                        including, if specifically designated, 
                        the Federal Government.
                  (B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding 
                any other provision of law, a self-protected 
                entity may, for cybersecurity purposes--
                          (i) use cybersecurity systems to 
                        identify and obtain cyber threat 
                        information to protect the rights and 
                        property of such self-protected entity; 
                        and
                          (ii) share such cyber threat 
                        information with any other entity, 
                        including the Federal Government.
          (2) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat 
        information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
                  (A) shall only be shared in accordance with 
                any restrictions placed on the sharing of such 
                information by the protected entity or self-
                protected entity authorizing such sharing, 
                including appropriate anonymization or 
                minimization of such information;
                  (B) may not be used by an entity to gain an 
                unfair competitive advantage to the detriment 
                of the protected entity or the self-protected 
                entity authorizing the sharing of information; 
                and
                  (C) if shared with the Federal Government--
                          (i) shall be exempt from disclosure 
                        under section 552 of title 5, United 
                        States Code;
                          (ii) shall be considered proprietary 
                        information and shall not be disclosed 
                        to an entity outside of the Federal 
                        Government except as authorized by the 
                        entity sharing such information; and
                          (iii) shall not be used by the 
                        Federal Government for regulatory 
                        purposes.
          (3) Exemption from liability.--No civil or criminal 
        cause of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal 
        or State court against a protected entity, self-
        protected entity, cybersecurity provider, or an 
        officer, employee, or agent of a protected entity, 
        self-protected entity, or cybersecurity provider, 
        acting in good faith--
                  (A) for using cybersecurity systems or 
                sharing information in accordance with this 
                section; or
                  (B) for not acting on information obtained or 
                shared in accordance with this section.
          (4) Relationship to other laws requiring the 
        disclosure of information.--The submission of 
        information under this subsection to the Federal 
        Government shall not satisfy or affect any requirement 
        under any other provision of law for a person or entity 
        to provide information to the Federal Government.
  (c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
          (1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber 
        threat information shared with the Federal Government 
        in accordance with subsection (b) for any lawful 
        purpose only if--
                  (A) the use of such information is not for a 
                regulatory purpose; and
                  (B) at least one significant purpose of the 
                use of such information is--
                          (i) a cybersecurity purpose; or
                          (ii) the protection of the national 
                        security of the United States.
          (2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal 
        Government may not affirmatively search cyber threat 
        information shared with the Federal Government under 
        subsection (b) for a purpose other than a purpose 
        referred to in paragraph (1)(B).
          (3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this 
        section shall be construed to permit the Federal 
        Government to--
                  (A) require a private-sector entity to share 
                information with the Federal Government; or
                  (B) condition the sharing of cyber threat 
                intelligence with a private-sector entity on 
                the provision of cyber threat information to 
                the Federal Government.
  (d) Report on Information Sharing.--
          (1) Report.--The Inspector General of the 
        Intelligence Community shall annually submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report 
        containing a review of the use of information shared 
        with the Federal Government under this section, 
        including--
                  (A) a review of the use by the Federal 
                Government of such information for a purpose 
                other than a cybersecurity purpose;
                  (B) a review of the type of information 
                shared with the Federal Government under this 
                section;
                  (C) a review of the actions taken by the 
                Federal Government based on such information;
                  (D) appropriate metrics to determine the 
                impact of the sharing of such information with 
                the Federal Government on privacy and civil 
                liberties, if any; and
                  (E) any recommendations of the Inspector 
                General for improvements or modifications to 
                the authorities under this section.
          (2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
        include a classified annex.
  (e) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any statute 
of a State or political subdivision of a State that restricts 
or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under 
subsection (b).
  (f) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to limit any other authority to use a cybersecurity 
system or to identify, obtain, or share cyber threat 
intelligence or cyber threat information.
  (g) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Certified entity.--The term ``certified entity'' 
        means a protected entity, self-protected entity, or 
        cybersecurity provider that--
                  (A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a 
                security clearance, as determined by the 
                Director of National Intelligence; and
                  (B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of 
                National Intelligence that such provider or 
                such entity can appropriately protect 
                classified cyber threat intelligence.
          (2) Cyber threat information.--The term ``cyber 
        threat information'' means information directly 
        pertaining to a vulnerability of, or threat to, a 
        system or network of a government or private entity, 
        including information pertaining to the protection of a 
        system or network from--
                  (A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy 
                such system or network; or
                  (B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, 
                or personally identifiable information.
          (3) Cyber threat intelligence.--The term ``cyber 
        threat intelligence'' means information in the 
        possession of an element of the intelligence community 
        directly pertaining to a vulnerability of, or threat 
        to, a system or network of a government or private 
        entity, including information pertaining to the 
        protection of a system or network from--
                  (A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy 
                such system or network; or
                  (B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, 
                or personally identifiable information.
          (4) Cybersecurity provider.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        provider'' means a non-governmental entity that 
        provides goods or services intended to be used for 
        cybersecurity purposes.
          (5) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        purpose'' means the purpose of ensuring the integrity, 
        confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguarding, a 
        system or network, including protecting a system or 
        network from--
                  (A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy 
                such system or network; or
                  (B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, 
                or personally identifiable information.
          (6) Cybersecurity system.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        system'' means a system designed or employed to ensure 
        the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of, or 
        safeguard, a system or network, including protecting a 
        system or network from--
                  (A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy 
                such system or network; or
                  (B) theft or misappropriation of private or 
                government information, intellectual property, 
                or personally identifiable information.
          (7) Protected entity.--The term ``protected entity'' 
        means an entity, other than an individual, that 
        contracts with a cybersecurity provider for goods or 
        services to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
          (8) Self-protected entity.--The term ``self-protected 
        entity'' means an entity, other than an individual, 
        that provides goods or services for cybersecurity 
        purposes to itself.

                             MINORITY VIEWS

        Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523

    As members of the Intelligence Committee, it is our 
responsibility to ensure that intelligence support to the 
cybersecurity of our nation is focused and robust. The 
Intelligence Community's unique insight and knowledge of 
cyberspace are critical to our nation's ability to defend, not 
only U.S. Government information technology, but also our 
Critical Infrastructure and Defense Industrial Base.
    This Bill is the culmination of a strong bipartisan effort 
and provides an innovative, yet pragmatic, approach to 
cybersecurity. It leverages the Intelligence Community's 
expertise and incentivizes the private sector to share cyber 
threat information in order to build an enduring private-public 
partnership for this strategic threat to our nation's security. 
Specifically, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
provides the authority for the Intelligence Community to share 
classified cyber threat intelligence with properly-vetted 
industry partners and encourages the voluntary sharing of cyber 
threat information with the U.S. Government.
    It is the Minority's strong intent in supporting this Bill 
to facilitate this private-public sharing of information 
regarding malevolent cyber activity in a way that ensures that 
the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons are respected 
and protected. An equitable and ethical balance between 
flexible information sharing and privacy must be established, 
maintained and vigilantly reviewed.
    We express continued interest in working with the Majority 
to further address concerns raised by the Administration and 
civil liberties organizations.
    We believe that this Bill and its amendments strike this 
delicate balance by requiring that any shared information used 
by the Government meet a cybersecurity or national security 
threshold and by prohibiting the Government's use of shared 
information for regulatory purposes. Moreover, in recognition 
that this Bill is a pioneering effort, this Committee is fully 
committed to diligent oversight of the parties' conduct 
pursuant to this Bill.
    The Bill directs the Intelligence Community Inspector 
General to be alert to and review any U.S. Government activity 
or use of shared information that goes beyond the cybersecurity 
focus of this Bill. Should that oversight identify significant 
concerns or abuse, the Minority is committed to working with 
the Majority to take all appropriate and timely action to 
further enhance privacy protections.
    To repeat: the Minority supported this Bill in the 
expectation that, both the participating private companies and 
the Government, will appreciate and not abuse the flexibility 
and liability protection afforded by this Bill. With the 
dedicated support of both government and industry--overlaid 
with Congressional oversight--we are optimistic that this Bill 
will work as envisioned to strengthen cybersecurity in a manner 
that respects American values.

                                   C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.
                                   Mike Thompson.
                                   Jim Langevin.
                                   Adam B. Schiff.
                                   Dan Boren.
                                   Ben Chandler.

                             MINORITY VIEWS

        Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523

    The intent of this Bill is to authorize the U.S. Government 
to share classified cybersecurity intelligence with the private 
sector in a secure manner and to enable the private sector to 
share cybersecurity information with the U.S. Government in 
real-time, without fear of liability if acting in good faith.
    I agree that we are facing serious cyber threats and that 
all Americans will benefit from strong cybersecurity 
protections for our critical infrastructure. However, I believe 
we need to balance those concerns with measures to protect the 
privacy and civil liberties that Americans also deserve. While 
I appreciate the efforts of authors of this bipartisan bill and 
its focus on cybersecurity, I believe that balance has not yet 
been achieved.
    Although the Bill includes adequate protections for 
classified information and corporate proprietary information, 
its language does not provide commensurate protection for the 
personal accounts of U.S. persons or personal identifiable 
information (PII). For example, the Bill's language does not 
restrict the nature or volume of the information that the 
private sector can share with the Government, does not provide 
for mandatory minimization of PII, does not significantly 
curtail the Government's use of shared information, and does 
not include most of the privacy protections recommended by the 
White House in its proposed cybersecurity legislation.
    I am also concerned that the new liability shield provided 
in the Bill is overly broad and is less protective of consumers 
than similar shields provided under many state laws. We should 
be very careful whenever we limit injured consumers' ability to 
seek legal redress. If a good faith requirement is to be used, 
it should be based on clear and objective criteria. In no 
event, however, should cybersecurity entities be protected if 
injuries are the result of neglect, recklessness or misconduct.
    Accordingly, while I strongly agree with the need to enact 
effective cybersecurity legislation, and commend the 
constructive bipartisan effort underlying this Bill, I 
respectively dissent because the Bill does not sufficiently 
protect individual privacy rights and civil liberties.
                                   Janice D. Schakowsky.

                                  







Rise Of The Fourth Reich – Full Movie

The officers of the SS, Hitler’s feared paramilitary unit, were the most notorious war criminals of WWII. Some were brought to justice after the war, but many were able to escape from Germany. A massive secret organization known as Odessa was reportedly formed to help them flee and rebuild a new Reich that would again rise to power. MysteryQuest will investigate by following the path of feared Nazis from Germany, to Austria, and Italy. The team will also travel to Paraguay where many of the Nazis reportedly hid while plotting their new rise.

TOP-SECRET – U.S. Army Regulation 525–13 Antiterrorism

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/USArmy-Antiterrorism.png

 

This regulation establishes the Army Antiterrorism (AT) Program to protect personnel (Soldiers, members of other Services, Department of the Army (DA) civilian employees, Department of Defense (DOD) contractors and Family members of DOD employees), information, property, and facilities (including civil work and like projects) in all locations and situations against terrorism. It provides—

a. Department of the Army AT tasks
b. Department of the Army AT standards.
c. Implementing guidance for the execution of the AT standards.
d. Policies, procedures, and responsibilities for execution of the AT program.

5–21. Standard 20. Terrorism Incident Response Measures

a. Army standard 20. Commanders and heads of agencies/activities will include in AT plans terrorism incident response measures that prescribe appropriate actions for reporting terrorist threat information, responding to threats/actual attacks, and reporting terrorist incidents.

b. Implementing guidance.

(1) Terrorist incident response measures in AT plans will, at a minimum, address management of the FPCON system, implementation of all FPCON measures, and requirements for terrorist related reports. Plans will be affordable, effective, and attainable; tie security measures together; and integrate security efforts by assigning responsibilities, establishing procedures, and ensuring subordinate plans complement each other. At the garrison level, the plans must tie into other installation response plans.

(2) At garrison level, commanders will identify high risk targets (HRTs), mission essential vulnerable areas (MEVAs) and ensure planning provides for focus on these areas. Facility managers whose facility has been identified as a HRT will be informed, and will ensure facility security plans are formulated on this basis.

(3) Commanders will develop procedures to ensure periodic review, update, and coordination of response plans with appropriate responders.

(4) Commanders will ensure CBRNE, medical, fire, and police response procedures are integrated into consequence management/AT plans.

(5) Plans will include procedures for an attack warning system using a set of recognizable alarms and reactions for potential emergencies, as determined by the terrorist threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments. Commanders will exercise the attack warning system and ensure personnel are trained and proficient in recognition. In conjunction with the alarm warning system, commanders will conduct drills on emergency evacuations/ movements to safe havens/shelters-in-place.

(6) CONUS commanders will—

(a) Notify the local FBI office concerning threat incidents occurring at Army installations, facilities, activities, and civil work projects or like activities.

(b) Take appropriate action to prevent loss of life and/or mitigate property damage before the FBI response force arrives. On-site elements or USACIDC elements will be utilized to safeguard evidence, witness testimony, and related aspects of the criminal investigation process pending arrival of the FBI response force. Command of U.S. Army elements will remain within military channels.

(c) If the FBI declines jurisdiction over a threat incident occurring in an area of exclusive or concurrent Federal jurisdiction, take appropriate action in conjunction with USACIDC elements to resolve the incident. In such cases, commanders will request advisory support from the local FBI office.

(d) If the FBI declines jurisdiction over a threat incident occurring in an area of concurrent or proprietary Federal jurisdiction, coordinate the military response with USACIDC elements, state and local law enforcement agencies, as appropriate. In such cases, commanders will request advisory support from the local FBI office.

(7) OCONUS commanders will—

(a) Where practicable, involve HN security and law enforcement agencies in AT reactive planning and request employment of HN police forces in response to terrorist attacks.

(b) Coordinate reactions to incidents of a political nature with the U.S. Embassy and the HN, subject to instructions issued by the combatant commander with geographical responsibility.

(c) In SIGNIFICANT and HIGH terrorist threat level areas, plans to respond to terrorist incidents will contain procedures for the notification of all DOD personnel and their dependents. Such plans will provide for enhanced security measures and/or possible evacuation of DOD personnel and their dependents.

(8) USACIDC will investigate threat incidents in accordance with paragraph 2–20d.

(9) AT plans, orders, SOPs, terrorism threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments, and coordination measures will consider the potential threat use of WMD. Commanders will assess the vulnerability of installations, facilities, and personnel within their AOR to potential threat of terrorist using WMD and CBRNE weapons to include TIH. Clear command, control, and communication lines will be established between local, state, Federal, and HN emergency assistance agencies to detail support relationships and responsibilities. Response to WMD use by terrorists will be synchronized with other crisis management plans that deal with large-scale incident response and consequence management. Separate plans devoted only to terrorist use of WMD need not be published if existing crisis management plans covering similar events (such as accidental chemical spills) are sufficiently comprehensive.

 

 

Unveiled – Captured German War Films (1945)

Captured German War Films
Summary: POSTHUMOS AWARDS: CU, Swastika emblem, CUs, display of medals – men at attention. Sequence: Civilians receiving awards from Herman Goering. Karl Von Rumstedt, Admiral Erich Raeder and Herman Goering. Goering pays homage at dead soldier’s bier. MS, casket placed into mausoleum. HITLER VISITS WOUNDED VETS IN HOSPITAL: CU, Adolf Hitler arriving; with wounded vets, people cheer as he departs. MS, Hitler with officers in the field. MS, Heinrich Himmler, Joseph P Goebbels, Gen Guderian and others standing and talking in field. Review: Sequence – youthful officer inspecting and addressing company of German soldiers at attention, cut ins soldiers listening. VOLKSTURM ON PARADE: Sequence: Aged civilian members Of the Home Guard on parade. CU’s brassards with insignia typifying Volksturm. Parade scenes. U BOAT INSPECTION: Sequence: Aged civilian arriving at dock, touring interior of sub, at periscope (evidently U BOAT INVENTOR).

Department of Defense. Department of the Air Force. (09/26/1947 – )

ARC Identifier 64760 / Local Identifier 342-USAF-13034 and ARC Identifier 24043 / Local Identifier 111-ADC-10281. 1939-1945.

TOP-SECRET – Report by Vyshinsky to Molotov Concerning Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and the United States, August 1941

Date:
08/01/1941
Source:
Library of Congress
Description:
Report by Vyshinsky to Molotov concerning trade and economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, August 1941

 

To Comrade V. M. Molotov

I present for your confirmation:

1. The draft resolution of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars [SNK SSSR] on extending the trade agreement currently in effect between the USSR and the U.S.A. to August 6, 1942.

2. The text of notes which will be exchanged this August 4 in Washington between Umanskii and Welles.

The SNK SSSR resolution and notes which will be exchanged this August 4 in Washington are subject for publication.

In addition to this note on extending the agreement, two other notes will he exchanged:

a) on the U.S.A. rendering economic cooperation to us (with subsequent publication);

b) on the inapplicability for us of discretionary conditions concerning our gold and silver (without publi-cation).

The texts of the last two notes are not yet in our possession.

[handwritten: ] I am also enclosing a draft response to Comrade Umanskii.

Sent
[signed] A. Vyshinsky

[illegible]
” ” August 1941

IDU MID

TOP-SECRET – Silver Shadow to Unveil New Assault Rifle

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Silver Shadow will present a new weapon prototype during the Eurosatory exhibition in Paris.

A new player in the arsenal of Israeli weapons? Silver Shadow, the manufacturer of the Israeli-produced Gilboa assault rifle, will soon be presenting another product from the Gilboa line of weapons.

The product is a new assault rifle, with a double barrel – a unique and first of its kind among Israeli-produced weapons. The new weapon increases firepower and has improved marksmanship, but still takes standard ammunition.

The company will present the new weapon at the Eurosatory exhibition in Paris during June 2012. The exhibition is one of the most prominent exhibitions in the world for the fields of defense and security, and takes place every two years in France.

The largest defense companies in the world present their products at the exhibition; the Israeli pavilion, which will feature dozens of companies, is considered one of the most prominent ones at the show.

Hitler’s Escape – Full Movie

According the official public record, Adolf Hitler committed suicide in his underground bunker as allied troops stormed Berlin at the end of World War II. But no one actually saw him die. No body was ever produced. No photographs were ever taken. Some believe Hitler managed to escape, and for years there were sightings of the former dictator in many parts of the world. Then, in the 1990s the Russians revealed secret evidence taken from Hitler’s bunker decades earlier that they said proved he had died there. Among the evidence is a piece of skull. MysteryQuest obtained access to this evidence for testing and the results are startling.

Global Transparency – Culture of secrecy around global land deals must be lifted

A new report today reveals how opening up the process around large-scale land deals in developing countries would benefit local communities, governments and business, and provides direction on how this can be achieved.

The report, Dealing with Disclosure, published by Global Witness, the International Land Coalition and the Oakland Institute, looks at why it is vital to transform the secretive culture behind large scale land  deals, and for the first time shows how it might be done. At present decisions are being made in secret, with basic information unavailable even to those affected. The report argues that all contractual information must be made publicly available unless investors or governments can prove that this would harm commercial competitiveness or public interest – a principle it calls “if in doubt, disclose”.

The rush for land in developing countries has rapidly intensified since 2008, but the sector remains largely unregulated. Concerns are growing over the impact of big, secretive deals between governments and investors on communities and the environment. As more and more land is taken away from local communities, growing numbers of people are losing access to the resources they have relied on for generations, and ecosystems are being destroyed.

Decisions and negotiations around land deals are frequently conducted in secret, without the knowledge, let alone consent, of affected communities.  Without access to basic information such as contract terms or pre-project impact assessment studies, local communities and other parties cannot make informed decisions about the suitability of proposed investments.

This lack of information hampers efforts to hold governments or investors to account, making human rights and environmental abuses more likely. It also undermines governance and democratic processes and fosters high-level corruption, discouraging companies willing to operate responsibly.

Megan MacInnes, Senior Land Campaigner at Global Witness said “Far too many people are being kept in the dark about massive land deals that could destroy their homes and livelihoods. That this needs to change is well understood, but how to change it is not. For the first time, this report sets out in detail what tools governments, companies and citizens can harness to remove the shroud of secrecy that surrounds land acquisition. It takes lessons from efforts to improve transparency in other sectors and looks at what is likely to work for land. Companies should have to prove they are doing no harm, rather than communities with little information or power having to prove that a land deal is negatively affecting them.”

But it’s not only communities who would benefit from the changes the report proposes, as Frederic Mousseau Policy Director at the Oakland Institute explains. “Evidence increasingly points to the significant benefits for governments and business from improved transparency and ongoing public consultation. Whilst investors would benefit from a level playing field as well as reduced risks of corruption and expensive and damaging conflicts with communities, greater transparency would enable governments to make more informed decisions and negotiate better deals when allocating commercial rights to land.”

 

Unveiled – Chinese Wiretap Like World Leaders and Crooks

When Hu Jintao, China’s top leader, picked up the telephone last August to talk to a senior anticorruption official visiting Chongqing, special devices detected that he was being wiretapped — by local officials in that southwestern metropolis.

The discovery of that and other wiretapping led to an official investigation that helped topple Chongqing’s charismatic leader, Bo Xilai, in a political cataclysm that has yet to reach a conclusion.

Until now, the downfall of Mr. Bo has been cast largely as a tale of a populist who pursued his own agenda too aggressively for some top leaders in Beijing and was brought down by accusations that his wife had arranged the murder of Neil Heywood, a British consultant, after a business dispute. But the hidden wiretapping, previously alluded to only in internal Communist Party accounts of the scandal, appears to have provided another compelling reason for party leaders to turn on Mr. Bo.

The story of how China’s president was monitored also shows the level of mistrust among leaders in the one-party state. To maintain control over society, leaders have embraced enhanced surveillance technology. But some have turned it on one another — repeating patterns of intrigue that go back to the beginnings of Communist rule.

“This society has bred mistrust and violence,” said Roderick MacFarquhar, a historian of Communist China’s elite-level machinations over the past half century. “Leaders know you have to watch your back because you never know who will put a knife in it.”

Nearly a dozen people with party ties, speaking anonymously for fear of retribution, confirmed the wiretapping, as well as a widespread program of bugging across Chongqing. But the party’s public version of Mr. Bo’s fall omits it.

The official narrative and much foreign attention has focused on the more easily grasped death of Mr. Heywood in November. When Mr. Bo’s police chief, Wang Lijun, was stripped of his job and feared being implicated in Bo family affairs, he fled to the United States Consulate in Chengdu, where he spoke mostly about Mr. Heywood’s death.

The murder account is pivotal to the scandal, providing Mr. Bo’s opponents with an unassailable reason to have him removed. But party insiders say the wiretapping was seen as a direct challenge to central authorities. It revealed to them just how far Mr. Bo, who is now being investigated for serious disciplinary violations, was prepared to go in his efforts to grasp greater power in China. That compounded suspicions that Mr. Bo could not be trusted with a top slot in the party, which is due to reshuffle its senior leadership positions this fall.

“Everyone across China is improving their systems for the purposes of maintaining stability,” said one official with a central government media outlet, referring to surveillance tactics. “But not everyone dares to monitor party central leaders.”

According to senior party members, including editors, academics and people with ties to the military, Mr. Bo’s eavesdropping operations began several years ago as part of a state-financed surveillance buildup, ostensibly for the purposes of fighting crime and maintaining local political stability.

The architect was Mr. Wang, a nationally decorated crime fighter who had worked under Mr. Bo in the northeast province of Liaoning. Together they installed “a comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet,” according to the government media official.

One of several noted cybersecurity experts they enlisted was Fang Binxing, president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, who is often called the father of China’s “Great Firewall,” the nation’s vast Internet censorship system. Most recently, Mr. Fang advised the city on a new police information center using cloud-based computing, according to state news media reports. Late last year, Mr. Wang was named a visiting professor at Mr. Fang’s university.

Together, Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang unleashed a drive to smash what they said were crime rings that controlled large portions of Chongqing’s economic life. In interviews, targets of the crackdown marveled at the scale and determination with which local police intercepted their communications.

“On the phone, we dared not mention Bo Xilai or Wang Lijun,” said Li Jun, a fugitive property developer who now lives in hiding abroad. Instead, he and fellow businessmen took to scribbling notes, removing their cellphone batteries and stocking up on unregistered SIM cards to thwart surveillance as the crackdown mounted, he said.

Li Zhuang, a lawyer from a powerfully connected Beijing law firm, recalled how some cousins of one client had presented him with a full stack of unregistered mobile phone SIM cards, warning him of local wiretapping. Despite these precautions, the Chongqing police ended up arresting Mr. Li on the outskirts of Beijing, about 900 miles away, after he called his client’s wife and arranged to visit her later that day at a hospital.

“They already were there lying in ambush,” Mr. Li said. He added that Wang Lijun, by reputation, was a “tapping freak.”

Political figures were targeted in addition to those suspected of being mobsters.

One political analyst with senior-level ties, citing information obtained from a colonel he recently dined with, said Mr. Bo had tried to tap the phones of virtually all high-ranking leaders who visited Chongqing in recent years, including Zhou Yongkang, the law-and-order czar who was said to have backed Mr. Bo as his potential successor.

“Bo wanted to be extremely clear about what leaders’ attitudes toward him were,” the analyst said.

In one other instance last year, two journalists said, operatives were caught intercepting a conversation between the office of Mr. Hu and Liu Guanglei, a top party law-and-order official whom Mr. Wang had replaced as police chief. Mr. Liu once served under Mr. Hu in the 1980s in Guizhou Province.

Perhaps more worrisome to Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang, however, was the increased scrutiny from the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which by the beginning of 2012 had stationed up to four separate teams in Chongqing, two undercover, according to the political analyst, who cited Discipline Inspection sources. One line of inquiry, according to several party academics, involved Mr. Wang’s possible role in a police bribery case that unfolded last year in a Liaoning city where he once was police chief.

Beyond making a routine inspection, it is not clear why the disciplinary official who telephoned Mr. Hu — Ma Wen, the minister of supervision — was in Chongqing. Her high-security land link to Mr. Hu from the state guesthouse in Chongqing was monitored on Mr. Bo’s orders. The topic of the call is unknown but was probably not vital. Most phones are so unsafe that important information is often conveyed only in person or in writing.

But Beijing was galled that Mr. Bo would wiretap Mr. Hu, whether intentionally or not, and turned central security and disciplinary investigators loose on his police chief, who bore the brunt of the scrutiny over the next couple of months.

“Bo wanted to push the responsibility onto Wang,” one senior party editor said. “Wang couldn’t dare say it was Bo’s doing.”

Yet at some point well before fleeing Chongqing, Mr. Wang filed a pair of complaints to the inspection commission, the first anonymously and the second under his own name, according to a party academic with ties to Mr. Bo.

Both complaints said Mr. Bo had “opposed party central” authorities, including ordering the wiretapping of central leaders. The requests to investigate Mr. Bo were turned down at the time. Mr. Bo, who learned of the charges at a later point, told the academic shortly before his dismissal that he thought he could withstand Mr. Wang’s charges.

Mr. Wang is not believed to have discussed wiretapping at the United States Consulate. Instead, he focused on the less self-incriminating allegations of Mr. Bo’s wife’s arranging the killing of Mr. Heywood.

But tensions between the two men crested, sources said, when Mr. Bo found that Mr. Wang had also wiretapped him and his wife. After Mr. Wang was arrested in February, Mr. Bo detained Mr. Wang’s wiretapping specialist from Liaoning, a district police chief named Wang Pengfei.

Internal party accounts suggest that the party views the wiretapping as one of Mr. Bo’s most serious crimes. One preliminary indictment in mid-March accused Bo of damaging party unity by collecting evidence on other leaders.

Party officials, however, say it would be far too damaging to make the wiretapping public. When Mr. Bo is finally charged, wiretapping is not expected to be mentioned. “The things that can be publicized are the economic problems and the killing,” according to the senior official at the government media outlet. “That’s enough to decide the matter in public.”

DoD Stability Operations Capabilities Assessment 2012 – SECRET

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This report provides an assessment of Department of Defense (DoD) efforts over the past two years to implement requirements set forth in the 2009 DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations. It highlights significant initiatives currently underway or planned throughout DoD and provides recommendations and key findings to achieve further progress.

The overarching theme of the report is that the Department must learn from previous hard-won experience in stability operations and institutionalize, enhance, and evolve the lessons learned and capabilities acquired by the U.S. military for current and future operations. As part of a risk -balanced strategy, one ofthe Pentagon’s top priorities should be to prepare for the predominant sources of conflict in the 21 5t Century, specifically fragile states and the irregular challenges that they spawn. Even if we anticipate participating more selectively in these operations in the future, the U.S. military should capitalize on the adaptation in thinking that occurred as a result of the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq by preserving perishable expertise, and retaining key capabilities and the appropriate skill sets for these operations.

As U.S. defense strategy shifts from an emphasis on today’s wars to preparing for future challenges, the task of promoting stability in a volatile strategic environment remains one of our Nation’s top concerns. Emphasizing more effective non-military means and military-to-military cooperation can help to prevent instability from triggering conflicts, thereby reducing demand for large-scale stability operations aimed at bringing such conflicts to closure. As part of a prudent down-sizing of our posture, the U.S. military must be able to retain otherwise perishable skills, expertise and specialized capabilities acquired as a consequence of its hard-won experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Retaining these capabilities requires an enduring investment in people, the wherewithal to institutionalize lessons learned, and the retention of forces that can be quickly regenerated to meet future demands.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has taken positive steps since 2009 toward enhancing its stability operations capabilities. Joint doctrine is now on a firmer foundation; the Services have strengthened relevant proficiencies at the unit level; and investments in civil-military planning, exercising, field-level coordination and capacity-building are noteworthy. Even so, these gains are ad hoc and temporary for the most part and will be fleeting unless affirmative steps are taken to preserve stability operations capabilities in the years ahead.

To help achieve this goal, this report recommends the following specific steps:

• DoD should continue to emphasize stability operations as a core military capability in all of its key policy and strategy documents.
• DoD should continue to make refinements to existing doctrine as new lessons emerge and develop a process to fast-track doctrine that absorbs these lessons based on operational necessities.
• DoD should persist in its efforts to translate such lessons into stability operations-related training and education at all levels. To help sustain civil-military training capacities, it should consider ways of incentivizing U.S. whole-of-government training and exercises, possibly through a pooled funding approach. It could also consider combining multiple exercises into a single capstone event focused on interagency integration.
• In close coordination with interagency partners, DoD should mitigate the negative effects of predictable gaps in civilian capacity in uncertain and hostile operational environments by continuing to place emphasis upon preparing U.S. military forces for likely stability operations tasks. We should continue to advocate for increased civilian agency capacity and resources, while also promoting the development of civilian-military capacity of allies and other partners to address stability operations and related activities.
• As defense resources shift back from contingency funding to our base budget, DoD should continue to work with Department of State, interagency partners and the Congress to review the adequacy of legal authorities and funding for the full range of security assistance and coalition support programs requiring coordinated defense, diplomacy, and development efforts in the stability operations arena. Specifically, the Congressionally-mandated annual review of the Global Security Contingency Fund execution, and other resultant lessons learned documents, could help in mapping out possible legislative changes and in recommending interagency planning process improvements.

Unsolved Mysteries of the Second World War – Hitler’s Secret Weapons – Full Movie

This is the most amazing documentary to date covering the technologies and mysteries of the second world war. There is footage in this film that I have never seen before! Amazing, that’s all I can say.

truthseekertimes.ca

 

Unveiled – Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development Technologies Used in U.S.

Citation: [Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development Technologies Used in U.S.; Attached to Routing and Record Sheet; Includes Memoranda Entitled “Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-foreign Intelligence Activities”; “Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted in Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems”; “Domestic Tests for Agency Research and Development Efforts”; “Survey of ORD for Non-foreign Intelligence Activities”; “[Excised] ORD Contacts with Domestic Council Agencies”; “Processing of Audio Tape for Bureau of Narcotics Dangerous Drug Division” [Two Versions]; “Assistance to Bureau of Narcotics: Enhancement of Noisy Audio Tape Recordings”; “Telecon This Morning concerning Any OSA Activities Which Could Put the Agency into an Embarrassing Situation”; “Correspondence Received by Chairman Hébert, House Armed Services Committee, concerning [Excised]”; and “Policy regarding Assistance to Agencies outside the Intelligence Community on Speech Processing Problems”; Heavily Excised]
Top Secret, Compendium, May 09, 1973, 41 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00022
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Science and Technology. Office of Research and Development
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Aerospace Corporation; Colby, William E.; Colson, Charles W.; Halperin, Morton H.; Hébert, Felix E.; McMahon, John N.; National Institutes of Health (U.S.); Schlesinger, James R.; United States Intelligence Board. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee; United States. Air Force; United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; United States. Army; United States. Atomic Energy Commission; United States. Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. National Photographic Interpretation Center; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. Office of Scientific Intelligence; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Science and Technology. Deputy Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Science and Technology. Office of Research and Development; United States. Coast Guard; United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services; United States. Defense Intelligence Agency; United States. Department of Agriculture; United States. Department of Commerce; United States. Department of Justice. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs; United States. Department of Justice. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration; United States. Department of State; United States. Department of the Interior; United States. Department of the Treasury; United States. Department of the Treasury. Customs Service; United States. Environmental Protection Agency; United States. Executive Office of the President; United States. Federal Aviation Administration; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. Internal Revenue Service; United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration; United States. National Security Agency; United States. Navy; United States. Office of Telecommunications Policy; United States. Secret Service
Subjects: Agricultural products | Communications interception | Counterintelligence | Defectors | Electronic surveillance | Hijacking | Human behavior experiments | Mexico-United States Border | Narcotics | Natural disasters | Natural resources | Nuclear reactors | Opium production | Photographic intelligence | Police assistance | Polygraph examinations | Psychological assessments | Research and development | Riot control | San Francisco (California) | Satellite reconnaissance | Surveillance countermeasures | Surveillance equipment | Telephone monitoring | U-2 Aircraft | Watergate Affair (1972-1974)
Abstract: Describes Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development technology and assistance provided to or requested by military and law-enforcement organizations.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (1.5 MB)

Durable URL for this record

Confidential – Individual Indicted in Connection with Machine Gun Attack on U.S. Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2011

WASHINGTON—Mevlid Jasarevic, 23, a citizen of Serbia, was indicted today by a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia on charges of attempted murder and other violations in connection with his alleged machine gun attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 28, 2011.

The indictment was announced by Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Division.

The 10-count indictment charges Jasarevic with one count of attempt to murder U.S. officers or employees; one count of attempt to murder U.S. nationals within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (the U.S. Embassy); one count of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; one count of assaulting U.S. officers or employees with a deadly weapon; one count of destruction of property within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; and five counts of use of a firearm during a crime of violence.

Yesterday, authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina brought charges against Jasaveric and two others in connection with the alleged attack on the U.S. Embassy. Jasaveric is in the custody of Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. The United States has closely cooperated with Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities in their investigation of the U.S. Embassy attack and strongly supports their decision to charge and prosecute those allegedly involved. The United States will continue to cooperate fully with authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina to bring to justice those involved.

The case is being investigated by the FBI Washington Field Office. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Bowman of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Joshua Larocca of the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. The Office of International Affairs in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division also provided assistance.

The attempted murder charges against Jasarevic, as well as the charges of assaulting U.S. officers and employees with a deadly weapon, and destruction of property each carry a maximum sentence of 20 years. Each charge of using a firearm during a crime of violence carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years for use of a machine gun. The charge of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States carries a maximum sentence of 10 years.

The public is reminded that an indictment contains mere allegations. Defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Texas Federal Grand Jury Indicts Sinaloa Cartel Leaders

United States Attorney Robert Pitman, DEA Special Agent in Charge Joseph M. Arabit, FBI Special Agent in Charge Mark Morgan, and ATF Special Agent in Charge Robert Champion today announced the indictment of Joaquin Guzman Loera, aka “El Chapo”; Ismael Zambada Garcia aka “Mayo”; and 22 other individuals responsible for the operations and management of the Sinaloa Cartel (cartel) charging them with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.

The 14-count grand jury indictment, returned on April 11, 2012 and unsealed today charges conspiracy to violate the RICO statute; conspiracy to possess more than five kilograms of cocaine and over 1000 kilograms of marijuana; conspiracy to import more than five kilograms of cocaine and 1000 kilograms of marijuana; conspiracy to commit money laundering; conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes; murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) or drug trafficking; engaging in a CCE in furtherance of drug trafficking; conspiracy to kill in a foreign country; kidnapping; and violent crimes in aid of racketeering.

The other 22 defendants charged in this indictment include:

German (Last Name Unknown), aka “Paisa,” “German Olivares”; Mario Nunez-Meza, aka “Mayito,” “M-10”; Amado Nunez-Meza, aka “Flaco,” “M-11,” “El Flais”; Jose Antonio Torres Marrufo, aka “Jaguar,” “Tonin,” Catorce,” “14,” “Tono,” “El Uno”; Gabino Salas-Valenciano, aka “El Ingeniero”; Sergio Garduno-Escobedo, aka “Coma”; David Sanchez-Hernandez, aka “Christian”; Ivan Sanchez-Hernandez; Jesus Rodrigo Fierro-Ramirez, aka “Huichi,” “Pena”; Arturo Lozano-Mendez, aka “Garza”; Mario De La O Lopez aka “Flaco”; Arturo Shows Urquidi, aka “Chous”; Salvador Valdez, aka “Robles”; Daniel Franco Lopez, aka “Micha,” “Neon,” “Fer”; Luis Arellano-Romero, aka “Bichi,” Bichy,” “Helio”; Fernando Arellano-Romero, aka “Rayo,” “24,” “Gamma,” “Blue Demon”; Mario Alberto Iglesias-Villegas, aka “Dos,” “El 2,” “Delta,” “Parka,” “Grim Reaper,” “Daniel Cuellar Anchondo,” “Delfin”; Adrian Avila-Ramirez aka “Bam Bam,” “Tacuba,” “El 19”; Valentin Saenz De La Cruz aka “El Valle,” “Lic”; Emigdio Martinez, Jr., aka “Millo”; Carlos Flores, aka “Buffalo,” “Charly”; and, Jose (Last Name Unknown), aka “Toca,” “Tocayo,” “Pachi.”

According to the indictment, the purpose of the Sinaloa Cartel is to smuggle large quantities of marijuana and cocaine, as well as other drugs, into the United States for distribution. Laundered proceeds of drug trafficking activities are returned to cartel members and are used in part to purchase properties related to the daily functioning of the cartel, including real estate, firearms, ammunition, bulletproof vests, radios, telephones, uniforms, and vehicles. In an effort to maintain control of all aspects of their operations, the cartel and its associates, including members of the Gente Nueva (“New People”) and the Artistas Asesinos (“Murder artists”), kidnap, torture, and murder those who lose or steal assets belonging to, are disloyal to, or are enemies of the cartel. This includes the Juarez Cartel led by Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, a competing drug organization, as well as its enforcement arm known as La Linea and the Barrio Aztecas. Often, murders committed by the cartel involve brutal acts of violence as well the public display of the victim along with banners bearing written warnings to those who would cross the cartel.

“Murder, kidnapping, money laundering, and drug trafficking are the four corners of this organization’s foundation,” stated U.S. Attorney Robert Pitman. “For years, their violence, ruthlessness, and complete disregard for human life and the rule of law have greatly impacted the citizens of the Republic of Mexico and the United States. They must be held accountable for their criminal actions.”

This investigation resulted in the seizure of hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and thousands of pounds of marijuana in cities throughout the United States. Law enforcement also took possession of millions of dollars in drug proceeds that were destined to be returned to the cartel in Mexico. Agents and officers likewise seized hundreds of weapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition intended to be smuggled into Mexico to assist the cartel’s battle to take control of one of the key drug trafficking corridors used to bring drugs into the United States.

“This indictment is the result of a complex, long-term investigation by DEA and our law enforcement partners in the U.S. and Mexico, targeting the Sinaloa Cartel at its highest levels. In addition to violations relating to the trafficking of huge quantities of cocaine and marijuana, the charges encompass money laundering, weapons smuggling, kidnappings, and murders employed by the cartel to fund, expand and protect its far-reaching criminal enterprise. These charges are an important step in bringing to justice those responsible for supplying a large portion of the illegal drugs flowing into communities in the United States through the El Paso area, as well as much of the violence that has ravaged neighboring Ciudad Juarez,” said Joseph M. Arabit, Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration-El Paso Division.

The indictment references two acts of violence allegedly committed by members of the cartel. First, the indictment alleges that in September 2009, Jose Antonio Torres Marrufo, Gabino Salas-Valenciano, Fernando Arellano-Romero, and Mario Iglesias-Villegas, under the leadership of Joaquin Guzman and Ismael Zambada, conspired to kidnap and murder a Horizon City Texas, resident. Specifically, Jose Antonio Torres Marrufo ordered the kidnapping of the victim to answer for the loss of a 670-pound load of marijuana seized by Border Patrol at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint on August 5, 2009. After the kidnapping, the victim was taken to Juarez, where Torres Marrufo interrogated him and ordered that he be killed. On September 8, 2009, the victim’s mutilated body was discovered in Juarez.

Second, the indictment alleges that on May 7, 2010, Jose Torres Marrufo, Fernando Arellano-Romero, and Mario Iglesias-Villegas, under the leadership of Joaquin Guzman and Ismael Zambada, conspired to kidnap and murder an American citizen and two members of his family. Specifically, Torres Marrufo caused an individual in El Paso to travel to a wedding ceremony in Juarez to confirm the identity of a target. The target was the groom, a United States citizen and a resident of Columbus, New Mexico. Under Torres Marrufo’s orders, the groom, his brother and his uncle were all kidnapped during the wedding ceremony and subsequently tortured and murdered. Their bodies were discovered by Juarez police a few days later in the bed of an abandoned pickup truck. Additionally, a fourth person was killed during the kidnapping at the wedding ceremony.

“This indictment has been years in the making, the focus being to dismantle the Sinaloa Cartel by focusing on its upper echelon. The indictment represents the unwavering commitment and collaboration among the law enforcement community to bring justice to those who have inflicted unconscionable violence on so many citizens on both sides of the border. We are sending a clear message that we will continue our relentless pursuit of drug trafficking organizations responsible for such widespread devastation within our communities,” stated FBI Special Agent in Charge Mark Morgan.

“This highly cooperative investigation shows that law enforcement can make significant inroads into drug trafficking organizations and that the major players are not immune from prosecution. This also relates to the illegal firearm traffickers who support such organizations and are responsible for the violence and bloodshed that is occurring,” stated ATF Special Agent in Charge Robert Champion.

This investigation was conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, together with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement-Homeland Security Investigations, United States Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, United States Marshals Service, El Paso Police Department, El Paso Sheriff’s Office, and Texas Department of Public Safety. United States Attorney Robert Pitman also expresses his appreciation to New Mexico United States Attorney Ken Gonzalez and his attorneys, Attorney General of Mexico Marisela Morales and her attorneys, and to law enforcement authorities in Mexico for their assistance.

Upon conviction, the defendants face up to life in federal prison. Three of the 14 counts (seven, 11, and 14)—which involve the kidnapping and murder of a resident of Horizon City and three members of a wedding party in Juarez—may result in the imposition of the death penalty upon conviction.

It is important to note that an indictment is merely a charge and should not be considered as evidence of guilt. The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

SECRET – FBI Motorcycle Gang Trademarks Logo to Prevent Undercover Infiltration

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/FBI-VagosTM.png

 

(U//LES) Trademarking of Vagos Outlaw Motorcycle Gang “Cuts” to prevent penetration by undercover Law Enforcement operations.

(U//LES) As of 2 May 2011, the International Chapter of the Vagos Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (Vagos) trademarked their “cuts” – the patches which identify their OMG affiliation – in an effort to prevent law enforcement agencies from inserting undercover officers into their organization.

(U//LES) The Vagos added the ® symbol to the bottom center of the large back patch as shown in photo 1. There are only about 20 of these new patches which are currently being worn by members. It is believed that the new patches will be given out to new members as they are vetted by the Vagos leadership. By doing this, the Vagos believe they will have exclusive rights to the Vagos patch and no one, including undercover officers, would be able to wear the patch without the consent of the International Vagos OMG leadership.

(U//FOUO) Research within the United States Patent and Trademark Office was conducted which indicated the Vagos International Motorcycle Club Corporation California, 780 N. Diamond Bar Blvd., #B12, Diamond Bar California, 91765, filed to make the Vagos name and symbol a registered trademark on July 2, 2010, Serial Number 85076951. Changes and requests by the Vagos Corporation were submitted as recently as May 2, 2011 to the Patent and Trademark Office.

 

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/vagos-tm.png

The most important international Book about the STASI

http://bks3.books.google.se/books?id=LLZJk4FrqwwC&printsec=frontcover&img=1&zoom=1&edge=curl&imgtk=AFLRE70e6Nq3p1tcJn_Lbr8L0HfZPzI4eV1PEPEt9i00tzbbJJVEv69yY6XFAWSIlvbeTTw9xds_wXSWLUgakwjhxqirz1XzP2ytczsm0rBAJmRVKCAqxOpHswYMBd1TtBhMcZviH2iE

Seduced by Secrets:

Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World
More fascinating than fiction, Seduced by Secrets takes the reader inside the real world of one of the most effective and feared spy agencies in history. The book reveals, for the first time, the secret technical methods and sources of the Stasi (East German Ministry for State Security) as it stole secrets from abroad and developed gadgets at home, employing universal, highly guarded techniques often used by other spy and security agencies. Seduced by Secrets draws on secret files from the Stasi archives, including CIA-acquired material, interviews and friendships, court documents, and unusual visits to spy sites, including “breaking into” a prison, to demonstrate that the Stasi overestimated the power of secrets to solve problems and created an insular spy culture more intent on securing its power than protecting national security. It recreates the Stasi’s secret world of technology through biographies of agents, defectors, and officers and by visualizing James Bond-like techniques and gadgets. In this highly original book, Kristie Macrakis adds a new dimension to our understanding of the East German Ministry for State Security by bringing the topic into the realm of espionage history and exiting the political domain.
Of all the books on the Stasi, this is fairly unique as it covers their technical espionage and technology procurement programs. Highly recommended.
DOWNLOAD THE E-BOOK HERE

The Truth about the Iranian UAV

Iranian Ababil UAV
Iranian Ababil UAV

Israel is trying to discover the extent to which the Iranian announcement regarding the development of a new UAV named “Shaparak” is true.

According to the Iranians, the UAV has a take-off weight of 100 kg and can carry a payload weighing up to 8 kg. In addition, the statement says that the UAV has an endurance of 3.5 hours in altitudes of up to 4 km.

In recent years, Iran has invested considerable efforts in developing UAVs. However, Israel is assessing that its achievements are few.

Currently, Iran is exploiting situations in other countries in order to garner operational experience with their UAVs. As was previously revealed in IsraelDefense, there is proof that Iran has operated UAVs on behalf of the Syrian regime.

According to reports from sources following Iran’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, an Iranian Pahpad UAV was sighted in the past few weeks in the skies near Homs, Syria, which is considered the most advanced in Syria’s arsenal.

In the past, Tehran has claimed that the UAV possesses stealth qualities. While Western elements doubt this claim, they say that it is undoubtedly an advanced UAV, at least with regards to its aerodynamic configuration.

Iran has previously supplied Hezbollah with self-produced UAVs, and the country has previously developed various basic UAVs as well, including the Ra’ad and Nazir. Four years ago, Iran’s defense minister claimed that his country successfully developed a UAV with a flight range of approximately 1,000 km.

Israel has experience with simple Iranian UAVs launched from southern Lebanon by Hezbollah towards Israel’s northern region. In June 2006, the IAF intercepted a suicide UAV carrying a payload of explosives. The Ababil UAV is a copy of a Russian UAV that is produced in Iran. It first breached Israel’s borders on November 7, 2004, and circled for five minutes over the region of Nahariya, photographing the area with a basic photographic system installed onboard. The Ababil UAV has a flight speed of nearly 300 km/h and has a maximum range of 240 km.

Israel is assessing that advanced Iranian UAVs have already been transferred to Hezbollah. The operation of the Iranian UAV in Syria is part of Tehran’s assistance fo Assad’s regime, as well as an Iranian opportunity to operate it in real conditions.

Source: Israel Defense

Confidential – Senate Review of CIA Interrogation Program “Nearing Completion”

The Senate Intelligence Committee has been reviewing the post-9/11 detention and interrogation practices of the Central Intelligence Agency for four years and is still not finished.  But the end appears to be in sight.

“The review itself is nearing completion — before the end of summer — but is not over yet,” a spokesperson for the Committee said.  “The release date should be not too far thereafter, but is not set.”

“This review is the only comprehensive in-depth look at the facts and documents pertaining to the creation, management, and effectiveness of the CIA detention and interrogation program,” according to Sen. Jay Rockefeller, who was chairman of the Intelligence Committee when the review began in 2008.

Committee staff are said to have reviewed millions of pages of classified documents pertaining to the CIA program.

In newly published questions for the record following his confirmation hearing last year to be Director of the CIA, Gen. David Petraeus was asked by Senator Rockefeller if he would cooperate with the Committee review.

“I believe that a holistic and comprehensive review of the United States Government’s detention and interrogation programs can lead to valuable lessons that might inform future policies,” Petraeus replied.

“The best way to gain a common set of facts would be to reach out to the intelligence and military communities responsible for detentions and interrogations and for implementing future policies,” he added.  “[T]o gain the proper insights from a series of actions or decisions, we cannot separate the review process from the public servants undertaking the actions,” he said.

Gen. Petraeus also responded to questions concerning interrogation in the “ticking time bomb” scenario (he says “research is required now”), and the applicability of official U.S. government statements on the use of drones to CIA operations (which he declined to confirm), among other topics.

His responses to these questions were published earlier this month in the record of his June 23, 2011 confirmation hearing.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the current chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, provided a preview of the Committee’s findings on CIA interrogation practices in a November 29, 2011 floor statement during the debate on the FY2012 defense authorization act (also noted by Jeffrey Kaye in The Public Record).

“As chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I can say that we are nearing the completion a comprehensive review of the CIA’s former interrogation and detention program, and I can assure the Senate and the Nation that coercive and abusive treatment of detainees in U.S. custody was far more systematic and widespread than we thought,” Sen. Feinstein said.

“Moreover, the abuse stemmed not from the isolated acts of a few bad apples but from fact that the line was blurred between what is permissible and impermissible conduct, putting U.S. personnel in an untenable position with their superiors and the law.”

The FBI – San Marino Man Sentenced to Over 10 Years in Federal Prison in $9 Million Mortgage Fraud and Tax Evasion Scheme

LOS ANGELES—A San Marino man has been sentenced to 121 months in federal prison for defrauding banks and other lenders by using “straw borrowers” and bogus documents to obtain millions of dollars in loans for houses and high-end vehicles that included Ferraris and Lamborghinis.

Scott Dority, 54, was sentenced last Monday by United States District Judge R. Gary Klausner. The sentencing hearing was under seal, and the United States Attorney’s Office learned today that the matter had been unsealed.

Dority pleaded guilty on March 14, 2011 to wire fraud, conspiracy, aggravated identity theft, and two counts of tax evasion. When he pleaded guilty, he admitted that his fraudulent conduct caused at least $4 million in losses to financial institutions that issued mortgages and approximately $5 million in losses to institutions that issue loans for the sports cars and recreational vehicles.

Dority also admitted in court that he failed to file tax returns for 2005 and 2006, even though he had hundreds of thousands of dollars in income in each of those years.

According to a now-unsealed court document, Dority, along with others, recruited individuals with good credit to act as straw buyers to purchase residential homes or expensive vehicles. Dority created a package of materials—including fake bank statements, fake pay stubs, and bogus fake tax returns—to make it appear that these straw buyers had sufficient assets and income to pay back loans used to purchase the real estate and vehicles. These fake documents were then submitted to lenders, who relied upon them to issue more than $9 million in mortgage and vehicle loans.

As part of the 121-month prison sentence, Dority received a mandatory two-year prison term for aggravated identity theft.

The investigation into this scheme was conducted jointly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, IRS-Criminal Investigation, and the United States Secret Service.

Report – Obama Bans Electronic Aid to Iran and Syria — Executive Order 13606

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/23/executive-order-blocking-property-and-suspending-
entry-united-states-cer

EXECUTIVE ORDER
13606

– – – – – – –

BLOCKING THE PROPERTY AND SUSPENDING ENTRY INTO THE

UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN PERSONS WITH RESPECT TO GRAVE

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN AND SYRIA

VIA INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, hereby determine that the commission of serious human rights abuses against the people of Iran and Syria by their governments, facilitated by computer and network disruption, monitoring, and tracking by those governments, and abetted by entities in Iran and Syria that are complicit in their governments’ malign use of technology for those purposes, threaten the national security and foreign policy of the United States. The Governments of Iran and Syria are endeavoring to rapidly upgrade their technological ability to conduct such activities. Cognizant of the vital importance of providing technology that enables the Iranian and Syrian people to freely communicate with each other and the outside world, as well as the preservation, to the extent possible, of global telecommunications supply chains for essential products and services to enable the free flow of information, the measures in this order are designed primarily to address the need to prevent entities located in whole or in part in Iran and Syria from facilitating or committing serious human rights abuses. In order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergencies declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, as relied upon for additional steps in subsequent Executive Orders, and in Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, as modified in scope and relied upon for additional steps in subsequent Executive Orders, and to address the situation described above, I hereby order:

Section 1.

(a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person, including any foreign branch, of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:

(i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and(ii) any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at the recommendation of the Secretary of State:

(A) to have operated, or to have directed the operation of, information and communications technology that facilitates computer or network disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Iran or the Government of Syria;(B) to have sold, leased, or otherwise provided, directly or indirectly, goods, services, or technology to Iran or Syria likely to be used to facilitate computer or network disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Iran or the Government of Syria;

(C) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the activities described in subsections (a)(ii)(A) and (B) of this section or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or

(D) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.

(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order.

Sec. 2. I hereby determine that the making of donations of the type of articles specified in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the two national emergencies identified in the preamble to this order, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by section 1 of this order.

Sec. 3. The prohibitions in section 1 of this order include but are not limited to:

(a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; and(b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

Sec. 4. I hereby find that the unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens who meet one or more of the criteria in section 1 of this order would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend the entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of such persons. Such persons shall be treated as persons covered by section 1 of Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject to United Nations Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions).

Sec. 5.

(a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 6. Nothing in section 1 of this order shall prohibit transactions for the conduct of the official business of the United States Government by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of this order:

(a) the term “person” means an individual or entity;(b) the term “information and communications technology” means any hardware, software, or other product or service primarily intended to fulfill or enable the function of information processing and communication by electronic means, including transmission and display, including via the Internet;

(c) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;

(d) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States;

(e) the term “Government of Iran” means the Government of Iran, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Iran, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government of Iran; and

(f) the term “Government of Syria” means the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities.

Sec. 8. For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the two national emergencies identified in the preamble to this order, there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to section 1 of this order.

Sec. 9. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.

Sec. 10. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to determine that circumstances no longer warrant the blocking of the property and interests in property of a person listed in the Annex to this order and to take necessary action to give effect to that determination.

Sec. 11. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Sec. 12. The measures taken pursuant to this order with respect to Iran are in response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended solely as a response to those later actions.

Sec. 13. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 23, 2012.

BARACK OBAMA

__________________

ANNEX

Individual

1. Ali MAMLUK [director of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, born 1947]

Entities

1. Syrian General Intelligence Directorate2. Syriatel

3. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

4. Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security

5. Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran

6. Datak Telecom

__________

Annex from Federal Register:

http://www.ofr.gov/OFRUpload/OFRData/2012-09933_PI.pdf

[FR Doc. 2012-10034 Filed 04/23/2012 at 11:15 am; Publication Date: 04/24/2012]

TOP-SECRET – Photos from the Fodor Nuclear Plant, Near Qom, Iran

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Bunker Portals September 2011

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Site in March 2005

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Site in September 2009[Image]
Site in July 2011[Image]
Site in September 2011, Missile Protection Site at Upper Right and Below
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Site in September 2011[Image]
Site in September 2011[Image]
Site in September 2011[Image]
Missile Protection Site in September 2011[Image]

 

Confidential – FBI High Value Detainee Interrogation Group “Advance the Science of Interrogation” Contract Announcement

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/FBI-HIG-BAA.png

 

The purpose of research supported by the HIG is to advance the science and practice of intelligence interviewing and interrogation. Offerors will conduct research for the HIG in their facilities. The HIG has defined several areas for long-range study and advisory support. These research areas include but are not limited to:

  • Field observations of military and strategic interrogators, intelligence interviewers and debriefers in order to document strategies, methods and outcomes;
  • Surveys and structured interviews of interrogators, intelligence interviewers and debriefers specified by the Government in order to document what these operational personnel think works and does not work and the development of operationally-based best practices which may be later investigated via laboratory or field studies;
  • Development, testing and evaluation of metrics for assessing the efficacies of interrogations, intelligence interviews and debriefs and of the use of particular interrogation, intelligence interview and debrief strategies and methods;
  • Field quasi-experimental studies to evaluate the efficacy of new evidence-based interrogation, intelligence interview and debrief strategies and methods;
  • Laboratory studies to test and/or discover new interrogation, intelligence interview and debrief methods;
  • Laboratory or field studies to assess the validity of evidence-based interviewing, deception detection, and other relevant principles and/or methods across non-U.S. populations both with and without the use of interpreters;
  • Laboratory or field studies on fundamental psychological processes (to include but not be limited to decision-making, emotion, motivation, memory, persuasion, social identities and social development) as these are relevant to interrogations, intelligence interviews and debriefs;
  • Laboratory or field studies of interpersonal processes (e.g., social influence, persuasion, negotiation, conflict resolution and management), with particular attention to cultural and intercultural issues; and
  • Topics considered out of scope for this BAA include the development of technologies for credibility assessment or other performance support aids, methods relying exclusively on case studies, and language training.

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

FBI-HIG-BAA

Verschlusssache Waffenbrüder – Die Straftaten der Sowjetarmee – Ganzer Film

Beinahe 50 Jahre gehörten die Sowjetsoldaten zum Alltag in Ostdeutschland. Laut verkündet wurden die offiziellen Parolen vom festen Bruderbund. Verschwiegen wurde, dass die “Freunde” auch Täter waren. Jahr für Jahr begingen die Armeeangehörigen mehr als 2000 Straftaten. Doch offiziell darüber geredet wurde nicht. Verbrechen sowjetischer Soldaten in der DDR waren tabu. Das tatsächliche Ausmaß dieses dunklen Kapitels der “Waffen- und Klassenbrüderschaft” wurde erst nach dem Abzug der sowjetischen Streitkräfte bekannt. Von 1976 bis 1989 wurden 27.505 kriminelle Vorgänge erfasst: Verkehrs- und Schießunfälle, Diebstähle, Körperverletzungen, Vergewaltigungen und Mord. So ist ein Film entstanden, der erstmalig anhand konkreter Fälle das Problem der Straftaten sowjetischer Soldaten in der DDR dokumentarisch aufarbeitet. Im Mittelpunkt stehen die Opfer und ihre Angehörigen. Zu Wort kommen auch DDR-Militärstaatsanwälte und Angehörige der Kriminalpolizei. Es werden einzelne Straftaten rekonstruiert und der Umgang damit von Seiten der DDR-Behörden geschildert.

Die “DDR” und Kuba – Zement gegen Südfrüchte

Die DDR und Kuba
Auf den ersten Blick gab es nur Gegensätze zwischen diesen beiden Ländern des real existierenden Sozialismus: Hier mausgrau, dort grellbunt, hier bierernst, dort ausgelassen und lebensfroh. Eines jedoch verband Castros Kuba und Honeckers DDR über alle Jahrzehnte hinweg: die Verwaltung des Mangels. Ostberlin schickte klapprige Zementfabriken und sogar Rum aus zweifelhafter Destillation über den Atlantik, Havanna revanchierte sich mit Orangen, die nicht schmeckten, und Arbeiterkolonnen, die den unersättlichen Planstellenhunger der DDR-Staatswirtschaft nur ansatzweise stillen konnten. Im Schatten Moskaus entstand so eine zarte Bande gegenseitiger Abhängigkeiten, nach außen selbstverständlich propagiert als “unverbrüchliche Freundschaft zweier Bruderstaaten”. Seit Castros Machtantritt im Jahr 1959 gab es bei den Genossen in Ostberlin nicht nur ein wirtschaftliches Interesse an dem exotischen “Ostblock”-Staat. So konnte man seinem bald eingemauerten Volk zumindest auf dem Papier einen Urlaub in der Karibik in Aussicht stellen. Umgekehrt war für Castro die DDR das sozialistische “Musterländle” im fernen Europa: Fleiß, Ordnungssinn und Know-How der Ostdeutschen beeindruckten den Revolutionär. Anders als dem sowjetischen “Herren”-Gebaren konnte auch der einfache Kubaner dem immer etwas ungelenken Auftritt der Ostdeutschen Sympathie entgegenbringen. Hinter der offiziellen Propaganda wuchsen so viele menschliche Beziehungen, die oft bis heute lebendig blieben.

Unveiled – Kabul attacks shows failure of intelligence

 

Kabul attacks show intel failures in Afghanistan. Dozens, possibly hundreds of people would have been involved in training, equipping and then infiltrating into the heart of Kabul the large number of insurgents who were prepared to fight to a certain death in the Afghan capital last Sunday. Yet neither Afghan nor foreign intelligence operatives appeared to have any idea that an unprecedented wave of attacks was about to engulf both Kabul and several other key locations around the country. So it seems that Afghan President Hamid Karzai may have a point when he says that the “infiltration in Kabul and other provinces is an intelligence failure for us and especially for NATO and should be seriously investigated”.
►►Report claims China spies on US space technology. China is stealing US military and civilian space technology in an effort to disrupt US access to intelligence, navigation and communications satellites, according to a report authored by the State and Defense Departments. The report (.pdf) argues China should be excluded from recommendations made to the US government to ease restrictions on exports of communications and remote-sensing satellites and equipment. Chinese officials have denied the report’s allegations, calling it a “Cold War ghost”.
►►The long and sordid history of sex and espionage. Using seduction to extract valuable information is as old as the Old Testament —literally— Whether from conviction or for profit, women —and men— have traded sex for secrets for centuries. The Cold War provided plenty of opportunities for so-called “honey-pot” scandals. Perhaps the most dramatic case of seduction in recent times involved Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu. In 1986 he visited London and provided The Sunday Times with dozens of photographs of Israel’s alleged nuclear weapons program. But Mossad was on his trail and a female agent —Cheryl Ben Tov— befriended him (reportedly bumping into him at a cigarette kiosk in London’s Leicester Square). She lured him to Rome for a weekend, where he was drugged and spirited to Israel.

Die Mauer – Fluchten und Tragödien – Ganzer Film

Die Mauer – Fluchten und Tragödien Unter Lebensgefahr in die Freiheit

In den frühen Morgenstunden des 13. August 1961 beginnt die “Abriegelung” West-Berlins durch DDR-Grenztruppen — die Geburtsstunde der Mauer. Fast drei Jahrzehnte teilt der “antifaschistische Schutzwall” Deutschland in zwei Hälften, und ca. 200 Menschen bezahlen den Versuch, aus der DDR in den Westen zu fliehen, mit dem Leben. Tausenden gelingt die “Republikflucht”, zum Teil auf abenteuerliche Weise: mit Ballons, durch selbst gegrabene Tunnel, im Kofferraum oder mit Tauchausrüstung durch die Ostsee. Der Film blickt zurück auf ein unmenschliches Bollwerk und die vielen Versuche, es zu überwinden. Wie viele Menschen genau ihr Leben bei einem Fluchtversuch über die Grenze der DDR verloren haben, ist auch heute noch ungewiss. Die SED-Führung versuchte nach Kräften, Todesfälle zu verschleiern. Die Abriegelung Westberlins war unblutig verlaufen, wenige Tage später aber erließ das SED-Politbüro einen ersten, noch verklausulierten Schießbefehl an die Grenztruppen. Am 24. August 1961, wenige Wochen nach Ulbrichts Befehl zur “Grenzschließung”, wurde der 24jährige Günter Litwin bei einem Fluchtversuch durch einen gezielten Kopfschuss getötet.

Unveiled – Ex-MI6 Charles Farr Out of Shadows

A sends:

http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/comment/profiles/article1021573.ece [Subscription required]

Chief snooper pops out of the shadows

David Leppard

Sunday Times, 22/4/12, p23 main section

When the embattled Theresa May appears before a committee of MPs on Tuesday to give evidence about her work as home secretary she will be accompanied by one of Whitehall’s most powerful, controversial and secretive mandarins. Charles Farr, the Home Office’s top “securocrat”, is set to emerge from the shadows for the first time as he is asked to defend the coalition’s plans to monitor the Internet use and digital communications of everyone in Britain…

He joined MI6 some time in the 19802, serving in South Africa and Jordan. Farr is understood to have come to prominence, as one contemporary recalled, “flying around Afghanistan in a helicopter with thousands of dollars in bundles, doing deals with farmers to not grow opium. Bad policy as it turned out, but he did it very well…”

Farr’s critics say he still carries the legacy of his MI6 heyday — a mindset they claim is inappropriate for his job at the heart of Whitehall security policy. “When you are an MI6 officer out in the field, trying to stop people getting nuclear weapons in, say, Kazakhstan, you have to be very independently minded and very confident in your own judgement. There’s not a lot of ministerial control or public accountability,” says an admirer who knows him well. “Charles feels very uncomfortable in the world of domestic politics and doesn’t read it very well.”

A former Home Office official went further: “When you’re suddenly flung into a top position with management and policy responsibility in the Home Office, you can’t go on behaving like you are in the Tora Bora caves doing deals with warlords. Your job is to advise ministers who decide policy. You can’t go around thinking you are a player in your own right. It’s a constitutional concern…”

It’s no secret in Whitehall that the grandiosely titled communications capabilities development programme was Farr’s “policy baby”. In fact, it was a rehash of an earlier attempt by Farr in 2009 to persuade the then Labour home secretary to build a giant database where the government could hold details of all emails and telephone calls. It obviously needed sensitive handling, but its delivery was bungled by Farr’s office and it was dumped by Labour after an uproar. When a new government was elected he tried to resurrect the plan — with similar results.

A similar lack of deftness befell Farr’s efforts to develop “Prevent”, a controversial plank of the government’s counterterrorism policy that aimed to identify and thwart thousands of young Muslim men who might be vulnerable to violent extremism… “It was a blurring of the policy of surveillance with a different policy of community engagement and building a civil society,” said a former Home Office official. “But if, like Charles Farr, you are a career spook you just don’t get that. You see everything as an opportunity for surveillance and you see everybody as potentially sinister…”

Another former official, who had a showdown with Farr over policy, recalls: “He’s almost messianic. He’s like he’s on a mission to protect the nation. When you disagree with him he gets very emotional. He’s one of these guys who goes white and shakes when he loses his temper…”

“He has on occasions adopted a style that could be considered inappropriate,” said a former official. “He’s a very uncivil servant.”

STASI auf dem Schulhof

Annette Baumeister zeigt beschädigte Seelen, in denen das Gift der Staatssicherheit bis heute fortwirkt. Tausende Betroffene leben in Deutschland, kaum einer traut sich, darüber zu sprechen. Zu groß ist die Angst, stigmatisiert zu werden.

Am Ende der DDR waren ungefähr 8.000 Kinder und Jugendliche so genannte “inoffizielle Mitarbeiter” der Staatssicherheit. Sie wurden in Jugendclubs, in Kirchen und an den Schulen angesprochen. Sie sollten ihre Freunde aushorchen oder über ihre Eltern berichten.

Marko ist 17 Jahre alt, als ihn die Staatssicherheit über seine Dresdner Schule kontaktiert. Kerstin und Elvira besuchen in den 70er Jahren das Internat Wickersdorf für angehende Russischlehrer. Auch sie sind minderjährig, als sie ins Direktorenzimmer bestellt werden und dort auf Männer von der Staatssicherheit treffen. “Ich hatte das Gefühl, die wissen alles über mich”, sagt Kerstin heute über das Anwerbegespräch als damals 16-Jährige im Büro des Schuldirektors. “Ich hatte auch die Befürchtung, wenn ich da nicht mitmache, dass ich dann auch mein Abitur nicht machen kann.” Unter Druck gesetzt, unterschreibt sie die Verpflichtung, niemandem davon zu erzählen, auch den Eltern nicht.

Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit will wissen, was die Kinder und Jugendlichen denken und fühlen, will ihnen “unter die Haut kriechen und ins Herz schauen”, schließlich hängt von ihnen die Zukunft des Sozialismus ab. Stasiminister Erich Mielke befahl schon 1966, Minderjährige anzuwerben und zu Spitzeln zu machen. Und an der “Juristischen Hochschule” der Staatssicherheit in Potsdam lernen die Führungsoffiziere, wie das geht und welche Jugendlichen besonders dazu zu drängen sind.

Der Film rekonstruiert das Schicksal von Marko, Kerstin und Elvira und zeigt, wie die Stasi vorging, um Jugendliche zu Spitzeldiensten zu pressen. “Stasi auf dem Schulhof” schenkt drei Betroffenen von damals Gehör. Erstmals erzählen sie ihre Geschichte und reflektieren ihre damalige Lebenssituation, ihre Naivität, ihre Verzweiflung, die Einsamkeit, ihre Schuldgefühle. Daneben erzählt der ehemalige Schuldirektor, welche Rolle er bei der Anwerbung spielte, beschreibt ein ehemaliger Führungsoffizier, mit welchem Geschick er die Jugendlichen anwarb und wie die Treffen mit ihnen abliefen.

Ein Film von Annette Baumeister

Confidential – FEMA Research Report: How to Improve Public’s Suspicious Activity Reporting

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The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Individual and Community Preparedness Division partnered with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) on a project to research and develop a strategy to improve the public’s awareness and reporting of suspicious activity. In early 2010, IACP conducted research of contemporary and historical practices intended to improve the public’s reporting of suspicious activity. The literature review showed that little research existed on the motivations and barriers that affect whether or not individuals report information to law enforcement. To close this gap in data, IACP developed a three phase primary research strategy. This report provides an overview of key research findings and provides insights and recommendations that support national and local campaigns.

This research effort complements other national efforts like the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “If You See Something, Say Something™” public awareness campaign. The “If You See Something, Say Something™” campaign was originally used by New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), which has licensed the use of the slogan to DHS for anti-terrorism and anti-crime efforts. As part of the campaign, DHS has partnered with multiple private sector partners, sporting teams, transportation agencies, states, cities, colleges and universities. Great strides have been made within the last few years to improve information sharing amongst law enforcement agencies and fusion centers via initiatives like the NSI; yet, more can be done to improve the quantity and quality of information that law enforcement receives from the public.

Residents know their communities best and are often the first to notice when something out of the ordinary occurs. With the onset of decreased resources and increased responsibilities, law enforcement is more reliant than ever on community members to provide accurate, reliable, and timely information regarding suspicious activities that may be indicators of terrorism.

Focus group participants identified several barriers that may prevent community members from reporting suspicious activity. The most frequently cited reason was fear of retaliation. One participant noted a concern that whenever police are called, “they respond with flashing lights and sirens blaring and everyone in the neighborhood would know [who reported the activity].” Women were more likely than men to list fear of retaliation as a barrier. When it came to suspicious activity that may not necessarily be classified as criminal activity, some participants reported not knowing exactly what qualified as “important enough” to report. They wanted to avoid being wrong or appearing “foolish” in the eyes of local law enforcement.

When telephone survey participants were presented with a list of circumstances that could prevent respondents from reporting suspicious activity, the majority said they would not be deterred from reporting. However, there were circumstances that would at least make people more hesitant to report suspicious activity (See Figure 1). Concern over getting an innocent person in trouble (43 percent) was mentioned as the circumstance that was most likely to cause respondents to reconsider reporting the suspicious activity. According to more than one in three (36 percent) respondents, fear of retaliation would make them reconsider reporting. Nearly a third of respondents (31 percent) felt that if they were not sure the information would be a worthwhile use of police resources, they might not report it. Being uncomfortable judging others and assuming someone else would report the activity were the next most frequently mentioned circumstances that would affect reporting of suspicious activity (31 percent and 29 percent).

 

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Communities should leverage new technologies to promote anonymous and easily accessible methods of reporting. Many community members fear retaliation and value anonymity when contacting law enforcement. Website portals, text messaging, and mobile phone applications can be used to allow for convenient, anonymous reporting.

Forty-one percent of females and 30 percent of males listed fear of retaliation as a barrier when deciding whether or not to report an observation of suspicious behavior. Many agencies are turning to text messages and web-based reporting programs that allow residents to remain anonymous while submitting reports, reducing concerns over intimidation and negative consequences.

Across age groups, research participants were receptive to the use of these new technologies in the reporting of suspicious activity. Thirty-four percent stated they were likely to report by phone mobile application, 30 percent by cell phone text message, and 25 percent on a government approved website. However, it is important to provide a variety of reporting options, as some community members may not have access to these forms of technology.

Public education should explain the dispatch process, so community members better understand when, how, and if an officer will respond. For individuals such as the focus group member who worried about police “responding with flashing lights and sirens,” this may help relieve some of the anxiety about remaining anonymous when calling law enforcement.

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

FEMA-ImprovingSAR

The Hunt For Gollum – Lord of the Rings Prequel – Full Movie

Award winning unofficial prequel to The Lord Of The Rings dramatising Aragorn & Gandalf’s long search for Gollum directed by British filmmaker Chris Bouchard. Based faithfully on the appendices of the books this is a non-profit, serious homage to the writing of J.R.R Tolkien and the films of Peter Jackson. It was shot on locations in England and Snowdonia with a team of over a hundred people working over the Internet. It took two years to make and was released as a non-profit Internet-only video by agreement with Tolkien Enterprizes. This Youtube version is slightly extended with 1 scene added back in. http://www.thehuntforgollum.com http://www.ioniafilms.com

Born of Hope – Full Movie

Born of Hope is an independent feature film inspired by the Lord of the Rings and produced by Actors at Work Productions in the UK.
http://www.bornofhope.com

Thanks to Chris Bouchard and the H4G team for putting the film here. For more films by the makers of this and BoH extras please visit.
ActorsatWork
http://www.youtube.com/actorsatwork

Check them out for more videos regarding the film including the audio commentary.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elt_l8zisik

A scattered people, the descendants of storied sea kings of the ancient West, struggle to survive in a lonely wilderness as a dark force relentlessly bends its will toward their destruction. Yet amidst these valiant, desperate people, hope remains. A royal house endures unbroken from father to son.

This 70 minute original drama is set in the time before the War of the Ring and tells the story of the Dúnedain, the Rangers of the North, before the return of the King. Inspired by only a couple of paragraphs written by Tolkien in the appendices of the Lord of the Rings we follow Arathorn and Gilraen, the parents of Aragorn, from their first meeting through a turbulent time in their people’s history.

The STASI in West-Berlin – Die STASI in West-Berlin – Full Movie – Ganzer Film

Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR (kurz MfS oder Stasi, abwertend auch SSD) war der Inlands- und Auslandsgeheimdienst der DDR und zugleich Ermittlungsbehörde (Untersuchungsorgan) für „politische Straftaten”. Das MfS war innenpolitisch vor allem ein Unterdrückungs- und Überwachungsinstrument der SED („Schild und Schwert der Partei”) gegenüber der DDR-Bevölkerung, das dem Machterhalt diente. Dabei setzte es als Mittel Überwachung, Einschüchterung, Terror und die so genannte Zersetzung gegen Oppositionelle und Regimekritiker („feindlich-negative Personen”) ein.

Das MfS wurde am 8. Februar 1950 gegründet. Der Sprachgebrauch der SED, der das MfS als „Schild und Schwert der Partei” bezeichnete, beschreibt die ihm zugedachte Funktion im politisch-ideologischen System der DDR.

Neben dem MfS gab es auch einen weiteren Nachrichtendienst in der DDR, die Militärische Aufklärung der Nationalen Volksarmee (militärischer Aufklärungsdienst) mit Sitz in Berlin-Treptow. Die Verwaltung Aufklärung wurde ebenso wie die Grenztruppen und die restliche NVA durch die Hauptabteilung I (MfS-Militärabwehr oder Verwaltung 2000) kontrolliert („abgesichert”).

TOP-SECRET – The CIA Crown Jewels – The Watergare Case

Citation: DDCI Statement about the Watergate Case
[Central Intelligence Agency Employee Bulletin Containing Vernon Walter’s Statement on CIA Involvement in Watergate; Best Available Copy] , [Classification Unknown], Newsletter, 359, May 21, 1973, 3 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00031
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Cushman, Robert E., Jr.; Dean, John Wesley III; Democratic National Committee (U.S.); Ehrlichman, John D.; Gray, L. Patrick; Haldeman, H.R.; Helms, Richard M.; Hunt, E. Howard; Nixon, Richard M.; Schlesinger, James R.; United States. Department of Justice; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. White House; Walters, Vernon A.
Subjects: Congressional hearings | Covert operations | Government appropriations and expenditures | Mexico | Watergate Affair (1972-1974)
Abstract: Disseminates Vernon Walter’s statement to congressional committee about his communications with John Dean and Patrick Gray on Central Intelligence Agency involvement in Watergate and CIA’s issuance of equipment to Howard Hunt.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (156 KB)

Durable URL for this record

Hitler’s Warriors – Wilhelm Keitel – Full Movie

 

From the series “Hitler’s Warriors”.

Wilhelm Bodewin Gustav Keitel (22 September 1882 — 16 October 1946) was a German field marshal (Generalfeldmarschall). As head of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) and de facto war minister, he was one of Germany’s most senior military leaders during World War II. At the Allied court at Nuremberg he was tried, sentenced to death and hanged as a war criminal.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Eleven Individuals of the Genovese Organized Crime Family Indicted

An 18-count indictment was unsealed in federal court in Brooklyn this morning charging 11 individuals, including several made members and associates of the Genovese organized crime family of La Cosa Nostra (the “Genovese family”), variously with racketeering conspiracy, extortion, illegal gambling, union embezzlement, and obstruction of justice. The defendants will make their initial appearance later today before United States Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go at the U.S. Courthouse at 225 Cadman Plaza East in Brooklyn, New York.

The case was announced by Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York; Janice K. Fedarcyk, Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office; Robert Panella, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, Office of Labor Racketeering and Fraud Investigations, New York Region; Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, New York City Police Department; and Rose Gill Hearn, Commissioner, New York City Department of Investigation (DOI).

As alleged in the indictment and a detention memorandum filed by the government today, Conrad Ianniello is a captain in the Genovese family. James Bernardone, the Secretary Treasurer of Local 124 of the International Union of Journeymen and Allied Trades (IUJAT), and Salvester Zarzana, the former President of Local 926 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, are both soldiers in the Genovese family. Ryan Ellis, Paul Gasparrini, William Panzera, and Robert Scalza, the Secretary Treasurer of IUJAT Local 713, are associates of the Genovese family. Also named as defendants are Robert Fiorello, Rodney Johnson, Felice Masullo, and John Squitieri.

Ianniello is charged with, among other crimes, racketeering conspiracy, including predicate acts of illegal gambling; conspiring to extort vendors at the annual Feast of San Gennaro held in Little Italy, New York in 2008; and, along with Scalza and Ellis, conspiring to extort a labor union between April 2008 and May 2008 in order to induce the union to cease its efforts to organize workers at a company on Long Island. Based on their threats, the defendants allegedly hoped to pave the way for Scalza’s union, IUJAT Local 713, to unionize the company instead.

The indictment charges Bernardone and Gasparrini with racketeering conspiracy, including predicate acts of conspiring to extort a subcontractor related to work performed at construction sites in Manhattan, Queens, and Brooklyn from approximately 2006 to 2009, including work performed at a Hampton Inn located on Ditmars Boulevard in Queens. Zarzana is also charged with extortion related to one of those construction sites. In addition, the indictment alleges that in 2008, Squitieri embezzled money from employee pension and annuity funds of Local 7-Tile, Marble, and Terrazzo of the Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers union by providing non-union laborers to perform tile-related work during a renovation at the Paramount Hotel in Manhattan, thereby avoiding paying into Local 7’s employee pension benefit plans. Johnson, a project manager at the Paramount Hotel renovation, is charged with obstruction of justice in connection with his efforts to impede a federal grand jury investigation conducted in this district that ultimately resulted in the charges brought in the indictment unsealed today.

Finally, Panzera and Fiorello are charged with crimes related to their involvement in loansharking and the extortionate collection of money from a victim.

“This indictment is the most recent chapter in this office’s continued fight against organized crime’s efforts to infiltrate unions and businesses operating in New York City. Where others saw a city festival, urban renewal, and job growth, these defendants allegedly saw only a chance to line their pockets at the expense of hard working individuals. And when law enforcement began to probe their actions, one defendant allegedly went so far as to try to block that investigation,” stated United States Attorney Lynch. “Organized crime figures and union officials who seek to earn money by corrupting legitimate industry will be investigated and prosecuted to the full extent of the law.”

FBI Assistant Director in Charge Fedarcyk stated, “Today’s charges highlight not only the ongoing vigilance of the FBI in policing the corrupt conduct of La Cosa Nostra, but also the necessity of such vigilance. Even as mob families seek and discover new ways to make money by illegitimate means, they continue to rely on tried-and-true schemes like extortion and gambling. The mob’s purpose is making money, and how is less important than how much.”

Special Agent in Charge Panella, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, stated, “The RICO indictment and today’s arrests reflect our strong commitment to combat the infiltration of unions by organized crime members and associates for their personal enrichment. The defendants allegedly utilized their organized crime influence to corrupt businesses and advance various illegal schemes. The Office of Inspector General will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to vigorously investigate labor racketeering in the nation’s unions.”

NYPD Commissioner Kelly stated, “As alleged in the indictment, the defendants’ extortion knew no bounds—in fact, one of the defendants allegedly even used the feast of San Gennaro to extort money from vendors involved in the celebration of the saint’s life. I commend the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the federal agents and New York City detectives for this successful investigation.”

DOI Commissioner Gill Hearn stated, “The charges underscore the determination of federal and city investigators to curtail organized crime’s influence in New York City, including the Feast of San Gennaro in Little Italy. DOI was pleased to assist its federal partners on this significant indictment.”

The defendants face maximum sentences ranging from five to 20 years of imprisonment on each count of conviction.

The government’s case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Nicole Argentieri, Jacquelyn Kasulis, and Amanda Hector.

The Defendants

Name Age Residence
Conrad Ianniello 68 Staten Island, New York
James Bernardone 44 Bronx, New York
Ryan Ellis 30 Queens, New York
Rober Fiorello 62 Jackson, New Jersey
Paul Gasparrini 39 Yonkers, New York
Rodney Johnson 49 Edgewater, New Jersey
Felice Masullo 40 Queens, New York
William Panzera 39 North Haledon, New Jersey
Robert Scalza 66 Long Island, New York
John Squitieri 55 Rockland County, New York
Salvester Zarzana 48 Brooklyn, New York

Revealed – Kony 2012 Campaign Loses Couch Potatoes

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Linking to a video on Facebook is one thing. Getting off the couch is quite another.

Viral internet sensation Kony 2012 found the campaign’s youthful army of ”clicktivists” largely unwilling to actually get up, go outside and put up posters.

Judging by the mood online, many had decided the whole meme was, like, so 10 minutes ago.

Participants in the campaign’s Cover the Night event on Friday were asked to form into teams, volunteer for their community for a few hours by picking up rubbish or washing cars, then spend the evening plastering walls, pavements and windows with promotional material.

But amazing things generally failed to happen. In New York, barely 5000 people had pledged on Facebook to join in. The event’s page didn’t specify a location, and Twitter revealed only a handful of groups heading to places such as Times Square, where a big video screen showed a Kony 2012 trailer every half hour just above a Foot Locker store.

Unveiled – Alan Turing Code Papers Released

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Alan Turing, perhaps the greatest computer scientist ever, famous for breaking the Germans’ Enigma code in World War II, wrote two papers on code breaking that have just been released by Britain’s spy center, GCHQ.

Two 70-year-old papers by Alan Turing on the theory of code breaking have been released by the government’s communications headquarters, GCHQ.

It is believed Turing wrote the papers while at Bletchley Park working on breaking German Enigma codes. A GCHQ mathematician said the fact that the contents had been restricted “shows what a tremendous importance it has in the foundations of our subject”.

It comes amid celebrations to mark the centenary of Turing’s birth. The two papers are now available to view at the National Archives at Kew, west London. GCHQ was able to approximately date the papers because in one example Turing had made reference to Hitler’s age.

 

Alan Mathison Turing, OBE, FRS (play /ˈtjʊərɪŋ/ TEWR-ing; 23 June 1912 – 7 June 1954), was an English mathematician, logician, cryptanalyst, and computer scientist. He was highly influential in the development of computer science, providing a formalisation of the concepts of “algorithm” and “computation” with the Turing machine, which played a significant role in the creation of the modern computer.[1][2] Turing is widely considered to be the father of computer science and artificial intelligence.[3] He was stockily built, had a high-pitched voice, and was talkative, witty, and somewhat donnish.[4] He showed many of the characteristics that are indicative of Asperger syndrome.[5]

During the Second World War, Turing worked for the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS) at Bletchley Park, Britain’s codebreaking centre. For a time he was head of Hut 8, the section responsible for German naval cryptanalysis. He devised a number of techniques for breaking German ciphers, including the method of the bombe, an electromechanical machine that could find settings for the Enigma machine.

After the war he worked at the National Physical Laboratory, where he created one of the first designs for a stored-program computer, the ACE. In 1948 Turing joined Max Newman’s Computing Laboratory at Manchester University, where he assisted in the development of the Manchester computers[6] and became interested in mathematical biology. He wrote a paper on the chemical basis of morphogenesis,[7] and he predicted oscillating chemical reactions such as the Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction, which were first observed in the 1960s.

Turing’s homosexuality resulted in a criminal prosecution in 1952, when homosexual acts were still illegal in the United Kingdom. He accepted treatment with female hormones (chemical castration) as an alternative to prison. He died in 1954, just over two weeks before his 42nd bi