Revealed – Dossier Center List Of Kremlin Organized Criminal Association

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Become a Patron!

Quote: “On April 6, 2018, the US Treasury Department introduced new sanctions against 24 Russians, including entrepreneurs and government officials from Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. We believe it would be wrong to rely solely on the opinion of a foreign government. The Dossier Center publishes its own list of possible organizers of the Kremlin organized criminal organization and their likely accomplices with short profiles. “

Possible organizers

Ilya Eliseev
Evgeny Prigozhin
Vladimir Yakunin
Gennady Petrov
Gennady Timchenko
Alexander Bortnikov
Juri Worobjow
Andrey Skoch
Andrey Vorobyov
Andrey Akimov
Victor Vekselberg
Alexander Bastrykin
Igor Rotenberg
Oleg Feoktistov
Eduard Khudainatov
Evgeny Shkolov
Vladimir Ustinov
Sergei Shoigu
Viacheslav Volodin
Nikolay Patrushev
Georgy Poltavchenko
Yuri Chaika
Victor Zolotov
Alexey Miller
Igor Sechin
Andrey Kostin
Oleg Deripaska
Suleiman Kerimov
Yuri Kovalchuk
Alexey Mordashov
Iskandar Makhmudov
Arkady Rotenberg
Boris Rotenberg
Kirill Shamalov

Can you add anything ?

Possible accomplices

Sergey Bochkarev
Natalia Veselnitskaya
Alexander Novak
Andrey Belousov
Vladimir Yakushev
Konstantin Chuichenko
Alexander Mitusov
Alexey Kuznetsov
Maksut Shadayev
Sergej Lawrow
Denis Katsyv
Boris Gromov
Petr Katsyv
Oleg Budargin
Maxim Liksutov
Ilya Eliseev
Dmitry Kiselev
Nikolay Nikiforov
Vladimir Puchkov
Victor Kharitonin
Alexander Klyachin
Maxim Vorobiev
Sergei Sobyanin
Leonid Mikhelson
Igor Kesaev
Samvel Karapetyan
Vladislav Reznik
Yuri Chikhanchin
Olga Golodets
Dmitry Rogozin
Evgeny Prigozhin
Vladimir Yakunin
Alexander Tkachev
Gennady Petrov
Nikolay Tokarev
Andrey Fursenko
Gennady Timchenko
Leonid Simanovsky
Alexander Bortnikov
Juri Worobjow
Igor Shchegolev
Andrey Skoch
Andrey Vorobyov
Deutscher Gref
Alexander Zharov
Andrey Akimov
Victor Vekselberg
Vladimir Bogdanov
Alexey Dyumin
Alexander Bastrykin
Timur Valiulin
Alexander Torshin
Mikhail Fradkov
Sergey Fursenko
Igor Rotenberg
Konstantin Kosachev
Alexander Fomin
Valery Falkov
Victoria Abramchenko
Maxim Reshetnikov
Marat Khusnullin
Mikhail Mishustin
Mikhail Murashko
Oleg Matytsin
Oleg Feoktistov
Olga Lyubimova
Sergey Kravtsov
Tatiana Golikova
Dmitry Chernyshenko
Eduard Khudainatov
Juri Borisow
Yuri Trutnev
Alexander Kozlov
Igor Levitin
Evgeny Shkolov
Vladimir Ustinov
Igor Shuvalov
Sergey Prikhodko
Arkady Dvorkovich
Vladimir Medinsky
Sergei Shoigu
Denis Manturov
Vladimir Kolokoltsev
Valentina Matvienko
Viacheslav Volodin
Nikolay Patrushev
Rashid Nurgaliev
Georgy Poltavchenko
Yuri Chaika
Victor Zolotov
Alexey Miller
Igor Sechin
Andrey Kostin
Oleg Deripaska
Suleiman Kerimov
Yuri Kovalchuk
Ziyavudin Magomedov
Alexey Mordashov
Iskandar Makhmudov
Arkady Rotenberg
Boris Rotenberg
Kirill Shamalov

Can you add anything ?

Enthüllt – Dossier Center Liste Der Von Kreml Organisierten Kriminellen Vereinigung

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Become a Patron!

Zitat:”Am 6. April 2018 führte das US-Finanzministerium neue Sanktionen gegen 24 Russen ein, darunter Unternehmer und Regierungsbeamte aus dem inneren Kreis von Wladimir Putin. Wir glauben, dass es falsch wäre, sich nur auf die Meinung einer ausländischen Regierung zu verlassen. Das Dossier Center veröffentlicht eine eigene Liste möglicher Organisatoren der von Kreml organisierten kriminellen Vereinigung und ihrer wahrscheinlichen Komplizen mit kurzen Profilen.”

Mögliche Organisatoren


Ilya Eliseev
Evgeny Prigozhin
Vladimir Yakunin
Gennady Petrov
Gennady Timchenko
Alexander Bortnikov
Juri Worobjow
Andrey Skoch
Andrey Vorobyov
Andrey Akimov
Victor Vekselberg
Alexander Bastrykin
Igor Rotenberg
Oleg Feoktistov
Eduard Khudainatov
Evgeny Shkolov
Vladimir Ustinov
Sergei Shoigu
Viacheslav Volodin
Nikolay Patrushev
Georgy Poltavchenko
Yuri Chaika
Victor Zolotov
Alexey Miller
Igor Sechin
Andrey Kostin
Oleg Deripaska
Suleiman Kerimov
Yuri Kovalchuk
Alexey Mordashov
Iskandar Makhmudov
Arkady Rotenberg
Boris Rotenberg
Kirill Shamalov
Kannst du etwas hinzufügen?

Mögliche Komplizen


Sergey Bochkarev
Natalia Veselnitskaya
Alexander Novak
Andrey Belousov
Vladimir Yakushev
Konstantin Chuichenko
Alexander Mitusov
Alexey Kuznetsov
Maksut Shadayev
Sergej Lawrow
Denis Katsyv
Boris Gromov
Petr Katsyv
Oleg Budargin
Maxim Liksutov
Ilya Eliseev
Dmitry Kiselev
Nikolay Nikiforov
Vladimir Puchkov
Victor Kharitonin
Alexander Klyachin
Maxim Vorobiev
Sergei Sobyanin
Leonid Mikhelson
Igor Kesaev
Samvel Karapetyan
Vladislav Reznik
Yuri Chikhanchin
Olga Golodets
Dmitry Rogozin
Evgeny Prigozhin
Vladimir Yakunin
Alexander Tkachev
Gennady Petrov
Nikolay Tokarev
Andrey Fursenko
Gennady Timchenko
Leonid Simanovsky
Alexander Bortnikov
Juri Worobjow
Igor Shchegolev
Andrey Skoch
Andrey Vorobyov
Deutscher Gref
Alexander Zharov
Andrey Akimov
Victor Vekselberg
Vladimir Bogdanov
Alexey Dyumin
Alexander Bastrykin
Timur Valiulin
Alexander Torshin
Mikhail Fradkov
Sergey Fursenko
Igor Rotenberg
Konstantin Kosachev
Alexander Fomin
Valery Falkov
Victoria Abramchenko
Maxim Reshetnikov
Marat Khusnullin
Mikhail Mishustin
Mikhail Murashko
Oleg Matytsin
Oleg Feoktistov
Olga Lyubimova
Sergey Kravtsov
Tatiana Golikova
Dmitry Chernyshenko
Eduard Khudainatov
Juri Borisow
Yuri Trutnev
Alexander Kozlov
Igor Levitin
Evgeny Shkolov
Vladimir Ustinov
Igor Shuvalov
Sergey Prikhodko
Arkady Dvorkovich
Vladimir Medinsky
Sergei Shoigu
Denis Manturov
Vladimir Kolokoltsev
Valentina Matvienko
Viacheslav Volodin
Nikolay Patrushev
Rashid Nurgaliev
Georgy Poltavchenko
Yuri Chaika
Victor Zolotov
Alexey Miller
Igor Sechin
Andrey Kostin
Oleg Deripaska
Suleiman Kerimov
Yuri Kovalchuk
Ziyavudin Magomedov
Alexey Mordashov
Iskandar Makhmudov
Arkady Rotenberg
Boris Rotenberg
Kirill Shamalov

Kannst du etwas hinzufügen?

Exil-Russen-Tycoon Chodorkowski Sagt Aus: “KGB / FSB Drangen in Merkels „Inneren Kreis“ Ein.”

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Become a Patron!

Russland hat Agenten in den „internen Kreis“ der deutschen Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und in die österreichischen Geheimdienste aufgenommen, hat der im Exil lebende russische Tycoon Michail Chodorkowski enthüllt.

Sie seien jedoch nur Teil eines umfassenderen kremlfreundlichen Netzwerks in EU-Staaten, darunter die Tschechische Republik, Zypern, Frankreich, Griechenland, Lettland, Litauen und Polen.

Chodorkowski machte die Enthüllungen in einer Videoanhörung mit einem Ausschuss des Europäischen Parlaments (EP) über ausländische Einmischung am Montag (10. Mai).

Eine in Deutschland registrierte Denkfabrik namens Dialogue of Civilizations, die vom russischen Oligarchen Vladimir Yakunin ins Leben gerufen wurde, “wird verwendet, um potenzielle Kreml-Verbündete unter den europäischen Eliten zu identifizieren”, sagte er.

Und “eine von Jakunins … Quellen, auf die er sich in seinen Berichten an den Kreml bezieht, gehört zu Angela Merkels innerem Kreis”, fügte Chodorkowski hinzu.

Ein ehemaliger österreichischer Geschäftsführer namens Jan Marsalek (Wirecard) wurde auch von Russland eingesetzt, um „einen hochrangigen österreichischen Geheimdienstoffizier“ zu rekrutieren und Parteien zu beherbergen, um Informationen über andere Sicherheitschefs und Politiker zu sammeln, sagte Chodorkowski.

Aufgrund der Sensibilität der Fälle nannte er den Merkel-Vertrauten oder hochrangigen österreichischen Spion in seinen öffentlichen Äußerungen gegenüber den Abgeordneten nicht.

“Einige der hier bereitgestellten Informationen können von unseren Quellen vor Gericht nicht bestätigt werden, weil sie um ihr Leben und das ihrer Familien [in Russland] fürchten”, sagte Chodorkowski.

Seine in Großbritannien ansässige Nichtregierungsorganisation für Demokratie, The Dossier Centre, gab am selben Tag Einzelheiten in einem 60-seitigen Bericht bekannt, der den Mitgliedern des EP-Ausschusses über eine sichere Website zur Verfügung gestellt wurde.

In der Zwischenzeit habe Jewgeni Prigoschin, ein weiterer kremlfreundlicher Wirtschaftsmagnat, auch in Europa Schaden angerichtet, sagte Chodorkowski in der Anhörung am Montag.

Zu Prigozhins Aktivitäten gehörten die Beschaffung deutscher Komponenten für russische „Massenvernichtungswaffen“ und die Rekrutierung deutscher Politiker, um zwielichtige Wahlen in russlandfreundlichen Staaten in Afrika zu legitimieren.

Prigozhins Internet-Trollfabriken waren “damit beschäftigt, die anti-französische Stimmung in afrikanischen Ländern zu fördern” und “einen diplomatischen Konflikt zwischen Frankreich und Italien zu provozieren”.

Und Prigozhins Mitarbeiter versuchten, eine kremlfreundliche politische Partei in Griechenland zu gründen, die sich um den griechischen Politiker Konstantin Gabaeridis dreht, sagte Chodorkowski.

Er nannte und beschämte zwei rechtsextreme französische Politiker – Thierry Mariani (MdEP) und Aymeric Chauprade (ehemaliger MdEP) – als Kreml-Handlanger.

Chauprade zum Beispiel half dabei, französische Politiker mit Kreml-Kontakten bekannt zu machen, und bot Jakunin “sogar Ghostwriting-Dienste an”, sagte Chodorkowski.

Zu Russlands Netzwerk in der Tschechischen Republik gehörten “hochrangige tschechische Regierungsbeamte” sowie der kommunistische Abgeordnete Zdeněk Ondráček, so Chodorkowski.

An der fünften Kolumne in Zypern war Eleni Loizidou beteiligt, ein ehemaliger Staatsanwalt, der “die russischen Behörden über viele Jahre informell beraten und Insiderinformationen zur Verfügung gestellt hat” und “sich im Namen des Kremls in [rechtliche] Verfahren einmischte”, sagte Chodorkowski.

Ein ehemaliger polnischer Abgeordneter, Mateusz Piskorski, wurde ebenfalls von einer mit dem Kreml verbundenen PR-Firma beauftragt, „loyale europäische Politiker zu finden“, die er zu vom Kreml gesponserten Veranstaltungen einlud, sagte Chodorkowski.

In Litauen identifizierten die Spindoktoren des Kremls Vygaudas Ušackas, einen ehemaligen Außenminister und EU-Botschafter in Russland, als „freundlichen Kandidaten für die litauische Präsidentschaft“.

Und Lettland sah aus wie ein Spielplatz für die Kreml-Elite, auf dem beispielsweise Verwandte der russischen Oligarchen Yuri Kovalchuk und Nikolai Tokarev Immobilien und Anteile an lokalen Firmen besaßen.

“Tokarev und Kovalchuk waren die Hauptglieder des Finanzierungsplans für Putins Palast, der Gegenstand von Navalnys Film war”, bemerkte Chodorkowski unter Bezugnahme auf den russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin und den Oppositionsaktivisten Alexei Navalny, der kürzlich Putins opulente Privatvilla auf YouTube enthüllte.

“Der Hauptwirkungsmechanismus für die politischen und geschäftlichen Eliten in Europa ist die [finanzielle] Korruption”, sagte Chodorkowski.

“Wir sind bereit, auf Anfrage der jeweiligen Strafverfolgungsbehörden Beweise dafür vorzulegen, aber wir werden diese Beweise natürlich nicht an diejenigen weitergeben, die möglicherweise mit dem Kreml in Verbindung stehen”, fügte er unter Bezugnahme auf Dokumente und andere Informationen hinzu was sein Zeugnis untermauerte.

Wenn er sich jedoch Sorgen um den Schutz von Quellen macht, könnten einige Abgeordnete selbst eine Bedrohung darstellen.

Mariani, den Chodorkowski benannt und beschämt hat, ist Mitglied des Ausschusses für ausländische Einmischung des EP und sollte beispielsweise privilegierten Zugang zu Chodorkowskis 60-seitigem Dossier haben.

Und während der französische Europaabgeordnete am Montag nicht sprach, intervenierte ein französischer Euro-Abgeordneter der Mariani-Gruppe für Unabhängigkeit und Demokratie, Jean-Lin Lacapelle, in seinem Namen.

Chodorkowski wurde eine “Reihe von Attentaten” und “Geldwäsche” vorgeworfen, und das EP hätte ihn nicht zum Sprechen einladen sollen, sagte Lacapelle und plapperte über russische Propaganda.

“Ich möchte mich entschuldigen, weil ich gehört habe, wie einer unserer Kollegen Sie auf sehr vulgäre und unfaire Weise angegriffen hat”, sagte der französische liberale Europaabgeordnete Bernard Guetta zu Chodorkowski.

“Die EU muss ihr eigenes Haus von hybriden Kreml-Einflüssen, schmutzigem Geld und Korruption reinigen”, sagte auch Andrius Kubilius, ein Mitte-Rechts-Abgeordneter Litauens und ehemaliger Premierminister, in allgemeineren Bemerkungen.

“Wenn wir die demokratische Entwicklung in Russland fördern wollen, müssen wir unser eigenes Haus reinigen”, sagte er.

KGB/FSB Penetrated Merkel’s ‘Inner Circle’, Khodorkovsky Says

Become a Patron!

True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Treffen im Kreml: Merkel sucht in Moskau Putins Unterstützung
Merkel & Putin

Become a Patron!

Russia has enrolled agents in German chancellor Angela Merkel’s “internal circle” and in Austrian intelligence administrations, exiled Russian tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky has revealed.

But they are just part of a wider pro-Kremlin network in EU states, including the Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, he said.

Khodorkovsky made the revelations in a video-hearing with a European Parliament (EP) committee on foreign interference on Monday (10 May).

A German-registered think-tank, called Dialogue of Civilisations, created by Russian oligarch Vladimir Yakunin “is used to identify potential Kremlin allies among European elites,” he said.

And “one of Yakunin’s … sources that he refers to in his reports to the Kremlin forms part of Angela Merkel’s inner circle,” Khodorkovsky added.

A former Austrian business executive called Jan Marsalek was also used by Russia to recruit “a high-ranking Austrian intelligence officer” and to host parties to gather information on other security chiefs and politicians, Khodorkovsky said.

He did not name the Merkel confidante or senior Austrian spy in his public remarks to MEPs due to the sensitivity of the cases.

“Some of the information provided here cannot be corroborated by our sources in court because of fear for their lives and the lives of their families [in Russia],” Khodorkovsky said.

But his UK-based pro-democracy NGO, The Dossier Centre, the same day, disclosed details in a 60-page report made available to members of the EP committee via a secure website.

Meanwhile, Yevgeny Prigozhin, another pro-Kremlin business tycoon, was also doing harm in Europe, Khodorkovsky said in Monday’s hearing.

Prigozhin’s activities included procuring German components for Russian “weapons of mass destruction” and recruiting German politicians to legitimise dodgy elections in Russia-friendly states in Africa.

Prigozhin’s internet “troll factories” were “engaged in fomenting anti-French sentiment in African countries” and trying to “provoke a diplomatic conflict between France and Italy”.

And Prigozhin’s staff tried to create a pro-Kremlin political party in Greece centred around Greek politician Konstantin Gabaeridis, Khodorkovsky said.

He named and shamed two far-right French politicians – Thierry Mariani (an MEP) and Aymeric Chauprade (a former MEP) – as Kremlin stooges.

Chauprade, for instance, helped introduce French politicians to Kremlin contacts and “even offered ghost-writing services” to Yakunin, Khodorkovsky said.

Russia’s network in the Czech Republic included “high-ranking Czech government officials”, as well as communist MP Zdeněk Ondráček, Khodorkovsky noted.

Its fifth column in Cyprus involved Eleni Loizidou, a former prosecutor, who “informally advised Russian authorities over many years, providing insider information” and who “interfered in [legal] proceedings on behalf of the Kremlin,” Khodorkovsky said.

A former Polish MP, Mateusz Piskorski, was also tasked by a Kremlin-linked PR firm with “finding loyal European politicians”, whom he invited to Kremlin-sponsored events, Khodorkovsky said.

In Lithuania, Kremlin spin-doctors identified Vygaudas Ušackas, a former foreign minister and EU ambassador to Russia, as “a friendly candidate for the Lithuanian presidency”.

And Latvia looked like a playground for the Kremlin elite, where relatives of Russian oligarchs Yuri Kovalchuk and Nikolai Tokarev, for instance, owned real estate and shares in local firms.

“Tokarev and Kovalchuk were the main links in the financing scheme for Putin’s palace which was the subject of Navalny’s film,” Khodorkovsky noted, referring to Russian president Vladimir Putin and opposition activist Alexei Navalny, who recently exposed Putin’s opulent private mansion on YouTube.

“The main impact mechanism on European political and business elites is about [financial] corruption,” Khodorkovsky said.

“We are prepared to provide proof that we have upon request of respective law enforcement agencies, but of course we’re not going to share this evidence with those who are potentially linked to the Kremlin,” he added, referring to documents and other information which underpinned his testimony.

But if he was concerned about protecting sources, then some MEPs might themselves pose a threat.

Mariani, whom Khodorkovsky named and shamed, is a member of the EP’s foreign-interference committee and was meant to have privileged access to Khodorkovsky’s 60-page dossier, for instance.

And while the French MEP did not speak on Monday, a fellow French euro-deputy from Mariani’s Independence and Democracy group, Jean-Lin Lacapelle, intervened on his behalf.

Khodorkovsky was accused of a “string of assassinations” and “money-laundering” and the EP should not have invited him to speak, Lacapelle said, parroting Russian propaganda.

“I’d like to present my apologies because I heard one of our colleagues attack you in a very vulgar and unfair way,” French liberal MEP Bernard Guetta told Khodorkovsky.

“The EU needs to clean its own house from hybrid Kremlin influence, dirty money, and corruption,” Andrius Kubilius, a centre-right Lithuanian MEP and former prime minister, also said, in more general remarks.

“If we want to promote democratic development in Russia, we need to clean our own house,” he said.

Get new recipes delivered to your inbox.

Cry For Rescue – “Save Meduza Our Continued Existence Now Depends On You”

Sultan Suleimanov / Meduza

The Russian authorities are trying to kill Meduza. The Justice Ministry has labeled us a “foreign agent,” chasing away our advertisers. This means we will run out of money. We are already running out of money.

Let’s cut to the chase: You can help sustain Meduza right here.

We’ve always believed that we could build a media outlet that served the public at no charge, relying on ad revenue. This kind of work is especially crucial in a country where the demand for honest information is so enormous and the supply of independent journalism is so critically low.

We achieved exactly what we hoped to do. It took us six years, and the Russian authorities crushed our business in a single day.

To adapt to these new circumstances, we have slashed our budget. Meduza no longer has a physical office — not in Riga or in Moscow. We’ve essentially stopped working with freelance writers. We also introduced pay cuts ranging from 30 to 50 percent.

Even like this, however, Meduza won’t last long.

Our continued existence now depends on you. This is the first time we’ve asked you, our readers, for help. Please help us save Meduza.

We can’t survive without you.

Set up your payments here.

You can sign up for one-time or recurring contributions to Meduza. Please tell your colleagues, friends, and subscribers that they can help keep independent journalism alive in Russia with a donation of any size. Spreading the word helps, too. Thank you!

Russian Court Forbids Activities of Navalny’s Organizations

Arbeitsverbot für Nawalnys Organisation: Putin will die totale Kontrolle -  Politik - Tagesspiegel

A court in Moscow suspended the exercises of a few associations established by the detained top Kremlin pundit Alexei Navalny, until it settles on a solicitation by investigators to pronounce these associations “fanatic.”

The Moscow City Court “has chosen to utilize the break proportions of security through disallowing certain demonstrations with respect to the Anti-Corruption Foundation and the Citizens’ Rights Protection Foundation non-business associations,” the court said, as indicated by the Russian news office Tass.

Investigators accept that these associations “are setting conditions for destabilizing the socio-political circumstance, and that they will probably arrange affections for changing the establishment of the protected request, to be specific by utilizing a ‘shading transformation’ situation,” the organization said, alluding to a rush of favorable to vote based system fights in post-Soviet nations and the Middle East 10 years prior. In those insurgencies, non-administrative associations assumed a critical part.

“The indictment likewise believes that these constructions are completing the movement of unfamiliar and global associations thought about unfortunate on Russian soil,” read the organization report.

Russian specialists have effectively denoted Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) as a “unfamiliar specialist” in October 2019.

In any case, whenever set apart as “fanatic,” the FBK could be put on Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee’s “Fear based oppressor and radical associations and materials” list, which incorporates gatherings, for example, al-Qaeda or ISIS.

“Group 29” (Команда 29), a gathering of legal advisors guarding Navalny and his associations said the court gave them two packs of material, some of which is marked “classified,” and just two days to consider a huge number of pages.

“What we saw is an annal of restraints against Alexei Navalny and his allies. We don’t comprehend what was the reason for the characterization,” the group expressed, alluding to the mark “fanatic.”

Court’s authorities didn’t remark on the subtleties of the break administering, saying that the duplicates of the choice were shipped off the gatherings in question, yet FBK Director, Ivan Zhdanov, distributed a piece of the report.

It said that the establishment is not, at this point permitted to spread its materials by means of the Internet or other broad communications, or to sort out and hold exhibits, mass activities or some other sort of open occasions, or to partake in choices or decisions. That would incorporate the approaching races for the Russian Duma (parliament), booked for September this year.

The establishments have likewise been prohibited from utilizing their financial balances, with the exception of making good on fines and assessments.

Zhdanov portrayed the assents as “idiocy”, clarifying that FBK, as a legitimate element, had never coordinated a convention and it had never run for the decisions.

Simply a day sooner, the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office mentioned suspension of associations supporting the Russian resistance pioneer Navalny, restricting the exercises of the alleged Navalny Headquarters the nation over, as per FBK.

Putin Wants To Forbid Alexey Navalny’s Political & Anti-Corruption Network As ‘Extremist.’

Russische Behörden warnen Nawalny-Anhänger vor Protesten

State investigators in Moscow have documented a claim to assign Alexey Navalny’s whole enemy of debasement and political framework as “fanatic” associations, successfully prohibiting these gatherings. In particular, authorities are focusing on the Anti-Corruption Foundation and the Citizens’ Rights Protection Foundation (the two of which Russia’s Justice Ministry has effectively assigned as “unfamiliar specialists”), just as Navalny’s cross country organization of mission workplaces. Meduza asked Valeriya Vetoshkina, a basic freedoms attorney at Team 29, what may befall everybody currently working and chipping in at Navalny’s associations, and how the specialists could deal with allies.

What occurs if a Russian court consents to assign the Anti-Corruption Foundation, the Citizens’ Rights Protection Foundation, and Alexey Navalny’s organization of mission workplaces as “radical associations”:

The second the decision enters power (after a probably bids measure), anybody officially recorded as administrative staff could be accused of a lawful offense “for getting sorted out the exercises of a radical association” and face a greatest punishment of 10 years in jail.

The specialists could likewise force six-year jail sentences on customary representatives and anybody blameworthy of “purposeful activities identified with the continuation or resumption of this present association’s exercises (like leading discussions to advance the restricted association’s exercises, straightforwardly partaking in progressing exercises, etc).”

Any individual who funds these gatherings (through gifts, for instance) or helps as a volunteer could be detained for as long as eight years.

Anybody indicted for the exercises recorded above could be added to Russia’s government vault of psychological militants and radicals, which would hinder all their ledgers and breaking point their legitimate month to month spending to 10,000 rubles ($130) — barring the installment of fines, charges, etc. These limitations would likewise apply to the entirety of their relatives.

Navalny’s associations would lose the option to arrange public occasions.

Showing the images or logos of a fanatic association is deserving of a fine or 15 days in prison. Anybody indicted for this offense loses the option to represent chose office for one year.

The uplifting news for Navalny’s allies is that the radical assignment can’t be retroactive, implying that previous allies can’t be arraigned for their gifts. The awful news is that any individual who distributed the gathering’s images or logos can be arraigned if the substance is as yet available. All in all, Russians who shared these pictures via web-based media (even years prior) hazard being indicted on the off chance that they don’t erase those posts very soon.

It’s muddled what will befall the analytical reports (like the narrative about Vladimir Putin’s “royal residence” on the Black Sea) and different materials delivered throughout the years by Navalny’s associations. Sensibly, neither informal organizations nor news sources ought to be considered responsible for scattering the gatherings’ substance since they shared these materials before the Russian equity framework at any point prohibited the Navalny mechanical assembly. Russian law requirement is flighty, in any case, in light of the fact that the specialists see “spread” and “distribution” not as a one-time occasion but rather as an interaction that doesn’t end until the materials are not, at this point freely open.

In fact talking, an association’s materials aren’t naturally assigned as radical on the grounds that the actual gathering is restricted for fanaticism. At the end of the day, it wouldn’t in a split second become illicit to sum up one of the Anti-Corruption Foundation’s insightful reports. How this works out as a general rule, nonetheless, would be an issue of authorization. All things considered, Russian courts would at last boycott everything these associations at any point distributed.

Whatever the specialists choose about Navalny’s insightful reports and mission materials, news sources would be needed to determine at whatever point referencing these gatherings that the Russian specialists have assigned them as “radical” (similarly as media sources currently need to distinguish them as “unfamiliar specialists”).

The court’s decision will concern these particular associations, implying that Navalny’s group could keep up activities by basically making new gatherings, in principle. Be that as it may, as a wake up call, consider Mikhail Khorodovsky’s involvement in the “Open Russia” development. In 2017, the Russian specialists prohibited the Britain-enrolled association “Open Russia” as “unwanted” and afterward continued to mistreat individuals from the indistinguishably named “Open Russia” development in Russia. In 2019, this last gathering disintegrated itself, and its activists set up one more design with a similar name however neglected to get the Justice Ministry’s proper enrollment. Today, law implementation routinely disturbs the new development’s occasions and prosecutes its individuals. (Most as of late, police in Moscow scattered a meeting of free city delegates held in March 2021.) To exacerbate the situation for the Navalny lobby, the “radicalism” assignment in Russia is much more genuine from a lawful viewpoint than “nuisance.”

Berlin Murder – New Intel On FSB Involvement Exposed

  • In a series of investigations in 2019 and 2020, Bellingcat, along with its investigative partners The Insider and Der Spiegel, identified the person suspected in the August 2019 assassination of Georgian asylum seeker Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Berlin. The suspected assassin, who traveled to Berlin under the name of Vadim Sokolov, a Russian citizen, was arrested by Berlin police shortly after the killing and is currently on trial at the Berlin appellate court (Kammergericht).
  • Our initial investigation found that the passport on which the arrested suspect traveled was state-issued, but linked to an inauthentic identity; and that a man with the particulars of “Vadim Sokolov” did not exist in Russian registries prior to 2019. We concluded that this cover identity – which had obtained a full set of matching presence in all kinds of Russian registries, including the tax registry, in 2019 – could only have been issued by the Russian authorities.
  • Subsequently, we were able to match the suspect to the real identity of Vadim Krasikov, 56, a person whom Russian investigators placed on an international search in connection with a 2013 murder. The Interpol search warrant had been withdrawn in 2015. Our identification was based largely on geographically overlapping use of telephones used by “Vadim Sokolov” and Vadim Krasikov as well as on facial comparison of a black-and-white photograph of Krasikov to the arrest mugshots and visa application photos of “Vadim Sokolov”.
  • Based on analysis of telephone metadata, we found that prior to his trip to Berlin, Vadim Krasikov had been communicating intensively with members of the Vympel group of companies – comprised primarily of former FSB Spetsnaz officers – and had visited secure FSB training facilities in the immediate eve of his trip to Germany.
  • Largely in reliance of Bellingcat’s investigations, German prosecutors have indicted Vadim Krasikov as a killer who acted on behalf of the Russian state, and in particular the country’s security service – the FSB. The case is currently in trial phase at first-instance court in Berlin, and a verdict is expected in the first half of 2021. The prosecution believes that there is overwhelming forensic evidence that the detained suspect is in fact the assassin – including DNA match with items disposed of by the killer in the Spree river. However, the killing’s connection to Russian state largely hinges on the case that “Vadim Sokolov” and Vadim Krasikov are the same person. 
  • The accused maintains that his name is Vadim Sokolov, that he was a tourist in Berlin, and that he is not aware of a Vadim Krasikov. The defense lawyers argue that the evidence of identity of the two personas is inconclusive, and is based solely on a facial comparison.

New data freshly obtained by Ukrainian law enforcement and passed on to German investigators strongly supports the key premise of Bellingcat’s identification, and removes more or less any residual uncertainty that “Sokolov” and Krasikov are the same person. This data was obtained during a special operation of Ukrainian law enforcement in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city and the hometown of Vadim Krasikov’s wife. According to sources of our investigative partner Spiegel, the new data has been passed to German law enforcement in the last few days. Spiegel obtained some of the documents and photographs from the new data set and shared them with Bellingcat.

Тhe new data includes photographs from what appears to be a 2010 wedding album of Vadim Krasikov and his current wife. They also include a marriage certificate, showing the husband’s name as “Vadim Krasikov”.

The color photographs, which have been reviewed by us, provide multiple new samples of Vadim Krasikov’s face from different perspectives, making a facial comparison significantly more reliable than by use of the original black-and-white photos that we previously obtained. The identity match using the new photographs in Microsoft’s Azure tool is even higher, with a matching factor of 0.88902 (this factor is very high given the 10 year difference between the photographs and the facial hair changes; similar comparisons using photos with a 10-year gap of the of the same person yield results between 0.75 and 0.9).

A screen grab of facial comparison results using the Microsoft Azure tool.

Crucially, the newly obtained collection of photographs includes an image of Vadim Krasikov sitting on a beach in a baseball cap and a tank top. Visible in the photograph is a large tattoo on his left shoulder. This tattoo is identical to the tattoo seen on the shoulder of “Vadim Sokolov”, from a police custody photograph obtained previously by the Dossier Center.

Left, a tattoo on the arm of Vadim Sokolov. Right, a picture of Vadim Krasikov.

The near-perfect match is not only based on the exact same pattern of the tattoo and its identical placement on the same spot on the left upper arm in both photographs. A close-up comparison of the skin under the tattoo shows multiple overlapping skin artefacts, such as freckles, moles and scars.

A comparison of tattoos detailed in pictures of Vadim Sokolov and Vadim Krasikov.

Importantly, the German indictment documents as well as a police file describing the arrested “Sokolov” refer to a second tattoo – of a snake – on his lower right arm. This is compatible with a tattoo partially visible on the lower right arm of Krasikov’s beach photo.

A second tattoo on the arm of Vadim Krasikov.

The new photographs provided by Ukrainian authorities to German prosecutors present a new set of data points that make the identification of the accused as Vadim Krasikov even more robust than before. Furthermore, they provide an important second independent source for this verification. Notably, many of the wedding album photographs show Krasikov in the presence of his wife, his parents and in-laws – thus linking the person from the photographs to the name of Vadim Krasikov that is seen in the marriage certificate.

New Indications of an FSB link

As reported in our previous investigations, in the months following the killing of Khangoshvili and the arrest of Vadim Krasikov, metadata of the telephone previously used by Krasikov shows that that number continued communicating with a burner number which had not called Krasikov before the Berlin trip.

Our working hypothesis was that following his departure, Krasikov’s number was used by his wife – this was corroborated by the geolocation data that showed the phone stayed within the home base of Krasikov’s apartment, and occasionally moved in sync with his wife’s phone number. Krasikov’s telephone moved in the direction of Domodedovo airport on 6 December 2019 and was turned off permanently at approximately noon on that day. Our assumption was that the burner number belonged to one of Krasikov’s supervisors from the Vympel group – Evgeny Eroshkin, a senior former FSB special operations officer.

By tracing the burner number’s geolocation on that day, we discovered that it also moved towards Domodedovo airport, and later that day reappeared in Simferopol – the main city and airport on the Crimean peninsula.

By analysing the flights between Domodedovo and Simferopol airports on that day, we were able to narrow down the potential flights to only one that matched the switch-off and switch-on times of the burner number. We then obtained the passenger manifest of this flight.

In the passenger list, we discovered, as we suspected, Evgeny Eroshkin – confirming our hypothesis that he was the owner of the burner number. We also identified two other passengers – appearing to be a woman and her daughter. The woman and the child’s first names matched those of Krasikov’s wife and daughter, however the last name was different (per our editorial policy we do not publish names of relatives of our investigation subjects).

Notably, the birth date of the woman was exactly one year older than that of Krasikov’s wife.

This is a pattern of false-identity creation that appears to be preferred by the FSB; and we have previously identified and reported on this in the case of the FSB poison squad that tailed Alexei Navalny. The passport number on which the woman traveled had a prefix of 45 that means that it would have been issued in Moscow.

We verified if a person with this name and birthdate exists in any Russian databases, and the result was negative. This, together with the naming and birthdate pattern, plus the full match of the child’s birthdate with that of Krasikov’s child, corroborated our hypothesis that the Russian authorities had issued a new identity to Vadim Krasikov’s family, and had provided them with an FSB “handler”. Indeed, travel data for Mr. Eroshkin shows that he traveled from Moscow to Crimea at least once every month since that initial trip in December 2019, and used this burner phone almost exclusively for communication with a new burner number that we believe is used by Ms. Krasikova.

Notably, the passport number issued for the new, fake identity of Vadim Krasikov’s wife shows that it is not a regular number issued in 2019. The numbering of the passport (45044201**) indicates that it was issued in Moscow in 2004 or early 2005 (long before Ms. Krasikova moved from Ukraine to Russia in 2009). More importantly, the passport number appears to be from a series of sequentially numbered passports issued to FSB undercover operatives. For instance, a number from the same series and only a few numbers apart was used by “Sergey Lukashevich”, a cover persona who in 2015 served as Minister of State Security of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. Multiple media reports and witness testimony confirm that the so-called Ministry of State Security was staffed by FSB undercover operatives.

A screengrab showing travel details and passport number of “Sergey Lukashevich”.

Other passports from the same numbering range belong to other non-existing personas, some of which flew on joint bookings with members of the closest entourage of former Ukrainian president Yanukovich.

These new findings corroborate even further our previous conclusion that the FSB had a direct involvement in the preparation and commissioning of the Berlin assassination, and in the cover-up of the evidence after the killing. This, apparently, includes issuing cover identities for Krasikov’s family members and moving them to Crimea, where they appear to be in direct contact with an FSB handler.

The FSB Handler

Based on leaked 2017 employment data, Evgeny Eroshkin, born 1963, is an employee of Vympel Sodeystvie, one of the many Vympel-named private security companies formally owned by Eduard Bendersky. As written earlier, Bendersky is a former FSB Spetsnaz commander who owns a cluster of security-themed companies that boast of being able to “resolve any issue as complex as it may be” and being incorporated by former FSB special service officers. A review of recent airline travel data shows that in 2015 and 2016 Bendersky flew on joint bookings with Col. Gen. Alexey Sedov, Director of FSB’s 2nd Service.

Evgeny Eroshkin, photo from visa application.

In the months before the Khangoshvili assassination, Evgeny Eroshkin communicated by phone intensively with two of the suspects in the murder case: the accused, Vadim Krasikov, and the second suspect Roman Demyanchenko. As described above, our findings indicate that he also communicated frequently and traveled with Krasikov’s presumed wife after Krasikov was detained in Germany, implying that he had at least some degree of involvement in the preparation and clean-up operation after the Berlin attack.

However, data from a 2019 visa application submitted by Eroshkin suggests he may have had plans for more than just a remote involvement in this operation. Data from Schengen’s visa database seen by us shows that on 27 February 2019 Eroshkin applied – under his real name – for a Schengen visa at the Consulate of Greece in Moscow. He requested a multi-entry visa to travel to Europe in the period from 26 April 2019 until 26 October 2019.

However, the Greek consulate did not honor this request, and on the following day – 28 February 2019 – granted him a one-time visa valid only for 17 days during the period from 26 April to 27 May 2019.

Travel records for Eroshkin show that he chose not to use this visa, and did not travel to the Schengen area. Instead, on the day he received the shorter-than-expected visa, he initiated his first phone call to Vadim Krasikov. They had 28 phone interactions in the following five months, the last one just days before his trip to Berlin.

Relevance of Findings

The newly obtained data provided by Ukrainian authorities to the German investigators may become a crucial component in the prosecution’s case. If the new data makes its way to the evidence file of the ongoing court case – which is nearing its final phase – it may be enough to convince the court that “Vadim Sokolov” does not exist, and that on the eve of the assassination, the Russian state issued fake identity documents to Vadim Krasikov. This would strengthen the prosecution’s case that the killing was commissioned by the Russian state. The court will then have to weigh the voluminous – while circumstantial – evidence that Krasikov acted on behalf of the Russian state against the defendant’s continued silence.

In the latest court hearing , the court heard from a police officer to whom the defendant had earlier said that his mother could confirm his identity as “Sokolov”. The presiding judge offered the accused to provide name and contact details for his mother so she could be contacted to testify that he is who he says he is. The defendant’s lawyer quickly intervened and said that his client will continue to use his legal right to remain silent.

If a court verdict does corroborate the prosecution’s indictment, a new set of diplomatic sanctions from Germany are expected. The German government has already committed to further, harsher sanctions against Russia if the court verdict confirms the accusation of state involvement in Khangoshvili’s assassination.

Source:Bellingcat

In Berlin Putin’s Deputy Kadyrov Terrorizes Chechen Refugees

Germany has a populace of a huge number of Chechens. The greater part of them have shown up in the course of recent years looking for refuge. Meduza has distributed a report on how Chechens endeavor getting to the European Union by intersection the line among Belarus and Poland. At Meduza’s solicitation, Dmitry Vachedin, a columnist presently dwelling in Germany, has examined the existence of Berlin’s Chechen people group and learned of an outfitted posse, the individuals from which undermine their comrades with death for indecent lead.

On a late September evening in 2016, bare photos of twenty-year-old Madina* were messaged as once huge mob from her taken cellphone to each individual on her contact list. After an hour, the telephone rang in her loft in a calm private piece of Berlin.

Madina was the one to reply; she perceived her uncle’s voice. The incensed uncle proclaimed that he would not talk with “the whore” and requested that she call her mom and father to the telephone. The young lady woke her folks. In her quality, the family led a gathering on her destiny. The uncle, who lived in another European nation, recommended that the issue be addressed “inside the family” and that the young lady be returned to their country and executed there. The uncle by and by elected to submit the homicide and surprisingly offered to come to Chechnya, however the whole family had needed to escape the republic back in 2010 because of a contention with nearby specialists. Thus, it was settled that Madina and her mom would take a trip to Chechnya that very morning to meet her uncle, who might play out the execution.

While her uncle got down to booking tickets, her mom was to monitor Madina in order to guarantee that the youngster didn’t flee. Her mom gathered and concealed Madina’s papers and afterward hit the hay in the kid’s room; her uncle intended to call before the morning namaz, which was around six o’clock. The ladies spent the remainder of the night peacefully; Madina’s mom wouldn’t converse with her. The two of them faked rest. At around six, her uncle called and educated them that he had purchased morning tickets from Berlin to Grozny with an exchange in Moscow.

At 6:31 AM sharp, when her mom left the space to wake her dad, Madina snatched her mom’s cellphone and called the police. She disclosed to the administrator that she was a Muslim whose guardians had quite recently discovered that she had a sweetheart (in fact, this was false, yet she was shy of time) and now needed to kill her. She gave her location and hung up. police were at their doorstep with seven minutes. Madina reviews that, after seeing the police, her mom began embracing her. In her nightgown, without her assets or papers, Madina left for a ladies’ home for survivors of misuse.

She didn’t call her folks for seven days. They addressed her benevolent, saying they were sorry to have terrified her. After fourteen days, she got back. When she entered her loft, her mom beat her up, trim her hair, made her put on a burqa and took her to see a gynecologist. After the gynecologist expressed that Madina was as yet a virgin, the family chose to secure her until the seniors made up their brains about her destiny. After seven days, the young lady figured out how to get away – again with the assistance of police – who removed her on the guise of exploring the robbery of her cellphone.

This, nonetheless, was not the finish of her difficulty. At the point when Madina ventured out from home, her case quit being a familial issue and turned into a shared one. As indicated by Madina, it is presently the obligation of any Chechen man, paying little mind to his connections to her of her family or scarcity in that department, to discover her and rebuff her. In Berlin, there is has a pack of Chechens professing to be accountable for such matters. “There is no such law; it is not their issue to worry about,” says Madina. “Yet, it’s an unwritten set of principles.”

“Having sworn on the Quran, we go out onto the roads”

Toward the beginning of May, a video was dispersed across WhatsApp channels utilized by Germany’s Chechen people group. The video comprised of a foundation photograph of an equipped, concealed man with his weapon pointing at the camera. A male voice conveyed the accompanying message in Chechen: “As-salamu alaykum, Muslim siblings and sisters. Here, in Europe, certain Chechen ladies and men who appear as though ladies do unspeakable things. You know it; I know it; everyone knows it. This is the reason we thusly pronounce: For now, there are around 80 of us. [More] individuals will join. The individuals who have lost their nohchalla (note: public character or attitude), who play with men of other ethnic gatherings and wed them, Chechen ladies who have picked some unacceptable way and those [creatures] who call themselves Chechen men – given a large portion of an opportunity, we will sort every one of them out. Having sworn on the Quran, we go out onto the roads. This is our statement of plan; don’t say that you were not cautioned; don’t say that you didn’t have the foggiest idea. May Allah award us harmony and set our feet on the way towards equity.”

As indicated by sources, this statement was perused by an agent of a Berlin-based group of around 100 individuals, headed by previous partners in crime of Dzhokhar Dudayev – a Chechen dissident pioneer. The “activists” have thrashed at any rate two Chechen young ladies in the previous fourteen days alone. (One of them is an occupant of the Berlin ward of Neukölln). All Berliners of Chechen cause met know about the pack’s presence.

Our interviewees have conceded that in any event half of populace of neighborhood single Chechen young ladies have sufficient data on their cellphones to be considered “liable”. Partner with men of different identities, smoking, drinking liquor, visiting hookah parlors, discotheques, or even open pools can cause mutual rage. A solitary photo in a public WhatsApp talk can pariah a whole family and the remainder of the local area would be obliged to stop all correspondence with them. With everybody under doubt and everybody answerable for each other, Chechen young ladies say they are here and there drew nearer by outsiders in the road who reprimand them for their appearance, including for wearing splendid lipstick. The burglary of a cellphone and the ensuing posting of bargaining material is a hard blow; the shamed individual has nobody to go to and the person who posted the casualty’s photographs doesn’t hazard anything.

Meduza’s interviewees have noted on numerous events that assumptions for conduct are more unbending and exacting in Chechen traveler networks than in Chechnya itself, where young ladies are even permitted to wear short skirts. This marvel has been named “an opposition in uprightness” between the counter Kadyrov European exile local area and Kadyrov-managed Chechnya: each gathering looks for demonstrate that they address “equitable” Chechens. In any case, their implicit rules share a ton practically speaking. “On the off chance that Kadyrov discovers, he will send his men to take me to Chechnya,” fears a Chechen young lady who lives in Berlin and is dating an outsider.

In the fall of 2016, a youthful Chechen lady who later imparted her story to Meduza was recorded on record while strolling down the road and chatting conversing with a non-Chechen man. That very evening, two or three dozen obscure Chechen men drove up to her home in northern Berlin. The man she had the dauntlessness to be seen with was severely beaten; he had practically the entirety of his teeth took out. The young lady figured out how to stow away.

“So here I am figuring: for what reason does my private life concern [them] by any stretch of the imagination? I don’t have any acquaintance with them. I would prefer not to. I’m not their sister or girl. My private life is nobody else’s business,” says the interviewee. As indicated by her and different Chechens, disregarding these dangers, there are to an ever increasing extent “violators” of the ethical code: Chechen young ladies go to German schools, whose educational programs remember classes for sexual training, or German language courses, where they meet individuals of different societies.

Two young ladies disclosed to Meduza that they took a stab at wearing a hijab and sticking to Chechen customs, yet proved unable “stand the pietism of having a twofold existence.” “Even in a hijab, I was known as a whore, for example, for wearing eye make-up. Also, I thought: ‘Who am I attempting to please?'” said one of the young ladies. “To acquire everybody’s regard, you need to put on a headscarf, bring down your eyes, and never venture out from home. In any case, who might need such a day to day existence?” ponders the other.

Following her second getaway from her family, Madina is sequestered from everything from the Chechen people group. She has shaved her head and wears hued contact focal points; she expects to change her name and go through plastic medical procedure. “In the event that you don’t change your name and your face, they will chase you down and execute you,” she says. There is basically no chance to get out for her: to change her name, she needs to apply to a Russian enlistment office, which would be just about as great as handing herself over. In spite of the fact that she moved on from a German secondary school without a hitch, the young lady barely at any point leaves her condo. It is essentially risky. “I would prefer not to be Chechen any longer,” she says.

It is difficult to evaluate the genuine number of Chechens living in Berlin. As per paper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany has acknowledged 36,000 Chechens in the previous five years alone. Most of them have remained in Berlin and the encompassing province of Brandenburg, notwithstanding specialists’ endeavors to urge their resettlement to Bavaria. In 2013, the city organization even took a stab at “excepting”

Berlin for Chechen outcasts to forestall the arrangement of an excessively huge ethnic local area nearby. According to the current circumstance, this endeavor was a long way from effective. Despite the fact that Chechen evacuees have a genuinely slim likelihood of being allowed refuge – in 2016, just 2.8 percent of shelter demands were conceded – the local area isn’t becoming any more modest. As per Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, mass removals to Poland (the central matter of passage for Chechens to Germany) or Russia are not normal: in 2016, just 110 Chechen.

How Russia Goes After Its Critics & Citizens Abroad

When it comes to carrying out repressions, the Russian government’s reach isn’t limited by its own borders. The Kremlin is known for going after perceived enemies abroad — especially former “insiders” and members of the political opposition. In recent years, high-profile assassinations linked to Russian agents have made headlines around the world, and Moscow has developed a reputation for abusing the Interpol notice system.

At the same time, those who flee Russia’s Chechen Republic are particularly at risk. Under regional leader Ramzan Kadyrov, this sub-national regime has carried out a unique and concerted campaign to control the Chechen diaspora. Moreover, asylum seekers from the Russian North Caucasus who seek refuge in European countries are now faced with rising xenophobia, as well as tightening migration policies that threaten to send them back to Russia.

To find out more about how the Russian — and Chechen — authorities carry out repressive activities beyond Russia’s borders, “The Naked Pravda” spoke to Nate Schenkkan, director for research strategy at Freedom House, and Kateryna Sergatskova, the editor-in-chief of Zaborona Media.

“The Naked Pravda” comes out on Saturdays (or sometimes Fridays). Catch every new episode by subscribing at Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Google Podcasts, or other platforms. If you have a question or comment about the show, please write to Kevin Rothrock at kevin@meduza.io with the subject line: “The Naked Pravda.”

The Oil Deal Funding Ukraine’s Top Pro-Kremlin Politician

President Vladimir Putin at a meeting with Viktor Medvedchuk

Ukrainian legislator Viktor Medvedchuk is a nearby partner of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and a solid Kremlin partner. Another examination uncovers how a deal energy bargain in Russia has gotten him and an accomplice a huge number of dollars.

Through an organization of shell organizations, Viktor Medvedchuk and a long-lasting colleague acquired a rewarding stake in a Russian petroleum processing plant for simply more than $40,000.

This stake created a huge number of dollars in profits. Medvedchuk has since assisted set with increasing and money Ukraine’s greatest supportive of Russia party.

Organizations associated with the two men additionally paid just around $1,000 for a controlling interest in an organization holding rights to build up an almost one-billion-barrel Russian oil field.

In the early long stretches of February 27, 2014, many shooters in plain Russian military uniform raged the parliament of Ukraine’s Crimean landmass, lifted Russian banners, and stood monitor as officials casted a ballot to arrange a choice to split away and turn out to be essential for Russia.

The appearance of the “little green men,” as they were brought in Ukraine, denoted a defining moment in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s endeavors to handle Ukraine after fights overturned his partner President Viktor Yanukovych. However, it was by all account not the only occasion that would help concrete Russian impact in Ukraine that day.

A large portion of a landmass away, in the radiant European seaward sanctuary of Cyprus, a cryptic arrangement was being struck: An enormous stake in Yug Energo, proprietor of a worthwhile Russian petroleum treatment facility, was sold at deal rates to organizations connected to Ukraine’s driving supportive of Russia resistance lawmaker Viktor Medvedchuk and his long-term colleague, individual from parliament Taras Kozak.

An examination by the Ukrainian RFE/RL program Schemes and OCCRP has tracked down that the organizations connected to Medvedchuk and Kozak had the option to get a 42-percent stake in Yug Energo from Russian extremely rich person Sergey Kislov for scarcely more than $40,000 — a little part of what the men would make from the arrangement throughout the next few years.

The Yug Energo stake qualified Medvedchuk and Kozak for a huge part of the benefits from the Novoshakhtinsky petroleum processing plant, a half-billion-dollar office finished a couple of years sooner in Russia’s southern Rostov locale. These profits would add up to a huge number of dollars, reinforcing Medvedchuk’s funds as he organized a political rebound and assisted set with increasing and money Ukraine’s greatest favorable to Russian ideological group, Opposition Platform — For Life.

In 2018, Medvedchuk and Kozak developed their contribution in Yug Energo, expanding their joined stake to 93 percent. Plans originally uncovered Medvedchuk’s association with the processing plant that very year. However, the price tag of the underlying stake has at no other time been unveiled.

Journalists have additionally now uncovered another clear Russian darling arrangement dating to 2016, whereby organizations constrained by both Medvedchuk and Kozak paid about $1,000 for a controlling interest in an organization that holds rights to build up a very nearly one billion – barrel Russian oil field.

The two arrangements were helped out through a perplexing arrangement of offer exchanges and credit arrangements including shell organizations in Cyprus that seemed to bode well, said Graham Barrow, a UK-based monetary violations expert who checked on the records. The organizations included regularly had confusingly comparable names, with stakes changing hands for what have all the earmarks of being undeniably not exactly their genuine worth, he added.

“There is no getting away from that it would seem that a significant resource has changed hands and that, as indicated by the documentation that you’ve seen and I’ve seen, the installment for that is by all accounts fiercely unbalanced to the worth that was moved,” Barrow said.

Medvedchuk and Kozak didn’t answer to questions sent by correspondents. Kislov’s organization, Yug Rusi, additionally didn’t react to questions.

At the point when a columnist for Schemes endeavored to get some information about the arrangement outside of parliament toward the beginning of March, Medvedchuk left.

Medvedchuk, the deal’s main beneficiary, has a long history in Ukrainian politics and enjoys close personal ties to Russia’s leadership.

Putin has told Russian media that he first met Medvedchuk, who is now 66, in the early 2000s when Medvedchuk was serving as chief of staff for former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. In 2004, Medvedchuk and his wife, Oksana Marchenko, honored Putin by making him godfather to their daughter, Daryna. Svetlana Medvedeva — the wife of former Russian President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev — was named the girl’s godmother.

Following Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which brought in a pro-European administration, Medvedchuk attempted to muster pro-Russian political forces into a parliamentary bloc, but they failed to win any seats in the 2006 elections. He surfaced again after Yanukovych came to power in 2010, running an organization that campaigned for closer economic ties with Russia.

Following Yanukovych’s overthrow in 2014, Medvedchuk was sanctioned by the U.S. for “violating Ukrainian sovereignty” and by Canada due to his alleged “political responsibility” for Ukraine’s crisis. He spent some time in the political wilderness before emerging once more as an opposition politician, still pushing to realign Ukraine with Moscow.

Medvedchuk’s business partner Kozak, who is often seen as Medvedchuk’s proxy, purchased the 112, Zik, and NewsOne television channels in 2018 and 2019 and promptly transformed them into pro-Russian outlets. He also became a key member of the newly created pro-Moscow party Opposition Platform — For Life, which won 44 seats in parliament the following year.

Both Medvedchuk and Kozak were sanctioned earlier this year by President Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration on suspicions of “financing terrorism,” a move Medvedchuk’s party said brought Ukraine “one step closer to becoming a dictatorship.” Their television channels were also taken off the air.

Eugene Magda, director of the Institute of World Policy (Ukraine) think tank, said that Medvedchuk appeared to be a “key instrument of influence” for Moscow in Ukraine and a “man whom Putin directly trusts.”

“Medvedchuk’s long-standing cooperation with the Kremlin shows that he is ready to defend Putin’s interests… quite consistently,” Magda said.

Medvedchuk and Kozak’s control of the newly built Novoshakhtinsky refinery would prove highly lucrative.

The oil refinery was first opened in 2009 in Russia’s Rostov region by Sergey Kislov’s Yug Rusi holding company. Kislov, who made his fortune in agriculture, said in an interview at the time that it cost roughly 15 billion roubles ($500 million) to build.

The facility became the centerpiece of Kislov’s Yug Energo, which also owned subsidiaries used to ship and sell products from the refinery including diesel fuel, straight-run gasoline, and fuel oil. But the refinery almost immediately ran into trouble. Shortly after its launch, its operating license was reportedly suspended for safety violations by Russian regulators after then-Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin ordered a probe into a number of refineries. Sechin, a close Putin confidante, now heads state oil company Rosneft. The refinery also soon faced debt repayment demands from Russia’s majority-state-owned Sberbank, which financed about half the construction costs.

According to local media reports, Kislov was already looking for a buyer by 2011, citing difficulties competing with large state companies and major private-sector producers. Early potential buyers included a Russian state company, Zarubezhneft. But for unclear reasons, the deal never went through.

Despite its troubles, Yug Energo remained a solid earner. Company financial reports show the company was consistently in the black, earning $73 million in profits in 2013.

The profits did not stop Kislov from moving to offload the asset. By the end of 2013, he had initiated a series of opaque and complicated transactions between companies registered in Cyprus that ended with Medvedchuk and Kozak taking a large stake in the refinery.

In December 2013 — as protests against Yanukovych raged in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti square — Kislov set up two companies in Cyprus: Ventolor Investments on December 6, and Teteos Global on December 9. He then transferred a 42-percent stake in Yug Energo to these companies, saying that the shares had been pledged as collateral on a loan from another one of his companies. However, reporters were unable to find any documents proving the loan’s existence. Audit documents show that the shares were valued at just over $1.1 million.

Then, in January 2014, Kislov transferred the two companies’ shares to two other Cyprus shell firms with similar names: The shares of Ventolor Investments were transferred to a company called Ventolor Holding, while the Teteos Global shares were transferred to a company called Teteos Holding.

The handover to Medvedchuk and Kozak took place the following month. On February 27 — the day Crimean parliament was stormed — two Cyprus companies connected to Medvedchuk and Kozak, Kranatoco Trading and Bifilessa Development, took ownership of Ventolor Holding and Teteos Holding, respectively. Inexplicably, the value of the combined 42 percent share in Yug Energo was declared at just $40,989 — nearly 27 times less than they had been worth on the previous transfer.

For financial crimes analyst Barrow, such a deal makes no sense for a legitimate business transaction.

“Normally when you sell a business it’s done very straightforwardly: you have a seller and a buyer, and the buyer buys the shares for the value of the company,” he said. He pointed to how this sale had instead been completed through multiple offshore companies for diminishing returns for subsequent sales. “That doesn’t look like a sensible way of disposing of an asset” that was making tens of millions of dollars in profits, he said. “It’s a bit like giving your bank balance away for nothing.”

Kozak and Medvedchuk can be connected to the Cyprus-based companies Kranatoco Trading and Bifilessa Development through their wives and a network of known proxies. Both men’s wives are fixtures in the men’s business holdings, previous investigations have shown.

At the time of the share acquisition on February 27, 2014, Kranatoco Trading was owned and controlled on paper by two Cypriot citizens named Anna Korelidou and Christina Antoniadou, who have also played roles in several other companies that Medvedchuk has claimed on his government asset declaration. In July 2017, Kranatoco came under the direct ownership of a company ultimately owned by Medvedchuk’s wife, Oksana Marchenko. Medvedchuk has previously stated that his wife has represented his ownership interest in companies in order to avoid U.S. sanctions.

At the time of the oil refinery purchase, the other Cyprus company, Bifilessa, was under the control of two Cypriot proxies. By July 2020, however, ownership was transferred to Kozak’s common-law wife, Nataliia Lavreniuk.

With 42 percent of Yug Energo now under their control, the companies linked to Medvedchuk and Kozak began raking in tens of millions of dollars in dividends.

Company audits show that Ventolor Investments, the company ultimately tied to Medvedchuk, received $31.77 million in dividends in 2014. Teteos Global, the company linked to Kozak, received $13.08 million over the same time period. In 2015, Ventolor received $8.93 million in dividends, while Teteos received $3.68 million. Neither company received dividends in 2016.

Documents after that date are patchy, but the information available indicates that the stakes have remained extremely lucrative. An audit of Teteos shows that the company earned 8.68 million euros ($9.8 million) in 2017. Audits for Ventolor are not available, but documents for Yug Energo show it paid out $80 million in dividends that year — meaning the share flowing to the Medvedchuk-linked company was likely just shy of $23.8 million.

Documents show that the shell companies boosted their combined stake in Yug Energo to 93 percent in February 2018. The details of this deal remain unclear.

Having profited mightily from a Russian oil refinery, Medvedchuk and Kozak also turned their sights on the state-owned Gavrikovsky oil field in the Khanty-Mansi region in the western Siberian plain — an asset also linked to Kislov.

In June 2015, Russia’s Federal Subsoil Resources Management Agency awarded the rights to develop the 136.7-million-ton field to NZNP Trade LLC, a company ultimately owned by Kislov’s Yug Energo and whose main previous function had been to sell products from the Novoshakhtinsky refinery.

The original tender conditions for the field had raised eyebrows at the time. A Rosneft subsidiary had been considered a leading contender. But, according to Russian business media outlets, authorities had made it a requirement that the winner would need to refine oil in Rostov, some 3,500 kilometers away from the deposits. Rosneft’s subsidiary even tried to sue the state institution behind the tender, but later simply recalled its tender application for unknown reasons.

The following year, the Ukrainians took majority control of NZNP Trade and its oil rights. Documents from Cyprus show that the Kozak-linked Teteos Holding acquired a 14.9-percent stake in NZNP Trade for just 202 euros ($224), while the Medvedchuk-linked Ventolor Holding obtained 50.1 percent of the company for $758.

There is no indication that the Gavrikovsky field is online yet. Company documents from 2019 show that the new owners invested just $177,800 in its development that year.

The Novoshakhtinsky refinery, meanwhile, is getting an upgrade. On March 12, a construction company connected to the refinery signed a deal to expand and modernize the facility for an estimated $2.5 billion.

The work, which is due to finish in 2030, will allow for the production of Euro-5 grade gasoline. It will also boost the refinery’s capacity by about 40 percent — and with it, almost certainly, the profits of its owners.

Alexey Navalny’s Wellbeing Is Breaking Down In Jail, His Legal Counselor Says

The state of Alexey Navalny’s health is deteriorating in prison, his lawyer Olga Mikhailova told on Wednesday, March 24.

“Yesterday his leg went numb. Before that his back hurt for a long time. On Friday, he was seen by a local neurologist, on Monday he was given two ibuprofen tablets, and that’s it. Naturally, he didn’t get better.”

According to Mikhailova, Navalny’s lawyers are currently near the Pokrov penal colony where he is in custody, but they aren’t being allowed inside on the pretext of “sensitive activities.”

Navalny’s chief of staff Leonid Volkov believes that the opposition politician may have been moved to the prison’s hospital, and that the prison administration wants to hide this fact.

On March 15, it was confirmed that Alexey Navalny was in custody at Penal Colony No. 2 (IK-2) in the city of Pokrov in Russia’s Vladimir region. That same day, Navalny’s associates uploaded a Facebook post on his behalf, in which he wrote that he was “doing well overall.”

Another social media post was published on Navalny’s behalf on March 22. It made no mention of the state of his health.

On Monday, Alexey Navalny confirmed that he is in custody at Penal Colony No. 2 in the town of Pokrov, northeast of Moscow. His whereabouts were unknown over the weekend after the news broke on Friday that he had been transferred out of a detention center in the nearby town of Kolchugino. Navalny says he’s “doing well overall,” though he described the notorious penitentiary as a “friendly concentration camp.” According to his lawyers, with whom Navalny met on Monday, the opposition politician is set to remain in a quarantine unit for the next two weeks, after which he will be integrated with the prison’s general population.

Alexey Navalny confirmed that he had been moved to Pokrov’s Penal Colony No.2 in social media posts made on his behalf during the day on Monday. Describing the conditions of his detention, Navalny wrote, “I haven’t yet seen any violence or even a hint of it, although by the tense posture of the convicts, standing at attention and afraid to turn their heads, I easily believe the numerous stories that here, in IK-2 Pokrov, people were beaten half to death with wooden hammers just recently.” The opposition politician underscored that the penitentiary operates based on the “literal fulfilment of endless rules.” In his words, the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) has “set up a real concentration camp 100 kilometers [62 miles] from Moscow.” “That’s what I call my new home ‘our friendly concentration camp’,” Navalny wrote, adding that he’s “doing well overall.”
IK-2 is a notoriously harsh penal colony, where the administration exercises total control over the lives of the inmates. In early March, Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (the FBK, which is considered a “foreign agent” in Russia) released a video about the penitentiary, featuring reports about prison staff beating inmates, including immediately upon arrival. Activist Konstantin Kotov, who served a sentence at Penal Colony No. 2, said that prisoners who defend their rights “can be reprimanded for anything, even an unbuttoned button,” which can, in turn, affect their eligibility for parole. Kotov’s lawyer Maria Eysmont said that in Penal Colony No. 2, “everything is aimed at making people feel completely dependent on the administration.”

Putin Will Receive Coronavirus Vaccine Off Camera

Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to receive his first dose of a coronavirus vaccine on Tuesday, March 23, but the Kremlin has no plans to disclose which one. Putin’s immunization will also be taking place off camera, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Tuesday.

“As you can see, the president devotes a significant portion of his working time to events, talks, and meetings related to vaccination, vaccine production, and so on and so forth. Therefore, the president is doing a lot to promote the vaccines. And as far as vaccination on camera, well, he was never a supporter, he doesn’t like it.”

Confirming that the Kremlin will not be disclosing which drug Putin receives, Peskov added that all three Russian vaccines are “absolutely reliable and effective.”

On Monday, March 22, Putin announced that he planned to get vaccinated against COVID-19 the next day. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov later specified that the president’s immunization wouldn’t be a public event.

Navalny’s Partners Launch New Mission Requiring His Freedom

Moscow court rejects Kremlin critic Navalny's appeal against prison sentence

Alexey Navalny’s allies have reported the beginning of another “Freedom for Navalny!” crusade, which incorporates plans to hold another convention requiring his delivery from jail.

As per a post distributed on the resistance lawmaker’s site, the forthcoming dissent activity will be a “generally unique meeting that everybody will think about.” The individuals who wish to make a section in a dissent move are approached to enlist their email address on a devoted site — Navalny’s partners have vowed to name the date of the assembly once 500,000 individuals have joined.

We know the solitary hindrance to this is dread. [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is acceptable at exchanging dread. His mob police with truncheons, his police vans and judges — the entirety of this attempts to threaten the residents of our country. Try not to go out: you’ll be beaten, fined, captured — this is his principle contention, his fundamental instrument for looking after power. Yet, we additionally realize very well that if 1,000 individuals come out they all get captured, if it’s 10,000 they get scattered, however on the off chance that it’s 100,000 the mob police are respectful.

Very quickly after the declaration about the dispatch of the mission went up, the enrollment site got inaccessible. At the hour of this composition, in excess of 15,000 individuals had enrolled to take an interest.

On February 2, a Moscow condemned Navalny to time in jail for supposedly disregarding his parole in the Yves Rocher case while in Germany (where he went through five months recuperating in the wake of being harmed with a synthetic nerve specialist in August 2020). Navalny will currently burn through more than two years in jail. Right now, he’s carrying out his punishment at Corrective Settlement No. 2 (IK-2) in the city of Pokrov in the Vladimir district.

In late January and early February, a huge number of individuals across Russian participated in supportive of Navalny showings. In many urban areas, cops savagely scattered the dissidents; in absolute in excess of 10,000 individuals were confined, large numbers of whom in this way gotten prison time or sizable money related fines. The specialists additionally dispatched around 90 criminal cases regarding the exhibitions.

Must See – Randy Newman – Putin (Official Video)

PUTIN SONGTEXT

Putin puttin’ his pants on
One leg at a time
You mean he’s just like a regular fella, huh?
He ain’t nothing like a regular fella

Putin puttin’ his hat on
Hat size number nine
“You sayin’ Putin’s gettin’ big headed?”
Putin’s head’s just fine

He can drive his giant tractor
Across the Trans-Siberian plain
He can power a nuclear reactor
With the left side of his brain
And when he takes his shirt off
He drives the ladies crazy
When he takes his shirt off
Makes me wanna be a lady
It’s the Putin Girls!


Putin if you put it when you
Put it where you put it
Putin if you put it
Will you put it next to me?
Putin if you put it when you
Put it where you put it
Putin if you put it
Will you put it next to me?

Now Putin hates the Putin girls
‘Cause he hates vulgarity
And he loves his mother country
And he loves his family

He and his ex-wife Lyudmila
Are riding along the shore
Of the beautiful new Russian Black Sea
Let’s listen in
A great man is speaking

We fought a war for this?
I’m almost ashamed
The Mediterranean
Now there’s a resort worth fighting for
If only the Greeks or the Turks
Would start to sniff around
I’d bring the hammer down
So quick their woolly heads would spin
Woolly head, woolly head, woolly head

Or, wait a minute
Even better
What if the Kurds got in the way?
Hey! Kurds and way, curds and whey!

Sometimes a people is greater than their leader
Germany, Kentucky, France
Sometimes a leader towers over his country
One shot at glory, they don’t get a second chance
I dragged these peasants kicking and screaming
Into the 21st century
I thought they’d make it
I must have been dreaming
These chicken farmers and file clerks gonna be the death of me

I can’t do it
Sure, you can
I can’t do it
Yeah, you can
What makes you say that girls?
Tell you why. ‘Cause you’re the Putin man
Who whipped Napoleon?
We did!
Who won World War II?
The Americans!
That’s a good one ladies
It’s our turn to sit in the comfy chair
And you’re the man gonna get us there!

I don’t know, Lenin couldn’t do it
I don’t know, Stalin couldn’t do it
They couldn’t do it
Why you think I can?
You’re gonna lead our people to the Promised Land
You’re right, ’cause, Goddamn, I’m the Putin Man

How Russian Cops utilize compromised Informers to imprison innocent Individuals

K.G.B. Museum Closes; Lipstick Gun and Other Spy Relics Go on Sale - The  New York Times
A KGB Office in the KGB Museum, New York City, NYC, USA

Correspondents from iStories and Meduza inspected Moscow court archives and discovered more than 140 “proficient observers” — individuals who consistently affirm in legal disputes identified with drug charges. The training is unmitigatedly illicit, however judges send individuals to jail for quite a long time dependent on these observers’ declarations.

In May 2018, 35 year-old Natalya Goloborodko contacted Moscow police with an end goal to “uncover a seller of illegal substances.” The officials chose to lead a “test buy” — Goloborodko would purchase drugs from the vendor under official watch. The police discovered two observers, and together they all went to the home of Nikolai Grigoryev, the supposed street pharmacist. When the arrangement was made, the officials captured Grigoryev. Back at the station, they seized the cash Grigoryev had supposedly gotten from Goloborodko for the medications, and — within the sight of witnesses — they discovered MDMA, amphetamines, and hash in his loft. The specialists accused Grigoryev of two checks of selling medications and one tally of endeavoring to sell (they found data about future medication bargains on his telephone). He admitted to everything upon cross examination.

In court, notwithstanding, Grigoryev kept up his guiltlessness, saying that the police constrained his admission and that Natalya Goloborodko outlined him. He confessed to knowing Goloborodka, yet demanded that he never sold her amphetamines. The police planted the cash on him, he said. Nikolai’s mom and sister said in court that they had “never associated him with managing drugs.” The wrongdoing’s just observers were the cops, Goloborodko, and the two authority witnesses.

Grigoryev ended up gathering one of them in a squad car before his condemning hearing. 38 year-old Mikhail Rakhmankin, whose duty as an authority witness was to go about as a free onlooker during the hunt, had just been attempted twice for managing drugs himself. He was in the squad car with Grigoryev on the grounds that he was at the same time under scrutiny, and the two men were being kept in a similar pretrial detainment office.

Regardless, the adjudicator decided that “the safeguard’s assessment that the hunt included observers who were subject to cops is unconfirmed.” On August 1, 2019, the Kuntsevsky District Court indicted Nikolai Grigoryev and condemned him to 11 years in jail.

iStories and Meduza’s investigation found that Grigoryev’s story is just a drop in a larger sea of fabricated drug cases. They analyzed tens of thousands of sentences and discovered more than 140 “professional witnesses” in Moscow alone; many of them were officers’ acquaintances, drug addicts, or people who had previously been convicted. Police officers regularly used these people to fabricate criminal cases, ultimately sending defendants to prison for years, despite their lawyers’ protests.

THE PRIVATE PUTIN RIVIERA UNDER MEDIA SURVEILLANCE

Bildergebnis für PRIVATE PUTIN RIVIERA
Putin and his bossom friend Randy Gerd from Germany

Very rich person and long-lasting Putin partner Arkady Rotenberg has approached as the authority proprietor of the Russian president’s “castle.” soon, another enormous development adventure will start close to the home — 119 hectares (around 294 sections of land) has been dispensed for a chasing lodge. The “Divnomorskoye” domain is found close by — a 323-hectare (798-section of land) property that incorporates a spa unpredictable, a winery, and a “tasting house.” A private water park is set to be worked there soon. The entirety of this has a place with Putin-connected extremely rich person Gennady Timchenko and financial specialist Vladimir Kolbin (the child of Putin’s cherished companion Petr Kolbin). Farther away is the home of the top of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill. Worked as a profound and social focus, the property incorporates an indoor pool, 70 hectares (around 173 sections of land) of grape plantations, and a winery — costing roughly 22 billion rubles ($298 million) altogether. Through the woodland interfacing with “Putin’s royal residence” there are two camping areas having a place with very rich person Oleg Deripaska esteemed at 7 billion rubles (almost $95 million), alongside a huge number of hectares of leased chasing grounds, the expense of which specialists wouldn’t endeavor to gauge. The neighbor nearest to “Putin’s royal residence” is the “Parus” office having a place with finance manager Sergey Shishkarev. This plot of land itself costs about 1.2 billion rubles ( $16.2 million) — that is without adding the estimation of the structures on the property, since nothing is thought about them. The close by resort town of Gelendzhik is home to the home of “Putin’s own financier” Yuri Kovalchuk — a 70 hectare property esteemed at 11 billion rubles (more than $148 million). The property’s principle building is 6,752 square meters (72,678 feet), and incorporates a roof pool and all encompassing glass dividers.

PUTIN’s ‘I live in my own bubble’ – INSIDE VIEW INTO PUTIN’s FAMILY

Bildergebnis für Louiza Rozova

Elon Musk may have failed to get Vladimir Putin into a chat room on Clubhouse, but one of the Russian president’s alleged daughters has joined the new social network. Late on Tuesday, Louiza Rozova spoke briefly to Andrey Zakharov, one of the journalists who recently outed her as Putin’s supposedly illegitimate daughter. In November 2020, Zakharov and others at Proekt released an investigative report revealing that a minority stake in the enormous Rossiya Bank belongs to a woman named Svetlana Krivonogikh, apparently received thanks to her intimate association with Russia’s president. Proekt also reported that Krivonogikh has a daughter named Louiza Rozova who “looks remarkably” like Putin. Based on a transcript reported by The Village, Meduza summarizes Rozova’s Clubhouse broadcast on Tuesday night.

Before Louiza Rozova’s Clubhouse companions invited Andrey Zakharov into their chat room, she was asked about Putin’s infamous response to Alexey Navalny’s attempted assassination (the president told journalists last December that “they’d have killed him if they wanted to kill him”). Rozova has apparently pondered the moral implications of Navalny’s poisoning (in addition to the origins of the pandemic):

“[…] there’s a society of these rich people who staged all this mess with the coronavirus. And it turns out that they’re killing people. I believe it. But if ordinary people can do it, why then can’t the state do it, too, for good reasons? I won’t say that I support it, but it’s just that it happens and this is the world we’re living in.”

When Zakharov joined the chat room, he introduced himself as the journalist who reported Rozova’s relationship to Putin and then immediately asked her (addressing her as “Liza”) if she is, in fact, the president’s daughter. A friend in the Clubhouse room defended Rozova, saying, “As a journalist, you should realize that she’ll never tell you anything.” Rozova then corrected Zakharov, saying, “My name is Louiza, not Liza.”

After some more back-and-forth, Zakharov told Rozova that he admired the apparent hopefulness of her youth, comparing the promise and optimism of her St. Petersburg education and online activity to the “darkness” and censorship that consumes television and Russia’s old media. “The chance to follow Putin’s daughter, who chats with subscribers, means there’s hope in this country,” said Zakharov, urging Rozova not to “disappoint” people:

“You’re an interesting figure but all this interest is based on the fact that you’re the president’s daughter. You can build your personal brand around this — please keep this in mind. […] Personally, I wish you all the very best. You’re not to blame for who your father is.”

Zakharov then asked Rozova how she’s handled the repercussions of being identified as one of Vladimir Putin’s children. She thanked him for spicing up her life:

“I’d hit a rut in life. Things had stagnated. I’m very grateful that I got this opportunity — that I lit up like this and people saw my account [on Instagram]. I’ve never tried to be popular, but … I’m feeling great, so don’t you worry about me. […] I don’t follow politics at all. I’m busy with the things I like. You thought I’d delete my account? As if! I live my own life and I’m busy with fashion. It’s not the center of my life, but I like it. I’m not going to stop doing everything I was doing because of your investigation. I’m still living the same life and talking to the same friends. 

Before Zakharov was booted from the Clubhouse room, he managed to ask Rozova what she thinks about modern Russia. She apparently saw the question as a criticism of her sheltered life and responded accordingly:

“There’s no one answer to any question… You’re right that I live in my own little art-world. It’s true that I live in my own bubble. I don’t watch TV and sometimes I follow the news on Telegram channels, but not really. I watch fashion shows, I buy copies of Vogue, and I love to go to the nearby restaurant and eat tasty pasta, dishing with friends about the latest gossip and investigations.”

PUTIN’s HENCHMEN WANT TO FINE NAWALNY 950,000 RUBLES

Bildergebnis für putin nawalny

Putin’s henchman has asked Moscow’s Babushinsky District Court to fine opposition politician Alexey Navalny 950,000 rubles (nearly $13,000) for slandering a World War II veteran, Meduza’s correspondent reported from the courtroom on Tuesday, February 16.

Navalny’s defense team, in turn, has asked the court for his acquittal.

Tuesday’s proceedings marked Navalny’s third hearing in the defamation case launched against him in June 2020, after he called a group of public figures “corrupt hacks” for appearing in an advertisement for Russia’s constitutional plebiscite aired by the state-run media outlet Russia Today. State investigators maintained that Navalny’s comments “discredited the honor and dignity” of Ignat Artemenko, a World War II veteran who appeared in the video.

At the beginning of the hearing on Tuesday, state prosecutor Ekaterina Frolova suggested dividing the materials from the criminal case into separate proceedings. Frolova argued that state investigators should look into Navalny’s “offensive” statements to the judge, the prosecutor, and the complainant.

In response, Navalny called himself a “lovely defendant” and said that “we have been present at the birth of a new criminal case.” Judge Vera Akimova deemed the prosecution’s petition premature, adding that she will make a decision on this issue when making ruling in the criminal case. 

Navalny’s defamation trial will resume at 2:00 p.m. Moscow time, on Saturday, February 20.The opposition politician now has two hearings scheduled for that day: at 10:00 a.m. local time, the Moscow City Court is set to consider his appeal against the Simonovsky District Court’s decision to imprison him for allegedly violating the terms of probation in the Yves Rocher case.

How Navalny will be transported between the two courts remains unknown. Spokespeople for the Moscow City Court promised to offer clarification on this procedure at a later time.

In a comment on today’s hearing, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov underscored that “insulting veterans is not allowed in this country,” RIA Novosti reported

On February 2, the Simonovsky District Court revoked Navalny’s probation in the Yves Rocher case and sentenced him to three and a half years in prison. Pending the appellate ruling, Navalny will spend two years and eight months behind bars due to time already served under house arrest. 

Navalny is also facing felony fraud charges for allegedly embezzling hundreds of millions of rubles in donations made to his non-profit and other organizations. If convicted, he faces up to 10 years in prison. 

Putin’s castle’ connected to financier Yuri Kovalchuk and Khrushchev

Bildergebnis für Putin's castle

Most recently, investigative reporters at Sobesednik, Proekt, The Bell, and other outlets have linked the infamous “palace” to Yuri Kovalchuk, the principal shareholder of Rossiya Bank and one of Vladimir Putin’s oldest friends.

The corporate email address listed for the St.-Petersburg-based firm “Binom” (the registered owner of Vladimir Putin’s alleged “palace” on the Black Sea coast) is hosted on the domain “llcinvest.ru.” According to the website Sobesednik, this domain belongs to the company “Standart,” which is in turn affiliated with Yuri Kovalchuk.

“Standart” is registered at the same address as “Igora Drive” and several other assets owned by Kovalchuk, says the news site The Bell. In fact, some of these businesses also use the llcinvest.ru domain. Spokespeople for Binom confirmed to Sobesednik that these firms all belong to a single conglomerate.

Binom also verified that it employs Denis Matyunin, whose name appears in documents as the legal representative for the owner of the “Shellest” yacht, which Sobesednik says periodically “ferries up” to the coastline near Gelendzhik, where Vladimir Putin’s alleged “palace” is located. The yacht itself is registered to the “Revival of Maritime Traditions” nonprofit partnership, which is also reportedly tied to Yuri Kovalchuk, according to both Sobesednik and the anti-corruption initiative Scanner Project.

Navalny’s investigation into “Putin’s palace” also mentioned Yuri Kovalchuk.
Rumors and reports about a mansion for Vladimir Putin outside Gelendzhik have circulated since 2010. The public’s interest reawakened in January 2021 when Alexey Navalny released an investigative report describing the construction (and perpetual remodeling) of the seaside compound. In his report, Navalny mentions Yuri Kovalchuk as one of the businessmen who allegedly helped finance both the palace and several adjacent vineyards and wineries.

After Navalny’s investigation became an international sensation, Alexander Ponomarenko announced that he cut ties with the property back in 2016 (though federal records still list him as the sole owner), and the billionaire Arkady Rotenberg publicly claimed to own the constriction site, which he says is the future home of an “apartment hotel” complex. But Rotenberg and Ponomarenko are old business partners, and open sources alone make it “difficult, to say the least,” to verify the palace’s true owner, says The Bell.


‘I loved this country’ Meduza talks to the architect behind ‘Putin’s palace’ about his career in Russia — and how it came to a sad end
It’s good to be the president Meduza spoke to contractors who helped build Vladimir Putin’s alleged seaside palace. Also, new blueprints reveal a subterranean fortress, multiple ‘aqua-discos,’ and more.
Kovalchuk might also have helped Putin buy a dacha complex near Yalta that was a famous retreat for Soviet leaders
The “Wisteria” dacha complex outside Yalta was originally built for Nikita Khrushchev, but his successor Leonid Brezhnev enjoyed more time there than any Soviet leader. After the USSR’s collapse, the compound became a vacation resort. In 2004, the Russian state bank VTB (then “Vneshtorgbank”) bought the facility, but the Ukrainian government canceled the sale a year later. According to Leonid Kuchma, who was Ukraine’s president at the time, Russia wanted Wisteria as a residence for Vladimir Putin.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the authorities seized Wisteria and then privatized it in 2019, selling the property for 1.2 billion rubles ($16.3 million). The Crimean government has not disclosed the buyers’ names, but the news outlet Krym Realii (designated by the Russian Justice Ministry as a “foreign agent”) reported that a firm called “Oreanda-12,” owned by someone named Janis Ermanis, ultimately bought the dacha complex — a remarkable acquisition for a company with just 10,000 rubles ($135) in charter capital, no profits, and no website or contacts listed publicly.

Journalists at Proekt tracked down Ermanis in Moscow and learned that he’s a trained economist who offers private lessons in Wing Chun kung fu. Speaking to Proekt, he neither confirmed nor denied his role in buying Wisteria. Colleagues and relatives say he lives a modest life.

Ermanis is listed as Oreanda-12’s director and sole shareholder, says Proekt. The company’s shareholder register, moreover, is a St.-Petersburg-based firm called “Accounting and Registration Center,” which formally belongs to five individuals with known ties to Kovalchuk’s Rossiya Bank. The same firm in St. Petersburg acts as the shareholder register for Rossiya Bank, the National Media Group, and almost all Kovalchuk’s assets in Crimea.

Wisteria hasn’t welcomed any new guests in more than five years, locals told Proekt. An employee working at the neighboring Kremlin-run “Nizhnyaya Oreanda” retreat told journalists that construction work is underway at the vacant compound. Including Wisteria, President Putin may have more than 20 official and unofficial residences across Russia and Crimea, writes Proekt.

Corrupt To The Bone – Kirill Shamalov – Putin’s Son In Law

Putin's billionaire son-in-law replaces Russian leader's daughter for  glamorous new socialite wife | Daily Mail Online

Thousands of emails sent and received by Kirill Shamalov — Vladimir Putin’s former son-in-law — showcase the fantastic wealth and personal power that come with access to Russia’s first family.

Key Findings

  • Shamalov and Putin’s daughter spent millions setting up luxurious households in Russia and France even as Putin banned Russian elites from owning foreign assets.
  • Soon after marrying Putin’s daughter, Shamalov spent an astonishing $100 to acquire a share in Russia’s largest petrochemical company that was worth $380 million.
  • Shamalov later acquired an additional, much larger stake in the company in a well-known deal that made him a billionaire. His emails reveal that this acquisition was just one of the lucrative opportunities with which he was presented — and contain a hint about how it may have been structured.
  • Shamalov’s proximity to political power made him a highly desired partner. In one case, he was offered a free share in a large company in exchange for his ability to wield “administrative resources,” exemplifying the corrupt nexus of power and business that characterizes modern Russia.

In Russia, few secrets are guarded as jealously as basic information about President Vladimir Putin’s family.

The president’s official biography confirms the widely-known fact that he and his former wife had two daughters, Maria and Katerina. But neither Putin nor his press service have ever revealed his daughters’ full names or anything about their family lives or careers. Neither uses his surname in public.Кирилл и КатяRead this investigation in Russian on the site of our Russian member center, IStories.Read more

Among the few facts that have been pieced together by journalists is that Putin’s younger daughter, Katerina, was once married to a man named Kirill Shamalov. It is clear that Shamalov is a wealthy man, having become Russia’s youngest billionaire at just 32 years old. But he is not a household name, and few details about his fantastic acquisition of wealth have been reported.

Now, for the first time, a wider set of facts about Shamalov has become available. Earlier this year, reporters from IStories, OCCRP’s Russian member center, gained access to a leaked archive of Shamalov’s emails from an anonymous source.

The leak contains more than 10,000 messages spanning the years 2003 to 2020, and it offers unprecedented insight into a man who has rare access to the inner workings of Russian political life.

🔗Collection Number One

The anonymous source didn’t reveal how he or she obtained Shamalov’s emails — but the messages themselves hint at a possible answer.MORE

Publishing leaks from anonymous sources is a difficult journalistic decision.

In the first place, the authenticity of documents received from an unknown party may be in question. To verify the Shamalov archive, the emails were first structured and indexed by OCCRP’s data analysts. Reporters from IStories then spent nearly a year verifying them: They checked email headers, spoke with senders, and substantiated information in company registries, real estate databases, social networks, and other publicly available sources. Our conclusion is that the emails are real.

Another issue is privacy. When granting access to the material, the source requested that reporters not publish any medical records. This request has been honored. IStories and OCCRP have also chosen not to release the archive indiscriminately. What’s being used in this investigation is just enough to tell a story that’s in the public interest.

Beyond confirming without a doubt that Shamalov married Putin’s daughter Katerina, who uses the surname Tikhonova, the archive contains a number of other revelations about the financial advantages he gained, and the influence he enjoyed, through his access to the first family. His evident ability to wield administrative resources and personal connections to the financial benefit of himself and his friends and business partners exemplifies the corrupt nexus of power and business that characterizes modern Russia.

Kirill Shamalov and Katerina Tikhonova both declined to comment for this story. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, replied in one sentence: “We’ve already left such questions without answers many times.”

🔗The Elder Shamalov

Kirill Shamalov is the son of Nikolai Shamalov, one of Putin’s oldest and closest friends.MORE

“New Piterskie”

Many members of Russia’s ruling elite are old Putin associates who followed him to Moscow and took up key government posts after he rose to the presidency.

These dacha neighbors, judo sparring partners, massage therapists, and one-time city bureaucrats are sometimes called Piterskie after their hometown of St. Petersburg — a term that, by analogy to other geographical epithets like the Tambovskie or Izmailovskie, carries more than a whiff of organized crime.

Many of these men are still around. But over the two decades since Putin took office, their children and grandchildren have amassed their own wealth and power and have begun to rise into top positions. Call them the “new Piterskie.”

Shamalov’s email archive offers a curious portrait of this group. Many of them, like him, studied law at St. Petersburg State University. They discuss taking positions in government, state firms, and big business, and note that when they come to Moscow, the city will be a different one than their parents once conquered.

But some things never change. As in their parents’ world, personal connections mean everything for the new Piterskie.

In June 2004, when Shamalov was in his final year of studies, he received an email from a classmate, Yan Piskunov:

Buddy, we’ll arrange everything in the best way possible! It’ll be sweet. The main thing is to discuss the organization. I’ll send you the speech on Tuesday morning. I’ll pick up the review today or Monday, and during the week we’ll prepare answers to the reviewers’ questions and comments. I was very glad to finally see you. Get some rest and take your time.”

Judging from the context, the message is about helping Shamalov prepare his thesis defense — and handing him a pre-written speech to present before the examination committee.

A few days later, the presentation was ready.

“Hello Shamalov :)!,” Piskunov writes again. “Draft speech … attached.” And indeed, the attached file contained a presentation about a thesis on real estate law.

The cheerful Piskunov had a career ahead of him that would be the envy of any Russian student. Not long after he graduated, at age 25, he vaulted into an executive position at Gazprom-Media, the largest media holding in the country, becoming its deputy general director and head of the legal department.

The group, which includes such popular outlets as the NTV and TNT television channels and the Echo of Moscow radio station, belongs to Gazprombank. By coincidence or not, Shamalov’s older brother, Yuri, is on the board of directors of both the media holding and the bank. He did not respond to requests for comment.

In September 2009, Piskunov came up in Shamalov’s correspondence again when an acquaintance wrote him with an unusual, but extremely frank, request: “Question: is it possible to change the position of Piskunov and Pleshkov towards Vnukovo airport, or to neutralize their activities?”

A memo attached to the email provided the relevant context: Two of Moscow’s major airports, Vnukovo and Domodedovo, had been involved in a commercial dispute that had been resolved in Domodedovo’s favor, costing Vnukovo some 350 million rubles ($11.8 million). According to the writer, the courts had made the ruling “under pressure” from Dmitry Pleshkov, then the “Head of the Secretariat of the Chairman of the Supreme Arbitration Court,” who himself allegedly acted “on behalf of Yan Borisovich Piskunov … of Gazprom-Media.” He was asking whether these two men could be influenced in a way that would favor Vnukovo airport.

There’s no evidence that Shamalov made any requests to either Piskunov or Pleshkov to intervene in the airport dispute. But a month later, the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District overturned the earlier court decision, saving Vnukovo millions. Exactly what Shamalov’s acquaintance asked for had happened.

Shamalov was only 27 that year, but he already had an impressive resume, having worked for Gazprom, Gazprombank, the Russian government, and Rosoboronexport, the country’s top arms exporter. He was now Vice President for Administrative Business Support at Sibur, Russia’s largest petrochemical company.

But much bigger things were to come.

In 2013, as several outlets including Reuters reported, Shamalov married a woman named Katerina Tikhonova who was described as Putin’s daughter.Young Scientist Flies High with Leg Up From PutinThis OCCRP story from 2015 looks into Tikhonova’s Innopraktika Foundation — and her passion for acrobatic rock-and-roll.Read more

The Kremlin has refused to confirm that this is the case. But Shamalov’s emails leave no doubt, and confirm Tikhonova and Shamalov were married in February 2013. They don’t reveal when the couple got acquainted. But the evidence — including this message he received from one of the organizers of their wedding — indicates that he has known her for most of his life:

Kirill, Katerina,

During the Ice Show, a screen will be installed behind the stage to show a video sequence to accompany the performances on the ice, and during some numbers a live broadcast will be organized to show what’s happening on stage (for example, during your dance).

For the video sequence, we need:

  1. Your joint photos from 2012-2013 (“recent”)
  2. Childhood photos — separately, together …
  3. Text from messages, from both Katerina and Kirill … just the text, it’d be nice to have something recognizable … how you addressed each other …
  4. Kirill, a photo in military uniform? Maybe with friends, or taking your oath, there’s probably something …
  5. Kirill — what was your phone number in 2003/2004 – when you called Katerina?
  6. Katerina, we would like to have some video clips of your performances ? Perhaps there are some from that iconic world championship in Munich, when Kirill spent 11 hours with you? Or whatever you’re willing to show (I remember that there are competitors among the guests)

Credit: Shamalov email archiveA rendering of a proposed arrangement for the inner garden of the Usovo house.

By the summer before their wedding, the couple was busy arranging a luxurious life in Russia and France. On June 2, 2012, Shamalov received an email from the woman who was in charge of rebuilding and decorating a house for the young couple in Usovo, a village in an elite area near Moscow not far from the president’s Novo-Ogarevo residence:

Dear Kirill, here are the photos of items that Katya has chosen for your garden. Everything is in stock in Italy (we received confirmation). To get this order moving, you must make an advance payment of 60% of the indicated amount.

Attached to the email was a list of purchases for a small outdoor tent — a table, a sofa, a couple of armchairs, a fabric curtain — that cost 53,000 euros.

Shamalov forwarded this to his future wife: “I like it, no objections. What’s your opinion?”

Two days later, Tikhonova sent Shamalov a list of Japanese books for their home library that cost over $7,700. More expensive still was a carpet for the library that the couple purchased for 54,300 euros.

Shamalov received frequent reports on the progress of the house thanks to which it is possible to estimate its total cost. The renovation, furniture, and equipment came to nearly 8 million euros. Adding the estimated cost of the land and the house itself brings the possible total price of the mansion to about 15-17 million euros.Credit: Table by OCCRPA selection of 10 noteworthy items for Shamalov and Tikhonova’s Usovo mansion from the home improvement reports he received.

But the house in Usovo was not the couple’s only expensive property.

In October 2012, through a Monaco company called Alta Mira, Shamalov bought a mansion in the French resort town of Biarritz from the family of Gennady Timchenko, a longtime Putin friend and a multi-billionaire with interests in energy, transport and infrastructure. Judging by documents in Shamalov’s emails, the Biarritz mansion cost 4.5 million euros.

The decoration of this house, too, spoke of the couple’s expensive tastes. In July 2014, a designer asked Shamalov to approve the purchase of 19,000 euros’ worth of terrace and garden furniture. He forwarded this message to Tikhonova, who replied two days later: “This isn’t how it’s done. Tell her to send pictures;) or at least links to a site where you can see pictures)”Credit: The Anti-Corruption FoundationShamalov and Tikhonova’s mansion in Biarritz.

In the Russian Style

New Husband of Putin’s Ex-Wife Buys Posh Villa in South of FranceArtur Ocheretny, the new husband of Putin’s ex-wife, acquired his own villa in Biarritz in 2013, not far from Shamalov’s mansion.Read more

Shamalov’s emails reveal the details of the couple’s February 2013 wedding at the Igora ski resort in the Leningrad region.

At the end of January, Shamalov began sending out invitations with a detailed description of the elaborate dress code for three days and nights of celebration, including “cocktail,” “creative black tie,” and “casual chic” attire, all “in the Russian style.”

The newlyweds invited about 100 guests, including six officers of the Presidential Security Service who stayed nearby for protection. Curiously, the list did not include Tikhonova’s parents, Putin and his wife (the couple had not yet announced their divorce), though their omission may have been a security precaution.

On February 1, Shamalov received the final schedule. The first day included a “Russian tea party” with a samovar, traditional sweets, and buns, followed by a pre-wedding dinner. On the morning of the second day, the young couple was to marry in the church, followed by street festivities called “Russian holiday on the square” and a wedding banquet. On the third day, guests gathered for a farewell dinner where they were serenaded by Tikhonova’s favorite singer, Margarita Pozoyan.

Like most Russian couples, the newlyweds asked the guests to chip in for a gift. “We are planning to order an individual wedding tea-table service for 24 persons produced by the Imperial Porcelain Factory. The program will provide a special time and place for collecting money in envelopes,” the postcard read. The newlyweds spent their honeymoon in Mauritius.

A Generous Gift

Credit: Shamalov email archiveThe happy couple.

It was after the wedding that Shamalov’s wealth began to approach the stratosphere.

Judging by his emails, Shamalov already owned a network of offshore companies by the time he was married. Most of these firms, run by lawyers from various countries, were registered to proxy owners. The main custodian of Shamalov’s offshore secrets was Dario Item, the ambassador of the small Caribbean state of Antigua and Barbuda to Spain, Monaco, and Liechtenstein.

In June 2013, Shamalov’s offshore company in Belize, Kylsyth Investments Limited, acquired 38,000 shares of a Guernsey-based offshore, Themis Holdings Limited, from yet another offshore called Volyn Portfolio Corp, this one based in the British Virgin Islands.

At that time, Themis Holdings was Sibur’s parent company. In other words, by acquiring the Themis shares, Shamalov had acquired 3.8 percent of Russia’s largest petrochemical company.

He did so for the astonishing price of $100. Shamalov later estimated Sibur’s value at the time to be $10 billion, which means his share would be worth $380 million. He had acquired fantastic wealth for nearly nothing.

In a later interview with Kommersant, Shamalov mentioned acquiring the Sibur shares in an options program. Such programs are meant to reward employees of a company by giving them a stake in its performance, allowing them to buy shares at a discount.

In response to journalists’ inquiries, the Sibur press office provided a statement from the company’s chairman, Dmitry Konov, who confirmed that this was how Shamalov obtained his shares. He said he had done so like any other manager: “The conditions of the purchase … didn’t differ from the conditions of purchases by other managers,” he wrote. “There were no exclusive conditions for Shamalov.”

Just six months later, another Shamalov-related offshore from the British Virgin Islands, Lauruz Ltd, raised $250 million against just 2 percent of Themis Holdings Ltd. The guarantor of this loan agreement was Kylsyth Investments.

IStories reporters examined the contracts of 11 top Sibur managers who participated in the program at the same time as Shamalov and found that they all paid real money for their shares, with discounts of about 15 percent from market price. For example, Sergei Komyshan, the company’s executive director, paid $21.6 million for his shares, which represented 0.26 percent of the company, according to his contract. The vice president, Alexei Filippovski, paid $12.7 million for his 0.15 percent. (Sibur’s chairman disputed these numbers, but did not provide any alternatives.)

The president’s son-in-law was the only one who used the stock options program to acquire so much wealth for nearly nothing. And this was only the beginning of his post-nuptial luck.Credit: ITAR-TASS / Vladimir SmirnovA Sibur petrochemical plant in the Nizhni Novgorod region.

Offer After Offer

As he settled into his career at Sibur, Shamalov attracted droves of advisers and assistants who went looking for projects for him to invest in, wrote abstracts for his speeches, and even provided him with answers to possible audience questions — just like when he was a student.

After he married Tikhonova, his assistants got to work finding financial projects for their boss. One by one, Shamalov began to receive messages from them with fantastic offers worth billions, enabling him to choose from among them the way we might pick out milk at the store.

In May 2013, Shamalov’s assistant Denis Nikienko sent him a proposal to acquire stakes in three companies at once — Rostelecom, Tele2-Russia and Tricolor TV — in order to subsequently unite them into a “national telecommunications leader.” The total cost of the deal would be about $9 billion. Nikienko suggested financing it using money from “friendly financial institutions” like Gazprombank or Gazfond — headed by Shamalov’s brother — rather than his own funds.

The best minds in Russia were apparently eager to make deals with the young businessman. In August and September 2013, Nikienko sent his boss several proposals from Sergey Kotlyarenko, the asset manager of former Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov. In his first message, Kotlyarenko suggested that Shamalov buy up an entire tower and business center in the Moscow City business district for $1.3 billion. Kotlyarenko’s second idea was “to create a global leader in oilfield services’’ through the acquisition of RN-Bureniya, a subsidiary of the Rosneft state oil company. “The company’s revenue for 2014-2015 can be brought to 4.5 billion dollars a year,” Kotlyarenko wrote. (He did not respond to requests for comment.)

In April 2014, Nikienko sent Shamalov more proposals. One was to buy 51 percent of the VSMPO-Avisma corporation, the world’s largest titanium producer. Such a stake was then worth over $1 billion. He explained the advantages of the deal:

Why 51%? If someone is on a sanctions list, then U.S. citizens and corporations can’t do business with companies in which the sanctioned person owns more than 50%. Since the U.S. is interested in collaborating with VSMPO-Avisma, it’s unlikely to sanction this company or its shareholders.

Another proposal was for Shamalov to purchase an additional stake in Sibur.

GNT [Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko] being a shareholder in the Company creates restrictions for its operations. There have already been cases of banks and business partners refusing to collaborate with Sibur [due to Timchenko’s inclusion in the sanctions lists.] To solve the problem, it is proposed to buy out GNT’s share. The purchase can be carried out through two of the Company’s managers and subsequently consolidating the share (the mechanism of creating an artificial debt and repaying it with a second block of shares has been worked out).

As subsequent events showed, this was the proposal Shamalov chose.

Billions More

On August 1, 2014, Shamalov registered a company called Yauza 12 at his Moscow apartment. Then, as his emails show, his company acquired 17 percent of Sibur from Timchenko just six days later, bringing his share in the petrochemical giant to just over 21 percent — and increasing his wealth by $2 billion.

The transaction made Shamalov the youngest billionaire in Russia and the second-largest shareholder in the country’s largest petrochemical holding company. It also attracted considerable attention, and the following year Shamalov sat for his friendly interview with Kommersant.

The president’s son-in-law told the newspaper that he had borrowed the funds to make this acquisition from Gazprombank (whose board of directors includes his brother Yuri), backed by his own assets. He did not explain what these assets were. Leveraging the 3.8 percent of Sibur he had already acquired, Shamalov could theoretically have raised about $500 million. But where did the young businessman get the remaining amount?

Shamalov’s emails provide no answer to this question — but Nikienko’s reference to “creating artificial debt” is a tantalizing hint. The practice of using fictitious debt to create a legal pretext for transferring assets as a “repayment” has been described in Russian legal literature as a popular method of gaining control of enterprises for next to nothing.

But the technique need not be limited to hostile takeovers. If such a method were used in this case, with the Sibur shares being transferred as a “repayment” of a debt that did not really exist, no additional funds would need to be raised. However, beyond Nikienko’s suggestion in a single email, there is no evidence that this is what happened, and the full story remains unexplained.

It’s unknown when and how Shamalov’s Yauza 12 paid off its huge loan. Its most recent available financial statements, for 2016, show 80 billion rubles ($1.28 billion) in borrowed funds. The company was liquidated in December 2017.

Shamalov ended his Kommersant interview with a patriotic statement: “I was born, raised, and live in Russia. And my businesses are here too. And all of them are in Russian jurisdiction, not offshore. It’s not like me to build some kind of fallback position, to organize businesses abroad.”

Of course, many of his dealings were in fact abroad — his transactions in Belize, his French villa (then owned by a Monaco company), and several bank accounts he opened in Switzerland that year. But by 2017, as sanctions cover an ever-wider circle of Putin acquaintances, Shamalov’s attorneys began to curtail his financial activities in European banks and registered a special fund for him, the Centurion International Fund, on Labuan Island, an offshore territory that is part of Malaysia.

The Wife’s Acquaintance

Even before his marriage, Shamalov could be considered one of the most influential people in Russia thanks to his father’s friendship with the president and his “new Piterskie” friends and acquaintances. But after the wedding, he became a member of the family — with all the opportunities that come with it.

One of the guests at his wedding, listed as a guest of the bride, was Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the country’s sovereign wealth fund and one of the most important state players in the Russian economy. Created in 2011, the fund was tasked with investing in leading Russian companies and attracting foreign investors.

Dmitriev’s wife, Natalya Popova, was Tikhonova’s deputy at her non-profit foundation, and the two young couples were friends, celebrating holidays together abroad several times. Shamalov and Dmitriev regularly exchanged emails, sharing links and opinions on economic issues. In several cases, Dmitriev sent Shamalov confidential RDIF documents.

On December 7, 2012, Dmitriev sent Shamalov a RDIF presentation marked “strictly confidential.” It described a planned transaction where the fund would buy into Rostelecom, one of Russia’s largest telecom operators.

At the time, this deal was not publicly known, and the RDIF director was well aware that he was sharing secret information:

I am sending this — but everything is extremely confidential — if you need to use the materials or show it to someone else — please let me know — I will advise on the best way — because a lot of what is attached is confidential and for your eyes only.”

On another occasion, in July 2013, Dmitriev forwarded Shamalov a message he had sent to Ksenia Yudaeva, then the head of the Expert Department of the President of Russia. Attached were the minutes of a meeting between RDIF officials and Nikolai Nikiforov, the minister of communications, on the creation of a postal bank.

It is common for state companies like RDIF to have trade secret protection clauses. Reporters were unable to find such a provision on the RDIF website, and RDIF did not respond to requests for comment, but similar documents have been published on the websites of other state-owned companies. Typically, an employee of such an enterprise can send confidential information to third parties only on the basis of an agreement. Violation of these standards can carry not only administrative, but also criminal liability.

It’s unknown whether Shamalov benefited from the confidential documents Dmitriev shared with him, but in theory such information could be worth a fortune. This is especially true when it comes to publicly traded companies like Rostelecom. In 2013, together with Deutsche Bank, RDIF acquired 2.7 percent of the telecom operator for 7.7 billion rubles ($238 million), six months after Shamalov learned of these plans. The news led to an increase in the value of Rostelecom shares by nearly 30 percent between August, when the first reports of a possible deal emerged, and October, when the deal was closed. Someone who knew of the plans in advance would be in a position to make a tidy profit.

RDIF also proved helpful to Shamalov in strictly material terms. In January 2015, Dmitriev sent Shamalov an article from the newspaper Vedomosti with the headline “RDIF will help Sibur.” The article discussed RDIF’s proposed investment in a Sibur project to build a petrochemical plant in Tobolsk called Zapsibneftekhim.

“Little by little, we’re beginning to realize [the plan] :),” – Dmitriev wrote.

“Super!” answered Shamalov, Sibur’s second-largest shareholder.

Zapsibneftekhim, the largest petrochemical complex in Russia, opened last May after $9.5 billion in investment. At the end of 2015, RDIF announced on its website that, along with other investors, it had provided more than a third of the project funding.

🔗Putin Helps

To implement such a massive scheme, the participation of a friendly state fund was insufficient — so Shamalov’s father-in-law came to his aid. In October 2015, Putin approved the allocation of $1.75 billion for the Zapsibneftekhim project from the National Wealth Fund, which is intended to co-finance citizens’ pension savings and to cover the deficit of the Pension Fund.

Dmitriev also benefited from his friendship with Shamalov. For example, RDIF purchased the Sibur terminal for transshipment of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in the Ust-Luga commercial seaport. Judging from Shamalov’s emails, not all of Sibur’s top managers were delighted with the idea of selling the terminal. The company’s former CFO, Pavel Maly, wrote that the deal would lose Sibur more than $250 million.

I understand that the transaction may contain other assets that I don’t know about. Maybe it’s extremely important for us to establish cooperation with RDIF. … I would be grateful for this kind of information. But if there are no other considerations, it seems to me the most reasonable move is to ‘pull the plug on the project.’

Dmitriev somehow acquired this confidential note, and left comments in red for Shamalov indicating his disagreement with Maly’s assessment. In the end, Sibur went ahead with the deal. With a consortium of other investors, RDIF bought the Ust-Luga terminal for $700 million.

Dmitriev did not reply to requests for comment for this story.

An Administrative Resource

Shamalov was an incredibly popular business partner. Businessmen with the most tempting offers lined up to meet him, and he was offered free shares in various enterprises, apparently under the assumption that the president’s son-in-law would bring something more valuable to the table than money.

In 2017, his former classmate Dmitry Utevsky offered Shamalov a share in a large garbage company in the Leningrad region. Utevsky promised his partner a “fixed annual income,” and in return asked literally for an “administrative resource (at least at the level of the head of a region).” In Russia, this is the common term for officials who make use of their powers for private benefit. We don’t know how Shamalov responded to this proposal, but his emails contain examples when he helped his partners solve problems through high-level government contacts.

Together with his father, for many years Shamalov was a co-owner of the Russian Cement Company and the Siberian Cement holding company. In 2016, Sharykin found himself in an unpleasant situation. On April 7, his home and office were searched by officers from the Investigative Committee and FSB operatives.

Four days later, Shamalov received an email from Valery Bodrenkov, Siberian Cement’s vice president, with the subject line “For the guarantor, a ‘soft’ version.” The email was accompanied by a message to Putin from Sharykin.

The company owner wrote that the searches had been initiated by a “business competitor,” Siberian Cement’s former president. His note ended with an earnest appeal:

I ask you, dear Vladimir Vladimirovich, to take this situation under your personal control, to instruct the leadership of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation to assess the legality of the actions of the FSB and the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the searches at my place of residence.

That same day, Shamalov forwarded the message to his secretary and asked for it to be printed out. It’s unknown whether Shamalov delivered it to his father-in-law, but this was not the only time Sharykin asked for his help — and there is evidence that Shamalov responded to his requests.

A year later, in April 2017, Sharykin sent Shamalov two more messages addressed to the president. In the first, he complained that his company, Ceramic Technologies (which Shamalov’s father also co-owned for several years), had developed an innovative method of burying radioactive waste, but that Rosatom had not agreed to cooperate. “I ask you to instruct the head of the State Atomic Energy Corporation ‘Rosatom’ Likhachev A.V. about the creation and implementation of a joint program,” Sharykin wrote.

In his second note, Shamalov’s partner complained that the same company, Ceramic Technologies, was developing optics for space and ground-based telescopes, but the state corporation Roscosmos was not buying them. “I ask you to instruct the General Director of the State Corporation for Space Activities ‘Roscosmos’ I.A. Komarov to develop a joint program for the implementation of existing technologies,” Sharykin wrote.

Apparently, Shamalov managed to help, at least in part. Two weeks later, on May 12, 2017, he received another email from Sharykin.

Kirill, good morning. I’m sending the protocols. The meeting with KSV went well, he delved carefully into all the issues. Warmest regards.

The abbreviation “KSV” corresponds to the initials of Sergei Vladilenovich Kirienko, the former head of Rosatom, as well as first deputy of the head of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Attached to the email were minutes of a meeting between managers of Rosatom and Ceramic Technologies. Sharykin did not respond to requests for comment.

On another occasion, a request for help came through Tikhonova’s foundation, Innopraktika . The message so accurately characterizes the Russian economy that it’s worth citing in detail.

On November 12, 2014, Alexander Veresov, the foundation’s head for working with the scientific community, received an email from the CEO of a company that developed veterinary medicines. His company was having a hard time getting a drug registered, facing monopolization in the veterinary market and general corruption. So he asked Veresov to get the president’s daughter to help:

First of all, you understand, to avoid serious problems in the future, ask Katerina to use this information without any links to me. … Entry to the market for veterinary drugs is practically closed for the ‘wrong’ companies that could compete with several of the largest companies, the ultimate beneficiaries of which are officials of the Rosselkhoznadzor [the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision].



The problem is that for the “wrong” companies, the requirements are applied in full, making the registration process almost impossible, while for the “right” companies, mostly, it’s not. Therefore, to summarize, I would ask Katerina, firstly, to send a direct and transparent message (without any excessive pressure) to the “spoiling” comrades that domestic innovative developments should be given a pass. Because their actions are at odds with the interests and security of the state. This concerns not only me, but dozens of unfairly treated applicants. But, I would really ask Katerina to give a clear signal that there will be MONITORING of their further actions … If there is such monitoring and control on her part, they will not dare to do what they usually do.

We do not know what Shamalov and Tikhonova may have done to help, but the drug was registered in 2016.

The Parting

In early 2018, Bloomberg reported that Shamalov and Tikhonova had split up after about five years of marriage. Six months earlier, Shamalov sold the Sibur stake he had acquired from Timchenko in 2013. His emails shed no light on how much, if anything, he received for the sale. Timchenko did not respond to requests for comment.

After parting with Tikhonova, Shamalov found a new partner, the glamorous socialite Zhanna Volkova. By 2019, their relationship appeared to be official: That October, Volkova sent documents to Shamalov about registration of an offshore company in the British Virgin Islands, Kenaston Properties Ltd, of which she became the beneficiary. In the documents, her surname is indicated as Shamalova.

In 2018, Shamalov was sanctioned by the United States joining “a select circle of billionaires from Vladimir Putin’s entourage” after his marriage. The Americans were rather late: The last email in the archive between Shamalov and Tikhonova was sent on June 15, 2017. In it, Shamalov forwarded a message from a famous St. Petersburg architect with design options for a country villa.

EU Parliament wants Sanctions against Putin’s Inner Circle and Russian Oligarchs

Nawalny veröffentlicht Video zu angeblichem Luxus-Palast von Putin |  STERN.de

The European Parliament has adopted a resolution calling on EU member states to “significantly strengthen” sanctions against Russia and stop work on completing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in response to the arrest of opposition figure Alexey Navalny. 

In particular, the members of the European Parliament are calling for sanctions against:

  • “Individuals and legal entities” involved in the decision to imprison Navalny
  • “Russian oligarchs linked to the regime”
  • Members of President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle
  • And “Russian media propagandists, who possess assets in the EU and can currently travel there.”

Additional restrictive measures could also be taken for human rights violations, under the new EU GlobalHuman Rights Sanctions Regime.

The resolution demands Navalny’s “immediate and unconditional release,” as well as the release of all other individuals detained in connection with his return to Russia.

After Alexey Navalny’s arrest, his associate Vladimir Ashurkov published a list of Russian nationals who, in Navalny’s opinion, ought to be placed under sanctions. Among others, the list includes oligarch Alisher Usmanov, billionaire Roman Abramovich, TV host Vladimir Solovyov, and Health Minister Mikhail Murashk.

Nawalny veröffentlicht investigatives Video über Putin | Machtkampf in Russland

Putin´s berühmtester Kritiker Nawalny veröffentlichte vor einigen Stunden ein investigatives Antikorruptionsvideo gegen den russischen Präsidenten. Innerhalb weniger Stunden wurde das Video bereits 18 Millionen mal angeklickt. Studio Berlin veröffentlicht das fast 2 Stunden lange Video ungekürzt. Das Video ist in russischer Sprache, allerdings kann man in den Youtube-Einstellungen “englisch” als Untertitel aktivieren. Die Studio Berlin Community hat viele russisch-sprachige Follower. Vielleicht mag der eine oder andere seine Meinung zu dem Video in die Kommentare schreiben. Kurz nach dem Nawalny in Moskau verhaftet wurde, hat sein Team dieses Video veröffentlicht. Dazu sagt Nawalny im Video selbst: »Wir haben ausgemacht, dass wir diese Recherche erst veröffentlichen, wenn ich wieder in Moskau bin, damit ihr wichtigster Held nicht glaubt, wir haben Angst vor ihm«. Dabei sitzt Nawalny auf einer Bank in Dresden (In Dresden war Putin einst als KGB-Offizier aktiv). Dies werde »ein psychologisches Porträt«, so Nawalny: »Wir wollen verstehen, wie aus einem einfachen Sowjetoffizier ein Irrer wurde, der auf Geld und Luxus fixiert ist.«

Borat at Putin’s Palace from the investigation of Alexei Navalny

Freedom for Alexei Navalny. Wikipedia: Putin’s Palace(Residence at Cape Idokopas). On 19 January 2021, two days after Navalny was detained by Russian authorities upon his return to Russia, a video investigation by him and the Anti-Corruption Foundation FBK was published accusing President Vladimir Putin of using fraudulently obtained funds to build the estate for himself in what he called “the world’s biggest bribe”. In the investigation, Navalny said that the estate is 39 times the size of Monaco and cost over 100 billion rubles $1.35 billion to construct. It also showed aerial footage of the estate via a drone and a detailed floorplan of the palace that Navalny said was given by a contractor, which he compared to photographs from inside the palace that were leaked onto the Internet in 2011. He also detailed an elaborate corruption scheme allegedly involving Putin’s inner circle that allowed Putin to hide billions of dollars to build the estate. World community Alexey Navalny needs your help. The Residence at Cape Idokopas Russian: Резиденция на мысе Идокопас, also known as Putin’s Palace is a large Italianate palace complex located on the Black Sea coast near the village of Praskoveevka in Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. The palace was claimed to have been built for President Vladimir Putin


SHOW LESS


“Where injustice becomes right, resistance becomes a duty!”

 

Alexej Nawalny: Wie der Anti-Putin wirklich tickt und was ihn antreibt

“Where injustice becomes right, resistance becomes a duty!”

This motto does not only apply to the Hitler era, but also to Russia under Putin.

Alexey Navalny lives this resistance, setting an example for all of us – as do Julian Assange and Edward Snowden.

This becomes all the more important as the mainstream media of all countries are often corrupt and use the above-mentioned lone fighters as an alibi.

Allow me to remind you that even in Germany former Chancellors and active Prime Ministers still actively support Putin and his system of injustice.

A murderous system of injustice to which former Stasi employees and their IMs will still be subject to in 2021.

The federal German legislature, judiciary and executive are also disintegrated by these figures.

As is well known, the fish stinks from the head.

Sincerely you

Bernd Pulch

“Wo Unrecht zu Recht wird, wird Widerstand zur Pflicht !”

Gemeinsam gegen Putin: Chodorkowski unterstützt Nawalny - n-tv.de

“Wo Unrecht zu Recht wird, wird Widerstand zur Pflicht !”

Dieses Motto gilt nicht nur für die Hitler-Zeit, sondern ebenso für das Russland unter Putin.

Alexey Nawalny lebt diesen Widerstand, beispiel gebend für uns alle – ebenso wie Julian Assange und Edward Snowden.

Dies wird um so wichtiger als die Mainstream-Medien aller Länder oft korrupt sind und die oben genannten Einzelkämpfer als Alibi nutzen.

Es sei mir erlaubt daran zu erinnern, dass auch in Deutschland noch ehemalige Bundeskanzler und aktive Ministerpräsidentinnen Putin und sein Unrechtssystem aktiv unterstützen.

Ein mörderisches Unrechtssystem, dem weiter ehemalige Stasi-Mitarbeiter und deren IM auch in 2021 noch untertan sind.

Auch die bundesdeutsche Legislative, Judikative und Exekutive ist von diesen Gestalten zersetzt.

Der Fisch stinkt bekanntlich vom Kopf her.

Herzlichst Ihr

Bernd Pulch

i

List of crimes for which Medvedev and Putin cannot be tried

List of crimes for which Medvedev and Putin cannot be tried

A bill on guarantees of the immunity of the former president was submitted to the State Duma. It will bring the federal law into line with the latest version of the Russian Constitution (adopted by a vote in the summer of 2020). The document not only complicates the procedure for depriving the former president of immunity, but also actually allows the former head of state to commit some crimes after his resignation.

After the adoption of this bill, both the current and the former president can be deprived of immunity only for grave and especially grave crimes. That is, all crimes of small and medium gravity, committed by the former president of Russia, will remain unpunished. Meduza re-read the Criminal Code and wrote out most of the crimes that could theoretically get away with Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin. Moreover, we are talking about both past and future deeds.

Crimes against life and health
Murder committed in passion (v. 107)
Murder committed in excess of the limits of necessary defense (Art.108)
Causing death by negligence (Article 109)
Driving a person to suicide or attempted suicide (part 1 of article 110)
Inclination to commit suicide (part 1 and part 3 of Art. 110¹)
Facilitating suicide (Art.110 Part 2 and Part 3)
Intentional infliction of medium-gravity harm to health (Article 112)
Infliction of grave or moderate harm to health in a state of passion (Article 113)
Causing serious or moderate harm to health when the limits of necessary defense are exceeded (Article 114)
Intentional infliction of slight harm to health (Article 115)
Beating (Art. 116)
Torment (part 1 of article 117)
Causing grievous bodily harm through negligence (Article 118)
Threats of murder or grievous bodily harm (Article 119)
Coercion to remove human organs or tissues for transplantation (Article 120)
Infection with a venereal disease (Art. 121)
Infection with HIV (part 1, part 2 and part 4 of article 122)
Obstruction of the provision of medical care (art.124¹)
Leaving in danger (Art. 125)

Crimes against freedom, honor and dignity of the person
Kidnapping (part 1 of article 126)
Unlawful deprivation of liberty (parts 1 and 2 of article 127)
Use of slave labor (Part 1 of Art. 127²)
Libel (art. 128¹)

Crimes against sexual inviolability and sexual freedom of the person
Compulsion to conduct of a sexual nature (Art. 133)
Sexual intercourse and other actions of a sexual nature with a person under the age of sixteen (part 1 of article 134)
Depraved actions (part 1 of article 135)

Crimes against constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms
Discrimination (art. 136)
Violation of privacy (art. 137)
Violation of secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph or other messages (Article 138)
Illegal circulation of special technical means intended for secretly obtaining information (Article 138¹)
Violation of the inviolability of the home (Article 139)
Obstruction of the exercise of electoral rights or the work of election commissions (art. 141)
Violation of the procedure for financing the election campaign (Article 141¹)
Illegal issuance and receipt of a ballot paper, a ballot paper for a referendum, a ballot paper for an all-Russian vote (Art. 142²)
Obstruction of the legitimate professional activities of journalists (parts 1 and 2 of article 144)
Violation of copyright and related rights (parts 1 and 2 of article 146)
Infringement of inventive and patent rights (Art. 147)
Violation of the right to freedom of conscience and religion (Article 148)
Obstruction of a meeting, meeting, demonstration, procession, picketing or participation in them (Art. 149)

Crimes against family and minors
Involvement of a minor in the commission of a crime (part 1 of article 150)
Involvement of a minor in the commission of antisocial acts (part 1 and part 2 of article 151)
Retail sale of alcoholic beverages to minors (Art. 151¹)
Involvement of a minor in the commission of acts that pose a danger to the life of a minor (Art. 151²)
Substitution of a child committed from mercenary or other base motives (Article 153)
Illegal adoption (adoption) (Article 154)
Failure to fulfill the duties of raising a minor (Article 156)
Failure to pay funds for the maintenance of children or disabled parents (Article 157)

Property crimes
Theft (part 1 and part 2 of article 158)
Fraud (part 1, part 2 and part 5 of article 159)
Credit fraud (part 1 and part 2 of Art.159¹)
Fraud in receiving payments (part 1 and part 2 of Art. 159²)
Fraud using electronic means of payment (part 1 and part 2 of article 159³)
Fraud in the field of insurance (part 1 and part 2 of article 159⁵)
Fraud in the field of computer information (part 1 and part 2 of article 159⁶)
Misappropriation or waste (part 1 and part 2 of article 160)
Robbery (part 1 of article 161)
Extortion (part 1 of article 163)
Causing property damage by deception or breach of trust (Article 165)
Unlawful seizure of a car or other vehicle without the purpose of theft (part 1 of article 166)
Intentional destruction or damage to property (Article 167)
Destruction or damage to property by negligence (Article 168)

Crimes in the field of economic activity
Illegal business (art. 171)
Production, purchase, storage, transportation or sale of goods and products without labeling and (or) applying information provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation (part 1, part 1¹, part 3 and part 5 of article 171¹)
Illegal organization and conduct of gambling (parts 1 and 2 of Art. 171²)
Illegal production and (or) circulation of ethyl alcohol, alcoholic and alcohol-containing products (Art. 171³)
Illegal retail sale of alcoholic and alcohol-containing food products (Article 171⁴)
Illegal banking (part 1 of article 172)
Illegal formation (creation, reorganization) of a legal entity (Art. 173¹)
Illegal use of documents for the formation (creation, reorganization) of a legal entity (Art. 173²)
Legalization (laundering) of funds or other property acquired by other persons in a criminal way (part 1, part 2 and part 3 of article 174)
Legalization (laundering) of funds or other property acquired by a person as a result of a crime committed by him (part 1, part 2 and part 3 of Art. 174¹)
Acquisition or sale of property, knowingly obtained by criminal means (part 1 and part 2 of article 175)
Unlawful receipt of a loan (Article 176)
Malicious evasion of accounts payable (Article 177)
Restriction of competition (part 1 of article 178)
Coercion to complete a transaction or refuse to complete it (part 1 of article 179)
Illegal use of means of individualization of goods (works, services) (part 1, part 2 and part 3 of article 180)
Illegal receipt and disclosure of information constituting commercial, tax or banking secrets (part 1, part 2 and part 3 of article 183)
Unlawful influence on the result of an official sports competition or spectacular commercial competition (part 1 of article 184)
Market manipulation (part 1 of article 185³)
Unlawful use of insider information (part 1 of article 185⁶)
Illegal export from the Russian Federation or transfer of raw materials, materials, equipment, technologies, scientific and technical information, illegal performance of work (provision of services) that can be used to create weapons of mass destruction, weapons and military equipment (parts 1 and 2 Article 189)
Illegal circulation of amber, jade or other semi-precious stones, precious metals, precious stones or pearls (part 1, part 2, part 4 of article 191)
Acquisition, storage, transportation, processing for the purpose of marketing or marketing of knowingly illegally harvested timber (Article 191¹)
Acquisition, storage, transportation, processing for the purpose of marketing or marketing of knowingly illegally harvested timber (Article 191¹)
Performing currency transactions to transfer funds in foreign currency or the currency of the Russian Federation to the accounts of non-residents using forged documents (part 1 and part 2 of article 193¹)
Evasion of payment of customs payments levied from an organization or an individual (parts 1 and 2 of article 194)
Smuggling of cash and (or) monetary instruments (Art. 200¹)
Smuggling of alcoholic beverages and (or) tobacco products (part 1 of Art. 200²)

Crimes against the interests of service in commercial and other organizations
Commercial bribery (part 1, part 2, part 5 and part 6 of Art.204)
Mediation in commercial bribery (part 1 and part 2 of Art.204¹)
Petty commercial bribery (Article 204²)

Public Safety Crimes
Public calls for terrorist activities, public justification of terrorism or propaganda of terrorism (Part 1 of Art. 205²)
Failure to report a crime (art. 205⁶)
Knowingly false reporting of an act of terrorism (part 1 and part 2 of article 207)
Public dissemination of knowingly false information about circumstances posing a threat to the life and safety of citizens (Art.207¹)
Public dissemination of knowingly false socially significant information, which entailed grave consequences (Article 207²)
Calls for riots or participation in them, as well as calls for violence against citizens (part 3 of article 212)
Hooliganism (part 1 of article 213)
Vandalism (Art. 214)
Decommissioning of life support facilities (part 1 and part 2 of Art. 215²)
Unlawful entry into a guarded object (Art.215⁴)
Illegal handling of nuclear materials or radioactive substances (part 1 and part 2 of article 220)
Theft or extortion of nuclear materials or radioactive substances (part 1 of article 221)
Illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation or carrying of weapons, their main parts, ammunition (part 1 of article 222)
Illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation or carrying of explosives or explosive devices (part 1 of article 222¹)
Illegal manufacture of weapons (Article 223)
Negligent possession of firearms (Article 224)

Crimes against public health and public morals
Illegal acquisition, storage, transportation, manufacture, processing of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances or their analogues, as well as illegal acquisition, storage, transportation of plants containing narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, or their parts containing narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances (part 1 Article 228)
Illegal acquisition, storage or transportation of precursors of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, as well as illegal acquisition, storage or transportation of plants containing precursors of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, or their parts containing precursors of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances (Article 228³)
Illegal production, sale or shipment of precursors of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, as well as illegal sale or shipment of plants containing precursors of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, or parts thereof containing precursors of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances (Part 1 of Art.228.)
Induction to the consumption of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances or their analogs (part 1 of article 230)
Illegal cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances or their precursors (part 1 of article 231)
Organization or maintenance of dens or the systematic provision of premises for the consumption of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances or their analogues (Part 1 of Art.232)
Illegal issuance or forgery of prescriptions or other documents giving the right to receive narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances (Article 233)
Illegal circulation of strong or poisonous substances for marketing purposes (part 1 and part 2 of article 234)
Illegal implementation of medical or pharmaceutical activities (Article 235)
Illegal production of medicines and medical devices (part 1 of article 235¹)
Circulation of counterfeit, substandard and unregistered medicines, medical devices and circulation of counterfeit dietary supplements (part 1 of Art.238¹)
Creation of a non-profit organization that infringes upon the personality and rights of citizens (Article 239)
Involvement in prostitution (part 1 of article 240)
Receiving sexual services from a minor (Art.240¹)
Organization of prostitution (part 1 of article 241)
Illegal production and circulation of pornographic materials or objects (part 1 and part 2 of article 242)
Destruction or damage of cultural heritage objects (historical and cultural monuments) of the peoples of the Russian Federation included in the unified state register of cultural heritage objects (historical and cultural monuments) of the peoples of the Russian Federation, identified cultural heritage objects, natural complexes, objects taken under state protection, or cultural values (part 1 of article 243)
Illegal search and (or) removal of archaeological objects from the places of occurrence (part 1 and part 2 of article 243²)
Destruction or damage of military graves, as well as monuments, steles, obelisks, other memorial structures or objects that perpetuate the memory of those killed in the defense of the Fatherland or its interests, or dedicated to the days of military glory of Russia (Article 243⁴)
Desecration of the bodies of the dead and the places of their burial (Article 244)
Cruelty to animals (Article 245)

Environmental crimes
Water pollution (Art. 250)
Air pollution (art. 251)
Pollution of the marine environment (Art. 252)
Violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation on the continental shelf and on the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation (Article 253)
Damage to the earth (v. 254)
Violation of the rules for the protection and use of subsurface resources (Article 255)
Illegal extraction (catch) of aquatic biological resources (Art. 256)
Violation of the rules for the protection of aquatic biological resources (Article 257)
Illegal hunting (art. 258)
Illegal extraction and circulation of especially valuable wild animals and aquatic biological resources belonging to the species included in the Red Book of the Russian Federation and (or) protected by international treaties of the Russian Federation (part 1 and part 1¹ of article 258¹)
Destruction of critical habitats for organisms listed in the Red Book of the Russian Federation (Article 259)
Illegal felling of forest plantations (parts 1 and 2 of article 260)
Destruction or damage of forest plantations (i. 1 and part 2 of article 261)
Violation of the regime of specially protected natural areas and natural objects (Article 262)

Crimes against traffic safety and transport operation
Violation of the rules of the road and the operation of vehicles (part 1, part 2, part 3, part 5 of article 264)
Destruction of vehicles or means of communication (Article 267)
Committing hooligan motives of actions that threaten the safe operation of vehicles (Art.267¹)
Violation of the rules ensuring the safe operation of transport (Article 268)

Crimes in the field of computer information
Unlawful access to computer information (part 1, part 2 and part 3 of article 272)
Creation, use and distribution of malicious computer programs (part 1 and part 2 of article 273)
Violation of the rules for the operation of means of storage, processing or transmission of computer information and information and telecommunication networks (Art.274)
Unlawful influence on the critical information infrastructure of the Russian Federation (part 1 of article 274¹)

Crimes against the foundations of the constitutional system and state security
Public calls to carry out extremist activities (Article 280)
Public calls for the implementation of actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation (Art.280¹)
Incitement to hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity (part 1 of article 282)
Disclosure of state secrets (part 1 of article 283)
Unlawful receipt of information constituting a state secret (part 1 of article 283¹)
Loss of documents containing state secrets (Article 284)

Crimes against state power, interests of civil service and service in local self-government bodies
Taking a bribe (part 1 of article 290)
Giving a bribe (part 1 and part 2 of article 291)
Mediation in bribery (part 1 of article 291¹)
Petty bribery (art. 291²)

Crimes against justice
Obstruction of justice and preliminary investigation (Art.294)
Threats or violent actions in connection with the administration of justice or the production of a preliminary investigation (part 1, part 2 and part 3 of article 296)
Disrespect for the court (Art. 297)
Defamation against a judge, juror, prosecutor, investigator, person conducting the inquiry, an employee of the compulsory enforcement bodies of the Russian Federation (Article 298¹)
Coercion to testify (part 1 of article 302)
Knowingly false denunciation (part 1 and part 2 of article 306)
Knowingly false testimony, expert opinion, specialist or incorrect translation (Article 307)
Refusal of witness or victim to testify (Article 308)
Bribery or coercion to testify or evade testimony or to incorrect translation (part 1, part 2 and part 3 of article 309)
Disclosure of data from preliminary investigation (Art. 310)
Concealment of crimes (Art. 316)

Crimes against the order of administration
Use of violence against a government official (part 1 of article 318)
Insulting a government official (Article 319)
Disclosure of information on security measures applied to an official of a law enforcement or regulatory body (Article 320)
Illegal crossing of the State border of the Russian Federation (part 1 of article 322)
Organization of illegal migration (part 1 of article 322¹)
Fictitious registration of a citizen of the Russian Federation at the place of stay or at the place of residence in a residential building in the Russian Federation and fictitious registration of a foreign citizen or stateless person at the place of residence in a residential building in the Russian Federation (Art. 322²)
Illegal change of the State border of the Russian Federation (Article 323)
Purchase or sale of official documents and state awards (Article 324)
Theft or damage to documents, stamps, seals or theft of excise stamps, special stamps or conformity marks (Article 325)
Unlawful seizure of the state registration plate of a vehicle (Art. 325¹)
Forgery or destruction of the vehicle identification number (Article 326)
Forgery, manufacture or circulation of forged documents, state awards, stamps, seals or letterheads (Art. 327)
Production, sale or use of counterfeit excise stamps, special stamps or conformity marks (part 1 and part 2 of article 327¹)
Forgery of documents for medicines or medical devices or packaging of medicines or medical devices (Part 1 and Part 2 of Art. 327²)
Desecration of the State Emblem of the Russian Federation or the State Flag of the Russian Federation (Article 329)
Arbitrariness (Article 330)
Malicious evasion of duties defined by the legislation of the Russian Federation on non-profit organizations performing the functions of a foreign agent (Article 330¹)
Failure to comply with the obligation to submit a notification that a citizen of the Russian Federation has citizenship (nationality) of a foreign state or a residence permit or other valid document confirming the right to his permanent residence in a foreign state (Art. 330²)

Crimes against the peace and security of mankind
Public calls to unleash an aggressive war (Article 354)
Rehabilitation of Nazism (Article 354¹)

 

Russian Private Military Companies in Operations, Competition, and Conflict

The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) supported the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) to break down the wonder of Russian private military organizations (PMCs), the situations under which they would matter to U.S. Armed force move commandants, and whether they comprise a one of a kind danger to U.S. furthermore, accomplice powers.

The essential crowd for this investigation is U.S. Armed force move administrators and their staffs, yet the discoveries and experiences ought to likewise be valuable for anybody in the U.S. public security and protection networks worried about deviated activities of the Russian Federation around the globe. To begin with, this examination presents key discoveries from profound jump exploration and investigation on Russian PMCs introduced in the supplement. It tends to their utilizations, hardware, preparing, faculty, state contribution, legitimate issues, and other related subjects. Second, these discoveries are utilized to advise a scientific model to investigate the operational difficulties and contemplations Russian PMCs could present to U.S. Armed force move officers.

Key Findings

Primary concern Up Front: Russian PMCs are utilized as a power multiplier to accomplish targets for both government and Russia-adjusted private interests while limiting both political and military expenses. While Moscow keeps on considering the to be of Russian PMCs as helpful, their utilization likewise presents a few weaknesses that present both operational and key dangers to Russian Federation targets.

Well disposed Regime Support: Russian administrators see Russian PMCs as an instrument to prop up benevolent systems under danger of breakdown or ouster. Russian PMCs work:

• Alongside and installed with well disposed state militaries.

• With non-state outfitted gatherings in hostile battle tasks.

Hostile Role: While likewise utilized for help undertakings more ordinary of military and security temporary workers, Russian PMCs have had an articulated part in hostile battle tasks.

Moving Control: The order and control (C2) of Russian PMCs isn’t steady in all operational settings.

• Sometimes Russian PMCs fall under the C2 of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or Russian insight offices.

• At different occasions, PMCs fall under the C2 of accomplice governments or adjusted private interests.

Conflicting Capabilities: The nature of staff and materiel empowering Russian PMCs is conflicting. Russian PMC capacities in faculty, preparing, and hardware have all the earmarks of being more noteworthy when a PMC is firmly lined up with state uphold from the Russian MoD.

Casual by Design: Despite administrative endeavors to authorize PMCs, Russian law proceeds to officially prohibit their creation and bars people from going along with them under enemy of hired soldier laws. Notwithstanding, Russian pioneers utilize this legitimate denial to carefully control some PMCs (e.g., the specific capture of PMCs who may introduce homegrown security or political dangers), not to keep PMCs from working.

Weaknesses: The utilization of Russian PMCs presents new operational and key dangers to Moscow. Confidence in Russian PMC units in high-hazard missions seems fragile. Despite the fact that their utilization gives political insurance from the optics of high Russian MoD setbacks, both Russian PMC losses and their get back make novel political and homegrown security hazards. Their utilization additionally confuses interior system legislative issues in Moscow, making rivalry between the MoD and private values that can endanger tasks (see the reference section: Syria). At long last, the equivocalness of operational control and dynamic over Russian PMCs frees Moscow up to the danger of being considered dependable by the global network for activities taken by Russian PMCs under the order of different interests.

Operational Challenges and Considerations Presented by Russian PMCs

Main concern Up Front: Russian PMCs don’t represent a special strategic danger—other state and non-state entertainers are comparably skilled. In any case:

• PMCs can work over the contention continuum and present the United States with predicaments at all degrees of war.

• Challenges Russian PMCs could present in noncombatant departure tasks (NEOs) and peacekeeping activities (PKOs) merit cautious thought

Most Dangerous Scenario: The most hazardous situation including a Russian PMC is one where a U.S. Armed force detachment could experience a state-upheld, contingent strategic gathering (BTG)- like substance with cutting edge weapons, forefront empowering influence advances, and skill:

• With an elevated level of Russian state uphold, a Russian PMC in Syria had the option to work as a semi BTG; it directed fundamental joined arms activities with infantry, reinforcement, and ordnance.

• With the guide of Russian help and powers, separatists in eastern Ukraine led consolidated arms tasks and was exceptionally capable at empowering incorporation, especially data activities (IO), electronic fighting (EW), and automated elevated frameworks (UAS).

In all probability Scenarios: Russian state-upheld PMC activities pointed toward disturbing U.S. tasks during emergency reaction or restricted possibility activities. PMCs may execute the accompanying:

• Occupy potential departure destinations or other key landscape during a NEO.

• Ally with neighborhood entertainers in PKO to give weapons and preparing to bunches contradicted to U.S. activities.

• Provide different types of help, including knowledge and keeping up impact in a given zone.

Other Potential Scenarios: Less serious situations exist where Russian PMCs could look to contend with and sabotage U.S. impact with neighborhood specialists and regular citizens.

Russian PMCs are known, affirmed, and associated with being available and working in various nations across eastern and focal Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and somewhere else. This addendum subtleties accessible data concerning Russian PMC exercises in known or suspected AOs to illuminate the examination contained in the body of this report.

Syria, Ukraine, the CAR, and Sudan are talked about top to bottom, enumerating the utilizations and different credits of Russian PMCs in each AO. Different AOs talked about finally are Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Different nations where Russian PMCs are claimed to have worked are likewise referenced and quickly talked about.

Unmistakable Intervention in Syria

The appearance of the Russian Federation’s conventional military inclusion in September 2015 started noteworthy development in the hostile utilization of Russian PMCs in Syria and focused a more splendid light on the activities of Wagner, which served a function in Ukraine up until that point that was more enthusiastically for eyewitnesses to recognize from different entertainers in the contention. Russian PMCs were dynamic in Syria a long time before Russia’s proper intercession—Wagner since fall 2014 or earlier,190 and the Slavonic Corps in 2013. Notwithstanding, the proper utilization of power brought a flood of Russian PMC faculty and started a period interspersed by a few fights where Russian PMCs assumed a huge job—essentially Wagner, on occasion passing by the name “OSM” as indicated by some press reports.

In late 2013, Ukraine was required to consent to an affiliation arrangement with the European Union (EU). Notwithstanding, this would have blocked the nation from participation in the Russia-drove Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), so Moscow forced heightening monetary backlashes and dangers on Kyiv, to the point that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych declared an unexpected inversion. The declaration started the Euromaidan development—a long arrangement of favorable to Western, against Russian fights and conflicts from late 2013 to mid 2014 in Kyiv and across western Ukraine—which, in spite of endeavors by Moscow, eliminated Yanukovych from office. Russia reacted with military activities to attack and addition the Crimean Peninsula and backing dissident powers in eastern Ukraine.

Asserted Use on the Crimean Peninsula

In late February 2014, Russian unique powers work force in plain outfits showed up in Crimea and assumed responsibility for certain administration, air terminal, and different offices. Metaphorically alluded to as “amiable individuals” or “minimal green men,” these formally unattributed powers worked close by other military arrangements to immobilize Ukrainian powers and inevitably assume full responsibility for the landmass. A few open source reports charge that RussianPMCs took an interest in the activities prompting the addition of Crimea (explicitly an early cycle of Wagner that was at the time a casual gathering of Slavonic Corps leftovers with local people and others). By and by, the degree or veracity of a Russian PMC function in the intrusion of Crimea isn’t affirmed, and there gives off an impression of being no immediate proof accessible to check these cases. Russian Cossack units, notwithstanding, assumed a plain function in the occupation as battling powers, monitors at checkpoints, and road implementation to smother fights.

There are a few different nations where Russian PMCs are suspected to be available and working in some limit. Nonetheless, data concerning their utilizations, destinations, and different subtleties is scant. Moreover, separating whether such organizations are working as PSCs in the open market for power, or in the event that they are satisfying any Russian Federation international strategy or security goals, is muddled.

Doctor at Omsk clinic who treated Navalny has surrendered

The appointee head doctor at the Omsk clinic that quickly treated resistance figure Alexey Navalny in August has surrendered “for individual reasons,” as per the news office RIA Novosti. Anatoly Kalinichenko told the site Ngs55.ru that his choice to take an occupation somewhere else is unopinionated and due basically to the way that he’d developed worn out on managerial work. He simply needs to re-visitation of medical procedure, he says.

Navalny was hospitalized at Kalinichenko’s office on August 20 after his departure from Tomsk to Moscow made a crisis arrival in Omsk. While he stayed at the Omsk clinic until the night of August 21, Kalinichenko was the essential wellspring of data for writers giving an account of Navalny’s ailment.

Kalinichenko was one of the medical clinic authorities who asserted that specialists found no hints of toxin in Navalny’s framework and contended that the legislator’s delicate state forestalled his prompt exchange to a superior prepared facility in Berlin.

Deadly – The Chilling Way Vladimir Putin Deals With His Enemies

“The Russian state goes after enemies, traitors, opponents, critics, journalists,” Buzzfeed News’ Heidi Blake told InsideEdition.com. The results are chilling, and often deadly. Blake is the author of “From Russia, With Blood: the Kremlin’s Ruthless Assassination Program and Vladimir Putin’s Secret War on the West.” Her investigative team found Russian links to over a dozen mysterious deaths on English soil, including that of exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky.

Revealed – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Mail-In Voting in 2020

Presidential Election Day USA 2020. Vote In USA, Banner Design.. Royalty  Free Cliparts, Vectors, And Stock Illustration. Image 142112824.

Page Count: 11 pages
Date: July 28, 2020
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security
File Type: pdf
File Size: 577,002 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 4018616B3963268F457A9A294BF1A3A04EB90025898BC3C54B4785B048C873BB

Download File

All forms of voting – in this case mail-in voting – bring a variety of cyber and infrastructure risks. Risks to mail-in voting can be managed through various policies, procedures, and controls.
The outbound and inbound processing of mail-in ballots introduces additional infrastructure and technology, which increases the potential scalability of cyber attacks. Implementation of mail-in voting infrastructure and processes within a compressed timeline may also introduce new risk. To address this risk, election officials should focus on cyber risk management activities, including access controls and authentication best practices when implementing expanded mail-in voting.

Integrity attacks on voter registration data and systems represent a comparatively higher risk in a mail-in voting environment when compared to an in-person voting environment. This is because the voter is not present at the time of casting the ballot and cannot help to answer questions regarding their eligibility or identity verification.

Operational risk management responsibility differs with mail-in voting and in-person voting processes. For mail-in voting, some of the risk under the control of election officials during in-person voting shifts to outside entities, such as ballot printers, mail processing facilities, and the United States Postal Service (USPS).

Physical access at election offices and warehouses represents a risk in a mail-in voting environment. Completed ballots are returned to the election office and must be securely stored for days or weeks before processing through voter authentication and tabulation processes. Managing risks to these processes requires implementing secure procedures for storage, access controls, and chain of custody, such as ballot accounting.
Inbound mail-in ballot processes and tabulation take longer than in-person processing, causing tabulation of results to occur more slowly and resulting in more ballots to tabulate following election night. Media, candidates, and voters should expect less comprehensive results on election night, which creates additional risk of electoral uncertainty and confidence in results.

Disinformation risk to mail-in voting infrastructure and processes is similar to that of in-person voting while utilizing different content. Threat actors may leverage limited understanding regarding mail-in voting processes to mislead and confuse the public.

Election infrastructure includes a diverse set of systems, networks, and processes. Mail-in voting is a method of administering elections. When voting by mail, authorized voters receive a ballot in the mail, either automatically or after the application process. In most implementations, the voter marks the ballot, puts the ballot in an envelope, signs an affidavit, and returns the package via mail or by dropping off at a ballot drop box or other designated location.

Currently, five states (Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah, and Washington) automatically send every registered voter a ballot by mail. At least 21 other states have laws that allow at least some elections to be conducted by mail. In addition to the five states that send every voter a ballot, five states (Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, and New Jersey) and the District of Columbia (D.C.) allow a voter to apply to receive a mail-in ballot permanently, so that voters do not have to apply each election.1 Currently, 34 states and D.C. allow any registered voter to request a mail-in ballot. There are 16 states that require voters to have an excuse such as temporary absence from the voting district, illness, or disability or require voters to be of a certain age (typically 65+) to be eligible to receive a ballot by mail. Some states are recognizing COVID-19 as a valid excuse.

Although they perform similar functions, mail-in voting processes and infrastructure vary from state to state and often differ even between counties, parishes, towns, or cities within a state or territory. While each state manages and conducts mail-in elections differently based on state and local legal requirements, common risks and mitigations exist across states and implementations.

Voter registration and mail ballot application processing collects data used to determine voter eligibility, the type of ballot a voter receives, the location or address for mailing the ballot to the voter, and whether election officials can accept the ballot. Either an integrity attack or an availability attack on a voter registration system could result in a voter not being able to cast a ballot or a voter’s ballot not being counted. Integrity attacks on voter registration data and systems represents a comparatively higher risk in a mail-in voting environment than an in-person voting environment. This is because the voter is not present at the time of casting the ballot and cannot help to resolve questions regarding eligibility or verification. Mail-in voters whose registration records are altered or deleted in an integrity attack do not have the opportunity to be issued a provisional ballot, which are available to in-person voters.

  • An integrity attack that removed a voter from the voter registration, permanent mail, or absentee ballot request list could result in the voter not receiving a ballot, unless the voter proactively followed up to re-register, re-apply, or if the election official received the ballot as undeliverable and contacted the voter. The impact is that a voter may not receive a ballot or receipt of a ballot may be delayed, resulting in a jurisdiction potentially not accepting a voted ballot. The voter would still possess the ability to vote in person provisionally.
  • An integrity attack on a voter’s name could result in the voter receiving a ballot package that is not addressed to the proper individual. If there was an integrity attack on a voter’s identifying information (i.e., date of birth [DOB], driver’s license number [DL], last four digits of Social Security number [SSN], etc.), the voter’s proof of ID, where required, would not match the voter’s record. The voter would either need to inform the election official and update his or her voter record (assuming that the voter registration deadline has not passed), or risk having their voted ballot rejected upon receipt.
  • An integrity attack on a voter’s ballot mailing address may result in the voter not receiving a ballot, unless the voter proactively updated his or her registration with the correct address, or the election official received the ballot as undeliverable and contacted the voter. This assumes that the voter registration or ballot application deadline has not passed, allowing the voter to update his or her information. The impact is that a voter may not receive a ballot, or receipt of a ballot is delayed.
  • An integrity attack on a voter’s signature on file could result in the voter having the ballot package rejected and their ballot uncounted. If the state is one of the 19 that requires a voter to receive notification when there is a discrepancy with their signature or the signature on the return ballot envelope is missing (a.k.a. “cure process”), the voter may have an opportunity to correct the situation by being notified that the ballot was rejected and taking action to resolve the issue. This can be done by an election official notifying the voter or a voter checking a ballot tracking system, if available.
  • An availability attack on the voter registration database or specific information, such as a list of mail voters, voter names, or addresses could result in the delay of voters receiving their ballots, and further impact voters’ ability to return ballots on time to ensure they are counted. In most states, a ballot may be returned in person, in which case the impact of an availability attack may only affect the outbound process providing a measure of resilience.

Video – Russland: Der Fall Nawalny – Opposition in Gefahr

Die Vergiftung von Oppositionsführer Alexej Nawalny ist nicht der erste Anschlag gegen einen Putin-Kritiker. Politischer Widerstand in Russland kann lebensgefährlich sein.

Regimekritiker Michail Efremow vor dubiosem Moskauer Gericht – 11 Jahre Gefängnis gefordert

Russland: Populärer Schauspieler nach Alkoholfahrt mit tödlichem Ausgang  unter Hausarrest — RT Deutsch

Das Gericht verkündet demnächst ein Urteil über den Regimekritiker & Schauspieler Michail Efremow. Die Staatsanwaltschaft fordert, den Schauspieler wegen eines Unfalls, bei dem der 57-jährige Sergei Zakharov starb, zu 11 Jahren Gefängnis zu verurteilen.

Hintergrund: Mikhail Efremov stürzte am 8. Juni auf dem Smolenskaya-Platz in Moskau betrunken in einen Lada-Van in seinem Grand Cherokee-Jeep. Der Fahrer des Lieferwagens Der 57-jährige Kurier des Delikateska-Online-Shops, Sergei Zakharov, wurde getötet.

Zeugen:

Mikhail Efremov – Schauspieler, Angeklagter

Elman Pashayev – Efremovs Anwalt

Verwandte von Sergei Zakharov – Opfer

Alexander Dobrovinsky – Anwalt für Zakharovs Verwandte

Mehrere Dutzend Journalisten

Zuschauer

Was die Staatsanwaltschaft verlangt: Verurteilung von Yefremov zu 11 Jahren in einer Kolonie des Generalregimes – fast die Höchstdauer nach diesem Artikel des Strafgesetzbuchs. Um einen Führerschein für drei Jahre zu entziehen, zahlen Sie drei Verwandten des Verstorbenen einen Rubel und 500.000 Rubel an Zakharovs ältesten Sohn.

Was die Verteidigung verlangt: Efremov nicht seiner Freiheit zu berauben, ihn in extremen Fällen in eine Koloniesiedlung zu schicken. „11 Jahre sind sehr blutrünstig. Dies ist ein Todesurteil “, sagte Efremov selbst.

Ort und Zeit der Klage: Presnensky Court of Moscow, Beginn der Sitzung – 11:00 Uhr (russische Zeit), 8.9.2020

Nawalny aus Koma geweckt – Deutsch-russisches Verhältnis am Boden

Sein Zustand verbessert sich und er ist wieder ansprechbar: Berliner Ärzte haben den Kremlkritiker Alexej Nawalny aus dem künstlichen Koma geholt. Sein Fall hat inzwischen hohe Wellen geschlagen.

Nawalny vergiftet: Statement von Maas und Kramp-Karrenbauer zum Vorfall

Seit mehreren Tagen befindet sich der russische Kreml-Kritiker Alexej Nawalny in der Berliner Charité. Er war dorthin mit Symptomen einer Vergiftung gekommen. Nun gibt es laut Bundesregierung einen “zweifelsfreien Nachweis” für eine Vergiftung mit einem chemischen Nervenkampfstoff aus der Nowitschok-Gruppe. Das erklärte Regierungssprecher Steffen Seibert. Ein Speziallabor der Bundeswehr habe eine toxikologische Untersuchung anhand von Proben durchgeführt. Hierbei sei die Vergiftung nachgewiesen worden.

Mögliche Sanktionen gegen Russland – Navalny-Ärzte suchen Hilfe bei Novichok-Forschern

Hilferuf an Bundeswehr - Charité geht von Nervengift-Anschlag auf Nawalny aus - Politik Inland - Bild.de
Deutschlands Außenminister Heiko Maas sagte, Berlin sei bereit, diplomatische Sanktionen gegen Russland einzuführen, wenn sich herausstellen würde, dass die russischen Behörden hinter der Vergiftung des Oppositionspolitikers Alexey Navalny stecken, berichtet Reuters.

Maas unterstrich, dass die deutschen Behörden als Reaktion auf die Ermordung des ehemaligen tschetschenischen Feldkommandanten Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, der im August 2019 in Berlin erschossen wurde, genauso handeln würden. Nachdem ein russischer Staatsbürger wegen des Attentats angeklagt worden war, wies Deutschland zwei russische Diplomaten aus , die angeblich als ausländische Geheimdienstagenten für das russische Verteidigungsministerium tätig waren (Moskau reagierte mit Sachleistungen und vertrieb zwei der deutschen Bevölkerung).

Laut der deutschen Wochenzeitung Der Spiegel haben die Ärzte, die Nawalny im Charité-Krankenhaus in Berlin behandeln, heimlich Hilfe bei der Bundeswehr gesucht, die über ein eigenes Toxikologielabor in München verfügt. Die Ärzte wandten sich auch an Spezialisten des britischen Porton Down-Labors, die für die Untersuchung des versuchten Mordes an Sergey und Yulia Skripal verantwortlich waren, nachdem sie 2018 in Salisbury mit einer Substanz der Novichok-Klasse vergiftet worden waren.

Zuvor berichteten Der Spiegel und das Ermittlungsbüro Bellingcat, dass die deutschen Ärzte wegen möglicher Ähnlichkeiten zwischen der Vergiftung von Navalny und dem versuchten Mord an dem bulgarischen Waffenhändler Emilian Gebrev, der 2015 angeblich mit Novichok vergiftet worden war, auch Ärzte in Bulgarien kontaktiert hatten.

Video – Boris Nemzow – Tod an der Kremlmauer

Am 27. Februar 2015 ereignete sich der Mord an dem russischen Oppositionspolitiker Boris Nemzow. Die Welle der Empörung und Anteilnahme nach der Ermordung war sowohl in Russland als auch im Ausland hoch. Russlands Präsident Putin versprach umgehende Aufklärung. Was ist seitdem passiert, und was weiß man heute über die Drahtzieher des Mordes?

Spur nach Moskau – Warum musste Litwinenko sterben

“2006 starb in London der ehemalige KGB-Offizier Alexander Litwinenko an einer Vergiftung durch radioaktives Polonium. Indizien deuten auf den russischen Geheimdienst als Auftraggeber. In einem öffentlichen Anhörungsverfahren in London wurden in den letzten Monaten viele Details des Polonium-Mordes bekannt. Russland weigert sich bis heute die beiden mutmaßlichen Mörder Andrei Lugowoi und Dmitri Kowtun nach England auszuliefern. Alexander Litwinenko starb am 23. November 2006 in der Londoner Universitätsklinik. Drei Wochen zuvor war er mit radioaktivem Polonium vergiftet worden, das seinen Körper von innen zerfraß. Die mutmaßlichen Mörder waren schnell identifiziert: Andrei Lugowoi und Dmitri Kowtun, zwei Geschäftsleute mit Verbindungen zum russischen Geheimdienst. Die britische Justiz erließ internationale Haftbefehle, doch der Kreml weigert sich, Lugowoi und Kowtun auszuliefern. In einem öffentlichen Anhörungsverfahren vor den Courts of Justice in London, für das die Witwe Marina Litwinenko jahrelang gekämpft hatte, wurden viele Einzelheiten und Umstände der Tat bekannt. Und die Indizien deuten darauf hin, dass Präsident Putin zumindest davon wusste. Egmont R. Koch geht in seiner Reportage diesen Vorwürfen nach. Er trifft in Moskau, Sankt Petersburg und an der amerikanischen Ostküste Freunde und ehemalige Kollegen von Litwinenko. Sie sind davon überzeugt, dass es sich bei dem Giftanschlag um einen Staatsmord handelte. Litwinenko und Putin trafen sich ein einziges Mal persönlich, im August 1998. Damals versuchte der Offizier des FSB (vormals KGB) seinen obersten Chef, den gerade ernannten FSB-Direktor Wladimir Putin, von der grassierenden Korruption im Geheimdienst zu überzeugen. Putin wollte davon nichts wissen, befahl stattdessen, Litwinenkos Privattelefon anzuzapfen und ihn zu überwachen. Seit diesem Ereignis herrschte eine erbitterte Feindschaft zwischen den beiden. Und blanker Hass. 2000 floh Litwinenko mit seiner Familie nach London, wo er seine Vorwürfe Richtung Kreml verschärfte. Er behauptete, Putin habe in seiner Vergangenheit mit der Russenmafia kooperiert und am Drogenschmuggel partizipiert. Aber waren diese Beschuldigungen gerechtfertigt? Oder hatte er sie erfunden, um dem Präsidenten zu schaden? „Litwinenko war besessen von der Idee, Putin als Präsident stürzen zu können“, erinnert sich sein Freund, der Historiker Juri Felshtinsky. Irgendwann habe der FSB offenbar geglaubt, ihn zum Schweigen bringen zu müssen.”

Todkranker Kreml-Kritiker Alexej Nawalny in Berlin eingetroffen – Video

Der womöglich vergiftete russische Kremlkritiker Alexej Nawalny ist zur medizinischen Behandlung in Berlin eingetroffen. Ein Spezialflug mit dem im Koma liegenden Oppositionellen sei am Samstag gelandet, sagte eine Sprecherin des 44-Jährigen. Jaka Bizilj von der Organisation Cinema For Peace, die den Transport Nawalnys aus einem Krankenhaus in der sibirischen Stadt Omsk organisiert hatte, bestätigte: «Nawalny ist in Berlin». Vorausgegangen war ein Tauziehen mit den russischen Ärzten des Oppositionellen, die sich gegen seine Verlegung ausgesprochen hatten, weil er ihrer Ansicht nach nicht stabil genug für den Transport war. Anhänger Nawalnys vermuteten dahinter aber politische Gründe und mutmaßten, dass die russische Regierung die Verlegung so lange hinauszögern wollte, bis kein Gift mehr in seinem Blut nachweisbar sei. Kreml-Sprecher Dmitri Peskow wies das zurück und sagte, es sei eine rein medizinische Entscheidung gewesen. Nawalny war am Donnerstag auf einem Flug von Sibirien nach Moskau plötzlich zusammengebrochen, das Flugzeug landete daraufhin in Omsk, wo er ins Krankenhaus gebracht wurde. Am Freitag gelangte dann ein Spezialflugzeug mit modernem medizinischen Gerät und deutschen Ärzten nach Omsk, um Nawalny in die Charité zu bringen. Es dauerte aber bis zum frühen Samstagmorgen, bis er dann auch wirklich abfliegen konnte. Nawalnys Anhänger vermuten, dass er vor dem Flug einen vergifteten Tee getrunken habe und dass der Kreml dahinterstecke. Die russischen Ärzte erklärten hingegen, es gebe keine Belege für eine Vergiftung. Die Nachrichtenseite NGS55 in Omsk veröffentlichte eine Videostellungnahme des Chefarzts des örtlichen Krankenhauses, Alexander Murachowski. Dieser sagte, eine Stoffwechselstörung sei die wahrscheinlichste Diagnose. «Sie könnte durch einen starken Abfall des Blutzuckers im Flugzeug angestoßen worden sein, was den Verlust des Bewusstseins verursacht hat», sagte er. Nawalnys Anhänger wiesen diese Theorie zurück. «Sie erlauben den Transport von Alexej nicht wegen einer Stoffwechselstörung und eines Abfalls des Blutzuckers?!», fragte der Chef von Nawalnys Stiftung für den Kampf gegen Korruption, Iwan Schdanow, auf Twitter. Auch einige Toxikologen zeigten sich skeptisch, wie man so schnell eine Vergiftung ausschließen könne. So etwas brauche Zeit, sagte Alastair Hay, ein emeritierter Professor und Experte von der Universität von Leeds. Besonders wenn es eine hochgiftige Substanz sei, wäre diese nur in geringer Konzentration im Blut und deshalb durch Tests nicht so leicht nachweisbar.

STILL ALIVE AND KICKING – DIE STASI SEILSCHAFTEN 2020

STILL ALIVE AND KICKING – DIE STASI SEILSCHAFTEN 2020

https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article134309778/Auf-die-SED-Seilschaften-ist-noch-immer-Verlass.html

Daran hat sich nichts geändert. Im Gegenteil: Die STASI-Connections zu Putin und auch nach China werden intensiver genutzt denn je:

  • für Subventionsbetrug
  • Energie-Pipelines
  • Gazprom Deutschland
  • Cybercrime
  • Zersetzung der deutschen und europäischen Politik, Justiz, Medien und Wirtschaft

Wie schon immer werden die STASI-Seilschaften aus Moskau dirigiert.

Denn auch Wladimir Putin ist einer von ihnen:

Quellbild anzeigen

 

Video – THE KGB LIST REVEALED

You want to check whether a certain person was or is in the KGB ? You may look at on this website http://www.berndpulch.org in the KGB spies category for more information.

Insider – Mutmassliche IM Erika trifft Putin – Bundesregierung fordert erneut russische Hilfe in Mordfall

Insider – Mutmassliche IM Erika trifft Putin – Bundesregierung fordert erneut russische Hilfe in Mordfall

Putins Stasi-Ausweis aus Dresdner Archiv

Putins STASI-Ausweis aus Dresdner Archiv

 

Vor dem Ukraine-Gipfel in Paris hat Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel (CDU) mit dem russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin ein Einzelgespräch geführt.
Über die Inhalte machte die deutsche Seite am Montag zunächst keine Angaben. Es war erwartet worden, dass Merkel den Mord an einem Georgier in Berlin anspricht, der zu einer diplomatischen Krise zwischen Deutschland und Russland geführt hat.

Kurz vor der Abreise Merkels nach Paris hatte die Bundesregierung erneut eine “ernsthafte und unverzügliche Mitwirkung der russischen Behörden” an der Aufklärung des Verbrechens gefordert. Man sei “weiterhin bestürzt über die Tat”, sagte die stellvertretende Regierungssprecherin Ulrike Demmer.
Wegen fehlender Kooperation bei der Aufklärung des mutmaßlichen Auftragsmords am 23. August im Kleinen Tiergarten in Berlin hatte die Bundesregierung zwei russische Diplomaten ausgewiesen. Die von Moskau angekündigte Reaktion steht noch aus. Der Generalbundesanwalt hat wegen der grundsätzlichen Bedeutung des Falls die Ermittlungen übernommen.

Die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden und die Bundesregierung hätten “verschiedene russische Stellen mit Anfragen zu dem Fall befasst”, sagte Demmer. Genauer wollte sie es nicht sagen. Russland weist die Vorwürfe zurück.

Putins STASI-Ausweis:

Von Seiten der Stasiunterlagenbehörde heißt es: “Es war übliche Praxis beim DDR-Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, die Verbindungsoffiziere des russischen Geheimdienstes KGB und die ihnen untergeordneten Offiziere wie Putin mit Hausausweisen der zuständigen MfS-Dienststelle auszustatten.”

Putin war Augenzeuge, als während der friedlichen Revolution am 5. Dezember 1989 rund 5000 Demonstranten die hermetisch abgeschirmte Dresdner Bezirksverwaltung der Staatssicherheit besetzten. Als sich die Demonstranten der Dienststelle näherten, kam es fast zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen mit sowjetischen Militärs.

Aufgrund einer Medienanfrage seien Akten der Abteilung “Kader und Schulung” der ehemaligen Stasi-Bezirksverwaltung Dresden durchforstet worden, sagte Felber. Dabei sei man auf den Ausweis gestoßen. “Es ist schon eine kleine Sensation. Putins Name war in den Akten, die die Ausgabe der Ausweise an sowjetische Militärangehörige nachweisen, nicht verzeichnet.”

 

Im Internet wird daraufhin gewiesen, dass Angela Merkel von zahlreichen IM’s umgeben gewesen sei. Daraus wird geschlussfolgert, dass auch sie für den Staatssicherheitsdienst gearbeitet hätte. Tatsächlich waren wenigstens drei ihrer Kollegen am Zentralinstitut beim Staatssicherheitsdienst als Informanten erfasst: Hans-Jörg Osten (IM “Einstein”), Frank Schneider (IM “Bachmann”) und Michael Schindhelm (IM “Manfred Weih”). Mit Letzterem, den PDS-Kultursenator Thomas Flierl 2005 zum Generaldirektor der Berliner Opernstiftung berief, teilte sie sich eine Zeit lang ihr Büro. Als sie 1989 zum Demokratischen Aufbruch stieß, arbeitete sie mit einem weiteren Stasi-Informanten, dem ersten Parteivorsitzenden Wolfgang Schnur (IM „Torsten“ und „Dr. Ralf Schirmer“) zusammen. Im April 1990 wurde sie schließlich stellvertretende Regierungssprecherin unter dem letzten DDR-Ministerpräsidenten Lothar de Maizière, der in MfS-Unterlagen als IM “Czerny” erfasst ist.

 

IM Czerny mit Merkel

 

IM ERIKA – Im Internet verbreitetes “Filmplakat”

 

“Unsere Ex-FDJ-Sekretärin Angela Merkel lebe hoch” – Stasi-Opfer-Demonstration 2016 in Berlin

Historiker Hubertus Knabe kommentiert: “Nimmt man alle diese Fakten zusammen, muss man zu folgendem Schluss kommen: Für die Behauptung, Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel hätte unter dem Decknamen “Erika” für den Staatssicherheitsdienst gearbeitet, gibt es keinerlei Belege. Sollte es einen entsprechenden IM-Vorgang gegeben haben, müssten selbst im Fall seiner Vernichtung zumindest noch Spuren davon erhalten sein – zum Beispiel Berichte aus der Quelle “Erika”, die in den Akten ausgespähter Personen abgelegt wurden. Das ist nach gegenwärtigem Kenntnisstand aber nicht der Fall. Ob die Säcke mit den zerrissenen Unterlagen darüber hinaus gehende Hinweise enthalten, bleibt Spekulation.”

QUELLE:

IM Erika – eine Spurensuche

GRU-KGB Mord an Putin-Feind mitten in Berlin – die Spur führt nach Moskau

GRU-KGB Mord an Putin-Feind mitten in Berlin – die Spur führt nach Moskau

Langsam dämmert es auch den Mainstream-Medien, das GRU/KGB und Neo-STASI weiterhin aktiv sind und unbequeme Gegner überall auf der Welt ermorden – auch in BERLIN. So berichtet nunmehr auch die wachgeküsste Tagesschau:

“Zelimkhan Khangoshvili fürchtete um sein Leben. Der russische Staat sei hinter ihm her, berichtete der Tschetschene mit georgischem Pass bei seiner Asylanhörung im brandenburgischen Eisenhüttenstadt im Januar 2017. Mehrere Mordanschläge habe es in den vergangenen Jahren auf ihn gegeben, so der ehemalige Rebellenkommandeur. Er sei ein gesuchter Mann – im Kaukasus und darüber hinaus. Was er denn befürchte, wenn er nach Russland zurückkehren müsste, wollte der Mitarbeiter des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) von ihm wissen. Khangoshvilis Antwort: “Die russischen Organe werden einen Mord inszenieren.”

Am 23. August 2019, gegen 11:58 Uhr, wurde Zelimkhan Khangoshvili schließlich ermordet. Nicht in Russland oder im Kaukasus, sondern mitten in Berlin. Im Kleinen Tiergarten im Ortsteil Moabit war der 40-Jährige gerade auf dem Weg zum Freitagsgebet in der Moschee, als sich ein Mann auf einem Fahrrad näherte und ihm aus kurzer Distanz mit einer Pistole samt Schalldämpfer in den Kopf schoss. Khangoshvili war sofort tot.

Der Mord an dem Georgier gibt seitdem Rätsel auf: Wer steckt hinter dem Attentat? War es ein Auftragsmord aus dem kriminellen Milieu? Eine Fehde unter Kaukasiern? Oder gar ein Attentat im Auftrag des Kreml?

Der mutmaßliche Todesschütze hatte nach der Tat versucht mit einem E-Roller zu fliehen, war jedoch festgenommen worden: Es ist ein stämmiger Mann mit Schnauzbart und auffälligen Tätowierungen. Laut Pass handelt es sich um den russischen Staatsbürger Vadim Sokolov. Er sitzt in Berlin in Untersuchungshaft und schweigt. Einmal soll er Besuch von Diplomaten aus der russischen Botschaft bekommen haben, die ihn konsularisch betreuen.

Die Ermittlungen in dem Fall führt das Berliner Landeskriminalamt (LKA). Der Vorwurf gegen den festgenommenen Tatverdächtigen lautete bislang: Mord. Weil die Tat aber eine so große Brisanz birgt, lässt sich der Generalbundesanwalt seit Beginn an über den Stand der Ermittlungen informieren. Und auch das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) ist beteiligt.

Jetzt könnte der Fall allerdings eine neue Dimension bekommen: Die Bundesanwaltschaft will das Verfahren nach Informationen von WDR, NDR und “Süddeutscher Zeitung” noch in dieser Woche übernehmen. Und zwar wegen eines möglichen Geheimdienst-Hintergrunds. In Karlsruhe geht man inzwischen davon aus, dass der russische Staat den Mord in Berlin-Moabit in Auftrag gegeben haben könnte. Auch der “Spiegel” hatte darüber berichtet.

Ein Abgleich der biometrischen Daten der damaligen Fahndungsbilder ergab nun eine hohe Ähnlichkeit mit dem in Berlin festgenommenen Tatverdächtigen Sokolov. Auffällig war allerdings: Russland hatte die internationale Fahndung nach Vadim K. im Jahr 2015 ganz plötzlich eingestellt. Der Verdacht der deutschen Ermittler ist nun: Russische Dienste könnten den mutmaßlichen Mörder gefunden und für ein Attentat rekrutiert haben. Und schufen daraufhin die Falschidentität Sokolov.”

In Geheimdienstkreisen ist man sich sicher, es war Putins langer Arm in Berlin.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF – Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment: Russian Strategic Intentions

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF – Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment: Russian Strategic Intentions

Understanding the fate of worldwide rivalry and struggle is presently more significant than any time in recent memory. In a powerfully evolving world, the nature and character of fighting, prevention, compellence, acceleration the executives, and influence are critical and basic in deciding how the US and its accomplices should:

• Strategize to shield their worldwide advantages against exercises that are proposed to undermine those interests over the range of rivalry;

• Shield their inclinations against dangers by provincial contenders through available resources corresponding to procedures versus China and Russia however don’t undermine different interests; and

• Get ready US and accomplice powers to react to unforeseen and lithe improvements in worldwide legislative issues and innovation by distinguishing territories for participation, moderating the danger of exercises shy of equipped clash, and preventing furnished clash over various wellsprings of national power (e.g., exchange, tact, security).

The National Security System (NSS), National Safeguard Methodology (NDS), and National Military Procedure all note that future encounters between significant forces may regularly happen underneath the degree of outfitted clash. In this condition, monetary challenge, impact crusades, paramilitary activities, digital interruptions, and political fighting will probably turn out to be increasingly pervasive. Such encounters increment the danger of misperception and miscount, between powers with huge military quality, which may then build the danger of furnished clash. In this specific situation, the US ability to impact the results of both worldwide and local occasions must be reexamined. The developing uniqueness among incredible forces (i.e., the US, China, and Russia) with respect to what comprises authentic or adequate discouragement, compellence, and acceleration the board exercises ought to be deliberately analyzed.

With that in mind, this white paper surveys Russian exercises over the globe to assemble an improved, major comprehension of the contemporary and future impact condition. Countering Russian provocative exercises requires an exhaustive technique and the NDS perceives this reality so as to effectively counter Russian provocative exercises; thus, the US should cooperatively utilize various instruments of national control in a synchronized way. As white paper supporter Brig Gen (ret) Ransack Spalding III recommends, “the US job with respect to Russia ought to be to keep on connecting with European partners to lead the pack for adjusting in Europe. The partners’ objective ought to be discouragement. Simultaneously, the US ought to reciprocally connect with Russia to strip them away from China’s circle. The US can work with Russia in manners that improve the US-Russia relationship without diminishing European endeavors to adjust and dissuade.”

The articles in this white paper give government partners—knowledge, law authorization, military, and approach organizations—with important bits of knowledge and systematic structures to help the US, its partners, and accomplices in building up a thorough methodology to contend and vanquish this Russian test. Critical perceptions include:

• Russia is receiving coercive systems that include the arranged work of military and nonmilitary intends to stop and constrain the US, its partners and accomplices before and after the flare-up of threats. These procedures must be proactively stood up to, or the risk of critical outfitted clash may increment.

• Russia displays a profound situated feeling of geopolitical uncertainty which propels it to seek after key goals that set up an uncontested range of prominence in the post-Soviet locale. However, Russians progressively can’t help contradicting the Kremlin’s statements that the US is an approaching outside risk and an incendiary power in Russian local governmental issues.

• Russia’s hazy area strategies are best when the objective is profoundly captivated or does not have the ability to oppose and react successfully to Russian animosity. As per Russian vital idea, discouragement and compellence are cut out of the same cloth.

Just with an adjusted and synchrozined entire of government approach will the US contend and win against rising powers like Russia and China. Such cooperation requires a typical comprehension of our rivals, their strategies and wanted endstates and we mean that this white paper will accomplish this basic objective.

This white paper was set up as a major aspect of the Key Multilayer Asssessment, entitled The Eventual fate of Worldwide Challenge and Struggle. Twenty-three master donors added to this white paper and gave wide-going evaluations of Russia’s worldwide advantages and targets, just as the exercises—dim or something else—that it behaviors to accomplish them. This white paper is separated into five segments and twenty-five sections, as depicted underneath. This rundown reports a portion of the white paper’s significant level discoveries, yet it is not a viable alternative for a cautious read of the individual commitments.

There is expansive agreement among the patrons that Russian President Vladimir Putin is in reality holding fast to a worldwide fantastic technique, which expects to accomplish the accompanying objectives:

• Recover and verify Russia’s impact over previous Soviet countries

• Recapture overall acknowledgment as an “incredible power”

• Depict itself as a solid entertainer, a key local powerbroker, and a fruitful middle person (Katz; Borshchevskaya) so as to increase financial, military, and political impact over countries

worldwide and to refine the radical decides and standards that at present administer the world request (Lamoreaux)

As per Dr. Robert Individual, these objectives are inspired by Russia’s profound situated geopolitical frailty. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Association, Russia has battled to discover its place in the worldwide network, which has left the administration with a waiting want to recapture the impact and power that it once had. Specifically, Russia tries to recover its impact over previous Soviet states, which it claims are in its legitimate “authoritative reach” (Lamoreaux; Individual; Swamp). Therefore, one of the US’s center objectives, to be specific advancing and securing the worldwide liberal request, comes into conflict with the objectives of Russia’s terrific system. This supports the Kremlin’s conviction that it must contain and compel US impact and exercises in Europe and somewhere else over the globe. As Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya’s commitment recommends, the Russian initiative’s perspective is lose-lose; it accepts that with the end goal for Russia to win, the US must lose. In any case, Dr. Christopher Swamp’s commitment recommends that this world view isn’t really shared by the Russian populace or its tip top.

As prove by the scope of “hazy area” exercises it takes part in, some of the master donors contend that the Russian administration considers itself to be at war with the US and the West all in all. From a Russian point of view, this war isn’t add up to, yet rather, it is basic (Goure)— a kind of “war” that is inconsistent with the general US comprehension of fighting. Russia accepts that there is no inadmissible or ill-conceived type of prevention, compellence, or heightening administration (Goure). It additionally doesn’t put stock in the continuum of contention that the US has developed. Like Russia’s view of its opposition with the US, its impression of contention is dichotomous: one is either at war or not at war. To battle and win this war, Russia accepts that the effective incorporation of all instruments of state control (Goure), just as the coordinated work of non-military and military intends to deflect and constrain (Flynn), are foremost. Moreover, Russian military ideas incorporate choices for utilizing preemptive power to incite stun and deter a foe from directing military tasks and to urge a de-heightening of threats (Flynn). The creators see that Russia’s methodologies are persistently advancing and expect that the inconsistency between the Russian and the US comprehension of “contention” and “war” will keep on developing, prompting a higher danger of acceleration in future circumstances including the two countries.

By and large, Russia’s impact abroad is developing, and the Kremlin has aced the utilization of “cross breed fighting” in driving Russia’s international strategy (Lamoreaux). Russia uses an assortment of hazy area strategies around the world. These incorporate the utilization of paramilitary powers and different intermediaries, obstruction in political procedures, financial and vitality abuse (especially in Africa), surveillance, and media and publicity control. Putin is likewise adroit at mixing military and non military personnel components for most extreme effect (Weitz).

The particular strategies of half and half fighting that Russia utilizes change by locale. In Europe, for instance, Russia has used purposeful publicity, an expanding reliance on outside vitality assets, and political control to accomplish its essential objectives (Schindler; Lamoreaux). Interestingly, in the Center East and Africa—significant wellsprings of minerals and other regular assets from a Russian perspective1—Russia has fundamentally used financial abuse devices (Katz; Borshchevskaya; Severin). In Focal Asia, Russia keeps up a significantly more constrained nearness, because of China’s geographic closeness and the present degrees of monetary and security commitment by other provincial on-screen characters (Kangas). By the by, Russia retains impact in the Focal Asia, because of its authentic, etymological, and social associations with the district (Laruelle; Dyet). In like manner, in Latin America, Russia comes up short on an adequate measure of deployable assets to completely execute its methodology or to broaden its impact far (Ellis). Be that as it may, as Dr. Barnett S. Koven and Ms. Abigail C. Kamp watch, Russia compensates for its deficiencies by taking part in long winded and receptive undertakings to upset US impact in the locale.

Stasi-Agent Putin Allzeit Bereit in Moskau & Dresden

Bildergebnis für putin stasi


In einem Archiv wurde der Stasi-Ausweis des heutigen russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin gefunden. Mit dem Ausweis habe er in Stasi-Dienststellen ein- und ausgehen können. Damit zeigt sich, dass es noch etliche Stasi-Promis gibt, die bis jetzt noch nicht enttarnt wurden. Diese Stasi-“Stars” sind nicht auf der offiziellen Stasi-Liste verzeichnet, die im Hinblick auf Rentenforderungen vor dem Ende der DDR erstellt wurde.

Folgen jetzt noch mehr Enttarnungen ?

Russlands Präsident Wladimir Putin (66) hatte bis zum Mauerfall auch einen Ausweis der Staatssicherheit der DDR. Das Dokument habe jahrelang unbemerkt im Archiv gelegen, sagte der Dresdner Außenstellenleiter der Stasiunterlagenbehörde, Konrad Felber..

Der Ausweis war am 31. Dezember 1985 ausgestellt und bis Ende 1989 immer wieder verlängert worden. Putin war damals als Offizier des sowjetischen Geheimdienstes KGB in Dresden tätig.

Mit dem Dokument habe Putin ohne umfangreiche Kontrolle in den Dienststellen der Stasi ein- und ausgehen können, erläuterte Felber.

“Das heißt aber nicht automatisch, dass Putin für die Stasi gearbeitet hat.” Nein, denn die Stasi hat för Putins KGB gearbeitet und diverse Seilschaftenvor allem in Ostberlin tun dies heute noch – Mord und Cyberkrieg inklusive.

“Zu sowjetischen Zeiten waren der KGB und die Stasi befreundete Dienste. Deshalb ist nicht auszuschließen, dass es auch wechselseitige Ausweise gab”, sagte Putins Sprecher Dmitri Peskow der Agentur Tass zufolge.

Putin war Augenzeuge, als während der friedlichen Revolution am 5. Dezember 1989 rund 5.000 Demonstranten die hermetisch abgeschirmte Dresdner Bezirksverwaltung der Staatssicherheit besetzten. Als sich die Demonstranten der Dienststelle näherten, kam es fast zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen mit sowjetischen Militärs.

Bildergebnis für putin stasi

 

Aufgrund einer Medienanfrage seien Akten der Abteilung “Kader und Schulung” der ehemaligen Stasi-Bezirksverwaltung Dresden durchforstet worden, sagte Felber. Dabei sei man auf den Ausweis gestoßen.

“Es ist schon eine kleine Sensation. Putins Name war in den Akten, die die Ausgabe der Ausweise an sowjetische Militärangehörige nachweisen, nicht verzeichnet.”

Es zeigt sich wieder einmal, wie die Stasiunterlagenbehörde, die seit Beginn mit Stasi-Agenten durchsetzt war und ist, arbeitet.

Bildergebnis für putin stasi

Wann kommen endlich die längst überfälligen anderen Enttarnungen ?

 

No Joke ! How Putin and his CYBERSTASI tricked the UK into the Brexit

No Joke ! How Putin and his CYBERSTASI tricked the UK into the Brexit

We are Proud Bear. We are collective of Russia GRU agents retrained in fields of digital telephony and Myspace.

For years we help people of England make freedom from the European Union and democracy voting. Here is how:

But why nobody talk of this winning?? Why are friends Boris and Nigel not shouting this from the tabletops?? Why are people of United England not clapping us with loudness??

We don’t know the reasons. So we are asking YOU – friends in Britain – to pay for THE BIGGEST SCREEN BILLBOARD IN SOON-TO-BE-NOT-EUROPE to celebrate our together success. Let’s make big conversation on this important winning.

LET US MAKE GOOD THIS BILLBOARD TO CELEBRATE A RED, WHITE & BLUE BREXIT!

https://www.facebook.com/plugins/video.php?href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fproudbear1999%2Fvideos%2F306975890138779%2F&show_text=1&width=476

(This billboard is just photoshop picture fake. Together we pay for buy reality billboard in London Waterloo station!)

LET US PAINT THE ENGLAND RED, WHITE AND BLUE!

Deadline for 💰💰💰 is Heroes of the Fatherland Day on December 7, 2018!

£2,837.00 raised£55,000 target

High tech totaliser that updates at least once EVERY 24 HOURS!

CHIP IN!Generous peoples providing their Rubles or Pounds (not Euros) to this noble cause will join the exclusive Proud Bear Supporters Club, bringing untold happiness to all.

Let us shout as one voice:

Happy Brexit! Cheers! Nostrovia! Novichok!