King Kong vs Godzilla – Full Sci-Fi Action Movie – Michael Keith

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Watch #KingKongVsGodzilla Hollywood epic movie. Starring Michael Keith, Harry Holcombe, James Yagi, Tadao Takashima and Keji Sahaka. Directed by Ishirō Hondatch

The Nurse (1997) | Hollywood Thriller Movie – Lisa Zane, John Stockwell

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Watch #TheNurse 1997 Thriller movie. Starring Lisa Zane, John Stockwell, John Stockwell, Nancy Dussault and Sherrie Rose. Directed by Robert Malenfant. Music by Richard Bowers Produced by Richard Brandes #ActionThrillerMovie #HollywoodActionMovie #HollywoodThrillerMovie Synopsis A traumatized nurse plots revenge against a catatonic businessman, whom she blames for the death of her father. She integrates herself in to his family as his personal nurse and plots revenge by killing off his family members one by one.

The Front Page -Steamboat Bill, Jr. (1928) | Silent Comedy Movie – Buster Keaton, Ernest Torrence

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Watch #SteamboatBill,Jr. 1928 Silent Comedy Movie. Starring Buster Keaton and Ernest Torrence, Directed by Charles Reisner, Produced by Joseph M. Schenck. #BusterKeatonMovie #ComedyMovie #LatestHollywoodMovies #HollywoodMovies #ActionThrillerMovie

How to Murder Your Wife (1965) – Romantic Comedy Movie – Jack Lemmon, Virna Lisi

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Watch #HowtoMurderYourWife 1965 Romantic Comedy movie.

Starring Jack Lemmon, Virna Lisi, Terry-Thomas, Claire Trevor, Sidney Blackmer and Max Showalter. Directed by Richard Quine Music by Neal Hefti Produced by George Axelrod

The Front Page – Chai Bisket Stories – Suhas

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An aspiring filmmaker narrates a highly complex story to a producer. As his story unfolds, we will find out if the narrator is successful in getting his story approved.

Starring Suhas & Sridhar

Directed by Filmian

Produced by Anurag & Sharath

Music by Karthik Rodriguez

Cinematography by Shreekar Khajandar

Editing by Pavan Kalyan

The Front Page – Full Movie

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A crusading newspaper editor tricks his retiring star reporter into covering one last case. Director: Lewis Milestone Writers: Ben Hecht, Charles MacArthur Stars: Adolphe Menjou, Pat O’Brien, Mary Brian Genres: Classics, Comedy, Crime, Drama, Romance

UNVEILED – Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat, Dump It

Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat, Dump It

First Cyber Command Defeat:

http://cryptome.org/0002/uscybercom/uscybercom-defeat.htm

Cyber Command suffered its second defeat with the win of Edward Snowden. The first defeat was won by Bradley Manning. This suggests Cybercom deserves dissolution and a better command instituted, or, best, nothing like it.

The commander for both losses, General Keith Alexander, has to go. And a new, agile Cybercom, if it is to endure, needs to be separated from the venerable, deeply experienced, albeit sclerotic, National Security Agency. Different missions require different enabling legislation, leadership, funding, policy, staffing, training, operation and security.

An effective Cybercom may not be possible within the military culture of tradition, over-staffing, minutely specified military occupation specialty, heirarchical rank, medieval separation of officers from enlisted members, advancement in rank by longevity and favoritism, special training for combat, and further divided between military and civilian — the latter further fragmented between inside civilians and outside contractors with multiple sub-contractors.

The legislation and implementation of this complex traditional, command-driven organization assures it will not be capable of handling the challenges of cyber swarming, rapid evolution of technology and techniques — much of it grown outside established institutions — youthful contempt for authority, national and international disloyalty and disinterest, and most of all, ingrained insurgency.

For this insurgency, outwitting national security establishments is considered to be sport, a game, a test of prowess, bragging rights, and it is winning in cyber space, only periodically, laughingly infrequently, defeated, caputured and imprisoned by use of legacy, lumbering, clumsy, expensive, failure-and-excuse-prone mechanisms, in which legacy leaders like NSA, FBI, CIA, White House and Congress — supported by contractors, lobbyists and donors — can only dissimulate, apologize and promise to do better with more funding and more draconian crack-down on civil liberties.

Cyber Command is a failure — sibling of Department of Homeland Security — a boondoggle, a huge transfer of funds to the cybersecurity (and homeland security) industry from legacy military pork barrels. Thousands of suitably-skilled youngsters — most self-trained by a subversive culture hostile to authority — have been enlisted, hired and contracted to run cyber offensive and defensive operations under the rigidly ranked command of military officers accustomed to obedience and respect of rank.

Cybersecurity contracting — commercial and institutional — is an equally great failure. It too is a boondoggle, spoiled rotten with generous and laxly-overseen funding, often led by ex-military officers and those long accustomed to military grade perquisites, protected by secrecy, back-slapping, insider favoritism, laziness, lack of competition, forgiveness of corruption, shallow and classified IG investigation, all the attributes of its single customer, the national security consortium beloved of governments and autocrats.

No wonder the coddled and well-paid youngsters defy, dance around, ridicule and outrun these balloon-headed officers and liquored-contractors, this is what they have done most of their teenage and adult lives. Their loyalty is to their own culture, open, non-secret, disputatious, daring and fun-filled, most emphatically not venerated-military or rich-contractor grade.

What would a replacement for Cybercom be like? Not military, not commercial, not NGO, then what?

Plenty of cyber initiatives are underway which demonstrate effective alternatives to heirarchical military, commercial and NGO cyber deadwood. They have been created and are run by some of the most brilliant brains and imaginations in the world, agile, cheap, mostly volunteer and leaderless, disputatious, humorous, dismissive of authority of any kind, gov, mil, com, edu, org.

Don’t expect to hire or contract or academicize them. The best of them do not go inside institutions — except to social engineer and disclose the secrets of authoritative corruption.

Examples abound: just read the official demonizations of outsiders spilling insider secrets of gov, mil, com and ngo.

Instead of wasting treasure on dim-witted cybercommands listen to those secret-spilling demons, better understood as angels out-dancing the pinheads.

Der Anfang vom Ende des “GoMoPa”-“Nawito”-Google-Terrors

BGH-Urteil zu Suchmaschinen
Richter nehmen Google-Vorschläge unter die Lupe
Ein Kosmetikhersteller hat vor dem BGH ein wegweisendes Urteil erstritten: Künftig können Suchmaschinenbetreiber für Verletzungen des Persönlichkeitsrechts bei sogenannten Autocomplete-Vorschlägen haftbar gemacht werden.

Von Michael Reissenberger, SWR

Gernot Lehr, der Anwalt von Bettina Wulff, die ihren Ruf gegen Rotlichtgerüchte vor Gericht verteidigt, hatte den richtigen Riecher, als er kürzlich eine Vertagung des laufenden Verfahrens erwirkte. Denn das jüngste Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs (BGH) sorgt künftig für Schutz für alle, die sich beim Googeln ihres Namens von Suchvorschlägen beleidigt fühlen.

Die Bundesrichter nehmen jetzt die Betreiber von Suchmaschinen stärker in die Pflicht. Sie müssen zwar nicht selber das Netz auf alle Suchwortkombinationen, die vielleicht Anstoß erregen könnten, durchpflügen. Denn – so sagen die Bundesrichter – im Prinzip sei gegen eine Suchwortergänzung nichts einzuwenden. Schließlich würden von einer Rechenmaschine zunächst nur Suchvorschläge von Internetnutzern ausgewertet.

Geldentschädigung für Rufschädigungen

Aber sie müssen spätestens reagieren, wenn Betroffene auf solche Rufschädigungen per Internet hinweisen. Die Internetunternehmen müssen dann zumindest rechtswidrige Verletzungen des Persönlichkeitsrechts abstellen und bei weiteren Verstößen auch eine Geldentschädigung bezahlen.

Schutz der Persönlichkeitsrecht hat Vorrang
tagesschau 20:00 Uhr, 14.05.2013, Gigi Deppe, SWR
Download der Videodatei
Ein Kosmetikhersteller hat dieses Urteil für Google-Geschädigte erstritten. Er sah seinen Namen zu Unrecht mit den Kombinationswörtern Scientology und Betrug in den Schmutz gezogen und bestand darauf, dass er in keinerlei Zusammenhang mit diesem als geldgierig verrufenen Sektenbetrieb steht oder stand. Zudem sei ihm kein Betrug vorzuwerfen, es habe auch kein entsprechendes Ermittlungsverfahren gegeben. Die Suchergebnisse von Google würden auch keine einzige Seite auflisten, die eine Verbindung zwischen dem Kosmetikhersteller und den beiden Ergänzungswörtern Scientology und Betrug aufweisen.

Ihm hatten Kölner Richter in zwei Instanzen den Schutz gegen den Internetriesen verweigert. Es seien schließlich nur mathematische Effekte je nach Suchworthäufigkeit, kein Internetnutzer nehme für bare Münze, welche Suchwortvorschläge da kommen, so hatten die Kölner Juristen argumentiert.

Hintergrund
Googles Autocomplete-Funktion
Ein praktischer Helfer mit Risiken | mehr
Google allzu dickfellig

Doch nun muss Google solche Beschwerden wegen Rufmords ernster nehmen. Auch im Fall von Bettina Wulff dürfte mit dem jetzigen Bundesgerichtshofurteil klar sein, dass der Internetkonzern sich in den letzten Monaten allzu dickfellig verhalten hat. Die Rotlichtgerüchte um die Präsidentengattin, die der Google-Suchwortmodus verbreitet hat, waren ja schon seit längerem öffentliches Thema, bis sich Bettina Wulff entschloss, dagegen vorzugehen. Hier dürfte sehr spannend werden, ob und welche Geldentschädigung hier verlangt werden kann.

Der Bundesgerichtshof hatte auch im vorliegenden Fall noch nicht darüber zu entscheiden, weil er das Kölner Musterverfahren nochmal an die untere Instanz zur Nachbesserung zurückgeschickt hat. Die Bundesrichter kündigten aber im Grundsatz bei solchen Google-Rufschädigungen einen Anspruch auf Geldentschädigung zumindest in engen Grenzen an.

Würden Sie dem mutmasslichen Auftraggeber von Internet-Verbrechern, Otmar Knoll, “Fairvesta”, Geld anvertrauen ?

Liebe Leser,

wir haben eine Umfrage gestartet:

Würden Sie dem mutmasslichen Auftraggeber von Internet-Verbrechern, Otmar Knoll, “Fairvesta”, der diese Taten selbst per E-Mail ankündigt, Ihr Geld anvertrauen ?

Und zu welchen Taten halten Sie so jemanden noch für fähig ?

Wir freuen uns auf Ihre Reaktionen !

Hier die Belege für die monatelangen Internet-Attacken der Internet-Kriminellen, die Graphiken zeigen die DDos-Attacken auf über 20 Webseiten:

https://berndpulch.org/2013/04/04/a-overview-of-the-heavy-cyberattacks-on-our-websites-to-stop-the-truth-done-by-the-suspects/

und

https://berndpulch.org/2013/04/05/even-more-mental-and-pysical-attacks-on-our-servers-by-the-suspects-of-gomopa-nawito-otmar-knoll-and-peter-ehlers/

Hier die Rechtslage:

https://berndpulch.org/2013/04/05/die-rechtslage-bei-schweren-internet-angriffen-wie-von-mutmasslich-gomopa-nawito-und-konsorten/

Hier die Bekenner-E-Mail des dubiosen “Otmar Knoll” von der dubiosen “fairvesta”:

 

Zitat OtmarKnoll/Fairvesta:

 

Subject:  

AW: AW: AW: AW: [Fwd: Your enquiry]

From:  

“Knoll, Otmar”

Date:  

Tue, February 5, 2013 8:14 pm

To:  

“‘office@ebizz.tv'”

Priority:  

Normal

Options:  

View Full Header | View Printable Version  | Download this as a file

 

Schade dass Sie nicht hören wollen, nun ist es zu spät, vielleicht überlegen Sie
sich das noch mal.
Den wenn die Domains offline gehen, dann haben Sie kein Medium mehr.
Wer nicht hören will muss fühlen sagt ein Sprichwort.
        
        
        http://i-nvestment.com/category/leserbrief/
        
        
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
        
Otmar Knoll
Handlungsbevollmächtigter
        
fairvesta Group AG
Konrad-Adenauer-Str. 15
D - 72072 Tübingen
Tel:  +49 (0)7071 3665-0
Fax: +49 (0)7071 3665-77
        o.knoll@fairvesta.de 
www.fairvesta.de
        
Amtsgericht Stuttgart HRB 382675
Vorstand: Hermann Geiger
Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrates: Alfred Renner
Sitz: Tübingen
USt.-IdNr.: DE814337296

Subject:  

Jetzt aber offline

From:  

“Knoll, Otmar” <O.Knoll@fairvesta.de>

Date:  

Tue, February 5, 2013 11:20 pm

To:  

“‘office@ebizz.tv'” <office@ebizz.tv>

Priority:  

Normal

Options:  

View Full Header | View Printable Version  | Download this as a file

 

http://www.investment-on.com/component/content/article/34-investment-m

UPS, ist wohl offline gegangen, da haben meine Rundschreiben wohl geholfen. So wie
es aussieht ist Ihre Seite nicht mehr erreichbar, insbesondere nachdem Sie meine
letzten Mails online gestellt haben. Haben Sie wirklich geglaubt das das durchgeht
und wir uns das gefallen lassen?

Das kann auch mit den andern Domains so gehen, Sie haben ja noch genügend online!

....
Also Sie
haben keine Chance!
 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
 
Otmar Knoll
Handlungsbevollmächtigter
 
fairvesta Group AG
Konrad-Adenauer-Str. 15
D - 72072 Tübingen
Tel:  +49 (0)7071 3665-0
Fax: +49 (0)7071 3665-77
o.knoll@fairvesta.de
www.fairvesta.de
 
Amtsgericht Stuttgart HRB 382675
Vorstand: Hermann Geiger
Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrates: Alfred Renner
Sitz: Tübingen
USt.-IdNr.: DE814337296
 
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Unveiled – Seduced by Secrets – Inside the STASI Tech World – The E-Book – Free Download

Seduced-by-Secrets-Inside-the-Stasis-Spy-Tech-World-2008-Macrakis

In addition to revealing who the spies were, where they worked, and why they did what they did, the Rosenholz material unmasks an incredibly bloated human web of recruiters, instructors, couriers, and residents. The spiderweb was designed to support an agent, but was not cost-effective while it ensnared the secrets of the West. The Stasi simply overestimated the power of stolen technological secrets to solve its economic problems, and the enormous spy infrastructure investment produced a very small return.”

“Scientific-technical intelligence gathering for the MfS usually meant recruiting agents who had access to important Western companies like IBM. Occasionally foreigners volunteered to contribute to the MfS’s scientific developments. An unusual offer came in the mid-sixties from an American computer specialist, Henry Sherwood, who wanted to help East Germany’s data processing industry. Born in Berlin under the name Heinz Weizenbaum, he fled the Nazis in 1936 and arrived in America, where he changed his name while in the U.S. Army. His brother was the famous MIT computer professor Joseph Weizenbaum. Sherwood was invited to direct the Diebold European research program in 1966 and invited the East German Data Processing and Business Machines Company to take part in the program.

Suspicious that Sherwood might be an agent for a capitalist company, the Stasi set four informants on him at the Diebold Conference and between 1966 and 1969 launched ‘Action World Stature’ to try to use the material from the various conferences. Unfortunately, the Stasi staff members did not know English and could not effectively use the material. When Sherwood visited Erfurt, he brought IBM manuals and other material with him, which the Stasi photographed. When there was an opportunity for a German to go to America to acquire more knowledge about data processing, the Stasi vetoed the trip because they were worried that the scientist might be recruited and never come back.

And that was the main contradiction the Stasi presents us with: on the one hand, they vigorously supported state programs by acquiring the needed embargoed or secret technology. On the other hand, security concerns made them work against their own interests by restricting the needed international travel of scientists and by imposing other harmful security measures.

Die Rechtslage bei schweren Internet-Angriffen wie von mutmasslich “GoMoPa”, “Nawito” und Konsorten

Zitat:

Nachfolgend einige Links zu dem brisanten Thema, den wenn mutmasslich “GoMoPa”, “Nawito”, Sven Schmidt, “Eagle IT” und dubioser  “CTO” der dubiosen “GoMoPa” sowie sein mutmasslicher Genosse Thomas Promny und Genossen unsere starken Server ungestraft attackieren können, kann bald jedes Unternehmen ähnliche Probleme haben wie wir:

http://www.fr-online.de/wikileaks—die-enthuellungsplattform/ddos-attacken-sabotage-im-weltweiten-netz,4882932,4913810.html

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial_of_Service

http://www.internet-strafrecht.com/distributed-denial-of-service-ddos-attacken-strafbar-oder-nicht/internet-strafrecht/internetstrafrecht/

All das zeigt, welche Kriminellen hier in STASI-Manier am Werk sind:

Sie haben Angst vor der Wahrheit und können sich nur durch kriminelle Aktionen halten….

AN OVERVIEW OF THE HEAVY CYBERATTACKS ON OUR WEBSITES TO STOP THE TRUTH DONE BY THE SUSPECTS

These graphs below show the cyberattacks on our website initiated by the suspects we already mentioned and who even announced in an email that tehy would do this illegal internet crime. The email was by Otmar Knoll, Fairvesta, who announced the cybercrime. The suspected hackers are from “GoMoPa” and their thugs.

The graphs show the DDos attacks on our servers.

What is a DDos attack ?

Read here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack

These internet crimes are punished with  longterm jail sentences and financial compensation..

Die untenstehenden Graphiken zeigen die Hackernagriffe auf unsere Webseiten, die seit Jahren durchgeführt werden im Ausschnitt. In einer Email an uns hat Otmar Knoll, Fairvesta, die Hackerangriffe, somit schwere Internetverbrechen angekündigt. Wir haben diese Emails bereits veröffentlicht. Mutmasslich arbeitet Otmar Knoll mit den üblichen Verdächtigen der “GoMoPa”, ihren Informanten und Hackern zusammen:

Die Graphiken zeigen die sogenannten DDos-Angriffe auf unsere Server.

Was ist eine DDos Attacke ?

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial_of_Service

Lesen Sie hier:

Diese Vergehen werden mit langjährigen Freiheitsstrafen und Schadensersatz bestraft.

graph eastern

graph 3graph2graphgraphgraph

Cloudflare Inside View – Biggest DDos Attack in History on Spamhaus

At CloudFlare, we deal with large DDoS attacks every day. Usually, these attacks are directed at large companies or organizations that are reluctant to talk about their details. It’s fun, therefore, whenever we have a customer that is willing to let us tell the story of an attack they saw and how we mitigated it. This is one of those stories.

Spamhaus

Yesterday, Tuesday, March 19, 2013, CloudFlare was contacted by the non-profit anti-spam organization Spamhaus. They were suffering a large DDoS attack against their website and asked if we could help mitigate the attack.

Spamhaus_logo

Spamhaus provides one of the key backbones that underpins much of the anti-spam filtering online. Run by a tireless team of volunteers, Spamhaus patrols the Internet for spammers and publishes a list of the servers they use to send their messages in order to empower email system administrators to filter unwanted messages. Spamhaus’s services are so pervasive and important to the operation of the Internet’s email architecture that, when a lawsuit threatened to shut the service down, industry experts testified [PDF, full disclosure: I wrote the brief back in the day] that doing so risked literally breaking email since Spamhaus is directly or indirectly responsible for filtering as much as 80% of daily spam messages.

Beginning on March 18, the Spamhaus site came under attack. The attack was large enough that the Spamhaus team wasn’t sure of its size when they contacted us. It was sufficiently large to fully saturate their connection to the rest of the Internet and knock their site offline. These very large attacks, which are known as Layer 3 attacks, are difficult to stop with any on-premise solution. Put simply: if you have a router with a 10Gbps port, and someone sends you 11Gbps of traffic, it doesn’t matter what intelligent software you have to stop the attack because your network link is completely saturated.

Burst_pipe

While we don’t know who was behind this attack, Spamhaus has made plenty of enemies over the years. Spammers aren’t always the most lovable of individuals and Spamhaus has been threatened, sued, and DDoSed regularly. Spamhaus’s blocklists are distributed via DNS and there is a long list of volunteer organizations that mirror their DNS infrastructure in order to ensure it is resilient to attacks. The website, however, was unreachable.

Filling Up the Series of Tubes

Very large Layer 3 attacks are nearly always originated from a number of sources. These many sources each send traffic to a single Internet location, effectively creating a tidal wave that overwhelms the target’s resources. In this sense, the attack is distributed (the first D in DDoS — Distributed Denial of Service). The sources of attack traffic can be a group of individuals working together (e.g., the Anonymous LOIC model, although this is Layer 7 traffic and even at high volumes usually much smaller in volume than other methods), a botnet of compromised PCs, a botnet of compromised servers, misconfigured DNS resolvers, or even home Internet routers with weak passwords.

Since an attacker attempting to launch a Layer 3 attack doesn’t care about receiving a response to the requests they send, the packets that make up the attack do not have to be accurate or correctly formatted. Attackers will regularly spoof all the information in the attack packets, including the source IP, making it look like the attack is coming from a virtually infinite number of sources. Since packets data can be fully randomized, using techniques like IP filtering even upstream becomes virtually useless.

Spamhaus signed up for CloudFlare on Tuesday afternoon and we immediately mitigated the attack, making the site once again reachable. (More on how we did that below.) Once on our network, we also began recording data about the attack. At first, the attack was relatively modest (around 10Gbps). There was a brief spike around 16:30 UTC, likely a test, that lasted approximately 10 minutes. Then, around 21:30 UTC, the attackers let loose a very large wave.

The graph below is generated from bandwidth samples across a number of the routers that sit in front of servers we use for DDoS scrubbing. The green area represents in-bound requests and the blue line represents out-bound responses. While there is always some attack traffic on our network, it’s easy to see when the attack against Spamhaus started and then began to taper off around 02:30 UTC on March 20, 2013. As I’m writing this at 16:15 UTC on March 20, 2013, it appears the attack is picking up again.

How to Generate a 75Gbps DDoS

The largest source of attack traffic against Spamhaus came from DNS reflection. I’vewritten about these attacks before and in the last year they have become the source of the largest Layer 3 DDoS attacks we see (sometimes well exceeding 100Gbps). Open DNS resolvers are quickly becoming the scourge of the Internet and the size of these attacks will only continue to rise until all providers make a concerted effort to close them. (It also makes sense to implement BCP-38, but that’s a topic for another post another time.)

The basic technique of a DNS reflection attack is to send a request for a large DNS zone file with the source IP address spoofed to be the intended victim to a large number of open DNS resolvers. The resolvers then respond to the request, sending the large DNS zone answer to the intended victim. The attackers’ requests themselves are only a fraction of the size of the responses, meaning the attacker can effectively amplify their attack to many times the size of the bandwidth resources they themselves control.

In the Spamhaus case, the attacker was sending requests for the DNS zone file for ripe.net to open DNS resolvers. The attacker spoofed the CloudFlare IPs we’d issued for Spamhaus as the source in their DNS requests. The open resolvers responded with DNS zone file, generating collectively approximately 75Gbps of attack traffic. The requests were likely approximately 36 bytes long (e.g. dig ANY ripe.net @X.X.X.X +edns=0 +bufsize=4096, where X.X.X.X is replaced with the IP address of an open DNS resolver) and the response was approximately 3,000 bytes, translating to a 100x amplification factor.

We recorded over 30,000 unique DNS resolvers involved in the attack. This translates to each open DNS resolver sending an average of 2.5Mbps, which is small enough to fly under the radar of most DNS resolvers. Because the attacker used a DNS amplification, the attacker only needed to control a botnet or cluster of servers to generate 750Mbps — which is possible with a small sized botnet or a handful of AWS instances. It is worth repeating: open DNS resolvers are the scourge of the Internet and these attacks will become more common and large until service providers take serious efforts to close them.

How You Mitigate a 75Gbps DDoS

While large Layer 3 attacks are difficult for an on-premise DDoS solution to mitigate, CloudFlare’s network was specifically designed from the beginning to stop these types of attacks. We make heavy use of Anycast. That means the same IP address is announced from every one of our 23 worldwide data centers. The network itself load balances requests to the nearest facility. Under normal circumstances, this helps us ensure a visitor is routed to the nearest data center on our network.

When there’s an attack, Anycast serves to effectively dilute it by spreading it across our facilities. Since every data center announces the same IP address for any CloudFlare customer, traffic cannot be concentrated in any one location. Instead of the attack being many-to-one, it becomes many-to-many with no single point on the network acting as a bottleneck.

Once diluted, the attack becomes relatively easy to stop at each of our data centers. Because CloudFlare acts as a virtual shield in front of our customers sites, with Layer 3 attacks none of the attack traffic reaches the customer’s servers. Traffic to Spamhaus’s network dropped to below the levels when the attack started as soon as they signed up for our service.

Other Noise

While the majority of the traffic involved in the attack was DNS reflection, the attacker threw in a few other attack methods as well. One was a so-called ACK reflection attack. When a TCP connection is established there is a handshake. The server initiating the TCP session first sends a SYN (for synchronize) request to the receiving server. The receiving server responds with an ACK (for acknowledge). After that handshake, data can be exchanged.

In an ACK reflection, the attacker sends a number of SYN packets to servers with a spoofed source IP address pointing to the intended victim. The servers then respond to the victim’s IP with an ACK. Like the DNS reflection attack, this disguises the source of the attack, making it appear to come from legitimate servers. However, unlike the DNS reflection attack, there is no amplification factor: the bandwidth from the ACKs is symmetrical to the bandwidth the attacker has to generate the SYNs. CloudFlare is configured to drop unmatched ACKs, which mitigates these types of attacks.

Whenever we see one of these large attacks, network operators will write to us upset that we are attacking their infrastructure with abusive DNS queries or SYN floods. In fact, it is their infrastructure that is being used to reflect an attack at us. By working with and educating network operators, they clean up their network which helps to solve the root cause of these large attacks.

History Repeats Itself

Finally, it’s worth noting how similar this battle against DDoS attacks and open DNS relays is with Spamhaus’s original fight. If DDoS is the network scourge of tomorrow, spam was its clear predecessor. Paul Vixie, the father of the DNSBL, set out in 1997 to use DNS to help shut down the spam source of the day: open email relays. These relays were being used to disguise the origin of spam messages, making them more difficult to block. What was needed was a list of mail relays that mail serves could query against and decide whether to accept messages.

History_repeats_itself

While it wasn’t originally designed with the idea in mind, DNS proved a highly scalable and efficient means to distribute a queryable list of open mail relays that email service providers could use to block unwanted messages. Spamhaus arose as one of the most respected and widely used DNSBLs, effectively blocking a huge percentage of daily spam volume.

As open mail relays were shut, spammers turned to virus writers to create botnets that could be used to relay spam. Spamhaus expanded their operations to list the IPs of known botnets, trying to stay ahead of spammers. CloudFlare’s own history grew out of Project Honey Pot, which started as an automated service to track the resources used by spammers and publishes the HTTP:BL.

Today, as Spamhaus’s success has eroded the business model of spammers, botnet operators are increasingly renting their networks to launch DDoS attacks. At the same time, DNSBLs proved that there were many functions that the DNS protocol could be used for, encouraging many people to tinker with installing their own DNS resolvers. Unfortunately, these DNS resolvers are often mis-configured and left open to abuse, making them the DDoS equivalent of the open mail relay.

If you’re running a network, take a second to make sure you’ve closed any open resolvers before DDoS explodes into an even worse problem than it already is.

Cryptome reveals – Internet Is a Spy State

Internet Is a Spy State

 


At 06:09 AM 3/18/2013, Eugen Leitl wrote on Cypherpunks:

http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/16/opinion/schneier-internet-surveillance/index.html

The Internet is a surveillance state

By Bruce Schneier, Special to CNN

March 16, 2013 — Updated 1804 GMT (0204 HKT)

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

Bruce Schneier: Whether we like it or not, we’re being tracked all the time on the Internet

Schneier: Our surveillance state is efficient beyond the wildest dreams of George Orwell

He says governments and corporations are working together to keep things that way

Schneier: Slap-on-the-wrist fines notwithstanding, no one is agitating for better privacy laws

Editor’s note: Bruce Schneier is a security technologist and author of “Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust Society Needs to Survive.”

__________

Cryptome:

That the Internet is a gigantic spying machine has been known since its invention, the security industry has made billions pretending to protect against its spying.

Schneier has also written recently that security does not work, cannot work, that attackers are always going to excell over defenders, due to the economic incentives to attack being greater than those to defend.

Long a top expert selling security services, what is Schneier up to with gloom and doom that is usually associated with selling snake oil — his favorite target. Has his amply promoted 24×7 services been defeated by attackers? Is he keeping that quiet? Is he about to be doxed, has been hit with a blackmail demand, or worse, his defenses compromised? Who else among the experts are colluding with this initiative to admit Internet deception from the git go?

Recall that beloved Peter Neumann and others advocate chucking the current Internet and starting over with better security and privacy basic requirements. Uh huh, and what will take its place, will it be better or more snake oil? And what to do with all that stored data of the world’s greatest spying machine promoted with the complicity of Internet advocates and the security industry?

Pardon, monsieur, foxes in the hen house, comes to mind.

Schneier says in his security-is-doomed-to-fail piece a public discussion is needed on what to do, the experts don’t have answers. That’s a good start after years of experts promising to do better next time, meanwhile trust open source, trust us.

Where does snake oil end and “something better” begin? Is something better ever not snake oil? Is a public discussion of an issue never not rigged in favor of the organizers? Is tumultous public discussion never not preamble to a coup justified as needed to control the mob who has gotten out of hand, who voted the wrong way, who attacked the leaders? Who hacked the experts?

Coups are always justified as needed for security, and who Machiavelli’s the coup masters other than security and propaganda experts yearning to maintain privilege and reputation.

Coups are not always obvious, the most effective are hardly noticed.

 


The Proof: Cyber Attacks since Years – Der Beweis: Die jahrelangen Cyberattacken gegen unsere Webseiten

The Proof: Cyber Attacks since Years – Der Beweis: Die jahrelangen Cyberattacken gegen unsere Webseiten

Ein kleiner Ausschnitt

A little excerpt:

graph

Bernd-Pulchernst

Dear Readers,

since days our websites berndpulch.org and http://www.investment-on.com

are attacked by vicious criminals which have been identified including their comrades.

All the proof is given to the relevant authorities.

In the meantime every attack gives us more evidence against these criminals.

We released a new website

http://www.bernd-pulch.org

is a clone of http://www.berndpulch.org

and some more will follow.

History shows that all censorship could not stop the truth.

In fact people get even more curious about the truth which the censors want

to hide !

Sincerely yours

Bernd Pulch

Publisher

Proven – China ‘aiding hacker attacks on west’

The building in Shanghai that hosts the Chinese military's Unit 61398

The building in Shanghai that hosts the Chinese military’s Unit 61398, which has been accused of involvement in hacking attacks. Photograph: Peter Parks/AFP/Getty Images

The Chinese army has launched hundreds of cyber-attacks against western companies and defence groups from a nondescript office building in Shanghai, according to a report that warns hackers have stolen vast amounts of data from their targets.

Mandiant, a security company that has been investigating attacks against western organisations for over six years, said in a report (PDF)the attacks came from a 12-storey building belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general staff’s department, also known as Unit 61398.

Mandiant said it believed a hacking network named the Comment Crew or the Shanghai Group was based inside the compound, in a rundown residential neighbourhood. Although the report fails directly to place the hackers inside the building, it argues there is no other logical reason why so many attacks have emanated from such a small area.

“It is time to acknowledge the threat is originating in China, and we wanted to do our part to arm and prepare security professionals to combat that threat effectively,” said the report.

The discovery will further raise the temperature in the intergovernmental cyberwars, which have heated up in recent years as the US, IsraelIran, China and UK have all used computer subterfuge to undermine rival state or terrorist organisations. One security expert warned that companies in high-profile fields should assume they will be targeted and hacked, and build systems that will fence sensitive data off from each other.

Rik Ferguson, global vice-president of security research at the data security company Trend Micro, said: “We need to concentrate less on building castles and assuming they will be impervious, and more on building better dungeons so that when people get in they can’t get anything else.” .

Mandiant says Unit 61398 could house “hundreds or thousands” of people and has military-grade, high-speed fibre-optic connections from China Mobile, the world’s largest telecoms carrier. “The nature of Unit 61398’s work is considered by China to be a state secret; however, we believe it engages in harmful computer network operations,” Mandiant said in the report.

It said Unit 61398 had been operating since 2006, and was one of the most prolific hacking groups “in terms of quantity of information stolen”. This it estimated at hundreds of terabytes, enough for thousands of 3D designs and blueprints.

“APT1”, as Mandiant calls it, is only one of 20 groups Mandiant says has carried out scores of hacking attacks against businesses and organisations in the west, including companies that work in strategic industries such as US power and water infrastructure.

A typical attack would leave software that hid its presence from the user or administrator and silently siphon data to a remote server elsewhere on the internet at the instruction of a separate “command and control” (C&C) computer. By analysing the hidden software, the pattern of connections and links from the C&C server, the team at Mandiant said they were confident of the source of the threat.

A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman denied the government was behind the attacks, saying: “Hacking attacks are transnational and anonymous. Determining their origins is extremely difficult. We don’t know how the evidence in this so-called report can be tenable. Arbitrary criticism based on rudimentary data is irresponsible, unprofessional and not helpful in resolving the issue.”

But Ferguson told the Guardian: “This is a pretty compelling report, with evidence collected over a prolonged period of time. It points very strongly to marked Chinese involvement.”

Mandiant, based in Alexandria, Virginia, in the US, investigated the New York Times break-in, for which it suggested Chinese sources could be to blame.

President Barack Obama is already beefing up US security, introducing an executive order in his State of the Union speech this month that would let the government work with the private sector to fend off hacking. But it will take until February 2014 to have a final version ready for implementation.

The revelation comes days after the New York TimesWall Street Journaland Washington Post, as well as the social networks Facebook and Twitter, said they had been subjected to “highly sophisticated” hacks that in some cases focused on correspondents writing about China and its government.

Separate investigations by the computer company Dell, working with the news company Bloombergtracked down another alleged hacker, Zhang Changhe, who has written a number of papers on PC hacking. Zhang works at the PLA’s “information engineering university” in Zhengzhou, Henan province, north-central China.

The allegations will raise the temperature in the continuing cyberwar between the west and China, which has been steadily rising since the Pentagon and MI6 uncovered Titan Rain, a scheme that tried to siphon data from the Pentagon and the House of Commons in 2006, and which one security expert said at the time dated back at least to 2004.

Ferguson suggested that western governments were also carrying out attacks against Chinese targets – “but that’s not a culture which would open up about being hit. I would be surprised and disappointed if most western nations don’t have a cybersecurity force.”

The Stuxnet virus, which hit Iran’s uranium reprocessing plant in 2010, is believed to have been written jointly by the US and Israel, while Iranian sources are believed to have hacked companies that issue email security certificates so that they can crack secure connections used by Iranian dissidents on Google’s Gmail system. China is also reckoned to have been behind the hacking of Google’s email servers in that country in late 2009, in an operation that files from WikiLeaks suggested was inspired by the Beijing government.

A timeline of government-sponsored hacking attacks

 

2004 suspected: Chinese group in Shanghai begins probing US companies and military targets.

 

2005: Titan Rain” pulls data from the Pentagon’s systems, and a specialist says of a December 2005 attack on the House of Commons computer system that “The degree of sophistication was extremely high. They were very clever programmers.”

 

2007: Estonia’s government and other internet services are knocked offline by a coordinated attack from more than a million computers around the world – reckoned to have been run from a group acting at the urging of the Russian government. Nobody is ever arrested over the attack.

 

2008: Russia’s government is suspected of carrying out a cyberattack to knock out government and other websites inside Georgia, with which it is fighting a border skirmish over the territory of Ossetia.

 

December 2009: Google’s email systems in China are hacked by a group which tries to identify and take over the accounts of Chinese dissidents. Google withdraws its search engine from the Chinese mainland in protest at the actions. Wikileaks cables suggest that the Chinese government was aware of the hacking.

 

2010: The Flame virus begins silently infecting computers in Iran. Itincorporates cutting-edge cryptography breakthroughs which would require world-class experts to write. That is then used to infect Windows PCs via the Windows Update mechanism which normally creates a cryptographically secure link to Microsoft. Instead, Flame puts software that watches every keystroke and frame on the PC. Analysts say that only a “wealthy” nation state could have written the virus, which breaks new ground in encryption.

 

The Stuxnet worm is discovered to have been affecting systems inside Iran’s uranium reprocessing establishment, passing from Windows PCs to the industrial systems which control centrifuges that separate out heavier uranium. The worm makes the centrifuges spin out of control, while suggesting on their control panel that they are operating normally – and so break them. Iran denies that the attack has affected its project. The US and Israel are later fingered as being behind the code.

 

September 2011: a new virus that silently captures data from transactions in Middle Eastern online banking is unleashed. The principal targets use Lebanese banks. It is not identified until August 2012, when Russian security company Kaspersky discovers the name “Gauss” embedded inside it. The company says the malware it is “nation state-sponsored” – probably by a western state seeking to trace transactions by specific targets.

 

2012: About 30,000 Windows PCs at Saudi Aramco, the world’s most valuable company, are rendered unusable after a virus called “Shamoon” wipes and corrupts data and the part of the hard drive needed to “bootstrap” the machine when it is turned on. In the US, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta described Shamoon as “one of the most destructive viruses ever” and suggested it could be used to launch an attack as destructive as the 9/11 attacks of 2001.

SECRET from PI – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Recruiting

DHS-FBI-Recruiting

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists are attempting to recruit new members in the United States and overseas to support their operations, obtain funding, and conduct terrorist attacks.  For example, in May 2012, Maryland-based Mohammad Hassan Khalid pled guilty to attempting to use the Internet to recruit individuals who had the ability to travel to and around Europe to conduct terrorist acts, in addition to providing logistical and financial support to terrorists.  In prior cases of recruitment, individuals who were willing to participate in terrorist acts became involved with known and suspected terrorists, participated in paramilitary training abroad, or tried to acquire small arms and build explosives.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incident from the NSI shared space is an example of an individual being recruited to commit violence.  The example is provided for situational awareness and training:

— (U//FOUO) An individual contacted the police to report being approached by two subjects about supplying firearms and participating in an attack on a military installation.  The subjects were arrested and charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the US Government after being observed conducting surveillance of targets, testing security, and acquiring weapons for the attack.  One of the subjects pled guilty to the charges and is awaiting sentencing.

(U) Past Activities Observed in Individuals Recruited to Participate in Terrorism

(U//FOUO) Studies of terrorist actors have identified particular behaviors that have been observed in individuals vulnerable to recruitment or who have been recruited, and were ready to commit acts of violence.  Any one of these activities may be insignificant on its own, but when observed in combination with other prior observed behaviors—particularly advocacy of violence—may constitute a basis for reporting.

— (U//FOUO) Acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political activity, expressed willingness to commit acts of violence, or close association with individuals or groups suspected of violent extremism.

— (U//FOUO) Communication with violent extremists, either through direct contact or virtually, or active participation in violent extremist blogs, chat rooms, and password-protected websites.

— (U//FOUO) Interest in paramilitary and explosives training or reconnaissance and surveillance activities in a manner reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning.

— (U//FOUO) Possession of literature written by and for violent extremist groups on terrorist techniques, including use of explosives, poisons, firearms and heavy weapons (when combined with other prior observed behaviors).

— (U//FOUO) Involvement by individuals—who otherwise never committed a crime—in theft, fraud, and illegal activities to fund terrorist causes.

(U//FOUO) In addition, individuals or groups attempting to enlist others to participate in acts of violence or terrorism should be reported to authorities.

(U//FOUO) These identified activities have been observed in cases of mobilization to violence, but are not a concrete formula for predicting illegal activity.  First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).  DHS and FBI are not advocating interference with the rights of law-abiding individuals.  There may be a legitimate reason why some of the observed behaviors are present; it is up to you to determine when that is not the case.

TOP-SECRET – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Recruiting

 

sara-eisen

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists are attempting to recruit new members in the United States and overseas to support their operations, obtain funding, and conduct terrorist attacks.  For example, in May 2012, Maryland-based Mohammad Hassan Khalid pled guilty to attempting to use the Internet to recruit individuals who had the ability to travel to and around Europe to conduct terrorist acts, in addition to providing logistical and financial support to terrorists.  In prior cases of recruitment, individuals who were willing to participate in terrorist acts became involved with known and suspected terrorists, participated in paramilitary training abroad, or tried to acquire small arms and build explosives.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incident from the NSI shared space is an example of an individual being recruited to commit violence.  The example is provided for situational awareness and training:

— (U//FOUO) An individual contacted the police to report being approached by two subjects about supplying firearms and participating in an attack on a military installation.  The subjects were arrested and charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the US Government after being observed conducting surveillance of targets, testing security, and acquiring weapons for the attack.  One of the subjects pled guilty to the charges and is awaiting sentencing.

(U) Past Activities Observed in Individuals Recruited to Participate in Terrorism

(U//FOUO) Studies of terrorist actors have identified particular behaviors that have been observed in individuals vulnerable to recruitment or who have been recruited, and were ready to commit acts of violence.  Any one of these activities may be insignificant on its own, but when observed in combination with other prior observed behaviors—particularly advocacy of violence—may constitute a basis for reporting.

— (U//FOUO) Acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political activity, expressed willingness to commit acts of violence, or close association with individuals or groups suspected of violent extremism.

— (U//FOUO) Communication with violent extremists, either through direct contact or virtually, or active participation in violent extremist blogs, chat rooms, and password-protected websites.

— (U//FOUO) Interest in paramilitary and explosives training or reconnaissance and surveillance activities in a manner reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning.

— (U//FOUO) Possession of literature written by and for violent extremist groups on terrorist techniques, including use of explosives, poisons, firearms and heavy weapons (when combined with other prior observed behaviors).

— (U//FOUO) Involvement by individuals—who otherwise never committed a crime—in theft, fraud, and illegal activities to fund terrorist causes.

(U//FOUO) In addition, individuals or groups attempting to enlist others to participate in acts of violence or terrorism should be reported to authorities.

(U//FOUO) These identified activities have been observed in cases of mobilization to violence, but are not a concrete formula for predicting illegal activity.  First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).  DHS and FBI are not advocating interference with the rights of law-abiding individuals.  There may be a legitimate reason why some of the observed behaviors are present; it is up to you to determine when that is not the case.

Cyberattacken wie bei uns – Chinesische Hacker spionieren New York Times aus

NEW YORK TIMES – Chinesische Hacker spionieren US-Tageszeitung aus

Hacker sind in Computer der New York Times eingedrungen. Sie stahlen Passwörter und spionierten E-Mail-Konten aus. Sicherheitsexperten verfolgten die Angriffe nach China zurück.

Unbekannte haben sich über Monate Zugang zu den Computersystemen der Tageszeitung New York Times (NYT) verschafft. Die Sicherheitsexperten konnten die Angriffe nach China zurückverfolgen. Anlass war mutmaßlich ein Bericht über die Familie des scheidenden Premierministers Wen Jiabao – die Angriffe begannen kurz danach.

Die Angreifer drangen in die Systeme der New York Times ein. Dort installierten sie Schadsoftware und verschafften sich Zugang zu den Arbeitsplatzrechnern von 53 Mitarbeitern, von denen die meisten nicht im Newsroom arbeiten. Zudem kopierten die Angreifer die Passwörter aller NYT-Mitarbeiter. Es sollen keine Kundendaten entwendet worden sein.

Warnung vor Erscheinen

Die Angriffe schienen in direktem Zusammenhang mit dem Bericht über den chinesischen Politiker zu stehen: Sie hätten unmittelbar nach der Veröffentlichung am 25. Oktober 2012 begonnen, berichtet die Tageszeitung. Kurz zuvor sei die Zeitung von chinesischen Behörden vor Angriffen gewarnt worden. Die Tageszeitung habe sich an den Netzbetreiber AT&T gewandt, und der habe direkt, nachdem der Artikel online erschienen war, Aktivitäten festgestellt, die auf einen Computerangriff hinwiesen. Das NYT engagierte daraufhin das Sicherheitsunternehmen Mandiant und informierte das FBI.

Die Analyse der Mandiant-Experten ergab, dass der Angriff schon früher begonnen hatte: Im September, kurz vor dem Ende der Recherchen zu dem Artikel, waren die Hacker erstmals in die NYT-Computer eingedrungen und hatten das Passwortsystem gehackt. So konnten sie sich Zugriff auf die E-Mail-Konten von David Barboza, Leiter des NYT-Büros in Schanghai und Autor des Berichts, und Jim Yardley, Leiter des Südostasienbüros in Indien und davor Chef des Pekinger Büros, verschaffen.

Wie es scheint, kopierten die Angreifer jedoch keine Dokumente, sondern suchten nach den Namen von Informanten. Auch hatten sie kein Interesse daran, die Computersysteme der Zeitung komplett lahmzulegen – obwohl sie, wie die Zeitung zugibt, die Möglichkeit dazu gehabt hätten.

Phishing-Mails

Wie die Angreifer den Zugang zu den NYT-Computern erlangten, ist noch nicht geklärt. Die Experten vermuten, dass sie E-Mails mit verseuchten Anhängen oder Links verschickt haben, über die Schadsoftware auf die Computer geschleust wurde. Inzwischen seien alle Zugänge, die die Hacker nutzten, geschlossen.

Um ihre Spuren zu verwischen, waren die Angreifer zuerst in Computersysteme von US-Universitäten eingedrungen, so dass es auf den ersten Blick so aussah, als kämen die Angriffe von dort. Chinesische Hacker gehen nach Angaben der von der NYT beauftragten Sicherheitsexperten häufig so vor. Auch die verwendete Schadsoftware wies Merkmale auf, die auf Akteure aus China schließen lassen. Schließlich gelang es den Sicherheitsexperten, die Angriffe zu den Universitätscomputern zurückzuverfolgen, die als Ausgangspunkt von Angriffen des chinesischen Militärs auf Lieferanten des US-Militärs gelten.

Hacker bei Bloomberg

Die NYT scheint indes nicht das einzige Medienunternehmen zu sein, das chinesische Hacker ins Visier genommen haben: 2012 wurden bei Bloomberg News Computer mit Schadsoftware infiziert. Anlass war mutmaßlich ein vergleichbarer Bericht der Nachrichtenagentur über Xi Jinping, seinerzeit noch Vizepräsident und inzwischen Chef der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas und designierter Staatschef.

Wen ist seit 2003 Premierminister der Volksrepublik China. Zuvor war er fünf Jahre lang Vizepremier. Im Oktober 2012 deckte die NYT auf, dass Wens Familie während seiner Amtszeit ein immenses Vermögen angehäuft habe – umgerechnet rund über 2 Milliarden Euro sollen Wens Angehörige, vor allem seine Frau Zhang Peili, zusammengetragen haben. Die Behörden reagierten umgehend auf den Bericht: Sie sperrten den Zugang zur Website der Zeitung.

Was wusste Wen?

Unklar ist Wens Rolle: Zwar ist seine Familie während seiner Amtszeit reich geworden – unter anderem aufgrund wirtschaftlicher Entscheidungen, die Wen mitverantwortet hat. Er selbst soll aber von den Aktivitäten seiner Frau wenig angetan gewesen sein. Laut einer der von Wikileaks veröffentlichten Botschaftsdepeschen soll er sogar deswegen eine Scheidung erwogen haben. Nach dem NYT-Bericht forderte er eine Untersuchung und bot an, dafür die Vermögensverhältnisse der Familie offenzulegen.

Wen wird turnusmäßig nach zwei Amtszeiten von je fünf Jahren sein Amt in diesem Frühjahr aufgeben. Auf dem 18. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei wurde im Herbst 2012 die neue Führungsriege vorgestellt. Wens Nachfolger wird voraussichtlich Li Keqiang, der das Amt im März übernehmen soll. Im Vorfeld des Führungswechsels gab es einen Machtkampf zwischen zwei Parteiflügeln.
OUR WEBSITES ARE UNDER ATTACK BY CHINESE HACKERS WHICH ARE ACTING ON BEHALF OF SOME GERMAN THUGS.

DER BEWEIS AUS DEM JAHR 2000: SO REGTE GRUNER und JAHR-TOCHTER, IPV, MICH AN, DEN TITEL “INVESTMENT” ZU LANCIEREN

download

DER BEWEIS AUS DEM JAHR 2000: SO REGTE GRUNER & JAHR-TOCHTER, IPV, MICH AN, DEN TITEL “INVESTMENT” AUCH IN DEUTSCHLAND  ZU LANCIEREN. DESHALB  HAT “PETER HLERS” MUTMASSLICH “GoMoPa” BEAUFTRAGT, MICH AUSZUSCHALTEN.

DANN HABE ICH ÜBER “GoMoPa” UND IHRE MUTMASSLICHEN PARTNER “PETER EHLERS” UND “GERD BENNEWIRTZ” RECHERCHIERT…

“PETER EHLERS” “DAS INVESTMENT”: “BUNDESKANZLERIN ANGELA MERKEL UND BUNDESFINANZMINISTER WOLFGANG SCHÄUBLE SIND DEUTSCHLANDS BEKANNTESTE HEHLER!”

“Sind Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und Finanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble Deutschlands bekannteste Hehler ?” „Sicher nein“, werden Sie jetzt sagen und fragen: „Wer behauptet diesen staatszersetzenden Schwachsinn ?“„Fonds & Friends-Herausgeber“ Peter Ehlers (wenn der Name stimmt ?) und der Ost-Berliner NACHRICHTENDIENST”  “GoMoPa” bezeichneten die deutsche Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und den deutschen Bundesfinanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble als “kriminelle Hehler” und als Deutschlands „bekannteste Hehler“. Original-Zitat Peter Ehlers (wenn denn wengistens der Name stimmt ?) : „Wolfgang Schäuble, Finanzminister unter Kanzlerin Angela Merkel. Beide sind sich nicht immer einig. Jetzt schon: Sie wollen als Staat, von deutschen Steuergeldern bezahlt, ein neues staatliches Geschäft eröffnen: Hehlerei.Peter Ehlers,Herausgeber DAS INVESTMENTEin Kommentar von Peter Ehlers, Herausgeber DAS INVESTMENTEin durchaus einträgliches Geschäft, das nur einen Haken hat: Es ist illegal. Schäuble hat dafür eine lustige Rechtsauffassung: Er sieht den Deal, den der damalige Finanzminister Peer Steinbrück („das beste Geschäft meines Lebens“) machte, für sich als Rechtfertigung. Frei nach dem billigen Motto: Wenn mein Vorgänger kriminell war, darf ich das ja wohl auch sein.“Das heisst nicht nur Schäuble handelt illegal und kriminell – im ganz grossen Stil, sondern auch die Vorgänger Ex-Bundes-Finanzminister Peer Steinbrück und Ex-Bundeskanzler gerhard Schröder…Und mich bezeichnet Peter Ehlers (wenn denn wengistens der Name stimmt ?) als “Internet-Terroristen”, „Erpresser“, „Gewohnheitsverbrecher“ und „Idioten“, ach ja meinen akademischen Titel Magister Artium täusche ich auch vor, sagen Peter Ehlers und GoMoPa, unisono..
Dies ist bezeichnet für die psychotische Wahnwelt dieser mutmasslich kommunistischen Delinquenten aus dem Osten Deutschlands.
Zum Tatbestand:
Im deutschen Strafrecht ist die Beamtenbeleidigung kein eigener Tatbestand. Ein Beamter ist hier nicht anders gestellt als ein anderer Bürger. Es handelt sich also um eine „normale“ Beleidigung gemäß § 185StGB.
Dennoch gibt es bei der Beleidigung eines Amtsträgers, der nicht zwingend Beamter sein muss, eine verfahrensrechtliche Besonderheit: Während die Straftat grundsätzlich nur auf Antrag des Verletzten verfolgt wird, kann gemäß § 194 Abs. 3 StGB bei Amtsträgern auch der Dienstvorgesetzte des Beleidigten den Strafantrag stellen:
„Ist die Beleidigung gegen einen Amtsträger, einen für den öffentlichen Dienst besonders Verpflichteten oder einen Soldaten der Bundeswehr während der Ausübung seines Dienstes oder in Beziehung auf seinen Dienst begangen, so wird sie auch auf Antrag des Dienstvorgesetzten verfolgt. Richtet sich die Tat gegen eine Behörde oder eine sonstige Stelle, die Aufgaben der öffentlichen Verwaltung wahrnimmt, so wird sie auf Antrag des Behördenleiters oder des Leiters der aufsichtführenden Behörde verfolgt. Dasselbe gilt für Träger von Ämtern und für Behörden der Kirchen und anderen Religionsgesellschaften des öffentlichen Rechts.“
Außerdem wird von der Staatsanwaltschaft in der Regel das öffentliche Interesse an der Strafverfolgung bejaht, so dass es weitaus seltener zur Verweisung auf den Privatklageweg oder zur Einstellung des Verfahrens nach § 153, 153a StPO kommt.
In der Praxis zieht die Beleidigung vor allem von (Polizei-)Beamten meist Geldstrafen nach sich. Bei mehrfach wegen solcher Delikte vorbestraften Personen sind in der Praxis schon kurze Freiheitsstrafen von z. B. 3 Monaten ohne Bewährung vorgekommen.
Fallbeispiel:
Beleidigung von Amtsträgern”Prozesse-Dieter” verurteilt“Prozesse-Dieter”, prozessfreudiger Sozialhilfeempfänger aus Ratingen, ist zu einem Jahr Haft verurteilt worden. Das Amtsgericht in Ratingen bei Düsseldorf sprach den als “König der Kläger” bekannt gewordenen ehemaligen 73-jährigen Sportlehrer wegen 44 Beleidigungen von Amtsträgern wie Beamten, Richtern und Rechtspflegern schuldig.
Per Postkarten hatte sie der Senior mit Fäkalausdrücken überzogen. Das Gericht setzte sich über den psychiatrischen Gutachter hinweg, der den Angeklagten als schuldunfähig eingestuft hatte, weil dieser an einer paranoiden Persönlichkeitsstörung leide.
Dies trifft möglicherweise auch auf die Delinquenten Peter Ehlers/”GoMoPa” zu.Zum Thema Wirecard und “GoMoPa” schreibt das “Handelsblatt:Finanzaufsicht untersucht Kursachterbahn bei Wirecard07.04.2010, 07:01 Uhrexklusiv Die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht BaFin hat aufgrund der merkwürdigen Kursturbulenzen der Wirecard-Aktie eine förmliche Untersuchung des Falles eingeleitet. BaFin prüft mögliche Marktmanipulationen nach Falschbericht des Internetdienstes Gomopa. Zwei der Gomopa-Gründer wurden schon 2006 wegen Betrugs verurteilt.von Sönke Iwersen   Der Kurs von Wirecard, einem Anbieter für elektronische Zahlungslöungen, ist am am vergangenen Dienstag nach Marktgerüchten heftig eingebrochen. Die BaFin prüft mögliche Manipulationen. Quelle: PressebildFRANKFURT. Die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht BaFin hat aufgrund der merkwürdigen Kursturbulenzen der Wirecard-Aktie eine förmliche Untersuchung des Falles eingeleitet. “Wir prüfen, ob es Anhaltspunkte für Marktmanipulation in Aktien der Wirecard AG gibt”, sagte eine BaFin-Sprecherin. Zu Details könne sie sich jedoch nicht äußern.Der Kurs des Münchener Zahlungsabwicklers Wirecard war am vergangenen Dienstag um mehr als 30 Prozent eingebrochen. Am Abend zuvor hatte der Internetdienst Goldman, Morgenstern & Partners (Gomopa) berichtet, der in den USA wegen illegalen Online-Glücksspiels verhaftete Deutsche Michael Schütt habe in einem Geständnis Wirecard schwer belastet. Gomopa bezog sich auf einen Bericht der Lokalzeitung “Naples News”. Schütt habe ausgesagt, er sei bei illegalen Geldgeschäften direkt vom Wirecard-Vorstand beauftragt worden.Das Problem an dem Gomopa-Bericht: Er war falsch. Wie Nachfragen des Handelsblattes ergaben, hat die Reporterin, die für die “Naples News” über Schütt schreibt, Wirecard nie erwähnt. Gomopa reagierte auf Nachfragen zögerlich. Erst löschte der Dienst den Hinweis auf die Lokalzeitung, hielt aber den Vorwurf aufrecht, Schütt habe Wirecard belastet. Danach änderte man den Bericht erneut. Nun hieß es, ein Informant von Gomopa verfüge über die fraglichen Details aus Schütts Geständnis.Dem Handelsblatt liegt inzwischen das amtliche Protokoll von Schütts Geständnis am 23. März vor. Schütt bekennt sich darin schuldig, illegale Geldgeschäfte im Zusammenhang mit Online-Glücksspiel abgewickelt zu haben. Das Wort Wirecard kommt nicht vor. Gomopa hatte zu Wochenbeginn seinen Text erneut geändert und nun behauptet, Schütt belaste “eine Bank”. Auf erneute Nachfragen des Handelsblattes war der Bericht dann ganz verschwunden.Der Kurs von Wirecard hat sich inzwischen fast vollständig erholt. Ein Frankfurter Analyst sagte, für ihn sei klar, dass die Aktie seit Wochen manipuliert werde. Erst verteure sich die Leihe der Aktie, dann komme es zu außergewöhnlichem Handel, danach tauchten plötzlich desaströse Gerüchte auf. Dazu gehöre auch die Anzeige, die vor kurzem bei der Staatsanwaltschaft München einging und Wirecard der Geldwäsche bezichtigt. Es sei offensichtlich, dass Short Seller mit der Wirecard-Aktie Jojo spielen.Mark Vornkahl, einer der Gründer von Gomopa wies den Vorwurf der Kursmanipulation gestern zurück. Man wolle nur die Wahrheit aufdecken. Es ist allerdings nicht das erste Mal, dass Gomopa-Vertreter ins Zwielicht geraten. 2006 wurden Vornkahl und Mitgründer Klaus Maurischat wegen Betrugs an einem Anleger verurteilt. Maurischat gab gestern gegenüber dem Handelsblatt weitere Verurteilungen zu. Es habe sich dabei jedoch nicht um Anlagebetrug gehandelt.http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/boerse-maerkte/boerse-inside/finanzaufsicht-untersucht-kursachterbahn-bei-wirecard/3406252.htmlUND SOLCHE TYPEN VERBREITEN WEITERE ENTEN AUS IRGENDEINEM SADDAM – ERDLOCH WÄHREND IN IHREM “VIRTUELLEN BÜRO” NUR EIN LEERER STUHL STEHT.Ich bin der Erbe unseres Familienbuches und damit das Oberhaupt unserer Familie Pulch. Unsere Familie hat seit Jahrunderten in Deutschland, USA und vielen anderen Ländern, erfolgreiche Unternehmer, Staatssekretäre, Banker, Richter, Anwälte, Politiker und auch Journalisten hervorgebracht. Wir lassen unseren guten Namen nicht durch vorbestrafte Anlagebetrüger, Cybermörder undStasi/NS-Kriminelle verunglimpfen. Deren Taten und Fäkalsprache sprechen für sich und bedürfen keiner ernsthaften Auseinandersetzung.Die bezahlten Betrüger sollen die Kapitalanlage-Verbrecher schützen.Darum geht es im Kern. Wie auch schon unterhttp://www.victims-opfer.comundhttp://sjb-fonds-opfer.com/?page_id=11764klar ersichtlich.Hier ist der Original-Bericht von MeridianCapitalhttp://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:8jmni-h2e_4J:www.maurischatinhaft.wordpress.com/+verhaftung+klaus+maurischat&cd=2&hl=de&ct=clnk&gl=de&source=www.google.deIchwerde die kriminellen Verantwortlichen und ihre kriminellen Helfershelfer bis zur letzten Konsequenz zur Verantwortung ziehen.Magister Bernd PulchPS Ich bedanke mich bei investment-on.com sowie allen anderen Medien für die Möglichkeit, die Dinge gerade zu rücken.

Unternehmensinformation / Kurzprofil: INVESTMENT (das Original) erscheint mit einer deutschen Ausgabe, einer globalen Ausgabe und einer Asien-Ausgabe seit mehr als 10 Jahren als unabhängiges Magazin fürInvestoren und Finanzprofis. Dabei stehen die sogenannten “HNWI im Fokus”. Unterstützt durch das Wachstum der Börsenkapitalisierungen in den Schwellenländern stieg das Gesamtvermögen der weltweiten High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI – Privatpersonen mit Nettofinanzvermögen > 1 Mio. US-Dollar ohne Verbrauchsgüter und eigengenutzte Immobilien) im Jahr um 9,4% auf 40,7 Billionen US-Dollar. Dies geht aus dem von Merrill Lynch und Capgemini veröffentlichten zwölften, jährlich erscheinenden, World Wealth Report hervor. Die weltweite Anzahl der HNWI nahm 2007 um 6% auf 10,1 Millionen zu. Gleichzeitig stieg die Zahl der besonders wohlhabenden Personen (Ultra High Net Worth Individuals – UHNWI – Privatpersonen mit Nettofinanzvermögen > 30 Mio. US-Dollar ohne Verbrauchsgüter und eigengenutzte Immobilien) um 8,8%. Erstmals seit Bestehen dieses Reports wurde beim durchschnittlichen Finanzvermögen der HNWI die Schwelle von 4 Millionen US-Dollar überschritten.INVESTMENT gehört zu EBIZZ.TV.Über EBIZZ.TV: EBIZZ TV ist im Veoh-Verbund mit über 600 eigenen Internet-TV-Kanälen und 100.000 assoziierten Kanälen eines der global reichweitenstärksten aber auch zielgruppengenauesten Portale. Im Februar erzielte das Netzwerk laut Nielsen Net Ratings über 28 Mio. Unique User, an Page Views über 350 Millionen (210 Millionen an Video Streams).(Reporting Sandra Lowe ; Editing George Highbottom, Magister Bernd Pulch* und Kim Halburton)
Aus sicherheitstechnischen Gründen geben wir zu unseren Mitarbeitern keine weiteren persönlichen Daten bekannt.
siehe unseren Kreuzzug gegen Cyber Stalking
*Magister Bernd M. Pulch (MA – Magister Artium)
Abschluss des Studiums der Publizistik (Note 2) , Komparatistik (Note 1) und Germanistik (Note 1-2) 1988
Universität Mainz
Magisterarbeit bei Professor Kepplinger über Dolf Zillmanns “Emotional Arousal Theory”1987, Mainz, 400 Seiten
Sie können die Magisterarbeit bei uns zum Preis von nur € 99,- über das Kontaktformular bestellen.
Die Zahlung erfolgt per Vorkasse. Die Lieferzeit beträgt ca. 14 Tage in Deutschland.
© 2011 für Texte und gestaltete Anzeigen beim Verlag. Nachdruck, Vervielfältigung und elektronische Speicherung nur unter Quellenangabe und mit schriftlicher Genehmigung gestattet.

http://www.berndpulch.org

Investment Magazin, Investment, Das Investment

Opfer: DIE STASI-FÄLSCHER UND DER BEWEIS: WIE MERIDIAN CAPITAL VON “GoMoPa” ERPRESST WURDE

 

 

 

 UND HIER DIE STASI-FÄLSCHUNG UM EINEN “GoMoPa”-GEGNER ZU BELASTEN:
Der Beweis: Erpressungsversuch des „NACHRICHTENDIENSTES“ GoMoPa“ an Meridian Capital (Nachfolgend bringen wir eine Original-Pressemeldung von „GoMoPa“, dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ mit dem Meridian Capital, London, erpresst werden sollte. Der Artikel strotzt nur von Fehlern. Damit ist deutlich, dass „GoMoPa“ tatsäch Meridian Capital erpresst hat und die Aktionen von Meridian Capital sich gegen „GoMoPa“ gerichtet haben.
Die gefälschte Pressemitteilung von Meridian Capital in Bezug auf unser Haus soll von dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „GoMoPa“ ablenken.„GoMopa“ schreibt:08.09.2008
Weltweite Finanzierungen mit Widersprüchen

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.

Der Firmensitz

Der Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“.

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos.

Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“

Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt.
Martin Kraeter: „ Ein ‚britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. So etwas gibt es schlicht und ergreifend nicht! Der Nahostkonflikt schwelt schon seit mehr als 50 Jahren. Hier in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) werden Israelis erst gar nicht ins Land gelassen. Israelische Produkte sind gebannt. Es gibt nicht einmal direkte Telefonverbindungen. Die VAE haben fast 70% der Wiederaufbaukosten des Libanon geschultert, nachdem Israel dort einmarschiert ist.“

Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome.

Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich.

Der Webauftritt

Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai.

Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln.

Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“

Zitatende

Dies ist das altbekannte Muster des „NACHRCHTENDIENSTES“ „GoMoPa“ und seiner Berliner und Hamburger Komplizen Falschmeldungen zu verbreiten, um Firmen und Personen erpressen oder ausschalten zu können.

 

SIEHE

 

http://www.google.de/#hl=de&safe=off&output=search&sclient=psy-ab&q=DER+BEWEIS:+WIE+MERIDIAN+CAPITAL+VON+%22GoMoPa%22+ERPRESST+WURDE&oq=DER+BEWEIS:+WIE+MERIDIAN+CAPITAL+VON+%22GoMoPa%22+ERPRESST+WURDE&gs_l=hp.3…20004.20004.1.20777.1.1.0.0.0.0.85.85.1.1.0…0.0…1c.1.NfThx6kPTBA&psj=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.&fp=c4affe4f526437d4&bpcl=35466521&biw=1248&bih=899

CYBERSTASI unmasked – Emma Watson Most Popular Name for Cyber Criminals

Emma Watson is the most dangerous name to search on the Internet, according to a study by computer safety company McAfee. Cyber criminals use Watson’s name to attract people to details about the “Harry Potter” and “Perks of Being a Wallflower” actress and then trick them into downloading malware or giving personal information. Patrick Jones has what other celebrities, like Selena Gomez and Jessica Biel, could put you at risk.

Check out more videos at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL74E8B2F03DB0CE3F&feature=edit_ok

Buzz60 is designed for the way we live now. Short, quirky video snacks that are a little sassy, and always smart. Buzz 60 — and the Buzz60 channel on YouTube – produces all kinds of newsy video clips for web viewers who want more than just repurposed content. Our team is a diverse group of video journalists with dozens of Emmy awards, an authentic sense of humor, and a mandate to connect with viewers every day.

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Weitere Erpresser und Stalking-Mail der “GoMoPa” (Betreiber eines Sexual-Kinderportals)

Subject:   HALLO KINDERFICKER PULCH UND SCHRAMM!!!
From:   “Anonymous” <remailer@foo.asia-king.co.uk>
Date:   Tue, March 13, 2012 2:19 pm
To:   office@investment-on.com
Priority:   Normal
Options:   View Full Header | View Printable Version  | Download this as a file
HIER GEHT BALD DIE POST RICHTIG AB. 
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
SO IN ETWA WIRD ES AUSSEHEN:
INTERNETJAGT AUF DIE KINDERFICKER BERND PULCH 
UND STEFAN SCHRAMM!
xxxx
AN DIESER STELLE KOMMEN PORNPGRAPHISCHE 
FOTOS VON EUREN OPFER-KINDERN.
JETZT GEHT ES LOS PULCH UND SCHRAMM!!!
AUF ALLEN KANAELEN!!!

 

 

 

DIE TÄTER-LISTE – 90.000 STASI-MITARBEITER MIT KLARNAMEN ZUM DOWNLOADEN

Become a Patron!

Diese Liste beinhaltet die Namen von 90.598 Mitarbeitern des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der DDR. Die Liste ist nicht vollständig. Insbesondere Mitarbeiter der Führungsebene sind nicht enthalten.

This is a list of 90.598 members of the secret police of East Germany (Ministry for State Security), the list isn’t complete, because the most of the high Officiers lieke Colonel and higher have destroyed the personal Informations in the last days of Eastern Germany.

Listen der Stasimitarbeiter-hier findest Du sie! Was bedeuten die Zahlen?
 
1.Listen der Stasi-Diensteinheiten!
Bem.:hier kannst du die Nr.(6-stellig) der Dienststellen heraussuchen.
2.Liste der Stasi-Mitarbeiter (Hauptamtlich)
Bem.:Hoffentlich hast Du einen guten Rechner, denn die Liste ist erschreckend lang. Die ersten 6 Ziffern sind das Geburtsdatum + die nächsten 6 Ziffern = Dienstausweisnummer! Die zwei Ziffern hinter dem Geburtsdatum geben das Geschlecht an: 41 und 42 = Männlich, 51 und 52 = Weiblich! Wichtig für suchen und finden, sind die sechs Ziffern in den Semikolon vor den Namen: z.B. ;07;00;44; ! Das ist die Nummer der Dienststelle !
Also du suchst in der Liste der Dienststellen, die Nummer der Dienststelle, die Dich interessiert. Damit gehst Du in die Liste der Mitarbeiter und suchst Dir alle Mitarbeiter der entsprechenden Dienststelle heraus. Ich habe das für mein Wohnort getan und so alle Mitarbeiter gefunden. Ob die Liste Vollständig ist kann ich nicht einschätzen, aber zumindest er/kannte ich einige Exverräter vom Namen her.
3.Liste der OibE (Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz)

Hiermit stelle ich eine Liste der Stasi-Mitarbeiter mit Ihrem Klarnamen zum Download ins Internet:

.
http://cryptome.org/ma_stasi.zip

Unveiled – WikiLeaks Setting Another Trap for Journalists, NGOs

A sends:

I tasted that poison today. It was strange, the feeling of having the privilege to information that was only made available to “a select few” was overwhelming, I don’t have the vocabulary to describe what the poison tastes like, but I can understand how some people could become addicted to it, even if it meant their death.

You are right, WL is setting “Terms and Conditions” to the access to stolen property, and attempting to force Journalists into an “Agreement” to those “Conditions, however unenforceable.

Your thoughts and counsel were welcomed, they snapped me out of that trance that I found myself in.

The only thing to do is, publish everything that I’ve learned over the last many hours about this whole affair.

 


2012-00414 WikiLeaks Partner for Global Intelligence Files June 26, 2012 (copy below) via Google Search

[Image]

Cryptome rejects this proprietary publishing manipulation. Again, WikiLeaks is inducing participation in a crime covered with pseudo-journalistic exculpation. Again excluding open public access in favor of contractual marketing of stolen material and aiding its profitable commercialization.

It’s a trap, don’t do it, don’t encourage others to take the bait.

Don’t send anything to me you don’t want published. This note will be published .

_____

At 06:24 PM 6/26/2012, you wrote:

Please Do Not Post, still working on getting us access.

Below if the terms and conditions that WL is sending to everyone.

 


_Terms and Conditions for access to the Global Intelligence Files

These Terms and Conditions are an agreement between you as an individual (not your organisation) and WikiLeaks with respect to use of the Global Intelligence Files.

1. WikiLeaks will provide access to the data known as Project Rock Guitar through WikiLeaks’ search database. You will use the search database as per instructions on the site and will not use robots on the system.

2. The decision what to publish in news articles and papers will remain at your discretion. You will credit WikiLeaks in the following manner: “investigative partnership organised by WikiLeaks” and refer to the data as having been “obtained by WikiLeaks”.

3. You will refer clearly on your website to the document(s) provided by WikiLeaks that were used in preparation of these news articles or papers and link from your publication to the data on WikiLeaks’ website.

4. You will treat any alleged and/or suspected WikiLeaks sources for the Global Intelligence Files as confidential sources of your own, with all the ethical and legal protections such sources are entitled to. You, in accordance with journalistic and professional ethics, will not speculate as to their identities. In relation to WikiLeaks’ provision of confidential information to you, you will treat WikiLeaks as a confidential journalistic source. Although you will publicly describe the information has having been “obtained by WikiLeaks” you will not, for the protection of WikiLeaks, you and the WikiLeaks sources, say that the information was “given” to you by WikiLeaks.

5. When publishing any story or material based on the Global Intelligence Files you understand that in relation to exclusivity you must inform WikiLeaks of the identification number of the data informing your publication and will submit this number to WikiLeaks’ release platform before the story is to first appear in any of your publishing mediums, so that WikiLeaks can publish the original data at the same time. You will also provide a URL link to where the story or material will appear on your site. Instructions for this release system are on the GI Files site and must be read and followed once you have access to the site. You understand that the release system provided by WikiLeaks must be treated in a reputable manner: there is to be no playing of the system to schedule large quantities of data in advance to reserve them, or using robots on the system. Scheduling must reflect true intentions to publish at the date and time you list on the release system.

6. You will treat each of the documents made available to you by WikiLeaks as confidential unless and until a story based on their content is published. You will exercise care in ensuring that the materials will not be vulnerable to hacking or other efforts to discover their content.

7. WikiLeaks journalists, employees, consultants and infrastructure are the subject of State and private intelligence activity and politicised financial blockades. To protect its continued ability to publish effectively, various WikiLeaks methods, people and locations need to be kept confidential. Unless otherwise stated, these include, but are not limited to: identifying details of all WikiLeaks personnel, security methods, communication systems or methods, locations, strategic plans, information on threats against WikiLeaks, the number of WikiLeaks personnel, the number of WikiLeaks personnel in different areas, usernames, passwords, transportation and financial arrangements including financial transportation methods.

8. Trading, selling, sharing or giving away your account is prohibited, as is trading and selling invites or offering them in public.

9. You understand that any breach of these Terms and Conditions or mismanagement of the search database or release platform will result in your access being withdrawn, along with the access of the anyone that invited you and anyone you invite. You are responsible for your own account and for the people you invite.

By ticking this box you agree to abide by all of the above Terms and Conditions

Your login and password will be sent by mail.

 


GIFiles Signup Instructions

Becoming a WikiLeaks Partner for the Global Intelligence Files

You have been invited to enter a secret world.

By joining the global WikiLeaks partnership on the Global Intelligence Files (the GI Files) — you will have access to more than five million emails from the Texas-headquartered “global intelligence” company Stratfor. The emails date from between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large organisations, including the US Department of Homeland Security and the US Defense Intelligence Agency. Being part of this international team will allow you to search the emails using the sophisticated search engine designed by WikiLeaks to enable you to research and publish articles and papers using this data.

The purpose of this system is to maximise global impact of the GI Files by restricting supply to those who are most likely to research and publish on them.

We are allowing journalists, academics and human rights organisations to search and publish the GI Files. To enter into this partnership you will need to be given a unique code by one of our existing partners. Users who demonstrate research and publishing ability will be considered as partners for new WikiLeaks publications.

Once you have this code please follow the instructions below to enter the partnership and gain access to the GI Files. These instructions are designed to be idiot-proof. They explain every step of this process, but don’t be scared – for most people this will be quick.

1. Download Tor, a tool for encrypted anonymous web-browsing. Without this you will not be able to access our Terms and Conditions, or the GI Files database.

Tor Instructions:
– To get Tor please go to the following URL to download the “Tor Browser Bundle:” https://www.torproject.org/projects…
– Choose the correct version depending on whether you use Windows, Mac or Linux and download it in the language you want.
– Click on the correct version to download it and then save it – we suggest to your Desktop.
– Once you have saved it you can find the “Tor Browser Bundle” application in the place you saved it.
– You will need to double-click on the Start Tor browser application to run Tor.
– You will need Tor running to access the site to agree to our Terms and Conditions, and then to later access the GI Files site.

2. Start Tor and go to the following site (it will only work using Tor). Wait up to 30 seconds for the site to load for the first time: http://7f4lihm464gdcwfc.onion/invit…

3. Enter your unique invite code to get access to the GI Files partner Terms and Conditions.

4. Enter your name, organisation name, email address and phone number. The email address you give cannot be a personal email address; it must be a work email account.

5. Read all parts of the Terms and Conditions and make sure you understand them. If you have any questions, please email: signup@wikileaks.org

6. Once you understand your responsibilities under the Terms and Conditions tick the check box to confirm your agreement.

7. Within 15 minutes you will receive an email to the email address you supplied giving you login details to the GI Files website.

8. Login to the site at the following URL: http://7f4lihm464gdcwfc.onion/ giving your username and password as supplied in the email. This URL can only be accessed when using Tor.

9. Once you are logged into the site you will see your user page, the search interface and publishing interface. At the top of the page are tabs that explain how these work. On your user page you will have five invite codes for you to give to others so that they can also gain access to the GI Files.

10. If you wish to invite someone to the GI Files then give them a unique invite code, along with the URL to this page of instructions – each person you invite must be a journalist, NGO worker or academic from a different organisation (for complete understanding of who you can invite please see the invite rules below).

11. If you violate any of the Terms and Conditions you risk having your login terminated, along with that of the person that invited you and the people that you invited. If any of the contacts you invited violate the terms of the Terms and Conditions, they risk having their login terminated, your login terminated and the logins of the people they invited terminated.

Invite Rules:

Each invite code must be given to a person who:
A. is a real person
B. is either a journalist, Professor or Associate Professor at a University or an employee of a human rights organisation
C. is from a different organisation to you and your other invitees
D. is using an email that is not a personal email
E. is using an email that is from a different domain to your email address and that of the other people you invite
F. is going to use the GI Files search and release site for research, the results of which will be communicated to the public.

For any issues or questions related to this signup process, please email: signup@wikileaks.org

 


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Public Intelligence – Ohio Fusion Center Report: Bath Salts and Officer Safety

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/OHSP-BathSalts.png

(U//FOUO) The Ohio State Highway Patrol Criminal Intelligence Unit recently partnered with the Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) and gathered information regarding bath salts via a survey. The objective of the study was to assist Law Enforcement by creating an officer safety awareness product relating to the dangers of encountering people on bath salts.

(U//FOUO) A survey was distributed to law enforcement and 5 agencies responded back with pertinent information regarding the use and possession of bath salts. The agencies which contributed to this analysis are as follows:

Barberton Police Department, OH; Ohio State Highway Patrol; Powell Police Department, OH; Reynoldsburg Division of Police; and West Virginia State Police – Wheeling Division (Parcel Interdiction).

(U//FOUO) Information was obtained on 161 incidents involving bath salts.

(U//FOUO) OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS:

  • Out of the 161 incidents reported, officers made 77 arrests involving bath salt use/possession. Many of the incidents occurred before legislation was passed; therefore mere possession was not criminal at the time of many of these reports.
  • There were 27 use of force reports involving bath salts.
  • There were 3 incidents that involved fleeing of suspects.
  • 7 suspects were taken to hospital associated with bath salt use.
  • 7 offenders were pinked slipped and taken to mental health facilities.
  • There were 4 reports of deaths associated with bath salt use (Note: cause of death results did NOT find that bath salts use was the sole contributor in any of these deaths).
  • There was 1 report of suicide; 2 suicide attempts; and 1 suicide threat involving bath salt use.
  • Suspects reported paying approximately $20-$25 for bath salts.
  • The offenders reported multiple ways of using bath salts including: snorting, injection with a needle syringe, and drinking the bath salts by mixing it with fluid.
  • Many offenders admitted to combining bath salts with other drugs.
  • When reported, most people said they got the bath salts from independently owned convenient stores and drive-thrus, gas stations or markets. A WV State Police (parcel narcotics interdiction) Officer reported that a prominent internet company is: Southern Burn LLC from South Carolina.

(U//FOUO) OFFICER SAFETY CONCERNS

  • Use of force incidents included: use of Taser (3 incidents), hands on, escorts, restrained by medical professionals, and bean bag use.
  • One “officer in trouble” call was reported, involving an officer fighting with a person on bath salts.
  • Both officers in a Reynoldsburg Police case were surprised after a Taser was used on a suspect. They explained that the Taser was shot and the probes penetrated in the torso of the suspect, however it had minimal effects; the suspect fought through the electric current and rose to his feet.
  • Injuries sustained to suspects included: bruises, cuts, Taser punctures, and minimal injuries from bean bag rounds.
  • Officers sustained injuries including: injury to knee, injury to back, injury to groin, ankles, scrapes and bruises, and multiple injuries from strikes to the face.
  • 2 officers and 7 offenders were taken to the hospital resulting from physical force.
  • One incident involved the use of the SWAT team and another involved escalated use of force involving bean bag rounds.

(U//FOUO) PHYSIOLOGICAL REACTIONS FROM BATH SALT USE

  • Suspects showed the following physical reactions to bath salts: Hyperventilation, cramps, dehydration, vomiting, shaking, loss of memory, pale, emaciated, jittery, lethargy, incoherent speech, rambling, rapid movement, rapid speech, disoriented, itchy skin, and several suspect admitted to a lack of sleep for multiple days.
  • An offender described bath salts as giving him a “cocaine rush” and it being a very “intense” high.
  • Witnesses described bath salt users as:
    • Hostile, violent, unpredictable, out of control, paranoid, and reckless.
  • Additional reports by Law Enforcement involving people on bath salts:
    • Officer described one suspect as having unusual superhuman strength.
    • Officer described suspect as shooting off the ground like a “flash of light.”
    • One suspect bent the hinged handcuffs during the arrest.
  • The following hallucinations were reported:
    • A hit-skip offender said he saw a brick wall, which in turn caused a crash.
    • A male, using bath salts, reported raccoons setting fire inside his home. As a result, he proceeded to destroy his home and used a hatchet to cut up his deck, while attempting to locate the fire-setting raccoons. He also believed the raccoons stole his cell phone.
    • A male, using bath salts, believed he was being followed by police helicopters and police officers were using mirrors, snipers and different types of scopes to look through his walls. He called police requesting to negotiate with them, however there were no police at the residence when the call was made.
    • During the course of speaking to an offender and officer reported, he yelled, “AT&T calling, may I help you, AT&T is calling, a million dollars, two black guys……it’s not a racial thing, it’s not a racial thing.”
    • A bath salt user reported he hears voices; one voice was going to beat him with a ball bat.
    • The domestic violence offender using bath salts reported his mother was practicing demonology & witchcraft and she was poisoning his food. He was arrested for choking her.
    • DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:
    • OHSP-BathSalts

Unveiled – Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate and the Euro InterBank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty

WASHINGTON—Barclays Bank PLC, a financial institution headquartered in London, has entered into an agreement with the Department of Justice to pay a $160 million penalty to resolve violations arising from Barclays’ submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR), which are benchmark interest rates used in financial markets around the world, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and Assistant Director in Charge James W. McJunkin of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

As part of the agreement with the Department of Justice, Barclays has admitted and accepted responsibility for its misconduct set forth in a statement of facts that is incorporated into the agreement. According to the agreement, Barclays provided LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that, at various times, were false because they improperly took into account the trading positions of its derivative traders, or reputational concerns about negative media attention relating to its LIBOR submissions. The Justice Department’s criminal investigation into the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR by other financial institutions and individuals is ongoing. The agreement requires Barclays to continue cooperating with the department in its ongoing investigation.

“LIBOR and EURIBOR are critically important benchmark interest rates,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. “Because mortgages, student loans, financial derivatives, and other financial products rely on LIBOR and EURIBOR as reference rates, the manipulation of submissions used to calculate those rates can have significant negative effects on consumers and financial markets worldwide. For years, traders at Barclays encouraged the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions in order to benefit their financial positions; and, in the midst of the financial crisis, Barclays management directed that U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions be artificially lowered. For this illegal conduct, Barclays is paying a significant price. To the bank’s credit, Barclays also took a significant step toward accepting responsibility for its conduct by being the first institution to provide extensive and meaningful cooperation to the government. Its efforts have substantially assisted the Criminal Division in our ongoing investigation of individuals and other financial institutions in this matter.”

“Barclays Bank’s illegal activity involved manipulating its submissions for benchmark interest rates in order to benefit its trading positions and the media’s perception of the bank’s financial health,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “Today’s announcement is the result of the hard work of the FBI special agents, financial analysts, and forensic accountants as well as the prosecutors who dedicated significant time and resources to investigating this case.”

Barclays was one of the financial institutions that contributed rates used in the calculation of LIBOR and EURIBOR. The contributed rates are generally meant to reflect each bank’s assessment of the rates at which it could borrow unsecured interbank funds. For LIBOR, the highest and lowest 25 percent of contributed rates are excluded from the calculation and the remaining rates are averaged to calculate the fixed rates. For EURIBOR, the highest and lowest 15 percent are excluded, and the remaining 70 percent are averaged to calculate the fixed rates.

Futures, options, swaps, and other derivative financial instruments traded in the over-the-counter market and on exchanges worldwide are settled based on LIBOR. Further, mortgages, credit cards, student loans, and other consumer lending products often use LIBOR as a reference rate. According to the agreement, an individual bank’s LIBOR or EURIBOR submission cannot appropriately be influenced by the financial positions of its derivatives traders or the bank’s concerns about public perception of its financial health due to its LIBOR submissions.

According to the agreement, between 2005 and 2007, and then occasionally thereafter through 2009, certain Barclays traders requested that the Barclays LIBOR and EURIBOR submitters contribute rates that would benefit the financial positions held by those traders. The requests were made by traders in New York and London, via electronic messages, telephone conversations, and in-person conversations. The employees responsible for the LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions accommodated those requests on numerous occasions in submitting the bank’s contributions. On some occasions, Barclays’s submissions affected the fixed rates.

In addition, between August 2005 and May 2008, certain Barclays traders communicated with traders at other financial institutions, including other banks on the LIBOR and EURIBOR panels, to request LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that would be favorable to their or their counterparts’ trading positions, according to the agreement.

When the requests of traders for favorable LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions were taken into account by the rate submitters, Barclays’ rate submissions were false and misleading.

Further, according to the agreement, between approximately August 2007 and January 2009, in response to initial and ongoing press speculation that Barclays’ high U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions at the time might reflect liquidity problems at Barclays, members of Barclays management directed that Barclays’ dollar LIBOR submissions be lowered. This management instruction often resulted in Barclays’ submission of false rates that did not reflect its perceived cost of obtaining interbank funds. While the purpose of this particular conduct was to influence Barclays’ rate submissions, as opposed to the resulting fixes, there were some occasions when Barclays’ submissions affected the fixed rates.

The agreement and monetary penalty recognize Barclays’ extraordinary cooperation. Barclays made timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of its misconduct. After government authorities began investigating allegations that banks had engaged in manipulation of benchmark interest rates, Barclays was the first bank to cooperate in a meaningful way in disclosing its conduct relating to LIBOR and EURIBOR. Barclays’ disclosure included relevant facts that at the time were not known to the government. Barclays’s cooperation has been extensive, in terms of the quality and type of information and assistance provided, and has been of substantial value in furthering the department’s ongoing criminal investigation. Barclays has made a commitment to future cooperation with the department and other government authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Assistant Attorney General Breuer further stated, “As today’s agreement reflects, we are committed to holding companies accountable for their misconduct while, at the same time, giving meaningful credit to companies that provide full and valuable cooperation in our investigations.”

In addition, Barclays has implemented a series of compliance measures and will implement additional internal controls regarding its submission of LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, as required by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Barclays will also continue to be supervised and monitored by the FSA.

The agreement and monetary penalty further recognize certain mitigating factors to Barclays’ misconduct. At times, Barclays employees raised concerns with the British Bankers’ Association, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in late 2007 and in 2008 that the Dollar LIBOR rates submitted by contributing banks, including Barclays, were too low and did not accurately reflect the market. Further, during this time, notwithstanding Barclays’s improperly low dollar LIBOR submissions, those submissions were often higher than the contributions used in the calculation of the fixed rates.

As a result of Barclays’s admission of its misconduct, its extraordinary cooperation, its remediation efforts and certain mitigating and other factors, the department agreed not to prosecute Barclays for providing false LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, provided that Barclays satisfies its ongoing obligations under the agreement for a period of two years. The non-prosecution agreement applies only to Barclays and not to any employees or officers of Barclays or any other individuals.

In a related matter, the CFTC brought attempted manipulation and false reporting charges against Barclays, which the bank agreed to settle. The CFTC imposed a $200 million penalty and required Barclays to implement detailed measures designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of its benchmark interest rate submissions.

The FSA issued a final notice regarding its enforcement action against Barclays and has imposed a penalty of £59.5 million against it.

The case is being handled by Deputy Chief Daniel Braun, Assistant Chiefs Rebecca Rohr and Robertson Park, Trial Attorney Alexander Berlin, and Special Trial Attorney Luke Marsh of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section. The investigation is being conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, jointly with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.

The Department acknowledges and expresses its appreciation for the significant assistance provided by the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement, which referred the conduct to the department, as well as the FSA’s Enforcement and Financial Crime Division.

This agreement is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch and, with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task force visit: http://www.stopfraud.gov.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Texas Resident Convicted on Charge of Attempted Use of Weapon of Mass Destruction

AMARILLO, TX—Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, 22, a citizen of Saudi Arabia and resident of Lubbock, Texas, was convicted by a federal jury today on an indictment charging one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary to make an improvised explosive device (IED) and his research of potential U.S. targets, including persons and infrastructure.

The verdict, which was reached in the Northern District of Texas, was announced by Sarah R. Saldaña, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Diego G. Rodriguez, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Dallas Field Division.

Sentencing has been scheduled for October 9, 2012, in Amarillo. Aldawsari, who was lawfully admitted into the United States in 2008 on a student visa and was enrolled at South Plains College near Lubbock, faces a maximum sentence of life in prison and a $250,000 fine. He was arrested on February 23, 2011 on a criminal complaint and later charged in a March 9, 2011 federal indictment with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.

According to court documents and evidence presented during trial, at the time of his arrest last year, Aldawsari had been researching online how to construct an IED using several chemicals as ingredients. He had also acquired or taken a substantial step toward acquiring most of the ingredients and equipment necessary to construct an IED, and he had conducted online research of several potential U.S. targets, the affidavit alleges. In addition, he had allegedly described his desire for violent jihad and martyrdom in blog postings and a personal journal.

“While many people are responsible for thwarting Aldawsari’s threat and bringing him to justice, we owe a debt of gratitude to all the members of the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force, and especially to the hundreds of hardworking and dedicated FBI agents, analysts, linguists, and others,” said U.S. Attorney Saldaña. “Their efforts, coupled with the hard work and excellent cooperation from the Lubbock Police Department and the Texas Tech Police Department, are the reason we were able to stop this defendant from carrying out a catastrophic act of terrorism.”

“As this trial demonstrated, Aldawsari purchased ingredients to construct an explosive device and was actively researching potential targets in the United States. Thanks to the efforts of many agents, analysts, and prosecutors, this plot was thwarted before it could advance further,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco. “This case serves as another reminder of the need for continued vigilance both at home and abroad.”

“Today’s guilty verdict shows how individuals in the United States with the intent to do harm can acquire the knowledge and materials necessary to carry out an attack,” said SAC Rodriguez. “Our success in locating and preventing Mr. Aldawsari from carrying out an attack is a result of cooperation within the law enforcement and intelligence communities, particularly, the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Texas Tech Police Department, the Lubbock Police Department, and the Lubbock County Sheriff’s Office, but also a demonstration of information sharing across FBI divisions, as well as assistance from the community. I want to thank the dedicated agents, officers, and analysts; the computer forensics team; and linguists that worked diligently on this investigation, as well as prosecutors serving in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Northern District.”

The government presented evidence that on February 1, 2011, a chemical supplier reported to the FBI a suspicious attempted purchase of concentrated phenol by a man identifying himself as Khalid Aldawsari. Phenol is a toxic chemical with legitimate uses, but it can also be used to make the explosive trinitrophenol, also known as T.N.P., or picric acid. Ingredients typically used with phenol to make picric acid, or T.N.P., are concentrated sulfuric and nitric acids.

Aldawsari attempted to have the phenol order shipped to a freight company so it could be held for him there, but the freight company told Aldawsari that the order had been returned to the supplier and called the police. Later, Aldawsari falsely told the supplier he was associated with a university and wanted the phenol for “off-campus, personal research.” Frustrated by questions being asked over his phenol order, Aldawsari cancelled his order, placed an order with another company, and later e-mailed himself instructions for producing phenol. In December 2010, he had successfully purchased concentrated nitric and sulfuric acids.

Aldawsari used various e-mail accounts in researching explosives and targets and often sent e-mails to himself as part of this process. He e-mailed himself a recipe for picric acid, which was described in the e-mail as a “military explosive” and also e-mailed himself instructions on how to convert a cell phone into a remote detonator and how to prepare a booby-trapped vehicle using household items. Aldawsari also purchased many other items, including a Hazmat suit, a soldering iron kit, glass beakers and flasks, a stun gun, clocks, and a battery tester.

Excerpts from a journal found at Aldawsari’s residence indicated that he had been planning to commit a terrorist attack in the United States for years. One entry describes how Aldawsari sought and obtained a particular scholarship because it allowed him to come directly to the United States and helped him financially, which he said “will help tremendously in providing me with the support I need for Jihad.” The entry continues, “And now, after mastering the English language, learning how to build explosives and continuous planning to target the infidel Americans, it is time for Jihad.”

In another entry, Aldawsari wrote that he was near to reaching his goal and near to getting weapons to use against infidels and their helpers. He also listed a “synopsis of important steps” that included obtaining a forged U.S. birth certificate; renting a car; using different driver’s licenses for each car rented; putting bombs in cars and taking them to different places during rush hour; and leaving the city for a safe place.

Aldawsari conducted research on various targets and e-mailed himself information on these locations and people. One of the documents he sent himself, with the subject line listed as “Targets,” contained the names and home addresses of three American citizens who had previously served in the U.S. military and had been stationed for a time at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In others, Aldawsari sent himself the names of 12 reservoir dams in Colorado and California and listed two categories of targets: hydroelectric dams and nuclear power plants. He also sent himself an e-mail titled “Tyrant’s House,” in which he listed the Dallas address for former President George W. Bush. Aldawsari also conducted research that indicated he considered using infant dolls to conceal explosives and the possible targeting of a nightclub with an explosive concealed in a backpack.

This case was investigated by the FBI’s Dallas Joint Terrorism Task Force, with assistance from the Lubbock Police Department and the Texas Tech Police Department. The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jeffrey R. Haag, Denise Williams, James T. Jacks, and Matthew J. Kacsmaryk and Trial Attorney David Cora from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.