TOP-SECRET – (U//FOUO) Los Angeles Fusion Center: Steganography Intelligence Bulletin

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(U//FOUO) Steganography—the practice of concealing data within a carrier—may be used to obscure malicious or criminal information and activity from law enforcement. While steganography dates to the fifth century BC, it has long been regarded as, and remains, one of the most advanced forms of clandestine communication. In modern usage, the Internet allows accessibility to, and broad dissemination of, steganography tools, and its application continues to evolve with technology. Understanding steganography in its current state is essential to its identification and detection.

(U) Detection

(U//FOUO) Detecting steganography is challenging; in fact, determining whether media contains extraneous data is nearly impossible. Generally, detection occurs only through direct knowledge of its existence, evidence of steganography tools, or chance. Some indicators of steganography may include:

• (U//FOUO) Conspicuous and unusual sharing of digital media files via peer-to-peer (P2P) clients, e-mail, or uploads to Web sites
• (U//FOUO) Repeated sharing of the same file
• (U//FOUO) Possession of steganography software, or visiting sites known to contain steganography
• (U//FOUO) Sharing of content that is inconsistent with a subject’s life, such as pictures of children when he or she is not known to have any
• (U//FOUO) Possession of two or more copies of a file that do not look/sound identical, that is, the same image but of varying sizes and hash values
• (U//FOUO) Presence of files whose large size is unusual for the type of content
• (U//FOUO) Possession of books or articles on—or, expression of interest in—cryptography or steganography

(U) Note that traditional security devices (for example, firewalls) do not detect steganography; a file containing a concealed message presents as a legitimate file.

(U) Tools for Detection

(U) Steganalysis, the method of detecting steganography and destroying the hidden message, is possible through free online tools. Deciphering and viewing the original message is challenging without the encryption keys, and some detection software may only identify steganography within a specific medium.

(U) Illicit Uses of Steganography

(U) Covert Communication

(U) Steganography can be used to hide communication behind seemingly innocuous files to pass messages without fear of detection.

• (U) According to an indictment unsealed in June 2010, an accused Russian spy network in New York began to use steganography as early as 2005. After a raid on the home of an alleged spy, law enforcement found a program on a computer that allowed group members to embed data in images on publicly available Web sites.
• (U//FOUO) The second issue of The Technical Mujahid details the benefits of using steganography over encryption; the magazine includes instructions for and examples of steganography.

(U) Concealing Illicit Activity

(U//FOUO) Criminals use steganography to hide materials or information for the purpose of

• (U) Trafficking in child pornography
• (U) Committing fraud
• (U) Evading government censorship abroad
• (U) Conducting industrial espionage

(U) VoIP Steganography

(U) Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) steganography, also known as network steganography, is one example of adaption to new technology. Use of a proprietary VoIP service eliminates the need for a carrier to conceal data, and extends the message length. The longer the conversation or data exchange, the longer or more detailed the hidden message can be. The brief time period the VoIP data exists for makes this nearly impossible to detect or prevent.

 

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

LAJRIC-Steganography

 

CONFIDENTIAL – The FBI – The Chicago Mafia Down but Not Out

06/27/11

Chicago mafiaA Roman Catholic priest and former prison chaplain who ministered to Chicago mob boss Frank Calabrese, Sr., was indicted earlier this month for illegally passing jailhouse messages from Calabrese and plotting with his associates on the outside—a sobering reminder of how deeply organized crime can reach into the community, even from behind bars.

“Members of the mob will go to almost any lengths to carry out their criminal activity,” said Special Agent Ted McNamara, a veteran investigator who supervises the La Cosa Nostra (LCN) organized crime squad in our Chicago Field Office.

Calabrese, Sr., was sentenced to life in prison in 2009 for his role in 18 gangland slayings in the Chicago area dating back to 1970. His arrest—along with 13 others—was part of one of the most successful organized crime cases in FBI history, an eight-year investigation called Operation Family Secrets.

Because of the Family Secrets case—in which Calabrese’s son testified against him—“the Chicago mob does not have the power and influence it once had,” McNamara said. “But the mob still operates, and its members still represent a potentially serious criminal threat.”

Unlike New York’s infamous Five Families, the Chicago mob consists of only one family, often referred to as the “Outfit.” It is organized under a variety of crews that engage in various criminal activities. A portion of the crews’ illegal gains goes to the Outfit’s top bosses.

“New York gets most of the attention regarding LCN,” McNamara said, “but historically, going back to the days of Al Capone, Chicago LCN has always been a player, particularly in places like Las Vegas.”

Unlike their New York counterparts, the Outfit has traditionally stayed away from drug trafficking, preferring instead crimes such as loan-sharking and online gambling operations and capitalizing on other profitable vices. One of the reasons it is so difficult to completely stamp out mob activity, McNamara said, is that over time the crews have insinuated themselves into unions and legitimate businesses.

“Typically they get into running restaurants and other legal businesses that they can use to hide money gained from their illicit activities,” McNamara explained. “Over the years the Outfit has learned that killing people brings too much heat from law enforcement. Today they might not even beat up a businessman who doesn’t pay back a debt,” he added. Instead, they take a piece of his business, and then, over time, exercise more and more control over the company.

The Family Secrets case, which began in 1999 and resulted in the indictment of 14 subjects in 2005 for racketeering and murder, dealt a crushing blow to the Chicago mob. “Our goal now,” McNamara said, “is to keep them from gaining strength again. We’ve got them down, and we’ve got to keep them down.”

He noted that some of the mobsters currently in jail as a result of numerous prosecutions will be getting out in the next few years, and they will be under pressure to start making money again for the Outfit’s top bosses.

“As long as there is money to be made from criminal activity,” McNamara said, “these guys will never stop. So we need to continue to be vigilant and take the long view. The work we do on the LCN squad requires a lot of patience.”

The FBI reports about the Sicilian Mafia

Italian Organized Crime

Overview

Analysts training in the classroom

Since their appearance in the 1800s, the Italian criminal societies known as the Mafia have infiltrated the social and economic fabric of Italy and now impact the world. They are some of the most notorious and widespread of all criminal societies.

There are several groups currently active in the U.S.: the Sicilian Mafia; the Camorra or Neapolitan Mafia; the ’Ndrangheta or Calabrian Mafia; and the Sacra Corona Unita or United Sacred Crown.

We estimate the four groups have approximately 25,000 members total, with 250,000 affiliates worldwide. There are more than 3,000 members and affiliates in the U.S., scattered mostly throughout the major cities in the Northeast, the Midwest, California, and the South. Their largest presence centers around New York, southern New Jersey, and Philadelphia.

Their criminal activities are international with members and affiliates in Canada, South America, Australia, and parts of Europe. They are also known to collaborate with other international organized crime groups from all over the world, especially in drug trafficking.

The major threats to American society posed by these groups are drug trafficking and money laundering. They have been involved in heroin trafficking for decades. Two major investigations that targeted Italian organized crime drug trafficking in the 1980s are known as the “French Connection” and the “Pizza Connection.”

These groups don’t limit themselves to drug running, though. They’re also involved in illegal gambling, political corruption, extortion, kidnapping, fraud, counterfeiting, infiltration of legitimate businesses, murders, bombings, and weapons trafficking. Industry experts in Italy estimate that their worldwide criminal activity is worth more than $100 billion annually.

A Long History

These enterprises evolved over the course of 3,000 years during numerous periods of invasion and exploitation by numerous conquering armies in Italy. Over the millennia, Sicilians became more clannish and began to rely on familial ties for safety, protection, justice, and survival.

An underground secret society formed initially as resistance fighters against the invaders and to exact frontier vigilante justice against oppression. A member was known as a “Man Of Honor,” respected and admired because he protected his family and friends and kept silent even unto death.

Sicilians weren’t concerned if the group profited from its actions because it came at the expense of the oppressive authorities. These secret societies eventually grew into the Mafia.

Since the 1900s, thousands of Italian organized crime figures—mostly Sicilian Mafiosi—have come illegally to this country. Many who fled here in the early 1920s helped establish what is known today as La Cosa Nostra or the American Mafia.

Charles “Lucky” Luciano, a Mafioso from Sicily, came to the U.S. during this era and is credited for making the American La Cosa Nostra what it is today. Luciano structured the La Cosa Nostra after the Sicilian Mafia. When Luciano was deported back to Italy in 1946 for operating a prostitution ring, he became a liaison between the Sicilian Mafia and La Cosa Nostra.

Sicilian Mafia (based in Sicily)

The Sicilian Mafia formed in the mid-1800s to unify the Sicilian peasants against their enemies. In Sicily, the word Mafia tends to mean “manly.” The Sicilian Mafia changed from a group of honorable Sicilian men to an organized criminal group in the 1920s.

In the 1950s, Sicily enjoyed a massive building boom. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the Sicilian Mafia gained control of the building contracts and made millions of dollars. Today, the Sicilian Mafia has evolved into an international organized crime group. Some experts estimate it is the second largest organization in Italy.

The Sicilian Mafia specializes in heroin trafficking, political corruption, and military arms trafficking—and is also known to engage in arson, frauds, counterfeiting, and other racketeering crimes. With an estimated 2,500 Sicilian Mafia affiliates it is the most powerful and most active Italian organized crime group in the U.S.

The Sicilian Mafia is infamous for its aggressive assaults on Italian law enforcement officials. In Sicily the term “Excellent Cadaver” is used to distinguish the assassination of prominent government officials from the common criminals and ordinary citizens killed by the Mafia. High-ranking victims include police commissioners, mayors, judges, police colonels and generals, and Parliament members.

On May 23, 1992, the Sicilian Mafia struck Italian law enforcement with a vengeance. At approximately 6 p.m., Italian Magistrate Giovanni Falcone, his wife, and three police body guards were killed by a massive bomb. Falcone was the director of Criminal Affairs in Rome. The bomb made a crater 30 feet in diameter in the road. The murders became known as the Capaci Massacre.

Less than two months later, on July 19, the Mafia struck Falcone’s newly named replacement, Judge Paolo Borsellino in Palermo, Sicily. Borsellino and five bodyguards were killed outside the apartment of Borsellino’s mother when a car packed with explosives was detonated by remote control.

Under Judge Falcone’s tenure the FBI and Italian law enforcement established a close working relationship aimed at dismantling Italian organized crime groups operating in both countries. That relationship has intensified since then.

Camorra or Neapolitan Mafia (based in Naples)

The word “Camorra” means gang. The Camorra first appeared in the mid-1800s in Naples, Italy, as a prison gang. Once released, members formed clans in the cities and continued to grow in power. The Camorra has more than 100 clans and approximately 7,000 members, making it the largest of the Italian organized crime groups.

In the 1970s, the Sicilian Mafia convinced the Camorra to convert their cigarette smuggling routes into drug smuggling routes with the Sicilian Mafia’s assistance. Not all Camorra leaders agreed, leading to the Camorra Wars that cost 400 lives. Opponents of drug trafficking lost the war.

The Camorra made a fortune in reconstruction after an earthquake ravaged the Campania region in 1980. Now it specializes in cigarette smuggling and receives payoffs from other criminal groups for any cigarette traffic through Italy. The Camorra is also involved in money laundering, extortion, alien smuggling, robbery, blackmail, kidnapping, political corruption, and counterfeiting.

It is believed that nearly 200 Camorra affiliates reside in this country, many of whom arrived during the Camorra Wars.

’Ndrangheta or Calabrian Mafia (based in Calabria)

The word “’Ndrangheta” comes from the Greek meaning courage or loyalty. The ’Ndrangheta formed in the 1860s when a group of Sicilians was banished from the island by the Italian government. They settled in Calabria and formed small criminal groups.

There are about 160 ’Ndrangheta cells with roughly 6,000 members. They specialize in kidnapping and political corruption, but also engage in drug trafficking, murder, bombings, counterfeiting, gambling, frauds, thefts, labor racketeering, loansharking, and alien smuggling.

Cells are loosely connected family groups based on blood relationships and marriages. In the U.S., there are an estimated 100-200 members and associates, primarily in New York and Florida.

Sacra Corona Unita or United Sacred Crown (based in the Puglia region)

Law enforcement became aware of the Sacra Corona Unita in the late 1980s. Like other groups, it started as a prison gang. As its members were released, they settled in the Puglia region in Italy and continued to grow and form links with other Mafia groups. The Sacra Corona Unita is headquartered in Brindisi, located in the southeastern region of Puglia.

The Sacra Corona Unita consists of about 50 clans with approximately 2,000 members and specializes in smuggling cigarettes, drugs, arms, and people. It is also involved in money laundering, extortion, and political corruption. The organization collects payoffs from other criminal groups for landing rights on the southeast coast of Italy, a natural gateway for smuggling to and from post-Communist countries like Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

Very few Sacra Corona Unita members have been identified in the U.S., although some individuals in Illinois, Florida, and New York have links to the organization.

 


La Cosa Nostra

La Cosa Nostra is the foremost organized criminal threat to American society. Literally translated into English it means “this thing of ours.” It is a nationwide alliance of criminals—linked by blood ties or through conspiracy—dedicated to pursuing crime and protecting its members.

La Cosa Nostra, or the LCN as it is known by the FBI, consists of different “families” or groups that are generally arranged geographically and engaged in significant and organized racketeering activity. It is also known as the Mafia, a term used to describe other organized crime groups.

The LCN is most active in the New York metropolitan area, parts of New Jersey, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, and New England. It has members in other major cities and is involved in international crimes.

History of La Cosa Nostra

Although La Cosa Nostra has its roots in Italian organized crime, it has been a separate organization for many years. Today, La Cosa Nostra cooperates in various criminal activities with different criminal groups that are headquartered in Italy.

Giuseppe Esposito was the first known Sicilian Mafia member to emigrate to the U.S. He and six other Sicilians fled to New York after murdering the chancellor and a vice chancellor of a Sicilian province and 11 wealthy landowners. He was arrested in New Orleans in 1881 and extradited to Italy.

New Orleans was also the site of the first major Mafia incident in this country. On October 15, 1890, New Orleans Police Superintendent David Hennessey was murdered execution-style. Hundreds of Sicilians were arrested, and 19 were eventually indicted for the murder. An acquittal generated rumors of widespread bribery and intimidated witnesses. Outraged citizens of New Orleans organized a lynch mob and killed 11 of the 19 defendants. Two were hanged, nine were shot, and the remaining eight escaped.

The American Mafia has evolved over the years as various gangs assumed—and lost—dominance over the years: the Black Hand gangs around 1900; the Five Points Gang in the 1910s and ‘20s in New York City; Al Capone’s Syndicate in Chicago in the 1920s. By the end of the ‘20s, two primary factions had emerged, leading to a war for control of organized crime in New York City.

The murder of faction leader Joseph Masseria brought an end to the gang warfare, and the two groups united to form the organization now dubbed La Cosa Nostra. It was not a peaceful beginning: Salvatore Maranzano, the first leader of La Cosa Nostra, was murdered within six months.

Charles “Lucky” Luciano became the new leader. Maranzano had established the La Cosa Nostra code of conduct, set up the “family” divisions and structure, and established procedures for resolving disputes. Luciano set up the “Commission” to rule all La Cosa Nostra activities. The Commission included bosses from six or seven families.

Luciano was deported back to Italy in 1946 based on his conviction for operating a prostitution ring. There, he became a liaison between the Sicilian Mafia and La Cosa Nostra.

Other Historical Highlights:

1951: A U.S. Senate committee led by Democrat Estes Kefauver of Tennessee determined that a “sinister criminal organization” known as the Mafia operated in this nation.

1957: The New York State Police uncovered a meeting of major LCN figures from around the country in the small upstate New York town of Apalachin. Many of the attendees were arrested. The event was the catalyst that changed the way law enforcement battles organized crime.

1963: Joseph Valachi became the first La Cosa Nostra member to provide a detailed looked inside the organization. Recruited by FBI agents, Valachi revealed to a U.S. Senate committee numerous secrets of the organization, including its name, structure, power bases, codes, swearing-in ceremony, and members of the organization.

Today, La Cosa Nostra is involved in a broad spectrum of illegal activities: murder, extortion, drug trafficking, corruption of public officials, gambling, infiltration of legitimate businesses, labor racketeering, loan sharking, prostitution, pornography, tax-fraud schemes, and stock manipulation schemes.

The Genovese Crime Family

Named after legendary boss Vito Genovese, the Genovese crime family was once considered the most powerful organized crime family in the nation. Members and their numerous associates engaged in drug trafficking, murder, assault, gambling, extortion, loansharking, labor racketeering, money laundering, arson, gasoline bootlegging, and infiltration of legitimate businesses.

Genovese family members are also involved in stock market manipulation and other illegal frauds and schemes as evidenced by the recent FBI investigation code named “Mobstocks.”

The Genovese crime family has its roots in the Italian criminal groups in New York controlled by Joseph Masseria in the 1920s. The family history is rife with murder, violence, and greed.

Early History—Masseria and Maranzano

Masseria sparked the so-called “Castellammarese War” in 1928 when he tried to gain control of organized crime across the country. The war ended in 1931 when Salvatore Maranzano conspired with Masseria’s top soldier, Charles “Lucky” Luciano, to have Masseria killed. Maranzano emerged as the most powerful Mafia boss in the nation, setting up five separate criminal groups in New York and calling himself “Boss of Bosses.”

Two of the most powerful La Cosa Nostra families—known today as the Genovese and Gambino families—emerged from Maranzano’s restructuring efforts. Maranzano named Luciano the first boss of what would later be known as the Genovese family. Luciano showed his appreciation less than five months later by sending five men dressed as police officers to Maranzano’s office to murder him.

Luciano, Costello, and Genovese

With Maranzano out of the way, Luciano become the most powerful Mafia boss in America and used his position to run La Cosa Nostra like a major corporation. He set up the LCN Commission, or ruling body, composed of seven bosses, and divided the different rackets among the families.

In 1936, Luciano was sentenced to 30 to 50 years in prison. Ten years later, he was released from prison and deported to Italy, never to return. When he was convicted, Frank Costello became acting boss because Genovese—then just an underboss—had fled to Italy to avoid a murder charge. His return to the states was cleared when a key witness against him was poisoned and the charges were dropped.

Costello led the family for approximately 20 years until May of 1957 when Genovese took control by sending soldier Vincent “the Chin” Gigante to murder him. Costello survived the attack but relinquished control of the family to Genovese. Attempted murder charges against Gigante were dismissed when Costello refused to identify him as the shooter.

In 1959, it was Genovese’s turn to go to prison following a conviction of conspiracy to violate narcotics laws. He received a 15-year sentence but continued to run the family through his underlings from his prison cell in Atlanta, Georgia.

Valachi Sings—and Lombardo Leads

About this time, Joseph Valachi, a “made man,” was sent to the same prison as Genovese on a narcotics conviction. Labeled an informer, Valachi survived three attempts on his life behind bars. Still in prison in 1962, he killed a man he thought Genovese had sent to kill him. He was sentenced to life for the murder.

The sentencing was a turning point for Valachi, who decided to cooperate with the U.S. government. On September 27, 1963, he appeared before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and testified that he was a member of a secret criminal society in the U.S. known as La Cosa Nostra.

In 1969, several years after Valachi began cooperating with the FBI, Vito Genovese died in his prison cell. By then the Genovese family was under the control of Philip “Benny Squint” Lombardo. Unlike the bosses before him, Lombardo preferred to rule behind his underboss. His first, Thomas Eboli, was murdered in 1972. Lombardo promoted Frank “Funzi” Tieri, and later Anthony “Fat Tony” Salerno as his front men.

Throughout the 1980s, the Genovese family hierarchy went through several changes. Tieri, recognized on the street as the Genovese family boss in the late 1970s, was convicted for operating a criminal organization through a pattern of racketeering that included murder and extortion.

Salerno then fronted as boss until he had stroke in 1981. In 1985, Salerno and the bosses of the other four New York families were convicted for operating a criminal enterprise—the LCN Commission. Lombardo, his two captains in prison and his health failing, turned full control of the Genovese family over to Gigante—the man who tried to kill Costello 30 years earlier.

Fish on the Hook

In 1986, a second member turned against the Genovese family when Vincent “Fish” Cafaro, a soldier and right-hand-man to Anthony Salerno, decided to cooperate with the FBI and testify. According to Cafaro’s sworn statement, Gigante ran the family from behind the scenes while pretending to be mentally ill. Cafaro said this behavior helped further insulate Gigante from authorities while he ran the Genovese family’s criminal activities.

Gigante’s odd behavior and mumbling while he walked around New York’s East Village in a bathrobe earned him the nickname “the Odd Father.” After an FBI investigation, Gigante was convicted of racketeering and murder conspiracy in December 1997 and sentenced to 12 years. Another FBI investigation led to his indictment on January 17, 2002, accusing him of continuing to run the Genovese family from prison. He pled guilty to obstruction of justice in 2003.

Gigante died in prison in December 2005 in the same federal hospital where Gambino family leader John Gotti had died in 2002.

 


The Italian American Working Group

Over the years, FBI investigations have revealed how organized criminal groups have proliferated and impacted much of the world. Partnerships with foreign law enforcement agencies are essential to combat global organized crime groups.

Among the partnerships the FBI is involved with is the Italian American Working Group, which meets every year. The group addresses organized crime, cyber crime, money laundering, international terrorism, illegal immigration, cooperating witnesses, drug smuggling, art theft, extradition matters, and cigarette smuggling. The U.S. and Italy take turns hosting the meetings.

 


Labor Racketeering

Labor racketeering is the domination, manipulation, and control of a labor movement in order to affect related businesses and industries. It can lead to the denial of workers’ rights and inflicts an economic loss on the workers, business, industry, insurer, or consumer.

The historical involvement of La Cosa Nostra in labor racketeering has been thoroughly documented:

  • More than one-third of the 58 members arrested in 1957 at the Apalachin conference in New York listed their employment as “labor” or “labor-management relations.”
  • Three major U.S. Senate investigations have documented La Cosa Nostra’s involvement in labor racketeering. One of these, the McClellan Committee, in the late-1950s, found systemic racketeering in both the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union.
  • In 1986, the President’s Council on Organized Crime reported that five major unions—including the Teamsters and the Laborers International Union of North America—were dominated by organized crime.
  • In the early 1980s, former Gambino Family Boss Paul Castellano was overheard saying, “Our job is to run the unions.”

Labor racketeering has become one of La Cosa Nostra’s fundamental sources of profit, national power, and influence.

FBI investigations over the years have clearly demonstrated that labor racketeering costs the American public millions of dollars each year through increased labor costs that are eventually passed on to consumers.

Labor unions provide a rich source for organized criminal groups to exploit: their pension, welfare, and health funds. There are approximately 75,000 union locals in the U.S., and many of them maintain their own benefit funds. In the mid-1980s, the Teamsters controlled more than 1,000 funds with total assets of more than $9 billion.

Labor racketeers attempt to control health, welfare, and pension plans by offering “sweetheart” contracts, peaceful labor relations, and relaxed work rules to companies, or by rigging union elections.

Labor law violations occur primarily in large cities with both a strong industrial base and strong labor unions, like New York, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia. These cities also have a large presence of organized crime figures.

We have several investigative techniques to root out labor law violations: electronic surveillance, undercover operations, confidential sources, and victim interviews. We also have numerous criminal and civil statutes to use at our disposal, primarily through the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Statute.

The civil provisions of the RICO statute have proven to be very powerful weapons, especially the consent decrees. They are often more productive because they attack the entire corrupt entity instead of imprisoning individuals, who can easily be replaced with other organized crime members or associates.

Consent decrees are most effective when there is long-term, systemic corruption at virtually every level of a labor union by criminal organizations. A civil RICO complaint and subsequent consent decree can restore democracy to a corrupt union by imposing civil remedies designed to eliminate such corruption and deter its re-emergence.

The Teamsters are the best example of how efficiently the civil RICO process can be used. For decades, the Teamsters has been substantially controlled by La Cosa Nostra. In recent years, four of eight Teamster presidents were indicted, yet the union continued to be controlled by organized crime elements. The government has been fairly successful at removing the extensive criminal influence from this 1.4 million-member union by using the civil process.

We work closely with the Office of Labor Racketeering in the Department of Labor and with the U.S. Attorneys’ offices in investigating violations of labor law.

Confidential from the FBI – Cargo Theft How a Memphis Task Force Combats a Costly Problem

fter many hours on the road, the long-haul driver pulled his tractor-trailer into a Tennessee truck stop for a break and a hot meal. But by the time he looked over the menu, a crew of professional thieves had made off with his rig and all its contents.

 

 

truck trailer

Partnerships Make a Difference

In 2005, two large pharmaceutical companies were the victims of major cargo thefts at the same truck stop within a short time period, and each had no idea what had happened to the other. When they found out later, a meeting was called among pharmaceutical industry leaders, and the concept of a security coalition was born. The coalition would consist not only of industry members but also law enforcement.

Today, the Pharmaceutical Cargo Security Coalition shares information about thefts and best practices for reducing risk, according to Charles Forsaith, director of supply chain security for Purdue Pharma Technologies, who coordinates the coalition.

“We educate everyone in our industry,” said Forsaith, “and we work together with law enforcement to stop these crimes. That partnership has yielded a measurable decline in cargo theft.”

In 2008, for example, the pharmaceutical industry reported losses of 16 full trailer loads each valued in excess of $1 million. In 2011, Forsaith said, there were only four such losses valued over $1 million. In 2008, the odds of recovering a lost load were 31 percent. Today, he said, with the help of GPS tracking devices and a strong working relationship with law enforcement, the odds for recovery are better than 65 percent.

“We realized that we couldn’t put a stop to these crimes on our own,” he said. “In addition to educating our industry, we knew we needed buy-in from law enforcement, and we have been extremely pleased working with the FBI’s cargo theft task forces.”

Cargo theft is a multi-billion-dollar criminal enterprise in the U.S., and the FBI has seven task forces located around the country to combat the problem. In the Memphis region, according to Special Agent Conrad Straube, coordinator of the Memphis Cargo Theft Task Force, “there is an average of one cargo theft every day of the year.”

Memphis—located along major interstate highways and home to a variety of product distribution centers—is a hot spot for cargo theft. The thieves steal trucks with trailers or just the trailers and their contents. Often, goods are stolen from distribution center warehouses or even from moving rail cars.

On a recent day, Straube and his task force partners from the Memphis Police Department, Shelby County Sheriff’s Office, and the U.S. Marshals Service were on the road, following up on leads at truck stops and other locations in and around Memphis. The task force is busy—and successful. From January 2011 to the end of September, it recovered more than $1.5 million in stolen cargo and vehicles.

Task force member Barry Clark, a detective with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office, explained that some of the theft crews are so organized that each member has his own specialty, from the break-in artist who can steal a rig in seconds to professional drivers, surveillance experts, and the guys who know how to defeat the specialized devices that lock trailers carrying extremely valuable loads. “This is their business,” Clark said. “And they are good at it.”

Crew leaders know where to find willing buyers, too—from small mom and pop stores who don’t ask questions when they buy at prices below wholesale to online merchants who may or may not know they are purchasing stolen goods.

Although many crews target specific cargo such as electronics and pharmaceuticals—always in demand and easy to sell—other thieves steal whatever they can get their hands on. Straube and his team have recovered stolen trailers full of dog food, hair dryers, lawn mower engines, and even popsicles.

“When you talk about the victims of cargo theft,” Straube explained, “beyond the trucking companies and manufacturers, you have to include all consumers. Because when these items are stolen, it eventually drives up the cost of merchandise for everybody.”

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  Podcast: Special agent discusses cargo theft.

Cargo theft is also a “gateway” crime, said Special Agent Eric Ives, a program manager in our Criminal Investigative Division at FBI Headquarters who coordinates major theft investigations from a national perspective. “Groups that do these crimes are often funding other illegal activities, like buying drugs or weapons. And compared to many crimes,” Ives added, “cargo theft is highly profitable and not particularly dangerous.”

Conrad agreed, adding that thieves often rob warehouses on a Friday night, and by the time the crime is discovered and reported Monday morning, the stolen merchandise may already be on a store shelf or auctioned online.

That’s why our task forces—comprised of local, state, and federal law enforcement—and our partnerships with private industry (see sidebar) are critical in the fight against these costly crimes, Ives said. “Cargo theft is a sophisticated and organized enterprise,” he added, “and we take this threat very seriously.”

Uncensored – Femen topless protest : ‘Gangsta party in Davos’

Three topless Ukrainian protesters were detained on Saturday while trying to break into an invitation-only gathering of international CEOs and political leaders to call attention to the needs of the world’s poor. After a complicated journey to reach the heavily guarded Swiss resort town of Davos, the women arrived at the entrance to the congress centre where the World Economic Forum takes place every year. With temperatures around freezing in the snow-filled town, they took off their tops and climbed a fence before being detained. Davos police spokesman Thomas Hobi said the three women were taken to the police station and their papers were checked. The activists are from the group Femen, which has become popular in Ukraine for staging small, half-naked protests to highlight a range of issues including oppression of political opposition. They have also conducted protests in some other countries.

TOP-SECRET – Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) Final Version May 2011

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The Parties to this Agreement,

Noting that effective enforcement of intellectual property rights is critical to sustaining economic growth across all industries and globally;

Noting further that the proliferation of counterfeit and pirated goods, as well as of services that distribute infringing material, undermines legitimate trade and sustainable development of the world economy, causes significant financial losses for right holders and for legitimate businesses, and, in some cases, provides a source of revenue for organized crime and otherwise poses risks to the public;

Desiring to combat such proliferation through enhanced international cooperation and more effective international enforcement;

Intending to provide effective and appropriate means, complementing the TRIPS Agreement, for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in their respective legal systems and practices;

Desiring to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade;

Desiring to address the problem of infringement of intellectual property rights, including infringement taking place in the digital environment, in particular with respect to copyright or related rights, in a manner that balances the rights and interests of the relevant right holders, service providers, and users;

Desiring to promote cooperation between service providers and right holders to address relevant infringements in the digital environment;

Desiring that this Agreement operates in a manner mutually supportive of international enforcement work and cooperation conducted within relevant international organizations;

Recognizing the principles set forth in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted on 14 November 2001, at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference;

Hereby agree as follows:

pirated copyright goods means any goods which are copies made without the consent of the right holder or person duly authorized by the right holder in the country of production and which are made directly or indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of the country in which the procedures set forth in Chapter II (Legal Framework for Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights) are invoked;

ARTICLE 9: DAMAGES

1. Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities have the authority to order the infringer who, knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered as a result of the infringement. In determining the
amount of damages for infringement of intellectual property rights, a Party’s judicial authorities shall have the authority to consider, inter alia, any legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may include lost profits, the value of the infringed goods or services measured by the market price, or the suggested retail price.

2. At least in cases of copyright or related rights infringement and trademark counterfeiting, each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings, its judicial authorities have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder the infringer’s profits that are attributable to the infringement. A Party may presume those profits to be the amount of damages referred to in paragraph 1.

ARTICLE 11: INFORMATION RELATED TO INFRINGEMENT

Without prejudice to its law governing privilege, the protection of confidentiality of information sources, or the processing of personal data, each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities have the authority, upon a justified request of the right holder, to order the infringer or, in the alternative, the alleged infringer, to provide to the right holder or to the judicial authorities, at least for the purpose of collecting evidence, relevant information as provided for in its applicable laws and regulations that the infringer or alleged infringer possesses or controls. Such information may include information regarding any person involved in any aspect of the infringement or alleged infringement and regarding the means of production or the channels of distribution of the infringing or allegedly infringing goods or services, including the identification of third persons alleged to be involved in the production and distribution of such goods or services and of their channels of distribution.

ARTICLE 19: DETERMINATION AS TO INFRINGEMENT

Each Party shall adopt or maintain procedures by which its competent authorities may determine, within a reasonable period after the initiation of the procedures described in Article 16 (Border Measures), whether the suspect goods infringe an intellectual property right.

ARTICLE 20: REMEDIES

1. Each Party shall provide that its competent authorities have the authority to order the destruction of goods following a determination referred to in Article 19 (Determination as to Infringement) that the goods are infringing. In cases where such goods are not destroyed, each Party shall ensure that, except in exceptional circumstances, such goods are disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm to the right holder.

2. In regard to counterfeit trademark goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce.

3. A Party may provide that its competent authorities have the authority to impose administrative penalties following a determination referred to in Article 19 (Determination as to Infringement) that the goods are infringing.

 

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

ACTA-Final

Uncensored – FEMEN.— Woman Power.Missions.Goals.Actions.

FEMEN. Woman Power.

WE ARE THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT
We unite young women basing on the principles of social awareness and activism, intellectual and cultural development.
We recognise the European values of freedom, equality and comprehensive development of a person irrespective of the gender.
We build up a national image of feminity, maternity and beauty based on the Euro-Athlantic Women’s Movements experience.
We set up brand new standards of the civil movement in Ukraine.
We have worked out our own unique form of a civil self-expression based on courage, creativity, efficiency and shock.
We demonstrate that the civil movements can influence the public opinion and lobby the interests of a target group.
We plan to become the biggest and the most influential feminist movement in Europe.

OUR MISSION

The mission of the “FEMEN” Movement is to create the most favorable conditions for the young women to join up into a social group with the general idea of the mutual support and social responsibility, helping to reveal the talents of each member of the Movement.

OUR GOALS

To react and influence the acute social issues of the Ukrainian society, especially those that directly touch upon the interests of the Ukrainian Women.
To counteract actively the negative tendencies endangering physical and mental health of the Ukrainian women community.
Inform the society of the Ukrainian women’s issues and problems.
To develop leadership, intellectual and moral qualities of the young women in Ukraine.
To build up the image of Ukraine, the country with great opportunities for women.
To establish cooperation with other international women’s organizations to carry out the large-scale international programmes on the territory of Ukraine.

OUR ACTIONS

Subway — Movement – Life: The Joint Action with Kyiv underground authorities targeted on improving the image of the underground.

No Water in the Tap — I Wash in Maydan: Action against hot water cut offs in Kyiv hostels.

Ukraine is not a Brothel: The national programme aimed at fighting against the sexual tourism in Ukraine.

A Letter to the Minister: The Appeal to the governmental authorities with the demands to impose sanctions on sexual tourism in Ukraine on the legislation level.

Bromide Deactivation Action: The Picket outside the Turkish Republic Embassy. Turkish citizen are the most active sexual tourists in our country.

Dirty Games: The Action against the pre-term parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

Civil Solidarity Action A Rescue Buoy: The action in support of the Ukrainian sailors held hostage by Somalia Pirates.

No More Games, Mr Gainer: The Action within the frames of the Sex Tourtism Fighting Programme held at the National Security Service Office Building and targeted on the citizen of the USA, Mr David Gainer, the organizer of the sex-tours to Ukraine. There was a letter sent to the Foreign Office and Consulate with the demands to start the investigation and deportation of the man.

OUR PROGRAMMES

“Ukraine is not a Brothel”: The National Programme targeted at fighting against the sex-tourism in Ukraine.
“Sex is not for Sale”: The Programme to fight against sex and porn industry in Ukraine.
“MATER FEST”: The first international festival of a modern women culture.
«Kyiv Glam Sprint 2009»: The Ukrainian analogue of the international movement “Race on high hills”.
“The Green Mile”: The Programme to abolish the lifetime sentence for women in Ukraine.
Emergency programme: The Programme of immediate reacting on the acute issues that includes street actions and performances.

The following mass media reported on the FEMEN actions:

Der Spiegel
Die Welt
Independent.ie
Korrespondent.net
Gelf Magazine
Korrespondent
Kyiv Post
Jetzt.de

OUR CONTACTS

Anna Gutsol
+3 8(097) 96 71 753
anna.hutsol@mail.ru

TOP-SECRET – Documents Detail CIA, MI6 Relationship With Qaddafi

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This image provided by Human Rights Watch on Saturday, Sept. 3, 2011 shows part of a secret document dated June 19, 2003 discovered by Human Rights Watch in Tripoli, Libya, detailing a meeting regarding a CIA visit to Libya’s WMD programs. The CIA and other Western intelligence agencies worked closely with the ousted regime of Moammar Gadhafi, sharing tips and cooperating in handing over terror suspects for interrogation to a regime known to use torture, according to a trove of security documents discovered after the fall of Tripoli. The revelations provide new details on the West’s efforts to turn Libya’s mercurial leader from foe to ally and provide an embarrassing example of the U.S. administration’s collaboration with authoritarian regimes in the war on terror. (AP Photo/Human Rights Watch)

 

Libya: secret dossier reveals Gaddafi’s UK spy links

A cache of papers found at the intelligence headquarters dating from the time it was run by Moussa Koussa, who later became foreign minister and defected in March, showed Libya was handed Islamist opposition members as part of the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” programme.

MI6 also provided extensive information to the Libyan authorities of opponents living in Britain.

The British intelligence services seem to have been more circumspect than their American colleagues, however. Often the files, which were found by Human Rights Watch and shown to The Sunday Telegraph, suggest they restricted themselves to confirming information already known to the Libyans.

It also shows one reason for the co-operation – MI6′s belief that Libyan Islamists were playing a central role in funding and supporting al-Qaeda, often via contacts in Iran.

MI6 and the CIA were instrument in the attempts by former Prime Minister Tony Blair to bring Col Gaddafi “in from the cold”, started at the time the alleged Lockerbie bombers were handed over for trial in The Hague.

In return for compensating victims of the Lockerbie bombing and other terrorist outrages, and surrendering its programme for weapons of mass destruction, diplomatic relations were resumed and sanctions dropped.

The documents give details of how much further subsequent co-operation went between Libya and the West. They confirm that Abdulhakim Belhadj, now leader of the Tripoli Military Council under the rebel government, was flown by the CIA to Libya for interrogation and imprisonment in 2004.

 

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Documents with photographs and details of people wanted by the Libyan External Security office are seen in the abandoned office where Muammar Gaddafi’s former spy chief and foreign minister Moussa Koussa was based in Tripoli September 3, 2011. Documents found in the abandoned office of Gaddafi’s intelligence chief indicate the U.S. and British spy agencies helped the fallen strongman persecute Libyan dissidents, Human Rights Watch said on Saturday. The documents were uncovered by the human rights activist group in Koussa’s abandoned offices.

 

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A list of telephone interceptions by the Libyan External Security office is seen at the abandoned office of Muammar Gaddafi’s former spy chief and foreign minister Moussa Koussa in Tripoli September 3, 2011. Documents found in the abandoned office of Gaddafi’s intelligence chief indicate the U.S. and British spy agencies helped the fallen strongman persecute Libyan dissidents, Human Rights Watch said on Saturday. The documents were uncovered by the human rights activist group in Koussa’s abandoned offices.

 

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This image provided by Human Rights Watch on Saturday, Sept. 3, 2011, shows a secret document dated April 15, 2004 discovered by Human Rights Watch in Tripoli, Libya, detailing a request for Libya to take custody of a terrorist suspect known as “Shaykh Musa.” The CIA and other Western intelligence agencies worked closely with the ousted regime of Moammar Gadhafi, sharing tips and cooperating in handing over terror suspects for interrogation to a regime known to use torture, according to a trove of security documents discovered after the fall of Tripoli. The revelations provide new details on the West’s efforts to turn Libya’s mercurial leader from foe to ally and provide an embarrassing example of the U.S. administration’s collaboration with authoritarian regimes in the war on terror.

TOP-SECRET – (U//FOUO) DHS-FBI-USSS 2012 State of the Union Address Joint Threat Assessment

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(U//FOUO) This Joint Threat Assessment (JTA) addresses potential threats to the President’s delivery of the State of the Union address at the US Capitol on 24 January 2012.

(U) This information is intended to support federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local government agencies and authorities and other entities in developing and prioritizing protective and support measures relating to an existing or emerging threat to homeland security.

(U//FOUO) The information in this assessment is current as of 9 January 2012. Unless otherwise noted, this JTA uses the FBI definition of terms, which may differ from the definitions used by DHS.

(U) Key Findings

(U//FOUO) We have no specific or credible information indicating a threat to the US Capitol or the National Capital Region (NCR) to coincide with the 2012 State of the Union address. We assess, however, that al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and allies remain committed to attacking the Homeland and, as of February 2010, al-Qa‘ida identified the NCR and the State of the Union address itself as important targets, presumably for attacks. Moreover, homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) as well as lone offenders could view the event as an attractive target, offering the means to inflict casualties and garner extensive media coverage. Detecting homeland plots involving HVEs and lone offenders continues to challenge law enforcement and intelligence agencies due to the operational independence of the perpetrators, which can reduce or eliminate preoperational indicators.

(U//FOUO) Robust event security at the US Capitol might cause would-be attackers to engage less secure targets within the NCR during the State of the Union address in order to leverage the media attention and symbolism associated with the address.

(U) Intelligence Gaps

(U//FOUO) Are international terrorist groups or their affiliates and allies plotting to attack the US Capitol or the NCR during the State of the Union address?

(U//FOUO) Are domestic extremists planning to disrupt the State of the Union address by targeting entities associated with the US Government, including the US Capitol?

(U//FOUO) Are unidentified HVEs, inspired by international terrorist groups, planning to attack the US Capitol or the NCR during the State of the Union address?

(U//FOUO) Are unidentified lone offenders plotting to attack the US Capitol or the NCR during the State of the Union address?

(U//FOUO) Will peaceful demonstrations in the area of the US Capitol or within the NCR be exploited by violent actors who will pose a risk to officer safety during the State of the Union address?

 

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

DHS-SOTU-2012

 

 

UNCENSORED – FEMEN Protests at World Economic Forum


[Image]Activists of the Ukrainian feminist nudity group FEMEN clash with Swiss police during a protest at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum, WEF, in Davos, Switzerland, Saturday, Jan. 28, 2012. (Jean-Christophe Bott)
[Image]EDS NOTE NUDITY Topless Ukrainian protesters demonstrate at the entrance to the congress center where the World Economic Forum takes place in Davos, Switzerland Saturday, Jan. 28, 2012. The activists are from the group Femen, which has have become popular in Ukraine for staging small, half-naked protests against a range of issues including oppression of political opposition. (Anja Niedringhaus)
[Image]Topless Ukrainian protesters climb up a fence at the entrance to the congress center where the World Economic Forum takes place in Davos, Switzerland Saturday, Jan. 28, 2012. The activists are from the group Femen, which has have become popular in Ukraine for staging small, half-naked protests against a range of issues including oppression of political opposition. (Anja Niedringhaus)
[Image]EDS NOTE NUDITY – Topless Ukrainian protesters demonstrate at the entrance to the congress center where the World Economic Forum takes place in Davos, Saturday, Jan. 28, 2012. The activists are from the group Femen, which has become popular in Ukraine for staging small, half-naked protests against a range of issues including oppression of political opposition. (Anja Niedringhaus)
[Image]EDS NOTE NUDITY- A topless Ukrainian protester is arrested by Swiss police after climbing up a fence at the entrance to the congress center where the World Economic Forum takes place in Davos, Saturday, Jan. 28, 2012. The activists are from the group Femen, which has become popular in Ukraine for staging small, half-naked protests against a range of issues including oppression of political opposition. (Anja Niedringhaus)
[Image]Topless Ukrainian protesters demonstrate at the entrance to the congress center where the World Economic Forum takes place in Davos, Switzerland Saturday, Jan. 28, 2012. The activists are from the group Femen, which has have become popular in Ukraine for staging small, half-naked protests against a range of issues including oppression of political opposition. (Anja Niedringhaus)
[Image]A topless Ukrainian protester is arrested by Swiss police after climbing up a fence at the entrance to the congress center where the World Economic Forum takes place in Davos, Switzerland Saturday, Jan. 28, 2012. The activists are from the group Femen, which has have become popular in Ukraine for staging small, half-naked protests against a range of issues including oppression of political opposition. (Anja Niedringhaus)
[Image]Topless Ukrainian protesters demonstrate at the entrance to the congress center where the World Economic Forum takes place in Davos, Saturday, Jan. 28, 2012. The activists are from the group Femen, which has have become popular in Ukraine for staging small, half-naked protests against a range of issues including oppression of political opposition. (Anja Niedringhaus)
[Image]An activist from Ukrainian feminist group FEMEN shouts slogans as she is arrested by Swiss police during a topless protest on January 28, 2012, against the World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting on January 28, 2012 in the Swiss resort of Davos. Getty
[Image]An activist from Ukrainian feminist group FEMEN shouts slogans as she is arrested by Swiss police during a topless protest on January 28, 2012, against the World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting on January 28, 2012 in the Swiss resort of Davos. Getty
[Image]Attivist from Ukrainian feminist group ‘ Femen ‘ is arrested by Swiss police as they make a topless protest on January 28, 2012, against the World Economic Forum (WEF) in the center of the Swiss resort of Davos. The global elite has talked itself into an upbeat frame of mind as the Davos forum nears its climax on Saturday, but the Greek debt crisis still hangs heavily over proceedings. Getty
[Image]EDS NOTE : NUDITY – A member of the Ukrainian FEMEN women’s rights group is detained by policemen after a protest at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum, WEF, in Davos, Switzerland, Saturday, Jan. 28, 2012. In freezing temperatures three topless Ukrainian protesters were detained Saturday while climbing a security fence outside the economic forum to draw attention to the needs of the world’s poor. The protesters had their papers checked and will be released later from custody.

TOP-SECRET-Bilderberg Meetings Participant Lists 1954-2011

The following represents a nearly complete list of participants and attendees of Bilderberg Meetings from 1954-2011. It will be updated over time as more information is acquired.  If you have any additional information, including copies of official participant lists, please contact us or upload them using our secure online submission form.

Meeting Time Meeting Location Participant List Agenda
May 29-31, 1954 Hotel de Bilderberg
Osterbeek, Netherlands
Unofficial Unofficial
March 18-20, 1955 Barbizon, France
September 23-25, 1955 Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
May 11-13, 1956 Fredenborg, Denmark
February 15-17, 1957 St. Simons Island Conference, USA Unofficial Unofficial
September 13-15, 1958 Buxton Conference, England Incomplete Unofficial
September 18-20, 1959 Çinar Hotel
Yeşilköy, Istanbul, Turkey
May 28-29, 1960 Palace Hotel Bürgenstock, Nidwalden, Switzerland
April 21-23, 1961 Manoir St. Castin Lac-Beauport, Quebec, Quebec, Canada
May 18-20, 1962 Grand Hotel Saltsjöbaden Saltsjöbaden, Sweden
March 29-31, 1963 Cannes, France Unofficial Unofficial
March 20-22, 1964 Williamsburg Conference, Virginia, USA Unofficial Unofficial
April 2-4, 1965 Villa D’Este Conference, Italy Unofficial Unofficial
April 2-4, 1966 Nassauer Hof Hotel Wiesbaden Wiesbaden, West Germany Unofficial Unofficial
March 31-April 2, 1967 Cambridge, United Kingdom Unofficial Unofficial
April 26-28, 1968 Mont Tremblant, Canada Unofficial Unofficial
May 9-11, 1969 Hotel Marienlyst
Helsingør, Denmark
Unofficial Unofficial
April 17-19, 1970 Grand Hotel Quellenhof
Bad Ragaz Conference, Sweden
Unofficial Unofficial
April 23-25, 1971 Woodstock Inn
Woodstock, Vermont, U.S.A.
Unofficial Unofficial
April 21-23, 1972 La Reserve di Knokke-Heist
Knokke, Belgium
Unofficial Unofficial
May 11-13, 1973 Grand Hotel Saltsjöbaden
Saltsjöbaden, Sweden
Unofficial Unofficial
April 19-21, 1974 Hotel Mont d’Arbois
Megeve, France
Unofficial Unofficial
April 25-27, 1975 Golden Dolphin Hotel Çeşme, İzmir, Turkey Unofficial Unofficial
April 1976 The Homestead
Hot Springs, Virginia, United States
April 22-24, 1977 Paramount Imperial Hotel Torquay, United Kingdom Unofficial Unofficial
April 21-23, 1978 Chauncey Conference Center
Princeton, New Jersey, United States
Unofficial Unofficial
April 27-29, 1979 Grand Hotel Sauerhof Baden bei Wien, Austria Unofficial Unofficial
April 18-20, 1980 Dorint Sofitel Quellenhof Aachen
Aachen, West Germany
Unofficial Unofficial
May 15-17, 1981 Palace Hotel
Bürgenstock, Nidwalden, Switzerland
Unofficial Unofficial
April 14-16, 1982 Rica Park Hotel Sandefjord
Sandefjord, Norway
Unofficial Unofficial
May 13-15, 1983 Château Montebello Montebello, Quebec, Canada Unofficial Unofficial
May 11-13, 1984 Grand Hotel Saltsjöbaden Saltsjöbaden, Sweden Unofficial Unofficial
May 10-12, 1985 Doral Arrowwood Hotel Rye Brook, New York, United States Unofficial Unofficial
April 25-27, 1986 Gleneagles Hotel Gleneagles, Auchterarder, United Kingdom Unofficial Unofficial
April 24-26, 1987 Villa d’Este
Cernobbio, Italy
Unofficial Unofficial
June 3-5, 1988 Interalpen-Hotel Tyrol Telfs-Buchen, Austria Unofficial Unofficial
May 12-14, 1989 Gran Hotel de La Toja Isla de La Toja, Spain Unofficial Unofficial
May 10-13, 1990 Harrison Conference Center
Glen Cove, New York, United States
Unofficial Unofficial
June 6-9, 1991 Baden-Baden, Germany Unofficial Unofficial
May 21-24, 1992 Evian-les-Bains, France Unofficial Unofficial
April 22-25, 1993 Nafsika Astir Palace Hotel
Vouliagmeni, Greece
Unofficial Unofficial
June 2-5, 1994 Helsinki, Finland Unofficial Unofficial
June 8-11, 1995 Zurich, Switzerland Unofficial Unofficial
May 30 – June 2, 1996 The Kingbridge Centre in King City, Ontario, Canada Unofficial Unofficial
June 12-15, 1997 PineIsle Resort, Atlanta, U.S.A. Unofficial Unofficial
May 14-17, 1998 Turnberry Hotel, Ayrshire, Scotland Unofficial Unofficial
June 3-6, 1999 Caesar Park Hotel Penha Longa
Hotel Caesar Park Penha Longa,Sintra, Portugal
Unofficial Unofficial
June 1-3, 2000 Chateau Du Lac Hotel
Brussels, Belgium
Unofficial Unofficial
May 24-27, 2001 Hotel Stenungsbaden
Stenungsund, Sweden
Unofficial Unofficial
May 30 – June 2, 2002 Westfields Marriott
Chantilly, Virginia, U.S.A.
Unofficial Unofficial
May 15-18, 2003 Trianon Palace Hotel
Versaille, France
Unofficial Unofficial
June 3-6, 2004 Grand Hotel des Iles Borromees
Stressa, Italy
Unofficial Unofficial
May 5-8, 2005 Dorint Sofitel Seehotel Überfahrt
Rottach-Egern, Germany
Unofficial Unofficial
June 8-11, 2006 Brookstreet Hotel Ottawa, Canada Unofficial
June 3 – May 31, 2007 Ritz-Carlton Hotel
Istanbul, Turkey
Official
June 5-8, 2008 Westfields Marriott
Chantilly, Virginia, USA
Official
May 14-17, 2009 Astir Palace
Vouliagmeni, Greece
Official
June 3-6, 2010 Hotel Dolce
Sitges, Spain
Official
June 9-12, 2011 Hotel Suvretta House, St. Moritz, Switzerland Official

TOP-SECRET-(U//FOUO) Afghanistan Human Terrain Team AF-24 Quarterly Report Summer 2011

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COMMERCE (Security, Drought, and Prices) by DR Burke

Drought is taking its toll on farmers in the western areas of RC north. The first sign appeared in early spring. Realizing that the grazing land was going to be insufficient to support their flocks, farmers began slaughtering more of their sheep than usual. This, in turn, produced a temporary glut of lamb and a drop in what the farmer could expect from each animal. Faced with insufficient grazing land, some farmers are opting to move their animals to higher ground and to fields that can still provide a bit of nourishment for their hungry animals. Farmers in Jowzjan, for example, are moving their sheep down into Faryab. If current conditions worsen, flare-ups over common grazing lands may occur; local farmers may be unwilling to share valuable terrain with those they view as intruders.

All the farmers we have spoken with have noted the dramatic downturn in the yield of all crops, especially the all-important wheat harvest. Drought has severely diminished this year’s wheat harvest in the west of RC-North and escalated the price for flour for the average consumer. In response to a worsening economy, a few farmers have planted small fields of poppies, a crop that can tolerate dry conditions much better than wheat, watermelon, grapes, and tomatoes, the typical cash crops of the region. The poppy farmers are hoping, no doubt, that the lucrative profits from a small amount of opium will offset the shortfall of other crops. Some farmers have gone to Iran or sent their sons to Iran to seek jobs in construction in order to support their families, leaving behind villages even more vulnerable to insurgent influence. Without sufficient food for their families, other military aged men will, no doubt, be more susceptible to offers from insurgent leaders.

GOVERNANCE by DR Burke:

Local governance in rural Afghanistan is not simple. Older customary local assemblies operate alongside GIRoA officials, Community Development Councils (CDC’s), and insurgent groups. Although we speak of insurgent governments as “shadow governments,” they rarely exist in the shadows for those over whom they wield power. In villages where insurgents continue to exercise control, the insurgents and not GIRoA perform traditional governmental functions; they levy taxes, resolve disputes (they are, in many villages the only law in town), and maintain local defense forces.

Western Powers have invested their hope and their treasure in inventing a new form of local control: Community District Councils that come out of the National Solidarity Program (NSP). Managed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) with funds from NGO’s and from the World Bank, these organizations set priorities for the expenditure of donor money and oversee contracts. Although they offer an alternative to the indiscriminate funding of the past that encouraged favoritism and corruption, these organizations have little authority except when it comes to the stewardship of outside money. As those development funds begin to dry up, will CDC’s vanish? Can they be further empowered?

Customary organizations like shuras, on the other hand, continue in many rural areas to function as they have for generations raising collective concerns and resolving disputes. In districts like Ghormach insurgents have exerted considerable influence on these local shuras. In the last few months we have learned a good deal about these governing bodies. We recommend that ISAF forces use these local shuras as vehicles through which they can engage villagers and increase security. Our efforts have focused on obtaining information for our brigade, battalion, and companies located in Ghormach and Qeysar that identifies individuals with whom they may want to engage.

DOWNLOAD ORGINAL FILE HERE

USArmy-HTT-AF-24

 

TOP-SECRET – (U//FOUO) Joint Publication 3-15.1 Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations

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(U) This publication provides joint doctrine for planning and executing counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations. It outlines responsibilities, provides command and control considerations, discusses organizational options, details the C-IED process and attack the network methodology, and introduces models for coordinating with C-IED supporting organizations.

(U) This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and provides the doctrinal basis for the planning and conduct of joint C-IED operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. (U) Attacking the Network—General Considerations

(U) While attacking the adversary’s network is a complex, time-consuming task, raising the adversaries’ cost of IED employment to unacceptable levels can be accomplished through a focused, continuous series of operations designed to disrupt the people, places, processes, and materials that support the IEDs’ design, supply, and employment chain. However, C-IED operations must be accomplished within the context of successfully targeting the broader adversary infrastructure.

a. (FOUO) There is no guaranteed method of defining and codifying targetable activities and major components of an IED network. To avoid detection and attack, adversary networks camouflage and constantly revise, or adapt, their TTP. At the highest echelons, the leadership rarely communicates openly and generally uses trusted aides and couriers to provide broad guidance to subordinates and direct the network. At the lowest echelons, the local cell members are detectable, targetable, and replaceable. Therefore, eliminating individuals only provides temporary and limited solutions to countering IED threats. But as networks function and move resources (information, money, supplies, recruits) from the highest to the lowest echelons, these activities are detectable and targetable. Disrupting the flow of resources is the most reliable way of neutralizing the adversary’s use of IEDs. While ideology may produce recruits, they have to eat, obtain weapons, travel, and build, transport, and emplace bombs. Personnel can be replaced, but
the adversary’s logistical infrastructure and materials often take more time.

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

JCS-CIED

CONFIDENTIAL – FBI MegaUpload Search Photos and Video

Hi.

4 FBI agents took part in the Megaupload Search. They are still in NZ.

Here are Flickr Photos from the Search. 2 pictures are from inside the villa. The cars in the garage etc., and from the court yesterday.

FBI Operation in Kim Schmitz Dotcom House NZ – Flicker Photos

http://www.flickr.com/photos/32368051[at]N08/sets/72157625312230860/

USA v. Convicted Hacker Kim Schmitz Kim Dotcom – Indictment

http://www.4law.co.il/mega5112.pdf

Videos are here from the court etc.

New Zealand TV : MegaUpload Piracy Arrest 23/1/12 Hacker Kim Schmitz Dotcom

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WC47dn0LnnQ

China Brasil Germany TVs : MegaUpload Piracy Arrest 23/1/12 Hacker Kim Schmitz Dotcom

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=86pT7r4RcYg

A French Blogger Already Killed me Yesterday hehehe…

http://nanojv.wordpress.com/2012/01/23/boaz-guttman-attentat/

 

VIDEO- LAPD, Special Forces Conduct Urban Operations Exercise Over Downtown LA

Military helicopters will be flying high and dipping low above the skies of Los Angeles Thursday as part of a special operations training program.

Sky2 captured dramatic maneuvers Wednesday night as a Blackhawk helicopter and four other OH-6 helicopters – or “little birds” – flew over the city.

The Blackhawk hovered over the U.S. Bank building before it made a practice drop-off at a nearby park.

At one point, our cameras captured a soldier sitting with his legs dangling outside a chopper.

Throughout the exercise, the five rotorcrafts were staged at Dodger Stadium.

The LAPD says the purpose of the training is, in part, to ensure the military’s ability to operate in urban environments.

Unveield – Corruption scandal shakes Vatican as internal letters leaked

The Vatican was shaken by a corruption scandal Thursday after an Italian television investigation said a former top official had been transferred against his will after complaining about irregularities in awarding contracts.

The show “The Untouchables” on the respected private television network La 7 Wednesday night showed what it said were several letters that Archbishop Carlo Maria Vigano, who was then deputy-governor of Vatican City, sent to superiors, including Pope Benedict, in 2011 about the corruption.

The Vatican issued a statement Thursday criticizing the “methods” used in the journalistic investigation. But it confirmed that the letters were authentic by expressing “sadness over the publication of reserved documents.”

As deputy governor of the Vatican City for two years from 2009 to 2011, Vigano was the number two official in a department responsible for maintaining the tiny city-state’s gardens, buildings, streets, museums and other infrastructure.

Vigano, currently the Vatican’s ambassador in Washington, said in the letters that when he took the job in 2009 he discovered a web of corruption, nepotism and cronyism linked to the awarding of contracts to outside companies at inflated prices.

In one letter, Vigano tells the pope of a smear campaign against him (Vigano) by other Vatican officials who wanted him transferred because they were upset that he had taken drastic steps to save the Vatican money by cleaning up its procedures.

“Holy Father, my transfer right now would provoke much disorientation and discouragement in those who have believed it was possible to clean up so many situations of corruption and abuse of power that have been rooted in the management of so many departments,” Vigano wrote to the pope on March 27, 2011.

In another letter to the pope on April 4, 2011, Vigano says he discovered the management of some Vatican City investments was entrusted to two funds managed by a committee of Italian bankers “who looked after their own interests more than ours.”

LOSS OF $2.5 MILLION, 550,000 EURO NATIVITY SCENE

Vigano says in the same letter that in one single financial transaction in December, 2009, “they made us lose two and a half million dollars.”

The program interviewed a man it identified as a member of the bankers’ committee who said Vigano had developed a reputation as a “ballbreaker” among companies that had contracts with the Vatican, because of his insistence on transparency and competition.

The man’s face was blurred on the transmission and his voice was distorted in order to conceal his identity.

In one of the letters to the pope, Vigano said Vatican-employed maintenance workers were demoralized because “work was always given to the same companies at costs at least double compared to those charged outside the Vatican.”

For example, when Vigano discovered that the cost of the Vatican’s larger than life nativity scene in St Peter’s Square was 550,000 euros in 2009, he chopped 200,000 euros off the cost for the next Christmas, the program said.

Even though, Vigano’s cost-cutting and transparency campaign helped turned Vatican City’s budget from deficit to surplus during his tenure, in 2011 unsigned articles criticizing him as inefficient appeared in the Italian newspaper Il Giornale.

On March 22, 2011, Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone informed Vigano that he was being removed from his position, even though it was to have lasted until 2014.

Five days later he wrote to Bertone complaining that he was left “dumbfounded” by the ouster and because Bertone’s motives for his removal were identical to those published in an anonymous article published against him in Il Giornale that month.

In early April, Vigano went over Bertone’s head again and wrote directly to the pope, telling him that he had worked hard to “eliminate corruption, private interests and dysfunction that are widespread in various departments.”

He also tells the pope in the same letter that “no-one should be surprised about the press campaign against me” because he tried to root out corruption and had made enemies.

Despite his appeals to the pope that a transfer, even if it meant a promotion, “would be a defeat difficult for me to accept,” Vigano was named ambassador to Washington in October of last year after the sudden death of the previous envoy to the United States.

In its statement, the Vatican said the journalistic investigation had treated complicated subjects in a “partial and banal way” and could take steps to defend the “honor of morally upright people” who loyally serve the Church.

The statement said that today’s administration was a continuation of the “correct and transparent management that inspired Monsignor Vigano.”

CONFIDENTIAL – Information Operations Are Now “Inform and Influence Activities”

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The U.S. Army’s doctrine on information operations is getting an overhaul and a new name to reflect the changing nature of military operations. Information operations, which has traditionally included fields such as psychological operations and military deception, will now be incorporated into “Inform and Influence Operations” and changes to the doctrine will be reflected in an updated field manual to be released in 2012. The changes are in response to fundamental shifts in U.S. Army information operations that emphasize the increasingly integrated role of U.S. forces in stability operations and counterinsurgency.

The sometimes controversial field of information operations focuses on military control and manipulation of the information environment operating in a battlespace. According to a 2003 manual from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.” When a revised version of the Army manual on operations (FM-3) was released in 2010, the revisions vastly changed the nature of military information operations. Several of the revisions were brought about after there was public and congressional controversy surrounding the issue of whether certain military tactics constituted “traditional military action” or “covert action.” Some of the tactics, such as military information support operations (MISO), formerly referred to as psychological operations (PSYOP), require the military to lie about the source of material or “delay recognition” of its origin. The 2010 U.S. Army War College Information Operations Primer states that “the military’s activities to influence target audiences outside combat zones has sparked debate over whether these activities should properly fall under the Department of State. These questions have caused additional media interest and Congressional scrutiny, and in cases have resulted in reduced funding for military IO efforts.”

A draft version of the U.S. Army’s new manual obtained by Public Intelligence defines “Inform and Influence activities” as the “integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking.” The manual provides a more holistic approach to information operations designed to emphasize the nature of every soldiers’ actions on the information environment of a given operation. It describes “information fratricide” as “employing information-related capabilities operations elements in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.”

The ability to “influence” a population is defined in the manual as causing audiences to “think or behave in a manner favorable to the commander’s objectives” which results from “applying perception management to affect the target’s emotions, motives, and reasoning.” This can include inform and influence activities that support offensive operations, such as “destroying” which uses “lethal and nonlethal means to physically render enemy information useless or information systems ineffective unless reconstituted.” The manual also includes a number of newer concepts related to information operations, such as “cyber electromagnetic activities” which “seize, retain, and exploit advantages in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum” enabling “Army forces to retain freedom of action while denying freedom of action to enemies and adversaries.”

SEE DRAFT HERE

USArmy-InformInfluence

STASILAND – True Stories – The Book by Anna Funder

Stasiland: Oh Wasn’t it so Terrible – True Stories from Behind the Berlin Wall (Stasiland: Ach, war es nicht so schrecklich – Wahre Geschichten von hinter der Berliner Mauer by Anna Funder is a polyvocal text about individuals who resisted the East German regime, and others who worked for its secret police, the Stasi. It tells the story of what it was like to work for the Stasi, and describes how those who did so now come to terms, or not, with their pasts.

Funder, an Australian, found that Germans often resorted to stereotypes in describing the Ossis, the German nickname for those who lived in East Germany, dismissing questions about civil resistance. She used classified ads to reach former members of the Stasi and anti-Stasi organizations and interviewed them extensively.[1]

Chris Mitchell of Spike Magazine called it “an essential insight into the totalitarian regime”.[2] Giles MacDonogh wrote in The Guardian that the culture of informants and moral capitulations “comes wonderfully to life in Funder’s racy account”.[1]

Stasiland has been published in fifteen countries and translated into a dozen different languages. It was shortlisted for many awards in the UK and Australia, among them the Age Book of the Year Awards, the Queensland Premier’s Literary Awards, the Guardian First Book Award 2003, the South Australian Festival Awards for Literature (Innovation in Writing) 2004, the Index Freedom of Expression Awards 2004, and the W.H. Heinemann Award 2004. In June 2004 it was awarded the world’s biggest prize for non-fiction, the Samuel Johnson Prize.

Stasiland is being developed for the stage by The National Theatre in London.

Notes

References

Stalisland – Germany – Video

Everyone knows about the Nazis camps of Auschwitz and Dachau. But few are aware of the systemic oppression that went on under the Stasis. Now some ex-Stasis agents are trying to re-write history.

“I won’t apologise for anything. I can only apologise for not having worked more efficiently”, states former Stasi spy Peter Wolter. He maintains that the thousands of people tortured and imprisoned were; “quite rightly punished”. Along with other ex-agents, Wolter is campaigning to have a museum documenting the suffering of prisoners in Stasi prisons closed. As Anna Funder, author of ‘Stasiland’ states; “these were people writing doctoral theses on how to destroy a soul”. Now thousands of ordinary Germans who had their lives destroyed by the Stasis fear their suffering will be negated.

Kim Dotcom starring in Kimble goes Monaco # 2

One year later Kimble wants to go and visit the Monaco Grand Prix once more! So guess what, he invited his friends again, now even a bigger group and they drive off in the most expensive cars you can imagine for a $10.000.000+ weekend in Monaco!

Kimble, also known as Kim Dotcom is currently being indicted for copyright fraud as owner of Megaupload.

“Kimble Goes Monaco Part II,” like all sequels, strains to top its predecessor; it’s the Teflon Don to Part I’s Port of Miami. More Ferraris! More hangers-on! A more lavish steam-table banquet! A champagne-spritzing Saint Tropez lingerie party! A Trap-a-Holics-style announcer peppering his German-language narration with stray English phrases like “all-inclusive,” “The boys are in town!,” “Kim-pire,” and “Fireworks, DJ, laser show!” Kim-posse members like Keiwan, Matthias and Gitta return, but they’re preceded in the credits—which borrow the theme music and wipe effects from Dynasty’s opening sequence by some new faces. Here’s Finn Batato, who would go on to become Megaupload’s chief marketing officer; he was arrested on Thursday, too. (The indictment names him as part of the overall MegaConspiracy but also specifically charges him with having circulated Megaupload links to infringing copies of the movies My Blueberry Nights and Dan in Real Life and Louis Armstrong’s recording of the song “We Have All The Time In The World,” which anyone attuned to the James Bondian aspects of this case will recognize as a soundtrack cut from On Her Majesty’s Secret Service.)

Here, too, and all over the video, is Frank Lämmermann, sort of a German Jean-Ralphio type with a towering head of shellacked ich-bin-un-zany-comedian hair, acting as de facto master of ceremonies. Lämmermann was apparently a presenter on the German music/entertainment network Viva at the time, and went on to conquer America with an appearance on Pauly Shore’s TBS series Minding the Store, which Google indicates was a thing that existed. A German message-board poster once said of Lämmermann, “For, instead of encouraging you to laugh stimulates only! Apart from that the guy is so annoying that one feels after a short time to give him the urge to become one with the baseball bat.” We’re pretty sure we agree; although his presence as host frees up Schmitz himself to drink out of a punchbowl and whip his male associates’ bare asses with a belt, it lends a self-conscious, Billionaires Gone Wild vibe to the proceedings, especially when Lämmermann is walking around with a shotgun mic interviewing women about their nipples.

Like the Jersey Shore kids returning to Karma, the Kimble Clan returns to the Autobahn, to the zuper-yacht, and eventually to Jimmy*z. They’ve been coming to this same party for years, and in no way is that depressing! The party continues back on the yacht—fireworks, DJ, lasershow!—and at some point Keiwan, egged on by other party guests, eats a whole onion. In a way, we’re lucky that all Kim went on to do was change his name to “Dotcom” and (allegedly) aid in the file-sharing-abetted downfall of the content industry; there’s a sociopathic emptiness to the proceedings on display in this second video. This is the party you have before you have the party where you rent out an island and hunt humans for sport.

Kim Dotcom starring in Kimble goes Monaco #1

Kimble, our internethero goes to Monaco with his friends, spending a good $10.000.000 during one Formula 1 weekend!

Kimble, also known as Kim Dotcom is currently being indicted for copyright fraud as owner of Megaupload.

It’s not every day that you encounter a real-life practitioner of Bond-villainous ostentation like Kim Schmitz, aka Kim Dotcom, founder of the now-shuttered file-hosting network Megaupload. The German-Finnish hacker-turned-accused-copyright-infringement-magnate was arrested last Thursday by New Zealand police acting in cooperation with the FBI; he and his business associates, referred to, awesomely, as “the MegaConspiracy” in an indictment filed on January 5th in U.S. District Court, are being charged with “criminal copyright infringement and money laundering on a massive scale with estimated harm to copyright holders well in excess of $500,000,000 and reported income in excess of $175,000,000.” In happier times, Schmitz raced in the Gumball Rally and bankrolled lavish fireworks displays for his adopted homeland of New Zealand and star-studded music videos featuring artists like will.i.am (literally) singing Megaupload’s praises; shortly before his arrest, he became the world’s top-ranked Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 player, sitting at #1 on the game’s “Kills” and “Free-for-all” leaderboards as of three weeks ago. He was busted the day before his 38th birthday, at a $30 million rented mansion north of Auckland; he was allegedly hiding in a panic room with a sawed-off shotgun, like any innocent person celebrating a birthday.

Schmitz is six-foot-six, per Wikipedia, and weighs 285 pounds. He looks like Augustus Gloop grown up all muah-ha-ha; basically, the US government and the entertainment industry could not have asked for a better Dr. Evil figure to help them dramatize the inherent nefariousness of copyright infringement, unless Kim had been so kind as to pose for pictures stroking a fluffy white cat. The indictment (posted as a PDF here) is 72 pages long and packed with amazing details. The list of assets the authorities are looking to seize includes 59 different bank accounts, a $15,000 Devon Works Tread 1 watch made of bulletproof polycarbonate (described on Devon Works’ Website as “a big, bold sexy declaration of independence from the status quo”), a statue of the Predator, and a fleet of luxury cars, including Mercedes-Benzes with license plates reading “GOOD,” “EVIL,” “CEO,” “MAFIA,” “GOD,” “STONED,” “POLICE,” “HACKER” and “GUILTY.” (Some perspective: When Time Magazine profiled Napster cofounder and original file-sharing gangsta Shawn Fanning twelve years ago, he was driving a “newly customized” Mazda RX-7.)

Commissioning vanity plates to trumpet your Internet-outlaw status on a fleet of Benzes is crazy, but it’s by no means out of character for Dotcom. Way back at the dawn of this century, when he was merely a hacker-turned-entrepreneur known as “Kimble,” before he was arrested in Bangkok and fined ¬100,000 for embezzlement and insider trading, he made some endlessly entertaining video documentaries celebrating a cash-incinerating lifestyle that looks, in retrospect, like a dress rehearsal for the hyperindulged-international-superpirate role the US government has accused him of playing.

You can find both “Kimble Goes to Monaco” and “Kimble Goes to Monaco Part II” on Google Video. They’re in German, without subtitles, but you’ll get the gist: Look at how much fun we’re having. Imagine how much it costs.

Uncensored Video – Femen of Ukraine

Our God is woman, our mission is protest, our weapons are bare breasts!
簡介
FEMEN (Ukrainian:Фемен) is a Ukrainian protest group based in Kiev, founded in 2008. The organisation became internationally known for organizing topless protests against sex tourists, international marriage agencies, sexism and other social, national and international ills. Some of the goals of the organisation are: “To develop leadership, intellectual and moral qualities of the young women in Ukraine” and “To build up the image of Ukraine, the country with great opportunities for women”. As of late April 2010 the organisation is contemplating becoming a political party to run for seats in the next Ukrainian parliamentary election.

History

The movement was founded in 2008 by Anna Hutsol (born 1983, most FEMEN members are younger) after she became attuned to the sad stories of Ukrainian woman duped by false promises from abroad: “I set up FEMEN because I realised that there was a lack of women activists in our society; Ukraine is male-oriented and women take a passive role.” Since then the organization has staged noticeable erotically-flavored rallies (among others) near the building of the Cabinet of Ministers, at Maidan Nezalezhnosti, the Turkish embassy in Ukraine and in front of the Iranian embassy to oppose the expected execution of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani.

The goals of the organization is “to shake women in Ukraine, making them socially active; to organize in 2017 a women’s revolution.”
FEMEN justifies its provocative methods stating “This is the only way to be heard in this country. If we staged simple protests with banners, then our claims would not have been noticed”. The organisation plans to become the biggest and the most influential feminist movement in Europe.

Exposed – Mitt Romney’s Tax Returns 2010-2011

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Willard M and Ann D Romney Estimated 1040 for 2011

104 pages

Download original document here

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Willard M and Ann D Romney 1040 for 2010 203 pages

Download original document here

Romney-2010-1040

The Ann and Mitt Romney 1995 Family Trust 1041 for 2010 81 page

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The Ann D. Romney Blind Trust 1041 for 2010 83 pages

AnnRomneyTrust-1041-2010

The W. Mitt Romney Blind Trust 1041 for 2010 37 pages

RomneyBlindTrust-1041-2010

The Tyler Foundation 990 from 2010 39 pages

TylerFoundation-990-2010

The word ‘Stasi’ has become ‘a global synonym for the secret police terrors of communism’.

The East German State Security Service, commonly known as the Stasi, was founded in February 1950. For forty years, the Stasi maintained a frightening reputation for surveillance, infiltration and terror, leading Historian Timothy Garton Ash to comment that the word ‘Stasi’ has become ‘a global synonym for the secret police terrors of communism’. The tentacles of Stasi power and influence were so far reaching that it was recently revealed that the Stasi had even compiled a secret dossier on Erich Honecker, leader of the GDR 1971 – 1989; using information obtained about Honecker’s attempts to collaborate with the Nazis during the Second World War to force him to resign in October 1989. In January 1990, shortly after the collapse of communism in the GDR, crowds of protestors stormed and occupied the Stasi headquarters in Berlin; an act symbolising the people’s victory over one of the greatest evils of state socialism in the GDR. The Stasi kept meticulous records about those placed under surveillance, with over 180km of shelved Stasi files surviving the collapse of the GDR. In the post-communist years this information was declassified and between 1992 and 2011 an estimated 2.75 individuals have requested access to their files. In many instances people discovered that people they had trusted – family members, close friends, neighbours and work colleagues – had worked as informants for the Stasi. In this article, guest author David Cook explores the key role played by Stasi informers in the GDR, considering the motivations of those who agreed to work with the Stasi and the impact of popular participation on wider society.

 

Living with the Enemy: Informing the Stasi in the GDR.

By David Cook.

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was the golden child of the Soviet Union, often portrayed as the torch bearer for the communist system around the world. Yet its people still could not be allowed the freedom to air their individual opinions, the views of the state were final and absolute, and to contradict the party was considered no less serious a crime than treason itself. A powerful police organ was needed to keep the people in check, a progenitor of fear that would bend the populace to the will of the state. In the GDR the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi, was the tool used to attempt to mould the East German people to the Communist Party’s (SED) requirements. However, police and party pressure alone is not enough to oppress an entire country; popular participation is ultimately key to any regime’s survival. In the case of the GDR, its own people helped to maintain the party’s power through their role as police informers. Informers played a crucial role, acting as a vital cog in the vast machinery of the East German police state; both responding to and perpetuating the climate of fear that permeated throughout East German society.

 

By 1989, when the Berlin Wall collapsed and communism in East Germany came to an end, it is estimated that the MfS had 97,000 official employees as well as approximately 173,000 unofficial informers. Roughly this translated as a ratio of one agent per 63 of the population, a position far in advance of the Soviet Union’s KGB, that even at its height could only manage one per 5830 people (Figures taken from Anna Funder, Stasiland, Granta: 2004). The Stasi amounted to a small army infiltrating the very fabric of the communist regime, whose sole purpose was the surveillance and repression of the East German people. Fear of the state – and of the Stasi as a tool of state control – was widespread, and this terror was used as a vital tool in the creation of a malleable citizenry.

The Stasi motto ‘Schild und Schwert der Partei’ declared its intention to act as the ‘Shield and Sword’ of the Communist Party in East Germany.

 

There were a variety of things that could bring a person to the attention of the Stasi. Once the MfS had targeted a suspect the goal was often to engender self-doubt in that person, to prevent them from living any semblance of a normal life, and if indeed they were guilty of some form of ‘subversion’, to encourage them to further implicate and discredit themselves. Ulrike Poppe was one such individual whose work in dissident peace and feminist movements were deemed to be a threat to the stability of communist East Germany by the Stasi. Between 1973 – 1989, Poppe was arrested a total of 14 times. For 15 years she was placed under surveillance, followed by her own personal MfS agent and subjected to daily harassment. In this way the Stasi undermined their targets’ self-confidence and peace of mind, rather than physically beating them. Although physical coercion was employed by the Stasi, the evidence indicates that they often preferred to utilise more ‘subtle’ (but equally effective) means of psychological torture. Isolation, sleep deprivation, disorientation, humiliation, restriction of food and water and ominous threats against the subject and their families combined with promises of leniency if they ‘confessed’ were all commonly cited interrogation tactics. The MfS was not concerned with human rights and paid no more than lip service to the notion of a democratic legal process and legitimate trials, as illustrated by the head of the Stasi, Erich Mielke, who maintained a policy of: ‘Execution, if necessary without a court verdict.’

 

One victim’s memories of Hohenschönhausen, the feared Stasi prison in East Berlin:

 

 

For the police state to function fully however, participation from amongst the populace was key. Their vital tool here was to be the Inofizelle Mitarbeiter (I.M). IMs were unofficial collaborators who informed on work colleagues, friends, and even their own spouses. Informers were a part of everyday life, supplying the Stasi with the banal trivialities that they deemed necessary to neutralise their targets. During the lifespan of the communist regime in East Germany it is estimated from existing archival material that there were up to 500,000 informers active at various times. Or more starkly one in 30 of the population had worked for the Stasi by the fall of the GDR. Informers were controlled by their own special department, HA IX (Main Department 9), often referred to as ‘the centre of the inquisition.’

 

People were not often willing informers however, and it would be wrong to accuse the majority of East Germans of freely consenting to work with the Stasi. Motives for becoming an informer appear to be numerous, and this topic has provided the basis for many historical works. Yet as crucial as they were to the oppression of the population, what drove so many East Germans to inform on their own people? Robert Gellately in his article, Denunciation in 20th Century Germany, posits a view of a ‘culture of denunciation’ that was a hangover from the Nazi period. People became I.Ms for a number of reasons in his view: for personal gain; so visits to the West would be granted; from a desire to change the system from within; or in the majority of cases through blackmail and coercion by the Stasi. Fear then, was also used as a tool to recruit informers from the general populace.

 

Timothy Garton Ash’s book, The File, is based on his own personal Stasi file as he tracks down and talks to many of those that informed on him, noting the motivations behind their actions. Each of the informers exhibits differing reasons for their collaboration, all of which are covered by Gellately’s theory. ‘Michaela’ was an art director and as such was encouraged to inform on those the Stasi deemed interesting in order to make her job easier. Visas enabling visits to art exhibits in the West or much needed budget increases could be obtained in exchange for information. Whilst ‘Michalea’ was an example of someone working for the police state for personal gain, two other examples in Garton Ash’s book were recruited through blackmail. ‘Schuldt’ was persuaded to become an informer due to fear of his homosexuality being made public and his life ruined; ‘Smith’ on the other hand collaborated to prove his innocence in the face of accusations of being a Western spy. In this way the Stasi was able to build up a frighteningly vast network of informers utilised to collate data on anyone deemed of interest to the state.

 

Stasi Files Department, Berlin. The Stasi kept meticulous files on all individuals under surveillance, the majority of which survived the collapse of communism and are now accesible to the public.

 

Fear, as illustrated in the cases of ‘Smith’ and ‘Schuldt’, was the most powerful weapon possessed by the Stasi. It was a weapon they utilised freely, creating large networks of informers and ensuring the system survived. The MfS were the source of this fear in society at large, creating a resigned conformity amongst the masses that kept them subordinate to the whims of the SED. This is the crucial role played by the security apparatus in a truly repressive police state. Without the conformity of the lower levels of society the system would have collapsed. The majority of the population learned, from a dread of the consequences, to live with this authority in return for living a semblance of a peaceful life. Reicker, Schwarz and Schneider describe the day to day life of a GDR citizen as such: ‘The daily lie, which everyone participated in to some extent … Once you learn to accept the big political lie you allow yourself little lies in other places. Unconsciously.’  It was this willingness by the German population to be subjected to authority, and the all powerful nature of the MfS, that Funder argues led to the relatively low level dissident movement within the GDR.

 

Everyday life was pervaded by the party ideology, the individual was disregarded and the regime elevated above it. Virtually no corner of life was left untouched by the influence of the party and its ‘guard dog’, the Stasi. The security apparatus infiltrated and manipulated the educational sector; determining who could study at university and which subjects were ‘suitable’ for academic research and teaching, with almost a quarter of staff at the East German Humboldt university in the Stasi’s employ. All communication in and out of the communist state was monitored and intercepted by the MfS. In East Berlin, 25 phone stations enabled the tapping of up to 20,000 calls simultaneously. Figures show that 2,300 telegrams a day were read by the Stasi in 1983 alone. Interception of packages also proved to be a favoured method of state security, and one that provided rich dividends. Estimates taken from surviving archival material put the figure of currency seized by the MfS as equalling 32.8 million DM. (Figures taken from Mike Dennis, The Stasi: Myth and Reality, Longman: 2003)

 

‘Smell Sampling’ was used by the Stasi to track dissidents in the GDR.

 

Life was controlled by the MfS and the SED, with all methods utilised to prevent contact with the western world. People adapt however, and East Germans developed ‘coping mechanisms’. Secret codes and gestures were developed to indicate when known Stasi informers or operatives were nearby. Even today the terror of the MfS remains a powerful force in the everyday life of former GDR citizens, acting as a kind of ‘wall in the mind’. Claudia Rusch, the daughter of an East German dissident, leaves no doubt as to the GDR’s status as a police state in her description of life under the former regime:

 

“That was the real strength of the state security; to produce the effect that millions of people behaved towards one another with anxiety, self-control and suspicion. They ensured that if you told a political joke you automatically lowered your voice. Anticipatory obedience spread through every sinew of society and intimidated a whole nation”.

(Claudia Rusch, quoted in Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State, Yale University Press: 2005)

 

The people of East Germany were browbeaten by the Stasi’s propagation of fear, its far reaching tentacles spread through society in the form of informers hidden in plain sight. Any person deemed of particular interest had an MfS file which would contain an almost minute-by-minute account of the suspect’s life, from which the MfS could create any motive for action they deemed necessary. Fear pervaded all aspects of life in the GDR, the population cowed by the threat of MfS reprisal, unable to build the foundations for an opposition movement. In the pursuit of blanket surveillance of the population, the Stasi gained a terrifying level of power over the East German people and could manipulate them at their whim. Agents of the state were everywhere, in the workplace, the classroom and even sleeping in the same bed. In this way conformity was enforced through implicit, rather than explicit terror.

 

About the Author:

David Cook has just completed his BA (Hons) in History at Swansea University, graduating with first-class honours in July 2011. During the final year of his study he specialised in the study of Cold War Eastern Europe. Following university David plans to travel, before eventually undertaking a Masters degree in History.

 

For more information on this topic see:

Timothy Garton Ash, The File: A Personal History, (London: Atlantic Books, 2009)

Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949-1989, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)

Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Hoenecker, (London:YaleUniversity Press, 2005)

Anna Funder, Stasiland: Stories From Behind the Berlin Wall, (London: Granta Books, 2004)

Robert Gellately, Denunciations in 20th Century Germany: Aspects of Self-Policing in the Third Reich and the German Democratic Republic 

 

TOP-SECRET – The FBI – Closing in on the Barker/Karpis Gang

Weapons displayed on porch
The Barkers were heavily armed at a cottage near Lake Weir, Florida where they engaged in a shootout with Bureau agents in 1935. The weapons above were seized following the gunfight.

 

In January 1935—77 years ago this month—more than a dozen Bureau agents surrounded a quaint two-story home on Lake Weir, Florida. Within moments, a fierce shoot-out erupted. It didn’t go well for the heavily armed criminals inside.

 

Barker criminal record

The Bremer Investigation

A total of 25 individuals were convicted in connection with the Edward Bremer kidnapping, including seven who harbored members of the Barker/Karpis gang. Six of those convicted received life sentences, and three were killed resisting arrest, including Russell Gibson, Fred Barker (above), and Kate “Ma” Barker.

For the Bureau of Investigation—just six months away from being renamed the FBI—the firefight was a continuation of a busy year of battling gangsters. In 1934, notorious public enemies like John Dillinger, “Pretty Boy” Floyd, and “Baby Face” Nelson had fallen at the hands of Bureau agents. Heading into 1935, the top priority was to put a dangerous gang—led by the wily Alvin “Creepy” Karpis and a pair of Barker brothers—out of business.

The gang got the Bureau’s attention through two high-profile kidnappings. The second targeted a wealthy banker named Edward George Bremer, Jr., who was snatched in St. Paul, Minnesota on January 17, 1934. Bremer was released three weeks later after his family paid $200,000 in ransom. Although he couldn’t identify the culprits, Bremer provided many clues. A key break came when the fingerprint of Arthur “Doc” or “Dock” Barker, a known criminal, turned up on an empty gas can found by a local police officer along the kidnapping route. Soon, a number of Barker’s confederates—including his brother Fred, Karpis, Harry Campbell, Fred Goetz, Russell Gibson, Volney Davis, and others—were linked to the crime.

 

The hunt was on, but the gang had a head start. They had split up and begun crisscrossing the country—with some even fleeing to Cuba. Three went as far as to undergo back-room plastic surgeries to conceal their fingerprints and identities. Others passed the ransom loot back and forth and looked for ways to launder the bills.

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In late September, Fred Barker and Campbell registered under fake names at the El Commodore Hotel in Miami. Joining them was Fred’s mother—Kate “Ma” Barker, who was known to help her criminal sons. When Fred asked for a quiet place to live, the hotel manager told him of a friend’s cottage for rent on the nearby Lake Weir. The Barkers moved there in November.

In December, Doc Barker was tracked by Bureau investigators to a home in Chicago. On January 8, Doc was arrested without incident. Later that night, several associates of Russell Gibson were also apprehended. Heavily armed and wearing a bullet-proof vest, Gibson tried to fight it out but was mortally wounded. Searching the apartment, agents found powerful firearms and loads of ammunition. And, tellingly, a map of Florida—with Lake Weir circled. Agents soon located the cottage hideout.

Shortly after 5 a.m. on January 16, 1935, a group of agents led by Earl Connelly surrounded the house and demanded the Barkers’ surrender. No response. They waited 15 minutes and called again. Again, no answer. Following another call for surrender and more silence, agents shot some tear gas grenades at the windows of the house. Someone in the house shouted, “All right, go ahead,” then machine-gun fire blasted from the upstairs window.

The agents responded with volleys of their own; more gunfire erupted from the house. Over the next hour, intermittent shots came from the home, and agents returned fire. By 10:30 a.m., all firing had stopped. Both Ma and Fred, it was soon learned, were dead.

The Barkers were history, but the cunning Karpis was still on the loose. How we caught up with him is another story that we’ll tell in the coming months.

BETREFF: Stellen Sie sich vor Frau “Beate P” eng verwandt mit ihrem Wettbewerber Thomas P. “ermittelt seit Jahren gegen Sie!

Liebe Leser,

seit geraumer Zeit versucht eine Staatsdienerin gegen mich vorzugehen..

Seit mindestens 2006 wird all dies gegen mich (die “GoMoPa” Stalker gegen mich Seiten) kolportiert in self-full-filling prophecy

Beate P.*** (Name auf Anfrage anonymisiert).

Ich habe meine Gesellschaftsanteile an  der Immobilien Zeitung GmbH  an  Thomas P***  (selber Name) verkauft.

(Name auf Anfrage anonymisiert).

Seitdem wir die STASI-Connections aufgedeckt haben, geht die betreffende Staatsdienerin. gegen mich verstärkt vor.

Zu dieser Stunde gebe ich Ihnen hierzu weiter keinen Kommentar.

Sie steht mutmasslich in enger Verbindung mit RA Resch, dessen STASI-Verbindungen offenkundig sind und selbst von ihm bestätigt wurden.

Sie hat gleichzeitig seit langem Kenntnis von allen Stalker Sites gegen mich und allen anderen miesen Tricks, den Rufmorden auch gegen viele andere Unternehmen und unternimmt mutmasslich nichts hierzu.  Damit deckt  sie mutmasslich die Täter und ermöglicht  Ihnen mutmasslich weitere Verbrechen.

Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium, Publizistik, Germanistik, Komparastistk,

Für Rückfragen stehe ich Ihnen jederzeit zur Verfügung.

TOP-SECRET – Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar

https://i1.wp.com/www.publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/rl31787.jpg

 

This report describes the emerging areas of information operations, electronic warfare, and cyberwar in the context of U.S. national security. It also suggests related policy issues of potential interest to Congress.  For military planners, the control of information is critical to military success, and communications networks and computers are of vital operational importance.  The use of technology to both control and disrupt the flow of information has been generally referred to by several names: information warfare, electronic warfare, cyberwar, netwar, and Information Operations (IO). Currently, IO activities are grouped by the Department of Defense (DOD) into five core capabilities: (1) Psychological Operations, (2) Military Deception, (3) Operational Security, (4) Computer Network Operations, and (5) Electronic Warfare. Current U.S. military doctrine for IO now places increased emphasis on Psychological Operations, Computer Network Operations, and Electronic Warfare, which includes use of non-kinetic electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, and nonlethal weapons for crowd control. However, as high technology is increasingly incorporated into military functions, the boundaries between all five IO core capabilities are becoming blurred.

DOD has noted that military functions involving the electromagnetic spectrum take place in what is now called the cyber domain, similar to air, land, and sea. This cyber domain is the responsibility of the new Air Force Cyber Command and includes cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, and protection of U.S. critical infrastructure networks that support telecommunications systems, utilities, and transportation.

Control of information has always been part of military operations, and the U.S. Strategic Command views information operations as a core military competency, with new emphasis on (1) use of electromagnetic energy, (2) cyber operations, and (3) use of psychological operations to manipulate an adversary’s perceptions.  Department of Defense (DOD) officials now consider cyberspace to be a domain forwarfare, similar to air, space, land, and sea.

The DOD views information itself as both a weapon and a target in warfare. In addition, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) provides the ability to rapidly disseminate persuasive information to directly influence the decisionmaking of diverse audiences, and is seen as a means for deterring aggression, and important for undermining the leadership and popular support for terrorist organizations.  However, new technologies for military IO also create new national security policy issues, including (1) consideration of psychological operations used to affect friendly nations or domestic audiences; and (2) possible accusations against the U.S. of war crimes if offensive military computer operations or electronic warfare tools severely disrupt critical civilian computer systems, or the systems of non-combatant nations.

At the same time, the civilian Al Jazeera news network, based in Qatar, beams its messages to well over 35 million viewers in the Middle East, and is considered by many to be a “market competitor” for U.S. PSYOP. Terrorist groups can also use the Internet to quickly place their own messages before an international audience.  Some observers have stated that the U.S. will continue to lose ground in the global media wars until it develops a coordinated strategic communications strategy to counter competitive civilian news media, such as Al Jazeera.

Domination of the Electromagnetic Spectrum.

DOD now emphasizes maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum, including the capability to disrupt all current and future communication systems, sensors, and weapons systems.  This may include: (1) navigation warfare, including methods for offensive space operations where global positioning satellites may be disrupted; or, (2) methods to control adversary radio systems; and, (3) methods to place false images onto radar systems, block directed energy weapons, and misdirect unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or robots operated by adversaries.

Homeland security reportedly will also be a large part of the Cyber Command’s responsibility, including protection of telecommunications systems, utilities, and transportation. Several issues to be considered may include: (1) what kind of educational skills, technical skills, and training are needed for staff at the Cyber Command; and (2), what kind of career path can be offered to those in the Air Force who want to participate in defending the new cyber domain.

BUCHT-TIP – aus Georg Herbstritt Alles rechtens bei der Stasi? Die Strafverfahren bundesdeutscher Gerichte gegen MfS-Mitarbeiter

Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) hat entscheidend dazu beigetragen, dass vielen DDR-Bürgern grundlegende Menschen- und Bürgerrechte vorenthalten blieben, und MfS-Mitarbeiter haben sich in großem Umfang strafbarer Methoden bedient. Das ist weitgehend unstrittig. Doch als die MfS-Straftaten in den neunziger Jahren endlich juristisch geahndet werden konnten, war die Enttäuschung am Ende groß: Gerade einmal 251 Personen wurden wegen Straftaten angeklagt, die sie im Auftrag des MfS begangen hatten; unter ihnen 182 hauptamtliche und 42 inoffizielle MfS-Mitarbeiter. Zwei Drittel der Strafverfahren endeten entweder mit Freispruch oder ohne ein Urteil, lediglich ein Drittel der Angeklagten wurde verurteilt, wobei die Strafen äußerst milde ausfielen. Nur ein MfS-Offizier sowie zwei inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IM) mussten eine Haftstrafe antreten; ersterer wegen Beihilfe zum Mord, ein IM wegen dreifachen Mordversuchs, ein anderer IM wegen Beihilfe zum versuchten Mord.
„Die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung des MfS-Unrechts ist zu großen Teilen erfolglos gewesen“, lautet denn auch das Fazit von Roland Schißau in seinem hier zu besprechenden Buch, und er schreibt weiter: „Das Unternehmen, die Taten des MfS mit den Mitteln des Strafrechts umfassend zu ahnden, hat sich trotz umfangreicher Strafverfolgungsaktivitäten der Ermittlungsbehörden als nicht durchführbar erwiesen.“
Die Enttäuschung hierüber führt immer wieder zu unsachlicher und unfundierter Kritik an den Justizbehörden. Wer sich mit solcher Polemik nicht zufrieden geben will, sondern verstehen und begreifen möchte, warum die Justiz so und nicht anders handelte, dem sei die Arbeit von Schißau nachdrücklich empfohlen. Schißaus Arbeit entstand als Dissertation im Rahmen des groß angelegten Projekts „Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht“ bei den Strafrechtsprofessoren Klaus Marxen und Gerhard Werle an der Berliner Humboldt-Universität. Aus dem umfangreichen Themenkomplex der juristischen Aufarbeitung von DDR-Systemkriminalität nahm er die Deliktgruppe „MfS-Unrecht“ in den Blick. Dabei gab es faktisch Überschneidungen mit anderen Deliktgruppen des DDR-Unrechts wie den Misshandlungen in Haftanstalten, der Denunziation oder der Spionage, worauf Schißau deutlich hinweist. So bezieht er auch Anklageschriften aus den Spionagestrafverfahren in seine Untersuchung und seine Statistik mit ein, konkret die Anklagen gegen Günther Kratsch, weil diesem neben der MfS-Hauptabteilung II (Spionageabwehr) auch die Abteilung M (Postkontrolle) unterstand, Horst Männchen, der als Leiter der Hauptabteilung III (Funkaufklärung) auch für Telefonüberwachung verantwortlich war, sowie die früheren Leiter der Hauptabteilung VIII (Ermittlungen), Albert Schubert und Karli Coburger, wegen den von Mitarbeitern ihrer Abteilung begangenen Mordversuche außerhalb der DDR. Unklar bleibt, warum das 1997 ergangene Urteil gegen den langjährigen Leiter der Hauptverwaltung A (HV A) des MfS (Auslandsspionage), Markus Wolf, nicht einbezogen wird. Denn Wolf wurde 1997 unter anderem wegen der unerlaubten Festnahme Georg Angerers im Jahr 1959 verurteilt, und der Fall Angerer wird in Schißaus Buch als ein Beispiel für MfS-Unrecht vorgestellt.
Schißaus Arbeit ist klar strukturiert. Einleitend präsentiert er einige Basisdaten zum MfS, stellt die verschiedenen Justizbehörden vor, die mit der Ahndung von DDR-Unrecht befasst waren und erörtert die allgemeinen rechtlichen Voraussetzungen der Strafverfolgung. Sodann behandelt er kapitelweise die verschiedenen Fallgruppen von MfS-Straftaten: Abhören von Telefongesprächen, Öffnen von Briefsendungen, Entnahme von Geld- und Wertgegenständen aus Postsendungen, heimliches Betreten fremder Räumlichkeiten, Preisgabe von Informationen aus Mandats- und Patientenverhältnissen, Tötungsdelikte, Verschleppungen aus der Bundesrepublik in die DDR, Verrat und Denunziation, Drangsalierungen zur Aussageerzwingung, unerlaubte Festnahmen, Repressalien gegenüber Ausreiseantragstellern sowie sonstige Taten. In jedem Kapitel geht er nach einem einheitlichen Muster vor: Er skizziert zunächst konkrete, historische Fälle, also „Tathandlungen“, beschreibt dann den Verlauf der Strafverfahren, um dann ausGeorg
Herbstritt
Alles rechtens bei der Stasi?
Die Strafverfahren bundesdeutscher Gerichte gegen MfS-Mitarbeiter
Roland Schißau: Strafverfahren wegen MfS-Unrechts. Die Strafprozesse bundesdeutscher Gerichte gegen ehemalige Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der DDR (= Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften, Strafrecht, Bd. 22.)
Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006,
361 Seiten. 44,65 EUR. ISBN 978-3-8305-1140-3.
71
H
orch und Guck 1/2008 | Heft 59
führlich die juristische bzw. strafrechtliche Entscheidungsfindung darzulegen. Dem schließt sich jeweils ein Kommentar des Verfassers an. Verschiedene Statistiken am Ende des Bandes ermöglichen eine schnelle Übersicht über die Strafverfahren; ihr Wert besteht auch darin, dass sie die Daten aus den einzelnen Bundesländern unter einheitlichen Kriterien zusammenführen.
Insgesamt wird das Buch den selbst gesteckten Zielen gerecht: Tatsachengrundlagen zu bieten sowie die Justizaktivitäten in einer für dieses Thema bislang nicht vorgelegten Vollständigkeit offenzulegen und kritisch zu würdigen, um die Leser in die Lage zu versetzen, sich ein eigenes Urteil über diese Fragen zu bilden.
Bemerkenswert ist vor allem die offene und direkte Art, in der der Autor Gerichtsentscheidungen kritisiert und mitunter direkt als „falsch“ bezeichnet und verdeutlicht, welche Entscheidung die bestehende Rechtslage eigentlich erfordert hätte. Mehrfach thematisiert er auch die markanten regionalen Unterschiede bei der Strafverfolgung und richtet an die besonders zurückhaltenden Staatsanwaltschaften in Brandenburg und Mecklenburg-Vorpommern die Frage, ob sie nicht das berechtigte Interesse der Opfer an einer gerichtlichen Befassung mit den MfS-Taten vernachlässigten. In vielen Fällen kann er aber auch nur die rechtlichen Probleme erläutern, die einer Strafverfolgung im Wege standen: So konnten verschiedene Delikte wie Öffnen von Briefsendungen oder heimliches Betreten der Wohnung einfach deshalb nicht geahndet werden, weil die Justiz in diesen Fällen nur dann aktiv werden darf, wenn die Opfer innerhalb einer sehr kurzes Frist selbst einen Strafantrag stellen, wozu es aber bis auf eine Ausnahme nicht kam. Andere Delikte wie die Verletzung des Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses waren nach DDR-Strafgesetzbuch nur für Postmitarbeiter mit Strafe bedroht. Hinzu kamen überlastete Gerichte und nicht fachkundige Richter, während das Problem der Verjährung faktisch kaum eine Rolle spielte.
Deutlich wird aus all dem, dass die geringe Zahl der Verurteilungen keineswegs einen Freibrief für die ehemaligen MfS-Mitarbeiter darstellt. Den wenigen Urteilen kommt nach Ansicht von Schißau deshalb vor allem symbolische Bedeutung zu, weil sie die auch juristisch begründete Aussage erlauben, dass sich das MfS strafbarer Methoden bediente.
Als Jurist erkennt Schißau den Wert der Strafverfahren auch darin, dass eine gerichtliche Klärung bestimmter Sachverhalte herbeigeführt wurde, was den gesamten Aufarbeitungsprozess voranbrachte, auch wenn es kaum zu Urteilen kam. Beispielsweise war das Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Dresden zu der Entscheidung gelangt, dass MfS-Mitarbeiter keinen „Verbotsirrtum“ für sich beanspruchen könnten; zumal als Hochschulabsolventen seien sie sehr wohl in der Lage gewesen, die Rechtswidrigkeit ihres Handelns zu erkennen, so das OLG Dresden. Schißau bescheinigt der Justiz in seinem Fazit letztlich ein rechtlich einwandfreies Vorgehen ohne politisch motivierten Verfolgungseifer; insbesondere seien keine Sonderstraftatbestände konstruiert worden. Künftige Diskussionen über den Einsatz des Strafrechts könnten nun auf einer fundierten sachlichen Grundlage geführt werden.
Für den juristischen Laien bietet Schißaus Buch die Möglichkeit, juristische Argumentationsgänge zu einem wichtigen zeithistorischen Thema kennenzulernen. Manche Ausführungen sind indes schwer verständlich, weil Schißau die Inhalte der Paragraphen, mit denen er argumentiert, nicht erläutert. Lediglich die einschlägigen Bestimmungen aus der Strafprozessordnung und dem Strafgesetzbuch der DDR druckt er im Anhang ab; dasselbe hätte man sich für die bundesdeutschen Vorschriften gewünscht. Äußerst lückenhaft ist das Sach- und Namensregister am Ende des Bandes ausgefallen. Bedauerlich ist, dass sich das Buch ausschließlich auf juristischem Terrain bewegt und die Möglichkeiten nicht nutzt, die sich aus der Nähe zur Zeitgeschichtsschreibung ergeben. Praktisch wirkt sich das unter anderem dahingehend aus, dass die zeithistorische Literatur zur MfS-Geschichte weitestgehend unberücksichtigt bleibt. Einige Feststellungen über das MfS sowie über zeithistorische Sachverhalte sind deshalb unzutreffend; beispielsweise kann man der Postkontrolle des MfS nicht bescheinigen, dass sie „vornehmlich Aufgaben der Spionageabwehr“ wahrnahm.
Parallel zu Schißaus Dissertation erschien im Rahmen des Projekts „Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht“ ein Doppelband mit mehreren einschlägigen Anklageschriften und Gerichtsurteilen. Es wäre wünschenswert, wenn auch die übrigen Anklageschriften und Gerichtsurteile, die im Rahmen des Projekts zusammengetragen wurden, der zeitgeschichtlichen Forschung zur Verfügung gestellt würden. Von einem interdisziplinären Ansatz könnten Juristen und Historiker gleichermaßen
profitieren. GH
2.440 Seiten Informationen zu einem Spott-Preis!
Die HORCH-UND-GUCK-CD-ROM mit den Heften 1 – 30 (1/1992 – 2/2000)
Die CD-ROM kostet 20,– € (für Abonnenten 10,– €, für Institutionen 50,– €)
und kann bei uns bestellt werden:
H
ORCH UND GUCK, Winsstraße 60, 10405 Berlin
Telefon: +49 (0) 30 / 88 55 21 70, E-Mail: info@buergerkomitee.org
Georg Herbstritt,
geb. l965 in Schluchsee. Historiker,
l994-98 wiss. Mitarbeiter des LStU in Schwerin und seit l999 in der Abt. Bildung und Forschung der BStU. Zuletzt publ.: Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage, Göttingen 2007.

Scheinberg-Indictment-Anklageschrift im Original: MANHATTAN U.S. ATTORNEY CHARGES PRINCIPALS OF THREE LARGEST INTERNET POKER COMPANIES WITH BANK FRAUD, ILLEGAL GAMBLING OFFENSES AND LAUNDERING BILLIONS IN ILLEGAL GAMBLING PROCEEDS

After the indictment of the founder of PokerStars, Isai Scheinberg, by the U.S. Department of Justice on “Black Friday,” many in the business and poker communities are asking, “Who is Isai Scheinberg?” An article in a Canadian newspaper attempts to answer that question.

The Toronto Globe and Mail presented an article written by Colin Freeze that covers much of what is known about Scheinberg. Freeze looks at the Scheinbergs as an “Internet Age equivalent of the Bronfmans, the Montreal clan who famously parlayed U.S. Prohibition laws into a billion-dollar booze business.” The Bronfmans owned Seagram’s during the Prohibition Era of the early 20th century.

Freeze details the April 15 indictment of Scheinberg and Paul Tate of PokerStars as well as the founders of Full Tilt Poker and Absolute Poker before delving into what effect the shutdown of poker in the United States will mean for the company.

“Win or lose, PokerStars’ luck has already soured fast,” Freeze wrote in his article. “Gone already are millions of paying American customers, a number of lucrative television contracts, and the nascent partnership with Wynn Resorts. Operations in other jurisdictions – including Europe, where it is partly licensed, and Canada, where it is not – should help PokerStars weather the U.S. shutdown, albeit in a diminished form.”

So what is known about Scheinberg and how did he reach such lofty heights with PokerStars? According to the Globe and Mail, Scheinberg got his start in the computer industry as a programmer with IBM in Canada. While working in the computer industry, Scheinberg showed an interest in poker.

According to the Hendon Mob database, Scheinberg competed at the 1996 World Series of Poker, earning a 25th place finish in a $2,500 No Limit Hold’em event. Two years later, he made the final table in a $1,000 No Limit Hold’em tournament at the United States Poker Championships in Atlantic City. Scheinberg would eventually bow out of the tournament in eighth place against a table that featured poker pros like Men “The Master” Nguyen and Kevin Song.

Perhaps these brushes with the poker world were what planted the seed for what would become Scheinberg’s greatest success – or his greatest pain. As the 21st century dawned, Scheinberg created PYR Software, a company that Forbes described in a February 2010 article as “a software development company that helps customers worldwide to retain industry leadership.” The real reason for the development of PYR Software, however, was to facilitate an idea in Scheinberg’s head.

In March 2001, PokerStars went active, offering internet poker to a quietly growing worldwide market. Over the next five years, the gaming site became one of the major players in the online poker industry. By 2006, the growth of the company led Scheinberg to float the idea of holding an initial public offering (IPO). Political activity in that same year, however, changed his mind and led PokerStars onto the path it has reached today.

The passage of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act in 2006 shut down the IPO rumblings, as PokerStars continued to offer its wares to American customers. The reason for this was simple: with the major players in the industry such as PartyPoker and 888 leaving the market due to their publicly traded status, PokerStars would be able to snare a sizeable chunk of the American market.

Over the past five years, PokerStars became the preeminent leader in online poker, with a reported value of around $10 billion.

The 65-year-old Scheinberg and his family do not actively court media attention, although Scheinberg has occasionally stepped to the poker tables. In 2008, he played in one of the preliminary events during the PokerStars European Poker Tour Grand Final. In a €1,000 No Limit Hold’em tournament, Scheinberg finished eighth, but many in the audience had no clue that the founder of the site they played at was in such close proximity.

The future for Scheinberg is murky at best. Due to the indictment, Scheinberg and his family may never set foot on North American soil because of extradition treaties among the U.S., Mexico, and Canada. MANX Radio, the radio station of the Isle of Man where PokerStars’ headquarters are located, reports that the legal team for PokerStars is already ramping up, stating to a reporter from the station that they will “robustly” defend Scheinberg and Paul Tate against the charges in the United States.

 

 

Letztes Jahr haben die US-Behörden bekanntlich die Webseiten von PokerStars, Full Tilt, UB und Absolute Poker gesperrt. Es wurde Anklage gegen die Betreiber und deren Mitarbeiter erhoben. PokerOlymp hat die 51-seitige Anklageschrift unter die Lupe genommen und erklärt den Lesern, was genau die Behörden den Online-Pokerräumen vorwerfen.

preet_bharara Preet Bhrara, Verfasser der Anklage


Juristisch gesehen ist eine Anklageschrift das Dokument, mit der die Strafverfolgungsbehörden einen Fall vor Gericht bringen.

Sie hat grundsätzlich zwei Funktionen, zum einen den oder die Angeklagten über die ihnen vorgeworfenen Taten zu informieren und zum anderen die Festlegung des Prozessgegenstandes in sachlicher und personaler Hinsicht.

Die vorgeworfenen Delikte und Handlungen
Zum Vorwurf wird den Angeklagten die Unterwanderung des Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act von 2006, das Betreiben illegaler Glücksspiel-Unternehmen, organisierter Bankbetrug und organisierte Geldwäsche gemacht. Hierfür sind Geldstrafen und Gefängnisstrafen bis zu 30 Jahre vorgesehen.

Bereits in der Einleitung macht United States Attorney Preet Bhrara klar, worum es geht. Er benennt zunächst PokerStars, Full Tilt und AP/UB als die führenden Online-Poker-Unternehmen in den USA seit 2006. Die Unternehmen hätten mindestens von November 2006 bis März 2011 agiert. Als Verantwortliche benennt er die Angeklagten Isai Scheinberg, Raymond Bitar, Scott Tom, Brent Beckley, Nelson Burtnick, Paul Tate, Ryan Lang, Bradley Franzen, Ira Rubin, Chad Elie und John Campos.

Die angeblichen Methoden der Täuschung
Dann geht es direkt ans Eingemachte: Der Staatsanwalt führt aus, dass in den USA seit Einführung des UIGEA den Banken verboten sei, Transaktionen im Zusammenhang mit Online-Glücksspiel durchzuführen. Die Angeklagten hätten im Tatzeitraum betrügerische Methoden verwendet, diese Restriktionen zu umgehen und so mehrere Milliarden Dollar von US-Bürgern aus illegalem Glücksspiel erhalten. Zu diesem Zweck seien US-Banken und andere Stellen direkt und indirekt getäuscht worden.

Hierzu hätten sich die Pokerräume unter anderem so genannter ‘payment-processors’ bedient, deren Aufgabe es gewesen sei, die wahre Natur die Geldströme gegenüber den Banken zu verschleiern. Hierzu seien Scheinfirmen und eigens zu dem Zweck erstellte Webseiten benutzt worden. Die Angeklagten Ryan Lang, Bradley Franzen, Ira Rubin und Chad Elie hätten als solche “payment processors” im Auftrag der Gaming-Unternehmen fungiert.

Dann listet die Anklage über mehrere Seiten detailliert die Angeklagten auf und welche Funktion sie bei den jeweiligen Pokerräumen ausüben. Der Fokus liegt hier insbesondere auf Isai Scheinberg, der als Gründer von PokerStars benannt wird und auf Raymond Bitar, dem Gründer von Full Tilt.

PartyPoker und der UIGEA
Es wird ausführlich die Einführung des UIGEA im Jahr 2006 beschrieben und dass es seitdem ein “federal crime” sei, als Online-Glücksspiel-Unternehmen wissentlich Zahlungen zu empfangen oder weiterzuleiten, die aus illegalem Glücksspiel stammen oder für dieses bestimmt sind.

Es wird auch erwähnt, dass der größte damalige Pokerraum wegen dem UIGEA seine Dienste in den USA eingestellt hatte. Gemeint ist PartyPoker, obwohl das Unternehmen in der Anklage nicht ausdrücklich benannt wird. Die jetzt im Fokus der Ermittlungen stehenden Pokerräume hätten aber weitergemacht, so hätte beispielsweise Absolute Poker damals verlauten lassen, dass sie “eine private Organisation seien, die gemäß ihrem Geschäftsmodell viel Flexibilität und Kreativität genieße.”

 

Die Methoden im Detail
Dann geht es weiter und es werden die Methoden beschrieben, die PokerStars, Full Tilt und UB/AP angeblich dazu verwendeten, die Banken über die illegale Natur der Geldtransaktionen hinwegzutäuschen und die Geldströme aus den USA heraus hin zu den Firmensitzen in Übersee zu leiten.

Es ist zum einen die Rede davon, dass Visa und Mastercard spezifische “transaction codes” für Online-Gambling-Vorgänge eingeführt hätten. So sei es für die Banken leicht gewesen, Vorgänge, die mit Online-Glücksspiel zu tun haben, zu blockieren. Die Angeklagten hätten dies aber umgangen, indem sie den Vorgängen falsche “transaction codes” zugeordnet hätten. Hierdurch hätten sie die Banken über die wahre Natur der Vorgänge getäuscht. Allein zu diesem Zweck sei ein Netz von Scheinfirmen, z. B. Online-Blumenläden oder Online-Tierfutter-Händler, aufgebaut worden.

Von Zeit zu Zeit seien diese Scheinfirmen jedoch entdeckt worden. Für diesen Fall hätten die Angeklagten jedoch zahllose Ersatzunternehmen parat gehabt, z. B. http://www.petfoodstore.biz oder http://www.beddingsuperstore.tv, die bei Bedarf eingesprungen seien. Daneben seien so genannte “pre-paid credit cards” zu Verschleierung benutzt worden. Diese konnte man angeblich ohne verdächtigen “transaction code” aufladen.

Auch im Wege des “e-check processing” seien Zahlungen mit Hilfe von Scheinfirmen verschleiert worden. Die Scheinfirmen hätten Konten eröffnet und so unrechtmäßig den Geldfluss zwischen den Online-Gambling-Unternehmen und den Banken ermöglicht. Vor allem die angeklagten “payment-processors” Ryan Lang und Bradley Franzen hätten hierfür von den Online-Pokerräumen hohe Beträge erhalten. Auch der Angeklagte Ira Rubin hätte beispielsweise Mitte 2008 dutzende Scheinfirmen aufgebaut, darunter Fahrrad-, Juwelen-, Bekleidungs- und Golfhändler.

Teilweise hätten die Spieler das gemerkt und seien auf die ‘komischen’ Namen der Scheinhändler auf ihren Kontoauszügen aufmerksam geworden. So hätten zwei Spieler im März 2009 sogar versucht, bei ‘oneshopcenter.com’ und ‘mygolflocation.com’ Waren zu erwerben. Hierauf hätten sie Antwort von PokerStars bekommen und nicht von den betreffenden Websites.

Daneben werden in der Anklage noch weitere angeblich benutzte Techniken zur Verschleierung der illegalen Geldtransaktionen beschrieben. Besonders schwer wiegt der Vorwurf, es seien “Multi-Millionen-Investitionen” geflossen, um Banken unter eigene Kontrolle zu bringen.

Die Konsequenzen
Im Ergebnis sollen die Angeklagten mehrere Milliarden Dollar an den Staat zahlen. Es werden auch detailliert die Konten beschrieben, auf denen das Geld momentan zu finden ist. Vor allem die Vorwürfe organisierte Geldwäsche und organisierter Bankbetrug wiegen sehr schwer. Für diese Delikte sieht das amerikanische Rechtssystem hohe Strafen vor, bei Geldwäsche ist gibt es maximal 20, bei Bankbetrug bis zu 30 Jahre Gefängnis.

Die Höhe der in Rede stehenden Summen, der lange Tatbegehungszeitraum und die hohe Strafandrohung machen den Ernst der Lage deutlich. Kennern des amerikanischen Rechtssystems zufolge, ist in dem Verfahren nicht mit besonders viel Milde des Staates zu rechnen. Immerhin ist Anurag Dikshit als einer der Gründer von PartyPoker seinerzeit zur Zahlung einer Strafe in Höhe von 300 Millionen Dollar verurteilt worden. Und das obwohl PartyPoker seinen Betrieb in den USA nach dem Inkrafttreten des UIGEA nachweislich eingestellt hatte. Lange war unklar, ob der Milliardär nicht sogar zusätzlich eine Gefängnisstrafe antreten muss.

Wir möchten darauf hinweisen, dass dies nur eine grobe Übersicht der 51-seitigen Anklageschrift darstellt, die notwendigerweise nicht alle Aspekte im Detail abdecken kann. Wir hoffen dennoch, unseren Lesern die Tatvorwürfe etwas näher gebracht zu haben.

 

HIER KÖNNEN SIE DIE ANKLAGESCHRIFT IM ORIGINAL DOWNLOADEN

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CONFIDENTIAL – U.S. Army FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities Draft Manual

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INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES DEFINED

1-1. Inform and influence activities is the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking.

INTEGRATE INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

1-2. All assets and capabilities at a commander’s disposal have the capacity to inform and influence selected audiences to varying degrees. While specific assets termed as “information-related capabilities” are information-centric in mission and purpose, others are standard capabilities that inform and influence officers use for planning to support commanders’ information strategy and mission objectives. The primary information-related capabilities that support inform and influence activities typically include, but are not limited to, public affairs, military information support operations, combat camera, Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs, cyber electromagnetic activities, counterintelligence, operations security, military deception, and others so designated by a commander. In addition to the primary information-related capabilities, there are operational capabilities not solely designed to inform or influence that commanders can designate to assist in achieving mission objectives, such as maneuver forces, engineers, and medical units. Success depends on commanders and staffs effectively employing all available operational assets to best shape the information environment.

SYNCHRONIZE THEMES, MESSAGES, AND ACTIONS WITH OPERATIONS

1-3. Commanders synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform and influence the various audiences within their area of operations and area of interest. Audiences include groups, organizations, and individuals. Synchronization of themes, messages, and actions promotes and shapes the attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors of the audiences in the area of operations while marginalizing or defeating adversary or enemy information efforts towards the same. Synchronization supports the commander’s operational goals by aligning words with deeds to avoid message confusion or information fratricide. Information fratricide is the result of employing information-related capabilities operations elements in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.

1-4. Soldiers’ actions are among the most potent factors in successfully executing inform and influence activities. Visible actions coordinated with carefully chosen, truthful words influence audiences more than uncoordinated or contradictory actions and words. All audiences—local and regional as well as adversary and enemy—compare the friendly force’s message with its actions. Consistency contributes to the success of friendly operations by building trust and reinforcing credibility. Conversely, if actions and messages are inconsistent, friendly forces lose credibility. Loss of credibility makes land forces vulnerable to enemy and adversary propaganda or counter-messaging and places Army forces at a disadvantage. Aligning inform and influence activities with the overall operation ensures that messages are consistent with forces’ actions to amplify the credibility of those messages.

MILITARY DECEPTION

3-12. Military deception involves actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decisionmakers. This information-related capability intends the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that contribute to accomplishment of the friendly mission. Military deception does not fall under the direct purview of the G-7 (S-7) but is considered a primary influencing capability of inform and influence activities. Military deception consists of counterdeception, deception in support of operations security, and tactical deception.

3-13. Counterdeception contributes to situational understanding by protecting friendly human and automated decisionmaking from adversary deception. Counterdeception strives to make Army commanders aware of adversary deception activities so they can formulate informed and coordinated responses.

3-14. A deception in support of operations security protects friendly operations, personnel, programs, equipment, and other assets against foreign intelligence security services collection. It creates multiple false indicators. These indicators confuse the adversary or enemy. Sometimes they make friendly intentions harder for the adversary or enemy intelligence gathering apparatus to interpret. Often it limits the adversary or enemy’s ability to collect accurate intelligence on friendly forces.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES

3-16. Cyber electromagnetic activities seize, retain, and exploit advantages in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. The result enables Army forces to retain freedom of action while denying freedom of action to enemies and adversaries, thereby enabling the overall operation. For more information on cyber electromagnetic operations, see FM 3-36.

3-17. Although inform and influence activities and cyber electromagnetic activities are interrelated, each requires a uniquely different skill set to perform the required processes effectively. Ultimately both work towards contributing to affecting personal cognition, and both activities are able to mutually support one another. Therefore, cyber electromagnetic activities is considered an information-related capability that must be synchronized and integrated through inform and influence activities. Not only can it reinforce messaging efforts by providing additional means for message distribution, but it is also incorporated to execute or support offensive and defensive operational planning against an adversary or enemy audience.

 

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USArmy-InformInfluence

CONFIDENTIAL – Number of Corrupt Russian Officials Doubled

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The number of corruption-related crimes involving top government officials and large bribes increased 100% in 2010 year-on-year, Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev said on Thursday.

“Criminal proceedings were launched against some 10,000 officials, one-third of them were started for taking brides,” Nurgaliyev said at a session of a Russian presidential council for combating corruption.

More than 20 top Russian officials were brought to trial last year compared with half that number in 2009. “Such cases almost doubled,” Nurgaliyev said adding that corruption remains an issue of concern despite efforts taken by the government.

Nurgaliyev said the Russian Interior Ministry plans to speed up efforts to combat corruption. He said the main focus will be made on detecting corruption-related crimes among businessmen and also ministry officials themselves.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev launched a wholesale reform to clean up corruption but admitted earlier that his anti-corruption drive had so far yielded few practical results.

The Berlin-based non-governmental anti-corruption organization Transparency International has persistently rated Russia as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. In the 2009 Corruption Perception Index, Russia was ranked 146 out of 180 countries, with a ranking below countries like Togo, Pakistan and Libya.

President Dmitry Medvedev gave prosecutors three months to verify income declarations filed by government officials as part of his drive to stamp out Russia’s rampant corruption.

“You hear that they all have palaces in the countryside and the declarations they make” are tiny, Medvedev told a government meeting on corruption in the Kremlin today. “Let’s check it all. If there are discrepancies, prepare proposals on the accountability of these people.”

Medvedev, who called corruption a threat to national security, has pushed for government officials to make their income declarations public and wants new legislation that will dramatically increase fines for taking bribes. Russia is the world’s most corrupt major economy, according to Berlin-based Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index released in October. It ranked 154th among 178 countries.

Among new proposals, bribes under 25,000 rubles ($832) will entail either a fine of 25 times to 50 times the amount, or a jail term of up to three years and a fine. Bribes of over a million rubles will carry a fine of between 80 times and 100 times the sum or a jail term of up to 15 years plus a fine.

“We have to find a way to undermine the material interest in bribe taking,” Medvedev’s aide Larisa Brycheva told reporters after the meeting. Anti-corruption amendments to more than a dozen laws will be sent to the State Duma, the lower chamber of parliament, by the end of the month, she said.

UNCENSORED – Belarus Protest Photos

[Image]Belarus plainclothes policemen detain protesters during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]Belarus plainclothes policemen detain a protester during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]Belarus plainclothes policemen detain protesters during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko.[Image]
[Image]Detained protesters show V-signs as they sit in a police van during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]A detained protester showsa V-sign as he sits in a police van during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]Belarus plainclothes policemen detain a protester during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]Belarus plainclothes policemen detain a protester during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]A Belarus plainclothes policeman, left, detains protesters during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]A woman protects her husband from a plainclothes policeman, left, during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]A woman argues with plainclothes policemen as they push back protesters during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]Belarus plainclothes policemen push back protesters during an action “Revolution via social network” in Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Police in Belarus have violently quashed a peaceful anti-government rally, detaining dozens of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. (Sergei Grits)
[Image]Youths applaud as they participate in a peaceful rally to protest the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko, Minsk, Belarus, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. Belarusian police violently dispersed a peaceful rally Wednesday by thousands of people protesting the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko and the country’s worst financial crisis since the fall of the Soviet Union two decades ago. (Sergei Grits)

TOP-SECRET – Guantanamo 10th Anniversary Photos

Guantanamo Prison 24 January 2010[Image]
High-value Detainee Units 6, top left, and 5, top right.[Image]
Detainee Hearing Court[Image]
Open for 10 years on Wednesday Jan. 11, 2012 the Guantanamo Bay prison seems more established than ever. The deadline set by President Barack Obama to close it came and went two years ago. No detainee has left in a year because of restrictions on transfers, and indefinite military detention is now enshrined in U.S. law.

2010

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FILE – In this March 30, 2010 file photo, reviewed by the U.S. military, a shackled detainee reads his materials as he attends a class in “Life Skills”, as guards in the background shackle another detainee to the floor, inside Camp 6 high-security detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

2009

[Image]FILE – In this June 1, 2009 file photo, reviewed by the U.S. military, Chinese Uighur detainees, who at the time were cleared for release, show a home-made note to visiting members of the media in Camp Iguana detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

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FILE – In this May 31, 2009 file photo, reviewed by the U.S. military, two detainees sit together in Camp Six, a maximum-security detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

[Image]FILE – In this May 14, 2009 file photo, reviewed by the U.S. military, detainees pray before dawn near a fence of razor-wire inside Camp 4 detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.
[Image]FILE – In this May 13, 2009 file photo, reviewed by the U.S. military, a detainee stands at his cell window yelling after seeing a group of journalists who were visiting Camp 5 maximum-security detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

2008

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FILE – In this Nov. 19, 2008 file photo, reviewed by the U.S. Military, a detainee sleeps in his cell in Camp 5 detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

2007

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FILE – In this Oct. 9, 2007 file photo, reviewed by a U.S. Department of Defense official, military personnel inspect each occupied cell on a two-minute cycle at Camp 5 maximum-security facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

2006

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FILE – In this Dec. 6, 2006 file photo, reviewed by a U.S. Department of Defense official, a shackled detainee is transported away from his annual Administrative Review Board hearing with U.S. officials, in Camp Delta detention center at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

[Image]FILE – In this Dec. 4, 2006 file photo, reviewed by a U.S. Department of Defense official, a detainee shields his face as he peers out through the so-called “bean hole” which is used to pass food and other items into detainee cells, in Camp Delta detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.
[Image]FILE – In this Sept. 19, 2006 file photo, reviewed by a U.S. Department of Defense official, a detainee stands at a fence holding Islamic prayer beads in Camp Delta detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.
[Image]FILE – In this Sept. 19, 2006 file photo, reviewed by a U.S. Department of Defense official, military personnel stand inside the brand new Camp 6 maximum security detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

2004

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FILE – In this June 30, 2004 file photo, reviewed by US military officials, a detainee, who uses a prosthetic leg, sleeps inside his cell at Camp Five, the maximum-security detention and interrogation facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

2002

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FILE – In this March 1, 2002 file photo, a detainee is escorted to interrogation by U.S. military guards in the temporary detention facility Camp X-Ray at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

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FILE – In this Jan. 11, 2002 file photo, released by the U.S. Department of Defense, detainees wearing orange jump suits sit in a holding area as military police patrol during in-processing at the temporary detention facility Camp X-Ray on Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.

Believed Terrorist al’Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – statements as mirror

Inspire Magazine Series

 


A sends:

Please mirror the following documents on cryptome.org. They are all of the English language magazines titled “Inspire”, authored by al’Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), put out to date.

If possible, it would be helpful for you to also have a single page that will be kept up to date in the future, listing all volumes that have been published.

inspire-1.pdf (31.6MB)

inspire-2.pdf (41.6MB)

inspire-3.pdf (5.5MB)

inspire-4.pdf (15.7MB)

inspire-5.pdf (6.5MB)

inspire-6.pdf (19.5MB)

inspire-7.pdf (28.9MB)

Uncensored – Women Protest Worldwide Photos 11

[Image]Members of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) chant slongans against French president during a protest outside the French consulate in Istanbul, on January 24, 2012. The French Senate on Monday approved, by 127 votes to 86, the measure which makes it an offence punishable by jail in France to deny that the 1915 massacre of Armenians by Ottoman Turk forces amounted to genocide. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, whose right-wing UMP party put forward the bill, now has sign it into law. Getty
[Image]Monica a German trucker gestures on the Turin highway during a truckers’ protest against the government’s deregulation plans in Turin January 23, 2012. Truckers blocked roads throughout Italy and taxi drivers resumed a strike on Monday as opposition mounted to fuel tax rises and economic reforms aimed at opening up competition in protected sectors including transport and pharmacies. Reuters
[Image]Pro-life activists protest at the March for Life rally on January 23, 2012 in Washington, DC. Pro-life activists gather each year to protest on the anniversary of the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision that legalized abortion. Getty
[Image]An ‘Occupy WEF’ protester cuts firewood during a protest against the World Economic Forum (WEF) at the Swiss resort of Davos on January 23, 2012. Some 1,600 economic and political leaders, including 40 heads of states and governments, will be asked to urgently find ways to reform a capitalist system that has been described as ‘outdated and crumbling as they converge at eastern Switzerland’s chic ski station of Davos for the 42nd edition of the five-day World Economic Forum (WEF) which opens on January 25, 2012. Getty
[Image]Members of a leftist Turkish party waves party flags and hold a banner reading ‘Armenian allegations are part of a new Treaty of Sevres (which would have divided Turkey) by the USA and EU’ as they protest outside the French embassy in Ankara on January 23, 2012. Turkey threatened France with new sanctions over a bill criminalising the denial of the Armenian genocide as the French Senate prepared to vote on the legislation. Getty
[Image]Cambodian victims hold a demonstration to mark the third anniversary of a forced eviction in the Dey Krahorm community, Tuesday, Jan. 24, 2012, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Three years ago residents were forcibly evicted from their homes and told by local authorities that the land was owned by others. (Heng Sinith)
[Image]AIDS protestors are seen outside the FDA building on Monday Jan. 23, 2012, in Silver Spring, MD. (Larry French)
[Image]A Hungarian protestor covers her mouth with a mask during a protest in support of the largest opposition radio station ‘Klub Radio’ which recently lost its radio frequency in Budapest, Hungary, Sunday, Jan. 22, 2012. Thousands gathered to protest against the government’s controversial media law and to help the ‘Klub Radio’. (Bela Szandelszky)
[Image]The Ladies in White, a group of family members of imprisoned dissidents, protest during their weekly march in Havana January 22, 2012. The opposition group “Ladies in White” accused the Cuban government on Sunday of “murdering” by neglect a 31-year-old dissident who died last week following a hunger strike in prison. Ladies in White leader Berta Soler said Wilman Villar Mendoza died because the government did not respect his rights and that he was only the latest such victim to die for the same reason. Reuters
[Image]Anti-government protesters shout as they carry portraits of several prisoners during a rally organized by the pro-democracy 20th February movement in Casablanca, Morocco, Sunday, Jan. 22 2012. Like the rest of the region, Morocco was once shaken by pro-democracy protests but the king has succeeded in blunting them by holding early elections and amending the constitution and the numbers of protesters have dwindled.
[Image]Demonstrators, dressed as workers, holds a sign that reads in Spanish ‘I don’t want apartheids in Chile’ during a protest in support of maids and workers outside the gated community “El Algarrobal II” in Chicureo, Chile, Saturday, Jan. 21, 2012. According to community rules, workers are forbidden to walk along the residential development.
[Image]Topless activists of Ukraine’s protest group Femen punch reporters in front of the Bulgarian Parliament in Sofia, on Saturday, Jan 21, 2012. Ukrainian female rights activists FEMEN staged a protest in Sofia against the domestic violence on women and children and against human trafficking. (Valentina Petrova)
[Image]An anti-government protester holds a banner that reads ‘I love democracy’ while posing in front of a group of riot police in combat gear in Bucharest, Romania, early Saturday, Jan. 21, 2012. Police on Sunday clashed with a small contingent of around 1,000 protesters in the capital, after demonstrations against austerity measures turned violent. (Vadim Ghirda)
[Image]Occupy protester Julie Searle chains herself to fellow protesters blocking a Bank of America branch entrance on Friday, Jan. 20, 2012, in San Francisco. Anti-Wall Street demonstrators across the U.S. planned rallies Friday in front of banks and courthouses. (Noah Berger)
[Image]Children chant slogans during an anti-Syrian regime demonstration at the mountain resort town of Zabadani, Syria, near the Lebanese border, on Friday Jan. 20, 2012. President Bashar Assad’s forces attacked Zabadani, some 17 miles (27 kilometers) west of the capital, for six days, sparking fierce fighting that involved heavy bombardments and clashes with army defectors.
[Image]Protesters hold signs that read in Spanish “English get out of Malvinas” outside the British embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Friday Jan. 20, 2012. A small crowd of demonstrators turned out Friday after British Prime Minister David Cameron accused Argentina of being “much more than colonialist” for asserting its claims to the islands.
[Image]A demonstrator chants as she holds up a poster with the image of Chile’s Interior Minister Rodrigo Hinzpeter, during a protest against a proposed plan on new ways to crack down on unauthorized social protests, in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Jan. 19, 2012. “Hinzpeter Law,” had included enabling police to seize images from media without court orders but Hinzpeter is backing away from that idea.
[Image]Half naked and caged activists of the animal rights group ‘Igualdad Animal’ (Equality Animal) symbolically sit in cages to denounce the slaying of animals to make fur coats, in Barcelona, Spain, Thursday, Jan. 19, 2012. (Manu Fernandez)
[Image]Bulgarian environmental activist wears a gas mask and carries Bulgarian national flag during a protest in Sofia, on Wednesday, Jan 18, 2012. Though the Bulgarian parliament banned on Wednesday shale oil and gas exploration through hydraulic fracturing or fracking hundreds activists gathered to protest against the environmental policy of the government. (Valentina Petrova)
[Image]Israeli Ethiopian girls have their faces painted as they take part in a demonstration against racism and discrimination in Jerusalem, Wednesday, Jan. 18, 2012. Thousands of young Ethiopian immigrants and other supporters gathered on Wednesday outside the Israeli parliament, to protest what they say is racism directed at them. (Sebastian Scheiner)
[Image]An anti-government protester draped in a Bahraini flag argues with riot police who told her to go inside as police dispersed a banned demonstration Wednesday, Jan. 18, 2012, in Manama, Bahrain. Opposition groups, led by al-Wefaq society, had called for a march through central Manama, but turned the protest into a sit-in when police who turned out in large numbers blocked their way.
[Image]Workers demonstrate at the request of the CGT union (General Confederation of Work), in Marseille, southern France, Wednesday, Jan. 18, 2012, against what they describe as anti social government measures. Labor unions insist workers shouldn’t have to pay the cost of the financial crisis at a time when many French companies are still making profits, and accuse unpopular conservative leader President Nicolas Sarkozy of putting together a slap-dash solution ahead of elections.
[Image]Occupy London protesters chant anti-corporate slogans as they gather on the steps of St. Paul’s Cathedral, in central London, Wednesday, Jan. 18, 2012. Britain’s High Court decided Wednesday, Occupy London protest camp an be evicted from outside St. Paul’s Cathedral. (Lefteris Pitarakis)
[Image]Occupy Congress protesters arrives for a day of demonstrations and activities on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Jan. 17, 2012. (J. Scott Applewhite)
[Image]Protester, holds a black cross to symbolically mourn the death of PSI (Private Sector Involvement) and CDS (Credit Default Swaps) during a rally in central Athens, Tuesday, Jan. 17, 2012. Strikes and demonstrations over austerity measures hit the Greek capital of Athens on Tuesday, as international debt inspectors returned to resume their scrutiny of the country’s reforms. (Dimitri Messinis)
[Image]International Indignados movement demonstrators chash with Italian police officers as they try to move out of St. Peter’s Square at the Vatican, in Rome, Saturday, Jan. 13, 2012. The Indignados staged a sit-in and tried to place tents and climb the Vatican Christmas tree as a protest. (Andrew Medichini)
[Image]Border guards, fire brigade officers and prison guards blow horns as they protest demanding monthly wage increases of 300 zlotys (US dollar 85, euro 66) , just like those recently given to the police and armed forces, in Warsaw, Poland, Thursday, Jan. 12, 2012. Similar protests took place simultaneously in Warsaw, Gdansk, Poznan and Wroclaw, the four Polish towns that will host the Euro 2012 soccer championships games. (Alik Keplicz)
[Image]Indigenous women rest after protesting the Conga gold and silver mining project in Cajamarca, Peru, Tuesday Jan. 3, 2012. Demonstrators in Peru resumed their protests against plans to develop a $4.8 billion gold mine, saying they fear the mine will will taint their water and affect a major aquifer. The mine is majority owned by U.S.-based Newmont Mining Corp. (Karel Navarro)

 

Exclusive Photos – Kim Schmitz and Megauploads Photos from the FBI investigation

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FBI Director Louis Freeh in FBI HQ With 2 Israeli Investigators.Second Left
Robert Goldstein.Second Right Oren Shalev.Both from the Israel National Anti Fraud Unit.During Investigation in US.Photo:FBI

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Spies Arrested by FBI.

Exposed – Original Kim Schmitz and Megauploads Photos from the FBI investigation – Home and Cars

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DIE ABSURDEN BEHAUPTUNGEN DER STASI-STALKER UND IHRER KOMPLIZEN

Liebe Leser,

STASI war schon immer absurd, kriminell, aber auch lächerlich und dumm.

Das zeigt sich auch gerade wieder an den Neo-STASI-STALKERN der “GoMoPa”.

Erst bin ich kein Akademiker, dann wieder doch, dann wird eine Meridian Capital-Webseite plump gefälscht, um mich zu belasten, dann sollen wir angeblich eine “rumänische Domain” und eine “mobile Bank” besitzen.

Hallo, gehts noch, Genossen STASI-STALKER ?

Zuviel Rotkäppchen-Sekt gemischt mit Methyl-Akohol getrunken ?

Wir haben weder das Eine noch das Andere.

Der eigentliche Skandal sind aber nicht nur die Neo-STASI, die STASI-STALKER und ihre dumm-dreisten Rufmorde und mutmasslich auch Morde, sondern ihre Komplizen, Zuträger und Informanten in der Immobilien- und Justizszene, denen wir auf die Spur gekommen sind.

Das wird alles ans Tageslicht kommen !

Herzlichst Ihr

Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium der Publizistik, Germanistik und Komparatistik

PS: All diese Zusammenhänge sind schon viel zu vielen Insidern bekannt, als das dies noch vertuscht werden kann.

Featured CIA Stories – The National Committee for Free Europe, 1949

On June 1, 1949, a group of prominent American businessmen, lawyers, and philanthropists – including Allen Dulles, who would become Director of Central Intelligence in 1953 – launched the National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE) at a press release in New York. Only a handful of people knew that NCFE was actually the public face of an innovative “psychological warfare” project undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). That operation – which soon gave rise to Radio Free Europe – would become one of the longest running and successful covert action campaigns ever mounted by the United States.

Radio Free Europe George Kennan of the Department of State could be considered the godfather of NCFE. He – more than any other official – pressed the National Security Council to reorganize covert action planning and management. This resulted in the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) at the CIA in September 1948 and the appointment of the visionary OSS veteran Frank G. Wisner as its chief.

Kennan proposed that OPC work through an “American freedom committee” in dealing with anti-Communist émigré groups in the United States to develop operations abroad. The idea was to fund selected émigrés in their activities to demonstrate that the newly imposed Soviet-style dictatorships in Eastern Europe oppressed the aspirations of their people. NCFE was the American umbrella for these exiled European figures in the United States, raising private funds through Crusade for Freedom to supplement CIA funding and organizing exile activities to reach back to their occupied homelands.

From the start, Wisner and OPC regarded NCFE as one of their signature operations. As the Cold War reached perhaps its most dangerous phase, NCFE and other projects (such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1950, and Radio Liberty, which began broadcasts to the Soviet Union in 1953) rallied anti-Communist intellectuals, politicians, and activists to fight the Soviets in a contest for the peoples’ “minds and loyalties.”

NCFE soon gave rise to its more famous progeny, Radio Free Europe, which began broadcasting behind the Iron Curtain on July 4, 1950. Radio Free Europe aired programs to Eastern Europe in six languages. For decades, it was a beacon of hope to people who had otherwise lost access to the outside world.

CIA subsidies to the Free Europe Committee (NCFE’s later name) ended in 1971, after Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-NJ) revealed that it received covert assistance. After that date, Radio Free Europe was publicly funded by Congressional appropriation through the presidentially appointed Board for International Broadcasting. RFE merged with Radio Liberty (RL) in 1976 in a new non-profit corporation, RFE/RL, INc. Oversight was assumed in 1995 by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, responsible for all non-military U.S. international broadcasting.

RFE/RL broadcasts today to 21 countries in 28 languages, including Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Russia.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Former CIA Officer John Kiriakou Charged with Disclosing Covert Officer’s Identity and Other Classified Information to Journalists and Lying to CIA’s Publications Review Board

ALEXANDRIA, VA—A former CIA officer, John Kiriakou, was charged today with repeatedly disclosing classified information to journalists, including the name of a covert CIA officer and information revealing the role of another CIA employee in classified activities, Justice Department officials announced. The charges result from an investigation that was triggered by a classified defense filing in January 2009, which contained classified information the defense had not been given through official government channels, and, in part, by the discovery in the spring of 2009 of photographs of certain government employees and contractors in the materials of high-value detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The investigation revealed that on multiple occasions, one of the journalists to whom Kiriakou is alleged to have illegally disclosed classified information, in turn, disclosed that information to a defense team investigator, and that this information was reflected in the classified defense filing and enabled the defense team to take or obtain surveillance photographs of government personnel. There are no allegations of criminal activity by any members of the defense team for the detainees.

Kiriakou, 47, of Arlington, Va., was a CIA intelligence officer between 1990 and 2004, serving at headquarters and in various classified overseas assignments. He is scheduled to appear at 2 p.m. today before U.S. Magistrate Judge John F. Anderson in federal court in Alexandria.

Kiriakou was charged with one count of violating the Intelligence Identities Protection Act for allegedly illegally disclosing the identity of a covert officer and two counts of violating the Espionage Act for allegedly illegally disclosing national defense information to individuals not authorized to receive it. Kiriakou was also charged with one count of making false statements for allegedly lying to the Publications Review Board of the CIA in an unsuccessful attempt to trick the CIA into allowing him to include classified information in a book he was seeking to publish.

The four-count criminal complaint, which was filed today in the Eastern District of Virginia, alleges that Kiriakou made illegal disclosures about two CIA employees and their involvement in classified operations to two journalists on multiple occasions between 2007 and 2009. In one case, revealing the employee’s name as a CIA officer disclosed classified information as the employee was and remains covert (identified in the complaint as “Covert Officer A”). In the second case, Kiriakou allegedly disclosed the name and contact information of an employee, identified in the complaint as “Officer B,” whose participation in an operation to capture and question terrorism subject Abu Zubaydah in 2002 was then classified. Kiriakou’s alleged disclosures occurred prior to a June 2008 front-page story in The New York Times disclosing Officer B’s alleged role in the Abu Zubaydah operation.

“Safeguarding classified information, including the identities of CIA officers involved in sensitive operations, is critical to keeping our intelligence officers safe and protecting our national security,” said Attorney General Eric Holder. “Today’s charges reinforce the Justice Department’s commitment to hold accountable anyone who would violate the solemn duty not to disclose such sensitive information.”

Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, who was appointed Special Attorney in 2010 to supervise the investigation, said: “I want to thank the Washington Field Office of the FBI and the team of attorneys assigned to this matter for their hard work and dedication to tracing the sources of the leaks of classified information.” Mr. Fitzgerald announced the charges with James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and they thanked the Central Intelligence Agency for its very substantial assistance in the investigation, as well as the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for its significant assistance.

“Protecting the identities of America’s covert operatives is one of the most important responsibilities of those who are entrusted with roles in our nation’s intelligence community. The FBI and our intelligence community partners work diligently to hold accountable those who violate that special trust,” said Mr. McJunkin.

The CIA filed a crimes report with the Justice Department on March 19, 2009, prior to the discovery of the photographs and after reviewing the Jan. 19, 2009, classified filing by defense counsel for certain detainees with the military commission then responsible for adjudicating charges. The defense filing contained information relating to the identities and activities of covert government personnel, but prior to Jan. 19, 2009, there had been no authorized disclosure to defense counsel of the classified information. The Justice Department’s National Security Division, working with the FBI, began the investigation. To avoid the risk of encountering a conflict of interest because of the pending prosecutions of some of the high-value detainees, Mr. Fitzgerald was assigned to supervise the investigation conducted by a team of attorneys from the Southern District of New York, the Northern District of Illinois, and the Counterespionage Section of the National Security Division who were not involved in pending prosecutions of the detainees.

According to the complaint affidavit, the investigation determined that no laws were broken by the defense team as no law prohibited defense counsel from filing a classified document under seal outlining for a court classified information they had learned during the course of their investigation. Regarding the 32 pages of photographs that were taken or obtained by the defense team and provided to the detainees, the investigation found no evidence the defense attorneys transmitting the photographs were aware of, much less disclosed, the identities of the persons depicted in particular photographs and no evidence that the defense team disclosed other classified matters associated with certain of those individuals to the detainees. The defense team did not take photographs of persons known or believed to be current covert officers. Rather, defense counsel, using a technique known as a double-blind photo lineup, provided photograph spreads of unidentified individuals to their clients to determine whether they recognized anyone who may have participated in questioning them. No law or military commission order expressly prohibited defense counsel from providing their clients with these photo spreads.

Further investigation, based in part on e-mails recovered from judicially-authorized search warrants served on two e-mail accounts associated with Kiriakou, allegedly revealed that:

  • Kiriakou disclosed to Journalist A the name of Covert Officer A and the fact that Covert Officer A was involved in a particular classified operation. The journalist then provided the defense investigator with the full name of the covert CIA employee;
  • Kiriakou disclosed or confirmed to Journalists A, B, and C the then-classified information that Officer B participated in the Abu Zubaydah operation and provided two of those journalists with contact information for Officer B, including a personal e-mail address. One of the journalists subsequently provided the defense investigator with Officer B’s home telephone number, which the investigator used to identify and photograph Officer B; and
  • Kiriakou lied to the CIA regarding the existence and use of a classified technique, referred to as a “magic box,” in an unsuccessful effort to trick the CIA into allowing him to publish information about the classified technique in a book.

Upon joining the CIA in 1990 and on multiple occasions in following years, Kiriakou signed secrecy and non-disclosure agreements not to disclose classified information to unauthorized individuals.

Regarding Covert Officer A, the affidavit details a series of e-mail communications between Kiriakou and Journalist A in July and August 2008. In an exchange of e-mails on July 11, 2008, Kiriakou allegedly illegally confirmed for Journalist A that Covert Officer A, whose first name only was exchanged at that point, was “the team leader on [specific operation].” On August 18, 2008, Journalist A sent Kiriakou an e-mail asking if Kiriakou could pick out Covert Officer A’s last name from a list of names Journalist A provided in the e-mail. On Aug. 19, 2008, Kiriakou allegedly passed the last name of Covert Officer A to Journalist A by e-mail, stating “It came to me last night.” Covert Officer A’s last name had not been on the list provided by Journalist A. Later that same day, approximately two hours later, Journalist A sent an e-mail to the defense investigator that contained Covert Officer A’s full name. Neither Journalist A, nor any other journalist to the government’s knowledge, has published the name of Covert Officer A.

At the time of Kiriakou’s allegedly unauthorized disclosures to Journalist A, the identification of Covert Officer A as “the team leader on [specific operation]” was classified at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) level because it revealed both Covert Officer A’s identity and his association with the CIA’s Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI) Program relating to the capture, detention, and questioning of terrorism subjects. The defense investigator was able to identify Covert Officer A only after receiving the e-mail from Journalist A, and both Covert Officer A’s name and association with the RDI Program were included in the January 2009 classified defense filing. The defense investigator told the government that he understood from the circumstances that Covert Officer A was a covert employee and, accordingly, did not take his photograph. No photograph of Covert Officer A was recovered from the detainees at Guantanamo.

In a recorded interview last Thursday, FBI agents told Kiriakou that Covert Officer A’s name was included in the classified defense filing. The affidavit states Kiriakou said, among other things, “How the heck did they get him? . . . [First name of Covert Officer A] was always undercover. His entire career was undercover.” Kiriakou further stated that he never provided Covert Officer A’s name or any other information about Covert Officer A to any journalist and stated “Once they get the names, I mean this is scary.”

Regarding Officer B, the affidavit states that he worked overseas with Kiriakou on an operation to locate and capture Abu Zubaydah, and Officer B’s association with the RDI Program and the Abu Zubaydah operation in particular were classified until that information was recently declassified to allow the prosecution of Kiriakou to proceed.

In June 2008, The New York Times published an article by Journalist B entitled “Inside the Interrogation of a 9/11 Mastermind,” which publicly identified Officer B and reported his alleged role in the capture and questioning of Abu Zubaydah—facts which were then classified. The article attributed other information to Kiriakou as a source, but did not identify the source(s) who disclosed or confirmed Officer B’s identity. The charges allege that at various times prior to publication of the article, Kiriakou provided Journalist B with personal information regarding Officer B, knowing that Journalist B was seeking to identify and locate Officer B. In doing so, Kiriakou allegedly confirmed classified information that Officer B was involved in the Abu Zubaydah operation. For example, Kiriakou allegedly e-mailed Officer B’s phone number and personal e-mail address to Journalist B, who attempted to contact Officer B via his personal e-mail in April and May 2008. Officer B had provided his personal e-mail address to Kiriakou, but not to Journalist B or any other journalist. Subsequently, Kiriakou allegedly revealed classified information by confirming for Journalist B additional information that an individual with Officer B’s name, who was associated with particular contact information that Journalist B had found on a website, was located in Pakistan in March 2002, which was where and when the Abu Zubaydah operation took place.

After The New York Times article was published, Kiriakou sent several e-mails denying that he was the source for information regarding Officer B, while, at the same time, allegedly lying about the number and nature of his contacts with Journalist B. For example, in an e-mail dated June 30, 2008, Kiriakou told Officer B that Kiriakou had spoken to the newspaper’s ombudsman after the article was published and said that the use of Officer B’s name was “despicable and unnecessary” and could put Officer B in danger. Kiriakou also denied that he had cooperated with the article and claimed that he had declined to talk to Journalist B, except to say that he believed the article absolutely should not mention Officer B’s name. “[W]hile it might not be illegal to name you, it would certainly be immoral,” Kiriakou wrote to Officer B, according to the affidavit.

From at least November 2007 through November 2008, Kiriakou allegedly provided Journalist A with Officer B’s personal contact information and disclosed to Journalist A classified information revealing Officer B’s association with the RDI Program. Just as Journalist A had disclosed to the defense investigator classified information that Kiriakou allegedly imparted about Covert Officer A, Journalist A, in turn, provided the defense investigator information that Kiriakou had disclosed about Officer B. For example, in an e-mail dated April 10, 2008, Journalist A provided the defense investigator with Officer B’s home phone number, which, in light of Officer B’s common surname, allowed the investigator to quickly and accurately identify Officer B and photograph him. Both Officer B’s name and his association with the RDI Program were included in the January 2009 classified defense filing, and four photographs of Officer B were among the photos recovered at Guantanamo.

In the same recorded interview with FBI agents last week, Kiriakou said he “absolutely” considered Officer B’s association with the Abu Zubaydah operation classified, the affidavit states. Kiriakou also denied providing any contact information for Officer B or Officer B’s association with the Abu Zubaydah operation to Journalists A and B prior to publication of the June 2008 New York Times article. When specifically asked whether he had anything to do with providing Officer B’s name or other information about Officer B to Journalist B prior to the article, Kiriakou stated “Heavens no.”

As background, the affidavit states that sometime prior to May 22, 2007, Kiriakou disclosed to Journalist C classified information regarding Officer B’s association with Abu Zubaydah operation, apparently while collaborating on a preliminary book proposal. A footnote states that Journalist C is not the coauthor of the book Kiriakou eventually published.

Prior to publication of his book, The Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIA’s War on Terror, Kiriakou submitted a draft manuscript in July 2008 to the CIA’s Publication Review Board (PRB). In an attempt to trick the CIA into allowing him to publish information regarding a classified investigative technique, Kiriakou allegedly lied to the PRB by falsely claiming that the technique was fictional and that he had never heard of it before. In fact, according to a transcript of a recorded interview conducted in August 2007 to assist Kiriakou’s coauthor in drafting the book, Kiriakou described the technique, which he referred to as the “magic box,” and told his coauthor that the CIA had used the technique in the Abu Zubaydah operation. The technique was also disclosed in the June 2008 New York Times article and referred to as a “magic box.”

In his submission letter to the PRB, Kiriakou flagged the reference to a device called a “magic box,” stating he had read about it in the newspaper article but added that the information was “clearly fabricated,” as he was unaware of and had used no such device. The affidavit contains the contents of an August 2008 e-mail that Kiriakou sent his coauthor admitting that he lied to the PRB in an attempt to include classified information in the book. The PRB subsequently informed Kiriakou that the draft manuscript contained classified information that he could not use, and information regarding the technique that Kiriakou included in the manuscript remained classified until it was recently declassified to allow Kiriakou’s prosecution to proceed.

Upon conviction, the count charging illegal disclosure of Covert Officer A’s identity to a person not authorized to receive classified information carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison, which must be imposed consecutively to any other term of imprisonment; the two counts charging violations of the Espionage Act each carry a maximum term of 10 years in prison; and making false statements carries a maximum prison term of five years. Each count carries a maximum fine of $250,000.

A complaint contains only allegations and is not evidence of guilt. The defendant is presumed innocent and is entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The government is being represented in court by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Iris Lan (Southern District of New York) and Mark E. Schneider (Northern District of Illinois), and DOJ trial attorney Ryan Fayhee, of the Counterespionage Section of the National Security Division. Assistant U.S. Attorney Lisa Owings (Eastern District of Virginia) will assist in the matter under local court rules.

TOP-SECRET – (U//FOUO) DoD Global Information Grid 2.0 Concept of Operations

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Executive Summary

Achieving and maintaining the information advantage as a critical element of national power requires the concentrated effort of the entire Department of Defense (DoD) to provide a seamless information environment optimized for the warfighter.

Operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan support the continued need to eliminate barriers to information sharing that currently exist on DoD’s multiple networks. A concerted effort to unify the networks into a single information environment providing timely information to commanders will improve command and control, thus increasing our speed of action. Providing an information technology (IT) / National Security Systems (NSS) infrastructure that is accessible anywhere and anytime is key to ensuring the agility of the Department and allowing our most valuable resources, our people, nearly instant access to the information they need to make decisions in the execution of their missions. In turn, the Global Information Grid (GIG) must be designed and optimized to support warfighting functions of advantaged and disadvantaged users, to include mission partners, across the full range of military and National Security operations in any operational environment. The GIG must also be resilient and able to support the missions despite attacks by sophisticated adversaries.

The operational concept of GIG 2.0 is depicted in Figure 1, and builds upon net-centric concepts as articulated in DoD Information Enterprise Architecture (DIEA) Version 1.0 (April 2008).

Furthermore, GIG 2.0 is founded upon the following 5 characteristics which are further discussed in section 2.7: Global Authentication, Access Control, and Directory Services Information and Services ―From the Edge‖ Joint Infrastructure Common Policies and Standards Unity of Command.

GIG 2.0 will facilitate mission accomplishment by providing tactical services ―from the edge‖ in support of the warfighter. The warfighter tactical edge user solutions must work in austere deployed environments. Today many IT services and systems are designed to work in a robust IT environment and often do not scale down to the deployed user. This separation between home station and deployed capabilities requires the user to transition from garrison IT services to tactical IT services, often losing functionality in the deployed environment. This document presents the GIG 2.0 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) as it relates to five key critical characteristics of the GIG and their relationship to the DoD Joint Capability Areas (JCA).

 

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DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

DoD-GIG2-CONOPS

 

Dokumentiert – STASI-Morde – Hinrichtungen in der DDR

 

Die Todesstrafe war eines der größten Geheimnisse der DDR: Vor 20 Jahren schaffte das Politbüro Exekutionen ab. SED-Chef Honecker ging es dabei nicht um Humanismus und Menschenrechte – der Diktator brauchte den Goodwill des Westens, um seinen maroden Staat am Leben zu halten.
Die wahrscheinlich letzte Hinrichtung in Deutschland fand am 26. Juni 1981 in der DDR, in der Hinrichtungsstätte im Gefängnis in der Alfred-Kästner-Straße, Leipzig, statt: Der 39-jährige Stasi-Hauptmann Dr. Werner Teske, dem vorgeworfen wurde, sich mit Akten in den Westen absetzen zu wollen (Spionagetatbestand), wurde durch den “unerwarteten Nahschuss” hingerichtet. Hierbei verkündete der Staatsanwalt dem völlig Ahnungslosen die beiden Sätze “Das Gnadengesuch ist abgelehnt. Ihre Hinrichtung steht unmittelbar bevor.” Daraufhin trat der letzte deutsche Henker, Hermann Lorenz, unbemerkt von hinten heran und schoss Teske ohne weitere Umschweife mit einer Armeepistole in den Hinterkopf. Lorenz hat auf diese Weise etwa zwanzig Hinrichtungen vollstreckt und wurde später zum Major befördert.
Das letzte nicht-militärische Todesurteil in der DDR wurde am 15. September 1972 an dem Kindermörder Erwin Hagedorn aus Eberswalde vollzogen.

INOFFIZIELL GING UND GEHT DAS MORDEN WEITER – ICH SAGE NUR DIOXIN

TOP-SECRET – Japanese Government Denied Existence of Document on Fukushima Worst-Case Scenario

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The government buried a worst-case scenario for the Fukushima nuclear crisis that was drafted last March and kept it under wraps until the end of last year, sources in the administration said Saturday.

After the document was shown to a small, select group of senior government officials at the prime minister’s office in late March, the administration of then Prime Minister Naoto Kan decided to quietly bury it, the sources said.

“When the document was presented (in March), a discussion ensued about keeping its existence secret,” a government source said.

In order to deny its existence, the government treated it as a personal document of Japan Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Shunsuke Kondo, who authored it, until the end of December, the sources said.

It was only then that it was actually recognized as an official government document, they said.

“The content was so shocking that we decided to treat it as if it didn’t exist,” a senior government official said.

A private-sector panel investigating the disaster at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant intends to examine whether the government tried to manipulate information during its handling of the crisis.

 

he document was dated March 25, 2011, two weeks after the massive earthquake and tsunami triggered the country’s worst nuclear crisis. It was premised on a scenario in which all plant workers had to be evacuated due to a rise in radiation levels after a hydrogen explosion damaged a containment vessel encasing the plan’s No. 1 reactor.

The document said that should such a case occur, residents within a radius of 170 kilometers or more of the plant would be forced to move out, while those within a radius of 250 km of the plant, including Tokyo, would be allowed to leave if they wish.

“It contained such shocking content that we decided to treat it as if it never existed,” a senior government official said.

Another government source said, “When the document was presented, there was a discussion about the choice of keeping the existence of the document itself secret.”

Kan admitted the existence of a worst case scenario in September, while the government of his successor, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, decided to treat the document as a Cabinet Office document after some parts of it were reported in December.

STASI-AGENTEN MIT GEHEIMCODES TEIL 16-STASI AGENTS WITH SECRET CODES PART 16

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Diese Liste beinhaltet die Namen von 90.598 Mitarbeitern des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der DDR. Die Liste ist nicht vollständig. Insbesondere Mitarbeiter der Führungsebene sind nicht enthalten.

This is a list of 90.598 members of the secret police of East Germany (Ministry for State Security), the list isn’t complete, because the most of the high Officiers lieke Colonel and higher have destroyed the personal Informations in the last days of Eastern Germany.

Listen der Stasimitarbeiter-hier findest Du sie! Was bedeuten die Zahlen?
1.Listen der Stasi-Diensteinheiten!
Bem.:hier kannst du die Nr.(6-stellig) der Dienststellen heraussuchen.
2.Liste der Stasi-Mitarbeiter (Hauptamtlich)
Bem.:Hoffentlich hast Du einen guten Rechner, denn die Liste ist erschreckend lang. Die ersten 6 Ziffern sind das Geburtsdatum + die nächsten 6 Ziffern = Dienstausweisnummer! Die zwei Ziffern hinter dem Geburtsdatum geben das Geschlecht an: 41 und 42 = Männlich, 51 und 52 = Weiblich! Wichtig für suchen und finden, sind die sechs Ziffern in den Semikolon vor den Namen: z.B. ;07;00;44; ! Das ist die Nummer der Dienststelle !
Also du suchst in der Liste der Dienststellen, die Nummer der Dienststelle, die Dich interessiert. Damit gehst Du in die Liste der Mitarbeiter und suchst Dir alle Mitarbeiter der entsprechenden Dienststelle heraus. Ich habe das für mein Wohnort getan und so alle Mitarbeiter gefunden. Ob die Liste Vollständig ist kann ich nicht einschätzen, aber zumindest er/kannte ich einige Exverräter vom Namen her.
3.Liste der OibE (Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz)

 

Warum mich die Neo-STASI zum Nummer 1 Feind erklärt hat und “liquidieren” will

Liebe Leser,

nachdem wir die STASI-Listen veröffentlichen und damit entschieden gegen die Neo-STASI und deren bislang getarnte Verbündete auch in der Gesellschaft, der Legislative und der Justiz vorgehen, nehmen die Morddrohungen und die Erpressungen sowie die Rufmorde vor allem der Neo STASI-“GoMoMoPa” gegen mich zu.

Keine Sorge.

Wer mich kennt, weiss, dass dies mich nicht stoppen wird.

Einer muss diesen Job machen.

Herzlichst Ihr

Bernd Pulch, MA

 

 

 

 

Exposed – Kim Schmitz aka dotcom and MegaUpload Photos in the Court of New Zealand

[Image]Megaupload.com employees Bram van der Kolk, also known as Bramos, left, Finn Batato,second from left, Mathias Ortmann and founder, former CEO and current chief innovation officer of Megaupload.com Kim Dotcom (also known as Kim Schmitz and Kim Tim Jim Vestor), right, appear in North Shore District Court in Auckland, New Zealand, Friday, Jan. 20, 2012.
German Internet millionaire Kim Schmitz arrives for. a trial at a district court in Munich in these May 27, 2002 file photos. New Zealand police broke through electronic locks and cut their way into a mansion safe room to arrest the alleged kingpin of an international Internet copyright theft case and seize millions of dollars worth of cars, artwork and other goods. German national Schmitz, also known as Kim Dotcom, was one of four men arrested in Auckland on January 20, 2012, in an investigation of the Megaupload.com website led by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Reuters
[Image]In this April 30, 2007 file photo, attorney Robert Bennett speaks in Washington. Bennett, one of the nation’s most prominent defense lawyers will represent file-sharing website Megaupload on charges that the company used its popular site to orchestrate a massive piracy scheme that enabled millions of illegal downloads of movies and other content. (J. Scott Applewhite)
[Image]Tow trucks wait to remove vehicles from Kim Dotcom’s house in Coatesville, north west of Auckland, New Zealand Friday, Jan. 20, 2012. Police arrested founder Kim Dotcom and three employees of Megaupload.com, a giant Internet file-sharing site, on U.S. accusations that they facilitated millions of illegal downloads of films, music and other content costing copyright holders at least $500 million in lost revenue. (Natalie Slade)
[Image]A general view shows the Dotcom Mansion, home of Megaupload founder Kim Dotcom, in Coatesville, Auckland, January 21, 2012. The U.S. government shut down the Megaupload.com content sharing website, charging its founders and several employees with massive copyright infringement, the latest skirmish in a high-profile battle against piracy of movies and music. The U.S. Department of Justice announced the indictment and arrests of four company executives in New Zealand on Friday as debate over online piracy reaches fever pitch in Washington where lawmakers are trying to craft tougher legislation. Reuters
[Image]A broken intercom system is seen after a police raid at Dotcom Mansion, home of accused Kim Dotcom, who founded the Megaupload.com site and ran it from the $30 million mansion in Coatesville, Auckland January 21, 2012. The U.S. government shut down the Megaupload.com content sharing website, charging its founders and several employees with massive copyright infringement, the latest skirmish in a high-profile battle against piracy of movies and music. New Zealand police on Friday raided a mansion in Auckland and arrested Kim Dotcom, also known as Kim Schmitz, 37, a German national with New Zealand residency. Reuters
[Image]An entrance to Megaupload’s office at a hotel in Hong Kong is seen in this Hong Kong government handout photo released late January 20, 2012. The Hong Kong government said on Friday over HK$300 million ($38.4 million) worth of proceeds from Megaupload were seized in the country in joint operations by Hong Kong customs and U.S. authorities. The U.S. government shut down the Megaupload.com content sharing website, charging its founders and several employees with massive copyright infringement, the latest skirmish in a high-profile battle against piracy of movies and music. Reuters
[Image]In this photo taken Friday, Jan. 20,2012, provided by the Government Information Service in Hong Kong, large-scale high-speed servers set up at Megaupload’s office are shown inside a hotel room in Hong Kong. Customs officials said they seized more than $42.5 million in assets from the Hong Kong based company. The U.S. government shut down Megaupload’s file-sharing website on Thursday, alleging that the company facilitated illegal downloads of copyrighted movies and other content.
[Image]A masked hacker, part of the Anonymous group, hacks the French presidential Elysee Palace website on January 20, 2012 near the eastern city of Lyon. Anonymous, which briefly knocked the FBI and Justice Department websites offline in retaliation for the US shutdown of file-sharing site Megaupload, is a shadowy group of international hackers with no central hierarchy. On the left screen, an Occupy mask is seen. Getty

The FBI reports – Human Trafficking Prevention

Laborer
Human trafficking victims can be found in many job locations and industries.

Human Trafficking Prevention
Help Us Identify Potential Victims

 

01/20/12

For the young Ukrainians, it was a dream come true—the promise of well-paying jobs and free room and board in the United States. Once they arrived, however, it quickly turned into a nightmare. They were forced to endure 16-plus hour workdays, usually with no pay. Their living conditions were wretched, with up to 10 workers in often-unfurnished apartments or row houses. And they faced intimidation, threats of physical harm, or actual violence to keep them in line.

 

Trafficking victims

Human Trafficking Myths

Be aware of these enduring myths about human trafficking:

Myth: Trafficking must involve the crossing of borders.
Fact: Despite the use of the word “trafficking,” victims can actually be held within their own country—anti-trafficking laws don’t require that victims must have traveled from somewhere else.

Myth: U.S. citizens can’t be trafficked.
Fact: They can and they are.

Myth: Victims know what they are getting into or have chances to escape.
Fact: They’re actually duped into it and may not even think of escaping because of threats against them or ignorance of the law.

Myth: Victims are never paid.
Fact: Sometimes they are paid, but not very much.

Myth: Victims never have freedom of movement.
Fact: Some victims can move about, but are coerced into always returning, perhaps with a threat against their families back home.

One last note: human trafficking is often confused with alien smuggling, which includes those who consent to smuggling to get across a border illegally.

Members of the organized criminal enterprise responsible for these workers’ misery were ultimately identified and charged in a conspiracy to operate a human trafficking scheme. But, as we observe National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month, we’re reminded that there are still thousands of victims in the U.S.—and millions worldwide—being forced into both legal and illegal activities.

Human trafficking generates billions of dollars of profit each year, making it one of the world’s fastest growing criminal activities. The FBI investigates it as a priority under our civil rights program, but we see human trafficking activities in other investigative areas as well, including organized crime, crimes against children, and gangs.

To address the threat, we work cases with our local, state, federal, and international partners and participate in approximately 70 multi-agency human trafficking task forces. We also offer our counterparts—as well as non-governmental organizations, including non-profits—human trafficking awareness training. And to help get a better handle on human trafficking within the U.S., the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting program plans to start collecting human trafficking data from law enforcement in 2013.

Many of our human trafficking cases are based on information from our partners and from criminal sources, but we also can and do receive tips from the public.

That’s where you come in. Please keep your eyes out for the following indicators that suggest the possibility of human trafficking:

 

  • Individuals who have no contact with friends or family and no access to identification documents, bank accounts, or cash;
  • Workplaces where psychological manipulation and control are used;
  • Homes or apartments with inhumane living conditions;
  • People whose communications and movements are always monitored or who have moved or rotated through multiple locations in a short amount of time;
  • Places where locks and fences are positioned to confine occupants; and
  • Workers who have excessively long and unusual hours, are unpaid or paid very little, are unable take breaks or days off and have unusual work restrictions, and/or have unexplained work injuries or signs of untreated illness or disease.

 

Bear in mind: human trafficking victims can be found in many job locations and industries—including factories, restaurants, elder care facilities, hotels, housekeeping, child-rearing, agriculture, construction and landscaping, food processing, meat-packing, cleaning services…as well as the commercial sex industry.

And here’s one more thing to consider: while the majority of human trafficking victims in our investigations are from other countries and may speak little or no English, approximately 33 percent of victims are Americans. They come from a variety of groups that are vulnerable to coercive tactics—like minors, certain immigrant populations, the homeless, substance abusers, the mentally challenged and/or minimally educated, and those who come from cultures that historically distrust law enforcement or who have little or no experience with the legal system.

If you suspect human trafficking activities, do us and the victims a big favor: call the National Human Trafficking Resource Center at 1-888-3737-888 or contact the FBI through our Tips webpage.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Former Chicago Lawyer Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Mortgage Fraud Involving at Least 102 Fraudulent Bailouts

CHICAGO—A former Chicago lawyer was sentenced to 15 years in federal prison for engaging in mortgage and bankruptcy fraud schemes involving a so-called “mortgage bailout” program that purported to “rescue” financially distressed homeowners but instead tricked victims into relinquishing title to their homes and declaring bankruptcy. The defendant, Norton Helton, participated in at least 102 fraudulent mortgage bailout transactions and more than a dozen fraudulent bankruptcies in 2004 and 2005. He was ordered to pay more than $3.2 million in mandatory restitution to various lenders and financial institutions that were not repaid by the borrowers or fully recovered through subsequent foreclosure sales, federal law enforcement officials announced today.

Helton, 50, of Atlanta and formerly of Chicago, was sentenced Wednesday by U.S. District Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan in federal court in Chicago. He was ordered to begin serving his sentence in June.

Helton and two co-defendants, Charles White and Felicia Ford, were convicted of multiple fraud counts following a five-week trial in June and July 2010. White, 43, of Chicago, was sentenced late last year to more than 22 years in prison, while Ford, 39, of Chicago, is awaiting sentencing next month.

White owned and operated Eyes Have Not Seen (EHNS), which purported to offer insolvent homeowners mortgage bailout services that would prevent them from losing their homes in foreclosure by selling their property to third-party investors for whom the defendants fraudulently obtained mortgage financing. The victim-clients were assured they could continue living in their homes rent and mortgage-free for a year while they attempted to eliminate their debt and repair their credit. EHNS misled clients concerning the operation of the purported program. In particular, victim-clients were not told that their homes were, in fact, being sold to third parties and that ENHS would strip their homes of any available equity at the time of sale, which EHNS did. Instead, ENHS clients were told that they were only temporarily transferring their homes and would preserve their ownership rights.

Helton was recruited by White to represent ENHS participants at the real estate transactions it orchestrated. The victim-clients typically met Helton for the first time at the closings at which they sold their homes. Helton worked to placate individuals who questioned the program and to dissuade them from retaining independent legal advice. He received above-market legal fees for appearing at closings at which he did little more than guide victim-clients through the paperwork that sold their homes with EHNS receiving all of the profits from the sale. Helton further used the ENHS real estate closings to recruit prospective bankruptcy clients, informing them that bankruptcy would serve as a component of the bailout program. Helton subsequently filed more than a dozen bankruptcy petitions for victim-clients that omitted any reference to their recent EHNS property sales.

In addition to participating in ENHS’s bailout program, Helton attempted to implement his own mortgage bailout program through Diamond Management of Chicago, Inc., a foreclosure avoidance company comparable to EHNS. Helton marketed Diamond’s bailout program and his bankruptcy services as part of a “credit repair” system.

Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, announced the sentence today with Robert D. Grant, Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Barry McLaughlin, Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Housing and Urban Development Office of Inspector General in Chicago; and Thomas P. Brady, Inspector in Charge of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in Chicago. The U.S. Trustee Program, a Justice Department component that oversees administration of bankruptcy cases and private trustees, also assisted in the investigation.

The government is being represented by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Joel Hammerman and Mark E. Schneider.

The case is part of a continuing effort to investigate and prosecute mortgage fraud in northern Illinois and nationwide under the umbrella of the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, which was established to lead an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. For more information on the task force, visit: http://www.StopFraud.go

Egyptian Revolution Protest Manual (How to Protest Intelligently)

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/EgyptianRevolutionManual_Page_01-724x1024.jpg

This document is an Arabic manual for Egyptian protesters circulated via email and in hard copy prior to the protests on Friday January 28, 2010. For background on the document and English translations of selected portions, see The Atlantic’s article Egyptian Activists’ Action Plan: Translated.

 

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

EgyptianRevolutionManual

TOP-SECRET – Faces of Torture: Egyptian State Security Officers Photos and Names

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/egypt-ss.jpg

The following set of photos and names has been publicly posted to other sites, including Cryptome. However, with the recent confirmation that Flickr removed and censored these photos, we wish to ensure that this information reaches as many people as possible. We are also aware that this site is visited frequently by members of the Egyptian government and the International Criminal Court.

When we stormed State Security Police headquarters in Nasr City, which hosted one of Mubarak’s largest torture facilities, on Saturday I found two DVDs in one of the offices, both titled “أرشيف السادة ضباط الجهاز” The Agency Officers’ Archive. The DVDs included profile pictures of State Security officers, organized in folders. Each folder had the officers’ name. Some however did not have the names. There were also sub folders that included pictures of those officers in social events like weddings.

I don’t know what was the purpose of these two DVDs, but I sincerely thank the State Security officials who gave us this present on a golden plate. I initially uploaded the profile pictures to this flickr set and added them to the Piggipedia. But unfortunately, flickr censored the pictures on grounds of “copyrights infringement”!

With the help of ANONYMOUS and other bloggers in Egypt and abroad, I re-uploaded the pictures to the cyberspace, and they are now hosted on several sites.

I urge you all to circulate them. And if you have any more information about those officers please come forward.

Each member of SS has to be brought to justice. This was an agency devoted to spying, surveillance, torture and murder. Every member of this organization from the informer all the way up to the generals should be prosecuted. SS has to be dissolved. It cannot be “restructured” like what the current PM is calling for.

Although those torturers violated our private lives on a daily basis, bugging our phones, offices, and even our bedrooms, I will respect the privacy of their families and will not publish the photos of their social events that included family members.

Download .zip file containing all images (417 MB)

Download .pdf file containing all images (26 MB)

Names of Officers Whose Photos are Contained in the File

  • Ahmad el-Badawi
  • Ahmad Fathi
  • Ahmad Raafat
  • Ahmad Raoof
  • Ahmed Atef
  • Ahmed el-Azzazi
  • Ali Allam
  • Amgad Ezz Eddin
  • Amr Abdel Moula
  • Amr L’Assar
  • Assem Esmat
  • Ayman el-Banna
  • Ayman el-Rashidi
  • Ehab el-Gheryani
  • Fahd Abul Kheir
  • Hani Talaat
  • Hassan Abdel Rahman
  • Hassan Tantawi
  • Hisham Abu Gheida
  • Hisham el-Baradei
  • Hisham el-Dafrawi
  • Hossam Wahdan
  • Kamal el-Sayyed
  • Khaled el-Taweel
  • Khaled Moussa
  • Khaled Shaker
  • Magdi el-Masri
  • Maged Mostafa
  • Mahmoud el-Rashidi
  • Mahmoud el-Zeini
  • Mohamed Abdel Kareem
  • Mohamed Abul Wafa
  • Mohamed el-Morshedi
  • Mohamed el-Samanoudi
  • Mohamed el-Zamak
  • Mohamed Hanafi
  • Mohamed Mahmoud Barghash
  • Mohamed Safwat
  • Mohamed Taher
  • Mohamed Yehia
  • Mortada Ibrahim
  • Motassem Ghoneim
  • Rashad Ghoneim
  • Rushdi el-Qamari
  • Salah Hegazi
  • Salah Salama
  • Sherif el-Bahei
  • Sherif Shabana
  • Shoman
  • Tarek el-Bahnassawi
  • Tarek el-Mouggi
  • Tarek el-Rakaybi

Photos of 168 officers whose names are not known are also contained in the file.

FEMEN of Ukraine, the courageous sisters – Uncensored Movie leaked

Three Ukrainian FEMEN activists have allegedly been kidnapped by Belarusian KGB officers who threatened the protesters with knives, cut their hair and then left the women alone in the woods, says the movement’s webpage.

The activists disappeared on Monday in the Belarusian capital, Minsk, after protesting in front of the KGB building against the country’s long-ruling president, Aleksandr Lukashenko.

“From 6 pm Kiev time, the connection with the FEMEN activists has been lost, and one hour later all their mobile phones appeared to be switched off,” a statement on the movement’s webpage said.

Later one of the missing women, Irina Shevchenko, managed to get access to a phone. The activist told her colleagues she had been detained by the police and KGB officers at Minsk railway station, together with two other FEMEN protesters.

“We were blindfolded and put into a bus,” Shevchenko said. “Then they took us to the woods, poured oil over us, forced us to undress — threatening to set fire to us or stab us with knives. They later used those knives to cut our hair.”

Then the activists were left alone in the woods, with no clothes or documents. The girls made a long journey on foot before finding help in a small village which turned out to be deep in the Belarusian outback.

In their blog, the movement’s leaders called on locals to help the activists hide from the police until Ukrainian embassy staff managed to rescue them.

Earlier the movement announced that its camerawoman, Kitty Green, who has Australian citizenship, was detained together with two local journalists. The women were released from detention several hours later; Green was deported to Vilnius, Lithuania.

An official of Belarus State Border Committee, Aleksandr Tushchenko, told Interfax that the committee had no information on the arrest of the FEMEN activists.

The Belarusian Foreign Ministry also denied detaining the FEMEN protesters, nor have they confirmed that they are aware of the activists’ whereabouts.

During their anti-Lukashenko protest, the topless activists chanted, “Long live Belarus!” One of them was made up as President Lukashenko.

December 19 is the anniversary of an unauthorized opposition rally that took place in Minsk in 2010 following presidential elections which was brutally dispersed by police, with many protesters beaten up and arrested.

The FEMEN movement is not notorious for politically-motivated naked protests held at home in Ukraine and in countries throughout Europe, including Vatican City. One of their latest actions was held in the Russian capital, Moscow, in front of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.

Revealed – Anonymous Hacks Public Intelligence in “Friendly Audit”

https://i2.wp.com/publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/publicint-1024x612.png

On January 16, 2012 an unauthorized party associated with the hacktivist collective Anonymous gained access to this site’s web server. The attacker gained root access and posted a number of versions of a photo of a naked man. These images were used to deface the front of the site in multiple locations and contained the message “WAS HERE WITH 0DAY, ONLY SHIT I FOUND BAD WAS U LOGGING IN FROM A DSL CONNECTION… THEN AGAIN U BOUGHT THIS SERVER WITH UR PERSONAL CARD SO U CAN BE DOX’D… LEFT U THESE COX AS A FRIENDLY REMINDER THAT YOUR BOX CAN BE PWNED AT ALL TIMES…” The attackers then manipulated configuration files for the server which caused an error message to appear to visitors of the site. This state persisted for approximately eight hours blocking access to the site before it was later fixed by the attacker, who left a longer explanation for the hack in the server’s root directory.

Though the hackers were fairly polite and we do not believe that there is any current threat to our users, we have disabled our submissions form and will not be accepting new information at the moment. We have also disabled some of the user features on the site, which were more a remnant of a previous phase of this site’s operation and served little practical value. If you, at any point, have had an account on this site with a password that is also used elsewhere, you should change it. The hackers claim that they did not look into our database to retrieve this information. However, you would be wise to protect against that possibility.

We feel that this action by Anonymous was misguided. While we understand their desire to demonstrate their ability to “penetrate” anything, their defacement of this platform was unnecessary. This site has functioned for several years now as a vital source of information that is concealed and restricted from the general public. Large amounts of people in all walks of life utilize its resources. At the time of the defacement, this site was serving several files as source material for articles in publications around the world, including information on the automated scanning of license plates and other forms of public surveillance in Germany, the Department of Defense’s Non-Lethal Weapons Reference Book which received a large amount of coverage in Russia and Eastern Europe after it was reported on by the BBC, and a particularly frank Marine Corps handbook that describes the CIA’s history of funding the Mujahideen via the Pakistani ISI. Because of the defacement, many people visiting the site were then confronted with pictures of naked men which may have dissuaded them from accessing the extremely important information contained in these documents.

We’ve never professed to be extremely adept technologically, nor have we ever claimed to be creating a massively secure system for the submission of high-profile leaks. In fact, we hate “leaks” in general and we try to avoid using the word as much as possible. Leaking implies an accident, like something that escaped through a crack or water passing through a sieve. How can you leak something that should never have been secret in the first place? We are simply average, humble people who are trying to inform ourselves and others about the world in which we live. Nearly every piece of information on this site is something that was obtained from a publicly-accessible source using means available to any member of the public. We have published this material using open-source software in an attempt to inform others and demonstrate the potential for public action in the sphere of intelligence and media.

And so, if we are to create anything lasting, we must work together towards a society where everyone can express themselves freely and share information openly. We must not attack one another, for this only undermines the legitimacy of our cause. If we are to live in a world where knowledge truly is free, we must act with the gravity that this freedom demands. Anarchy is not chaos, it is self-governance.

A message left by the hacker:

sorry for this but we consider u friendly so i just left a message and
wiped /var/log

there was nothing u could do against this breach, this was just to
remind you that we can breach anything and so can the enemy :)

be careful what u do, improve ur OPSEC

maybe buy the server/hosting with a temp card and access is via Tor

try and remove links from ur personal life from this service :)

keep up the good work and hope u enjoy the cox :D

cheers

#antisec

PS: i didnt steal any of ur credentials neither i even look into the mysql
db, i  dont know any of ur passwords though u should change them of course.
this was a direct root via a 0day we have :) it was not ur fault... i just
thought that i should leave u this message apart from the cox so u get a feel
what penetration looks like... our enemies dont leave messages ;)

STASI-AGENTEN MIT GEHEIMCODES TEIL 17-STASI AGENTS WITH SECRET CODES PART 17

see more info at http://www.victims-opfer.com

Die Liste wurde bereits früher hier publiziert:

 

http://stasiopfer.de/component/option,com_simpleboard/Itemid,/func,view/id,993815828/catid,4/

 

Vom “Stasiopfer”-Angebot führt ein Link zu einer Website in den USA (www.jya.com), die sich auch mit den Praktiken von Geheimdiensten beschäftigt. Dort findet sich die “Fipro-Liste”, das detaillierte “Finanzprojekt” der Stasi, angefertigt in den letzten Tagen der DDR, um die Rentenansprüche der rund 100 000 hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter des MfS auch nach dem Zusammenbruch des Systems belegen zu können. Die “Fipro-Liste” ist seit langem bekannt und diente Anfang der neunziger Jahre etwa zur Identifizierung der so genannten OibE – Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz. Diese  Liste „Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz“im Jahre 1991 erschien  in der “taz. Die Echtheit kann beim BStU überprüft werden.

Siehe u.a. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-22539439.html

Auf Druck ehemaliger STASI-Leute und Ihrer Genossen wurde die Liste aus dem Verkehr gezogen.

Hier ist sie wieder:

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