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China’s Military Culture Field Guide is designed to provide deploying military personnel an overview of China’s military cultural terrain. In this field guide, China’s military cultural history has been synopsized to capture the more significant aspects of China’s military cultural environment, with emphasis on factors having the greatest potential to impact operations.
The field guide presents background information to show China’s military mind-set through its history, values, and internal dynamics. It also contains practical sections on lifestyle, customs, and habits. For those seeking more extensive information, MCIA produces a series of cultural intelligence studies on China’s military that explores the dynamics of China’s military culture at a deeper level.
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The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the world’s largest standing army; it protects the world’s fastestrising economic power. In recent years, U.S. personnel have gained a much greater understanding of the PLA’s equipment and capabilities. However, knowledge of the values, beliefs, and essential cultural features that influence the way PLA members behave, interact, and make decisions is much less widespread. This field guide is aimed at U.S. personnel who will interact with Chinese military personnel but have limited knowledge of China or the PLA. The guide is intended to help readers better understand why PLA members act as they do and how the PLA differs from the U.S. military. This guide is divided into three parts. “Who is the PLA?” provides background on the PLA’s structure and personnel and discusses how the PLA is transforming itself.“How the PLA Sees Itself” traces the beliefs the PLA promotes about its origins, historical legacies, and key values. “Understanding PLA Actions” describes key aspects of PLA behavior, including its changing operational practices and its decision-making principles and processes, and discusses how U.S. personnel can most effectively interact with PLA members.
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The PLA is a Party-Army: its missions, institutions, and practices are all shaped by the fact that its ultimate loyalty is to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Change is a key element of PLA culture. The PLA is undergoing tremendous changes in its personnel system and its operational doctrine and practices. It is experiencing the “growing pains” of its transformation from a peasant army to a modern military. The PLA promotes the view that its greatest strengths are the morale and discipline of its personnel, and that these qualities enable the PLA to compensate for weak material capabilities. However, PLA leaders worry that these “human qualities” are increasingly difficult to maintain in a rapidly changing society.
U.S. personnel are often frustrated by the different expectations that the PLA and the U.S. military bring to military-to-military interactions. However, U.S. personnel can improve the quality of these exchanges by gaining an understanding of the PLA’s professional and cultural norms and an appreciation of what its members seek to gain from interaction with the U.S. military.
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Looking for a Few Good Men
According to a popular saying in imperial China, “Just as good iron is not forged into nails, good men do not become soldiers.” Today’s PLA faces immense difficulties in attracting the “good men” it needs in order to build the high-quality fighting force it wants. Based on the demands of 21st century warfare, the PLA now seeks:
● Conscripts from urban, educated backgrounds
● Officers who are better educated and more technically capable
● Personnel who are innovative and willing to take risksHowever, due to recent changes in Chinese society, young people with strong skills have a wide range of opportunities in the private sector or overseas. Despite reforms to the personnel system, PLA leaders remain concerned that the PLA has too many:
● Conscripts who are rural, uneducated, and poor
● Officers who stay too long in their positions and are too slow to adapt to new techniques and technologies
● Personnel (particularly officers) who are conservative and risk averse…
Recent Issues
● In 2002 China’s official news service reported that most PLA barracks finally had year-round electricity, heat, air conditioning, and indoor plumbing.
● In 2003 a PLAN depot reported that it was rethinking its earlier refusal to install air conditioning in the quarters for NCOs’ visiting family members. This refusal had resulted from concerns that if the quarters were too comfortable, family members would stay too long.
● In 2005 a PLAAF newspaper proudly reported that a tactical unit had installed 17 new showers, so that the troops could have one hot shower per week.
● In 2006 the leaders of a Second Artillery unit, concerned that unit personnel would be “tempted” by the bars and markets of a nearby town, built a wall around the unit compound to keep personnel inside. Personnel simply climbed over it to go into town, for such purposes as calling their families and taking uniforms to the dry cleaners.…
Suspicion of Foreigners
Today’s PLA members—and Chinese citizens more generally—still display a sense of wounded pride over what they call the “Century of Humiliation,” the period between 1840 and 1949 when China lost sovereignty, power, and human lives to foreign invaders. Because of these bitter memories, Chinese resistance to foreign interference is very strong. PRC leaders and intellectuals interpret many U.S. actions as evidence that the United States is determined to keep China from gaining global influence.
The CCP actively encourages the PLA to distrust foreign intentions. For instance, President Hu Jintao, in a 2004 speech on the PLA’s main tasks, warned that “Western hostile forces have not given up the wild ambition of trying to subjugate us, intensifying the political strategy of westernizing and dividing up China.” U.S. guests of the PLA may be surprised to find their hosts questioning the intentions of the U.S. government and people toward China during seemingly unrelated conversations.
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This study examines the military culture of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It focuses on the following:
• Values and traditions that the PLA regards as important
• Organizational characteristics that shape PLA practices
• Behaviors that result from these values, traditions, and organizational characteristics.Change is a central feature of present-day Chinese military culture. The PLA has transformed itself from a mass peasant army to a modern military in just a few decades, and now seeks to further transform to meet the needs of 21st century warfare. These shifts require PLA leaders to examine whether traditional values and organizational structures are compatible with modern demands. This study describes both those aspects of PLA culture that are regarded as central to the PLA’s identity and those that are currently undergoing rapid transformation.
The research for this study draws upon the following sources:
• PLA publications, including service newspapers, official histories, and leadership manuals
• Chinese- and English-language scholarly studies and policy analyses of the PLA
• Interviews conducted with U.S. military and DoD personnel who have interacted with the PLA.…
Key Findings
Origins of PLA Culture
Most PLA leaders believe that ancient Chinese values and war-fighting principles remain relevant for managing a modern military.
PLA and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders express great pride in China’s ancient military traditions, which they believe are far richer than those of the West. PLA publications draw extensively on these traditions for principles and lessons relevant to current needs.
• PLA leaders draw on the teachings of ancient military thinkers, especially Sun Tzu (Sunzi), for operational and strategic lessons.
• PLA leaders also draw on classic martial novels such as Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin as important sources of strategic principles and models of heroism and loyalty.
• PLA texts implicitly draw on the Confucian view of relationships as a framework for how PLA members should interact, although this influence is seldom acknowledged.The PLA teaches that China’s martial traditions are uniquely moral and defensive.
The PLA instructs its personnel that they are the heirs to a martial tradition that:
• Is defined by an emphasis on morality
• Draws its support from the common people
• Is defensive in orientation
• Prefers to avoid direct combat when there are other ways to prevail
• Focuses on strategic and tactical cleverness over physical or material superiority.The values and organizational structures of the PLA have been deeply influenced by principles of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
Many of China’s early Communist military leaders were trained in Leninist theoretical and organizational principles at the Whampoa Military Academy in the 1920s. Mao Zedong later modified these ideas to give them a more populist orientation, creating what came to be known as “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.” This body of thought provided the foundation for many of the PLA’s central principles, including the following:
• The Party-Army principle: The Party has absolute control over the armed forces.
• Mass mobilization: All of society should participate in the revolutionary tasks of the Party and support the undertakings of the armed forces.• Broad consultation, limited participation: Ordinary people’s opinions and concerns should be included in Party decisions, but their direct participation in decision-making should be limited.
• Voluntarism: Human willpower can overcome great material disadvantage.The PLA uses a selective interpretation of modern Chinese history to mold the worldview and self-image of its personnel.
The PLA has developed distinctive beliefs about its own history, which give weight to the PLA’s present-day tasks. (These beliefs do not always match those of outside observers.) The PLA teaches its members the following lessons about modern Chinese history:
• Foreign nations have long sought to deny China her sovereignty.
• The PLA and the CCP “saved” China from foreign aggression, domestic tyranny, and economic backwardness.
• The PLA has won every war it has fought, even when it has faced much larger and more advanced adversaries.
• The PLA has only waged war when forced to do so, and has always fought in a distinctly moral and defensive fashion.The PLA’s Emphasis on Morality
Throughout its history, the PLA has claimed that its greatest advantage lies in the moral, political, and spiritual excellence of its troops.
Mao and other early Communist military leaders saw war as the supreme test of the human spirit and believed that strength of character, not advanced weaponry or equipment, was the decisive factor in warfare.
This belief grew out of necessity: in its early days, the PLA (then known as the Red Army) was quite weak in material capabilities. Its leaders had to rely instead on the “human factor” – the physical, moral and political superiority of its troops, expressed through their honesty, discipline, and hard work – as its comparative advantage. The Red Army’s surprising successes against materially superior enemies in the Chinese civil war and in World War II cemented its leaders’ belief that moral and personal qualities of individual servicemembers can indeed shortcomings in other areas.
Despite any developments or acquisitions it has made in the last decade, today’s PLA still views itself as materially outmatched by the U.S. and other militaries, and continues to emphasize the importance of building its human capital to compensate for these shortcomings.
The PLA teaches its members that it has a special obligation to treat people humanely and equitably.
The PLA considers itself a “people’s army” that draws its strength from the support of the common people, and it teaches that this support was crucial to its past victories. Its leaders assert that the PLA must both defend the Chinese people in wartime, and aid them in their daily lives during peacetime. It considers this focus on the needs of the people to be a central aspect of its identity, setting it apart from foreign militaries and from previous, non-communist, Chinese armies.
This principle manifests itself in two beliefs:
• The PLA believes that treating its own personnel (particularly enlisted personnel) with paternalistic kindness and mercy is an important indicator of its moral and martial strength.
• The PLA believes that it must treat Chinese civilians with the utmost humanity and courtesy.The PLA sees itself as a beacon of moral values to Chinese society as a whole. PLA texts stress that members of the Chinese military must be morally better than average people. PLA publications emphasize the need for officers to model good behavior and moral rectitude for the soldiers under their command, and for PLA personnel to secure civilian support for PLA missions by acting as models of socialist ethics.
To ensure that its personnel fulfill their obligations to each other and to society, the PLA has developed a number of moral and disciplinary codes.
These codes include the following:
• The “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention” (late 1920s) guided soldiers’ interactions with civilians. This code required the Red Army to project the image of a benevolent force working to minimize the impact of military activity on civilian life. PLA personnel still consider these to be fundamental guidelines for military-civilian relations.
• The “Servicemen’s Moral Standards” (2001) were aimed at defining the PLA’s core values and shaping interactions among personnel.…
PLA Organizing Principles
The PLA is a “Party-Army” controlled by the CCP at all levels.
Central to the PLA’s organizational culture is its identity as a “Party-Army.” Party control of the military is as fundamental to the PLA as civilian control is to the U.S. military.
Central features of the Party-Army are:
• Absolute allegiance to the Party above all else. PLA members swear loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party, not to the Chinese State.
• Centralized Party command.
o The PLA’s national command authority (the Central Military Commission, or CMC, of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party) is a Party organization.
o Party structures exist at all levels of the PLA and play a central role in unit-level decisions.
• Weak state authority. State institutions also have little power over the Chinese military.
o There is a State CMC, but it is a “shell” organization whose membership is usually identical to that of the Party CMC.
o The Ministry of National Defense (MND) exists mostly for protocol purposes and to organize exchanges with foreign militaries. Its Minister is a powerful individual, but his power comes not from his state position but from his positions in the top echelons of the Party.
• Dual leadership. All PLA units are led jointly by a military commander and a political officer. These two officers are considered co-equals and exercise joint leadership over the unit.
• A comprehensive system of Party organizations and “political work.” Political officers and Party committees oversee the day-to-day implementation of “military political work” at every level of the PLA. Political work is the primary mode by which the PLA:
o Carries out the Party’s objectives
o Manages its human resources
o Manages its relations with the civilian population
o Conducts many aspects of training, indoctrination, and wartime activities to co-opt, coerce, or undermine enemy forces.…
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Unwilling to bear the political and economic burden of shoring up a key African ally all by herself, France sought to internationalize a growing political and military crisis in Rwanda by pushing responsibility onto the United Nations in the period leading up to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. At the same time, French president Francois Mitterrand remained deeply suspicious of Tutsi-led rebels who invaded Rwanda from Uganda, with what an aide described as “the benevolent complicity of the Anglo-Saxon world.” (Document 15)
The contradictions in Mitterrand’s policy toward Rwanda are captured in French government documents, translated into English by the National Security Archive at George Washington University and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. The documents trace the alarm felt in Paris over military advances by Tutsi-led rebels and frustration with the Hutu-dominated government of President Juvénal Habyarimana.
Today’s postings form part of a detailed documentation of the international response to the genocide that killed between 500,000 and a million Rwandans, predominantly Tutsi, between April and July 1994. Future briefing books will examine events before and after the onset of the genocide, including the Arusha peace negotiations, a growing refugee crisis, and the fateful decision to withdraw the bulk of the United Nations peacekeeping force.
The documents posted today in English and French are extracted from hundreds of documents released by a French parliamentary commission in 1998 and the so-called “Mitterrand archive,” which was leaked to French researchers from 2005 onwards. While the provenance of the Mitterrand archive remains unclear, the authenticity of the documents has been confirmed by former Mitterrand aides, French researchers, and lawyers involved in a series of cases related to the genocide.
While the documents contained in the Mitterrand archive provide a valuable insight into official French thinking, the unauthorized nature of their release also raises problems for independent researchers. It is impossible to know, for example, how many documents are missing from the archive, and the reasons for their non-disclosure. The motivations of the leaker, or leakers, also remain unclear.
French researchers have noted several glaring gaps in the collection, parts of which have been made available to journalists and other researchers at the Francois Mitterrand Institute in Paris. The documents focus on political developments and offer relatively scant details about the military cooperation between France and Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. Also missing are details of the French decision to accord protection and political asylum to leading members of the Rwandan regime following the assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994. It is important that the public be given access to these records in order to complete the picture of French decision-making about the Rwandan genocide.
The documents portray France as a reluctant, and somewhat ambiguous, supporter of the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. On the one hand, Mitterrand viewed Rwanda as an integral part of French-speaking Africa, known as Francophonie, on the edge of what French officials called an “Anglophone front.” (Document 8) On the other hand, he did not want to squander too much French blood and treasure on a former Belgian — not French — colony.
The French role in supporting the Habyarimana government has been the subject of great controversy, with some critics claiming that France was complicit in the actions of future genocidaires. With Belgium assuming a more neutral position, Habyarimana viewed France as his primary international ally, and a military bulwark against the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front.
After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, Mitterrand called for the creation of multi-party democracies in Africa, and linked French economic assistance to progress toward democratization, as reflected in his address to the Franco-African summit at Le Baule in June 1990. The documents show that he urged Habyarimana to negotiate a compromise deal with political opponents inside the country (largely Hutus, based in the south of the country), as well as the armed opposition outside the country (the Rwandan Patriotic Front).
After dispatching thousands of troops and military advisors to Rwanda between 1990 and 1993, France saw the Arusha peace progress, and the arrival of United Nations peacekeepers, as a way to extricate herself from an increasingly complicated political and military situation.
A recurring theme in the documents is the conviction, shared by Mitterrand and his advisers, that the Rwandan Patriotic Front wanted to use its superior military position to restore a Tutsi-dominated regime in Rwanda. French military advisers reported that the rebel movement had acquired surface-to-air missiles from Uganda. When President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down by a SAM missile on April 6, 1994, triggering the genocide, French officials immediately suspected the RPF. Other observers, among them Alison Desforges, note that there has never been a full and official investigation into who is responsible for shooting down President Habyarimana’s plane, leaving many possibilities including the RPF, Hutu moderates, the president’s own party, or possibly the presidential guard.[1]
In addition to the documents included in the chronological narrative below, we are also publishing an annex of other French government documents translated into English by the National Security Archive and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. A subsequent posting will focus on French policy toward Rwanda between April and July 1994.
Arnaud Siad is a researcher based in Paris for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and a PhD student at the Institute of Political Science (Sciences Po) in Paris. Christina Graubert is a student at Oxford University, and a former intern for the National Security Archive.
Document 1: French version, English version
DATE: March 12, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Official Visit of President Habyarimana to Paris (April 2nd, 3rd, and 4th 1990)”
Document 2: French version, English version
DATE: March 14, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Requests for Military Order Likely to be Presented to the President of the French Republic by the Rwandan President at their Meeting on April 3, 1990 (First Part of Two)
Preparing for an official visit to France in April 1990, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana outlined his political and security concerns to the French ambassador in Kigali, Georges Martres. He also requested military support for his government, to counter a threatened invasion by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, based in Uganda. In these confidential diplomatic dispatches, Martres explains that Habyarimana was becoming increasingly unpopular at home, forcing him to rely on the Rwandan army and police. Habyarimana requests a new plane and radar equipment to counter the air threat from Uganda and the RPF. According to Martres, the president has made similar requests to Belgium over the course of many years, but they have been ignored.
Document 3: French version, English version
DATE: June 20, 1990
FROM: President Francois Mitterrand
TO: Franco-African Summit
SOURCE: Council for the Liberation and Change in Congo (Website)
SUBJECT: Address to Franco-African Summit, La Baule, France
President Mitterrand’s speech to the Franco-African summit of June 1990 in the western French town of La Baule represented a defining moment in French African policy. In the aftermath of the Cold War, and the fall of the Berlin wall, Mitterrand cited democracy as a “universal principle” and urged African leaders to introduce multi-party systems and guarantee freedom of the press. He also stated that French development aid to African countries would be linked to progress toward democracy.
Document 4: French version, English version
DATE: October 7, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “Situation in Rwanda”
Document 5: French version, English version
DATE: October 8, 1990
FROM: [Chief of French Defense Staff] Admiral Jacques Lanxade
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Situation in Rwanda”
On October 1, 1990, Tutsi-led rebels from the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda from Uganda. These two documents reflect the French government’s view of the resulting conflict. In a diplomatic cable from Kigali dated October 7, Ambassador Martres urges French military support for President Habyarimana to prevent “domination of the Hutus by the Tutsi minority.” The following day, October 8, the chief of the French Defence Staff, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, drew the line at direct French involvement in the fighting. He recommended turning down Habyarimana’s request for aerial support and engagement of French ground units, but approved the supply of ammunition and rockets to Rwandan government forces.
Document 6: French version, English version
DATE: October 15, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “Analysis of the Situation by the Tutsi Population”
Document 7: French version, English version
DATE: October 24, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] George Martres & [French Military Attaché] Colonel René Galinié.
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “Assessment of the Political Situation”
On October 24, France responded to the RPF attack by rushing 314 French troops to Rwanda under Operation Noroit, ostensibly to protect French citizens. In these dispatches, French officials discuss the threat of the “total elimination” of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda, in response to the RPF invasion. The French military attaché in Rwanda predicts the “likely physical elimination” of Tutsis living inside Rwanda — between 500,000 and 700,000 people — by the seven million strong Hutu majority in the event of a successful Tutsi-led invasion from Uganda.
Document 8: French version, English version
DATE: January 23, 1991
FROM: French Council of Ministers minutes
TO: n/a
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Discussion on Foreign Affairs”
French military action in Rwanda is ostensibly aimed at protecting European citizens trapped in the northern town of Ruhengeri, which is being besieged by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front. At a cabinet meeting, President Mitterrand depicts the fighting as a conflict between Francophone Rwanda and Anglophone Uganda. He says that Ugandan President Museveni should be told that “it is not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to impose its will on the [Hutu] majority” in Rwanda.
Document 9: French version, English version
DATE: April 22, 1991
FROM: [Presidential Advisor] Gilles Vidal
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Interview with Mr. Juvénal Habyarimana, President of the Republic of Rwanda”
President Habyarimana paid an official visit to France in April 1991. In return for French military and diplomatic support, Mitterrand urges the Rwandan leader to push ahead with democratization efforts, respect human rights, and negotiate a political settlement with the Tutsi-led rebels. He also calls for the peaceful return of an estimated half a million Tutsi refugees, forced out of Rwanda following the Hutu-led “revolution” of 1959 and independence from Belgium in 1962.
Document 10: French version, English version
DATE: May 23, 1991
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda – Presence of surface-to-air missiles”
President Mitterrand’s military advisor, General Quesnot, reports that an offensive by “Ugandan-Tutsi” rebels in northeast Rwanda has been “neutralized” by the Rwandan army. He reports that a SAM-16 missile, with a range of 5 kilometers (3 miles), has been captured by Rwandan troops, marking a “new and dangerous step in foreign assistance to the rebels.”
Document 11: French version, English version
DATE: July 1, 1992
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda. Military situation.”
General Quesnot reports to Mitterrand that the RPF has stepped up its offensive into northern Rwanda “with the important support of the Ugandan army,” prior to the start of peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, scheduled for July 10, 1992. He recommends that French military advisors be allowed to train Rwandan soldiers in the use of military equipment “subject to the most extreme discretion,” but should not take part in combat operations.
Document 12: French version, English version
DATE: January 19, 1993
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Mission from International Federation for Human Rights”
Document 13: French version, English version
DATE: February 1, 1993
FROM: [Human rights activist] Jean Carbonare
TO: [Advisor on African Affairs to President Mitterrand] Bruno Delaye
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Human Rights Violations in Rwanda”
In January 1993, an international human rights commission arrived in Kigali to investigate allegations of Rwandan government connivance in massacres of minority Tutsis. Ambassador Martres feared that the commission report would embarrass President Habyarimana and the French government, and predicted a backlash by Hutu hardliners, based in northern Rwanda. An imprisoned Rwandan journalist, Janvier Afrika, told the commission that the violence was being fueled by “death squads” linked to Hutu extremists close to Habyarimana.
Document 14: French version, English version
DATE: February 8, 1993
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot and [Advisor on African Affairs to Mitterrand] Bruno Delaye
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda – RPF Military Offensive”
On February 8, 1993, following reports of massacres of minority Tutsis, the Rwandan Patriotic Front launched a major offensive in northern Rwanda, capturing the town of Ruhengeri. The French government immediately called a “crisis meeting,” and authorized expanded support for the Rwandan army, “with the exception of direct participation of French forces” in the fighting.
Document 15: French version, English version
DATE: February 15, 1993
FROM: [Advisor on African Affairs to Mitterrand] Bruno Delaye
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda: Mission to Kigali and Kampala”
Reporting on a trip to Rwanda and Uganda, presidential advisor Bruno Delaye describes the “disastrous” political situation in Rwanda following the RPF attack on Ruhengeri. He warns that the rebels are in a position to “capture Kigali.” Delaye attempts to negotiate a deal between “the Hutus of the North,” gathered around President Habyarimana, who are opposed to any political concessions to the RPF, and “the Hutus of the South,” who favor negotiations with the RPF and the overthrow of Habyarimana. The French-brokered deal includes a joint denunciation of the RPF, renewed commitment to democratization, and a resumption of the Arusha peace negotiations.
Document 16: French version, English version
DATE: February 26, 1993
FROM: [Defense Minister] Pierre Joxe
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda”
In a memorandum to French President Mitterrand, Defense Minister Pierre Joxe expresses concern at the failure of the Rwandan army to resist a Tutsi-led invasion of the country, despite the presence of 690 French military advisors under Operation Noroit. He suggests that Habyarimana is “largely responsible” for the “present fiasco” through his “political intransigence.” He recommends pressuring Habyarimana to soften his position by threatening to withdraw French troops and negotiate a political solution to the crisis.
Document 17: French version, English version
DATE: March 3, 1993
FROM: Notes taken by Hubert Védrine taken during Council of Ministers
TO: n/a
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Situation in Rwanda”
Anxious to reduce France’s military exposure in Rwanda, President Mitterrand sought to internationalize the conflict “by handing it over to the United Nations.” He viewed United Nations involvement in Rwanda as the best exit strategy for France, while avoiding an outright RPF victory.
Document 18: French version, English version
DATE: April 2, 1993
FROM: Council of Ministers minutes
TO: n/a
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Situation in Rwanda”
A right-wing victory in French parliamentary elections in March 1993 posed a further complication for French foreign policy, obliging President Mitterrand to share power with a conservative prime minister, Édouard Balladur. During the first cabinet meeting of the “cohabitation” regime, Mitterrand and Balladur agree on the need to reinforce the French presence in Rwanda with 1,000 additional troops.
Document 19: French version, English version
DATE: February 28, 1994
FROM: [Co-Pilot of Habyarimana’s Presidential Plane] Jean-Pierre Minaberry
TO: Private Letter to a Friend
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “Missiles Threatening the Security of the Falcon’s Flights”
In a private letter to a friend, the French pilot of Habyarimana’s plane expresses concern about the possibility of an attack on the Falcon 50 jet. Colonel Minaberry suspects that Rwandan Patriotic Front troops, who have recently taken over the parliament building in Kigali (CND), have the technical capability to shoot down a plane landing at Kigali airport with Soviet SA-7 or SA-16 surface-to-air missiles. He discusses alternative landing approaches to neutralize the threat.
Document 20: French version, English version
DATE: April 7, 1994
FROM: [Advisor on African Affairs to Mitterrand] Bruno Delaye
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “Attack against the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi”
The first report to Mitterrand on the downing of Habyarimana’s plane “attributes” responsibility to the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, but does not provide any concrete evidence. Presidential advisor Bruno Delaye reports that the Presidential Guard has begun to hunt down political opponents of the president, both Hutus and Tutsis, and a military confrontation “appears inevitable.” Delaye says the French embassy is ready to provide shelter to Habyarimana’s family, in accordance with Mitterrand’s instructions.
Document 21: French version, English version
DATE: March 30, 1990
FROM: [Presidential advisor] Claude Arnaud
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “President of Rwanda’s Visit (Monday April 2)”
Document 22: French version, English version
DATE: October 19, 1990
FROM: [Presidential advisor] Jean Christophe Mitterrand
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda”
Document 23: French version, English version
DATE: October 13, 1990
FROM: [French Military Attaché] Colonel René Galinié & [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Embassies in Bangui, Kinshasa & Bujumbura
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “General Situation on October 13, 1990, Local Time 12 pm”
Document 24: French version, English version
DATE: November 14, 1990
FROM: Council of Ministers Notes
TO: n/a
SOURCE: Mitterand Archive
SUBJECT: International Situation
Document 25: French version, English version
DATE: December 14, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “President Habyarimana’s Meeting with General Varret”
Document 26: French version, English version
DATE: December 19, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “Joint Report of the Resident Ambassadors of the E.E.C in Rwanda”
Document 27: French version, English version
DATE: January 2, 1991
FROM: [Chief of French Defense Staff] Admiral Jacques Lanxade
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda – Situation Update”
Document 28: French version, English version
DATE: January 30, 1991
FROM: President Francois Mitterrand
TO: President Juvénal Habyarimana
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: [Situation in Rwanda]
Document 29: French version, English version
DATE: April 22, 1991
FROM: [Chief of French Defense Staff] Admiral Jacques Lanxade
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda. Situation Update.”
Document 30: French version, English version
DATE: August 10, 1991
FROM: [French Defense Attaché in Kigali] Colonel Bernard Cussac
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “Circumstances of Detainees at Kigali Prison, Accused of Having Taken Up Arms against Rwanda (Inkotayni)”
Document 31: French version, English version
DATE: November 20, 1991
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General [Jean-Pierre] Huchon
TO: [Presidential advisor] Thierry de Beaucé
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda. Meeting of the Presidents”
Document 32: French version, English version
DATE: January 15, 1993
FROM: President Francois Mitterrand
TO: President of the United States, George Bush
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: [Funding Humanitarian Aid in Rwanda]
Document 33: French version, English version
DATE: February 13, 1993
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda”
Document 34: French version, English version
DATE: February 19, 1993
FROM: [Presidential advisor] Dominique Pin & [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Rwanda”
Document 35: French version, English version
DATE: February 26, 1993
FROM: [Presidential advisor] Dominique Pin
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Mission of Mr. Debarge to Rwanda and Uganda – Talking Points”
Document 36: French version, English version
DATE: March 3, 1993
FROM: Council of Ministers Minutes
TO: n/a
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
TOPIC: Situation in Rwanda
Document 37: French version, English version
DATE: March 3, 1993
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterand Archive
SUBJECT: Rwanda
Document 38: French version, English version
DATE: June 22, 1993
FROM: French Delegation to the UN
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: “Rwanda Resolution 846”
Document 39: French version, English version
DATE: August 4, 1993
FROM: Restricted Council Meeting
TO: n/a
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Situation in Rwanda and Congo”
Document 40: French version, English version
DATE: August 28, 1993
FROM: [President of the Rwandan Patriotic Front] Colonel Kanyarengwe
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
TOPIC: [Letter of Thanks to the French Government for Role in Arusha]
Document 41: French version, English version
DATE: September 27, 1993
FROM: President Francois Mitterand
TO: President of the United States, Bill Clinton
SOURCE: Mitterand Archive
SUBJECT: [Letter to President Clinton to Ask for Support in Plea for UN Mission in Rwanda]
Document 42: French version, English version
DATE: October 11, 1993
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
TOPIC: “Interview with President Habyarimana of Rwanda – Monday, October 11, 1993 at 6:30PM Defense Issues”
Document 43: French version, English version
DATE: October 23, 1993
FROM: [Presidential advisors] Dominique Pin & Rear Admiral de Lussy
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Situation in Burundi”
Document 44: French version, English version
DATE: November 15, 1993
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Your Meeting with [Defense Minister] Léotard on November 15 at 17:00”
Document 45: French version, English version
DATE: February 11, 1994
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: “Note to the Attention of the President of the Republic”
[1] Des Forges, Alison, et. al, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda,New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pgs 181 – 183.
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Frauen: Angela Merkel // Anna Karenina – 0:1
Männer: Angela Merkel // Wladimir Putin – 1:0
Medien: Systemmedien // Staatsmedien – 1:1
Wirtschaft: Gerhard Cromme // Gerhard Schröder – 0:1
Literatur: Juli Zeh // Kyrillische Schrift (beide unlesbar) – 1:1
Musik: Beckmann & Band // Modern Talking – 0:0
Kunst: Privatwohnung Gurlitt // Eremitage – 1:0
Justiz: Strafbefreiende Selbstanzeige // Straflager in Sibirien – 0:1
Sport: FC Bayern // Wladimir Putin 0:1
Denksport: Peer Steinbrück // Garri Kasparow – 0:1
Sex: Homosexuell // Homophob – 1:0
Verkehr: Deutsche Bahn // Transsibirische Eisenbahn – 0:1
Protestkultur: Wutbürgertum // Pussy Riot – 0:1
Nationaltier: Hund // Bär – 0:1
Essen: McDonald’s // Mc Donald’s – 1:1
Kino: Til Schweiger // Keine Ahnung – 0:2
Kriminalität: Maschmeyer, Hoeneß // Chodorkowki, Mafia – 0:1
Motto: Muß ja! // Muß gar nicht. Nastrowje! – 0:1
Endergebnis: 6 : 15
Quelle:
Titanic Magazin
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Günter Schabowski, damals Mitglied des Zentralkomitees der SED, erläutert die Entscheidungskompetenzen des Ministers für Staatssicherheit Erich Mielke.
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Günter Schabowski, damals Mitglied des Zentralkomitees der SED, erläutert die Entscheidungskompetenzen des Ministers für Staatssicherheit Erich Mielke.
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Günter Schabowski, damals Mitglied des Zentralkomitees der SED, stellt heraus, dass Erich Mielkes Loyalität eher der Sowjetunion als DDR-Staatschef Erich Honecker galt.
Auch RA Resch war monatelang in Moskau … Honi soit qui mal y pense
STASI-Oberst und “GoMoPa”-Inspirator, Autor der Killerbibel Toxdat, war sogar der KGB-Liebling Moskaus in Deutschland.
Tschekisten verstehen einander – vor allem wenn sie Experten in Sachen Liquidation sind. Hier ist psychische und physische
Exekution gemeint. Im großen Stil.Unbemerkt.Lautlos.Mörderisch.
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Jetzt haben es die alten STASI-Seilschaften im STASILAND Brandenburg erreicht: Leitende Landesbeamte und Juristen sollen im Land Brandenburg letztmalig auf frühere Stasi-Tätigkeit überprüft werden. Dies empfiehlt die Enquetekommision zu den Folgen der SED-Diktatur, die ihren Abschlussbericht am Freitag an Landtagspräsident Gunter Fritsch übergibt.
Tja, warum wohl ???
Fast vier Jahre lang hatte sich das Gremium von Abgeordneten und Wissenschaftlern mit mehr als 30 Gutachten beraten sowie über 80 Sachverständige und Zeitzeugen angehört. Das Gremium wurde nach Bekanntwerden von Stasi-Fällen in der Linksfraktion im Juni 2010 von der Opposition durchgesetzt. Nach anfänglich sehr kontroversen Diskussionen verabschiedete die Kommission den rund 400 Seiten starken Abschlussbericht im Februar fast einmütig.
Einzig der Historiker Helmut Müller-Enbergs gab zum Schluss ein Minderheitenvotum ab. Er sah auch in der Kommission eine „Kultur des Verschweigens” und warf ihr mangelndes Interesse an der Geschichte der SED-Diktatur vor.
In Brandenburg sind auch der STASI-“Investor” Maik Uwe Hinkel, der verurteile STASI-KoKo-Immobilienpleitier Axel Hilpert und der alte “gute Bekannte” (Eigenaussage) von STASI-Oberst und Killerbibel Toxdat-Autor Ehrenfried Stelzer, RA Jochen Resch, Chef der Verbraucherhilfe, und “GoMoPa”-“Inspirator” aktiv.
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Snowden leaks reveal NSA monitored US law firms representing foreign governments and targeted WikiLeaks and its supporters. (Photo: Patrick Semansky/AP/File)
A Top Secret document leaked by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, Edward Snowden, reveals that the agency spied on an American law firm representing Indonesia in a trade dispute against the US. The document raises both concerns for US lawyers with clients overseas and accusations of economic espionage. While the NSA is prohibited from targeting American organizations, including law firms, attorney-client conversations “do not get special protections under American law from N.S.A. eavesdropping,” and the agency “can intercept the communications of Americans if they are in contact with a foreign intelligence target abroad, such as Indonesian officials.”
Other Top Secret documents provided by Edward Snowden and posted on The Intercept (the new website edited by Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, and Jeremy Scahill) disclose the agency’s strategic targeting of WikiLeaks, its supporters, and other activist groups –including Pirate Bay and Anonymous. The documents confirm that the NSA’s British counterpart, GCHQ, electronically monitored WikiLeaks website visitors; that the Obama administration urged foreign governments to file criminal charges against WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange, over publication of Afghanistan war logs; that the Obama administration discussed labeling WikiLeaks “a malicious foreign actor” to ease extensive electronic surveillance of its activities; and that a 2008 US Army report identified ways to destroy the organization.
DNI Clapper says government should have been more forthcoming about NSA surveillance programs.
In a recent interview with The Daily Beast, Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, said the NSA should have informed Congress and the public about its surveillance programs far sooner. Clapper argued that the shock value of Snowden’s revelations are the main reason the public and privacy advocates are opposed to the programs, and that had the agency been more forthright, the programs would be more widely accepted. Regardless, in light of Snowden’s disclosures and President Obama’s avowed “efforts to overhaul the intelligence community,” outgoing NSA director Gen. Keith Alexander will be sending President Obama proposals for storing the data collected by the bulk phone records collection program outside the NSA sometime this week. In his NSA reform speech, Obama suggested that private phone companies might store the data, though the private companies themselves remain adamantly opposed to such a move.
The British High Court upheld London police’s August 18, 2013, detention of David Miranda, Glenn Greenwald’s partner, at London’s Heathrow Airport. The police detained Miranda for nearly nine hours after invoking terrorism legislation, and seized devices that contained documents leaked by Edward Snowden, including nearly 60,000 “highly classified UK intelligence documents.” Miranda’s lawyers argued “that the government’s use of terrorism legislation to detain the Brazilian citizen was improper, disproportionate, and ran counter to the principle of free expression,” citing further concerns that the detention would intimidate other journalists. However, the Court ruled Miranda’s detention “was a proportionate measure in the circumstances.” The majority of the information Miranda carried was encrypted, and, as of August 30, 2013, Scotland Yard’s Counter Terrorism Command, SO15, had only reconstructed 75 of the 60,000 documents.
White House seeking potential new drone bases near Pakistan’s NW border. Photo: Ethan Miller/Getty Images
The White House is seeking potential new bases in Central Asia for the CIA’s lethal drone program in Northwest Pakistan in the event US forces are forced to withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of this year. However, officials are concerned that their ability to target operatives in Pakistan will be greatly reduced if they are forced to relocate from their Afghan bases, in large part because the amount of human intelligence required to support the strikes necessitates being close to Pakistan’s Northwest border. However, a recent Intercept report examines the NSA’s role in the CIA’s drone program, and argues that the NSA uses “electronic surveillance, rather than human intelligence, as the primary method to locate targets,” and the CIA, “[r]ather than confirming a target’s identity with operatives or informants on the ground, the CIA or the U.S. military then orders a strike based on the activity and location of the mobile phone a person is believed to be using.”
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) scrapped its plan to build a national license plate tracking system to catch fugitive illegal immigrants yesterday “after privacy advocates raised concern about the initiative.” Earlier this week, a DHS spokeswoman announced that the database “could only be accessed in conjunction with ongoing criminal investigations or to locate wanted individuals,” and stressed that it “would be run by a commercial enterprise, and the data would be collected and stored by the commercial enterprise, not the government.” However, outcry arose after the Washington Post reported the program could “contain more than 1 billion records and could be shared with other law enforcement agencies, raising concerns that the movements of ordinary citizens who are under no criminal suspicion could be scrutinized.” Even though the national tracking system has been nixed, a 2012 Police Executive Research Forum report found that 71% of all US police departments already use automatic license plate tracking.
Finally this week, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently released a report examining FOIA statistics, backlogs, and potential policy options to improve the FOIA. The report cautions against taking all agency reporting at face value, pointing out, “a reduction in backlog does not necessarily mean an agency is more efficiently administering FOIA. For example, an agency could eliminate a backlog by denying complex requests that could otherwise be released in part.” The report also cites the Archive’s latest FOIA audit on outdated agency FOIA regulations, and suggests that Congress “may wish to consider whether it should direct agencies to examine their FOIA regulations, to determine whether they reflect statutory amendments, and to update any regulations that do not reflect FOIA, as amended.” The report further notes that Congress could monitor the expansion of (b)(3) exemptions to “prevent the creation of exemptions written more broadly than intended,” and preventing “certain agencies from operating without the public being able to access data and records.”
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| NSA Cybercom Michael Rogers Eyeball
A Chicago native, Rogers and his wife, Dana, have two grown sons, one of whom is a Navy lieutenant. The president’s nominee began his career as a surface warfare officer in 1981. After a few years he became a cryptologist, intercepting signals from enemy radar and communications systems for intelligence analysts. In the Navy, which in 2005 broadened the job of cryptologist and rebranded it as information warfare officer, Rogers’s skills included the growing field of computer network operations, to include attacks, defense and deception. _____ Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers Vice Adm. Rogers is a native of Chicago and attended Auburn University, graduating in 1981 and receiving his commission via the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps. Originally a surface warfare officer (SWO), he was selected for re-designation to cryptology (now Information Warfare) in 1986. He assumed his present duties as commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/commander, U.S. 10th Fleet in September 2011. Since becoming a flag officer in 2007, Rogers has also been the director for Intelligence for both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Pacific Command. Duties afloat have included service at the unit level as a SWO aboard USS Caron (DD 970); at the strike group level as the senior cryptologist on the staff of Commander, Carrier Group Two/John F. Kennedy Carrier Strike Group; and, at the numbered fleet level on the staff of Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet embarked in USS Lasalle (AGF 3) as the fleet information operations (IO) officer and fleet cryptologist. He has also led cryptologic direct support missions aboard U.S. submarines and surface units in the Arabian Gulf and Mediterranean. Ashore, Rogers commanded Naval Security Group Activity Winter Harbor, Maine (1998-2000); and, has served at Naval Security Group Department; NAVCOMSTA Rota, Spain; Naval Military Personnel Command; Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; the Bureau of Personnel as the cryptologic junior officer detailer; and, Commander, Naval Security Group Command as aide and executive assistant (EA) to the commander. Rogers’ joint service both afloat and ashore has been extensive and, prior to becoming a flag officer, he served at U.S. Atlantic Command, CJTF 120 Operation Support Democracy (Haiti), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, Europe, and the Joint Staff. His Joint Staff duties (2003-2007) included leadership of the J3 Computer Network Attack/Defense and IO Operations shops, EA to the J3, EA to two Directors of the Joint Staff, special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, director of the Chairman’s Action Group, and a leader of the JCS Joint Strategic Working Group. Rogers is a distinguished graduate of the National War College and a graduate of highest distinction from the Naval War College. He is also an Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI fellow and holds a Master of Science in National Security Strategy.
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