Corrupt To The Bone – Kirill Shamalov – Putin’s Son In Law

Putin's billionaire son-in-law replaces Russian leader's daughter for  glamorous new socialite wife | Daily Mail Online

Thousands of emails sent and received by Kirill Shamalov — Vladimir Putin’s former son-in-law — showcase the fantastic wealth and personal power that come with access to Russia’s first family.

Key Findings

  • Shamalov and Putin’s daughter spent millions setting up luxurious households in Russia and France even as Putin banned Russian elites from owning foreign assets.
  • Soon after marrying Putin’s daughter, Shamalov spent an astonishing $100 to acquire a share in Russia’s largest petrochemical company that was worth $380 million.
  • Shamalov later acquired an additional, much larger stake in the company in a well-known deal that made him a billionaire. His emails reveal that this acquisition was just one of the lucrative opportunities with which he was presented — and contain a hint about how it may have been structured.
  • Shamalov’s proximity to political power made him a highly desired partner. In one case, he was offered a free share in a large company in exchange for his ability to wield “administrative resources,” exemplifying the corrupt nexus of power and business that characterizes modern Russia.

In Russia, few secrets are guarded as jealously as basic information about President Vladimir Putin’s family.

The president’s official biography confirms the widely-known fact that he and his former wife had two daughters, Maria and Katerina. But neither Putin nor his press service have ever revealed his daughters’ full names or anything about their family lives or careers. Neither uses his surname in public.Кирилл и КатяRead this investigation in Russian on the site of our Russian member center, IStories.Read more

Among the few facts that have been pieced together by journalists is that Putin’s younger daughter, Katerina, was once married to a man named Kirill Shamalov. It is clear that Shamalov is a wealthy man, having become Russia’s youngest billionaire at just 32 years old. But he is not a household name, and few details about his fantastic acquisition of wealth have been reported.

Now, for the first time, a wider set of facts about Shamalov has become available. Earlier this year, reporters from IStories, OCCRP’s Russian member center, gained access to a leaked archive of Shamalov’s emails from an anonymous source.

The leak contains more than 10,000 messages spanning the years 2003 to 2020, and it offers unprecedented insight into a man who has rare access to the inner workings of Russian political life.

🔗Collection Number One

The anonymous source didn’t reveal how he or she obtained Shamalov’s emails — but the messages themselves hint at a possible answer.MORE

Publishing leaks from anonymous sources is a difficult journalistic decision.

In the first place, the authenticity of documents received from an unknown party may be in question. To verify the Shamalov archive, the emails were first structured and indexed by OCCRP’s data analysts. Reporters from IStories then spent nearly a year verifying them: They checked email headers, spoke with senders, and substantiated information in company registries, real estate databases, social networks, and other publicly available sources. Our conclusion is that the emails are real.

Another issue is privacy. When granting access to the material, the source requested that reporters not publish any medical records. This request has been honored. IStories and OCCRP have also chosen not to release the archive indiscriminately. What’s being used in this investigation is just enough to tell a story that’s in the public interest.

Beyond confirming without a doubt that Shamalov married Putin’s daughter Katerina, who uses the surname Tikhonova, the archive contains a number of other revelations about the financial advantages he gained, and the influence he enjoyed, through his access to the first family. His evident ability to wield administrative resources and personal connections to the financial benefit of himself and his friends and business partners exemplifies the corrupt nexus of power and business that characterizes modern Russia.

Kirill Shamalov and Katerina Tikhonova both declined to comment for this story. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, replied in one sentence: “We’ve already left such questions without answers many times.”

🔗The Elder Shamalov

Kirill Shamalov is the son of Nikolai Shamalov, one of Putin’s oldest and closest friends.MORE

“New Piterskie”

Many members of Russia’s ruling elite are old Putin associates who followed him to Moscow and took up key government posts after he rose to the presidency.

These dacha neighbors, judo sparring partners, massage therapists, and one-time city bureaucrats are sometimes called Piterskie after their hometown of St. Petersburg — a term that, by analogy to other geographical epithets like the Tambovskie or Izmailovskie, carries more than a whiff of organized crime.

Many of these men are still around. But over the two decades since Putin took office, their children and grandchildren have amassed their own wealth and power and have begun to rise into top positions. Call them the “new Piterskie.”

Shamalov’s email archive offers a curious portrait of this group. Many of them, like him, studied law at St. Petersburg State University. They discuss taking positions in government, state firms, and big business, and note that when they come to Moscow, the city will be a different one than their parents once conquered.

But some things never change. As in their parents’ world, personal connections mean everything for the new Piterskie.

In June 2004, when Shamalov was in his final year of studies, he received an email from a classmate, Yan Piskunov:

Buddy, we’ll arrange everything in the best way possible! It’ll be sweet. The main thing is to discuss the organization. I’ll send you the speech on Tuesday morning. I’ll pick up the review today or Monday, and during the week we’ll prepare answers to the reviewers’ questions and comments. I was very glad to finally see you. Get some rest and take your time.”

Judging from the context, the message is about helping Shamalov prepare his thesis defense — and handing him a pre-written speech to present before the examination committee.

A few days later, the presentation was ready.

“Hello Shamalov :)!,” Piskunov writes again. “Draft speech … attached.” And indeed, the attached file contained a presentation about a thesis on real estate law.

The cheerful Piskunov had a career ahead of him that would be the envy of any Russian student. Not long after he graduated, at age 25, he vaulted into an executive position at Gazprom-Media, the largest media holding in the country, becoming its deputy general director and head of the legal department.

The group, which includes such popular outlets as the NTV and TNT television channels and the Echo of Moscow radio station, belongs to Gazprombank. By coincidence or not, Shamalov’s older brother, Yuri, is on the board of directors of both the media holding and the bank. He did not respond to requests for comment.

In September 2009, Piskunov came up in Shamalov’s correspondence again when an acquaintance wrote him with an unusual, but extremely frank, request: “Question: is it possible to change the position of Piskunov and Pleshkov towards Vnukovo airport, or to neutralize their activities?”

A memo attached to the email provided the relevant context: Two of Moscow’s major airports, Vnukovo and Domodedovo, had been involved in a commercial dispute that had been resolved in Domodedovo’s favor, costing Vnukovo some 350 million rubles ($11.8 million). According to the writer, the courts had made the ruling “under pressure” from Dmitry Pleshkov, then the “Head of the Secretariat of the Chairman of the Supreme Arbitration Court,” who himself allegedly acted “on behalf of Yan Borisovich Piskunov … of Gazprom-Media.” He was asking whether these two men could be influenced in a way that would favor Vnukovo airport.

There’s no evidence that Shamalov made any requests to either Piskunov or Pleshkov to intervene in the airport dispute. But a month later, the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District overturned the earlier court decision, saving Vnukovo millions. Exactly what Shamalov’s acquaintance asked for had happened.

Shamalov was only 27 that year, but he already had an impressive resume, having worked for Gazprom, Gazprombank, the Russian government, and Rosoboronexport, the country’s top arms exporter. He was now Vice President for Administrative Business Support at Sibur, Russia’s largest petrochemical company.

But much bigger things were to come.

In 2013, as several outlets including Reuters reported, Shamalov married a woman named Katerina Tikhonova who was described as Putin’s daughter.Young Scientist Flies High with Leg Up From PutinThis OCCRP story from 2015 looks into Tikhonova’s Innopraktika Foundation — and her passion for acrobatic rock-and-roll.Read more

The Kremlin has refused to confirm that this is the case. But Shamalov’s emails leave no doubt, and confirm Tikhonova and Shamalov were married in February 2013. They don’t reveal when the couple got acquainted. But the evidence — including this message he received from one of the organizers of their wedding — indicates that he has known her for most of his life:

Kirill, Katerina,

During the Ice Show, a screen will be installed behind the stage to show a video sequence to accompany the performances on the ice, and during some numbers a live broadcast will be organized to show what’s happening on stage (for example, during your dance).

For the video sequence, we need:

  1. Your joint photos from 2012-2013 (“recent”)
  2. Childhood photos — separately, together …
  3. Text from messages, from both Katerina and Kirill … just the text, it’d be nice to have something recognizable … how you addressed each other …
  4. Kirill, a photo in military uniform? Maybe with friends, or taking your oath, there’s probably something …
  5. Kirill — what was your phone number in 2003/2004 – when you called Katerina?
  6. Katerina, we would like to have some video clips of your performances ? Perhaps there are some from that iconic world championship in Munich, when Kirill spent 11 hours with you? Or whatever you’re willing to show (I remember that there are competitors among the guests)

Credit: Shamalov email archiveA rendering of a proposed arrangement for the inner garden of the Usovo house.

By the summer before their wedding, the couple was busy arranging a luxurious life in Russia and France. On June 2, 2012, Shamalov received an email from the woman who was in charge of rebuilding and decorating a house for the young couple in Usovo, a village in an elite area near Moscow not far from the president’s Novo-Ogarevo residence:

Dear Kirill, here are the photos of items that Katya has chosen for your garden. Everything is in stock in Italy (we received confirmation). To get this order moving, you must make an advance payment of 60% of the indicated amount.

Attached to the email was a list of purchases for a small outdoor tent — a table, a sofa, a couple of armchairs, a fabric curtain — that cost 53,000 euros.

Shamalov forwarded this to his future wife: “I like it, no objections. What’s your opinion?”

Two days later, Tikhonova sent Shamalov a list of Japanese books for their home library that cost over $7,700. More expensive still was a carpet for the library that the couple purchased for 54,300 euros.

Shamalov received frequent reports on the progress of the house thanks to which it is possible to estimate its total cost. The renovation, furniture, and equipment came to nearly 8 million euros. Adding the estimated cost of the land and the house itself brings the possible total price of the mansion to about 15-17 million euros.Credit: Table by OCCRPA selection of 10 noteworthy items for Shamalov and Tikhonova’s Usovo mansion from the home improvement reports he received.

But the house in Usovo was not the couple’s only expensive property.

In October 2012, through a Monaco company called Alta Mira, Shamalov bought a mansion in the French resort town of Biarritz from the family of Gennady Timchenko, a longtime Putin friend and a multi-billionaire with interests in energy, transport and infrastructure. Judging by documents in Shamalov’s emails, the Biarritz mansion cost 4.5 million euros.

The decoration of this house, too, spoke of the couple’s expensive tastes. In July 2014, a designer asked Shamalov to approve the purchase of 19,000 euros’ worth of terrace and garden furniture. He forwarded this message to Tikhonova, who replied two days later: “This isn’t how it’s done. Tell her to send pictures;) or at least links to a site where you can see pictures)”Credit: The Anti-Corruption FoundationShamalov and Tikhonova’s mansion in Biarritz.

In the Russian Style

New Husband of Putin’s Ex-Wife Buys Posh Villa in South of FranceArtur Ocheretny, the new husband of Putin’s ex-wife, acquired his own villa in Biarritz in 2013, not far from Shamalov’s mansion.Read more

Shamalov’s emails reveal the details of the couple’s February 2013 wedding at the Igora ski resort in the Leningrad region.

At the end of January, Shamalov began sending out invitations with a detailed description of the elaborate dress code for three days and nights of celebration, including “cocktail,” “creative black tie,” and “casual chic” attire, all “in the Russian style.”

The newlyweds invited about 100 guests, including six officers of the Presidential Security Service who stayed nearby for protection. Curiously, the list did not include Tikhonova’s parents, Putin and his wife (the couple had not yet announced their divorce), though their omission may have been a security precaution.

On February 1, Shamalov received the final schedule. The first day included a “Russian tea party” with a samovar, traditional sweets, and buns, followed by a pre-wedding dinner. On the morning of the second day, the young couple was to marry in the church, followed by street festivities called “Russian holiday on the square” and a wedding banquet. On the third day, guests gathered for a farewell dinner where they were serenaded by Tikhonova’s favorite singer, Margarita Pozoyan.

Like most Russian couples, the newlyweds asked the guests to chip in for a gift. “We are planning to order an individual wedding tea-table service for 24 persons produced by the Imperial Porcelain Factory. The program will provide a special time and place for collecting money in envelopes,” the postcard read. The newlyweds spent their honeymoon in Mauritius.

A Generous Gift

Credit: Shamalov email archiveThe happy couple.

It was after the wedding that Shamalov’s wealth began to approach the stratosphere.

Judging by his emails, Shamalov already owned a network of offshore companies by the time he was married. Most of these firms, run by lawyers from various countries, were registered to proxy owners. The main custodian of Shamalov’s offshore secrets was Dario Item, the ambassador of the small Caribbean state of Antigua and Barbuda to Spain, Monaco, and Liechtenstein.

In June 2013, Shamalov’s offshore company in Belize, Kylsyth Investments Limited, acquired 38,000 shares of a Guernsey-based offshore, Themis Holdings Limited, from yet another offshore called Volyn Portfolio Corp, this one based in the British Virgin Islands.

At that time, Themis Holdings was Sibur’s parent company. In other words, by acquiring the Themis shares, Shamalov had acquired 3.8 percent of Russia’s largest petrochemical company.

He did so for the astonishing price of $100. Shamalov later estimated Sibur’s value at the time to be $10 billion, which means his share would be worth $380 million. He had acquired fantastic wealth for nearly nothing.

In a later interview with Kommersant, Shamalov mentioned acquiring the Sibur shares in an options program. Such programs are meant to reward employees of a company by giving them a stake in its performance, allowing them to buy shares at a discount.

In response to journalists’ inquiries, the Sibur press office provided a statement from the company’s chairman, Dmitry Konov, who confirmed that this was how Shamalov obtained his shares. He said he had done so like any other manager: “The conditions of the purchase … didn’t differ from the conditions of purchases by other managers,” he wrote. “There were no exclusive conditions for Shamalov.”

Just six months later, another Shamalov-related offshore from the British Virgin Islands, Lauruz Ltd, raised $250 million against just 2 percent of Themis Holdings Ltd. The guarantor of this loan agreement was Kylsyth Investments.

IStories reporters examined the contracts of 11 top Sibur managers who participated in the program at the same time as Shamalov and found that they all paid real money for their shares, with discounts of about 15 percent from market price. For example, Sergei Komyshan, the company’s executive director, paid $21.6 million for his shares, which represented 0.26 percent of the company, according to his contract. The vice president, Alexei Filippovski, paid $12.7 million for his 0.15 percent. (Sibur’s chairman disputed these numbers, but did not provide any alternatives.)

The president’s son-in-law was the only one who used the stock options program to acquire so much wealth for nearly nothing. And this was only the beginning of his post-nuptial luck.Credit: ITAR-TASS / Vladimir SmirnovA Sibur petrochemical plant in the Nizhni Novgorod region.

Offer After Offer

As he settled into his career at Sibur, Shamalov attracted droves of advisers and assistants who went looking for projects for him to invest in, wrote abstracts for his speeches, and even provided him with answers to possible audience questions — just like when he was a student.

After he married Tikhonova, his assistants got to work finding financial projects for their boss. One by one, Shamalov began to receive messages from them with fantastic offers worth billions, enabling him to choose from among them the way we might pick out milk at the store.

In May 2013, Shamalov’s assistant Denis Nikienko sent him a proposal to acquire stakes in three companies at once — Rostelecom, Tele2-Russia and Tricolor TV — in order to subsequently unite them into a “national telecommunications leader.” The total cost of the deal would be about $9 billion. Nikienko suggested financing it using money from “friendly financial institutions” like Gazprombank or Gazfond — headed by Shamalov’s brother — rather than his own funds.

The best minds in Russia were apparently eager to make deals with the young businessman. In August and September 2013, Nikienko sent his boss several proposals from Sergey Kotlyarenko, the asset manager of former Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov. In his first message, Kotlyarenko suggested that Shamalov buy up an entire tower and business center in the Moscow City business district for $1.3 billion. Kotlyarenko’s second idea was “to create a global leader in oilfield services’’ through the acquisition of RN-Bureniya, a subsidiary of the Rosneft state oil company. “The company’s revenue for 2014-2015 can be brought to 4.5 billion dollars a year,” Kotlyarenko wrote. (He did not respond to requests for comment.)

In April 2014, Nikienko sent Shamalov more proposals. One was to buy 51 percent of the VSMPO-Avisma corporation, the world’s largest titanium producer. Such a stake was then worth over $1 billion. He explained the advantages of the deal:

Why 51%? If someone is on a sanctions list, then U.S. citizens and corporations can’t do business with companies in which the sanctioned person owns more than 50%. Since the U.S. is interested in collaborating with VSMPO-Avisma, it’s unlikely to sanction this company or its shareholders.

Another proposal was for Shamalov to purchase an additional stake in Sibur.

GNT [Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko] being a shareholder in the Company creates restrictions for its operations. There have already been cases of banks and business partners refusing to collaborate with Sibur [due to Timchenko’s inclusion in the sanctions lists.] To solve the problem, it is proposed to buy out GNT’s share. The purchase can be carried out through two of the Company’s managers and subsequently consolidating the share (the mechanism of creating an artificial debt and repaying it with a second block of shares has been worked out).

As subsequent events showed, this was the proposal Shamalov chose.

Billions More

On August 1, 2014, Shamalov registered a company called Yauza 12 at his Moscow apartment. Then, as his emails show, his company acquired 17 percent of Sibur from Timchenko just six days later, bringing his share in the petrochemical giant to just over 21 percent — and increasing his wealth by $2 billion.

The transaction made Shamalov the youngest billionaire in Russia and the second-largest shareholder in the country’s largest petrochemical holding company. It also attracted considerable attention, and the following year Shamalov sat for his friendly interview with Kommersant.

The president’s son-in-law told the newspaper that he had borrowed the funds to make this acquisition from Gazprombank (whose board of directors includes his brother Yuri), backed by his own assets. He did not explain what these assets were. Leveraging the 3.8 percent of Sibur he had already acquired, Shamalov could theoretically have raised about $500 million. But where did the young businessman get the remaining amount?

Shamalov’s emails provide no answer to this question — but Nikienko’s reference to “creating artificial debt” is a tantalizing hint. The practice of using fictitious debt to create a legal pretext for transferring assets as a “repayment” has been described in Russian legal literature as a popular method of gaining control of enterprises for next to nothing.

But the technique need not be limited to hostile takeovers. If such a method were used in this case, with the Sibur shares being transferred as a “repayment” of a debt that did not really exist, no additional funds would need to be raised. However, beyond Nikienko’s suggestion in a single email, there is no evidence that this is what happened, and the full story remains unexplained.

It’s unknown when and how Shamalov’s Yauza 12 paid off its huge loan. Its most recent available financial statements, for 2016, show 80 billion rubles ($1.28 billion) in borrowed funds. The company was liquidated in December 2017.

Shamalov ended his Kommersant interview with a patriotic statement: “I was born, raised, and live in Russia. And my businesses are here too. And all of them are in Russian jurisdiction, not offshore. It’s not like me to build some kind of fallback position, to organize businesses abroad.”

Of course, many of his dealings were in fact abroad — his transactions in Belize, his French villa (then owned by a Monaco company), and several bank accounts he opened in Switzerland that year. But by 2017, as sanctions cover an ever-wider circle of Putin acquaintances, Shamalov’s attorneys began to curtail his financial activities in European banks and registered a special fund for him, the Centurion International Fund, on Labuan Island, an offshore territory that is part of Malaysia.

The Wife’s Acquaintance

Even before his marriage, Shamalov could be considered one of the most influential people in Russia thanks to his father’s friendship with the president and his “new Piterskie” friends and acquaintances. But after the wedding, he became a member of the family — with all the opportunities that come with it.

One of the guests at his wedding, listed as a guest of the bride, was Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the country’s sovereign wealth fund and one of the most important state players in the Russian economy. Created in 2011, the fund was tasked with investing in leading Russian companies and attracting foreign investors.

Dmitriev’s wife, Natalya Popova, was Tikhonova’s deputy at her non-profit foundation, and the two young couples were friends, celebrating holidays together abroad several times. Shamalov and Dmitriev regularly exchanged emails, sharing links and opinions on economic issues. In several cases, Dmitriev sent Shamalov confidential RDIF documents.

On December 7, 2012, Dmitriev sent Shamalov a RDIF presentation marked “strictly confidential.” It described a planned transaction where the fund would buy into Rostelecom, one of Russia’s largest telecom operators.

At the time, this deal was not publicly known, and the RDIF director was well aware that he was sharing secret information:

I am sending this — but everything is extremely confidential — if you need to use the materials or show it to someone else — please let me know — I will advise on the best way — because a lot of what is attached is confidential and for your eyes only.”

On another occasion, in July 2013, Dmitriev forwarded Shamalov a message he had sent to Ksenia Yudaeva, then the head of the Expert Department of the President of Russia. Attached were the minutes of a meeting between RDIF officials and Nikolai Nikiforov, the minister of communications, on the creation of a postal bank.

It is common for state companies like RDIF to have trade secret protection clauses. Reporters were unable to find such a provision on the RDIF website, and RDIF did not respond to requests for comment, but similar documents have been published on the websites of other state-owned companies. Typically, an employee of such an enterprise can send confidential information to third parties only on the basis of an agreement. Violation of these standards can carry not only administrative, but also criminal liability.

It’s unknown whether Shamalov benefited from the confidential documents Dmitriev shared with him, but in theory such information could be worth a fortune. This is especially true when it comes to publicly traded companies like Rostelecom. In 2013, together with Deutsche Bank, RDIF acquired 2.7 percent of the telecom operator for 7.7 billion rubles ($238 million), six months after Shamalov learned of these plans. The news led to an increase in the value of Rostelecom shares by nearly 30 percent between August, when the first reports of a possible deal emerged, and October, when the deal was closed. Someone who knew of the plans in advance would be in a position to make a tidy profit.

RDIF also proved helpful to Shamalov in strictly material terms. In January 2015, Dmitriev sent Shamalov an article from the newspaper Vedomosti with the headline “RDIF will help Sibur.” The article discussed RDIF’s proposed investment in a Sibur project to build a petrochemical plant in Tobolsk called Zapsibneftekhim.

“Little by little, we’re beginning to realize [the plan] :),” – Dmitriev wrote.

“Super!” answered Shamalov, Sibur’s second-largest shareholder.

Zapsibneftekhim, the largest petrochemical complex in Russia, opened last May after $9.5 billion in investment. At the end of 2015, RDIF announced on its website that, along with other investors, it had provided more than a third of the project funding.

🔗Putin Helps

To implement such a massive scheme, the participation of a friendly state fund was insufficient — so Shamalov’s father-in-law came to his aid. In October 2015, Putin approved the allocation of $1.75 billion for the Zapsibneftekhim project from the National Wealth Fund, which is intended to co-finance citizens’ pension savings and to cover the deficit of the Pension Fund.

Dmitriev also benefited from his friendship with Shamalov. For example, RDIF purchased the Sibur terminal for transshipment of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in the Ust-Luga commercial seaport. Judging from Shamalov’s emails, not all of Sibur’s top managers were delighted with the idea of selling the terminal. The company’s former CFO, Pavel Maly, wrote that the deal would lose Sibur more than $250 million.

I understand that the transaction may contain other assets that I don’t know about. Maybe it’s extremely important for us to establish cooperation with RDIF. … I would be grateful for this kind of information. But if there are no other considerations, it seems to me the most reasonable move is to ‘pull the plug on the project.’

Dmitriev somehow acquired this confidential note, and left comments in red for Shamalov indicating his disagreement with Maly’s assessment. In the end, Sibur went ahead with the deal. With a consortium of other investors, RDIF bought the Ust-Luga terminal for $700 million.

Dmitriev did not reply to requests for comment for this story.

An Administrative Resource

Shamalov was an incredibly popular business partner. Businessmen with the most tempting offers lined up to meet him, and he was offered free shares in various enterprises, apparently under the assumption that the president’s son-in-law would bring something more valuable to the table than money.

In 2017, his former classmate Dmitry Utevsky offered Shamalov a share in a large garbage company in the Leningrad region. Utevsky promised his partner a “fixed annual income,” and in return asked literally for an “administrative resource (at least at the level of the head of a region).” In Russia, this is the common term for officials who make use of their powers for private benefit. We don’t know how Shamalov responded to this proposal, but his emails contain examples when he helped his partners solve problems through high-level government contacts.

Together with his father, for many years Shamalov was a co-owner of the Russian Cement Company and the Siberian Cement holding company. In 2016, Sharykin found himself in an unpleasant situation. On April 7, his home and office were searched by officers from the Investigative Committee and FSB operatives.

Four days later, Shamalov received an email from Valery Bodrenkov, Siberian Cement’s vice president, with the subject line “For the guarantor, a ‘soft’ version.” The email was accompanied by a message to Putin from Sharykin.

The company owner wrote that the searches had been initiated by a “business competitor,” Siberian Cement’s former president. His note ended with an earnest appeal:

I ask you, dear Vladimir Vladimirovich, to take this situation under your personal control, to instruct the leadership of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation to assess the legality of the actions of the FSB and the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the searches at my place of residence.

That same day, Shamalov forwarded the message to his secretary and asked for it to be printed out. It’s unknown whether Shamalov delivered it to his father-in-law, but this was not the only time Sharykin asked for his help — and there is evidence that Shamalov responded to his requests.

A year later, in April 2017, Sharykin sent Shamalov two more messages addressed to the president. In the first, he complained that his company, Ceramic Technologies (which Shamalov’s father also co-owned for several years), had developed an innovative method of burying radioactive waste, but that Rosatom had not agreed to cooperate. “I ask you to instruct the head of the State Atomic Energy Corporation ‘Rosatom’ Likhachev A.V. about the creation and implementation of a joint program,” Sharykin wrote.

In his second note, Shamalov’s partner complained that the same company, Ceramic Technologies, was developing optics for space and ground-based telescopes, but the state corporation Roscosmos was not buying them. “I ask you to instruct the General Director of the State Corporation for Space Activities ‘Roscosmos’ I.A. Komarov to develop a joint program for the implementation of existing technologies,” Sharykin wrote.

Apparently, Shamalov managed to help, at least in part. Two weeks later, on May 12, 2017, he received another email from Sharykin.

Kirill, good morning. I’m sending the protocols. The meeting with KSV went well, he delved carefully into all the issues. Warmest regards.

The abbreviation “KSV” corresponds to the initials of Sergei Vladilenovich Kirienko, the former head of Rosatom, as well as first deputy of the head of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Attached to the email were minutes of a meeting between managers of Rosatom and Ceramic Technologies. Sharykin did not respond to requests for comment.

On another occasion, a request for help came through Tikhonova’s foundation, Innopraktika . The message so accurately characterizes the Russian economy that it’s worth citing in detail.

On November 12, 2014, Alexander Veresov, the foundation’s head for working with the scientific community, received an email from the CEO of a company that developed veterinary medicines. His company was having a hard time getting a drug registered, facing monopolization in the veterinary market and general corruption. So he asked Veresov to get the president’s daughter to help:

First of all, you understand, to avoid serious problems in the future, ask Katerina to use this information without any links to me. … Entry to the market for veterinary drugs is practically closed for the ‘wrong’ companies that could compete with several of the largest companies, the ultimate beneficiaries of which are officials of the Rosselkhoznadzor [the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision].



The problem is that for the “wrong” companies, the requirements are applied in full, making the registration process almost impossible, while for the “right” companies, mostly, it’s not. Therefore, to summarize, I would ask Katerina, firstly, to send a direct and transparent message (without any excessive pressure) to the “spoiling” comrades that domestic innovative developments should be given a pass. Because their actions are at odds with the interests and security of the state. This concerns not only me, but dozens of unfairly treated applicants. But, I would really ask Katerina to give a clear signal that there will be MONITORING of their further actions … If there is such monitoring and control on her part, they will not dare to do what they usually do.

We do not know what Shamalov and Tikhonova may have done to help, but the drug was registered in 2016.

The Parting

In early 2018, Bloomberg reported that Shamalov and Tikhonova had split up after about five years of marriage. Six months earlier, Shamalov sold the Sibur stake he had acquired from Timchenko in 2013. His emails shed no light on how much, if anything, he received for the sale. Timchenko did not respond to requests for comment.

After parting with Tikhonova, Shamalov found a new partner, the glamorous socialite Zhanna Volkova. By 2019, their relationship appeared to be official: That October, Volkova sent documents to Shamalov about registration of an offshore company in the British Virgin Islands, Kenaston Properties Ltd, of which she became the beneficiary. In the documents, her surname is indicated as Shamalova.

In 2018, Shamalov was sanctioned by the United States joining “a select circle of billionaires from Vladimir Putin’s entourage” after his marriage. The Americans were rather late: The last email in the archive between Shamalov and Tikhonova was sent on June 15, 2017. In it, Shamalov forwarded a message from a famous St. Petersburg architect with design options for a country villa.

EU Parliament wants Sanctions against Putin’s Inner Circle and Russian Oligarchs

Nawalny veröffentlicht Video zu angeblichem Luxus-Palast von Putin |  STERN.de

The European Parliament has adopted a resolution calling on EU member states to “significantly strengthen” sanctions against Russia and stop work on completing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in response to the arrest of opposition figure Alexey Navalny. 

In particular, the members of the European Parliament are calling for sanctions against:

  • “Individuals and legal entities” involved in the decision to imprison Navalny
  • “Russian oligarchs linked to the regime”
  • Members of President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle
  • And “Russian media propagandists, who possess assets in the EU and can currently travel there.”

Additional restrictive measures could also be taken for human rights violations, under the new EU GlobalHuman Rights Sanctions Regime.

The resolution demands Navalny’s “immediate and unconditional release,” as well as the release of all other individuals detained in connection with his return to Russia.

After Alexey Navalny’s arrest, his associate Vladimir Ashurkov published a list of Russian nationals who, in Navalny’s opinion, ought to be placed under sanctions. Among others, the list includes oligarch Alisher Usmanov, billionaire Roman Abramovich, TV host Vladimir Solovyov, and Health Minister Mikhail Murashk.

Nawalny veröffentlicht investigatives Video über Putin | Machtkampf in Russland

Putin´s berühmtester Kritiker Nawalny veröffentlichte vor einigen Stunden ein investigatives Antikorruptionsvideo gegen den russischen Präsidenten. Innerhalb weniger Stunden wurde das Video bereits 18 Millionen mal angeklickt. Studio Berlin veröffentlicht das fast 2 Stunden lange Video ungekürzt. Das Video ist in russischer Sprache, allerdings kann man in den Youtube-Einstellungen “englisch” als Untertitel aktivieren. Die Studio Berlin Community hat viele russisch-sprachige Follower. Vielleicht mag der eine oder andere seine Meinung zu dem Video in die Kommentare schreiben. Kurz nach dem Nawalny in Moskau verhaftet wurde, hat sein Team dieses Video veröffentlicht. Dazu sagt Nawalny im Video selbst: »Wir haben ausgemacht, dass wir diese Recherche erst veröffentlichen, wenn ich wieder in Moskau bin, damit ihr wichtigster Held nicht glaubt, wir haben Angst vor ihm«. Dabei sitzt Nawalny auf einer Bank in Dresden (In Dresden war Putin einst als KGB-Offizier aktiv). Dies werde »ein psychologisches Porträt«, so Nawalny: »Wir wollen verstehen, wie aus einem einfachen Sowjetoffizier ein Irrer wurde, der auf Geld und Luxus fixiert ist.«

Borat at Putin’s Palace from the investigation of Alexei Navalny

Freedom for Alexei Navalny. Wikipedia: Putin’s Palace(Residence at Cape Idokopas). On 19 January 2021, two days after Navalny was detained by Russian authorities upon his return to Russia, a video investigation by him and the Anti-Corruption Foundation FBK was published accusing President Vladimir Putin of using fraudulently obtained funds to build the estate for himself in what he called “the world’s biggest bribe”. In the investigation, Navalny said that the estate is 39 times the size of Monaco and cost over 100 billion rubles $1.35 billion to construct. It also showed aerial footage of the estate via a drone and a detailed floorplan of the palace that Navalny said was given by a contractor, which he compared to photographs from inside the palace that were leaked onto the Internet in 2011. He also detailed an elaborate corruption scheme allegedly involving Putin’s inner circle that allowed Putin to hide billions of dollars to build the estate. World community Alexey Navalny needs your help. The Residence at Cape Idokopas Russian: Резиденция на мысе Идокопас, also known as Putin’s Palace is a large Italianate palace complex located on the Black Sea coast near the village of Praskoveevka in Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. The palace was claimed to have been built for President Vladimir Putin


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“Where injustice becomes right, resistance becomes a duty!”

 

Alexej Nawalny: Wie der Anti-Putin wirklich tickt und was ihn antreibt

“Where injustice becomes right, resistance becomes a duty!”

This motto does not only apply to the Hitler era, but also to Russia under Putin.

Alexey Navalny lives this resistance, setting an example for all of us – as do Julian Assange and Edward Snowden.

This becomes all the more important as the mainstream media of all countries are often corrupt and use the above-mentioned lone fighters as an alibi.

Allow me to remind you that even in Germany former Chancellors and active Prime Ministers still actively support Putin and his system of injustice.

A murderous system of injustice to which former Stasi employees and their IMs will still be subject to in 2021.

The federal German legislature, judiciary and executive are also disintegrated by these figures.

As is well known, the fish stinks from the head.

Sincerely you

Bernd Pulch

“Wo Unrecht zu Recht wird, wird Widerstand zur Pflicht !”

Gemeinsam gegen Putin: Chodorkowski unterstützt Nawalny - n-tv.de

“Wo Unrecht zu Recht wird, wird Widerstand zur Pflicht !”

Dieses Motto gilt nicht nur für die Hitler-Zeit, sondern ebenso für das Russland unter Putin.

Alexey Nawalny lebt diesen Widerstand, beispiel gebend für uns alle – ebenso wie Julian Assange und Edward Snowden.

Dies wird um so wichtiger als die Mainstream-Medien aller Länder oft korrupt sind und die oben genannten Einzelkämpfer als Alibi nutzen.

Es sei mir erlaubt daran zu erinnern, dass auch in Deutschland noch ehemalige Bundeskanzler und aktive Ministerpräsidentinnen Putin und sein Unrechtssystem aktiv unterstützen.

Ein mörderisches Unrechtssystem, dem weiter ehemalige Stasi-Mitarbeiter und deren IM auch in 2021 noch untertan sind.

Auch die bundesdeutsche Legislative, Judikative und Exekutive ist von diesen Gestalten zersetzt.

Der Fisch stinkt bekanntlich vom Kopf her.

Herzlichst Ihr

Bernd Pulch

i

Dutch Govt removes two Russians utilizing Political Cover

The Dutch minister of the Interior, Kajsa Ollongren, sent a letter (in Dutch) to the House of Representatives to educate the parliament about the disturbance regarding a Russian reconnaissance activity.

Two Russians utilizing a conciliatory cover to submit undercover work for the Russian common unfamiliar knowledge organization SVR have been ousted from the Netherlands. Both were certify as representative at the Russian government office in The Hague. The clergyman says the SVR insight official assembled a “generous” organization of sources (i.e., he was a case official) working in the Dutch innovative area. He sought after data about AI, semiconductors and nano innovation; information that has both common and military applications. At times the sources got paid for their participation.

The Dutch common knowledge and security administration AIVD upset the activity. On 9 December 2020, the Russian represetative to the Netherlands was called by the Dutch service of Foreign Affairs. The Russian envoy was informed that the two Russians have been assigned as Persona Non Grata (PNG), i.e., they are ousted from the Netherlands.

This case includes different organizations and one instructive foundation, whose personalities are not uncovered. The clergyman expresses that the surveillance “has likely made harm the associations where the sources are or were dynamic, and in this way to the Dutch economy and public security.”

The clergyman expresses that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) will make a lawful move against one source based on migration law.

The clergyman additionally reports the Dutch organization will investigate conceivable outcomes to condemn the demonstration of helping out an unfamiliar insight administration. Presently, that follow up on and without help from anyone else is definitely not a culpable offense. Legitimate potential outcomes do as of now exist with respect to infringement of privacy of authentic mysteries and friends insider facts, be that as it may. For related advancements at the EU level, look at the Trade mysteries page of the European Commission.

At last, the clergyman brings up that this case shows “that dangers from unfamiliar states against the Netherlands are genuine”, and that a more extensive subsequent will happen of the parliamentary letters “Countering unfamiliar state dangers” of 18 April 2019 and “Information security in advanced education and science” of 27 November 2020.

Three side notes:

For a short look into one part of the work life of case officials (and their periodic supporting officials), see Physical Counter Surveillance – Dry Cleaning and Evading Capture (September 2019).

For (self-)assurance, see New leaflet on secret activities from the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) – informal English interpretation (May 2020).

For additional (foundation) perusing, look at the site of the U.S. Public Counterintelligence and Security Center, part of the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); it has a ton of good preparing and understanding material.

For much further (foundation) perusing, outstandingly the part of people and helplessness/weakness to being enrolled as spies/sources, I suggest the Selected Reports page of the U.S. DOD Defense Human Resources Activity site. Furthermore, scan Google for “MICE” and “RASCLS”.

Additionally for (self-)insurance, Dutch perusers might need to educate themselves about in the index of the parliamentary letter of 18 April 2019 that the clergyman alludes to: Nederlandse aanpak tegengaan statelijke dreigingen (April 2019).

In case you’re at an association that has a requirement for knowledge into insurance against insider dangers, I suggest looking at Signpost Six. It was established by @Elsine_van_Os, who once in the past worked at the Dutch military insight and security administration MIVD.

The rest of this post is an interpretation of the fundamental body of the clergyman’s letter on the upset surveillance activity.

[… ]

Interruption

As referenced in the yearly reports of the AIVD, the Netherlands is an objective of Russian insight administrations who secretly gather data that is significant to Russia, including financial and logical data.

The AIVD as of late finished activities of a Russian insight official of the common unfamiliar knowledge administration SVR. The Russian public, who was utilized at the Russian international safe haven as a licensed representative, was associated with undercover work on innovation and science. He constructed a generous organization of sources, every one of whom are or were utilized in the Dutch cutting edge area. The insight official was keen on data about, among others, man-made consciousness, semiconductors, and nano innovation. A lot of this innovation is useful both for common and military applications.

The Russian knowledge official connected with people who approach delicate data inside the innovative area, and now and again paid for that. A second Russian SVR official, additionally licensed as representative, satisfied a supporting job.

Organizations and instructive establishment have been educated

The cutting edge area in the Netherlands holds high-caliber and novel information. The undercover work has likely made harm the associations where the sources are or were dynamic, and accordingly to the Dutch economy and public security.

The wellsprings of the Russian knowledge official have been reached by the AIVD to disturb their exercises. In various cases, the AIVD has presented an official notice to the organizations and instructive foundation included with the end goal that they can take measures. In one case, an official notice was shipped off the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND). The IND will take legitimate measures against one source. The AIVD is exploring whether further authority warnings can be shipped off the IND.

No remarks can be made about the characters of the sources and which organizations and instructive foundation are included.

Persona Non Grata

Because of the distinguished reconnaissance exercises, the Russian represetative has been called by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 December 2020, and has been informed that the insight official, just as the supporting SVR laborer, have been assigned as Persona Non Grata (PNG).

Criminalization of secret activities

Because of the expanded weakness of the Netherlands for surveillance, the Dutch organization has inspected the additional estimation of criminalization of undercover work. Criminal law as of now gives lawful potential outcomes to act against wrongdoings including infringement of classification of authentic insider facts and friends privileged insights. In any case, reconnaissance in the feeling of people secretly teaming up with an unfamiliar knowledge administration is right now not a culpable office. The organization has set up that extra criminalization is alluring and will inspect how that can been sought after, and afterward start an authoritative cycle.

Development

This case shows, once more, that dangers from unfamiliar states against the Netherlands are genuine. We will additionally illuminate you about the more extensive methodology in development to the Parliamentary Letters “Countering unfamiliar state dangers” of 18 April 2019 and “Information security in advanced education and science” of 27 November 2020.

Mindfulness

The AIVD is focused on bringing issues to light about undercover work hazards and, where conceivable, discloses to organizations, governments and instructive establishments how they can forestall this, both now and later on.

MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL VASILII CHUIKOV, PAVEL YUDIN, AND IVAN IL’ICHEV TO GEORGII MALENKOV CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN THE GDR

Quellbild anzeigen

SECRET
Copy No.

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

18 May 1953
pg. 00195

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to Comrade G.M. Malenkov

In accordance with instructions from the CPSU CC, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany presents this report on the reasons for the departure of the population from the German Democratic Republic to West Germany, and also on proposals to end these departures.

In its note to the CPSU CC of 15 March 1953, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany delivered a detailed analysis of the economic and political situation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite the general economic improvements and political strengthening of the GDR, the departure of the population from the GDR to West Germany is growing, as is confirmed by the data furnished below:

195119524 mo. of 1953
1. In all, number who left the GDR160,560165,571120,531
Left illegally99,797136,065120,109
Moved with permission60,76329,506422
2. Arrived in the GDR from West Germany27,37224,0123,589



By their social composition, those who have left the GDR fall into the following categories:

195119524 mo. of 1953
Workers27,17335,30017,784
White-collar workers12,09822,02213,156
Peasants1,2504,0227,555
Intelligentsia2,0623,0442,498
StudentsNo data1,064814
Other categories and family members57,21470,61378,302



Detailed data on social and age composition are contained in Appendix No. 1.
Of this number, 320 persons exited across maritime and zonal borders during the [first] four months of 1953; the rest left through Berlin.
The increase in the number of persons moving from the GDR to West Germany can be explained by an intensification of the class struggle in the city and the countryside, and also by the fact that in the practical work of implementing major economic and political measures, administration often is substituted for political mass work, and certain ministries [and] local party and state organs commit gross errors and excesses in regard to different strata of the population.
After the Second Conference of the SED [in 1952], the government of the GDR and the SED CC took a number of important decisions aimed at limiting capitalist elements in industry and trade, as well as the kulak class in the countryside.
The most important measures on limiting capitalist elements in the city are:

– limiting the supply of raw materials, electric power, and fuel to private industrial enterprises, and goods to private commerce, as well as ending the sale of new industrial equipment, freight vehicles, vessels, and transport and fishing fleets to private enterprises;
– liquidating the majority of large private wholesale firms by administrative procedure under the pretext that they were violating the laws of the GDR;
– implementing special measures to combat speculation and [cutting off] links between private entrepreneurs and firms in West Berlin and West Germany, as well as forcibly closing the branches of West German and West Berlin firms in the democratic sector of Berlin and the GDR;
– canceling some tax advantages earlier granted to large private industrial enterprises on the basis of laws enacted before 1945, as well as intensifying the recovery of [tax] arrears;
– transferring the owners of enterprises employing more than five workers, rather than the existing [cut-off point of] 10 workers, from the category of artisans to the category of industrial enterprises, which has led to a significant increase in the tax burden on this group and to their exclusion from membership in the artisan guilds.

The most important measures to limit capitalist elements in the countryside are:

– raising the norms on compulsory supplies of meat as compared to 1952 and sharply increasing measures on forcible collections of all arrears, going as far as criminal indictments and the confiscation of property;
– kulak farms are the last to be given access to MTS vehicles, and tariffs on them are raised to the level of actual cost of the service [uroven’ sebestoimosti], which is twice what is paid by farms of under 20 hectares;
– supplying mineral fertilizers to kulak farms only after the needs of agricultural cooperatives and the working peasantry have been met in full, which in practice has led to a sharp reduction in the supply of phosphorous fertilizer to these farms;
– ending grants of long-term credits to kulaks and limiting grants of short-term credits;
– farms having 20 or more acres of land and two or more full-time workers are not accepted as members of agricultural production cooperatives.

In 1953, the compulsory use through MTSs of kulak farms’ tractors and agricultural machines (after they had finished their work in the fields) on other peasant farms, which has deprived large farms of the opportunity to lease their tractors and agricultural machines on terms that are profitable for them.
Excluding kulaks from the governing board[s] of peasant mutual-aid committees and agriculture trade cooperatives, where they had significant economic and political influence.
The Politburo of the SED CC passed a resolution on accepting land from kulak farmers who wish to give it to the state, while leaving 6-7 hectares at their [i.e. the farmers’] disposal, if these peasants so desire. This resolution, announced by Ulbricht at a congress of peasants at the beginning of February this year, was taken as an indication of increased pressure on the kulak class.
All of this led a portion of the peasantry, chiefly large [peasants], to begin to give up their land. On 1 April 1953, 442,8 thousand ha., or 7.3% of the entire arable agricultural area of all peasant farms, including 393,0 thousand ha. from farms having over 20 ha. land, or 26% of the agricultural area of these sorts of farms, were abandoned and vacant.
It should be noted that the measures to limit capitalist elements in the city and the countryside in many cases are implemented without sufficient political and economic preparation, as a result of which some party and governmental measures have found insufficient support among a significant portion of the populace.

II.

With the general rise in the standard of living of the populace, a disjunction between the growth of the populace’s money income and the growth of commodity circulation developed toward the beginning of 1953. The fund of wages paid out in the first quarter of 1953 was 17.3% greater than that of the first quarter of the previous year; the volume of commodity circulation over this period rose by only 10% at comparable prices, while commodity circulation in the first quarter of 1953 compared with the fourth quarter of 1952 shrank and consisted of 6.030 million marks against 7.361 million marks in the fourth quarter of 1952.
The under-fulfillment of the production plan for consumer goods in the absence of corresponding reserves and the non-fulfillment of the export-import plan, led to an acute shortage of goods in the commercial network. In this way, the elevated requirements of the population were not wholly satisfied.
Data about the fulfillment of the plan by industry in the first quarter is shown in Appendix No.2.
The autumn and winter of 1952-1953, which were difficult for the GDR, and the weak organization of harvest work led to a significant drop in the harvest of sugar beets, oil crops, potatoes and vegetables. Besides this, the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the plan for stockpiles and purchases of agricultural goods in 1952 led to difficulties in the supply of food to the populace.
This made it necessary to halt commercial sales of fats and sugar in the first quarter of 1953, to substitute partially rationed fats and sugar with other goods, to abolish ration cards for private-capitalist elements and persons of free professions (this affected about 500,000 people), to abolish some additional ration cards for the intelligentsia, and also to raise the prices for meat given out through ration cards by 10-15%, and for commercially sold confectioneries by 12-50%.
With the cancellation of ration cards for footwear and for knitted goods, the fixed price level [uroven’ edinykh tsen] was left close to the previously effective commercial prices. Prices were raised on a significant portion of imported consumer goods.
In the course of the entire winter period, interruptions in the supply of coal and electricity to the populace in the republic occurred, as a result of which many schools, residential buildings, and socio-cultural [kul’turno-bytovye] establishments often went unheated.

III.

Recently the government of the GDR made a series of decisions on strengthening punitive policies in the struggle against the theft of people’s property, on criminal sanctions for evading state agricultural quotas and taxes, on limiting the activity of private wholesale firms, and on purging certain regions of dubious elements of questionable class. These decisions are basically correct. However, during the implementation of these decisions manifold excesses are being committed, as is expressed in the intensification of different sorts of repressive measures in relation to the populace. As a result of [these actions] the number of arrests of citizens and convicted persons significantly increased: if in the first half-year of 1952, 11,346 arrests were carried out, [and] in the second half-year 17,471, then during just the first quarter of 1953, 14,348 arrests were carried out.
Detailed data are provided in Appendices No. 3, 4, and 5.
By the directive adopted by the GEC on 23 September 1948, “On punishments for violations of economic order,” which is currently in effect, the police are given the right broadly to carry out arrests and searches on the grounds of only suspicion of economic crimes. On the basis of this directive, in 1952, 16,482 proceedings were instituted and 4,185 persons were arrested. In 1953, in only the first quarter, 5,094 proceedings were instituted and 2,548 persons were arrested.
There are many cases of incorrect arrests, unlawful and groundless searches in apartments and offices, [and] violations of the established arrest and custody procedure.
On 1 April 1953, there were 54,876 persons in the jails of the GDR; of these, up to 13,141 had not yet had their cases reviewed by the courts.

IV.

Within the SED CC and in local party organs, there is an underestimation of the political significance of the populace’s departure from the GDR to West Germany. This underestimation has manifested itself, in particular, in the directives of the SED CC. Thus, in letters from 6 January and 30 April of this year, no political evaluation was made of the issue and no measures are planned which would help bring about a fundamental change in the situation. In CC directives, the departure of party members from the GDR is not characterized as a party crime. Meanwhile, 2,718 members and candidates of the SED, and of these, 175 functionaries, were counted among those who left the GDR during the [first] four months of 1953. In addition, over that period, 2,610 members of the Union of Youth [FDJ] left.
Party organs exert almost no influence over the mass democratic organs–labor unions, the Union of Youth, and the Women’s League–in inducing them to carry out work to prevent the departure of the population from the GDR.
The press and radio of the GDR weakly expose the slanderous propaganda emanating from West Germany about the refugees, weakly publicize the measures taken by the government of the GDR to accommodate refugees who have returned to the Republic, by giving them work [and] living quarters, and guaranteeing other rights to them, [and they] rarely organize statements by persons who have returned from West Germany. Newspapers, as a rule, remain silent about the facts of the migration of residents of West Germany to the GDR, and do not use their statements for propaganda purposes.
Party and governmental organs commit serious distortions in the implementation of the SED’s policy with regard to the intelligentsia.
In the second half of 1952, the SED CC and the GDR government undertook a series of economic and political measures aimed at drawing the intelligentsia into active participation in cultural and economic construction. From 1 July 1952, the pay for engineering-technical and scientific workers was significantly increased, and for the most outstanding scientific and technical personnel, high personal salaries of up to 15,000 marks a month were established.
Despite this, the role of the intelligentsia in building the Republic and the necessity of involving the old intelligentsia is still underestimated within the party and the country. In a significant portion of enterprises, a sectarian relationship to the intelligentsia has still not been overcome. The intelligentsia is not drawn into active participation in the productive and social life of the enterprise.
There are serious drawbacks in the way ideological work with the intelligentsia is handled. In a crude and clumsy manner, demands are made for the reconstruction of all scientific work on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Due to this, scholars of the old school consider that, insofar as they are not Marxists, they have no prospects in the GDR.
Little attention is paid by the SED to organizing scientific discussions, to the free exchange of opinions, [and] the discussion of different problems in advanced science and practice, in the intelligentsia’s milieu.
To date, the linking and exchange of scientific activity between scientists of the GDR and scientists of the Soviet Union and social democratic countries is still insufficiently developed.
A feeling of anxiety for their personal safety is evident among broad circles of the intelligentsia and most of all among the technical intelligentsia. The instances of groundless accusations of sabotage constitute the reason for this sort of mood. The absence of the necessary explanatory work on this issue creates favorable conditions for the activity of enemies and the broad dissemination of all sorts of slanders.

V.

West German and Anglo-American authorities are carrying out economic and political diversions aimed at disrupting the five-year plan and at discrediting the policy of the GDR government before the populace. They have worked out a system of measures to entice engineering-technical, scientific and highly-qualified workers from the enterprises and establishments of the GDR.
In West Berlin, a high exchange rate of the Western mark in relation to the Eastern mark is being artificially maintained, making it profitable for the West Berlin population to buy food in the GDR. On the other hand, the acute shortage of high-quality consumer goods in the GDR and their presence in West Berlin attracts a large mass of the residents of the GDR into the Western sector[s] of Berlin. Providing West Berlin with a high level of supply of every imaginable good and lower prices for goods compared to the rest of West Germany has the aim of creating the impression among the population that a high standard of living in West Germany exists in comparison with the GDR.
One of the methods of enemy activity is to dispatch special recruiters to the GDR who entice qualified workers, engineers and technicians, and teachers of secondary and higher schools, to the West.
The West German authorities, the Americans, English, and French, systematically conduct propaganda on the radio in favor of the GDR population’s departure for the West, send large quantities of provocative letters, and give provocative telephone warnings of allegedly imminent arrests of GDR citizens.

VI.

The church, especially of late, is displaying an active role in enemy propaganda against the GDR. The leaders of the Protestant and Catholic Churches located in West Germany have taken the path of open struggle against the GDR; in sermons and in multiple letters, the clergy calls upon the populace to flee to the West.
The SED CC is committing some mistakes in its relations with the church.
On 27 January 1953, the SED CC made a decision on exposing the anti-democratic activity of the church youth organization “Junge Gemeinde.” It was proposed not to begin to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” through broad propaganda work among the populace, but through the organization of trials. In connection with this instruction, the organs of the MfS [Stasi] carried out the arrests of some clergymen and members of “Junge Gemeinde” in February and March. Due to the inadequacy and unconvincing character of the material, however, the trials have not yet been held. Then the SED CC gave an order to begin unmasking “Junge Gemeinde” in the youth press. During the implementation of these instructions, the accusation was made across the board that all of the members of “Junge Gemeinde” were members of the terrorist West German youth organization (BDJ). As a result of this the campaign to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” has currently exacerbated relations between the church and the state.
At one of the meetings with the first secretaries of the SED district committees, W. Ulbricht gave the order that open meetings were to be held in all institutions of higher learning and 12-grade schools of the League of FDJ to expose the “Junge Gemeinde,” in the course of which the expulsion of the leaders and most active members of “Junge Gemeinde” from schools and educational institutions was to be demanded. In certain schools the number of those expelled reaches 20-30 persons, and in each institution of higher education, the number of expelled students ranges from 5 to 20 persons; this in particular, has led to the fact that in March and April of this year alone, 250 people from 39 12-grade schools have fled to the West.

VII.

In the interest of halting the departure of the population to West Germany, it seems expedient to recommend the implementation of the following measures to the leadership of the GDR:

On economic issues:

1. To take measures toward the unconditional fulfillment of the industrial production plan for 1953, which is decisive for the fulfillment of the five-year plan. To liquidate the lag which took place from the beginning of the year and especially to devote attention to assuring the fulfillment of the plan for machine-building [industry], the introduction of electric power, and the development of [the] metallurgy [industry].
2. Over the course of a month, to work out measures to increase the 1953 consumer goods production plan and the development of commodity circulation.
For this purpose, the government of the GDR must take additional measures to import necessary raw materials: cotton–15-20,000 tons, wool–3,000 tons, heavy leather—2,500 tons. To increase imports of food stuffs (fats, fruits, and others) and some high-quality manufactured consumer goods. For this purpose, to assign additional output of high-quality production for export, in particular to capitalist countries, having found the necessary raw materials locally, using the free [industrial] capacities at hand, especially in precision mechanics and optics.
The GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade makes insufficient use of the possibilities of trade with capitalist countries. It is desirable to render necessary aid to the GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade through the trade representatives of the USSR and the people’s democracies in capitalist countries.
3. To oblige local organs of power to improve the leadership of local industry significantly. To oblige the GDR Gosplan [State Planning Commission] to re-examine within a month the 1953 production plans for local industry with a view to expanding them significantly.
4. In noting the underestimation of the role of manufacture in supplying the population with consumer goods, it is necessary to take governmental measures in support of crafts production. It is expedient, in keeping with the realization of artisans’ cooperatives, to organize supplies of raw materials for them on a contractual basis on the condition that they hand over their completed products to the state commercial network; to work out measures to offer artisans tax and credit advantages, and also to equip artisans’ cooperatives and individual enterprises with industrial equipment.
5. Considering that one of the reasons for the departure of peasants from the GDR to West Germany is the high norms for quotas of agricultural deliveries to the state, to reduce by 5-10% the differentiated norms in effect in 1953 for compulsory supplies of grain crops and meat by peasant farms.
6. To cancel ration cards for meat, fats and sugar from the autumn of 1953, thereby completing the elimination of the rationing system in the GDR, keeping in mind that the per-capita consumption norms that have been attained furnish the possibility of a transition to free commerce.
7. To work out a three-year plan on mechanizing agriculture, developing the MTS network, and equipping it with tractors and agricultural machinery in order to have the possibility of fulfilling the needs for mechanized cultivation of the land not only of agricultural cooperatives, but also of individual peasant farms.
8. To halt the practice of using tractors and agricultural machines from private cultivators through the MTS for work on other farms.
9. To work out a three-year plan to develop animal husbandry and to create a fodder base, assuming the need for future improvements in supplies to the populace from their own resources.
10. To work out a production plan for fertilizer in quantities that will meet in full the needs of agriculture, including large private farms.
11. To concentrate the attention of state and party organs on the organizational-economic strengthening of the agricultural production cooperatives which have been created in order to ensure, even this year, a harvest in the cooperatives that is larger than that of the best individual agricultural farms, and an income for cooperative members [that] exceeds the incomes of individual peasant farms.
12. In carrying out measures on limiting private-capitalist elements, to differentiate between attitudes toward large and small retailers and other small entrepreneurs (proprietors of small restaurants, hairdressers, bakers, and so on) with regard to taxes, credits, issuing food ration cards, supplying goods to merchants; and to use private commerce in the capacity of a commodity distribution network to serve the population.
13. Considering the populace’s great demand for construction materials, [as well as] agricultural and gardening equipment, to organize a broad trade in them, both in the city and the countryside, having ensured a portion of additional funds for cement, saw-timber, tiles and machine-manufactured articles; to increase the production of agricultural and gardening equipment.

On administrative issues:

1. In the near future, to carry out a broad amnesty both with regard to persons convicted in the first period for Nazi crimes, and, in particular, persons convicted in the most recent period, with the exception of persons convicted for espionage, terrorist acts, diversions, premeditated murder and for large thefts of the people’s property. 15-17,000 persons could be freed from prisons by the amnesty.
2. To take measures quickly toward the introduction of strict order and the observance of lawfulness in procedures for arresting and detaining citizens.
3. To organize expediently social courts [obshchestvennye sudy] in enterprises, in institutions, and at people’s estates [narodnye imeniia] to examine minor economic and administrative violations.
4. To re-examine the current criminal code to remove those articles of criminal law which permit their application to even the most inconsequential violations.
5. To cancel all criminal-legal orders containing the directives and circulars of separate ministries. Henceforward, to establish a procedure by which criminal-legal sanctions can be stipulated only in laws of the People’s Chamber, and in exceptional cases, in a decree by the government of the GDR.
6. To consider it crucial to carry out a reorganization of the communities [obshchiny] in the direction of enlarging and strengthening local authorities.
7. To carry out, in 1953, an exchange of passports for the entire population of the GDR and, first and foremost, for the population of the democratic sector of Berlin and its surrounding districts.
8. To re-examine the GDR government’s decree of 5 March 1953 on mass criminal indictments for the non-fulfillment of supply quotas [postavki] [to the state] and taxes.
9. In view of the fact that the migration of the population from the GDR to the West is taking place through Berlin, to consider it expedient to require GDR citizens to have passes [spravki] and business travel papers [komandirovochnye udostovereniia] from local institutions or organs of power upon entry into Berlin.

On political questions:

1. To end the political underestimation of the significance of the issue surrounding the departure of GDR citizens to West Germany that currently exists in party and state organs and among party workers. To oblige party organs and primary party organizations to analyze with care and to study all cases of departure and to take effective measures to ascertain the reasons influencing the population’s migration to West Germany.
To view the departure of members of the SED as a betrayal of the party. To investigate according to party procedure each case of departure by members of the SED to the West and to discuss [these cases] at general meetings of the party organizations and regional committees of the SED.
2. To commit the party and the mass democratic organizations of the GDR to conduct systematic explanatory work among the GDR populace against leaving for West Germany, exposing with concrete examples the slanderous fabrications, [and] the essence and methods of the subversive work which is being carried out by West German agents.
3. To take concrete measures to strengthen counter-propaganda, organizing it in such ways that the press and radio of the GDR systematically expose the mendacious Western propaganda on the issue of refugees from the GDR. To set aside the necessary resources for this.
4. In the interests of an effective struggle against the reactionary broadcasts of “RIAS,” to ensure the completion in 1953 of the construction of powerful radio stations in Magdeburg, Schwerin, and Dresden. To build 15 medium-wave low-power radio stations with up to 5 kilowatts of power and 10 short wave stations each with up to 2-3 kilowatts of power. To manufacture and deploy 400-600 “Gebor” radio sets.
5. In the interests of strengthening counter-propaganda, to organize through the KPD the systematic collection of information about the refugees’ difficult conditions and the poor material and legal conditions of different strata of the West German populace.
6. In order to expose the reactionary propaganda of the church, to explain in a detailed and systematic way through the press and in oral propaganda that the government of the GDR unswervingly observes freedom of conscience, of religion, and of religious observance, as provided for in the GDR constitution. To explain that the actions of the authorities are directed only against those church officials and leaders of “Junge Gemeinde” who conduct hostile subversive work against the democratic tradition of the GDR.
7. To take measures to correct the excesses which have been committed with regard to students expelled from school and from institutions of higher learning for belonging to the “Junge Gemeinde.”
8. For the SED CC to examine in particular the issue of improving work among the intelligentsia and to correct the mistakes that have been committed.
9. To take measures to improve scientific and cultural links between scholars in the GDR and in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies, as well as to supply the GDR intelligentsia with foreign scientific and technical literature.

V. Chuikov
P. Yudin
I. Il’ichev

18 May 1953.



Appendix No. 1

INFORMATION
on the social and age composition and party affiliation of those who left the GDR for West Germany

1. By social composition:

Second half of 1952Four months of 1953
1. Workers17,27917,784
2. White-collar workers14,17813,156
3. Kulaks1,1244,085
4. Medium peasants5461,364
5. Small peasants1,0771,140
6. Scientific workers2058
7. Workers in the arts216
8. Engineering-technical workers344870
9. Doctors167334
10. Lawyersno data120
11. Teachers and instructors in secondary and higher institutions of learning588900
12. Students659814
13. Church Employees7169
14. Artisansno data1,897
15. Owners of a commercial enterpriseno data2,937
16. Owners of a private enterpriseno data1,730
17. Pensionersno data4,286
18. Persons without definite occupationno data13,115
19. Housewivesno data24,350

2. By age

Second half-year of 1952Four months of 1953
Children up to 151760629814
[Persons] from 15 to 1854867234
from 18 to 251315314871
from 25 to 401811026725
from 40 to 501174818788
from 50 to 60786615045
over 6037367632

3. By party affiliation: (only over 4 months of 1953)

Members and candidates of the SED2,713of them, functionaries175
Members of the LDP865of them, functionaries5
Members of the CDU935of them, functionaries69
Members of the NDP375of them, functionaries30
Members of the DKP521of them, functionaries30
Members of the SSNM2,610of them, functionaries30

4. By place of work (only over 4 months of 1953).

1. From state institutions and communal enterprises5608
2. From people’s enterprises7847
3. From enterprises under wardship586
4. From large private enterprises3027
5. From small private enterprises9757
6. From “SAO” enterprises882
7. From MTS [machine-tractor stations]212
8. From agricultural food cooperatives191
9. Individual peasants3855
10. From peasant mutual-aid enterprises, commercial organizations and konzumy2414
11. From party, union and mass organizations266

Of the refugees:

1. Leaders of enterprises375
2. Division heads219

[Appendix No. II not included in original]

Appendix No. 3

INFORMATION
on persons convicted for 1951-1953
by punishment

Punishment1951 1st half2nd half1952 1st half2nd half1953 1st quarter
Death penalty107683
Life imprisonment1312223216
Convict prison [katorzhnaia tur ‘ma] for over 10 years748864159115
from 5 to 10 years47278110541136912
up to 5 years25433362357845975150
Imprisonment for 3 to 5 years250287383329183
Imprisonment for 1 to 3 years37854448502645612170
Imprisonment for up to 1 year162161392613778173457031
Short-term arrest392408559403201
Monetary fine178121478611101138196245
Educational measures for adolescents21792152257726651281
Other sanctions554912212
Total convicted4380140306381604507523309

Appendix No. 4

INFORMATION
on arrested persons under investigation
from 1952-1953 by types of crime

Types of crimesFirst half of 1952Second half of 1952First quarter of 1953
Proceedings institutedPersons arrestedProceedings institutedPersons arrestedProceedings institutedPersons arrested
1. Anti-democratic crimes119714282624329517522219
2. Espionage (Included in 1. above)180339510989226385
3. Possession of weapons393247233195205199
4. Opposition to authorities496273679339300188
5. SVAG Decree No. 160 (sabotage and diversions)155105209213170293
6. Law on preserving internal-German trade1818175714331084804703
7. Unlawful import and export of goods, as defined by 1948 decree of the NEK1004130370645617
8. Non-fulfillment of state deliveries23838584130750336
9. Crimes against the people’s property4053688255495353443988
10. Murder and maiming207433329573531915256
11. Crimes against morality244093625941105795520
12. Theft of private property3576524042840218994804844
13. Violation of borders5688284221501275
13. Others218523007263284999108383510
Total:714851134674655174712988314348

Appendix No. 5

INFORMATION
on arrested persons by their most recent
arrest from 1949-1953

Arrests over the second half of 194911,425 persons
Arrests over the first half of 195012,911 persons
Arrests over the second half of 195013,860 persons
Arrests over the first half of 195113,587 persons
Arrests over the second half of 195114,689 persons
Arrests over the first half of 195211,346 persons
Arrests over the second half of 195217,471 persons
Arrests over the first quarter of 195314,348 persons

DOCUMENT SUMMARY

The Soviet Control Commission in Germany reports statistics and a detailed assessment to Malenkov, analyzing the migration of the East German population to West Germany. It also includes proposals for implementing measures to prevent further departure from the GDR.

CREATORS

YUDIN, PAVEL F.

CHUIKOV, V. I. (VASILII IVANOVICH), 1900-1982

ILICHEV, IVAN

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

LOCATIONS DISCUSSED

SECRET
Copy No.

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

18 May 1953
pg. 00195

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to Comrade G.M. Malenkov

In accordance with instructions from the CPSU CC, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany presents this report on the reasons for the departure of the population from the German Democratic Republic to West Germany, and also on proposals to end these departures.

In its note to the CPSU CC of 15 March 1953, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany delivered a detailed analysis of the economic and political situation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite the general economic improvements and political strengthening of the GDR, the departure of the population from the GDR to West Germany is growing, as is confirmed by the data furnished below:

195119524 mo. of 1953
1. In all, number who left the GDR160,560165,571120,531
Left illegally99,797136,065120,109
Moved with permission60,76329,506422
2. Arrived in the GDR from West Germany27,37224,0123,589



By their social composition, those who have left the GDR fall into the following categories:

195119524 mo. of 1953
Workers27,17335,30017,784
White-collar workers12,09822,02213,156
Peasants1,2504,0227,555
Intelligentsia2,0623,0442,498
StudentsNo data1,064814
Other categories and family members57,21470,61378,302



Detailed data on social and age composition are contained in Appendix No. 1.
Of this number, 320 persons exited across maritime and zonal borders during the [first] four months of 1953; the rest left through Berlin.
The increase in the number of persons moving from the GDR to West Germany can be explained by an intensification of the class struggle in the city and the countryside, and also by the fact that in the practical work of implementing major economic and political measures, administration often is substituted for political mass work, and certain ministries [and] local party and state organs commit gross errors and excesses in regard to different strata of the population.
After the Second Conference of the SED [in 1952], the government of the GDR and the SED CC took a number of important decisions aimed at limiting capitalist elements in industry and trade, as well as the kulak class in the countryside.
The most important measures on limiting capitalist elements in the city are:

– limiting the supply of raw materials, electric power, and fuel to private industrial enterprises, and goods to private commerce, as well as ending the sale of new industrial equipment, freight vehicles, vessels, and transport and fishing fleets to private enterprises;
– liquidating the majority of large private wholesale firms by administrative procedure under the pretext that they were violating the laws of the GDR;
– implementing special measures to combat speculation and [cutting off] links between private entrepreneurs and firms in West Berlin and West Germany, as well as forcibly closing the branches of West German and West Berlin firms in the democratic sector of Berlin and the GDR;
– canceling some tax advantages earlier granted to large private industrial enterprises on the basis of laws enacted before 1945, as well as intensifying the recovery of [tax] arrears;
– transferring the owners of enterprises employing more than five workers, rather than the existing [cut-off point of] 10 workers, from the category of artisans to the category of industrial enterprises, which has led to a significant increase in the tax burden on this group and to their exclusion from membership in the artisan guilds.

The most important measures to limit capitalist elements in the countryside are:

– raising the norms on compulsory supplies of meat as compared to 1952 and sharply increasing measures on forcible collections of all arrears, going as far as criminal indictments and the confiscation of property;
– kulak farms are the last to be given access to MTS vehicles, and tariffs on them are raised to the level of actual cost of the service [uroven’ sebestoimosti], which is twice what is paid by farms of under 20 hectares;
– supplying mineral fertilizers to kulak farms only after the needs of agricultural cooperatives and the working peasantry have been met in full, which in practice has led to a sharp reduction in the supply of phosphorous fertilizer to these farms;
– ending grants of long-term credits to kulaks and limiting grants of short-term credits;
– farms having 20 or more acres of land and two or more full-time workers are not accepted as members of agricultural production cooperatives.

In 1953, the compulsory use through MTSs of kulak farms’ tractors and agricultural machines (after they had finished their work in the fields) on other peasant farms, which has deprived large farms of the opportunity to lease their tractors and agricultural machines on terms that are profitable for them.
Excluding kulaks from the governing board[s] of peasant mutual-aid committees and agriculture trade cooperatives, where they had significant economic and political influence.
The Politburo of the SED CC passed a resolution on accepting land from kulak farmers who wish to give it to the state, while leaving 6-7 hectares at their [i.e. the farmers’] disposal, if these peasants so desire. This resolution, announced by Ulbricht at a congress of peasants at the beginning of February this year, was taken as an indication of increased pressure on the kulak class.
All of this led a portion of the peasantry, chiefly large [peasants], to begin to give up their land. On 1 April 1953, 442,8 thousand ha., or 7.3% of the entire arable agricultural area of all peasant farms, including 393,0 thousand ha. from farms having over 20 ha. land, or 26% of the agricultural area of these sorts of farms, were abandoned and vacant.
It should be noted that the measures to limit capitalist elements in the city and the countryside in many cases are implemented without sufficient political and economic preparation, as a result of which some party and governmental measures have found insufficient support among a significant portion of the populace.

II.

With the general rise in the standard of living of the populace, a disjunction between the growth of the populace’s money income and the growth of commodity circulation developed toward the beginning of 1953. The fund of wages paid out in the first quarter of 1953 was 17.3% greater than that of the first quarter of the previous year; the volume of commodity circulation over this period rose by only 10% at comparable prices, while commodity circulation in the first quarter of 1953 compared with the fourth quarter of 1952 shrank and consisted of 6.030 million marks against 7.361 million marks in the fourth quarter of 1952.
The under-fulfillment of the production plan for consumer goods in the absence of corresponding reserves and the non-fulfillment of the export-import plan, led to an acute shortage of goods in the commercial network. In this way, the elevated requirements of the population were not wholly satisfied.
Data about the fulfillment of the plan by industry in the first quarter is shown in Appendix No.2.
The autumn and winter of 1952-1953, which were difficult for the GDR, and the weak organization of harvest work led to a significant drop in the harvest of sugar beets, oil crops, potatoes and vegetables. Besides this, the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the plan for stockpiles and purchases of agricultural goods in 1952 led to difficulties in the supply of food to the populace.
This made it necessary to halt commercial sales of fats and sugar in the first quarter of 1953, to substitute partially rationed fats and sugar with other goods, to abolish ration cards for private-capitalist elements and persons of free professions (this affected about 500,000 people), to abolish some additional ration cards for the intelligentsia, and also to raise the prices for meat given out through ration cards by 10-15%, and for commercially sold confectioneries by 12-50%.
With the cancellation of ration cards for footwear and for knitted goods, the fixed price level [uroven’ edinykh tsen] was left close to the previously effective commercial prices. Prices were raised on a significant portion of imported consumer goods.
In the course of the entire winter period, interruptions in the supply of coal and electricity to the populace in the republic occurred, as a result of which many schools, residential buildings, and socio-cultural [kul’turno-bytovye] establishments often went unheated.

III.

Recently the government of the GDR made a series of decisions on strengthening punitive policies in the struggle against the theft of people’s property, on criminal sanctions for evading state agricultural quotas and taxes, on limiting the activity of private wholesale firms, and on purging certain regions of dubious elements of questionable class. These decisions are basically correct. However, during the implementation of these decisions manifold excesses are being committed, as is expressed in the intensification of different sorts of repressive measures in relation to the populace. As a result of [these actions] the number of arrests of citizens and convicted persons significantly increased: if in the first half-year of 1952, 11,346 arrests were carried out, [and] in the second half-year 17,471, then during just the first quarter of 1953, 14,348 arrests were carried out.
Detailed data are provided in Appendices No. 3, 4, and 5.
By the directive adopted by the GEC on 23 September 1948, “On punishments for violations of economic order,” which is currently in effect, the police are given the right broadly to carry out arrests and searches on the grounds of only suspicion of economic crimes. On the basis of this directive, in 1952, 16,482 proceedings were instituted and 4,185 persons were arrested. In 1953, in only the first quarter, 5,094 proceedings were instituted and 2,548 persons were arrested.
There are many cases of incorrect arrests, unlawful and groundless searches in apartments and offices, [and] violations of the established arrest and custody procedure.
On 1 April 1953, there were 54,876 persons in the jails of the GDR; of these, up to 13,141 had not yet had their cases reviewed by the courts.

IV.

Within the SED CC and in local party organs, there is an underestimation of the political significance of the populace’s departure from the GDR to West Germany. This underestimation has manifested itself, in particular, in the directives of the SED CC. Thus, in letters from 6 January and 30 April of this year, no political evaluation was made of the issue and no measures are planned which would help bring about a fundamental change in the situation. In CC directives, the departure of party members from the GDR is not characterized as a party crime. Meanwhile, 2,718 members and candidates of the SED, and of these, 175 functionaries, were counted among those who left the GDR during the [first] four months of 1953. In addition, over that period, 2,610 members of the Union of Youth [FDJ] left.
Party organs exert almost no influence over the mass democratic organs–labor unions, the Union of Youth, and the Women’s League–in inducing them to carry out work to prevent the departure of the population from the GDR.
The press and radio of the GDR weakly expose the slanderous propaganda emanating from West Germany about the refugees, weakly publicize the measures taken by the government of the GDR to accommodate refugees who have returned to the Republic, by giving them work [and] living quarters, and guaranteeing other rights to them, [and they] rarely organize statements by persons who have returned from West Germany. Newspapers, as a rule, remain silent about the facts of the migration of residents of West Germany to the GDR, and do not use their statements for propaganda purposes.
Party and governmental organs commit serious distortions in the implementation of the SED’s policy with regard to the intelligentsia.
In the second half of 1952, the SED CC and the GDR government undertook a series of economic and political measures aimed at drawing the intelligentsia into active participation in cultural and economic construction. From 1 July 1952, the pay for engineering-technical and scientific workers was significantly increased, and for the most outstanding scientific and technical personnel, high personal salaries of up to 15,000 marks a month were established.
Despite this, the role of the intelligentsia in building the Republic and the necessity of involving the old intelligentsia is still underestimated within the party and the country. In a significant portion of enterprises, a sectarian relationship to the intelligentsia has still not been overcome. The intelligentsia is not drawn into active participation in the productive and social life of the enterprise.
There are serious drawbacks in the way ideological work with the intelligentsia is handled. In a crude and clumsy manner, demands are made for the reconstruction of all scientific work on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Due to this, scholars of the old school consider that, insofar as they are not Marxists, they have no prospects in the GDR.
Little attention is paid by the SED to organizing scientific discussions, to the free exchange of opinions, [and] the discussion of different problems in advanced science and practice, in the intelligentsia’s milieu.
To date, the linking and exchange of scientific activity between scientists of the GDR and scientists of the Soviet Union and social democratic countries is still insufficiently developed.
A feeling of anxiety for their personal safety is evident among broad circles of the intelligentsia and most of all among the technical intelligentsia. The instances of groundless accusations of sabotage constitute the reason for this sort of mood. The absence of the necessary explanatory work on this issue creates favorable conditions for the activity of enemies and the broad dissemination of all sorts of slanders.

V.

West German and Anglo-American authorities are carrying out economic and political diversions aimed at disrupting the five-year plan and at discrediting the policy of the GDR government before the populace. They have worked out a system of measures to entice engineering-technical, scientific and highly-qualified workers from the enterprises and establishments of the GDR.
In West Berlin, a high exchange rate of the Western mark in relation to the Eastern mark is being artificially maintained, making it profitable for the West Berlin population to buy food in the GDR. On the other hand, the acute shortage of high-quality consumer goods in the GDR and their presence in West Berlin attracts a large mass of the residents of the GDR into the Western sector[s] of Berlin. Providing West Berlin with a high level of supply of every imaginable good and lower prices for goods compared to the rest of West Germany has the aim of creating the impression among the population that a high standard of living in West Germany exists in comparison with the GDR.
One of the methods of enemy activity is to dispatch special recruiters to the GDR who entice qualified workers, engineers and technicians, and teachers of secondary and higher schools, to the West.
The West German authorities, the Americans, English, and French, systematically conduct propaganda on the radio in favor of the GDR population’s departure for the West, send large quantities of provocative letters, and give provocative telephone warnings of allegedly imminent arrests of GDR citizens.

VI.

The church, especially of late, is displaying an active role in enemy propaganda against the GDR. The leaders of the Protestant and Catholic Churches located in West Germany have taken the path of open struggle against the GDR; in sermons and in multiple letters, the clergy calls upon the populace to flee to the West.
The SED CC is committing some mistakes in its relations with the church.
On 27 January 1953, the SED CC made a decision on exposing the anti-democratic activity of the church youth organization “Junge Gemeinde.” It was proposed not to begin to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” through broad propaganda work among the populace, but through the organization of trials. In connection with this instruction, the organs of the MfS [Stasi] carried out the arrests of some clergymen and members of “Junge Gemeinde” in February and March. Due to the inadequacy and unconvincing character of the material, however, the trials have not yet been held. Then the SED CC gave an order to begin unmasking “Junge Gemeinde” in the youth press. During the implementation of these instructions, the accusation was made across the board that all of the members of “Junge Gemeinde” were members of the terrorist West German youth organization (BDJ). As a result of this the campaign to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” has currently exacerbated relations between the church and the state.
At one of the meetings with the first secretaries of the SED district committees, W. Ulbricht gave the order that open meetings were to be held in all institutions of higher learning and 12-grade schools of the League of FDJ to expose the “Junge Gemeinde,” in the course of which the expulsion of the leaders and most active members of “Junge Gemeinde” from schools and educational institutions was to be demanded. In certain schools the number of those expelled reaches 20-30 persons, and in each institution of higher education, the number of expelled students ranges from 5 to 20 persons; this in particular, has led to the fact that in March and April of this year alone, 250 people from 39 12-grade schools have fled to the West.

VII.

In the interest of halting the departure of the population to West Germany, it seems expedient to recommend the implementation of the following measures to the leadership of the GDR:

On economic issues:

1. To take measures toward the unconditional fulfillment of the industrial production plan for 1953, which is decisive for the fulfillment of the five-year plan. To liquidate the lag which took place from the beginning of the year and especially to devote attention to assuring the fulfillment of the plan for machine-building [industry], the introduction of electric power, and the development of [the] metallurgy [industry].
2. Over the course of a month, to work out measures to increase the 1953 consumer goods production plan and the development of commodity circulation.
For this purpose, the government of the GDR must take additional measures to import necessary raw materials: cotton–15-20,000 tons, wool–3,000 tons, heavy leather—2,500 tons. To increase imports of food stuffs (fats, fruits, and others) and some high-quality manufactured consumer goods. For this purpose, to assign additional output of high-quality production for export, in particular to capitalist countries, having found the necessary raw materials locally, using the free [industrial] capacities at hand, especially in precision mechanics and optics.
The GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade makes insufficient use of the possibilities of trade with capitalist countries. It is desirable to render necessary aid to the GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade through the trade representatives of the USSR and the people’s democracies in capitalist countries.
3. To oblige local organs of power to improve the leadership of local industry significantly. To oblige the GDR Gosplan [State Planning Commission] to re-examine within a month the 1953 production plans for local industry with a view to expanding them significantly.
4. In noting the underestimation of the role of manufacture in supplying the population with consumer goods, it is necessary to take governmental measures in support of crafts production. It is expedient, in keeping with the realization of artisans’ cooperatives, to organize supplies of raw materials for them on a contractual basis on the condition that they hand over their completed products to the state commercial network; to work out measures to offer artisans tax and credit advantages, and also to equip artisans’ cooperatives and individual enterprises with industrial equipment.
5. Considering that one of the reasons for the departure of peasants from the GDR to West Germany is the high norms for quotas of agricultural deliveries to the state, to reduce by 5-10% the differentiated norms in effect in 1953 for compulsory supplies of grain crops and meat by peasant farms.
6. To cancel ration cards for meat, fats and sugar from the autumn of 1953, thereby completing the elimination of the rationing system in the GDR, keeping in mind that the per-capita consumption norms that have been attained furnish the possibility of a transition to free commerce.
7. To work out a three-year plan on mechanizing agriculture, developing the MTS network, and equipping it with tractors and agricultural machinery in order to have the possibility of fulfilling the needs for mechanized cultivation of the land not only of agricultural cooperatives, but also of individual peasant farms.
8. To halt the practice of using tractors and agricultural machines from private cultivators through the MTS for work on other farms.
9. To work out a three-year plan to develop animal husbandry and to create a fodder base, assuming the need for future improvements in supplies to the populace from their own resources.
10. To work out a production plan for fertilizer in quantities that will meet in full the needs of agriculture, including large private farms.
11. To concentrate the attention of state and party organs on the organizational-economic strengthening of the agricultural production cooperatives which have been created in order to ensure, even this year, a harvest in the cooperatives that is larger than that of the best individual agricultural farms, and an income for cooperative members [that] exceeds the incomes of individual peasant farms.
12. In carrying out measures on limiting private-capitalist elements, to differentiate between attitudes toward large and small retailers and other small entrepreneurs (proprietors of small restaurants, hairdressers, bakers, and so on) with regard to taxes, credits, issuing food ration cards, supplying goods to merchants; and to use private commerce in the capacity of a commodity distribution network to serve the population.
13. Considering the populace’s great demand for construction materials, [as well as] agricultural and gardening equipment, to organize a broad trade in them, both in the city and the countryside, having ensured a portion of additional funds for cement, saw-timber, tiles and machine-manufactured articles; to increase the production of agricultural and gardening equipment.

On administrative issues:

1. In the near future, to carry out a broad amnesty both with regard to persons convicted in the first period for Nazi crimes, and, in particular, persons convicted in the most recent period, with the exception of persons convicted for espionage, terrorist acts, diversions, premeditated murder and for large thefts of the people’s property. 15-17,000 persons could be freed from prisons by the amnesty.
2. To take measures quickly toward the introduction of strict order and the observance of lawfulness in procedures for arresting and detaining citizens.
3. To organize expediently social courts [obshchestvennye sudy] in enterprises, in institutions, and at people’s estates [narodnye imeniia] to examine minor economic and administrative violations.
4. To re-examine the current criminal code to remove those articles of criminal law which permit their application to even the most inconsequential violations.
5. To cancel all criminal-legal orders containing the directives and circulars of separate ministries. Henceforward, to establish a procedure by which criminal-legal sanctions can be stipulated only in laws of the People’s Chamber, and in exceptional cases, in a decree by the government of the GDR.
6. To consider it crucial to carry out a reorganization of the communities [obshchiny] in the direction of enlarging and strengthening local authorities.
7. To carry out, in 1953, an exchange of passports for the entire population of the GDR and, first and foremost, for the population of the democratic sector of Berlin and its surrounding districts.
8. To re-examine the GDR government’s decree of 5 March 1953 on mass criminal indictments for the non-fulfillment of supply quotas [postavki] [to the state] and taxes.
9. In view of the fact that the migration of the population from the GDR to the West is taking place through Berlin, to consider it expedient to require GDR citizens to have passes [spravki] and business travel papers [komandirovochnye udostovereniia] from local institutions or organs of power upon entry into Berlin.

On political questions:

1. To end the political underestimation of the significance of the issue surrounding the departure of GDR citizens to West Germany that currently exists in party and state organs and among party workers. To oblige party organs and primary party organizations to analyze with care and to study all cases of departure and to take effective measures to ascertain the reasons influencing the population’s migration to West Germany.
To view the departure of members of the SED as a betrayal of the party. To investigate according to party procedure each case of departure by members of the SED to the West and to discuss [these cases] at general meetings of the party organizations and regional committees of the SED.
2. To commit the party and the mass democratic organizations of the GDR to conduct systematic explanatory work among the GDR populace against leaving for West Germany, exposing with concrete examples the slanderous fabrications, [and] the essence and methods of the subversive work which is being carried out by West German agents.
3. To take concrete measures to strengthen counter-propaganda, organizing it in such ways that the press and radio of the GDR systematically expose the mendacious Western propaganda on the issue of refugees from the GDR. To set aside the necessary resources for this.
4. In the interests of an effective struggle against the reactionary broadcasts of “RIAS,” to ensure the completion in 1953 of the construction of powerful radio stations in Magdeburg, Schwerin, and Dresden. To build 15 medium-wave low-power radio stations with up to 5 kilowatts of power and 10 short wave stations each with up to 2-3 kilowatts of power. To manufacture and deploy 400-600 “Gebor” radio sets.
5. In the interests of strengthening counter-propaganda, to organize through the KPD the systematic collection of information about the refugees’ difficult conditions and the poor material and legal conditions of different strata of the West German populace.
6. In order to expose the reactionary propaganda of the church, to explain in a detailed and systematic way through the press and in oral propaganda that the government of the GDR unswervingly observes freedom of conscience, of religion, and of religious observance, as provided for in the GDR constitution. To explain that the actions of the authorities are directed only against those church officials and leaders of “Junge Gemeinde” who conduct hostile subversive work against the democratic tradition of the GDR.
7. To take measures to correct the excesses which have been committed with regard to students expelled from school and from institutions of higher learning for belonging to the “Junge Gemeinde.”
8. For the SED CC to examine in particular the issue of improving work among the intelligentsia and to correct the mistakes that have been committed.
9. To take measures to improve scientific and cultural links between scholars in the GDR and in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies, as well as to supply the GDR intelligentsia with foreign scientific and technical literature.

V. Chuikov
P. Yudin
I. Il’ichev

18 May 1953.



Appendix No. 1

INFORMATION
on the social and age composition and party affiliation of those who left the GDR for West Germany

1. By social composition:

Second half of 1952Four months of 1953
1. Workers17,27917,784
2. White-collar workers14,17813,156
3. Kulaks1,1244,085
4. Medium peasants5461,364
5. Small peasants1,0771,140
6. Scientific workers2058
7. Workers in the arts216
8. Engineering-technical workers344870
9. Doctors167334
10. Lawyersno data120
11. Teachers and instructors in secondary and higher institutions of learning588900
12. Students659814
13. Church Employees7169
14. Artisansno data1,897
15. Owners of a commercial enterpriseno data2,937
16. Owners of a private enterpriseno data1,730
17. Pensionersno data4,286
18. Persons without definite occupationno data13,115
19. Housewivesno data24,350

2. By age

Second half-year of 1952Four months of 1953
Children up to 151760629814
[Persons] from 15 to 1854867234
from 18 to 251315314871
from 25 to 401811026725
from 40 to 501174818788
from 50 to 60786615045
over 6037367632

3. By party affiliation: (only over 4 months of 1953)

Members and candidates of the SED2,713of them, functionaries175
Members of the LDP865of them, functionaries5
Members of the CDU935of them, functionaries69
Members of the NDP375of them, functionaries30
Members of the DKP521of them, functionaries30
Members of the SSNM2,610of them, functionaries30

4. By place of work (only over 4 months of 1953).

1. From state institutions and communal enterprises5608
2. From people’s enterprises7847
3. From enterprises under wardship586
4. From large private enterprises3027
5. From small private enterprises9757
6. From “SAO” enterprises882
7. From MTS [machine-tractor stations]212
8. From agricultural food cooperatives191
9. Individual peasants3855
10. From peasant mutual-aid enterprises, commercial organizations and konzumy2414
11. From party, union and mass organizations266

Of the refugees:

1. Leaders of enterprises375
2. Division heads219

[Appendix No. II not included in original]

Appendix No. 3

INFORMATION
on persons convicted for 1951-1953
by punishment

Punishment1951 1st half2nd half1952 1st half2nd half1953 1st quarter
Death penalty107683
Life imprisonment1312223216
Convict prison [katorzhnaia tur ‘ma] for over 10 years748864159115
from 5 to 10 years47278110541136912
up to 5 years25433362357845975150
Imprisonment for 3 to 5 years250287383329183
Imprisonment for 1 to 3 years37854448502645612170
Imprisonment for up to 1 year162161392613778173457031
Short-term arrest392408559403201
Monetary fine178121478611101138196245
Educational measures for adolescents21792152257726651281
Other sanctions554912212
Total convicted4380140306381604507523309

Appendix No. 4

INFORMATION
on arrested persons under investigation
from 1952-1953 by types of crime

Types of crimesFirst half of 1952Second half of 1952First quarter of 1953
Proceedings institutedPersons arrestedProceedings institutedPersons arrestedProceedings institutedPersons arrested
1. Anti-democratic crimes119714282624329517522219
2. Espionage (Included in 1. above)180339510989226385
3. Possession of weapons393247233195205199
4. Opposition to authorities496273679339300188
5. SVAG Decree No. 160 (sabotage and diversions)155105209213170293
6. Law on preserving internal-German trade1818175714331084804703
7. Unlawful import and export of goods, as defined by 1948 decree of the NEK1004130370645617
8. Non-fulfillment of state deliveries23838584130750336
9. Crimes against the people’s property4053688255495353443988
10. Murder and maiming207433329573531915256
11. Crimes against morality244093625941105795520
12. Theft of private property3576524042840218994804844
13. Violation of borders5688284221501275
13. Others218523007263284999108383510
Total:714851134674655174712988314348

Appendix No. 5

INFORMATION
on arrested persons by their most recent
arrest from 1949-1953

Arrests over the second half of 194911,425 persons
Arrests over the first half of 195012,911 persons
Arrests over the second half of 195013,860 persons
Arrests over the first half of 195113,587 persons
Arrests over the second half of 195114,689 persons
Arrests over the first half of 195211,346 persons
Arrests over the second half of 195217,471 persons
Arrests over the first quarter of 195314,348 persons

DOCUMENT SUMMARY

The Soviet Control Commission in Germany reports statistics and a detailed assessment to Malenkov, analyzing the migration of the East German population to West Germany. It also includes proposals for implementing measures to prevent further departure from the GDR.

CREATORS

YUDIN, PAVEL F.

CHUIKOV, V. I. (VASILII IVANOVICH), 1900-1982

ILICHEV, IVAN

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

LOCATIONS DISCUSSED

REVEALED – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY NO. 1 FOR THE PERIOD 0800 25 MAY TO 0800 2 JUNE 1988

Quellbild anzeigen

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document describes Warsaw Pact military exercises conducted between 25 May and 2 June 1988. Summarized in detail, the comprehensive exercise brought all facets of the combined forces to “wartime strength” in response to a theoretical threat posed by NATO.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Eastern Europe
Poland
Russia

[Source: Institute of National Remembrance (IPNBU) 1408/2. Translated for CWIHP by
Gary Goldberg.]
[letterhead] GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
Deliver at 0800 2 June SECRET
Copy Nº 4
Exercise
[Original Polish receipt and
declassification stamps]
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
Nº 1
(for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988)
Warsaw
1988
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Nº 1
for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988

  1. In accordance with the growing threat of the “BLUES”, the “REDS” performed a
    covert operational deployment of selected formations and units in [their] armed forces.
    The following measures were performed within the framework of general preparations:
  • the dispatch of servicemen and reserves to military schools, courses, retraining, and
    command-staff training has been stopped; servicemen in courses are being recalled to
    their units;
  • troops in temporary locations are being recalled to their garrisons with the exception of
    formations at wartime strength and undergoing training (exercises) at training areas;
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    formation of detachments for engineer preparation of the terrain began on 1 June and
    which will be made ready to carry out work on behalf of the 3rd Front beginning [inserted
    by hand: 2] June.
  • [the following] have been deployed at field control posts: by 1 June, the staff of the 3rd
    Front, by 0800 2 June, the staffs of the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies;
  • by 26 May formations and units have been inspected for the deployment of elements
    of the mobilization base;
  • the discharge of reservists being trained has been halted. Equipment received from
    the economy has been left in the units;
  • since 1 June aircraft and helicopters received from the economy are being accepted
    and reequipped;
  • beginning 26 May a 24-hour watch has been established in all the armed forces and
    also in military commissariats; [there are] full shifts in national air defense troops and at
    the remaining HQs – reduced [shifts];
  • the border forces and selected units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have increased
    security at the border, airfields, and seaports.
  1. According to a 25 May directive of the GK OVS in the Western TVD he has planned a
    frontal defensive operation for 1 June. In response to the actions of the “BLUES” the
    forces allocated from the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Armies and also the engineer troops are
    preparing defensive positions in the main defensive zone.
    At the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    allocated combined-arms units, air forces, navy, missile troops and artillery, and REhB,
    intelligence, and communications have been brought up to wartime strength under the
    guise of an exercise and work on behalf of the economy and into full combat readiness
    in permanently deployed locations or contingency [neplanovye] areas.
    A. The 2nd Army (GDR Peoples Army)
  • by 25 May the 11th msd had been brought up to wartime strength and beginning on 31
    May together with a battalion of engineer vehicles it began engineer preparations of the
    2nd and 3rd positions of the main defensive zone in the sector south of SZCZECIN and
    BARLINEK;
  • on 25 May the Druzhba-88 exercise began at the DRAWSKI training area in which the
    18th msd, 25th td (of the 8th Army), and missile troops and artillery of the Army are
    participating;
  • [the following] have been brought up to wartime strength under the guise of
    preparations for an exercise: by 28 May, the 19th td; by 30 May, the 30th msd. The
    formations are being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations and are
    undergoing training in combat teamwork [slazhivanie] in garrison training centers.
  • the 29th msd was brought up to wartime strength by 2 June; after regrouping it is
    beginning to prepare the defense of the coastline in the sector DZIWNÓW,
    KOLOBRZEG.
    B. The 6th Army (USSR Armed Forces)
  • under the guise of preparations to carry out work on behalf of the economy the 2nd
    msd was brought up to strength by 25 May; together with the allocated engineer forces
    it is making engineering preparations of the second and third positions in the main
    defensive zone in the sector ZAGAN, PIENSK;
  • the 1st td was brought up to wartime strength starting 23 May and is training at the
    ZAGAN Training Area;
  • on 26 May the 3rd msd and on 30 May the 4th msd were brought up to wartime strength
    and brought into readiness at permanently deployed areas.
    C. The 3rd Army (Czechoslovak National Army)
  • the 31st td was brought up to wartime strength on 25 May and beginning 30 May it is
    making engineering preparations of positions in the main defensive zone together with a
    battalion of engineer vehicles of the 3rd isbr in the sector SLUBICE, GUBIN;
  • beginning 24 May the 33rd msd is conducting planned training at the WEDRZYN
    Training Area;
  • on 28 May the 32nd msd and on 31 May the 34th msd were brought up to wartime
    strength and began training in garrison areas to be brought into readiness for
    operations.
    D. The 8th Army (Polish Armed Forces)
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces by 26
    May the system of mobilization expansion of Army formations and units was inspected
    and mobilization documentation amplified;
  • under the guise of a planned exercise formations and units of the missile troops, air
    defense, REhB, and intelligence have been brought up to wartime strength and control
    posts have been provided; beginning 25 May they have been brought into readiness in
    reserve assembly areas or in training areas;
  • the 25th td has been brought up to wartime strength and is taking part in the Druzhba88 exercise at the DRAWSKI Training Area;
  • the training of the 21st td is underway at the Orzysz Training Area.
    E. The 11th vdbr
  • after the brigade was brought up to wartime strength it was brought into readiness at
    the reserve assembly area.
    F. The 12th Coastal Defense Brigade
  • it was brought up to wartime strength by 25 May under the guise of joint exercises with
    the Navy and is being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations.
    G. The 41st rmd [expansion unknown, but presumably a division, possibly a reserve
    mechanized division]
  • the formation of two mechanized regiments, communications, and air defense subunits
    began on 2 June.
    In reconnaissance forces
    Electronic intelligence units are reconnoitering the armed forces of the “BLUES” at the
    indicated lines [rubezhakh].
    Special reconnaissance units and subunits are conducting training in combat teamwork
    and are being brought into readiness for action.
    Reconnaissance aircraft are conducting intensified reconnaissance along the coastline
    and the western border of Poland.
    In REhB forces
    The 24th op-N [expansion unknown] and 8th op-N have been conducting training in
    combat teamwork at the MUSZAKI Training Area since 26 May.
    The remaining REhB units are conducting intensified training in garrison. Ten percent of
    REhB resources are on a round-the-clock watch.
    In Missile Troops and Artillery
    The formations of operational tactical missiles, field missile technical bases, the 8th
    apabr [Army Field Gun Artillery Brigade], the 21st ap BM [Heavy Artillery Regiment],
    and the 15th aiptap [Army Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment] in permanently deployed
    locations were brought up to wartime strength by 28 May.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and deployed by 29 May:
  • the 15th apabr and the 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Regiment (oapr) in border regions
    in the zone of the 2nd Army;
  • the 6th apabr and the 6th apar in border regions in the zone of the 6th Army;
  • the 3rd apar in firing positions west of Rzepin.
    [The following] are undergoing training in training areas:
  • the 3rd apabr and 3rd adnar [possibly “Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion”] since 27
    May at the Wedrzyn Training Area;
  • the 6th orap [Independent Aerial Reconnaissance Regiment] has been at the Zagan
    Training Area since 26 May;
  • the 15th orap is taking part in the Druzhba-88 exercise.
    The remaining missile and artillery frontal and Army formations and units are being
    brought into readiness by 2 June for operations in permanently deployed locations and
    assembly areas.
    9K714 [Oka tactical] missile battalions have been on alert since 25 May in garrison
    training areas.
    Tactical missile battalions and reconnaissance/strike and fire groups of first echelon
    formations are being brought into readiness in assembly areas.
    Conventionally-armed missiles will be delivered to rendezvous points (PV) by 0400 4
    June in order to train the allocated forces of the missile troop and artillery for a air
    defense operation:
  • to PV-1 – WEGORZEWO – four operational-tactical [missiles] and 16 tactical (4 [of
    them] “T”);
  • to PV-2 – WRONKI – eight operational-tactical;
  • to PV-3 – SWIEBODZIN – 12 tactical (4 [of them] “T”);
  • to PV-4 – RUDNA – 27, including 11 operational-tactical and 16 tactical (4 [of them]
    “T”).
    In the air forces
    Training in the combat teamwork of the operations of tactical groups is being conducted
    in formations and units. Airborne command posts were rebased from army aviation units
    to the landing fields of the respective HQs by 2 June where they are being kept in
    combat readiness Nº 2.
    The preparation of AUD [airfield sections of roads] for the dispersion of aircraft has been
    completed. The forward ground support echelons at all airfields have been brought into
    readiness for regrouping at the indicated airfields or at intermediate assembly areas.
    The second echelons are providing support to the air regiments’ missions.
    Aviation ammunition has been stored up to full scale in aircraft parking areas in
    readiness for immediate mounting.
    In the air defense troops
    By 2 June the air forces and air defense forces SKP [possibly “launch command post”]
    of the front and the SKP of Army aviation and air defense had been regrouped to the
    designated areas and maintained in readiness.
    First echelon SAM and radiotechnical units of the Front and armies have been
    regrouped from permanently deployed locations to designated areas and brought into
    readiness in accordance with decisions made in the Front, armies, and formations.
    The 8th zrp and air defense units of the 8th Army have been brought up to wartime
    strength and brought into readiness at permanently deployed locations.
    The radiotechnical troops of the air defense of the ground forces began to work on
    wartime radio frequencies beginning at 0800 2 June.
    [The following] are on combat alert in the air defense system:
  • in SAM regiments (zenap) – one battery each in readiness Nº 2 and one battery each
    in readiness Nº 3;
  • in SAM brigades [and] the Krug zrp – one battalion each (less two batteries) in
    readiness Nº 2 and one battalion (less two batteries) in readiness Nº 3.
    In engineer troops
    By 26 May engineer units which were performing work on behalf of the economy had
    returned to their garrisons.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and into readiness at permanently
    deployed locations under the guise of preparations for an exercise:
  • by 30 May, the 6th and 15th isbr’s, the 6th and 15th pomp’s, the 6th itp [Engineering and
    Technical Regiment], the 29th ib PU [Engineer Battalion for Equipping Control Posts],
    and the 220th Fortification Regiment;
  • by 2 June, the 3rd and 21st isbr’s and the 3rd itp.
    Minelaying equipment and mines are being issued and distributed from centrallysubordinate depots.
    Subunits of engineer vehicles of first echelon armies together with combined-arms
    formations began the fortification of lines in the main defense zone beginning 31 May.
    The 220th Fortification Regiment together with detachments for engineer preparation of
    the terrain began the engineering preparation of blocking positions and front line
    positions.
    The 283rd maskb [Camouflage Battalion] was brought into readiness by 26 May and
    began the construction of dummy areas in accordance with the Front plan.
    In the chemical troops
    [The following] have been brought into readiness under the guise of preparations for
    exercises:
  • the RAST [computation and analysis station] and rear RAST of the Front and armies in
    areas where Front and army control posts are deployed, by 26 May;
  • radiation and chemical reconnaissance subunits were brought up to wartime strength
    and into readiness for operations in assembly areas by 29 May.
    The peacetime system of radiation and chemical reconnaissance began operating in the
    country beginning 1 June.
    In signal troops
    Under the guise of preparations for exercises signals troops regrouped in areas where
    Front, army, and formation control posts are deployed by 28 May. Communications
    centers were ready for operation by 31 May.
    Radio, radiorelay, and cable communications have been organized. Satellite and
    troposphere communications have been readied for operation. Communications on
    wartime frequencies have been organized in all troop arms.
    In the services of the rear
    Planned measures are being carried out for the timely and complete deployment of the
    men and equipment of the operational rear and the organization of a field system of
    supply on behalf of the troops of the 3rd Front.
    The rear control posts of the 3rd Front, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies, and the rear
    formations and units of the 3rd Army (3rd omo [Independent Medical Detachment], and
    6th Army (6th mbu [Medical Reinforcement Brigade] were deployed by 0800 2 June.
    Full-scale mobile and operational reserves have been stockpiled in line units [v
    voyskakh]. Current supply of the troops is done from working stocks at garrison depots.
    Materiel resources are loaded onto combat vehicles and the transport vehicles of first
    echelon formations.
    Preparatory measures are being taken at military depots and the bases of the economy
    for a mass issue, loading, and distribution of material resources.
    Readiness to carry out missions to ensure the survivability of the transportation system
    (transshipment points, ports, approaches to crossings] has been verified.
    The preparedness of transportation resources (vehicles, trailers, rolling stock, ships)
    has been inspected and the priority of their movement (transfer by the armed forces)
    when making massive military shipments has been verified. The technical
    documentation of the construction of parallel bridges and crossings has been checked
    as well as the technical condition of bridges.
    Organizational measures for a continuous supply of nurses for the military medical
    service have been completed. Evacuation hospital equipment has been supplemented.
    Restrictions on the use of fuel have been introduced in the economy.
    Blood bank supplies at civilian donor stations intended for immediate delivery to the
    armed forces have been inspected.
    In the technical services
    The 23rd FRB was brought up to strength within the framework of planned exercises by
    24 May and sent to the TORUN Training Area where it is undergoing training in combat
    teamwork and special training.
    The organizational nucleus [orgyadro] for the 22nd FRB and 21st GFRB [expansion
    unknown] was called up by 28 May.
    Equipment received from the economy is being inspected.
    The 225th and 228th orpdn [Independent Missile Transportation Battalion] have been
    brought into readiness to receive missiles and to leave for the designated areas.
    Beginning 2 June under the guise of preparations for exercises, it began to be brought
    up to wartime strength at the location of permanent deployment of the 6th ARB.
    THE COMBINED BALTIC FLEET
    In accordance with a directive of the Commander of the OBF, the headquarters of the
    USSR BF [Baltic Fleet], Polish Navy, and GDR Peoples Navy have updated [utochnili]
    plans to defend the coastline.
    The allocated strike, anti-mine, and other support forces returned to their bases by 2000
    1 June after completing exercises and training launches of missiles. It is intended to
    complete the training of a combined ship squadron by 5 June. The plans for the
    coordination between the HQs of fleets and concerned formations have been updated.
    Naval reconnaissance forces (ship, aircraft, and radioelectronic) have been conducting
    continuous tracking of the operations of groups of ships of the Western Baltic fleet.
    Twenty-five percent of the water crossing equipment [plavsredstva] has been received
    from the economy. Sixty percent of the preparatory work on them has been done. Work
    is being done to rapidly deploy ships undergoing repair. Fifty percent of the ships have
    been demothballed by the crews. Work is continuing on the rest.
    Crews are being urgently trained for ships coming on line. The forces that perform
    verification trawling of coastal channels and the PLO forces to search and track
    submarines of the Western Baltic fleet have been augmented. Rear and technical
    support formations and units are being brought into readiness and are distributing
    reserves of material resources. They are deploying a system of temporary basing,
    supply, repair, and support to the forces in the areas in which they are serving.
    Internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
  1. At the instruction of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Country, the
    internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
    achieved readiness for operation by 30 May.
    Beginning 1 June the defense of seaports and airports was strengthened, as well as
    [these] borders:
  • northern – by the forces of the Baltic Border Troops Brigade (Baltic br PV);
  • western – by the forces of the Maritime, [Liubuski], and [Lurzicki] br PV.
  • southern – by the forces of the Sudety and [Gornoslenski] br PV.
    The border troops were subordinated to the Commanding General of the 3rd Front by 2
    June.
    Units of the internal troops and territorial defense troops had returned to MPD [their
    permanently deployed locations] by 26 May and are undergoing training in combat
    teamwork exercises in barracks-like [prikazarmennye] training grounds.
  1. Locations of permanent deployment
    Number Formations, units Location
    1
    2
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    1.
    2.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    Baltic brPV
    Maritime brPV
    [LIUBUSKI] brPV
    [LURZICKI] brPV
    SUDETY brPV
    [GORNOSLENSKI]
    19th Internal Troops
    Brigade (brVnV)
    10th brVnV
    6th brVnV
    Warsaw Territorial
    Defense Brigade (brTO)
    Katowice brTO
    Wielkopolski Territorial
    Defense Regiment (pTO)
    Szczecin pTO
    Wroclaw pTO
    Krakow pTO
    Gdansk pTO
    Kielce pTO
    KOSZALIN
    SZCZECIN
    KROSNO ODRZANSKIE
    LUBAN
    KLODZKO
    GLIWICE
    OLSZTYN
    KRAKÓW
    GÓRA KALWARIA
    WARSAW
    KATOWICE
    POZNAN
    SZCZECIN
    WROCLAW
    KRAKÓW
    GDANSK
    KIELCE
  2. Authorized organizational structure
    A. PV brigades (brPV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • two border guards battalions of 400 men each;
  • a maneuver battalion (of four companies);
    Total: 1260 men.
    Border troops battalion
  • HQ and staff;
  • six PV companies (rPV) of 60 men each;
    Total: 400 men.
    B. Brigade of internal troops (brVnV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • four infantry battalions;
  • a signals battalion;
  • a reconnaissance battalion;
  • an engineer battalion;
    Total: 1800 men.
    C Territorial defense brigade (brTO)
  • HQ and staff;
  • six TO battalions of 400 men each;
    Total: 2,500 men
    D. Territorial defense regiment
  • HQ and staff;
  • seven TO companies of 100 men each;
    Total: 760 men.
    EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF