Daran hat sich nichts geändert. Im Gegenteil: Die STASI-Connections zu Putin und auch nach China werden intensiver genutzt denn je:
Wie schon immer werden die STASI-Seilschaften aus Moskau dirigiert.
Denn auch Wladimir Putin ist einer von ihnen:
The following presentation was released by the U.S. Department of Justice in relation to their indictment of seven Russian GRU officers on charges related to “International Hacking and Related Influence and Disinformation Operations.”
Russian spies are corrupting Serbia. This is video of the Russian military main intelligence directorate (GRU) officer Colonel Georgy Viktorovich Kleban paying his Serbian agent who is senior Serbian official. Kleban works in Russian Embassy in Belgrade. This is what the Russians do to us, there ‘friends’.
Understanding the fate of worldwide rivalry and struggle is presently more significant than any time in recent memory. In a powerfully evolving world, the nature and character of fighting, prevention, compellence, acceleration the executives, and influence are critical and basic in deciding how the US and its accomplices should:
• Strategize to shield their worldwide advantages against exercises that are proposed to undermine those interests over the range of rivalry;
• Shield their inclinations against dangers by provincial contenders through available resources corresponding to procedures versus China and Russia however don’t undermine different interests; and
• Get ready US and accomplice powers to react to unforeseen and lithe improvements in worldwide legislative issues and innovation by distinguishing territories for participation, moderating the danger of exercises shy of equipped clash, and preventing furnished clash over various wellsprings of national power (e.g., exchange, tact, security).
The National Security System (NSS), National Safeguard Methodology (NDS), and National Military Procedure all note that future encounters between significant forces may regularly happen underneath the degree of outfitted clash. In this condition, monetary challenge, impact crusades, paramilitary activities, digital interruptions, and political fighting will probably turn out to be increasingly pervasive. Such encounters increment the danger of misperception and miscount, between powers with huge military quality, which may then build the danger of furnished clash. In this specific situation, the US ability to impact the results of both worldwide and local occasions must be reexamined. The developing uniqueness among incredible forces (i.e., the US, China, and Russia) with respect to what comprises authentic or adequate discouragement, compellence, and acceleration the board exercises ought to be deliberately analyzed.
With that in mind, this white paper surveys Russian exercises over the globe to assemble an improved, major comprehension of the contemporary and future impact condition. Countering Russian provocative exercises requires an exhaustive technique and the NDS perceives this reality so as to effectively counter Russian provocative exercises; thus, the US should cooperatively utilize various instruments of national control in a synchronized way. As white paper supporter Brig Gen (ret) Ransack Spalding III recommends, “the US job with respect to Russia ought to be to keep on connecting with European partners to lead the pack for adjusting in Europe. The partners’ objective ought to be discouragement. Simultaneously, the US ought to reciprocally connect with Russia to strip them away from China’s circle. The US can work with Russia in manners that improve the US-Russia relationship without diminishing European endeavors to adjust and dissuade.”
The articles in this white paper give government partners—knowledge, law authorization, military, and approach organizations—with important bits of knowledge and systematic structures to help the US, its partners, and accomplices in building up a thorough methodology to contend and vanquish this Russian test. Critical perceptions include:
• Russia is receiving coercive systems that include the arranged work of military and nonmilitary intends to stop and constrain the US, its partners and accomplices before and after the flare-up of threats. These procedures must be proactively stood up to, or the risk of critical outfitted clash may increment.
• Russia displays a profound situated feeling of geopolitical uncertainty which propels it to seek after key goals that set up an uncontested range of prominence in the post-Soviet locale. However, Russians progressively can’t help contradicting the Kremlin’s statements that the US is an approaching outside risk and an incendiary power in Russian local governmental issues.
• Russia’s hazy area strategies are best when the objective is profoundly captivated or does not have the ability to oppose and react successfully to Russian animosity. As per Russian vital idea, discouragement and compellence are cut out of the same cloth.
Just with an adjusted and synchrozined entire of government approach will the US contend and win against rising powers like Russia and China. Such cooperation requires a typical comprehension of our rivals, their strategies and wanted endstates and we mean that this white paper will accomplish this basic objective.
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This white paper was set up as a major aspect of the Key Multilayer Asssessment, entitled The Eventual fate of Worldwide Challenge and Struggle. Twenty-three master donors added to this white paper and gave wide-going evaluations of Russia’s worldwide advantages and targets, just as the exercises—dim or something else—that it behaviors to accomplish them. This white paper is separated into five segments and twenty-five sections, as depicted underneath. This rundown reports a portion of the white paper’s significant level discoveries, yet it is not a viable alternative for a cautious read of the individual commitments.
There is expansive agreement among the patrons that Russian President Vladimir Putin is in reality holding fast to a worldwide fantastic technique, which expects to accomplish the accompanying objectives:
• Recover and verify Russia’s impact over previous Soviet countries
• Recapture overall acknowledgment as an “incredible power”
• Depict itself as a solid entertainer, a key local powerbroker, and a fruitful middle person (Katz; Borshchevskaya) so as to increase financial, military, and political impact over countries
worldwide and to refine the radical decides and standards that at present administer the world request (Lamoreaux)
As per Dr. Robert Individual, these objectives are inspired by Russia’s profound situated geopolitical frailty. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Association, Russia has battled to discover its place in the worldwide network, which has left the administration with a waiting want to recapture the impact and power that it once had. Specifically, Russia tries to recover its impact over previous Soviet states, which it claims are in its legitimate “authoritative reach” (Lamoreaux; Individual; Swamp). Therefore, one of the US’s center objectives, to be specific advancing and securing the worldwide liberal request, comes into conflict with the objectives of Russia’s terrific system. This supports the Kremlin’s conviction that it must contain and compel US impact and exercises in Europe and somewhere else over the globe. As Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya’s commitment recommends, the Russian initiative’s perspective is lose-lose; it accepts that with the end goal for Russia to win, the US must lose. In any case, Dr. Christopher Swamp’s commitment recommends that this world view isn’t really shared by the Russian populace or its tip top.
As prove by the scope of “hazy area” exercises it takes part in, some of the master donors contend that the Russian administration considers itself to be at war with the US and the West all in all. From a Russian point of view, this war isn’t add up to, yet rather, it is basic (Goure)— a kind of “war” that is inconsistent with the general US comprehension of fighting. Russia accepts that there is no inadmissible or ill-conceived type of prevention, compellence, or heightening administration (Goure). It additionally doesn’t put stock in the continuum of contention that the US has developed. Like Russia’s view of its opposition with the US, its impression of contention is dichotomous: one is either at war or not at war. To battle and win this war, Russia accepts that the effective incorporation of all instruments of state control (Goure), just as the coordinated work of non-military and military intends to deflect and constrain (Flynn), are foremost. Moreover, Russian military ideas incorporate choices for utilizing preemptive power to incite stun and deter a foe from directing military tasks and to urge a de-heightening of threats (Flynn). The creators see that Russia’s methodologies are persistently advancing and expect that the inconsistency between the Russian and the US comprehension of “contention” and “war” will keep on developing, prompting a higher danger of acceleration in future circumstances including the two countries.
By and large, Russia’s impact abroad is developing, and the Kremlin has aced the utilization of “cross breed fighting” in driving Russia’s international strategy (Lamoreaux). Russia uses an assortment of hazy area strategies around the world. These incorporate the utilization of paramilitary powers and different intermediaries, obstruction in political procedures, financial and vitality abuse (especially in Africa), surveillance, and media and publicity control. Putin is likewise adroit at mixing military and non military personnel components for most extreme effect (Weitz).
The particular strategies of half and half fighting that Russia utilizes change by locale. In Europe, for instance, Russia has used purposeful publicity, an expanding reliance on outside vitality assets, and political control to accomplish its essential objectives (Schindler; Lamoreaux). Interestingly, in the Center East and Africa—significant wellsprings of minerals and other regular assets from a Russian perspective1—Russia has fundamentally used financial abuse devices (Katz; Borshchevskaya; Severin). In Focal Asia, Russia keeps up a significantly more constrained nearness, because of China’s geographic closeness and the present degrees of monetary and security commitment by other provincial on-screen characters (Kangas). By the by, Russia retains impact in the Focal Asia, because of its authentic, etymological, and social associations with the district (Laruelle; Dyet). In like manner, in Latin America, Russia comes up short on an adequate measure of deployable assets to completely execute its methodology or to broaden its impact far (Ellis). Be that as it may, as Dr. Barnett S. Koven and Ms. Abigail C. Kamp watch, Russia compensates for its deficiencies by taking part in long winded and receptive undertakings to upset US impact in the locale.
Executive Summary
In the last seven years, Russia has reasserted itself as a military force in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. With the 2008 military incursion into Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, Russia has assumed a more aggressive, interventionist stance in Europe. In the effort to influence events in Ukraine, the Russians have used what the US Army defines as “Hybrid Warfare” to infiltrate, isolate, and dominate eastern Ukraine and Crimea. This is all a part of the strategy of what can be called “Indirect Action”—the belief by the Russians that they reserve the right to protect ethnic Russians and interests in their former states from domination by Western powers and NATO.
It is important to note that the Russians do not use the terms Hybrid Warfare or Indirect Action to describe these tactics. These are terms that the Western media, think tanks, and analysts have developed to define this method of warfare. The Russians have used terms such as indirect, asymmetrical, and non-linear when discussing what is commonly referred to as Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid Warfare is a part of the strategy/policy of what can be called Indirect Action that the Russians believe is essential to protect their interests in their former satellite states (referred to as “the near abroad”). To the Russians, using covert methods, information warfare (INFOWAR), and special operations troops to make up for conventional disadvantages has been the norm for decades. Because the terms Hybrid Warfare and Indirect Action are familiar, they will be used throughout this report in reference to Russian indirect, asymmetrical, and nonlinear tactics.
This Threat Tactics Report (TTR) will focus on three distinct operations—Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and eastern Ukraine in 2014–2015. The TTR will present and analyze the tactics used in these conflicts, the lessons learned, and adjustments made by the Russian Armed Forces.
Executiive Summary
The Russians have employed Hybrid Warfare and Indirect Action to counter NATO and Western influence for over seventy years.Hybrid
Warfare is the use of political, social, criminal, and other non-kinetic means employed to overcome military limitations.1Indirect Action
can be defined as the need for Russia to defend its interests and sphere of influence in its former states and satellites.
Although Western observers characterize the actions of Russian Armed Forces as hybrid warfare, the Russian Army practices its long-established tactics with new attention to advanced developments in many areas such as precision weapons, command and control (C2) and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and electronic warfare (EW), and including direct and indirect application of these. The nature of these tactics is derived from Russia’s focused assessment of specific neighborhood threats and its long-time focus on security superiority in its Near Abroad.
Russia continues to maintain military bases in its former states to exert influence and control.
The Russians used conventional tactics in Georgia in 2008 and used indirect and asymmetric approaches in Crimea in 2014 and eastern Ukraine in 2014-2015.
The Euromaidan protests and overthrow of the Yanukovych government triggered the Russian incursion into Crimea and the seizure of the naval base at Sebastopol.
Russian intelligence operatives and SPF were instrumental in the success of the Crimea operation and are now assisting pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.
Russia may use these tactics in other areas such as Moldova, Transniestra, and the Baltic states.
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Crimean Takeover: Operational Overview
Crimea has long sought its independence from Ukraine because of its protracted association with Russia and the people’s desire to rejoin the Russian Federation. Crimea had become the home to a large ethnic Russian population, many of which had served in the Soviet/Russian military. As far back as February 1994, Crimean politicians would make speeches declaring the Crimeans not only sought separation from Ukraine, but also a unification of Crimea with Russia. When Yuriy Meshkov won the first and only independent Crimean presidential election in 1994 with 73% of the votes, he stated, “In spirit, the Crimean people have been and remain part of Russia.” During the next couple of years, Ukrainian marines took possession of a number of naval facilities on Crimea, evicted the pro-Russian political leaders in Crimea, and ended the short-lived independent Crimea on 17 March 1995. With protests from Moscow, this eventually led to the 1997 treaty that divided the Russian naval facilities between the two countries and allowed for the Russians to maintain a military presence in Crimea, primarily to support the Russian navy’s Black Sea Fleet. One of the most overlooked clauses in the agreement which allowed the February/March 2014 events to take place was the section that permitted Russian forces to implement not only security measures at their own permanent bases in Crimea, but to provide security for their own forces during deployment and redeployment movements to and from Russia. In the early stages of the crisis in late February 2014, this very minor clause in the treaty allowed the Russian military to move initially around Crimea without interference by any Ukrainian military personnel under the guise of the movement authorized by the military agreement between the two countries.
The Russian military launched their operation in Crimea less than a week after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych signed an agreement with the opposition political leaders on 21 February 2014 that confirmed early presidential elections would take place by the end of the year, ensured a national unity government would be created within a month, and guaranteed Ukraine would return to its 2004 constitution. Yanukovych then fled Kiev within 24 hours, however, instead of remaining in Ukraine to abide by the agreement. The timing also coincided with the scheduled military maneuvers in the Russian Central and Western Military Districts that obscured the Russian troop movements into the peninsula. The map in Figure 8 indicates the various activities from unclassified sources that took place in Crimea between the night of 27 February 2014 and 25 March 2014, when the Ukrainian government pulled its military forces from Crimea and ceded control of the peninsula to the Crimean “defense forces” backed by Russian military forces.
