Israel Admits Attacking Iran’s Nuclear Programme, As Cyber-Attack Derails Iranian Nuke Plant

Israel acknowledged that it was behind a cyberattack on Iran’s main nuclear facility on April 11. The cyberattack took place hours after officials at the Natanz reactor restarted spinning advanced centrifuges. These centrifuges could speed up the production of enriched uranium. Watch the video to know more.



Schah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi | corona

About the last operation/ operational mission of comrade [redacted]

Between 1979 and 1981 comrade [redacted] was stationed as a resident in Teheran.

In 1981 the Soviet- Iranian relations heated up (Mass persecutions, arrests and executions of operatives of the Tudeh- Party; temporary occupation of the UdSSR- Embassy by the revolutionary- guards, mysterious disappearance (probably treason) of the soviet counselor [redacted]).

For security reasons comrade [redacted] had to leave Teheran in this situation. (Shortly after his mission started, his successor was declared a persona non grata alongside other soviet diplomats).

During his operation in Teheran comrade [redacted] was in contact with the resident of the MfS. He widely supported our resident, a.m.

– with the assessment of the situation

– with the retransition/ return of a DDR- citizen (f) recruited by the enemy (overland to the Caspian sea and from there with a soviet ship to the UdSSR);

– with the preparation of an outward transfer of a DDR- citizen (m) (IMES- employee), who resided in the DDR- Embassy and against whom the Iranian authorities filed a request for extradition (outward transfer should take place with the help of a Bulgarian- Iranian transportation company, to which the comrade [redacted] had operational ties).

Comrade [redacted] wasn’t in the DDR so far. According to synopses at hand he did not receive an award by the MfS yet.

Description of the work of an East German agent in Iran who worked with the Stasi (MfS).


Iran–Politics and government
Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Iran
People’s Party of Iran (Tudeh)
East Germany


1979 hatte der Iran einen blutigen Machtwechsel erlebt. Die Islamische  Revolution zwang Schah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi



1. GDR-Iran Exchange of Opinions

On February 12, 1981, a government delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran was staying in the GDR under the leadership of the Minister of Education, Dr. Mohammed Javad Bahonar. He indicated to Comrade Oskar Fischer that his goal was find out the GDR’s position toward Iran’s Islamic revolution, the Iraqi invasion of Iran, and the preparedness of the GDR for further cooperation between the two countries.

Bahonar said that the Islamic revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini would be led to victory. The GDR was among the first countries that supported and recognized the Islamic revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran would like to develop close relations for the mutual benefit with all countries and governments that recognize the goals and the outcomes of the revolution.

On international problems, Bahonar explained that Iran is interested in securing freedom, ending the arms race, and ensuring popular national independence. He condemned the “spiral” of the arms race and interference in the domestic affairs of nations. He said that Iran is concerned about the presence of the “superpowers” in the Persian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean. He said that the Islamic Republic of Iran supports allowing the nations of this region taking responsibility for its security. According to him, the Iranian people are unconcerned about the increased military presence of the USA in the region. They would not like for “another power to take the place of the USA” in the struggle to remove this danger.

Regarding the Iran-Iraq conflict Iran shares the view of the GDR, that it only serves the purposes of imperialism and must be ended as soon as possible. This is of great significance for the continuation of the revolution in Iran. The Iranian government does not expect for the GDR to give up its friendly relations with Iraq. But it asks the question of who is the aggressor. Iran would like for the GDR to influence Iraq and pull it back. The position on the Iran-Iraq conflict for Iran is an important point for the development of further relations.

On Afghanistan Bahonar stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran condemns any interference of imperialism, particularly by the USA, in this country. This however does not mean that they accept the “presence” of another country. A “government that is forced on the people” can make no decisions that the people do not support.

Iran advocates for all peoples of the region to decide their own fate, without external influence and pressure.

Bahonar emphasized that Iran is prepared to expand and deepen bilateral cooperation with the GDR in political, economic, and cultural spheres.

Bahonar invited the GDR Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as the Vice President of the National Council to visit Iran. He welcomed proposals to conclude further treaties and demonstrated particular interest in the use of the GDR’s experience in the area of public education and higher education, as well as the cooperation of social forces united in the National Front. He requested the sharing of comprehensive informational materials on the GDR’s education system.

Comrade Oskar Fischer elaborated on the peace policy of the GDR and the principle standpoint of the GDR toward the Iranian popular revolution. He indicated that the imperialists are preparing new actions against the peace efforts of the people and that the international situation is coming to a dangerous point. The imperialist course of heavy armament, the acceleration of the arms race, the long-term armament program of NATO, the Brussels missile decision, the so-called new nuclear strategy of the USA, and not least the neutron weapon plans of the USA endanger the peace of the entire world. In this connection Comrade Oskar Fischer emphasized the role of the USSR and the countries of the Socialist community in the struggle for peace, security, detente, and disarmament.

The Foreign Minister of the GDR assessed the good relations that have developed between the GDR and Iran in many areas, particularly the economy and trade. He declared the preparedness of the GDR to further develop and deepen the relations between both countries, as well as to extend them into other areas. On this point he presented a number of suggestions, which were positively received by the Iranian partners.

Comrade Oskar Fischer presented the position of the GDR on the Iran-Iran conflict and Afghanistan.

Comrade Kirchhoff informed the delegation about the experiences of the National Front during the democratic transformation and the creation of the developed Socialist society of the GDR.

The conversations are the first political exchange of opinion between the two governments and have created starting points for further development of political relations.

They took place in a sober, open-minded, and constructive atmosphere.

Representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran discuss the arms race, the presence of superpowers in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the potential for bilateral cooperation between East Germany and Iran.


Afghanistan–History–Soviet occupation, 1979-1989
Iran–History–Revolution, 1979
Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Iran
Iran–Foreign relations–Iraq


Classic-Numismatik-Artefakten-Fabiano -




[Letterhead: Ministry for State Security]

Strictly Secret
Return requested

Berlin, the 4th of May, 1981

5 pages

6th Copy

No. 198/81



the activity of leftist organizations in Iran

The following information concerns the strategy and tactics of leftist groups in Iran, their activities, and the differences of opinion among them based on internal estimates.

Leftist forces, which were actively involved in the fall of the Shah, have been forced into the opposition with the establishment of the central power structure of clerical civilian forces. They are attacked by the ruling circles with religious hysteria and anti-communist fervor. The main forces of the leftist movement in Iran are the Tudeh Party, the Fedayin-e-chalk, and the Mujahadin-e-chalk. The “Organization of Fighting Muslims” under Habiholla Peyman is showing increasingly leftist tendencies. There are also a number of pseudo-leftist, leftist extremist, and Maoist organizations.

The main goal of the Tudeh Party in the current phase of the struggle is the creation of a unified people’s front on an anti-imperialist and democratic basis. As a most important premise for the attainment of this goal and ensuring favorable legal fighting conditions, the Party holds firmly onto support of Khomeini and the clerical regime against all attempts by imperialism and inner reaction to weaken the anti-imperalist thrust of the Iranian revolution.

The Party currently commands more than 30,000 members and sympathists. Their main influence is in Tehran, Abadan, the area around Gilan, Masanderon (on the Caspian Sea), and Kurdistan. In Azerbaijan the Party has not yet been able to re-capture the positions it attained earlier. Close collaboration with the majority faction of Fedayin-e-chalk has had a positive effect on the capabilities of the Tudeh Party.

The Party has individual representatives in the state apparatus and in some of the organizations (e.g. the Mustazafin Institute) that have been formed since the revolution. An expression of the increased effect of the Party among the working class is the election of a number of Party Members in union functions. Intelligence work, particularly in Tehran, is conducted through the “Democratic People’s Union of Iran.” The Party publishes a number of publications, the most well-known of which is the main organ “Mardom,” which until recently was able to be published regularly.

Despite a certain success in work among the masses it is difficult for the party to gain support from a broad section of the public, in view of the anti-communist fervor and the accusation of having been passive under the Shah’s regime. The tense relations between the Tudeh Party and Mujahadin-e-chalk has a negative effect in this regard, particularly among the youth. The recent attempts by forces supporting the regime to discredit the Tudeh Party and link them with leftist extremist forces remain until now without success. In view of the constant attacks on the Party, it is geared toward half-legal and illegal forms of fighting.

The so-called majority faction of the Fedayin-e-chalk, which was formed in 1980 because of differences over the further strategy and tact of the until-then unified organization, was able to further consolidate with the minority faction over Ashraf Daghani. It recognized that armed struggle against the Khomeini regime has no broad support among the populace. The majority faction, which advocates close collaboration with the Tudeh Party, has the goal of strengthening the anti-imperialist potential of the current regime and broadening the basis of the Organization among the working class. Both of these points are also meant to be the main content areas of the First Party Congress.

Report on leftist groups under attack by the central clerical leadership of Iran and particularly the Tudeh Party.


Iran–Politics and government
People’s Party of Iran (Tudeh)
Communist parties–Iran

TOP-SECRET – Iran Making Nuclear Weapons Report

TOP-SECRET – Iran Making Nuclear Weapons Report

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).

G. Possible Military Dimensions

38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these. Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.

39. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency on the resolution of all outstanding issues in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency. Since August 2008, Iran has not engaged with the Agency in any substantive way on this matter.

40. The Director General, in his opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011, stated that in the near future he hoped to set out in greater detail the basis for the Agency’s concerns so that all Member States would be kept fully informed. In line with that statement, the Annex to this report provides a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency to date which has given rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

41. The analysis itself is based on a structured and systematic approach to information analysis which the Agency uses in its evaluation of safeguards implementation in all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. This approach involves, inter alia, the identification of indicators of the existence or development of the processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.

42. The information which serves as the basis for the Agency’s analysis and concerns, as identified in the Annex, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself. It is consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved, and time frames.

43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.

45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.

Escalating Tensions Between the United States and Iran Pose Potential Threats to the United States

Escalating Tensions Between the United States and Iran Pose Potential Threats to the United States



The Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is planned to help bureaucratic, state, nearby, innate, and regional counterterrorism, digital, and law implementation authorities, and private segment accomplices, to viably stop, forestall, appropriate, or react to episodes, deadly tasks, or fear based oppressor assaults in the United States that could be led by or for the benefit of the Government of Iran (GOI) if the GOI were to see activities of the United States Government (USG) as demonstrations of war or existential dangers to the Iranian system. The GOI could act straightforwardly or enroll the participation of intermediaries and accomplices, for example, Lebanese Hizballah. The FBI, DHS, and NCTC had evaluated any active retaliatory assault would initially happen abroad. In the occasion the GOI were to decide to direct a Homeland assault, potential targets and strategies for assault in the Homeland could run from digital activities, to focused deaths of people considered dangers to the Iranian system, to damage of open or private foundation, including US army installations, oil and gas offices, and open tourist spots. USG activities may likewise incite vicious radical supporters of the GOI to submit assaults in retaliation, with next to zero notice, against US-based Iranian protesters, Jewish, Israeli, and Saudi people and interests, and USG faculty.

(U//FOUO) Immediate Response in Homeland Could Take Form of Cyber Operations

(U//FOUO) The FBI, DHS, and NCTC survey a prompt GOI reaction in the Homeland could appear as endeavored digital activities against USG offices and systems, including US military frameworks, and basic private part works, given that such tasks could be endeavored by Iran-based digital entertainers without the need of building up a US nearness. The US Intelligence Community has evaluated that Iran keeps on getting ready for digital assaults against the United States and partners. It is fit for causing confined, impermanent problematic impacts during a digital assault on unfortunate casualty systems. Verifiably, Iran has demonstrated the capacity to complete troublesome and ruinous digital assaults against open and private business systems, for example, expanded dispersed forswearing of-administration (DDoS) battles and information erasure assaults.

(U//FOUO) Iran speaks to a digital secret activities and assault risk, utilizing progressively refined digital methods and endeavoring to convey digital abilities that would empower assaults against basic foundation in the United States. Tehran’s general hazard math for a digital reaction likely will change dependent on the US strike, which Iranian pioneers have vocally depicted as escalatory, and hostile digital activities are probably going to be considered as retaliatory alternatives. Malignant action and observation may not really happen from Iranian Internet Protocol (IP) space, as on-screen characters may utilize midpoint framework in different nations. All things considered, traffic from Iranian IP locations may not be demonstrative of malignant movement. The FBI, DHS, and NCTC stress great digital cleanliness, for example, fixing frameworks and instructing work force to make preparations for generally utilized digital entertainer procedures, for example, social building and lance phishing.

(U//FOUO) Potential for GOI-Directed Lethal Attacks in the Homeland

(U//FOUO) as of late, the USG has captured a few people following up in the interest of either the GOI or Lebanese Hizballah who have directed reconnaissance demonstrative of possibility making arrangements for deadly assaults in the United States against offices and people.

» (U//FOUO) A specialist of the GOI captured in 2018 had led observation of Hillel CenterUSPER and Rohr Chabad CenterUSPER, Jewish establishments situated in Chicago, including shooting the security highlights encompassing the Chabad Center.

» (U//FOUO) Three Lebanese Hizballah External Security Organization (ESO) agents captured somewhere in the range of 2017 and 2019 had directed reconnaissance of US military and law implementation offices, basic foundation, private segment scenes, and open tourist spots in New York City, Boston, and Washington, DC.

(U//FOUO) The GOI likewise has a background marked by directing deaths and death endeavors against people in the United States it regards a danger to the Iranian system. The GOI killed the US-based previous representative for the Shah of the Iran in 1980 and plotted to kill the Saudi Arabian envoy to the United States in 2011. In August 2018, the USG captured two people for going about as operators of the GOI by directing incognito reconnaissance of Iranian protesters in New York City and Washington, DC, and the previously mentioned security highlights of Jewish offices in Chicago.