TOP-SECRET – Iran Making Nuclear Weapons Report

TOP-SECRET – Iran Making Nuclear Weapons Report

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).

G. Possible Military Dimensions

38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these. Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.

39. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency on the resolution of all outstanding issues in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency. Since August 2008, Iran has not engaged with the Agency in any substantive way on this matter.

40. The Director General, in his opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011, stated that in the near future he hoped to set out in greater detail the basis for the Agency’s concerns so that all Member States would be kept fully informed. In line with that statement, the Annex to this report provides a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency to date which has given rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

41. The analysis itself is based on a structured and systematic approach to information analysis which the Agency uses in its evaluation of safeguards implementation in all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. This approach involves, inter alia, the identification of indicators of the existence or development of the processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.

42. The information which serves as the basis for the Agency’s analysis and concerns, as identified in the Annex, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself. It is consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved, and time frames.

43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.

45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.

Escalating Tensions Between the United States and Iran Pose Potential Threats to the United States

Escalating Tensions Between the United States and Iran Pose Potential Threats to the United States



The Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is planned to help bureaucratic, state, nearby, innate, and regional counterterrorism, digital, and law implementation authorities, and private segment accomplices, to viably stop, forestall, appropriate, or react to episodes, deadly tasks, or fear based oppressor assaults in the United States that could be led by or for the benefit of the Government of Iran (GOI) if the GOI were to see activities of the United States Government (USG) as demonstrations of war or existential dangers to the Iranian system. The GOI could act straightforwardly or enroll the participation of intermediaries and accomplices, for example, Lebanese Hizballah. The FBI, DHS, and NCTC had evaluated any active retaliatory assault would initially happen abroad. In the occasion the GOI were to decide to direct a Homeland assault, potential targets and strategies for assault in the Homeland could run from digital activities, to focused deaths of people considered dangers to the Iranian system, to damage of open or private foundation, including US army installations, oil and gas offices, and open tourist spots. USG activities may likewise incite vicious radical supporters of the GOI to submit assaults in retaliation, with next to zero notice, against US-based Iranian protesters, Jewish, Israeli, and Saudi people and interests, and USG faculty.

(U//FOUO) Immediate Response in Homeland Could Take Form of Cyber Operations

(U//FOUO) The FBI, DHS, and NCTC survey a prompt GOI reaction in the Homeland could appear as endeavored digital activities against USG offices and systems, including US military frameworks, and basic private part works, given that such tasks could be endeavored by Iran-based digital entertainers without the need of building up a US nearness. The US Intelligence Community has evaluated that Iran keeps on getting ready for digital assaults against the United States and partners. It is fit for causing confined, impermanent problematic impacts during a digital assault on unfortunate casualty systems. Verifiably, Iran has demonstrated the capacity to complete troublesome and ruinous digital assaults against open and private business systems, for example, expanded dispersed forswearing of-administration (DDoS) battles and information erasure assaults.

(U//FOUO) Iran speaks to a digital secret activities and assault risk, utilizing progressively refined digital methods and endeavoring to convey digital abilities that would empower assaults against basic foundation in the United States. Tehran’s general hazard math for a digital reaction likely will change dependent on the US strike, which Iranian pioneers have vocally depicted as escalatory, and hostile digital activities are probably going to be considered as retaliatory alternatives. Malignant action and observation may not really happen from Iranian Internet Protocol (IP) space, as on-screen characters may utilize midpoint framework in different nations. All things considered, traffic from Iranian IP locations may not be demonstrative of malignant movement. The FBI, DHS, and NCTC stress great digital cleanliness, for example, fixing frameworks and instructing work force to make preparations for generally utilized digital entertainer procedures, for example, social building and lance phishing.

(U//FOUO) Potential for GOI-Directed Lethal Attacks in the Homeland

(U//FOUO) as of late, the USG has captured a few people following up in the interest of either the GOI or Lebanese Hizballah who have directed reconnaissance demonstrative of possibility making arrangements for deadly assaults in the United States against offices and people.

» (U//FOUO) A specialist of the GOI captured in 2018 had led observation of Hillel CenterUSPER and Rohr Chabad CenterUSPER, Jewish establishments situated in Chicago, including shooting the security highlights encompassing the Chabad Center.

» (U//FOUO) Three Lebanese Hizballah External Security Organization (ESO) agents captured somewhere in the range of 2017 and 2019 had directed reconnaissance of US military and law implementation offices, basic foundation, private segment scenes, and open tourist spots in New York City, Boston, and Washington, DC.

(U//FOUO) The GOI likewise has a background marked by directing deaths and death endeavors against people in the United States it regards a danger to the Iranian system. The GOI killed the US-based previous representative for the Shah of the Iran in 1980 and plotted to kill the Saudi Arabian envoy to the United States in 2011. In August 2018, the USG captured two people for going about as operators of the GOI by directing incognito reconnaissance of Iranian protesters in New York City and Washington, DC, and the previously mentioned security highlights of Jewish offices in Chicago.