Deuce Bigalow Male Gigolo – Full Movie

Deuce Bigalow: Male Gigolo is a 1999 comedy film starring Rob Schneider. Other cast members include Eddie Griffin, Amy Poehler, Oded Fehr, Arija Bareikis, and William Forsythe.

The story is about a hapless fishtank cleaner who goes into business as a male prostitute in an attempt to earn enough money to repair damage he caused while house-sitting.

TOP-SECRET – Defense Security Service Cybersecurity Operations Division Counterintelligence Presentation

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/DSS-CyberCI.png

 

Defense Security Service Cybersecurity Operations Division

  • 33 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • December 2012

Download

DSS Supports national security and the warfighter, secures the nation’s technological base, and oversees the protection of U.S. and foreign classified information in the hands of Industry

CI Mission

DSS CI identifies unlawful penetrators of cleared U.S. defense industry and articulates the threat for industry and government leaders

Scope

-10K+ firms; 13K+ facilities; 1.2m personnel
-1 CI professional / 261 facilities
-10.5% of facilities report

Capability

• (U) 11 personnel conducting analysis, liaison, field support, strategic development and program management
• (U) Wide range of skill sets – CI, CT, LE, Cyber, Security, Intel, IA, CNO and more
• (U) Direct access to cleared industry across 25 DSS field offices nationwide
• (U) Large roles at U.S. Cyber Command, National Security Agency, National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force and the Department of Homeland Security

Challenges

• (U) Secure sharing of threat information with industry partners
• (U) Identifying and reporting suspicious network activity
• (U) Limited resources to execute for an quickly expanding mission area Significant Achievements and Notable Events
• (U) Since September, 2009 – Assessed over 3,000 cyber-related suspicious contact reports from Industry and the Intelligence Community; facilitating action on over 170 federal investigations/operations
• (U) Developed four benchmark product lines for Industry and the Intelligence Community to include the 3rd edition of the DSS Cyber Trends
• (U) Briefed at 24 venues and over 1,000 personnel in FY12 on the cyber threat
• (U) In FY12, delivered over 350 threat notifications to industry, detailing adversary activity occurring on their networks.

(U) FY12 Industry Cyber Reporting

• (U//FOUO) 1,678 suspicious contact reports (SCR) categorized as cyber incidents (+102% from FY11)
• (U//FOUO) 1,322 of these were assessed as having a counterintelligence (CI) nexus or were of some positive intelligence (PI) value (+186% increase from FY11)
• (U//FOUO) 263 were categorized as successful intrusions (+78% increase from FY11)
• (U//FOUO) 82 SCRs resulted in an official investigation or operation by an action agency (+37% increase from FY11)

The Files TV – The Hidden Costs of Hamburgers

Americans love hamburgers — we eat about three burgers a week. But what are the hidden environmental costs? See sources from the Center for Investigative Reporting.http://cironline.org/reports/hidden-c…

Directed and produced by Carrie Ching, Reported by Sarah Terry-Cobo and Carrie Ching, Illustrated and animated by Arthur Jones.

This animation is part of The Food for 9 Billion series, a yearlong look at the challenge of feeding the world at a time of social and environmental change.

http://cironline.org/projects/food-fo…

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SECRECY NEWS – SUBPOENA OF AP PHONE RECORDS SAID TO DAMAGE PRESS FREEDOM

The government seizure of Associated Press telephone records in the course
of a leak investigation undermined freedom of the press in the United
States, congressional critics said yesterday.

"It seems to me the damage done to a free press is substantial," said Rep.
Zoe Lofgren at a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee.

Pursuant to subpoena, the government captured call records for 20
telephone lines of Associated Press reporters and editors over a two month
period last year.  The records are logs of calls made and received, but do
not include their contents.  It was a "massive and unprecedented intrusion"
into newsgathering activities, wrote the AP's president Gary Pruitt in a
May 13 letter.

The Justice Department denied that the action deviated from established
policy.

"We understand your position that these subpoenas should have been more
narrowly drawn, but in fact, consistent with Department policy, the
subpoenas were limited in both time and scope," wrote Deputy Attorney
General James M. Cole in a May 14 reply.

The  move arose from an AP story about a disrupted bomb plot originating
in Yemen that led to the revelation of a classified counterterrorism
operation and the existence of a valued agent. "This is among the top two
or three serious leaks that I've ever seen" said Attorney General Eric
Holder. He did not elaborate.

Meanwhile, the upshot is that any presumption of confidentiality in the
source-reporter relationship has been compromised across the board,
especially but not only in national security reporting.

        http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=183984442

"Reporters who might have previously believed that a confidential source
would speak to them would no longer have that level of confidence, because
those confidential sources are now going to be chilled in their
relationship with the press," Rep. Lofgren said yesterday.

Last year, congressional leaders harshly criticized the Obama
Administration for supposedly failing to aggressively combat leaks of
classified information, including in the present case.

"The Administration's disregard for the Constitution and rule of law not
only undermines our democracy, it threatens our national security," said
Rep. Lamar Smith, at a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee on June 7
of last year. "The Justice Department has not taken the initiative to
prosecute leaks of national security secrets. Recent leaks about a foiled
bomb plot out of Yemen and a cyberattack against Iran are, in the words of
Senate Intelligence Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein, quote, 'very detrimental,
very concerning, and hurt our country,' end quote."

The irony was not lost on Rep. Jerrold Nadler.

"I think we should put this in context, and remember that less than a year
ago this committee's Republican leadership demanded aggressive
investigation of press leaks, accusing the administration itself of
orchestrating those leaks," he noted. "Then, members of this committee
wanted the reporters subpoenaed, put in front of grand juries and
potentially jailed for contempt. Now, of course, it is convenient to attack
the attorney general for being too aggressive or the Justice Department for
being too aggressive."

"But this inconsistency on the part of my Republican colleagues should not
distract us from legitimate questions worthy of congressional oversight,
including whether the Espionage Act has been inappropriately used looking
at leakers, whether there is a need for a greater press shield,... and
Congress' broad grants of surveillance authority and immunity," Rep. Nadler
said.

Rep. Lofgren said that the damage done to freedom of the press by the
clandestine seizure of AP phone records "will continue until corrective
action is taken."

GPO SUSPENDS PUBLIC ACCESS TO SOME NASA RECORDS

The Government Printing Office is blocking public access to some
previously released records of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, while the records are reviewed to see if they contain
export-controlled information.  The move follows the controversial
disabling and partial restoration of the NASA Technical Reports Server
(NTRS) ("NASA Technical Report Database Partly Back Online," Secrecy News,
May 9.)

"GPO has been asked to suspend any activity related to making these
documents available if they have not been reviewed," GPO said in a notice
today.

        http://beta.fdlp.gov/news-and-events/

"During this time, PURLs that GPO has created for the electronic versions
of NASA Technical Reports found in cataloging records accessed through the
Catalog of U.S. Government Publications (CGP) may not link to the documents
that the catalog record describes."

US-CHINA MOTOR VEHICLE TRADE, AND MORE FROM CRS

"In 2009, China overtook the United States to become both the world's
largest producer of and market for motor vehicles," a new report from the
Congressional Research Service notes.

That is not altogether bad news. "Every year since 2010, General Motors
has sold more cars in China (through exports and its joint ventures there)
than in the United States," CRS said. "On the other hand, China maintains a
number of trade and investment barriers that affect trade flows in autos
and auto parts."

See U.S.-Chinese Motor Vehicle Trade: Overview and Issues, May 13, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43071.pdf

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has declined to make publicly available include the following.

Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia, May 9,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43070.pdf

Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional
Concerns, May 10, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42559.pdf

Women in Combat: Issues for Congress, May 9, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42075.pdf

The Peace Corps: Current Issues, May 10, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21168.pdf

Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns, May 10,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41604.pdf

The Federal Budget: Issues for FY2014 and Beyond, May 9, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43068.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
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To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
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OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     https://members.fas.org/donate

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Neue schwere Straftaten wohl wieder von “Gomopa” im Auftrag ihrer “Partner” – mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Otmar Knoll”

graph

Liebe Leser,

obenestehende Graphik zeigt die tagelangen, schweren Internetatatcken wohl immer wieder der Hacker der “GoMoPa” im Auftrag von mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Otmar Knoll” auf unsere Server – wie sie es auch bei Heinz Gewrlach machten – kurz vor seinem für fast alle überraschenden Tode.

“Otmar Knoll” von “Fairvesta” hat diese Angriffe uns gegenüber schriftlich angekündigt, ebenso wie “Peter Ehlers”, verstrickt mit der Fondsfirma “SJB” seines Parners “Gerd Bennewirtz”, uns mit Mordanschlägen gedroht hat !

Wür den Sie diesen Charaktern vertrauen und Ihr Geld anvertrauen ?

Sie sehen, mit welchen Figuren wir es hier zu tun haben…

Hier noch einmal die wichtigsten Infos zu diesen schweren Straftaten:

Neue Serverangriffe der vorbestraften Finanzbetrüger der “GoMoPa” und ihrer “Partner” mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Otmar Knoll”

Hier sehen Sie obenstehend den Beleg für die Internet-Attacken der er vorbestraften Finanzbetrüger der “GoMoPa” und ihrer “Partner” mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Otmar Knoll”

Das Urteil zu den vorbestraften Finanzbetrügern der “GoMoPa” wegen Betruges am eigenen Anleger finden Sie unter

https://berndpulch.org/das-betrugsurteil-gegen-bennewirtz-und-peter-ehlers-gomopa-partner-maurischat-und-vornkahl-wg-betruges-am-eigen-anleger/

These graphs below show the cyberattacks on our website initiated by the suspects we already mentioned and who even announced in an email that tehy would do this illegal internet crime. The email was by Otmar Knoll, Fairvesta, who announced the cybercrime. The suspected hackers are from “GoMoPa” and their thugs.

The graph shows the DDos attacks on our servers.

What is a DDos attack ?

Read here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack

These internet crimes are punished with longterm jail sentences and financial compensation..

Die obenstehende Graphik zeigen die Hackerangriffe auf unsere Webseiten, die seit Jahren durchgeführt werden im Ausschnitt. In einer Email an uns hat Otmar Knoll, Fairvesta, die Hackerangriffe, somit schwere Internetverbrechen angekündigt. Wir haben diese Emails bereits veröffentlicht. Mutmasslich arbeitet Otmar Knoll mit den üblichen Verdächtigen der “GoMoPa”, ihren Informanten und Hackern zusammen:

Die Graphiken zeigt die sogenannten DDos-Angriffe auf unsere Server.

Was ist eine DDos Attacke ?

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial_of_Service

Lesen Sie hier:

Diese Vergehen werden mit langjährigen Freiheitsstrafen und Schadensersatz bestraft.

The Files TV – Captive Radio

This excerpt from Lauren Rosenfeld’s documentary profiles the families of kidnapping victims in Colombia who use a weekly radio program to communicate with loved ones held hostage in the jungle. Winner of the 2012 Hearst Documentary Award, UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism.

Part of our New Voices series, featuring the next generation of video journalists.

The Files TV – City of No Illusions

Nearly one in six homes in Buffalo, NY is vacant, overwhelming the cash-strapped city. But residents of its most blighted neighborhood are taking matters into their own hands. Produced in 2011 by Vanessa Carr at UC Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism. Part of our New Voices series, featuring the next generation of video journalists.

Cryptome – Uncle Fester Decries Copyright Infringement

Uncle Fester Decries Copyright Infringement

 


A sends:

Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 18:55:23 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: uncle fester decries copyright infringement

“Steve Preisler” = Uncle Fester.

I am amazed that his name is public. His personal story is sympathetic personally. But I think his attitude towards “piracy” is biassed because he’s a “content creator”. If you don’t recognize his pseudonym, please read all the way through. His “piracy” opinions are to be excused in the Grand Scheme because of his other saintly behaviors, and also, they’re just his opinion.

Summary: the premiere author of accurate practical clandestine chemistry books does not like Kim Dot Com because the latter supports “theft” of the former’s publications. Overall though Steve Preisler seems brilliant, articulate, and as effective as say Julian or Jim Bell or Kim.com or Dread Pirate Roberts or even yourself 🙂 as an Army of One cultural destabilization / freedom fighter.

First, enjoy this:

“The worst thing of all about the net is the prevalence of copyright piracy. People have come to expect the right to steal! That is one way to get valid information on controversial topics off the net. Just download a stolen copy of a genuine book on the subject you are interested in. The people who run these download sites are repulsive in every way. Take the example of Mr. Dotcom who ran Megaupload. Fat-assed, pimple-faced and cowardly are just some of his better traits. I would simply love to be locked inside a cage with him for a few weeks. We would have one-on-one counseling sessions as I would teach him about the evils of stealing other people’s work.” –Uncle Fester

http://hooverhog.typepad.com/hognotes/2012/07/porno-for-chemists-
an-interview-with-uncle-fester.html

Now some background and I suggest that googling “Steve Preisler” will amaze.

He gets pissed at being jailed for applied chemistry so he opens Pandora’s Box. For two decades and some change, the underground writer known as “Uncle Fester” has been writing genuinely influential books. While his name may not come up  in graduate dissertations and intellectual salons, the import of Fester’s oeuvre can be descried in the hand-written labels of sealed evidence bags and in the photo-documented environs of police-cordoned clandestine drug labs all over the globe.

Although they present information that can be gleaned from standard chemistry texts, books like Home Workshop Explosives, Silent Death, and of course, Secrets of Methamphetamine Manufacture are perennial candidates for state censorship. Indeed, the mere existence of such literature can be enough to disturb the sensibilities of otherwise stalwart defenders of the First Amendment.

It may not help that Fester is a competent ­ and damn entertaining ­ writer who knows his shit and does his homework. A onetime National Merit Finalist who repeatedly aced his SATs, Fester double majored in chemistry and biology at Marquette University, graduating with a BS degree and a bright future. It was around this time that a taste for tweak landed Fester ­ then known as Steve Preisler ­ behind bars, a fateful turn out of which, like Sade and Genet, he would find his true calling, and have his revenge.

 

TOP-SECRET – UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/UNODC-OpiumSurvey-2012.png

 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012

  • 112 pages
  • May 2013

Download

Afghanistan cultivates, produces and process narcotics that are a threat to the region and worldwide. However, the international community also needs to understand that Afghanistan itself is a victim of this phenomenon. The existence of hundreds of thousands of problem drug users, as well as decades of civil war, terrorism and instability are all related to the existence of narcotics in the country.

According to the findings of this survey, the total area under cultivation was estimated at 154,000 hectares, an 18 per cent increase from the previous year. Comparisons of the gross and net values with Afghan’s licit GDP for 2012 also serve to highlight the opium economy’s impact on the country. In 2012, net opium exports were worth some 10 per cent of licit GDP, while the farmgate value of the opium needed to produce those exports alone was equivalent to 4 per cent of licit GDP.

On the basis of shared responsibility and the special session of the United Nation’s General assembly in 1998, the international community needs to take a balanced approach by addressing both the supply and the demand side equally. In addition, more attention needs to be paid to reduce demand and the smuggling of precursors as well as provide further support to the Government of Afghanistan.

  • The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2012 was estimated at 154,000 hectares, a 18% increase from the previous year.
  • The vast majority (95%) of opium cultivation took place in nine provinces in Afghanistan’s Southern and Western regions, which include the country’s most insecure provinces. In mirroring the polarization in the security situation between the lawless south and the relatively stable north of the country, this confirms the link between security and opium cultivation observed in previous years.
  • Hilmand remained Afghanistan’s major opium-cultivating province, followed by Farah, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Nimroz, Nangarhar, Badghis, Badakhshan, Kunar, Day Kundi, Hirat, Laghman, Zabul, Kapisa, Ghor and Kabul.
  • Opium cultivation increased in most of the main poppy-cultivating provinces, including in Hilmand itself (19%). However, relatively less poppy was cultivated inside the Hilmand “Food Zone”, where agricultural support programmes are implemented, than in the rest of the province.
  • Based on preliminary results from other countries, opium cultivation in Afghanistan represented 64% of global cultivation in 2012.
  • Total eradication of opium poppy increased by 154% in 2012 due to an increase in Governor-led eradication (GLE) in all regions, which accounted for 9,672 hectares.
  • Even though the area eradicated was the equivalent of less than 6.5 % of the total area under opium cultivation, with a total of 102 fatalities and 127 injured, the human cost of the eradication campaign was far higher in 2012 than in the preceding year.
  • Average opium yield amounted to 23.7 kilograms per hectare in 2012, which is 47% less than in 2011 (44.5 kilograms per hectare). This was due to a combination of a disease of the opium poppy and adverse weather conditions, particularly in the Eastern, Western and Southern regions of the country.
  • Potential opium production was estimated at 3,700 tons in 2012. While a 36% decrease from the previous year, based on preliminary results for some countries and regions, this figure represented 74% of global potential production.
  • The opium yield and production estimates of the years 2006 to 2009 were revised downward after a careful review revealed data quality problems which had led to an overestimation of the per-hectare yield.
  • Accounting for 69% of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan in 2012. The Western region was the country’s second most important opium-producing region, with 23% of national production.
  • At US$ 0.73 billion, or the equivalent of roughly 4% of the country’s estimated GDP, the farm-gate value of opium production in 2012 fell by 49%.
  • The gross export value of opium and heroin/morphine exports in 2012 was US$ 2.0 billion (US$ 2.6 billion in 2011). The net export value of Afghan opiates in 2012 was US$ 1.94 billion. Far smaller, the gross value of the domestic market for the drugs was estimated to be US$ 0.16 billion.
  • A comparison of these gross and net values with the licit 2012 GDP of Afghanistan (US$ 18.95 billion) shows the magnitude of the Afghan opium economy. In 2012, net opium exports were worth some 10% of licit GDP, while the farm-gate value of the opium needed to produce those exports alone was equivalent to 4% of licit GDP. The net value of the domestic market for opiates is small by comparison, but still worth approximately 1% of licit GDP.
  • On average, poppy-growing households in Afghanistan continue to have a higher cash income than households that do not grow poppy.
  • Between 2011 and 2012, per-hectare gross income from opium cultivation decreased by 57% to US$ 4,600, virtually the same level as in 2010. Farmers reported average expenditure corresponding to 28% of gross income, leading to a net income of US$ 3,300 per hectare.
  • In 2012, opium prices remained very high but decreased slightly in all regions of Afghanistan, though in the Eastern, Western and Southern regions, in particular, they showed signs of stabilization at a high level. There is thus a clear incentive for Afghan farmers to continue cultivating opium.
  • In general, opium-growing villages are situated significantly further from the nearest agricultural market than non-opium-growing villages, suggesting that market accessibility and farmers’ options for cultivating legitimate agricultural produce and to cultivate opium are issues that needs to be addressed.
  • The link between opium cultivation and lack of development is shown by the fact that while over 90% of non-poppy-growing villages have a boys’ school and almost three quarters a girls’ school, these proportions drop to 61% (boys’ school) and 19% (girls’ school) in poppy-growing villages. The possible negative long-term effect of having less access to education than their contemporaries, and the absence of schools for girls in over four fifths of poppy-growing villages in particular, is worrying.
  • Cannabis cultivation is closely related to poppy cultivation: 71% of poppy-growing villages reported cannabis cultivation in 2012, while only 2% of poppy-free villages reported it.

TOP-SECRET – Unveiled – Iran’s New Sea-based Missiles

                         GMT – 21:54 / تهران – 02:24

گروههاي خبري
عناوين کل اخبار
انتخابات ٩٢
اجتماعي
اقتصادي
بين الملل
سياسي
دانشگاه
فرهنگي
ورزشي
استانها
عکس
صوت و تصوير
سياست خارجي
ديدگاه
فضاي مجازي
حماسه و مقاومت
ديپلماسي عمومي و جنگ نرم
انتشارات
آرشيو اخبار :
92/02/22 – 10:31
شماره: 13920216000464
نسخه چاپيارسال به دوستان
سردار فرحی در گفت‌وگو با فارس اعلام کرد
تجهیز شناورهای سپاه به موشک‌های کروز با برد بیش از ۳۰۰ کیلومتر

رئیس سازمان هوافضای وزارت دفاع و پشتیبانی نیروهای مسلح از برنامه‌ریزی برای تحویل موشک‌های کروز پیشرفته با برد بیش از ۳۰۰ کیلومتر به نیروی دریایی سپاه خبر داد.

خبرگزاری فارس: تجهیز شناورهای سپاه به موشک‌های کروز با برد بیش از ۳۰۰ کیلومتر

 

سردار سید مهدی فرحی رئیس سازمان هوافضای وزارت دفاع و پشتیبانی نیروهای مسلح در گفتگو با خبرنگار دفاعی خبرگزاری فارس، با اشاره به تجهیز نیروهای مسلح از سوی این وزارتخانه به انواع تسلیحات نظامی ازجمله موشک و راکت گفت: تاکتیک‌ها و نحوه استفاده از این تجهیزات و تسلیحات به عهده فرماندهان نیروهای مسلح است.

وی ادامه داد: محصولات متعددی از جمله موشک‌های 300 کیلومتری در اختیار نیروی دریایی سپاه است.

فرحی تاکید کرد: بزودی محصولات جدید دیگری با بردهای مختلف و قابلیت‌های فوق‌العاده پیشرفته و از نوع کروز در اختیار نیروی دریایی سپاه قرار می‌گیرد.

رئیس سازمان هوافضای وزارت دفاع و پشتیبانی نیروهای مسلح اظهار داشت: دقت و برد موشک‌های جدید نسبت به موشک‌های 300 کیلومتری که اکنون در اختیار نیروی دریایی سپاه است، افزایش یافته است.

فرحی همچنین تاکید کرد: این موشک می‌‌تواند توان دفاعی ما را در نبردهای دریایی افزایش دهد.

به گزارش فارس، موشک‌های کروز ساحل به دریا و سطح به سطح با قابلیت‌های خاص خود، می‌توانند در مقابله با انواع تهدیدات، تاکتیک های خود را تغییر داده و این تغییر تاکتیک‌ها نیز در اختیار فرمانده نیرو قرار دارد.

موشک های کروز که امکان شلیک آنها از روی شناور نیز وجود دارد، می‌توانند از روی شناورهای با سرعت بالای 30 نات (حدود 60 کیلومتر) نیز شلیک شوند که از نمونه های قبلی در این حوزه می توان به موشک های کروز ظفر، نصر، نور، قادر و غدیر اشاره کرد.

انتهای پیام/

 

 

Iran’s New Sea-based Missiles

 


A sends:

Source : http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920216000464

Today 5-12-2013, General Farahi, the chief of the Iranian Ministry of Defense’s Aerospace Organization, has announced a new series of fast-acting sea-based rockets and missiles have been produced and turned over to IRGC’s Navy force. This force is responsible for “the security” of the Persian Gulf and the infamous Hormoz Strait.

According to publications by FarsNews, a semi-state-run media, IRGC’s Navy has been operating a series of fast-acting rockets and missiles fit to be fired from small-scale fast boats named “Zafar”, “Nasr”, “Nour”, Ghader” and “Ghadir”, but the newly produced “Cruise Type” missile which is unnamed in the report, has a firing speed of 300 Km/h and can be fired from a moving boat at a speed of 30 knots.

Netizens.

 


Cryptome unveils – Francis “Frank” Archibald, Jr. CIA Covert Head

 Francis “Frank” Archibald, Jr.

A sends: Archibald is reported to be the new head of CIA Clandestine Service.

http://archibaldinsc.blogspot.com/2010_12_01_archive.html (Blog of Francis X. Archibald, Sr.)

Francis “Frank” X. Archibald, Jr. and his wife, Lisa, of McLean, VA.

 


 

Francis “Frank” Archibald, Jr., CIA Covert Head

Intelius.com[Image]
Google Maps[Image]
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Public Intellligence – DHS Infrastructure Protection Report: Elementary and Secondary Schools

 

DHS Infrastructure Protection Report Series

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • September 15, 2011

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Approximately fifty million students attend nearly 100,000 public elementary and secondary schools throughout the Nation. Elementary and secondary schools are relatively open-access, limited egress congregation points for children, and have been successfully targeted by terrorists in the past.

Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity

Terrorists have a wide variety of weapons and tactics available to achieve their objectives. Specific threats of most concern to schools include:

  • Small arms attack
  • Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
  • Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)
  • Arson or incendiary attack
  • Chemical or biological attack

Terrorist activity indicators are observable anomalies or incidents that may precede a terrorist attack. Indicators of an imminent attack requiring immediate action may include the following:

  • Persons in crowded areas (e.g., school auditorium, cafeteria, athletic facilities) wearing unusually bulky clothing that might conceal suicide explosives or weapons
  • Vehicles approaching the school at an unusually high speed or steering around barriers and traffic controls
  • Suspicious or illegally parked vehicles on or near school grounds
  • Unattended packages (e.g., backpack, briefcase, box) that may contain explosives. Packages may be left in open areas or may be hidden in trash receptacles, lockers, or similar containers.
  • Evidence of unauthorized access to heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) areas of a school; indications of unusual substances near air intakes
  • Suspicious packages and/or letters received by mail that might contain explosives or chemical/biological/ radiological agents.

Indicators of potential surveillance by terrorists include:

  • Persons using or carrying video/camera/observation equipment in or near the school over an extended period
  • Persons parking, standing, or loitering in the same area over a multiple-day period with no reasonable explanation
  • Persons questioning school employees off-site about practices pertaining to the school and its operations
  • Persons discovered with school maps, photos, or diagrams with key components or sensitive areas highlighted
  • Suspicious personal e-mail, telephone, fax, or postal mail requests for information about the school or its operations
  • A noted pattern of false alarms requiring a response by law enforcement or emergency services
  • Threats by telephone, mail, or e-mail and/or increase in reports of threats from known reliable sources

Common Vulnerabilities

The following are key common vulnerabilities of elementary and secondary schools:

  • Relatively open access to school grounds and buildings
  • Limited or no vehicle access controls
  • Large concentrations of students gathering in open areas outside school buildings on a regular and readily observable schedule
  • Proximity of schools and neighboring facilities, especially in urban areas
  • Limited or no inspection of students’ personal articles, particularly in lower-crime areas
  • Limited security on school buses

Protective Measures

Protective measures include equipment, personnel, and procedures designed to protect a facility against threats and to mitigate the effects of an attack. Protective measures for elementary and secondary schools include:

Planning and Preparedness

  • Designate an employee as security director to develop, implement, and coordinate all security-related activities
  • Conduct security audits on a regular and continuing basis. Develop a comprehensive security plan and emergency response plan for the school
  • Conduct regular exercises of emergency plans
  • Establish liaison and regular communication with local law enforcement and emergency responders

Personnel

  • Conduct background checks on all school employees
  • Incorporate security into employee training programs
  • Provide security information and training to all students

Access Control

  • Define the facility perimeter and areas within the facility that require access control. Maintain building access points to the minimum needed
  • Issue photo identification badges to all school employees and students
  • Require visitors check in with the front office upon arrival and departure
  • Provide visitors with school issued identification badges when on school grounds.
  • Positively identify all vehicles and drivers that enter the school parking lots
  • Institute a policy restricting other vehicles from accessing the bus-loading zone
  • Secure ladders, awnings, and parapets that provide access to building roofs, HVAC systems, and other critical equipment

Barriers

  • Install appropriate perimeter barriers and gates. Maintain clear area at perimeter barriers to enable continuous monitoring and to inhibit concealment of people or packages
  • Establish a clear zone adjacent to buildings. Keep zone free of vegetation and other obstructions
  • Install barriers to protect doors and windows from small arms fire and explosive blast effects

Communication and Notification

  • Install system(s) that provide communication with all people at the school, including employees, students, emergency response teams, and visitors
  • Develop a plan for communicating with parents during emergency situations
  • Develop a notification protocol that outlines who should be contacted in emergencies.
  • Develop a procedure for communicating with the public and the media regarding security issues

Monitoring, Surveillance, Inspection

  • Evaluate needs and design a monitoring, surveillance, and inspection program
  • Provide visual surveillance capability (e.g., designated surveillance points, cleared lines of sight)
  • Install intrusion detection and alarm systems
  • Deploy personnel assigned to security duty to regularly inspect sensitive or critical areas
  • Continuously monitor all people entering and leaving the facility for suspicious behavior
  • Continuously monitor all vehicles approaching the facility for signs of threatening behavior

Infrastructure Interdependencies

  • Ensure that the school has adequate utility service capacity to meet normal and emergency needs
  • Ensure that employees are familiar with how to shut off utility services
  • Provide adequate physical security for utility services

Cyber Security

  • Develop and implement a security plan for computer and information systems hardware and software
  • Maintain a well-trained computer security staff
  • Incident Response
  • Ensure that an adequate number of emergency response personnel are on duty and/or on call
  • Provide training and equipment to emergency response personnel to enable them to deal with terrorist-related incidents
  • Check the status of all emergency response equipment and supplies on a regular basis
  • Develop a plan for discharging students following incident resolution

Unveiled by Cryptome – Gina Cheri Haspel, ex-Acting CIA Covert Head

Gina Cheri Haspel, ex-Acting CIA Covert Head

 


Thanks to John Dinges, Gawker,  HENRIE @CHIMUCHYO, Cryptocomb and others.

Gina Cheri Haspel served as acting head of CIA Clandestine Service until the recent appointment of Francis “Frank” Archibald. Both are “undercover” officers — until now.

In addition to information provided by others above, Haspel served in New York in 2012 (MyLife) and in Ethiopia in 1988 (Key officers of foreign service posts (May 1988)).

From Intelius (addresses 1 and 2 are London; address 8 is Ankara):

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Thanks to Henrie for pointing.

From The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in Clandestine Service, Henry Crumpton, 2012:

My NR [CIA National Resources] deputy, who had served me well, departed after my first year for another assignment. I was able to convince Gina to be my new deputy. She had multiple overseas tours, serving as a chief of station in one especially challenging place. She also had honchoed an important office in CTC. But soon after her arrival, the new DDO, Jose Rodriguez, asked that she be bumped upstairs to serve as his chief of staff.

I needed to find another deputy fast. I was sulking in Gina’s office, asking her if she had any ideas about her replacement.

“Sure. Right here in NR. She’s pulled together a crack team of young officers who love her. She’s a leader. Donna.”

“Well, of course. She would be great. Why didn’t I think of her?” I knew the reason. She was not an operations officer. She was a reports officer. I served a bias, like other operations officers, and it was a fault. Donna had had multiple tours abroad. She knew the division as well as anybody, and she understood the substantive issues better than anybody. Her collection initiatives had helped the division more than double intelligence production in a year. With her help, the division had also boosted its recruitment of foreign agents. She could lead, and not just those under her direct command. She could build and lead effective networks across the Agency, across the intelligence community. Best of all, she would not tolerate any bullshit, including mine. I had seen her rip the bark off a few arrogant, macho case officers who had challenged her.

I stuck my head out the door and asked my secretary to get Donna.   She arrived in a few seconds, pad and pen in hand, and plopped down on the couch. Gina was behind her desk.

“Well, what do you want?” Donna asked, wondering about our silence and grins.

“Hank has decided on his new deputy,” Gina said.

“Oh, good. Who?”

“You,” I answered. Donna gasped, then blinked rapidly.

“You have to be kidding,” Donna finally responded.

“Nope,” I said. “You are the best. You, in fact, are the only candidate,” Gina added.

“Gina, you can start her in-brief,” I instructed, as I walked out the door, leaving them to sort out the transition. That was one of the best management decisions that I ever made.

 


SECRECY NEWS – SENATE CONFIRMS CHAIR OF PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES BOARD

Almost a year and a half after he was nominated by President Obama in December 2011, the Senate yesterday confirmed David Medine to be the chairman of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board by a vote of 53-45. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_cr/medine.html Republicans, led by Sen. Charles Grassley, opposed the nominee and voted against him. “I was disappointed that he failed to answer a basic yes-or-no question about national security law: ‘Do you believe that we are engaged in a war on terrorism?’,” Sen. Grassley said. “Instead of a simple yes or no, he opted for a more limited answer that military power is permissible in appropriate cases.” Democrats, led by Sen. Patrick Leahy, praised Mr. Medine and the Board that he will now lead. “The confirmation of this nominee is a significant victory for all Americans who care about safeguarding our privacy rights and civil liberties,” Sen. Leahy said. “The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is a guardian of Americans’ privacy rights and civil liberties as well as an essential part of our national security strategy,” he said. But this seems like an overstatement. The size of the five-member Board and the resources available to it are not commensurate with the responsibilities it has nominally been assigned. It cannot possibly perform comprehensive oversight of the broad range of privacy or civil liberties concerns that arise in the national security domain. Expectations to the contrary are bound to be disappointed. At best, the Board may serve as a boutique oversight shop that tackles a couple of discrete policy issues each year. For background on the origins and development of the Board, see Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status, Congressional Research Service, August 27, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34385.pdf INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS, AND OTHER DOD DIRECTIVES The procedures by which the U.S. Air Force establishes international agreements for the exchange of intelligence information with foreign military services were described in a new Air Force Instruction. “Foreign military organizations being considered for inclusion in an IIA (international intelligence agreement) must clearly support U.S. security and foreign policy objectives. The foreign government must have favorable relations with the United States; a well-developed, secure intelligence service; and a stable domestic environment and military unity. Known national characteristics of the foreign government in question must fall within the guidelines of the United States national disclosure and security policy, and be reasonably expected to have adequate fiscal means, and conform to legal guidelines,” the Instruction states. Such agreements must “Provide for mutual support (quid pro quo)” and must “Provide intelligence that would otherwise be denied to the United States.” See Air Force Instruction 14-102, International Intelligence Agreements, April 29, 2013: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afi14-102.pdf Another new Department of Defense Instruction governs records management within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “It is DoD policy,” it states, “to limit the creation of records to those essential for the efficient conduct of official business and to preserve those of continuing value while systematically eliminating all others.” See OSD Records and Information Management Program, Administrative Instruction 15, May 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ai15.pdf Other noteworthy new military publications include the following. Information Operations (IO), DoD Directive 3600.01, May 2, 2013: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3600_01.pdf DODD 5134.10 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), DoD Directive 5134.10, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5134_10.pdf THE U.S. SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE, AND MORE FROM CRS New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has not made available to the public include the following. The U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce: Recent, Current, and Projected Employment, Wages, and Unemployment, May 6, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43061.pdf Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42834.pdf Tax Reform in the 113th Congress: An Overview of Proposals, May 6, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43060.pdf Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, May 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf Terrorist Watch List Screening and Background Checks for Firearms, May 1, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42336.pdf Missing Adults: Background, Federal Programs, and Issues for Congress, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34616.pdf Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21721.pdf Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, May 7, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative Discipline in the House of Representatives, May 2, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31382.pdf No-Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational, and Legal Considerations for Congress, May 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41701.pdf Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2013, May 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/subscribe/ To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/unsubscribe/ OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: https://members.fas.org/donate _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: http://www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood@fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691

Trotz Internet-Attacken der “GoMoPa”:Wer wirklich und tatsächlich Geld erhielt: “GoMoPa” und Genossen !

hacker

Alle Internettacken der mutmasslichen STASI-Typen der “GoMoPa” können die Wahrheit nicht stoppen.

Klar ist, nicht ich, sondern “GoMoPa” erhielt Geld von S&K.

Nicht ich, sondern “Dr. Rainer Zitelmann” wurde bei Springer als Immobilienredakteur entfernt, nachdem sich der Verlag mit seinen Schriften zu Adolf Hitler und Auschwitz auseinandergesetzt hat.

Ich habe nie bei Axel Springer gearbeitet. Dies kann jeder bei Springer nachprüfen.

Nicht ich, sondern “GoMoPa” und “Dr. Rainer Zitelmann”  haben Beraterverträge mit deutschen Immobilienfirmen.

Die Latrinenparolen sollen doch nur von den tatsächlichem Korruptionsnetzwerk und den alten Genossen und deren Seilschaften ablenken,

wie dies bereits oft versucht wurde.

Und dann wenn alles nichts hilft, werden unseren Seiten gehackt und mit DDoS-Hacker-Attacken angegriffen…

Das leuchtet doch jedem ein ! Hilflose Versuche der korrupten Seilschaften von “GoMoPa” und Genossen.

Und ganz sicher ist auch: Ich bin kein Fähnchen im Wind !

Hier noch einmal meine detaillierte Stellungnahme.

Bernd Pulch

Liebe Leser,

wieder einmal versucht die dubiose “GoMoPa” und deren Handlanger, Konsorten und Komparsen mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” und “Nawito” von mutmasslich eigenen Taten abzulenken und mir perfide den “Schwarzen Peter” zuzuschieben.

Wie bereits im Falle meines angeblichen falschen Magistertitels, dem Fall Meridian Capital etc pp die Liste ist endlos.

Ein Sammelsurium von  Kolportagen, Fabeln, Märchen und Latrinenpatrolen…

Dabei liegen die Beweis klar auf dem Tisch:

Die renommierten und etablierten Medien wie “ZEIT” und “Süddeutsche Zeitung” haben es aufgedeckt, was hier im Fall “S &K”/”GoMoPa” wirklich lief.

http://www.zeit.de/2013/11/Finanznachrichtendienst-Gomopa

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/mutmassliche-anlagebetrueger-sk-die-akte-midas-1.1620191-4

Nachdem zahlreiche Internetangriffe nichts gebracht haben, nun wieder dieser Unsinn.

Hier noch einmal meine Stellungnahme zu der “GoMoPa”/Ehlers/Nawito-Absurdistan-Agit-Propaganda:

Dear Readers,

let me just briefly comment a mental cyberattack which should distract your attention from the real issues.

I have never had any consulting position or contract for any German company.

I have never worked for the Axel Springer Publishing House – not even as a freelance journalist.

These facts are clear and can be verified easily – just by calling Axel Springer.

The facts are

1) Dr. Rainer Zitelmann worked for the Axel Springer Company. You can esaily find out what happened there. I just mention the word “Auschwitz” in this context…As you see from his website and in the internet Zitelmann is in fact consulting many German companies.

2) “GoMoPa” had in fact a consultation contract with estavis and got in fact money from estavis and many various companies i.e. “S&K”

These contracts are known and 100% true and published by various media i.e. “ZEIT”, “MANAGER MAGAZIN”, “SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG” etc.

3) Meridian Capital was the subject of “GoMoPa”s articles.

4) “Nawito” whover or whatever it is did not even bother to contact us.

5) The “information” about one of our companies is false.

6) The “Nawito” informer “Peter Ehlers” did in fact attack Chancellor Merkel and the Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble as “Deutschlands bekannteste Hehler” to name just one fact about “Peter Ehlers” or whatever his name might be who by the way got a lot of money from the bancrupt SAM AG which was also subject of “GoMoPa”‘s reporting and we know similiar cases of this endeavour.

7) The last editor who was attacked by such cyberattacks died in a very mysterious way, Heinz Gerlach. He might have been controversial but nevertheless – the truth is the truth.

He was the first journalist to publish the truth about the mysterious headquarter of “GoMoPa” in New York and their consulting contract with estavis and died suddenly and totally unexpected for most of us – not for all.

The circumstances of his death remain unsolved for me.

We are ready to proof this everytime and do not work with “colportations”.

Obviously cyberattacks on our websites since years are not enough to keep the truth down – defamation must be added – a wellknown STASI technique to irritate the public – MENTAL AND PYSICAL CYBERATTACKS done by the well-know suspects.

Sincerely your

Bernd Pulch

Magister Artium der Publizistik, Germanistik und Komparatistik

PS

COPIES OF PHYSICAL CYBER ATTACKS ON OUR SERVERS BY THE SUSPECTS AND “INFORMERS” OF “NAWITO”

graph eastern

graph 3

graph2

graph

The attacked website are for example:

http://www.investment-on.com

http://www.berndpulch.org

http://investment-magazin.com

http://www.investment-magazin.tv

and about 20 more.

CONFIDENTIAL-Taiwanese Violating U.S. Laws to Prevent Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHICAGO—A resident of Taiwan whom the U.S. government has linked to the supply of weapons machinery to North Korea, and his son, who resides in suburban Chicago, are facing federal charges here for allegedly conspiring to violate U.S. laws designed to thwart the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, federal law enforcement officials announced today.

Hsien Tai Tsai, also known as “Alex Tsai,” who is believed to reside in Taiwan, was arrested last Wednesday in Tallinn, Estonia, while his son, Yueh-Hsun Tsai, also known as “Gary Tsai,” who is from Taiwan and is a legal permanent resident in the United States, was arrested the same day at his home in Glenview, Illinios.

Gary Tsai, 36, was ordered held in custody pending a detention hearing at 1:30 p.m. today before Magistrate Judge Susan Cox in U.S. District Court in Chicago. Alex Tsai, 67, remains in custody in Estonia pending proceedings to extradite him to the United States.

Both men were charged in federal court in Chicago with three identical offenses in separate complaints that were filed previously and unsealed following their arrests. Each was charged with one count of conspiring to defraud the United States in its enforcement of laws and regulations prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, one count of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by conspiring to evade the restrictions imposed on Alex Tsai and two of his companies by the U.S. Treasury Department, and one count of money laundering.

The arrests and charges were announced by Gary S. Shapiro, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois; Cory B. Nelson, Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the FBI; Gary Hartwig, Special Agent in Charge of Homeland Security Investigations in Chicago; and Ronald B. Orzel, Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Export Enforcement, Chicago Field Office. The Justice Department’s National Security Division and Office of International Affairs assisted with the investigation. U.S. officials thanked the Estonian Internal Security Service and the Estonian Prosecutor’s Office for their cooperation.

According to both complaint affidavits, agents have been investigating Alex and Gary Tsai, as well as Individual A (a Taiwanese associate of Alex Tsai) and a network of companies engaged in the export of U.S. origin goods and machinery that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. The investigation has revealed that Alex and Gary Tsai and Individual A are associated with at least three companies based in Taiwan—Global Interface Company Inc., Trans Merits Co. Ltd., and Trans Multi Mechanics Co. Ltd.—that have purchased and then exported, and attempted to purchase and then export, from the United States machinery used to fabricate metals and other materials with a high degree of precision.

On January 16, 2009, under Executive Order 13382, which sanctions proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Alex Tsai, Global Interface, and Trans Merits as proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems and prohibiting any person or company in the United States from knowingly engaging in any transaction or dealing with Alex Tsai and the two Taiwanese companies.

In announcing the January 2009 OFAC order, the Treasury Department said that Alex Tsai was designated for providing, or attempting to provide, financial, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), which was designated as a proliferator by President George W. Bush in June 2005. The Treasury Department asserted that Alex Tsai “has been supplying goods with weapons production capabilities to KOMID and its subordinates since the late 1990s, and he has been involved in shipping items to North Korea that could be used to support North Korea’s advanced weapons program.” The Treasury Department further said that Global Interface was designated “for being owned or controlled by Tsai,” who