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At an October 10, 1983, meeting, Deputy Chairman of the KGB Kryuchkov confirmed to East German foreign intelligence spy chief Markus Wolf that some Soviet KGB agents abroad had begun systematically reporting on indicators of a possible Western nuclear first strike.  In this conversation, Kryuchkov provides a bona fide to Gordievsky’s published February 1983 cable (Document 9) by stating that the KGB intelligence directorate had given “a few assignments to some KGB resident agents abroad who have to report on them every two weeks.”

Kryuchkov attempted to explain the necessity of RYaN to Wolf by stating that “Currently strategic nuclear weapons can be used in less than 24 hours.  So this is about the phase of decision-making, and about working out a system that denies the adversary the option of a surprise.”

For his part, Wolf appeared skeptical of the concept of RYaN, writing in a 1984 an appended note that RYaN “must be complemented, revised, and made more precise,” and bemoaning “the problem of not getting deceived” by faulty indicators. He concluded that “clear-headedness about the entire RYaN complex” was a “mandatory requirement.”  In an addendum that Wolf drafted, he stressed the need to know the “actual situation” rather than the picture presented by Operation RYaN’s indicators. “Constant and ongoing assessments,” he wrote, “have to be made whether certain developments actually constitute a crisis or not.”