CC BCP POLITBURO RESOLUTION “B” PROTOCOL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND STASI

Quellbild anzeigen

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
The CC BCP Politburo approves the protocol for cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi), agreed upon at a September meeting in Berlin.

CREATORS
TSANKOV, GEORGI

CHERVENKOV, VULKO

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Bulgarian Communist Party. Central Committee
Intelligence operations
Germany (East). Ministry for State Security (Stasi)
Intelligence service–Bulgaria
Bulgaria. Ministry of Internal Affairs
Bulgaria–Foreign relations–Communist countries
More …
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Bulgaria
East Germany

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110718

REVEALED – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY NO. 1 FOR THE PERIOD 0800 25 MAY TO 0800 2 JUNE 1988

Quellbild anzeigen

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document describes Warsaw Pact military exercises conducted between 25 May and 2 June 1988. Summarized in detail, the comprehensive exercise brought all facets of the combined forces to “wartime strength” in response to a theoretical threat posed by NATO.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Eastern Europe
Poland
Russia

[Source: Institute of National Remembrance (IPNBU) 1408/2. Translated for CWIHP by
Gary Goldberg.]
[letterhead] GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
Deliver at 0800 2 June SECRET
Copy Nº 4
Exercise
[Original Polish receipt and
declassification stamps]
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
Nº 1
(for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988)
Warsaw
1988
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Nº 1
for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988

  1. In accordance with the growing threat of the “BLUES”, the “REDS” performed a
    covert operational deployment of selected formations and units in [their] armed forces.
    The following measures were performed within the framework of general preparations:
  • the dispatch of servicemen and reserves to military schools, courses, retraining, and
    command-staff training has been stopped; servicemen in courses are being recalled to
    their units;
  • troops in temporary locations are being recalled to their garrisons with the exception of
    formations at wartime strength and undergoing training (exercises) at training areas;
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    formation of detachments for engineer preparation of the terrain began on 1 June and
    which will be made ready to carry out work on behalf of the 3rd Front beginning [inserted
    by hand: 2] June.
  • [the following] have been deployed at field control posts: by 1 June, the staff of the 3rd
    Front, by 0800 2 June, the staffs of the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies;
  • by 26 May formations and units have been inspected for the deployment of elements
    of the mobilization base;
  • the discharge of reservists being trained has been halted. Equipment received from
    the economy has been left in the units;
  • since 1 June aircraft and helicopters received from the economy are being accepted
    and reequipped;
  • beginning 26 May a 24-hour watch has been established in all the armed forces and
    also in military commissariats; [there are] full shifts in national air defense troops and at
    the remaining HQs – reduced [shifts];
  • the border forces and selected units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have increased
    security at the border, airfields, and seaports.
  1. According to a 25 May directive of the GK OVS in the Western TVD he has planned a
    frontal defensive operation for 1 June. In response to the actions of the “BLUES” the
    forces allocated from the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Armies and also the engineer troops are
    preparing defensive positions in the main defensive zone.
    At the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    allocated combined-arms units, air forces, navy, missile troops and artillery, and REhB,
    intelligence, and communications have been brought up to wartime strength under the
    guise of an exercise and work on behalf of the economy and into full combat readiness
    in permanently deployed locations or contingency [neplanovye] areas.
    A. The 2nd Army (GDR Peoples Army)
  • by 25 May the 11th msd had been brought up to wartime strength and beginning on 31
    May together with a battalion of engineer vehicles it began engineer preparations of the
    2nd and 3rd positions of the main defensive zone in the sector south of SZCZECIN and
    BARLINEK;
  • on 25 May the Druzhba-88 exercise began at the DRAWSKI training area in which the
    18th msd, 25th td (of the 8th Army), and missile troops and artillery of the Army are
    participating;
  • [the following] have been brought up to wartime strength under the guise of
    preparations for an exercise: by 28 May, the 19th td; by 30 May, the 30th msd. The
    formations are being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations and are
    undergoing training in combat teamwork [slazhivanie] in garrison training centers.
  • the 29th msd was brought up to wartime strength by 2 June; after regrouping it is
    beginning to prepare the defense of the coastline in the sector DZIWNÓW,
    KOLOBRZEG.
    B. The 6th Army (USSR Armed Forces)
  • under the guise of preparations to carry out work on behalf of the economy the 2nd
    msd was brought up to strength by 25 May; together with the allocated engineer forces
    it is making engineering preparations of the second and third positions in the main
    defensive zone in the sector ZAGAN, PIENSK;
  • the 1st td was brought up to wartime strength starting 23 May and is training at the
    ZAGAN Training Area;
  • on 26 May the 3rd msd and on 30 May the 4th msd were brought up to wartime strength
    and brought into readiness at permanently deployed areas.
    C. The 3rd Army (Czechoslovak National Army)
  • the 31st td was brought up to wartime strength on 25 May and beginning 30 May it is
    making engineering preparations of positions in the main defensive zone together with a
    battalion of engineer vehicles of the 3rd isbr in the sector SLUBICE, GUBIN;
  • beginning 24 May the 33rd msd is conducting planned training at the WEDRZYN
    Training Area;
  • on 28 May the 32nd msd and on 31 May the 34th msd were brought up to wartime
    strength and began training in garrison areas to be brought into readiness for
    operations.
    D. The 8th Army (Polish Armed Forces)
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces by 26
    May the system of mobilization expansion of Army formations and units was inspected
    and mobilization documentation amplified;
  • under the guise of a planned exercise formations and units of the missile troops, air
    defense, REhB, and intelligence have been brought up to wartime strength and control
    posts have been provided; beginning 25 May they have been brought into readiness in
    reserve assembly areas or in training areas;
  • the 25th td has been brought up to wartime strength and is taking part in the Druzhba88 exercise at the DRAWSKI Training Area;
  • the training of the 21st td is underway at the Orzysz Training Area.
    E. The 11th vdbr
  • after the brigade was brought up to wartime strength it was brought into readiness at
    the reserve assembly area.
    F. The 12th Coastal Defense Brigade
  • it was brought up to wartime strength by 25 May under the guise of joint exercises with
    the Navy and is being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations.
    G. The 41st rmd [expansion unknown, but presumably a division, possibly a reserve
    mechanized division]
  • the formation of two mechanized regiments, communications, and air defense subunits
    began on 2 June.
    In reconnaissance forces
    Electronic intelligence units are reconnoitering the armed forces of the “BLUES” at the
    indicated lines [rubezhakh].
    Special reconnaissance units and subunits are conducting training in combat teamwork
    and are being brought into readiness for action.
    Reconnaissance aircraft are conducting intensified reconnaissance along the coastline
    and the western border of Poland.
    In REhB forces
    The 24th op-N [expansion unknown] and 8th op-N have been conducting training in
    combat teamwork at the MUSZAKI Training Area since 26 May.
    The remaining REhB units are conducting intensified training in garrison. Ten percent of
    REhB resources are on a round-the-clock watch.
    In Missile Troops and Artillery
    The formations of operational tactical missiles, field missile technical bases, the 8th
    apabr [Army Field Gun Artillery Brigade], the 21st ap BM [Heavy Artillery Regiment],
    and the 15th aiptap [Army Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment] in permanently deployed
    locations were brought up to wartime strength by 28 May.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and deployed by 29 May:
  • the 15th apabr and the 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Regiment (oapr) in border regions
    in the zone of the 2nd Army;
  • the 6th apabr and the 6th apar in border regions in the zone of the 6th Army;
  • the 3rd apar in firing positions west of Rzepin.
    [The following] are undergoing training in training areas:
  • the 3rd apabr and 3rd adnar [possibly “Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion”] since 27
    May at the Wedrzyn Training Area;
  • the 6th orap [Independent Aerial Reconnaissance Regiment] has been at the Zagan
    Training Area since 26 May;
  • the 15th orap is taking part in the Druzhba-88 exercise.
    The remaining missile and artillery frontal and Army formations and units are being
    brought into readiness by 2 June for operations in permanently deployed locations and
    assembly areas.
    9K714 [Oka tactical] missile battalions have been on alert since 25 May in garrison
    training areas.
    Tactical missile battalions and reconnaissance/strike and fire groups of first echelon
    formations are being brought into readiness in assembly areas.
    Conventionally-armed missiles will be delivered to rendezvous points (PV) by 0400 4
    June in order to train the allocated forces of the missile troop and artillery for a air
    defense operation:
  • to PV-1 – WEGORZEWO – four operational-tactical [missiles] and 16 tactical (4 [of
    them] “T”);
  • to PV-2 – WRONKI – eight operational-tactical;
  • to PV-3 – SWIEBODZIN – 12 tactical (4 [of them] “T”);
  • to PV-4 – RUDNA – 27, including 11 operational-tactical and 16 tactical (4 [of them]
    “T”).
    In the air forces
    Training in the combat teamwork of the operations of tactical groups is being conducted
    in formations and units. Airborne command posts were rebased from army aviation units
    to the landing fields of the respective HQs by 2 June where they are being kept in
    combat readiness Nº 2.
    The preparation of AUD [airfield sections of roads] for the dispersion of aircraft has been
    completed. The forward ground support echelons at all airfields have been brought into
    readiness for regrouping at the indicated airfields or at intermediate assembly areas.
    The second echelons are providing support to the air regiments’ missions.
    Aviation ammunition has been stored up to full scale in aircraft parking areas in
    readiness for immediate mounting.
    In the air defense troops
    By 2 June the air forces and air defense forces SKP [possibly “launch command post”]
    of the front and the SKP of Army aviation and air defense had been regrouped to the
    designated areas and maintained in readiness.
    First echelon SAM and radiotechnical units of the Front and armies have been
    regrouped from permanently deployed locations to designated areas and brought into
    readiness in accordance with decisions made in the Front, armies, and formations.
    The 8th zrp and air defense units of the 8th Army have been brought up to wartime
    strength and brought into readiness at permanently deployed locations.
    The radiotechnical troops of the air defense of the ground forces began to work on
    wartime radio frequencies beginning at 0800 2 June.
    [The following] are on combat alert in the air defense system:
  • in SAM regiments (zenap) – one battery each in readiness Nº 2 and one battery each
    in readiness Nº 3;
  • in SAM brigades [and] the Krug zrp – one battalion each (less two batteries) in
    readiness Nº 2 and one battalion (less two batteries) in readiness Nº 3.
    In engineer troops
    By 26 May engineer units which were performing work on behalf of the economy had
    returned to their garrisons.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and into readiness at permanently
    deployed locations under the guise of preparations for an exercise:
  • by 30 May, the 6th and 15th isbr’s, the 6th and 15th pomp’s, the 6th itp [Engineering and
    Technical Regiment], the 29th ib PU [Engineer Battalion for Equipping Control Posts],
    and the 220th Fortification Regiment;
  • by 2 June, the 3rd and 21st isbr’s and the 3rd itp.
    Minelaying equipment and mines are being issued and distributed from centrallysubordinate depots.
    Subunits of engineer vehicles of first echelon armies together with combined-arms
    formations began the fortification of lines in the main defense zone beginning 31 May.
    The 220th Fortification Regiment together with detachments for engineer preparation of
    the terrain began the engineering preparation of blocking positions and front line
    positions.
    The 283rd maskb [Camouflage Battalion] was brought into readiness by 26 May and
    began the construction of dummy areas in accordance with the Front plan.
    In the chemical troops
    [The following] have been brought into readiness under the guise of preparations for
    exercises:
  • the RAST [computation and analysis station] and rear RAST of the Front and armies in
    areas where Front and army control posts are deployed, by 26 May;
  • radiation and chemical reconnaissance subunits were brought up to wartime strength
    and into readiness for operations in assembly areas by 29 May.
    The peacetime system of radiation and chemical reconnaissance began operating in the
    country beginning 1 June.
    In signal troops
    Under the guise of preparations for exercises signals troops regrouped in areas where
    Front, army, and formation control posts are deployed by 28 May. Communications
    centers were ready for operation by 31 May.
    Radio, radiorelay, and cable communications have been organized. Satellite and
    troposphere communications have been readied for operation. Communications on
    wartime frequencies have been organized in all troop arms.
    In the services of the rear
    Planned measures are being carried out for the timely and complete deployment of the
    men and equipment of the operational rear and the organization of a field system of
    supply on behalf of the troops of the 3rd Front.
    The rear control posts of the 3rd Front, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies, and the rear
    formations and units of the 3rd Army (3rd omo [Independent Medical Detachment], and
    6th Army (6th mbu [Medical Reinforcement Brigade] were deployed by 0800 2 June.
    Full-scale mobile and operational reserves have been stockpiled in line units [v
    voyskakh]. Current supply of the troops is done from working stocks at garrison depots.
    Materiel resources are loaded onto combat vehicles and the transport vehicles of first
    echelon formations.
    Preparatory measures are being taken at military depots and the bases of the economy
    for a mass issue, loading, and distribution of material resources.
    Readiness to carry out missions to ensure the survivability of the transportation system
    (transshipment points, ports, approaches to crossings] has been verified.
    The preparedness of transportation resources (vehicles, trailers, rolling stock, ships)
    has been inspected and the priority of their movement (transfer by the armed forces)
    when making massive military shipments has been verified. The technical
    documentation of the construction of parallel bridges and crossings has been checked
    as well as the technical condition of bridges.
    Organizational measures for a continuous supply of nurses for the military medical
    service have been completed. Evacuation hospital equipment has been supplemented.
    Restrictions on the use of fuel have been introduced in the economy.
    Blood bank supplies at civilian donor stations intended for immediate delivery to the
    armed forces have been inspected.
    In the technical services
    The 23rd FRB was brought up to strength within the framework of planned exercises by
    24 May and sent to the TORUN Training Area where it is undergoing training in combat
    teamwork and special training.
    The organizational nucleus [orgyadro] for the 22nd FRB and 21st GFRB [expansion
    unknown] was called up by 28 May.
    Equipment received from the economy is being inspected.
    The 225th and 228th orpdn [Independent Missile Transportation Battalion] have been
    brought into readiness to receive missiles and to leave for the designated areas.
    Beginning 2 June under the guise of preparations for exercises, it began to be brought
    up to wartime strength at the location of permanent deployment of the 6th ARB.
    THE COMBINED BALTIC FLEET
    In accordance with a directive of the Commander of the OBF, the headquarters of the
    USSR BF [Baltic Fleet], Polish Navy, and GDR Peoples Navy have updated [utochnili]
    plans to defend the coastline.
    The allocated strike, anti-mine, and other support forces returned to their bases by 2000
    1 June after completing exercises and training launches of missiles. It is intended to
    complete the training of a combined ship squadron by 5 June. The plans for the
    coordination between the HQs of fleets and concerned formations have been updated.
    Naval reconnaissance forces (ship, aircraft, and radioelectronic) have been conducting
    continuous tracking of the operations of groups of ships of the Western Baltic fleet.
    Twenty-five percent of the water crossing equipment [plavsredstva] has been received
    from the economy. Sixty percent of the preparatory work on them has been done. Work
    is being done to rapidly deploy ships undergoing repair. Fifty percent of the ships have
    been demothballed by the crews. Work is continuing on the rest.
    Crews are being urgently trained for ships coming on line. The forces that perform
    verification trawling of coastal channels and the PLO forces to search and track
    submarines of the Western Baltic fleet have been augmented. Rear and technical
    support formations and units are being brought into readiness and are distributing
    reserves of material resources. They are deploying a system of temporary basing,
    supply, repair, and support to the forces in the areas in which they are serving.
    Internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
  1. At the instruction of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Country, the
    internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
    achieved readiness for operation by 30 May.
    Beginning 1 June the defense of seaports and airports was strengthened, as well as
    [these] borders:
  • northern – by the forces of the Baltic Border Troops Brigade (Baltic br PV);
  • western – by the forces of the Maritime, [Liubuski], and [Lurzicki] br PV.
  • southern – by the forces of the Sudety and [Gornoslenski] br PV.
    The border troops were subordinated to the Commanding General of the 3rd Front by 2
    June.
    Units of the internal troops and territorial defense troops had returned to MPD [their
    permanently deployed locations] by 26 May and are undergoing training in combat
    teamwork exercises in barracks-like [prikazarmennye] training grounds.
  1. Locations of permanent deployment
    Number Formations, units Location
    1
    2
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    1.
    2.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    Baltic brPV
    Maritime brPV
    [LIUBUSKI] brPV
    [LURZICKI] brPV
    SUDETY brPV
    [GORNOSLENSKI]
    19th Internal Troops
    Brigade (brVnV)
    10th brVnV
    6th brVnV
    Warsaw Territorial
    Defense Brigade (brTO)
    Katowice brTO
    Wielkopolski Territorial
    Defense Regiment (pTO)
    Szczecin pTO
    Wroclaw pTO
    Krakow pTO
    Gdansk pTO
    Kielce pTO
    KOSZALIN
    SZCZECIN
    KROSNO ODRZANSKIE
    LUBAN
    KLODZKO
    GLIWICE
    OLSZTYN
    KRAKÓW
    GÓRA KALWARIA
    WARSAW
    KATOWICE
    POZNAN
    SZCZECIN
    WROCLAW
    KRAKÓW
    GDANSK
    KIELCE
  2. Authorized organizational structure
    A. PV brigades (brPV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • two border guards battalions of 400 men each;
  • a maneuver battalion (of four companies);
    Total: 1260 men.
    Border troops battalion
  • HQ and staff;
  • six PV companies (rPV) of 60 men each;
    Total: 400 men.
    B. Brigade of internal troops (brVnV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • four infantry battalions;
  • a signals battalion;
  • a reconnaissance battalion;
  • an engineer battalion;
    Total: 1800 men.
    C Territorial defense brigade (brTO)
  • HQ and staff;
  • six TO battalions of 400 men each;
    Total: 2,500 men
    D. Territorial defense regiment
  • HQ and staff;
  • seven TO companies of 100 men each;
    Total: 760 men.
    EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

Exposed – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY NO. 1 FOR THE PERIOD 0800 25 MAY TO 0800 2 JUNE 1988

Quellbild anzeigen

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document describes Warsaw Pact military exercises conducted between 25 May and 2 June 1988. Summarized in detail, the comprehensive exercise brought all facets of the combined forces to “wartime strength” in response to a theoretical threat posed by NATO.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Eastern Europe
Poland
Russia

[Source: Institute of National Remembrance (IPNBU) 1408/2. Translated for CWIHP by
Gary Goldberg.]
[letterhead] GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
Deliver at 0800 2 June SECRET
Copy Nº 4
Exercise
[Original Polish receipt and
declassification stamps]
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
Nº 1
(for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988)
Warsaw
1988
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Nº 1
for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988

  1. In accordance with the growing threat of the “BLUES”, the “REDS” performed a
    covert operational deployment of selected formations and units in [their] armed forces.
    The following measures were performed within the framework of general preparations:
  • the dispatch of servicemen and reserves to military schools, courses, retraining, and
    command-staff training has been stopped; servicemen in courses are being recalled to
    their units;
  • troops in temporary locations are being recalled to their garrisons with the exception of
    formations at wartime strength and undergoing training (exercises) at training areas;
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    formation of detachments for engineer preparation of the terrain began on 1 June and
    which will be made ready to carry out work on behalf of the 3rd Front beginning [inserted
    by hand: 2] June.
  • [the following] have been deployed at field control posts: by 1 June, the staff of the 3rd
    Front, by 0800 2 June, the staffs of the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies;
  • by 26 May formations and units have been inspected for the deployment of elements
    of the mobilization base;
  • the discharge of reservists being trained has been halted. Equipment received from
    the economy has been left in the units;
  • since 1 June aircraft and helicopters received from the economy are being accepted
    and reequipped;
  • beginning 26 May a 24-hour watch has been established in all the armed forces and
    also in military commissariats; [there are] full shifts in national air defense troops and at
    the remaining HQs – reduced [shifts];
  • the border forces and selected units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have increased
    security at the border, airfields, and seaports.
  1. According to a 25 May directive of the GK OVS in the Western TVD he has planned a
    frontal defensive operation for 1 June. In response to the actions of the “BLUES” the
    forces allocated from the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Armies and also the engineer troops are
    preparing defensive positions in the main defensive zone.
    At the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    allocated combined-arms units, air forces, navy, missile troops and artillery, and REhB,
    intelligence, and communications have been brought up to wartime strength under the
    guise of an exercise and work on behalf of the economy and into full combat readiness
    in permanently deployed locations or contingency [neplanovye] areas.
    A. The 2nd Army (GDR Peoples Army)
  • by 25 May the 11th msd had been brought up to wartime strength and beginning on 31
    May together with a battalion of engineer vehicles it began engineer preparations of the
    2nd and 3rd positions of the main defensive zone in the sector south of SZCZECIN and
    BARLINEK;
  • on 25 May the Druzhba-88 exercise began at the DRAWSKI training area in which the
    18th msd, 25th td (of the 8th Army), and missile troops and artillery of the Army are
    participating;
  • [the following] have been brought up to wartime strength under the guise of
    preparations for an exercise: by 28 May, the 19th td; by 30 May, the 30th msd. The
    formations are being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations and are
    undergoing training in combat teamwork [slazhivanie] in garrison training centers.
  • the 29th msd was brought up to wartime strength by 2 June; after regrouping it is
    beginning to prepare the defense of the coastline in the sector DZIWNÓW,
    KOLOBRZEG.
    B. The 6th Army (USSR Armed Forces)
  • under the guise of preparations to carry out work on behalf of the economy the 2nd
    msd was brought up to strength by 25 May; together with the allocated engineer forces
    it is making engineering preparations of the second and third positions in the main
    defensive zone in the sector ZAGAN, PIENSK;
  • the 1st td was brought up to wartime strength starting 23 May and is training at the
    ZAGAN Training Area;
  • on 26 May the 3rd msd and on 30 May the 4th msd were brought up to wartime strength
    and brought into readiness at permanently deployed areas.
    C. The 3rd Army (Czechoslovak National Army)
  • the 31st td was brought up to wartime strength on 25 May and beginning 30 May it is
    making engineering preparations of positions in the main defensive zone together with a
    battalion of engineer vehicles of the 3rd isbr in the sector SLUBICE, GUBIN;
  • beginning 24 May the 33rd msd is conducting planned training at the WEDRZYN
    Training Area;
  • on 28 May the 32nd msd and on 31 May the 34th msd were brought up to wartime
    strength and began training in garrison areas to be brought into readiness for
    operations.
    D. The 8th Army (Polish Armed Forces)
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces by 26
    May the system of mobilization expansion of Army formations and units was inspected
    and mobilization documentation amplified;
  • under the guise of a planned exercise formations and units of the missile troops, air
    defense, REhB, and intelligence have been brought up to wartime strength and control
    posts have been provided; beginning 25 May they have been brought into readiness in
    reserve assembly areas or in training areas;
  • the 25th td has been brought up to wartime strength and is taking part in the Druzhba88 exercise at the DRAWSKI Training Area;
  • the training of the 21st td is underway at the Orzysz Training Area.
    E. The 11th vdbr
  • after the brigade was brought up to wartime strength it was brought into readiness at
    the reserve assembly area.
    F. The 12th Coastal Defense Brigade
  • it was brought up to wartime strength by 25 May under the guise of joint exercises with
    the Navy and is being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations.
    G. The 41st rmd [expansion unknown, but presumably a division, possibly a reserve
    mechanized division]
  • the formation of two mechanized regiments, communications, and air defense subunits
    began on 2 June.
    In reconnaissance forces
    Electronic intelligence units are reconnoitering the armed forces of the “BLUES” at the
    indicated lines [rubezhakh].
    Special reconnaissance units and subunits are conducting training in combat teamwork
    and are being brought into readiness for action.
    Reconnaissance aircraft are conducting intensified reconnaissance along the coastline
    and the western border of Poland.
    In REhB forces
    The 24th op-N [expansion unknown] and 8th op-N have been conducting training in
    combat teamwork at the MUSZAKI Training Area since 26 May.
    The remaining REhB units are conducting intensified training in garrison. Ten percent of
    REhB resources are on a round-the-clock watch.
    In Missile Troops and Artillery
    The formations of operational tactical missiles, field missile technical bases, the 8th
    apabr [Army Field Gun Artillery Brigade], the 21st ap BM [Heavy Artillery Regiment],
    and the 15th aiptap [Army Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment] in permanently deployed
    locations were brought up to wartime strength by 28 May.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and deployed by 29 May:
  • the 15th apabr and the 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Regiment (oapr) in border regions
    in the zone of the 2nd Army;
  • the 6th apabr and the 6th apar in border regions in the zone of the 6th Army;
  • the 3rd apar in firing positions west of Rzepin.
    [The following] are undergoing training in training areas:
  • the 3rd apabr and 3rd adnar [possibly “Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion”] since 27
    May at the Wedrzyn Training Area;
  • the 6th orap [Independent Aerial Reconnaissance Regiment] has been at the Zagan
    Training Area since 26 May;
  • the 15th orap is taking part in the Druzhba-88 exercise.
    The remaining missile and artillery frontal and Army formations and units are being
    brought into readiness by 2 June for operations in permanently deployed locations and
    assembly areas.
    9K714 [Oka tactical] missile battalions have been on alert since 25 May in garrison
    training areas.
    Tactical missile battalions and reconnaissance/strike and fire groups of first echelon
    formations are being brought into readiness in assembly areas.
    Conventionally-armed missiles will be delivered to rendezvous points (PV) by 0400 4
    June in order to train the allocated forces of the missile troop and artillery for a air
    defense operation:
  • to PV-1 – WEGORZEWO – four operational-tactical [missiles] and 16 tactical (4 [of
    them] “T”);
  • to PV-2 – WRONKI – eight operational-tactical;
  • to PV-3 – SWIEBODZIN – 12 tactical (4 [of them] “T”);
  • to PV-4 – RUDNA – 27, including 11 operational-tactical and 16 tactical (4 [of them]
    “T”).
    In the air forces
    Training in the combat teamwork of the operations of tactical groups is being conducted
    in formations and units. Airborne command posts were rebased from army aviation units
    to the landing fields of the respective HQs by 2 June where they are being kept in
    combat readiness Nº 2.
    The preparation of AUD [airfield sections of roads] for the dispersion of aircraft has been
    completed. The forward ground support echelons at all airfields have been brought into
    readiness for regrouping at the indicated airfields or at intermediate assembly areas.
    The second echelons are providing support to the air regiments’ missions.
    Aviation ammunition has been stored up to full scale in aircraft parking areas in
    readiness for immediate mounting.
    In the air defense troops
    By 2 June the air forces and air defense forces SKP [possibly “launch command post”]
    of the front and the SKP of Army aviation and air defense had been regrouped to the
    designated areas and maintained in readiness.
    First echelon SAM and radiotechnical units of the Front and armies have been
    regrouped from permanently deployed locations to designated areas and brought into
    readiness in accordance with decisions made in the Front, armies, and formations.
    The 8th zrp and air defense units of the 8th Army have been brought up to wartime
    strength and brought into readiness at permanently deployed locations.
    The radiotechnical troops of the air defense of the ground forces began to work on
    wartime radio frequencies beginning at 0800 2 June.
    [The following] are on combat alert in the air defense system:
  • in SAM regiments (zenap) – one battery each in readiness Nº 2 and one battery each
    in readiness Nº 3;
  • in SAM brigades [and] the Krug zrp – one battalion each (less two batteries) in
    readiness Nº 2 and one battalion (less two batteries) in readiness Nº 3.
    In engineer troops
    By 26 May engineer units which were performing work on behalf of the economy had
    returned to their garrisons.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and into readiness at permanently
    deployed locations under the guise of preparations for an exercise:
  • by 30 May, the 6th and 15th isbr’s, the 6th and 15th pomp’s, the 6th itp [Engineering and
    Technical Regiment], the 29th ib PU [Engineer Battalion for Equipping Control Posts],
    and the 220th Fortification Regiment;
  • by 2 June, the 3rd and 21st isbr’s and the 3rd itp.
    Minelaying equipment and mines are being issued and distributed from centrallysubordinate depots.
    Subunits of engineer vehicles of first echelon armies together with combined-arms
    formations began the fortification of lines in the main defense zone beginning 31 May.
    The 220th Fortification Regiment together with detachments for engineer preparation of
    the terrain began the engineering preparation of blocking positions and front line
    positions.
    The 283rd maskb [Camouflage Battalion] was brought into readiness by 26 May and
    began the construction of dummy areas in accordance with the Front plan.
    In the chemical troops
    [The following] have been brought into readiness under the guise of preparations for
    exercises:
  • the RAST [computation and analysis station] and rear RAST of the Front and armies in
    areas where Front and army control posts are deployed, by 26 May;
  • radiation and chemical reconnaissance subunits were brought up to wartime strength
    and into readiness for operations in assembly areas by 29 May.
    The peacetime system of radiation and chemical reconnaissance began operating in the
    country beginning 1 June.
    In signal troops
    Under the guise of preparations for exercises signals troops regrouped in areas where
    Front, army, and formation control posts are deployed by 28 May. Communications
    centers were ready for operation by 31 May.
    Radio, radiorelay, and cable communications have been organized. Satellite and
    troposphere communications have been readied for operation. Communications on
    wartime frequencies have been organized in all troop arms.
    In the services of the rear
    Planned measures are being carried out for the timely and complete deployment of the
    men and equipment of the operational rear and the organization of a field system of
    supply on behalf of the troops of the 3rd Front.
    The rear control posts of the 3rd Front, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies, and the rear
    formations and units of the 3rd Army (3rd omo [Independent Medical Detachment], and
    6th Army (6th mbu [Medical Reinforcement Brigade] were deployed by 0800 2 June.
    Full-scale mobile and operational reserves have been stockpiled in line units [v
    voyskakh]. Current supply of the troops is done from working stocks at garrison depots.
    Materiel resources are loaded onto combat vehicles and the transport vehicles of first
    echelon formations.
    Preparatory measures are being taken at military depots and the bases of the economy
    for a mass issue, loading, and distribution of material resources.
    Readiness to carry out missions to ensure the survivability of the transportation system
    (transshipment points, ports, approaches to crossings] has been verified.
    The preparedness of transportation resources (vehicles, trailers, rolling stock, ships)
    has been inspected and the priority of their movement (transfer by the armed forces)
    when making massive military shipments has been verified. The technical
    documentation of the construction of parallel bridges and crossings has been checked
    as well as the technical condition of bridges.
    Organizational measures for a continuous supply of nurses for the military medical
    service have been completed. Evacuation hospital equipment has been supplemented.
    Restrictions on the use of fuel have been introduced in the economy.
    Blood bank supplies at civilian donor stations intended for immediate delivery to the
    armed forces have been inspected.
    In the technical services
    The 23rd FRB was brought up to strength within the framework of planned exercises by
    24 May and sent to the TORUN Training Area where it is undergoing training in combat
    teamwork and special training.
    The organizational nucleus [orgyadro] for the 22nd FRB and 21st GFRB [expansion
    unknown] was called up by 28 May.
    Equipment received from the economy is being inspected.
    The 225th and 228th orpdn [Independent Missile Transportation Battalion] have been
    brought into readiness to receive missiles and to leave for the designated areas.
    Beginning 2 June under the guise of preparations for exercises, it began to be brought
    up to wartime strength at the location of permanent deployment of the 6th ARB.
    THE COMBINED BALTIC FLEET
    In accordance with a directive of the Commander of the OBF, the headquarters of the
    USSR BF [Baltic Fleet], Polish Navy, and GDR Peoples Navy have updated [utochnili]
    plans to defend the coastline.
    The allocated strike, anti-mine, and other support forces returned to their bases by 2000
    1 June after completing exercises and training launches of missiles. It is intended to
    complete the training of a combined ship squadron by 5 June. The plans for the
    coordination between the HQs of fleets and concerned formations have been updated.
    Naval reconnaissance forces (ship, aircraft, and radioelectronic) have been conducting
    continuous tracking of the operations of groups of ships of the Western Baltic fleet.
    Twenty-five percent of the water crossing equipment [plavsredstva] has been received
    from the economy. Sixty percent of the preparatory work on them has been done. Work
    is being done to rapidly deploy ships undergoing repair. Fifty percent of the ships have
    been demothballed by the crews. Work is continuing on the rest.
    Crews are being urgently trained for ships coming on line. The forces that perform
    verification trawling of coastal channels and the PLO forces to search and track
    submarines of the Western Baltic fleet have been augmented. Rear and technical
    support formations and units are being brought into readiness and are distributing
    reserves of material resources. They are deploying a system of temporary basing,
    supply, repair, and support to the forces in the areas in which they are serving.
    Internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
  1. At the instruction of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Country, the
    internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
    achieved readiness for operation by 30 May.
    Beginning 1 June the defense of seaports and airports was strengthened, as well as
    [these] borders:
  • northern – by the forces of the Baltic Border Troops Brigade (Baltic br PV);
  • western – by the forces of the Maritime, [Liubuski], and [Lurzicki] br PV.
  • southern – by the forces of the Sudety and [Gornoslenski] br PV.
    The border troops were subordinated to the Commanding General of the 3rd Front by 2
    June.
    Units of the internal troops and territorial defense troops had returned to MPD [their
    permanently deployed locations] by 26 May and are undergoing training in combat
    teamwork exercises in barracks-like [prikazarmennye] training grounds.
  1. Locations of permanent deployment
    Number Formations, units Location
    1
    2
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    1.
    2.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    Baltic brPV
    Maritime brPV
    [LIUBUSKI] brPV
    [LURZICKI] brPV
    SUDETY brPV
    [GORNOSLENSKI]
    19th Internal Troops
    Brigade (brVnV)
    10th brVnV
    6th brVnV
    Warsaw Territorial
    Defense Brigade (brTO)
    Katowice brTO
    Wielkopolski Territorial
    Defense Regiment (pTO)
    Szczecin pTO
    Wroclaw pTO
    Krakow pTO
    Gdansk pTO
    Kielce pTO
    KOSZALIN
    SZCZECIN
    KROSNO ODRZANSKIE
    LUBAN
    KLODZKO
    GLIWICE
    OLSZTYN
    KRAKÓW
    GÓRA KALWARIA
    WARSAW
    KATOWICE
    POZNAN
    SZCZECIN
    WROCLAW
    KRAKÓW
    GDANSK
    KIELCE
  2. Authorized organizational structure
    A. PV brigades (brPV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • two border guards battalions of 400 men each;
  • a maneuver battalion (of four companies);
    Total: 1260 men.
    Border troops battalion
  • HQ and staff;
  • six PV companies (rPV) of 60 men each;
    Total: 400 men.
    B. Brigade of internal troops (brVnV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • four infantry battalions;
  • a signals battalion;
  • a reconnaissance battalion;
  • an engineer battalion;
    Total: 1800 men.
    C Territorial defense brigade (brTO)
  • HQ and staff;
  • six TO battalions of 400 men each;
    Total: 2,500 men
    D. Territorial defense regiment
  • HQ and staff;
  • seven TO companies of 100 men each;
    Total: 760 men.
    EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

Unvealed – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY NO. 2 FOR THE PERIOD 0800 2 JUNE TO 1900 6 JUNE 1988

Quellbild anzeigen

Secret

Copy Nº 4

Exercise Shchit [Shield]-88

[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Nº 2

for the period 0800 2 June to 1900 6 June 1988

  1. Beginning at 1900 4 June, the BLUES, performing an operational deployment of troops under the guise of preparations for a strategic defensive exercise, began to create strike groupings in the immediate proximity to the border with the REDS.

By 0800 6 June selected missile troops, artillery, and air units were brought into readiness at launch and firing positions. Reserve airfields and road sections designated as runways have been prepared to accept aircraft.

Units assigned to protect the border have begun to form march columns in the areas they occupy.

At 1900 6 June a full combat alert was declared in all the armed forces.

  1. In response to the measures by the BLUES, the REDS accelerated the operational development of troops, especially the occupation of more advantageous areas and operational deployment areas.

The resources designed to launch a retaliatory missile and air strike were brought into full combat readiness at alternate launch and firing positions by 0800 6 June.

  1. Large formations, formations, and units of the 3rd Front are at permanently deployed locations, alert assembly areas, and operational deployment and defensive areas. Beginning 1900 6 June they have been brought into readiness in accordance with mobilization and operational deployment plans and the decisions of the commanders and chiefs of the troop arms and services taking part in the exercise.

EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document describes a Warsaw Pact military exercise known as Shield-88. The exercise addresses a theoretical scenario in which NATO forces suddenly prepare to launch an attack on Warsaw Pact territory.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Eastern Europe

Exposed – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 INFORMATION SUMMARY NO. 1 AS OF 0800 2 JUNE 1988

Quellbild anzeigen

[letterhead] General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

SECRET

Copy Nº 4

Exercise

[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]

MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE POLISH ARMY

INFORMATION SUMMARY Nº 1

(as of 0800 2 June 1988)

WARSAW

1988

MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE POLISH ARMY

INFORMATION SUMMARY Nº 1

(as of 0800 2 June 1988)

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

  1. The BLUES continue to extend a campaign of slander against the REDS, their allies, and supporters. They say that the REDS have upset the balance of forces and are seeking new conquests to distract their peoples’ attention away from economic difficulties. The governments of the REDS are allegedly rejecting all peace proposals and appeals from various organizations and people who enjoy worldwide respect.
  2. Hostile acts against diplomatic representatives of the REDS are increasing in the BLUE countries. In spite of this, diplomatic contacts of the countries united in opposing blocs are characterized by increased activity. Political representatives and leaders say that the purpose of their actions and efforts is to avert war.
  3. At a meeting of the UN Security Council convened on 12 June at their initiative the leaders of the REDS accused some BLUE countries of whipping up tension in Europe, increasing military-political interference in other regions of the world, and putting pressure on the governments of countries which are dependent on them. It was declared that their lying and slanderous propaganda against the REDS had gone far beyond the bounds of good practice in international relations and is evidence of an intent to aggravate relations and a desire to cover their own aggressive intentions and preparations.
  4. The governments of the BLUES are reinforcing the economic blockage of the RED countries. They are announcing or threatening to introduce an air and naval blockade of certain continental and ocean regions of the world. They are trying to subject the ships of some RED countries in these regions to illegal controls.
  5. The propaganda campaign of slander against the sociopolitical system and government leaders of the REDS is increasing. Along with this subversive centers are pursuing activity directed at dividing the public, exciting anti-social forces, and creating a political and subversive underground.
  6. In response to the increasing aggressiveness of the BLUES the leaders of the REDS published a joint statement which noted that “the only sensible outcome of the situation which has developed is the achievement of an agreement between the opposing groups”.

THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY

  1. The unfavorable influence of the international situation on the views and the mood of the population is being observed in all regions of the country. A reduction of interest in work is being noted at industrial enterprises. Nervousness, discord, disorganization, and a lowering of labor discipline are increasing among the managers of enterprises. There are increasingly fewer young people in class at higher educational institutions. In spite of appeals from authorities long lines are forming in front of stores, including people who should be working at the time. As regards the shortage of foods in Wroclaw, for example, there appeared calls for workers to “vigorously protest”, including striking. An increased movement of the population by rail and road is being observed. Telephone lines are overloaded. Malicious agitation and undesirable phenomena are increasing in the countryside. Almost all deliveries of agricultural products to purchase points have stopped. Speculation is increasing throughout the entire country.
  2. Subversive propaganda centers and anti-government underground activists are increasing activity directed at subverting the country’s defense policy and also at discrediting its armed forces and the ministry of internal affairs. The increased size of expenditures for defense in comparison with the scale of social needs is cited in radio broadcasts. The capabilities of the weapons and equipment of our Army are doubted and it is called a “hopeless army”. Hostile propaganda is increasing among workers calculated at generating protests against “work, wage, and standard of living” conditions and “the necessity of sticking to utopian solutions of the problem of the political system”.
  3. The hostility of views, moods, and statements of part of the population is increasing throughout the entire country, namely:

a) in some population centers attempts have been made to organize street demonstrations “in defense of freedom and peace”. Handbills are being distributed containing calls for the protection of people refusing to serve in the Army;

b) at some enterprises criticism and dissatisfaction with the supply of raw materials and resources is increasing;

Some of the workers say that “in view of the passivity of the authorities” who are not in control of the situation they ought to make decisions independently and also express the opinion that in the event war begins the authorities would not be able to ensure the normal functioning of the economy and public life;

c) handbills have been distributed in six industrial centers containing instructions to effectively put machines and production equipment out of commission;

d) pessimism is growing in all levels of society with respect to the possibility of a peaceful solution to contentious international problems. Part of the public is under the strong influence of malicious propaganda and does not see the possibility of a victory by the REDS in a possible war. The opinion is also expressed that our territory will be occupied by BLUE troops;

e) in some population centers acts of terrorism and sabotage with the use of small explosive charges have been committed (railroad stations, bus stations [avtostantsiya], stores, post offices). The population is demanding that authorities severely punish the guilty.

THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY

  1. The political attitudes, morale, and discipline of servicemen, especially regular army personnel, are good. Dedication and precision in carrying out assignments to maintain combat readiness are increasing. No negative phenomena are being observed in the sentiments in the Army. Individual statements and incidents encounter a vigorous rebuff from commanders.
  2. In spite of some nervousness, the personnel of command organizations exhibit a feeling of responsibility for the timely and meticulous accomplishment of assigned tasks. Increased educational work with soldiers, primarily with reservists, is being done by cadre personnel..
  3. Political organs are stepping up preparations for operations in combat conditions. They are successfully combating hostile influences on the personnel. Requests are coming from formations and units for relevant information about the military and political situation and for propaganda materials.

EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document provides a scenario in which the “Blue” governments have engaged in a campaign of increasingly hostile propaganda intended to discredit the “Red” bloc socioeconomic system. Consequently, domestic morale is low. The population has grown pessimistic and, in light of the international situation, feels emboldened to challenge the Red authorities and leaders.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Eastern Europe

INFORMATION ON THE ORDER OF IMPLEMENTING MILITARY TECHNICAL COOPERATION OF THE USSR WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Quellbild anzeigen

 

 

 

On the order of implementing military technical cooperation of the USSR with foreign countries

1.Decisions on questions of military technical cooperation of the Soviet Union and foreign countries are made by the USSR Council of Ministers after approval by the CPSU Central Committee.

In accordance with Resolution No. 878-210 of the USSR Council of Ministers from July 30, 1987 “On measures to improve military technical cooperation with foreign countries,” consideration of concrete questions in this area is entrusted to the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on Military-Industrial Questions.

2.In accordance with Resolution No. 320 of the USSR Council of Ministers from March 12, 1988 practical implementation of military technical cooperation with foreign countries is entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Connections (MVES). This cooperation is intended to ensure the USSR conducts a unified foreign economic policy and safeguards its interests in foreign arms markets and the effectiveness of cooperation
3.Resolution No. 191 of the USSR Council of Ministers from February 28, 1989 has determined the functions fulfilled by the MVES to implement military technical cooperation together with the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gosplan, and other relevant Ministries and agencies, including:

– Consideration of the manner of foreign countries’ handling of deliveries of special property and provision of technical cooperation in its mastery, operation, and application;

– Implementation of delivery of special and other property from the USSR for the needs of armies, internal affairs agencies, and state safety;

– Provision of technical cooperation to foreign countries in creation of special units;

– Financial and monetary planning in all forms of operations among participants in military technical cooperation with foreign countries;

– Planning and organization of transfers of special property, its insurance, and ensuring the safety of delivery;

– Implementation of activities to secure the state and state secrets in work conducted and other functions;

In relation to the foregoing, the USSR MVES reserves the right:

– To communicate within the framework of its competency with institutions, organizations, and authorities of foreign states in the same way within the USSR as abroad, and to assign them and accept technical materials, samples, and documents from them in established order.

– To conduct talks and sign agreements as ordered by the Soviet government with foreign countries and to provide signatures on contracts with corresponding organizations in other countries;

– To send Soviet specialists abroad in established order in order to carry out their accepted duties and receive foreign delegations.

The USSR MVES implements military technical cooperation through the Main Engineering Administration, the Main Technical Administration, and the Main Administration on Cooperation, which are independent domestic organizations of this Ministry with rights as legal entities.

Reference: The measures by which the state regulates foreign economic activities are determined by Resolution No. 203 of the USSR Council of Ministers from March 7, 1989, and it states that “Enterprises, unions, manufacturing cooperatives, and other Soviet organizations cannot export weapons, firearms, military equipment, explosive substances, nuclear materials… individual types of products and technologies that are used or may be used in the creation of weapons or military equipment, poisons, narcotics, or psychotropic substances… other types of products or services, whose export is forbidden, unless otherwise provided by legislation.”

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
List of responsibilities allocated to the USSR Council of Ministers, CPSU Central Committee, Ministry of Foreign Economic Connections, and other relevant ministries on issues relating to the implementation of military technical cooperation between the USSR and foreign countries.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization
Soviet Union–Military policy
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Soviet Union

LETTER FROM STALIN TO CDE. G. APRESOV, CONSUL GENERAL IN URUMQI

 

7 Atrocities Soviet Dictator Joseph Stalin Committed | HowStuffWorksCde. APRESOV!

Sheng Shicai’s letter made a depressing impression on our comrades. Only a provocateur or an hopeless “leftist” having no idea about Marxism could have written it. What could have happened that Sheng, having such an adviser as you, could have written us (me, Molotov, and Voroshilov) such a letter?

We are sending Sheng a suitable letter, but Cde. Svanidze will pass you a copy of our reply.

You should explain to Sheng the meaning of our reply and take steps so that the instructions given in our reply are followed.

I warn that if our instructions are not taken into consideration we will be forced to deny aid to Sheng.

The charter of the Union is not bad, but paragraph five about “equal rights” for women is not suitable for Xinjiang conditions and should be discarded.

Greetings!

I. STALIN.

27 July 1934

[a handwritten version of the above follows]

LETTER OF GOVERNOR SHICAI SHENG TO CDES. STALIN, MOLOTOV, AND VOROSHILOV

Sheng Shicai - Wikiwand

Governor Shicai Sheng expresses his firm belief in Communism, his desire to overthrow the Nanjing Government and construct a Communist state in its place, and the need to establish a Communist Party branch in Xinjiang. Emphasizing his long study of Marxist theory, he requests that Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov allow him to join the Communist Party.

CREATOR
SHENG, SHICAI, 1897-1970

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Molotov, Vyacheslav M.
Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953
China–Politics and government–1912-1949
Communism–History–China
Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu (China)–History
Sheng, Shicai, 1897-1970
Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich, 1881-1969
China (Republic)–Foreign relations–Soviet Union
More …
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Soviet Union
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

Archive.

I. Stalin

Top Secret

Translation from Chinese

LETTER OF GOVERNOR SHENG SHICAI TO CDES. STALIN, MOLOTOV, AND VOROSHILOV

1. In August 1932 I sent letters to the Comintern and Mr. Stalin in which I briefly laid out my world view.

2. In this [letter] I consider it my duty to express deep gratitude for the great assistance you have given in calming Xinjiang and killing the bandit, Ma Zhongying.

3. In spite of the fact that I still am not a member of the Communist Party I have engaged in the study of Marxism and my faith in the triumph of Communism was a consequence of the study of historical materialism, “Das Kapital”, “The Communist Manifesto”, and “Critique of the Gotha Program”, which gives me the ability not to put myself in the ranks of blind imitators or collaborators.

A. The main importance of historical materialism is in the scientific explanation and interpretation of social development, in the evidence for the need to reorganize society, and in pointing out the ways for this reorganization.

B. On the basis of scientific methods and firmly established laws [like] “the law of the fall of profit” “Das Kapital” shows the inevitable demise of the hated capitalistic system at a certain stage of its development and the inevitability of the rise of Communism. Then he reveals a picture of the exploitation of the workers by the capitalists and the perniciousness (harm, malignance) of the surplus value they have created, and which factors are the causes of the appearance of the socialist revolution.

MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL VASILII CHUIKOV, PAVEL YUDIN, AND IVAN IL’ICHEV TO GEORGII MALENKOV CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN THE GDR

Georgy Malenkov: what “heir” of Stalin went to Church – The Global Domain  News

Malenkov

 

MAY 18, 1953
MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL VASILII CHUIKOV, PAVEL YUDIN, AND IVAN IL’ICHEV TO GEORGII MALENKOV CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN THE GDR

 

SECRET
Copy No.

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

18 May 1953
pg. 00195

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to Comrade G.M. Malenkov

In accordance with instructions from the CPSU CC, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany presents this report on the reasons for the departure of the population from the German Democratic Republic to West Germany, and also on proposals to end these departures.

In its note to the CPSU CC of 15 March 1953, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany delivered a detailed analysis of the economic and political situation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite the general economic improvements and political strengthening of the GDR, the departure of the population from the GDR to West Germany is growing, as is confirmed by the data furnished below:

1951

1952

4 mo. of 1953

1. In all, number who left the GDR

160,560

165,571

120,531

Left illegally

99,797

136,065

120,109

Moved with permission

60,763

29,506

422

2. Arrived in the GDR from West Germany

27,372

24,012

3,589

 

By their social composition, those who have left the GDR fall into the following categories:

1951

1952

4 mo. of 1953

Workers

27,173

35,300

17,784

White-collar workers

12,098

22,022

13,156

Peasants

1,250

4,022

7,555

Intelligentsia

2,062

3,044

2,498

Students

No data

1,064

814

Other categories and family members

57,214

70,613

78,302

 

Detailed data on social and age composition are contained in Appendix No. 1.
Of this number, 320 persons exited across maritime and zonal borders during the [first] four months of 1953; the rest left through Berlin.
The increase in the number of persons moving from the GDR to West Germany can be explained by an intensification of the class struggle in the city and the countryside, and also by the fact that in the practical work of implementing major economic and political measures, administration often is substituted for political mass work, and certain ministries [and] local party and state organs commit gross errors and excesses in regard to different strata of the population.
After the Second Conference of the SED [in 1952], the government of the GDR and the SED CC took a number of important decisions aimed at limiting capitalist elements in industry and trade, as well as the kulak class in the countryside.
The most important measures on limiting capitalist elements in the city are:

– limiting the supply of raw materials, electric power, and fuel to private industrial enterprises, and goods to private commerce, as well as ending the sale of new industrial equipment, freight vehicles, vessels, and transport and fishing fleets to private enterprises;
– liquidating the majority of large private wholesale firms by administrative procedure under the pretext that they were violating the laws of the GDR;
– implementing special measures to combat speculation and [cutting off] links between private entrepreneurs and firms in West Berlin and West Germany, as well as forcibly closing the branches of West German and West Berlin firms in the democratic sector of Berlin and the GDR;
– canceling some tax advantages earlier granted to large private industrial enterprises on the basis of laws enacted before 1945, as well as intensifying the recovery of [tax] arrears;
– transferring the owners of enterprises employing more than five workers, rather than the existing [cut-off point of] 10 workers, from the category of artisans to the category of industrial enterprises, which has led to a significant increase in the tax burden on this group and to their exclusion from membership in the artisan guilds.

The most important measures to limit capitalist elements in the countryside are:

– raising the norms on compulsory supplies of meat as compared to 1952 and sharply increasing measures on forcible collections of all arrears, going as far as criminal indictments and the confiscation of property;
– kulak farms are the last to be given access to MTS vehicles, and tariffs on them are raised to the level of actual cost of the service [uroven’ sebestoimosti], which is twice what is paid by farms of under 20 hectares;
– supplying mineral fertilizers to kulak farms only after the needs of agricultural cooperatives and the working peasantry have been met in full, which in practice has led to a sharp reduction in the supply of phosphorous fertilizer to these farms;
– ending grants of long-term credits to kulaks and limiting grants of short-term credits;
– farms having 20 or more acres of land and two or more full-time workers are not accepted as members of agricultural production cooperatives.

In 1953, the compulsory use through MTSs of kulak farms’ tractors and agricultural machines (after they had finished their work in the fields) on other peasant farms, which has deprived large farms of the opportunity to lease their tractors and agricultural machines on terms that are profitable for them.
Excluding kulaks from the governing board[s] of peasant mutual-aid committees and agriculture trade cooperatives, where they had significant economic and political influence.
The Politburo of the SED CC passed a resolution on accepting land from kulak farmers who wish to give it to the state, while leaving 6-7 hectares at their [i.e. the farmers’] disposal, if these peasants so desire. This resolution, announced by Ulbricht at a congress of peasants at the beginning of February this year, was taken as an indication of increased pressure on the kulak class.
All of this led a portion of the peasantry, chiefly large [peasants], to begin to give up their land. On 1 April 1953, 442,8 thousand ha., or 7.3% of the entire arable agricultural area of all peasant farms, including 393,0 thousand ha. from farms having over 20 ha. land, or 26% of the agricultural area of these sorts of farms, were abandoned and vacant.
It should be noted that the measures to limit capitalist elements in the city and the countryside in many cases are implemented without sufficient political and economic preparation, as a result of which some party and governmental measures have found insufficient support among a significant portion of the populace.

II.

With the general rise in the standard of living of the populace, a disjunction between the growth of the populace’s money income and the growth of commodity circulation developed toward the beginning of 1953. The fund of wages paid out in the first quarter of 1953 was 17.3% greater than that of the first quarter of the previous year; the volume of commodity circulation over this period rose by only 10% at comparable prices, while commodity circulation in the first quarter of 1953 compared with the fourth quarter of 1952 shrank and consisted of 6.030 million marks against 7.361 million marks in the fourth quarter of 1952.
The under-fulfillment of the production plan for consumer goods in the absence of corresponding reserves and the non-fulfillment of the export-import plan, led to an acute shortage of goods in the commercial network. In this way, the elevated requirements of the population were not wholly satisfied.
Data about the fulfillment of the plan by industry in the first quarter is shown in Appendix No.2.
The autumn and winter of 1952-1953, which were difficult for the GDR, and the weak organization of harvest work led to a significant drop in the harvest of sugar beets, oil crops, potatoes and vegetables. Besides this, the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the plan for stockpiles and purchases of agricultural goods in 1952 led to difficulties in the supply of food to the populace.
This made it necessary to halt commercial sales of fats and sugar in the first quarter of 1953, to substitute partially rationed fats and sugar with other goods, to abolish ration cards for private-capitalist elements and persons of free professions (this affected about 500,000 people), to abolish some additional ration cards for the intelligentsia, and also to raise the prices for meat given out through ration cards by 10-15%, and for commercially sold confectioneries by 12-50%.
With the cancellation of ration cards for footwear and for knitted goods, the fixed price level [uroven’ edinykh tsen] was left close to the previously effective commercial prices. Prices were raised on a significant portion of imported consumer goods.
In the course of the entire winter period, interruptions in the supply of coal and electricity to the populace in the republic occurred, as a result of which many schools, residential buildings, and socio-cultural [kul’turno-bytovye] establishments often went unheated.

III.

Recently the government of the GDR made a series of decisions on strengthening punitive policies in the struggle against the theft of people’s property, on criminal sanctions for evading state agricultural quotas and taxes, on limiting the activity of private wholesale firms, and on purging certain regions of dubious elements of questionable class. These decisions are basically correct. However, during the implementation of these decisions manifold excesses are being committed, as is expressed in the intensification of different sorts of repressive measures in relation to the populace. As a result of [these actions] the number of arrests of citizens and convicted persons significantly increased: if in the first half-year of 1952, 11,346 arrests were carried out, [and] in the second half-year 17,471, then during just the first quarter of 1953, 14,348 arrests were carried out.
Detailed data are provided in Appendices No. 3, 4, and 5.
By the directive adopted by the GEC on 23 September 1948, “On punishments for violations of economic order,” which is currently in effect, the police are given the right broadly to carry out arrests and searches on the grounds of only suspicion of economic crimes. On the basis of this directive, in 1952, 16,482 proceedings were instituted and 4,185 persons were arrested. In 1953, in only the first quarter, 5,094 proceedings were instituted and 2,548 persons were arrested.
There are many cases of incorrect arrests, unlawful and groundless searches in apartments and offices, [and] violations of the established arrest and custody procedure.
On 1 April 1953, there were 54,876 persons in the jails of the GDR; of these, up to 13,141 had not yet had their cases reviewed by the courts.

IV.

Within the SED CC and in local party organs, there is an underestimation of the political significance of the populace’s departure from the GDR to West Germany. This underestimation has manifested itself, in particular, in the directives of the SED CC. Thus, in letters from 6 January and 30 April of this year, no political evaluation was made of the issue and no measures are planned which would help bring about a fundamental change in the situation. In CC directives, the departure of party members from the GDR is not characterized as a party crime. Meanwhile, 2,718 members and candidates of the SED, and of these, 175 functionaries, were counted among those who left the GDR during the [first] four months of 1953. In addition, over that period, 2,610 members of the Union of Youth [FDJ] left.
Party organs exert almost no influence over the mass democratic organs–labor unions, the Union of Youth, and the Women’s League–in inducing them to carry out work to prevent the departure of the population from the GDR.
The press and radio of the GDR weakly expose the slanderous propaganda emanating from West Germany about the refugees, weakly publicize the measures taken by the government of the GDR to accommodate refugees who have returned to the Republic, by giving them work [and] living quarters, and guaranteeing other rights to them, [and they] rarely organize statements by persons who have returned from West Germany. Newspapers, as a rule, remain silent about the facts of the migration of residents of West Germany to the GDR, and do not use their statements for propaganda purposes.
Party and governmental organs commit serious distortions in the implementation of the SED’s policy with regard to the intelligentsia.
In the second half of 1952, the SED CC and the GDR government undertook a series of economic and political measures aimed at drawing the intelligentsia into active participation in cultural and economic construction. From 1 July 1952, the pay for engineering-technical and scientific workers was significantly increased, and for the most outstanding scientific and technical personnel, high personal salaries of up to 15,000 marks a month were established.
Despite this, the role of the intelligentsia in building the Republic and the necessity of involving the old intelligentsia is still underestimated within the party and the country. In a significant portion of enterprises, a sectarian relationship to the intelligentsia has still not been overcome. The intelligentsia is not drawn into active participation in the productive and social life of the enterprise.
There are serious drawbacks in the way ideological work with the intelligentsia is handled. In a crude and clumsy manner, demands are made for the reconstruction of all scientific work on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Due to this, scholars of the old school consider that, insofar as they are not Marxists, they have no prospects in the GDR.
Little attention is paid by the SED to organizing scientific discussions, to the free exchange of opinions, [and] the discussion of different problems in advanced science and practice, in the intelligentsia’s milieu.
To date, the linking and exchange of scientific activity between scientists of the GDR and scientists of the Soviet Union and social democratic countries is still insufficiently developed.
A feeling of anxiety for their personal safety is evident among broad circles of the intelligentsia and most of all among the technical intelligentsia. The instances of groundless accusations of sabotage constitute the reason for this sort of mood. The absence of the necessary explanatory work on this issue creates favorable conditions for the activity of enemies and the broad dissemination of all sorts of slanders.

V.

West German and Anglo-American authorities are carrying out economic and political diversions aimed at disrupting the five-year plan and at discrediting the policy of the GDR government before the populace. They have worked out a system of measures to entice engineering-technical, scientific and highly-qualified workers from the enterprises and establishments of the GDR.
In West Berlin, a high exchange rate of the Western mark in relation to the Eastern mark is being artificially maintained, making it profitable for the West Berlin population to buy food in the GDR. On the other hand, the acute shortage of high-quality consumer goods in the GDR and their presence in West Berlin attracts a large mass of the residents of the GDR into the Western sector[s] of Berlin. Providing West Berlin with a high level of supply of every imaginable good and lower prices for goods compared to the rest of West Germany has the aim of creating the impression among the population that a high standard of living in West Germany exists in comparison with the GDR.
One of the methods of enemy activity is to dispatch special recruiters to the GDR who entice qualified workers, engineers and technicians, and teachers of secondary and higher schools, to the West.
The West German authorities, the Americans, English, and French, systematically conduct propaganda on the radio in favor of the GDR population’s departure for the West, send large quantities of provocative letters, and give provocative telephone warnings of allegedly imminent arrests of GDR citizens.

VI.

The church, especially of late, is displaying an active role in enemy propaganda against the GDR. The leaders of the Protestant and Catholic Churches located in West Germany have taken the path of open struggle against the GDR; in sermons and in multiple letters, the clergy calls upon the populace to flee to the West.
The SED CC is committing some mistakes in its relations with the church.
On 27 January 1953, the SED CC made a decision on exposing the anti-democratic activity of the church youth organization “Junge Gemeinde.” It was proposed not to begin to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” through broad propaganda work among the populace, but through the organization of trials. In connection with this instruction, the organs of the MfS [Stasi] carried out the arrests of some clergymen and members of “Junge Gemeinde” in February and March. Due to the inadequacy and unconvincing character of the material, however, the trials have not yet been held. Then the SED CC gave an order to begin unmasking “Junge Gemeinde” in the youth press. During the implementation of these instructions, the accusation was made across the board that all of the members of “Junge Gemeinde” were members of the terrorist West German youth organization (BDJ). As a result of this the campaign to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” has currently exacerbated relations between the church and the state.
At one of the meetings with the first secretaries of the SED district committees, W. Ulbricht gave the order that open meetings were to be held in all institutions of higher learning and 12-grade schools of the League of FDJ to expose the “Junge Gemeinde,” in the course of which the expulsion of the leaders and most active members of “Junge Gemeinde” from schools and educational institutions was to be demanded. In certain schools the number of those expelled reaches 20-30 persons, and in each institution of higher education, the number of expelled students ranges from 5 to 20 persons; this in particular, has led to the fact that in March and April of this year alone, 250 people from 39 12-grade schools have fled to the West.

VII.

In the interest of halting the departure of the population to West Germany, it seems expedient to recommend the implementation of the following measures to the leadership of the GDR:

On economic issues:

1. To take measures toward the unconditional fulfillment of the industrial production plan for 1953, which is decisive for the fulfillment of the five-year plan. To liquidate the lag which took place from the beginning of the year and especially to devote attention to assuring the fulfillment of the plan for machine-building [industry], the introduction of electric power, and the development of [the] metallurgy [industry].
2. Over the course of a month, to work out measures to increase the 1953 consumer goods production plan and the development of commodity circulation.
For this purpose, the government of the GDR must take additional measures to import necessary raw materials: cotton–15-20,000 tons, wool–3,000 tons, heavy leather—2,500 tons. To increase imports of food stuffs (fats, fruits, and others) and some high-quality manufactured consumer goods. For this purpose, to assign additional output of high-quality production for export, in particular to capitalist countries, having found the necessary raw materials locally, using the free [industrial] capacities at hand, especially in precision mechanics and optics.
The GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade makes insufficient use of the possibilities of trade with capitalist countries. It is desirable to render necessary aid to the GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade through the trade representatives of the USSR and the people’s democracies in capitalist countries.
3. To oblige local organs of power to improve the leadership of local industry significantly. To oblige the GDR Gosplan [State Planning Commission] to re-examine within a month the 1953 production plans for local industry with a view to expanding them significantly.
4. In noting the underestimation of the role of manufacture in supplying the population with consumer goods, it is necessary to take governmental measures in support of crafts production. It is expedient, in keeping with the realization of artisans’ cooperatives, to organize supplies of raw materials for them on a contractual basis on the condition that they hand over their completed products to the state commercial network; to work out measures to offer artisans tax and credit advantages, and also to equip artisans’ cooperatives and individual enterprises with industrial equipment.
5. Considering that one of the reasons for the departure of peasants from the GDR to West Germany is the high norms for quotas of agricultural deliveries to the state, to reduce by 5-10% the differentiated norms in effect in 1953 for compulsory supplies of grain crops and meat by peasant farms.
6. To cancel ration cards for meat, fats and sugar from the autumn of 1953, thereby completing the elimination of the rationing system in the GDR, keeping in mind that the per-capita consumption norms that have been attained furnish the possibility of a transition to free commerce.
7. To work out a three-year plan on mechanizing agriculture, developing the MTS network, and equipping it with tractors and agricultural machinery in order to have the possibility of fulfilling the needs for mechanized cultivation of the land not only of agricultural cooperatives, but also of individual peasant farms.
8. To halt the practice of using tractors and agricultural machines from private cultivators through the MTS for work on other farms.
9. To work out a three-year plan to develop animal husbandry and to create a fodder base, assuming the need for future improvements in supplies to the populace from their own resources.
10. To work out a production plan for fertilizer in quantities that will meet in full the needs of agriculture, including large private farms.
11. To concentrate the attention of state and party organs on the organizational-economic strengthening of the agricultural production cooperatives which have been created in order to ensure, even this year, a harvest in the cooperatives that is larger than that of the best individual agricultural farms, and an income for cooperative members [that] exceeds the incomes of individual peasant farms.
12. In carrying out measures on limiting private-capitalist elements, to differentiate between attitudes toward large and small retailers and other small entrepreneurs (proprietors of small restaurants, hairdressers, bakers, and so on) with regard to taxes, credits, issuing food ration cards, supplying goods to merchants; and to use private commerce in the capacity of a commodity distribution network to serve the population.
13. Considering the populace’s great demand for construction materials, [as well as] agricultural and gardening equipment, to organize a broad trade in them, both in the city and the countryside, having ensured a portion of additional funds for cement, saw-timber, tiles and machine-manufactured articles; to increase the production of agricultural and gardening equipment.

On administrative issues:

1. In the near future, to carry out a broad amnesty both with regard to persons convicted in the first period for Nazi crimes, and, in particular, persons convicted in the most recent period, with the exception of persons convicted for espionage, terrorist acts, diversions, premeditated murder and for large thefts of the people’s property. 15-17,000 persons could be freed from prisons by the amnesty.
2. To take measures quickly toward the introduction of strict order and the observance of lawfulness in procedures for arresting and detaining citizens.
3. To organize expediently social courts [obshchestvennye sudy] in enterprises, in institutions, and at people’s estates [narodnye imeniia] to examine minor economic and administrative violations.
4. To re-examine the current criminal code to remove those articles of criminal law which permit their application to even the most inconsequential violations.
5. To cancel all criminal-legal orders containing the directives and circulars of separate ministries. Henceforward, to establish a procedure by which criminal-legal sanctions can be stipulated only in laws of the People’s Chamber, and in exceptional cases, in a decree by the government of the GDR.
6. To consider it crucial to carry out a reorganization of the communities [obshchiny] in the direction of enlarging and strengthening local authorities.
7. To carry out, in 1953, an exchange of passports for the entire population of the GDR and, first and foremost, for the population of the democratic sector of Berlin and its surrounding districts.
8. To re-examine the GDR government’s decree of 5 March 1953 on mass criminal indictments for the non-fulfillment of supply quotas [postavki] [to the state] and taxes.
9. In view of the fact that the migration of the population from the GDR to the West is taking place through Berlin, to consider it expedient to require GDR citizens to have passes [spravki] and business travel papers [komandirovochnye udostovereniia] from local institutions or organs of power upon entry into Berlin.

On political questions:

1. To end the political underestimation of the significance of the issue surrounding the departure of GDR citizens to West Germany that currently exists in party and state organs and among party workers. To oblige party organs and primary party organizations to analyze with care and to study all cases of departure and to take effective measures to ascertain the reasons influencing the population’s migration to West Germany.
To view the departure of members of the SED as a betrayal of the party. To investigate according to party procedure each case of departure by members of the SED to the West and to discuss [these cases] at general meetings of the party organizations and regional committees of the SED.
2. To commit the party and the mass democratic organizations of the GDR to conduct systematic explanatory work among the GDR populace against leaving for West Germany, exposing with concrete examples the slanderous fabrications, [and] the essence and methods of the subversive work which is being carried out by West German agents.
3. To take concrete measures to strengthen counter-propaganda, organizing it in such ways that the press and radio of the GDR systematically expose the mendacious Western propaganda on the issue of refugees from the GDR. To set aside the necessary resources for this.
4. In the interests of an effective struggle against the reactionary broadcasts of “RIAS,” to ensure the completion in 1953 of the construction of powerful radio stations in Magdeburg, Schwerin, and Dresden. To build 15 medium-wave low-power radio stations with up to 5 kilowatts of power and 10 short wave stations each with up to 2-3 kilowatts of power. To manufacture and deploy 400-600 “Gebor” radio sets.
5. In the interests of strengthening counter-propaganda, to organize through the KPD the systematic collection of information about the refugees’ difficult conditions and the poor material and legal conditions of different strata of the West German populace.
6. In order to expose the reactionary propaganda of the church, to explain in a detailed and systematic way through the press and in oral propaganda that the government of the GDR unswervingly observes freedom of conscience, of religion, and of religious observance, as provided for in the GDR constitution. To explain that the actions of the authorities are directed only against those church officials and leaders of “Junge Gemeinde” who conduct hostile subversive work against the democratic tradition of the GDR.
7. To take measures to correct the excesses which have been committed with regard to students expelled from school and from institutions of higher learning for belonging to the “Junge Gemeinde.”
8. For the SED CC to examine in particular the issue of improving work among the intelligentsia and to correct the mistakes that have been committed.
9. To take measures to improve scientific and cultural links between scholars in the GDR and in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies, as well as to supply the GDR intelligentsia with foreign scientific and technical literature.

V. Chuikov
P. Yudin
I. Il’ichev

18 May 1953.

 

Appendix No. 1

INFORMATION
on the social and age composition and party affiliation of those who left the GDR for West Germany

1. By social composition:

Second half of 1952

Four months of 1953

1. Workers

17,279

17,784

2. White-collar workers

14,178

13,156

3. Kulaks

1,124

4,085

4. Medium peasants

546

1,364

5. Small peasants

1,077

1,140

6. Scientific workers

20

58

7. Workers in the arts

216

8. Engineering-technical workers

344

870

9. Doctors

167

334

10. Lawyers

no data

120

11. Teachers and instructors in secondary and higher institutions of learning

588

900

12. Students

659

814

13. Church Employees

71

69

14. Artisans

no data

1,897

15. Owners of a commercial enterprise

no data

2,937

16. Owners of a private enterprise

no data

1,730

17. Pensioners

no data

4,286

18. Persons without definite occupation

no data

13,115

19. Housewives

no data

24,350

2. By age

Second half-year of 1952

Four months of 1953

Children up to 15

17606

29814

[Persons] from 15 to 18

5486

7234

from 18 to 25

13153

14871

from 25 to 40

18110

26725

from 40 to 50

11748

18788

from 50 to 60

7866

15045

over 60

3736

7632

3. By party affiliation: (only over 4 months of 1953)

Members and candidates of the SED

2,713

of them, functionaries

175

Members of the LDP

865

of them, functionaries

5

Members of the CDU

935

of them, functionaries

69

Members of the NDP

375

of them, functionaries

30

Members of the DKP

521

of them, functionaries

30

Members of the SSNM

2,610

of them, functionaries

30

4. By place of work (only over 4 months of 1953).

1. From state institutions and communal enterprises

5608

2. From people’s enterprises

7847

3. From enterprises under wardship

586

4. From large private enterprises

3027

5. From small private enterprises

9757

6. From “SAO” enterprises

882

7. From MTS [machine-tractor stations]

212

8. From agricultural food cooperatives

191

9. Individual peasants

3855

10. From peasant mutual-aid enterprises, commercial organizations and konzumy

2414

11. From party, union and mass organizations

266

Of the refugees:

1. Leaders of enterprises

375

2. Division heads

219

 

[Appendix No. II not included in original]

 

Appendix No. 3

INFORMATION
on persons convicted for 1951-1953
by punishment

Punishment

1951 1st half

2nd half

1952 1st half

2nd half

1953 1st quarter

Death penalty

10

7

6

8

3

Life imprisonment

13

12

22

32

16

Convict prison [katorzhnaia tur ‘ma] for over 10 years

74

88

64

159

115

from 5 to 10 years

472

781

1054

1136

912

up to 5 years

2543

3362

3578

4597

5150

Imprisonment for 3 to 5 years

250

287

383

329

183

Imprisonment for 1 to 3 years

3785

4448

5026

4561

2170

Imprisonment for up to 1 year

16216

13926

13778

17345

7031

Short-term arrest

392

408

559

403

201

Monetary fine

17812

14786

11101

13819

6245

Educational measures for adolescents

2179

2152

2577

2665

1281

Other sanctions

55

49

12

21

2

Total convicted

43801

40306

38160

45075

23309

 

Appendix No. 4

INFORMATION
on arrested persons under investigation
from 1952-1953 by types of crime

Types of crimes

First half of 1952

Second half of 1952

First quarter of 1953

Proceedings instituted

Persons arrested

Proceedings instituted

Persons arrested

Proceedings instituted

Persons arrested

1. Anti-democratic crimes

1197

1428

2624

3295

1752

2219

2. Espionage (Included in 1. above)

180

339

510

989

226

385

3. Possession of weapons

393

247

233

195

205

199

4. Opposition to authorities

496

273

679

339

300

188

5. SVAG Decree No. 160 (sabotage and diversions)

155

105

209

213

170

293

6. Law on preserving internal-German trade

1818

1757

1433

1084

804

703

7. Unlawful import and export of goods, as defined by 1948 decree of the NEK

1004

130

370

64

56

17

8. Non-fulfillment of state deliveries

238

38

584

130

750

336

9. Crimes against the people’s property

4053

688

2554

953

5344

3988

10. Murder and maiming

2074

333

2957

353

1915

256

11. Crimes against morality

2440

936

2594

1105

795

520

12. Theft of private property

35765

2404

28402

1899

4804

844

13. Violation of borders

5688

2842

2150

1275

13. Others

21852

3007

26328

4999

10838

3510

Total:

71485

11346

74655

17471

29883

14348

 

Appendix No. 5

INFORMATION
on arrested persons by their most recent
arrest from 1949-1953

Arrests over the second half of 1949

11,425 persons

Arrests over the first half of 1950

12,911 persons

Arrests over the second half of 1950

13,860 persons

Arrests over the first half of 1951

13,587 persons

Arrests over the second half of 1951

14,689 persons

Arrests over the first half of 1952

11,346 persons

Arrests over the second half of 1952

17,471 persons

Arrests over the first quarter of 1953

14,348 persons

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
The Soviet Control Commission in Germany reports statistics and a detailed assessment to Malenkov, analyzing the migration of the East German population to West Germany. It also includes proposals for implementing measures to prevent further departure from the GDR.

CREATORS
YUDIN, PAVEL F.

CHUIKOV, V. I. (VASILII IVANOVICH), 1900-1982

ILICHEV, IVAN

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Soviet Union
Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Germany (West)
Germany (East)–History–Uprising, 1953
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
East Germany
West Germany

WORKING NOTES FROM THE SESSION OF THE CPSU CC PRESIDIUM ON 4 NOVEMBER 1956 – HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956) - CVCE Website

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 4 November 1956
(Re: Protocol No. 51)

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov,Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov.

On the Operations and Situation in Hungary(1)
Cde. Kaganovich’s ciphered cable from
Cde. Malinin at Cde. Khrushchev (4 XI).(2)

1) Bring back Cdes. Mikoyan and Brezhnev.
2) Provide assistance to Hungary.(3)
3) More actively take part in the assistance to Egypt.(4)

Think through a number of measures (perhaps a demonstration at the English embassy). More widely in the newspapers.

Cde. Molotov—think about Hungary. Exert influence on Kadar so that Hungary does not go the route of Yugoslavia. They made changes in the Declaration—they now condemn the Rakosi-Gero clique—and this might be dangerous.(5) We must convince them that they should refrain from this reference to the Rakosi-Gero clique. Kadar is calling (1 XI) for a condemnation of Stalinism.(6) The title of Hungarian Workers’ Party should be retained. We should come to agreement with them and prevent them from shifting to Yugoslav positions.

Cde. Molotov—reinforce the military victory through political means.

Cde. Khrushchev—I don’t understand Cde. Molotov. He comes up with the most pernicious ideas.

Cde. Molotov—you should keep quiet and stop being so overbearing.

Cde. Bulganin—we should condemn the incorrect line of Rakosi-Gero.

Cde. Khrushchev:The declaration is good —we must act honorably.

Cde. Shepilov—during the editing they added the phrase “the clique of Rakosi and Gero.” We are giving them legal opportunities to denigrate the entire 12-year period of the HWP’s work.

Cde. Shepilov—is it really necessary to disparage cadres? Tomorrow it will be the “clique of Ulbricht.”(7)

Cde. Saburov—if they themselves don’t comprehend their mistakes, we will deal at length with the matter. Reward the military personnel. Take care of the families of those who perished. (8)

V. On Purging the Higher Educational Institutions of Unsavory Elements

(Cdes. Zhukov, Khrushchev, Furtseva, Pervukhin, Voroshilov) Furtseva, Pospelov, Shepilov, and Elyutin are to come up with recommendations for purging the higher educational institutions of unsavory elements.(9)

IV. On the Response to Cde. Kardelj and the Telegram About Imre Nagy

Affirm the text of the response.(10)

On Instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Hungary On the Raising of the Question at the Gen. Assembly’s Session on Hungary

Cde. Kadar is to say that he will withdraw the question from the UN.(11)

Translator’s Notes

1 This topic was not included in the formal protocol for the session (“Protokol No. 51 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 60-61).

2 Most likely, there is a mistake or omission in Malin’s text. These phrases, as given in the original, do not make sense.

3 The reference here is to financial, not military, assistance. A Soviet economic aid package for Hungary was approved on 5 November and announced the following day.

4 These points about the Suez Crisis are intriguing in light of what happened the following day (5 November). During the first several days of the Suez Crisis, Moscow’s response was limited to verbal protestations through the media and at the UN. On 5 November, the day before a ceasefire was arranged, Soviet prime minister Nikolai Bulganin sent letters to the U.S., French, British, and Israeli governments. His letter to President Eisenhower warned that “if this war is not halted, it will be fraught with danger and might escalate into a third world war.” Bulganin proposed that the United States and Soviet Union move jointly to “crush the aggressors,” an action he justified on the grounds that the two superpowers had “all modern types of arms, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and bear particular responsibility for stopping the war.” Not surprisingly, Eisenhower immediately rejected Bulganin’s proposal. Bulganin’s letters to France, Great Britain, and Israel were far more minatory, including thinly-veiled threats to use missiles if necessary to prevent Egypt’s destruction. The letters to France and Britain contained identical passages: “In what position would [Britain and France] have found themselves if they had been attacked by more powerful states possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction? These more powerful states, instead of sending naval or air forces to the shores of [Britain or France], could use other means, such as missile technology.” Bulganin’s letter to Israel declared that “Israel is playing with the fate of peace and the fate of its own people in a criminal and irresponsible manner.” This policy, Bulganin warned, “is raising doubts about the very existence of Israel as a state. We expect that the Government of Israel will come to its senses before it is too late and will halt its military operations against Egypt.” For the texts of the letters and other Soviet statements during the crisis, see D. T. Shepilov, ed., Suetskii krizis (Moscow: Politizdat, 1956). Although the letters represented a much more forceful and conspicuous Soviet stance against the allied incursions, they came so belatedly that they had only a minor impact at best on efforts to achieve a ceasefire.

5 This passage refers to the appeal to the nation that Kadar’s government issued when it was installed in power on 4 November.

6 Molotov is referring to Kadar’s radio address on 1 November, which was published in Nepszabad the following day.

7 This in fact is precisely what Ulbricht himself feared; see the detailed account by the chief of the East German State Security forces in 1956, Ernst Wollweber, in Wilfriede Otto, ed., “Ernst Wollweber: Aus Erinnerungen — Ein Portrait Walter Ulbrichts,” Beitrage zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, No. 3 (1990), esp. pp. 361- 378. For more on the impact of the 1956 crises on the East German communist leadership, see the papers presented by Hope M. Harrison and Christian F. Ostermann at the “Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence,” which took place in Budapest on 25-29 September 1996 and was organized by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the National Security Archive, and the Cold War International History Project. Copies of the papers, both of which draw extensively on the archives of the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), are available from the conference organizers.

8 Saburov is referring to the families of Soviet troops who were killed, not to the much larger number of Hungarians who died in the fighting.

9 This illustrates how concerned CPSU leaders were that the crisis was spilling over into the Soviet Union. Both before and after 4 November, unrest and protests occurred at a number of higher educational institutions in the USSR, including Moscow State University (MGU). At MGU, “protests against Soviet military intervention” were accompanied by “anti-Soviet slogans and posters.” Both students and faculty took part in the actions. The KGB quickly moved in and restored order, but the crackdown was not as vigorous and sweeping as some CPSU officials wanted. See the first-hand account by the longtime deputy director of the KGB, Filipp Bobkov, KGB i vlast’ (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp. 144-145. Bobkov claims that Pyotr Pospelov and some other senior party officials, as well as a number of high-ranking personnel in the KGB, wanted to launch “mass repressions” to deter any further unrest, but their proposals were never formally adopted. Subsequently, a commission headed by Brezhnev issued secret orders and guidelines to all party organizations to tighten political controls.

10 On 4 November, the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, sent a telegram to Moscow with information provided by Kardelj (at Tito’s behest) about the refuge granted to Imre Nagy and his aides in the Yugoslav embassy. The response, as approved by the CPSU Presidium, called on the Yugoslav authorities to turn over the Hungarian officials to Soviet troops. See “Vypiska iz protokola No. P51/IV zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 4 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 103-104.

11 Nagy had appealed to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold on 1 November asking for support of Hungary’s sovereignty and independence. The UN Security Council began considering the matter on 3 November. On 4 November, the UN Security Council took up the question of Soviet military intervention in Hungary, and the UN General Assembly voted to condemn the Soviet invasion. On 5 November, the CPSU newspaper Pravda featured a letter purportedly sent by Kadar and Imre Horvath to Dag Hammarskjold. The letter claimed that Nagy’s submission of the Hungarian question to the UN had been illegal, and requested that all consideration of the issue cease.

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
At this session of the CPSU CC, Molotov raises concerns over the new Hungarian government’s decision to condemn the “Rakosi-Gero clique” and call for the condemnation of Stalinism. Molotov argues that the CC must exert influence on Kadar to prevent Hungary from going the way of Yugoslavia. The session also discusses recommendations for purging higher educational institutions and Kadar’s withdrawal of appeals to the UN for assistance.

CREATORS
MALIN, V. N.

MOLOTOV, VYACHESLAV MIKHAYLOVICH, 1890-1986

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Hungary–History–Revolution, 1956
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Hungary
Soviet Union

WORKING NOTES FROM THE SESSION OF THE CPSU CC PRESIDIUM ON 30 OCTOBER 1956 – CHINESE COMRADES

 

 

 

Culture | Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Zhdanov,  Beria, Shvernik, Malenkov, Bulgarin,Shcherbakov Shkiryatov,Budyonny,  Loktinov and Mikhailov at the air show in Tushino (August 18, 1939)

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 1956(1)

(Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)(2)
Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov

On the Situation in Hungary
Information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Serov is read aloud.(3)

Cde. Zhukov provides information about the concentration of mil.-transport aircraft in the Vienna region.(4) Nagy is playing a double game (in Malinin’s opinion). Cde. Konev is to be sent to Budapest.(5)

On Discussions with the Chinese comrades. (6)
(Khrushchev)

We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people’s democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based. The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position. One document for the Hungarians, and another for the participants of the Warsaw Pact. On Rokossowski—I said to Gomulka that this matter is for you (the Poles) to decide.(7)

Cde. Bulganin—The Chinese cdes. have an incorrect impression of our relations with the countries of people’s democracy. On our appeal to the Hungarians—we should prepare it. A declaration should be prepared.

Cde. Molotov—Today an appeal must be written to the Hungarian people so that they promptly enter into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops. There is the Warsaw Pact. This must be considered with other countries. On the view of the Chinese comrades—they suggest that relations with the countries of the socialist camp be built on the principles of Pancha Shila.(8) Relations along interstate lines are on one basis and interparty relations on another.

Cde. Voroshilov: We must look ahead. Declarations must be composed so that we aren’t placed into an onerous position. We must criticize ourselves—but justly.

Cde. Kaganovich—Pancha Shila, but I don’t think they should propose that we build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila. Two documents—an appeal to the Hungarians and a Declaration. In this document we don’t need to provide self-criticism. There’s a difference between party and state relations.

Cde. Shepilov—The course of events reveals the crisis in our relations with the countries of people’s democracy. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. The underlying reasons must be revealed. The foundations remain unshakable. Eliminate the elements of diktat, not giving play in this situation to a number of measures to be considered in our relations. The declaration is the first step. There is no need for an appeal to the Hungarians. On the armed forces: We support the principles of non-interference. With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. We’ll have to keep up a struggle with national- Communism for a long time.

Cde. Zhukov—Agrees with what Cde. Shepilov has said. The main thing is to decide in Hungary. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole. This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere.

Cde. Zhukov—With regard to troops in the GDR and in Poland, the question is more serious. It must be considered at the Consultative Council.(9) The Consultative Council is to be convened. To persist further—it is unclear what will come of this. A quick decision, the main thing is to declare it today.

Cde. Furtseva—We should adopt a general declaration, not an appeal to the Hungarians. Not a cumbersome declaration. The second thing is important for the internal situation. We must search for other modes of relations with the countries of people’s democracy.
About meetings with leaders of the people’s democracies (concerning relations). We should convene a CC plenum (for informational purposes).(10)

Cde. Saburov: Agrees about the need for a Declaration and withdrawal of troops. At the XX Congress we did the correct thing, but then did not keep control of the unleashed initiative of the masses. It’s impossible to lead against the will of the people. We failed to stand for genuine Leninist principles of leadership. We might end up lagging behind events. Agrees with Cde. Furtseva. The ministers are asking; so are members of the CC.(11) With regard to Romania—they owe us 5 billion rubles for property created by the people.(12) We must reexamine our relations. Relations must be built on an equal basis.

Cde. Khrushchev: We are unanimous. As a first step we will issue a Declaration.

Cde. Khrushchev—informs the others about his conversation with Cde. Mikoyan. Kadar is behaving well. 5 of the 6 are firmly hanging in there.(13) A struggle is going on inside the [HWP— trans.] Presidium about the withdrawal of troops. The minister of defense will issue a directive about the suppression of insurgents in the cinema, using the armed forces. (Malinin, apparently, became nervous and left the session.) Officers from the state security (Hungarian) are with our troops.(14)

Consideration of the Draft Declaration
(Shepilov, Molotov, Bulganin)

Cde. Bulganin—we should say in what connection the question of a Declaration arose. Page 2, Par. 2, don’t soften the self-criticism. Mistakes were committed. Much use should be made of “Leninist principles.”

Cde. Khrushchev—expresses agreement. We should say we are guided by Leninist principles. Page 2, Par. 5—we should say we are making a statement, not an explanation.
Page 3—we should speak about economic equity, make it the main thing. We should say that no troops are stationed in the majority of countries. We should say that on the territory of the Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian states the stationing of troops is done with the consent of their governments and in the interests of these gov’ts and peoples.(15) We should express our view of the government of Hungary. Measures to support them. About support for the party and HWP CC and for the gov’t. We should refer specifically to Nagy and Kadar.

Cde. Kaganovich, Cde. Molotov, Cde.

Zhukov: We should mention the Potsdam agreement and the treaties with every country. (16)

Cde. Zhukov—We should express sympathy with the people. We should call for an end to the bloodshed. Page 2, Par. 2: We should say the XX Congress condemned the disregard for principles of equality.

Cde. Zhukov—we should speak about economics. Restructuring was thwarted after the XX Congress.

(Cde. Khrushchev)
We are turning to the member-states of the Warsaw Pact to consider the question of our advisers.(17) We are ready to withdraw them. Further editing.(18) Transmitted via high frequency to Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov.

Information from Cde. Yudin on Negotiations with the Chinese Comrades.
What’s the situation: Will Hungary leave our camp? Who is Nagy? Can he be trusted? About the advisers.Those taking part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Saburov, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Brezhnev, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin. Chinese comrades.

On the Situation in Hungary
(Cde. Khrushchev, Cde. Liu Shaoqi)

Cde. Liu Shaoqi indicates on behalf of the CPC CC that troops must remain in Hungary and in Budapest.(19)

Cde. Khrushchev—there are two paths. A military path—one of occupation. A peaceful path—the withdrawal of troops, negotiations.

Cde. Molotov—the political situation has taken clearer shape. An anti-revol. gov’t has been formed, a transitional gov’t.(20) We should issue the Declaration and explain our position. We should clarify our relationship with the new gov’t. We are entering into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops.

Nagy—the prime minister.
Kadar—a state minister.
Tildy Zoltan— “
Kovacs Bela—
Losonczy—a Communist and a supporter of Nagy(21)

Translator’s Notes

1 As with the previous session, the pages in the original file were slightly out of sequence. The order has been corrected in the translation.

2 Protocol No. 49 encompasses both this session and the session on the following day (see Document No. 8) under the rubric “On the Situation in Hungary” (O polozhenii v Vengrii). Point 1 (from 30 October) covers the Soviet declaration on ties with socialist countries, whereas Point 6 (from 31 October) covers the decision to invade. The relevant extracts from Protocol No. 49 are now stored in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 25-30 and APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41, respectively.

3 Presumably, the reference here is to three documents: one that arrived on the morning of 30 October, and two that arrived late at night on 29 October. The item that arrived on the morning of 30 October was a secure, high-frequency telephone message from Mikoyan and Suslov, which gave a bleak portrayal of the latest events. See “TsK KPSS,” 30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F.89, Op.45, D.12, Ll.1-3. Of the two documents that arrived late at night on the 29th, one was a ciphered telegram from Mikoyan and Suslov reporting that they had attended a session of the HWP Presidium earlier that evening. They also commented on the takeover of the Szabad Nep building by a group of unarmed students and writers. Mikoyan and Suslov asserted that the Hungarian “comrades have failed to win over the masses,” and that “the anti-Communist elements are behaving impudently.” In addition, they expressed concern about what would happen to former agents of the Hungarian State Security (AVH) forces in the wake of Nagy’s decision to disband the AVH. See “Shifrtelegramma: TsK KPSS,” 29 October 1956 (Strictly Secret- Urgent), from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, in AVPRF, F.059a, Op.4, P.6, D.5, Ll.13-14. The other document that arrived late on the 29th was a situation report from Ivan Serov, dated 29 October, which Mikoyan and Suslov ordered to be transmitted to Moscow via secure telephone. Serov’s report gave an updated overview of the insurgency and expressed deep concern about the likely repercussions from the dissolution of the AVH. See “Telefonogramma,” 29 October 1956, from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, relaying I. Serov’s memorandum, in APRF, F.3, Op.64, D.484, Ll.158-161.

4 British military transport aircraft were flying into the Vienna airport with supplies of humanitarian aid, which were then being conveyed to Budapest. It is unclear whether Zhukov knew why these planes were concentrated there. It is possible that he believed the aircraft were ferrying in military supplies or were preparing for a military operation.

5 As commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ivan Konev assumed direct command of Soviet military operations in Hungary in November 1956. In a telephone message on the morning of 30 October (see Note 78 supra), Mikoyan and Suslov had urged that Konev be dispatched to Hungary “immediately” as a precautionary step. One of Konev’s top aides during the invasion was General Mikhail Malinin, a first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, who commanded Soviet troops during the initial intervention on 23 October. As indicated in the previous line, Soviet leaders frequently consulted Malinin in the leadup to the invasion.

6 The “Chinese comrades” with whom Khrushchev had discussions were the members of the delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi (see Note 25 supra). Liu Shaoqi was in direct touch with Mao Zedong several times during the delegation’s stay in Moscow, and thus he was able to keep Khrushchev apprised of the Chinese leader’s views of the situation in Poland and Hungary.

7 Rokossowski had been removed from the Polish Politburo on 19 October. On 13 November he was replaced as Polish national defense minister by a Polish officer, Marshal Marian Spychalski. Rokossowski was then recalled to the Soviet Union, where he was appointed a deputy defense minister. Evidently, Khrushchev had spoken with Gomulka by phone that morning.

8 The five principles of Pancha Shila—(1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence—were endorsed in a joint statement by Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The principles were intended to “guide relations between the two countries” as well as “relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world.” For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China’s Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949- 1962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.

9 Zhukov is referring here to the Political Consultative Committee (PKK) of the recently-created Warsaw Treaty Organization. The PKK convened only seven times between 1955 and 1966, despite its statutory requirement to meet at least twice a year.

10 During major international crises in the post- Stalin period, the Soviet Presidium/Politburo occasionally would convene a Central Committee plenum to give the CC members a sense of involvement in decision-making and to ensure that the leadership’s policies would be firmly obeyed at lower levels.

11 Saburov is referring here to Furtseva’s suggestion that a CPSU CC plenum be convened for informational purposes.

12 This presumably refers to Soviet property transferred to Romania during World War II, rather than to Romania’s war reparations, which by 1956 were no longer of great magnitude.

13 Khrushchev is referring here to the six-member HWP Presidium. The only holdout was Nagy.

14 The State Security Department (Allam-Vedelmi Osztaly, or AVO), which was reorganized in 1949 and renamed the State Security Authority (Allam- Vedelmi Hatosag, or AVH), was reincorporated into the Hungarian Internal Affairs Ministry in the autumn of 1953. Formally, the agency was given back its old name of AVO, but it was still almost always known as the AVH. One of the earliest and most vigorous demands of the protesters in October 1956 was for the dissolution of the AVH. On 28 October, Nagy promised to fulfill this demand, and the Hungarian government approved the dissolution of the state security organs the following day. Because the AVH had been instrumental in carrying out repression and terror in the late 1940s and 1950s, some state security agents became the targets of lynchings and other violent reprisals during the 1956 uprising. Hungarian state security officers would have joined up with Soviet troops mainly to seek protection, not to assist in counterinsurgency operations. On this matter, see the documents transmitted by Suslov and Mikoyan on 29 October, cited in Note 78 supra.

15 It is interesting that, when referring to Soviet troops deployed in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev does not mention the Soviet troops in East Germany, implying that they were not necessarily there “with the consent of the [East German] government and in the interests of the [East German] government and people.”

16 The final Declaration noted that “Soviet units are in the Hungarian and Romanian republics in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and governmental agreements. Soviet military units are in the Polish republic on the basis of the Potsdam four-power agreement and the Warsaw Treaty.” The Declaration then claimed that “Soviet military units are not in the other people’s democracies,” omitting any mention of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in East Germany.

17 Khrushchev presumably is referring here to both the military advisers and the state security (KGB) advisers.

18 When this editing was completed, the Presidium formally adopted Resolution No. P49/1 (“Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” 30 October 1956, in APRF, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30) stating that it would “approve the text, with changes made at the CPSU CC Presidium session, of a Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the foundations of development and the further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.” The resolution ordered that the “text of the Declaration be broadcast on radio on 30 October and published in the press on 31 October 1956.” For the published text, see “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya I dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby I sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, p. 1.

19 It is unclear precisely when the Chinese changed their position from non-interventionist to pro-intervention. The statement recorded here, if correctly transcribed, would suggest that the change occurred before the final Soviet decision on 31 October, but almost all other evidence (including subsequent Presidium meetings recorded by Malin) suggests that it came after, not before, the Soviet decision. In any case, if the change did occur before, it did not have any discernible effect on the Soviet decision at this meeting to eschew intervention.

20 Molotov is referring here to major developments in Hungary. On 30 October, at 2:30 p.m. Budapest time, Nagy announced the formal restoration of a multi-party state and the establishment of an “inner cabinet” of the national government. The new cabinet consisted of Nagy, Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Erdei, Janos Kadar, Geza Losonczy, and Anna Kethly (from the Social Democratic Party). That same day, a “revolutionary national defense council” of the Hungarian armed forces was set up, which supported the demands of “the revolutionary councils of the working youth and intellectuals,” and called for the “immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and their withdrawal from the entire territory of Hungary within the shortest possible time.” The new Council also promised to disarm all agents from Hungary’s disbanded state security forces (AVH), who had been notorious agents of repression during the Stalin era. A Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee also was formed on 31 October, and it was empowered by the government to create a new army.

21 These are five of the seven members of Nagy’s new “inner cabinet.” Anna Kethly’s name is not listed here because she had not yet been appointed. (Nagy mentioned in his speech on 30 October that “a person to be nominated by the Social Democratic Party” would be in the inner cabinet, and Kethly later turned out to be that person.) It is unclear why Malin did not list Ferenc Erdei’s name here.

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
The Presidium decides to promulgate a declaration on Hungary in which Soviet withdrawal and relations with the new government will be addressed. Members discuss the language of the new declaration and the advice of the CPC CC regarding the status of Soviet troops. The declaration is also intended to address the broader crisis in Soviet relations with people’s democracies.

CREATOR
MALIN, V. N.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Communist countries–Internal relations
Communist countries
Soviet Union. Army
Warsaw Treaty Organization
Hungary–History–Revolution, 1956
Soviet Union–Foreign policy
More …
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
China
East Germany
Eastern Europe
Hungary
Soviet Union

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EXPOSED – SOVIET PLAN TO ASSASSINATE TITO

 

NKVD plan to assassinate Josip Broz Tito by a Soviet covert agent, codenamed “Max.” The plan envisions assassinating Tito during a private audience during Tito’s forthcoming visit to London, or at a diplomatic reception in Belgrade. This document was not dated.

CREATORS

  • STALIN, JOSEPH, 1879-1953

    GERMANY (EAST). MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY (STASI)

    SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
    Tito, Josip Broz, 1892-1980
    Soviet Union–Foreign relations–Yugoslavia
    Intelligence service–Soviet Union
    LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
    Soviet Union
    Yugoslavia

 

The MGB USSR requests permission to prepare a terrorist act (terakt) against Tito, by the illegal agent ‘Max’,” Comrade I.R. Grigulevich, a Soviet citizen and member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1950.

1. “Max” was placed in Italy on a Costa Rican passport, where he was able to gain the confidence and enter the circles of South American diplomats as well as well-known Costa Rican political and trade figures visiting Italy.

Using these connections, “Max”, on our orders, obtained an appointment as the special plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Italy and Yugoslavia. In the course of his diplomatic duties, in the second half of 1952, he visited Yugoslavia twice. He was well received there, with official welcoming into circles close to Tito’s clique; he was promised a personal audience with Tito.

“Max’s” present position offers us opportunities to carry out active measures (aktivnye deistviia) against Tito.
In early February of this year, we summoned “Max” to Vienna for a secret meeting. While discussing options, “Max” was asked how he thought he could be most useful, considering his position. “Max” proposed some kind of active measure against Tito personally.

In relation to this proposal, there was a discussion with him [Max] about how he imagined all of this and as a result, the following options for a terrorist act against Tito were presented.

1. To order “Max” to arrange a private audience with Tito, during which a soundless mechanism concealed in his clothes would release a dose of pulmonary plague bacteria that would guarantee death to Tito and all present. “Max” himself would not be informed of the substance’s nature, but with the goal of saving “Max’s” life, he would be given an anti-plague serum in advance.

2. In connection with Tito’s expected visit to London, to send “Max” there to use his official position and good personal relations with the Yugoslav ambassador in England, [Vladimir] Velebit, to obtain an invitation to the expected Yugoslav embassy reception in Tito’s honor.

The terrorist act could be accomplished by shooting with a silent mechanism concealed as a personal item, while simultaneously releasing tear gas to create panic among the crowd, allowing “Max” to escape and cover up all traces.

3. To use one of the official receptions in Belgrade to which members of the diplomatic corps are invited. The terrorist act could be implemented in the same way as the second option, to be carried out by “Max” who as a diplomat, accredited by the Yugoslav government, would be invited to such a reception.

In addition, to assign “Max” to work out an option whereby one of the Costa Rican representatives will give Tito some jewelry in a box, which when opened would release an instantaneously-effective poisonous substance.

We asked Max to once again think the operation over and to make suggestions on how he could realize, in the most efficient way, actions against Tito. Means of contact were established and it was agreed that further instructions would follow.


It seems appropriate to use “Max” to implement a terrorist act against Tito. “Max’s” personal qualities and intelligence experience make him suitable for such an assignment. We ask for your approval.

 

 

 

STALIN AND THE LEADERS OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY, WILHELM PIECK AND OTTO GROTEWOHL

The creation of East Germany, archive 1949 | Germany | The Guardian

Record of a conversation between Cde. I. V. Stalin and the leaders of the

Socialist Unity Party of Germany Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl,

26 March 1948, at 1900 hours

Top Secret

Present: V. M. Molotov, A. A. Zhdanov, G. M. Malenkov, V. S. Semenov (SVAG [Soviet Military Administration in Germany]), and interpreters – G. Ya. Korotkevich and F. Elsner.

PIECK thanked I. V. Stalin for the welcome and also for the aid which the Soviet Military Administration in Germany gives the SED [Socialist Unity Party].

I. V. STALIN asks whether the Military Administration is actually giving aid or if this is a compliment.

PIECK and GROTEWOHL say that they are actually receiving aid.

STALIN, joking, asks again, does this mean that they don’t just oppress you, but also give aid?

PIECK, laughing, confirms [this]. Then he says that he will describe political issues and Grotewohl economic [ones]. In Pieck’s words, the exacerbation of the conflicts between the Allies on the issues of an imperialistic or democratic peace with Germany, the unity or dismemberment of Germany, and its democratic development or colonialization by means of the Marshall Plan are influencing the mood of the German people. These conflicts are not so clear to the broad masses but they are influencing the mood of the masses, especially in Berlin. The Western powers are trying to influence the population and direct it against the USSR, arousing hostility against communism which supposedly wants to crush [poglotit’] the people, take the Germans’ private property away from them, etc.

STALIN laughs.

PIECK says that although this propaganda is stupid it has an influence on a population brought up in an anti-Communist atmosphere even back in the Weimar Republic and then under Hitler. One of the factors which promote anti-Soviet sentiments among Germans is the arrests of Germans without any communication between those arrested and relatives.

STALIN asks, who arrested these Germans?

In PIECK’s words the Soviet occupation authorities are making the arrests; after arrest these people sort of disappear from life, they are not afforded an opportunity to communicate with relatives, and there are no public trials. The population ascribes blame to the SED which supposedly doesn’t want to change this, but could. Pieck suggests that in important arrests both SED chairmen would be informed by the Soviet Military Administration, that correspondence between those arrested and relatives be permitted, and that open trials be set up. Pieck explains that in the west of Germany the occupation authorities also make large-scale arrests but there communications with relatives is permitted and from time to time open trials are held, which relieves the atmosphere.

STALIN asks perhaps those arrested by the Soviet authorities are foreign agents or spies?

PIECK replied affirmatively, but points out that there are other arrests made through denunciations by reactionaries. Arrested fascists from the ‘Werewolf [Organization],” for example, sometimes inform against Social Democrats in order to ease their own situation. There have been arrests of socialist-minded youth and also politically reliable SED people based on such inaccurate statements. It would be good to know the reasons for such arrests and also to free wrongly arrested people from internment camps.

STALIN asks why SED leaders did not write here about this.

PIECK replied that they did not want to bother I. V. Stalin with appeals about minor matters.

STALIN remarks, ‘What kind of bother this is!”

PIECK says that they wanted to describe a request about this here and consider it necessary to reexamine the methods without abolishing measures needed to ensure security. Difficulties for the Party also arose from expropriations of property in connection with land reform and the confiscation of enterprises from fascist and war criminals. Some mistakes were committed in the process, although the Party thinks of course that these democratic reforms are absolutely necessary.

STALIN asks, who performed the expropriation?

SEMENOV replies that the land reform was concluded by German agencies back in the autumn of 1945 and that there has been no further expropriation of land. The expropriation of enterprises of fascist and war criminals was made by decisions of German commissions in Lander and the SVAG only approved these decisions.

PIECK acknowledges that land reform has concluded but the confiscation of enterprises is continuing.

STALIN asks, to whom are the confiscated enterprises transferred?

PIECK replies that they are transferred to the ownership of German control bodies.

STALIN stresses that thus these enterprises will be transferred to the German public and not to the Russians.

PIECK mentions that part of the enterprises went to the ownership of Soviet joint-stock companies.

STALIN asks, whether enterprises are being transferred to Soviet joint-stock companies now?

PIECK does not reply to this question directly and talks about new confiscations of property in the zone for German control bodies.

STALIN asks, who is doing the confiscations?

PIECK replies that they are done by German commissions, but bourgeois parties are protesting this measure.

STALIN says that he, Stalin, has authority over the Soviet Military Administration but not over Germans. The first complaint is with regard to the Administration. He, Stalin, accepts it. The second is against Germans . . .

PIECK says that he wanted to show by this what difficulties the Party is encountering.

STALIN notes, “I understand.”

PIECK then talks about the growth of the influence of the SED among the masses, especially in connection with the people’s congress. The SED is fighting the Marshall Plan and the creation of a west German state. Therefore sharp differences arise with the western powers which lead to terrorist measures against the SED. Thanks to the people’s congress the Party managed to attract a large number of bourgeois elements in the movement. Two sessions of the congress were held. The first was convened during the London Session of Ministers of Foreign Affairs [SMID]. A delegation was selected which the SMID refused to grant a hearing. The second congress was held on the anniversary of the Revolution of 1848 and decided to collect signatures for a petition to hold a popular vote on the issue of the unity of Germany and also elected a people’s council of 400 members comprising a small parliament. The second congress also adopted a decision on the democratic and economic structure of Germany. The first congress was more impulsive and the second more businesslike. Two thousand two hundred participated in the first congress, of which 460 were from the western zones. Two thousand participated in the second congress, of which 512 were from the western zones. Most of the representatives from the western zones crossed the border illegally. Nevertheless, matters proceeded without arrests. There were 600 SED representatives at the first congress and 360 at the second. By reducing the number of SED representatives they wanted to show that the congress was not just an SED affair.

STALIN asked, to what party did those who come to the congress from the West belong?

PIECK replies that 80% were Communists. But there were also notable people from bourgeois parties.

STALIN asks for confirmation of this.

PIECK mentions Prof. [Hesterman] from Munster, who spoke in the debates at the German People’s Congress. There were also representatives from other parties, including the SPD [Social Democratic Party]. The second congress went successfully, which was evident from the measures against the congress adopted by the occupation authorities of the western powers who prohibited the congress and brazenly agitated against it even in the Control Council, where Robertson made insulting attacks on the congress. The SED turned to the British government with a request to force Robertson to take back his insulting remarks.

Pieck then cited data about the makeup of the People’s Council to which 300 members were elected from the Soviet zone and 100 from the western zones. There was a total of 85 SED members elected, about 10 from the SPD, and the rest were representatives of other parties and mass organizations.

STALIN asks again, “were Social Democrats also in it?”

PIECK replies affirmatively. He said further that administrative measures in the Soviet zone have a certain influence on the population, especially the transfer of the enterprises of fascist war criminals to the hands of the people. SVAG Order N° 324, which is based on the slogan ‘Work more to live better”, was of great help in increasing labor productivity. Some improvement of the economic situation has been achieved in the Soviet zone but all the same it remains difficult. The reorganization of the German Economic Commission 17 has great importance for administrative work. In contrast to the gradual economic improvement in the Soviet zone, a decline is being seen in the western occupation zones. The food situation there is worse.

STALIN asks, is the food supply worse in the west? Is this actually so?

PIECK confirms this and points out that there have been large-scale strikes there because of this. The British occupation authorities tried to ascribe a plan to turn the strikes into an uprising (the so-called “Plan M”) to the Communists. They wrote that the Communists have an even more dangerous “Plan R”. The SED announced right away that this is an invention of the British secret service; the British instead lost interest in dealing with these “plans” anymore. The Party received certain support in this from CDU [Christian Democratic Union] representative [Semler] in the two-zone Economic Council, who criticized the American policy in the West, stressing that it was leading to poverty and that the CDU is leading the strike itself. Clay declared that Semler is lying. Clay did not approve his election when the CDU of Bavaria elected Semler as its representative to the two-zone Economic Council.

Pieck further pointed to the phoniness of denazification in the western zones where old reactionary personnel remained in leadership posts in control bodies. Fascist officers are in judicial bodies and the police. Even Schumacher was forced to protest about this. There is no doubt that Schumacher is a British agent and that his statement had the purpose of calming the SPD. The British and the Americans are also obstructing any nationalization of industry in their zones. Propagandizing the Marshall Plan, they talk about the aid which they are supposedly planning to grant Germany. SED counter-agitation on this issue has not become so active as on the issue of the unity of Germany as a consequence of the illusions spread among the population associated with the Marshall Plan. The Party has not yet managed to involve the broad masses in fighting the Marshall Plan. The KPG [Communist Party of Germany] is organizationally and politically weak in the western zones. We view it as a party under the common leadership of the SED. The KPG has announced its acceptance of the principles and goals of the SED. KPG-SED working cooperation committees have been organized in the west but these committees have not been recognized by the occupation authorities. The KPG organization numbers 312,500 members and the SPD – 800,000.

STALIN asks, this is where, in the west?

PIECK confirms this. The KPG representation in the landtags is so small. In 12 Lander of the western zones the Communist have 83 seats of 1300, that is, 6.3%.

STALIN asks, is the KPG formally shut down in the western occupation zones?

PIECK replies in the negative. He then points out that the Communists received 9.1 % of the 20 million votes in the elections of the western zones. However, the influence of the KPG in enterprises is larger, especially in the Ruhr, where the Communists received 34% of the votes in the elections to production councils. The weakness of the KPG is in the lack of overall leadership. Up to now the leadership bodies existed only in the Lander but cooperation between the Party organizations of the Lander was weak. At the last SED CC plenum it was decided to create a single bureau for all the western zones which would have three well-trained comrades working in the western zones.

STALIN asks, why have the Communists and part of the Social Democrats not united into one common party?

PIECK replies that Schumacher is sharply against unity and expels anyone from the SPD who tries to advocate uniting with the Communists.

STALIN asks, is there any sort of opposition among the Social Democrats?

PIECK replies affirmatively. It is developing the more it becomes clearer that the SPD is harming the workers’ movement. For his part, Schumacher is trying to counter this by slandering the Communists.

STALIN says that he means something else. If there were a united party in the west then it would be better. It is advisable to remove the Communist sign which is scaring many people. This would be good. With such a unification it would be sufficient if only some Social Democrats switched to the united party. PIECK explains that they rejected a united party; when it was proposed, the reproach was that the SED is a renaming of the KPG.

STALIN notes that if there is any opposition in the SPD in the west then it would be possible bring it into a united party and carry out unification. Is this really impossible?

PIECK says that this is possible and refers to the example in Dortmund where in fact a united party organization was created.

STALIN asks, is this perhaps disadvantageous?

GROTWOHL says that unification is impossible since the occupation authorities are prohibiting the renaming of the Communist Party and the unification of the workers’ parties.

STALIN asks again, is unification being prohibited?

MOLOTOV confirms that is it being prohibited.

PIECK points out that the western occupation authorities are prohibiting even joint meetings of Social Democrats and Communists.

STALIN asks, do the occupation authorities really need the Communist sign? Then he explains that persecution against Communism is so strong that right now it scares the population away.

PIECK cites an example of the occupation authorities forcing signs about the people’s congress in Bremen to be signed by the KPG in order to scare the population.

STALIN comments – scoundrels. They need this scarecrow, this bugaboo.

PIECK talks about the difficulties of work for Communists in western Germany as a consequence of which not long ago orders were given to mix legal work with illegal [work] and prepare to switch to an illegal status.

STALIN says, “but if the Communists declare themselves a workers’ party, as they did in Poland!”

PIECKS says that they need to think about this but the permission of the occupation authorities, which they might refuse, is needed.

STALIN says that this needs to be tried. This wouldn’t be bad.

PIECK talks about the aid which the SED is giving the Communists of western Germany in personnel, paper, and money. Whereas in 1946 the KPG of the western zones was given 1.3 million marks, now they have been given 4.3 million marks. Pieck asks Stalin about transferring the Deutschlandsender radio station for German radio broadcasting; at the present time it is being used for relaying Moscow radio broadcasts to the Soviet occupation forces. The Berlin medium wave radio station put at the disposition of the Germans is not audible in western Germany, in particular, in the Ruhr.

STALIN asks, “is a single radio station sufficient?”

ELSNER says that Deutschlandsender is the most powerful radio station in Germany.

STALIN asks about the radio station in Nauen and receives the reply that it was destroyed during military operations.

Stalin asks what the distance is between Berlin and the Ruhr. He adds that it would be possible to give two radio stations so that the SED could cover all Europe with its programs.

PIECK repeats that the Berlin radio station at the disposition of the Germans is not audible in western Germany.

STALIN asks Pieck what he wants.

PIECK replies that they want to be given the Deutschlandsender radio station.

SEMENOV says that the Deutschlandsender is received by peoples’ receivers in all of Germany but peoples’ receivers do not receive the Berlin medium-wave station. He considers it possible to put Deutschlandsender at the disposition of the Germans, but Sokolovskiy objects to this.

MOLOTOV notes that at one time the SVAG objected to transferring this radio station to the Germans on the grounds that it ought to be under four-power control; hence if the SVAG had transferred this station to the Germans then the Allies would have take it for themselves.

SEMENOV confirms this and says that now this impediment has gone away.

STALIN says that we will transfer this station.

PIECK talks about the powerful propaganda apparatus which the western occupation authorities have in Berlin which the SED cannot even match. The SED is expanding agitation in the Soviet sector of Berlin, but in the western sectors the occupation authorities are interfering with work at enterprises, prohibit the hanging of signs, convening meetings, and they create Trotskyite groups. New elections will be held in Berlin this October. Pieck doesn’t think that the elections will be better for the SED than in 1946. They would be happy if the Allies were forced out of Berlin.

STALIN comments, let’s try with [our] common efforts; maybe we’ll force [them] out.

PIECK tells of the results of labor union elections in Berlin during which the SED lost votes, including among the metalworkers. This is a serious matter. They need to pursue a correct policy in order to make up what was lost. They need to overcome the weakness of the SED in political propaganda since it will be difficult if the Social Democratic opposition wins any more labor unions. The balance of strength between the SED and bourgeois parties in the Soviet zone comes down in favor of the SED. The Party received 47.6% of the seats in the elections to the landtags and has 50.5% together with the peasant mutual aid and Kulturbund parties. Both bourgeois parties, the CDU and the LDP, have 49.5% of the seats in the landtags. However, in some Lander the bourgeois parties have a weak majority in the landtags. Hence the need to maintain a [voting] bloc with these parties which exert a strong influence on the SED on political issues, especially when property issues are affected. Numerically, the SED is the strongest party in all of Germany and has 1,774,000 Party members. In the western zones and in Berlin the SPD numbers 800,000 members, including 45,000 members in Berlin. The SED has 108,000 members in Berlin. The bourgeois parties in the Soviet zone number 382,000 members and 31,000 in Berlin. Four million workers and white-collar workers have been organized into labor unions.

STALIN asks, where is this?

PIECK replies that it is in the Soviet zone. It comprises 64% of all those working in industry, transport, and in enterprises. The intra-Party situation in the SED has been improving recently. The internal cohesion of the Party is growing. However, there still remain vestiges of division among former Communists and former Social Democrats. Slander against opponents causes some wavering in the Party, for example, on the issue of the arrests. The Party is experiencing great difficulties in personnel for it has to send workers for control bodies, administrative bodies, mass organizations, the Party apparatus, the press, etc. The circle of trained workers from former Social Democrats is small. Therefore it is difficult to maintain parity, which will soon have to be abandoned. The training of personnel is also very important. This is the system of training personnel in the SED. Evenings on political issues are held in production groups and in groups by residence. In production organizations up to 50% of the Party members participate in them, but in non-production [groups] from 20 to 40%. District schools with 4800 students are operating in 115 districts (kreis). About 60,000 Party activists have passed through these schools. There are six three-month schools in Lander with 620 students. The highest level of Party education is the Higher Party School. Its course of study was recently extended to two years. They have 200 students and 27 instructors, who are very overworked. The Higher Party School has short-term [industrial] sector courses. A three-month Academy for Managerial Staff opened in May, which was then reorganized into a one-year Academy with 600 students. It will train high-level officials for administrative bodies and also instructors. Pieck talks of the Party’s intention to introduce a new discipline, “scientific socialism”, in six universities and three higher educational schools of the Soviet zone as a compulsory subject with an examination. This name was chosen in order to counter the propaganda against socialism from the West.

STALIN asks, did the other parties agree with this?

PIECK says that they should agree. Many talk about socialism in Germany but they represent something completely different as socialism. There are even Christian socialists.

STALIN again asks, do all parties agree with this?

PIECK continues that 20 docents need to be trained to pursue this plan. This is important in order to counter reactionary influences in the higher school. The SED wants to make this subject mandatory as long as students refuse.

STALIN laughs.

PIECK says that they announce to the students that the latter is not obligatory for socialists but if they are against Marxism then they should at least know what it is.

STALIN laughs and asks, but what are you saying, do they agree? For this will be done on government money, not Party [money].

PIECK says that they will carry this out and there will be no difficulties.

STALIN asks, there won’t?

PIECK replies affirmatively. He also says that Zolotukhin from the Soviet Military Administration supports this idea and is counting on achieving success. Pieck then says that of the 16,200 students of universities and higher schools of the Soviet zone only 4,600 students come from worker’s and peasant [families]. Four thousand two hundred students are SED members (26%), KhOS members are 7.5%, and LOP members are 9.2%. The remaining students are unaffiliated. Reactionaries hide under the label of unaffiliated. Of the student councils 36% are SED, 19% are KhOS members, 19% are LOP members, and 25% are unaffiliated.

Pieck says that thus the Party still has large tasks before it. They area also great with respect to work with bourgeois parties. Kaiser, speaking initially in favor of “Christian socialism”, recently tried to win the KhOS of the Soviet zone over to the side of the western powers. There is also great vacillation in the LOP, especially in Berlin where reactionaries were entrenched. It is necessary to find support inside these parties and remove the reactionaries. This can be done, relying on the people’s congress and speaking out for peace and the unification of Germany. Pieck speaks of the need to form a fourth party for former nominal Nazis who were resettlers from military districts and part of the POWs.

STALIN says that we know this. We have no objection. He asks, did [we/they] inform them of this?

PIECK replies affirmatively. He says that they have already begun this matter with the publication of the Nazional Zeitung newspaper. However, there are difficulties in selecting the leadership of this party inasmuch as people are needed for this who will not be against us, but also not too openly connected with us.

STALIN acknowledges.

PIECK says that the bourgeois parties are emphatically against the creation of such a new party since they understand that it will be developed at their expense.

Pieck then talks of the progress of the membership composition of the SED and that they are planning a verification [proverka] with the purpose of cleansing the Party of people who registered twice in the Party, by place of work and place of residence. The SED recently lost 12,500 members who left the partly due to dissatisfaction with the food supply and partly because the Party could not assimilate them in view of the weakness of educational work. During the same period 42,000 new Party members were accepted. Work needs to be strengthened to study and educate new Party members and, moreover, to pursue a individual recruiting campaign at enterprises. Summing up, Pieck says that they have two requests for Stalin, about the questions of arrest and the radio station.

STALIN says that he has written this down. He asks, is work being done among women?

PIECK replies that a Democratic Women’s Union exists and is working successfully among women.

STALIN asks, how are things with youth?

GROTWOHL points out that the Union of Free German Youth numbers 600,000 members and is working successfully among youth.

STALIN asks, is there such a union among Social Democrats in the West?

ELSNER replies affirmatively.

PIECK speaks of the weakness of Party work among intellectuals, although the SED has a decisive influence in the Kulturbund.

GROTEWOHL then speaks. He notes that the London Conference created a new situation for Germany. The Potsdam Agreement provided a clear procedure for working out a peace treaty for Germany. This has been destroyed. The Council of Minister of Foreign Affairs, as a body which can work out a peace treaty, is becoming superfluous. The question arises, who will make peace and what kind of peace will it be? In terms of international law Germany is in a vacuum [nakhoditsya v bezvozdushom prostranstve]. In the political sense it is deprived of a government. For a number of months the Control Council has not been able to decide on fundamental issues and after the 20 March meeting at which Sokolovskiy made a strongly worded demand about the London Conference of three powers, further work was curtailed. The Control Council is really not operating. There is no organization [instantsiya] to carry out the reparation plan for all of Germany. We have drawn conclusions from this for ourselves. A national calamity was declared at the people’s congress and a number of slogans were formulated. If there is no such body to perform German-wide tasks then the German people should embark on the path of national mutual aid. But national mutual aid is restricted by cases of interference by occupation authorities. After the collapse of the London Conference in December 1947 some separate measures were conducted in western Germany to reorganize the Economic Council and a government was actually formed. The core of the policy of the western occupation authorities in Germany is now the Marshall Plan. The discussion in the Control Council about financial reform is evidence of the danger of a separate financial reform in western Germany. This would mean the completion of the economic dismemberment of Germany. A separate financial reform is one of the primary elements of the Marshall Plan with respect to Germany. However, in the western zones most of the population is in a state of political apathy. They see the dollar and think that the Marshall Plan will give Germans an opportunity to live better. That’s how we assess the situation. Disappointment will come with respect to the economic results of the Marshall Plan since bourgeois policy precludes any kind of humaneness. In reality an increase of production and the development of exports of industrial goods is not being permitted in West Germany but the importation of raw material is growing and old monopolistic bodies are reviving; at the same time, the Ruhr is again being turned into a center of the armaments industry.

STALIN asks, is industry in the Ruhr improving?

GROTEWOHL says that the coal output in the Ruhr has increased to 300,000 tons a day.

STALIN asks about metal production in the Ruhr.

GROTEWOHL says that there is some increase in metals which has been achieved by using a food supply bonus system. There are no precise figures about industrial capacity in the western zones. Grotewohl continues, we are fighting against the Marshall Plan, for peace, against the dictatorship of monopolies, and for democracy. It is characteristic that hostility toward the Marshall Plan is developing among the German technical intelligentsia and business owners. The conviction is growing in these circles that the natural economic relations for Germany are with the east and southeastern Europe. Such an opinion is growing more quickly in these circles than even among workers. Grotewohl points out that the strikes in the western zones did not have a political nature, but were an expression of protest against hunger. Grotewohl then says that reactionary forces are directing their main thrust in their propaganda against Bolshevism, Russia, and the SED, which they identify with Russia. The SED is looking for a way to get out of such a situation. The most effective measure in this struggle is the organization of a self-supporting economic base in the Soviet zone. Therefore the economic problems of the Soviet zone are pushed to the forefront and which should be organically tied to the Party economic slogans for all Germany. The industrial production of the Soviet zone in 1936 came to 14.8 billion marks. In 1947 it was 9.4 billion marks, excluding the enterprises of Soviet joint stock companies, together with the production of which gross production of the zone is 10.4 billion marks. Thus, by comparison, industrial production has reached 56% of the 1936 level.

STALIN asks, whether comparable prices been taken into account in all this, and receives an affirmative reply.

GROTEWOHL says that according to the 1948 plan an increase of industrial production of the Soviet zone of 5% over 1947 was envisioned. We hope, he said, for an increase of production of 10%, but difficulties are arising which we cannot overcome alone. Grotewohl says that for a growth of industrial production of 10% they need the following quantities of raw material through imports: 250,000 tons of rolled metal and steel; 300,000 tons of hard coal; 22,000 tons of cotton; 1,700 tons of wool; 3,000 tons of flax; and 1,200 tons of hemp. In addition, from the production of Soviet joint stock companies they need to allocate 38,000 tons of artificial wool and 5,000 tons of artificial silk for the German economy. Touching on supply questions, Grotewohl said that at the present time in the Soviet zone they are issuing 1,500 calories per person per day. In 1950 they ought to increase the norms to 2,600 calories. But inasmuch as agriculture was seriously damaged as a result of the war the solution to this problem is impossible without the importation of food from abroad. Therefore they need to import 280,000 tons of grain, 120,000 tons of feed, and 1,200,000 tons of oilcake. The prewar requirement in meat and fats in the zone were 600,000 tons but now production is only 200,000 tons. Thus the shortage is 400,000 tons.

STALIN asks, has the population of the zone increased?

GROTEWOHL replies affirmatively.

When he cites the figure for demand in oilcake, STALIN asks, is this perhaps a mistake and says that Grotewohl is citing figures that are too large. GROTEWOHL admits the possibility of error. He then points out the need to create a foundation for the development of agriculture by importing feed for cattle and supplying fertilizers. The zone’s requirements in nitrogen fertilizers are calculated at 150,000 tons, which might be allotted from the production of the enterprises of Soviet joint stock companies. In addition, they need to import an additional 120,000 tons of phosphates. They also need to allocate 160,000 tons of coal to produce lime. The furnishing of these fertilizers could ensure a normal harvest in 1950. Grotewohl stipulated that all the figures he cited might be imprecise since he does not yet feel fully at home in the economic issues of the zone. Grotewohl then expressed a request that there be no reparations removals from the 1948 harvest. The reparations plan envisioned removals of sugar and alcohol for the fourth quarter. Grotewohl then cited figures for supplying the Party with paper, stressing the importance of this matter both for political propaganda as well as for the financial situation of the Party, which has large expenses for training personnel and maintaining a staff. Grotewohl pointed out that, in spite of an increase in Party members and the complexity of the issues before it, the SED is getting half as much paper in 1948 as it got in 1946.

STALIN asks, how much paper do you need?

GROTEWOHL replies that right now they’re getting 3,500 tons a quarter and the SVAG, 9,000 tons. This ask that the Party be allotted 3,000 additional tons of paper a quarter from these 9,000 tons.

Grotewohl then asks Stalin to give instructions to Soviet authorities to approve the agreement of DEFA, a mixed German-Soviet company, according to which the SED, as a stockholder of this company, would obtain the right to distribute German films in proportion to its capital in this company. This agreement was signed in Berlin but has not been approved in Moscow.

SEMENOV says that that agreement was not approved at the initiative of the Ministry of Cinematography but that the SVAG has advocated the approval of the agreement.

STALIN asks, why did [you] not write about this; don’t you know the way here?

Stalin told Grotewohl that we will discuss then and try to do everything possible.

Then STALIN asks, are there German police in the Soviet zone? In whose hands [are they]? Who controls them?

GROTEWOHL replies that the German police are under the control of the internal affairs bodies of the Lander and also of the Central Directorate of Internal Affairs of the Soviet zone.

STALIN asks about the strength of the police and their weaponry.

GROTEWOHL replies, that the police are poorly armed.

STALIN asks, are these reliable people?

GROTEWOHL replies, that 90% of them there are Party comrades. The ministers of internal affairs, he stressed, are all our people.

STALIN asks, but at HQ?

GROTEWOHL replies, also.

STALIN asks whether you think that the police need to be reinforced and paid well.

GROTEWOHL says that this a crucial issue, of course.

STALIN asks, what help do you need from us?

GROTEWOHL talks about the desirability of aid in training the police.

STALIN asks, do they have good people who could train the police?

GROTEWOHL says that in general there are few people for the police.

STALIN says that possibly they could be taken from the POWs.

GROTEWOHL says that they have part of the personnel in the police from the “Free Germany” committee and mentions in particular Colonel Markgraf, the Chief of the Berlin Police, and [Bechler], the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of one of the Lander.

STALIN says that if they need people from the POWs they can take them. He asks, has the number of people which can be supported been identified?

SEMENOV replies that as far as he remembers in view of the differences on this issue, the Control Council did not reach agreement but this needs to be verified.

STALIN says that if weapons are needed then German weapons, which of course we might have, can be used. Stalin stresses that the police are a very serious matter which needs to be discussed seriously. They will prove useful.

Stalin asks if there are other questions.

GROTEWOHL says that they wouldn’t like to carry out separate measures regarding governmental divisions during the further development of the Soviet zone before these measures are undertaken in the West.

STALIN comments that we have the same policy. This is a correct policy.

GROTEWOHL says that in this connection they are putting off the creation of a parliament and government in the Soviet zone.

STALIN approves.

GROTEWOHL says that the People’s Council should discuss individual questions but it does not have executive power and cannot adopt laws. STALIN says that this is right, but nevertheless you should create some surrogates or, rather, the nuclei (embryos} of a national German parliament and government.

GROTEWOHL says that the German Economic Commission is the nucleus of a government. They transmitted their wishes with respect to this commission in a special document.

STALIN says that he didn’t see this document and asks where they sent it. KOROTKEVICH says that the document was circulated from M.A. Suslov.

GROTEWOHL reads those measures from the circulated note about the German Economic Commission for which he is especially pressing, namely that the economic plan not be changed for a year without the agreement of the Economic Commission.

STALIN remarks, that’s good, but all the same are the Germans planning to pay reparations?

GROTEWOHL and PIECK confirm [this].

GROTEWOHL says that there should not, however, be removals beyond the reparations plan and the plan for occupational expenses. Otherwise it would be impossible to create the [economic] stimulus to develop the industrial initiative of the workers.

STALIN says that he understands this. Stalin then asks if Grotewohl knows how much the Russians get annually from reparations in millions of marks or dollars.

GROTEWOHL says that in 1948 1.2 billion marks were planned, which is 10% of the gross industrial production of the zone.

STALIN asks, how much will this be in dollars?

MOLOTOV replies that at a rate of 3 marks per American dollar this is $400,000,000.

STALIN asks, how is this, is it difficult?

GROTEWOHL did not reply. He said that they are very isolated and think that ties with other countries necessary. For this purpose they want to create commissions to study trade opportunities.

STALIN asks, with which countries?

GROTEWOHL replies, with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland.

STALIN says, we can help you establish ties. If Germany is divided into two states then western Germany will remain without a market but eastern Germany will have a good market.

GROTEWOHL asks if there is a possibility for the Soviet zone to have a two- or three-year economic development plan in the future.

STALIN says that when the Economic Commission expands and becomes stronger then, in his opinion, it could be done.

GROTEWOHL says: in order to swim you have to go in the water.

STALIN agrees. We’ll teach you everything, he says. We, too, couldn’t do anything earlier but then we learned. Germans are capable people. They will learn no worse than we.

STALIN raises another issue. He says that it would be good if some organ of the People’s Congress worked out a German constitution and put it out for discussion both in western and eastern Germany. This constitution ought not be very democratic in order not to scare off people, but it should all the same be sufficiently democratic so that the best elements of the West and East could accept it. This would be very good. The entire population needs to be involved in discussion the constitution. This would create a psychological basis for implementing the unification of Germany.

PIECK says that the People’s Council has chosen a constitutional commission and also commissions on a peace treaty, economic issues, and other [commissions].

STALIN comments that this commission on a peace treaty is a formal issue. But he, Stalin, considers working out a constitution to be one of the primary factors to prepare the German population for unification. Words about unity cannot be repeated all the time. They hear them several times and they this bores everyone. A specific plan needs to be given and the population drawn into working out this document. This needs to be done more quickly. The problem is not in bringing about the constitution. This will not be soon. It needs to be made a key factor to prepare the masses for the unification of Germany. The British and the Americans will try to buy the Germans, to put them in a privileged position. There is [only] one tool against this – to prepare the minds of the people for unification. A constitution is a very good tool, a remarkable tool.

PIECK says that they already tried to do this through Party channels in 1946.

STALIN says that this is not right. The commission should work out a constitution and the congress should discuss it and approve it, after which it is released to the people. This will be a long process. If it takes several years then you’ll profit from this. If minds are prepared for this idea then it will be impossible to wreck unification. Then the Americans will have to capitulate. It will be good if you take this advice.

GROTEWOHL stated that they are of the same opinion and this will provide an opportunity for concrete agitation.

STALIN confirms [this]. All the people expect this and they will receive material. And no America will be able to do anything with this. By this means you will link the entire population with the congress. The authority of the congress needs to be raised. Stalin says that the unification of Germany will not come right away. It’s necessary to fight for the unification of Germany with agitation and propaganda.

Stalin asks what other questions there are and whether they in a hurry to leave.

PIECK says that they are in a hurry and plan to fly out on Monday.

STALIN asks if it is possible to wait longer.

PIECK asks about the possibility of making the trip public. With Sokolovskiy’s permission he has already told member of the SED secretariat about the trip.

STALIN says that it’s all the same to us whether they announce the trip or not. They need to think what’s best for the Party. Glasnost would be possibly somewhat harmful to us. They will say that they went to Moscow, received Moscow’s orders, and the socialists have nothing like this, they operate through instructions. He, Stalin, doesn’t know whether they need to shout about this. If someone from the German Economic Commission were in Moscow involving representatives other parties this would be another matter, but this matter could be spoiled insofar as they will say that socialists don’t have their own chief. Will they not say so? Discuss this and decide it for yourselves.

PIECK agrees with Stalin and says that possibly there will come a time when a delegation of the People’s Council might be able to travel to Moscow.

STALIN says that then it will be possible to talk about a trip, but right now this is an internal Party matter.

PIECK says that they will give a report about the trip to members of the Party secretariat.

STALIN agrees with this. They sent you, they should also hear you out. You should be answerable to them.

Stalin then asks whether they can remain in Moscow until Wednesday when a reply might be given about questions of interest to them.

PIECK said that they could remain. In view of the Easter holidays their absence in Berlin will not be noticed.

At the conclusion STALIN was interested in how they were accommodated in Moscow and whether their food was good.

PIECK and GROTEWOHL express thanks and bade Stalin farewell.

The conversation lasted two and a half hours, from 1900 to 2130.

Recorded by:

V. Semenov

G. Korotkevich

 

DOCUMENT SUMMARY

 

In Tibet China uses New Forms of Coerced Labor and Micromanaging

Before Xinjiang, there was Tibet. Repressive policies tested there between 2012 and 2016 were then applied to the Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in northwestern China: entire cities covered in surveillance cameras, ubiquitous neighborhood police stations, residents made to report on another other.

Now that process also works the other way around. Xinjiang’s coercive labor program — which includes mandatory training for farmers and herders in centralized vocational facilities and their reassignment to state-assigned jobs, some far away — is being applied to Tibet. (Not the internment camps, though.)

Call this a feedback loop of forcible assimilation. It certainly is evidence of the scale of Beijing’s ruthless campaign to suppress cultural and ethnic differences — and not just in Tibet and Xinjiang.

I analyzed more than 100 policy papers and documents from the Tibetan authorities and state-media reports for a study published with the Jamestown Foundation this week. Photos show Tibetans training, wearing fatigues. Official documents outline how Beijing is rolling out for them a militarized labor program much like the one in place in Xinjiang: Tibetan nomads and farmers are being rounded up for military-style classes and taught work discipline, “gratitude” for the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese-language skills.

More than half a million workers have been trained under this policy during the first seven months of the year, according to official documents.

Reuters has confirmed these findings, uncovering more relevant documents. (The Chinese government has denied the charges, including that it is enlisting forced labor in Tibet.)

Tibet has long posed a particular challenge for the Chinese authorities. The region is very far from Beijing and strategically important because of its long border with India. Its people’s culture is distinct, and the devotion of many Tibetans to the Dalai Lama, who simultaneously embodies religious and political power — with a government in exile in India — is a double threat in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party.

The people of what the Chinese government refers to as the Tibet Autonomous Region — about 3.5 million, mostly nomads and farmers scattered throughout the vast Himalayan plateau — have resisted its encroachment for decades. Notably, riots broke out in the capital, Lhasa, in 2008, just weeks before the Olympic Games in Beijing, following years of tightening restrictions on cultural and religious freedoms.

There reportedly have been more than 150 cases of self-immolation carried out in protest since 2011. (Chinese troops patrolling Tibet carry fire extinguishers as part of their riot-control equipment.)

The Dalai Lama is 85, and the Chinese authorities in Beijing have been trying to shape his succession, asserting, for example, that Buddhist reincarnations must “comply” with Chinese law.

This is but one of the many ways in which Beijing has been doubling down on imposing state controls over Tibetan traditional ways of life.

Tibet, like Xinjiang, nominally is an autonomous region, yet in 2019, its government mandated that all Tibetan nomads and farmers be subjected to what some government directives call “military-style” training for vocational skills and then be assigned low-skilled jobs, for example in manufacturing or the services sector.

Some of the reports I have reviewed, including one by Tibet’s Ethnic Affairs Commission, claim that Tibetans’ religion cultivates “backward thinking.” The city of Chamdo claims to have “carried out the transfer of surplus labor force in agricultural and pastoral areas” in order to overcome Tibetans’ purportedly “poor organizational skills.”

According to a major policy paper by the Tibetan regional government, “The 2019-2020 Farmer and Pastoralist Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan,” the military drill-style skills training, coupled with what the government calls “thought education,” will supposedly compel Tibetans to voluntarily participate in the poverty alleviation efforts prescribed by the state.

As of this year, Tibet’s labor plan has explicitly included the transfer of Tibetan workers to other parts of China, with target quotas for each Tibetan region. Local officials who fail to meet those quotas are subject to punishment.

The main action plan also states that Tibetans are to be “encouraged” to hand over their land and herds to large-scale, state-run cooperatives and become shareholders in them. One state-media account from late July about progress with poverty alleviation describes the program as an effort to get Tibetans to “put down the whip, walk out of the pasture and enter the market.”

Becoming wage laborers forces Tibetans to give up herding and farming, and cuts them off from ancient traditions and sacred landscapes. And that’s just the point.

Many of the program’s main features, and objectives, bear a striking similarity with the plan in place in Xinjiang.

So do other measures designed to marginalize Tibetan culture.

For example, Beijing has drastically accelerated in recent years its efforts to minimize the teaching of the Tibetan language, including outside Tibet.

In late 2015, Tashi Wangchuk, a Tibetan from the remote nomadic region of Yulshul in Qinghai Province, tried to sue his local government over the curtailment of Tibetan language education. In 2018, he was sentenced to five years in prison for “inciting separatism.”

I reviewed official recruitment notices for teaching jobs in Yulshul and noticed that the number of advertisements for posts for Tibetan and subjects to be taught in Tibetan declined by 90 percent between 2014 and 2019.

Between 2010 and 2018, other Tibetan regions in Qinghai had recruited as many teachers for subjects taught in Tibetan as for subjects taught in Chinese. But in 2019 and this year so far, those regions advertised more than three times as many teaching positions for classes taught in Chinese than for classes in Tibetan. Similar shifts have happened in other Tibetan areas of China, like Ngawa Prefecture in Sichuan Province.

Tibetan Buddhism is also under attack. In the spring of 2019, the mayor of Lhasa claimed that the year before “the number of days major religious activities were held and the number of people attending them both reduced to below 10 per cent.” Last fall, Beijing started forbidding former government officials from practicing circumambulations at sacred sites.

The authorities of the Chamdo region of Tibet, after announcing in 2017 plans to set up video surveillance systems in main Buddhist temples, have spent 275 million yuan (more than $40 million) on a cloud computing system that enables, among other things, what they call “intelligent temple management” — a euphemism for comprehensive digital surveillance and control.

This strategy has old roots.

Back in 1989, the eminent Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong wrote that through a long process of “mixing and melding,” the Han majority and other ethnic groups in China would eventually combine into a single entity: the Chinese nation-race. In Fei’s view, the Han would be at the center of this fusion, because they were the superior culture into which so-called backward minority groups would inevitably assimilate.

The Chinese government adopted Fei’s vision, and for a time tried to help it along with a large dose of top-down economic development.

In 2000, President Jiang Zemin launched the Great Western Development Campaign, bringing infrastructure — and numerous Han — to the western part of China. Local ethnic minorities would benefit from the new economic activity and employment opportunities so long as they were willing to assimilate culturally and linguistically.

Many resisted. Local expressions of ethnic identities flourished. Tibetans and members of other minority groups flocked to schools that taught their languages, and kept their distinct religions alive.

In a speech in the fall of 2019, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed Fei’s vision of ethnic fusion. But Beijing’s means to achieve it have changed.

Forget organic and voluntary assimilation facilitated by economic incentives; now, minorities, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang, are being forced to comply by way of intrusive micromanaging by the state — a police state — armed with sophisticated surveillance systems, detailed databases and intense forms of social control.

Today, poverty alleviation, a pet project of Mr. Xi’s, is a cover for reshaping not only people’s livelihoods, but their entire lifestyles — their languages, religions, cultures and families.

In both Xinjiang and Tibet, teams of government officials are inserting themselves into homes. They are paired with and assigned to households, and work, eat and sleep with the people who live there.

Every Tibetan has a detailed file showing their income, employment status — and the state-approved solution for their situation. Tibetans who are sent to labor in workshops, often far from their families and places of worship, are easier to control. The children they leave behind grow up in boarding schools.

The purpose of these policies is clear, as are the stakes, and targeted groups are trying to push back. The central government’s recent efforts to replace Mongolian with Chinese as the main teaching language in schools in Inner Mongolia has triggered major protests there.

In Fei’s vision, ethnic fusion would happen slowly, naturally. That has failed. In Mr. Xi’s vision, the assimilation of minority groups must be coerced by the state. That, too, will fail.

Adrian Zenz (@adrianzenz) is a senior fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, in Washington, D.C.

Originally published in The New York Times.

Exposed – Russia Likely to Continue Seeking to Undermine Faith in US Electoral Process

Homeland Security Experts on the Biggest Threats and Challenges the U.S.  Faces in 2020 – Homeland Security Today
Page Count: 4 pages
Date: September 3, 2020
Restriction: For Official Use Only
Originating Organization: Cyber Mission Center, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
File Type: pdf
File Size: 167,819 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): CD0E044E731342D57AB13DCBB9C8B56D2D5A6295D1E51F6409461D1CAB55C61A

Download File

(U//FOUO) We assess that Russia is likely to continue amplifying criticisms of vote-by-mail and shifting voting processes amidst the COVID-19 pandemic to undermine public trust in the electoral process. Decisions made by state election officials on expanding vote-by-mail and adjusting in-person voting to accommodate challenges posed by COVID-19 have become topics of public debate. This public discussion represents a target for foreign malign influence operations that seeks to undermine faith in the electoral process by spreading disinformation about the accuracy of voter data for expanded vote-by-mail, outbound/inbound mail ballot process, signature verification and cure process, modifying scale of in-person voting, and safety and health concerns at polling places, according to CISA guidance documents provided to state and local election officials. Since at least March 2020, Russian malign influence actors have been amplifying allegations of election integrity issues in new voting processes and vote-by-mail programs.

(U//FOUO) Russian state media and proxy websites in mid-August 2020 criticized the integrity of expanded and universal vote-by-mail, claiming ineligible voters could receive ballots due to out-of-date voter rolls, leaving a vast amount of ballots unaccounted for and vulnerable to tampering.b These websites also alleged that vote-by-mail processes would overburden the US Postal Service and local boards of election, delaying vote tabulation and

creating more opportunities for fraud and error.

(U//FOUO) Since March 2020, Russian state media and proxy websites have denigrated vote-by-mail processes, alleging they lack transparency and procedural oversight, creating vast opportunities for voter fraud. These outlets also claimed that state election officials and policymakers leveraged the COVID-19 pandemic to justify politically-expedient decisions made on holding primary elections and implementing new voting processes and vote-by-mail programs allegedly designed to benefit specific candidates and influence election outcomes.

(U//FOUO) Throughout the 2020 primary elections, Russian state media and proxy websites amplified public narratives about shortcomings in ballot delivery and processing, such as claims that voters would not receive their mail ballot in time to cast their vote. These websites highlighted reductions in the number of in-person polling places in large cities due to the pandemic and the long lines this caused, claiming this
would disproportionately suppress voting among African-Americans and expose them to the spread of COVID-19.

(U//FOUO) We assess that Russian state media, proxies, and Russian-controlled social media trolls are likely to promote allegations of corruption, system failure, and foreign malign interference to sow distrust in democratic institutions and election outcomes. We base this assessment on content analysis of narratives and themes promoted by Russian state media and proxy websites throughout the 2020 election cycle concerning system integrity issues and parallels with observed Russian troll activity leading up to the 2018 and 2016 elections.

(U//FOUO) Russia continues to spread disinformation in the United States designed to undermine American confidence in democratic processes and denigrate a perceived anti-Russia establishment, using efforts such as Russian-controlled internet trolls and other proxies, according to an ODNI press statement. In the Iowa Caucuses in February, Russian state media and proxy websites claimed that the contest was fixed in favor of establishment candidates and that technical difficulties with the caucusing mobile voting application led to ballot manipulation. These outlets continued this narrative into March 2020, claiming that the Democratic Party made a corrupt back-room deal to orchestrate the exit of establishment candidates to consolidate the vote behind former Vice President BidenUSPER in advance of the Super Tuesday primary elections.

(U) Russian malign influence actors during the 2018 US midterm election claimed they controlled the US voting systems to prompt election integrity concerns, according to press reporting. In the 2016 US presidential election, Russian social media trolls targeted specific communities and claimed the election was rigged by the establishment, encouraging these voters to stay at home or vote for third-party candidates in order to influence the election outcome, according to reports by firms with expertise in social media network analysis.

CHINESE AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AND DISAPPEARED MY FATHER

A young Chinese woman in red aims her bow and arrow off screen.

The last time I saw my father was in 2013. We were on our way to Indiana University, where he was scheduled to begin a fellowship. He was arrested before boarding the plane and taken away. A mild-mannered, studious professor of economics, his life’s work was using his influence to promote peaceful coexistence between the Uyghur people—our people—and the Han ethnic majority that rules China. That went against the interest of the Chinese Communist government, and in 2014 they sentenced him to life in prison. The last time I spoke to him was the day before his arrest. I still don’t know if he is even alive—the last time I heard anything of his whereabouts was in 2017.

In many ways, I can identify with the title character in Disney’s Mulan films, based on the ancient Chinese legend. In the story, as China calls up the men from every family to defend against a foreign invasion, Mulan dresses as a boy and fights in the place of her father, who is too old to go himself. As a child growing up in Beijing, I loved the legend and the fun Disney cartoon version produced in 1998. Little did I know that I, like Mulan, would later be fighting for my own father—helping to carry on his work while he is unjustly imprisoned. I hope, like her, to achieve victory by one day gaining my father’s release.

Today, sadly, a new retelling of the Mulan story, once again by Disney, is profiting from the oppression of my people. This live-action version was filmed partly in the Uyghur region—officially known in China as “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region”—where the Chinese Communist government is holding at least one million members of Turkic ethnic minorities in concentration camps as part of a coordinated genocidal campaign. My father, if he is alive, may be among them—nobody will allow us to visit him, or even tell us where he is.

Despite widespread international condemnation of China’s brutal tactics in Xinjiang, Disney still chose to go there to film this movie, delivering money and the prestige of an international “family” brand to those directly engaged in genocide. Adding insult to injury, in the closing credits, they even made sure to thank the local government “bureau of public security” (also known as state police) and “publicity department” (or propaganda). These are the very same government agencies in the Uyghur region that are imprisoning Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities, and then telling their families and the international press they are merely being held in “training centers.” The “public security” office is currently under sanctions by the U.S. government for human rights abuses.

Disney still chose to go there to film this movie, delivering money and the prestige of an international “family” brand to those directly engaged in genocide.

Our people are no strangers to persecution and exploitation. Starting in the 1950s, the Communist government started pushing Han Chinese to move to the Uyghur region in a purposeful move to solve their own overcrowding and speed up the “Sinicization” of the Uyghur population. Their tactics have only become more aggressive since.

What is more disheartening is the West’s complicity, and specifically the major multinational corporations that are enabling the cultural genocide of the Uyghurs. China routinely uses its political prisoners as a source of forced labor in factories, and Uyghur prisoners have reportedly been put to work making products for major brands like Nike, Apple, and Gap. Recently the Trump administration announced plans to ban certain agricultural products from China due to concerns about their use of forced labor.

Hollywood isn’t immune from the charms of Beijing either. The promise of access to the massive Chinese market is irresistible for a movie industry desperate for revenue in the COVID era when movie ticket sales are down. While many theaters in the United States remain shut down, Mulan will be opening in Chinese theaters.

It appears, sadly, that Disney is the latest in the long and disappointing line of Western people and companies taken advantage of by China. We can hope, at least, that the outcry against Disney on behalf of the Uyghurs and freedom-loving people everywhere will not only lead others to #BoycottMulan in the short term, but in the long term demand that Western companies cease cooperating with Chinese oppression.

At the same time, I have learned to be positive. Disney has a chance to respond constructively to this issue. They could at least acknowledge the controversy, and maybe even donate some of their profits from Mulan and its merchandise to Uyghur families and survivors of the cultural genocide. In the end, we may even thank them for raising awareness of this issue—because the more the world knows, the less the Chinese Communist government can get away with.

Jewher Ilham is the Uyghur Human Rights Fellow at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation in Washington, D.C.

Originally published in Daily Beast.

Deals between Mafia Boss Marat Balagula, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus Exposed

Marat Balagula | Mafia Wiki | Fandom

Marat Balagula

Documents released through Par:AnoIA, allegedly containing details about deals with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The documents are partly in English, Russian and Chinese. One document, obtained from the Chinese foreign office in Minsk indicates relations between the notorious Russian mob boss Marat Balagula and high ranking Ukrainian politicians.

Download the documents here:

https://data.ddosecrets.com/file/Chinese%20Ministry%20of%20Commerce/BYCN.rar

Marat Balagula (born September 8, 1943, Orenburg, USSR) was a Russian immigrant who was a Former Soviet Union leader and  Russian mafia boss, and close associate of the Lucchese crime family. His nickname was “Tony Soprano of the Russian Mafia”.

Biography

Balagula was born in 1943 in Orenburg, Russia, at the height of World War II. His mother, Zinaida, fled with the children from their home in Odessa after the German Wehrmacht swept across the Russian steppes. Marat’s father, Jakov, was a lieutenant in the Red Army; Balagula claims that he was one of the armored corps that stormed Berlin during the last desperate hours of the war. In the harshness of the Joseph Stalin era, the Balagulas led a comfortable, middle class life. Jakov worked in a factory manufacturing locks, as did his wife. Young Marat, an average high school student, was drafted into the Soviet Army at the age of nineteen and served as a bursar for three years, after which the Party assigned him to manage a food co-op in Odessa. Determined to get ahead, Marat attended night school, receiving diploma as a teacher of mathematics and then a business degree in economics and mathematics. Like many ambitious Russians with capitalist predilections, he promptly plunged into the country’s flourishing black market. He quickly learned to attend to the demanding appetites of the apparatchiks, making certain that the choicest meats and produce was delivered to them.

Arrival to the U.S.

In 1977, Balagula decided to move his family to the United States under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. At first he worked as a textile cutter in Washington Heights, Manhattan for $3.50 per hour. His wife Alexandra later reminisced, “It was hard for us, with no language, no money.”

Balagula’s fortunes improved markedly when he relocated his family to Brighton Beach and began to work for the infamous vor Evsei Agron… Agron, it turned out, was no match for the ambitious Balagula. While Agron’s technical expertise didn’t go beyond seeking sadistic new uses for his electric cattle prod, Balagula wanted to lead the Organizatsiya into the upscale world of white collar crime, and with the experience he had gained in the Soviet Union, he developed a business acumen that put him in a class by himself. surrounded by a cadre of Russian economists and math prodigies at the Odessa restaurant, he acquired a knowledge of global markets that enabled him to make millions in the arcane world of commodities trading. He also energetically cultivated the Italian mobsters he met as Agron’s consigliere. After Agron was executed, Balagula organized his followers into a hierarchy, much like the Italian Mafia and before long, succeeded in transforming the Organizatsiya into a multi-billion dollar criminal empire that stretched across from the tatters of Communist Eastern Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Ultimately, however, it was Balagula’s spectacular success in the gasoline bootlegging business — a scheme that would reportedly earn him hundreds of millions of dollars and an honored position with the Italian Mafia — that would usher in the first Golden Age of Russian organized crime in America.”

Russian mob

According to a former associate “Marat was the king of Brighton Beach. He had a Robin Hood complex. People would come over from Russia and he’d give them jobs. He liked professional men. Guys came over and couldn’t practice medicine or use their engineering degrees. He sought them out. He was fascinated with intellectuals. He co-opted them. He put them into the gasoline business, he put them into car washes or taxi companies. He’d reinvest his own money in their business if they were having trouble. He had a heart.”

According to a former Suffolk County, New York prosecutor, however, there was another side to Balagula.

“Everybody in Brighton Beach talked about Balagula in hushed tones. These were people who knew him from the Old Country. They were really, genuinely scared of this guy.”

Lucchese Crime family associate

After the Colombo crime family began shaking down his gasoline business, Balagula asked for a sitdown with Lucchese crime family consigliere Christopher Furnari at Brooklyn’s 19th Hole social club. According to Anthony “Gaspipe” Casso, who was a Lucchese family soldier present at the meeting, Furnari declared,

“Here there’s enough for everybody to be happy… to leave the table satisfied. What we must avoid is trouble between us and the other families. I propose to make a deal with the others so there’s no bad blood…. Meanwhile, we will send word out that from now on you and your people are with the Lucchese family. No one will bother you. If anyone does bother you, come to us and Anthony will take care of it.”

New York’s Five Families imposed a two cent per gallon “Family tax” on Balagula’s bootlegging operation, which became their greatest moneymaker after drug trafficking. According to one former associate,

“La Cosa Nostra reminded Marat of the apparatchiks, power structure and hierarchy in the Soviet Union. He thought as long as he gave them something they would be powerful allies who would protect him from enemies and law enforcement. Then all of a sudden he was at risk of being killed if he couldn’t pay to the penny.”

Because Anthony Casso and Balagula hit it off so well, Casso was soon partners with Balagula in a diamond mine located in Sierra Leone, Africa. They opened a business office in Freetown. Casso also arranged for an Orthodox Jewish friend of his named Simon Stein, a diamond expert and member of the DeBeers Club, to travel from the Forty-seventh Street diamond district to Africa to smuggle diamonds back into the country in the linings and collars of overcoats and in secret compartments of very expensive leather luggage.

Enemies

It didn’t take long for word on the street to reach the Russian underworld: Marat Balagula was paying off the Italians; Balagula was a punk; Balagula had no balls. Balagula’s days were numbered. This, of course, was the beginning of serious trouble. Balagula did in fact have balls — he was a ruthless killer when necessary — but he also was a smart diplomatic administrator and he knew that the combined, concerted force of the Italian crime families would quickly wipe the newly arrived Russian competition off the proverbial map.

Shortly afterward, Balagula’s rival, a high-ranking Russian mafia member named Vladimir Reznikov, drove up to Balagula’s offices in the Midwood section of Brooklyn. Sitting in his car, Reznikov opened fire on the office building with an AK-47 assault rifle. One of Balagula’s close associates was killed and several secretaries were wounded.

Then, on June 12, 1986, Reznikov entered the Odessa nightclub in Brighton Beach. Reznikov pushed a 9mm Beretta into Balagula’s skull and demanded $600,000 as the price of not pulling the trigger. He also demanded a percentage of everything Balagula was involved in. After Balagula promised to get the money, Reznikov snarled, “Fuck with me and you’re dead – you and your whole fucking family; I swear I’ll fuck and kill your wife as you watch – you understand?”.

Shortly after Reznikov left, Balagula suffered a massive heart attack. He insisted, however on being treated at his home in Brighton Beach, where he felt it would be harder for Reznikov to kill him. When Anthony Casso arrived, he listened to Balagula’s story and seethed with fury. Casso later told his biographer Philip Carlo that, to his mind, Reznikov had just spat in the face of the entire Cosa Nostra. Casso responded, “Send word to Vladimir that you have his money, that he should come to the club tomorrow. We’ll take care of the rest.” Balagula responded, “You’re sure? This is an animal. It was him that used a machine gun in the office.” Casso responded, “Don’t concern yourself. I promise we’ll take care of him… Okay?” Casso then requested a photograph of Reznikov and a description of his car.

The following day, Reznikov returned to the Rasputin nightclub to pick up his money. Upon realizing that Balagula wasn’t there, Reznikov launched into a barrage of profanity and stormed back to the parking lot. There, Reznikov and two of his underlings was shot dead by Gambino crime family veteran hitman Joseph Testa with a machine gun. Testa then jumped into a car driven by Anthony Senter and left Brighton Beach. According to Casso, “After that, Marat didn’t have any problems with the Russians ever again.”

Downfall

In 1986, Balagula masterminded a $750,000 credit card scam when a business associate, Robert Fasano, began wearing a wire on him for the U.S. Secret Service. After being convicted on Federal charges, Balagula fled to Antwerp with his longtime mistress Natalia Shevchenko. After three years as a fugitive, Balagula was arrested in Frankfurt am Main, West Germany on February 27, 1989. In December 1989, Balagula was extradited to the United States and sentenced to eight years in prison for credit card fraud.

In November 1992, Balagula was convicted at a separate trial for gasoline bootlegging and sentenced to an additional ten years in Federal prison. While passing sentence, Judge Leonard Wexler declared, “This was supposed to be a haven for you. It turned out to be a hell for us.”

Balagula served his sentence and was released from Federal prison in 2004. Balagula was quoted as saying; “They claim I made $25 million per day bootlegging. It’s crazy! I got nothing. What have I got? The government took my apartment in Manhattan, my house in Long Island, $300,000 in cash. They said, ‘If you don’t cooperate with us you’ll go to jail for twenty years.’ … They want me to tell them about the Mafia, about gasoline, about hits. Forget it. All these charges are bullshit! All my life I like to help people. Just because a lot of people come to me for advice, everybody thinks I’m a boss. I came to America to find work, support myself, and create a future for my children.”

In 1977, Balagula decided to move his family to the United States under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. At first he worked as a textile cutter in Washington Heights, Manhattan for $3.50 per hour. His wife Alexandra later reminisced, “It was hard for us, with no language, no money.”

In the aftermath of Evsei Agron’s murder, Balagula took over as the most powerful Russian gangster in Brooklyn. According to a former Suffolk County, New York, prosecutor, however, there was another side to Balagula. “Everybody in Brighton Beach talked about Balagula in hushed tones. These were people who knew him from the Old Country. They were really, genuinely scared of this guy.”

After the Colombo crime family began shaking down his gasoline business, Balagula asked for a sitdown with Lucchese crime family consigliere Christopher Furnari at Brooklyn’s 19th Hole social club. According to Anthony “Gaspipe” Casso, who was a Lucchese soldier present at the meeting, Furnari declared,

In the aftermath, New York’s Five Families imposed a two cent per gallon “Family tax” on Balagula’s bootlegging operation, which became their greatest moneymaker after drug trafficking. According to one former associate,

According to author Philip Carlo, “Because Gaspipe and Russian mobster Marat Balagula hit it off so well, Casso was soon partners with Balagula on a diamond mine located in Sierra LeoneAfrica. They opened a business office in Freetown.

Balagula’s rival, a fellow Russian immigrant named Vladimir Reznikov, drove up to Balagula’s offices in the Midwood section of Brooklyn. Sitting in his car, Reznikov opened fire on the office building with an AK-47 assault rifle. One of Balagula’s close associates was killed and several secretaries were wounded.

Then, on June 12, 1986, Reznikov entered the Odessa nightclub in Brighton Beach. Reznikov pushed a 9mm Beretta into Balagula’s skull and demanded $600,000 as the price of not pulling the trigger. He also demanded a percentage of everything Balagula was involved in. Shortly after Reznikov left, Balagula suffered a massive heart attack. He insisted, however on being treated at his home in Brighton Beach, where he felt it would be harder for Reznikov to kill him. When Anthony Casso arrived, he listened to Balagula’s story and seethed with fury. Casso later told his biographer Philip Carlo that, to his mind, Reznikov had just spat in the face of the entire Cosa Nostra. Casso responded, “Send word to Vladimir that you have his money, that he should come to the club tomorrow. We’ll take care of the rest.”[10] Balagula responded, “You’re sure? This is an animal. It was him that used a machine gun in the office.” Casso responded, “Don’t concern yourself. I promise we’ll take care of him … Okay?” Casso then requested a photograph of Reznikov and a description of his car.

The following day, Reznikov returned to the Rasputin nightclub to pick up his money. Upon realizing that Balagula wasn’t there, Reznikov launched into a barrage of profanity and stormed back to the parking lot. There, Reznikov was shot dead by DeMeo crew veteran Joseph Testa. Testa then jumped into a car driven by Anthony Senter and left Brighton Beach. According to Casso, “After that, Marat didn’t have any problems with other Russians.”

In 1986, Balagula was masterminding a $750,000 credit card scam when a business associate, Robert Fasano, began wearing a wire on him for the U.S. Secret Service. After being convicted on Federal charges, Balagula fled to Antwerp with his longtime mistress Natalia Shevchenko. After three years as a fugitive, Balagula was arrested in Frankfurt am MainWest Germany, on February 27, 1989. In December 1989, Balagula was extradited to the United States and sentenced to eight years in prison for credit card fraud.

In November 1992, Balagula was convicted at a separate trial for gasoline bootlegging and sentenced to an additional ten years in Federal prison. While passing sentence, Judge Leonard Wexler declared, “This was supposed to be a heaven for you. It turned out to be a hell for us.”

Balagula served his sentence and was released from Federal prison in 2004.

He died from cancer in 2019.

Where Have All The Communist KGB and STASI Spies Gone ?

Fallout 4 - RED SCARE - FULL QUEST Mod Playthrough - COMMUNIST SPY ...

A look back: On Normannenstrasse in East Berlin, in the core of a standard white collar class neighborhood, stands a gigantic office complex: 41 solid structures as inauspiciously utilitarian as the condo towers that encompass them. Nine months prior it was the base camp of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security – the Staatsicherheit – or Stasi, maybe the most modern and sweeping undercover work association at any point made. Be that as it may, among January and March this year, as East Germany’s Communist Government at long last crumbled, the Stasi was officially disbanded. Today, the solid fortress is abandoned, its 10,000 rooms fixed, its operators bolted out.

From these dreary structures, 34,000 officials ran the Stasi’s 39 divisions. The staff included 2,100 operators alloted nonstop to perusing mail passed on from post workplaces and territorial Stasi base camp, 5,000 specialists liable for following suspects, and 6,000 agents whose solitary employment was tuning in to private phone discussions.

Primary Department VIII, otherwise called Observation, kept a nearby watch on residents through a broad system of sources in neighborhoods, schools, libraries and even service stations. Principle Department II – Counterintelligence – did electronic reconnaissance of outside ambassadors, specialists and writers and put spies in their workplaces, homes and lodgings. The Stasi even had a division to keep an eye on other Stasi individuals and sources.

”We are as yet getting stuns from what we discover,” says the movie producer Klaus Wendler, a representative for an East German Government advisory group that is currently filtering through the Stasi’s 5,000,000 documents. ”Performers had to keep an eye on individual artists, understudies were pressured into keeping an eye on companions, and youngsters were tricked into keeping an eye on their folks.”

With the disbanding of the Stasi, 85,000 full-time officials lost their positions essentially for the time being. Close to 10,000 have since discovered productive business, a large portion of them in different Government services, remembering 2,000 for the Ministry of the Interior, which some time ago administered the Stasi. The rest have joined the developing positions of East Germany’s jobless; some make due with standard joblessness benefits, while others get no Government remuneration by any stretch of the imagination. Many are upset at ending up barred, even alienated, by their kindred residents.

Abroad, the greater part of the Stasi’s 2,500 profession officials in consulates and missions no longer have a covert operative central command to answer to, and its untold a large number of independent covert government agents no longer get cash from their previous experts. West German insight officials gauge that there are exactly 5,000 agents in West Germany today, 500 of them ”top operators.” Eighty of those are thought to have entered the most elevated echelons of the military and Government, West German authorities state, including knowledge offices.

In spite of emotional political changes in Europe, West German insight authorities dread that not every one of these covert agents have changed their loyalties. Exceptionally restrained and still covert, some are as yet gathering and transferring data to Soviet knowledge organs, the West Germans accept. Others, they think, are essentially sticking around for their chance, holding back to be enacted.

Communist Spy Illustrations, Royalty-Free Vector Graphics & Clip ...

The Stasi has for some time been perceived as one of the best insight benefits on the planet, in a similar alliance as those of Israel and France. By the by, in the course of the most recent seven months, West German and American knowledge authorities have been astounded to find the size of its outside tasks, arranged until his retirement three years prior by the scandalous Markus Wolf. Until 1979, Western knowledge operators didn’t have a present photo of ”the man without a face.” But as of late he has ventured out from the shadows. Today, a smash hit creator, Wolf talks uninhibitedly of his effective infiltration of the West German insight and military over a time of over 30 years. What he doesn’t talk about is psychological oppression.

Over the most recent two months, frightening disclosures have become visible specifying the Stasi’s connects to an assortment of fear based oppressor gatherings, quite the extreme left Red Army Faction, eight of whose individuals were captured in June. With the assistance of the Stasi, they had been given new personalities and occupations in East Germany in the wake of doing psychological militant activities in the 1970’s and 80’s. The Stasi has additionally been ensnared in the Libyan-coordinated bombarding of the La Belle disco in West Germany in 1986: According to new data from witnesses and held onto documents, Stasi operators helped transport the explosives to West Berlin that brought about the passings of two American fighters.

In East Germany, as well, the Stasi, albeit formally nonexistent, stays a danger. In late June, new divulgences uncovered that in 1986, as the Soviet Union started changing its general public and the East German economy kept on decaying, the Stasi, predicting turmoil – however not the finish of the divider – set in excess of 2,000 individuals from a world class mystery team into the most significant levels of East German Government divisions, organizations and colleges. Another 500 government agents were dispatched to West Germany. East German authorities state that a large portion of them are still set up, their characters obscure, and suspect that they are compelled to hold up out any political disturbance.

Insight authorities are in a race to carry the most exceedingly terrible guilty parties to equity before they go for all time underground or sign up with new bosses. The pursuit is suggestive, says one American ambassador in Berlin, of a period in the no so distant past: ”Ferreting out the government operatives, psychological oppressors and Stasi operators is comparable to the quest for the Nazis and their teammates after they endeavored to vanish into German culture toward the finish of the war.”

On Friday morning, only 48 hours from money related unification on July 1, East Berlin is bursting at the seams with energy. Global camera teams and columnists have attacked the city to catch the beginning of another time. Be that as it may, in his office, just strides from the Volkskammer, or Parliament, Peter-Michael Diestel, East Germany’s 38-year-old Interior Minister, ponders the insult inheritance of the past. ”My crucial,” says just, ”is to destroy the Stasi.”

That assignment has tumbled to an impossible competitor: a previous dairy animals draining victor, weight lifter (he can seat press 420 pounds) and infrequent legal counselor who accepted the position of Interior Minister to a great extent in light of the fact that nobody else needed it.

Diestel, a local of Leipzig, has been occupied since getting to work in April. He has enrolled the collaboration of huge quantities of previous Stasi officials and, utilizing data from witnesses and Stasi records, has attempted to acquire ”independent” agents, either by extending to them employment opportunities or persuading them that the Stasi is done. He has gone along key data on fear mongers and sources to West German knowledge offices, and helped organize the capture in June of the Red Army Faction psychological oppressors. At last, Diestel built up the Stasi’s complicity in the La Belle disco bombarding.

Diestel is exploring a forlorn course, subject to furious assaults from both the left and right in East Germany, extraordinary weight from West German authorities, and week after week requires his acquiescence by the German Social Union, a traditionalist gathering in East Germany’s overseeing alliance. Due to day by day dangers against his life, the police monitor his significant other and three little youngsters nonstop. Says Peter Pragal, East Berlin reporter for the week by week magazine Stern: ”He has the hardest activity in Germany, East or West.”

Other than its full-time officials, selected from the best and most brilliant in East German culture, the Stasi had 150,000 dynamic sources and 500,000 to 2 million low maintenance witnesses in East Germany. Its land property alone – including the huge fortresslike complex in East Berlin and Stasi’s in excess of 2,000 structures, homes, dugouts, havens, medical clinics, and resorts all through East Germany – have been esteemed in the billions of dollars. Up until this point, Government agents attempting to take stock of the Stasi have counted 23,000 vehicles and trucks and 250,000 weapons, including submachine firearms, guns, rifles and explosive launchers.

The productive Stasi machine accumulated broad dossiers on in excess of 5 million East Germans – 33% of the populace – that included data as close as sexual propensities and as everyday as books settled up with the library. A great many calls were recorded; condos were pester and unlawfully looked (the Stasi would orchestrate to have suspects kept late at their employments). One protester as of late found that a small scale listening gadget fit for transmitting three miles had been sewn into his jacket neckline.

Residents were powerless against the Stasi’s Orwellian interruption whenever and anyplace – in their condos, industrial facilities, houses of worship, cafés, libraries, specialists’ workplaces, rooms, even on their excursions abroad. In some East German urban communities, each bit of mail was opened in exceptional steam rooms joined to the post workplaces.

At the point when East German soccer groups ventured out to play coordinates in West Germany, Stasi specialists obliged busloads of fans, checking whether any East German sat close to a West German, showed a West German banner or sang the West German national song of praise.

Igor Gouzenko, The Soviet Defector Who Started the Cold War

Up and down the a large number of miles of East German expressway, Stasi specialists acted like corner store chaperons, servers and travelers, cautiously taking note of whether East Germans left their vehicles close to Western vehicles or conveyed dubiously overwhelming baggage.

The Stasi made it basically incomprehensible for East Germans not to work together. Each field operator needed to convey in any event 25 new sources or start 25 examinations consistently. Residents who declined to help were either set apart as subversives or left to adapt to the administration independent. ”You were unable to go anyplace in East German culture except if you could pull the correct strings,” says Hasso Von Samson, a spokesman for West Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution. ”But I guess that’s what happens when they take away your enemy.”

This article reflects the situation in Germany in 1990.

Since then the top spies are still in touch with each other and form a dangerous network which is similiar to the Cosa Nostra in the USA and/or Sicily, the Yakuza in Japan, the Russian Mafia and the Chinese Triads.

The only distinction: The German STASI has learned the code of Omerta and operates in the dark – within the government, the Gauck administration, the Bundestag, the left party, the legal system as judges, attorney and prosecutors, the police and also in the German security and intelligence services.

And last not but least as undercover agents and informer for former KGB spy Wladimir Putin, now Russia’s ruler like former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, former STASI agent Matthias Warnig and the Gazprom and North Stream – Energy connection.

It is a taboo until now.

EXPOSED – U.S. Army Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

EXPOSED – U.S. Army Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

The Korean peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the US in the Pacific Command (PACOM), and many observers note that North Korea is an unpredictable and potentially volatile actor. According to the Department of Defense in its report to Congress and the intelligence community, the DPRK “remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” Some of the latest evidence of irrational behavior is the elevation of Kim Jong Un’s 26-year old sister to a high governmental post late in 2014, the computer hacking of the Sony Corporation supposedly by North Korea during late 2014 over the possible release of a film that mocked Kim Jong Un, and the April 2015 execution of a defense chief for allegedly nodding off during a meeting. Over the past 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its enemies, especially South Korea. These actions included attacks on South Korean naval vessels, the capturing of a US ship and holding American hostages for 11 months, the hijacking of a South Korean airline jet, electronic warfare against South Korean signals including global positioning satellites (GPS), and assassinations or attempted assassinations on South Korean officials including the ROK president. The attempted 1968 Blue House Raid by North Korean elite military personnel resulted in the death or capture of all 31 infiltrators involved in the assassination attempt as well as the death of 71 personnel, including three Americans, and the injury of 66 others as the North Korean SPF personnel attempted to escape back to DPRK territory.

The purpose of this North Korean Threat Tactics Report (TTR) is to explain to the Army training community how North Korea fights including its doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, and the warfighting functions. A TTR also identifies where the conditions specific to the actor are present in Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues.

Executive Summary

North Korea is an oligarchy with Kim Jong Un as its supreme leader.
The DPRK is a militaristic society with about 1.2 million active duty personnel in uniform out of a population of 24 million with another 7.7 million in the reserve forces.
All military personnel serve under the umbrella of the Korean People’s Army (KPA); the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) and Korean People’s Navy (KPN) primarily support the KPA ground forces.
The KPAF focuses on homeland defense and close air support to the KPA.
The KPN’s primary mission is to protect the North Korean coastline and support the KPA special purpose forces (SPF) in mission execution.
Much of the equipment in all military branches is old and obsolete, but the KPA has concentrated its modernization efforts on missile technology that may provide the means to successfully launch a nuclear warhead.
North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon and is modernizing its missile fleet in order to increase the attack range for its nuclear arsenal.
North Korea possesses both chemical and biological weapons.
The KPA practices both passive and active camouflage to hide its units, headquarters, and other important resources from the air.

Weaknesses

Although the North Korean military may feature some positive attributes as a fighting force, the KPA also suffers from many weaknesses as well. Much of the military’s equipment is old and obsolete. The North Korean military consciously refuses to rid itself of any equipment and still operate tanks that date back to World War II. This wide range of military hardware from many generations of warfare also generates logistical issues. The KPA’s supply personnel must not only find the spare parts for a large variety of equipment, the KPA maintenance personnel must be well-versed in the repair of a great assortment of vehicles and weapons. In addition, the DPRK lacks the logistical capability to support the KPA beyond a few months. Due to the shortage of fuel and the cost to operate vehicles for a cash-strapped country, many of the KPA soldiers find themselves involved in public works projects or helping farmers bring in their rice crops. Any time spent in non-military support is less time that the KPA soldiers can spend training for combat. Even the mechanized and armor forces, due to resource restraints, spend much of their training time doing light infantry training instead of mounted operations. While KPA soldiers may be well trained in individual skills or small unit tactics, the amount of time spent on larger exercises pales in comparison to most Western militaries. Without adequate time and resources to practice large scale military operations, the KPA will always face a steep learning curve when the KPA is forced to perform them in actual combat for the first time.

The DPRK’s unorthodox use of provocation in order to obtain concessions from its enemies—especially the US, South Korea, and Japan—is a danger. One never knows what North Korea will do next as, in the past, the DPRK has sanctioned assassination attempts on South Korean political leaders and conducted bombings when South Korean contingents are in another country, unannounced attacks on ships by submarines, unprovoked artillery attacks, or has tunneled underground into another country. US military personnel stationed in South Korea must be prepared for the unexpected from the DPRK.

One of these incidents could ignite the Korean peninsula back into a full-blown war. While an armistice has been in place since 1953, an armistice is just a ceasefire waiting for a peace treaty to be signed or for the resumption of hostilities. Any conflict between North and South Korea would inevitably bring the US into the conflict as the ROK has been an ally for over six decades.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and the missiles to transport it up to 9,650 km makes it a threat to US forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Alaska, or even the west coast of the continental United States. Even more concerning was the DPRK’s first successful test launch of a KN-11 missile from a submarine on 23 January 2015 since, in the near future, the North Korean submarines could silently move closer to their targets before launching a nuclear missile that would give the US less warning time. If the DPRK thought that the survival of its country or the Kim regime was at stake, North Korea might use any nuclear weapons at its disposal. The KPA also possesses chemical weapons and its doctrine calls for their employment. The DPRK is also involved in biological weapons research and would likely use those with offensive capabilities. US military personnel training for deployment to South Korea must be prepared to fight in a chemical, biological, or nuclear environment.

 

Stalin’s America | Socialism in America

Stalin’s America | Socialism in America

 

How the Socialist Party platform of 1928 worked its way into American political policy.

“The American people will never knowingly adopt Socialism. But under the name of ‘liberalism’ they will adopt every fragment of the Socialist program, until one day America will be a Socialist nation, without knowing how it happened.”

– Norman Thomas (1884-1968), six-time U.S. Presidential candidate for the Socialist Party of America

Socialist Party Platform 1928
(click to read entire platform)

( NOTE:   It is the intention of CrystalBull.com to remain politically independent, and not become mired in partisan politics.  Our mission is to study the world economy, and in that mission, at times, the relationship between politics and economics becomes highly relevant.  This is an important time for this commentary.  Whether the reader is liberal or conservative, Democrat or Republican, we believe this is of interest to all investors. These observations were first made by economists (Nobel Laureate) Milton and Rose Friedman, in Free to Choose in 1979, but have been updated here.  Thankfully, we have been spared the brutality of a Joseph Stalin, though many of the economic principles of his early years have crept into American life.)

Let’s set the stage…  The year is 1928.  World War I ended ten years ago, but its effects and settlements have left much of the world in dire straits economically.  The National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nazi) is gaining power in an economically-destitute Weimar Germany.  Benito Mussolini and the National Fascist Party are firmly entrenched in Italy.  The Bolshevik Revolution, where first the peasants, then Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik Party wrested power from the czars in Russia, is now a decade in the past.  Joseph Stalin has built a “cult of personality” in Russia, using mass media to create an idealized and heroic public image through unquestioned idolatry, flattery, and praise.

The propaganda machines of both Stalin’s Socialism and Mussolini’s Fascism are in full swing, painting rosy pictures of life under government control.  Franklin Delano Roosevelt is campaigning to become governor of New York.  The cocktail parties of Upper Manhattan are abuzz with chatter about the foreign rulers.  In fact, a year earlier, future members of FDR’s “Brain Trust” (mostly professors at Columbia University) went on a junket to Russia to meet with Stalin, and came back in admiration and awe.  One Brain Trust member, Stuart Chase, went on to write a very prophetic book, The New Deal, which laid the groundwork for the social programs of the FDR administration.  The last sentence of The New Deal reads, “Why should Russians have all the fun remaking a world?”

The U.S. economy is strong.  Life is good, but the “roaring 20’s” are about to come to an end.

In the 1928 election for President of the United States, Norman Thomas and James Maurer ran on the Socialist Party ticket.  They captured only one percent of the vote, but laid out a vision for what Socialism meant in the early part of the 20th century.  The planks of the Socialist Party platform were clearly defined.  It is fascinating that in just a few decades, most of the planks of the 1928 Socialist Party platform would be enacted into law, without the party ever winning an election.  Thomas finally quit American politics, stating that he was no longer needed, as the Democrat and Republican parties had adopted every plank in the platform.  He said, “The difference between Democrats and Republicans is: Democrats have accepted some ideas of Socialism cheerfully, while Republicans have accepted them reluctantly”.

Here are the economic planks of the Socialist Party platform of 1928, with editorial comment added (Click to read entire platform):

1. “Nationalization of our natural resources, beginning with the coal mines and water sites, particularly at Boulder Dam and Muscle Shoals.” (Boulder Dam, renamed Hoover Dam, and Muscle Shoals are now both federal government projects.)

2. “A publicly owned giant power system under which the federal government shall cooperate with the states and municipalities in the distribution of electrical energy to the people at cost…” (Tennessee Valley Authority, et al.  This is a generally accepted process across the country.  Even the private utilities are highly regulated.)

3. “National ownership and democratic management of railroads and other means of transportation and communication.” (Railroad passenger service was completely nationalized through Amtrak. Some freight service was nationalized through Conrail. Private railroads are strictly regulated by the federal government. The FCC controls communications by telephone, telegraph, radio, television, and the internet.)

4. “An adequate national program for flood control, flood relief, reforestation, irrigation, and reclamation.” (Government expenditures for these purposes are currently tens of billions of dollars per year, including FEMA, Army Corps of Engineers, etc.)

5. “Immediate governmental relief of the unemployed by the extension of all public works and a program of long range planning of public works . . .” (In the 1930s, WPA and PWA were a direct counterpart; now, a wide variety of other programs are.) “All persons thus employed to be engaged at hours and wages fixed by bona-fide labor unions.” (The Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healey Acts require contractors with government contracts to pay “prevailing wages,” generally interpreted as highest union wages.)

6. “Loans to states and municipalities without interest for the purpose of carrying on public works and the taking of such other measures as will lessen widespread misery.” (Federal grants in aid to states and local municipalities amount to billions of dollars a year.  Federal highway funds and many other public works projects.)

7. “A system of unemployment insurance.” (Part of Social Security system, as well as the Federal Unemployment Tax.)

8. “The nation-wide extension of public employment agencies in cooperation with city federations of labor.” (U.S. Employment Service and affiliated state employment services administer a network of thousands of local employment offices.)

9. “A system of health and accident insurance and of old age pensions as well as unemployment insurance.” (Part of Social Security, Unemployment. Universal health insurance coming soon.)

10. “Shortening the workday” and “Securing every worker a rest period of no less than two days in each week.” (Legislated by Department of Labor’s Wages and Hours Laws that require overtime for working more than eight hours per day or forty hours per week.)

11. “Enacting of an adequate federal anti-child labor amendment.” (Child labor provisions under Fair Labor Standards Act.)

12. “Abolition of the brutal exploitation of convicts under the contract system and substitution of a cooperative organization of industries in penitentiaries and workshops for the benefit of convicts and their dependents.” (In the 1930’s, contract labor was outlawed.  After that, rather than making products for private profit, inmates made license plates and other products for government or nonprofit agencies.  The Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 loosened regulations to allow prisons to put people to work, provided they paid prevailing wages, consulted unions, and didn’t displace workers outside prisons.)

13. “Legislation aiming at the prevention of occupational diseases.” (OSHA)

14. “Increase of taxation on high income levels, of corporation taxes and inheritance taxes, the proceeds to be used for old age pensions and other forms of social insurance.” (In 1928, highest personal income tax rate, 25 percent; in 2009, 35 percent, current proposals take that above 40%; in 1928, corporate tax rate, 12 percent; in 2009, 35-39% percent with proposed increases; in 1928, top federal estate tax rate, 20 percent; in 2009, 48% with proposed increases.)

15. “Appropriation by taxation of the annual rental value of all land held for speculation.” (Not achieved in this form, but property taxes have risen drastically.)

What were shunned as Socialist principles in 1928 are now generally accepted in American life.

If you find this interesting, please use the links below to forward to your friends.

Must Watch Video – Vladimir Putin Cold Open in Saturday Night Live

Must Watch Video – Vladimir Putin Cold Open in Saturday Night Live

Putin Wife,Putin News,Putin Net Worth,Putin Height,Putin Bay,Putin Memes,Putin Trump,Putin On The Ritz,Putin Age,Putin Trump Meeting,Putin And Trump,Putin Age,Putin And Trump Meeting,Putin Approval Rating,Putin And Obama,Putin Ally Crossword,Putin Assad,Putin And North Korea,Putin And Reagan,Putin As A Child,Putin Bay,Putin Bear,Putin Birthday,Putin Biography,Putin Bay Hotels,Putin Badass,Putin Bay Weather,Putin Blueberry Hill,Putin Bay Ferry,Putin Black Belt,Putin Children,Putin Calendar,Putin Clown,Putin Cartoon,Putin Chechnya,Putin Crying,Putin Canada,Putin Crimea,Putin Corruption,Putin Clinton,Putin Daughters,Putin Dog,Putin Documentary,Putin Dead,Putin Dog Merkel,Putin Definition,Putin Dancing,Putin Dolphins,Putin Drawing,Putin Dancing Gif,Putin Election,Putin Eating Popcorn,Putin English,Putin Election Results,Putin Erdogan,Putin Education,Putin Economy,Putin Eyes,Putin Exxon Deal,Putin Eye Color,Putin Family,Putin Food,Putin Funny,Putin Face,Putin Facts,Putin French,Putin Fishing,Poutine Fries,Putin Fascist,Putin Funny Face,Putin Gif,Putin Genocide,Putin Global Warming,Putin Gymnast,Putin Wife,Putin Gun,Putin Glasses,Putin Gangster,Putin Government,Putin Gorbachev,Putin Height,Putin Horse,Putin House,Putin Horseback,Putin Hockey,Putin History,Putin Hunting,Putin Hillary,Putin Human Rights,Putin Home,Putin Interview,Putin Images,Putin Israel,Putin Iq,Putin Isis,Putin In French,Putin Island,Putin Inauguration,Putin In Power,Putin Instagram,Putin Judo,Putin Jill Stein,Putin Journalists,Putin John Oliver,Putin Jehovah,Putin Jw,Putin Judo Gif,Putin Jesus,Putin James Bond,Putin Jehovah Witness,Putin Kgb,Putin Korea,Putin Karate,Putin Kremlin,Putin Kleptocracy,Putin Kim Jong Un,Putin Kraft Ring,Putin Kabaeva,Putin Khuilo,Putin Kid,Putin Laughing,Putin Laughing Gif,Putin Le Pen,Putin Languages,Putin Latest News,Putin Loves Trump,Putin Lollipop,Putin Likes Trump,Putin Limo,Putin Leadership,Putin Memes,Putin Merkel Dog,Putin Married,Putin Merkel,Putin Makeup,Putin Mask,Putin Martial Arts,Putin Meaning,Putin Macron,Putin Mansion,Putin News,Putin Net Worth,Putin North Korea,Putin New Wife,Putin Netanyahu,Putin Nato,Putin Net Worth Wiki,Putin Name Meaning,Putin Nickname,Putin Nuclear War,Putin On The Ritz,Putin On A Horse,Putin On Trump,Putin On North Korea,Putin Obama,Putin On The Ritz Gif,Putin On Syria,Putin Opposition,Putin On Snl,Putin On The Ritz Meme,Putin President,Putin Piano,Putin Palace,Putin Political Party,Putin Picture,Putin Poison,Putin Propaganda,Putin Puns,Putin Pop Song,Putin Popularity,Putin Quotes,Putin Quotes On Obama,Putin Queen Elizabeth,Putin Quotes Funny,Putin Quizlet,Putin Queen Elizabeth Stairs,Putin Quotes On Trump,Putin Quora,Putin Quote Immigrants,Putin Quebec,Putin Russia,Putin Reagan,Putin Riding Trump,Putin Rise To Power,Putin Reelection,Putin Richest Man In The World,Putin Riding A Ritz Cracker,Putin Response,Putin Ritz,Putin Rainbow,Putin Snl,Putin Syria,Putin Song,Putin Smiling,Putin Speech,Putin Shirt,Putin Speaking English,Putin Singing,Putin Salary,Putin Super Bowl Ring,Putin Trump,Putin Trump Meeting,Putin Twitter,Putin Trump Meme,Putin Trump Horse,Putin Trump Kiss,Putin Term Limit,Putin Trump Gif,Putin Term,Putin Today,Putin Ukraine,Putin Ussr,Putin Us Visit,Putin Unicorn,Putin Us Elections,Putin Un,Putin Undercover,Putin Urban Dictionary,Putin United Nations,Putin Us Relations,Putin Vs Trump,Putin Vs Obama,Putin Vladimir,Putin Video,Putin Vodka,Putin Vs Stalin,Putin Visits Trump,Putin Visit To White House,Putin Vampire,Putin Vs Obama Meme,Putin Wife,Putin Wiki,Putin Wealth,Putin Wink,Putin War,Putin Ww3,Putin Watch,Putin Winking Gif,Putin With Animals,Putin Walking,Putin Xi Jinping,Putin X Obama,Putin X Reader,Putin Xi,Putin And Trump,Putin And Obama,Putin And Assad,Putin And North Korea,Putin And Reagan,Putin And The Ritz,Putin Young,Putin Youtube,Putin Yacht,Putin Youth,Putin Yeltsin,Putin Yume,Putin Years As President,Putin Young Pictures,Putin Youth Army,Putin Yarmulke,Putin Zodiac Sign,Putin Zakaria,Putin Zassal,Putin Zassal Lyrics,Putin Zero Hedge,Putin Zeman,Putin Zil Limousine,Putin Zuma,Putin Za Makedonija,Putin Zapretio Albancima,