Gambling addicts may want to take note of who Kim Kardashian picked to win the Super Bowl… because Lord knows this chick knows how to make a buck!
FBI Bomb Data Center General Information Bulletin 2012-1
- 13 pages
- September 2012
As we enter an era in which the administration of law enforcement becomes more complicated, greater challenges are thrust not only upon police officials, but also upon the community at large. The bomb threat is one such challenge. The bomber has a distinct advantage over other criminals because he can pick his time and place from afar, and use the bomb threat as a weapon to achieve his criminal objectives. This bulletin has been prepared in order to provide law enforcement and public safety agencies with a working base from which to establish their own bomb threat response capability; and to enable these same agencies, when called upon by potential bomb or bomb threat targets in the business community, to offer assistance in developing guidelines for a bomb threat response plan.
In developing a bomb threat response plan, there are four general areas of consideration: (1) Planning and Preparation, (2) Receiving a Threat, (3) Evacuation, and (4) Search. Information presented under each of these four topics will assist in the preparation of an effective bomb threat plan. Suggested methods described in this bulletin will apply in most cases; however, specific requirements will be unique for each facility and will need to be worked out on an individual basis. Once the function of the organization, size of the facility, number of personnel, location and relation to other establishments, and available resources are evaluated; a comprehensive bomb threat plan can be formulated.
Words used in conjunction with this phase include organization, liaison, coordination, and control. Only with a properly organized plan will those affected by a bomb threat know how, when, and in what order to proceed.
Liaison should be maintained between appropriate public safety agencies and facilities likely to be subject to bomb threats or bombings; and also between public safety agencies and military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams charged with responding to bombing incidents.
Through such contact, it will be possible to determine what technical and training services might be needed by potential bomb threat targets. Note that while some public safety agencies may provide considerable aid in bomb threat situations, most public and private facilities must plan and carryout the major portion of the plan, including internal control and decision making. Both liaison and coordination are factors which a bomb threat plan must take into consideration, especially when neighboring establishments or businesses may share the same building. Proper coordination will assure smooth handling of the bomb threat with the least amount of inconvenience to all concerned. Control is especially important during evacuation and search efforts, and effective security will lessen the risk of an actual explosive device ever being planted.
RECEIVING A THREAT
In preparation for the eventuality of a telephone bomb threat, all personnel who handle incoming calls to a potential target facility should be supplied with a bomb threat checklist as shown in Figure 1. When a bomb threat is received, it may be advisable for the person receiving the call to give a prearranged signal. For instance, the signal can be as simple as holding up a red card. This would allow monitoring of the call by more than one person, and it would enable someone else to attempt to record and/or trace the telephone call.
Tape recording the call can reduce the chance or error in recording information provided in the bomb threat. It may serve as evidence valuable to the investigation and assist in evaluating the authenticity of the bomb threat.
Since local jurisdictions may have statutes restricting this sort of recording, the proper officials should be contacted prior to installation and use of such equipment. If a continuous recording setup is not deemed economically practical, a system which could be activated upon receipt of a threat call might be considered feasible. A local telephone company representative can provide information regarding specific services available. Regardless of whether the bomb threat call is to be recorded and/or monitored, the person handling it should remain calm and concentrate on the exact wording of the message, and any other details which could prove valuable in evaluating the threat.
In those instances when a bomb threat has been electronically recorded, voice identification techniques may be employed. While the courts and the scientific community are divided over the reliability of “voice printing” as evidence, it can serve as an investigative tool. Upon request, the FBI will perform audio examinations, for the purpose of investigative leads only, for any law enforcement agency. Departments interested in this service may contact their local FBI Field Office for further assistance.
Although comprising a smaller percentage of bomb threats, the written threat must be evaluated as carefully as one received over the telephone or the Internet. Written bomb threats often provide excellent document-type evidence. Once a written threat is recognized, further handling should be avoided in order to preserve fingerprints, handwriting, typewriting, postmarks, and other markings for appropriate forensic examination. This may be accomplished by immediately placing each item (i.e., threat documents, mail envelope, etc.) in separate protective see through covers, allowing further review of the pertinent information without needless handling. In order to effectively trace such a bomb threat and identify its writer, it is imperative to save all evidentiary items connected with the threat.
Regardless of how the bomb threat is received (e.g., e-mail, telephone, written), the subsequent investigation is potentially an involved and complex one requiring a substantial degree of investigative competency in order to bring the case to a successful conclusion. Cognizant of this, and of the fact that useful evidence regarding the threat seldom proceeds past the bomb threat stage, the efficient accumulation and preservation of evidence cannot be over stressed.
After a bomb threat has been received, the next step is to immediately notify the people responsible for carrying out the bomb threat response plan. During the planning phase, it is important to prepare a list setting forth those individuals and agencies to be notified in the event of a bomb threat. In addition to those people mentioned previously, the police department, fire department, FBI and other Federal public assistance agencies, medical facilities, neighboring businesses, employee union representatives, and local utility companies are among those whose emergency contact information should be included on such a list.
The bomb threat must now be evaluated for its potential authenticity. Factors involved in such an evaluation are formidable, and any subsequent decision is often based on little reliable information. During this decision making process, until proven otherwise, each threat should be treated as though it involved an actual explosive device; even though bomb threats in which an IED is present comprise a small percentage.
Monty Python Live Hollywood Bowl
http://www.euronews.com/ A former Ukrainian police officer has been jailed for life for the murder of a campaigning journalist Georgiy Gongadze in 2000.
General Oleksiy Pukach implied in court that others, including ex-President Leonid Kuchma, were equally guilty.
A case against the former leader was dismissed two years ago.
Gongadze wrote about political corruption and crime.
The discovery of the 31-year-old’s headless body sparked a wave of public anger which eventually led to the “Orange Revolution”.
His widow’s lawyer said she intended to appeal, arguing that the court has failed to determine the motives for the killing.
Iranian Hackers Target US-UK Joint Operations
An observer we trust has let us know that in an underground Iranian hacker and reverse engineering forum, one article shows some guys have been up to no good against US-UK Joint Operations and hacked into the Waves as well as the C4I system.
Ironically, there is a link and quote from cryptome.us [link added by Cryptome] regarding IRGC’s drones flying over US carriers and put both conclusions together in a way that reader, indirectly, understands that military SATCOMS and JTRS terrestrial (say military VHF) are not safe for US-UK and to our understanding they could easily use these capabilities to grab scores from catastrophic events. The fact Iran is still talking to 5+1 in addition to these efforts, to the best of our analysis, are Iranian Deterrence.
Hulk Hogan is catching some heat for tweeting a picture of his daughter’s sexy legs in a short skirt. Is Hulk just being a proud parent or just REALLY, SUPER CREEPY?
TC 90-5 Training for Reconnaissance Troop and Below in Urban Operations
- 116 pages
- Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use.
- February 2010
- 5.09 MB
Because the operational environment (OE) requires Army forces to operate in urban areas, commanders must have accurate information on the complex human elements, infrastructure, and physical terrain that make up the urban environment. The limits on imagery and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) capabilities place a premium on human-based visual reconnaissance. Reconnaissance troops and platoons must be trained to gather and analyze the necessary information and provide it to their commanders and higher headquarters. This chapter discusses definitions, training strategy, prerequisite training, individual task training, and collective task training designed to prepare reconnaissance units at troop level and below for operations in urban terrain.
URBAN-SPECIFIC TASKS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AND CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS
1-25. The following sample tasks are listed in TC 7-98-1:
- Conduct cordon and search operations, including site exploitation (SE).
- Conduct roadblock/checkpoint operations.
- Conduct civil disturbance operations.
- Secure civilians during operations.
- Process detainees and enemy prisoners of war (EPW).
1-26. See FM 3-06.11 for a review of additional tasks related to stability operations and civil support operations. These include, but are not limited to, the following:
- Conduct area security, including presence patrols.
- Conduct convoy escort.
- Conduct route clearance operations.
SECTION IX – CONTROL CIVILIAN MOVEMENT/DISTURBANCE
3-60. The likelihood of civil disturbances during urban operations is high. Handled poorly, the reaction to a civil disturbance can quickly escalate out of control, with potential long-term negative effects for mission accomplishment. Conversely, a well-handled situation will lead to an enhanced view of the reconnaissance platoon’s discipline and professionalism and potentially could result in fewer such incidents in the future.
3-61. Table 3-9 lists the supporting tasks that must be accomplished as part of controlling civilian movement and disturbances.
3-62. A possible TTP description for this task is covered by procedures known by the acronym of IDAM:
- Maintain common situational awareness (SA).
- Employ multidimensional/multiecheloned actions.
3-63. The first step entails isolating, in time and space, the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. Unit tactical operation centers in the theater must develop TTP that “isolate” riots or demonstrations to keep them from becoming larger and potentially more violent. The idea is to close access into and out of the demonstration location (Figure 3-13). Once access is closed, rioters tend to tire within hours, and the demonstration dies down, eventually resulting in a peaceful conclusion. Figure 3-14 provides a technique for positioning several tiers of checkpoints and tactical control points, given the mission to isolate a riot. Controlling major road networks into and out of the demonstration area also serves to enhance trafficability if the riot escalates.
3-64. Units dominate the situation through force presence and control of information resources. They can demonstrate an overwhelming show of force at command posts (CP) and dispatch helicopters to conduct overflights above demonstrations and massing civilian mobs. In addition, use of appropriate air assets can give commanders a bird’s-eye view of events, providing real-time updates on the situation and ensuring that units know the “ground truth” at all times. This knowledge gives commanders a decisive advantage both in negotiations with potentially hostile elements and in tactical maneuvers.
3-65. The following factors apply for the platoon in attempting to dominate the situation:
- Although units can dominate a civil disturbance using nonlethal munitions, it is important to consider force protection issues. In addition, if aviation assets are available, reconnaissance or utility helicopters can provide a show of force. Attack helicopters should be used in anoverwatch or reserve position.
- Forces may need to detain group leaders or instigators to dominate a civil disturbance. An instigator is identified as a person who is “prodding” others to commit disruptive acts or who is orchestrating the group. Often, an instigator carries a bullhorn or hand-held radio.
- The smallest unit that can employ the “snatch-and-grab” technique is a platoon. Before a platoon deploys to quell a riot, identify a four-person snatch-and-grab team, two to secure the individual and two to provide security. It is imperative that each member of the snatch-and-grab team wears the Kevlar helmet with face shield and flak vest, but the team should not bring weapons or load-bearing equipment with them into the crowd. See Figure 3-15 for an illustration of the snatch-and-grab team.
- In accordance with Executive Order 11850, the President of the United States must approve the use of the riot control agency (RCA). The U.S. policy is to employ RCAs in limited circumstances, though never as a method of warfare. Commanders should be conscious that use of RCAs might pose a risk of escalation or public panic if it creates the erroneous perception that a chemical weapon is being used.
- Another element that is crucial for successful civil disturbance operations is the use of combat camera personnel. Document events to hold personnel, factions, and gangs or groups accountable. To ensure that the right message is being presented, control the information environment through the synchronized efforts of information engagement assets, with support from the staff judge advocate (SJA) and civil affairs (CA) offices.
3-66. Commanders and leaders maintain SA through timely, accurate, and complete multisource reporting. They can receive reports from a broad spectrum of sources. Unit CPs, air assets, and close liaison with HN police, NGOs, PVOs, and other civilian agencies all contribute to an accurate assessment of any situation. In addition, UAS, such as the Predator and Pioneer, are effective in observing large sectors of an AO. Analyze the reports produced and relay them to each unit involved in the operation.
3-67. As part of the IDAM procedures, multidimensional/multiechelon actions may entail the following considerations:
- Policy and legal considerations.
- Standards of conduct.
- High visibility of civil disturbance operations with the media, including leaders who must interact with the media.
- Crowd dynamics.
- Communication skills for leaders who must manage aggressive and violent behavior of individuals and crowds.
- Use of electronic warfare to monitor and control belligerent communications.
- Lethal overwatch.
- Search and seizure techniques.
- Apprehension and detention.
- Neutralization of special threats.
- Recovery team tactics.
- Cordon operations to isolate potential areas of disturbance.
5-33. The smallest organizational PSYOP element is the tactical PSYOP team (TPT), consisting of three Soldiers. In high-intensity conflict, the TPT normally provides PSYOP support to a squadron. During counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, planning and execution are primarily conducted at the troop level because the troop is the element that most often directly engages the local government, populace, and adversary groups. Operating in the troop AO allows TPTs to develop rapport with the target audience. This rapport is critical to the accomplishment of the troop’s mission. The TPT chief, usually a SSG or SGT, is the PSYOP planner for the troop commander. He also coordinates with the tactical PSYOP detachment (TPD) at the squadron level for additional support to meet the troop commander’s requirements. PSYOP planning considerations include the following:
- The most effective methods for increasing acceptance of friendly forces in occupied territory.
- The most effective methods of undermining the will of the threat to resist.
- The impact of PSYOP on the civilian population, friendly government, and law enforcement agencies in the area.
- Clearly identified, specific PSYOP target group(s).
- Undermining the credibility of threat leadership and whether or not it will bring about the desired behavioral change.
Monty Python – Holy Grail – Black Knight
Monty Python Holy Grail
Hilary Duff is definitely stinkin’ rich and has very nice hair… and one (male) member of the TMZ newsroom just so happens to be her exact hair doppelganger!
USNORTHCOM PUBLICATION 3-20 TITLE 10 SUPPORT TO DUAL STATUS COMMANDER LED JOINT TASK FORCE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
- 194 pages
- January 31, 2012
The Council of Governors and the President of the United States have identified the need for Dual Status Commanders (DSC) to unify the response efforts within the 54 Territories and States of the United States of America. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has identified Title 10 Deputy Commanders (O-6 in grade) to lead a Joint Support Force Staff Element (JSF-SE) that will integrate with the State-Level DSC staff in order to provide unity of effort to the response of both Title 32/State Active Duty (SAD) and Title 10 forces. This Standard Operating Procedures document outlines the USNORTHCOM Staff support to the DSC Program, a template for a T10 Deputy Commander Handbook and the methods, procedures and best practices for the JSF-SE.
This chapter provides an overview and background of the Dual Status Commander (DSC) program, and it provides an introduction to the Title 10 Support to Dual-Status Commander Led Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures which details the roles, responsibilities and processes/procedures for USNORTHCOM Staff, components, subordinates, and assigned/attached forces in supporting the DSC program.
1.1.1. This standard operating procedure (SOP) outlines the Title 10 (T10) staff roles, responsibilities, and processes/procedures for support to a DSC during Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations (events/incidents requiring a Federal response).
1.1.2. This SOP consists of five chapters which provide: an overview of the DSC program (Chapter One); an outline of the roles, responsibilities, and processes/procedures for United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Staff Support to DSC led Joint Task Forces (JTFs) (Chapter Two); T10 Deputy Commander (Chapter Three); the Joint Support Force Staff Element (JSF-SE) SOP (Chapter Four); and a recommended JSF-SE training curriculum (Chapter Five).
1.1.3. This SOP assumes that USNORTHCOM will provide a baseline JSF-SE that will integrate with the State JTF staff to support the T10 requirements. The JSF-SE will leverage support from the State JTF staff to meet the T10 requirements (e.g., reporting of JTF Situation Report (SITREP)/Storyboard, joint personnel status reports (JPERSTATs), logistical status reports (LOGSTATs), etc). While DSC led JTFs can organize with parallel and separate staff structures under a DSC, the best practice referenced within this SOP is the integrated staff model, where T10 staff are fully integrated with the State Active Duty/Title 32 (SAD/T32) staff.
1.1.4. All references to State within this SOP are used to refer to States, Territories, Commonwealths and the District of Columbia.
1.2.1. In January 2009, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed the development of options and protocols that allow Federal military forces supporting the Primary Agency to assist State emergency response personnel in a coordinated response to domestic disasters and emergency operations, while preserving the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.
1.2.2. In February 2010, during the first Council of Governors meeting, the SecDef acknowledged mutually exclusive sovereign responsibilities of Governors and the President, and urged all participants to focus on common ground and build a consensus approach to coordinate disaster response.
1.2.3. In August 2010, the Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) hosted an orientation visit for the initial State DSC candidates (i.e., Florida, California, and Texas).
1.2.4. In December 2010, a Joint Action Plan for DSC was approved by the Council of Governors, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), stating that the appointment of a DSC is the “usual and customary command and control arrangement” when State and Federal military forces are employed simultaneously
in support of civil authorities in the United States.
1.2.5. In May 2011, CDRUSNORTHCOM assigned USNORTHCOM/J36 Domestic Operations (NC/J36) as office of primary responsibility (OPR) for DSC. NC/J36 will coordinate with NORADUSNORTHCOM (N-NC) J5 and N-NC/J7 on doctrine and training, respectively.
1.2.6. This SOP is one of many documents which address the DSC integrated response to a DSCA event.
1.2.7. Figure 1-2 provides a hierarchy of DOD’s DSCA-related documents. Links to these references can be found in Annex A.
220.127.116.11. DOD Directive 3025.18 outlines the DOD roles in providing DSCA.
18.104.22.168. DOD Directive 5105.83 National Guard Joint Force Headquarters – State (NG JFHQs-State) establishes policy for and defines the organization and management, responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the NG JFHQs-State.
22.214.171.124. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) DSCA Standing Execution Order (EXORD) directs DSCA operations in support of the National Response Framework (NRF) and identified primary agencies in the USNORTHCOM and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) domestic geographic areas of responsibility (AOR).
126.96.36.199. The CDRUSNORTHCOM Standing EXORD for DSCA operations outlines how USNORTHCOM will employ DOD forces in support of other federal agencies in the USNORTHCOM Operational Area (OA).
188.8.131.52. USNORTHCOM concept plan (CONPLAN) for DSCA is the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) plan to support the employment of T10 forces providing DSCA in accordance with (IAW) the NRF, applicable federal laws, DOD Directives, and other policy guidance including those hazards defined by the National Planning Scenarios that are not addressed by other Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasked plans.
184.108.40.206. USNORTHCOM operations order (OPORD) 01-11/01-12 provides direction on the conduct of military operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR. USNORTHCOM produces an OPORD annually to address planned/forecasted military operations in support of the USNORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan.
220.127.116.11.1. Subsequent Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) provide specific guidance (or changes to previous guidance) on unique events to address unforecasted military support operations.
18.104.22.168. The DSC Concept of Operations (CONOPS) describes the terms, responsibilities, and procedures governing the qualification, certification, appointment, and employment of a DSC for designated planned events, or in response to an emergency or major disaster within the United States, or its territories, possessions, and protectorates.
22.214.171.124. The USNORTHCOM Initial Entry Concept of Execution (CONEX) provides USNORTHCOM doctrine and procedures for establishing Joint initial command and control (C2) and support capability for its Civil Support (CS), Homeland Defense (HD) and Department of State (DOS) support operations.
126.96.36.199. The JTF Commander Training Course (JCTC) Handbook serves as a working reference and training tool for individuals who will command and employ JTFs for HD and CS at the federal and/or state level.