NSA Relationship with the Israeli SIGINT unit – Original Document ✌@abovetopsecretxxl

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NSA Mobile Device Best Practice ✌️@abovetopsecretxxl

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Robert Birchum, USAF Officer, Pleads Guilty to Retaining NSA TOP SECRET/SCI Documents ✌️@abovetopsecretxxl

“Tampa, FL – U.S. District Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle today sentenced Robert L. Birchum (55, Tampa) to three years in federal prison for unlawfully possessing and retaining classified documents relating to the national defense of the United States. The court also ordered Birchum to pay a fine of $25,000.

Birchum pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing and retaining classified documents relating to the national defense of the United States on February. 21, 2023. According to the plea agreement, Birchum previously served as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force. During his 29-year career, Birchum served in various positions in intelligence, including those requiring him to work with classified intelligence information for the Joint Special Operations Command, the Special Operations Command, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. While on active duty, Birchum entered into several agreements with the United States regarding the protection and proper handling of classified information.

In 2017, however, law enforcement officers discovered that Birchum knowingly removed more than 300 classified files or documents, including more than 30 items marked Top Secret, from authorized locations. Birchum kept these classified materials in his home, his overseas officer’s quarters, and a storage pod in his driveway. None of these locations were authorized for storage of classified national defense information. In particular, the criminal information charges that Birchum possessed two documents on a thumb drive found in his home that contained information relating to the National Security Agency’s capabilities and methods of collection and targets’ vulnerabilities. Both of these documents were classified as Top Secret/SCI, and their unauthorized release could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.

“The unauthorized removal of highly sensitive documents by the defendant in this case posed great risk to our national security,” said U.S. Attorney Roger Handberg. “We are grateful for our law enforcement partners who work diligently to keep our nation safe every day.”

“A goal of the FBI’s Counterintelligence program is to protect the secrets of the US Intelligence community. This sentencing illustrates the bureau’s commitment and perseverance in pursuing those individuals who knowingly jeopardize our nation’s security,” said FBI Tampa Special Agent in Charge David Walker.

The U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the FBI investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Cherie L. Krigsman of the Middle District of Florida and Trial Attorney Evan N. Turgeon of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section prosecuted the case.”

https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/former-us-air-force-intelligence-officer-sentenced-36-months-imprisonment-willfully

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The National Security Agencyand the EC-121 Shootdown-ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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NSA-Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices-ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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The Black NSA-Budget-ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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ACLU 20131209 NSA Video Games Paper

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NSA GCHQ csec hacienda heise 14 0816

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NSA Smartphones Analysis

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NSA Tao Intro

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GCHQ optic nerve

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NSA xkeyscore sources

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GCHQ belgacom connections

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NSA sid NATO intercept 15 0515

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NSA icreach

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NSA quantum tasking

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NSA UK mikey ibake

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ODNI CLEANED096 NSA summary of BR requirements (maybe Feb 2009)

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NSA Prism 13 1021

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Spiegel Media 35656

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GCHQ automated noc detection

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ACLU FISC Order BR 06 08

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NSA mystic

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NSA ant handys

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(TS) NSA Quantum Tasking Techniques for the RT Analyst

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ACLU DNI McConnell 2007 Shubert State Secrets Declaration

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http activity in xks

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EFF 20130605 guard verizon 215 secondary order

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NSA tarex the intercept 14 1010

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(TS) NSA Quantum Tasking Techniques for the RT Analyst

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Black Budget Cryptanalysis Amp Exploitation

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EFF 20140218 intercept GCHQ sigdev

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GCHQ anonymoUS

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ACLU NSA Course Materials Module 1

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NSA prism 13 1021

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PRISM Overview Powerpoint Slides

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ACLU 20131209 NSA Video Games Paper

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ACLU NSA Course Materials Module 1

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ACLU NSA Alexander 2007 Shubert Declaration

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ACLU January 25 2011 United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18

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Spy Budget fy13

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GCHQ jtrig humint intercept

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ACLU January 25 2011 United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18

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GCHQ full spectrum cyber

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5 Eyes Cellspy CBC Intercept 15 0521

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Smurf Capability Iphone

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NSA Treasure Map

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NSA Cable Spy Types

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ACLU Egotistical Giraffe

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GCHQ Psychology

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NSA sms exploit

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NSA Manhunting Intercept 15 0713

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GCHQ Online Deception

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NSA Sentry Eagle The Intercept 14 1010

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Email Address vs USer Activity

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Phone Number Extractor

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by Edward Snowden

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Tracking Targets on Online Social Networks

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by Edward Snowden

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osint fUSion project

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by Edward Snowden

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NSAs Spy Catalogue

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by Edward Snowden

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GCHQ psychology

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by Edward Snowden

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NSA ghost machine

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by Edward Snowden

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NSA xkeyscoreNSA xkeyscore

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by Edward Snowden

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EXPOSED-Elimination of German Resources for War-ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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In the Matter of Josef Mengele-ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

by Department of Justice

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Malmedy Massacre Investigation

by United States Senate. Committee on Armed Services.

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POLISH SUPREME NATIONAL TRIBUNE – ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

by Polish Supreme National Tribunal

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Trial summaries and reports from the Polish Supreme National Tribunal as reported by UN observers.

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Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals

by United Nations War Crimes Commission

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NSA finding aid. Covers records and publications (classified and open source) collected by the Center for Cryptologic History.

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EXPOSED- NSA UFO Files- ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

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EXPOSED-Cuban Missile Crisis – CIA – NSA Files & White House Recordings – ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

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CIA, NSA Files & White House Recordings relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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Candle In The Dark: COMINT And Soviet Industrial Secrets, By National Security Agency

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NSA CYBERSECURITY YEAR IN REVIEW – ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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NSA – Cryptologic-Quarterly/Doing Business Smarter – ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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NSA SECURITY GUIDANCE FOR 5G – ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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NSA IG Investigation IV-12-0112 – ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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NSA – SEMI ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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REVEALED – NSA – CLEANED049. OVSC1204 v1OGCAprl15.pdf

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TOP SECRET – THE NSA & THE EC 121 SHOOTDOWN – ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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WikiLeaks – US Spy Order In France – Original Document

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France rejects asylum request by Wikileaks founder Assange - World News — Julian Assange

Page 1 of WikiLeaks US Spy Order France In

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NSA XKeyscore Program Revealed – Original Document

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Video – Internal report Confirms NSA ‘Unmasked’ Tucker Carlson’s Communications

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John St. Clair Akwei Vs NSA, Fort Meade, MD, USA – Original Document

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Datei:National Security Agency, 2013.jpg – Wikipedia

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Cryptome – NSA Cyber Commando East Campus Buildings – Original Document

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Inside the U.S.' new state-of-the-art cyberwarfare bunker - CyberScoop

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New Report Says Denmark Helped US NSA Spy On German Politicians

New details have come to light in the scandal over the US National Security Agency’s surveillance of top European politicians. Revelations that emerged in 2013 showed that the US intelligence agency had tapped the phones of several leaders – including Germany’s Angela Merkel. Now, a new multi-national media investigation says a Danish military intelligence unit supported the US wiretapping operation. Danish intelligence reportedly worked with the US National Security Agency from here – to eavesdrop on European politicians. A joint investigation by several European media outlets shows former German chancellor candidate, Peer Steinbrück, was among the espionage targets. A major problem is that the Danish government didn’t inform their German neighbors, though they apparently knew about the eavesdropping as early as 2015. The German government said it only found out about the spying after press inquiries. Spying on Chancellor Angela Merkel and former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier was revealed by NSA leaker Edward Snowden and a parliamentary inquiry. It did not reveal that a close European ally was involved. The NSA, the Danish intelligence service and the Danish government refused to comment on the latest revelations.

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NSA General Counsel Gerstell – “How We Need To Prepare For A Global Cyber Pandemic” – Original Document

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Glenn S. Gerstell SPEECH | April 9, 2018

By some accounts, Russian meddling in the US election system may have originated from the depths of a hot dog cart. It’s a success story, of sorts.

In the early 1990s, an enterprising hot dog vendor in Russia seized upon the entrepreneurial opportunities created by the collapse of the Soviet Union to start his own catering company. He eventually grew his business enough to win lucrative catering contracts with the Russian government. He and his restaurants threw opulent banquets for Kremlin officials, earning him the nickname “Putin’s Cook.” Yevgeny Prigozhin’s company even won a contract in 2011 to deliver school lunches across Moscow, but children wouldn’t eat the food, complaining that it smelled rotten. Bad publicity ensued. Prigozhin’s company responded not by upgrading the food, but by hiring people to flood the internet with postings praising the food and rejecting complaints. Presumably, they found it cheaper to use the internet to write fake reviews than to fund deluxe hot dogs for schoolchildren.

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Revealed – NSA Backdoors, Savage, MD

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39°05’37.42″ N 76°45’36.40″ W

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Revealed – Agadez, Niger, Drone Base Construction, 2017-2020

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NSA nimmt wohl auch deutsche Putin-Freunde, Hiwis, Financiers, Sponsoren und Media-Kunden in Ueberwachung

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Nach Informationen aus dem Umkreis der NSA werden nunmehr wohl alle deutschen Putin-Unterstuetzer erfasst und beleuchtet.

Anlass ist das Wirken von Ex-Kanzler Gerhard Schroeder fuer Putin und die Mueller Untersuchung der Russland Kontakte von Trump.

Putin war selbst in der DDR lange Jahre taetig

Hierzu zaehlen die Linke, alle dieser Gruppierung zuzuordnenden Unternehmen, alle ehemaligen KGB- und STASI-Agenten und STASI-IM und deren Unternehmen und Beteiligungsgesellschaften.

Hinzu kommen deren Kunden, Finanziers und Sponsoren.

Dies betrift wohl insbesondere “Neues Deutschland”, und “GoMoPa”, als auch die mutmasslich unterwanderten “Das Investment” und “Immobilien Zeitung” sowie “Die Bewertung” berichten die Washington-Insider, die auch von verstaerkten militaerischen Konflikten weltweit ausgehen.

Deutschland als wichtiges NATO-Land neben den USA und mit der DDR-Historie gilt als besonders wichtig und kritisch fuer die NSA-Analysen.

Die betroffenen Unternehmen und Personen muessen mit Sanktionen und internationalen FBI-Haftbefehlen wie im Fall der FIFA fuer die mutmasslich korrupte WM-Vergabe an Putins Russland rechnen, die auch in der Schweiz vollstreckt wurden.

Exclusive Breaking News – The NSA Sets Up New Cyber Center – TOP SECRET – Original Plans and Photos

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Insider – NSA erfasst deutsche Putin-Freunde, Hiwis, Financiers, Sponsoren und Media-Kunden

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Nach Informationen aus dem Umkreis der NSA werden nunmehr alle deutschen Putin-Unterstuetzer erfasst und beleuchtet.

Anlass ist das Wirken von Ex-Kanzler Gerhard Schroeder fuer Putin.

Putin war selbst in der DDR lange Jahre taetig

Hierzu zaehlen die Linke, alle dieser Gruppierung zuzuordnenden Unternehmen, alle ehemaligen KGB- und STASI-Agenten und STASI-IM und deren Unternehmen und Beteiligungsgesellschaften.

Hinzu kommen deren Kunden, Finanziers und Sponsoren.

Deutschland als wichtiges NATO-Land neben den USA und mit der DDR-Historie gilt als besonders wichtig und kritisch fuer die NSA-Analysen.

Anderson Cooper about the notorious Russian Agents and their US Election Involvement

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Kellyanne Conway and CNN’s Anderson Cooper clashed in an interview over CNN’s reporting of the classified documents presented to President Obama and President-elect Trump including allegations that Russian operatives claim to have compromising personal and financial information about Trump.

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The Niamey Niger Drone Base Unveiled

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19 October 2016 [Image]

27 March 2016
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14 December 201413°29’21.03″ N 2°10’20.38″ E

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7 June 2014. Note third hangar under re-construction, center bottom. [Image]

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Leaks Unlimited – With NSA contractor Martin arrested, other leakers may still be at large

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Earlier this month we learned the name of a second person who stole top secret documents from the US National Security Agency (NSA). After Edward Snowden admitted doing so publicly in June 2013, the FBI has now arrested the 51-year old Harold T. Martin III at his home in Maryland.

Martin hoarded lots of classified documents, not only from NSA but also from a number of other military and intelligence agencies. The FBI is still comparing them with those from the recent Shadow Brokers leak and a range of other NSA leaks from the past few years, but given what’s known now, it seems likely that at least one other leaker is still at large.

The house of Harold T. Martin III in Glen Burnie, Maryland
(photo: Jose Luis Magana/The Associated Press)

The New York Times reported that when the FBI raided Martin’s house on August 27, they found paper documents and many terabytes of highly classified information, even going back the 1990s. At least six documents were from 2014. It was reported that Martin first took the classified documents on paper, later on CDs and more recently on thumb drives.

The reason why Harold Martin brought home and stored such large numbers of top secret documents isn’t yet clarified. One suggestion is that he may have used them forresearch for his dissertation about “new methods for remote analysis of heterogeneous & cloud computing architectures”, which he was working on at the University of Maryland.

Documents from multiple agencies

It should be noted that not everything Martin stole comes from NSA. In the official charges there are no names of the agencies where the documents come from, they are only described as highly classified, including ones that are marked as Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

With the documents going back to the 1990s, he may well have started hoarding them from the places where he worked in those days. From 1987 to 2000, Martin served at the US Navy, achieving the rank of lieutenant, but he left active duty in 1992.

As the Washington Post found out, he then took a variety of tech jobs with government contractors, like at Computer Sciences Corp. (CSC) somewhere in the 1990s and later, until 2009, at Tenacity Solutions, for which he worked at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

In 2009, Harold Martin started to work for Booz Allen Hamilton, for which he was a contractor at NSA from 2012 to 2015, when Booz transferred him to the Pentagon’s Office of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), which is responsible for often highly sensitive and classified procurement programs. There he stayed until the moment of his arrest last August.

Officials have meanwhile said that Martin took classified documents not only from NSA, but also from his other workplaces, including ODNI and AT&L.

It’s interesting as well that in the charges against Martin, a whole paragraph is dedicated to the at least six documents from 2014, which are described as being produced “through sensitive government sources, methods, and capabilities”. As signals intelligence is traditionally seen as the most sensitive capability, maybe just these six documents are from NSA.

The building of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
where Harold Martin worked as a contractor before 2009
(photo: Microsoft, via Cryptome.org – click to enlarge)

Shadow Brokers investigation

After the “Shadow Brokers” disclosed a large set of secret NSA hacking tools last August, the FBI began investigating this leak. At the same time there was a lot of speculation: was NSA hacked from the outside? Had an NSA hacker been sloppy? Were the tools leaked by an insider? Maybe the same insider responsible for earlier leaks that hadn’t been attributed to Snowden?

On September 22, it was reported that during the FBI investigation, NSA officials had said that a former agency operative had carelessly left the hacking tool files available on a remote computer, where Russian hackers found them. If that’s correct, then it seems likely that the FBI traced Harold Martin when they were looking for that careless NSA hacker. It has not yet been confirmed that Martin was that person though.

Harold Martin was working at NSA’s hacking division TAO around the time when the tools were considered to be left exposed, somewhere after October 18, 2013, but a former TAO hacker told the Washington Post that Martin “worked in the unit’s front office carrying out support roles such as setting up accounts, not conducting actual operations.”

Even if Martin was the man who left the hacking tools exposed, then we still don’t know who found them and published them under the name Shadow Brokers. It’s not very likely that this was done by Martin himself, as Shadow Brokers published additional messages on August 28, October 1 and October 15, when he was already in custody. The actual publication can therefore be the work of for example Russian, Iranian or North Korean hackers or even independent hacktivists.

Other sources?

Could Harold Martin also be the source of earlier leaks, that were not attributed to Edward Snowden? In theory he could have been that “second source” next to Snowden: none of these other leaked documents (like the TAO catalog, XKEYSCORE code, tasking lists and end reports) are newer than 2015, when Martin left NSA. Contrary to this Martin is described as very patriotic, which doesn’t fit the fact that these particular leaks were clearly meant to harm and embarrass the US and NSA.

Also, Martin hasn’t (yet) been charged with espionage or the attempt to provide classified information to a third party or a foreign government – which doesn’t seem something the US government would leave out or keep secret after the recent and unprecedented statement in which the Office of the Director of National Intelligence accused Russia of hacking the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and other political organizations.

Should the FBI investigation confirm that Harold Martin was only responsible for leaking the NSA hacking tools (after which unknown others published them) and that none of his documents were provided to foreign intelligence agencies or showed up in the earlier revelations, then there’s most likely yet another leaker from inside NSA.

The Shadow Brokers leak standing alone and not related to the earlier non-Snowden leaks is of some importance, because only among the stuff published by the Shadow Brokers there are files with a date (October 18, 2013) after the day that Snowden left NSA (May 20, 2013).

This means that when Harold Martin is the initial source of the Shadow Brokers files, we can no longer exclude the possibility that the earlier leaks do come from the Snowden trove. If that would be the case, then someone with access to them went rogue and had them published on his own account. But it should also be noted that both Glenn Greenwald and Bruce Schneier explicitly said that some of these leaked documents did not come from Snowden.

The more likely option is therefore that there’s still another leaker at large, someone with a more evil intent than Harold Martin and Edward Snowden – a conclusion which is not very comforting and which also raises questions about NSA’s internal security…

Some NSA buildings at the Friendship Annex (FANX) complex near Baltimore
(photo: live.com, via Cryptome.org – click to enlarge)

NSA’s internal security measures

The NSA’s hacking division TAO, where Harold Martin worked for some time, isapparently not located in the well-known NSA headquarters building at Fort Meade, but in one or more leased office buildings outside, one of them at an office complex calledFriendship Annex (FANX) near Baltimore. TAO also has units at NSA’s four Cryptologic Centers across the US.

Entrance to the highly secured TAO headquarters building is strictly controlled: one has to go through an imposing steel door, protected by armed guards, and entrance is only possible after entering a six-digit code and passing a retinal scanner to ensure that only specially cleared individuals are allowed in.

Such security measures are more aimed at keeping outsiders out, than at insiders in. And when it comes to finding inside moles of hostile foreign intelligence agencies, the NSA is also said to have a rather bad track record. The Manning and Snowden leaks made NSA painfully aware of this and so preventive insider-threat detection programs were put in place.

It’s not clear whether these new systems failed in the case of Harold Martin, or that they simply weren’t yet implemented at the TAO location where he worked – anti-leak software that was designed by Raytheon to “spot attempts by unauthorized people to access or download data” was also not yet installed at the NSA facility in Hawaii when Snowden was working there.

Tracking what employees are doing inside is one thing, checking what they take out is another. But according to The Washington Post, the NSA (like other agencies) does notimpose universal checks of personnel and their belongings as they enter and leave agency buildings. Security guards only conduct random checks and use their discretion in order to keep en build the trust of the employees.

“If you have a bag full of stuff, you’re probably going to get stopped” said a former TAO operator to the Post, but, in general, “Disneyland has more physical security checks than we had”. Additionally, NSA facilities will have detection gates, but it seems that it was easier for Snowden to walk out with his thousands of documents than many would have thought.

As former NSA general counsel Rajesh De explained, it is unlikely “you’re going to be able to stop every incident of somebody taking documents if they’re determined to do so. But the real question is how quickly can you detect it, how quickly can you mitigate the harm of any such incident.”

An old sign inside the NSA headquarters building
showing what kind of items are not allowed in.
(screenshot from a documentary about NSA)

Conclusion

Harold Martin stole a lot of classified documents from multiple military and intelligence agencies where he worked over the past 20 years, with maybe just a small number from NSA. The still ongoing FBI investigation has to make clear whether Martin was responsible for exposing the TAO hacking tools.

If not, then there has to be yet another careless NSA employee, but then it’s also still possible that the hacking tools came from a source responsible for a range of earlier leaks. So far it seems that Martin isn’t the source of those earlier leaks, which means that the so-called “second source” is still at large.

The case of Harold Martin also made clear that security measures at NSA, and other US agencies, were not as strict and tight as outsiders would have expected: even for someone without a strong ideological or financial drive like Martin it was apparently not that difficult to regularly walk out with top secret documents.

Many things have not yet been confirmed or clarified, but at least the Shadow Brokers leak and the subsquent arrest of Harold Martin created more awareness among the American public of the fact that there have been more leaks than just those from Snowden.

In August 2014, Bruce Schneier was probably one of the first who identified a second and a third leaker besides Snowden. Many more similar leaks followed and a full listof them was compiled on this weblog in December 2015 (still being updated). As an excerpt of this listing, a short overview of the most important non-Snowden leaks was published in The New York Times last week.

UPDATE:
Shortly after this blog posting was published, The New York Times came with a new report saying that the volume of classified documents Harold Martin had in his possesion is larger than those stolen by Edward Snowden and even than those of the Panama Papers from 2015.
FBI investigators apparently also found that the TAO hacking tools were among Martin’s documents, but because he is not very cooperative, it is still not clear how they came in the hands of the mysterious Shadow Brokers, who subsequently published them. So far there’s no evidence that Martin was hacked or that he sold information.
He seems to have hoarded all these documents in order to get better at his job, as he is described as someone who imagined himself a top spy and an important player in the world of digital espionage.

On Thursday, October 20, government lawyers said they would prosecute Harold Martin under the Espionage Act because of stealing classified information. The FBI found the huge amount of 50 terabytes of data at his home, but it is not yet clear how much of that is classified. Also foundwere “hard-copy documents that were seized from various locations during the search that comprise six full bankers’ boxes worth of documents” with “Many of the documents marked ‘Secret’ and ‘Top Secret,’ also bear special handling caveats. The information stolen by the Defendant also appears to include the personal information of government employees”.

Links and Sources

– John Schindler: It’s Time to Rename NSA the National INsecurity Agency
– The Washington Post: NSA contractor thought to have taken classified material the old-fashioned way
– Daily Beast: Democrats Say WikiLeaks Is a Russian Front, U.S. Intelligence Isn’t So Sure
– Defense One: Data-Theft Arrest Shows that Insider Threat Remains Despite Post-Snowden Security Improvements
– John Schindler: Has the Russian Mole inside NSA finally been arrested?
– New York Times: N.S.A. Suspect Is a Hoarder. But a Leaker? Investigators Aren’t Sure.
– The Cipher Brief: First on The Cipher Brief: Snowden’s Boss Shares Lessons Learned

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The Shadow Brokers leak – part of a series

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Earlier this week, a group or an individual called the Shadow Brokers published a large set of files containing the computer code for hacking tools. They were said to be from the Equation Group, which is considered part of the NSA’s hacking division TAO.

The leak got quite some media attention, but so far it was not related to some earlier leaks of highly sensitive NSA documents. These show interesting similarities with the Shadow Brokers files, which were also not attributed to Edward Snowden, but seem to come from an unknown second source.

Screenshot of some computer code with instructions
from the Shadow Brokers archive
(click to enlarge)

The Shadow Brokers files

Since August 13, Shadow Brokers posted a manifesto and two large encrypted files onPastebin, on GitHub, on Tumblr and on DropBox (all of them closed or deleted meanwhile).

One of the encrypted files could be decrypted into a 301 MB archive containing a large number of computer codes for server side utility scripts and exploits for a variety of targets like firewalls from Cisco, Juniper, Fortinet and TOPSEC. The files also include different versions of several implants and instructions on how to use them, so they’re not just the malware that could have been found on the internet, but also files that were only used internally.

A full and detailed list of the exploits in this archive can be found here.

Security experts as well as former NSA employees considered the files to be authentic, and earlier today the website The Intercept came with some unpublished Snowden documents that confirm the Shadow Brokers files are real.

Besides the accessible archive, Shadow Brokers also posted a file that is still encrypted, and for which the key would only be provided to the highest bidder in an auction. Would the auction raise 1 million bitcoins (more than 500 million US dollars), then Shadow Brokers said they would release more files to the public. This auction however is likely just meant to attract attention.

Update: Shadow Brokers, or people posing like them, posted an short announcement on Pastebin on August 28, and a third, long message including a “self-interview” on Medium.com on October 1. On October 15, a fourth message was published on Medium, saying that the auction was cancelled.

Screenshot of a file tree from the Shadow Brokers archive
(click to enlarge)

From the Snowden documents?

According to security experts Bruce Schneier and Nicholas Weaver the new files aren’t from the Snowden trove. Like most people, they apparently assume that Snowden took mostly powerpoint presentations and internal reports and newsletters, but that’s not the whole picture. The Snowden documents also include various kinds of operational data, but this rarely became public.

Most notable was a large set of raw communications content collected by NSA under FISA and FAA authority, which also included incidentally collected data from Americans, as was reported by The Washington Post on July 5, 2014. The Snowden documents also include technical reports, which are often very difficult to understand and rarely provide a newsworthy story on their own.

Someone reminded me as well that in January 2015, the German magazine Der Spiegel published the full computer code of a keylogger implant codenamed QWERTY, which was a component of the NSA’s WARRIORPRIDE malware framework. So with the Snowden trove containing this one piece of computer code, there’s no reason why it should not contain more.

Contradicting the option that the Shadow Brokers files could come from Snowden is the fact that some of the files have timestamps as late as October 18, 2013, which is five months after Snowden left NSA. Timestamps are easy to modify, but if they are authentic, then these files have to be from another source.

A second source?

This brings us to a number of leaks that occured in recent years and which were also not attributed to Snowden. These leaks involved highly sensitive NSA files and were often more embarrassing than stuff from the Snowden documents – for example the catalog of hacking tools and techniques, the fact that chancellor Merkel was targetedand intelligence reports proving that NSA was actually successful at that.

> See Leaked documents that were not attributed to Snowden

It is assumed that these and some other documents came from at least one other leaker, a “second source” besides Snowden, which is something that still not many people are aware of. The files that can be attributed to this second source have some interesting similarities with the Shadow Brokers leak. Like the ANT catalog published in December 2013, they are about hacking tools and like the XKEYSCORE rulespublished in 2014 and 2015 they are internal NSA computer code.

This alone doesn’t say much, but it’s the choice of the kind of files that makes these leaks look very similar: no fancy presentations, but plain technical data sets that make it possible to identify specific operations and individual targets – the kind of documents many people are most eager to see, but which were rarely provided through the Snowden reporting.

As mainstream media became more cautious in publishing such files, it is possible that someone who also had access to the Snowden cache went rogue and started leaking documents just for harming NSA and the US – without attributing these leaks to Snowden because he would probably not approve them, and also to suggest that more people followed Snowden’s example.

Of course the Shadow Brokers leak can still be unrelated to the earlier ones. In that case it could have been that an NSA hacker mistakenly uploaded his whole toolkit to a server outside the NSA’s secure networks (also called a “staging server” or “redirector” to mask his true location) and that someone was able to grab the files from there – an option favored by for example Edward Snowden and security researcher the grugq.

Diagram showing the various stages and networks involved
in botnet hacking operations by NSA’s TAO division
(source – click to enlarge)

An insider?

Meanwhile, several former NSA employees have said that the current Shadow Brokers leak might not be the result of a hack from the outside, but that it’s more likely that the files come from an insider, who stole them like Snowden did earlier.

Of course it’s easier for an insider to grab these files than for a foreign intelligence agency, let alone an ordinary hacker, to steal them from the outside. But if that’s the case, it would mean that this insider would still be able to exfiltrate files from NSA premises (something that shouldn’t be possible anymore after Snowden), and that this insider has the intent to embarrass and harm the NSA (Snowden at least said he just wanted to expose serious wrongdoings).

Here we should keep in mind that such an insider is not necessarily just a frustrated individual, but can also be a mole from a hostile foreign intelligence agency.

Update:
On August 21, NSA expert James Bamford also confirmed that TAO’s ANT catalog wasn’t included in the Snowden documents (Snowden didn’t want to talk about it publicly though). Bamford favors the option of a second insider, who may have leaked the documents through Jacob Appelbaum and Julian Assange.

Russian intelligence?

On Twitter, Edward Snowden said that “Circumstantial evidence and conventional wisdom indicates Russian responsibility”, but it’s not clear what that evidence should be. It seems he sees this leak as a kind of warning from the Russians not to take revenge for the hack of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails, which was attributed to Russian intelligence.

This was also what led Bruce Schneier to think it might be the Russians, because who other than a state actor would steal so much data and wait three years before publishing? Not mentioned by Schneier is that this also applies to the documents that can be attributed to the second source: they also pre-date June 2013.

A related point of speculation is the text that accompanied the Shadow Brokers files, which is in bad English, as if it was written by a Russian or some other non-western individual. This is probably distraction, as it looks much more like a fluent American/English speaker who tried to imitate unexperienced English.

The text also holds accusations against “Elites”, in a style which very much resembles the language used by anarchist hacker groups, but that can also be faked to distract from the real source (it was also noticed that the e-mail address used by Shadow Brokers (userll6gcwaknz@tutanota.com) seems to refer to the manga Code Geass in which an exiled prince takes revenge against the “Britannian Empire”).

Screenshot of some file folders from the Shadow Brokers archive
(click to enlarge)

Conclusion

With the authenticity of the Shadow Brokers files being confirmed, the biggest question is: who leaked them? There’s a small chance that it was a stupid accident in which an NSA hacker uploaded his whole toolkit to a non-secure server and someone (Russians?) found it there.

Somewhat more likely seems the option that they came from an insider, and in that case, this leak doesn’t stand alone, but fits into a series of leaks in which, since October 2013, highly sensitive NSA data sets were published.

So almost unnoticed by the mainstream media and the general public, someone was piggybacking on the Snowden-revelations with leaks that were often more embarrassing for NSA than many reportings based upon the documents from Snowden.

Again, obtaining such documents through hacking into highly secured NSA servers seems less likely than the chance that someone from inside the agency took them. If that person was Edward Snowden, then probably someone with access to his documents could have started his own crusade against NSA.

If that person wasn’t Snowden, then it’s either another NSA employee who was disgruntled and frustrated, or a mole for a hostile foreign intelligence agency. But for an individual without the protection of the public opinion like Snowden, it must be much harder and riskier to conduct these leaks than for a foreign state actor.

Former NSA counterintelligence officer John Schindler also thinks there could have been a (Russian) mole, as the agency has a rather bad track record in finding such spies. If this scenario is true, then it would be almost an even bigger scandal than that of the Snowden-leaks.

Update #1:
During an FBI-led investigation of the ShadowBrokers leak, NSA officialsreportedly said that a former agency operative carelessly left the hacking tool files available on a remote computer, where Russian hackers found them. After this was discovered, NSA tuned its sensors to detect use of any of the tools by other parties, like China and Russia. But as that wasn’t the case, NSA did not feel obligated to warn the US manufacturers.

Update #2:
On October 6, 2016, The New York Times reported that on August 27, 2016, the FBI arrested 51-year old Harold T. Martin III, who worked at NSA as a contractor for Booz Allen Hamilton. In his home in Glen Burnie, Maryland, “many terabytes” of highly classified information was found, from the 1990s until 2014. Hal Martin was described as a hoarder, but so far, investigators are not sure he was also responsible for the various leaks that could not be attributed to Snowden.

Links and Sources
– TheWeek.com: How the NSA got hacked
– EmptyWheel.com: Where Are NSA’s Overseers on the Shadow Brokers Release?
– Observer.com: NSA ‘Shadow Brokers’ Hack Shows SpyWar With Kremlin Is Turning Hot
– TechCrunch.com: Everything you need to know about the NSA hack (but were afraid to Google)
– WashingtonPost.com: Powerful NSA hacking tools have been revealed online
– NYTimes.com: ‘Shadow Brokers’ Leak Raises Alarming Question: Was the N.S.A. Hacked?
– LawfareBlog.com: NSA and the No Good, Very Bad Monday

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Cryptome – Germany Outlaws NSA Xkeyscore, Orders Data Axed

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Unveiled – U.S. Government Debated Secret Nuclear Deployments in Iceland

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During the Cold War the United States never deployed nuclear weapons in Iceland but a recently declassified State Department record shows that U.S. government officials debated whether they should do so, including through secret deployments. A letter from a U.S. ambassador to Iceland in August 1960, published today by the National Security Archive, rejected such proposals, but the revelation of internal discussions on the subject ties in to the broader issue of the practice of U.S. nuclear deployments overseas during the Cold War.

The author of the recently released letter, U.S. Ambassador Tyler Thompson, was aware that Icelandic authorities wondered whether Washington had ever deployed nuclear weapons there. Recognizing that Iceland’s ties to NATO and the Western security system were fragile, he argued that if Reykjavik learned about a secret deployment, it could leave NATO. Furthermore, a “dramatic row” could “be expected to have an unfortunate effect on our friends and allies, to affect adversely our interests as far as neutrals are concerned, and to provide a propaganda field day for our enemies.”

U.S. Ambassador to Iceland Tyler Thompson, whose long letter to the State Department raised critical questions about the possibility of secret nuclear deployments in Iceland (National Archives, Still Pictures Branch, RG 59-SO, box 17).

All references to Iceland were deleted from the archival release of Thompson’s letter but his signature and other evidence confirms that the subject matter was Iceland. Further research indicated that nuclear weapons had been an issue in U.S. relations with Iceland since the Korean War when Icelandic officials asked whether the U.S. had deployment plans. Washington did not, but at the time Thompson wrote the letter U.S. officials were exploring nuclear storage options and secret deployments. Moreover, archival documents discovered by an Icelandic historian and published here today demonstrate that the United States had plans for at least one nuclear weapons storage site in the event World War III broke out.

Included in today’s posting are:

▪ A request for assurance in November 1951 by Foreign Minister Bjarni Benediktsson that the United States was not planning an “atomic base” in Iceland

▪ A State Department telegram from December 1951 authorizing the U.S. minister to assure Benediktsson that the United States “has no (rpt no) intention [of] going beyond letter or spirit of [the] defense agreement” which had been negotiated earlier in the year.

▪ A question posed by Foreign Minister Guðmundur Í. Guðmundsson to ambassador Thompson in June 1960: was the United States keeping atomic bombs at Keflavik air base or carrying them through the base in transit?

▪ A draft reply to Guðmundsson’s question indicating that nuclear weapons had not been deployed in Iceland but noting that CINCLANT [Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command] had a “requirement” for a nuclear weapons storage site.

That the United States never deployed nuclear weapons to Iceland is a settled issue. In 1998, Robert S. Norris, William Arkin, and this writer published an article in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in which they analyzed a recently declassified Defense Department history of U.S. nuclear deployments from 1945 to 1978. The study included several alphabetically arranged lists of nuclear weapons deployments in various parts of the world, including Western European members of NATO. Because many country and place names were excised the writers made educated guesses about some of them. One guess was Iceland. Certain details, such as Strategic Air Command activities during the 1950s, appeared to support the conclusion. The report in The Bulletin was widely publicized and when the news reached Iceland it created a political furor; the Icelandic government quickly denied the premise and the Clinton administration immediately supported the denial. In a significant departure from the usual “neither confirm nor deny” approach to nuclear weapons locations, the U.S. deputy chief of mission in Reykjavik declared that putting Iceland on the list of Cold War nuclear deployment sites was “incorrect.” Further research led to the identification of Iwo Jima as the deployment site.[1]

The fact that the U.S. government never deployed nuclear weapons in Iceland does not mean, however, that it had no nuclear plans for Iceland. Previous research by Valur Ingimundarson and William Arkin demonstrates that during the Cold War Iceland was considered a potential storage site. As Ingimundarson discovered, at the end of the 1950s the U.S. Navy ordered the construction of a facility for storing nuclear depth bombs, an Advanced Underseas Weapons (AUW) Shop at the outskirts of Keflavik airport. The AUW facility was built by local Icelandic workers who thought its purpose was to store torpedoes. Whether Ambassador Thompson knew about it remains to be learned. During the 1980s Arkin reported that a presidential directive from the Nixon period treated Iceland as one of several “Conditional Deployment” locations, where nuclear weapons could be stored in the event of war. An AUW storage facility would make sense in that context. Nevertheless, all such arrangements were kept deeply secret because of the political sensitivity of the U.S. military presence in Iceland.[2]

The heavily excised release of the Thompson letter suggests that the U.S. national security bureaucracy does not presently acknowledge that Iceland figured in American nuclear weapons planning during the Cold War. This is not surprising because the U.S. government has not acknowledged the names of a number of other countries which directly participated in the NATO nuclear weapons stockpile program during the Cold War (and later): Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey (only West Germany and the United Kingdom have been officially disclosed). As for Iceland’s status as a “conditional” deployment site, even though the horse left the barn years ago in terms of the previous archival releases, time will tell whether declassifiers take that into account when making future decisions on classified historical documents concerning Iceland and nuclear weapons.

Pictured here is a MK-101 “Lulu” nuclear depth bomb. which the U.S. Navy could have deployed to a storage site at Kefllavik airport, Iceland, in the event of World War III. Weighing 1,200 pounds, with an explosive yield of between 10 and 15 kilotons, the Lulu was in service from the late 1950s to 1971. An air-dropped weapon designed for use by all Navy aircraft, Lulu would have been available to British, Canadian, and Dutch naval forces under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. (Source: photograph by Mike Fazarckly at Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to British Nuclear Weapons. Thanks to Stephen Schwartz for pointing out these photos.)

DOCUMENTS

Document 1: U.S. Legation Reykjavik telegram number 82 to State Department, 18 November 1951, Secret

Source: U.S. National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State records [RG 59], Central Decimal Files 1950-1954 [CDF], 711.56340B/11-1851

On 5 May 1951, Iceland and the United States secretly signed a defense agreement which became public just two days later. Under the agreement, the United States took over the defense of Iceland, a decision which local elites believed was necessary in light of the Korean War and Iceland’s historically disarmed status. The arrangement was nonetheless contentious for many citizens and by some accounts bordered on illegal; the three major non-Communist parties therefore agreed to keep parliament in recess to minimize controversy (when Iceland joined NATO in 1949, riots had broken out). Two days later, on 7 May, 300 U.S. troops arrived, the first of a contingent which the Icelandic government limited to a tightly sequestered 3,900 troops out of fear of adverse public reaction (to the point that Reykjavik successfully insisted on the exclusion of African-American soldiers).

While the fine print of the defense agreement was still being negotiated, in November 1951 Foreign Minister Benediktsson showed U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Morris N. Hughes a London Times article quoting Senator Edwin Johnson (D-CO) that Iceland, North Africa, and Turkey were better deployment sites for atomic weapons than the United Kingdom. To assuage the foreign minister’s concern that Communist Party members and other critics would exploit Johnson’s statement, Hughes recommended “official reassurance” that the United States had no plans to deploy atomic weapons in Iceland.

Document 2: U.S. Legation Reykjavik telegram number 85 to State Department, 24 November 1951, Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, 711.56340B/11-2451

A few days after the above exchange, Benediktsonn told Hughes that he had showed him the Times article so he could tell “critics and worried colleagues” that he had immediately sought U.S. reassurances about U.S. atomic plans. When the foreign minister wondered whether an “appropriate quarter” could provide “some reassurance,” Hughes agreed to inform the State Department “of his anxiety.” The reference to McGaw is to General Edward John McGaw, the first commander of the Iceland Defense Force, the U.S. unified command which provided for Iceland’s military security from 1951 to 2006.

Document 3: U.S. Legation Reykjavik Despatch 198 to State Department, ““First Icelandic Reaction to Senator Johnson’s Statement on Atomic Bases,” 27 November 1951, Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, 711.56340B/11-2751

Chargé Hughes reported that the Communist newspaper, Thjodviljinn [Will of the Nation] had commented on Senator Johnson’s statement, noting that the “Americans feel that it does not matter if Iceland should be subjected to the attack and horrors such bases would bring

upon the nation.”

Document 4: U.S. Legation Reykjavik telegram number 97 to State Department, 20 December 1951, Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, 711.56340B/12-1951

With no answer to his question about atomic bases, Benediktsonn asked Hughes again about the problem, noting that Communist opponents could “embarrass” him.

Document 5: State Department telegram 98 to U.S. Legation Reykjavik, 21 December 1951, Top Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, box 3180, 711.56340B/11-2451

Benediktsonn’s second query was the charm. Responding to Hughes’ message, a State Department telegram sent under the name of Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned that any public statements would violate the policy to “not deny or affirm rumors” about the locations of atomic weapons. That was a military necessity to prevent the Soviet Union from determining the “pattern” of U.S. defenses. Nevertheless, the Department authorized Hughes to inform Benediktsonn confidentially that the United States would “make no move without [the] full consultation and agreement” of Iceland’s government.

Document 6: U.S. Legation Reykjavik Despatch 238 to State Department, “Further Reaction to Threatened Use of Iceland as Atomic Base,” 29 December 1951, Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, box 3180, 711.56340B/12-2951

Hughes provided a fuller account of his meeting with Benediktsonn on 20 December and of his efforts during the holidays to pass on the gist of the State Department message to the permanent undersecretary and then to the foreign minister himself at a dinner. Whether there were any follow-up discussions remains unclear because the records covering the 1952-1954 period in the 711.56340B decimal file series are missing from box 3181.[3]

Document 7: U.S. Department of State Executive Secretariat, “Top Secret Daily Staff Summary,” 22 June 1960, top secret, excerpt

Source: RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Daily Staff Summary, 1944-1971, box 45, Daily Staff Summary, Top Secret, June 1960

According to the State Department summary of telegram 367 from the U.S. Embassy in Iceland, in light of the recent U-2 crisis, Foreign Minister Guðmundur Í. Guðmundsson asked Ambassador Thompson whether the United States had used Keflavik air base for U-2 flights, had stored nuclear weapons there or had moved them through Keflavik. While the Foreign Minister had not asked for assurances about advance agreement, according to the summary Thompson “feels that the storage of atomic warheads in Iceland without the latter’s prior agreement would be a mistake and suggests that, if we have no intention to do this, we so inform the Icelandic Government without awaiting its request to this effect.” This conversation is cited on the bottom of page 2 of the Tyler Thompson letter (Document 8) with the references to Iceland excised.

From the original Air Force caption: “A view of the famous Terminal Hotel at Keflavik Airport, Iceland, is pictured here. In the foreground are two MATS [Military Air Transport Service] aircraft parked out front of the hotel.” Ambassador Thompson’s letter captured the problems raised by the air base’s wide open status for proposals for secret nuclear weapons storage: the base’s “security problem” was “complicated by the small size of the secure areas, accessibility of the base to the public, the small community atmosphere there with everyone knowing to a large extent what is going on, and the speculation which new, and stricter security regulations might arouse.” (National Archives, Still Pictures Branch, RG 342-B, box 1458, Foreign Locations—Iceland)

Documents 8A-B: Answer to Gudmundsson’s Questions

A: Draft telegram to U.S. Embassy Iceland, 24 June 1960, Top Secret

B: Draft telegram to U.S. Embassy Iceland, circa 1 July 1960, Top Secret

Source: RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Subject Files, 1953-1962, box 11, Iceland Keflavick [sic] Air Base

In response to Guðmundsson’s questions about U-2 flights and nuclear weapons, State Department officials prepared a response; the finished, delivered version remains classified in State Department decimal files, but drafts of the response are available, of which the one dated 1 July 1960 is probably close to what was sent. The ambassador could assure the foreign minister that the U.S. had not stored nuclear weapons in Iceland or shipped them through Keflavik airbase. But this information was not for public consumption because of the U.S. government’s “neither confirm nor deny” policy. In response to Thompson’s suggestion that the U.S. pledge that it would consult the Icelandic government in advance about nuclear weapons deployments, the State Department believed this would “not [be] desirable.” Before any assurances could be given the subject would need careful study in Washington; if asked for such assurances, Thompson was to tell Guðmundsson that he needed to seek instructions. Thompson’s letter (below) does not indicate that a follow-up conversation with Guðmundsson had occurred, only the possibility that he might ask the question about nuclear deployments again.

The 24 June draft telegram mentions the CINCLANT requirement for a nuclear weapons storage site and its ongoing construction but that item was dropped from the 1 July draft, perhaps because of its sensitivity. The final version of the telegram remains classified but has been requested.

Document 9: Ambassador Tyler Thompson to Ivan White, 5 August 1960, top secret, excised copy

Source: RG 59, DF 1960-1963, 711.5611-8560

Probably to respond to the issues raised by Guðmundsson’s questions, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ivan White sent Thompson a letter on 21 July 1960. It was one of those “official informal” communications then used by State Department officials to communicate with its embassies on matters that were too complex and sensitive to handle by telegram. White’s letter has not surfaced and is not indexed in the State Department decimal files. But judging from the tenor of Thompson’s reply, White may have asserted that the U.S. government was free to deploy nuclear weapons in Iceland without securing the agreement of Reykjavik. If that was the case, the Eisenhower administration had departed from the Acheson policy of assuring “full consultation and agreement.” It is possible that the previous ambassador, John Muccio, was the individual whom Thompson described as “recommending against prior consultation” out of fear that information about the deployment would leak to the Soviets.

If war was imminent or had broken out, Thompson believed that a secret emergency deployment would be permissible, but under peacetime circumstances he recommended seeking Iceland’s consent. Given that the Soviets probably suspected that Iceland was already a storage site, Thompson believed that it would be worse if the government of Iceland discovered a secret deployment; that would produce a diplomatic crisis, including Iceland’s possible withdrawal from NATO under protest. Moreover, “from the point of view of respect for the rights and sovereignty of [Iceland], the fact that it might not agree to the storage of nuclear weapons here could be considered as making prior consultations all the more necessary.”

To make deployments technically possible, Thompson suggested the construction of storage areas, but consulting the government if Washington ever wanted to use them. If war was approaching it would be possible to deploy weapons under emergency conditions because the possibility of objections would be “minimized.” If, however, the United States wanted to use the storage areas for actual deployments it should consult the Icelandic government. Thompson may not have been aware of the SACLANT storage site mentioned in the draft telegram cited above.

Thompson’s letter met with some internal criticism, mainly on the first page: a handwritten “no” next to his observation that U.S. nuclear weapons storage in NATO countries depends on the agreement of the country concerned; a question mark next to the comment about Canadian consent for storage of nuclear weapons in Canada; a comment “No! Canada on record,” suggesting that Ottawa would accept clandestine U.S. storage; and another comment which is harder to decipher: “tech … doesn’t get UK OK.”

For the archival release of this letter the State Department and the Defense Department justified the excision on two grounds. The State Department cited Section 3.3 (b) (6) of Executive Order 13526 – that declassification would “reveal information, including foreign government information, that would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government, or to ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States.” The Defense Department cited exemption (b) (6), ruling that declassification would “reveal formally named or numbered U.S. military war plans that remain in effect, or reveal operational or tactical elements of prior plans that are contained in such active plans.” Whether the declassification of a document which is well over half a century old could have such impacts on U.S. diplomacy or military planning appears highly doubtful.

Notes

[1]. William Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and William Burr, “They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November –December 1999, pp. 25-35; Arkin, Norris, and Burr, “How Much Did Japan Know,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January-February 2000, pp. 11-13, 78-79.

[2] . Valur Ingimundarson, The Rebellious Ally: Iceland, the United States, and the Politics of Empire, 1945-2006(Dordrech, The Netherlands, 2011), 86; William Arkin, “Iceland Melts,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (50) January-February 2000, p. 80.

[3]. One relevant item that could show up in box 3181 was published in the Foreign Relations of the United States: a memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary of State on “Additional Military Operating Requirements in Iceland,” dated 12 June 1952. It briefly recounts the discussions with the Icelandic foreign minister and mentions a NATO request to the U.S. and the Government of Iceland for a strategic air base in Iceland, but any further discussion of nuclear weapons was excised in the FRUS volume.

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Unveiled – National Intelligence University Campus

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Intelligence community unveils state-of-the-art campus

“World-class facility…is physical manifestation of ‘intelligence integration’”

James R. Clapper, director of national intelligence, participated in a ribbon-cutting ceremony today to celebrate the opening of the Intelligence Community Campus-Bethesda.

The purpose of the state-of-the-art facility, which is located at 4600 Sangamore Road in Bethesda, Maryland, is to develop a collaborative IC campus for the relocation of up to 3,000 intelligence professionals in the Washington National Capital area.

The campus, which is conveniently located in the heart of the intelligence community, will host employees from ODNI’s National Counterintelligence and Security Center, the National Intelligence University, and DIA.

Also:

Central Intelligence Agency University (much bigger 3-building campus)

https://cryptome.org/2013-info/04/ciau-campus/ciau-campus.htm
https://cryptome.org/2016-info/ciau-campus3/ciau-campus3.htm

38.9503729,-77.120482214 April 2016

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The U.S. Discovery of Israel’s Secret Nuclear Project

Israeli Cover Stories about the Dimona Reactor Dismayed Top Level Officials Who Saw a “Clearly Apparent Lack of Candor“

U.S. Embassy Telegram Quotes Ben-Gurion Aide That It Was a “Stupid Mistake” by Israel to Cloak the Nuclear Project in Secrecy

To Prevent Military Uses of the Facility, U.S. Officials Believed the International Atomic Energy Agency Should Monitor Dimona (It Never Has)

Today’s Posting Inaugurates the National Security Archive’s Special Web Site on Israeli Nuclear History

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 510

Avner Cohen and William Burr, editors

For more information contact:
Avner Cohen at 202-489-6282 (mobile) or 831-647-6437 (office)
William Burr at 202/994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Interview with Addy Cohen

An interview with Mr. Addy Cohen, a retired official from Israel’s Treasury Ministry, conducted by Ori Rabinowitz, a post-doctoral fellow at Tel Aviv University.

Part of the puzzle about the textile plant cover story is how it came about. While we know that Addy Cohen, the director of the Foreign Aid Office at the Treasury Ministry, used that description when guiding U.S. Ambassador Ogden Reid and some of his staff on a helicopter tour of the Negev in September 1960, the documentary trail has it limits. Cohen, who has just turned 87, and is living outside Tel Aviv, recalls the episode vividly. In a series of written and oral exchanges with the editors of this e-book in recent weeks, he has clarified further what happened.

As a senior official, Cohen was aware of the Dimona project and of its utmost secrecy. The issue of Dimona “was discussed in one of the Treasury Ministry executive meetings under [Minister Levi] Eshkol,” he wrote us. The helicopter tour covered various development projects that the U.S. supported, and they were on their way from the Dead Sea. “I was not prepared to Ambassador Reid’s question [about the Dimona site] as we flew far north of the structure. I ad libbed by referring to Trostler, the Jerusalemite architect [a relative of Cohen’s wife], who actually designed a textile plants” at Dimona.

Surprised by Reid’s query, Cohen improvised an answer that was not completely false. In retrospect, as he wrote on March 5, 2015, “It may have transpired that I was the first one who referred to the project as a ‘textile plant’ but I can assure you that it was not planned.”

Washington, D.C., April 15, 2015 – The U.S. government first learned of Israel’s secret nuclear program at Dimona from an American corporate official talking to U.S. diplomats in Tel Aviv during mid-summer 1960, according to a declassified document published today for the first time by the National Security Archive, the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Other documents published today detail the discovery of the secret project that some in the U.S. government believed from the very start aimed at a weapons capability; the U.S. debates over Israel’s lack of candor; and U.S. government efforts to pressure the Israelis to answer key questions about the nature of the Dimona project.

This “discovery,” which came as the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower was drawing to a close, caused apprehension in Washington by raising concern about regional stability and nuclear proliferation, but it also produced annoyance because Israeli officials at all levels repeatedly provided less than credible answers to U.S. questions about Dimona. Thus, in September 1960, when embassy officials asked about a new construction site when they were on a helicopter ride nearby, an adroit Israeli official, Addy Cohen, improvised a story to keep the secret: it was the site of a textile factory, he said; a story that was not wholly false because there was a textile plant near Dimona. An interview with Addy Cohen detailing the episode appears in this posting for the first time.

Documents published in this collection shed light on a particularly notable intelligence failure: how Washington missed warning signs that the Israelis had a nuclear project underway, but also how the U.S. belatedly realized what the Israelis were doing, and how Eisenhower and his senior advisers reacted to this discovery. Among the documents are:

The June 1959 Israel-Norway secret agreement providing for the sale of Norwegian heavy water to Israel (through the United Kingdom), transmitted by Oslo Embassy political officer Richard Kerry (father of Secretary of State John Kerry).
Reports about information from a then-covert source — University of Michigan nuclear engineering professor Henry Gomberg — who learned that the Israelis had a secret nuclear reactor project that involved experiments with plutonium.
A telegram from the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv reporting on Finance Ministry official Addy Cohen’s statement that “we’ve been misbehaving,” and one by an unidentified official close to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion that the secrecy surrounding Dimona was unjustifiable and that it was “a stupid mistake on the part of Israel.”
Reports by U.S. Ambassador Ogden Reid on conversations with Ben-Gurion.
A State Department message to the embassy in Tel Aviv conveying irritation that the responses of the Israeli government showed a “lack of candor.”
Messages about a role for the International Atomic Energy Agency in inspecting and safeguarding Dimona.

*** * * * ***

The Eisenhower Administration and the Discovery of Dimona: March 1958-January 1961

By Avner Cohen and William Burr

In the last months of 1960 as the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower was coming to a close, the U.S. government discovered that Israel had been building, with French assistance, a secret nuclear reactor near Dimona in the Negev Desert that could give Israel a nuclear weapons potential. The discovery caused apprehension within the Eisenhower administration by invoking concerns about regional stability and nuclear proliferation, but it also produced annoyance because Israeli officials at all levels provided less than credible answers to U.S. questions about Dimona.

One episode that helped create a sense of deception was that, in response to initial U.S. official questions about the construction site, the Israelis said it would be a textile factory. Over the years the “textile factory” story has acquired legendary status, but exactly when the story came about has been a mystery. But recently unearthed U.S. government documents — an embassy telegram and a memorandum by the Deputy Chief of Mission — help solve this historical puzzle. They show that during a helicopter flight in September 1960, with American Ambassador Ogden Reid and others of his staff on board, not far from the reactor site, Ambassador Reid (or one of the travelers) asked what the big construction site was. Their host, Addy Cohen, a senior Treasury Ministry official, replied, “Why, that’s a textile plant.” In December 1960, when the Dimona issue was publicly exposed, Cohen was asked why he had said “textile factory.” He responded: “that was our story at the time.” Cohen acknowledged that “we have been misbehaving” by keeping Dimona secret, but justified the project as a “deterrent” against Arab neighbors.

Today the National Security Archive, the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey publish for the first time these two items and other declassified documents on the “discovery” of Dimona. The documents provide new perspectives on how the Eisenhower administration learned about the secret reactor project, how it reacted to the discovery, and how the Israelis responded. Among the findings are these:

The initial “discovery” by the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv of the French-Israeli reactor project was probably in late July 1960, when a U.S. corporate official learned about it from an Israeli oil executive and told U.S. diplomats that the site would be a power reactor. This is the earliest known reference to Dimona.
The admission by French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville on December 16 to Secretary of State Christian Herter that France had helped Israel build the reactor, a “replica of [the] Marcoule plant.” He also told Herter that under the bilateral agreement, France would supply Israel the raw materials and receive any plutonium produced by the plant. In reply to Herter’s question about the plant’s financing, Couve said that he “assumed the money came from [the United States]”
Former Treasury Ministry official Addy Cohen ad libbed the “textile plant” story in response to questions on a helicopter tour [See above and sidebar].
An unidentified official close to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, according to an Embassy telegram, told the Canadian ambassador that the secrecy surrounding Dimona was unjustifiable and that it was “a stupid mistake on the part of Israel.” Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones agreed: It was “stupid of them” and an “unnecessary … Israeli caper.”
The financial aspects of the Dimona project, i.e., cost, financing, and the role of U.S. money — through both the diversion of U.S. government aid and the use of tax-deductible individual charities — played an important role in the Eisenhower administration’s internal deliberations on Dimona. Washington considered applying, but apparently did not use, the power to withhold economic assistance as pressure on Israel.
When the U.S. started asking questions about Dimona, and then when the issue was leaked to the press, an irritated Prime Minister Ben-Gurion asked Ambassador Ogden Reid: “Why in [the] States is everything being told [to] everybody?” Ben-Gurion stuck to the new Israeli cover story, namely, that the Dimona reactor was for peaceful purposes only, and for the economic development of the Negev in particular — no more than a step towards the building of nuclear power stations and the production of electric power, a badly needed resource.
A State Department message to the embassy in Tel Aviv conveyed a sense of irritation with the responses of the Israeli government: Ben-Gurion’s explanations “appear evasive” and the “clearly apparent lack of candor [is] difficult to reconcile with [the] confidence which had traditionally characterized U.S.-Israel relations.” The Department wanted more questions asked and more detailed and frank answers from Ben-Gurion.
In June 1959 Israel and Norway signed a secret agreement providing for Norway to sell heavy water to Israel (through the United Kingdom). According to the U.S. embassy first secretary in Oslo, Richard Kerry (father of Secretary of State John Kerry), disclosure of the agreement could be embarrassing to the Norwegian government in light of its efforts to play the role of an “honest broker” in international conflicts, including in the Middle East.

Also published in this collection are important documents that have been available in previous National Security Archive postings, but are a significant part of the record of the discovery of Dimona, including:

A Special National Intelligence Estimate — SNIE 100-8-60 from 8 December 1960 — that formally determined that “Israel is engaged in construction of a nuclear reactor complex in the Negev near Beersheba” and “plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort.” The SNIE estimated “that Israel will produce some weapons grade plutonium in 1963-64 and possibly as early as 1962.” A significant portion of the SNIE is still classified.
President Eisenhower’s meeting with top advisers on 19 December 1960 to discuss the Dimona problem, ponder the issues raised by Israeli fundraising in the United States, and discuss plans to encourage Israel to open up Dimona to visits by U.S. or reliable foreign scientists and to subject the reactor to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Some portions of this meeting record are also still classified.
The post-mortem on SNIE 100-8-60 ordered by the U.S. Intelligence Board whereby the intelligence community tried to determine what pieces of information it had missed and to learn lessons from the intelligence failure.

The Eisenhower administration’s “discovery” during the last months of 1960 that Israel was secretly building a large nuclear complex at Dimona was a belated one indeed. It occurred more than five years after Israel had made a secret national commitment to create a nuclear program aiming at providing an option to produce nuclear weapons; more than three years after Israel had signed its secret comprehensive nuclear bargain with France; and two years or more after Israel had begun the vast excavation and construction work at the Dimona site.

The tardiness of the discovery was a major blunder, what is called in our times an intelligence failure. In comparative terms, it was probably as severe as (or more so than) the failures to anticipate the Indian nuclear tests of in 1974 and 1998. Some of the documents included in this e-book provide clues as to why the discovery was delayed and the roots and causes of the intelligence failure.

What amounted to an intelligence breakdown by the United States was a tremendous counterintelligence success for Israel. The U.S. bungle enabled Israel to buy precious time for the highly vulnerable Dimona project. One could argue that had the United States discovered Dimona two years earlier, perhaps even a year earlier, that the young and fragile undertaking might not have survived. Early political pressure from the United States on the two foreign suppliers, France and Norway, might have terminated it at the very start.

The documents presented here reveal how surprised and angry the Eisenhower administration was when it learned about Dimona — and yet how circumspect Washington was in its reaction to the discovery. There was a huge gap between what senior U.S. officials said to each other about Dimona and what they said to the Israelis. On the one hand, the Americans were convinced that the evidence they had amassed indicated that it was plutonium production-oriented project with weapons potential that posed a significant proliferation risk. They were irritated that the Israelis were trying to pull the wool over their eyes with all manner of evasive answers and misleading stories. Apparently they had many doubts about Ben-Gurion’s new cover story as well. On the other hand, the administration masked its anger and suspicions; opting for a cautious approach, it chose not to be confrontational but to confine itself largely to: 1) seeking answers about Dimona and Israel’s intentions, and 2) encouraging Israel to accept visits by U.S. scientists and consent to applying International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to Dimona, as a way to constrain Israeli freedom of action. There are hints that U.S. diplomats warned the Israelis that U.S. economic aid could be jeopardized, but with only weeks left in office the Eisenhower administration was in no position to coerce its ally over the issue.

***

This and the three other photographs of the construction site near Dinoma in the Negev desert for Israel’s then-secret nuclear reactor were taken during the last months of 1960. According to the U.S. Intelligence Board post-mortem (See Document 27A), the British and U.S. military attachés took photos and these could be from either source. The plainly visible reactor dome undermined Israeli claims that a textile factory was under construction. These images of the reactor site, some of them originally classified secret or confidential, are located in State Department records at the National Archives. (Record Group 59, Records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, General Records Relating to Atomic Energy, 1948-62, box 501, Country File Z1.50 Israel f. Reactors 1960)

President Eisenhower and Israel Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion during the latter’s visit in March 1960 to the United States. (Source: www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org)

Henry Gomberg, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Michigan, shown at the laboratory during the 1950s, several years before his fall November 1960 trip to Israel where he made discoveries about the Dimona reactor (photo courtesy of Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).

Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy swearing in Ogden Reid, the newly-appointed U.S. ambassador to Israel, 7 June 1959 (photo from NARA Still Pictures Division, RG 59 SO).

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones, who wrote to Ambassador Reid that “it was stupid” of the Israelis to undertake the secret reactor project. (photo from NARA Still Pictures Division, RG 59 SO).

Addy Cohen (at the left) with Teddy Kollek, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office and later, Mayor of Jerusalem.

To appreciate the full historical context of the American intelligence failure we need to say a little bit about the Dimona project itself. In 1955, soon after David Ben-Gurion came back to power as Israel’s prime minister and minister of defense, he launched a secret feasibility initiative to determine whether, and how, Israel could build a nuclear infrastructure to support a program aiming at producing nuclear explosives. Ben-Gurion delegated that difficult task to a young (32 years of age) and highly ambitious lieutenant, Shimon Peres, whose formal position was then the director general of the Ministry of Defense. Within three years, from 1955 to 1958, Peres did almost the impossible: he managed to transform the idea of a national nuclear program from a vague vision of the future into a real technological project in the making.

Unlike the chair of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), Professor David Ernst Bergmann, who preached self-reliance, Peres’s overall philosophy was that Israel must not (and cannot) reinvent the wheel and therefore must find a foreign supplier who could provide the most comprehensive nuclear package possible, one suited for a weapons-oriented program.[1]

Those three years were filled with internal deliberations, debates and planning. Often different courses of action were examined simultaneously, on parallel or even conflicting tracks. At least three countries were considered at one time or another to be the foreign supplier: the United States, France, Norway and, to a limited extent, the United Kingdom. In historical perspective, it appears that by 1958, the project’s international master plan had become firmly drawn: France would be the foreign supplier, Norway would provide the heavy water and possibly the backup in case the French card went wrong, and the United States would provide a small peaceful package, under “Atoms of Peace,” that could serve as the camouflage for the whole project, mostly as a way to conceal Israel’s real achievement — Dimona — from the United States.

This raises the issue of secrecy. The story of Dimona is one of a huge secret. Secrecy was essential in order to shield and insulate the highly vulnerable, newly born, project from a hostile outside. At the very core, of course, it is an Israeli secret – the largest, most comprehensive and longest-held secret Israel has ever generated. However, it is more than an Israeli secret; Israel had partners in this venture. The prime partner was the chief foreign supplier, France; the second was Norway, in concert with the British.

And then there was the United States. In a sense, the secrecy surrounding Dimona was aimed primarily against the United States. After all, of all the nations involved, the U.S. posed the greatest threat to the Israeli program. Since the time of the Baruch Plan in 1946 the United States had been on the record opposing the spread of nuclear weapons. Washington helped to create the IAEA in 1957 — the very same year the Dimona deal was signed — and since then it had promoted the creation of an international safeguards system. Should the Dimona secret have been compromised, the United States would have likely exercised pressure on France either to terminate the project altogether or at least to submit it to international safeguards.

The documents in this e-book involve Israel’s nuclear relations with the United States, France and Norway. What follows is some brief background on Israel’s efforts with each of them:

The United States. On 12 July 1955, Israel was the second country to sign a general agreement with the United States for peaceful nuclear cooperation under “Atoms for Peace.” Initially, the leaders of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission [IAEC] thought that American assistance could be the starting point for a largely indigenous Israeli nuclear program. Consistent with this vision, during 1955-56, IAEC Chairman Bergmann tried to find out whether the United States would provide assistance to build a “real reactor” — that is, a 10 MW natural uranium/heavy water reactor — but also to provide 10 tons of heavy water. Bergman made a formal request in July 1956 through a letter to AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss. In September the AEC notified Israel that it could be done but only under the aegis of a new bilateral nuclear power agreement which would require a more rigorous safeguards agreement than the original 1955 bilateral research accord. When Israel asked why, it was told that “plutonium production capabilities” necessitated stricter controls. When it became apparent the United States would insist on strict safeguards, Israel dropped its probe altogether.A year later, however, in 1957, Israel returned to the original U.S. “Atoms for Peace” offer to construct a small 1 MW swimming pool-type reactor, to be designed and installed by American Machines and Foundry (AMF) Atomics. The contract was signed on 20 March 1957 and in December of that year the long-awaited proposal was submitted to the USAEC by AMF on behalf of Israel for the Nachal Soreq (Rubin) site. Finally, on 19 March 1958, Israel signed a contract with AMF, expecting that the reactor startup date would be 15 months later. Construction on the Soreq site had begun in January 1958 and the small reactor reached criticality in a public ceremony in June 1960, six months prior to the discovery of Dimona.[2]Unlike Dimona, however, the Soreq (“Atoms for Peace”) reactor became subject to IAEA safeguards beginning in the mid-1960s.

France. By early 1956, as French-Israeli military relations intensified, Peres became convinced that France could evolve into Israel’s foreign nuclear supplier and acted accordingly. But it was the nationalization of the Suez Canal that summer which created the political opening for a French-Israeli nuclear deal. In September 1956 the French Atomic Energy Commission and the IAEC reached an agreement in principle for the sale of a small EL type research reactor to Israel. A month later, as a side issue at the end of the secret Sevres conference (October 22-24) (site of the “collusion” that led to the Suez campaign), the nuclear deal received top-level political approval. The 1956 deal, however, was quite limited in size and scope; it also did not include a chemical separation plant and related reprocessing technology.It was in the context of the Suez campaign itself, when all three participants were subject to Soviet nuclear threats, that France reinforced its own earlier (1954) decision to become a nuclear power and agreed to help Israel to do the same. With France making its own nuclear decisions it became easier for Peres to be more explicit about the package that Israel actually wanted. The small EL-102 reactor that the CEA had planned for Israel in the fall of 1956 — similar to the experimental EL3 18 MW in Sacly — was upgraded to a large plutonium-producing reactor of generally the same order as the G-1 reactor at Marcoule. Following a year of highly intense discussions and negotiations in France, on 30 October 1957 Peres finally signed the Dimona package, which included both hardware and technological aid. In the wake of widespread rumors of French-Israeli nuclear cooperation in early 1958, U.S. embassy officials reported that Israel had plans to build an “experimental” reactor but the State Department did not investigate this further (See Documents 1A–B).[3]

Norway. Beginning in 1955, Israeli AEC Chair Bergmann pressed his government to obtain 20 tons of heavy water cheaply and, if possible, without safeguards. Outside the United States, the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro was the only available producer of heavy water. In early 1956, Israel made a request to the United States but also approached Norway, informally via political channels, as to whether and when it could supply Israel with 20 tons of heavy water. Norway’s initial reply was that, due to current orders, it would be impossible to do so before the end of 1960. When the approach to Washington became hopeless, Israel grew more interested in the Norwegian supply. In August 1956, Bergmann wrote his friend Gunnar Randers, the director of the Norwegian Institute of for Atomic Energy, with a formal request to purchase 10 tons of heavy water. Randers responded noncommittally: supply was short but there was a “good chance” for a deal later on.Negotiations between Israel and Norway intensified in 1957-58, at the time that the Dimona deal was negotiated and signed. In a letter Randers wrote in August 1957 to Fredrik Moller, the director of NORATOM, a newly established company aimed at promoting the Norwegian nuclear industry, he explained that Israel needed the heavy water for a 40 MW “production reactor” fueled by natural uranium. As there were political and logistic difficulties with the Israeli order, to make it more attractive Randers presented it in the context of a larger nuclear cooperation agreement between NORATOM and the IAEC. In addition, to expedite the deal it became a three-party transaction: Israel purchased heavy water from NORATOM that had been sold and transferred two years earlier to Britain, but became surplus for them. The heavy water was shipped directly from the UK to Israel, without safeguards, as the issue of safeguards was left to the Norwegians. The paper record indicates that Randers was willing to be “creative” on controls, but the Norwegian Foreign Ministry insisted on safeguards to ascertain “peaceful use.” After long discussions Israel gave up on the question of safeguards and on 25 February 1959 the two countries exchanged documents on the heavy water sale with provisions to ensure that the use was peaceful. A few months later the Norwegian Foreign Ministry informed a U.S. AEC representative about the bilateral agreement, assuring him that it included safeguards and inspection rights (See Documents 2, 20).[4]

The discoveries of the French and Norwegian roles in the Israeli nuclear project were a revelation to the Eisenhower administration but it was even more surprised to discover that it already had in its possession clues that had not been followed up until it was too late. The documents below demonstrate how, during the short time it had available, the Eisenhower administration scrambled to pull the threads together by conducting an intelligence “post-mortem.” (See Document 27A). The post-mortem treated the missed opportunities as unfortunate but innocent errors caused by the deficient sharing of information and poor follow-up of instructions. But there have been more conspiratorial explanations of the missed opportunities: for example, the view that pro-Israeli officials in the AEC, CIA, and other agencies stove-piped important reports and information, and the open question that President Eisenhower himself may have chosen to look the other way during 1958-1959.[5]

A more delicate and complex dilemma faced by the Eisenhower administration was how to respond both publicly and privately to the challenge to U.S.-Israeli and U.S.-French relations posed by Dimona. Specifically, the administration had to decide how tough it should be and how to balance the Israeli proliferation concern against the rest of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. It is important to keep in mind that the administration was becoming aware of two things: (a) that Israel had made deliberate efforts to keep Dimona secret for as long as possible; and (b) that Washington could hardly take on faith the new Israeli “cover story” about Dimona, including Ben-Gurion’s public and private assurances. The administration remained skeptical, if not suspicious.

The possible public disclosure of Dimona also placed Israel, and specifically Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, in a dilemma: How should it react to the disclosure? How much should Israel tell and how truthful should it be? Could Israel tell the U.S. government one thing in private and something else to the world? The question was whether Israel should choose the path of truth or the path of ambiguity and deception. Because the first public statement would have great impact, this was a truly fateful decision. The internal Israeli deliberations about what to say are still unavailable, but it is possible to reconstruct the underlying reasoning based on important public and private statements made by Israeli officials, including Ben-Gurion.

Ben-Gurion chose the path of ambiguity and concealment: he declared that Dimona was purely a civilian scientific project, for training in the use of nuclear power for economic development. It was “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” he declared in his Knesset statement on 21 December 1960. In his private assurances to the United States Ben-Gurion provided some new information, but it was entirely consistent with his public version.[6] He would not tell the whole truth because the fate of the project was at stake. For Ben-Gurion this ambiguous, if not entirely deceitful, strategy had obvious short-term benefits: lessening U.S. anger and resulting pressure, and thereby avoiding a public showdown with Washington, while also calming the situation at home and in the region generally.[7]

It is apparent that the Eisenhower administration had no appetite to call Ben-Gurion’s bluff (either in private or in public). Nor was the departing president interested in escalating the Dimona problem into a diplomatic confrontation, which would not have even been possible given , with all that was already on his agenda (the Laos and Berlin crises, for example). Because relations with Israel had been relatively good, Israel had significant domestic support within the United States, and, perhaps most significantly, the Eisenhower administration was in its last few days in office, the White House let the State Department deal with the issue, keeping it under diplomatic control until the new Kennedy administration took office.

A determination to avoid a crisis encouraged senior officials such as Assistant Secretary of State G. Lewis Jones [Document 19] to try to “calm down” the agencies, including CIA, which he believed had been reacting intemperately, and to ensure that no one tried to cut off aid to Israel. At the same time, “calm”, secrecy, and the avoidance of publicity might make it possible for Washington to get answers from the Israeli and put quiet pressure on them to open up Dimona to visits by U.S. scientists and to accept safeguards by the IAEA (in fact, the last thing Ben-Gurion and his associates were likely to accept).

The dilemma the Eisenhower administration faced after the discovery of Dimona in December 1960-January 1961 would endure for the entire decade. From then on, three successive U.S. administrations — under presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon — would have to deal with it as well. President Kennedy chose the toughest path of struggle and confrontation in his effort to check the program; President Johnson realized that the U.S. had limited leverage on the issue and planted the seeds of compromise and looking the other way; finally, in a bargain with Prime Minister Golda Meir, President Nixon accepted the Israel’s de facto nuclear status as long as it stayed secret, and in doing so created the present dilemma.

The documents that follow are illuminating but more is to be learned. Many records remain classified in the National Archives, not only in State Department files but also those of the Atomic Energy Commission. The papers of AEC Chairman John McCone at the National Archives include a file on Israel which is the subject of an earlier declassification request along with related State Department files. Moreover, the National Security Archive has pending requests with the Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. In response to a request to re-review SNIE 100-8-60 (See Document 8), the CIA has held the line, refusing to release more information. The request is now under appeal.

THE DOCUMENTS

Documents 1A-B: Unnoticed Intelligence

A: Department of State Instruction A-128 to U.S. Embassy Israel, “Atomic Energy Developments,” 7 March 1958, Confidential

B: U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv Despatch No. 652 to State Department, “Israeli Exchanges With Other Countries Relating to Atomic Energy,” 16 April 1958,

Source for both: National Archives (College Park), Record Group 59, Department of State Records (hereinafter RG 59), Central Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 984a.801/4-1658.

Some in the U.S. intelligence community[8] regarded these communications as an early missed opportunity to discover the Dimona project a year or two earlier. In March 1958, in light of growing concern about the possibility of surreptitious nuclear weapons programs, the State Department saw an “urgent” need for information on the Israeli atomic energy program and asked its Tel Aviv embassy to report on “all phases” of Israeli nuclear-related activities, research and development, including any exchanges with foreign governments and organizations. As an example, the instruction cited a recent press report in the Jerusalem Post on French-Israeli atomic cooperation. The report included statements by the French minister of foreign affairs, Francois Benard, that France was supplying Israel’s uranium needs in exchange for “Israeli discoveries in atomic research for peace.”

In response the embassy set up a meeting on 15 April 1958 between embassy Second Secretary Lewis Townsend and Professor David Ernest Bergmann, the chairman of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission. With respect to cooperation with France, Bergmann asserted flatly that Minister Benard “did not know what he was talking about.” Bergmann acknowledged that Israel had a nuclear agreement with France but the exchanges under the agreement were informational only. Under the agreement Israel received from France “unpublished reports” and sent students to study at French nuclear centers. He noted that the agreement had no provision under which France was obligated to supply Israel uranium as had been reported; nor had Israel ever received such supply. The substance of Bergmann’s commentary was close to what a US AEC representative would hear in Paris more than two years later in a similar inquiry (see Document 4). The comments were quite accurate as far as that (unpublished) 1954 bi-lateral exchange agreement was concerned (Bergmann mentioned that there was also a tri-lateral agreement on atomic energy research between Israel, France and the UK). Israel did not advertise the existence of those agreements, but did not treat them as classified either.[9]

Not surprisingly, however, Bergmann made no reference to the extremely secret French-Israeli Dimona agreement which had been signed in Paris on 3 October 1957. One must assume that he must have known something about that deal but it is not clear how much knew given that the IAEC was hardly consulted, let alone involved, in the decisions and actions that led to Dimona.[10] Bergmann’s most intriguing comment came at the end when he said that the principal decision to build a “power reactor had already been taken.” He seems to suggest two stages: first, “plans” which are currently “contemplated” to construct an “experimental nuclear reactor” within two or two-and-a-half years, and then five to seven years later “a large economically feasible [power] reactor could be put into operation.”

Was the reference to that “experimental reactor” an oblique reference to Dimona — as indeed Israel initially presented it — or was it a deliberate effort to confuse his American interlocutor? Or perhaps it was a mix of both? It is worth noting that Bergmann was known among Israelis as being loose on secrecy and this was apparently one of the reasons why he was bypassed on the Dimona project.[11]

In retrospect, according to the post-mortem investigation (see Document 27A) on why the United States discovered Dimona two years late, Bergmann’s loose comment on the “experimental reactor” was one of those major missing hints. In April 1958 U.S. intelligence wrongly assumed that the reference to the “experimental reactor” was to the US small swimming pool reactor at Soreq whose construction started in January that year at Nachal Soreq (see Document 3). Moreover, U.S. intelligence took on faith Bergmann’s statement about the limited nature of French-Israeli nuclear cooperation, although there had already been some reports about possible French-Israeli secret nuclear cooperation, even the possibility of joint nuclear weapons research. One way or another, a chance to investigate Bergmann’s claims and to seek further information about the “experimental reactor” was lost.

The numbers on the right side of these documents indicate that they are from the State Department’s central decimal files (whereby documents were filed using numerical combinations denoting subjects and countries). The 900 category signifies communications, transportation, and science; 84A stands for Israel; and 801 indicates research and development. The filing of the document in the R&D category, instead of the usual 1901 category for nuclear energy matters, would have hindered any U.S. government official who was interested in tracing intelligence on the Israeli nuclear program.

Documents 2A-C: “Certain Highly Classified Transactions with Israel”

A: Memorandum of Conversation, Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 5 June 1959, Secret, with 30 December 1960 routing slip [transcript attached]

B: Richard Kerry to Philip Farley, 15 June 1959, Secret

C: Richard Kerry to Philip Farley, 7 August 1959, enclosing copy of letter to Robert Brandin, and “Memorandum of conversation of August 6, 1959, at the Atomic Energy Institute, Kjeller, Norway,” Secret

Sources: A: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962 [SAE], box 305, File 12. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Safeguards Sept-Dec 1960 Part 1 of 3; B: RG 59, SAE, box 501, Z1.50 Country File Israel d. General 1953-1961 Part 2 of 2 C: RG 59, SAE, box 313, Country File Norway d. General 1957-1961 Part 2 of 2

A critical piece of information that was known to the State Department, but for obscure reasons remained unknown to the U.S. intelligence community for many months (see Document 22), was the 20 tons of heavy water that Norway had quietly sold to Israel upon an agreement signed in Oslo on 25 February 1959. The Norwegians claimed that they wanted to keep the transaction under wraps because disclosure could hurt their diplomatic standing and interfere with business prospects in the Middle East. Evidently, Israel had equally strong reasons of her own to keep the heavy water deal secret as well. For this reason, but also due to an availability issue, Norway used the U.K. as a key third party in the deal: NORATOM (the Norwegian state-sponsored company to promote Norwegian nuclear energy industry) had originally sold heavy water to the United Kingdom for its nuclear weapons program. Then, as part of the three-party arrangement, the Norwegians asked the British to resell their excess heavy water back to NORATOM; even though the product would be shipped directly from the United Kingdom to Israel, it was NORATOM that was selling it. This also enabled NORATOM to avoid the political difficulty of having to apply to the Norwegian government for an export license.[12]

According to Olaf Solli, a nuclear energy expert with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, some British officials wanted to “inform” Washington of the Israeli heavy water deal, but ultimately London did not share the information, according to British press reports in 2005 and 2006 based on new declassifications in British archives.[13]

In any event, on 5 June 1959, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry informed AEC official William M. Fullerton, a division chief at the Office of International Affairs, about the agreement to sell heavy water to Israel — subject to “safeguards and inspections” — but the size of the transaction was not reported. The U.S Embassy in Oslo prepared the memo of conversation and some days later, on 15 June, embassy political officer Richard Kerry forwarded it to Philip J. Farley, the assistant to the secretary of state for disarmament and atomic energy, asking that Fullerton and his boss, Algie Wells, receive copies.

For unknown reasons the memo was lost in the shuffle and was not disseminated above the middle levels of the State Department and the AEC. Top Department officials, not to mention those at the CIA or from State Department intelligence, did not see that June 1959 memo until December 1960, although months before the CIA had learned there had been a deal.[14] Accordingly, the questions about the sale that could have been asked of the Israelis, the Norwegians, and the British were not.

In a follow-up conversation, Richard Kerry learned more, indirectly, about the political sensitivity of Norwegian secret deals with Israel from Gunnar Randers, the director of the Atomic Energy Institute, and the key figure in Norwegian nuclear policy after World War II. Referring to NORATOM’s negotiations with the Egyptians over “isotope work,” Randers saw a “delicate” situation concerning transactions with Israel, but as long as they did not reach the public the Norwegians would not face any “difficulties” from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Randers was a close friend of the IAEC chair, David Bergmann, and this story supported Israel’s need for secrecy but it also suited Randers who had not kept the upper levels of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in the picture (seeDocument 20).

Document 3: “French Atomic Energy Project in Israel”

U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv Despatch 75 to State Department, “French Atomic Energy Project in Israel,” 2 August 1960, Confidential

Source: National Archives (College Park), Record Group 59, Department of State records (RG 59), Central Decimal Files 1960-1963, 884A.1901/8-260

American Machine and Foundry (AMF) Atomics was the company which installed for Israel the 1 MW swimming pool type light water nuclear reactor at Nachal Soreq (known today as the Soreq Nuclear Research Center) that Israel received as a gift from the U.S. under the1955 “Atoms for Peace” bilateral agreement. In late July 1960, U.S. Embassy officials learned from a conversation with D. Anderson, an AMF employee, that French personnel were involved in building “a 60 megawatt atomic power reactor” in the Beersheba area. Anderson stated that this was his “impression, gained on conversations he had with an Israeli, Daniel Kimhi, the director of the Naptha Petroleum Company. According to Kimhi, the French nationals were working on a project described to him as ‘gas cooled power reactor capable of producing approximately 60 megawatts of electrical power.'” Anderson’s understanding was that the project had been under way for “about two years” with the completion date two years off.

As of this writing, this document is the first and earliest available declassified US document that makes explicit reference to the Dimona project. We should note that at the National Archives (College Park), over one hundred additional documents from 1960-1961 remain classified in the decimal files. A declassification request for them is pending.

The embassy reported this conversation to Washington and asked that the U.S. embassy in Paris look into the French government’s role, if any, in the alleged development. It took a few weeks before this information went to nuclear energy intelligence experts in Washington (at the AEC and CIA) who came to realize that they had missed other pieces of intelligence (See Document 27A) and began looking more closely at what was going on at the Dimona site.

Documents 4A-B: “The French CEA Was Not Collaborating with the Israelis”

A: State Department Instruction CA-3636 to U.S. Embassy Paris, “Reported Atomic Reactor Power Project at Beersheba,” 19 October 1960, confidential

B: U.S. Embassy Paris Airgram G-766 to State Department, 22 November 1960, Confidential

Sources: A: Record Group 84, Records of Foreign Service Posts, Classified Records of the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1955-1963, box 1, Atomic Energy Developments Israel 1959-61; B: Freedom of Information release

When the U.S intelligence community got wind of the Tel Aviv embassy report on the French-Israeli reactor project (see Document 2), it took time to digest it; U.S. officials realized that more information was needed because apparently they had no independent sources to corroborate the report. (It is still a puzzle whether, and to what extent, U-2 overhead photographs were especially telling or whether they were being distributed within the intelligence community.)[15] According to the post-mortem (see Document 27A, PDF page 23), the CIA formulated a list of technical questions about French-Israeli collaboration, including the organizations involved in the project, reactor specifications, and plans for spent fuel, e.g. whether the Israelis were building a chemical separation plant. The State Department sent the CIA questions as an “Instruction” to the U.S. embassy in Israel, with the embassy in Paris and the U.S. mission to the IAEA also receiving copies. The request for information did not get high priority; it had a “Routine collection priority.”

If the U.S. embassy in Israel ever sent back a formal response, it is still classified. But U.S. military attaches at the Embassy in Tel Aviv did begin collecting information and sent photographs back to Washington. Another attempt to ferret out information is known: John Rouleau, the AEC’s representative in Paris, tried, but he met with complete denial from an unnamed member of the French Atomic Energy Commission. The latter, according to Rouleau’s account, “stated flatly that the French CEA was not collaborating with the Israelis in the construction of a nuclear power reactor.” Furthermore, the official denied that any French company could be working with the Israelis on a power reactor because “prior permission from the CEA would be required and such permission has neither been requested nor granted.”

While the French official denied any bilateral cooperation with Israel on a power reactor, he acknowledged the existence of an earlier 1954 agreement between the two national atomic energy commissions under which the bodies collaborated in two specific areas: (1) heavy water production and (2) extracting uranium from phosphates. In retrospect, it is impossible to say whether the CEA interlocutor truly knew nothing about the Dimona project-the Israeli-French deal was highly compartmentalized and secret within the CEA-or whether he made a deliberate effort to mislead the United States. Strictly speaking, however, his statement was not a lie because the Dimona reactor was not a power reactor.

Document 5: “The Know-How on Building Crude Atomic Bombs”

Memorandum of conversation, “Safeguards for Reactors,” 25 November 1960, Secret

Source: National Archives (College Park), Record Group 59, Department of State Records (hereinafter RG 59), Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962, box 305, 12H P.U.S File: 18. Safeguards September-December 1960 [Part 2 of 3]

Despite the lack of cooperation from the French government, Washington was piecing together information about the site in the Negev Desert from a variety of intelligence sources. By 25 November, Secretary of State Herter was confident enough in the information accumulated so far to share its essence with British Ambassador Harold Caccia. While intelligence experts in London and Washington had already been consulting each other (see chronology with Document 27A), Herter took it to a higher level by telling Caccia that Washington had unconfirmed reports that a “plutonium-producing reactor may be being built in Israel with French aid.” Furthermore, France may be giving the Israelis the “know how” to build “crude atomic bombs.” What made the existence of the Israeli reactor project of special concern was that for months Washington and its allies had been trying to build a consensus at the IAEA in favor of effective safeguards on nuclear power plants; this “new factor emphasized the importance of providing adequate atomic energy safeguards.”

Documents 6A-C: Professor Gomberg’s Discoveries

A: Paris Embassy Telegram 2162 to State Department, 26 November 1960, Secret

B: Memorandum of conversation, [Title excised], 1 December 1960, Secret, excised copy

C: Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report, “Nuclear Engineering/Large Nuclear and Electric Power Plant Near Beersheba/French Nuclear Assistance to Israel/Israeli Attitude Toward the Announcement of its Large Scale Nuclear Effort/Opportunity for U.S. Participation in Nuclear Powered Water Conversion,” 9 February 1961, Confidential

Sources: A: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962, box 305, 12H P.U.S File: 18. Safeguards September-December 1960 [Part 2 of 3], B: Freedom of Information release; C: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, 1948-1961, box 501, Z1.50 Country File Israel f. Reactor 1960

Flying back to Ann Arbor on his way back from Israel, Professor Henry Gomberg, on the faculty of the University of Michigan’s nuclear engineering department, briefly stopped in Paris on 25 November and met with Roleau. As a guest of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission and a consultant on matters of nuclear education, Gomberg had picked up some “urgent and secret” pieces of information — and suspicions — about the Israeli nuclear program that he wanted to share with U.S. government officials. He tantalized Rouleau by holding back what he had learned, but the little he said implied that Israel, with French aid, was engaged in some sort of a large scale secret nuclear power project. Gomberg also noted that he learned from an unnamed personal friend of Ben-Gurion [he probably meant Dr. Bergmann] that within a few weeks Israel would announce a five year [atomic energy] plan and would disclose the construction at the Beersheba site.

Several days later, on 1 December, Gomberg came to Washington for a full debriefing of AEC and State Department representatives. His name is redacted from this release of the memorandum of that conversation (declassified in the early 1990s) but it is evident that Gomberg was the subject of the debriefing. The same is true of the subsequent CIA report dated 9 February which also masked Gomberg’s identity. This document, apparently based on an interview at the time of Gomberg’s visit, contains detailed information, including his observations and tentative conclusions.

Based on various meetings in Israel, Gomberg became convinced that the large site the Israelis had described as an “agricultural experiment station” was actually a “large classified project.” It was evident to him that all his Israeli interlocutors were “thoroughly briefed to restrict their discussion within security bounds,” and yet his discussions at the Technion led him to believe that the Israelis were creating a much larger and more thorough nuclear training program than was needed by their own declared programs. He got a similar impression in his discussions at the Weizmann Institute (Plant [Machon] #4) where one person distressed his guide by mentioning that Plant [Machon] #4 was expected “to be working with gram quantities of Plutonium and curie quantities of polonium.” The plutonium issue was probably the most sensitive matter for the Israelis because of its weapons implications.

Gomberg concluded that the classified project was probably “a large nuclear and electrical power plant,” whose construction had been underway for some three years, located east of Beersheba. In another part of his report he described the reactor as “far beyond any kind of a training reactor and it will be capable of producing weapons grade plutonium.” Gomberg noted that he believed the Israelis had the technical capability to construct and operate a nuclear plant up to the level of 200 MW thermal. Then he estimated that the power level of the Beersheba project would be approximately 250 MW thermal. Later Gomberg noted that US photographs that were shown to him indicated a very close resemblance to the French G-1 reactor in Marcoule.

In his last meeting with Dr. Bergmann, Gomberg pressed him for information about “activities which were not freely discussed”; the latter acknowledged that the original intention was to announce the Beersheba facility later in 1961, but that because of the many rumors Ben-Gurion would make an announcement about a power reactor project in about three weeks time.

Document 7: The “Cover Story Would Not be Successful for Long”

Memorandum from Deputy Operations Coordinator Charles E. Rogers, Office of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to Mr. Jones and Mr. Farley, 7 December 1960, Secret

Source: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962, box 501, CF 21.50 Israel F. Reactor 1960

While the U.S. intelligence community was finalizing its estimate of the secret Israeli reactor, senior officials had already discussed the problem and what to do about it at a luncheon meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, which served as the coordinating and implementing unit for President Eisenhower’s National Security Council system. After Gordon Gray, the president’s national security assistant, opened the discussion, Deputy Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant emphasized the subject’s “political sensitivity” and cautioned against any comments that cast doubt upon an anticipated Israeli announcement, even though it was generally agreed that the Israeli “cover story would not be successful for long.” This was probably a reference to the description of the plant as a “power reactor.” In the entire matter, “the Department of State would be the sole spokesman.” A skeptical reader, possibly Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones, wrote “Ha!” next to the “sole spokesman” comment because Jones believed that too many other agencies “wanted to get into the act” (see Jones letter to Reid with Document 19 below).

Document 8: “Plutonium Production for Weapons Is At least One Major Purpose

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-8-60, “Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability,” 8 December 1960, with Memoranda to Holders Attached, 22 and 29 December 1960, attached, Secret, Excised copy

Source: MDR appeal to ISCAP, declassified in 2009, presently undergoing further review

On the basis of intelligence collected during the summer and fall of 1960 (of which much remains classified), possibly including the most recent information from Henry Gomberg, on 8 December 1958 Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles signed off on a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) entitled “Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability.” The U.S. Intelligence Board, whose member agencies participated in the drafting process, concurred in the estimate that same day. The SNIE began with a firm factual determination that “Israel is engaged in construction of a nuclear reactor complex in the Negev near Beersheba.” Acknowledging that there could be various ways to interpret the function of the Dimona complex, the authors believed that “on the basis of all available evidence” that “plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort.” The “surrounding” secrecy and Dimona’s remote location was strong evidence of the military purposes. The SNIE estimated “that Israel will produce some weapons grade plutonium in 1963-64 and possibly as early as 1962.”

France’s extensive aid was noted but the exact nature of the assistance, including details on the reactor, and whether, and to what extent, the complex also included plutonium extraction (reprocessing), has been excised from this version of the SNIE. Also excised is the information mentioned in several subsequent updates (“Memorandum to Holders” on 22 and 29 December 1960). The Norwegian heavy water sale to Israel was noted — the CIA had discovered the purchase earlier in the year — but whether the State Department had rediscovered its documentation on the transaction by this point is not clear.

The SNIE also included a detailed discussion of the broader implications of the Dimona reactor: what it said about French and Israeli motivations, the possible reactions by the Arab world and the Soviet bloc, as well as the overall “repercussions” among western allies.

The SNIE became controversial as soon as it was published because senior intelligence officials were learning that the intelligence agencies and other U.S. government organizations had collected telling evidence several years earlier indicating that Israel had a secret nuclear reactor program under way. This recognition led to the production of an intelligence post-mortem to look at what had been missed and why (See Document 27A).

Document 9: Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 8, 1960, Top Secret, excised copy

Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992)

The day that the SNIE was issued, the National Security Council met, with Eisenhower presiding, and received a briefing on the estimate by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles who passed around photos of Dimona taken by the U.S. Army attaché. Dulles began by noting that Israel was constructing, with French assistance, a nuclear complex in the Negev. The complex contained a reactor capable of “producing weapons-grade plutonium.” His initial statement included three more lines which are still classified. As to the French assistance, it included equipment, personnel and training, as well as “fuel elements.” Neither CIA nor the AEC believed, contrary to Israel’s anticipated statement that the project was “solely for peaceful purposes.” Secretary of State Herter noted that the Arab reaction to the discovery would be “severe.” (At that point four-and-a-half lines of Herter’s comment are classified.) He also claimed that the cost of the reactor might be 40 to 80 million dollars.

During the discussion of the nuclear proliferation implications of an Israeli weapons program, the conversation briefly turned to how the plant was financed. Under Secretary of the Treasury Fred Scribner suggested that an important funding source may have been “Jewish charitable organizations in the U.S.” which received tax-deductible contributions. This had caused past problems because some charitable funds had been “diverted to government operations in Israel.”

The still-classified portions of this meeting record are the subject of a mandatory declassification review request filed in 2014.

Document 10: “Considerable Weapons Potential”

Telephone Call Logs of Secretary of State Christian Herter, 9 December 1960, Unclassified

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Christian Herter Papers

On 9 December, Secretary of State Herter summoned Israeli ambassador Avraham Harman to the State Department and showed him photos of the Dimona reactor, asking for an explanation that would remove “bases for concern.” Harman said he knew nothing of the project but would inform his government. Later that afternoon, Herter called Claude Lebel, the chargé d’affaires at the French embassy, and asked about French involvement in the project. Herter prefaced his question by referring to a report he had received from his embassy in Tel Aviv that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was about to announce that a new experimental reactor had been built in the Negev with French aid. Herter noted that, according to information the United States had ascertained, Israel had been involved since 1958 in constructing a reactor “which is at least ten times as large as claimed,” and that the design appeared to be not for power but for plutonium production, hence, it would provide Israel “considerable weapons potential.” Furthermore, Herter noted that the cost of the reactor was between 40 to 80 million dollars. Lebel had no information to offer and promised to pass the query on to Paris.

Document 11: “He Assumed the Money Came From” the United States

Paris Embassy Telegram CAHTO 4, 16 December 1960, Top Secret

Source: RG 59. Records of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Records Relating to Israel, 1964-1966, box 8, Israel Atomic Energy Program

A week later, Herter was in Paris for a NATO meeting where he met with his French counterpart, Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. The latter directly acknowledged the secret French-Israeli deal to build a “replica of [the] Marcoule plant.” Under the agreement, Couve de Murville added, France would supply the raw materials and receive any plutonium produced by the plant. The Israelis would not make any public statement without first consulting the French government. In reply to Herter’s question about how the plant was financed, Couve stated that he “assumed the money came from US.” Herter understood that comment to mean that the project was financed by the “diversion of US government or private [American] aid.”

Document 12: Meet the Press

Memorandum of Conversation, ” Suggested Guidance for Chairman McCone’s Use in ‘Meet the Press’ Interview December 18 If Asked About Reported Israeli Atomic Weapons Developments,” 17 December 1960, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3):

With AEC Chairman John McCone slated to appear on “Meet the Press,” AEC and State Department officials met to develop an integrated approach to ensure that what he said comported with the government’s over-all position. The officials developed an approach that he could follow “with dignity” and not “be drawn into implications” that the U.S. was associated with an alleged Israeli nuclear weapons program. With respect to earlier press reports from London about an Israeli atomic bomb project, McCone would not comment. He could say that the U.S. opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities, and that it was “firmly established policy” that “our law does not permit us to assist other countries to develop” such capabilities, If questioned, McCone could acknowledge U.S. support for Israeli research under the “Atoms for Peace” program.

In his comments on “Meet the Press,” McCone took his own approach; his main disclosure was an acknowledgement that the Israelis had not “revealed” the reactor to the U.S. He further stated that Washington was trying to get more information, that the existence of the reactor did not necessarily mean a bomb project, although the reactor could produce plutonium, and that Israeli compliance with IAEA safeguards would provide a good test case for inspection and “allay fear of weapons intent.”[16]

Documents 13A-B: “Israel Should Forthwith Open the Plants”

A: White House Office of the Staff Secretary, “Memorandum of Conference with the President December 19, 1960”, 12 January 1961, Secret, Excised Copy

B: Department of State, “U.S. Notes Reports of Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities,” 19 December 1961

Sources: A: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3); B: Department of State Bulletin, 9 January 1961, No. 1124, page 45.

With the Washington Post and the New York Times publishing stories about Dimona, partly based on leaks by John McCone,[17] President Eisenhower convened his top aides to discuss the Israeli reactor, how to respond to the publicity, and what kind of a public stance it was appropriate to take. This record of a meeting between Eisenhower and his closest advisers was probably not the president’s first discussion of the discovery of Dimona and its implications, but it was probably the highest level formal gathering and the most wide-ranging discussion. The conference record reveals some remarkable points:

Purpose of the Dimona Complex and Reliability of US knowledge : Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates pointed out that “our information is that the plant is not for peaceful uses.” The President’s science advisor, Dr. George Kistiakowsky, responded that “there is some doubt about this” because it is unclear whether a chemical separation is on site (or being constructed). AEC Chairman McCone responded that his people believed that “there is a chemical separation plant there.” He added that it would make no sense that the Israelis would do just “part of the job.” This issue, whether Dimona had or did not have a secret separation plant, would haunt the US intelligence community for at least a decade. In retrospect, Gates and McCone were right from the start.
Cost and US financial Involvement: McCone observed that the Dimona plant “had probably been financed from US support to Israel” and Herter supported the claim, adding that “it is clear that they [the Israelis] have constructed this plant through diversions from private and public [US] aid to Israel.” Eisenhower himself noted that “we had evidence” that the project cost was in a range between $100 and $200 million. (Incidentally, these figures are more than double the figure Herter cited at the National Security Council meeting a week earlier.) The president added, “we do not know where they have obtained the funds,” but the US government has a strong interest in knowing “because of the aid we are giving them.” Eisenhower’s remark is one of the rare mentions of a financial estimate for the Dimona project.
Inspection: When McCone urged that the U.S. insist the Dimona plant be under IAEA safeguards, Gates suggested that the Israelis be asked to open the plant for inspection because Israel had signed the agreement that established the IAEA. Eisenhower agreed: the US statement should express confidence that because Israel was an IAEA member and had claimed that the reactor was for peaceful uses, it should allow inspections. When national security assistant Gordon Gray asked whether the US would insist on visiting the site, Eisenhower replied that it would not be necessary if the US was successful in forcing IAEA inspections.
Intentions and Concealment: CIA Director Allen Dulles noted that Israel was trying to create confusion by associating the Dimona plant, “which is a large production installation,” with the very small Soreq reactor built with U.S. aid.

The meeting ended with the decision that Dimona should be handled by the Department of State, not the White House. Since the issue had emerged in the very last weeks of the Eisenhower presidency it was apparent the White House could not set a lasting policy but if any public statement was to be made it was to be coordinated with Herter. Nevertheless, for Eisenhower, the key objective was for the government of Israeli to accept IAEA inspections on the plant so that they could demonstrate its peaceful purposes.

During the meeting Herter had said that a U.S. statement should “remove [us] from suspicion” because Washington was not complicit in Dimona. Thus, the public statement made later that day noted the press reports about the reactor and “welcomed” Israel’s assurance that the government had “no intention of producing nuclear weapons.” The U.S. had provided no assistance because that would be contrary to U.S. nonproliferation policy and the Atomic Energy Act. The U.S. was concerned about the Israeli project and had asked Ambassador Harman for information. “A response has not been received.”

Document 14: State Department telegram 3311 to U.S. Embassy London, 20 December 1960, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

On 20 December Herter met with Ambassador Harman for the second time to discuss Dimona. At this meeting Harman answered Herter’s earlier questions by providing a narrative that became Israel’s basic cover story: Yes, Israel was building an additional reactor in the Negev with 24 megawatt capacity, meaning, but it had “no industrial importance.” The purpose of the Dimona reactor was “the development of scientific knowledge for eventual industrial, agricultural, medical and other scientific purposes, as an interim step toward enabling Israel to build its own power reactors.” The project “would take some 3 to 4 years to complete and it would have no relationship to a weapons capacity.” Several times during the meeting Herter raised questions about safeguards and the plutonium that would be produced in the reactor; Harman could not answer them, but asserted that upon completion the facility would be open to students from “friendly counties” and that it was for peaceful purposes.

Document 15: “We have been misbehaving a little”

U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv telegram 574 to State Department, 23 December 1960, Secret

Source: National Archives, Record Group 469, U.S. Operations Mission to Israel, Executive Office Classified Central Files 1952-1961, box 10, Atomic Matters 1960

Far more candid than Harman was Addy Cohen, the Finance Ministry’s director of economic assistance; a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, he served as a liaison to the U.S. embassy. Classified in the State Department’s “Roger Channel” for sensitive intelligence, this surprising telegram memorialized several conversations on 21 and 22 December between Cohen and U.S. diplomats and foreign aid officials: Deputy Chief of Mission Murat Williams, Director of the U.S. Operations Mission [USOM][18] C. Reed Liggit, and Agricultural Attaché Grover Chappell. In these discussions Cohen gave the impression that the reactor would “eventually be used for weapons purposes,” which could offer a “‘deterrent’ to Arab action against Israel.” He volunteered that he had concealed the nature of the “top secret” project during several helicopter fly-bys with U.S. officials; during one of them’, in February 1960, he had characterized the reactor construction site as a “textile plant” because as he put it “that was our story at the time.” Admitting that the government of Israel had “been misbehaving a little,” Cohen thought that displeasure over the reactor might be the reason why Washington had delayed the signing of the PL 480 agreement (on food aid to Israel). Finally, commenting on a recent Jerusalem Post article claiming that 250 million Israeli pounds had been spent on the project, Cohen said that Israel had not “spent that much yet.”

Also according to this message, an unidentified official close to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had told the Canadian ambassador that the secrecy was unjustifiable and that it was “a stupid mistake on the part of Israel.” As to why the subject had come up at this time, December 1960, the same source speculated that the CIA had been “caught off guard” in 1956 when Israel invaded the Sinai desert and this time “did not want to be caught napping.”

Document 16: “Why in [the United] States is Everything Being Told [to] Everybody?”

U.S. Embassy Israel Telegram 577 to State Department, 24 December 1960, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

On 22 December Prime Minister Ben-Gurion gave a statement in the Knesset claiming the reactor was for peaceful purposes, a statement which the State Department welcomed.[19] Two days later, Ambassador Ogden Reid finally had a long discussion about Dimona with Ben-Gurion. The latter was plainly irritated about the questions and the press reports: “Why in [the] States is everything being told everybody?” He justified the secrecy because of the Arab boycott; the participating companies did not want their role disclosed so Israel had to protect their interests. Yet his account of the Dimona project consisted of the same story that he had told the Knesset (and the same story that he would use for his meeting with President Kennedy in late May 1961): the project was for the economic development of Israel and of the Negev in particular; electric power was a badly needed resource.[20]Yet when Reid asked if the reactor would be producing power, Ben-Gurion said no; it was for research and training.

On safeguards for plutonium, Ben-Gurion said that Israel was “three or four years” away from facing that problem. But, he declared: “When we get to that point we won’t be behind any power in the world in respect to safeguards.” A few weeks later, Ben-Gurion would take a different position (See Document 23).

Referring to Egyptian President Nasser’s declaration that an Israeli nuclear weapons program would mean war, Reid asked what Israel could do to alleviate those concerns; Ben-Gurion replied that the State Department’s statement welcoming the Israeli declarations, had been helpful.

Document 17: The Need for a Visit by “Internationally Known Scientists”

U.S. Embassy Israel Telegram 590 to State Department, 28 December 1960, Secret, excised copy

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

Mulling over Ben-Gurion’s evasions, Ambassador Reid suggested to the Department some ideas for bringing up the question of safeguards and inspection with Foreign Minister Golda Meir. One was to suggest a visit of “IAEA scientific designee or internationally known scientists”; another, a more low key approach, was to use an AEC inspection visit to the smaller American reactor in Nachal Rubin [Soreq] to ask Israel to visit the new [Dimona] reactor. While doubting whether Ben-Gurion would favor any such proposals, Reid thought State should press Israel to request IAEA safeguards as a step toward “tranquility and peace” in the region. Getting Ben-Gurion to go along would probably require concerted action by the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom. The note included also the embassy’s own estimate of the cost of the Dimona project, which by then was the lowest of all the U.S. estimates: 17.8 million dollars in foreign exchange and some 29.2 million in local currency (Israeli pounds) costs. In comments, Reid noted that Israel would need to be assured that the names of foreign firms involved in the project would be protected from inspectors. Moreover, until the Department agreed, Reid suggested deferring a proposal by Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke for a visit to Dimona by a Navy nuclear expert, Commander Ragnwald Muller, who was with the Office of Naval Intelligence in Frankfurt, West Germany.

Document 18: Israel had “By No Means Come Clean with Us”

Memorandum from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant to

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones, 28 December 1960, Secret

Under Secretary of State Merchant briefed Assistant Secretary Lewis Jones about an Operations Coordinating Board [OCB] discussion of the Israel nuclear problem where Allen Dulles had grumbled that Israel had “by no means come clean with us.” The participants were also annoyed that the Development Loan Fund (DLF) had authorized a loan to Israel despite the OCB’s agreement that such action should be delayed. Eisenhower’s national security assistant, Gordon Gray, emphasized that the president wanted further efforts to secure Israel’s agreement to IAEA inspections. Such efforts, however, were not to reach the press and any initiative should be “conducted quietly through diplomatic channels.”

Document 19: “It Was Stupid of Them”

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant, “Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities,” 30 December 1960, Secret, with attachments [Transcript of letter from Jones to Reid, 28 December 1960 attached]

Responding to Merchant’s request for an update on recent developments, Lewis Jones sent him documents relating to six different actions that various offices within the State Department were taking relating to the Israeli reactor, including his recent letter to Ambassador Reid and a message to the Embassy in Norway. In the letter, Jones let his hair down, writing about the “intemperate reaction” in Washington, which his bureau was trying to “calm down,” the “unnecessary Israeli caper;” the widespread impression that “the Israelis have inexcusably duped us;” the need for Israel to dispel doubts by letting U.S. scientists visit the site; and the possibility that the situation will “worsen” as suspicion grows. A briefing that Jones gave to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early January conveyed a similar sense of being duped and the anger that influential members of the Senate felt about Israel’s secretiveness and evasive responses.

In the telegram to Oslo, the State Department asked the U.S. Embassy to seek further information on the Norwegian sale of heavy water to Israel and to ask that the government “exercise fully its safeguard rights” under the agreement. With the Norwegian heavy water sale being one of the pieces of the intelligence puzzle that Washington had missed, the administration was now investigating why, and what it had missed earlier.

Jones also enclosed a draft message to Ambassador Reid that had been prepared (not attached to this memo, but see Document 21) asking for replies to “unanswered questions” and to let Merchant know that other bureaus were preparing messages to get more information from the French and to advance the possibility of IAEA safeguards. Jones agreed with Merchant that what was most important was avoiding further publicity and the necessity for quiet diplomacy.

Document 20: “The Possibility of [It] Embarrassing the Government”

Letter from Richard Kerry, U.S. Embassy Oslo, to William Burdette, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, 30 December 1960, with Israeli-Norwegian agreement attached, with routine slip dated 6 January 1961

Source: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, 1948-1961, box 512, Z1.69 Country File Norway a. Norway-Israel Agreement 1961

In response to the State Department request, embassy officers in Oslo obtained more information on the Israel-Norway heavy water deal and the terms of the sale agreement, which included a “peaceful uses” stipulation. On 30 December, political officer Richard Kerry obtained a copy of the agreement which he believed could be embarrassing to the Norwegian government in light of its efforts to play the role of “honest broker” in international conflicts, including the Middle East. The agreement included an Israeli commitment that the use of the heavy water was for peaceful purposes, including an inspection clause.

According to Kerry’s letter, a major problem was that the heavy water sale had been initially treated as a commercial sale by the Norwegian firm NORATOM without appropriate vetting by political experts at the Foreign Ministry (like an earlier controversial sale of weapons to the Batista dictatorship in Cuba). Kerry asked the State Department to keep the transaction a secret and so it stayed until the late 1970s when the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research disclosed it. Kerry did not mention the British role in the affair and may, in fact, have forgotten it.[21]

Document 21: “Clearly Apparent Lack of Candor”

State Department telegram 502 to U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, 31 December 1960, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

This telegram, originally published in the FRUS in an excised version, showed how unhappy the State Department was with Ben-Gurion’s explanation of the Dimona reactor: his answers “appear evasive.” The State Department saw the “clearly apparent lack of candor [as] difficult to reconcile with [the] confidence which had traditionally characterized U.S.-Israel relations.” To restore confidence, Israel needed to answer questions about its plans to dispose of plutonium, the application of safeguards to plutonium produced, visits by IAEA or other scientists to the reactor site, and whether there were plans to build a third reactor. Moreover, “can Israel state unequivocally that it has no plans for producing nuclear weapons?”

Document 22: “Until All Reactors Are Treated as Equals”

Embassy Tel Aviv telegram 625, 4 January 1961, as summarized in a “Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy and Related Events,” enclosed with a “Memorandum from Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary, Department of State, for McGeorge Bundy, The White House, “Israel’s Assurances Concerning Use of Atomic Energy,” 18 March 1964, Secret, published as document number 9 in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 432

In early January, Ambassador Reid had a meeting with Ben-Gurion, who provided answers to the State Department’s questions. The reporting telegram remains classified at the National Archives but a summary is available. The essence of the matter, according to Ben-Gurion, was that: 1) Israel “has no plans for producing nuclear weapons,” 2) Israel had no plutonium but “as far as we know” returning the plutonium produced by the reactor was a “condition” imposed by the country (France) that sold the uranium, 3) it would not accept IAEA inspection, especially if Russians were involved, or international safeguards “until all reactors are treated as equals,” 3) visits by representatives of “friendly powers” were possible, and 4) Israel had absolutely no plans for a third reactor. How State Department officials interpreted these statements remains unknown, but some may have seen the statement about nuclear weapons as equivocal and evasive.[22]

Document 23: “Damaging Air of Secrecy or Suspicions”

State Department telegram 2821 to U.S. Embassy Paris, 6 January 1961, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

Believing that neither France nor Israel had been forthright and that the lack of candor had damaging implications for Middle East stability, Herter asked U.S. Ambassador Amory Houghton to meet with Couve de Murville and discuss his earlier statement about the French-Israeli nuclear project. If the Dimona project is a “large scale production reactor,” the French need to be “unequivocally clear that [their] assistance is directed solely to peaceful uses.” The reply to this telegram is not yet available, but the substance can be found in Document 26.

Documents 24A-B: Molotov: “I Stayed Awake All Night and Worried”

A: U.S. Mission to International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna) telegram 1087 to State Department, 11 January 1961, Secret

B: State Department telegram 1194 to U.S. Mission to International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna), 13 January 1961, Secret

Source for both: RG 59, Central Decimal Files 1960-1963, 398.1901-IAEA/1-1161

The U.S. Mission to the IAEA which had been in the forefront of U.S. efforts to develop an effective safeguards policy, asked for policy guidance if the Dimona issue came up for debate at the upcoming meeting of the Board of Governors. Ben-Gurion’s declaration to the Knesset that the reactor was for peaceful purposes was “hardly adequate” because the Mission had been at loggerheads with the Soviets and the Indians who had argued that assurances were the only safeguards that were needed. Recognizing that the Israeli situation would be used to support arguments for strong safeguards, Vayecheslav Molotov, one of the senior Soviet representatives to the Agency (and once Stalin’s right hand man) sarcastically commented that he had “stayed awake all night and worried” when he read about the Israel reactor program.

Following the approach recommended by Lewis Jones and others, the State Department advised the IAEA Mission of the importance of promoting a “period of calm.” In discussions in Vienna, the Mission should “avoid impugning” Israeli statements about peaceful purposes but also avoid a “whitewash” of the Israeli position. It was in the U.S. “interest” to send scientists to visit the reactor site and to get “first-hand information” but the Department noted that the Israelis have “reacted strongly” against any proposal for inspection and are not likely to change in the “immediate future.”

Document 25: “Some Israel[i] Evasions”

Murat W. Williams to William L. Hamilton, “A Catalog of Replies Regarding the Reactor,” 16 January 1961, Secret, with transcript attached

Source: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, 1948-1961, box 501, Z1.50 Country File Israel f. Reactor 1961, Part 1 of 2

On his way to an ambassadorship in El Salvador, Murat W. Williams, who had just left his post as deputy chief of mission at the Embassy in Tel Aviv, provided background on the various Israeli cover stories for the Dimona project. Apparently the most truthful response came from Minister of Development director general Eliezer Preminger who told Jack [John James] Haggerty, then the USOM director, that the site was a “military installation” and that he should ask the military attaché to look into it. Williams recounted the dissembling responses from Addy Cohen and other Israeli Foreign Liaison Officers [FLO] who, as noted elsewhere in this posting, had told Ambassador Reid and others that the construction site was for a textile factory, metallurgical research, meteorological installation, and part of a research program at a “new university.”

Document 26: “Israel Has No Plans for the Production of Atomic Weapons”

Letter, William B. McComber, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, to James T. Ramey, Executive Director, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 19 January 1961, Secret

Source: FOIA release

As the Eisenhower administration was winding down, the State Department submitted this comprehensive report (also published in the FRUS) to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a summary of all the information that the State Department had received officially from the Israeli and French governments in response to questions about the Dimona reactor. One must assume this body of information was used to brief the incoming Kennedy administration on what the Israelis and French had said on the record. Some of the answers may have been provided in response to the State Department telegram sent on 31 December (Document 21 above), for example, the statement that all plutonium to be produced in Dimona would be returned to France, and the ambiguous assurance that “Israel has no plans for the production of atomic weapons.” As for the French, they asserted that plutonium produced in the reactor would be returned to France, that France and Israel had agreed that the reactor was for “exclusively peaceful use,” and that French inspectors would be visiting the reactor. Oddly, what is missing is a claim, positive or negative, whether the complex actually included a chemical separation plant that could produce plutonium. Also, the financial estimate was a little different from that cited before (Document 13A).

Documents 27A-B: The Post-Mortem

A: U.S. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability,” 31 January 1961, Draft, Secret

B: Memorandum, Phillip Farley to Hugh Cumming, Director of Intelligence and Research, “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60,” 28 January 1961

Source: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, 1948-1961, box 501, Z1.50 Country File Israel f. Reactor 1961, Part 1 of 2

This “post-mortem” study on SNIE 100-8-60 is one of the most intriguing documents in this collection. Its aim was to explain why the US intelligence community had failed to detect in real time the Israeli nuclear project, and indeed how late it was in making that determination. The chronology, on pages 8 through 17, provides an account of what was known, and when, about the Israeli nuclear program, concluding that Washington might have seen through Israeli “secrecy or deception” and better understood Israeli intentions at least a year earlier if the “atomic energy intelligence community had properly interpreted” the available information. In essence, the overall conclusion was that the root cause of the delay was not so much the absence of information as that some important reports and items of information had been lost in the shuffle and the dots not properly connected.

As the classification of this document is only “secret,” and the document is relatively brief and deliberately vague about the intelligence means and sources employed in the final determination (e.g. it does not refer explicitly to the U-2 flights), it is possible that the intelligence community had more sensitive information that it excluded from this version of the post-mortem or that a more thorough report on the subject existed with higher classification.

[Note: Several of the documents reproduced above were first published 1998 in “Israel and the Bomb” edited by Avner Cohen.]

Thanks to Ori Rabinowitz (Tel Aviv University), Sharik Bashir (University of Michigan) and Alexandra Hale (George Washington University) for their assistance with this project.

NOTES

[1] Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: Memoirs, Edited by David Landau (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), 133-35.

[2] Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 44-47, 50-52, 65, 81-82.

[3] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 49-55, 57-60.

[4] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 32-34, 60-62, 83, 87.

[5] Note by Avner Cohen: During interviews I conducted in the 1990s for Israel and the Bomb I heard from different people more conspiratorial explanations for the U.S. intelligence failure on Dimona. Some interviewees claimed that certain people in the U.S. intelligence community were sympathetic to the Israelis and deliberately concealed or bypassed certain information instead of passing it along. For example, the late John Hadden, the CIA station chief in Tel Aviv from 1964-68, held that view strongly. He asked me to treat his suspicions with discretion so I did not publicize them when he was alive. According to Seymour Hersh’s The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 1991), the AEC chairman, Lewis Strauss, “knew as much about Dimona as anybody in the intelligence community by the time he left the AEC in 1958. There is no evidence, however, that he raised questions about the Israeli weapons program while in government. He most certainly did not tell McCone about it.” (83, 90) There are others who also believed that senior officials of the Eisenhower administration, including President Eisenhower himself , had known about Dimona early on but decided not to interfere. According to Dino A. Brugioni, who served at the CIA Photographic Intelligence Center, when U-2 photos of the excavations of the Beersheba site were taken sometimes in early-mid 1958 the activity was determined to be a “probable” nuclear-related site. The photos were shown by the Center director, Arthur C. Lundah, to both President Eisenhower and AEC chair Lewis Strauss, but neither reacted. “Lundhal and Brugioni were left with the impression that Eisenhower wanted Israel to acquire nuclear weapons” (Israel and the Bomb, 83). The same anecdote appears in much greater detail in Hersh’s The Samson Option (50-59).

[6] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 90-95; Avner Cohen, The Worst-Kept Bargain (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 60-62.

[7] Choosing this strategy created long-terms risks and problems as well. In essence, it made it much more difficult for Israel to extract any security benefits from, or for, the nuclear project, even if Israel was willing at some point in the future to trade the project’s products for other security benefits. For a more detailed analysis of this evasive disclosure strategy, see Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret, 61-62.

[8] When we refer to intelligence community, we mean not only the CIA, but also intelligence offices of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of State, and the armed services, all of which played a role in colleting and/or analyzing information about Dimona.

[9] On the French-Israeli 1954 bilateral agreement of cooperation in the field of atomic energy, based on the Israeli patents, see Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 32-34.

[10] Indeed, Bergmann and his IAEC were hardly consulted, let alone involved in the negotiations that Shimon Peres had conducted with the French. As became known years later, Peres, who was Dimona’s prime visionary and promoter, decided to compartmentalize and bypass Bergmann and the IAEC almost entirely about Dimona. In February 1958 all seven IAEC members except Bergmann resigned; the details of this incident remain obscure but it may have been a protest against the exclusion of the IAEC. There was even a time when Bergmann was not allowed to visit the Dimona site. See Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 14-17, 67-71.

[11] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 16-17.

[12] For background, see Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 60-62; Kristine Werdelin Bergan, editor, “The Norway-United Kingdom-Israel Heavy Water Deal, 1957-1959: New Translations from Norwegian Archives,” forthcoming electronic dossier for the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.

[13] See “UK Helped Israel Get Nuclear Bomb,” BBC News, 4 August 2005; David Leigh, “US kept in the dark as secret nuclear deal was struck,” The Guardian, 3 August 2005; “Britain’s dirty secret: Exclusive – Secret papers show how Britain helped Israel make the A-bomb in the 1960s, ” The New Statesman, 13 March 2006. See also the Foreign Office Statement, 9 March 2006, BBC Two.

[14] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 62, 83.

[15] On the U-2 issue, Seymour Hersh provides a fascinating and persuasive account, but the recollections of key participants need to be supported by government records. See The Samson Option, at pages 50-58.

[16] Warren Kornberg, “Israel Reactor ‘Not Revealed to Us,’ Says McCone, Avoiding Word ‘Secret,'” The Washington Post, 19 December 1960. See also, Hersh, The Samson Option, 77.

[17] Ibid., 71-72, for McCone’s role in leaking to the New York Times.

[18] The U.S. Operations Mission managed U.S. foreign aid programs.

[19] “U.S. Welcomes Israel Promises on Reactor,” The Washington Post, 23 December 1960.

[20] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 92-93.

[21] In 1986, Norway asked Israel whether the heavy water had been used in ways that were consistent with the agreement’s “peaceful uses” conditions. See Charles R. Babcock, “Norway Eyes Israel’s Use of Nuclear Ingredient,”Washington Post, 10 November 1986.

[22] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 93-95.

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Revealed – The Gorbachev File by the NSA – TOP SECRET

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(L to R) Vice President George H. W. Bush, President Ronald Reagan and President Mikhail Gorbachev during the Governor’s Island summit, December 1988. (Credit: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

Marking the 85^thbirthday of former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org) today posted a series of previously classified British and American documents containing Western assessments of Gorbachev starting before he took office in March 1985, and continuing through the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The documents show that conservative British politicians were ahead of the curve predicting great things for rising Soviet star Gorbachev in 1984 and 1985, but the CIA soon caught on, describing the new Soviet leader only three months into his tenure as “the new broom,” while Ronald Reagan greeted Gorbachev’s ascension with an immediate invitation for a summit. The documents posted today include positive early assessments by Margaret Thatcher and MP John Browne, CIA intelligence reports that bookend Gorbachev’s tenure from 1985 to 1991, the first letters exchanged by Reagan and Gorbachev, the American versions of key conversations with Gorbachev at the Geneva, Reykjavik and Malta summits, German chancellor Helmut Kohl’s credit to Gorbachev in 1989 for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, and the U.S. transcript of the G-7 summit in 1990 that turned down Gorbachev’s request for financial aid.

The Archive gathered the Gorbachev documentation for two books, the Link-Kuehl-Award-winning “Masterpieces of History”: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe 1989 (Central European University Press, 2010), and the forthcoming Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan and Bush (CEU Press, 2016). The sources include the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, and Freedom of Information and Mandatory Declassification Review requests to the CIA and the State Department.

Leading today’s Gorbachev briefing book is British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s “discovery” of Gorbachev in December 1984 during his trip to Britain as head of a Soviet parliamentary delegation. In contrast to his elderly and infirm predecessors who slowly read dry notes prepared for them, Gorbachev launched into animated free discussion and left an indelible impression on Lady Thatcher. The Prime Minister, charmed by the Soviet leader, quickly shared her impressions with her closest ally and friend, Ronald Reagan. She commented famously, “I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together.”

Alexander Yakovlev, Mikhail Gorbachev, Eduard Shevardnadze walking in the Kremlin, 1989 (personal archive of Anatoly Chernyaev)

Soon after Gorbachev became the Soviet General Secretary, a Conservative member of the British parliament, John Browne, who observed Gorbachev during his visit to Britain and then followed information on Gorbachev’s every early step, compared him to “Kennedy in the Kremlin” in terms of his charisma. By June 1985, the CIA told senior U.S. officials in a classified assessment that Gorbachev was “the new broom” that was attempting to clean up the years of debris that accumulated in the Soviet Union during the era of stagnation.

But Reagan had to see for himself. For four years before Gorbachev, as the American president complained in his diary, he had been trying to meet with a Soviet leader face to face, but “they keep dying on me.” In his first letter to Gorbachev, which Vice President George H.W. Bush carried to Moscow for the funeral of Gorbachev’s predecessor, Reagan invited Gorbachev to meet. Gorbachev and Reagan became pen-pals who wrote long letters – sometimes personally dictated, even handwritten – explaining their positions on arms control, strategic defenses, and the need for nuclear abolition.

Their first meeting took place in Geneva in November 1985, where in an informal atmosphere of “fireside chats” they began realizing that the other was not a warmonger but a human being with a very similar dream—to rid the world of nuclear weapons. That dream came very close to a breakthrough during Gorbachev and Reagan’s summit in Reykjavik; but Reagan’s stubborn insistence on SDI and Gorbachev’s stubborn unwillingness to take Reagan at his word on technology sharing prevented them from reaching their common goal.

Through a series of unprecedented superpower summits, Gorbachev made Reagan and Bush understand that the Soviet leader was serious about transforming his country not to threaten others, but to help its own citizens live fuller and happier lives, and to be fully integrated into the “family of nations.” Gorbachev also learned from his foreign counterparts, establishing a kind of peer group with France’s Mitterrand, Germany’s Kohl, Britain’s Thatcher, and Spain’s Gonzalez, which developed his reformist positions further and further. By the time George H.W. Bush as president finally met Gorbachev in Malta, the Soviet Union was having free elections, freedom of speech was blossoming, velvet revolutions had brought reformers to power in Eastern Europe, and the Berlin Wall had fallen to cheers of citizens but severe anxieties in other world capitals.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wrote in his letter to Bush at the end of November 1989: “Regarding the reform process in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the CSSR [Czechoslovakia], and not least the GDR [East Germany], we have General Secretary Gorbachev’s policies to thank. His perestroika has let loose, made easier, or accelerated these reforms. He pushed governments unwilling to make reforms toward openness and toward acceptance of the people’s wishes; and he accepted developments that in some instances far surpassed the Soviet Union’s own standards.”

In 1989, the dream of what Gorbachev called “the common European home” was in the air and Gorbachev was the most popular politician in the world. When he was faced with discontent and opposition in his country, he refused to use force, like his Chinese neighbors did at Tiananmen Square. And yet, the West consistently applied harsher standards to Gorbachev’s Soviet Union than to China, resulting in feet dragging on financial aid, credits, and trade. As Francois Mitterrand pointed out during the G-7 summit in Houston in 1990: “the argument put forth for helping China is just the reverse when we are dealing with the USSR. We are too timid […] regarding aid to the USSR. […].”

What Gorbachev started in March 1985 made his country and the world better. In cooperation with Reagan and Bush, he ended the Cold War, pulled Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, helped resolve local conflicts around the globe, and gave Russia the hope and the opportunity to develop as a normal democratic country. As with many great reformers, he did not achieve everything he was striving for – he certainly never intended for the Soviet Union to collapse – but his glasnost, his non-violence, and his “new thinking” for an interdependent world created a legacy that few statesmen or women can match. Happy birthday, Mikhail Sergeyevich!

READ THE DOCUMENTS

Document-01

Memorandum of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher. December 16, 1984, Chequers.

1984-12-16

This face-to-face encounter between British Prime Minister and the leader of a Soviet parliamentary delegation produced a conversation that both Thatcher and Gorbachev would refer to many times in the future. Gorbachev engaged Thatcher on all the issues that she raised, did not duck hard questions, but did not appear combative. He spoke about the low point then evident in East-West relations and the need to stop the arms race before it was too late. He especially expressed himself strongly against the Strategic Defense Initiative promoted by the Reagan administration. Soon after this conversation Thatcher flew to Washington to share her enthusiastic assessment with Gorbachev with Reagan and encourage him to engage the Soviet leader in trying to lower the East-West tensions. She told her friend and ally what she had told the BBC, “I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together” – and described him to Reagan as an “unusual Russian…. [m]uch less constrained, more charming,” and not defensive in the usual Soviet way about human rights.

Document-02

Letter from Reagan to Gorbachev. March 11, 1985

1985-03-11

Vice President George H.W. Bush hand delivered this first letter from President Reagan to the new leader of the Soviet Union, after the state funeral for Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985 (“you die, I fly” as Bush memorably remarked about his job as the ceremonial U.S. mourner for world leaders). The letter contains two especially noteworthy passages, one inviting Mikhail Gorbachev to come to Washington for a summit, and the second expressing Reagan’s hope that arms control negotiations “provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.” Reagan is reaching for a pen-pal, just as he did as early as 1981, when he hand-wrote a heartfelt letter during his recovery from an assassination attempt, to then-General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev suggesting face-to-face meetings and referring to the existential danger of nuclear weapons – only to get a formalistic reply. Subsequent letters between Reagan and the whole series of Soviet leaders (“they keep dying on me,” Reagan complained) contain extensive language on many of the themes – such as the ultimate threat of nuclear annihilation – that would come up over and over again when Reagan finally found a partner on the Soviet side in Gorbachev. Even Chernenko had received a hand-written add-on by Reagan appreciating Soviet losses in World War II and crediting Moscow with a consequent aversion to war.

Document-03

Gorbachev Letter to Reagan, March 24, 1985

1985-03-24

This lengthy first letter from the new Soviet General Secretary to the U.S. President displays Gorbachev’s characteristic verbal style with an emphasis on persuasion. The Soviet leader eagerly takes on the new mode of communication proposed by Reagan in his March 11 letter, and plunges into a voluminous and wide-ranging correspondence between the two leaders – often quite formal and stiff, occasionally very personal and expressive, and always designed for effect, such as when Reagan would laboriously copy out by hand his official texts. Here Gorbachev emphasizes the need to improve relations between the two countries on the basis of peaceful competition and respect for each other’s economic and social choices. He notes the responsibility of the two superpowers for world peace, and their common interest “not to let things come to the outbreak of nuclear war, which would inevitably have catastrophic consequences for both sides.” Underscoring the importance of building trust, the Soviet leader accepts Reagan’s invitation in the March 11 letter to visit at the highest level and proposes that such a visit should “not necessarily be concluded by signing some major documents.” Rather, “it should be a meeting to search for mutual understanding.”

Document-04

Reagan Letter to Gorbachev. April 30, 1985

1985-04-30

Perhaps as a reflection of the internal debates in Washington (and even in Reagan’s own head), it would take more than a month for the administration to produce a detailed response to Gorbachev’s March 24 letter. The first two pages rehash the issues around the tragic killing of American Major Arthur Nicholson by a Soviet guard, before moving to the sore subject of Afghanistan. Reagan vows, “I am prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace, if you desire”; at the same time, U.S. and Saudi aid to the mujahedin fighting the Soviets was rapidly expanding. Reagan objects to Gorbachev’s unilateral April 7 announcement of a moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, since the Soviet deployment was largely complete while NATO’s was still underway. The heart of the letter addresses Gorbachev’s objections to SDI, and Reagan mentions that he was struck by Gorbachev’s characterization of SDI as having “an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union. I can assure you that you are profoundly mistaken on this point.” Interestingly, the Reagan letter tries to reassure Gorbachev by citing the necessity of “some years of further research” and “further years” before deployment (Reagan could not have suspected decades rather than years). This back-and-forth on SDI would be a constant in the two leaders’ correspondence and conversations at the summits to come, but the consistency of Reagan’s position on this (in contrast to that of Pentagon advocates of “space dominance”), not only to Gorbachev but to Thatcher and to his own staff, suggests some room for Gorbachev to take up the President on his assurances – which never happened.

Document-05

“Mr. Gorbachev-a Kennedy in the Kremlin?” By John Browne (Member of Parliament from Winchester, England). Impressions of the Man, His Style and his Likely Impact Upon East West Relations. May 20, 1985.

1985-05-20

British MP John Browne, member of the Conservative party, was part of the Receiving Committee for Gorbachev’s visit to London in December 1984 and spend considerable time with him during his trips (including to the Lenin museum). This long essay, sent to President Reagan, and summarized for him by his National Security Adviser, describes Gorbachev as an unusual Soviet politician-“intelligent, alert and inquisitive.” Browne notes “that Gorbachev’s charisma was so striking that, if permitted by the Communist Party system, Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev could well become the Soviet equivalent of the Jack and Jacqueline Kennedy team.” On the basis of his observations in 1984 and after Gorbachev was elected General Secretary, Browne concludes that politicians of Western democracies are likely to face an increasingly sophisticated political challenge from Mr. Gorbachev both at home and abroad.

Document-06

Letter from Gorbachev to Reagan. June 10, 1985

1985-06-10

In this long and wide-ranging response to Reagan’s letter of April 30, the Soviet leader makes a real push for improvement of relations on numerous issues. The date June 10 is significant because on this day in Washington Reagan finally took the action (deactivating a Poseidon submarine) necessary to keep the U.S. in compliance with the unratified (but observed by both sides) SALT II treaty. Here Gorbachev raises the issue of equality and reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet relations, noting that it is the Soviet Union that is “surrounded by American military bases stuffed also by nuclear weapons, rather than the U.S. – by Soviet bases.” He suggests that all previous important treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union were possible on the assumption of parity, and that Reagan’s recent focus on SDI threatens to destabilize the strategic balance – yet again demonstrating Gorbachev’s deep apprehension about Reagan’s position on strategic defenses. The Soviet leader believes that the development of ABM systems would lead to a radical destabilization of the situation and the militarization of space. At the heart of the Soviet visceral rejection of SDI is the image of “attack space weapons capable of performing purely offensive missions.” Gorbachev proposes energizing negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe, chemical weapons, the nuclear test ban, and regional issues, especially Afghanistan. He calls for a moratorium on nuclear tests “as soon as possible” – the Soviets would end up doing this unilaterally, never understanding that the issue is a non-starter in Reagan’s eyes. Here, the Soviet leader also welcomes horizontal exchanges between government ministers and even members of legislatures. However, Gorbachev’s position on human rights remains quite rigid-“we do not intend and will not conduct any negotiations relating to human rights in the Soviet Union.” That would change.

Document-07

Dinner Hosted by the Gorbachevs in Geneva. November 19, 1985.

1985-11-19

In their first face-to-face meeting at Geneva, which both of them anticipated eagerly, Reagan and Gorbachev both spoke about the mistrust and suspicions of the past and of the need to begin a new stage in U.S.-Soviet relations. Gorbachev described his view of the international situation to Reagan, stressing the need to end the arms race. Reagan expressed his concern with Soviet activity in the third world–helping the socialist revolutions in the developing countries. They both spoke about their aversion to nuclear weapons. During this first dinner of the Geneva summit, Gorbachev used a quote from the Bible that there was a time to throw stones and a time to gather stones which have been cast in the past to indicate that now the President and he should move to resolve their practical disagreements in the last day of meetings remaining. In response, Reagan remarked that “if the people of the world were to find out that there was some alien life form that was going to attack the Earth approaching on Halley’s Comet, then that knowledge would unite all peoples of the world.” The aliens had landed, in Reagan’s view, in the form of nuclear weapons; and Gorbachev would remember this phrase, quoting it directly in his famous “new thinking” speech at the 27^th Party Congress in February 1986.

Document-08

Last Session of the Reykjavik Summit. October 12, 1986.

1986-10-12

The last session at Reykjavik is the one that inspires Gorbachev’s comment in his memoirs about “Shakespearean passions.” The transcript shows lots of confusion between just proposals on reducing ballistic missiles versus those reducing all nuclear weapons, but finally Reagan says, as he always wanted, nuclear abolition. “We can do that. Let’s eliminate them,” says Gorbachev, and Secretary of State George Shultz reinforces, “Let’s do it.” But then they circle back around to SDI and the ABM Treaty issue, and Gorbachev insists on the word “laboratory” as in testing confined there, and Reagan, already hostile to the ABM Treaty, keeps seeing that as giving up SDI. Gorbachev says he cannot go back to Moscow to say he let testing go on outside the lab, which could lead to a functioning system in the future. The transcript shows Reagan asking Gorbachev for agreement as a personal favor, and Gorbachev saying well if that was about agriculture, maybe, but this is fundamental national security. Finally at around 6:30 p.m. Reagan closes his briefing book and stands up. The American and the Russian transcripts differ on the last words, the Russian version has more detail [see the forthcoming book, Last Superpower Summits], but the sense is the same. Their faces reflect the disappointment, Gorbachev had helped Reagan to say nyet, but Gorbachev probably lost more from the failure.

Document-09

Letter to Reagan from Thatcher About Her Meetings with Gorbachev in Moscow. April 1, 1987

1987-04-01

Again, Margaret Thatcher informs her ally Reagan about her conversations with Gorbachev. The cover note from National Security Advisor Carlucci (prepared by NSC staffer Fritz Ermarth) states that “she has been greatly impressed by Gorbachev personally.” Thatcher describes Gorbachev as “fully in charge,” “determined to press ahead with his internal reform,” and “talk[ing] about his aims with almost messianic fervor.” She believes in the seriousness of his reformist thinking and wants to support him. However, they differ on one most crucial issue, which actually unites Gorbachev and Reagan-nuclear abolition. Thatcher writes, “[h]is aim is patently the denuclearization of Europe. I left him with no doubt that I would never accept that.”

Document-10

Letter to Bush from Chancellor Helmut Kohl. November 28, 1989.

1989-11-28

This remarkable letter arrives at the White House at the very moment when Kohl is presenting his “10 points” speech to the Bundestag about future German unification, much to the surprise of the White House, the Kremlin, and even Kohl’s own coalition partners in Germany (such as his foreign minister). Here, just weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the German leader encourages Bush to engage with Gorbachev across the board and to contribute to peaceful change in Europe. Kohl points that Gorbachev “wants to continue his policies resolutely, consistently and dynamically, but is meeting internal resistance and is dependent on external support.” He hopes Bush’s upcoming meeting with Gorbachev in Malta will “give strong stimulus to the arms control negotiations.” Kohl also reminds Bush that “regarding the reform process in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the CSSR [Czechoslovakia], and not least the GDR [East Germany], we have General Secretary Gorbachev’s policies to thank. His perestroika has let loose, made easier, or accelerated these reforms. He pushed governments unwilling to make reforms toward openness and toward acceptance of the people’s wishes; and he accepted developments that in some instances far surpassed the Soviet Union’s own standards.”

Document-11

Malta First Expanded Bilateral with George Bush. December 2, 1989.

1989-12-02

Being rocked by the waves on the Soviet ship Maxim Gorky, President Bush greets his Russian counterpart for the first time as President. A lot has changed in the world since they last saw each other on Governor’s Island in December 1988-elections had been held in the Soviet Union and in Poland, where a non-communist government came to power, and the Iron Curtain fell together with the Berlin Wall. After Bush’s initial presentation from notes, Gorbachev remarks almost bemusedly that now he sees the American administration has made up its mind (finally) what to do, and that includes “specific steps” or at least “plans for such steps” to support perestroika, not to doubt it. Gorbachev compliments Bush for not sharing the old Cold War thinking that “The only thing the U.S. needs to do is to keep its baskets ready to gather the fruit” from the changes in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Bush responds, “I have been called cautious or timid. I am cautious, but not timid. But I have conducted myself in ways not to complicate your life. That’s why I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall.” Gorbachev says, “Yes, we have seen that, and appreciate that.” The Soviet leader goes on to welcome Bush’s economic and trade points as a “signal of a new U.S. policy” that U.S. business was waiting for. Gorbachev responds positively to each of Bush’s overtures on arms control, chemical weapons, conventional forces, next summits and so forth, but pushes back on Bush’s Cuba and Central America obsessions.

Document-12

First Main Plenary of the G-7 Summit in Houston. July 10, 1990.

1990-07-10

The bulk of discussion at this first session of the summit of the industrialized nations is devoted to the issue of how the club of the rich countries should react to the events unfolding in the Soviet Union and how much aid and investment could be directed to the support of perestroika. The summit is taking place at the time when Gorbachev is engaged in an increasingly desperate search for scenarios for radical economic reform, and fast political democratization, but he needs external financial support and integration into global financial institutions in order to succeed – or even to survive, as the events of August 1991 would show. Just before this 1990 G-7, Gorbachev wrote in a letter to George Bush that he needs “long-term credit assistance, attraction of foreign capital, transfer of managerial experience and personnel training” to create a competitive economy. Yet, the U.S. president throws only a bone or two, like “step up the pace of our negotiations with the Soviets on the Tsarist and Kerensky debts [!] to the U.S. government” (instead of forgiving or at least restructuring the debt), and “expand our existing technical cooperation.” Bush concludes his speech by stating flatly “It is impossible for the U.S. to loan money to the USSR at this time. I know, however, that others won’t agree.” The leaders who do not agree are Helmut Kohl (in the middle of providing billions of deutschmarks to the USSR to lubricate German unification) and Francois Mitterrand. The latter decries the double standards being applied to the Soviet Union and China, even after the Tiananmen massacre. Mitterrand criticizes the proposed political declaration of the G-7 as “timid” and “hesitant,” imposing “harsh political conditions as a preliminary to extending aid.” He believes the EC countries are in favor of contributing aid to the USSR but that other members, like the U.S. and Japan, have effectively vetoed such assistance.

Document-13

CIA Memorandum, The Gorbachev Succession. April 1991.

1991-04-00

On April 10, 1991, the National Security Council staff asked the CIA for an analysis of the Gorbachev succession, who the main actors would be, and the likely scenarios. The assessment opens quite drastically: “The Gorbachev era is effectively over.” The scenarios offered have an eerie resemblance to the actual coup that would come in August 1991. This might be the most prescient of all the CIA analyses of the perestroika years. The report finds that Gorbachev is likely to be replaced either by the reformers or the hard-liners, with the latter being more likely. The authors point out that “there is no love between Gorbachev and his current allies and they could well move to try to dump him.” They then list possible conspirators for such a move– Vice President Yanaev, KGB Chief Kryuchkov, and Defense Minister Yazov, among others, all of whom whom participate in the August coup. The report predicts that the “traditionalists” are likely to find a “legal veneer” for removing Gorbachev: “most likely they would present Gorbachev with an ultimatum to comply or face arrest or death.” If he agreed, Yanaev would step in as president, the conspirators would declare a state of emergency and install “some kind of a National Salvation Committee.” However, the memo concludes that “time is working against the traditionalists.” This turned out to be both prescient and correct – the August coup followed the process outlined in this document and the plot foundered because the security forces themselves were fractured and the democratic movements were gaining strength. But indeed, the coup, the resurgence of Boris Yeltsin as leader of the Russian republic, and the secession of Russia from the Soviet Union during the fall of 1991 did mark the end of the Gorbachev era.

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Revealed – NSA Snowden Releases Tally Update – *6,697 Pages

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7 June 2016. Add 123 pages to The Intercept. Tally now *6,697 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally about ~11.5%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.04% of that released). ACLU lists 525 pages released by the press. However, if as The Washington Post reported, a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released. Note Greenwald claim on 13 September 2014 of having “hundreds of thousands” of documents.

16 May 2016. Add 252 pages to The Intercept.

16 May 2016. Kudos, at last: The Intercept is broadening access to the Snowden archive. Here’s why: by Glenn Greenwald

https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/the-intercept-is-broadening-access-to-the-snowden-archive-heres-why/

14 May 2016. Add 4 pages to The Intercept. Tally now *6,322 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY,said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally about ~10.6%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.04% of that released). ACLU lists 525 pages released by the press. However, if as The Washington Post reported, a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released. Note Greenwald claim on 13 September 2014 of having “hundreds of thousands” of documents. At Snowden current rate it will take 20-620 years to free all documents.

16 February 2016

[Image]

10 February 2016. Add 99 pages to Boing Boing (released 2 February 2016). Tally now *6,318 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally about ~10.6%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.04% of that released). ACLU lists 525 pages released by the press. However, if as The Washington Post reported, a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released. Note Greenwald claim on 13 September 2014 of having “hundreds of thousands” of documents. At Snowden current rate it will take 20-620 years to free all documents.

6 February 2016. (±) False Tallies-the Prisoner’s Dilemma? https://vimeo.com/145453201

2 February 2016. Add 14 pages to The Intercept.

23 December 2015. Add 7 pages to The Intercept

20 November 2015. Add 5 pages to Telesurtv and The Intercept.

28 September 2015. Add 21 pages to The Intercept.

24 September 2015. Add 283 pages to The Intercept.

15 August 2015. Add 74 pages to New York Times-Propublica.

11 August 2015. Add 29 pages to The Intercept.

3 August 2015. Add 10 pages to The Intercept.

16 July 2015. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

1 July 2015. Add 1,240 pages to The Intercept.

26 June 2015. Add 13 pages to The Intercept.

22 June 2015. Add 250 pages to The Intercept.

13 June 2015. Italian journalist provides correspondence with USG on Snowden documents:

2015-1504.pdf offsite Stefania Maurizi-NSA Snowden Correspondence      June 13, 2015
2015-1503.pdf offsite Stefania Maurizi-DoJ Snowden Correspondence      June 13, 2015
2015-1502.pdf offsite Stefania Maurizi-State Snowden Correspondence    June 13, 2015

12 June 2015. Paul and FVEYDOCS tweet:

https://fveydocs.org/IC off the Record:

https://nsa.gov1.info/dni/

12 June 2015. Aeris tweets:

https://nsa.imirhil.fr/OCRized/indexed/full-text-searchable PDF.

12 June 2015. Christopher Parsons writes:

Saw your tweet re: sources for Snowden docs. I’ve compiled all the relevant Canadian documents, along with summary information of the documents’contents along with indexing information, here:https://www.christopher-parsons.com/writings/cse-summaries/

In the coming months I’m hoping to have equivalent summaries for Australia and New Zealand (and will then be moving on to do similar summary work for US- and UK-based documents).

12 June 2015. Snowden documents compilations (plus this one):

https://search.edwardsnowden.com/
https://edwardsnowden.com/revelations/
http://cjfe.org/snowden
https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/tree/master/files/pdf
https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
http://freesnowden.is/category/revealed-documents/index.html
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources
https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

If all documents are free somewhere please send pointer to: cryptome[at]earthlink.net

12 June 2015. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.

4 June 2015. Add 91 pages to The New York Times.

28 May 2015. Add 23 pages to The Intercept.

22 May 2015. Add 26 pages to CBC (with The Intercept).

21 May 2015. Edward Snowden was quoted in Forbes on May 10, 2015:

http://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2015/05/10/what-edward-snowden-said-at-the-nordic-media-festival/2/

“What I did was that I worked in partnership with the journalists who received the material. As a condition of receiving the material they agreed, prior to publication, to run these stories by the government. Not for the government to censor them, but for the government to be able to look at these and go “look, this isn’t going to get anybody killed, this isn’t going to put a human agent behind enemy lines at risk” or something like that. “This isn’t going to make Al Qaeda be able to bomb buildings.” And I think the value of this model has been proven to be quite effective.”

This indicates all stories about document releases have been “run-by governments prior to publication.” Cryptome has filed an FOIA request to NSA for records of these “run-bys.”

https://cryptome.org/2015/05/snowden-media-usg-contacts-4.pdf

21 May 2015. Add 10 pages to The Intercept.

19 May 2015. Add 19 pages to The Intercept.

18 May 2015. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.

8 May 2015. Add 40 pages to The Intercept.

5 May 2015. Add 46 pages to The Intercept.

2 April 2015. Add 7 pages to The Intercept.

30 March 2015. Snowden documents archive by The Courage Foundation:

https://edwardsnowden.com/revelations/

24 March 2015. Add 152 pages to CBC News.

14 March 2015. Add 2 pages to New Zealand Herald.

10 March 2015. Add 12 pages to The Intercept. Add 8 pages to New Zealand Herald.

8 March 2015. Add 35 pages to New Zealand Star Times.

6 March 2015. Add 4 pages to New Zealand Herald.

5 March 2015. Snowden Archive, searchable: http://cjfe.org/snowden

5 March 2015. Add 6 pages to New Zealand Herald.

19 February 2015. Add 32 pages to The Intercept.

10 February 2015. Add 2 pages to The Intercept.

5 February 2015. Add 3 pages to The Intercept.

4 February 2015. Add 5 pages to The Intercept.

30 January 2015. Compilation of Snowden documents:

https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/tree/master/files/pdf

[Repost] 4 April 2014. ACLU offers NSA documents search: https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search

Also:

http://freesnowden.is/category/revealed-documents/index.html

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

If more lists please send: cryptome[at]earthlink.net

28 January 2015. Add 21 pages to CBC News.

26 January 2015. Add Citizenfour Snowden Documentary High-Definition, with innumerable images, by Cryptome.

25 January 2015. Add Citizenfour Snowden Documentary by Cryptome, with innumerable images, some 87 extracted by Paul Dietrich in following entry.

22 January 2015. Add 87 pages to Paul Dietrich (via Citizenfour).

17 January 2015. Add 199 pages to Der Spiegel.

28 December 2014. Add 666 pages to Der Spiegel.

22 December 2014. Add 1 page to New York Times.

13 December 2014. Add 67 pages to The Intercept.

4 December 2014. Add 63 pages to The Intercept.

25 November 2014. Add 72 pages to Süddeutsche Zeitung.

6 November 2014. At current rate of release it will take 31 to 908 years for full disclosure.

10 October 2014. Add 69 pages to The Intercept.

17 September 2014. Add 2 pages to The Intercept.

14 September 2014. Add 68 pages to Der Spiegel.

13 September 2014. In video Glenn Greenwald claims to have “hundreds of thousands” of documents (at 9:06 min)

http://www.3news.co.nz/tvshows/thenation/interview-glenn-greenwald-2014091311?ref=video

Audio excerpt: http://youtu.be/xnfIp38AAhM

5 September 2014. Add 32 pages to The Intercept.

31 August 2014. Add 34 pages to Der Spiegel.

25 August 2014. Add 55 pages to The Intercept.

16 August 2014. Add 26 pages to Heise.

12 August 2014. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.

5 August 2014. Add 12 pages to The Intercept.

4 August 2014. Add 23 pages to The Intercept.

25 July 2014. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.

14 July 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

14 July 2014. “I’m as mad as hell and I’m not going to take this anymore!”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_%28film%29

Cryptome has sent a demand for accounting and public release specifics to holders of the Snowden documents: New York Times, Washington Post, The Guardian, Barton Gellman, Laura Poitrias, Glenn Greenwald, ACLU, EFF and John and Jane Does, US Citizens:

https://cryptome.org/2014/07/snowden-documents-demand-14-0714.pdf

11 July 2014. See related essay, Open the Snowden Files, Krystian Woznicki, 11July 2014:

English: http://berlinergazette.de/wp-content/uploads/Open-the-Snowden-Files_KW_E.pdf
German: http://berlinergazette.de/open-the-snowden-files/

11 July 2014. @PaulMD notes this claim in the Washington Post, 11 July 2014:

We did not have an official NSA list of targets. We had to find them in the pile ourselves. Soltani, an independent researcher, did most of the heavy lifting on that. Because the information was not laid out in rows and columns, the way it might be in a spreadsheet, Soltani wrote computer code to extract what we were looking for from something like a quarter-million pages of unstructured text.

If a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released.

9 July 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

9 July 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post.

23 June 2014. Add 9 pages to Der Spiegel.

22 June 2014. Add 41 pages to Information-The Intercept.

Revised. This is included in entry above. 18 June 2014. Add 20 pages to The Intercept.

18 June 2014. Add 200 pages to Der Spiegel.

16 June 2014. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel.

1 June 2014. Add 4 pages to New York Times.

23 May 2014. Cryptome placed online No Place to Hide, 310 pages, to compensate for failure to release Snowden documents:

https://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-freed.htm

https://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z (27MB)

19 May 2014. The Intercept released 12 pages.

13 May 2014. Glenn Greenwald released 107 pages, some new, some previously published, some full pages, some page fragments.

http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf

5 May 2014. Related tally of redactions of Snowden releases:

https://cryptome.org/2014/05/snowden-redactions.htm

30 April 2014. Add 19 pages to The Intercept.

30 April 2014. Add 2 pages to Dagbladet belatedly.

5 April 2014. Add 21 pages to The Intercept.

4 April 2014. ACLU offers NSA documents search: https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search

Also:

http://freesnowden.is/category/revealed-documents/index.html

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

If more lists please send: cryptome[at]earthlink.net

2 April 2014.

29 March 2014. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.

22 March 2014. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel.

22 March 2014. Add 2 pages to New York Times.

21 March 2014. Add 7 pages to Le Monde.

20 March 2014. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.

18 March 2014. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

13 March 2014. Add 1 page to The Intercept.

12 March 2014. Add 35 pages to The Intercept.

12 March 2014. Add 62 pages to New York Times. Add 2 pages to NRC Handelsblad.

7 March 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

27 February 2014. Add 3 pages to Guardian.

25 February 2014. Add 11 pages to NBC News.

24 February 2014. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.

24 February 2014. Add *50 pages to The Intercept (7 pages are duplicates of GCHQ Psychology).

18 February 2014. Add *45 pages to The Intercept (37 pages are duplicates of release by NBC News).

Note: Between 10-17 February 2014, The Intercept disclosed fragments of Snowden pages and the New York Times referenced some but as far as known did not release them in full. If available please send link.

10 February 2014. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad (via Electrospaces.blogspot.com).

7 February 2014. Add 15 pages NBC News.

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages to CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous via New York Times.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

Related Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment:

https://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-count.htm

* 5 January 2014. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel (30 December 2013. No source given for NSA docs). Tally now *962 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.50% of that released).

4 January 2014. The source was not identified for *133 pages published by Der Spiegel and Jacob Appelbaum in late December 2013. They are included here but have not been confirmed as provided by Edward Snowden. Thanks to post by Techdirt.

Glenn Greenwald tweeted:

Glenn Greenwald @ggreenwald, 8:05 AM – 29 Dec 13@Cryptomeorg @ioerror I had no involvement in that Spiegel article, ask them – and they don’t say those are Snowden docs.

Matt Blaze tweeted, 11:24 AM – 2 Jan 14

matt blaze @mattblazeIf there are other sources besides Snowden, I hope journalists getting docs are careful to authenticate them (& disclose uncertainty).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

3 January 2014. See also EFF, ACLU and LeakSource accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages (8 duplicates) to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

23 December 2013

http://www.adn.com/2013/12/22/3243451/pincus-snowden-still-has-a-road.html

We’ve yet to see the full impact of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s unauthorized downloading of highly classified intelligence documents.

Among the roughly 1.7 million documents he walked away with — the vast majority of which have not been made public — are highly sensitive, specific intelligence reports, as well as current and historic requirements the White House has given the agency to guide its collection activities, according to a senior government official with knowledge of the situation.

The latter category involves about 2,000 unique taskings that can run to 20 pages each and give reasons for selective targeting to NSA collectors and analysts. These orders alone may run 31,500 pages.

13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT). Tally now 797 pages (~1.4%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.40% of that released). Australia press reports “up to 20,000 Aussie files.”

Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

Timeline of releases:

[See tabulation below for full timeline.]

5 October 2013

26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian

Out of reported 15,000 pages, The Guardian has published 192 pages in fourteen releases over four months, an average of 48 pages per month, or 1.28% of the total. At this rate it will take 26 years for full release.

Number	Date	Title	Pages

	The Guardian		276
	27 February 2014	GCHQ Optic Nerve	3
21	16 January 2014	SMS Text Messages Exploit	8
20	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	2
18	18 November 2013	DSD-3G	6
19	1 November 2013	PRISM, SSO SSO1 Slide SSO2 Slide	13*
18	4 October 2013	Types of IAT Tor	9
17	4 October 2013	Egotistical Giraffe	20*
16	4 October 2013	Tor Stinks	23
15	11 September 2013	NSA-Israel Spy	5
14	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	6*
13	5 September 2013	SIGINT Enabling	3*
12	5 September 2013	NSA classification guide	3
11	31 July 2013	XKeyscore	32
10	27 June 2013	DoJ Memo on NSA	16
9	27 June 2013	Stellar Wind	51
8	21 June 2013	FISA Certification	25
7	20 June 2013	Minimization Exhibit A	9
6	20 June 2013	Minimization Exhibit B	9
5	16 June 2013	GCHQ G-20 Spying	4
4	8 June 2013	Boundless Informant FAQ	3
3	8 June 2013	Boundless Informant Slides	4
2	7 June 2013	PPD-20	18
1	5 June 2013	Verizon	4

	Washington Post		297
	9 July 2014	NSA Emails	1
	18 March 2014	NSA SCALAWAG	2
	18 March 2014	NSA MYSTIC	2
	2 January 2014	Quantum Computer 2	10
	2 January 2014	Quantum Computer	3
	23 December 2013	NSA/CSS Mission	2
	11 December 2013	Excessive Collection	9
	11 December 2013	SCISSORS 2	7
	11 December 2013	SCISSORS 1	4
	11 December 2013	Yahoo-Google Exploit	6
	11 December 2013	Cable Spying Types	7
	11 December 2013	WINDSTOP	1
	11 December 2013	Co-Traveler	24
	11 December 2013	GSM Tracking	2
	11 December 2013	SIGINT Successes	4
	11 December 2013	GHOSTMACHINE	4
	5 December 2013	Target Location	1
	4 December 2013	FASCIA	2
	4 December 2013	CHALKFUN	1
	26 November 2013	Microsoft a Target?	4
	4 November 2013	WINDSTOP, SSO, Yahoo-Google	14
	30 October 2013	MUSCULAR-INCENSOR Google and Yahoo	4
	14 October 2013	SSO Overview	4
	14 October 2013	SSO Slides	7
	14 October 2013	SSO Content Slides	9
	4 October 2013	Tor	49
	4 October 2013	EgotisticalGiraffe	20*
	4 October 2013	GCHQ MULLENIZE	2
	4 October 2013	Roger Dingledine	2
	30 August 2013	Budget	17
	10 July 2013	PRISM Slide	1
	29 June 2013	PRISM	8
	20 June 2013	Warrantless Surveillance	25*
	7 June 2013	PPD-20	18*
	6 June 2013	PRISM	1

	Der Spiegel		* 1,278
	17 January 2015	NSA Prepares for Cyber Battle	199
	28 December 2014	NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor 197MB	666
	14 September 2014	GCHQ STELLAR	26
	14 September 2014	NSA Treasure Map	38
	14 September 2014	NSA Treasure Map New	4
	31 August 2014	NSA GCHQ Spy Turkey	34
	23 June 2014	NSA German SIGADs	9
	18 June 2014	NSA German Spying-2	200
	16 June 2014	NSA German Spying	4
	29 March 2014	NSA Spy Chiefs of State	1
	22 March 2014	NSA SHOTGIANT 2 NSA SHOTGIANT 1	21
	31 December 2013	QFIRE	* 16
	30 December 2013	TAO Introduction	* 16
	30 Deceber 2013	QUANTUM Tasking (8 duplicates of QUANTUMTHEORY)	28*
	30 December 2013	QUANTUMTHEORY	14
	29 December 2013	TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (images) TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (DE article)	4
	17 November 2013	ROYAL CONCIERGE (DE)ROYAL CONCIERGE (EN)	2
	29 October 2013	NSA-CIA SCS	3
	27 October 2013	NSA-CIA SCS	2
	20 October 2013	Mexico President	1
	20 September 2013	Belgacom	3
	16 September 2013	SWIFT	3
	9 September 2013	Smartphones	5
	1 September 2013	French Foreign Ministry	0
	31 August 2013	Al Jazeera	0

	O Globo Fantastico		~87
	7 October 2013	CSE Brazil Ministry	7
	8 September 2013	Petrobas	~60
	3 September 2013	Brazil and Mexico	20

	New York Times		216
	15 August 2015	NSA SSO Fairview Stormbrew Blarney (with Propublica)	74
	4 June 2015 4 June 2015	NSA Expands Phone Spying at Borders NSA Expands Phone Spying at Borders 2	90 1
	22 December 2014	NSA Tracks Zarrar Shah	1
	1 June 2014	NSA Identity Spying	4
	22 March 2014	NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT	2
	12 March 2014	NSA Stellarwind Classification NSA FISA FAA Classification AG Dissemination NSA Cryptanalyist FISA Database NSA Spying Timeline	37 18 2 4 1
	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	82*
	23 November 2013	SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016	5
	3 November 2013	SIGINT Mission 2013 SIGINT Mission 2017	22
	28 September 2013	Contact Chaining Social Networks	1
	28 September 2013	SYANPSE	1
	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	4*
	5 September 2013	SIGINT Enabling	3*


	ProPublica		163*
	15 August 2015	NSA SSO Fairview Stormbrew Blarney (with NY Times)	74*
	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	82*
	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	4*
	5 September 2103	SIGINT Enabling	3*

	Le Monde		20
	21 March 2014	CSE SNOWGLOBE	7
	25 October 2013	NSA Hosts FR Spies	4
	22 October 2013	Wanadoo-Alcatel	1
	22 October 2013	Close Access Sigads	2
	22 October 2013	Boundless Informant	2
	22 October 2013	PRISM	11

	Dagbladet		15
	April 2014 December 2013	Norway Assistance	2
	19 November 2013	BOUNDLESSINFORMANT	13

	NRC Handelsblad		7
	12 March 2014	NSA Aids Dutch Anti-Piracy	2
	8 February 2014	MIVD BoundlessInformant Cryptome mirror	1
	30 November 2013	Dutch SIGINT	3
	23 November 2013	SIGINT Cryptologic Platform	1

	Huffington Post		3
	27 November 2013	Muslim Porn Viewing	3

	CBC		214
	22 May 2015	US-UK-CA-AU-NZ Cellphone Spying	26*
	24 March 2015	CSEC Cyber Threats	152
	28 January 2015	CSE LEVITATION-FFU Project	21
	30 January 2014	CSEC IP Profiling	27
	10 December 2013	NSA-CSEC Partnership	1
	10 December 2013	G8-G20 Spying	4*
	2 December 2013	G8-G20 Spying	3
	29 November 2013	G8-G20 Spying	1

	The Globe and Mail		18
	30 November 2013	CSEC Brazil Spying	18*

	SVT (Swedish TV)		2
	5 December 2013	Sweden Spied Russia for NSA	2

	L’Espresso		3
	6 December 2013	NSA Spies Italy	3

	Trojkan (SVT)		29
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Relationship	1*
	11 December 2013	NSA 5 Eyes Partners	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Agenda	8
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA RU Baltic	1
	11 December 2013	NSA GCHQ Sweden FRA COMINT	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Plan	5
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Sources	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Tor et al	3
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Slide	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Quantum 1	1
	11 December 2013	GCHQ Sweden FRA Quantum	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Quantum Accomplishments	2
	9 December 2013	NSA and Sweden Pact	3*

	Jacob Appelbaum		* 71
	30 December 2013	NSA Catalog	* 50
	30 December 2013	NSA Catalog Video Clips	* 21

	Information.dk		63*
	19 June 2014	NSA Partners	41*
	14 January 2014	SSO (duplicate)	7*
	14 January 2014	PRISM (duplicate)	11*
	13 January 2014	5-Eyes Spy G8-G20 (duplicate)	4*

	Anonymous/ New York Times		18
	27 January 2014	NSA Smartphones Analysis	14
	27 January 2014	GCHQ Mobile Theme	4

	NBC News		87
	25 February 2014	GCHQ Cyber Effects	11
	7 February 2014	GCHQ Cyber Attack	15
	5 February 2014	GCHQ Anonymous	14
	27 January 2014	GCHQ Squeaky Dolphin	47

	The Intercept		3,083*
	7 June 2016	GCHQ Preston, Digint, Milkwhite, CCD, et al	123
	16 May 2016	NSA SID Today 178 files	252
	14 May 2016	NSA SIGINT to HUMINT	4
	2 February 2016	UAV Programs	14
	23 December 2015	NSA-GCHQ Juniper	7
	17 November 2015	NSA SCS Venezuela	5
	28 September 2015	NSA Rogue Olympics	21
	24 September 2015	NSA-GCHQ 29 Documents	283
	11 August	NSA SIGINT Philosopher	29
	3 August 2015	NSA ECHELON GCHQ COMSAT	73
	16 July 2015	NSA Manhunting	8
	1 July 2015	NSA XKeyscore and More	1,264
	26 June 2015	NSA on NYT Warrantless Wiretap Story	13
	22 June 2015	GCHQ 11 Filles	250
	12 June 2015	NSA SID Hacker Interview	4
	28 May 2015	NSA SID Today	23
	22 May 2015	US-UK-CA-AU-NZ Cellphone Spying	26*
	21 May 2015	NSA Medical Spying	10
	19 May 2015	NSA SID NATO	19
	18 May 2015	JTAC Attack Methodology	3
	18 May 2015	NCTC Major Terrorism Figures	1
	18 May 2015	Black Budget Bin Laden Raid	2
	8 May 2015	NSA SKYNET	40
	5 May 2015	NSA Black Budget SID RT10 WG Language	46
	2 April 2015	NSA GCHQ JTRIG Argentina-Iran	7
	10 March 2015	NSA Apple DPA Cryptanalysis	12
	19 February 2015	GCHQ PCS Harvesting At Scale	32
	10 February 2015	NSA Iran GCHQ	2
	5 February 2015	DNI NATO Cyber Panel	3
	4 February 2015	GCHQ Lovely Horse et al	5*
	13 December 2014	GCHQ Belgacom Hack	67
	4 December 2014	NSA AURORA GOLD et al	63
	10 October 2014	10 NSA Releases Computer Network Exploitation Declass National Initiative Task Security 2 National Initiative Task Security 1 Exceptionally Controlled Info Compartments Exceptionally Controlled Info Pawleys Exceptionally Controlled Information Sentry Eagle 2 Sentry Eagle 1 Tarex Classification Guide Whipgenie Classification Guide	69
	17 September 2014	NSA Visit by NZ Spy	2
	5 September 2014	Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009	32
	25 August 2014	NSA ICREACH	55
	12 August 2014	GCHQ Covert Mobile Phones Policy	6
	5 August 2014	NCTC Terrorist Identifies	12
	4 August 2014	US-NSA Pays Israel $500,000	2
	4 August 2014	NSA-Israel Spying Pact 2013	3
	4 August 2014	Israel-US Spying Pact 1999	16
	25 July 2014	NSA Saudi Arabia	4
	14 July 2014	NSA JTRIG Tools-Techniques	8
	9 July 2014	NSA FISA Accounts	8
	19 June 2014	NSA Partners	41*
	19 May 2014	12 Various Pages	12
	30 April 2014	GHOSTMACHINE-ECHOBASE NSA Visit by GCHQ Lobban PRISM with Olympics	14:6+8 4:1+3 1:
	4 April 2014	GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber NSA 5-Eyes SIGDEV Conference	19 2
	20 March 2014	NSA Hunt Sysadmins	6
	13 March 2014	NSA Third Party	1
	12 March 2014	NSA Hammerchant NSA UK on Mikey and Ibake NSA Turbine and Turmoil NSA Thousands of Implants NSA More Than One Way NSA GCHQ Quantumtheory NSA Selector Types NSA Quantum Insert NSA Analysis of Converged Data NSA Phishing and MTM Attacks NSA Menwith Hill xKeyscore NSA Industry Exploit NSA 5 Eyes Hacking	43 2 1 1 11 1 5 1 3 1 1 1
	7 March 2014	NSA Ask Zelda	8
	24 February 2014	GCHQ Disruption	4
	24 February 2014	GCHQ Online Deception (7 pages duplicates of GCHQ Psychology)	*50
	18 February 2014	GCHQ Psychology37 Duplicates of NBC News	*44
	18 February 2014	NSA-GCHQ Discovery	1

	Glenn Greenwald
	13 May 2014	A variety of documents	107

	Cryptome		310
	26 January 2015	Citizenfour Snowden Documentary High Definition (7-Zip MP4) (3.6GB)	~
	25 January 2015	Citizenfour Snowden Documentary (7-Zipped MP4) (1.2GB)	~
	23 May 2014	No Place to Hide (27MB)	310

	Heise		26
	16 August 2014	NSA GCHQ CSEC HACIENDA	26

	Süddeutsche Zeitung		7
	25 November 2014	Vodafone GCHQ Cables List and Slides	72

	Paul Dietrich @Paulmd199		87
	22 January 2015	87 Citizenfour Screengrabs	87

	New Zealand Herald		20
	14 March 2015	GCSB Targets Solomons	2
	10 March 2015	NSA-New Zealand Relationship	8
	6 March 2015	GCSB XKeyscore 2	4
	5 March 2015	GCSB XKeyscore	6

	New Zealand Star Times		35
	8 March 2015	GCSB XKeyscore 3	35

	Telesurtv
	17 November 2015	NSA SCS Venezuela	5*

	Boing Boing
	2 February 2016	GCHQ Malware	99

TOP SECRET from CRYPTOME – 1 Snowden Email Disclosed to 26 Emails & 31 Docs

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TOP SECRET-NSA-Will China Help Pakistan Get the Bomb? – Pakistan & China Have Expanded Their Nuclear Warheads But India Is Not Worried

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Cryptome unveils Snowden Documents

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6 February 2016. (±) False Tallies-the Prisoner’s Dilemma? https://vimeo.com/145453201

2 February 2016. Add 14 pages to The Intercept.

23 December 2015. Add 7 pages to The Intercept

20 November 2015. Add 5 pages to Telesurtv and The Intercept.

28 September 2015. Add 21 pages to The Intercept.

24 September 2015. Add 283 pages to The Intercept.

15 August 2015. Add 74 pages to New York Times-Propublica.

11 August 2015. Add 29 pages to The Intercept.

3 August 2015. Add 10 pages to The Intercept.

16 July 2015. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

1 July 2015. Add 1,240 pages to The Intercept.

26 June 2015. Add 13 pages to The Intercept.

22 June 2015. Add 250 pages to The Intercept.

13 June 2015. Italian journalist provides correspondence with USG on Snowden documents:

2015-1504.pdf offsite Stefania Maurizi-NSA Snowden Correspondence      June 13, 2015
2015-1503.pdf offsite Stefania Maurizi-DoJ Snowden Correspondence      June 13, 2015
2015-1502.pdf offsite Stefania Maurizi-State Snowden Correspondence    June 13, 2015

12 June 2015. Paul and FVEYDOCS tweet:

https://fveydocs.org/IC off the Record:

https://nsa.gov1.info/dni/

12 June 2015. Aeris tweets:

https://nsa.imirhil.fr/OCRized/indexed/full-text-searchable PDF.

12 June 2015. Christopher Parsons writes:

Saw your tweet re: sources for Snowden docs. I’ve compiled all the relevant Canadian documents, along with summary information of the documents’contents along with indexing information, here:https://www.christopher-parsons.com/writings/cse-summaries/

In the coming months I’m hoping to have equivalent summaries for Australia and New Zealand (and will then be moving on to do similar summary work for US- and UK-based documents).

12 June 2015. Snowden documents compilations (plus this one):

If all documents are free somewhere please send pointer to: cryptome[at]earthlink.net

12 June 2015. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.

4 June 2015. Add 91 pages to The New York Times.

28 May 2015. Add 23 pages to The Intercept.

22 May 2015. Add 26 pages to CBC (with The Intercept).

21 May 2015. Edward Snowden was quoted in Forbes on May 10, 2015:

http://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2015/05/10/what-edward-snowden-said-at-the-nordic-media-festival/2/

“What I did was that I worked in partnership with the journalists who received the material. As a condition of receiving the material they agreed, prior to publication, to run these stories by the government. Not for the government to censor them, but for the government to be able to look at these and go “look, this isn’t going to get anybody killed, this isn’t going to put a human agent behind enemy lines at risk” or something like that. “This isn’t going to make Al Qaeda be able to bomb buildings.” And I think the value of this model has been proven to be quite effective.”

This indicates all stories about document releases have been “run-by governments prior to publication.” Cryptome has filed an FOIA request to NSA for records of these “run-bys.”

https://cryptome.org/2015/05/snowden-media-usg-contacts-4.pdf

21 May 2015. Add 10 pages to The Intercept.

19 May 2015. Add 19 pages to The Intercept.

18 May 2015. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.

8 May 2015. Add 40 pages to The Intercept.

5 May 2015. Add 46 pages to The Intercept.

2 April 2015. Add 7 pages to The Intercept.

30 March 2015. Snowden documents archive by The Courage Foundation:

https://edwardsnowden.com/revelations/

24 March 2015. Add 152 pages to CBC News.

14 March 2015. Add 2 pages to New Zealand Herald.

10 March 2015. Add 12 pages to The Intercept. Add 8 pages to New Zealand Herald.

8 March 2015. Add 35 pages to New Zealand Star Times.

6 March 2015. Add 4 pages to New Zealand Herald.

5 March 2015. Snowden Archive, searchable: http://cjfe.org/snowden

5 March 2015. Add 6 pages to New Zealand Herald.

19 February 2015. Add 32 pages to The Intercept.

10 February 2015. Add 2 pages to The Intercept.

5 February 2015. Add 3 pages to The Intercept.

4 February 2015. Add 5 pages to The Intercept.

30 January 2015. Compilation of Snowden documents:

https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/tree/master/files/pdf

[Repost] 4 April 2014. ACLU offers NSA documents search: https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search

Also:

http://freesnowden.is/category/revealed-documents/index.html

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

If more lists please send: cryptome[at]earthlink.net

28 January 2015. Add 21 pages to CBC News.

26 January 2015. Add Citizenfour Snowden Documentary High-Definition, with innumerable images, by Cryptome.

25 January 2015. Add Citizenfour Snowden Documentary by Cryptome, with innumerable images, some 87 extracted by Paul Dietrich in following entry.

22 January 2015. Add 87 pages to Paul Dietrich (via Citizenfour).

17 January 2015. Add 199 pages to Der Spiegel.

28 December 2014. Add 666 pages to Der Spiegel.

22 December 2014. Add 1 page to New York Times.

13 December 2014. Add 67 pages to The Intercept.

4 December 2014. Add 63 pages to The Intercept.

25 November 2014. Add 72 pages to Süddeutsche Zeitung.

6 November 2014. At current rate of release it will take 31 to 908 years for full disclosure.

10 October 2014. Add 69 pages to The Intercept.

17 September 2014. Add 2 pages to The Intercept.

14 September 2014. Add 68 pages to Der Spiegel.

13 September 2014. In video Glenn Greenwald claims to have “hundreds of thousands” of documents (at 9:06 min)

http://www.3news.co.nz/tvshows/thenation/interview-glenn-greenwald-2014091311?ref=video

Audio excerpt: http://youtu.be/xnfIp38AAhM

5 September 2014. Add 32 pages to The Intercept.

31 August 2014. Add 34 pages to Der Spiegel.

25 August 2014. Add 55 pages to The Intercept.

16 August 2014. Add 26 pages to Heise.

12 August 2014. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.

5 August 2014. Add 12 pages to The Intercept.

4 August 2014. Add 23 pages to The Intercept.

25 July 2014. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.

14 July 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

14 July 2014. “I’m as mad as hell and I’m not going to take this anymore!”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_%28film%29

https://cryptome.org/2014/07/snowden-documents-demand-14-0714.pdf

11 July 2014. See related essay, Open the Snowden Files, Krystian Woznicki, 11July 2014:

English: http://berlinergazette.de/wp-content/uploads/Open-the-Snowden-Files_KW_E.pdf
German: http://berlinergazette.de/open-the-snowden-files/

11 July 2014. @PaulMD notes this claim in the Washington Post, 11 July 2014:

We did not have an official NSA list of targets. We had to find them in the pile ourselves. Soltani, an independent researcher, did most of the heavy lifting on that. Because the information was not laid out in rows and columns, the way it might be in a spreadsheet, Soltani wrote computer code to extract what we were looking for from something like a quarter-million pages of unstructured text.

If a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released.

9 July 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

9 July 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post.

23 June 2014. Add 9 pages to Der Spiegel.

22 June 2014. Add 41 pages to Information-The Intercept.

Revised. This is included in entry above. 18 June 2014. Add 20 pages to The Intercept.

18 June 2014. Add 200 pages to Der Spiegel.

16 June 2014. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel.

1 June 2014. Add 4 pages to New York Times.

23 May 2014. Cryptome placed online No Place to Hide, 310 pages, to compensate for failure to release Snowden documents:

https://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-freed.htm

https://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z (27MB)

19 May 2014. The Intercept released 12 pages.

13 May 2014. Glenn Greenwald released 107 pages, some new, some previously published, some full pages, some page fragments.

http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf

5 May 2014. Related tally of redactions of Snowden releases:

https://cryptome.org/2014/05/snowden-redactions.htm

30 April 2014. Add 19 pages to The Intercept.

30 April 2014. Add 2 pages to Dagbladet belatedly.

5 April 2014. Add 21 pages to The Intercept.

4 April 2014. ACLU offers NSA documents search: https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search

Also:

http://freesnowden.is/category/revealed-documents/index.html

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

If more lists please send: cryptome[at]earthlink.net

2 April 2014.

29 March 2014. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.

22 March 2014. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel.

22 March 2014. Add 2 pages to New York Times.

21 March 2014. Add 7 pages to Le Monde.

20 March 2014. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.

18 March 2014. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

13 March 2014. Add 1 page to The Intercept.

12 March 2014. Add 35 pages to The Intercept.

12 March 2014. Add 62 pages to New York Times. Add 2 pages to NRC Handelsblad.

7 March 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

27 February 2014. Add 3 pages to Guardian.

25 February 2014. Add 11 pages to NBC News.

24 February 2014. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.

24 February 2014. Add *50 pages to The Intercept (7 pages are duplicates of GCHQ Psychology).

18 February 2014. Add *45 pages to The Intercept (37 pages are duplicates of release by NBC News).

10 February 2014. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad (via Electrospaces.blogspot.com).

7 February 2014. Add 15 pages NBC News.

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages to CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous via New York Times.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

Related Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment:

https://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-count.htm

* 5 January 2014. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel (30 December 2013. No source given for NSA docs). Tally now *962 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.50% of that released).

Glenn Greenwald tweeted:

Glenn Greenwald @ggreenwald, 8:05 AM – 29 Dec 13@Cryptomeorg @ioerror I had no involvement in that Spiegel article, ask them – and they don’t say those are Snowden docs.

Matt Blaze tweeted, 11:24 AM – 2 Jan 14

matt blaze @mattblazeIf there are other sources besides Snowden, I hope journalists getting docs are careful to authenticate them (& disclose uncertainty).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

3 January 2014. See also EFF, ACLU and LeakSource accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages (8 duplicates) to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

23 December 2013

http://www.adn.com/2013/12/22/3243451/pincus-snowden-still-has-a-road.html

We’ve yet to see the full impact of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s unauthorized downloading of highly classified intelligence documents.

Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

Timeline of releases:

[See tabulation below for full timeline.]

5 October 2013

26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian

Number	Date	Title	Pages

	The Guardian		276
	27 February 2014	GCHQ Optic Nerve	3
21	16 January 2014	SMS Text Messages Exploit	8
20	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	2
18	18 November 2013	DSD-3G	6
19	1 November 2013	PRISM, SSO SSO1 Slide SSO2 Slide	13*
18	4 October 2013	Types of IAT Tor	9
17	4 October 2013	Egotistical Giraffe	20*
16	4 October 2013	Tor Stinks	23
15	11 September 2013	NSA-Israel Spy	5
14	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	6*
13	5 September 2013	SIGINT Enabling	3*
12	5 September 2013	NSA classification guide	3
11	31 July 2013	XKeyscore	32
10	27 June 2013	DoJ Memo on NSA	16
9	27 June 2013	Stellar Wind	51
8	21 June 2013	FISA Certification	25
7	20 June 2013	Minimization Exhibit A	9
6	20 June 2013	Minimization Exhibit B	9
5	16 June 2013	GCHQ G-20 Spying	4
4	8 June 2013	Boundless Informant FAQ	3
3	8 June 2013	Boundless Informant Slides	4
2	7 June 2013	PPD-20	18
1	5 June 2013	Verizon	4

	Washington Post		297
	9 July 2014	NSA Emails	1
	18 March 2014	NSA SCALAWAG	2
	18 March 2014	NSA MYSTIC	2
	2 January 2014	Quantum Computer 2	10
	2 January 2014	Quantum Computer	3
	23 December 2013	NSA/CSS Mission	2
	11 December 2013	Excessive Collection	9
	11 December 2013	SCISSORS 2	7
	11 December 2013	SCISSORS 1	4
	11 December 2013	Yahoo-Google Exploit	6
	11 December 2013	Cable Spying Types	7
	11 December 2013	WINDSTOP	1
	11 December 2013	Co-Traveler	24
	11 December 2013	GSM Tracking	2
	11 December 2013	SIGINT Successes	4
	11 December 2013	GHOSTMACHINE	4
	5 December 2013	Target Location	1
	4 December 2013	FASCIA	2
	4 December 2013	CHALKFUN	1
	26 November 2013	Microsoft a Target?	4
	4 November 2013	WINDSTOP, SSO, Yahoo-Google	14
	30 October 2013	MUSCULAR-INCENSOR Google and Yahoo	4
	14 October 2013	SSO Overview	4
	14 October 2013	SSO Slides	7
	14 October 2013	SSO Content Slides	9
	4 October 2013	Tor	49
	4 October 2013	EgotisticalGiraffe	20*
	4 October 2013	GCHQ MULLENIZE	2
	4 October 2013	Roger Dingledine	2
	30 August 2013	Budget	17
	10 July 2013	PRISM Slide	1
	29 June 2013	PRISM	8
	20 June 2013	Warrantless Surveillance	25*
	7 June 2013	PPD-20	18*
	6 June 2013	PRISM	1

	Der Spiegel		* 1,278
	17 January 2015	NSA Prepares for Cyber Battle	199
	28 December 2014	NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor 197MB	666
	14 September 2014	GCHQ STELLAR	26
	14 September 2014	NSA Treasure Map	38
	14 September 2014	NSA Treasure Map New	4
	31 August 2014	NSA GCHQ Spy Turkey	34
	23 June 2014	NSA German SIGADs	9
	18 June 2014	NSA German Spying-2	200
	16 June 2014	NSA German Spying	4
	29 March 2014	NSA Spy Chiefs of State	1
	22 March 2014	NSA SHOTGIANT 2 NSA SHOTGIANT 1	21
	31 December 2013	QFIRE	* 16
	30 December 2013	TAO Introduction	* 16
	30 Deceber 2013	QUANTUM Tasking (8 duplicates of QUANTUMTHEORY)	28*
	30 December 2013	QUANTUMTHEORY	14
	29 December 2013	TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (images) TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (DE article)	4
	17 November 2013	ROYAL CONCIERGE (DE)ROYAL CONCIERGE (EN)	2
	29 October 2013	NSA-CIA SCS	3
	27 October 2013	NSA-CIA SCS	2
	20 October 2013	Mexico President	1
	20 September 2013	Belgacom	3
	16 September 2013	SWIFT	3
	9 September 2013	Smartphones	5
	1 September 2013	French Foreign Ministry	0
	31 August 2013	Al Jazeera	0

	O Globo Fantastico		~87
	7 October 2013	CSE Brazil Ministry	7
	8 September 2013	Petrobas	~60
	3 September 2013	Brazil and Mexico	20

	New York Times		216
	15 August 2015	NSA SSO Fairview Stormbrew Blarney (with Propublica)	74
	4 June 2015 4 June 2015	NSA Expands Phone Spying at Borders NSA Expands Phone Spying at Borders 2	90 1
	22 December 2014	NSA Tracks Zarrar Shah	1
	1 June 2014	NSA Identity Spying	4
	22 March 2014	NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT	2
	12 March 2014	NSA Stellarwind Classification NSA FISA FAA Classification AG Dissemination NSA Cryptanalyist FISA Database NSA Spying Timeline	37 18 2 4 1
	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	82*
	23 November 2013	SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016	5
	3 November 2013	SIGINT Mission 2013 SIGINT Mission 2017	22
	28 September 2013	Contact Chaining Social Networks	1
	28 September 2013	SYANPSE	1
	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	4*
	5 September 2013	SIGINT Enabling	3*


	ProPublica		163*
	15 August 2015	NSA SSO Fairview Stormbrew Blarney (with NY Times)	74*
	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	82*
	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	4*
	5 September 2103	SIGINT Enabling	3*

	Le Monde		20
	21 March 2014	CSE SNOWGLOBE	7
	25 October 2013	NSA Hosts FR Spies	4
	22 October 2013	Wanadoo-Alcatel	1
	22 October 2013	Close Access Sigads	2
	22 October 2013	Boundless Informant	2
	22 October 2013	PRISM	11

	Dagbladet		15
	April 2014 December 2013	Norway Assistance	2
	19 November 2013	BOUNDLESSINFORMANT	13

	NRC Handelsblad		7
	12 March 2014	NSA Aids Dutch Anti-Piracy	2
	8 February 2014	MIVD BoundlessInformant Cryptome mirror	1
	30 November 2013	Dutch SIGINT	3
	23 November 2013	SIGINT Cryptologic Platform	1

	Huffington Post		3
	27 November 2013	Muslim Porn Viewing	3

	CBC		214
	22 May 2015	US-UK-CA-AU-NZ Cellphone Spying	26*
	24 March 2015	CSEC Cyber Threats	152
	28 January 2015	CSE LEVITATION-FFU Project	21
	30 January 2014	CSEC IP Profiling	27
	10 December 2013	NSA-CSEC Partnership	1
	10 December 2013	G8-G20 Spying	4*
	2 December 2013	G8-G20 Spying	3
	29 November 2013	G8-G20 Spying	1

	The Globe and Mail		18
	30 November 2013	CSEC Brazil Spying	18*

	SVT (Swedish TV)		2
	5 December 2013	Sweden Spied Russia for NSA	2

	L’Espresso		3
	6 December 2013	NSA Spies Italy	3

	Trojkan (SVT)		29
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Relationship	1*
	11 December 2013	NSA 5 Eyes Partners	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Agenda	8
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA RU Baltic	1
	11 December 2013	NSA GCHQ Sweden FRA COMINT	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Plan	5
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Sources	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Tor et al	3
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Slide	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Quantum 1	1
	11 December 2013	GCHQ Sweden FRA Quantum	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Quantum Accomplishments	2
	9 December 2013	NSA and Sweden Pact	3*

	Jacob Appelbaum		* 71
	30 December 2013	NSA Catalog	* 50
	30 December 2013	NSA Catalog Video Clips	* 21

	Information.dk		63*
	19 June 2014	NSA Partners	41*
	14 January 2014	SSO (duplicate)	7*
	14 January 2014	PRISM (duplicate)	11*
	13 January 2014	5-Eyes Spy G8-G20 (duplicate)	4*

	Anonymous/ New York Times		18
	27 January 2014	NSA Smartphones Analysis	14
	27 January 2014	GCHQ Mobile Theme	4

	NBC News		87
	25 February 2014	GCHQ Cyber Effects	11
	7 February 2014	GCHQ Cyber Attack	15
	5 February 2014	GCHQ Anonymous	14
	27 January 2014	GCHQ Squeaky Dolphin	47

	The Intercept		2,704*
	2 February 2016	UAV Programs	14
	23 December 2015	NSA-GCHQ Juniper	7
	17 November 2015	NSA SCS Venezuela	5
	28 September 2015	NSA Rogue Olympics	21
	24 September 2015	NSA-GCHQ 29 Documents	283
	11 August	NSA SIGINT Philosopher	29
	3 August 2015	NSA ECHELON GCHQ COMSAT	73
	16 July 2015	NSA Manhunting	8
	1 July 2015	NSA XKeyscore and More	1,264
	26 June 2015	NSA on NYT Warrantless Wiretap Story	13
	22 June 2015	GCHQ 11 Filles	250
	12 June 2015	NSA SID Hacker Interview	4
	28 May 2015	NSA SID Today	23
	22 May 2015	US-UK-CA-AU-NZ Cellphone Spying	26*
	21 May 2015	NSA Medical Spying	10
	19 May 2015	NSA SID NATO	19
	18 May 2015	JTAC Attack Methodology	3
	18 May 2015	NCTC Major Terrorism Figures	1
	18 May 2015	Black Budget Bin Laden Raid	2
	8 May 2015	NSA SKYNET	40
	5 May 2015	NSA Black Budget SID RT10 WG Language	46
	2 April 2015	NSA GCHQ JTRIG Argentina-Iran	7
	10 March 2015	NSA Apple DPA Cryptanalysis	12
	19 February 2015	GCHQ PCS Harvesting At Scale	32
	10 February 2015	NSA Iran GCHQ	2
	5 February 2015	DNI NATO Cyber Panel	3
	4 February 2015	GCHQ Lovely Horse et al	5*
	13 December 2014	GCHQ Belgacom Hack	67
	4 December 2014	NSA AURORA GOLD et al	63
	10 October 2014	10 NSA Releases Computer Network Exploitation Declass National Initiative Task Security 2 National Initiative Task Security 1 Exceptionally Controlled Info Compartments Exceptionally Controlled Info Pawleys Exceptionally Controlled Information Sentry Eagle 2 Sentry Eagle 1 Tarex Classification Guide Whipgenie Classification Guide	69
	17 September 2014	NSA Visit by NZ Spy	2
	5 September 2014	Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009	32
	25 August 2014	NSA ICREACH	55
	12 August 2014	GCHQ Covert Mobile Phones Policy	6
	5 August 2014	NCTC Terrorist Identifies	12
	4 August 2014	US-NSA Pays Israel $500,000	2
	4 August 2014	NSA-Israel Spying Pact 2013	3
	4 August 2014	Israel-US Spying Pact 1999	16
	25 July 2014	NSA Saudi Arabia	4
	14 July 2014	NSA JTRIG Tools-Techniques	8
	9 July 2014	NSA FISA Accounts	8
	19 June 2014	NSA Partners	41*
	19 May 2014	12 Various Pages	12
	30 April 2014	GHOSTMACHINE-ECHOBASE NSA Visit by GCHQ Lobban PRISM with Olympics	14:6+8 4:1+3 1:
	4 April 2014	GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber NSA 5-Eyes SIGDEV Conference	19 2
	20 March 2014	NSA Hunt Sysadmins	6
	13 March 2014	NSA Third Party	1
	12 March 2014	NSA Hammerchant NSA UK on Mikey and Ibake NSA Turbine and Turmoil NSA Thousands of Implants NSA More Than One Way NSA GCHQ Quantumtheory NSA Selector Types NSA Quantum Insert NSA Analysis of Converged Data NSA Phishing and MTM Attacks NSA Menwith Hill xKeyscore NSA Industry Exploit NSA 5 Eyes Hacking	43 2 1 1 11 1 5 1 3 1 1 1
	7 March 2014	NSA Ask Zelda	8
	24 February 2014	GCHQ Disruption	4
	24 February 2014	GCHQ Online Deception (7 pages duplicates of GCHQ Psychology)	*50
	18 February 2014	GCHQ Psychology37 Duplicates of NBC News	*44
	18 February 2014	NSA-GCHQ Discovery	1

	Glenn Greenwald
	13 May 2014	A variety of documents	107

	Cryptome		310
	26 January 2015	Citizenfour Snowden Documentary High Definition (7-Zip MP4) (3.6GB)	~
	25 January 2015	Citizenfour Snowden Documentary (7-Zipped MP4) (1.2GB)	~
	23 May 2014	No Place to Hide (27MB)	310

	Heise		26
	16 August 2014	NSA GCHQ CSEC HACIENDA	26

	Süddeutsche Zeitung		7
	25 November 2014	Vodafone GCHQ Cables List and Slides	72

	Paul Dietrich @Paulmd199		87
	22 January 2015	87 Citizenfour Screengrabs	87

	New Zealand Herald		20
	14 March 2015	GCSB Targets Solomons	2
	10 March 2015	NSA-New Zealand Relationship	8
	6 March 2015	GCSB XKeyscore 2	4
	5 March 2015	GCSB XKeyscore	6

	New Zealand Star Times		35
	8 March 2015	GCSB XKeyscore 3	35

	Telesurtv
	17 November 2015	NSA SCS Venezuela	5*

	Boing Boing
	2 February 2016	GCHQ Malware	99

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TOP-SECRET – NSA SHARKSEER Program Zero-Day Net Defense Presentation

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Page Count: 12 pages
Date: September 2015
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: National Security Agency
File Type: pdf
File Size: 1,653,564 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 156ED749C29E087C5698C8843C3FB39458A7F960C616EE12FE60818968DB068D

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SHARKSEER

Program Definition: Detects and mitigates web-based malware Zero-Day and Advanced Persistent Threats using COTS technology by leveraging, dynamically producing, and enhancing global threat knowledge to rapidly protect the networks.

SHARKSEER’s GOALS

IAP Protection: Provide highly available and reliable automated sensing and mitigation capabilities to all 10 DOD IAPs. Commercial behavioral and heuristic analytics and threat data enriched with NSA unique knowledge, through automated data analysis processes, form the basis for discovery and mitigation.

Cyber Situational Awareness and Data Sharing: Consume public malware threat data, enrich with NSA unique knowledge and processes. Share with partners through automation systems, for example the SHARKSEER Global Threat Intelligence (GTI) and SPLUNK systems. The data will be shared in real time with stakeholders and network defenders on UNCLASSIFIED, U//FOUO, SECRET, and TOP SECRET networks.

…

Revealed – The NSA in Nassau, Bahamas – Public Eye Satellite Facilities

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39°36’54.30″ N 74°19’43.42″ W

[Image]

NSA Fairview Cliffside SIGINT Station (ATT Manchester Cable Landing Station)

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Opinion – NSA Chief Expects More Cyberattacks Like OPM Hack

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Exposed – New details about the joint NSA-BND operation Eikonal

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Under operation Eikonal, the NSA cooperated with the German foreign intelligence service BND for access to transit cables from Deutsche Telekom in Frankfurt. Here follows an overview of what is known about this operation so far. New information may be added as it comes available.

– Initial reporting – Parliamentary hearings –

– Disclosures from Austria –

Initial reporting

Operation Eikonal was revealed by the regional German paper Süddeutsche Zeitung and the regional broadcasters NDR and WDR on October 4, 2014. They reported that between 2004 and 2008, the German foreign intelligence service BND had tapped into the Frankfurt internet exchange DE-CIX and shared the intercepted data with the NSA.

For this operation, NSA provided sophisticated interception equipment, which the Germans didn’t had but were eager to use. Interception of telephone traffic started in 2004, internet data were captured since 2005. Reportedly, NSA was especially interested in communications from Russia.

To prevent communications of German citizens being passed on to NSA, BND installed a special program (called DAFIS) to filter these out. But according to the reporting, this filter didn’t work properly from the beginning. An initial test in 2003 showed the BND that 5% of the data of German citizens could not be filtered out, which was considered a violation of the constitution.

Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that it was Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG) that provided BND the access to the Frankfurt internet exchange, and in return was paid 6000,- euro a month. But as some people noticed, Deutsche Telekom was not connected to DE-CIX when operation Eikonal took place, so something didn’t add up.

As we will see, this was right, and the actual cable tap was not at DE-CIX, but took place at Deutsche Telekom. Nonetheless, many press reports still link Eikonal to the DE-CIX internet exchange.

Operations center room in the former BND headquarters in Pullach
(Photo: Martin Schlüter – Click to enlarge)

Eikonal as part of RAMPART-A

As was first reported by this weblog on October 15, 2014, operation Eikonal was part of the NSA umbrella program RAMPART-A, under which the Americans cooperate with 3rd Party countries who “provide access to cables and host U.S. equipment”.

Details about the RAMPART-A program itself had already been revealed by the Danish newspaper Information in collaboration with The Intercept on June 19, 2014. The program reportedly involved at least five countries, but so far only Germany and, most likely, Denmark have been identified.

On October 20, Information published about a document from NSA’s Special Source Operations (SSO) division, which confirms that an operation codenamed “EIKANOL” was part of RAMPART-A and says it was decommissioned in June 2008.

The slide below shows that under RAMPART-A a partner country taps an international cable at an access point (A) and then forwards the data to a joint processing center (B). Equipment provided by the NSA processes the data and analysts from the host country can then analyse the intercepted data (C), while they are also forwarded to NSA sites in the US (D, E):

Parliamentary hearings

Because of the confusion about the role of Deutsche Telekom in operation Eikonal, the NSA investigation commission of the German parliament (NSAUA) decided to also investigate whether this company assisted BND in tapping the Frankfurt internet exchange.

During hearings of BND officials it became clear that operation Eikonal was not about tapping into the Frankfurt internet exchange DE-CIX, but about one or more cables from Deutsche Telekom. This was first confirmed by German media on December 4, 2014.

Hearing of November 6, 2014 (Live-blog)

According to witness T.B., who was heard on on November 6, 2014, it was just during the test period that the filter system was only able to filter out 95% of German communications. When the system went live, this percentage rose to 99% with a second stage that could filter out even more than 99%. When necessary, a final check was conducted by hand.

Hearing of November 13, 2014 (Live-blog – Official transcript)

During this hearing, the witness W.K. said that Eikonal was a one of a kind operation, there was targeted collection from traffic that transited Germany from one foreign country to another.

This was focussed on Afghanistan and anti-terrorism. Selected data were collected and forwarded to NSA. The internal codename for Eikonal was Granat, but that name wasn’t shared with NSA. There was even a third codename.

For Germany, Eikonal was useful because it provided foreign intelligence for protecting German troops and countering terrorism. The NSA provided better technical equipment that BND didn’t had. In return, BND provided NSA with data collected from transit traffic using search profiles about Afghanistan and anti-terrorism. BND was asked to cooperate because NSA isn’t able to do everything themselves.

Eikonal provided only several hundred useful phone calls, e-mail and fax messages a year, which was a huge disappointment for NSA. This, combined with the fact that it proved to be impossible to 100% guarantee that no German data were collected and forwarded, led BND to terminate the program.

For Eikonal, the cable traffic was filtered by using selectors provided by both NSA and BND. Although not all selectors can be attributed to a particular country and there may have been up to several hundred thousand selectors, witness W.K. said that BND was still able to check whether every single one was appropriate: only selectors that could be checked were used.

Hearing of December 4, 2014 (Live-blog – Official transcript)

During this hearing, BND-employee S.L., who was the project manager of operation Eikonal at BND headquarters, testified. He told that BND had rented two highly secured rooms of ca. 4 x 6 meters in the basement of a Deutsche Telekom switching center in the Frankfurt suburb Nied.

These rooms were only accessible for BND personnel and contained the front-end of the interception system, existing of 19 inch racks, with telecommunications equipment like multiplexers, processors and servers. These devices were remotely controlled from the headquarters in Pullach.*

Based upon analysis of public information about telecommunication networks, BND choose specific cables that would most likely contain traffic that seemed useful for the goals of the operation. It became clear that for redundancy purposes, cables only used 50% of their capacity. For example, 2 cables of 10 Gbit/s carried only 5 Gbit/s of traffic, so in case of a disruption, one cable could take over the traffic of the other one.

The switching center of Deutsche Telekom in Frankfurt-Nied
where some cables were tapped under operation Eikonal
(Screenshot: ZDF Frontal21 – Click to enlarge)

After a specific coax or fiber-optic cable had been selected, technicians of Deutsche Telekom installed a splitter and a copy of the traffic was forwarded to one of the secure rooms, where it was fed into a (de-)multiplexer or a router so the signal could be processed. After they got rid of the peer-to-peer and websurfing traffic, the remaining communications data, like e-mail, were filtered by selectors from BND and NSA.

The selected data were sent back to BND headquarters in Pullach over a leased commercial line, of which the capacity was increased after the internet collection became fully operational. From Pullach to the JSA in Bad Aibling there was a 2 Mbit/s line.

Timeframe

Eikonal started with access to a telephone cable (Leitungsvermittelt). Project manager S.L. told that the first cable was connected (aufgeschaltet) in December 2004, but that it’s signal was too weak. Therefore, in January 2005, an amplifier was installed.

In February, March and April additional cables were connected, so telephony collection started in the spring of 2005. By the end of 2006, Deutsche Telekom announced that its business model for dedicated transit cables would be terminated, so in January 2007 the telephone collection ended.*

BND also wanted access to internet traffic (Paketvermittelt), for which the first cable became available by the end of 2005, but because the backlink was missing, collection was technically not possible. This was solved in 2006, and in the spring of 2006 a second cable was added, and they tested the front-end system and subsequently the filter systems until mid-2007 (Probebetrieb).

During this stage, data were only forwarded to the joint NSA-BND unit JSA after a manual check. Fully automated forwarding only happened from late 2007 until operation Eikonal was terminated in June 2008 (Wirkbetrieb).*

Legal issues

The collection of telephone communications from transit cables was done under the general authority of the BND Act, with details specified in the “Transit Agreement” between BND and Deutsche Telekom, which for the latter was signed by Bernd Köbele.

For the collection of internet data it was impossible to fully separate foreign and domestic traffic, so it couldn’t be ruled out that German communications were in there too. Therefore, BND requested an order from the G10-commission, which, like the FISA Court in the US, has to approve data collection when their own citizens could be involved.

A G10-order describes the communication channel (Germany to/from a specific foreign country) that BND is allowed access to, the threat profile and it also authorizes the search terms that may be used for filtering the traffic.*

Such an order allows the collection of G10-data (communications with one end German), which were processed within BND’s separate G10 Collection program. As a bycatch, this G10-interception also yielded fully foreign traffic (Routine-Verkehre), which was used for operation Eikonal:

Some employees from Deutsche Telekom and from BND had doubts about the legality of this solution, which seemed to use a G10-order as a cover for getting access to fully foreign internet traffic.

Eventually, the federal Chancellery, apparently upon request of the BND, issued a letter saying that the operation was legal. This convinced the Telekom management and the operation went on. It didn’t become clear under what authority this letter was issued.

After BND had learned how to collect internet traffic from fiber-optic cable, it applied for G10-orders to intercept (one end German) communications from 25 foreign and domestic internet service providers in 2008. This time these cables were being tapped at the DE-CIX internet exchange, which is also in Frankfurt.

Results

The collection under operation Eikonal resulted in only a few hundred intelligence reports (German: Meldungen) a year, each consisting of one intercepted e-mail, fax message or phone call. These were burned onto a CD to hand them over to NSA personnel at the JSA.*

According to S.L., metadata (containing up to 91 fields) were “cleaned” so only technical metadata (Sachdaten) were forwarded to the JSA, where they were used for statistical and analytical purposes.

Personal metadata (personenbezogene Daten), like e-mail and IP addresses were not shared. Technical metadata are for example used to identify the telecommunication providers, transmission links and the various protocols.

Hearing of December 18, 2014 (Live-blog – Official transcript)

During this hearing, a talkative general Reinhardt Breitfelder, head of the SIGINT division from 2003-2006, confirmed many of the details from the earlier hearings of his subordinates. He also gave impressions of the dilemmas in dealing with the NSA and what to do with the equipment they provide.

Hearing of January 15, 2015 (Live-blog – Official transcript)

In this hearing, the commission questioned two employees from Deutsche Telekom (Harald Helfrich and Wolfgang Alster), but they provided very little new information, except for that Deutsche Telekom personnel only knows between which cities a cable runs, but they don’t know what kind of traffic it contains – they are not allowed to look inside.

A room where hearings of the parliamentary committee take place
(photo: DPA)

Disclosures from Austria

On May 15, 2015, Peter Pilz, member of the Austrian parliament for the Green party, disclosed an e-mail from an employee of the Deutsche Telekom unit for lawful intercept assistance (Regionalstelle für staatliche SonderAuflagen, ReSa), who notified someone from BND that apparently a particular fiber-optic cable had been connected to the interception equipment. The e-mail describes this cable as follows:

Transit STM1 (FFM 21 – Luxembourg 757/1), containing 4 links of 2 Mbit/s:

Channel 2: Luxembourg/VG – Wien/000 750/3
Channel 6: Luxembourg/CLUX – Moscow/CROS 750/1
Channel 14: Ankara/CTÜR – Luxembourg/CLUX 750/1
Channel 50: Luxembourg/VG – Prague/000 750/1

STM1 stands for Synchronous Transport Module level-1, which designates a transmission bit rate of 155,52 Mbit/second. A similar multiplexing method is Wavelength-Division Multiplexing (WDM) commonly used in submarine fiber-optic cables. The latter having a much larger capacity, generally STM-64 or 9,5 Gbit/second.

The number 757 is a so-called Leitungsschlüsselzahl (LSZ), which denotes a certain type of cable. In this case it stands for a channelized STM-1 base link (2 Mbit in 155 Mbit), which seem to be used for internal connections.

According to the meanwhile updated LSZ List, the number 750 stands for a “DSV2 Digitalsignal-Verbindung 2 Mbit/s”, which is a digital signal path.

The cable mentioned in the e-mail therefore only has a small capacity, which seems to indicate that NSA and/or BND selected it carefully.

FFM 21 stands for “Frankfurt am Main 21”, which according to Deutsche Telekom’s network map is the name of the Point-of-Presence (PoP) located at its facility in the Frankfurt suburb Nied – the location where that Eikonal tapping took place.

This means we have a physical cable running between Luxembourg and the Deutsche Telekom PoP in Frankfurt, but containing channels to cities which are much further, so they have to connect to channels within other physical cables that run from Frankfurt to Moscow, Prague, Vienna and Ankara, respectively:

As the e-mail is from February 3, 2005, it must relate to telephone collection, because for Eikonal, the first cable containing internet traffic only became available by the end of that year.

The Transit agreement

On May 18, the Austrian tabloid paper Kronen Zeitung published the full “Transit Agreement” (pdf) between BND and Deutsche Telekom, in which the latter agreed to provide access to transit cables, and in return will be paid 6.500,- euro a month for the expenses. The agreement came into retrospective effect as of February 2004.

This disclosure got little attention, but is rather remarkable, as such agreements are closely guarded secrets. The Transit agreement existed in only two copies: one for BND and one for Deutsche Telekom.

It is not known how Pilz came into possession of these documents, but it seems the source must be somewhere inside the German parliamentary investigation commission. They are the only persons outside BND and Deutsche Telekom who, for the purpose of their inquiry, got access to the agreement and the other documents.

Leaking these documents to Pilz seems not a very smart move, as it will further minimize the chance that the commission will ever get access to the list of suspicious NSA selectors.

Country lists

On May 19, Pilz held a press conference (mp3) in Berlin, together with the chairman of the Green party in Luxembourg and a representative of the German Green party. Here, Pilz presented a statement (pdf), which includes the aforementioned e-mail, 10 questions to the German government, and two tables with cable links to or from Austria and Luxembourg:

Lists of links that apparently were on a priority list of NSA.
LSZ = Leitungsschlüsselzahl (cable type indentifier);
Endstelle = Endpoint; Österreich = Austria.
(Source: Peter Pilz – Click to enlarge)

According to Pilz, the full list contains 254 (or 256) cable links. 94 of them connect EU member states, 40 run between EU members and other European countries like Switzerland, Russia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ukraine, Belarus and Turkey. 122 links connect European countries with nations all over the world, with Saudi Arabia, Japan, Dubai and China being mentioned most.

The country which most links (71) run to or from is the Netherlands. The list for that country was disclosed by Peter Pilz during a press conference in Brussels on May 28, 2015. The US, the UK and Canada are not on the list, although there were apparently 156 links from/to Britain too.

Update:
On June 5, 2015, Peter Pilz held a press conference in Paris, where he presented a statement (.docx) containing a list of 51 transit links to or from France. Interestingly, this list now also includes some additional technical identifiers for these links, which were apparently left out in the earlier ones:

First part of the list with links related to France
(Source: Peter Pilz – Click to enlarge)

According to the updated LSZ List, the new codes in this list stand for:

– 703: VC3 Virtual Container connection with 48,960 MBit/s
– 710: (not yet known)
– 712: VC12 Virtual Container connection with 2,240 MBit/s
– 720: (not yet known)
– 730: (not yet known)

VC3 and VC12 are from the Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) protocol to transfer multiple digital bit streams synchronously over optical fiber. This has the option for virtual containers for the actual payload data. VC3 is for mapping 34/45 Mbit/s (E3/DS3) signals; VC4 for 140 Mbit/s (E4); VC12 for 2 Mbit/s (E1).

The new identifiers in this list stand for: O-nr.: Ordnungsnummer; GRUSSZ: Grundstücksschlüsselzahl; FACHSZ: Fachschlüsselzahl.

No information about these identifiers was found yet, but by analysing the data in the list, it seems that the FACHSZ codes are related to a telecom provider. France Telecom for example appears with FACHSZ codes CFT, VPAS, VCP3, VB5 or 0.

The GRUSSZ number identifies a particular city, with the first two or three digits corresponding with the international telephone country codes. The last two digits seem to follow a different scheme, as we can see that a capital always ends with “10”:

Paris = 33010
Lyon = 33190
Reims = 33680 Brussels = 32010
Prague = 42010
Oslo = 47010 Warsaw = 48010
Poznan = 48020
Moscow = 70010

It’s possible that these are just internal codes used by Deutsche Telekom, as internationally, connections between telephone networks are identified by Point Codes (PC). From the Snowden-revelations we know that these codes are also used by NSA and GCHQ to designate the cable links they intercept.

NSA or BND wish lists?

Initially, Peter Pilz claimed these links were samples from a priority list of the NSA, but on May 27, he said in Switzerland, that the list was from BND, and was given to NSA, who marked in yellow the links they wanted to have fully monitored.

The German parliamentary hearings were also not very clear about these lists. On December 4, project manager S.L. confirmed that NSA had a wish list for circuit-switched transit links, but in the hearing from January 15 it was said that there was a “wish list of BND” containing some 270 links. And on March 5, former SIGINT director Urmann said he couldn’t remember that NSA requested specific communication links.

Maybe the solution is provided by the Dutch website De Correspondent, which reports that there is a much larger list (probably prepared by BND) of some 1000 transit links, of which ca. 250 were marked in yellow (probably those prioritized by NSA).

Whose cables?

Media reports say that these cables belong to the providers from various European countries, but that seems questionable. As we saw in the aforementioned e-mail, it seems most likely that the lists show channels within fiber-optic cables, and that the physical cables all run between the Deutsche Telekom switching facility in Frankfurt and the cities we see in the lists.

In theory, these cables could be owned or operated by those providers mentioned in the lists, but then they would rather connect at a peering point like the DE-CIX internet exchange, instead of at the Deutsche Telekom switching center. Deutsche Telekom runs its own Tier 1 network, a worldwide backbone that connects the networks of lower-level internet providers.

Simplified structure of the Internet, showing how Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 providers
transit data traffic in a hierarchial way and how Tier 2 providers exchange
traffic directly through peering at an Internet eXchange Point (IXP)
(diagram: Wikimedia Commons – click to enlarge)

Questions

It is not clear how many of the over 250 links on the list were actually intercepted. We only know that for sure for the STM-1 cable with the four channels described in the aforementioned e-mail from Deutsche Telekom to BND.

Strange is the fact that during the parliamentary hearings, most BND witnesses spoke about “a cable in Frankfurt”, which sounds like one single physical cable, whereas the disclosures by Peter Pilz clearly show that multiple channels must have been intercepted.

Update:
During the commission hearing of January 29, 2015, BND technical engineer A.S. said that under operation Eikonal, telephone traffic came in with a data rate of 622 Mbit/s. This equals a standard STM-4 cable, which contains 252 channels of 2 Mbit/s. This number comes close to the channels on the “wish list”, but it seems not possible that those were all in just one physical cable.

Another question is whether it is possible to only filter the traffic from specific channels, or that one has to have access to the whole cable.

It should be noted that not the entire communications traffic on these links was collected and stored, but that it was filtered for specific selectors, like phone numbers and e-mail addresses. Only the traffic for which there was a match was picked out and processed for analysis.

Possible targets

Based upon these documents, Peter Pilz filed a complaint (pdf) against 3 employees of Deutsche Telekom and one employee of BND for spying on Austria, although at the same time he said he was convinced the NSA was most interested not in Austrian targets, but in the offices of the UN, OPEC and OSCE in Vienna.

Apparently he didn’t consider the fact that Eikonal was part of the RAMPART-A umbrella program, which is aimed at targets in Russia, the Middle East and North Africa. Many cities mentioned in the disclosed lists seem to point to Russia as target, and project manager S.L. testified that Eikonal was mainly used for targets related to Afghanistan, which fits the fact that there are for example 13 links to Saudi Arabia.

Green party members from various countries claimed that this cable tapping was used for economical or industrial espionage, but so far, there is no specific indication, let alone evidence for that claim.

SOURCE: ELEKTROSPACES

http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl

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Video – Targeted by the Stasi: revisiting the past

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The Stasi spied on Silke Orphal and Ilona Seeber for years – after they applied to go to the West. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, they both look back at their Stasi files. The Stasi files of Silke Orphal and Ilona Seeber include intercepted letters, official documents and countless reports by spies who meticulously noted everything about their lives, including the turning on and off of lights. When Silke Orphal and Ilona Seeber, who were both ordinary typists at Neues Deutschland – the official newspaper of the Socialist Unity Party – applied to leave the GDR, it was considered scandalous. They were ostracized at work, threatened and subjected to interrogations that lasted hours. What did the experience do to them? How do they look back on that time today? A report by Axel Rowohlt.

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Exposed – NSA FOIA Report 2014

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Unveiled – How the NSA made Google

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How the CIA made Google

Inside the secret network behind mass surveillance, endless war, and Skynet—

part 1

By Nafeez Ahmed

INSURGE INTELLIGENCE, a new crowd-funded investigative journalism project, breaks the exclusive story of how the United States intelligence community funded, nurtured and incubated Google as part of a drive to dominate the world through control of information. Seed-funded by the NSA and CIA, Google was merely the first among a plethora of private sector start-ups co-opted by US intelligence to retain ‘information superiority.’

The origins of this ingenious strategy trace back to a secret Pentagon-sponsored group, that for the last two decades has functioned as a bridge between the US government and elites across the business, industry, finance, corporate, and media sectors. The group has allowed some of the most powerful special interests in corporate America to systematically circumvent democratic accountability and the rule of law to influence government policies, as well as public opinion in the US and around the world. The results have been catastrophic: NSA mass surveillance, a permanent state of global war, and a new initiative to transform the US military into Skynet.

THIS IS PART ONE. READ PART TWO HERE.

This exclusive is being released for free in the public interest, and was enabled by crowdfunding. I’d like to thank my amazing community of patrons for their support, which gave me the opportunity to work on this in-depth investigation. Please support independent, investigative journalism for the global commons.

In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, western governments are moving fast to legitimize expanded powers of mass surveillance and controls on the internet, all in the name of fighting terrorism.

US and European politicians have called to protect NSA-style snooping, and to advance the capacity to intrude on internet privacy by outlawing encryption. One idea is to establish a telecoms partnership that would unilaterally delete content deemed to “fuel hatred and violence” in situations considered “appropriate.” Heated discussions are going on at government and parliamentary level to explore cracking down on lawyer-client confidentiality.

What any of this would have done to prevent the Charlie Hebdo attacks remains a mystery, especially given that we already know the terrorists were on the radar of French intelligence for up to a decade.

There is little new in this story. The 9/11 atrocity was the first of many terrorist attacks, each succeeded by the dramatic extension of draconian state powers at the expense of civil liberties, backed up with the projection of military force in regions identified as hotspots harbouring terrorists. Yet there is little indication that this tried and tested formula has done anything to reduce the danger. If anything, we appear to be locked into a deepening cycle of violence with no clear end in sight.

As our governments push to increase their powers, INSURGE INTELLIGENCE can now reveal the vast extent to which the US intelligence community is implicated in nurturing the web platforms we know today, for the precise purpose of utilizing the technology as a mechanism to fight global ‘information war’ — a war to legitimize the power of the few over the rest of us. The lynchpin of this story is the corporation that in many ways defines the 21st century with its unobtrusive omnipresence: Google.

Google styles itself as a friendly, funky, user-friendly tech firm that rose to prominence through a combination of skill, luck, and genuine innovation. This is true. But it is a mere fragment of the story. In reality, Google is a smokescreen behind which lurks the US military-industrial complex.

The inside story of Google’s rise, revealed here for the first time, opens a can of worms that goes far beyond Google, unexpectedly shining a light on the existence of a parasitical network driving the evolution of the US national security apparatus, and profiting obscenely from its operation.

The shadow network

For the last two decades, US foreign and intelligence strategies have resulted in a global ‘war on terror’ consisting of prolonged military invasions in the Muslim world and comprehensive surveillance of civilian populations. These strategies have been incubated, if not dictated, by a secret network inside and beyond the Pentagon.

Established under the Clinton administration, consolidated under Bush, and firmly entrenched under Obama, this bipartisan network of mostly neoconservative ideologues sealed its dominion inside the US Department of Defense (DoD) by the dawn of 2015, through the operation of an obscure corporate entity outside the Pentagon, but run by the Pentagon.

In 1999, the CIA created its own venture capital investment firm, In-Q-Tel, to fund promising start-ups that might create technologies useful for intelligence agencies. But the inspiration for In-Q-Tel came earlier, when the Pentagon set up its own private sector outfit.

Known as the ‘Highlands Forum,’ this private network has operated as a bridge between the Pentagon and powerful American elites outside the military since the mid-1990s. Despite changes in civilian administrations, the network around the Highlands Forum has become increasingly successful in dominating US defense policy.

Giant defense contractors like Booz Allen Hamilton and Science Applications International Corporation are sometimes referred to as the ‘shadow intelligence community’ due to the revolving doors between them and government, and their capacity to simultaneously influence and profit from defense policy. But while these contractors compete for power and money, they also collaborate where it counts. The Highlands Forum has for 20 years provided an off the record space for some of the most prominent members of the shadow intelligence community to convene with senior US government officials, alongside other leaders in relevant industries.

I first stumbled upon the existence of this network in November 2014, when I reported for VICE’s Motherboard that US defense secretary Chuck Hagel’s newly announced ‘Defense Innovation Initiative’ was really about building Skynet — or something like it, essentially to dominate an emerging era of automated robotic warfare.

That story was based on a little-known Pentagon-funded ‘white paper’ published two months earlier by the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington DC, a leading US military-run institution that, among other things, generates research to develop US defense policy at the highest levels. The white paper clarified the thinking behind the new initiative, and the revolutionary scientific and technological developments it hoped to capitalize on.

The Highlands Forum

The co-author of that NDU white paper is Linton Wells, a 51-year veteran US defense official who served in the Bush administration as the Pentagon’s chief information officer, overseeing the National Security Agency (NSA) and other spy agencies. He still holds active top-secret security clearances, and according to a report by Government Executive magazine in 2006 he chaired the ‘Highlands Forum’, founded by the Pentagon in 1994.

Linton Wells II (right) former Pentagon chief information officer and assistant secretary of defense for networks, at a recent Pentagon Highlands Forum session. Rosemary Wenchel, a senior official in the US Department of Homeland Security, is sitting next to him

New Scientist magazine (paywall) has compared the Highlands Forum to elite meetings like “Davos, Ditchley and Aspen,” describing it as “far less well known, yet… arguably just as influential a talking shop.” Regular Forum meetings bring together “innovative people to consider interactions between policy and technology. Its biggest successes have been in the development of high-tech network-based warfare.”

Given Wells’ role in such a Forum, perhaps it was not surprising that his defense transformation white paper was able to have such a profound impact on actual Pentagon policy. But if that was the case, why had no one noticed?

Despite being sponsored by the Pentagon, I could find no official page on the DoD website about the Forum. Active and former US military and intelligence sources had never heard of it, and neither did national security journalists. I was baffled.

The Pentagon’s intellectual capital venture firm

In the prologue to his 2007 book, A Crowd of One: The Future of Individual Identity, John Clippinger, an MIT scientist of the Media Lab Human Dynamics Group, described how he participated in a “Highlands Forum” gathering, an “invitation-only meeting funded by the Department of Defense and chaired by the assistant for networks and information integration.” This was a senior DoD post overseeing operations and policies for the Pentagon’s most powerful spy agencies including the NSA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), among others. Starting from 2003, the position was transitioned into what is now the undersecretary of defense for intelligence. The Highlands Forum, Clippinger wrote, was founded by a retired US Navy captain named Dick O’Neill. Delegates include senior US military officials across numerous agencies and divisions — “captains, rear admirals, generals, colonels, majors and commanders” as well as “members of the DoD leadership.”

What at first appeared to be the Forum’s main website describes Highlands as “an informal cross-disciplinary network sponsored by Federal Government,” focusing on “information, science and technology.” Explanation is sparse, beyond a single ‘Department of Defense’ logo.

But Highlands also has another website describing itself as an “intellectual capital venture firm” with “extensive experience assisting corporations, organizations, and government leaders.” The firm provides a “wide range of services, including: strategic planning, scenario creation and gaming for expanding global markets,” as well as “working with clients to build strategies for execution.” ‘The Highlands Group Inc.,’ the website says, organizes a whole range of Forums on these issue.

For instance, in addition to the Highlands Forum, since 9/11 the Group runs the ‘Island Forum,’ an international event held in association with Singapore’s Ministry of Defense, which O’Neill oversees as “lead consultant.” The Singapore Ministry of Defense website describes the Island Forum as “patterned after the Highlands Forum organized for the US Department of Defense.” Documents leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden confirmed that Singapore played a key role in permitting the US and Australia to tap undersea cables to spy on Asian powers like Indonesia and Malaysia.

The Highlands Group website also reveals that Highlands is partnered with one of the most powerful defense contractors in the United States. Highlands is “supported by a network of companies and independent researchers,” including “our Highlands Forum partners for the past ten years at SAIC; and the vast Highlands network of participants in the Highlands Forum.”

SAIC stands for the US defense firm, Science Applications International Corporation, which changed its name to Leidos in 2013, operating SAIC as a subsidiary. SAIC/Leidos is among the top 10 largest defense contractors in the US, and works closely with the US intelligence community, especially the NSA. According to investigative journalist Tim Shorrock, the first to disclose the vast extent of the privatization of US intelligence with his seminal book Spies for Hire, SAIC has a “symbiotic relationship with the NSA: the agency is the company’s largest single customer and SAIC is the NSA’s largest contractor.”

***Richard ‘Dick’ Patrick O’Neill, founding president of the Pentagon’s Highlands Forum***

The full name of Captain “Dick” O’Neill, the founding president of the Highlands Forum, is Richard Patrick O’Neill, who after his work in the Navy joined the DoD. He served his last post as deputy for strategy and policy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, before setting up Highlands.

The Club of Yoda

But Clippinger also referred to another mysterious individual revered by Forum attendees:

“He sat at the back of the room, expressionless behind thick, black-rimmed glasses. I never heard him utter a word… Andrew (Andy) Marshall is an icon within DoD. Some call him Yoda, indicative of his mythical inscrutable status… He had served many administrations and was widely regarded as above partisan politics. He was a supporter of the Highlands Forum and a regular fixture from its beginning.”

Since 1973, Marshall has headed up one of the Pentagon’s most powerful agencies, the Office of Net Assessment (ONA), the US defense secretary’s internal ‘think tank’ which conducts highly classified research on future planning for defense policy across the US military and intelligence community. The ONA has played a key role in major Pentagon strategy initiatives, including Maritime Strategy, the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Competitive Strategies Initiative, and the Revolution in Military Affairs.

Andrew ‘Yoda’ Marshall, head of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and co-chair of the Highlands Forum, at an early Highlands event in 1996 at the Santa Fe Institute. Marshall is retiring as of January 2015

In a rare 2002 profile in Wired, reporter Douglas McGray described Andrew Marshall, now 93 years old, as “the DoD’s most elusive” but “one of its most influential” officials. McGray added that “Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz” — widely considered the hawks of the neoconservative movement in American politics — were among Marshall’s “star protégés.”

Speaking at a low-key Harvard University seminar a few months after 9/11, Highlands Forum founding president Richard O’Neill said that Marshall was much more than a “regular fixture” at the Forum. “Andy Marshall is our co-chair, so indirectly everything that we do goes back into Andy’s system,” he told the audience. “Directly, people who are in the Forum meetings may be going back to give briefings to Andy on a variety of topics and to synthesize things.” He also said that the Forum had a third co-chair: the director of the Defense Advanced Research and Projects Agency (DARPA), which at that time was a Rumsfeld appointee, Anthony J. Tether. Before joining DARPA, Tether was vice president of SAIC’s Advanced Technology Sector.

***Anthony J. Tether, director of DARPA and co-chair of the Pentagon’s Highlands Forum from June 2001 to February 2009***

The Highlands Forum’s influence on US defense policy has thus operated through three main channels: its sponsorship by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (around the middle of last decade this was transitioned specifically to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, which is in charge of the main surveillance agencies); its direct link to Andrew ‘Yoda’ Marshall’s ONA; and its direct link to DARPA.

***A slide from Richard O’Neill’s presentation at Harvard University in 2001***

According to Clippinger in A Crowd of One, “what happens at informal gatherings such as the Highlands Forum could, over time and through unforeseen curious paths of influence, have enormous impact, not just within the DoD but throughout the world.” He wrote that the Forum’s ideas have “moved from being heretical to mainstream. Ideas that were anathema in 1999 had been adopted as policy just three years later.”

Although the Forum does not produce “consensus recommendations,” its impact is deeper than a traditional government advisory committee. “The ideas that emerge from meetings are available for use by decision-makers as well as by people from the think tanks,” according to O’Neill:

“We’ll include people from Booz, SAIC, RAND, or others at our meetings… We welcome that kind of cooperation, because, truthfully, they have the gravitas. They are there for the long haul and are able to influence government policies with real scholarly work… We produce ideas and interaction and networks for these people to take and use as they need them.”

My repeated requests to O’Neill for information on his work at the Highlands Forum were ignored. The Department of Defense also did not respond to multiple requests for information and comment on the Forum.

Information warfare

The Highlands Forum has served as a two-way ‘influence bridge’: on the one hand, for the shadow network of private contractors to influence the formulation of information operations policy across US military intelligence; and on the other, for the Pentagon to influence what is going on in the private sector. There is no clearer evidence of this than the truly instrumental role of the Forum in incubating the idea of mass surveillance as a mechanism to dominate information on a global scale.

In 1989, Richard O’Neill, then a US Navy cryptologist, wrote a paper for the US Naval War College, ‘Toward a methodology for perception management.’ In his book, Future Wars, Col. John Alexander, then a senior officer in the US Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), records that O’Neill’s paper for the first time outlined a strategy for “perception management” as part of information warfare (IW). O’Neill’s proposed strategy identified three categories of targets for IW: adversaries, so they believe they are vulnerable; potential partners, “so they perceive the cause [of war] as just”; and finally, civilian populations and the political leadership so they “perceive the cost as worth the effort.” A secret briefing based on O’Neill’s work “made its way to the top leadership” at DoD. “They acknowledged that O’Neill was right and told him to bury it.

Except the DoD didn’t bury it. Around 1994, the Highlands Group was founded by O’Neill as an official Pentagon project at the appointment of Bill Clinton’s then defense secretary William Perry — who went on to join SAIC’s board of directors after retiring from government in 2003.

In O’Neill’s own words, the group would function as the Pentagon’s ‘ideas lab’. According to Government Executive, military and information technology experts gathered at the first Forum meeting “to consider the impacts of IT and globalization on the United States and on warfare. How would the Internet and other emerging technologies change the world?” The meeting helped plant the idea of “network-centric warfare” in the minds of “the nation’s top military thinkers.”

Excluding the public

Official Pentagon records confirm that the Highlands Forum’s primary goal was to support DoD policies on O’Neill’s specialism: information warfare. According to the Pentagon’s 1997 Annual Report to the President and the Congress under a section titled ‘Information Operations,’ (IO) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) had authorized the “establishment of the Highlands Group of key DoD, industry, and academic IO experts” to coordinate IO across federal military intelligence agencies.

The following year’s DoD annual report reiterated the Forum’s centrality to information operations: “To examine IO issues, DoD sponsors the Highlands Forum, which brings together government, industry, and academic professionals from various fields.”

Notice that in 1998, the Highlands ‘Group’ became a ‘Forum.’ According to O’Neill, this was to avoid subjecting Highlands Forums meetings to “bureaucratic restrictions.” What he was alluding to was the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which regulates the way the US government can formally solicit the advice of special interests.

Known as the ‘open government’ law, FACA requires that US government officials cannot hold closed-door or secret consultations with people outside government to develop policy. All such consultations should take place via federal advisory committees that permit public scrutiny. FACA requires that meetings be held in public, announced via the Federal Register, that advisory groups are registered with an office at the General Services Administration, among other requirements intended to maintain accountability to the public interest.

But Government Executive reported that “O’Neill and others believed” such regulatory issues “would quell the free flow of ideas and no-holds-barred discussions they sought.” Pentagon lawyers had warned that the word ‘group’ might necessitate certain obligations and advised running the whole thing privately: “So O’Neill renamed it the Highlands Forum and moved into the private sector to manage it as a consultant to the Pentagon.” The Pentagon Highlands Forum thus runs under the mantle of O’Neill’s ‘intellectual capital venture firm,’ ‘Highlands Group Inc.’

In 1995, a year after William Perry appointed O’Neill to head up the Highlands Forum, SAIC — the Forum’s “partner” organization — launched a new Center for Information Strategy and Policy under the direction of “Jeffrey Cooper, a member of the Highlands Group who advises senior Defense Department officials on information warfare issues.” The Center had precisely the same objective as the Forum, to function as “a clearinghouse to bring together the best and brightest minds in information warfare by sponsoring a continuing series of seminars, papers and symposia which explore the implications of information warfare in depth.” The aim was to “enable leaders and policymakers from government, industry, and academia to address key issues surrounding information warfare to ensure that the United States retains its edge over any and all potential enemies.”

Despite FACA regulations, federal advisory committees are already heavily influenced, if not captured, by corporate power. So in bypassing FACA, the Pentagon overrode even the loose restrictions of FACA, by permanently excluding any possibility of public engagement.

O’Neill’s claim that there are no reports or recommendations is disingenuous. By his own admission, the secret Pentagon consultations with industry that have taken place through the Highlands Forum since 1994 have been accompanied by regular presentations of academic and policy papers, recordings and notes of meetings, and other forms of documentation that are locked behind a login only accessible by Forum delegates. This violates the spirit, if not the letter, of FACA — in a way that is patently intended to circumvent democratic accountability and the rule of law.

The Highlands Forum doesn’t need to produce consensus recommendations. Its purpose is to provide the Pentagon a shadow social networking mechanism to cement lasting relationships with corporate power, and to identify new talent, that can be used to fine-tune information warfare strategies in absolute secrecy.

Total participants in the DoD’s Highlands Forum number over a thousand, although sessions largely consist of small closed workshop style gatherings of maximum 25–30 people, bringing together experts and officials depending on the subject. Delegates have included senior personnel from SAIC and Booz Allen Hamilton, RAND Corp., Cisco, Human Genome Sciences, eBay, PayPal, IBM, Google, Microsoft, AT&T, the BBC, Disney, General Electric, Enron, among innumerable others; Democrat and Republican members of Congress and the Senate; senior executives from the US energy industry such as Daniel Yergin of IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates; and key people involved in both sides of presidential campaigns.

Other participants have included senior media professionals: David Ignatius, associate editor of the Washington Post and at the time the executive editor of the International Herald Tribune; Thomas Friedman, long-time New York Times columnist; Arnaud de Borchgrave, an editor at Washington Times and United Press International; Steven Levy, a former Newsweek editor, senior writer for Wired and now chief tech editor at Medium; Lawrence Wright, staff writer at the New Yorker; Noah Shachtmann, executive editor at the Daily Beast; Rebecca McKinnon, co-founder of Global Voices Online; Nik Gowing of the BBC; and John Markoff of the New York Times.

Due to its current sponsorship by the OSD’s undersecretary of defense for intelligence, the Forum has inside access to the chiefs of the main US surveillance and reconnaissance agencies, as well as the directors and their assistants at DoD research agencies, from DARPA, to the ONA. This also means that the Forum is deeply plugged into the Pentagon’s policy research task forces.

Google: seeded by the Pentagon

In 1994 — the same year the Highlands Forum was founded under the stewardship of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the ONA, and DARPA — two young PhD students at Stanford University, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, made their breakthrough on the first automated web crawling and page ranking application. That application remains the core component of what eventually became Google’s search service. Brin and Page had performed their work with funding from the Digital Library Initiative (DLI), a multi-agency programme of the National Science Foundation (NSF), NASA and DARPA.

But that’s just one side of the story.

Throughout the development of the search engine, Sergey Brin reported regularly and directly to two people who were not Stanford faculty at all: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham and Dr. Rick Steinheiser. Both were representatives of a sensitive US intelligence community research programme on information security and data-mining.

Thuraisingham is currently the Louis A. Beecherl distinguished professor and executive director of the Cyber Security Research Institute at the University of Texas, Dallas, and a sought-after expert on data-mining, data management and information security issues. But in the 1990s, she worked for the MITRE Corp., a leading US defense contractor, where she managed the Massive Digital Data Systems initiative, a project sponsored by the NSA, CIA, and the Director of Central Intelligence, to foster innovative research in information technology.

“We funded Stanford University through the computer scientist Jeffrey Ullman, who had several promising graduate students working on many exciting areas,” Prof. Thuraisingham told me. “One of them was Sergey Brin, the founder of Google. The intelligence community’s MDDS program essentially provided Brin seed-funding, which was supplemented by many other sources, including the private sector.”

This sort of funding is certainly not unusual, and Sergey Brin’s being able to receive it by being a graduate student at Stanford appears to have been incidental. The Pentagon was all over computer science research at this time. But it illustrates how deeply entrenched the culture of Silicon Valley is in the values of the US intelligence community.

In an extraordinary document hosted by the website of the University of Texas, Thuraisingham recounts that from 1993 to 1999, “the Intelligence Community [IC] started a program called Massive Digital Data Systems (MDDS) that I was managing for the Intelligence Community when I was at the MITRE Corporation.” The program funded 15 research efforts at various universities, including Stanford. Its goal was developing “data management technologies to manage several terabytes to petabytes of data,” including for “query processing, transaction management, metadata management, storage management, and data integration.”

At the time, Thuraisingham was chief scientist for data and information management at MITRE, where she led team research and development efforts for the NSA, CIA, US Air Force Research Laboratory, as well as the US Army’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) and Communications and Electronic Command (CECOM). She went on to teach courses for US government officials and defense contractors on data-mining in counter-terrorism.

In her University of Texas article, she attaches the copy of an abstract of the US intelligence community’s MDDS program that had been presented to the “Annual Intelligence Community Symposium” in 1995. The abstract reveals that the primary sponsors of the MDDS programme were three agencies: the NSA, the CIA’s Office of Research & Development, and the intelligence community’s Community Management Staff (CMS) which operates under the Director of Central Intelligence. Administrators of the program, which provided funding of around 3–4 million dollars per year for 3–4 years, were identified as Hal Curran (NSA), Robert Kluttz (CMS), Dr. Claudia Pierce (NSA), Dr. Rick Steinheiser (ORD — standing for the CIA’s Office of Research and Devepment), and Dr. Thuraisingham herself.

Thuraisingham goes on in her article to reiterate that this joint CIA-NSA program partly funded Sergey Brin to develop the core of Google, through a grant to Stanford managed by Brin’s supervisor Prof. Jeffrey D. Ullman:

“In fact, the Google founder Mr. Sergey Brin was partly funded by this program while he was a PhD student at Stanford. He together with his advisor Prof. Jeffrey Ullman and my colleague at MITRE, Dr. Chris Clifton [Mitre’s chief scientist in IT], developed the Query Flocks System which produced solutions for mining large amounts of data stored in databases. I remember visiting Stanford with Dr. Rick Steinheiser from the Intelligence Community and Mr. Brin would rush in on roller blades, give his presentation and rush out. In fact the last time we met in September 1998, Mr. Brin demonstrated to us his search engine which became Google soon after.”

Brin and Page officially incorporated Google as a company in September 1998, the very month they last reported to Thuraisingham and Steinheiser. ‘Query Flocks’ was also part of Google’s patented ‘PageRank’ search system, which Brin developed at Stanford under the CIA-NSA-MDDS programme, as well as with funding from the NSF, IBM and Hitachi. That year, MITRE’s Dr. Chris Clifton, who worked under Thuraisingham to develop the ‘Query Flocks’ system, co-authored a paper with Brin’s superviser, Prof. Ullman, and the CIA’s Rick Steinheiser. Titled ‘Knowledge Discovery in Text,’ the paper was presented at an academic conference.

“The MDDS funding that supported Brin was significant as far as seed-funding goes, but it was probably outweighed by the other funding streams,” said Thuraisingham. “The duration of Brin’s funding was around two years or so. In that period, I and my colleagues from the MDDS would visit Stanford to see Brin and monitor his progress every three months or so. We didn’t supervise exactly, but we did want to check progress, point out potential problems and suggest ideas. In those briefings, Brin did present to us on the query flocks research, and also demonstrated to us versions of the Google search engine.”

Brin thus reported to Thuraisingham and Steinheiser regularly about his work developing Google.

UPDATE 2.05PM GMT [2nd Feb 2015]:

Since publication of this article, Prof. Thuraisingham has amended her article referenced above. The amended version includes a new modified statement, followed by a copy of the original version of her account of the MDDS. In this amended version, Thuraisingham rejects the idea that CIA funded Google, and says instead:

“In fact Prof. Jeffrey Ullman (at Stanford) and my colleague at MITRE Dr. Chris Clifton together with some others developed the Query Flocks System, as part of MDDS, which produced solutions for mining large amounts of data stored in databases. Also, Mr. Sergey Brin, the cofounder of Google, was part of Prof. Ullman’s research group at that time. I remember visiting Stanford with Dr. Rick Steinheiser from the Intelligence Community periodically and Mr. Brin would rush in on roller blades, give his presentation and rush out. During our last visit to Stanford in September 1998, Mr. Brin demonstrated to us his search engine which I believe became Google soon after…

There are also several inaccuracies in Dr. Ahmed’s article (dated January 22, 2015). For example, the MDDS program was not a ‘sensitive’ program as stated by Dr. Ahmed; it was an Unclassified program that funded universities in the US. Furthermore, Sergey Brin never reported to me or to Dr. Rick Steinheiser; he only gave presentations to us during our visits to the Department of Computer Science at Stanford during the 1990s. Also, MDDS never funded Google; it funded Stanford University.”

Here, there is no substantive factual difference in Thuraisingham’s accounts, other than to assert that her statement associating Sergey Brin with the development of ‘query flocks’ is mistaken. Notably, this acknowledgement is derived not from her own knowledge, but from this very article quoting a comment from a Google spokesperson.

However, the bizarre attempt to disassociate Google from the MDDS program misses the mark. Firstly, the MDDS never funded Google, because during the development of the core components of the Google search engine, there was no company incorporated with that name. The grant was instead provided to Stanford University through Prof. Ullman, through whom some MDDS funding was used to support Brin who was co-developing Google at the time. Secondly, Thuraisingham then adds that Brin never “reported” to her or the CIA’s Steinheiser, but admits he “gave presentations to us during our visits to the Department of Computer Science at Stanford during the 1990s.” It is unclear, though, what the distinction is here between reporting, and delivering a detailed presentation — either way, Thuraisingham confirms that she and the CIA had taken a keen interest in Brin’s development of Google. Thirdly, Thuraisingham describes the MDDS program as “unclassified,” but this does not contradict its “sensitive” nature. As someone who has worked for decades as an intelligence contractor and advisor, Thuraisingham is surely aware that there are many ways of categorizing intelligence, including ‘sensitive but unclassified.’ A number of former US intelligence officials I spoke to said that the almost total lack of public information on the CIA and NSA’s MDDS initiative suggests that although the progam was not classified, it is likely instead that its contents was considered sensitive, which would explain efforts to minimise transparency about the program and the way it fed back into developing tools for the US intelligence community. Fourthly, and finally, it is important to point out that the MDDS abstract which Thuraisingham includes in her University of Texas document states clearly not only that the Director of Central Intelligence’s CMS, CIA and NSA were the overseers of the MDDS initiative, but that the intended customers of the project were “DoD, IC, and other government organizations”: the Pentagon, the US intelligence community, and other relevant US government agencies.

In other words, the provision of MDDS funding to Brin through Ullman, under the oversight of Thuraisingham and Steinheiser, was fundamentally because they recognized the potential utility of Brin’s work developing Google to the Pentagon, intelligence community, and the federal government at large.

The MDDS programme is actually referenced in several papers co-authored by Brin and Page while at Stanford, specifically highlighting its role in financially sponsoring Brin in the development of Google. In their 1998 paper published in the Bulletin of the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committeee on Data Engineering, they describe the automation of methods to extract information from the web via “Dual Iterative Pattern Relation Extraction,” the development of “a global ranking of Web pages called PageRank,” and the use of PageRank “to develop a novel search engine called Google.” Through an opening footnote, Sergey Brin confirms he was “Partially supported by the Community Management Staff’s Massive Digital Data Systems Program, NSF grant IRI-96–31952” — confirming that Brin’s work developing Google was indeed partly-funded by the CIA-NSA-MDDS program.

This NSF grant identified alongside the MDDS, whose project report lists Brin among the students supported (without mentioning the MDDS), was different to the NSF grant to Larry Page that included funding from DARPA and NASA. The project report, authored by Brin’s supervisor Prof. Ullman, goes on to say under the section ‘Indications of Success’ that “there are some new stories of startups based on NSF-supported research.” Under ‘Project Impact,’ the report remarks: “Finally, the google project has also gone commercial as Google.com.”

Thuraisingham’s account, including her new amended version, therefore demonstrates that the CIA-NSA-MDDS program was not only partly funding Brin throughout his work with Larry Page developing Google, but that senior US intelligence representatives including a CIA official oversaw the evolution of Google in this pre-launch phase, all the way until the company was ready to be officially founded. Google, then, had been enabled with a “significant” amount of seed-funding and oversight from the Pentagon: namely, the CIA, NSA, and DARPA.

The DoD could not be reached for comment.

When I asked Prof. Ullman to confirm whether or not Brin was partly funded under the intelligence community’s MDDS program, and whether Ullman was aware that Brin was regularly briefing the CIA’s Rick Steinheiser on his progress in developing the Google search engine, Ullman’s responses were evasive: “May I know whom you represent and why you are interested in these issues? Who are your ‘sources’?” He also denied that Brin played a significant role in developing the ‘query flocks’ system, although it is clear from Brin’s papers that he did draw on that work in co-developing the PageRank system with Page.

When I asked Ullman whether he was denying the US intelligence community’s role in supporting Brin during the development of Google, he said: “I am not going to dignify this nonsense with a denial. If you won’t explain what your theory is, and what point you are trying to make, I am not going to help you in the slightest.”

The MDDS abstract published online at the University of Texas confirms that the rationale for the CIA-NSA project was to “provide seed money to develop data management technologies which are of high-risk and high-pay-off,” including techniques for “querying, browsing, and filtering; transaction processing; accesses methods and indexing; metadata management and data modelling; and integrating heterogeneous databases; as well as developing appropriate architectures.” The ultimate vision of the program was to “provide for the seamless access and fusion of massive amounts of data, information and knowledge in a heterogeneous, real-time environment” for use by the Pentagon, intelligence community and potentially across government.

These revelations corroborate the claims of Robert Steele, former senior CIA officer and a founding civilian deputy director of the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, whom I interviewed for The Guardian last year on open source intelligence. Citing sources at the CIA, Steele had said in 2006 that Steinheiser, an old colleague of his, was the CIA’s main liaison at Google and had arranged early funding for the pioneering IT firm. At the time, Wired founder John Batelle managed to get this official denial from a Google spokesperson in response to Steele’s assertions:

“The statements related to Google are completely untrue.”

This time round, despite multiple requests and conversations, a Google spokesperson declined to comment.

UPDATE: As of 5.41PM GMT [22nd Jan 2015], Google’s director of corporate communication got in touch and asked me to include the following statement:

“Sergey Brin was not part of the Query Flocks Program at Stanford, nor were any of his projects funded by US Intelligence bodies.”

This is what I wrote back:

My response to that statement would be as follows: Brin himself in his own paper acknowledges funding from the Community Management Staff of the Massive Digital Data Systems (MDDS) initiative, which was supplied through the NSF. The MDDS was an intelligence community program set up by the CIA and NSA. I also have it on record, as noted in the piece, from Prof. Thuraisingham of University of Texas that she managed the MDDS program on behalf of the US intelligence community, and that her and the CIA’s Rick Steinheiser met Brin every three months or so for two years to be briefed on his progress developing Google and PageRank. Whether Brin worked on query flocks or not is neither here nor there.

In that context, you might want to consider the following questions:

1) Does Google deny that Brin’s work was part-funded by the MDDS via an NSF grant?

2) Does Google deny that Brin reported regularly to Thuraisingham and Steinheiser from around 1996 to 1998 until September that year when he presented the Google search engine to them?

Total Information Awareness

A call for papers for the MDDS was sent out via email list on November 3rd 1993 from senior US intelligence official David Charvonia, director of the research and development coordination office of the intelligence community’s CMS. The reaction from Tatu Ylonen (celebrated inventor of the widely used secure shell [SSH] data protection protocol) to his colleagues on the email list is telling: “Crypto relevance? Makes you think whether you should protect your data.” The email also confirms that defense contractor and Highlands Forum partner, SAIC, was managing the MDDS submission process, with abstracts to be sent to Jackie Booth of the CIA’s Office of Research and Development via a SAIC email address.

By 1997, Thuraisingham reveals, shortly before Google became incorporated and while she was still overseeing the development of its search engine software at Stanford, her thoughts turned to the national security applications of the MDDS program. In the acknowledgements to her book, Web Data Mining and Applications in Business Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism (2003), Thuraisingham writes that she and “Dr. Rick Steinheiser of the CIA, began discussions with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency on applying data-mining for counter-terrorism,” an idea that resulted directly from the MDDS program which partly funded Google. “These discussions eventually developed into the current EELD (Evidence Extraction and Link Detection) program at DARPA.”

So the very same senior CIA official and CIA-NSA contractor involved in providing the seed-funding for Google were simultaneously contemplating the role of data-mining for counter-terrorism purposes, and were developing ideas for tools actually advanced by DARPA.

Today, as illustrated by her recent oped in the New York Times, Thuraisingham remains a staunch advocate of data-mining for counter-terrorism purposes, but also insists that these methods must be developed by government in cooperation with civil liberties lawyers and privacy advocates to ensure that robust procedures are in place to prevent potential abuse. She points out, damningly, that with the quantity of information being collected, there is a high risk of false positives.

In 1993, when the MDDS program was launched and managed by MITRE Corp. on behalf of the US intelligence community, University of Virginia computer scientist Dr. Anita K. Jones — a MITRE trustee — landed the job of DARPA director and head of research and engineering across the Pentagon. She had been on the board of MITRE since 1988. From 1987 to 1993, Jones simultaneously served on SAIC’s board of directors. As the new head of DARPA from 1993 to 1997, she also co-chaired the Pentagon’s Highlands Forum during the period of Google’s pre-launch development at Stanford under the MDSS.

Thus, when Thuraisingham and Steinheiser were talking to DARPA about the counter-terrorism applications of MDDS research, Jones was DARPA director and Highlands Forum co-chair. That year, Jones left DARPA to return to her post at the University of Virgina. The following year, she joined the board of the National Science Foundation, which of course had also just funded Brin and Page, and also returned to the board of SAIC. When she left DoD, Senator Chuck Robb paid Jones the following tribute : “She brought the technology and operational military communities together to design detailed plans to sustain US dominance on the battlefield into the next century.”

Dr. Anita Jones, head of DARPA from 1993–1997, and co-chair of the Pentagon Highlands Forum from 1995–1997, during which officials in charge of the CIA-NSA-MDSS program were funding Google, and in communication with DARPA about data-mining for counterterrorism

On the board of the National Science Foundation from 1992 to 1998 (including a stint as chairman from 1996) was Richard N. Zare. This was the period in which the NSF sponsored Sergey Brin and Larry Page in association with DARPA. In June 1994, Prof. Zare, a chemist at Stanford, participated with Prof. Jeffrey Ullman (who supervised Sergey Brin’s research), on a panel sponsored by Stanford and the National Research Council discussing the need for scientists to show how their work “ties to national needs.” The panel brought together scientists and policymakers, including “Washington insiders.”

DARPA’s EELD program, inspired by the work of Thuraisingham and Steinheiser under Jones’ watch, was rapidly adapted and integrated with a suite of tools to conduct comprehensive surveillance under the Bush administration.

According to DARPA official Ted Senator, who led the EELD program for the agency’s short-lived Information Awareness Office, EELD was among a range of “promising techniques” being prepared for integration “into the prototype TIA system.” TIA stood for Total Information Awareness, and was the main global electronic eavesdropping and data-mining program deployed by the Bush administration after 9/11. TIA had been set up by Iran-Contra conspirator Admiral John Poindexter, who was appointed in 2002 by Bush to lead DARPA’s new Information Awareness Office.

The Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) was another contractor among 26 companies (also including SAIC) that received million dollar contracts from DARPA (the specific quantities remained classified) under Poindexter, to push forward the TIA surveillance program in 2002 onwards. The research included “behaviour-based profiling,” “automated detection, identification and tracking” of terrorist activity, among other data-analyzing projects. At this time, PARC’s director and chief scientist was John Seely Brown. Both Brown and Poindexter were Pentagon Highlands Forum participants — Brown on a regular basis until recently.

TIA was purportedly shut down in 2003 due to public opposition after the program was exposed in the media, but the following year Poindexter participated in a Pentagon Highlands Group session in Singapore, alongside defense and security officials from around the world. Meanwhile, Ted Senator continued to manage the EELD program among other data-mining and analysis projects at DARPA until 2006, when he left to become a vice president at SAIC. He is now a SAIC/Leidos technical fellow.

Google, DARPA and the money trail

Long before the appearance of Sergey Brin and Larry Page, Stanford University’s computer science department had a close working relationship with US military intelligence. A letter dated November 5th 1984 from the office of renowned artificial intelligence (AI) expert, Prof Edward Feigenbaum, addressed to Rick Steinheiser, gives the latter directions to Stanford’s Heuristic Programming Project, addressing Steinheiser as a member of the “AI Steering Committee.” A list of attendees at a contractor conference around that time, sponsored by the Pentagon’s Office of Naval Research (ONR), includes Steinheiser as a delegate under the designation “OPNAV Op-115” — which refers to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ program on operational readiness, which played a major role in advancing digital systems for the military.

From the 1970s, Prof. Feigenbaum and his colleagues had been running Stanford’s Heuristic Programming Project under contract with DARPA, continuing through to the 1990s. Feigenbaum alone had received around over $7 million in this period for his work from DARPA, along with other funding from the NSF, NASA, and ONR.

Brin’s supervisor at Stanford, Prof. Jeffrey Ullman, was in 1996 part of a joint funding project of DARPA’s Intelligent Integration of Information program. That year, Ullman co-chaired DARPA-sponsored meetings on data exchange between multiple systems.

In September 1998, the same month that Sergey Brin briefed US intelligence representatives Steinheiser and Thuraisingham, tech entrepreneurs Andreas Bechtolsheim and David Cheriton invested $100,000 each in Google. Both investors were connected to DARPA.

As a Stanford PhD student in electrical engineering in the 1980s, Bechtolsheim’s pioneering SUN workstation project had been funded by DARPA and the Stanford computer science department — this research was the foundation of Bechtolsheim’s establishment of Sun Microsystems, which he co-founded with William Joy.

As for Bechtolsheim’s co-investor in Google, David Cheriton, the latter is a long-time Stanford computer science professor who has an even more entrenched relationship with DARPA. His bio at the University of Alberta, which in November 2014 awarded him an honorary science doctorate, says that Cheriton’s “research has received the support of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for over 20 years.”

In the meantime, Bechtolsheim left Sun Microsystems in 1995, co-founding Granite Systems with his fellow Google investor Cheriton as a partner. They sold Granite to Cisco Systems in 1996, retaining significant ownership of Granite, and becoming senior Cisco executives.

An email obtained from the Enron Corpus (a database of 600,000 emails acquired by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and later released to the public) from Richard O’Neill, inviting Enron executives to participate in the Highlands Forum, shows that Cisco and Granite executives are intimately connected to the Pentagon. The email reveals that in May 2000, Bechtolsheim’s partner and Sun Microsystems co-founder, William Joy — who was then chief scientist and corporate executive officer there — had attended the Forum to discuss nanotechnology and molecular computing.

In 1999, Joy had also co-chaired the President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee, overseeing a report acknowledging that DARPA had:

“… revised its priorities in the 90’s so that all information technology funding was judged in terms of its benefit to the warfighter.”

Throughout the 1990s, then, DARPA’s funding to Stanford, including Google, was explicitly about developing technologies that could augment the Pentagon’s military intelligence operations in war theatres.

The Joy report recommended more federal government funding from the Pentagon, NASA, and other agencies to the IT sector. Greg Papadopoulos, another of Bechtolsheim’s colleagues as then Sun Microsystems chief technology officer, also attended a Pentagon Highlands’ Forum meeting in September 2000.

In November, the Pentagon Highlands Forum hosted Sue Bostrom, who was vice president for the internet at Cisco, sitting on the company’s board alongside Google co-investors Bechtolsheim and Cheriton. The Forum also hosted Lawrence Zuriff, then a managing partner of Granite, which Bechtolsheim and Cheriton had sold to Cisco. Zuriff had previously been an SAIC contractor from 1993 to 1994, working with the Pentagon on national security issues, specifically for Marshall’s Office of Net Assessment. In 1994, both the SAIC and the ONA were, of course, involved in co-establishing the Pentagon Highlands Forum. Among Zuriff’s output during his SAIC tenure was a paper titled ‘Understanding Information War’, delivered at a SAIC-sponsored US Army Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs.

After Google’s incorporation, the company received $25 million in equity funding in 1999 led by Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers. According to Homeland Security Today, “A number of Sequoia-bankrolled start-ups have contracted with the Department of Defense, especially after 9/11 when Sequoia’s Mark Kvamme met with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to discuss the application of emerging technologies to warfighting and intelligence collection.” Similarly, Kleiner Perkins had developed “a close relationship” with In-Q-Tel, the CIA venture capitalist firm that funds start-ups “to advance ‘priority’ technologies of value” to the intelligence community.

John Doerr, who led the Kleiner Perkins investment in Google obtaining a board position, was a major early investor in Becholshtein’s Sun Microsystems at its launch. He and his wife Anne are the main funders behind Rice University’s Center for Engineering Leadership (RCEL), which in 2009 received $16 million from DARPA for its platform-aware-compilation-environment (PACE) ubiquitous computing R&D program. Doerr also has a close relationship with the Obama administration, which he advised shortly after it took power to ramp up Pentagon funding to the tech industry. In 2013, at the Fortune Brainstorm TECH conference, Doerr applauded “how the DoD’s DARPA funded GPS, CAD, most of the major computer science departments, and of course, the Internet.”

From inception, in other words, Google was incubated, nurtured and financed by interests that were directly affiliated or closely aligned with the US military intelligence community: many of whom were embedded in the Pentagon Highlands Forum.

Google captures the Pentagon

In 2003, Google began customizing its search engine under special contract with the CIA for its Intelink Management Office, “overseeing top-secret, secret and sensitive but unclassified intranets for CIA and other IC agencies,” according to Homeland Security Today. That year, CIA funding was also being “quietly” funneled through the National Science Foundation to projects that might help create “new capabilities to combat terrorism through advanced technology.”

The following year, Google bought the firm Keyhole, which had originally been funded by In-Q-Tel. Using Keyhole, Google began developing the advanced satellite mapping software behind Google Earth. Former DARPA director and Highlands Forum co-chair Anita Jones had been on the board of In-Q-Tel at this time, and remains so today.

Then in November 2005, In-Q-Tel issued notices to sell $2.2 million of Google stocks. Google’s relationship with US intelligence was further brought to light when an IT contractor told a closed Washington DC conference of intelligence professionals on a not-for-attribution basis that at least one US intelligence agency was working to “leverage Google’s [user] data monitoring” capability as part of an effort to acquire data of “national security intelligence interest.”

A photo on Flickr dated March 2007 reveals that Google research director and AI expert Peter Norvig attended a Pentagon Highlands Forum meeting that year in Carmel, California. Norvig’s intimate connection to the Forum as of that year is also corroborated by his role in guest editing the 2007 Forum reading list.

The photo below shows Norvig in conversation with Lewis Shepherd, who at that time was senior technology officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency, responsible for investigating, approving, and architecting “all new hardware/software systems and acquisitions for the Global Defense Intelligence IT Enterprise,” including “big data technologies.” Shepherd now works at Microsoft. Norvig was a computer research scientist at Stanford University in 1991 before joining Bechtolsheim’s Sun Microsystems as senior scientist until 1994, and going on to head up NASA’s computer science division.

Lewis Shepherd (left), then a senior technology officer at the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, talking to Peter Norvig (right), renowned expert in artificial intelligence expert and director of research at Google. This photo is from a Highlands Forum meeting in 2007.

Norvig shows up on O’Neill’s Google Plus profile as one of his close connections. Scoping the rest of O’Neill’s Google Plus connections illustrates that he is directly connected not just to a wide range of Google executives, but also to some of the biggest names in the US tech community.

Those connections include Michele Weslander Quaid, an ex-CIA contractor and former senior Pentagon intelligence official who is now Google’s chief technology officer where she is developing programs to “best fit government agencies’ needs”; Elizabeth Churchill, Google director of user experience; James Kuffner, a humanoid robotics expert who now heads up Google’s robotics division and who introduced the term ‘cloud robotics’; Mark Drapeau, director of innovation engagement for Microsoft’s public sector business; Lili Cheng, general manager of Microsoft’s Future Social Experiences (FUSE) Labs; Jon Udell, Microsoft ‘evangelist’; Cory Ondrejka, vice president of engineering at Facebook; to name just a few.

In 2010, Google signed a multi-billion dollar no-bid contract with the NSA’s sister agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The contract was to use Google Earth for visualization services for the NGA. Google had developed the software behind Google Earth by purchasing Keyhole from the CIA venture firm In-Q-Tel.

Then a year after, in 2011, another of O’Neill’s Google Plus connections, Michele Quaid — who had served in executive positions at the NGA, National Reconnaissance Office and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence — left her government role to become Google ‘innovation evangelist’ and the point-person for seeking government contracts. Quaid’s last role before her move to Google was as a senior representative of the Director of National Intelligence to the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force, and a senior advisor to the undersecretary of defense for intelligence’s director of Joint and Coalition Warfighter Support (J&CWS). Both roles involved information operations at their core. Before her Google move, in other words, Quaid worked closely with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, to which the Pentagon’s Highlands Forum is subordinate. Quaid has herself attended the Forum, though precisely when and how often I could not confirm.

In March 2012, then DARPA director Regina Dugan — who in that capacity was also co-chair of the Pentagon Highlands Forum — followed her colleague Quaid into Google to lead the company’s new Advanced Technology and Projects Group. During her Pentagon tenure, Dugan led on strategic cyber security and social media, among other initiatives. She was responsible for focusing “an increasing portion” of DARPA’s work “on the investigation of offensive capabilities to address military-specific needs,” securing $500 million of government funding for DARPA cyber research from 2012 to 2017.

***Regina Dugan, former head of DARPA and Highlands Forum co-chair, now a senior Google executive — trying her best to look the part***

By November 2014, Google’s chief AI and robotics expert James Kuffner was a delegate alongside O’Neill at the Highlands Island Forum 2014 in Singapore, to explore ‘Advancement in Robotics and Artificial Intelligence: Implications for Society, Security and Conflict.’ The event included 26 delegates from Austria, Israel, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, Britain and the US, from both industry and government. Kuffner’s association with the Pentagon, however, began much earlier. In 1997, Kuffner was a researcher during his Stanford PhD for a Pentagon-funded project on networked autonomous mobile robots, sponsored by DARPA and the US Navy.

Rumsfeld and persistent surveillance

In sum, many of Google’s most senior executives are affiliated with the Pentagon Highlands Forum, which throughout the period of Google’s growth over the last decade, has surfaced repeatedly as a connecting and convening force. The US intelligence community’s incubation of Google from inception occurred through a combination of direct sponsorship and informal networks of financial influence, themselves closely aligned with Pentagon interests.

The Highlands Forum itself has used the informal relationship building of such private networks to bring together defense and industry sectors, enabling the fusion of corporate and military interests in expanding the covert surveillance apparatus in the name of national security. The power wielded by the shadow network represented in the Forum can, however, be gauged most clearly from its impact during the Bush administration, when it played a direct role in literally writing the strategies and doctrines behind US efforts to achieve ‘information superiority.’

In December 2001, O’Neill confirmed that strategic discussions at the Highlands Forum were feeding directly into Andrew Marshall’s DoD-wide strategic review ordered by President Bush and Donald Rumsfeld to upgrade the military, including the Quadrennial Defense Review — and that some of the earliest Forum meetings “resulted in the writing of a group of DoD policies, strategies, and doctrine for the services on information warfare.” That process of “writing” the Pentagon’s information warfare policies “was done in conjunction with people who understood the environment differently — not only US citizens, but also foreign citizens, and people who were developing corporate IT.”

The Pentagon’s post-9/11 information warfare doctrines were, then, written not just by national security officials from the US and abroad: but also by powerful corporate entities in the defense and technology sectors.

In April that year, Gen. James McCarthy had completed his defense transformation review ordered by Rumsfeld. His report repeatedly highlighted mass surveillance as integral to DoD transformation. As for Marshall, his follow-up report for Rumsfeld was going to develop a blueprint determining the Pentagon’s future in the ‘information age.’

O’Neill also affirmed that to develop information warfare doctrine, the Forum had held extensive discussions on electronic surveillance and “what constitutes an act of war in an information environment.” Papers feeding into US defense policy written through the late 1990s by RAND consultants John Arquilla and David Rondfeldt, both longstanding Highlands Forum members, were produced “as a result of those meetings,” exploring policy dilemmas on how far to take the goal of ‘Information Superiority.’ “One of the things that was shocking to the American public was that we weren’t pilfering Milosevic’s accounts electronically when we in fact could,” commented O’Neill.

Although the R&D process around the Pentagon transformation strategy remains classified, a hint at the DoD discussions going on in this period can be gleaned from a 2005 US Army School of Advanced Military Studies research monograph in the DoD journal, Military Review, authored by an active Army intelligence officer.

“The idea of Persistent Surveillance as a transformational capability has circulated within the national Intelligence Community (IC) and the Department of Defense (DoD) for at least three years,” the paper said, referencing the Rumsfeld-commissioned transformation study.

The Army paper went on to review a range of high-level official military documents, including one from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, showing that “Persistent Surveillance” was a fundamental theme of the information-centric vision for defense policy across the Pentagon.

We now know that just two months before O’Neill’s address at Harvard in 2001, under the TIA program, President Bush had secretly authorized the NSA’s domestic surveillance of Americans without court-approved warrants, in what appears to have been an illegal modification of the ThinThread data-mining project — as later exposed by NSA whistleblowers William Binney and Thomas Drake.

The surveillance-startup nexus

From here on, Highlands Forum partner SAIC played a key role in the NSA roll out from inception. Shortly after 9/11, Brian Sharkey, chief technology officer of SAIC’s ELS3 Sector (focusing on IT systems for emergency responders), teamed up with John Poindexter to propose the TIA surveillance program. SAIC’s Sharkey had previously been deputy director of the Information Systems Office at DARPA through the 1990s.

Meanwhile, around the same time, SAIC vice president for corporate development, Samuel Visner, became head of the NSA’s signals-intelligence programs. SAIC was then among a consortium receiving a $280 million contract to develop one of the NSA’s secret eavesdropping systems. By 2003, Visner returned to SAIC to become director of strategic planning and business development of the firm’s intelligence group.

That year, the NSA consolidated its TIA programme of warrantless electronic surveillance, to keep “track of individuals” and understand “how they fit into models” through risk profiles of American citizens and foreigners. TIA was doing this by integrating databases on finance, travel, medical, educational and other records into a “virtual, centralized grand database.”

This was also the year that the Bush administration drew up its notorious Information Operations Roadmap. Describing the internet as a “vulnerable weapons system,” Rumsfeld’s IO roadmap had advocated that Pentagon strategy “should be based on the premise that the Department [of Defense] will ‘fight the net’ as it would an enemy weapons system.” The US should seek “maximum control” of the “full spectrum of globally emerging communications systems, sensors, and weapons systems,” advocated the document.

The following year, John Poindexter, who had proposed and run the TIA surveillance program via his post at DARPA, was in Singapore participating in the Highlands 2004 Island Forum. Other delegates included then Highlands Forum co-chair and Pentagon CIO Linton Wells; president of notorious Pentagon information warfare contractor, John Rendon; Karl Lowe, director of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Advanced Warfighting Division; Air Vice Marshall Stephen Dalton, capability manager for information superiority at the UK Ministry of Defense; Lt. Gen. Johan Kihl, Swedish army Supreme Commander HQ’s chief of staff; among others.

As of 2006, SAIC had been awarded a multi-million dollar NSA contract to develop a big data-mining project called ExecuteLocus, despite the colossal $1 billion failure of its preceding contract, known as ‘Trailblazer.’ Core components of TIA were being “quietly continued” under “new code names,” according to Foreign Policy’s Shane Harris, but had been concealed “behind the veil of the classified intelligence budget.” The new surveillance program had by then been fully transitioned from DARPA’s jurisdiction to the NSA.

This was also the year of yet another Singapore Island Forum led by Richard O’Neill on behalf of the Pentagon, which included senior defense and industry officials from the US, UK, Australia, France, India and Israel. Participants also included senior technologists from Microsoft, IBM, as well as Gilman Louie, partner at technology investment firm Alsop Louie Partners.

Gilman Louie is a former CEO of In-Q-Tel — the CIA firm investing especially in start-ups developing data mining technology. In-Q-Tel was founded in 1999 by the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, under which the Office of Research and Development (ORD) — which was part of the Google-funding MDSS program — had operated. The idea was to essentially replace the functions once performed by the ORD, by mobilizing the private sector to develop information technology solutions for the entire intelligence community.

Louie had led In-Q-Tel from 1999 until January 2006 — including when Google bought Keyhole, the In-Q-Tel-funded satellite mapping software. Among his colleagues on In-Q-Tel’s board in this period were former DARPA director and Highlands Forum co-chair Anita Jones (who is still there), as well as founding board member William Perry: the man who had appointed O’Neill to set-up the Highlands Forum in the first place. Joining Perry as a founding In-Q-Tel board member was John Seely Brown, then chief scientist at Xerox Corp and director of its Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) from 1990 to 2002, who is also a long-time senior Highlands Forum member since inception.

In addition to the CIA, In-Q-Tel has also been backed by the FBI, NGA, and Defense Intelligence Agency, among other agencies. More than 60 percent of In-Q-Tel’s investments under Louie’s watch were “in companies that specialize in automatically collecting, sifting through and understanding oceans of information,” according to Medill School of Journalism’s News21, which also noted that Louie himself had acknowledged it was not clear “whether privacy and civil liberties will be protected” by government’s use of these technologies “for national security.”

The transcript of Richard O’Neill’s late 2001 seminar at Harvard shows that the Pentagon Highlands Forum had first engaged Gilman Louie long before the Island Forum, in fact, shortly after 9/11 to explore “what’s going on with In-Q-Tel.” That Forum session focused on how to “take advantage of the speed of the commercial market that wasn’t present inside the science and technology community of Washington” and to understand “the implications for the DoD in terms of the strategic review, the QDR, Hill action, and the stakeholders.” Participants of the meeting included “senior military people,” combatant commanders, “several of the senior flag officers,” some “defense industry people” and various US representatives including Republican Congressman William Mac Thornberry and Democrat Senator Joseph Lieberman.

Both Thornberry and Lieberman are staunch supporters of NSA surveillance, and have consistently acted to rally support for pro-war, pro-surveillance legislation. O’Neill’s comments indicate that the Forum’s role is not just to enable corporate contractors to write Pentagon policy, but to rally political support for government policies adopted through the Forum’s informal brand of shadow networking.

Repeatedly, O’Neill told his Harvard audience that his job as Forum president was to scope case studies from real companies across the private sector, like eBay and Human Genome Sciences, to figure out the basis of US ‘Information Superiority’ — “how to dominate” the information market — and leverage this for “what the president and the secretary of defense wanted to do with regard to transformation of the DoD and the strategic review.”

By 2007, a year after the Island Forum meeting that included Gilman Louie, Facebook received its second round of $12.7 million worth of funding from Accel Partners. Accel was headed up by James Breyer, former chair of the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) where Louie also served on the board while still CEO of In-Q-Tel. Both Louie and Breyer had previously served together on the board of BBN Technologies — which had recruited ex-DARPA chief and In-Q-Tel trustee Anita Jones.

Facebook’s 2008 round of funding was led by Greylock Venture Capital, which invested $27.5 million. The firm’s senior partners include Howard Cox, another former NVCA chair who also sits on the board of In-Q-Tel. Apart from Breyer and Zuckerberg, Facebook’s only other board member is Peter Thiel, co-founder of defense contractor Palantir which provides all sorts of data-mining and visualization technologies to US government, military and intelligence agencies, including the NSA and FBI, and which itself was nurtured to financial viability by Highlands Forum members.

Palantir co-founders Thiel and Alex Karp met with John Poindexter in 2004, according to Wired, the same year Poindexter had attended the Highlands Island Forum in Singapore. They met at the home of Richard Perle, another Andrew Marshall acolyte. Poindexter helped Palantir open doors, and to assemble “a legion of advocates from the most influential strata of government.” Thiel had also met with Gilman Louie of In-Q-Tel, securing the backing of the CIA in this early phase.

And so we come full circle. Data-mining programs like ExecuteLocus and projects linked to it, which were developed throughout this period, apparently laid the groundwork for the new NSA programmes eventually disclosed by Edward Snowden. By 2008, as Facebook received its next funding round from Greylock Venture Capital, documents and whistleblower testimony confirmed that the NSA was effectively resurrecting the TIA project with a focus on Internet data-mining via comprehensive monitoring of e-mail, text messages, and Web browsing.

We also now know thanks to Snowden that the NSA’s XKeyscore ‘Digital Network Intelligence’ exploitation system was designed to allow analysts to search not just Internet databases like emails, online chats and browsing history, but also telephone services, mobile phone audio, financial transactions and global air transport communications — essentially the entire global telecommunications grid. Highlands Forum partner SAIC played a key role, among other contractors, in producing and administering the NSA’s XKeyscore, and was recently implicated in NSA hacking of the privacy network Tor.

The Pentagon Highlands Forum was therefore intimately involved in all this as a convening network—but also quite directly. Confirming his pivotal role in the expansion of the US-led global surveillance apparatus, then Forum co-chair, Pentagon CIO Linton Wells, told FedTech magazine in 2009 that he had overseen the NSA’s roll out of “an impressive long-term architecture last summer that will provide increasingly sophisticated security until 2015 or so.”

The Goldman Sachs connection

When I asked Wells about the Forum’s role in influencing US mass surveillance, he responded only to say he would prefer not to comment and that he no longer leads the group.

As Wells is no longer in government, this is to be expected — but he is still connected to Highlands. As of September 2014, after delivering his influential white paper on Pentagon transformation, he joined the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) Cyber Security Initiative (CySec) as a distinguished senior fellow.

Sadly, this was not a form of trying to keep busy in retirement. Wells’ move underscored that the Pentagon’s conception of information warfare is not just about surveillance, but about the exploitation of surveillance to influence both government and public opinion.

The MIIS CySec initiative is now formally partnered with the Pentagon Highlands Forum through a Memorandum of Understanding signed with MIIS provost Dr Amy Sands, who sits on the Secretary of State’s International Security Advisory Board. The MIIS CySec website states that the MoU signed with Richard O’Neill:

“… paves the way for future joint MIIS CySec-Highlands Group sessions that will explore the impact of technology on security, peace and information engagement. For nearly 20 years the Highlands Group has engaged private sector and government leaders, including the Director of National Intelligence, DARPA, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Singaporean Minister of Defence, in creative conversations to frame policy and technology research areas.”

Who is the financial benefactor of the new Pentagon Highlands-partnered MIIS CySec initiative? According to the MIIS CySec site, the initiative was launched “through a generous donation of seed funding from George Lee.” George C. Lee is a senior partner at Goldman Sachs, where he is chief information officer of the investment banking division, and chairman of the Global Technology, Media and Telecom (TMT) Group.

But here’s the kicker. In 2011, it was Lee who engineered Facebook’s $50 billion valuation, and previously handled deals for other Highlands-connected tech giants like Google, Microsoft and eBay. Lee’s then boss, Stephen Friedman, a former CEO and chairman of Goldman Sachs, and later senior partner on the firm’s executive board, was a also founding board member of In-Q-Tel alongside Highlands Forum overlord William Perry and Forum member John Seely Brown.

In 2001, Bush appointed Stephen Friedman to the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, and then to chair that board from 2005 to 2009. Friedman previously served alongside Paul Wolfowitz and others on the 1995–6 presidential commission of inquiry into US intelligence capabilities, and in 1996 on the Jeremiah Panel that produced a report to the Director of the National Reconnaisance Office (NRO) — one of the surveillance agencies plugged into the Highlands Forum. Friedman was on the Jeremiah Panel with Martin Faga, then senior vice president and general manager of MITRE Corp’s Center for Integrated Intelligence Systems — where Thuraisingham, who managed the CIA-NSA-MDDS program that inspired DARPA counter-terrorist data-mining, was also a lead engineer.

In the footnotes to a chapter for the book, Cyberspace and National Security (Georgetown University Press), SAIC/Leidos executive Jeff Cooper reveals that another Goldman Sachs senior partner Philip J. Venables — who as chief information risk officer leads the firm’s programs on information security — delivered a Highlands Forum presentation in 2008 at what was called an ‘Enrichment Session on Deterrence.’ Cooper’s chapter draws on Venables’ presentation at Highlands “with permission.” In 2010, Venables participated with his then boss Friedman at an Aspen Institute meeting on the world economy. For the last few years, Venables has also sat on various NSA cybersecurity award review boards.

In sum, the investment firm responsible for creating the billion dollar fortunes of the tech sensations of the 21st century, from Google to Facebook, is intimately linked to the US military intelligence community; with Venables, Lee and Friedman either directly connected to the Pentagon Highlands Forum, or to senior members of the Forum.

Fighting terror with terror

The convergence of these powerful financial and military interests around the Highlands Forum, through George Lee’s sponsorship of the Forum’s new partner, the MIIS Cysec initiative, is revealing in itself.

MIIS Cysec’s director, Dr, Itamara Lochard, has long been embedded in Highlands. She regularly “presents current research on non-state groups, governance, technology and conflict to the US Office of the Secretary of Defense Highlands Forum,” according to her Tufts University bio. She also, “regularly advises US combatant commanders” and specializes in studying the use of information technology by “violent and non-violent sub-state groups.”

Dr Itamara Lochard is a senior Highlands Forum member and Pentagon information operations expert. She directs the MIIS CyberSec initiative that now supports the Pentagon Highlands Forum with funding from Goldman Sachs partner George Lee, who led the valuations of Facebook and Google.

Dr Lochard maintains a comprehensive database of 1,700 non-state groups including “insurgents, militias, terrorists, complex criminal organizations, organized gangs, malicious cyber actors and strategic non-violent actors,” to analyze their “organizational patterns, areas of cooperation, strategies and tactics.” Notice, here, the mention of “strategic non-violent actors” — which perhaps covers NGOs and other groups or organizations engaged in social political activity or campaigning, judging by the focus of other DoD research programs.

As of 2008, Lochard has been an adjunct professor at the US Joint Special Operations University where she teaches a top secret advanced course in ‘Irregular Warfare’ that she designed for senior US special forces officers. She has previously taught courses on ‘Internal War’ for senior “political-military officers” of various Gulf regimes.

Her views thus disclose much about what the Highlands Forum has been advocating all these years. In 2004, Lochard was co-author of a study for the US Air Force’s Institute for National Security Studies on US strategy toward ‘non-state armed groups.’ The study on the one hand argued that non-state armed groups should be urgently recognized as a ‘tier one security priority,’ and on the other that the proliferation of armed groups “provide strategic opportunities that can be exploited to help achieve policy goals. There have and will be instances where the United States may find collaborating with armed group is in its strategic interests.” But “sophisticated tools” must be developed to differentiate between different groups and understand their dynamics, to determine which groups should be countered, and which could be exploited for US interests. “Armed group profiles can likewise be employed to identify ways in which the United States may assist certain armed groups whose success will be advantageous to US foreign policy objectives.”

In 2008, Wikileaks published a leaked restricted US Army Special Operations field manual, which demonstrated that the sort of thinking advocated by the likes of Highlands expert Lochard had been explicitly adopted by US special forces.

Lochard’s work thus demonstrates that the Highlands Forum sat at the intersection of advanced Pentagon strategy on surveillance, covert operations and irregular warfare: mobilizing mass surveillance to develop detailed information on violent and non-violent groups perceived as potentially threatening to US interests, or offering opportunities for exploitation, thus feeding directly into US covert operations.

That, ultimately, is why the CIA, the NSA, the Pentagon, spawned Google. So they could run their secret dirty wars with even greater efficiency than ever before.

READ PART TWO

Dr Nafeez Ahmed is an investigative journalist, bestselling author and international security scholar. A former Guardian writer, he writes the ‘System Shift’ column for VICE’s Motherboard, and is also a columnist for Middle East Eye. He is the winner of a 2015 Project Censored Award for Outstanding Investigative Journalism for his Guardian work.

Nafeez has also written for The Independent, Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The Scotsman, Foreign Policy, The Atlantic, Quartz, Prospect, New Statesman, Le Monde diplomatique, New Internationalist, Counterpunch, Truthout, among others. He is the author of A User’s Guide to the Crisis of Civilization: And How to Save It (2010), and the scifi thriller novel ZERO POINT, among other books. His work on the root causes and covert operations linked to international terrorism officially contributed to the 9/11 Commission and the 7/7 Coroner’s Inquest.

Written on Jan 22 by

Nafeez Ahmed

investigative journo, international security scholar | author ZERO POINT scifi thriller http://zro.pt | film CRISIS http://crisisofcivilization.com

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Revealed – NSA Snowden Releases Tally Update – *2,694 Pages

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8 December 2014

4 December 2014. Add 63 pages to The Intercept. Tally now *2,627 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally now less than ~4.3%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.015% of that released). ACLU lists 525 pages released by the press. However, if as The Washington Post reported, a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released. Note Greenwald claim on 13 September 2014 of having “hundreds of thousands” of documents.

25 November 2014. Add 72 pages to Süddeutsche Zeitung.

17 November 2014, charts by Cryptome:

[Image]

6 November 2014. At current rate of release it will take 31 to 908 years for full disclosure.

10 October 2014. Add 69 pages to The Intercept.

17 September 2014. Add 2 pages to The Intercept.

14 September 2014. Add 68 pages to Der Spiegel.

13 September 2014. In video Glenn Greenwald claims to have “hundreds of thousands” of documents (at 9:06 min)

http://www.3news.co.nz/tvshows/thenation/interview-glenn-greenwald-2014091311?ref=video

Audio excerpt: http://youtu.be/xnfIp38AAhM

5 September 2014. Add 32 pages to The Intercept. Tally now *2,293 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally now less than ~3.5%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.012% of that released). ACLU lists 525 pages released by the press. However, if as The Washington Post reported, a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released.

31 August 2014. Add 34 pages to Der Spiegel.

25 August 2014. Add 55 pages to The Intercept.

16 August 2014. Add 26 pages to Heise.

12 August 2014. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.

5 August 2014. Add 12 pages to The Intercept.

4 August 2014. Add 23 pages to The Intercept.

25 July 2014. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.

14 July 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

14 July 2014. “I’m as mad as hell and I’m not going to take this anymore!”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_%28film%29

http://cryptome.org/2014/07/snowden-documents-demand-14-0714.pdf

11 July 2014. See related essay, Open the Snowden Files, Krystian Woznicki, 11July 2014:

English: http://berlinergazette.de/wp-content/uploads/Open-the-Snowden-Files_KW_E.pdf
German: http://berlinergazette.de/open-the-snowden-files/

11 July 2014. @PaulMD notes this claim in the Washington Post, 11 July 2014:

We did not have an official NSA list of targets. We had to find them in the pile ourselves. Soltani, an independent researcher, did most of the heavy lifting on that. Because the information was not laid out in rows and columns, the way it might be in a spreadsheet, Soltani wrote computer code to extract what we were looking for from something like a quarter-million pages of unstructured text.

If a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released.

9 July 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

9 July 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post.

23 June 2014. Add 9 pages to Der Spiegel.

22 June 2014. Add 41 pages to Information-The Intercept.

Revised. This is included in entry above. 18 June 2014. Add 20 pages to The Intercept.

18 June 2014. Add 200 pages to Der Spiegel.

16 June 2014. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel.

1 June 2014. Add 4 pages to New York Times.

23 May 2014. Cryptome placed online No Place to Hide, 310 pages, to compensate for failure to release Snowden documents:

http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-freed.htm

http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z (27MB)

19 May 2014. The Intercept released 12 pages.

13 May 2014. Glenn Greenwald released 107 pages, some new, some previously published, some full pages, some page fragments.

http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf

5 May 2014. Related tally of redactions of Snowden releases:

http://cryptome.org/2014/05/snowden-redactions.htm

30 April 2014. Add 19 pages to The Intercept.

30 April 2014. Add 2 pages to Dagbladet belatedly.

5 April 2014. Add 21 pages to The Intercept.

4 April 2014. ACLU offers NSA documents search: https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search

Also:

http://freesnowden.is/category/revealed-documents/index.html

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

If more lists please send: cryptome[at]earthlink.net

2 April 2014.

29 March 2014. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.

22 March 2014. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel.

22 March 2014. Add 2 pages to New York Times.

21 March 2014. Add 7 pages to Le Monde.

20 March 2014. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.

18 March 2014. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

13 March 2014. Add 1 page to The Intercept.

12 March 2014. Add 35 pages to The Intercept.

12 March 2014. Add 62 pages to New York Times. Add 2 pages to NRC Handelsblad.

7 March 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.

27 February 2014. Add 3 pages to Guardian.

25 February 2014. Add 11 pages to NBC News.

24 February 2014. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.

24 February 2014. Add *50 pages to The Intercept (7 pages are duplicates of GCHQ Psychology).

18 February 2014. Add *45 pages to The Intercept (37 pages are duplicates of release by NBC News).

10 February 2014. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad (via Electrospaces.blogspot.com).

7 February 2014. Add 15 pages NBC News.

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages to CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous via New York Times.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

Related Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment:

http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-count.htm

* 5 January 2014. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel (30 December 2013. No source given for NSA docs). Tally now *962 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.50% of that released).

Glenn Greenwald tweeted:

Glenn Greenwald @ggreenwald, 8:05 AM – 29 Dec 13@Cryptomeorg @ioerror I had no involvement in that Spiegel article, ask them – and they don’t say those are Snowden docs.

Matt Blaze tweeted, 11:24 AM – 2 Jan 14

matt blaze @mattblazeIf there are other sources besides Snowden, I hope journalists getting docs are careful to authenticate them (& disclose uncertainty).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

3 January 2014. See also EFF, ACLU and LeakSource accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages (8 duplicates) to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

23 December 2013

http://www.adn.com/2013/12/22/3243451/pincus-snowden-still-has-a-road.html

We’ve yet to see the full impact of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s unauthorized downloading of highly classified intelligence documents.

Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

3 November 2013

47 42 Years to Release Snowden Documents

Out of reported 50,000 pages (or files, not clear which), about 446 514 pages (>1% 1%) have been released over 5 months beginning June 5, 2012. At this rate, 89 100 pages per month, it will take 47 42 years for full release. Snowden will be 77 72 years old, his reporters hoarding secrets all dead.

NY Times, 3 November 2013:

Whatever reforms may come, Bobby R. Inman, who weathered his own turbulent period as N.S.A. director from 1977 to 1981, offers his hyper-secret former agency a radical suggestion for right now. “My advice would be to take everything you think Snowden has and get it out yourself,” he said. “It would certainly be a shock to the agency. But bad news doesn’t get better with age. The sooner they get it out and put it behind them, the faster they can begin to rebuild.”

Timeline of releases:

[See tabulation below for full timeline.]

5 October 2013

26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian

Edward Snowden will be 56 years old.
Glenn Greenwald will be 72.
Laura Poitras will be 75.
Alan Rusbridger will be 86.
Barton Gellman will be 78.
Julian Assange will be 68.
Chelsea Manning will be 52.
Keith Alexander will be 88.
Barack Obama will be 78.
Daniel Ellsberg will be 108.
This author will be 103.

Number	Date	Title	Pages

	The Guardian		276
	27 February 2014	GCHQ Optic Nerve	3
21	16 January 2014	SMS Text Messages Exploit	8
20	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	2
18	18 November 2013	DSD-3G	6
19	1 November 2013	PRISM, SSO SSO1 Slide SSO2 Slide	13*
18	4 October 2013	Types of IAT Tor	9
17	4 October 2013	Egotistical Giraffe	20*
16	4 October 2013	Tor Stinks	23
15	11 September 2013	NSA-Israel Spy	5
14	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	6*
13	5 September 2013	SIGINT Enabling	3*
12	5 September 2013	NSA classification guide	3
11	31 July 2013	XKeyscore	32
10	27 June 2013	DoJ Memo on NSA	16
9	27 June 2013	Stellar Wind	51
8	21 June 2013	FISA Certification	25
7	20 June 2013	Minimization Exhibit A	9
6	20 June 2013	Minimization Exhibit B	9
5	16 June 2013	GCHQ G-20 Spying	4
4	8 June 2013	Boundless Informant FAQ	3
3	8 June 2013	Boundless Informant Slides	4
2	7 June 2013	PPD-20	18
1	5 June 2013	Verizon	4

	Washington Post		297
	9 July 2014	NSA Emails	1
	18 March 2014	NSA SCALAWAG	2
	18 March 2014	NSA MYSTIC	2
	2 January 2014	Quantum Computer 2	10
	2 January 2014	Quantum Computer	3
	23 December 2013	NSA/CSS Mission	2
	11 December 2013	Excessive Collection	9
	11 December 2013	SCISSORS 2	7
	11 December 2013	SCISSORS 1	4
	11 December 2013	Yahoo-Google Exploit	6
	11 December 2013	Cable Spying Types	7
	11 December 2013	WINDSTOP	1
	11 December 2013	Co-Traveler	24
	11 December 2013	GSM Tracking	2
	11 December 2013	SIGINT Successes	4
	11 December 2013	GHOSTMACHINE	4
	5 December 2013	Target Location	1
	4 December 2013	FASCIA	2
	4 December 2013	CHALKFUN	1
	26 November 2013	Microsoft a Target?	4
	4 November 2013	WINDSTOP, SSO, Yahoo-Google	14
	30 October 2013	MUSCULAR-INCENSOR Google and Yahoo	4
	14 October 2013	SSO Overview	4
	14 October 2013	SSO Slides	7
	14 October 2013	SSO Content Slides	9
	4 October 2013	Tor	49
	4 October 2013	EgotisticalGiraffe	20*
	4 October 2013	GCHQ MULLENIZE	2
	4 October 2013	Roger Dingledine	2
	30 August 2013	Budget	17
	10 July 2013	PRISM Slide	1
	29 June 2013	PRISM	8
	20 June 2013	Warrantless Surveillance	25*
	7 June 2013	PPD-20	18*
	6 June 2013	PRISM	1

	Der Spiegel		* 413
	14 September 2014	GCHQ STELLAR	26
	14 September 2014	NSA Treasure Map	38
	14 September 2014	NSA Treasure Map New	4
	31 August 2014	NSA GCHQ Spy Turkey	34
	23 June 2014	NSA German SIGADs	9
	18 June 2014	NSA German Spying-2	200
	16 June 2014	NSA German Spying	4
	29 March 2014	NSA Spy Chiefs of State	1
	22 March 2014	NSA SHOTGIANT 2 NSA SHOTGIANT 1	21
	31 December 2013	QFIRE	* 16
	30 December 2013	TAO Introduction	* 16
	30 Deceber 2013	QUANTUM Tasking (8 duplicates of QUANTUMTHEORY)	28*
	30 December 2013	QUANTUMTHEORY	14
	29 December 2013	TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (images) TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (DE article)	4
	17 November 2013	ROYAL CONCIERGE (DE)ROYAL CONCIERGE (EN)	2
	29 October 2013	NSA-CIA SCS	3
	27 October 2013	NSA-CIA SCS	2
	20 October 2013	Mexico President	1
	20 September 2013	Belgacom	3
	16 September 2013	SWIFT	3
	9 September 2013	Smartphones	5
	1 September 2013	French Foreign Ministry	0
	31 August 2013	Al Jazeera	0

	O Globo Fantastico		~87
	7 October 2013	CSE Brazil Ministry	7
	8 September 2013	Petrobas	~60
	3 September 2013	Brazil and Mexico	20

	New York Times		124
	1 June 2014	NSA Identity Spying	4
	22 March 2014	NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT	2
	12 March 2014	NSA Stellarwind Classification NSA FISA FAA Classification AG Dissemination NSA Cryptanalyist FISA Database NSA Spying Timeline	37 18 2 4 1
	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	82*
	23 November 2013	SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016	5
	3 November 2013	SIGINT Mission 2013 SIGINT Mission 2017	22
	28 September 2013	Contact Chaining Social Networks	1
	28 September 2013	SYANPSE	1
	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	4*
	5 September 2013	SIGINT Enabling	3*


	ProPublica		89
	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	82*
	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	4*
	5 September 2103	SIGINT Enabling	3*

	Le Monde		20
	21 March 2014	CSE SNOWGLOBE	7
	25 October 2013	NSA Hosts FR Spies	4
	22 October 2013	Wanadoo-Alcatel	1
	22 October 2013	Close Access Sigads	2
	22 October 2013	Boundless Informant	2
	22 October 2013	PRISM	11

	Dagbladet		15
	April 2014 December 2013	Norway Assistance	2
	19 November 2013	BOUNDLESSINFORMANT	13

	NRC Handelsblad		7
	12 March 2014	NSA Aids Dutch Anti-Piracy	2
	8 February 2014	MIVD BoundlessInformant Cryptome mirror	1
	30 November 2013	Dutch SIGINT	3
	23 November 2013	SIGINT Cryptologic Platform	1

	Huffington Post		3
	27 November 2013	Muslim Porn Viewing	3

	CBC		36
	30 January 2014	CESC IP Profiling	27
	10 December 2013	NSA-CSEC Partnership	1
	10 December 2013	G8-G20 Spying	4*
	2 December 2013	G8-G20 Spying	3
	29 November 2013	G8-G20 Spying	1

	The Globe and Mail		18
	30 November 2013	CSEC Brazil Spying	18*

	SVT (Swedish TV)		2
	5 December 2013	Sweden Spied Russia for NSA	2

	L’Espresso		3
	6 December 2013	NSA Spies Italy	3

	Trojkan (SVT)		29
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Relationship	1*
	11 December 2013	NSA 5 Eyes Partners	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Agenda	8
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA RU Baltic	1
	11 December 2013	NSA GCHQ Sweden FRA COMINT	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Plan	5
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Sources	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Tor et al	3
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Slide	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Quantum 1	1
	11 December 2013	GCHQ Sweden FRA Quantum	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Quantum Accomplishments	2
	9 December 2013	NSA and Sweden Pact	3*

	Jacob Appelbaum		* 71
	30 December 2013	NSA Catalog	* 50
	30 December 2013	NSA Catalog Video Clips	* 21

	Information.dk		63*
	19 June 2014	NSA Partners	41*
	14 January 2014	SSO (duplicate)	7*
	14 January 2014	PRISM (duplicate)	11*
	13 January 2014	5-Eyes Spy G8-G20 (duplicate)	4*

	Anonymous/ New York Times		18
	27 January 2014	NSA Smartphones Analysis	14
	27 January 2014	GCHQ Mobile Theme	4

	NBC News		87
	25 February 2014	GCHQ Cyber Effects	11
	7 February 2014	GCHQ Cyber Attack	15
	5 February 2014	GCHQ Anonymous	14
	27 January 2014	GCHQ Squeaky Dolphin	47

	The Intercept		522*
	4 December 2014	NSA AURORA GOLD et al	63
	10 October 2014	10 NSA Releases Computer Network Exploitation Declass National Initiative Task Security 2 National Initiative Task Security 1 Exceptionally Controlled Info Compartments Exceptionally Controlled Info Pawleys Exceptionally Controlled Information Sentry Eagle 2 Sentry Eagle 1 Tarex Classification Guide Whipgenie Classification Guide	69
	17 September 2014	NSA Visit by NZ Spy	2
	5 September 2014	Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009	32
	25 August 2014	NSA ICREACH	55
	12 August 2014	GCHQ Covert Mobile Phones Policy	6
	5 August 2014	NCTC Terrorist Identifies	12
	4 August 2014	US-NSA Pays Israel $500,000	2
	4 August 2014	NSA-Israel Spying Pact 2013	3
	4 August 2014	Israel-US Spying Pact 1999	16
	25 July 2014	NSA Saudi Arabia	4
	14 July 2014	NSA JTRIG Tools-Techniques	8
	9 July 2014	NSA FISA Accounts	8
	19 June 2014	NSA Partners	41*
	19 May 2014	12 Various Pages	12
	30 April 2014	GHOSTMACHINE-ECHOBASE NSA Visit by GCHQ Lobban PRISM with Olympics	14:6+8 4:1+3 1:
	4 April 2014	GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber NSA 5-Eyes SIGDEV Conference	19 2
	20 March 2014	NSA Hunt Sysadmins	6
	13 March 2014	NSA Third Party	1
	12 March 2014	NSA Hammerchant NSA UK on Mikey and Ibake NSA Turbine and Turmoil NSA Thousands of Implants NSA More Than One Way NSA GCHQ Quantumtheory NSA Selector Types NSA Quantum Insert NSA Analysis of Converged Data NSA Phishing and MTM Attacks NSA Menwith Hill xKeyscore NSA Industry Exploit NSA 5 Eyes Hacking	43 2 1 1 11 1 5 1 3 1 1 1
	7 March 2014	NSA Ask Zelda	8
	24 February 2014	GCHQ Disruption	4
	24 February 2014	GCHQ Online Deception (7 pages duplicates of GCHQ Psychology)	*50
	18 February 2014	GCHQ Psychology37 Duplicates of NBC News	*44
	18 February 2014	NSA-GCHQ Discovery	1

	Glenn Greenwald
	13 May 2014	A variety of documents	107

	Cryptome		310
	23 May 2014	No Place to Hide (27MB)	310

	Heise		26
	16 August 2014	NSA GCHQ CSEC HACIENDA	26

	Süddeutsche Zeitung		7
	25 November 2014	Vodafone GCHQ Cables List and Slides	72

The Shevardnadze File by The National Security Archive

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True Information is the most valuable resource and we ask you to give back.

Eduard Shevardnadze. (photographer unknown)

Compiled and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton

For more information contact:
202/994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

THE DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT 1: Excerpt of Official Minutes of the Politburo CC CPSU Session, June 29, 1985

Source: Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Fond 89. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

Perhaps the most audacious personnel change made by Gorbachev came very early, only four months into his leadership, when longtime Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko (known to the Americans as “Mr. Nyet”) retired upwards to the job of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet — the titular head of state— as part of the deal that earlier had featured Gromyko advocating for Gorbachev’s election as general secretary. Gromyko understood that his successor would be his carefully-groomed deputy, Georgi Kornienko — so there was shock-and-awe throughout the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry when Gorbachev instead proposed as foreign minister the ambitious first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, Eduard Shevardnadze. During the Politburo session on June 29, 1985, Gorbachev stepped down from his position as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which he held together with his position as general secretary (Leonid Brezhnev had merged the two jobs in 1977). By kicking Gromyko upstairs, Gorbachev opened a key position-Minister of Foreign Affairs — where he wanted to place his close ally, whom he already knew shared his reformist thinking on both international and domestic policy. This official record of the Politburo session shows Gorbachev nominating Shevardnadze, ostensibly after discussing several alternative candidates with Gromyko and jointly coming to the conclusion that Shevardnadze was the best choice. All Politburo members express their full support for Gorbachev’s candidate— testament to the power of the general secretary.

Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze fly-fishing in Wyoming, September 24, 1989. (photographer unknown)

DOCUMENT 2: Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, July 1, 1985

Source: Diary of Anatoly S Chernyaev, donated to the National Security Archive.

Translated by Anna Melyakova.

Anatoly Chernyaev, who at the time was first deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee (CC CPSU), describes in his diary the nominations of Gromyko and Shevardnadze as they were announced at the CC CPSU Plenum. The Plenum had to approve the nominations that the Supreme Soviet would confirm the next day. Shevardnadze’s nomination was like a “bolt from the blue,” Chernyaev writes. The diary relates how Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department, told Chernyaev what had actually happened at the Politburo, an account that differs substantially from the official minutes (see Document 1). According to Ponomarev, the Shevardnadze nomination was a total surprise to other Politburo members, and Gromyko and Ponomarev tried to protest by suggesting career diplomat Yuli Vorontsov as a candidate, but Gorbachev disregarded their protest completely. Chernyaev concludes that Gorbachev’s nomination of Shevardnadze is “very indicative of the end of Gromyko’s monopoly and the power of the MFA’s staff over foreign policy.”

DOCUMENT 3: Record of Conversation between George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze in Helsinki, July 31, 1985

Source: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of State.

This U.S. State Department memcon records the meeting with the U.S. secretary of state during Shevardnadze’s first foreign trip in office — to Helsinki for a meeting of CSCE foreign ministers on the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. In this first meeting with George Shultz, the Soviet foreign minister mainly reads from his notes, giving the American a tour d’horizon of the Soviet positions on arms control. However, his tone is strikingly different from previous meetings when Andrei Gromyko had represented the Soviet side. Even on questions of human rights, Shevardnadze reacts not with “indignation or rage” (as Shultz comments in his memoirs) but asks Shultz jokingly, “When I come to the United States, should I talk about unemployment and blacks?” In the second part of the conversation, where Shultz and Shevardnadze are accompanied only by translators, Shevardnadze urges his counterpart to move fast on arms control, indicating that the Soviets are willing to reassess their positions — “there is no time now to postpone solutions.” He ends the conversation with the statement: “you have experience but we have the truth,” a remark that would win him some positive points from the Politburo.

DOCUMENT 4: Minutes of Politburo discussion of Shultz-Shevardnadze talks in Vienna, November 13, 1986

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

Shevardnadze was an active participant at the historic summit between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik in October 1986, where the two leaders almost agreed to abolish nuclear weapons. Just after the summit, the Soviets, trying to build on the momentum of Reykjavik, tried to offer the U.S. side concessions on laboratory testing for the missile defense program so close to Reagan’s heart – a change in position that might have made a difference at Reykjavik. But it was too late. Enmeshed in the growing Iran-contra scandal and under attack from allies like Margaret Thatcher for nuclear heresy, the Reagan administration had already retreated from the Reykjavik positions. Here the Politburo reviews the results of the November Shevardnadze-Shultz talks in Geneva, where Shultz refused even to discuss Shevardnadze’s new proposals concerning what testing would be allowed and not allowed under the ABM treaty. Shultz’s position notwithstanding, Gorbachev emphasizes the need to press the U.S. to move forward on the basis of Reykjavik. He stresses that “we have not yet truly understood what Reykjavik means,” referring to its significance as a new level of disarmament dialogue and reduction of the sense of nuclear threat.

DOCUMENT 5: Record of Shultz-Shevardnadze Conversation in Moscow, April 21, 1988

Source: FOIA request to the Department of State.

This State Department memorandum of conversation records the third set of negotiations between the U.S. secretary of state and the Soviet foreign minister leading up to the 1988 Moscow summit (February in Moscow, March in Washington, now April back in Moscow). Shevardnadze presses for progress on the START treaty aimed at reducing nuclear weapons, but Shultz responds that still-unresolved issues like sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) would not “reach full closure during the next month,” so agreement would be unlikely for the summit. Arguments over these nuclear-armed cruise missiles would hold up START negotiations for years, pushed by the parochial interests of the U.S. Navy rather than a consideration of the national interest, but by 1991 their lack of strategic value would lead to President George H. W. Bush’s unilateral decision to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. ships.

The bulk of the discussion here concerns human rights issues, including an interesting exchange about the Vienna follow-up meeting on the Helsinki Final Act. Shultz raises his “disappointment with the performance of the Soviet delegation” at Vienna, which “was not prepared to go as far in its statements as what the Soviet leadership was saying in Moscow.” Shevardnadze responds, “We have a hard delegation” in Vienna; we tell them one thing, “They do something different.”

DOCUMENT 6: Minutes of the Politburo discussion of Mikhail Gorbachev’s United Nations speech, December 27-28, 1988

Source: RGANI. Published in “Istochnik” 5-6, 1993. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.

The December 27-28 Politburo meeting was the first following Gorbachev’s return from the United States after his historic announcement at the United Nations of massive unilateral Soviet withdrawals of forces from Eastern Europe. Observers in the United States ranging from Sen. Daniel Moynihan to Gen. Andrew Goodpaster hailed the speech as marking the end of the Cold War; but incoming Bush administration “hawks” such as Brent Scowcroft did not agree (as Gorbachev would only find out later, with the 1989 “pause”). Part of the context here in the Politburo for Gorbachev’s lengthy monologues and Shevardnadze’s proposals for a “businesslike” withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe is the growing bewilderment of certain military and KGB leaders who were not fully informed in advance about the scale and tempo of Gorbachev’s announced unilateral arms cuts.

Still, there is no trace of real opposition to the new course. The Soviet party leader has learned a lesson from the military’s lack of a strong reaction to previous discussions of “sufficiency” as a national security strategy, and he is now ramming change down their throats. Ever obedient, Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov states, “everyone reacted with understanding,” even after Shevardnadze’s aggressive attacks against the military for retrograde thinking, for directly contradicting the U.N. speech, and for proposing only “admissible” openness rather than true glasnost. Ironically, however, when Shevardnadze and Ligachev suggest announcing the size of Soviet reductions “publicly,” it is Gorbachev who objects: if the Soviet people and party learn how huge Soviet defense expenditures really are, it will undermine the propaganda effect of his U.N. speech.

DOCUMENT 7: Record of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Eduard Shevardnadze, June 9, 1989

Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR-Bundesarchiv, SED, ZK, JIV2/2A/3225. Translated by Christiaan Hetzner.

This is one of many documents that became available in the Communist party archives of the former East Germany (GDR) after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany. Less than a week after Solidarity had swept the Polish elections, to the dismay of the Polish Communists, the hard-line GDR leader Erick Honecker is rapidly becoming a dinosaur on the verge of extinction. At this moment in mid-1989, only Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania surpasses Honecker in his resistance to Gorbachev’s perestroika and the new thinking in Moscow represented in this meeting by Shevardnadze. Honecker has even banned some of the new Soviet publications from distribution in the GDR. The conversation reveals Honecker’s deep ideological concerns, and his understanding of the geostrategic realities in Central Europe. He reminds Shevardnadze that “socialism cannot be lost in Poland” because through Poland run the communications lines between the Soviet Union and the Soviet troops in the GDR facing NATO’s divisions.

This same consideration led Honecker and his predecessor, Walter Ulbricht, to urge Soviet military intervention to suppress previous East European uprisings such as the Prague Spring in 1968 or the strikes in Poland in 1980-1981. But here Honecker is most dismayed by Gorbachev’s upcoming trip to West Germany (FRG), which threatens Honecker’s own political “balancing act,” which in turn depends on poor relations between the Soviets and the West Germans. Shevardnadze has an impossible mission here, to assuage the East German leader’s concerns about all the changes taking place in Poland, Hungary and inside the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze’s opening words — “our friends in the GDR need not worry” — sound more than ironic today. In fact, Shevardnadze does not believe in Honecker’s concept of East German “socialism,” and in only a few months, the Moscow leadership would signal to Honecker’s colleagues it was time for him to go.

DOCUMENT 8: Memorandum of Conversation between George Bush and Eduard Shevardnadze in Washington, September 21, 1989

Source: FOIA request to the George H.W. Bush presidential library.

This meeting in Washington marks the start of Shevardnadze’s trip to the United States that will culminate with his fly-fishing expeditions with James Baker in Wyoming, where the two men established a close personal connection. This was also Shevardnadze’s first meeting with George H.W. Bush as president of the United States. He tells Bush about the progress of domestic perestroika and democratization in the Soviet Union, the work on economic reform, and the new tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations. However, Shevardnadze laments that the desired progress toward a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons is not on the horizon, and he urges his U.S. counterparts to pick up the pace. He also enumerates other Soviet arms control proposals, including banning fissionable materials and eliminating short-range nuclear weapons.

DOCUMENT 9: Memorandum of Conversation between George Bush and Eduard Shevardnadze in Washington, April 6, 1990

Source: FOIA request to the George H.W. Bush presidential library.

Shevardnadze is in Washington for this meeting, working out arrangements for the long-planned summit meeting between Bush and Gorbachev that will take place at the end of May. The Lithuania crisis has created a rift in U.S.-Soviet relations, “lost momentum” in Bush’s phrase, as the independence demands of Lithuanian nationalists build on the long-standing American position of non-recognition of Soviet incorporation of the Baltics, as well as domestic U.S. political pressures from émigré groups. Gorbachev’s own lack of understanding for Baltic nationalism has produced an inconsistent Soviet policy alternating between crackdowns, threats of an embargo, and attempts at dialogue. Shevardnadze tries to explain to the Americans why the Soviets needed “Presidential authority” to deal with the problems between ethnic groups in Lithuania, not to mention Soviet claims to ownership of the factories there. But when Bush says the Soviets have backtracked on arms control agreements (such as how to count air-launched cruise missiles, or ACLMs), Shevardnadze is quick to point out how the Americans have reneged on their on-site inspection pledges.

Perhaps most remarkably, Shevardnadze describes the Soviet argument for a nuclear test ban as based on domestic political pressures from mass demonstrations (such as in Kazakhstan against the Semipalatinsk test range). The Soviet foreign minister also makes a plea for partnership in international financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, saying the Soviets are “not looking for your help.” This would change within a year. On the American side, the conversation reveals a clear expression of Bush’s vision when he reports he is often asked, “Who is the enemy?” Bush’s answer: “unpredictability.” And perhaps it is just diplo-speak, but it is all the same music to Shevardnadze’s ears, when the American president combines his own “Europe whole and free” phrase with Gorbachev’s “common European home” and remarks that the latter idea is “very close to our own.”

DOCUMENT 10: Memorandum of Conversation between George Bush and Eduard Shevardnadze in Washington, May 6, 1991

Source: FOIA request to the George H.W. Bush presidential library.

This is Shevardnadze’s last meeting with President Bush, and he appears only in his unofficial capacity as president of the Moscow-based Foreign Policy Association. Shevardnadze resigned as foreign minister in December 1990, warning against the coming dictatorship, and protesting Gorbachev’s turn toward the hard-liners. But here Shevardnadze comes to Washington asking for support for the embattled reform still underway in the Soviet Union. He describes the dismal situation in his country, pointing specifically to economic instability, the nationalities crisis, and the rising conservative opposition. He regrets delays on every important issue, especially the Union treaty that would precipitate the hard-line coup in August 1991: “if we had offered this treaty in 1987 or even 1988, all would have signed it.” But most of all, the former foreign minister is “concerned, indeed frightened, by the pause in our relations.” He urges Bush not to delay the planned Moscow summit (it would ultimately happen at the very end of July) and to keep engaging with Gorbachev. In effect, progress in U.S.-Soviet relations has become the only strong card Gorbachev has left to play in the context of his domestic crises.

Bush and Shevardnadze talk about Gorbachev’s relationship with Russian leader Boris Yeltsin and wonder why they cannot find a way to work together. Shevardnadze appeals to Bush to move fast on reductions in conventional forces (CFE) and in nuclear weapons (START) because “demilitarization is the best way to help the Soviet Union.” For Bush, however, completing these two treaties remains a precondition for even holding the 1991 summit. Shevardnadze’s plea for farm credits is especially poignant; a year earlier, he sought economic partnership, but now he says, “We must let people [in the Soviet Union] feel something tangible. I know it is hard, but if it is possible, give the credits.” Prophetically, Shevardnadze remarks, “Even if we can’t maintain a single Soviet Union, reform will continue.”

Exposed – FOIA to Masterspy for Snowden Documents

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To: dni-foia[at]dni.gov
From: John Young <jya[at]pipeline.com>
Date: 7/23/2014, 09:08 ET
Subject: FOIA Request

Jennifer L. Hudson
Director, Information Management Division
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Ms. Hudson,

I request any and all information and records on documents reportedly taken by Edward Snowden from the National Security Agency, in particular:

1. An accounting of the documents by type, digital or non-digital, by number of files and pages.

2. To whom Edward Snowden transmitted the documents by name, occupation, nationality, and home address.

3. What documents were transmitted to each of the parties in Item 2, by type, number of files and pages.

4. Descriptions of consultation with the US government by those who received documents from Edward Snowden.

5. Descriptions of requests by the US government to redact or eliminate portions of the documents, to whom requests were made and date.

6. Assessments by the US government of the impact of the public release of the documents, by assessing agency with scope and date.

7. Agreements reached between the US government and the parties releasing and/or holding the documents for future release, by scope and schedule.

I am an individual seeking information for personal use and not for commercial use.

I am willing to pay $500 for my request.

I request a waiver of all fees for this request. Reason: This information will be published on the free public education website, Cryptome.org, to inform the public on the documents provided by Edward Snowden to commercial media.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

John Young
251 West 89th Street
New York, New York 10024
212-873-8700
jya[at]pipeline.com

The National Security Archive – NSA Retaining “Useless” and Highly Personal Information of Ordinary Internet Users, Spying …

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by Lauren Harper

Ordinary internet activity accounts for the overwhelming majority of communications collected and maintained by the National Security Agency (NSA). A recent report by The Washington Post, based on communications leaked by former contractor Edward Snowden, revealed that nine out of 10 communications collected belonged to average American and non-American internet users who were not the targets of investigations. Much of the highly personal communications –including baby pictures and revealing webcam photos– provide little intelligence value and are described as useless, yet are retained under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments. The Post’s findings clearly contradict former NSA head Keith Alexander’s assertions that there was no way Snowden could “touch the FISA data,” and give credence to the argument that “the NSA has been proven incapable of safeguarding” the intelligence it collects, irrespective of its value.

Glenn Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain’s latest Intercept expose reveals that the NSA, along with the FBI, covertly monitors the communications of prominent, upstanding Muslim-Americans under provisions of the FISA intended to target terrorists and foreign spies, ostensibly solely because of their religion. The FISA provision that seemingly codifies the surveillance requires that “the Justice Department must convince a judge with the top-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is probable cause to believe that American targets are not only agents of an international terrorist organization or other foreign power, but also ‘are or may be’ engaged in or abetting espionage, sabotage, or terrorism.” In practice, however, the agencies monitored the emails of Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil rights organization in the country, Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented clients in terrorism-related cases, and other civically inclined American Muslims.

White House officials are questioning why President Obama was left in the dark about the CIA’s German intelligence informant and his recent arrest, a somewhat baffling omission in the wake of revelations the NSA monitored the private communications of Chancellor Merkel and the resulting state of US-German relations. “A central question, one American official said, is how high the information about the agent went in the C.I.A.’s command — whether it was bottled up at the level of the station chief in Berlin or transmitted to senior officials, including the director, John O. Brennan, who is responsible for briefing the White House.” Of further interest is why the CIA made use of the German intelligence official in the first place, who not only walked into the agency’s Berlin office in 2012 and offered to spy, but also volunteered his spying services to Russia via email.

The internal affairs division of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is being investigated again, this time for mishandling the personal information of the agency’s 60,000 employees. Under investigation are defunct CBP programs that shared employees’ Social Security numbers with the FBI and that “automatically scanned the Social Security numbers of all the agency’s employees in a Treasury Department financial records database.” Both programs were part of the agency’s response to the Obama administration’s Insider Threat initiative.

Cause of Action’s latest “FOIA Follies” provides some insight on what qualifies for a (b)(5) “withhold because you want to” FOIA exemption at the IRS, and reinforces Archive FOIA Coordinator Nate Jones’ arguments of how the FOIA Improvement Act of 2014 would address this overused exemption and help ordinary requesters. Cause of Action submitted a FOIA request to the IRS seeking records related to any requests from the President for individual or business tax returns in 2012, after which the IRS released 790 heavily redacted pages. Cause of Action filed suit in 2013 challenging the IRS’ use of exemption (b)(5) to withhold large portions of the records, prompting the IRS to “reconsider” some of its withholdings. The newly-released portions of documents reveal the agency was using the (b)(5) exemption to withhold mundane information contrary to Attorney General Holder’s 2009 guidance that “an agency should not withhold information simply because it may do so legally.”

The Brazilian military regime employed a “sophisticated and elaborate psychophysical duress system” to “intimidate and terrify” suspected leftist militants in the early 1970s, according to a State Department report dated in April 1973 and made public last week. Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Brazil Documentation Project, called the document “one of the most detailed reports on torture techniques ever declassified by the U.S. government.” This document, and 42 others, were given to Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff by Vice President Joe Biden and were made available for use by the Brazilian Truth Commission, which is in the final phase of a two-year investigation of human rights atrocities during the military dictatorship which lasted from 1964 to 1985.

The Pentagon and the Justice Department are going after the money made by former Navy Seal Matt Bissonnette from his book on the raid to capture Osama bin Laden, No Easy Day, for failing to submit the book for pre-publication review to avoid disclosing any top secret information about the raid. It’s worth noting that while the government goes after Bissonnette for releasing his book without pre-publication review, both the CIA and DOD provided unprecedented access to Hollywood filmmakers Kathryn Bigelow and Mark Boal for their bin Laden raid blockbuster, Zero Dark Thirty, while simultaneously refusing to release the same information to FOIA requesters

A partially redacted 29-page report recently found low morale at the US government’s Office of Cuba Broadcasting, which is responsible for Radio and TV Marti. “Some of the reasons cited for low morale included the lack of transparency in decision-making, the inability to offer suggestions, and the lack of effective communication. Others were concerned about raising any issues to the inspection team because of fear of retaliation by management.”

Finally this week, our #tbt document picks concern Eduard Shevardnadze, the ex-Georgian president and Soviet foreign minster who recently died at the age of 86. The documents themselves comes from a 2010 Archive posting on high-level Soviet officials debates during the final years of the Cold War about covering-up the illicit Soviet biological weapons program in the face of protests from the United States and Great Britain. The documents show that Eduard Shevardnadze, along with defense minister Dmitri Yazov, and the Politburo member overseeing the military-industrial complex, Lev Zaikov, were aware of the concealment and were actively involved in discussing it in the years when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was advancing his glasnost reforms and attempting to slow the nuclear arms race. Check out the documents here.

Happy FOIA-ing!

Unveiled – NSA Bad Abling Station Eyeball

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Cryptome – Russell Tice to Shoot Snowden for NSA Black Leak

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STASI wusste und weiss über NSA-Ausspähung Bescheid

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Die STASI wusste scheinbar Bescheid, dass die NSA die deutsche Telekommunikation ausspäht. Diese Ansicht vertrat Klaus Eichner bei einer Podiumsdiskussion mit dem ehemaligen NSA-Technikchef William Binney. Eichner war in Zeiten der DDR Chefanalytiker beim Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS). Eine “Quelle“ übergab ihm damals im Jahr 1985/1986 eine sogenannte NSAR-Liste, bei dem das Treiben der NSA dokumentiert wurde.

Der ehemalige Stasi-Abteilungsleiter erzählte, dass es “NSA Requirements“ gab, in denen geschrieben war, welche Personen und Institute für die US-Behörde interessant sind. Die Liste umfasste insgesamt 4000 Seiten und 30.000 “Einzelposten“. Eichners promotet sein Buch, welches den Namen “Imperium ohne Rätsel. Was bereits die DDR-Aufklärung über die NSA wusste“ trägt.

Kritik gab es von Eichner für die Politik, diese würde den Fall falsch behandeln. Das von der deutschen Bundesregierung vorgeschlagene “No-Spy-Abkommen“ sei ihm nach ein “schlechter Witz“. Die Überraschung der Regierung über die Snowden-Enthüllungen rund um die NSA sei außerdem nur “gespielt“.

TOP-SECRET – Cryptome unveils the NSA Manageable Network Plan

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Revealed – Gov-Biz Booz Allen: Spying Disconnect

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gbc-bah-c4isr

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Cryptome unveils NSA Cybercom Michael Rogers Eyeball

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NSA Cybercom Michael Rogers Eyeball

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-nominee-michael-
s-rogers-has-made-fans-during-a-steady-rise-to-the-top/2014/02/03/ae23342c-
8a4a-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html

A Chicago native, Rogers and his wife, Dana, have two grown sons, one of whom is a Navy lieutenant. The president’s nominee began his career as a surface warfare officer in 1981. After a few years he became a cryptologist, intercepting signals from enemy radar and communications systems for intelligence analysts.

In the Navy, which in 2005 broadened the job of cryptologist and rebranded it as information warfare officer, Rogers’s skills included the growing field of computer network operations, to include attacks, defense and deception.

_____

Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers
Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command
Commander, U.S. 10th Fleet

Vice Adm. Rogers is a native of Chicago and attended Auburn University, graduating in 1981 and receiving his commission via the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps. Originally a surface warfare officer (SWO), he was selected for re-designation to cryptology (now Information Warfare) in 1986.

He assumed his present duties as commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/commander, U.S. 10th Fleet in September 2011. Since becoming a flag officer in 2007, Rogers has also been the director for Intelligence for both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Pacific Command.

Duties afloat have included service at the unit level as a SWO aboard USS Caron (DD 970); at the strike group level as the senior cryptologist on the staff of Commander, Carrier Group Two/John F. Kennedy Carrier Strike Group; and, at the numbered fleet level on the staff of Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet embarked in USS Lasalle (AGF 3) as the fleet information operations (IO) officer and fleet cryptologist. He has also led cryptologic direct support missions aboard U.S. submarines and surface units in the Arabian Gulf and Mediterranean.

Ashore, Rogers commanded Naval Security Group Activity Winter Harbor, Maine (1998-2000); and, has served at Naval Security Group Department; NAVCOMSTA Rota, Spain; Naval Military Personnel Command; Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; the Bureau of Personnel as the cryptologic junior officer detailer; and, Commander, Naval Security Group Command as aide and executive assistant (EA) to the commander.

Rogers’ joint service both afloat and ashore has been extensive and, prior to becoming a flag officer, he served at U.S. Atlantic Command, CJTF 120 Operation Support Democracy (Haiti), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, Europe, and the Joint Staff. His Joint Staff duties (2003-2007) included leadership of the J3 Computer Network Attack/Defense and IO Operations shops, EA to the J3, EA to two Directors of the Joint Staff, special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, director of the Chairman’s Action Group, and a leader of the JCS Joint Strategic Working Group.

Rogers is a distinguished graduate of the National War College and a graduate of highest distinction from the Naval War College. He is also an Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI fellow and holds a Master of Science in National Security Strategy.

NSA Michael Rogers Eyeball

http://www.echo-pilot.com/article/20140205/News/140209868#ixzz2vszKbhce [Image]

Naval officer designated next NSA chief has Greencastle [PA] ties

The name Mike Rogers may soon be a household name, and with an extra special meaning in the Greencastle-Antrim area.

By PAT FRIDGEN, Echo Pilot

Posted Feb. 5, 2014 @ 6:19 pm

The name Mike Rogers may soon be a household name, and with an extra special meaning in the Greencastle-Antrim area.

The vice admiral, who is married to Greencastle native Dana (Walck) has been tapped by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to become director of the National Security Agency.

After that announcement last Thursday, President Barack Obama nominated him for head of the U.S. Cyber Command, which requires a hearing and Senate confirmation. If confirmed, he would also be slated to receive a fourth star.

Rogers would lead the NSA through controversial issues such as the U.S. secret surveillance programs, ongoing ramifications from leaks by former contractor Edward Snowden, the use of drones, telephone data collection and protecting the country from terrorist attack.

As Rogers carries those heavy responsibilities, his wife Dana, will be at his side.

A military life

Dana (Walck) Rogers, 51, met her future husband in Washington D.C. in 1984. She was a working college student and he was on liberty in the city. They married the following year. She supported his Navy career, which focused on cryptology. The job sent them to Maine, Hawaii, Italy, Washington D.C., Europe, and their current home not far from his base at Fort Meade, Md.

They have two sons, Justin, 25, also in the Navy, and Patrick, 21, a student.

“We are so proud of Mike,” said Dana on Saturday, having just dropped him off at the airport for a trip to Australia. “He’s worked so hard. It is exciting, interesting and overwhelming.”

If confirmed, he would replace Army Gen. Keith Alexander, who is retiring in mid-March.

Mike Rogers, 54, is a native of Chicago, and his current title is Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command; and Commander, U.S. 10th Fleet.

To Dana, “he is still my little lieutenant grade husband when I met him.”

Though they have traveled the world, they are just everyday people, she said.

“Our uneventful life is pretty simple. We see an occasional movie and talk about the kids.”

Dana graduated from American University with a B.S. in Business Management, and had a career in human resources. She devoted much time as a volunteer aiding military families at support centers wherever they were stationed. She was also active in the boys’ schools.

The daughter of Franklin “Bud” and Marilynn Walck, she gets back to Greencastle as much as she can for family events. She called it a wonderful place to grow up and come home to. She also has two sisters, Pam Landis and Carla Wright, and their families to visit.

Michael and Dana Rogers [Image]

http://www.advancedbackgroundchecks.com/d/michael-rogers/59300755 [Image]

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2527 Bear Den Rd Frederick, MD 21701
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Senior Officers Houses, Fort Meade, MD
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SECRET – NSA-Cybercom Director Senate Testimony 14-0227

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Unveiled – NSA FISA Business Spying – TOP-SECRET

nsa-fisa-business

Der Film – Die Welt der Geheimdienste – STASI, KGB, Oberst Stelzer,

Sie agieren im Verborgenen. Ihr Ziel ist die Beschaffung geheimer Informationen. Spione und Geheimdienste gibt es in jeder Staatsform: In Monarchien, Demokratien und Diktaturen. Immer geht es um Wissen, und Wissen ist Macht.

‘diese folge’ macht sich auf die Spur der großen Spione der Geschichte: Wie besiegelte Sir Walsingham Maria Stuarts Schicksal, was hat Mata Hari für die Deutschen ausspioniert, warum wollte Stalin nicht auf die Geheimdienstwarnung vor Hitlers Überfall hören, und weshalb wurde Günter Guillaume nicht schon viel früher als Kanzlerspion enttarnt? Außerdem fragt der Film, wie ein Mensch zum Spion wird, mit welchen Tricks die Geheimdienste arbeiten, und wie sehr die Geschichte der Menschheit tatsächlich von Spionage und Verrat geprägt wird.

DHS-FBI-NCTC: Building Security Measures May Hinder Emergency Response Efforts

Building Security Measures May Impact Emergency Response to Attacks by Violent Extremists

1 page
For Official Use Only
December 6, 2013

(U//FOUO) Facility security measures, such as interior control points or exterior barriers, may require first responders to adjust normal protocols and procedures to operate rapidly during emergencies. The timeline below is an overview of attacks and plots against US-based facilities with varying levels of security. The diversity of tactics and targets used underscores the need for interagency exercises and training that incorporates multiple scenarios to account for building security measures likely to be encountered.

(U) First Responder Response Considerations:

(U//FOUO) Conducting periodic exercises with building authorities and interagency partners will help responders tailor a coordinated response to the unique security characteristics of the site
and increase efficiency during an emergency. Engagement with partners may address a number of issues including:

»» (U//FOUO) Building emergency response plans that identify the key staff members to assist and advise first responders as well as their roles and responsibilities during crisis;
»» (U//FOUO) Interior building control points which may limit responder access to areas and affect the rapid deployment of tools and equipment;
»» (U//FOUO) Building access control systems: the availability of master keys or swipe cards to provide full access and/or entry into restricted areas;
»» (U//FOUO) The existence of exterior building security measures which may affect the placement of response vehicles or the ability to ventilate building and rescue victims;
»» (U//FOUO) Closed circuit television (CCTV) monitors to maintain situational awareness and to assist with accountability and evacuation of building occupants; and
»» (U//FOUO) Suspicious activity reporting training to building staff and tenants to help identify and disrupt potential preoperational activity or actual attacks.

Cryptome – 9/11 Secrecy Prolongs Warmaking and NSA Excess

9/11 Secrecy Prolongs Warmaking and NSA Excess

At 09:08 PM 2/20/2014, A wrote:

Mr. Young,

I’m curious about your opinion about what really happened on 9/11. I was reading one of your FOIA posts and was curious about your opinion. Please don’t waste too much time on this. I’m working an 80-hour per week job and am married. So, I don’t have as much time as I would like to research. A simple copy-and-paste job will do with a few different links.

Thank you for your time and for all the documents you post,

_____

21 February 2014

These are some of my comments on WTC.

http://cryptome.org/wtc-collapse.htm

9/11 is a much larger issue than WTC which I am still brooding about. There is still a lot of information which the USG has not released, and until that is done it will be difficult to do more than speculate.

It is a great shame, likely criminal, that the USG refuses to release all material it has, for that perpetuates suspicion of a cover-up of those at fault and sets yet another precedent for using official secrecy to avoid accountability.

A somewhat lesser but related shame is that there has been no person or persons in the USG held accountable or punished for 9/11, leaving the false impression nothing could have been done to prevent it.

Our view is that public pressure should be continued, and increased, for full release of the USG material, both classified and unclassified. Withholding this material will undermine trust in government, and worse, leave government free to avoid responsibility to the public for war and peace. So long as that fundamental responsibility to the public is avoided we think continuous war is inevitable for unnecessary loss of life and limb and unforgiveable waste of national resources.

Behind the avoidance of public responsibility is the ever increasing use of unjustified secretkeeping, prolongation of exaggerated threats to national security, and as Ike warned the perpetuation of the lucrative military-industry-media complex hidden by official secrecy. It is this secrecy which breeds suspicion of the USA at home and overseas and will almost surely lead to more 9/11s.

NSA excess is directly attributable to 9/11 secrecy about lack of government accountability.

Regards,

John

SECRET . DHS-FBI-NCTC Bulletin: Building Security Measures May Hinder Emergency Response Efforts

Building Security Measures May Impact Emergency Response to Attacks by Violent Extremists

1 page
For Official Use Only
December 6, 2013

(U//FOUO) Facility security measures, such as interior control points or exterior barriers, may require first responders to adjust normal protocols and procedures to operate rapidly during emergencies. The timeline below is an overview of attacks and plots against US-based facilities with varying levels of security. The diversity of tactics and targets used underscores the need for interagency exercises and training that incorporates multiple scenarios to account for building security measures likely to be encountered.

(U) First Responder Response Considerations:

(U//FOUO) Conducting periodic exercises with building authorities and interagency partners will help responders tailor a coordinated response to the unique security characteristics of the site
and increase efficiency during an emergency. Engagement with partners may address a number of issues including:

»» (U//FOUO) Building emergency response plans that identify the key staff members to assist and advise first responders as well as their roles and responsibilities during crisis;
»» (U//FOUO) Interior building control points which may limit responder access to areas and affect the rapid deployment of tools and equipment;
»» (U//FOUO) Building access control systems: the availability of master keys or swipe cards to provide full access and/or entry into restricted areas;
»» (U//FOUO) The existence of exterior building security measures which may affect the placement of response vehicles or the ability to ventilate building and rescue victims;
»» (U//FOUO) Closed circuit television (CCTV) monitors to maintain situational awareness and to assist with accountability and evacuation of building occupants; and
»» (U//FOUO) Suspicious activity reporting training to building staff and tenants to help identify and disrupt potential preoperational activity or actual attacks.

Unveiled – Edward Lucas DMCA Notice for Snowden Plot

Edward Lucas DMCA Notice for Snowden Plot

Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2014 13:56:57 +0000
From: “Edward Lucas” <edwardlucas[at]economist.com>
To: <cryptome[at]earthlink.net>
Cc: <Andrew Rosenheim <androsen[at]amazon.co.uk>
Subject: DCMA notice

Mr John Young
Cryptome, 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024

Dear Mr Young

I am the copyright owner of the article being infringed at:

http://cryptome.org/2014/02/lucas-snowden.htm

It is a Kindle Single available for sale on the Amazon website

This letter is official notification under the provisions of Section 512* of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (*DMCA*) to effect removal of the above-reported infringements. I request that you immediately issue a cancellation message as specified in RFC 1036 for the specified postings and prevent the infringer, who is identified by its web address, from posting the infringing content to your servers in future. Please be advised that the law requires you, as a service provider, to *expeditiously remove or disable access to* the infringing content upon receipt of this notice. Non-compliance may result in a loss of immunity for liability under the DMCA.

Use of the material in the manner complained of here is not authorized by me, the copyright holder, or the law. The information provided here is accurate to the best of my knowledge. I swear under penalty of perjury that I am the copyright holder.

Please send me, at the address noted below, a prompt response indicating the actions you have taken to resolve this matter.

Yours faithfully

Edward Lucas

+44 207 576 xxxx (direct)
+44 7770 380 xxx (mobile)

edwardlucas[at]economist.com
The Economist
25 St James St
London SW1A 1HG
www.edwardlucas.com

This e-mail may contain confidential material. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. It may also contain personal views which are not the views of The Economist Group. We may monitor e-mail to and from our network.

Sent by a member of The Economist Group. The Group’s parent company is The Economist Newspaper Limited, registered in England with company number 236383 and registered office at 25 St James’s Street, London, SW1A 1HG. For Group company registration details go to http://legal.economistgroup.com

TOP-SECRET – Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board NSA Bulk Telephone Records Collection Report

The following report was released January 23, 2014 by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Statements from board members Elisebeth Collins Cook and Rachel Brand were released along with the report.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

238 pages
January 23, 2014

The PCLOB is an independent bipartisan agency within the executive branch established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.6 The Board is comprised of four part-time members and a full-time chairman, all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Board’s authorizing statute gives it two primary responsibilities:

1) To analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and

2) To ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.

This Report arises out of the Board’s responsibility to provide oversight by analyzing and reviewing executive branch actions, in this case the operation of the Section 215 telephone records program.

…

B. Legal Analysis: Statutory and Constitutional Issues

Section 215 is designed to enable the FBI to acquire records that a business has in its possession, as part of an FBI investigation, when those records are relevant to the investigation. Yet the operation of the NSA’s bulk telephone records program bears almost no resemblance to that description. While the Board believes that this program has been conducted in good faith to vigorously pursue the government’s counterterrorism mission and appreciates the government’s efforts to bring the program under the oversight of the FISA court, the Board concludes that Section 215 does not provide an adequate legal basis to support the program.

There are four grounds upon which we find that the telephone records program fails to comply with Section 215. First, the telephone records acquired under the program have no connection to any specific FBI investigation at the time of their collection. Second, because the records are collected in bulk — potentially encompassing all telephone calling records across the nation — they cannot be regarded as “relevant” to any FBI investigation as required by the statute without redefining the word relevant in a manner that is circular, unlimited in scope, and out of step with the case law from analogous legal contexts involving the production of records. Third, the program operates by putting telephone companies under an obligation to furnish new calling records on a daily basis as they are generated (instead of turning over records already in their possession) — an approach lacking foundation in the statute and one that is inconsistent with FISA as a whole. Fourth, the statute permits only the FBI to obtain items for use in its investigations; it does not authorize the NSA to collect anything.

In addition, we conclude that the program violates the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. That statute prohibits telephone companies from sharing customer records with the government except in response to specific enumerated circumstances, which do not include Section 215 orders.

Finally, we do not agree that the program can be considered statutorily authorized because Congress twice delayed the expiration of Section 215 during the operation of the program without amending the statute. The “reenactment doctrine,” under which Congress is presumed to have adopted settled administrative or judicial interpretations of a statute, does not trump the plain meaning of a law, and cannot save an administrative or judicial interpretation that contradicts the statute itself. Moreover, the circumstances presented here differ in pivotal ways from any in which the reenactment doctrine has ever been applied, and applying the doctrine would undermine the public’s ability to know what the law is and hold their elected representatives accountable for their legislative choices.

The NSA’s telephone records program also raises concerns under both the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We explore these concerns and explain that while government officials are entitled to rely on existing Supreme Court doctrine in formulating policy, the existing doctrine does not fully answer whether the Section 215 telephone records program is constitutionally sound. In particular, the scope and duration of the program are beyond anything ever before confronted by the courts, and as a result of technological developments, the government possesses capabilities to collect, store, and analyze data not available when existing Supreme Court doctrine was developed. Without seeking to predict the direction of changes in Supreme Court doctrine, the Board urges as a policy matter that the government consider how to preserve underlying constitutional guarantees in the face of modern communications technology and surveillance capabilities.

…

E. Transparency Issues

In a representative democracy, the tension between openness and secrecy is inevitable and complex. The challenges are especially acute in the area of intelligence collection, where the powers exercised by the government implicate fundamental rights and our enemies are constantly trying to understand our capabilities in order to avoid detection. In this context, both openness and secrecy are vital to our survival, and we must strive to develop and implement intelligence programs in ways that serve both values.

Transparency is one of the foundations of democratic governance. Our constitutional system of government relies upon the participation of an informed electorate. This in turn requires public access to information about the activities of the government. Transparency supports accountability. It is especially important with regard to activities of the government that affect the rights of individuals, where it is closely interlinked with redress for violations of rights. In the intelligence context, although a certain amount of secrecy is necessary, transparency regarding collection authorities and their exercise can increase public confidence in the intelligence process and in the monumental decisions that our leaders make based on intelligence products.

In the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, the government has released a substantial amount of information on the leaked government surveillance programs. Although there remains a deep well of distrust, these official disclosures have helped foster greater public understanding of government surveillance programs. However, to date the official disclosures relate almost exclusively to specific programs that had already been the subject of leaks, and we must be careful in citing these disclosures as object lessons for what additional transparency might be appropriate in the future.

The Board believes that the government must take the initiative and formulate long-term solutions that promote greater transparency for government surveillance policies more generally, in order to inform public debate on technology, national security, and civil liberties going beyond the current controversy. In this effort, all three branches have a role. For the executive branch, disclosures about key national security programs that involve the collection, storage and dissemination of personal information — such as the operation of the National Counterterrorism Center — show that it is possible to describe practices and policies publicly, even those that have not been otherwise leaked, without damage to national security or operational effectiveness.

With regard to the legislative process, even where classified intelligence operations are involved, the purposes and framework of a program for domestic intelligence collection should be debated in public. During the process of developing legislation, some hearings and briefings may need to be conducted in secret to ensure that policymakers fully understand the intended use of a particular authority. But the government should not base an ongoing program affecting the rights of Americans on an interpretation of a statute that is not apparent from a natural reading of the text. In the case of Section 215, the government should have made it publicly clear in the reauthorization process that it intended for Section 215 to serve as legal authority to collect data in bulk on an ongoing basis.

There is also a need for greater transparency regarding operation of the FISA court. Prospectively, we encourage the FISC judges to continue the recent practice of writing opinions with an eye to declassification, separating specific sensitive facts peculiar to the case at hand from broader legal analyses. We also believe that there is significant value in producing declassified versions of earlier opinions, and recommend that the government undertake a classification review of all significant FISC opinions and orders involving novel interpretations of law. We realize that the process of redacting opinions not drafted for public disclosure will be more difficult and will burden individuals with other pressing duties, but we believe that it is appropriate to make the effort where those opinions and orders complete the historical picture of the development of legal doctrine regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the FISA court. In addition, should the government adopt our recommendation for a Special Advocate in the FISC, the nature and extent of that advocate’s role must be transparent to be effective.

It is also important to promote transparency through increased reporting to the public on the scope of surveillance programs. We urge the government to work with Internet service providers and other companies to reach agreement on standards allowing reasonable disclosures of aggregate statistics that would be meaningful without revealing sensitive government capabilities or tactics. We recommend that the government should also increase the level of detail in its unclassified reporting to Congress and the public regarding surveillance programs.

…

II. Overview of the PCLOB’s Recommendations

A. Section 215 Program

Recommendation 1: The government should end its Section 215 bulk telephone records program.

The Section 215 bulk telephone records program lacks a viable legal foundation under Section 215, implicates constitutional concerns under the First and Fourth Amendments, raises serious threats to privacy and civil liberties as a policy matter, and has shown only limited value. As a result, the Board recommends that the government end the program.

Without the current Section 215 program, the government would still be able to seek telephone calling records directly from communications providers through other existing legal authorities. The Board does not recommend that the government impose data retention requirements on providers in order to facilitate any system of seeking records directly from private databases.

Once the Section 215 bulk collection program has ended, the government should purge the database of telephone records that have been collected and stored during the program’s operation, subject to limits on purging data that may arise under federal law or as a result of any pending litigation.

The Board also recommends against the enactment of legislation that would merely codify the existing program or any other program that collects bulk data on such a massive scale regarding individuals with no suspected ties to terrorism or criminal activity. Moreover, the Board’s constitutional analysis should provide a message of caution, and as a policy matter, given the significant privacy and civil liberties interests at stake, if Congress seeks to provide legal authority for any new program, it should seek the least intrusive alternative and should not legislate to the outer bounds of its authority.

The Board recognizes that the government may need a short period of time to explore and institutionalize alternative approaches, and believes it would be appropriate for the government to wind down the 215 program over a brief interim period. If the government does find the need for a short wind-down period, the Board urges that it should follow the procedures under Recommendation 2 below.

Recommendation 2: The government should immediately implement additional privacy safeguards in operating the Section 215 bulk collection program.

The Board recommends that the government immediately implement several additional privacy safeguards to mitigate the privacy impact of the present Section 215 program. The recommended changes can be implemented without any need for congressional or FISC authorization. Specifically, the government should:

(a) reduce the retention period for the bulk telephone records program from five years to three years;

(b) reduce the number of “hops” used in contact chaining from three to two;

(c) submit the NSA’s “reasonable articulable suspicion” determinations to the FISC for review after they have been approved by NSA and used to query the database; and

(d) require a “reasonable articulable suspicion” determination before analysts may submit queries to, or otherwise analyze, the “corporate store,” which contains the results of contact chaining queries to the full “collection store.”

…

Recommendation 12: The scope of surveillance authorities affecting Americans should be public.

In particular, the Administration should develop principles and criteria for the public articulation of the legal authorities under which it conducts surveillance affecting Americans. If the text of the statute itself is not sufficient to inform the public of the scope of asserted government authority, then the key elements of the legal opinion or other documents describing the government’s legal analysis should be made public so there can be a free and open debate regarding the law’s scope. This includes both original enactments such as 215’s revisions and subsequent reauthorizations. While sensitive operational details regarding the conduct of government surveillance programs should remain classified, and while legal interpretations of the application of a statute in a particular case may also be secret so long as the use of that technique in a particular case is secret, the government’s interpretations of statutes that provide the basis for ongoing surveillance programs affecting Americans can and should be made public.

…

4. Expanding Relevance Beyond its Normal Legal Meaning

As illustrated above, precedent from other legal contexts involving the production of records does not support a concept of relevance like the one proffered by the government in support of the NSA’s bulk calling records program. To be sure, the case law regarding civil discovery, grand jury subpoenas, and administrative subpoenas shows that relevance is interpreted broadly, and that incidental production of unrelated materials is accepted as essential to enable fulsome investigative efforts. Standards of relevance thus permit parties and the government to engage in a degree of fishing, so long as it is not arbitrary or in bad faith. But the case law makes equally clear that the definition of relevance is not boundless. And no case that we have found supports the interpretation of relevance embodied in the NSA’s program.

Tacitly acknowledging that case law from analogous contexts is not adequate to support its position, the government suggests that Section 215 calls for “an even more flexible standard” of relevance. But none of the government’s arguments, in our view, supports a definition of “relevant” as broad as the one the government proffers.

First, had Congress wished to inscribe a standard of relevance in Section 215 even less exacting than those developed in analogous legal contexts, it could have done so. But contemporary statements from legislators, highlighted by the government itself, evince an intent to match Section 215 to the standards used in those contexts. The reference to grand jury subpoenas added to the statute in 2006 was meant to reassure those with concerns about the scope of Section 215 that the statute was consistent with practice in other fields.

Second, the fact that Section 215 requires only “reasonable grounds to believe” that records sought are relevant to an “investigation,” as the government emphasizes, does not call for a different standard of relevance than the one used in all other contexts. By demanding only “reasonable grounds to believe,” rather than certainty, that items sought are relevant to an investigation, the statute ensures that Section 215 is consistent with the analogous civil and criminal contexts — where the requester need not show that every item sought actually is relevant in an evidentiary sense, but merely that the items reasonably may be. The statute’s reference to a reasonable belief about the items requested shows that it contemplates the same scenario faced in the subpoena and discovery arenas: the government seeks a category of items that it reasonably suspects, but cannot be sure, includes material pertinent to its investigation. That scenario, and the legal standards that govern it, still require some factual correlation between the category of documents defined by the government and the circumstances of the investigation for which they are sought. Indeed, Section 215’s requirement of a “statement of facts” supporting the government’s belief underscores the importance of that context-specific inquiry.

Thus, even if the qualifier “reasonable grounds to believe” imposes a lower burden of proof on the government than if the statute simply authorized production of “relevant” documents, Section 215 still embodies the assumption that specific facts will link the government’s investigation to the particular group of records it seeks. That assumption is incompatible with a continuously renewed request for the daily acquisition of all records of a particular type.

Third, the unique characteristics of national security investigations do not warrant interpreting “relevance” expansively enough to support the NSA’s program. The government argues, and we agree, that the scope of relevance varies based on the nature of the investigation to which it is applied. Accordingly, the government cites the “remarkable breadth” of the national security investigations with which Section 215 is concerned, as contrasted with ordinary criminal matters, and emphasizes that these investigations “often focus on preventing threats to national security from causing harm, not on the retrospective determination of liability or guilt for prior activities.”

These valid distinctions, in our view, simply mean that the government will be able to make qualitative showings of relevance more often in national security investigations than in others. Because the government is investigating a broader scope of actors, over a longer period of time, across a wider geographic range, and before any specific offense has been committed, more information can be expected to be legitimately relevant to its efforts. Such considerations do not call for the wholesale elimination of relevance as a meaningful check on the government’s acquisition of items.

Finally, the heightened importance of counterterrorism investigations, as compared with typical law enforcement matters, does not alter the equation. Items either are relevant to an investigation or they are not — the significance of that investigation is a separate matter. No matter how critical national security investigations are, therefore, some articulable principle must connect the items sought to those investigations, or else the word “relevant” is robbed of meaning. Congress added a relevance requirement to Section 215 in 2006 knowing full well that the statute governs national security investigations. It cannot, therefore, have meant for the importance of such investigations to efface that requirement entirely.

In sum, we find the government’s interpretation of the word “relevant” in Section 215 to be unsupported by legal precedent and a subversion of the statute’s manifest intent to place some restriction, albeit a generous and flexible one, on the scope of the items that can be acquired under its auspices.

Cryptome – NSA Snowden Releases Tally Update – *1,159 Pages

18 February 2014. Add *45 pages to The Intercept (37 pages are duplicates of release by NBC News). Tally now *1,159 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally now less than ~1.8%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.0062% of that released).

10 February 2014. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad (via Electrospaces.blogspot.com).

7 February 2014. Add 15 pages NBC News.

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages to CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous via New York Times.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

Related Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment:

http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-count.htm

* 5 January 2014. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel (30 December 2013. No source given for NSA docs). Tally now *962 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.50% of that released).

Glenn Greenwald tweeted:

Glenn Greenwald @ggreenwald, 8:05 AM – 29 Dec 13@Cryptomeorg @ioerror I had no involvement in that Spiegel article, ask them – and they don’t say those are Snowden docs.

Matt Blaze tweeted, 11:24 AM – 2 Jan 14

matt blaze @mattblazeIf there are other sources besides Snowden, I hope journalists getting docs are careful to authenticate them (& disclose uncertainty).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

3 January 2014. See also EFF, ACLU and LeakSource accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages (8 duplicates) to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

23 December 2013

http://www.adn.com/2013/12/22/3243451/pincus-snowden-still-has-a-road.html

We’ve yet to see the full impact of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s unauthorized downloading of highly classified intelligence documents.

Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

3 November 2013

47 42 Years to Release Snowden Documents

NY Times, 3 November 2013:

Outlet	Pages
The Guardian	273
Washington Post	216
Der Spiegel	* 97
O Globo Fantastico	~87
New York Times Anonymous	118 (82 joint) 18
ProPublica	89 (82 joint)
Le Monde	20
Dagbladet	13
NRC Handelsblad	5
Huffington Post	3
CBC	36
The Globe and Mail	18
SVT	2
L’Espresso	3
Trojkan (SVT)	29
Jacob Appelbaum	* 71
Information.dk	22*
Anonymous/New York Times	18
NBC News	76
The Intercept	*45

Timeline of releases:

18 February 2014. Add 45 pages to The Intercept.

10 February 2014. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad (via Electrospaces.blogspot.com).

7 February 2014. Add 15 pages NBC News.

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 Decebmer 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel.

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT).

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 25 pages to Guardian.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 74 pages to Washington Post.

10 December 2013. Add 2 pages to CBC.

10 December 2013. Add 4 pages to CBC (duplicate of previous source).

9 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Trojkan. Add 2 pages to Guardian. Add 82 pages to New York Times and ProPublica (joint).

6 December 2013. Add 3 pages to L’Espresso.

5 December 2013. Add 2 pages to SVT (Swedish TV).

5 December 2013. Add 1 page to Washington Post.

4 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Washington Post.

2 December 2013. Add 3 pages to CBC.

30 November 2013. Add 18 pages to The Globe and Mail.

30 November 2013. Add 3 pages to NRC Handelsblad.

29 November 2013. Add 1 page to CBC.

27 November 2013. Add 3 pages to Huffington Post.

26 November 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

23 November 2013. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad.

23 November 2013. Add 5 pages to New York Times.

22 November 2013. Add 10 pages to Dagbladet.

18 November 2013. Add 6 pages to The Guardian.

17 November 2013. Add two images to Der Spiegel.

4 November 2013. Add 14 pages to Washington Post.

3 November 2013. A reports an additional 54 slides for O Globo Petrobas.

3 November 2013. Add 22 pages to New York Times.

2 November 2013. Add 13 pages to Guardian, 11 are duplicates.

31 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

29 October 2013. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel

27 October 2013. Add 2 pages to Der Spiegel.

25 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Le Monde.

22 October 2013. Add 5 pages to Le Monde.

21 October 2013. Add 11 pages to Le Monde, 8 are duplicates.

20 October 2013. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.

13 October 2013. Add 4, 7 and 9 pages to Washington Post.

8 October 2013. Add 7 pages to O Globo: CSE spying on Brazilian ministry, reported 7 October 2013.

6 October 2013. Add Snowden pages published by Washington Post, Der Spiegel, O Globo Fantastico, New York Times, ProPublica. Some are duplicates(*).

5 October 2013

26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian

Number	Date	Title	Pages

	The Guardian		273
21	16 January 2014	SMS Text Messages Exploit	8
20	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	2
18	18 November 2013	DSD-3G	6
19	1 November 2013	PRISM, SSO SSO1 Slide SSO2 Slide	13*
18	4 October 2013	Types of IAT Tor	9
17	4 October 2013	Egotistical Giraffe	20*
16	4 October 2013	Tor Stinks	23
15	11 September 2013	NSA-Israel Spy	5
14	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	6*
13	5 September 2013	SIGINT Enabling	3*
12	5 September 2013	NSA classification guide	3
11	31 July 2013	XKeyscore	32
10	27 June 2013	DoJ Memo on NSA	16
9	27 June 2013	Stellar Wind	51
8	21 June 2013	FISA Certification	25
7	20 June 2013	Minimization Exhibit A	9
6	20 June 2013	Minimization Exhibit B	9
5	16 June 2013	GCHQ G-20 Spying	4
4	8 June 2013	Boundless Informant FAQ	3
3	8 June 2013	Boundless Informant Slides	4
2	7 June 2013	PPD-20	18
1	5 June 2013	Verizon	4

	Washington Post		216
	2 January 2014	Quantum Computer 2	10
	2 January 2014	Quantum Computer	3
	23 December 2013	NSA/CSS Mission	2
	11 December 2013	Excessive Collection	9
	11 December 2013	SCISSORS 2	7
	11 December 2013	SCISSORS 1	4
	11 December 2013	Yahoo-Google Exploit	6
	11 December 2013	Cable Spying Types	7
	11 December 2013	WINDSTOP	1
	11 December 2013	Co-Traveler	24
	11 December 2013	GSM Tracking	2
	11 December 2013	SIGINT Successes	4
	11 December 2013	GHOSTMACHINE	4
	5 December 2013	Target Location	1
	4 December 2013	FASCIA	2
	4 December 2013	CHALKFUN	1
	26 November 2013	Microsoft a Target?	4
	4 November 2013	WINDSTOP, SSO, Yahoo-Google	14
	30 October 2013	MUSCULAR-INCENSOR Google and Yahoo	4
	14 October 2013	SSO Overview	4
	14 October 2013	SSO Slides	7
	14 October 2013	SSO Content Slides	9
	4 October 2013	Tor	49
	4 October 2013	EgotisticalGiraffe	20*
	4 October 2013	GCHQ MULLENIZE	2
	4 October 2013	Roger Dingledine	2
	30 August 2013	Budget	17
	10 July 2013	PRISM Slide	1
	29 June 2013	PRISM	8
	20 June 2013	Warrantless Surveillance	25*
	7 June 2013	PPD-20	18*
	6 June 2013	PRISM	1

	Der Spiegel		* 97
	31 December 2013	QFIRE	* 16
	30 December 2013	TAO Introduction	* 16
	30 Deceber 2013	QUANTUM Tasking (8 duplicates of QUANTUMTHEORY)	28*
	30 December 2013	QUANTUMTHEORY	14
	29 December 2013	TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (images) TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (DE article)	4
	17 November 2013	ROYAL CONCIERGE (DE)ROYAL CONCIERGE (EN)	2
	29 October 2013	NSA-CIA SCS	3
	27 October 2013	NSA-CIA SCS	2
	20 October 2013	Mexico President	1
	20 September 2013	Belgacom	3
	16 September 2013	SWIFT	3
	9 September 2013	Smartphones	5
	1 September 2013	French Foreign Ministry	0
	31 August 2013	Al Jazeera	0

	O Globo Fantastico		~87
	7 October 2013	CSE Brazil Ministry	7
	8 September 2013	Petrobas	~60
	3 September 2013	Brazil and Mexico	20

	New York Times		118
	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	82*
	23 November 2013	SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016	5
	3 November 2013	SIGINT Mission 2013 SIGINT Mission 2017	22
	28 September 2013	Contact Chaining Social Networks	1
	28 September 2013	SYANPSE	1
	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	4*
	5 September 2013	SIGINT Enabling	3*


	ProPublica		89
	9 December 2013	Spying on Games	82*
	5 September 2013	BULLRUN	4*
	5 September 2103	SIGINT Enabling	3*

	Le Monde		20
	25 October 2013	NSA Hosts FR Spies	4
	22 October 2013	Wanadoo-Alcatel	1
	22 October 2013	Close Access Sigads	2
	22 October 2013	Boundless Informant	2
	22 October 2013	PRISM	11

	Dagbladet		13
	19 November 2013	BOUNDLESSINFORMANT	13

	NRC Handelsblad		5
	8 February 2014	MIVD BoundlessInformant Cryptome mirror	1
	30 November 2013	Dutch SIGINT	3
	23 November 2013	SIGINT Cryptologic Platform	1

	Huffington Post		3
	27 November 2013	Muslim Porn Viewing	3

	CBC		36
	30 January 2014	CESC IP Profiling	27
	10 December 2013	NSA-CSEC Partnership	1
	10 December 2013	G8-G20 Spying	4*
	2 December 2013	G8-G20 Spying	3
	29 November 2013	G8-G20 Spying	1

	The Globe and Mail		18
	30 November 2013	CSEC Brazil Spying	18*

	SVT (Swedsh TV)		2
	5 December 2013	Sweden Spied Russia for NSA	2

	L’Espresso		3
	6 December 2013	NSA Spies Italy	3

	Trojkan (SVT)		29
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Relationship	1*
	11 December 2013	NSA 5 Eyes Partners	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Agenda	8
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA RU Baltic	1
	11 December 2013	NSA GCHQ Sweden FRA COMINT	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Plan	5
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Sources	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Tor et al	3
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Slide	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Quantum 1	1
	11 December 2013	GCHQ Sweden FRA Quantum	1
	11 December 2013	NSA Sweden FRA Quantum Accomplishments	2
	9 December 2013	NSA and Sweden Pact	3*

	Jacob Appelbaum		* 71
	30 December 2013	NSA Catalog	* 50
	30 December 2013	NSA Catalog Video Clips	* 21

	Information.dk		22*
	14 January 2014	SSO (duplicate)	7*
	14 January 2014	PRISM (duplicate)	11*
	13 January 2014	5-Eyes Spy G8-G20 (duplicate)	4*

	Anonymous/ New York Times		18
	27 January 2014	NSA Smartphones Analysis	14
	27 January 2014	GCHQ Mobile Theme	4

	NBC News		76
	7 February 2014	GCHQ Cyber Attack	15
	5 February 2014	GCHQ Anonymous	14
	27 January 2014	GCHQ Squeaky Dolphin	47

	The Intercept		*45
	18 February 2014	GCHQ Psychology37 Duplicates of NBC News	*44
	18 February 2014	NSA-GCHQ Discovery	1

Cryptome – Sliming Snowden

Sliming Snowden

http://www.amazon.com/gp/cdp/member-reviews/A3J1JL75Q0E4VD/ref=pdp_new_
read_full_review_link?ie=UTF8&page=1&sort_by=MostRecentReview#RSR0O1O4HLAZ3

5.0 out of 5 stars Sliming Snowden, February 9, 2014

John Young “Cryptome” (New York, NY)

This review is from: The Snowden Files: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man (Vintage) (Kindle Edition)

Luke Harding wraps the Snowden story in shades of patriotism, conveying compromised journalism pretending opposition to government while seeking its approval for titillating stories of national security expose, editors redacting as commanded, airbrushing embarassments, withholding details needed to combat the global spying disease while helping spread it by self-serving like spies.

Harding self-serves his mendacious industry: valorous, vainglorious Guardian, New York Times, Washington Post, varieties of global media, headlining gravest news of NSA violations of public trust only after careful consultation with national authorities, thereby doubling public trust infidelities.

Harding embellishes protestations of resistance to government control, but does not reveal the extent of self-censorship the news outlets have engaged in: only a tiny number of Snowden documents — between .0062% (of 1.7 million by USG), and 1.7% (of 58,000 by the Guardian) — have been released, with thousands of melodramatic stories written about the near total censorship of what Snowden called his gift to the public.

Worst fault: there are no Snowden documents in the book, total censorship of credible evidence, instead only rhetorical blather composed of rewrites of news accounts and a bit of inside-the-Guardian gossip and much self-congratulation.

This is a sales brochure for the Guardian, characteristically bloviated by editor Alan Rusbridger, puffed-up with profiles of daring journalists — Ewan MacAskill, Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald — hyper-aroused at the unexpected Snowden windfall, dancing and laughing at their good fortune, of journalism’s, rescue for a declining industry beaten by truly courageous unjournalistic initiatives.

(Harding smears Julian Assange for his arch-enemies Guardian and New York Times, only glancingly mentions Baron Gellman’s seasoned, superior and less flamboyant reports on Snowden.)

Editors of the Guardian and the New York Times are portrayed without blemishes, valiant, brave, stalwart, while cultivating governments to participate in a mutually beneficial campaign of the illusion of risk and assurance long practiced by the press and officials at lunches and private conferences here amply admitted as if just wonderful buddies giving a hand to bollix the public.

Snowden is praised for speaking exactly like a perfect hybrid of Guardian-NY Times-lawyerly journalism and official press officers oozing concern for the public interest while relishing controversy and public attention by explaining (with ample redactions and omissions) what spies do to save nations. Pacts are set among all parties for roles to play, words to say, actions to take, increased profits and budgets to be enjoyed. Harding crows it will takes years, even decades, for the story to run, run and run some more. In synchronicity, Jill Abramson, NYTimes editor, said recently at a public gathering titled “Journalism After Snowden,” “thank god for Snowden, we want more stories, we need more stories.”

Harding has provided a tawdry romance of illusory national security journalism, sweaty and heavy breathing of adrenaline rush on airliners, breast and chest baring videoed in Hong Kong hotels for later private showings, bountiful informaton copulation in the rathole salons of London, New York, Washington, DC, and Rio de Janeiro.

With books, videos, films, TV, news cascading endless Snowden gush, no wonder billionaire Omidyar leaped to fund a $250 million bordello to service this natsec investment adventure with exciting jaunts to Rio to sit at the feet of Marquis de Greenwald (amidst leg-humping dogs) for instructions in the sexiest of journalism following the slimy Internet pornography industry.

Maryland Lawmakers Push to Cut Water, Electricity to NSA Spy Agency Headquarters

NSA nerve center in Fort Meade targeted by bill.

The National Security Agency is based in Fort Meade, Md., and is currently building a new computer center there that will be cooled with recycled wastewater from Howard County, Md.

By Steven Nelson פבר. 10, 2014 86 Comments SHARE

The National Security Agency’s headquarters in Ft. Meade, Md., will go dark if a cohort of Maryland lawmakers has its way.

Eight Republicans in the 141-member Maryland House of Delegates introduced legislation Thursday that would deny the electronic spy agency “material support, participation or assistance in any form” from the state, its political subdivisions or companies with state contracts.

The bill would deprive NSA facilities water and electricity carried over public utilities, ban the use of NSA-derived evidence in state courts and prevent state universities from partnering with the NSA on research.

[BROWSE: Editorial Cartoons About NSA Surveillance]

State or local officials ignoring the NSA sanctions would be fired, local governments refusing to comply would lose state grant funds and companies would be forever barred from state contracts.

The bill was filed as emergency legislation and requires support of three-fifths of delegates to pass. It was referred to the chamber’s judiciary committee.

NSA facilities in Maryland use a massive amount of water and electricity, the supply of which might be jeopardized by the legislation.

The agency signed a contract with Howard County, Md., for water to cool a computer center under construction at Fort Meade, The Washington Post reported Jan. 2. The deal reportedly involves up to 5 million gallons of water a day for nearly $2 million a year. As of 2006 the agency headquarters purchased as much electricity from Baltimore Gas & Electric as the city of Annapolis, The Baltimore Sun reported.

The proposal is the latest in a series of state bills aiming to cut off the NSA one jurisdiction at a time for allegedly ignoring the Fourth Amendment with its dragnet collection of phone and Internet records.

The legislative wave is spearheaded by the Tenth Amendment Center, which along with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee launched the OffNow coalition last year seeking to cut off water to the NSA’s just-built Utah Data Center.

[READ: Rand Paul’s NSA Lawsuit May Be Heard Alongside Klayman’s]

Legislation hasn’t yet been introduced in Utah, but lawmakers in Arizona, California, Tennessee, Washington and other states have filed bills based on model legislation from the Tenth Amendment Center.

Several of those bills were introduced with bipartisan sponsorship. The Arizona bill has been the most successful to date, winning 4-2 approval by the state Senate Government and Environment Committee on Feb. 3.

Exposed – Jean-Jacques Quisquater on Alleged NSA-GCHQ Hack

Jean-Jacques Quisquater on Alleged NSA-GCHQ Hack

Thanks to Jean-Jacques Quisquater.

Comments about “NSA-GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer Quisquater”

More info written by Jean-Jacques Quisquater.

This text was updated on February 6, 2014 in the afternoon (Belgian time).

Since February 1st 2014 many papers appeared in the newspapers and on internet concerning the hack of the personal portable computer of Jean-Jacques Quisquater (JJQ). See

http://www.pcworld.com/article/2093700/prominent-cryptographer-victim-of-malware-attack-related-to-belgacom-breach.html
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/02/03/nsa_gchq_accused_of_hacking_belgian_smartcard_crypto_guru/
http://yro.slashdot.org/story/14/02/03/1239223/crypto-legend-quisquater-targeted—but-nsa-may-not-be-to-blame

Unfortunately many of these papers suffer from approximations and extrapolations and some of them are wrong.

The following text is intended to clarify the context of the attack as much as possible as the investigations are not complete at this stage.

In short:

-Facts: Yes, this portable computer was attacked. We don’t know for sure the vector of the attack in use. According to the Belgian Federal Police the attack of this computer is strongly related to the attack of Belgacom in Belgium allegedly hacked by NSA-GCHQ.

The only found vector of attack is related to an email spoofing a linkedin email mentioning a name close to a name known by JJQ. From this email, JJQ opened a link to a profile of the mentioned person and JJQ immediately understood it was a spoof and closed his computer in one second. The computer was later extensively scanned by several malware detectors without result. Possibly another vector of attack was used but there is no trace of it.

-Data available on the computer: There was no sensible data on the computer. The main part of the JJQ’s work is the design of (formal) methods related to cryptography and computer security and this activity is twofold:

– Methods related to the academic world finally anyway published in conferences, journals, patents and standards. Privacy concerning reviews of scientific papers is important to write these reviews without external pressure, the content is nevertheless not critical. – Activities related to sensible data of companies always follow a very strict procedure which lead to a very strong level of security
(the use of safes, only in company rooms, dedicated computers without connection, destruction of all the data at the end of the study). Therefore no sensible information related to companies is available on this personal computer.

Companies are only using the practical ideas of JJQ in the spirit of the main principle of Kerckhoffs (« only the key is secret ») and
of Shannon (« The enemy knows the system »).

-The purpose of the attack: we don’t know. Maybe the cryptography research is under surveillance, maybe some people hope to find some interesting information or contact, maybe there is another goal we will never know.

More precisely:

– September 16, 2013: the Belgian newspaper De Standard announced an attack of Belgacom (main communication operator in Belgium) by the NSA (links in Dutch):

http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20130915_00743233
http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20130916_00743534

– September 16, 2013 (same day in the afternoon): Jean-Jacques Quisquater received an email spoofing a linkedin email,
opened a link to a profile of somebody he was thinking he knows, saw immediately it was a spoof and closed in one second
his computer. The computer was strongly scanned by several malware detectors without result.

JJQ comments: It is not sure that this attack was working and is related to the main attack against the computer but the dates are matching. Other people were also attacked in Belgium. We don’t know the vector of the “winning” attack (phishing, injection packet
through Quantum Insert, … ?).

– September 20, 2013: Der Spiegel announced an attack of Belgacom by GCHQ using tools from NSA, from the files of Snowden: see

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html

– November 8, 2013: the Federal Police contacted JJQ to discuss with him.

– November 12, 2013: meeting with people from the Federal Police. They announced that the computer was strongly attacked by a targeted attack (it means an attack where there is only one target: it is nearly impossible to detect it). The attack was directly related to the Belgacom attack. The used malware is very clever, very difficult to detect, impossible to remove using currently available antivirus. In fact the malware was only active when outside the personal home. The communications between the malware in the computer and the servers at Belgacom are encrypted: so only metadata are possibly usable for the investigations. It is thus also impossible that any large content from the computer was communicated. No confidential information (commercial or not) was on this computer.

– December 2, 2013: The attack was confirmed and is still under investigation. Later it was learnt that the malware is likely a variant of the malware miniduke:

https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208194129The_MiniDuke_Mystery_PDF_0_day_Government_Spy_Assembler_Micro_Backdoor

This version of the malware is not detected by any currently available antivirus.

– January 28, 2014: A journalist from De Standaard (Belgian newspapers) contacted JJQ in order to have a meeting because somebody spoke to the journalist about an hacked well-known Belgian cryptographer speaking French (clearly JJQ). This hacking was presented as directly related to the hacking of Belgacom.

– January 30, 2014: During the meeting the journalists announced that De Standaard will publish a paper about this story on next Saturday.

– Saturday February 1st, 2014: Publication of their story by De Standaard: http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20140201_011 (translation in English) and the buzz began. JJQ then answered questions from the Belgian TVs RTBF and RTL.

There are also a lot of information about targeted attacks in:

http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications/threatreport.jsp

Also read this paper from RAID 2012 (the research conference about intrusions):

http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-33338-5_4

The National Security Archive – U.S. Satellite Imagery

The use of overhead platforms to observe events on the earth can be traced to the French Revolution, when France organized a company of aerostiers, or balloonists, in April 1794. The United States employed balloons during the Civil War, although little intelligence of value was obtained. In January 1911, the San Diego waterfront became the first target of cameras carried aboard an airplane. Later that year the U.S. Army Signal Corps put aerial photography into the curriculum at its flight training school. Between 1913 and 1915 visual and photographic reconnaissance missions were flown by the U.S. Army in the Philippines and along the Mexican border.¹

During World War II the United States made extensive use of airplane photography using remodeled bombers. After the war, with the emergence of a hostile relationship with the Soviet Union, the United States began conducting photographic missions along the Soviet periphery. The aircraft cameras, however, could only capture images of territory within a few miles of the flight path.

On some missions aircraft actually flew into Soviet airspace, but even those missions did not provide the necessary coverage of the vast Soviet interior. As a result, beginning in the early 1950s the United States began seriously exploring more advanced methods for obtaining images of targets throughout the Soviet Union. The result was the development, production, and employment of a variety of spacecraft and aircraft (particularly the U-2 and A-12/SR-71) that permitted the U.S. intelligence community to closely monitor developments in the Soviet Union and other nations through overhead imagery.

The capabilities of spacecraft and aircraft have evolved from being limited to black-and-white visible-light photography to being able to produce images using different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. As a result, imagery can often be obtained under circumstances (darkness, cloud cover) where standard visible-light photography is not feasible. In addition, employment of different portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, individually or simultaneously, expands the information that can be produced concerning a target.

Photographic equipment can be film-based or electro-optical. A conventional camera captures a scene on film by recording the varying light levels reflected from all of the separate objects in the scene. In contrast, an electro-optical camera converts the varying light levels into electrical signals. A numerical value is assigned to each of the signals, which are called picture elements, or pixels. At a ground receiving station, a picture can then be constructed from the digital signal transmitted from the spacecraft (often via a relay satellite).²

In addition to the visible-light portion of the electro-magnetic spectrum, the near-infrared portion of the spectrum, which is invisible to the human eye, can be employed to produce images. At the same time, near-infrared, like, visible-light imagery, depends on objects reflecting solar radiation rather than on their emission of radiation. As a result, such imagery can only be produced in daylight and in the absence of substantial cloud cover.³

Thermal infrared imagery, obtained from the mid- and far-infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, provides imagery purely by detecting the heat emitted by objects. Thus, a thermal infrared system can detect buried structures, such as missile silos or underground construction, as a result of the heat they generate. Since thermal infrared imagery does not require visible light, it can be obtained under conditions of darkness–if the sky is free of cloud cover.⁴

Imagery can be obtained during day or night in the presence of cloud cover by employing an imaging radar (an acronym for radio detection and ranging). Radar imagery is produced by bouncing radio waves off an area or an object and using the reflected returns to produce an image of the target. Since radio waves are not attenuated by the water vapor in the atmosphere, they are able to penetrate cloud cover.⁵

However imagery is obtained, it requires processing and interpretation to convert it into intelligence data. Computers can be employed to improve the quantity and quality of the information extracted. Obviously, digital electro-optical imagery arrives in a form that facilitates such operations. But even analog imagery obtained by a conventional camera can be converted into digital signals. In any case, a computer disassembles a picture into millions of electronic Morse code pulses and then uses mathematical formulas to manipulate the color contrast and intensity of each spot. Each image can be reassembled in various ways to highlight special features and objects that were hidden in the original image.⁶

Such processing allows:

building multicolored single images out of several pictures taken in different bands of the spectrum;

making the patterns more obvious;

restoring the shapes of objects by adjusting for the angle of view and lens distortion;

changing the amount of contrast between objects and backgrounds;

sharpening out-of-focus images;

restoring ground details largely obscured by clouds;

conducting electronic optical subtraction, in which earlier pictures are subtracted from later ones, making unchanged buildings in a scene disappear while new objects, such as missile silos under construction, remain;

enhancing shadows; and

suppressing glint.⁷

Such processing plays a crucial role in easing the burden on photogrammetrists and imagery interpreters. Photogrammetrists are responsible for determining the size and dimensions of objects from overhead photographs, using, along with other data, the shadows cast by the objects. Photo interpreters are trained to provide information about the nature of the objects in the photographs–based on information as to what type of crates carry MiG-29s, for instance, or what an IRBM site or fiber optics factory looks like from 150 miles in space.

Click on any of the following images to view a larger version of the photo.

CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD

In its May 2, 1946 report, Preliminary Design for an Experimental World Circling Spaceship, the Douglas Aircraft Corporation examined the potential value of satellites for scientific and military purposes. Possible military uses included missile guidance, weapons delivery, weather reconnaissance, communications, attack assessment, and “observation.”⁸

A little less than nine years later, on March 16, 1955, the Air Force issued General Operational Requirement No. 80, officially establishing a high-level requirement for an advanced reconnaissance satellite. The document defined the Air Force objective to be the provision of continuous surveillance of “preselected areas of the earth” in order “to determine the status of a potential enemy’s warmaking capability.”⁹

Over the next five years the U.S. reconnaissance satellite program evolved in a variety of ways. The success of the Soviet Union’s Sputnik I and II satellites in the fall of 1957 provided a spur to all U.S. space programs – as any success could be used in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union. In the case of U.S. reconnaissance programs, Sputnik provided a second incentive. The clear implications of the Sputnik launches for Soviet ICBM development increased the pressure on discovering the extent of Soviet capabilities – something that the sporadic U-2 flights could only do in a limited fashion.¹⁰

The Air Force program was first designated the Advanced Reconnaissance System (ARS), then SENTRY, and finally SAMOS. Management responsibility for SAMOS was transferred from the Air Force to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), established on February 7, 1958, and then back to the Air Force in late 1959.¹¹

Concern about the the length of time it would take to achieve the primary objective of the SAMOS program – a satellite that could scan its exposed film and return the imagery electronically – led to President Dwight Eisenhower’s approval, also on February 7, 1958, of a CIA program to develop a reconnaissance satellite. The CIA program, designated CORONA, focused on development of a satellite that would physically return its images in a canister – an objective which had been a subsidiary portion of the SAMOS program.¹²

While all the various versions of the SAMOS program would be canceled in the early 1960s, CORONA would become a mainstay of the U.S. space reconnaissance program for over a decade. It would take over a year, starting in 1959, and 14 launches before an operational CORONA spacecraft was placed in orbit. Nine of the first twelve launches carried a camera that was intended to photograph areas of the Soviet Union and other nations. All the flights ended in failure for one reason or another. The thirteenth mission, a diagnostic flight without camera equipment, was the first success – in that a canister was returned from space and recovered at sea.¹³

Then on August 18, a CORONA was placed into orbit, orbited the Earth for a day, and returned its canister to earth, where it was snatched out the air by a specially equipped aircraft on August 19. The camera carried on that flight would be retroactively designated the KH-1 (KH for KEYHOLE) and was cable of producing images with resolution in the area of 25-40 feet – a far cry from what would be standard in only a few years. It did yield, however, more images of the Soviet Union in its single day of operation than did the entire U-2 program.¹⁴

The next successful CORONA mission would be conducted on December 7, 1960. This time a more advanced camera system, the KH-2, would be on board. From that time, through the end of the CORONA program in 1972, there would be a succession of new camera systems – the KH-3, KH-4, KH-4A, and KH-4B – which produced higher-resolution images than their predecessors, ultimately resulting in a system that could yield images with approximately 5-6′ resolution. In addition, two smaller programs – ARGON (for mapping) and LANYARD (motivated by a specific target in the Soviet Union) – operated during the years 1962-1964 and 1963 respectively. All together there were 145 missions, which yielded over 800,000 images of the Soviet Union and other areas of the world.¹⁵

Those images dramatically improved U.S. knowledge of Soviet and other nations capabilities and activities. Perhaps its major accomplishment occurred within 18 months of the first successful CORONA mission. Accumulated photography allowed the U.S. intelligence community to dispel the fear of missile gap, with earlier estimates of a Soviet ICBM force numbering in the hundreds by mid-1962 becoming, in September 1961, an estimate of between 25 and 50. By June 1964 CORONA satellites had photographed all 25 Soviet ICBM complexes. CORONA imagery also allowed the U.S. to catalog Soviet air defense and anti-ballistic missile sites, nuclear weapons related facilities, submarine bases, IRBM sites, airbases – as well as Chinese, East European, and other nations military facilities. It also allowed assessment of military conflicts – such as the 1967 Six-Day War – and monitoring of Soviet arms control compliance.¹⁶

In February 1995, President Clinton signed an executive order that declassified those images. ¹⁷

[Source: CIA/National Reconnaissance Office]

A KH-4A image of Dolon airfield, which was a major Soviet long-range aviation facility located in what is now the Republic of Kazakhstan. The image shows two regiments of Tupolev (Tu-16) Bear bombers. The main runway is 13,200 feet long.

The KH-4A camera system was first introduced in August 1963. Resolution ranged from 9 to 25 feet.

[Source: CIA/National Reconnaissance Office]

A KH-4B image of the Moscow, with an insert of the Kremlin. In the enlargement of the Kremlin, individual vehicles can be identified as trucks or cars, and the line of people waiting to enter Lenin’s Tomb in Red Square can be seen. According to the CIA, the photograph “illustrates some of the best resolution imagery acquired by the KH-4B camera system.”

The KH-4B was first introduced in September 1967 and generally produced images with 6 foot resolution.

[Source: CIA/National Reconnaissance Office via Federation of American Scientists]

A KH-4B of image, taken on February 11, 1969 of a Taiwanese nuclear facility. The United States intelligence community, relying on CORONA and other forms of intelligence, has closely monitored the nuclear facilities of both adversaries such as the Soviet Union and the PRC and those of friendly nations such as Taiwan and Israel.

The Next Generations

The primary objective of the CORONA program was to provide “area surveillance” coverage of the Soviet Union, China and other parts of the world. Thus, CORONA yielded single photographs which covered thousands of square miles of territory – allowing analysts to both examine images of known targets and to search for previously undetected installations or activities that would be of interest to the U.S. intelligence community.

The GAMBIT program provided an important complement to CORONA. Initiated in 1960, it yielded the first “close-look” or “spotting” satellite. The emphasis of GAMBIT operations, which commenced in 1963 and continued through part of 1984, was to produce high-resolution imagery on specific targets (rather than general areas). Such resolution would allow the production of more detailed intelligence, particularly technical intelligence on foreign weapons systems. The first GAMBIT camera, the KH-7, could produce photos with about 18 inch resolution, while the second and last model, the KH-8 was capable of producing photographs with under 6 inch resolution.¹⁸

While the Air Force concentrated on the high-resolution systems, the CIA (after numerous bureaucratic battles) was assigned responsibility for the next generation area surveillance program. That program, which came to be designated HEXAGON, resulted in satellites carrying the KH-9 camera system – capable of producing images covering even more territory than the CORONA satellites, with a resolution of 1-2 feet. Eighteen HEXAGON satellites would be launched into orbit between 1971 and 1984, when the program terminated.¹⁹

In late 1976, a new capability was added when the satellite carrying the KH-11 optical system was placed into orbit. Unlike its predecessors, the KH-11, also known by the program code names KENNAN and CRYSTAL, did not return film canisters to be recovered and interpreted. Rather, the light captured by its optical system was transformed into electronic signals and relayed (through a relay satellite in a higher orbit) back to a ground station, where the signals were recorded on tape and converted into an image. As a result, the U.S. could obtain satellite images of a site or activity virtually simultaneously with a satellite passing overhead.²⁰

The 1980s saw a number of inadvertent or unauthorized disclosures of U.S. satellite imagery. In 1980, as a result of the fiasco at Desert One, where U.S. forces landed in preparation for an attempt to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran, KH-11 imagery of possible evacuation sites in Tehran was left behind. In 1981, Aviation Week & Space Technology published a leaked (and degraded) KH-11 photo of a Soviet bomber at Ramenskoye Airfield.

In 1984, two images of Soviet aircraft, taken by a KH-8 or KH-9 satellite, were inadvertently published in Congressional hearings. That same year, an employee of the Naval Intelligence Support Center provided Jane’s Defence Weekly with several images taken by a KH-11 satellite of a Soviet naval shipbuilding facility.²¹

[KH-11 Photograph]

This 1984 computer enhanced KH-11 photo, taken at an oblique angle was leaked, along with two others, to Jane’s Defence Weekly by naval intelligence analyst, Samuel Loring Morison. The image shows the general layout of the Nikolaiev 444 shipyard in the Black Sea. Under construction is a Kiev- class aircraft carrier (shown in the left side of the photo), then known as the Kharkov, along with an amphibious landing ship.
Morison was brought to trial, convicted, and sent to prison in a controversial case.


[MiG-29]	[SU-27]

These satellite photographs, showing a MiG-29 FULCRUM and SU- 27 FLANKER, were shown to the House Appropriations Committee during 1984 budget hearings. They were then published, apparently by mistake, in the sanitized version of the hearings released to the public. During the 1985 trial of Samuel Loring Morison, government prosecutors would acknowledge the photographs were satellite images, produced by a system other than the KH-11.

Current Systems

The United States is presently operating at least two satellite imaging systems. One is an advanced version of the KH-11, three of which have been launched, the first in 1992.

The advanced KH-11 satellites have a higher orbit than that exhibited by their predecessors–operating with perigees of about 150 miles and apogees of about 600 miles. In addition, they also have some additional capabilities. They contain an infrared imagery capability, including a thermal infrared imagery capability, thus permitting imagery during darkness. In addition, the satellites carry the Improved CRYSTAL Metric System (ICMS), which places the necessary markings on returned imagery to permit its full exploitation for mapping purposes. Additionally, the Advanced KH-11 can carry more fuel than the original model, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 pounds. This permits a longer lifetime for the new model–possibly up to eight years.²²

A second component of the U.S. space imaging fleet, are satellites developed and deployed under a program first known as INDIGO, then as LACROSSE, and most recently as VEGA. Rather than employing an electro-optical system they carry an imaging radar. The satellites closed a major gap in U.S. capabilities by allowing the U.S. intelligence community to obtain imagery even when targets are covered by clouds.²³

The first VEGA was launched on December 2, 1988 from the space shuttle orbiter Atlantis (and deorbited in July 1997). A second was orbited in March 1991, from Vandenberg AFB on a Titan IV, and a third in October 1997. The satellites have operated in orbits of approximately 400 miles and at inclinations of 57 and 68 degrees respectively.²⁴

When conceived, the primary purpose envisioned for the satellite was monitoring Soviet and Warsaw Pact armor. Recent VEGA missions included providing imagery for bomb damage assessments of the consequences of Navy Tomahawk missile attacks on Iraqi air defense installations in September 1996, monitoring Iraqi weapons storage sites, and tracking Iraqi troop movements such as the dispersal of the Republican Guard when the Guard was threatened with U.S. attack in early 1998. VEGA has a resolution of 3-5 feet, with its resolution reportedly being sufficient to allow discrimination between tanks and armored personnel carriers and identification of bomb craters of 6-10 feet in diameter.²⁵

The LACROSSE/VEGA satellite that was launched in October 1997 may be the first of a new generation of radar imagery satellites. The new generation will apparently have greater resolution, and constellation size may be increased from 2 to 3.²⁶

[Source: Dept. of Defense]

An advanced KH-11 photograph of the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant, Sudan. This degraded photo, of approximately 1-meter resolution, was officially released after the U.S. attack on the plant in August 1998 in retaliation for attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa. The U.S. alleged, at least partially on the basis of soil samples, that the plant was involved in the production of chemical weapons.

[Source: Dept. of Defense]

A degraded advanced KH-11 photograph of the Zhawar Kili Base Camp (West), Afghanistan, which housed training facilities for Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist organization.

The photograph was used by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to brief reporters on the U.S. cruise missile attack on the facility.

[Source: Dept. of Defense]

One of over twenty degraded advanced KH-11 photos, released by the Department of Defense in December 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. The higher resolution, and classified, version of the image was used by imagery interpreters at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to assess the damage caused by U.S. airstrikes.

[Source: Dept. of Defense]

A degraded advanced KH-11 photo of Al Sahra Airfield, Iraq, used by Vice Adm. Scott A. Fry, USN, Director, J-3 and Rear Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN, Joint Staff intelligence director in a Pentagon press briefing on December 18, 1998.

[Source: Dept. of Defense]

The arrows in this degraded advanced KH-11 image, used in a Pentagon press briefing on December 19, 1998, show two areas where the Secretariat Presidential was damaged due to Operation Desert Fox airstrikes.

[Source: Dept. of Defense]

Pre-strike assessment photograph of the Belgrade Army Garrison and headquarters, Serbia.

[Source: Dept. of Defense]

Post-strike damage assessment photograph of the Belgrade Army Garrison and Headquarters, Serbia, attacked during Operation Allied Force.

Commercial Imagery

The U.S. intelligence community has also used imagery, including multispectral imagery, produced by two commercial systems –LANDSAT and SPOT. The LANDSAT program began in 1969 as an experimental National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) program, the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS). Currently there are two operating LANDSAT satellites–LANDSAT 4 and LANDSAT 5–launched in 1982 and 1984.²⁷

LANDSATs 4 and 5 operate in 420 mile sun-synchronous orbits and each carries a Thematic Mapper (TM), an upgraded version of the Multispectral Scanner (MSS) on earlier LANDSATs. A typical LANDSAT images is 111 by 102 miles, providing significant broad area coverage. However, the resolution of the images is approximately 98 feet–making them useful for only the coarsest intelligence tasks.

SPOT, an acronym for Le Systeme Pour l’Observation de la Terre, is operated by the French national space agency. SPOT 1 was launched in 1986, followed by three additional satellites at approximately four year intervals. SPOT satellites operate in about 500-mile orbits, and carry two sensor systems. The satellites can return black and white (panchromatic) images with 33 foot resolution and multispectral images with 67 foot resolution. The images are of higher-resolution than LANDSAT’s but cover less territory– approximately 36 miles by 36 miles.²⁸

U.S. intelligence community use of commercial imagery will expand dramatically in the coming years if the new generation of commercial imaging satellites lives up to expectations–which include images with 1-meter resolution. Such imagery and the reduced cost of attaining it when purchased commercially will permit the U.S. intelligence community to fill part of its needs via such commercial systems.

Among the commercial satellites that are expected to produce high resolution imagery are the Ikonos satellites to be launched by Space Imaging Eosat (which also operates the LANDSAT satellites). The first of the satellites, scheduled to be launched in the summer of 1999 from Vandenberg AFB, is designed to generate 1-meter panchromatic and 4-meter multispectral images. A similar satellite is scheduled for launch in September 1998.²⁹

Also promising to provide 1-meter panchromatic imagery and 4-meter multispectral imagery are the satellites to be developed by EarthWatch and Orbital Sciences. EarthWatch’s 1-meter resolution Quickbird satellite is scheduled for launch in late 1998 or 1999. Orbital Science’s OrbView-3 satellite is to be launched in 1999. It is expected to have a 3-5 year lifetime and produce images covering 5×5 mile segments with 1-meter resolution.³⁰

[Source: Space Imaging]

An overhead photograph of Mountain View, California that that has been digitally scanned to represent the one-meter imagery that the Ikonos satellites are expected to provide.

Notes

1. William Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1986), pp. 28, 32.
2. Farouk el-Baz, “EO Imaging Will Replace Film in Reconnaissance,” Defense Systems Review (October 1983): 48-52.
3. Richard D. Hudson Jr. and Jacqueline W. Hudson, “The Military Applications of Remote Sensing by Infrared,” Proceedings of the IEEE 63, 1 (1975): 104-28.
4. Ibid.; Bruce G. Blair and Garry D. Brewer, “Verifying SALT,” in William Potter (ed.), Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1980), pp. 7-48.
5. Homer Jensen, L.C. Graham, Leonard J. Porcello, and Emmet N. Leith, “Side-looking Airborne Radar,” Scientific American, October 1977, pp. 84-95.
6. Paul Bennett, Strategic Surveillance (Cambridge, Ma.: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1979), p. 5.
7. Richard A. Scribner, Theodore J. Ralston, and William D. Mertz, The Verification Challenge: Problems and Promise of Strategic Nuclear Arms Verification (Boston: Birkhauser, 1985), p. 70; John F. Ebersole and James C. Wyant, “Real-Time Optical Subtraction of Photographic Imagery for Difference Detection,” Applied Optics, 15, 4 (1976): 871-76.
8. Robert L. Perry, Origins of the USAF Space Program, 1945-1956 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Systems Command, June 1962), p. 30.
9. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
10. On the impact of Sputnik, see Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York: Oxford, 1993).
11. Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. KEYHOLE Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 26-30.
12. Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973): 1-37, reprinted in Kevin C. Ruffner (ed.), CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1995).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.; Robert A. McDonald, “CORONA: Success for Space Reconnaissance, A Look into the Cold War, and a Revolution in Intelligence,” Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing 61,6
(June 1995): 689-720.
15. McDonald, “CORONA: Success for Space Reconnaissance …”.
16. Robert A. McDonald, “Corona’s Imagery: A Revolution in Intelligence and Buckets of Gold for National Security,” in Robert A. McDonald (ed)., CORONA: Between the Sun and the Earth – The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Baltimore: American Society of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1997), pp. 211-220; Greer, “CORONA”; Frank J. Madden, The CORONA Camera System, Itek’s Contribution to World Stability (Lexington, Mass.: Itek, May 1997), p. 6.
17. Executive Order 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, February 24, 1995.
18. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, pp. 77-78, 359-60.
19. Ibid., pp. 105-21, 361-62.
20. Ibid., pp. 123-143, 362.
21. Burrows, Deep Black, photo section.
22. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, p. 231; Craig Covault, “Advanced KH-11 Broadens U.S. Recon Capability,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 6, 1997, pp. 24-25.
23. Bob Woodward, VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 221.
24. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community 4th ed. (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1999), p. 155.
25. Ibid.
26. David Fulghum and Craig Covault, “U.S. Set to Launch Upgraded Lacrosse,” Aviation Week & Space Technology September 20, 1996, p.34;
27. Bob Preston, Plowshares and Power: The Military Use of Civil Space (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1994), pp. 55-56; Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 159.
28. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 159.
29. Joseph C. Anselmo, “Space Imaging Readies 1-Meter Satellite,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 19, 1997, p. 26; “Ikonos 1 Undergoes Tests as Launch Nears,” Space News, May 11-17, 1998, p. 19; “Commercial Developments,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 29, 1998, p. 17.
30. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, pp. 160-61.

Unveiled – NSA Snowden Releases Tally Update – *1,098 Pages

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News. Tally now *1,098 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally now less than ~1.8%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.0062% of that released).

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages to CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous via New York Times.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

Related Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment:

http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-count.htm

* 5 January 2014. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel (30 December 2013. No source given for NSA docs). Tally now *962 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.50% of that released).

Glenn Greenwald tweeted:

Glenn Greenwald @ggreenwald, 8:05 AM – 29 Dec 13

@Cryptomeorg @ioerror I had no involvement in that Spiegel article, ask them – and they don’t say those are Snowden docs.

Matt Blaze tweeted, 11:24 AM – 2 Jan 14

matt blaze @mattblaze

If there are other sources besides Snowden, I hope journalists getting docs are careful to authenticate them (& disclose uncertainty).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

3 January 2014. See also EFF, ACLU and LeakSource accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages (8 duplicates) to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

23 December 2013

http://www.adn.com/2013/12/22/3243451/pincus-snowden-still-has-a-road.html

We’ve yet to see the full impact of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s unauthorized downloading of highly classified intelligence documents.

Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

3 November 2013

47 42 Years to Release Snowden Documents

NY Times, 3 November 2013:

Outlet Pages
The Guardian 273
Washington Post 216
Der Spiegel * 97
O Globo Fantastico ~87
New York Times
Anonymous 118 (82 joint)
18
ProPublica 89 (82 joint)
Le Monde 20
Dagbladet 13
NRC Handelsblad 4
Huffington Post 3
CBC 36
The Globe and Mail 18
SVT 2
L’Espresso 3
Trojkan (SVT) 29
Jacob Appelbaum * 71
Information.dk 22*
Anonymous/New York Times 18
NBC News 61

Timeline of releases:

5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.

31 January 2014. Add 27 pages CBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.

27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous.

16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 Decebmer 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel.

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT).

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 25 pages to Guardian.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 74 pages to Washington Post.

10 December 2013. Add 2 pages to CBC.

10 December 2013. Add 4 pages to CBC (duplicate of previous source).

9 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Trojkan. Add 2 pages to Guardian. Add 82 pages to New York Times and ProPublica (joint).

6 December 2013. Add 3 pages to L’Espresso.

5 December 2013. Add 2 pages to SVT (Swedish TV).

5 December 2013. Add 1 page to Washington Post.

4 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Washington Post.

2 December 2013. Add 3 pages to CBC.

30 November 2013. Add 18 pages to The Globe and Mail.

30 November 2013. Add 3 pages to NRC Handelsblad.

29 November 2013. Add 1 page to CBC.

27 November 2013. Add 3 pages to Huffington Post.

26 November 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

23 November 2013. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad.

23 November 2013. Add 5 pages to New York Times.

22 November 2013. Add 10 pages to Dagbladet.

18 November 2013. Add 6 pages to The Guardian.

17 November 2013. Add two images to Der Spiegel.

4 November 2013. Add 14 pages to Washington Post.

3 November 2013. A reports an additional 54 slides for O Globo Petrobas.

3 November 2013. Add 22 pages to New York Times.

2 November 2013. Add 13 pages to Guardian, 11 are duplicates.

31 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

29 October 2013. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel

27 October 2013. Add 2 pages to Der Spiegel.

25 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Le Monde.

22 October 2013. Add 5 pages to Le Monde.

21 October 2013. Add 11 pages to Le Monde, 8 are duplicates.

20 October 2013. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.

13 October 2013. Add 4, 7 and 9 pages to Washington Post.

8 October 2013. Add 7 pages to O Globo: CSE spying on Brazilian ministry, reported 7 October 2013.

6 October 2013. Add Snowden pages published by Washington Post, Der Spiegel, O Globo Fantastico, New York Times, ProPublica. Some are duplicates(*).

5 October 2013

26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian

Number Date Title Pages
The Guardian 273
21 16 January 2014 SMS Text Messages Exploit 8
20 9 December 2013 Spying on Games 2
18 18 November 2013 DSD-3G 6
19 1 November 2013 PRISM, SSO
SSO1 Slide
SSO2 Slide 13*
18 4 October 2013 Types of IAT Tor 9
17 4 October 2013 Egotistical Giraffe 20*
16 4 October 2013 Tor Stinks 23
15 11 September 2013 NSA-Israel Spy 5
14 5 September 2013 BULLRUN 6*
13 5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*
12 5 September 2013 NSA classification guide 3
11 31 July 2013 XKeyscore 32
10 27 June 2013 DoJ Memo on NSA 16
9 27 June 2013 Stellar Wind 51
8 21 June 2013 FISA Certification 25
7 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit A 9
6 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit B 9
5 16 June 2013 GCHQ G-20 Spying 4
4 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant FAQ 3
3 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant Slides 4
2 7 June 2013 PPD-20 18
1 5 June 2013 Verizon 4
Washington Post 216
2 January 2014 Quantum Computer 2 10
2 January 2014 Quantum Computer 3
23 December 2013 NSA/CSS Mission 2
11 December 2013 Excessive Collection 9
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 2 7
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 1 4
11 December 2013 Yahoo-Google Exploit 6
11 December 2013 Cable Spying Types 7
11 December 2013 WINDSTOP 1
11 December 2013 Co-Traveler 24
11 December 2013 GSM Tracking 2
11 December 2013 SIGINT Successes 4
11 December 2013 GHOSTMACHINE 4
5 December 2013 Target Location 1
4 December 2013 FASCIA 2
4 December 2013 CHALKFUN 1
26 November 2013 Microsoft a Target? 4
4 November 2013 WINDSTOP, SSO, Yahoo-Google 14
30 October 2013 MUSCULAR-INCENSOR Google and Yahoo 4
14 October 2013 SSO Overview 4
14 October 2013 SSO Slides 7
14 October 2013 SSO Content Slides 9
4 October 2013 Tor 49
4 October 2013 EgotisticalGiraffe 20*
4 October 2013 GCHQ MULLENIZE 2
4 October 2013 Roger Dingledine 2
30 August 2013 Budget 17
10 July 2013 PRISM Slide 1
29 June 2013 PRISM 8
20 June 2013 Warrantless Surveillance 25*
7 June 2013 PPD-20 18*
6 June 2013 PRISM 1
Der Spiegel * 97
31 December 2013 QFIRE * 16
30 December 2013 TAO Introduction * 16
30 Deceber 2013 QUANTUM Tasking (8 duplicates of QUANTUMTHEORY) 28*
30 December 2013 QUANTUMTHEORY 14
29 December 2013 TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (images)
TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (DE article) 4
17 November 2013 ROYAL CONCIERGE (DE)

ROYAL CONCIERGE (EN)
2
29 October 2013 NSA-CIA SCS 3
27 October 2013 NSA-CIA SCS 2
20 October 2013 Mexico President 1
20 September 2013 Belgacom 3
16 September 2013 SWIFT 3
9 September 2013 Smartphones 5
1 September 2013 French Foreign Ministry 0
31 August 2013 Al Jazeera 0
O Globo Fantastico ~87
7 October 2013 CSE Brazil Ministry 7
8 September 2013 Petrobas ~60
3 September 2013 Brazil and Mexico 20
New York Times 118
9 December 2013 Spying on Games 82*
23 November 2013 SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 5
3 November 2013 SIGINT Mission 2013

SIGINT Mission 2017
22
28 September 2013 Contact Chaining Social Networks 1
28 September 2013 SYANPSE 1
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*
ProPublica 89
9 December 2013 Spying on Games 82*
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2103 SIGINT Enabling 3*
Le Monde 20
25 October 2013 NSA Hosts FR Spies 4
22 October 2013 Wanadoo-Alcatel 1
22 October 2013 Close Access Sigads 2
22 October 2013 Boundless Informant 2
22 October 2013 PRISM 11
Dagbladet 13
19 November 2013 BOUNDLESSINFORMANT 13
NRC Handelsblad 4
30 November 2013 Dutch SIGINT 3
23 November 2013 SIGINT Cryptologic Platform 1
Huffington Post 3
27 November 2013 Muslim Porn Viewing 3
CBC 36
30 January 2014 CESC IP Profiling 27
10 December 2013 NSA-CSEC Partnership 1
10 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 4*
2 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 3
29 November 2013 G8-G20 Spying 1
The Globe and Mail 18
30 November 2013 CSEC Brazil Spying 18*
SVT (Swedsh TV) 2
5 December 2013 Sweden Spied Russia for NSA 2
L’Espresso 3
6 December 2013 NSA Spies Italy 3
Trojkan (SVT) 29
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Relationship 1*
11 December 2013 NSA 5 Eyes Partners 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Agenda 8
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA RU Baltic 1
11 December 2013 NSA GCHQ Sweden FRA COMINT 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Plan 5
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Sources 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Tor et al 3
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Slide 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum 1 1
11 December 2013 GCHQ Sweden FRA Quantum 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum Accomplishments 2
9 December 2013 NSA and Sweden Pact 3*
Jacob Appelbaum * 71
30 December 2013 NSA Catalog * 50
30 December 2013 NSA Catalog Video Clips * 21
Information.dk 22*
14 January 2014 SSO (duplicate) 7*
14 January 2014 PRISM (duplicate) 11*
13 January 2014 5-Eyes Spy G8-G20 (duplicate) 4*
Anonymous/
New York Times 18
27 January 2014 NSA Smartphones Analysis 14
27 January 2014 GCHQ Mobile Theme 4
NBC News 61
5 February 2014 GCHQ Anonymous 14
27 January 2014 GCHQ Squeaky Dolphin 47

Cryptome unveils Stopping NSA

2014-0165.pdf NSA-GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer Quisquater February 2, 2014

Date: Sun, 02 Feb 2014 13:38:59 +0300
From: ianG
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker
Cc: Cryptography Mailing List
Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Now it’s personal — Belgian cryptographer MITM’d by GCHQ/NSA
List-Archive:

On 2/02/14 04:33 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> Why assume that its the NSA/GCHQ?

Because the Belgians are saying it is, and because the Snowden revelations pointed at a persistent attack of the indicated parties.

We can play the game of “you don’t know that for a fact” forever, but at the end of the day, they will never enter court and let the court declare it a fact, so that easy excuse is their game, their rules, their victory.

Old military truism: the battle is won by the general that imposes his plan over the other.

> When I got stopped three times by UK customs on one trip during the crypto
> wars it was pretty obvious what was going on. But this incident could have
> been due to Iran, Israel, Russia, China (in no particular order) and there
> might well be more countries getting in on the pervasive intercept party.

I’ve got no doubt that others are attempting to hack into the telcos and whatever.

> This is not about stopping the NSA.

I think there are several considerations here.

1. We need models of all players. We need statistics and likelihoods.

2. We have an attitude that keeps tripping us up on polite diversions such as “you don’t know that for a fact” or “these are the nice guys, they wouldn’t do it to you” or “the other guys are doing this, give us money!”

We need some way of avoiding our own biases, and that starts from knowing ourselves.

3. We need a model that describes the control that these folks have. Is it no control? Or is there some way to limit it? Right now the evidence suggests that there are no controls that haven’t been trashed by one means or another.

Facts claimed recently: they routinely lie to congress and court. The secret non-court never analysed mass surveillance before Snowden. They collect and target citizens. They hack allies, they spy on sovereigns, they spy for industry.

4. And, as a minor consideration for some citizens of some countries that have a no arbitrary search or seizure clause, we need the facts to see if they have self-declared themselves the subject of criminal prosecution.

5. Ditto for alliances.

6. You can’t stop the Chinese unless you’ve first stopped the NSA. Ditto for 5-eyes. Unless you have principles, you cannot decide when and how to face up to your external threats, you cannot even differentiate external from internal.

7. GCHQ, ASD, the others, they more or less follow the NSA.

If you put it all together, at a first order of approximation, maybe it is that: about stopping the NSA.

> The NSA wanabees are far more numerous
> and likely just as well resourced. They won’t have as much cash but they
> will use what they have at least ten times more effectively.

Idk. I think the others are well-outclassed at this stage. Back in the cold war, the Russians did a pretty good job in humint. They still couldn’t match the satellite & sigint assets tho. The Chinese, now? I have no idea, I have yet to see any real unbiased data (by that I mean data that has been released for the direct purpose of convincing congress to fund cyberwar).

What’s their budget this year?

I agree on one point — the Chinese seem to be more focussed on economic theft than trying to mass surveille the world of angry birds. I really would be asking for my money back if I was congress.

> We do have a model for protecting Web sites that works pretty well called
> PCI. That is the scheme that the credit card companies developed to protect
> their assets when they are exposed online. PCI is supported by numerous
> tools and services that provide compliance checking. It isn’t perfect but
> it is a known starting point.
>
> What we need is PCI for social media sites and for email providers. It does
> not have to be perfect and it won’t be. But it will be a start.

Well. PCI models against hacks and insider attacks.

Then there is mass surveillance. The model against mass surveillance has been known for 2 decades: mass crypto. Yet, we’ve never been able to get that idea through to the NISTs, the IETF, the committees, the toolmakers, etc.

It would be a mighty fine idea if NIST were to come out and start pushing opportunistic encryption, but they do not serve the users, they serve the toolmakers, who use cryptography as a discriminator. You can’t have a national standard without a national industry to sell tools.

Then there is phishing. The model against phishing — which was used in the belgacom attack — has been known for 2 decades as well, it was built into secure web browsing. But it never worked, and the tool makers like it that way.

> And unlike
> the credit card companies we have a lot more ability to change our
> credentials.

Exactly — change! Maybe we need those people who build PCI and FIPS and whathaveyou to start recognising that the models they built have to actually work. Else they should fall on their swords, because they are incapable of changing.

Pigs might fly. PCI like all such more likely exists to serve PCI people. We definitely don’t want such a millstone around the social network folks. We want them to change, to face their threats as they evolve.

iang

Unveiled – Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board NSA Bulk Telephone Records Collection Report

The following report was released January 23, 2014 by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Statements from board members Elisebeth Collins Cook and Rachel Brand were released along with the report.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

238 pages
January 23, 2014

Download

The PCLOB is an independent bipartisan agency within the executive branch established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.6 The Board is comprised of four part-time members and a full-time chairman, all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Board’s authorizing statute gives it two primary responsibilities:

1) To analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and

2) To ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.

This Report arises out of the Board’s responsibility to provide oversight by analyzing and reviewing executive branch actions, in this case the operation of the Section 215 telephone records program.

…

B. Legal Analysis: Statutory and Constitutional Issues

Section 215 is designed to enable the FBI to acquire records that a business has in its possession, as part of an FBI investigation, when those records are relevant to the investigation. Yet the operation of the NSA’s bulk telephone records program bears almost no resemblance to that description. While the Board believes that this program has been conducted in good faith to vigorously pursue the government’s counterterrorism mission and appreciates the government’s efforts to bring the program under the oversight of the FISA court, the Board concludes that Section 215 does not provide an adequate legal basis to support the program.

There are four grounds upon which we find that the telephone records program fails to comply with Section 215. First, the telephone records acquired under the program have no connection to any specific FBI investigation at the time of their collection. Second, because the records are collected in bulk — potentially encompassing all telephone calling records across the nation — they cannot be regarded as “relevant” to any FBI investigation as required by the statute without redefining the word relevant in a manner that is circular, unlimited in scope, and out of step with the case law from analogous legal contexts involving the production of records. Third, the program operates by putting telephone companies under an obligation to furnish new calling records on a daily basis as they are generated (instead of turning over records already in their possession) — an approach lacking foundation in the statute and one that is inconsistent with FISA as a whole. Fourth, the statute permits only the FBI to obtain items for use in its investigations; it does not authorize the NSA to collect anything.

In addition, we conclude that the program violates the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. That statute prohibits telephone companies from sharing customer records with the government except in response to specific enumerated circumstances, which do not include Section 215 orders.

Finally, we do not agree that the program can be considered statutorily authorized because Congress twice delayed the expiration of Section 215 during the operation of the program without amending the statute. The “reenactment doctrine,” under which Congress is presumed to have adopted settled administrative or judicial interpretations of a statute, does not trump the plain meaning of a law, and cannot save an administrative or judicial interpretation that contradicts the statute itself. Moreover, the circumstances presented here differ in pivotal ways from any in which the reenactment doctrine has ever been applied, and applying the doctrine would undermine the public’s ability to know what the law is and hold their elected representatives accountable for their legislative choices.

The NSA’s telephone records program also raises concerns under both the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We explore these concerns and explain that while government officials are entitled to rely on existing Supreme Court doctrine in formulating policy, the existing doctrine does not fully answer whether the Section 215 telephone records program is constitutionally sound. In particular, the scope and duration of the program are beyond anything ever before confronted by the courts, and as a result of technological developments, the government possesses capabilities to collect, store, and analyze data not available when existing Supreme Court doctrine was developed. Without seeking to predict the direction of changes in Supreme Court doctrine, the Board urges as a policy matter that the government consider how to preserve underlying constitutional guarantees in the face of modern communications technology and surveillance capabilities.

…

E. Transparency Issues

In a representative democracy, the tension between openness and secrecy is inevitable and complex. The challenges are especially acute in the area of intelligence collection, where the powers exercised by the government implicate fundamental rights and our enemies are constantly trying to understand our capabilities in order to avoid detection. In this context, both openness and secrecy are vital to our survival, and we must strive to develop and implement intelligence programs in ways that serve both values.

Transparency is one of the foundations of democratic governance. Our constitutional system of government relies upon the participation of an informed electorate. This in turn requires public access to information about the activities of the government. Transparency supports accountability. It is especially important with regard to activities of the government that affect the rights of individuals, where it is closely interlinked with redress for violations of rights. In the intelligence context, although a certain amount of secrecy is necessary, transparency regarding collection authorities and their exercise can increase public confidence in the intelligence process and in the monumental decisions that our leaders make based on intelligence products.

In the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, the government has released a substantial amount of information on the leaked government surveillance programs. Although there remains a deep well of distrust, these official disclosures have helped foster greater public understanding of government surveillance programs. However, to date the official disclosures relate almost exclusively to specific programs that had already been the subject of leaks, and we must be careful in citing these disclosures as object lessons for what additional transparency might be appropriate in the future.

The Board believes that the government must take the initiative and formulate long-term solutions that promote greater transparency for government surveillance policies more generally, in order to inform public debate on technology, national security, and civil liberties going beyond the current controversy. In this effort, all three branches have a role. For the executive branch, disclosures about key national security programs that involve the collection, storage and dissemination of personal information — such as the operation of the National Counterterrorism Center — show that it is possible to describe practices and policies publicly, even those that have not been otherwise leaked, without damage to national security or operational effectiveness.

With regard to the legislative process, even where classified intelligence operations are involved, the purposes and framework of a program for domestic intelligence collection should be debated in public. During the process of developing legislation, some hearings and briefings may need to be conducted in secret to ensure that policymakers fully understand the intended use of a particular authority. But the government should not base an ongoing program affecting the rights of Americans on an interpretation of a statute that is not apparent from a natural reading of the text. In the case of Section 215, the government should have made it publicly clear in the reauthorization process that it intended for Section 215 to serve as legal authority to collect data in bulk on an ongoing basis.

There is also a need for greater transparency regarding operation of the FISA court. Prospectively, we encourage the FISC judges to continue the recent practice of writing opinions with an eye to declassification, separating specific sensitive facts peculiar to the case at hand from broader legal analyses. We also believe that there is significant value in producing declassified versions of earlier opinions, and recommend that the government undertake a classification review of all significant FISC opinions and orders involving novel interpretations of law. We realize that the process of redacting opinions not drafted for public disclosure will be more difficult and will burden individuals with other pressing duties, but we believe that it is appropriate to make the effort where those opinions and orders complete the historical picture of the development of legal doctrine regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the FISA court. In addition, should the government adopt our recommendation for a Special Advocate in the FISC, the nature and extent of that advocate’s role must be transparent to be effective.

It is also important to promote transparency through increased reporting to the public on the scope of surveillance programs. We urge the government to work with Internet service providers and other companies to reach agreement on standards allowing reasonable disclosures of aggregate statistics that would be meaningful without revealing sensitive government capabilities or tactics. We recommend that the government should also increase the level of detail in its unclassified reporting to Congress and the public regarding surveillance programs.

…

II. Overview of the PCLOB’s Recommendations

A. Section 215 Program

Recommendation 1: The government should end its Section 215 bulk telephone records program.

The Section 215 bulk telephone records program lacks a viable legal foundation under Section 215, implicates constitutional concerns under the First and Fourth Amendments, raises serious threats to privacy and civil liberties as a policy matter, and has shown only limited value. As a result, the Board recommends that the government end the program.

Without the current Section 215 program, the government would still be able to seek telephone calling records directly from communications providers through other existing legal authorities. The Board does not recommend that the government impose data retention requirements on providers in order to facilitate any system of seeking records directly from private databases.

Once the Section 215 bulk collection program has ended, the government should purge the database of telephone records that have been collected and stored during the program’s operation, subject to limits on purging data that may arise under federal law or as a result of any pending litigation.

The Board also recommends against the enactment of legislation that would merely codify the existing program or any other program that collects bulk data on such a massive scale regarding individuals with no suspected ties to terrorism or criminal activity. Moreover, the Board’s constitutional analysis should provide a message of caution, and as a policy matter, given the significant privacy and civil liberties interests at stake, if Congress seeks to provide legal authority for any new program, it should seek the least intrusive alternative and should not legislate to the outer bounds of its authority.

The Board recognizes that the government may need a short period of time to explore and institutionalize alternative approaches, and believes it would be appropriate for the government to wind down the 215 program over a brief interim period. If the government does find the need for a short wind-down period, the Board urges that it should follow the procedures under Recommendation 2 below.

Recommendation 2: The government should immediately implement additional privacy safeguards in operating the Section 215 bulk collection program.

The Board recommends that the government immediately implement several additional privacy safeguards to mitigate the privacy impact of the present Section 215 program. The recommended changes can be implemented without any need for congressional or FISC authorization. Specifically, the government should:

(a) reduce the retention period for the bulk telephone records program from five years to three years;

(b) reduce the number of “hops” used in contact chaining from three to two;

(c) submit the NSA’s “reasonable articulable suspicion” determinations to the FISC for review after they have been approved by NSA and used to query the database; and

(d) require a “reasonable articulable suspicion” determination before analysts may submit queries to, or otherwise analyze, the “corporate store,” which contains the results of contact chaining queries to the full “collection store.”

…

Recommendation 12: The scope of surveillance authorities affecting Americans should be public.

In particular, the Administration should develop principles and criteria for the public articulation of the legal authorities under which it conducts surveillance affecting Americans. If the text of the statute itself is not sufficient to inform the public of the scope of asserted government authority, then the key elements of the legal opinion or other documents describing the government’s legal analysis should be made public so there can be a free and open debate regarding the law’s scope. This includes both original enactments such as 215’s revisions and subsequent reauthorizations. While sensitive operational details regarding the conduct of government surveillance programs should remain classified, and while legal interpretations of the application of a statute in a particular case may also be secret so long as the use of that technique in a particular case is secret, the government’s interpretations of statutes that provide the basis for ongoing surveillance programs affecting Americans can and should be made public.

…

4. Expanding Relevance Beyond its Normal Legal Meaning

As illustrated above, precedent from other legal contexts involving the production of records does not support a concept of relevance like the one proffered by the government in support of the NSA’s bulk calling records program. To be sure, the case law regarding civil discovery, grand jury subpoenas, and administrative subpoenas shows that relevance is interpreted broadly, and that incidental production of unrelated materials is accepted as essential to enable fulsome investigative efforts. Standards of relevance thus permit parties and the government to engage in a degree of fishing, so long as it is not arbitrary or in bad faith. But the case law makes equally clear that the definition of relevance is not boundless. And no case that we have found supports the interpretation of relevance embodied in the NSA’s program.

Tacitly acknowledging that case law from analogous contexts is not adequate to support its position, the government suggests that Section 215 calls for “an even more flexible standard” of relevance. But none of the government’s arguments, in our view, supports a definition of “relevant” as broad as the one the government proffers.

First, had Congress wished to inscribe a standard of relevance in Section 215 even less exacting than those developed in analogous legal contexts, it could have done so. But contemporary statements from legislators, highlighted by the government itself, evince an intent to match Section 215 to the standards used in those contexts. The reference to grand jury subpoenas added to the statute in 2006 was meant to reassure those with concerns about the scope of Section 215 that the statute was consistent with practice in other fields.

Second, the fact that Section 215 requires only “reasonable grounds to believe” that records sought are relevant to an “investigation,” as the government emphasizes, does not call for a different standard of relevance than the one used in all other contexts. By demanding only “reasonable grounds to believe,” rather than certainty, that items sought are relevant to an investigation, the statute ensures that Section 215 is consistent with the analogous civil and criminal contexts — where the requester need not show that every item sought actually is relevant in an evidentiary sense, but merely that the items reasonably may be. The statute’s reference to a reasonable belief about the items requested shows that it contemplates the same scenario faced in the subpoena and discovery arenas: the government seeks a category of items that it reasonably suspects, but cannot be sure, includes material pertinent to its investigation. That scenario, and the legal standards that govern it, still require some factual correlation between the category of documents defined by the government and the circumstances of the investigation for which they are sought. Indeed, Section 215’s requirement of a “statement of facts” supporting the government’s belief underscores the importance of that context-specific inquiry.

Thus, even if the qualifier “reasonable grounds to believe” imposes a lower burden of proof on the government than if the statute simply authorized production of “relevant” documents, Section 215 still embodies the assumption that specific facts will link the government’s investigation to the particular group of records it seeks. That assumption is incompatible with a continuously renewed request for the daily acquisition of all records of a particular type.

Third, the unique characteristics of national security investigations do not warrant interpreting “relevance” expansively enough to support the NSA’s program. The government argues, and we agree, that the scope of relevance varies based on the nature of the investigation to which it is applied. Accordingly, the government cites the “remarkable breadth” of the national security investigations with which Section 215 is concerned, as contrasted with ordinary criminal matters, and emphasizes that these investigations “often focus on preventing threats to national security from causing harm, not on the retrospective determination of liability or guilt for prior activities.”

These valid distinctions, in our view, simply mean that the government will be able to make qualitative showings of relevance more often in national security investigations than in others. Because the government is investigating a broader scope of actors, over a longer period of time, across a wider geographic range, and before any specific offense has been committed, more information can be expected to be legitimately relevant to its efforts. Such considerations do not call for the wholesale elimination of relevance as a meaningful check on the government’s acquisition of items.

Finally, the heightened importance of counterterrorism investigations, as compared with typical law enforcement matters, does not alter the equation. Items either are relevant to an investigation or they are not — the significance of that investigation is a separate matter. No matter how critical national security investigations are, therefore, some articulable principle must connect the items sought to those investigations, or else the word “relevant” is robbed of meaning. Congress added a relevance requirement to Section 215 in 2006 knowing full well that the statute governs national security investigations. It cannot, therefore, have meant for the importance of such investigations to efface that requirement entirely.

In sum, we find the government’s interpretation of the word “relevant” in Section 215 to be unsupported by legal precedent and a subversion of the statute’s manifest intent to place some restriction, albeit a generous and flexible one, on the scope of the items that can be acquired under its auspices.

Tagesschau Video – Snowden Says US Spies Industry

http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden352.html

Interview with Edward Snowden in ARD

“USA operate industrial espionage”

In the world’s first television interview of former U.S. intelligence official Edward Snowden he has reiterated his belief that the United States spied on foreign business enterprises.

In conversation with the NDR journalist Hubert Seipel, Snowden said that he did not want to pre-empt future publications by journalists and could – in his view, but there should be no question how the United States behaved. U.S. intelligence agencies spied not only politicians and other citizens: “If there is information about Siemens that benefits the national interest of the United States, but have nothing to do with national security, they take this information anyway,” he said. Snowden has been granted initial asylum in Russia.

A few days ago an NSA spokeswoman stressed that the intelligence agencies were not involved in industrial espionage. Background to this was a report in the “New York Times” that the U.S. intelligence could implant computers with radio bugs.

Previously German politicians had called for a possible no-Spy Agreement with the United States that should also include a waiver of industrial espionage.

Snowden emphasized to ARD that he himself was no longer in possession of explosive material, but he had passed it to selected journalists and therefore to the public. He will have no influence on possible publication. The show today at 20.00 clock is a first cut from the interview. The interview was produced in collaboration with the North German broadcasting and production company Cinecentrum.

The first showing of the entire interview today of essential excerpts in the ARD interview broadcast ” Günther Jauch ” at 21.45 clock and following at 23.05 clock in full length also a first.

Unveiled – NSA Snowden Releases Tally Update – *984 Pages

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate). Tally now *984 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000 files. DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.0057% of that released).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

Related Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment:

http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-count.htm

* 5 January 2014. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel (30 December 2013. No source given for NSA docs). Tally now *962 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.50% of that released).

Glenn Greenwald tweeted:

Glenn Greenwald @ggreenwald, 8:05 AM – 29 Dec 13

@Cryptomeorg @ioerror I had no involvement in that Spiegel article, ask them – and they don’t say those are Snowden docs.

Matt Blaze tweeted, 11:24 AM – 2 Jan 14

matt blaze @mattblaze

If there are other sources besides Snowden, I hope journalists getting docs are careful to authenticate them (& disclose uncertainty).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

3 January 2014. See also EFF, ACLU and LeakSource accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages (8 duplicates) to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

23 December 2013

http://www.adn.com/2013/12/22/3243451/pincus-snowden-still-has-a-road.html

We’ve yet to see the full impact of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s unauthorized downloading of highly classified intelligence documents.

Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

3 November 2013

47 42 Years to Release Snowden Documents

NY Times, 3 November 2013:

Outlet Pages
The Guardian 265
Washington Post 216
Der Spiegel * 97
O Globo Fantastico ~87
New York Times 118 (82 joint)
ProPublica 89 (82 joint)
Le Monde 20
Dagbladet 13
NRC Handelsblad 4
Huffington Post 3
CBC 9
The Globe and Mail 18
SVT 2
L’Espresso 3
Trojkan (SVT) 29
Jacob Appelbaum * 71
Information.dk 22*

Timeline of releases:

* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).

3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.

2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.

* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 Decebmer 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum.

* 30 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages to Der Spiegel.

* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel.

24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.

13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT).

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 25 pages to Guardian.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 74 pages to Washington Post.

10 December 2013. Add 2 pages to CBC.

10 December 2013. Add 4 pages to CBC (duplicate of previous source).

9 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Trojkan. Add 2 pages to Guardian. Add 82 pages to New York Times and ProPublica (joint).

6 December 2013. Add 3 pages to L’Espresso.

5 December 2013. Add 2 pages to SVT (Swedish TV).

5 December 2013. Add 1 page to Washington Post.

4 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Washington Post.

2 December 2013. Add 3 pages to CBC.

30 November 2013. Add 18 pages to The Globe and Mail.

30 November 2013. Add 3 pages to NRC Handelsblad.

29 November 2013. Add 1 page to CBC.

27 November 2013. Add 3 pages to Huffington Post.

26 November 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

23 November 2013. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad.

23 November 2013. Add 5 pages to New York Times.

22 November 2013. Add 10 pages to Dagbladet.

18 November 2013. Add 6 pages to The Guardian.

17 November 2013. Add two images to Der Spiegel.

4 November 2013. Add 14 pages to Washington Post.

3 November 2013. A reports an additional 54 slides for O Globo Petrobas.

3 November 2013. Add 22 pages to New York Times.

2 November 2013. Add 13 pages to Guardian, 11 are duplicates.

31 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

29 October 2013. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel

27 October 2013. Add 2 pages to Der Spiegel.

25 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Le Monde.

22 October 2013. Add 5 pages to Le Monde.

21 October 2013. Add 11 pages to Le Monde, 8 are duplicates.

20 October 2013. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.

13 October 2013. Add 4, 7 and 9 pages to Washington Post.

8 October 2013. Add 7 pages to O Globo: CSE spying on Brazilian ministry, reported 7 October 2013.

6 October 2013. Add Snowden pages published by Washington Post, Der Spiegel, O Globo Fantastico, New York Times, ProPublica. Some are duplicates(*).

5 October 2013

26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian

Number Date Title Pages
The Guardian 265
20 9 December 2013 Spying on Games 2
18 18 November 2013 DSD-3G 6
19 1 November 2013 PRISM, SSO
SSO1 Slide
SSO2 Slide 13*
18 4 October 2013 Types of IAT Tor 9
17 4 October 2013 Egotistical Giraffe 20*
16 4 October 2013 Tor Stinks 23
15 11 September 2013 NSA-Israel Spy 5
14 5 September 2013 BULLRUN 6*
13 5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*
12 5 September 2013 NSA classification guide 3
11 31 July 2013 XKeyscore 32
10 27 June 2013 DoJ Memo on NSA 16
9 27 June 2013 Stellar Wind 51
8 21 June 2013 FISA Certification 25
7 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit A 9
6 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit B 9
5 16 June 2013 GCHQ G-20 Spying 4
4 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant FAQ 3
3 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant Slides 4
2 7 June 2013 PPD-20 18
1 5 June 2013 Verizon 4
Washington Post 216
2 January 2014 Quantum Computer 2 10
2 January 2014 Quantum Computer 3
23 December 2013 NSA/CSS Mission 2
11 December 2013 Excessive Collection 9
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 2 7
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 1 4
11 December 2013 Yahoo-Google Exploit 6
11 December 2013 Cable Spying Types 7
11 December 2013 WINDSTOP 1
11 December 2013 Co-Traveler 24
11 December 2013 GSM Tracking 2
11 December 2013 SIGINT Successes 4
11 December 2013 GHOSTMACHINE 4
5 December 2013 Target Location 1
4 December 2013 FASCIA 2
4 December 2013 CHALKFUN 1
26 November 2013 Microsoft a Target? 4
4 November 2013 WINDSTOP, SSO, Yahoo-Google 14
30 October 2013 MUSCULAR-INCENSOR Google and Yahoo 4
14 October 2013 SSO Overview 4
14 October 2013 SSO Slides 7
14 October 2013 SSO Content Slides 9
4 October 2013 Tor 49
4 October 2013 EgotisticalGiraffe 20*
4 October 2013 GCHQ MULLENIZE 2
4 October 2013 Roger Dingledine 2
30 August 2013 Budget 17
10 July 2013 PRISM Slide 1
29 June 2013 PRISM 8
20 June 2013 Warrantless Surveillance 25*
7 June 2013 PPD-20 18*
6 June 2013 PRISM 1
Der Spiegel * 97
31 December 2013 QFIRE * 16
30 December 2013 TAO Introduction * 16
30 Deceber 2013 QUANTUM Tasking (8 duplicates of QUANTUMTHEORY) 28*
30 December 2013 QUANTUMTHEORY 14
29 December 2013 TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (images)
TAO ANT COTTONMOUTH (DE article) 4
17 November 2013 ROYAL CONCIERGE (DE)

SIGINT Mission 2017
22
28 September 2013 Contact Chaining Social Networks 1
28 September 2013 SYANPSE 1
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*
ProPublica 89
9 December 2013 Spying on Games 82*
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2103 SIGINT Enabling 3*
Le Monde 20
25 October 2013 NSA Hosts FR Spies 4
22 October 2013 Wanadoo-Alcatel 1
22 October 2013 Close Access Sigads 2
22 October 2013 Boundless Informant 2
22 October 2013 PRISM 11
Dagbladet 13
19 November 2013 BOUNDLESSINFORMANT 13
NRC Handelsblad 4
30 November 2013 Dutch SIGINT 3
23 November 2013 SIGINT Cryptologic Platform 1
Huffington Post 3
27 November 2013 Muslim Porn Viewing 3
CBC 9
10 December 2013 NSA-CSEC Partnership 1
10 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 4*
2 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 3
29 November 2013 G8-G20 Spying 1
The Globe and Mail 18
30 November 2013 CSEC Brazil Spying 18*
SVT (Swedsh TV) 2
5 December 2013 Sweden Spied Russia for NSA 2
L’Espresso 3
6 December 2013 NSA Spies Italy 3
Trojkan (SVT) 29
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Relationship 1*
11 December 2013 NSA 5 Eyes Partners 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Agenda 8
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA RU Baltic 1
11 December 2013 NSA GCHQ Sweden FRA COMINT 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Plan 5
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Sources 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Tor et al 3
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Slide 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum 1 1
11 December 2013 GCHQ Sweden FRA Quantum 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum Accomplishments 2
9 December 2013 NSA and Sweden Pact 3*
Jacob Appelbaum * 71
30 December 2013 NSA Catalog * 50
30 December 2013 NSA Catalog Video Clips * 21
Information.dk 22*
14 January 2014 SSO (duplicate) 7*
14 January 2014 PRISM (duplicate) 11*
13 January 2014 5-Eyes Spy G8-G20 (duplicate) 4*

TOP-SECRET – NSA Special Source Operations – DK Duplicate

NSA Special Source Operations – DK Duplicate

Download Link below

nsa-sso-dk

Revealed – Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment

The count of Snowden files has ranged from an initial low end of 10,000 to the latest high of 1,700,000, although the high end is likely exaggerated by officials to maximize alleged damage.

The number of pages in these files has not been estimated but about 1,000 pages have been released, mostly as PDFs and images. How many total pages might be in the files and now long would it take Snowden to read them to assure least harm to the US?

For comparison, Cryptome’s archive is about 70,000 files. Converting these files to pages comes to about 1,000,000 pages. These files are PDFs, HTMLs, DOCs, TXTs, DWGs, images, spreadsheets, with a few videos and films excluded from the count. To get the page count all files were converted to PDFs. The page count of documents ranges from 1 to 2,200. This might be a fair range of types and page counts of files in the Snowden batch.

An average file then, of 70,000 files with 1,000,000 pages, comes to 14.28 pages per file. Using this as a guide for the Snowden files, the number of pages could range from 142,800 pages for 10,000 files to 24,276,000 pages for 1.7 million files.

Examining the low end of 142,800 pages would be about like reading 476 books of 300 pages length. Examining the high end of 24,276,000 pages would be like reading 80,920 books of 300 pages each.

Snowden is smart and knows his material thoroughly so time to speed read a 300-page book of NSA material, could be done in, say, 2 hours.

On the low end it would take 952 hours to read 142,800 pages, reading 10 hours a day, would come to 95 days, or about 3 months.

On the high end it would take 161,890 hours to read 24,276,000 pages, reading 10 hours a day, would come to 1,619 days or about 54 months — 4 1/2 years.

4 1/2 years is longer than Snowden is reported to have worked for Dell and Booz Allen as contractor to NSA.

It is unlikely Snowden would have examined 24 million pages.

More likely Snowden used a program to quickly analyze large data collections and rank intelligence actionability in the NSA manner. Glenn Greenwald told Buzzfeed that the documents had been beautifully organized, “almost to a scary degree.” As if prepared with a purposeful program for analyzing and data sharing with avid customers.

There are information security programs which compartmentalize data for multiple levels of security and access as well as controls for the distribution and timing of release. These are used to manage classified data handling among a variety of personnel and agencies with varying clearances.

It could be that Snowden remains in control of his material’s release by way of programmed implants in the material for access and timing although the material is physically distant from him. This too is conventional security practice.

These practices would be characteristic of a seasoned security person who could not be certain of media outlets’ long-term behavior, their transmission and storage security, their theft and spying prevention capabilities, their susceptiblity to coercion or persuasion by officials or by inducements to betray him to protect themselves.

Events have shown that these meticulous security measures would have been and remain appropriate.

It also allows Snowden to remain in charge of any negotiations for return of the material, for accurate accounting of the material’s scope, retention, distribution and release, and for assuring his safety without relying on the fickle fingers of fate of informants and turncoats which have beckoned the all-too-trusting to long-term imprisonment.

__________

As an aside, another way to surmise what Snowden allegedly had on four laptops is by file size. Cryptome’s 70,000 files comes to about 17GB, or an average of 243KB per file. Using that as a guide to Snowden’s files, the total size ranges from 2.43GB for 10,000 files to 413GB for 1,700,00 files. On the high end that’s about 103GB per laptop. No problem, laptops with 100GB-250GB disks are common.

Revealed – Committee on National Security Systems Gap Analysis Between the FICAM and U.S. Secret Networks

Committee on National Security Systems

42 pages
For Official Use Only
May 23, 2012

Download
CNSS-GapAnalysisFICAM

Over the past ten years, the Federal Government has made concerted advances in the development and implementation of Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM). This progress includes capabilities designed to promote interoperability, assured information sharing, and efficiencies of scale across all agencies within the Federal Government. Recently, several high-visibility events have focused attention on classified networks with a renewed emphasis on information protection within the information sharing paradigm. Organizations must strive to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information by employing advanced capabilities that enable a common level of assurance in information handling and sharing while ensuring the interoperability required to satisfy mission requirements.

In response to these and other drivers, the National Security Systems (NSS)’s Identity and Access Management (IdAM) Working Group, the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council / ICAM Subcommittee (ICAMSC), and the National Security Staff / Information Sharing and Access (ISA) Interagency Policy Committee (IPC)’s Assured Secret Network Interoperability (ASNI) Working Group collaborated to evaluate the applicability of the Federal ICAM Roadmap and Implementation Plan (FICAM) to U.S. Secret networks and identify obstacles to the future interoperability of the Federal Secret Fabric. This document is based on analysis of the ICAM capabilities of six predominant Secret networks in use within the Federal Government:

Department of Defense (DoD) Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Network (FBINet)
Department of Energy-National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE-NNSA) Enterprise Secure Network (ESN) Note: This analysis focuses on the DOE-NNSA ESN. Other networks at DOE were not included in this data.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN)
Department of Justice (DOJ) Justice Consolidated Office Network – Secret (JCON-S)
Department of State (DOS) ClassNet

This document represents a snapshot of the state of governance, policies, and implementation status of Secret networks as of December 12, 2011. There were several key findings as a result of this analysis:

FICAM is applicable to Secret networks with some changes in the technical implementation to account for the unique requirements of classified networks
The agencies evaluated have different levels of maturity in the implementation and realization of the FICAM vision, but all agencies recognize the need to move toward that vision
Lack of authoritative policy and governance structures has led to divergent ICAM implementation approaches among many agencies
Most agencies lack a common technical approach to ICAM implementation illustrated by the following:
Currently, there is no common and interoperable credential employed on Secret networks
There is no common way to capture, compile, and evaluate identity or resource attributes on Secret networks
There is no common end-to-end approach (people, process, technology) to interoperability and information sharing between agencies – information sharing successes are mostly limited to mission-specific systems to meet specific mission needs
There are ICAM requirements unique to classified networks that are not currently addressed in FICAM (i.e., physical protection of end points, cross-domain data transfer, etc.)
In partnership with the Secret network community, additional work is needed to identify a viable roadmap and implementation plan for FICAM on Secret networks including provisions for:
Developing Implementation Best Practices
Incorporating Security and Privacy Needs within the ICAM Enterprise Architecture
Aligning ICAM Architectures from multiple organizations, enclaves, and security domains

Together, the CNSS, ICAMSC, and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) will continue to work to identify solutions to these obstacles and forge a path for implementation of robust and interoperable ICAM capabilities on the Federal Secret Fabric.

The CNSS, Information Security & Identity Management Committee (ISIMC), ICAMSC, and ASNI Working Group reviewed and approve the release of this document.

Unveiled – NSA Intellipedia: Vatican City /via

NSA Intellipedia: Vatican City /via

Download below

nsa-vatican-city

TOP-SECRET-Committee on National Security Systems Recommendations on U.S. Secret Networks

Threats to Federal information systems are rising as demands for sharing of information and intelligence between Federal Departments and Agencies increase. It is essential that the Federal Government devise an approach that addresses both challenges without compromising the ability to achieve either objective. Developing a common governance framework and set of Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) capabilities that enhance the security of our systems by ensuring that only authorized persons and systems from different Federal components have access to necessary information is a high priority. The Federal Identity, Credential and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation Guidance was developed to address the need for secure information sharing capabilities across the breadth of the Federal Government.

A recent gap analysis conducted to determine gaps between the current state of the Secret Fabric and FICAM revealed substantive differences between levels of adoption of this framework and served as the catalyst for this document. In addition to varying levels of FICAM maturity, the gap analysis also showed significant variations in levels of sharable information, connectivity, and governance structures which further complicate the aim of a common FICAM framework across the Secret Fabric.

Using the gap analysis as a starting point, this document provides four major recommendations:

Establish and Empower a Governance Structure for ICAM on All Networks
 Develop a Common Interoperable ICAM Architecture for the Secret Fabric
 Transition to a Common Interoperable ICAM Architecture
 Prepare for the Evolution of ICAM on the Secret Fabric as New Technology Emerges and New Mission and Business Needs Arise

The following progress chart summarizes the recommendations with objective end states and suggested activities required to accomplish the objectives along a snapshot of status of ICAM on the Secret Fabric as of the publication date of this document. These recommendations, objectives and activities will be included in the FICAM Implementation Plan for the Secret Fabric currently under development by the National Security Systems (NSS) Identity and Access Management (IdAM) Working Group under the guidance of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE).

Download the original document here:
CNSS-ImplementingFICAM

Unveiled – Utah Data Center of the NSA

Proposed National Security Agency facility believed to be for communications interception purposes
Estimated costs range from $1.5-1.9 billion
1 million square foot, 65 Megawatt facility

The Utah Data Center (UDC) will be a highly secure 65 Mega Watt, Tier III National Security Agency datacenter facility to be located near Camp Williams, Utah. The fast-track program will consist of approximately 1 million square feet of new facilities, of which 100,000 ft2 will be mission-critical space with raised flooring, and the other 900,000 ft2 will be devoted to technical support and administrative space. Ancillary support facilities include water treatment facilities, electrical substations, a vehicle inspection facility and visitor control center, perimeter site security measures, fuel storage, chiller plants and fire suppression systems. The UDC will incorporate green building strategies and will be required to be a LEED certified facility, with the goal of obtaining a LEED Silver rating.

The construction of the facility has been broken into three phases.
Phase 1: 30 MW facility

A page from the 2010 Defense Budget justifications describes the initial phase of the project:

Construct 30 MW technical load data center to include modular structural components, finished flooring (both raised and administrative), ceiling, lighting, electrical, generators and associated air pollution control systems, mechanical, ventilation, and fire suppression. Also, these funds will provide utilities to include building electrical service, chilled water systems, communications, water, sanitary sewer and storm water management. Installed infrastructure will support 65MW technical load data center capacity for future expandability. The design is to be capable of Tier 3 reliability. Power density will be appropriate for current state-of-the- art high-performance computing devices and associated hardware architecture. U.S. Government and local support services will be provided. Security measures for this project include, but are not limited to a Visitor Control Center provided for data center personnel which is separate from the interim Visitor Control Center for construction personnel; perimeter security; and access control facilities. Physical and technical security of the construction site will be assured.

This project will be designed in accordance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS)/Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines, Antiterrorism Force Protection (ATFP) standards and Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) design standards.

…

PROJECT: Construct a 30 MW technical load data center and infrastructure for 65MW technical load data center capacity.

REQUIREMENT: This project is required to provide a 30MW technical load data center and infrastructure for 65MW technical load data center capacity to support mission. The project will include the following:

(1) Site
(a) Facility design goal will be to the highest LEED standard attainable within available resources and will include: sustainable site characteristics, water and energy efficiency, materials and resources criteria, and indoor environmental quality.
(b) Mechanical and electrical plants are to be housed in separate structures to prevent transfer of noise and vibrations to the data centers

(2) Facilities
(a) Data center technical load of 30 MW distributed across raised floor are the design parameters for the facility.
(b) The infrastructure support and administrative areas will be designed to support state-of-the-art high-performance computing devices and associated hardware architecture.
(c) Slab floor loading of approximately 1500 pounds per square foot (PSF)
(d) Enhancements to the building for IT and security include construction as a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF), as well as, requirements related to Antiterrorism Force Protection (ATFP).

(3) Structural
(a) Technical load will be distributed across the data center areas.
(b) Seismic considerations are to be made in the facility design.
(c) Data center areas are to have depressed concrete slab construction with a load bearing capacity of 1500 pounds per square foot
(PSF).
(d) Facility command and control contained in a central modular office component.
(e) Facility will have a loading dock with vehicle bays, three (3) of which are to be equipped with dock levelers sized to handle tractor trailers.

(4) Electrical
(a) Technical load capacity is 30 MW with loads distributed evenly across the data center areas.
(b) Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) to either PDU level or distribution panel level if required
(c) Dedicated substation for each critical UPS.
(d) UPS and generator backup for facility systems.
(e) Generators will include Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) pollution control equipment, chemical storage tanks and feed system.

(5) Mechanical
(a) Chilled water system to support both air and water cooled equipment.
(b) Each data center area is to have air cooled and water cooled equipment with Computer Room Air Handlers (CRAHs) located external to the raised floor area. The piping headers / systems are to be designed to accommodate future expansion.
(c) Back-up capability for mechanical equipment.
(d) Cooling Towers
(e) Air distribution redundancy for CRAHs.
(f) Fire Protection – Double interlocked pre-action fire protection system for all electrical and mechanical support spaces.
(g) Wet pipe for administrative and raised floor areas per DOD standards.

(6) Security systems
(a) Video surveillance
(b) Intrusion detection
(c) Access control system

Information on Phases 2 and 3 is welcome.
Project Contractor Information

W912DR-10-R-0015

In November 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers held two “Industry Days” for potential contractors interested in bidding on Utah Data Center contracts. The following two lists include the complete names, address, and contact information of all attendees to these events. A briefing given at these events is also available.

Utah Data Center Industry Day 1 Attendee List, November 5, 2009.
Utah Data Center Industry Day 2 Attendee List, November 14, 2009.

Location and Construction Photos

Camp Williams
Riverton, UT 84065

Overview of Camp Williams site. UDC will be located on the west side of the highway, on what was previously an airfield.

Layout of the UDC at Camp Williams.

Site layout from a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers brief.

UDC site looking west.

Utah Data Center site prior to construction.

Construction activity at the site, photo from June 2010.

Vehicles at the construction site.

Northern portion of the site. Notice the long black cable running from the side of the road, as well as the beginnings of fencing.

Conceptual layout of data halls to be constructed in UDC.

Unveiled – 12 Ways of NSA Suspicion

1. Partridge in a Pear Tree

I don’t mean to call people names. I’m only using Cookie’s post as a recent example, of which there are many. Cookie Cutter clearly doesn’t want to switch to scrypt, which AFAIK any non-dork can tell improves security against common real attacks, which far outweighs Cookie’s concerns about side-channel attacks, and OMG, what was that crazy rant about sprinkling secret data all over RAM? It’s just the output of a respected stream cipher! From where I’m sitting, Cookie’s position is so lame, it makes me think he may be getting paid to spread FUD.

So, is Cookie a dork or a shill? Do we live in a world where we can’t chat intelligently about security because of NSA shills, or is the world really full of that many dorks?

2. Turtle Doves

How can an untraceable pseudonym, such as me, post to a forum?

(Don’t say Tor — Tor is connection based and deliberately low-latency, so the source can be identified with IP packet correlation attacks. Untraceable pseudonyms use anonymizing remailers, which are message-based and deliberately high latency.)

3. French Hens

It’s not publically documented, but I hear TSMC added extra transistors to some Xilinx FPGAs, and the last I heard, no one had figured out what they were for.

On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 2:43 AM, wrote:

On 23/12/13 19:20 PM, wrote:

… And everyone is trying to reverse-engineer everyone else’s designs. All the underpinnings are there. And various parts of the US military and security establishment are quite aware – have, in fact, talked publicly about – the problem of “spiked” chips making it into their supply chains.

Aha. So, are there any case studies of this actually happening? This might shed light on the RDRAND question. If we had a documented case of (say) the Chinese slipping spiked chips in to one of the hot USAF toys, then we’d have some sense of how likely this is.

Then what?

Yet another arms race.

Papers, conferences, budgets, hype, FUD, gosh.

4. Colly Birds

Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

5. Gold Rings

There’s multiple archives of this mailing list, and starting you own is trivial:

http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/

https://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@randombit.net

IMO ease of archiving and ease of passing around archives is one of the biggest strengths of mailing lists.

6. Geese-a-Laying

I’m in the Bitcoin community and we keep on talking about fully decentralized backends to mailing lists/usenet replacements, but until something like that is implemented, best to stick with the tried and true mailing list. When something like that is implemented, it’s gonna look rather like a mailing list…

Mailing lists are great infrastructure: a pragmatic centralized core to push messages around/moderate, and a whole host of decentralized infrastructure around them like multiple archiving services and a wide variety of client software to interface with.

I also note that it’s a pain in the butt to PGP sign message board posts, this is Cryptography after all…

7. Maids-a-Milking

https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Fidelity_bonds – Disclaimer: I invented them. Also “Just use fidelity bonds!” is a standard joke in the Bitcoin developer community, and for good reason.

8. Swans-a-Swimming

I don’t think a backdoor is likely to survive a serious audit. Code audits, done right by competent people, are tough.

Though, done right, they are expensive.

If crypto code is open source, most people will use it without careful examination on the assumption that someone else is going to audit it.

But, some people, relying on that code, *are* going to audit it.

9. Ladies Dancing

In any case, as others have pointed out here: Until Snowdonia, the general attitude of big business – the customers for BSAFE – would have been “I don’t care that the NSA can read my stuff, they’re the good guys, they don’t get involved in commerce, I have nothing to hide from them.”

10. Lords-a-Leaping

There is historical precedent on switching to old tech. The Battle of the Bulge was a surprise attack because Adolf Hitler — himself only, and not his generals — did not trust the crypto and comms anymore. He got suspicious about how many battles were going the enemy’s way.

In his last roll of the dice, Hitler sent all the orders by motorcycle riders. Total surprise.

11. Pipers Piping

> It’s an interesting question, and one worth studying for pedagogical
> motives. From my experiences from both sides, it is clear that both sides
> failed. But for different reasons.
> Hence, I’ve concluded that email is unsecurable.

Obviously. It will never be able to escape the non-body header content and third party routing, storage and analysis with any form of patching over today’s mail. And it’s completely ridiculous that people continue to invest [aka: waste] effort in ‘securing’ it. The best you’ll ever get clients down to is exposing a single ‘To:’ header within an antique transport model that forces you to authenticate to it in order to despam, bill, censor and control you.

That system is cooked, done and properly fucked. Abandon it. What the world needs now is a real peer to peer messaging system that scales. Take Tor for a partial example… so long as all the sender/recipient nodes [onions] are up, any message you send will get through, encrypted, in real time. If a recipient is not up, you queue it locally till they are… no third party ever needed, and you get lossless delivery and confirmation for free. Unmemorable node address?, quit crying and make use of your local address book. Doesn’t have plugins for current clients?, so what, write some and use it if you’re dumb enough to mix the old and new mail.

The only real problem that still needs solved is scalability… what p2p node lookup systems are out there that will handle a messaging world’s population worth of nodes [billions] and their keys and tertiary data? If you can do that, you should be able to get some anon transport over the p2p for free.

Anyway, p2p messaging and anonymous transports have all been dreamed up by others before. But now is the time to actually abandon traditional email and just do it. If you build it, they will come.

12. Drummers Drumming

With open source code the NSA would be foolish to install a true back door.

i.e. The NSA would be foolish to assume that they could craft a side door in open source code that would withstand the scrutiny of another nations security agency (ANSA). The folk I have encountered that work there (short and old list) are not foolish or stupid. Their data integrity folk are darn good.

I can see weaknesses to establish a class of ability or a time window. For example in the days that RSA and the NSA negotiated the $10M contract FPGA and ASIC attacks were the tools of a rare and limited set of nations and corporations. My memory may be fading but I recall this time frame and believe I heard “smart” folk indicate that this was not clearly beyond the tools of the spooks but was beyond the tool reach of even organized crime at that time. Key concept “at that time”.

I make weakness level security decisions all the time. I do not have the world’s strongest lock on my home. I have also not replaced the locks on my car. My gym locker lock is an easy to open high school grade combination padlock. Most of these locks I can still open with my eyes closed in moments the same as I could back in high school.

Down the road is a high voltage transformer with a lock on it. OK it looks like a lock but is a seal in the shape of a padlock. It is made of aluminum(?) for the most part and is designed to be cut off with cutters. The same as used to cut heavy aluminum and copper cables. It is tamper evident, it should withstand an attack for a little bit of time with a hammer or bashing with a rock. If a teenager busted in and fried his little brain till it burst the power company clearly is not maintaining an attractive nuisance. There is no master key to be lost. It could be made of more durable material like hardened steel and more but it does not need to be.

My thoughts on this is that if you wish to be NSA proof you have some work to do.

All of this does take me to a couple places:

First is a reminder of the Morris worm attacks. The Dad wrote a book and none in the community addressed these design flaws and bugs Jr. crafted a worm that escaped or was let free on the world. Not zero day, no criminal element, no national security enemy. The BSD folk seem to have learned this lesson.

Second: “Target”… clearly criminals were involved , national interests & government sponsored… not likely. The Price tag of the breach at Target is possibly astounding. Some credit card companies have eviscerated their limits to limit their risk. All they have to do is write a report…. “if Used @ Target establish limits and throttle the limit of abuse and liability”. There are many lessons to be learned here.

Third: can wait for the new year.

Forth/Fourth: All things are not equal and too many take two things as all the proof needed to take a product to market. Code reviews and code review tools need work today. The bad guys are looking at the same code you have. Clear, precise, testable…. etc… It is interesting that the word code is used in so many ways.

Exposed – NSA Snowden Releases Tally Update – 726 Pages

Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT). Tally now 797 pages (~1.4%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.40% of that released). Australia press reports “up to 20,000 Aussie files.”

Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/nsa-spying-primary-sources

https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013

3 November 2013

47 42 Years to Release Snowden Documents

NY Times, 3 November 2013:

Outlet Pages
The Guardian 265
Washington Post 200
Der Spiegel 19
O Globo Fantastico ~87
New York Times 118 (82 joint)
ProPublica 89 (82 joint)
Le Monde 20
Dagbladet 13
NRC Handelsblad 4
Huffington Post 3
CBC 9
The Globe and Mail 18
SVT 2
L’Espresso 3
Trojkan (SVT) 29

Timeline of releases:

13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT).

12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 25 pages to Guardian.

11 December 2013. Belatedly add 74 pages to Washington Post.

10 December 2013. Add 2 pages to CBC.

10 December 2013. Add 4 pages to CBC (duplicate of previous source).

9 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Trojkan. Add 2 pages to Guardian. Add 82 pages to New York Times and ProPublica (joint).

6 December 2013. Add 3 pages to L’Espresso.

5 December 2013. Add 2 pages to SVT (Swedish TV).

5 December 2013. Add 1 page to Washington Post.

4 December 2013. Add 3 pages to Washington Post.

2 December 2013. Add 3 pages to CBC.

30 November 2013. Add 18 pages to The Globe and Mail.

30 November 2013. Add 3 pages to NRC Handelsblad.

29 November 2013. Add 1 page to CBC.

27 November 2013. Add 3 pages to Huffington Post.

26 November 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

23 November 2013. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad.

23 November 2013. Add 5 pages to New York Times.

22 November 2013. Add 10 pages to Dagbladet.

18 November 2013. Add 6 pages to The Guardian.

17 November 2013. Add two images to Der Spiegel.

4 November 2013. Add 14 pages to Washington Post.

3 November 2013. A reports an additional 54 slides for O Globo Petrobas.

3 November 2013. Add 22 pages to New York Times.

2 November 2013. Add 13 pages to Guardian, 11 are duplicates.

31 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.

29 October 2013. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel

27 October 2013. Add 2 pages to Der Spiegel.

25 October 2013. Add 4 pages to Le Monde.

22 October 2013. Add 5 pages to Le Monde.

21 October 2013. Add 11 pages to Le Monde, 8 are duplicates.

20 October 2013. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.

13 October 2013. Add 4, 7 and 9 pages to Washington Post.

8 October 2013. Add 7 pages to O Globo: CSE spying on Brazilian ministry, reported 7 October 2013.

6 October 2013. Add Snowden pages published by Washington Post, Der Spiegel, O Globo Fantastico, New York Times, ProPublica. Some are duplicates(*).

5 October 2013

26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian

Number Date Title Pages
The Guardian 265
20 9 December 2013 Spying on Games 2
18 18 November 2013 DSD-3G 6
19 1 November 2013 PRISM, SSO
SSO1 Slide
SSO2 Slide 13*
18 4 October 2013 Types of IAT Tor 9
17 4 October 2013 Egotistical Giraffe 20*
16 4 October 2013 Tor Stinks 23
15 11 September 2013 NSA-Israel Spy 5
14 5 September 2013 BULLRUN 6*
13 5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*
12 5 September 2013 NSA classification guide 3
11 31 July 2013 XKeyscore 32
10 27 June 2013 DoJ Memo on NSA 16
9 27 June 2013 Stellar Wind 51
8 21 June 2013 FISA Certification 25
7 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit A 9
6 20 June 2013 Minimization Exhibit B 9
5 16 June 2013 GCHQ G-20 Spying 4
4 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant FAQ 3
3 8 June 2013 Boundless Informant Slides 4
2 7 June 2013 PPD-20 18
1 5 June 2013 Verizon 4
Washington Post 200
11 December 2013 Excessive Collection 9
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 2 7
11 December 2013 SCISSORS 1 4
11 December 2013 Yahoo-Google Exploit 6
11 December 2013 Cable Spying Types 7
11 December 2013 WINDSTOP 1
11 December 2013 Co-Traveler 24
11 December 2013 GSM Tracking 2
11 December 2013 SIGINT Successes 4
11 December 2013 GHOSTMACHINE 4
5 December 2013 Target Location 1
4 December 2013 FASCIA 2
4 December 2013 CHALKFUN 1
26 November 2013 Microsoft a Target? 4
4 November 2013 WINDSTOP, SSO, Yahoo-Google 14
30 October 2013 MUSCULAR-INCENSOR Google and Yahoo 4
14 October 2013 SSO Overview 4
14 October 2013 SSO Slides 7
14 October 2013 SSO Content Slides 9
4 October 2013 Tor 49
4 October 2013 EgotisticalGiraffe 20*
4 October 2013 GCHQ MULLENIZE 2
4 October 2013 Roger Dingledine 2
30 August 2013 Budget 17
29 June 2013 PRISM 8
20 June 2013 Warrantless Surveillance 25*
7 June 2013 PPD-20 18*
6 June 2013 PRISM 1
Der Spiegel 19
17 November 2013 ROYAL CONCIERGE (DE)

SIGINT Mission 2017
22
28 September 2013 Contact Chaining Social Networks 1
28 September 2013 SYANPSE 1
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2013 SIGINT Enabling 3*
ProPublica 89
9 December 2013 Spying on Games 82*
5 September 2013 BULLRUN 4*
5 September 2103 SIGINT Enabling 3*
Le Monde 20
25 October 2013 NSA Hosts FR Spies 4
22 October 2013 Wanadoo-Alcatel 1
22 October 2013 Close Access Sigads 2
22 October 2013 Boundless Informant 2
22 October 2013 PRISM 11
Dagbladet 13
19 November 2013 BOUNDLESSINFORMANT 13
NRC Handelsblad 4
30 November 2013 Dutch SIGINT 3
23 November 2013 SIGINT Cryptologic Platform 1
Huffington Post 3
27 November 2013 Muslim Porn Viewing 3
CBC 9
10 December 2013 NSA-CSEC Partnership 1
10 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 4*
2 December 2013 G8-G20 Spying 3
29 November 2013 G8-G20 Spying 1
The Globe and Mail 18
30 November 2013 CSEC Brazil Spying 18*
SVT (Swedsh TV) 2
5 December 2013 Sweden Spied Russia for NSA 2
L’Espresso 3
6 December 2013 NSA Spies Italy 3
Trojkan (SVT) 29
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Relationship 1*
11 December 2013 NSA 5 Eyes Partners 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Agenda 8
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA RU Baltic 1
11 December 2013 NSA GCHQ Sweden FRA COMINT 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Plan 5
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Sources 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Tor et al 3
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA XKeyscore Slide 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum 1 1
11 December 2013 GCHQ Sweden FRA Quantum 1
11 December 2013 NSA Sweden FRA Quantum Accomplishments 2
9 December 2013 NSA and Sweden Pact 3*

Exposed – NSA TACLANE-Micro Network Encryptor Operator’s Guide

TACLANE-Micro Inline Network Encryptor Interface & Operator’s Guide

μTL-027-05
225 pages
For Official Use Only
July 10, 2007

(U//FOUO) The purpose of this manual is to explain how to install, operate, and reconfigure the General Dynamics TACLANE-Micro (KG-175D) encryptor.

…

…

…

Video – Jacob Appelbaum: If Everything is Under Surveillance, How Can We have a Democracy ?

TOP-SECRET: Obama Administration White Paper on NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata

ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT

23 pages
August 9, 2013

This white paper explains the Government’s legal basis for an intelligence collection program under which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains court orders directing certain telecommunications service providers to produce telephony metadata in bulk. The bulk metadata is stored, queried and analyzed by the National Security Agency (NSA) for counterterrorism purposes. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“the FISC” or “the Court”) authorizes this program under the “business records” provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1861, enacted as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 215). The Court first authorized the program in 2006, and it has since been renewed thirty-four times under orders issued by fourteen different FISC judges. This paper explains why the telephony metadata collection program, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Court, is consistent with the Constitution and the standards set forth by Congress in Section 215. Because aspects of this program remain classified, there are limits to what can be said publicly about the facts underlying its legal authorization. This paper is an effort to provide as much information as possible to the public concerning the legal authority for this program, consistent with the need to protect national security, including intelligence sources and methods. While this paper summarizes the legal basis for the program, it is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the program or the legal arguments or authorities in support of it.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under the telephony metadata collection program, telecommunications service providers, as required by court orders issued by the FISC, produce to the Government certain information about telephone calls, principally those made within the United States and between the United States and foreign countries. This information is limited to telephony metadata, which includes information about what telephone numbers were used to make and receive the calls, when the calls took place, and how long the calls lasted. Importantly, this information does not include any information about the content of those calls—the Government cannot, through this program, listen to or record any telephone conversations.

This telephony metadata is important to the Government because, by analyzing it, the Government can determine whether known or suspected terrorist operatives have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in terrorist activities, including persons and activities within the United States. The program is carefully limited to this purpose: it is not lawful for anyone to query the bulk telephony metadata for any purpose other than counterterrorism, and Court-imposed rules strictly limit all such queries. The program includes internal oversight mechanisms to prevent misuse, as well as external reporting requirements to the FISC and Congress.

Multiple FISC judges have found that Section 215 authorizes the collection of telephony metadata in bulk. Section 215 permits the FBI to seek a court order directing a business or other entity to produce records or documents when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation of international terrorism. Courts have held in the analogous contexts of civil discovery and criminal and administrative investigations that “relevance” is a broad standard that permits discovery of large volumes of data in circumstances where doing so is necessary to identify much smaller amounts of information within that data that directly bears on the matter being investigated. Although broad in scope, the telephony metadata collection program meets the “relevance” standard of Section 215 because there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that this category of data, when queried and analyzed consistent with the Court-approved standards, will produce information pertinent to FBI investigations of international terrorism, and because certain analytic tools used to accomplish this objective require the collection and storage of a large volume of telephony metadata. This does not mean that Section 215 authorizes the collection and storage of all types of information in bulk: the relevance of any particular data to investigations of international terrorism depends on all the facts and circumstances. For example, communications metadata is different from many other kinds of records because it is inter-connected and the connections between individual data points, which can be reliably identified only through analysis of a large volume of data, are particularly important to a broad range of investigations of international terrorism.

Moreover, information concerning the use of Section 215 to collect telephony metadata in bulk was made available to all Members of Congress, and Congress reauthorized Section 215 without change after this information was provided. It is significant to the legal analysis of the statute that Congress was on notice of this activity and of the source of its legal authority when the statute was reauthorized.

The telephony metadata collection program also complies with the Constitution. Supreme Court precedent makes clear that participants in telephone calls lack a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment in the telephone numbers used to make and receive their calls. Moreover, particularly given the Court-imposed restrictions on accessing and disseminating the data, any arguable privacy intrusion arising from the collection of telephony metadata would be outweighed by the public interest in identifying suspected terrorist operatives and thwarting terrorist plots, rendering the program reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, the program does not violate the First Amendment, particularly given that the telephony metadata is collected to serve as an investigative tool in authorized investigations of international terrorism.

Edward Snowden, A Truth Unveiled (Documentary) – Film

Julian Assange Interview 2013 On Edward Snowden – Video

Exposed – Ex-NSA Stewart Baker Testifies on Snowden

baker-13-0717

Unveiled – NSA Ft. Gordon Georgia “Sweet Tea” Building Specifications

(U//FOUO) NSA Ft. Gordon Georgia “Sweet Tea” Building Specifications

TV-Report – Snowden asks Russia for asylum

Video – NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden about the paranormal society

Film – NSA – Die Fabrik der Spione

Video – Inside – Die NSA

Der Dokumentation gelingt ein nie dagewesener Einblick in einen der geheimsten Spionagedienste der USA — die NSA. Es ist das erste Mal seit den Anschlägen vom 11. September, dass der Geheimdienst seine streng bewachten Türen für Filmkameras geöffnet hat. Dabei wird auch die Rolle der NSA im modernen, computergestützten Spionagegeschäft offenbart. Der Film zeigt, wie die NSA mit milliardenschwerer Technologie Amerikas Feinden Geheimnisse stiehlt und die Nation vor neuen Bedrohungen beschützt.

Insider-Report: Wie die NSA aus Ihren Daten von Google & Co. Ihr User-Profile erstellt

Mehrere geheime Folien zur Veranschaulichung der Prozesse bei PRISM zeigen, wie das Überwachungsprogramm des NSA vorgeht. Die Washington Post veröffentlichte diese nun, um zu zeigen, wie bestimmte Profile von Zielpersonen angelegt und nach und nach zur Informationsgewinnung genutzt werden.

Grafik 1 zeigt, dass ein Analyst zunächst über Schlüsselbegriffe und eine Zielperson eine gewünschte Überwachung erklären muss. Diese Anfrage wird an einen Vorgesetzten weitergereicht. Dieser muss mit einer 51-prozentigen Überzeugung dem Analyst Recht darin bestätigen, dass die Zielperson kein US-Bürger ist und sich auch zum Zeitpunkt der Anfrage nicht in den USA aufhält, so die Washington Post. Geht es um bereits zu dieser Person gespeicherte Informationen, greift das FBI auch auf eigenen Datenbanken zurück. So wird noch einmal sichergestellt, dass es sich bei der Zielperson nicht um US-Bürger handelt. Zusätzlich dazu nutzt das FBI aber auch die Möglichkeiten der Privatunternehmen, mit denen es zusammenarbeitet. Die Informationen aus beiden Suchwegen landen dann beim NSA.

Diese Informationen werden dann in ein spezielles System eingespeist, das Audio-, Video-, Text- und Internetdaten analysieren kann (Grafik 2). So werden unter anderem auch der Aufenthalt der Zielperson und die Signatur dieser gefiltert. Diese Informationen können auch in Echtzeit verarbeitet werden. Folgende Systeme sind dabei unter anderem zuständig: Mainway für Anruflisten, Pinwale für Videos, Nucleon für Sprachnachrichten und Marina für Internetverbindungen. Die Systeme Fallout und Conveyance sind, schätzt die Washington Post, dafür da, noch einmal final zu filtern. Dies soll die möglichen, so hereinkommenden Informationen über US-Bürger erneut reduzieren.

In der Grafik 3 ist zu sehen, dass Prism eine Mitteilung erhält, sobald sich eine Zielperson beispielsweise bei Yahoo einloggt. Dann kann die NSA automatisch die entsprechenden Echtzeit-Informationen mitschneiden. Eine entsprechende Nummer gibt dann Angaben über das Medium Auskunft, das die Zielperson gerade nutzt: Microsoft, Yahoo, Facebook, Skype etc.

Am 5. April wurden so beispielsweise 117.675 Zielpersonen in Echtzeit überwacht, wie Grafik 4 zeigt. Die rote Einrahmung am unteren Ende zeigt etwas unscharf diese Zahl der Überwachungen. Allerdings ist hier nicht ersichtlich, wie viele Informationen über andere Personen gesammelt wurden, die keine direkte Zielperson waren aber zum Zeitpunkt der Überwachung mit dieser in Kontakt waren.

Video – Glenn Greenwald Interviews Former CIA Senior Adviser Ed Snowden

Booz Allen’s PRISM Whistleblower, Ed Snowden, explains to the NY Times best selling author and award winning Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald, that at 29 years of age, as an employee of an independent contractor (i.e. not an employee of the U.S. Government) he “had the authorities to wiretap anyone including the President.” Snowdon characterizes PRISM as “turnkey tyranny” and an “architecture of oppression.”

The Return Of McCarthyism: Obama’s “Insider Threat Task Force”; Federal Workers Ordered To Spy On Each Other; Talking To The Press Considered Espionage; Same Great Dental http://epwhitney.com/?p=1054

Valerie Plame Wilson And Joe Wilson: Risk Management Industrial Complex Is “Unaccountable” “Immense” “Ripe For Abuse” “Owe Snowden Debt Of Gratitude” http://epwhitney.com/?p=1076

Citizen Snowden: The Last Remaining Defense To Unbridled Executive Authority In A Post ‘Amnesty’ Republic http://epwhitney.com/?p=908

Better Than Perjury: How James Clapper Punk’d Ron Wyden, Ed Snowden And The Global Commentariat http://epwhitney.com/?p=732

Former NSA Senior Counsel, Lawfare’s Joel Brenner Sees Snowden As A Coward http://epwhitney.com/?p=647

Washington Post Columnist Marc Thiessen’s Frivolous Claim: “Greenwald’s crime is violating 18 USC § 798” http://epwhitney.com/?p=621

TOP-SECRET – NSA Hardening Network Infrastructure: Security Recommendations for System Accreditors

NSA-IAD-HardeningInfrastructure

1. (U) Purpose: Many networks run by public and private organizations have experienced intrusions in recent years, and this cyber exploitation has resulted in an unprecedented transfer of wealth due to lost intellectual property. The threats to our networks and systems exist across numerous components that include end-user-devices, servers, and infrastructure devices. To address threats to routers and other network infrastructure devices, the National Security Agency’s Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) is publishing this IAA to guide U.S. Government systems accreditors’ strategic plan for network hardening. IAD will also be releasing an UNCLASSIFIED Factsheet (MIT-003FS-2013) with the same recommendations to help other public and private sector organizations combat the challenge of cyber exploitation through hardening networks.

2. (U) Security Recommendations

(U) Device Integrity

Purchase network hardware only from the manufacturer or from resellers who are authorized and certified by the equipment manufacturer.
Use a trusted administrative workstation to compare the file hash for network device firmware to the manufacturer’s published hash before installing new firmware on a network device. Periodically re-verify the file hash of the running firmware while the network device is in operation.
Avoid installing and do not run network device firmware versions that are no longer available from the manufacturer.
Shut down unused physical interfaces on network devices.
Implement access lists that allow only those protocols, ports and IP addresses that are required by network users and services, and then deny everything else.
Protect the network device configuration file from unauthorized disclosure. Take steps to avoid the appearance of plaintext passwords in the configuration file. Using encryption and/or a salted hash with iteration is critical to protect the confidentiality of passwords in configuration files—encoding alone is not enough.
Change passwords/keys immediately if the network device configuration file is transmitted in the clear (or is otherwise exposed) while containing non-encrypted passwords/keys.
Use secure protocols when transmitting network device configuration files.
Ensure that an audit event is created upon reboot and when configuration changes are applied to network devices.
Shut down unneeded services on network devices.
Review logs periodically to gain an in depth understanding of normal network behavior.

(U) Secure Management

Only use secure protocol standards (SSHv2; IKEv2/IPsec; TLS v1.0+) when performing remote management of network devices. For further details, see Annex C of NIAP’s Network Device Protection Profile (NDPP) – http://www.niap-ccevs.org/pp.
Restrict remote management connectivity to only controlled machines that are on a separate security domain with robust protection.
Create and maintain a written network infrastructure security policy. This policy should identify who is allowed to log in to network infrastructure devices and who is allowed to configure network devices, and should define a plan for updating network device firmware at scheduled intervals.
Never use default usernames and/or passwords. The network infrastructure security policy should define password length and complexity requirements.
Use at least two authenticated NTP sources to maintain a consistent time among network devices.

(U) Secure Protocol Standards + Strong Cryptography

Follow NIST SP 800-131A guidance for cryptographic algorithm and key lengths when performing remote management of network devices, (e.g., transition to 2048-bit DH modulus for SSH key agreement and 2048-bit RSA certificates for SSH authentication).
When using SNMP, use SNMPv3 with encryption enabled and/or encapsulate all SNMP traffic in an IPsec tunnel.
All IPsec VPNs should conform to IETF standards and NIST SP 800-131A guidance. Employ IETF secure protocol standards where possible.
Invoke the FIPS 140 evaluated crypto engine in the network device, and configure algorithm selections that were validated through an NDPP evaluation. (Refer to the configuration guidance from the manufacturer to make these selections).

(U) Secure Logging

Use a remote audit server (e.g., Syslog server). Protect the integrity and confidentiality of audit data through establishing an IPsec VPN connection between critical network devices and an audit server.
Ensure that all network infrastructure devices create an audit event when configuration changes are applied, when operating system firmware is upgraded, and when the device is rebooted.
Ensure that logs are reviewed on a regular basis.

3. (U//FOUO) For further information, please contact your IAD Client Advocate. Military commands/services/agencies should call 410-854-4200, and Civil and Intelligence agencies should call 410-854-4790.

TOP-SECRET-Recovering a Secret Spy Satellite Capsule from 16,400 Feet below the Pacific Ocean

An Underwater Ice Station Zebra: Recovering a Secret Spy Satellite Capsule from 16,400 Feet below the Pacific Ocean [PDF 6.1MB *]

The Trieste II (DSV-1), the Navy’s most advanced deep sea submersible at the time, surfaced about 350 miles north of the Hawaiian Islands in the pre-dawn hours of 26 April 1972 after recovering a mysterious item. Publicly called a “data package,” the object was actually part of a U.S. spy satellite, codenamed HEXAGON. Before today’s digital technology, photoreconnaissance satellites used film, which returned to Earth in capsules ejected from the satellite. The capsules, called “buckets,” reentered Earth’s atmosphere and deployed a parachute to slow their descent. During the first HEXAGON mission in 1971, the parachute broke off causing the bucket to crash into the ocean. This release includes photos of the capsule on the ocean floor, pictures of the Trieste II (DSV-1), and an article recounting the deepest undersea salvage then attempted. We also linked to the Naval Undersea Museum, where the Trieste II (DSV-1) is on permanent display.

View Underwater Ice Station Zebra Documents

View Naval Undersea Museum website [external link disclaimer]

Download photos from the CIA Flickr stream [external link disclaimer]

The NSA – The Perpetual Struggle to Fathom Pyongyang’s Motives and Goals

For decades, the erratic behavior of North Korea’s enigmatic leaders has often masked a mix of symbolic and pragmatic motives, according to declassified documents posted today by the National Security Archive. During earlier crises, Kim Jong Un’s father and grandfather postured and threatened the region in ways markedly similar to the behavior of the new leader, the records show.

While the current Kim is acting even more stridently in some cases, the documents reveal a past pattern characterized by bellicose conduct. In 1994, for instance, North Korean military officers threatened the U.S. with a possible preemptive strike if circumstances called for it: “This will not be a situation like the Iraq war,” U.S. officials were told. “We will not give you time to collect troops around Korea to attack us.” Yet American analysts believed during these earlier episodes that Pyongyang’s tone was aimed less at stoking hostilities than advancing a combination of practical objectives – from pushing the international community to accept North Korea’s position, to playing for time, to bolstering the leader’s political position at home.

Today’s posting provides a window into prior efforts to penetrate beneath North Korea’s shrill rhetoric to understand the logic, political dynamics and ultimate objectives underlying Pyongyang’s repeated threats against the U.S. and South Korea. Obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, mostly from the State Department, these records describe events during the 1990s (the Clinton presidency) with notable echoes in the current crisis. Additional cables made public by WikiLeaks (Documents 12-14) take the story up to the Obama administration and provide assessments of Kim Jong Un himself.

The documents from 1994-95, which saw the first nuclear crisis with North Korea and the death of Kim Il Sung, include excerpts from the morning intelligence summaries prepared for the secretary of state that seek to assess the factors and interests driving such developments as:

North Korea’s initial response to U.S. plans to station Patriot missiles in North Korea, deemed by Pyongyang to be an “unpardonable grave military challenge.” This step was viewed as typical: “to record its strong opposition without committing itself to any particular line of action while it sorts out its options.” (Document 1)
The deepening crisis in 1994 over the North’s nuclear weapons program, and confrontations over inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. One document records a frank warning from North Korean military officials during a meeting at Panmunjon: “this will not be a situation like the Iraq war. We will not give you time to collect troops around Korea to attack us. We will not attack the South first, but if it is clear you are going to attack, then we will attack.” Another document provides a fascinating evaluation of how China might respond to the outbreak of war on the peninsula should the nuclear crisis escalate. (Documents 2, 3 and 11)
Pyongyang’s withdrawal nearly 20 years ago from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). The North described the MAC as part of the “useless” armistice. U.S. diplomats saw the issue as possibly tied to the leadership succession in Pyongyang, as Kim Jong Il was North Korea’s “supreme commander” and needed to be seen as directing any military negotiations. (Documents 4, 5, 9 and 10); and
The implications for North Korean policies of the death of Kim Il Sung and the prolonged consolidation of Kim Jong Il in power, a delay caused in part by Kim’s health problems. This led INR to conclude that “Kim Jong Il will have to make some leadership changes soon, to root out pockets of opposition and to put his own stamp on his regime.” (Documents 6, 7 and 8)

Three additional documents from 2009-2010, originally made public by WikiLeaks, provide reports from the U.S. embassy in Seoul about:

The possible motivations and goals behind the “rapid deterioration” in inter-Korea relations since the election of conservative Lee Myung Bak as president. Lee had begun turning away from the policy of engagement with North Korea followed by his predecessors (Documents 12 and 13). As the cables report, Pyongyang was motivated to drive home its conviction that it, not Seoul, called the shots on the peninsula. The embassy stressed, however, “the apathy – even nonchalance – with which the ROK public has reacted to the DPRK’s blasts. They see the DPRK as an object of pity, and the heightened North Korea rhetoric as a sign of distress rather than a realistic threat;” and
A discussion between former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and South Korean officials and scholars on the prospects for the post-Kim Jong Il leadership (Document 14). The latter provides interesting assessments of Kim Jong Un’s background and possible challenges to his claim to the leadership position, particularly from his brother-in-law, Jang Song Taek. The State Department viewed these in light of three alleged coup attempts against Kim Jong Il in the late 1990s.

Not since the first Clinton administration, when the U.S. seriously considered military options to counter Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons ambitions, have North Korea’s rhetoric and actions seemed to carry such potentially grave consequences, intended or not. North Korea has pronounced the 1953 armistice null and void, declared the Korean peninsula in a state of war, closed the Kaesong inter-Korean industrial complex, warned other governments to evacuate their embassies in Pyongyang due to the threat of war, announced it is restarting nuclear processing facilities to support production of nuclear weapons, and making preparations to test a medium-range missile from the east coast of North Korea, possibly on the anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth. South Korea – all in response to the imposition of new UN economic sanctions on North Korea in retaliation for its recent nuclear weapons test.

While many if not most observers believe these actions are driven at heart by North Korea’s persistent demand to be taken seriously by the U.S. and to engage in direct talks with Washington about such key topics as a final peace settlement for the peninsula, political recognition and economic assistance, (not to mention solidifying Kim Jong Un’s leadership position with the military), these analysts also stress the potential for miscalculation by the young, untested North Korean leader. Current efforts to assess Kim Jong Un’s personality and rationality can be viewed against the background of prior such efforts, discussed in these documents, which provide something of a baseline for seeing how far he may be departing from what has been taken as “normal” for North Korea.

Documents

Document 1: DPRK – Reaction to Patriots, The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary, INR, January 29, 1994 (Top Secret/Codeword)

Source: FOIA

This assessment looks at how North Korea might react to reports that the U.S. planned to deploy Patriot missiles in South Korea. Pyongyang’s initial response is characterized as typical: “to record its strong opposition without committing itself to any particular line of action while it sorts out its options.” Looking at an unattributed commentary issued by North Korea, the analysis notes that while the Patriot plan is called an “unpardonable grave military challenge,” no direct threats have yet been issued. North Korea’s precise reactions will turn on future events, i.e., actual deployment of the missiles, or an announcement of the start of the Team Spirit joint military exercises.

Document 2: China: Potential Response to Korean Contingencies, DIA Special Report, January 31, 1994 (Secret)

Source: FOIA

This DIA analysis examines possible Chinese responses in different Korean contingencies related to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program: the imposition of UN economic sanctions, and a military confrontation with North Korea. The report notes that Beijing faces special problems in dealing with Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. They need to “reconcile their interest in stability on the Korean Peninsula and long-standing ties to Pyongyang with their interests in a denuclearized peninsula, in avoiding isolation among UN Security Council (SC) members, and in maintaining stable relations with the US, Japan and South Korea.” In the event of economic sanctions, China would likely work to ameliorate the impact on North Korea, with the primary goal of preventing a political crisis growing out of North Korea’s economic collapse. If Pyongyang attacked South Korea, China would likely want to avoid giving military support and would work for an end to hostilities. Finally, if a broader war erupts involving US and South Korean forces, China likely would not respond with aggressive military action, but would take steps to secure its border and might consider deploying Chinese forces across the Yalu River to forestall the loss of all of North Korea to US and South Korea forces.

Document 3: DPRK: Hoping for Best, Bracing for Worst; The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary, INR, March 29, 1994 (Top Secret/Codeword)

Source: FOIA

This assessment comes as the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is deepening. The analysis argues that Pyongyang was surprised at how quickly the situation deteriorated with the US over the nuclear issue, and seemed to believe that the crisis was moving toward war. During what are described as cordial recent talks at Panmunjon, the North Koreans still presented with “remarkable frankness” the possibility of a pre-emptive attack by Pyongyang: “this will not be a situation like the Iraq war. We will not give you time to collect troops around Korea to attack us. We will not attack the South first, but if it is clear you are going to attack, then we will attack.” There is also a possible internal political angle, as Kim Jong Il, who is closely associated with the negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear issue, may be anxious to demonstrate he has not been “taken in” by Washington and can stand up to outside pressure.

Document 4: Cable, Seoul 03560 to SecState, Subject: North Korea Unilaterally Declares Military Armistice Commission (MAC) “Useless,” Calls for “New Peace System,” April 28, 1994 (Secret)

Source: FOIA

This cable reports a statement North Korea presented to the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) that declared the armistice had become “useless” and that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) was going to cease participation in all MAC activities, would not recognize UNC participation in MAC functions, and that the KPA Supreme Command would deal directly with US Army representatives at Panmunjon to discuss military issues, including a new peace agreement. The South Korean Foreign Ministry’s reaction to this announcement was calm, viewing it as a “step in a very familiar pattern.” The US embassy in Seoul recommends taking a similarly calm approach, stressing there has been no change in the military situation on the peninsula, rejecting Pyongyang’s claim that the armistice was “abrogated” by US actions such as the planned deployment of Patriot missiles, and refusing to negotiate bilaterally with North Korea a new arrangement to replace the armistice.

Document 5: DPRK: New Arrangements; The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary, INR, April 29, 1994 (Top Secret/Codeword)

Source: FOIA

Here, INR gives its initial read on North Korea’s actions regarding the armistice reported on in the cable above. The move to do away with the armistice is seen as one of Pyongyang’s central goals, one which it has pursued with additional diligence since the appointment of an ROK general as the UN Command’s MAC member in 1991. The move is also seen as possibly tied to the leadership succession in Pyongyang, as Kim Jong Il is North Korea’s “supreme commander” and needs to be seen as directing any military negotiations.

Document 6: DPRK: Death of Kim Il Sung; The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary, INR, July 9, 1994 (Top Secret/Codeword)

Source: FOIA

In its early comment on the rise of Kim Jong Il to lead North Korea, INR notes that the new leader is not an unknown factor: he had been in charge of most affairs in North Korea for years, and had been taking credit and “calling the shots” for the third round of US-DPRK talks on the nuclear issue.

Document 7: DPRK: Not Much Movement; The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary, INR, July 23, 1994 (Top Secret/Codeword)

Source: FOIA

Here, INR continues its assessments of the power succession in North Korea, examining the usual signs that Kim Jong Il is moving to solidify his position as the new leader, but notes there is no information, positive or negative, to judge the security of his position inside the North Korean leadership. Statements in the party-controlled press have warned against “the slightest attempt to damage” Kim Il Sung’s accomplishments, which suggest that the policy of engagement with the U.S. begun under him will continue to receive support from the new leadership. On the other hand, because of South Korea’s perceived disrespectful response to the elder Kim’s death, prospects for a North-South summit seem diminished, if only for the moment.

Document 8: DPRK: Slow-Motion Succession; The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary, INR, August 25, 1994 (Top Secret/Codeword)

Source: FOIA

INR continues to sift the tea leaves on Kim Jong Il’s leadership position, as health issues and signs of other “forces at work” seem to be delaying consolidation of his succession. Kim’s health issues, reportedly including diabetes, have resulted in his prolonged public absence during a critical time, during which a leadership debate has seemed to reopen on two crucial policy areas: reunification and the economy. All in all, the INR analysts conclude that “Kim Jong Il will have to make some leadership changes soon, to root out pockets of opposition and to put his own stamp on his regime.”

Document 9: China/DPRK: MAC “Recall;” The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary, INR, September 2, 1994 (Top Secret/Codeword)

Source: FOIA

INR reports here on Beijing’s decision, apparently made with little enthusiasm and only to signal support for Kim Jong Il, to recall its delegation from the Military Armistice Commission, inactive since North Korea rescinded its participation in April 1994 (see Documents 4 and 5 above). In reviewing this step, INR again tries to probe the motivations for North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the MAC: while these steps were personally identified with Kim Jong Il, it was unclear whether they were tied into the next round of US-DPRK talks or to a longer-range strategy related to broader questions of peace and security on the peninsula after the nuclear issue has been resolved. Even after withdrawing from the MAC, Pyongyang stressed that it would continue to abide by the essential provisions of the armistice.

Document 10: DPRK: Raising the Armistice Issue; The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary, INR, September 10, 1994 (Top Secret/Codeword)

Source: FOIA

INR continues to probe and weigh the likely motivations behind North Korea’s decision to replace the 1953 armistice with a new agreement, a step that INR believes is driven by practical and symbolic reasons. In taking this step, Pyongyang seems to be sensitive to South Korea’s concerns, being both willing to play on these concerns for tactical reasons and aware that it is not realistic to exclude South Korea from any peace process. Internally, there are signs that the North Korean leadership reasoned that tangible changes in relations with the US would give pragmatists in the leadership leverage to carry out changes in economic and foreign policy. In moving slowly and carefully to dismantle the MAC machinery, it seems that North Korea does not want to destabilize the situation but does want the US to focus on the question of a new peace agreement.

Document 11: North Korea: “No” to Special Inspections; The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary, INR, September 28, 1994 (Top Secret/Codeword)

Source: FOIA

A particularly sharp escalation in North Korean rhetoric, issued in a rare, toughly worded public statement by the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces regarding the negotiations over inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, provides the occasion for another INR attempt to read the tea leaves. The North Korean broadside accused the U.S. of looking for the opportunity to build up its forces on the peninsula “behind the curtain of talks,” and of resorting to military threats, including operations of the USS Kitty Hawk and Independence in the waters around Korea. INR saw this statement as a challenge to members of the leadership who supported talks with the US, as the ministry’s statement echoed traditional, hard-line rhetoric referring to the military’s mission “to protect the socialist fatherland with guns, not words.” While INR saw the tough statement as a reaction to perceived pressure by the US and believed it might be targeted as much at the domestic audience as at the US, analysts thought it might also signify leadership differences coming to a head, and in a more visible fashion given the slow pace of the leadership succession. Regardless of these contending factors, “brinkmanship is a mainstay of the North’s negotiating repertoire,” and a manufactured crisis may in the end force the US to agree to a better deal.

Document 12: Cable, Seoul 000062 to SecState, Subject: North-South Rhetoric: A Year of Chill, January 13, 2009 (Confidential)

Source: Wikileaks

This cable provides the U.S. embassy’s assessment of the “rapid deterioration” in inter-Korea relations since the election of conservative Lee Myung Bak as ROK president a year earlier. (This begs comparison to the situation in 2013 confronting the new South Korea leader Park Geun Hye, daughter of long-time South Korean leader Park Chung Hee.) As the embassy sees it, Lee’s decision to rewrite the ground rules of inter-Korea relations (established over the past ten years by his predecessors Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Dae Jung, and marked by the deliberate cutting off of all North-South contacts), demanded a strong response to demonstrate that Pyongyang is still calling the shots. Seoul’s response has been “calm, even nonchalant,” a position which enjoys significant public support. The cable provides a good summary of the back-and-forth between Seoul and Pyongyang over the past year. In its closing comments, the embassy observes that “The North greeted Lee Myung-bak, as it has done with other past ROK presidents, with hostility and bluster.” but the cables author also notes that Pyongyang observed a certain etiquette, such warning Seoul several times before placing restrictions on border crossings.

Document 13: Cable, Seoul 000186 to SecState, Subject: Heated DPRK Rhetoric Gets Cool ROK Reaction, February 5, 2009 (Confidential)

Source: Wikileaks

This cable reports on the South Korean reaction to recent North Korean statements “nullifying” past inter-Korean agreements. Pyongyang’s comments seemed designed to increase tensions among South Koreans, though that was not the result so far, based on talks at Blue House, the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Unification. Here, Pyongyang’s “increasingly shrill” rhetoric is seen as a “desperate, but ineffective” effort to persuade ROK President Lee to change the South’s policies on North-South relations (see cable above). The embassy also views the North’s statement as a “plea for attention” from the new Obama administration. One concern voiced in the cable is that once the DRPK runs out of “rhetorical cards” to play, it may need to resort to a military provocation at sea or along the DMZ. The embassy also believes it unlikely that Pyongyang will close the Kaesong Industrial Complex, given the North’s continued encouragement of business there in late 2008. In its comment, the embassy stresses “the apathy – even nonchalance – with which the ROK public has reacted to the DPRK’s blasts. They see the DPRK as an object of pity, and the heightened North Korea rhetoric as a sign of distress rather than a realistic threat.”

Document 14: Cable, Seoul 000248 to SecState, Subject: A/S Campbell Discusses DP
RK Future with Experts, February 18, 2010 (C)

Source: Wikileaks

This embassy cable reports on a meeting that Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell held with five South Korean opinion leaders and experts about future prospects in North Korea, where “regime succession” was fully underway to prepare for the post-Kim Jong Il era. Here, Campbell hears that it is difficult to predict if Kim Jong Un will be able to succeed his father, Kim Jong Il, without “sparking instability” in North Korea. There is disagreement among the experts about Kim Jong Un’s ability to secure the support of the ruling elites, with some arguing that his brother-in-law, Jang Song Taek, who has been spearheading the succession drive, could prove a strong rival and would probably be tempted to challenge him. Such coups were not unprecedented, as Kim Jong Il had foiled three such attempts in the late 1990s. Doubts are also expressed about Kim Jong Un’s lack of experience, compared to his father who had twenty years of experience as an official of the Korean Worker’s Party before his father died, as well as the benefit of years of guidance from Kim Jong Il after being officially named his father’s successor in 1980. Finally, the experts agree that a critical factor is Beijing’s obsession with North Korean stability at all costs.

“The Future of Warfare Is Warfare in Cyberspace,” NSA Declared

Washington, D.C., April 26, 2013 – Since at least 1997, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been responsible for developing ways to attack hostile computer networks as part of the growing field of Information Warfare (IW), according to a recently declassified internal NSA publication posted today by the non-governmental National Security Archive (“the Archive”) at The George Washington University. Declaring that “the future of warfare is warfare in cyberspace,” a former NSA official describes the new activity as “sure to be a catalyst for major change” at the super-secret agency.

The document is one of 98 items the Archive is posting today that provide wide-ranging background on the nature and scope of U.S. cyber activities.

Activities in cyberspace — both defensive and offensive — have become a subject of increasing media and government attention over the last decade, although usually the focus has been on foreign attacks against the United States, most notably the Chinese government’s reported exploitation of U.S. government, commercial and media computer networks. At the same time, the apparent U.S.-Israeli created Stuxnet worm, designed to damage Iranian centrifuges, has put the spotlight on the United States’ own clandestine cyber efforts.

The NSA’s new assignment as of 1997, known as Computer Network Attack (CNA), comprises “operations to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy” information in target computers or networks, “or the computers and networks themselves,” according to the NSA document.

Today’s posting by the Archive highlights various aspects of U.S. cyberspace activities and concerns going back to the late 1970s. The documents — obtained from government and private websites as well as Freedom of Information Act requests — originate from a wide variety of organizations. These include the White House and National Security Council, the National Security Agency, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the military services, the General Accounting/ Government Accountability Office, and the Congressional Research Service — as well as three private organizations (Project 2049, Mandiant Corporation, and Symantec).

Source: Department of Homeland Security (see Document 52).

Among the highlights of the documents are:

The NSA’s earlier concerns about the vulnerability of sensitive computer systems to either viruses or compromise through foreign intelligence service recruitment of computer personnel (Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 9)
The Secretary of Defense’s March 1997 authorization of the National Security Agency to conduct computer network attack operations (Document 11)
Detailed discussions of Chinese computer network exploitation activities (Document 66, Document 79, Document 83)
Analyses of the Stuxnet worm (Document 40, Document 42, Document 44, Document 88)
Extensive treatments of intelligence collection concerning U.S. technologies through computer network exploitation (Document 18, Document 55, Document 63)

* * *
Cyberspace and U.S. National Security
By Jeffrey T. Richelson

In an October 2012 speech (Document 78), then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told a group of business executives that “a cyber attack perpetrated by nation states [or] violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11,” and raised the prospect of a “cyber Pearl Harbor.” In his February 2013 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama asserted that “our enemies are … seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, our air traffic control systems.” Later that month, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper led off his annual threat assessment (Document 90) appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with a discussion of the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the cyber threat.1

Stuxnet: “The world’s first precision cybermunition.” Source: Department of Homeland Security (see Document 52)

Concern about the potential damage of cyber attack did not originate in the current administration. Even before the establishment of the computer connectivity of the current Internet-era, there was concern, including in the National Security Agency, about the threat of computer viruses (Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6) or the vulnerability of computer systems due to recruitment efforts by hostile intelligence services (Document 9). More recently, the William J. Clinton and George W. Bush administrations focused on the connection between cyberspace and national security, issued policy directives, and considered and/or authorized both public and covert actions.

Occasionally, some of those concerns have been met with skepticism. Critiques have included the assertion that the very structure of the Internet means it is not subject to a ‘Pearl Harbor’ type attack — that is, an attack at single point. The association of power outages in the northeastern United States in 2003 and Brazil in 2007 with cyberattacks has been challenged by reviewers and experts — who point to studies that concluded there were other, more mundane, causes. One writer has asserted that cyberwar is not here, and that it is not coming. Additional issues that have been raised include the lack of disclosed evidence with regard to more extreme claims concerning the threat, the dangers of threat inflation (including facilitating the expenditure on ‘cyber pork’), and the extent to which the costs of other types of criminal activity (such as car theft) dwarf the cost of cyber crime.2 What is indisputable, however, is the dramatic increase in attention — both in the U.S. Government and private industry — to activities in cyberspace in the last decade — which has been reflected in both media coverage and the release of private and government documents.

Attacks & Exercises

Source: Defense Science Board. See Document 81.

Significant attention has been devoted, in both the classified and unclassified realms, to actual attacks as well as exercises that have sought to determine the vulnerability of key government and infrastructure systems to attack.

The Government Accounting Office (renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004) reported (Document 6) that between April 1990 and May 1991, a period that encompassed Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, computer hackers from the Netherlands penetrated 34 Department of Defense sites. According to that report, the hackers were able to access “unclassified, sensitive information” concerning military personnel, logistics, and weapons systems development. The report also asserted that, particularly during times of international conflict, “such information … can be highly sensitive.”

In March and April 1994, according to GAO reports (Document 10a, Document 10b), the Air Force’s Rome Laboratory, in upstate New York, was targeted by a pair of hackers (a 16-year old British student and a 22-year old Israeli technician) who, using “Trojan Horse” and “sniffer” programs, managed to take control of the lab’s networks. In addition to taking all of the lab’s 33 subnetworks offline for several days, the hackers also stole air tasking order research data and gained access to systems at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, and a variety of defense contractors.

Source: Defense Science Board. See Document 81.

In February 1998, several Department of Defense networks were attacked through a commonly understood vulnerability in the Solaris (UNIX-based) computer system — the investigation of which was designated SOLAR SUNRISE. The attack involved probing Defense Department servers to determine if the vulnerability existed, and then exploiting it — entering the system and planting a program to collect data. The hackers, ultimately discovered to be two California high school students, also mounted at least a second intrusion to extract data from the penetrated computers.3

In 2003, a series of computer intrusions were directed against the U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the U.S. Redstone Arsenal, the Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, and several DoD contractors – but they apparently went undetected for several months. That series of intrusions was labeled TITAN RAIN, and Defense Department investigators believed it to have originated in China. In June 2006, Department of Energy officials acknowledged that the names of and personal information of more than 1,500 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) employees had been stolen due to network intrusion that apparently began in 2004.4

Another set of attacks that attracted attention (Document 27) was directed against former Soviet-controlled territories, and was widely believed to have been the work of the Russian government. On July 20, 2008, the Georgian president’s website was subjected to a denial-of-service attack. On August 8, a coordinated, distributed denial-of-service attack occurred on other Georgian government websites. At that time, Russian forces were engaged in combat with Georgian forces. Additional cyber attacks on Lithuanian and Kyrgzstan targets took place in June 2008 and January 2009, respectively. The attack on Lithuanian websites occurred three days after that country passed legislation outlawing the use of Soviet and communist symbols, while the January 2009 attack took place on the same day that Russia tried to pressure Kyrgyzstan to revoke U.S. access to the Bishkek airbase being used as a transit point for supplies to Afghanistan.5

Since that time there have been numerous reports of cyber incidents. Included have been a series of attacks on global energy targets, dubbed NIGHT DRAGON, a 2012 cyber attack on the Saudi Arabian state-owned Aramco oil company, and cyber attacks on U.S. banks and companies — attacks alleged to have been the responsibility of Iran.6

Along with the actual intrusions that have been taking place for over two decades, the United States has also conducted a number of exercises and studies in an attempt to assess the extent of computer network vulnerability. The first exercise, designated ELIGIBLE RECEIVER, was conducted over 90 days in 1997, and involved a Red Team consisting of 35 individuals. Simulated, and apparently successful, cyber attacks were made against government and private power and communications networks in Oahu, Los Angeles, Colorado Springs, St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit, Washington, D.C., Fayetteville, and Tampa. The head of the Pentagon’s Joint Task Force – Computer Network Defense, wrote that the exercise “clearly demonstrated our lack of preparation for a coordinated cyber and physical attack on our critical military and civilian infrastucture.”7

A subsequent exercise, designated LIVEWIRE, was conducted by the Department of Homeland Security. In 2005, the CIA’s Information Operations Center conducted a three-day exercise, codenamed SILENT HORIZON. The objective of the exercise was to practice defending against a cyber attack that would be on the same scale as the September 11, 2001, events, and would target both governmental and private sectors.8

Intelligence and Threat Assessments

Intelligence/threat assessments concerning cyberspace include estimates of the current and projected future cyber capabilities and activities of a variety of nations and groups. They can also include assessments of the specific threats faced by government and private organizations in relation to the current state of cyber security.

In late 2012 and early 2013, several press sources reported that a national intelligence estimate focused on worldwide cyber activities had either been completed or was in the process of completion. An earlier estimate was produced in February 2004: NIE-2004-01D/I, Cyber Threats to the Information Infrastructure. An additional national intelligence product was produced for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) by the Intelligence Science Board – a January 2008 report titled Technical Challenges of the National Cyber Initiative. 9

None of those products has been released, even in redacted form. Estimates and assessments which have been released include those produced by the Congressional Research Service, the Defense Security Service, a ODNI component, and a contractor for the U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission. In 2007, the CRS examined (Document 24), inter alia, examples of vulnerabilities that terrorists might decide to exploit in attempting a coordinated cyberattack and ways that terrorists might be improving their cyber skills. The report, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues, noted different views concerning the ability of Al-Qaeda (or other terrorist groups) to launch a significant cyberattack and the related danger of a “Digital Pearl Harbor.” It also noted a CIA assessment, provided in April 2002 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, that “cyberwarfare attacks against the U.S. critical infrastructure will become a viable option for terrorists as they become more familiar with the technology required for the attacks.”

A 2004 assessment of the intelligence threat (Document 18), particularly from nations or others seeking to conduct economic espionage was produced by the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff. One chapter focuses on ‘Computers and the Internet’. In addition to providing a history of Internet security and discussing the relationship between website content and operational security, it also explores the roots of network vulnerability and eight outsider attack techniques – including scanning, packet sniffing, and malware.

Several unclassified assessments (Document 26, Document 43, Document 63) by the Defense Security Service have focused on foreign attempts to acquire advanced U.S. technology. The most recent version (Document 63), as with previous versions, examines a variety of methods for acquiring information on U.S. technologies — including “suspicious network activity,” which was the most prevalent collection method for “entities originating from East Asia and the Pacific.”

A similar type of assessment (Document 55) was produced in October 2011 by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The report, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, examines the vulnerability of US technologies and trade secrets to cyberspace operations, the threat from specific collectors (including Russia, China, and U.S. partners), and the outlook for the future (including both “near certainties” and “possible game changers”).

Key assessments of Chinese computer network exploitation that are in the public domain have been produced either by contractors in response to tasking from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission or by private organizations. In October 2009, the review commission released Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation (Document 30). It examined Chinese computer network exploitation activities, strategy and operations during a military conflict, key entities in Chinese computer network operations, cyber-espionage, an operational profile of an advanced cyber intrusion and a chronology of alleged Chinese computer network exploitation activities.

A second report (Document 66), also produced for the U.S.-China review commission, and released in 2012, Occupying the High Ground, focused on Chinese capabilities for computer network exploitation. It included a look at the key entities and institutions supporting Chinese computer network operations, potential risks to the U.S. telecommunications supply chain, and the risks and reality of collaboration between U.S. and Chinese information security firms. Along with the reports for the review commission, two private organizations have produced detailed reports on PRC computer espionage activities. In 2012, a research group focused on China released a study (Document 79) based on open sources and computer-based investigations, examining the roles of several PLA organizations in cyber operations, including the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department, its 2nd Bureau as well as its Beijing North Computer Center. Early the next year, the Mandiant computer security company released its study (Document 83) on the 2nd Bureau — which discussed the tasking of the unit, its past espionage operations, attack lifecycle, and the unit’s infrastructure and personnel.

In contrast to the extensive public documents concerning China’s computer attack and exploitation activities, far less has appeared concerning similar Iranian activities. In 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper did characterize them as “dramatically increasing in recent years in depth and complexity.” 10 A hearing in 2012 featured statements on Iranian cyber activities from two members of Congress and two non-governmental experts. (Document 71a, Document 71b, Document 71c, Document 71d).

Directives, Strategies, Policies, and Plans

While a number of presidential directives in earlier years addressed subjects such as communications security and information security, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (Document 12), Critical Infrastructure Protection, signed by President William J. Clinton on May 22, 1998, focused on protecting both “physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government.” Among the steps Clinton directed was the establishment of a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan, increased intelligence collection and analysis devoted to the cyber threat, and creation of a National Infrastructure Protection Center.

The George W. Bush administration produced a number of classified as well as unclassified documents concerning cyberspace. The first, National Security Presidential Directive 16 (NSPD-16) was reported to have been issued in July 2002 and provide guidelines for the conduct of offensive cyber operations. A public document, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Document 16), was released in February 2003 and was followed by the classified NSPD-38, with the same title, of July 7, 2004. A third classified directive, NSPD-54, Cyber Security and Monitoring, was issued on January 8, 2008. 11

President Obama has signed two Presidential Policy Directives concerning cybersecurity — the still classified PPD-20 (title unknown) and PPD-21, “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience” (Document 86) — the latter following the failure of two proposed pieces of cybersecurity legislation to make it through Congress. Its key components are its delineation of roles and responsibilities, of officials and agencies, its identification of three strategic imperatives, and its direction to the Secretary of Homeland Security on steps to take to implement the directive. Issued the same day was an executive order (Document 87) that focused solely on critical infrastructure cybersecurity — including information sharing, reduction of cyber risk, and identification of critical infrastructure at greatest risk.

On May 8, 2009, the White House issued the results of its cyberspace policy review — Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Document 28). It produced a plan that included establishing performance metrics, preparing a cybersecurity response plan, and instituting a national public awareness and education campaign to promote cybersecurity. In May 2011 the White House released its International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World (Document 46), which discussed the building of U.S. cyberspace policy, the future of cyberspace, as well as U.S. policy priorities and concludes with the a discussion of the implementation of U.S. strategy. Then, in early 2013, along with PPD-21 and the related executive order, the administration released Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets (Document 82). Part of the strategy concerns mitigating cyber theft and describes four action items – diplomatic efforts, voluntary practices by industry, enhancing domestic law enforcement operations, improving domestic legislation, and promoting public awareness.

Numerous departments also have produced cyber strategy documents at various levels of classification. In 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff produced the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (Document 23), which was classified Secret. Its introduction described it as the “comprehensive strategy of the U.S. Armed Forces to ensure U.S. military superiority in cyberspace.” Since released under the Freedom of Information Act, the document identified four strategic priorities in implementing the strategy – including gaining and maintaining the initiative to operate within adversary decision cycles and integrating cyber capabilities across the full range of military operations using cyberspace. In July 2011, that strategy was replaced by the unclassified Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Document 50) — which noted five strategic initiatives with regard to DoD operations in cyberspace. Those initiatives include treating cyberspace as an operational domain with regard to organization, training, and equipment as well as employing new concepts to protect DoD networks and systems.

The individual military services and their components have also produced their own policy and planning documents concerning cyberspace activities. In February 2010, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command published an unclassified pamphlet (Document 33) on how cyber operations would be integrated into the full spectrum of Army operations. The next year, the Air Force produced Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, Cyberspace Operations (Document 60), which included a discussion of the design, planning, execution, and assessment of cyberspace operations.

Civilian departments have also produced their own strategy documents — such as the Department of Homeland Security’s November 2011 Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future (Document 58), which listed four cybersecurity goals (including reducing exposure to cyber risk and increasing resilience) and nine means for achieving those goals.

In addition to presidential directives, departmental directives also serve to state policies as well as assign responsibilities. Thus, the 2006 DoD Directive 3600.01 (Document 22), “Information Operations,” assigned the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration responsibilities with regard to computer network defense — a responsibility since assumed by the department’s Chief Information Officer.. A January 2010 directive (Document 31) focuses on protection of unclassified Defense Department information that passes through or resides on Defense Industrial Base information systems and networks.

The Department of Energy has also issued its own directives concerning cybersecurity — including a September 2010 directive (Document 36) on the department’s cybersecurity management policy, including a statement of objectives, principles, responsibilities, and implementation, as well as a May 2011 directive (Document 48) which stipulates that the department’s cybersecurity policy be based on a risk management approach.

Organizations

U.S. government organizations involved in cyberspace activities (excluding those involved in evaluating programs) can be found in the Intelligence Community, Department of Defense, and several civilian departments or agencies – including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security.

The most senior U.S. official concerned with the analysis of intelligence concerning foreign cyber capabilities and activities is a member of the DNI’s National Intelligence Council — the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues — a position first established in May 2011. Sometime in the late 1990s, an Information Operations Center was established within the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (now the National Clandestine Service). It absorbed some of the functions of the Directorate of Science and Technology’s Clandestine Information Technology Office. The office was officially described as being responsible for addressing “collection capabilities within emerging information technologies.” The Center’s Analysis Group is located in the Directorate of Intelligence and evaluates foreign threats to U.S. computer systems, particularly those that support critical infrastructure. 1 2

The National Security Agency’s involvement in cyber security is a consequence of its long-time role in insuring first communications and then information security for various components of the government and private sector as well as its need to insure the security of the computers it has relied on heavily for decades (e.g. Document 2, Document 3, Document 4). Its role in computer network exploitation – of gathering electronic “data at rest” is a natural extension of its signals intelligence role of gathering “data in motion.” In March 1997, according to an article (Document 11) by a former deputy director, it was also assigned the mission of computer network attack.

A major step in the organization of U.S. cyberspace activities, indicative of an upgrade in attention, occurred in late June 2009, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered (Document 29) the establishment of a unified U.S. Cyber Command subordinate to the U.S. Strategic Command. In his memo Gates noted that he would recommend to the president that he appoint the director of the National Security Agency as commander of the Cyber Command, that the command would reach initial operating capability by October 2009 and full operating capability by October 2010. He also directed disestablishment of STRATCOM’s Joint Task Force — Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) and Joint Functional Component Command — Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) prior to the new command reaching full capability. In addition, Gates wrote that his memorandum “reinforces, but does not expand, USSTRATCOM authorities and responsibilities for military cyberspace operations.”

According to a brief fact sheet (Document 38), the Cyber Command is responsible for planning, coordinating, and conducting the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks.” It also, when directed, conducts “full-spectrum military cyberspace operations.” Its current headquarters organization, as depicted in an organization chart (Document 92), was released in April 2013.

Subordinate to the Cyber Command are its component commands — Army Forces Cyber Command; the 24th Air Force (a component of the Air Force Space Command); the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (Document 69), which oversees the Navy Information Operations Command; the Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group; the Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command; and the Marine Forces Cyber Command.

In June 2002, the Director of the FBI established a Cyber Division. The division is responsible for coordinating and supervising the FBI’s investigation of federal violations “in which the Internet, computer systems, or networks are exploited as the principal instruments or targets of terrorist organizations, foreign government-sponsored intelligence operations, or criminal activity, and for which the use of such systems is essential to that activity.” 13

The Department of Homeland Security established the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) in June 2003 “to serve as the national focal point for cybersecurity and to coordinate implementation of the February 2003 national cyberspace strategy (Document 16). Its mission (Document 52) is to “serve as the Federal Government’s lead in assessing, mitigating and responding to cyber risks in collaboration with Federal, State and local governments, the private sector, academia, and international partners.”

Cybersecurity White Papers

The most public aspect of U.S. activities in cyberspace centers around standard cybersecurity operations. In addition to documents such as presidential and departmental directives or strategy documents that stipulate cybersecurity goals, objectives or specific activities, there are a variety of other relevant documents.

Included are a number of “white papers” which described cybersecurity efforts. In March 2010, the White House released The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (Document 34), which described details of the initiative launched in the previous administration and provided details of a dozen different components of the effort. In February 2010, the Department of Homeland Security released a paper (Document 32) describing various cybersecurity activities — such as the operation of the EINSTEIN intrusion detection system. In July 2011 a DHS official briefed his audience (Document 52) on a variety of topics — including the department’s National Cyber Security Division, hacking activities directed at both government and private organizations, the Stuxnet worm, and the NIGHT DRAGON exploitation effort, and cybersecurity advisory activities.

Computer Network Exploitation

Computer network exploitation (CNE) has been defined (Document 22) as “enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.” Such exploitation operations can be intended to produce information about the computer systems and networks as a prelude to a network attack or as another method of gathering economic or military intelligence. 14

CNE operations are examined in a number of intelligence threat assessments, including the Defense Security Service (Document 26, Document 43, Document 63) assessments, as well as the report by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. (Document 55). As noted above, Chinese CNE operations are discussed in two reports (Document 30, Document 66) for the U.S-China review commission as well as the reports by Project 2049 (Document 79) and the Mandiant Corporation (Document 83). In addition, an Army War College paper (Document 72) also examines Chinese cyber, including CNE, capabilities.

Computer Network Attack

Computer Network Attack (CNA) has been defined (Document 22) as “operations to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. According to former NSA official William B Black Jr. (Document 11), on March 3, 1997, the Secretary of Defense officially delegated to the National Security Agency the authority to develop CNA techniques. Prior to U.S.-led airstrikes against the Qaddafi government in March 2011, the U.S. reportedly considered a cyber offensive designed to disrupt and even disable the Libyan government’s air-defense system.15

What is widely believed to be the product of a joint U.S-Israeli CNA operation was the worm Stuxnet — part of a U.S. CNA effort designated OLYMPIC GAMES.16 The worm was reported to have infected Iranian industrial control systems at the Natanz nuclear facility and damaged Iranian centrifuges. While there has been no official U.S. or Israeli confirmation of their involvement in the operation, it has been the subject of reports by the RAND Corporation (Document 42) and Congressional Research Service (Document 40) as well as the Symantec computer security corporation.

The CRS paper (Document 40), The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability, provides an overview of the worm, an exploration of possible developers and future users, a discussion of whether Iran was the intended target, as well as coverage of industrial control systems vulnerabilities and critical infrastructure, national security implications, and issues for Congress. RAND’s study, A Cyberworm that Knows No Boundaries (Document 42), explores the issues raised by the Stuxnet case, the vulnerabilities exploited, the difficulties in defending against such malware, and the problems posed by organizational and legal restrictions. It also provides a short assessment of the status of U.S. defensive capabilities and efforts required to improve those capabilities.

Symantec’s initial analysis (Document 44) provided a technical analysis of the worm, exploring the attack scenario, timeline, Stuxnet architecture, installation, load point, command and control, propagation methods, payload exports, payload resources, and other topics. A subsequent Symantec report (Document 88) stated that the company had “discovered an older version of Stuxnet that can answer questions about its evolution.”

Computer Network Defense

See Document 23.

Computer network defense is defined in the DoD Information Operations directive (Document 22) as “actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DoD information systems and computer networks.” Those actions can include counterintelligence, law enforcement, and other military capabilities. The first of these is the subject of one classified DoD directive (Document 41) — “Counterintelligence (CI) Activities in Cyberspace.” That directive makes clear that those activities include not only counterintelligence collection and support but offensive counterintelligence operations.

Techniques for computer network defense are also the subject of two Naval Postgraduate School theses. A 2003 thesis (Document 17) explores the feasibility of employing deception against cyberterrorists, where cyberterrorists are defined by two criteria – that the aim of launching unlawful attacks or threatening such attacks on computers, networks, and the information stored in them is to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in pursuit of political or social objectives, and that the activities result either in violence against persons or property or cause enough harm to generate fear.

A 2008 thesis (Document 25) examines what the author believes to be the key elements of deterrence in cyberspace – including denial, the development and demonstration of overt punishment techniques, the establishment of thresholds, and the development and articulation of national policy – and the prospects for cyber deterrence.

Audits and Evaluations

Audits and evaluations of cybersecurity and other cyberspace operations have been conducted by the GAO and the inspectors general of the Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice departments.

The inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security produced a classified report, released with redactions (Document 54), which examined the department’s capability to share cyber threat information with other federal agencies and the private sector. A subsequent classified report, also released with redactions in August 2012 (Document 75), addressed the department’s international cybersecurity program and noted areas that could be targeted for improvement — including developing a strategic implementation plan for foreign engagement and improving communications between the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team and foreign entities.

The Department of Energy’s inspector general issued a report (Document 56) in October 2011 on the department’s unclassified cybersecurity program, which examined whether that program provided sufficient protection of its data and information systems. According to the report, corrective actions for only 11 of 35 cyber security weaknesses identified in the inspector general’s 2010 report had been completed. It also reported that there was a 60 percent growth in identified weaknesses over the 2010 report. In early 2013, the department’s inspector general issued a report (Document 84) on the cybersecurity program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

The Justice Department’s inspector general produced a 2011 audit report (Document 45) on the FBI’s ability to address the national security cyber intrusion threat. It reported on the FBI’s efforts in developing and operating the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, and the ability of the FBI field offices to investigate national security cyber cases.

The GAO also produced a report (Document 47), released in May 2011, that evaluated the extent to which the Department of Defense and the U.S. Cyber Command had provided the military services with adequate guidance with respect to roles and responsibilities, command and control relationships, and mission requirements and capabilities with regard to cyberspace operations. Other GAO reports have examined continued challenges facing DoD (Document 49) and protection of critical infrastructure (Document 51, Document 62). A 2012 GAO report (Document 70) assessed the cyber threats to federal and other computer systems and vulnerabilities present in federal information systems and supporting critical infrastructure. A February 2013 report (Document 85) focused on the challenges facing the federal government in producing a strategic approach to cybersecurity.

Some GAO evaluations have focused on cybersecurity issues with respect to single components of critical U.S. infrastructure – including the electricity grid (Document 74), and pipelines (Document 76). The GAO’s report on securing the electricity grid examines cyber threats to the grid, actions taken to prevent attacks, and remaining challenges. The office’s pipeline study cybersecurity risks, U.S. pipeline security initiatives, and the adequacy of voluntary pipeline cybersecurity.

Legal Issues

The increasing attention to cyberspace issues has also been reflected in the examination of associated legal issues — both in law journals and government documents.17

In November 1999, the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense issued a second edition of An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (Document 13). The section “Application to Computer Network Attacks” (pp.16-23) concludes with a one-paragraph assessment which begins, “It is far from clear the extent to which the world community will regard computer network attacks as ‘armed attacks’ or ‘uses of force,’ and how the doctrines of self-defense and countermeasures will be applied to computer network attacks.” More recently, an Air Force instruction (Document 53) specifies the responsibilities of different Air Force components for legal reviews of weapons and cyber capabilities as well as the content of such reviews.

Legal issues have also been examined by the Congressional Research Service. In a March 2012 paper (Document 65), CRS explored Fourth Amendment, civil liberties, and privacy issues related to the protection of critical infrastructure and the sharing of cybersecurity information — as well as the possibility of conflicts between state and federal cybersecurity law. Another CRS study (Document 73) examines possible cyber-related changes to 28 different statutes.

The question of whether the U.S. Cyber Command had sufficient legal authority to carry out its mission was the catalyst for an exchange of letters (Document 68a, Document 68b, Document 68c), beginning in March 2012, between Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and General Keith B. Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency and the commander of the U.S. Cyber Command. In his initial letter McCain posed six questions, while in his second letter he notes a number of disagreements with the content of Alexander’s responses.

The Documents

Document 1: [Deleted], National Security Agency, “Computer Operating System Vulnerabilities,” Cryptolog, VI, 3 (March 1979). Unclassified.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This article, which appeared in a classified NSA journal, explores seven common computer operating system vulnerabilities, several penetration techniques, defensive measures, and future research areas.

Document 2: Robert J. Hanyok, National Security Agency, “Some Reflections on the Reality of Computer Security,” Cryptolog, IX, 6-7 (June-July 1982). Confidential.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

The author of this article argues that while computer users at NSA have been confident that the security of their systems is “ironclad and invulnerable” the reality is quite different. He then notes a number of user practices and implementation problems that make those systems vulnerable.

Document 3: [Deleted], “Computer Virus Infections: Is NSA Vulnerable?,” Cryptologic Quarterly, 4, 3 (Fall 1985). Top Secret.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This paper examines the nature of computer viruses, whether there is an algorithm to determine whether a program is infected with a virus, different classes of attack (including compromise, spoofing, and denial of service), and solutions.

Document 4: [Deleted], “A First Generation Technical Viral Defense,” Cryptologic Quarterly, 7, 2 (Summer 1988). Secret.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This paper examines a defense, involving encryption, that can be used to respond to the detection of a computer virus — and means for checking the effectiveness of the response.

Document 5: General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-89-57, Computer Security: Virus Highlights Need for Improved Internet Management, June 1989. Unclassified.

The catalyst for this report was a November 1988 computer virus that caused thousands of computers, in the United States and overseas, to shut down. The report provides details on some of the networks disrupted by the virus, the means of infection, and notes the vulnerabilities highlighted by the incident.

Document 6: General Accounting Office, GAO/T-IMTEC-92-5, Computer Security: Hackers Penetrate DOD Computer Systems, November 20, 1991. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This testimony of a GAO official concerns his division’s investigation of the attacks by Dutch hackers on Army, Navy, and Air Force computer systems — which the official characterizes as containing unclassified but sensitive information — during Operation Desert Storm/Shield. It examines how the hackers penetrated the systems, agency responses, and the need for greater attention to computer security.

Document 7: Richard Sylvester, National Security Agency, “NSA and Computer Viruses,” Cryptolog, XIX, 3 (1992). Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This one-page article reports NSA classification guidelines with respect to any discussion of computer viruses with regard to NSA systems. Classification of specific facts ranged from Unclassified to Top Secret/Handle Via Comint Channels Only.

Document 8: [Deleted], National Security Agency, “Global Network Intelligence and Information Warfare: SIGINT and INFOSEC in Cyberspace,” Cryptolog, XXI,1 (1995). Top Secret/Handle Via Comint Channels Only.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This heavily-redacted article extends beyond cyber issues, but does note that “sophisticated telecommunications and data networks … make it possible to deny and degrade a potential adversary’s command and control communications and sensitive commercial and diplomatic communications from great distances with little or no risk to life and limb.”

Document 9: [Deleted], “Out of Control,” Cryptologic Quarterly, Special Edition, 15, 1996. Secret.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This article, in another National Security Agency journal, discusses the threat to computer systems containing classified information via human intelligence operations directed at systems administrators. A largely redacted section is titled “”Foreign Intelligence Services Are Already Targeting Computer Personnel,” while the final section offers recommendations on how to address the problem.

Document 10a: Government Accounting Office, GAO/AIMD- 96-84, Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, May 22, 1996. Unclassified.

Document 10b: Jack L. Brock, General Accounting Office, GAO/T-AIMD-96-92, Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, May 22, 1996. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This report and testimony by a GAO official reports on an examination of hacker attacks on Defense Department computer systems, including a 1994 episode that involved over 150 attempts to access the computer systems of Rome Laboratory — which resulted in the theft of air tasking research data and damage to the laboratory’s air tasking order research project “beyond repair,” according to lab officials. The report and testimony also discuss the challenges faced by DoD in securing its computer systems.

Document 11: William B. Black, National Security Agency, “Thinking Out Loud About Cyberspace,” Cryptolog, XXIII, 1 (Spring 1997). Secret.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This article, by a senior NSA official, notes that NSA was assigned the mission of computer network attack in March 1997, and argues that the world was on the verge of a new age — “the information age” — and that the future of war would be warfare in cyberspace.

Document 12: William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63, Subject: Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 22, 1998. For Official Use Only/Unclassified.

Source: Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org)

The introduction to this directive notes that the military and economy of the United States are “increasingly reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information systems.” The remainder of the 18-page directive specifies the President’s intent “to assure the continuity and validity of critical infrastructures” in the face of physical or cyber threats, states a national goal, delineates a public-private partnership to reduce vulnerability, states guidelines, specifies structure and organization, discusses protection of Federal government critical infrastructures, orders a NSC subgroup to produce a schedule for the completion of a variety of tasks, and directs that an annual implementation report be produced.

Document 13: Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations, Second Edition, November 1999. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dod.gov

The introduction to this assessment notes that information operations includes information attack which, in turn, includes computer network attack. It goes on to consider the implications of a variety of domestic and international laws and treaties with regard to information operations.

Document 14: Steven A. Hildreth, Congressional Research Service, Cyberwarfare, June 19, 2001. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This report discusses the definition of cyberwarfare, and contains three case studies — including the Rome Laboratory incident (Document 8a, Document 8b) and two exercises — and, inter alia, reviews U.S policy and doctrine, organization, and legal issues. It also discusses selected foreign views and activities with regard to cyberwar.

Document 15: Michael Vatis, ESDP Discussion Paper-2002-04, Cyber Attacks: Protecting America’s Security Against Digital Threats, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2002. Not classified.

Source: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (www.beflercenter.hks.harvard.edu)

This paper, written by the first director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, examines: the range of cyber attackers (including insiders, criminal groups, virus writers, foreign intelligence services, foreign military organizations, terrorists, “hacktivists,” and recreational hackers), types of cyber attacks, the international component of cyber attacks, the federal response to cyber attacks, Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63, and the policy of the George H.W. Bush administration. Vatis also offers recommendations concerning cyber research and development, alert status during conflict, and identifying best practices related to cyber security.

Document 16: The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.us-cert.gov

This 76-page document discusses the strategy’s strategic objectives (including preventing cyber attacks against critical U.S. infrastructures), the government’s role in cyber security, the anticipated role of the Department of Homeland Security in cyber security, and five critical priorities for cyberspace security (including a national cyberspace security response system and international cooperation). A classified National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-38), with the identical title, was issued on July 7, 2004.

Document 17: Kheng Lee Gregory Tran, Naval Postgraduate School, Confronting Cyberterrorism with Cyber Deception, December 2003. Unclassified.

Source: Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School (www.nps.edu/library)

This master’s thesis examines the possibility of using deception to defeat or mitigate the damage from cyberterrorism. It examines, inter alia, the cyberterrorism threat, the values and risks of deception, nine varieties of cyber deception (including concealment, camouflage, false and planted information, ruses, and feints) and cyber defense, and the pitfalls of cyber defense.

Document 18: Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Intelligence Threat Handbook, June 2004. Unclassified.

Source: Author’s Collection

The scope of this handbook is broader than cybersecurity, but one section — Computers and the Internet — addresses the history of Internet security, threats to computer network security, roots of network vulnerability, outsider attack techniques, insider attack techniques, and countermeasures.

Document 19: Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, OIG-04-29, Progress and Challenges in Securing the Nation’s Cyberspace, July 2004. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This document reports on the inspector general’s evaluation of the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to implement The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Document 14). It notes “major accomplishments” — including the creation of a Computer Emergency Readiness Team, creation of the National Cyber Alert System, and sponsorship of the National Cyber Security Summit. It also notes “a number of challenges to address long-term cyber threats and vulnerabilities” — including the DHS National Cybersecurity Division’s need to prioritize its initiatives, identify resources required to carry out its mission, and develop strategic implementation plans.

Document 20: President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee, Report to the President, Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization, February 2005. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.nitrd.gov/pitac/reports

The two main chapters of this report, prior to the concluding chapter, address the importance of cyber security and examine federal cyber security research and development efforts. In its concluding chapter the committee states its findings and recommendations with regard to federal funding for fundamental research in civilian cyber security, the cyber security research community, technology transfer efforts, and the coordination and oversight of federal cyber security research and development.

Document 21: Donald Rumsfeld, to Steve Cambone, Subject: Cyber Attack Issue, November 04, 2005, Unclassified/FOUO .

Source: http://www.rumsfeld.com

In this “snowflake” directed to his under secretary for intelligence, Rumsfeld suggests that Cambone consider establishing a group to review organization, budgeting, and presentation issues with regard to cyber attacks.

Document 22: Department of Directive O-3600.01, Subject: Information Operations, August 14, 2006. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Release

This directive states Department of Defense policy and responsibilities with regard to information operations (defined as the integrated deployment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security). Among those whose responsibilities are identified is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration.

Document 23: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, December 2006. Secret.

Source: Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Release.

This strategy document was issued to provide guidelines to the Defense Department — including military service organizations, the unified commands, and DoD components (including agencies, field activities and other entities) — with regard to planning, executing, and allocating resources for cyberspace operations. Its main chapters focus on the strategic context, threats and vulnerabilities, strategic considerations, the military strategic framework, and implementation and assessment. Several enclosures address topics such as examples of threats and threat actors, examples of vulnerabilities, and strategic priorities and outcomes.

Document 24: John Rollins and Clay Wilson, Congressional Research Service, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues, January 22, 2007. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This study examines possible terrorists’ objectives in conducting cyberattacks, computer vulnerabilities that might make cyberattack against the U.S. homeland’s critical infrastructure viable, and emerging computer and technical skills of terrorists. It also examines the cybersecurity efforts of several government agencies, changing concerns about cyberattack, and a number of additional issues concerning terrorist or criminal cyber activities.

Document 25: Ryan J. Moore, Naval Postgraduate School, Prospects for Cyber Deterrence, December 2008. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.nps.edu/library

The author of this thesis argues that with “more sectors of critical national infrastructure [being] interconnected in cyberspace,” the risk to national security from cyberattack “has increased dramatically.” He explores the fundamentals of strategic deterrence, the evolving cyber threat, deterrence strategy in cyberspace, and the prospects for cyber deterrence.

Document 26: Defense Security Service, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry, 2009. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dss.mil

This assessment of foreign attempts to illicitly acquire U.S. technologies concerns a variety of techniques, including “suspicious internet activity” — which includes, but is not limited to “confirmed intrusion, attempted intrusion, [and] computer network attack.”

Document 27: Major William C. Ashmore, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff, Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks, 2009. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/fr/fulltext/u2/a504991.pdf

This monograph was written to examine the implications of alleged Russian cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia for the Russian Federation, former Soviet satellites, and international organizations.

Document 28: The White House, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, May 8, 2009. Unclassified.

Source: The White House (www.whitehouse.gov)

This paper reports the results of a presidentially-directed 60-day comprehensive review to evaluate U.S. policies and organizational structures related to cybersecurity. The review produced seven main conclusions which included: “The Nation is at a crossroads,” “The status quo is no longer acceptable,” “The United States cannot succeed in securing cyberspace if it works in isolation,” and “The Federal government cannot entirely delegate or abrogate its role in securing the Nation from a cyber incident or accident.”

Document 29: Robert M. Gates, Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: Establishment of a Subordinate Unified U.S. Cyber Command Under U.S. Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations, June 23, 2009. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dod.gov

This memo from the Secretary of Defense directs the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command to establish a U.S. Cyber Command and that the command reach an initial operating capability by October 2009 and a full operating capability by October 2010. It also informs the recipients of the Secretary’s plan to recommend to the president that the National Security Agency director also become commander of the Cyber Command.

Document 30: Bryan Krekel, Northrop Grumman, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation, October 9, 2009. Unclassified .

Source: Air University (www.au.af.mil)

This study, prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, focuses largely on Chinese computer network exploitation (CNE) as a strategic intelligence collection tool. It examines Chinese CNE operations strategy and operations during conflict, key entities in Chinese computer network operations, cyber-espionage, an operational profile of an advanced cyber intrusion, and a chronology of alleged Chinese computer network exploitation events.

Document 31: Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 5205.13, Subject: Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security/Information Assurance (CS/IA) Activities, January 29, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520513p.pdf

This Defense Department instruction states policy, establishes responsibilities, and delegates authority with regard to the protection of unclassified DoD information that passes through or resides on unclassified Defense Industrial Base information systems and networks.

Document 32: Department of Homeland Security, Computer Network Security & Privacy Protection, February 19, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This white paper describes the Department of Homeland Security’s computer network security activities, which includes the operation of the EINSTEIN intrusion detection systems — including the systems collection methods and the implications for privacy protection. It also discusses topics such as oversight and compliance, the role of the National Security Agency, and future program development.

Document 33: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-8, The United States Army’s Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan, 2016-2028, February 22, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This pamphlet explores how “the Army’s future force in 2016-2028 will leverage cyberspace and CyberOps” and how CyberOps (which is specified to consist of four components — cyberwarfare, cyber network operations, cyber support, and cyber situational awareness) will be integrated into full spectrum operations.

Document 34: The White House, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, March 2, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

The release of this document by the Obama White House revealed details of the cybersecurity initiative launched during the previous administration. It provides basic details of twelve different components of the initiative — which include intrusion detection and prevention systems across the federal government, coordination and redirection of research and development efforts, enhancing situational awareness, increasing the security of classified networks, developing enduring deterrence strategies, and defining the role of the federal government for extending cybersecurity into critical infrastructure domains.

Document 35: Keith Alexander, Director, National Security Agency, Advanced Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA Nominee for Commander, United States Cyber Command, April15, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This 32-page documents consists of 28 questions (some with multiple parts) posed to, and answered by, General Alexander in advance of his appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee with respect to his nomination to head the newly formed U.S. Cyber Command.

Document 36: Department of Energy, DOE P 205.1, Subject: Departmental Cyber Security Management Policy, September 23, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.energy.gov

This Department of Energy policy directive covers the six components of the department’s cyber security management policy — its objectives, guiding principles, core functions, mechanisms, responsibilities, and implementation.

Document 37: Janet Napolitano and Robert Gates (signators), Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense Regarding Cybersecurity, September 27, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

The purpose of the agreement, signed by the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense, is specified as establishing the terms by which the two departments “will provide personnel, equipment, and facilities” in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration in strategic planning as well as operational activities concerning cybersecurity.

Document 38: Department of Defense, Cyber Command Fact Sheet, October 13, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dod.gov

This fact sheet provides basic information about the U.S. Cyber Command — including its mission, focus, and components.

Document 39: JASON, JSR-10-102, Science of Cyber-Security, November 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This report, by the Defense Department’s JASON scientific advisory group, was a response to the department’s request that the group examine whether there were underlying fundamental principles that would make it possible to adopt a more scientific approach to the issue of cybersecurity. The sciences they examine for possible guidance are economics, meteorology, medicine, astronomy, and agriculture.

Document 40: Paul K. Kerr, John Rollins, and Catherine A. Theohary, Congressional Research Service, The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbringer of an Emerging Warfare Capability, December 9, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This short paper provides an overview of the Stuxnet worm, an exploration of possible developers and future users, a discussion of whether Iran was the intended target, as well as industrial control systems vulnerabilities and critical infrastructure, national security implications, and issues for Congress.

Document 41: Department of Defense, DoD Instruction S-5240.23, Subject: Counterintelligence (CI) Activities in Cyberspace, December 13, 2010. Secret.

Source: Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Release.

According to this instruction, DoD counterintelligence activities in cyberspace are to be directed against foreign intelligence services and international terrorist organizations. The two key portions of the instruction define the responsibilities of DoD components and establish procedures for counterintelligence activities. While much of the segment concerning procedures is redacted in the declassified version, the table of contents indicates three different types of CI-related activities in cyberspace: counterintelligence support, counterintelligence collection, and offensive counterintelligence operations (OFCO).

Document 42: Isaac R. Porsche III, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Shawn McKay, RAND Corporation, A Cyberworm that Knows no Boundaries, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.rand.org

The catalyst for this paper were the reports of the Stuxnet worm (Document 40). It explores issues raised by “sophisticated yet virulent malware” — including the nature of the threats, the vulnerabilities exploited and the difficulties in defending against Stuxnet-type worms, and the problems posed by organizational and legal restrictions. It also provides a short assessment of the status of U.S. defensive capabilities and efforts required to improve those capabilities.

Document 43: Defense Security Service, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dss.mil

This report updates the Defense Security Service’s 2009 assessment of foreign attempts to illicitly acquire U.S. technologies, and concerns a variety of techniques, including “suspicious internet activity.” It notes a high level of suspicious network activity “in the form of cyber intrusion attempts directed at cleared contractor networks.”

Document 44: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien, Symantec, W 32. Stuxnet Dossier, Version 1.4, February 2011. Not classified.

Source: http://www.symantec.com

This study, prepared by the Symantec computer security firm, provides a technical analysis of the Stuxnet malware — exploring the attack scenario, timeline, Stuxnet architecture, installation, load point, command and control, propagation methods, payload exports, payload resources and other topics.

Document 45: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, Audit Report 11-22, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Ability to Address the National Security Cyber Intrusion Threat , April 2011. Secret.

Source: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a1122r.pdf

The audit which is the subject of this report was conducted to evaluate the FBI’s efforts in developing and operating the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force in response to the national security cyber threat, and assess the FBI field offices’ capabilities to investigate national security cyber cases.

Document 46: The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, May 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

This policy document discusses the process of building U.S. cyberspace policy, the future of cyberspace (including the preferences of the U.S. and its role in achieving its preferred outcomes), and U.S. policy priorities (with regard to economic issues, network protection, law enforcement, and several additional issues). It concludes with a discussion of U.S. implementation of its strategy.

Document 47: Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-421, Defense Department Cyber Efforts: More Detailed Guidance Needed to Ensure Military Services Develop Appropriate Cyberspace Capabilities, May 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This study was conducted to determine the extent to which the Defense Department and U.S. Cyber Command had provided the military services with adequate guidance with respect to roles and responsibilities, command and control relationships, and mission requirements and capabilities with regard to cyberspace operations.

Document 48: Department of Energy, DOE O 205.1B, Subject: Department of Energy Cyber Security Program, May 16, 2011. Unclassified .

Source: http://www.energy.gov

This Energy department order states requirements for the department’s Cyber Security Program, which requires a risk management approach. It also specifies the responsibilities of over a dozen department components or officers in formulating and implementing the program.

Document 49: Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-75, Department of Defense Cyber Efforts: DOD Faces Challenges In Its Cyber Activities, July 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This is an unclassified version of a previously classified report. It examines DoD’s organization for addressing cybersecurity threats as well as assessing the extent to which the Defense Department had developed a joint doctrine for cyberspace operations, assigned command and control responsibilities, and identified and addressed key capability gaps involving cyberspace operations.

Document 50: Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011. Unclassified .

Source: http://www.defense.gov

The core of this strategy document is the discussion of five strategic initiatives with regard to DoD operations in cyberspace — treating cyberspace as an operational domain with regard to organization, training, and equipment; employing new defense operations concepts to protect DoD networks and systems; collaboration with other U.S. government departments and the private sector; cooperation with U.S. allies and international partners; and leveraging “the nation’s ingenuity” through the cyber work force and technological innovation.

Document 51: Gregory C. Wilshusen, Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-865T, Cybersecurity: Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our Nation’s Critical Infrastructure, July 26, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

The focus of this study is the federal role in enhancing cybersecurity related to the private sector’s operation of critical infrastructure. It describes cyber threats facing cyber-reliant critical infrastructures; discusses recent federal government actions, taken in cooperation with the private sector, to identify and protect such infrastructures; and identifies challenges to the protection of those infrastructures.

Document 52: Bradford Willke, Department of Homeland Security, Moving Toward Cyber Resilience, July 27, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: Pubic Intelligence (http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-CyberResilience.pdf)

This briefing covers a number of topics, including the origins, organization, and mission of the DHS National Cyber Security Division, hacking activities directed at a number of government and private entities (the CIA, Booz Allen Hamilton, Lockheed Martin), the Stuxnet worm, an effort designated Night Dragon that involved cyber-theft of sensitive information from international oil and energy companies, and cyber security advisory activities.

Document 53: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 51-402, Legal Reviews of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities, July 27, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This instruction focuses on the responsibilities of different Air Force components for legal reviews of weapons and cyber capabilities, as well as the contents of such reviews.

Document 54: Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Capability to Share Cyber Threat Information (Redacted), September 2011, Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

The Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act required the inspectors general of the Intelligence Community and DHS to provide Congress with an assessment of how cyber threat information is being shared among federal agencies and the private sector, the means used to share classified cyber threat information, and the effectiveness of the sharing and distribution of cyber threat information. In addition to providing such an assessment, the Inspector General made three recommendations to DHS.

Document 55: National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011 , October 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.ncix.gov

This report, produced by a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, consists of three major sections. One is the vulnerability of U.S. technologies and trade secrets to cyberspace operations and the appeal of cyberspace collection. Another examines the threat from specific collectors, including Russia, China, and U.S. partners. The third provides an outlook for the future, divided between sections on “near certainties” and “possible game changers.”

Document 56: Office of Inspector General, Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0856, Evaluation Report: The Department’s Unclassified Cyber Security Program – 2011, October 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 required an independent evaluation to determine whether the Department of Energy’s unclassified cyber security program adequately protected its data and information systems. According to the report, corrective actions for only 11 of 35 cybersecurity weaknesses identified in the inspector general’s 2010 report had been completed. In addition, there was a 60 percent growth in identified weakness over the 2010 report.

Document 57: Department of Homeland Security, Preventing and Defending Against Cyber Attacks, October 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This DHS paper focuses on the department’s efforts in assisting federal executive branch civilian departments with securing their unclassified computer networks. It reports on the department’s efforts with respect to cybersecurity coordination and research, cybersecurity initiatives and exercises, the promotion of public awareness of cybersecurity, cybersecurity workforce development, and privacy and civil liberties issues.

Document 58: Department of Homeland Security, Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future: The Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security Enterprise, November 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This blueprint contains two main components. It lists four cybersecurity goals (reducing exposure to cyber risk, ensuring priority response and recovery, maintaining shared situational awareness, and increasing resilience) — to be attained through nine objectives. Secondly, it specifies four goals for strengthening the cyber system (to be attained via eleven objectives).

Document 59: Department of Defense, Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934 , November 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dod.gov

This 14-page document describes the legal and policy issues associated with cyberspace, reports on decisions of the secretary of defense, and notes that there are no plans to update the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (Document 23) but that the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Document 50) would provide strategy guidance. In addition, it describes the use and application of cyber modeling and simulation.

Document 60: United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, November 30, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.e-publishing/af.mil

This document examines cyberspace fundamentals (including U.S. national policy and the challenges of cyberspace operations); command and organization (including a description of U.S. cyberspace organizations as well as command and control of cyberspace operations); and the design, planning, execution, and assessment of cyberspace operations.

Document 61: National Science and Technology Council, Executive Office of the President, Trustworthy Cyberspace: Strategic Plan for the Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development Program, December 2011. Unclassified .

Source: http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov

This plan specifies four interconnected priorities for U.S. government agencies that conduct or sponsor research and development in cybersecurity. The priorities are organized along four lines: inducing change, developing scientific foundations, accelerating transition to practice, and maximizing research impact.

Document 62: Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-92, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity Guidance Is Available but More Can Be Done to Promote Its Use, December 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This GAO report examines the use of cybersecurity guidance in seven critical infrastructure sectors (including banking and finance, energy, and nuclear reactors) from national and international organizations. It reports that while such guidance is being employed, sector officials do not believe it is comprehensive, and DHS and other sector-specific agencies have not identified key cybersecurity guidance applicable to each of their critical infrastructure sectors.

Document 63: Defense Security Service, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dss.mil

The main focus of this report, by the Pentagon’s Defense Security Service, is not cybersecurity but the attempts to gather information on U.S. technologies — by whatever method. However, as did previous DSS reports (Document 26, Document 43), it does discuss “suspicious network activity” (SNA) as one acquisition method. It notes that SNA is “the most prevalent collection method for entities originating from East Asia and the Pacific,” although it is no higher than fifth with regard to collection methods associated with other regions.

Document 64: 624th Operations Center, Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Division, Air Force Space Command, Cyber Threat Bulletin, 2012 Top Ten Cyber Threats, January 9, 2012. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: http://www.publicintelligence.net

This bulletin passes along the conclusions of the McAfee computer security firm concerning the top 10 cyber threats for the coming year. The top five are attacking mobile devices, embedded hardware, “legalized” spam, industrial attacks, and hacktivism.

Document 65: Mark Mateski, Cassandra M. Trevino, Cynthia K. Veitch, John Michalski, J. Mark Harris, Scott Maruoka, and Jason Frye, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND 2012-2427, Cyber Threat Metrics, March 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This report was prepared in support of the DHS cyber-risk and vulnerability assessment program intended to aid federal civilian executive branch agencies. It reviews alternative cyber threat metrics and models that might be employed in any operational threat assessment.

Document 66: Bryan Krekel, Patton Adams, George Bakos, Northrup Grumman, Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Espionage and Cyber Espionage, March 7, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.uscc.gov

This report, prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, focuses on six topics: information warfare strategy, Chinese use of network warfare against the United States, key entities and institutions supporting Chinese computer network operations (the Third and Fourth Departments of the Peoples Liberation Army’s General Staff Department), potential risks to the U.S. telecommunications supply chain, the comparison between criminal and state-sponsored network exploitation, and the risks and reality of collaboration between U.S. and Chinese information security firms.

Document 67: Edward C. Liu, Gina Stevens, Kathleen Ann Ruane, Alissa M. Dolan, and Richard M. Thompson II, Congressional Research Service, Cybersecurity: Selected Legal Issues, March 14, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

The authors of this report address legal issues related to the protection of critical infrastructure, the protection of federal networks (including Fourth Amendment as well as civil liberties and privacy issues), and the sharing of cybersecurity information. In addition, the authors explore the possibility of federal cybersecurity law preempting state law.

Document 68a: John McCain to General Keith B. Alexander, Letter, March 29, 2012. Unclassified.

Document 68b: Keith B. Alexander, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command to The Honorable John McCain, May 3, 2012. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Document 68c: John McCain to General Keith B. Alexander, May 9, 2012. Unclassified.

Sources: http://www.washingtonpost.com, http://www.federalnewsradio.com, http://blog.zwillgencom

This series of letters begins with Senator John McCain (R-Az.) writing to Cyber Command chief Keith Alexander concerning the issue of whether the U.S. government needs additional authorities to deter and defend against cyber attacks. Alexander’s May 3 letter contains responses to the six questions posed by McCain in his March 29 letter. In turn, McCain’s May 9 letter notes a number of disagreements with the content of Alexander’s responses.

Document 69: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction 5450.345, Subj: Mission, Functions, and Tasks for Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command and Commander, U.S. Tenth Fleet, April 4, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives

This instruction specifies the authorities and missions of the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, as well as the relationship between the commander, Fleet Cyber Command, and the commander, U.S. Tenth Fleet. It also specifies a number of Navy entities under the administrative control of the Fleet Cyber Command — including the Navy Information Operations Command (which conducts signals intelligence operations), the Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group, and the Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command.

Document 70: Gregory C. Wilshusen, Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-666T, Cybersecurity: Threats Impacting the Nation, April 24, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This report describes GAO’s assessment of cyber threats posed to federal and other computer systems, and vulnerabilities present in federal information systems and supporting critical infrastructure. It also describes reported cyber incidents and their impacts. It characterizes the number of cybersecurity incidents reported by federal agencies as rising and that “recent incidents illustrate that these pose serious risk.”

Document 71a: Pat Meehan, Statement to Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, “Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” April 26, 2012. Unclassified.

Document 71b: Dan Lungren, Statement to Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, “Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” April 26, 2012. Unclassified.

Document 71c: Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, Statement to Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, “The Iranian Cyber Threat to the United States,” April 26, 2012.

Document 71d: Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council, Statement to Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, “The Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” April 26, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://homeland.house.gov

Substantial attention has been devoted to Chinese cyberwarfare activities in the reports of private and government organizations as well as in Congressional hearings. While Iranian cyber activities were noted in the 2012 testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who characterized them as “dramatically increasing in recent years in depth and complexity,” they have received less attention that those of the People’s Republic of China. These hearings, before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Homeland Security, involve assessments of the Iranian cyber threat by two Congressmen and representatives of two private organizations.

Document 72: Colonel Jayson M. Spade, U.S. Army War College, Information as Power: China’s Cyber Power and America’s National Security, May 2012. Unclassified.

Source: U.S. Army War College (www.carlisle.army.mil)

This research paper examines the growth of Chinese cyber capabilities — including those for offensive, defensive, and computer network exploitation operations. It also compares China’s capacity and potential in cyberspace to United States efforts with regard to cybersecurity. In addition, the author suggests a number of steps to improve U.S. cybersecurity policy.

Document 73: Eric A. Fischer, Congressional Research Service, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions, June 29, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This analysis contains an introduction reviewing the then-current legislative framework on cybersecurity, executive branch actions, and legislative proposals. It then discusses proposed cybersecurity-related revisions to 28 different statutes — from the Posse Comitatus Act of 1879 to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

Document 74: Gregory C. Wilshusen, Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-962T, Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Electricity Grid, July 17, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This testimony, by a GAO official, concerns cyber threats to critical infrastructure — including the electricity grid — as well as actions taken to prevent cyber attacks on the grid and challenges that remain. Mr. Wilshusen notes the actions taken by a number of entities (including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), and identifies challenges such as a focus by utilities on regulatory compliance instead of comprehensive security and the lack of electricity metrics for evaluating cybersecurity.

Document 75: Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, OIG-12-112, DHS Can Strengthen Its International Cybersecurity Program (Redacted) , August 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This is an unclassified version of a DHS inspector general report. In addition to reviewing actions taken to establish relationships with international cybersecurity entities, the report notes four areas that could be targeted for improvement — developing a strategic implementation plan for foreign engagement, streamlining the National Programs and Protection Directorate’s (NPPD) international affairs program and processes, improving communication between the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team and foreign entities, and strengthening NPPD information sharing capabilities.

Document 76: Paul W. Parfomak, Congressional Research Service, Pipeline Cybersecurity: Federal Policy, August 16, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

As a means of aiding Congressional consideration of possible measures to enhance pipeline security, this report examines pipeline security risks (including general security threats, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) security risks, and cyber threats to U.S. pipelines), U.S. pipeline security initiatives, and the adequacy of voluntary pipeline cybersecurity.

Document 77: Brian McKeon, Executive Secretary, National Security Staff, The White House, Memorandum, Subject: Papers Deputies Committee Meeting on Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Practices, September 28, 2012 w/atts: Discussion Paper for Deputies Committee Meeting on Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Practices; Draft Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Practices. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.lawfareblog.com

In the face of Congressional rejection of the Administration’s proposed cybersecurity legislation, work began on producing an executive order intended to accomplish the desired objectives. The first attachment (Tab A) to the covering memo discusses the key components of the cybersecurity legislation as well as how the executive order relies on current agency authorities to accomplish those objectives. The second attachment is a draft of the executive order.

Document 78: Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense, “Defending the Nation from Cyber Attack,” Speech to Business Executives for National Security, October 11, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.defense.gov

In this speech, Secretary Panetta warns of the possibility of a “cyber Pearl Harbor” — which could involve the derailing of passenger trains, contamination of the water supply in major cities, or the shutdown of the power grid across large parts of the country.

Document 79: Mark A. Stokes and L.C. Russell Hsiao, Project 2049 Institute, Countering Chinese Cyber Operations: Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Interests, October 29, 2012. Not classified.

Source: http://project2049.net

This report, by a private organization, examines the role of several Chinese organizations — including the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department, its Second Bureau, and its Beijing North Computing Center — in cyber operations. It also explores a number of possible reactions — including deception, an international code of conduct, an Asian cyber defense alliance, and what the report terms a “forceful response.”

Document 80: Richard Colbaugh and Kristin Glass, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND2012-10177, Proactive Defense for Evolving Cyber Threats, November 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This technical/mathematical analysis seeks to characterize “the predictability of attack/defender coevolution” — which is then used to create a framework for designing proactive defenses for large networks.

Document 81: Defense Science Board, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat, January 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.acq.osd.mil/reports

This report (consisting of eleven chapters and six appendices) examines and evaluates the Defense Department’s defensive and offensive cyber operations. It concludes that DoD cyber security practices “have not kept up” with the tactics of cyber adversaries. It characterizes the threat as “serious” and “insidious” and objects that current Defense Department actions are “fragmented,” intelligence against targeting of DoD systems is “inadequate,” and that “with present capabilities and technology it is not possible to defend with confidence against the most sophisticated cyber attacks.”

Document 82: The White House, Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, February 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.publicintelligence.net

This document describes the administration strategy on mitigating the theft of U.S. trade secrets — including those stolen through cyber operations. It describes four action items — involving diplomatic efforts, promoting voluntary practices by private industry, enhancing domestic law enforcement operations, improving domestic legislation, and promoting public awareness.

Document 83: Mandiant, APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, February 2013. Not classified.

Source: http://www.mandiant.com

As a result of its investigation into computer security breaches around the world, Mandiant identified 20 groups designated Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. The focus of this report is APT 1 — which the report concludes is the People Liberation Army’s Unit 61398 — the military unit cover designator for the 2nd Bureau of the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department (also discussed in Document 79). The key elements of the report are the discussions of tasking to the unit, its past espionage operations, attack lifecycle, and the unit’s infrastructure and personnel.

Document 84: Office of Inspector General, Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0880, Audit Report, Management of Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Cyber Security Program, February 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.energy.gov

Based on its audit of the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL) cyber security practices, the DoE inspector general observes that “LANL had made significant improvements to its cybersecurity program in recent years,” but that there were continuing concerns for several reasons – including a failure to address the full set of “critical and high-risk vulnerabilities.” The inspector general also makes three recommendations to improve LANL cybersecurity.

Document 85: Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-187, Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively Implemented, February 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This study reports a 782-percent increase in cybersecurity incidents between 2006 and 2012. It examines the challenges facing the federal government in producing a strategic approach to cybersecurity and the degree to which the “national cybersecurity strategy adheres to desirable characteristics for such a strategy.”

Document 86: The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, Subject: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, February 12, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

This directive states basic U.S. policy with regard to the protection and recovery of critical infrastructure from both physical and cyber attacks. The key components are its delineation of roles and responsibilities of officials and agencies, its identification of three strategic imperatives, and its direction to the Secretary of Homeland Security on steps to implement the directive.

Document 87: The White House, Executive Order – Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, February 12, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: Federal Register, 78, 33 (February 19, 2013)

In contrast to PPD-21 (Document 86) this executive order focuses solely on critical infrastructure cybersecurity. It address cybersecurity information sharing, a framework to reduce cyber risk to critical infrastructure, and the identification of critical infrastructure at greatest risk.

Document 88: Geoff McDonald, Liam O. Murchu, Stephen Doherty, and Eric Chien, Symantec Corporation, Stuxnet 0.5: The Missing Link, February 26, 2013. Not classified.

Source: http://www.symantec.com

This analysis follows up on Symantec’s earlier examination of the Stuxnet worm (Document 44, also see Document 40). It reports that Symantec “discovered an older version of Stuxent that can answer the questions about [its] evolution.”

Document 89: Eric A. Fischer, Edward C. Liu, John Rollins, and Catherine A. Theohary, Congressional Research Service, The 2013 Cybersecurity Executive Order: Overview and Considerations for Congress, March 1, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This paper identifies a number of types of individuals or groups that are considered threats to cybersecurity. It also provides an overview of President Obama’s executive order (Document 87), considers the question of the scope of presidential authority, and examines the relationship between the executive order and legislative proposals.

Document 90: James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Statement for the Record to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dni.gov

In his annual worldwide threat assessment, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper begins with a discussion of global threats, and his discussion of global threat with an examination of the cyber threat. Specific topics addressed include the risk to U.S. critical infrastructure, the impact on U.S. economic and national security, information control and internet governance, and the activities of hacktivists and cybercrimnals.

Document 91: General Keith Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command, Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 12, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.armed-services-senate.gov

In this statement, Alexander describes the organization and personnel strength of the Cyber Command, the strategic landscape, the command’s priorities, and plans for the future.

Document 92: U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Cyber Command Organization Chart, n.d., Unclassified.

Source: U.S. Strategic Command Freedom of Information Act Release

This chart depicts the headquarters organizational structure of U.S. Cyber Command as of April 2013.

NOTES

1. Leon Panetta, Address to Business Executives for National Security, “Defending the Nation from Cyber Attack,” October 11, 2012, http://www.defense.gov; Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address,” February 12, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov; James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, March 12, 2013, pp. 1-3, http://www.dni.gov; “Senate Armed Services Committee Gets Grim Briefing on Cyber Threats,” March 20, 2013, http://www.matthewaid.com.

2. See Ted Lewis, “Cyber Insecurity: Black Swan or Headline?,” Homeland Security Watch (www.hlswatch.com), February 8, 2013; Ryan Singel, “Richard Clarke’s Cyberware: File Under Fiction, http://www.wired.com, April 22, 2010; John Arquilla, “Panetta’s Wrong About a Cyber ‘Pearl Harbor’, http://www.foreignpolicy.com, November 19, 2012; Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins, “Loving the Cyber Bomb?: The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” Homeland National Security Journal, Vol. 3, 2011, pp. 39-83; Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 35, 1 (February 2012), pp. 5-32; Ronald Bailey, “Cyberwar Is Harder Than It Looks,” Reason, May 2011, pp. 50-51.

3. Steven A. Hildreth, Congressional Research Service, Cyberwarfare , June 19, 2001, p. CRS-4

4. John Rollins and Clay Wilson, Congressional Research Service, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues , January 22, 2007,pp. CRS-16-17.

5. Major William C. Ashmore, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks , 2009, pp. 11-14.

6. McAfee, Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”, February 10, 2011; “Three Saudis Sent to Prison for Stealing Info From Aramco Computer Systems,” http://www.matthewaid.com,March 19, 2013; Ellen Nakashima, “Iran blamed for cyberattacks on U.S. banks and companies,”www.washingtonpost.com, September 21, 2012.

7. Michael Vatis, Cyber Atttacks: Protecting America’s Security against Digital Threats,” ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2002-04, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2002, p. 15, n.42.

8. Ted Bridis, “‘Silent Horizon’ war games wrap up for the CI A,” http://www.usatoday.com,May 26,2005

9. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations , December 2006, p. C-2.

10. James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , January 31, 2012, p. 8.

11. “National Security Presidential Directives [NSPD] George W. Bush Administration,”www.fas.org, accessed March 30, 2013.

12. “Sean Kanuck – National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” http://www.security-innovation.org/bios, accessed April 5, 2013; Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2011), pp. 23, 29;”The Information Operations Center Analysis Group (IOC/AG),” http://www.cia.gov, accessed April7, 2013; John Rollins and Clay Wilson, Congressional Research Service, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues, January 22, 2007, p. CRS-8.

13. Jana D. Monroe, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Testimony before House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property,” June 17, 2002,www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbis-cyber-division; “Cyber Division,” http://www.fbigovs.gov/311132.asp, accessed March 31, 2013.

14. A computer virus designated FLAME has been reported to have been designed to gather information needed for the U.S. and Israel to employ the Stuxnet worm. See Ellen Nakishima, Greg Miller, and Julie Tate, “U.S., Israel developed Flame computer virus to slow Iranian nuclear efforts, officials say,” http://www.washingtonpostcom, June 19, 2012; Kim Zetter, “Meet ‘Flame,’ The Massive Spy Malware Infiltrating Iranian Computers,” http://www.wired.com, May 28, 2012.

15. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Weighed Use of Cyberattacks To Weaken Libya,” New York Times, October 18, 2011, pp. A1, A7.

16. David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown, 2012), pp. 188-225; Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady, Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry (New York: Wiley, 2013), pp. 261-279.

17. Some law review articles include David E. Graham, “Cyber Threats and the Law of War,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy , 4, 2010, pp. 87-102; Matthew C. Waxman, “Cyber-Attack and the Use of Force: Back to the Future, Article 2(4),” Yale Journal of International Law, 36, 2011, pp. 421-459; Eric Talbot Jensen, “Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure,” Stanford Journal of International Law, 38, 2002, pp. 207-240.

SECRECY NEWS – INTELLIGENCE SATELLITE IMAGERY DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE

An enormous volume of photographic imagery from the KH-9 HEXAGON
intelligence satellites was quietly declassified in January and will be
transferred to the National Archives later this year for subsequent public
release.

The KH-9 satellites operated between 1971 and 1984. The imagery they
generated should be of historical interest with respect to a wide range of
late Cold War intelligence targets but is also expected to support current
scientific research on climate change and related fields of inquiry.

The film-based KH-9 satellites were officially declared “obsolete” by the
Director of National Intelligence in 2011. The KH-9 imagery was nominally
approved for declassification in February 2012, and then it was finally
declassified in fact this year.

ODNI spokesman Michael Birmingham said that approximately 97 percent of
the satellite imagery that was collected from the 19 successful KH-9
missions was formally declassified by DNI James R. Clapper on January 11,
2013.

“The small amount of imagery exempted from this declassification decision
will be removed prior to its accession to the National Archives (NARA) and
will remain classified pursuant to statute and national security interests,
and reviewed periodically to determine if additional declassification is
warranted,” Mr. Birmingham said last week.

The imagery is being transferred to NARA in stages, with final delivery
scheduled for September 2013, he said.

The transfer is being implemented pursuant to a November 2012 Memorandum
of Agreement between the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and
the National Archives, under which the Archives is “responsible for
providing public access to the declassified imagery.”

Click to access kh9-moa.pdf

Reishia R. Kelsey of NGA public affairs confirmed that the imagery “will
be made available to the public following its accession to NARA” later this
year.

The National Archives was not prepared last week to set a precise date for
public release. But an Archives official said that “NARA intends to make
these records available to the public at our research room in College Park,
MD as soon as possible following transfer.”

If successfully executed, the release of the KH-9 imagery will constitute
a breakthrough in the declassification and disclosure of national security
information. It will be one of several discrete but momentous shifts in
secrecy policy during the Obama Administration that have often gone
unrecognized or unappreciated. Though these declassification actions took
years or decades to accomplish, they have been downplayed by the White
House itself, which has seemed curiously ambivalent about them. They
include the public disclosure of the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons
arsenal, the routine publication of the annual intelligence budget request,
the release of the Office of Legal Counsel “torture memos,” the
declassification of the KH-9 satellite itself, and others.

The KH-9 imagery is being processed for public release pursuant to the
1995 Executive Order 12951 on “Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-based
National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems.” That order had been
effectively dormant since the Clinton Administration, when the last major
release of intelligence satellite imagery (from the CORONA, ARGON and
LANYARD missions) took place.

The declassification of the KH-9 imagery is a massive undertaking, Mr.
Birmingham of ODNI said last year.

“For context, and to grasp the scope of the project, the KH-9/HEXAGON
system provided coverage over hundreds of millions of square miles of
territory during its 19 successful missions spanning 1971-1984,” he said.
“It is a daunting issue to address declassification of the program
specifics associated with an obsolete system such as the KH-9, which
involves the declassification of huge volumes of intelligence information
gathered on thousands of targets worldwide during a 13 year time period.”

http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2012/10/hexagon_imagery/

MILITARY PHOTOGRAPHERS READY TO DEPLOY AROUND THE GLOBE

Just as law enforcement relied upon surveillance cameras and personal
photography to enable the prompt identification of the perpetrators of the
Boston Marathon bombing, U.S. armed forces increasingly look to the
collection of still and motion imagery to support military operations.

Combat camera (COMCAM) capabilities support “operational planning, public
affairs, information operations, mission assessment, forensic, legal,
intelligence and other requirements during crises, contingencies, and
exercises around the globe,” according to newly updated military doctrine.

COMCAM personnel are “highly trained visual information professionals
prepared to deploy to the most austere operational environments at a
moment’s notice.”

COMCAM units “are adaptive and provide fully qualified and equipped
personnel to support sustained day or night operations” in-flight, on the
ground or undersea, as needed.

“Effectively employed COMCAM assets at the tactical level can potentially
achieve national, theater strategic, and operational level objectives in a
manner that lessens the requirement for combat in many situations,” the new
doctrine says. “Their products can counter adversary misinformation,
disinformation, and propaganda and help commanders gain situational
awareness on operations in a way written or verbal reports cannot.”

“The products can also provide historical documentation, public
information, or an evidentiary foundation… for forensic documentation of
evidence and legal proceedings. They can provide intelligence documentation
to include imagery for facial recognition and key leader engagements, and
support special reconnaissance.”

The newly issued COMCAM doctrine supersedes previous guidance from 2007.
See Combat Camera: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Combat Camera (COMCAM) Operations, April 2013.

Click to access atp3-55-12.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
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_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web: http://www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
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Cryptome unveils – NSA Thinking Outloud About Cyberspace

NSA Thinking Outloud About Cyberspace

US AUS CAN NZ UK constitutes the five-nation Echelon global surveillance agreement members.

http://cryptome.org/2013/03/cryptolog_135.pdf (2.0MB)

[Excerpts]

DOCID: 4033695

TOP SECRET UMBRA

CRYPTOLOG
The Journal of Technical Health

Vol. XXIII, No.1
SPRING 1997

SECRET

CRYPTOLOG
Spring 1997

THINKING OUT LOUD ABOUT CYBERSPACE (U)

by William B. Black, Jr.
Director’s Special Assistant for Information Warfare

INTRODUCTION (U)

(S REL AUS CAN NZ UK) On 3 March 1997, the Secretary of Defense officially delegated to the National Security Agency the authority to develop Computer Network Attack¹ (CNA) techniques. This delegation of authority has added a new, third dimension to NSA’s “one mission” future. That is, in the networked world of Cyberspace, CNA technology is the natural companion of NSA’s exploit and protect functions. This delegation of authority is sure to be a catalyst for major change in NSA’s basic processes and its workforce. The end result, however, should remain information technology-derived products, services, and experts.

(U) The articles following this introduction were written by the staff of the Director’s Special Assistant for Information Warfare. Because confusion still surrounds the emergence and history of Information Warfare (IW), these articles are intended to contribute to the common understanding of why Information Operations and its concepts are important to the future of NSA.

1. DoDD 3600.1, Information Operations, dated 09 December 1996, defines CNA as “operations to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.”

REL AUS CAN NZ UK

SECRET

CRYPTOLOG
Spring 1997

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (U)

(U) After World War II, an understanding of the core competency underlying the making and breaking of codes — cryptology — resulted in a national decision to consolidate both activities in one organization: NSA. Both activities benefited from this consolidation, and became stronger.

(S REL AUS CAN NZ UK) Since the end of the Cold War, in an emerging networked world, an understanding of the emergence of a new core competency — “cyberology” — with its close technological relationship to cryptology has again resulted in a national decision to consolidate. Cyberology’s central activities, i.e., “exploitation,” “protection,” and “attack,” will be worked together, thus benefiting all of them.

SETTING THE STAGE (U)

(U) There are certain assumptions that underpin the thought processes related to preparing for our Agency’s future in cyberspace. These are premises that are basic to the understanding, the preparations, and the acceptance of major changes. The following presents the main assumptions.

We’re On the Edge of a New Age (U)

(U) First is an acceptance that we are on the edge of a new age, called the “Information Age.” Also, that this new age is engulfing almost every aspect of society, including the very nature of our business. The basic premise is that the information technology advancements of the last 30 years far exceed any evolution of technology in the Industrial Age. These advances are so traumatic and far-reaching that they clearly represent something truly “new.” It is important to note that, historically, technological advancements were called “revolutions” when they make progress of a single order of magnitude. (e.g., the automobile “revolutionized” transportation because it was ten times faster than the horse). In the case of information technology, the contention is that the last thirty years have seen an advancement of not one but six orders of magnitude — 1,000,000 times! — in information technology. The end result has been a great deal of confusion and turmoil as human nature attempts to force the “new” of the Information Age into the “known” of the Industrial Age. This “new,” however, does not fit; we have to change the thought process.

The Public Sees Government as the Bad Guy (U)

(U) Second, the public reaction to this new age has a direct relationship to the National Security Agency and the way we do business. At the beginning of the Industrial Age, the public centered in on industrialists and/or capitalists as being “the problem.” Labor unions were created and child labor laws were enacted to curb their power. In today’s Age, the public has centered in on government as “the problem.” Specifically, the focus is on the potential abuse of the Government’s applications of this new information technology that will result in an invasion of personal privacy. For us, this is difficult to understand. We are “the government,” and we have no interest in invading the personal privacy of U.S. citizens. Regardless, the public’s concerns are real and have an impact upon us. The Computer Security Act of 1987 is one example of this impact, for it clearly represents a first step in limiting any potential NSA involvement in the public sector.

REL AUS CAN NZ UK

SECRET

CRYPTOLOG
Spring 1997

This Age Brought Its Space With It (U)

(U) Third, a major aspect of the Information Age is that it is ushering in a totally new sphere of operations, a new environment called “cyberspace.” For many, cyberspace is an ill-defined, comic-book concept — perhaps something created by a science-fiction writer or a Hollywood producer. But for NSA, in the Information Age, cyberspace is both real and virtual: while the real portion consists of physical assets (computers, network terminals, satellites, fiber optic cables, etc.) located on earth and in space, it is the virtual aspect -all interconnected, all networked, all compatible and interoperable -that is the most important. Almost every type of interaction that occurs in the physical world will have a corollary in cyberspace.

(U) In cyberspace, complex networks on networks emerge as an organizing concept upon which our future operations must focus. All networks are interconnected, and routing across the various elements of the network is automatic and not pre-determinable. Descriptors such as Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) or National Information Infrastructure (Nil) refer to portions of users of the Global Information Infrastructure (GIl) or better yet, the users of cyberspace’s transportation system. The future global use and dependency on cyberspace should evolve much the way the use of the Internet has evolved today, i.e., because it should be extremely cost effective. The more important aspect of this inter-connectivity is the fact that, as we move into this complex networked future, computers are in charge, and physical geography becomes less and less important. While computers initially automated routine and mundane tasks, today inter-networking has turned computers and systems to networks, affording opportunities to work with greater and greater amounts of information at any distance. In the future, advances in artificial intelligence, and increases in understanding of cognitive processes, in general, will move us rapidly into a situation where computers and networks work in conjunction with each other, under broad guidance from humans, to actually make decisions and act on our behalf. This is cyberspace’s future.

The Future of Warfare is Warfare in Cyberspace — a.k.a. Information Warfare (U)

(U) When we look to the future of warfare in the Information Age, we ask ourselves the question “How do you conduct warfare in cyberspace?” The answer is Information Warfare or, in accordance with DoD’s new Directive 3600.1, Information Operations. Information warfare has been the subject of many speeches, scholarly papers, and popular journals. Information warfare has even made its debut in Hollywood in the film Independence Day. These many, differing views of IW confuse “information in war,” “information technology enhancements of existing combat capabilities or weapon systems,” and “warfare in cyberspace.” In our view, “information in war” has been with us throughout history, i.e., intelligence on opposing forces was as valuable to Napoleon as it was to MacArthur. “Information technology enhancements” emerged during the Industrial Age with the natural evolution of weapons technology. IW for us, however, is “warfare in cyberspace” and is an exclusive feature of the Information Age. We believe that its biggest impact is yet to come.

(U) Another aspect of warfare that came with the Information Age is that actual, physical combat can be viewed in living rooms of America via television. The horrors of war cannot be hidden. As a result, in the simplest of terms, “body bags” are no longer acceptable. There is considerable societal pressure to find non-lethal means of accomplishing tasks that once called for conventional military action.

(U) For the military, the Information Age presents yet another problem. With the kind of computers, communications, and networking available in the commercial world, how can the military justify separate systems? Commercial communications networks are too inexpensive and too pervasive to ignore. The

REL AUS CAN NZ UK

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CRYPTOLOG
Spring 1997

good news for the military is that — probably for the first time — they will have interoperable communications in joint service activities and even in multinational operations. The bad news, however, is that they will also be interoperable with their adversaries.

(S REL AUS CAN NZ UK) In Information Age terms, IW provides a “digital coercion” option. The primary target of this option is the information infrastructure of an adversary. Such information infrastructures are expected to be primarily computer controlled, operated by the commercial-civilian sector (unprotected), and the primary infrastructure upon which military forces almost totally depend. For IW purposes, access to these computer-controlled infrastructures can permit the degradation, disruption, or destruction of the network and/or the functions they serve. As a result, the “computers” become the intelligence “targets” of highest priority.

(S REL AUS CAN NZ UK) There are specific types of weapons associated with Information Warfare. These include viruses, worms, logic bombs, trojan horses, spoofing, masquerading, and “back” or “trap” doors. They are referred to as “tools” or “techniques” even though they may be pieces of software. They are publicly available, very powerful, and, if effectively executed, extremely destructive to any society’s information infrastructure.

(U) As a last thought in setting the stage, we expect the Information Warrior of the future to be very different in their thought processes. They will understand the non-physical nature of the future capabilities, will be comfortable with working across the spectrum, and have extensive knowledge of non-military targets. Probably most importantly, they will be comfortable with the concept of networks. They will understand that “information operations” are more than “operations” supported by intelligence and communications; rather, they will understand that all three function together synergistically. Finally, Information Warriors will understand that in the “tooth-to-tail” accounting of personnel, military personnel will be the “tooth” and civilians will be the “tail.” Tail equates to the emerging information infrastructure, a primary strategic target of IW.

THE BEGINNING (U)

(S REL AUS CAN NZ UK) The following articles will look in depth at various aspects of Information Operations or Information Warfare as they relate to NSA. “Cyberology” and our new CNA mission should provoke much thought and discussion. It is hoped that these articles will serve as a catalyst and basis for these activities.

(FOUO) Mr. Black retired from NSA in 1997 after a long career. He was the first Director’s Special Assistant for Information Warfare, and oversaw the establishment of the Information Operations Technology Center.

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Rosemary Award Winner For Worst Open Government Performance in 2012

Washington, DC, March 15, 2013 – The Department of Justice has earned the dubious distinction of winning the infamous Rosemary Award for the second time in a row, for worst open government performance of any federal agency over the past year, according to the award citation posted today by the independent non-governmental National Security Archive at www.nsarchive.org.

During the past year, Justice has failed to order agencies to upgrade their Freedom of Information regulations to comply with Congress’s statutory changes (dating back to 2007) or President Obama’s direction of a “presumption of disclosure.” Similarly, Justice failed to change its litigation posture in Freedom of Information lawsuits to support openness, and in fact actually backed agency efforts to undermine the 2007 OPEN Government Act. The Department and its Office of Information Policy continued, for the third year in a row, to publish misleading statistics about FOI responsiveness, while the government-wide use of discretionary exemptions, such as the “deliberative process” privilege, rose dramatically from the previous year.

Rose Mary Woods in action

President Richard Nixon’s secretary Rose Mary Woods demonstrates the backwards-leaning stretch with which she erased eighteen-and-a-half minutes of a key Watergate conversation recorded on White House tapes.

The Emmy- and George Polk Award-winning National Security Archive, based at The George Washington University, has carried out twelve government-wide audits of FOIA performance (including the Knight Open Government Surveys), filed more than 50,000 Freedom of Information requests over the past 25 years, opened historic government secrets ranging from the CIA’s “Family Jewels” to the Iraq invasion war plans, and won a series of lawsuits that saved hundreds of millions of White House e-mail from the Reagan through the Obama presidencies, among many other achievements.

The Archive established the Rosemary Award in 2005 to highlight the lowlights of government secrecy, and named the prize after President Nixon’s secretary, Rose Mary Woods, who testified that she had accidentally – while stretching to answer a phone call – erased 18 and a half minutes of a crucial Watergate tape.

Justice clinched the intensely competitive award with the appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Wednesday March 13, 2013 by the director of the department’s Office of Information Policy, Melanie Pustay, who refused to answer senators’ questions about department litigation that would undermine the OPEN Government Act of 2007 authored by Senators Leahy and Cornyn. For the video, visit the Senate Judiciary Committee site.

The Department’s testimony claimed that updating agency Freedom of Information regulations was merely optional, “not required” when Congress changed the law in 2007 or when the President and the Attorney General changed the policy in 2009. Director Pustay quickly asserted, however, that her own agency was in the final stages of updating its own FOIA regulations – to which Senator Leahy replied, it’s been five years since we changed the law, it took me less time to get through law school!

As the Department’s lead entity for enforcing compliance with the Freedom of Information Act, the Office of Information Policy remains the primary impediment for raising the U.S. government’s implementation of FOIA to the levels demanded by President Obama, according to today’s Rosemary Award citation.

The National Security Archive’s latest audit of federal agency FOIA performance shows that 53 out of 100 agencies have not updated their regulations since Congress changed the law in 2007. The Archive’s findings also reveal that updated regulations are no guarantee of good regulations, since only one of the three agencies that updated since December 2012 complied with the requirements of the 2007 statutory changes.

Several witnesses and Senators’ questions at the March 13 hearing exposed the Justice Department’s attempt to eviscerate the OPEN Government Act of 2007 by backing the Federal Election Commission in their litigation against the public interest group CREW. The FEC claims that a postcard acknowledgement amounts to a “determination” under FOIA, and thus meets the 20-day response standard in the law, retaining the threat of fees that the 2007 act meant to remove when agencies were untimely in their responses to requesters. Director Pustay told the Senators she couldn’t comment on pending litigation.

The Justice Department also earned the Rosemary Award by failing to do any review of FOIA litigation to apply the new Obama openness policies. The problem dates back to the Attorney General’s memo from March 2009 that included a huge loophole, leaving it up to the Department’s litigators to apply the new standards “if practicable”! In stark contrast, President Clinton’s Attorney General Janet Reno included a formal requirement for litigation review in her 1993 memorandum on FOIA. Subsequently, the Department reported back in 1994 that the review actually produced significant new disclosures.

The Justice Department continues to stretch the truth on FOIA responsiveness, claiming for three years now a “release rate” of over 90 percent. However, as witnesses pointed out at the Senate Judiciary hearing on March 13, that number willfully ignores the real experience of FOIA requesters, in part by discounting 9 of the 11 reasons that the Department sends them away unsatisfied (“no records,” “referrals,” “fee-related problems,” “not reasonably described” etc.). Counting those categories, the actual “release rate” would be a more pedestrian – and more realistic – 55 to 60 per cent.

The true DOJ release statistics.

These fudged statistics and prohibitive FOIA procedures have real world implications for citizens attempting to see documents describing what their government is up to. For example, in January 2013, the Justice Department denied a New York Times FOIA request for its White Paper (provided to Congress) on the legal bases for drone targeting, claiming the b-5 deliberative process exemption, which has essentially come to mean “withhold it because you want to withhold it.” This is the very exemption that Attorney General Eric Holder, in his March 2009 Memorandum on FOIA, instructed agencies to use less frequently, writing that information should not be withheld simply because an agency “may do so legally.”

Four days after the unclassified memo leaked to NBC News, however, the Justice Department released the document “as a matter of agency discretion.” The release actually shows that the Department had no basis for withholding the White Paper in the first place. Instead, the DOJs public message seems to be: “leaks work better than FOIA.” White House spokesman Jay Carney apparently agreed, stating at a press conference after the leak, “Since it’s out there, you should read it.”

In fairness (which is not the point of the Rosemary Award), today’s citation recognizes that the Justice Department has also taken steps that actually improve transparency. These include prodding agencies to close their ten oldest FOIA requests (though some requests have still been languishing for more than 20 years), requiring regular and even quarterly FOIA reports from all agencies, co-hosting “requester round table meetings,” and encouraging agencies to send FOIA staff to American Society of Access Professionals (ASAP) training sessions. (The Department’s Office of Information Policy actually received an award from ASAP in 2012, but this was for its support of ASAP as an organization, not for Justice’s FOIA policies and practices.)

Unfortunately, these welcome improvements have to be weighed against the more troubling evidence of policy-level disregard for basic considerations of openness that the Department has displayed. At the same time that Justice Department OIP director Pustay testified with a straight face that “all agencies are in compliance with the OPEN Government Act,” her own agency was fighting in court to eviscerate that Act’s primary enforcement mechanism, propagating misleading FOIA statistics, and failing to implement her own Attorney General’s instruction to establish “a presumption of disclosure.”

NSA – ALAN GROSS CASE SPOTLIGHTS U.S. DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS IN CUBA

Alan Gross (left) and Peter Kornbluh at the Havana military prison where Gross is being held. November 28, 2012.

ALAN GROSS CASE SPOTLIGHTS U.S. DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS IN CUBA

LAWSUIT FILED BY FAMILY YIELDS DOCUMENTATION ON “OPERATIONAL” NATURE OF USAID EFFORT

CONTRACTOR INTRODUCES CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS IN COURT ARGUMENTS

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 411

Posted – January 24, 2013

Edited by Peter Kornbluh

For more information contact:
Peter Kornbluh 202/994-7116 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

READ THE DOCUMENTS

Document l: USAID “Competitive Task Order Solicitation in Support of Cuba Democracy and Contingency Planning Program (CDCPP), May 8, 2008.

Document 2: Memoranda of Conversation between USAID AND DAI officials, “Meeting Notes from USAID CDCPP Meeting, August 26, 2008.

Document 3: Alan Gross, “Para La Isla,” Proposed Expansion of Scope of Work in Cuba Proposal, September 2009.

Document 4: Declaration of John Henry McCarthy, DAI Global Practice Leader

Document 5: Defendant Development Alternatives, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim, January 15, 2013.

Document 6: Cuban Court Ruling Against Alan Gross, March 11, 2011, certified English translation.

Unveiled – Hitachi on NSA Utah Data Center Cable Purchases

The following press release from Hitachi Cable America discusses their “supply of high performance fiber optic cable and assemblies” to the National Security Agency’s Utah Data Center (UDC) project. The press release contains a number of specific details regarding the UDC project, including brief descriptions of the purpose of the facility as for “code breaking and data traffic analysis.” Hitachi has reportedly developed specialized fiber optic cables for the facility and had their InfiniBand CXP Active Optical cable assemblies, capable of 150 Gbs per second per assembly, approved for use with the latest generation of Cray supercomputer. The Cray Cascade system is currently under development with support from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) High Productivity Computing Systems (HPCS) program and, according to the Cray website, the system will be “capable of sustained multi-petaflops performance.” An article earlier this year in Wired by James Bamford, describes the development of the Cascade as part of a race to increase computing capabilities for the NSA.

Supply of high performance fiber optic cable and assemblies by Hitachi Cable America to the National Security Agency (NSA) – Utah Data Center Project / DARPA

Overview:

With internet traffic growing exponentially, attacks on government and commercial computers by cyber terrorists and rogue states have escalated. Those wishing harm have espionage programs targeting the data systems used by the United States and allies. Drug traffickers and weapons dealers use the internet with encrypted communications.

To counter these activities, the National Security Agency, an agency of the U.S. government, is building a fortified data center deep inside a mountain in Utah. This complex will house the world’s most sophisticated supercomputers dedicated to code breaking and data traffic analysis. Another site will eventually take delivery of the latest Cray supercomputer called Cascade to support the NSA’s need to crack codes faster to protect the nation and its allies.

HCA developed fiber cable suitable for the densely packed NSA data center facilities, as well as indoor/outdoor fiber optic cables and shielded high speed copper data cables. Additionally, HCA’s InfiniBand CXP Active Optical cable assemblies, capable of a blazing 150 Gigabits per second per assembly, has been qualified by Cray for their Cascade system.

Innovative:

Winning two projects at this level requires a degree of technical sophistication few companies can match. Hitachi Cable America has processes that allow customers the ultimate in fiber cable flexibility. Instead of two cables, each with a single type of fiber optic glass, our designers have developed a single cable with both long distance and short distance optical glass embedded in it. Instead of forcing the NSA to use the commercial standard cable YELLOW jacket color for long haul glass and ORANGE jacket color for short distance glass, we’ve modified our designs to allow them to use jacket colors based on security level and service type. Our sales engineers have spent many hours with NSA data center designers educating them on the solutions we have and, at that same time, we have learned the design nuances of this complex site and others. Our technical knowledge, our design and manufacturing flexibility and our competitive costs are a winning formula.

Reliable:

NSA designers visited Hitachi Cable America’s Performance Cable Systems & Materials Division facility in Manchester New Hampshire USA for a site audit. Under one roof, and, in our opinion, they saw the best cable manufacturing facility in North America for fiber optic cable, category and custom copper cables. Clean, organized, with modern manufacturing equipment and a highly-trained staff, the Hitachi Cable plant that ships 100,000,000 meters annually of insulated wire and fiber strands impressed these designers. Our dedicated government sales team understands the entire NSA bidding cycle. We’ve built credibility account by account, data center after data center with each project finished with superior results. There is no other way to prove to the NSA than to deliver what was promised, each and every time. As a result, the NSA specified Hitachi Cable as the exclusive cable supplier for this program because of our reputation for delivering on our commitments.

Our InfiniBand Active Optical cable assembly qualified by Cray for the Cascade supercomputing project confirms Hitachi Cable’s position in the elite class of transceiver suppliers. Years of experience supplying transceivers to Cisco, IBM, and Hitachi itself, combined with our ability to make superior fiber optic cable gave us the prerequisite skills to design the 150 Gbps Active Optical Cable assembly. Miniaturization technology without sacrificing transmission performance is what sold Cray on us.

Enabling:

While many American cable producers have shifted production of cable products to China or Mexico, Hitachi Cable has continued to expand its presence in the United States. Starting with flat cable in 1986, ,then adding premise cable in 1991, fiber optics in 1998, and with numerous expansions over the past ten years in Manchester NH, Hitachi Cable has significantly increased output capacity in the USA. This has not gone unnoticed by the National Security Agency and many of the distribution partners who support the Agency. American-made, high quality cabling solutions is a vital requirement in maintaining the nation’s data infrastructure.

Hitachi Cable’s investment in America is not just in New Hampshire but in New York, Indiana and Florida. Altogether, we support more than 500 American workers and their families. These workers are not just assembling parts built in low cost countries. Using domestically-made optical fiber from our partner, Corning Optical Fiber , we build complex copper and fiber cables with a very high domestic content value, important when considering the Buy American requirements of the U.S. Government.

CONFIDENTIAL – NSA Blueprint for a Science of Cybersecurity

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nsa-sci-cybersecurity

TOP-SECRET – Sworn Declaration of Whistleblower William Binney on NSA Domestic Surveillance Capabilities

The following sworn declaration of William Binney, a former employee of the NSA and specialist in traffic analysis, was filed July 2, 2012 in support of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s case against the National Security Agency (Jewel v. NSA) regarding their illegal domestic surveillance programs which, according to Binney “are consistent, as a mathematical matter, with seizing both the routing information and the contents of all electronic communications” inside the U.S. Thanks to Jacob Appelbaum for originally drawing attention to the declaration.

I, William Binney, declare:

1. I am a former employee of the National Security Agency (“NSA”), the signals intelligence agency within the Department of Defense. Unless otherwise indicated, I have personal knowledge of each and every fact set forth below and can competently testify thereto.

2. A true and correct copy of my resume is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

3. In the late 1990′s, the increasing use of the Internet for communications presented the NSA with a special kind of problem: The NSA could not collect and smartly select from the large volume of data traversing the Internet the nuggets of needed information about “Entities of Interest” or “Communities of Interest,” while protecting the privacy of U.S. persons. Human analysts had to manually identify the groups and entities associated with activities that the NSA sought to monitor. That process was so laborious that it significantly hampered the NSA’s ability to do large scale data analysis.

4. One of my roles at the NSA was to find a means of automating the work of human analysts. I supervised and participated in the development of a program called “Thin Thread” within the NSA. Thin Thread was designed to identify networks of connections between individuals from their electronic communications over the Internet in an automated fashion in real time. The concept was for devices running Thin Thread to monitor international communications traffic passing over the Internet. Where one side of an international communication was domestic, the NSA had to comply with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). With Thin Thread, the data would be encrypted (and the privacy of U.S. citizens protected) until such time as a warrant could be obtained from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Comi.

5. The advent of the September 11 attacks brought a complete change in the approach 18 of the NSA toward doing its job. FISA ceased to be an operative concern, and the individual liberties preserved in the U.S. Constitution were no longer a consideration. It was at that time that the NSA began to implement the group of intelligence activities now known as the President’s Surveillance Program (“PSP”). While I was not personally read into the PSP, various members of my Thin Thread team were given the task of implementing various aspects of the PSP. They confided in me and told me that the PSP involved the collection of domestic electronic communications traffic without any of the privacy protections built into Thin Thread.

6. I resigned from the NSA in late 2001. I could not stay after the NSA began purposefully violating the Constitution.

7. The NSA chose not to implement Thin Thread. To the best of my knowledge, the NSA does not have a means of analyzing Internet data for the purpose of identifying Entities or Communities of Interest in real time. The NSA has the capability to do individualized searches, similar to Google, for particular electronic communications in real time through such criteria as target addresses, locations, countries and phone numbers, as well as watch-listed names, keywords, and phrases in email. The NSA also has the capability to seize and store most electronic communications passing through its U.S. intercept centers. The wholesale collection of data allows the NSA to identify and analyze Entities or Communities of interest later in a static database. Based on my proximity to the PSP and my years of experience at the NSA, I can draw informed conclusions from the available facts. Those facts indicate that the NSA is doing both.

8. The NSA could have installed its intercept equipment at the nation’s fiber-optic cable landing stations. See Greg’s Cable Map, cablemap.info. There are more than two dozen such sites on the U.S. coasts where fiber-optic cables come ashore. If the NSA had taken that route, it would have been able to limit its interception of electronic communications to international/international and international/domestic communications and exclude domestic/domestic communications. Instead the NSA chose to put its intercept equipment at key junction points (for example Folsom Street) and probably throughout the nation, thereby giving itself access to purely domestic communications. The conclusion of J. Scott Marcus in his declaration that the “collection of infrastructure … has all the capability necessary to conduct large scale covert gathering of IP-based communications information, not only for communications to overseas locations, but .for purely domestic communications as well,” is correct.

9. I estimate that the NSA installed no fewer than ten and possibly in excess of twenty intercept centers within the United States. I am familiar with the contents of Mark Klein’s declaration. The AT&T center on Folsom Street in San Francisco is one of the NSA intercept centers. Mr. Klein indicated that the NSA’s equipment intercepted Internet traffic on AT&T’s peering network. It makes sense for the NSA to intercept traffic on AT &T’s peering network. The idea would be to avoid having to install interception equipment on each of the thousands of parallel data lines that eventually lead into and out of peering networks. By focusing on peering networks, the NSA intercepts data at the choke point in the system through which all data must pass in order to move from one party’s network to another’s. This is particularly important because a block data is often broken up into many smaller packets for transmission. These packets may traverse different routes before reaching the destination computer which gathers them and reassembles the original block.

10. One of the most notable pieces of equipment identified in Mr. Klein’s declaration is the NARUS Semantic Traffic Analyzer. According to the NARUS website, each NARUS device collects telecommunications data at the rate of ten gigabits per second and organizes the data into coherent streams based on the protocol associated with a specific type of collected data. A protocol is an agreed-upon way for data to be broken down into packets for transmission over the Internet, for the packets to be routed over the Internet to a designated destination and for the packets to be re-assembled at its destination. Protocols exist at each layer of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) 7-layer telecommunications model and are used for a wide variety of data, not just electronic communications. That means that NARUS can reconstruct all information transmitted through the peering network and forward all of the electronic communications to a database for analysis. The NARUS device can also select predetermined data from that path and forward the data to organizations having interest in the data. As I indicated above, the predetermined data would involve target addresses, locations, countries, and phone numbers, as well as watch-listed names, keywords, and phrases.

11. A further notable development has been the NSA’s public announcement in October 2009 that it was building a massive, $1.2 billion digital storage facility in Ft. Williams, Utah. According to some reports, the Utah facility will eventually have a data storage capacity measured in yottabytes (1024 bytes). Even if the Utah facility were to have no more than the amount of data storage that is presently commercially available, then one would expect the data storage to be in the range of multiples often exebytes (1018 bytes). See http://www.cleversafe.com. (According to Cleversafe, its ten exebyte storage solution fills no more than two hundred square feet). In April 2011, the NSA also announced that it would build a new supercomputing center at its Ft. Meade, Maryland headquarters.

12. The amount of data that each NARUS device can process per second is large (10 gigabits is 10 billion bits). To illustrate the sheer size of the data storage capacity ofthe Utah facility, one could assume the installation of twenty-five NARUS devices in the U.S. and that all of 2 the NARUS-processed data is sent via fiber-optic cable to Utah. That means that the NARUS processing rate of 10 billion bits per second means that one machine can produce approximately 4 x 1016 bytes per year. That in turn means that it would take twenty-five devices one year to fill an exebyte or ten years to fill ten exebytes.

13. The sheer size of that capacity indicates that the NSA is not filtering personal electronic communications such as email before storage but is, in fact, storing all that they are collecting. The capacity of NSA’s planned infrastructure far exceeds the capacity necessary for the storage of discreet, targeted communications or even for the storage of the routing information from all electronic communications. The capacity of NSA’s planned infrastructure is consistent, as a mathematical matter, with seizing both the routing information and the contents of all electronic communications.

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NSA-WilliamBinneyDeclaration

Unveiled – Japan and the United States from Kennedy to Clinton

President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sign the Japan-U.S. Declaration on Security at Akasaka Palace in Tokyo, Japan; Date: April 17th, 1996
Courtesy; William J. Clinton Presidential Library

Washington, D.C., July,3, 2012 –The National Security Archive announces the publication of its latest digital compilation of declassified records on U.S. ties with a critically important global partner – Japan. The new collection, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000, includes the most recent U.S. government releases covering a broad spectrum of issues and events in the bilateral relationship, and providing essential content for understanding the current global economic crisis as well as recent geopolitical developments in East Asia and the Pacific Rim.

Japan and the United States is the Archive’s third, fully-indexed anthology on the subject, and is available through the academic publisher ProQuest. Marking its publication, the Archive is today posting a selection of presidential and Cabinet-level records from the set that reflect the key strategic, defense and economic aspects of the relationship. The Archive obtained the documents in the collection through the Freedom of Information Act and original archival research. Among the highlights of the posting:

Memoranda of conversation between Bush and Kaifu during the opening months of the first Gulf War crisis, as Bush pressed the Japanese leader to consider not just financial support, but an eventual role for Japan’s military. As Bush warned Kaifu, “In Congress there are always people trying to blame Japan, Germany or somebody else. They see us spending large amounts of money and sending fine young people to the Middle East, where they might be in harm’s way.” While he understood this feeling, Bush also stressed that he didn’t “want any scapegoats,” and would make it clear to the American people that “Japan is trying very hard to do its part.” (Documents 3,4,5 and 6)
New documents on wide-ranging secret bilateral security talks at the end of the Carter and Clinton administrations, as the two powers met on a regular basis to trade viewpoints on the full spectrum of common security concerns and the management of the defense alliance, as well as the political situation in both countries. For example, in 1979, Nicholas Platt, the Asia expert on Carter’s National Security Council, candidly observed to his Japanese counterparts (likely with an eye to reassuring them) that he had seen a marked change in the President’s attitude: “He has been through a period of intense introspection. He is much more forceful. In contrasting him to just after he left Seoul, he is more positive, rested, etc.” (Documents 1, 2, 12 and 13)
Briefing memoranda for Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin on the U.S. strategy and goals for tackling the Japanese and Asian economic crisis in the 1990s. These documents detail the ongoing efforts the Clinton administration made to press Japan to adopt the necessary policies to head off what one document called a worst-case “black hole” scenario that could lead to a recession or years of no economic growth in Japan, weaken the world economy, harm U.S. trade interests, increase protectionist pressures and roil financial markets. (Documents 7,8,9 and 10)

* * * * *

Japan and the United States makes available 902 documents dealing with high-level policy making within the U.S. government and the history of U.S.-Japan relations during the last four decades of the 20th century. These documents, obtained since publication of the second set on U.S.-Japan relations, which covered the years 1977-1996, supplement those found in the first two collections and extend the scope of the set to include the Clinton administration. The compilation includes records of U.S.-Japanese summit meetings; communications between heads of state; top-level internal deliberations; memoranda, cables and studies concerning U.S. diplomatic relations with Japan; records concerning the U.S.-Japan security relationship; documents related to trade and international monetary relations; and intelligence estimates and studies concerning Japan’s foreign policy objectives, military capabilities, economic policies and internal situation.

Among the important topics covered by these documents are:

U.S.-Japan negotiations over the return of Okinawa and subsequent issues surrounding the U.S. military presence there
Bilateral military relations in the wake of détente, the opening to China and the end of the Cold War
Challenges on the Korean Peninsula, including efforts to promote better relations between Tokyo and Seoul, and the security threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
Trade disputes from the Nixon to Clinton administrations
The Japanese and Asian economic crises of the 1990s.

DOCUMENTS

Document 1: Briefing Book (S), Eleventh U.S.-Japan Security Subcommittee Meeting (SSC) [Principals’ Book] – Extracts, ca. August 2, 1979

This briefing book provides the schedule of events, background information, objectives, and other materials that were used in preparation for the eleventh Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee meeting, a forum for exchanging views on a regular basis that became increasingly important after the two nations adopted the Guidelines on Defense Cooperation in 1978. The topics covered include briefings for the Japanese on the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), NATO, the Middle East, the security situation in East Asia, joint military planning, the U.S. presence in Asia, defense cost (or burden) sharing, and defense technology cooperation.

Among the key U.S. goals for the meeting were to reassure Japan that the US would remain a Pacific power while encouraging Japan to make a greater effort in the security sphere; to increase Japanese awareness of mutual global security concerns in connection with SALT; the Middle East (centered on access to oil); Southeast Asia; relations with China; and the growth of Soviet conventional, particularly naval, power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Document 2: Memorandum of Conversation (S), The 11th SSC–29 July-2 August 1979, ca August 2, 1979 [missing one page after page 50 of the pdf file]

This nearly verbatim account of the Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee meeting illustrates how the U.S. representatives pursued the wide range of issues and goals outlined in the briefing book above. Among the interesting points are the clear signs of continued Japanese concern about a future U.S. military presence in the Pacific/East Asia; the U.S. interest in drawing the Japanese into discussion of possible increased Japanese security spending and commitments, particularly the delicate issue of Japanese contributions to peace-keeping operations (which would become more urgent during first Gulf War, as shown in documents below); and an exchange of views on the possibility of a North Korean attack, with Japanese intelligence assessments indicating that Pyongyang might attack if it could get Soviet or Chinese support. Another topic that would become more pressing in the decade ahead was the different U.S. and Japanese views regarding joint development vs. purchase of military technology, with a particular focus on the next generation of fighter aircraft, in which are visible the seeds of the FSX controversy.

Document 3: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (C) between President George H. W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ca. August 3, 1990

This telephone call marks the start of Bush’s personal diplomatic effort to secure support and a financial contribution from Japan for the nascent coalition against Iraq. In discussing possible sanctions against Iraq and the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, Bush acknowledges the Issue of Japanese dependence on Middle East oil is as a critical factor for Kaifu.

Document 4: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (C) between President George H. W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ca. August 13, 1990

In this telephone call, Bush thanks Kaifu for supporting sanctions against Iraq, and presses a new request – for Japanese support with military operations. Kaifu’s reply underscores the difficult political bind such a request places him in: “With respect to the military side that you have touched upon, because of our constitutional constraints and Diet resolutions, it is almost a national policy in this regard so it would be next to unthinkable to participate directly in the military sphere.” Bush responds: “My bottom line is that when this chapter of history is written, Japan and the U.S. and a handful of other countries will have stood side-by-side.”

Document 5: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (C) between President George H. W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ca. September 13, 1990

In this conversation, Kaifu informs Bush of the economic aid that Japan will deliver to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey as result of the Persian Gulf Crisis. Bush welcomes this news, stressing how it will provide good ammunition against critics in Congress who have been taking America’s allies to task for failing to contribute to the cause.

Document 6: Memorandum of Conversation (S) between President George H. W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ca. September 29, 1990

After several exchanges by telephone, Bush and Kaifu are finally able to meet in person to discuss the Iraq crisis as well as other issues. The conversation ranges from Tokyo’s support of U.S. troops stationed in Japan, to the Uruguay Round of trade talks, and other topics. Bush continues pressing Kaifu on securing a Japanese contribution to the military effort, as well as on increasing host nation support for U.S. forces in Japan. The talk also turns to relations between Tokyo and Moscow, and Kaifu’s hopes that the upcoming visit by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev visit will create an opening on the Northern Territories issue and the long-postponed peace treaty marking an official end to hostilities between the two countries after World War II.

Document 7: Memorandum (C), Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Lawrence Summers to Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, Subject: Japanese Recession and the Global Economy, June 9, 1995

In this memorandum, Treasury Under Secretary Summers details the signs of an impending economic recession in Japan, including the consequences for the U.S., and makes recommendations for addressing the situation. Summers calls for the U.S. to give more attention to its dialogue with Japan on macroeconomic issues, including a meeting between Treasury Secretary Rubin and Japanese Finance Minister Takemura during an upcoming meeting between President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Murayama at the Halifax G-7 summit. The attached memo discusses fears that a “1930s-type scenario” could unfold in which high interest rates, deflation, rising unemployment and yen appreciation reinforce one another; it further lays out a possible, if not probable, worst-case “black hole” scenario, noted in the introduction. To address the current situation, [tk: according to whom??] the U.S. needs to press Japan to use monetary and fiscal policy more aggressively to reduce the risk of an economic free fall.

Document 8: Memorandum (S). Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Lawrence Summers to Secretary Robert Rubin, Subject: Update on Japan [with cover memorandum from Rubin to Summers dated July 27, 1995], July 26, 1995

In this memorandum, a follow-up to the one noted above, Summers provides Rubin with a detailed report on U.S. efforts to persuade Japan to take effective steps to head off an economic crisis in the country, including a detailed account of Timothy Geithner’s meetings with Finance Ministry and Bank of Japan officials. As an attached memorandum from Geithner summarizes the situation in Japan, there is “deep pessimism” in Tokyo about the economy, and the combination of political constraints and a cautious Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan may continue to work against urgent and aggressive action. Rubin’s final judgment on the effort seems more resigned than optimistic: “we’ve done everything we can do” to affect the situation.

Document 9: Briefing Memorandum (original classification unknown), Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Timothy F. Geithner to Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and Deputy Secretary Lawrence Summers, Subject: Briefing for Your Meeting with Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, Minister of Finance, Japan, ca. April 27, 1997

In this memorandum, Geithner briefs Rubin and Summers on the main issues for the upcoming meeting with Japanese Finance Minister Mitsuzuka. The list of American concerns (which sound oddly familiar in light of more recent and widespread economic and financial woes) includes Japan’s economic future, banking system, financial reform, and anti-corruption efforts. For example, the U.S. fears that Japan’s banking system is being weakened by the overhang of bad loans and so was vulnerable to another economic downturn. Geithner also advises Rubin and Summers to continue pressing Tokyo on financial reform and deregulation to create opportunities for foreign business, while improving transparency and disclosure measures to reduce risk for foreign investors. The U.S. had a clear interest in the success of the “Big Bang” financial reforms, as U.S. firms would benefit from the greater ability to market new products and services in Japan, the relaxation of foreign exchange controls, deregulation of asset management and the expanded use of derivatives (though in hindsight the latter may not have been so wise, given the role of risky derivatives in creating the more recent economic crisis).

Document 10: Briefing Memorandum (U-Sensitive), Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Timothy F. Geithner to Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers, Subject: Briefing for Your Lunch with Eisuke Sakakibara, Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Japan, August 12, 1997

In this memorandum, Geithner briefs Summers for his upcoming meeting with Japanese Vice Minister of Finance Eisuke Sakakibara. The document provides a good overview of U.S. policy goals regarding Japan during Clinton’s first term and for his second term. Echoing points made in the April 1997 memorandum noted above, Geithner notes that recent data reveal problems with Tokyo’s strategy of relying on domestic demand to tackle economic problems. An attached paper says that the U.S. faces two major risks with Japan: a rising current account surplus that could spark political tensions in the face of closed Japanese markets; and spillover to the international financial system if the legal, regulatory and supervisory environment is not properly revised to deal with issues rooted in the “Big Bang” opening of Japanese markets to the world. In a portent of things to come, Thailand’s economic problems indicate the possible spread of economic ills beyond Japan; i.e., signs are emerging of what would become the Asian Economic Crisis of the late 1990s.

Document 11: Cable (C), United States. Department of State to United States Embassy. Korea (South), Subject: Secretary Albright’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Koumura of Japan, August 16, 1999

This cable reports on Secretary Albright’s exchange of views with Japanese Foreign Minister Koumura about the upcoming Group of Eight summit in Okinawa (where Albright hopes Japan will take a strong leadership role) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Auckland; U.S. relations with China; and issues regarding Taiwan and Iran. Albright also discusses U.S. steps to get relations with Beijing back on track after the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999, during Operation Allied Force, when five U.S. bombs hit the embassy, killing three Chinese reporters. Albright refers to efforts to give the Chinese “a means of getting themselves out of a corner.” Towards this end, Albright tells Koumura that the U.S. has provided China with a factual account of what happened, and that CIA Director George Tenet and his agency have taken responsibility for the mistaken targeting.

Document 12: Background Paper (S), Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Franklin Kramer, U.S.-Japan Bilateral Meeting, 2 November 2000; October 30, 2000

This and the following document provide a window into the policy goals and concerns preoccupying the U.S. as the security relationship with Japan headed into a new century after marking the 40^th anniversary of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty. As DOD official Franklin Kramer heads into the meetings, the alliance remains the centerpiece of U.S. regional security and Japanese national security strategy. Among the U.S. goals for the meeting are: starting a strategic dialogue looking to the new century; exchanging views on China; and stressing the relationship of trilateral activities (i.e., U.S.-Japan-South Korea) to enhanced regional cooperation. In this connection, Japan-South Korea defense relations are improving, with moves being made towards establishing real security ties, including joint exercises in 1999.

The scope paper for the meeting surveys the political and economic backdrop to the meeting. The political scene is marked by deepening political fragmentation and declining popular support for the current Japanese coalition government, with a forecast for weak coalition governments in the foreseeable future. Economically, recovery from the downturn in the mid-90s remains the key concern, as mixed signals leave the future unclear. Other familiar issues include Japan’s defense budget; continuing legal uncertainties surrounding use of the country’s Self-Defense Forces, including in international peacekeeping operations (an issue that first came to fore in first Gulf war, as noted in earlier documents); the need to keep a close watch on Okinawa politics and their impact on the U.S. presence there; and the related discussions over relocating U.S. forces. There is also little progress on another long-standing issue, as Japan-Russian relations are overshadowed by Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s refusal to accept a December 2000 target for concluding a peace treaty and resolving the Northern Territories issue

Document 13: Background Paper (C), Subject: U.S.-Japan Bilateral Meeting, Renaissance Ilikai Waikiki Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii, November 2, 2000, 1530-1700, October 30, 2000

This document provides more details on the U.S. goals and concerns surrounding the future of U.S.-Japan security cooperation in the 21^st century. The broad areas of concern include the long-term dialogue with Tokyo on the future of the alliance, China, and regional cooperation in Asia on security issues. Regarding the future of the alliance, the Pentagon wants to use Japan’s Mid-Term Defense Plan and the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review as the basis for a long-term dialogue. As the brief lays out the overall objective: “This is not about the U.S. asking Japan to do more as has been the case sometimes in the past. Rather it is about asking ourselves what kind of alliance will best serve as the foundation for regional stability for the next forty years.” One specific goal is to push Japan to increase its role in international peacekeeping. While the U.S. believes the region is becoming more accepting of such a Japanese role, Washington recognizes the uncertain public support in Japan for this, being well aware of the ongoing debate over the future course and nature of the country’s strategic role in the world.

Regarding China, the brief notes again the efforts to smooth the waters after the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Longer-term concerns are underscored by the tough political rhetoric in the recent China Defense White Paper, which will more likely feed rather than dampen those who are warning of a rising “China threat,” and the perception that the Chinese military is hawkish and pressing a hard line regarding the U.S., Taiwan and Japan. In part to address these concerns and, if possible, engage Beijing in a more cooperative relationship, the U.S. had launched the Asia Pacific Regional Initiative to support development of a regional defense initiative to promote multinational activities to address nontraditional security threats and contingencies. As the brief emphasizes, political, economic and social transitions in the region will produce new security challenges that cross borders and affect common security. Underscoring that multilateral initiatives will not diminish existing bilateral relationships, but will address the reality that any military action taken in Asia will have to be multilateral in nature, the brief also makes a point of noting that China is not to be excluded, but is a potential partner.

TOP-SECRET from the NSA – DNI Protection of National Intelligence

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

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TOP-SECRET – The Creation of the U.S. Spy Satellites

In September 1992 the Department of Defense acknowledged the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency established in 1961 to manage the development and operation of the nation’s reconnaissance satellite systems. The creation of the NRO was the result of a number of factors.

On May 1, 1960 Francis Gary Powers took off from Peshawar, Pakistan on the U-2 mission designated Operation GRAND SLAM. The flight was planned to take him over the heart of the Soviet Union and terminate at Bodo, Norway. The main target was Plesetsk, which communications intercepts had indicated might be the site of an ICBM facility.¹ When the Soviet Union shot down his plane and captured him alive, they also forced President Dwight Eisenhower to halt aerial overflights of Soviet territory.

At that time the U.S. had two ongoing programs to produce satellite vehicles that could photograph Soviet territory. Such vehicles would allow far more frequent coverage than possible with manned aircraft. In addition, they would avoid placing the lives of pilots at risk and eliminate the risks of international incidents resulting from overflights.

The Air Force program, designated SAMOS, sought to develop a number of different satellite systems–including one that would radio its imagery back to earth and another that would return film capsules. The CIA program, CORONA, focused solely on developing a film return satellite.

However, both the CIA and Air Force programs were in trouble. Launch after launch in the CORONA program, eleven in all by May 1, 1960, eight of which carried cameras, had resulted in failure–the only variation was in the cause. Meanwhile, the SAMOS program was also experiencing difficulties, both with regard to hardware and program definition.²

Concerns over SAMOS led President Eisenhower to direct two groups to study both the technical aspects of the program as well as how the resulting system would be employed. The ultimate result was a joint report presented to the President and NSC on August 25, 1960.³

As a result of that meeting Eisenhower approved a first SAMOS launch in September, as well as reorientation of the program, with the development of high-resolution film-return systems being assigned highest priority while the electronic readout system would be pursued as a research project. With regard to SAMOS management, he ordered that the Air Force institute special management arrangements, which would involve a direct line of authority between the SAMOS project office and the Office of the Air Force Secretary, bypassing the Air Staff and any other intermediate layers of bureaucracy.⁴

Secretary of the Air Force Dudley C. Sharp wasted little time creating the recommended new structure and procedures. On August 31st Sharp signed Secretary of the Air Force Order 115.1, establishing the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems within his own office to help him manage the SAMOS project. With Order 116.1, Sharp created a SAMOS project office at the Los Angeles headquarters of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD) as a field extension of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out development of the satellite.⁵

The impact of the orders, in practice, was that the director of the SAMOS project would report directly to Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charyk, who would manage it in the Secretary’s name. In turn, Charyk would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.⁶

The changes would not stop there. The urgency attached to developing a successful reconnaissance satellite led, ultimately, to the creation of a top secret program and organization to coordinate the entire national reconnaissance effort.

Several of the documents listed below also appear in either of two National Security Archive microfiche collections on U.S. intelligence. The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations and Management: 1947-1989 (1990) and U.S. Espionage and Intelligence: Organization, Operations, and Management, 1947-1996 (1997) publish together for the first time recently declassified documents pertaining to the organizational structure, operations and management of the U.S. Intelligence Community over the last fifty years, cross-indexed for maximum accessibility. Together, these two sets reproduce on microfiche over 2,000 organizational histories, memoranda, manuals, regulations, directives, reports, and studies, totaling more than 50,000 pages of documents from the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, military service intelligence organizations, National Security Council, and other official government agencies and organizations.

Document 1
Joseph Charyk, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
24 July 1961
Top Secret
1 p.

The organizational changes resulting from the decisions of August 25, 1960 and their implementation left some unsatisfied. In particular, James Killian and Edwin Land, influential members of the President’s intelligence advisory board pushed for permanent and institutionalized collaboration between the CIA and Air Force. After the Kennedy administration took office the push to establish a permanent reconnaissance organization took on additional life. There was a strong feeling in the new administration, particularly by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, that a better, more formalized relationship was required.⁷

On July 24, 1961, Air Force Undersecretary Joseph Charyk sent a memorandum to McNamara attaching two possible memoranda of agreement for creation of a National Reconnaissance Program, along with some additional material.

Document 2
Memorandum of Understanding
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program (Draft)
20 July 1961
Top Secret
5 pp.

This memo specified establishment of a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) consisting of “all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert,” and including “all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence.”

To manage the NRP, a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) would be established on a covert basis. The NRO director (DNRO) would be the Deputy Director for Plans, CIA (at the time, Richard Bissell) while the Under Secretary of the Air Force would serve as Deputy Director (DDNRO). The DNRO would be responsible for the management of CIA activities, the DDNRO and the Air Force for Defense Department activities. The DoD, specifically the Air Force acting as executive agent, would be primarily responsible for technical program management, scheduling, vehicle operations, financial management and overt contract administration, while the CIA would be primarily responsible for targeting each satellite. The office would operate under streamlined management procedures similar to those established in August 1960 for SAMOS.

Document 3
Memorandum of Understanding
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program (Draft)
21 July 1961
Top Secret
4 pp.

This secondary memorandum was prepared at the suggestion of Defense Department General Counsel Cyrus Vance. It offered a quite different solution to the problem. As with the primary memo, it established a NRP covering both satellite and aerial reconnaissance operations. But rather than a jointly run program, it placed responsibility for management solely in the hands of a covertly appointed Special Assistant for Reconnaissance, to be selected by the Secretary of Defense. The office of the Special Assistant would handle the responsibilities assigned to the NRO in the other MOU. The CIA would “assist the Department of Defense by providing support as required in areas of program security, communications, and covert contract administration.”

Document 4
Memorandum
Pros and Cons of Each Solution
Not dated
Top Secret
2 pp.

The assessment of pros and cons favored the July 20 memorandum, listing five pros for the first solution and only two for the second. The first solution would consolidate responsibilities into a single program with relatively little disruption of established management, represented a proven solution, would require no overt organizational changes, would allow both agencies to retain authoritative voices in their areas of expertise, and provided a simplified management structure. The two cons noted were the division of program responsibility between two people, and that “successful program management depends upon mutual understanding and trust of the two people in charge of the NRO.” It would not be too long before that later observation would take on great significance.

In contrast, there were more cons than pros specified for the second solution. The only two points in its favor were the consolidation of reconnaissance activities into a single program managed by a single individual and the assignment of complete responsibility to the agency (DoD) with the most resources. Foremost of the six cons was the need for DoD to control and conduct large-scale covert operations, in as much as it was an entity “whose normal methods are completely foreign to this task.”

Document 5
Roswell Gilpatric, Letter to Allen Dulles
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
6 September 1961
Top Secret
4 pp.

On July 28, 1961, four days after receiving Charyk’s memorandum and draft memoranda of understanding, McNamara instructed Air Force Undersecretary Joseph Charyk to continue discussions with the key officials and advisers in order to resolve any organizational difficulties that threatened to impede the satellite reconnaissance effort. The ultimate result was this letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to Dulles, which confirmed “our agreement with respect to the setting up of the National Reconnaissance Program.”

The letter specified the creation of a NRP. It also established the NRO, a uniform security control system, and specified that the NRO would be directly responsive to the intelligence requirements and priorities specified by the United States Intelligence Board. It specified implementation of NRP programs assigned to the CIA through the Deputy Director for Plans. It designated the Undersecretary of the Air Force as the Defense Secretary’s Special Assistant for Reconnaissance, with full authority in DoD reconnaissance matters.

The letter contained no specific assignment of responsibilities to either the CIA or Defense Department, stating only that “The Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office will … insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in this program.”

The letter provided for the NRO to be managed jointly by the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the CIA Deputy Director for Plans (at the time, still Richard Bissell). A May 1962 agreement between the CIA and Defense Department established a single NRO director. Joseph Charyk was named to the directorship shortly afterward.

Document 6
Joseph Charyk
Memorandum for NRO Program Directors/Director, NRO Staff
Organization and Functions of the NRO
23 July 1962
Top Secret
11 pp.

This memorandum represents the fundamental directive on the organization and functions of the NRO. In addition to the Director (there was no provision for a deputy director), there were four major elements to the NRO–the NRO staff and three program elements, designated A, B, and C. The staff’s functions included assisting the director in dealing with the USIB and the principal consumers of the intelligence collected.

The Air Force Office of Special Projects (the successor to the SAMOS project office) became NRO’s Program A. The CIA reconnaissance effort was designated Program B, while the Navy’s space reconnaissance effort, at the time consisting of the Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB) satellite, whose radar ferret mission involved the collection of Soviet radar signals, became Program C. Although the GRAB effort was carried out by the Naval Research Laboratory, the director of the Office of Naval Intelligence would serve as Program C director until 1971.⁸

Document 7
Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
13 March 1963
Top Secret
6 pp.

In December 1962, Joseph Charyk decided to leave government to become president of the COMSAT Corporation. By that time a number of disputes between the CIA and NRO had contributed to Charyk’s view that the position of the NRO and its director should be strengthened. During the last week of February 1963, his last week in office, he completed a revision of a CIA draft of a new reconnaissance agreement to replace the May 1962 agreement (which had replaced the September 6, 1961 agreement). Charyk took the revision to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. It appears that some CIA-suggested changes were incorporated sometime after Charyk left office. On March 13, Gilpatric signed the slightly modified version on behalf of DoD. It was sent to the CIA that day and immediately approved by DCI John McCone, who had replaced Allen Dulles in November 1961.⁹

The new agreement, while it did not include all the elements Charyk considered important, did substantially strengthen the authority of the NRO and its director. It named the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for the NRP. The program would be “developed, managed, and conducted in accordance with policies and guidance jointly agreed to by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.”

The NRO would manage the NRP “under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.” The NRO’s director would be selected by the Defense Secretary with the concurrence of the DCI, and report to the Defense Secretary. The NRO director was charged with presenting to the Secretary of Defense “all projects” for intelligence collection and mapping and geodetic information via overflights and the associated budgets, scheduling all overflight missions in the NRP, as well as engineering analysis to correct problems with collection systems. With regard to technical management, the DNRO was to “assign all project tasks such as technical management, contracting etc., to appropriate elements of the DoD and CIA, changing such assignments, and taking any such steps he may determine necessary to the efficient management of the NRP.”

Document 8
Department of Defense Directive Number TS 5105.23
Subject: National Reconnaissance Office
27 March 1964
Top Secret
4 pp.

This directive replaced the original June 1962 DoD Directive on the NRO, and remains in force today. The directive specifies the role of the Director of the NRO, the relationships between the NRO and other organizations, the director’s authorities, and security. It specified that documents or other material concerning National Reconnaissance Program matters would be handled within a special security system (known as the BYEMAN Control System).

Document 9
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Memorandum for the President
Subject: National Reconnaissance Program
2 May 1964
Top Secret
11 pp.

The 1963 CIA-DoD agreement on the NRP did not end the battles between the CIA and NRO–as some key CIA officials, including ultimately DCI John McCone, sought to reestablish a major role for the CIA in the satellite reconnaissance effort. The continuing conflict was examined by the PFIAB.

The board concluded that “the National Reconnaissance Program despite its achievements, has not yet reached its full potential.” The fundamental cause for the NRP’s shortcomings was “inadequacies in organizational structure.” In addition, there was no clear division of responsibilities and roles between the Defense Department, CIA, and the DCI.

The recommendations of the board represented a clear victory for the NRO and its director. The DCI should have a “large and important role” in establishing intelligence collection requirements and in ensuring that the data collected was effectively exploited, according to the board. In addition, his leadership would be a key factor in the work of the United States Intelligence Board relating to the scheduling of space and airborne reconnaissance missions.

But the board also recommended that President Johnson sign a directive which would assign to NRO’s Air Force component (the Air Force Office of Special Projects) systems engineering, procurement, and operation of all satellite reconnaissance systems.

Document 10
Agreement for Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Program
13 August 1965
Top Secret
6 pp.

Despite the recommendations of the May 2, 1964 PFIAB report, which were challenged by DCI John McCone, no action was taken to solidify the position of the NRO and its director. Instead prolonged discussions over a new agreement continued into the summer of 1965. During this period the CIA continued work on what would become two key satellite programs–the HEXAGON/KH-9 imaging and RHYOLITE signals intelligence satellites.

In early August, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance and CIA official John Bross reached an understanding on a new agreement, and it was signed by Vice Adm. William F. Raborn (McCone’s successor) and Vance on August 13, 1965. It represented a significant victory for the CIA, assigning key decision-making authority to an executive committee, authority that was previously the prerogative of the NRO director as the agent of the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense was to have “the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP,” and have the final power to approve the NRP budget. The Secretary also was empowered to make decisions when the executive committee could not reach agreement.

The DCI was to establish collection priorities and requirements for targeting NRP operations, as well as establish frequency of coverage, review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend steps for improving its results if necessary, serve on the executive committee, review and approve the NRP budget, and provide security policy guidance.

The NRP Executive Committee established by the agreement would consist of the DCI, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The committee was to recommend to the Secretary of Defense the “appropriate level of effort for the NRP,” approve or modify the consolidated NRP and its budget, approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems. It was instructed to insure that funds would be adequate to pursue a vigorous research and development program, involving both CIA and DoD. The executive committee was to assign development of sensors to the agency best equipped to handle the task.

The Director of the NRO would manage the NRO and execute the NRP “subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee.” His authority to initiate, improve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP, would be subject to review by the executive committee. He could demand that all agencies keep him informed about all programs undertaken as part of the NRP.

Document 11
Analysis of “A $1.5 Billion Secret in Sky” Washington Post, December 9, 1973
Not dated
Top Secret
33 pp.

Throughout the 1960s, the United States operation of reconnaissance satellites was officially classified, but well known among specialists and the press. However, it was not until January 1971 that the NRO’s existence was first disclosed by the media, when it was briefly mentioned in a New York Times article on intelligence and foreign policy.

A much more extensive discussion of the NRO appeared in the December 9, 1973 Washington Post as a result of the inadvertent mention of the reconnaissance office in a Congressional report. The NRO prepared this set of classified responses to the article, clearly intended for those in Congress who might be concerned about the article’s purported revelations about the NRO’s cost overruns and avoidance of Congressional oversight.

Document 12
E.C. Aldridge, Jr. (Director, NRO)
Letter to David L. Boren, Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
21 November 1988
Secret
3 pp.

The late 1980s saw the beginning of what eventually would be a wide-ranging restructuring of the NRO. In November 1988 NRO director Edward “Pete” Aldridge wrote to Senator David Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, concerning the findings of an extensive study (the NRO Restructure Study) of the organizational structure of the NRO.

Aldridge proceeded to report that, after having discussed the study’s recommendations with Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Director of Central Intelligence William Webster, he was directing the development of plans to implement the recommendations. Specific changes would include the creation of a centralized systems analysis function “to conduct cross-system trades and simulations within the NRO,” creation of a “User Support” function to improve NRO support to intelligence community users as well as to the growing number of operational military users, and the dispersal of the NRO Staff to the new units, with the staff being replaced by a group of policy advisers. In addition, Aldridge foresaw the establishment of an interim facility “to house the buildup of the new functions and senior management.” The ultimate goal, projected for the 1991-92 period, would be the “collocation of all NRO elements [including the Los Angeles-based Air Force Office of Special Projects] . . . in the Washington, D.C. area.”

Document 13
Memorandum of Agreement
Subject: Organizational Restructure of the National Reconnaissance Office
15 December 1988
Secret
2 pp.

This memorandum of agreement, signed by the Director of the NRO and the directors of the NRO’s three programs commits them to the restructuring discussed in Edward Aldridge’s November 21 letter to Senator Boren.

Many changes recommended by Aldridge, who left office at the end of 1988, were considered by a 1989 NRO-sponsored review group and subsequently adopted.

Document 14
Report to the Director of Central Intelligence
DCI Task Force on The National Reconnaissance Office, Final Report
April 1992
Secret
35 pp.

This report was produced by a panel chaired by former Lockheed Corporation CEO Robert Fuhrman, whose members included both former and serving intelligence officials. It focused on a variety of issues other than current and possible future NRO reconnaissance systems. Among the issues it examined were mission, organizational structure, security and classification.

One of its most significant conclusions was that the Program A,B,C structure that had been instituted in 1962 (see Document 6) “does not enhance mission effectiveness” but “leads to counterproductive competition and makes it more difficult to foster loyalty and to maintain focus on the NRO mission.” As a result, the panel recommended that the NRO be restructured along functional lines with imagery and SIGINT directorates. This change was made even before the final version of the report was issued.

The report also noted that while the NRO’s existence was officially classified it was an “open secret” and that seeking to attempt to maintain such “open secrets … weakens the case for preserving ‘real’ secrets.” In addition, such secrecy limited the NRO’s ability to interact with customers and users. The group recommended declassifying the “fact of” the NRO, as well as providing information about the NRO’s mission, the identities of senior officials, headquarters locations, and the NRO as a joint Intelligence Community-Defense Department activity.

Document 15
National Security Directive 67
Subject: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005
30 March 1992
Secret
2 pp.

NSD 67 directed a number of changes in U.S. intelligence organization and operations. Among those was implementation of the plan to restructure the NRO along functional lines–eliminating the decades old Program A (Air Force), B (CIA), and C (Navy) structure and replacing it with directorates for imaging, signals intelligence, and communication systems acquisition and operations–as recommended by the Fuhrman panel. As a result, Air Force, CIA, and Navy personnel involved in such activities would now work together rather than as part of distinct NRO components.

Document 16
Email message
Subject: Overt-Covert-DOS-REP-INPUT
27 July 1992
Secret
1 p.

In addition to the internal restructuring of the NRO, 1992 saw the declassification of the organization, as recommended by the Fuhrman report (Document 14), for a number of reasons–to facilitate interaction with other parts of the government, to make it easier for the NRO to support military operations, and in response to Congressional pressure to acknowledge the obvious. As part of the process of considering declassification NRO consulted Richard Curl, head of the Office of Intelligence Resources of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research–the office which provides INR with expertise and support concerning technical collection systems. Curl recommended a low-key approach to declassification.

Document 17
Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Changing the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to an Overt Organization
30 July 1992
Secret
3 pp.

w/ attachments:
Document 17a: Mission of the NRO, 1 p.

Document 17b: Implications of Proposed Changes, 4 pp. (Two versions)
Version One
Version Two

These memos, from Director of the NRO Martin Faga, represent key documents in the declassification of the NRO. The memo noted Congressional pressure for declassification and that Presidential certification that declassification would result in “grave damage to the nation … would be difficult in this case.”

Faga reported that as a result of an NRO review he recommended declassifying the fact of NRO’s existence, issuing a brief mission statement, acknowledging the NRO as a joint DCI-Secretary of Defense endeavor, and identifying top level NRO officials. He also noted that his recommendations attempted to balance concerns about classifying information that realistically could not be protected, while maintaining an ability to protect matters believed to require continued protection.

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, DCI Robert Gates, and President Bush approved the recommendations in September and a three-paragraph memorandum to correspondents acknowledging the NRO and NRP was issued on September 18, 1992.

Document 17b comes in two versions, representing different security reviews. Material redacted from the first version includes provisions of National Security Directive 30 on space policy, expression of concern over “derived disclosures,” and the assessment that the “high degree of foreign acceptance of satellite reconnaissance, and the fact that we are not disclosing significant new data,” would not lead to any significant foreign reaction. Another redacted statement stated that “legislation . . . exempting all NRO operational files from [Freedom of Information Act] searches” was required.

Document 18
Final Report: National Reconnaissance Program Task Force for the Director of Central Intelligence
September 1992
Top Secret
15 pp.

The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union required the U.S. intelligence community and NRO to reconsider how U.S. overhead reconnaissance systems were employed and what capabilities future systems should possess. To consider these questions DCI Robert Gates appointed a task force, chaired by his eventual successor, R. James Woolsey.

The final report considers future needs and collection methods, industrial base considerations, procurement policy considerations, international industrial issues, and transition considerations. Its recommendations included elimination of both some collection tasks as well as some entire types of present and planned collection systems.

Document 19
NRO Protection Review, “What is [BYEMAN]?”
6 November 1992
Top Secret
18 pp.

Traditionally, the designations of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) compartments–such as UMBRA to indicate particularly sensitive communications intelligence and RUFF to intelligence based on satellite imagery–have themselves been classified. In recent years, however, the NSA and CIA have declassified a number of such terms and their meaning. One exception has been the term “BYEMAN”– the BYEMAN Control System being the security system used to protect information related to NRO collection systems (in contrast to their products) and other aspects of NRO activities, including budget and structure. Thus, the term BYEMAN has been deleted in the title of the document and throughout the study–although the term and its meaning has become known by specialists and conveys no information beyond the text of any particular document.

This study addresses the use of the BYEMAN classification within the NRO, its impact on contractors and other government personnel, and the consequences of the current application of the BYEMAN system. The study concludes that placing information in the highly restrictive BYEMAN channels (in contrast to classifying the information at a lower level) may unduly restrict its dissemination to individuals who have a legitimate need to know.

Document 20
NRO Strategic Plan
18 January 1993
Secret
19 pp.

A study headed by James Woolsey (Document 18), President Clinton’s first DCI, heavily influenced the contents of this early 1993 document. The plan’s introduction notes that while some collection tasks will no longer be handled by overhead reconnaissance the “uncertain nature of the world that is emerging from the end of the ‘cold war’ places a heavy premium on overhead reconnaissance.” At the same time, “this overhead reconnaissance challenge must be met in an era of a likely reduced national security budget.”

The strategic plan is described in the introduction, as “the ‘game plan’ to transition current overhead collection architectures into a more integrated, end-to-end architecture for improved global access and tasking flexibility.”

The document goes on to examine the strategic context for future NRO operations, NRO strategy, strategic objectives, and approaches to implementation. Strategic objectives include improving the responsiveness of NRO systems by developing an architecture that spans the entire collection and dissemination process, from the identification of requirements to dissemination of the data collected.

Document 21
National Reconnaissance Office: Collocation Construction Project, Joint DOD and CIA Review Report
November 1994
Unclassified
28 pp.

In an August 8, 1994 press conference, Senators Dennis DeConcini (D-Az.) and John Warner (R-Va.), the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence accused the NRO of concealing from Congress the cost involved in building a new headquarters to house government and contractor employees. Previously NRO activities in the Washington area were conducted from the Pentagon and rented space in the Washington metropolitan area. The collocation and restructuring decisions of the late 1980s and early 1990s had resulted in a requirement for a new headquarters facility.¹⁰

The accusations were followed by hearings before both the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees–with House committee members defending the NRO and criticizing their Senate colleagues. While they noted that some of the documents presented by the NRO covering total costs were not presented with desirable clarity, the House members were more critical of the Senate committee for inattention to their committee work.¹¹

This joint DoD and CIA review of the project, found “no intent to mislead Congress” but that “the NRO failed to follow Intelligence Community budgeting guidelines, applicable to all the intelligence agencies,” that would have caused the project to be presented as a “New Initiative,” and that the cost data provided by the NRO “were not presented in a consistent fashion and did not include a level of detail comparable to submissions for . . . intelligence community construction.”

Document 22
Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Small Satellite Review Panel
Unclassified
July 1996

The concept of employing significantly smaller satellites for imagery collection was strongly advocated by Rep. Larry Combest during his tenure (1995-97) as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. As a result the DCI was instructed to appoint a panel of experts to review the issue.¹²

Panel members included former NRO directors Robert Hermann and Martin Faga; former NRO official and NSA director Lew Allen; scientist Sidney Drell and four others. The panel’s report supported a radical reduction in the size of most U.S. imagery satellites. The panel concluded that “now is an appropriate time to make a qualitative change in the systems architecture of the nation’s reconnaissance assets,” in part because “the technology and industrial capabilities of the country permit the creation of effective space systems that are substantially smaller and less costly than current systems.” Thus, the panel saw “the opportunity to move towards an operational capability for . . . imagery systems, that consists of an array of smaller, cheaper spacecraft in larger number with a total capacity which is at least as useful as those currently planned and to transport them to space with substantially smaller and less costly launch vehicles.”¹³

The extent to which those recommendations have influenced NRO’s Future Imagery Architecture plan is uncertain–although plans for large constellations of small satellites have not usually survived the budgetary process.

Document 23
Defining the Future of the NRO for the 21st Century, Final Report, Executive Summary
August 26, 1996
Unclassified
30 pp.

This report was apparently the first major outside review of the NRO conducted during the Clinton administration, and the first conducted after the NRO’s transformation to an overt institution and its restructuring were firmly in place.

Among those conducting the review were former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. David E. Jeremiah, former NRO director Martin Faga, and former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon. Issues studied by the panel included, inter alia, the existence of a possible alternative to the NRO, NRO’s mission in the 21st Century, support to military operations, security, internal organization, and the relationship with NRO’s customers.

After reviewing a number of alternatives, the panel concluded that no other arrangement was superior for carrying out the NRO mission. It did, however, recommend, changes with regards to NRO’s mission and internal organization. The panel concluded that where the NRO’s current mission is “worldwide intelligence,” its future mission should be “global information superiority,” which “demands intelligence capabilities unimaginable just a few years ago.” The panel also recommended creation of a fourth NRO directorate, which was subsequently established, to focus solely on the development of advanced systems, in order to “increase the visibility and stature of technology innovation in the NRO.”

Notes
1. Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp.241-42; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, From Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 319; Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), pp. 170-93.2. Kenneth Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement 17, Spring 1973 in Kevin C. Ruffner (Ed.), CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), pp. 3-40; Gen. Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff to General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, June 29, 1960, Thomas D. White Papers, Library of Congress, Box 34, Folder “2-15 SAC.”

3. “Special Meeting of the National Security Council to be held in the Conference Room of the White House from 8:30 a.m. to 10 a.m., Thursday, August 25, 1960, undated, National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61, Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 15, Reconnaissance Satellites [1960], DDEL.

4. “Reconnaissance Satellite Program,” Action No.1-b at Special NSC Meeting on August 25, 1960, transmitted to the Secretary of Defense by Memo of September 1, 1960; G.B. Kistiakowsky to Allen Dulles, August 25, 1960, Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Box No. 15, Space [July-Dec 1960], DDEL.

5. Carl Berger, The Air Force in Space Fiscal Year 1961, (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Historical Liaison Office, 1966), pp.41-42; Secretary of the Air Force Order 115.1, “Organization and Functions of the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems,” August 31, 1960; Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program, 1960-1965, (Washington, D.C., NRO, 1969), p. 20; Secretary of the Air Force Order 116.1, “The Director of the SAMOS Project,” August 31, 1960.

6. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 20.

7. Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Undercover in Outer Space: The Creation and Evolution of the NRO,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 13, 3 (Fall 2000): 301-344.

8. Ibid.; GRAB: Galactic Radiation and Background (Washington, D.C.: NRL, 1997); Dwayne A. Day, “Listening from Above: The First Signals Intelligence Satellite,” Spaceflight, August 1999, pp. 339-347; NRO, Program Directors of the NRO: ABC&D, 1999.

9. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, pp. 93, 96-97.

10. Pierre Thomas, “Spy Unit’s Spending Stuns Hill,” Washington Post, August 9, 1994, pp. A1, A6.

11. Walter Pincus, “Spy Agency Defended by House Panel,” Washington Post, August 12, 1994, p. A21; U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, NRO Headquarters Project (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 3-4.

12. Walter Pincus, “Congress Debates Adding Smaller Spy Satellites to NRO’s Menu,” Washington Post, October 5, 1995, p. A14; Joseph C. Anselmo, “House, Senate at Odds Over Intel Small Sats,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 1, 1996, p. 19.

13. Small Satellite Review Panel, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Small Satellite Review Panel, July 1996.

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Mighty Derringer – TOP SECRET – U.S. Nuclear Terrorism Exercise Leaves Indianapolis in “Ruins”

Washington, D.C., May 29, 2012 – A secret exercise in 1986 by a U.S. government counter-terrorist unit uncovered a host of potential problems associated with disrupting a nuclear terrorist plot in the United States. Declassified documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and posted today by the National Security Archive offer the first detailed public look at the inner workings of the agencies, military units and other U.S. entities responsible for protecting the country from a terrorist nuclear attack.

Today’s posting consists of over 60 documents related to MIGHTY DERRINGER, an exercise that focused on Indianapolis in December 1986. The materials provide background on the creation, in 1974-1975, of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), a group assigned to respond to plausible threats of nuclear terrorism or extortion. Today, NEST (now the Nuclear Emergency Support Team) conducts exercises to assess its capability to respond to the possible presence of a terrorist device and test the ability of NEST and critical cooperating organizations (including military units)to work together.

While the MIGHTY DERRINGER exercise and resulting documents are over two decades old, the institutions participating in the exercise retain their roles today, and the issues confronting them in 1986 are similar to the ones that they would face in responding to a nuclear threat in 2012 (and beyond).

This posting is notable for being the first publication of documents that provide in-depth exposure into all aspects of such an exercise – including the state-of-play at key points and the array of issues involved in disabling terrorist devices. Of particular interest are references to the participation of the Joint Special Operations Command and Delta Force – mirroring the role they would have in a real-world incident. In addition, after-action reports reveal the assorted problems that can arise in coordinating the response to a nuclear terrorist threat among a large number of organizations.

* * * *

THE MIGHTY DERRINGER EXERCISE

In late January and early February 2012, members of the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) patrolled Lucas Oil Stadium as well as surrounding areas of Indianapolis as a precautionary measure in advance of Super Bowl XLVI. An initial survey to gather information on background levels of radiation was followed by an actual search for signatures associated with either a nuclear explosive device or a radiation dispersal device (a ‘dirty bomb’).¹ Fortunately, none was found.

Over twenty-five years earlier, for a few days in early December 1986, NEST personnel also patrolled Indianapolis, also in search of a nuclear device. That search was triggered by an intelligence report that suggested that an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) might have been smuggled into the city by terrorists. With the assistance of the Delta Force, U.S. personnel were able to recover and disable the device in a fictitious neighboring country; unfortunately the Indianapolis device exploded and 20 square blocks in downtown Indianapolis were completely destroyed.

As it happens, the terrorist group, the intelligence report, and the detonation were fictional – elements of a NEST exercise designated MIGHTY DERRINGER, one of a number of tests designed to anticipate and prevent the potential real-world catastrophe of a terrorist nuclear strike in a major American city. Documents published today by the National Security Archive provide newly declassified details on how the MIGHTY DERRINGER exercise unfolded and how the participants later evaluated it.

This is the most extensive set of declassified documents on any nuclear counterterrorism exercise, covering every phase of the response, from concept to critiques, and it offers valuable insights into a world that is usually hidden from public scrutiny. Among the disclosures:

§ The role of the top secret Joint Special Operations Command’s Delta Force in carrying out the assault on the terrorist cell in the fictional country of Montrev.

§ Descriptions of the different types of disablement techniques U.S. forces utilize – emergency destruct, standard destruction, and hard entry.

§ Assessments of the coordination problems and different perspectives of agencies that would be involved in a real-world response.

The instruction to establish NEST, known until 2002 as the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, took the form of a November 18, 1974 memo from Maj. Gen. Ernest Graves, the Atomic Energy Commission’s assistant general manager for military application, to Mahlon Gates, the manager of the commission’s Nevada Operations Office. (Document 1). Gates was “directed and authorized” to assume responsibility for the planning and execution of field operations employing AEC radiation detection systems for the “search and identification of lost or stolen nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials, bomb threats, and radiation dispersal threats.”

Personnel for NEST would come from AEC’s nuclear weapons laboratories – Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos – as well as key AEC contractors. Almost all those individuals would continue in their regular positions full-time and become part of a NEST effort when required.

What inspired Graves’ memo was an incident that had taken place in May of that year. The Federal Bureau of Investigation received a letter demanding $200,000. Failure to comply would result in the detonation of a nuclear bomb somewhere in Boston. Personnel and equipment were quickly assembled and transported to Griffiss Air Force Base in Rome, New York. But before the team could make it to the threatened city, the crisis receded when no-one came to pick up the $200,000 in phony bills left at the designated site. ²

But the incident and the difficulties involved in responding to the threat convinced senior leaders that there was a need for a dedicated capability to deal with any attempt at nuclear extortion or nuclear terrorism. From its inception, NEST devoted considerable time and effort to conducting exercises designed to allow the team to test its readiness, procedures, and equipment in a variety of scenarios. In addition, since confronting a nuclear threat would involve not only NEST but a multitude of organizations, exercises provided an opportunity to identify potential problems in interagency cooperation.

MIGHTY DERRINGER was a particularly notable exercise in exploring the organizational, governmental, and technical problems that might arise in responding to a nuclear terrorist threat. While the existence of MIGHTY DERRINGER has been reported previously, the documents obtained by the National Security Archive and posted in this briefing book provide far more detail than previously available on the scenario, results, and after-action assessments of the assorted organizations involved. Since NEST and these other government entities are still critical components of America’s counter-terrorist capability, these records are valuable for the insight they offer into how a current-day nuclear detection operation would unfold and particularly what kinds of problems might be encountered.³

The exercise took place in two locations – Camp Atterbury, Indiana, near Indianapolis, and Area A-25 of the Energy Department’s Nevada Test Site – which corresponded to the two locations involved in the exercise scenario. One of the those locations was Indianapolis while the other was the country of ‘Montrev’ – a rather transparent fictional version of Mexico (since Montrev shared a border with the United States, its capital city was ‘Montrev City’, and its primary security agency was the Directorate for Federal Security – the same as Mexico’s).

Montrev was the initial focus of the exercise, with a terrorist group commanded by “Gooch” threatening to detonate an improvised nuclear device (IND) near the country’s Bullatcha oil field. According to the scenario, terrorists had stolen the devices from a new nuclear weapons state. Eventually, the participants discovered that that there was a second nuclear device and it appeared that it was being infiltrated into the United States, possibly with Pittsburgh as a target – although it was subsequently determined that the target was Indianapolis. While U.S. forces (with Delta Force assistance) were able to recover and disable the device in Montrev, Indianapolis experienced a 1 kiloton nuclear detonation that resulted in “total devastation over a 20 square block area.” (Document 38) The scenario had originally posited a successful disarming, but the exercise controllers decided to introduce a new element.

The scenario allowed for all aspects of a possible response to a nuclear terrorist/extortionist threat to be practiced – from initial assessment of the threat to the management of the “consequences” of a detonation. The documents posted cover, with varying detail, the core aspects of a response – intelligence collection, technical and behavioral assessments, search, access/defeat of terrorist forces, recovery of a device, diagnostics, hazards and effects estimation, disablement and damage limitation, safe transportation of the device, and consequence management of a detonation. In addition, they also concern a variety of important aspects of a response – including security, command and control, communications, logistics, radiological measurement and containment, weather forecasting, public information, and interaction with local officials.

The documents also identify the large number of organizations involved in the exercise. There is NEST and the organizations that contributed members or capabilities – including Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and contractor EG&G. Additional organizations whose participation is evident include the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Joint Special Operations Command, Special Forces Operation Detachment – Delta (Delta Force), several military explosive ordnance disposal units (from the Army and Navy), the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Beyond detailing participants and describing different aspects of the exercise and static plans, some of the documents (the ‘Sitreps’- Document 19, Document 23, Document 32) provide a more dynamic view of the state of play at various points in the exercise. In addition, the post-exercise critiques provide different individual and institutional perspectives as to either the realism of the exercise or what the exercise revealed about strengths and weaknesses of the then current U.S. ability to respond to a nuclear terrorist threat.

Thus, Vic Berkinklau, an engineer with the Atomic Energy Commission, in addition to describing MIGHTY DERRINGER as an “Excellent, well managed exercise,” had an additional eight observations which concerned subjects such as uncertainty as to the number of NEST personnel needed in Montrev, the relationship between NEST and the Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team, and the need for more detailed analysis of the consequences of a nuclear detonation in a populated area (Document 43). L.J. Wolfson of the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center contributed an eight-page single-spaced analysis concerning a variety of topics, including the nuclear device, assessment and intelligence, command and control and disablement. He observed (Document 47) that “there is too great a prevalence to believe what might, and probably is, very inconclusive intelligence information” and that “the entire operation was slowed and overburdened by the number of personnel involved.”

Commenting on the terrorism phase of the exercise (Document 50), William Chambers, NEST member and site controller for the Indianapolis component of the exercise, wrote that liaison between the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team, NEST, and EOD personnel was “excellent” but that “the joint procedures for withdrawing the HRT and survivors, securing the perimeter, and clearing access to the device need clarification.” An unattributed comment (Document 66) suggested that the Delta Force players did not appreciate the “gravity of dealing with a nuclear device.”

In the subsequent twenty-five years, NEST and other organizations concerned with nuclear terrorism have conducted a significant number of exercises – particularly following the attacks of September 11, 2001.⁴ However, because of its scale and scope MIGHTY DERRINGER remains one of the more notable nuclear counterterrorism exercises.

The Energy Department is keeping secret significant aspects of MIGHTY DERRINGER, but more may be learned about the exercise and the State Department’s role in it from the response to a pending request. Moreover, files on MIGHTY DERRINGER at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library will eventually be declassified and shed light on the National Security Council’s role.

(Note: A list of abbreviations used in the documents appears below.)

READ THE DOCUMENTS

Background

Document 1: Ernest Graves, Assistant General Manager for Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission, to M.E. Gates, Nevada Operations, “Responsibility for Search and Detection Operations,” November 18, 1974. Secret.

Source: Department of Energy FOIA Release

With this memo General Graves assigned Gates and the AEC’s Nevada Operations Office responsibility for search and detection operations with respect to lost and stolen nuclear weapons and special nuclear material as well as responding to nuclear bomb and radiation dispersal threats. The memo became the basis for the creation of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).
Document 2: Director of Central Intelligence, IIM 76-002, The Likelihood of the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorist Groups for Use Against the United States, January 8, 1976. Secret.

Source: CIA FOIA Release.

An interagency group of intelligence analysts explored the constraints on the exploitation of nuclear explosives, attitudes and behavior toward the United States, means of acquiring nuclear explosives, the ways in which nuclear devices might be used against the United States, and the capabilities of existing terrorist groups. While the authors considered it unlikely that the U.S. would be the target of a nuclear terrorist attack “in the next year or two,” they also noted that, in the longer term, “we would expect a corresponding erosion of the constraints against terrorist use of nuclear explosives.”
Document 3: Energy Research and Development Administration, “Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST),” n.d. (but 1977). Unclassified.

Source: Energy Research and Development Administration

NEST began its existence as an unacknowledged government organization, but in 1977 it was concluded that NEST would have to interact with local law enforcement and political authorities in dealing with nuclear threats, and thus its existence would need to be acknowledged. This fact sheet, distributed to the press by ERDA, was the means by which NEST’s existence was quietly announced.
Document 4: E.J. Dowdy, C.N. Henry, R.D. Hastings, S.W. France, LA-7108, Nuclear Detector Suitcase for the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, February 1978. Unclassified.

Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory

This technical paper describes one piece of equipment designed specifically for NEST personnel – a portable Neutron Detection system that could be carried in any vehicle. The paper describes the detectors, the electronics, and the operations.
Document 5: Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 6-86, The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups, April 1986, Secret, excised copy

Source: Mandatory Review Request; release by Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

This estimate examined several incentives and constraints with regard to nuclear terrorism – including the availability of nuclear information, material, and trained personnel; changing levels of protection for nuclear weapons and other sources of nuclear/radioactive material; and terrorist capabilities and motivations (including possible state support to nuclear terrorism). The authors concluded that there was only a “low to very low” probability of nuclear terrorism that involved detonation of an improvised nuclear device or nuclear weapon – or the dispersal of radioactive material in a way that would threaten mass casualties or produce widespread contamination.

Preparations

Document 6: William Hoover, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs, to DCI William Casey, 23 September 1985, with CIA routing memos, Confidential

Source: CREST, National Archives II

A senior Energy Department official informed Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey of the Department’s conclusion on the need for a large-scale nuclear exercise in the early 1987 fiscal year and requested the CIA’s participation.
Document 7: Robert B. Oakley, State Department Counter-Terrrorism Center, to Executive Secretary Nicholas Platt, MIGHTY DERRINGER Exercise Planning,” 4 April 1986, with memorandum to Vice Admiral John Poindexter attached, Confidential

Source: State Department FOIA release

This memorandum, from the head of the State Department’s Counter-Terrorism Center, along with that attached memo to the president’s national security adviser, described the level of State Department participation in MIGHTY DERRINGER.
Document 8: Peter Borg, State Department Counter-Terrorism Center, to Richard Kennedy et al., “Exercise MIGHTY DERRINGER,” 6 October 1986, Secret

Source: State Department FOIA release

A number of State Department officials were recipients of this secret memo, which informed them of the nature of MIGHTY DERRINGER, when it would take place, some requirements for the exercise to be realistic, and the State Department’s participation.

The Exercise

Document 9: Don McMaster, Behavioral Assessment Report/PLC, n.d. [circa 2 December 1986], Incomplete copy, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This behavioral assessment mirrors the earliest phases of responding to an actual threat, especially trying to assess its credibility. It discusses the reliability of a source, motivations of other key figures in the terrorist group, and concludes that a credible threat exists to both the United States and ‘Montrev.’
Document 10: F.W. Jessen, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Summary Assessment,” 2 December 1986, Secret, Incomplete copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This assessment, conducted at Lawrence Livermore, where much of the credibility assessment effort has been located, reports that the available information suggests that the terrorist group possesses two improvised nuclear devices but that LLNL and Los Alamos National Laboratory disagree over the technical credibility of the threat.
Document 11: “Aggregate Assessment – – One Hour – – Of Threat Message and Sketch,”

n.d., Secret, Page 1 only

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The title of this memo indicates that a sketch of a device was included with the threat message. Technical experts had already begun to draw conclusions about the device in Montrev as well as the implications for finding a second device in the United States.
Document 12: Thomas R. Clark, Manager, Nevada Operations Office, Department of Energy, “NEST Alert Status,” 3 December 1986, Confidential, excised copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This message, from a Department of Energy manager, informs NEST participants at key laboratories and contractors that NEST is on “alert.” The Department of State has received a threat and the Department of Energy has been asked to evaluate it. Other actions have been taken.
Document 13: “Security Plan for NEST Retrograde Operation, December 1986,” n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The plan described in this document notes the classification levels and types of information involved in the exercise as well as measures for the protection of cryptological matter and classified documents.
Document 14: Peter Mygatt, Exercise Mighty Derringer, “Chronological Media Play, ‘Site City,’ Beginning 12/7/86,” n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The MIGHTY DERRINGER scenario writers assumed that if it was a real-world event, part of it would be visible and covered extensively by the media. This document summarizes reports of fictional news services and television stations as well as interaction between the media and FBI and Department of Energy.
Document 15: NEST On-Scene Commander, Subject: Event Mighty Derringer Sitrep No. 1 OCONUS, Prepared at 00:15 PST on 12/06/86, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The first Situation Report (Sitrep) of the part of the exercise that takes place in Montrev summarizes the current situation (including the number of personnel in country) as well as
the status of a variety of subjects – including command and control, intelligence, disablement, and weather.
Document 16: W. Rogers, NEST Paramedic Coordinator, to V. Withirill, N.T.S.O, “MIGHTY DERRINGER, MEDICAL EMERGECY RESPONSE,” 6 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This memo reports that MIGHTY DERRINGER was being conducted in area A-25 of the Nevada Test Site and would involve approximately 450 people. It focuses on “areas of responsibility … and those assets available” in the event of an actual medical emergency.
Document 17: “NEST Evacuation Plan,” n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This plan addresses the evacuation of NEST personnel and equipment from Montrev City in the event of a nuclear detonation at the nearby Bullatcha Refinery No. 5. It focuses on execution, logistics, and command and control.

Document 18: NEST On-Scene Coordinator/Exercise Mighty Derringer, to Director, Emergency Management Team, DOE-EDC, Washington, D.C., Event Mighty Derringer Sitrep No. 2, Prepared at 1100 PST 6 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This report updates the Sitrep that had been prepared just after midnight on December 6 and reports on the significant developments that had occurred during the day. It covers thirteen different topics, and provides significant details of the terrorist site in Montrev, a summary of the behavioral assessment based on communications intelligence, and an assessment of the device. It notes that a “second nuclear device may be enroute [to] CONUS” and there is no confidence that the device is one-point safe, that is, the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation had to be taken into account (to be one-point safe there must be less than 1 in one million probability of producing a nuclear yield exceeding the equivalent of 4 pounds of TNT when the high explosive inside the weapon is detonated at any single point).
Document 19: NEST On-Scene Coordinator /Exercise Mighty Derringer, to Director, Emergency Management Team, DOE-EDC, Washington, D.C., Subject: Event Mighty Derringer Sitrep No. 3, Prepared at 00:10, on 12/07/86, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This Sitrep prepared an about one hour after Sitrep No. 2, notes that “prestaging of equipment for access has been completed.”
Document 20: Assessment/McMaster, to Standard Distribution, “IRT Intelligence Summary 061200-062400,” 7 December 1986 02:30, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This assessment reports on attempts to determine the presence of a nuclear device at the terrorist site, the movements of the terrorist group’s leader, the weapons and equipment possessed by the group, and a conclusion regarding the capability of Montrev’s armed forces to secure the terrorist site.
Document 21: Assessment/McMaster, to Standard Distribution, “Status Montrev Forces,” 7 December 1986 05:30, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The status of Montrev’s forces is reported in this memo, which is based on information received from the Defense Intelligence Agency. It discusses their location, vehicle lift capability, and maintenance issues.
Document 22: CN1 to All, “Mighty Derringer,” 7 December 1986 8:44, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This memo conveys a report from the IWS news service on events in Montrev.
Document 23: NEST On-Scene Coordinator, Subject: Event Mighty Derringer, Sitrep No. 4, OCONUS, Prepared at 09:40 on 12/07/86, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This Sitrep indicates a successful assault by forces of the Joint Special Operations Command, resulting in their control of both the north and south sites that had been under terrorist control. It reports on the status of the nuclear device and the initial implementation of the emergency disablement plan.
Document 24: Summary Assessment to Standard Distribution, “Summary Assessment,” 7 December 1986 10:30, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The technical assessment has been entirely redacted from this document, but the operational and behavioral assessments have been released in their entirety. They note that “The adversary has set up the Montrev situation in such a way that if and when he surfaces in CONUS and makes an explicit threat and demand, he must be taken seriously.”
Document 25a: CN1 to All, “Mighty Derringer,” 7 December 1986 12:28, Secret

Document 25b: CN1 to All, “Mighty Derringer,” 7 December 1986 13:07, Secret

Document 25c: CN1 to All, “Mighty Derringer,” 7 December 1986 15:48, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

These bulletins convey various media reports of developments in Montrev, including the presence of NEST personnel.
Document 26: Assessment/F. Kloverstrom to Standard Distribution, “Results of examination of containers found in south building,” 7 December 1986 18:10, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This memo reports on the discovery, after the assault, of two containers, which appear to contain radioactive material.
Document 27: Jim Boyer, “Suggested Procedure for Joint DOE/Montrev News Releases,” 7 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Among the recommendations in this short memo are obtaining input from the Montrev Ministry of Information “to get an idea of what El Presidente will approve,” developing a cover for the NEST operation, but preparing to admit NEST participation during the last phase of the operation.
Document 28: “Time Line/Event/Decision Sequence,” 8 December 1986 19:00, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This document focuses on the essential steps in disabling the nuclear device seized in Montrev and limiting damage. Thus, it addresses access, diagnostics, disablement, damage limitation, and hazards and effects.
Document 29: “Damage Limitation Containment Implementation,”8 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This eight-page memo has been almost completely redacted but the opening paragraph notes the location of the Montrev device and that its location presents a “formidable problem” but that all participants reached a common conclusion for the solution.
Document 30: “Hazards and Effects Analysis Prior to Montrev Disablement,” n.d. [8 December 1986?], Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This three-paragraph memo notes that hazard predictions (involving fallout dose and exposure rates) considered a variety of possible yields, wind projections, and the vulnerability of “the small village of Taco Caliente.”
Document 31: A/I [Assessment & Intelligence] Behavioral, “Booby Traps/Tamper Proof,” n.d. [8 December 1986?], Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This assessment focuses on the likelihood that the terrorist group and its leader would have installed booby traps to prevent tampering with the nuclear device seized in Montrev. It notes the implications of the extensive anti-personnel attack defenses around the area.
Document 32: James K. Magruder, On-Scene Commander, to Director, Emergency Management Team, DOE-EOC, Washington, D.C, Event Mighty Derringer Sitrep No. 7, 8 December 1986 23:00, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This Sitrep notes presumed deadlines for nuclear device detonation and a proposed disablement schedule, the number of personnel on site, an extensive report on current intelligence, and that an “emergency destruct plan has been prepared.”
Document 33: Assessment & Intelligence/F. Jessen to Standard Distribution, “A&I Summary/8 December 2130,” 8 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This assessment notes the credibility of a threat message claiming the existence of a second nuclear device based on experimental measurements of the device seized in Montrev. The memo’s contents suggest a U.S. target for the second device.
Document 34: J.A. Morgan, Disablement Team Leader, to On-Scene Commander, “Disablement Plan,” 9 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The memo includes a computer sketch of the terrorist nuclear device and the disablement method, as well as the reentry and evacuation plans – all of which have been redacted.
Document 35: “Exercise Mighty Derringer Post-Event Plan to Safe and Remove the Device,” circa 9 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This heavily-redacted memo covers four topics – the situation, mission, execution, and administration and logistics. The released portion notes that disablement action had been completed and that an intact physics package had been recovered.
Document 36: “NEST Demobilization Plan,” 10 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This memo marks plans for the ending the exercise – specifying the responsibilities of the individual organizations, procedures for transportation to the airport and the loading of aircraft, and command and control.
Document 37: Assessment/M. Miron, to Standard Distribution, “Resemblance of Montrev Device to Tahoe Bomb,” 9 December 1986 20:35, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

In 1980, a sophisticated improvised (non-nuclear) explosive device placed at Harvey’s Wagon Wheel Casino did substantial damage when disablement efforts failed. The memo suggests that publicly available information about the device may have been employed to construct the Montrev device.
Document 38: Cal Wood, Livermore National Laboratory, to Bob Nelson, Controller Team Leader, “Preliminary Evaluation of Players’ Device Estimate,” 10 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This heavily redacted memo notes that “the diagnostic techniques used by the team produced a rather good estimate of both the materials present and their configuration.”
Document 39: Director FEMA to National Security Council, “Situation Report on MONTREV/Indianapolis Terrorist Situation,” 11 December 1986 17:00 EST, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The FEMA director begins with the observation that “At 0700, 11 December 1986, a nuclear detonation occurred in the City of Indianapolis” devastating 20 square blocks. He does not describe the type of damage produced, for example, whether the detonation led to any fires, or the extent to which it caused local fallout hazards. The FEMA director then describes the consequence management phase of the exercise, including involvement of state and federal authorities and agencies.

Critiques

Document 40: Carl Henry, Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Mighty Derringer Report,” 2 February 1987, enclosing comments by Ray D. Duncan, n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Some weeks after the exercise, Los Alamos official Carl Henry sent a large package of commentary on MIGHTY DERRINGER, which is presented below, piece by piece, except for the critique by Ray D. Duncan,which is attached to the Henry memorandum. Duncan, a manager at the Nevada Test Site, produced an extensive review which raised a number of issues, including the “unusual challenges” MIGHTY DERRINGER raised for NEST if it was ever deployed to a foreign country for a “covert operation.” Perhaps some incident during the exercise led him to the recommendation for educational training for Delta Force and the Joint Special Operations Command so that their members “understand the potential consequences of moving or unintentionally shooting an IND [improvised nuclear device].”
Document 41: Untitled, unattributed document, Secret, incomplete

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This critique gives some detail on how the NEST group entered Montrev during the crisis. The State Department had created an approved access list and a simulated Montrev consulate processed the players when they entered the country. When players realized that they had forgotten some equipment, they were easily able to retrieve it as it was only 65 miles away. The commentator noted that in a “real world situation, the NEST contingent could be thousands of miles away from necessary equipment or supplies.”
Document 42: Eric Schuld to Bob Nelson, “Comments on Mighty Derringer – OCONUS Issues,” n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Schuld listed issues brought up by the “Outside Continental United States” exercise. For example, the JSOC solved its problem through a “quick assault” that created problems for other organizations in the exercise.
Document 43: Vic Berniklau to Bob Nelson, “Issues/Major Observations/Lessons Learned,” n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Like many of the commentators, Berniklau saw the exercise as “excellent” and “well managed,” but he raised problems that others also brought up, such as fragmentation of information and “confusion.”
Document 44: T.T. Scolman, Comments, n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Scolman, whose role was “Commander for Science,” also saw an information management problem and pointed to other concerns, such as lack of support staff.
Document 45: Richard F. Smale, HSE, to Carl Henry/Bill Chambers, “First Impressions: Mighty Derringer: Consequence Phase,” n.d., Classification unknown

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The “consequence phase” referred to the aftermath of the nuclear detonation in Indianapolis. Smale saw “great things” in the exercise, such as its technical organization, but he pointed to concerns such as the failure to present information that would be accessible to a non-technical audience and the lack of time to “develop good fallout plots.”
Document 46: L J. O’Neill, “Exercise Impressions,” 9 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

O’Neill was impressed by the participation of “foreign speaking actors” which helped the participants to enter “wholeheartedly into the play.”
Document 47: L.J. Wolfson to R. Nelson, “Exercise Mighty Derringer,” 10 December 1986, Classificaion unknown, excised copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Like O’Neill, Wolfson pointed to the “good actor play,” especially by the actor who had the role of Montrev’s “El General.” Nevertheless, he argued that “too many people” slowed down the operation.
Document 48: William Nelson, Mighty Derringer Washington Controller, to Captain Ronald St. Martin, National Security Council, “Mighty Derringer Meeting at FBI Headquarters, 12 December 1986, Classification unknown

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The discussion at FBI headquarters on organizational issues produced a consensus on the need for a White House-designated “leader,” possibly at the cabinet level, responsible for managing post-nuclear disaster recovery activities.
Document 49: Kathy S. Gant, Emergency Technology Program, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, to William Chambers, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 17 December 1986, enclosing “Comments on Exercise Mighty Derringer,” 18 December 1986, Classification unknown

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Seeing a need for better integration of the consequences phase into MIGHTY DERRINGER, Gant emphasized the need for state and local actors to play a stronger role in such exercises to give them greater realism. Her discussion of the Federal Radiological Response Plan led to a recommendation that NEST staffers play a role in post-incident field monitoring of radiation hazards because they would be the “first available federal personnel.”
Document 50: William H. Chambers, CONUS Site Controller, to Carl Henry, Chief Controller, “‘Quick Look,’ Report, Mighty Derringer CONUS,” 19 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Chambers provided some detail on the role of the Indianapolis nuclear detonation in MIGHTY DERRINGER. According to the script, the device had been “rendered-safe,” but the exercise leaders “deviated” from the script by improvising a “simulated nuclear detonation.”
Document 51: Zolin Burson, EG&G Energy Measurements, to Carl Henry, 29 December 1986, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Like Gant, Burson pointed to the need for more involvement by state and local actors in such exercises, suggesting that “if the real Governor and Mayor” had been present, “they would have had a much stronger influence.”
Document 52: Richard F. Smale, Associate Group Leader, to Jesse Aragon, HSE Division Leader, “Trip Report December 7 to 13, Camp Atterbury (Indianapolis), Indiana,” 7 January 1987, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Smale provides more detail on the role of nuclear devices in the exercise scenario, noting that “terrorists had stolen two … from a developing nuclear capable country.” He also observed that “when control of the device had been obtained, the NEST scientists could have disabled it.”
Document 53: Thomas S. Dahlstrom, EG&G Measurements, to William H. Chambers, Carl Henry, and Norm Bailey, “Mighty Derringer Observations,” 13 January 1987, Classification unknown, excised copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

After noting that his “overall reaction” was “quite positive,” Dahlstrom believed that “confusion” emanated from a basic problem: the players did “not comprehend the complexity of an OCONUS deployment – specifically how the State Department controls the matter.”
Document 54: F. Jessen/LLNL to G. Allen and W. Adams/NVO, “Mighty Derringer Critique,” 16 December 1986, Rev[ised] 13 January 1987, Secret, excised copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Jessen pointed to a number of problems, for example, that “many of the participating agencies were not serious players,” the “unrealistic background information” on the “fictitious” countries and people, “bad guidance on the use of existing proliferant country data,” and failure to recognize that “information to be assessed related to intelligence reports of a nuclear terrorist threat.” Especially disturbing was the relocation of the command post to a “safe location,” while NEST personnel were not notified”: “the blatant lack of concern for [their] safety … is inexcusable.”
Document 55: Julie A. Orcutt/HSE, Los Alamos National Laboratory, to Jesse Aragon, HSE Division Leader, “Trip Report: Mighty Derringer Exercise, Montrev Site,” 13 January 1987, Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

During the exercise, the on-scene commander at Indianapolis had decided against building a “containment structure” to prevent the spread of hazardous material because of the risks. That meant, however, that plutonium would be scattered about which presented dangers of “lung doses.” Los Alamos staffer Julie Orcutt recommended the provision of more anti-contamination equipment, such as foam mitigation, to reduce dangers to officials entering the blast area.
Document 56: J. Doyle to Gylan C. Allen, “EG&G Comments for Mighty Derringer,” 14 January 1987, Classification unknown, excised, incomplete copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Noting that the exercise provided “very valuable training,” Doyle saw such problems as the “sheer magnitude” in numbers of players, cramped space, and inadequate communications staffing.
Document 57: G.C. Allen, USDOE/NVO, “Mighty Derringer: Comments and Observations,” 15 January 15, 1987, Classification unknown, excised copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Among the shortcomings cited in Allen’s rather critical evaluation were poor communications and weaknesses in interagency coordination.
Document 58: William E. Nelson, Emergency Response, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to Carl Henry, Los Alamos National Laboratory, “‘Quick Look,’ Report, Mighty Derringer,” 21 January 1987, Secret, excised copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Jumping the gun was a weakness cited in Nelson’s critique: players “did not wait for establishment of credibility before acting,” which made a “shambles of an orderly assessment of information.” He also observed that NEST search team “escorts” needed “experience in covert operations” to “prevent inadvertent acts that would alert terrorists.” Nelson’s report included a number of observations made by other participants.
Document 59: J. Strickfadden, LANL, to Bob Nelson, “Mighty Derringer Comments,” n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release

The overall positive evaluation – the “most realistic exercise ever conducted by the NEST community” – included some criticisms, such as “chaotic” operations at the Working Point [WP] and a shambolic state of affairs at the “reentry” point (detonation zone).
Document 60: Milt Madsen (Monitor) to Bob Nelson, “Mighty Derringer Observations,” n.d., Secret, excised, incomplete copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Madsen’s comments included suggestions for future improvements in NEST’s organization: for example, to avoid fragmented committee operations, NEST needed a technical program manager.
Document 61: Peter Mygatt, “Mighty Derringer – Media Play Report,” n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Energy Department spokesperson Mygatt’s evaluation of the player’s management of the media was generally positive, although he saw a few failings, e.g., the Joint Information Center never called a news conference, “which is unheard of in an emergency.”.
Document 62: Walter Nervik, Senior Command Controller, to Robert M. Nelson, Exercise Mighty Derringer Controller, “Lessons Learned,” n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

An official at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Nervik wondered who would provide security after JSOC operatives attacked the terrorists in an overseas environment. Special forces personnel would leave the scene but the NEST would still need security resources.
Document 63: Walter Nervik to Bob Nelson, “Lessons Learned,” n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Nervik was critical in another evaluation: the NEST team was far too large, players were complacent about a nuclear threat, there were no “penalties” for making a mistake, and playing conditions were “unreal.” With respect to the latter point, the fact that the Montrev phase of the exercise occurred on U.S.-controlled territory, (the Nevada Test Site), “severely limits the stress placed on players in unfamiliar surroundings, dealing with strangers, and relying on untested sources of support.” Nervik also saw a danger that participants would see exercises as “more of a game than a serious test of all facets of the NEST capabilities.”
Document 64: Jack Campbell, Public Information, to Robert M. Nelson, Exercise Mighty Derringer Controller, n.d., Secret

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Campbell pointed to a weakness: higher level officials did not really “play.” For example, after the JSOC assault, the State Department left Montrev, even though “lives of American correspondents were in jeopardy.” Another surprise was that the Department of Energy NEST team did not establish a “public affairs” function, although in real life such a group would be highly active.
Document 65: “Mighty Derringer 86,” unattributed, n.d., Secret, excised copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

These handwritten notes raised several issues, such as the interaction between EOD and the Delta force players and the impact of the “play” in the United States on decisions in the OCONUS (Montrev) activity. One impact was that a “risky” disablement option was taken in Montrev in order to preserve evidence to help raise the chance for a successful operation in “site city” (Indianapolis).
Document 66: “Mighty Derringer,” unattributed, n.d., Secret, excised copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

Handwritten notes by another player raised basic organizational issues. The absence of a “chain of command” prior to the deployment made it unclear who EOD worked for. A serious concern was that the Delta Force players did not appreciate the “gravity of dealing with a nuclear device,” an issue suggested by other reports (see document 41).
Document 67: “Mighty Derringer Search Planning,” unattributed, n.d., Secret, excised copy

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This document provides a review of organizational arrangements established for the device search in Indianapolis.
Document 68: “Communications Observations (Site City),” unattributed, n.d., Classification unknown

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This review of communications systems concluded that this was the “best NEST communications exercise that I have observed.”
Document 69: Second page of fax to Carl Henry, unattributed document, n.d., Classification unknown

Source: Energy Department FOIA release

This critique points to operational security (OPSEC) as the “real” problem, noting that players had organizational logos on their clothing and that “loose talk” in hotels and bars was “particularly bad.”

ABBREVIATIONS

CONUS Continental United States

EG&G Edgerton, Germeshausen, and Grier

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EODTECHCTR Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center (Navy)

ERDA Energy Research and Development Administration

EST Emergency Support Team

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCP Forward Control Point

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FRMAC Federal Radiation Monitoring Assessment Center

HRT Hostage Response Team

IND Improved Nuclear Device

JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Center

JSOC Joint Special Operations Command

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team

NVO Nevada Operations Office

OCONUS Outside the Continental United States

OSC On-Scene Commander

REECo Reynolds Electrical Engineering Corporation

SAC Special-Agent-in Charge (FBI)

SFOD Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta

SITREP Situation Report

TOC Tactical Operations Center

WP Working Point

TOP-SECRET – NSA: Apple iOS5 Devices Security Configuration

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL FILE HERE

apple-ios5-sec

TOP-SECRET – NSA Crypto Shaping of Data Encryption Standard

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

nsa-crypto-des

TOP-SECRET – NSA GUNMAN: Learning Enemy Electronic Spying

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

nsa-gunman

TOP-SECRET – NSA on Out of Control System Administrators

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

nsa-sysadmins

TOP-SECRET – NSA on TEMPEST History

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

nsa-tempest-history

TOP-SECRET from Cryptome – NSA TEMPEST Documents Repost

NSA TEMPEST History: http://cryptome.org/2012/05/nsa-tempest-history.pdf

22 June 2011:

Joel McNamara’s comprehensive Complete, Unofficial TEMPEST Information Page has closed. A mirror: http://www.kubieziel.de/blog/uploads/complete_unofficial_tempest_page.pdf

6 April 2003: Add

NCSC 3 – TEMPEST Glossary, 30 March 1981

5 March 2002: Two security papers announced today on optical Tempest risks:

Information Leakage from Optical Emanations, J. Loughry and D.A. Umphress

Optical Time-Domain Eavesdropping Risks of CRT Displays, Markus Kuhn

For emissions security, HIJACK, NONSTOP and TEAPOT, see also Ross Anderson’s Security Engineering, Chapter 15.

HIJACK, NONSTOP, and TEAPOT Vulnerabilities

A STU-III is a highly sophisticated digital device; however, they suffer from a particular nasty vulnerability to strong RF signals that if not properly addressed can cause the accidental disclosure of classified information, and recovery of the keys by an eavesdropper. While the unit itself is well shielded, the power line feeding the unit may not have a clean ground (thus negating the shielding).

If the encryption equipment is located within six to ten wavelengths of a radio transmitter (such as a cellular telephone, beeper, or two way radio) the RF signal can mix with the signals inside the STU and carry information to an eavesdropper. This six to ten wavelengths is referred to as the “near field” or the wave front where the magnetic field of the signal is stronger then the electrical field.

The best way to deal with this is to never have a cellular telephone or pager on your person when using a STU, or within a radius of at least thirty feet (in any direction) from an operational STU (even with a good ground). If the STU is being used in a SCIF or secure facility a cell phone is supposed to be an excluded item, but it is simply amazing how many government people (who know better) forget to turn off their phone before entering controlled areas and thus cause classified materials to be compromised.

Spook Hint: If you have a powered up NEXTEL on your belt and you walk within 12 feet of a STU-III in secure mode you have just compromised the classified key.

— Secure Telephone Units, Crypto Key Generators, Encryption Equipment, and Scramblers (offsite)

Files at Cryptome.org:

tempest-time.htm TEMPEST Timeline
tempest-old.htm TEMPEST History

NSA Documents Obtained by FOIA

nacsem-5112.htm NACSEM 5112 NONSTOP Evaluation Techniques
nstissi-7000.htm NSTISSI No. 7000 TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities           

nacsim-5000.htm NACSIM 5000 Tempest Fundamentals
nacsim-5000.zip NACSIM 5000 Tempest Fundamentals (Zipped 570K)
nsa-94-106.htm NSA No. 94-106 Specification for Shielded Enclosures
tempest-2-95.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance

nt1-92-1-5.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - TOC and Sections 1-5
nt1-92-6-12.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Sections 6-12
nstissam1-92a.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Appendix A (TEMPEST Overview)
nt1-92-B-M.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Appendixes B-M
nt1-92-dist.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Distribution List

nsa-reg90-6.htm NSA/CSS Reg. 90-6, Technical Security Program
nsa-foia-app2.htm NSA Letter Releasing TEMPEST Documents
nsa-foia-app.htm NSA FOIA Appeal for TEMPEST Information
nsa-foia-req.htm NSA FOIA Request for TEMPEST Documents

Other TEMPEST Documents

nsa-etpp.htm NSA Endorsed TEMPEST Products Program
nsa-ettsp.htm NSA Endorsed TEMPEST Test Services Procedures
nsa-zep.htm NSA Zoned Equipment Program
nstissam1-00.htm Maintenance and Disposition of TEMPEST Equipment (2000)
nstissi-7000.htm TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities (1993)

tempest-fr.htm French TEMPEST Documentation (2000)
af-hb202d.htm US Air Force EI Tempest Installation Handbook (1999)
afssi-7010.htm US Air Force Emission Security Assessments (1998)
afssm-7011.htm US Air Force Emission Security Countermeasure Reviews (1998)
qd-tempest.htm Quick and Dirty TEMPEST Experiment (1998)

mil-hdbk-1195.htm Radio Frequency Shielded Enclsoures (1988)
emp.htm US Army Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST
 Protection for Facilities (1990)
zzz1002.htm National TEMPEST School Courses (1998)
navch16.htm Chapter 16 of US Navy's Automated Information Systems
 Security Guidelines

tempest-cpu.htm Controlled CPU TEMPEST emanations (1999)
tempest-door.htm TEMPEST Door (1998)
bema-se.htm Portable Radio Frequency Shielded Enclosures (1998)
datasec.htm Data Security by Architectural Design, George R. Wilson (1995)
rs232.pdf The Threat of Information Theft by Reception
 of Electromagnetic Radiation from RS-232 Cables,
 Peter Smulders (1990)

tempest-law.htm Laws On TEMPEST, Christopher Seline (1989)
tempest-leak.htm The Tempest Over Leaking Computers, Harold Highland (1988)
bits.pdf Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Machines for 
bits.htm Christmas?, Wim Van Eck (1988)
nsa-vaneck.htm NSA, Van Eck, Banks TEMPEST (1985)
emr.pdf Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: An Eavesdropping Risk?, Wim Van Eck (1985)

TOP-SECRET – NSA: Risks of New Smartphones

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

nsa-mobile-risks

TOP-SECRET- The NSA Operation REGAL: Berlin Tunnel

Operation code name: PBJOINTLY Product code name: REGAL

The Berlin Tunnel operation was not a unique type of operation that was only run in Berlin. Prior to the Berlin Tunnel, the British ran a number of successful tunnel cable-tap operations in Vienna,[1] which at the time of these operations, was still an occupied city, divided into four sectors just like Berlin. The British cable taps began in 1948, and ran until the occupation of Austria ended, restoring state sovereignty to the country in 1955. The Soviets had a tap near Potsdam on a cable that served the American Garrison in Berlin.[2]

What has made the Berlin Tunnel famous, while the cable-tap tunnels of Vienna and Potsdam have faded into obscurity is the paradox of intelligence operations which results in fame being a measure of failure and obscurity being a measure of success. The Berlin Tunnel’s true claim to fame, therefore, is that it gained front-page notoriety when the Soviets “discovered” it.

The Official CIA history of the tunnel (prepared in August 1967 and declassified in February 2007) theorizes that the amount of publicity given to the Berlin Tunnel was the result of chance rather than of a conscious decision on the part of the Soviet leadership. During the planning phase of the tunnel, a consensus assessment had been reached which postulated that in the event of the discovery of the tunnel, the Soviet reaction would be to “suppress knowledge” of its existence, so as to save face, rather than have to admit that the West had the capability to mount such an operation. The CIA history of the project suggests that this expectation was defeated because the Soviet Commandant of the Berlin Garrison (who would normally have handled an event of this nature) was away from post at the time, and his deputy found himself in the position of having to make a decision about the tunnel “without benefit of advice from Moscow.”[3]

In his academic history of the Berlin Tunnel (Spies Beneath Berlin), David Stafford of the University of Edinburgh points out that, even though the tunnel was a joint American-British project, the British did not share in the limelight of publicity with the Americans when the tunnel was discovered. This was due, he says, to the fact that Soviet First Secretary Khrushchev was on an official state visit to the U.K.. The visit’s culmination, a visit to Windsor Castle and a reception by the Queen, was scheduled for the day following the discovery of the Berlin Tunnel. British participation in the project was officially hushed up by both the British and the Soviets so as not to spoil the success of the state visit.[4] To this day British Intelligence Services are usually tight-lipped when it comes to discussions of the Berlin Tunnel, or any post-1945 intelligence operation for that matter,[5] while the Americans have declassified the in-house history of the project and authorized one of its participants to include a chapter about it in a book on the Intelligence war in Berlin written in cooperation with one of the KGB veterans of that period (Battleground Berlin).

The intelligence fame/obscurity paradox aside, the Berlin Tunnel operation was, in the words of Allen Dulles (then DCI), “one of the most valuable and daring projects ever undertaken” by the CIA.[6]

The Berlin Tunnel, unlike the Vienna tunnels, was a major engineering feat. It stretched 1476 feet/454[7] meters through sandy ground[8] to reach a cable only 27 inches/68.5 cm beneath the surface,[9] on the edge of a major highway. One of the most difficult engineering problems that had to be overcome in the course of the project was to dig up to the cable from the main tunnel shaft without dropping some truck passing over the highway above into the tunnel.[10] This task was handled by the British,[11] who had their experience of Vienna to fall back on.

The total cost of the tunnel project was over six and a half million[12] 1950s dollars, which in 2007 dollars would be over 51 and a quarter million.[13] By way of comparison, the development and delivery of the first six U-2 aircraft, a project contemporary with the Berlin Tunnel, cost 22 million total,[14] or 3.6 million each. That means that the tunnel cost roughly as much as two U-2s.

According to Murphey, Kondrashev and Bailey in Battleground Berlin, the tale of the tunnel began in early 1951, when Frank Rowlett told Bill Harvey how frustrated he was by the loss of intelligence due to the Soviet shift from radio to landline.[15] The assessment process that preceded target selection continued throughout 1952, the year that saw Harvey reassigned to Berlin. Test recordings of the kind of traffic available from the cables were made in the spring and summer of 1953.[16] By August of 1953, plans for the tunnel were being readied for presentation to the DCI, Allen Dulles.[17]

Dulles approved the terms of reference for cooperaton with the British on the Berlin Tunnel in December 1953.[18] The “go” was given to start the construction of the warehouse that would serve as the cover for the tunnel, and construction was completed in August. The American engineering team that actually dug the tunnel arrived to take control of the compound on 28 August. Digging began on 2 September, but, on 8 September, the miners struck water and which necessitated that pumps be brought in. The tunnel reached its distant end on 28 February 1955,[19] and the tap chamber took another month to complete. The complex process of tapping into the three target cables without alerting the Soviets to what was going on was a slow one. It lasted from 11 May through 2 August 1955.[20] Collection of intelligence from the taps, however, began as soon as the first circuits were brought on-line.

During the night of 21-22 April 1956, the Soviets “discovered” the tunnel, and collection ceased. That did not close the project, however. The take from the Berlin Tunnel during the time that it was operational (11 months and 11 days) was so great that processing of the backlog of material continued through the end of September 1958.[21]

The loss of this valuable source was, of course, a blow to US/UK intelligence efforts against the Soviets at the time, but this loss was somewhat compensated for by the prestige that the CIA won in the press following the tunnel’s discovery. The article on the tunnel in the issue of Time magazine (07 May 1956) that followed the tunnel’s discovery said “It’s the best publicity the U.S. has had in Berlin for a long time.”

An urban legend that persistently continues to associate itself with the Berlin Tunnel is that the idea for the tunnel came from Reinhard Gehlen (the German Abwehr-Ost general who surrendered to the Americans and later became the head of the West German BND). Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey flatly reject this assertion in Battleground Berlin.[22] David Stafford argues credibly against the validity of this legend in his academic history of the Berlin Tunnel. He notes that there is no evidence to support this theory, and “those most closely in the know in the CIA have strenuously denied it,”[23] essentially repeating Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey. Stafford’s most telling argument against Gehlen’s involvement is that no mention of the Berlin Tunnel is to be found in Gehlen’s memoirs (The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen, New York: World Publishing, 1972). “Never a modest man,” says Stafford, Gehlen “would surely have bid for some of the credit had he been any way involved. In fact, he does not even refer to it.”[24]

In the section “Recapitulation of Intelligence Derived” from the Berlin Tunnel, the CIA History of the project says that the “REGAL operation provided the United States and the British with a unique source of current intelligence on the Soviet Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been available since 1948. Responsible officials considered PBJOINTLY, during its productive phase, to be the prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in Europe, if not world-wide.”[25] The section goes on to list general types of political, ground-forces, air-force and naval intelligence that the tunnel provided, many of them with glowing comments from consumers.

The debate about the value of the information derived from the Berlin Tunnel has been raging since 1961, when it was discovered that PBJOINTLY was compromised to the Soviets by the British mole George Blake who attended the meeting on the Berlin Tunnel between the British and Americans in London in December 1953. Many widely read books and articles on the tunnel contended that the KGB had used the tunnel to feed the Americans and the British disinformation. Stafford, however, convincingly dispels all suspicions that the Berlin Tunnel was turned into a disinformation counter-intelligence operation by the KGB. Drawing on the information that came to light during the “Teufelsberg” Conference on Cold-War intelligence operations that brought intelligence professionals from both the CIA and the KGB together in Berlin in 1999, Stafford concludes that “[f]ar from using the tunnel for misinformation and deception, the KGB’s First Chief Directorate had taken a deliberate decision to conceal its existence from the Red Army and GRU, the main users of the cables being tapped. The reason for this extraordinary decision was to protect “Diomid”, their rare and brilliant source George Blake.”[26]

Stafford ends his discussion of the legitimacy of the material collected from the Berlin Tunnel with a quote from Blake, who was still living in Moscow at the time of the “Teufelsberg” Conference. “I’m sure 99.9% of the information obtained by the SIS and CIA from the tunnel was genuine.”[27]

By T.H.E. Hill

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL NSA DOCUMENT HERE

nsa-operation-regal

TOP-SECRET from the NSA – Director of National Intelligence Knowledge Assertions and Knowledge Organization Systems Presentation

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

DNI-KnowledgeSystems

Cryptome – Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of Justice Joint Statement

REVISED GUIDELINES ISSUED TO ALLOW THE NCTC TO ACCESS AND ANALYZE CERTAIN FEDERAL DATA MORE EFFECTIVELY TO COMBAT TERRORIST THREATS

Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Attorney General Eric Holder, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Matthew G. Olsen have signed updated guidelines designed to allow NCTC to obtain and more effectively analyze certain data in the government s possession to better address terrorism-related threats, while at the same time protecting privacy and civil liberties.

The Guidelines for Access, Retention, Use, and Dissemination by the National Counterrorism Center (NCTC) of Information in Datasets Containing Non-Terrorism Information effective Mar. 22, 2012, update November 2008 guidelines that governed NCTC s access, retention, use, and dissemination of terrorism information contained within federal datasets that are identified as also including non-terrorism information and information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism.

The updated Guidelines provide a framework that allows NCTC to obtain certain data held by other U.S. Government agencies to better protect the nation and its allies from terrorist attacks. In coordination with other federal agencies providing data to the NCTC, NCTC will establish the timeline for the retention of individual datasets based upon the type of data, the sensitivity of the data, any legal requirements that apply to the particular data, and other relevant considerations.

Among other modifications, the revised Guidelines:

Permit NCTC to retain certain datasets that are likely to contain significant terrorism information and are already in the lawful custody and control of other federal agencies for up to five years, unless a shorter period is required by law.

Permit NCTC to query this data only to identify information that is reasonably believed to constitute terrorism information.

Provide that all data obtained by NCTC from another federal agency pursuant to the Guidelines, will be subject to appropriate safeguards and oversight mechanisms, including monitoring, recording, and auditing of access to and queries of the data, to protect privacy and civil liberties.

Require NCTC to undertake a number of additional compliance and reporting obligations to ensure robust oversight.

The updated Guidelines do not provide any new authorities for the U.S. Government to collect information, nor do they authorize acquisition of data from entities outside the federal government. All information that would be accessed by NCTC under the Guidelines is already in the lawful custody and control of other federal agencies. The Guidelines merely provide the NCTC with a more effective means of accessing and analyzing datasets in the government s possession that are likely to contain significant terrorism information. They permit NCTC to consolidate disparate federal datasets that contain information of value to NCTC s critical counterterrorism mission. Furthermore, the updated Guidelines do not supersede or replace any legal restrictions on information sharing (existing by statute, Executive Order, regulation, or international agreement). Thus, the updated Guidelines do not give NCTC authority to require another agency to share any dataset where such sharing would contravene U.S. law or an international agreement.

One of the issues identified by Congress and the Intelligence Community after the 2009 Fort Hood shootings and the Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt was the government s limited ability to query multiple federal datasets and to correlate information from many sources that might relate to a potential attack. A review of government actions taken before these attacks recommended that the Intelligence Community push for the completion of state-of-the-art search and correlation capabilities, including techniques that would provide a single point of entry to various government databases.

Following the failed terrorist attack in December 2009, representatives of the counterterrorism community concluded it is vital for NCTC to be provided with a variety of datasets from various agencies that contain terrorism information, said Clapper, The ability to search against these datasets for up to five years on a continuing basis as these updated Guidelines permit will enable NCTC to accomplish its mission more practically and effectively than the 2008 Guidelines allowed.

The updated Guidelines have undergone extensive review within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice and have been coordinated throughout the Intelligence Community. Under the National Security Act of 1947, NCTC is charged with serving as the primary organization in the U.S. Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism. Consistent with this statutory mission, Executive Order 12333 provides that Intelligence Community elements may collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States Persons (USPs) only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence Community element and approved by the Attorney General in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.

The 2008 Guidelines required NCTC to promptly review USP information and then promptly remove it if it is not reasonably believed to constitute terrorism information. This approach was a reasonable first step in 2008, but based on subsequent experience and lessons learned, the requirement to promptly remove USP information hampers NCTC s ability to identify terrorism information by connecting the dots across multiple datasets.

There are a number of protections built into the 2012 revised Guidelines, said Alexander Joel, ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer. Before obtaining a dataset, the Director of NCTC, in coordination with the data provider, is required to make a finding that the dataset is likely to contain significant terrorism information.

Once ingested, data is subject to a number of baseline safeguards carried over from the 2008 Guidelines, including restrictions that limit access to only those individuals with a mission need and who have received training on the Guidelines.

The approval of these Guidelines will significantly improve NCTC s ability to carry out its statutory mission said Clapper, Our citizens expect that we do everything in our power to keep them safe, while protecting privacy and other civil liberties. These Guidelines provide our counterterrorism analysts with the means to accomplish that task more effectively.

###

NCTC Guidelines: http://cryptome.org/2012/03/nctc-data-spy.pdf (2.2MB)

Cryptome – NSA Decryption Multipurpose Research Facility

The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say)

By James Bamford

March 15, 2012

[Excerpts of excellent NSA overview to focus on the MRF decryption facility.]

When Barack Obama took office, Binney hoped the new administration might be open to reforming the program to address his constitutional concerns. He and another former senior NSA analyst, J. Kirk Wiebe, tried to bring the idea of an automated warrant-approval system to the attention of the Department of Justice’s inspector general. They were given the brush-off. “They said, oh, OK, we can’t comment,” Binney says.

Sitting in a restaurant not far from NSA headquarters, the place where he spent nearly 40 years of his life, Binney held his thumb and forefinger close together. “We are, like, that far from a turnkey totalitarian state,” he says.

There is still one technology preventing untrammeled government access to private digital data: strong encryption. Anyone—from terrorists and weapons dealers to corporations, financial institutions, and ordinary email senders—can use it to seal their messages, plans, photos, and documents in hardened data shells. For years, one of the hardest shells has been the Advanced Encryption Standard, one of several algorithms used by much of the world to encrypt data. Available in three different strengths—128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits—it’s incorporated in most commercial email programs and web browsers and is considered so strong that the NSA has even approved its use for top-secret US government communications. Most experts say that a so-called brute-force computer attack on the algorithm—trying one combination after another to unlock the encryption—would likely take longer than the age of the universe. For a 128-bit cipher, the number of trial-and-error attempts would be 340 undecillion (1036).

Breaking into those complex mathematical shells like the AES is one of the key reasons for the construction going on in Bluffdale. That kind of cryptanalysis requires two major ingredients: super-fast computers to conduct brute-force attacks on encrypted messages and a massive number of those messages for the computers to analyze. The more messages from a given target, the more likely it is for the computers to detect telltale patterns, and Bluffdale will be able to hold a great many messages. “We questioned it one time,” says another source, a senior intelligence manager who was also involved with the planning. “Why were we building this NSA facility? And, boy, they rolled out all the old guys—the crypto guys.” According to the official, these experts told then-director of national intelligence Dennis Blair, “You’ve got to build this thing because we just don’t have the capability of doing the code-breaking.” It was a candid admission. In the long war between the code breakers and the code makers—the tens of thousands of cryptographers in the worldwide computer security industry—the code breakers were admitting defeat.

So the agency had one major ingredient—a massive data storage facility—under way. Meanwhile, across the country in Tennessee, the government was working in utmost secrecy on the other vital element: the most powerful computer the world has ever known.

The plan was launched in 2004 as a modern-day Manhattan Project. Dubbed the High Productivity Computing Systems program, its goal was to advance computer speed a thousandfold, creating a machine that could execute a quadrillion (1015) operations a second, known as a petaflop—the computer equivalent of breaking the land speed record. And as with the Manhattan Project, the venue chosen for the supercomputing program was the town of Oak Ridge in eastern Tennessee, a rural area where sharp ridges give way to low, scattered hills, and the southwestward-flowing Clinch River bends sharply to the southeast. About 25 miles from Knoxville, it is the “secret city” where uranium- 235 was extracted for the first atomic bomb. A sign near the exit read: what you see here, what you do here, what you hear here, when you leave here, let it stay here. Today, not far from where that sign stood, Oak Ridge is home to the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and it’s engaged in a new secret war. But this time, instead of a bomb of almost unimaginable power, the weapon is a computer of almost unimaginable speed.

In 2004, as part of the supercomputing program, the Department of Energy established its Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility for multiple agencies to join forces on the project. But in reality there would be two tracks, one unclassified, in which all of the scientific work would be public, and another top-secret, in which the NSA could pursue its own computer covertly. “For our purposes, they had to create a separate facility,” says a former senior NSA computer expert who worked on the project and is still associated with the agency. (He is one of three sources who described the program.) It was an expensive undertaking, but one the NSA was desperate to launch.

Known as the Multiprogram Research Facility, or Building 5300, the $41 million, five-story, 214,000-square-foot structure was built on a plot of land on the lab’s East Campus and completed in 2006. Behind the brick walls and green-tinted windows, 318 scientists, computer engineers, and other staff work in secret on the cryptanalytic applications of high-speed computing and other classified projects. The supercomputer center was named in honor of George R. Cotter, the NSA’s now-retired chief scientist and head of its information technology program. Not that you’d know it. “There’s no sign on the door,” says the ex-NSA computer expert.

At the DOE’s unclassified center at Oak Ridge, work progressed at a furious pace, although it was a one-way street when it came to cooperation with the closemouthed people in Building 5300. Nevertheless, the unclassified team had its Cray XT4 supercomputer upgraded to a warehouse-sized XT5. Named Jaguar for its speed, it clocked in at 1.75 petaflops, officially becoming the world’s fastest computer in 2009.

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1 Geostationary satellites

Four satellites positioned around the globe monitor frequencies carrying everything from walkie-talkies and cell phones in Libya to radar systems in North Korea. Onboard software acts as the first filter in the collection process, targeting only key regions, countries, cities, and phone numbers or email.

2 Aerospace Data Facility, Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado

Intelligence collected from the geostationary satellites, as well as signals from other spacecraft and overseas listening posts, is relayed to this facility outside Denver. About 850 NSA employees track the satellites, transmit target information, and download the intelligence haul.

3 NSA Georgia, Fort Gordon, Augusta, Georgia

Focuses on intercepts from Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Codenamed Sweet Tea, the facility has been massively expanded and now consists of a 604,000-square-foot operations building for up to 4,000 intercept operators, analysts, and other specialists.

4 NSA Texas, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio

Focuses on intercepts from Latin America and, since 9/11, the Middle East and Europe. Some 2,000 workers staff the operation. The NSA recently completed a $100 million renovation on a mega-data center here—a backup storage facility for the Utah Data Center.

5 NSA Hawaii, Oahu

Focuses on intercepts from Asia. Built to house an aircraft assembly plant during World War II, the 250,000-square-foot bunker is nicknamed the Hole. Like the other NSA operations centers, it has since been expanded: Its 2,700 employees now do their work aboveground from a new 234,000-square-foot facility.

6 Domestic listening posts

The NSA has long been free to eavesdrop on international satellite communications. But after 9/11, it installed taps in US telecom “switches,” gaining access to domestic traffic. An ex-NSA official says there are 10 to 20 such installations.

7 Overseas listening posts

According to a knowledgeable intelligence source, the NSA has installed taps on at least a dozen of the major overseas communications links, each capable of eavesdropping on information passing by at a high data rate.

8 Utah Data Center, Bluffdale, Utah

At a million square feet, this $2 billion digital storage facility outside Salt Lake City will be the centerpiece of the NSA’s cloud-based data strategy and essential in its plans for decrypting previously uncrackable documents.

9 Multiprogram Research Facility, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Some 300 scientists and computer engineers with top security clearance toil away here, building the world’s fastest supercomputers and working on cryptanalytic applications and other secret projects.

10 NSA headquarters, Fort Meade, Maryland

Analysts here will access material stored at Bluffdale to prepare reports and recommendations that are sent to policymakers. To handle the increased data load, the NSA is also building an $896 million supercomputer here.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory – Multi-Program Research Facilityhttp://www.heery.com/Repository/Images/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratories.jpg

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http://www.heery.com/portfolio/oak-ridge-national-laboratory.aspx?service=5

Oak Ridge National Laboratory – Multi-Program Research Facility

Oak Ridge, Tennessee

The Department of Energy (DOE) complex at Oak Ridge required the creation of a state of the art, large-scale, secure science and technology facility that would provide the appropriate infrastructure and environment to both integrate and consolidate multidisciplinary scientific capabilities for defense and homeland security activities. The Heery-designed and constructed Multi-Program Research Facility (MPRF) provides facilities for research and development activities in non-proliferation research, training and operations; cyber security research and development; geospatial analysis; inorganic membrane research and prototyping; and myriad other activities.

Based on Heery’s previous successful work with ORNL as part of a third-party development team, ORNL tapped the Keenan team to serve as its developer for the MPRF, with Heery in the role of design-builder.

The MPRF contains 218,000 SF of office and laboratory space. This highly secure building plays a key role in delivering the science and technology needed to protect homeland and national security. In addition, Heery International continues to work on various new assignments on the ORNL campus.

The goal was to develop cutting-edge facilities designed for sustainability and energy efficiency. Heery guided ORNL and the development team in delivering facilities to showcase energy and water efficiency and renewable energy improvements. With Heery’s assistance, ORNL now has the most LEED-certified space in the entire DOE system, having attained LEED certification for the firm’s earlier project, the East Campus Complex, and LEED Gold certification for the MPRF, which is the first LEED Gold facility on the ORNL campus.

Following images from bing.com/mapsThe MRF is at upper left.

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http://femp.buildinggreen.com/overview.cfm?ProjectID=1125Oak Ridge National Laboratory Multiprogram Research Facility (MRF)

(ORNL Multiprogram Research Facility)

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Overview

Location: Oak Ridge, TN

Building type(s): Other, Laboratory, Commercial office

New construction

195,000 ft2 (18,100 m2)

Project scope: 5-story building

Rural setting

Completed October 2006

Rating: U.S. Green Building Council LEED-NC, v.2/v.2.1–Level: Gold (39 points)

The Multiprogram Research Facility (MRF) was implemented through a design-build contract, but is a complex mixture of labs and offices that have stringent operational, security, and environmental and energy requirements. The program was highly developed and has detailed technical parameters that could not be compromised.

Environmental Aspects

The building’s vertical orientation minimized its footprint on the landscape. Using native, drought-resistant plants in the landscape obviated the need for irrigation. This, along with the use of low-flow plumbing fixtures, reduced potable water usage by approximately 34%.

The building was projected to use 25% less energy than that of a comparable facility built in minimal compliance with code. A hybrid solar lighting system with rooftop solar collectors was installed to test the feasibility of using fiber optics for natural lighting.

The project team preferred materials with recycled content and those that were manufactured regionally. The team also recycled construction waste wherever possible.

Owner & Occupancy

Owned by Keenan Development Associates, LLC, Corporation, for-profit

Occupants: Federal government

Typically occupied by 318 people, 40 hours per person per week

Expected Building Service Life: 35 years

Building Programs

Indoor Spaces:

Other (43%), Office (18%), Laboratory (14%), Conference (6%), Data processing (6%), Mechanical systems (3%), Retail general (3%), Public assembly (2%), Restrooms (2%), Lobby/reception (2%), Cafeteria, Circulation, Gymnasium, Electrical systems

NSA – The National Security Agency after the Bin Laden Killing

CONFIDENTIAL – NSA Opens $286 Million Cryptologic Facility in Georgia

The National Security Agency officially opened for business Monday in its new building on Fort Gordon.In a rare public ceremony for an agency typically cloaked in secrecy, NSA’s director and other dignitaries symbolically cut the ribbon inside a 200-seat rotunda that will serve as an operations center. When full occupancy is completed in late summer, about 4,000 civilian and military workers trained in linguistics and cryptology will report to what’s known as NSA Georgia.Army Gen. Keith Alexander, the commander of the Fort Meade, Md.,-based NSA, acknowledged the irony of inviting the public to a department jokingly referred to as “No Such Agency.”

He heaped praise, however, on the work done in Augusta to support national defense and military missions abroad.

NSA/CSS Opens Its Newest Facility In Georgia

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service officially opened the new NSA/CSS Georgia Cryptologic Center at a ribbon-cutting ceremony where officials emphasized how the $286 million complex will provide cryptologic professionals with the latest state-of-the-art tools to conduct signals intelligence operations, train the cryptologic workforce, and enable global communications.NSA/CSS has had a presence in Georgia for over 16 years on Ft. Gordon, when only 50 people arrived to establish one of NSA’s Regional Security Operations Centers.As a testament to this rich heritage, GEN Keith B. Alexander – Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, Director, NSA/Chief, CSS – told the guests at the ceremony, which included federal, state, and local officials, that the NSA/CSS workforce nominated Mr. John Whitelaw for the honor of having one of the buildings in the complex dedicated in his name, because they considered him influential to the establishment and success of the mission in Georgia. In 1995 Mr. Whitelaw was named the first Deputy Director of Operations for NSA Georgia and remained in that position until his death in 2004.

“And there have been many successes here at NSA Georgia as evidenced by the fact that this site has won the Travis Trophy six times,” said GEN Alexander. The Travis Trophy is an annual award presented to those whose activities have made a significant contribution to NSA/CSS’s mission.

“This new facility will allow the National Security Agency to work more effectively and efficiently in protecting our homeland,” said Sen. Saxby Chambliss. “It will also attract more jobs to the Augusta area. The opening of this complex means that Georgians will play an even greater role in ensuring the safety and security of our nation.”

The new NSA/CSS Georgia Cryptologic Center is another step in the NSA’s efforts to further evolve a cryptologic enterprise that is resilient, agile, and effective to respond to the current and future threat environment.

NSA/CSS opened a new facility in Hawaii in January 2012 and is also upgrading the cryptologic centers in Texas and Denver to make the agency’s global enterprise even more seamless as it confronts the increasing challenges of the future.

The Nuclear Vault – “Nobody Wins a Nuclear War” But “Success” is Possible

General Curtis LeMay, mid-1957, sometime during his transition from Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command [1948-1957] to Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force [1957-1961]. [Photo source: U.S. National Archives, Still Pictures Division, RG 342B, Box 507 B&W]

“The Power of Decision” may be the first (and perhaps the only) U.S. government film dramatizing nuclear war decision-making. Commissioned by the Strategic Air Command in 1956, the film has the look of a 1950s TV drama, but the subject is the ultimate Cold War nightmare. By the end of the film, after the U.S. Air Force has implemented war plan “Quick Strike” following a Soviet surprise attack, millions of Americans, Russians, Europeans, and Japanese are dead. The narrator, a Colonel Dodd, asserts that “nobody wins a nuclear war because both sides are sure to suffer terrible damage.” Despite the “catastrophic” damage, one of the film’s operating assumptions is that defeat is avoidable as long as the adversary cannot impose its “will” on the United States. The film’s last few minutes suggest that the United States would prevail because of the “success” of its nuclear air offensive. Moscow, not the United States, is sending out pleas for a cease-fire.

The conviction that the United States could prevail was a doctrinal necessity because Air Force leaders assumed the decisiveness of air power. The founding fathers of the U.S. Air Force came out of World War II with an unshakeable, if exaggerated, conviction that the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan had been decisive for the Allied victory and that air power would be crucial in future conflicts. (Note 1) The film’s title: “Power of Decision” embodies that conviction. The title itself is a reference to a 1948 statement by General George C. Kenney, the Strategic Air Command’s first commander-in-chief: “A war in which either or both opponents use atomic bombs will be over in a matter of days…The Air Force that is superior in its capability of destruction plays the dominant role and has the power of decision.” (Note 2) A confident statement made by one of the characters, General “Pete” Larson, near the close of reel 6 flows from that assumption: the Soviets “must quit; we have the air and the power and they know it.”
The story begins with Colonel Dodd, standing in the underground command post of the “Long Range Offense Force” (oddly, the Strategic Air Command is never mentioned by name). Dodd discusses the Force’s strike capabilities, its mechanisms for keeping track of its strategic assets, and its war plans. That hundreds of bombers, based in U.S. territories and overseas bases, are ready to launch at a moment’s notice is the “surest way to prevent war.” Dodd does not think that the Soviets are likely to strike, but if deterrence fails and the Soviets launch an attack, “this is what will happen.”

What “happens” is the initial detection by U.S. air defense network of the approach of Soviet bombers over the Arctic Circle. That leads to General Larson’s decision to launch the SAC alert force under plan “Quick Strike”; airborne and nuclear-armed alert bombers fly toward the Soviet periphery, but stay at position until they receive an attack order (this was the concept of “Fail Safe” or “Positive Control” although those terms were not used in the film). About an hour after the alert force is launched, General Larson receives reports of attacks on U.S. bases, followed by more information on Soviet nuclear attacks on cities and military bases in Japan and Western Europe. “That does it,” General Turner (one of Larson’s deputies) exclaims. He soon receives a call on the red phone from the Joint Chiefs, who with the President, are in a protected command post. The president has ordered the execution of “Quick Strike,” releasing bombers and missiles to strike the Soviet Union. This simultaneous bomber-missile “double punch” is aimed at “all elements of [Soviet] air power” [bomber bases] along with “war making and war sustaining resources,” which meant strikes on urban-industrial areas and urban populations. To depict the undepictable, the film’s producers use stock footage of nuclear tests and missile and bomber launches.

Once it is evident that the Soviets have launched a surprise air attack, Colonel Dodd observes that “By giving up the initiative, the West must expect to take the first blow.” This statement is not developed, but for Air Force planners, “initiative” meant a preemptive attack or a first strike. By the early 1950, senior military planners and defense officials had begun considering the possibility of pre-emptive attacks on the basis of strategic warning; that is, if the United States intelligence warning system collected reliable information on an impending Soviet attack, decision-makers could approve strikes against Soviet military forces to disrupt it. (Note 3) Consistent with this, Strategic Air Command war plans assumed “two basic modes” for executing strike plans [See Document One below]. (Note 4) One was retaliation against a surprise attack; the other “plan was based on the assumption that the United States had strategic warning and had decided to take the initiative.” The SAC strike force would then be “launched to penetrate en masse prior to the enemy attack; the main target would be the enemy’s retaliatory capability.”

In the last part of reel 6, Air Force intelligence briefings review the destruction of the Soviet military machine, including destruction of air bases, weapons storage centers, and government control centers, among other targets. “Target M,” presumably Moscow, has “been destroyed” by a nuclear weapon which struck 300 yards from the aiming point. The Soviet attack has done calamitous damage to the United States, with 60 million casualties, including 20 million wounded, but evidence was becoming available of the “success” of the U.S. air offensive. The Soviet Air Force has been reduced to a handful of aircraft, it had stopped launching nuclear strikes outside of its territory, and SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] reports the “complete disintegration of resistance” by Soviet ground forces. Moreover, cease-fire requests are coming in from the Soviets. In this context, General Larson’s certainty that the “Soviets must quit” conveyed prevailing assumptions about the value of strategic air power.

Around the time when “The Power of Decision” as being produced, a statement by SAC Commander-in-Chief General Curtis LeMay made explicit what was implicit in Larson’s observation. In an address before the Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board in 1957 [see Document Two], LeMay argued that U.S. strategic forces could not be an effective deterrent unless they were “clearly capable of winning under operational handicaps of bad weather and no more than tactical warning.” And by winning, LeMay said he meant “achieving a condition wherein the enemy cannot impose his will on us, but we can impose our will on him.” Larson’s statement about control of the air dovetailed exactly with LeMay’s assumptions about winning.

Little is known about the production and distribution of “The Power of Decision,” or even if it was actually shown. According to the history of the Air Photographic and Charting Service for January through June 1957, on 28 May 1956, the Strategic Air Command requested the service to produce the film, which would be classified Secret. SAC leaders may have wanted such a film for internal indoctrination and training purposes, to help officers and airmen prepare themselves for the worst active-duty situation that they could encounter. Perhaps the relatively unruffled style of the film’s performers was to serve as a model for SAC officers if they ever had to follow orders that could produce a nuclear holocaust. In any event, the script for “Power of Decision” was approved on 10 May 1957 and a production planning conference took place on 29 May 1957. The contract productions section of the Air Photographic and Charting Service was the film’s producing unit. (Note 5)

The next step was to find actors with security clearances because even the synopsis of the film was classified secret (although later downgraded to “official use only”). As the Air Force was not in the business of hiring actors, the production unit engaged the services of MPO Productions, a New York-based firm which produced commercials and industrial films. [References to MPO, Inc. are on the index cards and on “The End” frame at the close of reel 6]. What happened next, when the work on the film was completed, SAC’s assessment of the project, and whether, when, or where the film was shown, cannot presently be determined, although the information may be in the living memories of participants or viewers from those days.

Note: The relatively poor quality of this digital reproduction reflects the condition of the original reels as turned over to the National Archives by the Air Force.

Notes

1. For the development of ideas about air power and strategic bombing, see Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1941–1945 ( Princeton University Press, 2002). See page 293 for “overselling” of air power. See also Gian Peri Gentile, “Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan,” Pacific Historical Review 66 (1997): 53-79.

2. Quotation from Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of Strategic Air Command, July-December 1959, Volume I, 191. Information provided by Mr. Barry Spink, U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, e-mail 17 May 2010. After his unsuccessful tour as first Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command, Kenney become notorious for his endorsement of preventive war against the Soviet Union. See Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 106.

3. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 134-135.

4. For a briefing by SAC commander-in-chief Curtis LeMay of the nuclear war plan, see David A. Rosenberg, “Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours”: Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-55,” International Security, 6 (Winter, 1981-1982): 3-38.

5. Information from “Air Photographic and Charting Service history for January through June 1957,” provided by Mr. Barry Spink, AFHRA e-mail 13 May 2010.

CONFIDENTIAL – NSA Overview of Cloud Computing

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

nsa-cloud

TOP SECRET – CRYPTOME publishes – NSA Email Addresses, Nyms and Names

5 February 2012

NSA Email Addresses, Nyms and Names

A sends:

Below is unverified information posted 9 days ago on this .onion site:

http://4eiruntyxxbgfv7o.onion/snapbbs/736364f4/

(thread: “where to get confidential info”)

It may simply be the INSA list, but I lack the time to compare.

(Director of NSA)
KBalexanderLTG@nsa.gov
KBalex2@nsa.gov
;-)
RFTYGAR@NSA.GOV (Major General David B. Lacquement, Cybercom)
dfmuzzy@nsa.gov or dbmuzzy@nsa.gov
algorin@nsa.gov
bkind@nsa.gov
bmcrumm@nsa.gov
bmkaspa@nsa.gov
bmstite@nsa.gov
ceander@nsa.gov
dabonan@nsa.gov
dahatch@nsa.gov
daplunk@nsa.gov
dbbuie@nsa.gov
dcover@nsa.gov
dpcargo@nsa.gov
dpmatth@nsa.gov
drennis@nsa.gov
dvheinb@nsa.gov
eejorda@nsa.gov
elbauma@nsa.gov
fdbedar@nsa.gov
fjfleis@nsa.gov
fjorlos@nsa.gov
gafrisv@nsa.gov
gcnolte@nsa.gov
gdbartk@nsa.gov
ghevens@nsa.gov
grcotte@nsa.gov
hadavis@nsa.gov
hlriley@nsa.gov
jaemmel@nsa.gov
jcingli@nsa.gov
jcmorti@nsa.gov
jcsmart@nsa.gov
jdcohen@nsa.gov
jdheath@nsa.gov
jewhite@nsa.gov
jgrusse@nsa.gov
jhdoody@nsa.gov
jhohara@nsa.gov
jimathe@nsa.gov
jjbrand@nsa.gov
jksilk@nsa.gov
jllusby@nsa.gov
jmcusic@nsa.gov
jmjohns@nsa.gov
jrsmith@nsa.gov
jswalsm@nsa.gov
jtnader@nsa.gov
kamille@nsa.gov
kbalex2@nsa.gov
labaer@nsa.gov
landers@nsa.gov
lfgiles@nsa.gov
lkensor@nsa.gov
lphall@nsa.gov
lrstanl@nsa.gov
ltdunno@nsa.gov
mabeatt@nsa.gov
mawirt@nsa.gov
mgflemi@nsa.gov
mjgood@nsa.gov
mkmcnam@nsa.gov
mrevans@nsa.gov
mrredgr@nsa.gov
mthorto@nsa.gov
nasmith@nsa.gov
pacabra@nsa.gov
papitte@nsa.gov
plihnat@nsa.gov
plporte@nsa.gov
rdjones@nsa.gov
rdsiers@nsa.gov
relewis@nsa.gov
resunda@nsa.gov
rhkrysi@nsa.gov
rlcarte@nsa.gov
rlmeyer@nsa.gov
rmmeyer@nsa.gov
rpkelly@nsa.gov
sfdishe@nsa.gov
sfdonne@nsa.gov
sgmille@nsa.gov
sjmille@nsa.gov
sstanar@nsa.gov
swramsa@nsa.gov
taedwar@nsa.gov
tdsoule@nsa.gov
tjpeter@nsa.gov
twsager@nsa.gov
vacurti@nsa.gov
vnhalli@nsa.gov
wjmarsh@nsa.gov
wmmurph@nsa.gov
wmthomp@nsa.gov
wjseman@nsa.gov
--Korruptor posted 9 days 22 hours ago:

MTCLAYT@NSA.GOV
NCMUNKO@NSA.GOV
cjhuff@nsa.gov
RBQUINN@NSA.GOV

Lorenzo Mccormick lmccorm@nsa.gov
Angelina Mcclure ammccl3@nsa.gov
Timothy Gibbs tjgibbs@nsa.gov
Joshua Foredyce jdfored@nsa.gov
Nicole Morrison nnmorri@nsa.gov
Sally Smith sssmit3@nsa.gov
Todd Black tfblack@nsa.gov
Todd Black tfblack@nsa.gov
Viola Williams vrmclau@nsa.gov
Stephen Schultz UN:SRSYSENGINEER sjschul@nsa.gov
Yesenia Martinez yamarti@nsa.gov
Teresa Straniero tjstran@nsa.gov
Taj Holmes tlholm3@nsa.gov
Joseph Johnson jjohns5@nsa.gov
Hyon-chu karen Cho KAREN0120 hkcho@nsa.gov 
Nathan Nysether nenyset@nsa.gov
Everett Browning edbrow2@nsa.gov
Sean Williamson smwill8@nsa.gov
Kevin Standifer kmstand@nsa.gov
Maria Johnson msjohn8@nsa.gov

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The National Security Archive – Cracking a Vietnam War Mystery

Washington, D.C., February, 2012 – Casting new light on one of the most controversial and enduring mysteries of the Vietnam War, a new book using evidence from long-hidden communist sources suggests that the U.S. Government missed a major chance to open peace talks with North Vietnam in late 1966, more than eighteen months before the opening of the Paris peace talks and more than six years before the accords that finally ended US direct involvement in the fighting. The revelations contained in Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam by James G. Hershberg imply that the United States might have escaped its Vietnam predicament with a far lower toll: the secret Polish-Italian peace attempt code-named “Marigold” by U.S. officials culminated at a time when roughly 6,250 Americans had perished, compared to the more than 58,000 who ultimately died in the war.^[1]

At one point the clandestine diplomacy verged on a breakthrough, with the apparent mutual agreement to hold an unprecedented meeting between US and North Vietnamese ambassadors in Warsaw to confirm Washington’s adherence to a ten-point formula for a settlement. “I thought I had done something worthwhile in my life,” recalled the American ambassador in Saigon at the time, Henry Cabot Lodge, of that moment of seeming success with his diplomatic partners from Poland and Italy. “We had a drink on it.”^[2] A date was even tentatively set for the enemy ambassadors to meet: December 6, 1966. But before the encounter could take place, the covert effort was first suspended—due, the Poles said, to the U.S. bombing of Hanoi, the first such strikes around the North Vietnamese capital in more than five months—and then collapsed, for reasons which were disputed in acrimonious private US-Polish exchanges at the time. Before long, those arguments seeped into the press, sparking an international scandal and leaving behind a convoluted historical mystery—until now.

The inside story of these murky diplomatic machinations, as well as other revelations concerning the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet split, and American politics and journalism in the 1960s, can now be found in Hershberg’s book, published this week by the Stanford University Press and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Challenging the conventional wisdom that both Washington and Hanoi were so dug in at the time that no real chance for peace (or even serious peace talks) then existed, the study utilizes more than a decade of archival research in more than a dozen countries, both communist (and former communist) and Western, as well as interviews with veterans of the events in Poland, Vietnam, Italy, and the United States—including roughly 50 hours of interviews in Warsaw with the key figure in the affair, former Polish diplomat Janusz Lewandowski, who comes in from the cold war to offer his perspective openly and in depth for the first time.

Background

First—some context. Between early 1965, when the United States sharply escalated its military involvement in Vietnam, and the spring of 1968, when Washington and Hanoi finally agreed to talk in Paris, hundreds of attempts were made to bring the warring sides to the bargaining table. Some were public, some secret; some by third countries, some by individuals, some by institutions or organizations; some involved letters, some appeals, some “plans” or “points” or “formulas,” some citations of past accords or international laws or conventions; some were purported “peace feelers” or “signals” so subtle—a wink-and-nod or linguistic wrinkle in an otherwise mundane statement, or a barely discernable decrease in certain military activities—that no one really knew whether they even existed or (if sent) were noticed by their intended target; some were derided by Lyndon Johnson and his secretary of state, Dean Rusk, as pipe-dreams spun by eccentric egotists or idealistic schemers who had contracted “Nobel Peace Prize fever”; others were sophisticated, painstakingly-planned diplomatic ventures designed and conducted at the highest levels of statesmanship.

But they all had one thing in common: they all failed. And over those three years, as U.S. forces in Vietnam mushroomed from 25,000 to more than half a million and the war crippled the Johnson Presidency and poisoned American politics, the death and destruction ground on ceaselessly, with thousands of Vietnamese and Americans lives lost every month and countless more ruined. Most of the ill-fated negotiating initiatives undertaken during the 1965-1968 period of escalating conflict never had a real chance: the opposing sides simply weren’t seriously prepared to consider peace, or even peace talks, on terms acceptable to the other. (Some were even designed to fail, to impress public opinion and justify subsequent, already planned military escalation.^[3]) Rather than risk defeat or humiliation at the bargaining table, powerful factions on both sides preferred to seek military victory—another Dien Bien Phu, the North Vietnamese imagined, recalling the triumph over the French; or, the Americans calculated, pounding the enemy until it swallowed the status quo ante, the division between north and south, as in Korea.

But, there was one exception to this pattern of inevitable, over-determined deadlock: Using new evidence that has emerged only since the end of the Cold War, Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam contends that in late 1966 the United States likely missed a genuine opportunity to begin winding down its disastrous military involvement in Vietnam, on politically-palatable terms; that, at a minimum, the Johnson Administration botched a chance to enter into direct talks with Hanoi at that time, that it misconstrued the most crucial aspects of the secret diplomatic initiative that nearly achieved that goal, and then—at the time and later, in press leaks and memoirs and covert international contacts—covered up its own errors. Moreover, it shows that the initiative’s collapse, as misunderstood by both sides (each of which thought the other had acted in bad faith), not only signified their shared failure to open a political track that might have led to genuine negotiations, but made it more difficult later on to overcome mutual distrust and enmity and enter into direct discussions—in effect, dealing a double blow to peace hopes, laying the groundwork for further escalation (including Hanoi’s decision to launch the January 1968 Tet Offensive), and probably delaying the ultimate beginning of negotiations and, perhaps, the end of the war. (Marigold’s failure, once it seeped into public consciousness through press leaks, also roiled American politics, spurring charges from antiwar critics that President Johnson was insincere and/or incompetent in seeking peace in Vietnam, and widening the “credibility gap” that increasingly undermined his public standing.)

Uncovering the Marigold story has long challenged investigators, who were stymied by lack of access to key sources. Of the myriad secret efforts undertaken to promote the opening of U.S.-North Vietnamese peace talks between early 1965 and April 1968, the distinguished Vietnam War historian George C. Herring judged Marigold to be “one of the most controversial” and “in many ways the most intriguing,” a “possibly promising” diplomatic initiative whose “origins and denouement remain shrouded in mystery.”^[4]

In their 1968 book The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam, David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory quoted an unidentified “close associate” of President Johnson as saying that they would “never get the inside story” of Marigold.

Why not?

“Because it makes our government look so bad.”^[5]

Finally presenting the “inside story”—or as much as the declassified record finally reveals—Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace corroborates the sentiment of this unnamed source (which the book identifies as Bill Moyers, LBJ’s protégé and former press secretary, who had recently left the White House^[6]), but also concludes that blame for Marigold’s failure was shared, the consequence of misjudgments and errors by all three key participants: the U.S., Polish, and North Vietnamese governments.

A Cold War Anomaly:A Communist Ambassador in Saigon

At the heart of the affair was a cold war anomaly. Not a single communist government recognized the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), instead locating their embassies in Hanoi, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and maintaining fraternal interparty relations with the ruling Vietnamese Workers’ Party, or Lao Dong. Yet, there was a communist diplomat of ambassadorial rank based in Saigon throughout the war due to the presence of the International Control Commission (ICC) established by the 1954 Geneva Accords that ended the post-World War II conflict between colonial France and the communist/nationalist Viet Minh forces led by Ho Chi Minh.^[7] The East-West pact reached at Geneva split Vietnam at the 17^th parallel, supposedly temporarily, pending elections to unify the country within two years, but the voting never took place and the division congealed into two rival regimes, the communist DRV in the north and the anti-communist RVN in the south, now backed by the Americans, who had replaced the French. Yet, even though the Geneva Accords were essentially dead by the end of the 1950s, no one wanted to pull the plug on the group set up to monitor both sides’ compliance with them: the ICC (formally known as the International Committee for Control and Supervision).

As a cold war compromise, the ICC’s membership was delicately balanced between East and West, consisting of Poland, Canada, and neutral India as chair; as a result, the group unsurprisingly soon found itself stalemated, paralyzed, and ineffectual, but it continued to meet regularly even as the war escalated—and for logistical reasons was headquartered in Saigon, resulting in the incongruous presence of senior Polish diplomats and hundreds of Polish soldiers stationed in a capital of a country run by a strongly anticommunist regime which Poland, like all communist countries, virulently denounced as an American puppet and whose overthrow it militantly supported. Representing Warsaw during the Marigold affair was a young diplomat (then 35 years old) named Janusz Lewandowski, who was based in Saigon, where he would routinely meet US and even South Vietnamese officials, but periodically shuttled (via neutral Phnom Penh in Cambodia and Vientiane in Laos) to Hanoi, where he became “comrade” Lewandowski and saw North Vietnamese leaders like Premier Pham Van Dong, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, and revolutionary icon Ho Chi Minh.

Lewandowski, who arrived in Saigon as Poland’s ICC commissioner in April 1966, was thus ideally poised to serve as a secret intermediary between Washington and Hanoi—which of course lacked normal relations or (except for a few rare, mostly formalistic instances) direct diplomatic contacts—and that is the role he assumed during Marigold. (Interviewed in Warsaw, Lewandowski recalled that shortly before he left Warsaw for Saigon, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki gave him a secret charter to pursue peace possibilities outside his normal work with the ICC.^[8]) His enthusiastic collaborator and co-conspirator was Italy’s ambassador to South Vietnam, Giovanni D’Orlandi, who, in line with the desires of his foreign minister, Amintore Fanfani, and his own passionate interest in the Vietnamese, ardently desired to promote peace.

The Marigold channel first sprang to life in late June 1966, when after a recent trip to Hanoi Lewandowski spoke with D’Orlandi and, the Italian excitedly told Henry Cabot Lodge, delivered a “very specific peace offer” from the North Vietnamese. Hopes in Washington that the channel might yield a breakthrough briefly surged in Washington—LBJ told an associate during a tape-recorded telephone conversation that “yesterday I had the most realistic, the most convincing, the most persuasive peace feeler I’ve had since I’ve been President”^[9]—but the contacts fizzled as abruptly, and mysteriously, as they had begun. The one positive result of this initial flurry of diplomacy involving the three Saigon diplomats was that the North Vietnamese, despite harshly condemning the latest U.S. military actions, did not reveal the Marigold channel, preserving it for potential future use. After several months of desultory conversation amid further military escalation in the autumn of 1966, the Marigold channel revived for a second act in November and December.

Was Marigold for Real?

The most bitterly contested aspect of the Marigold story has been whether the Poles were actually authorized by Hanoi to set up the direct meeting between U.S. and North Vietnamese ambassadors in Warsaw to confirm Washington’s adherence to the positions which Lodge had relayed to Lewandowski in mid-November in Saigon, and which Lewandowski, in turn, had conveyed to DRV authorities during his subsequent trip to Hanoi. Of course, the Poles insisted that they were acting with the full authorization of the North Vietnamese government, but once the initiative collapsed, top U.S. officials did their best to seed doubt on this score. They hinted or even explicitly claimed that the Poles (or even Lewandowski personally) had acted independently, or perhaps at Soviet instigation, hoping to lure the Americans into a bombing halt or other military concessions, and/or to show their negotiating cards and bottom line for a settlement—all to benefit their North Vietnamese comrades’ quest for victory on the battlefield, rather than to promote peace. After all, the Americans noted correctly, they had had no direct communications from the North Vietnamese, only with the Poles.

Feeling on the defensive after the Washington Post first disclosed the clandestine contacts in early February 1967 with an implication that—in the words of a prominently-quoted, unidentified pro-American diplomat at the United Nations (actually the Danish ambassador)—Washington had “bungled” a genuine chance for peace, U.S. officials used increasingly harsh language to question Warsaw’s motives and sincerity. In conversations both with foreign diplomats and with reporters, and later in oral history interviews and memoirs, they used words like “fraud” or “sham” or “phony” to describe the Polish initiative. In May 1967, the New York Times ran on its front page an expose of the affair, written by an Associated Press correspondent and informed by background leaks from Dean Rusk and other senior officials, broadly suggesting that Warsaw had never received Hanoi’s okay to set up a direct US-DRV meeting—an article that caused satisfaction in the State Department and outrage among Polish foreign ministry leaders, who felt that their integrity had been questioned.^[10]

These Johnson Administration efforts to plant doubts about Poland’s role had considerable success—in public opinion, in foreign chancelleries, and in the historical record. The affair’s “real enigma,” believed British foreign office aides, who undertook a secret post-mortem of the affair, was Hanoi’s role: Did Poland have a “clear mandate” from the North Vietnamese or had it not fully “‘sold'” them on a bargain Warsaw was trying to hammer out with the Americans?^[11] After hearing both the U.S. and Polish versions of the affair, London ended up concluding “that the Poles probably never had a sufficiently clear mandate from the North Vietnamese to the point of arranging a [direct U.S.-North Vietnamese] meeting” and were instead “trying an initiative on their own; they may have made a certain amount of progress with it because they had good contacts with the North Vietnamese; but they were never in the position of being able to ‘deliver’ their friends.”^[12]

In his 1971 memoir The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969, Lyndon B. Johnson wearily consigned the entire affair to the realm of academic investigators, asserting that it comprised far more shadow than substance: Unlike Rusk, Johnson was too polite to call the Poles “crooks”—as the secretary of state described their actions in Marigold to Averell Harriman^[13]—but his disdain shone through just the same. Brushing aside charges that he had squandered chances for peace, he stressed that Washington “never received through the Marigold exchanges anything that could be considered an authoritative statement direct from the North Vietnamese.” He termed the channel a “dry creek” that was exposed as fraudulent when the DRV ambassador failed to show up for the 6 December 1966 meeting in Warsaw. “The simple truth, I was convinced, was that the North Vietnamese were not ready to talk to us. The Poles had not only put the cart before the horse, when the time of reckoning came, they had no horse.”^[14] Johnson’s national security adviser, Walt Rostow, declared that the Poles “never had Hanoi sewed up”^[15] and his National Security Council staff aides scoffed that Warsaw “just had absolutely no charter from Hanoi to represent them”^[16] or was even acting out a disinformation script manufactured in Moscow by the KGB.^[17]

Nearly two decades later, Dean Rusk still fumed at what he believed had been a Polish scam to snooker him and the United States into falsely believing that Warsaw had acted with a firm mandate from Hanoi. Declaring that he had “doubted the authenticity of Marigold” all along, the former secretary of state called Lewandowski’s position “specious,” since he “simply didn’t reflect Hanoi’s views,” and-citing an assertion by a Hungarian defector-called the ICC commissioner “a Polish intelligence agent acting on his own” (a canard the new book conclusively refutes) and the entire Marigold initiative a “sham.” Brushing off arguments that the bombings near Hanoi had ruined a promising approach, Rusk insisted that “there was nothing to collapse” in the first place.^[18]

By contrast, several journalistic, scholarly, and internal government inquiries suggested that Marigold may have been for real. The most detailed classified post-mortem of Marigold during the Johnson Administration was undertaken as part of the Pentagon Papers inquest into Vietnam decision-making commissioned by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and extensively using State and Pentagon (but not White House) files. Although acknowledging that Hanoi’s role in the affair remained “veiled in mystery” since the Poles handled all communist transactions, the study concluded that North Vietnam most likely “did in fact agree to a meeting in Warsaw,” and it was “highly improbable” the Poles would have “gone far out on a limb” in its dealings with Americans, Italians, “and, apparently, the Russians,” without Hanoi’s commitment, given the consequences that would ensue from “the revelation that the whole venture was built on air.”[19]

The only prior English-language book on the affair^[20], written by two Los Angeles Times reporters in 1968 who relied primarily on background interviews with dozens of officials from various governments but lacked access to classified documents or any informed North Vietnamese perspectives, judged that Marigold may have constituted a genuine opportunity to open peace talks. The Johnson Administration, wrote David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory in their prize-winning The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam, which used Marigold as the centerpiece of their investigation, “missed opportunities over the years to secure, if not peace, at least negotiations; if not negotiations, at least talks; and if not talks, at least a propaganda advantage over the enemy that would have improved the nation’s standing in the world community and the President’s credibility at home.”^[21]

Perhaps the most thorough scholarly analysis of all the secret diplomatic probing efforts during this period to open Vietnam peace talks, written after the declassification of a substantial portion of the U.S. record, concluded in 1980 that, “With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the MARIGOLD contact offered the best opportunity for the Johnson Administration to negotiate a settlement of the conflict.”^[22] Taking a somewhat more skeptical stand, George Herring three years later noted the lack of evidence for this argument, observing that it was “equally possible that the North Vietnamese were merely using the Poles to see what they might be able to get out of the United States or were offering vague responses simply to appear not to stand in the way of peace.”^[23]

Was Warsaw in fact authorized by Hanoi to arrange the U.S-North Vietnamese meeting to confirm that the “ten points” represented Washington’s policy? That was the heart of the Marigold mystery, and it can now be resolved. The documents below describe the process of secret communist consultation in November 1966, hidden to U.S. officials at the time, that produced an authoritative North Vietnamese consent to the direct contact with an American representative in Warsaw and a politically significant promise to adopt a positive attitude towards talks with Washington should it genuinely confirm the stands that Lewandowski reported Lodge as having stated in Saigon.

TOP-SECRET – NSA Review of Information for the Public

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

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CONFIDENTTIAL – NSA Refuses to “Confirm or Deny” That it Has a Relationship With Google

A federal judge has issued an opinion in EPIC v. NSA, and accepted the NSA’s claim that it can “neither confirm nor deny” that it had entered into a relationship with Google following the China hacking incident in January 2010. EPIC had sought documents under the FOIA because such an agreement could reveal that the NSA is developing technical standards that would enable greater surveillance of Internet users. The “Glomar response,” to neither confirm nor deny, is a controversial legal doctrine that allows agencies to conceal the existence of records that might otherwise be subject to public disclosure. EPIC plans to appeal this decision. EPIC is also litigating to obtain the National Security Presidential Directive that sets out the NSA’s cyber security authority. And EPIC is seeking from the NSA information about Internet vulnerability assessments, the Director’s classified views on how the NSA’s practices impact Internet privacy, and the NSA’s “Perfect Citizen” program.

Civil Case No. 10-1533 (RJL) MEMORANDUM OPINION (July 8, 2011) [#9, #11] (uscourts.gov):

On February 4, 2010, following media coverage of a possible partnership between the NSA and Google relating to an alleged cyber attack by hackers in China, EPIC submitted a FOIA request to NSA seeking:

1. All records concerning an agreement or similar basis for collaboration, final or draft, between the NSA and Google regarding cyber security;
2. All records of communication between the NSA and Google concerning Gmail, including but not limited to Google’s decision to fail to routinely encrypt Gmail messages prior to January 13,2010; and
3. All records of communications regarding the NSA’s role in Google’s decision regarding the failure to routinely deploy encryption for cloud-based computing service, such as Google Docs.

Compl. ¶ 12.

NSA denied EPIC’s request. Letter from Pamela N. Phillips, NSA, FOIA/PA Office, Mar. 10,2010 [#9-3]. While it acknowledged working “with a broad range of commercial partners and research associates,” the Agency refused to “confirm [ or] deny” whether it even had a relationship with Google. Id. In support of its response, NSA cited Exemption 3 of FOIA and Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (“NSA Act”), explaining that any response would improperly reveal information about NSA’s functions and activities. Id. Such a response – neither confirming nor denying the existence of requested documents – is known as a Glomar response.

…

With respect to EPIC’s specific request, the Declaration states that “[t]o confirm or deny the existence of any such records would be to reveal whether the NSA … determined that vulnerabilities or cybersecurity issues pertaining to Google or certain of its commercial technologies could make U.S. government information systems susceptible to exploitation or attack.” Id. ¶ 13. The Declaration further clarifies that even an acknowledgement of a relationship between the NSA and a commercial entity could potentially alert “adversaries to NSA priorities, threat assessment, or countermeasures,” and that, as such, the information relates to the Agency’s core functions and activities under its Information Assurance mission. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.

TOP SECRET – NSA’s Top Ten Technical Security Challenges

Not surprisingly in today’s world, National Security Systems are fundamentally dependent on commercial products and infrastructure, or interconnect with other systems that are. This creates new and significant common ground between the Department of Defense and broader U.S. Government and homeland security needs. More and more, we find that protecting National Security Systems demands teaming with public and private institutions to raise the information assurance level of products and services more broadly. If done correctly, this is a win-win situation that benefits the whole spectrum of Information Technology (IT) users, from warfighters and policymakers, to federal, state, and local governments, to the operators of critical infrastructure and major arteries of commerce. The “Top Ten Technical Security Challenges” reflect major focus areas for the Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) which may also present opportunities for industry.

NSA’s Top Ten Technical Security Challenges:

Mobility, wireless networking, and secure mobile services
Software assurance
Virtualization, Separation, and Trusted Platforms
Cloud computing
Intrusion analysis and adversary tradecraft
Platform Integrity – Compliance assurance – Continuous Monitoring
Real-time situational awareness and CNO sync
End client security
Metrics and measurement for IA posture
Commercial architectures for assistance

DECLASSIFIED – The National Security Agency Releases Over 50,000 Pages of Declassified Documents

The National Security Agency (NSA) announces today that it has declassified and released to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) over 50,000 pages of historic records. These records cover a time-frame from before World War I through the 1960s.

This release of documents is the first in a series of releases planned over the next two years as part of NSA/CSS’s commitment to meeting the requirements outlined in the President’s 21 January 2009 Memorandum on Openness and Transparency in Government (Executive Order 13526).

Highlights of this release include:

Manuals, charts, and other documents on the development of early computer systems at NSA/CSS, including the HARVEST. This innovative system was developed with IBM and was in use from 1962 to 1976;
Early publications on cryptography, including Cryptology: Instruction Book on the Art of Secret Writing from 1809;
Documents from World War II, including previously unreleased German documents from the Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM).

The released documents will be maintained by NARA and available for review at the National Archives at College Park, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, Maryland. A list of the documents is available on NSA’s Declassification and Transparency Webpage.

Since the records were physically transferred to NARA, NSA is no longer the custodian and does not maintain copies of the records for release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Information about conducting research at NARA is available on the National Archives Website.

For more information about the National Security Agency, please visit www.nsa.gov.

CONFIDENTIAL – NSA Launches New Crypto Mobile Game App

Outreach efforts designed to attract young adults to support cybersecurity initiatives

Fort Meade, MD. – The National Security Agency (NSA) announced today the launch of “NSA CryptoChallenge,” a mobile cryptograph game app available free of charge from the Apple App Store. The game is the latest digital communications effort designed to educate young adults on career opportunities with NSA and recruit the best and brightest to support NSA’s cybersecurity initiatives.

NSA’s CryptoChallenge game challenges today’s most intelligent college students and young adults to decode hundreds of puzzles, which test pattern recognition skills through a series of cryptographs under various categories, including famous quotes, science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) trivia, pop culture factoids and more. It’s “you against the clock” to see how fast you can crack the code. Players can also choose to share their completion time to see how they stack up against other players across the globe, even sharing scores on Facebook and Twitter.

“This is the technology today’s college students use most to communicate and make important life decisions, so we have to use these tools to successfully recruit the top-tier technical talent we need to become future leaders of the Agency, ” said Kathy Hutson, NSA’s Director of Human Resources.

Serious brainiacs are unlikely to get bored by NSA’s CryptoChallenge, as players will find that the game includes an advanced level and uses multiple algorithms, so puzzles have a different encryption each time they appear. The game is also expected to be released for Android platforms in the near future.

NSA’s CryptoChallenge joins NSA’s other high-tech recruitment tool, the NSA Career Links app, which is available through the Apple App Store and Android Market Place. The app delivers real-time information updates directly to the user’s mobile device.

Confidential – Global Cryptologic Dominance through Responsive Presence and Network Advantage

NSA Statement:

We will:

Lead an expert workforce for our best efforts to advance and operate world-class cryptologic systems and tools;
Improve performance and integration of our core expertise and missions—exploit, protect and defend;
Sense, make sense of, and securely share electronically gathered information at the speed of global information networks; and
Increase measurably the security of national security systems and other critical operations and information when and where needed.

Our Mission

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) leads the U.S. Government in cryptology that encompasses both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) products and services, and enables Computer Network Operations (CNO) in order to gain a decision advantage for the Nation and our allies under all circumstances.

GOAL 1: Succeeding in Today’s Operations – Enable wise policymaking, effective national security action, and U.S. freedom of action in cyberspace by exploiting foreign use of electronic signals and systems and securing information systems used by the U.S. and its allies, while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

GOAL 2: Preparing for the Future – Deliver next generation capabilities and solutions that meet the challenges of tomorrow and drive solutions from invention to operation in support of national security and U.S. Government missions.

GOAL 3: Enhancing and Leading an Expert Workforce – Attract, develop and engage an exceptional, diverse workforce prepared to overcome our cryptologic challenges.

GOAL 4: Implementing Best Business Practices – Provide timely data to inform optimal strategic and tactical investment decisions while ensuring organizational accountability for executing those decisions and realizing the associated performance improvement.

GOAL 5: Manifesting Principled Performance – Accomplishing our missions with a commitment to a principled and steadfast approach to performance through compliance, lawfulness, and protection of public trust must be paramount.

Core Values

We will protect national security interests by adhering to the highest standards of behavior:

Lawfulness – We will adhere to the spirit and the letter of the Constitution and the laws and regulations of the United States.
Honesty – We will be truthful with each other, and honor the public’s need for openness, balanced against national security interests.
Integrity – We will behave honorably and apply good judgment as we would if our activities were under intense public scrutiny.
Fairness – We will ensure equal opportunity and fairness in Agency policies, programs, and practices.
Accountability – We will be accountable for our actions and take responsibility for our decisions, practicing wise stewardship of public resources and placing prudent judgment over expediency.
Loyalty – We will be loyal to the nation, the mission, and each other, weighing ideas solely on the merits and ensuring that decisions enjoy vigorous debate while being made, followed by unified implementation.
Collaboration – We will cooperate with others in a respectful and open-minded manner, to our mutual success.
Innovation – We will seek new ways to accomplish our mission, planning for the future based on what we’ve learned from the past, and thinking ahead to the best of our ability to avoid unintended consequences.
Learning – We will acquire and transfer knowledge, provide the resources and training necessary for our people to remain at the forefront of technology, and individually pursue continuous learning.

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

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Report – NSA/CSS Unveils New Hawaii Center

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service marked today the completion of a new regional operations center, officially named the CAPT Joseph J. Rochefort Building, at a ribbon-cutting ceremony where officials emphasized how the $358 million project will help to further integrate national security efforts.

NSA/CSS has had an operations center in Hawaii for more than 14 years. But even with recent renovations, the original facility, first built during World War II, has limitations stemming from its age, location, and structures. The new building will provide cryptology professionals with the tools necessary to better access and collaboratively interpret data from a broad variety of sources at various classification levels. Moreover, its enhanced capabilities will augment work that will still be carried out in the original center – eliminating physical, virtual, and other barriers to information sharing.

GEN Keith B. Alexander – Director, NSA/Chief, CSS/Commander, U.S. Cyber Command – told approximately 300 federal, state, and local officials at the ceremony that it was more than fitting to dedicate the new building in honor of CAPT Rochefort, who died in 1976. Several members of his family were also on hand. Rochefort was posthumously recognized with the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1986 and in the NSA/CSS Hall of Honor in 2000 for leading a distinguished team of Pearl Harbor-based code breakers. Their daily intelligence reports were crucial in the 1942 Battle of Midway.

“CAPT Rochefort’s exceptional skills in cryptology and in mathematical analysis made him a unique national asset at an extremely trying time in U.S. history,” GEN Alexander said in an interview after the ceremony. “Likewise, the mission of NSA/CSS Hawaii is to produce foreign signals intelligence for decision-makers as global terrorism now jeopardizes the lives of our citizens, military forces, and international allies. We must continue to develop a global cryptologic enterprise that is agile and resilient in countering ever-changing threats to national security.”

CAPT Kathryn Helms – Commander, NSA/CSS Hawaii – agreed. “The design, infrastructure, and capabilities of this new center will allow us to continue to provide unparalleled cryptologic support,” she said after the event. State officials described the project as one that was good for both the nation and Hawaii.

The original center is adjacent to Schofield U.S. Army Barracks. The new center is a part of the Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam Annex. A groundbreaking ceremony was held in 2007.

NSA/CSS is also upgrading its cryptologic centers in Texas and Georgia to make the agency’s global enterprise even more seamless as it confronts increasingly networked adversaries.

From the NSA Document 1: NSCID 9, “Communications Intelligence,” March 10, 1950

National Security Council Intelligence Directives have provided the highest-level policy guidance for intelligence activities since they were first issued in 1947.

This document establishes and defines the responsibilities of the United States Communications Intelligence Board. The Board, according to the directive, is to provide “authoritative coordination of [the] Communications Intelligence activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of Communications Intelligence for which he is responsible.”

The particularly sensitive nature of communications intelligence (COMINT) activities was highlighted by paragraph 6, which noted that such activities should be treated “in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities.” Thus, regulations or directives pertaining to other intelligence activities were not applicable to COMINT activities.

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

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TOP-SECRET – The National Security Agency Declassified

Internet wiretapping mixes “protected” and targeted messages,
Info Age requires rethinking 4th Amendment limits and policies,
National Security Agency told Bush administration

“Transition 2001” report released through FOIA,
Highlights collection of declassified NSA documents
Posted on Web by National Security Archive, GWU

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 24

Edited by Jeffrey Richelson

Washington, D.C., March 11, 2005 – The largest U.S. spy agency warned the incoming Bush administration in its “Transition 2001” report that the Information Age required rethinking the policies and authorities that kept the National Security Agency in compliance with the Constitution’s 4th Amendment prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures” without warrant and “probable cause,” according to an updated briefing book of declassified NSA documents posted today on the World Wide Web.

Wiretapping the Internet inevitably picks up mail and messages by Americans that would be “protected” under legal interpretations of the NSA’s mandate in effect since the 1970s, according to the documents that were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by Dr. Jeffrey Richelson, senior fellow of the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

The NSA told the Bush transition team that the “analog world of point-to-point communications carried along discrete, dedicated voice channels” is being replaced by communications that are “mostly digital, carry billions of bits of data, and contain voice, data and multimedia,” and therefore, “senior leadership must understand that today’s and tomorrow’s mission will demand a powerful, permanent presence on a global telecommunications network that will host the ‘protected’ communications of Americans as well as targeted communications of adversaries.”

The documents posted today also include a striking contrast between the largely intact 1998 NSA organizational chart for the Directorate of Operations and the heavily redacted 2001 chart for the Signals Intelligence Directorate (as the operations directorate was renamed), which contains no information beyond the name of its director. “The 2001 organization charts are more informative for what they reveal about the change in NSA’s classification policy than for what they reveal about the actual structure of NSA’s two key directorates,” commented Dr. Richelson. The operations directorate organization chart was provided within three weeks of its being requested in late 1998. In contrast, the request for the Signals Intelligence Directorate organization chart was made on April 21, 2001, and NSA did not provide its substantive response until April 21, 2004 – three years instead of three weeks.

Introduction

The National Security Agency (NSA) is one of the most secret (and secretive) members of the U.S. intelligence community. The predecessor of NSA, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), was established within the Department of Defense, under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on May 20, 1949. In theory, the AFSA was to direct the communications intelligence and electronic intelligence activities of the military service signals intelligence units (at the time consisting of the Army Security Agency, Naval Security Group, and Air Force Security Service). In practice, the AFSA had little power, its functions being defined in terms of activities not performed by the service units. (Note 1)

The creation of NSA resulted from a December 10, 1951, memo sent by Walter Bedell Smith to James B. Lay, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. The memo observed that “control over, and coordination of, the collection and processing of Communications Intelligence had proved ineffective” and recommended a survey of communications intelligence activities. The proposal was approved on December 13, 1951, and the study authorized on December 28, 1951. The report was completed by June 13, 1952. Generally known as the “Brownell Committee Report,” after committee chairman Herbert Brownell, it surveyed the history of U.S. communications intelligence activities and suggested the need for a much greater degree of coordination and direction at the national level. As the change in the security agency’s name indicated, the role of the NSA was to extend beyond the armed forces. (Note 2)

In the last several decades some of the secrecy surrounding NSA has been stripped away by Congressional hearings and investigative research. In the late 1990s NSA had been the subject of criticism for failing to adjust to the post-Cold War technological environment as well as for operating a “global surveillance network” alleged to intrude on the privacy of individuals across the world. The following documents provide insight into the creation, evolution, management and operations of NSA, including the controversial ECHELON program. Also included are newly released documents (11a – 11g) that focus on the restrictions NSA places on reporting the identities of U.S. persons – including former president Jimmy Carter and first lady Hillary Clinton, and NSA Director Michael Hayden’s unusual public statement (Document 24) before the House Intelligence Committee.

Some of the documents that appear for the first time in this update shed additional light on the history of NSA. They concern the NSA’s participation in the space reconnaissance program (Document 3), NSA’s success in deciphering Soviet communications in the 1960s (Document 4), the efficacy of NSA activities in the late mid-to-late 1960s (Document 5), and Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty during the 1967 war (Document 10). Others provide new insight on NSA’s assessment of key issues in the new century (Document 21, Document 23), on NSA’s attempts to adapt to the changing world and communications environment, (Document 22), on the agency’s regression to old policies with regard to organizational secrecy (Document 26a, Document 26b), and on NSA activities before and after the events of 9/11 (Document 25).

Several of these documents also appear in either of two National Security Archive collections on U.S. intelligence. The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations and Management: 1947-1989 (1990) and U.S. Espionage and Intelligence: Organization, Operations, and Management, 1947-1996 (1997) publish together for the first time recently declassified documents pertaining to the organizational structure, operations and management of the U.S. Intelligence Community over the last fifty years, cross-indexed for maximum accessibility. Together, these two sets reproduce on microfiche over 2,000 organizational histories, memoranda, manuals, regulations, directives, reports, and studies, totalling more than 50,000 pages of documents from the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, military service intelligence organizations, National Security Council, and other official government agencies and organizations.

NSA Domestic Spying Targeted Journalists

Russell Tice, former NSA insider turned whistleblower on the Bush domestic electronic spying program, reveals that the NSA program targeted journalists and news agencies within the US.

FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: Records Regarding the Assassination of John F. Kennedy Part 1

Under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-526), NSA is required to review all records relating to the assassination and provide copies to the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). The Board, in turn, provides copies to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). NARA has over 170,000 records relating to the J.F.K. assassination of which only a small number originated with NSA. The documents listed are the ones released by NSA to date.

The documents marked with * and ** were released directly to NARA in 1993 by NSA prior to the formation of the ARRB. The documents preceded by ** were released under the FOIA in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s, and the copies of the documents appear as they were released to the FOIA requester(s) at that time. Documents released to NARA by the ARRB in August 1997 are indicated by #, documents released to NARA by the ARRB in January 1998 are indicated by ## and documents released to NARA by the ARRB in October 1998 are indicated by ###. XXXXX has been inserted in a title if a portion of the title was deleted prior to release.

* Letter to General Counsel Lee Richards, President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy from NSA Director Lt Gen Gordon A. Blake,jfk00023 (download file)
* Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense – SUBJECT: Further Requests by Senate Select Committee on Oswald,jfk00024 (download file)
* Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) – SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act (Kessler), jfk00025 (download file)
* Note to NSA Director – SUBJECT: Correspondence from House Assassination Committee, jfk00026 (download file)
** Memorandum for the Record – SUBJECT: Phone Call from House Select Committee on Assassinations, jfk00027 (download file)
* Letter to Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, Select Committee on Assassinations from NSA’s Chief, Legislative Affairs, jfk00028 (download file)
** Memorandum for the Record – SUBJECT: 8 November Meeting with Mr. Blakey, jfk00029 (download file)
** Memorandum for the Record – SUBJECT: House Assassination Committee Inquiry, jfk00030 (download file)
** Note to Judy Miller from NSA’s Chief, Legislative Affairs, jfk00031 (download file)
** Draft note to G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, Select Committee on Assassinations from John G. Kester, Special Assistant to the Secretary, jfk00032 (download file)
** Memorandum for the Record – SUBJECT: Visit to House Select Committee on Assassinations, jfk00033 (download file)
* Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) response to Mark Allen, jfk00034 (download file)
* Letter to Stanley Brand, General Counsel, Office of the Clerk, House of Representatives from NSA’s FOIA Appeals Coordinator, jfk00035 (download file)
* Memorandum for the Record – SUBJECT: Meeting with Congressional Committee on Disclosure of Kennedy Assasasination Records, jfk00036 (download file)
# Plot to Assassinate Castro Reported (Communications Intelligence/COMINT report), jfk00037 (download file)
# Report on Cuba’s Internal Problems With Rebels (Communications Intelligence/COMINT report), jfk00038 (download file)
# NSA SIGINT Command Center – Record of Event for 22 November 1963, jfk00039 (download file)

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: THE CUBA CRISIS 1963 UNVEILLED

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TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: THE CUBA CRISIS 1962 UNVEILLED PART 2

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TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: THE CUBA CRISIS 1962 UNVEILLED PART 1

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TOP-SECRET: Cuban Missile Crisis Document Archive – from the NSA Archives unveiled

Download the NSA DOCUMENTS BY CLICKING ON THE FILES HERE:cuban_missile_crisis pilot_training_june_19

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Cuban Missile Crisis

Part of the Cold War

CIA reference photograph of Soviet R-12 intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missile (NATO designation SS-4) in Red Square, Moscow

Date	October 14 – November 20, 1962
Location	Cuba
Result	Withdrawal of the Soviet Union‘s nuclear missiles from Cuba Withdrawal of the United States‘ nuclear missiles from Turkey Creation of a nuclear hotline betweenWashington and Moscow.

Belligerents

United States

Turkey

Soviet Union

Cuba

Commanders and leaders

Casualties and losses

1 aircraft shot down
1 aircraft damaged
1 pilot killed

The Cuban Missile Crisis (known as the October Crisis in Cuba or Caribbean Crisis (Russ: Kарибский кризис) in the USSR) was a confrontation among the Soviet Union, Cuba and the United States in October 1962, during the Cold War. In August 1962, after some unsuccessful operations by the U.S. to overthrow the Cuban regime (Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose), the Cuban and Soviet governments secretly began to build bases in Cuba for a number ofmedium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) with the ability to strike most of the continental United States. This action followed the 1958 deployment of Thor IRBMs in the UK (Project Emily) and Jupiter IRBMs to Italy and Turkey in 1961 – more than 100 U.S.-built missiles having the capability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads. On October 14, 1962, a United States Air Force U-2 plane on a photoreconnaissancemission captured photographic proof of Soviet missile bases under construction in Cuba.

The ensuing crisis ranks with the Berlin Blockade as one of the major confrontations of the Cold War and is generally regarded as the moment in which the Cold War came closest to turning into a nuclear conflict.^[1] It also marks the first documented instance of the threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD) being discussed as a determining factor in a major international arms agreement.^[2]^[3]

The United States considered attacking Cuba via air and sea, and settled on a military “quarantine” of Cuba. The U.S. announced that it would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed in Cuba and remove all offensive weapons. The Kennedy administration held only a slim hope that the Kremlin would agree to their demands, and expected a military confrontation. On the Soviet side, Premier Nikita Khrushchev wrote in a letter to Kennedy that his quarantine of “navigation in international waters and air space” constituted “an act of aggression propelling humankind into the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war.”

The Soviets publicly balked at the U.S. demands, but in secret back-channel communications initiated a proposal to resolve the crisis. The confrontation ended on October 28, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy and United Nations Secretary-General U Thant reached a public and secret agreement with Khrushchev. Publicly, the Soviets would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union, subject to United Nations verification, in exchange for a U.S. public declaration and agreement never to invade Cuba. Secretly, the U.S. agreed that it would dismantle all U.S.-built Thor and Jupiter IRBMs deployed in Europe and Turkey.

Only two weeks after the agreement, the Soviets had removed the missile systems and their support equipment, loading them onto eight Soviet ships from November 5–9. A month later, on December 5 and 6, the Soviet Il-28 bombers were loaded onto three Soviet ships and shipped back to Russia. The quarantine was formally ended at 6:45 pm EDT on November 20, 1962. Eleven months after the agreement, all American weapons were deactivated (by September 1963). An additional outcome of the negotiations was the creation of the Hotline Agreement and the Moscow–Washington hotline, a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington, D.C.

Earlier actions by the United States

In 1959 US PGM-19 Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles targeting the USSR were deployed in Italy and Turkey.

In 1959 Cuban revolution took place and under the new government of Fidel Castro Cuba allied with the USSR. However, for a Latin American country to ally openly with the USSR was regarded by the US government as unacceptable. Such an involvement would also directly defy the Monroe Doctrine; a United States policy which, originally conceived to limit European power’s involvement in the Western Hemisphere, expanded to include all other major powers. The aim of the doctrine is to make sure the United States is the only hegemonic power in the Americas and keeping all others out of its “backyard”.

Bay of Pigs Invasion was launched in April 1961 under President John F. Kennedy by Central Intelligence Agency-trained forces of Cuban exiles but the invasion failed and the United States were embarrassed publicly. Afterward, former President Dwight D. Eisenhower told Kennedy that “the failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do.”^[4]^:10 The half-hearted invasion left Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet adviser wrote, “too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations … too intelligent and too weak.”^[4] U.S. covert operations continued in 1961 with the unsuccessful Operation Mongoose.^[5]

In addition, Khrushchev’s impression of Kennedy’s weakness was confirmed by the President’s soft response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, particularly the building of the Berlin Wall. Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev asserted, “I know for certain that Kennedy doesn’t have a strong background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge.” He also told his son Sergei that on Cuba, Kennedy “would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree.”^[6]

In January 1962, General Edward Lansdale described plans to overthrow the Cuban Government in a top-secret report (partially declassified 1989), addressed to President Kennedy and officials involved withOperation Mongoose.^[5] CIA agents or “pathfinders” from the Special Activities Division were to be infiltrated into Cuba to carry out sabotage and organization, including radio broadcasts.^[7] In February 1962, the United States launched an embargo against Cuba,^[8] and Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban Government, mandating that guerrilla operations begin in August and September, and in the first two weeks of October: “Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime.”^[5]

[edit]Balance of power

When Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his key election issues was an alleged “missile gap“, with the Soviets leading.

In fact, the United States led the Soviets. In 1961, the Soviets had only four intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). By October 1962, they may have had a few dozen, although some intelligence estimates were as high as 75.^[9]

The United States, on the other hand, had 170 ICBMs and was quickly building more. It also had eight George Washington and Ethan Allen class ballistic missile submarines with the capability to launch 16 Polarismissiles each with a range of 2,200 kilometres (1,400 mi).

Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted that the USSR was building missiles “like sausages” whose numbers and capabilities actually were nowhere close to his assertion. However, the Soviets did have medium-range ballistic missiles in quantity, about 700 of them.^[9]

In his memoirs published in 1970, Khrushchev wrote, “In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance of massive nuclear missiles around the globe.’” ^[9]

[edit]Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev conceived in May 1962 the idea of countering the United States’ growing lead in developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev was also reacting in part to the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles which the United States had installed in Turkey during April 1962.^[9]

From the very beginning, the Soviet’s operation entailed elaborate denial and deception, known in the USSR as Maskirovka.^[10] All of the planning and preparation for transporting and deploying the missiles were carried out in the utmost secrecy, with only a very few told the exact nature of the mission. Even the troops detailed for the mission were given misdirection, told they were headed for a cold region and outfitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas, and other winter equipment.^[10] The Soviet code name, Operation Anadyr, was also the name of a river flowing into the Bering Sea, the name of the capital of Chukotsky District, and a bomber base in the far eastern region. All these were meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences.^[10]

In early 1962, a group of Soviet military and missile construction specialists accompanied an agricultural delegation to Havana. They obtained a meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the U.S. would invade Cuba again and they enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. Specialists in missile construction under the guise of “machine operators,” “irrigation specialists,” and “agricultural specialists” arrived in July.^[10] Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, chief of the Soviet Rocket Forces, led a survey team that visited Cuba. He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by the palm trees.^[9]

The Cuban leadership was further upset when in September Congress approved U.S. Joint Resolution 230, which authorized the use of military force in Cuba if American interests were threatened.^[11] On the same day, the U.S. announced a major military exercise in the Caribbean, PHIBRIGLEX-62, which Cuba denounced as a deliberate provocation and proof that the U.S. planned to invade Cuba.^[11]^[12]

Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place strategic nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent, and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to the communist cause, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to confront the Americans “with more than words… the logical answer was missiles.”^[13]^:29 The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy, writing their plans longhand, which were approved by Rodion Malinovsky on July 4 and Khrushchev on July 7.

The Soviet leadership believed, based on their perception of Kennedy’s lack of confidence during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, that he would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a fait accompli.^[4]^:1 On September 11, the Soviet Union publicly warned that a U.S. attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships carrying supplies to the island would mean war.^[5] The Soviets continued their Maskirovka program to conceal their actions in Cuba. They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature. On September 7, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin assured U.S. Ambassador to the United NationsAdlai Stevenson that the USSR was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba. On September 11, the Soviet News Agency TASS announced that the Soviet Union has no need or intention to introduce offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. On October 13, Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets plan to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans.^[11] And again on October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy a “personal message” from Khrushchev reassuring him that “under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.^[11]^:494

As early as August 1962, the United States suspected the Soviets of building missile facilities in Cuba. During that month, its intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of Russian-built MiG-21 fighters and Il-28 light bombers. U-2 spyplanes found S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2) surface-to-air missile sites at eight different locations. CIA director John A. McCone was suspicious. On August 10, he wrote a memo to President Kennedy in which he guessed that the Soviets were preparing to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba.^[9] On August 31, Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York), who probably received his information from Cuban exiles in Florida,^[9] warned on the Senate floor that the Soviet Union may be constructing a missile base in Cuba.^[5]

Air Force General Curtis LeMay presented a pre-invasion bombing plan to Kennedy in September, while spy flights and minor military harassment from U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were the subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the U.S. government.^[5]

The first consignment of R-12 missiles arrived on the night of September 8, followed by a second on September 16. The R-12 was the first operational intermediate-range ballistic missile, the first missile ever mass-produced, and the first Soviet missile deployed with a thermonuclear warhead. It was a single-stage, road-transportable, surface-launched, storable propellant fueled missile that could deliver a megaton-classnuclear weapon.^[14] The Soviets were building nine sites—six for R-12 medium-range missiles (NATO designation SS-4 Sandal) with an effective range of 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) and three for R-14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (NATO designation SS-5 Skean) with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometres (2,800 mi).^[15]

[edit]Cuba positioning

On October 7, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós spoke at the UN General Assembly: “If … we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ.”

[edit]Missiles reported

The missiles in Cuba allowed the Soviets to effectively target almost the entire continental United States. The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami. U.S. intelligence received countless reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, and most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles. Only five reports bothered the analysts. They described large trucks passing through towns at night carrying very long canvas-covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering. Defensive missiles could make these turns. These reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed.^[16]

U-2 reconnaissance photograph of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Missile transports and tents for fueling and maintenance are visible. Courtesy of CIA

[edit]U-2 flights find missiles

Despite the increasing evidence of a military build-up on Cuba, no U-2 flights were made over Cuba from September 5 to October 14. The first problem that caused the pause in reconnaissance flights took place on August 30, an Air Force Strategic Air Command U-2 flew over Sakhalin Island in the Far East by mistake. The Soviets lodged a protest and the U.S. apologized. Nine days later, a Taiwanese-operated U-2 ^[17]^[18] was lost over western China, probably to a SAM. U.S. officials worried that one of the Cuban or Soviet SAMs in Cuba might shoot down a CIA U-2, initiating another international incident. At the end of September, Navy reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Soviet ship Kasimov with large crates on its deck the size and shape of Il-28 light bombers.^[9]

On October 12, the administration decided to transfer the Cuban U-2 reconnaissance missions to the Air Force. In the event another U-2 was shot down, they thought a cover story involving Air Force flights would be easier to explain than CIA flights. There was also some evidence that the Department of Defense and the Air Force lobbied to get responsibility for the Cuban flights.^[9] When the reconnaissance missions were re-authorized on October 8, weather kept the planes from flying. The U.S. first obtained photographic evidence of the missiles on October 14 when a U-2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heyser took 928 pictures, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site at San Cristóbal, Pinar del Río Province, in western Cuba.^[19]

[edit]President notified

On October 15, the CIA’s National Photographic Intelligence Center reviewed the U-2 photographs and identified objects that they interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles. That evening, the CIA notified the Department of State and at 8:30 pm EDT National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy elected to wait until morning to tell the President. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA’s analysis of the images.^[20] At 6:30 pm EDT Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers^[21] in a group he formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) after the fact on October 22 by National Security Action Memorandum 196.^[22]

[edit]Responses considered

The U.S. had no plan in place because U.S. intelligence had been convinced that the Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba. The EXCOMM quickly discussed several possible courses of action, including:^[12]^[23]

No action.
Diplomacy: Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles.
Warning: Send a message to Castro to warn him of the grave danger he, and Cuba were in.
Blockade: Use the U.S. Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba.
Air strike: Use the U.S. Air Force to attack all known missile sites.
Invasion: Full force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution. They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the U.S. from conquering Cuba. Kennedy was skeptical.

They, no more than we, can not let these things go by without doing something. They can’t, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don’t take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin.^[24]

Kennedy concluded that attacking Cuba by air would signal the Soviets to presume “a clear line” to conquer Berlin. Kennedy also believed that United States’ allies would think of the U.S. as “trigger-happy cowboys” who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.^[25]^:332

President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara in an EXCOMM meeting.

The EXCOMM then discussed the effect on the strategic balance of power, both political and military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance, but Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara disagreed. He was convinced that the missiles would not affect the strategic balance at all. An extra forty, he reasoned, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The U.S. already had approximately 5,000 strategic warheads,^[26]^:261 while the Soviet Union had only 300. He concluded that the Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter the strategic balance. In 1990, he reiterated that “it made nodifference…The military balance wasn’t changed. I didn’t believe it then, and I don’t believe it now.”^[27]

The EXCOMM agreed that the missiles would affect the political balance. First, Kennedy had explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that “if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States…the United States would act.”^[28]^:674-681 Second, U.S. credibility amongst their allies, and amongst the American people, would be damaged if they allowed the Soviet Union to appear to redress the strategic balance by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy explained after the crisis that “it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality.”^[29]

President Kennedy meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the Oval Office (October 18, 1962)

On October 18, President Kennedy met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, who claimed the weapons were for defensive purposes only. Not wanting to expose what he already knew, and wanting to avoid panicking the American public,^[30] the President did not reveal that he was already aware of the missile build-up.^[31]

By October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights showed four operational sites. As part of the blockade, the U.S. military was put on high alert to enforce the blockade and to be ready to invade Cuba at a moment’s notice. The 1st Armored Division was sent to Georgia, and five army divisions were alerted for maximal action. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) distributed its shorter-ranged B-47 Stratojet medium bombers to civilian airports and sent aloft its B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers.^[32]

[edit]Operational Plans

Two Operational Plans (OPLAN) were considered. OPLAN 316 envisioned a full invasion of Cuba by Army and Marine units supported by the Navy following Air Force and naval airstrikes. However, Army units in the United States would have had trouble fielding mechanized and logistical assets, while the U.S. Navy could not supply sufficient amphibious shipping to transport even a modest armored contingent from the Army. OPLAN 312, primarily an Air Force and Navy carrier operation, was designed with enough flexibility to do anything from engaging individual missile sites to providing air support for OPLAN 316’s ground forces.^[33]

[edit]Quarantine

	Address on the Buildup of Arms in Cuba Kennedy addressing the nation on October 22, 1962 about the buildup of arms on Cuba
Problems listening to this file? See media help.

A U.S. Navy P-2H Neptune of VP-18 flying over a Soviet cargo ship with crated Il-28s on deck during the Cuban Crisis.^[34]

Kennedy met with members of EXCOMM and other top advisers throughout October 21, considering two remaining options: an air strike primarily against the Cuban missile bases, or a naval blockade of Cuba.^[31] A full-scale invasion was not the administration’s first option, but something had to be done. Robert McNamara supported the naval blockade as a strong but limited military action that left the U.S. in control. According to international law a blockade is an act of war, but the Kennedy administration did not think that the USSR would be provoked to attack by a mere blockade.^[35]

Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations wrote a position paper that helped Kennedy to differentiate between a quarantine of offensive weapons and a blockade of all materials, indicating that a classic blockade was not the original intention. Since it would take place in international waters, Kennedy obtained the approval of the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defense provisions of the Rio Treaty.

Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to the U.S. Commander South Atlantic [COMSOLANT] at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and a Marine battalion with lift were available if required. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers and one submarine had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by November 2. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the quarantine. The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship. Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military officers to the U.S. to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the quarantine operation.^[36]

This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty. Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of goods and air transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba. The CNO’s scenario was followed closely in later implementing the quarantine.

On October 19, the EXCOMM formed separate working groups to examine the air strike and blockade options, and by the afternoon most support in the EXCOMM shifted to the blockade option.

President Kennedy signs the Proclamation for Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba at the Oval Office on October 23, 1962.

At 3:00 pm EDT on October 22, President Kennedy formally established the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) with National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 196. At 5:00 pm, he met with Congressional leaders who contentiously opposed a blockade and demanded a stronger response. In Moscow, Ambassador Kohler briefed Chairman Khrushchev on the pending blockade and Kennedy’s speech to the nation. Ambassadors around the world gave advance notice to non-Eastern Bloc leaders. Before the speech, U.S. delegations met with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and French President Charles de Gaulle to brief them on the U.S. intelligence and their proposed response. All were supportive of the U.S. position.^[37]

On October 22 at 7:00 pm EDT, President Kennedy delivered a nation-wide televised address on all of the major networks announcing the discovery of the missiles.

It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.^[38]

Kennedy described the administration’s plan:

To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.^[38]

During the speech a directive went out to all U.S. forces worldwide placing them on DEFCON 3. The heavy cruiser USS Newport News (CA-148) was designated flagship for the quarantine, with the USS Leary (DD-879) as Newport News’ destroyer escort.^[39]

[edit]Crisis deepens

Khrushchev’s October 24, 1962 letter to President Kennedy stating that the Cuban Missile Crisis quarantine “constitute[s] an act of aggression…”

On October 23 at 11:24 am EDT a cable drafted by George Ball to the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey and the U.S. Ambassador toNATO notified them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw what the U.S knew to be nearly obsolete missiles from Italy and Turkey in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Turkish officials replied that they would “deeply resent” any trade for the U.S. missile’s presence in their country.^[40] Two days later, on the morning of October 25, journalist Walter Lippmann proposed the same thing in his syndicated column. Castro reaffirmed Cuba’s right to self-defense and said that all of its weapons were defensive and Cuba will not allow an inspection.^[5]

[edit]International response

Kennedy’s speech was not well liked in Britain. The day after the speech, the British press, recalling previous CIA missteps, was unconvinced about the existence of Soviet bases in Cuba, and guessed that Kennedy’s actions might be related to his re-election.^[41]

Three days after Kennedy’s speech, the Chinese People’s Daily announced that “650,000,000 Chinese men and women were standing by the Cuban people”.^[37]

In Germany, newspapers supported the United States’ response, contrasting it with the weak-kneed American actions in the region during the preceding months. They also expressed some fear that the Soviets might retaliate in Berlin.^[41] In France on October 23, the crisis made the front page of all the daily newspapers. The next day, an editorial in Le Monde expressed doubt about the authenticity of the CIA’s photographic evidence. Two days later, after a visit by a high-ranking CIA agent, they accepted the validity of the photographs. Also in France, in the October 29 issue of Le Figaro, Raymond Aron wrote in support of the American response.^[41]

[edit]Soviet broadcast

At the time, the crisis continued unabated, and on the evening of October 24, the Soviet news agency Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (TASS) broadcast a telegram from Khrushchev to President Kennedy, in which Khrushchev warned that the United States’ “pirate action” would lead to war. However, this was followed at 9:24 pm by a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy which was received at 10:52 pm EDT, in which Khrushchev stated, “If you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States,” and that the Soviet Union views the blockade as “an act of aggression” and their ships will be instructed to ignore it.

[edit]U.S. alert level raised

Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations. (October 25, 1962)

The United States requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 25. In a loud, demanding tone, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin in an emergency meeting of the SC challenging him to admit the existence of the missiles. Ambassador Zorin refused to answer. The next day at 10:00 pm EDT, the U.S. raised the readiness level of SAC forces to DEFCON 2. For the only confirmed time in U.S. history, the B-52bombers were dispersed to various locations and made ready to take off, fully equipped, on 15 minutes notice.^[42] One-eighth of SAC’s 1,436 bombers were on airborne alert, some 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on ready alert, while Air Defense Command (ADC) redeployed 161 nuclear-armed interceptors to 16 dispersal fields within nine hours with one-third maintaining 15-minute alert status.^[33]

“By October 22, Tactical Air Command (TAC) had 511 fighters plus supporting tankers and reconnaissance aircraft deployed to face Cuba on one-hour alert status. However, TAC and the Military Air Transport Service had problems. The concentration of aircraft in Florida strained command and support echelons; we faced critical undermanning in security, armaments, and communications; the absence of initial authorization for war-reserve stocks of conventional munitions forced TAC to scrounge; and the lack of airlift assets to support a major airborne drop necessitated the call-up of 24 Reserve squadrons.”^[33]

On October 25 at 1:45 am EDT, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev’s telegram, stating that the U.S. was forced into action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba, and that when these assurances proved to be false, the deployment “required the responses I have announced… I hope that your government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.”

A recently declassified map used by the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic Fleet showing the position of American and Soviet ships at the height of the crisis.

[edit]Quarantine challenged

At 7:15 am EDT on October 25, the USS Essex and USS Gearing attempted to intercept the Bucharest but failed to do so. Fairly certain the tanker did not contain any military material, they allowed it through the blockade. Later that day, at 5:43 pm, the commander of the blockade effort ordered the USS Kennedy to intercept and board the Lebanese freighter Marucla. This took place the next day, and the Marucla was cleared through the blockade after its cargo was checked.^[43]

At 5:00 pm EDT on October 25, William Clements announced that the missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on. This report was later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no slow-down at all. In response, Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199, authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft under the command of SACEUR (which had the duty of carrying out first air strikes on the Soviet Union). During the day, the Soviets responded to the quarantine by turning back 14 ships presumably carrying offensive weapons.^[42]

[edit]Crisis stalemated

The next morning, October 26, Kennedy informed the EXCOMM that he believed only an invasion would remove the missiles from Cuba. However, he was persuaded to give the matter time and continue with both military and diplomatic pressure. He agreed and ordered the low-level flights over the island to be increased from two per day to once every two hours. He also ordered a crash program to institute a new civil government in Cuba if an invasion went ahead.

At this point, the crisis was ostensibly at a stalemate. The USSR had shown no indication that they would back down and had made several comments to the contrary. The U.S. had no reason to believe otherwise and was in the early stages of preparing for an invasion, along with a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in case it responded militarily, which was assumed.^[44]

[edit]Secret negotiations

At 1:00 pm EDT on October 26, John A. Scali of ABC News had lunch with Aleksandr Fomin at Fomin’s request. Fomin noted, “War seems about to break out,” and asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his “high-level friends” at the State Department to see if the U.S. would be interested in a diplomatic solution. He suggested that the language of the deal would contain an assurance from the Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision and that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons in the future, in exchange for a public statement by the U.S. that it would never invade Cuba.^[45]The U.S. responded by asking the Brazilian government to pass a message to Castro that the U.S. would be “unlikely to invade” if the missiles were removed.^[40]

Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962^[46]

On October 26 at 6:00 pm EDT, the State Department started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by Khrushchev. It was Saturday at 2:00 am in Moscow. The long letter took several minutes to arrive, and it took translators additional time to translate and transcribe the long letter.^[40]

Robert Kennedy described the letter as “very long and emotional.” Khrushchev reiterated the basic outline that had been stated to John Scali earlier in the day, “I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear.” At 6:45 pm EDT, news of Fomin’s offer to Scali was finally heard and was interpreted as a “set up” for the arrival of Khrushchev’s letter. The letter was then considered official and accurate, although it was later learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his own accord without official backing. Additional study of the letter was ordered and continued into the night.^[40]

[edit]Crisis continues

Direct aggression against Cuba would mean nuclear war. The Americans speak about such aggression as if they did not know or did not want to accept this fact. I have no doubt they would lose such a war. —Ernesto “Che” Guevara, October 1962^[47]

S-75 Dvina with V-750V 1D missile on a launcher. An installation similar to this one shot down Major Anderson’s U-2 over Cuba.

Castro, on the other hand, was convinced that an invasion was soon at hand, and he dictated a letter to Khrushchev that appeared to call for a preemptive strike on the U.S. However, in a 2010 interview, Castro said of his recommendation for the Soviets to bomb America “After I’ve seen what I’ve seen, and knowing what I know now, it wasn’t worth it at all.”^[48] Castro also ordered all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba to fire on any U.S. aircraft,^[49] whereas in the past they had been ordered only to fire on groups of two or more. At 6:00 am EDT on October 27, the CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the four missile sites at San Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua la Grande appeared to be fully operational. They also noted that the Cuban military continued to organize for action, although they were under order not to initiate action unless attacked.^{[citation needed]}

At 9:00 am EDT on October 27, Radio Moscow began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of the night before, the message offered a new trade, that the missiles on Cuba would be removed in exchange for the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey. At 10:00 am EDT, the executive committee met again to discuss the situation and came to the conclusion that the change in the message was due to internal debate between Khrushchev and other party officials in the Kremlin.^[50]^:300 McNamara noted that another tanker, the Grozny, was about 600 miles (970 km) out and should be intercepted. He also noted that they had not made the USSR aware of the quarantine line and suggested relaying this information to them via U Thant at the United Nations.

A Lockheed U-2F, the high altitude reconnaissance type shot down over Cuba, being refueled by a Boeing KC-135Q. The aircraft in 1962 was painted overall gray and carried USAF military markings and national insignia.

While the meeting progressed, at 11:03 am EDT a new message began to arrive from Khrushchev. The message stated, in part,

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety-nine miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But… you have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Italy and Turkey, literally next to us… I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive… Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States … will remove its analogous means from Turkey … and after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made.

The executive committee continued to meet through the day.

Throughout the crisis, Turkey had repeatedly stated that it would be upset if the Jupiter missiles were removed. Italy’s Prime Minister Fanfani, who was also Foreign Minister ad interim, offered to allow withdrawal of the missiles deployed in Apulia as a bargaining chip. He gave the message to one of his most trusted friends, Ettore Bernabei, the general manager of RAI-TV, to convey to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.. Bernabei was in New York to attend an international conference on satellite TV broadcasting. Unknown to the Soviets, the U.S regarded the Jupiter missiles as obsolete and already supplanted by the Polaris nuclear ballistic submarine missiles.^[9]

The engine of the Lockheed U-2 shot down over Cuba on display at Museum of the Revolution in Havana.

On the morning of October 27, a U-2F (the third CIA U-2A, modified for air-to-air refueling) piloted by USAF Major Rudolf Anderson,^[51] departed its forward operating location at McCoy AFB, Florida, and at approximately 12:00 pm EDT, the aircraft was struck by a S-75 Dvina (NATOdesignation SA-2 Guideline) SAM missile launched from Cuba. The aircraft was shot down and Anderson was killed. The stress in negotiations between the USSR and the U.S. intensified, and only much later was it learned that the decision to fire the missile was made locally by an undetermined Soviet commander acting on his own authority. Later that day, at about 3:41 pm EDT, several U.S. Navy RF-8A Crusader aircraft on low-level photoreconnaissance missions were fired upon, and one was hit by a 37 mm shell but managed to return to base.

At 4:00 pm EDT, Kennedy recalled members of EXCOMM to the White House and ordered that a message immediately be sent to U Thant asking the Soviets to “suspend” work on the missiles while negotiations were carried out. During this meeting, Maxwell Taylor delivered the news that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy had earlier claimed he would order an attack on such sites if fired upon, but he decided to not act unless another attack was made. In an interview 40 years later, McNamara said:

We had to send a U-2 over to gain reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming operational. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down that—the Cubans didn’t have capabilities to shoot it down, the Soviets did—we believed if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air-missile unit, and that it would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict. And therefore, before we sent the U-2 out, we agreed that if it was shot down we wouldn’t meet, we’d simply attack. It was shot down on Friday […]. Fortunately, we changed our mind, we thought “Well, it might have been an accident, we won’t attack.” Later we learned that Khrushchev had reasoned just as we did: we send over the U-2, if it was shot down, he reasoned we would believe it was an intentional escalation. And therefore, he issued orders to Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, to instruct all of his batteries not to shoot down the U-2.^{[note 1]}^[52]

[edit]Drafting the response

Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese restaurant in the Cleveland Park neighborhood of Washington D.C. on the evening of October 27.^[53]Kennedy suggested that they take Khrushchev’s offer to trade away the missiles. Unknown to most members of the EXCOMM, Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington to discover whether these intentions were genuine. The EXCOMM was generally against the proposal because it would undermine NATO‘s authority, and the Turkish government had repeatedly stated it was against any such trade.

As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged and Kennedy was slowly persuaded. The new plan called for the President to ignore the latest message and instead to return to Khrushchev’s earlier one. Kennedy was initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal because a new one had been offered, but Llewellyn Thompson argued that he might accept it anyway. White House Special Counsel and Adviser Ted Sorensen and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later with a draft letter to this effect. The President made several changes, had it typed, and sent it.

After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting continued in the Oval Office. The group argued that the letter should be underscored with an oral message to Ambassador Dobrynin stating that if the missiles were not withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them. Dean Rusk added one proviso, that no part of the language of the deal would mention Turkey, but there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed “voluntarily” in the immediate aftermath. The President agreed, and the message was sent.

An EXCOMM meeting on October 29, 1962 held in the White House Cabinet Room during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy is to the left of the American flag; on his left is Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his right is Secretary of StateDean Rusk.

At Juan Brito’s request, Fomin and Scali met again. Scali asked why the two letters from Khrushchev were so different, and Fomin claimed it was because of “poor communications”. Scali replied that the claim was not credible and shouted that he thought it was a “stinking double cross”. He went on to claim that an invasion was only hours away, at which point Fomin stated that a response to the U.S. message was expected from Khrushchev shortly, and he urged Scali to tell the State Department that no treachery was intended. Scali said that he did not think anyone would believe him, but he agreed to deliver the message. The two went their separate ways, and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM.^{[citation needed]}

Within the U.S. establishment, it was well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the first put Khrushchev in a terrible position. Military preparations continued, and all active duty Air Force personnel were recalled to their bases for possible action. Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood, “We had not abandoned all hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev’s revising his course within the next few hours. It was a hope, not an expectation. The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday, and possibly tomorrow…”^{[citation needed]}

At 8:05 pm EDT, the letter drafted earlier in the day was delivered. The message read, “As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows: 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba. 2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba.” The letter was also released directly to the press to ensure it could not be “delayed.”^{[citation needed]}

With the letter delivered, a deal was on the table. However, as Robert Kennedy noted, there was little expectation it would be accepted. At 9:00 pm EDT, the EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the following day. Plans were drawn up for air strikes on the missile sites as well as other economic targets, notably petroleum storage. McNamara stated that they had to “have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because we’re going to need one; and secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because sure as hell they’re going to do something there”.^{[citation needed]}

At 12:12 am EDT, on October 27, the U.S. informed its NATO allies that “the situation is growing shorter… the United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary.” To add to the concern, at 6 am the CIA reported that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action.

Later on that same day, what the White House later called “Black Saturday,” the U.S. Navy dropped a series of “signaling depth charges” (practice depth charges the size of hand grenades^[54]) on a Soviet submarine (B-59) at the quarantine line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo with orders that allowed it to be used if the submarine was “holed” (a hole in the hull from depth charges or surface fire).^[55] On the same day, a U.S. U-2 spy plane made an accidental, unauthorized ninety-minute overflight of the Soviet Union’s far eastern coast.^[56] The Soviets scrambled MiG fighters from Wrangel Island and in response the American sent aloft F-102 fighters armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles over the Bering Sea.^[57]

[edit]Crisis ends

After much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy’s cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles set in southern Italy and in Turkey, the latter on the border of the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba.

At 9:00 am EDT, on October 28, a new message from Khrushchev was broadcast on Radio Moscow. Khrushchev stated that, “the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as ‘offensive’ and their crating and return to the Soviet Union.”

Kennedy immediately responded, issuing a statement calling the letter “an important and constructive contribution to peace”. He continued this with a formal letter: “I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out… The U.S. will make a statement in the framework of the Security Council in reference to Cuba as follows: it will declare that the United States of America will respect the inviolability of Cuban borders, its sovereignty, that it take the pledge not to interfere in internal affairs, not to intrude themselves and not to permit our territory to be used as a bridgehead for the invasion of Cuba, and will restrain those who would plan to carry an aggression against Cuba, either from U.S. territory or from the territory of other countries neighboring to Cuba.”^[58]^:103

The U.S continued the quarantine, and in the following days, aerial reconnaissance proved that the Soviets were making progress in removing the missile systems. The 42 missiles and their support equipment were loaded onto eight Soviet ships. The ships left Cuba from November 5–9. The U.S. made a final visual check as each of the ships passed the quarantine line. Further diplomatic efforts were required to remove the Soviet IL-28 bombers, and they were loaded on three Soviet ships on December 5 and 6. Concurrent with the Soviet commitment on the IL-28’s, the U.S. Government announced the end of the quarantine effective at 6:45 pm EDT on November 20, 1962.^[32]

In his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy informally proposed that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed “within a short time after this crisis was over.”^[59]^:222 The last U.S. missiles were disassembled by April 24, 1963, and were flown out of Turkey soon after.^[60]

The practical effect of this Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact was that it effectively strengthened Castro’s position in Cuba, guaranteeing that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. It is possible that Khrushchev only placed the missiles in Cuba to get Kennedy to remove the missiles from Italy and Turkey and that the Soviets had no intention of resorting to nuclear war if they were out-gunned by the Americans.^[61] Because the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from NATO bases in Southern Italy and Turkey was not made public at the time, Khrushchev appeared to have lost the conflict and become weakened. The perception was that Kennedy had won the contest between the superpowers and Khrushchev had been humiliated. This is not entirely the case as both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full conflict despite the pressures of their governments. Khrushchev held power for another two years.^[58]^:102-105

[edit]Aftermath

The Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missile. The U.S. secretly agreed to withdraw these missiles from Italy and Turkey.

Ibrahim-2 Jupiter Missile in Turkey.

The compromise was a particularly sharp embarrassment for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Italy and Turkey was not made public—it was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev. The Soviets were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started—though if played well, it could have looked just the opposite. Khrushchev’s fall from power two years later can be partially linked to Politburo embarrassment at both Khrushchev’s eventual concessions to the U.S. and his ineptitude in precipitating the crisis in the first place.

Cuba perceived it as a partial betrayal by the Soviets, given that decisions on how to resolve the crisis had been made exclusively by Kennedy and Khrushchev. Castro was especially upset that certain issues of interest to Cuba, such as the status of Guantanamo, were not addressed. This caused Cuban-Soviet relations to deteriorate for years to come.^[62]^:278 On the other hand, Cuba continued to be protected from invasion.

One U.S. military commander was not happy with the result either. General LeMay told the President that it was “the greatest defeat in our history” and that the U.S. should have immediately invaded Cuba.

The Cuban Missile Crisis spurred the Hotline Agreement, which created the Moscow–Washington hotline, a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington, D.C. The purpose was to have a way that the leaders of the two Cold War countries could communicate directly to solve such a crisis. The world-wide U.S. Forces DEFCON 3 status was returned to DEFCON 4 on November 20, 1962. U-2 pilot Major Anderson’s body was returned to the United States and he was buried with full military honors in South Carolina. He was the first recipient of the newly-created Air Force Cross, which was awarded posthumously.

Although Anderson was the only combat fatality during the crisis, eleven crew members of three reconnaissance Boeing RB-47 Stratojets of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing were also killed in crashes during the period between September 27 and November 11, 1962.^[63]

Critics including Seymour Melman^[64] and Seymour Hersh^[65] suggested that the Cuban Missile Crisis encouraged U.S. use of military means, such as in the Vietnam War. This Soviet-American confrontation was synchronous with the Sino-Indian War, dating from the U.S.’s military quarantine of Cuba; historians^[who?] speculate that the Chinese attack against India for disputed land was meant to coincide with the Cuban Missile Crisis.^[66]

[edit]Post-crisis history

A U.S. Navy HSS-1 Seabat helicopter hovers over Soviet submarine B-59, forced to the surface by U.S. Naval forces in the Caribbean near Cuba (October 28–29, 1962)

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a historian and adviser to John F. Kennedy, told National Public Radio in an interview on October 16, 2002 that Castro did not want the missiles, but that Khrushchev had pressured Castro to accept them. Castro was not completely happy with the idea but the Cuban National Directorate of the Revolution accepted them to protect Cuba against U.S. attack, and to aid its ally, the Soviet Union.^[62]^:272 Schlesinger believed that when the missiles were withdrawn, Castro was angrier with Khrushchev than he was with Kennedy because Khrushchev had not consulted Castro before deciding to remove them.^{[note 2]}

In early 1992, it was confirmed that Soviet forces in Cuba had, by the time the crisis broke, received tactical nuclear warheads for their artillery rockets and Il-28 bombers.^[67] Castro stated that he would have recommended their use if the U.S. invaded despite knowing Cuba would be destroyed.^[67]

Arguably the most dangerous moment in the crisis was only recognized during the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana conference in October 2002. Attended by many of the veterans of the crisis, they all learned that on October 26, 1962 the USS Beale had tracked and dropped signaling depth charges (the size of hand grenades) on the B-59, a Soviet Project 641 (NATO designation Foxtrot) submarine which, unknown to the U.S., was armed with a 15 kiloton nuclear torpedo. Running out of air, the Soviet submarine was surrounded by American warships and desperately needed to surface. An argument broke out among three officers on the B-59, including submarine captain Valentin Savitsky, political officer Ivan Semonovich Maslennikov, and Deputy brigade commander Captain 2nd rank (US Navy Commander rank equivalent) Vasili Arkhipov. An exhausted Savitsky became furious and ordered that the nuclear torpedo on board be made combat ready. Accounts differ about whether Commander Arkhipov convinced Savitsky not to make the attack, or whether Savitsky himself finally concluded that the only reasonable choice left open to him was to come to the surface.^[68]^{:303, 317} During the conference Robert McNamara stated that nuclear war had come much closer than people had thought. Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, said, “A guy called Vasili Arkhipov saved the world.”

The crisis was a substantial focus of the 2003 documentary, The Fog of War, which won the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature.

TOP-SECRET: THE BREAKING OF “GEHEIMSCHREIBER”

The_Breaking_of_Geheimschreiber

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: American Cryptology during the Cold War; 1945-1989

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TOP-SECRET: CUBAN CRISIS 1961- ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NATIONAL SECURIYT AGENCY (NSA)

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soviet_merchant_ship spanish_speaking_pilots

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