Yushchenko Poisoning Case -Viktor Yushchenko: Ukraine’s Ex-President On Being Poisoned

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Ukraine’s former president Viktor Yushchenko says he hopes Europe will wake up to the threat posed by Russia in the wake of the poisonings in Salisbury. Seventeen years ago Mr Yushchenko was taking on a presidential candidate favoured by Russia when he was poisoned with a dioxin, a toxic chemical.

Stasi-Dioxin – The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” Searching For the Perfect Murder

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Evidence shows that such a perfect murder plotted by former Stasi agents is the cause of the death of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.

The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [ˈʃtaziː]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of East Germany. The MfS was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. It was widely regarded as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies in the world. The MfS motto was “Schild und Schwert der Partei” (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).

According to the confessions of an informer, Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch writes most of the “articles” of the communist “STASI” agency “GoMoPa” himself or it is done by lawyers of his firm. The whistleblower states that lawyer Resch is the mastermind behind the “CYBER-STASI” called “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”. Bizarre enough they use Jewish names of non-existing Jewish lawyers by the name of “Goldman, Morgenstern and Partner” to stage their bogus “firm”.  Further involved in their complots are a “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber and “STASI”-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer, “the first crime expert” in the former communist East-Germany.
According to London based Meridian Capital hundreds and thousands of wealthy people and companies have paid to the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” to avoid their cyberstalking (see article below).
Finally the German criminal police started their investigations (case number ST/0148943/2011).
The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” is also involved in the death of the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach who died under strange circumstances in July 2010.
Only hours after his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” was spreading the news that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution and set the stage for a fairy tale. Months before his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” started a campaign to ruin his reputation and presumably was also responsable for cyberattacks to bring his website down. In fact they presumably used the same tactics also against our servers. Therefore we investigated all internet details of them and handed the facts to the FBI and international authorities.

Story background:
Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.

The serial betrayer and  cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders  say they  have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of  “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions,  individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011
In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.

Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.

The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.

This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.

Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.

The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover  the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers  named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment section.

-“Worse than the Gestapo.” —Simon Wiesenthal, Nazi hunter said about the notorious “Stasi”.

Less than a month after German demonstrators began to tear down the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, irate East German citizens stormed the Leipzig district office of the Ministry for State Security (MfS)—the Stasi, as it was more commonly called. Not a shot was fired, and there was no evidence of “street justice” as Stasi officers surrendered meekly and were peacefully led away. The following month, on January 15, hundreds of citizens sacked Stasi headquarters in Berlin. Again there was no bloodshed. The last bit of unfinished business was accomplished on May 31 when the Stasi radioed its agents in West Germany to fold their tents and come home.
The intelligence department of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), the People’s Army, had done the same almost a week earlier, but with what its members thought was better style. In-stead of sending the five-digit code groups that it had used for decades to message its spies in West Germany, the army group broadcast a male choir singing a children’s ditty about a duck swimming on a lake. There was no doubt that the singing spymasters had been drowning their sorrow over losing the Cold War in schnapps. The giggling, word-slurring songsters repeated the refrain three times: “Dunk your little head in the water and lift your little tail.” This was the signal to agents under deep cover that it was time to come home.
With extraordinary speed and political resolve, the divided nation was reunified a year later. The collapse of the despotic regime was total. It was a euphoric time for Germans, but reunification also produced a new national dilemma. Nazi war crimes were still being tried in West Germany, forty-six years after World War II. Suddenly the German government was faced with demands that the communist officials who had ordered, executed, and abetted crimes against their own people—crimes that were as brutal as those perpetrated by their Nazi predecessors—also be prosecuted.
The people of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), the German Democratic Republic, as the state had called itself for forty years, were clamoring for instant revenge. Their wrath was directed primarily against the country’s communist rulers—the upper echelon of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei (SED), the Socialist Unity Party. The tens of thousands of second-echelon party functionaries who had enriched themselves at the expense of their cocitizens were also prime targets for retribution.
Particularly singled out were the former members of the Stasi, the East German secret police, who previously had considered themselves the “shield and sword” of the party. When the regime collapsed, the Stasi had 102,000 full-time officers and noncommissioned personnel on its rolls, including 11,000 members of the ministry’s own special guards regiment. Between 1950 and 1989, a total of 274,000 persons served in the Stasi.
The people’s ire was running equally strong against the regular Stasi informers, the inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs). By 1995, 174,000 had been identified as IMs, or 2.5 percent of the total population between the ages of 18 and 60. Researchers were aghast when they found that about 10,000 IMs, or roughly 6 percent of the total, had not yet reached the age of 18. Since many records were destroyed, the exact number of IMs probably will never be determined; but 500,000 was cited as a realistic figure. Former Colonel Rainer Wiegand, who served in the Stasi counterintelligence directorate, estimated that the figure could go as high as 2 million, if occasional stool pigeons were included.
“The Stasi was much, much worse than the Gestapo, if you consider only the oppression of its own people,” according to Simon Wiesenthal of Vienna, Austria, who has been hunting Nazi criminals for half a century. “The Gestapo had 40,000 officials watching a country of 80 million, while the Stasi employed 102,000 to control only 17 million.” One might add that the Nazi terror lasted only twelve years, whereas the Stasi had four decades in which to perfect its machinery of oppression, espionage, and international terrorism and subversion.
To ensure that the people would become and remain submissive, East German communist leaders saturated their realm with more spies than had any other totalitarian government in recent history. The Soviet Union’s KGB employed about 480,000 full-time agents to oversee a nation of 280 million, which means there was one agent per 5,830 citizens. Using Wiesenthal’s figures for the Nazi Gestapo, there was one officer for 2,000 people. The ratio for the Stasi was one secret policeman per 166 East Germans. When the regular informers are added, these ratios become much higher: In the Stasi’s case, there would have been at least one spy watching every 66 citizens! When one adds in the estimated numbers of part-time snoops, the result is nothing short of monstrous: one informer per 6.5 citizens. It would not have been unreasonable to assume that at least one Stasi informer was present in any party of ten or twelve dinner guests.


Like a giant octopus, the Stasi’s tentacles probed every aspect of life. Full-time officers were posted to all major industrial plants. Without exception, one tenant in every apartment build-ing was designated as a watchdog reporting to an area representative of the Volkspolizei (Vopo), the People’s Police. In turn, the police officer was the Stasi’s man. If a relative or friend came to stay overnight, it was reported. Schools, universities, and hospitals were infiltrated from top to bottom. German academe was shocked to learn that Heinrich Fink, professor of theology and vice chancellor at East Berlin’s Humboldt University, had been a Stasi informer since 1968. After Fink’s Stasi connections came to light, he was summarily fired. Doctors, lawyers, journalists, writers, actors, and sports figures were co-opted by Stasi officers, as were waiters and hotel personnel. Tapping about 100,000 telephone lines in West Germany and West Berlin around the clock was the job of 2,000 officers.
Stasi officers knew no limits and had no shame when it came to “protecting the party and the state.” Churchmen, including high officials of both Protestant and Catholic denomina-tions, were recruited en masse as secret informers. Their offices and confessionals were infested with eavesdropping devices. Even the director of Leipzig’s famous Thomas Church choir, Hans-Joachim Rotch, was forced to resign when he was unmasked as a Spitzel, the people’s pejorative for a Stasi informant.
Absolutely nothing was sacred to the secret police. Tiny holes were bored in apartment and hotel room walls through which Stasi agents filmed their “suspects” with special video cam-eras. Even bathrooms were penetrated by the communist voyeurs.8 Like the Nazi Gestapo, the Stasi was the sinister side of deutsche Gründlichkeit (German thoroughness).
After the Berlin wall came down, the victims of the DDR regime demanded immediate retribution. Ironically, their demands were countered by their fellow Germans in the West who, living in freedom, had diligently built einen demokratischen Rechtsstaat, a democratic state governed by the rule of law. The challenge of protecting the rights of both the victims and the accused was immense, given the emotions surrounding the issue. Government leaders and democratic politicians recognized that there could be no “quick fix” of communist injustices without jeopardizing the entire system of democratic jurisprudence. Moving too rapidly merely to satisfy the popular thirst for revenge might well have resulted in acquittals or mistrials. Intricate jurisdictional questions needed to be resolved with both alacrity and meticulousness. No German government could afford to allow a perpetrator to go free because of a judicial error. The political fallout from any such occurrence, especially in the East, could prove fatal to whatever political party occupied the chancellor’s office in Bonn at the time.
Politicians and legal scholars of the “old federal states,” or West Germany, counseled patience, pointing out that even the prosecution of Nazi criminals had not yet been completed. Before unification, Germans would speak of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to grips with the past”) when they discussed dealing with Nazi crimes. In the reunited Germany, this word came to imply the communist past as well. The two were considered comparable especially in the area of human rights violations. Dealing with major Nazi crimes, however, was far less complicated for the Germans: Adolf Hitler and his Gestapo and Schutzstaffel (SS) chief, Heinrich Himmler, killed themselves, as did Luftwaffe chief and Vice Chancellor Hermann Göring, who also had been the first chief of the Gestapo. The victorious Allies prosecuted the rest of the top leadership at the International War Crimes Tribunal in Nürnberg. Twelve were hanged, three received life terms, four were sentenced to lesser terms of imprisonment (up to twenty years), and three were acquitted.
The cases of communist judges and prosecutors accused of Rechtsbeugung (perversion of justice) are more problematic. According to Franco Werkenthin, a Berlin legal expert charged with analyzing communist crimes for the German parliament, those sitting in judgment of many of the accused face a difficult task because of the general failure of German justice after World War II. Not a single judge or prosecutor who served the Nazi regime was brought to account for having perverted justice—even those who had handed down death sentences for infringements that in a democracy would have been considered relatively minor offenses. Werkenthin called this phenomenon die Jauche der Justiz, the cesspool of justice.
Of course, the crimes committed by the communists were not nearly as heinous as the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews, or the mass murders in Nazi-occupied territories. However, the communists’ brutal oppression of the nation by means including murder alongside legal execution put the SED leadership on a par with Hitler’s gang. In that sense, Walter Ulbricht or Erich Honecker (Ulbricht’s successor as the party’s secretary-general and head of state) and secret police chief Erich Mielke can justifiably be compared to Hitler and Himmler, respectively.
Arrest warrants were issued for Honecker and Mielke. The Soviet government engineered Honecker’s escape to Moscow, where he became the ward of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gor-bachev. When the Soviet Union crumbled, the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin expelled Honecker. He was arrested on his return to Germany, but a court decided against a trial when he was diagnosed with liver cancer. Honecker flew to Chile with his wife Margot to live with their daughter, a Chilean citizen by marriage. His exile was short, and he died in 1994. Mielke was not so fortunate: His KGB friends turned their backs on him. He was tried in Germany for the 1931 murder of two police officers, found guilty, and sentenced to six years in prison. Other charges, including manslaughter, were dismissed because of his advanced age and poor health.
Three other members of the twenty-one-member ruling Politburo also have been tried. Former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler was convicted of manslaughter in connection with the order to kill people who were trying to escape to the West. He received a seven-and-a-half-year term. Two others, members of the Central Committee and the National Defense Council, were tried with Kessler and sentenced to seven and a half years and five years, respectively. Politburo member Harry Tisch, who was also head of the communist trade union, was found guilty of embezzlement and served eighteen months. Six others, including Egon Krenz (Honecker’s successor as party chief), were charged with manslaughter. Krenz was found guilty, and on August 25, 1997, was sentenced to six and a half years in prison.
However, eight years after reunification, many of the 165 members of the Central Committee have not yet been put under investigation. In 1945, Nazis holding comparable or lesser positions were subject to automatic arrest by the Allies. They spent months or even years in camps while their cases were adjudicated. Moreover, the Nürnberg Tribunal branded the Reich and its Corps of Political Leaders, SS, Security Service (SD), Secret State Police (Gestapo), SA (Storm Troopers), and Armed Forces High Command criminal organizations. Similarly sweeping actions against communist leaders and functionaries such as Stasi officers were never contemplated, even though tens of thousands of political trials and human rights abuses have been documented. After the East German regime fell, German judicial authorities scrupulously avoided the appearance of waging witch-hunts or using the law as a weapon of vengeance. Prosecutors and judges made great efforts to be fair, often suspending legal action while requesting rulings from the supreme court on possible constitutional conflicts.
The victims of oppression clamored for revenge and demanded speedy prosecution of the erstwhile tyrants. They had little patience for a judicial system that was handicapped by a lack of unblemished and experienced criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges. Despite these handicaps, the Berlin Central Police Investigations Group for Government Criminality, mindful that the statute of limitations for most communist crimes would expire at the end of 1999, made significant progress under its director Manfred Kittlaus, the able former director of the West Berlin state police. Kittlaus’s major task in 1998 was to investigate wrongful deaths, including 73 murders, 30 attempted murders, 583 cases of manslaughter, 2,938 instances of attempted manslaughter, and 425 other suspicious deaths. Of the 73 murders, 22 were classified as contract murders.
One of those tried and convicted for attempted contract murder was former Stasi collaborator Peter Haak, who was sentenced to six and a half years in prison. The fifty-two-year-old Haak took part in the Stasi’s 1981 Operation Scorpion, which was designed to pursue people who helped East Germans escape to the West. Proceedings against former General Gerhard Neiber, whose Stasi directorate was responsible for preventing escapes and for wreaking vengeance, were still pending in 1998.
Peter Haak’s murder plot was hatched after he befriended Wolfgang Welsch and his family. Welsch was a thorn in the side of the Stasi because of his success in smuggling people out of the DDR. Haak joined Welsch and the latter’s wife and seven-year-old daughter on a vacation in Israel, where he mixed a gram of thallium, a highly poisonous metallic chemical element used in rat poison, into the hamburgers he was preparing for a meal. Welsch’s wife and daughter vomited immediately after ingesting the poison and recovered quickly. Welsch suffered severe aftereffects, but eventually recovered: He had consumed a large amount of beer with the meal, and an expert testified that the alcohol had probably flushed the poison from his system.
Berlin Prosecutor General Christoph Schäfgen revealed that after the DDR’s demise 15,200 investigations had been launched, of which more than 9,000 were still active at the beginning of 1995. Indictments were handed down in 153 cases, and 73 perpetrators were convicted. Among those convicted were the aforementioned Politburo members as well as a number of border guards who had killed people who were trying to escape to the West.
Despite widespread misgivings about the judicial failures in connection with some Nazi crimes, a number of judges and prosecutors were convicted and jailed for up to three years for perversion of justice. In collusion with the Stasi, they had requested or handed down more severe sentences in political cases so that the state could collect greater amounts when the “convicts” were ransomed by the West German government. {The amount of ransom paid was governed by the time a prisoner had been sentenced to serve.)
The enormity of the task facing judicial authorities in reunified Germany becomes starkly evident when one examines the actions they have taken in all five former East German prov-inces and in East Berlin. From the end of 1990 to July 1996, 52,050 probes were launched into charges of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, election fraud, and per-version of justice. A total of 29,557 investigations were halted for various reasons including death, severe illness, old age, or insufficient evidence. In those five and a half years, there were only 139 convictions.
The problem is even more staggering when cases of espionage are included. Between 1990 and 1996, the office of the federal prosecutor general launched 6,641 probes, of which 2,431 were terminated before trial—most due to the statute of limitations. Of 175 indictments on charges of espionage, 95 resulted in convictions. In addition to the cases handled at the federal level, the prosecutor general referred 3,926 investigations to state authorities, who terminated 3,344 without trial. State courts conducted 356 trials, resulting in 248 convictions. Because the statute of limitations for espionage is five years, the prosecutor general’s office told me in 1997 it was unlikely that more espionage trials would be conducted.
It is important to emphasize the difference between the statute’s application to so-called government crimes committed in East Germany before the collapse and to crimes, such as es-pionage, committed in West Germany. The Unification Treaty specifically permits the belated prosecution of individuals who committed acts that were punishable under the East German criminal code and who due to official connivance were not prosecuted earlier. There is no statute of limitations for murder. For most other crimes the limit is five years; however, due to the obstacles created by previous government connivance, the German parliament in 1993 doubled this time limit for prosecution of the more serious crimes. At the same time, the par-liament decreed that all cases must be adjudicated by the end of 2002. For less serious offenses, the statute would have run out on December 31, 1997, but the parliament extended it to 2000.
A number of politicians, jurists, and liberal journalists pleaded for a general amnesty for crimes committed by former DDR leaders and Communist Party functionaries. A former West German supreme court judge, Ernst Mahrenholz, said the “sharp sword of justice prevents reconciliation.” Schäfgen, the Berlin prosecutor general, had this answer for the former high court judge and other amnesty advocates:

I cannot agree. We are raising no special, sharp sword against East Germans. We must pursue state-sponsored injustice in exactly the same manner as we do when a thief steals or when one human being kills another. If one wants to change that, then we would have to do away with the entire criminal justice system, because punishment always hurts. We are not criminalizing an entire people but only an ever shrinking, small portion.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who was West Germany’s minister of justice when the nation was unified, said this at a session of parliament in September 1991: “We must punish the perpetrators. This is not a matter of a victor’s justice. We owe it to the ideal of justice and to the victims. All of those who ordered injustices and those who executed the orders must be punished; the top men of the SED as well as the ones who shot [people] at the wall.” Aware that the feelings against communists were running high among their victims, Kinkel pointed to past revolutions after which the representatives of the old system were collectively liquidated. In the same speech before parliament, he said:

Such methods are alien to a state ruled by law. Violence and vengeance are incompatible with the law in any case. At the same time, we cannot tolerate that the problems are swept under the rug as a way of dealing with a horrible past, because the results will later be disastrous for society. We Germans know from our own experience where this leads. Jewish philosophy formulates it in this way: “The secret of redemption is called remembering.”

Defense attorneys for communist officials have maintained that the difficulty lies in the fact that hundreds of thousands of political opponents were tried under laws of the DDR. Although these laws were designed to smother political dissent and grossly violated basic human rights and democratic norms, they were nonetheless laws promulgated by a sovereign state. How could one justly try individual Stasi officers, prosecutors, and judges who had simply been fulfilling their legal responsibility to pursue and punish violators of the law?
Opinions varied widely on whether and how the Stasi and other perpetrators of state-sponsored crimes should be tried. Did the laws of the DDR, as they existed before reunification, still apply in the east? Or was the criminal code of the western part of the country the proper instrument of justice in reunified Germany? However, these questions were moot: As Rupert Scholz, professor of law at the University of Munich and a Christian Democratic member of parliament, pointed out, the Unification Treaty specifies that the penal code of the DDR and not that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) shall be applied to offenses committed in East Germany. Scholz’s view was upheld by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the supreme court. Most offenses committed by party functionaries and Stasi officers—murder, kidnapping, torture, illegal wiretapping, mail robbery, and fraud—were subject to prosecution in reunified Germany under the DDR’s penal code. But this would not satisfy the tens of thousands of citizens who had been sent to prison under East German laws covering purely political offenses for which there was no West German equivalent.
Nevertheless, said Scholz, judicial authorities were by no means hamstrung, because West Germany had never recognized the East German state according to international law. “We have always said that we are one nation; that the division of Germany led neither to full recognition under international law nor, concomitantly, to a recognition of the legal system of the DDR,” Scholz said. Accordingly, West German courts have consistently maintained that West German law protects all Germans equally, including those living in the East. Therefore, no matter where the crimes were committed, whether in the East or the West, all Germans have always been subject to West German laws. Applying this logic, East German border guards who had either killed or wounded persons trying to escape to the West could be tried under the jurisdiction of West Germany.
The “one nation” principle was not upheld by the German supreme court. Prior to the court’s decision, however, Colonel General Markus Wolf, chief of the Stasi’s foreign espionage directorate, and some of his officers who personally controlled agents from East Berlin had been tried for treason and convicted. Wolf had been sentenced to six years in prison. The su-preme court ruling overturned that verdict and those imposed on Wolf’s cohorts, even though they had obtained the most closely held West German secrets and handed them over to the KGB. The maximum penalty for Landesverrat, or treason, is life imprisonment. In vacating Wolf’s sentence, the court said he could not be convicted because he operated only from East German territory and under East German law.
However, Wolf was reindicted on charges of kidnapping and causing bodily harm, crimes also punishable under East German law. The former Stasi three-star general, on March 24, 1955, had approved in writing a plan to kidnap a woman who worked for the U.S. mission in West Berlin. The woman and her mother were tricked by a Stasi agent whom the woman had been teaching English, and voluntarily got into his car. He drove them into the Soviet sector of the divided city, where they were seized by Stasi officers. The woman was subjected to psychological torture and threatened with imprisonment unless she signed an agreement to spy for the Stasi. She agreed. On her return to the American sector, however, the woman reported the incident to security officials. Wolf had committed a felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment in West Germany. He was found guilty in March 1977 and sentenced to two years’ probation.
Those who have challenged the application of the statute of limitations to communist crimes, especially to the executions of citizens fleeing to the West, have drawn parallels to the notorious executive orders of Adolf Hitler. Hitler issued orders mandating the summary execution of Soviet Army political commissars upon their capture and initiating the extermination of Jews. An early postwar judicial decision held that these orders were equivalent to law. When that law was declared illegal and retroactively repealed by the West German Bundestag, the statute of limitations was suspended—that is, it never took effect. Many of those convicted in subsequent trials of carrying out the Führer’s orders were executed by the Allies. The German supreme court has ruled the same way as the Bundestag on the order to shoot people trying to escape to West Germany, making the statute of limitations inapplicable to such cases. The ruling made possible the trial of members of the National Defense Council who took part in formulating or promulgating the order. A number of border guards who had shot would-be escapees also have been tried and convicted.
Chief Prosecutor Heiner Sauer, former head of the West German Central Registration Office for Political Crimes, was particularly concerned with the border shootings. His office, located in Salzgitter, West Germany, was established in 1961 as a direct consequence of the Berlin Wall, which was erected on August 13 of that year. Willy Brandt, at the time the city’s mayor (later federal chancellor) had decided that crimes committed by East German border guards should be recorded. At his behest, a central registry of all shootings and other serious border incidents was instituted. Between August 13, 1961 and the opening of the borders on November 9, 1989, 186 border killings were registered. But when the Stasi archives were opened, investigators found that at least 825 people had paid with their lives for trying to escape to the West. This figure was reported to the court that was trying former members of the National Defense Council. In addition to these border incidents, the registry also had recorded a number of similar political offenses committed in the interior of the DDR: By fall 1991, Sauer’s office had registered 4,444 cases of actual or attempted killings and about 40,000 sentences handed down by DDR courts for “political offenses.”
During the early years of Sauer’s operation, the details of political prosecutions became known only when victims were ransomed by West Germany or were expelled. Between 1963 and 1989, West Germany paid DM5 billion (nearly US$3 billion) to the communist regime for the release of 34,000 political prisoners. The price per head varied according to the importance of the person or the length of the sentence. In some cases the ransom amounted to more than US$56,000. The highest sum ever paid to the East Germans appears to have been DM450,000 (US$264,705 using an exchange rate of US$1.70 to the mark). The ransom “object” in this case was Count Benedikt von Hoensbroech. A student in his early twenties, von Hoensbroech was attending a West Berlin university when the wall went up. He was caught by the Stasi while trying to help people escape and was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. The case at-tracted international attention because his family was related to Queen Fabiola of Belgium, who interceded with the East Germans. Smelling money, the East German government first demanded the equivalent of more than US$1 million from the young man’s father as ransom. In the end, the parties settled on the figure of DM450,000, of which the West German gov-ernment paid DM40,000 (about $23,529). Such ransom operations were fully controlled by the Stasi.
Political prisoners released in the DDR could not be registered by the West Germans because their cases remained secret. The victims were admonished to keep quiet or face another prison term. Nonetheless, in the first year after reunification, Sauer’s office added another 20,000 documented cases, for a total of 60,000. Sauer said he believed the final figure of all political prosecutions would be somewhere around 300,000. In every case, the Stasi was involved either in the initial arrest or in pretrial interrogations during which “confessions” were usually extracted by physical or psychological torture, particularly between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s.
Until 1987, the DDR imposed the death penalty for a number of capital crimes, including murder, espionage, and economic offenses. But after the mid-1950s, nearly all death sentences were kept quiet and executions were carried out in the strictest secrecy, initially by guillotine and in later years by a single pistol shot to the neck. In most instances, the relatives of those killed were not informed either of the sentence or of the execution. The corpses were cremated and the ashes buried secretly, sometimes at construction sites. In reporting about one executioner who shot more than twenty persons to death, the Berlin newspaper Bildzeitung said that a total of 170 civilians had been executed in East Germany. However, Franco Werkenthin, the Berlin official investigating DDR crimes, said he had documented at least three hundred executions. He declined to say how many were for political offenses, because he had not yet submitted his report to parliament. “But it was substantial,” he told me. The true number of executions may never be known because no complete record of death sentences meted out by civil courts could be found. Other death sentences were handed down by military courts, and many records of those are also missing. In addition, German historian Günther Buch believes that about two hundred members of the Stasi itself were executed for various crimes, including attempts to escape to the West.


The preamble to the East German criminal code stated that the purpose of the code was to “safeguard the dignity of humankind, its freedom and rights under the aegis of the criminal code of the socialist state,” and that “a person can be prosecuted under the criminal code only in strictest concurrence with the law.” However, many of the codified offenses for which East German citizens were prosecuted and imprisoned were unique to totalitarian regimes, both fascist and communist.
Moreover, certain sections of the code, such as those on “Treasonable Relaying of Information” and “Treasonable Agent Activity,” were perversely applied, landing countless East Germans in maximum security penitentiaries. The victims of this perversion of justice usually were persons who had requested legal exit permits from the DDR authorities and had been turned down. In many cases, their “crime” was having contacted a Western consulate to inquire about immigration procedures. Sentences of up to two and a half years’ hard labor were not unusual as punishment for such inquiries.
Engaging in “propaganda hostile to the state” was another punishable offense. In one such case, a young man was arrested and prosecuted for saying that it was not necessary to station tanks at the border and for referring to border fortifications as “nonsense.” During his trial, he “admitted” to owning a television set on which he watched West German programs and later told friends what he saw. One of those “friends” had denounced him to the Stasi. The judge considered the accused’s actions especially egregious and sentenced him to a year and a half at hard labor.
Ironically, another part of this section of the criminal code decreed that “glorifying militarism” also was a punishable offense, although the DDR itself “glorified” its People’s Army beyond any Western norm. That army was clad in uniforms and insignia identical to those of the Nazi Wehrmacht, albeit without eagles and swastikas. The helmets, too, were differently shaped, but the Prussian goose step was regulation during parades.
A nineteen-year-old who had placed a sign in an apartment window reading “When justice is turned into injustice, resistance becomes an obligation!” was rewarded with twenty-two months in the penitentiary. Earlier, the youth had applied for an exit visa and had been turned down. A thirty-four-year-old father of two who also had been denied permission to leave the “workers’ and peasants’ state” with his family similarly advertised that fact with a poster reading “We want to leave, but they won’t let us.” The man went to prison for sixteen months. The “crimes” of both men were covered by a law on “Interference in Activities of the State or Society.”
Two letters—one to a friend in West Germany, seeking assistance to legally emigrate to the West, and another containing a similar appeal to Chief of State Honecker—brought a four-year sentence to their writer, who was convicted under two laws: those on “establishing illegal contacts” (writing to his friend) and on “public denigration” (writing to Honecker). The Stasi had illegally intercepted both letters.
The East German party chiefs were not content to rely only on the Stasi’s millions of informers to ferret out antistate sentiments. Leaving nothing to chance, they created a law that made the failure to denounce fellow citizens a crime punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. One man was sentenced to twenty-three months for failing to report that a friend of his was preparing to escape to the West. The mandatory denunciation law had its roots in the statutes of the Socialist Unity Party, which were published in the form of a little red booklet. I picked up a copy of this booklet that had been discarded by its previous owner, a Stasi chauffeur, who had written “Ha, Ha” next to the mandate to “report any misdeeds, regardless of the person responsible, to leading party organs, all the way up to the Central Committee.”
Rupert Scholz, member of parliament and professor of law at the University of Munich, said many East Germans feel there is little determination among their Western brethren to bring the Stasi criminals to trial. “In fact, we already have heard many of them say that the peaceful revolution should have been a bloody one instead so they could have done away with their tormentors by hanging them posthaste,” Scholz told me.
The Reverend Joachim Gauck, minister to a Lutheran parish in East Germany, shared the people’s pessimism that justice would be done. Following reunification, Gauck was appointed by the Bonn government as its special representative for safeguarding and maintaining the Stasi archives. “We must at least establish a legal basis for finding the culprits in our files,” Gauck told me. “But it will not be easy. If you stood the millions of files upright in one line, they would stretch for 202 kilometers [about 121 miles]. In those files you can find an unbe-lievable number of Stasi victims and their tormentors.”
Gauck was given the mandate he needed in November 1991, when the German parliament passed a law authorizing file searches to uncover Stasi perpetrators and their informants. He viewed this legislation as first step in the right direction. With the evidence from Stasi files, the perpetrators could be removed from their public service jobs without any formal legal pro-ceedings. Said Gauck: “We needed this law badly. It is not reasonable that persons who served this apparatus of oppression remain in positions of trust. We need to win our people over to accepting that they are now free and governed by the rule of law. To achieve that, we must build up their confidence and trust in the public service.”
Searching the roughly six million files will take years. A significant number of the dossiers are located in repositories of the Stasi regional offices, sprinkled throughout eastern Germany. To put the files at the Berlin central repository in archival order would take one person 128 years. The job might have been made easier had the last DDR government not ordered the burning of thousands of Stasi computer tapes, ostensibly to forestall a witch-hunt. Thousands of files dealing with espionage were shredded and packed into 17,200 paper sacks. These were discovered when the Stasi headquarters was stormed on January 15, 1990. The contents of all of these bags now have been inspected. It took two workers between six and eight weeks to go through one bag. Then began the work of the puzzlers, putting the shredded pieces together. By the middle of 1997, fewer than 500 bags of shredded papers had been reconstructed—into about 200,000 pages. Further complicating matters was the lack of trained archivists and experts capable of organizing these files—to say nothing of the 37.5 million index cards bearing the names of informers as well as persons under Stasi surveillance—and interpreting their contents. Initially, funding for a staff of about 550 individuals was planned, at a total of about DM24.5 million annually (about US$15 million using an exchange rate of US$1.60). By 1997, the budget had grown to US$137 million and the staff to 3,100.
Stasi victims and citizens who had been under surveillance were allowed to examine their Stasi files. Within four years of reunification, about 860,000 persons had asked to inspect their case files, with 17,626 of those requests being received in December 1994 alone. By 1997, 3.4 million people had asked to see their files. Countless civil suits were launched when victims found the names of those who had denounced and betrayed them, and many family relationships and friendships were destroyed.
The rehabilitation of Stasi victims and financial restitution to them was well under way; but Gauck believed that criminal prosecution of the perpetrators would continue to be extremely difficult. “We can already see that leading SED functionaries who bear responsibility for the inhumane policies, for which they should be tried, are instead accused of lesser offenses such as corruption. It is actually an insult to democracy that a man like Harry Tisch is tried for embezzlement and not for being a member of the Politburo, where the criminal policies originated.”
The “Stasi files law,” as it is popularly known, also made it possible to vet parliamentarians for Stasi connections. Hundreds were fired or resigned—and a few committed suicide—when it was discovered that they had been Stasi informants. Among those who resigned was Lothar de Maiziere, the last premier of the DDR, who signed the unification agreement with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He was a member of the East German version of the Christian Democratic Union, which like all noncommunist parties in the Eastern bloc had been totally co-opted by the regime. After reunification, he moved into parliament and was awarded the vice chairmanship of Kohl’s Christian Democratic Union. A lawyer, De Maiziere had functioned for years as an IM, an informer, under the cover name Cerny. De Maiziere at first denied he was Cerny, but the evidence was overwhelming. It was De Maiziere’s government that had ordered the destruction of the Stasi computer tapes.


De Maiziere, who had been a driving force behind prompt reunification, soon passed into oblivion; but twenty members of the old Communist Party, the SED, are still members of parliament. The SED changed its name in late 1989, when the DDR was collapsing, to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Its new leadership arrogantly dismissed their bloody past as irrelevant now that the word democratic had been adopted as part of their party’s name. If the elections of summer 1990 had taken place just a few months later and thus had been conducted under the law of reunified Germany, these individuals would not have won parliamentary seats. The West German electoral rules governing the proportional representation system require that a party garner at least 5 percent of the vote before it may enter parliament. In addition to choosing a party, voters cast a second ballot for a specific person. This is called a direct mandate. If any party falls below 5 percent but gets at least three direct mandates, that party is seated in parliament. As a one-time compromise in consideration of East Germany’s smaller population, the Bonn government accepted a 3-percent margin of party votes. Even so, the PDS barely made it into parliament.
In the 1994 general election, the first after reunification, the party polled 4.4 percent. Had it not been for the votes electing four persons by direct mandate, the PDS would have been excluded. The direct mandates all came from East Berlin districts heavily populated by unemployed, former Communist Party and government officials. One of the men elected directly was Gregor Gysi, a communist lawyer who had been accused of informing on his clients to the Stasi. Gysi denied the allegations and had obtained a temporary injunction barring a former East German dissident from making the assertion. However, a Hamburg court lifted the injunction in December 1994 on the basis of Stasi documents that indicated Gysi had no case.
Another candidate directly elected to parliament was Stefan Heym, a German-born writer who had emigrated to the United States after Hitler came to power, had changed his name from Helmut Flieg, and had become a U.S. citizen. He served in the U.S. Army as an officer during World War II, but switched sides in 1952 to live in East Germany, forfeiting his U.S. citizenship in order to become an East German citizen and a member of the Communist Party. A year later, on June 17, 1953, the East German people rose up in a revolt that was crushed by the Red Army. Had it not been for the intervention of the Soviets, Heym wrote afterward in the communist daily newspaper Berliner Zeitung, “the American bombing would have already begun. The shots against the rebels were fired to prevent war, rather than to begin one.” And when Stalin died, just four months earlier, Heym used the same newspaper to mourn the butcher of an estimated twenty million people as the “most loved man of our times.” Finally, in a speech on January 31, 1995, at a demonstration marking the 62nd anniversary of the Nazi takeover, the unrepentant Heym, now eighty-two years old, had the gall to say that the present climate in Germany was “very similar to that in 1933, and this frightens me.” It was a grotesque spectacle when Heym was accorded the “honor” of delivering the opening address of the 1965 parliamentary session traditionally reserved for the body’s oldest member. Despite vehement protests, parliamentary president Rita Süssmuth ruled to uphold the tradition.
One of the PDS members also retaining his seat was Hans Modrow. Modrow, a veteran communist, was SED district secretary in Dresden. It was a most powerful communal political position. Modrow was a vital cog in the apparatus of state repression. The local Stasi chief, Major General Horst Böhm, reported directly to him. Modrow was the one who ordered the Vopo, the People’s Police, to resort to violence in putting down massive protests during the turbulent days in fall 1989, just before the Berlin Wall fell. Hundreds of protesters were severely beaten and jailed. Böhm, the Dresden Stasi boss, was found shot dead in his office in early 1990, just before he was to appear before a commission that had been convened to settle the future of the communist state. His death was listed as a suicide. However, an unsubstantiated rumor has it that he was murdered to prevent him from testifying about Modrow’s despotic rule. Modrow was found guilty of election fraud in May 1993. The DDR hierarchy, according to the evidence, had ordered that the number of votes opposing the official slate in the 1989 election had to be fewer than in 1985. Modrow reported that only 2.5 percent of the ballots in his district were cast in opposition; but the true number was at least four times higher. The judge issued him a mere rebuke, refusing to imprison or fine him. The federal high court, which reviews sentences, ordered in November 1994 that Modrow stand trial again because the sentence “was too mild.” After a new trial in 1996 on charges of perjury, Modrow was sentenced to six months’ probation. A year later, parliament was still considering whether he should be deprived of his seat.
Unlike the Nazi Party’s finances and property, which were confiscated by the victorious Allies and turned over to the first West German government in 1949, the SED’s millions were inherited by the PDS, which spirited part of those funds out of the country when the East German government collapsed. The PDS also became custodian of the archives of the SED and refused anyone outside the party access to them. Shortly after reunification, in 1990, the courts ruled that the archives were state property. Judicial authorities as well as scholars were permitted to research them. Nevertheless, the SED archives were almost lost. In 1994, the German news magazine Focus discovered a letter dated March 1991, sent by Gregor Gysi in the capacity of PDS party chief to Vladimir A. Ivashko, assistant secretary-general of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party. In this letter, Gysi pleaded with Soviet leaders either to put pressure on German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to return the archive to the PDS, or if Kohl felt this was politically impossible, to destroy it. The opening of the archive, Gysi wrote, was a “genuine catastrophe,” because it contained many secret documents. Publication of the documents would have “extremely unpleasant results not only for the PDS but for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well,” Gysi wrote. But his Soviet friends were no longer able to help him. The archive holds documents on Politburo decisions and directives that might prove crucial in prosecuting the former East German party hierarchy. In the end, the PDS offered to settle for 20 percent of the SED’s ill-gotten funds, forfeiting the rest as a gesture of goodwill toward the new state.
Not all observers were impressed by this compromise. Peter Gauweiler, Bavaria’s minister for development and ecological affairs at the time of reunification, and a member of the Christian Democratic Party, demanded that the PDS and the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, the West German Communist Party), be outlawed: “Every month we learn of new crimes committed by the SED—terrible things, gruesome things,” Gauweiler said. “We cannot tolerate a successor organization to such an extremely criminal gang.”

STASI – East Germany’s Secret Police -Germany’s Records Of Repression

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Sixty years after the Berlin Wall was erected, the spectre of the Stasi continues to loom over Germany.

STAS – East Germany’s Secret Police -East Germany’s Stasi Files

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In a musty room somewhere inside a maze of offices in east Berlin, two women are working patiently on what may be the biggest puzzle the world has ever seen – more than half a billion pieces that together detail innumerable actions committed by East Germany’s secret police.

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“Worse than the Gestapo.” — Simon Wiesenthal, Nazi hunter

Lauschen, spähen, schnüffeln: Vor 60 Jahren wurde die DDR-Staatssicherheit gegründet. Mehr als 91.000 hauptamtliche und doppelt so viele inoffizielle Mitarbeiter garantierten der SED die Macht. Ein Geheimdienst im klassischen Sinn war der Apparat nie, eher schon eine kriminelle Vereinigung mit tödlichen Methoden“, schreibt die angesehene Tageszeitung „DIE WELT“.

„Genau so verfährt auch der „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „ GoMoPa“ , erläutert Rainer W. (Name wurde aus Sicherheitsgründen anonymisiert). Er war über mehrere Monate „inoffizieller“ Mitarbeiter des „NACHRICHTENDIENSTES“ „GoMoPa“, einem angeblichen Zusammenschluss jüdischer US-Rechtsanwälte namens Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner LLC, die noch nie jemand gesehen hat. Stattdessen sehen die Personen, die sich mit „GoMoPa“ beschäftigen nur die Totenkopfmaske stalinistischer STASI-Hacker, Erpresser und Cyberstalker.

Rainer W.: „Die eigentlichen Köpfe von „GoMoPa“ sind meiner Meinung nach wohl RA Jochen Resch und STASI-Oberst Ehrenfried Stelzer. Maurischat (ein Deckname) hat nicht das Format so eine Organisation aufzuziehen.“

Seit Jahren schon vesuchen die vorbestraften Serien-Kriminellen um das „Aushängeschild“ Klaus-Dieter Maurischat die deutsche Wirtschaft zu infiltrieren. Doch erst seit dem mutmasslichen Mord an Heinz Gerlach und den monatelangen Attacken gegen unser Haus sind viele Fakten recherchiert und zu Tage gekommen.

Vor allem über die Methoden des „NACHRICHTENDIENSTES“ – aber auch über dessen Hintermänner in Berlin, denn in New York existiert sowieso nur eine Briefkastenadresse und auch das „Büro“ in Berlin ist ein „virtuelles Regus-Büro“.

Die Fassade soll den „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ tarnen.

„DIE WELT“ schreibt: „40 Jahre lang, von der Gründung bis zu ihrer schrittweisen Auflösung zwischen Dezember 1989 und März 1990, war die Staatssicherheit der wichtigste Machtgarant der SED-Herrschaft. In dieser Zeit wucherte der Apparat immer mehr, bis schließlich mehr als 91.000 hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter für das MfS tätig waren.

Dieses Heer betreute eine Schattenarmee mit 189.000 „Inoffiziellen Mitarbeitern“ (IM). Statistisch gesehen kam in der DDR auf 55 erwachsene Bürger ein Vollzeit- oder Teilzeit-Stasi-Mann. Zum Vergleich: Im kommunistischen Polen lag das Verhältnis bei 1500 zu eins.

Der Apparat hat ungezählte Verbrechen zu verantworten. Darin folgte er seinen sowjetischen Vorbildern, der Tscheka (stolz nannten sich Stasi-Leute „Tschekisten“) und dem KGB. Vor allem aber prägte ein Mann das kriminelle Gebaren des MfS: Erich Mielke hatte sich schon als junger Mann 1931 als Attentäter in Berlin bewährt, als er im Auftrag der KPD zusammen mit einem Mittäter zwei Berliner Polizeioffiziere erschoss.

Der Doppelmörder konnte flüchten und führte im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg stalinistische Säuberungen in den eigenen Reihen durch. Im Sommer 1945 kehrte er nach Berlin zurück und übernahm sofort eine führende Position in der neu eingerichteten Polizei – interessanterweise in jenem Gebäude, das bis 1990 Sitz und Postanschrift der Staatssicherheit sein sollte.“

Zu den ungezählten Verrechen zählen Morde, Entführungen, Raub, Erpressung, Bespitzelung und jahrelange Gefängnishaft für Regime-Kritiker.

Jörg Berger flüchtete 1979 aus der DDR. Auch im Westen blieb die Stasi sein ständiger Begleiter. Jörg Berger berichtete vor seinem frühen Tod: „Nehmen wir den Fall des Spielers Lutz Eigendorf. Der war kurz vor mir geflüchtet und hat dann durch viel Medienpräsenz noch selbst dazu beigetragen, den Rummel anzufachen. Er starb bei einem Unfall auf der Autobahn, höchstwahrscheinlich hat ihn die Stasi vor seinem Tod geblendet. Entsprechendes findet sich jedenfalls in seiner Akte. Die Leute um Eigendorf waren die Leute, die ich auch um mich versammelt hatte. Dazu war er ein junger Spieler, ich ein gestandener Trainer. So hat man mir die Autoreifen zerstochen, auf der Autobahn löste sich ein Rad – und monatelang hatte ich Lähmungserscheinungen. Vermutlich von einer Bleivergiftung, die die Stasi initiiert hatte. Die haben mir wohl etwas in ein Getränk gemischt.“

„Der „Blitz“ traf Wilhelm van Ackern am 24. März 1955, kurz nach 22.30 Uhr – in Form von K.-o.-Tropfen in frisch gebrühtem Bohnenkaffee. Der vermeintliche Informant Fritz Weidmann hatte den 39-jährigen Fotohändler in eine konspirative Wohnung in der Kreuzberger Gneisenaustraße gelockt und ihm dort den vergifteten Kaffee serviert.

Nach wenigen Minuten wurde van Ackern übel; gestützt von Weidmann, verließ er die Wohnung. Doch auf der Straße erwartete ein weiterer Mann die beiden mit einem Wagen. Wilhelm van Ackern wurde im Schutz der Dunkelheit hineingestoßen und über die noch offene Sektorengrenze von West- nach Ost-Berlin ins Untersuchungsgefängnis Hohenschönhausen gefahren. Erst neuneinhalb Jahre später, teilweise verbüßt in der berüchtigten DDR-Sonderhaftanstalt Bautzen II, kam er frei und durfte zurück nach West-Berlin.“

Von Arsen bis Zyankali:
Der Giftschrank der Staatssicherheit


Dieter Baumann ist nicht totzukriegen. Nach einer zweijährigen Dopingsperre geht er jetzt wieder an den Start. 1999 eine positive Dopingprobe. Dass er sich selbst gedopt hat, glauben heute nur noch seine Feinde. Und Feinde aus der ehemaligen DDR hatte er genug:

Dieter Baumann 1991:
„Trainer, die eben mit solchen Dingen zu tun hatten, mit Doping, die können vom DLV nicht weiter beschäftigt werden.“

Dieter Baumann 1994:
„Aber die Trainer und die Funktionäre, die haben es nämlich entschieden, dass man es macht. Und diese Leute hat man jetzt wieder.“

Dieter Baumann 1998:
„Für mich als Athlet, das beanspruche ja auch ich für mich selber, gilt als Nachweis eine positive Probe oder ein Geständnis.“

In Baumanns Zahnpasta fanden Kontrolleure das Dopingmittel Norandrostendion. Wie man Zahnpasta-Tuben mit Gift präpariert, kann man in den Stasiakten nachlesen: mit einem Glasröhrchen im hinteren Teil der Z-Tube.

Die Zeitschrift „Laufzeit“ im Osten Berlins fragte ein Jahr vor Baumanns Dopingtest nach einem „Messias“ der Antidopingbewegung und beendete den Kommentar mit dem Satz: „Muß man sich angesichts morgendlicher Hochform eines Tages gar fragen: Ist meine Zahnpasta noch sauber?“

Laufzeit-Chef Wolfgang Weising, früher Leichtathletikautor bei der NVA-Zeitung „Volksarmee“ – sagte gegenüber report AUS MÜNCHEN, diese Formulierung sei Zufall gewesen. Baumann, das Opfer eines Komplotts? Selbst die Tübinger Kriminalpolizei schließt heute aus, dass sich Baumann selbst gedopt hat. Auch wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen belegen: Er konnte seine Zahnpasta nicht nachträglich manipuliert haben. Baumanns größte Entlastung: die Dosis war niemals leistungssteigernd.

Baumann selbst will nicht öffentlich spekulieren, wer ihm das Dopingmittel unterjubelte. Es müsse aber jemand aus seinem engen Umfeld sein.

Dieter Baumann, Olympiasieger 1992:
„Ich glaube schon, dass die Täter sich verrechnet haben. Ich glaube, der Wunsch der Täter, soviel kann ich sagen, ist mein Eindruck, dass es mich überhaupt nicht mehr gibt im Sport. Und ich hab’ dann so ein Naturell, wo ich denke: Nee, wenn jemand so einen innigen Wunsch hat, dann sollte man den nicht erfüllen.“

Die Existenz von Kritikern vernichten, das war eine Aufgabe der Stasi. Der Rechtsmediziner Prof. Thomas Daldrup von der Universität Düsseldorf hat die sogenannte „Toxdat“-Studie der DDR untersucht – eine 900 Seiten starke Datenbank über Giftmordmöglichkeiten. Hier ist detailliert beschrieben wie sich selbst Laien Gifte beschaffen können und wie man einen Mord am besten verschleiert.

Prof. Thomas Daldrup, Präsident Gesellschaft für Toxikologische und Forensische Chemie:
“Hier ist so ein Beispiel für einen Stoff, den will ich nicht erwähnen. ‚Dieser Stoff erfüllt in hohem Maße Kriterien für ein zum perfekten Mord geeignetes Gift.’ Also, das kann man doch gar nicht anders lesen, als dass hier eine Anleitung zum perfektem Mord mit Gift gegeben wird. Hier ist es mal ganz klar ausgedrückt, aber das ganze Buch ist gefüllt mit solchen Informationen.“

Hinweise auf die Verschleierung provozierter Unfälle finden sich ebenfalls in Toxdat: „Vortäuschung von Verkehrsunfällen durch Auslösung von sekundenschneller Bewusstlosigkeit mittels Minigasgenerator in Belüftungsschächten von PKW.“

Da ist zum Beispiel der rätselhafte Verkehrsunfall des ehemaligen DDR-Fußballspielers Lutz Eigendorf im Jahr 1983. Vier Jahre zuvor war er nach einem Spiel in der Bundesrepublik nicht in die DDR zurückgekehrt. Er war ein leidenschaftlicher Autofahrer, seine Fahrweise risikovoll, das notierten die Spitzel der Stasi im Westen. Kurz vor seinem Verkehrsunfall stoppt die Stasi seine Fahrtzeit und die genaue Streckenführung seines täglichen Wegs vom Stadion nach Hause.

Zum Unfallhergang tauchen vor zwei Jahren neue Hinweise auf. Wurde Eigendorf gezielt geblendet? In den Giftakten der Stasi heißt es: „verblitzen, Eigendorf“. Hatte man Eigendorf heimlich ein pupillenerweiterndes Mittel verabreicht?

Die Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin kann Fragen dazu nicht beantworten, da eine Obduktion nicht angeordnet wurde, auch nach Auftauchen der neuen Stasidokumente nicht.

Ein weiterer Fall: Fußballtrainer Jörg Berger liest seine Stasiakten. Nach seiner Flucht aus der DDR wurde der Star-Trainer ´79 zum Staatsfeind.

Jörg Berger, Fußballtrainer Alemannia Aachen:
„Hier ist alles gesagt!“

Die Stasi wusste, dass Berger Angst hatte vor einem möglichen Auftragsmord, um weitere Fußballer vor einer Flucht abzuhalten:

„BERGER bekundete angeblich (…), daß es ihm nicht so ergehen soll wie EIGENDORF.“

Die Stasi glaubte, dass Berger der Drahtzieher war für die Republikflucht mehrerer Fußballer. Als Berger dann Mitte der 80er Jahre als Trainer auf dem Sprung in die 1. Bundesliga war und sich die DDR-Sportler Falko Götz und Dirk Schlegel nach Westdeutschland absetzten, schien Berger für die DDR unerträglich zu werden.

„Im operativen Vorgang ‚Ball’ wurde operativ herausgearbeitet, daß BERGER wesentlichen Anteil am Verrat von GÖTZ und SCHLEGEL hatte.“

Jörg Berger, Fußballtrainer, Alemannia Aachen:
„Es ist auch in diesen Aussagen zu erkennen, dass man mich berufsunfähig machen wollte oder dass man mich kaltstellen wollte in der Richtung, dass ich nicht mehr als Trainer arbeite, um da vielleicht auch nicht mehr die Einflüsse auf Spieler oder vielleicht sogar auf Trainer zu haben.“

1986 litt Berger unter rätselhaften Lähmungserscheinungen. Der Erklärungsversuch damals: eine Virusinfektion. Im Auftrag von report AUS MÜNCHEN hat der Rechtsmediziner Prof. Wolfgang Eisenmenger vor dem Hintergrund von Toxdat Bergers Krankenakten analysiert. Jetzt scheint festzustehen: Berger wurde vergiftet.

Prof. Wolfgang Eisenmenger, Klinikum Innenstadt der Universität München, Institut für Rechtsmedizin:
„Wenn man die laborchemischen Befunde aus dem Krankenhaus kritisch würdigt, muss man sagen, es spricht in Nachhinein nichts für eine durchgemachte Virusentzündung. Da die Schwermetallvergiftungen nicht gezielt untersucht worden sind, kann man sie aufgrund der Laborbefunde nicht ausschließen. (…) Es kommen – wenn man das Krankheitsbild würdigt – vor allem Schwermetalle aus der Gruppe der Bleiverbindungen und der Arsenverbindungen in Betracht.“

Die Anleitung, eine Arsenikvergiftung zu verschleiern – liefert ebenfalls wieder die DDR-Giftstudie Toxdat.

Frühere Stasi-Mitarbeiter wollten auch ihn ausschalten, das glaubt der Bundestagsabgeordnete Hartmut Büttner aus Hannover. 1995 hatte er einen mysteriösen Autounfall, der ihn beinahe das Leben kostete. Nach der Wiedervereinigung hatte der Abgeordnete zu den Hintermännern der „Toxdat“-Studie recherchiert und sich sehr für die Offenlegung der Stasi-Akten durch die Gauck-Behörde eingesetzt.

Hartmut Büttner, CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneter 1991:
„Ich halte es für skandalös, dass der mit dem Sektglas parlierende Altsozialist den Insassen von Bautzen völlig verdrängt hat.”

Als Büttner ´95 auf gerader, staubtrockener Straße verunglückte, findet keine Filigranuntersuchung des Wagens statt. Während er im Koma liegt, gibt die Polizei das Schrottauto frei. Eine Speditionsfirma zahlt dafür eilig das Sechsfache seines Werts. Büttner wurde mitgeteilt:

Hartmut Büttner, CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneter:
“Dieses Auto ist in der Tat ins ‚solvente Ausland’ – in diesem Fall nach Polen – geschickt worden. Und in Polen wurde dieser Wagen nach einer Woche als gestohlen gemeldet.“

Viele Unfälle und Erkrankungen von ehemaligen DDR-Systemkritikern scheinen noch lange nicht geklärt.

Ebenso wie der Todesfall Heinz Gerlach zur Gänze aufgeklärt werden muss

„DIE WELT“ berichtet: „Mielkes Leute pfuschten in das Leben von Millionen DDR-Bürgern hinein, zerstörten berufliche oder private Hoffnungen und zersetzten routinemäßig ganze Familien. Außerdem schädigte die Stasi im Laufe der Jahrzehnte Hunderttausende Menschen in der SED-Diktatur vorsätzlich, brach unangepasste Charaktere mit psychischem Druck.

In jedem DDR-Bezirk unterhielt das MfS eigene Untersuchungshaftanstalten, in Potsdam zum Beispiel in der Lindenstraße 54/55. In Berlin gab es neben der Zentrale in Lichtenberg die Stasi-Bezirksverwaltung Berlin, die bis 1985 in einem ehemaligen Krankenhaus an der Prenzlauer Allee und danach in einem 100 Millionen DDR-Mark teuren Neubau am Tierpark Friedrichsfelde amtierte, und das große Sperrgebiet in Hohenschönhausen, wo neben einem Gefängnis auch das streng geheime NS-Archiv der Stasi und technische Abteilungen saßen.

Neben der alltäglichen Unterdrückung stehen die schweren Gewalttaten des MfS; sie umfassen praktisch alle Paragrafen des DDR-Strafgesetzbuchs. So verschleppten Stasi-Kommandos im Laufe der Zeit mindestens 500, vielleicht aber auch bis zu tausend Menschen in die DDR – westliche Agenten, Überläufer aus den eigenen Reihen und SED-Kritiker vor allem. Einige von ihnen, zum Beispiel der vormalige Volkspolizei-Chef Robert Bialek, überlebten die Verschleppung nicht; andere, wie die „Verräter“ Paul Rebenstock und Sylvester Murau, wurden nach manipulierten Prozessen hingerichtet.

Ein juristisch verbrämter Mord war die Hinrichtung des MfS-Hauptmanns Werner Teske 1981. Er hatte mit dem Gedanken gespielt, in den Westen überzulaufen, allerdings nie einen konkreten Versuch dazu unternommen. Obwohl selbst das scharfe DDR-Strafrecht die Todesstrafe nur für vollendeten schweren Landesverrat vorsah, den Teske unzweifelhaft nicht begangen hatte, wurde er im Leipziger Gefängnis durch Genickschuss getötet.

Auch direkte Mordanschläge beging die Stasi. So lauerte 1976 ein Spezialkommando der Stasi, die „Einsatzkompanie der Hauptabteilung I“, auf westlicher Seite der innerdeutschen Grenze dem Fluchthelfer Michael Gartenschläger auf. Er wollte dort eine Splittermine vom Typ SM-70 abmontieren, die berüchtigte „Selbstschussanlage“. Vier Männer der Einsatzkompanie erwarteten ihn und eröffneten sofort das Feuer, als der langjährige politische Gefangene an den Grenzzaun heranschlich. MfS-Generalleutnant Karl Kleinjung, der Chef der Hauptabteilung I, hatte zuvor befohlen, „den oder die Täter festzunehmen bzw. zu vernichten“.

Auch der Schweizer Fluchthelfer Hans Lenzlinger wurde wohl im Auftrag des MfS 1979 in seiner Züricher Wohnung erschossen. Vielleicht war Bruno Beater, der ranghöchste Stellvertreter Mielkes und Experte für „nasse Jobs“, in den Anschlag verwickelt; aufgeklärt wurde dieser Mord aber nie.

Nicht das befohlene Ziel erreichten dagegen Mordanschläge gegen andere Fluchthelfer. Kay Mierendorff, der Hunderten DDR-Bürgern gegen fünfstellige Summen in die Freiheit verhalf, bekam im Februar 1982 eine Briefbombe zugeschickt, die ihn schwer verletzte und bleibende Schäden hervorrief.

Einen anderen „Hauptfeind“ der SED, den Fluchthelfer Wolfgang Welsch, vergiftete ein in seinen Kreis eingeschleuster Stasi-Agent im Sommer 1981 mit dem extrem toxischen Schwermetall Thallium; den Tod von Welschs Ehefrau und ihrer Tochter nahm der Stasi-IM billigend in Kauf.

Geplant, aber wohl nicht ausgeführt worden sind Mordanschläge auf Rainer Hildebrandt, den Kopf der DDR-kritischen „Arbeitsgemeinschaft 13. August“, die von ihrem Haus am Checkpoint Charlie aus das Unrecht der Mauer unnachgiebig anprangerte, und auf den Friedrichshainer Pfarrer Rainer Eppelmann, der unter Erich Honecker zeitweise als „Staatsfeind Nummer eins“ der SED galt. Umstritten ist dagegen, ob der DDR-Fußballstar Lutz Eigendorf 1983 von der Stasi durch einen vorsätzlich herbeigeführten Autounfall ermordet wurde. Vieles spricht dafür; der letzte Beweis ist in den allerdings bisher nur zum Teil sachgerecht erschlossenen Akten der Birthler-Behörde nicht aufgetaucht.

Noch öfter als potenziell tödliche Methoden wandten die Stasi-Experten allerdings das Mittel der Erpressung an. In verschiedenen Hotels für westliche Touristen in der ganzen DDR waren über den Betten Kameras eingebaut; auf interessante Ausländer wurden gezielt Prostituierte der Stasi angesetzt, um sie später mit kompromittierenden Fotos erpressen zu können. Das Gleiche versuchte das MfS auch mit Heinrich Lummer, dem West-Berliner CDU-Politiker. Über Jahre hinweg pflegte er eine geheime Beziehung zu einer Ost-Berlinerin, die in Wirklichkeit wohl von Anfang an als Spitzel auf ihn angesetzt war. 1981/82 versuchte das MfS, Lummer zu erpressen, was aber misslang.

Rund 40 Jahre lang garantierte die Stasi als „Schild und Schwert der Partei“ die Existenz der SED-Diktatur. Doch manches misslang Mielkes Mannen auch. So erwies sich beispielsweise die Suche nach den Autoren eines anonymen, kritischen Aufrufs als erfolglos, der 1969 an der Humboldt-Universität auftauchte. Trotz enormen Aufwandes und Kosten von rund einer Million DDR-Mark konnte das MfS die Verantwortlichen, die Studenten Rainer Schottländer und Michael Müller, nie überführen. So wurde ihr Protest zum „teuersten Flugblatt der Welt“.“

Insider Rainer W.:“Genau diese Methodenw erden heute von „GoMoPa“ und deren Hintermännern weider angewandt – natürlich verfeinert und mit Internet-Cyberstalking-Taktiken garniert.

Hinzu kommt der systematische Rufmord via Google und mit falschen Gerüchten, Erpresseranrufen, Morddrohungen, Cyberattacken, Kontoplünderungen und die Zerstörung von Geschäftsbeziehung durch

Systematisch gestreutes Misstrauen. Nehmen Sie all dies zusammen, dann haben Sie die STASI von heute: den „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „GoMoPa“.“

Remember – New Criminal Police Action Against “GoMoPa” & Also Against Google

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Dear readers,

on our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders  say they  have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the


The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of  “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.

Besides that many legal institutions,  individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.

The case number is


My warmest regards

Bernd Pulch

Remember Russian Television Journalist Killed Ilyas Shurpayev – March 21th 2008

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A Russian television journalist who had reported from the turbulent North Caucasus region was found strangled in his Moscow apartment on Friday, prosecutors said.

Police said the body of Ilyas Shurpayev, 32, was found by firefighters when they arrived to put out a fire in his apartment. They said it appeared Shurpayev was strangled with a belt and his attackers set his apartment on fire before leaving.

Shurpayev had moved to Moscow from Dagestan, a crime-ridden southern province neighboring Chechnya where he worked for several years as a reporter with state-controlled Channel One television.

Shurpayev reported from many conflict zones in the former Soviet Union including Chechnya and Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

A spokesman for the investigations committee of the Prosecutor-General’s office said several theories for Shurpayev’s murder were being checked, including those related to his personal life and his work.

“Apparently the journalist knew his murderer because he opened the door for him and let him in,” the spokesman said.

Russian media reported that a concierge in the apartment block where Shurpayev lived had seen the last person to visit him.

More than a dozen journalists have been slain in contract-style killings in Russia since 2000. Many journalists appear to have been targeted for beatings and killings because of their attempts to dig into allegations of corruption.

Shurpayev was not known as an investigative reporter.

Several hours before his death he posted an entry on his personal Internet blog, http://www.shurpaev.livejournal.com, saying he had been included in a black list of journalists barred from contributing to an unnamed Dagestani newspaper.

“Now I am a dissident! What nonsense!”, wrote Shurpayev, who said he had published only travel reports in the paper.

“I have not participated in the political life of my republic or even my district because I am too lazy and have no time,” he wrote.

King Kong vs Godzilla – Full Sci-Fi Action Movie – Michael Keith

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Watch #KingKongVsGodzilla Hollywood epic movie. Starring Michael Keith, Harry Holcombe, James Yagi, Tadao Takashima and Keji Sahaka. Directed by Ishirō Hondatch

The Nurse (1997) | Hollywood Thriller Movie – Lisa Zane, John Stockwell

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Watch #TheNurse 1997 Thriller movie. Starring Lisa Zane, John Stockwell, John Stockwell, Nancy Dussault and Sherrie Rose. Directed by Robert Malenfant. Music by Richard Bowers Produced by Richard Brandes #ActionThrillerMovie #HollywoodActionMovie #HollywoodThrillerMovie Synopsis A traumatized nurse plots revenge against a catatonic businessman, whom she blames for the death of her father. She integrates herself in to his family as his personal nurse and plots revenge by killing off his family members one by one.

The Front Page -Steamboat Bill, Jr. (1928) | Silent Comedy Movie – Buster Keaton, Ernest Torrence

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Watch #SteamboatBill,Jr. 1928 Silent Comedy Movie. Starring Buster Keaton and Ernest Torrence, Directed by Charles Reisner, Produced by Joseph M. Schenck. #BusterKeatonMovie #ComedyMovie #LatestHollywoodMovies #HollywoodMovies #ActionThrillerMovie

How to Murder Your Wife (1965) – Romantic Comedy Movie – Jack Lemmon, Virna Lisi

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Watch #HowtoMurderYourWife 1965 Romantic Comedy movie.

Starring Jack Lemmon, Virna Lisi, Terry-Thomas, Claire Trevor, Sidney Blackmer and Max Showalter. Directed by Richard Quine Music by Neal Hefti Produced by George Axelrod

The Front Page – Chai Bisket Stories – Suhas

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An aspiring filmmaker narrates a highly complex story to a producer. As his story unfolds, we will find out if the narrator is successful in getting his story approved.

Starring Suhas & Sridhar

Directed by Filmian

Produced by Anurag & Sharath

Music by Karthik Rodriguez

Cinematography by Shreekar Khajandar

Editing by Pavan Kalyan

The Front Page – Full Movie

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A crusading newspaper editor tricks his retiring star reporter into covering one last case. Director: Lewis Milestone Writers: Ben Hecht, Charles MacArthur Stars: Adolphe Menjou, Pat O’Brien, Mary Brian Genres: Classics, Comedy, Crime, Drama, Romance

Die Rechtslage bei schweren Internet-Angriffen wie von mutmasslich “GoMoPa”, “Nawito” und Konsorten


Nachfolgend einige Links zu dem brisanten Thema, den wenn mutmasslich “GoMoPa”, “Nawito”, Sven Schmidt, “Eagle IT” und dubioser  “CTO” der dubiosen “GoMoPa” sowie sein mutmasslicher Genosse Thomas Promny und Genossen unsere starken Server ungestraft attackieren können, kann bald jedes Unternehmen ähnliche Probleme haben wie wir:




All das zeigt, welche Kriminellen hier in STASI-Manier am Werk sind:

Sie haben Angst vor der Wahrheit und können sich nur durch kriminelle Aktionen halten….

DIE ZEIT über das Zitat “ausgeklügelte Schutzgeldsystem von Gomopa”

Artikel Link



Wie der Finanznachrichtendienst Gomopa gegen Betrüger kämpft und dabei selbst dubiose Geschäfte macht.

Es war an einem Mittwochmittag im September 2012 in Berlin-Kreuzberg, als Klaus Maurischat, ein Eis in der Hand und einen Kollegen neben sich, über eine Brücke spazierte und brutal überfallen wurde. Drei schwarz vermummte Männer griffen ihn an, sie schlugen ihn auf offener Straße nieder und traten ihm ins Gesicht, dann liefen sie davon. Blutend schleppte sich Maurischat in sein Büro am Tempelhofer Ufer und rief die Polizei.

Maurischat, 56, war wohl kein Zufallsopfer. Der Mann lebt gefährlich. Er ist Chef eines Finanznachrichtendienstes namens Gomopa, und er hat es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, Anlagebetrügern und anderen Wirtschaftskriminellen auf die Spur zu kommen und auf seiner Internetseite vor ihnen zu warnen. So schafft man sich Feinde in einem Milieu, in dem es Geld im Überfluss und wenig Skrupel gibt. Wer ihm die Schläger auf den Hals hetzte, ist nicht bekannt.


Eine der Firmen, mit denen sich Maurischat und seine Mitarbeiter in den vergangenen Jahren intensiv beschäftigten, ist die Immobiliengruppe S&K mit Sitz in Frankfurt. Die Rechercheure von Gomopa hatten einen guten Riecher, denn auch die Strafverfolgungsbehörden nahmen die Firma ins Visier, und sie holten jüngst zum großen Schlag aus: Am 19. Februar durchsuchten nicht weniger als 1.200 Ermittlungsbeamte und 15 Staatsanwälte eine Frankfurter Jugendstilvilla und mehr als 130 Objekte in sieben Bundesländern.

Die Hauptverdächtigen wurden verhaftet, es sind der 33-jährige Stephan Schäfer und der 31-jährige Jonas Köller, die beiden Chefs von S&K. Sie werden verdächtigt, ein betrügerisches Schneeballsystem aufgebaut und Geldanleger um einen dreistelligen Millionenbetrag betrogen zu haben. Das Geld soll unter anderem für den exzessiven und extrem aufwendigen Lebensstil der Beschuldigten verwendet worden sein. Die Staatsanwaltschaft ermittelt in dem Fall gegen insgesamt 50 Personen, darunter sind auch Anwälte und Sachverständige, die den Hauptverdächtigen zu Diensten waren.

Für Maurischat und seine Truppe könnte der Triumph kaum größer sein. Bereits im März 2010 hatten sie vor S&K gewarnt. Für ihre Berichterstattung waren die Rechercheure von der Frankfurter Firma mit Klagen überzogen worden. Auf der Internetseite des Finanznachrichtendienstes ist zu lesen: “Bis zur vorgestrigen Verhaftung von Schäfer und seines Geschäftspartners Jonas Köller wurden gegen GoMoPa.net insgesamt zwölf Klagen an vier Landgerichten (Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln und Frankfurt am Main) eingereicht und der Streitwert auf drei Millionen Euro hochgetrieben.” Man habe sich davon aber nicht schrecken lassen: “GoMoPa.net hielt stand.” Damit weckt der Fall S&K Sympathien für ein Unternehmen, das sich gerne als eine Art Schutzpolizei für Bürger und Anleger darstellt. “GoMoPa wurde mit dem Ziel gegründet, durch aktive Aufklärung und permanente Transparenz nachhaltig zur Betrugsprävention in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft beizutragen”, heißt es auf der Website.

Das klingt gut, wenn nicht: zu gut, um wahr zu sein. Recherchen der ZEIT legen den Verdacht nahe, dass die selbst erklärten Saubermänner ebenfalls Dreck am Stecken haben könnten. Es gibt Indizien für systematisch betriebene Erpressungen.

Gomopa steht für Goldman, Morgenstern & Partners, der Hauptsitz des Unternehmens ist New York, aber mit der berühmten Investmentbank hat die Firma nichts zu tun. Bei der auf der Website angegebenen Adresse von Gomopa handelt es sich um ein Gebäude an der Madison Avenue in Midtown Manhattan. Dort findet sich ein Business Center, eine Art Gemeinschaftsbüro, wo sich Unternehmen Fax, Kopierer und Konferenzräume teilen. Bei einem Besuch vor Ort war niemand von Gomopa für die ZEIT zu erreichen. Man solle einen Termin machen, sagte die Empfangsdame. Persönlich kenne sie niemanden von der Firma.

Tatsächlich scheint Gomopa maßgeblich von Deutschland aus betrieben zu werden. Am Tempelhofer Ufer in Berlin-Kreuzberg hat eine Gomopa GmbH ihren Sitz, es handelt sich um eine Niederlassung der US-Firma.

Ein ehemaliger freier Mitarbeiter der Firma beschreibt gegenüber der ZEIT den eigentlichen Zweck des Unternehmens als ein “ausgeklügeltes Schutzgeld-Geschäftsmodell”.

Seite 2/3:

“Dann morgen unser abgesteckter positiv Artikel”

Die Sache laufe so: “Entweder die betroffenen Unternehmen zahlen, oder Gomopa zerstört ihren Ruf so gründlich, dass sie keine Geschäfte mehr machen können.”

Das wäre Erpressung. Um das zu kaschieren, zahle die erpresste Firma an Gomopa das Geld für eine angebliche Dienstleistung, so der Exmitarbeiter. Oder sie beteilige sich sogar mit Kapital an Gomopa.

Das Ganze spielt sich vor dem Hintergrund des sogenannten grauen Kapitalmarkts ab. Die dort tätigen Unternehmen werden nicht von Aufsichtsbehörden überwacht. Sie versprechen potenziellen Geldanlegern hohe Renditen, etwa mit Immobiliengeschäften, Unternehmensbeteiligungen oder Edelsteinhandel. Auf die Risiken wird oft nur im Kleingedruckten hingewiesen. Ob die versprochene Rendite fließt, zeigt sich häufig erst nach Jahren. Viele Unternehmen handeln legal, aber Abzocke und Betrügereien kommen häufig vor. Seriöse Anbieter sind von unseriösen schwer zu unterscheiden.

Fachorgane mit kritischen Experten, die in diesem Bereich für Aufklärung sorgen, können Anleger vor Schäden bewahren, sind also eigentlich eine gute Sache. Es gibt aber offenbar auch ein anderes Geschäftsmodell: Erfahrene Szenekenner durchleuchten Anlagefirmen und unterziehen sie einer ständigen kritischen Berichterstattung, sie lassen sich dann aber durch Geldzahlungen der betroffenen Unternehmen ruhigstellen. Dass dieses Geschäftsmodell ganz besonders einträglich sein kann, ergibt sich aus der Tatsache, dass gerade unentdeckte Anlagebetrüger regelmäßig in Geld schwimmen und ein großes Interesse daran haben, ihre Geschäfte so lange wie möglich weiterzubetreiben.

Im Fall S&K ging es damit los, dass dessen Chefs eine Reihe anonymer E-Mails erhielten, wie sie der ZEIT vor ihrer Verhaftung berichteten. “Hallöle ihr milchreisbubis!”, begann eine dieser Nachrichten. “Eure klitsche ist in einem jahr geschichte. was jetzt im internet auf euch traumtänzer und loser zukommt, ahnt ihr nicht. haut ab, solange es noch geht. das ist ein gutgemeinter rat und unsere letzte warnung.”

Stephan Schäfer behauptet, Maurischat habe zugegeben, dass er und ein Mann namens Wolfgang Zimmermann für die anonymen Mails und auch für anonyme Internetseiten gegen S&K verantwortlich seien. “Das ist eine Lüge!”, schreibt Maurischat der ZEIT. Nie habe er derlei getan, nie derlei zugegeben.

Unstrittig ist, dass sich Maurischat und Schäfer im September 2012 in der Gomopa-Niederlassung in Berlin trafen, um Differenzen auszuräumen. Nach Maurischats Darstellung führte er damals mit Schäfer Vergleichsverhandlungen. Der Immobilienunternehmer habe ihn, einen anderen Mann namens Zimmermann und Gomopa verleumdet und nach einer Unterlassungsklage eingewilligt, Schmerzensgeld zu leisten. Überdies habe der S&K-Chef angeboten, sich bei dem Finanznachrichtendienst mit zwei Millionen Euro zu beteiligen.

Obwohl es sich dabei um eine außerordentlich merkwürdige Offerte handelte, war sie für Maurischat durchaus akzeptabel: “Ich schlug ihm vor, wenn er das wolle, dann könne er eine speziell dafür anzufertigende Teilhabererklärung unterzeichnen.”

Das tat Schäfer zwar nicht, aber er zahlte immerhin 200.000 Euro an Maurischat. Der leitete einen Großteil des Geldes an Zimmermann und andere weiter und behielt 30.000 Euro.

Am 22. Oktober schrieb Maurischat eine Mail an Schäfer, in der es zum einen um dieses bereits gezahlte Geld ging und zum anderen um eine noch vorzunehmende Beteiligung Schäfers an Gomopa. Diese Beteiligung hätte auch beeinflusst, wie über S&K auf GoMoPa.net berichtet worden wäre. Das legt jedenfalls die Mail nahe, die der Anlegerschützer schrieb.

“Also, Teilhabervertrag unterschrieben zu mir und entsprechend handeln. Dann morgen unser abgesteckter positiv Artikel und die beiden o.a. Artikel sind auch weg”, so Maurischat an Schäfer. Er bot an: “Meinetwegen schmeiße ich sämtliche Artikel auch sofort und heute raus wenn mir der unterschriebene und in der Anlage befindliche Teilhabervertrag vorliegt und wir das zum Bestandteil unserer Vereinbarung machen!” Der Schluss dieser Mail spricht Bände: “Jetzt du wieder! Gruß Klaus”.

Nach der Zahlung seien Artikel über sein Unternehmen auf der Website von Gomopa zum Teil verschwunden und zum Teil durch positivere Berichte ersetzt worden, sagt Schäfer. Maurischat behauptet heute, dass er einen Einstieg von S&K bei seinem Finanznachrichtendienst nur akzeptiert hätte, wenn sich die Immobilienfirma vorher von einem von ihm ausgewählten Wirtschaftsprüfer hätte begutachten lassen wollen. In der der ZEIT vorliegenden “Beteiligungserklärung” steht davon allerdings nichts. Dafür findet sich dort diese Passage: Gomopa “wird nach Eingang der ersten Zahlung sämtliche S&K betreffenden Artikel vom Netz nehmen und neue Artikel über S&K nicht veröffentlichen ohne diese mit S&K einvernehmlich abzusprechen”.

Seite 3/3:

So ist das in der Szene: Man schlägt sich – und verträgt sich

Klaus Maurischat verhandelte nach Unterlagen, die der ZEIT vorliegen, auch mit einem Finanzunternehmer in Hamburg. Dabei ging es ebenfalls um einen Einstieg bei Gomopa. Und auch über diesen Mann und einen seiner Geschäftspartner waren zuvor auf der Gomopa-Website kritische Beiträge erschienen.

Der Mann ließ sich auf die Sache ein. Der Gomopa-Chef habe ihm in einem mündlichen Gespräch klargemacht, dass die negativen Berichte nur gegen Geld ein Ende nehmen würden, sagt der Hamburger Geschäftsmann: “Zu zahlen erschien mir günstiger, als sich auf einen Internetkrieg einzulassen.”

Auch dieser Unternehmer bekam anonyme Mails. Bei einer stand in der Betreffzeile: “Kurz vor dem Konkurs?” Darunter folgten acht “Überschriften, die auf Internetseiten Sie zukünftig begleiten könnten”.

Der Hamburger schrieb an Maurischat: “Ich (…) bestätige hiermit den verbindlichen Antrag auf Ankauf von 40 Stck./ in Worten vierzig Shares (Aktien)” an der Gomopa Control Inc. Der Sitz dieser Gomopa-Tochter ist Miami im US-Bundesstaat Florida. Vereinbart wurde eine Beteiligung in Höhe von 200000 Euro.

Unstreitig ist, dass Gomopa im April 2012 von dem Hamburger Kaufmann 24750 Euro als erste Rate kassierte. Maurischat bestätigte ihm auch schriftlich den Eingang des Geldes und wies in dem Schreiben ausdrücklich darauf hin, dass diese Beteiligung in keinem Zusammenhang mit der Berichterstattung auf GoMoPa.net stehe, wie “böse Menschen” denken könnten.

Als der Unternehmer dann aber nicht die noch ausstehenden 175250 Euro überwies, bedrohte ihn Maurischat per Mail vom 9. Juli 2012: “Nochmals mache ich Sie darauf aufmerksam, dass ich Ihnen und sämtlichen Unternehmen an denen Sie beteiligt sind eigene Internetseiten widmen und über Ihre Geschäftspraktiken aufklären werde, wenn Sie Ihren Verpflichtungen nicht nachkommen.” Er werde überdies “sämtliche Geschäftsbanken Ihres Hauses informieren und über Ihr Unternehmen mehrfach auf unserer Plattform öffentlich berichten”, drohte Maurischat. “Diese Meldungen gehen sodann an fast 60000 User und Vertriebe aus dem Finanzbereich!” Angeblich schauen jährlich 8,4 Millionen Besucher auf der Gomopa-Website vorbei.

Auch per SMS drohte Maurischat dem Kaufmann: “Bis zum Offenbarungseid oder zur Insolvenz werde ich Sie treiben. Zahlen Sie nicht, bereite ich Ihnen und Ihrer Firma einen Skandal – da denken Sie noch in 20 Jahren dran!”

Maurischat gibt heute zu, diese Mails und Nachrichten “wahrscheinlich” geschrieben zu haben. Er sei “mehr als wütend” gewesen, weil der Hamburger ihm gegenüber sein Kaufmannsehrenwort gebrochen habe. Nicht er habe dem Mann eine Beteiligung angeboten, sondern der habe ihn danach gefragt. Das zugesagte Geld sei für ein neues Projekt seines Unternehmens fest eingeplant gewesen, sein Ausbleiben habe die Firma in ziemliche Schwierigkeiten gebracht.

Der ZEIT sind 14 weitere Firmen bekannt, die behaupten, im Zusammenhang mit Gomopa-Berichten zu Geldzahlungen genötigt worden zu sein. Sie haben Angst, genannt zu werden. “Gegen Gomopa haben Sie keine Chance”, sagt ein Unternehmer. “Auf deren Berichte wird im Internet geklickt. Egal ob die Fakten stimmen oder nicht.”

Maurischat weist alle Anschuldigungen zurück. Gomopa mache die Berichterstattung im Internet nie von Geldzahlungen abhängig. Vielmehr werde er diffamiert von Leuten, “die von uns beim Betrügen und Lügen erwischt wurden”.

Über ihn selbst, der mal eine Lehre als Groß- und Einzelhandelskaufmann gemacht hat, heißt es auf der Gomopa-Website, dass er “die Methoden und Tricks des Marktes wie kaum ein anderer” kenne, und das ist sicher wahr. Dass er einschlägig vorbestraft ist, steht nicht da. Man erfährt auf der Website auch nichts über die Verbindung mit dem 60-jährigen Wolfgang Zimmermann, einer ebenfalls schillernden Figur der Szene.

Zimmermann steht hinter einer Firma namens Confidential Business mit Sitz in Panama. Er taucht oft dann bei Unternehmen auf, wenn diese wegen Artikeln auf GoMoPa.net und anonymen Internetseiten unter Druck stehen. Zimmermann bietet an, das Problem gegen eine Geldzahlung zu lösen. Seine Dienstleistungen hat er in einem Werbebrief an das Frankfurter Immobilienunternehmen S&K (etwas ungelenk) so beschrieben: “Ich gebe meiner Klientel äußerst aggressive, aber legale Waffen und Mittel zu Hand.”

Wie Maurischat und Zimmermann zusammenarbeiten, das geht unter anderem aus einer der ZEIT vorliegenden Mail hervor, die Zimmermann an einen Finanzunternehmer geschrieben hat. Darin droht er: “Wir stellen weitere Anzeigen. Bis Sie am Ende sind.” Gomopa leiste “echt gute Arbeit”, schreibt Zimmermann und fügt hinzu: “Die können Sie nicht abstellen, da haben Sie keine Chance mehr. (…) Sie wollten ja nicht zahlen.”

Zimmermann hat sich zu keinem der Vorwürfe geäußert. Dass mit ihm nicht zu spaßen ist, hat auch Maurischat erfahren. Zwischen ihm und Zimmermann habe es einen jahrelangen Streit und “Internetkrieg” gegeben, schreibt er der ZEIT.“Auf diversen, anonym ins Internet gestellten Webseiten wurden Mitarbeiter und ich unter anderem als Päderasten, Gewohnheitsverbrecher und Kinderschänder bezeichnet.” 2006 habe man den “Krieg” mithilfe eines Anwalts beendet. Dann sei “Ruhe eingekehrt”. So ist das in der Szene: Man schlägt sich – und verträgt sich.

So wollte SJB-Bennewirtz für die fingierte STASI-”GoMoPa” Artikel bei uns löschen – So eng arbeiten SJB und “GoMoPa” zusammen

Subject: Request
From: “P. Schmitz” <p.schmitz@deinguterruf.de>
Date: Fri, July 1, 2011 12:18 pm
To: office@ebizz.tv
Priority: Normal
Options: View Full Header | View Printable Version | Download this as a file
Dear madams, dear sirs,

by order of our customer SJB Fonds Skyline OHG we are kindly asking you
to remove some entries on your website thetvnet.com. The
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We hope you can manage the removal of these entries according to the wish
of our customer contemporarily.These entries and similar ones cause
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We wanna thank you for your appreciation, for further information
please visit our website deinguterruf.de. (the english version is
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In case you are not the right receipt for this request, it would be
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If you have further questions concerning this case or our services in
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It would be a great pleasure to receive a positive feedback.

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Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

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TOP-SECRET – An Illegal Trainer (KGB history of agent “Halef”). Folder 60. The Chekist Anthology.

01 June 2007 Source:
The Mitrokhin Archive Description:
Describes training techniques used by the KGB in logistical preparation of their operatives for assignments abroad. This article focuses on the employment history of the KGB agent codenamed “Halef.” Between 1955 and 1967, Halef was stationed in Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 1967, due to his insignificant feedback and a weak performance as a field operative, Halef was transferred back as a trainer. As a trainer, Halef traveled extensively. While in the United States, the KGB developed a fictitious identity for Halef – a so-called legend-biography – in case his activity aroused suspicion and he were detained by authorities. In the United States, France and Mexico, Halef’s objectives included developing and testing means of communication with the KGB, which could be used to inform the KGB of an operative’s arrival to and departure from a country, request a meeting, or announce an emergency. In addition to assessing the existing signal language used among operatives, the KGB also instructed Halef to collect the data necessary to set up new surveillance locations in a number of countries. In 1977, Halef was performing assignments in Pakistan and Burma. In 1978, he and his wife were engaged in assignments throughout the USSR. From the USSR, they were relocated to the GDR and then to Bulgaria, where they boarded a cruise ship going from Varny to Suhumi to survey the ports of the Black Sea basin. Traveling through Odessa, Halef photographed military vessels and observed the procedures of the border patrol and customs officers.


Volume 60 – An Illegal Trainer

Unveiled – WikiLeaks Setting Another Trap for Journalists, NGOs

A sends:

I tasted that poison today. It was strange, the feeling of having the privilege to information that was only made available to “a select few” was overwhelming, I don’t have the vocabulary to describe what the poison tastes like, but I can understand how some people could become addicted to it, even if it meant their death.

You are right, WL is setting “Terms and Conditions” to the access to stolen property, and attempting to force Journalists into an “Agreement” to those “Conditions, however unenforceable.

Your thoughts and counsel were welcomed, they snapped me out of that trance that I found myself in.

The only thing to do is, publish everything that I’ve learned over the last many hours about this whole affair.


2012-00414 WikiLeaks Partner for Global Intelligence Files June 26, 2012 (copy below) via Google Search


Cryptome rejects this proprietary publishing manipulation. Again, WikiLeaks is inducing participation in a crime covered with pseudo-journalistic exculpation. Again excluding open public access in favor of contractual marketing of stolen material and aiding its profitable commercialization.

It’s a trap, don’t do it, don’t encourage others to take the bait.

Don’t send anything to me you don’t want published. This note will be published .


At 06:24 PM 6/26/2012, you wrote:

Please Do Not Post, still working on getting us access.

Below if the terms and conditions that WL is sending to everyone.


_Terms and Conditions for access to the Global Intelligence Files

These Terms and Conditions are an agreement between you as an individual (not your organisation) and WikiLeaks with respect to use of the Global Intelligence Files.

1. WikiLeaks will provide access to the data known as Project Rock Guitar through WikiLeaks’ search database. You will use the search database as per instructions on the site and will not use robots on the system.

2. The decision what to publish in news articles and papers will remain at your discretion. You will credit WikiLeaks in the following manner: “investigative partnership organised by WikiLeaks” and refer to the data as having been “obtained by WikiLeaks”.

3. You will refer clearly on your website to the document(s) provided by WikiLeaks that were used in preparation of these news articles or papers and link from your publication to the data on WikiLeaks’ website.

4. You will treat any alleged and/or suspected WikiLeaks sources for the Global Intelligence Files as confidential sources of your own, with all the ethical and legal protections such sources are entitled to. You, in accordance with journalistic and professional ethics, will not speculate as to their identities. In relation to WikiLeaks’ provision of confidential information to you, you will treat WikiLeaks as a confidential journalistic source. Although you will publicly describe the information has having been “obtained by WikiLeaks” you will not, for the protection of WikiLeaks, you and the WikiLeaks sources, say that the information was “given” to you by WikiLeaks.

5. When publishing any story or material based on the Global Intelligence Files you understand that in relation to exclusivity you must inform WikiLeaks of the identification number of the data informing your publication and will submit this number to WikiLeaks’ release platform before the story is to first appear in any of your publishing mediums, so that WikiLeaks can publish the original data at the same time. You will also provide a URL link to where the story or material will appear on your site. Instructions for this release system are on the GI Files site and must be read and followed once you have access to the site. You understand that the release system provided by WikiLeaks must be treated in a reputable manner: there is to be no playing of the system to schedule large quantities of data in advance to reserve them, or using robots on the system. Scheduling must reflect true intentions to publish at the date and time you list on the release system.

6. You will treat each of the documents made available to you by WikiLeaks as confidential unless and until a story based on their content is published. You will exercise care in ensuring that the materials will not be vulnerable to hacking or other efforts to discover their content.

7. WikiLeaks journalists, employees, consultants and infrastructure are the subject of State and private intelligence activity and politicised financial blockades. To protect its continued ability to publish effectively, various WikiLeaks methods, people and locations need to be kept confidential. Unless otherwise stated, these include, but are not limited to: identifying details of all WikiLeaks personnel, security methods, communication systems or methods, locations, strategic plans, information on threats against WikiLeaks, the number of WikiLeaks personnel, the number of WikiLeaks personnel in different areas, usernames, passwords, transportation and financial arrangements including financial transportation methods.

8. Trading, selling, sharing or giving away your account is prohibited, as is trading and selling invites or offering them in public.

9. You understand that any breach of these Terms and Conditions or mismanagement of the search database or release platform will result in your access being withdrawn, along with the access of the anyone that invited you and anyone you invite. You are responsible for your own account and for the people you invite.

By ticking this box you agree to abide by all of the above Terms and Conditions

Your login and password will be sent by mail.


GIFiles Signup Instructions

Becoming a WikiLeaks Partner for the Global Intelligence Files

You have been invited to enter a secret world.

By joining the global WikiLeaks partnership on the Global Intelligence Files (the GI Files) — you will have access to more than five million emails from the Texas-headquartered “global intelligence” company Stratfor. The emails date from between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large organisations, including the US Department of Homeland Security and the US Defense Intelligence Agency. Being part of this international team will allow you to search the emails using the sophisticated search engine designed by WikiLeaks to enable you to research and publish articles and papers using this data.

The purpose of this system is to maximise global impact of the GI Files by restricting supply to those who are most likely to research and publish on them.

We are allowing journalists, academics and human rights organisations to search and publish the GI Files. To enter into this partnership you will need to be given a unique code by one of our existing partners. Users who demonstrate research and publishing ability will be considered as partners for new WikiLeaks publications.

Once you have this code please follow the instructions below to enter the partnership and gain access to the GI Files. These instructions are designed to be idiot-proof. They explain every step of this process, but don’t be scared – for most people this will be quick.

1. Download Tor, a tool for encrypted anonymous web-browsing. Without this you will not be able to access our Terms and Conditions, or the GI Files database.

Tor Instructions:
– To get Tor please go to the following URL to download the “Tor Browser Bundle:” https://www.torproject.org/projects…
– Choose the correct version depending on whether you use Windows, Mac or Linux and download it in the language you want.
– Click on the correct version to download it and then save it – we suggest to your Desktop.
– Once you have saved it you can find the “Tor Browser Bundle” application in the place you saved it.
– You will need to double-click on the Start Tor browser application to run Tor.
– You will need Tor running to access the site to agree to our Terms and Conditions, and then to later access the GI Files site.

2. Start Tor and go to the following site (it will only work using Tor). Wait up to 30 seconds for the site to load for the first time: http://7f4lihm464gdcwfc.onion/invit…

3. Enter your unique invite code to get access to the GI Files partner Terms and Conditions.

4. Enter your name, organisation name, email address and phone number. The email address you give cannot be a personal email address; it must be a work email account.

5. Read all parts of the Terms and Conditions and make sure you understand them. If you have any questions, please email: signup@wikileaks.org

6. Once you understand your responsibilities under the Terms and Conditions tick the check box to confirm your agreement.

7. Within 15 minutes you will receive an email to the email address you supplied giving you login details to the GI Files website.

8. Login to the site at the following URL: http://7f4lihm464gdcwfc.onion/ giving your username and password as supplied in the email. This URL can only be accessed when using Tor.

9. Once you are logged into the site you will see your user page, the search interface and publishing interface. At the top of the page are tabs that explain how these work. On your user page you will have five invite codes for you to give to others so that they can also gain access to the GI Files.

10. If you wish to invite someone to the GI Files then give them a unique invite code, along with the URL to this page of instructions – each person you invite must be a journalist, NGO worker or academic from a different organisation (for complete understanding of who you can invite please see the invite rules below).

11. If you violate any of the Terms and Conditions you risk having your login terminated, along with that of the person that invited you and the people that you invited. If any of the contacts you invited violate the terms of the Terms and Conditions, they risk having their login terminated, your login terminated and the logins of the people they invited terminated.

Invite Rules:

Each invite code must be given to a person who:
A. is a real person
B. is either a journalist, Professor or Associate Professor at a University or an employee of a human rights organisation
C. is from a different organisation to you and your other invitees
D. is using an email that is not a personal email
E. is using an email that is from a different domain to your email address and that of the other people you invite
F. is going to use the GI Files search and release site for research, the results of which will be communicated to the public.

For any issues or questions related to this signup process, please email: signup@wikileaks.org





Public Intelligence – Ohio Fusion Center Report: Bath Salts and Officer Safety


(U//FOUO) The Ohio State Highway Patrol Criminal Intelligence Unit recently partnered with the Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) and gathered information regarding bath salts via a survey. The objective of the study was to assist Law Enforcement by creating an officer safety awareness product relating to the dangers of encountering people on bath salts.

(U//FOUO) A survey was distributed to law enforcement and 5 agencies responded back with pertinent information regarding the use and possession of bath salts. The agencies which contributed to this analysis are as follows:

Barberton Police Department, OH; Ohio State Highway Patrol; Powell Police Department, OH; Reynoldsburg Division of Police; and West Virginia State Police – Wheeling Division (Parcel Interdiction).

(U//FOUO) Information was obtained on 161 incidents involving bath salts.


  • Out of the 161 incidents reported, officers made 77 arrests involving bath salt use/possession. Many of the incidents occurred before legislation was passed; therefore mere possession was not criminal at the time of many of these reports.
  • There were 27 use of force reports involving bath salts.
  • There were 3 incidents that involved fleeing of suspects.
  • 7 suspects were taken to hospital associated with bath salt use.
  • 7 offenders were pinked slipped and taken to mental health facilities.
  • There were 4 reports of deaths associated with bath salt use (Note: cause of death results did NOT find that bath salts use was the sole contributor in any of these deaths).
  • There was 1 report of suicide; 2 suicide attempts; and 1 suicide threat involving bath salt use.
  • Suspects reported paying approximately $20-$25 for bath salts.
  • The offenders reported multiple ways of using bath salts including: snorting, injection with a needle syringe, and drinking the bath salts by mixing it with fluid.
  • Many offenders admitted to combining bath salts with other drugs.
  • When reported, most people said they got the bath salts from independently owned convenient stores and drive-thrus, gas stations or markets. A WV State Police (parcel narcotics interdiction) Officer reported that a prominent internet company is: Southern Burn LLC from South Carolina.


  • Use of force incidents included: use of Taser (3 incidents), hands on, escorts, restrained by medical professionals, and bean bag use.
  • One “officer in trouble” call was reported, involving an officer fighting with a person on bath salts.
  • Both officers in a Reynoldsburg Police case were surprised after a Taser was used on a suspect. They explained that the Taser was shot and the probes penetrated in the torso of the suspect, however it had minimal effects; the suspect fought through the electric current and rose to his feet.
  • Injuries sustained to suspects included: bruises, cuts, Taser punctures, and minimal injuries from bean bag rounds.
  • Officers sustained injuries including: injury to knee, injury to back, injury to groin, ankles, scrapes and bruises, and multiple injuries from strikes to the face.
  • 2 officers and 7 offenders were taken to the hospital resulting from physical force.
  • One incident involved the use of the SWAT team and another involved escalated use of force involving bean bag rounds.


  • Suspects showed the following physical reactions to bath salts: Hyperventilation, cramps, dehydration, vomiting, shaking, loss of memory, pale, emaciated, jittery, lethargy, incoherent speech, rambling, rapid movement, rapid speech, disoriented, itchy skin, and several suspect admitted to a lack of sleep for multiple days.
  • An offender described bath salts as giving him a “cocaine rush” and it being a very “intense” high.
  • Witnesses described bath salt users as:
    • Hostile, violent, unpredictable, out of control, paranoid, and reckless.
  • Additional reports by Law Enforcement involving people on bath salts:
    • Officer described one suspect as having unusual superhuman strength.
    • Officer described suspect as shooting off the ground like a “flash of light.”
    • One suspect bent the hinged handcuffs during the arrest.
  • The following hallucinations were reported:
    • A hit-skip offender said he saw a brick wall, which in turn caused a crash.
    • A male, using bath salts, reported raccoons setting fire inside his home. As a result, he proceeded to destroy his home and used a hatchet to cut up his deck, while attempting to locate the fire-setting raccoons. He also believed the raccoons stole his cell phone.
    • A male, using bath salts, believed he was being followed by police helicopters and police officers were using mirrors, snipers and different types of scopes to look through his walls. He called police requesting to negotiate with them, however there were no police at the residence when the call was made.
    • During the course of speaking to an offender and officer reported, he yelled, “AT&T calling, may I help you, AT&T is calling, a million dollars, two black guys……it’s not a racial thing, it’s not a racial thing.”
    • A bath salt user reported he hears voices; one voice was going to beat him with a ball bat.
    • The domestic violence offender using bath salts reported his mother was practicing demonology & witchcraft and she was poisoning his food. He was arrested for choking her.
    • OHSP-BathSalts

Unveiled – Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate and the Euro InterBank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty

WASHINGTON—Barclays Bank PLC, a financial institution headquartered in London, has entered into an agreement with the Department of Justice to pay a $160 million penalty to resolve violations arising from Barclays’ submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR), which are benchmark interest rates used in financial markets around the world, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and Assistant Director in Charge James W. McJunkin of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

As part of the agreement with the Department of Justice, Barclays has admitted and accepted responsibility for its misconduct set forth in a statement of facts that is incorporated into the agreement. According to the agreement, Barclays provided LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that, at various times, were false because they improperly took into account the trading positions of its derivative traders, or reputational concerns about negative media attention relating to its LIBOR submissions. The Justice Department’s criminal investigation into the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR by other financial institutions and individuals is ongoing. The agreement requires Barclays to continue cooperating with the department in its ongoing investigation.

“LIBOR and EURIBOR are critically important benchmark interest rates,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. “Because mortgages, student loans, financial derivatives, and other financial products rely on LIBOR and EURIBOR as reference rates, the manipulation of submissions used to calculate those rates can have significant negative effects on consumers and financial markets worldwide. For years, traders at Barclays encouraged the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions in order to benefit their financial positions; and, in the midst of the financial crisis, Barclays management directed that U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions be artificially lowered. For this illegal conduct, Barclays is paying a significant price. To the bank’s credit, Barclays also took a significant step toward accepting responsibility for its conduct by being the first institution to provide extensive and meaningful cooperation to the government. Its efforts have substantially assisted the Criminal Division in our ongoing investigation of individuals and other financial institutions in this matter.”

“Barclays Bank’s illegal activity involved manipulating its submissions for benchmark interest rates in order to benefit its trading positions and the media’s perception of the bank’s financial health,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “Today’s announcement is the result of the hard work of the FBI special agents, financial analysts, and forensic accountants as well as the prosecutors who dedicated significant time and resources to investigating this case.”

Barclays was one of the financial institutions that contributed rates used in the calculation of LIBOR and EURIBOR. The contributed rates are generally meant to reflect each bank’s assessment of the rates at which it could borrow unsecured interbank funds. For LIBOR, the highest and lowest 25 percent of contributed rates are excluded from the calculation and the remaining rates are averaged to calculate the fixed rates. For EURIBOR, the highest and lowest 15 percent are excluded, and the remaining 70 percent are averaged to calculate the fixed rates.

Futures, options, swaps, and other derivative financial instruments traded in the over-the-counter market and on exchanges worldwide are settled based on LIBOR. Further, mortgages, credit cards, student loans, and other consumer lending products often use LIBOR as a reference rate. According to the agreement, an individual bank’s LIBOR or EURIBOR submission cannot appropriately be influenced by the financial positions of its derivatives traders or the bank’s concerns about public perception of its financial health due to its LIBOR submissions.

According to the agreement, between 2005 and 2007, and then occasionally thereafter through 2009, certain Barclays traders requested that the Barclays LIBOR and EURIBOR submitters contribute rates that would benefit the financial positions held by those traders. The requests were made by traders in New York and London, via electronic messages, telephone conversations, and in-person conversations. The employees responsible for the LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions accommodated those requests on numerous occasions in submitting the bank’s contributions. On some occasions, Barclays’s submissions affected the fixed rates.

In addition, between August 2005 and May 2008, certain Barclays traders communicated with traders at other financial institutions, including other banks on the LIBOR and EURIBOR panels, to request LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that would be favorable to their or their counterparts’ trading positions, according to the agreement.

When the requests of traders for favorable LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions were taken into account by the rate submitters, Barclays’ rate submissions were false and misleading.

Further, according to the agreement, between approximately August 2007 and January 2009, in response to initial and ongoing press speculation that Barclays’ high U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions at the time might reflect liquidity problems at Barclays, members of Barclays management directed that Barclays’ dollar LIBOR submissions be lowered. This management instruction often resulted in Barclays’ submission of false rates that did not reflect its perceived cost of obtaining interbank funds. While the purpose of this particular conduct was to influence Barclays’ rate submissions, as opposed to the resulting fixes, there were some occasions when Barclays’ submissions affected the fixed rates.

The agreement and monetary penalty recognize Barclays’ extraordinary cooperation. Barclays made timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of its misconduct. After government authorities began investigating allegations that banks had engaged in manipulation of benchmark interest rates, Barclays was the first bank to cooperate in a meaningful way in disclosing its conduct relating to LIBOR and EURIBOR. Barclays’ disclosure included relevant facts that at the time were not known to the government. Barclays’s cooperation has been extensive, in terms of the quality and type of information and assistance provided, and has been of substantial value in furthering the department’s ongoing criminal investigation. Barclays has made a commitment to future cooperation with the department and other government authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Assistant Attorney General Breuer further stated, “As today’s agreement reflects, we are committed to holding companies accountable for their misconduct while, at the same time, giving meaningful credit to companies that provide full and valuable cooperation in our investigations.”

In addition, Barclays has implemented a series of compliance measures and will implement additional internal controls regarding its submission of LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, as required by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Barclays will also continue to be supervised and monitored by the FSA.

The agreement and monetary penalty further recognize certain mitigating factors to Barclays’ misconduct. At times, Barclays employees raised concerns with the British Bankers’ Association, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in late 2007 and in 2008 that the Dollar LIBOR rates submitted by contributing banks, including Barclays, were too low and did not accurately reflect the market. Further, during this time, notwithstanding Barclays’s improperly low dollar LIBOR submissions, those submissions were often higher than the contributions used in the calculation of the fixed rates.

As a result of Barclays’s admission of its misconduct, its extraordinary cooperation, its remediation efforts and certain mitigating and other factors, the department agreed not to prosecute Barclays for providing false LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, provided that Barclays satisfies its ongoing obligations under the agreement for a period of two years. The non-prosecution agreement applies only to Barclays and not to any employees or officers of Barclays or any other individuals.

In a related matter, the CFTC brought attempted manipulation and false reporting charges against Barclays, which the bank agreed to settle. The CFTC imposed a $200 million penalty and required Barclays to implement detailed measures designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of its benchmark interest rate submissions.

The FSA issued a final notice regarding its enforcement action against Barclays and has imposed a penalty of £59.5 million against it.

The case is being handled by Deputy Chief Daniel Braun, Assistant Chiefs Rebecca Rohr and Robertson Park, Trial Attorney Alexander Berlin, and Special Trial Attorney Luke Marsh of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section. The investigation is being conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, jointly with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.

The Department acknowledges and expresses its appreciation for the significant assistance provided by the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement, which referred the conduct to the department, as well as the FSA’s Enforcement and Financial Crime Division.

This agreement is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch and, with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task force visit: http://www.stopfraud.gov.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Texas Resident Convicted on Charge of Attempted Use of Weapon of Mass Destruction

AMARILLO, TX—Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, 22, a citizen of Saudi Arabia and resident of Lubbock, Texas, was convicted by a federal jury today on an indictment charging one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary to make an improvised explosive device (IED) and his research of potential U.S. targets, including persons and infrastructure.

The verdict, which was reached in the Northern District of Texas, was announced by Sarah R. Saldaña, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Diego G. Rodriguez, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Dallas Field Division.

Sentencing has been scheduled for October 9, 2012, in Amarillo. Aldawsari, who was lawfully admitted into the United States in 2008 on a student visa and was enrolled at South Plains College near Lubbock, faces a maximum sentence of life in prison and a $250,000 fine. He was arrested on February 23, 2011 on a criminal complaint and later charged in a March 9, 2011 federal indictment with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.

According to court documents and evidence presented during trial, at the time of his arrest last year, Aldawsari had been researching online how to construct an IED using several chemicals as ingredients. He had also acquired or taken a substantial step toward acquiring most of the ingredients and equipment necessary to construct an IED, and he had conducted online research of several potential U.S. targets, the affidavit alleges. In addition, he had allegedly described his desire for violent jihad and martyrdom in blog postings and a personal journal.

“While many people are responsible for thwarting Aldawsari’s threat and bringing him to justice, we owe a debt of gratitude to all the members of the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force, and especially to the hundreds of hardworking and dedicated FBI agents, analysts, linguists, and others,” said U.S. Attorney Saldaña. “Their efforts, coupled with the hard work and excellent cooperation from the Lubbock Police Department and the Texas Tech Police Department, are the reason we were able to stop this defendant from carrying out a catastrophic act of terrorism.”

“As this trial demonstrated, Aldawsari purchased ingredients to construct an explosive device and was actively researching potential targets in the United States. Thanks to the efforts of many agents, analysts, and prosecutors, this plot was thwarted before it could advance further,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco. “This case serves as another reminder of the need for continued vigilance both at home and abroad.”

“Today’s guilty verdict shows how individuals in the United States with the intent to do harm can acquire the knowledge and materials necessary to carry out an attack,” said SAC Rodriguez. “Our success in locating and preventing Mr. Aldawsari from carrying out an attack is a result of cooperation within the law enforcement and intelligence communities, particularly, the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Texas Tech Police Department, the Lubbock Police Department, and the Lubbock County Sheriff’s Office, but also a demonstration of information sharing across FBI divisions, as well as assistance from the community. I want to thank the dedicated agents, officers, and analysts; the computer forensics team; and linguists that worked diligently on this investigation, as well as prosecutors serving in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Northern District.”

The government presented evidence that on February 1, 2011, a chemical supplier reported to the FBI a suspicious attempted purchase of concentrated phenol by a man identifying himself as Khalid Aldawsari. Phenol is a toxic chemical with legitimate uses, but it can also be used to make the explosive trinitrophenol, also known as T.N.P., or picric acid. Ingredients typically used with phenol to make picric acid, or T.N.P., are concentrated sulfuric and nitric acids.

Aldawsari attempted to have the phenol order shipped to a freight company so it could be held for him there, but the freight company told Aldawsari that the order had been returned to the supplier and called the police. Later, Aldawsari falsely told the supplier he was associated with a university and wanted the phenol for “off-campus, personal research.” Frustrated by questions being asked over his phenol order, Aldawsari cancelled his order, placed an order with another company, and later e-mailed himself instructions for producing phenol. In December 2010, he had successfully purchased concentrated nitric and sulfuric acids.

Aldawsari used various e-mail accounts in researching explosives and targets and often sent e-mails to himself as part of this process. He e-mailed himself a recipe for picric acid, which was described in the e-mail as a “military explosive” and also e-mailed himself instructions on how to convert a cell phone into a remote detonator and how to prepare a booby-trapped vehicle using household items. Aldawsari also purchased many other items, including a Hazmat suit, a soldering iron kit, glass beakers and flasks, a stun gun, clocks, and a battery tester.

Excerpts from a journal found at Aldawsari’s residence indicated that he had been planning to commit a terrorist attack in the United States for years. One entry describes how Aldawsari sought and obtained a particular scholarship because it allowed him to come directly to the United States and helped him financially, which he said “will help tremendously in providing me with the support I need for Jihad.” The entry continues, “And now, after mastering the English language, learning how to build explosives and continuous planning to target the infidel Americans, it is time for Jihad.”

In another entry, Aldawsari wrote that he was near to reaching his goal and near to getting weapons to use against infidels and their helpers. He also listed a “synopsis of important steps” that included obtaining a forged U.S. birth certificate; renting a car; using different driver’s licenses for each car rented; putting bombs in cars and taking them to different places during rush hour; and leaving the city for a safe place.

Aldawsari conducted research on various targets and e-mailed himself information on these locations and people. One of the documents he sent himself, with the subject line listed as “Targets,” contained the names and home addresses of three American citizens who had previously served in the U.S. military and had been stationed for a time at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In others, Aldawsari sent himself the names of 12 reservoir dams in Colorado and California and listed two categories of targets: hydroelectric dams and nuclear power plants. He also sent himself an e-mail titled “Tyrant’s House,” in which he listed the Dallas address for former President George W. Bush. Aldawsari also conducted research that indicated he considered using infant dolls to conceal explosives and the possible targeting of a nightclub with an explosive concealed in a backpack.

This case was investigated by the FBI’s Dallas Joint Terrorism Task Force, with assistance from the Lubbock Police Department and the Texas Tech Police Department. The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jeffrey R. Haag, Denise Williams, James T. Jacks, and Matthew J. Kacsmaryk and Trial Attorney David Cora from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

TOP-SECRET – The Creation of the U.S. Spy Satellites

In September 1992 the Department of Defense acknowledged the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency established in 1961 to manage the development and operation of the nation’s reconnaissance satellite systems.  The creation of the NRO was the result of a number of factors.

On May 1, 1960 Francis Gary Powers took off from Peshawar, Pakistan on the U-2 mission designated Operation GRAND SLAM.  The flight was planned to take him over the heart of the Soviet Union and terminate at Bodo, Norway.  The main target was Plesetsk, which communications intercepts had indicated might be the site of an ICBM facility.1  When the Soviet Union shot down his plane and captured him alive, they also forced President Dwight Eisenhower to halt aerial overflights of Soviet territory.

At that time the U.S. had two ongoing programs to produce satellite vehicles that could photograph Soviet territory.  Such vehicles would allow far more frequent coverage than possible with manned aircraft.  In addition, they would avoid placing the lives of pilots at risk and eliminate the risks of international incidents resulting from overflights.

The Air Force program, designated SAMOS, sought to develop a number of different satellite systems–including one that would radio its imagery back to earth and another that would return film capsules.  The CIA program, CORONA, focused solely on developing a film return satellite.

However, both the CIA and Air Force programs were in trouble.  Launch after launch in the CORONA program, eleven in all by May 1, 1960, eight of which carried cameras, had resulted in failure–the only variation was in the cause.  Meanwhile, the SAMOS program was also experiencing difficulties, both with regard to hardware and program definition.2

Concerns over SAMOS led President Eisenhower to direct two groups to study both the technical aspects of the program as well as how the resulting system would be employed.  The ultimate result was a joint report presented to the President and NSC on August 25, 1960.3

As a result of that meeting Eisenhower approved a first SAMOS launch in September, as well as reorientation of the program, with the development of high-resolution film-return systems being assigned highest priority while the electronic readout system would be pursued as a research project.  With regard to SAMOS management, he ordered that the Air Force institute special management arrangements, which would involve a direct line of authority between the SAMOS project office and the Office of the Air Force Secretary, bypassing the Air Staff and any other intermediate layers of bureaucracy.4

Secretary of the Air Force Dudley C. Sharp wasted little time creating the recommended new structure and procedures.  On August 31st Sharp signed Secretary of the Air Force Order 115.1, establishing the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems within his own office to help him manage the SAMOS project. With Order 116.1, Sharp created a SAMOS project office at the Los Angeles headquarters of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD) as a field extension of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out development of the satellite.5

The impact of the orders, in practice, was that the director of the SAMOS project would report directly to Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charyk, who would manage it in the Secretary’s name. In turn, Charyk would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.6

The changes would not stop there.  The urgency attached to developing a successful reconnaissance satellite led, ultimately, to the creation of a top secret program and organization to coordinate the entire national reconnaissance effort.

Several of the documents listed below also appear in either of two National Security Archive microfiche collections on U.S. intelligence.  The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations and Management: 1947-1989 (1990) and U.S. Espionage and Intelligence: Organization, Operations, and Management, 1947-1996 (1997) publish together for the first time recently declassified documents pertaining to the organizational structure, operations and management of the U.S. Intelligence Community over the last fifty years, cross-indexed for maximum accessibility.  Together, these two sets reproduce on microfiche over 2,000 organizational histories, memoranda, manuals, regulations, directives, reports, and studies, totaling more than 50,000 pages of documents from the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, military service intelligence organizations, National Security Council, and other official government agencies and organizations.


Document 1
Joseph Charyk, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
24 July 1961
Top Secret
1 p.

The organizational changes resulting from the decisions of August 25, 1960 and their implementation left some unsatisfied.  In particular, James Killian and Edwin Land, influential members of the President’s intelligence advisory board pushed for permanent and institutionalized collaboration between the CIA and Air Force.  After the Kennedy administration took office the push to establish a permanent reconnaissance organization took on additional life.  There was a strong feeling in the new administration, particularly by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, that a better, more formalized relationship was required.7

On July 24, 1961, Air Force Undersecretary Joseph Charyk sent a memorandum to McNamara attaching two possible memoranda of agreement for creation of a National Reconnaissance Program, along with some additional material.

Document 2
Memorandum of Understanding
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program (Draft)
20 July 1961
Top Secret
5 pp.

This memo specified establishment of a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) consisting of “all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert,” and including “all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence.”

To manage the NRP, a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) would be established on a covert basis. The NRO director (DNRO) would be the Deputy Director for Plans, CIA (at the time, Richard Bissell) while the Under Secretary of the Air Force would serve as Deputy Director (DDNRO). The DNRO would be responsible for the management of CIA activities, the DDNRO and the Air Force for Defense Department activities.  The DoD, specifically the Air Force acting as executive agent, would be primarily responsible for technical program management, scheduling, vehicle operations, financial management and overt contract administration, while the CIA would be primarily responsible for targeting each satellite.  The office would operate under streamlined management procedures similar to those established in August 1960 for SAMOS.

Document 3
Memorandum of Understanding
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program (Draft)
21 July 1961
Top Secret
4 pp.

This secondary memorandum was prepared at the suggestion of Defense Department General Counsel Cyrus Vance.  It offered a quite different solution to the problem.  As with the primary memo, it established a NRP covering both satellite and aerial reconnaissance operations.  But rather than a jointly run program, it placed responsibility for management solely in the hands of a covertly appointed Special Assistant for Reconnaissance, to be selected by the Secretary of Defense.  The office of the Special Assistant would handle the responsibilities assigned to the NRO in the other MOU.  The CIA would “assist the Department of Defense by providing support as required in areas of program security, communications, and covert contract administration.”

Document 4
Pros and Cons of Each Solution
Not dated
Top Secret
2 pp.

The assessment of pros and cons favored the July 20 memorandum, listing five pros for the first solution and only two for the second.  The first solution would consolidate responsibilities into a single program with relatively little disruption of established management, represented a proven solution, would require no overt organizational changes, would allow both agencies to retain authoritative voices in their areas of expertise, and provided a simplified management structure.  The two cons noted were the division of program responsibility between two people, and that “successful program management depends upon mutual understanding and trust of the two people in charge of the NRO.”  It would not be too long before that later observation would take on great significance.

In contrast, there were more cons than pros specified for the second solution.  The only two points in its favor were the consolidation of reconnaissance activities into a single program managed by a single individual and the assignment of complete responsibility to the agency (DoD) with the most resources.  Foremost of the six cons was the need for DoD to control and conduct large-scale covert operations, in as much as it was an entity “whose normal methods are completely foreign to this task.”

Document 5
Roswell Gilpatric, Letter to Allen Dulles
Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
6 September 1961
Top Secret
4 pp.

On July 28, 1961, four days after receiving Charyk’s memorandum and draft memoranda of understanding, McNamara instructed Air Force Undersecretary Joseph Charyk to continue discussions with the key officials and advisers in order to resolve any organizational difficulties that threatened to impede the satellite reconnaissance effort.  The ultimate result was this letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to Dulles, which confirmed “our agreement with respect to the setting up of the National Reconnaissance Program.”

The letter specified the creation of a NRP.  It also established the NRO, a uniform security control system, and specified that the NRO would be directly responsive to the intelligence requirements and priorities specified by the United States Intelligence Board.  It specified implementation of NRP programs assigned to the CIA through the Deputy Director for Plans.  It designated the Undersecretary of the Air Force as the Defense Secretary’s Special Assistant for Reconnaissance, with full authority in DoD reconnaissance matters.

The letter contained no specific assignment of responsibilities to either the CIA or Defense Department, stating only that “The Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office will … insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in this program.”

The letter provided for the NRO to be managed jointly by the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the CIA Deputy Director for Plans (at the time, still Richard Bissell).  A May 1962 agreement between the CIA and Defense Department established a single NRO director.  Joseph Charyk was named to the directorship shortly afterward.

Document 6
Joseph Charyk
Memorandum for NRO Program Directors/Director, NRO Staff
Organization and Functions of the NRO
23 July 1962
Top Secret
11 pp.

This memorandum represents the fundamental directive on the organization and functions of the NRO.  In addition to the Director (there was no provision for a deputy director), there were four major elements to the NRO–the NRO staff and three program elements, designated A, B, and C.  The staff’s functions included assisting the director in dealing with the USIB and the principal consumers of the intelligence collected.

The Air Force Office of Special Projects (the successor to the SAMOS project office) became NRO’s Program A.  The CIA reconnaissance effort was designated Program B, while the Navy’s space reconnaissance effort, at the time consisting of the Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB) satellite, whose radar ferret mission involved the collection of Soviet radar signals, became Program C.  Although the GRAB effort was carried out by the Naval Research Laboratory, the director of the Office of Naval Intelligence would serve as Program C director until 1971.8

Document 7
Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on Management of the National Reconnaissance Program
13 March 1963
Top Secret
6 pp.

In December 1962, Joseph Charyk decided to leave government to become president of the COMSAT Corporation.  By that time a number of disputes between the CIA and NRO had contributed to Charyk’s view that the position of the NRO and its director should be strengthened.  During the last week of February 1963, his last week in office, he completed a revision of a CIA draft of a new reconnaissance agreement to replace the May 1962 agreement (which had replaced the September 6, 1961 agreement).  Charyk took the revision to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric.  It appears that some CIA-suggested changes were incorporated sometime after Charyk left office.  On March 13, Gilpatric signed the slightly modified version on behalf of DoD.  It was sent to the CIA that day and immediately approved by DCI John McCone, who had replaced Allen Dulles in November 1961.9

The new agreement, while it did not include all the elements Charyk considered important, did substantially strengthen the authority of the NRO and its director.  It named the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for the NRP.  The program would be “developed, managed, and conducted in accordance with policies and guidance jointly agreed to by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.”

The NRO would manage the NRP “under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.”  The NRO’s director would be selected by the Defense Secretary with the concurrence of the DCI, and report to the Defense Secretary.  The NRO director was charged with presenting to the Secretary of Defense “all projects” for intelligence collection and mapping and geodetic information via overflights and the associated budgets, scheduling all overflight missions in the NRP, as well as engineering analysis to correct problems with collection systems.  With regard to technical management, the DNRO was to “assign all project tasks such as technical management, contracting etc., to appropriate elements of the DoD and CIA, changing such assignments, and taking any such steps he may determine necessary to the efficient management of the NRP.”

Document 8
Department of Defense Directive Number TS 5105.23
Subject: National Reconnaissance Office
27 March 1964
Top Secret
4 pp.

This directive replaced the original June 1962 DoD Directive on the NRO, and remains in force today. The directive specifies the role of the Director of the NRO, the relationships between the NRO and other organizations, the director’s authorities, and security. It specified that documents or other material concerning National Reconnaissance Program matters would be handled within a special security system (known as the BYEMAN Control System).

Document 9
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Memorandum for the President
Subject: National Reconnaissance Program
2 May 1964
Top Secret
11 pp.

The 1963 CIA-DoD agreement on the NRP did not end the battles between the CIA and NRO–as some key CIA officials, including ultimately DCI John McCone, sought to reestablish a major role for the CIA in the satellite reconnaissance effort.  The continuing conflict was examined by the PFIAB.

The board concluded that “the National Reconnaissance Program despite its achievements, has not yet reached its full potential.”  The fundamental cause for the NRP’s shortcomings was “inadequacies in organizational structure.”  In addition, there was no clear division of responsibilities and roles between the Defense Department, CIA, and the DCI.

The recommendations of the board represented a clear victory for the NRO and its director.  The DCI should have a “large and important role” in establishing intelligence collection requirements and in ensuring that the data collected was effectively exploited, according to the board.  In addition, his leadership would be a key factor in the work of the United States Intelligence Board relating to the scheduling of space and airborne reconnaissance missions.

But the board also recommended that President Johnson sign a directive which would assign to NRO’s Air Force component (the Air Force Office of Special Projects) systems engineering, procurement, and operation of all satellite reconnaissance systems.

Document 10
Agreement for Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Program
13 August 1965
Top Secret
6 pp.

Despite the recommendations of the May 2, 1964 PFIAB report, which were challenged by DCI John McCone, no action was taken to solidify the position of the NRO and its director.  Instead prolonged discussions over a new agreement continued into the summer of 1965.  During this period the CIA continued work on what would become two key satellite programs–the HEXAGON/KH-9 imaging and RHYOLITE signals intelligence satellites.

In early August, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance and CIA official John Bross reached an understanding on a new agreement, and it was signed by Vice Adm. William F. Raborn (McCone’s successor) and Vance on August 13, 1965.  It represented a significant victory for the CIA, assigning key decision-making authority to an executive committee, authority that was previously the prerogative of the NRO director as the agent of the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense was to have “the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP,” and have the final power to approve the NRP budget.  The Secretary also was empowered to make decisions when the executive committee could not reach agreement.

The DCI was to establish collection priorities and requirements for targeting NRP operations, as well as establish frequency of coverage, review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend steps for improving its results if necessary, serve on the executive committee, review and approve the NRP budget, and provide security policy guidance.

The NRP Executive Committee established by the agreement would consist of the DCI, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.  The committee was to recommend to the Secretary of Defense the “appropriate level of effort for the NRP,” approve or modify the consolidated NRP and its budget, approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems.  It was instructed to insure that funds would be adequate to pursue a vigorous research and development program, involving both CIA and DoD.  The executive committee was to assign development of sensors to the agency best equipped to handle the task.

The Director of the NRO would manage the NRO and execute the NRP “subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee.”  His authority to initiate, improve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP, would be subject to review by the executive committee.  He could demand that all agencies keep him informed about all programs undertaken as part of the NRP.

Document 11
Analysis of “A $1.5 Billion Secret in Sky” Washington Post, December 9, 1973
Not dated
Top Secret
33 pp.

Throughout the 1960s, the United States operation of reconnaissance satellites was officially classified, but well known among specialists and the press.  However, it was not until January 1971 that the NRO’s existence was first disclosed by the media, when it was briefly mentioned in a New York Times article on intelligence and foreign policy.

A much more extensive discussion of the NRO appeared in the December 9, 1973 Washington Post as a result of the inadvertent mention of the reconnaissance office in a Congressional report.  The NRO prepared this set of classified responses to the article, clearly intended for those in Congress who might be concerned about the article’s purported revelations about the NRO’s cost overruns and avoidance of Congressional oversight.

Document 12
E.C. Aldridge, Jr. (Director, NRO)
Letter to David L. Boren, Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
21 November 1988
3 pp.

The late 1980s saw the beginning of what eventually would be a wide-ranging restructuring of the NRO.  In November 1988 NRO director Edward “Pete” Aldridge wrote to Senator David Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, concerning the findings of an extensive study (the NRO Restructure Study) of the organizational structure of the NRO.

Aldridge proceeded to report that, after having discussed the study’s recommendations with Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Director of Central Intelligence William Webster, he was directing the development of plans to implement the recommendations.  Specific changes would include the creation of a centralized systems analysis function “to conduct cross-system trades and simulations within the NRO,” creation of a “User Support” function to improve NRO support to intelligence community users as well as to the growing number of operational military users, and the dispersal of the NRO Staff to the new units, with the staff being replaced by a group of policy advisers.  In addition, Aldridge foresaw the establishment of an interim facility “to house the buildup of the new functions and senior management.”  The ultimate goal, projected for the 1991-92 period, would be the “collocation of all NRO elements [including the Los Angeles-based Air Force Office of Special Projects] . . . in the Washington, D.C. area.”

Document 13
Memorandum of Agreement
Subject: Organizational Restructure of the National Reconnaissance Office
15 December 1988
2 pp.

This memorandum of agreement, signed by the Director of the NRO and the directors of the NRO’s three programs commits them to the restructuring discussed in Edward Aldridge’s November 21 letter to Senator Boren.

Many changes recommended by Aldridge, who left office at the end of 1988, were considered by a 1989 NRO-sponsored review group and subsequently adopted.

Document 14
Report to the Director of Central Intelligence
DCI Task Force on The National Reconnaissance Office, Final Report
April 1992
35 pp.

This report was produced by a panel chaired by former Lockheed Corporation CEO Robert Fuhrman, whose members included both former and serving intelligence officials.  It focused on a variety of issues other than current and possible future NRO reconnaissance systems.  Among the issues it examined were mission, organizational structure, security and classification.

One of its most significant conclusions was that the Program A,B,C structure that had been instituted in 1962 (see Document 6) “does not enhance mission effectiveness” but “leads to counterproductive competition and makes it more difficult to foster loyalty and to maintain focus on the NRO mission.”  As a result, the panel recommended that the NRO be restructured along functional lines with imagery and SIGINT directorates.  This change was made even before the final version of the report was issued.

The report also noted that while the NRO’s existence was officially classified it was an “open secret” and that seeking to attempt to maintain such “open secrets … weakens the case for preserving ‘real’ secrets.”  In addition, such secrecy limited the NRO’s ability to interact with customers and users.  The group recommended declassifying the “fact of” the NRO, as well as providing information about the NRO’s mission, the identities of senior officials, headquarters locations, and the NRO as a joint Intelligence Community-Defense Department activity.

Document 15
National Security Directive 67
Subject: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005
30 March 1992
2 pp.

NSD 67 directed a number of changes in U.S. intelligence organization and operations.  Among those was implementation of the plan to restructure the NRO along functional lines–eliminating the decades old Program A (Air Force), B (CIA), and C (Navy) structure and replacing it with directorates for imaging, signals intelligence, and communication systems acquisition and operations–as recommended by the Fuhrman panel.  As a result, Air Force, CIA, and Navy personnel involved in such activities would now work together rather than as part of distinct NRO components.

Document 16
Email message
Subject: Overt-Covert-DOS-REP-INPUT
27 July 1992
1 p.

In addition to the internal restructuring of the NRO, 1992 saw the declassification of the organization, as recommended by the Fuhrman report (Document 14), for a number of reasons–to facilitate interaction with other parts of the government, to make it easier for the NRO to support military operations, and in response to Congressional pressure to acknowledge the obvious.  As part of the process of considering declassification NRO consulted Richard Curl, head of the Office of Intelligence Resources of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research–the office which provides INR with expertise and support concerning technical collection systems.  Curl recommended a low-key approach to declassification.

Document 17
Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Changing the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to an Overt Organization
30 July 1992
3 pp.

w/ attachments:
Document 17a: Mission of the NRO, 1 p.

Document 17b:  Implications of Proposed Changes, 4 pp. (Two versions)
 Version One
 Version Two

These memos, from Director of the NRO Martin Faga, represent key documents in the declassification of the NRO. The memo noted Congressional pressure for declassification and that Presidential certification that declassification would result in “grave damage to the nation … would be difficult in this case.”

Faga reported that as a result of an NRO review he recommended declassifying the fact of NRO’s existence, issuing a brief mission statement, acknowledging the NRO as a joint DCI-Secretary of Defense endeavor, and identifying top level NRO officials. He also noted that his recommendations attempted to balance concerns about classifying information that realistically could not be protected, while maintaining an ability to protect matters believed to require continued protection.

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, DCI Robert Gates, and President Bush approved the recommendations in September and a three-paragraph memorandum to correspondents acknowledging the NRO and NRP was issued on September 18, 1992.

Document 17b comes in two versions, representing different security reviews.  Material redacted from the first version includes provisions of National Security Directive 30 on space policy, expression of concern over “derived disclosures,” and the assessment that the “high degree of foreign acceptance of satellite reconnaissance, and the fact that we are not disclosing significant new data,” would not lead to any significant foreign reaction.  Another redacted statement stated that “legislation . . . exempting all NRO operational files from [Freedom of Information Act] searches” was required.

Document 18
Final Report: National Reconnaissance Program Task Force for the Director of Central Intelligence
September 1992
Top Secret
15 pp.

The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union required the U.S. intelligence community and NRO to reconsider how U.S. overhead reconnaissance systems were employed and what capabilities future systems should possess.  To consider these questions DCI Robert Gates appointed a task force, chaired by his eventual successor, R. James Woolsey.

The final report considers future needs and collection methods, industrial base considerations, procurement policy considerations, international industrial issues, and transition considerations.  Its recommendations included elimination of both some collection tasks as well as some entire types of present and planned collection systems.

Document 19
NRO Protection Review, “What is [BYEMAN]?”
6 November 1992
Top Secret
18 pp.

Traditionally, the designations of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) compartments–such as UMBRA to indicate particularly sensitive communications intelligence and RUFF to intelligence based on satellite imagery–have themselves been classified.  In recent years, however, the NSA and CIA have declassified a number of such terms and their meaning. One exception has been the term “BYEMAN”– the BYEMAN Control System being the security system used to protect information related to NRO collection systems (in contrast to their products) and other aspects of NRO activities, including budget and structure.  Thus, the term BYEMAN has been deleted in the title of the document and throughout the study–although the term and its meaning has become known by specialists and conveys no information beyond the text of any particular document.

This study addresses the use of the BYEMAN classification within the NRO, its impact on contractors and other government personnel, and the consequences of the current application of the BYEMAN system.  The study concludes that placing information in the highly restrictive BYEMAN channels (in contrast to classifying the information at a lower level) may unduly restrict its dissemination to individuals who have a legitimate need to know.

Document 20
NRO Strategic Plan
18 January 1993
19 pp.

A study headed by James Woolsey (Document 18), President Clinton’s first DCI, heavily influenced the contents of this early 1993 document.  The plan’s introduction notes that while some collection tasks will no longer be handled by overhead reconnaissance the “uncertain nature of the world that is emerging from the end of the ‘cold war’ places a heavy premium on overhead reconnaissance.”  At the same time, “this overhead reconnaissance challenge must be met in an era of a likely reduced national security budget.”

The strategic plan is described in the introduction, as “the ‘game plan’ to transition current overhead collection architectures into a more integrated, end-to-end architecture for improved global access and tasking flexibility.”

The document goes on to examine the strategic context for future NRO operations, NRO strategy, strategic objectives, and approaches to implementation.  Strategic objectives include improving the responsiveness of NRO systems by developing an architecture that spans the entire collection and dissemination process, from the identification of requirements to dissemination of the data collected.

Document 21
National Reconnaissance Office: Collocation Construction Project, Joint DOD and CIA Review Report
November 1994
28 pp.

In an August 8, 1994 press conference, Senators Dennis DeConcini (D-Az.) and John Warner (R-Va.), the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence accused the NRO of concealing from Congress the cost involved in building a new headquarters to house government and contractor employees.  Previously NRO activities in the Washington area were conducted from the Pentagon and rented space in the Washington metropolitan area.  The collocation and restructuring decisions of the late 1980s and early 1990s had resulted in a requirement for a new headquarters facility.10

The accusations were followed by hearings before both the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees–with House committee members defending the NRO and criticizing their Senate colleagues.  While they noted that some of the documents presented by the NRO covering total costs were not presented with desirable clarity, the House members were more critical of the Senate committee for inattention to their committee work.11

This joint DoD and CIA review of the project, found “no intent to mislead Congress” but that “the NRO failed to follow Intelligence Community budgeting guidelines, applicable to all the intelligence agencies,” that would have caused the project to be presented as a “New Initiative,” and that the cost data provided by the NRO “were not presented in a consistent fashion and did not include a level of detail comparable to submissions for . . . intelligence community construction.”

Document 22
Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Small Satellite Review Panel
July 1996

The concept of employing significantly smaller satellites for imagery collection was strongly advocated by Rep. Larry Combest during his tenure (1995-97) as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.  As a result the DCI was instructed to appoint a panel of experts to review the issue.12

Panel members included former NRO directors Robert Hermann and Martin Faga; former NRO official and NSA director Lew Allen; scientist Sidney Drell and four others.  The panel’s report supported a radical reduction in the size of most U.S. imagery satellites.  The panel concluded that “now is an appropriate time to make a qualitative change in the systems architecture of the nation’s reconnaissance assets,” in part because “the technology and industrial capabilities of the country permit the creation of effective space systems that are substantially smaller and less costly than current systems.”  Thus, the panel saw “the opportunity to move towards an operational capability for . . . imagery systems, that consists of an array of smaller, cheaper spacecraft in larger number with a total capacity which is at least as useful as those currently planned and to transport them to space with substantially smaller and less costly launch vehicles.”13

The extent to which those recommendations have influenced NRO’s Future Imagery Architecture plan is uncertain–although plans for large constellations of small satellites have not usually survived the budgetary process.

Document 23
Defining the Future of the NRO for the 21st Century, Final Report, Executive Summary
August 26, 1996
30 pp.

This report was apparently the first major outside review of the NRO conducted during the Clinton administration, and the first conducted after the NRO’s transformation to an overt institution and its restructuring were firmly in place.

Among those conducting the review were former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. David E. Jeremiah, former NRO director Martin Faga, and former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon.  Issues studied by the panel included, inter alia, the existence of a possible alternative to the NRO, NRO’s mission in the 21st Century, support to military operations, security, internal organization, and the relationship with NRO’s customers.

After reviewing a number of alternatives, the panel concluded that no other arrangement was superior for carrying out the NRO mission.  It did, however, recommend, changes with regards to NRO’s mission and internal organization.  The panel concluded that where the NRO’s current mission is “worldwide intelligence,” its future mission should be “global information superiority,” which “demands intelligence capabilities unimaginable just a few years ago.”  The panel also recommended creation of a fourth NRO directorate, which was subsequently established, to focus solely on the development of advanced systems, in order to “increase the visibility and stature of technology innovation in the NRO.”


1. Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp.241-42; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, From Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 319; Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), pp. 170-93.2. Kenneth Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement 17, Spring 1973 in Kevin C. Ruffner (Ed.), CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), pp. 3-40; Gen. Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff to General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, June 29, 1960, Thomas D. White Papers, Library of Congress, Box 34, Folder “2-15 SAC.”

3. “Special Meeting of the National Security Council to be held in the Conference Room of the White House from 8:30 a.m. to 10 a.m., Thursday, August 25, 1960, undated, National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61, Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 15, Reconnaissance Satellites [1960], DDEL.

4. “Reconnaissance Satellite Program,” Action No.1-b at Special NSC Meeting on August 25, 1960, transmitted to the Secretary of Defense by Memo of September 1, 1960; G.B. Kistiakowsky to Allen Dulles, August 25, 1960, Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Box No. 15, Space [July-Dec 1960], DDEL.

5. Carl Berger, The Air Force in Space Fiscal Year 1961, (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Historical Liaison Office, 1966), pp.41-42; Secretary of the Air Force Order 115.1, “Organization and Functions of the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems,” August 31, 1960; Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program, 1960-1965, (Washington, D.C., NRO, 1969), p. 20; Secretary of the Air Force Order 116.1, “The Director of the SAMOS Project,” August 31, 1960.

6. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 20.

7. Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Undercover in Outer Space: The Creation and Evolution of the NRO,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 13, 3 (Fall 2000): 301-344.

8. Ibid.; GRAB: Galactic Radiation and Background (Washington, D.C.: NRL, 1997); Dwayne A. Day, “Listening from Above: The First Signals Intelligence Satellite,” Spaceflight, August 1999, pp. 339-347; NRO, Program Directors of the NRO: ABC&D, 1999.

9. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, pp. 93, 96-97.

10. Pierre Thomas, “Spy Unit’s Spending Stuns Hill,” Washington Post, August 9, 1994, pp. A1, A6.

11. Walter Pincus, “Spy Agency Defended by House Panel,” Washington Post, August 12, 1994, p. A21; U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, NRO Headquarters Project (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 3-4.

12. Walter Pincus, “Congress Debates Adding Smaller Spy Satellites to NRO’s Menu,” Washington Post, October 5, 1995, p. A14; Joseph C. Anselmo, “House, Senate at Odds Over Intel Small Sats,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 1, 1996, p. 19.

13. Small Satellite Review Panel, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Small Satellite Review Panel, July 1996.

Revealed – Former CIA Officer Kiriakou Calls Leak Prosecution Selective, Vindictive

Former CIA officer John Kiriakou, who is charged with unauthorized disclosure of a covert officer’s identity and other classified information, says that the case against him is driven by government animosity, and that he is a target of selective prosecution.

“When White House aides leaked stories about the heroes who killed Osama Bin Laden, they were not prosecuted.  When the Washington Post was granted access to the covert director of the CTC for a profile of those directing America’s ‘war on terror,’ no one was prosecuted,” his attorneys wrote in a newly disclosed motion for dismissal.

“But when John Kiriakou gave an interview where he admitted the United States used waterboarding and when he further opined that waterboarding was ineffective, the government went after him,” the motion stated.

“The United States has improperly selected him for prosecution based on his exercise of his constitutional rights and on the animus the United States holds toward him” while “the government has tolerated other disclosures because they resulted in press favorable to the government.”

A copy of the June 12 defense motion was cleared for public release yesterday.

In a separate motion for dismissal, Mr. Kiriakou’s attorneys challenged the constitutionality of the statutes under which he is being prosecuted, including the Intelligence Identities Protection Act and section 793(d) of the Espionage Act, which they argued are “unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”

Furthermore, because overclassification is rampant, they said, the classification status of any particular information is not a reliable index of its sensitivity.

“The government’s acknowledged practice of over-classification means that not all classified information actually has the potential to damage national security if released….  The fact that information is classified does not actually clarify whether its disclosure… could cause any injury to the United States.”

A government response to the defense motions is due by July 2.

Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary, 1972 – TOP-SECRET from the NSA

click for full sizeFirst trip with Gorbachev. Chernyaev in Belgium, October 1972.

Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary, 1972

Soviet government official Anatoly Chernyaev records an insider’s view of the Brezhnev era

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 379

Translated and edited by Anna Melyakova and Svetlana Savranskaya “Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary is one of the great internal records of the Gorbachev years, a trove of irreplaceable observations about a turning point in history. There is nothing else quite like it, allowing the reader to sit at Gorbachev’s elbow at the time of perestroika and glasnost, experiencing the breakthroughs and setbacks. It is a major contribution to our understanding of this momentous period.”
— David E. Hoffman, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Dead Hand

“Remarkable diary …”
— Historian Amy Knight, New York Review of Books, April 6, 2012

click for full sizeChernyaev, Anatoly Kovalev and Alexander Bovin in Zavidovo.

click for full sizeChernyaev and Georgy Arbatov in Zavidovo.

Washington, D.C., May 25, 2012 – Today the National Security Archive publishes excerpts from Anatoly S. Chernyaev’s diary of 1972 for the first time in English translation with edits and postscript by the author. While the diary for the Gorbachev years, 1985-1991, published before and widely used in scholarly work on the end of the Cold War provided a major source on the Gorbachev reforms, the earlier years of the diary give the reader a very rare window into the workings of the Brezhnev inner circle in the 1970s.

The portrait of the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, whom most Americans remember from his later years as frail and incomprehensible, emerges very differently from the earliest in the series of diaries donated by Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev to the National Security Archive. In 1972, Chernyaev, deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee, started keeping a systematic diary, recording his attendance at Politburo meetings, his participation in meetings at the state dacha in Zavidovo (where the experts and speechwriters met to draft speeches and reports for the General Secretary), visits abroad, and the daily life of a high-level Soviet apparatchik.

In 1972, Brezhnev is a skillful negotiator, who prepares seriously for Richard Nixon’s first visit to Moscow, who discusses texts of his speeches with leading Moscow intellectuals whom he brought into his inner circle as speechwriters and consultants, who is essentially non-ideological in his dealings with foreign leaders-negotiating arms control and economic agreements with Nixon while the U.S. forces are bombing the Soviet communist ally Vietnam, preferring Georges Pompidou to the leader of French communists Georges Marchais, and”brainwashing” Pakistani leader Bhutto. The two most striking differences between the aging Brezhnev of the late 1970s-early 1980s and the Brezhnev of this diary are that the General Secretary is clearly in charge of the Politburo sessions and that he actively consults with leading experts and intellectuals, such as Georgy Arbatov, Nikolai Inozemtsev, Alexander Bovin and Chernyaev himself.

Chernyaev’s daily duties are centered around the international communist movement, interactions with representatives from European communist parties. The reader sees Chernyaev’s emerging disillusionment with his work, which in comparison to real foreign policy, like preparation for Nixon’s visit, feels meaningless. Chernyaev comes to believe that “the Communist Movement right now is nothing more than an ideological addendum to our foreign policy,” and that the Soviet authority in the progressive movements in the world is shrinking: “nobody believes us anymore, no matter how we portray the Chinese and try to explain our Marxist-Leninist purity.”

He sees the future in a different direction. After Nixon’s visit, Chernyaev is asked to draft Brezhnev’s speech on Soviet-American relations and thus is allowed to see all the materials from the meeting, including all transcripts of conversation. Impressed with the quality of interaction and the non-ideological spirit of it, Chernyaev anticipates a new era: “Be that as it may, but we’ve crossed the Rubicon. The great Rubicon of world history. These weeks of May 1972 will go down in history as the beginning of an era of convergence.”

But the new era will only come thirteen years later. In 1972, he sees the first almost imperceptible sign from the future. In October 1972, he is asked to accompany first secretary of the Stavropol region on a trip to Belgium. This is where Chernyaev meets and spends time with Mikhail Gorbachev for the first time. Astonishingly, as Chernyaev later admits, he did not record this meeting in the diary at the time. Only photographs documented this auspicious meeting where Chernyaev sits on the left hand of the future Soviet leader, whose right hand he was destined to become in the late 1980s.