Uncensored – Hitler’s Henchmen – Diplomat of Evil Joachim von Ribbentrop

“Hitler’s Henchmen” is a six-part series that portrays the men who aided Adolf Hitler in his rise to power and serviced the infernal machinery of the Third Reich. The Nuremberg Trials play an important role here: in a historical first, the International War Crimes Tribunal passed judgment on leading Nazi paladins for their unparalleled atrocities while exposing to the world the infamy of the Hitler regime and its leaders. ZDF uses newly discovered archive material and interviews with surviving family members and Nazi insiders to draw historical psychograms of Hitler’s closest aides. Conceived as a sequel to our six-part series “Hitler,” “Hitler’s Henchmen” offers in-depth personal and political profiles of six men who became architects of the destruction of Europe. Portraits of the men who carried out Hitler’s plans: ZDF’s sequel about the men who consolidated Hitler’s reign and turned his plans into action. They wove the complicities and plots without which Hitler could have never perpetrated the crime of the century. They helped to sway the judges and the bureaucrats, the armed forces and the police, the scientists and the industrialists, the students and their teachers to the regime’s ways of thinking. What kind of people were they? What inspired them to serve a corrupt administration with such enthusiasm and devotion? How did their careers unfold and their fates end? The series answers these and other questions by examining six of Hitler’s cohorts. The portraits of these aides-de-camp provide viewers with a revealing psychogram of “Hitler’s willing executors.” The films present for the first time newly discovered film clips and sound recordings from international archives. Recent revelations provided by historical research and interviews with former coworkers, relatives, and victims are also shown.
Hitler’s Henchmen 1 Episodes:
1. The Propagandist/Firebrand – Joseph Goebbels – German with English Subtitles
2. The Marshall – Hermann Goering – German with English Subtitles
3. The Deputy – Rudolf Hess – German with English Subtitles
4. The Executioner – Heinrich Himmler – German with English Subtitles
5. The Admiral – Karl Doenitz – German with English Subtitles
6. The Architect – Albert Speer – German with English Subtitles
Hitler’s Henchmen II Episodes:
1. Bureaucrat of Murder – Adolf Eichmann – German with English Subtitles
2. The Secretary – Martin Bormann – German with English Subtitles
3. The Corruptor of Youth – Baldur von Schirach – German with English Subtitles
4. Diplomat of Evil – Joachim von Ribbentrop – German with English Subtitles
5. Doctor of Death – Josef Mengele – German and English with Swedish Subtitles
6. Arbitrator over Death and Life – Roland Freisler – German with English Subtitles

Uncensored – Hitler’s Henchmen – The Secretary Martin Bormann

“Hitler’s Henchmen” is a six-part series that portrays the men who aided Adolf Hitler in his rise to power and serviced the infernal machinery of the Third Reich. The Nuremberg Trials play an important role here: in a historical first, the International War Crimes Tribunal passed judgment on leading Nazi paladins for their unparalleled atrocities while exposing to the world the infamy of the Hitler regime and its leaders. ZDF uses newly discovered archive material and interviews with surviving family members and Nazi insiders to draw historical psychograms of Hitler’s closest aides. Conceived as a sequel to our six-part series “Hitler,” “Hitler’s Henchmen” offers in-depth personal and political profiles of six men who became architects of the destruction of Europe. Portraits of the men who carried out Hitler’s plans: ZDF’s sequel about the men who consolidated Hitler’s reign and turned his plans into action. They wove the complicities and plots without which Hitler could have never perpetrated the crime of the century. They helped to sway the judges and the bureaucrats, the armed forces and the police, the scientists and the industrialists, the students and their teachers to the regime’s ways of thinking. What kind of people were they? What inspired them to serve a corrupt administration with such enthusiasm and devotion? How did their careers unfold and their fates end? The series answers these and other questions by examining six of Hitler’s cohorts. The portraits of these aides-de-camp provide viewers with a revealing psychogram of “Hitler’s willing executors.” The films present for the first time newly discovered film clips and sound recordings from international archives. Recent revelations provided by historical research and interviews with former coworkers, relatives, and victims are also shown.
Hitler’s Henchmen 1 Episodes:
1. The Propagandist/Firebrand – Joseph Goebbels – German with English Subtitles
2. The Marshall – Hermann Goering – German with English Subtitles
3. The Deputy – Rudolf Hess – German with English Subtitles
4. The Executioner – Heinrich Himmler – German with English Subtitles
5. The Admiral – Karl Doenitz – German with English Subtitles
6. The Architect – Albert Speer – German with English Subtitles
Hitler’s Henchmen II Episodes:
1. Bureaucrat of Murder – Adolf Eichmann – German with English Subtitles
2. The Secretary – Martin Bormann – German with English Subtitles
3. The Corruptor of Youth – Baldur von Schirach – German with English Subtitles
4. Diplomat of Evil – Joachim von Ribbentrop – German with English Subtitles
5. Doctor of Death – Josef Mengele – German and English with Swedish Subtitles
6. Arbitrator over Death and Life – Roland Freisler – German with English Subtitles

Confidential – New Jersey Office of Homeland Security Terrorism Awareness and Prevention Participant Guide

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The New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness is pleased to present this opportunity for you to learn more about terrorism awareness and prevention. This program is designed to raise the awareness of New Jersey citizens and workers so they can assist in combating terrorism by enhancing powers of observation and encouraging mutual assistance and concern. It involves the joint efforts of the federal, state and local agencies along with the residents of New Jersey.

While our country tells us to be more aware no one is telling is how and for what. This leaves the possibility for misunderstanding, abuses, and prejudices to surface. This program will inform citizens of what to look for and that their observations should rely on the unusual or suspicious activities and behaviors. Citizens should never use race or religion as factors for reporting suspicious activity.

You, the residents and workers of New Jersey, are our partners.

 

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Neue Morddrohung – mutmasslich von “Peter Ehlers” – EIN SCHUSS AUF PULCH und alles ist erledigt”

Lieber Leser,

Wildwest bei der mutmasslichen STASI:

Vor Zeugen hat mutmasslich “Peter Ehlers” mir mit einem Mordanschlag gedroht – und die Parallele zu dem verstorbenen Journalisten Heinz Gerlach gezogen.

Alle wissen, ich habe als Erster kritisch über Heinz Gerlach berichtet und bin deswegen von ihm verklagt worden.

Den Prozess haben meine Gesellschafter und ich damals gewonnen.

ABER ICH HABE AUCH ALS ERSTER ÜBER DEN MUTMASSLICHEN MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH UND DIE VERDACHTSMOMENTE GEGEN STASI-GOMOPA GESCHRIEBEN

NIE IM LEBEN HABE ICH GEDACHT DASS AUS “PETER EHLERS” MORDDROHUNGEN BLUTIGER ERNST WIRD

Ich habe mich im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes getäuscht.

Heute wissen wir über das STASI-“GoMoPa”-Geflecht Bescheid.

Die mörderischen und rufmörderischen Drohungen von mutmasslich ” Peter Ehlers” und von “GoMoPa” sowie deren Partnern und Aufftraggebern erhalten ich und meine Partner und Kunden täglich.

Desgleichen immer mehr Beweise über die Helfer UND Helfershelfer UND DEREN MUTMASSLICHE AUFTRAGGEBER RESCH UND BENNEWIRTZ , der STASI-“GoMoPa” sowie deren HELFERSHELFER  Thomas P und Beate P, Isabella C und Jan M UND WIE DIE JUSTIZ MANIPULIERT WURDE UND WIRD INDEM BEWEISE UNTERSCHLAGEN UND GEFÄLSCHT WERDEN

Für “PETER EHLERS” sind BUNDESKANZLERIN ANGELA MERKEL UND FINANZMINSITER WOLFGANG SCHÄUBLE DEUTSCHLANDS “GRÖSSTE HEHLER”

Verstehen Sie jetzt, mit wem und was wir hier zu tun haben ?

Schöne Grüsse

Bernd Pulch, MA der Publizistik, Germanistik und Komparatistik

Unveiled – FBI – Facebook and Twitter Social Media Open Sources Spying – PDF

American intelligence agency FBI is reportedly developing new software to scan social networks Twitter and Facebook to look for emerging threats and predict crimes.
The FBI has asked technology firms to create software that can effectively scan the websites for words, phrases and other suspected behaviour, a US Federal site  reported.
It will also be able to translate from foreign languages as well as detect patterns of users misleading the police.
Download the  cake from FBI bakery HERE

FBI20112

 

Russia – Hezbollah in Possession of Advanced Antitank Missiles

Russia recently unveiled its new Kornet EM missile that can launch at least two antitank missiles simultaneously. There is concern that the weapon might be transferred to Syria, and then make its way to Hezbollah in Lebanon

Is Hezbollah in Possession of Advanced Antitank Missiles?

Russia unveiled its new Kornet EM antitank missile at a recent exhibition. This missile is an advanced variant of the veteran Kornet missile, and is meant to be easier to operate against a wider range of targets.

Israel is concerned that quantities of the advanced missile might be transferred from Russia to Syria, and then might end up in the hands of Hezbollah.

The new missile has a greater level of precision with a range of up to 10 km, compared to the previous missile’s range of 5 km.

One of the missile’s advantages is that it can be used in the “natural reserves” in south Lebanon, since it can be assembled on various mobile light platforms.

In addition, the system allows for the simultaneous firing of two missiles, which may pose a risk to the IDF’s armored vehicles.

Israel has been concerned since the start of the popular uprising in Syria that the Assad regime is transferring quantities of weapons to Hezbollah to preserve the strength of its regional ally.

The FBI – Interview – The Cyber Threat Part 2: Shawn Henry on Partnerships, Challenges

Shawn Henry
Shawn Henry

The Cyber Threat
Part 2: Shawn Henry on Partnerships, Challenges

03/30/12

Part 2 of an interview with Shawn Henry, executive assistant director of the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch.

Q: Why are partnerships so important?

Henry: The threat we face is not solely within the FBI’s area of responsibility. So we work very closely with other law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community domestically. We share tactics and intelligence. We also partner with the private sector, because they often are the victims and see attacks before anybody else. The final piece—and one of the most significant—is international law enforcement partnerships. The ability to reach across the ocean once we identify criminals and put our hands on them is something that is relatively new. For many years, the adversaries believed they were immune to prosecution because they were thousands of miles away. That’s not the case anymore. Through our partnerships we have arrested hundreds of bad actors who targeted U.S. and foreign infrastructure and institutions. Just in the last two years we have worked with dozens of countries, and we have actually stationed FBI agents overseas into the police agencies in countries including Ukraine, Romania, The Netherlands, and Estonia.

The Cyber Threat

Shawn Henry, who became a special agent in 1989 and rose to become the FBI’s top official on cyber crime, talks about the evolving cyber threat and his FBI career.

The Cyber Threat, Part 1
FBI Cyber Division
More Cyber Crimes Stories

Q: So the cyber threat is truly global in scope?

Henry: Absolutely. In the physical world when somebody robs a bank, the pool of suspects is limited to the number of people in the general vicinity of that bank. When a bank is robbed virtually, even though it is very real for the victims—the money is actually gone—the pool of suspects is limited to the number of people on the face of the earth that have a laptop and an Internet connection, because anybody with an Internet connection can potentially attack any other computer that is tied to the network. You don’t have to be a computer scientist to launch these types of attacks.

Q: Going forward, what are the challenges regarding the cyber threat?

Henry: What I call the expansion of the network is going to create challenges. As technology increases, the threat becomes greater. All our wireless networks and smart devices are network-based, and anything touching the network is potentially susceptible. As more and more information transitions across the network, more adversaries will move to get their hands on it, because that information is extraordinarily valuable.

Q: You have responsibilities beyond the cyber area. What are some of the challenges you see with other criminal matters?

Henry: As an organization, fighting terrorism is rightfully the FBI’s number one priority, but criminal threats are substantial. There is white-collar crime, where we’ve seen people lose their entire life savings because of criminals taking advantage of them. There’s something very rewarding about seeing our agents and analysts aggressively working to take those criminals off the streets. We’ve seen public corruption cases where people have abused their position for personal gain. I see those types of cases continuing. There’s a percentage of people in society that are always going to be bad actors.

Q: What are you going to miss when you leave the Bureau?

Henry: The people and the mission. There is nothing else I wanted to do more in my professional life than to be an FBI agent. The quality and caliber of the people I have worked with are second to none. Working day to day to carry out our mission to help protect the country is an experience that can never be replaced. I leave with a tremendous sense of pride.

SECRET – Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Procedures for Handling First Amendment Assemblies and Mass Demonstrations

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The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) outlined in this manual are to ensure that this department is prepared to respond effectively and efficiently in accordance with applicable law and District of Columbia policy to any unlawful conduct occurring in the context of First Amendment assemblies. These SOP’s incorporate revisions to the manner in which the Metropolitan Police Department responds to demonstrations and other assemblies on District of Columbia public space that the District has implemented in resolving litigation. This manual also reflects measures mandated by the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004.

This handbook sets forth general policy and shall serve as standard operating procedures for all members in carrying out the mission of the Metropolitan Police Department in dealing with all demonstrations, rallies, marches, picket lines, or other similar gatherings conducted for the purpose of persons expressing their political, social, or religious views. This policy is intended to exceed constitutional requirements and satisfy the heightened requirements of local statutory law and best practices.

The manual also is designed around the concept of operational flexibility within the requirements of the National Incident Management System. It is impossible to devise specific standard procedures for handling all possible situations, for each has its own characteristics and problems. The overall police philosophy must be one of moderation, flexibility and controlled response. Since each situation is unique, both commanders and supervisory officials must plan to respond according to the nature and size of the crowd. The tactical procedures established within this manual are a guide, and not a substitute for the exercise of sound judgment and proper command and supervision within the context of general departmental policy.

It is imperative that members of the force understand the role of the Metropolitan Police Department during mass demonstrations and major disturbances in our city and the manner by which the department prepares itself to fulfill this role. It is to this end that this handbook is dedicated.

V. VIOLENT CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Unplanned civil disturbances may arise from a number of causes such as political grievances, economic conflicts, community unrest, or in response to police action taking place in neighborhoods, or in the midst of a crowded street, park or public place. Civil disturbance participants come from all walks of life and cover the entire political spectrum.

Whenever an unplanned First Amendment assembly arises, the first officer on the scene will serve as the initial incident commander. That member will be responsible for conducting an assessment of the scene, notifying the CIC and the element Watch Commander of the situation and requesting assistance from the Special Operations Division.

The basic human element sparking a civil disturbance is usually the presence of a crowd. Civil disturbances usually arise when a crowd:

1. Gathers to air grievances on issues, and transfers its anger from the issues to the people dealing with the issues.
2. Swells uncontrollably as curious bystanders and sympathetic onlookers join forces with the activists or protestors.
3. Is incited to irrational action by skillful agitators.

In civil disturbances, crowds employ any number of tactics to achieve their goals. Their tactics may be unplanned or planned, non-violent or violent confrontations. As indicated, the situations that could evolve into a violent civil disturbance are numerous and varied. Often there will be little or no warning before the onset of violence or property damage. In a few instances, it may be possible to predict a level of civil disorder by the nature of a pre-planned event. However, each civil disturbance situation is unique and commanders and supervisory officials must, therefore, plan and respond according to the nature and size of the disturbance. The policies and procedures presented in this SOP are based upon the concept of operational flexibility, and it is expected that officials will exercise sound judgment and proper command and supervisory responsibility in the control of a civil disturbance.

Uncensored – Hitler’s Henchmen – Bureaucrat of Murder – Adolf Eichmann

“Hitler’s Henchmen” is a six-part series that portrays the men who aided Adolf Hitler in his rise to power and serviced the infernal machinery of the Third Reich. The Nuremberg Trials play an important role here: in a historical first, the International War Crimes Tribunal passed judgment on leading Nazi paladins for their unparalleled atrocities while exposing to the world the infamy of the Hitler regime and its leaders. ZDF uses newly discovered archive material and interviews with surviving family members and Nazi insiders to draw historical psychograms of Hitler’s closest aides. Conceived as a sequel to our six-part series “Hitler,” “Hitler’s Henchmen” offers in-depth personal and political profiles of six men who became architects of the destruction of Europe. Portraits of the men who carried out Hitler’s plans: ZDF’s sequel about the men who consolidated Hitler’s reign and turned his plans into action. They wove the complicities and plots without which Hitler could have never perpetrated the crime of the century. They helped to sway the judges and the bureaucrats, the armed forces and the police, the scientists and the industrialists, the students and their teachers to the regime’s ways of thinking. What kind of people were they? What inspired them to serve a corrupt administration with such enthusiasm and devotion? How did their careers unfold and their fates end? The series answers these and other questions by examining six of Hitler’s cohorts. The portraits of these aides-de-camp provide viewers with a revealing psychogram of “Hitler’s willing executors.” The films present for the first time newly discovered film clips and sound recordings from international archives. Recent revelations provided by historical research and interviews with former coworkers, relatives, and victims are also shown.
Hitler’s Henchmen 1 Episodes:
1. The Propagandist/Firebrand – Joseph Goebbels – German with English Subtitles
2. The Marshall – Hermann Goering – German with English Subtitles
3. The Deputy – Rudolf Hess – German with English Subtitles
4. The Executioner – Heinrich Himmler – German with English Subtitles
5. The Admiral – Karl Doenitz – German with English Subtitles
6. The Architect – Albert Speer – German with English Subtitles
Hitler’s Henchmen II Episodes:
1. Bureaucrat of Murder – Adolf Eichmann – German with English Subtitles
2. The Secretary – Martin Bormann – German with English Subtitles
3. The Corruptor of Youth – Baldur von Schirach – German with English Subtitles
4. Diplomat of Evil – Joachim von Ribbentrop – German with English Subtitles
5. Doctor of Death – Josef Mengele – German and English with Swedish Subtitles
6. Arbitrator over Death and Life – Roland Freisler – German with English Subtitles

The CIA Crown Jewels – The MHCHAOS Program

Citation: The MHCHAOS Program
Secret, Report, May 08, 1973, 3 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00058
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Dean, John Wesley III; Fedayeen-e Islam; Kissinger, Henry A.; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. East Asia Division; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. East Asia Division. Vietnam Operations; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Soviet Bloc Division; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Special Operations Division; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Plans. Far East Division. China Operations; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Plans. Western Hemisphere Division. Cuban Operations Group; United States. Department of Justice. Attorney General; United States. Department of State. Secretary; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Director; United States. White House
Subjects: Algiers (Algeria) | Biographical intelligence | Brussels (Belgium) | China | Communications interception | Communications security | Conakry (Guinea) | Covert identities | Cuba | Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) | Domestic intelligence | Foreign citizens | Hong Kong | Intelligence collection | Interagency cooperation | Korea (North) | Mexico City (Mexico) | Ottawa (Canada) | Paris (France) | Political activists | Project MHCHAOS [Codename CHAOS] | Santiago (Chile) | Soviet Union | Stockholm (Sweden) | Vietnam (North)
Abstract: Describes MHCHAOS program and activities, including intelligence gathering on U.S. and foreign dissidents and methods for transmitting findings to U.S. agencies.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (102 KB)

Durable URL for this record

The FBI – Four Additional Defendants Charged for Assaulting Practitioners of the Amish Religion in Cleveland

WASHINGTON—The Justice Department announced today that a federal grand jury in Cleveland returned a 10-count superseding indictment in United States v. Mullet, et al. The superseding indictment charges 10 men and six women, all residents of Ohio, with federal crimes arising out of a series of religiously-motivated assaults on practitioners of the Amish religion.

The superseding indictment addresses five separate assaults that occurred between September and November of 2011 and obstructive conduct related to those assaults. In each assault, defendants forcibly removed beard and head hair from practitioners of the Amish faith with whom they had ongoing religious disputes. As set forth in the superseding indictment, the manner in which Amish men wear their beards and Amish women wear their hair are symbols of their faith. The superseding indictment adds four defendants, Lovina Miller, Kathryn Miller, Emma Miller and Elizabeth Miller, who had not previously been charged. The indictment also adds charges against some of the defendants for the concealment and destruction of evidence, including a disposable camera, shears, and a bag of hair from victims of the attacks, as well as a charge against Samuel Mullet, Sr. for false statements he allegedly made to federal agents during the investigation.

This case is being investigated by the Cleveland Division of the FBI and is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Thomas Getz and Bridget M. Brennan of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Ohio and Deputy Chief Kristy Parker of the Civil Rights Division’s Criminal Section.

For more information on the 12 defendants previously charged in this case, please visit http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-crt-1683.html.

An indictment is merely an accusation. All defendants are presumed innocent of the charges until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in court.

Secret – U.S. Army Document and Media Exploitation Draft Manual

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This publication provides Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) required for Army personnel when conducting Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) operations. The document is designed to serve as a reference for multiple personnel at varying echelons. The ATTP provides specific information for Army personnel operating as part of a DOMEX or other exploitation team for the collection, processing, and reporting of DOMEX activities. The manual serves as a reference for staff planners and intelligence personnel at battalion and brigade combat teams. Additionally, the manual provides an understanding of DOMEX activities, procedures, organizations, products, and databases at joint task force, U.S. Army, and the Department of Defense.

DOCUMENT AND MEDIA EXPLOITATION

1-2. DOMEX is the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hardcopy documents and electronic media that are under the U.S. Government’s physical control and are not publicly available (training circular [TC] 2-91.8).

1-3. DOMEX includes the collection and exploitation of captured equipment, documents, and media to generate actionable intelligence. DOMEX provides leaders at all echelons with intelligence about enemy forces; their plans and intentions; and their TTP. It does this through the rapid and accurate extraction, exploitation, and analysis of acquired documents, cell phones, computers, digital storage devices, video and audio tapes, and other media and material. DOMEX is a critical part of target exploitation, especially as it relates to actions on the objective during site exploitation activities.

1-4. Through DOMEX, information is systematically extracted from all captured materials in response to the commanders’ critical information requirements (CCIR). DOMEX activities—

  • Maximize the value of intelligence gained from captured materials.
  • Provide commanders with timely and relevant intelligence to effectively enhance awareness of the enemies’ capabilities, operational structures, and intents.
  • Provide timely and accurate intelligence support to the commander throughout the full spectrum of operations.
  • Assist in criminal prosecution and legal processes by maintaining chain of custody procedures and preserving the evidentiary value of captured materials.

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From the FBI – The Cyber Threat Part 1: On the Front Lines with Shawn Henry

Shawn Henry realized a lifelong dream when he became a special agent in 1989. Since that time he has traveled the world for investigations and become one of the FBI’s most senior executives and its top official on cyber crime. FBI.gov recently sat down with Henry—who is about to retire from the Bureau—to talk about the cyber threat and his FBI career.

Q: You were involved with cyber investigations long before the public had an awareness of how serious the threat is. How did you become interested in the cyber realm?

Henry: I was always interested in technology, and in the late 1990s I started to take courses at the FBI related to cyber intrusion investigations. When I had an opportunity to move over to that side of the house, I seized it. I saw right away that the challenges we were going to face in the future were tremendous, and I wanted to be on the front lines of that.

Q: How has the cyber threat changed over time?

Henry: Early on, cyber intrusions such as website defacements and denial of service attacks were generally perceived to be pranks by teenagers. But even then, in the late 1990s, there were state actors sponsored by governments who were attacking networks. What received media attention was the teenage hacker and the defacements, but there were more significant types of attacks and a more substantial threat that was in the background. Also, those early attacks were much more intermittent. Now we are seeing literally thousands of attacks a day. The ones people hear about are often because victims are coming forward. And there are more substantial attacks that people don’t ever see or hear about.

Q: Where are the cyber threats coming from today?

Henry: We see three primary actors: organized crime groups that are primarily threatening the financial services sector, and they are expanding the scope of their attacks; state sponsors—foreign governments that are interested in pilfering data, including intellectual property and research and development data from major manufacturers, government agencies, and defense contractors; and increasingly there are terrorist groups who want to impact this country the same way they did on 9/11 by flying planes into buildings. They are seeking to use the network to challenge the United States by looking at critical infrastructure to disrupt or harm the viability of our way of life.

Q: How has the FBI adapted to address the threat?

Henry: We have grown substantially, particularly in the last four or five years, where we have hired much more technically proficient agents, many of whom have advanced degrees in computer science or information technology. We bring them onboard and teach them to be FBI agents rather than trying to teach FBI agents how the technology works. That has given us a leg up and put our capabilities on par with anybody in the world. We have also worked proactively to mitigate the threat by using some of the same investigative techniques we use in the physical world—undercover operations, cooperating witnesses, and authorized surveillance techniques. We have taken those same time-tested tactics and applied them to the cyber threat. So we are now able to breach networks of criminal actors by putting somebody into their group. The other critical area we have been successful in is developing partnerships.

 

Shawn Henry is executive assistant director of the FBI’s Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch. He served as assistant director of the Cyber Division from September 2008 to January 2010,

TOP-SECRET – Garbage Collectors Around the U.S. Trained to Report Suspicious Activity

Several newspapers in southern Florida are reporting that trash collectors are receiving training from their employer Waste Management to work with local law enforcement to report crimes and other suspicious activities. The training is part of a program called Waste Watch that is designed to leverage the fact that “drivers are familiar with their routes and are in the same neighborhoods every day” which “puts them in the unique position to spot unusual activity and anything out of the ordinary.” Press releases from Waste Management describe the program as a way of opening “channels of communication with the authorities to help keep them informed and alert of what’s happening in their city’s streets and alleys.”

Waste Watch training sessions are conducted by former FBI agents in association with security representatives from Waste Management. The program has been operating since 2004 when it was first introduced by Waste Management’s Corporate Security Services and Community Relations offices. Waste Watch operates in more than 100 communities around the country including Utah, New York, Nevada, South Carolina, California, Oregon, Michigan, Washington and Florida. There is little public information available on the program or the content of training material presented to Waste Watch participants.

Given the recent proliferation of programs dedicated to promoting suspicious activity reporting, more information is needed on the program’s guidelines for detecting and reporting suspicious activity. FBI flyers designed to promote suspicious activity reporting have listed actions like insisting on paying cash or trying to cover one’s computer screen as evidence of potential terrorist activity. A similar guide produced by the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness listed yawning and repeatedly touching one’s face as suspicious activities. The Waste Watch program does seem to have produced some positive results, including helping to catch vandals or petty thieves. In 2008 the program was awarded the “Award of Excellence in the Neighborhood Watch” by the National Sheriff’s Association.

While encouraging citizens and businesses to look out for criminal activity is a worthwhile cause, the recent proliferation of programs for reporting suspicious activity has raised concerns from civil liberties groups about the potential for turning citizens and business owners into effective spies on their neighbors and customers. The Department of Homeland Security’s “If You See Something, Say Something” program has greatly expanded in the last few years by partnering with the NBA, MLB, NFL, MLS, NCAA, religious organizations, hotel television providers and even Walmart to promote suspicious activity reporting. Fusion centers and cities around the country are creating websites and phone applications to help citizens report suspicious activity, complete with photographs and geolocation information. However, the “Waste Watch” program extends citizen surveillance one step further by leveraging the manpower of the country’s largest waste collection company to look not just for suspicious activity, but for “anything out of the ordinary.”

Uncensored – Hitler’s Henchmen – The Deputy – Rudolf Hess

“Hitler’s Henchmen” is a six-part series that portrays the men who aided Adolf Hitler in his rise to power and serviced the infernal machinery of the Third Reich. The Nuremberg Trials play an important role here: in a historical first, the International War Crimes Tribunal passed judgment on leading Nazi paladins for their unparalleled atrocities while exposing to the world the infamy of the Hitler regime and its leaders. ZDF uses newly discovered archive material and interviews with surviving family members and Nazi insiders to draw historical psychograms of Hitler’s closest aides. Conceived as a sequel to our six-part series “Hitler,” “Hitler’s Henchmen” offers in-depth personal and political profiles of six men who became architects of the destruction of Europe. Portraits of the men who carried out Hitler’s plans: ZDF’s sequel about the men who consolidated Hitler’s reign and turned his plans into action. They wove the complicities and plots without which Hitler could have never perpetrated the crime of the century. They helped to sway the judges and the bureaucrats, the armed forces and the police, the scientists and the industrialists, the students and their teachers to the regime’s ways of thinking. What kind of people were they? What inspired them to serve a corrupt administration with such enthusiasm and devotion? How did their careers unfold and their fates end? The series answers these and other questions by examining six of Hitler’s cohorts. The portraits of these aides-de-camp provide viewers with a revealing psychogram of “Hitler’s willing executors.” The films present for the first time newly discovered film clips and sound recordings from international archives. Recent revelations provided by historical research and interviews with former coworkers, relatives, and victims are also shown.
Hitler’s Henchmen 1 Episodes:
1. The Propagandist/Firebrand – Joseph Goebbels – German with English Subtitles
2. The Marshall – Hermann Goering – German with English Subtitles
3. The Deputy – Rudolf Hess – German with English Subtitles
4. The Executioner – Heinrich Himmler – German with English Subtitles
5. The Admiral – Karl Doenitz – German with English Subtitles
6. The Architect – Albert Speer – German with English Subtitles
Hitler’s Henchmen II Episodes:
1. Bureaucrat of Murder – Adolf Eichmann – German with English Subtitles
2. The Secretary – Martin Bormann – German with English Subtitles
3. The Corruptor of Youth – Baldur von Schirach – German with English Subtitles
4. Diplomat of Evil – Joachim von Ribbentrop – German with English Subtitles
5. Doctor of Death – Josef Mengele – German and English with Swedish Subtitles
6. Arbitrator over Death and Life – Roland Freisler – German with English Subtitles

 

 

 

Confidential – Restricted U.S. Military Multi-Service Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE) Manual

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JFIRE is a pocket-size, quick-reference guide for requesting fire support in accordance with approved joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). JFIRE contains calls for fire, joint air attack team (JAAT) techniques, a format for joint air strike requests, close air support (CAS) coordination and planning procedures, communications architecture, and weapons data.

Scope

JFIRE applies to the tactical and special operating forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. It is a United States (US) unilateral-only document, but includes some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formats where appropriate. Information in JFIRE has been extracted from existing Service directives. It is primarily intended for use by members of battalion and squadronlevel combat units.

5. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Considerations

UASs consist of one or more unmanned aircraft (UA), a control station, datalinks, and payloads. The capability of UASs to support or execute CAS varies greatly between systems. For example, US Air Force (USAF) MQ-1 and MQ-9 are armed with air-to-surface weapons, have radio communications aboard the UA, and are flown by rated aviators trained in CAS procedures. Other systems may not be similarly equipped or flown by CAS-qualified crews but may be employed for situational awareness, target marking, or as an observer for Types 2 or 3 control by the controlling JTAC. (See appendices A and B for more information on UASs.) The following UAS CAS considerations are intended for use with CAS-capable UAS and CAS-qualified UAS operators only:

a. Threat: Unmanned aircraft are unlikely to survive in a heavily defended environment. Consideration must be given to enemy air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons with the ability to engage a UA at its operating location and altitude. UAs are not normally equipped with warning receivers or countermeasures and depend on threat avoidance for mission survivability. Datalinks may be susceptible to jamming or interference.

b. Weather: UAs are susceptible to turbulence, icing, and visible precipitation. Electro-optical (EO) / IR sensors and laser designators / range finders / target markers require unobstructed LOS to the target. Intervening haze, clouds, or blowing dust may interfere with or prevent mission accomplishment. On the other hand, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and inertially aided munitions (IAMs) are unaffected by haze, cloud cover, or dust. High winds aloft may make it difficult for the UA to maintain station in a highly restricted location or may unacceptably delay transit between target areas.

c. Signature: UAs vary in visual, radar, IR, and acoustic signature and in system ability and crew proficiency to manage the signature. For example, when minimum noise is desired to avoid tipping off a target, it may be possible to modulate power and trade altitude for airspeed in order to reduce the noise signature while approaching closer to a target. On the other hand, it may be desirable to announce presence in order to stimulate a desired response or intimidate the target.

d. Deconfliction: While UASs presently lack the ability to see and avoid other aircraft, there are other means to integrate UASs (e.g., voice radio; tactical datalinks; identification, friend or foe [IFF]). Formal and informal airspace control measures apply to UASs. UAs may hold overhead or offset from a target. Relatively slow airspeeds can permit a UA to operate in a smaller segment of airspace than other aircraft. Depending upon performance capabilities of the specific UAS and communications with the crew, it may take several minutes to reposition the UA or change altitude blocks. JTACs must trade off the best position for the UASs to employ sensors / weapons against the desired target(s) with the ability to best employ other assets. Consideration should also be given to the “lost link” profile autonomously flown by UA if the control datalink is lost. Upon initial check-in, the JTAC should query the UAS operator for the currently programmed lost-link profile. If unacceptable due to airspace limitations or other reasons, the JTAC should direct a new lost-link profile and receive verification that the UA has been programmed.

e. Communication and Situational Awareness: Some UAs have onboard radios and / or secure voice providing the ability to communicate with the UAS pilot as with any manned aircraft. In addition, some UASs have secure chat and voice over Internet Protocol, as well as additional air and ground situational awareness displays. Providing the ground scheme of maneuver to the supporting UAS can significantly increase the crew’s situational awareness and subsequent mission support.

f. Video Downlink (VDL) and Machine-to-machine Datalinks: Some UASs can accept and provide machine-to-machine digital targeting information and many UASs provide LOS video downlinks to users with compatible video receivers. This can significantly reduce voice traffic and reduce information transfer errors. (See table 21 VDL – Link / Frequency / Player Reference on p.77 for more information.)

g. Tactics: UASs employ using a variety of tactics ranging from a wheel to a variant of an IP-target run-in. UA performance characteristics and sensor and weapons capabilities, along with the environmental and tactical situation, influence the selection of tactics, ranges, altitudes, and timing considerations.

 

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Uncensored – Hitler’s Henchmen – The Executioner – Heinrich Himmler

“Hitler’s Henchmen” is a six-part series that portrays the men who aided Adolf Hitler in his rise to power and serviced the infernal machinery of the Third Reich. The Nuremberg Trials play an important role here: in a historical first, the International War Crimes Tribunal passed judgment on leading Nazi paladins for their unparalleled atrocities while exposing to the world the infamy of the Hitler regime and its leaders. ZDF uses newly discovered archive material and interviews with surviving family members and Nazi insiders to draw historical psychograms of Hitler’s closest aides. Conceived as a sequel to our six-part series “Hitler,” “Hitler’s Henchmen” offers in-depth personal and political profiles of six men who became architects of the destruction of Europe. Portraits of the men who carried out Hitler’s plans: ZDF’s sequel about the men who consolidated Hitler’s reign and turned his plans into action. They wove the complicities and plots without which Hitler could have never perpetrated the crime of the century. They helped to sway the judges and the bureaucrats, the armed forces and the police, the scientists and the industrialists, the students and their teachers to the regime’s ways of thinking. What kind of people were they? What inspired them to serve a corrupt administration with such enthusiasm and devotion? How did their careers unfold and their fates end? The series answers these and other questions by examining six of Hitler’s cohorts. The portraits of these aides-de-camp provide viewers with a revealing psychogram of “Hitler’s willing executors.” The films present for the first time newly discovered film clips and sound recordings from international archives. Recent revelations provided by historical research and interviews with former coworkers, relatives, and victims are also shown.
Hitler’s Henchmen 1 Episodes:
1. The Propagandist/Firebrand – Joseph Goebbels – German with English Subtitles
2. The Marshall – Hermann Goering – German with English Subtitles
3. The Deputy – Rudolf Hess – German with English Subtitles
4. The Executioner – Heinrich Himmler – German with English Subtitles
5. The Admiral – Karl Doenitz – German with English Subtitles
6. The Architect – Albert Speer – German with English Subtitles
Hitler’s Henchmen II Episodes:
1. Bureaucrat of Murder – Adolf Eichmann – German with English Subtitles
2. The Secretary – Martin Bormann – German with English Subtitles
3. The Corruptor of Youth – Baldur von Schirach – German with English Subtitles
4. Diplomat of Evil – Joachim von Ribbentrop – German with English Subtitles
5. Doctor of Death – Josef Mengele – German and English with Swedish Subtitles
6. Arbitrator over Death and Life – Roland Freisler – German with English Subtitles

Unveiled – Censored U.S. Army Articles on Afghan Massacre Suspect Staff Sergeant Robert Bales

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The following are mirrored copies of multiple U.S. Army news articles referencing and containing pictures of Staff Sergeant Robert Bales who has been identified as the man accused of murdering of 16 civilians in Kandahar on March 11, 2012.  These two articles along with all other photos and media created by the U.S. Army that references Bales or contains photos of him is being removed from Army websites in an attempt to wipe away traces of the soldier’s online history.  We have mirrored the material in the interest of preserving the documents for analysis and historical interest.

High Desert Warrior Volume 7, Number 35Original URL: http://assets.mediaspanonline.com/prod/6887587/hdw_09012011A24.pdf September 1, 2011 Download PDF (6.52 MB)
U.S. Army News Article “Lessons Learned in Iraq: The Battle of Zarqa”Original URL: http://www.army.mil/article/16623/Lessons_learned_in_Iraq__the_Battle_of_Zarqa/

 

Lessons Learned in Iraq: The Battle of Zarqa

February 9, 2009

By Don Kramer

Story Highlights

  • With the trappings of World War I and II tactics and 21st Century weaponry, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment’s fight in January 2007
  • Captain Brent Clemmer’s C Company was the tip of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment spear on Jan. 28, 2007. He had tested the limits o
  • Warriors to life-savers: Patriot Battalion Soldiers were wary of the first group of Shiite fighters who walked out of Zarqa under white flag

Editor’s note: This is a three-part account of the Battle of Zarqa, also called the Battle of Najaf in some sources. Background information and portions of this article were drawn from the Fort Lewis Battle Command Training Center 2008 video documentary of the Battle of Zarqa. The full video and other training and leader development information is available on https://StrykerNet.army.mil to AKO account holders.

FORT LEWIS, Wash. – With the trappings of World War I and II tactics and 21st Century weaponry, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment’s fight in January 2007 to recover a downed Apache helicopter south of Najaf stands as unique among Operation Iraqi Freedom engagements.

Counterinsurgency operations carry their own metrics, different from those that measure success in combat against an enemy who stands and fights. But by all military standards, Lt. Col. Barry Huggins’ 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division Stryker battalion achieved a smashing success in what might have been the most traditional battle of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It ended in such a one-sided victory for U.S. and Iraqi forces that anticoalition media attempted to frame it as a “massacre” – until details came to light of the enemy’s plans, detailed preparations and prodigious arsenal of weapons and equipment.

On Jan. 28 and 29, 2007, a fanatic and well-armed Shiite paramilitary faction stood and fought in southern Iraq against two companies of 2-3 Inf. augmented with engineers, 8th Iraqi Army elements and two Special Forces detachments, on a compound the insurgents had prepared for months. Riddled on three sides with deep trenches, high berms and antitank positions and protected on the fourth by the Euphrates River, nearly 600 Jund as-Sama’, “Soldiers of Heaven,” fired all of their considerable ordnance and launched one assault after another throughout the night in attempts to surprise and outflank the Patriot Battalion task force. For the Shiite fighters, they had begun an apocalyptic battle they believed would hasten the return of the Mahdi, the 12th Imam.

In the end, the most important metric was the casualty count: 250 enemy fighters killed, 81 wounded and 410 detained and not a single 2-3 Inf. Soldier hurt or killed. Sophisticated, relentless firepower defeated superior numbers on ground of the enemy’s choosing. As the company commander of the lead element, Capt. Brent Clemmer, now a major enrolled at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. paraphrased a Ranger epigram, “Forget the fair fight.”

Every commander’s most optimistic intent on the battlefield had been realized – decisive victory with no loss of life to his unit.

What cannot be measured occurred at the end of the battle. Defining “agility,” American Soldiers seamlessly shifted into humanitarian operations. The Charger Company first sergeant, 1st Sgt. Viriato Ferrera, hastily organized detainee and casualty collection points at the outskirts of the village. He was shocked to see women and children join the trickle of demoralized fighters, which turned rapidly into a stream and then, a flood.

Within minutes of surrender, 2-3 Inf. Soldiers began a 10-hour struggle to save the lives of the same Jund as-Sama’ members they had battled all night long. Along with them came hundreds of their wives and children, completely taxing the unit’s medical supplies and personnel.

Some of the Patriots said they felt fated to take part in the surreal mix of fighting and lifesaving in Zarqa, since their involvement in the episode happened by chance.

The situation

The Patriot Battalion, which had already moved in late December from Mosul to Baghdad, had been detached from 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division to 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division to assist with its large southern battle space. Spartan Brigade leaders had asked for reinforcements based on the identification of several targets by intelligence during the Ashura season, the commemoration of the battle of Karbala in 680 A.D., during which the Muslim prophet Muhammad’s grandson, Husayn ibn Ali, died. As the holiest day of the year among many Shiites, it represents a key moment in their historical separation from Sunni Islam. Ashura is marked by pilgrimages to Karbala by Shiite faithful who often become targets for Sunni zealots.

The Soldiers of 2-3 Inf. had been on their own journey.

“We’d been on a long odyssey for the last week and a half before this whole thing started,” Clemmer said. The battalion left FOB Liberty in Baghdad for Karbala “on a 15-minute string,” and hadn’t returned to refit and resupply. Meanwhile, two of Clemmer’s three C Company platoons lost vehicles in the course of subsequent movements.

“We weren’t supposed to even be with the brigade we were with at the time,” said the company commander. “There weren’t any other Strykers down there at (Forward Operating Base) Kalsu when it happened. Who would have come to the rescue’”

On Jan. 28, 4th Bde., 25th Inf. Div. received a call for help from Operational Detachment Alpha 563, a Special Forces team that had answered an earlier call from another SF A-team, 566, in Zarqa, a village south of Najaf. The following account is taken from the introduction to the DVD produced by the Leader Development Team in the I Corps Battle Command Training Center at Fort Lewis:

Iraqi police received a tip that Jund as-Sama’ based in Zarqa were planning to assassinate Shiite leaders including the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr, during Ashura.

Provincial authorities reported the information to the 8th Iraqi Army, which sent a scout platoon with American advisers to conduct reconnaissance and report on the gathering in Zarqa. Once on site, the Iraqi scouts were attacked by a battalion-sized element with small arms and heavy machine guns. The scouts requested assistance.

U.S. Army SF Detachment ODA 566 arrived at 8 a.m., Jan 28. The ODA reported a large insurgent element had occupied hasty fighting positions in existing drainage canals and was placing effective small arms, machine gun and rocket-propelled-grenade fire on the Iraqi Forces.

ODA 566 requested reinforcements. A joint patrol of Iraqi SWAT and another SF detachment, ODA 563, moved to the site. After close air support from F-16s and A-10s failed to disrupt the insurgent defense, ODA 566 requested attack aviation. An attack weapons team of two AH-64 Apache helicopters departed FOB Kalsu and arrived at 12:30 p.m., simultaneously with the arrival of Hillah SWAT and ODA 563. Coordinated attacks began on the insurgent positions.

At about 1:30 p.m., one of the Apaches was shot down near the enemy position, killing both pilots. Insurgent direct fire, now augmented with mortars, prevented the SF from securing the aircraft. The coalition forces on site established an overwatch of the crash site, and effectively fixed the insurgent force with direct fire, additional attack aviation and continuous close air support.

The 4th Bde., 25th Inf. Div. commander, Col. Mike Garrett, directed that his attached Stryker battalion task force answer the call.

“The best force I’ve got, the most ready force to move 97 kilometers quickly into this unknown situation is the Strykers that are attached to me,” Lt. Col. Adam Rocke, current 2-3 Inf. commander, then the 3rd Bde., 2nd Inf. Div. operations officer, paraphrased Garrett.

Movement to Zarqa

Huggins got the call and said he could have his companies together in 15 minutes. They had planned to conduct raids that night anyway, so the planning sequence was already completed. When Clemmer’s radio squawked, in fact, he thought it was part of the rehearsal for that night’s operation.

“No sir, it’s not a practice, sir,” said the voice of his operations sergeant. “Brigade’s calling us and there’s a helicopter down.”

“We’re focused on a helicopter needs to be recovered,” Huggins said. “We get the word that there’s an (SF) ODA at the scene securing it and there’s some light contact. About an hour later we get the word to launch. I send the initial company forward, Charlie Company with Brent Clemmer, and he’s moving within 10 minutes of that launch. I assemble the logistics support trains with my Bravo Company and my battalion TAC. We’re still trying to figure out the situation on the ground.”

As orders to saddle up moved through the companies, the common expectation among the Soldiers was that they would be back in their racks at FOB Kalsu by midnight. No one had heard of the brisk fighting going on 100 kilometers to the south.

Charger Company left an hour after the launch order and Blackhorse followed a half hour later with Huggins, the TAC and battalion support trains in tow. The way south from FOB Kalsu took C Company through the city of Hillah, which they found full of Ashura pilgrims. The movement halted in its tracks.

“There’s a couple thousand people flailing themselves, big banners and everything else,” Clemmer said. “Here’s where some of the lessons of Mosul came into effect because we had worked with the police so well.”

The Iraqi police escorted the fast-moving Stryker convoy around the crowds and with the help of its escort, had quickly cleared the city and resumed its pace. Clemmer’s company made it to the outskirts of Zarqa in about 90 minutes total, despite the slowdown in Hillah.

As he arrived on site, Clemmer saw a humvee with steer horns mounted on the grill along the road. “It was Special Forces, no doubt about that,” Clemmer said. “I roll in there, jump out of the truck and the first thing I hear is .50 cal down the road just going off. So much for a secure site.”

A brief hand-off of control of the site focused on the recovery operation at hand.

“We go and confirm we have two people in the helicopter, and that was the most important thing – make sure the two guys were there,” Clemmer said. “We were there. No one else was going to get to them. It took hours to get them out, but we were going to get them out.”

Forget the fair fight: Part 2: ‘It was like a match lit up’

Captain Brent Clemmer’s C Company was the tip of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment spear on Jan. 28, 2007. He had tested the limits of his Stryker vehicles to cover the ground from FOB Kalsu to Zarqa, leading his Charger-Company convoy on a 97-kilometer dead gallop in 90 minutes.

Almost as soon as the convoy arrived at 5:30 p.m. to take control of the crash site of an AH-64, automatic fire erupted, touching off a fire fight that would last all night.

The situation was confusing at first. Iraqi 8th Army and SWAT elements had been heavily engaged in the hours prior to the arrival of the small task force and were unable to provide a detailed picture of the battleground.

A berm complex, a series of tree lines and a small cluster of farm buildings obstructed views of what Patriot Soldiers later learned was a fortified compound at the edge of a hardened village full of zealots prepared to fight to their deaths.

“The SF did a good job covering the crash site by fire,” said Staff Sgt. Brian Butler, then weapons squad leader of 2nd Platoon, C Co., “but they didn’t have the means to build a perimeter around it. The only enemy they were seeing were the ones trying to go out to the crash site to get the pilots.”

The twilight had turned to darkness, through which the Charger platoons prepared to maneuver around the helicopter. Clemmer issued orders to his platoon leaders to envelop the crash. As the platoons stepped off, AK-47s opened up from four huts to the north.

“The SF was still in control of the birds at that point,” Butler said. “That’s when the first Hellfire went off.” “It was like a match lit up,” said Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, team leader in C Company’s 1st Squad, 1st Platoon. “It looked like a toy with a candle lit underneath it. Fire straight up.”

By 5:45 p.m., the Charger platoons had formed a horseshoe around the downed Apache. They had begun the assault in their Strykers, then dismounted to sweep back across the site. Until then, there had been no mortar- or rocket-propelled-grenade fire to argue against tactical exposure.

By a few minutes after 6 p.m., they had secured the site enough to let the engineers do their work. Sappers traveling with C Company recovered the first pilot while Patriot Soldiers provided cover.

The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Barry Huggins, arrived with Capt. Bill Parsons’ B Company, which was task-organized with recovery vehicles and his own engineer platoon.

Charger Company’s 1st Platoon took up positions on the eastern side of the chopper while 2nd Platoon settled to the Southeast, directly in front of the still-burning wreckage. Third platoon occupied berms to the west.

Small-arms fire started almost immediately from farther to the southeast. As the platoons were aligned, only 3rd could answer to suppress it without firing through its own lines.

“The bad guys were not afraid to shoot a lot but had no (aiming lights) and were poorly trained,” Clemmer said. “The result was they shot high. Most of my guys will tell you they had parts of the trees around us falling onto them, cut down by enemy fire.”

Clemmer called forward his company mortar section and oriented his section sergeant, Staff Sgt. Scott Muetz, on the targets to the east and southeast. Muetz and his section leader, Staff Sgt. Larry Neal, had endured merciless ribbing from the rest of the battalion for their insistence on training on their guns while artillery Soldiers in OIF were used overwhelmingly as infantry assets. Every Charger mortarman was thankful that night for his long hours of training and certification on the guns. With its thicket of deep trenches, Zarqa was more than anything an indirect-fire fight.

“All we had visual on was a little farm shack,” Muetz said. “(The compound and village were) farther back in. But at first we were wondering, ‘What’s all this firing about””

The mortar section fired missions and alternately dug in. By the early morning, the 60 mm tubes were ensconced inside fighting positions. The platoons on the crash-site perimeter were also using shovels in throwback defensive tactics.

“The cool part about this was World War II style, you dug in,” Bales said. “Guys were out there digging a fighting position in the ground. You’re taking a shovel and digging as fast as you can.”

“It’s no problem digging when you have rounds zinging by and the vehicle behind you is getting hit,” Muetz said. Soon after he arrived, Parsons conducted a reconnaissance-in-force and placed his engineer platoon in security overwatch on the main road into the site known as ASR Miami. Soon after he arrived, he conducted his own battle handoff with ODA 563 personnel.

En route from FOB Kalsu, Parsons had already attended to convoy security by sending his executive officer, 1st Lt. Patrick Horan, and a small team to neutralize a machine-gun ambush at a choke point along their route to Zarqa. By the time they arrived on the high ground where the enemy position had been sited, the machine gun and its crew were gone.

While B Company settled in, Huggins moved his command post and battalion support trains forward near the C Co. mortar section, now fully engaged in firing 60 mm missions. He was still unaware of the village in front of him, hidden behind the complex of farm shacks and a grove of date palms. After receiving Clemmer’s initial reports of spirited resistance and a thorough report from Capt. Roy Kempf, team leader of ODA 563, Huggins began to grasp the capability and dedication of the enemy still menacing the downed Apache in his battle space.

The plan changes

Huggins decided to modify the mission to engage the large concentration of enemy fighters they had encountered; he called in Parsons and Clemmer and issued an order to destroy enemy forces in the vicinity, while continuing recovery operations.

“We had not yet completed the recovery of the crash site, but had the site well secured,” Huggins wrote later in his commander’s summary of the battle. “I developed a plan to coordinate the airspace and allow close-air support, mortars, and rotary-winged aircraft all to participate in the fight. (I) figured we had a lucrative target and should develop it.”

“One of the main reasons we were successful,” Parsons said, “was Lt. Col. Huggins’ simple but effective plan that fixed the enemy and facilitated coordination between the different units on the ground.”

He assigned the Joint Theater Air Control System to Parsons to coordinate air assets and ordered him to lead his company south to seal off the bottom of the site. With Blackhorse Soldiers in place by 9 p.m., C Company to the west and the river to the east, Huggins concentrated air power on the northern sector to complete the box around the compound.

“They had a kill box where aircraft were looking for their own targets and calling to make sure everything was clear,” said C Co. fire support NCO, Staff Sgt. Jason Sims. “We had our indirect fires to the west of that, fixed wing and Spectre (gun ships) coming in. They were deconflicting themselves for the most part.”

Muetz’s mortar section switched to 120 mm rounds with low charges to keep the rounds below the flock of swirling aircraft. The Stryker mortar variant delivered round after pinpoint round to foil a number of insurgent attempts to regroup or mount charges.

“Those 120s were dead on,” Bales said. “We were getting (target) refinements from Spectre that were no refinements at all with the 120s. They were just dead on, just that accurate.”

“We were hearing reports that we’d killed a hundred in this trench line and I’m saying ‘Come on now, who’s slinging this bull” Clemmer said. “I’ve been in Iraq twice now and we’ve never faced 100 bad guys. It ended up being incredibly accurate, but in our minds, a hundred guys!”

Meanwhile, the careful work continued of extricating the second Apache pilot from the wreckage. Along with ducking enemy fire, the helicopter itself created a greater danger to the engineers attached to Charger Company.

“One Apache has so much (unexploded ordnance),” Butler said. “There was UXO scattered all over that field. I didn’t want to blow up trying to dig in so we didn’t dig in our hasties.”

At 10:27 p.m., brigade engineers accomplished the solemn task of securing the remains of the second pilot. “My infantry was forward fighting and those studs got the bodies out,” Clemmer said. “This was not an easy or pleasant task.”

Fire superiority

As the night wore on, despite the murderous volume of fire from all sides and above, the Soldiers-of-Heaven fighters showed incredible resiliency.

“There was a north-south running road with a big berm, behind which they were able to run and reinforce behind and a trench line that also ran east and west,” Butler said. “They’d come up on that berm and we’d shoot them; they’d pull that guy back, do buddy aid on him and replace the guy. So as they were taking casualties they were pulling guys back.”

A half-dozen times during the night, enemy fighters made suicidal rushes, some getting to within 100 to 150 meters of Patriot positions, Butler estimated. Every time, they were cut down by the weapons platform most available at the moment.

“Throughout the night, the enemy came up out of their positions and would come towards us,” Clemmer said. “It wasn’t fair and that was fine with me. As 3rd Battalion, 75th Infantry (Rangers) used to say, ‘forget the fair fight.’ Our thermals would see them and that .50 cal and the remote weapon station is wicked, wicked, wicked.”

Specialist Rodrigo Moreno had a front-row seat with 2nd Platoon, C Company directly in front of the crash site.

“When we were shooting I kind of stood up a little bit and tried to shoot,” Moreno said, “but I remember when they were dropping the 500 pounders, we got up on our knees even though bullets were still going over us and we got blown back.”

“We had so much control, we were bringing munitions in as close as we could according to military standard,” Sims said, “having the control and confidence and everybody knew where everybody was on the battlefield.”

It was clear that no amount of fanaticism would stand up to the sophistication and fire superiority of the array of U.S. weapons systems.

As midnight passed, Huggins directed B- and C-Company commanders to offer surrender terms over the public address systems in their command Strykers. They promised a lull to allow enemy fighters to gather themselves and come forward. Instead, the insurgents used the time to regroup and counter-attack.

“By (1 a.m. the enemy) was re-engaging with heavy machine guns and repositioning forces,” Huggins said. “We re-engaged with all assets. Among other things, we hit a truck carrying ammunition; it continued to cook off for half an hour. At another point, we hit an underground cache, with sympathetic detonations and small-arms ammunition cooking off for some time afterwards.”

The battle wanes

The volume of fire decreased through the early hours of Jan. 29, to the point that by some time between 3 and 4 a.m., 1st Sgt. Viriato Ferrera said it stopped altogether.

“That was the point where I think we broke their will,” Ferrera said.

Tarps and more recovery equipment arrived with ammunition resupply, allowing the sappers to complete their work dismantling the helicopter and loading the pieces onto two flat racks.

In the early morning the dangerous mission of trench clearing fell to B Company. Huggins’ battle plan from the beginning was for a Blackhorse assault from the south in the morning.

“At first light my 1st Platoon, led by 1st Lt. Austin Jones, moved up the eastern side of the objective to prevent some enemy from escaping,” Parsons said. “Then we got on-line, all four platoons, and cleared the trenches.”

While B Company mopped up the southern trenches, Clemmer was preparing his company for daylight assault from the west. He dismounted with his platoons and advanced to the berm closest to the compound. Charger Soldiers were going through final checks before the attack.

“I’m right behind my middle platoon, and we’re prepping hand grenades,” Clemmer said. “We’re going to go over the berm and seize this foothold to establish our support-by-fire line for B Company.”

As they popped up to go over the berm, fires that had burned overnight met another arms cache that exploded immediately in front of the C Co. position.

“Everyone was hitting the deck, diving over berms,” Clemmer said. “The next thing that happens is you start seeing white flags coming out. I’m looking up and my 2nd Platoon leader is in front of me saying, ‘Sir, they’re surrendering.’”

Zarqa: Forget the fair fight – Part 3: Warriors to life-savers

Patriot Battalion Soldiers were wary of the first group of Shiite fighters who walked out of Zarqa under white flags.

Special Forces officers had warned Huggins of the Soldiers of Heaven using flags of truce in attempts to sucker U.S. forces into ambushes, word of which he passed through his subordinate commanders.

Huggins’ plan before the surrender called for B Co. to clear trenches and assault from the south in the early morning hours of Monday, Jan. 29. For C Co. to assume unobstructed positions from which it could support Blackhorse Soldiers by fire, its platoons were forced to move forward, then intended to pivot on-line and orient with fields of fire across the trenches and the southern edge of the village.

Clemmer had dismounted and was following his 2nd Platoon forward on foot when the white flags appeared. After fighting throughout the night the Chargers took cover on line behind a berm, distrustful of their enemy. Clemmer ordered his platoons to halt in place to let the situation develop, ensuring this surrender was genuine.

“Everyone was exhausted at this point,” said C Company platoon leader, 1st Lt. Steve Smith. “Everyone was tense and waiting to see what would happen. We’d been shot at all night by these guys.”

First Lieutenant Jon Lowe’s 2nd Platoon, B Company Soldiers moved out to clear the largest swath of the Blackhorse sector. Lowe “had a tougher task because they had to clear a portion of the rubble-strewn village that was more heavily populated,” Parsons said, as well their share of the trench line. Lowe’s platoon also linked with the right flank of C Co. to prevent fratricide. The companies swept forward across the open areas south and west of the village and into the village itself without major incident.

“The fight was out of the enemy,” Parsons said.

Parsons’ B Co. was still clearing forward of its fighting positions from the previous night when the small group surrendered to C Co. Within a few minutes, the group in the C Company sector grew bolder.

“My assessment later is they were the bravest ones,” Clemmer said. “They probably thought we would kill them.”

The operational pause was the first chance for the 2-3 Inf. Soldiers to get a good look at what was in front of them, their first pictures that weren’t through the sites of weapons. It was their first realization that there was a village ahead rather than a few random farm buildings.

Two women followed the first group out of the village. When the Americans held their fire for the first several minutes, more followed.

The Charger 3rd Platoon sergeant, Sgt. 1st Class Tausala Faamausili, was the first to see severely wounded villagers ahead, calling out “We’ve got three litter urgents.” From that point, the floodgates opened.

“All of the sudden we go from five or 10 people to 50, then 100,” Clemmer said. “Now two platoons are fully engaged from putting the pins back in grenades, calling the trucks up, whipping the concertina wire off the trucks to start building some pens.”

Clemmer did a quick handoff with his first sergeant, who set up detainee- and casualty-collection points. The company commander culled out two squads from each platoon and pushed forward to continue clearing the village, while 1st Sgt. Viriato Ferrera took charge of the rest to quickly organize a field medical site.

Shifting on the fly

With no formal order or declaration, the mission of the first sergeant’s half of C Company shifted from combat to humanitarian operations.

“I took most of my combat lifesavers, my emergency medical technicians,” Ferrera said. “As I started getting flooded with people I called everybody else up and said, ‘Look, I need your CLSs, I need all your EMTs down here. I need your medics down here with me.’”

Huggins directed Parsons’ company to keep its medics in case his Blackhorse Soldiers met resistance in the trenches. Every other able bodied medic or Soldier with medical training streamed into the impromptu aid station to help.

The battalion surgeon, Lt. Col. Dean Pedersen, prepared his medical-evacuation-variant Stryker to receive patients, then moved out to start categorizing the wounded.

“I jumped into sort of a triage mode,” Pedersen said. “I let the medics do what treatment they could and just became an adviser, running from medic to medic saying ‘Here, do this, do that … This woman we need to evac urgently; this one isn’t going to make it no matter what we do, go to the next.’ There were all kinds (of injuries); the extent of the injuries were massive – extremity amputations to bullet wounds to fractured pelvis, intra-abdominal wounds.”

By 9 a.m., the pens were filling fast. There seemed an unlimited number of seriously wounded.

“I had the vehicles positioned so that the people getting treated weren’t in view of the detainees,” Ferrera said. He set up a field surgical site with Pedersen treating the most seriously wounded.

“Once we started getting the initial casualties in we identified some litter-urgents we had to get out of there,” Ferrera said. “I started calling battalion requesting a bird because we needed to get them air evaced out of there because they were going to pass away.”

The sun appeared blood red that morning, Clemmer said, in part because of sand in the air from desert winds. By the time the three medevac helicopters approached, the formation with the call sign “Spirit 11″ flew into a full-on sandstorm, somehow touching down exactly on the landing zone that had been scratched out for them.

Weather conditions allowed only one medical sortie, however, with the three birds taking 16 of the worst injured. Two died, but 14 were saved as a direct result of the heroic efforts of the Spirit 11 pilots.

Clearing the village

Charger Company Soldiers not engaged in the medical effort moved into the village. Clemmer said it looked like a scene from hell, wrought by the combination of Air Force and Army weapons, from indirect and his own direct fire.

The scene in the village invaded all Charger Soldiers’ senses at once.

“I’ve tried to forget the smell,” Clemmer said. “The coppery, charred, sickly sweet smell of it all was overpowering. My radio-telephone operator, Spc. (Zachary) Parsons, and I were moving all around the town and had to keep passing by a couple of the worst spots. He’d just keep lighting the smokes and passing them too me. They were a great distraction to the carnage.”

Clemmer wasn’t a smoker, but inhaled an entire pack as he and his RTO surveyed the damage.

Bill Parsons’ Blackhorse Soldiers encountered the same scenes in the southern sector of the village they cleared.

“I just couldn’t understand, faced with this overwhelming firepower, why someone would stand and fight to your death,” Parsons said.

Their own plentiful supply of arms and ammunition had apparently given the cult members a false security. Most of the dead were fully outfitted for combat.

“I thought when we were coming up on the objective that like a lot of times it was going to be pretty hard to tell who were combatants and who were not,” said Staff Sgt. Brian Butler, weapons squad leader in 2nd Platoon of C Co., “but it wasn’t actually. About 95 percent of everybody who was fighting against us, they had some gear on. They had full kits on and they were fully armed. It was clear cut: bad guys here, good guys there. If you were male, you were fighting. That’s the way they were doing it. Older males and younger, teen-age and above, they were all kitted up. They had night observation devices, sniper rifles – they had everything.”

One C Co. squad gunned down a Soldiers-of-Heaven fighter carrying an AK-47 as he dashed toward a heavy machine gun.

Another squad returned fire as they cleared a building, killing a holdout who attempted to ambush its members.

But these were the exceptions. Most combatants were too injured, exhausted or shell shocked to resist.

“One by one we started pulling these males out,” said platoon leader, 1st Lt. Gregory Weber. “About 50 percent of them had some sort of injury, whether it was minor with shrapnel and scratches to some amputees, loss of hearing and eyesight.”

After a while, however, the clearing operation morphed with the humanitarian. As Soldiers pulled out the injured, it became apparent to their horror that these fanatics had brought their families to the fight.

“Once we started clearing the town we actually started carrying people back out,” said Staff Sgt. Bales, a team leader in 1st Platoon, C Co. “We’d go in, find some people that we could help, because there were a bunch of dead people we couldn’t, throw them on a litter and bring them out to the casualty collection point.”

Heavy toll

From mid-morning through mid-afternoon, the medical aid station brimmed with bloody customers. The Charger first sergeant estimated that 90 percent of the wounded and detainees were combatants, about half of those humiliated at their loss, but most of them visibly grateful to no longer be fighting.

The nature of the casualties demonstrated the precision of U.S. firepower. Huggins said the highest battle-damage estimate of noncombatants killed was 10, a statistic verging on miraculous considering the ordnance visited upon the Shiite fighters, testimony to the accuracy of U.S. weapons and the remarkable discipline exercised by the pilots, artillerymen and Soldiers pulling the triggers.

“I was glad for the pilots that they saw it from afar because we were dealing with most of that,” Butler said. “They did an outstanding job of target discrimination because most of the dead were all enemy (combatants).”

As the day wore on, the relentless flow of casualties took its toll on C Company’s stores of supplies.

“That’s the first time I saw the MEV completely empty of all first aid equipment,” Ferrera said. “We went completely black on equipment and first aid supplies.”

The number and nature of the wounded also took an emotional toll.

“The hardest thing they had to deal with (among) all the guys that were treating that day, as well as myself because I have four children, was treating the children,” Ferrera said.

He stopped one NCO from fleeing after treating a 5-year-old girl with a grievously injured arm.

“‘I need you here to do your job, Sergeant,’” he told the exhausted, overwhelmed medic. “‘These people need you.’ That was probably the largest battle that day – treating the children.”

Faamausili, who was named an “Armed Forces Real Hero” by the Rainier Chapter of the American Red Cross for his combat- and lifesaving actions that day, found two children dead along the road leading to the village. The platoon sergeant’s men watched as he wrapped them in a rug and, eyes glistening, gently placed them away from traffic.

“Just the grief on his face for the loss of a child’s life,” Clemmer said. “The guy’s almost 6’6″ and 300 pounds, and in this tender way wrapping up someone who had been killed, treating them like his own kids. I try to get most of the images of that place out of my head, but that’s one of the few that always sticks there.”

Ferrera stayed on task but remembered thinking at the end of the day, “Why would you bring your family, your children to something like this if you know what you were going to do’”

By 3 p.m., they had treated most of the wounded and around 4 p.m., transferred responsibility for them and the site to the Iraqi Security Forces.

Pedersen, exhausted by his lifesaving efforts, knelt and took a moment to catch his breath. He had trouble getting back on his feet.

Aftermath

Interrogators’ interviews with detainees began to paint an intelligence picture later confirmed by materials collected at Zarqa. The Soldiers of Heaven were a Shiite splinter group that had prepared and trained for combat. They had imminent plans to travel to Najaf and murder three Shiite leaders during Ashura to foment strife and exacerbate an already tenuous security environment that some were in January 2007 calling a civil war in Iraq.

“This is a cult who had bought this farm, like the Branch Davidians,” Huggins said. “It was their base. They had stockpiled medical supplies, ammunition, a significant number of weapons, literally hundreds and hundreds of small arms, RPGs.

I don’t know what the result would have been had all those folks been assassinated during Ashura. It’s probably not unreasonable to assume that a collapse would have ensued. And it was headed off because they shot a helicopter down and we got sucked into what went from a search-and-rescue to a recovery to a hasty defense to an attack to humanitarian relief.”

The current commander of 2-3 Inf. saw the battle as validation for the tactics, configuration and agility of the Stryker brigade combat team.

“Zarqa demonstrated that we have an expeditionary mindset, a mindset unlike any other unit in the Army today,” Lt. Col. Adam Rocke said. “It shows that a Stryker infantry task force is capable of doing things that no other unit in the Army is capable of doing, exemplifying flexibility, agility and lethality like no other unit.”

Rocke said the battalion’s exceptional chain of command helped the SBCT produced the one-sided victory.

“Leadership is paramount,” he said, “leaders who are seasoned, who understand commander’s intent and who act with disciplined initiative and who understand the offensive mindset.”

The ability to conduct full-spectrum operations and transition to humanitarian activities proved how unique Stryker Soldiers are, he said.

That sentiment was shared by the NCOs who were there, many of whom remain in the Patriot Battalion.

“I’ve never been more proud to be a part of this unit than that day,” Bales said now a member of 2-3 Inf. headquarters, “for the simple fact that we discriminated between the bad guys and the noncombatants and then afterward we ended up helping the people that three or four hours before were trying to kill us. I think that’s the real difference between being an American as opposed to being a bad guy, someone who puts his family in harm’s way like that.”

Clemmer, who won a Silver Star for his leadership through all phases of the complex battle, saw it as a moral victory as well as a tactical one.

“There is not an army in the world, in my opinion, that can go from taking pins out of grenades and throwing them over trenches to receiving wounded, treating the wounded and taking care of an enemy that we had killed throughout the night – treating enemy combatants with that humanity.”

For its actions in the Battle of Zarqa, 2-3 Inf. has been submitted for the Valorous Unit Award. The recommendation received the endorsement of the current commanding general of Central Command, Gen. David S. Petraeus, and is awaiting final approval at Human Resources Command.

Don Kramer is a reporter with Fort Lewis’ Northwest Guardian.

NSA-U.S. Intelligence : Hiding of Military Assets by “Rogue Nations” and Other States a Major Security Challenge for 21st Century

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB372/geoEyeSatImage.jpg

 

Washington, D.C., March 27, 2012 – A central element of the current debate over how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program has focused on the possible difficulty of destroying the Qom underground uranium enrichment facility via air strikes. However, documents posted today by the National Security Archive show that Qom is only the latest in a long series of alleged and real underground facilities that for decades have been a high priority challenge for U.S. and allied intelligence collection and analysis efforts, as well as for military planners.

The documents featured in this posting describe in detail the agencies and programs the U.S. government has brought to the task of identifying and assessing underground structures in foreign countries since World War II. Internal records indicate there are more than 10,000 such facilities worldwide, many of them in hostile territory, and many presumably intended to hide or protect lethal military equipment and activities, including weapons of mass destruction, that could threaten U.S. or allied interests.

The records (and introductory essay by Archive Fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson) also discuss the vast complexities of gathering and analyzing intelligence on these facilities, and detail several of the highly technical methods U.S. agencies have developed for the purpose over time.

Introduction: “Underground Facilities: Intelligence and Targeting Issues”

By Jeffrey T. Richelson

A central element of the current debate over how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program has focused on the possible difficulty of destroying the Qom underground uranium enrichment facility via air strikes.1 But documents posted today by the National Security Archive show that Qom is only the latest in a long series of alleged and real underground facilities that for decades have been a high priority challenge for U.S. and allied intelligence collection and analysis efforts, as well as for military planners.

Such challenges go back to at least the Second World War. In August 1943, the Germans, in the face of allied aerial attacks, decided to move production of their A-4 (V-2) rocket to an underground facility near Nordhausen. By late 1944, British intelligence was reporting that the facility was producing over thirty rockets a day, while the British Chiefs of Staff wanted to know the feasibility of a bombing campaign to halt or seriously impair production. In her memoirs, Constance Babington-Smith reported examining aerial photographs of Kahla, in the Thuringian Hills, and finding evidence of an underground jet-fighter factory.2

During the Cold War there were two types of underground facilities that were, in some ways, emblematic of the consequences of that war turning into a hot one – missile silos and leadership protection bunkers. While the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (if not before), the U.S. Intelligence Community’s concern about foreign underground facilities has grown over the last two decades, particularly with respect to “rogue nations” that have discovered that hardening and concealing sensitive operations “remains an effective response to the technology advantages in intelligence and weaponry enjoyed by the United States and its allies” (Document 23). In 1999, a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment of the threat for the following twenty years stated that “The proliferation of underground facilities (UGFs) in recent years has emerged as one of the most difficult challenges facing the U.S. Intelligence Community and is projected to become even more of a problem over the next two decades.”3

The concern about underground facilities (or “hard and buried” targets) is evident in the establishment of a number components in various intelligence and defense agencies. The National Reconnaissance Office has a Hard and Buried Targets Working Group, while the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, had (as of 2005) an Information and Underground Issues Division in its analysis directorate, and by 2008 the Defense Threat Reduction Agency had Hard Target Research and Analysis Center.4

But the most significant indication of the concern about underground facilities was the establishment, in 1997, of the Underground Facility Analysis Center (UFAC), which while subordinate to DIA also relies on participation from a number of other intelligence agencies – including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Strategic Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center, and the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) – as well as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). When it was established, UFAC had a staff of 20; by 2009 that number had grown to 240.5

The underground facilities that have been and are of concern to the U.S. Intelligence Community have an assortment of purposes. One is covert concealment and transportation, the most prominent example being the tunnels constructed under the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea to allow North Korean troops to be infiltrated into the South. According to independent experts, 12 levels of underground tunnels also lie beneath the Russian capital, the largest being an underground subway system reserved for high-ranking officials.6

A second type of underground facility are those employed for fuel and food storage. By 1976, according to a memo (Document 7) from the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the secretary of defense, the Soviet Union had either developed or was in the process of developing underground grain storage depots. In late 2008 or early 2009, North Korea reportedly built an underground fueling facility at the Musudan-ni missile complex on the nation’s northeastern coast. According to the report, the objective of constructing the facility was to make it more difficult for reconnaissance satellites to detect signs that a missile was being prepared for launch.7

As noted above, the construction of underground bunkers for leadership protection was part of both United States and Soviet nuclear strategy during the Cold War. According to various reports, the end of the Cold War did not diminish Russian interest in the upgrading of older facilities and the construction of new ones.

The Pentagon’s 1988 report (Document 14) on Soviet military power also noted that “neither changes in the Soviets’ leadership nor the restructuring of the strategic balance and the refinements in military doctrine that accompanied these changes have diminished their commitment to the program,” and that “another round of construction on these complexes began in the early 1980s.” About a decade later, reports appeared concerning new Soviet underground structures, some for leadership protection. Intelligence reports from 1997 stated that construction was nearly complete on a government relocation bunker 46 miles south of Moscow. That project, along with refurbishment efforts at other bunkers in the Moscow area, was believed to be intended to ensure “continuity of leadership during nuclear war.” Another construction effort was at Yamantau Mountain, about 850 miles east of Moscow – which included the digging of a “deep underground complex” as well as construction at above-ground support areas.8

Russia is, of course, not the only nation whose underground facilities are of interest to the U.S. Intelligence Community and military. In June 1989, in the midst of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, The New York Times quoted an intelligence official as stating that “All of the top leaders have gone underground to their bunkers.” Not surprisingly, U.S. forces found vast underground complexes when they arrived in Baghdad in 2003, including a 12-room complex inside a cave. Libya also maintained underground bunkers designed to protect its leadership – or, more accurately, the Qadhafi family. One was located 40 feet underneath a mansion owned by one of Muammar Qadhafi’s sons. The facility contained an operating room, medical supplies, a generator, and living quarters.9

In addition to investing heavily in underground leadership protection facilities, the Soviet Union and now Russia have devoted considerable resources to underground construction with another purpose – the preservation of command, control, and communications capabilities. In 1997, an intelligence report stated that there was ongoing construction work on a “nuclear-survivable strategic command post at Kosvinsky Mountain,” about 850 miles east of Moscow. A press report characterized the facility as the Russian counterpart to the North American Defense Command’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. In March 2011, the director of the DIA reported (Document 38) that Russia was upgrading “massive underground facilities that provide command and control of its strategic nuclear forces.”10

Cuba has also, reportedly, constructed bunkers to protect command, control, and communications capabilities. According to a press report, a circa-2000 DIA report stated that “All essential Cuban command, control, and communications sites are in hardened bunkers,” and that “Many of the sites are greater than 20 meters below the surface, making some too deep to attack with conventional munitions.” The Amiriyah Bunker and Shelter in Iraq was originally built as an air raid shelter during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), and subsequently converted into a military command and control center. In 1991, it was used as a military communications center by senior Iraqi military officials. During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, selected civilians were admitted to the top floor at night, and a number were killed when the facility was bombed on February 13, 1991.11

The practice of building underground factories for weapons production may be a precaution to ensure continued production during wartime – as Nazi Germany did in relocating A-4 (V-2) production underground. It might also be a peacetime measure undertaken to limit intelligence collection about the items being produced, for example weaponry (such as biological agents) being manufactured in violation of a treaty.

In 1966, China launched Project 816, which called for an underground plutonium production reactor and a reprocessing facility located near the village of Baotao, in the Fuling District of Chongqing Province. The effort resulted in the construction of the world’s largest “man-made cave” – 104,000 square meters, the equivalent of 20 football fields. However, with the facility about 85% complete, it was scrapped in 1982. After the weapons effort was shut down, the facility was converted into a chemical-fertilizer plant. (Document 37).12

Three decades after China launched that project, Libya was involved in another such project. In April 1996, the Defense Department reported (Document 18) that the Qadhafi regime had initiated construction of “a large, underground chemical warfare plant near Tarhunah, a mountainous region about 60 kilometers [37 miles] southeast of Tripoli.” The DoD report observed that “putting the facility underground masks its activities and increases its survivability in case of an attack.” In late June 1996 it was reported that construction had stopped on the facility – at least that there was no activity outside the site.13

In March 2011, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency told (Document 38) a Congressional committee that “Iran has major underground nuclear facilities at Qom and Natanz.” Later that year, Iran apparently moved uranium hexaflouride to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom, in preparation to begin enrichment operations. Then, in January 2012 diplomats confirmed a report that Iran had commenced uranium enrichment at Fordow, and stated that 348 centrifuges were in operation, in two cascades.14

In addition to weapons production and storage, underground facilities may also be used

to protect operational weapons sites – that is, sites with aircraft, missiles, or communications equipment that are ready for immediate use. A 1972 national intelligence estimate (Document 6) noted the underground facilities associated with Chinese air bases, which could be employed to hide operations-ready aircraft. A 1982 imagery analysis report (Document 11) focused on retractable radio-relay antennas that could be withdrawn into a concrete area underground.

In 1984, it was reported that North Korea also protected radars and missiles in underground facilities, popping up for action when needed. By 2002, North Korea maintained underground hangars at Puckch’ang Air Base, 34 miles northeast of Pyonyang along the Taedong River.15

In June 2011, Iran unveiled underground missile silos, which state television claimed held medium- and long-range missiles. The television report showed footage of an underground launching pad for what was identified as a Shahab-3 missile. Previously, Western news organizations had reported evidence, albeit sketchy, of Iranian missile silos near Tabriz and Khorramabad in northwest Iran.16

Exactly how many facilities around the world fall into each category is not clear , particularly not at the unclassified level. But a 2001 report to Congress (Document 23) noted the Intelligence Community’s suspicion that there were over 10,000 potential hard and buried targets and that number would increase over the next decade.

U.S. intelligence requirements with respect to monitoring underground facilities can be divided into four basic categories. The first is verifying the existence of such a facility at a specific location, hints of which may come from intelligence sources or claims that may emanate from defectors. A second requirement is determining the facility’s mission whether it be leadership protection, weapons production, weapons storage or something else. The third requirement is the development of specific intelligence concerning the facility – including its physical layout and size, the number of personnel, the equipment present, and its capability and/or output – whether that be the number of troops that can pass through a tunnel, the number of weapons stored, or the facility’s ability to produce enriched uranium or a biological agent. The intelligence developed concerning those requirements can be employed to assess foreign capabilities, monitor treaty compliance, as well as plan or conduct military operations.

Additional data requirements exist when the facility is considered a potential target. The information required includes the natural protection offered by the surface under which the facility has been constructed(e.g. its geology), the depth at which the facility exists, and the extent to which the facility has been hardened (and with what material).

The effort to gather such intelligence involves a variety of collection, analysis, and processing techniques. Overhead imagery, including electro-optical, radar, and infrared imagery, can spot construction in progress, allow estimation of the amount of material that has been dug out of the ground, or identify entrances leading underground. Overhead photography identified extensive underground construction in Cuba in 1966 (Document 3), a possible alternate military command center in the Wuhan Military Region of China (Document 10), and retractable radio-relay antennas in the Soviet Union and Poland in the 1980s (Document 11). The satellite imagery displayed in the 1988 edition of Soviet Military Power (Document 14) shows an entrance to a wartime underground relocation center as well as a surface support area and road/rail transfer point. Libya’s work on an underground chemical agents production plant was spotted by satellite photography in the 1990s (Document 13).

Signals intelligence may provide data on the location or specifics of underground sites, such as its mission or other details about its operations. Human intelligence, including overt collection involving foreign construction crews involved in building bunkers for foreign leaders, can also contribute to knowledge about the facilities – and provide information of relevance to determining the their vulnerability to attack. Even open sources, including press and television reports, have occasionally been helpful in this regard (Document 35). The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command’s Asian Studies Detachment has produced studies of North Korean underground facilities based on open sources.17

But a key discipline in the effort directed against such targets is measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) – which includes, but is not limited to, hyperspectral imagery, geophysical data (acoustic, seismic and electromagnetic signals), effluents, and the analysis of the collected data. The Air Force Technical Applications Center and U.S. Geological Survey, – with seismic and acoustic collection capabilities, and DIA’s MASINT and Technical Collection Directorate, are particularly involved in those aspects of the underground facilities intelligence effort.

The esoteric nature of the MASINT effort is illustrated by the variety of technical reports prepared in the quest to improve U.S. capabilities to gather intelligence on underground facilities. Thus, the 1999 report, Characterization of Underground Facilities (Document 20) includes sections on the magnetic detection of machinery, laser vibrometry, and the detection of heat shimmer. Similarly, a report prepared for the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, titled Time- Exposure Acoustics for Imaging Underground Structures (Document 28), contains an appendix replete with formulas and discussion of computation “by backpropagating the received signals” and “signal loss due to geometric spreading.” Another report, produced by the U.S. Army Research and Development Center (Document 33) refers to signals extracted from simulation data that “reveal impulsive vertical ground-surface vibrations caused by the surface waves.” Another effort, an Air War College paper (Document 27), discusses applying gravity gradiometry to the search for deeply buried facilities.

As noted above, intelligence collection and analysis concerning an underground facility may be partially based on the prospect of military action to destroy or significantly degrade the capabilities of a facility. Thus, the July 2001 report to Congress from the secretaries of defense and energy (Document 18) notes a variety of programs to procure weapons capable of penetrating hardened and buried targets, including the Enhanced GBU-28 bomb for the B-2 bomber and the Advanced Unitary Penetrator bomb for smaller aircraft. The previous year, another Air War College study, Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations (Document 22), examined the ‘critical nodes’ of deeply buried facilities and a number of ‘neutralizing concepts’ for each node – including (p. 23) ‘undermine with suitcase nukes’ and ‘entombment’ as possible means for overburdening the physical structure node. More recently, in early 2012, it was reported that the Pentagon had concluded that the 30,0000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator was not capable of destroying some of Iran’s hardened underground facilities and that the Defense Department was seeking to make it more powerful.18

It is clear that no other nation, including Israel, can match the United States’ capabilities for the collection and analysis of data on foreign underground facilities, or that other governments have an equal ability to develop weapons to destroy such facilities. Despite the close U.S.-Israeli intelligence relationship, it is not likely that the United States has fully shared its intelligence on facilities such as Qom. What intelligence on Qom or other Iranian nuclear facilities the U.S. chooses to share with Israel is likely to be influenced by the impact the U.S. believes such shared intelligence might have on Israeli decisions.

 


DOCUMENTS

Document 1: Central Intelligence Agency, “Underground Shelter Used by KIM Il-Sung,” May 9, 1951. Secret.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool.

This short report, probably based on human intelligence, provides data on an underground reinforced concrete shelter, constructed within a cave for North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung.

Document 2: Central Intelligence Agency, “Construction of a Large Underground Shelter under Zizkov Hill in Prague,” March 27, 1957. Secret
Source: CIA Records Search Tool.

This report covers both the history of underground construction at Zizkov, which went back to World War II, as well as its then-current use for protecting employees of several nearby factories.

Document 3: Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Subject: Joint CIA-DIA Report on the Military Posture in Cuba As It Pertains to Strategic Weapons, August 17, 1966. Secret.
Source: LBJ Library.

This one-page memo focuses on “extensive underground construction” throughout Cuba, spotted by overhead photography. The memo notes the number of bunkers built or under construction, and the evidence (or lack thereof) concerning the possible use of the bunkers for storing strategic weapons.

Document 4: National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Underground Aircraft Dispersal, Bihac Airfield, Yugoslavia,” June 17, 1968. Top Secret RUFF.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool.

This report notes the identification, based on satellite imagery, of the underground dispersal of aircraft at a Yugoslavian airfield. In addition to discussing the implications of the satellite imagery, it also provides relevant data drawn from other sources (‘collateral’) – including human intelligence.

Document 5: Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet and People’s Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and Strategy, March 1972. Top Secret. (Extract)
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request.

Annex A of this report focuses on PRC force development and deployment, and contains a brief discussion (on p. II-A-5) of China’s construction – beginning no later than 1963 – of underground facilities at a number of naval bases.

Document 6: Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 13-3-72, China’s Military Policy and General Purpose Forces, July 20, 1972. Top Secret. (Extract)
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room (www.cia.gov).

In its discussion of the Chinese air force this estimate notes “a rapid growth of underground facilities near [Chinese] airfields” and that the facilities represent an “important feature of the Chinese program to build air installations.” It goes on to estimate the number of airfields with underground facilities and the number of fighters they can accommodate. The estimate also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the facilities.

Document 7: Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Soviet Grain Consumption and Imports, June 25, 1976. Confidential.
Source: The Rumsfeld Papers (www.rumsfeld.com)

This brief memo references a Defense Intelligence Agency briefing on Soviet underground grain storage facilities.

Document 8: National Photographic Interpretation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Underground Berthing Facilities in North Korea, March 1, 1978. Secret.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool.

This slide identifies the location of North Korean underground berthing facilities.

Document 9: J.F. Vesecky, W.A. Nierenberg, A.M. Despan, SRI International, JSR-79-11, Tunnel Detection, April 1, 1980. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org)

This technical study, conducted for the Department of Defense’s scientific advisory group, JASON, focuses on the possible use of seismic and electromagnetic waves in detecting tunnels.

Document 10: National Photographic Interpretation Center, CIA. Possible Alternate Military Command Center, Wuhan Military Region, China, November 1980. Top Secret.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool.

This imagery analysis report, which apparently also uses information from communications intelligence, notes the discovery of a possible alternate military command center in eastern China, about 600 miles from Beijing. It discusses the underground complex as well as communications facilities.

Document 11: National Photographic Interpretation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, IAR-0039/82, Retractable Hardened Radio-Relay Antennas in the USSR and Poland, May 1982. Secret/WNINTEL.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool.

This imagery analysis report focuses on retractable radio-relay antennas that had been identified in the Soviet Union and Poland through satellite photography. The report notes that the antennas are mast-mounted “and the masts apparently can be retracted into a shaft set in an underground concrete housing.”

Document 12: Director of Central Intelligence, IIM 83-10005JX, Soviet Wartime Management: The Role of Civil Defense in Leadership Continuity, December 1983. Top Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room (www.cia.gov).

This interagency intelligence memorandum focuses on various aspects of the role of civil defense in the continuity of leadership in the Soviet Union in the event of war. One part of the memorandum (Chapter IV) discusses the assorted types of leadership protection and relocation facilities – which include underground structures. Among the facilities examined in the chapter are those at Sharapovo andChekhov. The authors observe that “the deep underground facilities at these complexes for the National Command Authority would present a difficult target problem.” They also note that construction on another complex about 400 miles from Moscow, believed to be an alternate national command facility, was continuing.

Document 13: Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Civil Defense: Medical Planning for Post Attack Recovery, July 1984. Secret.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool.

This study of Soviet medical planning for a post-nuclear attack environment includes a discussion (pp. 10,12) of underground medical facilities, which comprise both “modestly equipped dispensaries” as well as “extensive underground facilities.” It also discusses different groups to be served by those facilities – including leadership and nearby civilian populations after evacuation.

Document 14: Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988). Unclassified. (Extract)
Source: Department of Defense.

The U.S. interest in and concern about Soviet underground leadership protection facilities was evident in some issues of the Defense Department’s annual report, on Soviet military forces prepared, during the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. The 1988 edition contained a discussion of those facilities, an annotated satellite photograph of a relocation facility, and a artist’s depiction of both the outside and inside of such a facility.

Document 15: Department of Defense, Military Forces in Transition, 1991. (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1991). Unclassified (Extract)
Source: Department of Defense.

This, the last Department of Defense report on Soviet military power, contains a briefer treatment of Moscow’s deep underground facilities, using the same artist’s depiction as employed in the 1988 report (Document 14). It notes a Soviet press report about “the presence of an enormous underground leadership bunker adjacent to Moscow State University.”

Document 16: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, “Underground Nuclear Facilities,” December 9, 1992. Secret.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request.

Among the topics discussed in this report by the State Department’s intelligence unit on underground facilities is the possibility that if South Africa did not accurately declare the amount of highly enriched uranium it had produced it could be stored underground in South Africa.

Document 17: National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Photo Interpretation Student Handbook, Module 6, March 1996. Unclassified. (Extract)
Source: Donation.

This paper from a manual produced by the U.S. national imagery interpretation organization (today known as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) contains a brief discussion that is designed to aid imagery interpreters in identifying underground facilities employed for the storage of ammunition and bombs. It also discusses the feasibility of damaging the facilities via aerial attack.

Document 18: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996. Unclassified. (Extract)
Source: Department of Defense.

Two pages from this Defense Department report on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction focus on the Libyan chemical warfare program, which initially involved production of chemical agents at the above-ground Rabta facility. After the U.S. focused international attention on that facility, Libya began construction on an underground alternative.

Document 19: Director of Central Intelligence, FY 1998-1999 Congressional Budget Justification, Volume IV: National Reconnaissance Program, February 1997. Secret. (Extract)
Source: Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org).

This page from the budget justification for the National Reconnaissance Program notes the challenges posed by underground facilities.

Document 20: JASON, JSR-97-155, Characterization of Underground Facilities, April 12, 1999. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org).

This technical study, produced by the DOD’s JASON advisory group, examines a number of technical approaches to the characterization of underground facilities – including seismic/vibration sensing, imagery and change detection, low-frequency electromagnetic techniques, magnetic detection of machinery, detection of power lines, and low frequency electromagnetic techniques. It also examines the differences in characterizing covert and overt facilities, and looks at possible areas for future research and development.

Document 21: Department of Defense, Joint Warfighting Science & Technology Plan, February 2000. Unclassified. (Extract)
Source: www.wslfweb.org.

This chapter of the joint warfighting science and technology plan is focused at least as much on the requirements for destroying or neutralizing underground targets as on the intelligence problem. It notes the differences among underground targets with respect to a number of factors, identifies the “core capabilities” (e.g., detect, characterize) that are needed to destroy or neutralize such targets, and the functional capabilities required (eighteen in all – from sensors to decision process analysis and assessment).

Document 22: Lt. Col. Eric M. Sepp, Air War College Center for Strategy and Technology, Occasional Paper No. 14, Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations, May 2000. Unclassified.
Source: Air War College.

This author states that “the existence of deeply buried [u]nderground facilities has emerged as one of the more difficult challenges to confront U.S. military forces in the twenty-first century.” The paper focuses on two intelligence issues – locating and analyzing deeply buried facilities – as well as neutralizing such facilities.

Document 23: Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy, Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, July 2001. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org).

This report was mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for the 2001 fiscal year. It provides an introduction to the topic, a description of accomplishments, requirements, relevant programs, and the role of science and technology in meeting future threats.

Document 24: Steve Buchsbaum and Dan Cress, Special Projects Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “A Program to Counter Underground Facilities,” 2002. Unclassified.
Source: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (www.darpa.mil).

This short paper describes DARPA work on countering underground facilities. It delineates program objectives and notes that the DARPA program has focused on two primary approaches for characterizing underground facilities – PASEM (passive, acoustic, seismic, and electromagnetic monitoring) or the use of effluents.

Document 25: Department of State, Apparatus of Lies: Saddam’s Disinformation and Propaganda, 1990-2003, 2003. Unclassified. (Extract)
Source: Department of State.

Part of this State Department release focuses on an incident during the 1991 Persian Gulf war – the allied bombing of an underground bunker whose top floor had, unknown to the U.S, been used to house civilians at night. The release describes the origins of the facility, the security arrangements as of 1991, and its use for military purposes.

Document 26: Keith Payne, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, For: Larry Di Rita, Subject: Secretary’s Response to Rep. Tauscher before the HASC, 5 Feb., n.d. (circa Feb. 2003). Unclassified.
Source: The Rumsfeld Papers (www.rumsfeld.com).

This memo, which concerns Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s response to a question posed during a House Armed Services Committee hearing concerning small nuclear weapons, notes an attempt to improve U.S. capabilities to model the ground shock created by both nuclear and conventional weapons against underground facilities.

Document 27: Lt. Col. Arnold H. Streland, Air War College, Air University, Going Deep: A System Concept for Detecting Deeply Buried Facilities from Space, February 23, 2003. Unclassfied.
Source: Air War College.

This paper, in addition to providing background on the history of underground facilities and the threat they pose, examines the problem of locating those facilities and understanding their uses, and then turns to the use of space-based gravity measurement to help locate deeply buried facilities.

Document 28: I.J. Won, Alan Witten, and Steven Norton, Geophex Ltd and University of Oklahoma, Time-Exposure Acoustics for Imaging Underground Structures, June 25, 2003. Unclassified.
Source: Defense Technical Information Center.

This paper, sponsored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, reports on the authors’ development of a “new technique for imaging underground facilities based on the passive monitoring of acoustic emissions from both stationary and moving equipment within such facilities.”

Document 29: Greg Duckworth, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Counter Underground Facilities, 2004. Unclassified.
Source: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

This briefing identifies different varieties of underground facilities and assorted means for detecting them.

Document 30: Maj. Mark Easterbrook, ‘Unearthing’ the Truth in Defense of Our Nation,” Pathfinder, January – February 2005. Unclassified.
Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

This article, from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s unclassified magazine, describes the background and functions of the Underground Facility Analysis Center (UFAC) as well as interagency participation in the center, which is operated by DIA. It also describes the UFAC “knowledge base” and specifies the six goals “guiding UFAC development.”

Document 31: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Steve Cambone Subject: Deep Earth Penetrator, February 24, 2005. For Official Use Only.
Source: The Rumsfeld Papers (www.rumsfeld.com).

This memo from the Secretary of Defense asks for information about the underground activities of “all appropriate nations” as a prelude to a meeting about a ‘bunker buster’ weapon.

Document 32: Michael Klumb, “Searching for Undergrounds with a High-Tech Toolkit,” Pathfinder, March – April 2005. Unclassified.
Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

This Pathfinder article focuses on the tools used to search and characterize underground facilities. Sections cover classifying urban terrain, distinguishing recurring features, the relevance of medical techniques, and the use of radar data.

Document 33: U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Seismic Propagation From Activity In Tunnels And Underground Facilities, November 1, 2006. Unclassified.
Source: Defense Technical Information Center.

As its title partially indicates, this highly technical analysis focuses on the use of seismic signals generated by mechanical activity in underground facilities – which, the authors write, “can be measured as ground vibrations at offset distances.”

Document 34: Scott Robertson, “Collaboration Is Cornerstone of UFAC,” Pathfinder, May/June 2007. Unclassified.
Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

In addition to specifying the agencies involved in the UFAC effort, the article notes the role of the NGA element of the center, and reports on UFAC’s functions as specified in its charter.

Document 35: DNI Open Source Center, “Subtitled Clips of China’s Declassified Underground Nuclear Facility in Chongqing,” April 23, 2010. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org).

This brief OSC document reports on the content of a Chinese television report on an underground facility that was originally the home of a plutonium production reactor and was converted into a chemical factory.

Document 36: Underground Facility Analysis Center, “UFAC Digs Deep to Find Covert Facilities,” Communiqué, May/June 2010. Unclassified.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request.

This short article, appeared in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s unclassified magazine, and provides a description of UFAC, the role of different agencies in the center, and some of the techniques employed by the center.

Document 37: Frank Pabian, Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR#10-01758, The New Geospatial Tools: Global Transparency Enhancing Safeguards Verifications, October 27, 2010. Unclassified.
Source: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies.

One portion of this briefing focuses on the use of geospatial tools (particularly imagery and geo-location) in locating an underground facility in China that had been first constructed to house a plutonium production facility.

Document 38: Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Worldwide Threat Assessment, March 10, 2011. Unclassified.
Source: Defense Intelligence Agency.

This assessment, by the DIA’s director, briefly notes the role of underground facilities in protecting Iran’s nuclear program (p. 14) and Russian command and control facilities (p.20). It also notes (p. 32) that employment of underground facilities represents a transnational trend.

Document 39: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011, 2011. Unclassified. (Extract)
Source: Department of Defense (www.defense.gov).

This report, which focuses on a large number of components of Chinese military power, contains a brief description of the interest of the Second Artillery Corps in the employment of underground facilities and their role in Chinese nuclear strategy.

Document 40: Gunnar J. Radel, Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Geophysics, June 14, 2011. Unclassified.
Source: Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology (www.iris.edu).

This briefing, by a staff member of the Underground Facility Analysis Center, focuses on geophysical sensing in locating underground facilities, applications (treaty monitoring, battlespace awareness, and clandestine tunnel detection), and assorted challenges (for example, terrain and man-made clutter).

Document 41: Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Annual Threat Assessment, February 16, 2012. Unclassified.
Source: U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee.

As he did the year before, DIA Director Burgess notes Russia’s massive effort to upgrade its underground command and control facilities (p. 22). In addition (pp. 26-27) he notes six countries and one terrorist group that employ underground facilities and specifies five uses of such facilities (including cover and concealment, and industrial production).

 

 


NOTES

1. Joby Warrick, “Iran’s underground nuclear sites not immune to U.S. bunker-busters, experts say,” www.washingtonpost.com, February 29, 2012.

2. Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemunde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 202; F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.A.G. Simkins, and C.F.G. Ransom, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 571; Constance Babington-Smith, Air Spy: The Story of Photo Intelligence in World War II (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 192-193.

3. Defense I\ntelligence Agency, A Primer on the Future Threat, The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020, July 1999, p. 139. Portions of the Primer appear in Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004), pp. 194-223.

4. “About the Authors,” Pathfinder, May/June 2005, p. 4; “Statement of Dr. James Tengelia, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,” March 12, 2008, p. 5.

5. Maj. Mark Esterbrook, “‘Unearthing’ the Truth in Defense of Our Nation, Pathfinder, January-February 2005, pp. 19-21; “Tunnel vision,” DefenseNews (www.defensenews.com), August 1, 2009. The Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), in response to a FOIA request for a copy of any memorandum of agreement between AFTAC and UFAC refused to confirm or deny the existence of such an agreement. However, the DIA, in response to an identical request, while denying the request, stated that “A search of DIA’s systems of records located one document responsive to your request.” Alesia Y. William, Chief, Freedom of Information Act Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, to Jeffrey Richelson, July 8, 2010.

6. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB (New York: Public Affairs, 2010, p. 118.

7. Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Soviet Grain Consumption and Imports, June 25, 1976. Kwang- Tae Kim, Associated Press, “Report: NKorea builds underground fueling facility,” February 25, 2009.

8. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, An Assessment of the Threat 1988, p. 60; Bill Gertz, “Moscow builds bunkers against nuclear attack,” Washington Times, April 1, 1997, pp. A1, A16; Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1999), pp. 44, 231.

9. Thomas L. Friedman, “200,000 Troops Near Beijing, U.S. Says,” New York Times, June 8, 1989, p. A13; Robert Tanner, “U.S. soldiers enter Saddam’s tunnels,” Washington Times, April 10, 2003, p. A13. Thomas Erdbrink, “Deep underground, elaborate bunkers show that Gaddafi family was ready,” Washington Post, August 26, 2011, p. A8.

10. Bill Gertz, “Moscow builds bunkers against nuclear attack”; Bill Gertz, Betrayal, pp. 47, 231; Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Inside Russia’s magic mountain,” World Net Daily (www.wnd.com), June 6, 2000; Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, World Wide Threat Assessment, March 10, 2011, p. 20.

11. Bill Gertz, “Notes from the Pentagon,” December 8, 2000, http://www.gertzfilecom/InsidetheRing.html, “Cuba Bunkers,” http://groups.yahoo.com/group/coldwarcomms/message/1730. U.S. Department of State , Apparatus of Lies: Saddam’s Disinformation and Propaganda, 1990-2003, 2003, p. 12.

12. Frank Pabian, Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR 10-04532, Using the New Geospatial Tools to Locate a Newly Revealed Underground Plutonium Production Complex in China, July 21, 2010, n.p. Open Source Center, “Subtitled Clips of China’s Declassified Underground Nuclear Facility in Chongqing,” April 23, 2010.

13. Barbara Starr, “Impenetrable Libyan CW plant progresses …,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 17, 1996, p. 3; “Targeting a Buried Threat,” Newsweek, April 22, 1996, p. 6; Charles Aldinger, “U.S. Rules Out Nuclear Attack on Libya Plant,” Washington Post, May 8, 1996, p. A32; Bill Gertz, “Libyans stop work on chemical plant,” Washington Times, June 25, 1996, p. A4; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996, p. 26.

14. Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Worldwide Threat Assessment, March 10, 2011, p. 14; “Iran Prepares to Transport Atomic Substance to New Enrichment Facility,” Global Security Newswire, (http://gsn.nti.org), October 21, 2011; George Jahn, “Iran nuclear work at bunker is confirmed,” www.washingtontimes.com, January 9, 2012; David E. Sanger, “Iran Trumpets Nuclear Ability At a 2nd Plant,” New York Times, January 9, 2012, pp. A1, A3.

15. Benjamin F. Schemmer, “North Korea Buries Its Aircraft, Guns, Submarines, and Radars Inside Granite,” Armed Forces Journal International, August 1984, pp. 94-97. Jonas Siegel, “In harm’s way,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005, pp. 34-35.

16. William J. Broad, “Iran Unveils Missile Silos As It Begins War Games,” New York Times, June 28, 2011, p. A4.

17. David A. Reese, “50 Years of Excellence: ASD Forges Ahead as the Army’s Premier OSINT Unit in the Pacific,” Military Intelligence Professionals Bulletin, October – December 2005, pp. 27-29.

18. Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “Pentagon Seeks Mightier Bomb Vs. Iran,” Wall Street Journal January 28-29, 2012, pp. A1, A2.

Confidential – U.S. Army Afghanistan Theater of Operations Evidence Collection Guide

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/USArmy-AfghanEvidence.png

 

The transition from law of war-based detentions to evidence-based criminal detentions is underway. To fully support this aspect of our counter-insurgency (COIN) mission, Coalition Forces, partnered with Afghan units, are working in the field to provide information and evidence that supports detention operations. These efforts will most fully support the COIN effort if detainees suspected of committing criminal offenses are referred to the Afghan criminal justice system for pre-trial detention, prosecution, and serving of sentence for their crimes, based upon evidence which is used and understood in Afghan criminal courts.

This Guide will assist Coalition Forces and Afghan units by providing practical means and methods to properly identify, collect, preserve, and provide evidence that will be recognized and accepted by the Afghan criminal justice system. Using this Guide, Coalition Forces and partnered Afghan units can provide usable evidence, including statements, sketches, photographs, and physical evidence, to the Afghan authorities for each case. This justice effort continues in tandem with and complements existing intelligence exploitation which facilitates our own targeting process. To the greatest extent possible, however, the creation of unclassified products and declassification of classified products will significantly enhance in the transferability of evidence to the Afghan courts.

Built upon original work of Regional Commands, enhanced by the Detainee Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Training Team, Legal Operation Directorate, CJIATF-435, and coordinated with Battle Space Owners and Afghan partners throughout Afghanistan, this Guide will assist Coalition Forces and partnered Afghan units in properly handling and documenting evidence. While each nation within the Coalition Forces may have independent national authorities to adhere to in the detention process, the techniques provided in this Guide will assist all Coalition Forces to understand the importance of the collection of evidence for each suspect in order to continue the transition to evidence based-criminal detentions.

II. Why Evidence Collection is Vital

1. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is a sovereign entity with its own criminal justice system. As we strive to improve adherence to the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, we must enable and support the criminal justice system. Capturing units must provide evidence and witness statements for use in an Afghan court of law to enable the National Security Prosecutor’s Unit (NSPU) or a provincial criminal court to prosecute and convict criminal suspects. Appropriate evidence collection may result in admissible evidence being used in support of effective prosecutions. To the greatest extent possible, evidence collection and case preparation will be performed by Afghan partnering forces. Although USFOR-A and ISAF continue to have a need to exploit evidence for potential intelligence value, units should ultimately turn all evidence associated with a suspect over to Afghan authorities. Therefore, units must have a plan to transfer both a copy of the case file as well as all the evidence and statements with suspects to the appropriate local, provincial, or national governmental authorities or to a national security court.

2. The Afghan legal system does not specify a standard of proof similar to that found in most common law western legal regimes. Instead, units must coordinate with the relevant local, provincial, or national prosecutors and judges to determine the specific type and amount of evidence deemed credible. Some prosecutors or judges might require a slightly different format or type of evidence than is accepted by most other authorities. Evidence collection practices and the type of evidence to be collected, as suggested in this Guide, should be tailored to fit local court requirements as necessary.

Report – An Estimated $8 Billion in Cash Was Smuggled Out of Afghanistan Last Year

 

In the busy street markets of Kabul, stacks of cash sit in piles as moneychangers shout the day’s exchange rate to shoppers bustling by. Currency is bought and sold in the open air.

But all the money changing hands on the streets is barely a drop in the bucket compared to all the cash being siphoned out of the country in suitcases, and that is not a metaphor.

“It’s hard to estimate exactly how much is going out of Afghanistan, but I can tell you in 2011, 4.5 billion was (flown) out of Afghanistan,” said Khan Afzal Hadawal, deputy governor of the bank of Afghanistan.

That is just what is moving out of the Kabul airport. It is estimated $8 billion in cash was lugged out of the country last year by car, private jets and border crossings. That is almost double the entire country’s budget for 2011.

The government is trying to stop the outflow of money to other countries and encourage investment in Afghanistan. It has capped the amount of cash that can be taken out of the country at $20,000.

Video – NYPD Infiltrated Liberal Political Groups

Via The Huffington Post: “Undercover NYPD officers attended meetings of liberal political organizations and kept intelligence files on activists who planned protests around the country, according to interviews and documents that show how police have used counterterrorism tactics to monitor even lawful activities…”.* Ana Kasparian and Cenk Uygur break it down on The Young Turks.

* http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/nypd-infiltrated-liberal-political-g…

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Video – Obama Open Mic Audio With Russian President Medvedev

Via The Huffington Post/Reuters: “President Barack Obama was caught on camera on Monday assuring outgoing Russian President Dmitry Medvedev he will have “more flexibility” to deal with contentious issues like missile defense after the U.S. presidential election. Obama, during talks in Seoul, urged Moscow to give him “space” until after the November ballot, and Medvedev said he would relay the message to incoming Russian president Vladimir Putin. The unusually frank exchange came as Obama and Medvedev huddled together on the eve of a global nuclear security summit in the South Korean capital, unaware their words were being picked up by microphones as reporters were led into the room…”.* The Young Turks host Cenk Uygur breaks it down.

* http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/26/nuclear-summit-barack-obama-medvedev…

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Reports on types of alias documentation issued by Central Cover Staff of Central Intelligence Agency

Citation: [Memoranda on Alias Documentation Provided by Central Intelligence Agency’s Central Cover Staff; Attached to Divider Sheet; Includes Routing Sheets and Attachments Entitled “Cover Support”; Variations of “CCS Cover Support Provided within the United States”; Variations of “Alias Passports”; “Alias U.S. Documentation”; “U.S. Documentation in Clandestine Services Operations”; Heavily Excised]
Secret, Compendium, May 07, 1973, 34 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00047
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Central Cover Staff
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Bissell, Richard M., Jr.; Colby, William E.; Helms, Richard M.; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Central Cover Staff. Chief; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Deputy Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Plans. Deputy Director; United States. Department of Justice. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Subjects: Alias documentation | Corporations | Covert identities
Abstract: Reports on types of alias documentation issued by Central Cover Staff of Central Intelligence Agency.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (360 KB)

Durable URL for this record

Cryptome – General Strike in Central Park New York City

Tuesday — 03.27.12 ­ General Strike in Central Park

CONTENTS:

1. Invitation / Introduction
2. Some Background
3. Online Resources
4. Readings
5. Local Links
6. Precarious & Service Worker Assembly

___________________________________________________
1. Invitation / Introduction

What: Drifting Assembly on General Strike
When: Tuesday — 03.27.12
Where: Central Park, meet up at the steps of Metropolitan Museum
When: 6:00 pm
Who: Everyone (dress warm)

During the winter, we participated in a molecular seminar entitled
‘Welcome to the New Paradigm; The Crisis of Everything Everywhere.’ A few
hundred people attended over the course of 9 days, some staying for a
session, others for a day, and yet others for the entire duration.
Together we organized, disorganized, ate, spoke, disagreed, speculated,
walked, mapped, manifested, felt, listened, played, and even mic checked
Diego Rivera.

’Welcome to the New Paradigm’ was an allusion
to a banner we had seen in Washington Square Park at the conclusion of a
day of actions globally on October 15. That same night, after Gayatri
Spivak addressed everyone, we discovered that along with a lot of friends,
she had been thinking about the potentials for a General Strike.

At the time, the occupations at Liberty and across the globe were so
powerful; it was still unclear whether the idea of a General Strike was a
nostalgic regression or potential mode of amplification and generalization
of refusal. After all, the occupations were themselves a new paradigm of a
strike, not just striking against a work place or work but taking
everything, everywhere. As the coordinated and violent attacks by police started in late Fall on
the encampments, there was an even greater urgency placed upon everyone to
consider how this refusal of austerity, of faux solutions, of legalized
robbery, of new forms of enclosure, of an increasing surveillance /
security state, of ever greater ecological ruin, of continued structural
racism, could be expressed, embodied, uttered, collectively; and how could
this be done in a forceful manner, without further empowering or placing
all of our collective attention into a reactionary game with and on the
police force.

In January, we returned to the question of the General Strike and
we asked one another:

What it could mean a General Strike today given the global dimension of
financial capital, given the shifting qualities of the workplace and
work-time (namely its increased itinerancy, placelessness, instability,
meaninglessness), given the ever more invasive forms of extracting
productivity and value from the basic reproduction of our life and social
relations?

The winter provided to hundreds of people a season to formally and
informally meet, consider, propose plans and create possibilities for the
General Strike that has been called on May 1st.
In examining the shifted terrain of work, productivity, and thus strike,
the critical questions which emerge are:

How can this complex arrangement …

– of placed and non-placed labor (i.e., labor that occurs in a
recognizable workplace as well as Starbucks or the neighborhood boutique
cafe or the street or in the home)

– of recognized and unrecognized productivity (i.e., a waged job, albeit
badly paid, contracted labor or just using Google, Facebook, YouTube,
indirectly producing immense data, content, value, profits)
- of
remunerated and unremunerated life (i.e., the time which is paid for a
specific work and the time spent between any specific work just making
oneself available, preparing, learning new skills which could be reapplied
back into work)

– of visible and invisible, of legal and not legalized, of union and
non-unionized workers

… redefine the strategies for a General Strike?

Where could be the sites of blockage? Where could be the site of flow
stoppage? Where could be the sites of non-cooperation? How to activate
other fields of non-cooperation such a debt strike under the heading
general strike? And where could be the sites of cooperation, of
communization, of convergence?

Seen in the light of occupation, how might the general strike also
question the ideals sovereignty, autonomy, or freedom that presume an
individual political subject? How has occupation allowed us to reconceive
the strike not just as total refusal, blockage, or stoppage, but as a
public gathering that demonstrates the practices and principles of
socialization, communization, and mutual aid and care? What would it mean
to rethink the social intransitivity of the strike—its lack of
instrumentality, of work, of means-ends relations—as neither undoing or
negativity nor direct action, but as opening onto the potentiality of
being-in-common?

What does it mean to strike if you are unemployed? Or “your own boss”? Or
a freelance worker? How to also take account of those whose time is not so
flexible, and who face greater threats and risks in walking off the job or
joining a public demonstration?

What qualities could a strike take to address the multiplicity of sites of
and modes of production? And if our consumption, obedience, and everyday
participation is part of our productivity, if our everyday social
reproduction is the lubricant of the economic machinery that increasingly
surveys and oppresses the multitudes and our shared habitats, how could
May 1st become the turning point to intensify a process not only of
withdrawal or a symbolic act but a call for the infinite strike, the
closest we can get of doing nothing, how actively we envision and realize
our lives without capitalism.

We are interested in continuing this discussion not only on theoretical
grounds but through proposals for specific actions online and in the city.
We would like to propose meeting at Central Park on Tuesday early evening
for a walk and informal assembly.

The walking assembly will be unfacilitated by the Central Park Exploratory
Committee, an ungroup attempting to reassert the park as a commons, and as
potential site of convergence on the day of the General Strike, resulting
in a meshwork of refusal, food, music, pleasure, sensuality, resistance,
communization. The group is interested in weaving together with others
great fictions and believes strongly that such visions or horizons will
resonate with multitudes not only on May Day but also for the days
after.

Come join us and bring things to share: proposals,
food, drink.

___________________________________________________
2. Background

A general strike has been called for May Day, first by Occupy Los Angeles
on November 15th, and locally by Occupy Wall Street on February 14th. In
the time between and since many other city and neighborhood assemblies
have taken up the call, and a number of other coalitions, collectives, and
committees have started to agitate and organize for a general strike in
2012.

These recent calls for a May Day general strike have taken inspiration
from Occupy Oakland’s wildcat general strike of November 2nd, 2011, and
the struggles in Wisconsin last Spring which first reignited interest in
the concept. In the months since the Occupy movement began we have seen
general strikes called in Belgium, Egypt, Greece, India, Israel, Italy,
Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and the United
Kingdom.

The general assembly of Occupy Los Angeles committed to the general strike
on December 19th; Occupy Boston on January 7th; Occupy Tampa on January
7th; Occupy Pasadena on January 8th; Occupy Phoenix on January 10th;
Occupy Williamsburg and Occupy Long Beach on January 17th; Occupy Brooklyn
on January 19th; Occupy Oakland on January 29th; Occupy Ventura on
February 7th; New York City on February 14th; Occupy Sydney on February
18th; Occupy Detroit on February 21st; Occupy Seattle on February 26th;
and Occupy Bushwick on March 1st. In the weeks between and since many
other cities, assemblies, and organizations have also called for the May
Day General Strike, and we expect more to follow suit in the next five
weeks.

___________________________________________________
3. Some Online Resources

NEW YORK CITY LINKS
http://da.nycga.net/mayday/
http://da.nycga.net/category/subgroups/may-day/
https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/strikeeverywhere
http://maydaynyc.org/
http://www.nycga.net/
http://occuprint.org/Category/MayDay
http://occupybk.org/
http://occupybk.org/groups/organize-bushwick-1128840377/
http://occupywilliamsburg.org/
http://strikeeverywhere.net/
http://university.nycga.net/our-courses/studying-may-day/
http://university.nycga.net/our-courses/studying-may-day/recommended-readings/
http://wiki.occupy.net/wiki/May_Day

ONLINE RESOURCES
http://www.gstrike.org/
http://insurrectiondays.noblogs.org/
http://interoccupy.org/may1call/
http://libcom.org/gallery/may-1st-2012-posters-graphics
http://www.occupymay1st.org/
http://www.occupymay1st.org/groups/occupation-coordination/
http://www.occupymay1st.org/resources/imagery/
https://www.facebook.com/events/337068492974144/
https://www.facebook.com/events/307864259256522/
https://www.facebook.com/events/119235331529404/
https://www.facebook.com/events/367411923279181/
https://www.facebook.com/events/185740101536525/
https://www.facebook.com/OccupyGeneralStrike
https://www.facebook.com/occupym1
https://www.facebook.com/occupymayfirst
https://www.facebook.com/strikeeverywhere
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Occupy-May-1st-General-Strike/160023040772206
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Resources-for-the-worldwide-general-strike-May-1st/354855194534813
https://twitter.com/global_strike
https://twitter.com/May1StreetTeam
https://twitter.com/Maydaystrike
https://twitter.com/nycgenstrike
https://twitter.com/OccupyGenStrike
https://twitter.com/OccupyGenStrk
https://twitter.com/occupym1
https://twitter.com/OWSGenStrike
https://twitter.com/OWSMayDay
https://twitter.com/StrikeEverywher
https://twitter.com/USGeneralStrike
https://twitter.com/WorldStrikeMay1

___________________________________________________
4. Readings

[unsorted]
–The Social General Strike – Stephen Naft, 1905:
http://www.mediafire.com/?t37d5nxsvshzdcr

–The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions – Rosa
Luxemburg, 1906:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1906/mass-strike/index.htm

–Reflections on Violence – George Sorel, 1908:
http://ifile.it/wpclbh/__Sorel__Reflections_on_Violence__Cambridge_Texts_in_the_
History_of_Political_Thought_.l_ntx2j6721x3xo9.pdf

–“The General Strike” – Bill Haywood, 1911:
http://www.iww.org/en/history/library/Haywood/GeneralStrike

–“Critique of Violence” – Walter Benjamin, 1921:
http://www.mediafire.com/?ew0x25f2guv

–The General Strike – Ralph Chaplin, 1933:
http://libcom.org/library/general-strike-ralph-chaplin

–“The General Strike” – W.E.B. Du Bois, 1935:
http://townsendlab.berkeley.edu/sites/all/files/The%20General%20Strike.pdf

–Kill the Bill: The Power of a General Strike – Madison IWW, 2011:
http://libcom.org/library/iww-general-strike-pamphlet

–“To All the Working People: Call for De-Nuke General Strike” – Committee
for De-nuke General Strike, 2011:
http://jfissures.wordpress.com/2011/03/26/to-all-the-working-people-%E2%80%93-call-
for-de-nuke-general-strike/

–“Wisconsin’s Lost Strike Moment” – Nicolas Lampert & Dan S. Wang, 2011:
http://www.justseeds.org/blog/2011/04/wisconsins_lost_strike_moment_1.html

–“What Chance a General Strike in Manhattan?” – Nikolas Kozloff, 2011:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/10/2011107135115719238.html

–“A Message to the Partisans, in Advance of the General Strike” – Society
of Enemies, 2011: http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2011/11/01/18696540.php

–“Blockading the Port is Only the First of Many Last Resorts” – Society
of Enemies, 2011:
http://www.bayofrage.com/from-the-bay/blockading-the-port-is-only-the-first-of-many-last-resorts/

–“General Strike” – Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 2011:
http://occupytheory.org/Tidal_5.html

–“What are the Origins of May Day?” – Rosa Luxemburg, 1894:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1894/02/may-day.htm

–“The Idea of May Day on the March” – Rosa Luxemburg, 1913:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1913/04/30.htm

–“May Day in the West and the East” – Leon Trotsky, 1923:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/04/mayday.htm

–“The First of May: Symbol of a New Era in the Life and Struggle of the
Toilers” – Nestor Makhno, 1928:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/makhno-nestor/works/1928/05_01.htm

–The History of Mayday – Alexander Trachtenberg, 1932:
http://www.marxists.org/subject/mayday/articles/tracht.html

–“A General Strike” – Mariarosa Dall Costa, 1974:
http://caringlabor.wordpress.com/2010/10/20/mariarosa-dalla-costa-a-general-strike/

–“What do we mean by… The General Strike?” – Chris Harman, 1985:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1985/01/genstrike.htm

–The Incomplete, True, Authentic and Wonderful History of May Day – Peter
Linebaugh, 1986

–“Birth of a Holiday: The First of May” – Eric Hobsbawm, 1994:
http://libcom.org/history/birth-holiday-first-may

–“Infinite Strike” – Anonymous, 2010:
http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Anonymous__Infinite_Strike.html

–“Which Way Forward for the 99%?” – Occupy May 1st, 2012:
http://libcom.org/library/which-way-forward-99-build-power-show-power-through-
mass-participatory-bold-action

___________________________________________________
5. NYC Links

Brooklyn General Assembly: http://occupybk.org/
Bushwick General Assembly: https://www.facebook.com/groups/Bushwick.GA/
New York City General Assembly: http://www.nycga.net/
Strike Everywhere: http://strikeeverywhere.net/
Williamsburg General Assembly: http://occupywilliamsburg.org/

___________________________________________________
6. Precarious & Service Worker Assembly

Start:
03/28/2012 19:30

Category:
Precarious/Service Worker Assembly

Address:
360 Court Street, Brooklyn, NY, 11231, United States

Tired of being treated like a servant by your customers? Tired of
management demanding more and more for less and less? Feeling alone or
frustrated? Come to the first Precarious and Service Worker Assembly to
network with others who share your interests!

As service workers, we are often both overworked and underpaid; with
Management forcing workers to work ever faster in an ever shorter amount
of time. Productivity and speed-of-service requirements increase while
hours per week are slashed. It’s clear: The harder we work, the less we
get paid, and the richer they get!

Many of us are already in tough situations as parents, immigrants, young
people, and students. Racism is blatantly apparent at many of our
workplaces, with Latino and immigrant workers confined to back-of-house
positions, maintaining a racial hierarchy to keep us separated. For some,
a job at a restaurant or a cafe is a 2nd or even 3rd job, a result of the
declining wages for other careers. Even worse, we often find ourselves
forced into student loan and credit card debt because of low pay. All the
while, rent, food, and transportation costs climb through the roof.

Solidarity and support among local service workers can be empowering for
all of us. Remember, they can’t run these places without us. Bosses thrive
by pitting us against one another, but if not for us, Management wouldn’t
make a dime. So let’s take what’s ours!

Bring some goods to share from your place of employment if you’d like, and
feel free to bring a friend or two ­as long as they’re not the boss! We’ll
be discussing how we can make our collective situation much more
interesting and how we can engage together in upcoming actions like the
May Day General Strike.

__________________________________________________
16 Beaver Group
16 Beaver Street, 4th fl.
New York, NY 10004

for directions/subscriptions/info visit:
http://www.16beavergroup.org

TRAINS:
4,5 — Bowling Green
2,3 — Wall Street
J,Z —  Broad Street
R — Whitehall
1 — South Ferry

Research Project on Robert L. Vesco – The CIA Criown Jewels

Citation: Research Project on Robert L. Vesco
[Attached to Divider Sheet], Secret, Memorandum, May 07, 1973, 3 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00048
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. European Division. Chief
From: Roosevelt, Archibald B.
To: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Deputy Director
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Helms, Richard M.; Proctor, Edward W.; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Deputy Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. Office of Economic Research; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Plans; Vesco, Robert L.
Subjects: Corporations | Investigations
Abstract: Recounts Central Intelligence Agency Office of Economic Research’s investigation of Robert Vesco and the sudden cancellation of inquiry at Richard Helms’ behest.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (60 KB)

TOP-SECRET – DHS-FBI Intelligence Bulletin on Homegrown Extremist Retaliation for Afghan Massacre

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/DHS-FBI-AfghanMassacreRetaliation.png

(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin is intended to increase awareness and provide understanding of the nature of potentially emergent threats in response to the alleged killing of civilians by a US soldier in Afghanistan and the burning of Korans and other religious documents on a military base. This Information is provided to support the activities of FBI and DHS and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and the private sector to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.

(U//FOUO) Civilian Killings in Afghanistan Could Lead to Retaliatory Attacks by Homegrown Violent Extremists In the United States

(U//FOUO) On 11 March 2012, a US service member stationed in Afghanistan allegedly went on a shooting spree, killing 16 civilians, Including nine children, according to US press reporting. The FBI and DHS are concerned that this event could contribute to the radicalization or mobilization of homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) in the Homeland, particularly against US-based military targets, which HVEs have historically considered legitimate targets for retaliation in response to past alleged US military actions against civilians overseas.

(U//FOUO) The soldier who allegedly perpetrated the attacks reportedly trained at Joint Base Lewls-McChord near Tacoma, Washington. This base was also the training site of four soldiers convicted in 2011 of killing Afghan citizens, according to US press reporting. Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif, currently awaiting trial for plotting an attack, Initially wanted to target Lewis-McChord in retaliation for the actions of soldiers who had been stationed there. Ultimately, Abdul-Latif changed his alleged target to a Military Entrance Processing Station in Seattle, Washington, in part because he believed it was a softer target.

(U//FOUO) Perceived US Military Anti-Islamic Events in Afghanistan Could Compound Homegrown Violent Extremist Grievances

(U//FOUO) We assess that the alleged killing of civilians by a US soldier could trigger acts of violence by HVEs as this was a motivation that drove plotting against Joint Base Lewis-McChord. While recent high profile perceived offenses against Islam historically have led to calls for retaliation by violent extremists, they have not yet incited HVEs to attack in the United States. Nevertheless, the series of perceived anti-Mulslim and anti-Islamic events in Afghanistan since January 2012-which include graphic images of dead civilians-could cumulatively lead an HVE to mobilize to violence.

(U//FOUO) Some users of Web sites hosting violent extremist content circulated graphic images of the 11 March 2012 shooting victims, including women and children, and called for revenge against the US military. Some users stated their belief that the attack was intentionally planned by the US military and that there were more killings than reported by the media.

 

 

Video – Volksgerichtshof (Nazi Peoples Court) – NEW FOOTAGE

 

 

This is a collection of unique footage of the proceedings of the Volksgerichtshof, the “Nazi Peoples Court”, which was specifically set up for political enemies.

In these 7 parts who will find comprehensive footage of the proceedings after the failed attempt of officers and civilians to kill Hitler on 20th July 1944.

I post these clips so that their memory won’t be forgotten. These people had a conscience and were incredibly brave. They are role models for all of us. They knew that the failure of their actions would lead to death, but their aim was to prevent to total distruction of Germany and to end the unspeakable crimes of the Nazi Regime.

I am afraid that all this footage is in German language. However, there are other clips on youtube on which the ravings of Roland Freisler, Hitlers “blood judge”, are translated.

However, these clips contain much more footage than was ever shown on youtube and outside Germany. This film is a real treasure for anybody who is interested in the actions of the men and women of the 20th July 1944 and the proceedings of the Nazi Peoples Court (Volksgerichtshof).

Please look up further details in Wikipedia.

The CIA Crown Jewels – Items for Possible Use in Briefing the DCI

Citation: Items for Possible Use in Briefing the DCI
[Attached to Divider Sheet], Secret, Memorandum, May 07, 1973, 3 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00049
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Soviet Bloc Division. Chief
From: Blee, David H.
To: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Deputy Director
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Nosenko, Yurii; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Management and Services. Office of Security. Director; United States. Department of Justice. Marshals Service; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Subjects: Assassination plots | Attorneys | Counterintelligence | Defectors | Detention | Interagency cooperation | News media | Organized crime | Safe houses | Soviet Union
Abstract: Describes Central Intelligence Agency Soviet Bloc Division activities that could be considered “inappropriate,” including provision of safe house for U.S. attorney threatened by “organized criminal elements,” collaboration with Federal Bureau of Investigation on counterintelligence training, and secret detention of Soviet defector Yurii Nosenko.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (59 KB)

Weird in Wired – Three Blind Phreaks

How the phone-phreaking Badir brothers ran rings around Israel‘s telcos for six scam-filled years.


Inside the chintz-filled living room of the Badir family’s neat and modest home, a feast of freshly roasted chicken, saffron rice, and seasoned vegetable stew perfumes the air. Friends and relatives pour through the front door to congratulate 27-year-old Munther “Ramy” Badir. He’s just been released from prison after serving 47 months for computer-related crimes. Outside, Islamic prayers resonate from speakers on a truck moving slowly down the dusty streets of Kafr Kassem. Everyone in this Israeli village – populated mostly by Arabs – appears ecstatic to have Ramy back.

But he does not see their smiles. Ramy, along with two of his three brothers, has been blind since birth due to a genetic defect. He and his sightless brothers have devoted their lives to proving they can out-think, out-program, and out-hack anyone with vision. (Their sighted brother, Ashraf, is a baker with no tech leanings.) They’ve been remarkably successful. Ramy says dryly, “A computer that is safe and protected is a computer stacked in a warehouse and unplugged.”

Israeli authorities agree. The 44 charges leveled against Ramy, Muzher, and Shadde Badir in 1999 included telecommunications fraud, theft of computer data, and impersonation of a police officer. The brothers’ six-year spree of hacking into phone systems and hijacking telephone time ended when they were convicted of stealing credit card numbers and breaking into the Israeli army radio station’s telephone system to set up an illicit phone company. Unwitting customers – mostly Palestinians on theWest Bankand Gaza Strip – paid the fake telco for long distance calls that were billed to the radio station. A lawyer close to the case said that the Badirs’ scams pulled in more than $2 million.

Ramy, the leader and most technologically savvy of the brothers, was the only one sentenced to prison. Muzher, 28, was ordered to perform community service for six months; Shadde, 22, received a suspended sentence – not because he was innocent, the judge made clear, but because of his age.

Those targeted by the Badirs feel less charitable. Yekutiel “Kuty” Lavi, a security specialist at Bezeq International,Israel’s largest telco and a frequent victim of the Badirs, angrily complains, “Every day people try to steal from us, but nobody has ever stolen from us the way the Badirs did. When they dial, they use the middle finger.”

The Badirs pulled off Mamet-worthy phone cons, employing cell phones, Braille-display computers, ace code-writing skills, and an uncanny ability to impersonate anyone from corporate suits to sex-starved females. On the phone, the brothers morph into verbal 007s, intimidating men, seducing women, and wheedling classified information from steely-voiced security personnel. The phone phreakers’ term for this is social engineering: using a combination of brains and guile to obtain codes for trespassing into systems to rejigger them via strings of touch-tone code. Combine this talent with supersensitive hearing – the brothers can dissect an international connection the way wine expert Robert Parker pulls notes from a glass of Bordeaux – and you have what BernieS, a legendary phreaker and contributor to the hacking journal 2600, calls “a formidable skill set.”

At one point during my visit with the Badirs, I pull out my cell phone and make a call. Before it even connects, Shadde, who is sitting across the room, recites all 12 digits perfectly.

Ramy smiles at the parlor trick. “It used to be disgusting to be blind,” he says. “Today, you scare people. You possess skills that those with sight cannot possibly understand.”

Two hours into an afternoon-long interview with the Hebrew-speaking Badirs, my translator’s lips lock. He shrugs and tells me that the Badirs have shifted into a secret code. Ramy later explains that as kids he and Muzher developed their own language – reordering letters in mathematically complex ways – after they discovered that other boys were snooping on their conversations. “People said that God cursed our mother by giving her three blind sons,” recalls Ramy. “Children beat us on the backs of our legs. Those abuses left scars on our hearts. But they also forced us to grow stronger.”

The young Badirs closed ranks and vowed that their blindness would never be an impediment. They taught themselves to take apart telephones, to mimic voices and verbal tics, and to get around Tel Aviv without canes or guide dogs. They became obsessed with technology and telephones. After encountering their first computer, in 1989, at Tel Aviv’s Center for the Blind, Ramy and Muzher became enchanted with the IBM clones. They hung aroundTelAvivUniversitywhile working, with little success, as software and telephone consultants; their early crimes were the phreaker equivalent of shoplifting a Hershey bar.

But Ramy was too ambitious to stop there. “I taught myself to program in all the languages: C, C++, Basic, Java, HTML, PHP, CGI. I built my own black boxes, blue boxes, and red boxes,” which, respectively, circumvent billing, generate tones to place free calls, and simulate pulses triggered by money dropped into a pay phone. “I used those boxes to get into and decode phone systems.”

In 1993, Bezeq technicians caught the Badirs snagging telephone time for their own use. Things quickly escalated when the brothers obtained the codes to break into PBXs – private branch exchanges – belonging to Bezeq and to the Israeli headquarters of Comverse, Intel, Nortel, and others. PBXs are the computerized nerve centers that operate phone systems; they are designed to be repaired, updated, and altered remotely by technicians using touch-tone codes.

“The Badirs regularly called Bezeq, pretending to be engineers in the field,” recalls Eyal Raz, who worked in the telco’s international antifraud unit from 1994 to 1999. “They called secretaries and said,

‘I need to get in to do a repair. You need to give me the number and password.’ Sometimes they succeeded, or else they’d get only the number and try to break the password by using proprietary programs.” At other times, a secretary would simply key in the code, providing what seemed like onetime access but actually enabling the brothers to hear touch tones and translate them into numbers they could then use whenever they pleased.

The three used their access to devise an elaborate moneymaking scheme. According to Raz, during the mid-1990s the brothers made a deal with a phone sex outfit based in theDominican Republic. They would be paid for driving calls to the service. The Badirs made the calls themselves, but the lines were rigged so that Comverse and Nortel were billed by the phone sex service.

At the time there were no computer crime laws inIsrael, so Bezeq took it upon itself to try to short-circuit the Badirs. “At one point I asked an engineer to block three lines that the Badirs had opened up for themselves,” recalls Raz. “They knew that I had put the blocks on. So a couple days later, one of them phoned the engineer and said, ‘This is Eyal Raz. Please unblock those three lines.’ The engineer, who knew my voice, believed it was me. He unblocked the lines.” Raz shakes his head, showing grudging admiration. “These are very clever boys.”

In 1995, the Badirs turned their attention to a business closer to home. Their target was Israeli phone sex mogul Ben Zion “Bency” Levy, who maintained a database of thousands of customer credit card numbers. Ramy and his brothers went to work on Levy’s secretary, patiently convincing her to provide the information that would allow them to unlock the credit card numbers and PINs.

“We knew to approach her gently and break through her psychological barrier,” says Muzher. ” We had her tell us clues that would lead to the password of her boss’s computer.”

“I figured out the personality of her boss, learned the numbers that were meaningful to him, and used those numbers to get into his system remotely,” says Ramy. In the end, the Badirs seized some 20,000 credit card numbers – and, after being confronted by Levy, caused all of his telephones to ring continuously with no caller on the other end of the line.

In 1996, Levy reported the scam toIsrael’s National Fraud Unit. The following year, a file of Badir-related complaints – including Levy’s – landed on the desk of David Osmo, an investigator withIsrael’s national police force. Osmo met with Ramy and recalls being amazed at the speed of the young man’s fingers on a phone keypad when he made a call. “I told him he is a smart person who should use his intelligence for good things,” Osmo says. “Return back to society,” he urged.

Ramy remembers his response to Osmo: “You can chase me for 20 years and you will not find anything to convict me on.”

The Israeli Army Radio Station is guarded as if it were a military base. Occupying four floors of a dirty white building on a busy two-lane street in Jaffa, the station is protected 24/7 by a half-dozen armed recruits. In 1998, the brothers joined forces with a group of Jewish and Arab scam artists and targeted the station, intending to hijack phone lines and sell call time on them.

Though they were convicted of participating in the scheme, the brothers deny they were involved. Ramy is nonetheless willing to speak knowledgeably about the con. “These were among the most protected lines in theMiddle East,” says Ramy. “They had a lot of scrambling, and big technology is required in order to get in.”

Why an army outpost? “Those lines cannot be tapped by the police, so there is no monitoring,” explains Ramy. “These are the safest lines on which to do something like this.”

Authorities maintain that Ramy broke into the army radio station’s phone system and activated a dormant function called direct inward systems access, which allows long distance calls to be placed remotely and charged to that particular phone account. He structured the DISA so that as many as 281 people would be able to make telephone calls simultaneously on that single line.

Once the long distance access was in place, the Badirs’ partners set up a switchboard inside a shack in an orange grove inJaffa. Voilא, instant phone company. Customers placed calls from kiosks along the Gaza Strip, from cloned cell phones, or directly from their homes; these were routed from the switchboard to the radio station’s DISA. The Badirs and their partners billed customers for the calls, while the actual costs were absorbed by the radio station.

It wasn’t long before the station realized its bills were excessive and contacted Bezeq. The company’s security specialists joined with the Israeli national police in an investigation. They raided the orange grove, arresting several low-level workers at the shack. Only after one of them mentioned that the lines had been set up by blind technicians, says one source close to police, did the probe turn to the Badirs.

At the time, Ramy and his brothers were already in the crosshairs. Suspects in numerous telecommunication crimes, their home phone was frequently tapped by the national police. They reviewed the tap transcripts and spent a year investigating the brothers, hoping to find incontrovertible links between them and the pirate phone company. An intense cat-and-mouse game developed: the Badirs on one side, with fraud investigator David Osmo and prosecutor Doron Porat on the other.

While Porat was working on the case, his car’s GPS system and email were repeatedly hacked. “There was a message waiting for him with his password in it,” says Ramy, sounding quite pleased. “After that, he changed his password every hour before giving up on email altogether and using a typewriter.” The brothers reportedly contactedIsrael’s DMV and registered Osmo’s car under another name, causing embarrassing problems for the investigator when he tried to sell his vehicle.

“The police experienced bad luck,” notes Ramy. “Their telephone systems went down, their computers developed bugs. Osmo got big bills for calls that he hadn’t made. He believed we were always listening in on him. Sometimes Osmo spoke on the telephone and other calls came across the line as he tried to talk.” Ramy smiles devilishly. “He found that to be very annoying.”

Ironically, even as they knew the degree to which they were being pursued, the Badirs did not show a lot of restraint over the telephone. “This was our mistake,” admits Ramy, who believed that some of his phone lines were secure. “We knew the police were chasing us and trying to catch us. Our overconfidence led us to think they would never do it.”

On June 14, 1999, 14 police officers raided the brothers’ home in Kafr Kassem. Though they found a safe containing more than $14,000 worth of Jordanian dinars, investigators did not uncover an expected treasure trove of hardware, software, and notes in Braille. “It’s all in our heads,” asserts Ramy. “The police took my laptop, which contained programs for running through thousands of numbers very quickly, but I had it designed to erase everything on the hard drive if it was opened by somebody other than me. They lost all the material.”

Ramy, Muzher, and Shadde were arrested on a variety of charges relating to computer fraud in connection with their hacks of the radio station and Bency Levy’s phone sex operation. Police took them from their home in wrist and leg cuffs, but even in custody, they could not help but show off by conversing in their secret language and announcing telephone numbers that were being keyed in by law enforcers. “When Doron Porat stood next to me,” adds Ramy, “he took the battery out of his cell phone.”

Ramy was jailed throughout the trial, which dragged on for 27 months and took the prosecutors way beyond their depth of technological expertise. Porat and his team eventually quit trying to explain how the Badirs did what they’d been charged with and focused instead on simply proving they did commit acts like breaking into a phone company switchboard.

In her November 2001 ruling, judge Saviona Rotlevi went easy on Muzher and Shadde but found Ramy guilty of 20 counts concerning Israeli cyberlaw, 4 counts of telecom law violation, and 15 counts of other crimes. The judge sentenced him to 65 months in prison. Among his restrictions: All of his calls were to be made with the assistance of a guard so that he would never touch a telephone keypad.

After nearly four years behind bars, Ramy was released when a judge ruled he’d served enough time. He marks his second day of freedom by repairing with Muzher and Shadde to a small cafי on the edge of Kafr Kassem. Inside, the brothers order bottles of orange juice and three water pipes. They puff deeply, releasing plumes of fruity-smelling tobacco smoke.

Despite his years in prison, Ramy appears to have no financial worries. Upon arriving home, he promptly ordered a $20,000 Braille-display computer fromGermany. He also spent a couple of hours checking on the construction of his new four-story house. Workers broke ground on it while he was still in prison; completion was scheduled to coincide with his original release date. It’s a sprawling, solid-looking place, situated on a prime corner lot in the center of Kafr Kassem. The top floor will be a high tech penthouse where Ramy can hatch his next move.

And what will that be? Ramy claims a couple of juicy software programs that he began developing in prison are in the pipeline. “I am inventing a PBX firewall,” he says. “I know all the weakest spots of a telephone system. I can protect any system from infiltration.”

Ramy insists there are major companies interested in his new software. He talks about big money and big meetings. But he refuses to show what he’s working on and won’t name anybody who’s backing him. One person who sounds perfectly game to be involved is the brothers’ old nemesis Eyal Raz. “If he can build that, he’ll become a billionaire,” predicts Raz, who now works for a Tel Aviv-based phone security firm called ECtel. “The Badirs know so much and are so talented that I would happily use them as consultants.”

Ramy insists he has outgrown the scams: “I am going to the other side, coming up with devices that will keep the phreakers out.”

You want to believe him, you really do. Maybe it’s the truth. Or maybe it’s a sweet bit of social engineering designed to generate positive press and position the Badir brothers for their next spree.

Hate Crime – Three Men Plead Guilty to Racially Motivated Assault and Murder in Mississippi

In the early morning hours of June 26, 2011, Daryl Paul Dedmon, John Aaron Rice, and Dylan Wade Butler were driving around Jackson, Mississippi, engaging in one of their favorite pastimes—looking for innocent victims to attack. They based their search on one specific factor: skin color…they wanted to hurt African-Americans. This time, they happened upon James Craig Anderson in a motel parking lot, got out of their vehicles, and began their unprovoked assault. Once back in their vehicles, Dedmon used his Ford F-250 pickup truck as a murder weapon, deliberately running over Mr. Anderson.

In the first case involving the death of a victim brought under the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Dedmon, Rice, and Butler pled guilty on Thursday to their roles in this unthinkable crime. At a press conference regarding the guilty pleas, Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez stated, “This is a case about a group of racist thugs who made a sport of targeting African-Americans in Jackson and attacking them without provocation, simply because of the color of their skin.”

Investigating hate crimes is the top priority of the FBI’s civil rights program, and personnel in the Bureau’s Jackson Field Office devoted themselves to this investigation, with the assistance of the Jackson Police Department. Jackson Special Agent in Charge Daniel McMullen said, “Every sector of our community has a role to play in helping to ensure that no person is targeted for violence because of who they are or what they believe.”

Echoed Perez, “We must and will remain ever vigilant in our common humanity to root out hate and violence when it rears its ugly face. Hate crimes such as this simply have no place in Jackson, in Mississippi, or anywhere in America.”

SECRET – The FBI – Multi-Million-Dollar Hospice Health Care Fraud Alleged

PHILADELPHIA—An indictment was unsealed today charging five nurses in a health care fraud conspiracy arising from their employment at Home Care Hospice Inc. (HCH), a hospice care provider in Philadelphia, between 2005 and 2008 that resulted in a multi-million-dollar fraud on Medicare. Patricia McGill, 64, of Philadelphia, was a registered nurse and served as the director of professional services for HCH. She allegedly authorized and supervised the admission of inappropriate and ineligible patients for hospice services, resulting in approximately $9.32 million in fraudulent claims. She is charged, along with Natalya Shvets, 42, of Southhampton, Pennsylvania Giorgi Oqroshidze, 36, of Philadelphia; Yevgeniya Goltman, 42, of Newtown, Pennsylvania; and Alexsandr Koptyakov, 39, of Bensalem, Pennsylvania, with one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and numerous counts of health care fraud. All five defendants were arrested this morning.

HCH was co-owned by Matthew Kolodesh, who is charged separately in an indictment unsealed October 12, 2011, and “A.P.,” the Hospice Director for HCH. HCH was a for-profit business at 1810 Grant Avenue, and later 2801 Grant Avenue, in Philadelphia that provided hospice services for patients at nursing homes, hospitals, and private residences. According to the indictment, announced by United States Attorney Zane David Memeger, McGill authorized nursing staff and supervisors, including her co-defendants, to fabricate and falsify documents in support of hospice care for patients who were not eligible for hospice care, or for a higher, more costly level of care than was actually provided to the patients. Between January 2005 and December 2008, approximately $9,328,000 in fraudulent claims for inappropriate patients were submitted to Medicare as authorized by AP and McGill. Defendants Shvets, Oqroshidze, Goltman, and Koptyakov created fraudulent nursing notes for approximately 150 patients indicating hospice services were provided for patients, when, in reality, they were not.

In February 2007, HCH was notified that it was subject to a claims review audit. According to the indictment, in anticipation of this audit, McGill assisted A.P. in reviewing patient charts, sanctioning false documentation by the nursing staff, and authorizing the alteration of charts. In September 2007, HCH was notified that it had exceeded its cap for Medicare reimbursement and would have to repay $2,625,047 to the government program. At that point, A.P. and McGill directed staff to review patient files and discharge hospice patients. This resulted in a mass discharge of patients. In one month, 79 hospice patients were discharged in October 2007 and a total of 128 discharged by January 2008, some of whom had been ineligible for hospice or inappropriately maintained on hospice service in excess of six months. Some of the patients discharged were shifted to another hospice business owned by Kolodesh. In the spring of 2008, approximately 20 percent of the discharged patients were placed back on hospice service at HCH with McGill’s knowledge. McGill is charged in 14 counts; Shvets is charged in eight counts; Oqroshidze is charged in seven counts; Goltman is charged in four counts; and Koptykov is charged in eight counts.

If convicted of all charges, McGill faces a potential advisory sentencing guideline range of 108 to 135 months in prison, a fine of up to $150,000, and a $1400 special assessment; Shvets, Goltman, and Koptykov each face a potential advisory sentencing guideline range of 27 to 33 months in prison, a fine of up to $60,000, and an $800 special assessment; Oqroshidze faces a potential advisory sentencing guideline range of 21 to 27 months in prison, a fine of up to $50,000, and a $700 special assessment.

The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Health and Human Services-Office of Inspector General. It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Suzanne B. Ercole and Trial Attorney Margaret Vierbuchen of the Organized Crime and Gang Section in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division.

TOP-SECRET from Inside the CIA – CIA Narcotics Activities Having Domestic Implications

Citation: CIA Narcotics Activities Having Domestic Implications
[Attached to Divider Sheet, Heavily Excised Cover Sheet, and Memorandum; Includes Variation of Main Document], Secret, Memorandum, May 07, 1973, 5 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00050
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Narcotics Coordination Group. Chief
To: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Deputy Director
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Technical Services Division; United States. Department of Justice. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Subjects: Alias documentation | Covert identities | Domestic intelligence | Intelligence collection | Interagency cooperation | Narcotics | Photographic intelligence | Police assistance | United States citizens | Wiretapping
Abstract: Describes coordination with law enforcement agencies on intelligence gathering and reporting on U.S. citizens suspected of narcotics trafficking.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (94 KB)

Public Intelligence – Where’s the Evidence Against Staff Sergeant Robert Bales?

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In this Sunday, March 11, 2012 photo, men stand next to blood stains and charred remains inside a home where witnesses say Afghans were killed by a U.S. soldier in Panjwai, Kandahar province south of Kabul, Afghanistan.

The lawyer for the soldier accused of massacring seventeen people in a small Afghan village earlier this month has stated publicly that there is little or no evidence against his client.  John Henry Browne, who is defending Staff Sergeant Robert Bales, told NBC that the U.S. government’s prosecution of Bales will be difficult as “They have no bodies, they have no autopsies, they have no forensics, they have no photographs, they have no witnesses. There is no Afghan who is going to come here to testify against this guy, so how do they prove premeditation? It’s going to be a problem for them.”  In an interview with CBS, Browne reiterated this claim stating “There is no crime scene. There is no CSI stuff. There’s no DNA. There’s no fingerprints.”  Browne has also stated that there is “no evidence about how many alleged victims” or “of where those remains are.”

Given the state of war and turmoil in Afghanistan, this complete absence of evidence might seem plausible to those unfamiliar with the Afghan justice system or the military’s on-the-ground capabilities in the region.  However, for a number of years the U.S. military has operated complex forensic facilities in every region of Afghanistan capable of fingerprint and DNA analysis, ballistics testing, forensic chemistry and more.  In fact, collecting complex evidence to be used in the trials of Afghan insurgents is a common practice for U.S. soldiers.  Both the U.S. Army and ISAF have issued guides to soldiers regarding the collection of evidence in support of prosecution of insurgency crimes.

ISAF’s evidence collection guide details how to interview witnesses, perform chemical tests, collect DNA evidence, photograph the crime scene, analyze tire marks and footprints and how to eventually turn all this evidence over to Afghan courts while maintaining a chain of custody.  The U.S. Army’s guide similarly details sophisticated methods of evidence collection by “providing practical means and methods to properly identify, collect, preserve, and provide evidence that will be recognized and accepted by the Afghan criminal justice system.”  A presentation from the U.S. Army’s Office of the Provost Marshal General indicates that as of August 2011 there were three Joint Expeditionary Forensics Facilities (JEFFs) throughout Afghanistan including one in Kandahar, the same province where Staff Sgt. Bales reportedly committed the massacre.  These forensics facilities are capable of DNA analysis, latent print identification, photographic forensics, as well as chemical and ballistic analysis.  The presentation also indicates that there are centralized crime labs operated in coordination with the Afghan government capable of many of the same methods of forensic analysis.

While Browne’s claims could simply reflect that the U.S. military’s investigation of the incident is still in an early stage, the supposed lack of evidence is troubling given that many witnesses still maintain that more than one person was involved in the massacre, a belief supported by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.  After meeting with the victims’ family members, Karzai said that they did not believe it was possible for one man to kill seventeen people in different rooms of houses in multiple villages, drag the bodies into piles and burn them within such a limited period of time.   According to the Washington Post, survivors of the massacre have told family members that “There were 10 soldiers in our neighborhood alone.”  An Afghan parliamentary investigation found that it was widely reported by witnesses that up to twenty soldiers may have been involved and the BBC reported that residents heard helicopters that they believe were supporting the operation.

Though Staff Sgt. Bales has now been charged with seventeen counts of premeditated murder, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. military will present the same level of forensic evidence that it routinely collects and analyzes when attempting to prosecute suspected insurgents.

Secret – Washington D.C. Fusion Center: White Powder Letters Warning March 2012

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Since 2007 an unknown subject has sent more than 360 letters containing a white, powder substance to various government officials, public schools and other locations. In May, 2011 20 letters were delivered to public schools in Washington, DC. Over the past two days similar letters have been received in Washington, DC; New York, New York; Dallas, Texas and Enfield, Connecticut.

(U//FOUO) SCOPE

The WRTAC produces Information Bulletins in response to changes in the threat environment from terrorist attacks, natural hazards, criminal developments, and other events.

(U//FOUO) EVENT OVERVIEW

A series of “white powder letters” were received in the District of Columbia in October, 2010 and May, 2011. Similar letters were received at various locations around the country March 6, 2012 and additional letters may be in the mail system pending delivery. Specially trained response teams are prepared to investigate and collect any suspicious letters.

The letters are postmarked Dallas,Texas and contain a letter with the words AL AQEDA-FBI or similar language and contain a white powder. They are typically addressed using a computer printed label.

(U) Indicators of Suspicious Packages and Envelopes. Suspicious packages and envelopes often have characteristics that can alert handlers or recipients to potentially harmful contents.

• Inappropriate or unusual labeling:
• Excessive postage.
• A handwritten or poorly typed address.
• Misspellings of common words.
• Strange return address or no return address.
• Incorrect title or title without a name.
• Not addressed to a specific person.
• Marked with restrictions, such as “Personal,” “Confidential,” or “Do not X-ray.”
• Marked with threatening, insulting, or disparaging language.
• Postmarked from a city or state that does not match the return address.

(U) Appearance:

• Powdery substance felt through or visible on the package or envelope.
• Oily stains, discolorations, or odor.
• Lopsided or uneven envelope.
• Excessive packaging material such as masking tape or string.
• Other suspicious signs:
• Excessive weight.
o Ticking sound.
o Protruding wires or aluminum foil.

 

The FBI – Former NBA Player and CEO of The George Group Indicted in Ponzi Scheme

NEWARK—C. Tate George, former NBA basketball player and the CEO of purported real estate development firm The George Group, was indicted today by a Newark grand jury for allegedly orchestrating a $2 million investment fraud scheme, U.S. Attorney Paul J. Fishman announced.

George, 43, of Newark, was indicted on four counts of wire fraud. He was previously charged by criminal complaint with one count of wire fraud. He will be arraigned on the new charges in Newark federal court on a date to be determined.

According to the indictment and other documents filed in this case:

George, a former player for the New Jersey Nets and Milwaukee Bucks, held himself out as the CEO of The George Group and claimed to have more than $500 million in assets under management. He pitched prospective investors, including several former professional athletes, to invest with the firm and told them their money would be used to fund The George Group’s purchase and development of real estate development projects, including projects in Connecticut and New Jersey. George represented to some prospective investors that their funds would be held in an attorney trust account and personally guaranteed the return of their investments, with interest.

Based on George’s representations, investors invested more than $2 million in The George Group between 2005 and 2011, which he deposited in both the firm’s and his personal bank accounts. Instead of using investments to fund real estate development projects as promised, George used the money from new investors to pay existing investors in Ponzi scheme fashion. He also used some of the money for home improvement projects, meals at restaurants, clothing, and gas. The George Group had virtually no income-generating operations.

Under the wire fraud counts with which he is charged, George faces a maximum potential penalty of 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine for each count.

U.S. Attorney Fishman credited special agents of the FBI, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Michael B. Ward; postal inspectors of the USPIS, under the direction of Postal Inspector in Charge Philip R. Bartlett; and the Securities and Exchange Commission, under the direction of George S. Canellos, director of the New York Regional Office, with the investigation leading to today’s Indictment.

The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher J. Kelly of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Economic Crimes Unit in Newark.

The charges and allegations contained in the indictment are merely accusations and the defendant is considered innocent unless and until proven guilty.

If you believe you are a victim of or otherwise have information concerning this alleged scheme, you are encouraged to contact the FBI at 973-792-3000.

This case was brought in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

Defense counsel: Thomas R. Ashley Esq., Newark

TOP-SECET – U.S. Marine Corps Suicide Activity Report for February 2012

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CY 2008 national suicide rate adjusted for MC demographics

The 2008 national suicide rate adjusted for Marine Corps demographics is 20.7 per 100,000.

Calculating an adjusted national rate is important to accurately compare Marine Corps and national suicide rates, as in Figure 1.

The national adjusted suicide rate is calculated by taking Centers for Disease Control data, and changing the data to look more like the Marine Corps (mostly young and male). Adjusted civilian rates for CYs ’09 and ’10 will be calculated when the data is available.

Suicide Prevention Media Guidelines:

The Suicide Prevention Resource Center offers the following guidelines when using media to prevent suicide:

– Themes should be positive (e.g., “Life is worth living”) versus negative (e.g., “Don‟t kill yourself”).
– Depictions should not contain graphics or descriptions of methods of suicide (e.g., guns, pills, etc.) because that has been shown to lead to copycat suicides.
– The word „suicide‟ should not appear in titles or headlines.
– Scenes should depict desired behavior (e.g., Marines talking to other Marines), not undesired behavior (e.g., sitting isolated in a corner).
– Actors or models should not appear disheveled, depressed, or in obvious distress. They should appear normal, because there are often no obvious warning signs of distress, and close engagement is required to tell if someone may be at risk.

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Inside in the CIA – Item for the List of Delicate Matters

Citation: Item for the List of Delicate Matters
[Attached to Divider Sheet], Secret, Memorandum, May 07, 1973, 2 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00052
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Foreign Intelligence Staff. Chief
To: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Deputy Director
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Barreaux, Theodore C.; Colby, William E.; Houston, Laurence R.; Timmeny, Wallace L.; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. Deputy Director; United States. Securities and Exchange Commission; Vesco, Robert L.; Walsh, Paul V.; Young, David R.
Subjects: Corporations | Interagency cooperation | Investigations | Organized crime
Abstract: Reports on request from Securities and Exchange Commission for information on “foreign connections with organized crime” in the U.S.; notes Central Intelligence Agency’s release of banking transaction made by associate of Robert Vesco.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (39 KB)

Betreff: Neo-Nazi-Terrorbande – Beate Zschäpe soll bei Morden geholfen haben

Die mutmaßliche Terroristin Beate Zschäpe muss wegen der Neonazi-Mordserie womöglich als Mittäterin mit lebenslanger Haft rechnen. Es gebe viele Beweismittel, die belegten, dass Zschäpe “an den Taten beteiligt war, zumindest durch logistische Hilfe”, sagte Generalbundesanwalt Harald Range der “Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung”. Derzeit sei noch nicht klar, ob Zschäpe “an einem oder mehreren Tatorten” war.

Range zufolge arbeitet die Bundesanwaltschaft “mit Hochdruck” daran, Zschäpe eine Beteiligung an den Morden ihrer mutmaßlichen Komplizen Uwe Mundlos und Uwe Böhnhardt nachzuweisen. Viele Beweismittel belegten, “dass sie sehr genau wusste, was in den Köpfen von Mundlos und Böhnhardt vorgegangen ist und was sie getan haben”, sagte Range. “Wenn wir ihr die Mittäterschaft zum Mord nachweisen können, ist eine lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe die Konsequenz. Bei so vielen Morden kann das auch wirklich heißen: lebenslang”, unterstrich Range.

Zschäpe schweigt bislang zu ihrer Rolle in dem Neonazi-Trio, das nach seinem Abtauchen Ende der 1990er Jahre die Terror-Gruppe “Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund” (NSU) gegründet haben soll. Dem NSU werden zehn Morde, zwei Sprengstoffanschläge und eine Serie von Banküberfällen zur Last gelegt. Mundlos und Böhnhardt waren im November nach einem gescheiterten Banküberfall in Eisenach tot in einem Wohnmobil gefunden worden, Zschäpe stellte sich der Polizei.

Vor dem Hintergrund der jahrelang unentdeckt gebliebenen Terrorzelle forderte Range zudem eine Ausweitung der Rechte seiner Behörde. Die Bundesanwaltschaft brauche “mehr und klare Initiativrechte, um in der Lage zu sein, selbst zu prüfen und zu bewerten, ob wir in einem konkreten Fall zuständig sind”, sagte er der “FAS”.

Range betonte, bei der NPD sei keine systematische Hilfe für den NSU zu erkennen. Bei einzelnen Unterstützern gebe es eine personelle Überschneidung. “Eine strukturierte Unterstützung aus der NPD gab es nach unseren bisherigen Erkenntnissen aber nicht.” Laut “Focus” soll der NSU offenbar mehr Unterstützer gehabt haben als bisher bekannt. Darauf deuteten mehrere Ausweis-Dokumente hin, die in der abgebrannten Wohnung von Mundlos, Böhnhardt und Zschäpe in Zwickau sichergestellt worden seien. Dem Bericht zufolge fanden Polizisten im Brandschutt des Hauses die Personalausweise von drei Männern aus Sachsen im Alter von 29, 35 und 37 Jahren. Böhnhardt und Mundlos könnten sich demnach die Papiere besorgt haben, um ihre wahre Identität zu verschleiern.

Nach Informationen des “Spiegel” berichtete der als mutmaßlicher NSU-Unterstützer inhaftierte Holger G. den Ermittlern von erheblichen Spannungen innerhalb des Trios. So habe sich die Zelle einen heftigen Streit in Chemnitz geliefert und sich vorübergehend getrennt. Nach dem Streit, der beinahe handgreiflich geworden sei, habe Mundlos demnach zeitweise eine eigene Wohnung bezogen. Diese Aussage wird dem Magazin zufolge durch einen Mietvertrag für eine Wohnung in Zwickau untermauert, der auf die Aliaspersonalien von Mundlos ausgestellt war.

G. soll laut “Spiegel” darüber hinaus zu Protokoll gegeben haben, dass er von den untergetauchten Terroristen 10.000 Mark vermutlich aus Raubüberfällen zur “Aufbewahrung” erhalten habe. Die gleiche Summe habe auch der ebenfalls inhaftierte Ex-NPD-Funktionär Ralf Wohlleben von dem Trio erhalten.

Endorsement – Warum die FDP so wichtig ist

Liebe Leser,

die FDP ist in Deutschland die einzige Partei die konsequent liberal und wirtschaftsfreundlich ist.

Keine andere Partei ist damit den Umverteilern und Staaatsgläubigern so abhold.

Deshalb wollen sie die FDP  – auch über die Medien vernichten.

Das darf nicht sein:

Keine andere Partei ist so liberal im Denken und im Handeln – seit Jahrzehnten.

Keine andere Partei hat sich so entschieden für Bürgerrechte und gegen Nazis und STASI eingesetzt.

Unterstützen Sie die FDP, wenn Sie nicht wollen, dass Deutschland wieder  und weiter von mono-gläubigen, unfähigen Apparatschiks regiert wird !

Stärken Sie die Freiheitsliebe und wehren Sie sic gegen das getarnte sozialistische -kommunistische Gesocks.

Herzlichst Ihr

Wahrheitsliebender Bernd Pulch

Unternehmer seit 30 Jahren – (Ohne Staatshilfe, ohne Förderhilfe, ohne Investoren)

Nicht-Genosse, nicht-korrupt, nicht-erpressbar

Magister der Publizistik, Germanistik und Komparatistik

Erpresser-Mail von STASI-“GoMoPa” von mutmasslich “Gerd Bennewirtz” und “Peter Ehlers” beauftragt (Identitäten mutmasslich unklar)

HALLO KINDERFICKER PULCH UND SCHRAMM!!!

IER GEHT BALD DIE POST RICHTIG AB.
http://www…
http://www….
SO IN ETWA WIRD ES AUSSEHEN:
INTERNETJAGT AUF DIE KINDERFICKER BERND PULCH
UND STEFAN SCHRAMM!
http://www.yout….
AN DIESER STELLE KOMMEN PORNPGRAPHISCHE
FOTOS VON EUREN OPFER-KINDERN.
JETZT GEHT ES LOS PULCH UND SCHRAMM!!!
AUF ALLEN KANAELEN!!!

DAS IST DAS ORIGINAL MIT DEN GRAMMATIK-FEHLERN – NATÜRLICH LIEGEN ALLE DIESE ERPRSSER-MAILS- AUCH BEATE P VOR

RATEN SIE MAL WAS PASSIERT UND PASSIEREN WIRD  VON IHRER SEITE  ?

UND JETZT RATEN SIE MAL WAS WIR TUN WERDEN ?

GRATULIERE !

RICHTIG GERATEN !

Herzlichst Ihr
Nicht korrupter und nicht erpressbarer Bernd Pulch, MA der Publizistik, Germanistk und Komparatistik

DER VON DER STASI ERMORDETE JÖRG BERGER – “Blei- und Arsenverbindungen wurden mir ins Essen oder Trinken getan”

DFB Torwart-Trainer,  Jörg Berger und Jogi Löw – Jörg Berger: “Blei- und Arsenverbindungen wurden mir ins Essen oder Trinken getan”

Zitat: “Nach der Wende forderte man mich auf, meine Krankenakten an Professor Dr. Wolfgang Eisenmenger zu schicken, tätig am Institut für Rechtsmedizin der Münchner Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität. Er kam zu dem Ergebnis, dass es sich aufgrund der darin beschriebenen Symptome wahrscheinlich nicht um eine Viruserkrankung, sondern um eine Vergiftung gehandelt habe. Er konkretisierte dies auch noch in Hinsicht auf eine Schwermetallvergiftung aus der Gruppe der Blei- und Arsenverbindungen.

Die Stasi-Akten geben darüber keine klaren Auskünfte. Das einzige, was aus den Akten selber hervorgeht, ist, dass in der Zeit „agressives Verhalten gegenüber dem Feindbild Berger“ angesagt war. In meiner Lesart: Es ging ihnen bei mir nicht gerade um Mord, sondern darum, mich beruflich außer Gefecht zu setzen. Nicht umsonst hatte man mir wohl ein Gift gegeben, das Lähmungserscheinungen auslöst. Dennoch: In zu hoher Dosierung hätte es meine Gliedmaßen absterben lassen, aber auch zum Tode führen können. Dann wäre es doch ein Auftragsmord gewesen. Mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit hat mir jemand das Mittel in ein Getränk oder ins Essen getan. “

“Ich habe die Stasi unterschätzt”

Trainer Jörg Berger über seine “Republikflucht”, zerstochene Auto-Reifen und vergebliche Warnungen an Lutz Eigendorf.

Herr Berger, Otto Rehhagel hat Sie 1983 erst nach Informationen über Lok Leipzig ausfragt und anschließend zum Dank ins Weserstadion eingeladen. Sie lehnten ab. Warum?

Ich hätte mich damit zur Zielscheibe für die Stasi gemacht. So offensiv wollte ich mich dem DDR-System nicht präsentieren.

Rehhagel hat das damals allerdings überhaupt nicht verstanden.

Otto hat nie geglaubt, dass der Arm der Stasi bis nach Bremen reichen würde, dass die Stasi in Westdeutschland für mich eine Gefahr darstellen könnte.

Hätten Sie ihm das nicht erklären können? Gründe gab es doch genug.

Otto hätte mich nicht verstanden! Als ich meine Problematik vorsichtig andeutete, hat er gesagt: “Du bist doch im Westen, was soll dir schon passieren?” Mit Erklärungen habe ich mich lange zurückgehalten. Bis zu meiner Einsicht in die Stasi-Akten. Selbst meine Frau, die ich ja im Westen kennen gelernt hatte, hat mich manchmal gefragt:”Jörg, leidest du schon unter Verfolgungswahn?” Später hat sie sich dafür entschuldigt.

Sie haben sich insgesamt also sehr bedeckt gehalten?

Ich habe es zumindest immer versucht. Anders als Lutz Eigendorf, der sich sehr provokant inszeniert hat. Wenn Ost-Vereine in Westdeutschland gespielt haben, ist Lutz mit seinem großen Schlitten vorgefahren und hat – überspitzt formuliert – mit den großen Scheinen gewedelt. Der Erfolg von “Republikflüchtlingen” wie Lutz und mir war ein rotes Tuch für das DDR-Regime. Jedes Mal, wenn die uns gesehen haben, war das eine persönliche Niederlage. Ein Verräter, der im Westen gefeiert wird? Eine Katastrophe!

Wann wurde Ihnen bewusst, dass die Stasi auch im Westen hinter Ihnen her war?

Eigentlich schon in der deutschen Botschaft in Belgrad, nach meiner Flucht aus Subotica. Man sagte mir, in ganz Jugoslawien werde bereits nach mir gefahndet. So wichtig hatte ich mich dann doch nicht eingeschätzt. Im Aufnahmelager in Gießen wurde ich stundenlang vom BND und der CIA verhört. Da ist mir erst klar geworden, wie riskant meine Flucht war, welcher riesige Partei-Apparat dahinter steckt. Nach einer Woche in Westdeutschland wurde ich vom MfS (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Anm. d. Red.) unter Druck gesetzt. Vor meiner Flucht war ich mir sicher gewesen, im Westen die ganze DDR-Vergangenheit abzuschütteln.

Hätten Sie nicht auch einfach Sportlehrer auf dem Land werden können?

Dass ich Bundesliga-Trainer werde, hätte ich ja nie gedacht. Im Nachhinein wäre mein Fall bei der Stasi dann sicherlich schnell vergessen gewesen. Nur dachte ich damals: Je erfolgreicher und populärer du wirst, desto weniger traut sich die DDR an dich heran! Ich habe die Stasi unterschätzt. So lange, bis das mit Lutz Eigendorf passierte.

Als Eigendorf starb, haben Sie gleich gedacht: Das war Mord?

Sofort. Ich war im Stadion, als in der Halbzeit ein Journalist zu mir kommt und sagt: “Jörg, der Eigendorf ist tot.” Ich frage: “Wie und wo?” – “Mit dem Auto. In Braunschweig.” Danach habe ich zu meiner Frau gesagt: “Jetzt muss ich noch mehr aufpassen. Denen ist alles zuzutrauen.”

Was haben Sie konkret unternommen?

Mein Auto häufiger warten lassen. Reifen prüfen, die Bremsleitung untersuchen. Mir fiel auf, wie oft meine Reifen zerstochen waren. Einmal ist mir bei Tempo 160 das Rad abgefallen. Das war kein Zufall.

In einem Stasi-Eintrag über Eigendorfs Tod heißt es: “Eigendorf verblitzt.” Warum war er zur Zielscheibe geworden?

Lutz war ein Eigenbrötler, sehr von sich eingenommen und ziemlich unbedacht. Er hat dieses schicksalhafte Interview für “Kennzeichen D” direkt vor der Berliner Mauer gegeben, im Hintergrund sah man das Stadion vom BFC. Ich war einen Tag vorher da und sollte mich ebenfalls vor der Mauer befragen lassen. “Das könnt ihr gleich wieder vergessen”, habe ich gesagt. Lutz hat es gemacht. Das war quasi eine Aufforderung an alle Ost-Fußballer: Folgt mir in die Freiheit! Ich habe ihn gewarnt: “Lutz, so kannst du die nicht weiter provozieren, sonst bekommst du irgendwann einen Knüppel auf den Kopf!”

1986 bekamen Sie keinen Knüppel auf den Kopf, sondern wurden vergiftet.

Ich war inzwischen Trainer bei Hessen Kassel und litt plötzlich unter Lähmungen. Zuerst wurde der Fuß taub, dann das Bein und die Hände. Alles war wie abgestorben. Vermutlich eine Schwermetall-Vergiftung, irgendwas wurde mir auf jeden Fall ins Essen getan

Wie hat der Westen darauf reagiert?

Das wurde schnell unter den Tisch gekehrt. Der Tod von Eigendorf, meine Vergiftung: das hätte die diplomatischen Beziehungen zur DDR nur gestört. Offiziell sollte ich vom BND abgeschirmt werden, später habe ich in meinen Stasi-Akten gelesen, dass die Mielke-Behörde tatsächlich über jeden meiner Schritte in Westdeutschland Bescheid wusste.

Wie haben Sie das Ende der DDR erlebt?

Das Regime war für mich gestorben, die DDR abgehakt, nicht aber die Menschen. Meine gesamten Ersparnisse hätte ich darauf verwettet, dass die Grenze niemals wieder geöffnet werden würde. Als die Mauer fiel, war das für mich der politisch bewegendste Moment in meinem Leben. Ich dachte: Was ist denn jetzt passiert? Was hat das für Folgen? Ich habe geheult, ich habe gejubelt. Und wieder geheult. Andere haben Champagner getrunken.

Nach der Wende sind viele Ex-“Genossen” in neuen Ämtern aufgetaucht, auch im Fußball. Sie beschreiben die Szene, als Sie Wolfgang Riedel wieder sehen …

… ausgerechnet den Mann, der mich als Leiter unserer Verbandsdelegation in Jugoslawien nach meiner Flucht durch das ganze Land gejagt hatte. Ein absoluter Hardliner. 100 Prozent SED-treu. Der läuft mir auf der Treppe in der Otto-Fleck-Schneise entgegen, Riedel war inzwischen beim DFB gelandet. Hätte ich dem zwölf Jahre vorher gesagt, wie toll der DFB ist, wäre meine Karriere beendet gewesen. Wenn meine Frau nicht dabei gewesen wäre, ich hätte mich auf den gestürzt! Nach der Wende hat man sich im Fußball nicht genügend um Aufklärung bemüht. Sie glauben doch nicht, dass jemand vom DFB wieder eine ähnliche Position im DDR-Verband bekommen hätte?

Hätten Sie die Verbandsführung nicht aufklären können?

Wie denn? Damals hatte ich doch noch gar keine handfesten Beweise. Die fielen mir erst später in die Hand, bei der Einsicht in meine Stasiakten. Mir hätte direkt nach der Wende kein Mensch geglaubt

Secret – The CIA – Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

Citation: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities
[Central Intelligence Agency Funds for Federal Bureau of Investigation], Secret, Memorandum, May 07, 1973, 1 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00056
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Plans. Missions and Programs Staff
From: Sherman, Edward L.
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Angleton, James; Briggs, Charles; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Technical Services Division; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Executive Director; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Subjects: Government appropriations and expenditures | Interagency cooperation
Abstract: Reveals that Central Intelligence Agency funds were made available to Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (22 KB)

TOP-SECRET – The CIA Training of Foreign Police Forces

Citation: [Training of Foreign Police Forces; Attached to Divider Sheet and Routing Sheet; Includes Attachments Entitled “Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group Activities”; “Joint CIA/USAID Terrorist (Technical) Investigations Course #7 (English Language) CI Staff’s Project [Excised]”; “Facts and Statistics”; and “National Security: Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead”]
Secret, Compendium, April 25, 1973, 16 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00059
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency
To: Halpern, Sam
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Abshire, David M.; Allen, Richard V.; Angleton, James; Burke, Arleigh A.; Colby, William E.; Dade County (Florida). Police Department. Bomb Squad; International Police Academy; Mitrione, Daniel A.; Schlesinger, James R.; Tupamaros (Uruguay); United States Park Police; United States. Agency for International Development. Office of Public Safety; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Counterintelligence Staff. Chief; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Counterintelligence Staff. Police Group; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Deputy Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Technical Services Division; United States. Department of the Treasury. Office of Enforcement; United States. Secret Service
Subjects: Biographical intelligence | Bombings | Developing countries | Diplomatic security | Explosives detection | Foreign policy | Government appropriations and expenditures | Intelligence collection | Interagency cooperation | International trade | Investigations | Latin America | Murders | Police assistance | Sabotage | Sanctions | Target analysis | Terrorism | Uruguay
Abstract: Provides overview of coordination among Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and International Police Academy for training of foreign police and security forces; assesses potential use of aid and trade relationships to affect change in foreign governments.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (1.1 MB)

NEUE DROHMAIL DER STASI DER “GoMoPa” MUTMASSSLICH IM AUFTRAG VON GERD BENNEWIRTZ UND PETER EHLERS

Hey kids fucker Pulch. The new year has nasty 
surprises for you child and mother fucker.
The Internet never sleeps. We wish you a good time.


Hier der die Info zu dem "GoMoPa"-"Kinderportal":

http://www.victims-opfer.com/?p=22832

DER SCHELM DENKT WIE ER IST SIND AUCH ANDERE - MITNICHTEN

Cryptome – Quantum Computation Cognitive Footprint

A sends a comment from Schneier on Security:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/01/authentication_1.html

Slightly Weird claim: Cognitive Footprint Biometric Application has been around for years

A ‘cognitive footprint’ biometric analysis system based on keyboard and mouse movements, combined with software-use behavior, has been in production for years. I’ve known of it since 2004 with a high degree of confidence, but I’m generally wise enough not to discuss it. I tinker with AI and neural networks (NN) myself, and am an expert software engineer, so I can reliably tell you that it’s not particularly hard to build such a system at the toy/theoretical level. It’s probably quite hard to implement it well in the real world.

My browser-centric toy model of a cognitive footprint biometric application used JavaScript to track keyboard and mouse interaction, which then passed time-parsed data to a neural network for classification. With an ordinary (non-recurrent) neural network the above comments about error rates and edge cases are very accurate. However, with access to an advanced recurrent neural network I’m pretty sure that the error rate could be reduced to a level low enough for effective use in combination with other authentication methods.

___________

Thoroughly Outlandish Claim: Five Eyes got production QC power in 1995

A real-world functional cognitive footprint biometric application requires an advanced recurrent neural network. The recurrent neural network that now powers this app is (literally) related to or descended from a classified system built to crack public-private key cryptography in the 90s.

The Five Eyes (AUS CAN NZ UK US) have had access to practical, production quantum computer power since about 1995. Other groups may have had access since that era, but that’s a moot point. I strongly suspect that both China and Russia later developed operational QCs along similar principles.

The QC approach that actually works, in a production-ready scale-able way, is to run a virtual Turing machine atop a winner-take-all-style teleportation/entanglement-based recurrent topological quantum neural network (QNN). Even a basic neural network is Turing Complete, because a NN can perfectly emulate an XOR gate, and multiple XOR gates can be used to construct a Turing machine. A quantum neural network can emulate a quantum Turing machine.

The underlying physical system for this type of QNN is interactions between non-abelian anyons in a two dimensional electron gas (2DEG). The primary math required is a branch of Knot Theory called Braid Theory. Obviously, the primary purpose of this system, from the Five Eyes/Echelon perspective, is to run Shor’s algorithm to crack public/private key cryptography. A perusal of current known quantum algorithms, combined with a survey of current advanced AI applications, may suggest other uses.

___________

Not especially Weird Claim: There’s a really nifty back story about how this new general technology was developed, and why it matters. It is worthy of a book by Neal Stephenson.

The subject of the 1985 Nobel Prize in Physics was the “quantum Hall effect”, which opened up new avenues of research into quantum effects, esp. in two dimensional electron gases. The process of creating a working quantum neural network involved generating lots of anyons (soliton-type standing waves treated as particles) in a two dimensional electron gas and then exploring and measuring the results.

The cleverest aspect of inventing this new technology was to take this ‘Anyon Soup’ system to the edge of chaos, per the life work of Stuart Kauffman, and then exploit the emergent neural network to bootstrap itself into a more stable and usable system via evolutionary programming techniques. See Kauffman’s publications for details on how and why this emergent neural network exists, and then consider it’s environment to see why it is a quantum neural network. This author believes Stuart Kauffman is overdue for a Nobel Prize.

The original work inventing this new technology was done between 1990 and 1995. It would be hard to do this work methodically without stumbling on the previously unknown fractional quantum Hall effect. The discoverers of this effect were awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize in Physics, and now lead various Quantum Computing research institutes.

Someone, somewhere, is due to be awarded the Grand Prize Turing Award, for solving Turing’s unfinished Morphogenesis problem, and then implementing Turing’s original machine on the resulting artificially intelligent ‘organism’. I’m inclined towards neither spiritualism nor whimsy, but were I so, then I might suspect that, after he died in 1954, Alan Turing reincarnated quickly, in 1965, in order to finish his incomplete life work. The classified nature of the work probably precludes any awards.

I’d really like it if this whole thing was declassified, but fear we’ll have to wait many additional decades for that. This QNN is an excellent candidate to pursue adiabatic (reversible) computing, might be helpful for certain approaches to advanced nanotechnology, and, were it declassified, might also be helpful to many other scientific ventures. Per the Ultra Secret, it’s undoubtedly still considered ‘national security’, even if it’s becoming an open secret within the Intelligence Community.

— Energyscholar

The FBI Financial Intelligence – Center Getting Ahead of Crime

FIC seal

Investigating financial crime is like working a puzzle—you have to fit all of the pieces of information together in order to see the entire picture. The FBI’s Financial Intelligence Center in Washington, D.C., does just that, linking disparate pieces of data to give our field investigators a clearer picture of possible criminal activity in their regions.

The center was established in the fall of 2009 in response to the financial crisis at that time—its mission was to identify potential investigative targets engaged in mortgage fraud. Because of its success, the center’s focus expanded to include other types of financial crimes, like securities/commodities fraud, health care fraud, money laundering, fraud against the government, and even public corruption (which usually involves financial wrongdoing of some sort).

The center is staffed primarily by intelligence analysts and staff operations specialists. Their first order of business is to review large datasets that come from the FBI, other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, consumer complaint websites, etc. Computer programs cull out data with common themes (i.e., similar scams, similar names). That data is researched and analyzed to help further identify potential subjects and/or activity, and the results are organized using spreadsheets and link analysis in order to draw connections among all the key players. If there is good reason to believe that criminal activity exists, the results are summarized in an intelligence package and sent to the appropriate field office.

During fiscal year 2011, FBI offices opened dozens of investigations based on the center’s intelligence packages.

Current initiatives. In response to some of the most serious financial crimes, the Financial Intelligence Center is working on a number of specific initiatives, such as:

  • Foreclosure rescue fraud, where analysts collect and analyze deceptive practices complaint data from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which is then cross-referenced with suspicious activity reports filed by financial institutions;
  • Securities and corporate fraud, in which the center partners with the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to review civil referrals for possible criminal violations;
  • Health care fraud, which involves us working with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) and the Department of Justice on a new predictive modeling system that uses algorithms to generate lists of medical professionals potentially engaging in health care fraud; and
  • Money laundering, in which analysts review incoming intelligence from the FBI’s Southwest Border Initiative to determine if subjects are laundering proceeds from criminal activities.

Although the center’s primary mission is to identify those who may have thus far escaped the law enforcement lens, it also uses its tools and expertise to enhance current investigations that feature large numbers of subjects and multiple FBI offices.

Of course, we don’t do this alone—we work closely with our partners. As a matter of fact, our analysts are currently or will soon be embedded in the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the SEC, the Internal Revenue Service, the FTC, and the CMS….to expand even further the pool of data that can be used by all to uncover financial crime.

The bottom line of the FBI’s Financial Intelligence Center: to work proactively to help identify the nation’s most egregious criminal enterprises.

Cryptome – Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of Justice Joint Statement

REVISED GUIDELINES ISSUED TO ALLOW THE NCTC TO ACCESS AND ANALYZE CERTAIN FEDERAL DATA MORE EFFECTIVELY TO COMBAT TERRORIST THREATS

Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Attorney General Eric Holder, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Matthew G. Olsen have signed updated guidelines designed to allow NCTC to obtain and more effectively analyze certain data in the government s possession to better address terrorism-related threats, while at the same time protecting privacy and civil liberties.

The Guidelines for Access, Retention, Use, and Dissemination by the National Counterrorism Center (NCTC) of Information in Datasets Containing Non-Terrorism Information effective Mar. 22, 2012, update November 2008 guidelines that governed NCTC s access, retention, use, and dissemination of terrorism information contained within federal datasets that are identified as also including non-terrorism information and information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism.

The updated Guidelines provide a framework that allows NCTC to obtain certain data held by other U.S. Government agencies to better protect the nation and its allies from terrorist attacks.  In coordination with other federal agencies providing data to the NCTC, NCTC will establish the timeline for the retention of individual datasets based upon the type of data, the sensitivity of the data, any legal requirements that apply to the particular data, and other relevant considerations.

Among other modifications, the revised Guidelines:

  • Permit NCTC to retain certain datasets that are likely to contain significant terrorism information and are already in the lawful custody and control of other federal agencies for up to five years, unless a shorter period is required by law.
  • Permit NCTC to query this data only to identify information that is reasonably believed to constitute terrorism information.
  • Provide that all data obtained by NCTC from another federal agency pursuant to the Guidelines, will be subject to appropriate safeguards and oversight mechanisms, including monitoring, recording, and auditing of access to and queries of the data, to protect privacy and civil liberties.
  • Require NCTC to undertake a number of additional compliance and reporting obligations to ensure robust oversight.

The updated Guidelines do not provide any new authorities for the U.S. Government to collect information, nor do they authorize acquisition of data from entities outside the federal government.  All information that would be accessed by NCTC under the Guidelines is already in the lawful custody and control of other federal agencies.  The Guidelines merely provide the NCTC with a more effective means of accessing and analyzing datasets in the government s possession that are likely to contain significant terrorism information.  They permit NCTC to consolidate disparate federal datasets that contain information of value to NCTC s critical counterterrorism mission.  Furthermore, the updated Guidelines do not supersede or replace any legal restrictions on information sharing (existing by statute, Executive Order, regulation, or international agreement).  Thus, the updated Guidelines do not give NCTC authority to require another agency to share any dataset where such sharing would contravene U.S. law or an international agreement.

One of the issues identified by Congress and the Intelligence Community after the 2009 Fort Hood shootings and the Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt was the government s limited ability to query multiple federal datasets and to correlate information from many sources that might relate to a potential attack.  A review of government actions taken before these attacks recommended that the Intelligence Community push for the completion of state-of-the-art search and correlation capabilities, including techniques that would provide a single point of entry to various government databases.

Following the failed terrorist attack in December 2009, representatives of the counterterrorism community concluded it is vital for NCTC to be provided with a variety of datasets from various agencies that contain terrorism information, said Clapper, The ability to search against these datasets for up to five years on a continuing basis as these updated Guidelines permit will enable NCTC to accomplish its mission more practically and effectively than the 2008 Guidelines allowed.

The updated Guidelines have undergone extensive review within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice and have been coordinated throughout the Intelligence Community.  Under the National Security Act of 1947, NCTC is charged with serving as the primary organization in the U.S. Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism.  Consistent with this statutory mission, Executive Order 12333 provides that Intelligence Community elements may collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States Persons (USPs) only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence Community element and approved by the Attorney General in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.

The 2008 Guidelines required NCTC to promptly review USP information and then promptly remove it if it is not reasonably believed to constitute terrorism information.  This approach was a reasonable first step in 2008, but based on subsequent experience and lessons learned, the requirement to promptly remove USP information hampers NCTC s ability to identify terrorism information by connecting the dots across multiple datasets.

There are a number of protections built into the 2012 revised Guidelines, said Alexander Joel, ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer. Before obtaining a dataset, the Director of NCTC, in coordination with the data provider, is required to make a finding that the dataset is likely to contain significant terrorism information.

Once ingested, data is subject to a number of baseline safeguards carried over from the 2008 Guidelines, including restrictions that limit access to only those individuals with a mission need and who have received training on the Guidelines.

The approval of these Guidelines will significantly improve NCTC s ability to carry out its statutory mission said Clapper, Our citizens expect that we do everything in our power to keep them safe, while protecting privacy and other civil liberties. These Guidelines provide our counterterrorism analysts with the means to accomplish that task more effectively.

###

NCTC Guidelines: http://cryptome.org/2012/03/nctc-data-spy.pdf (2.2MB)

TOP-SECRET – The CIA Crown Jewels – The CIA and Allende

Citation: The CIA and Allende
[Editorial on U.S. Involvement in Foreign Matters], Non-Classified, Article, April 12, 1973, 1 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00042
Origin: Baltimore News American
From: Roche, John P.
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Allende Gossens, Salvador; Colby, William E.; Dulles, John Foster; International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Organization of American States; Roosevelt, Theodore
Subjects: Assassinations | Chile | Coffee industry | Congressional investigations | Covert operations | Dominican Republic | Egypt | Elections | Foreign assistance | Foreign investments | Foreign policy | News media | Panama | Trujillo, Rafael Assassination (1961)
Abstract: Reveals U.S. covert operations in other countries and debates ethics of U.S. intervention in foreign matters.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (63 KB)

TOP-SECRET from the CIA – Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August 1972) Conventions

Citation: Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August 1972) Conventions
[Attached to Divider Sheet; Includes Attachments Entitled “CIA Support to the Secret Service for the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, July 9-15, 1972” and “Democratic National Convention–Miami, Florida–July 9-15, 1972”], Secret, Memorandum, June 23, 1972, 7 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00055
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Plans. Western Hemisphere Division. Chief
From: Shackley, Theodore G.
To: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Executive Director-Comptroller
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Angleton, James; Helms, Richard M.; Rowley, James J.; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Deputy Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Operations. Counterintelligence Staff. Chief; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Plans. Acting Deputy Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Plans. Deputy Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Executive Director-Comptroller; United States. Secret Service
Subjects: Caribbean Region | Cuban exiles | Democratic National Convention (1972) | Domestic intelligence | Intelligence collection | Interagency cooperation | Latin America | Miami (Florida) | Project JMCOBRA | Project JMFALCON | Republican National Convention (1972) | Safe houses | Security personnel
Abstract: Documents coordination efforts between Central Intelligence Agency and Secret Service in preparation for 1972 Democratic and Republican National Conventions.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (205 KB)

The FBI – $1 Million Reward Offered for Missing Retired FBI Agent

 

Robert Levinson image array

This week marks the fifth anniversary of Robert Levinson’s disappearance, and the FBI today announced a reward of up to $1 million for information leading to the safe recovery and return of the retired special agent.

 

Levinson, who retired from the FBI in 1998 after 22 years of service, was working as a private investigator when he traveled to Kish Island, Iran on March 8, 2007. He has not been seen or heard from publicly since he disappeared the following day. In 2010, a video showing him in captivity was sent to the Levinson family by his captors.

 

Supporting the Levinson FamilySociety of Former Special Agents

The Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI announced this week that it will give the two youngest Levinson children $5,000 each to help with college costs.

“Bob is part of the FBI family,” said Brad Benson, the society’s president. “We are trying to help carry out what he would be doing for his children if he were home. We also want to commend and support the fact that Bob’s family has pulled together so heroically.”

The FBI is responsible for investigating crimes committed against U.S. citizens abroad. We have been working since 2007 to obtain information about Levinson’s whereabouts and well-being.

 

“On the fifth anniversary of Bob’s disappearance, the FBI continues to follow every lead into his abduction and captivity,” said James W. McJunkin, assistant director in charge of our Washington Field Office. “We are committed to bringing Bob home safely to his family. We hope this reward will encourage anyone with information, no matter how insignificant they may think it is, to come forward. It may be the clue that we need to locate Bob.”

“Though he is retired from the FBI, Bob remains a member of the FBI family to this day,” said Director Robert S. Mueller, “and his family is our family. Like all families, we stand together in good times and in times of adversity. Today, we stand together to reaffirm our commitment to Bob Levinson.”

 

“I am very grateful that the FBI has offered this reward,” said Levinson’s wife Christine. “Our family believes the only way of resolving this issue successfully is with the FBI’s help. It has been an extremely difficult time for my family,” she said. “We all thought Bob would be home by now. But five years have passed, and we still don’t know why he’s being held, who has him, or where he is.”

 

Levinson will celebrate his 64th birthday on March 10. In addition to his wife of 37 years, Levinson has seven children and two grandchildren. The family has been working tirelessly to bring Levinson home safely. “Our youngest son is about to graduate from high school,” Christine Levinson said. “He was in middle school when his father disappeared.”

 

In March 2011, the U.S. secretary of state issued a statement that the U.S. government had received indications that Levinson was being held by a group in southwest Asia. That region includes the border areas of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. A publicity campaign is being launched this week in southwest Asia to heighten awareness of Levinson’s abduction, announce the $1,000,000 reward, and solicit information. Billboards, radio messages, and flyers will be used to publicize the reward and the investigation. A telephone tip line will be provided to listeners and viewers in that region so that they can confidentially provide information.

 

“We’re never going to give up,” Christine Levinson said. “Our goal is to get Bob home. We miss him every single day.”

Confidential – The Department of Justice’s Principles for Conducting Online Undercover Operations

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/two-versions.jpg

 

In 1999 the Department of Justice convened a working group to discuss the increasingly technological makeup of criminal organizations and the challenges law enforcement face when conducting online investigations.  The Online Investigations Working Group included members of the FBI, Treasury, Secret Service, IRS, ATF, Air Force and even NASA who worked to produce a series of general principles governing the legality of online investigative practices.  The working group came up with eleven principles governing everything from basic information gathering to undercover operations and wrote a final report titled “Online Investigative Principles for Federal Law Enforcement Agents” that detailed the group’s findings.  Though it was originally marked as “Sensitive Law Enforcement Information,” a significant portion of the document was released to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in 2004.  However, several very significant portions of the document that discuss online undercover operations were released in a heavily redacted form.  These sections are highly relevant to understanding law enforcement’s pursuit of the hacktivist group Anonymous and the recent case of LulzSec leader “Sabu” who operated for nearly six months as a FBI informant after his arrest in June 2011.

Though it was written over a decade ago, the principles described in the DoJ’s guide for federal agents offer tremendous insight into the legal reasoning behind many tactics used by law enforcement to gather evidence in online settings.  These tactics can range from the basic, such as using internet search tools or looking up an IP address, to the more advanced, like creating undercover online identities and websites to gather incriminating information.  When the document was first released to EPIC in 2004, two sections were entirely redacted for the reason that they “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions.”  The first section covered Principle 7 of online investigations “Online Undercover Facilities” which describes how “just as law enforcement agencies may establish physical-world undercover entities, they also may establish online undercover facilities, such as bulletin board systems, Internet service providers, and World Wide Web sites, which covertly offer information or services to the public.”  The second section removed from the document discussed Principle 9 “Appropriating Online Identities” which occurs when “a law enforcement agent electronically communicates with others by deliberately assuming the known online identity (such as the username) of a real person, without obtaining that person’s consent.”

The document’s description of online undercover facilities states that federal agents may operate websites, web-based services and even ISPs either directly or indirectly in order to obtain evidence in a criminal case.  An example of such an operation is provided:

As part of a project to identify and prosecute computer criminals, a law enforcement agency considers a proposal to operate a World Wide Web site with information about and computer programs for hacking, links to other hacker sites, and a facility to allow people who access the site to discuss hacking techniques. The proposal would allow the law enforcement agents running the site to track all visitors, and monitor all communications among the users. Because this proposal would establish an online undercover facility that would do more than just provide information or a means to contact agents, the consultation requirement applies to this proposal.

This means that if you are the subject of a high-level criminal investigation, online services that you use, such as a VPN or server provider, could in fact be part of an elaborate law enforcement operation and access to your private user information may have been gained either surreptitiously or through direct consent of the service’s legitimate operators. In addition to setting up false web facilities, federal agents may also seize someone’s “online identity” to communicate with others and gather evidence while representing themselves as the owner of the seized identity.  The recent case of LulzSec leader/FBI informant Sabu is actually different than this because Hector Xavier Monsegur, the individual who used the name Sabu and operated its associated Twitter account, gave law enforcement permission to use his identity to gain evidence from other users.  This method is also covered in the document under Principle 8 “Communicating Through the Online Identity of a Cooperating Witness, With Consent.”

 

Confidential an Diego Fusion Center: The Role of the Firefighter Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO)

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(U//FOUO) Valued Access and Role of the Firefighter TLO: Firefighters’ roles as a first responder and an emergency medical service allow for unique access to people and information, which can generate invaluable tips and leads. Because the presence and effectiveness of firefighters mitigate the impact of a terrorist incident involving massive human casualties, terrorists have historically conducted preoperational planning that target firefighting agencies in order to limit the effectiveness of their reaction capabilities.

(U//FOUO) The following case studies provide details on how and why terrorists have historically conducted targeting and preoperational planning on firefighting organizations. Additionally, this bulletin will address related terrorist techniques and activities that will help the Fire TLO identify and report terrorist related activity.

(U//FOUO) Terrorist surveillance techniques and indicators of terrorist activities:

• Unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel, entry points and access controls, or perimeter fences or walls.
• Dry runs: attempting to gain access to secure facilities or bypassing security.
• Unusual behavior such as watching or documenting personnel or vehicles entering or leaving designated facilities or parking areas.
• Attempts to determine the number of security personnel and shift changes.
• Increase in anonymous telephone or e‐mail threats to facilities in conjunction with suspected surveillance incidents.
• Two or three individuals, on foot, demonstrating a combination of observation and recording data (i.e., note‐taking, photography, filming).

TOP-SECRET – ISAF Guide to Collecting Evidence for Prosecution in Afghan Courts

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A Guide to Collecting Evidence for Prosecution in Afghan Courts

For the National Security Prosecutor’s Unit (NSPU) or a provincial court to prosecute and convict detainees, including Afghan murder suspects or National Security criminals, capturing units must provide evidence and witness statements against the suspects for use in an Afghan court of law. Appropriate evidence collection may result in admissible evidence in support of effective prosecutions. Turn all evidence associated with the suspect over to Afghan authorities and obtain a thoroughly documented receipt for the evidence.

Evidence collection may also be necessary without an actual detention. Operators may find weapons, documents, or other items that should be collected as evidence, even if no one is detained.

To the greatest extent possible, in order to increase the likelihood of admissibility in the Afghan courts, evidence collection and case preparation should be performed by Afghan partnering forces.

This booklet is a guide. Your local prosecutor or judge may require a slightly different format or type of evidence. Your evidence may be tailored to fit your local court’s requirements if necessary.

Prior to the Operation.

Each tactical unit conducting an operation will appoint an evidence collection team (a.k.a. Site Exploitation (SE) team) who will plan for, collect, receive, and handle all evidence seized during the operation. This team will be properly trained on evidence collection and handling procedures and will include an Afghan partnering member.

Whenever possible, obtain a search warrant before an operation where you plan to collect evidence. If the warrant is not obtained in advance, your unit should ensure that a warrant is obtained after the operation.

Planning and Equipment

During planning for a specific operation, the team will consider the following issues and prepare accordingly:

Possible evidence
• Documents
• Weapons
• IED components / explosives
• Drugs
• Witness statements (Interpreters!)

 

DOWNLOAD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

 

The NSA – Holder Responds to Rosemary Award


Director of the DOJ Office of Information Policy, Melanie Pustay, US Assistant Attorney General and Chief FOIA Officer Tony West, and US Attorney General Eric Holder, sit beneath the Spirit of Justice in the Department of Justice’s Great Hall.

Washington, DC, March 22, 2012 – Attorney General Eric Holder kicked off Sunshine Week 2012 by rehashing widely discredited statistics released by the Department of Justice after it was awarded the Rosemary Award by the National Security Archive for the worst open government performance by a federal agency in 2011.

In his speech, Holder stated that Department of Justice’s work on FOIA was “nothing short of remarkable,” but – just as his recent speech on the legality of assassinating Americans did not mention the “targeted killing” of al-Awlaki – Holder did not mention or refute his department’s Rosemary Award, or the reasons the DOJ was awarded it. His department’s open government failures included the DOJ Office of Information Policy’s attempt to issue new regulations that (among other steps backward) would have allowed the agency to lie to FOIA requesters and exclude online media from news media reduced fee status; the “odd” argument made to the Supreme Court by the DOJ’s Assistant Solicitor General that the Freedom of Information Act should become a withholding rather than a disclosure statute; and the DOJ’s “war on leakers” which has surely had a chilling effect upon –to use Holder’s own words– “the sacred bond of trust which must always exists between the government and those we are privileged to serve.”

Holder did, however, repeat claims from a Department of Justice press release posted just after being awarded the Rosemary Award, boasting of a 94 percent FOIA release rate and a 26 percent reduction in FOIA backlog. A National Security Archive analysis of the DOJ’s release rate shows that the DOJ excluded nine of the eleven reasons that the Department denied documents to requesters from its count. These include denials based upon: fees (pricing requesters out); referrals (passing the request off to another agency while the requester still waits); “no records” (very frequently the result of inadequate searches by DOJ employees); and requests “improper for other reasons” (which ostensibly include the “can neither confirm nor deny” glomar exemption).

What Holder did not mention was that when the full eleven reasons for denial are factored in, the Department of Justice’s “release rate” is a much more believable 56.7 percent. Melanie Pustay, head of the DOJ Office of Information Policy since 2007, also spoke. She boasted that Department of FOIA officials are using “new and creative” methods to improve FOIA output. Unfortunately, these methods appear to include “new and creative” math that obfuscates the true number of documents released under FOIA in an attempt to portray the Department of Justice in a better light. Josh Gerstein recently reported in Politico that one other “new and creative” method that the Federal Bureau of Investigation used to reduce its backlog was to simply close some requests even though the requesters “may not always have been notified.”

Dan Metcalfe, founding director and 25-year veteran of the Justice Department’s Office of Information and Privacy (now called the Office of Information Policy), agrees. The Atlantic Wire reported his judgment that, “The department’s most recent backlog reduction claim appears to be grossly wrong.” Metcalfe pointed out that to boast of a reduced backlog, the DOJ omitted data about 3,081 other “pending FOIA requests” that have not been responded to, but could not all technically be overdue. When these “pending” requests are factored in, the Department of Justice achieved a much more modest 4.5 percent decrease in actual outstanding requests, over a two-year period. According to Metcalfe, “For [the Department of Justice] to falsely claim that it ‘continues to lead by example’ has now become sad to the point of being pathetic, as is the notion that it is doing more today than ever in the past to promote FOIA disclosure.”

A FOIA survey by the Associated Press also debunks the Department of Justice’s claims about sky-high FOIA release rates government-wide. Pustay used similarly misleading math to claim an astounding 92 percent FOIA release rate across all government agencies. The Associated Press surveyed the 37 largest FOIA agencies and found a much more plausible 65 percent release rate. Unlike the Department of Justice, the Associated Press survey tallied all denials of requests including fee denials, “no records” denials, and referrals to other agencies.

It’s unclear why the Attorney General chose to regurgitate these flawed statistics. Perhaps, he simply read what the Office of Information Policy provided him, without double checking the facts. Perhaps he actually placed more importance on scoring favorable headlines than presenting a clear picture of the DOJ’s progress on FOIA. No matter the reason, the discredited figures he cited in his speech went far in disproving DOJ spokeswoman Tracy Schmaler’s bold assertion that, “Anyone who knows anything about the Freedom of Information Act will tell you that the Department of Justice is doing more than ever to promote openness and transparency under that act.”

An analysis of the DOJ’s annual FOIA reports also shows that the DOJ’s three leadership offices, the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, and the Office of the Associate Attorney General have some of the worst FOIA results within the Department of Justice. As Holder “celebrated and showcased” the Department of Justice’s FOIA progress, the combined backlog of his own leadership offices had risen 35.27 percent since fiscal year 2010. Troublingly, the Office of Information Policy is responsible for processing FOIA requests at the DOJ leadership offices. How can Americans trust the DOJ OIP to reform FOIA throughout the federal government, when it can’t even improve the backlog in its own department’s leadership offices? As Senator Grassley told OIP Chief Pustay during last year’s Sunshine Week, “The president set a very high benchmark [on FOIA]. And if we’re doing the same thing after two and a half years of this administration, the same as we’ve been doing for 20 years, the president’s benchmark isn’t being followed by the people he appoints.”

Today’s presentation did provide some room from optimism from agencies other than the DOJ that have taken bold steps to improve their FOIA process. The Federal Communications Commission now proactively posts its proceedings on its relaunched, search-centered website. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission harnessed the power of e-discovery tools and electronic delivery of records to push out documents about the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe. The Social Security Administration set up a FOIA process evaluation working group to evaluate its FOIA efficiency. The Department of the Interior completed a complete “reorganization” of the FOIA office, led by the Secretary of the Interior; FOIA officials are now required to send monthly summaries of overdue FOIA requests.

However each of these FOIA reforms was created by individual agencies, and the Department of Justice has done very little –three years after Holder’s FOIA memorandum– to effect this kind of government-wide, rather than piecemeal, FOIA change.

At the Department of Justice, Holder proclaimed that he “is committed to this work,” and announced a new search pane for the FOIA.gov website –essentially a pane that simply shows the results of a google search with “site:.gov” added at the end. His promises to post monthly FOIA logs of requests to the Attorney General’s office and to eventually incorporate the FOIA.gov search and tracking into the AG’s FOIA webpage are baby steps in the correct direction. But Holder did not comment on his agency’s 21.8 percent increase its use of the b(5) “deliberative process” exemption, a key indicator showing the DOJ’s backsliding on discretionary releases. Holder also did not mention the US government’s increased reliance on the b(1) national security exemption to censor information about an ever-expanding sphere of topics (Holder’s own DOJ refuses to confirm or deny the existence of an Office of Legal Counsel memo allowing the “targeted killing” of US citizens without trial). Nor did he propose fixing the unnecessary and wasteful referral system, in which multiple (sometimes up to fourteen) agency reviews of documents lead to twenty-year-old outstanding FOIA requests.

The one fact that Holder did get absolutely correct was his comment that the Department of Justice’s FOIA progress to date is “only the beginning” of what needs to be done to achieve his 2009 promise to ensure that the Freedom of Information Act “is realized in practice.” To actually realize this, Holder must force his Department of Justice to work toward actual, difficult, fundamental, FOIA change within his DOJ and throughout the federal government, rather than merely restating his Office of Information Policy’s misleading FOIA statistics.

The FBI – Former President of Atlanta-Based Public Company Indicted in Multi-Million-Dollar Securities Fraud Cover-Up

ATLANTA—JOSEPH PACIFICO, 62, of Atlanta, was indicted today by a federal grand jury for securities fraud, causing the filing of false financial statements, and falsifying the books and records of a public company. The charges are part of a superseding indictment that charges PACIFICO and another former top executive, JOSEPH M. ELLES, 57, of Las Vegas, Nevada, with 37 federal crimes relating to their alleged roles in accounting irregularities at the major children’s clothing company Carter’s Inc. PACIFICO’s initial appearance in court on the charges has not yet been scheduled.

United States Attorney Sally Quillian Yates said of the case, “The indictment of this case investigated by the President’s Financial Fraud Task Force demonstrates that we will follow the evidence wherever it leads, even to the top of the corporate ladder. Joseph Pacifico, the former number two executive at Carter’s Inc., based in Atlanta, is accused of trying to hide a multi-million-dollar fraud, lying to shareholders, and committing additional crimes in the course of the attempted cover-up. Shareholders expect and deserve far more from their corporate leaders.”

Brian D. Lamkin, Special Agent in Charge, FBI Atlanta Field Office, stated, “Such actions by a senior corporate officer as charged in the superseding indictment impact not only the company in which he served but the many shareholders who make investment decisions based on that company’s financial statements. The FBI will continue to work with its various law enforcement partners and the U.S. Attorney’s Office as it aggressively investigates those who engage in corporate fraud.”

According to United States Attorney Yates, the charges, and other information presented in court: PACIFICO served as president of the Atlanta-based children’s clothing company Carter’s Inc. from 2004 until December 2009. PACIFICO was a senior executive officer of the company and the highest-ranking executive in the Carter’s sales organization. He supervised the company’s head of wholesale sales, defendant JOSEPH M. ELLES, and the company’s wholesale sales accounts, including Kohl’s Department Stores.

Carter’s is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and its stock is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. It is obligated to report its financial results in annual and quarterly filings with the SEC, so that members of the public can make informed investment decisions. The securities laws also require Carter’s to make and keep accurate corporate books and records.

The superseding indictment alleges that, at least by April 2009, PACIFICO was aware that ELLES and others had been deliberately causing Carter’s to falsely record in its accounting books millions of dollars in rebates that ELLES had agreed to pay to Kohl’s and other retailers. The superseding indictment alleges that, from 2006 and into 2009, at the end of each fiscal year and at the end of several fiscal quarters, ELLES agreed to pay rebates to Kohl’s and other retailers referred to as “margin support” or “accommodations.” These rebates, which are common in the apparel industry, help compensate the retailer in certain circumstances where the retailer was unable to make its expected profit margins from the sale of Carter’s goods. These rebates are expenses that reduce Carter’s net sales revenue and profits.

The superseding indictment alleges that ELLES manipulated the company’s accounting for millions of dollars in rebates to Kohl’s by misrepresenting that the rebates related to sales made in current fiscal years or quarters, rather than the prior years or quarters in which the sales were actually made. This caused Carter’s to record all of the sales revenue from selling goods in a particular year or quarter without accounting for all of the expenses (“accommodations” or “margin support”) that the company was incurring in connection with those sales.

The superseding indictment alleges that at least by April 2009 and continuing through November 2009, PACIFICO was aware of millions of dollars in undisclosed rebates and attempted to keep them hidden from other members of senior management, Carter’s shareholders, internal and external auditors, and others. The superseding indictment alleges that PACIFICO did so by lying to other members of senior management and other employees, signing false documents, and instructing subordinates not to relay information about the rebates to senior management or dissuading them from doing so.

The superseding indictment alleges that, as a result of the fraud and attempted cover-up, PACIFICO caused Carter’s to materially misstate its net income and other items in its publicly filed financial statements from April 2009 through July 2009 and falsified and caused to be falsified certain corporate books and records during that period. The superseding indictment alleges that ELLES caused Carter’s to file materially false financial statements for several years and quarters from at least November 2006 through July 2009, and that he also falsified or caused to be falsified multiple corporate books and records during that period.

In late October 2009 and continuing into December 2009, Carter’s announced that it had discovered the accounting regularities and that it intended to re-state several years’ worth of previously-published financial statements. Carter’s stock price fell over 20 percent on the day it announced that it would delay the release of its financial information for the third quarter of 2009 in order to review its accounting for accommodations. PACIFICO was placed on administrative leave in November 2009 and then resigned in December 2009. ELLES left the company earlier in 2009, working for the company in a consulting capacity for three months after resigning in March 2009.

The grand jury previously returned a 32-count indictment against ELLES on September 21, 2011 containing charges for securities fraud, causing the filing of false financial statements, falsifying corporate books and records, wire fraud, and mail fraud.

The securities fraud charges against PACIFICO and ELLES each carry a maximum sentence of 25 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000. The charges against PACIFICO and ELLES for causing the filing of false financial statements with the SEC and the falsification of corporate books and records, in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, each carry a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a fine of up to $5 million. The wire and mail fraud charges against ELLES alone each carry a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000. In determining the actual sentence, the court will consider the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which are not binding but provide appropriate sentencing ranges for most offenders.

This law enforcement action is part of President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

This case is being investigated by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The SEC has conducted a separate investigation of possible civil violations of the U.S. securities laws, and in December 2010 reached a non-prosecution agreement with Carter’s and filed a civil enforcement action against ELLES alleging securities fraud, insider trading, and other securities violations. That case remains pending.

Assistant United States Attorney David M. Chaiken is prosecuting the case.

Members of the public are reminded that the indictment contains only allegations. A defendant is presumed innocent of the charges, and it will be the government’s burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

Unveiled – Noted Scientist Sentenced to 13-Year Prison Term for Attempted Espionage, Fraud, and Tax Charges

WASHINGTON—Stewart David Nozette, 54, a scientist who once worked for the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the White House’s National Space Council, was sentenced today to 13 years in prison for attempted espionage, conspiracy to defraud the United States, and tax evasion.

The sentence covered charges in two cases. In one, Nozette pleaded guilty in September 2011 to attempted espionage for providing classified information to a person he believed to be an Israeli intelligence officer. In the other, he pleaded guilty in January 2009 to fraud and tax charges stemming from more than $265,000 in false claims he submitted to the government.

The sentencing, which took place this morning in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, was announced by Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General John A. DiCicco of the Tax Division.

Joining in the announcement were James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office; Paul K. Martin, Inspector General for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA OIG); Eric Hylton, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office of the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI); and John Wagner, Special Agent in Charge of the Washington, D.C. Office of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

In addition to the prison term, the Honorable Paul L. Friedman ordered that Nozette pay more than $217,000 in restitution to the government agencies he defrauded.

Nozette has been in custody since his arrest for attempted espionage on October 19, 2009. At the time, he was awaiting sentencing on the fraud and tax evasion charges. FBI agents arrested Nozette following an undercover operation in which he provided classified materials on three occasions, including one that formed the basis for his guilty plea. He was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury. The indictment does not allege that the government of Israel or anyone acting on its behalf committed any offense under U.S. laws in this case.

“Stewart Nozette’s greed exceeded his loyalty to our country,” said U.S. Attorney Machen. “He wasted his talent and ruined his reputation by agreeing to sell national secrets to someone he believed was a foreign agent. His time in prison will provide him ample opportunity to reflect on his decision to betray the United States.”

“Stewart Nozette betrayed his country and the trust that was placed in him by attempting to sell some of America’s most closely-guarded secrets for profit. Today, he received the justice he deserves. As this case demonstrates, we remain vigilant in protecting America’s secrets and in bringing to justice those who compromise them,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco. “I thank the many agents, analysts, and prosecutors who worked on this important case.”

“As this case demonstrates, those who attempt to evade their taxes by abusing the tax-exempt status of non-profit entities will be investigated, prosecuted, and punished,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General DiCicco.

“Today’s sentencing demonstrates that espionage remains a serious threat to our national security,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “The FBI and our partners in the defense and intelligence communities work every day to prevent sensitive information from getting into the wrong hands, and I commend the hard work of the dedicated agents, analysts, and prosecutors who spent a significant amount of time bringing this case to resolution.”

“We are particularly proud that NASA OIG’s fraud investigation of Nozette, which began in 2006, served as the catalyst for further investigation and today’s outcome,” said NASA Inspector General Martin.

“IRS-Criminal Investigation provides financial investigative expertise in our work with our law enforcement partners,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Hylton. “Pooling the skills of each agency makes a formidable team as we investigate allegations of wrongdoing. Mr. Nozette decided to betray his country to line his own pockets rather than play by the rules. He now is being held accountable for his actions.”

“Federal agents take an oath to protect our nation ‘against all enemies, foreign and domestic.’ That would include ‘insider threats’ like Stewart Nozette,” said Special Agent in Charge Wagner. “NCIS is committed to working with our law enforcement partners and prosecutors to find and hold accountable those like Nozette who put personal gain above national security.”

Nozette received a Ph.D. in planetary sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Beginning in at least 1989, he held sensitive and high-profile positions within the U.S. government. He worked in various capacities on behalf of the government in the development of state-of-the-art programs in defense and space. During his career, for example, Nozette worked at the White House on the National Space Council, Executive Office of the President. He also worked as a physicist for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he designed highly advanced technology.

Nozette was the president, treasurer, and director of the Alliance for Competitive Technology (ACT), a non-profit organization that he organized in March 1990. Between January 2000 and February 2006, Nozette, through his company, ACT, entered into agreements with several government agencies to develop highly advanced technology. Nozette performed some of this research and development at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) in Washington, D.C.; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in Arlington, Virginia; and NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland.

In connection with the fraud and tax case, Nozette admitted that, from 2000 through 2006, he used ACT to defraud the NRL, DARPA and NASA by making and presenting more than $265,000 in fraudulent reimbursement claims, most of which were paid. He also admitted that, from 2001 through 2005, he willfully evaded more than $200,000 in federal taxes. In addition, he admitted using ACT, an entity exempt from taxation because of its non-profit status, to receive income and to pay personal expenses, such as mortgages, automobile loans, sedan services, and other items.

The investigation concerning ACT led investigators to suspect that Nozette had misused government information. From 1989 through 2006, Nozette held security clearances as high as top secret and had regular, frequent access to classified information and documents related to the national defense of the United States.

On September 3, 2009, Nozette was contacted via telephone by an individual purporting to be an Israeli intelligence officer from the Mossad, but who was, in fact, an undercover employee of the FBI. That same day, Nozette informed the undercover employee that he had clearances “all the way to top secret/SCI” and that anything “that the U.S. has done in space I’ve seen.” He stated that he would provide classified information for money and a foreign passport to a country without extradition to the United States.

A series of contacts followed over the next several weeks, including meetings and exchanges in which Nozette took $10,000 in cash left by the FBI at prearranged drop-off sites. Nozette provided information classified as secret/SCI and top secret/SCI that related to national defense. Some of this information directly concerned satellites, early warning systems, means of defense or retaliation against large-scale attack, communications intelligence information, and major elements of defense strategy.

Nozette and the undercover employee met for the final time on October 19, 2009 at the Mayflower Hotel. During that meeting, Nozette pushed to receive larger payments for the secrets he was disclosing, declaring that, “I gave you even in this first run some of the most classified information that there is…I’ve sort of crossed the Rubicon.”

Nozette was arrested soon after he made these statements.

The investigation of the fraud and tax evasion case was conducted by NASA OIG, NCIS, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), IRS-CI, the IRS Tax Exempt and Government Entities Group, the Naval Audit Service, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

The prosecution of the fraud and tax evasion case was handled by Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael K. Atkinson from the Fraud and Public Corruption Section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Kenneth C. Vert from the Department of Justice’s Tax Division.

The investigation of the attempted espionage case was conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, with assistance from NCIS; Naval Audit Service; National Reconnaissance Office; Air Force Office of Special Investigations; Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; DCIS; Defense Contract Audit Agency; U.S. Army 902nd Military Intelligence Group; NASA Office of Counterintelligence; NASA OIG; Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; IRS-CI; IRS Tax Exempt and Government Entities group; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, as well as other partners in the U.S. intelligence community.

The prosecution of that case was handled by Assistant U.S. Attorney Anthony Asuncion, from the National Security Section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, and Trial Attorneys Deborah A. Curtis and Heather M. Schmidt, from the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

TOP-SECRET – Transcript of Council on Foreign Relations Secret Meeting on the Theory of CIA Covert Action

The following is a transcript of a private meeting held in 1968 in the New York Pratt House of the Council on Foreign Relations.  The meeting was attended by a number of prominent members of the early U.S. intelligence community, including Richard Bissell and Allen Dulles.  The transcript was reportedly discovered by Vietnam War protesters who occupied a building in 1971 housing Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.  One of the attendees of the secret meeting, William Harris, served as an associate to the Center for International Affairs and this transcript was found in his personal files.  The transcript was published in full in the 1974 book “The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence” by Victor Marchetti, a former special assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and John D. Marks, a former officer of the United States Department of State.  The meeting transcript is described in the book as the “most complete description of the CIA’s covert-action strategy and tactics ever made available to the outside world.”

Minutes of the 1968 “Bissell Meeting” at the Council on Foreign Relations

The third meeting of the Discussion Group on Intelligence and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on January 8, 1968, at 5:00 p.m. Present were: Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Discussion Leader; Douglas Dillon, Chairman; William J. Barnds, Secretary; William R. Harris, Rapporteur; George Agree, Frank Altschul, Robert Amory, Jr., Meyer Bernstein, Col. Sidney B. Berry, Jr., Allen W. Dulles, George S. Franklin, Jr., Eugene Fubini, Julius C. Holmes, Thomas L. Hughes, Joseph Kraft, David W. MacEachron, Philip W. Quigg, Harry Howe Ransom, Theodore C. Sorensen, David B. Truman.

The Chairman, Mr. Dillon, opened the meeting, noting that although this entire series of discussion was “off-the-record,” the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions.

Mr. Dillon noted that problems involving CIA’s relationships with private institutions would be examined at a later meeting, though neither Mr. Bissell nor others should feel restricted in discussion of such problems this evening.

As the session’s discussion leader, Mr. Bissell offered a review and appraisal of covert operations in U.S. foreign policy.

Touching briefly upon the question of responsibility, of whether these agencies are instruments of national policy, Mr. Bissell remarked that, in such a group, he needn’t elaborate on CIA’s responsiveness to national policy; that we could assume that, although CIA participates in policy making (as do other “action agencies,” such as AID, the military services and Departments, in addition to the Department of State), CIA was a responsible agency of national policy.

Indeed in Mr. Bissell’s personal experience, CIA’s role was more carefully circumscribed and the established limits observed more attentively than in ECA, where Mr. Bissell had previously worked.

The essential control of CIA rested in a Cabinent-level committee, comprising a representative of the White House staff the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and in recent years the personal participation of the Director of Central Intelligence. Over the years this committee has become a more powerful and effective device for enforcing control. It reviews all new projects, and periodically scrutinizes ongoing projects.

As an interdepartmental committee composed of busy officials who meet only once per week, this control group is of limited effectiveness. Were it the only control instrument, Mr. Bissell would view it as inadequate, but in fact this committee is merely the summit of control, with a series of intermediate review procedures as lower levels. Projects are usually discussed in the relevant office of the Assistant Secretary of State, and, if at all related to Defense Department interests, at a similar level in DoD, frequently after consideration at lower levels in these departments. It was rare to take an issue before the Special Group prior to discussion at lower levels, and if there was objection at lower levels most issues were not proposed to the Special Group — excepting large projects or key issues, which would be appealed at every level, including the Special Group.

Similar procedures applied in the field. Generally, the Ambassador had a right to know of any covert operations in his jurisdiction, although in special cases (as a result of requests from the local Chief of State or the Secretary of State) the chief of station was instructed to withhold information from the Ambassador. Indeed, in one case the restriction was imposed upon the specific exhortation of the Ambassador in question, who preferred to remain ignorant of certain activities.

Of the “blown” operations, frequently among the larger ones, most are known to have been approved by the President himself. The U-2 project, for example, was an offshoot of the Land (intelligence) Committee of the Killian panel on surprise attack; it was proposed as a Killian panel recommendation to the President, supported by USIB; its procurement, in utmost secrecy, was authorized by the President, and, with the exception of the first few flights (the initial authorization being to operate for a period of ten days, “weather permitting”), each individual flight was authorized by the President, with participation by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

Covert operations should, for some purposes, be divided into two classifications: ( 1) Intelligence collection, primarily espionage, or the obtaining of intelligence by covert means; and (2) Covert action, attempting to influence the internal affairs of other nations — sometimes called “intervention” — by covert means.

Although these two categories of activity can be separated in theory, intelligence collection and covert action interact and overlap. Efforts have been made historically to separate the two functions but the result has usually been regarded as “a total disaster organizationally.” One such attempt was the establishment in the early days of CIA (1948) of the OPC under Frank G. Wisner as a separate organ for covert action. Although supported and given cover by the CIA, this organization was independent and Wisner reported directly to the Secretaries of State and Defense. “Beedle” Smith decided when he became Director of Central Intelligence that, if he were responsible for OPC, he was going to run it and it was merged with the clandestine intelligence organization in such a way that within the combined Clandestine Service there was a complete integration of intelligence collection and covert action functions in each area division.

In addition to our experience with OPC, the Germans and the British for a time during the war had organizations for covert special operations separate from, and inevitably in competition with. their espionage services. In every case the experience has been unfortunate. Although there are many disagreements within CIA on matters of doctrine, the view is unanimous that the splitting of intelligence and covert action services would be disastrous, with resulting competition for recruitment of agents, multiple recruitment of the same agents, additional security risks, and dissipation of effort.

Concerning the first category, intelligence collection, we should ask: (a) What is the scope of “covert intelligence collection”? (b) What intelligence collection functions can best be performed covertly?

The scope of covert intelligence collection includes: (1) reconnaissance; (2) communications and electronic intelligence, primarily undertaken by NSA; and (3) classical espionage, by agents. In gauging their utility, Mr. Bissell ranked (1) the most important, (2) slightly below, and (3) considerably below both (1) and (2).

Although it is less effective, classical espionage is “much the least costly,” with the hardware components of recon and NSA activities raising their costs considerably.

(In the after-dinner discussion, an authority on communications-electronics expressed his concurrence in Mr. Bissell’s relative rankings. Notwithstanding technological advances in cryptology, the increased sophistication in most cryptosystems assured that (1) (reconnaissance) outranked (2). Another observer noted that the budgets correlated in similar manner, the former speaker concurring and noting that, however surprising, the budgets approximated maximum utility according to cost-effectiveness criteria.)

Postwar U.S. reconnaissance operations began, historically, as “covert” operations, primarily a series of clandestine overflights of Communist territory in Eastern Europe, inaugurated in the early 1950s. These early efforts were followed by the U-2 project, which provided limited coverage but dramatic results.

Now we have reconnaissance satellites. Overhead reconnaissance is one of the most open of “secrets” in international affairs; it is no longer really a “covert activity,” and bureaucratic responsibility for it now resides in the Pentagon. Classical espionage, in the early postwar years, was conducted with special intensity in West Germany, and before the Berlin wall, in that city, which was ideal for the moving of agents in both directions, providing a sizable flow of political and economic intelligence (especially from East Germany).

Throughout the period since the early fifties, of course, the Communist bloc, and more especially the U.S.S.R. itself, has been recognized as the primary target for espionage activities. Circumstances have greatly limited the scale of operations that could be undertaken within the bloc so much of the effort has been directed at bloc nationals stationed in neutral or friendly areas, and at “third country” operations that seek to use the nationals of other non-Communist countries as sources of information on the Soviet bloc.

More recently there has been a shift in priorities for classical espionage toward targets in the underdeveloped world. Partly as a result of this change in priorities and partly because of other developments, the scale of the classical espionage effort mounted in Europe has considerably diminished. The U.S.S.R. remains a prime target but Communist China would today be given the same priority.

As to the kinds of information that could be obtained, espionage has been of declining relative importance as a means of learning about observable developments, such as new construction, the characteristics of transportation systems, the strength and deployment of military forces and the like because reconnaissance has become a far more effective collection technique and (except in China) travel is freer and far more extensive than some years ago. It had been hoped that espionage would contribute to the collection of intelligence on Soviet and East European technology, since this is a body of information not readily observable (until embodied in operational systems). Another type of intelligence for which espionage would seem to be the only available technique is that concerning enemy intentions. In practice however espionage has been disappointing with respect to both these types of intelligence. They ,are for obvious reasons closely guarded and the task is just too difficult to permit results to be obtained with any dependability or regularity. With respect to the former category — technology — the published literature and direct professional contacts with the scientific community have been far richer sources.

(A communications-electronics expert interjected the observation that the same reasoning applied to inadequacies in S&T intelligence collection; technology is just too difficult for agents, who are insufficiently trained to comprehend what they observe as the technologies become increasingly complicated.)

As to friendly neutrals and allies, it is usually easier to learn what one wishes by overt contacts, human contact of overt members of the U.S. mission or private citizens. We don’t need espionage to learn British, or even French
intentions.

(The speaker was questioned as to whether the other side’s espionage was of similarly limited utility, or whether — with their Philbys — they were more successful?)

Mr. Bissell remarked that Soviet Union successes were primarily in counterintelligence, though going back aways, the Soviet Union had been more successful in recruiting U.S. scientists.

(The question was raised as to whether Burgess and MacLean constituted merely C.I. successes.)

Mr. Bissell thought so.

(In another’s recollection, Soviet atomic intelligence efforts had been of substantial assistance in facilitating the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Although it is not possible to estimate with precision the effects of this intelligence, it was Lewis Strauss’s guess that atomic intelligence successes allowed the Soviets to detonate their first device at least one and one-half and perhaps as much as two and one-half years before such a test would have been possible with purely indigenous efforts.)

The general conclusion is that against the Soviet bloc or other sophisticated societies, espionage is not a primary source of intelligence, although it has had occasional brilliant successes (like the Berlin Tunnel and several of the high level defectors). A basic reason is that espionage operates mainly through the recruitment of agents and it is enormously difficult to recruit high level agents. A low level agent, even assuming that he remained loyal and that there is some means of communicating with him[,] simply cannot tell you much of what you want to know. The secrets we cannot find out by reconnaissance or from open sources are in the minds of scientists and senior policy makers and are not accessible to an ordinary citizen even of middle rank.

In contrast, the underdeveloped world presents greater opportunities for covert intelligence collection, simply because governments are much less highly oriented; there is less security consciousness; and there is apt to be more actual or potential diffusion of power among parties, localities, organizations, and individuals outside of the central governments. The primary purpose of espionage in these areas is to provide Washington with timely knowledge of the internal power balance, a form of intelligence that is primarily of tactical significance.

Why is this relevant?

Changes in the balance of power are extremely difficult to discern except through frequent contact with power elements. Again and again we have been surprised at coups within the military; often, we have failed to talk to the junior officers or non-coms who are involved in the coups. The same problem applies to labor leaders, and others. Frequently we don’t know of power relationships, because power balances are murky and sometimes not well known even to the principal actors. Only by knowing the principal players well do you have a chance of careful prediction. There is real scope for action in this area; the technique is essentially that of “penetration,” including “penetrations” of the sort which horrify classicists of covert operations, with a disregard for the “standards” and “agent recruitment rules.” Many of the “penetrations” don’t take the form of “hiring” but of establishing a close or friendly relationship (which may or may not be furthered by the provision of money from time to time).

In some countries the CIA representative has served as a close counselor (and in at least one case a drinking companion) of the chief of state. These are situations of course in which the tasks of intelligence collection and political action overlap to the point of being almost indistinguishable. (The question was raised as to why ordinary diplomats couldn’t maintain these relationships.)

Mr. Bissell observed that often they could. There were special cases, however, such as in one Republic where the chief of state had a “special relationship” with the senior CIA officers without the knowledge of the U.S. Ambassador because the President of the Republic had so requested it. The CIA man sent reports by CIA channels back to the Secretary of State, but the Ambassador in the field, as agreed by the Secretary of State, wasn’t to be informed. In this case, a problem arose when the relevant Assistant Secretary of State (who had received cables from the CIA man) became the new Ambassador, but the President of the Republic liked the new Ambassador and asked that a “special relationship” be established with him too.

Aside from this unique case, it seems to have been true generally that the Ambassador has to be a formal representative of the United States most of whose relations with the government to which he is accredited are through or with the knowledge of. its foreign office. On the other hand, the CIA representative can maintain a more intimate and informal relationship the privacy of which can be better preserved both within the government of the country in question and within the United States government. Moreover, if a chief of state leaves the scene or changes his mind, you can quietly move a station chief, but it could be embarrassing if it were necessary suddenly to recall the U.S. Ambassador.

(Was the previously described relationship really a “covert operation”?)

The “cover” may be to shield visibility from some junior officials or, in the case of a “private adviser” to a chief of state, to shield this fact from politicians of the local government. (Another observation was that the method of reporting, through CIA channels, constituted one difference and had some influence. A chief of state who knew that CIA’s reports would be handfed in a smaller circle, with less attendant publicity, might prefer these channels for some communications.)

Concerning the second category, covert action:

The scope of covert action could include: (1) political advice and counsel; (2) subsidies to an individual; (3) financial support and “technical assistance” to political parties; ( 4) support of private organizations, including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives, etc.; (5) covert propaganda; (6) “private” training of individuals and exchange of persons; (7) economic operations; and (8) paramilitary [or] political action operations designed to overthrow or to support a regime (like the Bay of Pigs and the programs in Laos). These operations can be classified in various ways: by the degree and type of secrecy required [,] by their legality, and, perhaps, by their benign or hostile character.

From whom is the activity to be kept secret? After five days, for example, the U-2 flights were not secret from the Russians but these operations remained highly secret in the United States, and with good reason. If these overflights had “leaked” to the American press, the U.S.S.R. would have had been forced to take action. On a less severe level the same problem applies to satellite reconnaissance. These are examples of two hostile governments collaborating to keep operations secret from the general public of both sides. “Unfortunately, there aren’t enough of these situations.” (The remark was interjected that there was another reason for secrecy; if one had to admit to the activity, one would have to show the results, and exactly how good or bad they were.)

Covert operations could be classified by their legality or illegality. Many of them are legal.

They can also be classified as “benign” or “hostile.” Most operations in Western Europe have been “benign,” though involving the gravest improprieties, and in some cases clearly illegal action. (E.g., covert support of political parties.)

In the case of a large underdeveloped country, for example, money was put into a party’s funds without the knowledge of that party. The relatively few economic operations that have been undertaken have been both benign and legal. One of these involved the provision by CIA of interim ostensibly private financing of an overt project pending an overt and official loan by AID. Its purpose was to give AID time for some hard bargaining without causing a complete failure of the transaction. The stereotype, of course, is that all covert operations are illegal and hostile, but this is not really the case.

The role of covert intervention can best be understood by contrast with the overt activities of the United States government. Diplomacy seeks results by bargaining on a government-to-government basis, sometimes openly — sometimes privately. Foreign economic policy and cultural programs seek to modify benignly the economies of other countries and the climate of opinion within them. Covert intervention is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with fairly short-term objectives in view. An effort to build up the economy of an underdeveloped country must be subtle, long continued, probably quite costly, and must openly enlist the cooperation of major groups within the country if it is to have much influence. On the other hand an effort to weaken the local Communist party or to win an election, and to achieve results within at most two or three years, must obviously be covert, it must pragmatically use the people and the instrumentalities that are available and the methods that seem likely to work. It is not surprising that the practitioners within the United States government of these two types of intervention differ temperamentally and in their preferences for methods, friends, and ideologies.

The essence of such intervention in the internal power balance is the identification of allies who can be rendered more effective, more powerful, and perhaps wiser through covert assistance. Typically these local allies know the source of the assistance but neither they nor the United States could afford to admit to its existence. Agents for fairly minor and low sensitivity interventions, for instance some covert propaganda and certain economic activities, can be recruited simply with money. But for the larger and more sensitive interventions, the allies must have their own motivation. On the whole the Agency has been remarkably successful in finding individuals and instrumentalities with which and through which it could work in this fashion. Implied in the requirement for a pre-existing motivation is the corollary that an attempt to induce the local ally to follow a course he does not believe in will at least reduce his effectiveness and may destroy the whole operation. It is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor, and. cultural groups that have recently been publicized that the Agency’s objective was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render them more effective.

Turning to relations with other agencies. Mr. Bissell was impressed by the degree of improvement in relations with the State Department. Seen from the Washington end, there has been an increase in consultation at the country-desk level, more often at the Bureau level or the Assistant Secretary of State level as the operation shapes up. The main problem some five to six years ago was not one of responsibility or authority but of cover arrangements.

Mr. Bissell provided a brief critique of covert operations, along the following lines:

That aspect of the Agency’s operations most in need of change is the Agency’s use and abuse of “cover.” In this regard, the “background paper” for this session raised many cover-oriented questions.

On disclosure of private institutional support of late, it is very clear that we should have had greater compartmenting of operations.

If the Agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have “blown” cannot be resurrected.

We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of “cut-outs.” CIA’s interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected.

If various groups hadn’t been aware of the source of their funding, the damage subsequent to disclosure might have been far less than occurred.

The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied.

The problem of Agency operations overseas is frequently a problem for the State Department. It tends to be true that local allies ‘ find themselves dealing always with an American and an official American-since the cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employee. There are powerful reasons for this practice, and it will always be desirable to have some CIA personnel housed in the Embassy compound, if only for local “command post” and communications requirements.

Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. This would. require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U.S. posture.

The United States should make increasing use of non-nationals, who, with effort at indoctrination and training, should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff. As we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circumscribed. The primary change recommended would be to build up a system of unofficial cover; to see how far we can go with non-U.S. nationals, especially in the field. The CIA might be able to make increasing use of non-nationals as “career agents” that is with a status midway between that of the classical agent used in a single compartmented operation perhaps for a limited period of time and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations and well informed of the Agency’s capabilities. Such career agents should be encouraged with an effort at indoctrination and training and with a prospect of long-term employment to develop a second loyalty and they could of course never be employed in ways that would conflict with their primary loyalties toward their own countries. This still leaves open, however, a wide range of potential uses. The desirability of more effective use of foreign nationals increases as we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia, and Africa where the conduct of United States nationals is easily subject to scrutiny and is likely to be increasingly circumscribed.

These suggestions about unofficial cover and career agents illustrate and emphasize the need for continuing efforts to develop covert action capabilities even where there is no immediate need to employ them. The central task is that of identifying potential indigenous allies-both individuals and organizations-making contact with them, and establishing the fact of a community of interest. There is some room for improvement, Mr. Bissell thought, in the planning of covert action country by country. Covert intervention is probably most effective in situations where a comprehensive effort is undertaken with a number of separate operations designed to support and complement one another and to have a cumulatively significant effect. The Agency probably finds itself involved in too many small covert action operations having no particular relationship with one another and having little cumulative impact.

There is no doubt that some covertly funded programs could be undertaken overtly, Mr. Bissell thought. Often activities have been initiated through CIA channels because they could be started more quickly and informally but do not inherently need to be secret. An example might be certain exchange of persons programs designed to identify potential political leaders and give them some exposure to the United States. It should be noted, however, that many such innocent programs are more effective if carried out by private auspices than if supported officially by the United States government. They do not need to be covert but if legitimate private entities such as the foundations do not initiate them, there may be no way to get them done except by covert support to “front” organizations.

Many propaganda operations are of declining effectiveness. Some can be continued at slight cost, but some of the larger ones (radio, etc.) are pretty well “blown” and not inexpensive. USIA doesn’t like them, and although they did have a real justification some ten to fifteen years ago as the voice of refugees and emigres, groups which also have declined in value, and in the view of some professionals are likely to continue declining in value.

In his last two years in the Agency, Mr. Bissell felt that the Clandestine Services could have been smaller.

Indeed, steps were taken to reduce their size. It is impossible to separate the issue of size from personnel and cover problems. It was Mr. Bissell’s impression that the Clandestine Services were becoming increasingly a career service, too much like the Foreign Service (personnel looking to a succession of overt posts in a safe career) . One result was the circumscription of local contacts. There was a subtle change taking place, which threatened to degrade some of CIA’s former capabilities. Formally, the CIA had a staff with a wide variety of backgrounds, experiences, and capabilities. Its members were recruited from every sort of public and private occupation. If this diversity and variety is lost through the process of recruiting staff members from college, training them in a fairly standard pattern, and carrying them through orderly planned careers in the Agency, one of the organization’s most valuable attributes will disappear.

Finally, Mr. Bissell remarked on large operations. It is self-evident that if an operation is too large, it can’t remain a deeply kept secret. At best, one can then hope for a successful formal disclaimer. The worst of many faults of the Bay of Pigs operation was excessive reliance on the operation’s disclaimability.

It has been a wise decision that operations of that scale not be undertaken by the Agency, except in theaters such as Vietnam, where the stakes and standards are different.

Covert action operations are generally aimed at short-term goals and the justification for the control machinery is that bias of operators to the short run can be compensated for in the review process. Mr. Bissell can conceive of no other way to force greater attention to long-range costs and values. One alternative is that caution will lead to ineffectuality. “Operational types” will he risk-takers, the counterweight is, and should be, applied by the other agencies in government.

In the discussion following Mr. Bissell’s talk, the issue of CIA cover was cited as among the more interesting from the perspective of a former State Department appointee. The size of covert operations known to other governments was a continuing embarrassment, and the overseas staff maintained for these purposes and known to host governments was a similar source of embarrassment. From time to time, efforts were made to reduce overseas staff; although agreement in principle was readily forthcoming, the particulars of staff reduction were difficult to obtain.

A former member of the Special Group (who served eighteen months on that committee) agreed with Mr. Bissell’s earlier remarks on control mechanisms, insofar as they applied to review of new projects. These received most careful scrutiny. Insofar as the Special Group considered ongoing projects during this eighteen-month period, it was recalled that there was not any systematic, thorough procedure for such review, the committee finding itself busy with all the new proposals. If it were true that most operations were most useful for short-term goals, then perhaps there should be greater attention to review of ongoing projects, and termination of more projects earlier than in past practice.

A continuing problem which worries one former official was that. concerning the “charter” of CIA, the public expression of which, in the National Security Act of 1947, was necessarily vague. CIA’s full “charter” has been frequently revised, but it has been, and must remain[,] secret. The absence of a public charter leads people to search for the charter and to question the Agency’s authority to undertake various activities. The problem of a secret “charter” remains as a curse, but the need for secrecy would appear to preclude a solution.

Another former official remarked on the inadequacy of clandestine intelligence as a means of obtaining enemy intentions. Sherman Kent (former Chairman. Board of National Estimates) distinguishes “the knowable” from “the unknowable,” and we should recognize that much remains impossible to know, including, frequently, enemy intentions.

Respecting the reduction of overseas personnel and programs of declining utility, it was noted that the curtailment of over-age and unproductive personnel was a thorny issue. Recognizing the likelihood of appeal to the President and the absence of widespread participation in a manpower review, a former budget official arranged the participation of the Bureau of the Budget, CIA, FIAB, and relevant Under Secretaries in considerations of budgetary modifications. What emerged was an inertia, partly the inertia of the cold war. Parenthetically, a couple of much-criticized public media projects (cited by name) had proven of value, as the fall of Novotny in Czechoslovakia suggested, but a number of ineffective programs were retained. The problem was to free the budget, to do something new, in the place of old programs, not to reduce the budget, but unfortunately, the chiefs in CIA wanted to control their working capital. If it were only possible to tell these officials not to worry. that we were setting aside $xxx million for CIA, and merely seeking to encourage better use of the same dollar amounts, then it would have been possible to move around some money. The big “iffy” question was a particular (named) foundation, which received a sizable allocation. Finally. everything was cleared up, and the next big review was scheduled, but never really effected as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis. The review was geared up in 1963 once again.

Another observer, drawing upon work with the “combined cryptologic budget” and private industry, concluded that it was usually impossible to cut a budget; usually it was only possible to substitute a new project for an old one.

The Chairman suggested a number of questions: What are the effects of covert operations being blown? What can be done to improve the image of the Agency? What can he done to improve relations between the Agency and the press?

It was thought that a journalist’s perspective might aid in discussing these questions, but a number of prior issues were thought to require attention:

(1) The matter of size required attention. In any government agency size can become a problem; increasingly there is a realization that the government is too big and “an ever-swelling tumor.” At some point there will have to be a fairly sharp cutback in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

(2) One was not overly impressed by the use of CIA in the developing world; in any case, we could have increased confidence in the range of choice in most developing areas. Conversely, it might not be as easy. as Mr. Bissell suggested to know the power structure in more developed areas, in Western Europe and Japan.

(A query was interjected: Why should we have increasing confidence in the range of choice in developing areas? Perhaps there are Jess variations than we earlier thought. “Things are evening out and we can live more comfortably.”)

(3) Where do you bury the body? One is not completely convinced by citation of the experience with Frank Wisner’s OPC. We could get around the responsibility issue raised by “Beedle” Smith; we could get around conflicting chains of command.

(4) Related to (3). Maybe there is a cost to be paid for having covert operations under CIA. Perhaps we could have intelligence collection under State and covert operations under the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

In response to items (3) and (4) some earlier remarks were clarified: one would not claim that the operational side of CIA need be where it is. Rather, one would inveigh against the splitting of covert intelligence collection and covert operations. One could, however, split the operational side from the analytic side. This is a plausible case, a solution for which could be worked out (though, on balance, the speaker was against it). But to split the operational side-as the German case, the British case for a time, and our own for a time suggested-would be disastrous.

Remarking on labor activities, one participant stated that before May 1967 it was common knowledge that there bad been some CIA support for labor programs, but first Ramparts and then Tom Braden spelled out this support in public. Those in international labor affairs were dismayed, and certain newspapermen compounded their difficulties by confusing AID with CIA, and claiming that the AFL-CIO’s Free Labor Development program was tainted.

Since these disclosures, the turn of events has been unexpected. First, there hasn’t been any real trouble with international labor programs. Indeed, there has been an increase in demand for U.S. labor programs and the strain on our capacity has been embarrassing. Formerly, these foreign labor unions knew we were short of funds, but now they all assume we have secret CIA money, and they ask for more help.

Worse yet, Vic Reuther, who had been alleging that others were receiving CIA money, and whose brother’s receipt of $50,000 from CIA in old bills was subsequently disclosed by Tom Braden, still goes on with his charges that the AFL-CIO has taken CIA money. Here again, no one seems to listen. “The net result has been as close to zero as possible. We’ve come to accept CIA, like sin.” So, for example, British Guiana’s labor unions were supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before. So, our expectations to the contrary, there has been almost no damage.

A former State Department official offered some remarks on intelligence operations as seen from the field. He concurred in Mr. Bissell’s remarks on “cover.” The initial agreement between the Agency and State was intended to be “temporary,” but “nothing endures like the ephemeral.”

How are Agency officials under “official cover” specially equipped to handle covert operations? If the Agency station chief has a “special relationship” with the chief of state, one would submit that it was because the Ambassador wasn’t worth a damn. Moreover, such a “special relationship” created the risk that the chief of state, seeing two channels to Washington, could play one off against another. Some foreign statesmen are convinced that an “invisible government” really exists, and this impression shouldn’t be allowed,

Also, prejudice in favor of covertly obtained intelligence is a troublesome thing.

One way to overcome the misconceptions is to make CIA a truly secret service, and not merely an agency duplicating the Foreign Service. With money shortages CIA has often filled a vacuum, but this does not make it right.

Another questioned the discussion leader’s proposal for greater utilization of non-U.S. nationals. How could you get non-nationals to do the job and to develop loyalty to the United States?

One was not sure that it was doable, but it was worth trying. It would be more prone to work if you used a national of Country B to work in Country C, if what you are asking is neither (1) against the interest of Country B, nor (2) nefarious. You do need some cover, and the natural vehicle is an organization with non-American nationals.

Another observer was struck by the lack of interest in the “blowing” of covertly sponsored radio activities. Why has there been so little interest in these activities, in contrast to the immense concern over the CIA-NSA relationship? One might conclude that the public is not likely to be concerned by the penetration of overseas institutions, at least not nearly so much as by penetration of U.S. institutions. “The public doesn’t think it’s right: they don’t know where it ends; they take a look at their neighbors.” Does this suggested expansion in use of private institutions include those in the United States, or U.S. institutions operating overseas?

In response, attention was drawn to the clear jurisdictional boundaries between CIA and the FBI, CIA being proscribed from “internal security functions.” CIA was averse to surveillance of U.S. citizens overseas (even when specifically requested), and averse to operating in the United States, excepting against foreigners here as transients. One might want CIA to expand its use of U.S. private corporations, but for objectives outside the United States. It was recalled that the Agency funding of the National Student Association was, in every case, for activities outside the United States or for activities with overseas objectives.

Why, we might ask, should the U.S. government use nongovernmental institutions more, and why should it deal with them in the United States? If dealings are overseas, then it is necessary to maintain an overseas bureaucracy to deal with the locals. It is also necessary to engage in communications in a possibly hostile environment. If one deals through U.S. corporations with overseas activities, one can keep most of the bureaucratic staff at home and can deal through the corporate headquarters, perhaps using corporate channels for overseas communications (including classified communications). In this opinion, the policy distinction should involve the use to which the private institution is put, not whether or not to use private institutions. In another view it was desirable for this discussion group to examine different types of institutions. For example, should CIA use educational institutions? Should CIA have influenced the selection of NSA officers?

One was not aware that CIA had influenced the election of NSA officers; if it had, it shouldn’t have done so, in one’s opinion.

Mightn’t it be possible to deal with individuals rather than organizations?

Yes, in many cases this would be preferable. It depended upon skill in the use of our operating capabilities. As an example of the political use of secretly acquired intelligence, a former official noted the clandestine acquisition of Khrushchev’s “secret speech” in February 1956. The speech was too long for even Khrushchev to memorize, and over one hundred people had heard it. We targeted it, and by secret means acquired a copy. The State Department released the text and The New York Times printed it in full. The repercussions were felt around the world, and particularly within the Communist bloc. The Soviets felt unable to deny the authenticity of the text we released, and the effect upon many of the satellite states was profound. It was the beginning of the split in the Communist movement. If you get a precise target, and go after it, you can change history.

Another observer was troubled by the earlier-expressed point about increased use of private institutions. Most demoralizing in the academic community was the sense of uncertainty about institutions with which individuals were associated. There is a profound problem in penetrating institutions within the country when there is a generalized loss of faith, a fear that nothing is what it seems. It was noted that the next session, on February 15, 1968, would concentrate upon relations with private institutions.

To one observer, part of this solution would be found in the political process, involving extragovernmental contacts in the sphere of political action.

In response to a query, the relative utilities of types of intelligence data were reviewed. Most valuable was reconnaissance, then communications-electronic intelligence, then classical espionage. We have forgotten, it was noted, the number one over-all source, namely, overt data.

The meeting was adjourned at 9:15p.m., and participants were reminded of the next meeting on February 15.

WILLIAM R. HARRIS
RAPPORTEUR

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The Software that will Provide Intelligence Information during Investigations

MITsy International Ltd., the largest and most experienced Israeli company in the field of data-storage reconstruction and data recovery, is presenting a new, fast, and very efficient Hebrew version of Foresee digital forensic software. ForeSee can trace data that has been deleted from any platform, including hidden files.

“Files, emails, and online communication plays an important role in all aspects of life, and tracing data deleted by criminals is therefore, vital for many investigations,” explains Avner Sharon, MITsy’s CEO. “The new, improved version of MITsy allows the police to work faster and in a more precise manner during the investigation, and prevents unpleasantness if the suspect isn’t guilty – or accelerate his conviction if he broke the law.”

The software itself is a unique product, specially adapted to the requirements of Israeli entities and authorities – the police, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defense, law offices, and legal departments in organizations. Foresee 2012 includes swift tracing and reconstruction of word strings and files on drives of all kinds, 32 and 64-bit system support, a more convenient and user-friendly interface, a search tool for specific words in deleted files, and improved Russian and Arabic support.

Shabak Arrested Suspect on Way to Abduct Soldier and Carry Out a Terror Attack Near Eilat

Mahammad Hasin Awad Abu-Aadra was arrested trying to infiltrate Israel through the Sinai. He confessed that he sought to implement a suicide attack in Eilat, planned by Hamas

Released for Publication: Shabak Arrested Suspect on Way to Abduct Soldier and Carry Out a Terror Attack Near Eilat

Shabak released a statement that they arrested Mahammad Hasin Awad Abu-Aadra, a Rafah resident, at the end of February, while he was attempting to infiltrate Israel through the Gaza border.

Abu-Aadra is suspected of planning to abduct an Israeli soldier, as well as planning a suicide attack in Eilat. Abu-Aadra is the son of a well-known Rafah family of Hamas operatives.

During the investigation, Abu-Aadra admitted that he escaped from Gaza to the Sinai a year ago via a tunnel, due to criminal entanglement. After several months in the Egyptian peninsula, Abu-Aadra was approached by Yunes Shluf, a Rafah resident and Hamas operative. According to Abu-Aadra, Shluf is the commander of the organization’s artillery layout and responsible for the Hamas observation layout in the Sinai.

He asked Abu-Aadra to work for Hamas in the Sinai, carry out observations, and photograph Israeli positions along the Egyptian border with the purpose of carrying out a terror attack.

Abu-Aadra understood from Shluf that there were other elements in the Sinai conducting intelligence collection in order to carry out terror attacks backed by Hamas. Some of the operatives even received considerable sums of money for this activity.

After agreeing to work for Hamas in the Sinai, Abu-Aadra was smuggled through a tunnel by Hamas operatives.

Abu-Aadra underwent a comprehensive military debriefing in Gaza, and was informed that the purpose of the intelligence collection was for examining targets and destinations for carrying out terror attacks. He was also told that his relative, Rashdi Jama’a Mousa Abu-Aadra, a Hamas military operative, would accompany him for collecting intelligence for attacks in Sinai.

In August 2011, both of them carried out most of the observations while equipped with sophisticated cameras and a GPS device, which they used to mark the targets they observed. Local Sinai residents additionally aided them.

It should be noted that the Taba border crossing was one of the targets for which they were collecting information, with emphasis on examining the security forces and the guard stations at the crossing. The two also collected intelligence about military outposts spread out across the border with Israel, as well as several civilian targets within Israel, with emphasis on targets in the city of Eilat. Both of the men infiltrated into Israeli territory as part of their activities, with the objective of collecting better intelligence about targets and ways to reach them.

After completing the observations, Mahammad and Rashdi transferred their information to the Gaza Strip, where it was examined by senior Hamas operatives. They later received follow-up missions and precise briefings regarding the information and the targets for which they needed to collect intelligence.

Near the end of 2011, Mahammad Abu-Aadra was asked to reach the Gaza Strip. Upon his arrival, he was taken along with Rushdi Abu-Aadra and Yunes Abu Shluf to a meeting with Ra’ed Atar, commander of Hamas’s military brigade in Rafah.

Mahammad Abu-Aadra agreed to carry out fire attacks towards military and civilian targets on the Sinai-Israel border, as well as fire rockets from Sinai towards Israel. Ra’ed Atar explained to Mahammad Abu-Aatra that the purpose of the attack would be the abduction of an Israeli soldier, and that another attack was planned.

In the additional attack, a squad of suicide bombers would be inserted into the city of Eilat in order to carry out a suicide attack.

Mahammad Abu-Aadra admitted during his interrogation that he agreed to set up the suicide squad in Eilat. He added that Yunes Shluf told him the training of the terrorists for the suicide attack squad had been completed, and that the infrastructure for their transport had been prepared in Sinai, but they were currently waiting for the right conditions to commence the attack.

An indictment have been presented to the Be’er Sheva regional court against Abu-Aadra, on charges including: contact with foreign agents, membership in an illegal organization, conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit abduction, intent to harm national security, and more.

Unveiled – U.S. Army Plans to Fire Whistleblower For Speaking to the Media

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The military’s embattled crime lab is trying to fire an outspoken whistleblower who’s spotlighted its problems.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory warned its firearms branch chief, Donald Mikko, in a memo of its plans to fire him, in part for talking to a McClatchy reporter.

As part of an internal investigation, Mikko was interrogated for about four hours and questioned about his contacts with McClatchy, according to his attorney Peter Lown. The Army Criminal Investigation Command, which oversees the lab, launched the inquiry after McClatchy published a story late last year about the lab losing evidence.

McClatchy has written more than a dozen stories about the lab since last March, which included details of the misconduct of two former analysts who made serious errors during DNA and firearms testing and who later were found to have falsified and destroyed documents when confronted with the problems.

As a result of McClatchy’s articles, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D- Vt., and Sen. Charles Grassley of Iowa, the committee’s top-ranking Republican member, urged the military to look into the lab’s handling of the misconduct by one of the analysts. An investigation by the Pentagon’s inspector general is ongoing.

“The Army is looking for a scapegoat to blame for the recent adverse media reports,” Lown said.

The Criminal Investigation Command, abbreviated as CID, says it’s never targeted anyone for talking to the news media, and it’s asserted that McClatchy’s series of stories has overblown isolated mistakes and misconduct that shouldn’t reflect on the lab’s overall reputation.

Stung by critical stories about their crime laboratory, officials at Army Criminal Investigation Command recently questioned lab employees for hours and scrutinized personal phone records looking for contacts with reporters.

The inquiry was launched after a McClatchy reporter asked questions late last year about the lab losing evidence. A command spokesman characterized the investigation as looking into violations of privacy law, but the investigation report, which McClatchy obtained, shows that the command was interested primarily in whether employees had provided information that resulted in a story about lab problems.

“This investigation was aimed at rooting out anyone even remotely critical of the lab,” charged Peter Lown, an attorney for one of the employees questioned in the probe. “The lab’s management doesn’t want any more critical stories.”

McClatchy has written a dozen stories about the lab since last March, including detailing the misconduct of two former analysts who made serious errors during DNA and firearms testing and who later were found to have falsified and destroyed documents when confronted with the problems.

As a result of McClatchy’s articles, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D- Vt., and Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, have urged the military to look into the lab’s handling of the misconduct by one of the analysts. An investigation by the Pentagon’s inspector general is ongoing.

The Army’s investigation of media contacts comes as the Obama administration takes a hard-line stance on leaks. President Barack Obama’s Justice and Defense departments have criminally prosecuted more former and current government officials on charges of disclosing information than previous administrations have.

Unlike in the Army investigation, however, all the prosecuted officials were accused of divulging classified intelligence, which can be a felony.

“This is an unprecedented crackdown by the Obama administration,” Jesselyn Radack, a lawyer with the Government Accountability Project, a public interest organization that protects whistleblowers. “It sends a very chilling message to any kind of whistleblower who is considering dissenting or speaking out.”

TOP-SECRET- The CIA reports – Transcript of 1968 Council on Foreign Relations Secret Meeting

The following is a transcript of a private meeting held in 1968 in the New York Pratt House of the Council on Foreign Relations.  The meeting was attended by a number of prominent members of the early U.S. intelligence community, including Richard Bissell and Allen Dulles.  The transcript was reportedly discovered by Vietnam War protesters who occupied a building in 1971 housing Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.  One of the attendees of the secret meeting, William Harris, served as an associate to the Center for International Affairs and this transcript was found in his personal files.  The transcript was published in full in the 1974 book “The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence” by Victor Marchetti, a former special assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and John D. Marks, a former officer of the United States Department of State.  The meeting transcript is described in the book as the “most complete description of the CIA’s covert-action strategy and tactics ever made available to the outside world.”A PDF version of the transcript is also available.

Minutes of the 1968 “Bissell Meeting” at the Council on Foreign Relations

The third meeting of the Discussion Group on Intelligence and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on January 8, 1968, at 5:00 p.m. Present were: Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Discussion Leader; Douglas Dillon, Chairman; William J. Barnds, Secretary; William R. Harris, Rapporteur; George Agree, Frank Altschul, Robert Amory, Jr., Meyer Bernstein, Col. Sidney B. Berry, Jr., Allen W. Dulles, George S. Franklin, Jr., Eugene Fubini, Julius C. Holmes, Thomas L. Hughes, Joseph Kraft, David W. MacEachron, Philip W. Quigg, Harry Howe Ransom, Theodore C. Sorensen, David B. Truman.

The Chairman, Mr. Dillon, opened the meeting, noting that although this entire series of discussion was “off-the-record,” the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions.

Mr. Dillon noted that problems involving CIA’s relationships with private institutions would be examined at a later meeting, though neither Mr. Bissell nor others should feel restricted in discussion of such problems this evening.

As the session’s discussion leader, Mr. Bissell offered a review and appraisal of covert operations in U.S. foreign policy.

Touching briefly upon the question of responsibility, of whether these agencies are instruments of national policy, Mr. Bissell remarked that, in such a group, he needn’t elaborate on CIA’s responsiveness to national policy; that we could assume that, although CIA participates in policy making (as do other “action agencies,” such as AID, the military services and Departments, in addition to the Department of State), CIA was a responsible agency of national policy.

Indeed in Mr. Bissell’s personal experience, CIA’s role was more carefully circumscribed and the established limits observed more attentively than in ECA, where Mr. Bissell had previously worked.

The essential control of CIA rested in a Cabinent-level committee, comprising a representative of the White House staff the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and in recent years the personal participation of the Director of Central Intelligence. Over the years this committee has become a more powerful and effective device for enforcing control. It reviews all new projects, and periodically scrutinizes ongoing projects.

As an interdepartmental committee composed of busy officials who meet only once per week, this control group is of limited effectiveness. Were it the only control instrument, Mr. Bissell would view it as inadequate, but in fact this committee is merely the summit of control, with a series of intermediate review procedures as lower levels. Projects are usually discussed in the relevant office of the Assistant Secretary of State, and, if at all related to Defense Department interests, at a similar level in DoD, frequently after consideration at lower levels in these departments. It was rare to take an issue before the Special Group prior to discussion at lower levels, and if there was objection at lower levels most issues were not proposed to the Special Group — excepting large projects or key issues, which would be appealed at every level, including the Special Group.

Similar procedures applied in the field. Generally, the Ambassador had a right to know of any covert operations in his jurisdiction, although in special cases (as a result of requests from the local Chief of State or the Secretary of State) the chief of station was instructed to withhold information from the Ambassador. Indeed, in one case the restriction was imposed upon the specific exhortation of the Ambassador in question, who preferred to remain ignorant of certain activities.

Of the “blown” operations, frequently among the larger ones, most are known to have been approved by the President himself. The U-2 project, for example, was an offshoot of the Land (intelligence) Committee of the Killian panel on surprise attack; it was proposed as a Killian panel recommendation to the President, supported by USIB; its procurement, in utmost secrecy, was authorized by the President, and, with the exception of the first few flights (the initial authorization being to operate for a period of ten days, “weather permitting”), each individual flight was authorized by the President, with participation by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

Covert operations should, for some purposes, be divided into two classifications: ( 1) Intelligence collection, primarily espionage, or the obtaining of intelligence by covert means; and (2) Covert action, attempting to influence the internal affairs of other nations — sometimes called “intervention” — by covert means.

Although these two categories of activity can be separated in theory, intelligence collection and covert action interact and overlap. Efforts have been made historically to separate the two functions but the result has usually been regarded as “a total disaster organizationally.” One such attempt was the establishment in the early days of CIA (1948) of the OPC under Frank G. Wisner as a separate organ for covert action. Although supported and given cover by the CIA, this organization was independent and Wisner reported directly to the Secretaries of State and Defense. “Beedle” Smith decided when he became Director of Central Intelligence that, if he were responsible for OPC, he was going to run it and it was merged with the clandestine intelligence organization in such a way that within the combined Clandestine Service there was a complete integration of intelligence collection and covert action functions in each area division.

In addition to our experience with OPC, the Germans and the British for a time during the war had organizations for covert special operations separate from, and inevitably in competition with. their espionage services. In every case the experience has been unfortunate. Although there are many disagreements within CIA on matters of doctrine, the view is unanimous that the splitting of intelligence and covert action services would be disastrous, with resulting competition for recruitment of agents, multiple recruitment of the same agents, additional security risks, and dissipation of effort.

Concerning the first category, intelligence collection, we should ask: (a) What is the scope of “covert intelligence collection”? (b) What intelligence collection functions can best be performed covertly?

The scope of covert intelligence collection includes: (1) reconnaissance; (2) communications and electronic intelligence, primarily undertaken by NSA; and (3) classical espionage, by agents. In gauging their utility, Mr. Bissell ranked (1) the most important, (2) slightly below, and (3) considerably below both (1) and (2).

Although it is less effective, classical espionage is “much the least costly,” with the hardware components of recon and NSA activities raising their costs considerably.

(In the after-dinner discussion, an authority on communications-electronics expressed his concurrence in Mr. Bissell’s relative rankings. Notwithstanding technological advances in cryptology, the increased sophistication in most cryptosystems assured that (1) (reconnaissance) outranked (2). Another observer noted that the budgets correlated in similar manner, the former speaker concurring and noting that, however surprising, the budgets approximated maximum utility according to cost-effectiveness criteria.)

Postwar U.S. reconnaissance operations began, historically, as “covert” operations, primarily a series of clandestine overflights of Communist territory in Eastern Europe, inaugurated in the early 1950s. These early efforts were followed by the U-2 project, which provided limited coverage but dramatic results.

Now we have reconnaissance satellites. Overhead reconnaissance is one of the most open of “secrets” in international affairs; it is no longer really a “covert activity,” and bureaucratic responsibility for it now resides in the Pentagon. Classical espionage, in the early postwar years, was conducted with special intensity in West Germany, and before the Berlin wall, in that city, which was ideal for the moving of agents in both directions, providing a sizable flow of political and economic intelligence (especially from East Germany).

Throughout the period since the early fifties, of course, the Communist bloc, and more especially the U.S.S.R. itself, has been recognized as the primary target for espionage activities. Circumstances have greatly limited the scale of operations that could be undertaken within the bloc so much of the effort has been directed at bloc nationals stationed in neutral or friendly areas, and at “third country” operations that seek to use the nationals of other non-Communist countries as sources of information on the Soviet bloc.

More recently there has been a shift in priorities for classical espionage toward targets in the underdeveloped world. Partly as a result of this change in priorities and partly because of other developments, the scale of the classical espionage effort mounted in Europe has considerably diminished. The U.S.S.R. remains a prime target but Communist China would today be given the same priority.

As to the kinds of information that could be obtained, espionage has been of declining relative importance as a means of learning about observable developments, such as new construction, the characteristics of transportation systems, the strength and deployment of military forces and the like because reconnaissance has become a far more effective collection technique and (except in China) travel is freer and far more extensive than some years ago. It had been hoped that espionage would contribute to the collection of intelligence on Soviet and East European technology, since this is a body of information not readily observable (until embodied in operational systems). Another type of intelligence for which espionage would seem to be the only available technique is that concerning enemy intentions. In practice however espionage has been disappointing with respect to both these types of intelligence. They ,are for obvious reasons closely guarded and the task is just too difficult to permit results to be obtained with any dependability or regularity. With respect to the former category — technology — the published literature and direct professional contacts with the scientific community have been far richer sources.

(A communications-electronics expert interjected the observation that the same reasoning applied to inadequacies in S&T intelligence collection; technology is just too difficult for agents, who are insufficiently trained to comprehend what they observe as the technologies become increasingly complicated.)

As to friendly neutrals and allies, it is usually easier to learn what one wishes by overt contacts, human contact of overt members of the U.S. mission or private citizens. We don’t need espionage to learn British, or even French
intentions.

(The speaker was questioned as to whether the other side’s espionage was of similarly limited utility, or whether — with their Philbys — they were more successful?)

Mr. Bissell remarked that Soviet Union successes were primarily in counterintelligence, though going back aways, the Soviet Union had been more successful in recruiting U.S. scientists.

(The question was raised as to whether Burgess and MacLean constituted merely C.I. successes.)

Mr. Bissell thought so.

(In another’s recollection, Soviet atomic intelligence efforts had been of substantial assistance in facilitating the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Although it is not possible to estimate with precision the effects of this intelligence, it was Lewis Strauss’s guess that atomic intelligence successes allowed the Soviets to detonate their first device at least one and one-half and perhaps as much as two and one-half years before such a test would have been possible with purely indigenous efforts.)

The general conclusion is that against the Soviet bloc or other sophisticated societies, espionage is not a primary source of intelligence, although it has had occasional brilliant successes (like the Berlin Tunnel and several of the high level defectors). A basic reason is that espionage operates mainly through the recruitment of agents and it is enormously difficult to recruit high level agents. A low level agent, even assuming that he remained loyal and that there is some means of communicating with him[,] simply cannot tell you much of what you want to know. The secrets we cannot find out by reconnaissance or from open sources are in the minds of scientists and senior policy makers and are not accessible to an ordinary citizen even of middle rank.

In contrast, the underdeveloped world presents greater opportunities for covert intelligence collection, simply because governments are much less highly oriented; there is less security consciousness; and there is apt to be more actual or potential diffusion of power among parties, localities, organizations, and individuals outside of the central governments. The primary purpose of espionage in these areas is to provide Washington with timely knowledge of the internal power balance, a form of intelligence that is primarily of tactical significance.

Why is this relevant?

Changes in the balance of power are extremely difficult to discern except through frequent contact with power elements. Again and again we have been surprised at coups within the military; often, we have failed to talk to the junior officers or non-coms who are involved in the coups. The same problem applies to labor leaders, and others. Frequently we don’t know of power relationships, because power balances are murky and sometimes not well known even to the principal actors. Only by knowing the principal players well do you have a chance of careful prediction. There is real scope for action in this area; the technique is essentially that of “penetration,” including “penetrations” of the sort which horrify classicists of covert operations, with a disregard for the “standards” and “agent recruitment rules.” Many of the “penetrations” don’t take the form of “hiring” but of establishing a close or friendly relationship (which may or may not be furthered by the provision of money from time to time).

In some countries the CIA representative has served as a close counselor (and in at least one case a drinking companion) of the chief of state. These are situations of course in which the tasks of intelligence collection and political action overlap to the point of being almost indistinguishable. (The question was raised as to why ordinary diplomats couldn’t maintain these relationships.)

Mr. Bissell observed that often they could. There were special cases, however, such as in one Republic where the chief of state had a “special relationship” with the senior CIA officers without the knowledge of the U.S. Ambassador because the President of the Republic had so requested it. The CIA man sent reports by CIA channels back to the Secretary of State, but the Ambassador in the field, as agreed by the Secretary of State, wasn’t to be informed. In this case, a problem arose when the relevant Assistant Secretary of State (who had received cables from the CIA man) became the new Ambassador, but the President of the Republic liked the new Ambassador and asked that a “special relationship” be established with him too.

Aside from this unique case, it seems to have been true generally that the Ambassador has to be a formal representative of the United States most of whose relations with the government to which he is accredited are through or with the knowledge of. its foreign office. On the other hand, the CIA representative can maintain a more intimate and informal relationship the privacy of which can be better preserved both within the government of the country in question and within the United States government. Moreover, if a chief of state leaves the scene or changes his mind, you can quietly move a station chief, but it could be embarrassing if it were necessary suddenly to recall the U.S. Ambassador.

(Was the previously described relationship really a “covert operation”?)

The “cover” may be to shield visibility from some junior officials or, in the case of a “private adviser” to a chief of state, to shield this fact from politicians of the local government. (Another observation was that the method of reporting, through CIA channels, constituted one difference and had some influence. A chief of state who knew that CIA’s reports would be handfed in a smaller circle, with less attendant publicity, might prefer these channels for some communications.)

Concerning the second category, covert action:

The scope of covert action could include: (1) political advice and counsel; (2) subsidies to an individual; (3) financial support and “technical assistance” to political parties; ( 4) support of private organizations, including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives, etc.; (5) covert propaganda; (6) “private” training of individuals and exchange of persons; (7) economic operations; and (8) paramilitary [or] political action operations designed to overthrow or to support a regime (like the Bay of Pigs and the programs in Laos). These operations can be classified in various ways: by the degree and type of secrecy required [,] by their legality, and, perhaps, by their benign or hostile character.

From whom is the activity to be kept secret? After five days, for example, the U-2 flights were not secret from the Russians but these operations remained highly secret in the United States, and with good reason. If these overflights had “leaked” to the American press, the U.S.S.R. would have had been forced to take action. On a less severe level the same problem applies to satellite reconnaissance. These are examples of two hostile governments collaborating to keep operations secret from the general public of both sides. “Unfortunately, there aren’t enough of these situations.” (The remark was interjected that there was another reason for secrecy; if one had to admit to the activity, one would have to show the results, and exactly how good or bad they were.)

Covert operations could be classified by their legality or illegality. Many of them are legal.

They can also be classified as “benign” or “hostile.” Most operations in Western Europe have been “benign,” though involving the gravest improprieties, and in some cases clearly illegal action. (E.g., covert support of political parties.)

In the case of a large underdeveloped country, for example, money was put into a party’s funds without the knowledge of that party. The relatively few economic operations that have been undertaken have been both benign and legal. One of these involved the provision by CIA of interim ostensibly private financing of an overt project pending an overt and official loan by AID. Its purpose was to give AID time for some hard bargaining without causing a complete failure of the transaction. The stereotype, of course, is that all covert operations are illegal and hostile, but this is not really the case.

The role of covert intervention can best be understood by contrast with the overt activities of the United States government. Diplomacy seeks results by bargaining on a government-to-government basis, sometimes openly — sometimes privately. Foreign economic policy and cultural programs seek to modify benignly the economies of other countries and the climate of opinion within them. Covert intervention is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with fairly short-term objectives in view. An effort to build up the economy of an underdeveloped country must be subtle, long continued, probably quite costly, and must openly enlist the cooperation of major groups within the country if it is to have much influence. On the other hand an effort to weaken the local Communist party or to win an election, and to achieve results within at most two or three years, must obviously be covert, it must pragmatically use the people and the instrumentalities that are available and the methods that seem likely to work. It is not surprising that the practitioners within the United States government of these two types of intervention differ temperamentally and in their preferences for methods, friends, and ideologies.

The essence of such intervention in the internal power balance is the identification of allies who can be rendered more effective, more powerful, and perhaps wiser through covert assistance. Typically these local allies know the source of the assistance but neither they nor the United States could afford to admit to its existence. Agents for fairly minor and low sensitivity interventions, for instance some covert propaganda and certain economic activities, can be recruited simply with money. But for the larger and more sensitive interventions, the allies must have their own motivation. On the whole the Agency has been remarkably successful in finding individuals and instrumentalities with which and through which it could work in this fashion. Implied in the requirement for a pre-existing motivation is the corollary that an attempt to induce the local ally to follow a course he does not believe in will at least reduce his effectiveness and may destroy the whole operation. It is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor, and. cultural groups that have recently been publicized that the Agency’s objective was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render them more effective.

Turning to relations with other agencies. Mr. Bissell was impressed by the degree of improvement in relations with the State Department. Seen from the Washington end, there has been an increase in consultation at the country-desk level, more often at the Bureau level or the Assistant Secretary of State level as the operation shapes up. The main problem some five to six years ago was not one of responsibility or authority but of cover arrangements.

Mr. Bissell provided a brief critique of covert operations, along the following lines:

That aspect of the Agency’s operations most in need of change is the Agency’s use and abuse of “cover.” In this regard, the “background paper” for this session raised many cover-oriented questions.

On disclosure of private institutional support of late, it is very clear that we should have had greater compartmenting of operations.

If the Agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have “blown” cannot be resurrected.

We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of “cut-outs.” CIA’s interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected.

If various groups hadn’t been aware of the source of their funding, the damage subsequent to disclosure might have been far less than occurred.

The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied.

The problem of Agency operations overseas is frequently a problem for the State Department. It tends to be true that local allies ‘ find themselves dealing always with an American and an official American-since the cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employee. There are powerful reasons for this practice, and it will always be desirable to have some CIA personnel housed in the Embassy compound, if only for local “command post” and communications requirements.

Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. This would. require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U.S. posture.

The United States should make increasing use of non-nationals, who, with effort at indoctrination and training, should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff. As we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circumscribed. The primary change recommended would be to build up a system of unofficial cover; to see how far we can go with non-U.S. nationals, especially in the field. The CIA might be able to make increasing use of non-nationals as “career agents” that is with a status midway between that of the classical agent used in a single compartmented operation perhaps for a limited period of time and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations and well informed of the Agency’s capabilities. Such career agents should be encouraged with an effort at indoctrination and training and with a prospect of long-term employment to develop a second loyalty and they could of course never be employed in ways that would conflict with their primary loyalties toward their own countries. This still leaves open, however, a wide range of potential uses. The desirability of more effective use of foreign nationals increases as we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia, and Africa where the conduct of United States nationals is easily subject to scrutiny and is likely to be increasingly circumscribed.

These suggestions about unofficial cover and career agents illustrate and emphasize the need for continuing efforts to develop covert action capabilities even where there is no immediate need to employ them. The central task is that of identifying potential indigenous allies-both individuals and organizations-making contact with them, and establishing the fact of a community of interest. There is some room for improvement, Mr. Bissell thought, in the planning of covert action country by country. Covert intervention is probably most effective in situations where a comprehensive effort is undertaken with a number of separate operations designed to support and complement one another and to have a cumulatively significant effect. The Agency probably finds itself involved in too many small covert action operations having no particular relationship with one another and having little cumulative impact.

There is no doubt that some covertly funded programs could be undertaken overtly, Mr. Bissell thought. Often activities have been initiated through CIA channels because they could be started more quickly and informally but do not inherently need to be secret. An example might be certain exchange of persons programs designed to identify potential political leaders and give them some exposure to the United States. It should be noted, however, that many such innocent programs are more effective if carried out by private auspices than if supported officially by the United States government. They do not need to be covert but if legitimate private entities such as the foundations do not initiate them, there may be no way to get them done except by covert support to “front” organizations.

Many propaganda operations are of declining effectiveness. Some can be continued at slight cost, but some of the larger ones (radio, etc.) are pretty well “blown” and not inexpensive. USIA doesn’t like them, and although they did have a real justification some ten to fifteen years ago as the voice of refugees and emigres, groups which also have declined in value, and in the view of some professionals are likely to continue declining in value.

In his last two years in the Agency, Mr. Bissell felt that the Clandestine Services could have been smaller.

Indeed, steps were taken to reduce their size. It is impossible to separate the issue of size from personnel and cover problems. It was Mr. Bissell’s impression that the Clandestine Services were becoming increasingly a career service, too much like the Foreign Service (personnel looking to a succession of overt posts in a safe career) . One result was the circumscription of local contacts. There was a subtle change taking place, which threatened to degrade some of CIA’s former capabilities. Formally, the CIA had a staff with a wide variety of backgrounds, experiences, and capabilities. Its members were recruited from every sort of public and private occupation. If this diversity and variety is lost through the process of recruiting staff members from college, training them in a fairly standard pattern, and carrying them through orderly planned careers in the Agency, one of the organization’s most valuable attributes will disappear.

Finally, Mr. Bissell remarked on large operations. It is self-evident that if an operation is too large, it can’t remain a deeply kept secret. At best, one can then hope for a successful formal disclaimer. The worst of many faults of the Bay of Pigs operation was excessive reliance on the operation’s disclaimability.

It has been a wise decision that operations of that scale not be undertaken by the Agency, except in theaters such as Vietnam, where the stakes and standards are different.

Covert action operations are generally aimed at short-term goals and the justification for the control machinery is that bias of operators to the short run can be compensated for in the review process. Mr. Bissell can conceive of no other way to force greater attention to long-range costs and values. One alternative is that caution will lead to ineffectuality. “Operational types” will he risk-takers, the counterweight is, and should be, applied by the other agencies in government.

In the discussion following Mr. Bissell’s talk, the issue of CIA cover was cited as among the more interesting from the perspective of a former State Department appointee. The size of covert operations known to other governments was a continuing embarrassment, and the overseas staff maintained for these purposes and known to host governments was a similar source of embarrassment. From time to time, efforts were made to reduce overseas staff; although agreement in principle was readily forthcoming, the particulars of staff reduction were difficult to obtain.

A former member of the Special Group (who served eighteen months on that committee) agreed with Mr. Bissell’s earlier remarks on control mechanisms, insofar as they applied to review of new projects. These received most careful scrutiny. Insofar as the Special Group considered ongoing projects during this eighteen-month period, it was recalled that there was not any systematic, thorough procedure for such review, the committee finding itself busy with all the new proposals. If it were true that most operations were most useful for short-term goals, then perhaps there should be greater attention to review of ongoing projects, and termination of more projects earlier than in past practice.

A continuing problem which worries one former official was that. concerning the “charter” of CIA, the public expression of which, in the National Security Act of 1947, was necessarily vague. CIA’s full “charter” has been frequently revised, but it has been, and must remain[,] secret. The absence of a public charter leads people to search for the charter and to question the Agency’s authority to undertake various activities. The problem of a secret “charter” remains as a curse, but the need for secrecy would appear to preclude a solution.

Another former official remarked on the inadequacy of clandestine intelligence as a means of obtaining enemy intentions. Sherman Kent (former Chairman. Board of National Estimates) distinguishes “the knowable” from “the unknowable,” and we should recognize that much remains impossible to know, including, frequently, enemy intentions.

Respecting the reduction of overseas personnel and programs of declining utility, it was noted that the curtailment of over-age and unproductive personnel was a thorny issue. Recognizing the likelihood of appeal to the President and the absence of widespread participation in a manpower review, a former budget official arranged the participation of the Bureau of the Budget, CIA, FIAB, and relevant Under Secretaries in considerations of budgetary modifications. What emerged was an inertia, partly the inertia of the cold war. Parenthetically, a couple of much-criticized public media projects (cited by name) had proven of value, as the fall of Novotny in Czechoslovakia suggested, but a number of ineffective programs were retained. The problem was to free the budget, to do something new, in the place of old programs, not to reduce the budget, but unfortunately, the chiefs in CIA wanted to control their working capital. If it were only possible to tell these officials not to worry. that we were setting aside $xxx million for CIA, and merely seeking to encourage better use of the same dollar amounts, then it would have been possible to move around some money. The big “iffy” question was a particular (named) foundation, which received a sizable allocation. Finally. everything was cleared up, and the next big review was scheduled, but never really effected as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis. The review was geared up in 1963 once again.

Another observer, drawing upon work with the “combined cryptologic budget” and private industry, concluded that it was usually impossible to cut a budget; usually it was only possible to substitute a new project for an old one.

The Chairman suggested a number of questions: What are the effects of covert operations being blown? What can be done to improve the image of the Agency? What can he done to improve relations between the Agency and the press?

It was thought that a journalist’s perspective might aid in discussing these questions, but a number of prior issues were thought to require attention:

(1) The matter of size required attention. In any government agency size can become a problem; increasingly there is a realization that the government is too big and “an ever-swelling tumor.” At some point there will have to be a fairly sharp cutback in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

(2) One was not overly impressed by the use of CIA in the developing world; in any case, we could have increased confidence in the range of choice in most developing areas. Conversely, it might not be as easy. as Mr. Bissell suggested to know the power structure in more developed areas, in Western Europe and Japan.

(A query was interjected: Why should we have increasing confidence in the range of choice in developing areas? Perhaps there are Jess variations than we earlier thought. “Things are evening out and we can live more comfortably.”)

(3) Where do you bury the body? One is not completely convinced by citation of the experience with Frank Wisner’s OPC. We could get around the responsibility issue raised by “Beedle” Smith; we could get around conflicting chains of command.

(4) Related to (3). Maybe there is a cost to be paid for having covert operations under CIA. Perhaps we could have intelligence collection under State and covert operations under the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

In response to items (3) and (4) some earlier remarks were clarified: one would not claim that the operational side of CIA need be where it is. Rather, one would inveigh against the splitting of covert intelligence collection and covert operations. One could, however, split the operational side from the analytic side. This is a plausible case, a solution for which could be worked out (though, on balance, the speaker was against it). But to split the operational side-as the German case, the British case for a time, and our own for a time suggested-would be disastrous.

Remarking on labor activities, one participant stated that before May 1967 it was common knowledge that there bad been some CIA support for labor programs, but first Ramparts and then Tom Braden spelled out this support in public. Those in international labor affairs were dismayed, and certain newspapermen compounded their difficulties by confusing AID with CIA, and claiming that the AFL-CIO’s Free Labor Development program was tainted.

Since these disclosures, the turn of events has been unexpected. First, there hasn’t been any real trouble with international labor programs. Indeed, there has been an increase in demand for U.S. labor programs and the strain on our capacity has been embarrassing. Formerly, these foreign labor unions knew we were short of funds, but now they all assume we have secret CIA money, and they ask for more help.

Worse yet, Vic Reuther, who had been alleging that others were receiving CIA money, and whose brother’s receipt of $50,000 from CIA in old bills was subsequently disclosed by Tom Braden, still goes on with his charges that the AFL-CIO has taken CIA money. Here again, no one seems to listen. “The net result has been as close to zero as possible. We’ve come to accept CIA, like sin.” So, for example, British Guiana’s labor unions were supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before. So, our expectations to the contrary, there has been almost no damage.

A former State Department official offered some remarks on intelligence operations as seen from the field. He concurred in Mr. Bissell’s remarks on “cover.” The initial agreement between the Agency and State was intended to be “temporary,” but “nothing endures like the ephemeral.”

How are Agency officials under “official cover” specially equipped to handle covert operations? If the Agency station chief has a “special relationship” with the chief of state, one would submit that it was because the Ambassador wasn’t worth a damn. Moreover, such a “special relationship” created the risk that the chief of state, seeing two channels to Washington, could play one off against another. Some foreign statesmen are convinced that an “invisible government” really exists, and this impression shouldn’t be allowed,

Also, prejudice in favor of covertly obtained intelligence is a troublesome thing.

One way to overcome the misconceptions is to make CIA a truly secret service, and not merely an agency duplicating the Foreign Service. With money shortages CIA has often filled a vacuum, but this does not make it right.

Another questioned the discussion leader’s proposal for greater utilization of non-U.S. nationals. How could you get non-nationals to do the job and to develop loyalty to the United States?

One was not sure that it was doable, but it was worth trying. It would be more prone to work if you used a national of Country B to work in Country C, if what you are asking is neither (1) against the interest of Country B, nor (2) nefarious. You do need some cover, and the natural vehicle is an organization with non-American nationals.

Another observer was struck by the lack of interest in the “blowing” of covertly sponsored radio activities. Why has there been so little interest in these activities, in contrast to the immense concern over the CIA-NSA relationship? One might conclude that the public is not likely to be concerned by the penetration of overseas institutions, at least not nearly so much as by penetration of U.S. institutions. “The public doesn’t think it’s right: they don’t know where it ends; they take a look at their neighbors.” Does this suggested expansion in use of private institutions include those in the United States, or U.S. institutions operating overseas?

In response, attention was drawn to the clear jurisdictional boundaries between CIA and the FBI, CIA being proscribed from “internal security functions.” CIA was averse to surveillance of U.S. citizens overseas (even when specifically requested), and averse to operating in the United States, excepting against foreigners here as transients. One might want CIA to expand its use of U.S. private corporations, but for objectives outside the United States. It was recalled that the Agency funding of the National Student Association was, in every case, for activities outside the United States or for activities with overseas objectives.

Why, we might ask, should the U.S. government use nongovernmental institutions more, and why should it deal with them in the United States? If dealings are overseas, then it is necessary to maintain an overseas bureaucracy to deal with the locals. It is also necessary to engage in communications in a possibly hostile environment. If one deals through U.S. corporations with overseas activities, one can keep most of the bureaucratic staff at home and can deal through the corporate headquarters, perhaps using corporate channels for overseas communications (including classified communications). In this opinion, the policy distinction should involve the use to which the private institution is put, not whether or not to use private institutions. In another view it was desirable for this discussion group to examine different types of institutions. For example, should CIA use educational institutions? Should CIA have influenced the selection of NSA officers?

One was not aware that CIA had influenced the election of NSA officers; if it had, it shouldn’t have done so, in one’s opinion.

Mightn’t it be possible to deal with individuals rather than organizations?

Yes, in many cases this would be preferable. It depended upon skill in the use of our operating capabilities. As an example of the political use of secretly acquired intelligence, a former official noted the clandestine acquisition of Khrushchev’s “secret speech” in February 1956. The speech was too long for even Khrushchev to memorize, and over one hundred people had heard it. We targeted it, and by secret means acquired a copy. The State Department released the text and The New York Times printed it in full. The repercussions were felt around the world, and particularly within the Communist bloc. The Soviets felt unable to deny the authenticity of the text we released, and the effect upon many of the satellite states was profound. It was the beginning of the split in the Communist movement. If you get a precise target, and go after it, you can change history.

Another observer was troubled by the earlier-expressed point about increased use of private institutions. Most demoralizing in the academic community was the sense of uncertainty about institutions with which individuals were associated. There is a profound problem in penetrating institutions within the country when there is a generalized loss of faith, a fear that nothing is what it seems. It was noted that the next session, on February 15, 1968, would concentrate upon relations with private institutions.

To one observer, part of this solution would be found in the political process, involving extragovernmental contacts in the sphere of political action.

In response to a query, the relative utilities of types of intelligence data were reviewed. Most valuable was reconnaissance, then communications-electronic intelligence, then classical espionage. We have forgotten, it was noted, the number one over-all source, namely, overt data.

The meeting was adjourned at 9:15p.m., and participants were reminded of the next meeting on February 15.

WILLIAM R. HARRIS
RAPPORTEUR

Offener Brief an Frau P

Sehr geehrte Frau P,

wir werden Sie und Ihre dubiosen Genossen für Ihre dubiosen Machenschaften zur Verantwortung ziehen

Das garantiere ich mit meinem Namen, ebenso wie ich die Hintermänner der STASI “GoMoPa” wie versprochen aufgedeckt habe !

Nicht Sozialistischer Gruss

Bernd Pulch, früherer Mentor von Thomas P, Ihrem Honeyboy

 

Secret – Transcript of 1968 Council on Foreign Relations Secret Meeting on the Theory of CIA Covert Action

The following is a transcript of a private meeting held in 1968 in the New York Pratt House of the Council on Foreign Relations.  The meeting was attended by a number of prominent members of the early U.S. intelligence community, including Richard Bissell and Allen Dulles.  The transcript was reportedly discovered by Vietnam War protesters who occupied a building in 1971 housing Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.  One of the attendees of the secret meeting, William Harris, served as an associate to the Center for International Affairs and this transcript was found in his personal files.  The transcript was published in full in the 1974 book “The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence” by Victor Marchetti, a former special assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and John D. Marks, a former officer of the United States Department of State.  The meeting transcript is described in the book as the “most complete description of the CIA’s covert-action strategy and tactics ever made available to the outside world.”A PDF version of the transcript is also available.

Minutes of the 1968 “Bissell Meeting” at the Council on Foreign Relations

The third meeting of the Discussion Group on Intelligence and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on January 8, 1968, at 5:00 p.m. Present were: Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Discussion Leader; Douglas Dillon, Chairman; William J. Barnds, Secretary; William R. Harris, Rapporteur; George Agree, Frank Altschul, Robert Amory, Jr., Meyer Bernstein, Col. Sidney B. Berry, Jr., Allen W. Dulles, George S. Franklin, Jr., Eugene Fubini, Julius C. Holmes, Thomas L. Hughes, Joseph Kraft, David W. MacEachron, Philip W. Quigg, Harry Howe Ransom, Theodore C. Sorensen, David B. Truman.

The Chairman, Mr. Dillon, opened the meeting, noting that although this entire series of discussion was “off-the-record,” the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions.

Mr. Dillon noted that problems involving CIA’s relationships with private institutions would be examined at a later meeting, though neither Mr. Bissell nor others should feel restricted in discussion of such problems this evening.

As the session’s discussion leader, Mr. Bissell offered a review and appraisal of covert operations in U.S. foreign policy.

Touching briefly upon the question of responsibility, of whether these agencies are instruments of national policy, Mr. Bissell remarked that, in such a group, he needn’t elaborate on CIA’s responsiveness to national policy; that we could assume that, although CIA participates in policy making (as do other “action agencies,” such as AID, the military services and Departments, in addition to the Department of State), CIA was a responsible agency of national policy.

Indeed in Mr. Bissell’s personal experience, CIA’s role was more carefully circumscribed and the established limits observed more attentively than in ECA, where Mr. Bissell had previously worked.

The essential control of CIA rested in a Cabinent-level committee, comprising a representative of the White House staff the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and in recent years the personal participation of the Director of Central Intelligence. Over the years this committee has become a more powerful and effective device for enforcing control. It reviews all new projects, and periodically scrutinizes ongoing projects.

As an interdepartmental committee composed of busy officials who meet only once per week, this control group is of limited effectiveness. Were it the only control instrument, Mr. Bissell would view it as inadequate, but in fact this committee is merely the summit of control, with a series of intermediate review procedures as lower levels. Projects are usually discussed in the relevant office of the Assistant Secretary of State, and, if at all related to Defense Department interests, at a similar level in DoD, frequently after consideration at lower levels in these departments. It was rare to take an issue before the Special Group prior to discussion at lower levels, and if there was objection at lower levels most issues were not proposed to the Special Group — excepting large projects or key issues, which would be appealed at every level, including the Special Group.

Similar procedures applied in the field. Generally, the Ambassador had a right to know of any covert operations in his jurisdiction, although in special cases (as a result of requests from the local Chief of State or the Secretary of State) the chief of station was instructed to withhold information from the Ambassador. Indeed, in one case the restriction was imposed upon the specific exhortation of the Ambassador in question, who preferred to remain ignorant of certain activities.

Of the “blown” operations, frequently among the larger ones, most are known to have been approved by the President himself. The U-2 project, for example, was an offshoot of the Land (intelligence) Committee of the Killian panel on surprise attack; it was proposed as a Killian panel recommendation to the President, supported by USIB; its procurement, in utmost secrecy, was authorized by the President, and, with the exception of the first few flights (the initial authorization being to operate for a period of ten days, “weather permitting”), each individual flight was authorized by the President, with participation by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

Covert operations should, for some purposes, be divided into two classifications: ( 1) Intelligence collection, primarily espionage, or the obtaining of intelligence by covert means; and (2) Covert action, attempting to influence the internal affairs of other nations — sometimes called “intervention” — by covert means.

Although these two categories of activity can be separated in theory, intelligence collection and covert action interact and overlap. Efforts have been made historically to separate the two functions but the result has usually been regarded as “a total disaster organizationally.” One such attempt was the establishment in the early days of CIA (1948) of the OPC under Frank G. Wisner as a separate organ for covert action. Although supported and given cover by the CIA, this organization was independent and Wisner reported directly to the Secretaries of State and Defense. “Beedle” Smith decided when he became Director of Central Intelligence that, if he were responsible for OPC, he was going to run it and it was merged with the clandestine intelligence organization in such a way that within the combined Clandestine Service there was a complete integration of intelligence collection and covert action functions in each area division.

In addition to our experience with OPC, the Germans and the British for a time during the war had organizations for covert special operations separate from, and inevitably in competition with. their espionage services. In every case the experience has been unfortunate. Although there are many disagreements within CIA on matters of doctrine, the view is unanimous that the splitting of intelligence and covert action services would be disastrous, with resulting competition for recruitment of agents, multiple recruitment of the same agents, additional security risks, and dissipation of effort.

Concerning the first category, intelligence collection, we should ask: (a) What is the scope of “covert intelligence collection”? (b) What intelligence collection functions can best be performed covertly?

The scope of covert intelligence collection includes: (1) reconnaissance; (2) communications and electronic intelligence, primarily undertaken by NSA; and (3) classical espionage, by agents. In gauging their utility, Mr. Bissell ranked (1) the most important, (2) slightly below, and (3) considerably below both (1) and (2).

Although it is less effective, classical espionage is “much the least costly,” with the hardware components of recon and NSA activities raising their costs considerably.

(In the after-dinner discussion, an authority on communications-electronics expressed his concurrence in Mr. Bissell’s relative rankings. Notwithstanding technological advances in cryptology, the increased sophistication in most cryptosystems assured that (1) (reconnaissance) outranked (2). Another observer noted that the budgets correlated in similar manner, the former speaker concurring and noting that, however surprising, the budgets approximated maximum utility according to cost-effectiveness criteria.)

Postwar U.S. reconnaissance operations began, historically, as “covert” operations, primarily a series of clandestine overflights of Communist territory in Eastern Europe, inaugurated in the early 1950s. These early efforts were followed by the U-2 project, which provided limited coverage but dramatic results.

Now we have reconnaissance satellites. Overhead reconnaissance is one of the most open of “secrets” in international affairs; it is no longer really a “covert activity,” and bureaucratic responsibility for it now resides in the Pentagon. Classical espionage, in the early postwar years, was conducted with special intensity in West Germany, and before the Berlin wall, in that city, which was ideal for the moving of agents in both directions, providing a sizable flow of political and economic intelligence (especially from East Germany).

Throughout the period since the early fifties, of course, the Communist bloc, and more especially the U.S.S.R. itself, has been recognized as the primary target for espionage activities. Circumstances have greatly limited the scale of operations that could be undertaken within the bloc so much of the effort has been directed at bloc nationals stationed in neutral or friendly areas, and at “third country” operations that seek to use the nationals of other non-Communist countries as sources of information on the Soviet bloc.

More recently there has been a shift in priorities for classical espionage toward targets in the underdeveloped world. Partly as a result of this change in priorities and partly because of other developments, the scale of the classical espionage effort mounted in Europe has considerably diminished. The U.S.S.R. remains a prime target but Communist China would today be given the same priority.

As to the kinds of information that could be obtained, espionage has been of declining relative importance as a means of learning about observable developments, such as new construction, the characteristics of transportation systems, the strength and deployment of military forces and the like because reconnaissance has become a far more effective collection technique and (except in China) travel is freer and far more extensive than some years ago. It had been hoped that espionage would contribute to the collection of intelligence on Soviet and East European technology, since this is a body of information not readily observable (until embodied in operational systems). Another type of intelligence for which espionage would seem to be the only available technique is that concerning enemy intentions. In practice however espionage has been disappointing with respect to both these types of intelligence. They ,are for obvious reasons closely guarded and the task is just too difficult to permit results to be obtained with any dependability or regularity. With respect to the former category — technology — the published literature and direct professional contacts with the scientific community have been far richer sources.

(A communications-electronics expert interjected the observation that the same reasoning applied to inadequacies in S&T intelligence collection; technology is just too difficult for agents, who are insufficiently trained to comprehend what they observe as the technologies become increasingly complicated.)

As to friendly neutrals and allies, it is usually easier to learn what one wishes by overt contacts, human contact of overt members of the U.S. mission or private citizens. We don’t need espionage to learn British, or even French
intentions.

(The speaker was questioned as to whether the other side’s espionage was of similarly limited utility, or whether — with their Philbys — they were more successful?)

Mr. Bissell remarked that Soviet Union successes were primarily in counterintelligence, though going back aways, the Soviet Union had been more successful in recruiting U.S. scientists.

(The question was raised as to whether Burgess and MacLean constituted merely C.I. successes.)

Mr. Bissell thought so.

(In another’s recollection, Soviet atomic intelligence efforts had been of substantial assistance in facilitating the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Although it is not possible to estimate with precision the effects of this intelligence, it was Lewis Strauss’s guess that atomic intelligence successes allowed the Soviets to detonate their first device at least one and one-half and perhaps as much as two and one-half years before such a test would have been possible with purely indigenous efforts.)

The general conclusion is that against the Soviet bloc or other sophisticated societies, espionage is not a primary source of intelligence, although it has had occasional brilliant successes (like the Berlin Tunnel and several of the high level defectors). A basic reason is that espionage operates mainly through the recruitment of agents and it is enormously difficult to recruit high level agents. A low level agent, even assuming that he remained loyal and that there is some means of communicating with him[,] simply cannot tell you much of what you want to know. The secrets we cannot find out by reconnaissance or from open sources are in the minds of scientists and senior policy makers and are not accessible to an ordinary citizen even of middle rank.

In contrast, the underdeveloped world presents greater opportunities for covert intelligence collection, simply because governments are much less highly oriented; there is less security consciousness; and there is apt to be more actual or potential diffusion of power among parties, localities, organizations, and individuals outside of the central governments. The primary purpose of espionage in these areas is to provide Washington with timely knowledge of the internal power balance, a form of intelligence that is primarily of tactical significance.

Why is this relevant?

Changes in the balance of power are extremely difficult to discern except through frequent contact with power elements. Again and again we have been surprised at coups within the military; often, we have failed to talk to the junior officers or non-coms who are involved in the coups. The same problem applies to labor leaders, and others. Frequently we don’t know of power relationships, because power balances are murky and sometimes not well known even to the principal actors. Only by knowing the principal players well do you have a chance of careful prediction. There is real scope for action in this area; the technique is essentially that of “penetration,” including “penetrations” of the sort which horrify classicists of covert operations, with a disregard for the “standards” and “agent recruitment rules.” Many of the “penetrations” don’t take the form of “hiring” but of establishing a close or friendly relationship (which may or may not be furthered by the provision of money from time to time).

In some countries the CIA representative has served as a close counselor (and in at least one case a drinking companion) of the chief of state. These are situations of course in which the tasks of intelligence collection and political action overlap to the point of being almost indistinguishable. (The question was raised as to why ordinary diplomats couldn’t maintain these relationships.)

Mr. Bissell observed that often they could. There were special cases, however, such as in one Republic where the chief of state had a “special relationship” with the senior CIA officers without the knowledge of the U.S. Ambassador because the President of the Republic had so requested it. The CIA man sent reports by CIA channels back to the Secretary of State, but the Ambassador in the field, as agreed by the Secretary of State, wasn’t to be informed. In this case, a problem arose when the relevant Assistant Secretary of State (who had received cables from the CIA man) became the new Ambassador, but the President of the Republic liked the new Ambassador and asked that a “special relationship” be established with him too.

Aside from this unique case, it seems to have been true generally that the Ambassador has to be a formal representative of the United States most of whose relations with the government to which he is accredited are through or with the knowledge of. its foreign office. On the other hand, the CIA representative can maintain a more intimate and informal relationship the privacy of which can be better preserved both within the government of the country in question and within the United States government. Moreover, if a chief of state leaves the scene or changes his mind, you can quietly move a station chief, but it could be embarrassing if it were necessary suddenly to recall the U.S. Ambassador.

(Was the previously described relationship really a “covert operation”?)

The “cover” may be to shield visibility from some junior officials or, in the case of a “private adviser” to a chief of state, to shield this fact from politicians of the local government. (Another observation was that the method of reporting, through CIA channels, constituted one difference and had some influence. A chief of state who knew that CIA’s reports would be handfed in a smaller circle, with less attendant publicity, might prefer these channels for some communications.)

Concerning the second category, covert action:

The scope of covert action could include: (1) political advice and counsel; (2) subsidies to an individual; (3) financial support and “technical assistance” to political parties; ( 4) support of private organizations, including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives, etc.; (5) covert propaganda; (6) “private” training of individuals and exchange of persons; (7) economic operations; and (8) paramilitary [or] political action operations designed to overthrow or to support a regime (like the Bay of Pigs and the programs in Laos). These operations can be classified in various ways: by the degree and type of secrecy required [,] by their legality, and, perhaps, by their benign or hostile character.

From whom is the activity to be kept secret? After five days, for example, the U-2 flights were not secret from the Russians but these operations remained highly secret in the United States, and with good reason. If these overflights had “leaked” to the American press, the U.S.S.R. would have had been forced to take action. On a less severe level the same problem applies to satellite reconnaissance. These are examples of two hostile governments collaborating to keep operations secret from the general public of both sides. “Unfortunately, there aren’t enough of these situations.” (The remark was interjected that there was another reason for secrecy; if one had to admit to the activity, one would have to show the results, and exactly how good or bad they were.)

Covert operations could be classified by their legality or illegality. Many of them are legal.

They can also be classified as “benign” or “hostile.” Most operations in Western Europe have been “benign,” though involving the gravest improprieties, and in some cases clearly illegal action. (E.g., covert support of political parties.)

In the case of a large underdeveloped country, for example, money was put into a party’s funds without the knowledge of that party. The relatively few economic operations that have been undertaken have been both benign and legal. One of these involved the provision by CIA of interim ostensibly private financing of an overt project pending an overt and official loan by AID. Its purpose was to give AID time for some hard bargaining without causing a complete failure of the transaction. The stereotype, of course, is that all covert operations are illegal and hostile, but this is not really the case.

The role of covert intervention can best be understood by contrast with the overt activities of the United States government. Diplomacy seeks results by bargaining on a government-to-government basis, sometimes openly — sometimes privately. Foreign economic policy and cultural programs seek to modify benignly the economies of other countries and the climate of opinion within them. Covert intervention is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with fairly short-term objectives in view. An effort to build up the economy of an underdeveloped country must be subtle, long continued, probably quite costly, and must openly enlist the cooperation of major groups within the country if it is to have much influence. On the other hand an effort to weaken the local Communist party or to win an election, and to achieve results within at most two or three years, must obviously be covert, it must pragmatically use the people and the instrumentalities that are available and the methods that seem likely to work. It is not surprising that the practitioners within the United States government of these two types of intervention differ temperamentally and in their preferences for methods, friends, and ideologies.

The essence of such intervention in the internal power balance is the identification of allies who can be rendered more effective, more powerful, and perhaps wiser through covert assistance. Typically these local allies know the source of the assistance but neither they nor the United States could afford to admit to its existence. Agents for fairly minor and low sensitivity interventions, for instance some covert propaganda and certain economic activities, can be recruited simply with money. But for the larger and more sensitive interventions, the allies must have their own motivation. On the whole the Agency has been remarkably successful in finding individuals and instrumentalities with which and through which it could work in this fashion. Implied in the requirement for a pre-existing motivation is the corollary that an attempt to induce the local ally to follow a course he does not believe in will at least reduce his effectiveness and may destroy the whole operation. It is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor, and. cultural groups that have recently been publicized that the Agency’s objective was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render them more effective.

Turning to relations with other agencies. Mr. Bissell was impressed by the degree of improvement in relations with the State Department. Seen from the Washington end, there has been an increase in consultation at the country-desk level, more often at the Bureau level or the Assistant Secretary of State level as the operation shapes up. The main problem some five to six years ago was not one of responsibility or authority but of cover arrangements.

Mr. Bissell provided a brief critique of covert operations, along the following lines:

That aspect of the Agency’s operations most in need of change is the Agency’s use and abuse of “cover.” In this regard, the “background paper” for this session raised many cover-oriented questions.

On disclosure of private institutional support of late, it is very clear that we should have had greater compartmenting of operations.

If the Agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have “blown” cannot be resurrected.

We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of “cut-outs.” CIA’s interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected.

If various groups hadn’t been aware of the source of their funding, the damage subsequent to disclosure might have been far less than occurred.

The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied.

The problem of Agency operations overseas is frequently a problem for the State Department. It tends to be true that local allies ‘ find themselves dealing always with an American and an official American-since the cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employee. There are powerful reasons for this practice, and it will always be desirable to have some CIA personnel housed in the Embassy compound, if only for local “command post” and communications requirements.

Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. This would. require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U.S. posture.

The United States should make increasing use of non-nationals, who, with effort at indoctrination and training, should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff. As we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circumscribed. The primary change recommended would be to build up a system of unofficial cover; to see how far we can go with non-U.S. nationals, especially in the field. The CIA might be able to make increasing use of non-nationals as “career agents” that is with a status midway between that of the classical agent used in a single compartmented operation perhaps for a limited period of time and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations and well informed of the Agency’s capabilities. Such career agents should be encouraged with an effort at indoctrination and training and with a prospect of long-term employment to develop a second loyalty and they could of course never be employed in ways that would conflict with their primary loyalties toward their own countries. This still leaves open, however, a wide range of potential uses. The desirability of more effective use of foreign nationals increases as we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia, and Africa where the conduct of United States nationals is easily subject to scrutiny and is likely to be increasingly circumscribed.

These suggestions about unofficial cover and career agents illustrate and emphasize the need for continuing efforts to develop covert action capabilities even where there is no immediate need to employ them. The central task is that of identifying potential indigenous allies-both individuals and organizations-making contact with them, and establishing the fact of a community of interest. There is some room for improvement, Mr. Bissell thought, in the planning of covert action country by country. Covert intervention is probably most effective in situations where a comprehensive effort is undertaken with a number of separate operations designed to support and complement one another and to have a cumulatively significant effect. The Agency probably finds itself involved in too many small covert action operations having no particular relationship with one another and having little cumulative impact.

There is no doubt that some covertly funded programs could be undertaken overtly, Mr. Bissell thought. Often activities have been initiated through CIA channels because they could be started more quickly and informally but do not inherently need to be secret. An example might be certain exchange of persons programs designed to identify potential political leaders and give them some exposure to the United States. It should be noted, however, that many such innocent programs are more effective if carried out by private auspices than if supported officially by the United States government. They do not need to be covert but if legitimate private entities such as the foundations do not initiate them, there may be no way to get them done except by covert support to “front” organizations.

Many propaganda operations are of declining effectiveness. Some can be continued at slight cost, but some of the larger ones (radio, etc.) are pretty well “blown” and not inexpensive. USIA doesn’t like them, and although they did have a real justification some ten to fifteen years ago as the voice of refugees and