Presidential Documents – Executive Order 14017 – America’s Supply Chains – Original Document

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Ransomware Attack Hits Data Center Provider CyrusOne: Report | Threatpost

Colonial Pipeline, supplier of 45% of East Coast fuel, was paralyzed in February by DarkSide ransomware attack.

In response to the Colonial Pipeline event attributed to the ransomware group DarkSide, the Biden Administration has announced an all-of-government effort to mitigate potential energy supply disruptions. On top of temporary actions to relieve fuel shortages, agencies such as the FBI and CISA have released advisory documents to “help [critical infrastructure] owners and operators improve their entity’s functional resilience by reducing their vulnerability to ransomware.”

In addition, President Biden signed an Executive Order designed broadly to “improve the nation’s cybersecurity,” although experts are already questioning whether the anticipated measures could have prevented any of the recent serious cyber events such as SolarWinds or Colonial Pipeline.

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CISA & FBI – DarkSide Ransomware – Best Practices For Preventing Business Disruption From Ransomware Attacks – Original Document

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Lazarus Group Brings APT Tactics to Ransomware | Threatpost
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Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 7 – Merkel & “IM Czerny” Alias Lothar De Maiziere

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„Angela Merkels politische Karriere schien auf den ersten Blick schon beendet zu sein, bevor sie noch richtig begonnen hatte. Denn die 0,92 Prozent, mit denen der Demokratische Aufbruch aus der Volkskammerwahl vom 18. März 1990 hervorging, hätten kaum Ansprüche auf Posten in der künftigen Regierung zugelassen. Doch auf den zweiten Blick stellten sich die Dinge anders dar: Noch in der Wahlnacht suchte die Pressesprecherin des Demokratischen Aufbruchs die Nähe zum Sieger, genauer gesagt zum Überraschungssieger, denn niemand hatte erwartet, dass Lothar de Maizière 40,8 Prozent der Stimmen bekommen würde.[1] Vorausgesagt worden war ein Triumph der Sozialdemokraten unter Ibrahim Böhme, der bald von seiner Stasivergangenheit eingeholt werden sollte. Sogar von einer absoluten Mehrheit sprachen die Demoskopen. Doch nun erhielten die Sozialdemokraten gerade einmal 21,9 Prozent. Die Menschen hatten de Maizière gewählt und den Bundeskanzler gemeint, der wie kein anderer für Deutschlands schnelle Vereinigung stand.
Angela Merkel harrte nicht bei den Verlierern vom Demokratischen Aufbruch aus. Eigentlich hatten sie in der Gaststätte »Zur Mühle« auf dem Prenzlauer Berg ein ganz anderes Ergebnis feiern wollen, ehe die Schnur-Affäre alles zunichtegemacht hatte. Sie fuhr stattdessen mit dem Journalisten und Politikberater Claus Detjen zum Palast der Republik, dem Sitz der Volkskammer, wo[…]“

Auszug aus: Reuth, Ralf Georg. „Das erste Leben der Angela M. (German Edition).“

Continue reading “Serie – Die Geheimnisse Der Angela Merkel Enthüllt – The Mysteries of Angela Merkel Exposed – 7 – Merkel & “IM Czerny” Alias Lothar De Maiziere”

IM “Anna Holik” Und IM “Hermann Reimer ” Nehmen Jägerheim Dortmund Ins Visier – Original Dokument

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NSA General Counsel Gerstell – “How We Need To Prepare For A Global Cyber Pandemic” – Original Document

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Glenn S. Gerstell SPEECH | April 9, 2018

By some accounts, Russian meddling in the US election system may have originated from the depths of a hot dog cart. It’s a success story, of sorts.

In the early 1990s, an enterprising hot dog vendor in Russia seized upon the entrepreneurial opportunities created by the collapse of the Soviet Union to start his own catering company. He eventually grew his business enough to win lucrative catering contracts with the Russian government. He and his restaurants threw opulent banquets for Kremlin officials, earning him the nickname “Putin’s Cook.” Yevgeny Prigozhin’s company even won a contract in 2011 to deliver school lunches across Moscow, but children wouldn’t eat the food, complaining that it smelled rotten. Bad publicity ensued. Prigozhin’s company responded not by upgrading the food, but by hiring people to flood the internet with postings praising the food and rejecting complaints. Presumably, they found it cheaper to use the internet to write fake reviews than to fund deluxe hot dogs for schoolchildren.

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Stasi OPK “Vogel” – Die Werbung des Konzernlenkersohnes Durch “IM Sebastian”, – Original Dokument

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Stasi Akte OPK “Illusion” – IM “Uwe Wenzel” “IM Paul Stenke” – Original Dokument – Deutsch

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The declassified fashions of East German spies - The Verge
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Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – Von Geheimnissen Verführt: In Der Spy-Tech-Welt Der Stasi – 3

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Ingenious gadgets, real-world quandaries at Washington's all-new Spy Museum

Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World

For his first two years as a spy, Rehder did not know he was selling secrets to the MfS, believing he was selling them to representatives of the Ministry for Machine Building. Stasi agents had been using a cover story. Cover stories or “false-flag” operations – when intelligence officers tell a potential agent that they come from another country – were often em- ployed when there was a sense that the potential recruit was hostile toward communist countries. It was not until January 1959 that Rehder’s case officers, including Major Pape, apparently revealed to Rehder who they were. The files contain no description of Rehder’s reaction to this news; he simply continued, apparently with great eagerness, to pass on company secrets for money. Perhaps the best clue that the Stasi had him in their pocket had come a few weeks earlier, when Gorbatschow that he had made an imprint of the key to the company archive. “With this key,” he told the officers, “I am in the position to access all company secrets.”

In seinen ersten zwei Jahren als Spion wusste Rehder nicht, dass er dem MfS Geheimnisse verkaufte, weil er glaubte, sie an Vertreter des Ministeriums für Maschinenbau zu verkaufen. Stasi-Agenten hatten eine Titelgeschichte verwendet. Coverstorys oder „False-Flag“-Operationen – wenn Geheimdienstoffiziere einem potenziellen Agenten mitteilen, dass er aus einem anderen Land kommt – wurden oft eingesetzt, wenn man den Eindruck hatte, dass der potenzielle Rekrut kommunistischen Ländern feindselig gegenüberstand. Erst im Januar 1959 verrieten Rehders Sachbearbeiter, darunter Major Pape, Rehder offenbar, wer sie waren. Die Akten enthalten keine Beschreibung von Rehders Reaktion auf diese Nachricht; er fuhr einfach fort, offenbar mit großem Eifer, Firmengeheimnisse gegen Geld weiterzugeben. Der vielleicht beste Hinweis darauf, dass die Stasi ihn in der Tasche hatte, war ein paar Wochen zuvor gekommen, als Gorbatschow damit prahlte, den Schlüssel zum Firmenarchiv abgedruckt zu haben. „Mit diesem Schlüssel“, sagte er den Beamten, „bin ich in der Lage, auf alle Betriebsgeheimnisse zuzugreifen.“

Continue reading “Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – Von Geheimnissen Verführt: In Der Spy-Tech-Welt Der Stasi – 3”

Stasi File OPK File “Illusion” – IM “Uwe Wenzel” – “IM Paul Stenke” Original Document – English Translation

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Can You Tell I'm a Stasi Spy? The Crazy Disguises of a Feared Security  State (Photos)
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European Union Exposes Plans For EU Digital Wallet To Come After Implementation Of Green Passport

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Do you think AI,that Harold created,would help in real world or it would  destroy it ? | Fandom

The European Union (EU) is set to uncover plans for an alliance wide advanced wallet, following solicitations from part states to track down a protected path for residents to get to public and private administrations on the web.

The application will allegedly permit residents across the EU to safely get to a scope of private and public administrations with a solitary online ID.

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Stasi Observation Report Of “Zange” By General Gaebel & Lieutenant Colonel Fritsch In Frankfurt/Oder

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Stasiland now: Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the author  of 'Stasiland' reveals the ongoing power of the former East German regime,  not just in politics and business but
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Kristie Macrakis Series – Seduced By Secrets: Inside The Stasi’s Spy-Tech World – Von Geheimnissen Verführt: In Der Spy-Tech-Welt Der Stasi – 2

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Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World

This book tells the story of how a spy and security agency was seduced by the power of technological secrets to solve intelligence and national problems, and, conversely, how it overestimated the power of stolen tech- nology from the West to boost its own technological capacities. By doing so it challenges the myth of an effective spy agency. By the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the system had become so bankrupt that the spy-tech props of the cloak-and-dagger world had increasingly been brought or bought from the West. Other writers have covered the Stasi’s repressive arm – its structures and function as the handmaiden of the state – and other topics such as the churches, the media, and politics.2 Seduced by Secrets concentrates on the spy game, on its methods and sources and on its technology.

Dieses Buch erzählt die Geschichte, wie eine Spionage- und Sicherheitsagentur von der Macht der technologischen Geheimnisse verführt wurde, um Geheimdienste und nationale Probleme zu lösen, und umgekehrt, wie sie die Macht der gestohlenen Technologie aus dem Westen überschätzte, um ihre eigenen technologischen Kapazitäten zu stärken . Auf diese Weise wird der Mythos einer effektiven Spionageagentur in Frage gestellt. Zum Zeitpunkt des Mauerfalls war das System so bankrott geworden, dass die Spionagetechniken der Welt der Umhänge und Dolche zunehmend aus dem Westen gebracht oder gekauft wurden. Andere Autoren haben über den repressiven Arm der Stasi – ihre Strukturen und ihre Funktion als Magd des Staates – und andere Themen wie Kirchen, Medien und Politik berichtet.2 Verführt von Secrets konzentriert sich auf das Spionagespiel, seine Methoden und Quellen und auf seine Technologie.

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Nach “Recherche” Über Journalisten – Datenschutzverfahren Gegen die Stasi-Behörde

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In der Aktenaffäre mit Tausenden von illegal veröffentlichten Seiten mit Stasi-Informationen über Journalisten und Gewerkschafter hat der Bundesbeauftragte für Datenschutz ein Verfahren gegen den Bundesbeauftragten für die Stasi-Akten eröffnet. Der Datenschutzbeauftragte bestätigte dies auf Anfrage von BuzzFeed News und Übermedien.

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After “Research” Of Journalists – Data Protection Proceedings Against The Stasi Records Authority

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In the file affair involving thousands of illegally published pages containing Stasi information about journalists and trade unionists, the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection has opened proceedings against the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi files. The data protection officer confirmed this at the request of BuzzFeed News and Übermedien.

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Juricon – Stasi-GoMoPa – Analyse Samt Auszug der Strafverfahren – Original Dokument

“Klaus-Dieter Maurischat”, Kinderfreund, Zeitreisender und Wundermann

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DDR-Geheimpolizei – So Arbeitet Die STASI – Brandaktuell – Sie Sind Immer Im Geschäft

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Die SED schuf mit dem Ministerium für Staatssicherheit einen Überwachungsapparat in der DDR. Die “Stasi” hatte den Auftrag, über alles Bescheid zu wissen. Wer einmal unter Verdacht geriet, wurde genauestens kontrolliert – jenseits von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechten. Um verdächtige Bürger zu observieren, setzte die Stasi Wanzen und Kameras ein, kontrollierte Post und Telefon und durchsuchte Wohnungen. Der Staatssicherheitsdienst hatte aber auch die Befugnis, Menschen zu verhaften und zu verhören. Neben den hauptamtlichen Stasi-Mitarbeitern gab es auch inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, die verdeckt arbeiteten. Ob es auch Spitzel im eigenen Umfeld gab? Auf diese Frage kann heute der Einblick in die Stasi-Akten BEDINGT eine Antwort geben…

Auf dieser Seite indes haben Sie die Namen von 99% aller Stasi-Agenten.

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GoMoPa4Kids – Reminiszenz In der “Welt” – “Kinderpornographie: Stasi erpresste Politiker”

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Kinder-Sexualaufklärung” unter falscher Flagge – “GoMoPa 4 Kids” – Over and  Out ! – BERNDPULCH.ORG – BERND-PULCH.ORG – TOXDAT, STASI List, STASI  SLEEPER List, KGB List, BDVP List, STASI Names A-Z, DDR-EAST

https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article378210/Kinderpornographie-Stasi-erpresste-Politiker.html

Kinderpornographie: Stasi erpresste Politiker

Veröffentlicht am 10.02.2003 | Lesedauer: 2 Minuten

Von Dirk Banse, Michael Behrendt

Ex-Geheimdienst-Offizier stellt Verbindung zum Fall des vermissten Berliner Jungen Manuel her.

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Check Out The Original Stasi Lists On This Site Only

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GoMoPa – Stasi – KGB – Toxdat – Ehrenfried Stelzer – Resch – Alles Dr. Mabuse Oder Was ?

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GoMoPa – Financal “Intelligence Service” oder was ? Resch in Moskau 1989 oder was ? Stelzer Autor von “Toxdat” oder was ?

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Beware Of The Fake Stasi Lists Of The Neo-Stasi – Visit Berndpulch.org

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MUTMASSLICHER GOMOPA-DRAHTZIEHER DR JOCHEN RESCH AUF DER WARNLISTE VON STIFTUNG WARENTEST

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https://www.test.de/Anlegeranwalt-Etwas-zu-vielseitig-5662824-0/

ALLES DR MABUSE ODER WAS ?

Everything Dr. Mabuse Or What? RA Resch Is Partner Of The Ibiza Video Maker Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai – Arrest in Berlin

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Coup Teil 86: Wie man Parteien unterwandert | Ceiberweiber

But hello – two men of honor in Berlin

Senior partner Dr. Jochen Resch left & right Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai, junior partner

Source: Dr. Resch
What the gentlemen are currently discussing should be of interest to many …

The Ibiza video was shot in the style of STASI.

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Alles Dr. Mabuse Oder Was ? RA Resch Ist Partner Des Ibiza Video – Machers Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai – Festnahme In Berlin

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Coup Teil 86: Wie man Parteien unterwandert | Ceiberweiber

Aber hallo – zwei Ehrenmänner in Berlin

Senior-Partner Dr. Jochen Resch links & rechts Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai, Junior-Partner 

  • Quelle: Facebook Account von Dr. Resch

Was die Herrschaften gerade zu besprechen haben, dürfte viele interessieren…

Das Ibiza Video wurde ganz im Stil der STASI gedreht.

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Gomopa-Stasi-Opfer: “Darum Ist Jochen Resch Der Erfundene “GoMoPa”-Goldman & Manfred Resch Der Erfundene “Morgenstern”

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Hallo Herr Pulch,

KGB-Spion Jochen Resch war 1989 monatelang in Moskau, einerseits aus Angst andererseits, um seine neue Rolle vorzubereiten. Dann hat er mit Stasi-Oberst Ehrenfried Stelzer die deutsch-russische Gesellschaft gegründet und parallel dazu Gomopa den Financial Intelligence Service, Intelligence steht für Geheimdienst wie Insider genauestens bestätigen können. Anschließend wurde Stelzer Reschs Strohmann bei der DIA und Maurischat Reschs Strohmann bei Gomopa.

Der Luca-Brasi-Brutalo der Gomopa hat keinerlei Bildung, ist wie “eine Flasche leer”, kann kein Englisch und keine Orthographie und ist leicht lenkbar für seinen Führungsoffizier Resch.

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Der Unheimliche Einfluss Von Ex-Stasi-Leuten

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Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, kurz: Stasi, war in der DDR die zentrale Institution zur Überwachung der Bevölkerung. Die Mitarbeiter der Stasi wurden gefürchtet – vor allem deshalb, weil sie meistens im Geheimen operierten. Heute ist das alles Geschichte. Wirklich? Wir zeigen, welchen Einfluss ehemalige Stasi-Leute teilweise immer noch haben … Die Gedenkstätte Berlin Hohenschönhausen – https://www.stiftung-hsh.de Das Stasimuseum in Berlin – https://www.stasimuseum.de Vereine, in denen frühere Stasimitarbeiter tätig sind: https://www.okv-ev.de https://www.isor-sozialverein.de/cms/… https://www.mfs-insider.de

“Zersetzung” In Der DDR – Die Zerstörerischen Methoden Der Stasi

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Systematisch hat die Staatssicherheit Menschen in der DDR ausspioniert und versucht, ihr Leben zu zerstören. In Lichtenberg wird die Ausstellung “Zersetzung – Repressionsmethode des Staatssicherheitsdienstes” dazu gezeigt. Nach diesem Modell arbeiten die Alt- und Neo-Stasi-Genossen der “GoMoPa” noch heute.

Das Betrugsurteil Gegen Klaus Maurischat/”GoMoPa” WG Betruges Am Eigenen Anleger: AZ 28 Ls 85/05

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DAS BETRUGSURTEIL GEGEN “BENNEWIRTZ” UND “PETER EHLERS” “GoMoPa”-PARTNER  “MAURISCHAT” UND “VORNKAHL” WG BETRUGES AM EIGENEN ANLEGER | I-NVESTMENT  -THE INVESTMENT - THE ORIGINAL
“Kinderfreund Klaus-Dieter Maurischat” bei einer typischen Geste

Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05 Klaus MaurischatLange Straße 3827313 Dörverden.

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BETREFF: TAGESSCHAU Bestätigt Unsere Haltung Zu “STASI – GoMoPa” & IM Genossen

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GoMoPa-Luca Brasi alias “Klaus-Dieter Maurischat”, “Kinderfreund”, & STASI-Handlanger des mutmasslichen wahren “GoMoPa”-Chefs, des mutmasslichen STASI-Oberst Jochen Resch, Berlin

“GoMoPa”-“CEO” und “President”, der wegen Betruges am eigenen Anleger verurteilte “Klaus-Dieter Maurischat”, der mutmaßliche Strohmann für seine Genossen, ein Mann mit einer äußerst dubiosen Biographie (siehe Artikel auf dieser Webseite).

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David Omand – How Spies Think – 10 Lessons In Intelligence – Part 5

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Lesson 3: Estimations Predictions need an explanatory model as well as sufficient data

In mid-August 1968, I was driving an elderly Land Rover with friends from university along the Hungarian side of the border with Czechoslovakia on the first stage of an expedition to eastern Turkey. To our surprise we found ourselves having to dodge in and out of the tank transporters of a Soviet armoured column crawling along the border. We did not realize – and nor did the Joint Intelligence Committee in London – that those tank crews already had orders to cross the border and invade Czechoslovakia as part of a twin strategy of intimidation and deception being employed by Yuri Andropov, then KGB chairman, to undermine the reform-minded government in Prague led by Alexander Dubček.1

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List Of Crimes For Which Medvedev And Putin Cannot Be Tried

List Of Crimes For Which Medvedev And Putin Cannot Be Tried

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A bill on guarantees of the immunity of the former president was submitted to the State Duma. It will bring the federal law into line with the latest version of the Russian Constitution (adopted by a vote in the summer of 2020). The document not only complicates the procedure for depriving the former president of immunity, but also actually allows the former head of state to commit some crimes after his resignation.

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David Omand – How Spies Think – 10 Lessons In Intelligence – Part 3

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STASI-AGENTS IN DISGUISE

Part One

AN ANALYST SEES: FOUR LESSONS IN ORDERING OUR THOUGHTS

1

Lesson 1: Situational awareness Our knowledge of the world is always fragmentary and incomplete, and is sometimes wrong

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Die Miesen Tricks Der Stasi-Agenten – Die Romeo-Falle

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Während des kalten Krieges versuchte das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit über viele Wege an geheime Informationen und Dokumente zu gelangen. Ein Mittel waren sogenannte “Romeo-Agenten”. Diese Männer wurden von der Stasi, teilweise bereits während des Studiums, angeworben und hatten es auf die Büroleiterinnen von Ministerien und Botschaften in Westdeutschland abgesehen. Sie verführten die jungen Frauen und nutzten deren Vertrauen gnadenlos aus. Mit welchen Tricks die Stasi noch gearbeitet hat, erfahrt Ihr in der Doku “Die Krake – Die Geschichte der Stasi”: https://www.zdf.de/dokumentation/zdf-…

Special Correspondent Andrey Pertsev Answers All Of Your Questions About Russia’s Presidential Executive Office

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In Russia, everybody is utilized to the reality the administration’s situation on intense political, social, and even social issues doesn’t originate from the offices that should be liable for these undertakings. The Kremlin consistently has the final word. Intermittently this doesn’t mean President Vladimir Putin himself, yet rather agents from his Presidential Executive Office. To get a more full comprehension of what Putin’s organization does, we asked “Meduza” political journalist Andrey Pertsev to separate the what precisely the Presidential Executive Office is, the extent of its formal (and casual) obligations, and the constraints of its impact over what occurs in Russia.

Russian political columnists regularly allude to the “Kremlin” as shorthand for the Presidential Executive Office of Russia (additionally alluded to as the Presidential Administration of Russia, which in Russian is abbreviated to the abbreviation “AP”). The Moscow Kremlin turned into the official home of the nation’s top authority very quickly after the October Revolution in 1917. What’s more, the Russian Federation proceeded with this convention after the Soviet Union fell; the Kremlin Senate houses Russian President Vladimir Putin’s office.

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David Omand – How Spies Think – 10 Lessons in Intelligence

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Sir David Omand, Former Director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)



Contents

Introduction. Why we need these lessons in seeking independence of mind, honesty and integrity

PART ONE: AN ANALYST SEES: FOUR LESSONS IN ORDERING OUR THOUGHTS

Lesson 1: Situational awareness. Our knowledge of the world is always fragmentary and incomplete, and is sometimes wrong Lesson 2: Explanation. Facts need explaining

Lesson 3: Estimations. Predictions need an explanatory model as well as sufficient data

Lesson 4: Strategic notice. We do not have to be so surprised by surprise

PART TWO: THREE LESSONS IN CHECKING OUR REASONING

Lesson 5: It is our own demons that are most likely to mislead us

Lesson 6: We are all susceptible to obsessive states of mind Lesson 7: Seeing is not always believing: beware manipulation, deception and faking

PART THREE: THREE LESSONS IN MAKING INTELLIGENT USE OF INTELLIGENCE

Lesson 8: Imagine yourself in the shoes of the person on the other side

Lesson 9: Trustworthiness creates lasting partnerships

Lesson 10: Subversion and sedition are now digital

PART FOUR

A final lesson in optimism

Acknowledgements

Notes and further reading

Index

About the Author

David Omand was the first UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator, responsible to the Prime Minister for the professional health of the intelligence community, national counter-terrorism strategy and ‘homeland security’. He served for seven years on the Joint Intelligence Committee. He was Permanent Secretary of the Home Office from 1997 to 2000, and before that Director of GCHQ.

For Keir, Robert, Beatrice and Ada, in the hope that

you will grow up in a better world

Introduction

Why we need these lessons in seeking independence of mind, honesty and integrity

Westminster, March 1982. ‘This is very serious, isn’t it?’ said Margaret Thatcher. She frowned and looked up from the intelligence reports I had handed her. ‘Yes, Prime Minister,’ I replied, ‘this intelligence can only be read one way: the Argentine Junta are in the final stages of preparing to invade the Falkland Islands, very likely this coming Saturday.’

It was the afternoon of Wednesday, 31 March 1982.

I was the Principal Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary, John Nott. We were in his room in the House of Commons drafting a speech when an officer from the Defence Intelligence Staff rushed down Whitehall with a locked pouch containing several distinctive folders. I knew immediately from the red diagonal crosses on their dark covers that they contained top secret material with its own special codeword (UMBRA), denoting that they came from the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).

The folders contained decrypted intercepts of Argentine naval communications. The messages showed that an Argentine submarine had been deployed on covert reconnaissance around the Falklands capital, Port Stanley, and that the Argentine Fleet, which had been on exercises, was reassembling. A further intercept referred to a task force said to be due to arrive at an unstated destination in the early hours of Friday, 2 April. From their analysis of the coordinates of the naval vessels, GCHQ had concluded

that its destination could only be Port Stanley.1

John Nott and I looked at each other with but one thought, loss of the Falkland Islands would bring a major existential crisis for the government

of Margaret Thatcher: the Prime Minister must be told at once. We hurried down the Commons corridor to her room and burst in on her.

The last assessment she had received from the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had told her that Argentina did not want to use force to secure its claim to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. However, the JIC had warned that if there was highly provocative action by the British towards Argentine nationals, who had landed illegally on the British South Atlantic island of South Georgia, then the Junta might use this as a pretext for action. Since the UK had no intention of provoking the Junta, the assessment was wrongly interpreted in Whitehall as reassuring. That made the fresh intelligence reports all the more dramatic. It was the first indication that the Argentine Junta was ready to use force to impose its claim.

The importance for us of being able to reason

The shock of seeing the nation suddenly pitched into the Falklands crisis is still deeply etched in my memory. It demonstrated to me the impact that errors in thinking can have. This is as true for all life as it is for national statecraft. My objective in writing this book therefore is an ambitious one: I want to empower people to make better decisions by learning how intelligence analysts think. I will provide lessons from our past to show how we can know more, explain more and anticipate more about what we face in the extraordinary age we now live in.

There are important life lessons in seeing how intelligence analysts reason. By learning what intelligence analysts do when they tackle problems, by observing them in real cases from recent history, we will learn how they order their thoughts and how they distinguish the likely from the unlikely and thus make better judgements. We will learn how to test alternative explanations methodically and judge how far we need to change our minds as new information arrives. Sound thinkers try to understand how their unconscious feelings as individuals, as members of a group and within an institution might affect their judgement. We will also see how we can fall victim to conspiracy thinking and how we can be taken in by deliberate deception.

We all face decisions and choices, at home, at work, at play. Today we have less and less time to make up our minds than ever before. We are in the digital age, bombarded with contradictory, false and confusing information from more sources than ever. Information is all around us and we feel compelled to respond at its speed. There are influential forces at play ranged against us pushing specific messages and opinions through social media. Overwhelmed by all this information, are we less, or more, ignorant than in previous times? Today more than ever, we need those lessons from the past.

Looking over the shoulder of an intelligence analyst

Over the centuries, generals naturally learned the advantage that intelligence can bring. Governments today deliberately equip themselves with specialist agencies to access and analyse information that can help

them make better decisions.2 Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) runs human agents overseas. The Security Service (MI5) and its law enforcement partners investigate domestic threats and conduct surveillance on suspects. The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) intercepts communications and gathers digital intelligence. The armed forces conduct their share of intelligence gathering in their operations overseas (including photographic intelligence from satellites and drones). It is the job of the intelligence analyst to fit all the resulting pieces together. They then produce assessments that aim to reduce the ignorance of the decisionmakers. They find out what is happening, they explain why it is

happening and they outline how things might develop.3

The more we understand about the decisions we have to take, the less likely it is that we will duck them, make bad choices or be seriously surprised. Much of what we need can come from sources that are open to anyone, provided sufficient care is taken to apply critical reasoning to them.

Reducing the ignorance of the decisionmaker does not necessarily mean simplifying. Often the intelligence assessment has to warn that the situation is more complicated than they had previously thought, that the motives of an adversary are to be feared and that a situation may develop in a bad way. But it is better to know than not. Harbouring illusions on such matters leads to poor, or even disastrous, decisions. The task of the intelligence officer is

to tell it as it is to government. When you make decisions, it is up to you todo the same to yourself.

The work of intelligence officers involves stealing the secrets of the dictators, terrorists and criminals who mean us harm. This is done using human sources or technical means to intrude into the privacy of personal correspondence or conversations. We therefore give our intelligence officers a licence to operate by ethical standards different from those we would hope to see applied in everyday life, justified by the reduction in harm to the

public they can achieve.4 Authoritarian states may well feel that they can dispense with such considerations and encourage their officers to do whatever they consider necessary, regardless of law or ethics, to achieve the objectives they have been set. For the democracies such behaviours would quickly undermine confidence in both government and intelligence services. Consequently, intelligence work is carefully regulated under domestic law to ensure it remains necessary and proportionate. I should therefore be clear. This book does not teach you how to spy on others, nor should it encourage you to do so. I want, however, to show that there are lessons from the thinking behind secret intelligence from which we can all benefit. This book is a guide to thinking straight, not a manual for bad behaviour.

Nor does thinking straight mean emotionless, bloodless calculation. ‘Negative capability’ was how the poet John Keats described the writer’s ability to pursue a vision of artistic beauty even when it led to uncertainty, confusion and intellectual doubt. For analytic thinkers the equivalent ability is tolerating the pain and confusion of not knowing, rather than imposing ready-made or omnipotent certainties on ambiguous situations or emotional challenges. To think clearly we must have a scientific, evidence-based approach which nevertheless holds a space for the ‘negative capability’

needed to retain an open mind.5

Intelligence analysts like to look ahead, but they do not pretend to be soothsayers. There are always going to be surprise outcomes, however hard we try to forecast events. The winner of the Grand National or the Indy 500 cannot be known in advance. Nor does the favourite with the crowds always come out in front. Events sometimes combine in ways that seem destined to confound us. Importantly, risks can also provide opportunities if we can use intelligence to position ourselves to take advantage of them.

Who am I to say this?

Intelligence agencies prefer to keep quiet about successes so that they can repeat them, but failures can become very public. I have included examples of both, together with a few glimpses from my own experience – one that spans the startling development of the digital world. It is sobering to recall that in my first paid job, in 1965, in the mathematics department of an engineering company in Glasgow, we learned to write machine code for the early computers then available using five-character punched paper tape for the input. Today, the mobile device in my pocket has immediate access to more processing power than there was then in the whole of Europe. This digitization of our lives brings us huge benefits. But it is also fraught with dangers, as we will examine in Chapter 10.

In 1969, fresh out of Cambridge, I joined GCHQ, the British signals intelligence and communications security agency, and learned of their pioneering work applying mathematics and computing to intelligence. I gave up my plans to pursue a doctorate in (very) theoretical economics, and the lure of an offer to become an economic adviser in HM Treasury. I chose instead a career in public service that would take me into the worlds of intelligence, defence, foreign affairs and security. In the Ministry of Defence (MOD), as a policy official, I used intelligence to craft advice for ministers and the Chiefs of Staff. I had three tours in the Private Office of the Secretary of State for Defence (serving six of them, from Lord Carrington in 1973 to John Nott in 1981) and saw the heavy burden of decisionmaking in crisis that rests at the political level. I saw how valuable good intelligence can be, and the problems its absence causes. When I was working as the UK Defence Counsellor in NATO Brussels it was clear how intelligence was shaping arms control and foreign policy. And as the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy in the MOD I was an avid senior customer for operational intelligence on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In that role I became a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the most senior intelligence assessment body in the UK, on which I served for a total of seven years.

When I left the MOD to go back to GCHQ as its Director in the mid-1990s, computing was transforming the ability to process, store and retrieve data at scale. I still recall the engineers reporting triumphantly to me that they had achieved for the first time stable storage of a terabyte of rapidly accessible data memory – a big step then although my small laptop today

has half as much again. Even more significantly, the Internet had arrived as an essential working domain for professionals, with the World Wide Web gaining in popularity and Microsoft’s new Hotmail service making email a fast and reliable form of communication. We knew digital technology would eventually penetrate into every aspect of our lives and that

organizations like GCHQ would have to change radically to cope.6 The pace of digital change has been faster than predicted. Then, smartphones had not been invented and nor of course had Facebook,

Twitter, YouTube and all the other social media platforms and apps that go with them. What would become Google was at that point a research project at Stanford. Within this small part of my working lifetime, I saw those revolutionary developments, and much more, come to dominate our world. In less than twenty years, our choices in economic, social and cultural life have become dependent on accessing networked digital technology and learning to live safely with it. There is no way back.

When I was unexpectedly appointed Permanent Secretary of the Home Office in 1997, it brought close contact with MI5 and Scotland Yard. Their use of intelligence was in investigations to identify and disrupt domestic threats, including terrorist and organized crime groups. It was in that period that the Home Office drew up the Human Rights Act and legislation to regulate and oversee investigatory powers to ensure a continual balancing act between our fundamental rights to life and security and the right to privacy for our personal and family life. My career as a Permanent Secretary continued with three years in the Cabinet Office after 9/11 as the first UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator. In that post, rejoining the JIC, I had responsibility for ensuring the health of the British intelligence community and for drawing up the first UK counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, still in force in 2020 as I write.

I offer you in this book my choice of lessons drawn from the world of secret intelligence both from the inside and from the perspective of the policymaker as a user of intelligence. I have learned the hard way that intelligence is difficult to come by, and is always fragmentary and incomplete, and is sometimes wrong. But used consistently and with understanding of its limitations, I know it shifts the odds in the nation’s favour. The same is true for you.

 

 

Prophezeiung Von 2005: Honeckers Rache

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“Angela Merkel ist am Ziel: Sie ist Kanzlerin der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

In Angela Merkels Welt herrscht das Grauen des schlechten Geschmacks

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Take A Look Inside An FBI Mobile Computer Forensics Lab – Video

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The FBI is utilizing technology that can travel right to the scene of the crime. 41 Action News got a rare look inside a mobile unit at the agency’s Heart of America Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory.

GoMoPa-Scheisshausfliegen Von der Krise Gebeutelt Im Letzten Kampf-Einsatz Aus Dem Stasi-Bunker

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Die Oberscheisshausfliege Klaus-Dieter Maurischat oder wie auch immer der Kinderfreund, Gestaltenwanderer und Zeitreisende heissen mag. Ein ganz schräger Fürst.

Offensicht setzt die Corona-Krise den GoMoPa-Scheisshausfliegen, laut Eigenbezeichnung, und deren IM besonders zu, anders sind die letzten verzweifelten Kampfeinsaetze der Ostberliner Erich Mielke-Epigonen nicht zu erklaeren.

Immer weniger Opfer fallen auf die alten Stasi-Tricks herein, dies zeigen auch die Rekord-Verleumdungen, Morddrohungen und dubiosen Meeting-Einladungen an mich in den letzten Wochen und Tagen.

Zuvor musste ja schon der mutmassliche Pate RA Resch vom noblen Kranzlereck an den Reuterplatz umziehen und seine Mannschaft drastisch reduzieren.

Auch die toedlichen Attentate durch Putins Schergen schaden den alten Stasi-Kaempen der GoMoPa nun zunehmend, da immer mehr Menschen die Zusammenhaenge erkennen.

Hier noch einmal die Highlights aus der Feder der Scheisshausfliegen:

https://berndpulch.org/bernd-pulch-der-beweis-%E2%80%93-so-wollte-der-serienbetruger-klaus-maurischat-uns-zwingen-die-berichterstattung-uber-den-%E2%80%9Cnachrichtendienst%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%9Cgomopa%E2%80%9D-einzustellen/
https://berndpulch.org/2011/02/24/weitere-erpressung-des-vorbestraften-serienbetrugers-klaus-maurischat-gomopa/

Der Neueste “Killing Joke” Der STASI-GoMoPa

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Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler, der Godfather der DDR-Serien, R.I.P.

Die neue geniale E-Mail-Falle der Neo-STASI aus Ostberlin an mich liest sich so:

[BERNDPULCH.ORG – BERND-PULCH.ORG – TOXDAT, STASI List, STASI SLEEPER List, KGB List, BDVP List, STASI Names A-Z, DDR-EAST GERMAN POLICE List,Offshore List, Leaks Lists, GOMOPA4KIDS-Pedophiles-Network, GOMOPA Victims List, GOMOPA Offender Names,] DIE TÄTER-LISTE – 90.000 STASI-MITARBEITER MIT KLARNAMEN ZUM DOWNLOADEN
Ich recherchiere für eine TV-Serie….

ursrechn@gmail.com

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Mutmasslich Tödliche Falle der STASI-GoMoPa für Mich

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Kriminalität in der DDR: Geheimsache Mord: Wie die Stasi Verbrechen  vertuschte - Seite 0 - Reportageseite - Tagesspiegel

Sehr geehrter Herr Bernd Pulch,

die krimin. Enteignung durch SED/Stasi meines Eigentums mit Betrug, Filegrundstück in Weißig, hat das Landgericht Dresden mich parteriloser Arbeiter Rehabilitiert,Beschluss BSRH 128/11 v. 30.7.12 mit Haftbefehlaufhebung RS II 113/86 wegen Rechtsstaatswidrigkeit.

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Must See Video – Nawalny Im “Spiegel”-Interview: Putin Steht Hinter Der Vergiftung

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Nawalny: “Ich behaupte, dass hinter der Tat Putin steht, und andere Versionen des Tathergangs habe ich nicht.”

Exposed – Russia Likely To Continue Seeking To Undermine Faith In US Electoral Process

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Homeland Security Experts on the Biggest Threats and Challenges the U.S.  Faces in 2020 – Homeland Security Today
 
Page Count: 4 pages
Date: September 3, 2020
Restriction: For Official Use Only
Originating Organization: Cyber Mission Center, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
File Type: pdf
File Size: 167,819 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): CD0E044E731342D57AB13DCBB9C8B56D2D5A6295D1E51F6409461D1CAB55C61A
 

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Exklusiv: RA Resch Ist Partner Des Ibiza Video – Machers Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai

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Coup Teil 86: Wie man Parteien unterwandert | Ceiberweiber

Senior-Partner Dr. Jochen Resch links & rechts Dr. Ramin Mirfakhrai, Junior-Partner 

  • Quelle: Facebook Account von Dr. Resch

Was die Herrschaften gerade zu besprechen haben, dürfte viele interessieren…

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Exposed – US Prosecutor Indicts Two Chinese For Hacking TBs Of Data

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Chinese cybercriminals hacked companies doing COVID-19 vaccine ...

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Andrej Hunko Und Die Partei Borotba: Propaganda Vom Kreml Für Den Bundestag

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Ukraine verbietet Linke-Abgeordnetem Hunko die Einreise – EURACTIV.de

Andrej Hunko

Der deutsche Geheimdienst BfV erklärte 2016, dass Russland hinter einer Reihe von Cyber-Angriffen gegen die Institutionen und Politiker des Landes steckt. Dazu gehörten ein schweres Hacking des Deutschen Bundestages im Jahr 2015 und ein weiterer Angriff im folgenden Jahr gegen die regierende Christlich-Demokratische Partei.
Am 5. Mai 2020 erließ die Bundesanwaltschaft einen Haftbefehl gegen Dmitry Badin, einen Russen, der der Hauptverdächtige beim Hacking des Bundestages 2015 ist.

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FSBs Magnificent Seven: Neue Verbindungen Zwischen Berlin Und Istanbul

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“Roman Davydov”, Foto aus dem slowakischen Visumantrag.

Am 23. August 2019 wurde Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, ein georgischer Asylbewerber tschetschenischer Herkunft, auf dem Rückweg vom Freitagsmoscheeservice in einem Park in der Nähe des Berliner Kleiner Tiergartens ermordet. Der Mörder war von der deutschen Polizei gefangen genommen worden, nachdem er mit dem Fahrrad vom Tatort weggelaufen war und zwei Teenager gesehen hatten, wie er seine Perücke, Kleidung und seinen Schalldämpfer in die Spree entsorgt hatte. Er ist seitdem in Haft und hat Unschuld behauptet.
In unseren früheren gemeinsamen Ermittlungen mit Der Spiegel und The Insider (Russland) haben wir den Mörder – der unter der gefälschten Identität von Vadim Sokolov (49) reiste – als Vadim Krasikov (54) identifiziert Mindestens zwei Auftragsmorde: 2007 in Karelien und 2013 in Moskau. Für diese Morde wurde er von den russischen Behörden auf einer Interpol Red Notice gesucht – bis er 2015 plötzlich fallen gelassen wurde.
Wir haben letztendlich herausgefunden, dass das Attentat vom russischen FSB, der staatlichen Sicherheitsbehörde, geplant und organisiert wurde. Die Vorbereitung des Mordes wurde direkt von hochrangigen Mitgliedern einer Veteranenstiftung ehemaliger Spetsnaz-Offiziere der Eliteeinheit FSB Vympel überwacht. Wir konnten jedoch nachweisen, dass der FSB direkt an der Planung und Unterstützung der Operation beteiligt war, da wir die wiederholte Anwesenheit des Mörders in den FSB Spetznaz-Schulungseinrichtungen in den Monaten vor seiner Reise unter einer von der Regierung ausgestellten Deckungsidentität geolokalisieren konnten im August 2019 nach Deutschland.

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Wer Ist Dmitry Badin, Der Von Deutschland Angeklagte GRU-Hacker Wegen Der Bundestags-Hacks?

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Am 5. Mai 2020 berichteten deutsche Medien, dass die deutsche Bundesanwaltschaft einen Haftbefehl gegen den russischen Staatsbürger Dmitry Badin erlassen hat, den Hauptverdächtigen beim Hacking des Deutschen Bundestages im Jahr 2015.

Was war der Bundestags-Hack 2015?

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Deals Between Mafia Boss Marat Balagula, Russia, Ukraine And Belarus Exposed

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Marat Balagula | Mafia Wiki | Fandom

Marat Balagula

Documents released through Par:AnoIA, allegedly containing details about deals with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The documents are partly in English, Russian and Chinese. One document, obtained from the Chinese foreign office in Minsk indicates relations between the notorious Russian mob boss Marat Balagula and high ranking Ukrainian politicians.

Download the documents here:

https://data.ddosecrets.com/file/Chinese%20Ministry%20of%20Commerce/BYCN.rar

Marat Balagula (born September 8, 1943, Orenburg, USSR) was a Russian immigrant who was a Former Soviet Union leader and  Russian mafia boss, and close associate of the Lucchese crime family. His nickname was “Tony Soprano of the Russian Mafia”.

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Murder In Mexico: What’s The Danger To An Foreign Tourist ?

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Full Coverage: Murder in Mexico

Mexico broke its record for manslaughters a year ago, and the elements that are driving that savagery are probably not going to lessen sooner rather than later.

Simultaneously, record quantities of U.S. residents are either visiting Mexico as voyagers or dwelling in the nation, yet the quantity of Americans killed in Mexico remains strikingly low.

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Tricky Hacker Email To Us Exposed – Probably By GoMoPa And Fancy Bear

Tricky Hacker Email To Us Exposed – Probably By GoMoPa And Fancy Bear

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Russel <donotreply@wordpress.com>
To:pulchbernd
 
Thu, Apr 30 at 11:53 AM
 
 
Name: Russel

Email: russel.corbat@timhortons.ca

Website: http://geomids

Comment: Hi,

My name is Russel Corbat and I work as an IT Security Manager at Tim Hortons Inc.

Around 7 hours ago, berndpulch.org has been involved to DDoS attack one of our private servers. As a result, we have been experiencing major disruptions in our network.

I had to take a close look at your web-site and I am almost sure that you have rather become a victim as well, instead of being a part of the attackers team.

So, before taking this matter to court and filing a police report, I am offering you a chance to fix this problem by yourself.

Moreover, I strongly suggest you to take this chance, as our attorneys were previously able to seize the defendant more than $417,000 by court action in similar case, just so you know.

However, the good news is the problem can be solved quite easily and you can even do it by yourself.

Tracking the requests sent by your web-site, our specialists identified the exact names of the malicious files used to DDoS attack our network.

Thus, you just need to delete these files and change the passwords on your web-site and the issue will be automatically resolved.

We would not like to involve most likely innocent people into any litigations, that�s why I prepared the list of files to be deleted, even though that doesn�t come within my duties. This will help us solve the problem once and for all.

I have additionally included detailed instructions on how to delete the files in a secure way. Make sure you study them before you start (pay close attention to item 3 of the attached instructions).

Download the report on malicious files and their uninstall instructions here:

https://sites.google.com/site/case000283/googledrive/share/downloads

Once again, we are in tune for a peaceful solution.

If you are not able to uninstall the malware on your web-site after reviewing the report, just email me and I will try to help you out with that (please do not forget to mention the case number, it can be found in the report).

In case you decide to ignore this message and the DDoS attack from your web-site to our network will be repeated once more, please note that we will contact our attorneys immediately and will have to involve police for further investigation, without giving you a prior notice on it.

Russel Corbat | IT security manager
russel.corbat@timhortons.ca

Tim Hortons Inc.
130 King Street West
Toronto, ON M5X 2A3
Canada


Time: April 30, 2020 at 10:53 am
IP Address: 51.79.37.25
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2016/02/10/cryptome-unveils-snowden-documents/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.

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Hacker Emails To Us Exposed – Probably By GoMoPa and Fancy Bear

Hacker Emails To Us Exposed – Probably By GoMoPa and Fancy Bear

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WARNING: DO NOT GO TO THE WEBSITES MENTIONED HERE:
SMVx <donotreply@wordpress.com>
To:pulchbernd
Sat, May 23 at 9:12 PM

Name: SMVx

Email:

Website: http://CTCF

Message:


Time: May 23, 2020 at 8:11 pm
IP Address: 195.54.167.122
Contact Form URL: https://berndpulch.org/2020/05/19/cryptoleaks-wie-cia-bnd-mit-schweizer-hilfe-global-spionierten/
Sent by an unverified visitor to your site.

[BERNDPULCH.ORG – BERND-PULCH.ORG – Stasi Liste, KGB Liste, Stasi List, KGB List] Cryptoleaks – Wie CIA & BND Mit Schweizer Hilfe Global Spionierten
Yahoo/Inbox

Where Have All The Communist KGB and STASI Spies Gone ?

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Fallout 4 - RED SCARE - FULL QUEST Mod Playthrough - COMMUNIST SPY ...

A look back: On Normannenstrasse in East Berlin, in the core of a standard white collar class neighborhood, stands a gigantic office complex: 41 solid structures as inauspiciously utilitarian as the condo towers that encompass them. Nine months prior it was the base camp of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security – the Staatsicherheit – or Stasi, maybe the most modern and sweeping undercover work association at any point made. Be that as it may, among January and March this year, as East Germany’s Communist Government at long last crumbled, the Stasi was officially disbanded. Today, the solid fortress is abandoned, its 10,000 rooms fixed, its operators bolted out.

From these dreary structures, 34,000 officials ran the Stasi’s 39 divisions. The staff included 2,100 operators alloted nonstop to perusing mail passed on from post workplaces and territorial Stasi base camp, 5,000 specialists liable for following suspects, and 6,000 agents whose solitary employment was tuning in to private phone discussions.

Primary Department VIII, otherwise called Observation, kept a nearby watch on residents through a broad system of sources in neighborhoods, schools, libraries and even service stations. Principle Department II – Counterintelligence – did electronic reconnaissance of outside ambassadors, specialists and writers and put spies in their workplaces, homes and lodgings. The Stasi even had a division to keep an eye on other Stasi individuals and sources.

”We are as yet getting stuns from what we discover,” says the movie producer Klaus Wendler, a representative for an East German Government advisory group that is currently filtering through the Stasi’s 5,000,000 documents. ”Performers had to keep an eye on individual artists, understudies were pressured into keeping an eye on companions, and youngsters were tricked into keeping an eye on their folks.”

With the disbanding of the Stasi, 85,000 full-time officials lost their positions essentially for the time being. Close to 10,000 have since discovered productive business, a large portion of them in different Government services, remembering 2,000 for the Ministry of the Interior, which some time ago administered the Stasi. The rest have joined the developing positions of East Germany’s jobless; some make due with standard joblessness benefits, while others get no Government remuneration by any stretch of the imagination. Many are upset at ending up barred, even alienated, by their kindred residents.

Abroad, the greater part of the Stasi’s 2,500 profession officials in consulates and missions no longer have a covert operative central command to answer to, and its untold a large number of independent covert government agents no longer get cash from their previous experts. West German insight officials gauge that there are exactly 5,000 agents in West Germany today, 500 of them ”top operators.” Eighty of those are thought to have entered the most elevated echelons of the military and Government, West German authorities state, including knowledge offices.

In spite of emotional political changes in Europe, West German insight authorities dread that not every one of these covert agents have changed their loyalties. Exceptionally restrained and still covert, some are as yet gathering and transferring data to Soviet knowledge organs, the West Germans accept. Others, they think, are essentially sticking around for their chance, holding back to be enacted.

Communist Spy Illustrations, Royalty-Free Vector Graphics & Clip ...

The Stasi has for some time been perceived as one of the best insight benefits on the planet, in a similar alliance as those of Israel and France. By the by, in the course of the most recent seven months, West German and American knowledge authorities have been astounded to find the size of its outside tasks, arranged until his retirement three years prior by the scandalous Markus Wolf. Until 1979, Western knowledge operators didn’t have a present photo of ”the man without a face.” But as of late he has ventured out from the shadows. Today, a smash hit creator, Wolf talks uninhibitedly of his effective infiltration of the West German insight and military over a time of over 30 years. What he doesn’t talk about is psychological oppression.

Over the most recent two months, frightening disclosures have become visible specifying the Stasi’s connects to an assortment of fear based oppressor gatherings, quite the extreme left Red Army Faction, eight of whose individuals were captured in June. With the assistance of the Stasi, they had been given new personalities and occupations in East Germany in the wake of doing psychological militant activities in the 1970’s and 80’s. The Stasi has additionally been ensnared in the Libyan-coordinated bombarding of the La Belle disco in West Germany in 1986: According to new data from witnesses and held onto documents, Stasi operators helped transport the explosives to West Berlin that brought about the passings of two American fighters.

In East Germany, as well, the Stasi, albeit formally nonexistent, stays a danger. In late June, new divulgences uncovered that in 1986, as the Soviet Union started changing its general public and the East German economy kept on decaying, the Stasi, predicting turmoil – however not the finish of the divider – set in excess of 2,000 individuals from a world class mystery team into the most significant levels of East German Government divisions, organizations and colleges. Another 500 government agents were dispatched to West Germany. East German authorities state that a large portion of them are still set up, their characters obscure, and suspect that they are compelled to hold up out any political disturbance.

Insight authorities are in a race to carry the most exceedingly terrible guilty parties to equity before they go for all time underground or sign up with new bosses. The pursuit is suggestive, says one American ambassador in Berlin, of a period in the no so distant past: ”Ferreting out the government operatives, psychological oppressors and Stasi operators is comparable to the quest for the Nazis and their teammates after they endeavored to vanish into German culture toward the finish of the war.”

On Friday morning, only 48 hours from money related unification on July 1, East Berlin is bursting at the seams with energy. Global camera teams and columnists have attacked the city to catch the beginning of another time. Be that as it may, in his office, just strides from the Volkskammer, or Parliament, Peter-Michael Diestel, East Germany’s 38-year-old Interior Minister, ponders the insult inheritance of the past. ”My crucial,” says just, ”is to destroy the Stasi.”

That assignment has tumbled to an impossible competitor: a previous dairy animals draining victor, weight lifter (he can seat press 420 pounds) and infrequent legal counselor who accepted the position of Interior Minister to a great extent in light of the fact that nobody else needed it.

Diestel, a local of Leipzig, has been occupied since getting to work in April. He has enrolled the collaboration of huge quantities of previous Stasi officials and, utilizing data from witnesses and Stasi records, has attempted to acquire ”independent” agents, either by extending to them employment opportunities or persuading them that the Stasi is done. He has gone along key data on fear mongers and sources to West German knowledge offices, and helped organize the capture in June of the Red Army Faction psychological oppressors. At last, Diestel built up the Stasi’s complicity in the La Belle disco bombarding.

Diestel is exploring a forlorn course, subject to furious assaults from both the left and right in East Germany, extraordinary weight from West German authorities, and week after week requires his acquiescence by the German Social Union, a traditionalist gathering in East Germany’s overseeing alliance. Due to day by day dangers against his life, the police monitor his significant other and three little youngsters nonstop. Says Peter Pragal, East Berlin reporter for the week by week magazine Stern: ”He has the hardest activity in Germany, East or West.”

Other than its full-time officials, selected from the best and most brilliant in East German culture, the Stasi had 150,000 dynamic sources and 500,000 to 2 million low maintenance witnesses in East Germany. Its land property alone – including the huge fortresslike complex in East Berlin and Stasi’s in excess of 2,000 structures, homes, dugouts, havens, medical clinics, and resorts all through East Germany – have been esteemed in the billions of dollars. Up until this point, Government agents attempting to take stock of the Stasi have counted 23,000 vehicles and trucks and 250,000 weapons, including submachine firearms, guns, rifles and explosive launchers.

The productive Stasi machine accumulated broad dossiers on in excess of 5 million East Germans – 33% of the populace – that included data as close as sexual propensities and as everyday as books settled up with the library. A great many calls were recorded; condos were pester and unlawfully looked (the Stasi would orchestrate to have suspects kept late at their employments). One protester as of late found that a small scale listening gadget fit for transmitting three miles had been sewn into his jacket neckline.

Residents were powerless against the Stasi’s Orwellian interruption whenever and anyplace – in their condos, industrial facilities, houses of worship, cafés, libraries, specialists’ workplaces, rooms, even on their excursions abroad. In some East German urban communities, each bit of mail was opened in exceptional steam rooms joined to the post workplaces.

At the point when East German soccer groups ventured out to play coordinates in West Germany, Stasi specialists obliged busloads of fans, checking whether any East German sat close to a West German, showed a West German banner or sang the West German national song of praise.

Igor Gouzenko, The Soviet Defector Who Started the Cold War

Up and down the a large number of miles of East German expressway, Stasi specialists acted like corner store chaperons, servers and travelers, cautiously taking note of whether East Germans left their vehicles close to Western vehicles or conveyed dubiously overwhelming baggage.

The Stasi made it basically incomprehensible for East Germans not to work together. Each field operator needed to convey in any event 25 new sources or start 25 examinations consistently. Residents who declined to help were either set apart as subversives or left to adapt to the administration independent. ”You were unable to go anyplace in East German culture except if you could pull the correct strings,” says Hasso Von Samson, a spokesman for West Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution. ”But I guess that’s what happens when they take away your enemy.”

This article reflects the situation in Germany in 1990.

Since then the top spies are still in touch with each other and form a dangerous network which is similiar to the Cosa Nostra in the USA and/or Sicily, the Yakuza in Japan, the Russian Mafia and the Chinese Triads.

The only distinction: The German STASI has learned the code of Omerta and operates in the dark – within the government, the Gauck administration, the Bundestag, the left party, the legal system as judges, attorney and prosecutors, the police and also in the German security and intelligence services.

And last not but least as undercover agents and informer for former KGB spy Wladimir Putin, now Russia’s ruler like former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, former STASI agent Matthias Warnig and the Gazprom and North Stream – Energy connection.

It is a taboo until now.

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STASI/KGB Intelligence Cooperation Under Project RYaN Exposed – TOP SECRET

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Ehemaliger BND-Chef kann geplante Ablösung Honeckers 1987 nicht ...

Between 1981 and 1989 the foreign intelligence branches of the Soviet KGB and the East German Ministry of State Security launched a combined effort to develop a system for detecting signs of an impending western nuclear first strike. Codenamed “Project RYaN”, this early-warning system constituted one part of the Soviet response to the perceived threat of a surprise “decapitation” strike by NATO nuclear forces.

233 pages of documents from the Stasi’s Hauptverwaltung A and analysis by Bernd Schaefer, Nate Jones, and Benjamin Fischer below give unprecedented insight into the capabilities and fears of the Eastern Bloc intelligence services from the Able Archer ’83 War Scare to the end of the Cold War.

Introduction to the Collection

by Bernd Schaefer

In November 2012 CWIHP published e-Dossier No. 37 on the cooperation between the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS or Stasi), which highlighted a wide array of German documents dating from the 1960s through 1989. These materials were introduced by Walter Süss and Douglas Selvage, historians in the research division of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU) in Berlin.[1] While e-Dossier No.37 featured just one document[2] on Soviet/East German preparations to detect a surprise Western “nuclear missile attack” (RYAN or Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie/Ракетно ядерное нападение in Russian) from August 1984, the BStU research division added a substantial number of German Stasi documents on RYAN to its online collection in 2013.[3] These new materials are remarkable and add to our understanding of the intentions, scope, and duration of the Soviet RYAN project; all of them are available in translation today in the CWHIP Digital Archive. The follow e-Dossier includes detailed comments and analysis on their significance by Nate Jones, a nuclear expert at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C., and Benjamin Fischer, a retired CIA officer and veteran researcher of RYAN and the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” of November 1983.

The August 1984 record of bilateral Stasi-KGB conversations, written by East German foreign intelligence spy chief Markus Wolf, includes an apt summarization of RYAN’s purpose by the Soviet representative: “The need for such approaches derives from the fact that a multitude of measures undertaken by the adversary do not allow advance determination which variation to launch a war the adversary will choose. In addition, we need to integrate experiences from analyzing the enemy’s crisis management into a process of further perfecting the definition of indicators to detect the adversary’s main measures for its acute war preparation.”[4]

It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war

It is undisputable that after 1979 the Soviet leadership, military, and intelligence service grew increasingly nervous about a “possible” Western “surprise nuclear missile attack” to “decapitate” the USSR’s nuclear potential and win a subsequent war. The KGB operated an intelligence network to monitor worldwide “indicators” to detect to assess the likelihood of a “surprise nuclear missile attacked” launched by NATO. Soviet assessments of the likelihood of such an attack differed over the years, peaking between 1982 and 1984.

KGB/Stasi Cooperation | Wilson Center

Whether such fears were warranted given the actual activities of the United States and NATO is disputed. Historians and analysts have differed in their assessments of partially declassified American sources, archival materials from Eastern European and Soviet archives, post-1990 oral histories from Russia, and memories of former actors, such as prominent KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky. Some consider the so-called “Able Archer Crisis” or “War Scare” of November 1983 to be the most dangerous event of the Cold War next to the Cuban Missile Crisis, while others view it in a much less dramatic fashion.[5]

The bulk of newly available Stasi and KGB documentation on RYAN from the BStU Archives in Berlin does not address Able Archer 83. However, it casts an unprecedented light on Stasi and KGB perspectives since 1984, as well as on the operational details, structure, and scope of the RYAN project. The collection includes a KGB catalogue from 1984/85 that, in excruciating detail, outlines the 292 indicators that might precede a potential “surprise nuclear missile attack.” Many of them refer to activities in and around Washington offices and buildings, including the White House parking lot. The collection also includes summaries of monthly KGB reports up to April 1989, which list possible global indicators of preparations for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” These records tell us that hundreds of KGB officers were assigned to work on the RYAN program and a special division was created inside the KGB exclusively for this purpose. Combined with earlier published Stasi documents on the Soviet shoot down of KAL 007 in September 1983 (in which Soviet intelligence’s inability to determine whether the airliner was military or civilian before it was shot down was identified as a serious problem[6]), these new RYAN materials provide ample evidence of comprehensive Soviet efforts to avoid and thwart a “surprise attack.”

While hindsight shows that Soviet fears were exaggerated, the level of Soviet and East German anxiety over Western intentions, particularly during the first Reagan administration, is noteworthy. On the other hand, many Stasi documents on RYAN read like overbearing bureaucratic exercises, aimed at comprehensiveness and perfection on paper, but unattainable in practice. Phrasing in some of the Stasi materials implies that there probably was some skepticism in higher Stasi echelons about the program’s effectiveness and the Soviet approach (though it did not deter the Stasi from contributing more substantive efforts than any other fraternal socialist intelligence service towards identifying indicators).

Still, it does not seem far-fetched that Soviet anxieties were enhanced by the ensuing and ever expanding RYAN program and fed into Moscow’s shift towards disarmament policies under Mikhail Gorbachev. Strangely enough, the KGB’s RYAN project had acquired such a life of its own that its operational routines continued all the way through the first half of 1989, regardless of changes in Soviet-American relations and disarmament efforts during the second Reagan and the early Bush I administration.

Was RYaN simply a “ vicious cycle of intelligence collection and assessment” as described by Oleg Gordievsky? While Gordievsky’s word choice is debatable, these new documents put a certain amount of Soviet “circular reasoning” on full display.


The Vicious Circle of Intelligence

by Nate Jones

Oleg Gordievsky, the spy who revealed the existence of Operation RYaN –RYaN (РЯН) is the Russian acronym for Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie (Ракетно ядерное нападение), or “nuclear missile attack”– described it as “a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment.” During the last decade of the Cold War, Soviet intelligence operatives abroad were “required to report alarming information” to Moscow about a Western surprise nuclear strike, “even if they themselves were skeptical of it.” After the Moscow Center received these inflated and incorrect –but requested– reports of Western preparations for a surprise nuclear strike, it became “duly alarmed by what they reported and demanded more.” Now, documents newly released by the Cold War International History Project and the Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic (BStU), provide unprecedented insight into the “vicious circle of intelligence” of Operation RYaN. And, in a development never envisaged by the documents’ authors, they now present historians with comprehensive, real-time monthly RYaN reports from Soviet intelligence operatives abroad as they witnessed and catalogued the Cold War’s end.[7]

In 1979 the Institute for Intelligence Problems, coordinated by the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, was tasked to work on “the development of new intelligence concepts” that could provide preliminary warning of Western preparations for a first strike. The result of this work was the creation of Operation RYaN, which was secretly announced in May of 1981.[8] At a major KGB conference in Moscow, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov, then Chairman of the KGB, justified the creation of Operation RYaN because, they claimed, the United States was “actively preparing for nuclear war” against the Soviet Union and its allies. According to a newly released Stasi report, the primary “Chekist work” discussed in the May 1981 meeting was the “demand to allow for ‘no surprise.’”[9]

The establishment of Operation RYaN has also been corroborated by KGB annual reports from 1981 and 1982, previously published by the National Security Archive. The 1981 annual report states that the KGB had “implemented measures to strengthen intelligence work in order to prevent a possible sudden outbreak of war by the enemy.” To do this, the KGB “actively obtained information on military and strategic issues, and the aggressive military and political plans of imperialism [the United States] and its accomplices,” and “enhanced the relevance and effectiveness of its active intelligence abilities.”[10]

The 1982 annual report confirmed Soviet fears of Western encirclement, and noted the challenges of countering the “U.S. and NATO aspirations to change the existing military-strategic balance.” Therefore, “[p]rimary attention was paid to military and strategic issues related to the danger of the enemy’s thermonuclear attack.” This Soviet unease was spurred by the pending November 1983 deployment of Pershing II and Gryphon Cruise missiles, whose short flight times and long range changed the nuclear balance by threatening Soviet nuclear command and control with decapitation.[11]

The first comprehensive account of the details of Operation RYaN remains a Top Secret February 1983 telegram from KGB Headquarters Moscow to the London KGB Residency entitled “Permanent operational assignment to uncover NATO preparations for a nuclear missile attack on the USSR,” with enclosed instructions on how to report on indicators pointing toward a nuclear sneak attack. This document was published in full in 1991 by Soviet double agent Oleg Gordievsky and British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew in Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985.

Above: M113 armored personnel carriers move through the town of Stockhausen (Herbstein) during REFORGER ’83 in Germany.

“The objective of the assignment is to see that the Residency works systematically to uncover any plans in preparation by the main adversary [USA] for RYaN and to organize continual watch to be kept for indications of a decision being taken to use nuclear weapons against the USSR or immediate preparations being made for a nuclear missile attack.”

Attached to the telegram was a list of seven “immediate” and thirteen “prospective” tasks for the agents to complete and report. These included: the collection of data on potential places of evacuation and shelter, an appraisal of the level of blood held in blood banks, observation of places where nuclear decisions were made and where nuclear weapons were stored, observation of key nuclear decision makers, observation of lines of communication, reconnaissance of the heads of churches and banks, and surveillance of security services and military installations.

Regrettably, however, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions included a facsimile reproduction of only the first page of this document. The additional pages were translated and typeset into English with no Russian corroboration of their authenticity. Nevertheless, the KGB annual reports, as well as documents from other former Eastern Bloc (Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian) archives, and now these Stasi documents, help to substantiate Gordievsky’s accounts.[12]

The newly released Stasi documents on RYaN show that East German Intelligence did not begin conducting RYaN collection activities until years after the Soviets began. A January 1983 “brief note” describes initial Stasi preparations for creation of systematic RYaN intelligence collection and reporting, but acknowledges “[f]urther questions had to be straightened out.” [13] At the February 9th high-level meeting in Moscow, Stasi head Erich Mielke told KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov that, “consultations have to be continued.” Chebrikov replied, “The work is definitely not finalized.”[14] In August of 1984, the Soviet and East German intelligence agencies were still discussing how, exactly, “to approach conceptual, organizational, and practical aspects when dealing with the RYaN problem.”[15]

In fact, German collection and analysis of RYaN information did not begin in earnest until early 1985, according to the February 15, 1985, Order Number 1/85 which directed that “all options” be utilized to detect Western “military aggression, particularly a surprise nuclear missile attack” by observing non-socialist states and West Berlin in a “systematic and targeted manner.”[16] While systematic Stasi RYaN collection and analysis did not commence until well after the end of what has become known as the “1983 War Scare,” these newly released documents do contain insights about the danger of the era, which will be discussed below.

Above: Order Number 1/85

The documents also provide unprecedented operational details about RYaN, including its size, the importance of East German intelligence to the Soviets, the use of computers for RYaN collection, and the 292 indicators that some Eastern Bloc intelligence experts believed could be used to detect a nuclear attack.

For the first time, historians have access to hard numbers about the size of Operation RYaN, revealing that within the KGB, 300 positions were created so that RYaN operatives could implement the real-time “transmission and evaluation” of reported indicators showing the likelihood of a Western first strike. In July of 1984, KGB chairman Victor Chebrikov created a new division within the First Department (Information) of the KGB’s First Main Directorate (responsible for foreign intelligence and operations) to implement Operation RYaN throughout the KGB and world. This coordinating division was composed of 50 KGB officers.[17]

The documents further acknowledge that the Stasi was the KGB’s primary source of foreign intelligence. In July 1981, Andropov thanked Stasi head Erich Mielke for providing information on “West German tank production, defense technology, and the NATO manual [as of now the contents of this manual is unknown].” Andropov then complemented the Stasi, lauding, “We rate your information very highly,” and forebodingly requested Stasi sources procure “an assessment of the NATO manual and NATO’s preparations for war.”[18] In September 1983, Deputy Chairman of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov told Stasi head Erich Mielke that although Andropov was officially on vacation in the Southern USSR, it was “no actual vacation… For half the day he is reading information, including ours [KGB] and what we received from you.” In December 1986, KGB Chairman Victor Chebrikov wrote Stasi head Erich Mielke to thank him for the “tangible results in this extremely important area [Operation RYaN].” He emphasized that the KGB “highly value[d] the contribution of the MfS of the GDR to the joint efforts on timely recognition of the danger of a sudden attack.”[19]

There are also references to the primitive computer system that the Soviet Union was attempting to use to track and calculate the coalition of world forces, including the risk of nuclear war. The KGB reported to the Stasi that it had “revised its planning for scientific-technological research and industrial procurement” of new “reliably working technology.” Gordievsky had earlier reported of “a large computer model in the Min[istry] of Defense to calculate and monitor the correlation of forces, including mili[tary], economy, [and] psychological factors, to assign numbers and relative weights.”[20] On November 23, 1983, US Defense and Intelligence officials circulated an article entitled, “In pursuit of the Essence of War” that described a Soviet method which “cataloged and computerized” the world’s “correlation of forces.” The results, it claimed, were “highly objective, empirically provable and readily adaptable to modern data processing.”[21] The newly released documents show that the East Germans were skeptical of Soviet computing prowess, however: past “Soviet experiences show us that a danger exists of computer application concepts not getting implemented,” snidely wrote Marcus Wolf.[22]

Computer analysis was desired because the amount of information captured during Operation RYaN was massive. The newly released Stasi documents provide far more detail than Gordievsky’s account of the precise indicators that human intelligence collectors were compiling and analyzing (such as: activity at Defense instillations, the location of prominent political officials, and even the treatment of “the most important government documents at the US National Archives”). In October 1983, Deputy KGB Chairman Kryuchkov revealed that the First Directorate’s Institute for Intelligence Problems[23] had compiled seven binders full of possible RYaN indicators.[24] By May of 1986, these binders had evolved into a catalogue of 292 indicators of “signs of tension.”[25] The Stasi reported that 226 indicators (77 percent) were able to be “covered, though to varying degree.” The indicators were organized into five main categories: Political, Military, Intelligence Services, Civil Defense Agencies, and the Economic sector. A read through the newly released full catalogue of RYaN indicators (as opposed to the truncated list published by Gordievsky) makes the program appear more rational and effective than has previously been portrayed.[26] Just one telling example is the fact that RYaN watchers had sniffed out the US Continuity of Government program, discovering and surveilling “two presidential planes… equipped with accelerated speed [and] electronic apparatuses which work under conditions of nuclear weapons use.”[27] These planes were where the president and his emergency cabinet would command during a nuclear war.

RYaN watchers were also instructed to watch for the “preparation and conduct of large-scale exercises,” because they increased “the level of combat-readiness of US strategic forces,” and hence, could indicate intentions for a “surprise nuclear missile attack.” When Gordievsky disclosed Operation RYaN he also revealed Able Archer 83, a November 1983 NATO command post nuclear release exercise that he claims Soviet intelligence may have miscalculated as an actual nuclear strike.[28]

The RYaN catalogue noted several indicators that would have occurred during Able Archer 83 (and other NATO exercises), including: the “large scale transfer of US armed forces” by C-5A and C-141 aircraft (16,000 troops were transferred from the US to Europe on radio silent flights during Autumn Forge 83, which included Able Archer 83); “preparation of anti-ABC [atomic-biological-chemical] protective gear” and mobilization (during Able Archer 83 the war gamers donned ABC equipment and transferred to an Alternate War Headquarters in response to simulated chemical attacks); and, perhaps most importantly, “significant changes in communications” including “transmittal of orders to deploy nuclear weapons” (on October 17-21 1983, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe school in Oberammergau, West Germany trained more than 50 NATO officers on new nuclear weapons release procedures which utilized a new format that was practiced for the first time during Able Archer 83).[29]

Another eyebrow-raising, though certainly not dispositive, reference to Able Archer 83 can be found in these documents. On November 7, the day Able Archer 83 began, an East German Major General (whose name is illegible) sent a summary of discussions between Stasi foreign intelligence chief Marcus Wolf and Deputy KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov to Major General Damm. Gordievsky has written that on November 8 or 9, he “was not sure which,” flash telegrams were sent to both KGB and GRU residencies in Western Europe reporting “an alert on US bases.” The flash telegrams “clearly implied that one of several possible explanations for the (non-existent) alert was that the countdown to a nuclear first strike had actually begun.”[30]

Perhaps relatedly, the East German documents also reveal a persistent undercurrent of skepticism and concern about the effectiveness of Operation RYaN. In August of 1984, Lev Shapkin, deputy director of the KGB for foreign intelligence, told Marcus Wolf that reforms to Operation RYaN were underway. Though no faulty reporting by Operation RYaN during Able Archer 83 was mentioned in the meeting, the two intelligence officials clearly were worried that false warnings of a Western nuclear first strike could lead to preemptive actions by Soviet nuclear forces. Shapkin told Wolf that the indicators agents were observing and reporting “must be complemented, revised, and made more precise,” and bemoaned “the problem of not getting deceived” by faulty indicators. He reiterated that “clear-headedness about the entire RYAN complex” was a “mandatory requirement.” Marcus Wolf included his concerns in an addendum to the summary of the meetings, stressing the need to know the “actual situation” rather than the picture presented by Operation RYaN’s indicators. “Constant and ongoing assessments,” he sensibly wrote, “have to be made whether certain developments actually constitute a crisis or not.”[31]

The documents contained in this release include one final invaluable resource for historians: monthly Soviet intelligence summaries (translated from Russian to German, and now, to English) spanning August 1986 to April 1989. The monthly summaries, serving a purpose likely never imagined by their drafters, allow us to see how Soviet intelligence witnessed and reported the peaceful ending of the Cold War. The reports, which mirror the above RYaN format, are thorough and include much reporting on the West still officially classified in the United States. This includes reports on the operational readiness of Pershing II, MX, and Trident missiles at specific bases, and US military activities in Nicaragua, Panama, and Iran/Iraq. They also include comprehensive reporting of NATO drills and maneuvers. The Soviet observers reported of Able Archer 87, for example, that NATO “simulated” the switch from peace to war time; nuclear consultations were practiced “in the context of the exercise.” Regrettably, no November 1983 RYaN report is yet available for historians to observe if the reporting on Able Archer 83 was as couched and nuanced as it was four years later.

The task of following CWIHP and the BStU’s lead and finding these earlier RYaN reports now falls to archivists and archival burrowers in other former Soviet states now liberalized.[32]

Finally, these monthly RYaN reports about the Cold War’s peaceful resolution reflect the strangeness of the nuclear superpower rivalry itself. The absurd logic of the Cold War becomes evident when one reads about the NATO “elimination of intermediate and tactical nuclear missiles” in a September 1987 report incongruently entitled, “On the Results of Intelligence Activities to Report Indicators for a Sudden Nuclear Missile Attack.”


Comments on the Soviet-East German Intelligence Alert

by Benjamin Fischer

A real contribution

The BStU documents contain important information about both the Soviet intelligence alert RYAN and its East German counterpart KWA (Kernwaffenangriff or nuclear-weapons attack) during the 1980s. On several accounts, we owe Douglas Selvege a debt of gratitude for locating and disseminating the new tranche. First, no Soviet records have become available since former KGB officer (and British agent) Oleg Gordievsky published a selection of RYAN cables almost a quarter of a century ago, and it is unlikely that Russia will declassify new sources. Most commentators, I myself the most culpable, were mesmerized by both the stark tone of both the cables and Gordievsky’s various accounts of the “war scare.” A more balanced interpretation is now possible. Second, the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) and especially its foreign intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung A (Main Directorate A, hereafter HV A), played a major role in the alert system documented here for the first time. For many years, the only information on the East German side was Markus Wolf’s memoir (1997), which some researchers considered a reliable and original source while others did not. Wolf, however, couched his brief account, referring only to RYAN, not KWA. He apparently expected that HV A records would never see the light of day. There was good reason to do so, since most files were destroyed on the eve of German unification.[33] Though skeptical about the purpose and priority of the Soviet intelligence alert, Wolf nevertheless saluted and obeyed KGB orders. The MfS/HV A organized an elaborate early-warning system (Früherkennung/Frühwarnsystem) that replicated and, to some degree, exceeded its Soviet counterpart.

How scary was the war scare?

Wolf occupied a much higher position than Gordievsky in the Warsaw Pact intelligence community. The spymaster was closer to the real center of power in Moscow, was a keen observer of both superpowers, and his agents in the West— especially inside NATO provided insights that countered the ideological stereotype of the “inherent aggressiveness” of the Western alliance. Moreover, his view may have been in line with the actual perceptions of his Soviet masters.

Yuri Andropov was the leading proponent of RYAN. He inaugurated the alert in 1981 as chairman of the KGB and presided over its expansion after succeeding Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary the next year. In May 1981, during a private conversation with Wolf’s boss, State Security Minister Erich Mielke, Andropov assessed the Reagan administration’s plans for accelerated modernization of strategic and theater-nuclear forces:

The US is preparing for war, but it is not willing to start a war. They are not building factories and palaces in order to destroy them. They are striving for military superiority in order to “check” us and then declare “checkmate” against us without starting a war. Maybe I am wrong.[34]

Andropov added that Washington had abandoned détente because it benefited the USSR at the expense of the US—in words that echoed Ronald Reagan’s condemnation of détente as a “one-way” street! Now the US was trying to recover its losses by reverting to the earlier policy of containment, in other words, to the old Cold War.

Two years later, facing the prospect of deployment of new US Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, Andropov addressed a meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee. The missiles were the “most serious challenge,” he said, and the military situation was “especially dangerous.” In the past, the US had counted on its nuclear weapons “to deter” and “to contain” the Soviet Union; now there was talk of actually fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war.[35] “It is difficult to say where the line between extortion and actual preparation to take a fateful step lies.”[36]

Andropov stopped short of declaring that war was imminent or unavoidable. In his public statements, however, he spoke as if the world was on the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Soviet propagandists compared Reagan to Hitler and the US to Nazi Germany on the eve of 1941. Less than a month after Andropov’s speech, the KGB dispatched a cable that sounded the alarm, asserting that RYAN “now lies at the core of [Soviet] military strategy;” the intelligence alert had become a military alert.[37]

Another “cut” at the question of leadership thinking on the prospect of war comes from a Politburo meeting in May 1983. Acknowledging that the US cruise and ballistic missiles would arrive on schedule, Andropov turned to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for an assessment of US intentions. Gromyko replied: “The United States, as is known, is talking about the fact that they can only strike in response to aggression. I think that without enough reason they wouldn’t dare to use nuclear missiles.” He added that, in any event, NATO’s pluralist structure would act as brake on the US: “Against the first strike are also Canada, England, France, and West Germany.”

The Alert Ramps Up

The Soviets were nervous but not to the point of shaking in their boots. RYAN did not, as Gordievsky claimed, begin to wind down in mid-1984, on the eve of his departure from London and after he had lost access to KGB cable traffic. It ramped up. KGB officer Lev Shapkin briefed the East Germans on a series of decisions made to expand RYAN and to create an infrastructure to support it.[38] The KGB formed a new division within the First (information/analysis) Department of the First Chief (foreign intelligence) Directorate (FCD). It was a situation center or watch office designed to collect and assess warning indicators and levy requirements on the FCD’s operations divisions and signals intelligence (Sigint) department.

The new division was a high priority and was almost certainly initiated by Andropov. The formation of a special RYAN commission chaired by KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov underscored the alert’s top-level political backing and its bureaucratic clout. Chebrikov earmarked 300 slots for the new RYAN division, 50 of which had been filled to monitor warning indications around the clock. However, the KGB had trouble finding qualified personnel and training officers to perform “warning-and-indications of war intelligence,” as it is referred to by US intelligence services. This is one of several signs that the Soviets, even in this late stage of the Cold War, had little or no experience with early-warning intelligence.

Warning and Surprise

RYAN was launched in May 1981 during an All-Union Conference of senior KGB managers from the length and breadth of the USSR. Andropov chaired it, but the presence of Leonid Brezhnev signified that the session was no routine gabfest. Gordievsky’s accounts give the impression that RYAN was the sole item on the agenda. It was not.

The East German documents show that the conference discussed a range of threats, referred to as “surprises,” emanating from within the USSR and the Eastern bloc, as well as from the international arena. The KGB chieftains were instructed to reorient their collection priorities toward early detection and advance warning of potential or impending crises that threatened the internal security and stability, as well as external security, of the Soviet empire. As KGB officer [full name unknown] Zinyov told the East Germans, the new operational directive was to “allow no surprises.” The mission of “Chekist work,” he added, now encompassed “the struggle against espionage and terror, questions of the economy, morale, the construction industry, etc.”[39]

Subsequently, FCD chief Vladimir Kryuchkov confided to Wolf that even foreign intelligence had been drawn into novel operations aimed at detecting threats to internal security originating from outside the USSR.[40] The MfS and HV A followed suit. “The bunker mentality of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] leadership revealed itself in the mantra-like repetition ‘impede every surprise from the enemy in every area.’”[41] This originally meant external military threats, i.e., the war scare, but then it expanded to include a range of dangers posed by domestic dissidence—religious, pacifist, and environmental groups, e.g.—allegedly supported by the West. The “most urgent” mission of the MfS, as well as the HV A, was to detect this conflation of internal and external “surprises” and to “prophylactically” deal with them before they grew to threaten the GDR regime.

Wolf’s repeated assertion that his service had nothing to do with the Stasi police-state was false. Like his counterpart Kryuchkov, Wolf followed orders. HV A case officers and their agents were tasked with collecting intelligence on internal threats emanating from abroad, even at the expense of conventional foreign intelligence inside the GDR and in the “Operations Area” (Stasi-deutsch for West Germany, West Berlin, and other NATO countries). The HV A began filing counterintelligence reports (Abwerberichte)—normally the provenance of the MfS internal security and surveillance departments—which contributed to increased repression in the GDR.[42]

KWA and the Frühwarnsystem

The MfS/HV A was the largest and most efficient Eastern bloc security/foreign intelligence service outside the Soviet Union. Its operational assets were considerable and in several respects exceeded those of the KGB, especially the massive MfS signals intelligence (Sigint) main directorate and the HV A’s extensive agent (Humint) networks that targeted West Germany/West Berlin and the US and NATO presence there.[43] Following the expansion of RYAN in mid-July, the KGB used the MfS/HV A to replicate its own organizational and operational model for early-warning intelligence.

This new collection includes one of the two key documents on KWA, Mielke’s Order Nr. 1/85, which mandated it as “the absolute priority” [emphasis in original] for the entire MfS.[44] The Order authorized Wolf, in his capacity as deputy MfS head, to formulate and implement an organizational plan and operational directives for the entire MfS. The second document[45] is not included in the collection, but several years ago I translated and commented on both documents.[46] The main components of the HV A’s early-warning system included:[47]

  • A “catalog” of warning indicators that was based on the RYAN template of five “political/societal areas” (US/NATO political and military leaderships, intelligence services, civil defense organizations, and economic institutions); it also included targets covered by MfS Sigint and HV A agent networks in West Germany/West Berlin, as well as US/NATO diplomatic, military, and intelligence sites in West Germany;[48]
  • A centralized situation center (Lagezentrum) to constantly monitor KWA indicators on a global basis;
  • A dedicated communications link to the KGB’s situation center;
  • Annual alert drills and military exercises for HV A officers that simulated conditions of a surprise attack;[49]
  • Emergency communications plans and safe houses in West Germany for agents selected to report on KWA;[50]
  • Coordination of operations and intelligence sharing with East German military intelligence on the Soviet model of KGB-GRU cooperation under RYAN guidelines.

A Catalog of Warning Indicators

The focal point of Soviet and East German collaboration was the compilation of a list or “catalog” of warning-of-war indicators designed to detect signs of an impending crisis or war “in real time.” The KGB demanded that the HV A catalog should be based on “strict conformity” with the RYAN template, i.e., on the five “political/societal areas” noted above.

Above: Cover page from the HA III copy of the Project RYaN catalog of indicators.

MfS/HV A records reveal that both services devoted considerable effort to conceptualizing, defining, and operationalizing warning indicators, yet they also seemed to have encountered problems that were never fully resolved. The main objective was agent penetration of “the enemy’s decision-making centers” and acquisition of “documents” on a political decision for war. The Soviet-East German intelligence reach, however, exceeded its grasp. The overriding goal was to obtain advance warning of a US decision to launch strategic nuclear forces, an urgent requirement since one-third of those forces remained on permanent alert, and the rest could be readied on short notice. A 1986 HV A report noted that “at the moment” this had not been accomplished.[51]

The second string to the RYAN/KWA bow was an extensive list of indirect indicators that, it was assumed, would reveal the implementation of alert procedures and mobilization plans that could not be concealed from intelligence surveillance and monitoring. The KGB and HV A were forced to resort to “observable intelligence,” i.e., things that can be seen and counted, in lieu of “message-like” intelligence, which relies on well-placed agents with access to plans, decisions, and intentions.[52] RYAN/KWA signified that the neither the KGB nor the HV A had such agents in place. The questionable methodological assumption was that overt or visible deviations from peacetime norms in the five political/societal areas could reveal a decision to attack the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries.

The one place where both services had well-placed agents was NATO headquarters. The KGB cables Gordievsky published, as well as the East German documents[EMP1] , reveal detailed knowledge of the alliance’s alert procedures and early-warning capabilities, especially NATO’s “crisis management” system. The KGB and HV A did not, however, find it reassuring that NATO arrangements were designed to warn of a Warsaw Pact attack in time to mount a defense. They simply declared that “crisis management” was dual-purpose concept that could be used to attack as well as warn.

The whole RYAN/KWA framework was anachronistic, seemingly more appropriate for the pre-nuclear age when states required lead times to mobilize armed forces and prepare populations for war. The template came from the KGB’s Institute for Research on Operational Problems. One explanation is that with little knowledge or experience to draw on, the Institute was dusting off old lessons learned from a previous surprise attack, namely Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa.

Some of the indicators were based on a mirror-image of how the Warsaw Pact would prepare for war, such as the stockpiling of mineral oil and mass slaughter of cattle. HV A case officers, for example, were instructed to look for:

“Confirmation of deviations in the behavior of prominent personalities and other persons in possession of classified information as well as their family members and persons close to them, which can be viewed as measures for protecting their own security (among other things, sudden moving into specially equipped secure accommodations, unexpected departure from normal residential areas and from border zones at home and abroad).”

The GDR, meanwhile, was building bunkers and fall-out shelters for the political, military, and intelligence elite and practicing “evacuation exercises” in case of a putative nuclear assault.[53]

The KGB and the HV A both had difficulties defining “key” indicators and do not appear to have arranged them in rank order or have assigned numerical weights or some form of an “accounting” method. There is a fleeting reference to the possibility of reaching false conclusions about hostile intentions, but the inherent problem of arriving at a false positive as watch officers worked through their checklists was apparently never fully addressed. Was there a tipping point or designated critical mass of accumulated indicators that would predict an attack? We don’t know, and the documents don’t tell us.

In 1986, the HV A reported that it had covered 226 of the 292 (!) indicators (“77%”), “albeit in varying degrees,” from its catalog, but what that meant is not clear. Were the results negative—no war on the horizon—or positive? The documents refer to efforts to employ computer-based data processing, but they also allude to problems with software and algorithms that, apparently, were never resolved.

All intelligence bureaucracies write memos and send cables when they want to give the impression that they are making decisions and taking action while, actually, “slow rolling the process.” The KGB-HV A dialogue on the indicators may have been no different. Despite repeated references to the urgency and priority of the alert, the HV A took several years to compile its own list of indicators. Meetings of working-level experts in Moscow and East Berlin were arranged at a leisurely pace. It took more than a year after Order Nr. 1/85 to organize an HV A situation center to monitor KWA indicators. By the time it was up and running, the entire effort was about to be overtaken by events in Moscow with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev and “new thinking.”

Mielke’s Variant

RYAN single-mindedly focused on the putative threat of a US surprise attack on the USSR. KGB cables declared that timely warning was required for Soviet strategic forces to take “retaliatory measures,” but the logic of the alert suggests that a preemptive first-strike, not a second-strike after US missiles had been launched, was the actual purpose.

Mielke repeatedly, and vainly, pushed for consideration of “other variants” of surprise, in particular conflict in Central Europe arising from a crisis in East-West relations. Mielke’s concern, shared by many in West Germany, was that the superpowers were prepared to fight in Europe, with conventional forces or “limited” nuclear strikes, down to the last German and on the last inch of German soil.[54] The Soviets simply ignored him. As the documents show time and again, Kremlin leaders had far less concern for their ally’s security than for their own.

Tradecraft and the war scare

The documents contain several references to operational tradecraft that underscore the Warsaw Pact’s lack of experience with warning intelligence. With the onset of the RYAN and KWA alerts, the KGB and the HV A, apparently for the first time, decided to issue to selected agents in the West rapid response communications equipment. The German term was Sofortmeldung (immediate reporting), which may have referred either to radios or burst transmitters using satellite relays to transmit encrypted electronic signals to the HV A situation center.

Theretofore, the KGB and HV A had employed personal communications (face-to-face meetings) or impersonal communications (dead drops) to pass requirements to and collect information from agents. Such arrangements required advance planning, conduct of pre-and-post meeting surveillance detection routes, and continuous “casing” for meeting or dead drop sites. Old-fashion tradecraft was secure but time-consuming and not suited for real-time reporting.

So, what was the war scare?

Wolf and his officers found Moscow’s “war games” a burdensome waste of time in pursuit of a non-existent threat. Some said KWA was a bureaucratic boondoggle that Mielke used to expand his power and influence. Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War” and a “sort of window dressing, and boiled down to compilation of regular reports stating that any given country was not intending in the next few days to drop nuclear bombs on the USSR.”[55] Soviet and East German leaders, however, were genuinely fearful, even if the threats and conspiracies they saw all around them were often exaggerated or even imaginary. As they were losing their grip on power, they were also losing their grip on reality.

Vadim Bakatin, the last KGB chairman, called RYAN “an atavism of the Cold War”

At the same time, the US was investing billions of dollars to upgrade its command-and-control, communications, intelligence, and early-warning capabilities, all predicated on the potential threat a Soviet surprise attack.[56] During the last decade of the Cold War, the fear of war was reciprocal and real, even if the threat of war was not.


Document Appendix

Document 1: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Brief Note, ‘Issues to Discuss with the Leadership of the KGB of the USSR’. 14 January 1983

A brief note written by the Ministry of State Security that includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

Document 2: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow’. 9 February 1983

This note on the talks between Minister Wolf and KGB Chairman Chebrikov contains heartfelt congratulations on cooperation thus far, but it also highlights problems with the situation and the importance of utilizing the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.

Document 3: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov’. 3 October 1983

These notes describe statements made by Colonel General Kryuchkov which outline the current state of Soviet institutions and intelligence networks in various regions, including Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the United States.

Document 4: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov’. 7 November 1983

This report describes conversations with Comrade Kryuchkov, coving a multitude of subjects, but delving briefly into the problem of “prevention of a surprise nuclear attack” (RYAN). Kryuchkov responded that this issue is being continually worked on, but no central decisions had been made as of yet.

Document 5: Committee for State Security (KGB), ‘Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’. 26 November 1984

A catalog of indicators of NATO preparation for nuclear war that were monitored by Warsaw Pact intelligence services under Project RYaN. The activity is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, and economic.

Document 6: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Order Number 1/85. 15 February 1985

This order from the Ministry of State Security describes the tasks of the MfS units concerning efforts to uncover intentions of aggression and surprise military activities by western states and their allies, especially a surprise nuclear missile attack against the USSR.

Document 7:Speech, East German Minister of State Security Mielke, ‘At the Enlarged Collegium Meeting on 7 June 1985 about Further Preparation of the XI SED Party Congress’. 10 June 1985

This speech by East German Minister of State Security Mielke addresses the technological, intellectual, and ideological preparations for war by the west and how to uncover and organize indicators of a potential attack.

Document 8: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)’. 6 May 1985

This report by Ministry of State Security describes developments and achievements toward early recognition of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

Document 9: Letter, East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov. 10 November 1986

This letter from East German Minister of State Security Mielke to KGB Chairman Chebrikov requests a consultation on the development and continuation of Complex RYAN, especially on furthering collaboration between the MfS and KGB.

Document 10: Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke. 24 December 1986

Responding to Mielke’s letter from November 1986, Chebrikov agrees to the proposed meeting between the MfS and the KGB on the subject of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the states of the socialist community.

Document 11: Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Plan for Consultations with the Delegation of the KGB. 20 January 1987.

This document is a plan for the consultations to take place in Berlin between the Stasi and the KBG. It includes objectives and proposed theses on the subject of early recognition of a sudden nuclear missile attack by NATO forces.

Documents 12 A–T: Committee for State Security (KGB), ‘About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’.

Documents 12A–T are monthly intelligence reports digests generated using intelligence by Project RyaN between August 1986 and April 1989.

[1] Süß, Walter and Douglas Selvage. “CWIHP e-Dossier No. 37: KGB/Stasi Cooperation” Cold War International History Project http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kgbstasi-cooperation.

[2]  “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721

[3] „Das MfS und die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen kommunistischen Geheimdiensten: Staatssicherheit und sowjetischer KGB.“ Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.  http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/MfS-Dokumente/MfS-KGB/_node.html.

[4] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.

[5] See below respective comments by Nate Jones and Ben Fischer.

[6] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov,” September 19, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5306, pp. 1-19. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115718.

Deputy KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov described Soviet “evidence” that the flight looked like a “reconnaissance mission”: “If we would have known this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down.” Put differently, the Soviet side wondered what would have been if the plane would have been a military aircraft and part of a Western surprise attack: In this case the Soviet Union would have been unable to detect such an attack, i.e. Moscow would have become “surprised.”

[7] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 585.

[8] Other sources vary the spelling of RYaN. Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin spelled it “ryon.” Another spelling includes the word “surprise:” “VRYAN” “vnezapnoe raketno yadernoe napadenie” –surprise nuclear missile attack. Czech Intelligence referred to the operation as NRJAN.  One document shows that the Bulgarians monitored “VRYAN indicators” as late as June 1987.  These East German documents confirm that the operation continued until at least April, 1989.  The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 523; Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West, (New York: St. Martins, 1994), 302; 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”

[9] RYaN Translation #2

[10] The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/.

[11] The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/; Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464. Recently, Benjamin Fischer has introduced an additional potential source of East German fear: CANOPY WING, purportedly a US military research project to exploit a vulnerability of Soviet Warsaw pact command and control communications to launch a “decapitation/surgical” strike.

[12] 9 March 1984, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, provided by Jordan Baev; Peter Rendek, ” Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986 .”

[13] “Issues to discuss with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR” http://digitalarchive.org/document/119308.

[14] “Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow.” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119319.

[15] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.

[16] “Order Number 1/85” http://digitalarchive.org/document/119322.

[17] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721. It is possible that this new coordinating division was created as a reaction to the false alerts generated by Operation RYaN in November 1983 incorrectly warning that a NATO nuclear release drill, Able Archer 83, could have been an actual nuclear attack.

[18] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115717.

[19] ”Letter, KGB Chairman Chebrikov to East German Minister for State Security Mielke.” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119332; For more on the East German contributions to Soviet intelligence collection, see Benjamin Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:3, 431-464.

[20] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/.

[21] The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/.

[22] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721

[23] Translated here as “Institute for Operative Problems.”

[24] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119320

[25] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘Report on Development and Achieved State of Work Regarding Early Recognition of Adversarial Attack and Surprise Intentions (Complex RYAN)”  http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119334.

[26] “Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Report, ‘Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document 119338. A partially declassified CIA document shows that Operation RYaN had its analogue in U.S. intelligence gathering. The CIA was also working with the DIA, and presumably allied intelligence agencies, to create a list of indicators — including the defense industry — for its chiefs of station to monitor, in an attempt to “emphasize greater early warning cooperation with intelligence services.”  Other parallels to RYaN date back to 1961, when the Soviets also instructed embassies in all “capitalist” countries to collect and report information during the Berlin Crisis. In 1991, one might have deduced the January 16 Desert Storm invasion by monitoring the influx of pizza deliveries to the Pentagon, according to current U.S. Army Operational Security (OPSEC) training materials.  In October 1983, justifying the KGB’s difficulties, Kryuchkov stated, “Even in the United States they have not completed this [a RYaN equivalent] yet.” The 1983 War Scare, Part One http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/.

[27]  “Report, Ministry of State Security (Stasi), ‘About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack’” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119909. For more on Continuity of Government, see James Mann, “The Armageddon Plan,” The Atlantic, March 2004.

[28] Still-classified reports by the British Joint Intelligence Council and the US President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have allegedly confirmed Gordievsky’s accounts.  See The 1983 War Scare, Part Three, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/, and British Documents Confirm UK Alerted US to Danger of Able Archer 83, http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/11/04/british-documents-confirm-uk-alerted-us-to-danger-of-able-archer-83/

[29] The 1983 War Scare, Part Two http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/.

[30] Regrettably, no text of the November 8 or 9 flash telegram has been released or reproduced. Gordievsky’s revelation of this warning is the only basis for the current historical record (though the preceding and following telegrams which he reproduced and published do serve as somewhat sturdy bona fides).  Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985, (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1991), 87.

[31] Marcus Wolf did not write kindly of the Soviets, or Operation RYaN, in his 1997 memoir:  “Our Soviet partners had become obsessed with the danger of a nuclear missile attack,” though he writes that he had not. “Like most intelligent people, I found these war games a burdensome waste of time, but these orders were no more open to discussion than other orders from above.” Marcus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (New York: Random House, 1997), 222.   http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721.

[32] Welcome, Ukraine.  http://euromaidanberlin.wordpress.com/2014/04/01/kgb-archives-in-ukraine-will-be-open-to-public/

[33] For an account of the file destruction by the HV A officer who supervised it, see Klaus Eichner and Gotthold Schramm, Konterspionage: Die DDR-Aufklärung in den Geheimdienstzentrum (Berlin: edition ost, 2010), pp. 174-177.

[34] “Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov,” July 11, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5382, p. 1-19. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115717

[35] Andropov was referring to the new US war-fighting strategy for “prevailing” in a limited nuclear conflict that was first announced as Presidential Directive 59 by the Carter administration and slightly modified during the Reagan administration in National Security Decision Memorandum 13.

[36] “Speech of General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” Available at   <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/doc19.htm&gt;

[37] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. 74.

[38] “Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984,” August 24, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5384, pp. 1-16. Translated from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115721

[39] RYAN Translation #2: “Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, on February 9, 1983 in Moscow.”

[40] RYAN Translation #3: “Notes on Statements made by Comrade Colonel General Kryuchkov, V. A. on October 3, 1983.”

[41] Peter Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione: Ein Insider Report (Berlin: elefanten press, 1992), p. 85.

[42] Ibid.

[43] On MfS Sigint, see Ben B. Fischer, “‘One of the Biggest Ears in the World’: East German Sigint Operations,’” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11:2 (Spring 1998), pp.142‑153.  The MfS, the HV A, and the intelligence service of the East German Army were handling some 3,000 agents in West Germany/West Berlin when the Berlin Wall fell.  About half spied for the MfS and military intelligence and the other half for the HV A. Five of every 100,000 West German citizens were “working clandestinely for the GDR.” Georg Herbstritt, Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage: Eine analytische Studie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 2007), p. 84.

[44] “Befehl 1/85 zu den Aufgaben der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitigen Aufklärung akuter Agressionsabsichten und überraschender militärischer Aktivitäten imperialisticher Staaten und Bundnisse, inbesondere zur Verhinderung eines überraschinden Raketenkernwaffenangriffs gegen Staaten der sozialistischen Gemeinschaft,” BstU [Bündesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR], ZA [Zentralarchiv], DSt [Dokumentenstelle im Zentalarchiv des BStU]103137. Also RYAN Translation #4.

[45] “1. Durchführungsbestimmung des Stellvertreters des Ministers auf Befehl 1/85 vom 15.2.1985, GVS 0008-1/85: Allzeitige Nutzung der Möglichkeiten der Dienstheiten des MfS zur frühzeitgen und zuverlässigen Beschaffung von Hinweisen auf akute feindliche Aggressionsabsichten, -vorbereitungen und –handlungen,” BstU, ZA, DSt103137.

[46] Benjamin B. Fischer, “The 1980s Soviet War Scare: New Evidence from East German Documents,” Intelligence and National Security, 14:4 (Autumn 1999), pp. 186-197.

[47] Wolf’s tasking of MfS departments is described in Ibid.

[48] “Katalog ausgewählter Indikatoren zur Früherkennung gegnerischer militärischer Aggressionsvorbereitungen und Überraschungsabsichten, inbesondere von Maßssnahmen zur Vorbereitung eines überraschenden Raketenwaffenangriffs (KWA),” BstU, ZA, DSt103137. A different version of this text is available in Document #5 of this collection.

[49] See Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, pp. 72, 85 and Günter Bohnsack, Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung: Die Legende Stirbt  (Berlin: edition ost, 1997), p. 64.

[50] Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 85.

[51] RYAN Translation #6: “R E P O R T on development and achieved state of work regarding early recognition of enemy attack and surprise intentions (Complex RYAN).”

[52] Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 83-88.

[53] Richter and Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, p. 72.

[54] Fear of a superpower conflict lead GDR leader Erich Honecker to open a back channel to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a decision that irritated Andropov. Markus Wolfe, Man Without a Face (New York: Times Books, 1997), p. 221.

[55] Mikhail A. Alexeev, Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 203.

[56] See Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992). Parallels between mutual American and Soviet fears of surprise attack are discussed in Benjamin B. Fischer, “The Soviet-American War Scare of the 1980s,” International Journal of Intelligence andCounterintelligence 19:3, Fall 2006, pp.480-519.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Bernd Schaefer

Bernd Schaefer

Global Fellow, Former Senior Scholar;
Professional Lecturer, The George Washington University
Nate Jones

Nate Jones

Director, Freedom of Information Act Project, National Security Archive

Benjamin B. Fischer

Former Chief Historian of the Central Intelligence Agency

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Nuclear Proliferation International History Project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews, and other empirical sources. At the Wilson Center, it is part of the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program.  Read more

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War. Through an award winning Digital Archive, the Project allows scholars, journalists, students, and the interested public to reassess the Cold War and its many contemporary legacies. It is part of the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program.  Read more

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Covid Situation Insider Infos Revealed

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Here Are Some Key Events to Look For:

  • An effective drug treatment (probably 3-7 months). That won’t stop the spread and it won’t be a “cure” but it will take some pressure off the health system. (One tip: DON’T take hydroxychloroquine. That’s a really bad idea. The first study showed increased mortality in patients and we have no idea how to use it effectively.)

  • Widespread testing… most likely at home pin prick antibody blood testing. Hard to give an exact time frame and the logistics are huge but the test is cheap, easy and fast. Running two tests 14+ days apart through a whole region would identify most cases and also let you know who is likely to have some immunity.

  • A vaccine (probably 12-18 months…could be longer). That’s when things should return to somewhat normal. Then the main risk is the virus mutating but even that becomes a lower risk because it will no longer be a “novel” virus. Once people are vaccinated their immune systems will not be starting from zero with a different coronavirus.

Caution – The 2nd Wave
In some regions, case numbers will be driven down with strong social distancing and regions may lift restrictions.

But this could be a problem…

Historically it’s the second and third wave of infections that cause the most deaths. With restrictions lifted an area could see returning cases again, possibly after summer, either from existing infections in the region spiking back up or infections being reintroduced from areas of the world that are in winter.

Understanding that most regions are looking at 6-18 months of social distancing can help businesses plan their marketing…

Businesses should take aggressive precautions to stay safe and sanitary and get aggressive in educating clients about what precautions they’re taking. That will give people the confidence to do business with them…

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Freedom Of Information In The Time Of COVID-19 By Steven Aftergood

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In principle, the COVID-19 outbreak could provide a compelling new justification for expediting the processing of certain Freedom of Information Act requests related to the pandemic. But it is more likely to slow down the handling of most requests as agency employees work remotely and other concerns are understandably prioritized.

The impact of COVID-19 was surveyed by the Congressional Research Service in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Processing Changes Due to COVID-19: In Brief, March 27, 2020.

Other noteworthy new and updated reports from CRS include:

U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress, updated March 27, 2020

The Employment-Based Immigration Backlog, March 26, 2020

Demographic and Social Characteristics of Persons in Poverty: 2018, March 26, 2020

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA): Emergency Temporary Standards (ETS) and COVID-19, March 26, 2020

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements, updated March 26, 2020

Congressional Use of Advisory Commissions Following Crises, CRS In Focus, March 25, 2020

Die Linke AKA SED Zeigt Ihr Wahres (STASI)-Gesicht – Tote Über Tote – Die Toxdat-Partei Im Machtrausch

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Ein Diskussionsbeitrag auf dem Strategietreffen der Linken zum künftigen Kurs der Partei am vergangenen Wochenende in Kassel hat scharfe Kritik ausgelöst. CSU-Generalsekretär Markus Blume forderte deswegen am Dienstag den Rücktritt von Linke-Chef Bernd Riexinger.

Continue reading “Die Linke AKA SED Zeigt Ihr Wahres (STASI)-Gesicht – Tote Über Tote – Die Toxdat-Partei Im Machtrausch”

Murdered – Dorothy Kilgallen killed After She Discovered WHO The Kennedy Assassins Were

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Author and former criminal defense attorney, Mark Shaw, speaks about his book “The Reporter Who Knew Too Much” and its follow-up, “Denial of Justice.” Each chronicle not only his 12 years of research but most importantly, the life and times and mysterious death of What’s My Line? TV star and crack investigative reporter Dorothy Kilgallen and her 18-month investigation of the Dallas tragedies which included being the only reporter to interview Jack Ruby at his trial. Shaw also discusses his controversial exposure of the most important JFK assassination documents in history, the Jack Ruby trial transcripts.

#DorothyKilgallen #JFK #JackRuby #OnStageAPL #AllenTexas https://www.AllenLibrary.org

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SIEGFRIED SIEVERT: VORBILD FÜR KLAUS MAURISCHAT: EIN STASI-DIOXIN-GIFT-PANSCHER

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Klaus Maurischat

GoMoPa- Genosse Klaus Maurischat verwendet seit Jahr und Tag das Pseudonym “Siegfried Siewert”, inspiriert von dem größten Giftpanscher Deutschlands, dem STASI-Mann Siegfried Sievert.

Die Akte trägt die Registriernummer II 153/71, ist mehrere Hundert Seiten dick. Auf dem Deckel – in feiner Schreibschrift – ein Name: „Pluto“. Unter diesem Decknamen spionierte Siegfried Sievert (58) 18 Jahre lang für die Staatssicherheit der DDR – der Futtermittelpanscher, der mutmaßlich für den deutschen Dioxin-Skandal verantwortlich ist!

Auf Antrag von BILD gab die zuständige Birthler-Behörde die Unterlagen jetzt heraus. Die Dokumente zeichnen das Bild eines Mannes, der rücksichtslos ist, skrupellos und vor allem auf eigenen Profit bedacht.

Rückblick. 1971 wird die Stasi auf den 18-jährigen Sievert aufmerksam. Sie beobachtet sein „dekadentes Aussehen“, seine hohe Intelligenz und seine „guten Verbindungen zu anderen jugendlichen Personenkreisen“. Sievert wird angeworben. Aus einem Bericht vom 16. März 1971: „Der Kandidat kann zur Absicherung der Jugend (…) eingesetzt werden.“

 

Sievert wählt seinen Decknamen selbst, kassiert fortan Prämien für seine „inoffizielle Mitarbeit“. In den Unterlagen finden sich zahlreiche Quittungen, eine vom 6. November 1987: „Hiermit bescheinige ich den Erhalt von 100 Mark für geleistete Arbeit.“

Continue reading “SIEGFRIED SIEVERT: VORBILD FÜR KLAUS MAURISCHAT: EIN STASI-DIOXIN-GIFT-PANSCHER”

LESERBRIEF: BERND ZIMMERMANN, STASI-OFFIZIER UND “GoMoPa”-TOP-GENOSSE

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image002 LESERBRIEF: BERND ZIMMERMANN, STASI OFFIZIER UND GoMoPa TOP GENOSSE

Zimmermann, Bernd; 07.08.39; HVA; 961500; 1080; 458/63, A

war früher ein STASI-Offizier im besonderen Einsatz in Westdeutschland, heute ist er ein Top-GoMoPa-Genosse.

bald mehr

Deep Throat

Peter Gaudlitz: Plötzlich Staatsfeind – Video

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Von ihren Plänen, in den Westen zu fliehen, hatten Peter Gaudlitz und seine Freundin niemandem erzählt. Trotzdem wurden sie verraten und fortan durch die Stasi observiert. Erst nach der Wiedervereinigung konnte Peter Gaudlitz in seiner Stasi-Akte nachlesen, dass wohl sein Vater den Verdacht geäußert hatte, sein Sohn wolle fliehen.

 

 

STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASES UKRAINE DOCUMENTS

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On Friday evening, the State Department released nearly 100 pages of records in response to American Oversight’s lawsuit seeking a range of documents related to the Trump administration’s dealings with Ukraine.

Among other records, the production includes emails that confirm multiple contacts in March of 2019 between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Trump lawyer Rudy Giuliani, at least one of which was facilitated by President Trump’s assistant Madeleine Westerhout.

American Oversight is reviewing the production to assess whether the State Department has fully complied with the court’s order. Notes on what we’ve found are below.

You can download the documents here. They are also available below.

Statement from American Oversight Executive Director Austin Evers

“We can see why Mike Pompeo has refused to release this information to Congress. It reveals a clear paper trail from Rudy Giuliani to the Oval Office to Secretary Pompeo to facilitate Giuliani’s smear campaign against a U.S. ambassador.

“This is just the first round of disclosures. The evidence is only going to get worse for the administration as its stonewall strategy collapses in the face of court orders.

“That American Oversight could obtain these documents establishes that there is no legal basis for the administration to withhold them from Congress. That conclusively shows that the administration is engaged in obstruction of justice. The president and his allies should ask themselves if impeachment for obstruction is worth it if the strategy isn’t even going to be effective.

“This lawsuit is just one of several American Oversight is pursuing to bring transparency to the Ukraine investigation. The public should expect more disclosures, over the administration’s strong objection, for the foreseeable future.”

In the Documents

New: The documents show a March 26, 2019, call between Rudy Giuliani and Mike Pompeo. (Page 39 of document)

A March 28, 2019, email includes a list of scheduled calls for Pompeo. Calls include Rudy Giuliani on March 29, and Rep. Devin Nunes on April 1, 2019.

On March 27, 2019, Rudy Giuliani’s assistant contacted Madeleine Westerhout, who was serving as the president’s Oval Office gatekeeper at the time. She asked Westerhout for a “good number” for Pompeo, adding that she had “been trying and getting nowhere through regular channels.” Westerhout contacted someone at the State Department to ask for a number she could provide. (Page 55)

During his closed-door testimony, career diplomat David Hale mentioned two calls between Pompeo and Giuliani, one on March 28, 2019, and one on March 29. The documents include a March 28 email to Hale indicating that Pompeo had been the one to request a call with Giuliani. (Page 45)

The March 29 call appears on page 46, and the confirmation of its scheduling is on page 44.

Also in the documents: An April 5 letter to the State Department from six former U.S. ambassadors to Ukraine (including Bill Taylor), expressing their concern about the attacks on U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch. (Page 13)

On April 12, 2019, Reps. Steny Hoyer and Eliot Engel wrote to Pompeo, also expressing their concern (page 28). The State Department responded on June 11, saying “Yovanovitch was due to complete her three-year diplomatic assignment in Kyiv this summer.” (Page 34)

Note: The State Department did not produce a formal directive recalling Yovanovitch or a formal readout of Trump’s July 25 call with Zelensky. Both of these were covered by the court’s production order.

 

Continue reading “STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASES UKRAINE DOCUMENTS”

Insider – Mutmassliche IM Erika trifft Putin – Bundesregierung fordert erneut russische Hilfe in Mordfall

Insider – Mutmassliche IM Erika trifft Putin – Bundesregierung fordert erneut russische Hilfe in Mordfall

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Wladimir Putin: Stasi-Ausweis von Ex-KGB-Offizier in Dresden gefunden - DER  SPIEGEL

STASI-Ausweis aus Dresdner Archiv

Vor dem Ukraine-Gipfel in Paris hat Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel (CDU) mit dem russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin ein Einzelgespräch geführt.
Über die Inhalte machte die deutsche Seite am Montag zunächst keine Angaben. Es war erwartet worden, dass Merkel den Mord an einem Georgier in Berlin anspricht, der zu einer diplomatischen Krise zwischen Deutschland und Russland geführt hat.

Kurz vor der Abreise Merkels nach Paris hatte die Bundesregierung erneut eine “ernsthafte und unverzügliche Mitwirkung der russischen Behörden” an der Aufklärung des Verbrechens gefordert. Man sei “weiterhin bestürzt über die Tat”, sagte die stellvertretende Regierungssprecherin Ulrike Demmer.
Wegen fehlender Kooperation bei der Aufklärung des mutmaßlichen Auftragsmords am 23. August im Kleinen Tiergarten in Berlin hatte die Bundesregierung zwei russische Diplomaten ausgewiesen. Die von Moskau angekündigte Reaktion steht noch aus. Der Generalbundesanwalt hat wegen der grundsätzlichen Bedeutung des Falls die Ermittlungen übernommen.

Die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden und die Bundesregierung hätten “verschiedene russische Stellen mit Anfragen zu dem Fall befasst”, sagte Demmer. Genauer wollte sie es nicht sagen. Russland weist die Vorwürfe zurück.

Putins STASI-Ausweis:

Von Seiten der Stasiunterlagenbehörde heißt es: “Es war übliche Praxis beim DDR-Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, die Verbindungsoffiziere des russischen Geheimdienstes KGB und die ihnen untergeordneten Offiziere wie Putin mit Hausausweisen der zuständigen MfS-Dienststelle auszustatten.”

Putin war Augenzeuge, als während der friedlichen Revolution am 5. Dezember 1989 rund 5000 Demonstranten die hermetisch abgeschirmte Dresdner Bezirksverwaltung der Staatssicherheit besetzten. Als sich die Demonstranten der Dienststelle näherten, kam es fast zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen mit sowjetischen Militärs.

Aufgrund einer Medienanfrage seien Akten der Abteilung “Kader und Schulung” der ehemaligen Stasi-Bezirksverwaltung Dresden durchforstet worden, sagte Felber. Dabei sei man auf den Ausweis gestoßen. “Es ist schon eine kleine Sensation. Putins Name war in den Akten, die die Ausgabe der Ausweise an sowjetische Militärangehörige nachweisen, nicht verzeichnet.”

Im Internet wird daraufhin gewiesen, dass Angela Merkel von zahlreichen IM’s umgeben gewesen sei. Daraus wird geschlussfolgert, dass auch sie für den Staatssicherheitsdienst gearbeitet hätte. Tatsächlich waren wenigstens drei ihrer Kollegen am Zentralinstitut beim Staatssicherheitsdienst als Informanten erfasst: Hans-Jörg Osten (IM “Einstein”), Frank Schneider (IM “Bachmann”) und Michael Schindhelm (IM “Manfred Weih”). Mit Letzterem, den PDS-Kultursenator Thomas Flierl 2005 zum Generaldirektor der Berliner Opernstiftung berief, teilte sie sich eine Zeit lang ihr Büro. Als sie 1989 zum Demokratischen Aufbruch stieß, arbeitete sie mit einem weiteren Stasi-Informanten, dem ersten Parteivorsitzenden Wolfgang Schnur (IM „Torsten“ und „Dr. Ralf Schirmer“) zusammen. Im April 1990 wurde sie schließlich stellvertretende Regierungssprecherin unter dem letzten DDR-Ministerpräsidenten Lothar de Maizière, der in MfS-Unterlagen als IM “Czerny” erfasst ist.

IM Czerny mit Merkel

IM ERIKA – Im Internet verbreitetes “Filmplakat”

“Unsere Ex-FDJ-Sekretärin Angela Merkel lebe hoch” – Stasi-Opfer-Demonstration 2016 in Berlin

Historiker Hubertus Knabe kommentiert: “Nimmt man alle diese Fakten zusammen, muss man zu folgendem Schluss kommen: Für die Behauptung, Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel hätte unter dem Decknamen “Erika” für den Staatssicherheitsdienst gearbeitet, gibt es keinerlei Belege. Sollte es einen entsprechenden IM-Vorgang gegeben haben, müssten selbst im Fall seiner Vernichtung zumindest noch Spuren davon erhalten sein – zum Beispiel Berichte aus der Quelle “Erika”, die in den Akten ausgespähter Personen abgelegt wurden. Das ist nach gegenwärtigem Kenntnisstand aber nicht der Fall. Ob die Säcke mit den zerrissenen Unterlagen darüber hinaus gehende Hinweise enthalten, bleibt Spekulation.”

QUELLE:

Must See Film – Geheimnisse der STASI

Must See Film – Geheimnisse der STASI

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Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR: Es ist nicht nur eine Behörde – es ist ein ganzes Imperium. Geheimpolizei und Nachrichtendienste in einer einzigen Institution. Die Staatssicherheit durchdringt die Gesellschaft komplett. Ihre Informanten sind überall. In Gerichten und Behörden, am Arbeitsplatz, in der eigenen Familie – in Ost, aber auch in West. Wie die Stasi zu dem geworden ist, zeigt “Feind ist, wer anders denkt – Geheimnisse der Stasi”. Auch heute noch. Denn die STASI-Agenten leben mitten unter uns und haben den staatlichen Machtapparat längst gründlich zersetzt.

Wie heisst es so schön. Der Fisch stinkt vom Kopf her…