BETREFF: TAGESSCHAU bestätigt unsere Haltung zu “STASI – GoMoPa” & IM Genossen

GoMoPa-Luca Brasi alias “Klaus-Dieter Maurischat”, “Kinderfreund”, & STASI-Handlanger des mutmasslichen wahren “GoMoPa”-Chefs, des mutmasslichen STASI-Oberst Jochen Resch, Berlin

“GoMoPa”-“CEO” und “President”, der wegen Betruges am eigenen Anleger verurteilte “Klaus-Dieter Maurischat”, der mutmaßliche Strohmann für seine Genossen, ein Mann mit einer äußerst dubiosen Biographie (siehe Artikel auf dieser Webseite).

https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/gomopa-101.html

Der “Kinderfreund” stoesst sich an der Publikation seines Photos auf dieser Webseite und schickt eine dubiose E-Mail mit Virus-Anhang:

Mel
Melphotographer140@hotmail.com
http://morrtas
181.215.203.30
https://berndpulch.org/2015/04/18/tagesschau-bestatigt-unsere-haltung-zu-gomopa-genossen/Edit | Classic Editor | Quick Edit | Trash
[BERNDPULCH.ORG – BERND-PULCH.ORG – TOXDAT, STASI List, STASI SLEEPER List, KGB List, BDVP List, STASI Names A-Z, DDR-EAST GERMAN POLICE List,Offshore List, Leaks Lists, GOMOPA4KIDS-Pedophiles-Network, GOMOPA Victims List, GOMOPA Offender Names,] TAGESSCHAU bestätigt unsere Haltung zu “GoMoPa” & Genossen
Hello there! This is Melika and I am a certified photographer and illustrator. I was baffled, mildly speaking, when I saw my images at your web-site. If you use a copyrighted image without an owner’s permission, you’d better know that you could be sued by the creator. It’s not legal to use stolen images and it’s so mean! Check out this document with the links to my images you used at berndpulch.org and my earlier publications to get the evidence of my copyrights. Download it now and check this out for yourself: https://sites.google.com/view/id983016300057/google/drive/file/downloads/storage?FileID=84809287572317692 If you don’t get rid of the images mentioned in the file above within the next several days, I’ll file a complaint on you to your hosting provider informing them that my copyrights have been severely infringed and I am trying to protect my intellectual property. And if it doesn’t help, trust me I am going to take legal action against you! And I will not bother myself to let you know of it in advance.

 

SPASS IBO, alte STASI SCHNAUTZE !

 

 

REVEALED – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY NO. 1 FOR THE PERIOD 0800 25 MAY TO 0800 2 JUNE 1988

Quellbild anzeigen

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document describes Warsaw Pact military exercises conducted between 25 May and 2 June 1988. Summarized in detail, the comprehensive exercise brought all facets of the combined forces to “wartime strength” in response to a theoretical threat posed by NATO.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Eastern Europe
Poland
Russia

[Source: Institute of National Remembrance (IPNBU) 1408/2. Translated for CWIHP by
Gary Goldberg.]
[letterhead] GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
Deliver at 0800 2 June SECRET
Copy Nº 4
Exercise
[Original Polish receipt and
declassification stamps]
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
Nº 1
(for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988)
Warsaw
1988
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Nº 1
for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988

  1. In accordance with the growing threat of the “BLUES”, the “REDS” performed a
    covert operational deployment of selected formations and units in [their] armed forces.
    The following measures were performed within the framework of general preparations:
  • the dispatch of servicemen and reserves to military schools, courses, retraining, and
    command-staff training has been stopped; servicemen in courses are being recalled to
    their units;
  • troops in temporary locations are being recalled to their garrisons with the exception of
    formations at wartime strength and undergoing training (exercises) at training areas;
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    formation of detachments for engineer preparation of the terrain began on 1 June and
    which will be made ready to carry out work on behalf of the 3rd Front beginning [inserted
    by hand: 2] June.
  • [the following] have been deployed at field control posts: by 1 June, the staff of the 3rd
    Front, by 0800 2 June, the staffs of the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies;
  • by 26 May formations and units have been inspected for the deployment of elements
    of the mobilization base;
  • the discharge of reservists being trained has been halted. Equipment received from
    the economy has been left in the units;
  • since 1 June aircraft and helicopters received from the economy are being accepted
    and reequipped;
  • beginning 26 May a 24-hour watch has been established in all the armed forces and
    also in military commissariats; [there are] full shifts in national air defense troops and at
    the remaining HQs – reduced [shifts];
  • the border forces and selected units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have increased
    security at the border, airfields, and seaports.
  1. According to a 25 May directive of the GK OVS in the Western TVD he has planned a
    frontal defensive operation for 1 June. In response to the actions of the “BLUES” the
    forces allocated from the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Armies and also the engineer troops are
    preparing defensive positions in the main defensive zone.
    At the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    allocated combined-arms units, air forces, navy, missile troops and artillery, and REhB,
    intelligence, and communications have been brought up to wartime strength under the
    guise of an exercise and work on behalf of the economy and into full combat readiness
    in permanently deployed locations or contingency [neplanovye] areas.
    A. The 2nd Army (GDR Peoples Army)
  • by 25 May the 11th msd had been brought up to wartime strength and beginning on 31
    May together with a battalion of engineer vehicles it began engineer preparations of the
    2nd and 3rd positions of the main defensive zone in the sector south of SZCZECIN and
    BARLINEK;
  • on 25 May the Druzhba-88 exercise began at the DRAWSKI training area in which the
    18th msd, 25th td (of the 8th Army), and missile troops and artillery of the Army are
    participating;
  • [the following] have been brought up to wartime strength under the guise of
    preparations for an exercise: by 28 May, the 19th td; by 30 May, the 30th msd. The
    formations are being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations and are
    undergoing training in combat teamwork [slazhivanie] in garrison training centers.
  • the 29th msd was brought up to wartime strength by 2 June; after regrouping it is
    beginning to prepare the defense of the coastline in the sector DZIWNÓW,
    KOLOBRZEG.
    B. The 6th Army (USSR Armed Forces)
  • under the guise of preparations to carry out work on behalf of the economy the 2nd
    msd was brought up to strength by 25 May; together with the allocated engineer forces
    it is making engineering preparations of the second and third positions in the main
    defensive zone in the sector ZAGAN, PIENSK;
  • the 1st td was brought up to wartime strength starting 23 May and is training at the
    ZAGAN Training Area;
  • on 26 May the 3rd msd and on 30 May the 4th msd were brought up to wartime strength
    and brought into readiness at permanently deployed areas.
    C. The 3rd Army (Czechoslovak National Army)
  • the 31st td was brought up to wartime strength on 25 May and beginning 30 May it is
    making engineering preparations of positions in the main defensive zone together with a
    battalion of engineer vehicles of the 3rd isbr in the sector SLUBICE, GUBIN;
  • beginning 24 May the 33rd msd is conducting planned training at the WEDRZYN
    Training Area;
  • on 28 May the 32nd msd and on 31 May the 34th msd were brought up to wartime
    strength and began training in garrison areas to be brought into readiness for
    operations.
    D. The 8th Army (Polish Armed Forces)
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces by 26
    May the system of mobilization expansion of Army formations and units was inspected
    and mobilization documentation amplified;
  • under the guise of a planned exercise formations and units of the missile troops, air
    defense, REhB, and intelligence have been brought up to wartime strength and control
    posts have been provided; beginning 25 May they have been brought into readiness in
    reserve assembly areas or in training areas;
  • the 25th td has been brought up to wartime strength and is taking part in the Druzhba88 exercise at the DRAWSKI Training Area;
  • the training of the 21st td is underway at the Orzysz Training Area.
    E. The 11th vdbr
  • after the brigade was brought up to wartime strength it was brought into readiness at
    the reserve assembly area.
    F. The 12th Coastal Defense Brigade
  • it was brought up to wartime strength by 25 May under the guise of joint exercises with
    the Navy and is being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations.
    G. The 41st rmd [expansion unknown, but presumably a division, possibly a reserve
    mechanized division]
  • the formation of two mechanized regiments, communications, and air defense subunits
    began on 2 June.
    In reconnaissance forces
    Electronic intelligence units are reconnoitering the armed forces of the “BLUES” at the
    indicated lines [rubezhakh].
    Special reconnaissance units and subunits are conducting training in combat teamwork
    and are being brought into readiness for action.
    Reconnaissance aircraft are conducting intensified reconnaissance along the coastline
    and the western border of Poland.
    In REhB forces
    The 24th op-N [expansion unknown] and 8th op-N have been conducting training in
    combat teamwork at the MUSZAKI Training Area since 26 May.
    The remaining REhB units are conducting intensified training in garrison. Ten percent of
    REhB resources are on a round-the-clock watch.
    In Missile Troops and Artillery
    The formations of operational tactical missiles, field missile technical bases, the 8th
    apabr [Army Field Gun Artillery Brigade], the 21st ap BM [Heavy Artillery Regiment],
    and the 15th aiptap [Army Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment] in permanently deployed
    locations were brought up to wartime strength by 28 May.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and deployed by 29 May:
  • the 15th apabr and the 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Regiment (oapr) in border regions
    in the zone of the 2nd Army;
  • the 6th apabr and the 6th apar in border regions in the zone of the 6th Army;
  • the 3rd apar in firing positions west of Rzepin.
    [The following] are undergoing training in training areas:
  • the 3rd apabr and 3rd adnar [possibly “Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion”] since 27
    May at the Wedrzyn Training Area;
  • the 6th orap [Independent Aerial Reconnaissance Regiment] has been at the Zagan
    Training Area since 26 May;
  • the 15th orap is taking part in the Druzhba-88 exercise.
    The remaining missile and artillery frontal and Army formations and units are being
    brought into readiness by 2 June for operations in permanently deployed locations and
    assembly areas.
    9K714 [Oka tactical] missile battalions have been on alert since 25 May in garrison
    training areas.
    Tactical missile battalions and reconnaissance/strike and fire groups of first echelon
    formations are being brought into readiness in assembly areas.
    Conventionally-armed missiles will be delivered to rendezvous points (PV) by 0400 4
    June in order to train the allocated forces of the missile troop and artillery for a air
    defense operation:
  • to PV-1 – WEGORZEWO – four operational-tactical [missiles] and 16 tactical (4 [of
    them] “T”);
  • to PV-2 – WRONKI – eight operational-tactical;
  • to PV-3 – SWIEBODZIN – 12 tactical (4 [of them] “T”);
  • to PV-4 – RUDNA – 27, including 11 operational-tactical and 16 tactical (4 [of them]
    “T”).
    In the air forces
    Training in the combat teamwork of the operations of tactical groups is being conducted
    in formations and units. Airborne command posts were rebased from army aviation units
    to the landing fields of the respective HQs by 2 June where they are being kept in
    combat readiness Nº 2.
    The preparation of AUD [airfield sections of roads] for the dispersion of aircraft has been
    completed. The forward ground support echelons at all airfields have been brought into
    readiness for regrouping at the indicated airfields or at intermediate assembly areas.
    The second echelons are providing support to the air regiments’ missions.
    Aviation ammunition has been stored up to full scale in aircraft parking areas in
    readiness for immediate mounting.
    In the air defense troops
    By 2 June the air forces and air defense forces SKP [possibly “launch command post”]
    of the front and the SKP of Army aviation and air defense had been regrouped to the
    designated areas and maintained in readiness.
    First echelon SAM and radiotechnical units of the Front and armies have been
    regrouped from permanently deployed locations to designated areas and brought into
    readiness in accordance with decisions made in the Front, armies, and formations.
    The 8th zrp and air defense units of the 8th Army have been brought up to wartime
    strength and brought into readiness at permanently deployed locations.
    The radiotechnical troops of the air defense of the ground forces began to work on
    wartime radio frequencies beginning at 0800 2 June.
    [The following] are on combat alert in the air defense system:
  • in SAM regiments (zenap) – one battery each in readiness Nº 2 and one battery each
    in readiness Nº 3;
  • in SAM brigades [and] the Krug zrp – one battalion each (less two batteries) in
    readiness Nº 2 and one battalion (less two batteries) in readiness Nº 3.
    In engineer troops
    By 26 May engineer units which were performing work on behalf of the economy had
    returned to their garrisons.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and into readiness at permanently
    deployed locations under the guise of preparations for an exercise:
  • by 30 May, the 6th and 15th isbr’s, the 6th and 15th pomp’s, the 6th itp [Engineering and
    Technical Regiment], the 29th ib PU [Engineer Battalion for Equipping Control Posts],
    and the 220th Fortification Regiment;
  • by 2 June, the 3rd and 21st isbr’s and the 3rd itp.
    Minelaying equipment and mines are being issued and distributed from centrallysubordinate depots.
    Subunits of engineer vehicles of first echelon armies together with combined-arms
    formations began the fortification of lines in the main defense zone beginning 31 May.
    The 220th Fortification Regiment together with detachments for engineer preparation of
    the terrain began the engineering preparation of blocking positions and front line
    positions.
    The 283rd maskb [Camouflage Battalion] was brought into readiness by 26 May and
    began the construction of dummy areas in accordance with the Front plan.
    In the chemical troops
    [The following] have been brought into readiness under the guise of preparations for
    exercises:
  • the RAST [computation and analysis station] and rear RAST of the Front and armies in
    areas where Front and army control posts are deployed, by 26 May;
  • radiation and chemical reconnaissance subunits were brought up to wartime strength
    and into readiness for operations in assembly areas by 29 May.
    The peacetime system of radiation and chemical reconnaissance began operating in the
    country beginning 1 June.
    In signal troops
    Under the guise of preparations for exercises signals troops regrouped in areas where
    Front, army, and formation control posts are deployed by 28 May. Communications
    centers were ready for operation by 31 May.
    Radio, radiorelay, and cable communications have been organized. Satellite and
    troposphere communications have been readied for operation. Communications on
    wartime frequencies have been organized in all troop arms.
    In the services of the rear
    Planned measures are being carried out for the timely and complete deployment of the
    men and equipment of the operational rear and the organization of a field system of
    supply on behalf of the troops of the 3rd Front.
    The rear control posts of the 3rd Front, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies, and the rear
    formations and units of the 3rd Army (3rd omo [Independent Medical Detachment], and
    6th Army (6th mbu [Medical Reinforcement Brigade] were deployed by 0800 2 June.
    Full-scale mobile and operational reserves have been stockpiled in line units [v
    voyskakh]. Current supply of the troops is done from working stocks at garrison depots.
    Materiel resources are loaded onto combat vehicles and the transport vehicles of first
    echelon formations.
    Preparatory measures are being taken at military depots and the bases of the economy
    for a mass issue, loading, and distribution of material resources.
    Readiness to carry out missions to ensure the survivability of the transportation system
    (transshipment points, ports, approaches to crossings] has been verified.
    The preparedness of transportation resources (vehicles, trailers, rolling stock, ships)
    has been inspected and the priority of their movement (transfer by the armed forces)
    when making massive military shipments has been verified. The technical
    documentation of the construction of parallel bridges and crossings has been checked
    as well as the technical condition of bridges.
    Organizational measures for a continuous supply of nurses for the military medical
    service have been completed. Evacuation hospital equipment has been supplemented.
    Restrictions on the use of fuel have been introduced in the economy.
    Blood bank supplies at civilian donor stations intended for immediate delivery to the
    armed forces have been inspected.
    In the technical services
    The 23rd FRB was brought up to strength within the framework of planned exercises by
    24 May and sent to the TORUN Training Area where it is undergoing training in combat
    teamwork and special training.
    The organizational nucleus [orgyadro] for the 22nd FRB and 21st GFRB [expansion
    unknown] was called up by 28 May.
    Equipment received from the economy is being inspected.
    The 225th and 228th orpdn [Independent Missile Transportation Battalion] have been
    brought into readiness to receive missiles and to leave for the designated areas.
    Beginning 2 June under the guise of preparations for exercises, it began to be brought
    up to wartime strength at the location of permanent deployment of the 6th ARB.
    THE COMBINED BALTIC FLEET
    In accordance with a directive of the Commander of the OBF, the headquarters of the
    USSR BF [Baltic Fleet], Polish Navy, and GDR Peoples Navy have updated [utochnili]
    plans to defend the coastline.
    The allocated strike, anti-mine, and other support forces returned to their bases by 2000
    1 June after completing exercises and training launches of missiles. It is intended to
    complete the training of a combined ship squadron by 5 June. The plans for the
    coordination between the HQs of fleets and concerned formations have been updated.
    Naval reconnaissance forces (ship, aircraft, and radioelectronic) have been conducting
    continuous tracking of the operations of groups of ships of the Western Baltic fleet.
    Twenty-five percent of the water crossing equipment [plavsredstva] has been received
    from the economy. Sixty percent of the preparatory work on them has been done. Work
    is being done to rapidly deploy ships undergoing repair. Fifty percent of the ships have
    been demothballed by the crews. Work is continuing on the rest.
    Crews are being urgently trained for ships coming on line. The forces that perform
    verification trawling of coastal channels and the PLO forces to search and track
    submarines of the Western Baltic fleet have been augmented. Rear and technical
    support formations and units are being brought into readiness and are distributing
    reserves of material resources. They are deploying a system of temporary basing,
    supply, repair, and support to the forces in the areas in which they are serving.
    Internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
  1. At the instruction of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Country, the
    internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
    achieved readiness for operation by 30 May.
    Beginning 1 June the defense of seaports and airports was strengthened, as well as
    [these] borders:
  • northern – by the forces of the Baltic Border Troops Brigade (Baltic br PV);
  • western – by the forces of the Maritime, [Liubuski], and [Lurzicki] br PV.
  • southern – by the forces of the Sudety and [Gornoslenski] br PV.
    The border troops were subordinated to the Commanding General of the 3rd Front by 2
    June.
    Units of the internal troops and territorial defense troops had returned to MPD [their
    permanently deployed locations] by 26 May and are undergoing training in combat
    teamwork exercises in barracks-like [prikazarmennye] training grounds.
  1. Locations of permanent deployment
    Number Formations, units Location
    1
    2
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    1.
    2.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    Baltic brPV
    Maritime brPV
    [LIUBUSKI] brPV
    [LURZICKI] brPV
    SUDETY brPV
    [GORNOSLENSKI]
    19th Internal Troops
    Brigade (brVnV)
    10th brVnV
    6th brVnV
    Warsaw Territorial
    Defense Brigade (brTO)
    Katowice brTO
    Wielkopolski Territorial
    Defense Regiment (pTO)
    Szczecin pTO
    Wroclaw pTO
    Krakow pTO
    Gdansk pTO
    Kielce pTO
    KOSZALIN
    SZCZECIN
    KROSNO ODRZANSKIE
    LUBAN
    KLODZKO
    GLIWICE
    OLSZTYN
    KRAKÓW
    GÓRA KALWARIA
    WARSAW
    KATOWICE
    POZNAN
    SZCZECIN
    WROCLAW
    KRAKÓW
    GDANSK
    KIELCE
  2. Authorized organizational structure
    A. PV brigades (brPV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • two border guards battalions of 400 men each;
  • a maneuver battalion (of four companies);
    Total: 1260 men.
    Border troops battalion
  • HQ and staff;
  • six PV companies (rPV) of 60 men each;
    Total: 400 men.
    B. Brigade of internal troops (brVnV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • four infantry battalions;
  • a signals battalion;
  • a reconnaissance battalion;
  • an engineer battalion;
    Total: 1800 men.
    C Territorial defense brigade (brTO)
  • HQ and staff;
  • six TO battalions of 400 men each;
    Total: 2,500 men
    D. Territorial defense regiment
  • HQ and staff;
  • seven TO companies of 100 men each;
    Total: 760 men.
    EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

REVEALED – LECTURE BY SERGEI AKHROMEYEV, ‘THE CURRENT STATE OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE’

Quellbild anzeigen

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

CREATOR
AKHROMEYEV, SERGEI

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Nuclear disarmament
North Atlantic Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Nuclear weapons–North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nuclear nonproliferation
Arms race
Nuclear weapons–United States
Military doctrine–Poland
Military doctrine–Soviet Union
Poland–Military relations–Soviet Union
Nuclear weapons–Warsaw Treaty Organization
More …
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Poland
Soviet Union
United States

[stamp]
IPN [Institute of National Remembrance]
BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents]
Warsaw
HQ Silesian Military District – Staff [top of stamp invisible] UNRESTRICTED 1 [handwritten]
First Department No. 2838 RESTRICTED
No. 9F 579/I [handwritten] No. 72248 UNRESTRICTED
1988 – 06-07 19__ Received 1988 – 06- 14
50-984 Wrocław Annex 1 Sheet 27
GOC/CHIEF 9 [?]U [?] 2838 [handwritten]
[handwritten diagonally across the page and very hard to read]
Comrade Lieutenant Colonel [illegible]
Based on this material carry out training of cadres and staff and [?] with a view to [rest
illegible]. Signed [illegible signature] 15.06.88
On the instructions of the Chief of Staff of the Silesian Military District I am sending for official use a
translation of a lecture by the Chief of the General Staff, the first Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal
of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, given on 14.04.1988 at the Polish Army General Staff College.
Annex 1 on 27 sheets.
CHIEF
[stamp]
IPN [Institute of National Remembrance]
BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents]
Warsaw
Colonel Dr. Stanisław KOZIEJ
Printed Silesian Military District [illegible] 876/88
I confirm conformity with the original
13 ii 2008
[illegible] Wojciech
[stamp]
IPN [Institute of National Remembrance]
BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents]
Warsaw
Annex To outgoing letter No. 7[?]2248 [illegible]
incoming 7.06.1988
No. 1 dated 1988 – 06.14
Working translation from Russian UNRESTRICTED 2 [handwritten]
RESTRICTED
Copy no. 12
[illegible stamp]
THE CURRENT STATE OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
(a lecture given by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR at the Polish Army
General Staff College.)
I confirm conformity with the original
Honored Comrade Lieutenant General Józef Użycki, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army!
Honored Comrade Major General Władysław Mróz, Commandant of the Polish Army
General Staff College!
Honored Polish comrades!
Permit me, first of all, to thank everyone most sincerely for the privilege of appearing before you and to
transmit greetings, as well as best wishes to the College’s team from the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Army
General Comrade Dimitri Yazov, from the generals, admirals and officers of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed
Forces.
In my talk I should like to present the fundamentals of Soviet military doctrine closely linked to the
principal directions of the military doctrines of the nations of the Warsaw Pact.
It is no accident that currently much is written and said throughout the whole world about military
doctrines. Everyone is threatened by the danger of nuclear war. Mankind’s greatest task is to survive in an era of
space flight and nuclear power. New political thinking requires also new attitudes in military thinking.

  • [illegible] [illegible stamp]
    [an identical copy of the previous page]
    [stamp]
    IPN [Institute of National Remembrance] -2- 3 [handwritten]
    BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents]
    Warsaw
    It was emphasized at the meeting of the Annual [illegible handwritten word] Political Committee of the
    Warsaw Pact Countries in Berlin that, in the current situation, there is a greater need to understand correctly the
    aims and intentions in the military sphere of countries, as well as of political-military alliances, as embodied in
    other military doctrines. For it is in military doctrines that we find a reflection of the real essence of military
    policy, the thrust of weapons’ development, of production and of the armed forces’ preparations. [underlined by
    hand]
    Allow me in this lecture to focus on a few current issues, first of all of Soviet military doctrine.
    [stamp] I confirm conformity with the original _
    IPN [Institute of National Remembrance]
    BUiAD [Office of accessibility and archiving of documents]
    Warsaw
    I. CONTENT AND THRUST OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
    What do we mean by military doctrine? Why, in addition to the study of war, do we also have the concept
    of military doctrine? Well, in the study of war we can find various views on the issues of national defense and
    military matters. From a theoretical point of view this is both good and desirable. After all, the process of the clash
    of ideas leads to truth, based on defensible premises. However, some disputes can be never-ending, while the
    practical work of strengthening a country’s defenses requires legally-sanctioned views on the most pressing issues
    of the armed forces’ development and preparations.
    Military doctrine – is not simply a collection of theoretical views, but a system of decisions, which firstly:
    reflects officially-accepted views, which are binding on military personnel; secondly – military doctrine does not
    encompass the whole of military-political and military-technical knowledge, but only the most important, basic
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    conclusions indicating the key thrust of the armed forces’ development and preparations.
    From the scientific point of view the military doctrine of socialist countries is based on Marxist-Leninist
    teaching on war and the army, military thought, as well as on the whole system of knowledge about war and the
    army. Military doctrine selects from the whole system of knowledge and sanctions in official documents the most
    important, key decisions emanating from specific military-political tasks in the current phase, from intentions to
    ensure the socialist countries’ security and defense at the present level of military threat, and from our country’s
    and the socialist countries’ economic and military potential.
    The Warsaw Pact’s military doctrine was drawn up by the combined efforts of the political leadership of
    the allied countries and adopted by the Advisory Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact. The ministers of defense
    and general staffs of the fraternal armies are responsible for specifying its military-technical dimension.
    In the USSR military doctrine is drawn up, ratified and implemented by the Defense Committee of the
    USSR, the Soviet government and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.
    The military doctrine of the countries of the Warsaw Pact reflects the commonality of the socialist
    countries’ military-political defensive goals. Each of our socialist countries has its own national defense doctrine.
    Our common military doctrine in no way interferes with or contradicts any country’s national interests. These
    doctrines organically reinforce and permeate one another, representing an expression of the general, basic tenets of
    the defense of socialism.
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    While the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Organization covers defense issues basically applicable to
    Europe, Soviet military doctrine also embraces a set of national goals dealing with the use of nuclear weapons, the
    country’s defense in the East and elsewhere, in other words with the defense of the achievements of socialism, on
    more or less a global scale. [underlined by hand] This indicates the scale, the complexity, the many-sidedness and
    mutual connections of the defense problems which we have to solve. Of course, we solve these problems in
    consultation with our allies both in Europe and elsewhere.
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    The Warsaw Pact countries’ adoption of common, agreed guidelines for military doctrine is of great
    significance. In the international context it allows us to eliminate the mutual suspicions and lack of trust,
    accumulated over many decades, between countries with different systems, to achieve a better understanding of
    fears and mutual goals. From the point of view of solving the defense problems facing the socialist countries this
    represents a unified approach to understanding military doctrine as well as co-ordinating our efforts on behalf of
    our socialist homeland.
    Summing up the issues, it is possible to state that current Soviet military doctrine represents a system of
    officially-accepted, basic views on the issue of preventing war, the development of armed forces, the preparation of
    countries and armed forces to repel aggression as well as to conduct military operations in defense of socialism.
    While our earlier military doctrine was seen as a system of thoughts about preparations for war and its
    conduct, its current fundamental thrust is to prevent war. The task of preventing war is the primary objective,
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    the essence of military doctrine, the fundamental function of a nation and its armed forces.
    Obviously, preventing a world war is primarily a political issue. But politics, in their purest form, do not
    exist. They can be realistic only when they take into account the close interconnection of a country’s social,
    economic, ideological and defense interests.
    In this connection, the Ministry of Defense, as well as the General Staff, must focus ever more vigorously
    on solving problems connected to preventing war, arms reduction, strengthening trust between countries based on
    the document of the Stockholm Agreement and others. In order more effectively to deter aggression, constant
    analysis, especially by higher-ranking officers, of the current state and potential development of armaments and
    military equipment of one’s own and one’s adversary’s armed forces is essential. At the same time, one should act
    in such a way as not to create an intensification of the arms race. This is a cardinal principle, which has become the
    basis for the emergence in our military doctrine and strategy of a new direction relating to the problems of
    preventing war. [underlined by hand] For the General Staff in the Soviet Union it is this very principle which is
    probably the reason for its reconstruction.
    Our military doctrine has a political and a military-technical side. Military doctrine’s political side has a
    leading role. It defines the attitude towards the problem of war and its prevention in the nuclear age, the thrust of
    tasks associated with strengthening the defense and ensuring the security of a country based on Lenin’s statement
    that: “a revolution is only worthwhile if it can defend itself.”
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    The essence of our military doctrine’s political side depends on the fact that the socialist countries
    unhesitatingly reject war as a means of solving political, economic and ideological differences between countries.
    They treat no country, no nation as an enemy and make no territorial claims on any nation.
    The socialist countries resolutely oppose nuclear war and any other war. In current conditions world war
    has ceased to be the continuation of rational politics [underlined by hand] by the use of other – forceful means.
    Nuclear war, should it be begun, could lead to the destruction of mankind. Likewise a conventional war can take a
    much more destructive and murderous form. [stamp]
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    A system of international security can be created only as part of a whole network of accomplishments in
    the military, political, economic and humanitarian fields. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have
    suggested a number of concrete proposals along these lines.
    We attach great importance to the initiative of the People’s Republic of Poland proposed by the First
    Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, Comrade W. JARUZELSKI, on the 8th of
    May 1987 at the Second Congress of the Patriotic Movement for National Revival.
    As you know, this initiative envisages:
  • in the area of nuclear weapons – a gradual withdrawal and reduction of jointly-agreed categories of
    nuclear weapons (operational, tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons);
  • in the area of conventional weapons – a gradual withdrawal and reduction of jointly-agreed categories of
    conventional weapons, initially the most powerful ones used for sudden assault (at present negotiations on this
    subject are taking place);
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  • in the area of military doctrines – giving all military doctrines an exclusively defensive character so that,
    accompanied by a ceaseless maintenance of military parity, one could aim to achieve a level of armaments on either
    side which would not permit of a sudden attack. The objective of this evolution would be the mutual recognition of
    military doctrines as purely defensive;
  • in the area of accompanying measures of trust and security – defining security and confidence-building
    measures going further than the Stockholm ones; adopting undertakings not to use nuclear weapons first; a
    prohibition on concentrating large numbers of forces or carrying out military exercises along the demarcation line
    between the military blocks; a ceiling on the size of permitted military exercises. Detailed control mechanisms
    would be worked out.
    Expressing their support for these proposals the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries believe
    extending confidence-building measures to naval and air exercises to be appropriate.
    The meeting of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
    Union, Mikhail GORBACHEV, with the President of the United States, Ronald REAGAN, the diligent efforts of
    the Soviet leadership have brought the first positive results which have an historical significance. The signing of
    the agreement on the decommissioning of medium and short-range missiles represents in practical terms the
    beginning of a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations are being conducted on a radical (50%) reduction of
    offensive strategic weapons while maintaining the terms of the agreement on anti-missile systems.
    The essential characteristic of the military doctrine of the countries of the Warsaw Pact is that it is entirely
    defensive in nature. These countries have confirmed that there are no circumstances under which they would start
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    a war, be it nuclear or conventional, against any country unless they are the object of an attack. They will never use
    nuclear weapons first.
    It would be in the interest of the countries of the Warsaw Pact to achieve the lowest possible level of
    military confrontation between nations. Under the present circumstances the lowest possible level of armaments
    guarantees mutual security. However, since this level is limited by the military preparations of the imperialist
    countries, the defensive strength of the socialist countries should be so calculated that between the USSR and the
    USA, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, it be even, similar; their security be mutual and, on the international scale,
    universal. The socialist countries do not insist on greater security, but they will not settle for less. Out of concern
    for their security, the countries of the Warsaw Pact are forced continually to improve their defensive capabilities so
    as not to be at a military disadvantage.
    The military-technical side of our military doctrine, starting from military-political premises, identifies a
    basic potential opponent and the nature of the military threat (for what kind of war should the armed forces be
    preparing); what armed forces are indispensable for conducting such a war and what should be their dispositions;
    methods of employment; thrust of preparations.
    Examining the nature of the military threat one can state that an analysis of the factors defining the
    development of the political-military situation confirms that we are facing a military threat. We still are. As
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    Mikhail GORBACHEV emphasized at a ceremony on November 2, 1987 commemorating the 70th anniversary of
    the Great Socialist October Revolution, despite some changes on the part of capitalism, its very being represents the
    principal threat of war.
    This is a function of the NATO countries’ aggressive policies. In its military doctrine the USA officially
    outlines and sanctions the notion of eradicating socialism as a socio-political system, using military means if
    necessary. Accordingly, the USA has adopted the doctrine of ‘direct confrontation’ calculated to impose American
    hegemony throughout the world, while the NATO doctrine of ‘flexible response’ anticipates war being waged using
    nuclear, as well as conventional weapons.
    In the current conditions of military-strategic parity, the imperialists are continually seeking ways to
    achieve their objectives both without war as well as by means of war. Nor, in their military doctrine, do they
    exclude the use of nuclear war whose aim is thus to achieve victory through sudden, incapacitating attacks aimed at
    weakening our strategic forces, using in this nuclear attack munitions and explosives which do not produce
    (dangerous to them) nuclear radiation, as well as launching attacks from space with weapons based on new
    principles of physics. This all emphasizes a strategy of using nuclear weapons first.
    Recently, the USA and its allies have come to the conclusion that their current strategic nuclear arsenal
    does not allow them to achieve military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. The USA is
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    attempting to get out of this blind alley by means of the SDI program: deploying an anti-missile system for national
    defense with some weapons based in space, with an offensive weapons system launched from space, and with the
    accelerated development of new, more effective conventional weapons.
    In its offensive strategic arsenal the USA is developing the MX ballistic missile and the B-1B strategic
    bomber. It continues to build OHIO-class nuclear submarines carrying TRIDENT 2 missiles. New guided
    weaponry for the strategic air force is planned. Work is being carried out on the new MIDGETMAN ballistic
    missile and the STEALTH bomber, which are to be introduced in the 90s.
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    With reference to NATO’s general maneuver forces, we see a continuing increase in their combat
    effectiveness in line with the 20-year development plan adopted by the NATO leadership in December 1985. This
    involves equipping the ground forces, air forces and naval forces with new tanks, artillery, aircraft and other longrange weapons systems, with precision targeting capabilities and capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear
    munitions.
    There has been an increase in the scale and intensity of different exercises involving NATO armed forces,
    during which large forces are deployed near the socialist countries’ borders. NATO military doctrine anticipates
    that its armed forces will operate mainly in a sudden, polite [‘uprzedzający’, likely a typo or a mis-translation from
    the original Russian.] manner deep into the Theater of Operations, carrying out attacks on the command and control
    elements of our strategic nuclear forces and key Army, Air Defense and Naval assets, second echelon forces,
    reserves and lines of communication. This
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    can be clearly seen in the concepts of ‘the air-land war’ and ‘engagement of second-echelon forces’. NATO
    combined forces, by virtue of their composition, location and operational deployment (including numerous forward
    bases and naval forces), their high level of readiness, have clearly crossed the line of what is necessary for their
    own defense and are in reality offensive forces. In the Central European theater of operations alone we can count in
    peacetime 42 divisions and 2,500 military aircraft. During major maneuvers these forces are increased 1½ to 2
    times. The danger increases of the enemy launching a surprise attack, which by the way is NATO commanders’
    principal objective.
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    The outcome of the NATO Council’s meetings in Brussels earlier this year (March 2-3) proves that the
    Western countries not only do not intend to reduce preparations for war, but are intending to expand them. The
    agreement on medium and short-range missiles has yet to be ratified, and already there is talk of compensating for
    them in Europe. This position on the part of the leadership of NATO combined forces was also confirmed at a
    meeting between the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Army General Dimitri YAZOV, and the US Secretary of
    Defense, Frank CARLUCCI.
    If the implementation of all these military programs and the imperialist countries’ preparations are not
    countered, they could lead to a heightened military threat to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. This
    is objective reality which cannot be discounted.
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    Therefore, at this stage it is particularly important to raise the effectiveness of the armed forces’
    development and their equipment levels, while taking very much into account the military-economic viewpoint, a
    general increase in vigilance, organization and discipline, the combat readiness of command and control assets and
    of the armed forces, and raising qualitative indices in the area of operational and combat training. It is precisely on
    solving these issues that the leadership and entire personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces are currently working.
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    The task of the military-technical side of military doctrine is not only to identify the nature of the military
    threat but also to provide a precise answer to the question: for responding to what attack should the armed forces be
    prepared?
    In the current situation we accept as an initial premise the possibility of both conventional and nuclear
    world war. Thus the armed forces need to be equally prepared for both kinds of war.
    The need to prepare for nuclear war derives from the fact that there is a continual threat of nuclear war and
    in the event that the imperialist countries unleash it, our armed forces should carry out retaliatory-interception and
    retaliatory strikes, in other words execute their responsibility to defend the socialist homeland, depending on which
    kind of means are used to unleash war and what are its consequences.
    It is essential to prepare the land forces and navy for conventional warfare since, given the catastrophic
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    effects of nuclear war, the possibility of conducting a conventional war becomes greater. In recent years our enemy
    has ever more frequently emphasized starting war using conventional means. Therefore, if the aggressor starts such
    a war, we shall have to respond using similar means, without having recourse to using nuclear weapons first.
    In the military-political sphere our military doctrine has always been defensive in nature. Today this
    feature is being expanded and deepened.
    In the current existing conditions, our forces’ vigorous retaliatory measures aimed at repelling aggression
    represent realistic variants of military countermeasures against an aggressor. Just such operational methods allow
    us to fight effectively to prevent war and assure an effective national defense.
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    II. The armed forces’ development and preparations taking into account our military doctrine’s defensive nature.
    In the area of the armed forces’ development our military doctrine is based on the need to achieve the
    lowest possible level of military rivalry between nations. However, since the level of armaments depends in the
    first instance on the imperialist countries’ military preparations, then the defensive might of the USSR and the other
    socialist countries should be such as to assure an effective defense of our country and of our allies.
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    The principle of adequate force, if examined in general terms, is based on the fact that, within certain
    parameters of force deployment on the part of the countries (the coalition) and the quantity and type of armaments
    as well as operational readiness, has reflected closely the level of military threat, has ensured military parity
    between the opposing sides and has assured the effective defense of the countries (the coalition).
    A reasonable level of adequate defensive force can be defined as that level which guarantees that an
    aggressor, whatever the circumstances in which he initiates war, will be repelled and crushingly defeated.
    [underlined by hand] We agree that neither side be able to conduct long-term offensive operations with clear
    objectives, unless the other side also agrees to establishing talks about them.
    In realistic terms, an adequate level of defense means that it is essential that we have armed forces which
    would allow us effectively to prevent imperialism from starting a war and, in the event of an attack on the USSR
    and the Warsaw Pact countries, to repel aggression. Our armed forces in Europe should be capable of repelling
    aggression in the course of defensive operations (which will require time), but if the aggression does not cease, of
    moving over to the counter-offensive and inflicting a defeat on the aggressor. [underlined by hand]
    In recent times, in the countries of Western Europe intensive work has been conducted (especially in
    opposition circles) on the theory of the so-called ‘unprovocative defense’ or the ‘inoffensive defense’. The essence
    of this idea is that the armed forces’ structure, training, material-technical support and strategy should be such that
    they would be unable to conduct large-scale offensive operations, but would be adequate to conduct simultaneously
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    a ‘credible defense’. It coincides, on the face of it, with our views. However, in comparison to our conception of
    the adequate defense the essential difference is that the whole system of the ‘unprovocative defense’ is based on the
    premise that nuclear weapons should be the principal element of a retaliatory strike. We are against that.
    [underlined by hand]
    Summing up, the defensive nature of our military doctrine creates more favorable conditions to prevent war
    in the context of an economical solution to the problems of developing the armed forces and national defense,
    accepting military parity and adequate defense as a given.
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    Our military doctrine’s defensive nature sets higher standards for the army’s (armed forces’) battle
    preparedness and readiness to mobilize. The organization and directions of the armed forces’ strategic
    development and their achievement of higher states of military readiness should be formulated taking into account
    the aggressor’s growing ability to launch a surprise attack. It could be carried out in new, more diverse and
    dangerous forms, including sudden attacks using large formations and means, under the guise of large-scale
    maneuvers and without an initial build-up of forces in the vicinity of the border.
    In this situation the role of the army’s (armed forces’) intelligence and constant readiness to deter
    aggression is even more important.
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    The defensive nature of our military doctrine also has a significant influence on the manner of deploying all
    types of armed forces in the initial phase of an operation and throughout the operational system.
    The following elements belong in the modern operational system: strategic operations directed at repelling
    an enemy’s strike from space, strategic nuclear forces’ operations, strategic operations in the continental theater of
    operations, operations in the oceanic theatre of operations .
    In the event of war being launched against the USSR and the other socialist countries, the principal task
    will be to repel the enemy’s attack, break up the assault of his forces in the land theaters of operations and in the
    oceanic (sea) theaters of operation, and defeat them.
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    A decisive factor in our modern military doctrine is that an essential feature of our forces’ operations in the
    initial phase of a war will be all-arms retaliatory operations involved in repelling the attack.
    Given the defensive nature of our military doctrine, in the period preceding hostilities and in their initial
    phase the concept of flexible strategic deployment gains added significance (above all moving the economy and the
    armed forces onto a war footing). It is also anticipated that earlier, in proportion to the threat level, the armed
    forces’ state of readiness would be raised, as well as their immediate ability to be tasked at short notice in the event
    of a surprise enemy attack. Given the defensive nature of our military doctrine, both in the conventional and the
    nuclear context, the role of strategic operations involved in repelling an enemy strike from space assumes greater
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    importance. It fully conforms to the defensive nature of our military doctrine and it plays an important role in our
    overall system of warfare devoted to repelling enemy aggression. This operation is planned and implemented at the
    desired level still during peacetime (intelligence, communication of a missile attack, space assets, duty air defense
    units). [underlined by hand] In the event of war, the forces and assets involved in this operation will be the first to
    see action.
    In a nuclear war the strategic use of nuclear forces is decisive, since, in the event of initial aggression, they
    should be ready to carry out retaliatory-interception or retaliatory strikes. The assured effectiveness of the system
    of communications concerning a missile strike is of exceptional importance, as is improving the durability of
    strategic nuclear assets.
    In a conventional war, in order to paralyze the enemy’s offensive forces’ key strategic assets, air force, air
    defense forces, command and control infrastructure and economy we might have to conduct strategic air operations.
    [underlined by hand]
    The naval forces’ key efforts in a war’s initial phase will be focused on: 1) ensuring the development and
    combat readiness of their ballistic missile submarines; 2) carrying out strikes on the enemy’s naval forces; 3)
    conducting combat operations along the enemy’s oceanic and sea lines of communication; 4) co-operating with
    forces operating in coastal theaters, conducting amphibious and anti-amphibious operations.
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    One of the most important forms of warfare are strategic operations in the continental theater of operations.
    Given the defensive nature of our military doctrine, in the initial phases of a war this will usually be a strategic
    defensive operation.
    Within the context of the above-mentioned strategic operations, operational elements from all the armed
    forces will conduct all-arms, combined and independent operations.
    Contrary to previous dispositions, our current military doctrine presents the problem of defense and attack
    in a new light. We see both these forms of military operations as basic.
    The role of the defense for the formations of our armed forces in the theatre of operations expands during a
    war’s initial phase. It ceases to be exclusively a secondary element of our operations and it will be conducted
    deliberately in the theater of operations. The relationship between defensive and offensive operations in the overall
    battle plan is changing.
    On the one hand, we are aware that our armed forces have always been trained in a spirit of vigorous and
    decisive offense. This was developed as a result of our experience in the Second World War. Nor do we intend to
    devote less attention to problems of the offense in present conditions.
    At the same time, we must remember Lenin’s assertion that: ‘…Marxism must take into account true life
    and real facts and not just cling to yesterday’s ideas…’ He emphasized that in military matters taking into account
    the true correlation of forces has enormous significance.
    During a conventional war both sides will be forced constantly to adjust their strategic goals and actions to
    prevent them turning it into a nuclear war. There will be a need to define precisely the critical moments in the
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    development of an operation, to assess in a responsible manner the eventual consequences of specific decisions, in
    other words, if war is unleashed, the political leadership will still retain numerous levers to affect its scale and
    character.
    This analysis leads us to the statement that in a war using conventional weapons, in the initial stage of the
    war an essential element in the operations of the Soviet armed forces and their allied armies will be to repel
    aggression in all theatres, leading to strategic defensive action. At the same time, defense alone cannot lead to the
    complete destruction of the enemy. That is why our military doctrine takes into account the need to transition (after
    having repelled the enemy’s aggression or even during it) to vigorous, decisive, offensive operations. In this
    connection, in the war’s initial phase the counter-attack becomes a basic element in conducting offensive
    operations. It should be prepared during stubborn defensive fighting.
    In connection with the foregoing, let us assume that a basic objective of the counter-attack in current
    conditions will be to destroy the enemy’s assault formations, as well as to seize the frontiers, thus permitting further
    operations appropriate to the given situation. The counter-attack will probably end when the situation is stabilized
    and the frontier is seized. [underlined by hand]
    [illegible handwriting in left margin]
    Sometimes two completely different concepts are confused: the first one – concerning the defensive nature
    of our doctrine consists in the fact that we shall not be the first to start any war; the second one – concerning the
    nature of our operations at the start of and during a war. At the start of a war we shall indeed be forced to defend
    ourselves, but in the course of it [underlined by hand] our armed forces will act vigorously and decisively,
    [underlined by hand]
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    I confirm conformity with the original 21 [handwritten]
  • 20 –
    both during the defensive fighting and particularly during the offensive phase, the counter-attack and especially
    during the transition to the counter-attack. There is no contradiction here.
    In the current conditions we also have to count on the possibility of the enemy making a surprise attack.
    Based on our experience of 1941, the Israeli attack on Syria in 1982, the USA on Libya in 1986, it emerges that the
    enemy, through disinformation and diverting attention, and through the use of unexpected means can achieve
    surprise, even when war and hostilities are apparently inevitable. Hence the armed forces should always be
    prepared to repel an enemy attack.
    [stamp]
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    In connection with the foregoing, during their1988 training cycle the armed forces of the USSR will devote
    50% of their time to the subject of defense. The defensive nature of our military doctrine does not imply passivity
    while conducting the defense. Naturally, earlier preparations and the choice of the moment to attack give the
    enemy specific advantages and, at the outset of hostilities, he will have the strategic initiative. However, our
    retaliatory operations should be vigorous and so calculated that from the very outset we shall be fighting for the
    strategic initiative [underlined by hand] and to thwart the enemy’s plans with decisive action, and to impose our
    will on him. While during the Second World War the first stage of the real breakthrough in the war was achieved
    only after half a year (before Moscow), in current conditions we shall need to achieve this breakthrough within a
    few weeks. [underlined by hand] A deliberate transition to the defense can in this regard afford considerable
    advantages, as it did at Kursk in 1943, during Polish First Army’s defense on the Magnuszew bridgehead in 1944,
    and in Pomerania in 1945.
    [stamp]
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    I confirm conformity with the original 22 [handwritten]
  • 21 –
    It is our contention that in current circumstances the defense must be organized, and defensive operations
    carried out, so as to inflict a defeat on the enemy at the very outset of an attack and prevent him from making a
    deep penetration, leading to a considerable loss of territory on our part.
    Given the present balance of forces in Europe, the task of repelling an attack can in general be left to firstechelon forces, without involving larger forces further back. In order to transition to the counter-attack we shall
    need to involve additional forces. Taking into account the Polish Army’s strategic dispositions, it would probably
    be appropriate to prepare both for defensive as well as offensive operations.
    Taking into account all these factors, we in fact plan and implement preparations for the initial defensive
    operations in peacetime. Preparations for defensive operations involve: taking the decision; planning the operation;
    giving the forces their objectives; preparing a fire plan; making arrangements for co-operation; preparing the
    command and control elements as well as the forces to achieve their military objectives; using engineers to prepare
    the terrain; organizing political work; organizing all-round protection for military operations; organizing command;
    deploying forces to their defensive positions; checking the forces’ readiness for combat operations.
    In the event of a sudden enemy attack, we shall not have the necessary time to complete preparations for
    defensive operations. Therefore, everything possible should be done beforehand. Most of the tasks outlined here
    can be carried out in peacetime. This is in fact currently taking place in all branches and operational formations of
    [stamp]
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    [stamp]
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    I confirm conformity with the original 23 [handwritten]
  • 22 –
    the armed forces. Yet, as was demonstrated in army front staff exercises carried out in March earlier this year
    involving the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the preparations for such operations require an in-depth
    approach. In particular, in addition to planning and studying objectives on maps and on the ground, one can carry
    out a number of practical tasks (training with commanders and staff using maps and on the ground; reconnaissance
    and establishing the topographical lines of defensive positions; preparing command posts and the like).
    It is also essential to organize the defense and carry out defensive operations so as to defeat the enemy at
    the very start of his assault, to prevent his forces making a deep penetration and us losing a great deal of territory.
    [stamp]
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    For this reason, a defensive belt (an advanced [forward [handwritten] position) should be created to a depth
    of no greater than 10-15 kilometers. [handwritten underlined exclamation mark in right margin]
    From experience gained during exercises, it clearly emerges that our deployment of defensive lines, belts
    and positions is similar to that of the last war, while the army’s organization, as well as its operational deployment,
    its line of battle, have changed radically. In this connection, it is not always understood the same way by everyone:
    who should occupy which positions, which belts, which defensive lines; who, and using which forces, should
    prepare them. The weakest area is the tactical defensive zone, because it does not provide forces or resources to
    defend the secondary belt. [underlined by hand] It is anticipated that a main belt, at a distance of 70-80 and 100-
    120 km., will be established for army defensive lines, and then, at a depth of 150-200 to 300 km., for front
    [underlined by hand]
    defensive lines.
    [stamp]
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    I confirm conformity with the original 24 [handwritten]
  • 23 –
    The experience of war teaches us that if the tactical zone is breached, it is difficult, and at times even
    impossible, to re-stabilize the whole defensive situation. The obverse of this is that , if the stability of the principal
    belt and of the whole tactical zone is maintained, then even specific enemy breaches are not dangerous.
    In this connection, it would seem appropriate to have a principal defensive belt to a depth of 20-25 km..
    The depth of positions – 2-2.5 km; the distance between positions should be 2-4 km.. A second defensive belt must
    be established at all costs, so that the tactical defensive zone’s depth should be about 40-60 km..
    [illegible handwriting in left margin]
    Accordingly, army lines should be established to a depth of about 70-80 km., depending on the terrain, and
    front lines – 150-200 km and 250 km..
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    Defensive lines should not be established theoretically, but for specific formations and arms. The decisions
    should identify who is to prepare the lines, to occupy them and what he will do there, what are his objectives.
    The second echelons should be located in one of the suitable areas in preparation for a counter-attack or to
    occupy the defensive lines. Other variants are permissible. These problems should be solved taking into account
    the specific situation, the assigned tasks, the defensive front’s breadth, available forces and assets, the nature of the
    terrain.
    As far as Europe and other areas are concerned, it is important, when setting up the defense, to integrate
    small, and especially large towns into it. They should be prepared for all-round defense, as key strongpoints.
    [stamp]
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    [stamp]
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    I confirm conformity with the original 25 [handwritten]
  • 24 –
    An important element in the resilience of a tactical defense zone is the all-arms fire plan, air strikes and
    engineered obstacles. It is well-known that in war commanders of fronts and armies personally worked on their fire
    plan, and tactical commanders at all levels selected positions for all types of anti-tank weapons or machine guns.
    We should not now forget this.
    Once the enemy has launched his attack, an immediate response is of enormous importance. In the event of
    his sudden attack, one must be ready to carry out an assault, using those units on duty, against those targets to be hit
    first. However, as a rule, we should aim at an earlier secret deployment of firepower assets and at the moment
    when the enemy launches his strike, we should be able immediately to lay down powerful retaliatory fire using all
    possible force and means.
    In the event of a breach or a breakthrough, we should carry out counter-attacks and counter-strikes.
    Several problems involved in conducting defensive operations. In order to conduct an effective defensive
    operation well-organized intelligence, able to detect in good time enemy preparations for an attack, plays a
    decisive role.
    Once permission has been granted, one should secretly stop operational preparations, deploy forces to their
    designated lines, sectors and areas; move to defensive positions; develop a fire plan and use engineers to prepare
    the ground. There will not always be enough time to accomplish this.
    [stamp]
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    [stamp]
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    I confirm conformity with the original 26 [handwritten]
  • 25 –
    Experience gained from exercises shows that 2 days are needed to prepare a defense in a divisional belt,
    together with immediate engineering works, while full preparations require 5-6 days.
    Experience suggests that counter-attacks and counter-strikes can be successful only when they are well
    prepared, launched unexpectedly and at the most favorable moment, with good air-cover, as well as strong air and
    artillery support.
    Given the current nature of armed conflict the effectiveness of all kinds of operation, of strategic and
    operational activities will depend even more on army command elements’ stamina and on force protection. An
    issue of prime importance is raising the combat readiness of command elements, the effectiveness of their work, the
    durability of command posts and communications systems, the widespread use of automated command and
    communications systems.
    Exercises involving the Group of Soviet Forces in German demonstrate yet again the cardinal importance
    of raising the armed forces’ levels of combat readiness and discipline, of competent troop-handling and of
    maintaining a consistent ability to combat every effort to infringe the sovereignty of the socialist countries. At
    present we are conducting a stubborn effort to eliminate from the process of command an academic and formalist
    approach and giving a realistic and practical character to the work of commanders and staff. We feel it appropriate
    to reduce the amount and scope of planning documents and to devote more time to mastering practical subjects
    dealing with preparing for combat operations, effectively taking advantage of communications and automated
    command systems.
    [stamp]
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    [stamp]
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    I confirm conformity with the original 27 [handwritten]
  • 26 –
    In the area of party-political work we anticipate devoting particular attention to developing among the
    soldiers a new way of thinking, taking into account the defensive nature of our military doctrine. In our work with
    the soldiers of our armed forces we need to explain in a clear and well-prepared manner that the defensive nature of
    our military doctrine requires not passivity, but vigorous and decisive action, a high level of alertness and combat
    readiness.
    There are more problems relating to the defensive nature of our military doctrine which we shall need to
    analyze and develop practically in a detailed manner. In particular, we intend to update the combat manual,
    [underlined by hand] the training programs, both in military schools and throughout the armed forces, commission
    academic studies on solutions to the large number of emerging problems.
    We are also, in line with a joint decision taken at a meeting held within the walls of your academy under
    the direction of General F. SIWICKI, now finishing a work on the socialist science of war. Conclusions from
    academic research work focusing on operational-strategic issues are being ever more widely introduced into the
    theoretical side of things. With the aim of a more detailed analysis of these issues and in order to co-ordinate
    research we have created in the General Staff a center for the study of operational-strategic issues, and in the
    different branches of the armed forces operational-tactical research centers. Work continues on a second edition of
    the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and a ten-volume history of the Second World War.
    One of the most important lessons of the war is that only with the effort of the whole nation, under the
    [stamp]
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    [stamp]
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    I confirm conformity with the original 28 [handwritten]
  • 27 –
    leadership of the Party, can one assure a successful defense of the socialist Motherland. The reconstruction in our
    country, outlined at the 27th Congress of the CPSU and now being implemented, and the profound socio-economic,
    spiritual and cultural changes taking place within Soviet society have a great significance for the further
    strengthening of the country’s defenses.
    This is being followed appropriately by a restructuring of the development and preparations of the Soviet
    Armed Forces. We are solving the task of raising further the Army and Navy’s combat readiness in close cooperation with the leadership of the Polish Army and of the other fraternal countries of the Warsaw Pact.
    We are conscious that the Polish Army, together with the Soviet Armed Forces, accumulated its greatest
    experience during the Second World War and, in terms of combat, these are battle-hardened armies. The essence of
    this experience has not lost its meaning today.
    Our good co-operation in the post-war years means much to us and we shall continue not to spare any effort
    to deepen and develop further our friendship and co-operation between the Soviet Armed Forces and the Polish
    Army, with a view to ensuring the peace and security of the countries of the socialist commonwealth.
    Allow me to wish you every success in strengthening the defense of the Polish People’s Republic.
    [stamp]
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    Printed. Silesian Military District no. 877/88
    The following have taken note of letter no. 72248 [most of the initials are illegible; most of the page is hard to
    decipher]
  1. Chief of staff 13. Head of communications
  2. Deputy, political 14. Head of [?]
  3. Deputy, operations 15. Head of armor and [?]
  4. Head of technical services 16. Head of engineering [?]
  5. Quartermaster 17. Head of chemical services [?]
  6. Head operational section 18. Head of [?] services
  7. Head of intelligence [?] section 19. Head of [?] services Kaleta
  8. Head of organization and training 20. Head of special services [?]
  9. Head of [?] 21. Head of medical services
  10. Head of cadre [?] section 22. Head of finance and banking [?]
  11. Head of [?] 23. Legal advisor
  12. Head of [?] 24. Secretary
    [?] lecture [?] staff cadres [?] on 04.07.88[ handwritten]
    [stamp]
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    Translated thanks to a generous contribution from
    John A. Adams and the John A. Adams Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis
    at the Virginia Military Institute.

Exposed – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY NO. 1 FOR THE PERIOD 0800 25 MAY TO 0800 2 JUNE 1988

Quellbild anzeigen

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document describes Warsaw Pact military exercises conducted between 25 May and 2 June 1988. Summarized in detail, the comprehensive exercise brought all facets of the combined forces to “wartime strength” in response to a theoretical threat posed by NATO.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Eastern Europe
Poland
Russia

[Source: Institute of National Remembrance (IPNBU) 1408/2. Translated for CWIHP by
Gary Goldberg.]
[letterhead] GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
Deliver at 0800 2 June SECRET
Copy Nº 4
Exercise
[Original Polish receipt and
declassification stamps]
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
Nº 1
(for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988)
Warsaw
1988
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Nº 1
for the period 0800 25 May to 0800 2 June 1988

  1. In accordance with the growing threat of the “BLUES”, the “REDS” performed a
    covert operational deployment of selected formations and units in [their] armed forces.
    The following measures were performed within the framework of general preparations:
  • the dispatch of servicemen and reserves to military schools, courses, retraining, and
    command-staff training has been stopped; servicemen in courses are being recalled to
    their units;
  • troops in temporary locations are being recalled to their garrisons with the exception of
    formations at wartime strength and undergoing training (exercises) at training areas;
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    formation of detachments for engineer preparation of the terrain began on 1 June and
    which will be made ready to carry out work on behalf of the 3rd Front beginning [inserted
    by hand: 2] June.
  • [the following] have been deployed at field control posts: by 1 June, the staff of the 3rd
    Front, by 0800 2 June, the staffs of the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies;
  • by 26 May formations and units have been inspected for the deployment of elements
    of the mobilization base;
  • the discharge of reservists being trained has been halted. Equipment received from
    the economy has been left in the units;
  • since 1 June aircraft and helicopters received from the economy are being accepted
    and reequipped;
  • beginning 26 May a 24-hour watch has been established in all the armed forces and
    also in military commissariats; [there are] full shifts in national air defense troops and at
    the remaining HQs – reduced [shifts];
  • the border forces and selected units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have increased
    security at the border, airfields, and seaports.
  1. According to a 25 May directive of the GK OVS in the Western TVD he has planned a
    frontal defensive operation for 1 June. In response to the actions of the “BLUES” the
    forces allocated from the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Armies and also the engineer troops are
    preparing defensive positions in the main defensive zone.
    At the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces the
    allocated combined-arms units, air forces, navy, missile troops and artillery, and REhB,
    intelligence, and communications have been brought up to wartime strength under the
    guise of an exercise and work on behalf of the economy and into full combat readiness
    in permanently deployed locations or contingency [neplanovye] areas.
    A. The 2nd Army (GDR Peoples Army)
  • by 25 May the 11th msd had been brought up to wartime strength and beginning on 31
    May together with a battalion of engineer vehicles it began engineer preparations of the
    2nd and 3rd positions of the main defensive zone in the sector south of SZCZECIN and
    BARLINEK;
  • on 25 May the Druzhba-88 exercise began at the DRAWSKI training area in which the
    18th msd, 25th td (of the 8th Army), and missile troops and artillery of the Army are
    participating;
  • [the following] have been brought up to wartime strength under the guise of
    preparations for an exercise: by 28 May, the 19th td; by 30 May, the 30th msd. The
    formations are being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations and are
    undergoing training in combat teamwork [slazhivanie] in garrison training centers.
  • the 29th msd was brought up to wartime strength by 2 June; after regrouping it is
    beginning to prepare the defense of the coastline in the sector DZIWNÓW,
    KOLOBRZEG.
    B. The 6th Army (USSR Armed Forces)
  • under the guise of preparations to carry out work on behalf of the economy the 2nd
    msd was brought up to strength by 25 May; together with the allocated engineer forces
    it is making engineering preparations of the second and third positions in the main
    defensive zone in the sector ZAGAN, PIENSK;
  • the 1st td was brought up to wartime strength starting 23 May and is training at the
    ZAGAN Training Area;
  • on 26 May the 3rd msd and on 30 May the 4th msd were brought up to wartime strength
    and brought into readiness at permanently deployed areas.
    C. The 3rd Army (Czechoslovak National Army)
  • the 31st td was brought up to wartime strength on 25 May and beginning 30 May it is
    making engineering preparations of positions in the main defensive zone together with a
    battalion of engineer vehicles of the 3rd isbr in the sector SLUBICE, GUBIN;
  • beginning 24 May the 33rd msd is conducting planned training at the WEDRZYN
    Training Area;
  • on 28 May the 32nd msd and on 31 May the 34th msd were brought up to wartime
    strength and began training in garrison areas to be brought into readiness for
    operations.
    D. The 8th Army (Polish Armed Forces)
  • at the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces by 26
    May the system of mobilization expansion of Army formations and units was inspected
    and mobilization documentation amplified;
  • under the guise of a planned exercise formations and units of the missile troops, air
    defense, REhB, and intelligence have been brought up to wartime strength and control
    posts have been provided; beginning 25 May they have been brought into readiness in
    reserve assembly areas or in training areas;
  • the 25th td has been brought up to wartime strength and is taking part in the Druzhba88 exercise at the DRAWSKI Training Area;
  • the training of the 21st td is underway at the Orzysz Training Area.
    E. The 11th vdbr
  • after the brigade was brought up to wartime strength it was brought into readiness at
    the reserve assembly area.
    F. The 12th Coastal Defense Brigade
  • it was brought up to wartime strength by 25 May under the guise of joint exercises with
    the Navy and is being brought into readiness in permanently deployed locations.
    G. The 41st rmd [expansion unknown, but presumably a division, possibly a reserve
    mechanized division]
  • the formation of two mechanized regiments, communications, and air defense subunits
    began on 2 June.
    In reconnaissance forces
    Electronic intelligence units are reconnoitering the armed forces of the “BLUES” at the
    indicated lines [rubezhakh].
    Special reconnaissance units and subunits are conducting training in combat teamwork
    and are being brought into readiness for action.
    Reconnaissance aircraft are conducting intensified reconnaissance along the coastline
    and the western border of Poland.
    In REhB forces
    The 24th op-N [expansion unknown] and 8th op-N have been conducting training in
    combat teamwork at the MUSZAKI Training Area since 26 May.
    The remaining REhB units are conducting intensified training in garrison. Ten percent of
    REhB resources are on a round-the-clock watch.
    In Missile Troops and Artillery
    The formations of operational tactical missiles, field missile technical bases, the 8th
    apabr [Army Field Gun Artillery Brigade], the 21st ap BM [Heavy Artillery Regiment],
    and the 15th aiptap [Army Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment] in permanently deployed
    locations were brought up to wartime strength by 28 May.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and deployed by 29 May:
  • the 15th apabr and the 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Regiment (oapr) in border regions
    in the zone of the 2nd Army;
  • the 6th apabr and the 6th apar in border regions in the zone of the 6th Army;
  • the 3rd apar in firing positions west of Rzepin.
    [The following] are undergoing training in training areas:
  • the 3rd apabr and 3rd adnar [possibly “Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion”] since 27
    May at the Wedrzyn Training Area;
  • the 6th orap [Independent Aerial Reconnaissance Regiment] has been at the Zagan
    Training Area since 26 May;
  • the 15th orap is taking part in the Druzhba-88 exercise.
    The remaining missile and artillery frontal and Army formations and units are being
    brought into readiness by 2 June for operations in permanently deployed locations and
    assembly areas.
    9K714 [Oka tactical] missile battalions have been on alert since 25 May in garrison
    training areas.
    Tactical missile battalions and reconnaissance/strike and fire groups of first echelon
    formations are being brought into readiness in assembly areas.
    Conventionally-armed missiles will be delivered to rendezvous points (PV) by 0400 4
    June in order to train the allocated forces of the missile troop and artillery for a air
    defense operation:
  • to PV-1 – WEGORZEWO – four operational-tactical [missiles] and 16 tactical (4 [of
    them] “T”);
  • to PV-2 – WRONKI – eight operational-tactical;
  • to PV-3 – SWIEBODZIN – 12 tactical (4 [of them] “T”);
  • to PV-4 – RUDNA – 27, including 11 operational-tactical and 16 tactical (4 [of them]
    “T”).
    In the air forces
    Training in the combat teamwork of the operations of tactical groups is being conducted
    in formations and units. Airborne command posts were rebased from army aviation units
    to the landing fields of the respective HQs by 2 June where they are being kept in
    combat readiness Nº 2.
    The preparation of AUD [airfield sections of roads] for the dispersion of aircraft has been
    completed. The forward ground support echelons at all airfields have been brought into
    readiness for regrouping at the indicated airfields or at intermediate assembly areas.
    The second echelons are providing support to the air regiments’ missions.
    Aviation ammunition has been stored up to full scale in aircraft parking areas in
    readiness for immediate mounting.
    In the air defense troops
    By 2 June the air forces and air defense forces SKP [possibly “launch command post”]
    of the front and the SKP of Army aviation and air defense had been regrouped to the
    designated areas and maintained in readiness.
    First echelon SAM and radiotechnical units of the Front and armies have been
    regrouped from permanently deployed locations to designated areas and brought into
    readiness in accordance with decisions made in the Front, armies, and formations.
    The 8th zrp and air defense units of the 8th Army have been brought up to wartime
    strength and brought into readiness at permanently deployed locations.
    The radiotechnical troops of the air defense of the ground forces began to work on
    wartime radio frequencies beginning at 0800 2 June.
    [The following] are on combat alert in the air defense system:
  • in SAM regiments (zenap) – one battery each in readiness Nº 2 and one battery each
    in readiness Nº 3;
  • in SAM brigades [and] the Krug zrp – one battalion each (less two batteries) in
    readiness Nº 2 and one battalion (less two batteries) in readiness Nº 3.
    In engineer troops
    By 26 May engineer units which were performing work on behalf of the economy had
    returned to their garrisons.
    [The following] were brought up to wartime strength and into readiness at permanently
    deployed locations under the guise of preparations for an exercise:
  • by 30 May, the 6th and 15th isbr’s, the 6th and 15th pomp’s, the 6th itp [Engineering and
    Technical Regiment], the 29th ib PU [Engineer Battalion for Equipping Control Posts],
    and the 220th Fortification Regiment;
  • by 2 June, the 3rd and 21st isbr’s and the 3rd itp.
    Minelaying equipment and mines are being issued and distributed from centrallysubordinate depots.
    Subunits of engineer vehicles of first echelon armies together with combined-arms
    formations began the fortification of lines in the main defense zone beginning 31 May.
    The 220th Fortification Regiment together with detachments for engineer preparation of
    the terrain began the engineering preparation of blocking positions and front line
    positions.
    The 283rd maskb [Camouflage Battalion] was brought into readiness by 26 May and
    began the construction of dummy areas in accordance with the Front plan.
    In the chemical troops
    [The following] have been brought into readiness under the guise of preparations for
    exercises:
  • the RAST [computation and analysis station] and rear RAST of the Front and armies in
    areas where Front and army control posts are deployed, by 26 May;
  • radiation and chemical reconnaissance subunits were brought up to wartime strength
    and into readiness for operations in assembly areas by 29 May.
    The peacetime system of radiation and chemical reconnaissance began operating in the
    country beginning 1 June.
    In signal troops
    Under the guise of preparations for exercises signals troops regrouped in areas where
    Front, army, and formation control posts are deployed by 28 May. Communications
    centers were ready for operation by 31 May.
    Radio, radiorelay, and cable communications have been organized. Satellite and
    troposphere communications have been readied for operation. Communications on
    wartime frequencies have been organized in all troop arms.
    In the services of the rear
    Planned measures are being carried out for the timely and complete deployment of the
    men and equipment of the operational rear and the organization of a field system of
    supply on behalf of the troops of the 3rd Front.
    The rear control posts of the 3rd Front, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 8th Armies, and the rear
    formations and units of the 3rd Army (3rd omo [Independent Medical Detachment], and
    6th Army (6th mbu [Medical Reinforcement Brigade] were deployed by 0800 2 June.
    Full-scale mobile and operational reserves have been stockpiled in line units [v
    voyskakh]. Current supply of the troops is done from working stocks at garrison depots.
    Materiel resources are loaded onto combat vehicles and the transport vehicles of first
    echelon formations.
    Preparatory measures are being taken at military depots and the bases of the economy
    for a mass issue, loading, and distribution of material resources.
    Readiness to carry out missions to ensure the survivability of the transportation system
    (transshipment points, ports, approaches to crossings] has been verified.
    The preparedness of transportation resources (vehicles, trailers, rolling stock, ships)
    has been inspected and the priority of their movement (transfer by the armed forces)
    when making massive military shipments has been verified. The technical
    documentation of the construction of parallel bridges and crossings has been checked
    as well as the technical condition of bridges.
    Organizational measures for a continuous supply of nurses for the military medical
    service have been completed. Evacuation hospital equipment has been supplemented.
    Restrictions on the use of fuel have been introduced in the economy.
    Blood bank supplies at civilian donor stations intended for immediate delivery to the
    armed forces have been inspected.
    In the technical services
    The 23rd FRB was brought up to strength within the framework of planned exercises by
    24 May and sent to the TORUN Training Area where it is undergoing training in combat
    teamwork and special training.
    The organizational nucleus [orgyadro] for the 22nd FRB and 21st GFRB [expansion
    unknown] was called up by 28 May.
    Equipment received from the economy is being inspected.
    The 225th and 228th orpdn [Independent Missile Transportation Battalion] have been
    brought into readiness to receive missiles and to leave for the designated areas.
    Beginning 2 June under the guise of preparations for exercises, it began to be brought
    up to wartime strength at the location of permanent deployment of the 6th ARB.
    THE COMBINED BALTIC FLEET
    In accordance with a directive of the Commander of the OBF, the headquarters of the
    USSR BF [Baltic Fleet], Polish Navy, and GDR Peoples Navy have updated [utochnili]
    plans to defend the coastline.
    The allocated strike, anti-mine, and other support forces returned to their bases by 2000
    1 June after completing exercises and training launches of missiles. It is intended to
    complete the training of a combined ship squadron by 5 June. The plans for the
    coordination between the HQs of fleets and concerned formations have been updated.
    Naval reconnaissance forces (ship, aircraft, and radioelectronic) have been conducting
    continuous tracking of the operations of groups of ships of the Western Baltic fleet.
    Twenty-five percent of the water crossing equipment [plavsredstva] has been received
    from the economy. Sixty percent of the preparatory work on them has been done. Work
    is being done to rapidly deploy ships undergoing repair. Fifty percent of the ships have
    been demothballed by the crews. Work is continuing on the rest.
    Crews are being urgently trained for ships coming on line. The forces that perform
    verification trawling of coastal channels and the PLO forces to search and track
    submarines of the Western Baltic fleet have been augmented. Rear and technical
    support formations and units are being brought into readiness and are distributing
    reserves of material resources. They are deploying a system of temporary basing,
    supply, repair, and support to the forces in the areas in which they are serving.
    Internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
  1. At the instruction of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Country, the
    internal troops, territorial defense troops, and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
    achieved readiness for operation by 30 May.
    Beginning 1 June the defense of seaports and airports was strengthened, as well as
    [these] borders:
  • northern – by the forces of the Baltic Border Troops Brigade (Baltic br PV);
  • western – by the forces of the Maritime, [Liubuski], and [Lurzicki] br PV.
  • southern – by the forces of the Sudety and [Gornoslenski] br PV.
    The border troops were subordinated to the Commanding General of the 3rd Front by 2
    June.
    Units of the internal troops and territorial defense troops had returned to MPD [their
    permanently deployed locations] by 26 May and are undergoing training in combat
    teamwork exercises in barracks-like [prikazarmennye] training grounds.
  1. Locations of permanent deployment
    Number Formations, units Location
    1
    2
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    1.
    2.
    1.
    2.
    3.
    4.
    5.
    6.
    Baltic brPV
    Maritime brPV
    [LIUBUSKI] brPV
    [LURZICKI] brPV
    SUDETY brPV
    [GORNOSLENSKI]
    19th Internal Troops
    Brigade (brVnV)
    10th brVnV
    6th brVnV
    Warsaw Territorial
    Defense Brigade (brTO)
    Katowice brTO
    Wielkopolski Territorial
    Defense Regiment (pTO)
    Szczecin pTO
    Wroclaw pTO
    Krakow pTO
    Gdansk pTO
    Kielce pTO
    KOSZALIN
    SZCZECIN
    KROSNO ODRZANSKIE
    LUBAN
    KLODZKO
    GLIWICE
    OLSZTYN
    KRAKÓW
    GÓRA KALWARIA
    WARSAW
    KATOWICE
    POZNAN
    SZCZECIN
    WROCLAW
    KRAKÓW
    GDANSK
    KIELCE
  2. Authorized organizational structure
    A. PV brigades (brPV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • two border guards battalions of 400 men each;
  • a maneuver battalion (of four companies);
    Total: 1260 men.
    Border troops battalion
  • HQ and staff;
  • six PV companies (rPV) of 60 men each;
    Total: 400 men.
    B. Brigade of internal troops (brVnV)
  • HQ and staff;
  • four infantry battalions;
  • a signals battalion;
  • a reconnaissance battalion;
  • an engineer battalion;
    Total: 1800 men.
    C Territorial defense brigade (brTO)
  • HQ and staff;
  • six TO battalions of 400 men each;
    Total: 2,500 men
    D. Territorial defense regiment
  • HQ and staff;
  • seven TO companies of 100 men each;
    Total: 760 men.
    EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

Unvealed – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY NO. 2 FOR THE PERIOD 0800 2 JUNE TO 1900 6 JUNE 1988

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Secret

Copy Nº 4

Exercise Shchit [Shield]-88

[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Nº 2

for the period 0800 2 June to 1900 6 June 1988

  1. Beginning at 1900 4 June, the BLUES, performing an operational deployment of troops under the guise of preparations for a strategic defensive exercise, began to create strike groupings in the immediate proximity to the border with the REDS.

By 0800 6 June selected missile troops, artillery, and air units were brought into readiness at launch and firing positions. Reserve airfields and road sections designated as runways have been prepared to accept aircraft.

Units assigned to protect the border have begun to form march columns in the areas they occupy.

At 1900 6 June a full combat alert was declared in all the armed forces.

  1. In response to the measures by the BLUES, the REDS accelerated the operational development of troops, especially the occupation of more advantageous areas and operational deployment areas.

The resources designed to launch a retaliatory missile and air strike were brought into full combat readiness at alternate launch and firing positions by 0800 6 June.

  1. Large formations, formations, and units of the 3rd Front are at permanently deployed locations, alert assembly areas, and operational deployment and defensive areas. Beginning 1900 6 June they have been brought into readiness in accordance with mobilization and operational deployment plans and the decisions of the commanders and chiefs of the troop arms and services taking part in the exercise.

EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document describes a Warsaw Pact military exercise known as Shield-88. The exercise addresses a theoretical scenario in which NATO forces suddenly prepare to launch an attack on Warsaw Pact territory.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Eastern Europe

Exposed – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 INFORMATION SUMMARY NO. 1 AS OF 0800 2 JUNE 1988

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[letterhead] General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

SECRET

Copy Nº 4

Exercise

[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]

MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE POLISH ARMY

INFORMATION SUMMARY Nº 1

(as of 0800 2 June 1988)

WARSAW

1988

MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE POLISH ARMY

INFORMATION SUMMARY Nº 1

(as of 0800 2 June 1988)

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

  1. The BLUES continue to extend a campaign of slander against the REDS, their allies, and supporters. They say that the REDS have upset the balance of forces and are seeking new conquests to distract their peoples’ attention away from economic difficulties. The governments of the REDS are allegedly rejecting all peace proposals and appeals from various organizations and people who enjoy worldwide respect.
  2. Hostile acts against diplomatic representatives of the REDS are increasing in the BLUE countries. In spite of this, diplomatic contacts of the countries united in opposing blocs are characterized by increased activity. Political representatives and leaders say that the purpose of their actions and efforts is to avert war.
  3. At a meeting of the UN Security Council convened on 12 June at their initiative the leaders of the REDS accused some BLUE countries of whipping up tension in Europe, increasing military-political interference in other regions of the world, and putting pressure on the governments of countries which are dependent on them. It was declared that their lying and slanderous propaganda against the REDS had gone far beyond the bounds of good practice in international relations and is evidence of an intent to aggravate relations and a desire to cover their own aggressive intentions and preparations.
  4. The governments of the BLUES are reinforcing the economic blockage of the RED countries. They are announcing or threatening to introduce an air and naval blockade of certain continental and ocean regions of the world. They are trying to subject the ships of some RED countries in these regions to illegal controls.
  5. The propaganda campaign of slander against the sociopolitical system and government leaders of the REDS is increasing. Along with this subversive centers are pursuing activity directed at dividing the public, exciting anti-social forces, and creating a political and subversive underground.
  6. In response to the increasing aggressiveness of the BLUES the leaders of the REDS published a joint statement which noted that “the only sensible outcome of the situation which has developed is the achievement of an agreement between the opposing groups”.

THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY

  1. The unfavorable influence of the international situation on the views and the mood of the population is being observed in all regions of the country. A reduction of interest in work is being noted at industrial enterprises. Nervousness, discord, disorganization, and a lowering of labor discipline are increasing among the managers of enterprises. There are increasingly fewer young people in class at higher educational institutions. In spite of appeals from authorities long lines are forming in front of stores, including people who should be working at the time. As regards the shortage of foods in Wroclaw, for example, there appeared calls for workers to “vigorously protest”, including striking. An increased movement of the population by rail and road is being observed. Telephone lines are overloaded. Malicious agitation and undesirable phenomena are increasing in the countryside. Almost all deliveries of agricultural products to purchase points have stopped. Speculation is increasing throughout the entire country.
  2. Subversive propaganda centers and anti-government underground activists are increasing activity directed at subverting the country’s defense policy and also at discrediting its armed forces and the ministry of internal affairs. The increased size of expenditures for defense in comparison with the scale of social needs is cited in radio broadcasts. The capabilities of the weapons and equipment of our Army are doubted and it is called a “hopeless army”. Hostile propaganda is increasing among workers calculated at generating protests against “work, wage, and standard of living” conditions and “the necessity of sticking to utopian solutions of the problem of the political system”.
  3. The hostility of views, moods, and statements of part of the population is increasing throughout the entire country, namely:

a) in some population centers attempts have been made to organize street demonstrations “in defense of freedom and peace”. Handbills are being distributed containing calls for the protection of people refusing to serve in the Army;

b) at some enterprises criticism and dissatisfaction with the supply of raw materials and resources is increasing;

Some of the workers say that “in view of the passivity of the authorities” who are not in control of the situation they ought to make decisions independently and also express the opinion that in the event war begins the authorities would not be able to ensure the normal functioning of the economy and public life;

c) handbills have been distributed in six industrial centers containing instructions to effectively put machines and production equipment out of commission;

d) pessimism is growing in all levels of society with respect to the possibility of a peaceful solution to contentious international problems. Part of the public is under the strong influence of malicious propaganda and does not see the possibility of a victory by the REDS in a possible war. The opinion is also expressed that our territory will be occupied by BLUE troops;

e) in some population centers acts of terrorism and sabotage with the use of small explosive charges have been committed (railroad stations, bus stations [avtostantsiya], stores, post offices). The population is demanding that authorities severely punish the guilty.

THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY

  1. The political attitudes, morale, and discipline of servicemen, especially regular army personnel, are good. Dedication and precision in carrying out assignments to maintain combat readiness are increasing. No negative phenomena are being observed in the sentiments in the Army. Individual statements and incidents encounter a vigorous rebuff from commanders.
  2. In spite of some nervousness, the personnel of command organizations exhibit a feeling of responsibility for the timely and meticulous accomplishment of assigned tasks. Increased educational work with soldiers, primarily with reservists, is being done by cadre personnel..
  3. Political organs are stepping up preparations for operations in combat conditions. They are successfully combating hostile influences on the personnel. Requests are coming from formations and units for relevant information about the military and political situation and for propaganda materials.

EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document provides a scenario in which the “Blue” governments have engaged in a campaign of increasingly hostile propaganda intended to discredit the “Red” bloc socioeconomic system. Consequently, domestic morale is low. The population has grown pessimistic and, in light of the international situation, feels emboldened to challenge the Red authorities and leaders.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Eastern Europe

Revealed – MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1 AS OF 0800 2 JUNE 1988

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[letterhead] General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

   TOP SECRET

Copy Nº 4

Exercise

[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Nº 1

WARSAW 1988

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY Nº 1

as of 0800 2 June 1988

I. THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION

The fall of 1987 brought a considerable revival of multilateral and bilateral relations between the BLUE and RED countries. The governments of both sides began constructive talks to relax tension and strengthen means of mutual trust. Controversial decisions were made and zones of influence were also identified in areas where oil and natural gas were being intensively exploited.

As a result of the revived political dialog there came a softening of the binding positions about the free exchange of information and the development of private tourism. The magnitude of the influence of the mass media on the population rose in connection with the use of satellite communications. The mass media of the BLUES played a leading role in this.

In the spring of 1988 the policy of détente was not supported by the command staff of the armed forces of the BLUE countries. The senior officers in the leadership of the armed forces began to officially oppose the policy pursued by their governments. Acts of terrorism against active political leaders who supported the policy of détente occurred in the BLUE countries.

The ordinary personnel of the armed forces began to doubt the results of the work of international commissions to monitor the measures being taken within the framework of inspecting the actual implementation of previously concluded agreements. They disputed the trustworthiness of the work being done and vilified the governments of the RED countries, blaming them for trying to upset the military balance in their favor.

Detailed programs for the rapid introduction of arms shipments into the armed forces of these countries were presented in spring briefings with the command staff of the armed forces of the BLUE countries. The program to equip the armed forces with smart weapons was cut to five years. The deadline to complete this program will be 1993. Armored and mechanized divisions have become the main formations of the ground forces. Decisions were made about the intensive training of servicemen for them to master the latest generation of combat equipment. The number of exercises with troops in at the regimental-battalion echelon has increased considerably.

The number of exercises with troops in the first quarter of 1988 doubled in comparison with the same quarter of the previous year. The intensive preparation of alternate local mobilization resources and the deployment of territorial defense units continue.

II. SOME MILITARY, TECHNICAL, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

According to the treaties concluded between the BLUES and REDS by 1 May each side was to dismantle and destroy 50% of the warheads and medium-range ground-launched missiles, 40% of intermediate-range warheads and missiles, and also 25% of strategic nuclear platforms.

A reorganization of formations has been completed in the Ground Forces. The posture and main weaponry is in Appendix Nº 2 to operational assignment Nº 1.

The latest generation equipment has been placed in service in the fighter-bomber and transport aircraft of the Air Forces. Su-25 aircraft have been placed in service in fighter-bomber air divisions, and in some fighter units, Su-27’s and MiG-29’s. Transport aviation has received aircraft with a increased range and greater cargo capacity. In addition, cruise missiles have been placed in service in army aviation air units; each Army has one air squadron of 24 cruise missiles.

A surface ship modernization program is being carried out in the Navy, particularly with missile armament. The first missile frigates have entered service. Sixty percent of submarines have been modernized. They were equipped with automated navigation systems and sonar suites to detect and identify targets. Naval aviation is being modernized. New types of anti-submarine helicopters are coming into service.

III. TROOP TRAINING AND EXERCISES

Intensive training in garrisons, training grounds, and training areas located near the barracks continues in the armed forces of the BLUE countries. The main effort in the training process has been concentrated on improving the systems of mobilization deployment of the armed forces. The main effort in the formations and units of operational troops has been concentrated on mastering new equipment and organizing coordination with aviation.

[The following] continue within the framework of the spring series of exercises on the territory of BLUE countries:

  • VESNA-88, a multi-stage command staff exercise, continues in the LEIPZIG, HALLE, ERFURT, PLAUEN area,
  • LABENDYN 2/88, a multi-stage command-staff exercise of the formations of the 26th Army, in the area southwest of NEUBRANDENBURG, WAREN, and MIROW,
  • selected units of missile troops and artillery at the front echelon are conducting a tactical exercise with live firing at training areas in the area of LUCKENWALDE, LÜBBEN, and SCHÖNEWALDE,
  • beginning 1 June selected coastal defense units in coordination with territorial defense units began the exercise BEREG in the area of WISMAR Bay in which the planning, organization, and conduct of an anti-amphibious assault landing operation are being worked out.

About 3000 soldiers and sailors and also about 40 ships of various classes are involved in the operation,

  • VOLANT, an opposing-force exercise with units of the 21st md, has been conducted since 26 May in the GRYFINO Training Area. A mobilization deployment of cadre units was conducted in the first stage of the exercise. A total of more than 3000 reservists were involved. The main stage of the exercise will start on 3 June in which munitions will be fired.
  • MAR’YASH-88, an opposing-force exercise with units of the 344th msd, began in the area of the FRANKFURT Training Area on 30 May. The main purpose of the exercise is to conduct a surprise inspection of plans to replenish personnel from the “B” table of organization and improve officers’ and reservists’ knowledge about the planning, organization and conduct of defensive operations in the division in the initial stage of a war,
  • BAR’ER-88, an opposing-force exercise with units of the 35th td, began on 1 June in the region of the COTTBUS Training Area. The main purpose of the exercise is to inspect the state of the division’s combat readiness and its combat effectiveness for use in battle after regrouping to a great distance. The exercise will conclude with an inspected [inspektsionnaya] firing at the Training Area,
  • on 28-29 May the BLUES conducted an inspection of the activation of the troop notification and mobilization deployment system on the territory of the Central TO District.

The inspection was played out and involved 50% of the personnel of the TO units and subunits in the District.

IV. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

28 May. The VESNA-88 exercise concluded. Units of the 63rd td remained on the territory of the LEIPZIG Training Area to conduct additional firing; the remaining staffs and units were regrouped to permanently deployed locations.

As a result of the pressure brought about by military circles, on 1 June the BLUES halted work on the elimination of medium and intermediate-range missiles because of the alleged continuing modernization of tactical nuclear platforms in the armed forces of the RED countries.

EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This intelligence summary describes a potential scenario in which the policy of detente in “Blue” countries begins to deteriorate and increased military exercises are conducted.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Eastern Europe
SEE ALSO
APPEARS IN COLLECTIONS
Warsaw Pact Military Planning

MILITARY EXERCISE SHCHIT-88 INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2 FOR THE PERIOD 0800 2 JUNE TO 1900 6 JUNE 1988

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[letterhead] General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

TOP SECRET

Copy Nº 4

Exercise

[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Nº 2

WARSAW

1988

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY Nº 2

for the period 0800 2 June to 1900 6 June 1988

I. THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION

The actions of the BLUE countries have led to a further aggravation of the military-political situation in Europe. In their official statements the leaders of the BLUE countries accused the governments of the RED countries of violating human rights and also of forcing their citizens to perform military obligations.

Alternative military service is being subjected to sharp criticism, particularly in the Polish armed forces.

The parliaments of the BLUE countries have approved government proposals about granting special credits for the financing of dissident organizations operating in the RED countries. Propaganda directed against political parties and government groups has been stepped up and the number of radio broadcasts in Slavic languages has been increased . Dissident organizations active in RED countries have increased their efforts in order to shake the unity of the [RED] countries and provoke a rebellion.

The diplomatic steps of the RED countries to halt conflict and relax international tension have not brought tangible results. The security services of the BLUE countries have recently taken steps to publicly compromise the most active diplomats from the RED countries. More than 50 diplomats from RED countries had been expelled from BLUE countries by 5 June. The mass media is waging a campaign against other diplomats who have allegedly engaged in espionage.

Taking retaliatory measures, the REDS suggested that 30 diplomats of the BLUE countries leave their countries, accusing [them] of espionage, and did not agree to the accreditation of 20 diplomats of these countries. The BLUES accused the RED countries of whipping up tension in bilateral relations and also of intentionally inflaming international relations in order to lead to an armed confrontation.

II. ARMED FORCES EXERCISES

Within the framework of a spring series of exercises and preparations for a strategic command-staff exercise, DRUZHBA-88, in which operations groups from the staffs of the Northern, Central, and Southern Fronts, armies and selected divisions are to be involved, the BLUES are continuing to develop measures to inspect the state of combat readiness of the large formations and formations in the ground forces, air forces, and navy. A regrouping of formations and units is being conducted.

During the exercises being conducted up to now measures have being worked out to verify the state of combat and mobilization readiness of the selected formations and units. Officers are improving their knowledge in the area of planning, organizing, and marching to great distances. In addition, an inspection of the level of combat training of the troops involved in the exercise is being conducted.

In addition to the exercises being conducted up to now in the ground forces of the BLUE countries, in recent days the following training measures have begun to be worked out:

  • on 2 June at the CEDYNIA Training Area, a one-sided exercise of units selected from the 28th td under the name RUBIN-88. The primary goal of the exercise is to improve the troops’ planning, organization, and conduct of defensive operations;
  • on 4 June an opposing-force exercise with the troops of the 62nd td under the name CHERNYY KOT began at the [WEISSEWASSER] Training Area. The goal of the exercise is to check the state of combat readiness of division units and improve the officers’ knowledge of the planning, organization, and conduct of defensive operations in the initial period of a war;
  • on the morning of 6 June an inspection of the combat readiness of the 10th and 12th td’s was declared. At 1200 the departure of units of these divisions for areas where troops go on alert was noted;
  • in areas north of NEUBRANDENBURG the operation of the field CP communications center of the 26th Army; 15 km west of NEURUPPIN [that of the] 27th Army; 20 km east of DESSAU -[of] the 35th Army; 18 km north of KARL-MARX-STADT – [of] the 36th Army; and 25 km north of PRAGUE, [of] the 48th Army were noted;
  • intensive training of troops has been noted in training grounds near locations of permanent deployment and in the areas of [LIPSTADT] and SIEGEN. The outfitting of the troops and the technical condition of transport equipment is being checked;
  • the departure of march columns of the 36th td was noted in the area of HALLE at 1800 6 June. Traffic control posts were set up on the streets in an easterly direction;
  • intensified preparations for a march of the 63rd td were noted in the area of the LEIPZIG Training Area;
  • formations and units not involved in the exercise are in permanently deployed locations and are undergoing intensive training.

III. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The number of workers employed in key military industrial enterprises has increased in the BLUE countries. The high rate of production of T-72 tanks and SU-27 and MiG-29 aircraft is being maintained.

The implementation of a program to build and repair ships and submarines has been accelerated. Restrictions have been introduced on the free movement of RED diplomats in the territory of most of the BLUE countries.

The security of important military facilities has been strengthened, new passes introduced, and the operating procedures of the personnel observation and monitoring systems near guarded facilities have been increased.

On 5 June government control over the distribution of fuel and electrical power was introduced in a majority of BLUE countries. Their supply to the civilian population was reduced considerably.

The number of reconnaissance flights along the border with the BLUE countries has increased as well as reconnaissance missions [reysy], especially in the Baltic Sea area. Fishing cutters have been enlisted to conduct reconnaissance in the waters bordering the RED countries. The number of fishing cutters of the BLUE countries in fishing grounds near the territorial waters of RED countries increased sharply last week.

An increase in the tempo of repair work, the installation of air defense equipment on several BLUE ships, technical inspections, and the presence of crews on mothballed ships has been noted in ports and naval bases.

On the night of 5-6 June selected surface ships left the main naval bases for forming-up places within the framework of preparations for the SKAGEN-88 exercise which, according to plan, will be held from 7 June to 6 July in the area of the western BALTIC straits.

On 5 June an inspection of the air defense system was conducted in the BLUE countries. An additional 36 radar stations and 46 AAA battery firing positions were deployed near airfields within the framework of this inspection. Individual air defense regions have reached readiness Nº 2 within the framework of a training exercise.

At 1900 6 June a codeword message to bring formations and units into full combat readiness was intercepted in the warning net of the armed forces of the BLUE countries.

EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
This document provides background information on a hypothetical political/military scenario leading up to the command staff exercise SHICHT-88 [TARCZA-88 in Polish]. In the scenario ‘Blue’ military leaders have begun to oppose the policy of detente pursued by their governments and consequently have raised their level of combat readiness by increasing the frequency of military exercises and pressured ‘Blue’ governments into ending the destruction of intermediate-range nuclear forces as required by the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe. In response the ‘Reds’ have also raised their combat readiness. The increased international tension has affected the situation within Poland, contributing to increased anti-government sentiment.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization
Anti-communist movements
Press–Western countries
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Poland
West Germany

 

 

 

INFORMATION ON THE ORDER OF IMPLEMENTING MILITARY TECHNICAL COOPERATION OF THE USSR WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

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On the order of implementing military technical cooperation of the USSR with foreign countries

1.Decisions on questions of military technical cooperation of the Soviet Union and foreign countries are made by the USSR Council of Ministers after approval by the CPSU Central Committee.

In accordance with Resolution No. 878-210 of the USSR Council of Ministers from July 30, 1987 “On measures to improve military technical cooperation with foreign countries,” consideration of concrete questions in this area is entrusted to the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on Military-Industrial Questions.

2.In accordance with Resolution No. 320 of the USSR Council of Ministers from March 12, 1988 practical implementation of military technical cooperation with foreign countries is entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Connections (MVES). This cooperation is intended to ensure the USSR conducts a unified foreign economic policy and safeguards its interests in foreign arms markets and the effectiveness of cooperation
3.Resolution No. 191 of the USSR Council of Ministers from February 28, 1989 has determined the functions fulfilled by the MVES to implement military technical cooperation together with the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gosplan, and other relevant Ministries and agencies, including:

– Consideration of the manner of foreign countries’ handling of deliveries of special property and provision of technical cooperation in its mastery, operation, and application;

– Implementation of delivery of special and other property from the USSR for the needs of armies, internal affairs agencies, and state safety;

– Provision of technical cooperation to foreign countries in creation of special units;

– Financial and monetary planning in all forms of operations among participants in military technical cooperation with foreign countries;

– Planning and organization of transfers of special property, its insurance, and ensuring the safety of delivery;

– Implementation of activities to secure the state and state secrets in work conducted and other functions;

In relation to the foregoing, the USSR MVES reserves the right:

– To communicate within the framework of its competency with institutions, organizations, and authorities of foreign states in the same way within the USSR as abroad, and to assign them and accept technical materials, samples, and documents from them in established order.

– To conduct talks and sign agreements as ordered by the Soviet government with foreign countries and to provide signatures on contracts with corresponding organizations in other countries;

– To send Soviet specialists abroad in established order in order to carry out their accepted duties and receive foreign delegations.

The USSR MVES implements military technical cooperation through the Main Engineering Administration, the Main Technical Administration, and the Main Administration on Cooperation, which are independent domestic organizations of this Ministry with rights as legal entities.

Reference: The measures by which the state regulates foreign economic activities are determined by Resolution No. 203 of the USSR Council of Ministers from March 7, 1989, and it states that “Enterprises, unions, manufacturing cooperatives, and other Soviet organizations cannot export weapons, firearms, military equipment, explosive substances, nuclear materials… individual types of products and technologies that are used or may be used in the creation of weapons or military equipment, poisons, narcotics, or psychotropic substances… other types of products or services, whose export is forbidden, unless otherwise provided by legislation.”

DOCUMENT SUMMARY
List of responsibilities allocated to the USSR Council of Ministers, CPSU Central Committee, Ministry of Foreign Economic Connections, and other relevant ministries on issues relating to the implementation of military technical cooperation between the USSR and foreign countries.

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED
Warsaw Treaty Organization
Soviet Union–Military policy
LOCATIONS DISCUSSED
Soviet Union

LETTER FROM STALIN TO CDE. G. APRESOV, CONSUL GENERAL IN URUMQI

 

7 Atrocities Soviet Dictator Joseph Stalin Committed | HowStuffWorksCde. APRESOV!

Sheng Shicai’s letter made a depressing impression on our comrades. Only a provocateur or an hopeless “leftist” having no idea about Marxism could have written it. What could have happened that Sheng, having such an adviser as you, could have written us (me, Molotov, and Voroshilov) such a letter?

We are sending Sheng a suitable letter, but Cde. Svanidze will pass you a copy of our reply.

You should explain to Sheng the meaning of our reply and take steps so that the instructions given in our reply are followed.

I warn that if our instructions are not taken into consideration we will be forced to deny aid to Sheng.

The charter of the Union is not bad, but paragraph five about “equal rights” for women is not suitable for Xinjiang conditions and should be discarded.

Greetings!

I. STALIN.

27 July 1934

[a handwritten version of the above follows]