The Dentist – WC Fields – Comedy Movie

 

W.C. Fields stars as the subject of this classic comedy short, which he also wrote the screenplay for. The dentist is a misanthropic, absent-minded sort who keeps an office in the same house that he shares with his rebellious young daughter. One morning she announces that she has fallen in love with Arthur, the iceman. Fields won’t have it, and scares the poor Romeo off when he tries to make his daily “delivery.” The hubbub makes him late for his golf game. When he tees off, the ball knocks an elderly man out cold but he plays through regardless, trying to cheat wherever possible. Frustrated by a particularly difficult hole, Fields loses his temper and tosses all of his clubs (and the caddy) into a water trap. Back at the office, the dentist locks his daughter in her room to prevent her from eloping with the iceman, and takes out all his frustrations on his patients (whom he refers to as “buzzards” and “palookas”). An attractive young girl naively bends over to show where a little dog bit her, a sophisticated society dame is driven into bizarre contortions while Fields sadistically drills, and a strange “little fella” ends up with a mouth full of broken teeth and birds in his beard. Through it all, the dentist treats everyone with disdain, but his well-deserved comeuppance is on the way.

An unconventional dentist deals with his patients in some very unusual ways. He wrestles one woman all over the office during an extraction. Then another patient has such a heavy beard that he can’t find the man’s mouth. The zaniest dentist’s office you’ve ever seen.

TOP-SECRET-Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/USArmy-SF-Evacuation.png

 

 

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.131 establishes Army special operations forces (ARSOF) doctrine for planning, coordinating, and executing noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) across the entire continuum of operational environments. NEOs are inherently joint operations. History demonstrates that joint forces conducted the vast majority of NEOs. This manual describes ARSOF operating within that context, thus the content of this manual mixes joint and Army terminology where appropriate. This manual does not duplicate or supplant established doctrine dealing with tactical or strategic operations, but it does provide a specific framework to apply that doctrine. Commanders tasked to conduct NEOs should ensure that their planning staff is familiar with referenced publications.

NATIONAL POLICY

1-1. The DOS directs NEOs. During a NEO, the welfare of in-country U.S. personnel is the paramount consideration. However, the decision to evacuate the Embassy and the order to execute a NEO also affect political elements that may influence the timing of an evacuation. U.S. foreign policy objectives are the determining factor in the timing of an evacuation. The following paragraphs discuss the national policy concerning NEOs.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12656

1-2. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, the DOS is responsible for protecting and evacuating U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. Executive Order 12656 also directs the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing these plans.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

1-3. Every U.S. Embassy and Consulate must maintain an emergency action plan (EAP). One section of the EAP covers the military evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals. The appropriate geographic combatant commander (GCC) reviews the EAP to ensure it is accurate and adequate to allow military support. Evacuation operations differ from other military operations in that the senior DOS representative directs the operation at the time of evacuation. The DOS representative’s order to evacuate is usually a political decision with extensive ramifications. The DOS or Ambassador may not give an evacuation order at the most opportune time. The representative may delay the order until the last moment to save political face by avoiding actions seen as a tacit admission of political failure. The DOS or the Ambassador may initiate the evacuation process or plan. Evacuation transportation options, in order of preference, are—

  • Commercial transportation (already scheduled).
  • Commercial charter.
  • U.S. military charter.
  • U.S. military transportation.

Note: Transportation options must be coordinated through the Washington Liaison Group (WLG).

EVACUATION GUIDELINES

1-4. The DOS or the Ambassador can order the following personnel to depart. These personnel are eligible for evacuation assistance. Once evacuated, the DOS and chief of mission (COM) must approve their return. Personnel in this category are—

  • U.S. civilian employees of United States Government (USG) agencies, except mission-essential DOD employees of military commands.
  • U.S. military personnel assigned to the Embassy, such as Marine security guards, defense attaché (DATT), and security assistance personnel.
  • Peace Corps volunteers.
  • USG contractors, if the contract provides for evacuation assistance.
  • Dependents of those listed above.
  • Dependents of other U.S. military personnel, including those assigned to military commands.

1-5. The DOS or Ambassador cannot order the following personnel to depart, but these personnel are entitled to evacuation assistance. They may return at their discretion and expense. These personnel are—

  • U.S. employees of non-USG organizations.
  • U.S. employees employed by or assigned to international organizations.
  • U.S. employees that the host government directly contracts, even if the USG funds the contract.
  • U.S. employees of private entities, such as relief organizations, even if the employer receives USG funding.
  • Fulbright grantees and private U.S. citizens.
  • Family members of private U.S. citizens, to include alien spouses, children, and other bona fide residents of the household.
  • Other individuals the DOD designates eligible.

1-6. Legal, permanent U.S. residents (green card holders) are not entitled to any special assistance unless they fall into one of the above categories. As a rule, if the USG is controlling the evacuation, the priorities
for assistance are as follows:

  • Priority I: U.S. citizens.
  • Priority II: Alien immediate family members of U.S. citizens.
  • Priority III: TCNs and designated foreign-service national employees of the USG.
  • Priority IV: Seriously ill or injured eligible non-U.S. citizens in imminent peril as determined by the DOS (but who do not qualify for a higher priority).
  • Priority V: Other individuals the DOS determines eligible.

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

USArmy-SF-Evacuation

Ex-Capital Chefredakteur Brunowsky entlarvt die STASI-Stalker- und Erpresser-Spekulanten-Methoden der “GoMoPa” am Beispiel WGF

 

Nepper Schlepper Bauernfänger im Internet

Im Internet tummeln sich seit einiger Zeit Finanzportale, in denen anonyme Schreiber manipulative Texte verfassen. Sie richten sich in der Regel gegen kleine, marktenge Börsenwerte und kooperieren mit Anwälten, die vorgeblich Kapitalanleger schützen wollen und für die notwendigen Zitate gut sind.
Das ganze funktioniert so:  Ein kritischer Text in “www.börsennews.de” oder “www.gomopa.net“, anonym oder unter falschem Namen geschrieben, stellt Fragen, ob das Geld der Anleger sicher sei, ohne diese Frage zu beantworten. Der Schreiber sendet diesen Text anonym an Medien wie das Handelsblatt oder FTD. Ein kooperierender Anwalt spricht dann vielsagend von Gefahren für den Anleger. Die Anleger reagieren natürlich  verunsichert, der Kurs stürzt ab. Leerverkäufer – wahrscheinlich aus dem Umfeld des Trios Finanzportal, Finanjournalist und Anwalt – haben sich rechtzeitig eingedeckt und sahnen einen kräftigen Gewinn ab.

Die größeren Medien sehen angesichts der Kursverluste nun ebenfalls das Unternehmen in Gefahr, berichten darüber und verunsichern die Anleger zusätzlich. Vom Finanzportal “gomopa.net” ist bekannt, dass es anschließend den Betroffenen einen PR-Beratungsvertrag aufdrücken wollte, den diese dann als “Erpressung” ablehnten, wie die Süddeutsche Zeitung am 3.9.2010 berichtete. Auch das  Handelsblatt hat im April vor einiger Zeit über einen ähnlichen Fall berichtet.
Ich erlebe diese Methoden gerade bei einer ähnlichen Kampagne gegen meinen Mandanten WGF AG. Die WGF AG handelt mit Immobilien, entwickelt großartige Projekte und refinanziert sich mit Hypothekenanleihen. Am 15.11. wurde pünktlich die zweite mit 6,35% verzinste  Hypothekenanleihe im Volumen von 30 Millionen Euro entgegen diversen Unkenrufen pünktlich und vollständig zurückgezahlt.
Im Juli war ein Text unter falschem Namen im Finanzportal “Börsennews” mit Zitaten eines Anwalts erschienen, den der Autor weiteren Medien zuspielte. Unmittelbar darauf stürzten die Kurse mehrere Anleihen von 100 auf teilweise bis zu 60 Prozent. Die Kurse erholten sich dann zwar wieder um 10 bis 15 Prozentpunkte, aber nicht so, dass Raum für die Platzierung neuer Anleihen mit einem Ausgabekurs von 100 blieb. Die WGF war dennoch in der Lage, aus dem gut laufenden operativen Geschäft heraus die Rückzahlung der zweiten Anleihe sicher zu stellen. Anfang der Woche, am Tag nach der Rückzahlung erschien wieder ein anonymer Artikel in “gomopa.net”. So geht die Kampagne weiter.
Selbstverständlich müssen alle Geschäftsmodelle kritisch hinterfragt werden. Unternehmen machen Fehler und müssen diese Fehler auch beheben. Es kann aber nicht sein, dass gewissenlose Leute im Internet ihr Unwesen treiben und ganze Unternehmen attackieren, um damit Geld zu verdienen: Der Anwalt, der dazu beiträgt, Unternehmen zu gefährden, um anschließend Klienten für seinen sogenannten Kapitalanlegerschutz zu generieren, ist genauso hinterhältig wie der Journalist, der sich nicht zu seinen Texten bekennt und anonym oder unter falschem Namen schreibt, um an Kursspekulationen mitzuverdienen.

SECRET – Criminal Bombers Use Curiosity and Greed to Lure Victims

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ATF-CriminalBombers.png

 

(U) Some criminal bombers exploited their victims’ sense of greed or general curiosity by hiding improvised explosive devices (IEDs) inside common everyday items and leaving them as discarded merchandise to be found by the victim. Victims then perceived these situations as an unexpected opportunity to obtain an object of value with no associated cost. The devices utilized victim-operated switches rather than command or time switches. While a seemingly discarded working tool or item could be considered an enticement in itself, the lack of a written note or similar enticement distinguished these bombing incidents from other IEDs that utilized written messages to bait the victim. Recent bombing incidents in Phoenix and Glendale, Arizona, might be another example of this tactic.

Scope

(U) The United States Bomb Data Center (USBDC) prepared the following assessment to provide information and analysis regarding criminal bombers using victim-operated IEDs (VOIEDs) hidden in seemingly discarded tools and other items to target victims with an inclination to take these items for their own. This assessment highlights three bombing investigations where criminal bombers utilized this tactic with multiple devices. In order to protect the ongoing investigation into the three bombings in Phoenix and Glendale, Arizona, no specific details about these IEDs will be provided other than those already published by other agencies. A query of the Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS) database identified appropriate cases that utilized these types of devices. Further information on these investigations originated from ATF investigation reports and laboratory reports. All of the incidents originated from the United States, but the assessment could apply to similar cases in other countries.

Key Findings

• (U) Criminal bombers exploited their victims’ propensity for greed and general curiosity by concealing IEDs inside common everyday items and leaving them where they could be easily found.
• (U) The IEDs in these cases utilized victim-operated switches to function the devices.
• (U) Each of the highlighted bombings lacked a written note as a means of enticement, possibly because the bombers knew that the victims would take the item based on its perceived intrinsic value without any need to further manipulate the victim with a written enticement.
• The target selection for these bombings was a mixture of random victims or an attack against a victim due to a personal vendetta.

(U) Some criminal bombers exploited their victims’ sense of greed or general curiosity by hiding improvised explosive devices (IEDs) inside common everyday items and leaving them as discarded merchandise to be found by the victim. Examples of these tools included electric razors, electric drills, flashlights, and a toolbox. The victims found these items and took them under the belief that the tools were merely discarded but still useable. The bombers used victim-operated switches to function the devices rather than a command switch or a time switch. Using a victim-operated switch avoided premature explosions or having the device initiate when the victim was not in close proximity to the device. Moreover, the bombers in these cases did not use a written enticement to lure the victim into handling the item. Without the enticement, these bombing incidents were differentiated from other bombing incidents with victim-operated switches that used an enticement such as a note, gift wrapping, letter or package or some other method to compel the victim to handle the item and function the IED.

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE

ATF-CriminalBombers

Letter of Introduction – Full Hollywood Movie – Adolphe Menjou

An aging actor,trying to make a comeback on Broadway,is surprised when his estranged daughter shows up..It seems that she is an actress and is also trying to make it on Broadway..Adolphe Menjou,Andrea Leeds,Edgar Bergen,Ann Sheridan..

Secrecy News – SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE MOVES TO AMEND FISA AMENDMENTS ACT

The Obama Administration proposal to renew the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act for another five years would be
amended to a three year extension, if the Senate Judiciary Committee has
its way.

Last June, the Senate Intelligence Committee approved -- without amendment
-- the Administration's request for a five year renewal of the intelligence
surveillance authorities of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) that are due to
expire at the end of this year.  Shortly thereafter, the Senate Judiciary
Committee asked that the measure be referred for its consideration as well.

Last week, the Judiciary Committee reported its version of the bill and,
unlike the Intelligence Committee, it insisted on amending the
Administration proposal, over the opposition of Republican members of the
Committee.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_rpt/faa-sjc.html

The amended version of the bill would not curtail the scope of existing
surveillance authorities.

However, the Committee amendment would extend those authorities until
2015, rather than 2017 as the Administration asked.  It would further
require the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community "to conduct a
comprehensive review of the implementation of the FISA Amendments Act, with
particular regard to the protection of the privacy rights of United States
persons."  The Inspector General would also be required to publicly release
an unclassified summary of the review. A similar proposal offered by
Senators Wyden and Udall was rejected by the Senate Intelligence Committee.

These modest amendments to the Administration proposal are necessary and
appropriate, the Judiciary Committee said in its new report on the bill.

"The alternative of a five-year extension [...] without any additional
oversight or accountability requirements, and without the benefit of the
complete work of the inspectors general, is ill-advised and inconsistent
with this Committee's constitutional responsibility to provide vigorous and
effective oversight."

All Republican members of the Committee voted against the amended bill and
urged that the Obama Administration's position be adopted by Congress.

"Our oversight of the statute has found no evidence that it has been
intentionally misused or that more oversight is needed," the Republicans
wrote in a minority statement appended to the report.  "The combination of
the statutory limitations on collection, targeting and minimization
procedures and guidelines, and compliance oversight by the Administration
and Congress, ensure that the rights of U.S. persons are sufficiently
protected when their communications are incidentally collected in the
course of targeting non-U.S. persons located abroad."

Yet such oversight has failed in the past, the Committee report noted.  In
its narrative account of the background to the bill, the Committee majority
recalled that the post-9/11 surveillance program began outside the
framework of the law and without proper congressional notification or
approval.

"This warrantless surveillance was conducted outside the scope of FISA,
without any approval by the FISA court, and without the full knowledge or
consent of Congress," the Committee report noted.  "The public first became
aware of the existence of this warrantless surveillance program in December
2005 through a report in the New York Times."

Although the Judiciary Committee bill, as amended, is inconsistent with
the version reported out of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the report
noted that the amended bill was supported by Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the
chair of the Intelligence Committee, which should presumably increase the
likelihood of its approval by the full Senate.  If approved, the amended
bill would then have to be reconciled with the "clean," unamended extension
that was approved by the House.

DNI ISSUES DIRECTIVE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY

The Director of National Intelligence "is committed to protecting civil
liberties and privacy, which are foundational principles of our Nation's
democratic society, preserved in the Constitution of the United States, and
guaranteed in Federal law."

So states a new Intelligence Community Directive on Civil Liberties and
Privacy, signed by DNI James R. Clapper on August 31, 2012.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-107.pdf

Beyond affirming the value of civil liberties, the new directive -- ICD
107 -- also directs the establishment of oversight mechanisms and of
procedures for redress of alleged violations.

The DNI directive does not include definitions of privacy or civil
liberties, and its practical meaning is somewhat elusive.

"Intelligence activities shall be conducted in a manner that protects
civil liberties and privacy," the directive states.  But that seemingly
categorical statement is rendered ambiguous by the very next sentence.

"The IC shall protect civil liberties and privacy in a manner that enables
proper intelligence integration and information sharing and safeguarding."

DNI DIRECTIVE PROMOTES USE OF "TEARLINE" DOCUMENTS

In order to promote improved information sharing, the Director of National
Intellingence told agencies to make use of "tearlines." This refers to the
practice of segregating and withholding the most sensitive portions of a
document, allowing the remainder to be "torn off," literally or
figuratively, and widely disseminated.

"Tearlines are portions of an intelligence report or product that provide
the substance of a more highly classified or controlled report without
identifying sensitive sources, methods, or other operational information,"
a new DNI directive states. "Tearlines release classified intelligence
information with less restrictive dissemination controls, and, when
possible, at a lower classification."

"Tearlines shall be written for the broadest possible readership in
accordance with established information sharing policies, and requirements
in law and policy to protect intelligence sources and methods."

See "Tearline Production and Dissemination," Intelligence Community
Directive 209, September 6, 2012:

        http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-209.pdf

In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress
mandated that "the President shall... issue guidelines... to ensure that
information is provided in its most shareable form, such as by using
tearlines to separate out data from the sources and methods by which the
data are obtained" (section 1016(d)(1)).

Although the tearline approach also lends itself to public dissemination
of national security documents, with particularly material removed, the new
intelligence directive does not explicitly extend to sharing information
with the public.

REAGAN DIRECTIVE ON "PRE-EMPTIVE NEUTRALIZATION" OF TERRORISTS

In 1984, President Reagan ordered the Director of Central Intelligence to
develop "capabilities for the pre-emptive neutralization of anti-American
terrorist groups which plan, support, or conduct hostile terrorist acts
against U.S. citizens, interests, and property overseas."

The President further ordered the DCI to "develop a clandestine service
capability, using all lawful means, for effective response overseas against
terrorist acts commmitted against U.S. citizens, facilities, or interests."

Those instructions were contained in National Security Decision Directive
138, "Combatting Terrorism," which was issued on April 3, 1984.

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-138.pdf

A few weeks earlier, Hezbollah forces in Lebanon had kidnapped William
Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut.

NSDD 138 remained classified for many years and was not fully declassified
until two years into the Obama Administration.

TOP-SECRET-FBI Going Dark: Law Enforcement Problems in Lawful Surveillance

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/FBI-GoingDark.png

 

(U//LES) ‘Going Dark’ is a Law Enforcement (LE) initiative to address the gap between the legal authority and practical ability of LE to conduct lawfully-authorized electronic surveillance. Problems highlighted by the Going Dark initiative include LE’s difficulty in receiving information from some technology companies, and criminal’s use of advanced technologies and techniques that can complicate carrying out of lawfully-authorized court orders to conduct electronic surveillance.

(U) This Situational Information Report (SIR) is being provided to state and local Law Enforcement Officers (LEO) in response to questions asked about the Going Dark initiative. The intent of this document is to explain basic information on the initiative and a small sampling of the technologies and techniques that may pose problems during lawfully-authorized electronic surveillance. This product reflects the views of FBI Albany on problems state and local LE may encounter and has not been vetted by FBI Headquarters.

(U) There are many sophisticated technologies and techniques that can complicate lawfully-authorized electronic surveillance. Additionally, it is possible to use these technologies and techniques in tandem, for instance, a criminal may encrypt their web traffic and use a proxy server to hide their location.

(U) Compliance Issues

(U//LES) LE’s ability to monitor sophisticated technologies is complicated by the companies that sell the technologies. Some companies are unable to comply with LE requests for lawful intercepts due to a lack of knowledge regarding LE authority, a belief that they are not subject to the laws providing LE intercept authority, or a lack of technical capability to provide the requested information. Due to the Internet and the ease with which consumers are able to purchase/use items from around the world, other companies are sometimes located outside the United States and not subject to US electronic surveillance legislation. Additionally, some companies simply do not keep the documentation necessary to comply with legal requests, either because they are not aware of the requirements or because they purposely seek to protect privacy or impede LE activities.

(U) Hiding Data

(U//LES) Encryption is one of the most common techniques and it is extremely difficult for LE to decrypt information without cooperation. Encryption is the process of applying an algorithm to a set of data that alters the data into an unrecognizable format. Only users with the decryption keys are able to decrypt the data. Through the use of hardware and software-based encryption, consumers are able to use encryption to secure individual files, hard drives, removable media (CDs, USB sticks, etc.), e-mails, instant messages, text messages and even phone calls. Encryption can be achieved through a wide variety of software and smartphone applications, that are typically user friendly. LE may be able to decrypt some data without cooperation due to poor user practices, including notes and e-mails containing passwords, and decryption keys contained in computer memory (RAM); however, frequently LE receives encrypted data, but has no way to decrypt it.

(U//LES) Steganography is a tool that physically embeds a set of data within another set of data. Methods exist to embed data inside of digital images and may allow for steganography to be applied to streamed content, like videos, music, and phone calls. The existence of the embedded data is invisible to a user unless the LEO has special training in what indicators to look for, and even if LE knows about the data, it may be impossible to retrieve the embedded data.

(U//LES) Some Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services encrypt voice traffic. The use of these technologies means that criminals carry on phone conversations that LE has difficulty intercepting, and even if the calls are intercepted, LE some data may be encrypted and unable to be analyzed.

(U) Hiding Originator Information

(U//LES) When encryption and steganography is deployed, LE can determine who the sender and receiver is, however, there are technologies and techniques that prevent LE from determining who sent and/or received the information. A Proxy server is an intermediary for another computer to connect to the Internet. Typically, the destination computer only sees that the request came from the proxy server and does not know who originated the request. To find both the destination and originator information, LE must identify and work with the proxy server owner, who could be in another country, and are frequently unwilling to cooperate with LE requests. Proxy servers may or may not keep log files that can aid Law Enforcement in determining where the traffic originated. The Onion Router (Tor) is a sophisticated network of proxy servers that allow Internet users to route their traffic through multiple intermediaries (Tor nodes), completely masking the originating computer. Tor is specifically designed so that no single computer in the chain knows both the destination and origination information, and the Tor network is comprised of multiple home and business users throughout the world, making it almost impossible to find the originating and/or destination computer.

(U//LES) While not always considered Going Dark issues, the following are worth mentioning due to their use in recent local cases and the difficulties they caused investigators.

(U//LES) Anonymous remailers prevent the identification of an e-mail writer, allowing the writer to send an e-mail without any originating information. The program accepts the properly formatted e-mail and forwards it to the recipient without any information about the sender. Some remailers will forward the e-mail at a random date and time, up to seven days after the writer hits “send” to prevent anyone from using the date-time stamp to identify the sender. Many of these services do not keep log files, which can make it impossible to trace the e-mail back to the sender.

(U//LES) Communication companies offer phone number spoofing and voice changing services, which allow callers to mask their identities. When a phone number spoofer is used, the application/service hides the number of the caller and provides false caller identification information. Some applications allow the caller to choose what number they want displayed, which makes it easy to impersonate another person or company.

(U//LES) FBI Albany is interested in information regarding criminal use of sophisticated tradecraft to counter LE activity.

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

FBI-GoingDark

SI Swimsuit – Models in the Philippines – Video

Travel to the Philippines along with the Sports Illustated 2011 Swimsuit cover model, Irina Shayk and other gorgeous 2011 Sports Illustrated Swimsuit models.
Check out more exclusive videos and photos at http://www.si.com/swimsuit

The FBI – Couple Pleads Guilty to Operating Gambling Business and Structuring Over $100,000

HONOLULU—Lloyd Robert Marshall, age 67, and Nitta Mitsuko Marshall, age 65, former Waianae residents, today pled guilty before United States Magistrate Judge Barry M. Kurren to conspiracy to conduct, operate, finance, supervise, and direct an illegal gambling business involving cockfighting, dice tables, and card games at their Puuhulu Road property in Waianae. The Marshalls also entered guilty pleas to 13 counts of structuring over $132,000 in proceeds during a one-year period from the illegal gambling business to evade certain regulations relating to currency transactions. Under federal law, a Currency Transaction Report must be filed by a financial institution with the Internal Revenue Service in regard to any currency transaction over $10,000. It is illegal to structure transactions with financial institutions in order to avoid this filing requirement.

Florence T. Nakakuni, United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, said that the Marshalls also agreed to forfeit $170,578.75 in cash, representing gambling proceeds which were seized on July 2, 2011, during a search warrant executed on their property, and their interest in real property used as the venue for the illegal gambling activities. According to documents filed in connection with the case, from approximately 2009 to July 2011, the Marshalls agreed to use their property as a site of illegal cockfighting contests and dice and card games. Police observed from 100 to 600 people at these “derbies.” People attending the games paid parking and entrance fees.

The defendants face maximum penalties of five years’ imprisonment for the gambling charges and 10 years’ imprisonment for each of the structuring counts, along with fines totaling up to $250,000 and $500,000 respectively, when they are sentenced on January 28, 2013, before Chief United States District Judge Susan Oki Mollway.

The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations, and the Honolulu Police Department. Assistant United States Attorney Beverly Wee Sameshima is handling the prosecution.

Cryptome unveals – Iran Information Control

Iran Information Control

http://www.blockediniran.com/

Our friends have initiated this service to help reporters and investigators examine if a www source is blocked in Iran. We will release dox regarding a company named “DELTA-GLOBAL” that is the major player in Iranian Cyberspace censorship next week. Revelations will show who are these people and how they got into this business in the first place and how much of money is being moved by such activities that do not even work properly as Iranian authorities want due to corruption, stupidity and ignorance. Hail to all Iran-ops Anonz. expect us 🙂

 


http://fa.irannuc.ir/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2877:%DA%AF%D8%B2%
D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D9%88%DB%8C%DA%98%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%B4%D8%
AA-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%
D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%
A8%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88-%DA%86%
D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%9F&catid=102:%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%
88%D8%B9%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%81%D9%86%
DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82%DB%8C&Itemid=508

“IranNuc.ir” is an institution close to MOIS, the Iranian intelligence. Content authors whose names are sometimes published and open are current or former members of MOIS according to our OSINT. The page comments on Iranian Nuclear Chief’s revelations of “Sabotage” operation on Power Cables going to Fordo enrichment facility just a couple of hours before IAEA inspectors “Suddenly” asked Iran for an inspection on Fordo. Several press including BBC (Iranian intelligence translates BBC to MI6) and a bunch of Israeli news agencies published information from unknown source that the recent explosion near Fordo was the result of regular investigations by military guards in the area when a “Fake rock-looking Spy Device” been found or touched by them therefore it went into self-destruct mode and made the explosion. These Press, based on similar incidents on Lebanon or based on the insights of their unknown source concluded that it was a Mossad op.

Now after Dr. Abbasi’s speech at Vienna and the above mentioned rumors, IranNuc.ir says “Security” sources who are “informed” have told them that the high power cables of Fordo have been blown up using a hand-made explosive and it was rather a simple attack that was handled properly without incidents inside Fordo, which is confirmed by IAEA. Although we have always observed Iran’s willingness to blame foreign services for stuff (no matter true or false), recently two operations have surfaced including the one discussed in this message and another explosion this year at Bigeneh, IRGC’s famous missile center that have been dealt with differently. In both cases Iran reacts immediately and call bullshit on the opposite, offering scenarios like accidents or simple hand-made attacks.

People familiar with intense Security close to physical locations of sensitivity inside Iran tell us this is a childish “Media Handling” by military or intelligence elements who do not have slightest idea how Media works. We conclude that such operations are not simple or “hand-made” scale. Adding it to our background on Iran’s complicated political infrastructure and total Darkness nature of intelligence ops of Iran, there is strong possibility of wide inside infight between powerful components in addition to small scale cooperations with foreign services to grab more power. We have seen similar scene in Iran around 10 years ago when reformists versus conservatives war was hard and real, same as it is between different types of conservatives who reach for next Presidential election.

 


 


 

 

 


 

Simon Wiesenthal Center publishes Iran Targets Israel: The Fateful Confrontation

Yesterday, on Yom Kippurthe holiest day for world Jewry, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, stood before the nations of the world as a respected speaker at the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

Not since ancient times—when Queen Esther foiled Haman’s genocidal designs—has a threat this serious to the future of our people emanated from that land.

And it is not just about nuclear weapons.
Long before the current nuclear crisis, Tehran’s blood feud against Israel, her people and her Judaic traditions were a centerpiece of the mullahtocracy ever since the Ayatollah Khomeini seized power.

In his new Simon Wiesenthal Center report,Iran Targets Israel: The Fateful Confrontation, historian Dr. Harold Brackman outlines the multifaceted scope of the Iranian regime’s existential hatred for the Jewish State.

In the report, you will learn about the:

• Evolution of Holocaust Denial and Jew hatred as the cornerstone of Iranian statecraft
• Ayatollah Khomeini’s overthrow of the Shah four decades ago
• Iran’s terror network stretching from Syria and Lebanon to North Korea to Argentina and now in Venezuela
• The current Iranian nuclear threat

Iran Targets Israel: The Fateful Confrontation indicates that there are no easy answers posed by the Iranian regime’s bombast and threatsThe only certainty is that to do nothing—retreating into wishful thinking and anti-Israel scapegoating, will produce unspeakable catastrophic results for the Jewish state and all countries in the Middle East and beyond.

 

Ahmadinejad: “Israel will be eliminated”  – United Nations,  September 2012

“Iranian President Ahmadinejad should not be speaking from a podium at the UN General Assembly. Instead, he should be in the dock of the International Court of Justice in the Hague for planning and inciting the destruction of Israel, a UN member state in good standing, and genocide against the Israeli people,”

Dr. Harold Brackman, author of Iran Target Israel: The Fateful Confrontation

DOWNLOAD THE REPORT HERE:

IRAN-TARGETS-ISRAEL_THE FATEFUL-CONFRONTATION

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2012 Indefinite Detention Permanent Injunction

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NDAA-PermanentInjunction.png

 

KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge:

On May 16, 2012, this Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of § 1021(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (Dec. 31, 2011)(“the NDAA”). See Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331, 2012 WL 1721124 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012) (order granting preliminary injunction) (the “May 16 Opinion”). On June 6, 2012, in response to a footnote contained in the Government’s motion for reconsideration suggesting an unduly narrow interpretation of that ruling, this Court issued a summary order stating that the injunction was intended to–and did apply to–any and all enforcement of § 1021(b)(2), not simply to plaintiffs in this lawsuit.

On August 7, 2012, the Court held oral argument on the request for a permanent injunction (the “August hearing”). At the commencement of that argument, the Court confirmed that the parties agreed that the evidentiary record developed at the March 29, 2012, preliminary injunction hearing (the “March hearing”) would constitute the trial record for this matter. Hr’g Tr. of Oral Argument on Permanent Inj., Aug. 7, 2012 (Dkt. See Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331, 2012 WL 2044565, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012) (summary order). On June 8, 2012, the parties agreed that neither side would seek to add to the evidentiary record presented in support of the preliminary injunction and that they would proceed directly to a hearing on plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction. (See Order (June 8, 2012) (Dkt. No. 43) at 1.) Accordingly, the parties submitted additional legal memoranda but no additional factual materials.

On August 7, 2012, the Court held oral argument on the request for a permanent injunction (the “August hearing”). At the commencement of that argument, the Court confirmed that the parties agreed that the evidentiary record developed at the March 29, 2012, preliminary injunction hearing (the “March hearing”) would constitute the trial record for this matter. Hr’g Tr. of Oral Argument on Permanent Inj., Aug. 7, 2012 (Dkt. No. 59) (“Tr. II”) at 3. The Court bases its findings of fact on that record.

For the reasons set forth below, this Court grants plaintiffs’ motion and permanently enjoins enforcement of § 1021(b)(2) of the NDAA (referred to herein as “§ 1021(b)(2)”).

The balance of the hardships also clearly weighs in plaintiffs’ favor. The Government already has ample authorization to pursue those actually involved in the attacks on September 11, 2001, and it has a host of criminal statutes (referred to above) that it can use to prosecute those who engage in a variety of activities that endanger lives or constitute terrorism. According to the Government, § 1021 is merely a reaffirmation of the AUMF–a position with which the Court disagrees. If, however, the Government is taken at its word, then enjoining its ability to enforce § 1021(b)(2) removes no tools from the Government’s arsenal. Most importantly, since Congress may pass no law abridging rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, enjoining enforcement of a statute that does just that cannot deprive Congress or the executive branch of that which they have no right to have.

The last element relates to the weighing of the public interest: does the public have a greater interest in preservation of its First Amendment and due process rights that are infringed by § 1021(b)(2), or in having the statute potentially available for use by law enforcement authorities? Here too, the fact that, according to the Government, § 1021(b)(2) adds nothing new to their authority, is decisive. Enjoining the statute will therefore not endanger the public. The Government did not put forward any evidence at trial that it needed the statute for law enforcement efforts; in contrast, plaintiffs did present evidence that First Amendment rights have already been harmed and will be harmed by the prospect of § 1021(b)(2) being enforced. The public has a strong and undoubted interest in the clear preservation of First and Fifth Amendment rights.

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

NDAA-PermanentInjunction

Der Beweis – So wollte “Klaus Maurischat”, “GoMoPa” , mich erpressen

Unser Bildtext: Klaus Maurischat: There is no Place like home

So wollte der Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat uns zwingen die Berichterstattung über den “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa” einzustellen

Meine Anmerkung:  Sie lesen

den Original-Text mit den Original-Rechtschreibfehlern von Maurischat  in chronologischer Reihenfolge von unten nach oben. “Unter den Linden” ist die Regus-Tarnadresse für den untergetauchten Serienbetrüger und Stasi-Ganoven. “SUMA” steht im Sprach-Jargon des “GoMoPa”-“NACHRICHTENDIENSTLERS” für Suchmaschine. Es ist damit in einer Linie mit den Silben der STASI als Abkürzung für lange Wörter wie

– STASI

– GoMoPa

– KoKo

– Noha

– Mitropa

Zitat:

HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)

> Was anderes fällt einem Hilfsschüler auch nicht ein! Wenn ich dich
> schnappe, dann haue ich dir die Fresse ein – mein Lieber! Merk dir
> das gut, du Kinderficker!
>
> Was sagt denn dein Freund Dr. XXX  zu deinem handeln, Schwuchtel?
>
> > HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)
> >
> > > Geiles Google Suchergebniss hast du mittlerweile. Das ist sowas von
> > > geil. Am besten ist dieser Beitrag zu Deiner Magisterarbeit, du
> > > Spinner:
> > >
> > > http://scheisshausfliege.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/die-diplomarbeit-des-magisters-bernd-pulch-ein-haufen-scheisse/
> > >
> > > Wenn du nicht aufhörst, wird niemand mehr ein Stück Brot von dir
> > > nehmen. Dein Name ist dan absolut durch. Glaub mir, wir verstehen da
> > > mehr von als du Schwachkopf!
> > >
> > > Im Übrigen kannst du mich stets gern persönlich treffen. Unter den
> > > Linden 21, Berlin –  habe immer für dich Feigling Zeit! (TARN-ADRESSE)
> > >
> > > So – und nun überle wann du die Artikel über uns löschen willst,
> > > sonst mache ich die erste Seite der SUMA Ergebnisse mit deinen
> > > Einträgen voll.

Secret Agent – Full Movie

After three British agents are assigned to assassinate a mysterious German spy during World War 1, two of them become ambivalent when their duty to the mission conflicts with their consciences…Directed by Alfred Hitchcock..stars John Geilgud,Madeleine Caroll,Robert Young

The FBI – Undercover Women Agents

silhouette of woman

Celebrating Women Special Agents
Part 6: Working Undercover

09/21/2012

They’ve played the part of everyone from a college student to a CEO…created and run entire fictitious companies…attended motorcycle gang weddings…even been “arrested” for the good of the cause.

In the four decades since women have served as FBI agents, they’ve taken on one of the most difficult—yet vitally important—roles in the Bureau: going undercover.

Surveillance image

At a Glance: The FBI’s Undercover Program

ABSCAMDonnie Brasco/Organize CrimeOperation GreylordPizza ConnectionTennessee Waltz.

These well-known and highly successful undercover operations received a great deal of attention—and scrutiny—in their day, but in the end, each of them resulted in numerous convictions and a wealth of intelligence on how criminal enterprises operated.

The use of undercover operations continues to be an essential part of detecting, preventing, and prosecuting crime—allowing us to penetrate the veil of secrecy that surrounds criminal groups engaging in financial crime, public corruption, organized crime, cyber crime, and other illegal activity. Undercover operations are used very effectively in national security investigations as well.

All of our undercover operations are conducted in strict accordance with FBI and Department of Justice administrative and operational policies and guidelines. We’re also subject to congressional oversight.

In order to identify individuals with the ability to perform safely and effectively in an undercover capacity, agents interested in the undercover program must first undergo an exhaustive assessment and certification process—which includes an intensive training curriculum—before being selected.

Our early female pioneers had a lot of fascinating stories to tell about this work—how dangerous it was, how they gained the trust of criminals, how they used their specialized language and other skills.

Recently, we talked with three current female agents about their undercover experiences. Despite the challenges of the job, all are passionate about their work and believe that women bring unique perspectives that enhance their effectiveness on the job.

Because of obvious sensitivities, we’re keeping the identities of these agents confidential.

Q. What types of cases have you been involved in, and what types of roles have you played?

Agent #2: “I’ve worked cases involving outlaw motorcycle gangs, espionage, and public corruption, among others. I’ve had roles where I was the primary undercover, the secondary undercover, and even had cameo undercover appearances in other undercover operations.”

Agent #3: “A variety of cases and roles…for instance, in health care fraud, a patient seeking prescription medicine; in mortgage fraud, a wealthy investor; in public corruption, a CEO; and in organized crime, a business woman in one case and a girlfriend to a male undercover agent in another.”

Q. What qualities do you think undercover agents need to be successful?

Agent #1: “I think the FBI needs a variety of people with different qualities for undercover work…a loner would be a great fit for some cases, while a gregarious, outgoing person would be perfect for another.”

‘You Can’t Miss a Beat’

A retired special agent who spent years undercover in the late 70s and early 80s reflects on her work. Play Video

Agent #3: “Both life and job experiences contribute to being a successful undercover agent—being a team player, having a good work ethic and a sense of humor, staying flexible, and exercising good judgment and common sense. I also think that the many roles we play in real life—wife, mother, girlfriend, etc.—help us get close to our subjects.”

Q. Have the criminals in your investigations ever said anything after they learned who you really were?

Agent #1: “Yes. Many times, criminals offer us up (as crooked colleagues) when they’re trying to cooperate in post-arrest interviews. It’s pretty interesting to see how convinced they are that we’re really criminals, too!”

Agent #2: “I think the words that sum it up best are, ‘No way, I don’t believe it!’ That makes me feel like I’ve done my job well.”

What’s your most memorable experience while serving undercover?

Agent #1: “It’s difficult to pick one. I’ve listened to domestic extremists talk about how corrupt the U.S. is; pretended to befriend a dirty drug-dealing cop; been arrested and jailed (twice!); attended high-end poker games; and paid kickbacks to corrupt doctors.”

Agent #2: “During a health care fraud case, a target doctor was showing me around his office and offered me free Botox injections in my forehead. I didn’t want to make him suspicious, so I got the injections. I had to do a lot of paperwork explaining that one!”

“These women, and others like them,” says the agent who currently oversees the Bureau’s Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit, “are a huge asset…many past and ongoing undercover operations owe their successes to the unique perspectives, expertise, and diversity female undercover personnel regularly provide in this elite and demanding area.

Unveiled by Cryptome – InfoSecurity and Privacy Advisory Board Meet

Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board Meet

 


http://www.ofr.gov/OFRUpload/OFRData/2012-23608_PI.pdf

[FR Doc. 2012-23608 Filed 09/24/2012 at 8:45 am; Publication Date: 09/25/2012]

Billing Code 3510-13

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Announcing an Open Meeting of the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Commerce

ACTION: Notice

SUMMARY: The Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) will meet Wednesday, October 10, 2012, from 8:00 A.M. until 5:00 P.M. Eastern Time, Thursday, October 11, 2012, from 8:00 A.M. until 5:00 P.M. Eastern Time, and Friday, October 12, 2012, from 8:00 A.M. until 12:00 P.M. Eastern Time. All sessions will be open to the public.

DATES: The meeting will be held on Wednesday, October 10, 2012, from 8:00 A.M. until

5:00 P.M. Eastern Time, Thursday, October 11, 2012, from 8:00 A.M. until 5:00 P.M. Eastern Time, and Friday, October 12, 2012, from 8:00 A.M. until 12:00 P.M. Eastern Time.

ADDRESS: The meeting will take place at the Courtyard Washington Embassy Row, General Scott Room, 1600 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC, 20036.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Annie Sokol, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930, telephone: (301) 975-2006, or by email at: annie.sokol@nist.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. App., notice is hereby given that the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) will meet Wednesday, October 10, 2012, from 8:00 A.M. until 5:00 P.M. Eastern Time, Thursday, October 11, 2012, from 8:00 A.M. until 5:00 P.M. Eastern Time, and Friday, October 12, 2012, from 8:00 A.M. until 12:00 P.M. Eastern Time. All sessions will be open to the public. The ISPAB is authorized by 15 U.S.C. 278g-4, as amended, and advises the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of NIST on security and privacy issues pertaining to federal computer systems. Details regarding the ISPAB’s activities are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/index.html

The agenda is expected to include the following items:

– Presentation relating to SP 800-53 Revision 4,- Panel discussion with members of the Office of Inspector General relating to NIST guidelines to advance security,

– Panel discussion on the latest development of FedRAMP,

– Panel discussion/updates on privacy and security risks for medical devices and the Government Accountability Office (GAO),

– Presentation on healthcare information technology security,

– Cybersecurity Updates from Director of Cybersecurity, White House,

– Presentation on Security, Privacy and Information Sharing,

– Discussion/presentation on information sharing, cyber and communications across federal agencies with the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC, DHS) Director,

– Presentation/Discussion on Radios used by federal civilian agencies, and

– Update of NIST Computer Security Division.

Note that agenda items may change without notice because of possible unexpected schedule conflicts of presenters. The final agenda will be posted on the Web site indicated above.

Seating will be available for the public and media. No registration is required to attend this meeting.

Public Participation: The ISPAB agenda will include a period of time, not to exceed thirty minutes, for oral comments from the public (Friday, October 12, 2012, between 10:00 A.M. and 10:30 A.M.). Speakers will be selected on a first-come, first-served basis. Each speaker will be limited to five minutes. Questions from the public will not be considered during this period. Members of the public who are interested in speaking are requested to contact Annie Sokol at the contact information indicated in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this notice.

Speakers who wish to expand upon their oral statements, those who had wished to speak but could not be accommodated on the agenda, and those who were unable to attend in person are invited to submit written statements. In addition, written statements are invited and may be submitted to the ISPAB at any time. All written statements should be directed to the ISPAB Secretariat, Information Technology Laboratory, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930.

Dated: September 19, 2012

Willie E. May Associate Director for Laboratory Programs

[FR Doc. 2012-23608 Filed 09/24/2012 at 8:45 am; Publication Date: 09/25/2012]

 



 

 

 


	

Public Intelligence – Confidential -Restricted U.S. Army Drills

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/USArmy-CBRN-DomesticDrills.png

 

This drill book provides platoon, squad, and team leaders with standardized drills that are designed for use by trainers at the platoon and squad level. Standardized drills are essential to the success of platoon leaders, trainers, and small-unit leaders. These drills provide the performance measures, standards, and sequential procedures that will help guide the unit through training tasks for which doctrine is just now being developed. Chemical Corps platoons and squads must be able to perform these drills quickly, effectively, and to standard at all times.

The target audience for this drill book is Chemical Corps squads and platoons who have been assigned the additional chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) domestic support mission.

3-2. Crew Drill 03-3-DC101.

TASK: Prepare for Domestic Response Casualty Decontamination (DRCD) Operations

CONDITIONS (CUE): Terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are threatened or have occurred. The unit has received an order to alert, recall, and assemble in support of a DRCD mission. The DRCD equipment has been issued and preloaded into shipping containers. The unit receives the order to prepare for the DRCD operations.

STANDARDS: Each crew member conducts preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on the equipment and vehicles according to the operator’s manual. The equipment and vehicles are prepared according to the unit standard operating procedure (SOP) and load plan. The vehicles are assembled and prepared for convoy movement.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

NOTE: The medical triage is performed by trained medical personnel and medical support personnel from the local area hospital.

1. The unit establishes medical emergency triage and emergency treatment stations within 30 minutes of receiving the order.

2. Casualties are initially triaged at the medical emergency triage station.

a. Ambulatory casualties are—

(1) Checked for symptoms.
(2) Provided triage tags.
(3) Directed to the log-in station.

b. Nonambulatory casualties are—

(1) Checked for symptoms.
(2) Provided triage tags.
(3) Given initial medical treatment.
(4) Placed on litters.
(5) Transported to the log-in station.

COACHING POINT:

NOTE: The emergency medical triage and medical treatment stations are located in the hot zone. The emergency medical triage station provides an initial assessment of the casualties. The emergency medical treatment station provides treatment to stabilize the casualties prior to initiating the decontamination process. a. Have the unit leaders explain their parts in the drill.

b. Conduct an after-action review (AAR) to identify strengths, shortcomings, and corrective actions.

c. Reinforce that the medical personnel in the emergency treatment area provide lifesaving emergency medical care only. The amount of medical care given at the emergency medical treatment station will be limited to those actions deemed necessary to stabilize the casualty and increase his survivability throughout the rest of the decontamination process.

TASK: Establish a Nonambulatory Clothing Removal Station

CONDITIONS (CUE): Terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are threatened or have occurred. The domestic response casualty decontamination (DRCD) unit is given the mission to establish the nonambulatory clothing removal station.

STANDARDS: Establish the nonambulatory clothing removal station in the hot zone. Equip the station with the proper equipment to remove clothing from the casualty, and equip the contaminated-waste receptacles to receive the contaminated clothing.

TASK: Establish a Domestic Response Casualty Decontamination Shower System

CONDITIONS (CUE): Terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are threatened or have occurred. The platoon is given a complete DRCD shower system. The unit is given the mission to set-up the DRCD shower system.

TASK: Establish a Casualty Contamination Check Station

CONDITIONS (CUE): Terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are threatened or have occurred. Detection and monitoring equipment are on hand. The unit is given the mission to set up the contamination check station.

STANDARDS: The contamination check station is established in the warm zone. Ambulatory and nonambulatory casualties are checked for residual contamination. Casualties with residual contamination are recycled through the casualty shower unit. Casualties with no signs of residual contamination are forwarded to the redress/cover station.

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

USArmy-CBRN-DomesticDrills

Robin Hood – Full Movie – Douglas Fairbanks – Wallace Beery

Amid big-budget medieval pageantry, King Richard goes on the Crusades leaving his brother Prince John as regent, who promptly emerges as a cruel, grasping, treacherous tyrant. Apprised of England’s peril by message from his lady-love Marian.

This quirky animated take on the classic tale of Robin Hood finds Tom spying for the Sherriff of Nottingham and Prince John. When he realizes his employers have foul plans for Maid Marion, he enlists Jerry to help him save Maid Marion and bring the true king back safely.

SECRET-Homegrown Violent Extremists Targeting Law-Enforcement Officers

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NCTC-HVEsTargetingLEOs-790x1024.jpg

 

Authored by: NCTC

Coordinated with: CIA, DHS, DIA, FBI, NSA, State/INR

(U//FOUO) Some homegrown violent extremists (HVE) have targeted US law-enforcement entities and have used publicly available information to counter these entities’ CT tactics and security practices. Law-enforcement entities are being identified by these extremists as both strategic targets and targets of opportunity, mainly because a core element of HVE subculture perceives that persecution by US law enforcement reflects the West’s inherent aggression toward Islam, which reinforces the violent opposition by HVEs to law enforcement.

  • Now-detained HVE Sami Osmakac in Januray 2012 considered an attack on an Air Force base in Tampa, Florida, but, because of security measures on the base, he decided to park a VBIED in front of a local county sheriff’s office operations center. Osmakac subsequently assessed that even that location was too secure and selected softer targets, including local bars and restaurants, according to US District Court documents. Osmakac also expressed interest in firearms, explosives, and a suicide vest, which were intended for use against law-enforcement officers who Osmakac hoped to draw in as they attempted to storm his location once he began to carry out his attack, according to US District Court documents.
  • Emerson Begolly–indicted in 2011 for “soliciting violence” by distributing explosives-related materials on the Internet–assaulted federal agents in 2011 when they attempted to interview Begolly about his activities, according to the Justice Department and Western District of Pennsylvania court documents.
  • Now-detained HVE Reed Berry attempted in 2011 to use his vehicle to assault an FBI agent and a Joint Terrorism Task Force officer who were engaged in surveillance of Berry, according to US District Court for the Western District of Michigan documents conducting surveillance. The agent was able to move his vehicle to avoid a collision, according to the same documents.

(U//FOUO) Successful informant and undercover operations have been crucial to disrupting a number of high-profile HVE plots since 2009. The public disclosure of the law-enforcement operations by the media or openly available court documents, however, could result in an increase in HVE plots focused specifically against law-enforcement officers. The exploitation of public available documents highlighting law-enforcement disruption strategies could enable HVEs to improve their operational security, potentially limiting the effectiveness of future undercover operations.

  • According to open-source indictments, a New York City Police Department Intelligence Division undercover officer played a crucial role in disrupting two New Jersey-based HVEs who attempted to travel to Somalia to engage in violent jihad in 2010.
  • Now-detained HVE Jesse Morton posted a video on Islampolicy.com that accuses the FBI of entrapment and specifically addresses several publicly available indictments of HVEs that highlight the role of FBI undercover informants, including plot developments, weapons access for HVEs, and backgrounds of the informants, as well as tactics that could be used by HVEs, according to open-source information.

This report is provided by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Managing Editor, NCTC Current, (571) 280-6889.

Cryptome – Iran Targets US Bases in the Region

Iran Targets US Bases in the Region

http://rajanews.com/userfiles/flash/mostanad/e17bba6a5442dd2638abe26fbe7b2ea4260871.flv

In this piece of video IRGC’s aerospace force commander makes crucial statement. He is saying we are not going to go to a technical war with our advanced adversary, instead, we have designed specific targeted attacks and scenarios for specific places we would want to hit without hesitation with huge amount of missiles — then the report shows a test attack with mid range and ballistic missiles on a “one-to-one” size “American” base in Kuwait which its specifies obtained by UAVs and “local posts” and explains how the air defense systems will be evaded with simple targeted techniques instead of huge all purpose arsenals.

http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/82934/%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%
B1%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%
BE%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%
87-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%
8C%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%BE%DB%
8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%
A9%D8%A7-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%88-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3

The page contains references to Iranian military official quotes that they will hit U.S navy carriers in case of a war using missiles and UAVs. At the end of the page there is a Video taken by some of these UAVs. They get close to U.S carriers and “identify” the model of air planes it is carrying or the planes that take off including F-16s.

Considering Iran does not have stand-alone Satellites to have a reliable C4ISR for wide area wars, including the type of operations that is being discussed — there are serious questions whether Iran is exploiting U.S. owned satellite communications for its own purposes under cover of commercial or emergency services? U.S. army’s C4ISR is highly dependent on services such as the ones offered by ViaSat or Inmarsat and there is absolutely no other remotely comparable infrastructure. Adding the Iranian attack on lockheed martin’s “Monster” there are debates within Satellite and ISR production engineers whether Iranians are actually using U.S.’s own “wide area ISR model and technologies” in their attacks?

There are hints given to us that BGAN, the 4th generation of Inmarsat infrastructure, that claims military grade security have been exploited several times recently by Hezbollah operative’s in Syria and Russian ISR battleship floating around that same area since many inter-operations between NATO elements and U.S. army is based on BGAN. Public documents are available on Inmarsat’s government services site, last I checked. BGAN services are reported accepted and working — source is a reporter just came back from Tehran’s NAM, she broadcast live Video feed using BGAN. We have experiences with Iran that shows when they cannot control or monitor something, they do their best on jamming and disruptions. They are not even officially shy about it anymore. We believe there might be a serious dark hole in U.S.’s infrastructure and least we can certain about it Hezbollah (=Iran) and Russians have the capabilities to exploit these types of holes.

http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910702001212

“Farsnews” is one of Iran’s semi-official News Agencies that has tight ties with Power elements, including IRGC and MOIS .

The page is reporting IRGC’s aerospace commander, General Hajizadeh, said in an interview tonight “We consider American bases as a part of American Soil, not as a part of Qatar -Bahrain and Afghanistan”. The interview ends with this statement: “we will attack these bases in case of a war, no doubt”.

http://rajanews.com/detail.asp?id=138567

Iranian official says an in interview that starting from tonight up until undetermined time, Google’s services including Gmail will be Filtered in Iran. He added that the decision was made due to huge number of calls people made to remove contents related to recent insults on Prophet Mohammad. Youtube, Twitter, Facebook, Blogspot and wordpress were already Filtered in Iran for a couple of years.



 

Unveiled by PI – U.S. Army Afghanistan Civilian Casualty Prevention Handbook

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The U.S. military has long been committed to upholding the law of armed conflict and minimizing collateral damage. This includes the killing or wounding of noncombatant civilians — described in this handbook as civilian casualties or CIVCAS — as well as damage to facilities, equipment, or other property. Due to several factors, the impact of CIVCAS has increased to the point that single tactical actions can have strategic consequences and limit overall freedom of action. These factors include: the increased transparency of war, where tactical actions can be recorded and transmitted worldwide in real time; increased expectations for the United States’ conduct of war in light of improved precision and overall capabilities; and the enemy exploitation of CIVCAS to undermine U.S. legitimacy and objectives.

Because of these factors, CIVCAS became a key operational issue in Afghanistan beginning in 2005. Despite efforts to reduce civilian harm caused by coalition forces, initial initiatives in Afghanistan1 were not successful in mitigating the issue. Several high-profile CIVCAS events in 2008 and early 2009 highlighted the lack of progress in effectively addressing CIVCAS. The Bala Balouk CIVCAS incident in May 2009 resulted in increased emphasis and focus by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leadership on the reduction of CIVCAS. Since mid-2009, ISAF leadership has consistently and strongly emphasized the importance of reducing CIVCAS, both by modifying procedures and policies and by urging tactical patience when feasible to aid discrimination. The COMISAF continues to stress to currently deployed forces the importance of minimizing CIVCAS, and recently emphasized to ISAF contributing nations how they must better prepare incoming forces to deal with the issue of CIVCAS.

The ISAF has made significant progress in reducing CIVCAS, with a 20 percent reduction in ISAF-caused CIVCAS in 2010 and 2011 compared to 2009. At the same time, CIVCAS reduction and mitigation is a strategic as well as a tactical issue. Single CIVCAS incidents continue to negatively impact the ISAF mission and curtail necessary freedom of action. Because of this, continued vigilance is required in reducing CIVCAS during ISAF operations.

LTG Scaparotti (former Commander, ISAF Joint Command) shared a number of overarching principles for reducing and mitigating CIVCAS in Afghanistan with ISAF tactical forces. These principles, based on lessons from hundreds of CIVCAS incidents, include:

  • Consider tactical alternatives. In decisions regarding the use of force, consider the best means of achieving the desired effects with minimum CIVCAS. This can include exercising tactical patience when feasible.
  • Partner with Afghans to the fullest extent possible. Historically, partnered operations are less likely to result in CIVCAS. Partnering also helps to develop mature Afghan forces, a key to successful transition.
  • Learn what is “normal.” Behavior that seems inexplicable to U.S. forces can be normal for Afghans. When positive identification (PID) comes from perceived hostile intent, take every opportunity to confirm PID and consider if the behavior could be that of noncombatants.
  • Improve shared situational awareness. Clearly and objectively share details with other forces and higher headquarters about potential threats, the operating environment, and your own status. Avoid leading language.
  • Leverage relationships with Afghans before, during, and after operations to share responsibility, gain information, and reduce/mitigate CIVCAS.
  • Conduct battle damage assessment (BDA) whenever possible. Detailed BDA of effects on the civilian population is essential for effective consequence management. There are many options for determining ground truth.
  • Be fast and not wrong. Communicate information as soon as available but, to avoid damaging credibility, do not report details that are speculative.

This handbook describes the general principles listed above and provides concrete steps that Soldiers can include in their operations. In addition to avoiding CIVCAS, effective consequence management of CIVCAS is critical — the longest chapter of this handbook is devoted to this topic to provide a blueprint on how to respond when CIVCAS occurs. Importantly, these principles and steps are not meant to be burdensome, but rather are critical tools to enable success in the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan. The experience of prior ISAF soldiers has shown that efforts to reduce CIVCAS — and mitigate their effects when they occur — can be a win-win scenario, both reducing harm to civilians and maintaining mission effectiveness.

Tactical Alternatives

In cases where Soldiers have the opportunity to consider various options and ask the question “Should I shoot?,” they can consider tactical alternatives. For example, some forces had a procedure of calling in close air support (CAS) whenever they were in a troops-in-contact situation. But the tactical directive caused them to re-evaluate their use of air platforms as the default response, and they started using organic fires and maneuver as an option that was more discriminate. In general, forces considered three types of tactical alternatives:

  • Shaping. Soldiers can plan for potential situations and proactively shape the environment to prevent a situation before it occurs. One example is the thoughtful placement and design of a checkpoint. Positioning a checkpoint at a place of limited visibility compresses timelines for decision making and determination of intent, which can contribute to a faulty assumption of hostile intent. Conversely, designing a checkpoint with plenty of visibility or with physical barriers (either natural barriers or artificial ones like T-walls) to channel and slow down traffic buys time for decision making as well as increases the safety of forces.
  • Alternate tactics. Soldiers can consider different options to deal with the situation. One example is a unit deciding to use its sniper to neutralize an insurgent instead of using indirect fire or CAS. Similarly, some units use nonlethal weapons before they resort to lethal force. Sometimes this means acting in such a way that force is not necessary. In one incident, Soldiers were standing at the side of a road and trying to cross through local traffic. The Soldiers signaled oncoming vehicles to stop so that they could cross. One vehicle did not respond to their signal, so the Soldiers escalated force, which ended by them firing at the vehicle, causing a CIVCAS. An alternate tactic in that situation could have been for the Soldiers to let the vehicle go by and then cross the road.
  • Tactical patience. When Soldiers are not facing an immediate threat, they can exercise tactical patience and take additional time to confirm PID and situational awareness. This is especially valuable when PID is based on perceived hostile intent, as many Afghans have been shot because they were behaving in a way that was unexpected or misunderstood by coalition forces. If Soldiers are coordinating with other forces to obtain fires, this can also involve confirming the known facts with those forces to ensure that all involved have a common understanding of the situation.

Ground BDA is not always feasible due to ground force location and threat considerations. Where air platforms are involved or available, full-motion video from airborne platforms can be used as a surrogate for a ground BDA. Recorded video can be declassified, if necessary, and shared with Afghan leaders in key leader engagements (KLEs). However, video from air platforms does not always capture needed details on the ground — such as identifying CIVCAS inside buildings or under rubble — so this should be a last resort. On-the-ground BDA should always be the default option. If ISAF soldiers are not available to conduct a BDA, some forces have called on Afghan security forces to quickly conduct BDA for them.

 

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

CALL-AfghanCIVCAS

TOP-SECRET – NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan

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Despite the continuous counter-narcotics efforts of the international community and the Afghan government throughout the past decade, Agence France-Presse wrote in April 2012 that Afghanistan continues to be a major contributor to the global drug supply. Approximately 90% of the world’s opium, most of which is processed into heroin, originates in Afghan fields. While potential opium production in Afghanistan peaked in 2007, poppy cultivation has recently risen. For instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) marked a 61% increase in the potential opium production between 2010 and 2011. A separate UNODC report from 2010 states that drugs and bribes are equivalent to approximately a quarter of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP).

Dynamics & Motivations. Price fluctuations influence market dynamics, according to the UNODC. For instance, the rise in poppy cultivation between 2005 and 2009 translated into an increase in supply, which in turn helped to bring about the gradual decrease in the price of opium. Similarly, a decline in the amount of opium poppies produced in 2009-2010 contributed to rising poppy values and greater cultivation in 2011. Other factors are also reportedly at play. For instance, a World Bank report on “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan” says that poppies are attractive to some farmers because “there is working capital financing available at all stages, as well as credit and other inputs for producers.” The same report notes that many poorer households are obligated to grow poppies by landowners and creditors to enable them to pay off debts. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting further indicates that many Afghan farmers are in fact compelled to grow this crop by insurgent elements through threats and intimidation.

Who Benefits? Numerous people benefit from the poppy cultivation business and from related narcotics processing and trafficking, according to the World Bank. However, the benefits are far from evenly distributed among groups involved in the trade. The World Bank notes that farmers with limited amounts of land, most of whom are involved in sharecropping, benefit the least while farmers with capital resources and significant landholdings receive greater income. Small-scale opium traders also benefit, though their income is eclipsed by that accruing to wholesalers and refiners who arrange transport and processing of raw materials into opium and heroin. The Chr. Michelsen Institute notes that the proceeds of poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking particularly benefit a small group of warlords.

The Taliban and other insurgent groups also reportedly receive income from poppy cultivation, hashish cultivation and narcotics trafficking. The World Bank’s report on “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan” says that insecurity in parts of Afghanistan during the course of the past 11 years has facilitated poppy cultivation and that opium has provided a “ready source of cash” which has financed the purchase of weapons and other items necessary to sustain the insurgency. Furthermore, UNODC’s report on “The Global Afghan Opium Trade” says the Taliban receives approximately 10% of the value of opiates being transported by traffickers. Given that the total value of the heroin trafficked to Iran and Pakistan was estimated to be approximately USD 700 million in 2009, UNODC says approximately USD 70 million may have been paid to the Taliban as tax on transport alone. Poppies and narcotics reportedly also contribute to the insurgency’s financing in other ways.

Beyond Poppies & Opium. In addition to the opium “industry”, Afghanistan has also become the biggest producer of hashish, a drug produced from the cannabis crop’s resin. According to Time Magazine, Afghan farmers earned approximately USD 94 million from the sales of 1,500-3,500 tonnes of hashish.”

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/afghan-opium-2011.png

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

CFC-AfghanNarcotics

Voodoo Man – Bela Lugosi – Full Movie

Dr. Richard Marlowe uses a combination of voodoo rite and hypnotic suggestion to attempt to revivify his beautiful, but long-dead wife, by transferring the life essences of several hapless young girls he has kidnapped and imprisoned in the dungeon beneath his mansion

Though no more expensive or ambitious than any of his earlier Sam Katzman-produced vehicles, Bela Lugosi’s Voodoo Man is perhaps the best of the batch, if only because of its quirky supporting cast and casually offbeat dialogue. Lugosi plays Dr. Marlowe, a practioner of voodoo who kidnaps nubile young ladies and places them in a state of suspended animation. He hopes that this practice will somehow restore his zombiefied wife (Ellen Hall) to her normal self. But when he abducts Betty (Wanda McKay), the girlfriend of screenwriter Ralph (Michael Ames), Marlowe’s little scheme begins to unravel. Aiding and abetting Marlowe in collecting unwary females is gas-station attendant Nicrolas (George Zucco), while the doctor’s retarded handyman Job (John Carradine, who has the film’s best and most amusing scenes) dutifully looks after the quick-frozen cuties. When it’s all over, Ralph enthusiastically suggests to his studio boss S. K. (not the real Sam Katzman, but reasonable facsimile John Ince) that the story of Marlowe and his voodoo-practicing cohorts would make a great film vehicle for Bela Lugosi! Best line: Lugosi calmly explaining that his wife seems so pale because “she has been dead for twenty-two years now.”

SECRET – Money As A Weapon System-Afghanistan (MAAWS-A)

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2. BACKGROUND.

A. Purpose.

The aim of reintegration is to stabilize local areas by convincing insurgents, their leaders and their supporters to cease active and/or passive support for the insurgency and to become peaceful members of Afghan society. Reintegration will supplement the continuing lethal and non-lethal activities that form a part of counterinsurgency operations. Reintegration will complement efforts to support political, governance, social and economic opportunity within communities. U.S. support for the Afghan Reintegration Programs must be attuned to Afghan culture. The guidance shall refer to a former fighter who has been accepted into ARP as a ―reintegree.

B. Definitions.

1. A formal reintegree is defined as an Afghan who has:

a. Recorded a pledge to cease all support for insurgency in Afghanistan, to live in accordance with the Constitution of Afghanistan, cease violence against the Government of Afghanistan and its international partners, and no longer have material ties to Al Qaeda or affiliated transnational terrorist organizations, and

b. Been sponsored by a responsible community member, or a government official in cases where the reintegree cannot return to their community.

2. Reintegration refers to efforts to assimilate fighters and leaders peacefully into Afghan society. Among the individuals to whom this applies are fighters who have been removed from the battlefield as well as those who are detained or incarcerated in U.S. or Afghan facilities, respectively. Although some reintegration programs involve modest stipends for relocation or compensation for services, these stipends will be subject to appropriate safeguards, and in no event will payments be made to reward insurgents for cessation of hostilities.

3. Reconciliation refers to high-level political dialogue with senior leaders of major insurgent groups such as the Quetta Shura Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), designed to terminate their armed resistance against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Higher-level reconciliation efforts may allow relatively senior leaders to join a peaceful political process under the Afghan Constitution under the auspices of GIRoA, which should continue to manage these efforts. Funding for the ARP will not be used to support reconciliation requirements.

C. Key ARP Concepts.

1. Reintegration programs are Afghan led programs that have the outward appearance of an Afghan driven program consistent with the Afghan constitution and the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP).

2. Many Afghan fighters are not ideologically committed to the insurgency; rather they are motivated by grievances, issues of security and/or financial incentives. It is believed that many of these Afghans, along with their communities, will cut their ties to the insurgency, abandon violence, and accept the Afghan Constitution, including respect for human rights once being offered the opportunity to participate in a reintegration program. In addition, Afghan fighters who have been placed in detention or correction facilities may take part in reintegration programs. Motives for reintegration may include initiation of effective grievance resolution processes with the community and individual, the belief in a better life, incentives to pursue that better-life, and disincentives to participate in insurgent or terrorist acts.

3. The community is viewed as the center-of-gravity for successful and lasting reintegration. As such, the community will be responsible for accepting back reintegrees who wish to reintegrate, and will take responsibility for their progress.

a. Reintegration efforts should benefit and be provided to peaceful members of a community as well, not just reintegrees, in order to avoid perverse incentives. For example, measures should be taken to ensure peaceful members of a community are able to partake in the dividends of the peace process in order to avoid resentment of reintegree’s who are also benefiting from the reintegration program.

b. Reintegrees receiving support under the ARP are sponsored by a responsible community member or government official in cases where the reintegree cannot return to their community. In addition, pledges made by reintegrees must be recorded, and the community must accept that the consequence for acts of recidivism will be discontinuation of ARP support in that community.

4. Effective support for the GIRoA reintegration program will require coordination between Afghanistan’s national and sub-national levels and will require proper oversight. U.S. support must be flexible enough to allow the U.S. Government to respond quickly with resources and policy decisions to field personnel and enable the GIRoA’s reintegration program to capitalize on emerging opportunities. It is imperative that both district and village leadership, as well as the local population, support the proposed project in order to increase the likelihood for success, and that GIRoA is kept informed of all such programs.

5. Material incentives in the form of transition assistance, job training, and support for grievance resolution are likely to be part of a final GIRoA led reintegration program, and will require international community support for implementation. Both International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and USFOR-A play important roles in GIRoA’s reintegration program. A robust civilian contribution from the international community of both material and political support will also be important for the overall success of the program.

6. Vetting is the process by which potential reintegrees are assessed as to whether they will be accepted back into the community. Vetting will be conducted at the community level by local elders and/or village leaders, in coordination with Ministry of Interior (MOI) and National Directorate of Security (NDS). All reintegrees seeking reintegration will have their biometric and identifying data collected by MOI and submitted to the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), ISAF and UN databases to run background checks and create a record in order to prevent more than one attempt at reintegration. In cases where the reintegree will not be accepted into a specific community, the MOI will process and coordinate moving the reintegree, along with their family if applicable, to a different community within Afghanistan that will support reintegration. The MOI will be the lead agency for collecting biometric and other identifying data with the support of NDS, MOD, ISAF and UN as deemed necessary.

7. GIRoA is developing an approach to provide amnesty for reintegration candidates. GIRoA is responsible for ensuring it does so in full conformity with local law, international law, treaties and established agreements. This amnesty may be retroactive and probationary in nature. If the participant deviates from the program, the amnesty will be void. If it is determined that a reintegree has committed severe criminal acts, MOI, supported by the NDS, Ministry of Defense (MOD), and ISAF, will deal with the criminal in accordance with Afghan law. A criminal is defined as a person charged with and convicted of a crime, under Afghan law.

8. In order to support national unity, reintegration efforts should not favor a particular ethnicity. There will be no power-sharing or other arrangements that would offer extra-constitutional governmental authority as a reward for reintegration (effectively rewarding insurgent violence and undermining constitutional processes), and there will be no arrangements that would undermine the authority of GIRoA.

a. Critical to attracting insurgents to participate in reintegration is a more capable and credible GIRoA, seen as effective by its people, and capable of providing effective security and justice.

b. The Afghan Reintegration Program, and our support to the APRP using ARP funds, must be transparent and the administrators of the program must be accountable to the Afghan people and GIRoA, and international community.

9. Although NDAA funds in support of reintegration utilize many of the same delivery mechanisms as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), they differ in that the ARP’s primary objective is to support the reintegration of reintegrees. Activities such as vocational training, works projects, education or other projects should only be funded by ARP if they are in support of the peaceful assimilation of reintegrees, leaders, their supporters and their communities who have officially renounced support for the insurgency.

10. Reintegration does not support any deal that violates the Afghan Constitution, nor does it involve paying potential reintegrees to stop fighting.

11. Reintegration may involve low-level political and dispute negotiations, but it should not undermine constitutional processes by establishing power-sharing or other arrangements that would offer extra-constitutional government authority as a reward for reintegration, effectively rewarding insurgent violence. Additionally, there should be no arrangements that would undermine the authority of the GIRoA.

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL:

USFOR-A-MAAWS-ARP

 

The Ape Man – Full Movie – Bela Lugosi

Conducting weird scientific experiments, crazed Dr. James Brewster, aided by his colleague Dr. Randall, has managed to transform himself into a hairy, stooped-over ape-man. Desperately seeking a cure, Brewster believes only an injection of recently-drawn human spinal fluid will prove effective. With Randall refusing to help him, it falls to Brewster and his captive gorilla to find appropriate donors.

Revealed – Lost in Corruption – Iran-US Clashes

Lost in Corruption

Contents focused on Iranian vs. U.S clashes

 


21 September 2012

Rajanews

http://rajanews.com/detail.asp?id=138264

“Rajanews” is a website “officially” belong to a series of hardliners with origins in the Iran/Iraq war – they promote war, arrests, Spy executions and alike. Some info on their site is not propaganda and comes from real sources, which are, their own hardliner friends in politics, Military and Intelligence. The guy who is behind the whole side is “Mr Nili”. His father has been killed in war with Iraq. he is an active member of Basij as well .

The clip says just same as Chinese stared to steal American tech from middle of war fields and put them to use to make more advanced tech, Iran has been doing the same and what happened to RQ-thing is only one of those operations that turned into a headline to weaken the military position of U.S in Media.

 


Mashreghnews

http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/156072/%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86-
%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D
B%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%E2%80%8C-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D
8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5-%D8%B4%D8%AF

“Mashreghnews” is closed to armed forces. High likely IRGC. Due to its extreme focus on “air” related stuff, it might be connected to a company or an institute that works for IRGC’s Aerospace Forces. Iran has two military. Artesh, or “Army” is the one that is conventional with most personnel, limited political involvement and low technology. IRGC or Sepah, made after Iraqs attack to Iran from ordinary people to protect the “revolution” and then remained as a whole separate military figure. Army has an Air force, IRAF. They are running the airplanes, specially F-14 Tomcats. Iran is the ONLY and largest owner of F-14s at the moment due to restrictions and also because bold military ties of U.S govt with Shah’s Army before the Revolution. Back then, and even these days, Tomcats are stuff one can count on them. Army also has a Force name “Air Defense”. These are the “S-300 bullshit” people who run Radars and surface to air offense. at IRGC side, they only have an Aerospace Force. While it has limited kid stuff planes, its focus is Missiles. I suppose you see Khameneie’s cleverness in designing and running this shit for past 26-7 years, having many fingers up his ass domestically and overseas, he is still doing kinda fine. One must be objective, while critical. He is, for real, a strong leader, despite what is his beliefs or his obligations or goals.

The link says the FIRST Iranian Presidential “semi” Candidate has been stepped up. He must be get an approval before the election to be an official candidate but, nonetheless, not only he will get it, the fact that he stepped up matters.

“Pour-Mohammadi” is an Islamic cleric close to Khameneie. He been in intelligence most of his life and he was responsible for assassinations for around 180 opposition figures outside of Iran in 90’s, resulted in “Mykonos” scandal. His role was never made that clear because STUPID Iranian oppositions wanted to blame the leader and get it over with. Well, German court ruled this out and said the leader of the country is responsible. Western ambassadors left, then they came back. Nothing serious happened. Iranian intelligence who runs Hezbollah, help German BND to release Hostages in Lebanon. Huh.

“Pour-Mohammadi” is not somebody who Iranians, at this point, no matter what belief, vote for. I suppose he knows that as well. He has a very bad rep. Even hardliners won’t vote for somebody who ran a notorious assassination team, probably bigger than the whole Mossad. He could be very corrupt, or he can make serious damages to ones political or real life if he wants. He might stay in race until the end, maybe to win back some rep, maybe to promote himself as the next judiciary chief of another higher level post that the leader assigns.

He is known to be at the side of conservatives. he is a serious enemy of reformists and he is in deep fight with Ahmadinejad people. he had records of “Billion” dollar scale corruptions in import/export deals (which I can just go and say they are true given his posts and his records) but nobody ever dared to go further than this. It probably will never happen.

 


Home-Made Weapons

http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/155915/%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C
-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%
D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-6%D8%B3%
D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%DA%98%D9%87-31%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%DB%8C%
D9%88%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3

http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/154510/%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C
-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%
DA%A9%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A
7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%DA%98%D9%87-31-%D8%B4%D9%
87%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B9%DA%A9
%D8%B3

Coverage of a recent demonstration of “home-made” Weapons and analysis of their capabilities comparing to their foreign rivals. Most of these equipment are built in Ministry of Defense. It is a part of government (not Armed forces) and its focus is to develop “technology” and build defense industries. So, almost all of MoD is R&D or purchase or sale. They sell to Iranian Army and IRGC, in addition to some other countries. Awhile back, Israeli soldiers found a house in Palestine full of RPGs made in Iran who had the Logo of Iranian MoD on them, in a massive scale. Its on youtube and Iam sure they are real, do not ask how 🙂

 


Borhan

http://borhan.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=4058

“Borhan” is a think-tank closed to Basij. It employs professors and intellectuals to make speeches for educating or helping average Shia-directed population to understand what is happening in the world. They translate and make interviews and “inject” what they want into it, eventually. The link is an exclusive interview with an American activist in NY about Occupy WST and what is happening on the field and numbers of people (INCLUDING FEMALES – read in/with Persian accent and mindset: U.S Police is Raping and gang banging 200 women in a basement like a porno while they are drinking ALCOHOL and shaking the Uncle Sam’s Flag).

 


Rememberemad

http://rememberemad.com/list.htm

You have seen this before. Its a Lebanese-Iranian –> Shia, offense and hacks on Israeli sources. You have covered it before. They got identity information of at least 6 million Israelis and they published a part of it – maybe to show off maybe a sting op. During the recent weeks I had my own op and got 3 Gigabytes dump of information from them, Zipped. It “looks” like correct, as its claimed on the page. Apparently, they hit a data center that is hosting many governmental web servers of Israel and they also “hit” a tech support there who has kids, Russian roots and VERY interested in Porn, so to put an embarrassment they published passwords of all the sites he was responsible for supporting and the kind of Porn he was into, to affect his family life and to affect personnel of the data center.

Why interesting? It is similar to what happened to Diginotar. Forget about the SSL/PKI thing. It was stupid in the first place and hacking into CA’s websites or Politely/unpolietely/politically/legally/secretly get access to Private keys is nothing new. What was new was DIGINOTAR itself. Because? It was Netherlands official CA of government and Netherland is introduced as a “Base” of operations against Iran, with diplomatic covers, Budget (public info) and hosting several Radio, Satellite and TV channels that only attack the Islamic Regime. So, it really was not an attack to SSL. SSL was fucked before and now, thanks to many blackhat presentations, defcon, schmoocon, shit-cons in Security area and this incidents even 5 years old Childs know about it. What is the solution? There is not one, that is for real use, at the moment. But the “Stick up the Netherland Govt” was a major point. that company was bankrupt, government communications were stopped, many people got into fight with each other. The Diginotar hacker, suddenly showed up in Twitter! (as if Iranian intelligence is going to communicate with open world using twitter) and tried to appear himself as a young person with low English skills, then he made threats to American CA’s. These threats were confirmed by these companies later. I have had a life in IT. I clearly know what happens to IT techs even if a slight fuckup surfaces specially with govt. It is disruptive, more than stupid hacker community could imagine, as they keep talking about some fuckup in MD5 or some 2-bit field in a certificate. They play kid’s game. The “Stick” up to a government’s ass is not. I am closely watching the scene. By now, I am pretty sure you understand that. Remember emad is VERY much looks same as the behavior I observered in diginotar. I am just going to conclude and rule out: they are same people. Intelligence contractors, not young, not stupid, highly determined. They know what they are doing, while U.S is in fight to pass a Cyber security bill and Israel send retards to kill 5 people in a 75 million person country that has 70% of them under 35 years old and more than 5000 “university students” officially applied to change their field from whatever to Nuclear Engineering, after the assassinations. Huh.

 


 


 

 

 


 

Unveiled by Cryptome – FBI Has No Files on Cyberpunks

Federal Bureau of Investigation
September 10, 2012 (Received Septembe 14, 2012)

FOIPA Request No. 1198150-00
Subject: CYPHERPUNKS

“Based the information you provided we conducted a search of the Central Records System. We were unable to identify main file records responsive to the FOIA.”

Now with one record, our emailed FOIA request:

August 31, 2012

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attn: FOI/PA Request
Record/Information Dissemination Section
170 Marcel Drive
Winchester, VA 22602-4843

Dear FBI FOIA Office,

Under provisions of the FOIA I request any and all FBI records on the group “Cypherpunks” affiliated with the online Cypherpunk Mail List established in 1992 and continuing to the present.

A description of the Cypherpunks group and some of its members, including me, is available on Wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypherpunks

This material will be published on the public education website Cryptome.org of which I am the administrator.

I agree to pay for costs associated with this request as provided by the FOIA.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

John Young
Cryptome.org


The arcanity of FOIA requests is that if not precise the responses will be this generic unresponsive FBI response. A cypherpunks may have a separate file in a personal name, anonym, nickname or association with another organization, or several, which would not be provided in response to a “cypherpunks” request. John Young, for example, has been visited twice by the FBI, and telephoned twice more, but no FBI records have been found in response to several FOIA requests to various components of the FBI, each of which has a separate file system. These restricted systems are usually not linked to the “Central Records System main file records” often cited in FOIA answers to head off further inquiry and to require expensive, slow, law suits for access.



	

Unveiled – Hitachi on NSA Utah Data Center Cable Purchases

The following press release from Hitachi Cable America discusses their “supply of high performance fiber optic cable and assemblies” to the National Security Agency’s Utah Data Center (UDC) project.  The press release contains a number of specific details regarding the UDC project, including brief descriptions of the purpose of the facility as for “code breaking and data traffic analysis.” Hitachi has reportedly developed specialized fiber optic cables for the facility and had their InfiniBand CXP Active Optical cable assemblies, capable of 150 Gbs per second per assembly, approved for use with the latest generation of Cray supercomputer.  The Cray Cascade system is currently under development with support from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) High Productivity Computing Systems (HPCS) program and, according to the Cray website, the system will be “capable of sustained multi-petaflops performance.”   An article earlier this year in Wired by James Bamford, describes the development of the Cascade as part of a race to increase computing capabilities for the NSA.

Supply of high performance fiber optic cable and assemblies by Hitachi Cable America to the National Security Agency (NSA) – Utah Data Center Project / DARPA

Overview:

With internet traffic growing exponentially, attacks on government and commercial computers by cyber terrorists and rogue states have escalated. Those wishing harm have espionage programs targeting the data systems used by the United States and allies. Drug traffickers and weapons dealers use the internet with encrypted communications.

To counter these activities, the National Security Agency, an agency of the U.S. government, is building a fortified data center deep inside a mountain in Utah. This complex will house the world’s most sophisticated supercomputers dedicated to code breaking and data traffic analysis. Another site will eventually take delivery of the latest Cray supercomputer called Cascade to support the NSA’s need to crack codes faster to protect the nation and its allies.

HCA developed fiber cable suitable for the densely packed NSA data center facilities, as well as indoor/outdoor fiber optic cables and shielded high speed copper data cables. Additionally, HCA’s InfiniBand CXP Active Optical cable assemblies, capable of a blazing 150 Gigabits per second per assembly, has been qualified by Cray for their Cascade system.

Innovative:

Winning two projects at this level requires a degree of technical sophistication few companies can match. Hitachi Cable America has processes that allow customers the ultimate in fiber cable flexibility. Instead of two cables, each with a single type of fiber optic glass, our designers have developed a single cable with both long distance and short distance optical glass embedded in it. Instead of forcing the NSA to use the commercial standard cable YELLOW jacket color for long haul glass and ORANGE jacket color for short distance glass, we’ve modified our designs to allow them to use jacket colors based on security level and service type. Our sales engineers have spent many hours with NSA data center designers educating them on the solutions we have and, at that same time, we have learned the design nuances of this complex site and others. Our technical knowledge, our design and manufacturing flexibility and our competitive costs are a winning formula.

Reliable:

NSA designers visited Hitachi Cable America’s Performance Cable Systems & Materials Division facility in Manchester New Hampshire USA for a site audit. Under one roof, and, in our opinion, they saw the best cable manufacturing facility in North America for fiber optic cable, category and custom copper cables. Clean, organized, with modern manufacturing equipment and a highly-trained staff, the Hitachi Cable plant that ships 100,000,000 meters annually of insulated wire and fiber strands impressed these designers. Our dedicated government sales team understands the entire NSA bidding cycle. We’ve built credibility account by account, data center after data center with each project finished with superior results. There is no other way to prove to the NSA than to deliver what was promised, each and every time. As a result, the NSA specified Hitachi Cable as the exclusive cable supplier for this program because of our reputation for delivering on our commitments.

Our InfiniBand Active Optical cable assembly qualified by Cray for the Cascade supercomputing project confirms Hitachi Cable’s position in the elite class of transceiver suppliers. Years of experience supplying transceivers to Cisco, IBM, and Hitachi itself, combined with our ability to make superior fiber optic cable gave us the prerequisite skills to design the 150 Gbps Active Optical Cable assembly. Miniaturization technology without sacrificing transmission performance is what sold Cray on us.

Enabling:

While many American cable producers have shifted production of cable products to China or Mexico, Hitachi Cable has continued to expand its presence in the United States. Starting with flat cable in 1986, ,then adding premise cable in 1991, fiber optics in 1998, and with numerous expansions over the past ten years in Manchester NH, Hitachi Cable has significantly increased output capacity in the USA. This has not gone unnoticed by the National Security Agency and many of the distribution partners who support the Agency. American-made, high quality cabling solutions is a vital requirement in maintaining the nation’s data infrastructure.

Hitachi Cable’s investment in America is not just in New Hampshire but in New York, Indiana and Florida. Altogether, we support more than 500 American workers and their families. These workers are not just assembling parts built in low cost countries. Using domestically-made optical fiber from our partner, Corning Optical Fiber , we build complex copper and fiber cables with a very high domestic content value, important when considering the Buy American requirements of the U.S. Government.

Unveiled by Cryptome – 600 Photos of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS March 11-28, 2011

On 11 September 2012 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) released 600 photos taken March 11-28, 2011 after the tsunami hit the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station. These are the TEPCO links to 40 collections within the 600.

List and Thumbnails of the 600 Photos (1.1MB)
TEPCO listed links in reverse chronoligical order
(40) Around the Unit 4 Reactor Building  March 28, 2011
(39) Unit 1 and 2 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Inside)   March 28, 2011
(38) Unit 1 and 2 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Outside)   March 28, 2011
(37) Unit 2 Transformer Area  March 28, 2011
(36) Unit 1 Transformer Area  March 28, 2011
(35) Unit 4 Instrument Air Compressor   March 25, 2011
(34) Around the Unit 1 Large Equipment Hatch  March 23, 2011
(33) Inside the Unit 2 Power Source Room  March 23, 2011
(32) Unit 3 and 4 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Inside)  March 23, 2011
(31) Unit 3 and 4 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Outside)  March 23, 2011
(30) Sea side area of Unit 2  March 23, 2011
(29) Sea side area of Unit 1  March 23, 2011
(28) At Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  March 23, 2011
(27) Inside the Unit 2 Basement Power Source Room  March 23, 2011
(26) Inside the Unit 2 Alternate Power Source Room  March 23, 2011
(25) Around the Unit 2 Alternate Power Source Room   March 23, 2011
(24) Inside the Unit 1 Power Source Room  March 23, 2011
(23) Around the Outdoor Power Panel  March 22, 2011
(22) Cable Route from the Reserve Power Substation to Unit 2 Turbine Building Power Panel  March 22, 2011
(21) Inside Reserve Power Substation March 22, 2011
(20) Around Reserve Power Substation March 22, 2011
(19) Unit 6 Transformer Area March 22, 2011
(18) Unit 5 and 6 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Inside)  March 22, 2011
(17) Unit 5 Transformer Area March 22, 2011
(16) Unit 5 and 6 Switchyard Area (Outside)  March 22, 2011
(15) The Situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after the explosion of Unit 1,3 and 4. March 17, 2011
(14) Inside the Unit 5 Power Source Room March 17, 2011
(13) Inside the Unit 5 and 6 Vertical Shafts March 17, 2011
(12) Inside the Unit 6 Power Source Room March 17, 2011
(11) Inside the Unit 5 and 6 Transmission Board Room  March 17, 2011
(10) Inside the Unit 5 and 6 Main Control Room March 17, 2011
(9) Sea side area of Unit 5 and 6 March 17, 2011
(8) Appearance of Unit 3 after the explosion, and appearance of Unit 4 before the explosion viewed from Unit 3 March 11, 2011
(7) Appearance of Unit 1 after the explosion March 11, 2011
(6) The situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in the aftermath of the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake March 11, 2011
(5) The status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station when the tsunami hit March 11, 2011
(4) The situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake March 11, 2011
(3) The situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Main Office Building, etc.) after the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake March 11, 2011
(2) The status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station when the tsunami hit (Undertow) March 11, 2011
(1) The shallow draft quay in the aftermath of the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake March 11, 2011

	

TOP-SECRET – DHS Protective Security Advisor (PSA) Names and Locations March 2012

The following map of Department of Homeland Security protective security advisors (PSA) around the country was taken from a presentation given at the FEMA National Preparedness Symposium held in early August.

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/dhs-psa-1024x643.png

 

Region State City Name
Northwest Scott Behunin
Northwest AK Anchorage Thomas Burgess
Northwest CO Denver Joe O’Keefe
Northwest ID Boise Eric Puype
Northwest MT Helena Randy Middlebrook
Northwest OR Portland Glen Collins
Northwest UT Salt Lake City Ralph Ley
Northwest WA Seattle David Holcomb
Northwest WY Cheyenne Kenneth Longfritz
Southwest Donald Cheatham
Southwest AZ Phoenix Christine Figueroa
Southwest CA Los Angeles Brian Keith
Southwest CA Los Angeles Donald Ray
Southwest CA Sacramento Frank Calvillo
Southwest CA San Diego Peter Owen
Southwest CA Fresno Richard Sierze
Southwest CA San Francisco Richard Stribling
Southwest HI Honolulu Richard Mitchem
Southwest NM Aluquerque Jeffrey Murray
Southwest NV Las Vegas Gonzalo Cordova
Midwest Gregory Gardner
Midwest AR Little Rock Katherine Crowley
Midwest IA Des Moines Phil Pitzen
Midwest KS Topeka Charles Clanahan
Midwest MO St. Louis Rick Goins
Midwest ND Bismarck Donald Rosenberg
Midwest NE Omaha Greg Hollingsead
Midwest OK Oklahoma City Glenn Moore
Midwest SD Pierre August Geisinger
Headquarters VA Bill Eagan
Northeast Mary Raymond
Northeast CT New Haven Douglas Pesce
Northeast MA Boston Al Richmond
Northeast ME Portland Christopher Reidel
Northeast NH Manchester Ronald Peimer
Northeast NJ Newark Frank Westfall
Northeast NY Albany Al Stenson
Northeast NY New York City Joe Tadrick
Northeast NY New York City Kevin Peterson
Northeast NY Buffalo Mark Kreyer
Northeast PR San Juan Julio Gonzalez-Rodriguez
Northeast RI Providence Alan Seitz
Northeast VT Williston Gabriel Palazzi
Mid-Atlantic John Guest
Mid-Atlantic DC National Capital Region Sean McAraw
Mid-Atlantic DC National Capital Region Matthew Wombacher
Mid-Atlantic DE Dover Ken Greeson
Mid-Atlantic MD Baltimore Ray Hanna
Mid-Atlantic PA Philidelphia Bill Ryan
Mid-Atlantic PA Pittsburgh Bob Winters
Mid-Atlantic PA Harrisburg Stephen White
Mid-Atlantic VA Richmond Robert Mooney
Mid-Atlantic VA Norfolk Mark Milicich
Mid-Atlantic WV Charleston Kenneth Ullom
Southeast Donald Robinson
Southeast FL Tallahassee Billy Sasser
Southeast FL Miami Gary Warren
Southeast FL Tampa Olivia Gagnon
Southeast FL Orlando Marty Smith
Southeast GA Atlanta James Hardy
Southeast NC Raleigh Darryl Aspey
Southeast SC Columbia Keith Jones
Southeast TN Memphis Greg Innis
Southeast TN Nashville Mark Coffey
Gulf Coast Steve Nicholas
Gulf Coast AL Mobile Kirk Toth
Gulf Coast AL Birmingham Mike Waters
Gulf Coast LA New Orleans Phil Constantin
Gulf Coast LA Baton Rouge Jeff McKee
Gulf Coast MS Jackson James Fenn
Gulf Coast TX Austin Ronald McPherson
Gulf Coast TX Dallas Harvey Perriott
Gulf Coast TX El Paso Charles Hamilton
Gulf Coast TX Houston Kerry Spaulding
Gulf Coast TX Houston Michael Macha

Stéphane Bourgoin – Being Serial Killer (Full Documentary Movie)

Stéphane Bourgoin , born March 14, 1953 in Paris , is a writer French and bookseller specializing in criminology and crime fiction, especially in the study of serial killer (see criminal profiling ). Rape and murder of the wife of Stephane Bourgoin by a serial killer in 1976 is the source of his interest in this type of criminal one .
It publishes books on the phenomenon in its own name and under the pseudonym ‘collective Stephen Jallieu he shares with Isabelle Longuet . They co-wrote and cannibals Crimes (2004), The Year of the Crime (2006) and Infanticide (2007).
He was – among others – on the jury at the festival Fantastic’Arts in 1999 .
Regarding the Attacks in Norway in 2011 and a controversy that has sprung around the responsibility of video games in the acts of the mass murderers, some about Stephane Bourgoin in the press have been truncated or distorted, which could generate anger and threatening language in some video game enthusiasts. The exact content of the statements of Stéphane Bourgoin is as follows: “These killers are fascinated by violent video games. These games consumed in high doses cause desensitization relative to the crime. In some games, crossing the different levels, sometimes you have to kill a policeman or a pregnant woman. Whoever plays is by definition an actor, he is not passive. Some Japanese games, available for free online, allow to play as a serial rapist. The player becomes an active participant and expresses his fantasies. Here is the real danger. ” 2 . Www.citazine.fr on the site, he further stated: “A news agency has somewhat exaggerated and distorted my words. What I said exactly the typical profile of mass murderer, is that Of the 113 cases in twenty years, 108 were engaged on a daily and sometimes for hours to violent video games. But I added, of course, that this is not the fact of playing violent video games that makes one becomes a mass murderer. ” 3 .
He is regularly interviewed by some media.

1988 : Fredric Brown – The whimsical dreamer (Ed. Inking )
1998 : The Red Book of Jack the Ripper (Éd.Grasset)
2000 : Twelve serial killers (Ed Manitoba)
2001 : Thirteen new serial killers (Ed Manitoba)
2003 : Serial killers – Survey of serial killers, new revised and enlarged edition (Grasset Ed.),
reference book on the phenomenon of serial murder
2004 : The Black Book of Serial Killers (Ed. Grasset)
This book traces seven biographies of serial killers: Jeffrey Dahmer , Peter Kürten , Albert de Salvo , Ottis Toole and Henry Lee Lucas , Ed Kemper , Arthur Shawcross , Gary Ridgway – A typographical error appears on the back cover: the Strangler Düsseldorf is not Peter “Kurien” but Peter Kürten
2004 : Profiling, a woman on the trail of serial killers (Ed Grasset)
2006 : The Black Dahlia , autopsy of a crime from 1947 to James Ellroy (Edit Editions)
2007 : Infanticide examines several cases of child murders
2008 : The Keys to the Fourniret case (Editions Pascal Galodé – Ed paperback)
2010 : Killers (Ed. Grasset)
2011 : Serial killers – Global Survey on serial killers, new revised and enlarged edition (Grasset Ed.),

Invisible Ghost – Full Movie – Bela Lugosi

A doctor (Lugosi) unwittingly commits a series of grisly murderers while hypnotized by the ghost of his dead wife!

Invisible Ghost is far from the best of Bela Lugosi’s Monogram vehicles (if indeed there is such a thing), but with Joseph H. Lewis at the controls it is far and away the best directed. Lugosi is cast as Kessler, an otherwise normal gentleman who goes balmy whenever he thinks about his late wife (Betty Compson). It gets worse when Kessler is transformed via hypnosis into an unwitting murderer, apparently at the behest of his wife’s ghost. An innocent man (John McGuire) is executed for Kessler’s first murder, but the victim’s twin brother (also John McGuire) teams with Kessler’s daughter (Polly Ann Young) to determine the identity of the true killer. Though cheaply made, The Invisible Ghost maintains an appropriately spooky atmosphere throughout, with Lugosi delivering a full-blooded performance as a basically decent man controlled by homicidal impulses beyond his ken. Best of all is the non-stereotypical performance by african-american actor Clarence Muse as Lugosi’s articulate, take-charge butler.

Die Liste der STASI-Agenten zum Download (Fipro-Liste)

Die vollständige Liste der STASI-Agenten zum Download (Fipro-Liste)

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

MA_Stasi

Unter dem Download-Link  findet sich die “Fipro-Liste”, das detaillierte “Finanzprojekt” der Stasi, angefertigt in den letzten Tagen der DDR, um die Rentenansprüche der rund 100 000 hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter des MfS auch nach dem Zusammenbruch des Systems belegen zu können. Die “Fipro-Liste” ist seit langem bekannt und diente Anfang der neunziger Jahre etwa zur Identifizierung der so genannten OibE – Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz. Diese  Liste „Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz“im Jahre 1991 erschien  in der “taz. Die Echtheit kann beim BStU überprüft werden.

Diese Liste beinhaltet die Namen von 90.598 Mitarbeitern des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der DDR. Die Liste ist nicht vollständig. Insbesondere Mitarbeiter der Führungsebene sind nicht enthalten.

This is a list of 90.598 members of the secret police of East Germany (Ministry for State Security), the list isn’t complete, because the most of the high Officiers lieke Colonel and higher have destroyed the personal Informations in the last days of Eastern Germany.

Listen der Stasimitarbeiter-hier findest Du sie! Was bedeuten die Zahlen?
1.Listen der Stasi-Diensteinheiten!
Bem.:hier kannst du die Nr.(6-stellig) der Dienststellen heraussuchen.
2.Liste der Stasi-Mitarbeiter (Hauptamtlich)
Bem.:Hoffentlich hast Du einen guten Rechner, denn die Liste ist erschreckend lang. Die ersten 6 Ziffern sind das Geburtsdatum + die nächsten 6 Ziffern = Dienstausweisnummer! Die zwei Ziffern hinter dem Geburtsdatum geben das Geschlecht an: 41 und 42 = Männlich, 51 und 52 = Weiblich! Wichtig für suchen und finden, sind die sechs Ziffern in den Semikolon vor den Namen: z.B. ;07;00;44; ! Das ist die Nummer der Dienststelle !
Also du suchst in der Liste der Dienststellen, die Nummer der Dienststelle, die Dich interessiert. Damit gehst Du in die Liste der Mitarbeiter und suchst Dir alle Mitarbeiter der entsprechenden Dienststelle heraus. Ich habe das für mein Wohnort getan und so alle Mitarbeiter gefunden. Ob die Liste Vollständig ist kann ich nicht einschätzen, aber zumindest er/kannte ich einige Exverräter vom Namen her.
3.Liste der OibE (Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz)

THE INVESTMENT – MAGAZINE – THE ORIGINAL – DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN – DAS ORIGINAL – Die vollständige Liste der STASI-Agenten zum Download (Fipro-Liste)
DER BEWEIS “DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN” DAS ORIGINAL IST ECHT
https://berndpulch.org/2011/04/17/der-beweis-das-investment-magazin-das-original/
DER MAGISTER-TITEL VON BERND PULCH IST ECHT
https://berndpulch.org/der-beweis-magisterarbeit-bernd-pulch/

R

Cryptome publishes secret Taliban Fight Files

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/world/asia/green-on-blue-attacks-in-afghanistan-continue.html

An audacious Taliban attack on a heavily fortified base in southern Afghanistan did far more damage than initially reported, destroying or severely damaging eight attack jets in the most destructive single strike on Western matériel in the 11-year war, military officials said Sunday.

While other attacks have caused greater loss of life, the assault late Friday at Camp Bastion in Helmand Province, one of the largest and best-defended posts in Afghanistan, was troubling to NATO because the attackers were able to penetrate the base, killing two Marines and causing more than $200 million in damage. “We’re saying it’s a very sophisticated attack,” said a military official here. “We’ve lost aircraft in battle, but nothing like this.” …

The military investigation into the attack at Bastion is now trying to uncover whether the insurgents had help from inside the camp and whether they were trained or aided by neighboring countries, such as Pakistan or Iran, which have allowed the Taliban to take refuge on their territory. But military officials and Afghan analysts said that the insurgents may well have prepared for their mission in significant measure by studying easily available satellite images on the Internet. “We don’t underestimate the enemy,” the military official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the continuing investigation. “We know the enemy has limited capability to do these, but they are not a whole bunch of yokels running around the country.” …

Wahid Mujda, an Afghan analyst who tracks the Taliban, said that despite the Taliban’s statement that the attack was retaliation for an anti-Muslim video, the video almost certainly had nothing to do with it.

“I do not think that the Camp Bastion attack had anything to do with the anti-Prophet movie,” Mr. Mujda said. “Given the sophistication of the attack one can say with a lot of confidence that the Taliban had been training, rehearsing and preparing for weeks and even months. Everything was not planned and decided overnight.”

He predicted that the Afghan government and the international military forces here would see similar attacks in the future.

“They have experts, strategists, planners and designers, they have a great knowledge of the modern technology,” Mr. Mujda said.

“My sources in the Taliban tell me that every time they want to attack an important target they use Google Maps and other available means for studying and understanding their targets.”

_____

Source of photos below: UK Ministry of Defence imagery website, selected from 369 photos of Camp Bastion and from the US Department of Defense imagery server, selected for over 500 photos on Camp Bastion

 

Camp Bastion Afghanistan Photos

[Image]

Photograph shows Royal Air Force Chinook Mk2 helicopters from 1310 Flight taking off from Camp Bastion airfield in Helmand, Afghanistan. The Joint Helicopter Force (AFGHANISTAN) or JHF (A) is a deployed tri-Service unit from the Joint Helicopter Command. Its primary purpose is to facilitate tactical mobility, reconnaissance and Aviation Fires support to the UK task force in Helmand Province and to the multi-national force of Regional Command (South). October 31, 2011. MoD

[Image]

Photograph shows an Army Air Corps Apache Longbow helicopter landing at Camp Bastion airfield, Afghanistan. The Joint Helicopter Force (AFGHANISTAN) or JHF (A) is a deployed tri-Service unit from the Joint Helicopter Command. Its primary purpose is to facilitate tactical mobility, reconnaissance and Aviation Fires support to the UK task force in Helmand Province and to the multi-national force of Regional Command (South). October 31, 2011. MoD

[Image]

A Royal Navy Sea King Mk4 helicopter is pictured over Camp Bastion, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Royal Navy Sea King Mk4 helicopters from 845 and 846 Naval Air Squadrons normally based with Commando Helicopter Force at the Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton in Somerset, flying as part of the Joint Helicopter Force Afghanistan in support of current operations in Afghanistan. October 5, 2011. MoD

[Image]

Royal Navy Sea King Mk4 helicopters from 845 and 846 Naval Air Squadrons normally based with Commando Helicopter Force at the Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton in Somerset, flying as part of the Joint Helicopter Force Afghanistan in support of current operations in Afghanistan. The helicopters are pictured flying over Camp Bastion, Helmand province. September 28, 2011. MoD

[Image]

An RAF C-130 Hecules aircraft is seen taking off from Camp Bastion Airfield, Afghanistan. The C-130 fleet are part of 904 Expeditionary Air Wing. 904 Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW) is the RAF Headquarters element based at Kandahar airfield, which is a strategically vital location just ten miles from Afghanistan’s second city comprising of 1.2 million people. Kandahar is one of the world’s busiest airfields, with over 400 aircraft and a quarter of a million aircraft movements every year. It is home to a diverse mix of nations operating a vast range of platforms including RAF Reaper Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS), helicopters, strategic and tactical lift such as the RAF C-130, civilian and contractor aircraft and a large number of fast jets including F16, Mirage 2000, FA-18, A-10 and the RAF Tornado GR4. These aircraft operate in harmony to provide critical support to the Land Forces and contribute to the ISAF mission to stabilise and develop Afghanistan. The C-130J Hercules is used in the tactical support role. It is capable of operating from unprepared austere airstrips, and operates in support of Land Forces by moving troops and delivering supplies through air drop. Both aircraft types operate extensively in support of British troops, but are also in demand across the entire operating area and will frequently support Coalition Forces across the whole of Afghanistan. July 5, 2011. MoD

[Image]

[Image]

A Mastiff Armoured vehicle is pictured in front of a Wolfhound. The 2nd Royal Tank Regiment’s Falcon Squadron, based in Tidworth, Hants, have arrived at Camp Bastion in Afghanistan’s Helmand province and are conducting their final training – known as RSOI – before going out on the ground. RSOI – or the Reception Staging and Onward Integration package, to give it its full title – is mandatory for all soldiers entering Afghanistan. Here the guys have a last practice of their skills in the conditions they will face out on the ground. They are also taught the enemy’s latest techniques by soldiers returning from their tour of duty. May 1, 2011. MoD

[Image]

A Royal Air Force aircrewman leaves an RAF Merlin Helicopter at Camp Bastion in Helmand Province, Afghanistan following a successful mission. This image was a winner in the Royal Air Force Photographic Competition 2010. July 7, 2010. MoD

[Image]

Pictured is the Joint Theatre Education Centre at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. Camp Bastion is the main headquarters for British Forces in Afghanistan. December 13, 2009. MoD

[Image]

The sign at the entrance way to Camp Bastion in Helmand, Afghanistan. Camp Bastion is the main headquarters for British Forces in Afghanistan. Within it’s perimeter are an airfield, offices and accommodation. December 12, 2009. MoD

[Image]

[Image]

The two tier accommodation blocks at Camp Bastion, Helmand, Afghanistan. Camp Bastion is the headquarters for British Forces in Afghanistan.  December 13, 2009. MoD

[Image]

Pictured is the Church at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan where troops of several different denominations are able to worship. Designed not only as a worship centre for the military personnel in Camp Bastion, it also provides a haven in the midst of a very robust and exhausting working environment and is used almost constantly by day and through the evenings. Camp Bastion is the main headquarters for British Forces in Afghanistan. December 13, 2009. MoD

[Image]

A Jackal Armoured Vehicle is put through it’s paces at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. The Jackal is a highly manoeuvreable Mobility Weapon-Mounted Installation Kit (MWMIK) vehicle that dramatically improves upon the adapted Land Rover WMIK previously used in theatre. April 2, 2008. MoD

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The Medical Treatment Facility at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. The Medical Treatment Facility (MTF), which is housed in one of the few solid buildings at Bastion replaces the tented field hospital that has been used since 2003. The temperature-controlled building allows the medics to better avoid the heat, cold or dust that come with the Helmand territory. With a fully equipped operating theatre supporting two operating tables, the MTF also supports up to six beds for the most critically injured in an Intensive Treatment Unit (ITU). Two general wards handle patients with recovery needs and there are an additional two separate, private rooms, supplying a total capacity of 37 beds, with room for expansion. February 9, 2008. MoD

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An aerial image of the Royal Marine Armoured Support Troop (AST) as they move their Viking all terrain vehicles from Kandahar to Camp Bastion in Helmand Province. October 21, 2006. MoD

Images following from the US Department of Defense imagery server, selected for over 500 on Camp Bastion [Image]

The American flag flies at half-staff outside the hangar of Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, Jan. 24, 2012. The squadron held a ceremony to honor six Marines who were killed when their CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter crashed conducting combat operations in Helmand province, Afghanistan, Jan. 19, 2012. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Brian Adam Jones/Released)

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U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Mark Sabatino, a plane captain with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369, performs maintenance on an AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter at Camp Bastion, Helmand province, Afghanistan, Jan. 19, 2012. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Brian Adam Jones/Released)

[Image]

U.S. Marines render a gunfighter salute during an awards ceremony in honor of Sgt. Christopher Lemke, a mechanic with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369, at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, Jan. 12, 2012. Lemke discovered a previously unknown issue with a UH-1Y Venom aircraft that represented an extreme risk to the aircraft and aircrew. Lemke was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Brian Jones/Released)

[Image]

U.S. Marines and Coalition Forces run in a half-marathon on New Year’s Day, aboard Camp Bastion, Helmand province, Afghanistan, January 1, 2012. The event was held to raise money for the British Limbless Ex-Service Men’s Association, an organization dedicated to helping UK troops who have lost limbs in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Timothy L. Solano)

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U.S. Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369 raise their arms as a UH-1Y Venom helicopter takes off Dec. 5, 2011, at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. Marines with HMLA-369 raise their arms as a form of saluting to wish pilots and other crew members a safe mission. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Robert R. Carrasco/Released)

[Image]

British Soldiers offload from a UH-60 Blackhawk to pick up an injured Afghan Uniformed Policeman aboard forward operating base Jackson, Sangin, Afghanistan Oct. 2, 2011. The policeman was transported to Camp Bastion for further medical care. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Armando Mendoza/Released)

UK Drones unveiled by Cryptome

UK Drones

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A Royal Air Force Reaper UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) from 39 Squadron, makes its approach to Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan following a mission. The aircraft, armed with Paveway bombs and Hellfire missiles, is remotely controlled from Kandahar for takeoff and landing and by British troops in Nevada, USA during the actual sortie. 1 November 2010. MoD

[Image]

This image shows Reaper a Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS), part of 39 Squadron Royal Air Force. The Reaper has completed 20,000 operational flight hours in theatre, and is operated from Kandahar Air Field (KAF) in Afghanistan. Reaper is a medium-to-high altitude, long endurance Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS). The Reaper’s primary mission is to act as an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset, employing sensors to provide real-time data to commanders and intelligence specialists at all levels. Febraury 28, 2011. MoD

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A Reaper Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) comes into land at Kandahar Airbase in Helmand, Afghanistan. Breaking new ground for the RAF, the MQ-9 Reaper has become an invaluable asset in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. It is able to spend great lengths of time silently observing the enemy before using a range of precision munitions to defend coalition troops and civilians from danger. This image was a runner-up in the RAF 2011 Photographic Competititon. January 5, 2011. MoD

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A pilot from 39 Sqn remotely controls a Reaper MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, during a training sortie over the west coast of America from Creech Air Force Base. UAV’s can be remotely piloted on Operation Herrick in Afghanistan from half way around the world at Creech AFB. 39 Sqn who are parented by RAF Waddington in the UK currently have around 70 personnel based in Nevada covering all trades from pilots to administration staff. March 19, 2009. MoD

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A Reaper MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operated by 39 Squadron of the Royal Air Force, awaits take off from Creech Air Force Bace, Nevada prior to a training mission over the west coast of America. 39 Sqn, who are parented by RAF Waddington in the UK, currently have around 70 personnel based in Nevada covering all trades from Pilots to admin staff. March 19, 2009. MoD

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Watchkeeper makes it’s first flight in the UK. The new UAV flew for the first time in the UK on 14 April 2010, taking off from dedicated facilities at Parc Aberporth in West Wales for a 20-minute flight. Watchkeeper provides enhanced UAV capability that will enable commanders to detect and track targets for long periods, without the need to deploy troops into potentially sensitive or dangerous areas. The system is capable of rapid deployment and operations anywhere in the world and will support the information requirements of all three services. April 13, 2012. MoD

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A soldier of Bravo Company, 1 Rifles is pictured manning a Desert Hawk UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) from a remote controlling unit in Afghanistan. Desert Hawk is a portable UAV surveillance system which provides aerial video reconnaissance. It has a flight time of approximately one hour, and can fly anywhere within a 10km radius of its ground control station. It has both day and night time (thermal imaging) capability. The equipment can be used for a variety of tasks, such as force protection for convoys and patrols, route clearance, base security, reconnaissance or target tracking. The operator is able to view and record data in real time and act upon any hostile activity that the UAV encounters. March 20, 2009. MoD

 

[Image]A soldier of Bravo Company, 1 Rifles launches a Desert Hawk UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) from a WMIK Landrover during an operation near Garmsir, Afghanistan. Desert Hawk is a portable UAV surveillance system which provides aerial video reconnaissance. It has a flight time of approximately one hour, and can fly anywhere within a 10km radius of its ground control station. It has both day and night time (thermal imaging) capability. The equipment can be used for a variety of tasks, such as force protection for convoys and patrols, route clearance, base security, reconnaissance or target tracking. March 20, 2009. MoD

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A soldier of the Royal Artillery launches a Desert Hawk UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) during Operation Ghartse Dagger in Helmand, Afghanistan. Desert Hawk is a portable UAV surveillance system which provides aerial video reconnaissance. It has a flight time of approximately one hour, and can fly anywhere within a 10km radius of its ground control station. It has both day and night time (thermal imaging) capability. The equipment can be used for a variety of tasks, such as force protection for convoys and patrols, route clearance, base security, reconnaissance or target tracking. March 5, 2008. MoD

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The Unmanned Aerial System, Predator aircraft ready for take-off on the runway. Set up in January 2004 as an urgent operational requirement to support coalition operations in the Multi-National Division (South East) or MND (SE) of Iraq, 1115 Flight consists of 45 predominantly Royal Air Force personnel comprising pilots, sensor operators, engineers and other support personnel. The pilots and sensor operators work round-the-clock at Ground Control Stations housed at Nellis Air Force Base whilst the engineers are based at Creech Air Force Base both of which are in Nevada USA. Flying the Predator Unmanned Aerial System, they provide vital persistent, wide-area surveillance to support troops on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan. If called upon to do so they can also provide close air support, video support of surface actions, air strike coordination, and direct fire support. May 24, 2006.

SECRET – French Army Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level

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This document covers a particular course of action that is a subset of tactical operations and is conducted primarily during the stabilization phase in order to restore security: counterinsurgency (COIN). It has been developed in order to compensate for the lack of appropriate tactical procedures adapted from classical coercive methods (offensive or defensive) and the control of secured areas.

It consists of a course of action intended to face an asymmetric threat imbedded in an armed organization that indiscriminately employs guerilla tactics or terrorism. This course of action uses procedures previously widespread but then abandoned after the war in Algeria, but which are making a comeback due to their relevance in Iraq and Afghanistan.

COIN not only covers the tactical aspects of the fight against armed anti-organizational forces but obligatorily becomes part of a global maneuver where the population is at stake. The armed forces therefore intervene to back-up a government strategy that includes COIN by lending support when the situation goes beyond the capability of security forces to maintain order, or in some cases, when these forces do not exist.

0.2.1 Types of Armed Protest and their Organization

In the context of intra-state conflict, the protest against legitimate political authority can take on several forms – described in the schematic below – two of which, not exclusive of each other, basically arise from the armed struggle: guerilla warfare and terrorism. They are the expression of the same armed resistance phenomenon: insurgency.

The protagonists can be classified in three types of systems: the predator system revolving around the search for profit, the demand system focused on seizing local power and the subversive system with a “revolutionary” nature, which seeks to impose its values without any concession. However, the different actors in asymmetrical conflicts frequently belong to hybrid systems, for example, simultaneously acting as both predators and protestors.

Whatever the type, insurgency is structured in relation to its environment, and, in particular, in relation to the population which represents the major stake. This point is fundamental.

 

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DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

FR-TacticalCOIN

Serial Killers: Aileen Wuornos – Full Movie

Aileen Carol Wuornos (February 29, 1956 — October 9, 2002) was an American serial killer who killed seven men in Florida in 1989 and 1990. Wuornos claimed that her victims had either raped or attempted to rape her while she was working as a prostitute, and that all of the killings were committed in self-defense. She was convicted and sentenced to death for seven of the murders and was executed by the State of Florida by lethal injection on October 9, 2002.

American Scary – Full Movie

AMERICAN SCARY is a look at the nation’s tradition of horror hosting, from Zacherley to A. Ghastlee Ghoul. With interviews and footage from major hosts from the 1950s to the present day, such as Zacherley, Vampira, Ghoulardi and others, along with memories from celebrities and fans who were influenced by these hosts, you’ll follow this American folk art form from its glamorous beginnings, through repeated waves of popularity in the 1960s and 1970s, to its scrappy resurgence and survival in the current age of cable access and the Internet. American Scary looks to remind people how much fun local TV could be — and maybe could be again.

TOP-SECRET – Restricted U.S. Army Technical Escort Battalion Operations Manual

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FM 3-11.20 Technical Escort Battalion Operations

  • 228 pages
  • Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only, due to the sensitive nature of information within this manual
  • August 2007

Field Manual (FM) 3-11.20 provides doctrine for planning and conducting technical escort (TE) operations. It describes—

• Mission analysis.
• Hazard and site characterization.
• Sampling.
• Monitoring.
• Mitigation.
• Decontamination.
• Disablement.
• Elimination.
• Munitions assessment.
• Emergency response.
• Sensitive-site exploitation (SSE).

This manual specifically targets TE battalion commanders and staffs and key agencies with the tools and information necessary to plan and execute TE operations. It also provides reference information for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) personnel.

ORGANIZATION

1-3. TE battalions are organized into CBRN teams and remediation and restoration teams (RRTs).

• CBRN teams provide—
• Support to joint task forces (JTFs) and CCDRs.
• Forward employment in nonpermissive environments.
• Complete unit core capabilities to supported elements.
• Domestic crisis management support for chemical-biological (CB) devices to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DOD, and local responders.
• CBRN advice, secure reach-back, CBRN assessment, and chemical expertise to other emergency response teams worldwide.
• RRTs are stewards of the environment. They provide—
• Remediation and response for CBRN material to the Army Corps of Engineers (COE), the product manager for nonstockpile chemical material, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and state and local governments.
• Complete unit core capabilities to supported elements.

DOMESTIC

2-4. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the LFA for crisis and consequence management. DOD support to DHS includes (1) identifying, assessing, dismantling, transferring, and disposing of a contaminant and (2) conducting decontamination operations. Additionally, incidents involving CBRN environments often require a response according to a specific federal emergency operations plan, such as the National Response Plan (NRP), the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (commonly referred to as the National Contingency Plan [NCP]; Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 300), or the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). These plans designate an LFA to coordinate the federal response, and the type of emergency determines the LFA. In general, an LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with agencies providing direct support. (Appendix A lists the LFA for each of the emergency support functions [ESFs] designated in the NRP.)

CIVIL SUPPORT

8-7. Civil support includes assistance to U.S. civic authorities for—

• Domestic emergencies.
• Designated law enforcement within the scope of restrictions required by 18 USC 1385 (the Posse Comitatus Act).
• Other incidents approved by the Secretary of Defense.

8-8. Support must be consistent with military readiness, DOD directives, and the law. The employment of military forces within the United States and its territories and possessions under the auspices of civil support typically falls under the broad mission of military assistance to civil authorities. This mission consists of three mission subsets:

• Military support to civil authorities.
• Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies.
• Military assistance for civil disturbances.

8-9. As directed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, DHS is the LFA for CBRN crisis management and consequence management. DOD supports DHS by identifying, assessing, dismantling, transferring, and disposing of contaminants and by conducting decontamination operations. Additionally, an incident involving CBRN contamination is likely to require a response according to a specific federal emergency OPLAN (such as the NRP, NCP, or Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan). These plans designate an LFA to coordinate the federal response depending on the type of emergency. In general, an LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with agencies providing direct support to the LFA.

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

USArmy-TechEscort

Madness in the Fast Lane – Full Movie – Must watch !

Ursula and Sabina Eriksson, born 1967, are a pair of Swedish twins who came to national attention in the United Kingdom in 2008 after an apparent episode of folie à deux which resulted in unique footage of insanity on the M6 motorway and the killing of Glenn Hollinshead. No drugs or alcohol were involved in any of the incidents.[1][2] Their actions have never been explained, other than by a rare, induced delusional disorder which caused the pair to be temporarily insane.[3]
The twins met in Ireland before travelling to England. After their odd behaviour caused them to be left at an M6 service station, they ran on to the motorway numerous times and were struck by oncoming vehicles, causing Ursula to be incapacitated. Sabina refused medical aid and attacked a police officer, at which point she was arrested. After being released by police in Stoke-on-Trent, Sabina then was taken in by a local resident whom she later killed in an unprovoked attack. She was arrested after jumping off a bridge into a busy road and later pleaded guilty to manslaughter with diminished responsibility. She was sentenced to five years imprisonment and was scheduled for release in mid-2011.
Sabina was paroled in 2011; her whereabouts are currently unknown.

Horror Hotel – Full Movie

A female college student visits a small New England town called Whitewood during her winter vacation so she can research her paper on witchcraft. She checks into the “Raven’s Inn,” run by Mrs. Newlis and notices some weird happenings. She soon finds herself “marked” for sacrifice by the undead coven of witches led by the innkeeper.

George Baxt scripted this extraordinarily good chiller from a story by Milton Subotsky, who also co-produced. A college student (Venetia Stevenson) with an interest in witchcraft goes to the Massachusetts town of Whitewood. It’s a foggy, spooky town which gets even scarier when Stevenson discovers that the owner of the Raven’s Inn, Mrs. Newlis (Patricia Jessel) is in fact a 268-year old witch. Jessel sold her soul to the Devil to regain her life after being burned at the stake. The whole town is her coven, including Stevenson’s kindly history professor (Christopher Lee). Stevenson’s boyfriend and brother arrive to look for her and discover human sacrifices and all sorts of evil goings-on. One of the few horror films of the period which still has the power to frighten, Horror Hotel is required viewing for genre fans.

Crytome unveils 600 Photos of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

600 Photos of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS March 11-28, 2011

 


On 11 September 2012 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) released 600 photos taken March 11-28, 2011 after the tsunami hit the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station. These are the TEPCO links to 40 collections within the 600.

List and Thumbnails of the 600 Photos (1.1MB)
TEPCO listed links in reverse chronoligical order
(40) Around the Unit 4 Reactor Building  March 28, 2011
(39) Unit 1 and 2 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Inside)   March 28, 2011
(38) Unit 1 and 2 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Outside)   March 28, 2011
(37) Unit 2 Transformer Area  March 28, 2011
(36) Unit 1 Transformer Area  March 28, 2011
(35) Unit 4 Instrument Air Compressor   March 25, 2011
(34) Around the Unit 1 Large Equipment Hatch  March 23, 2011
(33) Inside the Unit 2 Power Source Room  March 23, 2011
(32) Unit 3 and 4 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Inside)  March 23, 2011
(31) Unit 3 and 4 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Outside)  March 23, 2011
(30) Sea side area of Unit 2  March 23, 2011
(29) Sea side area of Unit 1  March 23, 2011
(28) At Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  March 23, 2011
(27) Inside the Unit 2 Basement Power Source Room  March 23, 2011
(26) Inside the Unit 2 Alternate Power Source Room  March 23, 2011
(25) Around the Unit 2 Alternate Power Source Room   March 23, 2011
(24) Inside the Unit 1 Power Source Room  March 23, 2011
(23) Around the Outdoor Power Panel  March 22, 2011
(22) Cable Route from the Reserve Power Substation to Unit 2 Turbine Building Power Panel  March 22, 2011
(21) Inside Reserve Power Substation March 22, 2011
(20) Around Reserve Power Substation March 22, 2011
(19) Unit 6 Transformer Area March 22, 2011
(18) Unit 5 and 6 Ultraigh Voltage Switchyard Area (Inside)  March 22, 2011
(17) Unit 5 Transformer Area March 22, 2011
(16) Unit 5 and 6 Switchyard Area (Outside)  March 22, 2011
(15) The Situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after the explosion of Unit 1,3 and 4. March 17, 2011
(14) Inside the Unit 5 Power Source Room March 17, 2011
(13) Inside the Unit 5 and 6 Vertical Shafts March 17, 2011
(12) Inside the Unit 6 Power Source Room March 17, 2011
(11) Inside the Unit 5 and 6 Transmission Board Room  March 17, 2011
(10) Inside the Unit 5 and 6 Main Control Room March 17, 2011
(9) Sea side area of Unit 5 and 6 March 17, 2011
(8) Appearance of Unit 3 after the explosion, and appearance of Unit 4 before the explosion viewed from Unit 3 March 11, 2011
(7) Appearance of Unit 1 after the explosion March 11, 2011
(6) The situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in the aftermath of the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake March 11, 2011
(5) The status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station when the tsunami hit March 11, 2011
(4) The situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake March 11, 2011
(3) The situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Main Office Building, etc.) after the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake March 11, 2011
(2) The status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station when the tsunami hit (Undertow) March 11, 2011
(1) The shallow draft quay in the aftermath of the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake March 11, 2011

 

 

 


	

Big, Bigger, Biggest: Prison – Full Documentary Movie

This episode reveals the engineering breakthroughs behind one of the world’s most secure prisons.
Holding over 1400 of America’s most dangerous prisoners North Branch Correctional Institution is claimed to be the most advanced prison in the US. Over two thirds of the men at the prison have killed and most dream of escape. They are locked up in cells able to withstand bomb blasts and the prison is brimming with technology designed to keep them secure and safe from each other.
But North Branch Correctional Institution wasn’t designed and built in a day.
It stands on the shoulders of historic engineering achievements that have allowed it to grow so secure. This film charts the stories of four historic innovations, embodied by landmark facilities — giants of the prison world.
One by one — traveling up the scale — this film reveals the incredible stories behind these machines and the inventions that drove them ever more secure. four ingenious leaps forward that enabled prisons to become SAFER, TOUGHER and BIGGER.
The film investigates how designers of London’s most infamous prison, the Tower of London, needed to fortify the perimeter after a daring escape. The film explores the development of a comprehensive surveillance system at Eastern State Penitentiary that watched over the US’s most notorious criminals including Al Capone. The system kept inmates safe from each other, and the guards secure. At the prison of Alcatraz Island a former inmate and guard explain how remote control doors made of toughened steel were impossible to hack though, but how weaknesses in cell design were exploited by prisoners in one of the most audacious and infamous escapes of all time.
At every stage the film shows how each invention and lesson is applied to North Branch Correctional Institution as it follows the day to day running of the prison. The film finds out from the prisoners themselves what it’s like to be locked up inside one of the world’s most secure prisons. It meets the guards who monitor inmates 24 hours a day and explores the defenses that make the perimeter impenetrable. The latest in riot control equipment is put to the test as we see the effects of non-lethal weapons such as pepper spray and Tasers on unlucky volunteers.
Stunning CGI animation brings the four innovations and landmark prisons to life. Combined with practical demonstrations this film provides the ultimate explanation of how ingenious technology enabled the prison to evolve into one of the most secure facilities in the world — North Branch Correctional Institution.

Public Intelligence – International Association of Chiefs of Police Recommended Guidelines for Using Drones

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Rapid advances in technology have led to the development and increased use of unmanned aircraft. That technology is now making its way into the hands of law enforcement officers nationwide.

We also live in a culture that is extremely sensitive to the idea of preventing unnecessary government intrusion into any facet of our lives. Personal rights are cherished and legally protected by the Constitution. Despite their proven effectiveness, concerns about privacy threaten to overshadow the benefits this technology promises to bring to public safety. From enhanced officer safety by exposing unseen dangers, to finding those most vulnerable who may have wandered away from their caregivers, the potential benefits are irrefutable. However, privacy concerns are an issue that must be dealt with effectively if a law enforcement agency expects the public to support the use of UA by their police.

The Aviation Committee has been involved in the development of unmanned aircraft policy and regulations for several years. The Committee recommends the following guidelines for use by any law enforcement agency contemplating the use of unmanned aircraft.

DEFINITIONS:

1. Model Aircraft – A remote controlled aircraft used by hobbyists, which is manufactured and operated for the purposes of sport, recreation and/or competition.
2. Unmanned Aircraft (UA) – An aircraft that is intended to navigate in the air without an on-board pilot. Also called Remote Piloted Aircraft and “drones.”
3. UA Flight Crewmember – A pilot, visual observer, payload operator or other person assigned duties for a UA for the purpose of flight.
4. Unmanned Aircraft Pilot – A person exercising control over an unmanned aircraft during flight.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT:

1. Law enforcement agencies desiring to use UA should first determine how they will use this technology, including the costs and benefits to be gained.
2. The agency should then engage their community early in the planning process, including their governing body and civil liberties advocates.
3. The agency should assure the community that it values the protections provided citizens by the U.S. Constitution. Further, that the agency will operate the aircraft in full compliance with the mandates of the Constitution, federal, state and local law governing search and seizure.
4. The community should be provided an opportunity to review and comment on agency procedures as they are being drafted. Where appropriate, recommendations should be considered for adoption in the policy.
5. As with the community, the news media should be brought into the process early in its development.

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS:

1. The UA should have the ability to capture flight time by individual flight and cumulative over a period of time. The ability to reset the flight time counter should be restricted to a supervisor or administrator.
2. The aircraft itself should be painted in a high visibility paint scheme. This will facilitate line of sight control by the aircraft pilot and allow persons on the ground to monitor the location of the aircraft. This recommendation recognizes that in some cases where officer safety is a concern, such as high risk warrant service, high visibility may not be optimal. However, most situations of this type are conducted covertly and at night. Further, given the ability to observe a large area from an aerial vantage point, it may not be necessary to fly the aircraft directly over the target location.
3. Equipping the aircraft with weapons of any type is strongly discouraged. Given the current state of the technology, the ability to effectively deploy weapons from a small UA is doubtful. Further, public acceptance of airborne use of force is likewise doubtful and could result in unnecessary community resistance to the program.
4. The use of model aircraft, modified with cameras, or other sensors, is discouraged due to concerns over reliability and safety.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES:

1. UA operations require a Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). A law enforcement agency contemplating the use of UA should contact the FAA early in the planning process to determine the requirements for obtaining a COA.
2. UA will only be operated by personnel, both pilots and crew members, who have been trained and certified in the operation of the system. All agency personnel with UA responsibilities, including command officers, will be provided training in the policies and procedures governing their use.
3. All flights will be approved by a supervisor and must be for a legitimate public safety mission, training, or demonstration purposes.
4. All flights will be documented on a form designed for that purpose and all flight time shall be accounted for on the form. The reason for the flight and name of the supervisor approving will also be documented.
5. An authorized supervisor/administrator will audit flight documentation at regular intervals. The results of the audit will be documented. Any changes to the flight time counter will be documented.
6. Unauthorized use of a UA will result in strict accountability.
7. Except for those instances where officer safety could be jeopardized, the agency should consider using a “Reverse 911” telephone system to alert those living and working in the vicinity of aircraft operations (if such a system is available). If such a system is not available, the use of patrol car public address systems should be considered. This will not only provide a level of safety should the aircraft make an uncontrolled landing, but citizens may also be able to assist with the incident.
8. Where there are specific and articulable grounds to believe that the UA will collect evidence of criminal wrongdoing and if the UA will intrude upon reasonable expectations of privacy, the agency will secure a search warrant prior to conducting the flight.

IMAGE RETENTION:

1. Unless required as evidence of a crime, as part of an on-going investigation, for training, or required by law, images captured by a UA should not be retained by the agency.
2. Unless exempt by law, retained images should be open for public inspection.