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✌️Julian Assange: Wikileaks and Empire – Original Document✌️

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✌UK High Court Judgment on Assange Appeal – Original Document✌

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Assange High Court Appeal, July 7, 2023 – Original Document ✌️@abovetopsecretxxl

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EXPOSED:WikiLeaks Vault 7 CIA Files, January 21, 2023

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UK Home Secretary Approves The Extradition Of Julian Assange To The US

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The Council Of Europe Commissioner For Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović Officially Called Not To Extradite Julian Assange – Original Document

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USA vs. Wikileaks: Assange nun auch wegen Spionage ...

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LEAKED – Soros Email To Podesta Re Transition WikiLeaks – ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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WIKILEAKS – COLLATERAL MURDER – VIDEO

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USA-Vs-Assange-Judgment-Summary – Original Document

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USA vs. Wikileaks: Assange nun auch wegen Spionage ...
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High Court In London Allows Extradition Of Wikileaks Julian Assange To The United States

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A judge blocked Assange’s extradition in January over concerns about his mental condition. The High Court said Friday that it had received appropriate assurances from the U.S. to meet the threshold for extradition.

He is wanted in the U.S. on charges of violating the Espionage Act.

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DID WIKILEAKS RELEASE A MOON LANDING CUT SCENE ALLEGEDLY FILMED IN NEVADA DESERT?

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Stella Morris Speaks At Huge Protest For Julian Assange And Press Freedom In London

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Today there was a major protest in London, United Kingdom, to stop the extradition to the United States for journalist Julian Assange. In this video his fiancee Stella Morris speaks out against the horrible treatment of this innocent journalist who is currently in jail and facing a lifetime in prison. Video shot by EFF Press.

LIVE – Assange Supporters Rally In London

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Whaaaat?!! The CIA Plotted To MURDER Julian Assange!!

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Edward Snowden & Julian Assange’s Warning About The Security And Surveillance Industrial Complex

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LIVESTREAM – London Court Holds Hearing For US Appeal Against Denial Of Assange’s Extradition

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Ruptly is live outside the Royal Courts of Justice in London, as a preliminary hearing for the United States appeal against the denial on Julian Assange’s extradition to the US to face espionage charges is held. Assange is expected to attend the hearing in person.

A protest in his support is set to take place outside the court. ​Following that hearing, the High Court is expected to schedule a date to hear full appeal arguments. ​​In July, Britain’s High Court granted the US government a permission to appeal an earlier decision by a lower court judge that Assange could not be sent to the United States to face charges due to concerns over his mental health and potential risk of suicide in the US prison system. ​​

The Wikileaks founder faces seventeen charges under the Espionage Act, and one under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the US. He could get a sentence of 175 years in prison, if convicted. ​ ​​Currently, Assange is held in near-solitary confinement in London’s HMP Belmarsh.​

WikiLeaks – US Spy Order In France – Original Document

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France rejects asylum request by Wikileaks founder Assange - World News
Julian Assange
Page 1 of WikiLeaks US Spy Order France In
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US Appeal Of Assange Extradition Decision ‘Not Unexpected’

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A UK court is allowing the US to appeal a decision denying the extradition of Julian Assange after a judge refused the request in January. Mr Assange’s lawyer Jennifer Robinson says the appeal is “not unexpected” after the ruling at the beginning of the year but the likelihood it will be granted is unknown.

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Attorney: U.S. Case Against Julian Assange Falls Apart – Report

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One of the main witnesses in Julian Assange’s extradition case has admitted he made false claims against Assange in exchange for immunity from prosecution, a bombshell revelation that could have a major impact on the WikiLeaks founder’s fate.

Assange faces up to 175 years in prison if brought to the U.S., where he was indicted for violations of the Espionage Act related to the publication of classified documents exposing U.S. war crimes. According to a new article in the Icelandic newspaper Stundin, the convicted hacker Sigurdur “Siggi” Thordarson falsely claimed he was a prominent WikiLeaks representative instructed by Assange to carry out hacking attacks, but he was in fact only tangentially involved with the organization.

The article suggests the U.S. Justice Department collaborated with Thordarson to generate the indictment for Assange that was submitted to the British courts. “This is just the latest revelation to demonstrate why the U.S. case should be dropped,” says Jennifer Robinson, a human rights attorney who has been advising Assange and WikiLeaks since 2010.

“The factual basis for this case has completely fallen apart.” #DemocracyNow Democracy Now! is an independent global news hour that airs on nearly 1,400 TV and radio stations Monday through Friday. Watch our livestream 8-9AM ET: https://democracynow.org Please consider supporting independent media by making a donation to Democracy Now! today: https://democracynow.org/donate

Docu – Julian Assange And WikiLeaks – Story Of A Whistleblower

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The decision not to extradite Julian Assange to the US is unlikely to be the end of his struggle. For the past 10 years, a team of reporters has followed Assange and the WikiLeaks network.

In their first film in 2011, they portrayed Julian Assange and his team as transparency activists, fighting for a new, open relationship between citizens and information. Since then, Wikileaks has come under constant pressure from the US government. But the site nevertheless continued to publish secret and explosive information that has both illuminated and shaped our world.

In 2013, the team met Julian Assange again, interviewing him in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. At the time, Assange had no idea that he was going to spend the next seven years in these rooms, observed by surveillance cameras. In 2016, Wikileaks played a crucial role in the election of US President Donald Trump. In 2017, it tried to similarly influence the French election. Throughout the years, the reporters have kept filming, talking to Julian Assange’s father, who regularly visits him in London’s Belmarsh prison, as well as to his lawyers. Today, Julian Assange and WikiLeaks are at a turning point in their history.

To his detractors, Assange is a spy and a traitor, and deserves his fate. His supporters say the US extradition request is a serious and unprecedented attack on the freedom of information, protected by the US constitution. And who’s to say that the news outlets that have collaborated with WikiLeaks won’t be prosecuted, as well?

JULIAN ASSANGE VICTORIOUS IN UK COURT FIGHT

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Here is the the Court Judgement

TOP SECRET Files About And From Julian Assange & Wikileaks Unveiled

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Democracy Now – Julian Assange Is FREE – Charges Dropped

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Video – Trend Micro about Putins Cyber Espionage Troops Pawn Storm

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Unveiled – Swedish Prosecutors Ask Assange for Clarifications

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The prosecutors have received Julian Assange’s consent, with some reservations, to be interviewed in London and have his DNA taken. The prosecutors have asked for clarifications concerning the reservations.

– As soon as it becomes clear that there are no obstacles for the planned investigation matters, we will submit a request for legal assistance to the British authorities to further continue the investigation. A request will also be sent to the Ecuadorian authorities regarding permission to perform investigative measures at the country’s embassy in London, says Director of Public Prosecution Marianne Ny.

At present, it is not possible to estimate when the interview will take place.

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Unveiled – WikiLeaks Project K-Release of Kissinger Cables

WikiLeaks Project K – Release of Kissinger Cables

A sends:

From: “Sunshine Press”
Date: Apr 7, 2013 7:37 PM
Subject: WIKILEAKS PRESS RELEASE | THE KISSINGER CABLES OVER 1.3 MILLION DOCUMENTS
To: “Sunshine Press The”

WIKILEAKS SPECIAL PROJECT K: THE KISSINGER CABLES

‘Investigative journalism has never been this effective!’ Publico

The Kissinger Cables are part of today’s launch of the WikiLeaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD), which holds the world’s largest searchable collection of United States confidential, or formerly confidential, diplomatic communications. As of its launch on April 8, 2013 it holds 2 million records comprising approximately 1 billion words.

WikiLeaks’ publisher Julian Assange stated: “The collection covers US involvements in, and diplomatic or intelligence reporting on, every country on Earth. It is the single most significant body of geopolitical material ever published.”

THE KISSINGER CABLES

“The illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a little longer.” — Henry A. Kissinger, US Secretary of State, March 10, 1975: http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/P860114-1573_MC_b.html#efmCS3CUB

The Kissinger Cables comprise more than 1.7 million US diplomatic records for the period 1973 to 1976, including 205,901 records relating to former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Dating from January 1, 1973 to December 31, 1976 they cover a variety of diplomatic traffic including cables, intelligence reports and congressional correspondence. They include more than 1.3 million full diplomatic cables and 320,000 originally classified records. These include more than 227,000 cables classified as “CONFIDENTIAL” and 61,000 cables classified as “SECRET”. Perhaps more importantly, there are more than 12,000 documents with the sensitive handling restriction “NODIS” or ‘no distribution’, and more than 9,000 labelled “Eyes Only”.

At around 700 million words, the Kissinger Cables collection is approximately five times the size of WikiLeaks’ Cablegate. The raw PDF data is more than 380 Gigabytes in size and is the largest WikiLeaks publication to date.

WikiLeaks’ media partners will be reporting throughout the week on their findings. These include significant revelations about US involvements with fascist dictatorships, particularly in Latin America, under Franco’s Spain (including about the Spanish royal family) and in Greece under the regime of the Colonels.

The documents also contain hourly diplomatic reporting on the 1973 war between Israel, Egypt and Syria (the “Yom Kippur war”). While several of these documents have been used by US academic researchers in the past, the Kissinger Cables provides unparalleled access to journalists and the general public.

Most of the records were reviewed by the United States Department of State’s systematic 25-year declassification process. At review, the records were assessed and either declassified or kept classified with some or all of the metadata records declassified. Both sets of records were then subject to an additional review by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Once believed to be releasable, they were placed as individual PDFs at the National Archives as part of their Central Foreign Policy Files collection. Despite the review process supposedly assessing documents after 25 years there are no diplomatic records later than 1976. The formal declassification and review process of these extremely valuable historical documents is therefore currently running 12 years late.

The form in which these documents were held at NARA was as 1.7 million individual PDFs. To prepare these documents for integration into the PlusD collection, WikiLeaks obtained and reverse-engineered all 1.7 million PDFs and performed a detailed analysis of individual fields, developed sophisticated technical systems to deal with the complex and voluminous data and corrected a great many errors introduced by NARA, the State Department or its diplomats, for example harmonizing the many different ways in which departments, capitals and people’s names were spelt. All our corrective work is referenced and available from the links in the individual field descriptions on the PlusD text search interface: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd

RECLASSIFICATION ATTEMPTS THWARTED

The CIA and other agencies have attempted to reclassify or withhold sections of the US National Archives. Detailed minutes of US State Department meetings show that these attempts, which originated under the Bush II administration, have continued on through until at least 2009. A 2006 analysis by the US National Security Archives, an independent non-governmental research institute and library located at George Washington University, found that 55,000 pages had been secretly reclassified.

The censorship of the US National Archives was thrown into stark relief in November last year when the Archive censored all searches for ‘WikiLeaks’ from its records. See http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2012/11/03/us-national-archives-has-blocked-searches-for-wikileaks/

Julian Assange, WikiLeaks’ publisher, said: “The US administration cannot be trusted to maintain the history of its interactions with the world. Fortunately, an organisation with an unbroken record in resisting censorship attempts now has a copy.”

MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS REPORTING THIS WEEK

Australia – Fairfax (Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, the Canberra Times and the Australian Fianancial Review)
Argentina – Pagina 12
Brazil – Publica
Bulgaria – Bivol
Egypt – Al Masry Al Youm
Greece – Ta Nea
Guatemala – Plaza Publica
Haiti – Haiti Liberte
India – The Hindu
Italy – L’Espresso
Italy – La Repubblica
Lebanon – Al Akhbar
Mexico – La Jornada
Spain – Publico
Sweden – Aftonbladet
UK – Press Association
US – Associated Press
US – The Nation

PRESS CONFERENCE

WikiLeaks Special Project K: concerning the United States, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Central and South East Asia, Europe and the Pacific, with special focus on Israel, Russia, India, Japan, South Africa, France and Francophone Africa.

WHERE

The National Press Club
The Holeman Lounge
529 14th St. NW
13th Floor
Washington, DC
20045

+1 202-662-7500

WHEN

Monday April 8th at 9am (Washington time)

INTERVIEWS

WikiLeaks Spokesperson Kristinn Hrafnsson is available for interviews after the press conference please make arrangements with Melanie Lerardi ( Mlerardi@press.org ) or +1 (202) 662 7502 alternatively you can call Kristinn directly on +354 821 7121 or email sunshinepress@this.is

STATUS UPDATES

WIKILEAKS AND JULIAN ASSANGE

After WikiLeaks’ publication of Pentagon and State Department documents in 2010, the White House launched a multi-agency investigation into WikiLeaks and its publisher Julian Assange. The investigation includes the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI, the State Department, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) among others. The DoJ / FBI investigation is ongoing, as is its associated Grand Jury in Alexandria, Virginia, which is headed up by District Attorney Neil McBride, a current candidate for the FBI directorship.

A number of senior political figures in the United States have called for the assassination, extraordinary rendition or kidnapping of Julian Assange and other WikiLeaks staff and for the execution of WikiLeaks US sources: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZuQW0US2sJw

The Grand Jury has coercively forced numerous people to give testimony in secret and to do so without the presence of a judge or defence lawyer. The actions of the Grand Jury, including issuing PATRIOT Act ‘subpoenas’ against Twitter, Google and other companies, is the subject of ongoing legal proceedings.

On 1 February this year, the Associated Press reported that the FBI was conducting an illegal investigation into WikiLeaks‚Äô activities in Iceland. This investigation was discovered by the Icelandic Minister of the Interior, Ögmundur Jónasson, who ordered the FBI to leave and issued a formal diplomatic protest to the United States.

Julian Assange, an Australian, was granted political asylum on 19 August 2012 by the government of Ecuador. He remains under their protection in the Embassy of Ecuador in London. British police have surrounded the embassy and the British government admits to spending more than $4.5 million on this policing presence so far. Contrary to international law, the United Kingdom refuses to grant Julian Assange safe passage to Ecuador, saying that he must be extradited to Sweden to answer questions. He has not been charged with an offence in either country and the chief of the Swedish Supreme Court says there is no legal reason why Swedish police cannot go to London should they wish to speak to him.

By 8 April 2013 Julian Assange will have been imprisoned, detained under house arrest in the United Kingdom, and unable to leave the protective custody of the Ecuadorian Embassy for a total of 854 days.

On 11 April 2013 a feature film about Julian Assange in his formative years will open the Washington DC International Film Festival: http://www.filmfestdc.org

Julian Assange is a popular figure in his native Australia, where he is running for the Australian Senate. The latest poll, by Labour party polling outfit UMR, showed he had 27 per cent of the voting intention: http://wikileaksparty.org.au/

For further information see: http://justice4assange.com/extraditing-assange.html and https//usvwikileaks.org/ and http://justice4assange.com/

BRADLEY MANNING

An alleged WikiLeaks source, intelligence analyst Bradley Manning, now aged 25, was arrested on 26 May 2010 by US Army investigators. Manning was detained under extreme conditions in Kuwait and Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. The United Nations Rapporteur on Torture Juan E. Mendez formally found these conditions to amount to “cruel and abusive treatment” akin to torture. Judge Denise Lind of the US military court found that his conditions were illegal. After the resignation of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs P. J. Crowley over the issue, Manning was transferred to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Quantico barracks were decommissioned. Mr. Manning’s defence team said that the abusive treatment may have been in order to break Mr. Manning into turning State’s witness against WikiLeaks publisher Julian Assange.

By 8 April 2013 Bradley Manning will have been detained without trial for 1049 days, the longest detention without trial of a US soldier in modern history. His trial is said by Guantanamo beat reporters to be more secret that the military commissions held against al Qaeda suspects. It is scheduled for 2 June 2013 at Fort Meade, Maryland. WikiLeaks, the Center for Constitutional Rights and more than 30 other media organizations have filed suit against the US military for the abuse of secrecy used in prosecuting the case.

ECONOMIC CENSORSHIP: BANKING BLOCKADE

After documented political pressure, including from Senator Joseph Lieberman and Congressman Peter T. King, VISA, MasterCard, Bank of America, PayPal, Western Union, AMEX, Diners Club, Discover and JCB erected an extra-legal banking blockade against the WikiLeaks organization and its donors. The blockade is the subject of ongoing litigation and a resolution by the European Parliament. It has been condemned by the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, the New York Times, Reporters Without Borders, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Amnesty International, the Council of Europe, and numerous other organizations.

The fiscal blockade against WikiLeaks is similar to that conducted against the central banks of Cuba and Iran, however, unlike these two countries, the WikiLeaks blockade is being conducted with no known legal or administrative basis. In fact, the US Secretary of the Treasury found in early 2011 that there was no legal reason to place WikiLeaks under a US embargo. Due to the market dominance of VISA, MasterCard and PayPal, the extra-legal action has cut off 95 per cent of WikiLeaks’ income stream, costing the organization more than $50 million dollars.

All litigation to date has been won by WikiLeaks and its partners, but the blockade continues. An appeal, lodged by Valitor (Visa Iceland) is to be heard by the Icelandic Supreme Court on April 15, 2013.

BREAKING THE BLOCKADE: THE US FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOUNDATION

In December 2012 Daniel Ellsberg, John Cusack, John Perry Barlow, Glenn Greenwald and others launched the Freedom of the Press Foundation, which allows US citizens to bypass the blockade to make tax-deductable and anonymous donations to WikiLeaks. For more information go to: See https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/ and http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-declares-war-on-banking.html
[]YouTube – Videos from this email

Revealed – Bradley Manning Attorney on Statement Release

Bradley Manning Attorney on Statement Release


Date: 1 Mar 2013 11:57:42 -0700
From: “The Law Office of David E. Coombs” <info[at]armycourtmartialdefense.com>
Subject: [Auto-Reply] Request for Bradley Manning Statement

Thank you for your recent inquiry. A representative from our office will contact you as soon as possible.

**If this is an inquiry regarding United States v. Manning, our office will not be granting interviews or responding to inquires at this time. However, recognizing the public’s interest in this case, we will be issuing regular public releases at www.armycourtmartialdefense.info.

_____

To: info[at]armycourtmartialdefense.com
Subject: Request for Bradley Manning Statement
Dated: March 1, 2013

Dear Mr. Coombs,

We respectfully request for publication a copy of the full statement by PFC Bradley Manning in court yesterday, February 28, 2013.

Publication will be on Cryptome.org, a public education website.

Thanks very much.

Unveiled by Cryptome – Bradley Manning Military Spying Analyzed

Bradley Manning Military Spying Analyzed

 


This comments on Alexa O’Brien’s Narration of Bradley Manning’s court statement, February 28, 2013:

http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_
providence_hearing_statement.html

Manning’s statement provides useful information to understand military spying seldom revealed to the public. His statement was not only advised by his defense attorney but vetted by military intelligence as mandated for court proceedings.

1. Manning cites his advanced training as a military spy at Fort Huachaca, AZ, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 35F; this MOS requires Top Secret/SCI clearance.*

1.1 He does not describe specific skills he obtained and their application during training. Presumably much of this is classified.

2. Manning cites his military spying duty at Fort Drum, NY.

2.1 He does not describe specifics of what this spying involved. Presumably much of this is classified, particular that associated with spying inside the United States or on US persons.

2.2 Nor if this spying inside the United States and against US persons was legal. Military uses, and perhaps personal use, is likely classified.

3. Manning describes surveilling websites, chat rooms, and other fora as part of his military spying duites, including targets located in the United States and against US persons.

3.1. He does not describe if this surveillance was recorded and applied for military spying purposes by him and/or others in addition to his personal use.

3.2 Nor if this spying inside the United States and against US persons was legal. Military uses, and perhaps personal use, is likely classified.

4. Manning describes chats and communications allegedly with representatives of WikiLeaks.

4.1 He does not describe if these were recorded and/or used for military spying purposes. Presumbly military uses are classified.

5. Manning describes his back-ups of data and analysis of military spying.

5.1 He does not describe military systems back-ups which are conventional in most systems and in particular on systems handling classiifed information.

5.2 Presumably these back-ups will contain data about his and all others’ back-ups and downloads.

6. Manning describes archiving and sharing of spying data and analysis for general use.

6.1 He does not describe multi-level security measures customarily applied to archiving and sharing systems.

6.2 Presumbably these security systems recorded all uploads, downloads and accesses to archiving and sharing systems.

7. Manning describes lax monitoring of computer and network usage, outages, work-arounds and contingencies of systems he used in military spying as justification for his personal initiatives.

7.1 He does not describe counter-intelligence measures to track usage, outage, work-arounds and contingencies long associated with computer and networks, especially those handling classified information.

8. Manning admits to disclosing lightly classified information in his statement.

8.1 He does not disclose any lightly or other classified information in his statement. Presumably advised to not do so.

9. Manning does not describe military spy training in deception, undercover, ruse, lying, impersonation, dupery, false innocence, attacks, counter-attacks, guile, sabotage, planting false information, spread of disinformation, ploys and other spy tradecraft, in particular those associated with the cyber-spy curriculum at Fort Huachuca, AZ.

9.1 Presumbably much of this is classified.

10. Manning describes use of Tor for anonymizing.

10.1 He does not describe faults in Tor:

10.2 Its principal funding by the US Government;

10.3 Its tax-exempt status by the US Government;

10.4 Its principal place of operation in the US;

10.5 Its principal staffing by US persons;

10.6 Its principal board members by US persons;

10.7 Its vulnerability of tracking users through sniffing of nodes and instantaneous access to node activity by planted-ware (including the nodes which claim to not log).

_________

Corollaries:

11. The USG will call 140 or more witnesses for the Manning trial.

11.1 Presumably no prosecution classified testimony will be public, as before.

12. Manning defense will call its witnesses.

12.1 Presumably no defense classified testimony will be public, as before.

13. Military court may withhold information from the public more than civilian courts.

13.1 Information, evidence and testimonry can be classified to avoid disclosure by using military courts to cloak illegal operations.

14. MOS 35F has been revised in response to Manning disclosures, imprisonment and prosecution.

14.1 MOS 35F revisions will not be made public, especially spying inside the United States and against US persons, as before.

15. There will no disclosure of using young service members to spy inside and outside the United States, as long practiced and more recently online.

16. There will be no disclosure of manipulating young service members to believe they know more than they do or getting away with more than they are — standard means and methods of spy operations.

17. There will be no disclosure of manipulating the public by encouraging ostensibly opposition media coverage.

18. There will be no disclosure of manipulating friendly and hostile participants to inform on each other.

More later when the official transcript is released — with the likelihood it may be redacted, doctored or revised for security clearance.

 


* Top Secret clearance is for life; even it is withdrawn there is no escape from the obligation to never reveal what was learned under the clearance (Daniel Ellsberg readily admits he never revealed all he knew for that reason; nor has the other famous US disclosers not in jail or buried).

 


 

 

 

 


Cryptome – Assange’s International Subversive Vol 1

Assange International Subversive

 


A sends:

Here is “International Subversive” Vol#1, the Hacking E-zine produced / edited by the Australian ‘hacker’ Mendax in 1991 (reference: Dreyfus, “Underground: Tales of hacking, madness and obsession on the electronic frontier” Ch.8

http://suelette.home.xs4all.nl/underground/justin/chapter_8.html ) aka Assange

The document came to me in several pieces – I’ve made no changes to the content other than to stick them together in order and add in some formatting (spaces) that tidy up some of the headings, so all spelling mistakes etc are originals (there are two section “2.4” & two section “2.7”, the later of each should be sections “2.5” & “2.8” respectively I guess according to the contents section). Best viewed with a fixed-width font.

The E-zine lists its editor as ‘The Chthonic Hvee’, presumably Mendax wielded his electronic editorial pen to publish under a different alias (in the same way he was able to change is alias from ‘proff’ to ‘Mendax’ being a research contributor to the Dreyfus book. Interesting.).

I can’t confirm the original source of the document or the accuracy of its content so it comes to you with all appropriate disclaimers – perhaps some of Cryptomes readers will be familiar with the incidents , etc., discussed within and can comment further, if you decide to publish this.

http://cryptome.org/2013/01/International_Subversive__Volume1.txt.gz

Revealed – Former C.I.A. Officer Is the First to Face Prison for a Classified Leak

The first C.I.A. officer to be
convicted of disclosing classified
information to a reporter in more
than six decades is scheduled to be
sentenced to 30 months in prison on
Jan. 25. John Kiriakou is to be
sentenced as part of a plea deal in
which he admitted e-mailing the name
of a covert officer to a
reporter.His prosecution, as well as
five others, has been lauded on
Capitol Hill as a long-overdue
response to a rash of dangerous
disclosures and defended by both
President Obama and Attorney General
Eric H. Holder Jr.Mr. Kiriakou is
remorseful, up to a point. “I
should never have provided the
name,” he said.Supporters say
Mr. Kiriakou neither intended to
damage national security nor did so.
Some see a dark paradox in the
impending imprisonment of Mr.
Kiriakou, who in a 2007 appearance
on ABC News defended the
C.I.A.’s use of desperate
measures to get information but also
said that he had come to believe
that waterboarding was torture and
should no longer be used.

Important – WikiLeaks is Now Tax Deductible in U.S. and E.U.

Dear Friend of WikiLeaks

This week sees the launch of the Freedom of the Press Foundation − a new initiative
inspired by the fight against the two-year-long extra-judicial financial embargo
imposed on WikiLeaks by U.S. financial giants including Visa, MasterCard, PayPal and
the Bank of America.

The Freedom of Press Foundation is tax deductible across America and takes credit
cards, PayPal and google Checkout.

The other week Wau Holland, who collect money for WikiLeaks in Germany, announced
they are tax deductible across Europe and can take bank transfers. 

Make the most of your donation this Christmas and ensure it is tax deductible using
one of these methods.

Full press release on launch of Freedom of the Press Foundation:
http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-declares-war-on-banking.html
Full Press release on Wau Holland tax deductibility:
http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-donations-now-tax.html
All ways to donate: http://shop.wikileaks.org/donate 

https://wlfriends.org/
http://www.swedenversusassange.com/
http://www.bradleymanning.org/
http://freehammond.com/
http://freeanakata.se/index
http://freeanons.org/

Revealed – WikiLeaks declares war on banking blockade

 

assange

Dear Friend of WikiLeaks 

Today sees the launch of the Freedom of the Press Foundation − a new initiative
inspired by the fight against the two-year-long extra-judicial financial embargo
imposed on WikiLeaks by U.S. financial giants including Visa, MasterCard, PayPal and
the Bank of America.   

The Freedom of the Press Foundation (https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/about), an
initiative of Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) co-founder John Perry Barlow,
former Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg, the actor John Cusack and
others, will crowd-source fundraising and support for organizations or individuals
under attack for publishing the truth. It aims to promote "aggressive,
public-interest journalism focused on exposing mismanagement, corruption and
law-breaking in government".   

Over the last two years the blockade has stopped 95 per cent of contributions to
WikiLeaks, running primary cash reserves down from more than a million dollars in
2010 to under a thousand dollars, as of December 2012. Only an aggressive attack
against the blockade will permit WikiLeaks to continue publishing through 2013. 

The new initiative, combined with a recent victory in Germany, means contributions
to WikiLeaks now have tax-deductible status throughout the United States and Europe.

Julian Assange, WikiLeaks' publisher, said: “We've fought this immoral blockade for
two long years. We smashed it in the courts. We smashed it in the Treasury. We
smashed it in France. We smashed it in Germany. And now, with strong and generous
friends who still believe in First Amendment rights, we're going to smash it in the
United States as well.” 

The Foundation's first 'bundle' will crowd-source funds for WikiLeaks, the National
Security Archive, The UpTake and MuckRock News. Donors will be able to use a slider
to set how much of their donation they wish each organization to receive and can
donate to WikiLeaks using their credit cards. The Foundation holds 501(c) charitable
status, so donations are tax-deductible in the U.S. Other courageous press
organizations will be added as time goes by. It will not be possible to see by
banking records what portion of a donor's contribution, if any, goes to WikiLeaks. 

It is admitted by Visa, MasterCard and others that the blockade is entirely as a
result of WikiLeaks' publications. In fact, the U.S. Treasury has cleared WikiLeaks
and WikiLeaks has won against Visa in court, but the blockade continues. 

John Perry Barlow
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/apr/20/hacktivists-battle-internet?INTCMP=SRCH),
a board member of the new Foundation, says the initiative aims to achieve more than
just crowd-sourced fundraising: "We hope it makes a moral argument against these
sorts of actions. But it could also be the basis of a legal challenge. We now have
private organizations with the ability to stifle free expression. These companies
have no bill of rights that applies to their action – they only have terms of
service." 

The WikiLeaks banking blockade showed how devastating such extra-judicial measures
can be for not-for-profit investigative journalism and free press organizations.
Initiatives such as the Freedom of the Press Foundation are vital to sustain a truly
independent free press.  
In heavily redacted European Commission documents recently released by WikiLeaks
(http://wikileaks.org/European-Commission-enabling.html#pr), MasterCard Europe
admitted that U.S. Senate Homeland Security Chairman Joseph Lieberman and
Congressman Peter T. King were both directly involved in instigating the blockade. 

As journalist Glenn Greenwald
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/23/anonymous-trial-wikileaks-internet-freedom)
− also on the FPF board − recently wrote: "What possible political value can the
internet serve, or journalism generally, if the U.S. government, outside the
confines of law, is empowered − as it did here − to cripple the operating abilities
of any group which meaningfully challenges its policies and exposes its
wrongdoing?... That the U.S. government largely succeeded in using extra-legal and
extra-judicial means to cripple an adverse journalistic outlet is a truly
consequential episode: nobody, regardless of one's views on WikiLeaks, should want
any government to have that power."   

But what of the chance these U.S. companies will blockade the FPF like they did
WikiLeaks? "Let Visa, Mastercard, PayPal and all the rest block the independent
Freedom of the Press Foundation. Let them demonstrate to the world once again who
they really are," said Mr Assange.

Wikileaks – Two Years of Cablegate as Bradley Manning Testifies for the First Time

assange

Dear Friend of WikiLeaks

We recently celebrated the two-year anniversary of Cablegate on the same day as
Bradley Manning testified for the first time about the torture he has received at
the hands of the U.S. government.   

To mark this occasion Julian Assange wrote a piece for the Huffington Post showing
some of the effects of Cablegate across the globe, including helping to end the Iraq
War and playing a crucial part in the Arab Spring.   

When WikiLeaks started to publish Cablegate, the largest diplomatic leak in history,
the U.S. government retaliated with unprecedented attacks on Julian Assange and
WikiLeaks, including threats to assassinate Assange and establishing an
extra-judicial banking blockade against WikiLeaks and Assange.   

Despite these attempts to close down WikiLeaks we continued in 2012 with even more
publications: the GI Files, Syria Files and the Detainee Policies. Along with our
supporters we shall continue to fight through next year as well. 

Read Julian Assange's full article here: 
English [en]:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julian-assange/wikileaks-bradley-manning-testifies-cablegate_b_2215387.html

Spanish [es]:
http://www.huffingtonpost.es/julian-assange/dos-anos-de-cablegate-bra_b_2216375.html

French [fr]:
http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/julian-assange/bradley-manning-wikileaks-assange_b_2216565.html

Italian [it]:
http://www.huffingtonpost.it/julian-assange/contro-il-blocco-finanzia_b_2218367.html

http://shop.wikileaks.org/donate 
https://wlfriends.org/
http://www.swedenversusassange.com/
http://www.bradleymanning.org/
http://freehammond.com/
http://freeanakata.se/index
http://freeanons.org/

--------------------------------

Two Years of Cablegate as Bradley Manning Testifies for the First Time by Julian
Assange in The Huffington Post

Thursday, November 29th, Bradley Manning testified for the first time since his
arrest two and a half years ago in Baghdad. Today also marks the two-year
anniversary of the first front pages around the world from Cablegate, an archive of
251,287 U.S. State Department diplomatic cables -- messages sent between the State
Department and its embassies, consulates and diplomatic missions around the world.
In collaboration with a network of more than 100 press outlets we revealed the full
spectrum of techniques used by the United States to exert itself around the world.
The young intelligence analyst Bradley Manning was detained as an alleged source.

WikiLeaks came under attack, with American politicians and right-wing pundits
calling for all of us to be designated as terrorists, some even calling for my
assassination and the kidnapping of our staff. Speaking on Meet The Press, Vice
President Joe Biden referred to me as a "high-tech terrorist," while Senator Joe
Lieberman demanded that we be prosecuted under the U.S. Espionage Act. The
Department of Justice spokesperson Dean Boyd admitted as recently as July 2012 that
the Department of Justice investigation into WikiLeaks is ongoing, and the Pentagon
renewed its threats against us on September 28th, declaring our work an "ongoing
crime." As a result, I have been granted political asylum and now live in the
Ecuadorian embassy in London, surrounded by armed police while the FBI portion of
the "whole of government" investigation against us, according to court testimony,
had reached 42,135 pages as of December last year.

Earlier this week, WikiLeaks released European Commission documents showing that
Senator Lieberman and Congressman Peter T. King directly influenced decisions by
PayPal, Visa and MasterCard to block donations to WikiLeaks, which has blocked 95
percent of our donors since December of 2010. Last week the European Parliament
expressed its will that the Commission should prevent the arbitrary blockade of
WikiLeaks.

Bradley Manning, who is alleged to be a source of the cables, started testifying on
Thursday about his pre-trial treatment, which UN Special Rapporteur Juan Mendez said
was "at a minimum cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 16
of the Convention against Torture." Captain William Hoctor, the government
psychiatrist with 24 years of experience who evaluated Manning at Quantico base in
Virginia, testified that brig commanders had ignored his recommendations for
Manning's detention, something he had not even experienced in his work at Guantánamo
bay prison.

Bradley Manning has been detained without trial for 921 days. This is the longest
pre-trial detention of a U.S. military soldier since at least the Vietnam War. U.S.
military law says the maximum is 120 days.

The material that Bradley Manning is alleged to have leaked has highlighted
astonishing examples of U.S. subversion of the democratic process around the world,
systematic evasion of accountability for atrocities and killings, and many other
abuses. Our archive of State Department cables have appeared in tens of thousands of
articles, books and scholarly works, illustrating the nature of U.S. foreign policy
and the instruments of U.S. national power. On the two-year anniversary of the start
of Cablegate, I want to highlight some of the stories that have emerged.

A War of Terror

The United States' War on Terror has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives,
inflamed sectarian violence, and made a mockery of international law. Victims and
their families struggle to have their stories acknowledged, and the U.S.' systematic
avoidance of accountability for war crimes implicitly denies their right to be
considered human beings. Moreover, as the U.S. increasingly relies on clandestine
military operations conducted outside the scrutiny of government oversight, the
execution of this expanding War on Terror becomes increasingly uncoupled from the
democratic process. While President Obama had promised the American people in 2008
that he would end the Iraq War, U.S. troops were only withdrawn when information
from a cable revived international scrutiny of abuse occurring in Iraq, resulting in
a refusal to grant continued immunity to U.S. troops in 2012 or beyond.

In 2007 the U.S. embassy in Baghdad obtained a copy of the Iraqi government's final
investigation report on the massacre of 17 civilians on September 16th, 2007 in
Nisour Square. The report concluded that the incident was an unprovoked attack on
unarmed civilians, asked for $8 million in compensation for each death and $4
million for each injury, and demanded that the private security firm Blackwater be
replaced within six months. Blackwater continued to operate in Iraq for two years
afterwards, and the U.S. Embassy compensated victims with $10,000 for each death and
$5,000 for each injury. Five years later, the offending Blackwater mercenaries have
escaped from accountability to Iraq, and attempts to bring them to justice in the
U.S. have resulted in a long chain of dismissed cases and one undisclosed
settlement. WikiLeaks' Iraq War Logs release of 391,832 U.S. Army field reports
uncovered 14 additional cases where Blackwater opened fire on civilians, along with
numerous oth
 er incidents of abuse. The Iraq War Logs also showed how the United States handed
over prisoners to be tortured in gruesome detail -- stories of electrocution,
mutilation and of victims being attacked with drills.

The fact that, five years on, the victims of the Nisour Square Massacre have seen no
meaningful accountability is an atrocity. But it is unfortunately no surprise that
the U.S. claims immunity for its forces in other countries, then fails to administer
justice at home.

These events -- and in particular one cable detailing the summary execution of 10
Iraqi civilians, including four women and five children -- by U.S. soldiers and a
subsequent airstrike to cover up the evidence, forced the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq
in 2011. The story of handcuffed execution and cover-up sparked outrage around the
world in the midst of negotiations to extend U.S. troop presence into 2012 and, in
response to international coverage, Iraq revived its investigation into the
incident. Iraq ultimately refused to grant immunity to U.S. troops in 2012, forcing
the U.S. to withdraw in December 2011.

This systemic violence and cover-up extends to the war in Afghanistan. When news
emerged that a midnight bombing campaign on the Afghan village of Granai in 2009 had
possibly resulted in the death of up to 100 civilians, U.S. officials publicly
asserted that most of the dead had been Taliban fighters. A State Department cable
written shortly after the event summarizes a meeting between the Red Cross'
Afghanistan chief Reto Stocker and U.S. Ambassador Carl Eikenberry in which they
discussed findings from an investigation of the event. In the cable, Stocker is
referred to as "one of the most credible sources for unbiased and objective
information in Afghanistan." The Red Cross report estimated that 89 of the dead and
13 injured were in fact civilians. Neither the U.S. government nor the Red Cross
publicly revealed these figures.

WikiLeaks and the Arab Spring

The Tunisian cables describe the extreme corruption and lack of transparency of the
Ben Ali regime. The Ben Ali extended family are described as the worst offenders,
their lavish life accompanied by "a wide-range of corrupt schemes," including
"property expropriation and extortion of bribes." We also learned that Ben Ali
family assets included an airline, several hotels and a radio station. One cable
describes state censorship of Tunisia's only private broadcast satellite TV station,
and a surprise tax judgment against the station of almost $1.5 million.

In its 2011 annual report, Amnesty International praised WikiLeaks and its media
partners for catalyzing the revolution in Tunisia:

    "While the 'Jasmine Revolution' in Tunisia would not have happened without the
long struggle of brave human rights defenders over the last two decades, support
for activists from outside the country may have been strengthened as people
scrutinized the WikiLeaks documents on Tunisia and understood the roots of the
anger. In particular, some of the documents made clear that countries around the
world were aware of both the political repression and the lack of economic
opportunity, but for the most part were not taking action to urge change."

When Tunisia's president Moncef Marzouki spoke with me on The World Tomorrow, he
thanked WikiLeaks for its work, saying, "I am very grateful for all that you have
done for promoting human rights, truth, and I admire and support your efforts."

Shortly following Tunisia's revolution, protests erupted in Libya, and a new batch
of cables revealed the strategic calculations behind U.S. support of the Gaddafi
regime. In Egypt, cables revealed that Mubarak would rather die in office than step
down and that his son would likely succeed him. Then, just as evidence emerged that
Vice President Suleiman was tipped to replace Mubarak, cables were released
detailing his former role as intelligence chief, as well as his close ties to
Israel. Such elements became a crucial part of the ongoing Egyptian uprising.

A Global Death Squad Consulting Firm?

For years, WikiLeaks faced a chorus of accusations by U.S. officials and right-wing
pundits of making the world a less-safe place, and of having potentially caused harm
through publication of embarrassing secrets. In reality, the cables show that
torture and killing are not isolated events, but the violent manifestations of an
aggressive policy of coercion used by the United States in the pursuit of its
strategic commercial and political goals around the world.

While U.S. law bans the training of military units with a history of human rights
violations, in practice the law is easily and often circumvented. The Indonesian
army's elite special forces unit KOPASSUS has brutally repressed the West Papuans'
freedom movement (West Papua has been occupied by Indonesia since 1963), as has been
extensively documented by Human Rights Watch. Despite this, U.S. diplomats in
Jakarta judged in 2007 that the time had come to resume collaboration with KOPASSUS,
for the sake of "commercial interest" and "the protection of U.S. officials."

A diplomatic cable from November 2009 mentions as a side note that right-wing
paramilitaries in Colombia were responsible for the death of 257,089 victims, a
figure well above the estimations of local human rights activists. The U.S. has
nonetheless offered generous support to the Colombian military; Amnesty
International, which has called for a complete cut-off of U.S. military aid to
Colombia, has estimated that total U.S. aid in 2006 amounted to $728 million, of
which 80 percent was given to military and police assistance. As of 2012, U.S.
military support to Colombia is ongoing.

Such examples illustrate the United States' liberal interpretation of the laws
banning the training of military units with a history of human rights violations. In
another cable from August 2008, U.S. officials acknowledge that the Bangladeshi
death squad, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), has been involved in obvious human
rights violations, making support for the RAB difficult -- U.S. officials hoped,
however, to improve the RAB's record and polish its public image. U.S. officials
praised the RAB for having "succeeded in reducing crime and fighting terrorism,
making it in many ways Bangladesh's most respected police unit." In a diplomatic
cable from 2009, it was also revealed that the UK had been training the RAB for the
previous 18 months "in areas such as investigative interviewing techniques and rules
of engagement."

Foreign Service Spies

In 2009, Hillary Clinton sent an intelligence gathering directive to 33 embassies
and consulates around the world. The directive asked diplomats to gather
intelligence on UN officials, including credit card numbers and online handles. A
similar cable requested intelligence on officials from the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Burundy, Rwanda and Uganda, and specifically mentioned the collection of DNA
samples, iris scans and computer passwords.

Another state department cable revealed that a mole within the German government was
spying for the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, frequently updating U.S. officials on
negotiations between Merkel's conservative Christian Democrats and Westerwelle's FDP
on the formation of a new coalition government in 2009. Helmut Metzner, formerly
chief of staff to Germany's foreign minister, admitted to being the mole mentioned
in these cables when this story broke in the press, and was subsequently fired.

Lobbying for Unaccountability -- Manipulation of Judicial Process in Other Countries

Abuse that occurs in war, as it did in Iraq, is often dismissed by its perpetrators
as exceptional, and we are often assured that when abuse has occurred, the
accountability mechanisms in place will bring justice. The diplomatic cables have
given us numerous concrete examples of the coercion used by the U.S. to manipulate
and undermine judicial processes in other countries, and they establish a clear
policy for the evasion of accountability in any form.

During the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, two journalists -- including the Spanish
journalist José Couso -- were killed and three others were wounded when a U.S. tank
fired on the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad. An investigation into the event was
subsequently launched in Spain, and an international arrest warrant was issued for
three U.S. soldiers involved. Cables showed that the U.S. aggressively fought to
have Spanish officials drop the case. Writing about the case in one cable, U.S.
Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre emphasizes: "While we are careful to show our respect for
the tragic death of Couso and for the independence of the Spanish judicial system,
behind the scenes we have fought tooth and nail to make the charges disappear."
Shamefully, this quote was redacted in the original reporting on the subject from El
Pais and Le Monde.

In another example from 2003, a German citizen of Lebanese origins, Kalid el-Masri,
was kidnapped while on vacation in Macedonia, renditioned to Afghanistan by the CIA,
and tortured for four months. When his captors finally decided he was innocent, he
was flown to Albania and dumped on a country road without so much as an apology. In
a cable from 2007, we learn that when a German prosecutor issued arrest warrants for
agents involved in el-Masri's kidnapping, the U.S. ambassador in Berlin warned
German officials that there would be repercussions. No arrests have yet been made
and el-Masri is still seeking justice.

The U.S.' manipulation extended to the UK, where a cable shows that during a British
public inquiry led by Sir John Chilcot into the UK role in the Iraq War, the
Ministry of Defence had "put measures in place" to protect U.S. interests.

Global Powers Work to Break Environmental Solidarity, and to Exploit "Opportunities"
of Climate Change

On environmental issues, cables show that the U.S. routinely makes symbolic gestures
rather than initiating substantial practices to combat climate change, and works
aggressively to tailor international agreements to its own commercial interests.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked embassies to gather intelligence on the
preparations for the Copenhagen UN Convention on Climate Change Meeting in December
2009, asking for biographical details of representatives from China, France, Japan,
Mexico, Russia and the European Union. Cables show that in Copenhagen the U.S.
manipulated the accord talks by offering "gifts" to poorer countries to derail
opposition to the accord proposed by first world powers. Another cable from the
Secretary of State revealed that in 2010, a Maldives ambassador designate had
stressed the importance of "tangible assistance" from larger economies to smaller
ones. As a consequence of this meeting, the accord offered financial compensation to
poor countries suffering from the effects of global warming.

In a visit to Canada in 2009 David Goldwyn, the State Department's Coordinator for
International Energy Affairs discussed public relations assistance to be offered to
the oil sands industry. Goldwyn proposed consulting experts, scholars and think
tanks to "increase visibility and accessibility of more positive news stories." The
cable was later used by environmentalists in their battle against the Keystone XL
pipeline, which ships crude oil across the U.S.-Canada border. In early 2012,
President Obama rejected the Keystone XL pipeline proposal, but recently publicly
announced support for another proposal. It also turns out that Goldwyn eventually
went on to work for Sutherland, a lobbying group in favor of Keystone XL.

The cables also reveal that the U.S. is carefully positioning itself to take
advantage of new opportunities for harvesting hydrocarbons and minerals from the
Arctic as climate change melts polar ice. U.S. diplomats were hoping to offer
Greenland support for its independence from Denmark in exchange for access by
American gas and oil companies to exploit the country's resources. The U.S. has been
closely watching Russia, America's main competitor for Arctic resources, but
American officials also showed concern over Canada's potential territorial claim to
the Arctic's Northwest passage.

Secret Agreements -- Circumvention of the Democratic Process

The State Department cables revealed that the United States and its allies
systematically make secret arrangements with various governments, hiding details not
only from the country's public, but sometimes even from the country's
representatives, ministers and oversight bodies.

In 2009, Jeremy Scahill and Seymour Hersh broke a story in The Nation on secret U.S.
special operations forces combat missions and drone strikes in Pakistan. When
questioned about the story, Department of Defense spokesperson Geoff Morrell
dismissed the claims as "conspiratorial theories." Only one year later, cables
released by WikiLeaks confirmed their story. In addition, cables quoted Pakistan's
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani telling U.S. officials: "I don't care if they do
it as long as they get the right people -- we'll protest about it in the National
Assembly and then ignore it." Stories based on State Department cables also revealed
agreements between the U.S. and Yemen in which the Yemeni government would claim
responsibility for attacks launched by the U.S. on local militia groups. The release
of State Department cables resulted in total transparency with respect to certain
aspects of the War on Terror.

State Department cables also revealed that the U.S. worked with Australia to weaken
the text of an international agreement banning the use of cluster munitions -- bombs
which spray thousands of smaller bomblets over a large area. Out of more than 13,000
casualties of cluster munitions registered by Handicap International, over 98
percent are civilian and one-third of those are children. Despite this, cables also
revealed that the UK's then-Foreign Minister David Miliband secretly approved the
use of a legal loophole to allow the United States to store cluster munitions on UK
territory, despite the fact that the UK is a signatory to a convention banning them.
The United States is not a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and
even attempted in 2011 to have the ban lifted by the UN.

In 2007, former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister John Manley asked U.S. officials for
predator drones to help shore up liberal support for a sustained Canadian presence
in the war in Afghanistan. At the time, Manley was leading a government-appointed
panel charged with investigating Canada's interests in a future role in Afghanistan.
In August 2012, the Ottawa Citizen reported that the Canadian government is seeking
to spend up to $1 billion on a state-of-the-art armed drone fleet.

The cables also revealed that Canada's conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper
secretly promised NATO in January 2010 that Canada would remain in Afghanistan to
conduct army training even after the end of its mission in 2011. The Canadian public
was shocked when the government announced that it would be extending its mission in
November of that year. Harper expressed concern to U.S. diplomats that an early
departure of Canadian troops from Aghanistan would seem like a "withdrawal,"
reflecting the low public support for Canada's mission in Afghanistan.

In 2008, the U.S. proposed an "informal agreement" to Swedish government officials
for the exchange of information on terrorism watch-lists. U.S. officials explained
that they feared scrutiny by the Swedish parliament would jeopardize "law
enforcement and anti-terrorism cooperation." Cables also revealed that in 2009, the
U.S. resumed full intelligence-sharing with New Zealand after it had been restricted
in retaliation for the country's ban against nuclear-powered or armed vessels in its
ports. Both governments agreed that the newly resumed cooperation should be kept
hidden from the public.

The Realpolitik of Commercial Lobbying

State Department cables illustrate that U.S. officials and their commercial partners
take a default position of having an intrinsic right to resources and market
dominance around the world.

In a 2007 cable to the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Ambassador Craig Stapleton
suggested taking a hard-line approach towards the European Union over its resistance
to American genetically modified products and foods. France's refusal to embrace
GMOs and agricultural biotechnology, according to Ambassador Stapleton, would lead
to a general European rejection of GMOs, and he suggested retaliation to help the
French see things differently:

    "Country team Paris recommends that we calibrate a target retaliation list that
causes some pain across the EU since this is a collective responsibility, but
that also focuses in part on the worst culprits. The list should be measured
rather than vicious and must be sustainable over the long term, since we should
not expect an early victory." 

The cables also showed that the U.S. revoked visas of then-Ecuadoran presidential
candidate Xavier Neira and seven others due to their involvement in a legal case
against the American pharmaceutical company Pfizer for unfair competition. The
timing of the decision to revoke their visas coincided with the upcoming
presidential elections and an impending court decision on the case. In its
explanation of the revocation, officials cite "corruption" and the case against
Pfizer.

The U.S.-based Shell Oil company has a long and sordid history in Nigeria, and its
representatives spoke openly about activities in the country. In a 2009 meeting,
Shell representatives told U.S. officials that they would be able to influence the
Nigerian government's 2009 Petroleum Industry Bill to suit their interests.

Cables from 2005 highlight U.S. determination to "improve the investment climate"
for mining companies in Peru. Representatives from Canada, UK, Australia,
Switzerland and South Africa met to strategize ways of circumventing anti-mining
protests coming from a diverse group of NGOs, the Catholic Church and indigenous
Peruvians. Once protests had turned violent, the U.S. used this as an excuse for
monitoring NGO groups such as Oxfam and Friends of the Earth, and asked the Peruvian
government to enhance security by taking control of roadways and transit areas.

In other cases, officials in the U.S. Embassy assisted in lobbying for or against
particular pieces of legislation according to U.S. commercial interests. U.S.
officials lobbied on behalf of Visa and MasterCard against a bill in Russia which
would have created a national card payment system, taking away Visa and MasterCard's
market share.

Strategic Duplicity on Human Rights and Press Freedom

A cable summarizing a meeting with a director of Al Jazeera shows that U.S.
officials expected a special report with graphic images of injured Iraqis to be
changed and its images removed. In another cable, the director is asked to explain
Al Jazeera's lack of coverage of the Iran elections and protests as opposed to their
"heavy" coverage of Gaza.

The U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet is based in the kingdom of Bahrain, and the U.S. has
maintained a mutually beneficial relationship with the country's leaders over the
past years. In one cable, the U.S. ambassador to Bahrain praised the country and its
king, pointing out that U.S. companies had won major contracts there. This same
regime brutally cracked down on protesters during the Arab Spring, and Bahraini
authorities shut down dissident websites and publications. While the U.S. State
Department harshly condemned the crackdown on protests after Iran's 2009 elections,
it remained silent on the killings in Bahrain.

Thailand's Monarchy Exposed

Thailand's lèse majesté law prevents anyone in the country from speaking openly
about the monarchy without risk of severe punishment. As such, any reports about
political developments in the country are censored, and there is a huge gap in
public knowledge about the country's political environment. WikiLeaks' release of
State Department cables gives an unprecedented view of not only the monarchy's deep
impact on the politics of the country, but also the close relationship that Thailand
had with the U.S. Journalist Andrew MacGregor Marshall quit his job at Reuters to
write his book Thailand's Moment of Truth, using the Thai cables exposing obscured
and taboo aspects of Thailand's politics, history and international relations for
the first time.

U.S. Aims to Reshape Global Views and Law on Intellectual Property and Copyright

U.S.-based lobbying groups work hand in hand with U.S. State Department officials
around the world to aggressively lobby for legislation and trade agreements that
favor American companies such as Google, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft, or large
film studios such as Disney, Paramount, Sony and Warner.

A 2006 cable from Japan describes the first draft proposals for a "gold standard" in
intellectual property rights enforcement, called ACTA. This standard was meant to
give intellectual property owners much stronger powers, even at the expense of
citizen privacy and due process. ACTA was subsequently negotiated in secret, unknown
to the general public, until WikiLeaks leaked the first draft in 2008. In the film
industry, the lobbyist group for motion picture studios conspired with their
Australian counterpart to establish a legal precedent for holding an Internet
service provider accountable for copyright infringement in Australia. What is the
effect of this push and pull? It is a global environment where legislation and legal
precedents are set to benefit intellectual property owners who are rich, powerful
and influential -- even at the expense of public good.

Breaking the Monopoly on Influence

The examples I present above represent only a small fraction of what has been
revealed by WikiLeaks material. Since 2010, Western governments have tried to
portray WikiLeaks as a terrorist organization, enabling a disproportionate response
from both political figures and private institutions. It is the case that WikiLeaks'
publications can and have changed the world, but that change has clearly been for
the better. Two years on, no claim of individual harm has been presented, and the
examples above clearly show precisely who has blood on their hands.

In large Western democracies, the political discourse has been so highly controlled
for so long, that it is no longer shocking when Western experts fill in to speak for
third world victims, or when an American president stands up at a podium to accept
his Nobel Peace Prize, and makes the case for war. It is, in fact, no longer safe to
presume that a media outlet such as The New York Times would perform the same act
today as they did in 1971 when Daniel Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers.

In a panel discussion with Daniel Ellsberg and New York Times editor Jill Abramson
discussing the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg voiced his dissent over the Times'
acquiescence to the Bush administration's request to delay James Risen's story on
warrantless NSA wiretapping until after the 2004 elections. Abramson equivocated:

    "The thing is when the government says -- you know -- by publishing a story
you're harming the national security, you're helping the terrorists. I mean,
there are still people today who argue that the NSA program was the crown jewel,
the most valuable anti-terrorism program that the Bush administration had going,
and that it was terribly wrong of the Times to publish." 

On the same panel, Daniel Ellsberg said of the Pentagon Papers:

    "The secrecy of these documents has so far condemned over 30,000 Americans to
death and several million Vietnamese. And the continued secrecy of them will
undoubtedly contribute to the death of tens of thousands more Americans, and so
forth. I think that's true. But that comes up in the WikiLeaks case, right now."

Since the release of the diplomatic cables, WikiLeaks has continued its operations
despite the financial blockade, publishing leaked documents from companies selling
mass interception units to state spy agencies around the world; detainee profiles
for almost all of the people detained at Guantánamo Bay prison; U.S. policy manuals
for detention of military prisoners in the War on Terror; intelligence databases
from the private intelligence firm Stratfor; and millions of documents from inside
the Syrian government. The information we've disclosed frustrates the controlled
political discourse that is trumpeted by establishment media and Western governments
to shape public perception.

We will continue our fight against the financial blockade, and we will continue to
publish. The Pentagon's threats against us do the United States a disservice and
will not be heeded.

With thanks to WikiLeaks Press for research.

Cryptome – Anonymous Hacks DEBKA.com

Anonymous Hacks DEBKA.com

 


http://pastebin.com/ESZXPw8J

Greetings Citizens of the world,

This is Anonymous.

DEBKA.com is an Israeli-Based News-Agency, which has tied relations with Israeli Intelligence Agency (MOSSAD) and Military sources, “Tongue of MOSSAD”. DEBKA first started around 2000 in purpose of polluting media with Zionist-Oriented news and rumors.

DEBKA also analyzes on how people react to news and information offered by the agency in their state of art laboratory. Using these methods the agency has got the ability to release news and rumors in subjects which have most impact in the eyes of readers and political figures.

We have managed to hack their systems and acquire highly sensitive information, including employees and authors personal information, labs details and of course their subscribers.

For now, we only release portion of what we have got which includes subscribers emails and passwords (Most of them are retired MOSSAD agents!!!). At the end we have a message for them:

THIS IS A WARNNING TO THOSE WHOM SUBSCRIBED TO DEBKA:

STOP SUPPORTING ZIONISM,
STOP SUPPORTING MASS-MURDUR,
STOP SUPPORTING KILLERS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

WE WOULD PUBLISH MORE DETAILS AND INFORMATION IN FUTURE…

     
    Target:         http://www.debka-net-weekly.com/mailme.php?email=123@admin.com

    Data Base:      weekly
    Table: users

    Password        email
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    1439    yizraeli@zahav.net.il

    FMLnWA  bslater@netvision.net.il

    palmira admin@debka.com

    E6FZtf  mepstein@aremet.com

    KpQQu4  estelleroith@btinternet.com

    hGEJML  dachind@attglobal.net

    Adler  

    PjpVKT  estironi@bezeqint.net

    jWpHCq  gedit2@debka.com

    12345   edit@debka.com

    f8wKtE  sharon.mikhailov@gmail.com

    KvpYx8  sruben288?@a?l.com

    mBDXtj  john_erard@yahoo.com

    zjDrin  kirkvolkman@msn.com

    O8Qrpm  shulster@direcway.com

    TKT6bd  barbara@subacorp.com

    3AYN3f  csnobelen@csll.ca

    saturn  bsmith@advcourttech.com

    LnEV5a  flaifer@nyc.rr.com

    zEwiu5  gldf4him@verizon.net

    3WicZG  themajor3@rcn.com

    7o5yRh  LARsubscription@paramountbio.com

    No7c4G  marsha.s.kantor@verizon.net

    QDrRpP  Noahgladstone@verizon.net

    SVgQfE  r.liebis@verizon.net

    aSvu6V  rlgotte@rcn.com

    chochoma hosogold@hotmail.com

    KDjbVq  stanjoseph@verizon.net

    RL8dQ1  wmcdo1@hughes.net

    4R0TJn  zs_ima@yahoo.com

    WpRRS4  sutherland@charter.net

    vinnie  sndpaper@hotmail.com

    iOk2YK  dbsajet@xs4all.nl

    CGA6Wz  eric@cooperfund.com

    hyO0c8  maher_90250@yahoo.com

    qa9zFu  aherbert@rodmanandrenshaw.com

    20022002 d?nderson@loeb.com

    wFiNUi  mike@mgwelbel.com

    murphy  rifgroup@aol.com

    Mindylou38 jiblais@dc.rr.com

    3117    michael.gindi@mac.com

    G2iyT7  crabtownprofs@comcast.net

    CDSrUo  brazil@inter.net.il

    ug04NV  alive@finishalive.com

    bsmd    drsalick@aol.com

    sE758A  zkatz@att.net.mx

    2MDyHk  ticitavi@aol.com

    Kisyk8  hauknest@aol.com

    BWrtJZ  ttdoonan@hotmail.com

    T5Kcne  tom@corrigan.com

    sT5BVU  fherman@calix.com

    a5bNEE  somthinsmith@msn.com

    0FBm30  jim@jbyrneco.com

    tKa8z6  sandler@ccf.org

    fSY7HR  schulzepb@aol.com

    KA1Mqe  odd.sverre.hove@dagen.no

    MSGACORN msgold@msn.com

    cWEY45  aldo_b@inter.net.il

    xJUNp4  david.wirtschafter@juno.com

    M2C7sS  llewis1007@aol.com

    1931624 fjc@colsa.com

    PGNjkX  jason@xmiller.com

    c1C3hY  joe582@Bellsouth.net

    xL5J9V  johnburk@deskmedia.com

    EVi1ny  martyreit@csreit.com

    presstek Rang1995@gmail.com

    3Vsf1x  exec@borealis.gi

    cpkdHA  silonde@bellsouth.net

    LqK2pT  tckrcr@aol.com

    WZxqpN  warrenschwar?z@accbrdbnd.com

    cahfgr  yk4000@ballade.plala.or.jp

    tP1c7f  oranim@usa.net

    Shelidan billyo@microsoft.com

    wr5x6c  wmanag18@aol.com

    dUhSeF  dkufeld@aol.com

    dragon  godsart@bellsouth.net

    2KjLCS  lewinassoc@earthlink.net

    uf7eK6  johnsoneb10@aol.com

    yxfuXA  jeirealty2@aol.com

    yvMsQ8  harvey6@ix.netcom.com

    SmileyElle lazyviking@centurytel.net

    E7DQny  twtspt@aol.com

    8xFBW4  amermin@globenet.com.ph

    99516   sspec99516@aol.com

    cF3JSg  bnesin@microgrit.com

    RqR8Mg  corevalue@comcast.net

    1PhUyP  randerson3@cox.net

    LSSspu  zippy20854@aol.com

    EvbC2N  ophir@speakeasy.net

    9mH3Ub  norm@theeisenberggroup.com

    DDcMRJ  njarendt@tds.net

This just has been started……. 🙂

We are Anonymous
We are Legion
We do not forgive.
We do not forget.
Israel, it is too late to expect us.

http://wikileak.ir/en/leaks/7/DEBKA+internal+informations+Hacked+%26+Leaked

#Anonymous #OpIsrael #DEBKALeak

 


Unveiled – Julian Assange: Cryptographic Call to Arms

assange

Julian Assange: Cryptographic Call to Arms

 


Excerpted from Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet, by Julian Assange with Jacob Appelbaum, Andy Müller-Maguhn and Jérémie Zimmermann. OR Books, New York, 2012, 186 pages, Paper. Buy online. Cryptome review of the book.

Pages 1-7.

INTRODUCTION: A CALL TO CRYPTOGRAPHIC ARMS

This book is not a manifesto. There is not time for that. This book is a warning.

The world is not sliding, but galloping into a new transnational dystopia. This development has not been properly recognized outside of national security circles. It has been hidden by secrecy, complexity and scale. The internet, our greatest tool of emancipation, has been transformed into the most dangerous facilitator of totalitarianism we have ever seen. The internet is a threat to human civilization.

These transformations have come about silently, because those who know what is going on work in the global surveillance industry and have no incentives to speak out. Left to its own trajectory, within a few years, global civilization will be a postmodern surveillance dystopia, from which escape for all but the most skilled individuals will be impossible. In fact, we may already be there.

While many writers have considered what the internet means for global civilization, they are wrong. They are wrong because they do not have the sense of perspective that direct experience brings. They are wrong because they have never met the enemy.

No description of the world survives first contact with the enemy.

We have met the enemy.

Over the last six years WikiLeaks has had conflicts with nearly every powerful state. We know the new surveillance state from an insider’s perspective, because we have plumbed its secrets. We know it from a combatant’s perspective, because we have had to protect our people, our finances and our sources from it. We know it from a global perspective, because we have people, assets and information in nearly every country. We know it from the perspective of time, because we have been fighting this phenomenon for years and have seen it double and spread, again and again. It is an invasive parasite, growing fat off societies that merge with the internet. It is rolling over the planet, infecting all states and peoples before it.

What is to be done?

Once upon a time in a place that was neither here nor there, we, the constructors and citizens of the young internet discussed the future of our new world.

We saw that the relationships between all people would be mediated by our new world, and that the nature of states, which are defined by how people exchange information, economic value, and force, would also change.

We saw that the merger between existing state structures and the internet created an opening to change the nature of states.

First, recall that states are systems through which coercive force flows. Factions within a state may compete for support, leading to democratic surface phenomena, but the underpinnings of states are the systematic application, and avoidance, of violence. Land ownership, property, rents, dividends, taxation, court fines, censorship, copyrights and trademarks are all enforced by the threatened application of state violence.

Most of the time we are not even aware of how close to violence we are, because we all grant concessions to avoid it. Like sailors smelling the breeze, we rarely contemplate how our surface world is propped up from below by darkness.

In the new space of the internet what would be the mediator of coercive force?

Does it even make sense to ask this question? In this otherworldly space, this seemingly platonic realm of ideas and information flow, could there be a notion of coercive force? A force that could modify historical records, tap phones, separate people, transform complexity into rubble, and erect walls, like an occupying army?

The platonic nature of the internet, ideas and information flows, is debased by its physical origins. Its foundations are fiber optic cable lines stretching across the ocean floors, satellites spinning above our heads, computer servers housed in buildings in cities from New York to Nairobi. Like the soldier who slew Archimedes with a mere sword, so too could an armed militia take control of the peak development of Western civilization, our platonic realm.

The new world of the internet, abstracted from the old world of brute atoms, longed for independence. But states and their friends moved to control our new world — by controlling its physical underpinnings. The state, like an army around an oil well, or a customs agent extracting bribes at the border, would soon learn to leverage its control of physical space to gain control over our platonic realm. It would prevent the independence we had dreamed of, and then, squatting on fiber optic lines and around satellite ground stations, it would go on to mass intercept the information flow of our new world — its very essence even as every human, economic, and political relationship embraced it. The state would leech into the veins and arteries of our new societies, gobbling up every relationship expressed or communicated, every web page read, every message sent and every thought googled, and then store this knowledge, billions of interceptions a day, undreamed of power, in vast top secret warehouses, forever. It would go on to mine and mine again this treasure, the collective private intellectual output of humanity, with ever more sophisticated search and pattern finding algorithms, enriching the treasure and maximizing the power imbalance between interceptors and the world of interceptees. And then the state would reflect what it had learned back into the physical world, to start wars, to target drones, to manipulate UN committees and trade deals, and to do favors for its vast connected network of industries, insiders and cronies.

But we discovered something. Our one hope against total domination. A hope that with courage, insight and solidarity we could use to resist. A strange property of the physical universe that we live in.

The universe believes in encryption.

It is easier to encrypt information than it is to decrypt it.

We saw we could use this strange property to create the laws of a new world. To abstract away our new platonic realm from its base underpinnings of satellites, undersea cables and their controllers. To fortify our space behind a cryptographic veil. To create new lands barred to those who control physical reality, because to follow us into them would require infinite resources.

And in this manner to declare independence.

Scientists in the Manhattan Project discovered that the universe permitted the construction of a nuclear bomb. This was not an obvious conclusion. Perhaps nuclear weapons were not within the laws of physics. However, the universe believes in atomic bombs and nuclear reactors. They are a phenomenon the universe blesses, like salt, sea or stars.

Similarly, the universe, our physical universe, has that property that makes it possible for an individual or a group of individuals to reliably, automatically, even without knowing, encipher something, so that all the resources and all the political will of the strongest superpower on earth may not decipher it. And the paths of encipherment between people can mesh together to create regions free from the coercive force of the outer state. Free from mass interception. Free from state control.

In this way, people can oppose their will to that of a fully mobilized superpower and win. Encryption is an embodiment of the laws of physics, and it does not listen to the bluster of states, even transnational surveillance dystopias.

It isn’t obvious that the world had to work this way. But somehow the universe smiles on encryption.

Cryptography is the ultimate form of non-violent direct action. While nuclear weapons states can exert unlimited violence over even millions of individuals, strong cryptography means that a state, even by exercising unlimited violence, cannot violate the intent of individuals to keep secrets from them.

Strong cryptography can resist an unlimited application of violence. No amount of coercive force will ever solve a math problem.

But could we take this strange fact about the world and build it up to be a basic emancipatory building block for the independence of mankind in the platonic realm of the internet? And as societies merged with the internet could that liberty then be reflected back into physical reality to redefine the state?

Recall that states are the systems which determine where and how coercive force is consistently applied.

The question of how much coercive force can seep into the platonic realm of the internet from the physical world is answered by cryptography and the cypherpunks’ ideals.

As states merge with the internet and the future of our civilization becomes the future of the internet, we must redefine force relations.

If we do not, the universality of the internet will merge global humanity into one giant grid of mass surveillance and mass control.

We must raise an alarm. This book is a watchman’s shout in the night.

On March 20, 2012, while under house arrest in the United Kingdom awaiting extradition, I met with three friends and fellow watchmen on the principle that perhaps in unison our voices can wake up the town. We must communicate what we have learned while there is still a chance for you, the reader, to understand and act on what is happening.

It is time to take up the arms of our new world, to fight for ourselves and for those we love.

Our task is to secure self-determination where we can, to hold back the coming dystopia where we cannot, and if all else fails, to accelerate its self-destruction.

— Julian Assange, London, October 2012

New – WikiLeaks donations now tax deductible EU wide

Wau-Holland-Stiftung (WHS), named in memory of the German philosopher and net
activist Wau Holland, has been collecting donations for WikiLeaks since 2009. In the
immediate aftermath of WikiLeaks publication of the US diplomatic cables in 2010,
not only did PayPal arbitrarily shut down the WHS donations account, but the
tax-exempt status of the Foundation was challenged as well.

It took almost two years of negotiations with German tax authorities to strike a
deal: Tax exemption (charitable status) will be granted again going forward and
going back to 2011, but not for 2010. (See: "Taxing Transparency", Der Spiegel, 13
Nov 2012).

Therefore, citizens of EU member states will be able to donate to WikiLeaks
operations through WHS and in addition, write the donation off from their income
tax. This is because of a ruling of the European Court in 2009 (Decision C-318_07),
which mandates that every member state must honour the tax exemption decision of any
other member state.

And this is how you make a money transfer to support WikiLeaks:

Recipient: Wau Holland Stiftung
  Bank: Commerzbank Kassel, Königsplatz 32-34, 34117 Kassel, Germany
  IBAN: DE46 5204 0021 0277 2812 04
  BIC/SWIFT: COBADEFF520
  Reference: WikiLeaks or Project 04 if you prefer
  add your e-mail or postal address to receive a tax-deductible donation receipt.

Hamburg, 26. Nov 2012 Wau-Holland-Stiftung http://www.wauland.de

Other methods of donation:
https://shop.wikileaks.org/donate

Unveiled – European Commission enabling blockade of WikiLeaks by U.S. hard-right Lieberman/King, contrary to European Parliament’s wishes

European Commission documents released today by WikiLeaks show that hard-right U.S.
politicians were directly behind the extrajudicial banking blockade against
WikiLeaks. In the heavily redacted documents, MasterCard Europe admits that Senator
Joseph Lieberman and Congressman Peter T. King both "had conversations" with
MasterCard in the United States. Lieberman, the then-chair of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, boasted of instigating Amazon's cutting of service to
WikiLeaks - an action condemned by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on
7 December 2011.

Senator Lieberman tried to introduce the SHIELD Act into the Senate and advocated
for prosecuting the New York Times for espionage in connection with WikiLeaks'
releases. Rep. Peter King, chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, tried to
formally designate WikiLeaks as a foreign terrorist organization, have its staff
listed as 'enemy combatants', and have WikiLeaks put on a U.S. Treasury blacklist.
On 13 January 2011 the U.S. Treasury announced it would not do so because there was
no evidence that WikiLeaks should be on such a list. While Lieberman and King were
unsuccessful in these methods of legally cutting WikiLeaks from its popular donor
base, they were successful in doing so extra-legally via VISA and MasterCard, which
together hold a monopoly of 97 per cent of the market of EU card payments.

VISA Europe is registered in London and is owned by a consortium of European banks.
MasterCard Europe is registered in Belgium and has similar ownership, but the
Commission papers show that European control of VISA Europe and MasterCard Europe is
a fiction. The papers reveal that the instructions to blockade WikiLeaks' operations
in Europe came directly from VISA and MasterCard in the United States. Ownership
would normally imply control, but VISA and MasterCard Europe are essentially
controlled by confidential contracts with their U.S. counterparts, a hidden
organizational structure that the Commission calls an "association of undertakings".

On Tuesday, 19 November 2012, the European Parliament took an important step towards
safeguarding the economic sovereignty of all Europeans. In Article 32 of its
resolution, the European Parliament expressed the will that the Commission should
prevent the arbitrary refusal of payments by credit card companies, which
economically strangles businesses and organizations, notably ours. The resolution is
an important step to putting an end to the Lieberman/King blockade, which has wiped
out 95 per cent of WikiLeaks' revenues. The Lieberman/King blockade has been
directly condemned by, among others, the UN Special Rapporteur of Freedom of Speech
and the New York Times Editorial Board. The blockade is a direct infringement of the
Article 19 right to receive and impart information, and threatens all donor-funded
organizations and the freedom of the press.

It comes as a surprise, then, that the European Commission is taking the contrary
view in its preliminary decision, of not opening a formal investigation into VISA,
MasterCard and AmEx's violations against DataCell, the company that collected
donations to the WikiLeaks project until the imposition of the blockade in 2010. The
Commission's 16-page preliminary decision has been announced after 15 months of
deliberations. The 'normal' waiting time is four months. Yesterday, DataCell and
WikiLeaks submitted detailed counter-arguments to the Commission's preliminary
decision.

Through the leaked documents we learn that VISA and MasterCard have used a false
statement by the Australian Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, to mislead the European
Commission. The Prime Minister's statement, which she later claimed was made in her
"private capacity", was that the WikiLeaks publication of diplomatic cables was
"illegal". This was declared to be false by a subsequent investigation by the
Australian Federal Police, which declared that WikiLeaks had not broken any
Australian law. Earlier this year, the Australian Senate passed a resolution
demanding the retraction of the Prime Minister's false statement.

The leaked documents reveal MasterCard's political stance to our exposure of the
crimes and horrors of military campaigns: "It is evident that any affiliation with
an organisation causing damage to the national interests of several nations involved
in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq... will be extremely damaging for the public
perception of MasterCard".

Julian Assange said: 
> There is no sovereignty without economic sovereignty. It is concerning that
hard-right elements in the United States have been able to pressure VISA and
MasterCard, who together hold monopoly over the European market, into introducing
a blockade that the U.S. Treasury has rightly rejected. These unaccountable
elements are directly interfering in the political and economic freedoms of EU
consumers and are setting a precedent for political censorship of the world's
media.

WikiLeaks will continue to fight the blockade, despite its limited resources,
because it is fighting for its survival. Already there have been victories. In June
2012 WikiLeaks won its first court victory in Iceland against the Lieberman-King
blockade. Last month WikiLeaks opened a new battle front by filing, together with
its partner DataCell, a case against Teller A/S (VISA Denmark).

NOTE

The movement in Parliament and in the rest of Europe is to support WikiLeaks'
publishing rights. The German foundation Wau Holland Stiftung (WHS), which collected
donations for WikiLeaks via PayPal had their donations account arbitrarily shut
down. The tax-exempt status of the Foundation was challenged as well, as a result of
political interference which was exposed this month in Der Spiegel ("Taxing
Transparency"). Yesterday, WHS announced that, after almost two years of
negotiations with German tax authorities, its tax exemption (charitable status) has
been reinstated. Citizens of all EU Member States will now be able to donate to
WikiLeaks' operations through WHS and deduct the donation from their income tax.

*Additional information*:
UN Special Rapporteur on Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression:
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=829&lID=1
Council of Europe - Declaration on online service providers:
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1883671&Site=CM
The Guardian Comment is Free (23 November 2012) by Glenn Greewald:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/23/anonymous-trial-wikileaks-internet-freedom
Video: U.S. demands to assassinate Assange - http://youtube.com/watch?v=ZuQW0US2sJw

*Quote from Visa and MasterCard Submissions to the European Commission*

Visa's response to the European Central Bank:

> As you will no doubt be aware, in some jurisdictions, various stakeholders have
questioned whether WikiLeaks is, in respect of some of the material it publishes,
committing criminal acts. Our Operating Regulations prohibit the use of the Visa
system for illegal purposes either in the jurisdiction of the merchant (in this
case Iceland) or the jurisdiction of the cardholder (which could be anywhere in
the world). It is possible that activities that are permitted in one jurisdiction
may be illegal in others. Accordingly, the application of the relevant position
under the Operating Regulations does not necessarily depend solely on Icelandic
law.

> This position is appropriate and proportionate in light of the alleged unlawful
conduct of WikiLeaks, which, among other sensitive material, in 2010 published and
refuses to return large amounts of material stolen from classified US military
databases. Further, according to recent press coverage, it appears that the
leaking of sensitive information is continuing.

MasterCard's arguments to the European Commission:

> MasterCard does not hold a collective dominant position with Visa... It is also
worth mentioning here that MasterCard does not constitute an 'essential facility',
and therefore is under no obligation to provide its services to any particular
undertakings.

> It is evident that any affiliation with an organisation causing damage to the
national interests of several nations involved in the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and possibly putting lives needlessly at risk, will be damaging for the
public perception of MasterCard and consequently damage MasterCard's goodwill or
its [trade]Marks.

> By way of example, in 2004 MasterCard requested the Dutch acquirer, then 'Interpay
Nederlands B.V.' (now 'Paysquare') to suspend the provision of acquiring services
to merchants operating websites offering access to pornographic material including
showing sexual acts with animals ('bestiality content').

> ...before taking its decision, MasterCard Incorporated did not have any contacts
with public authorities, and therefore did not act upon request from any public
authorities.

> MasterCard Incorporated had several conversations with the FBI, US Treasury and
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) about the possibility of such DDoS
attacks.

> MasterCard Incorporated had conversations with certain Congressional staff (i.e.
Chairman Lieberman and Chairman King's [Senate and House Homeland Security Chairs]
staff)."

*European Parliament - on Card, Internet and mobile payments*

  Towards an integrated European market for card, internet and mobile payments - 20
November 2012

The European Parliament voted that the Commission introduce legislation to determine
when credit card companies can deny payments:

> 32. Considers it likely that there will be a growing number of European companies
whose activities are effectively dependent on being able to accept payments by
card; considers it to be in the public interest to define objective rules
describing the circumstances and procedures under which card payment schemes may
unilaterally refuse acceptance;

In his intervention, Swedish MEP Christian Engstrom explained:

> Another example is when Visa, Mastercard and Paypal blocked payments to WikiLeaks.
There was no legal basis and [it] should be seen as the three companies helped the
US government to silence an inconvenient voice. It is not acceptable that private
corporations have the power of [controlling] free speech.

Unveiled – NARA Leaks WikiLeaks Citations – Block Lifted

National Archives fixes search but bans WikiLeaks documents:http://cryptome.org/2012/11/nara-bans-wikileaks.htm

6 November 2012.

Griffin Boyce sends 6 November 2012:

After hearing that the national archives was blocking wikileaks-related searches, I decided to try it out myself. I was able to search for WikiLeaks uninhibited on the public site [1][2]. Though if blocked in the future, a search for *ikileaks (with the asterisk) will bring them up as well [3].[1] http://search.archives.gov/query.html?col=1arch&qt=wikileaks

[2] http://research.archives.gov/search?expression=WikiLeaks

[3] http://search.archives.gov/query.html?qt=*ikileaks

@USNatArchives tweeted yesterday that it would look into the block, and it has been lifted although the hits are fewer than the 30 by Google:

US National Archives @USNatArchivesWe’re looking into this, and we’ll update soon. MT @public_archive: The banning of @wikileaks from @USNatArchives: http://bit.ly/SmVQfQ

4 November 2012. About 30 Google hits for “WikiLeaks” on the National Archives website via search of “site:archives.gov wikileaks

3 November 2012. NARA online produces one hit for “Assange:”

http://research.archives.gov/search?expression=assange&pg_src=group&data-source=all

Did you mean passage?AOTUS: Collector in Chief | What I’m Reading

http://blogs.archives.gov/aotus/?page_id=314

Google hits for Assange “About 55,500,000.”

2 November 2012. @AlecMuffett notes that wildcards such as “?ikileaks” and “wiki?eaks” retrieve a few more documents with the word “WikiLeaks” in them.

2 November 2012

NARA Leaks WikiLeaks Citations


Access to documents containing the word “WikiLeaks” are blocked at the US National Archives website:

http://research.archives.gov/search?v%3Aproject=opa&query=WikiLeaks

The URL you requested has been blockedThe page you have requested has been blocked, because the URL is banned.

URL = research.archives.gov/search?v%3Aproject=opa&query=WikiLeaks

However documents with the words “Wiki” and “Leak,” separated by a space, are not. Six documents with “Wiki” and “Leak” may be retrieved:

http://research.archives.gov/search?expression=wiki+leak&pg_src=brief&data-source=archives-gov

1. June 2011 NISPPAChttp://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/nisppac/meeting-june-2011.pdf

2. meeting march 2011

http://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/nisppac/meeting-march-2011.pdf

3. meeting jun 2011

http://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/nisppac/meeting-jun-2011.pdf

4. Microsoft Word – Advisory Committee Minutes_June 2011

http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/committees/pdfs/2011-06-minutes.pdf

5. Press Release Archive by Date

http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/date-archive.html

6. meeting nov 2011

http://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/nisppac/meeting-nov-2011.pdf



 

Cryptome unveils WikiLeaks-Wau Holland Tax-Exemption Revoked

German original:

http://www.wauland.de/index.html

English translation:

http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=
translate.google.com&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http://www.wauland.de/index.html&usg=
ALkJrhiHuOyIgKZ5kkDp2eyG49lBd0h6eA

ON OUR OWN – November 5, 2012

Public benefit of

Wau Holland Foundation

History of withdrawal

End of 2010, the Wau Holland Foundation (WHS) was intervention by the Hessian Ministry of Interior ( [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] ,) the exempt status by the then competent tax office Kassel denied [5] . This decision was taken so that the foundation had with the fundraising and the associated project financing WikiLeaks violated the “principle of selflessness.”

Under the principle of selflessness (§ 55 AO), a foundation may not primarily pursue economic purposes, eg commercial purposes or other commercial purposes, but can only use the money to further their own goals. The withdrawal of exempt status by the IRS is already difficult to understand why, for two reasons: First, lay the tax office has not received accounting records from the year 2010 which would justify such a decision. Second, the regional council has Kassel as supervisory authority early December in a press release made it clear that the promotion of WikiLeaks very well according to the statutes of the Foundation to purchase.

Perhaps this is why the reasoning by the tax office in Hamburg, after the relocation of the Foundation inherited the controversial procedure was changed, and as a “violation of the principle of immediacy” (§ 57 AO) pursued.

During the test

The WHS commissioned a specialized foundation and tax law firm to represent their interests and put an objection against the decision [6] . In subsequent proceedings, there was a test of whether the Foundation had in 2010 met the “requirement of immediacy” and the statutes according to the donations it was no longer in dispute.

The “principle of immediacy,” requires that a nonprofit organization can indeed engage helpers to achieve their goals, it must be a traceable control procedures are set binding.

End of 2009 / early 2010 the WHS had met with the “WikiLeaks” only oral agreements, until the end of 2010, these arrangements were also fixed in a written contract with a project manager, in addition to the objectives and responsibilities and control processes are defined. Although the guidelines were already out of the contract throughout 2010, lived by all parties accordingly, did the tax office does not recognize that the immediacy was preserved and declined after 18 months of testing our appeal against the decision from [7] .

To the process after all this time to finally bring to a conclusion, the WHS agreed with the tax office to Hamburg to complain against a rejection of the opposition does not [8] and to obtain the profit for 2011 and subsequent years back.

Of present state

We have learned through this process, what contractual conditions, we need to encourage charitable can. All donors from 2010, we unfortunately have to say that these donations are not tax deductible. Nevertheless, these donations were used for the purposes of the donor.

When we are presented by the tax office promised exemption notification has been received, we can exhibit for the years 2011 and 2012 donation receipts upon request. For donations to 200, – Euro for the donor, the payment document is sufficient, together with the notice of exemption, which can then be downloaded from http://www.wauland.de.

The projects that promote Wau Holland Foundation, also here to inform.

We appreciate every donation, here you can see the form in which you can donate. For donations, large donations and inheritance rules please contact us at the contact form available.

Explanatory documents

[1] Emails between the Interior and Regional Council

[2]Innenminster of foundation supervision (2010-12-10)

[3] Foundation supervision of Interior Minister (2010-12-16)

[4] Interior Minister of Supervision of the Foundation (2011-01-05)

[5] Revocation of exempt status by the FA Kassel (2011-01-07)

[6] Objection to the tax office decision (2011-01-11)

[7] Objection decision of the Tax Office Hamburg-Nord (2012-10-25)

[8] Action waiver of WHS (2012-10-29)

Former CIA Officer John Kirakou Pleads Guilty to Disclosing Classified Information About CIA Officer

 

ALEXANDRIA, VA—Former CIA Officer John Kiriakou, 48, of Arlington, Virginia, pleaded guilty today to disclosing to a journalist the name of a covert CIA officer and also admitted to disclosing information revealing the role of another CIA employee in classified activities.

Neil H. MacBride, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office, made the announcement after the plea was accepted by U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.

Kiriakou pleaded guilty today to one count of intentionally disclosing information identifying a covert agent. As part of the plea agreement, the United States and Kiriakou agree that a sentence of 30 months in prison is the appropriate disposition of this case. Sentencing has been scheduled for January 25, 2013.

“The government has a vital interest in protecting the identities of those involved in covert operations,” said U.S. Attorney MacBride. “Leaks of highly sensitive, closely held, and classified information compromise national security and can put individual lives in danger.”

“Disclosing classified information, including the names of CIA officers, to unauthorized individuals is a clear violation of the law,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “Today’s plea would not be possible without the hard work of the prosecutors and FBI special agents and analysts who brought this case to justice and who will continue to pursue those who ignore their obligations to protect national security secrets.”

According to court records, the case is a result of an investigation triggered by a classified filing in January 2009 by defense counsel for high-value detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This filing contained classified information the defense had not been given through official government channels, including photographs of certain government employees and contractors. The investigation revealed that on multiple occasions, one of the journalists to whom Kiriakou illegally disclosed classified information, in turn, disclosed that information to a defense team investigator. This information was reflected in the classified defense filing and enabled the defense team to take or obtain surveillance photographs of government personnel. The government has made no allegations of criminal activity by any members of the defense team for the detainees.

Kiriakou was a CIA intelligence officer between 1990 and 2004, serving at headquarters and in various classified overseas assignments. Upon joining the CIA in 1990 and on multiple occasions in following years, Kiriakou signed secrecy and non-disclosure agreements not to disclose classified information to unauthorized individuals. In a statement of facts filed with his plea agreement, Kiriakou admitted that he made illegal disclosures about two CIA employees and their involvement in classified operations to two journalists (referenced as “Journalist A” and “Journalist B” in court records) on multiple occasions between 2007 and 2009.

Kiriakou admitted that, through a series of e-mails with Journalist A, he disclosed the full name of a CIA officer (referred to as “Officer A” in court records) whose association with the CIA had been classified for more than two decades. In addition to identifying the officer for the journalist, Kiriakou also provided information that helped the journalist link the officer to a particular classified operation.

In addition, Kiriakou admitted that he disclosed to Journalists A and B the name and contact information of a CIA analyst, identified in court records as “Officer B,” along with his association with an operation to capture terrorism subject Abu Zubaydah in 2002. Kiriakou knew that the association of Officer B with the Abu Zubaydah operation was classified. Based in part on this information, Journalist B subsequently published a June 2008 front-page story in The New York Times disclosing Officer B’s alleged role in the Abu Zubaydah operation.

Without Kiriakou’s knowledge, Journalist A passed the information he obtained from Kiriakou to an investigator assisting in the defense of high-value detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

Kiriakou also admitted that he lied to the CIA regarding the existence and use of a classified technique, referred to as a “magic box,” while seeking permission from the CIA’s Publications Review Board to include the classified technique in a book.

This case was investigated by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, with assistance from the CIA and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Iris Lan of the Southern District of New York; Mark E. Schneider and Ryan Fayhee of the Northern District of Illinois; and W. Neil Hammerstrom, Jr. of the Eastern District of Virginia are prosecuting the case on behalf of the United States.

 



	

Revealed – US Government Publications Citing WikiLeaks

US Government Publications Citing WikiLeaks


150 publications cited:

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/search.action?sr=1&originalSearch=wikileaks&st=wikileaks&ps=
50&na=&se=&sb=re&timeFrame=&dateBrowse=&govAuthBrowse=&collection=&historical=false


1.
Congressional Hearings. General. Judiciary. Thursday, December 16, 2010.

…LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY WIKILEAKS…LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY WIKILEAKS ———- THURSDAY, DECEMBER…legal and constitutional issues raised by WikiLeaks before the Committee on Judiciary… More Information

2.
Congressional Hearings. General. Homeland and Governmental Affairs. Thursday, March 10, 2011.

…112-219 INFORMATION SHARING IN THE ERA OF WIKILEAKS: BALANCING SECURITY AND COLLABORATION…105 INFORMATION SHARING IN THE ERA OF WIKILEAKS: BALANCING SECURITY AND COLLABORATION…information-sharing strategies. Now I fear the WikiLeaks case has become a rallying cry for… More Information

3.
Congressional Record. Mrs. MILLER of Michigan. Wednesday, December 1, 2010.

…House] [Page H7760] IT IS TIME TO SHUT WIKILEAKS DOWN (Mrs. MILLER of Michigan asked…saw again this week the organization WikiLeaks release hundreds of thousands of classified…has committed treason. I think that WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange,… More Information

4.
Congressional Record. Ms. WOOLSEY. Friday, July 30, 2010.

…House] [Pages H6563-H6564] WIKILEAKS DOCUMENTS ADD TO MOUNTING EVIDENCE AGAINST…to the news media this past weekend by WikiLeaks add to the mounting evidence that the…been asked to make for nearly a decade. WikiLeaks uncovers much that has been missing… More Information

5.
Congressional Bills. 111th Congress. Introduced in House. Wednesday, December 15, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks and public press outlets…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks and public press outlets. Resolved…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks and select public press outlets,… More Information

6.
Congressional Record. Mr. HOLT. Tuesday, August 10, 2010.

…Extensions of Remarks] [Page E1574] THE WIKILEAKS SCANDAL ______ HON. RUSH D. HOLT…Afghanistan that were published by the WikiLeaks.org website. Before rushing to judgment…so-called “Afghan War Diary” of WikiLeaks.org. Some of the documents I… More Information

7.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

[Congressional Record Index (2010)] WIKILEAKS (Internet site) Bills and resolutions Dept. of State…classified documents unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media (see H. Res…. More Information

8.
History of Bills. 111th Congress, 2nd Session. Introduced. 2010.

…all classified Department of State documents assessed by the Department to have been unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks and public press outlets; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. By Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, H8520… More Information

9.
Congressional Hearings. General. Appropriations; Armed Services. Thursday, November 17, 2011.

…Nation’s vital secrets to prevent another Wikileaks episode and any further neutralization…challenge. Senator McCain. On the issue of Wikileaks, what’s your understanding of the status of investigations into the cause of Wikileaks? Dr. Vickers. Sir, the Office… More Information

10.
Congressional Record. Mr. FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. LAMBORN, and others. Tuesday, November 30, 2010.

…to start out tonight by addressing the WikiLeaks issue. I know that a lot of people across…my mind that what we’ve seen on the WikiLeaks issue is really more confirmatory than…that’s informative. In many ways what the WikiLeaks information has demonstrated is… More Information

11.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.J. Res. 64. Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. BERMAN, and others. Tuesday, July 27, 2010.

…here is that this Congress ignores the WikiLeaks documents that point out a connection…AID and civilian personnel to go. The WikiLeaks documents, with all the transparency…continue to rise. Documents released by WikiLeaks report that Pakistan intelligence… More Information

12.
Congressional Hearings. General. Foreign Affairs. Wednesday, December 1, 2010.

…which were unfortunately released by Wikileaks. However much one might deplore the…raising points based on revelations from WikiLeaks, but I am going to make an exception…York Times claim, based, it says, on WikiLeaks documents, that Iran has acquired… More Information

13.
Congressional Record. Regarding S. 4000. Ms. COLLINS and Mr. ENSIGN. Thursday, December 2, 2010.

…this year, the organization known as WikiLeaks, led by an Australian citizen named…al-Qaida in Afghanistan. In October, WikiLeaks dumped 400,000 classified documents…of Iraq. Now, just a few days ago, WikiLeaks has dumped another 250,000… More Information

14.
United States Courts Opinions. United States District Court District of Massachusetts. Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER – denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Maynard, Timothy). Wednesday, March 28, 2012.

…having disclosed restricted material to WikiLeaks. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 12. Manning’s arrest followed WikiLeaks’ publication of “Collateral Murder…Filed 03/28/12 Page 3 of 27 4 and WikiLeaks were, at the time the complaint… More Information

15.
Congressional Hearings. General. Homeland and Governmental Affairs. Wednesday, March 30, 2011.

…indicated. There is no question that WikiLeaks‘ unauthorized publication of sensitive…share information. For instance, the WikiLeaks disclosures exposed the risks of what…course, but that in the aftermath of WikiLeaks, information must be shared in a… More Information

16.
Congressional Record. Regarding H. Res. 1556. Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. DREIER, and others. Tuesday, July 27, 2010.

…revelations in the documents published by WikiLeaks echoed these disturbing conclusions…just came out this past weekend, the WikiLeaks report that has been carried widely in…Pakistan, becomes urgent in light of the WikiLeaks expose, which has indicated that… More Information

17.
United States Courts Opinions. United States District Court District of Columbia. MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly on July 23, 2012. (lcckk3). Monday, July 23, 2012.

…after being published by third-party WikiLeaks and because the State Department has allegedly…after being published by third-party WikiLeaks and because the State Department…precedent. No matter how extensive, the WikiLeaks disclosure is no substitute for… More Information

18.
Congressional Hearings. General. Armed Services. Thursday, December 2, 2010.

…we are very deeply concerned about Wikileaks, the impact that it has had on identifying…you held any individual responsible for Wikileaks, punished anyone, put anyone on leave…concerned, Admiral Mullen, about the Wikileaks issue. General Petraeus said:… More Information

19.
Congressional Hearings. Authorization. Armed Services. Thursday, February 17, 2011.

…just briefly. Anything more on the Wikileaks investigation? Secretary Gates…would be sufficient to prevent another Wikileaks event? If not, what other changes would…the major contributing factors in the WikiLeaks incident was the large amount of… More Information

20.
Congressional Hearings. General. Armed Services. Thursday, November 18, 2010.

McGRATH; MICHAEL J. McCORD; SHARON E. BURKE; SOLOMON B. WATSON; KATHERINE G. HAMMACK; VADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; LTG KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC; JONATHAN WOODSON,… More Information

21.
Congressional Hearings. General. Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Wednesday, March 24, 2010.

…security flaws. They posted the document at Wikileaks.\30\ Another anonymous group of Chinese…censorship software,” posted June 2009 on Wikileaks.org at:… More Information

22.
Congressional Reports. Committee on Homeland Security. Wednesday, December 28, 2011.

…dissemination of classified information on the WikiLeaks.org website, and the authorization…SENSITIVE INFORMATION In July 2010, WikiLeaks.org posted thousands of sensitive and…Security. The threat was compounded when WikiLeaks.org, in November 2010, released… More Information

23.
Congressional Hearings. General. Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. Wednesday, April 6, 2011.

…vulnerabilities, such as those identified in the WikiLeaks incident. Specifically, we have requested…insider threat-type setback, such as the WikiLeaks affair, is going to hamper further efforts…information? And what effect has the WikiLeaks case had on our… More Information

24.
Congressional Reports. Committee on Homeland Security. Tuesday, June 12, 2012.

…dissemination of classified information on the WikiLeaks.org website, and the authorization…SENSITIVE INFORMATION In July 2010, WikiLeaks.org posted thousands of sensitive and…security. The threat was compounded when WikiLeaks.org, in November 2010, released… More Information

25.
Congressional Reports. Committee on Homeland Security. Tuesday, June 28, 2011.

…SENSITIVE INFORMATION In July 2010, Wikileaks posted thousands of sensitive and classified…That threat was only compounded when Wikileaks, in November 2010, released another…of Treasury seeking the designation of Wikileaks and its founder on the Specially… More Information

26.
Congressional Hearings. General. Armed Services. Thursday, March 10, 2011.

…classified documents subsequently released by WikiLeaks. Speaking from an intelligence perspective…release of classified U.S. documents by WikiLeaks. While the impacts of the WikiLeaks disclosures are still being assessed, we… More Information

27.
Congressional Hearings. General. Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management; Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Wednesday, October 26, 2011.

…Saudi ambassador reportedly was quoted in Wikileaks that came out in the press as saying…State Department cable made public by WikiLeaks quotes Ambassador Jubeir as telling American…17\ “WikiLeaks Cable Hints at Motive for Alleged… More Information

28.
Congressional Hearings. Authorization. Armed Services. Wednesday, March 2, 2011.

…Obviously, in the light of the whole WikiLeaks thing, there have been heightened concerns…wants to add, obviously, you mentioned WikiLeaks, Mr. Smith. You are absolutely right…of things that happen with respect to WikiLeaks does not happen again. Beyond… More Information

29.
Congressional Record. Mrs. MILLER of Michigan. Tuesday, December 7, 2010.

…MILLER of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, since WikiLeaks has begun releasing American top secret…this. I believe that the actions of WikiLeaks provide material support to our terrorist…organization. Others have argued that WikiLeaks is simply a media organization… More Information

30.
Congressional Record. Mr. PAUL. Thursday, December 9, 2010.

…minutes. Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, WikiLeaks‘ release of classified information has…information that he did not steal? And if WikiLeaks is to be prosecuted for publishing classified…number of deaths: Lying us into war or WikiLeaks‘ revelations or the release of the… More Information

31.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…H2525-H2530 [14AP], E553 [15AP] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…the FCC (S. 649), S1615 [16MR] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

32.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…Daily News: anniversary, H271 [21JA] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…tribute (S. Res. 494), S2481 [20AP] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

33.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…antipersonnel landmines, E871 [18MY] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…antipersonnel landmines, S3864 [18MY] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

34.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…committee members, H7301-H7304 [29SE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…PATRIOT) Act: reform, S2108 [25MR] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

35.
Congressional Reports. Thursday, March 17, 2011.

…Committee also held a hearing on the Wikileaks organization and the principle of “need to know.” Wikileaks is an international organization that…matters. The Committee’s review of Wikileaks and other unauthorized releases… More Information

36.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…28SE], H8333 [14DE], E2176 [16DE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…S. 624), S7222- S7224 [20SE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

37.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…H846-H848, H895-H901 [25FE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…tribute to National Guard, S5740 [12JY] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

38.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…Writing on America Award, E1455 [28JY] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…Tribune: anniversary, S4843 [10JN] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

39.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…H846-H848, H895-H901 [25FE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…reform, S2108 [25MR] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

40.
Congressional Record. Regarding S. 3240. Mr. REID, Ms. MIKULSKI, and others. Tuesday, June 5, 2012.

…a 22-year-old Army private in the Wikileaks matter and former CIA employees in other…personnel such as the Army private in the WikiLeaks matter or the former CIA employee who…one thing to have a private, in the WikiLeaks matter, who had access to it,… More Information

41.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…veterans and survivors, H2731 [21AP] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…Afghanistan (S. 3234), S4146 [24MY] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

42.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…H8102, H8104 [8DE], E2202 [18DE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…authority (S. 3847), S7560 [27SE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

43.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…convene (H.R. 5006), E522 [13AP] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…antipersonnel landmines, S3864 [18MY] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

44.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media…29JN] U.S. policy, H6047 [27JY] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified…S5481, S5497 [28JN], S7587 [28SE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of… More Information

45.
Congressional Reports. Committee on the Judiciary. Monday, January 3, 2011.

…Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks. Committee on the Judiciary. December…Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks (Serial No. Not Available as of Jan…release of U.S. government documents by WikiLeaks, including the constitutional and… More Information

46.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…of bias in coverage of immigration issues, E1782 [29SE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified documents to the…attacks in Federal court in New York, NY, S1250 [8MR] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of Dept. of Defense… More Information

47.
Compilation of Presidential Documents. Supplementary Materials. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…National Security Adviser James L. Jones, Jr., on the WikiLeaks web site posting documents concerning military operations…Released November 28 Statement by the Press Secretary on the WikiLeaks web site posting Department of State documents… More Information

48.
Congressional Hearings. General. Commerce. Wednesday, June 29, 2011.

…anonymous, the underground group associated with last year’s Wikileaks-related cyber attacks openly called for and carried out…Anonymous, the underground group associated with last year’s WikiLeaks-related cyber attacks, openly called for and carried… More Information

49.
Congressional Record. Thursday, March 10, 2011.

…behalf. [[Page D221]] INFORMATION SHARING IN THE ERA OF WIKILEAKS Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs…concluded a hearing to examine information sharing in the era of WikiLeaks, focusing on balancing security and collaboration,… More Information

50.
Congressional Hearings. Appropriation. Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. Thursday, February 25, 2010.

…make a brief comment about the recent leaks that were from WikiLeaks. To be clear, as President Obama said yesterday, that…Afghanistan. You just cannot impose order from above. The WikiLeaks was just–not new history, ancient history. You… More Information

51.
Congressional Record. Wednesday, December 1, 2010.

…by Chairman Levin and Representative Brady (TX). BRIEFING–WIKILEAKS Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Met in executive session to receive a briefing on WikiLeaks Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information. The… More Information

52.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.R. 1. Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky, Mr. DICKS, and others. Tuesday, February 15, 2011.

…Maryland is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. BARTLETT. Last week, there was WikiLeaks activity that pointed out a huge problem that we in the world face. WikiLeaks released some confidential emails that indicated that the Saudis had only… More Information

53.
Congressional Hearings. Appropriation. Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies. Wednesday, March 2, 2011.

…cases, you almost have to start over. Mr. Wolf. Yes. Look at the pain and suffering that WikiLeaks has created. I mean, what took place in WikiLeaks has resulted in the death of people and the fall of governments. It has done a pretty… More Information

54.
Congressional Record. Thursday, December 9, 2010.

…Department of Justice; and public witnesses. BRIEFING–WIKILEAKS UPDATE Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Met in executive session to receive a briefing on Update on WikiLeaks Unauthorized Disclosures. The Committee was briefed… More Information

55.
Congressional Hearings. General. Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet. Wednesday, May 25, 2011.

…attack that wreaks the most damage as demonstrated by the WikiLeaks case where thousands of classified State Department documents…the Government have increased at an alarming rate. Although WikiLeaks has become the face of security breaches within the… More Information

56.
Congressional Hearings. General. Armed Services. Thursday, March 3, 2011.

…have. Now, you have to shrink Saudi Arabia a bit because WikiLeaks, a couple weeks ago, indicated they have been fibbing about…China, are demanding hugely increased amounts of oil. The WikiLeaks thing indicates there is less oil out there than we… More Information

57.
Congressional Hearings. General. Science, Space, and Technology. Thursday, March 3, 2011.

…oil, and Saudi Arabia needs to be diminished of it because Wikileaks a couple weeks ago indicated they have been fibbing about…India, using hugely increased amounts of oil. We have the Wikileaks a couple weeks ago indicating that… More Information

58.
Congressional Hearings. General. Homeland Security. Thursday, March 10, 2011.

…can to keep our homeland secure.” When asked about WikiLeaks and the potential prosecution of Julian Assange, Holder said, “it’s an ongoing investigation.” “What Wikileaks did, at the end of the day, was harmful to… More Information

59.
Congressional Record. Regarding H. Res. 79. Mr. DREIER, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, and others. Thursday, February 10, 2011.

…Twitter provide the account details of people connected to the WikiLeaks easel including its founder, Julian Assange, isn’t noteworthy…inform the people whose records the government was seeking. WikiLeaks says it suspects that other large sites like Google and… More Information

60.
Congressional Record. Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Thursday, December 16, 2010.

…cited by the New York Times but has not yet been posted by Wikileaks says that Saudi donors remain the chief financiers of Sunni…CPC” to receive an indefinite waiver. In one of the Wikileaks cables written earlier this year on Saudi King Abdullah… More Information

61.
Compilation of Presidential Documents. Interviews With the News Media. Friday, March 11, 2011.

…USA, who is accused of leaking classified documents to the WikiLeaks organization . Categories: Interviews With the News Media…Criminal Court, International; Defense and national security : WikiLeaks publication of classified U.S. Government… More Information

62.
Congressional Hearings. General. Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies. Wednesday, March 16, 2011.

…as field reports on Pakistan) were obtained by the group WikiLeaks.org. According to DOD, this investigation was related…new oil and gas field bid negotiations. As we saw with the WikiLeaks document disclosures brought about by a malicious… More Information

63.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.R. 4899. Mr. OBEY, Mr. LEWIS of California, and others. Tuesday, July 27, 2010.

…distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich). Mr. KUCINICH. Wikileaks released 92,000 previously secret documents, totaling 200…It would be good if Congress had announced hearings once WikiLeaks documents came forward. But what we’ve learned is… More Information

64.
Congressional Record. Mr. PAUL. Wednesday, January 26, 2011.

…to attack. A State Department cable recently published by WikiLeaks confirmed that U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie did indeed…seems willing to end. Julian Assange, the publisher of the WikiLeaks memo, is now considered an enemy of the state…. More Information

65.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.R. 1586. Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. NELSON of Florida, and others. Monday, August 2, 2010.

…Florida. Mr. President, last weekend, a Web page called WikiLeaks posted what they titled the “Afghan War Diary.” It…right now in Newsweek: “Taliban Seeks Vengeance in Wake of WikiLeaks. Leaked U.S. Intel documents listed the names and… More Information

66.
Congressional Record. Thursday, December 16, 2010.

…Pages D1206-D1207] Committee Meetings ESPIONAGE ACT/WIKILEAKS Committee on the Judiciary: Held a hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks. Testimony was heard from public witnesses…. More Information

67.
Congressional Hearings. Nomination. Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. Thursday, September 22, 2011.

…Intelligence Community, especially within Washington. While WikiLeaks garnered a lot of attention because of its scope, there continue…IG with respect to compromises or potential compromises and WikiLeaks-type situations. I think that there tends to be a… More Information

68.
Congressional Hearings. General. Judiciary. Wednesday, March 16, 2011.

…mortgage fraud, for example–it seems that we know some things and we have learned through WikiLeaks and those who received some of the WikiLeaks information about Bank of America and Bank of America is involved with the Balboa… More Information

69.
Congressional Hearings. General. Appropriations; Foreign Relations. Wednesday, March 16, 2011.

gpo.gov/fdsys/ _____ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 74-273 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009 ———————————————————————– For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet:… More Information

70.
Congressional Record. Mr. SMITH of Texas. Thursday, December 2, 2010.

…classified State Department documents obtained illegally by WikiLeaks. But one year ago, The Times declined to print information…contradictory temperature data. Regarding its decision to print the WikiLeaks documents, The Times wrote: “For The Times to… More Information

71.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…their families, and recognize efforts of emergency response workers at the mine disaster (H. Res. 1236), E590 [20AP] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of Dept. of Defense classified documents to the news media related to Pakistan and… More Information

72.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…attack the U.S. be considered enemy combatants to be tried by military tribunals instead of civilian courts, H7745 [30NO] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified documents to the news media, H7743, H7745 [30NO] World War II:… More Information

73.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…Votes: position on missed, H8966 [22DE], E265 [26FE] Wheelin’ Team 457 (organization): tribute, E86 [26JA] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified documents to the news media, H7760 [1DE], H8035 [7DE] Remarks in House… More Information

74.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…War II veterans traveling to Washington, DC, to visit memorials built in their honor (H. Res. 1673), E1754 [28SE] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified documents to the news media, H8278 [9DE] Remarks in House relative to… More Information

75.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…and approval to amendments made by Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia (S.J. Res. 25), H2522 [14AP] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified documents to the news media, E2044 [2DE] World Intellectual Property Day:… More Information

76.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…provide whistleblower protections to certain workers in the offshore oil and gas industry (H.R. 5851), H6489 [30JY] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of Dept. of Defense classified documents to the news media related to Pakistan and… More Information

77.
United States Courts Opinions. United States District Court Eastern District of California. FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 12/17/10 RECOMMENDING that Pltf’s 17 Motion to Remand be granted and this entire case be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of El Dorado; Third-Party Deft USA’s 35 Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Third-Party…. Monday, December 20, 2010.

…v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998); Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2008). District courts have diversity jurisdiction over “all civil… More Information

78.
Congressional Record. Friday, March 4, 2011.

…Counsel, 10 a.m., SD-342. March 10, Full Committee, to hold hearings to examine information sharing in the era of WikiLeaks, focusing on balancing security and collaboration, 3 p.m., SD-342. Committee on the Judiciary: March 9, to… More Information

79.
Compilation of Presidential Documents. Addresses and Remarks. Tuesday, July 27, 2010.

…Force, commander; Afghanistan : U.S. military forces :: Deployment; Afghanistan : U.S. policy review; Afghanistan : WikiLeaks publication of classified U.S. military documents; Armed Forces, U.S. : Funding; Business and industry :… More Information

80.
Congressional Hearings. General. Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations. Wednesday, May 25, 2011.

…attacked Google and at least 80 other U.S. companies. Not all threats to Federal cybersecurity are external. In June 2010, Wikileaks released thousands of classified Department of State and Department of Defense documents. Immediately following the… More Information

81.
Congressional Hearings. General. Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment. Tuesday, December 15, 2009.

…Eco-Terrorism: Environmental and Animal Rights Militants in The United States, (May 7, 2008), available at http://wikileaks.org/leak/dhs-ecoterrorism-in-us- 2008.pdf. \34\ T.J. Greaney, `Fusion Center’ Data Draws Fire… More Information

82.
Congressional Hearings. General. Judiciary. Wednesday, April 29, 2009.

…cover anybody who Tweets regularly or who posts reports about current events on a Web site like Facebook, or even sites like Wikileaks that encourage people to disseminate classified information illegally. My staff has met with your staff on this bill,… More Information

83.
Congressional Hearings. General. Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment. Wednesday, March 18, 2009.

…Eco-Terrorism: Environmental and Animal Rights Militants in the United States, (May 7, 2008), available at http://wikileaks.org/leak/dhs-ecoterrorism-in-us-… More Information

84.
Congressional Hearings. General. Foreign Relations. Tuesday, May 24, 2011.

…largely by the Haqqani network, the ferocious Taliban militia based in Pakistan’s tribal regions. According to a July 2009 WikiLeaks cable from the U.S. consulate in Peshawar, which abuts the Pakistani tribal regions, Jalaluddin Haqqani, the… More Information

85.
Congressional Record. Mr. SANDERS. Thursday, March 10, 2011.

…session of the Senate on March 10, 2011, at 3 p.m. to conduct a hearing entitled “Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks: Balancing Security and Collaboration.” The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Committee on… More Information

86.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.R. 1892. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER, and others. Friday, December 16, 2011.

…country safe, technological advances have also increased the risks of this cooperation. As we saw last year with the damage of Wikileaks the threat from a malicious insider, with the “keys to the kingdom,” is real. This bill requires the Director… More Information

87.
United States Courts Opinions. United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York. (Written Opinion) Memorandum of Opinion Signed on 7/22/2011 Regarding the Applicant, Dr. Martin Prager. (Porter, Marguerite). Friday, July 22, 2011.

…900120, at *7 (E.D. Va. March 11, 2011) (application of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) to foreign users involved in WikiLeaks investigation not an extraterritorial application of U.S. law because statute governs disclosure by the American… More Information

88.
Congressional Record. Mr. KUCINICH. Tuesday, July 27, 2010.

…AMERICA (Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.) Mr. KUCINICH. Wake up, America. WikiLeaks‘ release of secret war documents gave us 92,000 reasons to end the wars. Pick one. Wake up, America. Main Street… More Information

89.
Congressional Record. Mr. BOND, Mr. DURBIN, and others. Wednesday, November 17, 2010.

…disclosed, and the lives that will likely be lost, as a result of the obscene amount of classified information compromised by Wikileaks. Of course, to call this a leak case is gross mischaracterization; it is more like a tidal wave. We are blessed with… More Information

90.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.R. 1892. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER, and others. Friday, September 9, 2011.

…country safe, unrestrained and unregulated access can put our country at great risk. As we have seen from both the damage of WikiLeaks and historical espionage cases, the threat from a malicious insider with the keys to the kingdom is very real. We are… More Information

91.
Congressional Record. Mr. McCONNELL, Mr. KYL, and others. Thursday, December 16, 2010.

…nuclear missile defense to a significant degree. I am not persuaded that that has not occurred. For example, the latest WikiLeaks reveal that the administration negotiated away President Bush’s plan for a forward missile defense site in Poland in… More Information

92.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

[Congressional Record Index (2010)] ASSANGE, JULIAN Remarks in House WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified documents to the news media, H8035… More Information

93.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…rates, H3761 [25MY] Votes: position on missed, H6124 [27JY], E201, E208, E213 [23FE], E894, E897 [20MY] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified documents to the news media, H7744 [30NO] Tributes Popps, Dean G.,… More Information

94.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…H138 [13JA] ——transmit to the House of Representatives classified documents unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media (see H. Res. 1763), H8520 [15DE] Developing countries: protect girls… More Information

95.
Congressional Hearings. General. Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. Wednesday, June 20, 2012.

…I think was warranted. We’ve had a long history of problems with Ms. Abul Naga. If you go back and look back at these Wikileaks documents, you’ll see a stack about this thick of complaints from the U.S. Embassy about how Ms. Abul Naga… More Information

96.
Congressional Record. Regarding S. Res. 4. Monday, March 7, 2011.

…SH-219 3 p.m. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs To hold hearings to examine information sharing in the era of WikiLeaks, focusing on balancing security and collaboration. SD-342 MARCH 15 10 a.m. Budget To hold hearings to examine the… More Information

97.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.R. 754. Ms. KLOBUCHAR and Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thursday, May 26, 2011.

…requiring the intelligence community to prevent another security disaster, such as the recent leaks of classified information to Wikileaks, through the implementation of automated information technology threat detection programs that must be fully… More Information

98.
Congressional Hearings. General. Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.s. Postal Service and Labor Policy. Tuesday, November 15, 2011.

…what you are offering. The Federal Government has a hard time keeping secrets. Don’t take my word for it, just look at WikiLeaks. The idea that somehow we can feel secure that you all have created a system that is going to be secure. Mr. Berry…. More Information

99.
Congressional Hearings. General. Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. Thursday, February 17, 2011.

…S.? And what do we do when criminals start using secure communication tools provided by developers associated with the WikiLeaks organization, who will ignore requests by U.S. law enforcement agencies? Ms. Caproni. Thank you for that… More Information

100.
Congressional Record. Regarding S. Res. 4. Wednesday, March 2, 2011.

…SH-219 3 p.m. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs To hold hearings to examine information sharing in the era of WikiLeaks, focusing on balancing security and collaboration. SD-342 MARCH 15 10:15 a.m. Judiciary To hold hearings to… More Information

101.
Congressional Record. Friday, December 10, 2010.

…Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis– Part II, 10 a.m., 2141 Rayburn. December 16, hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks, 9:30 a.m., 2141… More Information

102.
Congressional Record. Mr. KERRY, Mr. INOUYE, and others. Friday, December 17, 2010.

…would all acknowledge it is becoming less and less so, as we have all painfully seen, even in things like the most recent WikiLeaks situation that occurred on cable traffic. There are growing problems in Iran and North Korea, and all of the concerns… More Information

103.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.R. 754. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER, and others. Thursday, May 12, 2011.

…NCTC. The bill also adds hundreds of millions of dollars for intelligence above current levels. In response to the Web site WikiLeaks, the bill includes an insider threat detection program that automatically monitors unauthorized access to classified… More Information

104.
Congressional Record. Tuesday, November 30, 2010.

…Insurers and Patients, 10:30 a.m., 2141 Rayburn. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, executive, briefing on WikiLeaks Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, 11 a.m., 304-HVC. Subcommittee on Intelligence Community… More Information

105.
Congressional Record. Mr. NELSON of Florida. Tuesday, November 30, 2010.

…To betray those sources, to now put their lives in jeopardy by the indiscriminate turning over to an organization called WikiLeaks that suddenly puts all of this up on the Web, is the height of irresponsibility, an act against humanity, and it has… More Information

106.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…17JN] Dept. of State: transmit to the House of Representatives classified documents unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks (Internet site) and the news media (see H. Res. 1763), H8520 [15DE] Executive Office of the President: request… More Information

107.
Congressional Hearings. General. Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade. Thursday, June 2, 2011.

…believe, is unprecedented in its size and scope. Initially anonymous, the underground group associated with last year’s WikiLeaks-related cyber attacks openly called for and carried out massive denial-of-service attacks against numerous Sony… More Information

108.
United States Courts Opinions. United States District Court District of Columbia. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that Mr. Paracha shall file the past-due report by May 2, 2011; government’s opposition to the emergency application is due by May 11, 2011; and reply is due by May 18, 2011. Signed by Judge Paul L. Friedman on April 29, 2011. (MA). Friday, April 29, 2011.

…petitioner Saifullah Paracha’s counsel filed an emergency application for immediate access to all publicly available WikiLeaks documents relevant to Mr. Paracha’s case. See Emergency Application at 1, Apr. 27, 2011. The following day,… More Information

109.
Congressional Hearings. General. Commerce. Wednesday, May 11, 2011.

…secure communications networks or our research and development efforts. Now, some of them are being outsourced thanks to WikiLeaks, et cetera, but we have to find a way to deal with all of this. Co-Chair Hutchison, I just had a long meeting… More Information

110.
Congressional Record. Mr. BARTLETT. Tuesday, May 24, 2011.

…look like if the size of the country was relative to how much oil it had. Now we’ve got to modify this a little because WikiLeaks just exposed some papers from Saudi Arabia that said they’ve been fibbing about how much oil they have, that they… More Information

111.
Congressional Reports. Committee on Armed Services. To accompany S. 1253. Wednesday, June 22, 2011.

…Further interactions with the Department have not settled the issue. On the one hand, especially in the aftermath of the Wikileaks disaster, the Department really has dramatically, and one assumes permanently, reduced the number of computers and… More Information

112.
Congressional Hearings. General. Banking, Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment; Homeland and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Wednesday, December 8, 2010.

…make sure, while this data is being collected and for the right purposes, that it is secure and that we do not read about WikiLeaks or anything else with our positions because that would be catastrophic to our clients. Chairman Levin. OK. But… More Information

113.
Congressional Hearings. General. Armed Services. Tuesday, March 1, 2011.

…There is now escalating unrest in the Arab world where most of the world’s oil reserves are. And a couple of weeks ago, WikiLeaks indicated that Saudi Arabia has 40 percent less oil reserves than they were claiming. That is probably true of most of… More Information

114.
Congressional Hearings. General. Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. Thursday, December 9, 2010.

…information, sensitive information. We don’t want to tell you. It is why you know more about the United States from reading WikiLeaks than you get in classified briefings from this executive branch and previous ones. It is not a partisan issue; it… More Information

115.
Congressional Record. Wednesday, March 9, 2011.

…of Special Counsel, 10 a.m., SD-342. Full Committee, to hold hearings to examine information sharing in the era of WikiLeaks, focusing on balancing security and collaboration, 3 p.m., SD-342. Committee on the Judiciary, business… More Information

116.
Congressional Record. Regarding H. Con. Res. 28. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. KUCINICH, and others. Thursday, March 17, 2011.

…committing many more American lives and hundreds of billions of additional U.S. dollars for many years to come. As the WikiLeaks war diary comprised of more than 91,000 secret reports on the Afghanistan War makes clear, any sense of American and… More Information

117.
Congressional Hearings. General. Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. Thursday, December 8, 2011.

…a dozen European and American companies have helped their government to put them in jail. According to files released by WikiLeaks in partnership with five news media outlets last week, more than 160 companies are actually involved. The surveillance… More Information

118.
Congressional Record. Regarding H. Res. 493. Mr. BISHOP of Utah, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, and others. Wednesday, December 14, 2011.

…job-creating small businesses, and also the inclusion of important cyberprotections to prevent future incidents similar to WikiLeaks. This bill will also ensure the long-term strength of programs critical to our naval dominance and strategic… More Information

119.
Congressional Record. Mr. LEAHY, Mr. CHAMBLISS, and others. Monday, September 12, 2011.

…it. Unfortunately, some of the old tendencies to restrict intelligence are recurring, particularly amid concerns about Wikileaks. I share the anger about the many leaks of classified information that have jeopardized successful intelligence… More Information

120.
Congressional Record. Regarding H. Res. 1735. Mr. BERMAN, Mr. POE of Texas, and others. Tuesday, November 30, 2010.

…denuclearization issue for the past 20 years. The unconscionable revelations of classified information in the past few days by WikiLeaks have nonetheless opened our eyes to the full extent of the North Korean cooperation with the little tyrant from the… More Information

121.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…Unemployment: provide additional emergency unemployment compensation, S2189 [12AP] ——rates, S137 [22JA] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified documents to the news media, S8270 [30NO] ——release of Dept. of… More Information

122.
United States Courts Opinions. United States District Court Eastern District of California. FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 7/19/10 RECOMMENDING that the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss 107 be granted and that plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Thomas A. Anderson, Candace Heidelberger, Delores Spindler, Hilary Berardi (formerly known as Hilary Burget…. Tuesday, July 20, 2010.

…Investor Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2004); Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Case 2:09-cv-00522-JAM-KJN Document 144 Filed… More Information

123.
Congressional Reports. Committee on Armed Services. Monday, January 3, 2011.

…Afghanistan and Iraq July 21, 2010–Skelton Honors WWII and Current Service Members July 26, 2010–Skelton Statement on WikiLeaks July 27, 2010–Skelton Statement on the Vote on the War Supplemental July 29, 2010–Skelton on Army Health… More Information

124.
Congressional Hearings. Authorization. Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. Wednesday, March 9, 2011.

…What is wrong with those protections? Mr. Sanchez. Well, I think the problem here is that as, for example, the recent WikiLeaks disclosures have made clear, when databases, however protected or classified they may be, are allowed to contain… More Information

125.
Congressional Hearings. General. Oversight and Government Reform. Thursday, July 7, 2011.

…regards to ensuring we have the latest and greatest products installed. HBSS is an example as we kind of worked through the Wikileaks mitigation but continuous efforts working with them on threat mitigation. Mr. Baker. A significant amount of… More Information

126.
Congressional Hearings. General. Armed Services . Thursday, September 23, 2010.

…countries on our–through the–via the Internet. I am concerned, given the case of Private Manning and–and the WikiLeaks case, as well, about attacks within, you know–in other words, people that have access to our systems that… More Information

127.
Congressional Hearings. General. Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources. Thursday, June 16, 2011.

…40 of the overall oil price when oil was at its height. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/25/114759/wikileaks– saudis-often-warned.html See also: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/&#8230; More Information

128.
Congressional Record. Mr. MARKEY. Tuesday, January 18, 2011.

…Boston Globe, Dec. 29, 2010] Probe Both Sides in Sri Lanka No foreign leader has fared worse in the cables released by WikiLeaks than Sri Lanka’s President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who has been resisting calls for an international inquiry into possible… More Information

129.
Congressional Record. Wednesday, December 8, 2010.

…Civil Liberties, hearing on Civil Liberties and National Security, 9:30 a.m., 2141 Rayburn. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, executive, briefing on Update on WikiLeaks Unauthorized Disclosures, 1 p.m.,… More Information

130.
Congressional Record. Mr. BROUN of Georgia, Mrs. LOWEY, and others. Friday, February 18, 2011.

…terrorists, given that they had exported 15 of the 19 homicide bombers on September 11, given that just in December when the WikiLeaks came out, it was learned in a quote from the Secretary of State, “It has been an ongoing challenge to persuade… More Information

131.
Congressional Record. Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. REID, and others. Friday, December 3, 2010.

…investments to secure Federal information systems. We have just been briefed on the profound and deleterious impact of the WikiLeaks. We have a lot of work to do to improve our security systems. Are those unobligated funds coming out of that program?… More Information

132.
Congressional Record. Mr. KERRY and Mr. DORGAN. Monday, November 29, 2010.

…the Office of Senate Security and read the transcript of that hearing, which I suspect will stay there and not appear in WikiLeaks. If my colleagues want a public statement on verification, I would once again cite what James Clapper, the Director… More Information

133.
Congressional Record Index. Friday, December 31, 2010.

…civilian courts, H7745 [30NO] U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START): renewal, H2570, H2571 [14AP] WikiLeaks (Internet site): release of classified documents to the news media, H7743 [30NO] Remarks in House relative to… More Information

134.
Congressional Hearings. General. Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. Tuesday, November 15, 2011.

…are concerned that we are witnessing the opening salvos of a new kind of conflict waged in cyberspace. As we learned in the Wikileaks case, one individual with access to classified data can threaten America’s national operational security, and as we… More Information

135.
Congressional Documents. 111th Congress. Wednesday, December 22, 2010.

…States. We need to have a law of war which allows us to hold them. As a final thought on intelligence, however, the recent WikiLeaks scandal has shown us what damage the Internet can do to our diplomatic efforts as well as the safety of those in… More Information

136.
United States Courts Opinions. United States District Court Eastern District of California. ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 3/9/2010 GRANTING plaintiff’s 2 6 Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Plaintiff obligated to pay filing fee of $350 for action. The 1 Complaint is DISMISSED w/leave to amend. Within 30 days from date of Order, plaintiff shall complete attached Notice of Amendment…. Wednesday, March 10, 2010.

…Investor Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2004); Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Although the captions in plaintiff’s form complaint and… More Information

137.
Congressional Hearings. General. Financial Services, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit. Wednesday, September 14, 2011.

…perpetrate malicious activity. We saw evidence of this in the denial-of-service attacks on the payment card industry after WikiLeaks events last year. One such botnet targeting the financial services industry is called Qakbot. It is a sophisticated… More Information

138.
Congressional Reports. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. To accompany H.R. 754. Tuesday, May 3, 2011.

…threat is complex and real and growing by the day. Incidents like the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by Wikileaks also show us that despite the tremendous progress made since 9/11 in information sharing, we still need to have… More Information

139.
Congressional Record. Mrs. MALONEY. Thursday, December 15, 2011.

…the Saudi intelligence chief and as ambassador to the United States, suggested that Saudi Arabia may seek nuclear weapons. Wikileaks revealed that Egypt’s leaders told U.S. officials that Egypt would acquire nuclear weapons if Iran did. This lends… More Information

140.
Congressional Hearings. General. Intelligence. Thursday, February 3, 2011.

…or making it more efficient I’d just urge you to think outside the box and let us help you do that. Lastly, since the Wikileaks disclosure began the tug between the need to know versus the need to share has come under increased scrutiny. What are… More Information

141.
Congressional Hearings. General. Intelligence. Wednesday, February 16, 2011.

…Perhaps the most prominent example recently is the unauthorized downloading of classified documents, subsequently released by WikiLeaks. From an intelligence perspective, these disclosures have been very damaging. I want to assure the Committee that as… More Information

142.
Congressional Hearings. Appropriation. Appropriations, Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government Appropriations. Thursday, February 10, 2011.

…give us that that information would be kept secure? Now, that is not an issue with your agency, per se. We have seen the Wikileaks. So what sort of assurances could we have? Mr. Shulman. I think there has been some inaccurate commentary about the… More Information

143.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.R. 1905. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. KUCINICH, and others. Tuesday, December 13, 2011.

…A. headquarters, described Amano as being “ready for prime time.” According to the cable, which was obtained by WikiLeaks, in a meeting in September, 2009, with Glyn Davies, the American permanent representative to the I.A.E.A.,… More Information

144.
Congressional Record. Mr. LEAHY. Wednesday, December 22, 2010.

…and national security posed by data breaches have not gone away. The recently reported cyber attacks in response to the WikiLeaks disclosures are fresh reminders of the urgent need to have national standards to protect the privacy of America’s… More Information

145.
Congressional Record. Regarding H. Con. Res. 335. Mr. BERMAN, Mrs. LOWEY, and others. Friday, December 17, 2010.

…interventions and times that I dealt with him on a particular project over the years, but I feel like I would be bringing WikiLeaks to the House floor were I to go through all of those. So I will restrain myself just to say he truly was one of a… More Information

146.
Congressional Record. Regarding H.R. 4853. Mr. REID, Mr. McCONNELL, and others. Tuesday, December 14, 2010.

…States. We need to have a law of war which allows us to hold them. As a final thought on intelligence, however, the recent WikiLeaks scandal has shown us what damage the Internet can do to our diplomatic efforts as well as the safety of those in… More Information

147.
Congressional Record. Wednesday, December 15, 2010.

…closed hearings to examine certain intelligence matters, 2:30 p.m., SH-219. House Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks, 10 a.m., 2141… More Information

148.
Congressional Record. Mrs. BACHMANN, Mr. SKELTON, and others. Wednesday, December 15, 2010.

…all classified Department of State documents assessed by the Department to have been unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks and public press outlets; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. By Mr. BERMAN (for himself, Mr. Poe of Texas, Ms…. More Information

149.
Congressional Record. Monday, November 29, 2010.

…of 2010, 3 p.m., H-313 Capitol. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December 1, executive, briefing on WikiLeaks Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, 11 a.m., 304-HVC. December 1, Subcommittee on Intelligence… More Information

150.
Congressional Record. Mr. BARTLETT. Friday, December 2, 2011.

…may have 22 percent of all the reserves in the world. You may remember, oh, 6 weeks or a couple months ago, there was a WikiLeaks expose that said that maybe the Saudis had overestimated their oil reserves by as much as 40 percent. So the map might… More Information


WIKILEAKS intervenes in the U.S. federal election

 

Dear WikiLeaks Friend,

From today WikiLeaks has decided to intervene in the U.S. federal election. It is clear that whether Republicans or Democrats are in power, without the sort of pressure we can exert when we are at our strongest, the U.S. government will continue to declare the whole world a battleground. Last Friday, the Pentagon publicly reissued its threats against WikiLeaks, demanding that we destroy our previous publications and cease “soliciting” U.S. military whistleblowers — and that our failure to do so was an ongoing “crime” and “law enforcement matter”. The FBI file for the pending prosecution of WikiLeaks, according to court records from earlier this year, has reached 42,135 pages. WikiLeaks is determined to stop these and other moves towards what appears to be ?€? let’s be honest ?€? a transnational security state dystopia. We believe knowledge is power and that knowledge should be in the hands of the people. By placing huge quantities of secret knowledge into your hands we can stop the concentration of power that is driving these trends. We ask that you cast the only vote that matters, and vote with your wallet. It is possible for you to make donations with your credit card, despite the attempted blockade. To do so, visit http://wikileaks.org/donate Also, please consider visiting our campaign website, at http://wikileaks.org/donate2012 and passing it on to your friends and family. Below are some suggestions Friends of WikiLeaks might want to consider to support WikiLeaks in this campaign: -Show your support to the world AND financially assist WikiLeaks: Buy a Tshirt at the official WikiLeaks store: http://www.wikileaks.spreadshirt.com – Download a poster to print and display from: http://www.somersetbean.blogspot.com – write to your national papers to correct libels against Assange and WikiLeaks: eg Julian Assange has not been charged with any crime anywhere, yet publications state the contrary. – write articles, facebook posts, tweets emails etc titled ‘Why I will not be voting for Obama’ or ‘Why I will not be voting from Romney – Contact your friends, family, colleagues and classmates organise a WikiLeaks campaign event – Create a WikiLeaks Campaign/Defence Group at your school, college, University or work place Solidarity, Julian Assange and Team

Unveiled – The Syria Files by Wikileaks

Julian Assange, investigative partnership organised by WikiLeaks and the data obtained by WikiLeaks.

Bernd Pulch, MA, Publisher and Journalist

 

 

 

 

Dear Readers,

in continuing our partnership with Wikiileweaks we will soon publish the Syria Files by Wikileaks.

WikiLeaks began publishing the Syria Files – more than two million emails from Syrian political figures, ministries and associated companies, dating from August 2006 to March 2012.

This extraordinary data set derives from 680 Syria-related entities or domain names, including those of the Ministries of Presidential Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Information, Transport and Culture.

Over the next two months, ground-breaking stories derived from the files will appear in WikiLeaks (global), Al Akhbar (Lebanon), Al Masry Al Youm (Egypt), ARD (Germany), Associated Press (US), L’Espresso (Italy), Owni (France) and Publico.es (Spain). Other publications will announce themselves closer to their publishing date.

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange said: “The material is embarrassing to Syria, but it is also embarrassing to Syria’s opponents. It helps us not merely to criticise one group or another, but to understand their interests, actions and thoughts. It is only through understanding this conflict that we can hope to resolve it.”

At this time Syria is undergoing a violent internal conflict that has killed between 6,000 and 15,000 people in the last 18 months. The Syria Files shine a light on the inner workings of the Syrian government and economy, but they also reveal how the West and Western companies say one thing and do another.

The range of information extends from the intimate correspondence of the most senior Baath party figures to records of financial transfers sent from Syrian ministries to other nations.

The database comprises 2,434,899 emails from the 680 domains. There are 678,752 different email addresses that have sent emails and 1,082,447 different recipients. There are a number of different languages in the set, including around 400,000 emails in Arabic and 68,000 emails in Russian. The data is more than eight times the size of ’Cablegate’ in terms of number of documents, and more than 100 times the size in terms of data. Around 42,000 emails were infected with viruses or trojans. To solve these complexities, WikiLeaks built a general-purpose, multi-language political data-mining system which can handle massive data sets like those represented by the Syria Files.

In such a large collection of information, it is not possible to verify every single email at once; however, WikiLeaks and its co-publishers have done so for all initial stories to be published. We are statistically confident that the vast majority of the data are what they purport to be.

We would like to thank our sources, technical team, donors and defenders without whom this contribution to the historical record would not be possible. https://wlfriends.org/

For more information on the Syria Files, please see: http://wikileaks.org/syria-files/re…

For media enquiries, please see: http://wikileaks.org/Press

Sincerely your

Bernd Pulch, MA, Publisher and Journalist

>Cryptome unveils AntiLeaks Questions

AntiLeaks Questions

 


A sends:

Antileaks,

Several questions:

1. What do you hope to gain by your recent attack upon WL?

2. Are you affiliated officially or unofficially with any US
governmental organization? Meaning, are you acting on "orders" or
autonomously?

3. If (2) is a positive, or even as allegedly US citizens, how do you
reconcile your actions with the First Amendment to the Bill of Rights?

4. What would you say to other American Citizens who have viewed your
cyber actions in a negative light?

5. Would you like to comment on the logistics of your attacks? It was
reported that several thousands of computers were taken over for the
attack. Do you confirm these reports?

6. Do you view your actions as: criminal acts, acts of vigilantes or
otherwise?

7. Does antileaks view WL as a "online publisher", a terrorist group
or otherwise?

8. Is antileaks opposed to all "leaks"? Is there any situation when a
leak is justified in the minds of "antileaks" by governmental or
non-governmental actors (and in the realm of any historical context)?

Appreciated.

Sex, Lies and Julian Assange – Full Movie

He had just humiliated the most powerful nation in the world, heading one of the most controversial cyber operations in history. So when Julian Assange arrived in Sweden in August 2010 he was greeted like a conquering hero. But within weeks there was a warrant out for his arrest and he was being investigated for rape and sexual molestation. However, as the details of the allegations against Assange emerged, suspicions arose over the legal barrage being aimed at him. Exploring the mysterious circumstances surrounding the case, this doc gets to the heart of a bizzare tale of international cat and mouse.
“Sitting outdoors with the world’s coolest, smartest people! It’s amazing!”, Anna Ardin tweeted, as she sat at a barbecue she had arranged for Assange. Yet according to the allegations she would later bring against him he had recently sexually abused her. “You wouldn’t send such messages if you had been raped by someone the night before”, argues Assange’s lawyer. Both Assange and his supporters believe the attempt to force his return to Sweden is simply the first step in a plan to see him extradited to the United States and that the case against him is a set up.
It’s clear that when Assange arrived in Sweden Anna Ardin & Sofia Wilen were both enthralled by the Wikileaks phenomena and he slept with both women over a period of weeks. The charges originated with a misunderstanding in a Stockholm police station that “some sort of sex crime had been committed”. Wilen refused to sign what had been taken down. Assange was interviewed but not charged with any offence. But 12 days after being given permission to leave the country, the case was re-opened and the Swedes issued a warrant for his arrest.
At this point Assange was at the height of his powers and three weeks later he delivered a massive hit against America: the Iraq War Logs. An outraged US labelled him a “traitor” and were overcome with calls to “shoot the son-of-a-bitch”. Shortly afterwards Sweden issued an Interpol Red Notice for his arrest; a highly unusual move. “Red Notices are normally the preserve of terrorists and dictators. Even Gaddafi was not subject to a Red Notice.”
After 500 days of fighting extradition from the UK to Sweden, Assange made his dramatic dash to the Ecuadorian embassy. In an interview from inside, Assange claims he had sensed the net tightening around him when, “the Swedish government publicly announced that it would detain me without charge in severe conditions. On the same evening security contractors turned up unannounced at 10:30pm and insisted on fitting another manacle to my leg”.
Following the complex twists and turns of the entire saga, this documentary charts a case far more complex than the Swedes seem to be admitting to. When pressed about the strange manner in which the charges were brought the answer is baffling: “I can very well understand the confusion…it is very difficult to understand, well, exactly how it works.” And as Assange’s US lawyer points out, he should be worried. “I’d be very nervous, because if the United States get their hands on you, you’re a goner.”

 

 

Unveiled – Why Assange Remained Within an Embassy Window

Why Assange Remained Within an Embassy Window to Deliver a Speech

Assange speech photos: http://cryptome.org/2012-info/assange-juliets/assange-juliets-romedia.htm

 


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Based on photos of Assange’s appearance at the Ecuadorian Embassy he carefully did not cross the legal boundary of the embassy, that is, the national boundary of Ecuador, by stepping onto the balcony where two videographers were positioned. (A protruding balcony is considered to be outside a building in most laws governing buildings.) This could indicate recognition that if he had crossed the boundary police could have entered the embassy to arrest him on the grounds that he had breached the national boundary and thereby lost asylum protection.

An inadvertent transgression, violating a precise definition of a boundary like a national border, has been used in many other cases to pursue a person across the boundary — borders of the Soviet satellites and US borders, for example.

Assange was awkwardly positioned in the embassy window frame to face the entire widespread crowd as he would have been able to do if he had stood on the balcony.

Toward the end of his speech Assange looked skyward, perhaps toward a helicopter which may have been video-taping his exact position. A toe, a foot, an arm might be forgiven, but a fully body likely not. Evidence will tell if he went too far, or will be accused of doing so.

His own two videographers will have evidence of compliance, although it is not clear if his lower body was taped. Photographs taken by the crowd could show more if they were zoomed to the border of Ecuador at Assange’s lower body.

Not to be overlooked, however, is that his position within the window frame could have been for quick escape against violence or kidnap, official or otherwise.

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Assange is an inch or so taller than the interior frame of the window (photos show he stooped to pass through the frame). Thus it would have been more convenient to move to the balcony for the speech if not advised against it.

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Assange’s shoe remains on the window sill, the Ecuador national boundary. Shoe and sill enlarged below.

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Shoe toe over the sill edge but within the Ecuador boundary.

 

 


 

 

 


 

 

 


 

Unveiled – Assange Juliets the Romedia Photos

Assange Juliets the Romedia Photos

Based on photos of Assange’s appearance at the Ecuadorian Embassy he carefully did not cross the legal boundary of the embassy, that is, the national boundary of Ecuador, by stepping onto the balcony where two videographers were positioned. (A protruding balcony is considered to be outside a building in most laws governing buildings.) This could indicate recognition that if he had crossed the boundary police could have entered the embassy to arrest him on the grounds that he had breached the national boundary and thereby lost asylum protection.

An inadvertent transgression, violating a precise definition of a boundary like a national border, has been used in many other cases to pursue a person across the boundary — borders of the Soviet satellites and US borders, for example.

Assange was awkwardly positioned in the embassy window frame to face the entire widespread crowd as he would have been able to do if he had stood on the balcony.

Toward the end of his speech Assange looked skyward, perhaps toward a helicopter which may have been video-taping his exact position. A toe, a foot, an arm might be forgiven, but a fully body likely not. Evidence will tell if he went too far, or will be accused of doing so.

His own two videographers will have evidence of compliance, although it is not clear if his lower body was taped. Photographs taken by the crowd could show more if they were zoomed to the border of Ecuador at Assange’s lower body.

Not to be overlooked, however, is that his position within the window frame could have been for quick escape against violence or kidnap, official or otherwise.

 


Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks re-enters the embassy after making a statement from a balcony of the Equador Embassy in London, Sunday, Aug. 19, 2012. Assange called on United States President Barack Obama to end a “witch hunt” against the secret-spilling WikiLeaks organization. AP

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WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange looks up as he retreats from the window of Ecuadorian Embassy in central London after making a statement to the media and supporters outside, Sunday, Aug. 19, 2012. Assange called on United States President Barack Obama to end a “witch hunt” against the secret-spilling WikiLeaks organization. AP

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WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange makes a statement to the media and supporters at a window of Ecuadorian Embassy in central London, Sunday, Aug. 19, 2012. Julian Assange entered the embassy in June in an attempt to gain political asylum to prevent him from being extradited to Sweden, where he faces allegations of sex crimes, which he denies. AP

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WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, left, with his legal adviser Balthasar Garcon, right, talk inside the Ecuadorian embassy in London, Sunday Aug. 19, 2012. WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange took refuge inside Ecuador’s Embassy in London two months ago, seeking to avoid extradition to Sweden for questioning over sexual misconduct allegations. Woman at centre unidentified. AP

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Police officers stand outside the Ecuadorian Embassy [balcony perhaps to be Assange pulpit] in London on August 19, 2012. WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange was to face the world’s media today from Ecuador’s embassy in London where he has been holed up for two months, but the Australian risks arrest if he steps outside.

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Unveiled – Assange Protest Photos EC Embassy 12-0816

Julian Assange Protest Photos 16 August 2012

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British police officers stand guard outside the Ecuadorian Embassy in central London, Thursday, Aug. 16, 2012 after Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Ricardo Patino announced that he had granted political asylum to WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange. He’s won asylum in Ecuador, but Julian Assange is no closer to getting there. The dramatic decision by the Latin American nation to identify the WikiLeaks founder as a political refugee is a symbolic boost for the embattled ex-hacker, but legal experts say that does little to help him avoid extradition to Sweden and does much to drag Britain and Ecuador into a contentious international faceoff. AP

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Ecuador’s Foreign Minister Ricardo Patino speaks during a news conference in Quito August 16, 2012. Ecuador has granted political asylum to WikiLeaks’ founder Julian Assange, Patino said on Thursday, a day after the British government threatened to storm the Ecuadorean embassy in London to arrest Assange. Britain has said it is determined to extradite the former computer hacker, who enraged Washington in 2010 when his WikiLeaks website published secret U.S. diplomatic cables, to Sweden where he has been accused of rape and sexual assault. Reuters

Video – Ecuador Grants Assange Asylum

DemocracyNow.org – As Ecuador prepared to announce its decision on granting asylum to WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, Britain threatened to raid the Ecuadorian embassy in London where Assange has taken refuge for the past two months. Britain told Ecuador that giving Julian Assange asylum would not change a thing and that it might still revoke the diplomatic status of Quito’s embassy in London to allow the extradition of the WikiLeaks founder to Sweden, to face questioning over alleged sexual misconduct. We’re joined by Michael Ratner, an attorney for Julian Assange and President Emeritus of the Center for Constitutional Rights; and by Ben Griffin, an activist with Veterans for Peace U.K., participating in a vigil in support of Assange outside the Ecuadorean embassy in London. “Is this really about the U.S. being the ‘hidden hand’ behind what the British are doing so they can eventually get a hold of Julian Assange, try him for espionage and put him in a jail?” Ratner asks. “That’s what’s going on here — lets not kid ourselves.”

Watch all Democracy Now! reports on Julian Assange at:http://www.democracynow.org/topics/julian_assange

To watch the complete weekday independent news hour, read the transcript, download the podcast, search our vast archive, or to find more information about Democracy Now! and Amy Goodman, visithttp://www.democracynow.org/

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Info – New WikiLeaks Donation Gateway

Dear WikiLeaks Friend,

We urge all our supporters around the world to use their Visa and MasterCard to donate to WikiLeaks today with a new system, whilst they still can –

http://shop.wikileaks.org/donate#dccard

In a statement at 11am BST today, Wednesday 18th July, WikiLeaks announced the opening of a new payment gateway that allows the public to donate to WikiLeaks with their Visa and MasterCards, depsite the banking blockade.

The banking blockade by US financial institutions that has been running for almost two years has meant that WikiLeaks has lost 95% of its donations and have been forced to run off reserve funds. These reserve funds will run out in a few months.

However, today, WikiLeaks has found a way around this blockade with a new payment system of FDNN using Carte Bleue. The French credit card system, Carte Bleue, is coupled with the VISA/MasterCard system globally. VISA and MasterCard are contractually barred from directly cutting off merchants through the Carte Bleue system.

The French non-profit FDNN (Fund for the Defense of Net Neutrality- Fonds de Défense de la Net Neutralité) has set up a Carte Bleue fund for WikiLeaks.

Julian Assange, WikiLeaks’ founder said: “We beat them in Iceland and, by God, we’ll beat them in France as well. Let them shut it down. Let them demonstrate to the world once again their corrupt pandering to Washington. We’re waiting. Our lawyers are waiting. The whole world is waiting. Do it.”

———————-

To support WikiLeaks and find out all the ways to donate, including our new creditcard system, PayPal, Flattr and Bitcoin and keep us strong at https://shop.wikileaks.org/donate.

For the full press release and new donation video go to:

http://www.wikileaks.org/Press-Release-WikiLeaks-opens-path.html

 


 

 


 

 

 


	

Cryptome – Whistleblowing in a Wikileaks World

Whistleblowing in a Wikileaks World

 


Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2012 14:05:12 +0200
From: “Patrice Riemens” <patrice[at]xs4all.nl>
To: nettime-l[at]kein.org
Subject: <nettime> Gregory M Bernard’s [MA] thesis on ‘Whistleblowing in a Wikileaks World’ (ExecSum)

Gregory M Bernard
Whistleblowing in a Wikileaks World
A Model for Responsible Disclosure in Homeland Security MA thesis (March 2012)
Naval Postgraduate School (US Navy)
Monterey, California

Full text thru: http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/6769

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

A dramatic change in the information-sharing environment has occurred over the last decade. New technologies, the rapid evolution of the Internet, and innovations in social media have provided the ability to gather and share information at an unprecedented level. The Executive Branch of the U.S. Government touts the virtues of transparency, while Congress defines whistleblowing and the disclosure of government fraud/waste/abuse as a “civic duty”, and yet the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process is broken, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) is woefully inadequate, and secrecy continues to run rampant. The disclosure of hundreds of thousands of potentially classified documents to the organization Wikileaks may be an example of what this contradiction has caused. The existence of Wikileaks as an organization is irrelevant now, and their most significant contribution is not the release of 1.2 million documents. Rather, the most significant impact of Wikileaks is their successful demonstration and validation of the ‘Wikileaks model.’ Wikileaks has demonstrated the power of the Internet using web technologies to provide protections through anonymity, while giving individuals access to a worldwide audience. The current troubles faced by the organization may or may not portend the end of Wikileaks; however, it does provide a glimpse into the future of whistleblowing. Building upon the apparent success of the Wikileaks model, the Wall Street Journal and Al-Jazeera have both implemented “anonymous” whistleblower submission sites. This new paradigm for communications, as enabled by the innovative uses of the Internet and social media, provides both opportunities and areas for concern regarding government transparency.

Problem Statement

Whistleblowing serves as a critical check and balance system to government bureaucracy, helping to circumvent administrative roadblocks and to provide a mechanism through which homeland security can monitor and increase efficiency in its operations. Homeland security also deals with information that can be of a sensitive or secret nature, the unauthorized disclosure of which can cause damage to both homeland security efforts and national security. Maintaining the balance between secrecy and transparency is a difficult proposition; however, current government efforts, particularly its handling of whistleblowers, places that balance in jeopardy. The government has taken some steps to address some of these problems; however, the government has also taken extreme measures to prosecute any whistleblowers who stray outside the appropriate submission process (i.e., deemed an unauthorized leak of sensitive/classified information) or are not protected by the WPA. Instead of acknowledging that current policy on whistleblowers is broken, the government’s current course of action decreases the likelihood important fraud/waste/abuse information will be received from whistleblowers, while possibly influencing their decision and encouraging them to bypass authorized channels and instead utilize the Internet to protect themselves from identification and retaliation. The current lack of public trust in government, and the existence of alternative avenues for disclosure that provide greater protections than those currently offered by the U.S. Government, serve to exacerbate the problem.

Research Question

What policy model and associated technological process could the U.S. DHS implement that will encourage whistleblowers to submit information through authorized channels as opposed to leaking information to unauthorized parties?

Analysis

To answer the research question, this thesis explores three primary areas. The first is the whistleblowing environment, to include definitions, applicable policies, laws (both domestic and international), authorized and unauthorized processes, motivations, public trust, requirements, and intentions of all parties involved. The second area of focus is technology, specifically, the available options, best practices, and vulnerabilities of potential technological solutions (e.g., phone, email, web). The final portion of thesis serves to develop and evaluate policy options based on the findings and conclusions identified in the first two areas of analysis.

Those findings are as follows:

• Overclassification is a problem• Information sharing is critical to both U.S. security and U.S democracy

• Homeland security efforts require public (to include its employees and partners) trust and support to succeed

• The ability to keep secrets and maintain control of classified information will continue to decrease

• Decreasing overclassification will save the United States money

• Whistleblowing is a civic duty xvi

• The government is committed to providing whistleblower protections

• Whistleblowers are in large part motivated by patriotism

• Anonymity is a positive incentive for whistleblowers

• Fourth and Fifth Estates (media and stateless news organizations) provide alternatives to the government process

• Public trust in the government has declined

• Public trust can be increased through the use of third parties

• Technology exists to provide anonymity to whistleblowers

• Current options for whistleblowing are inadequate These premises form the foundation and justification for the implementation of any solution.

Current legitimate/authorized processes, such as submission through standard government channels, present significant risks to the whistleblower. Clandestine/unauthorized processes, such as the Internet (Wikileaks) and mainstream media, represent a clear breach of the law, which is in conflict with the “do the right thing” mindset of many whistleblowers. If whistleblowers had a way to communicate identified issues through an authorized third party that would serve as a proxy on their behalf, it would undermine the current processes (both legitimate and clandestine), potentially making them obsolete. It would reduce the personal risk faced by whistleblowers by providing the anonymity that makes the clandestine approach attractive, without clearly breaking the law. The Department of Homeland Security has an opportunity to build upon and improve the “Wikileaks Model,” to harness its use of technology and process to create a solution that would meet the needs of both whistleblowers and the government. If implemented correctly, the number of legitimate whistleblower complaints would increase (overall submissions would increase), and the number of whistleblowers who choose unauthorized avenues would be expected to decrease.

Recommendation

For any solution to be considered successful, it is critical to establish a clear definition of success. This thesis proposes the following definition of success for any whistleblowing solution. To promote the voluntary disclosure of information by any man or woman who reasonably believes that organizational wrongdoing has occurred, the facilitation of corrective action to address the wrongdoing, and providing for the protection of the submitter while maintaining information security, all within the bounds of U.S. law.

Four key pillars create the foundation for success.

• Whistleblowers must have the support of leadership• Legislation and policies must be clear and straightforward

• Whistleblowing policies must enforce accountability

• Authorized channels must provide at least as much protection as unauthorized channels

The conclusions drawn in this thesis, including the policy model ultimately recommended, is based on the research and the findings identified above. Combined with a current understanding of the problem, the evaluation criteria, and the potential solutions available, it is recommended that the government establish a partnership with a non-government organization (NGO) within U.S. legal jurisdiction, and subsidize the establishment of a government sponsored whistleblower submission website and virtual private network. This solution would allow whistleblowers to submit information to the government with the protection of anonymity, through the third party NGO. Establishing this policy provides whistleblowers who truly believe in improving government operations through the submission of information on fraud/waste/abuse or other types of concerns, a legitimate way to achieve their goal without risking their career and future on the weak whistleblower protections currently in place. While it may not completely eliminate leaks to the media or organizations, such as Wikileaks, the researcher believes those leaks will decrease as more whistleblowers give the government an opportunity to act on their submission.

 



	

TOP-SECRET – Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet WikiLeaks Talking Points

The following documents were publicly released on July 11, 2012 in response to a Freedom of Information request to the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet for:

“All documents (including electronic documents) that have been sent by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to the Prime Minister between 1 January 2011 and 4 June 2012 that relate to WikiLeaks, Mr Julian Paul Assange and/or United States Army private Bradley Manning.”

Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet WikiLeaks Talking Points

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

 

AU-DPMC-WikiLeaks

Networth of Julian Assange

Julian Assange is an Australian publisher, journalist, computer programmer and Internet activist, with a net worth of $300 thousand. Julian Assange has earned his net worth as the editor in chief of WikiLeaks, which is a whistleblower website to create open governments, by exposing private, secret, and classified media from anonymous news sources, news leaks, and whistleblowers. Assange was born in Townsville, Queensland, Australia, on July 3, 1971. He is well-known for his public appearances in many parts of the world, to speak out about freedom of the press, censorship and investigative journalism.

Some topics that have been published on his WikiLeaks site include; extrajudicial killings in Kenya, toxic waste dumping in Cote d’Ivoire, and procedures at Guantanamo Bay. WikiLeaks has five international print media partners, which include; Der Spiegel, e Monde, The Guardian, El Pais and The New York Times. In November, of 2010 WikiLeaks and its five media partners began publishing detailed correspondence between the U.S State Department and its diplomatic missions around the world, (also known as Cablegate).

How much is Julian Assange worth?

Julian Assange Net Worth

Assange has won many awards and nominations, including the 2009 Amnesty International Media Award and Readers’ Choice for TIME magazine’s 2010 Person of the Year. In his youth he was referred to as “Australia’s most famous, ethical, computer hacker” by the Personal Democracy Forum. As a youth, he was charged with 31 counts of hacking and related crimes. It took three years for the case to make it to court where Julian pled guilty to 25 charges of hacking. The other six charges were dropped. He was released on bond for good conduct, after being fined AUD $2,100. Assange has never been married, however, he does have one son with an ex-girlfriend. After a custody battle that lasted for years, the couple formed an activist group, referred to as, “Parent Inquiry Into Child Protection,” which created a “central databank” for otherwise inaccessible legal records, related to child custody issues in Australia.

Unveiled by Wikileaks – BULGARIA – Stasi mayor unacceptable

Date 2011-07-12 13:27:06 From ben.preisler@stratfor.com
To eurasia@stratfor.com
Others Listname: mailto:eurasia@stratfor.com
MessageId: <4E1C2F8A.8000705@stratfor.com>
InReplyTo: 4E1B2BD5.9000703@stratfor.com
Text Glasove – Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s governing party Gerb is putting
up a former State Security officer as its candidate for mayor
of Bulgaria’s fifth largest city Russe in the Bulgarian local
elections scheduled for October. The opposition online
newspaper Glasove is disgusted: “Stoilov was a permanent
employee of the State Security who openly admits that he
recruited soldiers for military counter-espionage and is proud
of it to boot. In an interview last year he said that many
things in Bulgaria would have turned out differently had the
State Security been reformed in the right way. … You must
have a screw loose if you can’t find anyone better than a guy
with a Stasi past after four years on the city council.”
(11/07/2011) +++
http://www.glasove.com/gerb-mozhe-da-specheli-mestnite-izbori-samo-ako-gi-falshifitsira-14877

Benjamin Preisler
+216 22 73 23 19

Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

TOP-SECRET – Activation Order – ADM Cyberstalker Client

Activation Order –ADM Cyberstalker

Client – ADM Corporate Security Division

Overview – The client has requested a new cyberstalker report regarding their CEO, Patricia A. Woertz and her immediate family.

Deliverable – Stratfor will provide a written report detailing the available public information regarding the Woertz family. The report will include only information obtained from publicly available sources.

ACTIVATION ORDER – Cyberstalker Report

Date 2007-10-01 18:32:44
From alfano@stratfor.com
To howerton@stratfor.com
mfriedman@stratfor.com
gfriedman@stratfor.com
stewart@stratfor.com
McCullar@stratfor.com
greg.sikes@stratfor.com
briefers@stratfor.com
Others MessageId: <00df01c80448$b27a6020$8ead1cac@stratfor.com>
InReplyTo: 000c01c7fabf$b265ebf0$ae01a8c0@stratfor.com

The report will contain two primary sections.  The first section will be prose detailing our findings—this section will be approximately four to five pages long.  The second section will be appendices that will provide a copy and paste view of the actual information that we were able to obtain.

The final report should be delivered in PDF format.

Timeline – Anya will write this report.  Following comments from Stick, I’ll send the report to Mike McCullar for edit before COB on Thursday, October 4.  Mike will return the finished product to me by COB on Wednesday, October 10.

Comments –   Client is making decision about whether to conduct full re-investigations on other members of the family.

Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

Unveiled – B4/G4 – GERMANY/RUSSIA – STASI Allegations Haunt German Gazprom Executive

 

B4/G4 – GERMANY/RUSSIA – Stasi Allegations Haunt German Gazprom Executive

Date 2008-05-07 17:05:55
From goodrich@stratfor.com
To os@stratfor.com
gvalerts@stratfor.com
Others InReplyTo: 4EE0BAE9.9020601@stratfor.com
Text
Stasi Allegations Haunt German Gazprom Executive

07.05.2008

An investigation has been launched into the alleged Stasi involvement of a
senior executive at the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom.

Felix Strehober, chief financial officer of Gazprom Germania, was under
investigation for his work as an undercover officer of the Stasi,
according to a Wednesday report in the German newspaper Die Welt.

Die Welt said Strehober, who was born in East Berlin, could be charged in
Cologne with perjury. Stehober had made a statutory declaration last year
declaring that he had never “been a salaried employee of the Ministry of
State Security (Stasi) or the equivalent.”

The prosecutor’s office in Cologne confirmed that Strehober is under
investigation.

More than 100 pages in official German archives showed that Strehober had
been an undercover officer for the Stasi, the hated East German police
notorious for its surveillance and imprisonment of ordinary Germans.

Gazprom not taking action

The German subsidiary of Gazprom, the world’s biggest gas company, said
the case was “an employee’s private matter.” A company spokesman said
Gazprom did not see any reason to take action, and added that Strehober
had placed the matter in the hands of a lawyer.

A statutory declaration is a legal affirmation equivalent to a statement
under a religious oath.

http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3317092,00.html?maca=en-rss-en-all-1573-rdf

Lauren Goodrich
Director of Analysis
Senior Eurasia Analyst
Stratfor
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
T: 512.744.4311
F: 512.744.4334
lauren.goodrich@stratfor.com
http://www.stratfor.com

 

 

Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

TOP-SECRET – Stratfor – Re: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded STASI files

Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

Re: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded Stasi files

Date 2007-05-11 21:46:04
From goodrich@stratfor.com
To analysts@stratfor.com
davison@stratfor.com
aaric.eisenstein@stratfor.com
Others MessageId: <4644C7FC.5000007@stratfor.com>
InReplyTo: 0e6f01c79404$f1f258c0$8a01a8c0@stratfor.com
Text
OMG… you can tell you have a kid!Aaric Eisenstein wrote:Get this to The King right away. There may yet be time to save Humpty
Dumpty!

Aaric S. Eisenstein

Stratfor

VP Publishing

700 Lavaca St., Suite 900

Austin, TX 78701

512-744-4308

512-744-4334 fax

———————————————————————-

From: os@stratfor.com [mailto:os@stratfor.com]
Sent: Friday, May 11, 2007 2:38 PM
To: analysts@stratfor.com
Subject: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded Stasi
files
New Computer Program to Reassemble Shredded Stasi Files
Millions of files consigned to paper shredders in the late days of the
East German regime will be pieced together by computer. The massive job
of reassembling this puzzle from the late Cold War was performed, until
now, by hand.

It’s been years in the making, but finally software designed to
electronically piece together some 45 million shredded documents from
the East German secret police went into service in Berlin on Wednesday.
Now, a puzzle that would take 30 diligent Germans 600 to 800 years to
finish by hand, according to one estimate, might be solved by computer
in seven.

Photo Gallery: Reconstructing the Cold War
Click on a picture to launch the image gallery (4 Photos)

“It’s very exciting to decode Stasi papers,” said Jan Schneider, head
engineer on the project at the Fraunhofer Institute for Production
Systems and Design Technology located in the German capital. “You have
the feeling you are making history.”

Or at least putting it back together again. In 1989, with the looming
collapse of the Communist regime becoming increasingly evident, agents
of the East German Staatssicherheitsdienst or Stasi feverishly plowed
millions of active files through paper shredders, or just tore them up
by hand.

Rights activists interrupted the project and rescued a total of 16,250
garbage bags full of scraps. But rescuing the history on those sheets of
paper amounted to an absurdly difficult jigsaw puzzle. By 2000, no more
than 323 sacks were legible again — reconstructed by a team of 15
people working in Nuremburg — leaving 15,927 to go. So the German
government promised money to any group that could plausibly deal with
the remaining tons of paper.

The Fraunhofer Institute won the contract in 2003, and began a pilot
phase of the project on Wednesday. Four hundred sacks of scraps will be
scanned, front and back, and newly-refined software will try to arrange
the digitized fragments according to shape, texture, ink color,
handwriting style and recognizable official stamps.

NEWSLETTER
Sign up for Spiegel Online’s daily newsletter and get the best of Der
Spiegel’s and Spiegel Online’s international coverage in your In- Box
everyday.

Gu:nter Bormann, from the agency that oversees old Stasi documents (the
Federal Commission for the Records of the national Security Service of
the Former German Democratic Republic), says most of the paper probably
dates from the years 1988 and 1989. “This is what Stasi officers had on
their desks at the end,” he says. “It’s not material from dusty
archives.”

Still-unknown Stasi informants — ordinary East Germans who spied on
other East Germans — stand to be uncovered. International espionage
files are reportedly not among the thousands of sacks; most of those
having been more conclusively destroyed.

The Fraunhofer Institute’s computers will start with documents torn by
hand, because large irregular fragments lend themselves to shape
recognition more readily than uniform strips from shredding machines.
The institute received a promise of EUR6.3 million ($8.53 million) in
April from the German parliament for this phase, which is expected to
take about two years.

If it’s deemed successful, the rest of the job would take four to five
years, according to project chief Bertram Nickolay. The final cost will
be up to EUR30 million.

msm/ap

Re: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded Stasi files

Date 2007-05-11 21:46:04
From goodrich@stratfor.com
To analysts@stratfor.com
davison@stratfor.com
aaric.eisenstein@stratfor.com
Others MessageId: <4644C7FC.5000007@stratfor.com>
InReplyTo: 0e6f01c79404$f1f258c0$8a01a8c0@stratfor.com
Text
OMG… you can tell you have a kid!Aaric Eisenstein wrote:

Get this to The King right away. There may yet be time to save Humpty
Dumpty!

Aaric S. Eisenstein

Stratfor

VP Publishing

700 Lavaca St., Suite 900

Austin, TX 78701

512-744-4308

512-744-4334 fax

———————————————————————-

From: os@stratfor.com [mailto:os@stratfor.com]
Sent: Friday, May 11, 2007 2:38 PM
To: analysts@stratfor.com
Subject: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded Stasi
files
New Computer Program to Reassemble Shredded Stasi Files
Millions of files consigned to paper shredders in the late days of the
East German regime will be pieced together by computer. The massive job
of reassembling this puzzle from the late Cold War was performed, until
now, by hand.

It’s been years in the making, but finally software designed to
electronically piece together some 45 million shredded documents from
the East German secret police went into service in Berlin on Wednesday.
Now, a puzzle that would take 30 diligent Germans 600 to 800 years to
finish by hand, according to one estimate, might be solved by computer
in seven.

Photo Gallery: Reconstructing the Cold War
Click on a picture to launch the image gallery (4 Photos)

“It’s very exciting to decode Stasi papers,” said Jan Schneider, head
engineer on the project at the Fraunhofer Institute for Production
Systems and Design Technology located in the German capital. “You have
the feeling you are making history.”

Or at least putting it back together again. In 1989, with the looming
collapse of the Communist regime becoming increasingly evident, agents
of the East German Staatssicherheitsdienst or Stasi feverishly plowed
millions of active files through paper shredders, or just tore them up
by hand.

Rights activists interrupted the project and rescued a total of 16,250
garbage bags full of scraps. But rescuing the history on those sheets of
paper amounted to an absurdly difficult jigsaw puzzle. By 2000, no more
than 323 sacks were legible again — reconstructed by a team of 15
people working in Nuremburg — leaving 15,927 to go. So the German
government promised money to any group that could plausibly deal with
the remaining tons of paper.

The Fraunhofer Institute won the contract in 2003, and began a pilot
phase of the project on Wednesday. Four hundred sacks of scraps will be
scanned, front and back, and newly-refined software will try to arrange
the digitized fragments according to shape, texture, ink color,
handwriting style and recognizable official stamps.

NEWSLETTER
Sign up for Spiegel Online’s daily newsletter and get the best of Der
Spiegel’s and Spiegel Online’s international coverage in your In- Box
everyday.

Gu:nter Bormann, from the agency that oversees old Stasi documents (the
Federal Commission for the Records of the national Security Service of
the Former German Democratic Republic), says most of the paper probably
dates from the years 1988 and 1989. “This is what Stasi officers had on
their desks at the end,” he says. “It’s not material from dusty
archives.”

Still-unknown Stasi informants — ordinary East Germans who spied on
other East Germans — stand to be uncovered. International espionage
files are reportedly not among the thousands of sacks; most of those
having been more conclusively destroyed.

The Fraunhofer Institute’s computers will start with documents torn by
hand, because large irregular fragments lend themselves to shape
recognition more readily than uniform strips from shredding machines.
The institute received a promise of EUR6.3 million ($8.53 million) in
April from the German parliament for this phase, which is expected to
take about two years.

If it’s deemed successful, the rest of the job would take four to five
years, according to project chief Bertram Nickolay. The final cost will
be up to EUR30 million.

msm/ap

Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

TOP-SECRET – Former STASI Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO]

Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

[Eurasia] [Fwd: Re: Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO]

Date 2010-09-27 20:24:23
From lena.bell@stratfor.com
To eurasia@stratfor.com
Others Listname: mailto:eurasia@stratfor.com
MessageId: <4CA0E157.50106@stratfor.com>
InReplyTo: 263969146.2106108.1285610199486.JavaMail.root@core.stratfor.com
Text
——– Original Message ——–Subject: Re: Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for
NATO
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2010 13:21:39 -0500
From: Marko Papic <marko.papic@stratfor.com>
To: Lena Bell <lena.bell@stratfor.com>
References: <4CA0DEFD.2020800@stratfor.com>Feel free to send these to eurasia@stratfor.comVery interesting articles. I’m a big fan of Spiegel.Lena Bell wrote:thpught you’d find this interesting Marko

Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,719726,00.html

09/27/2010

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West Germans were desperate to
prevent the Stasi’s top codebreakers from falling into the wrong hands
and set up a company to hire the East German cryptographers. Now the
former Stasi scientists develop technology used by Angela Merkel and
NATO.

Every morning, while going to his office in Berlin’s Adlershof district,
Ralph W. passes a reminder of his own past, a small museum that occupies
a room on the ground floor of the building. The museum could easily
double as a command center run by the class enemy in an old James Bond
film. A display of coding devices from various decades includes the
T-310, a green metal machine roughly the size of a huge refrigerator,
which East German officials used to encode their telex messages.

The device was the pride of the Stasi, the feared East German secret
police, which was W.’s former employer. Today he works as a cryptologist
with Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH (SIT), a subsidiary of Rohde & Schwarz, a
Munich-based company specializing in testing equipment, broadcasting and
secure communications. W. and his colleagues encode sensitive
information to ensure that it can only be read or heard by authorized
individuals. Their most important customers are NATO and the German
government.

Rohde & Schwarz is something of an unofficial supplier of choice to the
German government. Among other things, the company develops bugproof
mobile phones for official use. Since 2004, its Berlin-based subsidiary
SIT, which specializes in encryption solutions, has been classified as a
“security partner” to the German Interior Ministry, which recently
ordered a few thousand encoding devices for mobile phones, at about
EUR1,250 ($1,675) apiece. Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel has used
phones equipped with SIT’s encryption technology. In other words, the
Stasi’s former cryptographers are now Merkel’s cryptographers.

Secret Operation

The transfer of Ralph W. and other cryptologists from the East German
Ministry for State Security, as the Stasi was officially known, to West
Germany was handled both seamlessly and discreetly. West German
officials were determined to make sure that no one would find out about
the integration of East Germany’s top cryptologists into the west. The
operation was so secret, in fact, that it has remained unknown to this
day.

Only a handful of officials were involved in the operation, which was
planned at the West German Interior Ministry in Bonn. In January 1991,
Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH was founded. The company was established
primarily to provide employment for particularly talented Stasi
cryptologists that the Bonn government wanted to keep in key positions.

Ralph W. is one of those specialists. W., who holds a doctorate in
mathematics, signed a declaration of commitment to the Stasi on Sept. 1,
1982. By the end of his time with the Stasi, he was making 22,550 East
German marks a year — an excellent salary by East German standards. And
when he was promoted to the rank of captain in June 1987, his superior
characterized W. as one of the “most capable comrades in the
collective.” While with the Stasi, W. worked in Department XI, which
also boasted the name “Central Cryptology Agency” (ZCO).

Looking for the Top Performers

The story begins during the heady days of the East German revolution in
1990. Officially, the East German government, under its last communist
premier, Hans Modrow, had established a government committee to dissolve
the Ministry for State Security which reported to the new East German
interior minister, Peter-Michael Diestel. In reality, the West German
government was already playing a key role in particularly sensitive
matters. Then-West German Interior Minister Wolfgang Scha:uble (who is
the current German finance minister) had instructed two senior Interior
Ministry officials, Hans Neusel and Eckart Werthebach, to take care of
the most politically sensitive remnants of the 40-year intelligence war
between the two Germanys.

The government of then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl was interested in more
than just the politically explosive material contained in some of the
Stasi’s files. It also had its eye on the top performers in the former
East German spy agency. The cryptologists were of particular interest to
the Kohl government, which recognized that experts capable of developing
good codes would also be adept at breaking them. The Stasi cryptologists
were proven experts in both fields.

Documents from the Stasi records department indicate that the one of the
Stasi cryptologists’ achievements was to break Vericrypt and Cryptophon
standards that had been used until the 1980s. This meant that they were
capable of decoding encrypted radio transmissions by the two main West
German intelligence agencies — the Office for the Protection of the
Constitution and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) — and the West
German border police. The East Germans even managed to decode the BND’s
orders to members of the clandestine “Gladio” group, which was intended
to continue anti-communist operations in the event of a Warsaw Pact
invasion of Western Europe.

The West German government was determined to prevent these highly
trained East German experts from entering the free market. The idea that
specialists who had spent decades working with West German encryption
methods and had successfully cracked West German intelligence’s codes
could defect to Middle Eastern countries like Syria was a nightmare.
Until then, the BND had had no difficulties listening in on intelligence
communications in the Middle East, an ability the potential defection of
Stasi experts would likely have compromised. Bonn also hoped to use
their skills to break into regions where its own agents were making no
headway. All of this meant that the Stasi experts had to be brought on
board in the West — even if it involved unconventional methods.

: Cherrypicking the Stasi’s Top Brains

The government officials in Bonn turned to an expert for advice: Otto
Leiberich, a cryptologist and mathematician who had headed the Central
Office for Cryptology, the equivalent of the Stasi’s ZCO at the West
German BND, until the mid-1970s. Leiberich’s task, after he was brought
in as a member of the secret operation, was to evaluate the professional
abilities of the Stasi experts.

Leiberich still has vivid memories of his first official trip to the
town of Hoppegarten, next to Berlin. One of the East German
cryptologists at the meeting greeted the members of the West German
delegation as “comrades,” Leiberich recalls. He was impressed by the
East Germans’ expertise, says Leiberich. “They were excellent
mathematicians who were not personally guilty of any misconduct.”

Leiberich says he would have liked to hire them, particularly the
Stasi’s then “chief decoder,” the ZCO department head, Horst M. A gaunt
chain-smoker who wore horn-rimmed glasses, M. was born in 1937 and had
earned a degree in mathematics at East Berlin’s Humboldt University. But
the West was also interested in younger people, in the expectation that
they would be of greater value in the nascent computer age.

A Free-Market Solution

Leiberich could have used the extra manpower, especially after 1990,
when the West German Central Office for Cryptology was spun off from the
BND and a law was enacted to form the new Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI). Leiberich, who was named the BSI’s first president,
headed a team consisting mainly of former intelligence colleagues.

But Neusel, the senior official from the West German Interior Ministry,
dismissed the idea as too precarious. Firstly, the government had
decided not to integrate former Stasi officials, because of their past
activities, into the bureaucracy of a unified Germany. Additionally, as
one person involved in the operation recalls, concerns about potential
traitors gave rise to a “sacred principle,” namely that “no one from the
Stasi was to be transferred to the West German intelligence agencies.”

It also didn’t help that the Stasi’s Central Cryptology Agency had been
hastily spun off into the East German Interior Ministry, because the
West German cabinet had decided not to allow any members of the East
German Interior Ministry to work in federal agencies.

But the free market was not restricted by any government resolutions. A
creative solution was needed, and no one was better suited for coming up
with the necessary fix than Hermann Schwarz, one of the two founders of
Rohde & Schwarz.

A Soft Spot for the East

Founded in 1933, the company, a provider of radio, measuring and
security technology, was dependent on government contracts and was a
reliable supplier to the West German intelligence agencies. Besides,
Schwarz had a soft spot for the East. He had earned his doctorate in
1931 in the eastern city of Jena, where he had also met his eventual
business partner, Lothar Rohde.

But to Schwarz, who was already elderly at the time and has since died,
allowing his company’s name to be used as a cover for a Stasi connection
seemed too risky. According to someone familiar with the operation, the
West Germans must have applied a bit of soft pressure on Schwarz, who
was “extremely worried that it would be made public one day.”

But the officials eventually did manage to convince Schwarz to play
along. His change of heart was probably due in part to the prospect of
additional research and federal contracts, which were in fact showered
on his company.

In the end, BSI head Leiberich and a senior Interior Ministry official
decided which former Stasi experts were to be transferred to the front
company. Former Stasi department head Horst M. was seamlessly integrated
into the market economy at SIT, where his wife also began working as a
secretary. Ralph W., who was in his 30s at the time and had been with
the Stasi for eight years, also fitted the desired profile, as did his
colleagues Wolfgang K. and Volker S. In total, about a dozen former
Stasi employees, most of them mathematicians, were given the chance to
embark on a second cryptology career in post-reunification Germany.

The federal government provided whatever assistance it could, but only
with the utmost discretion. SIT was initially headquartered in the town
of Gru:nheide in the eastern state of Brandenburg, in a former Stasi
children’s home.

‘Cosmic Top Secret’

An episode from the 1990s shows how conspiratorially the operation was
handled, even within the West German intelligence community. When the
BND needed a “D-channel filter” — a precursor to today’s firewalls —
to protect communications networks, it contacted the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI). But BND officials pricked up their ears when
they discovered that the work was being done by SIT. A private company
protecting the computers of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency?
Nevertheless, the BND officials were told that it was “totally OK,” and
that the BSI would take responsibility for SIT.

For the parent company Rohde & Schwarz, the former problem child in
Brandenburg soon became a success story. SIT took over the cryptology
division of German engineering giant Siemens, and the company now
employs about 150 mathematicians, engineers and computer scientists at
its three locations. SIT, which proudly refers to itself as the
“preferred supplier of high-security cryptography” for NATO, even
includes in its product line devices classified as “Cosmic Top Secret,”
NATO’s highest secrecy level. SIT’s Elcrodat solution, standard
equipment on NATO submarines, frigates and military helicopters, has
provided the company with orders worth millions for years.

When approached by SPIEGEL, Rohde & Schwarz declined to comment on this
previously unknown part of its company history.

To show its gratitude for the company’s efforts, the federal government
did more than just provide it with lucrative contracts. Eckart
Werthebach, the Interior Ministry official, awarded the former managing
director of SIT, a senior Rohde & Schwarz executive originally from West
Germany, the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany for his
services. The executive received the decoration in a formal ceremony at
Villa Hammerschmidt in Bonn, the former official residence of the German
president.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Marko Papic

Geopol Analyst – Eurasia

STRATFOR

700 Lavaca Street – 900

Austin, Texas

78701 USA

P: + 1-512-744-4094

marko.papic@stratfor.com

CONFIDENTIAL – Wikileaks Central/Guantanamo/Khadr Interviews

Wikileaks Central/Guantanamo/Khadr Interviews

Cryptome mirrors provided if the files at the EX.UA site are removed.

 


http://www.ex.ua/view_storage/919793642447

Object of temporary storage with access key “919793642447“:Wikileaks Central/Guantanamo/Khadr interviews
22:51, 3 July 2012, 23:14, 3 July 2012

These are two interviews which were unpublished by the Wikileaks news site Wikileaks Central. Editor in chief Heather Marsh (@georgiebc) interviewed Canadian defence attorney Dennis Edney re Guantanamo child detainee Omar Khadr. In [recording] ed017 Edney explains that Omar was ordered to sign his plea deal without having it explained to him by a lawyer or anyone. In [recording] ed023 Edney speaks of witness intimidation and blackmail threats by the FBI. These interviews were suppressed (according to the audio) due to concerns of legal repercussions to the defence attorney.

Files:
Amount: 2, total size: 65,778,403
1.
http://cryptome.org/2012/07/ed017.MP3.m4a
(31MB)
 

22:32, 3 July 2012
b0f2e07bb7746ba3842f22702c93e8dc

 

 

2.
http://cryptome.org/2012/07/ed023.MP3.m4a
(35MB)
 

20:56, 3 July 2012
fe72db5b1298bc23ccf53e3dcd345c97

 

 

 


Cryptome – Who’s Who at WikiLeaks

Who’s Who at WikiLeaks

 


A sends:

See here a story entitled: “Who’s Who at Wikileaks?” where you are quoted as saying:

— Young finally quit the organization on January 7, 2007. His final words: “Wikileaks is a fraud… working for the enemy” —

Is this quotation correct and do you still stand by the statement? Would you like to clarify who is “the enemy”?

The East and associated interests?

Cryptome:

I did not “quit” WikiLeaks, I was unsubscribed from its private mail list for disputing grandiose ambition. And am still disputing that unfortunate promotional aspect of WikiLeaks, a widespread defect of information providers of all stripes. “Who’s Who at WikiLeaks” is itself a promotional gambit of the defective means to garner attention with a grandiose headline and slanted research. That is, the enemy.

This is the full message from which the quote was cobbled:

http://cryptome.org/wikileaks/wikileaks-leak.htm[This message was not distributed by the closed wikileaks list.]

To: Wikileaks <wikileaks[a t]wikileaks.org>
From: John Young <jya[a t]pipeline.com>
Subject: Re: [WL] Funding / who is on this list.
Date: Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2007 11:47:00 -0500

Cryptome is publishing the contents of this list, and how I was induced to serve as US person for registration.

Wikileaks is a fraud:

[This is a restricted internal development mailinglist for w-i-k-i-l-e-a-k-s-.-o-r-g.
Please do not mention that word directly in these discussions; refer instead to ‘WL’.
This list is housed at riseup.net, an activist collective in Seattle with an established lawyer
and plenty of backbone.]

Fuck your cute hustle and disinformation campaign against legitimate dissent. Same old shit, working for the enemy.

The enemy are those who set up and participate in false public interest initiatives to mislead the public, a very ancient practice of power groups who sponsor dissidents to serve as controlled opposition. CIA and most if not all national intelligence agencies (and their host governments) engage in this practice by supporting NGOs, individuals, churches, universities, think tanks, media outlets, including so-called alternative outlets, anti-war initiatives, indeed, it is prudent to consider any long-lived group as having been either set up by authorities or co-opted once successful (usually through favorable tax treatment and funding). It is a difficult task to sort out who is complicit and who is not due to the quick adoption by covert operations of the honest groups means and methods.

Not all members of honest groups know what their organizations are being used for. When they learn the truth they become premier leakers. However, leaks are often deliberate deceptions, so the challenge is to be wary but not crippled by paranoia.

WikiLeaks is not the first nor the last which will be accused of complicity with the authorities. The analysis of “Who’s Who at WikiLeaks” could be applied to hundreds of other public interest groups. Not all have benefited from as many insiders leaking as WikiLeaks, nor have as many had to shift their policy and procedures in response to leaks.

I told the WikiLeaks mail list in December 2006 WL would face leaks itself, smears, attacks, betrayals. That has come to pass, my leaks merely the first and many more will follow.

WikiLeaks has matured sufficiently to exploit opposition, in the manner of the enemy it ostensibly fights.

None of this message is private — but the file headline smells like formulaic propaganda.

Unveiled – WikiLeaks Setting Another Trap for Journalists, NGOs

A sends:

I tasted that poison today. It was strange, the feeling of having the privilege to information that was only made available to “a select few” was overwhelming, I don’t have the vocabulary to describe what the poison tastes like, but I can understand how some people could become addicted to it, even if it meant their death.

You are right, WL is setting “Terms and Conditions” to the access to stolen property, and attempting to force Journalists into an “Agreement” to those “Conditions, however unenforceable.

Your thoughts and counsel were welcomed, they snapped me out of that trance that I found myself in.

The only thing to do is, publish everything that I’ve learned over the last many hours about this whole affair.

 


2012-00414 WikiLeaks Partner for Global Intelligence Files June 26, 2012 (copy below) via Google Search

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Cryptome rejects this proprietary publishing manipulation. Again, WikiLeaks is inducing participation in a crime covered with pseudo-journalistic exculpation. Again excluding open public access in favor of contractual marketing of stolen material and aiding its profitable commercialization.

It’s a trap, don’t do it, don’t encourage others to take the bait.

Don’t send anything to me you don’t want published. This note will be published .

_____

At 06:24 PM 6/26/2012, you wrote:

Please Do Not Post, still working on getting us access.

Below if the terms and conditions that WL is sending to everyone.

 


_Terms and Conditions for access to the Global Intelligence Files

These Terms and Conditions are an agreement between you as an individual (not your organisation) and WikiLeaks with respect to use of the Global Intelligence Files.

1. WikiLeaks will provide access to the data known as Project Rock Guitar through WikiLeaks’ search database. You will use the search database as per instructions on the site and will not use robots on the system.

2. The decision what to publish in news articles and papers will remain at your discretion. You will credit WikiLeaks in the following manner: “investigative partnership organised by WikiLeaks” and refer to the data as having been “obtained by WikiLeaks”.

3. You will refer clearly on your website to the document(s) provided by WikiLeaks that were used in preparation of these news articles or papers and link from your publication to the data on WikiLeaks’ website.

4. You will treat any alleged and/or suspected WikiLeaks sources for the Global Intelligence Files as confidential sources of your own, with all the ethical and legal protections such sources are entitled to. You, in accordance with journalistic and professional ethics, will not speculate as to their identities. In relation to WikiLeaks’ provision of confidential information to you, you will treat WikiLeaks as a confidential journalistic source. Although you will publicly describe the information has having been “obtained by WikiLeaks” you will not, for the protection of WikiLeaks, you and the WikiLeaks sources, say that the information was “given” to you by WikiLeaks.

5. When publishing any story or material based on the Global Intelligence Files you understand that in relation to exclusivity you must inform WikiLeaks of the identification number of the data informing your publication and will submit this number to WikiLeaks’ release platform before the story is to first appear in any of your publishing mediums, so that WikiLeaks can publish the original data at the same time. You will also provide a URL link to where the story or material will appear on your site. Instructions for this release system are on the GI Files site and must be read and followed once you have access to the site. You understand that the release system provided by WikiLeaks must be treated in a reputable manner: there is to be no playing of the system to schedule large quantities of data in advance to reserve them, or using robots on the system. Scheduling must reflect true intentions to publish at the date and time you list on the release system.

6. You will treat each of the documents made available to you by WikiLeaks as confidential unless and until a story based on their content is published. You will exercise care in ensuring that the materials will not be vulnerable to hacking or other efforts to discover their content.

7. WikiLeaks journalists, employees, consultants and infrastructure are the subject of State and private intelligence activity and politicised financial blockades. To protect its continued ability to publish effectively, various WikiLeaks methods, people and locations need to be kept confidential. Unless otherwise stated, these include, but are not limited to: identifying details of all WikiLeaks personnel, security methods, communication systems or methods, locations, strategic plans, information on threats against WikiLeaks, the number of WikiLeaks personnel, the number of WikiLeaks personnel in different areas, usernames, passwords, transportation and financial arrangements including financial transportation methods.

8. Trading, selling, sharing or giving away your account is prohibited, as is trading and selling invites or offering them in public.

9. You understand that any breach of these Terms and Conditions or mismanagement of the search database or release platform will result in your access being withdrawn, along with the access of the anyone that invited you and anyone you invite. You are responsible for your own account and for the people you invite.

By ticking this box you agree to abide by all of the above Terms and Conditions

Your login and password will be sent by mail.

 


GIFiles Signup Instructions

Becoming a WikiLeaks Partner for the Global Intelligence Files

You have been invited to enter a secret world.

By joining the global WikiLeaks partnership on the Global Intelligence Files (the GI Files) — you will have access to more than five million emails from the Texas-headquartered “global intelligence” company Stratfor. The emails date from between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large organisations, including the US Department of Homeland Security and the US Defense Intelligence Agency. Being part of this international team will allow you to search the emails using the sophisticated search engine designed by WikiLeaks to enable you to research and publish articles and papers using this data.

The purpose of this system is to maximise global impact of the GI Files by restricting supply to those who are most likely to research and publish on them.

We are allowing journalists, academics and human rights organisations to search and publish the GI Files. To enter into this partnership you will need to be given a unique code by one of our existing partners. Users who demonstrate research and publishing ability will be considered as partners for new WikiLeaks publications.

Once you have this code please follow the instructions below to enter the partnership and gain access to the GI Files. These instructions are designed to be idiot-proof. They explain every step of this process, but don’t be scared – for most people this will be quick.

1. Download Tor, a tool for encrypted anonymous web-browsing. Without this you will not be able to access our Terms and Conditions, or the GI Files database.

Tor Instructions:
– To get Tor please go to the following URL to download the “Tor Browser Bundle:” https://www.torproject.org/projects…
– Choose the correct version depending on whether you use Windows, Mac or Linux and download it in the language you want.
– Click on the correct version to download it and then save it – we suggest to your Desktop.
– Once you have saved it you can find the “Tor Browser Bundle” application in the place you saved it.
– You will need to double-click on the Start Tor browser application to run Tor.
– You will need Tor running to access the site to agree to our Terms and Conditions, and then to later access the GI Files site.

2. Start Tor and go to the following site (it will only work using Tor). Wait up to 30 seconds for the site to load for the first time: http://7f4lihm464gdcwfc.onion/invit…

3. Enter your unique invite code to get access to the GI Files partner Terms and Conditions.

4. Enter your name, organisation name, email address and phone number. The email address you give cannot be a personal email address; it must be a work email account.

5. Read all parts of the Terms and Conditions and make sure you understand them. If you have any questions, please email: signup@wikileaks.org

6. Once you understand your responsibilities under the Terms and Conditions tick the check box to confirm your agreement.

7. Within 15 minutes you will receive an email to the email address you supplied giving you login details to the GI Files website.

8. Login to the site at the following URL: http://7f4lihm464gdcwfc.onion/ giving your username and password as supplied in the email. This URL can only be accessed when using Tor.

9. Once you are logged into the site you will see your user page, the search interface and publishing interface. At the top of the page are tabs that explain how these work. On your user page you will have five invite codes for you to give to others so that they can also gain access to the GI Files.

10. If you wish to invite someone to the GI Files then give them a unique invite code, along with the URL to this page of instructions – each person you invite must be a journalist, NGO worker or academic from a different organisation (for complete understanding of who you can invite please see the invite rules below).

11. If you violate any of the Terms and Conditions you risk having your login terminated, along with that of the person that invited you and the people that you invited. If any of the contacts you invited violate the terms of the Terms and Conditions, they risk having their login terminated, your login terminated and the logins of the people they invited terminated.

Invite Rules:

Each invite code must be given to a person who:
A. is a real person
B. is either a journalist, Professor or Associate Professor at a University or an employee of a human rights organisation
C. is from a different organisation to you and your other invitees
D. is using an email that is not a personal email
E. is using an email that is from a different domain to your email address and that of the other people you invite
F. is going to use the GI Files search and release site for research, the results of which will be communicated to the public.

For any issues or questions related to this signup process, please email: signup@wikileaks.org

 


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TOP-SECRET from Cryptome – Julian Assange Casa Ecuador Embassy London

Julian Assange Casa Ecuador Embassy London

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A woman poses for a candid photograph alongside a protester wearing a Guy Fawkes mask and holding a sign reading ‘I’m Julian’ as he demonstrates outside the Ecuadorian embassy in London, on June 23, 2012, where Wikileaks founder Julian Assange is seeking political asylum. Ecuador today recalled its ambassador to Britain to discuss what to do about WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who has sought refuge in their diplomatic mission in London. Assange, an Australian national, sought refuge in the Ecuadoran embassy on June 19 and asked Quito to give him asylum as he seeks to avoid extradition to Sweden on allegations of rape, fearing Stockholm will turn him over to the United States. Getty

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Women walk past protest placards outside the Ecuadorian embassy in London, on June 23, 2012, where supporters of Wikileaks founder Julian Assange gathered to demonstrate. Ecuador today recalled its ambassador to Britain to discuss what to do about WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who has sought refuge in their diplomatic mission in London. Assange, an Australian national, sought refuge in the Ecuadoran embassy on June 19 and asked Quito to give him asylum as he seeks to avoid extradition to Sweden on allegations of rape, fearing Stockholm will turn him over to the United States. Getty

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Photographers take pictures of protesters showing their support for Julian Assange outside the Ecuadorian embassy on June 22, 2012 in London, England. Julian Assange, the founder of the WikiLeaks whistle-blowing website, has sought refuge in Ecuador’s London embassy to prevent him from being extradited to Sweden on allegations of rape and assault. Getty

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Protesters show their support for Julian Assange outside the Ecuadorian embassy on June 22, 2012 in London, England. Julian Assange, the founder of the WikiLeaks whistle-blowing website, has sought refuge in Ecuador’s London embassy to prevent him from being extradited to Sweden on allegations of rape and assault. Getty

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A British police officer stands guard outside the Ecuadorian Embassy, in London, Friday, June 22, 2012. WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange entered the embassy on Monday in an attempt to gain political asylum to prevent him from being extradited to Sweden to face allegations of sex crimes, which he denies. In a telephone interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) from inside the embassy, the 40-year-old Australian said he did not know when the decision about his plea for asylum would be made. AP

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A man reads a book in front of a demonstration outside the Ecuadorian embassy in London, on June 22, 2012, where Wikileaks founder Julian Assange is seeking political asylum. President Rafael Correa said Ecuador would discuss WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange’s bid for asylum with other countries and did not want to ‘offend anyone,’ including Britain. Getty


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Sarah Saunders, a personal friend and contributor toward the bail of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, speaks to the media outside the Ecuadorian embassy in central London on June 21, 2012, where Assange is still holed up seeking political asylum. Assange will remain inside Ecuador’s embassy in London until his case is resolved, in a process that could take ‘hours or days’, a spokesman for the whistleblower website said June 21. Assange, 40, turned up in the embassy on June 19 and sought asylum in a dramatic bid to avoid extradition to Sweden over allegations of rape and sexual assault. Getty [Assange was reportedly housed most recently at the rural home of Sarah Saunders, a successful caterer.]

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Ecuadorian ambassador to London Ana Alban gets out of a car as she arrives at the embassy in central London on June 21, 2012 where Wikileaks founder Julian Assange is holed up while Ecuador consider his application for asylum. Ecuador’s president said Thursday his government would take its time in deciding whether to grant asylum to Julian Assange as the WikiLeaks founder spent a second night at its embassy in London. The 40-year-old Australian sparked a stand-off with British police after he turned up in the embassy on June 19 and asked for asylum in a dramatic bid to avoid extradition to Sweden over allegations of rape and sexual assault. Getty

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Police stand guard outside the Ecuadorian Embassy, London, Wednesday June 20, 2012. WikiLeaks chief Julian Assange has made a run for the Ecuadorean Embassy in London, seeking asylum in a long shot move that, if successful, would place him in a small, friendly South American country rather than in Sweden facing questioning about alleged sex crimes. Tuesday’s unexpected caper has added a new and bizarre twist to Assange’s increasingly desperate bid to avoid extradition to Scandinavia. AP

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Police patrol outside the Ecuadorian Embassy, London, Wednesday June 20, 2012. WikiLeaks chief Julian Assange has made a run for the Ecuadorean Embassy in London, seeking asylum in a long shot move that, if successful, would place him in a small, friendly South American country rather than in Sweden facing questioning about alleged sex crimes.

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Police officers stand outside Ecuador’s embassy in London June 20, 2012. WikiLeaks’ founder Julian Assange has taken refuge in Ecuador’s embassy in London and asked for asylum, officials said on Tuesday, in a last-ditch bid to avoid extradition to Sweden over sex crime accusations. AP

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Police officers stand outside the Ecuadorian embassy in London Wednesday June 20, 2012 where the Wikileaks founder Julian Assange is seeking political asylum. Assange has made a run for the Ecuadorean Embassy in London, seeking asylum in a long shot move that, if successful, would place him in a small, friendly South American country rather than in Sweden facing questioning about alleged sex crimes. Tuesday’s unexpected caper has added a new and bizarre twist to Assange’s increasingly desperate bid to avoid extradition to Scandinavia. Reuters

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Supporters of WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange gather outside Ecuador’s Embassy in central London June 20, 2012. Assange has taken refuge in Ecuador’s embassy in London and asked for asylum, officials said on Tuesday, in a last-ditch bid to avoid extradition to Sweden over sex crime accusations. Reuters

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Television crews and journalists gather outside the Ecuadorian Embassy (Background) in central London, on June 20, 2012, where Wikileaks founder Julian Assange is seeking political asylum as he fights extradition to Sweden over alleged sex crimes. Assange, who has sought political asylum inside the Ecuadorian embassy in London, has breached bail conditions and is subject to arrest, British police said Wednesday. Getty

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Supporters of Wikileaks founder Julian Assange rally with placards outside Ecuador’s embassy in central London on June 20, 2012, where Assange is seeking political asylum as he fights extradition to Sweden over alleged sex crimes. Assange, who last week exhausted all his legal options in Britain, walked into the embassy on June 19 and applied for political asylum, as time ran out in his marathon legal battle to avoid being sent to Sweden. Getty

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Demonstrators protest outside the Ecuadorian consulate on June 20, 2012 in London, England. Wikileaks Founder Julian Assange has sought asylum at the Ecuadorian embassy in Knightsbridge as he continues to fight against his possible extradition to Sweden over alleged sex crimes. Getty


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Ecuador’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ricardo Patino (C), Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Marco Albuja (R) and Undersecretary for North America and Europe, Paul Villagomez attend a news conference regarding WikiLeaks’ founder Julian Assange in Quito June 19, 2012. Assange is seeking asylum in Ecuador after arriving at the South American nation’s embassy in London, Ecuador’s foreign minister said on Tuesday, a move that may help the self-styled anti-secrecy crusader avoid extradition to Sweden. Reuters

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Members of the media gather outside Ecuador’s embassy where Wikileaks founder Julian Assange has sought political asylum, in London June 19, 2012. Assange is seeking asylum in Ecuador after arriving at the South American nation’s embassy in London, Ecuador’s foreign minister said on Tuesday, a move that may help the self-styled anti-secrecy crusader avoid extradition to Sweden. Reuters

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Members of the media gather outside Ecuador’s embassy where WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has sought political asylum, in London June 19, 2012. Assange is seeking asylum in Ecuador after arriving at the South American nation’s embassy in London, Ecuador’s foreign minister said on Tuesday, a move that may help the self-styled anti-secrecy crusader avoid extradition to Sweden. Reuters

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A police officer gestures outside Ecuador’s embassy where WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has sought political asylum, in London June 19, 2012. Assange is seeking asylum in Ecuador after arriving at the South American nation’s embassy in London, Ecuador’s foreign minister said on Tuesday, a move that may help the self-styled anti-secrecy crusader avoid extradition to Sweden. Reuters

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A police officer leaves Ecuador’s embassy where WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has sought political asylum, in London June 19, 2012. Assange is seeking asylum in Ecuador after arriving at the South American nation’s embassy in London, Ecuador’s foreign minister said on Tuesday, a move that may help the self-styled anti-secrecy crusader avoid extradition to Sweden. Reuters

[Image]

Police officers stand outside Ecuador’s embassy where WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has sought political asylum, in London June 19, 2012. Assange is seeking asylum in Ecuador after arriving at the South American nation’s embassy in London, Ecuador’s foreign minister said on Tuesday, a move that may help the self-styled anti-secrecy crusader avoid extradition to Sweden. Reuters

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Two men walk out of the Embassy of Ecuador in London, carrying legal books about diplomatic law , in London Tuesday, June 19, 2012. Embattled WikiLeaks chief Julian Assange took refuge Tuesday in Ecuador s embassy in London and is seeking political asylum, his organization and the South American nation s foreign minister said. Foreign Minister Ricardo Patino said the leftist government of President Rafael Correa was weighing the request. He did not indicate when a decision might be made. AP

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A general view of the Embassy of Ecuador in London Tuesday, June 19, 2012. Embattled WikiLeaks chief Julian Assange took refuge Tuesday in Ecuador s embassy in London and is seeking political asylum, his organization and the South American nation s foreign minister said. Foreign Minister Ricardo Patino said the leftist government of President Rafael Correa was weighing the request. He did not indicate when a decision might be made. AP

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http://binged.it/MdqPbd

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CONFIDENTIAL – SE Prosecution Authority: The Assange Matter

The Assange Matter

UK Supreme Court decision

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has today [May 30, 2012] decided to uphold and grant the request to surrender Julian Assange to Sweden.

Two lower instances had previously decided that Julian Assange should be surrendered to Sweden in accordance with the European Arrest Warrant Act. These were appealed by Assange and on 1-2 February 2012 hearings were held in the Supreme Court, which has now issued its decision.

The counsel for Mr Assange, Ms Rose, has indicated that she may make an application to re-open the Supreme Court’s decision. The Supreme Court has granted Ms Rose 14 days to make such an application. In accordance with the regulatory framework on European arrest warrants, Julian Assange will be surrendered to Sweden within 10 days after a legally binding judgement.

Since November 2010, Mr. Assange has been detained in his absence, on probable cause suspected of rape (less severe crime), sexual molestation and unlawful coercion.

Concerning requests for interviews

The Director of Public Prosecution, Marianne Ny, cannot supply any information regarding the case at the moment, but will give interviews in connection with a detention hearing in Sweden.

Contact:

Director of Communication Karin Rosander +46 10 562 50 10

Press Service +46 72 204 56 29

 


http://www.aklagare.se/In-English/About-us/International-prosecution-operations/Facts-about-
extradition-of-a-person-who-has-been-surrendered/

Facts about extradition and surrender

Different rules apply within the EU (surrender) and outside the EU (extradition).

Due to general agreements in the European Arrest Warrant Act, Sweden cannot extradite a person who has been surrendered to Sweden from another country without certain considerations.

Concerning surrender to another country within the European Union, the Act states that the executing country under certain circumstances must approve a further surrender.

On the other hand, if the extradition concerns a country outside the European Union the authorities in the executing country (the country that surrendered the person) must consent such extradition. Sweden cannot, without such consent, extradite a person, for example to the USA.

What happens in Sweden when a person is surrendered from another EU country?

The authority, in this case the Swedish Prosecution Authority, that issued the arrest warrant is responsible for transporting the suspect to Sweden within a stated time frame, once the other member state has taken a decision to surrender the suspect. The Swedish Prosecution Authority may request assistance from the National Police Board, or a police authority specified by the National Police Board, which is what generally occurs.

An order of detention has previously been issued, which is a precondition for the issuing of an arrest warrant. When the individual lands in Sweden, all regulations concerning the arrest warrant as concerns deprivation of liberty are voided and the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure applies, as in any national case where an order for the arrest of the individual has been issued in his absence.

The Principle of Speciality applies here, i.e. the person surrendered to Sweden may not be tried for any crimes other than those stated in the arrest warrant and may not be surrendered to another state, unless the original surrendering country grants its permission. In addition, the conditions imposed by the surrendering country also apply.

As soon as the obstacle to the presence of the detainee has ceased to apply, i.e. the detainee is on site in Sweden, a “report shall be made to the Court” (Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 24, Section 17). After this the Court will, without delay, hold a hearing concerning the detention issue, not later than 4 days (96 hours) after the time when the obstacle to the presence of the detainee ceased to apply.

Consequently, this is a new detention hearing in the presence of the suspect, where he is able to exercise his rights in a better manner than during the hearing he did not attend, but was represented by his legal representative only. When the detention hearing has been concluded, the Court will immediately issue its decision concerning detention. Either the detention will be cancelled or a new detention decision will be taken. A date by which prosecution must be initiated is also issued. The Court’s decision may be appealed.

 


http://www.aklagare.se/PageFiles/346/Chapter%206.pdf

Extract from the Swedish Penal Code Chapter 6:1, 6:10, 4:4

Chapter 6

Section 1

A person who by assault or otherwise by violence or by threat of a criminal act forces another person to have sexual intercourse or to undertake or endure another sexual act that, having regard to the nature of the violation and the circumstances in general, is comparable to sexual intercourse, shall be sentenced for rape to imprisonment for at least two and at most six years.

This shall also apply if a person engages with another person in sexual intercourse or in a sexual act which under the first paragraph is comparable to sexual intercourse by improperly exploiting that the person, due to unconsciousness, sleep, intoxication or other drug influence, illness, physical injury or mental disturbance, or otherwise in view of the circumstances in general, is in a helpless state.

If, in view of the circumstances associated with the crime, a crime provided for in the first or second paragraph is considered less aggravated, a sentence to imprisonment for at most four years shall be imposed for rape.

If a crime provided for in the first or second paragraph is considered gross, a sentence to imprisonment for at least four and at most ten years shall be imposed for gross rape. In assessing whether the crime is gross, special consideration shall be given to whether the violence or threat was of a particularly serious nature or whether more than one person assaulted the victim or in any other way took part in the assault or whether the perpetrator having regard to the method used or otherwise exhibited particular ruthlessness or brutality.

Section 10

A person who, otherwise than as previously provided in this Chapter, sexually touches a child under fifteen years of age or induces the child to undertake or participate in an act with sexual implications, shall be sentenced for sexual molestation to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years.

This also applies to a person who exposes himself or herself to another person in a manner that is likely to cause discomfort, or who otherwise by word or deed molests a person in a way that is likely to violate that person’s sexual integrity.

Chapter 4

Section 4

A person who, by assault or otherwise by force or by threat of a criminal act, compels another to do, submit to or omit to do something, shall be sentenced for unlawful coercion to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. Anyone who to such effect exercises coercion by threatening to prosecute or report another for a crime or give detrimental information about another, shall also be sentenced for unlawful coercion, provided that the coercion is wrongful. If the crime referred to in the first, paragraph is gross, imprisonment for at least six months and at most six years shall be imposed. In assessing whether the crime is gross special consideration shall be given to whether the act included the infliction of pain to force a confession, or other torture.

 


http://www.aklagare.se/In-English/The-role-of-the-prosecutor/Decision-to-prosecute/Retrial/

Review

It is possible to request a review of a prosecutor’s ruling concerning, for example, a discontinued preliminary investigation or a decision not to bring charges. Requests for review are made by one of the Prosecution Authority’s prosecution development centres.

If a request for a review is received by a public prosecution office, first of all the prosecutor who made the ruling shall decide whether or not any new circumstances have come to light in the matter.

If new circumstances are cited, the prosecutor reconsiders his/her decision. If this reconsideration fails to result in any change to the original ruling, the matter is referred to the prosecution development centre. The same applies if there are no new circumstances to be considered in the case.

At the prosecution development centre, the case will be reviewed by the Director of Public Prosecution, who will then make a decision on, for instance, the resumption of a discontinued investigation or that certain investigation measures should be taken. The case is then referred back to the original public prosecution office, but to a different prosecutor.

Decisions made by a prosecution development centre can also be reviewed, and the matter will in this case be handled by the Office of the Prosecutor-General.

Few rulings are changed

During 2008, over 2 000 rulings by prosecutors were reviewed at the four prosecution development centres. This is less than 1 per cent of all the prosecutor rulings that were made during the course of the year. Prosecutor rulings were revised in 220 cases (approximately 11 per cent of the reviews conducted and some 0.04 per cent of all prosecutor rulings).

 


http://www.aklagare.se/In-English/Media/The-Assange-Matter/The-Assange-Matter/

Chronology

Events concerning Julian Assange in chronological order

Swedish proceedings

20 August 2010

The duty prosecutor orders the arrest of Julian Assange, suspected of rape and sexual molestation.

21 August 2010

The case is transferred to a prosecutor at City Public Prosecution Office in Stockholm.

25 August 2010

The prosecutor takes a decision to terminate the preliminary investigation concerning suspected rape.

27 August 2010

Lawyer Claes Borgström, legal representative of the women who reported Julian Assange, requests a review of the prosecutor’s decision to terminate the preliminary investigation concerning rape. The review request is sent to the Prosecution Development Centre in Gothenburg.

1 September 2010

Marianne Ny, Director of Public Prosecution, takes a decision to resume the preliminary investigation concerning the suspected rape. The preliminary investigation on sexual molestation is expanded to cover all the events in the crime reports.

September 2010

The investigation is underway.

September 2010

The arrest of Julian Assange is ordered.

18 November 2010

Marianne Ny orders the arrest of Julian Assange, with probable cause, suspected of rape, three cases of sexual molestation and illegal coercion. This measure is taken as it has been impossible to interview him during the investigation.

Stockholm District Court takes a decision to order the arrest of Julian Assange in accordance with the Prosecutor’s request.

In order to execute this decision, the Prosecutor takes a decision to issue an international warrant for the arrest of Julian Assange, a European Arrest Warrant.

22 November 2010

Julian Assange appeals the issue of the District Court arrest warrant to Svea Court of Appeal.

24 November 2010

Svea Court of Appeal refuses the appeal and takes a decision that the arrest warrant is to remain in place, with probable cause, on suspicion of rape (less serious crime), unlawful coercion and two cases of sexual molestation.

The international request and the European Arrest Warrant are confirmed in accordance with the decision of the District Court.

30 November 2010

Julian Assange appeals the arrest warrant issued by Svea Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court.

2 December 2010

The Supreme Court takes a decision not to grant Julian Assange leave to appeal. The decision of the Svea Court of Appeal stands.

On the request of the British police, additional information is added to the European Arrest Warrant concerning the maximum penalty in Sweden for the crimes of sexual molestation and unlawful coercion.

British proceedings

7 december 2010

Julian Assange is arrested by British police.

16 December 2010

At a hearing on detention at Westminster Magistrates Court in London, the Court decides that Julian Assange should be granted bail.

7-8 February 2011

Hearing in London concerning surrender according to the European Arrest Warrant.

24 February 2011

The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court makes a decision to grant the request for surrender of Mr. Julian Assange to Sweden.

March 2011

Mr Assange appeals the court’s decision.

12-13 July 2011

Hearing in High Court in London concerning surrender according to the European Arrest Warrant.

2 November 2011

The High Court dismisses the appeal by Mr. Julian Assange against his extradition to Sweden.

5 December 2011

The Court grants Mr. Assange the right, within 2 weeks, to request leave to appeal to the UK Supreme Court.

16 December 2011

The Supreme Court grants Mr. Assange leave to appeal. The Court will sit on 1 and 2 February 2012.

1-2 February 2012

Hearing in the Supreme Court of Great Britain concerning whether a prosecutor can be considered to have the legal authority to issue a European Arrest Warrant.

[Events of May 30, 2012 not listed.]

 


http://www.aklagare.se/In-English/Media/News-in-English1/

News

News from the Swedish Prosecution Authority

2012-05-30: Assange granted 14 days to apply for re-opening

The counsel for Mr Assange, Ms Rose, this morning indicated that she may make an application to re-open the UK Supreme Court’s decision.

2012-05-30: Decision from the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has today decided to uphold and grant the request to surrender Julian Assange to Sweden.

2012-05-29: Decision in the UK Supreme Court

Wednesday 30 May, the UK Supreme Court will issue the judgement in the matter concerning Julian Assange’s surrender to Sweden.

2011-12-16: Assange granted leave to appeal

Today, the Supreme Court of Great Britain took a decision to grant Julian Assange leave to appeal in the matter of his surrender to Sweden in accordance with a European Arrest Warrant.

2011-11-02: Mr. Julian Assange to be surrendered

The High Court has today dismissed an appeal by Mr. Julian Assange against his surrender to Sweden. The decision can be appealed.

2011-09-11: Suspected terrorist crimes in Gothenburg

Statement from the prosecutor concerning suspicions of terrorist crime.

2011-07-13: Hearing in London on the Assange matter

Hearing in High Court in London concerning surrender according to the European Arrest Warrant.

2011-04-04: Preliminary investigation of unlawful intelligence activities is closed

Chief Public Prosecutor Tomas Lindstrand The Prosecution Office for National Security have closed the investigation since the crime of unlawful intelligence activities could not be substantiated.

2011-02-24: Assange to be surrendered (updated)

The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court has made a decision to grant the request for surrender of Mr. Julian Assange.

2011-02-10: Statement by the Prosecutor-General of Sweden concerning the Assange case

Anders Perklev comments on critical statements concerning the Swedish legal system and the Director of Public Prosecution.

2011-02-04: British court hearing on the Assange case

On 7 and 8 February a court in England will hear the case concerning the surrender to Sweden of Julian Assange in accordance with the European arrest warrant issued against him.

2010-12-16: Julian Assange granted bail in The High Court

At a hearing on Thursday 16 December, The High Court in London decided that Julian Assange should be granted bail.

2010-12-14: Julian Assange granted bail at Westminster Magistrates Court in London

At a hearing on Tuesday 14 December, Westminster Magistrates Court in London decided that Julian Assange should be granted bail.

2010-12-08: Cyber attack on the web site

On Tuesday evening the web site of the Swedish Prosecution Authority was attacked. Due to an unusual amount of visitors the site became overloded and crashed. The site was restored on Wednesday morning.

2010-12-07: British Police have arrested Mr. Assange

Statement from Director of Prosecution, Ms. Marianne Ny

2010-12-06: British Police supplied with requested information concerning Assange

Director of Prosecution Ms. Marianne Ny has supplied the British Police with the requested additional information.

2010-12-02: Julian Assange has been detained in his absence

Julian Assange has been detained in his absence suspected of rape, sexual molestation and unlawful coercion. Mr Assange had appealed the detention decision issued by Svea Court of Appeal.

2010-12-01: An european arrest warrant for Mr. Assange has been issued

Director of Prosecution, Ms. Marianne Ny, can confirm that an european arrest warrant for Mr. Assange has been issued.

2010-11-18: Mr. Assange detained in his absence

As a result of the court’s decision to detain Mr. Assange in his absence, an international arrest warrant will be issued.

2010-11-18: Request for detention of Mr. Assange

Director of Prosecution, Ms. Marianne Ny, has requested the District Court of Stockholm to detain Mr Assange in his absence.

 


 


 

Unveiled – 142 WikiLeaks Cables Citing SIMO Code for CIA

142 WikiLeaks Cables Citing SIMO Code for CIA

SIMO-CIA.zip 142 WikiLeaks Cables Citing SIMO Code for CIA May 31, 2012

Examples of WikiLeaks Cables Showing Use of Code Word SIMO for CIA or C/SIMO for Chief of Station (Thanks to @Nin_99 and @Wikileaks for link to Taz.de)

http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=05LJUBLJANA808&hl=C%2FSIMO

1. (S) On November 23, DCM, C/SIMO, and PolMiloff delivered reftel demarche and presentation to MFA Director for Policy Planning and Multilateral Policy (A/S equivalent) Stanislav Rascan, Security Department Head Stanislav Vidovic, and Security Department staffer Rina Pavlin Gnidovec. During the course of C/SIMO’s presentation, Vidovic asked whether the documents shown in the PowerPoint were from Iran, whether the test facility pictured in the diagram was a detonation site or a monitoring facility, and whether IC projections included a timeline for completion of a usable nuclear weapon. C/SIMO responded by noting the documents were from Iran, the diagram featured in the presentation depicted a monitoring facility 10 km removed from the detonation site, and that no known concrete timeline for weaponization existed. Vidovic also asked whether it is the U.S. assessment that Iran is building a nuclear weapon for defensive purposes or whether it has aggressive intentions. C/SIMO underscored the possibility that Iran could use a nuclear weapon preemptively, though it might choose to do so through another state or non-state organization.

http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=06TOKYO5624&hl=SIMO

8. (S) U.S. participants:

– Assistant Secretary Randall Fort
– INR/NEA Chief John Merrill
– Embassy SIMO Representative Constance Taube
– Political Officer Keith Jordan (control officer)
– Political Officer Evan Reade (notetaker)

http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=08BELGRADE1108&hl=SIMO

1. (S/NF) The GOT on January 12 passed to SIMO the names of US Embassy officers found on a piece of paper at one of the sites used by “Salafist” terror suspects (reftels). SIMO is reporting this information through other channels.

http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=06KUWAIT4653&hl=SIMO

2. (S/NF) SIMO noted continuing robust information exchange with Kuwait State Security (KSS) and Kuwait Military Intelligence (KMI) on a range of issues including Iraq, Iran and Hezbollah. KSS and KMI continue to expend substantial resources on force protection efforts for U.S. personnel and convoys. SIMO Chief said U.S.-provided training had increased this year through his organization. He cited the GOK need to improve capabilities across the board, particularly tradecraft and technical capabilities. DATT noted that following the initial phase of DIA-funded human intelligence training, Kuwait will likely pursue further training through private contractors.

For many more instances search for “SIMO” at Cablesearch.org (SIMO will be highlighted in yellow. Ignore its use as a proper name.)


TOP-SECRET – UK Supreme Court on Assange v SE 30 May 2012

        The SUPREME COURT

Case details

 
General
CaseID UKSC 2011/0264
Case name Assange (Appellant) v The Swedish Judicial Authority (Respondent)
Case stage Awaiting Judgment
Date of issue 15 Dec 2011
Expedition requested Requested
Order being appealed – Date 02 Nov 2011
Order being appealed – Court Divisional Court QBD (EW)
Devolution No
Human Rights raised Yes
Human Rights raised – details Article 5(3)
Intervener Yes
 
Case Summary
On appeal from the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division (England and Wales)

Issue

Whether a European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) issued by a public prosecutor is a valid Part 1 EAW issued by a “judicial authority” for the purpose and within the meaning of sections 2 and 66 of the Extradition Act 2003.

Facts

The Appellant, a journalist well known through his operation of Wikileaks, visited Sweden to give a lecture in August 2010. He had sexual relations with two women. Both women went to the police who treated their visits as the filing of complaints. The Appellant was interviewed by police and subsequently left Sweden in ignorance of the fact that a domestic arrest warrant had been issued for him. Proceedings were brought in the Swedish courts in the Appellant’s absence, although he was represented, in which a domestic warrant for the Appellant’s detention for interrogation was granted and upheld on appeal. Subsequently, an EAW for the Appellant was issued by the Swedish Prosecution Authority that set out allegations of four offences of unlawful coercion and sexual misconduct including rape. The EAW was certified by the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency under the Extradition Act 2003. The Appellant surrendered himself for arrest in the UK and, following an extradition hearing, his extradition to Sweden was ordered. The order was upheld on appeal to the Divisional Court.

Subject Matter catchwords for indexing

Extradition “European Arrest Warrant” Judicial Authority

 
Permission to appeal
Date supporting documents received 15 Dec 2011
Date PTA application referred to justices
Date of oral hearing
Permission granted/refused Granted
Notice of intention to proceed filed Yes
 
Parties
Appellant name Julian Paul Assange
Appellant case due date
Appellant case date filed 13 Jan 2012
Respondent name The Swedish Prosecution Authority
Date form 3 filed
Date form 3 issued
Respondent case due date
Respondent case date filed
Intervener – names Gerard Batten and Vladimir Bukovsky
Lord Advocate
 
Appeal
Justices allocated Yes
Justices allocated – names Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore
Lord Wilson
PTA granted by court below No
Statement of facts & issues and Appendix due date
Statement of facts & issues and Appendix date filed 12 Jan 2012
Time estimate
Time estimate received
Time estimate number of days 2 days
Hearing date 01 Feb 2012
Other hearing location
Core volumes due date
Core volumes date filed
Authorities due date
Authorities date filed
Hand down date 30 May 2012

 

 


WIKILEAKS – 9/11 tragedy pager intercepts.

From 3AM on Sunday September 11, 2011, until 3AM the following day (US east coast time), WikiLeaks is re-releasing over half a million US national text pager intercepts. The intercepts cover a 24 hour period surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington.
The messages are being broadcast “live” to the global community — sychronized to the time of day they were sent. The first message is from 3AM September 11, 2001, five hours before the first attack, and the last, 24 hours later.
Text pagers are usualy carried by persons operating in an official capacity. Messages in the archive range from Pentagon, FBI, FEMA and New York Police Department exchanges, to computers reporting faults at investment banks inside the World Trade Center
The archive is a completely objective record of the defining moment of our time. We hope that its entrance into the historical record will lead to a nuanced understanding of how this event led to death, opportunism and war.
An index of messages released so far is available here.
Twitter users may use the hashtag #911txts. We will give status updates at twitter.com/wikileaks.

Last 12 intercept collections:

2001.09.12 02.55 to 2001.09.12 02.59 (text)
2001.09.12 02.50 to 2001.09.12 02.54 (text)
2001.09.12 02.45 to 2001.09.12 02.49 (text)
2001.09.12 02.40 to 2001.09.12 02.44 (text)
2001.09.12 02.35 to 2001.09.12 02.39 (text)
2001.09.12 02.30 to 2001.09.12 02.34 (text)
2001.09.12 02.25 to 2001.09.12 02.29 (text)
2001.09.12 02.20 to 2001.09.12 02.24 (text)
2001.09.12 02.15 to 2001.09.12 02.19 (text)
2001.09.12 02.10 to 2001.09.12 02.14 (text)
2001.09.12 02.05 to 2001.09.12 02.09 (text)
2001.09.12 02.00 to 2001.09.12 02.04 (text)

JULIAN ASSANGE UNVEILS – Cuba to work around US embargo via undersea cable to Venezuela

https://i0.wp.com/wikileaks.org/w/images/a/a7/Cuba-cable.jpg

JULIAN ASSANGE (investigative editor)
July 16, 2008

From Santiago de Cuba to La Guaira : Cuba will be connected to the Internet by 2010

Page one of the Cuba-Venezuela confidential contract annex
According to the Vice Minister of Telecommunication, Boris Moreno, the government is unable to offer Cubans comprehensive Internet for their new Pcs because the American embargo prevents it from getting service directly from the United States nearby through underwater cables. Instead, Cuba gets Internet service through less reliable satellite connections, usually from faraway countries including Italy and Canada.
— Cuba blames US for Internet restrictions, AP Newswire 16 May 2008[1]

Documents released by Wikileaks reveal that Cuba and Venezuela signed a confidential contract in 2006 to lay an undersea fibre-optic cable that bypasses the United States. The cable is to be completed by 2010.

The contract between the two countries, which has been independently verified, adds weight to Cuban statements that the United States economic embargo of the island has forced it to rely on slow and expensive satellite links for Internet connectivity. Cuba is situated a mere 120 kilometres off the coast of Florida. The proposed 1,500 kilometre cable will connect Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti and Trinidad to the rest of the world via La Guaira, Venezuela.

Carrying out the work are CVG Telecom (Corporación Venezolana de Guyana) and ETC (Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba).

The leaked documents have technical details and pictures of the cable, maps, and systems to be used, parties signing the agreement, terms and conditions, costs, and a schedule of charges and compromises. The connection allows for the transmission of data, video and voice (VoIP). According to the contract, the agreement is designed to build a relationship of “strategic value” which will permit Cuba and Venezuela to, among other matters:

  • Increase interchange between the two governments.
  • Foster science, cultural and social development.
  • Increase the volume and variety of relationships between country members of ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for America) and the South American MERCOSUR trading block.
  • Help serve the increasing demand of commercial traffic between Cuba, Venezuela and the rest of the world.

The contract parties state that given the diversity of foreign affairs, they wish to build a new international order, multi-polar, based in sustainability, equity and common good and that an international cable with maximum security protected by international organizations (ITU/ICPC) is crucial.

The documents disclose plans to separate commercial traffic and governmental traffic upon data arrival.

 

TOP-SECRET – Russia transferred Iranian defense system codes to Israel

 

The Wikileaks website is releasing more than five million documents, including intelligence-related email correspondences from the US intelligence company Stratfor. The emails are said to be between senior intelligence and military persons involved with the company from both the past and the present.

One of the emails includes information from a source that claims Israel gave Russia codes for UAVs that were sold to the Georgian army in exchange for codes for the Tor-M1 air defense system Russia sold to the Iranian army.

According to foreign publications, Iran signed an arms deal with Russia in 2005, which saw the procurement of medium-ranged air defense systems. According to the source, whose remarks were posted on Wikileaks, Russia transferred the communication codes for the systems to Israel, in exchange for codes present in the UAVs that Israel sold to Georgia.

The source is a former officer in the Mexican army, and is described as a reliable source.
Accordingly, the Georgians discovered the Russian-Israeli move, which is why they are now seeking a substitute for the UAVs they procured from Israel.

WIKILEAKS – Release “Wir weisen der CIA den Weg”

List of documents > Release “Wir weisen der CIA den Weg”

Read stories about those documents at the following addresses:

Email-ID Subject From To Date
64027 INSIGHT – Russia/Israel/Georgia/Mexico – defense deals and swaps reva.bhalla@stratfor.com secure@stratfor.com 2009-02
201031 reva.bhalla@stratfor.com friedman@att.blackberry.net 2011-12
277400 Please invoice and charge credit card Booz Allen Hamilton $20,790 – renewal (paid $19,800 last year) wright@stratfor.com oconnor@stratfor.com, george.friedman@stratfor.com, Don.kuykendall@stratfor.com, cs@stratfor.com, kelly.tryce@stratfor.com, rob.bassetti@stratfor.com, holly.sparkman@stratfor.com, fernando.jaimes@stratfor.com 2011-03
383068 Re: names20 burton@stratfor.com zucha@stratfor.com 2010-04
971109 Re: INSIGHT – BRAZIL – On military purchases hughes@stratfor.com marko.papic@stratfor.com, secure@stratfor.com 2010-10
1977338 Re: [alpha] Musings on The Outfit friedman@att.blackberry.net alpha@stratfor.com 2011-07
3438302 FW: CIA head of analysis fired iser@stratfor.com allstratfor@stratfor.com 2004-12
5091635 Re: A thought on open source practice friedman@att.blackberry.net analysts@stratfor.com 2009-03
5305447 Updated Sales Force Contacts Anya.Alfano@stratfor.com zucha@stratfor.com, amy.fisher@stratfor.com 2010-09
5521421 Re: note from Yemeni diplomatic source bokhari@stratfor.com analysts@stratfor.com 2011-01

WIKILEAKS publishes 5 Million Statfor files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered “global intelligence” company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal’s Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor’s web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

Uncensored – Bradley Manning Protest 16 December 2011

[Image]Army Pfc. Bradley Manning, left, is escorted out of a courthouse at Fort Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, after the first day of a military hearing that will determine if he should face court-martial for his alleged role in the WikiLeaks classified leaks case. Manning is suspected of being the source in one of the largest unauthorized disclosures of classified information in U.S. history. (Cliff Owen)
[Image]Army Pfc. Bradley Manning is escorted in handcuffs out of a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, after the first day of a military hearing that will determine if he should face court-martial for his alleged role in the WikiLeaks classified leaks case. Manning is suspected of being the source in one of the largest unauthorized disclosures of classified information in U.S. history. (Cliff Owen)
[Image]Pfc. Bradley Manning is escorted from his his Article 32 hearing December 16, 2011 in Fort Meade, Maryland. Manning is accused of disclosing more than 260,000 diplomatic cables, more than 90,000 intelligence reports on the war in Afghanistan and one video of a military helicopter attack to WikiLeaks, a Web site dedicated to publishing secret documents. Getty
[Image]Army security offices stand watch moments before Army Pfc. Bradley Manning is escorted out of a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, after the first day of a military hearing that will determine if he should face court-martial for his alleged role in the WikiLeaks classified leaks case. Manning is suspected of being the source in one of the largest unauthorized disclosures of classified information in U.S. history. (Cliff Owen)
[Image]In this courtroom sketch, Army Pfc. Bradley Manning, second from left, sits as his attorney, David E. Coombs, speaks during a military hearing in Fort Meade, Md. , Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, that will determine if Manning should face court-martial for his alleged role in the WikiLeaks classified leaks case. Manning is suspected of being the source in one of the largest unauthorized disclosures of classified information in U.S. history. AP
[Image]David E. Coombs, attorney for Army Pfc. Bradley Manning, right, leaves a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md. , Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, during a recess in a military hearing that will determine if Manning should face court-martial for his alleged role in the WikiLeaks classified leaks case. Manning is suspected of being the source in one of the largest unauthorized disclosures of classified information in U.S. history. AP
[Image]Protestors supporting Pfc. Bradley Manning march outside the gate of Ft. Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, where Manning will be attending a hearing to determine if he will be court martialed. (Susan Walsh)
[Image]Protestors supporting Pfc. Bradley Manning gather outside Ft. Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, where Manning will be attending a hearing to determine if he will be court martialed. The U.S. military is making its case for why Manning should be court-martialed on charges of endangering national security by stealing and leaking an enormous trove of government secrets. (Susan Walsh)
[Image]Protestors supporting Bradley Manning gather outside Ft. Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, where Manning will be attending a hearing to determine if he will be court martialed. (Susan Walsh)
[Image]Richard Ochs of Baltimore, Md., protests outside of Ft. Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, to support Pfc. Bradley Manning who will be attending a hearing to determine if he will be court martialed. (Susan Walsh)
[Image]A soldier stands guard at a roadblock outside of a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, during a military hearing that will determine if Army Pfc. Bradley Manning should face court-martial for his alleged role in the WikiLeaks classified leaks case. Manning is suspected of being the source in one of the largest unauthorized disclosures of classified information in U.S. history. (Patrick Semansky)
[Image]Dave Eberhardt of Baltimore, Md., protests outside Ft. Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, in support Pfc. Bradley Manning. The U.S. military is making its case for why Manning should be court-martialed on charges of endangering national security by stealing and leaking an enormous trove of government secrets. (Susan Walsh)
[Image]Supporters of Pfc. Bradley Manning walk away after attending his Article 32 hearing, on December 16, 2011 in Fort Meade, Maryland. Manning is accused of disclosing more than 260,000 diplomatic cables, more than 90,000 intelligence reports on the war in Afghanistan and one video of a military helicopter attack to WikiLeaks, a Web site dedicated to publishing secret documents. Getty
[Image]Military police talk to supprters of Pfc. Bradley Manning after they attended his Article 32 hearing December 16, 2011 in Fort Meade, Maryland. Pfc. Manning is accused of disclosing more than 260,000 diplomatic cables, more than 90,000 intelligence reports on the war in Afghanistan and one video of a military helicopter attack to WikiLeaks, a Web site dedicated to publishing secret documents. Getty
[Image]People walk into a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md., Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, for a military hearing that will determine if Army Pfc. Bradley Manning should face court-martial for his alleged role in the WikiLeaks classified leaks case. Manning is suspected of being the source in one of the largest unauthorized disclosures of classified information in U.S. history. (Patrick Semansky)

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[Image]Police officers from U.S. Army Fort George G. Meade walk outside the base gates to talk with journalists and demonstrators protesting in supprt of U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning December 18, 2011 in Fort Meade, Maryland. Manning is accused of disclosing more than 260,000 diplomatic cables, more than 90,000 intelligence reports on the war in Afghanistan and one video of a military helicopter attack to WikiLeaks, a Web site dedicated to publishing secret documents. Getty

[Image]Supporters of U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning, an Army intelligence analyst, hold vigil outside the gates of U.S. Army Fort George G. Meade where Manning’s Article 32 preliminary hearing will begin December 18, 2011 in Fort Meade, Maryland. Manning is accused of disclosing more than 260,000 diplomatic cables, more than 90,000 intelligence reports on the war in Afghanistan and one video of a military helicopter attack to WikiLeaks, a Web site dedicated to publishing secret documents. Getty
[Image]A helicopter from the Anne Arundel County Sheriff’s Office circles above supporters of U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning, an Army intelligence analyst, as they hold vigil outside the gates of U.S. Army Fort George G. Meade, where Manning’s Article 32 preliminary hearing is being held, December 18, 2011 in Fort Meade, Maryland. Manning is accused of disclosing more than 260,000 diplomatic cables, more than 90,000 intelligence reports on the war in Afghanistan and one video of a military helicopter attack to WikiLeaks, a Web site dedicated to publishing secret documents. Getty
[Image]A military personnel directs a group of people outside the courthouse at Fort Meade, Maryland during the U.S. vs Private Bradley E. Manning Article 32 hearing December 16, 2011. An Army intelligence analyst suspected in the biggest leak of classified U.S. documents in history makes his first court appearance on Friday accused of multiple charges including aiding the enemy, which could bring life imprisonment. Reuters
[Image]Supporters of U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning, an Army intelligence analyst, hold vigil outside the gates of U.S. Army Fort George G. Meade where Manning’s Article 32 preliminary hearing will begin December 18, 2011 in Fort Meade, Maryland. Manning is accused of disclosing more than 260,000 diplomatic cables, more than 90,000 intelligence reports on the war in Afghanistan and one video of a military helicopter attack to WikiLeaks, a Web site dedicated to publishing secret documents. Getty
[Image]Journalists stand outside the courthouse at Fort Meade, Maryland during the U.S. vs Private Bradley E. Manning Article 32 hearing December 16, 2011. An Army intelligence analyst suspected in the biggest leak of classified U.S. documents in history makes his first court appearance on Friday accused of multiple charges including aiding the enemy, which could bring life imprisonment. Reuters
[Image]David E. Coombs, attorney for Army Pfc. Bradley Manning, leaves a courthouse in Fort Meade, Md. , Friday, Dec. 16, 2011, during a recess in a military hearing that will determine if Manning should face court-martial for his alleged role in the WikiLeaks classified leaks case. Manning is suspected of being the source in one of the largest unauthorized disclosures of classified information in U.S. history.

TOP SECRET – White House “WikiLeaks” Executive Order on Improving Security of Classified Networks

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WikiLeaksExecutiveOrder

 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America and in order to ensure the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information (classified information) on computer networks, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. Our Nation’s security requires classified information to be shared immediately with authorized users around the world but also requires sophisticated and vigilant means to ensure it is shared securely. Computer networks have individual and common vulnerabilities that require coordinated decisions on risk management.

This order directs structural reforms to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks that shall be consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. Agencies bear the primary responsibility for meeting these twin goals. These structural reforms will ensure coordinated interagency development and reliable implementation of policies and minimum standards regarding information security, personnel security, and systems security; address both internal and external security threats and vulnerabilities; and provide policies and minimum standards for sharing classified information both within and outside the Federal Government. These policies and minimum standards will address all agencies that operate or access classified computer networks, all users of classified computer networks (including contractors and others who operate or access classified computer networks controlled by the Federal Government), and all classified information on those networks.

Sec. 2. General Responsibilities of Agencies.

Sec. 2.1. The heads of agencies that operate or access classified computer networks shall have responsibility for appropriately sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks. As part of this responsibility, they shall:

(a) designate a senior official to be charged with overseeing classified information sharing and safeguarding efforts for the agency;

(b) implement an insider threat detection and prevention program consistent with guidance and standards developed by the Insider Threat Task Force established in section 6 of this order;

(c) perform self-assessments of compliance with policies and standards issued pursuant to sections 3.3, 5.2, and 6.3 of this order, as well as other applicable policies and standards, the results of which shall be reported annually to the Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee established in section 3 of this order;

(d) provide information and access, as warranted and consistent with law and section 7(d) of this order, to enable independent assessments by the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks and the Insider Threat Task Force of compliance with relevant established policies and standards; and

(e) detail or assign staff as appropriate and necessary to the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office and the Insider Threat Task Force on an ongoing basis.

Sec. 3. Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee.

Sec. 3.1. There is established a Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee (Steering Committee) to exercise overall responsibility and ensure senior-level accountability for the coordinated interagency development and implementation of policies and standards regarding the sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks.

Sec. 3.2. The Steering Committee shall be co-chaired by senior representatives of the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Staff. Members of the committee shall be officers of the United States as designated by the heads of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Information Security Oversight Office within the National Archives and Records Administration (ISOO), as well as such additional agencies as the co-chairs of the Steering Committee may designate.

Sec. 3.3. The responsibilities of the Steering Committee shall include:

(a) establishing Government-wide classified information sharing and safeguarding goals and annually reviewing executive branch successes and shortcomings in achieving those goals;

(b) preparing within 90 days of the date of this order and at least annually thereafter, a report for the President assessing the executive branch’s successes and shortcomings in sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks and discussing potential future vulnerabilities;

(c) developing program and budget recommendations to achieve Government-wide classified information sharing and safeguarding goals;

(d) coordinating the interagency development and implementation of priorities, policies, and standards for sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks;

(e) recommending overarching policies, when appropriate, for promulgation by the Office of Management and Budget or the ISOO;

(f) coordinating efforts by agencies, the Executive Agent, and the Task Force to assess compliance with established policies and standards and recommending corrective actions needed to ensure compliance;

(g) providing overall mission guidance for the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) with respect to the functions to be performed by the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office established in section 4 of this order; and

(h) referring policy and compliance issues that cannot be resolved by the Steering Committee to the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-1 of February 13, 2009 (Organization of the National Security Council System).

Sec. 4. Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office.

Sec. 4.1. There shall be established a Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office (CISSO) within and subordinate to the office of the PM-ISE to provide expert, fulltime, sustained focus on responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks. Staff of the CISSO shall include detailees, as needed and appropriate, from agencies represented on the Steering Committee.

Sec. 4.2. The responsibilities of CISSO shall include:

(a) providing staff support for the Steering Committee;

(b) advising the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks and the Insider Threat Task Force on the development of an effective program to monitor compliance with established policies and standards needed to achieve classified information sharing and safeguarding goals; and

(c) consulting with the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the ISOO, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and others, as appropriate, to ensure consistency with policies and standards under Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009, Executive Order 12829 of January 6, 1993, as amended, Executive Order 13549 of August 18, 2010, and Executive Order 13556 of November 4, 2010.

Sec. 5. Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks.

Sec. 5.1. The Secretary of Defense and the Director, National Security Agency, shall jointly act as the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks (the “Executive Agent”), exercising the existing authorities of the Executive Agent and National Manager for national security systems, respectively, under National Security Directive/NSD-42 of July 5, 1990, as supplemented by and subject to this order.

Sec. 5.2. The Executive Agent’s responsibilities, in addition to those specified by NSD-42, shall include the following:

(a) developing effective technical safeguarding policies and standards in coordination with the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), as re-designated by Executive Orders 13286 of February 28, 2003, and 13231 of October 16, 2001, that address the safeguarding of classified information within national security systems, as well as the safeguarding of national security systems themselves;

(b) referring to the Steering Committee for resolution any unresolved issues delaying the Executive Agent’s timely development and issuance of technical policies and standards;

(c) reporting at least annually to the Steering Committee on the work of CNSS, including recommendations for any changes needed to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of that work; and

(d) conducting independent assessments of agency compliance with established safeguarding policies and standards, and reporting the results of such assessments to the Steering Committee.

Sec. 6. Insider Threat Task Force.

Sec. 6.1. There is established an interagency Insider Threat Task Force that shall develop a Government-wide program (insider threat program) for deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, including the safeguarding of classified information from exploitation, compromise, or other unauthorized disclosure, taking into account risk levels, as well as the distinct needs, missions, and systems of individual agencies. This program shall include development of policies, objectives, and priorities for establishing and integrating security, counterintelligence, user audits and monitoring, and other safeguarding capabilities and practices within agencies.

Sec. 6.2. The Task Force shall be co-chaired by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, or their designees. Membership on the Task Force shall be composed of officers of the United States from, and designated by the heads of, the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the ISOO, as well as such additional agencies as the co-chairs of the Task Force may designate. It shall be staffed by personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), and other agencies, as determined by the co-chairs for their respective agencies and to the extent permitted by law. Such personnel must be officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States. To the extent permitted by law, ONCIX shall provide an appropriate work site and administrative support for the Task Force.

Sec. 6.3. The Task Force’s responsibilities shall include the following:

(a) developing, in coordination with the Executive Agent, a Government-wide policy for the deterrence, detection, and mitigation of insider threats, which shall be submitted to the Steering Committee for appropriate review;

(b) in coordination with appropriate agencies, developing minimum standards and guidance for implementation of the insider threat program’s Government-wide policy and, within 1 year of the date of this order, issuing those minimum standards and guidance, which shall be binding on the executive branch;

(c) if sufficient appropriations or authorizations are obtained, continuing in coordination with appropriate agencies after 1 year from the date of this order to add to or modify those minimum standards and guidance, as appropriate;

(d) if sufficient appropriations or authorizations are not obtained, recommending for promulgation by the Office of Management and Budget or the ISOO any additional or modified minimum standards and guidance developed more than 1 year after the date of this order;

(e) referring to the Steering Committee for resolution any unresolved issues delaying the timely development and issuance of minimum standards;

(f) conducting, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the Task Force, independent assessments of the adequacy of agency programs to implement established policies and minimum standards, and reporting the results of such assessments to the Steering Committee;

(g) providing assistance to agencies, as requested, including through the dissemination of best practices; and

(h) providing analysis of new and continuing insider threat challenges facing the United States Government.

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) For the purposes of this order, the word “agencies” shall have the meaning set forth in section 6.1(b) of Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009.

(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to change the requirements of Executive Orders 12333 of December 4, 1981, 12829 of January 6, 1993, 12968 of August 2, 1995, 13388 of October 25, 2005, 13467 of June 30, 2008, 13526 of December 29, 2009, 13549 of August 18, 2010, and their successor orders and directives.

(c) Nothing in this order shall be construed to supersede or change the authorities of the Secretary of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Secretary of Defense under Executive Order 12829, as amended; the Secretary of Homeland Security under Executive Order 13549; the Secretary of State under title 22, United States Code, and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986; the Director of ISOO under Executive Orders 13526 and 12829, as amended; the PM-ISE under Executive Order 13388 or the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended; the Director, Central Intelligence Agency under NSD-42 and Executive Order 13286, as amended; the National Counterintelligence Executive, under the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002; or the Director of National Intelligence under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, NSD-42, and Executive Orders 12333, as amended, 12968, as amended, 13286, as amended, 13467, and 13526.

(d) Nothing in this order shall authorize the Steering Committee, CISSO, CNSS, or the Task Force to examine the facilities or systems of other agencies, without advance consultation with the head of such agency, nor to collect information for any purpose not provided herein.

(e) The entities created and the activities directed by this order shall not seek to deter, detect, or mitigate disclosures of information by Government employees or contractors that are lawful under and protected by the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Inspector General Act of 1978, or similar statutes, regulations, or policies.

(f) With respect to the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence, after consultation with the heads of affected agencies, may issue such policy directives and guidance as the Director of National Intelligence deems necessary to implement this order.

(g) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(1) the authority granted by law to an agency, or the head thereof; or

(2) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals

(h) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties, and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(i) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

BARACK OBAMA

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 7, 2011.

 

Vermont Infragard WikiLeaks and National Security Colloquium Presentations

In April 2011, a colloquium was held at the private military college Norwich University in conjunction with the Vermont branch of the FBI’s Infragard program.  These presentations from the colloquium provide insight into government responses to WikiLeaks and other similar initiatives.

See here

Vermont Infragard WikiLeaks and National Security Colloquium Presentations

WikiLeask suspends service because of costs – aks for donations

Citation:

We are forced to temporarily suspend publishing whilst we secure our economic survival. For almost a year we have been fighting an unlawful financial blockade. We cannot allow giant US finance companies to decide how the whole world votes with its pocket. Our battles are costly. We need your support to fight back. Please donate now.

CRYTOME – Emulate Wikileaks Operation

Despite the money machine Wikileaks has become for the thousands exploiting its product and notoriety, it deserves maximum financial, moral and political support in ways that help avoid dependency upon rigged markets and leveraged endorsements.

In comparison to the braggardy and IP theft of secrecy-protected 1% MSM, governments and corporations hiding behind branded Representative Democracy, Wikileaks — and its kind — are genuinely supportive of direct democracy. Avoid centralized, branded initiatives due to their susceptibility to covert control, participate in OWS and dispersed collectives.

Individual support for these dispersed initiatives is crucial to avoid the trap of 1% funding which has enlisted millions with sinecure indulgences from gov, mil, com, org and edu — not least those of the hypnotic debt-swap easy loan of the Internet which allows aggregating personal information by spying on unwary participants. Hopefully Wikileaks will never become one of those “Goodwill Industries” — gov, mil, com, org and edu — now preying on the Internet by rigging its operation for privileged users claiming public benefit.

The disclosed legal expenses for Assange which appear to soon outweigh Wikileaks’ operating costs do not augur well for the initiative remaining unfettered democratic. No explanation of why the legal costs are not donated — unless they are being used to launder money in the legacy practice of claiming “expenses” used by the 1% to camouflage profit.

Emulate Wikileaks operations with a similar initiative and/or by mirroring the site’s courageous offerings, but avoid the legal-financial black hole entrapment.

“Wikileaks: The Inside Story” According to The New York Times and The Guardian – Video

A panel discussion of working with Wikileaks held at Columbia University on 3 February 2011 featuring panelists Bill Keller, editor of The New York Times, Alan Rusbridger, editor of the Guardian and Jack Goldmsith, Harvard Law School, with interlocutor Emily Bell, Columbia Unversity.

State Department’s search for a WikiLeaks scapegoat

Hillary Clinton at the state department

Hillary Clinton at the State Department condemned the WikiLeaks release of US embassy cables, but has not commented on the department’s lax security. Photograph: Win Mcnamee/Getty Images

On the same day that more than 250,000 unredacted State Department cables hemorrhaged out onto the internet, I was interrogated for the first time in my 23-year State Department career by State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and told I was under investigation for allegedly disclosing classified information. The evidence of my crime? A posting on my blog from the previous month that included a link to a WikiLeaks document already available elsewhere on the web.

As we sat in a small, gray, windowless room, resplendent with a two-way mirror, multiple ceiling-mounted cameras, and iron rungs on the table to which handcuffs could be attached, the two DS agents stated that the inclusion of that link amounted to disclosing classified material. In other words, a link to a document posted by who-knows-who on a public website available at this moment to anyone in the world was the legal equivalent of me stealing a top secret report, hiding it under my coat and passing it to a Chinese spy in a dark alley.

The agents demanded to know who might be helping me with my blog (“Name names!”), if I had donated any money from my upcoming book on my wacky, year-long State Department assignment to a forward military base in Iraq, and if so, to which charities, the details of my contract with my publisher, how much money (if any) I had been paid, and – by the way – whether I had otherwise “transferred” classified information.

Had I, they asked, looked at the WikiLeaks site at home on my own time on my own computer? Every blog post, every Facebook post and every tweet by every State Department employee, they told me, must be pre-cleared by the department prior to “publication”. Then they called me back for a second 90-minute interview, stating that my refusal to answer questions would lead to my being fired, never mind the fifth (or the first) amendments.

Why me? It’s not like the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has the staff or the interest to monitor the hundreds of blogs, thousands of posts and millions of tweets by Foreign Service personnel. The answer, undoubtedly, is my new book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People. Its unvarnished portrait of State’s efforts and the US at work in Iraq has clearly angered someone, even though one part of State signed off on the book under internal clearance procedures some 13 months ago. I spent a year in Iraq leading a State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and, sadly, know exactly what I am talking about. DS monitoring my blog is like a small-town cop pulling over every African American driver: vindictive, selective prosecution. “Ya’ll be careful in these parts, ‘hear, ’cause we’re gonna set an example for your kind of people.”

Silly as it seems, such accusations carry a lot of weight if you work for the government. DS can unilaterally, and without any right of appeal or oversight, suspend your security clearance and for all intents and purposes end your career. The agents questioning me reminded me of just that, as well as of the potential for criminal prosecution – and all because of a link to a website, nothing more.

It was implied as well that even writing about the interrogation I underwent, as I am doing now, might morph into charges of “interfering with a government investigation”. They labelled routine documents in use in my interrogation as “law enforcement sensitive” to penalise me should I post them online. Who knew such small things actually threatened the security of the United States? Are these words so dangerous, or is our nation so fragile that legitimate criticism becomes a firing offense?

Let’s think through this disclosure of classified info thing, even if State won’t. Every website on the internet includes links to other websites. It’s how the web works. If you include a link to say, a CNN article about Libya, you are not “disclosing” that information – it’s already there. You’re just saying: “Have a look at this.” It’s like pointing out a newspaper article of interest to a guy next to you on the bus. (Careful, though, if it’s an article from the New York Times or the Washington Post: it might quote stuff from WikiLeaks and then you could be endangering national security.)

Security at State: hamburgers and mud

Security and the State Department go together like hamburgers and mud. Over the years, State has leaked like an old boot. One of its most hilarious security breaches took place when an unknown person walked into the secretary of State’s outer office and grabbed a pile of classified documents. From the vast trove of missing classified laptops to bugging devices found in its secure conference rooms, from high-ranking officials trading secrets in Vienna to top diplomats dallying with spies in Taiwan, even the publicly available list is long and ugly.

Of course, nothing compares to what history will, no doubt, record as the most significant outpouring of classified material ever: the dump of hundreds of thousands of cables that are now on display on WikiLeaks and its mushroom-like mirror sites. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (an oxymoron if ever there was one) is supposed to protect our American diplomats by securing State’s secrets, and over time, they just haven’t done very well at that.

Bradley Manning, left, is accused of stealing classified files released by Julian Assange, rightUS soldier Bradley Manning, left, who is accused of stealing the huge database of classified files released by the WikiLeaks website of Julian Assange, right. Photograph: Associated Press/AFP/Getty ImagesThe State Department and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security never took responsibility for their part in the loss of all those cables, never acknowledged their own mistakes or porous security measures. No one will ever be fired at State because of WikiLeaks – except, at some point, possibly me. Instead, State joined in the federal mugging of army Private Bradley Manning, the person alleged to have copied the cables onto a Lady Gaga CD while sitting in the Iraqi desert.

That all those cables were available electronically to everyone from the secretary of State to a lowly army private was the result of a clumsy post-9/11 decision at the highest levels of the State Department to quickly make up for information-sharing shortcomings. Trying to please an angry Bush White House, State went from sharing almost nothing to sharing almost everything overnight. They flung their whole library onto the government’s classified intranet, SIPRnet, making it available to hundreds of thousands of federal employees worldwide. It is usually not a good idea to make classified information that broadly available when you cannot control who gets access to it outside your own organisation. The intelligence agencies and the military certainly did no such thing on SIPRnet, before or after 9/11.

State did not restrict access. If you were in, you could see it all. There was no safeguard to ask why someone in the army in Iraq in 2010 needed to see reporting from 1980s Iceland. Even inside their own organisation, State requires its employees to “subscribe” to classified cables by topic, creating a record of what you see and limiting access by justifiable need. A guy who works on trade issues for Morocco might need to explain why he asked for political-military reports from Chile.

Most for-pay porn sites limit the amount of data that can be downloaded. Not State. Once those cables were available on SIPRnet, no alarms or restrictions were implemented so that low-level users couldn’t just download terabytes of classified data. If any activity logs were kept, it does not look like anyone checked them.

A few classified State Department cables will include sourcing, details on from whom or how information was collected. This source data allows an informed reader to judge the veracity of the information – was the source on a country’s nuclear plans a street vendor or a high military officer? Despite the sometimes life-or-death nature of protecting sources (though some argue this is overstated), State simply dumped its hundreds of thousands of cables online unredacted, leaving source names there, all pink and naked in the sun.

Then again, history shows that technical security is just not State’s game, which means the WikiLeaks uproar is less of a surprise in context. For example, in 2006, news reports indicated that State’s computer systems were massively hacked by Chinese computer geeks. In 2008, State data disclosures led to an identity theft scheme only uncovered through a fluke arrest by the Washington, DC cops. Before it was closed down in 2009, snooping on private passport records was a popular intramural activity at the State Department, widely known and casually accepted. In 2011, contractors using fake identities appear to have downloaded 250,000 internal medical of State Department employees, including mine.

Wishing isn’t a strategy, hope isn’t a plan

Despite their own shortcomings, State and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security take this position: if we shut our eyes tightly enough, there is no WikiLeaks. (The morning news summary at State includes this message: “Due to the security classification of many documents, the daily addendum will not include news clips that are generated by leaked cables by the website WikiLeaks.”) The corollary to such a position evidently goes something like this: since we won’t punish our own technical security people or the big shots who approved the whole flawed scheme in the first place, and the damned first amendment doesn’t allow us to punish the New York Times, let’s just punish one of our own employees for looking at, creating links to and discussing stuff on the web – and while he was at it, writing an accurate, first-hand and critical account of the disastrous, if often farcical, American project in Iraq.

That’s what frustrated bullies do – they pick on the ones they think they can get away with beating up. The advantage of all this? It gets rid of a “troublemaker”, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security people can claim that they are “doing something” about the WikiLeaks drip that continues even while they fiddle. Of course, it also chills free speech, sending a message to other employees about the price of speaking plainly.

Now does that make sense? Only inside the world of Diplomatic Security, where historically, it always has.

For example, Diplomatic Security famously took into custody the color slides reproduced in the Foreign Service Journal showing an open copy of one of the government’s most sensitive intelligence documents, albeit only after the photos were published and distributed in the thousands. Similarly, DS made it a crime to take photos of the giant US Embassy compound in Baghdad, but only after the architecture firm building it posted sketches of the embassy online; a Google search will still reveal many of those images; others who served in Iraq have posted them on their unsecured Facebook pages.

Imagine this: State’s employees are still blocked by a firewall from looking at websites that carry, or simply write about and refer to, WikiLeaks documents, including TomDispatch.com, which is publishing this piece. (That, in turn, means my colleagues at State won’t be able to read this – except on the sly.)

In the belly of the beast

Back in that windowless room for a second time, I faced the two DS agents clumsily trying to play semi-bad cop and altogether-bad cop. They once again reminded me of my obligation to protect classified information, and studiously ignored my response – that I indeed do take that obligation seriously; enough, in fact, to distinguish between actual disclosure and a witch-hunt.

As they raised their voices and made uncomfortable eye contact just like it says to do in any Interrogation 101 manual, you could almost imagine the hundreds of thousands of unredacted cables physically spinning through the air around us, heading – splat, splot, splat – for the web. Despite the Hollywood-style theatrics and the grim surroundings, the interrogation was less police state or 1984-style nightmare than a Brazil-like dark comedy.

In the end, though, it’s no joke. I’ve been a blogger since April, but my meeting with the DS agents somehow took place only a week before the publication date of my book. Days after my second interrogation, the principal deputy secretary of State wrote my publisher demanding small redactions in my book – already shipped to the bookstores – to avoid “harm to US security”. One demand: to cut a vignette based on a scene from the movie version of Black Hawk Down.

The link to WikiLeaks is still on my blog. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security declined my written offer to remove it, certainly an indication that however much my punishment mattered to them, the actual link mattered little. I may lose my job in State’s attempt to turn us all into mini-Bradley Mannings and so make America safe.

These are not people steeped in, or particularly appreciative of, the finer points of irony. Still, would anyone claim that there isn’t irony in the way the State Department regularly crusades for the rights of bloggers abroad in the face of all kinds of government oppression, crediting their voices for the Arab Spring, while going after one of its own bloggers at home for saying nothing that wasn’t truthful?

Here’s the best advice my friends in Diplomatic Security have to offer, as far as I can tell: slam the door after the cow has left the barn, then beat your wife as punishment. She didn’t do anything wrong, but she deserved it, and don’t you feel better now?

Julian Assange: The Unauthorised Autobiography – review

Julian Assange outside the High Court in July

‘It vexes me when the world won’t listen’: Assange arrives at the High Court in July to appeal against his extradition to Sweden on sexual assault charges. Photograph: Andy Rain/EPA

Marsupials are pouched animals, mostly from Australia, that give birth to their young in an unfinished state. What we have here is a weird marsupial hybrid. It’s part Australian WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, and part Scottish novelist and ghostwriter Andrew O’Hagan. This mixed-up creature has given birth to an unfinished draft, dragged out of its pouch and published before its maturity under the wacky title The Unauthorised Autobiography. Assange hasn’t really been well-served by his publisher’s behaviour. It’s the result of what seems to be a characteristic Assange imbroglio in which he will neither give back his £412,000 publisher’s advance, nor deliver a finally approved manuscript. But the decision by Canongate’s Jamie Byng to publish regardless, although understandable, has produced an unsatisfactory book.

The ghostwriter and his subject hadn’t yet really gelled by the time of this draft. It’s easy to see the fictionalising hand of O’Hagan in an early chapter about Assange’s hippy boyhood in northern Queensland. It begins, soulfully: “For most people, childhood is a climate. In my case, it is perfectly hot and humid with nothing above us but blue sky …” But a later section on the Aussie hacker’s souring partnership with the journalists who were to print his leaked US secrets is much more raw. The opening reads like Assange sounding off verbatim on a bad day, in a sentence full of bile and misogyny: “Vanity in a newspaper man is like perfume on a whore: they use it to fend off a dark whiff of themselves.” For by the time we reach this second half of the book, O’Hagan’s mediating intelligence seems to have retreated, and the digital recorder is doing much of the work. Perhaps the ghost got weary, locked up in a chilly East Anglian winter with his monologuing subject, who is currently confined there on bail, fighting extradition on Swedish sex allegations.

The lack of a final edit does other disservices to Assange’s story. The narrative stops too abruptly, before publication in the Guardian and the New York Times of the third and most important set of leaks he had acquired (the state department cables), and the subsequent legal pursuit of Assange on the sex complaints. It’s padded out instead with unnecessary chunks of the cables themselves, which can be read elsewhere. The unresolved criminal allegations, inevitably, make him censor a defensive account of sex with two Swedish fans. It’s all very well calling a woman “neurotic”, but did he deliberately tear a condom as she alleged?

Furthermore, a nervous Canongate libel lawyer, no longer able presumably to rely on Assange as a future witness, appears to have simply chopped out chunks of detail when Assange abuses those he doesn’t like. This censorship muddies what could have been a lively, if defamatory, narrative, and pointlessly withholds many of the names. I myself, for example, who clashed with Assange during the Guardian saga, and co-authored a book he didn’t care for, am anonymised throughout, transparently enough, as “the news reporter”. Yet Bill Keller, then editor of the New York Times and considered presumably to be libel-proof under US free-speech laws, remains relentlessly vituperated against under his own name.

A final fact-check would have removed a crop of stupid errors. It must have been a transcription mistake that turned Heather Brooke into “the ‘Independent’ journalist” rather than the independent journalist she is. And Oscar Wilde with his rent-boys was not “sleeping with panthers”, he was feasting with panthers.

For all its drawbacks, the memoir does add some good detail to the increasingly well-trodden field of Assange studies (it’s the fifth book so far). The passage in which he meets his biological father, a bohemian Sydney actor, for the first time in his 20s, is genuinely poignant: “I found myself getting sort of angry … There on shelf after shelf were the exact same books as those I had bought and read myself … If I had only known him, I might just have picked his books down from the shelf … I was forced to make myself up as I went along.”

And there’s a telling section in which Assange, perhaps unwittingly, reveals why he seeks out unquestioning disciples, and quarrels with so many others: “Opponents past and present have the same essential weakness about them – first they want to use you, then they want to be you, then they want to snuff you out. It’s a pattern that stretches in my life from toytown feds to hacks at the Guardian … Usually it ends with these people enumerating one’s personal faults, a shocking, ungrateful, unmanly effort, to be filed under despicable in my book … I’ve been meeting [these people] all my life.”

This seems to be a cry coming from a truly threatened personality, in fear of being overwhelmed and extinguished. People have criticised Assange for being preposterously grandiose and lashing out at imagined “enemies”. Perhaps they should have been kinder, for there is clearly something else at work here.

It’s a shame Assange couldn’t get on with the Guardian. As he has the grace occasionally to recognise in this book, people there share some of his beliefs – free speech, investigative journalism, standing up to big corporations and murderous governments, the potentially liberating quality of the internet. And his idea for WikiLeaks provided an exhilarating addition to the world’s journalistic possibilities. It was a neat tool – as an uncensorable global publisher of last resort, and as an electronic outlet for leaking the new kinds of huge database the computer age is bringing into existence. But unmediated leaking on a random basis, even of gigabits of purloined documents, cannot ever revolutionise all the world’s power relationships. There Assange shows, regrettably, that he is living in a fantasy world.

Behind his high-sounding talk of quantum mechanics and global conspiracies, there lies a more familiar and heartfelt cry: “If only people knew what was really going on, they’d do something about it!” One sympathises. But these very memoirs demonstrate the opposite. Nothing much happened after Assange threw back the curtain to reveal his sensationally leaked Baghdad helicopter gunship video, with US pilots mowing down Reuters employees and young children in a burst of incompetent cannon-fire. As Assange (or O’Hagan) concedes: “It vexes me when the world won’t listen.”

That was what forced him to accept an offer from some of the world’s major newspapers to make sense of the rest of his material, publish it under the authority of their own names and grant him a share of the credibility slowly built up over 190 years of reputable reporting. Thanks to that imaginative transaction, he rocketed briefly to worldwide fame. These marsupial memoirs of his seem unlikely to increase his prospects of becoming the messiah of the information age. Maybe, sadly, even the reverse.

David Leigh is the co-author of WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy (Guardian Books).

How 250,000 US embassy cables were leaked

Bradley Manning, left, is accused of stealing classified files released by Julian Assange, right

US soldier Bradley Manning, left, who is accused of stealing the classified files and handing the database to the WikiLeaks website of Julian Assange, right. Photograph: Associated Press/AFP/Getty Images

An innocuous-looking memory stick, no longer than a couple of fingernails, came into the hands of a Guardian reporter earlier this year. The device is so small it will hang easily on a keyring. But its contents will send shockwaves through the world’s chancelleries and deliver what one official described as “an epic blow” to US diplomacy.

The 1.6 gigabytes of text files on the memory stick ran to millions of words: the contents of more than 250,000 leaked state department cables, sent from, or to, US embassies around the world.

What will emerge in the days and weeks ahead is an unprecedented picture of secret diplomacy as conducted by the planet’s sole superpower. There are 251,287 dispatches in all, from more than 250 US embassies and consulates. They reveal how the US deals with both its allies and its enemies – negotiating, pressuring and sometimes brusquely denigrating foreign leaders, all behind the firewalls of ciphers and secrecy classifications that diplomats assume to be secure. The leaked cables range up to the “SECRET NOFORN” level, which means they are meant never to be shown to non-US citizens.

As well as conventional political analyses, some of the cables contain detailed accounts of corruption by foreign regimes, as well as intelligence on undercover arms shipments, human trafficking and sanction-busting efforts by would-be nuclear states such as Iran and Libya. Some are based on interviews with local sources while others are general impressions and briefings written for top state department visitors who may be unfamiliar with local nuances.

Intended to be read by officials in Washington up to the level of the secretary of state, the cables are generally drafted by the ambassador or subordinates. Although their contents are often startling and troubling, the cables are unlikely to gratify conspiracy theorists. They do not contain evidence of assassination plots, CIA bribery or such criminal enterprises as the Iran-Contra scandal in the Reagan years, when anti-Nicaraguan guerrillas were covertly financed.

One reason may be that America’s most sensitive “top secret” and above foreign intelligence files cannot be accessed from Siprnet, the defence department network involved.

The US military believes it knows where the leak originated. A soldier, Bradley Manning, 22, has been held in solitary confinement for the last seven months and is facing a court martial in the new year. The former intelligence analyst is charged with unauthorised downloads of classified material while serving on an army base outside Baghdad. He is suspected of taking copies not only of the state department archive, but also of video of an Apache helicopter crew gunning down civilians in Baghdad, and hundreds of thousands of daily war logs from military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It was childishly easy, according to the published chatlog of a conversation Manning had with a fellow-hacker. “I would come in with music on a CD-RW labelled with something like ‘Lady Gaga’ … erase the music … then write a compressed split file. No one suspected a thing … [I] listened and lip-synched to Lady Gaga’s Telephone while exfiltrating possibly the largest data spillage in American history.” He said that he “had unprecedented access to classified networks 14 hours a day 7 days a week for 8+ months”.

Manning told his correspondent Adrian Lamo, who subsequently denounced him to the authorities: “Hillary Clinton and several thousand diplomats around the world are going to have a heart attack when they wake up one morning and find an entire repository of classified foreign policy is available, in searchable format, to the public … Everywhere there’s a US post, there’s a diplomatic scandal that will be revealed. Worldwide anarchy in CSV format … It’s beautiful, and horrifying.”

He added: “Information should be free. It belongs in the public domain.”

Manning, according to the chatlogs, says he uploaded the copies to WikiLeaks, the “freedom of information activists” as he called them, led by Australian former hacker Julian Assange.

Assange and his circle apparently decided against immediately making the cables public. Instead they embarked on staged disclosure of the other material – aimed, as they put it on their website, at “maximising political impact”.

In April at a Washington press conference the group released the Apache helicopter video, titling it Collateral Murder.

The Guardian’s Nick Davies brokered an agreement with Assange to hand over in advance two further sets of military field reports on Iraq and Afghanistan so professional journalists could analyse them. Published earlier this year simultaneously with the New York Times and Der Spiegel in Germany, the analyses revealed that coalition forces killed civilians in previously unreported shootings and handed over prisoners to be tortured.

The revelations shot Assange and WikiLeaks to global prominence but led to angry denunciations from the Pentagon and calls from extreme rightwingers in the US that Assange be arrested or even assassinated. This month Sweden issued an international warrant for Assange, for questioning about alleged sexual assaults. His lawyer says the allegations spring from unprotected but otherwise consensual sex with two women.

WikiLeaks says it is now planning to post a selection of the cables. Meanwhile, a Guardian team of expert writers has been spending months combing through the data. Freedom of information campaigner Heather Brooke obtained a copy of the database through her own contacts and joined the Guardian team. The paper is to publish independently, but simultaneously with the New York Times and Der Spiegel, along with Le Monde in Paris and El País in Madrid. As on previous occasions the Guardian is redacting information likely to cause reprisals against vulnerable individuals.

WikiLeaks-named Ethiopian reporter in unredacted cable flees country in fear

Julian Assange, founder of wikileaks

Wikileaks named Ethiopian reporter Argaw Ashine, along with many others, when founder Julian Assange (pictured in July) agreed for leaked US cables to be published unredacted. Photograph: Lefteris Pitarakis/AP

An Ethiopian reporter has fled the country after being named in a WikiLeaks cable, in what a media rights group said was the first instance of one of the leaks causing direct repercussions for a journalist.

Wikileaks recently published all its cables unredacted, naming sources that were removed by partner media organisations, including the Guardian.

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) said reporter Argaw Ashine fled at the weekend after being interrogated over the identity of a government source mentioned in a leaked 2009 US cable. Argaw was the local correspondent for Kenya’s Nation Media Group.

The cable said Argaw was told by an unnamed source that the government would target six journalists from a newspaper seen as critical of the government. That paper closed later that year after citing harassment and intimidation.

Joel Simon, the New York-based CPJ’s executive director, said: “The threat we sought to avert through redactions of initial WikiLeaks cables has now become real. A citation in one of these cables can easily provide repressive governments with the perfect opportunity to persecute or punish journalists and activists.

“WikiLeaks must take responsibility for its actions and do whatever it can to reduce the risk to journalists named in its cables. It must put in place systems to ensure that such disclosures do not reoccur.”

Ethiopian officials on Thursday denied Argaw’s account to the CPJ that he had been harassed and intimidated because of the cable.

A government spokesman said officials had separately arrested five opposition figures on Wednesday, including a journalist, on allegations of terrorism. They follow dozens of other terrorism-related arrests and detentions in recent weeks, including those of two Swedish journalists.

The main opposition coalition said recent events illustrate a pattern of oppression as citizens tire of the longtime leadership and seek change. Human rights groups have long accused Ethiopia of cracking down on political dissent.

Shimeles Kemal, the government spokesman, said Argaw was not pressured to name a source and that Ethiopian law allows journalists to protect their sources.

“This is a very absurd and ridiculous accusation, the allegation that he was threatened by security to leave the country or disclose a source,” Shimeles said.

Argaw has asked the CPJ to not reveal his location.

Eskinder Nega, a journalist and publisher whose newspaper was shut down over allegations that the paper incited violence during disputed elections in 2005, was among the five opposition figures arrested on Wednesday, Shimeles said. After the newspaper was shut down, Eskinder continued to speak critically of the government in public forums, and articles under his byline appeared on opposition-aligned websites.

“According to the police statement, these people have been involved in activities, they have plotted, planned and carefully laid out contrived plans that are likely to wreak havoc in the country through launching terrorist attacks and throwing the country into utter chaos,” Shimeles said.

Opposition party official Negasso Gidada said another person arrested, Andualem Arage, served on the editorial board of an opposition-party newspaper. He denied the charges that the five were involved in terrorist activities.

Negasso said the party newspaper had been advocating for “the right to struggle in a peaceful, democratic, constitutional and legal way.

“The people are fed up because of the social, economic and political situation and the people follow also what is happening in North Africa and Arab countries … and people are saying, ‘When is our turn? When shall we go to the streets?'” he said.

“The attitude is so strong in the country, in the people, soon it will explode, and the government is afraid of that, and by arresting political party members and leaders, the government thinks it will take precautionary measures against that.”

TOP-SECRET – Khodorkovsky ‘will not be free while Putin is in power’

Wednesday, 18 April 2007, 07:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001770
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DOJ OF OPDAT/ALEXANDRE, LEHMANN AND NEWCOMBE, OCRS/OHR AND
SHASKY, OIA/BURKE AND DITTOE
STATE FOR EUR/RUS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/17/2017
TAGS ECON, KCRM, KJUS, PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
REF: A. MOSCOW 774 B. MOSCOW 697
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.5 (b, d)

1. (C) Summary: Emboffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX. He described the new embezzlement and money laundering charges — that Khodorkovskiy engaged in transfer pricing that harmed unwitting minority shareholders in Yukos’ three production subsidiaries — as a re-packaging of the charges in the first case. He claimed the defense has substantial evidence these shareholders were fully informed of these activities. Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the charges are without legal or factual support and questioned the prosecution’s claim that the loss to the subsidiaries was USD 30 billion, a figure he said was about equal to the value of the oil produced by the three units during the period in question. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was surprised that a Moscow court had agreed to change the venue of the trial from Chita to Moscow. He described two cases pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The first case claims that Khodorkovskiy was arrested and held in pre-trial detention in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention), while the second alleges violations of Khodorkovskiy’s right to a fair trial. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the case against XXXXXXXXXXXX is politically motivated and being run out of the Kremlin, and does not foresee any change of status for Khodorkovskiy while the Putin Administration remains in office. End Summary.

The New Charges

—————

2. (C) On February 16, the General Procuracy charged Khodorkovskiy and Platon Lebedev with embezzlement and money laundering (Ref B). According to the indictment, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev acquired controlling interests in three oil companies (Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz) and then caused these companies to sell oil at below-market prices to other companies that they controlled without disclosing to other shareholders their role in these transactions. They then allegedly re-sold the oil at market prices, which were approximately 3-4 times greater than the original purchase price. The alleged victims were the other shareholders of Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz, who were entitled to the benefit of an arms-length sale at market prices, but instead received only the artificially deflated prices allegedly set by Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev (Ref B).

3. (C) As an initial matter, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the new charges are simply a re-packaging of the charges in the first case. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX in the first case, prosecutors relied on the very same transactions to charge Khodorkovskiy with tax evasion. However, he said, they were unsatisfied with Khodorkovskiy’s eight-year sentence and decided to bring new charges carrying potentially heavier sentences. The money laundering charges carry a maximum sentence of 15 years and the embezzlement charges carry a maximum sentence of 10 years. He said the defense will challenge them on the grounds that they violate Russian and international norms prohibiting double jeopardy. XXXXXXXXXXXX also suggested that the new charges may have been brought to prevent Khodorkovskiy from being released on parole before upcoming Duma and Presidential elections. (Note: Russian law provides that a prisoner is eligible for early release after he has served half of his sentence. Because Khodorkovskiy was arrested in October 2003 and was sentenced to eight years, he might have been eligible for early release in October 2007. However, his prison violations, which XXXXXXXXXXXX claims were provoked by authorities, would likely have prevented his early release in any event. End Note.)

4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the new charges are without merit since this transfer pricing technique was not only legal but engaged in by “thousands of firms.” He noted that the business groups and industrial firms emerging from privatization during the 1990s were generally organized to take maximum advantage of benefits the GOR provided via “internal offshore” zones. The headquarters and some operating units of a group or firm were typically located in identified havens and conducted most of the transactions, thus allowing for tax optimization. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX this structure facilitated and encouraged the widespread practice of transfer pricing, whereby one part of a company

MOSCOW 00001770 002 OF 003

purchased the output made by another part of the company at below-market prices before selling the same output at a market price.

5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX defense would present substantial documentary evidence, including records of corporate meetings, proving that the minority shareholders of Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz were fully informed of all relevant aspects of the subject transactions. XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that if the minority shareholders had actually been defrauded, as prosecutors claim, they would have filed civil suits, which they did not do. Finally, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the prosecution’s claim of a USD 30 billion loss to the shareholders is &absurd8 because the sum would represent the total value of all the oil produced by the subject companies during the relevant time period rather than the difference between what the minority shareholders actually received and what they would have received in arms-length transactions, which, he said, would have been much a more sensible way to measure the alleged loss.

The Trial: Where and When?

————————–

6. (C) The Procuracy filed the new charges in Chita, where Khodorkovskiy is presently incarcerated, and sought to conduct the preliminary investigation and trial there (Ref B). Shortly after the new charges were filed, the defense filed a motion seeking a change of venue to Moscow, claiming that the majority of witnesses and evidence are located there. On March 20, the Basmanny Court in Moscow granted the defense motion. The Procuracy appealed this decision and the appeal was heard on April 16 in the Moscow City Court. This Court upheld the Basmanny Court’s decision transferring the case to Moscow. XXXXXXXXXXXX Russian law provides that the preliminary investigation should be conducted in the place where the crime was allegedly committed, but may be conducted in the place where the defendant is located to ensure &completeness, objectivity and compliance with procedural norms.”

7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the Procuracy chose Chita to make it difficult for the defense team to meet with their clients and prepare their defense. Specifically, he said, Chita is difficult to reach and lacks the copying machines and other office equipment the defense needs to prepare its case. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that although the Procuracy’s decision was clearly wrong as a matter of law, he was surprised by the Basmanny Court’s decision because the same court had consistently ruled against Khodorkovskiy in the first case. He claimed that the ruling was an indication of a general recognition that the Procuracy had “gone too far.”

8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that he did not know when the trial on the new charges would take place. He said that the prosecution had sought to start the trial in June so that it would be completed before the elections, but noted that the case materials consist of 127 volumes and said that the XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the prosecutors will likely move to cut off the defense’s review of the case file in May, but said that the defense would challenge such a motion. Under Russian law, the prosecution can seek to limit the time that the defense has to review the case file if there are grounds to believe that the defense is engaging in unreasonable delay. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that a trial date could not be set until the location of the trial had been determined. Therefore, because of ongoing litigation regarding the venue of the trial and the voluminous nature of the case file, it is not clear when the case will proceed to trial.

The European Court of Human Rights

———————————-

9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that Khodorkovskiy has filed two complaints to the ECHR in Strasbourg alleging violations of his rights under the Convention in the first case. The ECHR in Strasbourg adjudicates claims brought under the Convention. As a result of Russia’s ratification of the Convention in 1998, Russia is bound by the Convention and any ECHR decisions interpreting it. The first complaint, he said,

MOSCOW 00001770 003 OF 003

alleges that Khodorkovskiy was arrested and held in pre-trial detention in violation of the Convention. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the ECHR had agreed to hear this case on an accelerated timetable, but had not yet set a date.

10. (C) The second complaint, he said, alleges violations of Khodorkovskiy’s right to a fair trial. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that before adjudicating a case, the ECHR typically sends a list of specific questions about the movant’s claims to the respondent government. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX the Russian government has not yet responded to the ECHR’s questions regarding the second complaint and it is therefore not clear when this case will be considered. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the second complaint is “more interesting” than the first because, if successful, it could result in a reversal of Khodorkovskiy’s conviction. By contrast, the first claim could only result in an award of monetary damages. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that the French Embassy in Moscow and German Bundestag have shown interest in this case.

No Changes Expected

——————-

11. (C) In his final remarks, XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the new charges against Khodorkovskiy are politically motivated and said that the case is being orchestrated entirely by the Kremlin. Although he stated confidently that the charges are without legal or evidentiary support, he concluded by saying that Khodorkovskiy would likely remain in prison as long as the Putin Administration is in power. BURNS

TOP-SECRET – China ‘would accept’ Korean reunification

Monday, 22 February 2010, 09:32
S E C R E T SEOUL 000272
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, <abbr title=”JA“><abbr title=”JA“>JA, CH
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
  1. South Korea’s vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo tells the Americans that senior Chinese officials have told him that China is fed up with the North Korean regime’s behaviour and would not oppose Korean reunification. Chun says North Korea has already collapsed economically and will collapse politically when Kim Jong-il dies. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
  2. Read related article

Summary

——-

1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea‘s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy. Beijing had “no will” to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies — and the DPRK characterized as “the most incompetent official in China” — had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.

VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations…

——————————————

2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in “two to three years.” Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy; there was “no substance” to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry’s “briefing” to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui’s visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had “basically read a Xinhua press release,” Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.

3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea “than most people believe.” Beijing had “no will” to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies and the DPRK leadership “knows it.” Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the “brink of collapse,” the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

—————————————–

4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was “a very bad thing” that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s delegation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it appeared that the DPRK “must have lobbied extremely hard” for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China’s 6PT chief. [NAME REMOVED] complained that Wu is the PRC’s XXXXXXXXXXXX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who “knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn’t speak English.” Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming — to anyone willing to listen — that the PRC’s economic rise represented a “return to normalcy” with China as a great world power.

…China’s “New Generation” of Korea-Hands…

———————————————

5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials XXXXXXXXXXXX stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chun said, were ready to “face the new reality” that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state — a view that since North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.

…PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario…

———————————————

6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly “not welcome” any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a “benign alliance” — as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chundismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China’s strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea — not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could “strengthen the centrifugal forces in China’s minority areas.”

…and Japan

————

7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s control. Chun asserted that, even though “Japan’s preference” was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS

TOP-SECRET – Arms smuggling into Lebanon and the Gaza Strip

Cable dated:2009-11-18T14:32:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002501
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, KWBG, EG, IR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: COUNTERSMUGGLING TECHNICAL DISCUSSION (PART 2 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S) Summary: Concurrent to the Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) Executive Session, IDF J5 and Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) officers briefed U.S. JPMG delegation members on current arms transfers and weapons smuggling into Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. IDF J5 and IDI officers first focused on arms transfers to Hizballah in Lebanon via Iran and Syria, and provided current estimates of Hizballah arms. IDF J5 and IDI officers argued that Hizballah’s ultimate goal during any future conflict is to launch a massive number of missiles and rockets daily into Israeli territory, including those that can reach the Tel Aviv area. J5 and IDI also described the sophisticated smuggling routes from Iran into the Gaza Strip, arguing that Hamas is now more powerful than prior to Operation Cast Lead. IDF J5 and IDI officers noted improved countersmuggling efforts by Egypt, but stressed more must be done to curb smuggling into Gaza. This is the second of four cables (septel) reporting on the 40th Joint Political Military Group. End summary.

2. (SBU) Israeli attendees included representatives from the IDF J5, IDI, Shin Bet, and Mossad. The U.S. delegation was led by PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy Robert Maggi, and included PM/RSAT John Schwenk, OSD Israel Desk Officer Eric Lynn, J5 Israel Desk Officer LTC Alan Simms, U.S. DAO Tel Aviv Assistant Air Attache Matt Yocum, EUCOM LCDR Molly McCabe, and U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv political-military officer Jason Grubb.

3. (S) Maggi stressed the importance of and noted progress with counter-smuggling efforts into Gaza — but also acknowledged the GOI desire to see even further progress. He said the USG was looking for practical ideas to improve counter-smuggling efforts. IDF J5 officers argued that smuggling represents a strategic challenge for the GOI, which is facing a proliferation of knowledge and capabilities that are severely limiting Israel’s diplomatic options for peace. IDF J5 made the case that weapons and knowledge proliferate from state actors, which disrupts diplomatic regional efforts. IDF J5 highlighted “regional faultlines,” with the United States and Iran leading two opposing camps — and countries such as China, Russia, and Qatar remaining on the sidelines with unclear intentions.

4. (S) IDI officers briefed on arms “deliveries” to the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, making the case with the latter that these arms transfers were done openly and should not be considered smuggling. IDI noted that since 2006, Hizballah has increased its quantity of sophisticated arms with improved range and accuracy — these arms were acquired via Syria and Iran despite the presence of UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). IDI highlighted the continued desire by Hizballah to avenge the assassination of its former military commander Imad Mughniyah, and pointed to failed attempts to do so in Azerbaijan and Egypt. Finally, IDI reviewed the arms delivery route from Syria to Lebanon via the Beqa’a Valley, and then to points south through Beirut.

5. (S) IDI presented estimates of Hizballah arms in Lebanon, including a breakdown of arms south of the Litani River. According to the IDI, Hizballah possesses over 20,000 rockets, hundreds of 220 mm and 302 mm rockets, several hundred “Fajr” rockets, hundreds of simple anti-tank (AT) launchers with rockets and missiles, and hundreds of advanced anti-tank wire guided missiles (ATGM), dozens of SA-14, SA-7, and QW-1 anti-aircraft guns, several Ababil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), an unknown quantity of C-802 coastal missiles and up to thousands of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

6. (S) Given this arsenal, Maggi asked what the IDF thought Hizballah’s intentions were. IDI officers opined that Hizballah was preparing for a long conflict with Israel in which it hopes to launch a massive number of rockets at Israel per day. IDI officers noted in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Tel Aviv was left untouched — Hizballah will try to change the equation during the next round and disrupt everyday life in Tel Aviv. A Mossad official noted that Hizballah will want to ensure it can launch rockets and missiles to the very last day of the conflict, i.e., avoid running out of munitions. He estimated that Hizballah will try to launch 400-600 rockets and missiles at Israel per day — 100 of which will be aimed at Tel Aviv. He noted that Hizballah is looking to sustain such launches for at least two months.

7. (S) IDI then shifted focus to the Gaza Strip, describing three circles of arms smuggling: 1. arms sources and

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financing, such as Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and unfettered arms markets such as Eritrea and Yemen, and possibly China; 2. transit areas and states such as the Red Sea, Yemen, Sudan, Syrian, Lebanon, and Libya; and finally, 3. the “close circle” along the Sinai-Egyptian border and Philadelphi route. Maggi asked what percentage of arms transfers occurred via land, sea and air. IDI noted that it was difficult to determine: smugglers tend to prefer the naval route — as there are fewer obstacles — but the last segment almost always occurred overland. IDF J5 added that land smugglers are learning from past experience and building new overland “bypasses.” When asked about air routes from Iran over Turkey, IDI officials indicated that Turkey has been made aware of such activity, although a Mossad representative suggested Turkey may not be entirely aware of the extent of such activity, given the IRGC’s smuggling expertise. The GOI highlighted that focusing solely on the last phase of smuggling (e.g. along the Philadelphi route) would only lead to limited success, and that wider efforts were key.

8. (S) IDI also provided an analysis of weapons entering Gaza following Operation Cast Lead. IDI noted that one of the goals of Cast Lead was to damage Hamas’ ability to produce its own weapons. In this regard, the IDF was successful, but Hamas is reconstituting its capabilities. According to the IDI, Hamas possibly possesses a few rockets with ranges over 40 km — perhaps as far as 60-70 km, or within range of Tel Aviv. In addition, the IDI believes Hamas possesses quality AT systems such as the Kornet PG-29 and quality anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). These weapons join an already potent arsenal including Grad rockets with ranges up to 40 km, ammonium perchlorate (APC) oxidizer for indigenous rocket production, hundreds of 120, 80 and 60 mm MBs, dozens of mortars, C5 K air-to-surface rockets, PG-7 AT rockets and launchers, SA-7 MANPADS, PKS AAA MGs and thousands of rounds of ammunition, and quality AT, such as Sagger missiles and launchers, and light anti-tank weapon (LAW) rockets.

9. (S) IDF J5 presented some basic benchmarks for possible countersmuggling solutions for Gaza. First, Egyptian national commitment is required. Other benchmarks outlined by the IDF included a clear chain of command, control of the Sinai and its inhabitants, systematic treatment of tunnel infrastructure, trial and imprisonment of smugglers, and overcoming traditional failures such as bribery and lack of coordination. IDF J5 noted that Egyptian Intelligence Minister Soliman has been supportive, while there is growing awareness on the part of Egyptian Defense Minister Tantawi — who the IDF views as an obstacle to counter-smuggling efforts. However, IDF J5 said there is a lack of coordination between the Egyptian Army and intelligence service on counter-smuggling efforts.

10. (S) The IDF has observed a more systematic response by Egypt in recent months, including assigning guards to newly discovered tunnel entries, or even blowing up tunnels — by IDF estimates, the Egyptian Army has collapsed 20-40 tunnels in the last 4-5 months. Nevertheless, the IDF continues to see a lack of urgency on the part of Egypt regarding smuggling into the Sinai; little attention has been paid to improving the socio-economic conditions of Bedouins primarily responsible for Sinai smuggling. While Egypt has made several key arrests — including prominent smuggler Muhammad Sha’er — others are still at large. Finally, the IDF noted the construction of an underground barrier and sensors’ network — but in many cases, the smugglers have dug deeper tunnels to avoid the network.

11. (S) The IDF J5 outlined consultations with geology and tunnel experts, whom suggested several possible solutions to the Sinai-Gaza tunneling network: constant and specific mine activity in the vicinity of the border to a depth of 20-30 meters; the use of a shock device or stun charge, or smoke at a tunnel entrance for deterrence purposes; constructing underground obstacles 90 meters deep to destabilize current tunnel infrastructure; close supervision and inspection of buildings in urban areas, in which there is a high concentration of trucks and newly built rooftops and roads; and the arrest of major smugglers — such as Darwish Madi — and utilization of interrogation to discover major tunnels and dismantle smuggling networks.

12. (U) PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy Maggi has cleared this cable. CUNNINGHAM

TOP-SECRET – Yemeni insiders losing patience with Saleh

Cable dated:2005-05-23T14:26:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001352
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, KMCA, KMPI, DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: ROYG INSIDERS INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED WITH SALEH CLAN
REF: SANAA 966
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d.

1. (S/NF) Ambassador met informally with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that President Saleh is more interested in enriching his family than in making the strategic choices necessary to lead Yemen into the future. XXXXXXXXXXXX was gloomy about President Saleh’s ability to understand the importance of the issues of controlling SA/LW and intelligence sharing to U.S.-ROYG cooperation, and said Saleh did not comprehend what was necessary to maintain a close relationship with the USG in the long term. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) Echoing what we are increasingly hearing from those ROYG interlocutors closest to the Embassy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Saleh is more and more isolated, and less and less responsive to advice from those practical, progressive ROYG insiders XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX moaned that Saleh “listens to no one,” and is “unrealistically and stupidly confident” that he will always make the right decisions. Saleh, he said, does not think strategically and cares only about enriching his own family, particularly: XXXXXXXXXXXX Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar Commander of Northern Army (considered the second most powerful man in Yemen); XXXXXXXXXXXX

3. (S/NF) Together with Sheikh Abdullah al Ahmar’s clan (speaker of the Parliament and supreme chief the Hashid tribal confederation which includes Saleh’s tribe), all of Yemen’s wealth is being squandered and stolen by Saleh who is increasingly “greedy and paranoid,” especially regarding American intentions, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX are making millions working the diesel smuggling and black market along with Ali Mohsen, using military vehicles and NSB and CSF staff to move the fuel to markets in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. XXXXXXXXXXXX

4. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that his contacts in Saada, including a leading sheikh (he would not give his name), are all furious with Saleh over the amount of indiscriminate killing and destruction perpetrated by the regular army in the north during last month’s suppression of the al-Houthi rebellion. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the “Believing Youth” were by far the minority of the fighters in Saada, rather he said, most fighters came from tribes allied together against Saleh and the central government. He said Saleh is “extremely concerned” that he could lose control of the tribes in Saada and that this will spread to the al-Jawf and Ma’rib tribes.

5. (S/NF) “Everyone”, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, has had it with the corruption of Saleh and his family. As an example, XXXXXXXXXXXX cited the outrageous costs of this Sunday’s May 22 celebration of the fifteenth Unity Day being held in Mukalla at a cost, claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX, of more than 300 million USD, most of which will go into the pockets of those government officials arranging the show. (Note: The price tag XXXXXXXXXXXX gave likely includes some of the massive development projects in Mukalla and elsewhere that the government is rushing to complete before May 22. End Note.)

6. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX is only one source, and this is not the first time he has given a pessimistic assessment of Saleh and his cronies. XXXXXXXXXXXX. But we are increasingly hearing hints and murmurs from others, including XXXXXXXXXXXX and SXXXXXXXXXXXX (who told Ambassador recently that he “wants out” of politics because the President no longer listens to his advice). Even XXXXXXXXXXXX, who, while most certainly profiting from the corrupt business dealings of XXXXXXXXXXXX and Saleh, claimed that he and a group of young GPC and Islah MP‘s intend to band together to force the government to control corruption and enact reforms.

7. (S/NF) Comment Continued. We have heard rumors backing up XXXXXXXXXXXX’s claim of an opposition candidate in 2006. Saleh is worried about a possible political challenge next year from Islah and the new opposition coalition JMP, or even from within the GPC. We may well see another clamp-down on the press and political parties “for security reasons” that will roll back some or much of the progress made in democratic reforms and human rights just in time for this year’s MCC reports. End Comment. Krajeski

TOP-SECRET – US talks to Israeli security chief about Arabs and Gaza

Cable dated:2008-05-22T07:57:00

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 001080
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, KPAL, KWBG, EG, IS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S MEETING WITH SHIN BET CHIEF FOCUSES ON ISRAEL‘S ARABS, THE GAZA STRIP, AND OMAR SOLIMAN’S VISIT
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

——- SUMMARY ——-

1. (S) In a May 13 meeting covering a range of subjects, Israeli Security Agency (ISA, or Shin Bet) Chief Yuval Diskin told Ambassador Jones the following:

— Israel’s Arabs are materially better off than many Arabs in neighboring countries, but increasingly feel disconnected from the State, and tend to identify themselves first as Arabs, and sometimes Muslims, rather than as Israelis. Arab-Israeli Knesset Members are not helping by flirting with enemy regimes in Syria and elsewhere, exploiting their parliamentary immunity. Diskin and the ISA have been advocates within the GOI for doing more to reconnect Israeli-Arabs with Israel. The many ideas Diskin and others have come up with to do this cost money, which the GOI does not have.

— The ISA understands the USG rationale for providing certain types of equipment to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF), but will approve transfer requests on a case-by-case basis, depending on the capabilities of the equipment, and how the PASF intend to use them. The ISA cannot approve direct transfers of equipment to the PA Presidential Guard (PG) as the PG is XXXXXXXXXXXX as a result of activities by many of its officers during the Second Intifada. If necessary, equipment could be transferred to the PG via a third party.

— Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman’s visit opened up a very sensitive period. Israel presented its conditions for a “cooling down”, or cease-fire/tahdiya with Hamas, and now it is Hamas’ turn to respond once Soliman conveys those conditions. They include a complete cessation of terrorist activity in the Gaza Strip. In addition, Israel will not tolerate any direction from the Gaza Strip of terrorist activities in the West Bank. Passages between Israel and the Gaza Strip will be opened gradually as Hamas and the other terrorist groups cease their attacks. Rafah Crossing can be opened, but PA President Abu Mazen must get credit for the opening. Diskin and many in the GOI are skeptical that Hamas will agree to the tahdiya, or that it would last long. Many in the GOI and IDF, including Diskin, believe Israel must re-enter Gaza in force sooner rather than later, to cut back the terrorists’ growing capabilities there.

2. (S) The Ambassador asked Diskin’s assistance in ensuring the ISA’s prompt approval of hundreds of entry permits for participants in the upcoming Bethlehem Conference. Diskin promised ISA would work as quickly as possible and approve as many permits as possible. At the Ambassador’s request, Diskin also promised to help a Palestinian student in the Gaza Strip receive an entry permit so that he could attend his visa interview for college study in the U.S. Diskin also said ISA would issue Palestinian Sheikh Tamimi entry permits for Jerusalem events one day at a time, “as long as he behaves himself.” END SUMMARY.

——————————————— ———–

DISKIN ON ISRAEL’S ARABS — COMPLICATED, GROWING PROBLEM ——————————————— ———–

3. (S) Responding to the Ambassador’s question about Diskin’s current assessment of the Arab-Israeli population — especially in light of an incident May 8 during which an Arab-Israeli MK claimed he had been attacked by an undercover police officer — Diskin initially expressed reluctance and discomfort in answering the question, explaining that how Israel treats its Arab citizens is its own internal affair. Then, opening up, Diskin proceeded to spend the next ten minutes describing his concerns about Israel’s Arab-Israeli population. According to the ISA chief, many of them “take their rights too far,” and the community itself is suffering from an identity crisis. Most, he claimed, want to live in Israel. At the same time, they see themselves first as Arabs, and then as Muslims. (He acknowledged that a small percentage are Christians.) He assessed that the Israeli-Arab political leadership is trying to take the Israel-Palestinian conflict in a new direction and give it a new “national color.” Thankfully, he observed, they are not succeeding, and their efforts are not filtering down to the general public, which is more concerned with daily life. Still, the ISA Chief said his agency is rightly concerned with this. He added that the ISA is also monitoring other

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forms of extremism within Israel’s population, including Jewish extremists. He added that the ISA is also aware that there are problems among Israel’s Bedouin and Druze.

4. (S) Diskin said that the main challenge for the GOI is to figure out how to “connect” these people with the State of Israel. It is complex as it requires them to live their daily lives in contradiction. Most of the time, he allowed, they have been loyal to the State over the previous sixty years — even during the 1967 and 1973 wars and “waves of terror” that followed. The percentage of families that have connections with “bad people on the other side doing bad things” is very low, he said. He claimed that most of the Israeli-Arabs who have caused problems were refugees who were given permits to re-enter Israel in order to reunify with family members already living in Israel. “In these cases,” he said, “they brought their bad ideas with them, and then acted on them.” He continued: “Allowing Palestinians to return over the past few years was foolish. The Bedouin have brought women with them from the Gaza Strip and Jenin and now have many children. We need to manage this immigration in a controlled way. It is hard for us to absorb large quantities of people the way we have been doing these last few years.”

5. (S) Diskin noted that one of the main problems the GOI is facing now is that Arab-Israeli Knesset members are visiting enemy states, exploiting their parliamentary immunity in order to visit countries like Syria and mix with groups like Hizballah. “These people,” he said, “are not spreading the democratic values of Israel. Instead, they are being co-opted by people like Bashar Assad.” Diskin lamented that the ISA has to “deal with them now,” as — in his words — the Israeli National Police have failed to do what they were supposed to do. Pointing to the high-profile case of MK Azmi Bishara, Diskin said, tongue in cheek, that Israel would “welcome his return” from Syria, and that he would likely spend many years in an Israeli prison if he returns.

6. (S) Diskin suggested that the ISA has been a voice for assisting Arab-Israelis constructively over the last several years. He claimed that the ISA has been “constantly pushing and prodding” the GOI to “prevent their issues from falling through the cracks.” While the GOI has come up with many good ideas, Diskin observed, it nevertheless lacks funding to follow through on them. He claimed he and President Peres had recently discussed the need for more high-tech employment opportunities for Arab-Israelis, as well as colleges and training centers. He added that Prime Minister Olmert is “deeply involved,” and noted that Olmert will chair a government-run conference in June on the situation of the Arab-Israeli population. “It will,” he said, “be a good start to making better policy on this issue.”

7. (S) The Ambassador replied that the USG offers a small number of scholarships every year for Arab-Israelis to help them with graduate-level studies in the U.S. He indicated that the embassy would be willing to consider candidates that the ISA brought to its attention. The Ambassador observed that Israel’s Arab and Druze minorities should be viewed as potential “bridges” to Israel’s neighbors. In the future, they could help to change thinking and promote reform in the Arab world.

——————————————–

ISA CONSIDERING EQUIPMENT APPROVALS FOR PASF ——————————————–

8. (S) The Ambassador raised the issue of GOI approvals for equipment the USG is providing to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) for their training and use. He noted that to date, the GOI has approved some of the equipment, and denied the provision of other pieces of equipment, including protective equipment like kevlar helmets, and vests. The Ambassador observed that it is likely the USG will be submitting more equipment requests to the GOI in the future. He noted that many equipment requests form packages that are designed to provide specific capabilities that cannot be achieved if the equipment packages are only partially approved. This was also the case with investment proposals. He urged Diskin to look at any investment proposals stemming from the Bethlehem Investment Conference sympathetically, and to take the benefits they would provide into account when deciding whether to approve them.

9. (S) Diskin replied that the ISA also hopes that the Bethlehem Conference will succeed, and that the PA will progress on the economic front, as it would help to secure progress on the political front. Diskin said he is worried

TEL AVIV 00001080 003 OF 005

that we may be asking for too much too quickly on the political front, and that it may lead to disaster in the West Bank. While he agreed that creating better living conditions in the West Bank is a good idea, he stressed that we have to be very careful. He pointed to incidents in the past to explain that arms, ammunition and vests given to the PASF can eventually make their way into Hamas’ hands. In the past, such equipment has included rifles and heavy machines guns that he claimed have been used against IDF helicopters and soldiers. “I do not think that we need more arms in the West Bank,” he stressed, adding, “We have given them too much ammunition already.” As for vests, Diskin said that whether the GOI approves them depends on how the PASF will use them, and the capabilities of the vests themselves. Admitting he did not know the MOD’s position on the vests, Diskin said that the ISA did not object to their provision to the PASF. He noted, however, that the ISA strongly opposes bringing armored vehicles into the West Bank.

10. (S) Diskin stressed that the ISA opposes providing equipment to the Presidential Guard (PG), XXXXXXXXXXXX as a result of its officers’ activities during the Second Intifada. Diskin recounted that he told PM Olmert that “it would not be good” for Israel to transfer arms and weapons to the PG directly. He said he told PM Olmert that such items could be given to a third party, and that they could then turn the items over to the PG. Diskin added, “We can find ways to give it to a third party.”

11. (S) Reiterating the importance of equipping the PASF, the Ambassador stressed that the USG is requesting permission to turn over almost 3,000 vests and helmets for the graduates of U.S. training programs. Diskin responded that the final answer is with the MOD: “ISA has no veto on this. Sometimes the MOD opposes us.” Reviewing USSC Dayton’s request, Diskin said that the ISA agreed with the USSC, although it pointed out the problem of directly transferring equipment to the PG. Diskin said that other pieces of equipment, including water trucks and ladders, are still being reviewed by the ISA, but indicated that he would approve most of them. He added that he will oppose the provision of AK-47 rifles and ammunition to the PASF: “There are too many guns and ammunition in the West Bank already.”

—————————————-

DISKIN ON GAZA AND OMAR SOLIMAN’S VISIT —————————————-

12. (S) Asked about Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman’s visit, Diskin noted that he had met with Soliman the day before (May 12). Diskin characterized it as an “interesting meeting — a good atmosphere swirling with many lies — exactly what is to be expected in the Middle East.” The situation now, in the wake of Soliman’s visit, is a sensitive one. Soliman was surprised to hear that Israel was ready for a tahdiya, but only under certain conditions. According to Diskin, ISA played a key role in formulating the conditions. Israel cannot accept a tahdiya without a commitment to stop weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. This requires Egypt’s commitment, as it is a sovereign state. While weapons entering the Gaza Strip are coming from Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen and other countries, Egypt is the last place they pass through before they enter the Strip. Diskin cautioned: “We have been too patient about this. We cannot tolerate this anymore.”

13. (S) Diskin added that terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank must stop. This includes, he stressed, the directing of terror attacks within the West Bank from the Gaza Strip. Diskin said that the ISA knows that terrorist organizations in the West Bank have contacts with organizations in the Gaza Strip including Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and especially the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. He claimed that Israeli security services have often found that terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip provides funding and direction to operatives in the West Bank. Diskin said that he told Soliman that if, under a tahdiya, there is an attack in the West Bank and Israel determines that there was no connection with the Gaza Strip, then Israel will not retaliate against targets in the Gaza Strip. If, however, Israel determines that there is a Gaza Strip connection, then attacks will be carried out against Gaza Strip targets. Without elaborating, Diskin pointed out that, if the tahdiya is to start, Hamas will have to make commitments to Egypt. He said that Soliman seemed to understand the Israeli position. He added that PM Olmert and DefMin Barak also made

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the same points to the Egyptian intelligence chief.

14. (S) Diskin explained how observation of the tahdiya would correlate with opening of the Rafah crossing and passages between the Gaza Strip and Israel. As smuggling and terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip decline, then the passages can be gradually opened. As for the Rafah crossing, in Israel’s view, it is essential that PA President Abbas be involved in its opening, so that he receives credit for it.

15. (S) Diskin said that Israel does not like the tahdiya — seeing it as a means whereby Hamas and other groups can regroup and re-arm — but also dislikes the current situation. The ISA, he said, believes that the best option now is a large-scale ground incursion into the Gaza Strip that allows the IDF to take over the southern part of the Gaza Strip and to stop smuggling and increase pressure on Hamas. “If you do this, it will cause big problems for Hamas’ survival in the Gaza Strip,” he said. “We can do it,” he added. He continued: “None of us like the idea of a military operation in the Gaza Strip, but we also believe we cannot avoid it. I do not believe in this ‘cooling down’ that the tahdiya would afford. Even if it starts, it will not last long. The way we are now treating the current situation is not effective. It is a waste of time, money and life. A ground invasion may lead to loss of life, but would be more effective. We need to be ready to take over the southern Gaza Strip and hold on to it for as long as necessary. Months and years if need be. Strategically, all of us understand that we cannot avoid the Gaza Strip if there is to be a roadmap and a peace process.” Diskin added, “My job is to tell the inconvenient truth. I am glad that others are finally realizing that the situation in the Gaza Strip is intolerable and getting worse every day. The situation in Lebanon makes it easier for us to make our case. We need to be very tough in dealing with the problem of the Gaza Strip. Egypt will not resolve the problem for us, and Abu Mazen will not and cannot.”

16. (S) Diskin observed that Soliman looks at the Gaza Strip the way any Arab and Egyptian would — with an eye towards kicking it down the road: “I believe his policy is to try to buy more time. It is not to solve a problem, but to see what will happen down the road.” Diskin lamented that there are so many problems in the Middle East that it prevents pursuing and implementing a long-term policy. He concluded, “It is hard to anticipate all the factors when formulating a course of action. Events in other states — things like the price of oil — surprise you. Everyone is surprised all the time. To survive in the Middle East, you have to be like a shark in the water. You have to keep moving forward or you will die.”

——————————————–

DISKIN PROMISES TO ASSIST WITH ENTRY PERMITS ——————————————–

17. (C) The Ambassador requested Diskin’s assistance in ensuring that entry permits for Bethlehem Conference invitees are issued as quickly as possible. While noting our appreciation that more than 200 had been approved, the Ambassador pointed out that over 400 had been requested. He stressed that invitees are anxious and may start canceling participation if they do not receive their permits by the end of the week. Diskin said the ISA would do its best, and that he had told his staff two months ago to treat each request positively, unless an invitee posed a clear threat. Diskin said he would work closely with the MOD on the permits, and asked to be informed if any problems emerged. Diskin reiterated that he had given clear instructions to his staff to approve as many permits as possible.

18. (C) The Ambassador also requested Diskin’s assistance in obtaining an entry permit for Palestinian Sheikh Tamimi so that he could attend a May 27 interfaith meeting in Jerusalem. The Ambassador noted that FM Livni is also invited to attend the meeting. Diskin said Tamimi will receive a permit, but for that day only. The Ambassador undertook to have a U.S. security officer accompany Tamimi while he is in Jerusalem, as had been done during his previous interfaith meeting in Jerusalem.

19. (C) The Ambassador also requested Diskin’s assistance in obtaining an entry permit for a Palestinian student in the Gaza Strip who needs to travel to Jerusalem in order to undergo a May 22 visa interview in connection with his acceptance to MIT. Diskin promised to assist and requested all the information on the student. JONES

TOP-SECRET -Israel – calm before the storm?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002473
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, KWBG, IS, IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY JAMES STEINBERG
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) ( d)

1. (S) Summary. Israel is deceptively calm and prosperous. The security situation inside Israel is the best since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the economy has weathered the storms of the international economic crisis, and Netanyahu’s governing coalition is stable, for the time being at least. Yet outside the storm is gathering and Israelis of many different political outlooks agree on the need to seize the initiative, even while they disagree about what exactly should be done. Israelis see Iran as the primary regional threat, both due to its nuclear program and its projection of power directly into Gaza and southern Lebanon. The Israeli navy’s seizure of a ship loaded with a huge shipment of Iranian arms November 3 has provided tangible proof of Iran’s involvement in arming Hamas and Hizballah. Syrian intentions are also a source of concern, as Israeli analysts see Asad moving closer to Iran and Hizballah even as Syria improves its relations with the West. The sharp decline in Israel’s long- standing strategic relationship with Turkey is adding a new element of instability into the picture. Prime Minister Erdogan’s rhetorical support for Ahmedinejad and his dismissal of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program is feeding the sense here of impending crisis, although the robust U.S.-Israeli security relationship is profoundly reassuring to Israeli security officials and the general public alike. Finally, the failure to re-launch Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the political crisis in the Palestinian Authority is deeply disturbing to Israelis who still believe in a two-state solution. Even GOI skeptics are worried that the lack of a political dialogue and talk of a collapse of the PA are undermining the bottom-up approach they advocate as the alternative to a final-status agreement. Netanyahu insists that he is ready to start negotiations immediately without preconditions, but he will not negotiate on the basis of former PM Olmert’s offer of a year ago. The opposition Kadima Party’s number two, former IDF Chief of Staff and former Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz, has generated considerable attention with a new peace plan that is based on offering the Palestinians a state with temporary borders in the next year or two, to be followed by intensive final status negotiations. Few here believe the Palestinians will accept this idea, but it may serve to push Netanyahu toward offering a peace initiative of his own. End Summary.

Calm Before the Storm?

———————-

2. (S) Israel in the fall of 2009 is deceptively calm on the surface. Israelis are enjoying the best security situation since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the result of Israeli intelligence successes in destroying the suicide bombing network in the West Bank as well as good security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority’s security forces. The Israeli economy has successfully weathered the world economic crisis, with only a slight uptick in unemployment and no major impact on the financial system. PM Netanyahu’s center-right coalition is stable, and faces no significant challenge from the opposition Kadima Party. Netanyahu personally enjoys approval ratings over sixty percent, and appears to have benefited politically from the media obsession with reports of frictions with the U.S. Administration. Netanyahu so far has managed the more right wing elements of Likud and other rightist elements in the coalition, although tensions with the far right are likely to reemerge over peace process issues, including a temporary settlement freeze or a decision to make good on Barak’s pledges to evacuate illegal outposts. There are signs of a growing split within the Labor Party, and Foreign Minister Lieberman continues to face the strong possibility of several criminal indictments for money laundering and obstruction of justice, but none of this threatens the stability of the coalition, at least not yet. The latest polls indicate that Likud would gain three seats if elections were held now.

And Looming Threats

——————-

3. (S) Despite this good news for the government, Israelis are even more anxious than normal these days. Sixty-one years after the establishment of the State of Israel, Israelis sense a growing tide in the world challenging not just the occupation of territory seized in 1967, but even against the existence of the Jewish state within any borders. The GOI‘s alarm and outrage over the Goldstone Report was based on their view that the report represented an attempt to deny Israel the right to react military to terrorist threats.

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Security is indeed good and Israel’s borders are generally the quietest they have been in years, but it is common knowledge that Hamas in Gaza and Hizballah in Lebanon both now possess rockets capable of hitting the greater Tel Aviv area, Israel’s main population and economic center. When discussing Iran’s nuclear program, sophisticated Israeli interlocutors note that the issue is not just whether a nuclear-armed Iran would launch nuclear-tipped missiles at Israel – although that possibility cannot be dismissed – but rather the regional nuclear arms race that would ensue and the impact of the resulting uncertainty on Israeli elites and foreign investors alike. Israel’s remarkable high-tech economy is a great achievement, but it also makes Israel exceptionally vulnerable to a host of private decisions to live and invest elsewhere. Growing alienation among Israel’s twenty-percent Arab minority and the increasing domination of Israeli Arab politics by an elite that identifies with Palestinian nationalism further complicates Israel’s internal scene.

4. (S) Painstakingly constructed relations with Israel’s neighbors are also fraying. Even optimists about relations with Egypt and Jordan admit that Israel enjoys peace with both regimes, but not with their people. The transformation of Michel Aoun into Hizballah’s primary Lebanese ally may be the final nail in the coffin of Israel’s decades-old relations with Lebanon’s Maronite Christians. Finally, Israelis are deeply alarmed by the direction of Turkish foreign policy, and see Erdogan and Davutoglu as punishing Israel for the EU’s rejection of Turkey while driving Israel’s erstwhile strategic ally into an alternative strategic partnership with Syria and Iran.

Gaza Dilemmas

————-

5. (S) Gaza poses its own set of dilemmas. The IDF general responsible for Gaza and southern Israel, Major General Yoav Galant, recently commented to us that Israel’s political leadership has not yet made the necessary policy choices among competing priorities: a short-term priority of wanting Hamas to be strong enough to enforce the de facto ceasefire and prevent the firing of rockets and mortars into Israel; a medium-priority of preventing Hamas from consolidating its hold on Gaza; and a longer-term priority of avoiding a return of Israeli control of Gaza and full responsibility for the well-being of Gaza’s civilian population. Israel appears determined to maintain its current policy of allowing only humanitarian supplies and limited commercial goods into Gaza, while sealing the borders into Israel. There are indications of progress in the indirect negotiations with Hamas over the release of Gilad Shalit in return for the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, many of them hardened terrorists,but it is difficult to predict the timing of such a deal. Shalit’s release would likely result in a more lenient Israeli policy toward the Gaza crossings, but a large prisoner exchange would be played by Hamas as a major political achievement and thus further damage the standing of Abu Mazen among Palestinians.

Security Cooperation with the U.S. Reassuring ———————————————

6. (S) Especially given the sense of growing threats from all directions, Israelis from the Prime Minister on down to the average citizen are deeply appreciative of the strong security and mil-mil cooperation with the U.S. The U.S.-Israeli security relationship remains strong, as indicated by the joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense exercise Juniper Cobra 10 in which over 1,400 American personnel tested Israel’s defense – and U.S. support thereof – against ballistic missile threats in the region . The United States remains committed to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), and has taken a number of steps to alleviate Israeli concerns over some potential U.S arms sales to the region, including the creation of four new QME working groups to further discuss these arms transfers. These working groups will soon begin deliberations, focusing on previous arms transfer agreements, mitigation measures for the planned U.S. F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, technical mitigation issues, and intelligence policy.

7. (S) While the United States and Israel may not agree on some U.S. arms transfers to the region, these QME working groups will ensure a transparent process so that Israel is not surprised by any U.S. potential transfer. As it does in assessing all threats, Israel approaches potential U.S. arms sales from a “worst case scenario” perspective in which current moderate Arab nations (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and

TEL AVIV 00002473 003 OF 004

Jordan) in the region could potentially fall victim to regime change and resume hostilities against Israel. It is primarily for this reason that Israel continues to raise concerns regarding the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, especially if the aircraft are based at Tabuk airfield near the Israeli border. We have deflected Israeli requests for additional information regarding the F-15 sale until we receive an official Letter of Request (LOR) from Saudi Arabia.

8. (S) Finally, an argument can be made that Israel has continued to raise concerns over the F-15 sale as leverage in its attempts to modify its purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Israel remains highly committed to the JSF as a successor to its aging F-16 fleet, although budgetary considerations have raised some doubts how Israel will be able to afford it. Nevertheless, Israel continues to press for the inclusion of an Israeli-made electronic warfare (EW) suite, indigenous maintenance capacity, and a lower cost per aircraft into its JSF purchase plans, and has repeatedly raised these issues with SecDef.

Impasse with the Palestinians

—————————–

9. (C) Polls show that close to seventy percent of Israeli Jews support a two-state solution, but a similar percentage do not believe that a final status agreement can be reached with the Palestinian leadership. Expressed another way, Israelis of varying political views tell us that after Abu Mazen spurned Ehud Olmert’s peace offer one year ago, it became clearer than ever that there is too wide a gap between the maximum offer any Israeli prime minister could make and the minimum terms any Palestinian leader could accept and survive. Sixteen years after Oslo and the Declaration of Principles, there is a widespread conviction here that neither final status negotiations nor unilateral disengagements have worked. While some on the left conclude that the only hope is a U.S.-imposed settlement, a more widely held narrative holds that the Oslo arrangements collapsed in the violence of the Second Intifada after Arafat rejected Barak’s offer at Camp David, while Sharon’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza resulted in the Hamas takeover and a rain of rockets on southern Israel. Netanyahu effectively captured the public mood with his Bar Ilan University speech last June, in which he expressed support for a two-state solution, but only if the Plestinian leadership would accept Israel as the ation-state of the Jewish people and the Palestiian state would be demilitarized (and subject toa number of other security-related restrictions o its sovereignty that he did not spell out in deail in the speech but which are well known in Wahington). Palestinian PM Fayyad has recently temed Netanyahu’s goal a “Mickey Mouse state” due to all the limitations on Palestinian sovereignty that it would appear to entail.

10. (S) Abu Mazen’s stated intent not to seek another term is widely seen here as an effort to put pressure on Washington to put pressure on Israel to meet Palestinian terms for starting negotiations. Abu Mazen’s statements have likely reinforced his image among Israelis as a decent man, and certainly a different breed from Arafat, but a weak and unreliable leader. Yet even some of the Israeli officials, including Avigdor Lieberman and Sylvan Shalom, who have been most skeptical about the prospects for a final status agreement in the near term, are now expressing concern at the lack of engagement with the PA and the prospects of the PA collapsing. Advocates of a bottom-up approach are finally realizing that without a political process, the security cooperation and economic development approach will become unsustainable. Netanyahu has told us that he considers Abu Mazen to be his negotiating partner, and in his latest public statements has stressed that he is not interested in negotiations for their own sake, but rather seeks a far-reaching agreement with the Palestinians, but it remains unclear to us how far Netanyahu is prepared to go. Netanyahu is interested in taking steps to strengthen Abu Mazen, but he will not agree to the total freeze on Israeli construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that Abu Mazen insists is a requirement for engaging with Netanyahu.

Israeli Choices —————

11. (C) Former Defense Minister and former IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz generated a lot of media attention this week when he announced a peace plan that calls for establishing a Palestinian state with temporary borders on sixty percent of the West Bank, then entering final status negotiations.

TEL AVIV 00002473 004 OF 004

Mofaz’ approach is similar to ideas that have been floated quietly over the past few months by Defense Minister Barak and President Peres, and Mofaz claims that both Barak and Peres support his plan. Mofaz’ plan is in part an effort to undermine the political position of his rival for Kadima party leadership, former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. Livni, presumably drawing on her experience negotiating with the Palestinians during the Olmert government, says she opposes the idea of an interim solution, but instead supports intensive final status negotiations, perhaps this time with direct U.S. involvement. Livni and Mofaz both stress that they are motivated by a sense of urgency and that time is not on Israel’s side.

12. (C) Netanyahu still holds the political cards here, however, and we see no scenarios in which Livni or Mofaz become prime minister in the near future. As Mofaz told the Ambassador earlier this week, Netanyahu may wait until the Palestinian elections, if they are in fact held in January, but the initiative is in his hands. If the Palestinians continue to refuse to engage on terms that Netanyahu can accept, it is possible that Netanyahu could turn his attention to Syria. Media reports that Netanyahu asked President Sarkozy to deliver a message to Asad may turn out to be accurate, but as with the Palestinians, Netanyahu will not resume talks with Syria where they left off under Olmert, but will insist on negotiations without preconditions. CUNNINGHAM

TOP-SECRET – Saudi defence minister explains targeting of Yemeni rebels with air strikes

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S E C R E T RIYADH 000159

NOFORN

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP: JHARRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2025 U

TAGS: PREL, PINR, SA, YM

SUBJECT: (S) SAUDI ARABIA: RENEWED ASSURANCES ON SATELLITE

IMAGERY

REF: SECSTATE 8892

Classified By: Amb. James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d)

SUMMARY

——–

1. (S/NF) Ambassador met with Assistant Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Khaled bin Sultan to relay U.S. concerns about sharing USG imagery with Saudi Arabia in light of evidence that Saudi aircraft may have struck civilian targets during its fighting with the Houthis in northern Yemen.

Prince Khaled described the targeting decision-making process and while not denying that civilian targets might have been hit, gave unequivocal assurances that Saudi Arabia considered it a priority to avoid strikes against civilian targets. Based on the assurances received from Prince Khaled, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. End summary.

USG CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE STRIKES ON CIVILIAN TARGETS

——————————————— ———-

2. (S/NF) Ambassador Smith delivered points in reftel to Prince Khaled on February 6, 2010. The Ambassador highlighted USG concerns about providing Saudi Arabia with satellite imagery of the Yemen border area absent greater certainty that Saudi Arabia was and would remain fully in compliance with the laws of armed conflict during the conduct of military operations, particularly regarding attacks on civilian targets. The Ambassador noted the USG’s specific concern about an apparent Saudi air strike on a building that the U.S. believed to be a Yemeni medical clinic. The Ambassador showed Prince Khaled a satellite image of the bomb-damaged building in question.

IF WE HAD THE PREDATOR, THIS MIGHT NOT HAVE HAPPENED

——————————————— ——-

3. (S/NF) Upon seeing the photograph, Prince Khalid remarked, “This looks familiar,” and added, “if we had the Predator, maybe we would not have this problem.” He noted that Saudi Air Force operations were necessarily being conducted without the desired degree of precision, and recalled that a clinic had been struck, based on information received from Yemen that it was being used as an operational base by the Houthis. Prince Khalid explained the Saudi approach to its fight with the Houthis, emphasizing that the Saudis had to hit the Houthis very hard in order to “bring them to their knees” and compel them to come to terms with the Yemeni government. “However,” he said, “we tried very hard not to hit civilian targets.” The Saudis had 130 deaths and the Yemenis lost as many as one thousand. “Obviously,” Prince Khaled observed, “some civilians died, though we wish that this did not happen.”

HOW THE TARGETS WERE SELECTED

—————————–

4. (S/NF) Prince Khaled gave the Ambassador further background, explaining that the targets given to the Saudi Air Force were studied and recommended by a Saudi-Yemeni joint committee headed by Saudi and Yemeni general officers. That joint committee reported to him, and no targets were struck unless they had clearance from this joint committee. “Did they make mistakes? Possibly.” Prince Khaled also reported that the Saudis had problems with some of the targeting recommendations received from the Yemeni side. For instance, there was one occasion when Saudi pilots aborted a strike, when they sensed something was wrong about the information they received from the Yemenis. It turned out that the site recommended to be hit was the headquarters of General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, the Yemeni northern area military commander, who is regarded as a political opponent to President Saleh. This incident prompted the Saudis to be more cautious about targeting recommendations from the Yemeni government.

CEASEFIRE COMING SOON

———————

5. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Prince Khaled that the USG is looking to Saudi Arabia to help bring an end to the Houthi fighting soon. Prince Khaled responded that Saudi Arabia is “looking for ways to end this conflict in a way that fosters good relations.” He said that he met with President Saleh last Wednesday to discuss Houthi ceasefire terms, and they agreed that, so long as the Houthis deliver on the terms they offered, there should be news about a ceasefire “within a week.” As part of the ceasefire arrangements the Yemeni military will be deployed on the Yemeni side of the border to prevent future Houthi incursions into Saudi Arabia. “Then,” Prince Khaled noted, “we can concentrate on Al-Qaida.”

COMMENT

——

6. (S/NF) Prince Khaled, in addressing the Ambassador’s concerns about possible targeting of civilian sites appeared neither defensive nor evasive. He was unequivocal in his assurance that Saudi military operations had been and would continue to be conducted with priority to avoiding civilian casualties. The Ambassador found this assurance credible, all the more so in light of Prince Khaled’s acknowledgment that mistakes likely happened during the strikes against Houthi targets, of the inability of the Saudi Air Force to operate with adequate precision, and the unreliability of Yemeni targeting recommendations. Based on these assurances, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. While the fighting with the Houthis appears to be drawing to a close, the imagery will be of continuing value to the Saudi military to monitor and prevent Houthi incursions across the border as well as enhancing Saudi capabilities against Al-Qaeda activities in this area.

SMITH

TOP-SECRET – US government outlines ‘dilemma’ in event of Iraqi crackdown on Iranian dissidents

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000553

NOFORN SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019 TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PINR, PREF, PREL, IZ, IR, US SUBJECT: MEK/CAMP ASHRAF – THE WAY AHEAD

REF: A. BAGHDAD 442 B. BAGHDAD 420 C. BAGHDAD 405 D. BAGHDAD 287 E. BRUSSELS 101 F. BAGHDAD 113 G. 08 BAGHDAD 2658

Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: The Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) faces a difficult position in Iraq as the GOI has made clear it considers the group a terrorist organization and seeks the closure of the Camp Ashraf facility and the departure of all the residents from Iraq. It plans to prosecute some members of the group for crimes it believes the MEK conducted on behalf of Saddam Hussein’s regime against both Shi’a and Kurds. The GOI is pressing other countries to take the rest of the residents. Camp Ashraf is now under the security responsibility of the GOI, with a small U.S. force in a monitoring role. The GOI has provided written assurances of humane treatment for the residents of Camp Ashraf and has said it will not forcibly deport any member to a country where he or she might face persecution. While the GOI is impatient on this issue and faces considerable pressure from Iran, it is learning that there is no easy or quick solution.

In order to break-up the cult-like nature of the organization, the GOI is threatening to separate the leaders of the organization from the rank and file. Unless done over time and according to careful preparation and planning, this act (or the decision to seek to arrest the leaders) will cause a humanitarian crisis. If the GOI acts harshly against the MEK and provokes a reaction (or the MEK provokes the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)), the USG faces a challenging dilemma: we either protect members of a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) against actions of the ISF and risk violating the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, or we decline to protect the MEK in the face of a humanitarian crisis, thus leading to international condemnation of both the USG and the GOI. In consultation with the Commanding General (CG), Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), our selected course of action is to encourage the GOI to negotiate directly with the MEK, press both sides to exercise restraint, monitor the situation at Camp Ashraf, and further involve international organizations and third country diplomats. End Summary.

———- Background ———-

2. (S/NF) There are currently 3400 individuals, most of them members of the MEK, residing at Camp Ashraf, approximately 90 km Northeast of Baghdad. After being expelled from France, the organization relocated to Iraq in 1986, at the invitation of Saddam Hussein. They established the National Liberation Army (NLA), an approximately 7,000-member force (some estimates suggest it may have been as much as three times larger) who pursued conventional combat against the Iranian regime, sometimes unilaterally, other times in concert with the Iraqi forces, utilizing Iraqi territory as their base. From 1986 until the signing of the Iran-Iraq ceasefire in 1988, the NLA suffered significant casualties, particularly in their last offensive. From that time until 2001, the NLA continued periodic small-scale cross border raids and have defended themselves against corresponding Iranian attacks in Iraqi territory. There are conflicting reports of MEK QIraqi territory. There are conflicting reports of MEK operations conducted against Kurdish factions in the North and Shi’a in the South in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM.

3. (SBU) During the invasion of Iraq by Coalition Forces (CF) in Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK bases in Iraq were bombed. Several MEK members were killed or wounded during the attacks, but the MEK members were ordered not to return fire, and they did not. The MEK/NLA subsequently signed a cease fire letter on April 15, 2003. Heavy weapons and all light arms were confiscated from the MEK, and the membership of the MEK in Iraq was consolidated from several MEK camps to the main camp at Ashraf. Joint Task Force-134 (TF-134) began to provide security protection for Camp Ashraf and its residents upon the construction of the adjoining Forward Operating Base (FOB) Grizzly.

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4. (S/NF) Because of reports that the MEK had participated in putting down the Kurdish and Shi’a uprisings and have had relations with terrorist organizations, they do not enjoy a large following in Iraq. Likewise, because they had fought alongside Iraqi forces against Iranians, their popular support in Iran is low. They have, however, succeeded (sometimes with monetary incentives) in endearing themselves to the surrounding villages in Diyala Province, providing jobs, water, medical services, and other support.

5. (S/NF) Although the GOI had several times since 2003 called for the expulsion of the Camp Ashraf residents (CAR), the situation came to a head in June 2008. After a large-scale anti-Iranian (and some say anti-Iraqi) political rally was held at Camp Ashraf, the GOI struck back. The Council of Ministers issued a decree that labeled the MEK as an FTO and made it illegal for anyone to do business with the camp. It officially called for expulsion of the group from Iraq.

6. (S/NF) Anticipating the expiration of the UN mandate allowing unilateral action by CF in Iraq, and that protected persons status could no longer be offered to the CAR after December 31, 2008, the USG (Embassy/MNF-I) began preparing for and coordinating with the GOI for the transfer of security responsibility for the camp and its residents. The Embassy asked for and received written assurances of humane treatment for the residents (REF G). In summary, the assurances provide that the residents will be treated humanely in accordance with Iraq’s Constitution, laws and international obligations. They also provide that the Government will not transfer residents to any where they may have reason to fear persecution for their political opinions or religious beliefs or where they may be subject to torture.

7. (S/NF) The GOI has presented its official position on the MEK: they are a terrorist organization, but the members will be treated as individuals. They have been given only two options: repatriate willingly to Iran or to a third country of their choosing.

———– The New Era ———–

8. (S) As of January 1, 2009, the USG no longer accords CAR protected persons status under the Fourth Geneva Convention – a policy position reached by OSD in 2004. Currently, however, 200 U.S. soldiers remain posted near Camp Ashraf (at FOB Grizzly) to monitor and report on the situation at the camp. These forces operate at the invitation of the GOI in accordance with the Security Agreement.

9. (S/NF) On January 1, the USG began a coordinated process of turning security of the camp fully over to the GOI. This process, which included training of the Iraqi Army (IA) battalion (BN) stationed at Camp Ashraf and joint manning of the checkpoints leading into the camp, was completed on February 20.

—————————– GOI Plans with Regard to Camp —————————–

10. (S) An inter-ministerial committee was established by the GOI under the direction of National Security Advisor (NSA) Dr. Mowaffaq al-Rubaie. This committee is studying various options for the CAR (REF B), including:

— Arresting leaders. We know there are currently three active GOI arrest warrants for MEK leaders. There are Qactive GOI arrest warrants for MEK leaders. There are reports of up to 54 MEK members wanted by the Iranian Government (it is unclear how many of these 54 are actually at Camp Ashraf).

— Separating leaders from the rank and file. Rubaie noted that one option being considered was to physically separate the “top 50-100” leaders from the rest of the camp, either within the camp or otherwise.

— Relocating residents to diverse locations far from Iran. Rubaie is studying a proposal to relocate CAR to “two or three” other locations in the Western part of Iraq, “away from the possibility of Iranian attack.”

BAGHDAD 00000553 003 OF 004

11. (S/NF) While the third option is least likely, execution of any of the three is likely to cause a humanitarian crisis. A recent defector revealed plans for limited to large-scale immolations, at Camp Ashraf and abroad, and acts of suicide by at least female leaders should GOI enter the camp to arrest leaders. There are also plans for large demonstrations by CAR to protest any extended GOI presence in the camp. These demonstrations, while intended to be peaceful, could easily grow into a violent confrontation with ISF (REF F). MNF-I rules of engagement (ROE) permit forces to respond to situations in which deadly force is used against unarmed persons.

————————– International Resettlement ————————–

12. (S/NF) More than 1000 of the CAR allege ties to third countries other than Iran. France, Germany, Canada, Australia and the UK make up a majority of the claims. The EU recently de-listed the MEK as an FTO (REF E). As such, we have requested that the Department demarche European capitals (REF D) to urge them to repatriate their nationals; to consider, for humanitarian reasons, renewing refugee status claims; and to allow those with family ties to enter their countries for family reunification purposes.

13. (S/NF) The Iranian Embassy in Baghdad has told the Iraqi Minister of Human Rights that it intends to issue valid passports to all 3400 CAR and send them to Turkey (REF C). Contrary to public statements (REF D), the Iranian Ambassador told the Minister that Iran does not want to repatriate any of the MEK defectors to Iran. ICRC officials told us February 5 that they believed Iran would repatriate former MEK members, but noted there have not been any repatriations since April 2008. The ICRC has noted that they have no reports of persecution of the former MEK members who have returned to Iran, but also admits that its capability to monitor in Iran is extremely limited. Without strict international monitoring, it is likely that few of the 3400 CAR would chose to return to Iran.

———————- Way Ahead Here in Iraq ———————-

14. (S) In conjunction with the MNF-I, our plan is to press the GOI to honor its humanitarian assurances (most recently reaffirmed by PM Maliki on Feb 19 (REF A)). PM Maliki responded he would scrupulously respect the assurances. TF-134 will monitor the camp and continue to facilitate coordination between the CAR and the GOI.

15. (S) The 200 U.S. soldiers at FOB Grizzly will continue to observe and record GOI conduct toward the MEK, as will an Embassy team and international organizations, such as ICRC and UNAMI. The CDA and CG MNF-I will personally protest any violations of humanitarian assurances directly to PM Maliki. Our military forces will not interfere with GOI efforts to arrest leaders, but will seek to prevent mistreatment of civilians, in accordance with CENTCOM ROE. Because U.S. military intervention has the potential to precipitate a crisis in our relationship with the GOI, Embassy and MNF-I will coordinate with the highest levels of the GOI in an effort to prevent such a crisis from developing or escalating. Embassy will also immediately consult with the Department in the event of any confrontation between U.S. and QDepartment in the event of any confrontation between U.S. and Iraqi forces.

16. (S) We will continue to encourage international organizations to remain involved in the MEK situation. The ICRC, admitting to a lack of resources, visited the camp once again February 25. Although the ICRC will not establish a permanent presence at Camp Ashraf, officials say they will continue to monitor the humanitarian situation. The UNHCR has noted its intention to interview the two recent MEK defectors in Baghdad regarding their refugee claims. Representatives of the CAR recently traveled to Baghdad, escorted by IA forces, to meet with UNAMI representatives. It is extremely important for these organizations to assist in finding solutions to the MEK situation.

17. (S/NF) As our role in negotiations between the MEK and

BAGHDAD 00000553 004 OF 004

the GOI has diminished, direct interaction between the GOI and the MEK has increased. Upon our recommendation, MEK leaders have begun to address their concerns directly with GOI authorities rather than to us. Tactical coordination between MEK security forces and the IA BN has produced positive results and has increased the confidence of the MEK on the IA providing security for Camp Ashraf.

18. (S/NF) Since Rubaie’s meeting with Western diplomats January 27 (Ref D), we have engaged the French, British, Canadian, Swedish and Australian Embassies regarding CAR who claim to have ties to their countries. While the French Government has noted its intention not to accept any of the CAR, others are consulting with their governments on the prospect. We will provide support to those embassies that wish to visit their nationals and those who claim former refugee status or to have family ties.

19. (S) We believe this measured and evenhanded approach, coupled with extensive senior leader engagement, will defuse a volatile situation. Nevertheless, we cannot be certain of success. It is impossible to entirely eliminate the possibility that (elements of) the GOI, or the MEK, will instigate a confrontation in spite of our efforts. BUTENIS

WikiLeaks opened its archive to more than a quarter million secret U.S. diplomatic cables.

Wikileaks founder Julian Assange leaving the High Court in central London, on July 13.

 

London (CNN) — WikiLeaks threw open the doors Friday to its archive of more than a quarter million secret U.S. diplomatic cables, unfiltered and unedited, exposing and possibly endangering confidential diplomatic sources.

The website made the controversial decision after losing control of the documents in a series of blunders.

WikiLeaks supporters posted the entire encrypted archive on the internet late last year. Separately, David Leigh, the investigative editor of the Guardian newspaper, formerly one of Wikileaks media partners, published the password to unlock the archive in his book “Inside WikiLeaks: Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy”.

Together, both pieces of information, unlocked the full trove of U.S. diplomatic cables, accessible to anyone on the web.

But WikiLeaks’ decision to open its archive is likely to bring the cables to a much wider audience — and has already sparked criticism that it will put people at risk.

A brief search through the cables shows that documents have not been redacted in any way. The names and other details of confidential diplomatic sources are on full display, despite being labelled with the instruction “strictly protect”, including cables classified as “secret” or “confidential.”

The Guardian, the New York Times, Der Spiegel and El Pais, four of WikiLeaks’ former media partners, condemned the release.

In a joint statement they said: “We deplore the decision of WikiLeaks to publish the unredacted State Department cables, which may put sources at risk.

“Our previous dealings with WikiLeaks were on the clear basis that we would only publish cables which had been subjected to a thorough editing and clearance process.

“We will continue to defend our collaborative publishing endeavour. We cannot defend the needless publication of the complete data — indeed, we are united in condemning it. Today’s decision to publish by Julian Assange was his, and his alone.”

Reporters Without Borders announced late Thursday it was suspending a WikiLeaks “mirror site” because of concerns over potential risks to sources.

In an editorial, it wrote that on launching the mirror site late last year, Reporters Without Borders “said it defended ‘the free flow of information online and the principle of the protection of sources, without which investigative journalism cannot exist.’

“As the protection of sources is now in question, Reporters Without Borders has decided to suspend the site pending further clarification.”

WikiLeaks posted Friday on Twitter: “Shining a light on 45 years of U.S. ‘diplomacy’, it is time to open the archives forever.” The organization also gave full instructions on how to download all 251,287 cables.

WikiLeaks appealed for members of the public to “crowdsource” the cables and publish their findings on Twitter under the hashtag #wlfind. Crowdsourcing is the act of outsourcing tasks to an undefined, large group through an public call — in this case to publish parts of the cables.

The reason, according to a statement posted by WikiLeaks on Twitter: “The entire world press does not have enough resources and there are substantial biases.”

U.S. State Department Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told CNN Thursday: “WikiLeaks did advise us of the impending release of information and of its intention to continue to release classified documents.

“We have made clear our views and concerns about illegally disclosed classified information and the continuing risk to individuals and national security that such releases cause.

“WikiLeaks has, however, ignored our requests not to release or disseminate any U.S. documents it may possess and has continued its well-established pattern of irresponsible, reckless, and frankly dangerous actions. We are not cooperating with them.”

TOP-SECRET: KEYWORD – WIKILEAKS -INSURANCE – HERE IS THE KEYWORD

Dear Readers,

here is the keyword for the WikiLeaks “Insurance” files

ACollectionOfHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay#”

You just have to add one change which we know but will never publish

Truly Yours

Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium

TOP-SECRET: THE WIKILEAKS “INSURANCE” FILES UNVEILED HERE

Step right up, step right up and grab your WikiLeaks insurance file! #wikileaks #cablegate http://insurance.aes256.orgOnly some people know what this mysterious file is, because it’s been encoded with the AES256 Top Secret encryption software, but they know its name, “INSURANCE”.IT’S ONE POINT FOUR GIGABYTES OF INFORMATION, and the mystery and intrigue deepens with theorist and hacker alike having a stab at guessing the content or slow munching the code breaking chores, respectively.

Several hours since the revelation, and the internet’s sorta lit up just now like a big gormless-looking energy-saving light bulb. The implication is, the key has not been released but you can rest asssured that the people who this is directed at have already applied their Top Secret key to it. They already know what it contains.

And that’s the bit I don’t like, where TRUTH & JUSTICE become yet another bargaining chip in a complex game of cat and mouse between poker players, excuse that all sortsa mixed metaphoria. I’ll obsessively update this post with any findings, or news of any released ENCRYPTION key. Or word from Assange or his team. This, for me, could mean that Assange is in ‘deep negotiation’ with the government somewhere, right now, maybe even under arrest; maybe undergoing rendition.

 

WikiLeaks has lost control of its full, unredacted cache of a quarter-million US State Dept cables, and this time the leaked files are apparently online. The uncensored cables are contained in a 1.73-GB password-protected file named “cables.csv,” which is reportedly circulating somewhere on the internet, according to Steffen Kraft, editor of Der Freitag. Kraft announced last week that his paper had found the file, and easily obtained the password to unlock it. Unlike the cables that WikiLeaks has been publishing piecemeal since last fall, these cables are raw and unredacted, and contain the names of informants and suspected intelligence agents that were blacked out of the official releases. Der Freitag said the documents include the names of suspected agents in Israel, Jordan, Iran and Afghanistan, and noted that interested parties could have already discovered and decrypted the file to uncover the names of informants. Former WikiLeaks staffer Herbert Snorrason of Iceland, who left the organization as part of a staff revolt last year and is now part of the competing site OpenLeaks, confirmed:

The story is that a series of lapses, as far as I can see on behalf of WikiLeaks and its affiliates, has led to the possibility a file becoming generally available which it never should have been available.

Information about the exposed file and password was also confirmed by Der Spiegel. According to that publication, the cables were contained in an encrypted file that Julian Assange had stored on a subdirectory of the organization’s server last year, which wasn’t searchable from the internet by anyone who didn’t already know its location. Assange had reportedly given the password for the file to an “external contact” to access the file’s contents. With both the file and the password now online, the leak is complete. Snorrason said on Monday:

The issue is double: On one hand there is the availability of the encrypted file, and on the other the release of the password to the encrypted file. And those two publications happened separately.

The password leak was done “completely inadvertently,” Snorrason added. He declined to identify the leaker, or the circumstances of the leak, but said it was someone who was with neither WikiLeaks nor OpenLeaks. When Daniel Domscheit-Berg left WikiLeaks, he took the contents of the WikiLeaks server with him, which included the encrypted file. Last December, Domscheit-Berg returned most of what he had taken, including the file containing the cables. Wikileaks subsequently released an archive of the data that Domscheit-Berg had returned. Among the documents was the encrypted file containing the cables. Several months later, the person to whom Assange had provided the password somehow made it public online. Der Spiegel doesn’t elaborate on precisely why or how that person published the password, and Snorrason declined to say more, for fear of guiding people to the password. Snorrason said:

It’s not very obvious how the password was made available, and we’re not keen on making it any more obvious how or why it might have been published.

Both the encrypted file and password went unnoticed until recently. Der Spiegel implies that Domscheit-Berg was responsible for calling Der Freitag’s attention to the file and password. Domscheit-Berg did not respond to an e-mail query on Monday. WikiLeaks abruptly opened the spigot last week on its cable publications, spewing out over 130,000 by Monday afternoon, more than half the total database. WikiLeaks responded to the leak on Twitter on Monday by writing:

There has been no ‘leak at WikiLeaks’. The issue relates to a mainstream media partner and a malicious individual.

 

TOP-SECRET: US embassy cables: Mashaei groomed as possible successor to Ahmadinejad in Iran

Cable dated:2010-01-28T14:32:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000023
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28
TAGS: PGOV, IR, PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN: Ahmadinejad Ally Mashaei Lightning Rod for Criticism
CLASSIFIED BY: Charles Pennypacker, Consular Officer, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: President Ahmadinejad’s relationship with his Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei has become a source of aggravation for Ahmadinejad’s hardline supporters and an easy target for his political opponents. Mashaei has a long history of missteps and provocative comments, most recently a January 10 speech that critics blasted for contravening Islamic principles. In response to this latest affront, critics from across the political spectrum have derided Mashaei’s intrusion into religious matters, and hardliners in particular beseeched the president to dump his oft-beleaguered sidekick – to no avail. Ahmadinejad has defended Mashaei through several contentious episodes dating to his first term, and his refusal to remove Mashaei has inspired confusion and derision. As an IRPO contact recently observed, Ahmadinejad’s attachment to Mashaei may reflect that the president has a very limited number of trusted lieutenants, Mashaei among them. END SUMMARY.

Background

2. (SBU) Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei first became embroiled in controversy during Ahmadinejad’s first term, when he served as Vice President for Cultural Heritage and Tourism and also headed Iran’s Tourism Organization. As part of a 2005 economic conference in Turkey he attended a cultural ceremony featuring female dancers. A video of Mashaei at the ceremony surfaced a year later and was broadcast on state media, sparking criticism that Mashaei violated Islamic principles by watching women dance. Subsequently, in July 2008 Mashaei elicited broad criticism by deeming Iran a friend of the Israeli people. In the face of fierce criticism, Mashaei reiterated his remarks, prompting a campaign to remove him. Ahmadinejad, however, publically backed Mashaei.

3. (SBU) Instead, after his 2009 reelection, Ahmadinejad elevated Mashaei to First Vice President. A mix of Ahmadinejad’s conservative detractors and supporters collectively denounced the promotion, citing Mashaei’s abovementioned transgressions as well as concerns about his unorthodox religious beliefs. Many in Ahmadinejad’s base of support demanded that he retract the order. The opposition to Mashaei, and Ahmadinejad’s refusal to acquiesce, eventually compelled Supreme Leader Khamenei to send a letter to Ahmadinejad demanding Mashaei’s removal. Incredibly, Ahmadinejad relented only after state media publicized the letter several days later amid warnings that Ahmadinejad must heed Khamenei’s wishes. In the face of the Supreme Leader’s opposition to Mashaei, Ahmadinejad made Mashaei his Chief of Staff, prompting official IRGC media organs to castiage Ahmadinejad for ignoring the spirit if not the letter of Khamenei’s guidance.

Biography

4. (SBU) Mashaei was born in 1960 in Ramsar and attended Esfahan Industrial University, where he studied electrical engineering. The origins of his relationship with Ahmadinejad are unclear, though a Fars News Agency account says they met when Ahmadinejad was governor of the city of Khoi in the late 1980s and Mashaei was serving in the Intelligence Ministry. (NOTE: Mashaei’s daughter married Ahmadinejad’s son in 2008. END NOTE.) In addition to his past work in the Intelligence Ministry, Mashaei’s website lists several other official jobs:

– General Manager for Social Affairs, Interior Ministry

– Manager, Payam Radio Station

– Manager, Tehran Radio Station

– Deputy for Social Affairs and Culture, Tehran Municipality

DUBAI 00000023 002 OF 003

– Director, Iran Tourism Organization

5. (SBU) Mashaei’s website also lists the various posts he currently holds in the Ahmadinejad government beyond his role as chief of staff:

– Director, Center for Study of Globalization

– President’s Deputy, Supreme Council for Iranians Abroad

– Member, Government Cultural Committee

– President’s Representative, Council Overseeing IRIB

– Member, Government Economic and Cultural Committee

6. (SBU) Ahmadinejad’s stubborn defense of Mashaei bespeaks his importance as a key advisor for the increasingly isolated president; he also has emerged as a spokesman for the Ahmadinejad administration. Ahmadinejad has even told press that he would gladly serve as Vice-President in a Mashaei administration, prompting many to speculate that Ahmadinejad seeks to have Mashaei replace him in 2013.

A Political Punching Bag

7. (C) Since his installation as Chief of Staff, Mashaei has attracted far more attention for his ‘unofficial’ comments about religion, bearing out the earlier whispers that the opposition to Mashaei stemmed from his unorthodox religious views. An IRPO contact last summer said many clerics were concerned by Mashaei’s belief in the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam and by the intrusion of a layman into religious matters. During Ahmadinejad’s second term Mashaei has repeatedly stoked withering criticism by airing his religious views – and, in doing so, provided great fodder too for the president’s political foes.

8. (C) The criticism of Mashaei, and Ahmadinejad by association, is both real and opportunistic. Ahmadinejad’s hardline backers bristle at Mashaei’s presence in his government and time again beseech him to dump him. Kayhan Newspaper in November responded to a Mashaei assertion that ‘God is not the axis of unity among men’ by arguing that his comments contravene Islam and other religions and suggesting to Ahmadinejad that the government, the people of Iran, and the president himself would all be better off without Mashaie. The IRGC newspaper Sobh-e Sadegh a week later sent Ahmadinejad the same message-that he should abandon Mashaei.

9. (C) On January 10 during a university speech Mashaei invited derision by denigrating past prophets’ management ability. According to BBC Farsi, Mashaei pointed out that the prophet Noah (there are many prophets in Islam) lived for 950 years and even in that time was not able to establish ‘justice,’ thus creating the need for more prophets. A clerical supporter responded by complaining that Mashaei’s presence on the Ahmadinejad government causes much pain for the president’s supporters. Kayhan followed suit and carried an article mocking Mashaei and asking that he stay out of such matters. Ahmadinejad’s brother Davud, the former head of the president’s office of inspection, accused Mashaei of saying “absurd” things to keep the system busy and to prevent progress towards Khomeini’s goals. He mockingly implied that Mashaei’s only ‘accomplishment’ is his friendship with Hooshang Amir Ahmadi. (COMMENT: Davud Ahmadinejad, who resigned his position as in August 2008, reportedly did so due to disagreements with his brother regarding Mashaei. END COMMENT.)

DUBAI 00000023 003 OF 003

10. (SBU) Ahmadinejad’s opponents use the president’s relationship with Mashaei for mockery and to score political points. Numerous IRPO contacts have related well known anecdotes about Mashaei’s religious views and firm belief in the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam. Among them is the political ‘urban myth’ in Tehran that Ahmadinejad’s devotion to Mashaei is said to stem from his belief that Mashaei is in fact in direct contact with the Twelfth Imam. According to these rumors, Mashaei allegedly occasionally enters a trance-like state to communicate with the Twelfth Imam or will sometimes randomly say ‘hello’ to no one at all and then explain that the Twelfth Imam just passed by.

11. (SBU) On January 17 the moderate website ‘Ayande News’ carried an article about a meeting between Ahmadinejad and his supporters in which he defended Mashaei and referred to him as ‘Ohleeah ollah’, a title reserved for Islam’s most revered. Afterwards, the meeting’s organizer compared the relationship of Ahmadinejad and Mashaei to that of a ‘disciple and a mystic master.’ The oppositionist website ‘Rah-e Sabz’ has carried innumerable derogatory stories about Mashaei, among them allegations that Mashaei has assisted in the sale of Iranian antiquities outside of the country and that Mashaei’s family members have received jobs at the state-owned carmaker Saipa.

12. (SBU) The recent attacks on Mashaei seemingly culminated with reports of Mashaei’s resignation. On January 20, for example, the website ‘Khabar Online’ (affiliated with Majlis Speaker Larijani) published rumors that Mashaei would soon resign his position. The report cited a Majlis member who said that he regarded Mashaei as a “spent force.” However, Mashaei that day denied the reports of his resignation and the protests continued. BBC Farsi on January 27 reported that a Majlis faction aligned with traditional conservatives, the ‘Front of the Followers of the Line of the Imam and the Supreme Leader,’ sent Ahmadinejad a letter asking him to remove Mashaei.

13. (C) COMMENT: Mashaei’s presence in the Ahmadinejad government and the criticism he elicits illustrates some of the ongoing factional divisions in Tehran. That Larijani and other more moderate principlists use Mashaei to badger Ahmadinejad is not surpising; these camps have been jockeying for position since the 2005 presidential election campaign. More interesting is the criticism from Ahmadinejad’s hardline supporters. These hardliners still rely on the traditional clergy for a patina of Islamic legitimacy, and the clerical class’ near universal distaste for Mashaei’s version of Islam contributes to the hardline animosity to Ahmadinejad. To date, the criticism of Mashaei has stopped short of attacking Ahmadinejad directly, but his backers seem increasingly weary of Mashaei’s antics and Ahmadinejad’s patience for them. Ahmadinejad, who reportedly believes Mashaei is merely misunderstood, seems doggedly determined to retain his chief of staff even in the face of protests from his base. It was only with Khamenei’s direct intervention that Ahmadinejad grudgingly retracted Mashaei’s elevation to first vice president; it seems that to depose Mashaei, his critics may need to enlist the Supreme Leader once again. END COMMMENT. EYRE

TOP-SECRET: Israel sees Iran’s uranium enrichment as ‘point of no return’

Thursday, 17 March 2005, 14:58
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001593
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/14/2015
TAGS PARM, PREL, MNUC, KNNP, EU, IR, IS, GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
REF: STATE 26053
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
  1. Israel urges international pressure on Tehran but worries US may move towards a less tough EU position. Israel is aware that it will be harder to destroy Iranian nuclear sites than it was Iraq’s reactor in 1981. Expects Iran to hit back at coalition forces in Iraq and the Gulf and launch terrorist attacks. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
  2. Read related article

1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the “point of no return” for Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. The GOI believes that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such as sanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying the EU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement. The Israelis support a unified international front but are concerned that the USG may move toward the EU position. Despite the GOI‘s focus on the diplomatic track, public and private speculation about possible Israeli air strikes continues. In weighing the military options, the GOI is aware of significant differences from its successful strike against Iraq’s nuclear program in 1981, including an uncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalition forces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities to retaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changed strategic environment. END SUMMARY.

——————————————— ———-

The Iranian Threat, “Point of No Return,” and Timelines

——————————————— ———-

2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran “the main threat to Israel” and has recently expressed concern that some states are “getting used to” the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Other senior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran’s nuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagan calls an “existential threat” that alters the strategic balance in the region.

3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of the enrichment cycle as the “point of no return” for the Iranian program, a view shared by many senior GOI officials. Mossad Chief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranian program will be unstoppable once it no longer requires outside assistance to complete the enrichment process. At the technical level, the director for external affairs at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that the critical step would be Iran’s operation of a centrifuge enrichment cascade.

4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability. In February, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes there is still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the window of opportunity is closing quickly. DefMin Mofaz cautioned that Iran is “less than one year away,” while the head of research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would reach this point by early 2007. Technical experts at the IAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capability within six months of the end of the suspension agreement. A few GOI officials admitted informally that these estimates need to be taken with caution. The head of the MFA’s strategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from 1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998 at the latest.

——————————————–

Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3

——————————————–

5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining diplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and EU-3. Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSC sanctions, e.g. on Iran’s airlines and trade, as noted below. President Katsav has said that Tehran is “very conscious of international opinion.” Other MFA and NSC officials point to the current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonos case as proof that diplomatic pressure can affect decision-making in Tehran.

6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3 efforts, but see no real alternative at this time. PM Sharon told reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to “play for time.” In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, and military leaders have all complained that the Europeans are “too soft.” Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned that Iran will “cheat” on any commitments it makes. MFA staff told poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effort will be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension or that the Europeans will support effective sanctions against Iran.

7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the Europeans and IAEA on several issues. First, the GOI would like a clearer and more detailed listing of all activities covered by the suspension, along with timelines for each step. Second, they want more robust verification measures and greater focus on Iran’s denial of access to IAEA inspectors. Third, the Israelis insist that any final agreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure that noncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level. Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the concrete consequences of such failure.

8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, but noticeable, economic impacts. After telling the press on March 10 that “it would probably not be advisable to impose an oil embargo on Iran,” PM Sharon advocated trade and flight restrictions. Lower-level GOI officials said these steps could include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe, limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, and suspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines within the EU. The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreign affairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S. for a “complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycle program.” In the short term, this means a full suspension of all enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactor construction, and related R&D activities.

——————————————— —

Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement

——————————————— —

9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action by the UNSC. PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue its efforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing to take Iran to the UNSC. In a meeting with a CoDel on December 12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead with the Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, including sanctions. President Katsav asked the Secretary not to “wait for the Europeans.”

10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomatic front. The IAEC’s director for non-proliferation admitted that the GOI sees “little we can do” to increase pressure on Iran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states said that Israel would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities, such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence material related to the Iranian program. She said the MFA believes that any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to a surge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention on Israel’s own nuclear activities.

11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials asked if the USG is shifting its policy on Iran. The deputy NSA for foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move is probably necessary to build international consensus for taking Iran to the UNSC. At the same time, he expressed concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called the EU’s habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to full compliance. Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were also disquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG is re-examining its position on Hizballah.

——————————————

The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak

——————————————

12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possible military options. In public, PM Sharon has stressed the importance of the “political and economic” track. During a recent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutz similarly said “we don’t want to go there.” In February, President Katsav told the Secretary that “the military option is not necessary — bring the issue to the Security Council.”

13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes usually focuses on the differences from the Israeli Air Force’s attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981. In private, GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors would make any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission. A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy that the GOI does not know where all of the targets are located and said that any attack would only delay, not end, the Iranian program. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states noted that potential target sites are well dispersed throughout the country, with several located in built-up civilian areas. The IAEC stressed the importance of Russian assistance in restraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and said that any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russian casualties and endanger Moscow’s cooperation.

14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raise additional complications. An Israeli assault would necessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq, they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliation throughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq. MFA and NSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicit a strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians, effectively freezing the peace process.

15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 and the IAEA. In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran’s ability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks by its regional surrogates. PM Sharon has claimed that Hizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states said that she believed that Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelis felt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqi threat. Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranian problem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, “I do not think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into an Israeli problem — it is a matter of concern for the whole world.”

——————————————— —

Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but …

——————————————— —

17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very real concerns about the feasibility of military strikes against the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, the GOI has shown time and again that it will act militarily if it believes that its security is threatened, and the IDF is most certainly keeping contingency plans up to date. The Israeli press reported that in February PM Sharon’s Security Cabinet had given “initial authorization” for an attack on Iran. The press reports cited an unnamed “Israeli security source,” who claimed that the USG would “authorize” an Israeli attack. Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparations for any military strike. Air defense operations would pose nearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Force activities preceding any attack. Due to both the extreme sensitivity of the issue and the GOI‘s near inability to prevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held, probably even from many members of PM Sharon’s Cabinet.

18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying at the highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3 effort is on track and backed by a solid international front. We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. position may move toward the EU stance. At the same time, we should recognize that Israeli intelligence briefings will understandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may not match current USG assessments.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department’s Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER

TOP-SECRET: TRIALS/EXECUTIONS OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS

R 090540Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7682
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCOMSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1381 

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: TRIALS/EXECUTIONS OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS: STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AND SHAH LASHES OUT AT FOREIGN CRITICS 

1. IN PROTEST AGAINST RECENT TRIALS/PUNISHMENT (PARTICULARLY EXECUTIONS, WHICH NOW TOTAL 10) OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT-ELEMENTS, TEHRAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS -- LEAD BY FACULTY OF ENGINEERING STUDENTS-- MOUNTED ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATION AFTERNOON OF MARCH 7 AND EVEN LARGE ONE (CIRC 600) MORNING OF MARCH 8. WHILE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION FELT CAPABLE OF HANDLING MARCH 7 DEMONSTRATION WITHOUT HELP OF OUTSIDE POLICE, THEY APPARENTLY FELT UNABLE DO SO MARCH 8 AND CALLED NATIONAL POLICE ONTO CAMPUS FOR BRIEF PERIOD. RESULT WAS MUCH MANHANDLING OF STUDENTS BUT THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ANY SERIOUS CASUALTIES/CLASHES, AND UNIVERSITY WAS QUIET BY EARLY AFTERNOON. 

2. SOME FACULTIES AT OTHER TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES (E.G. ARYAMEHR, NATIONAL AND POLYTECHNIC) ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ENGAGED IN SYMPATHY STRIKES" MARCH 8 BUT SO FAR NO DEMONSTRATIONS REPORTED* THERE IS RELIABLE REPORT THAT DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY OF MESHED (SIX OF 10 EXECUTED CAME FROM MESHED AREA) BECAME SERIOUS ENOUGH THAT UNIVERSITY WAS CLOSED THREE DAYS AGO AND STILL REMAINS CLOSED. (COMMENT: WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF GOI ORDERS TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES CLOSED UNTIL AFTER NO RUZ HOLIDAY.) 

3. FROM COMMENTS OF STUDENTS AND OBSERVERS CLOSE TO ACADEMIC CIRCLES, IT SEEMS CLEAR LARGE PART OF MOTIVATION FOR DEMONSTRATION AND SYMPATHY STRIKES  IS STUDENT ANGER OVER GOI'S CONTINUED DETENTION OF SEVERAL STUDENTS AS "ANTI-STATE" SUBVERSIVES AND, EVEN MORE, ANGER OVER RECENT TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS OF THOSE CONVICTED OF ANTI-STATE ACTIVITIES. THERE ARE ALREADY INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT GOI CONSIDERS TIMING OF DEMONSTRATIONS (PERHAPS DEMONSTRATIONS THEMSELVES) PROMOTED BY ANTI-STATE ELEMENTS TO EMBARRASS GOI DURING VISIT OF CHANCELLOR BRANDT AND HIS CONSIDERABLE PRESS RETINUE. 

4. IN RELATED DEVELOPMENT, WHICH MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN INTENDED FOR EARS OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS SHAH LASHED OUT STRONGLY IN MARCH 7 PRESS CONFERENCE (WITH GERMAN PRESSMEN) AT WHAT HE LABELLED DISTORTED FOREIGN REPORTING ABOUT TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. HIM HIT AT LE MONDE VIGOROUSLY AND REPEATEDLY, AND TOOK PARTICULAR EXCEPTION TO LE MONDE'S APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY FOR THOSE CONVICTED IN RECENT TRIALS. AFTER ASKING TWO RHETORICAL QUESTIONS "HAS LE MONDE EVER ASKED WHETHER THESE MURDERERS HAVE RIGHT TO TAKE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE? HAS LE MONDE EVER WRITTEN ONE WORD OF CONDEMNATION AGAINST TERRORISTS AND ASSASSINS SENT BY IRA TO EXTERMINATE PEOPLE?"), SHAH SAID FOREIGN PRESS HAS NO RIGHT GIVE ADVICE ON MATTERS THEY KNOW NOTHING ABOUT. HE RECALLED HIS "CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY" NOT TO PERMIT "TERROR OR ATTEMPTS AGAINST MY COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BY AGENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES." 

EXEMPT 

HECK

TOP-SECRET: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE

UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 5055 

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006
TAGS: IR PTER
SUBJECT: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE 

REF: TEHRAN 4887 

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SAID TAHERI, BOMBING AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE. SAVAK MAINTAINING ITS POLICY OF WIDESPREAD PREVENTIVE ARRESTS AND, WHILE THIS RUNS RISK OF HEIGHTENING RESENTMENT AMONG POPULACE, OFFICIALS SEEM CONFIDENT THAT GUERRILLAS ARE ON THE RUN. WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE OFFICIAL OPTIMISM AND FEEL THAT SANGUINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THE GUERRILLA REACTION THEY USUALLY PROVOKE MAY FURTHER ERODE CREDIBILITY OF SECURITY ORGANS IN MIND OF PUBLIC.
END SUMMARY 

1. IN WAKE OF SMOOTHLY HANDLED ASSASSINATION AUGUST 13 OF HEAD OF PRISONS BRIGADIER GENERAL SAID TAHERI (REFTEL) WHO WAS ALSO CHIEF OF AN ANTI-GUERRILLA SUBCOMMITTEE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED. RECENT CONFIRMED INCIDENTS HAVE INCLUDED A BOMB IN A TEHRAN DEPARTMENT STORE WHICH INJURED THE TERRORIST PLANTING IT, BOMB IN TEHRAN NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY BUILDING WHICH KILLED WATCHMAN, APPREHENSION OF A TERRORIST IN SOUTH TEHRAN WHICH RESULTED IN ONE KILLED AND FIVE WOUNDED, AND SHOOTING TO DEATH OF THREE POLICEMEN IN A SMALL BAZAAR IN SOUTH TEHRAN. NUMEROUS OTHER BOMBINGS AND SHOOTINGS RUMORED BUT NOT VERIFIED BY EMBASSY OR CONFIRMED BY GOI. 

2. SAVAK AND OTHER SECURITY ORGANS ARE PROCEEDING WITH A WIDESPREAD AND, WE HEAR, NOT VERY WELL TARGETED ROUND-UP OF SUSPECTS, AIDED BY LISTS OF NAMES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FOUND IN DWELLING OF A RECENTLY SLAIN TERRORIST LEADER. POLICE NETS, WHICH ARE REPORTEDLY HAULING IN THE INNOCENT WITH THE GUILTY, HAVE EXTENDED AS FAR AFIELD AS ISFAHAN WHERE A NUMBER OF SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED TWO WEEKS AGO. 

3. DESPITE INCREASING LEVEL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, POLICE OFFICIALS REMAIN OPTIMISTIC. CHIEF OF NATIONAL POLICE LTG JAFFARQOLI SADRI ASSURED EMBOFF AUG. 17 THAT CURRENT FLURRY OF INCIDENTS CONSTITUTES DYING GASP OF GUERRILLAS WHO, HE CLAIMS, HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY TWO THIRDS IN PAST YEAR AND ARE FORCED TO ACT NOW TO SHOW THEY STILL EXIST. IN A MEDIA INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN LOCAL PRESS AUG. 19, SADRI UPPED FIGURE FOR REDUCTION OF GUERRILLA FORCES TO THREE FOURTHS, PREDICTED THAT REMAINING TERRORISTS WOULD SOON BE WIPED OUT AND REITERATED STANDARD GOVERNMENT LINE THAT GUERRILLAS ARE CONFUSED MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS OF MARXIST-LENINIST BENT BUT WITHOUT GOALS OR PROGRAM. IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF SADRI ATTACHED NO PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO MURDER OF GENERAL TAHERI, ASSERTING THAT TERRORISTS WOULD HAVE BEEN SATISIFED WITH ANY HIGH-RANKING OFFICER AND CHOSE TAWERI ONLY BECUASE OF IOSLATED LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR LONG WALKS ALONE. SADRI ALSO DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY THAT ASSASSINS WERE OF HIGHER CALIBER THAN RUN-OF-THE-MILL GUERRILLAS, POINTING OUT THAT SHOTS WHICH KILLED TAHERI HAD BEEN FIRED FROM 50 CENTIMETERS AND THAT "A CHILD COULD HIT A MAN FROM THAT DISTANCE." 

COMMENT: WE CONSIDER IT MORE LIKELY THAT TAHERI WAS PERSONALLY TARGETED DUE TO HIS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, SKILLFUL MANNER IN WHICH ASSASSINATION CARRIED OUT, REQUIRING CAREFUL PLANNING AND RECONNAISSANCE AS WELL AS DEFT EXECUTION, APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THOSE INVOLVED WERE MUCH BETTER TRAINED THAN AVERAGE TERRORISTS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN BLOWN UP BY THEIR OWN BOMBS. 

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NUMBER OF GUERRILLA INCIDENTS WILL BEGIN TO TAPER OFF, BUT WE DO NOT SHARE SADRI'S CONFIDENCE THAT HIS TACTICS AND THOSE OF SAVAK CAN COMPLETELY HALT TERRORIST ACTIVITY. IN FACT OVER REACTION AND TOO ZEALOUS A REPRESSION BY SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS SEEM AT LEAST AS LIKELY TO RECRUIT NEW GUERRILLAS AS TO STAMP OUT OLD ONES. IN ADDITION WISDOM SEEMS QUESTIONABLE OF SECURITY OFFICIALS MAKING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT BREAKUP OF GUERRILLA GROUPS AND PREDICTIONS OF THEIR DEMISE. WE RECALL THAT THE LAST SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT LAST JANUARY WAS FOLLOWED BY SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS ON US-PROPERTIES AND OTHER SITES IN TEHRAN. IN OUR VIEW SUCH PUBLIC DECLARATIONS RUN RISK OF INCREASING CREDIBILITY GAP AND RESENTMENT ON PART OF PUBLIC WHO LIKELY BE INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE OF INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS THAT DO NOT SEEM TO BE STAMPING OUT TERRORISTS. 

THE PROGNOSTICATION THEREFORE IS FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE TERRORISM BUT, DESPITE SUCCESSFUL MURDER OF TAHERI, WE DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT GUERRILLAS WILL NOW PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON ASSASSINATION AS A TOOL. REASON IS THAT TERRORISTS STILL LACK ENOUGH TRAINED PERSONNEL TO PULL OFF ASSASSINATIONS ON REGULAR BASIS. 

FARLAND

TOP-SECRET: BELARUS BI-WEEKLY POL/ECON REPORT

VZCZCXRO5335
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHSK #0059/01 0591540
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281540Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0699
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0053
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0709
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MINSK 000059 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR EUR/UMB (ASHEMA), DRL (DNADEL), AND EUR/ACE (KSALINGER)
EMBASSY KYIV FOR USAID (JRIORDAN AND KMONAGHAN) 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON ENRG ETRD BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS BI-WEEKLY POL/ECON REPORT - FEBRUARY 26, 2009 

MINSK 00000059  001.3 OF 004 

1. The following are brief items of interest compiled by Embassy
Minsk. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Civil Society
-------------
- GOB Crackdown on Polish Minority Sparks Flash Point with EU
- The Aggressive Suppression of Peaceful Demonstrations Returns
- New Election Law But GOB Control of Election Commission Endures
- State Media is Encouraged to Criticize Opposition Candidates 

Economy
-------
- Belarus Accepts New Russian Oil Tariff, But Only for Six Months
- Gazprom Now Has 50% of Beltransgaz, But May Want Majority
- IMF Most Likely To Issue Final SBA Tranche in late March
- Belarus Suspends Unilateral WTO Accession Talks 

Quote of the Week
----------------- 

-------------
Civil Society
------------- 

2. GOB Crackdown on the Polish Minority Sparks Flash Point with
EU 

During his meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw
Sikorski in Kyiv on February 25, President Lukashenka termed the
conflict between Polish minority groups in Belarus a
"misunderstanding" that would be resolved.  He stated that there
were no bilateral problems stemming from differences between the
Union of Poles of Belarus (UPB) recognized by the GOB and the
Warsaw-backed UPB.  Sikorski said that Lukashenka had agreed to
set up an expert group to study the issue of Belarus' Polish
minority.  The meeting came as a European Parliament (EP)
delegation arrived in Minsk on February 25 for a three-day
fact-finding mission.  The delegation will meet with GOB
officials, representatives of civil society, and opposition
forces.  The mission is expected to issue a report based on its
findings that will be incorporated into an EP resolution on the
human rights situation in Belarus.  The report will also include
recommendations on membership of a Belarus' delegation to the
EU-Neighborhood East Parliamentary Assembly Euronest to be
comprised of ten participants with observer status, likely
representing MPs and civil society and opposition parties, a
position the GOB opposes.  Anzhelika Borys, Leader of the
Warsaw-backed UPB, was in Brussels and Warsaw recently for a
series of meetings with EP members and the Polish President who
expressed solidarity with the Polish minority in Belarus.  Borys
explained that the GOB has sought "to present it as an internal
conflict in order to distract peoples' attention, so that the
issue is not seen in the context of human rights."  The
Spokesperson for Catherine Ashton, the EU's High Representative
on foreign policy, expressed EU FMs' concerns about the human
rights situation in Belarus and announced that the EU will
"remain vigilant and continue to raise the issue."  In addition,
Ashton condemned police action against the Warsaw-backed union
and what she called "attempts by authorities to impose a new
leadership on the Polish community."  Critical statements and
yet another round of confrontation between the official and
unrecognized unions stemmed from the February 17 GOB ruling that
ordered Borys' union to vacate the Polish House in Ivyanets.  In
addition, Borys was sentenced February 15 to a $365 fine for
participating in an unsanctioned demonstration in Hrodna on
February 10 in support of Teresa Sobal, the ousted manager of
the Ivyanets Polish House.  Borys' three senior associates
received five-day jail sentences for similar charges on February
15.  A senior Polish MFA official was quoted on February 19 as
saying that all the 16 Polish Houses in Belarus should be under
control of the Borys' union.  Only two of the Polish Houses,
which serve as social and cultural centers, still remain outside
control of the GOB-controlled union. 

3. The Aggressive Suppression of Peaceful Demonstrations Returns 

After permitting the monthly Solidarity Day demonstrations to
take place this fall (reftel Minsk 024), authorities cracked
down aggressively, manhandling and arresting demonstrators, as 

MINSK 00000059  002.3 OF 004 

activists attempted to stage three public protests in February.
Belarus security forces arrested 29 democratic activists
demonstrating in downtown Minsk on February 16 in remembrance of
opposition leaders who disappeared in 1999-2000.  Police for the
first time grabbed people as they approached the venue dragged
them off to waiting vans, while others were arrested in the
square a few minutes later.  Only two of the several dozen
policemen on site were in uniform.  Officers in plainclothes
used force against journalists, blocking photo and video
cameras, and pushing them away from the demonstrators.  In a
separate incident on February 14, police broke up a St.
Valentine's Day march staged by the Malady Front and arrested 22
activists, including four legal minors.  Young Belarus and
European Belarus civil groups held three rallies at different
venues on February 8 in support of the two Vaukavysk activists,
Mikalay Autukhovich and Uladzimir Asipenka, who have been held
in pretrial detention on terrorism charges since February 8,
2009.  Approximately 20 activists from those groups were
detained.  On all three days, people detained were eventually
released without charges but many reported being fingerprinted
and recorded on video and complained of suffering bruises and
scratches while in police detention, as well being threatened
verbally. 

4. New Election Law But GOB Control of Election Commission
Endures 

At a press conference on February 1, Central Election Commission
(CEC) Chairwoman Lidziya Yarmoshyna said that for the April 25
local elections 1,495 territorial election commissions covering
regional, town, and village councils have been established in
Belarus, with a total membership of 11,697.  Of those, 51.9
percent were nominated through the collection of voter
signatures, 35.3 percent were nominated by NGOs and political
parties, and 12.8 percent by "workers' collectives."  The
requirement that one-third of commissions' membership be
nominated by NGOs and political parties is a new requirement in
the electoral law.  However, as it has turned out only 105
persons or 0.9 percent of the total territorial commission
members are affiliated with political parties; and of these only
15 represent opposition parties, including nine with the
Spravedlivy Mir Belarusian Party of the Left, four with the
United Civic Party, and two with the Belarusian Social
Democratic Party Hramada.  There are 4,024 NGO members on the
territorial commission, but the vast majority are associated
with the state-controlled NGOs or associations such as Belaya
Rus, National Youth Union, Women's Union, Veterans' Union,
Federation of Trade Unions and others.  Independent observers
concluded that the overwhelming majority of territorial
commission members had served on commissions during previous
elections campaigns in Belarus and described them as
"ideologically" loyal to the regime.  At the district level,
there are 367 elections commissions (covering Oblast/Regional
councils and the Minsk city council).  The district commissions
have a total of 4,542 members, of whom 43 percent were nominated
by NGOs, mostly GOB-controlled, 18.2 percent by "workers'
collectives," 6.7 percent by political parties; 32.1 percent
sought membership through the collection of signatures.  Of the
political party representatives, only 72 come from opposition
parties.  The deadline for establishment of precinct-level
electoral commissions is March 7. 

5. State Media is Encouraged to Criticize Opposition Candidates 

On February 16, CEC Chairwoman Yarmoshyna stated at a workshop
on the role of the media in the election process that state
media have the right to criticize "opposition candidates" during
the election campaign.  The First Deputy Head of the
Presidential Administration Natallya Pyatkevich echoed her
remarks, saying that any journalist has the right to hold an
opinion and "report" it.  It is up to the journalist to do this
"correctly," she said, arguing that the interest of freedom of
information should be counterbalanced by responsibility on the
part of reporters. 

-------
Economy
------- 

6. Belarus Accepts New Russian Oil Tariff, But Only for Six
Months 

MINSK 00000059  003.3 OF 004 

Lukashenka issued an edict on February 12 approving the January
27 bilateral agreement on oil imports from Russia.  Russian
President Medvedev signed the amendments into law on February
15.  According to the new agreement, Belarus will receive 6.3
million tons of Russian oil duty-free in 2010 for internal use;
but additional supplies for refinement and export to any market
other than Russia will be subject to a 100% export duty.
Russian duty-free quota for Belarus may be reduced if Belarus
imposes additional transit duties on Russian oil passing through
Belarus to Europe.  Domestic consumption of crude oil for each
year will be adjusted by October 1.  While Lukashenka made no
public comments after signing the amendments, some senior GOB
officials have repeatedly argued that the export duty applied to
Russian oil supplies to Belarus violates Russia's commitments
under principles of the Custom Union of Belarus, Russian and
Kazakhstan.  Belarus' Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Yevdochenko
announced on February 16 that Belarus will insist that the
export duty be abolished starting July 1, 2010, when the single
Customs Union is scheduled to become operational.  In the
meantime, the GOB is looking for ways maintain the profitability
of the country's two oil refineries, which are facing serious
difficulty in adjusting to terms of the new oil supply agreement
with Russia.  IMF has calculated that GOB will lose no less than
$2 billion dollars in revenues since it is no longer able to
pocket the difference between the subsidized oil it use to
receive from Russia, and the refined petroleum products it sold
mainly to Europe at market rates. 

7. Gazprom Now Has 50% of Beltransgaz, But May Want Majority 

According to media reports, Russia's Gazprom transferred $625
million on February 24 for 12.5% stock in the Beltransgaz
natural gas transportation company, thus increasing its stake in
Beltransgaz to 50%. This was the final tranche under $2.5
billion agreement signed on May 18, 2007.  On February 25, the
Russian Ambassador to Belarus Alexander Surikov told the press
that Gazprom is interested in acquiring a controlling stake in
OAO Beltransgaz. "If Gazprom paid for 50% in Beltransgaz, it
definitely wants to have more. What other reason is there to buy
a 50% stake?" he explained.  On a separate issue, according to
the First Deputy Director of Beltransgaz Sorokhan, Belarus did
pay for Russian gas delivered in January 2010 under the terms
outlined in the five-year gas supply contract signed with
Gazprom in 2006, that will remove Russian subsidies on gas in
full by 2011.  The average import price Belarus paid in 2009 was
$148 per 1,000 cubic meters.  In the first quarter of 2010,
Belarus will pay $168, and given the current trends in world
prices, expects the price to go up $4 in the 2nd quarter "unless
we have contract adjustments," the official explained.  Belarus
has already been forced to raise natural gas prices for its
industrial consumers by 25% to $217.7 per 1,000 cubic meters.
The country imported a total of 17.6 billion cubic meters of
Russian natural gas in 2009 - 20.4% short of the agreed volume,
but Gazprom, according to Russian Ambassador to Belarus
Alexander Surikov, is not likely to seek compensation from
Belarus for importing less than agreed.  At the same time,
Belarus' Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Yevdochenko stated on
February 16 that Belarus objected to the Gazprom's monopoly of
gas supply within the Belarusian, Russian, and Kazakhstani
Customs Union. Commenting on the wish of the Belarusian
authorities to revise Gazprom's monopoly on gas supplies to
Belarus the Russian Ambassador said that Belarus must respect
the monopoly of Russia's Gazprom on natural gas export. When
Belarusian monopoly exporters supply tractors and trucks to
Russia, "this is considered normal but when a single Russian
exporter supplies natural gas, it is considered wrong," he argued 

8. IMF Most Likely To Issue Final SBA Tranche in late March 

An IMF staff mission and the GOB have reached an agreement,
subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board at the end of
March, on completion of the fourth and final review of the $3.52
billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Belarus, the IMF
announced.  The final tranche is valued at approximately $700
million under the current SBA.  According to the IMF staff
mission statement, "performance under the economic program
supported by the SBA has been good.  All end-December
performance criteria and structural benchmarks were met~ The
recent agreement with Russia on the pricing of imported crude
oil, in the absence of any offsetting measures, would widen
significantly the current account deficit and the general
government deficit.  The government is taking strong actions to 

MINSK 00000059  004.3 OF 004 

contain the effects of the oil price increase on the budget and
the balance of payments, and Fund staff support these measures.
Monetary policy and, more specifically, further tightening of
the limits on lending under government programs would support
the credibility of the exchange rate regime.  The current
exchange rate regime remains appropriate~  The authorities made
good progress on the financial sector issues~ The privatization
process has been slower than expected and the authorities need
to step it up to reduce government intervention in the economy
and to attract foreign direct investment.  The mission reached
understandings with the authorities on the measures which would
move the privatization process forward~  The authorities
expressed interest in continued cooperation with the IMF after
the expiration of the current program.  A possible follow-up
program with the Fund could be considered upon the completion of
the current [15-month] SBA."  The estimated external financial
gap that GOB will face in 2010 is $2 billion. 

9. Belarus Suspends Unilateral WTO Accession Talks 

Belarus Foreign Ministry official, Anton Kudasaw, announced on
February 19 that the WTO will soon take up consideration of the
possibility of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia jointly joining
WTO as a single Customs Union.  A negotiating team has been
formed to hold consultations with WTO members on the
simultaneous accession of the three countries. "Our side is
suspending unilateral negotiations on accession to the WTO," the
official explained.  Negotiations may begin after WTO members
study the explanatory notes for the Customs Union that are
expected to be submitted soon. 

-----------------
Quote of the Week
----------------- 

10. Speaking at the seminar for ideology officials of Minsk
region on February 17 the Fist Deputy Head of the Presidential
Administration Natalia Petkevich said: 

"Political and economic culture of Belarusians has grown. As a
result, their attitude to life and the world has become more
critical. In this context, ideology methods should change. They
should not be prohibitive. One should act subtler, wiser and
more cunningly~ We need an informal approach. The time of
slogans is gone. We should proceed from life and follow the
needs of people. If they need information, you should give it to
them. Otherwise, they will get it from other sources~ Let the
information originate from ideology services rather than
opposition websites."
SCANLAN

TOP-SECRET: DOCUMENTS ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

O 190550Z DEC 86
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS STATE 391887 

FOR POLITICAL OFFICERS, INFO PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS 

E.O. 12356:   N/A
TAGS: PTER SY
SUBJECT:      DOCUMENTS ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM 

1.  FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FACT PAPER ON SYRIAN
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND A CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED
TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS.  EARLIER
VERSIONS OF BOTH DOCUMENTS WERE RELEASED TO THE PRESS ON
NOVEMBER 14 AND APPEARED IN THE USIA WIRELESS FILE ON
THAT DATE.  BOTH DOCUMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN REVISED TO
REFLECT THE HASI CONVICTION IN WEST BERLIN ON NOVEMBER
26.  WE ASSUME USIS MADE APPROPRIATE USE OF THE MATERIAL
APPEARING IN THE WIRELESS FILE.  WE ARE SENDING THE
REVISED VERSIONS SO THAT POLOFFS MAY SHARE THE
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THESE DOCUMENTS WITH HOST
GOVERNMENTS. 

2.  (BEGIN TEXT OF FACT PAPER) 

DECEMBER 5, 1986 

SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:  1983-1986 

NEW EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR AND DIRECT INVOLVEMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO LIGHT IN
TWO RECENT TRIALS INCLUDING THE CONVICTION IN GREAT
BRITAIN OF NIZAR HINDAWI FOR THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF AN
EL AL CIVILIAN AIRPLANE WITH 375 PASSENGERS ABOARD. 

SYRIA CLEARLY HAS A LONG RECORD OF INVOLVEMENT IN
TERRORISM.  SYRIA IS ONE OF THE "CHARTER MEMBERS" OF
COUNTRIES ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S TERRORISM LIST, WHICH
WAS FIRST COMPILED IN 1979.  (COUNTRIES CURRENTLY ON THE
LIST ARE SYRIA, LIBYA, IRAN, SOUTH YEMEN, AND CUBA.) 

THE PATTERN OF SYRIAN ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
HAS VARIED.  FROM THE MID-1970'S THROUGH 1983, SYRIAN
PERSONNEL ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN
TERRORIST OPERATIONS.  THESE OPERATIONS WERE PRIMARILY
DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER ARABS, SUCH AS SYRIAN DISSIDENTS,
MODERATE ARAB STATES SUCH AS JORDAN, AND PRO-ARAFAT
PALESTINIANS, AS WELL AS ISRAELI AND JEWISH TARGETS.  IN
1982, FOR EXAMPLE, A CAR BOMB EXPLODED IN FRONT OF THE
OFFICES OF A LEBANESE-OWNED PRO-IRAQI NEWSPAPER IN
DOWNTOWN PARIS, KILLING ONE PERSON AND INJURING SCORES OF
OTHERS.  FRANCE LATER EXPELLED TWO SYRIAN DIPLOMATS AND
ORDERED ITS AMBASSADOR HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS. 

BY LATE 1983 DAMASCUS HAD CURTAILED USE OF ITS OWN
PERSONNEL.  INSTEAD, IT BEGAN TO RELY MORE HEAVILY ON
TERRORIST GROUPS MADE UP OF NON-SYRIANS WHO HAVE BASES
AND TRAINING FACILITIES IN SYRIA AND SYRIAN-OCCUPIED
AREAS OF LEBANON.  THE MOST NOTORIOUS OF THESE IS THE ABU
NIDAL ORGANIZATION. 

AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT SYRIA PREFERS TO
SUPPORT GROUPS WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY IN LINE
WITH SYRIAN OBJECTIVES, RATHER THAN TO SELECT TARGETS OR
CONTROL OPERATIONS ITSELF.  DAMASCUS UTILIZES THESE
GROUPS TO ATTACK OR INTIMIDATE ENEMIES AND OPPONENTS AND
TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.  YET AT THE SAME
TIME IT CAN DISAVOW KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR OPERATIONS.  SUCH
SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS HAVE CARRIED OUT SCORES OF
ATTACKS AGAINST PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB, TURKISH,
ISRAELI AND WESTERN TARGETS DURING THE PAST THREE
YEARS. 

THIS YEAR, INVESTIGATIONS INTO MAJOR INCIDENTS HAVE
REVEALED ANOTHER CHANGE IN SYRIAN ACTIVITIES:  THAT SYRIA
HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS WILLINGNESS TO BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED
IN TERRORIST ATTACKS.  THE BRITISH TRIAL AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTIVE EL AL BOMBING EXPOSED THE
DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF PRESIDENT ASSAD'S INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES.  AND THE WEST BERLIN TRIAL INTO THE BOMBING OF
THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION IN WEST BERLIN REVEAED
THE INVOLVEMENT OF SYRIAN OFFICIALS.  TO A LARGE DEGREE,
SYRIA HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN COVERING ITS TRACKS.  NOW,
HOWEVER, IN BRITAIN AND BERLIN, EVIDENCE OF MORE DIRECT
SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT HAS EMERGED. 

LONDON AND BERLIN INVESTIGATIONS 

IN THE BRITISH INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTED EL AL ATTACK,
HINDAWI TOLD BRITISH POLICE HE WAS RECRUITED BY HAITHAM
SAID, AN AIDE TO MAJOR GENERAL AL-KHULI, CHIEF OF SYRIAN
AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE.  ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL, AL-KHULI'S OPERATIVES: (1)
SUPPLIED HINDAWI, A JORDANIAN, WITH A SYRIAN PASSPORT;
(2) GAVE HIM DOLLARS 12,000 AND PROMISED HIM MORE MONEY
WHEN HE COMPLETED HIS MISSION TO PLANT A BOMB ABOARD AN
EL AL CIVILIAN AIRLINER; (3) PROVIDED HIM WITH THE BOMB
WHICH WAS CARRIED INTO LONDON ABOARD THE SYRIAN ARAB
AIRLINES, WHICH ALSO GAVE HIM SAA CREW MEMBER HOTEL
ACCOMMODATIONS; AND (4) TRAINED HIM IN THE BOMB'S USE. 

HINDAWI TRIED TO USE HIS PREGNANT GIRL FRIEND AS THE
UNWITTING CARRIER OF THE SOPHISTICATED BOMB WHICH WAS
BUILT INTO HER CARRY-ON BAG.  IF AN ALERT SECURITY
OFFICIAL HAD NOT SPOTTED THE DEVICE AFTER HER BAG CLEARED
AN EARLIER CHECK, 375 INNOCENT PERSONS, INCLUDING SOME
230 AMERICANS, WOULD HAVE PERISHED. 

AFTER THE APRIL 17 PLAN FAILED, ACCORDING TO EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL, HINDAWI FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS TO
GO TO THE SYRIAN EMBASSY, WHERE HE WAS GREETED BY THE
AMBASSADOR AND HIDDEN IN A SYRIAN SAFEHOUSE IN LONDON.
BRITISH PRESS REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION SAY BRITAIN
ALSO HAS EVIDENCE THAT THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON
WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE THE
ATTEMPTED BOMBING IN RECRUITING HINDAWI FOR SYRIAN
INTELLIGENCE. 

IN WEST BERLIN, HINDAWI'S BROTHER, AHMAD HASI, AND
ANOTHER ARAB, FAROUK SALAMEH, WERE CONVICTED FOR THE
MARCH 29 BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION IN
WEST BERLIN IN WHICH ELEVEN PERSONS WERE INJURED.  IN A
SWORN STATEMENT, HASI SAID HE PICKED UP THIS BOMB AT THE
SYRIAN EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN FROM A SENIOR SYRIAN AIR
FORCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, HAITHEM SAEED, AND A SYRIAN
EXPLOSIVES EXPERT WAS SENT FROM DAMASCUS TO REPAIR THE
DEVICE AFTER IT TWICE FAILED TO EXPLODE. 

ABU NIDAL 

SYRIA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE MOST ACTIVE AND BRUTAL
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUP OPERATING TODAY, ABU NIDAL.
(SEE NOTE BELOW)  ALTHOUGH ABU NIDAL NOW ALSO RECEIVES
BACKING AND SUPPORT FROM LIBYA, AND SANCTUARY IN EASTERN
EUROPE, DAMASCUS HAS PROVIDED ABU NIDAL WITH IMPORTANT
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT EVER SINCE THE GROUP MOVED FROM IRAQ
IN 1983.  SYRIA ALLOWS ABU NIDAL'S GROUP TO MAINTAIN
TRAINING CAMPS IN THE LEBANESE BIQA' VALLEY, AN AREA
UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SYRIAN ARMED FORCES.  SYRIA
PROVIDES THE GROUP WITH TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND PERMITS ITS
OPERATIVES TO TRANSIT FREELY THROUGH DAMASCUS WHEN
DEPARTING ON MISSIONS.  SYRIA CONTINUES TO PERMIT
OPERATION OF ABU NIDAL FACILITIES IN DAMASCUS.  (THE
SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ASSERTS THAT THE SOLE FUNCTION OF THESE
FACILITIES IS LIMITED TO CULTURAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS.) 

ALTHOUGH LAST DECEMBER'S ROME AIRPORT ATTACK WAS
COMMITTED UNDER LIBYAN SPONSORSHIP, THE SURVIVING MEMBER
OF THE FOUR-MAN TERRORIST TEAM, ACCORDING TO REPORTS ON
THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION, TOLD INVESTIGATORS THE TEAM
WAS TRAINED IN SYRIAN-OCCUPIED AREAS OF LEBANON BY
SYRIANS.  THE TEAM THEN TRAVELED TO DAMASCUS, WHERE IT
REMAINED WHILE FINAL PREPARATIONS WERE MADE FOR THE
ATTACK IN WHICH 16 CIVILIANS AND 3 TERRORISTS WERE
KILLED. 

IN ANKARA ON NOVEMBER 6, TURKISH PROSECUTERS ISSUED AN
INDICTMENT ACCUSING SIX PALESTINIANS WORKING FOR THE ABU
NIDAL ORGANIZATION OF KILLING A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN
JULY, 1985.  THE INDICTMENT ALSO LINKED THE MEN WITH FOUR
OTHER ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE SEPTEMBER 6, 1986 ATTACK ON
AN ISTANBUL SYNAGOGUE, KILLING 21 PERSONS AND A 1983
ATTEMPT TO PLACE A BOMB ON AN ALITALIA FLIGHT, AND THE
ATTEMPTED CAR BOMBING OF A U.S. OFFICERS CLUB IN IZMIR IN
1983. 

(BEGIN NOTE)  THE OFFICIAL NAME OF THE ABU NIDAL
ORGANIZATION IS "FATAH - REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL."  IT IS
HEADED BY SABRI AL-BANNA, A PALESTINIAN WHO USES THE NOM
DE GUERRE ABU NIDAL.  THE GROUP'S ORIGINAL NAME WAS THE
BLACK JUNE ORGANIZATION WHEN IT WAS FORMED IN 1976.
IRONICALLY, THIS GROUP FIRST CONCENTRATED ON SYRIAN
TARGETS, INCLUDING AN ATTACK ON SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
KHADDAM, NOW VICE PRESIDENT, IN 1977.  (END NOTE) 

THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION'S MOVE TO SYRIA IN 1983 WAS
FOLLOWED BY A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN THE GROUP'S TERRORIST
ATTACKS:  MORE THAN A DOZEN ATTACKS IN 1984 AND TWICE
THAT NUMBER IN 1985.  MORE THAN HALF OF THE 1985 ATTACKS
OCCURRED IN WESTERN EUROPE, INCLUDING ATTACKS ON BRITISH
TOURISTS AT HOTELS IN ATHENS.   WHEN KING HUSSEIN
LAUNCHED HIS FEBRUARY 1985 PEACE INITIATIVE, JORDAN
BECAME A MAJOR TARGET.  BUT WHEN JORDANIAN-SYRIAN
RELATIONS BEGAN TO WARM IN MID-1985, ATTACKS ON
JORDANIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD DIMINISHED. 

IN ITS DEALINGS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES, SYRIA HAS
CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO PLAY DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS
CONNECTION WITH ABU NIDAL AND HAS DENIED PERMITTING HIS
GROUP TO ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY.  HOWEVER, THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE THAT DAMASCUS HAS ACTUALLY RESTRAINED ABU
NIDAL'S ACTIVITIES (ABU NIDAL TRAINING CAMPS IN THE
SYRIAN-CONTROLLED BIQA' VALLEY CONTINUE TO OPERATE FOR
EXAMPLE) OR CUT BACK ON OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT.  ALTHOUGH
IT MAY NOT KNOW ABOUT EVERY OPERATION, GIVEN THE AMOUNT
AND NATURE OF SYRIAN SUPPORT, DAMASCUS COULD INFLUENCE
AND CONSTRAIN THE ABU NIDAL GROUP'S ACTIVITIES IN SYRIA
AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON IF IT CHOSE TO DO
SO. 

OTHER SYRIAN-SUPPORTED PALESTINIAN GROUPS 

SYRIA ALSO PROVIDES VARYING AMOUNTS OF SUPPORT TO OTHER
RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS.  THESE INCLUDE:  SAIQA, WHICH
IS UNDER TOTAL SYRIAN CONTROL; THE ABU MUSA GROUP, NOW
ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS; THE POPULAR FRONT
FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE--GENERAL COMMAND
(PFLP-GC); AND THE MARXIST POPULAR FRONT FOR THE
LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), WHICH NOW MAINTAINS ITS
PRINCIPAL BASE IN DAMASCUS. 

IN ALL, SYRIAN-SPONSORED GROUPS, INCLUDING THE ABU NIDAL
ORGANIZATION, WERE LINKED TO ABOUT 30 TERRORIST ATTACKS
DURING 1985, A QUARTER OF THEM IN GREECE ALONE.  THE ABU
MUSA GROUP ANNOUNCED FROM DAMASCUS ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO BOMB AN EL AL AIRLINER, IN MADRID ON
JUNE 26 OF THIS YEAR.  THE SUSPECT IN THAT ATTEMPT HAS
ADMITTED BEING A MEMBER OF THE GROUP.  TWO WEEKS LATER,
OTHER GROUPS SUPPORTED BY SYRIA, THE PFLP AND THE
LEBANESE SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY, ATTEMPTED AN
ATTACK ON AN ISRAELI RESORT TOWN ON JULY 10, 1986. 

SUPPORT FOR NON-PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS 

IN ADDITION TO THE RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS, A VARIETY
OF OTHER TERRORISTS HAVE FACILITIES AND RECEIVED
TERRORIST TRAINING IN SYRIA OR SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF
LEBANON:  THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, THE KURDISH LABOR PARTY,
THE ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA
(ASALA), AND THE PAKISTANI AL ZULFIKAR.  IN ADDITION, THE
LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION (LARF) IS BASED IN
THE LEBANESE VILLAGE OF QUBAYAT, WITHIN THE AREA OF
SYRIAN CONTROL IN LEBANON. 

TO THESE GROUPS MUST BE ADDED THE INDIVIDUAL
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS WHO FREQUENT DAMASCUS.   BRUNO
BREGUET, AN ASSOCIATE OF CARLOS, THE INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST, WAS ARRESTED IN PARIS IN FEBRUARY 1982 FOR
TRANSPORTING ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES.  LATER RELEASED, HE WAS
RECENTLY SIGHTED ON A FLIGHT TO DAMASCUS, MET ON ARRIVAL
BY SYRIAN AUTHORITIES, AND ESCORTED THROUGH THE AIRPORT
WITHOUT HAVING TO PASS THROUGH THE NORMAL CONTROLS.
EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT FREDERIC ORIACH, A MILITANT MEMBER
OF THE  FRENCH ACTION DIRECT, SPENT JULY AND AUGUST 1986
IN DAMASCUS PURSUING IDEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY STUDIES. 

CASUALTIES AND CONTROL 

ATTACKS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS SINCE 1983 HAVE KILLED
OR WOUNDED NEARLY 500 PEOPLE. 

SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS HAVE ATTACKED U.S. FACILITIES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST OVER 10 TIMES SINCE 1983.  IN JORDAN LAST
YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SYRIAN-SPONSORED JORDANIAN PEOPLES
REVOLUTIONARY PARTY ATTEMPTED TWO ANTI-U.S. ATTACKS.
BOMBS WERE FOUND AT A USAID EMPLOYEE'S HOME AND AT THE
AMERICAN CENTER FOR ORIENTAL STUDIES.  THESE OPERATIONS,
AS WELL AS OTHERS AIMED AGAINST JORDANIAN TARGETS, HAVE
HALTED SINCE THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT LATE LAST
YEAR--UNDERSCORING SYRIA'S ABILITY, IF IT WISHES, TO
CONTROL ITS SURROGATES' ACTIVITIES AND TO SEVERELY CURB
THE CAPABILITY OF THOSE TO WHOM IT PROVIDED SAFE HAVEN
AND SUPPORT. 

THIS HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY A TOP SYRIAN OFFICIAL WHO
TRIED TO DISMISS, IN A WASHINGTON POST PRESS INTERV1EW
THIS SEPTEMBER, EVIDENCE THAT ABU NIDAL'S GROUP WAS
INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS.  SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
FAROUK CHARAA SAID IN DISCUSSING THE ACTIONS OF THE ABU
NIDAL GROUP:  "WHOEVER KNOWS MY GOVERNMENT MUST REALIZE
THAT SUCH ATTACKS COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ITS
AWARENESS."  (END TEXT OF FACT PAPER.) 

3.  (BEGIN TEXT OF CHRONOLOGY) 

CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY
SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS:  1983-1986 

 THE FOLLOWING LIST OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IS NOT
INTENDED TO BE ALL-INCLUSIVE BUT IS ILLUSTRATIVE OF
SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN AND SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND
TERRORIST GROUPS.  THE GROUPS CITED HERE HAVE LINKS WITH
SYRIA. 

1986 

26 NOVEMBER WEST BERLIN.  A COURT CONVICTED TWO ARABS FOR
        THE MARCH 29 BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB
        FRIENDSHIP UNION WHICH INJURED 11 PERSONS.  IN
        A SWORN STATEMENT ONE OF THE DEFENDENTS, AHMAD
        HASI, SAID HE PICKED UP THE BOMB AT THE SYRIAN
        EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN FROM A SYRIAN AIR FORCE
        INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.  HASI IS A BROTHER OF
        NIZAR HINDAWI, WHO WAS CONVICTED IN A BRITISH
        COURT FOR THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF AN EL AL
        AIRLINER. 

6 NOVEMBER  TURKEY.  TURKISH PROSECUTORS ISSUED AN
        INDICTMENT ACCUSING SIX PALESTINIANS WORKING
        FOR THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION OF KILLING A
        JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN JULY 1985.  AN ARREST
        WARRANT ALSO WAS ISSUED FOR THE SYRIAN EMBASSY
        SECOND SECRETARY, MOHAMMED DARWICHI, WHO WAS
        ONE OF THE ORIGINAL DEFENDENTS AND LEFT
        TURKEY.  THE INDICTMENT ALSO LINKED MEMBERS OF
        THE GROUP WITH FOUR OTHER ACTIONS:  THE
        SEPTEMBER 6, 1986 ATTACK ON AN ISTANBUL
        SYNAGOGUE, WHICH KILLED 22 PERSONS; AN ATTEMPT
        TO PLACE A BOMB ON AN ALITALIA FLIGHT IN 1983;
        THE ATTEMPTED CAR BOMBING OF A U.S. OFFICERS'
        CLUB IN IZMIR IN 1983, AND THE KILLING OF A
        PALESTINIAN STUDENT IN ANKARA IN 1982. 

26 JUNE     MADRID.  A SPANIARD ATTEMPTED TO BOARD AN EL
       AL FLIGHT WITH A SUITCASE BOMB, APPARENTLY
       WITHOUT KNOWING IT.  THE SUSPECT ARRESTED BY
       SPANISH POLICE CARRIED A SYRIAN PASSPORT.  A
       SPOKESMAN FOR THE ABU MUSA GROUP, WHICH IS
       ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS, CLAIMED
       RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANTING THE BOMB, ALTHOUGH
       THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT DENIED INVOLVEMENT. 

17 APRIL  LONDON.  EL AL SECURITY DISCOVERED A SYRIAN-MADE
      BOMB IN THE LUGGAGE OF AN IRISH WOMAN AS SHE
      ATTEMPTED TO BOARD A PLANE FOR TEL AVIV.  A
      BRITISH COURT FOUND HER BOYFRIEND, NIZAR
      HINDAWI, GUILTY OF THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING, AND
      THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD
      CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN OFFICIAL
      INVOLVEMENT IN THE TERRORIST ACT. 

2 MARCH   WEST BANK.  TWO GUNMEN ASSASSINATED THE MAYOR OF
      NABLUS, ZAFER AL-MASRI, A PALESTINIAN APPOINTED
      BY ISRAEL.  BOTH THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND THE
      POPULAR FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
      CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

1985 

27 DEC.   ROME AND VIENNA.  ABU NIDAL TERRORISTS
      SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTACKED EL AL TICKET COUNTERS IN
      THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORTS, KILLING MORE THAN
      20 PEOPLE, INCLUDING FIVE AMERICANS, AND
      WOUNDING SOME 120 OTHERS.  (ALTHOUGH THESE
      ATTACKS WERE COMMITTED UNDER LIBYAN SPONSORSHIP,
      REPORTS ON THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION INDICATE
      THAT THE ROME TERRORIST TEAM RECEIVED TRAINING
      IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON AND PASSED
      THROUGH DAMASCUS.) 

30 SEPT.  NETHERLANDS.  A SMALL BOMB DAMAGED THE EL AL
      OFFICE OF AMSTERDAM.  FATAH REVOLUTIONARY
      COUNCIL--THE ABU NIDAL GROUP'S OFFICIAL
      NAME--CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

25 SEPT.  ITALY.  A BOMB EXPLODED IN A BRITISH AIRWAYS
      OFFICE IN ROME, INJURING 15 PEOPLE.  POLICE
      ARRESTED HASSAN ITAB FLEEING THE SCENE.  ITAB
      CLAIMED HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
      ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, AN ABU NIDAL
      "COVER" NAME, AND WAS LATER IDENTIFIED BY
      WITNESSES AS THE SAME MAN WHO THREW A GRENADE AT
      THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN ATHENS IN MARCH. 

18 SEPT.  GREECE.  MICHEL NIMRI, A JORDANIAN MAGAZINE
      PUBLISHER AND REPORTEDLY A PERSONAL FRIEND OF
      YASSIR ARAFAT, WAS ASSASSINATED IN ATHENS.
      BLACK SEPTEMBER, A NAME USED BY THE ABU NIDAL
      GROUP, CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY THE NEXT DAY. 

16 SEPT.  ITALY.  A GRENADE ATTACK ON A ROME SIDEWALK CAFE
      INJURED 38 TOURISTS, INCLUDING NINE AMERICANS.
      POLICE ARRESTED A PALESTINIAN IN CONNECTION WITH
      THE ATTACK.  THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF
      SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, ANOTHER SYRIAN-LINKED GROUP,
      CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY ON 19 SEPTEMBER. 

3 SEPT.   GREECE.  TERRORISTS THREW HAND GRENADES THAT
      WOUNDED 19 BRITISH TOURISTS AT THE GLYFADA HOTEL
      IN ATHENS.  BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED THE ATTACK
      WAS TO PRESSURE THE GREEK AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE
      A MAN ARRESTED NEAR THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY ON 31
      AUGUST. 

31 AUGUST GREECE.  POLICE ARRESTED A HEAVILY ARMED MAN
      NEAR THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ATHENS.  SAMIR
      SALAMEH ACKNOWLEDGED MEMBERSHIP IN BLACK
      SEPTEMBER AND CLAIMED HE PLANNED TO ASSASSINATE
      THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR. 

8 AUGUST  GREECE.  A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE KITCHEN OF THE
      LONDON HOTEL IN ATHENS, INJURING 13 PEOPLE--NINE
      OF THEM BRITISH SUBJECTS.  THE REVOLUTIONARY
      ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS CLAIMED
      RESPONSIBILITY, CONTENDING THE HOTEL WAS A
      "HIDEOUT" FOR BRITISH SPIES. 

24 JULY   TURKEY.  THE FIRST SECRETARY AT THE JORDANIAN
      EMBASSY IN ANKARA WAS ASSASSINATED BY A LONE
      GUNMAN.  THE INCIDENT WAS CLAIMED BY BLACK
      SEPTEMBER. 

11 JULY   KUWAIT.  TWO BOMBS EXPLODED WITHIN MINUTES OF
      EACH OTHER KILLING EIGHT PEOPLE AND INJURING 89
      IN TWO CAFES ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS APART.  THE
      ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED
      RESPONSIBILITY. 

1 JULY    SPAIN.  A BOMB EXPLODED AT THE BRITISH AIRWAYS
      TICKET OFFICE IN MADRID, ALSO DAMAGING THE TWA
      OFFICE UPSTAIRS.  THE ALIA ROYAL JORDANIAN
      AIRLINES TICKET OFFICE NEARBY WAS HIT BY
      AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE AND TWO GRENADES THAT
      FAILED TO EXPLODE.  ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND 27
      WERE WOUNDED.  CLAIMED BY ORGANIZATION OF THE
      OPPRESSED, REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF
      SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, AND BLACK SEPTEMBER. 

4 APRIL   GREECE.  A ROCKET WAS FIRED AT A JORDANIAN
      AIRLINER AS IT WAS TAKING OFF FROM ATHENS
     AIRPORT.  THE PROJECTILE HIT THE PLAN BUT DID
     NOT EXPLODE.  BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED
     RESPONSIBILITY. 

3 APRIL   ITALY.  A ROCKET NARROWLY MISSED THE JORDANIAN
     EMBASSY ON THE FIFTH FLOOR OF AN OFFICE BUILDING
     IN ROME.  NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.  BLACK
     SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

21 MARCH  ITALY.  THREE UNIDENTIFIED MEN THREW HAND
     GRENADES INTO A JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN
     ROME, INJURING TWO PEOPLE.  BLACK SEPTEMBER
     CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

21 MARCH  GREECE.  AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW A HAND
     GRENADE INTO THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN
     ATHENS, INJURING THREE PEOPLE.  CLAIMED BY BLACK
     SEPTEMBER.  (SEE SEPTEMBER 25, 1985 INCIDENT.) 

21 MARCH  CYPRUS.  AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW TWO HAND
     GRENADES INTO THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN
     NICOSIA.  CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 

9 MARCH   UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.  A BOMB WAS FOUND ON A
     JORDANIAN AIRLINER.  THE YOUNG PALESTINIAN WHO
     CARRIED THE BOMB ONTO THE KARACHI-TO-AMMAN
     FLIGHT SAID HE THOUGHT HE WAS TRANSPORTING DRUGS
     TO SUPPORT ABU NIDAL TERRORIST OPERATIONS. 

22 FEB.   JORDAN.  THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY
     PARTY PLACED A BOMB AT THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR
     ORIENTAL RESEARCH IN AMMAN.  THE BOMB WAS FOUND
     AND DEFUSED. 

10 JAN.   JORDAN.  A BOMB PLANTED BY THE JORDANIAN
     PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS DEFUSED NEAR A
     USAID EMPLOYEE'S HOME.  THE EXPLOSIVES HAD
     NEITHER A POWER SOURCE NOR A TIMING DEVICE. 

1984 

29 DEC.   JORDAN.  TWO UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN ASSASSINATED
     FAH AL-QAWASMEH, A MEMBER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE
     COMMITTEE AND FORMER MAYOR OF HEBRON, OUTSIDE
     HIS HOME IN AMMAN.  TWO WITNESSES TO THE
     SHOOTING WERE INJURED BY GUNFIRE AS THEY TRIED
     TO BLOCK THE ASSASSINS' FLEEING VEHICLE.  BLACK
     SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

14 DEC.   ITALY.  ISMAIL DARWISH, A LEADING MILITARY
      FIGURE IN THE FATAH MOVEMENT, WAS GUNNED DOWN ON
      A ROME STREET BY AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN WHO FLED ON
      A WAITING MOTOR SCOOTER.  ARAB REVOLUTIONARY
      BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

4 DEC.    ROMANIA.  THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION OF THE
       JORDANIAN EMBASSY WAS SHOT AND KILLED AS HE WAS
      GETTING INTO HIS CAR IN BUCHAREST.  BLACK
      SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

2 DEC.    JORDAN.  A GUARD DISCOVERED A BOMB CONCEALED IN
       AN ATTACHE CASE INSIDE THE AMERICAN LIFE
       INSURANCE AND CITIBANK BUILDING IN AMMAN.  BOMB
       TECHNICIANS DEFUSED THE DEVICE, WHICH CONTAINED
       18 BLOCKS OF TNT AND A TIMER.  THE JORDANIAN
       PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS LATER
       DETERMINED TO BE RESPONSIBLE. 

4 OCT.    CYPRUS.  A CAR BOMB EXPLODED BEHIND THE ISRAELI
       EMBASSY IN NICOSIA, SLIGHTLY INJURING ONE
       PERSON.  CLAIMED BY ABU MUSA'S FATAH DISSIDENT
       ORGANIZATION. 

13 AUGUST JORDAN.  JORDANIAN POLICE DEFUSED A BOMB
       CONSISTING OF SEVERAL HUNDRED GRAMS OF
       SOVIET-MADE EXPLOSIVES NEAR THE RESIDENCE OF A
       US EMBASSY OFFICIAL.  THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S
       REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS LATER DETERMINED TO BE
       RESPONSIBLE. 

11 AUGUST JORDAN.  MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S
       REVOLUTIONARY PARTY TRIED TO SET OFF A BOMB
       OUTSIDE THE JORDAN RADIO AND TELEVISION
       STATION.  THE BOMB WAS DISCOVERED AND DEFUSED. 

3 AUGUST  JORDAN.  A BOMB EXPLODED UNDER A WATER TRUCK
       PARKED NEAR THE U.S. EMBASSY WAREHOUSE IN
       AMMAN.  THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND ONLY MINOR
       DAMAGE.  THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED
       RESPONSIBILITY. 

29 MAY    CYPRUS.  A FORMER SAIQA OFFICER WHO HAD SWITCHED
       HIS ALLEGIANCE TO ARAFAT, ABDULLAH AHMAD
       SULEIMAN EL SAADI, WAS MURDERED IN LIMASSOL.
       FOUR SYRIAN MEN AND TWO WOMEN WERE ARRESTED FOR
       THE MURDER AND SUBSEQUENTLY DEPORTED FROM CYPRUS. 

3 MAY     CYPRUS.  AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN SHOT AND KILLED
      PALESTINIAN PUBLISHER HANNA MUQBIL AND WOUNDED
      HIS SECRETARY IN NICOSIA.  MUQBIL WAS REPORTEDLY
      A FORMER MEMBER OF ABU NIDAL WHO HAD DEFECTED TO
      ARAFAT'S CAMP. 

24 MARCH  JORDAN.  A BOMB WAS DEFUSED OUTSIDE THE BRITISH
      CONSULATE IN AMMAN.  THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED
      RESPONSIBILITY. 

24 MARCH  JORDAN.  A BOMB WAS DISCOVERED AND DEFUSED
      OUTSIDE THE BRITISH CULTURAL CENTER.  THE ABU
      NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

24 MARCH  JORDAN.  A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE PARKING LOT OF
      THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, WHICH IS ACROSS THE
      STREET FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY, DAMAGING TWO
      VEHICLES AND SLIGHTLY INJURING A USAID EMPLOYEE
      AND HIS DAUGHTER.  A SECOND BOMB WAS DISCOVERED
      IN THE PARKING LOT AND DEFUSED.  THE ABU NIDAL
      GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

1983 

29 DEC.   SPAIN.  TWO JORDANIAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEES WERE
      ATTACKED BY A LONE GUNMAN AS THEY WERE LEAVING
      THE EMBASSY.  WALID JAMAL BALKIS WAS KILLED
      INSTANTLY, AND IBRAHIM SAMI MOHAMMED WAS
      SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.  THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY
      BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

19 DEC.   TURKEY.  A CAR BOMB WAS DISCOVERED IN AN
      ABANDONED RENTAL CAR MIDWAY BETWEEN THE FRENCH
      CULTURAL HOUSE AND THE CORDON HOTEL USED BY
      AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IZMIR.  THE
      BOMB'S TIMER APPARENTLY MALFUNCTIONED.  TURKISH
      POLICE LINKED THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND SYRIAN
      AGENTS TO THE INCIDENT. 

7 NOV.    GREECE.  TWO SECURITY GUARDS OF THE JORDANIAN
      EMBASSY WERE WOUNDED ON A CROWDED STREET IN
      ATHENS.  ONE OF THE TWO VICTIMS DIED FROM HIS
      WOUNDS.  THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED
      RESPONSIBILITY. 

26 OCT.   ITALY.  THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE VATICAN
      AND HIS DRIVER WERE WOUNDED IN AN ASSASSINATION
      ATTEMPT IN ROME.  THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY
      BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

25 OCT.   INDIA.  JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR WOUNDED BY AN
     UNKNOWN ASSAILANT IN NEW DELHI.  CLAIMED BY THE
     ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 

13 OCT.   JORDAN.  TWO HAND GRENADES WERE THROWN INTO A
     POLICE BARRACKS IN AMMAN.  A MEMBER OF THE
     POLICE RECRUITED BY SAIQA CONFESSED TO THE
     ATTACK.  LOCAL AUTHORITIES SUSPECTED THAT ABU
     NIDAL ELEMENTS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. 

21 AUGUST GREECE.  A HIGH-LEVEL PLO OFFICIAL, MA'MUM
     MURAYSH, WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED
     MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE.  THE VICTIM'S SON AND HIS
     DRIVER WERE WOUNDED.  THE MOVEMENT FOR
     REBUILDING FATAH CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

10 APRIL  PORTUGAL.  THE PLO OBSERVER TO AN INTERNATIOAL
     CONFERENCE OF SOCIALISTS, ISAM AL-SARTAWI, WAS
     SHOT TO DEATH IN A HOTEL LOBBY.  SARTAWI'S
     SECRETARY WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK.
     THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

1 JANUARY ISRAEL.  A GRENADE ATTACK ON A CIVILIAN BUS IN
     TEL AVIV INJURED 12.  BOTH SAIQA AND ABU NIDAL
     CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

(END TEXT OF CHRONOLOGY.) 

4.  MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT, KABUL, MOSCOW, AND
LENINGRAD. 

SHULTZ

SECRET: URGENT DEMARCHE TO GOA

VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8040 3392140
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 042134Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0000
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 128040 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ ES RO AS EN
SUBJECT: URGENT DEMARCHE TO GOA 

REF: BAGHDAD 03794 

Classified By: DAS G Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d 

Summary
------- 

1. (S) Department requests that Embassy Canberra demarche
the Australian Government on the way forward in the GOA's
negotiations with the Government of Iraq on an agreement
to permit Australian forces to remain in Iraq after the
expiration of the UNSCR 1790 mandate for the multinational
force.  Please report GOA response, in particular any
indication that the GOA will communicate with its mission
in Baghdad.  Info addressee posts should feel free to use
points below as the basis of their own approaches to host
government on this issue. Please slug replies for EAP/ANP,
NEA/I, and S/I.  End Summary. 

Background
---------- 

2. (S)  As the GOI moves beyond the process of gaining
agreement for the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, it
is focusing on the terms for the continued presence of
four Coalition partners (Australia, Romania, El Salvador
and Estonia) beyond December 31. (The British are engaging
with the GOI at the highest level and have made
significant progress on a mechanism to permit them to stay
in Iraq.) Regarding the other four, the GOI made clear its
conditions for agreement: 1) that the Government will not
present any more security agreements to the Council of
Representatives (COR) and 2) that the forces of the four
must conduct non-combat missions. The GOI is pressing for
the simplest exchange of letters or diplomatic notes or
signed MOUs to permit continued operations. 

3. (S) The Australians have a high-level team in Baghdad
and are working with the GOI but to date remain
convinced that they need an agreement that would require
COR approval. Given the importance of the Australian
staff officers to MNF-I operations in Iraq, it would be
most helpful for Embassy Canberra to press the GOA to
look for a mechanism short of COR ratification to allow
the continued presence of its military officers. 

Points
-------- 

4. (S/REL AS EN ES RO UK) Department suggests that the
demarche be based on the following points: 

--Now that the U.S. has concluded its complex
negotiations with the GOI for a bilateral security
agreement, the GOI is focused on negotiating terms to
allow Coalition partners to remain in Iraq. 

--The U.S. strongly supports the presence of Australian
staff officers in MNF-I beyond January 1, 2009 and
Australia's other significant contributions to Operation
Iraqi Freedom. 

--The GOI has made it clear that Australia's continued
presence will be in a non-combat assistance capacity. 

--PM al-Maliki has stated that he will not present any
other bilateral security agreements to the COR. 

--Canberra should explore whether there are other
mechanisms that would allow Iraq to conclude a legally
binding agreement without the approval of the COR. Such
arrangements or agreement could be in the form of an
exchange of diplomatic notes or a MOU, and draw upon
relevant provisions in the U.S. Security Agreement with
Iraq in order to establish a basis for the continued
presence of Australian officers in Iraq. 

Additional Point As Appropriate
-------------------------------
5. If this remains an issue: We understand that the GOA
wishes to include its combat forces in TF158 in its
bilateral agreement. We recommend that this be addressed
separately given the GOI's position against combat
missions for coalition forces and that the GOA focus on
a security agreement covering the Australian staff
officers embedded with MNF-I only. 

Reporting Deadline
------------------ 

6.  Embassy should report results of efforts by cable to
the Department before December 12. 

7.  Please contact EAP/ANP's Aleisha Woodward or NEA/I's
Shaun Mandelkorn for any necessary further background
information or argumentation to meet our objectives.
RICE

SECRET: STATUS OF COALITION PARTNERS IN IRAQ; RECOMMENDED DEMARCHE FOR AUSTRALIA

VZCZCXRO7603
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3794/01 3381547
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031547Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0674
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0038
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0072
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE 0018
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0012
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003794 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ ES RO AS EN
SUBJECT: STATUS OF COALITION PARTNERS IN IRAQ; RECOMMENDED DEMARCHE FOR AUSTRALIA

Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) This is an action request, see paragraph 11. 

2. (S) Summary:  As the GOI moves beyond the process of
gaining agreement for the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, it is
focusing on the terms for the continued presence of four
Coalition partners (Australia, Romania, El Salvador and
Estonia) beyond December 31. (The British are engaging with
the GOI at the highest level and have made significant
progress on a mechanism to permit them to stay in Iraq.)
Regarding the other four, the GOI made clear its conditions
for agreement: 1) that the Government will not present any
more security agreements to the Council of Representatives
(COR) and 2) that the forces of the four must conduct
non-combat missions.  The GOI is pressing for the simplest
exchange of letters or diplomatic notes or signed MOUs to
permit continued operations. 

3. (S) Summary Continued: An Estonian parliamentary
delegation recently visited Iraq and an MOD official remained
behind to continue discussions with us and the GOI.  The
Salvadoran Defense Minister and team will be in Iraq December
5.  The Australians have a high-level team in Baghdad and are
working with the GOI but to date remain convinced that they
need an agreement ratified by the COR.  Given the importance
of the 42 Australian staff officers to MNF-I operations in
Iraq, we request the Department consider sending an urgent
demarche to Canberra pressing the GOA to look for a mechanism
short of COR ratification to allow the continued presence of
its military officers.  Additionally, NATO is proceeding to
formalize the GOI's strong interest in the continuation of
NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) and will renew an exchange
of letters with the GOI, citing the U.S. Security Agreement
in lieu of the UNSCR. End Summary. 

4. (S) Following the adoption by the COR of the U.S. Security
Agreement, the GOI has clearly stated its conditions for the
continued presence of the remaining four Coalition partners
(Australia, Romania, El Salvador and Estonia).  The PM has
made it absolutely clear in discussions with the Ambassador
and MNF-I CG Odierno that it will not support any further
agreements which require COR ratification.  The GOI has also
reiterated that the continued presence of these Coalition
forces will be in a "non-combat" assistance capacity. The
British are conducting high-level discussions with the GOI to
provide protection and conduct specific combat missions. 

5. (S) Instead of engaging in another campaign with the
various political factions in the COR, PM Nouri al-Maliki has
said he strongly prefers an exchange of diplomatic notes or a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) referencing provisions in
the U.S. Security Agreement. 

6. (S) Post has met repeatedly and at various levels with the
Australians concerning a suitable agreement.  The GOA remains
convinced that in order for any such agreement to be binding,
it must be ratified by the COR.  The Australians have 42
staff officers embedded within the Multi-National Forces Iraq
(MNF-I) in key positions.  Additionally, the Australians
participate in TF158 operating in Iraqi waters to protect
Iraq's oil installations.  The Australians understand the
complexity of including combat forces (TF158) in their
Qcomplexity of including combat forces (TF158) in their
agreement and may be willing to drop this in order to focus
on the non-combat embedded officers. 

7. (S) Given the clear position of PM al-Maliki and the
importance of the Australians to MNF-I, we recommend the
Department consider sending an urgent demarche to Canberra
recommending that the GOA consider an exchange of diplomatic
notes with the GOI, referencing provisions in the U.S.
Security Agreement.  We also recommend that Australia agree
to limit its agreement to the 42 embedded staff officers
currently serving with MNF-I (See proposed points in
paragraph 11). 

8. (S) Mati Raidma, Chairman of the National Defense Council of the Estonian Parliament, led a visit by Estonian Parliament Members to Baghdad last week, accompanied by MOD officials, to participate in discussions with the GOI on Estonia's continued presence in Iraq. One MOD official remained behind to follow up on these talks. Post met with the Estonian delegation and advised they pursue an exchange of diplomatic notes with the GOI, also reiterating that Estonia's continued presence would be in a non-combat assistance capacity. The Estonian Members were clear on this matter and in a meeting with the Iraqi Minister of Defense on November 27, did not raise the issue of Estonian forces conducting combat operations. We linked the Estonians with the Australians to facilitate their understanding of the negotiating process, while focusing on an exchange of diplomatic notes rather than COR ratification. The Salvadoran MOD will visit Iraq on December 5, at which time Post will advise the same course of action.

9. (S) As for Romania, its Embassy is engaged on this matter
and we are supporting their efforts.  Post has advised
Romania to consider a similar approach to Estonia through an
exchange of diplomatic notes, referencing provisions in the
U.S. Security Agreement. 

10. (S) NTM-I was invited by PM al-Maliki on January 29 to
remain in Iraq until the end of 2009.  NTM-I's current legal
status is derived from an exchange of letters between NATO
and the GOI, referencing the UNSCR.  NATO has approved a
draft exchange of letters and NATO Assistant Secretary
General for Operations Martin Howard will travel to Baghdad
next week to negotiate the exchange of letters. 

---------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------- 

11. (S) Post recommends that the Department consider
instructing our Embassy in Canberra to urgently demarche the
GOA to suggest strongly that the GOA consider an exchange of
diplomatic notes or other legal mechanism that does not
require action by the COR, referencing provisions in the U.S.
security agreement.  Post suggests that the demarche be based
on the following points: 

- Now that the U.S. has concluded its complex negotiations
with the GOI for a bilateral security agreement, the GOI is
focused on negotiating Coalition security agreements. 

- The U.S. strongly supports the presence of Australian staff
officers in MNF-I beyond January 1, 2009 and Australia's
other significant contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

- The GOI has made it clear that Australia's continued
presence will be in a non-combat assistance capacity. 

- PM al-Maliki has stated that he will not present any other
bilateral security agreements to the COR. 

- Canberra should strongly consider an exchange of diplomatic
notes or a MOU with the GOI, referencing provisions in the
U.S. Security Agreement with Iraq in order to establish a
basis for the continued presence of Australian officers in
Iraq. 

AS APPROPRIATE IF THIS REMAINS AN ISSUE: We understand that
the GOA wishes to include its combat forces in TF158 in its
bilateral agreement.  We recommend that this be addressed
separately given PM al-Maliki's position against combat
forces and that the GOA focus on a security agreement
covering the Australian staff officers embedded with MNF-I
only. 

CROCKER

CONFIDENTIAL: EXTENDED NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS OVER HIGH SEAS

P R 281848Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USCINCSO
CINCLANT
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
UNCLASSIFIED BUENOS AIRES 2481 

Original Telegram was Confidential but has since been
de-classified 

--------------------------------------------- ----
Copy from the National Archives
RG 59: General Records of the Department of state
1964-66 Central Foreign Policy File
File: POL 33-4 ARG
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

E.O. 12958: DECL: DECLASSIFIED BY NARA 09/02/2009
TAGS: EFIS PBTS AR
SUBJECT:  EXTENDED NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS OVER HIGH SEAS 

REF: STATE 106206 CIRCULAR; STATE CA-3400 NOV 2, 1966 

1.  PRESS REPORTS AND VARIETY EMBASSY SOURCES CONFIRM
NEW ARGENTINE LEGISLATION UNILATERALLY CHANGING SEAS JURIS-
DICTION NOW UNDER ADVANCED REVIEW.  REPORTEDLY LAW WOULD
ESTABLISH SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA, PLUS ANOTHER SIX MILES
OF EXCLUSIVE FISHING JURISDICTION, PLUS ANOTHER EXTENDED ZONE
OF "PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION" FOR FISHING PURPOSES.  DRAFT-
LAW UNDER CONSIDERATION IN ARGENTINE SENATE BEFORE JUNE 28
COUP WOULD HAVE DEFINED ZONE OF PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION
AS "EPICONTINENTAL SEA OUT TO 200 METER ISOBAR".  IN SOUTHERN
ARGENTINA THIS ZONE SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES WIDE AND BLANKETS
FALKLAND ISLANDS. 

2.  NAVATT STATES ARGENTINE NAVY THINKING OF PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION OUT TO 200 MILES (AS IN PERU, ECUADOR, CHILE)
RATHER THAN EPICONTINENTAL SEA.  200 MILE LIMIT DOES NOT
RPT NOT REACH FALKLANDS.  ARGENTINE NAVY OFF TOLD NAVATT
"200 MILE LIMIT SOON WILL BE STANDARD THROUGH HEMISPHERE". 

3.  FONOFF OFFICIALS REFERRING TO RECENT BRAZILIAN AND US
LEGISLATION HAVE INFORMALLY INDICATED DECISION ALREADY
FINAL RE SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA PLUS SIX MILE EXCLUSIVE
FISHING JURISDICTION, BUT THAT "PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION"
STILL UNDER STUDY.  TWO FONOFF MEN VOLUNTARILY AND INFORMALLY
SOUGHT EMBASSY REACTION TO POSSIBLE EXTENDED PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION BY SUGGESTING THAT US IN FACT HAS ACCEPTED
UNILATERALLY CREATED ECUADORIAN, PERUVIAN AND CHILEAN 200 MILE
LIMITS.  EMBOFF REJECTED IDEA US ACCEPTS THESE LIMITS IN ANY
WAY AND POINTED OUT 1965 AMENDMENTS TO AID LEGISLATION AIMED
AT FURTHER PROTECTING US FISHING RIGHTS. 

4.  FONOFF LEGAL ADVISOR CONCEDES DISTINCTION BETWEEN
"EXCLUSIVE" AND "PREFERENTIAL" FISHING JURISDICTION A SEMANTIC
NICETY.  HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IN ZONE OF "PREFERENTIAL" JURIS-
DICTION ARGENTINA WOULD CLAIM RIGHT TO TAX, LICENSE AND OTHER-
WISE CONTROL ALL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EXPLOITATION OF
RESOURCES OF SEA. 

5.  DRAFT LEGISLATION ON SEAS JURISDICTION LAY DORMANT UNTIL
SUDDEN AND SUBSTANTIAL IN FISHIN ARGENTINE EPICONTINENTAL SEAS
BY CUBAN AND EAST EUROPEAN (ESPECIALLY SOVIET) VESSELS PAST
SIX MONTHS ALARMED ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES.  (SEE NAVATT IR
5-804-0-140-66 OF NOV 18) NOT RPT NOT ALL SOVIET VESSELS WERE
FISHING OR FACTORY TYPES.  FONOFF SOURCES INFORMALLY STATE
ARMED FORCES PRESSURE MAKES EMISSION NEW LAW IMPERATIVE, QUITE
POSSIBLY APPEARING WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS.  WHEN ASKED BY FONOFF
MEN ABOUT "SECURITY PROBLEMS CREATED BY SOVIET TRAWLERS OFF US
COAST", EMBASSY OFF REPLIED US DID NOT RPT NOT SEE THAT
UNILATERAL ATTEMPT TO EXTEND SEAS JURISDICTION OFFERED ANY
REALISTIC SOLUTION FOR POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS, WHILE SUCH
ACTION COULD CREATE NEW SOURCES POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING AND
CONFLICT. 

6.  RE PAR 3 STATE 106206 BELIEVE OUTLINED PROPOSAL MIGHT
FORESTALL UNILATERAL ARGENTINE ATTEMPT TO SUBSTANTIALLY EXTEND
"PREFERENTIAL" FISHING JURISDICTION ONLY IF EMBASSY CAN BE
AUTHORIZED DISCUSS IDEA WITH ARGENTINES IMMEDIATELY. EVEN THEN
CHANCES SUCCESS LIMITED BY (A) ADVANCED STAGE PROPOSED ARGENTINE
LAW AND (B) PRIMACY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ARGENTINE THINKING.
WE WOULD BENEFIT SOME FROM FONOFF LEGAL ADVISORS' QUALMS ABOUT
UNILATERAL ACTION, AND FROM RESTRAINT OF RECENT BRAZILIAN
LEGISLATION WHICH DID NOT RPT NOT GO BEYOND 12-MILE LIMIT. 

7.  FOR DISCUSSION WITH ARGENTINES WOULD MODIFY TEXT IN STATE
10942 CIRCULAR TO:  (A) MAKE ALL REFERENCES TO ARGENTINA, VICE
CANADA; (B) REFER TO PROPOSED ARGENTINE CLAIMS OF PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION OVER WATERS WE REGARD AS HIGH SEAS; (C) ELIMINATE
REFERENCES TO "TRADITIONAL DISTANT WATER FISHERIES", SINCE
ARGENTINE COAST NOT RPT NOT TRADITIONAL FISHING ZONE (WHEREAS
NO. 3);  (D) ADD NOTATION THERE NO TRADITIONAL FISHING AND
CONFINE OPERATIVE AGREEMENT TO PROVISIONS FOR NON-TRADITIONAL
FISHING; (E) ELIMINATE LAST THREE PARS OF AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED
TO CANADIAN AMB. 

8.  IF AUTHORIZED, ENVISAGE TWO-STEP APPROACH TO FONOFF.
FIRST, INFORMAL AND ORAL, STRESSING OUR INTEREST IN FREEDOM OF
HIGH SEAS, NOTING EARLIER FONOFF CONFIRMATION NEW LAW UNDER
STUDY, OUTLINING OUR PROPOSAL IN GENERAL TERMS.  ON BASIS
FONOFF REACTION, WE WOULD THEN COUCH AIDE-MEMOIRE IN TERMS
WHICH WOULD APPEAR MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED. 

GP-3
SACCIO

TOP-SECRERT: 1989 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT FOR THE UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 03111 

S/CT FOR WHARTON 

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PTER UK
SUBJECT:  1989 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT FOR THE UK 

REF:  STATE 363024 

MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1989
--------------------------------------------- ----
1.  THROUGHOUT 1989, AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREAT TO THE UK AND UK INTERESTS
WERE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OUTLAWED PROVISIONAL IRISH
REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE
ACTIVITIES OF OUTLAWED PROTESTANT TERRORIST GROUPS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND.  THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
CAUSED THE DEATHS OF 62 PEOPLE  IN 1989, INCLUDING 14
MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND 9 POLICEMEN KILLED IN
TERRORIST ATTACKS.  PIRA TERRORIST ATTACKS ON TARGETS IN
BRITAIN AND IN MAINLAND EUROPE RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF
AN ADDITIONAL FIFTEEN UK ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL OR THEIR
FAMILY MEMBERS IN 1989. 

2.  HMG CONTINUED IN 1989 TO DEMAND INFORMATION FROM
LIBYA ABOUT ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PIRA, INCLUDING
DELIVERIES OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS OF EXPLOSIVES,
ARMAMENTS, AND AMMUNITION IN LARGE QUANTITIES.  DESPITE
CONTINUING OCCASIONAL CAPTURES OF PIRA ARMS AND SUPPLIES
IN 1989, THE PIRA WAS BELIEVED STILL TO HAVE ENOUGH
LIBYAN-SUPPLIED ARMS TO SUSTAIN ITS DESTRUCTIVE
TERRORIST CAMPAIGN FOR AT LEAST A DECADE. 

3.  THE FATWA -- OR DEATH EDICT -- OF IRAN'S AYATOLLAH
KHOMEINI AGAINST THE BRITISH AUTHOR SALMAN RUSHDIE ON 14
FEBRUARY 1989 LED TO WIDESPREAD PUBLIC DISTURBANCES
AMONG ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES IN BRITAIN AND ABROAD.  THERE
WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF BOMBINGS OF BOOKSTORES SELLING
RUSHDIE'S BOOK "SATANIC VERSES."  THREATS AGAINST
PUBLISHERS AND MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES REQUIRED POLICE
PROTECTION.  UK AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AND DEPORTED 23
IRANIANS ON NATIONAL SECURITY GROUNDS IN 1989. 

4.  BRITISH POLICE PROVIDED ROUND-THE-CLOCK PROTECTION
FOR SALMAN RUSHDIE THROUGHOUT THE REST OF 1989 TO
PREVENT HIS MURDER BY MUSLIM FANATICS WHO MIGHT SEEK TO
CARRY OUT THE "SENTENCE OF DEATH" AGAINST THE AUTHOR.
HMG OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS
TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES THAT THE UK HELD IRAN DIRECTLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ACTION TAKEN AGAINST BRITISH OR
OTHER NATIONALS AS A RESULT OF THE FATWA. 

5.  UK AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN 1989 TO INVESTIGATE THE
BOMBING OF PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 103 OVER LOCKERBIE,
SCOTLAND IN DECEMBER 1988.  THE INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN
EXTREMELY FAR-REACHING AND COSTLY BUT HAS RESULTED IN
CONSIDERABLE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT AND IN
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEMS
AND PROCEDURES.  UK INVESTIGATORS HAVE WORKED CLOSELY ON
THE CASE WITH CRIMINAL SPECIALISTS AND FORENSIC
SCIENTISTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FRG, AND OTHER
CONCERNED COUNTRIES.  BRITAIN SHARES A POSITION OF
LEADERSHIP IN THE WORLD-WIDE EFFORT TO CONCLUDE NEW
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON AVIATION SECURITY, CONTROL
OF EXPLOSIVES, AND THE SHARING OF INFORMATION AND
TECHNOLOGY TO COMBAT TERRORIST THREATS TO CIVIL AVIATION. 

6.  THE UK PROVIDES TRAINING, ADVICE, AND MATERIAL
ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES TO ASSIST THEIR OWN
EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORIST THREATS. 

7.  THE UK IS ACTIVE IN THE UN, THE EC, AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL FORA IN EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND
PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN EFFORTS
TO ISOLATE AND PENALIZE COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM. 

RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
-------------------------------
8.  UK COURTS IN BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND CONTINUED
IN 1989 TO PROSECUTE CASES AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE PIRA
AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE
DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. 

9.  BECAUSE OF THE SIGNIFICANT THREAT OF PIRA TERRORIST
ATTACKS IN THE UK, BRITAIN CONTINUED IN 1989 TO EXERCISE
THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF LAW CONTAINED IN THE 1984
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT.  THE ACT, AMONG ITS OTHER
ELEMENTS, ENABLES SPECIAL COURTS TO OPERATE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND DESPITE THE PERSISTENT THREAT OF PIRA TERRORISM
AGAINST JUDGES AND JURIES. 

10.  THERE ARE OUTSTANDING UK ARREST WARRANTS AGAINST
PIRA TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SEVERAL
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.  UK AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN 1989 TO
COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH OFFICIALS IN IRELAND, BELGIUM,
THE NETHERLANDS, THE FRG, FRANCE, AND OTHER COUNTRIES
DEALING WITH INCIDENTS OF PIRA TERRORISM AND ATTEMPTING
TO ARRANGE EXTRADITION OF PIRA MEMBERS WANTED FOR
TERRORIST ATTACKS. 

CATTO

SECRET: FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD 17 MARCH STATEMENT

R 201307Z MAR 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2276
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN
UNCLAS BEIRUT 01725 

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PTER PREL LE
SUBJECT:  FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD 17 MARCH STATEMENT 

1.  AP PROVIDED EMBASSY WITH FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC
JIHAD STATEMENT AS TELEPHONED MARCH 17 TO
REUTERS AND AFP. 

2.  BEGIN TEXT: 

"THE ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION IN THE NAME OF GOD
THE ALL MERCIFUL.  THE PUNISHMENT OF THOSE IS THE
CURSE OF GOD, THE ANGELS AND ALL PEOPLE.  THE DETENTION
OF TERRY ANDERSON, BRIAN LEVICK AND JERRY (GEOFFRY?)
NASH COMES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR CONTINUING
OPERATIONS AGAINST AMERICA AND ITS AGENTS.  WE ARE
DEFINITE THAT ISLAMIC BEIRUT IS FULL OF AGENTS FROM
ALL SIDES AND ACCORDINGLY WE ARE WORKING DAY AND
NIGHT TO PURGE OUR REGION OF ANY SUBVERSIVE ELEMENT
OF THE  MOSSAD, CIA OR ALLIED INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES.  WE ADDRESS A FINAL WARNING TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS RESIDING  IN OUR ISLAMIC REGIONS TO
RESPECT OUR HOSPITALITY AND NOT TO EXPLOIT THEIR
PRESENCE AMONG US TO UNDERTAKE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
AGAINST US.  ASSUMING THE PROFESSION OF A JOURNALIST,
MERCHANT, INDUSTRIALIST, SCIENTIST AND RELIGIOUS
MAN WILL FROM NOW ON BE OF NO AVAIL TO SPIES
STAYING AMONG US.  THEY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED, AND THEIR
PUNISHMENT IS WELL KNOWN.  ON THE OTHER HAND, WE
LEARNED THAT SWITZERLAND IS PLANNING TO BUY WEAPONS
AND PILOTLESS RECONNAISSANCE PLANES FROM THE
ZIONIST STATE.  WE WARN BERNE AGAINST MAKING SUCH
A STEP AS IT WILL REMOVE FROM IT ITS NEUTRAL
CHARACTER AND THREATEN ITS INTERESTS, ESTABLISHMENTS
AND NATIONALS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC AND WESTERN WORLD."
"WE HAVE DELAYED RELEASING THIS
STATEMENT UNTIL THE THREE WERE TAKEN OUTSIDE BEIRUT."
END TEXT. 

3.  INDIVIDUAL TAKING CALL SAID IT WAS FROM
THE "USUAL" MAN WHO CALLED, SPEAKING LEBANESE
ACCENTED ARABIC, ABOUT 1900 ON MARCH 17. 

BARTHOLOMEW

SECRET: FURTHER ON HIZBALLAH “MANIFESTO”

O 191237Z FEB 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1805
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
UNCLAS BEIRUT 01013 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

E.O. 12356:  NA
TAGS: PGOV PINT PTER LE IR
SUBJECT:  FURTHER ON HIZBALLAH "MANIFESTO" 

REF:  BEIRUT 992 

1.  AS REPORTED REFTEL, HIZBALLAH PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 16
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN LEBANON A POLITICAL "MANIFESTO."
HIZBALLAH'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, AS CITED FROM THE
MANIFESTO BY THE LOCAL FRENCH-LANGUAGE PRESS, FOLLOW. 

BEGIN TEXT. 

--  THE DEPARTURE OF THE ISRAELIS, PRELUDE TO THE
ANNIHILATION OF ISRAEL AND THE LIBERATION OF THE HOLY CITY
OF JERUSALEM. 

--  THE DEFINITIVE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE UNITED
STATES, FRANCE, AND THEIR ALLIES AND THE END OF THE
INFLUENCE OF ANY COLONIALIST STATE OVER THE COUNTRY. 

--  THE JUDGMENT OF PHALANGE PARTY MEMBERS FOR ALL THE
CRIMES THEY HAVE COMMITTED AGAINST MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS,
WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. 

--  THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL THE SONS OF OU
PEOPLE, AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE OF THE POLITICAL REGIME
WHICH THEY DESIRE. 

WE DO NOT HIDE, HOWEVER, OUR PREFERENCE FOR AN ISLAMIC
REGIME AND CALL ON EVERYONE TO CHOOSE IT, BECAUSE IT ALONE
GUARANTEES JUSTICE AND DIGNITY FOR ALL AND PREVENTS ANY
ATTEMPTS AT NEOCOLONIALIST INFILTRATION INTO OUR COUNTRIES 

END TEXT. 

2.  ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS, THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES
WERE CONTAINED IN A FIFTY-PAGE MANIFESTO ENTITLED "OPEN
LETTER TO THE OPPRESSED OF LEBANON AND THE WORLD."  THE
MANIFESTO WAS PRESENTED BY SHEIKH HASSAN GHIBRISS,
SPOKESMAN OF THE "HIZBALLAH NATION," TO A GATHERING OF
ABOUT 1000 SUPPORTERS ON FEBRUARY 16 IN THE SOUTHERN
BEIRUT SUBURB OF SHIYAH. 

3.  SEVERAL SHIITE AND SUNNI RELIGIOUS LEADERS REPORTEDLY
ATTENDED THE GATHERING, MOST NOTABLY SHEIKHS SOBHI TUFAYLI
HASSAN NASRALLAH, AND JALAL EDDIN ARKANDAN.  HOWEVER, BOTH
HIZBALLAH "SPIRITUAL GUIDE" SHEIKH FADLALLAH AND TAWHIID
MOVEMENT LEADER SHEIKH SHA'BAN WERE ABSENT DUE TO THEIR
CURRENT VISIT TO IRAN WHERE, ACCORDING TO LEBANESE
TELEVISION, THEY WERE RECEIVED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ON
FEBRUARY 15. 

4.  WE WOULD ALSO DRAW ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION TO FBIS
GF190720 AND GF190722 IN WHICH TEHRAN RADIO REPORTS
A MEETING ON FEBRUARY 16 BETWEEN SHEIKH FADLALLAH AND
GRAND AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI FOLLOWING WHICH THE TWO
RELIGIOUS LEADERS CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON. 

BARTHOLOMEW

TOP-SECRET: THE HIZBALLAH “MANIFESTO”

P 050846Z MAR 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2022
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 01351 

E.O. 12356:  NA
TAGS: PINT PTER LE
SUBJECT:  HIZBALLAH "MANIFESTO" 

REF:  BEIRUT 1013 

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN
FEBRUARY 23 "MIDDLE EAST REPORTER."  IT SUMMARIZES
48-PAGE HIZBALLAH TRACT ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 16 (REFTEL).
EMBASSY HAS REQUIRED ORIGINAL ARABIC-LANGUAGE TEXT OF
FULL MANIFIESTO, WHICH WE WILL POUCH TO INR AND
NEA/ARN. 

BEGIN TEXT. 

"HIZBULLAH" DEFINES ITS MILITANT POLICY
--------------------------------------- 

"HIZBULLAH" (PARTY OF GOD) HAS NOW PUBLICLY DEFINED ITS
POLICY, GOALS AND IDEOLOGY.  AS A GROUP OF FUNDAMENTALIST
SHIITES, THEY ARE DEDICATED TO PROMOT ISLAM ON THE
PATTERN OF KHOMEINI'S REVOLUTION IN IRAN.  THEY DERIVE
THEIR APPELATION FROM TWO KORANIC VERSES WHICH READ:
(1) "AND WHO SO TAKETH ALLAH AND HIS MESSANGER AND THOSE
WHO BELIEVE FOR FRIEND (WILL KNOW THAT), LO* THE PARTY
OF ALLAH THEY ARE THE VICTORIOUS." (SURAH 5/56); (2)
"THOU WILT NOT FIND FOLK WHO BELIEVE IN ALLAH AND HIS
MESSENGER, EVEN THOUGH THEY BE THEIR FATHERS OR THEIR
SONS OR THEIR BRETHREN OR THEIR CLAN.  AS FOR SUCH, HE
HATH WRITTEN FAITH UPON THEIR HEARTS AND HATH STRENGTHENED
THEM WITH A SPIRIT FROM HIM, AND HE WILL BRING THEM INTO
GARDENS UNDERNEATH WHICH RIVERS FLOW, WHEREIN THEY WILL
ABIDE.  ALLAH IS WELL PLEASED WITH THEM, AND THEY ARE
WELL PLEASED WITH HIM.  THEY ARE ALLAH'S PARTY, LO* IS
IT NOT ALLAH'S PARTY WHO ARE THE SUCCESSFUL.  (SURAH
58/22-23). 

ANNIVERSARY: MARKING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE
VIOLENT DEATH OF THE MOSLEM CLERIC SHEIKH RAGHEB HARB,
THE IMAM OF THE VILLAGE OF JABSHIT IN SOUTH LEBANON,
"HIZBULLAH" STAGED A MASS RALLY AT THE CHIYAH SUBURB
SATURDAY, FEB. 16, 1985.  SHEIKH HARB WAS A STAUNCH
OPPONENT OF ISRAEL OCCUPATION, AND AN ADVOCATE OF
"HIZBULLAH" AND THE RISE OF A PAN-ISLAMIC "NATION OF THE
PARTY OF GOD."  HE WAS ASSASSINATED REPORTEDLY BY
ISRAEL'S AGENTS IN HIS NATIVE VILLAGE ON FEB. 16, 1984. 

THE ORGANIZATION SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE THE
ACCUSATION THAT IT WAS A HAND OF TERRORISTS.  IT UNDER-
LINED ITS ALLEGIANCE TO "WELAYAT AL FAQIH" (RULE OF THE
THEOLOGIAN) UNDER IRAN'S AYATULLAH RUHALLAH KHOMEINI.
AMERICA, FRANCE, ISRAEL AND THE PHALANGE PARTY WERE
DECLARED AS ITS PRIME ENEMIES.  IT DESCRIBED THE PRESENT
LEBANESE SYSTEM AS "DESPOTIC" AND RENOUNCED THE REGIME
OF PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL. 

OPENING THE MEETING, SHEIKH GHABRIS SAID THAT "HIZBULLAH"
WAS "MISLEADINGLY DESCRIBED AS A HANDFUL OF FANATICS BENT
ON KILLING, PLUNDER AND ROBBERY;" AND THAT THEY WERE
"BLAMED FOR EVERY UNPLEASANT INCIDENT."  "BUT," HE
EMPHASIZED, "IT WAS "HIZBULLAH" WHICH ACTIVATED THE
(FREEDOM) FIGHTERS AND EXPELLED THE ENEMY." 

MANIFESTO: LATER SHEIKH IBRAHIM AL AMIN READ OUT AT THE
RALLY A 48-PAGE "MESSAGE" DEDICATED TO THE "MARTYR
SHEIKH RAGHEB HARB" WHICH WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A MANIFESTO
OF THE PARTY. (SEE MER OF FEB. 19, PAGE ').  THIS WAS
THE FIRST TIME "HIZBULLAH" DEFINED ITS MILITANT POSITION
AND IDEOLOGY SINCE IT MADE ITS IMPACT ON LEBANESE
POLITICS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS.  THE MESSAGE IDENTIFIED
THE MOSLEM FUNDAMENTALIST MEMBERS OF "HIZBALLAH" AS "THE
CHILDREN OF THE NATION WHOSE VANGUARD IN IRAN WAS
BESTOWED WITH VICTORY." 

"THIS VANGUARD," THE MESSAGE WENT ON, "HAS LAID THE
FOUNDATION OF A PAN-ISLAMIC STATE UNDER THE WISE GUIDANCE
OF THE FULLY QUALIFIED FAQIH AYATULLAH RUHALLAH KHOMEINI.
"HIZBULLAH" MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT HAD NO CARD-CARRYING
MEMBERS, "BUT IT IS LINKED TO ALL MOSLEMS IN THE WORLD
BY THE STRONG IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL BOND OF ISLAM." 

EAST AND WEST:  THE STATEMENT ATTACKED THE "HAUTY" POWERS
OF THE EAST AND WEST ALIKE.  IT SAID: "AMERICA HAS TRIED,
THROUGH ITS LOCAL AGENTS, TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT
THOSE WHO DESTROYED ITS ARROGANCE IN LEBANON AND FOILED
ITS CONSPIRACIES WERE BUT A HANDFUL OF FANATIC TERRORISTS
WHO HAVE NO MISSION BUT TO BLOW UP LIQUOR STORES,
GAMBLING CASINOS AND AMUSEMENT MACHINES." 

THE STATEMENT POINTED OUT THAT SUCH PRACTICES WERE ONLY
MARGINAL DEALING WITH THE TAIL INSTEAD OF THE HEAD. "WE
ARE HEADED FOR DEALING WITH EVIL AT THE ROOTS, AND THE
ROOTS ARE AMERICA," IT SAID, AND STRESSED THAT NOTHING
WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER FIGHTING THE U.S.
"HIZBULLAH" BELIEVES THAT BOTH WESTERN CAPITALISM AND
EASTERN COMMUNISM HAVE FAILED TO PROVIDE THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE MASSES.  "THE ANSWER LIES IN THE MISSION OF ISLAM,"
IT SAID. 

DEMANDS:  THE DECLARATION DEMANDED: 1. COMPLETE EVACUATION
OF ISRAEL ARMY FROM LEBANON "AS A PRELUDE FOR THE REMOVAL
OF ISRAEL FROM EXISTENCE AND LIBERATING JERUSALEM FROM
CLAWS OF OCCUPATION."  2. "AMERICA, FRANCE AND THEIR
ALLIES MUST LEAVE LEBANON ONCE AND FOR ALL, AND ANY
IMPERIAL INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRY MUST BE TERMINATED."
3. "THE PHALANGISTS MUST BE SUBJECTED TO JUSTICE AND BE
BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR ALL THE CRIMES THEY HAVE COMMITTED
AGAINST THE MOSLEMS AND THE CHRISTIANS WITH ENCOURAGEMENT
FROM AMERICAN AND ISRAEL."  4. "ALL OUR LEBANESE PEOPLE
MUST BE GIVEN THE CHANCE OF DETERMINING THEIR FUTURE
AND CHOOSES THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT, BEARING
IN MIND THAT WE WILL NOT GIVE UP OUR COMMITMENT TO THE
RULE OF ISLAM." 

POLITICAL "MARONISM":  THE POLICY OF THE LEADERS OF
"POLITICAL MARONISM" AS IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE "LEBANESE
FRONT" AND THE "LEBANESE FORCES" MILITIA CAN NEVER
ACHIEVE PEACE OR STABILITY FOR THE CHRISTIANS, SAID
"HIZBULLAH".  "IT IS A POLICY BASED ON FANATICISM,
SECTARIAN PRIVILEGES AND ALLIANCE WITH IMPERIALISM AND
ISRAEL," IT ADDED. 

UNIFIL:  THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE
(UNIFIL) OPERATING IN SOUTH LEBANON, IS ACCUSED
BY "HIZBULLAH" OF STANDING AS A "BUFFER" IMPEDING
THEIR RESISTANCE AND "MAINTAINING ISRAELI'S
SECURITY AND INVADING FORCES."  "HIZBULLAH"
DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHOWDOWN
WITH UNIFIL "IF IT CONTINUED TO CONNIVE WITH THE
ENEMY." 

OTHER ARAB STATES "ANXIOUSLY SEEKING PEACE WITH
ISRAEL" ALSO CAME UNDER FIRE FROM "HIZBULLAH".
THEY WERE URGED INSTEAD TO CLOSE THEIR RANKS,
DEFINE THEIR AIMS PRECISELY AND BREAK THE
FETTERS RESTRICTING THEIR WILL. 

MARCH:  ARMED MEMBERS OF "HIZBULLAH WERE REPORTED
TO HAVE MARCHED INTO SIDON MONDAY, FEB. 18,
AND TORE LEBANESE FLAGS AND PICTURES OF PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL.  (SEE MER OF FEB. 19, PAGE 2).  THEY
SMASHED A NUMBER OF STORES AND SUPER MARKETS
SELLING LIQUOR, AND RAISED IRANIAN FLAGS AND
PORTRAITS OF THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADER
AYATULLAH KHOMEINI.  THE ACTION WAS SEEN AS A
BACKLASH TO THE VISIT TO THE CITY THE DAY BEFORE
BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL JEERED BY THE ARMED DEM-
ONSTRATORS "THE SHAH OF LEBANON". 

THE GEMAYELS:  IN ITS STATEMENT, "HIZBULLAH"
LASHED OUT AGAINST PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL AND HIS
BROTHER THE LATE BASHIR.  IT SAID:  "THE BUTCHER
BASHIR HAD REACHED THE PRESIDENCY WITH THE
HELP OF ISRAEL, THE ARAB OIL PRINCES AND SYCOPHANT
MOSLEM MPS FLATTERING THE PHALANGISTS." 

"THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY AN ATTEMPT TO RECTIFY HIS
REPUGNANT IMAGE BY AN EXERCISE CALLED THE
"SALVATION COMMITTEE," WHICH WAS BUT AN
AMERICAN-ISRAELI BRIDGE USED BY THE PHALANGISTS
TO ACHIEVE CONTROL OVER THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE.
HOWEVER, OUR PEOPLE COULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH
HUMILIATION.  THEY DASHED THE DREAMS OF THE
ZIONISTS AND THEIR ALLIES.  AMERICA NEVERTHELESS,
PERSISTED IN ITS FOLLIES AND BROUGHT (PRESIDENT)
AMIN GEMAYEL TO SUCCEED HIS BROTHER.  THE FIRST
THING HE DID WAS TO DESTROY THE HOUSES OF THE
DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM THE SOUTH, DEFILE THE
ISLAMIC MOSQUES, ORDER THE ARMY TO BOMBARD THE
DOWN-TRODDAN SUBURB AND DESTRUCT  THE HOUSES
ON THEIR OCCUPANTS, AND TO CALL IN NATO FORCES
TO HELP HIM AGAINST US, CONCLUDE THE NOTORIOUS
17 MAY ACCORD WITH ISRAEL WHICH WOULD HAVE
TRANSFORMED LEBANON INTO AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE
OR AN AMERICAN COLONY." 

U.S. AND NATO:  "HIZBULLAH" DECLARED "CLEARLY
AND FRANKLY" THAT "WE FEAR NO ONE BUT GOD, AND
WE CANNOT TOLERATE INJUSTICE, AGGRESSION AND
HUMILIATION."  IT WENT ON TO ANNOUNCE:  "THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO PARTNERS AND THE
ZIONIST STATE WHICH HAS USURPED THE HOLY ISLAM
LAND OF PALESTINE, HAVE EXERCISED, AND ARE STILL
EXERCISING AGGRESSION ON US WITH A VIEW TO
HUMILIATING US.  WE, THEREFORE, ARE ALWAYS ON
THE ALERT AND CONSTANTLY GIRDING OURSELVES TO
REPEL THE AGGRESSION AND DEFEND OUR RELIGION,
EXISTENCE AND DIGNITY."  END TEXT. 

LYNE

CONFIDENTIAL: HIZBALLAH CALLS FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN LEBANON

P 181159Z FEB 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1795
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
UNCLAS BEIRUT 00992 

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINT PTER LE
SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH CALLS FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN LEBANON 

1.  IN A STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN BEIRUT NEWSPAPERS ON
FEBRUARY 18, HIZBALLAH DECLARED ITS ALLEGIANCE TO
AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND PLEDGED TO ESTABLISH "REVOLUTION-
ARY ISLAMIC RULE" IN LEBANON.  STATEMENT DENIED THAT
HIZBALLAH WOULD ESTABLISH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST RULE
BY FORCE, BUT "WE DO NOT HIDE OUR COMMITMENT TO
ISLAMIC RULE, AND WE CALL ON ALL PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THIS
REGIME.  WE WILL FIGHT ABSOLUTISM TO ITS ROOTS." 

2.  STATEMENT IS REPORTED BY LOCAL PRESS TO BE
HIZBALLAH'S FIRST PUBLIC MANIFESTO. 

BARTHOLOMEW

SECRET: PEACE COMMISSIONER TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT PENDING PROBLEMS WITH DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES

VZCZCXYZ0014
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DE RUEHBO #4988/01 1561613
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5636
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6861
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7791
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN LIMA 3853
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
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RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004988 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT PENDING
PROBLEMS WITH DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES 

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

1.  (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said in a May
26 meeting with Ambassador Wood that he expects dissident
factions of the paramilitary groups to demobilize soon.  The
GOC expects to confront the few remaining paramilitary groups
who refused to lay down their arms.  Restrepo said the GOC is
concerned about the emergence of a new generation of criminal
organizations, and called on the Prosecutor General's Office
(Fiscalia) to begin Justice and Peace legal processing as
soon possible.  End summary. 

---------------------------------
LAST TWO DEMOBILIZATIONS EXPECTED
--------------------------------- 

2.  (C) Restrepo noted that the last two groups to demobilize
are the final faction of the Elmer Cardenas Bloc and the
Cacique Pipinta.  The Constitutional Court's press release on
the Justice and Peace (J&P) Law on May 18, however, had
persuaded them to postpone their demobilization until after
the presidential election.  This 800-strong faction of the
Elmer Cardenas Bloc, which was a dissident AUC bloc in Choco
and Antioquia departments, is led by one of the founders of
the AUC and a loyal friend of former AUC leader Carlos
Castano, AKA "El Aleman."Restrepo explained that the reason
behind the delay in demobilizing is that the GOC has not been
able to supply the necessary security in this crucial
corridor that leads to Panama.  The fear by the locals is
that the FARC, which is currently located in the south of
Choco Department, would take over once the bloc demobilizes. 

3.  (C) The CaciquiPipinta Bloc, which is a dissident
faction of the Central Bolivar Bloc, is made up of some 300
men that operate in the north of Caldas Department.  Even
though this group is linked with AUC political leader Ernesto
Baez, Restrepo explained that it really does not belong to
anyone, and the group members do not accept orders from Baez.
 The faction's leaders have told Restrepo they have not
wanted to associate themselves with Baez and other more
recognized AUC leaders like "Macaco" because they did not
want to link themselves with narcotrafficking.  Restrepo
noted that this group is mainly known to be involved in
extortion. 

--------------------------------------------- --------
REMAINING AND RE-EMERGING GROUPS, A MAJOR GOC CONCERN
--------------------------------------------- -------- 

4.  (C) Restrepo warned that the GOC was not going to accept
the demobilizations of any additional groups besides Elmer
Cardenas and Cacique Pipinta.Restrepo had already
instructed the Operational Community for Laying Down Arms
(CODA), which certifies the demobilization of the individual
deserters, not to accept anymore AUC members.  He thought it
was important that the GOC demonstrate its willingness to
confront these groups. 

5.  (C) One group that has chosen not to demobilize, the
Martin Llanos Bloc, located in Casanare Department, has been
in inconclusive talks with the GOC for sometime now.
Restrepo described his talks with this group among the most
difficult and complicated.  Restrepo said he gets the
"chills" every time he talks to them.  Their philosophy is
very similar to the FARC; they want the GOC to offer them
territory to control.  According to Colombian intelligence
reports, some factions of this bloc are being regrouped into
new criminal organizations led by Hector Buitrago, who is the
father of Martin Llanos. 

6.  (C) Restrepo explained that the GOC is calling this
phenomenon the "new emerging anti-communist criminal groups," 

of which there are between 10 to 30 (reftel).  One of the
most prominent is the New Generation Group (ONG) located in
the Pacific Coast of Narino Department and led by former
paramilitary leader "Varela," who has been associated with
the North Valle drug cartel.  Other groups that are becoming
well-known around the country are the "Aguilas" (Eagles) and
"Halcones" (Falcons). 

7.  (C) In a conversation Restrepo had with former AUC
founder Carlos Castano in 2003, Castano warned he was fearful
of the possibility of new groups forming whose membership
included former members of the mafia, AUC, and FARC.  This
combination would be very dangerous and hard to detect since
they would have the know-how and experience of the three
groups and they would operate in small groups of 8 to 10 men. 

8.  (C) The Ambassador related his most recent trip to Tumaco
on the Pacific Coast and how concerned he was with the
vulnerability of this region where problems of
overpopulation, poverty, drugs, lack of infrastructure, and
ELN and FARC pressure converged.  In conversations with
locals, he heard of the growing presence of the ELN and their
gradual involvement in the drug trade.  ELN fronts in Narino
appear to be independent from the ELN's Central Command
(COCE).

--------------------------------------------- ----
JUSTICE AND PEACE LISTS ON HOLD: FISCALIA FEARFUL
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

9.  (C) Restrepo warned the Fiscalia must start processing
those on the Justice and Peace list soon to avoid the risk of
"a return to the mountains".  Restrepo expressed frustration
with the Ministry of Interior and Justice (MoIJ) and the
Fiscalia for sitting on the lists that he turned in over a
month ago.  He said it took him three months to convince over
2,284 paramilitaries to sign up for J&P and now this effort
might be in vain.  Of the 2,284, only 200 to 250 had open
cases, which meant that over 2,000 were willing to testify to
things the State was not aware of or did not have sufficient
information about.  Moreover, there were 2,400 individuals in
prisons who have included their names on the lists.  This was
a historic opportunity that could go to waste if the Fiscalia
did not act quickly.  According to Restrepo, the Fiscalia
should at least focus on the 200 paramilitary leaders who
have open cases. 

10.  (C) Restrepo understood that the Fiscalia has been
unable to process all these cases at once, but should try to
focus its resources on this endeavor.  Instead, between the
MoIJ and the Fiscalia, they have been sending messages back
and forth to his office, in his view, to obstruct movement on
the lists.  Restrepo noted that his relationship with
Minister of Interior and Justice SabasPretelt was worsening.
Pretelt was constantly meeting with paramilitary leaders and
"speaking badly about him behind his back."  Restrepo said
Pretelt and Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran are fearful of
what is to come: Pretelt, because he will have a hard time
fulfilling the behind-the-scenes promises he made to these
individuals, and Iguaran, because he is primarily responsible
for the success of this process.  Restrepo criticized Pretelt
for having a poor understanding of the reality of the former
combatants.  For example, in a Cabinet meeting, Pretelt
reported that over 70 percent of demobilized paramilitaries
are currently employed and the true figure is close to 7
percent.  (In a May 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Pretelt
said 11,675 former paramilitaries are employed in one form or
another, or about 35 percent of the total.) 

--------------------------------------
ARMS BEING TURNED OVER TO THE FISCALIA
-------------------------------------- 

11.  (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador the GOC was in the
process of handing over to the Prosecutor General's Office
(Fiscalia) 128 tons of arms turned in by the demobilized 

paramilitaries.  The GOC would like to consolidate these arms
in one location as soon as possible since they are located in
23 different cites around the country.  The GOC's
Antiterrorist Analysis Interinstitutional Group
(GIAT)--responsible for registering the trafficking of
weapons--has already recorded and identified the origin of
the arms (septel).  The Fiscalia is supposed to use GIAT
records in its investigations and help determine which are to
be deposited or destroyed.  Restrepo said, for security
reasons, all explosive material that was turned over by the
demobilized blocs had already been destroyed.  Anecdotally,
Restrepo commented that in just one of the demobilizations,
1,500 grenades were handed over in a truck as if they had
been potatoes. 

------------------------------
AMBASSADOR WILL VOICE CONCERNS
------------------------------ 

12.  (C) The Ambassador said the GOC needs to do a better job
at monitoring the demobilized paramilitaries and cracking
down on these newly formed criminal groups (septel).  This
process cannot be voluntary; the State needs to go after
those unwilling to cooperate.  If there are insufficient
resources, the GOC needs to refocus its efforts.  The USG has
authorized aid to the GOC, but the monies cannot be delivered
if the GOC does not show strong commitment to the process.
WOOD

SECRET: SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8302 0870151
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 242145Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 7721-7722
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0298-0299
S E C R E T STATE 028302 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CAPTION ADDED 

SIPDIS
NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS ETTC TU VE IR
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA 

REF: A. ANKARA 3
B. ANKARA 126 

Classified By: EUR/PRA Dir. Anita Friedt,
Reason 1.4 (b), (c) and (d) 

----------
BACKGROUND
----------- 

1. (S//NF) Venezuelan officials expected to receive a
shipment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and related
material from Iran, via Turkey, by May 2009. As of early
March, Venezuelan officials believed that the equipment would
be repackaged and labeled as electronic equipment, then
transported overland from Iran to Turkey. Once in Turkey,
the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime vessel for
continued shipment to Venezuela. The U.S. believes this
shipment constitutes arms and related materiel, which Iran is
prohibited from transferring pursuant to UN Security Council
Resolution 1747, paragraph 5. 

2. (S) This case appears to be similar to one from January
2009 where Iran attempted to ship drums of nitrate and
sulphite chemicals and dismantled laboratory instruments,
which could possibly be used for making bombs to Venezuela
via Turkey. In response to U.S. concerns that the shipment
may have been a violation of UNSCR 1747, Turkish officials
inspected the cargo and made a decision to return it to Iran.
(REFS A and B) 

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
-------------- 

3. (S) Drawing from the points in paragraph 5, which may be
left as a nonpaper, post is instructed to approach
appropriate-level Turkish officials and request that they
investigate this activity, and if the cargo is found to be in
violation of UNSCR 1747 that the GOT use all available means
to prevent the transshipment of this cargo and detain it. 

----------
OBJECTIVES
---------- 

4. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:
-- Provide Turkish officials with information regarding
Iran,s attempt to ship unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
related material to Venezuela via Turkey; 

-- Emphasize to the Turkish officials that UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran
from transferring any arms or related materiel; 

-- Emphasize that these goods are produced by an Iranian
entity listed in the Annex to UNSCR 1747. 

-- Urge the Government of Turkey (GOT) to take action against
this shipment pursuant to UNSCR 1747 and possibly 1737, and
in accordance with the GOT's laws and authorities; 

-- Thank the GOT for its willingness to interdict and take
positive action with regards to a similar shipment in
January. As a NATO Ally, we try to provide Turkey with as
much info as possible on these issues, which could help lead
them to take action in detaining shipments; and
-- Emphasized that, should we receive additional information
regarding this shipment, we will provide it as expeditiously
as possible. 

------------------------
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
------------------------ 

5. (S//REL Turkey) Begin talking points/non-paper: 

--We would like to share some information with you in an
effort to highlight a transfer of proliferation concern and
to ensure that Iran does not make use of your territory to
transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions
1737, 1747, and 1803. 

-- The U.S. has information indicating that Venezuelan
officials expected to receive a shipment of UAV and
UAV-related equipment from Iran by May 2009. 

-- As of early March, Venezuelan officials believed that the
equipment would be repackaged and labeled as electronic
equipment, then transported overland from Iran to Turkey.
Once in Turkey, the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime
vessel for continued shipment to Venezuela. 

--Venezuelan officials assessed that a shipment of
electronics coming from Turkey to Venezuela would be less
alerting than a shipment directly from Iran. 

--We believe these items are military UAVs and related items,
constituting arms and related materials and are thus captured
by UNSCR 1747 and subject to the asset freeze called for in
UNSCR 1737. 

-- UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5,
prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring any
arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and
whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of
Iran. 

--This system is produced by the Qods Aviation Industries. 

-- Qods Aeronautics Industries (aka Qods Aviations
Industries) is designated in the Annex to UNSCR 1747 and as
such these items would be subject to the asset freeze
provision of UNSCR 1737 regardless of whether the item is
MTCR- controlled or otherwise prohibited in paragraphs 3 or 4
of the resolution. 

-- As such, we request your assistance in preventing the
transfer of goods in violation of UNSCR 1747 and 1737. 

-- Additionally, it is possible that some UAV-related
equipment may be MTCR-controlled, per MTCR Item 12.A.1., if
the equipment is designed or modified to support other
Iranian UAVs that meet the Item 1.A.2. or 19.A.2. criteria.
Such items are included in document S/2006/815, the list of
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to
ballistic missile programs. Transfer of these items would be
a violation of UNSCR 1737 per paragraph 3. 

-- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued
cooperation, support and willingness to enact prompt and
thorough efforts in promoting interdictions designed to
prevent the transfer of sensitive materials by Iran. 

END POINTS. 

---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
--------------------- 

6. (U) Post is instructed to report results of its efforts
as soon as possible. 

-----------------
POINTS OF CONTACT
----------------- 

7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are and
Margaret Mitchell, ISN/CATR (mitchellmt2@state.gov) and Matt
Hardiman, EUR/PRA. 

8. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please
slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, IO, WHA, and T.
CLINTON

SECRET: ITALY: PM BERLUSCONI IN BROAD AGREEMENT

VZCZCXRO4386
PP RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #0726 1611152
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091152Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0438
INFO RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 3074
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 9416
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 3223
S E C R E T ROME 000726 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2023
TAGS: PREL NATO ETRD IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: PM BERLUSCONI IN BROAD AGREEMENT ON KEY
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) a...

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2023
TAGS: PREL NATO ETRD IT

1. (C/NF) The Ambassador met June 6 with PM Silvio Berlusconi
and U/S Gianni Letta to frame issues President Bush may
discuss with Berlusconi during their June 12 bilateral
meeting in Rome.  Berlusconi said he saw no problematic
issues in the U.S.-Italian relationship.  In office for less
than one month, Berlusconi indicated his government's
thinking on several matters was still evolving. 

2. (C/NF) The Ambassador said the President may discuss
lifting caveats in Afghanistan, increasing pressure on Iran,
Italian energy security, and Lebanon.  Independently,
Berlusconi raised GMOs, which he described as "the only way
to feed the world," noting that the current situation had
reinforced his support for GMOs. 

3. (S/NF) Afghanistan: The Ambassador thanked Berlusconi for
Italy's commitments in Afghanistan and urged Berlusconi to
lift caveats, especially geographic ones limiting freedom of
movement.  The Ambassador noted these prevented Italian
Carabinieri from providing on-site training and mentoring to
Afghan police.  Letta said the GOI was committed to
increasing operational flexibility for Italian soldiers
deployed to Afghanistan and was working on how it would do
that.  The Ambassador also told Berlusconi that we continue
to receive disturbing reports of Italians paying-off local
warlords and other combatants.  Berlusconi agreed this should
stop. 

4. (C/NF) Iran: The Ambassador complimented Berlusconi for
the recent tough tone his government has taken on Iran and
said the President would want to discuss how to increase
pressure on the Iranian regime.  Berlusconi called
Ahmadinejad a "crazy nut" who must be isolated and asked how
his government should respond to Italian companies asking
about doing business in Iran.  The Ambassador replied firmly,
no new investments. 

5. (C/NF) Energy Security: The Ambassador told Berlusconi the
President was keenly interested in energy security and
praised favorably recent positions taken by government
figures in support of nuclear power generation. He added that
while we are not anti-Russia, Europe's (including Italy's)
over-reliance on Russia for its energy needs was a serious
concern.  Berlusconi agreed, saying his government will
pursue several avenues toward energy diversification while
noting that Italy's energy dependence required strong
relations with Russia. 

6. (C/NF) Lebanon: The Ambassador told Berlusconi the
President would likely be interested in his views on Lebanon
and UNIFIL.  Letta responded that the government was still
reviewing its thinking on Lebanon. 

7. (C/NF) COMMENT: Berlusconi is very much looking forward to
the President's visit, sees himself and Italy as being on the
same page as the U.S., virtually across the board, and will
be ready to discuss all of the above issues with POTUS on
June 12.
SPOGLI

SECRET: ITALY: FM D’ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE,

VZCZCXRO7040
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DE RUEHRO #0710/01 0961009
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FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7637
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0550
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0310
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0369
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0651
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0359
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0464
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0939
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 4301
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0219
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2310
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0430
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8544
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2462
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0733
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0393
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

DEPT. FOR EUR 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE,
MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR

REF: A. STATE 36991
     B. STATE 37005
     C. STATE 41871
     D. STATE 42573
     E. ROME 625
     F. ROME 702 

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 

SUMMARY
------- 

1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a
clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo
and was told that the FM did not think he could or should
control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in
Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the
Afghan Government.  During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the
Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said
Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East
peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians
would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where
everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM),
and the Abu Omar case.  The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the
request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees
to help speed the closure of the facility.  D'Alema said
trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy
could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on
Guantanamo).  End Summary. 

Afghanistan and Emergency Now
----------------------------- 

2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister
D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda.
The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino
Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was
threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the
Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for
possible terrorist affiliations.  The Amb. said such an
unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked
if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats.
D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him
that if his employees are going to be arrested in
Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that
doesn't arrest his staff.  D'Alema told the Amb. that all
sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan
Government had evidence against the individual being held, it
should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access
to the detained individual.  Then, somewhat exasperated, he
said, "Strada is who he is.  He runs an NGO. He is not part
of the Italian Government.  He says they cannot work in
Helmand without having contact with the Taliban.  He thinks
the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there.
We have urged him to be prudent.  But we do not control him
and he feels threatened."  D'Alema then said that during the
Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were
traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses
could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be
reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would
not win this war. 

Kosovo - Firm Support for Status
-------------------------------- 

3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on
the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion
and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful.
D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the
Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be
touched").  Italy continued to believe that some non-status
issues, like protection of religious sites and minority
rights, however, could still be improved.  He said there were
two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter
would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from
under the European mission to Kosovo.  He argued that a UNSCR
was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a
proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something
conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to
Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence.
 Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he
said.  He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with
Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support
Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and
without new negotiations.  The Ambassador asked if D'Alema
could make a public statement to that effect.  D'Alema agreed
to do so. 

Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance
------------------------------------  

4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were
proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when
action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had
already been moved.  D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was
coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere.  He
added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week
to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested
vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah.  D'Alema
asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules.  We are in
compliance.  But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions
and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the
group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran,
despite being a UNSC member." 

Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity?
--------------------------------------------- -- 

5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent
helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept
the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would
meet with them.  The FM said he feared a moment of
opportunity was being lost.  Abu Mazen was stronger than
before but needed to find a way to get results out of his
dialogue with Olmert.  Both sides, he said, need to be pushed
and encouraged.  Without progress the risk of violence would
increase.  He suggested what was needed now was a confidence
building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing
prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting
more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security
assurances for Israel.  The Palestinians, he said, would
never accept an independent state within provisional borders,
because they believe this means they will never get final
status issues resolved.  He envisions an eventual regional
final status conference, but not until the open final status
questions have been resolved by the two sides.  He said with
both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions,
the international community needed to step in and offer hope
for positive movement.  Europe should press the Palestinians
and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated
division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians
needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S.
would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status
issues.  He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome
in the coming weeks. 

Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned
--------------------------- 

6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very
concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL.
Everything else was totally blocked.  Parliament was not
meeting.  Reconstruction was at a standstill.  The economy
was in danger.  There was no progress on the arms embargo or
Sheba Farms.  He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in
London had been a good step and hoped that the group would
meet at the political level to help bolster UN action.  He
also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or
the embargo would never work. 

Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea
------------------------------------------- 

7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for
Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo
detainees who could not be returned to their countries of
origin.  D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea
of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could
find a way to help, it would.  The devil would be in
practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the
detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on
taking Guantanamo detainees.) 

Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters
------------------------------ 

8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that
he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send
something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would
not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if
tendered.  This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by
the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the
extradition of the implicated Americans.  D'Alema said he
understood that L had discussed this with the Italian
Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were
waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits
of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min.
of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court
rendered a decision.  The FM noted that there was still the
risk of action by the magistrates at any time.  The
Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having
extradition requests forwarded.
SPOGLI

CONFIDENTIAL. DEMARCHE RESPONSE: RELEASE OF TALIBAN PRISONERS

VZCZCXYZ0017
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0186 0811428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221428Z MAR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0657
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0349
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0117
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0534
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 4415
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 6244
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 2371
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0185
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0464
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0273
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0857
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0305
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0563
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0383
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 1095
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0171
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 0774
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0598
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0536
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0446
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0272
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 3939
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY 0038
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 7088
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0511
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 3282
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 2339
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0754
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 6984
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0880
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 4418
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0358
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 7230
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 4039
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0051
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 5390
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000186 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017
TAGS: NATO PREF PTER PREL AF IT
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: RELEASE OF TALIBAN PRISONERS 

REF: A. SECSTATE 36204 B. USNATO 183 

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Anticipating reftel A, Ambassador Nuland,
during the March 21 North Atlantic Council meeting, joined
the UK in criticizing the evident Taliban-for-hostage
exchange in the release of kidnapped Italian journalist
Mastrogiacomo.  She also raised the issue separately with SYG
de Hoop Scheffer, who will address it with PermReps in a more
restricted forum, but is leaning toward pushing for an
Alliance-wide hostage policy.  USNATO believes NATO consensus
on a common policy will be hard to achieve, but the subject
is worth discussing to raise awareness.  END SUMMARY. 

2.  (C) During the March 21 NAC meeting, Ambassador Nuland
reinforced criticism by the UK Charge and noted strongly the
intrinsic dangers of bargaining with terrorists, plus concern
for all Allies if the Taliban thought that hostage taking was
a route to future prisoner exchanges (ref B).  She and the UK
Charge also asked the Secretary General and Chairman of the
Military Committee if ISAF had been consulted over the
process of Mastrogiacomo's release.  Both committed to
investigate.  The Italian Charge declined to comment on how
the journalist was freed without more details from capital,
but expressed the Italian government's gratitude to Karzai
for his help. 

3.  (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer told PermReps during the March
21 NAC that he intends to raise this issue at an informal
lunch or coffee gathering of PermReps in the near future.  In
a separate conversation with Ambassador Nuland, he said he is
leaning toward pushing for an Alliance-wide hostage policy. 

4.  (C) COMMENT: Raising awareness on this issue among NATO
Allies is important and necessary, with the goal of reaching
agreed guidelines.  However, achieving consensus on a binding
NATO hostage policy, similar to NSPD 12, for example, will be
very difficult.  Few Allies are likely to want a discussion
like this which they consider sovereign to be collectively
decided.  END COMMENT.
NULAND

SECRET: REQUEST FOR 212(F) VISA REVOCATION FOR CORRUPT DOMINICAN CONSUL IN HONG KONG

VZCZCXYZ0014
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DE RUEHDG #1692/01 1941101
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FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8758
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0094
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 0131
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0079
S E C R E T SANTO DOMINGO 001692

SIPDIS

SIPDIS 

DEPARTMENT FOR P, WHA, WHA/CAR, CA/VO/L/C ANDREW KOTUAL,

ALSO FOR CA/VO/L/A BRIAN HUNT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2027
TAGS: CVIS OPRC PHUM KCRM KCOR CH DR
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR 212(F) VISA REVOCATION FOR CORRUPT DOMINICAN CONSUL IN HONG KONG

REF: A. TD-314/30639-06
B. SANTO DOMINGO 0733

Classified By: ECOPOL COUNSELOR MICHAEL MEIGS.  Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (SBU) This is an advisory opinion requesting the revocation of the B1/B2 nonimmigrant visas issued to Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG; her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG; her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA; and her children, Yin Mey,
Yin Ney, Sheung Leung, and Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO, under the
Presidential Proclamation under section 212(f) of the INA suspending "the entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of certain persons who have committed, participated in, or are the beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions where that corruption has serious adverse effects on" (...) "U.S. foreign assistance goals (or) the security of the United States against transnational crime and terrorism."

2. (SBU) Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG is the Director of the Dominican Trade and Development Office in Hong Kong, which is the Dominican Republic's diplomatic mission to the People's Republic of China (PRC) (the Dominican government recognizes Taiwan, rather than the PRC). Cheung was appointed to this position by the Fernandez administration. Her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA, serves as the mission's deputy director, and her daughter, Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO, is the assistant director, according to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sources.  Cheung is married to a Chinese national by the name of Pak Shing CHEUNG.

3. (S//NF) According to SAA sources, prior to traveling to Hong Kong to take up her new position, Cheung commented that she intended to become extremely wealthy in her new job. As noted in Ref B, she has followed through on this pledge primarily through the corrupt sale of visas to intending migrants.  According to sources in the local Chinese community who have given reliable information on this issue in the past, Cheung's husband works directly with Chinese human smuggling organizations to identify potential migrants.

In many cases these migrants seek to use the Dominican Republic as a stepping stone in efforts to reach U.S. territory (refs A and B).

4. (S//NF) Once the migrants are identified, Cheung works to issue them with valid Dominican visas. The going rate for these visas is reported by various sources in the Foreign Ministry (Dominican Embassy to France), Chinese community and SAA to be approximately USD 10,000. The visa recipients almost never qualify for these visas; they lack the skills and/or resources that are prerequisites for investor classification, for example, or they have no family members in the Dominican Republic to justify classification under "family reunification." This means that those visas are issued in violation of Dominican law. Payments for this service are made in cash either directly at the Trade and Development Office in Hong Kong or at a nail salon in Santo Domingo that is owned by the brother of Cheung's husband, according to sources in the local Chinese community.

5. (S//NF) SAA has estimated the number of Chinese nationals smuggled through this arrangement at "roughly 4-20 (...) almost every week (since at least 2004)" (Ref A). As of early 2006 most all of these individuals traveled using visas that had been personally signed by Mrs. Cheung (Ref A). According to media reports and SAA contacts, these Chinese migrants are able to bypass regular processing at the airport and the scrutiny it entails because they travel with both their valid visas and with letters personally signed by Migration Director Amarante Baret. These letters are not issued to travelers from other countries, according to investigative reporting by independent newspaper Clave Digital. SAA is in possession of scores of such letters signed by Amarante Baret confirming the issuance of valid Dominican visas to hundreds (if not thousands) of Chinese nationals.  In addition, Dominican authorities determined that the addresses declared by some of the arriving Chinese were incorrect and were not the actual destinations of those individuals.

6. (S//NF) Few of these travelers ever return to their country of origin. As noted in Ref B, investigative reporting by Clave Digital asserted that of 2,948 Chinese nationals who
had entered the Dominican Republic over the last two years using temporary business visas, only 432 had returned to China. The Foreign Ministry has gone on record disputing  these numbers.

7. (C) Embassy requests a finding of ineligibility under section 212(f) in order revoke the nonimmigrant visas issued to Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG; her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG; her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA; and their daughter, Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO as individuals who have "committed or participated in" (...) "corruption in the performance of public functions." Casilda CASADO DE CHEUNG
manages the mission and is in charge of the issuance of  Dominican visas to intending migrants in violation of Dominican law. Her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG, works directly
with the smuggling organizations to identify migrants, and works with his brother in Santo Domingo to arrange for the transfer of funds supporting this scheme. Roger CASADO
ALCANTARA and Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO both work in upper management positions at the mission in Hong Kong, and are involved or, at the least, are the "beneficiaries of" the corruption that goes on at the mission. Embassy requests the
revocation of the visas issued to the minor children of Cheung -- Yin Mey, Yin Ney, and Sheung Leung CHEUNG CASADO -- because they are "beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions."

8. (C) Cheung's corruption has "serious adverse effects on" (...) "U.S. foreign assistance goals." Many of the Chinese nationals smuggled under this scheme appear to be victims of trafficking in persons, the eradication of which is a major U.S. foreign policy objective. For example, upon arrival in the Dominican Republic, many of these migrants are forced to work in conditions of involuntary servitude (ref A). It is possible that others are trafficked to work as "mistresses for some men from the Dominican elite" (ref B). These credible allegations of high-level official complicity in trafficking were a major factor in the Department's decision to return the Dominican Republic to the Tier 2 Watch List this year, as noted in the 2006 trafficking report's text.

Revoking Cheung and her family's visas would send a powerful message to Dominican authorities that the U.S. Government takes these allegations seriously. It could encourage Dominican authorities to investigate and prosecute these and other corrupt officials who have conspired in trafficking, something authorities have declined to do thus far despite specific accusations in the trafficking report.

9. (C) Cheung's corruption also has "serious adverse effects on" (...) "the security of the United States against transnational crime and terrorism." The Caribbean is often  referred to as the "third border" of the United States. Ref B outlines credible allegations that significant numbers of Chinese migrants smuggled under this system are using the  Dominican Republic as a stepping stone in efforts to migrate illegally to the United States. This network could conceivably be exploited by organized criminals and terrorists, who would threaten the security of the United States if they were allowed to reach U.S. territory.
BULLEN

SECRET: WHY WE NEED CONTINUING MINUSTAH PRESENCE IN HAITI

VZCZCXRO6232
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DE RUEHPU #1381/01 2751548
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INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 2071
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0242
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1844
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2426
RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL 0332
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC 1267
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001381

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DRL, S/CRS, INR/IAA
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL HA
SUBJECT: WHY WE NEED CONTINUING MINUSTAH PRESENCE IN HAITI

PORT AU PR 00001381 001.2 OF 004

Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson. Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4
(b), (d)

1. (U) This report responds to recommendation number 2 of the
Embassy Port au Prince OIG inspection report.

Summary
--------

2. (C) The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an
indispensable tool in realizing core USG policy interests in
Haiti. Security vulnerabilities and fundamental
institutional weaknesses mean that Haiti will require a
continuing - albeit eventually shrinking - MINUSTAH presence
for at least three and more likely five years. Haiti needs
the UN presence to fill the security gap caused by Haiti's
fledgling police force's lack of numbers and capabilities.
It needs MINUSTAH to partner with the USG and other donors in
institution-building. A premature departure of MINUSTAH
would leave the Preval government or his successor vulnerable
to resurgent kidnapping and international drug trafficking,
revived gangs, greater political violence, an exodus of
seaborne migrants, a sharp drop in foreign and domestic
investment, and resurgent populist and anti-market economy
political forces - reversing gains of the last two years.

3. (C) Summary Continued: MINUSTAH is a remarkable product
and symbol of hemispheric cooperation in a country with
little going for it. There is no feasible substitute for
this UN presence. It is a financial and regional security
bargain for the USG. USG civilian and military assistance
under current domestic and international conditions, alone or
in combination with our closest partners, could never fill
the gap left by a premature MINUSTAH pullout. The U.S. will
reap benefits from this hemispheric security cooperation for
years to come - but only if its success is not endangered by
early withdrawal. We must work to preserve MINUSTAH by
continuing to partner with it at all levels in coordination
with other major donor and MINUSTAH contributor countries
from the hemisphere. That partnering will also help counter
perceptions in Latin contributing countries that Haitians see
their presence in Haiti as unwanted. The Department and
Embassies in Latin countries contributing troops should work
to ensure th
ese countries' continuing support for MINUSTAH. End summary.

Haiti Needs MINUSTAH to Become Viable State
-------------------------------------------

4. (C) The fundamental USG policy goal in Haiti is to make
it a viable state that does not post a threat to the region
through domestic political turmoil or an exodus of illegal
migrants. To reach that point, Haiti must be able to assure
its own domestic security, govern itself with stable
democratic institutions, and create a business climate that
will get the economy moving. Haiti has made progress but is
still a long way from these goals. The United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is the largest and
most effective external institution pursuing them. Haiti's
progress toward viability hinges on a large international
security presence and continued injections of assistance to
consolidate its institutions and ease human misery. MINUSTAH
is the implementing instrument of the security goal, and
MINUSTAH elements are key players in the goal of
consolidating institutions and providing critical disaster
relief.

MINUSTAH a Security Linchpin
----------------------------

5. (C) MINUSTAH's core stabilization function is security:
filling the gap left by inadequate force levels and
capabilities of the Haitian National Police (HNP). The HNP
currently has approximately 9,000 officers. MINUSTAH in 2006
set a five-year target of training and fielding 14,000
officers - although the police reform report to the UN
Security Council says 20,000 are needed to adequately police
the country. At current training and vetting rates, Haiti

PORT AU PR 00001381 002.2 OF 004

will reach this goal by 2012 at the earliest, provided the
GOH is willing to fund and staff this level. (Note: This
projection rests on HNP plans to expand the capacity of the
Police Academy beginning with the summer class of 2008. End
note.) This gain in force will be reduced if the HNP acts
on the results of the ongoing UN vetting process and weeds
out officers found to be linked to crime, corruption, and
other misconduct. Normal attrition will also push the 2012
target date further out. Deficient capabilities - in
experience, investigative skills, and management, all
exacerbated by corruption -- limit the HNP's security clout.

6. (C) Given HNP's lack of capability, MINUSTAH's backup
security and police training functions are needed to fill the
resulting gap in security. MINUSTAH troops continue to
provide security in areas such as the Cite Soleil slum,
liberated from overt gang rule in early 2007. They are also
the country's ultimate riot control force which in times of
unrest protects strategic government installations, including
the National Palace and the airport. In MINUSTAH's UN police
operations pillar, Formed Police Units (FPU -
gendarmerie-type police units from individual contributor
countries) aid the HNP with security operations, such as
helping put down the mutiny at the national penitentiary last
November, and performing riot control during the April
disturbances. UNPOL officers provide support to HNP
operations, down to helping the anti-kidnapping unit and
beginning to assist the HNP's counter narcotics unit. The
UNPOL development pillar works with the HNP to develop its
capabilities. UNPOL officers guide and monitor the training
of the HNP at the Police Academy and in the field. The
MINUSTAH apparatus is also conducting the vetting of the
entire HNP, an essential aspect of HNP reform.

7. (C) The April food riots threw into stark relief
MINUSTAH's role as a security force of last resort. MIUSTAH
troops, FPU's and UNPOL provided the criticl extra security
capability that prevented riotes from overrunning the
Presidential Palace and pobably chasing President Preval
from office.

INUSTAH Role in Institution Building
------------------------------------

8. (C) MINUSTAH contibutes to building up Haiti's
political and judiial institutions and supporting them
day-to-day n the ground. It has a civilian presence
througout the country: its civil affairs division has tams
of advisers deployed in larger towns in all tn departments.
These units advise and train oficials at a level of
government that is just getting off the ground. At the
national level, MINUSTAH is a key partner of the U.S. and
other donor countries in building up and reforming Haiti's
judicial system. The dimensions of the UN's civilian
technical assistance and training for Haiti's national and
local institutions exceed that of all other diplomatic
missions in Haiti put together.

MINUSTAH Post-Hurricane Role
----------------------------

9. (C) The August-September series of hurricanes and floods
have put MINUSTAH's disaster relief role in the spotlight.
Cut roads and fallen bridges meant that Prime Minister
Michele Pierre-Louis' visits to flooded regions were possible
only in MINUSTAH helicopters. Their rotary wing aircraft
have also flown emergency aid to areas cut off from ground
transport, supplementing the air assets of the USS Kearsarge
and the World Food Program. MINUSTAH troops rescued flood
victims trapped in their homes, and continue to provide
security for food convoys and distribution points, assuring
that emergency aid commodities reach their destination and
are distributed in an orderly manner. MINUSTAH serves as the
coordinating body among donors and between donors and the
Government of Haiti.

Bottom Line on Continuing MINUSTAH Presence
-------------------------------------------

PORT AU PR 00001381 003.2 OF 004

10. (C) The U.S. has a strong interest in maintaining
MINUSTAH's presence in Haiti until Haiti's security, judicial
and political institutions are can maintain a minimal level
of domestic security and political stability on their own.
Embassy therefore believes that MINUSTAH's presence here is
needed until the HNP reaches at least 14,000 officers and
Haiti has installed a new President after the 2011
Presidential transition. A UN civilian advisory presence
will be needed for an additional period after the MINUSTAH
military and police are drawn down to help along Haiti's
institution-building. MINUSTAH already envisions gradually
transitioning the current force structure from predominantly
infantry to more military police and engineering units,
provided the UNSC agrees. It will reduce its civilian
presence as Haiti's institutions become more solid. However,
a significant withdrawal of the MINUSTAH security forces and
civilian advisers is not advisable for a minimum of three
years, and we believe that a fu
ll withdrawal of MINUSTAH should not be considered before
five years.

Scenario of a Premature MINUSTAH Departure
------------------------------------------

11. (C) A precipitous withdrawal of or premature drawdown
of MINUSTAH's security component could open the door to
elements that threaten Haiti's political stability and the
consolidation of its democratic institutions. These are
goals which we and our hemispheric and European allies since
2004 have devoted over two billion USD in resources to
achieve. Increased security and other assistance from the
U.S. and other large donors individually could not
immediately make up for the loss of MINUSTAH boots on the
ground.

12. (C) We could see a rollback of stabilization and
security gains made since MINUSTAH began to serious confront
security problems in 2006. Kidnappings, now reduced through
effective police work, might spike upward again. Drug
trafficking networks, a large threat even with the current
MINUSTAH presence, could ramp up shipments through Haiti and
further their penetration of police, the judiciary,
parliament -- where we estimate perhaps a score of deputies
and senators are linked to the drug trade. Gang structures,
weakened but not eliminated from Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien
and Gonaives, could flex their muscles again. If gangs
resurface, we could see the revival of politically-linked
armed groups that during the Aristide era engaged in targeted
violence including murder against regime critics. If these
factors produced greater general instability, larger numbers
of Haitians would likely to take to the boats and attempt to
reach the U.S., as they did in the unstable 1990s. An upward
trend of the above factors would cause a deterioration of the
economic environment and a drop in domestic and foreign
investment.

MINUSTAH a Good Deal for the U.S.
---------------------------------

13. (C) MINUSTAH's presence produces real regional security
dividends for the U.S. Paying one-quarter of MINUSTAH's
budget through our DPKO assessment, the U.S. reaps the
security and stabilization benefits of a 9,000-person
international military and civilian stabilization mission in
the hemisphere's most troubled country. The security
dividend the U.S. reaps from this hemispheric cooperation not
only benefits the immediate Caribbean, but also is developing
habits of security cooperation in the hemisphere that will
serve our interests for years to come. In the current
context of our military commitments elsewhere, the U.S. alone
could not replace this mission. This regionally-coordinated
Latin American commitment to Haiti would not be possible
without the UN umbrella. That same umbrella helps other
major donors -- led by Canada and followed up by the EU,
France, Spain, Japan and others -- justify their bilateral
assistance domestically. Without a UN-sanctioned
peacekeeping and stabilization force, we

PORT AU PR 00001381 004 OF 004

would be getting far less help from our hemispheric and
European partners in managing Haiti.

But We Must Short Up Support
----------------------------

14. (C) The U.S. will continue to reap these security
benefits only if MINUSTAH's mission succeeds and enables
Haiti to carry itself as a country. The USG thus has a
strong interest that contributing countries continue their
commitment until Haiti's stability is self-sustained. The
USG should work to shore up support for MINUSTAH in Haiti and
in hemispheric troop-contributing countries. We should take
emphasize in UN venues and bilaterally to our Latin partners
that the Haitian people and their legitimate government
support MINUSTAH's presence, and that the UN is here at the
express request of the Government of Haiti. We must be
sensitive to Latin fears that any Haitian opposition to the
UN presence undermines their domestic support for deployments
in Haiti. During the April riots, the Brazilian MINUSTAH
Force Commander told Ambassador and others that his greatest
fear was that his troops would be forced to fire on
demonstrators. He understood that this could ignite
opposition in Haiti, Brazil, and other contributing countries
to his troops' presence in Haiti. The Brazilian Embassy's
national day celebration in Port au Prince September 8 was an
exercise aimed at the Brazilian domestic audience. Attended
by several Brazilian senators, it featured slide paels
extolling the humanitarian work of Brazil's army at home and
in Haiti, and a pathos-filled speech by the Ambassador about
the history and culture Brazil shares with Haiti.

15. (C) The Port au Prince embassies of Latin countries
contributing to MINUSTAH look to the strength of the U.S.
commitment to the UN presence as a bellwether. Any slippage
of U.S. commitment would embolden domestic elements who
oppose these countries' participation in in the UN mission
here. We sense that the strong U.S. embrace of the UN
presence in Haiti helps their case at home for continuing
deployments in Haiti. The Embassy uses every opportunity to
partner publicly with and support MINUSTAH. The current
post-hurricane relief effort, however disordered, is proving
an opportunity for U.S., Canadian, and other bilateral donors
to partner with MINUSTAH in disaster assistance and
reconstruction. We sense that the humanitarian focus of
these crisis-response efforts -- in contrast to riot-control
efforts in April -- is helping the case in Latin countries
for continuing their peacekeeping contributions in Haiti.

16. (C) The USG in Washington, New York, and in Latin
capitals must also do their part to buck up support for
MINUSTAH. In UN Security Council discussions of
Haiti-related items, U.S. rhetorical appreciation for the UN
presence here helps reassure contributor countries that their
deployments are justified. Similar expressions of support to
Latin representatives in Washington and Latin capitals are
also helpful.

17. (C) In the end, what will maintain MINISTAH
participants' support for deployments in Haiti is progress
toward Haitian stabilization and state viability. Continuing
the UN presence at projected levels for three to five years
will not guarantee that result, but abruptly downsizing or
prematurely withdrawing it will make more likely a result in
Haiti we do not want, and would make future hemispheric
peacekeeping efforts more difficult to justify.
SANDERSON

SECRET: ANWAR IBRAHIM’S SODOMY TRIAL II – A PRIMER

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2918
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2796
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0639
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0001
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2610
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2652
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0227
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0904
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KUALA LUMPUR 000529 

SIPDIS 

FOR EAP/MTS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS MY
SUBJECT: ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D). 

Summary and Comment
------------------- 

1.    (C) Malaysian Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim will go
on trial beginning July 8 on charges of sodomy -- a criminal
offense in Malaysia -- with a former aide.  Anwar was
previously tried and convicted of sodomy in 2000 in a heavily
manipulated trial that the U.S. concluded "was marred by deep
flaws in the judicial process."  The verdict was overturned
on appeal in 2004.  Senior Malaysian authorities were very
aggressive in handling the present case during the initial
period of June-September 2008, but, coinciding with the
passing of Anwar's deadline to bring down the government
through Parliamentary cross-overs, have since taken a more
measured "rule-of-law" approach in public.  Authorities have
not taken all the legal and extra-legal measures available to
them, for example, to challenge Anwar's bail provisions or
resolve an earlier impasse regarding the court venue.
Anwar's conviction in this trial, which may last many months,
could end his political career; the judge would decide
whether Anwar would remain free pending an appeal.  This
cable provides a primer for the Department's reference,
including background on the 2000 conviction and the present
case, a synopsis of the specific legal charges and penalties,
a summary of likely evidence to be presented in court, and
three possible scenarios for the trial. 

2.  (C) Comment:  The issue of the specific actions between
Anwar and his aide will play out in court and, we suspect, in
a very sensationalistic fashion.  The facts surrounding the
case, however, make a compelling argument that the
government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political
act against the Opposition leader.  Whether the incident in
question was wholly concocted or has some basis in fact, the
case is not part of a morals campaign or a normal criminal
matter and has been the subject of extensive political
interference and manipulation.  As one consequence, much of
the Malaysian public remains deeply sceptical about the
government's prosecution of Anwar Ibrahim.  Anwar's flawed
trials in 1998-2000 produced a public uproar and attracted
international condemnation; in today's information-intensive
environment, such effects may be exacerbated depending on
events in court.  Embassy will provide draft press guidance
for the Department's consideration prior to the July 8 trial
date.  End Summary and Comment. 

Sodomy Case I, 1998-2000
------------------------ 

3.  (SBU) Under the government of former Prime Minister
Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim was charged and convicted of sodomy
(and abuse of power) in a sensationalistic trials in
1998-2000, directed and heavily manipulated by Mahathir
against his former deputy.  Anwar was charged with sodomizing
his wife's driver.  During his pre-trial detention, Anwar was
beaten by the then Inspector General of Police.  The High
Court convicted Anwar of sodomy in August 2000 and sentenced
him to nine years imprisonment.  The U.S. expressed deep
concern with the first sodomy trial, noting "that the trial
and (Anwar's) resulting conviction and nine-year jail
sentence were marred by deep flaws in the judicial process."
After Mahathir stepped down in favor of Abdullah Badawi, the
Federal Court overturned the conviction in September 2004 and
released Anwar from prison (Anwar's separate conviction for
abuse of power remained in place).  The Federal Court found
there were "many unusual things that happened regarding the
arrest and confession" of certain prosecution witnesses,
including the fact that Anwar's driver stated that he was
paid to make the allegations against Anwar.  In an unusual
move and possible political compromise, the Federal Court
judges included in their judgment the conclusion that there
was evidence to confirm "the appellants were involved in
homosexual activities," but added that the prosecution failed
to prove the alleged offenses beyond reasonable doubt.
Because Anwar's conviction on the separate charge of abuse of
power was not overturned, he was barred from political office
until April 2008. 

Sodomy Case II, 2008
-------------------- 

4.  (SBU) Less than four months after Anwar Ibrahim's
People's Justice Party (PKR) and its opposition partners made
significant advances in the March 2008 national elections,
and three months after Anwar became eligible for political
office, an aide to Anwar, Mohd Saiful Bukhari Azlan, filed a
police report on June 28, 2008, alleging that he had been
forcibly sodomized by Anwar on several occasions.  The
following day, Anwar took refuge in the Turkish ambassador's
residence, claiming that he feared a repetition of his 1998
arrest and for his personal safety.  He remained with the
Turkish ambassador for only one day, departing after public
assurances of his safety from the Foreign Minister and Home
Minister.  In the midst of a highly charged political
atmosphere, which included Anwar's claims that he could bring
down the government through Parliamentary defections by
September 16, 2008, and new allegations linking then DPM
Najib with the Altantuya murder case, the police
investigation proceeded.  It came to light that Saiful had
had contact with the office of then DPM Najib prior to
working with Anwar, and more significantly Saiful had met
with Najib (and allegedly his wife Rosmah) at Najib's home
just prior to filing his police complaint.  Najib first
denied publicly he had any connection with the case, and then
acknowledged meeting Saiful, an admission that preempted
internet reports about to be released by blogger Raja Petra
(who is now a fugitive from sedition charges). 

5.  (SBU) As authorities made known their intention to arrest
and charge Anwar for sodomy, Anwar's lawyers arranged for his
voluntary appearance before police for questioning and
charging.  Contrary to the agreement, on July 16, police in
commando-style outfits waylaid Anwar's convoy en route to the
police station and arrested him on the street.  Police
questioned Anwar, took him to a hospital to provide a DNA
sample (which Anwar refused, citing lawyers' advice and fear
of "manipulation"), and held him overnight.  Anwar was
released on police bail by a magistrate on July 17. 

The Charges
----------- 

6.  (SBU) On August 7, 2008, prosecutors charged Anwar
Ibrahim before a Sessions Court under Section 377B of the
Penal Code, which reads:  "Whoever voluntarily commits carnal
intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years
and shall be liable to whipping."  Section 377A of the Penal
Code defines "carnal intercourse against the order of nature"
as including sodomy.  Prosecutors specifically charged Anwar
with the sodomizing of Saiful Bukhari Azlan at a Kuala Lumpur
condominium (owned by Anwar's friend) on June 26, 2008.
Although Saiful originally claimed he was forcibly sodomized
on several occasions, the prosecutors chose not to pursue
charges against Anwar under a separate Penal Code section
(377C), which pertains to non-consensual sodomy (with a
higher burden of proof), and also to focus on only one
alleged incident.  It is important to note that under
Malaysia's legal system, prosecutors may amend the charges
during the course of the trial.  Saiful himself does not face
charges for the alleged acts.  The Court ordered Anwar to
remain free on a personal bond of US $5,700 RM 20,000 and did
not impose other restrictions (for example, Anwar has been
free to travel abroad and has done so on many occasions since
August 2008).  The government did not attempt to dispute or
revoke the bail provisions. 

Wrangle and Delay over Court Venue
---------------------------------- 

7.  (SBU) Following Anwar's formal charging, and with Anwar's
9/16 deadline looming in the background, prosecutors quickly
moved to transfer the case from the Sessions Court to the
High Court.  The prosecution argued on September 10, 2008,
that such an important case with possibly complicated legal
issues should be dealt with at the High Court and produced a
certificate signed by the Attorney General to move the case,
which under normal circumstances automatically results in a
transfer.  However, Anwar's lawyers objected to the transfer
out of concern that the more politicized High Court level
would result in a pro-prosecution judge hearing the case, as
happened during the first sodomy trial in 1999-2000.  In
November 2008, independent-minded Sessions Court judge
Komathy Suppiah rejected the certificate of transfer, noting
that Attorney General Gani Patail faced allegations of
evidence tampering in Anwar's 1998 case and the transfer
order signed by the AG would "undermine the public perception
of the judiciary." 

8.  (C) Judge Komathy was overruled in March 2009 by High
Court judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah who decided the Sessions
Court has no authority to refuse the Attorney General's
transfer order; Zabidin himself was then assigned to preside
over the sodomy trial.  Anwar's lawyers filed an appeal
against the transfer; the Court of Appeals only began to hear
the appeal on June 30; based on precedent, Anwar's camp
admits the appeal has little chance of success.  Zabidin
initially attempted to schedule the trial to begin in May
2009; defense lawyers argued they needed more time and hoped
their appeal would be heard prior to the trial.  (Note:  The
High Court often takes one to two years before setting trial
dates in normal criminal cases.  End Note.)  Zabidin
subsequently set the trial to begin on July 1.  Anwar's
lawyers filed an application to compel the prosecution to
provide them with full documentation and evidence that will
be introduced at the trial, which the prosecution has thus
far failed to do in apparent violation of the Criminal
Procedure Code.  With the hearing on the disclosure of
evidence set for July 1 (now pushed back to July 3), Judge
Zabidin postponed the trial start to July 8.  The judge
originally specified a three-week duration for the trial, but
lawyers assume that the trial will take many months to
conclude. 

The High Court Judge
-------------------- 

9.  (C) High Court Judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah is a lawyer
by training.  After private law practice, he joined the
judicial service as a Sessions Court judge and was elevated
to judicial commissioner in 2004.  After two years on
contract, Zabidin was promoted to become a permanent High
Court judge in 2006.  Zabidin is not a well-known judge and
is not associated with high profile or controversial
judgments, according to our senior legal contacts.  Anwar's
lawyers allege that Zabidin is beholden to the government and
will favor the prosecution; the judge's unusual rush to bring
the case to trial is viewed by the defense as an early
indication of his bias. 

Government Switches Gears
------------------------- 

10.  (C) Senior government and UMNO party officials adopted a
very aggressive public and private approach to the Anwar case
during the June-September 2008 period.  This included
frequent, prejudicial statements in public, and strong claims
in private to other politicians and diplomats regarding
Anwar's guilt.  This intensive phase encompassed the initial
news of the allegations and Anwar's formal charging, but also
Anwar's own aggressive political posturing and claims that he
could bring down the government by September 2008 through
Parliamentary crossovers.  After Anwar's deadline passed in
September, and after resolution of the UMNO leadership battle
in favor of Najib's succession in October 2008, we observed a
definite toning down of the Government's approach, and a
shifting to a lower gear.  For example, we did not hear
reports of government intervention to quickly resolve the
matter of the court venue, which effectively delayed the
prosecution by some seven months.  Anwar's bail provisions
remained in place and unchallenged.  Public statements by
senior government officials, outside of by-election
campaigns, became infrequent.  This toned down approach has
continued through the present; it would fit within a
hypothetical decision to demonstrate that the trial is a law
enforcement matter, rather than a political battle.
Regardless, it is clear that the government has not taken all
the legal and extra-legal steps against Anwar that it could
have since September 2008. 

GOM Confidence:  Waning or Recalculating?
----------------------------------------- 

11.  (C) Many of our government and UMNO contacts have
insisted to us, emphatically so in the early months of the
case, that the evidence against Anwar is very conclusive,
often hinting at video footage and physical evidence like DNA
(see below).  Recently, some contacts sympathetic to Anwar
but not part of his team claimed the government over time had
become less certain it had sufficient evidence to convict
Anwar.  According to one unconfirmed account, in June several
key aides to PM Najib advised him to drop the case against
Anwar because the evidence was not strong enough for an easy
conviction and the political cost of forcing through a guilty
verdict would be too high.  It is also possible that the
toned down rhetoric from the government has been
misinterpreted as uncertainty on the authorities' part. 

Evidence at the Trial
--------------------- 

12.  (C) Based on available information, we believe the
following evidentiary aspects will feature in Anwar's trial: 

Saiful's complaint:  The testimony of Saiful is central to
the government's case, and he is expected to take the stand.
Saiful has continued to assert that he was forcibly
sodomized, although the charges under Section 377B do not
require proof of a non-consensual act; given his youth (age
23) and physical size, Saiful will need to explain specific
circumstances of the incident to support his assertion of
rape. 

Medical reports:  As publicly revealed by defense lawyers,
Saiful underwent two medical examinations on June 28, 2008,
just prior to lodging a police report.  The first examination
by a Burmese doctor at a local hospital concluded there was
"no conclusive clinical findings" suggestive of sodomy, and
the doctor recommended he be examined at a government
hospital in line with police procedures in such cases.
(Note:  The Burmese doctor briefly left Malaysia after being
held for questioning by police.  End Note.)  The second
examination at the police-approved government hospital also
failed to uncover medical evidence of sodomy, according to
copies of hospital reports released by the defense. 

DNA:  The defense team believes prosecutors will introduce
DNA evidence, based on DNA samples held by the police since
1998, and are preparing expert witnesses.  The government's
hurried passage in Parliament of a DNA bill, approved by the
lower house on June 23, is widely seen as tied to the Anwar
trial and will permit the government to utilize the 11-year
old samples.  The defense could claim the samples were
planted, as is widely believed to be the case in Anwar's
earlier prosecution. 

Anwar's alibi:  Anwar's lawyers claim that five persons will
testify that Anwar was with them at the time of the alleged
incident.  They also claim that police attempted but failed
to intimidate some of these defense witnesses to change their
accounts. 

CCTV:  The prosecution may use CCTV footage from the
condominium where the alleged incident took place to confirm
Anwar's presence at a specific date and time. 

Character witnesses:  As happened in the 1999 case, it is
very possible that prosecutors introduce witnesses to attack
Anwar's character and actions aside from the alleged 2008
sodomy incident.  There are unconfirmed reports that the
prosecution will call 30 witnesses to the stand. 

Defense witnesses (PM Najib and wife Rosmah?):  In an effort
to demonstrate the political motivation in the government's
case, defense lawyers could call PM Najib, his wife Rosmah,
and other senior officials such as Najib's aide Khairil Anas
Yusof who appear connected to the case (Najib and Rosmah
because they met Saiful and discussed his reporting to the
police).  While this will make for momentary drama, we expect
the judge to disallow such moves. 

Bail and other Conditions during the Trial
------------------------------------------ 

13.  (C) Anwar's legal team has expressed concern that the
prosecution may apply to revoke the personal bond that allows
Anwar to be free pending the trial or seek to impose other
conditions, such as impounding his passport or restricting
his movement to within Kuala Lumpur.  The lawyers acknowledge
that there is not a strong precedent for overturning the
existing bail decision.  In several recent
politically-charged court cases, however, Malaysian judges
have ignored precedent decisions.  (Note:  We have no
information on the prosecution's intentions in this matter.
End Note.) 

What if Anwar is Convicted?
--------------------------- 

14.  (C) Most observers conclude that a conviction in Anwar's
case, one upheld on appeal, would essentially end Anwar's
political career given the legal penalties and Anwar's age
(62).  According to the Federal Constitution, a member of
Parliament will be disqualified from holding his seat if he
is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment for
a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not less
than US $570 RM 2,000 and has not received a free pardon.
This stipulation comes into effect after all appeals are
exhausted (at the Court of Appeals and Federal Court).  The
constitution also provides that a convicted person can only
be active in politics after five years from the date of his
release from prison.  At age 62, a second conviction could
effectively bar Anwar permanently from political life.  In
the event of a conviction, Anwar will certainly appeal.  The
judge will decide whether Anwar remains free pending appeal
or immediately goes to jail.  While officially remaining a
Member of Parliament pending the final outcome, he would be
unable to operate from prison as the Opposition leader. 

Political Interference and Manipulation
--------------------------------------- 

15.  (C) The issue of the alleged actions between Anwar and
Saiful will play out in court, and sodomy, even a consensual
act, is a crime under Malaysian law.  The facts surrounding
the case, however, make it clear that the government's
prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against
the Opposition leader.  The Malaysian government does not
aggressively prosecute cases of sodomy; we find record of
some 55 cases since 1991, or an average of 3 per year.  The
vast majority of such cases involve adults assaulting minors.
 Anwar's prosecution is not part of a morals campaign.  The
GOM does not aggressively target non-heterosexual behavior;
if it did so, a recent cabinet minister, senior staff
associated with PM Najib and other prominent citizens linked
to the government also would find themselves under
investigation. 

16.  (C) Aside from the immediate comparison with Anwar's
previous prosecution for sodomy, which was grossly
manipulated by former Prime Minister Mahathir, the
indications of political interference and manipulation in the
present case are compelling; much of the information is in
the public realm.  Collateral reporting, not addressed here,
provides further substantiation. 

Najib connection:  Keeping in mind that Najib and Anwar
remain bitter enemies, it is striking that Najib met
personally with the complainant Saiful prior to the police
report, and allegedly arranged for Saiful to have intensive
contact with senior police officials in the days before he
filed the complaint. 

Senior officials' involvement:  From the very early stages,
the senior-most officials in the government, including then
PM Abdullah, current PM Najib, cabinet ministers, the AGO and
national police chief (the latter two having played important
roles in Anwar's 1998-1999 flawed trials) and officials of
the ruling UMNO party have been intimately involved in
decisions regarding the case, according to Embassy contacts
and publicly available sources.  Despite the current
toned-down government approach, and emphasis that the Anwar
trial is a normal law enforcement matter, senior-most
executive and UMNO party officials continue such a directing
role. 

Leakage of information:  Senior government leaders provided
law enforcement information on the case to leaders of Anwar's
coalition partner, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), in an
unsuccessful attempt to split PAS from the opposition.  A
recent internet report claims that the government has
provided some government-directed press editors with a "sneak
preview" of evidence against Anwar. 

Public statements:  From the initial public reports of the
complaint against Anwar in June 2008 to Anwar's election to
Parliament in August 2008, PM Abdullah and other senior
leaders spoke publicly and frequently about Anwar's alleged
crime and the need for justice, and the case featured
prominently in the parliamentary campaign against Anwar.
There have been far fewer statements since September 2008,
except during by-election campaigns. 

Press:  The Government-directed mainstream press, which
includes all major dailies and all TV stations, provided
extensive coverage of Saiful's allegations while severely
limiting reporting on Anwar's response during the heated
period of June-August 2008. 

Alleged intimidation:  The police detained for questioning
the doctor who first examined Saiful, causing him to leave
Malaysia temporarily out of concern for his safety.  Police
also pressured the hospital in question to hold a press
conference to state that the doctor was not qualified to
conduct such an examination, according to our sources.
According to defence lawyers, several of their witnesses have
been threatened by police in an effort to change their
testimony.  The Imam for the Federal Territories (including
Kuala Lumpur and the administrative capital Putra Jaya)
claimed publicly that he was forced to witness an "improper"
Islamic oath taken by Saiful; he was subsequently sacked by
the Prime Minister's Department. 

Customized Legislation, the DNA bill:  The government
hurriedly prepared a bill on DNA evidence, following shortly
after Anwar's refusal to provide a DNA sample at the time of
his arrest, which compels suspects to provide samples and
allows authorities to utilize previously stored samples in
new criminal cases.  The government originally introduced the
bill in August 2008 and voted it through the lower house only
on June 23, 2009; several steps remain before it becomes law. 

Public Scepticism
----------------- 

17.  (C) In the run-up to Anwar's August 2008 arraignment,
public opinion polling conducted by the Merdeka Center,
Malaysia's most respected opinion survey group, revealed that
a preponderance of Malaysians believed the charges against
Anwar were unjust, indicating a deep public scepticism
regarding the government's case.  We understand that new
polling on this question will be released before the July 8
trial date.  Pollsters have informed us that the new data
continues to reflect widespread public suspicions.
Reportedly, only 15 percent of ethnic Malays and 10 percent
of Malaysians overall believe Anwar's prosecution to be
justified.  Outside of government circles, many Embassy
contacts, including those who give credence to rumors of
Anwar's personal life, take it as a matter of fact that the
government is prosecuting Anwar for political reasons.  In a
public statement made on June 24, former Bar Council
president (and U.S. Woman of Courage awardee in 2009) Ambiga
Sreenvasan urged the government to drop the charges against
Anwar in order to restore credibility to PM Najib's ruling
coalition. 

Scenarios
--------- 

18.  (C) When viewed as a political matter, a number of
potential scenarios for the Anwar prosecution present
themselves; below we review three that are most apparent.  In
these scenarios we assume that Najib will exercise the
deciding voice on how and whether to proceed, though he also
will need to weigh the opinions of other UMNO ruling party
elites. 

-- Conviction at all costs:  Based on an assessment that
Anwar is a threat to UMNO's continued rule at least at the
time of the next national elections, Najib and UMNO elites
decide that the political costs of prosecuting Anwar are
acceptable and pursue the matter aggressively inside and
outside the courtroom with the overriding goal of convicting
Anwar and removing him permanently from politics.  While
asserting that this is purely a law enforcement matter, the
government exerts political pressure as necessary, accepting
reputational risks in the process, and achieves a conviction
after months of high-profile drama in the courtroom.  The
courts hear and reject Anwar's appeals in an expedited
manner, well ahead of the next national elections in 2012 or
2013.  This scenario appeared to be in play during the
initial months of the case and in the lead up to Anwar's
September 2008 deadline to overturn the ruling coalition's
majority; it has been less apparent since then.  Recalling
the deep personal animosity between Najib and Anwar, and the
singular importance of Anwar to the opposition coalition,
this scenario remains plausible, even though Anwar's
immediate threat to UMNO's rule has passed. 

-- Merits of the case, reputational damage:  In a second
scenario, the government proceeds with the prosecution but
refrains from exerting undue pressure to achieve conviction,
believing that the evidence presented and/or the court
proceedings themselves will sufficiently damage Anwar's
reputation and this will outweigh harm to the Najib
administration's credibility.  Conviction remains the desired
outcome, supported by sufficient evidence, but the government
accepts some risk of a final verdict of innocence after all
appeals are heard.  This scenario rests on the assumption of
sufficiently clear evidence against Anwar that will swing
public opinion in favor of the government even in the event
of an eventual acquittal.  Absent greater information on the
government's evidence against Anwar, it is difficult to judge
the prospects for this scenario. 

-- Withdrawal:  In a third scenario, Najib and UMNO elites
decide that the government's case is not strong enough to
pursue, entails unacceptable political costs, or is no longer
necessary because of the diminished threat from Anwar.  The
government withdraws the charges prior to the trial start of
July 8, or shortly after the trial begins, possibly under
conditions of "discharge not amounting to acquittal."
(Lawyers tell us that such a discharge in theory would allow
the government to reactivate the case at a future time, thus
maintaining this as a lever over Anwar.)  Najib, confident
that he can beat back an opposition challenge in the next
election, attributes the original decision to prosecute to
the previous administration of Abdullah Badawi and takes
credit for respecting the rule of law in this high profile
case involving his determined political nemesis.  In contrast
to 2008, Najib's currently secure position as UMNO leader and
Prime Minister, along with Anwar's diminished threat, make
this scenario a political possibility, though some UMNO
elites and perhaps Najib himself may not want to give up the
opportunity to remove Anwar Ibrahim from politics once and
for all. 

KEITH

SECRET: CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S. OFFER

VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0559/01 2571036
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141036Z SEP 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4755
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL PRIORITY
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA PRIORITY 0142
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUEHKG/USDAO KINGSTON JM PRIORITY
S E C R E T HAVANA 000559 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S.
OFFER OF POST-HURRICANE ASSISTANCE 

REF: HAVANA 500 & 511 

Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIAMS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 

1. (S/NF) Summary: On 3 September 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard
Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the U.S.
Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba, engaged in a
candid conversation with a Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MINREX) official who provided insight into the possible
Government of Cuba (GOC) response to any USG offers of
post-hurricane assistance to the GOC. End Summary. 

2. (S/NF) A MINREX officer ("officer") in the Ministry's
North American Division, Rodney, who attends repatriations
somewhat infrequently (DIS has had contact with this official
on approximately 5 occasions- USINT consular officers have
also met this officer on other occasions while attending
repatriations), exchanged pleasantries with the DIS at the
outset of the repatriation. During the boat ride to the
receiving pier, the officer almost immediately directed the
conversation towards what seemed to be a pre-planned
discussion. Offering up the usual &in my personal opinion8
while placing a firm hand on his chest and gesturing towards
himself, the officer stated: "I have been reading a lot of
U.S. press reports about possible U.S. hurricane assistance
and I think the GOC would be willing to accept that
assistance." DIS stated to the officer that that approach
would be different than last year's GOC response to the
multiple USG offers of post-hurricane assistance. The
officer went on to say that "(political) conditions this year
are very different than they were last year this time," an
apparent reference to the recent re-establishment of USINT
access to MINREX (reftels). 

3. (S/NF) DIS stated to the officer that it was common and
prudent practice to offer a disaster assistance response team
(DART) to locations following natural disasters to assess the
damage and the necessary level and type of assistance. The
officer responded by saying that: "the level of damage to
Cuba during last year's hurricane season was evident and the
team was a precondition to providing post-hurricane
assistance to Cuba; the U.S. should not impose preconditions
and should allow the GOC to determine how assistance is
used." In turn, the DIS responded that the USG is not in the
business of writing blank checks to foreign governments to
which the officer seemed to be at a loss for words. The
officer and the DIS cordially agreed that this was an
ideological difference between both nations, and agreed that
while neither of us wanted to see any hurricane affect Cuba,
should the opportunity arise for the USG to offer hurricane
assistance to the GOC, it would be interesting to see how the
scenario unfolds. 

4. (S/NF) This officer is a young (29 years old), cordial,
well-spoken MINREX officer who utilizes repatriations as an
opportunity to practice what might already be considered
polished English. He studied economics, is well versed in
international political ideology, and appears to be a
voracious reader. Like his more senior MINREX counterparts,
he makes a point during each repatriation to discuss recent
U.S. press reporting relative to U.S.-Cuba relations, and
uses each repatriation as an opportunity to elicit a response
from the DIS on a wide scope of U.S.-Cuban matters, always
under the guise of being a personal opinion or interest. He
does not balk when given the chance to prop-up and support
the tenets of the Cuban revolution, and especially, in his
government's opinion, the harsh treatment the USG has
afforded the Cuban people throughout the course of the
revolution. He is able to support and speak to the major GOC
talking points (i.e. the embargo, Cuban-Americans, etc.), and
is likely to rise in the GOC. 

5. (S/NF) Comment: Yet again, MINREX has utilized the DIS and
the repatriation process as a forum to air out a current GOC 

focus, and float the idea by a U.S. officer who the GOC is
aware works in the political-economic section at USINT. The
typical "this is my opinion" approach from this MINREX
officer is an opening gesture, whereafter he and each MINREX
officer then communicates a willingness, need, or current
focus of the GOC that they have decided to communicate to the
Mission and USG at large. This may well be a concerted
effort on the part of MINREX to engage in one-on-one
communication, at a relatively low-level, as a circuitous
approach to GOC-U.S. communications in lieu of direct or
over-publicized talks. By communicating in this manner, the
GOC can communicate with the USG, in this case over the issue
of hurricane assistance, and still maintain its public image
and propaganda campaign that lambaste the USG for its
approach towards Cuba. Interestingly, DIS cannot recall any
recent press reporting having to do with possible
post-hurricane assistance to Cuba. 

(S/NF) Further Comment: DIS was extremely surprised by the
hurricane assistance-related comments made by the MINREX
officer. Having spent a significant amount of time working
and traveling with Cuban MININT and MINREX officers over the
past year, Cubans are extremely proud people, and almost
never admit that there is a flaw in their system, even when
the flaw is a glaring one. For a MINREX officer to admit
that his country may be willing to accept assistance from the
U.S. should a hurricane ravage this island again, ventures
well beyond the perceived pride level of GOC officials. More
than anything, the GOC does not like to be embarrassed, and
taking handouts from the USG may well be a point of
embarrassment for the GOC should they choose to accept. As
such, any genuine post-hurricane assistance offer should be
extended quietly; however, the USG should be wary that the
GOC may be expecting a blank check, not a calculated offer of
pragmatic post-hurricane assistance. End Comment.
WILLIAMS

SECRET: TURKEY: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 007059 

SIPDIS 

C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (CHANGED CLASSIFIED BY REASONS) 

STATE FOR S/CT AND TTIC 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2014
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert S. Deutsch; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

--------
OVERVIEW
-------- 

1. (U) Combating terrorism has long been a priority for the Government of Turkey (GOT).  In 2004, Turkey continued its strong support of the coalition in the global war against terror in Afghanistan by agreeing to assume command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for a second time.  It will command ISAF VII from February to August 2005, contributing up to 1,500 troops. 

2. (U) Domestic and transnational terrorist groups have targeted Turks and foreigners, occasionally including USG personnel, for over 40 years.  International and domestic terrorist groups operating in Turkey include Marxist-Leninist, radical Islamist, separatist, and pro-Chechen groups.  In response to these threats, GOT has developed both strong determination and the capability to fight most domestically-based terrorism.  Overall, Turkey continues to support the USG's international, coordinated approach, but that support can be modulated, particularly
when Turkish citizens are part of investigations. 

3. (U) A criminal trial is underway for dozens of defendants allegedly involved in the November 2003 Istanbul bombings. The lead defendants have admitted to contacts with Al-Qaedaand warned of further attacks if Turkey continues to cooperate with the U.S. and Israel.  However, most of the other defendants denied any responsibility for or knowledge of the bombings.  Verdicts and sentences are not expected
until sometime next year. 

4. (U) On March 9, a suicide attack against an Istanbul Masonic lodge killed two and wounded seven.  There appear to be connections between this attack and the murder of a Jewish dentist in Istanbul in 2003, as well as with the November 2003 bombings (one of those arrested and charged after this attack is also a defendant in that trial).  The circumstances of this attack, moreover, suggest that it may have been executed by Islamic extremists against what they believed was
a "Zionist" or Jewish target.  Thirteen suspects were originally charged and a criminal trial is underway. 

U.S. Designated Terrorist Organizations 

5. (U) On October 8, 1997, the Secretary of State named the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C, formerly known as Revolutionary Left, Dev-Sol) terrorist organizations, making them subject to the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  (The PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy
Congress, or KADEK, and in November 2003 changed names again,
becoming the Kurdistan People,s Congress, KHK.  The USG quickly indicated that the group will continue to be viewed as a terrorist organization.) 

Marxist-Leninist 

6. (U) The main radical-left terror organization, DHKP-C, conducts small-scale operations against Turks and foreigners alike (armed attacks on uniformed police, suicide and other bombings, assassinations).  This organization continued to target Turkish and western interests after the Iraq war and continues to organize itself predominantly within Europe. According to government authorities, DHKP-C cooperates with other groups in Europe by providing support, shelter, and arms to them.  Turkish authorities believe there has been a
resurgence in membership attributed to the left's dissatisfaction with the current government, which has Islamist roots.  DHKP-C claimed responsibility for more than 30 bombing attacks against Turkish targets in 2004.  They continue to attack U.S. foreign policy in their rhetoric,
especially with regard to Iraq, and credible reporting continues to suggest that American interests remain on their target list.  In a series of attacks launched prior to the 2004 NATO Summit, DHKP/C and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP) placed or attempted to place IEDs on the fringes of the pre-Summit security perimeters to signal their
displeasure with political events in Iraq and embarrass the GOT prior to hosting NATO members.  A Turkish policeman was seriously injured when one of these IED's planted near the hotel where the U.S. President was to stay was detonated. 

7. (U) The second active far-left terrorist organization is the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP).  MLKP conducts small-scale terrorist operations, usually using IEDs called "sound bombs," within metropolitan areas.  MLKP continues to conduct a low-level bombing campaign against western businesses in all the major Turkish cities in 2003.  In each instance, a sound bomb was placed on a doorstep or in the vicinity of a business in the evening hours when injury to innocent bystanders was least likely.  These sound bombs result in minimal damage.  MLKP is deemed responsible for a sound bomb attack on the Ankara Turkish American Association in 2004.  Other far-left terrorist organizations that have followings in Turkey include the Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML), Turkish Workers'and the
Peasants Liberation Army (TIKKO).  TKP/ML and TIKKO primarily
operate in the areas of Ordu, Tokat, and Samsun. 

Radical Islamist 

8. (U) The primary radical Islamist terror group of Turkey is Turkish Hizbullah.  Known to fight its rivals, namely the PKK (and its successors) and rival Islamic groups, Turkish Hizbullah has avoided confrontations with authorities. Turkish Hizbullah has not carried out any major operations in 2004 but, according to state authorities, continues to maintain the capability to conduct operations.  Local press
has speculated that Hizbullah may have played a role in the November bombings in Istanbul. 

9. (U) Other Islamic groups include the Great Eastern Raider's Front (IBDA-C), Federal Islamic State of Anatolia (Kaplancilar), Selam Group, Islamic Movement Organization (IHO), the Jerusalem Warriors, Selefiler, Sofular, and Beyyiat-I El-Imam.  Both IBDA-C and Beyyiat-I El-Imam are sympathetic to Al Qaida.  IBDA-C claimed to have conducted
the Istanbul bombings in November 2003, but Turkish authorities said publicly that the group could not have conducted the operation without the assistance of a larger organization such as Al Qaida, and IBDA-C has a track record of claiming responsibility for a range of terrorist actions.. 

Separatist 

10. (U) KHK or Kongragel, formerly known as the PKK and, later, KADEK, is the largest separatist organization in Turkey.  The group has stated that it intends again to launch attacks against the GOT in Turkey's western cities.  The group's capabilities for such activities remain an open question.  KHK,s capability to operate has been drastically reduced due to vigorous and on-going counter-insurgency
efforts of the Turkish Armed Forces, Jandarma, Turkish National Police (TNP), and village guards (a paramilitary guard force recruited from local villagers).  This effort ultimately led to the arrest and conviction of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999.  The European Union (EU) designated the PKK a terrorist organization in May 2002.  In April 2002
the group changed its name and organization.  Renamed the
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK), the
organization expanded its operations by focusing more on political activities.  In November 2003, KADEK changed its name to the Kurdistan People,s Congress (KHK or Kongragel) and now claims to be an organized political group advocating Kurdish rights. 

11. (U) In the summer of 2004, KADEK renounced its self-proclaimed cease-fire and threatened to renew its separatist struggle in both the Southeast and Turkey's western cities.  Turkish press subsequently reported multiple incidents in the Southeast of PKK/KADEK/KHK terrorist actions or in which Turkish security forces clashed with
PKK/KADEK/KHK militants.  From June 1 to October 28, 2004, 60
Turkish security personnel, 13 civilians, and 58 terrorists were killed and 865 terrorists captured, according to information from the GOT.  PKK/KADEK/KHK maintains approximately 500-armed militants in Turkey and up to 5,000 armed militants in Northern Iraq, according to Turkish government experts and NGOs.  As part of the GWOT, the U.S.
is committed to eliminating the threat to Turkey posed by the
PKK/KADEK/KHK in Iraq. 

Chechens in Turkey 

12. (U) Although Chechen terrorists did not conduct any major operations in Turkey in 2004, they maintain the capability to do so, according to Turkish officials.  Large numbers of Turks, many with roots in the Caucasus, are sympathetic to Chechen ambitions.  In April 2002, Mustafa Yilmaz, a Turkish citizen of Chechen origin, seized the Marmara Hotel in Istanbul and held 13 hostages for approximately twenty minutes until he surrendered without incident.  This followed
an April 22, 2001 seizure of Istanbul's Swiss Hotel by 13 pro-Chechen Turkish citizens who held 150 hostages, including 37 Americans, for approximately 12 hours. 

13. (U) The capitalized titles below correspond to reftel questions. 

--------------------------------------------- ----------------
GOT ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM (A)
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 

14. (U) Turkey remained a strong and active contributor to the Global War on Terrorism effort.  A number of factors make U.S. policies, notably affecting Iraq, unpopular in Turkey. Over time, this could undermine Turkey's strong support of the GWOT.  Turkey agreed to assume command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for a second time.  It will command ISAF VII from February to August 2005, contributing up to 1,500 troops. 

15. (U) Turkey permitted the transport to Iraq of humanitarian goods, contributed humanitarian goods and services and sold vital material such as fuel, food and water to U.S. forces in Iraq.  They also allowed Incirlik to be used for the outbound rotation of US troops returning from
Iraq.  Turkey was also active in reconstruction efforts, including the provision of electricity to Iraq and the training of Iraqi diplomats.  Some 70 Turkish citizens have been killed while supporting U.S. forces or reconstruction in Iraq.  It has contributed headquarters personnel to the NATO training mission in Iraq and offered senior military leadership training in Turkey as a further contribution to NATO's Iraq training mission. 

16. (U) Turkey has also been an active partner on other fronts in the global war on terrorism and international security: Our militaries coordinated assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their abilities to protect important energy transportation routes.  Turkey subscribes to every arms control arrangement it is eligible to join,
including the Proliferation Security Initiative.  Ankara has been supportive of international efforts to convince Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA.  The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training Center provides counterrorism and other training to personnel from PFP partner countries. The military also established a NATO Center of Excellence for the Defense Against Terrorism that will provide more specialized training opportunities for both NATO partner
nations and alliance members beginning in 2005. 

17. (SBU) In compliance with UN Security Resolution 1373, Turkey has ratified all United Nations conventions on combating terrorism.  However, Turkey has acted (by Council of Ministers decrees) to freeze the assets only of those terrorist organizations, persons, and entities designated pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1267 (relating to Taliban and Al-Qaida), because Turkish law does not currently
permit it to freeze the assets of other such organizations, persons, and entities.  The initial decree, No. 2001/3483, dated December 22, 2001, has been updated by decree Nos. 2002/3873, dated March 21, 2002, 2002/4206, dated May 16, 2002, 2002/4896, dated October 1, 2002, and 2002/5426, dated March 28, 2003.  Turkey needs to pass laws that will: 1) explicitly criminalize the financing of terrorism; 2) resolve
jurisdictional disputes between courts; 3) make it easier to seize terrorists, assets; 4) improve functioning of MASAK (the Turkish financial intelligence analysis unit); and 5) strengthen the Suspicious Transaction reporting regime.  The US and EU have begun assisting Turkey in drafting legislation and implementation that Turkish officials say will meet these needs. 

18. (U) Turkish efforts to seize the assets of those who fund terrorist organizations have been further hampered by insufficient training and limited cooperation between agencies.  The U.S. and EU assistance referenced above is intended as well to address these deficiencies.  The success of these efforts will in large part be dependent on political
support from top levels of the GOT. 

-----------------------------------
RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (B)
----------------------------------- 

19. (U) Parliament in June adopted legislation closing the State Security Courts (DGM), special courts designed to try cases involving terrorism and other "crimes against the State."  Under the legislation, the Government created new specialized heavy penal courts to take on most of the former DGM caseload.  The new courts have special powers similar to those of the DGMs.  Average trial times run more than a year, and defendants in the specialized courts are usually incarcerated during their trials. 

-----------------------------------------
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (C/D)
----------------------------------------- 

20. (U) In 2004, the Republic of Turkey did not seek the extradition of any suspects from the United States on terror-related charges, nor did the United States seek the extradition of such suspects from Turkey.  There are no impediments to host government prosecution and/or extradition of suspected terrorists.  In several instances where
countries in the region have sought rendition/extradition of
suspected terrorists located on Turkish territory, the process has proven difficult. 

21. (U) In the past, Turkey has faced difficulty in extraditing terror-related suspects from European countries. According to government officials, Turkey has requested the extradition of 245 high level administrators of terrorist organizations since 1991.  Sympathy with Kurdish political and cultural aspirations in some European states, allegations of torture by Turkish officials, and Turkey's legal provision
for the death penalty have all proved impediments to such
extraditions.  However, in August 2002, as a part of the European Union reform package, the Turkish Parliament passed a law banning the use of the death penalty. 

------------------------------------
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (E)
------------------------------------ 

22. (U) Turks see themselves to be among the world's primary
victims of terrorism.  They cite the 15-year insurgency of
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and the worldwide
assassination campaign against the Turkish diplomats and
their families by Armenian activists of the 1970s and 1980s.
They have long complained about European countries' harboring
Kurdish (PKK), leftist (DHKP-C) and Islamist (Hizbullah,
Kaplanists) terrorists.  The Turkish government and media
were quick to respond to the events of September 11.  At all
levels, there was an outpouring of sympathy and solidarity.
There was widespread public sentiment that now others were
beginning to experience what Turks had lived with for years.
Turkey's pre-9/11 historic cooperation with the U.S. in law
enforcement, military and intelligence activities has
increased over the last two years.  There has been visible
support for the security of Americans at our mission's
buildings by local police. 

23. (U) The Turkish stand on terrorism has been somewhat
softer in the case of the Chechens.  There are cultural and
religious ties between Turks and Chechens, and both have had
a long-time rivalry with Russia.  The media treated the
takeovers of a ferryboat in 1999 and a hotel in 2001 in
Istanbul more like protests than terrorist attacks. 

24. (U) The leftist and Islamic fringe press sometimes
portrays Chechen rebels, Palestinian suicide bombers and even
Al Qaida members of Anti-Iraqi forces as "freedom fighters."
Terrorism has long been an interest of academics and writers
in Turkey.  In recent years there have been several
conferences on the topic.  Those organized by institutions of
the State have been seen as tools in the fight against
terrorism.  Privately funded academic programs have focused
more on analyzing the impact of terrorism and the root causes
of terrorism. 

---------------------------------------------
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE GOT (F)
--------------------------------------------- 

25. (U) The Government of Turkey continued its aggressive
counterterrorism efforts in 2004.  In addition to sharing
intelligence information on various groups operating in
Turkey, the Turkish National Police and the National
Intelligence Organization (MIT) conducted an aggressive
counterterrorist campaign and detained numerous suspected
terrorists in scores of raids, disrupting these groups before
terrorist acts could be carried out.  They committed a high
level of resources to insuring the security surround the NATO
Summit in Istanbul was a success.  Working in partnership
with their NATO allies, the GOT carried out nurmeous
pre-emptive raids against suspected Al-Qa'ida-affiliated
plotters.  Possiblty, as a result, there were no terrorist
incidents directly affecting the Summit.  A similar but more
limited operation took place prior to the December visit of
Russian President Putin. 

26. (U) The GOT continues its active suppression of the
PKK/KADEK/KHK, though its security operations tempo has been
significantly reduced in line with a reduction in the
conflict.  It continues to monitor the organization's
political movements in an effort to stem any potential
disturbances. 

------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (G)
----------------------------------- 

27. (U) The GOT consistently and strongly opposes both
domestic and international terrorism.  Turkey does not view
its maintenance of diplomatic or economic/commercial
relations with Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria as
constituting support for international terrorism. 

--------------------------------------------- -
SUPPORT STATEMENTS FOR TERRORIST COUNTRIES (H)
--------------------------------------------- - 

28. (U) Turkey shares borders with, and has been an historic
trading partner of Syria and Iran.  It balances a
condemnation of terrorist activities in those countries
(including providing havens for the PKK) with the need to
access historic trade routes.  Public statements against
state-supported terrorism are clear.  It has security
relations aimed principally at PKK/KADEK/KHK terrorists with
both Syria and Iran. 

--------------------------------------------- ---------
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TERRORISM (I)
--------------------------------------------- --------- 

29. (U) Since the attacks of September 11, the GOT has taken
an active role in the worldwide opposition against terrorism.
 In November 2004, the High Military Council (YAS) announced
that the National Security Policy would be re-written to note
a shift in defense strategy from one focused on regional
threats to a focus on international terrorism, fundamentalist
and separatist threats.  In May 2002 the European Union
placed the PKK and DHKP/C on its list of terrorist groups
after an intensive push by the GOT, with U.S. support, for
the EU to adopt tougher measures against Turkish terror
groups operating in Europe. 

--------------------------------------------- ------------
USG COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH GOT (J)
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 

30. (U) Turkey remains a staunch ally in the War on
Terrorism.  The Turkish National Police (TNP) continues to
provide excellent protection of U.S. diplomatic and military
facilities throughout Turkey.  Prior to the June 2004 POTUS
visit and NATO Summit in Istanbul, Turkish National Police
were extremely active and aggressive in monitoring and, in
some cases, proactively detaining suspected terrorists. 

31. (U) In September and October 2003, USG officials met with
interagency Turkish teams to work out a joint action plan to
eliminate the threat posed by the PKK/KADEK/KHK presence in
northern Iraq.  Turkey agreed to consider an information
campaign to ensure that the terms of its "Reintegration Law"
and the conditions to which Turkish refugees in Iraq and
PKK/KADEK/KHK operatives surrendering under the law would
return were well known in northern Iraq.  The U.S. pledged to
use all the elements of statecraft in eliminating the
PKK/KADEK/KHK threat.  S/CT Coordinator Cofer Black announced
that the terrorist group had no future in northern Iraq.  To
generate momentum for returns to Turkey, the USG worked with
the Turks and UNHCR in November to accelerate the voluntary
repatriation of Turkish refugees in northern Iraq.  Assistant
Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration
Dewey met with Turkish and UNHCR reps in Ankara in late
November to move this process forward.  We continue to share
information on PKK/KADEK/KHK in order to limit their global
activities and in the expectation that circumstance in Iraq
will allow for trilateral collaberation (Turkey, Iraq,
U.S./MNF-I) on the safehavens and front parties there. 

32. (U) As noted above, Turkey is now in the process of
modifying its domestic laws to comply with the UN Convention
on Suppression of Terrorist Financing, which the GOT adopted
in 2002. 

33. (U) Turkey is an active participant in the Department's
Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.  Since 2001, the Turks
have participated in 27 ATA courses, to include the recently
developed Capstone series of anti-terror courses and
practical exercise, and a seminar on transnational terrorism
conducted at the ILEA Center in Budapest. 

(Information for the Report's classified annex) 

34. (S) The Turkish Government continued to allow the use of
Incirlik AFB to support U.S. operations in and out of
Afghanistan and Iraq, including: 

- Allowed the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base to transit cargo
flights bound for Afghanistan and to a lesser extent those to
Iraq; 

- Authorized the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base to transit
Taliban and Al-Qaida detainees from Afghanistan to GTMO; and
for the transit of released GTMO detainees back to their
country of origin. 

- Allowed the U.S. military to station tankers at Incirlik
Air Base to support OIF- and OEF-related refueling missions;
- Contributed KC-135 tankers to support OEF-related
operations; 

- As a result of S/CT Coordinator Black,s enhanced
intelligence sharing regarding PKK/KADEK/KHK as part of the
joint action plan to eliminate the PKK/KADEK/KHK threat from
Northern Iraq. 

- In March 2004, the Turkish General Staff's Intelligence
Directorate (J-2) began participating in a bilateral US-TU
"Intelligence Fusion Cell" designed to assist USCENTCOM
intelligence gathering against the PKK/KGK in northern Iraq.
TGS J-2 also responded quickly to US requests for information
on possible terrorist locations and some merchant ships of
interest. 

-------------------------------------------
COOPERATION-INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION (K/1)
------------------------------------------- 

(Information for the Report's Classified Annex) 

35. (C) The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United
States and Turkey, which entered into force in January 1981,
governs investigative cooperation.  The GOT has processed
requests for investigative access to evidence under this
treaty.  However, in some cases the GOT has left requests
unanswered for over three years. 

----------------------------
COOPERATION-PREVENTION (K/2)
---------------------------- 

36. (U) The GOT coordinates closely with the USG on
anti-terrorist financing initiatives.  In response to USG
requests to freeze terrorist-related financial assets, the
GOT has added to its domestic asset freeze list all names of
individuals and firms designated under UNSCR 1267 (names
related to financing of Taliban and al-Qaida).  The GOT also
investigates these names and freezes assets found in Turkey. 

--------------------------------------------- ----
COOPERATION DURING PAST FIVE YEARS-PREVENTION (L)
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

37. (U) Overall, in the last five years, the GOT has worked
closely with the USG in the apprehension, conviction, and
punishment of those responsible for terrorist attacks in
Turkey.  GOT response is always immediate and substantial
when alerted to threat or incident involving US interests.
DEUTSCH

ELECTION UPDATE: CAMPAIGNS HOLD FINAL RALLIES; NOW IT IS UP TO THE VOTERS

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SENSITIVE
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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: ELECTION UPDATE: CAMPAIGNS HOLD FINAL RALLIES; NOW IT IS UP TO THE VOTERS

REF: A. LIMA 1277 B. LIMA 1199

----------
SUMMARY
---------- 

1.  (U)  Presidential hopefuls ended their campaigns with a
flourish, holding massive closing rallies on 4/6, the final
day for campaigning before the 4/9 general elections.  Two of
the three leading candidates, Unidad Nacional's Lourdes
Flores and APRA's Alan Garcia, addressed their supporters in
Lima, while ultra-nationalist "outsider" Union por el Peru's
(UPP) Ollanta Humala stayed true to his southern power base
by staging his extravaganza in Arequipa.  The final two weeks
of the campaign saw the mud start to fly, albeit in moderate
quantities, with most of the dirt aimed at Humala.  Two
"private" polls leaked to international news organizatins
had contradictory results, raising uncertainty over the
electorate's volatility as it heads for the ballot boxes.
END SUMMARY. 

--------------
LOURDES FLORES
-------------- 

2.  (U)  Flores' raly attracted what the National Police
estimated as 19,000 followers to the Campo de Marte park just
off central Lima.  Her speech concentrated on the positive
message that her campaign focused on for the last two weeks:
that Unidad Nacional stands for a change with "serenity,"
offering a "certain path and a sure destination," vowing to
combat the marginalization of a large part of the population,
provide honest and efficient government, and promote growth
through enhancement of opportunities for small businesses.
Flores also took swipes at her principle opponents, warning
voters not to "hand over the country to adventurers and
improvisers" (an allusion to Humala), nor "to repeat the old
political, economic and social failures that only brought
more hunger and desperation and fewer illusions" (a reference
to Garcia's disastrous 1985-90 Government). 

-----------
ALAN GARCIA
----------- 

3.  (U)  Garcia's rally attracted what the National Police
estimated as 15,000 supporters to the Naval Heroes Plaza that
fronts the Sheraton Hotel and Palace of Justice in downtown
Lima.  He sought to position APRA as the principle political
force representing the center, between "the right wing of the
great capitalists, although it is dressing itself up
differently and assuming phrases at the last minute" (Flores)
and "a mendacious agitator and demagogue who recently, at age
45, discovered nationalism" (Humala).  He also sought to
reassure non-Apristas that his government would be an
inclusive one, open to working with other parties and
staffing the bureaucracy with qualified technocrats.  At
previous stops in Puno, Tumbes and Trujillo during the last
week of campaigning, Garcia delivered much the same message,
but added local riffs.  In Trujillo, an APRA stronghold, he
paid homage to the party's martyrs.  In Puno and Tumbes he
promised to create free trade zones and expand agricultural
credits. 

--------------
OLLANTA HUMALA
-------------- 

4.  (U)  Humala closed out his campaign in the central plaza
in Arequipa before a crowd estimated by the National Police
at 4,500.  The day before he held a rally at the Naval Heroes
Plaza in Lima, drawing an audience similar to Garcia's.  The
UPP candidate was clearly on the defensive, dedicating a
major portion of his speech to address the numerous questions
and accusations raised against him and his followers over the
past two weeks, damning his accusers and claiming that the
mass media is engaged in an anti-Humala campaign on behalf of
the traditional parties and great business interests. 

5. (U) Humala, his family and his entourage were the main focus of attention over the past two weeks of the campaign, with his political opponents and the media making hay over:

--  UPP spokesman Daniel Abugattas calling First Lady Eliane
Karp a "daughter of a whore," and accusing her of intervening
with the Israeli Embassy to prevent Peruvians of Palestinian
descent (Abugattas is one) from traveling to the West Bank
and Gaza.  Humala removed Abugattas as his spokesman, but
rejected calls to kick him off the UPP's congressional list
for Lima. 

--  Television commentator, renowned novelist, and
self-professed bi-sexual Jaime Bayly's claim that when one of
his staff asked Humala's father Isaac to appear on his TV
program, the latter responded, "Tell that faggot that we are
not going to go on his program and that when we are in the
government we will have him shot."  This followed on Humala's
mother's comments in March that homosexuals should be
executed (Ref B). 

--  Humala's claims that electoral authorities are conspiring
to commit fraud to prevent his election, pointing to the
latters' failure to provide a mechanism that would enable
on-duty military and police personnel to vote, and his threat
to have his supporters take to the street if this occurs.
Election authorities and OAS Observer Mission head Lloyd
Axworthy responded by dismissing the possibility of fraud.
Axworthy also minimized the importance of the affected
personnel not being able to cast ballots, noting that they
represent less than one percent of the national vote, and
that their dedication to security duties will enable the rest
of the Peruvian population to vote in safety. 

--  Media reports published on 3/31 that at least three
retired military officers serving important functions in
Humala's campaign (Colonels Adrian Villafuerte, Estuardo
Loyola, and Luis Pinto) served in positions of confidence for
generals linked closely to imprisoned former National
Security Advisor Vladimiro Montesinos. 

--  Humala's Second Vice President running mate Carlos Torres
having lunch on 4/2 with TV magnate (Channel 5) Genaro
Delgado Parker only a few hours after Humala vowed that
"shameless" media owners who owe the government millions of
dollars (Delgado Parker reportedly has debts to the GOP of
some USD 10 million) will be called on to pay up under his
administration.  Humala claimed that Torres met with Delgado
Parker without his knowledge, and subsequently issued
instructions that UPP candidates and officials may not/not
meet with media owners or business tycoons without his prior
approval. 

--  Humala's interview with Argentine daily "Pagina 12,"
which the Lima media picked up on 4/5, that if Lourdes Flores
wins, "What would happen is what happened to presidents of
other Latin American countries who were removed by the
people.  I think that it will be very difficult for Lourdes
Flores to manage to complete one year of government."
Flores, Garcia and media commentators leapt on this quote as
signifying that Humala was prepared employ non-democratic
means to obtain power should he be defeated at the ballot
box.  His critics generally ignored his qualification later
in the interview that any candidate "who represents
continuity" would last a year in office if they did not
address social demands. 

--  Humala's involvement in criminal investigations.  He has
been summoned to testify on 4/24 in the criminal trial of his
brother Antauro for the latter's leadership of the 1/1/05
Andahuaylas uprising.  In addition, Tocache prosecutor Arturo
Campos has said he intends to call Humala to testify in
mid-April in connection with the allegations that he
committed human rights violations when commanding an Army
base in the Huallaga Valley in 1992. 

--  Humala's admission that he was planning to visit a
factory belonging to Samuel and Mendel Winter, two media
owners who were convicted and sentenced to jail terms for
accepting bribes from Montesinos, and whose parole status is
being reviewed by a criminal court over their failure to pay
a multi-million dollar fine.

--  News that Salomon Lerner Ghitis, Humala's liaison to the
business community, recently met with the newly appointed
Chilean Ambassador to Peru, Christian Barros, in Santiago
raised speculation as to possible dealings between the
ultra-nationalist Humala and the country's southern neighbor.
 Humala dismissed the importance of these reports, stating
that Lerner's trip and meetings were related to the latter's
business and had nothing to do with the UPP campaign. 

--  Allegations that first surfaced on 4/5, charging that
retired Major Italo Ponce, a senior Humala campaign advisor,
visited imprisoned Montesinos crony Oscar Lopez Meneses in
jail to negotiate the conformation of UPP's congressional
list.  The weekly "Caretas" published an expose on 4/7, in
which a witness, businessman Augusto Vega, claimed to have
participated in these discussions.  Vega had been involved in
the UPP campaign until January of this year when he left, he
says, because of the Montesinos connection (NOTE:  We have
also heard that Vega broke with Humala after being passed
over as a congressional candidate.  END NOTE). 

--  A 4/6 report by the news magazine "La Ventana Indiscreta"
in which retired National Police Colonel Cesar Mojorovich,
who was in charge of the local police station when Humala
staged his 10/27/2000 "uprising" in Locumba, claimed that
Humala's action was a sham designed to distract the
government's and public's attention from Montesinos, who
chose that same day to make his escape from Peru on a boat.
Mojorovich's account does not/not appear to add anything new
to these allegations, which have been aired ever since
Humala's "uprising" took place, but it does have the effect
of bringing this issue to the fore again at a critical moment
of the campaign.  Perhaps not coincidentally, Mojorovich is
being accompanied by leading members of the Independent
Moralizing Front (FIM) party, which has been an outspoken
critic of Humala. 

-----------------
THE PRIVATE POLLS
----------------- 

6.  (U)  The Organic Election Law prohibits the public
diffusion of poll results for a week before the election.
This prevents the local media from publishing polls during
this period, but it does not/not prevent the polling
organizations or their private clients from leaking the
results to the international press so that the news gets back
to a Peruvian audience.  Such has occurred with respect to
two polls carried out by the Apoyo and CPI consultancies.
The Apoyo poll was based on interviews in Lima and urban
areas taken on 4/3 and combined with rural results from the
poll published on 4/2 (Ref A), has Humala at 31 percent with
Flores and Garcia tied at 23 percent.  The CPI poll, taken
nationally on 4/4, found a technical tie, with the top three
candidates within a range of less than three percent:  Flores
27.6 percent, Humala 25.9 percent and Garcia 24.9 percent. 

----------
COMMENT
---------- 

7.  (SBU)  With active campaigning at an end, it now is up to
the electorate to judge the candidates at the ballot box.
One unanswered question is whether the constant political and
media assaults on Humala will penetrate his Teflon shield and
wear away at his support (as the CPI poll reports and as the
previous Apoyo poll hinted was starting to occur - Ref A), or
whether his base of committed followers will remain unchanged
(as the latest Apoyo poll suggests).  The other major issues
in play are whether Flores has managed to arrest or reverse
her steady decline, and whether Garcia can maintain his final
sprint for the finish line and make it into the second round.
 The answers will come on 4/9.  END COMMENT.
STRUBLE

CONFIDENTIAL: PROMINENT BLOGGER FLEES SEDITION TRIAL

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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 000323 

SIPDIS 

FOR EAP/MTS AND DRL 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS: PHUM PINS PGOV KJUS KDEM UK MY
SUBJECT: PROMINENT BLOGGER FLEES SEDITION TRIAL 

REF: A. 08 KL 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED FROM ISA
     B. 08 KL 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA DETENTION
     C. 08 KL 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA 

Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and
 d). 

Summary and Comment
------------------- 

1.  (C) Prominent blogger and government critic Raja Petra
Kamarudin, who was jailed for two months in 2008 under the
Internal Security Act (ISA), failed to appear for his
sedition trail on April 23, and the court subsequently issued
a warrant for his arrest.  A member of his defense team
informed poloff that Raja Petra, along with his wife, fled to
the United Kingdom about two months ago on the belief that he
would face eventual imprisonment for sedition. 

2.  (SBU) Comment: Raja Petra, Malaysia's most controversial
on-line voice, will continue to be a nuisance to Prime
Minister Najib's administration.  Not expecting to return to
Malaysia anytime soon, we can expect Raja Petra to ratchet up
his criticism and purported exposes during his self-imposed
exile.  End Summary and Comment. 

Where is Raja Petra?
-------------------- 

3.  (SBU) Raja Petra Kamarudin, an outspoken blogger and
member of the Selangor state royal family failed to appear at
Sessions Court for the continuation of his sedition trial on
April 23.  The court subsequently issued a warrant for his
arrest.  Raja Petra faced charges under the Sedition Act for
articles he posted on his website, Malaysia Today, regarding
the high-profile Altantuya murder case and the victim's
alleged ties to Prime Minister Najib and his wife.  If
convicted of sedition, he faces a maximum sentence of three
years in jail. 

4.  (U) On April 23, Raja Petra posted on his website his
reasons for not appearing in court.  He claimed Malaysian
authorities intended to detain him under the ISA, as the
Government had done in September 2008 (ref A-C).  He also
stated the courts were unable to provide him with a fair
trial and noted the government was using sedition charges and
criminal defamation charges, in addition to detaining him
under ISA, for linking the Prime Minister to the murdered
Mongolian national Altantuya.  Raja Petra also mentioned that
he had angered the Selangor royal family with his criticism
of the Sultan of Perak related to the ruling coalition's
takeover of Perak state government from the opposition, and
therefore could not return to Selangor. 

Lawyer Confirms Departure for UK
-------------------------------- 

5.  (C) Poloff met with one of Raja Petra's lead lawyers on
April 23.  The lawyer disclosed that following Raja Petra's
last appearance in court in February Raja Petra's legal team
concluded their client would be found guilty and imprisoned
under the sedition charges, and informed Raja Petra
accordingly.  The lawyer claimed that the ruling coalition's
political influence over the court proceedings precluded a
fair trail.  He said that Raja Petra, who holds both
Malaysian and British passports, along with his wife had left
for the UK some two months ago and remained there.  His
departure was kept closely guarded with Raja Petra's closest
friends remaining in the dark.  The lawyer said it was
unclear if the Attorney General's Office realized Raja Petra
had left Malaysia, as the prosecutor's public statements
indicated he was still in the country.  After the court's
issuance of an arrest warrant for Raja Petra, and a "show
cause notice" for his wife as bail guarantor, some on-line
articles suggested Raja Petra was in the UK. 

KEITH

SECRET: BANANA WORKERS UNION LEADER MURDERED

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UNCLAS GUATEMALA 002172 

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SENSITIVE
SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, DRL/AWH, DRL/ILCSR
DOL FOR CROMERO, PCHURCH, LBUFFO 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ELAB KCRM PHUM KJUS KDEM PGOV GT
SUBJECT: BANANA WORKERS UNION LEADER MURDERED 

This is sensitive but unclassified.  Protect accordingly. 

1. (SBU) Summary:  Banana workers union leader Marco Tulio Ramirez Portela was murdered on September 23 by unidentified
assailants on a farm in Los Amates, Izabal owned by Bandegua,
a subsidiary of Del Monte.  Embassy Labor Officer met with  SITRABI leaders and Bandegua management October 1-2 to  discuss the murder, ongoing threats against the union, and  security for Bandegua workers and their families.  SITRABI  suggested that the killing may be related to Ramirez' union  activities, and expressed concerns over increased threats and the lack of security.  Bandegua executives believed that the  murder was a politically motivated killing, as investigations  conducted by the Public Ministry indicate.  Bandegua and SITRABI agreed to work together to increase security for the  workers.  Ambassador raised the case with the Attorney
General and Minister of Government.  End summary. 

Murder of Union Leader
----------------------
2. (U) Banana workers union leader Marco Ramirez, 43, was
murdered in the early morning of September 23 on a banana
farm on the private property of Bandegua, a subsidiary of  transnational Del Monte Fresh Produce Company, in Los Amates,  Izabal in eastern Guatemala.  He was reportedly shot by four  unidentified, masked assailants on two motorcycles about 100  meters from his house as he was leaving for work.  Ramirez  was the brother of the Secretary General of the Banana  Workers Union of Izabal (SITRABI).  He served as Secretary of  Culture and Sports on SITRABI's Executive Committee, and as  union sub-section leader of Yuma Farm where he lived and  worked. 

3. (U) Embassy Laboff visited Izabal October 1-2 to meet with  SITRABI and Bandegua to discuss the murder, continuing  threats and intimidation of union leaders, and security for the banana workers and their families.  Laboff also met with the victim's spouse, visited the crime scene and a banana factory at Yuma Farm, and spoke with the factory union leader, Bandegua site manager, and banana workers. 

SITRABI's View
--------------
4. (SBU) SITRABI leaders expressed concerns that the threats
and intimidation have not ceased but increased after the murder.  They reported that armed persons on motorcycles and in vehicles have been circling the residential areas of the farms and firing their guns to intimidate union leaders and workers. 

5. (SBU) SITRABI leaders and the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center Representative for Central America believe the murder was related to Ramirez' union activities.  According to SITRABI, Ramirez had problems with Bandegua management.  He had been subject to repeated threats of termination over the past year as well as accusations by management of sabotaging the company's production and inciting illegal work stoppages.  On the day prior to the murder, a vehicle reportedly driven by an individual affiliated with a local organized crime family was seen in front of Ramirez' house and was again seen just minutes prior to his murder.  Also on the day prior to the murder, the "second wife" of Bandegua's Labor Relations Manager was reportedly killed in the same manner as Ramirez. SITRABI believed the killing was a warning to the Labor
Relations Manager to be tougher with the union. 

6. (SBU) SITRABI Secretary General Noe Ramirez acknowledged
that the killing could also be related to politics.  His brother had served as an UNE election monitor at a voting center in Los Amates on September 9.  The UNE candidate won Qcenter in Los Amates on September 9.  The UNE candidate won the mayoral race over the Unionista candidate, who was widely alleged to be supported by a local organized crime family. Later the same day as Ramirez' murder, the body of an UNE activist was reportedly found riddled with bullets on a Bandegua farm in Los Amates. 

Bandegua's View
---------------
7. (SBU) Bandegua executives believe the killing was linked to politics.  General Manager Marco Antonio Garcia asserted that it was common knowledge, even among the victim's co-workers, that the killing was politically motivated.  He claimed that workers, and perhaps even SITRABI's leaders, know who actually murdered Ramirez but were reluctant to make any accusations other than against Bandegua.  Workers have mentioned that Ramirez had problems with individuals involved in politics and that one of those individuals could have killed him.  According to Garcia, it was well known in the community that Ramirez drank and talked too much, and insulted political candidates when under the influence of
alcohol. 

8. (SBU) Garcia shared SITRABI's concerns over security, noting that many Bandegua administrators and superintendents also live on the farms among the workers.  He pointed out that the area is extremely dangerous due to narcotrafficking and that there have been several murders.  Bandegua has a private security firm that guards the two vehicle access entry gates to its property and registers vehicles that enter the premises.  However, according to Garcia, Bandegua does not have direct control over the guards and the system is not foolproof, especially given the general state of violence in Guatemala.  Garcia agreed to work with the union on enhancing security for Bandegua workers and their families, and
proposed a meeting with the union to specifically address security issues. 

9. (SBU) Garcia asserted that the policy of Bandegua and Del Monte is zero tolerance for violence, and that Bandegua was not involved in the murder or intimidation of SITRABI leaders.  He stressed that Bandegua was cooperating fully with the Public Ministry and other authorities in the murder investigation.  Bandegua has also presented a formal complaint to the Public Ministry requesting a thorough investigation of the murder and urging that those responsible be held accountable. 

Embassy Action
--------------
10. (SBU) Ambassador met with the AFL-CIO Central American
Representative and raised the case with Minister of Government Torrebiarte and Attorney General Florido. Torrebiarte told Ambassador on October 24 that she was aware of the case and that the National Civil Police's special investigative unit for crimes against journalists and unionists was looking into it. 

11. (SBU) In response to raising the matter with Attorney General Florido, Ambassador received a letter October 24 from the Public Ministry, stating that investigations to date support a preliminary hypothesis that the killing was related to events on September 9.  According to the Public Ministry, investigations revealed that Ramirez had problems at a voting center on election day when a representative of another political party arrived with armed men to intimidate him. 

Comment
-------
12. (SBU) This murder is the latest of several murders of union leaders over the past year, and a grim reminder of the culture of impunity and violence that affects all Guatemalans.  The motives for this murder remain unclear. Embassy has spoken with the union, management, and government officials and has reason to doubt that the killing was related to the victim's union activities or that it involved
Bandegua.  Embassy is following this case closely and has pressed authorities at the highest level of government to thoroughly investigate this murder and review the actions of security force members in the area.
Derham

CONFIDENTIAL: PLD LEADER MEDINA KEEPS DISTANCE FROM FERNANDEZ

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDG #1340/01 2381957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251957Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1330
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PRIORITY 2182
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0920
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN PRIORITY 1094
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON PRIORITY 2885
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO PRIORITY 1219
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 4848
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY 1920
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0199
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMISTA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 001340

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2028
TAGS: PGOV PBIO SNAR ECON DR
SUBJECT: PLD LEADER MEDINA KEEPS DISTANCE FROM FERNANDEZ

REF: A. SANTO DOMINGO 01327
B. SANTO DOMINGO 01167
C. SANTO DOMINGO 01296

Classified By: P. Robert Fannin, Ambassador, Reasons 1.4(b), (d)

1. (C) BACKGROUND:  Danilo Medina is the second-most powerful leader in the PLD party, after President Fernandez himself, and is seen as the strategic brains behind the organization's rise from third-party status in the 1980s to control of the presidency and both houses of congress by 2006.

Medina served as Fernandez's Minister of the Presidency until late-2006.  He then left the administration to challenge the President for the PLD's 2008 nomination after Fernandez, according to Medina, broke a pledge to support his candidacy and instead ran for re-election.  Medina lost the 2008 PLD primary by a large margin, but later allowed his supporters to join the Fernandez campaign.  On August 11, he attended his first party meeting since the break with the President.

2. (C) POLCHIEF met with Danilo Medina on August 20 and inquired about the prospects for constitutional reform.

Medina said that Fernandez called a meeting of the PLD's Political Committee on August 11 and that the President pressed for his proposed constitutional amendments to be endorsed quickly, citing a need for an agreement prior to his August 16 inauguration speech.  A key proposed amendment would maintain the two-term limit on the presidency, but would permit the head of state to run again four years after leaving office.  Medina said that he voted against the amendment, even though it would allow him to run in 2012, because he is against re-election in any form; however, the proposed constitutional change was approved by the party.

Medina was critical of the fact that Fernandez -- after calling the meeting on the 11th knowing the party would want to please him before cabinet appointments were made on August 16 -- did not introduce the proposed amendments during his inauguration speech.

3. (C) Medina was critical of Fernandez's inauguration speech, sharing the view of other commentators that the address proposed more public works projects than the Government can afford (Ref A).  Medina argued that the Government will simply go into more debt to finance the President's projects.  He was also critical of what he
considers the excessive defense of the peso, which has caused interests rates to rise, as well as of Finance Minister Bengoa, who he described as a "yes man."

4. (C) POLCHIEF praised the recent success of the Dominican justice system in achieving convictions in the Baninter bank fraud (Ref B) and inquired about the prospects for prosecution of public-sector corruption.  Medina replied that
the fight against corruption should start within political parties, where the problem is serious.  He said that many politicians accept campaign contributions from narcotics
traffickers.  These types of contributions range, according to Medina, from officials who do not know (or fail to investigate whether) they are receiving narco money, to those
who proactively approach narcos in their districts to essentially shake them down.  Regarding the recent drug-related multiple murder case in Bani, Medina praised
Sen. Wilton Guerrero (PLD-Peravia), who has made allegations of official complicity in the drug trade in that area (Ref C).

5. (C) In a review of opposition parties, Medina contradicted prevailing wisdom by saying that the PRD party is doing well. He argued that the PRD lost the presidential election not because of the party's reputation, but because their candidate, Miguel Vargas Maldonado, was widely seen as having been deeply corrupt during his prior government service. Medina noted that, if the votes of allied parties are not
counted, the PRD beat the PLD in a majority of the country's provinces.  Regarding the PRSC, which received less than five percent of the vote, Medina said that the party does not have a clear future.

6. (C) COMMENT:  Medina has always kept his criticism of Fernandez out of the press; however, this meeting showed that behind closed doors he has the dagger out for the President. At times, Medina sounded more like a member of the opposition than a fellow PLD leader.  He is very powerful within the party, particularly in the congress, where the vote on constitutional reform will be an opportunity for him to flex his muscles.  With Fernandez likely to be barred from running again in 2012, all indications are that Medina will be the front-runner for the PLD nomination.

(U) Please visit us at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/
FANNIN

GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FRUSTRATION INCREASES

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0491/01 2231332
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111332Z AUG 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4662
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
INFO RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON PRIORITY 0020
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU PRIORITY 0039
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH J2 PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PRO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON//USDAO PRIORITY 0021
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE//USDAO PRIORITY 0011
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO//USDAO PRIORITY 0031
Tuesday, 11 August 2009, 13:32
S E C R E T HAVANA 000491
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/08/2029
TAGS SNAR, PREL, SMIG, PGOV, CU, ASEC
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FRUSTRATION INCREASES OVER LACK
OF JAMAICAN COUNTERNARCOTICS COOPERATION
Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)
1. (C) Summary: The U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba has spoken with Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) officials on multiple occasions, as recently as 4 August 2009, regarding their perceived lack of Government of Jamaica (GOJ) cooperation in attempting to curtail the flow of illicit narcotics to the Bahamas and the United States. Cuban MININT officials contend that narcotics smugglers from Jamaica are utilizing both Cuban airspace and waters to transport narcotics ultimately destined for the United States, but their repeated attempts to engage Jamaica on the issue have been ignored. End Summary.
2. (C) On 4 August 2009, DIS wrapped-up a two-day trip to Camaguey, Cuba where he received a briefing on the 5 July emergency landing of an aircraft, enroute from Jamaica, that dropped 13 bales of marijuana over a barren field in Cuba located southwest of Playa Santa Lucia in Camaguey Province. According to Cuban officials, the aircraft was destined for a pre-determined location over Bahamian waters where the narcotics would be dropped to two waiting go-fast vessels for eventual shipment to the United States. The crew of three discarded the contraband prematurely when they experienced engine problems.
3. (C) On 4 August, the DIS visited Joaquin de Aguero airport in Playa Santa Lucia where the smugglers’ aircraft is located; DIS was provided with further insight from airport officials as to how the case played-out, and how Cuban authorities responded. According to the Cuban Anti-Drug police (DNA), all three traffickers onboard the aircraft are being detained in Cuba. XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (C) The aforementioned case follows a 27 May 2009 case in which a joint-interdiction of a Jamaican go-fast vessel in the vicinity of Playa Guardalavaca, Cuba, that resulted in the Cuban Border Guard seizing 700 kg of Jamaican marijuana. This, after the Cuban Border Guard interdicted the vessel in its waters utilizing real-time information from OPBAT, USCG District 7, and the USCG DIS in Havana. The DIS attended a briefing on this case with Cuban officials, and boarded the subject narco-trafficking vessel.
5. (S) While the DIS is often briefed via formal means on the type of cases mentioned above, side-bar conversations during provincial trips outside of Havana with Cuban MININT officials often yield increased insight into Cuban counterdrug (CD) operations and mindset. A prevailing concern and significant frustration on the Cuban side is the reportedly complete lack of cooperation afforded them by the GOJ when it comes to CD information sharing. DIS has spoken to no fewer than 15 Cuban MININT officers whose primary missions/roles are drug interdiction or support to drug interdiction. Collectively and continually, they express frustration over the GOJ’s consistent ignoring of Cuban attempts to increase the flow of drug-related information between the two island nations to increase interdictions and avoid “being surprised by drugs.”
6. (C) MININT officers, specifically the MININT’s international relations division and anti-drug directorate,
with whom the DIS communicates extensively, consistently allude to the lengths the GOC has gone to in order to enhance the relationship. Without fail, MININT officials allude to the fact that narco-related information (i.e. information on go-fasts and aircraft transiting to/from Jamaica in the vicinity of Cuba) passed to the GOJ is always translated to English because in the past GOJ officials stated to the GOC that they did not understand Spanish; MININT officers report that despite their efforts, GOJ officials still do not respond.
7. (S) In October 2008, DIS attended a counternarcotics meeting onboard the RFA WAVE RULER in the Port of Havana. The meeting was arranged by the UK Defense Attache to encourage greater cooperation between GOC and GOJ over CD efforts; during conversations with the Attache, the DIS learned that the impetus behind the meeting was to bring GOC and GOJ authorities together to encourage greater dialogue, and to quash growing frustration between the two. In comments to the DIS after the meeting, Cuban officials stated that the two Jamaican officers “just sat there and didn’t say anything.” MININT officers mention that Jamaican officials commonly agree to greater information sharing in person; however, that is the extent of their efforts.
8. (C) Currently, Cuban officials appear resigned to the idea that they will not see greater GOJ cooperation in the near future. On 3 August, the DIS asked the chief of the MININT’s international relations department if he thought Cuban officials would sit down at a table with USCG, DEA, Jamaican officials, and Cuban DNA officers to discuss CD issues; he said it would be a possibility, but that the GOC does not have a suitable liaison officer at its embassy in Jamaica. DIS responded by asking if an officer or group of officers from the DNA would be able to travel to Jamaica for such talks; he once again stated that it is a possibility.
9. (C) Comment: DIS gauges that the GOC genuinely desires greater information sharing on CD issues with Jamaican authorities to serve the GOC’s strategic interests. Should we decide to pursue broader counternarcotics cooperation with the GOC, MININT-DNA may be willing to attend talks with US drug authorities in concert with Jamaican authorities. At the present time, however, it appears frustration is building within the ranks of the Cuban MININT-DNA, especially as CD cases continue to bring illicit narcotics in close proximity or actually to Cuba and its littorals, posing an interdiction challenge for Cuban authorities. Through their constant reminders to the DIS and via press reports to the Cuban people, GOC officials ultimately blame the United States for this problem due to the high demand for illicit narcotics by United States consumers. End Comment. FARRAR

SECRET FROM CUBA: FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0341/01 1601953
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091953Z JUN 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4471
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL PRIORITY
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA PRIORITY 0138
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUCOGCA/NAVSTA GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUWDHDP/OBLA LOS ANGELES CA PRIORITY
RUEHKG/USDAO KINGSTON JM PRIORITY
S E C R E T HAVANA 000341 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO
US-CU MIGRATION TALKS 

REF: (A) HAVANA 172 (B) HAVANA 187 

Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 

1. (S//NF) Summary: On 5 June, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Drug
Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the United States
Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba attended a
repatriation of sixteen Cuban migrants at Bahia de Cabanas.
During the transit to and from the pier, a Cuban Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MINREX) official offered subtle insights on
the possible GOC approach to the upcoming migration talks
between the USG and GOC, and reiterated past statements
regarding issues that he believes are of mutual concern
between both nations. The conversation occurred immediately
following 2 incidents involving the commandeering of a Cuban
Border Guard (CBG) go-fast (gf) by 2 CBG recruits, and the
appearance of 7 migrants in a raft in front of the USINT
building. End Summary. 

2. (S//NF) The 5 June repatriation was the second in a
week, with the first taking place on 30 May. Armando Bencomo
(Bencomo), the MINREX official in attendance, was
uncharacteristically quiet on 30 May, choosing not to
initiate conversation regarding policy issues as he normally
does. On 30 May, DIS mentioned to Bencomo the prospect for
re-initiation of migrant talks, to which Bencomo responded
that his government was mulling over the offer. Bencomo, in
typical fashion, made a point to reiterate that the former
Bush administration had quashed the talks in 2004, and stated
that the talks had previously been one of the only forms of
productive candor between both parties. 

3. (S//NF) Conversely, on 5 June, immediately upon
embarking on the short gf trip to the migrant receiving pier
at Cabanas, the conversation between DIS and Bencomo turned
to the subject of the migration talks. However, the topic
was brushed over, and Bencomo reiterated his past message
that the GOC is also interested in engaging in talks on 3
additional topics: counterdrug, counterterrorism, and natural
disaster response and preparation. These 3 items are common
themes in conversations with Bencomo, and DIS believes, based
on his repeated statements, and their recent offer to include
these three topics as a way ahead between both sides, that
the GOC's interest in these three items may be greater than
migration-related issues. 

4. (S//NF) Immediately following the repatriation, DIS and
Bencomo boarded the gf for the ten minute trip back to the
parking lot in the town of Cabanas. While boarding, in
nonchalant fashion, Bencomo asked about the status of 2 CBG
recruits who commandeered a CBG gf on the evening of 31 May.
The 2 were ultimately rescued by the USCG when the gf they
commandeered was located broken down fifty nautical miles
northwest of Cuba. DIS informed Bencomo that the 2 were
being treated per normal migrant processing protocols, and at
the time of the conversation, disposition had not been
determined- the issue was dropped immediately thereafter. 

5. (S//NF) A more detailed conversation regarding the
migrant talks ensued during the gf ride back to the parking
area at Cabanas. Adding the disclaimer "in my opinion,"
Bencomo said he thought the talks will be a positive thing.
DIS asked why, and Bencomo continued that the venue would be
a good opportunity to discuss why Cubans choose to leave
Cuba; specifically, Bencomo stated he believes the talks will
help identify which factors motivate Cubans to depart the
island to pursue a life in the United States. Bencomo,
without naming the policy, alluded to the "wet-foot,
dry-foot" policy currently in place that permits Cubans who
reach U.S. soil to remain there legally; Bencomo expressed
rather subtly his disapproval of this policy. Further, he
asserted that the talks would be a good venue where both
sides might develop or agree to joint measures that would 

help curtail a mass migration scenario from Cuba. In
addition, he stated that the talks would help both sides to
develop a response to a potential mass migration scenario.
Finally, Bencomo alluded to the Cuban mass migration events
in 1980 and 1994, and stated that in 1994 the U.S. encouraged
the behavior of Cubans who chose to steal boats and depart
the island by not returning those boats or treating said
Cubans as criminals. 

6. (S//NF) Recollecting an earlier conversation in which he
stated that, although the U.S. had made some recent overtures
towards the GOC, Bencomo stated that the U.S. could take
"heavier" steps to change the nature of the relationship. DIS
asked Bencomo why he believed migration talks and the other
three topics mentioned above were so important if the GOC was
so interested in seeing "heavier" changes. He stated that
the aforementioned forums for engagement are a launching
point, or segue, to further talks on larger issues, which we
believe include the embargo, Guantanamo Bay, and the five
Cuban spies. Bencomo summed up the Cuban outlook on the
current USG-GOC relationship when he stated that "everything
is in your (U.S.) hands." Note: This is a consistent theme
heard from all of the DIS's Cuban contacts; GOC
representatives persistently reiterate in their dialogue that
the status of the USG-GOC is the fault of the U.S., and the
road ahead lies entirely in the hands of the U.S. This line
of conversation is usually accompanied by an unsolicited
statement by the representatives that eschews the notion of
human rights and pre-conditions asserted by the U.S. in any
dealings with the GOC; both of these issues are so far beyond
the consideration of GOC officials that merely mentioning
them normally turns off a conversation in its entirety. 

7. (S//NF) Summary: DIS assesses that the GOC will attempt
to place the wet-foot, dry-foot issue at the center of the
upcoming migrant talks, and perhaps hammer the policy as the
prime reason for illicit Cuban migration departures from
Cuba. The mention of a mass migration scenario by a Cuban
official, especially one at the relatively high level that
Bencomo currently holds, is unusual. 

8. (S//NF) Further Summary: While the DIS has significant,
regular contact during repatriations with Bencomo, DIS also
has significant contact with Ministry of Interior (MININT)
officials while carrying out counternarcotic and
countermigration duties. As such, DIS has and continues to
gather unique insight into the demeanor and consistent party
line of these elements of the GOC. GOC officials tend to tow
the same line; however, DIS has noticed a recent up-tick in
anti-U.S. policy candor from the various GOC officials. DIS
estimates this is a sign that Cuban officials are
uncomfortable with the shifting U.S. approach to dealing with
Cuba demonstrated in recent months. In short, GOC is
developing a defensive posture, and is utilizing their
relationship with the DIS as one of an interlocutor to
verbally state their interest in discussing issues of mutual
cooperation; however, their actions, or lack thereof in some
cases, suggest otherwise. For instance, in the aftermath of
a large drug bust facilitated by US-Cuban-Bahamian
information exchange, wherein the CBG recovered a large
amount of marijuana and 3 traffickers, the Cuban
representative from the Anti Drug Directorate utilized a
follow-up meeting with the DIS to chastise U.S. authorities
in the U.S. for not detecting trace amounts of marijuana
concealed in ink markers and carried onto the island by Cuban
American visitors. The GOC mentality that they are never in
the wrong, and the U.S. has fostered the current poor state
of relations between the two states, is more prevalent now
than in the past year the DIS has spent on the island. End
Summary.
FARRAR

CONFIDENTIAL: BRAZIL GRANTS ASYLUM TO FARC TERRORIST

O 271830Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6146
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
AMCONSUL RECIFE
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
SECDEF WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001511 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV MARR BR CO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL GRANTS ASYLUM TO FARC TERRORIST 

REF: BRASILIA 719 

Classified By: PolCouns Dennis Hearne, 1.4 (B) and (D) 

1.  This is an action cable.  Please see paragraph 10 for
action request. 

2.  (C)  Summary: The Colombian government has called on
Brazil to reverse a July 14  decision to grant asylum to
wanted FARC terrorist Francisco Antonio Cadena.  Some media
in Brazil greeted the decision with speculation that the
judicial asylum process was subverted by President Lula da
Silva and elements of his Workers Party, who maintained close
ties with FARC leader Cadena, who lived in Brazil before his
arrest last year and who has a minor child with his Brazilian
wife.  The Colombian Embassy in Brasilia will meet July 28
with the head of the Brazilian refugee committee which
granted the asylum request, apparently on the strength of a
written statement by Cadena promising to sever all ties with
the Colombian terrorist group, the FARC.  The granting of
asylum to a known terrorist flies in the face of Brazilian
claims to oppose international terrorism.  Particularly
troubling are the allegations of the Presidency subverting
the judicial process and pressuring the refugee committee to
take a decision contrary to its own guidelines, allegations
we find credible.  We, like the Colombians, will try to
discover the official rationale for the decision and how the
GOB reconciles it with its public opposition to international
terrorism.  We would also appreciate instructions on other
actions, if any, we should be taking.  End Summary. 

3.  (C) In a decision taken and kept in secret, the Brazilian
National Committee on Refuges (CONARE) July 14 granted
political refugee status to Francisco Antonio Cadena Collazos
(known in Brazil as Olivera Medina), the so-called Ambassador
to Brazil of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia), who was arrested in Brazil in August 2005 at the
request of Interpol, based on a Colombian arrest warrant
which included charges of murder for terrorist purposes,
kidnapping, extortion and terrorism.  The decision will make
it impossible for Cadena to be extradited to Colombia as the
Colombian government requested on August 24, 2005 (reftel). 

4.  (C) In a statement issued July 19 in Bogota, the
Colombian government requested the Brazilian government to
reconsider the decision to grant asylum to Cadena and
reiterated its previous request for his extradition.  The
Political Counselor of the Colombian Embassy in Brasilia,
Juan Manuel Gonzalez Ayerbe, pointed out to poloff July 27
that CONARE guidelines preclude the granting of asylum to
persons who have committed war crimes or crimes against peace
or humanity, heinous crimes or acts of terrorism or drug
trafficking.  Gonzalez added that, aside from providing an
official notification of the decision through its Embassy in
Bogota, the GOB had made no comment on the case to the
Colombians and had not provided an official explanation of
the decision.  Gonzalez said that one of his contacts at the
Brazilian Foreign Ministry had told him unofficially that
Cadena had signed a statement saying he would cut all ties
with the FARC, and that CONARE had made its decision on that
basis. 

5.  (C) Gonzalez said the Colombia Embassy would meet July 28
with Luis Paulo Barreto, the General Secretary of the
Ministry of Justice, who serves as the chair of CONARE, to
seek a full explanation and to reiterate its request that
asylum be revoked and extradition proceed.  CONARE's other
members include the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
(Vice-Chair), Labor, Health, Education, the Federal Police,
UNHCR and NGO's from Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.  The press
spokesman of the CONARE told the Embassy July 27 that all
CONARE documents are confidential; there are no public
records or press releases concerning decisions, neither are
decisions published in the official government gazette.  The
rationale behind the secrecy is that persons requesting
refugee status are assumed to be in danger, so their names
cannot be released to the public. 

6.  (C) An article in the July 27 edition of the daily
newspaper Correio Brasiliense repeated the claim made to the
Colombian Embassy that the decision by CONARE was taken on
account of Cadena's commitment to cease terrorist activities
and quotes him as saying he will devote all his efforts from
now on to taking care of his Brazilian family.  The article
notes that the Justice Ministry had denied there had been
political pressure concerning the decision and gave
assurances that the decision was taken for technical reasons.
That claim is at variance with what Correio reported in
April (reftel). 

7.  (C) At that time, the daily reported that CONARE members
were complaining that the Office of the Presidency had
usurped the role of CONARE in assessing Cadena's asylum
request, calling the action a dangerous precedent that
politicized an issue that should be handled on its legal and
technical merits.  CONARE members accused Presidential
International Affairs Advisor Marcos Aurelio Garcia of being
behind the transfer of authority over the extradition request
from the Foreign Ministry to the Office of the Presidency
(The Colombian Ambassador echoed that view to the Charge,
adding that Garcia was known to have "sympathy" for the
FARC).  An advisor to Garcia rejected the charge, saying
Garcia was not involved in the issue. 

8.  (C) Counselor Gonzalez raised Garcia's name during our
July 27 meeting as a key player in the decision-making
process.  He added that, during the many years Cadena spent
in Brazil prior to his arrest last year, he had cultivated
close ties with President Lula's Labor Party (PT) and had met
with leaders of the PT in a house just outside of Brasilia
(called the Red Heart Mansion) owned by a PT member of
Congress .  He also echoed press and other public accounts
that PT leaders had met with Cadena in prison.  While
pointing out that claims of FARC donations to PT campaigns
had never been proven, he insisted there was ample proof of
Cadena's ties with PT leaders. 

9.  (C) Comment:  The decision by the Brazilian committee is
audacious but not necessarily surprising, as is the near
silence surrounding it.  Aside from a few articles in the
Brazilian press, there has been little notice of the decision
and no statements from Brazilian leftists (including those
who have run a web site in support of his asylum claim) or
the FARC itself.  Of course,  the GOB's silence on the issue
is not surprising.  Granting refugee status to a man accused
of terrorism against a friendly, democratically elected
government of a neighboring country is hardly the thing
President Lula or his associates would be eager to defend
publicly, especially since it would inevitably result during
this election period in a new airing  of the claims of FARC
support for PT 2002 campaigns, possibly including Lula's.
Embassy believes that high level political pressure resulted
in this decision. 

10.  (C) Action Request:  We, like the Colombians, will be
trying to find out what the official rationale for the asylum
decision was and how that can be reconciled with the GOB's
supposed opposition to international terrorism.  We would
also appreciate instructions from Washington regarding other
actions we should be taking. 

Chicola

CONFIDENTIAL: LIKELIHOOD OF A CUBAN MASS MIGRATION

VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0781/01 2702018
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 262018Z SEP 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3761
RUCOWCX/CCGDEIGHT NEW ORLEANS LA PRIORITY
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0547
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU 0034
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0009
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 0027
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM CMD CTR MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA 0125
RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000781 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2018
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL SMIG PHUM CU
SUBJECT: LIKELIHOOD OF A CUBAN MASS MIGRATION FOLLOWING
HURRICANE DESTRUCTION 

Classified By: COM JONATHAN D. FARRAR, REASONS 1.4 B & D 

1.  (C) Summary:  Hurricane season 2008 has been especially
unkind to the island of Cuba.  Four consecutive storms,
concluding with the most recent, Hurricane IKE, left much of
the island in shambles.  Buildings and homes, tobacco and
sugar crops, and island-wide infrastructure have all been
affected, including 444,000 damaged houses, and 63,000 houses
destroyed.  The level of destruction has led many Cuba
watchers to ask whether a Cuban mass migration is likely in
the near future.  While the aforementioned events have indeed
been historic in proportion, from our vantage point we see no
indication that a mass migration from Cuba is pending.
However, U.S. Interests Section (USINT) believes this is an
issue that must be given due deference as the outcome of
post-hurricane recovery efforts will play a large role in
determining whether Cubans take to the sea or remain on the
island.  End Summary. 

2.  (C) During post-hurricane interactions with a variety of
sources in Cuba, USINT personnel have not detected any
indication a mass migration from Cuba is pending.  Further,
Cubans who have regular contact with USINT (mainly
dissidents, refugees, and religious groups), including those
from Pinar del Rio, one of the worst hit and affected Cuban
provinces, have not reported the existence of rumors or
preparations by Cubans to depart the island in increased
numbers or larger go-fast or rustica loads. 

3.  (C) In conversation with Cuban Ministry of Interior
(MININT) personnel, specifically the Cuban Border Guard
(CBG), the USINT Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist
(DIS) learned that some CBG coastal outpost units in Ciego de
Avila, Camaguey, and Las Tunas provinces were damaged during
the wave of hurricanes, and that CBG troops are busy making
repairs to infrastructure there.  However, as expected, a CBG
Colonel informed the DIS that CBG patrols have not been
scaled back.  It should be noted that during a separate
meeting with MININT/CBG personnel immediately following the
passing of IKE, the same Colonel asked the DIS whether the US
Coast Guard was planning "an operation" following that most
recent hurricane; DIS believes the Colonel's question, in the
context of the meeting and conversation, was an attempt to
gauge whether the US government was concerned about an
increase in Cuban migrant departures or mass migration, and
inadvertently suggested himself that there was a fear on the
part of the CBG that at least an increase in Cuban migration
numbers was possible. 

4.  (C) Cubans we speak with are increasingly frustrated with
the difficulties caused by the hurricanes and the GOC's
refusal to accept some foreign assistance offers.  However,
the Cuban people possess a rather high boiling point: Cubans
have adopted a wait-and-see posture, also doing the best they
can in the interim to reinstall some sense of Cuban-style
"normalcy."  Via Cuban state broadcast television and radio,
the GOC has urged Cubans to fight, be disciplined, and
exhibit solidarity following each hurricane's destructive
path, and encouraged Cubans to work harder to overcome
current conditions. 

5.  (C) While there have been no suggestions of a mass
migration event from Cuba, the ingredients necessary for the
Cuban people and/or government to cook-up such a scenario
have manifested in Cuba over the past two months- they
include: multiple natural disasters, damaged or destroyed
infrastructure, an apparent shortage of food on the island,
significantly increased fuel prices, and a Cuban government
whose post-hurricane response and recovery "expertise" are in
demand and are apparently spread dangerously thin from the
Province of Pinar del Rio in the west to Guantanamo Province
in the east, and in every province in between.  Further, as
the rise and fall of Cuban migrant flow relies heavily on
weather conditions and sea state, the chances for an
increased egress of Cuban migrants prior to the winter cold
fronts and subsequent heavy seas would be more likely.  Many
Cubans may attempt to depart the island hoping to beat the
heavy seas or reunite with family in south Florida prior to
the holiday season; this hurricane season may exacerbate that
trend. 

6.  (C) Comment:  While the international community has its
eyes fixed on Cuba's pending response to the offers of
financial and resource assistance from the US government to
the GOC, it is possible that Cuban authorities will attempt
to mitigate the departure of Cuban migrants from the island
towards the United States to avoid negative press and
embarrassment.  However, as international interest wanes,
Cuban authorities may also lose interest in curtailing the
flow of Cubans towards the United States.  End Comment.
FARRAR

SECRET: TURKEY: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

P 111147Z DEC 00
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9745
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL ADANA
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 008112

S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/10
TAGS: PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 217248

(U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM JAMES F. JEFFREY FOR REASONS: 1.5
(B) AND (D).

--------
OVERVIEW
--------

1. (U) COMBATTING TERRORISM IS A MAJOR PRIORITY IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY. THE GOT APPROACHES THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS WITH AN OUTLOOK SIMILAR TO THE USG'S INTERNATIONAL, COORDINATED APPROACH. THE DANGER POSED TO TURKEY BY TERRORISM IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE THREE POSTS OF THE U.S. MISSION TO TURKEY CONSTITUTE 50 PERCENT OF THE HIGH-THREAT POSTS IN THE EUROPEAN BUREAU (EUR). MOREOVER, THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY EXCEEDS THE NUMBER IN THE REST OF THE HIGH-THREAT EUR COUNTRIES COMBINED. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY INCLUDE SEPARATIST, RADICAL ISLAMIST, LEFTIST, AND TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM, WHICH USED TO BE AN ISSUE FOR TURKEY, IS NOW LARGELY DEFUNCT. RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT EXISTS, OPERATES AT THE LEVEL OF CRIMINAL MAFIA GANGS.

U.S.-DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

2. (U) THE BEST-KNOWN TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY ARE THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK) AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT (DHKP/C, FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEV-SOL). ON OCTOBER 8, 1997, THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESIGNATED BOTH GROUPS AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SUBJECT TO THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996. ON OCTOBER 8, 1999, THE SECRETARY RENEWED THOSE DESIGNATIONS.

LEFTIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

3. (U) BEYOND THE PKK AND DHKP/C, THERE ARE SEVERAL LEFTIST AND ISLAMIST TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN TURKEY. MANY OF THESE GROUPS ARE SMALL AND RELATIVELY INACTIVE, THOUGH THEY HAVE TARGETED FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING AMERICANS, IN THE PAST. ONE OF THE MORE ACTIVE LEFTIST GROUPS IS THE TURKISH WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' LIBERATION ARMY (TIKKO). OTHER GROUPS INCLUDE THE TURKISH COMMUNIST LABORERS' PARTY/LENINIST (TKEP/L), THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY (TDKP), THE MARXIST LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY/LIBERATION (MLKP/K), AND THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS UNIT (TIKB).

ISLAMIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

4. (U) THE ACTIVE ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY ARE THE ISLAMIC GREAT EASTERN RAIDERS' FRONT (IBDA/C), TURKISH HIZBULLAH, AND THE "JERUSALEM WARRIORS." IN 2000, THE IBDA/C'S TEMPO OF OPERATIONS WAS LOW. HIZBULLAH, HOWEVER, WAS IN THE SPOTLIGHT BECAUSE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) RAIDS EXPOSED THE ALARMING REACH OF THE ORGANIZATION AND THE SURPRISING NUMBER OF COVERT MURDERS IT HAD STAGED. THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ALSO CAME TO PUBLIC ATTENTION IN 2000. THOUGH TURKISH HIZBULLAH AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT RELATED TO EACH OTHER, THE TNP UNCOVERED EVIDENCE FROM ITS RAIDS ON TURKISH HIZBULLAH THAT EXPOSED SOME OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE ORGANIZATION IS ALLEGED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS OF SEVERAL PROMINENT TURKISH INTELLECTUALS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND A U.S. SERVICE MEMBER.

5. (U) THE CAPITALIZED TITLES BELOW CORRESPOND TO REFTEL QUESTIONS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE "MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS" SECTION THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS, THEY ARE IN THE SAME ORDER AS THE QUESTIONS IN REFTEL.

----------------------------------
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS (E)
----------------------------------

INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

6. (U) DURING 2000, THE GOT CONTINUED TO SUPPORT EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREEMENTS ON TERRORISM. THE GOT IS A SIGNATORY TO ELEVEN OF TWELVE UN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONVENTIONS. DURING 2000, THE "INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS," WHICH TURKEY HAS SIGNED, WAS UNDERGOING THE PROCESS REQUIRED TO SECURE PARLIAMENTARY RATIFICATION. TURKEY HAS NOT YET SIGNED THE "INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM." 

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.]

7. (C) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS THE GOT HAS EXERCISED ITS RIGHT TO INSPECT THE CARGO OF IRANIAN FLIGHTS TRANSITING TURKISH AIRSPACE EN ROUTE TO LEBANON. IN LIGHT OF IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE HIZBULLAH, THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WITH LIMITED SUCCESS, THE TURKS ALSO CONTINUALLY USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO URGE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE EUROPEAN FRONT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PKK, DHKP/C AND OTHER GROUPS.

FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK

8. (U) ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT, THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES (TSK), JANDARMA (A PARAMILITARY POLICE FORCE), TNP, AND VILLAGE GUARDS (PARAMILITARY GUARD FORCES RECRUITED FROM AMONG SOUTHEASTERN VILLAGERS) CONTINUED VIGOROUS COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO SUPPRESS THE PKK THROUGHOUT EASTERN TURKEY AND IN NORTHERN IRAQ. CONTINUING GOT COUNTERINSURGENCY SUCCESSES AND THE PKK'S SELF-PROCLAIMED CEASE-FIRE LED TO A DECREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS. ACCORDING TO THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS), FOR THE FIRST ELEVEN MONTHS OF THIS YEAR THERE WERE 45 PKK-RELATED INCIDENTS, COMPARED TO 3,298 FOR THE FULL YEAR OF 1994. IN 2000, AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, MORE THAN 200,000 SECURITY PERSONNEL REMAINED DEDICATED TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN EASTERN TURKEY AND NORTHERN IRAQ. LARGE, MULTI-UNIT COMBINED-ARMS OPERATIONS WERE NOT NECESSARY; MOST COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY SMALLER UNITS ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

9. (U) TURKEY'S SOUTHEASTERN EFFORTS BORE FRUIT IN THE WAKE OF OCALAN'S 1999 CAPTURE. A MEASURE OF TURKEY'S SUCCESS WAS A STEEP DECREASE IN PKK-RELATED INCIDENTS IN 2000 AS COMPARED WITH 1999. AS A RESULT OF THE DECREASE, THE TSK WAS INCREASINGLY ABLE TO HAND OVER ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS TO THE JANDARMA AND TNP. ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE GOT'S PROGRESS AGAINST THE PKK WAS PARLIAMENT'S JUNE 2000 APPROVAL OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION CALLING FOR VAN PROVINCE TO BE REMOVED FROM THE STATE OF EMERGENCY REGION (OHAL). THE OHAL IS NOW REDUCED TO FOUR PROVINCES (DIYARBAKIR, HAKKARI, SIRNAK, AND TUNCELI).

10. (U) IN ADDITION TO CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, THE GOT CONTINUES ITS ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS ECONOMIC DISPARITIES IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY. THE GOT INTENDS FOR THESE EFFORTS, THE MOST PROMINENT OF WHICH IS THE SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA PROJECT (GAP), TO REDUCE THE POVERTY AND DESPERATION THAT IT BELIEVES ARE THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN THE REGION. UNFORTUNATELY, TURKEY'S ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS MEAN THAT MANY OF THESE EFFORTS ARE UNDER-FUNDED, IF FUNDED AT ALL. FROM A MORE POLITICAL APPROACH, THE GOT HAS NOT MOVED QUICKLY TO GRANT THE GREATER INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO ETHNIC KURDS THAT WOULD UNDERCUT THE SUPPORT ENJOYED IN THE REGION BY THE PKK. THE GOT AND TURKISH SOCIETY AS A WHOLE HAVE YET TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON HOW TO ACCOMMODATE THE DESIRE OF SOME TURKISH CITIZENS' TO EXPRESS THEIR KURDISH CULTURE.

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.]

11. (C) DESPITE TURKEY'S MILITARY SUCCESS AGAINST KURDISH TERRORISM, THE PKK'S RELUCTANCE TO CHALLENGE THE GOT STEMS, TO SOME EXTENT, FROM ITS LOYALTY TO ABDULLAH OCALAN AND THE DESIRE TO AVOID CAUSING HIS EXECUTION. THE PKK'S PERSONALITY-CULT MINDSET MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION TO ABANDON OCALAN BY IGNORING HIS CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, WITH APPROXIMATELY 5,000 PKK TERRORISTS UNDER ARMS OUTSIDE OF TURKEY, THE POSSIBILITY REMAINS THAT KURDISH TERRORISM WILL RETURN TO TURKEY, PERHAPS VIA A PKK FACTION OR SPLINTER GROUP. THIS BECOMES MORE LIKELY AS THE PKK CONTINUES TO SUFFER MILITARY DEFEATS FROM NORTHERN IRAQ'S KURDISH GROUPS, IN ADDITION TO THE TSK.

ON-GOING SUPPRESSION OF DHKP/C

12. (U) DURING 2000, TURKISH SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED THEIR ON-GOING AND EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN TO DISRUPT THE DHKP/C THROUGH RAIDS AND ARRESTS. THE TNP'S VIGILANCE CONTRIBUTED TO A YEAR IN WHICH DHKP/C INCIDENTS WERE RARE AND RELATIVELY MINOR. NOTABLE WAS THE TNP'S AUGUST ARREST OF SEVEN ALLEGED DHKP/C TERRORISTS WHO APPARENTLY WERE PLANNING AN ATTACK ON INCIRLIK AIRBASE, FROM WHICH U.S./UK/TURKISH COMBINED TASK FORCE ENFORCES THE "NO-FLY ZONE" OVER NORTHERN IRAQ.

MAJOR PUSH AGAINST HIZBULLAH

13. (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH (HIZBULLAH), WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN THE 1980S IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY, IS A SUNNI-ISLAM KURDISH GROUP NOT RELATED TO LEBANESE HIZBULLAH. HIZBULLAH HAS GENERALLY TARGETED ETHNIC-KURDS, PARTICULARLY BUSINESS AND CULTURAL FIGURES WHO WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY ISLAMIST IN THE ORGANIZATION'S EYES. IT ALSO FOLLOWS A PATTERN OF TARGETING ITS OWN FORMER MEMBERS WHO HAVE BROKEN RANKS OR SIMPLY MOVED ON FROM THE ORGANIZATION.

14. (U) OVER THE COURSE OF 1999, HIZBULLAH INCREASED ITS OPERATIONS IN ISTANBUL, WHERE THE DISAPPEARANCES OF ETHNIC-KURDISH BUSINESSMEN EVENTUALLY ATTRACTED POLICE ATTENTION. INVESTIGATIONS LED TO THE JANUARY 17 TNP RAID ON A HIZBULLAH SAFEHOUSE THAT WAS FORTUITOUSLY ALSO SERVING AS HIZBULLAH'S HEADQUARTERS. IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF THE RAID WERE THE DEATH OF HIZBULLAH LEADER HUSEYIN VELIOGLU AND THE DISCOVERY ON THE PREMISES OF THE BODIES OF SOME OF THE MISSING BUSINESSMEN. IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING, A TROVE OF EVIDENCE FROM THE RAID ALLOWED THE GOT TO CONDUCT A SERIES OF WIDE-RANGING RAIDS TO ROLL UP MUCH OF THE ORGANIZATION. THE TNP CAPTURED OR KILLED MUCH OF HIZBULLAH'S LEADERSHIP, SEIZED SEVERAL CACHES OF WEAPONS, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, DISCREDITED ITS EXTREMISM BY EXPOSING EVIDENCE OF 156 MURDERS.

15. (U) THOUGH SUCH RAIDS INFLICTED SEVERE DAMAGE ON HIZBULLAH, THE ORGANIZATION CONTINUES TO EXIST, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE GOT'S UNRELENTING PURSUIT OF ITS REMNANTS AND WITH WEEKLY REPORTS OF RAIDS AND ARRESTS. VIEWING STATISTICS FOR THE OHAL ONLY, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE GOT ACTIVITY AGAINST HIZBULLAH IS CLEAR, EVEN THOUGH FULL YEAR 2000 FIGURES WERE NOT YET AVAILABLE. FOR ALL OF 1999, THERE WERE 267 ANTI-HIZBULLAH OPERATIONS, WITH 420 SUSPECTS ARRESTED OUT OF A TOTAL OF 1366 TAKEN INTO TEMPORARY CUSTODY. FIGURES FOR 2000 UNTIL THE END OF OCTOBER SHOW 723 OPERATIONS, WITH 1744 SUSPECTS ARRESTED OUT OF 2712 TAKEN INTO TEMPORARY CUSTODY.

16. (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH HAS NOT YET ACTED AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS, PERSONNEL, OR FACILITIES, OR AGAINST THE TURKISH STATE, EXCEPT IN REACTION TO POLICE RAIDS. NONETHELESS, HIZBULLAH HARBORS EXTREME ANTI-WESTERN VIEWS AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ORGANIZATION MAY SHIFT ITS ATTENTION TO FOREIGNERS, TO INCLUDE AMERICANS, IN THE FUTURE. DURING 2000, GOT OFFICIALS AND THE TURKISH MEDIA ALLEGED THAT HIZBULLAH HAD IRANIAN LINKS AND SUPPORT.

CAPTURE OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS

17. (U) THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, WHICH REPORTEDLY IS A SUB-GROUP OF A LARGER GROUP CALLED TEVHIT ("UNITY" OR "MONOTHEISM"), IS AN ETHNIC TURKISH, EXTREME ISLAMIST GROUP. ITS MEMBERS ARE SUNNI MOSLEMS WHO SEEK TO ESTABLISH ISLAMIST RULE IN TURKEY. AS NOTED ABOVE, HIZBULLAH AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED. NONETHELESS, THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS HAD SUFFICIENT CONTACT THAT THE TNP'S RAIDS AGAINST HIZBULLAH PRODUCED EVIDENCE THAT IDENTIFIED THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS AND RESULTED IN THEIR MAY CAPTURE. ACCORDING TO SOME GOT OFFICIALS AND THE SUSPECTS' MEDIA-REPORTED CONFESSIONS, THIS PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE HAD IRANIAN TRAINING, SUPPORT, AND DIRECTION. THE ORGANIZATION STANDS ACCUSED OF THE PREVIOUSLY UNSOLVED MURDERS OF SECULARIST INTELLECTUALS, THE MOST PROMINENT OF WHOM WHERE UGUR MUMCU, AHMET TANER KISLALI, MUAMMER AKSOY, AND BAHRIYE UCOK. THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ALLEGEDLY MURDERED FOREIGNERS AS WELL, INCLUDING USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK AND EGYPTIAN, INDIAN, ISRAELI, AND SAUDI DIPLOMATS.

------------------------------------------
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO ACTS OF TERRORISM (A)
------------------------------------------

18. (U) TURKEY'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM TAKES A VIGOROUS APPROACH TO ENFORCING THE COUNTRY'S COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 150-200 TERRORISM-RELATED CASES PROSECUTED IN TURKEY'S STATE SECURITY COURTS, THREE STOOD OUT THIS YEAR.

STATUS OF ABDULLAH OCALAN'S CASE

19. (U) ON JUNE 29, 1999, ANKARA STATE SECURITY COURT NO. 2 CONVICTED ABDULLAH OCALAN OF TREASON UNDER ARTICLE 125 OF THE TURKISH PENAL CODE AND SENTENCED HIM TO DEATH. ON NOVEMBER 25, 1999, THE NINTH COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD THE VERDICT. ON JANUARY 12, 2000, PRIME MINISTER BULENT ECEVIT ANNOUNCED HIS DECISION NOT TO FORWARD CONVICTED PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN'S DEATH PENALTY SENTENCE TO PARLIAMENT, WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO APPROVE HIS EXECUTION. THIS DECISION WAS MADE IN CONSIDERATION THE APPEAL OCALAN'S TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR). IN NOVEMBER 2000, THAT APPEAL WAS TAKEN UP BY THE ECHR AND IS EXPECTED TO REQUIRE AT LEAST A YEAR-AND- A-HALF TO RESOLVE.

MAIN HIZBULLAH TRIAL

20. (U) THOUGH THERE ARE MULTIPLE COURT ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE GOT'S SUCCESSES AGAINST HIZBULLAH, THE MAIN TRIAL FOR 156 MURDERS OPENED IN JULY IN DIYARBAKIR'S STATE SECURITY COURT AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF 2000, WITH A DECISION EXPECTED SOMETIME IN 2001. AMONG THE 15 ACCUSED WERE VELIOGLU DEPUTIES CEMAL TUTAR AND EDIP GUMUS, WHO ALLEGEDLY HANDLED THE ORGANIZATION'S "MILITARY" AND "POLITICAL" ACTIVITIES.

JERUSALEM WARRIORS TRIAL

21. (U) THE TRIAL OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS AND THEIR ACCOMPLICES OPENED IN ANKARA ON AUGUST 14. 17 SUSPECTS WERE CHARGED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INVOLVEMENT IN 22 MURDERS OVER THE COURSE OF TEN YEARS. AS NOTED ABOVE, AMONG THE VICTIMS WHERE PROMINENT SECULARIST INTELLECTUALS AND JOURNALISTS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND ONE U.S. SERVICE MEMBER, USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK.

--------------------------------------------- --
EXTRADITIONS INVOLVING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (B)
--------------------------------------------- --

22. (U) IN 2000 THERE WERE NO EXTRADITIONS ON TERRORISM- RELATED CHARGES FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED STATES. LIKEWISE, THERE WERE NO SUCH EXTRADITIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO TURKEY, NOR WERE THERE ANY SUCH EXTRADITIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO TURKEY.

---------------------------------------------
IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION (C)
---------------------------------------------

23. (U) FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, TURKEY HAS LONG FACED DIFFICULTY IN THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. SYRIA, IRAQ, AND IRAN HAVE LONG HARBORED PKK TERRORISTS, WHICH THEY USE AS A TOOL IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY. IN EUROPE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR KURDISH POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. THE PKK HAS FOUND PROTECTION FROM PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION THERE DUE SOME GOVERNMENTS' INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LEGITIMATE KURDISH POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR PKK TERRORISM. THE DHKP/C AND OTHER LEFTIST TERROR GROUPS HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE TO OPERATE IN EUROPE UNDER A SHIELD OF CONCERNS ABOUT TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

24. (U) A KEY IMPEDIMENT TO EXTRADITIONS OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS FROM EUROPE IS TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, EVEN THOUGH A DE FACTO MORATORIUM EXISTS. SINCE 1984, 28 TERRORISTS, MOST NOTABLY PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN, HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, BUT NO EXECUTION HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT SINCE THAT TIME. NONETHELESS, AND DESPITE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TERRORISM, SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO EXTRADITE SUSPECTS TO TURKEY. THROUGHOUT 2000, PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE EVENTUAL ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CONTINUED, WITH MOST OBSERVERS PREDICTING THAT TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY STATUS WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO ABOLITION.

25. (U) ONE HIGH-PROFILE EXAMPLE OF A EUROPEAN REFUSAL TO EXTRADITE A SUSPECT SOUGHT BY TURKEY WAS THE CASE OF FEHRIYE ERDAL. ERDAL, A MEMBER OF THE DHKP/C, WAS ACCUSED OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JANUARY 1996 MURDER OF A PROMINENT INDUSTRIALIST, OZDEMIR SABANCI, AND TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CITED TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS AN OBSTACLE TO HER BEING RETURNED TO TURKEY, EVEN THOUGH TURKEY WAS WILLING TO PROMISE NOT TO EXECUTE HER. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO CHARACTERIZED THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH THE GOT SOUGHT HER AS BEING "POLITICAL CRIMES." SHE REMAINS UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN BELGIUM PENDING A TRIAL ON MINOR WEAPONS CHARGES. BELGIAN (AND OTHER) AUTHORITIES HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT TURKEY'S EXTRADITION REQUEST WAS NOT PRESENTED IN A MANNER TACTICALLY CALCULATED TO ACHIEVE EXTRADITION AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT A MORE SOPHISTICATED INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE EXTRADITION ISSUE MAY HAVE PRODUCED A MORE WELCOME RESULT.

26. (U) TURKISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS REPORT THAT THEY HAVE REQUESTED EXTRADITIONS OF SUSPECTED PKK, DHKP/C, AND OTHER TERRORISTS FROM FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, AND THE UK IN RECENT YEARS. ALL SUCH REQUESTS WERE REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SUSPECT MIGHT FACE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE CRIMES INVOLVED WERE POLITICAL, OR THE SUSPECTS MIGHT FACE PERSECUTION FOR POLITICAL BELIEFS.

------------------------------------
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (D)
------------------------------------

27. (U) PRESIDENT SEZER, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT, FOREIGN MINISTER CEM, CHIEF OF THE TGS GENERAL HUSEYIN KIVRIKOGLU, AND FORMER-PRESIDENT DEMIREL HAVE ALL MADE STRONG STATEMENTS DENOUNCING TERRORISM DURING 2000. THE GOT FREQUENTLY AND VIGOROUSLY MAKES PUBLIC CONDEMNATIONS OF ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM.

------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (F)
------------------------------------

28. (U) THE GOT CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY OPPOSES BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. TURKEY DOES NOT VIEW ITS MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA AS CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

--------------------------------------------- -----------
STATEMENTS SUPPORTING TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES (G)
--------------------------------------------- -----------

29. (U) THE GOT MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN 2000 IN SUPPORT OF TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES ON TERRORISM ISSUES.

--------------------------------------------- -------
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM (H)
--------------------------------------------- -------

30. (U) TURKISH OFFICIALS, IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, CONTINUE TO LABEL THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AS ONE OF THE GOT'S TOP SECURITY PRIORITIES. WHILE THE TSK CONTINUES ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST PKK TERRORISTS IN THE SOUTHEAST OF THE COUNTRY, THE TNP CARRIES ON ITS DILIGENT AND VIGOROUS WORK IN SUPPRESSING THE DHKP/C AND HIZBULLAH, WHICH PRIMARILY OPERATE IN URBAN AREAS.

--------------------------------------------- ----
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES (I)
--------------------------------------------- ----

31. (U) CLOSE U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION CONTINUES TO BE STRENGTHENED BY 14 YEARS OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE (ATA) PROGRAMS. ATA PROGRAMS INCLUDE MANDATORY HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENTS. GOT OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT THEY VIEW ATA PROGRAMS AS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARD BRINGING TURKISH POLICE STANDARDS INTO GREATER CONFORMITY WITH EU AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS.

32. (U) TURKEY COOPERATES WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ITS EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA. IN JUNE 2000, A GOT OBSERVER ATTENDED A CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON DESIGNED TO PROMOTE COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE AMONG KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN. TURKISH OFFICIALS HAVE REGULARLY PARTICIPATED IN COUNTER-TERRORISM CONSULTATIONS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. SUCH CONSULTATIONS ARE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND COORDINATE STRATEGY.

--------------------------------------------- ----
COOPERATION - INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS (J)
--------------------------------------------- ----

33. (U) THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE IN JANUARY 1981, GOVERNS INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION. THE GOT HAS EXPEDITIOUSLY PROCESSED REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACCESS TO EVIDENCE UNDER THIS TREATY. HOWEVER, IN SOME CASES THE GOT HAS LEFT REQUESTS UNANSWERED FOR OVER THREE YEARS. THERE WERE NO REQUESTS MADE TO THE GOT IN 2000.

34. (U) IN 1999 THE USG REQUESTED AND RECEIVED INFORMATION RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTEMPTED DHKP/C ROCKET ATTACK ON THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN ISTANBUL. THIS YEAR THE THREE TNP OFFICERS WHO PREVENTED THE ATTACK WERE TRIED ON CHARGES OF HAVING EXTRA-JUDICIALLY MURDERED THE DHKP/C SUSPECTS. THE CASE REMAINS ON-GOING.

35. (U) OVERALL, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE GOT HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG IN THE APPREHENSION, CONVICTION, AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN TURKEY. THE MOST PROMINENT EXAMPLE OF THE GOT'S AGGRESSIVE EFFORTS TO BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE IS THE ARREST AND ON-GOING TRIAL OF FOUR SUSPECTS IN THE 1991 ASSASSINATION OF USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK IN ANKARA. THE TRIAL OF THE FOUR, WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY MEMBERS OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, AN ISLAMIST TERROR GROUP, BEGAN IN AUGUST 2000. THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND THEIR 13 COHORTS, STAND ACCUSED OF ALMOST A SCORE OF OTHER MURDERS AND ATTACKS, AS NOTED ABOVE.

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX]

36. (S) IN 2000 THERE WAS ONE EXTRADITION FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED STATES INVOLVING AN INDIVIDUAL WITH SUSPECTED TERRORIST CONNECTIONS WHO HAD ALSO COMMITTED A VARIETY OF NON-TERROR RELATED CRIMES IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS EXTRADITION, WHICH WAS EFFECTED IN THE SPACE OF APPROXIMATELY FIVE MONTHS, WAS AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION. THE SMOOTH EXECUTION OF THE EXTRADITION WAS PARTICULARLY NOTABLE BECAUSE THE MOST RECENT PREVIOUS EXTRADITION, WHICH HAD NO TERRORISM ASPECT, WAS IN 1993.

----------------------------
COOPERATION - PREVENTION (K)
----------------------------

37. (U) THE GOT PROVIDES THE USG AND, IN PARTICULAR, U.S. SECURITY OFFICERS IN TURKEY WITH UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION REGARDING TERRORIST GROUP OPERATIONS. MOREOVER, THE GOT PROVIDES EXTENSIVE POLICE SUPPORT TO DETER AND PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN TURKEY. TURKEY PROVIDES DEDICATED TNP GUARDS WHO WORK IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH MISSION SECURITY PERSONNEL AT THE THREE DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN TURKEY (ANKARA, ISTANBUL, AND ADANA). TURKISH POLICE EXPEND LITERALLY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSON-HOURS PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF MANY OFFICIAL AMERICAN RESIDENCES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE TNP ALSO PROVIDES SECURITY MOTORCADE ESCORTS FOR MANY U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS EACH YEAR, INCLUDING FOR EVERY CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO VISIT TURKEY.

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX]

38. (S) IN THE LAST MONTHS OF 2000, U.S. FACILITIES IN TURKEY WERE SUBJECT TO ALMOST WEEKLY TERRORIST THREATS. IN PARTICULAR, INCIRLIK AIR BASE WAS SINGLED OUT AS THE SITE OF A POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACK. IN RESPONSE, THE TURKS UPGRADED THE THREAT LEVEL AT THE BASE, WHICH INCLUDED ERECTING BARRICADES AROUND THE AMERICAN SECTOR OF THE BASE, INCREASING VEHICLE SECURITY CHECKS, PERFORMING 100 PERCENT IDENTIFICATION CHECKS, AND INSTALLING MORE CHECK POINTS IN THE CITY OF ADANA OUTSIDE INCIRLIK. THE GOT ALSO PROVIDED ADDITIONAL PROTECTION IN DURING 6TH FLEET COMMANDER'S VISIT TO ANKARA AND DURING THE VISIT OF HIS FLAGSHIP, THE USS LASALLE, TO WESTERN TURKEY.

39. (S) IN OTHER ASPECTS OF COOPERATION AND PREVENTION, THE GOT'S COOPERATION HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING. THE GOT HAS RESPONDED IN A POSITIVE AND FORWARD-LEANING MANNER WHEN THE USG HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM. IN 2000, THE TURKISH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (TNIO), TGS, AND TNP ALL WORKED CLOSELY WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE TO RENDER, DISRUPT, TRACK, AND ARREST TERRORISTS WHO WERE TRANSITING TURKEY TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS OR WHO WERE BENT ON CAUSING HARM WITHIN TURKEY ITSELF. WHEN ASKED, THE GOT WATCH- LISTED INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT HAVE ARRIVED AT ONE OF TURKEY'S PORTS ENTRY. IT HAS PROVIDED THIS ASSISTANCE DESPITE, AT TIMES, VAGUELY-WORDED THREAT REPORTS THAT REQUIRED A SUBSTANTIAL PERSONNEL COMMITMENT TO DO A JOB THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PERFORMED WITH LESS EFFORT, HAD THE USG BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION.

40. (S) IN NOVEMBER 2000, THE TURKS PROVIDED EXCEPTIONAL ASSISTANCE TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE BY ARRESTING A USAMA BIN LADEN LIEUTENANT WHO ATTEMPTED TO TRANSIT TURKEY. AT THE REQUEST OF THE USG, THE TURKEY RENDERED HIM TO JUSTICE IN A THIRD COUNTRY. ALSO IN THE NOVEMBER/DECEMBER TIME FRAME, THE GOT AGGRESSIVELY PROVIDED COVERAGE OF THE MAJOR PORTS OF ENTRY IN AN ATTEMPT TO APPREHEND A SECOND AND EVEN MORE IMPORTANT PLAYER IN THE BIN LADIN ORGANIZATION.

PEARSON

SECRET: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA)

VZCZCXRO3142
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHKL #1114/01 3580721
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230721Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2163
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0552
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2711
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001114 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2028
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM
SUBJECT: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1026 - DPM NAJIB DISCUSSES ISA
     B. KUALA LUMPUR 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED
     C. KUALA LUMPUR 944 - MCA AND GERAKAN CRITICIZE UMNO
     D. KUALA LUMPUR 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA
     E. KUALA LUMPUR 834 - KOK RELEASED FROM ISA
     F. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA
     G. KUALA LUMPUR 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA
     H. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 902 - BEYOND ISA 

Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b, c and
d). 

NOTE:  THIS CABLE TRANSMITS AN EDITED VERSION OF KUALA LUMPUR
1102 SENT ON 12/18/08 IN MORE RESTRICTED CHANNELS.  END NOTE. 

1.  (S) Summary:  The Malaysian government's use of the
Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention
without trial and is central to the GOM's intelligence-driven
CT effort, has come under increasing political pressure over
the past three months.  The GOM's employment of the ISA in
September to carry out three politically-motivated ISA
detentions unrelated to terrorism sparked unprecedented
public criticism.  At least eight component parties from the
governing National Front (BN) coalition have since broken
ranks with the leading United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) and called for amending or abolishing the ISA.  The
opposition party alliance led by Anwar Ibrahim has made the
revocation of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals.
In November, a High Court judge delivered a legal blow to the
GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a ruling that freed
blogger Raja Petra, and the GOM is appealing the decision.
Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib and
Home Minister Syed Hamid have defended the ISA as essential
to national security, while Najib told the Ambassador
privately ISA should be retained but used more judiciously.
The GOM released 17 ISA detainees, among them 10 previously
linked to terrorist groups, including Yazid Sufaat, from
November 5 to December 4. 

2.  (S) Comment:  The ISA is the cornerstone of Malaysia's CT
effort and has allowed Special Branch to take successful
preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their
supporters.  Given the GOM's exclusive reliance on the ISA
"crutch" and on Special Branch's role, police and prosecutors
remain ill-prepared to investigate and bring to trial
terrorist suspects (or prosecute other complex criminal
conspiracies).  The ISA also is subject to misuse for
political ends and is an important insurance policy for
maintaining UMNO in power.  For both CT and political
reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA.  We doubt
that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in
public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in
September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation
in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power.
These developments, however, reinforce the conclusion (ref H)
that Malaysia cannot take for granted the availability of the
ISA as a CT tool in the long run.  It remains in the U.S.
interest to encourage and assist Malaysia to develop an
approach centered on prosecutions and convictions before an
independent judiciary to combat terrorism. 

3.  (C) Comment continued:  It is unclear to what extent
outside political pressures played a direct role in the GOM's
latest release of ISA detainees.  The decisions may have more
to do with Syed Hamid's personal exercise of authority as
Home Minister.  Syed Hamid has taken a more proactive role as
Home Minister, compared to PM Abdullah who held the position
through March 2008 and tended not to become involved in
details.  End Summary and Comment. 

4.  (C) The Malaysian government's use of the Internal
Security Act (ISA), central to the GOM's intelligence-driven
counterterrorism efforts, has come under increasing political
pressure since the September ISA arrests of three persons
based on political rather security considerations.  The
September 12 ISA detentions of an ethnic Chinese journalist,
an ethnic Chinese Opposition MP (Teresa Kok), and a prominent
blogger (Raja Petra Kamaruddin) served the ruling UMNO
party's immediate political purpose of sending a warning to
opposition politicians and those considering defecting from
BN, as some UMNO politicians have told us.  This came at a
time when Anwar Ibrahim was publicly threatening to bring
down the BN government via parliamentary crossovers by
September 16.  The arrests, however, also sparked
unprecedented public criticism of the ISA, including from
UMNO's ethnic minority partners within BN.  The Malaysian
Chinese Association (MCA), the key ethnic Chinese BN
component party, reportedly threatened to leave BN unless the
GOM released the Chinese journalist; the GOM complied within
less than 24 hours (ref F).  Authorities freed MP Teresa Kok
after seven days.  Home Minister Syed Hamid ordered a
two-year ISA detention period for Raja Petra, who was freed
on appeal in November in a surprise court ruling (see below). 

5.  (C) Comment:  Unlike his predecessor Mahathir, PM
Abdullah refrained from using the ISA for political purposes
until December 2007 when police detained five leaders of the
ethnic Indian activist group HINDRAF that organized large
street protests.  The public viewed the GOM's September 2008
ISA arrests as more transparently political, in part because
of the lack of public order concerns.  End Comment. 

6.  (C) Political pressure against the ISA did not dissipate
following the release of the first two of the three recent
ISA detainees.  At least eight component parties from the
governing BN coalition of 14 parties have since broken ranks
with UMNO and called for amending or reviewing the grounds
for the ISA, while several have supported the law's
abolition.  In late September MCA, BN's second largest party,
called for "a comprehensive review of the ISA so that it will
apply strictly to cases relating to terrorism and subversive
elements," and also argued for the introduction of "checks
and balances in the use of ISA."  The leader of the Gerakan
party, Koh Tsu Koon, called on the GOM to "abolish the ISA
once and for all," and rely on the judicial system instead.
The leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) also
initially called for ISA to be abolished, and on December 1
said PPP would withdraw from BN unless if the ISA were not
amended before the next election.  In response, Prime
Minister Abdullah called PPP's bluff and said the small
party, which holds no seats in Parliament, could leave BN if
it wished.  BN MPs so far have not backed up their criticism
of ISA with action.  In response to a petition circulated in
Parliament for the review or repeal of ISA, only one BN MP
signed his name. 

7.  (C) The opposition party alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, or
Pakatan) led by Anwar Ibrahim has vocally condemned ISA as
undemocratic and unjust, and made the abolishment of ISA one
of its highest profile policy goals.  A number of senior
officials from Pakatan's three parties, Anwar's Peoples
Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and
the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were detained under ISA
during the era of former Prime Minister Mahathir.  Not
surprisingly, the three parties have vowed to revoke ISA if
they come to power.  "Abolish ISA" was the most prominent
theme at PKR's annual party conference on November 29, which
Polcouns observed.  The keynote event concluded with a focus
on ISA and featured large screens that scrolled through the
list of all 60-plus ISA detainees with the several thousand
attendees reciting the detainees' names as they appeared.
Well-known blogger Raja Petra, released from ISA detention
only days before, mounted the stage as the surprise guest of
the grand finale. 

8.  (SBU) On November 7, a High Court judge delivered an
unanticipated legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in
using the ISA in a habeas corpus ruling that freed blogger
Raja Petra.  The Embassy obtained the full text of the
judge's 22-page ruling.  ISA Section 8.B states "there shall
be no judicial review in any court" of the Home Minister's
exercise of "discretionary powers in accordance with this
Act," except for compliance with procedural requirements.
The judge ruled, however, that the Home Minister decisions
could not be "unfettered and arbitrary," allowing for the
court to consider whether the Minister's ISA detention order
was "in accordance with the Act," and its focus on threats to
national security, including the national economy; threats to
maintenance of essential services; and threats to the public
emanating from a "substantial body of persons" who intend to
change the government through unlawful means. In the case of
Raja Petra, the judge concluded that the grounds for his
detention did not fall within the purview of the ISA.  The
government has appealed the ruling and as of mid-December the
appeal remains pending. 

9.  (C) Many civil society groups took the opportunity over
the past three months to highlight their standing opposition
to the ISA, as well as other emergency ordinances that allow
for detention without trial.  Both conservative and liberal
Muslim NGOs called on the GOM to abolish the ISA, as did the
inter-faith Consultative Forum that groups the leaders of all
major religions except Islam.  The National Human Rights
Commission (SUHAKAM) chairman Abu Talib restated the
commission's existing position, namely "detention without
trial is against human rights principles; that's why we
advised the Government years ago to repeal the ISA." 

10.  (C) As questions over the ISA have mounted, Prime
Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib, and other
senior UMNO leaders defended the ISA as essential to national
security.  In the wake of public criticism over the September
ISA arrests, Home Minister Syed Hamid, who has authority
under the ISA to approve detention orders, defended the Act
as essential and stated clearly that "we have no plans to do
away with ISA."  In early December, Syed Hamid waved off
criticisms, arguing that the ISA "has never been abused or
used for politics."  He also commented that, "Malaysians
sometimes don't know how lucky we are in that we have not
experienced what is happening in Mumbai (the terrorist
attack) and Bangkok (political unrest) now."  He said the
fact that there have been no post 9/11 terrors attacks in
Malaysia was in part due to the ISA.  On December 15, Syed
Hamid again publicly defended use of the ISA, stating, "More
apt, faster and better to use the ISA... detention under the
act is early action to prevent the security of the country
from being adversely affected." 

11.  (C) DPM Najib, who is anticipated to become Prime
Minister in late March 2009, told the Ambassador privately on
November 11 that the government continued to need the ISA,
"even though there are civil liberty concerns," but should
reserve ISA only for those who pose "serious threats, like
terrorists" (ref A).  On December 8, PM Abdullah publicly
rejected calls for amendments to the ISA. 

12.  (SBU) In early December, local and international press
reported that the GOM had released 17 ISA detainees from
November 5 through December 4.  Of those released, 10 had
been held for suspected links to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah,
and/or the Darul Islam terrorist groups.  The released
terrorist suspects included Yazid Sufaat, who played an
important role in Al Qaeda's anthrax development program,
according to the 9/11 Commission.  The remaining seven
persons released consisted of suspected foreign agents (2
persons), southern Thailand separatists (2), document forgers
(2), and prominent blogger Raja Petra, according to an NGO
that consistently and accurately monitors ISA detentions.
In his public remarks, Syed Hamid said those recently
released ISA detainees had been rehabilitated and no longer
posed a security threat to Malaysia. 

13.  (S) Note:  Authorities had detained the terrorist
suspects for periods between two and (in the case of Yazid
Sufaat) seven years, for an average detention period of four
years for the ten individuals.  Special Branch relies on a
process for rehabilitating ISA detainees, and eventually
releasing them under restricted and monitored conditions when
judged necessary.  The GOM has never attempted to prosecute
any terrorist suspects, including those held under the ISA.
This is due in large part to the fact that the GOM pursues
almost exclusively an intelligence approach to CT, as opposed
to a law enforcement approach that would involve criminal
investigations, collection of legally admissible evidence,
and development of cases for prosecution in the courts.  In
2007, Malaysia amended anti-terrorism provisions in its penal
code and criminal procedures code, but authorities have not
yet utilized these provisions.  Malaysia also has a poor
track record of prosecuting other complex criminal
conspiracies, including drug trafficking cases, preferring
instead to utilize the ISA and other emergency ordinances to
detain suspects without trial.  End Note. 

14.  (S) A well-known journalist contacted us in early
December and said that officers of the Police Special Branch
had complained to him that Home Minister Syed Hamid had
ordered the recent releases of terrorist suspects without
adequate consultation and in some cases against the
recommendation of Special Branch.  Australian and British
diplomats, speaking with Polcouns December 16, stated that
Syed Hamid, who is a lawyer by training, personally reviewed
the dossiers of ISA detainees and was inclined to approve
releases absent compelling justification from the Special
Branch. 

15.  (C) The Thai embassy contacted Poloff on December 15 to
express concern over the release of two ISA detainees (Abdul
Rahman bin Ahmad and Mat Tarmizi bin Shamsudin, who
apparently are dual-citizens of Malaysia and Thailand) who
had been held for their connection to the insurgency in
southern Thailand.  The Thai diplomat said Bangkok considered
Abdul Rahman in particular to be a major player in the
insurgency.  He noted that those released are required to
remain in Malaysia and check in periodically with the police.
 The Thai diplomat said he believed the GOM released the
detainees in order to diffuse criticism of the ISA.  We
learned that the Thai embassy also has contacted other
Western embassies (UK, France, Australia) to express concern
over the recent ISA releases. 

KEITH

CONFIDENTIAL: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013
TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN

SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN
ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS 

    CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) 

1. (C)  AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT
WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY
UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER
LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY
DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU.  THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY
THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU
WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS
GIVEN TO THE ISSUE.  THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN
TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH
EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD
DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS
EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES.
NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN
UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS.

2. (C)  LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO.
IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI
CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY.
LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE
MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S.
POSITION.  NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF
WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN
THE EU. 

3. (C)  IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON
ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME
    MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE
TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO.  ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS
FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH
LETTA.  ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT
MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS
ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS,
TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD
OR COULD TAKE. 

4. (C)  COMMENT:  LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION
ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE
GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS.  REPORTS OF DEFMIN
MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS
WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US.  (BUT MARTINO HAS
ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH
AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL
PROCESS.)  NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE
GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT
THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS.
EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE
HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE
NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY.  END COMMENT.
SEMBLER 

NNNN
 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013
TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN

SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN
ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS 

    CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) 

1. (C)  AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT
WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY
UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER
LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY
DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU.  THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY
THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU
WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS
GIVEN TO THE ISSUE.  THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN
TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH
EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD
DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS
EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES.
NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN
UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS.

2. (C)  LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO.
IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI
CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY.
LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE
MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S.
POSITION.  NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF
WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN
THE EU. 

3. (C)  IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON
ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME
    MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE
TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO.  ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS
FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH
LETTA.  ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT
MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS
ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS,
TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD
OR COULD TAKE. 

4. (C)  COMMENT:  LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION
ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE
GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS.  REPORTS OF DEFMIN
MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS
WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US.  (BUT MARTINO HAS
ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH
AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL
PROCESS.)  NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE
GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT
THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS.
EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE
HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE
NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY.  END COMMENT.
SEMBLER 

NNNN
 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 

"

CONFIDENTIAL: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003567 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER)
DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY)
DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK)
JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013
T...

SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL
TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE 

REF: USNATO 00777 

Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D. 

1.  (C)  Summary:  Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco
Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still
believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute
over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal
overlay of the M-code.  Aragona recognized US security
concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the
EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo.
 The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S.
and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the
event of warfare.  Aragona did not completely reject the
delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to
avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the
dispute is ripe for high level political intervention.
Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge
unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a
good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission.
Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable
venue for classified discussions.  He suggested they could
take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he
participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC.  See
Embassy comment para 16. End Summary. 

2.  (U)  On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA
Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC
dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS)
signal overlay of the GPS M-code.  The U.S. delegation was
led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced
Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Technical Affairs and
included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic
Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy
Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST
Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and
representatives from the political and science sections of
Embassy Rome.  Those joining Aragona included Giovanni
Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro
Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale,
Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto
Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense
General Staff, Ministry of Defense. 

U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed 

3.  (C)  Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is
important to hold informal consultations with key EU member
States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a
decision.  He recalled that the President raised M-Code
overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit.  In reviewing the USG
position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S.
accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the
security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated
Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both
the U.S. and NATO.  so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive
battle with the European Commission (EC).  Braibanti allowed
that some progress has been made in convincing European
officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad
idea.  However, consideration being given by the EC to use
BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay
of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities.
The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome. 

4.  (C)  Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed
to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some
flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be
difficult.  The U.S. has proposed several technical options
for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all
stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo
services.  Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's
timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member
states may find that the Commission has locked in technical
solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct
navigational warfare.  To avoid this eventuality, which could
put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear
political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal
structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations. 

But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks 

5.  (C)  Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S.
concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that
Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC.  He
assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security
issues at stake.  "Given our NATO membership it would be
crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona
declared.  These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed,
but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and
operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and
reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly
throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End
Note). 

6.  (C)  Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical
negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the
integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security
concerns.  Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted
that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with
technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a
"technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be
intensified.   Italy and the EC are ready to take into
account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that
technical solutions, which protect them, are available. 

7.  (C)  Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready
to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood
included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in
the prejudices of the past."  The EC was ready to sit and
discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution.  As for
political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission
is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed
while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo
system. 

8.  (C)  Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC
technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a
formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate
the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2,
and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS
signals.  In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not
rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its
technical experts to analyze them carefully.  Now that he had
seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with
some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of
these options will work.  Summing up this portion of the
discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona:
We may well reach a situation in September where we will have
analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide
a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to
conduct NAVWAR.  Our concern is that if EC technical experts
continue to operate within their current frame of reference,
we will arrive at a technical impasse.  To avoid this
impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from
member States that they should focus on options that do not
negatively impact NAVWAR.  (Note: on the margins of the
meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC
negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU
member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach
a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so
Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate
with the U.S.  Aragona discounted this possibility,
suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS
interoperability.  (End Note) 

NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks 

9.  (C)  Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical
problem over where to hold classified discussions and that
this problem should be easily resolvable.  Italy expects the
U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator
Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel).
Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a
classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO.  He
underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt
language.  Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission
to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC
rather than NATO-EC discussions.  The issue under discussion
is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and,
moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO.
Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG
was considering the issue of additional classified
discussions, including the modalities for such meetings. 

Some Agreement on Procedure, but.... 

10.  (C)  Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to
hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will
work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to
review technical and trade issues  He suggested folding the
technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session.
This could help to ensure transparency and avoid
misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the
available technical options.  Aragona acknowledged that
Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could
be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to
proceed along these lines. 

Still Talking Past Each Other on substance 

11.  (C)  The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France
might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the
interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO.  Mel
Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion
that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could
guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might
seek to sell to third countries. 

12.  (C)  "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S.
actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona
told the delegation.  "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe
that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular
country or the EC."  Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a
commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was
selected according to well established criteria based on the
belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service.
"I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in
a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in
mind that Galileo service must be sold.  The problem of
selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects
are also involved."  When Aragona stated it would not be
acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less
robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable
for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in
order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for
Galileo. 

13.  (C)  Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but
moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation.  He
suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to
hold classified discussions.  He claimed there is flexibility
and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable
to both sides.  Braibanti emphasized that after the September
discussions the USG would like to hold another set of
bilateral consultations with Italy.  Aragona was
noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September
plenary session and then decide on a way forward.  In terms
of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions
would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S.
and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by
which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another
frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution.  He
noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and
industrial interests to defend. 

Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries 

14.  (C)  Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice
Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15.  Possa is
responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for
Italian participation in ESA.  After a brief explanation of
the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa
immediately understood that a political, and not a technical
approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems.  Possa
suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans,
and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose
commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S.
were well known.  On the margins of a July 28
representational event,  ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised
briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino.  Martino
said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary
and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough.  He
was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle.
Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security
implications of the overlay, but observed that he was
perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much
assistance.  He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for
moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to
approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM
Berlusconi's closest political advisor. 

15.  (C)  ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18
with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to
discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of
the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo
at the December Transport Council.  Maraini told us that he
believed that Galileo was now principally a political
problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport
Ministry and Transport Council.  In a candid appraisal of
Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the
Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was
beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee.
Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very
little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and
that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the
EU was likely.  Maraini is worried about the outcome.  He
undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent
to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford. 

16.  (C)  Embassy Comment:  The U.S. delegation made the trip
to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during
his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing
to carry some water for us with the EC and member states.  We
were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead
decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the
script of the EC briefing book on Galileo.  Despite
understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI,
peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position
will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that
"technical solutions" still offer a way forward.  He threw us
a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top
cover to the expert level technical discussions.  However,
Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial
viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to
"guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to
French arguments. 

17.  (U)  This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti.
Sembler

CONFIDENTIAL: ANWAR SHIFTS GEARS, NOT GOALS, SAY AIDES

VZCZCXRO6876
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHKL #0991/01 3142324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 092324Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1936
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2678
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0516
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 000991 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EAP AND INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM MY
SUBJECT: ANWAR SHIFTS GEARS, NOT GOALS, SAY AIDES 
 
REF: KUALA LUMPUR 979 - INITIAL REACTION TO U.S. 
     ELECTION 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and 
 d). 
 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
1.  (C) Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim has shifted to a less 
aggressive posture for now, but his goal remains bringing 
down the UMNO-led government through parliamentary crossovers 
prior to Deputy Prime Minister Najib becoming the next UMNO 
party president and Prime Minister, according to top 
officials in Anwar's Peoples Justice Party (PKR).  Part of 
Anwar's strategy entails reaching out to the "losers" in the 
transition from Prime Minister Abdullah to Najib, including 
UMNO veteran Tengku Razaleigh.  The PKR officials 
acknowledged that the government's September arrests of three 
persons under the Internal Security Act (ISA) had sent an 
effective warning to those considering switching their 
support to Anwar.  PKR officials and Anwar's lawyers assumed 
the sodomy prosecution against Anwar would move forward, with 
a trial phase likely beginning by January.  The Opposition 
was unlikely to support "superficial" reforms that UMNO would 
try to rush through parliament as part of outgoing PM 
Abdullah's legacy.  The Ambassador met on October 30 with 
Tengku Razaleigh, who complained about his inability to 
compete in the UMNO nomination process due to money politics 
and contended that the next UMNO president (Najib) would not 
necessarily become the next Prime Minister. 
 
2.  (C) Comment:  We currently are witnessing a different 
tone and pace in the struggle between the Opposition and UMNO 
following Anwar's unrealized September deadline and the rapid 
consolidation of UMNO support behind Najib as the next Prime 
Minister.  While PKR's rationale for wanting to head-off 
Najib remains in place, Anwar has lost political momentum for 
the moment and seems to face increasingly long odds in 
securing future crossovers.  Anwar's ability to attract the 
"losers" from the Abdullah-Najib transition remains 
theoretical.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
Anwar's Less Aggressive Posture 
------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Polcouns met separately with PKR Information Chief 
Tian Chua and PKR Vice President Sivarasa Rasiah on November 
3 and 5, respectively.  Both PKR officials acknowledged that 
Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim has shifted to a lower key 
approach since the passage of Anwar's public September 16 
deadline to bring down PM Abdullah's government through the 
crossover of 30 or more government MPs.  Compared with 
September, Anwar is now more focused on consolidating the 
Opposition People's Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat), which 
encompasses three parties with often disparate political 
views:  PKR, the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party 
(DAP), and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).  As the 
formal Opposition leader in Parliament, Anwar is devoting 
attention to Pakatan's actions in parliament and guiding 
Opposition MPs, most of whom are sitting in the body for the 
first time. 
 
Crossover Goal Unchanged 
------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Despite his less aggressive public posture, Anwar's 
goal remains bringing down the UMNO-led government through 
parliamentary crossovers prior to Deputy Prime Minister Najib 
Tun Razak becoming the next UMNO party president and Prime 
Minister, Tian Chua and Sivarasa stated.  The time horizon 
has shifted from December to March 2009, in line with the 
shift in the UMNO party elections, at which time Najib is set 
to become UMNO president uncontested.  PKR officials 
reiterated that Anwar and PKR remain focused on preempting 
Najib's takeover if possible, because they believe Najib 
would invoke authoritarian measures to scuttle the Opposition 
before the next national elections.  In the months ahead, PKR 
would look for opportunities to weaken support for Najib and 
the government, for example by criticizing GOM measures in 
the face of a possible dramatic downturn in the economy 
following the global financial crisis, or by using new 
information linking Najib to scandals, like the Altantuya 
case and the Eurocopter purchase.  (Comment:  Anwar and other 
Opposition leaders have taken up such issues in Parliament 
over the past few weeks.  On November 4, Anwar led a walk-out 
of Opposition MPs to protest Najib's refusal to allow 
questions during his presentation of revised budget figures. 
End Comment.) 
 
Attracting the "Losers" 
----------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Anwar does not have enough ethnic Malay MPs ready to 
join the Opposition, according to both Tian Chua and 
Sivarasa, without which the Opposition faces unacceptable 
risks of a harsh government backlash justified on the basis 
of Malay nationalism.  Anwar reportedly hopes to attract 
disaffected UMNO leaders and MPs who are "losers" in the 
current transition from Abdullah to Najib; most prominent 
among these is veteran UMNO leader Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. 
Talks with Razaleigh remain inconclusive because Razaleigh 
continues to insist on the prospective position of Prime 
Minister, while PKR estimates that Razaleigh could secure the 
crossover of only four or five UMNO MPs (see notes below from 
the Ambassador's recent meeting with Razaleigh).  Anwar is 
also maintaining contact with PM Abdullah at this stage, 
primarily through son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin, Tian Chua 
said.  Whether members of Abdullah's circle would consider 
crossing over to Anwar remained an open question. 
 
ISA as Warning to MPs 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The two PKR officials acknowledged that the 
government's September arrests of three persons -- a 
journalist, an Opposition MP and blogger Raja Petra -- under 
the Internal Security Act (ISA) had sent an effective warning 
to those MPs considering switching support to Anwar. (let's 
mention Petra's release today)  (Comment:  In early October, 
UMNO MP Nur Jazlan told Polcouns that the ISA arrests had 
been "very successful" in achieving UMNO's objective of 
intimidating MPs who had considered joining with Anwar.  End 
Comment.) 
 
Sodomy Trial Will Remain a Factor 
--------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Sankara Nair, a prominent attorney for Anwar, told us 
on November 5 that, regardless of maneuvers in the current 
Sessions Court, it only a matter of time before the 
government shifted Anwar's sodomy case to the High Court, a 
more favorable venue for the prosecution.  Sivarasa, who also 
serves as one of Anwar's lawyers, believed that the trial 
phase of the sodomy case would begin in earnest by January. 
Neither Sankara nor Sivarasa believed the government would 
drop the case. 
 
Opposition Unlikely to Support Abdullah's Reforms 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8.  (C) The Prime Minister's circle -- through Khairy -- has 
approached Anwar regarding support for judicial reform 
measures that would be presented in Parliament soon as part 
of Abdullah's parting legacy, according to Sivarasa and Tian 
Chua.  The Opposition, however, was unlikely to support these 
measures because they did not represent meaningful changes. 
The Opposition believed, for example, the proposed changes to 
the Anti-Corruption Commission would leave the body under 
firm executive control.  Following the resignation of legal 
reform Minister Zaid Ibrahim, Nazri Aziz, de facto Minister 
for parliamentary affairs, led the judicial reform 
discussions in Parliament, but he lacked credibility. 
 
Anwar and the U.S. Presidential Election 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (U) Following his initial remarks of November 5 (reftel), 
Anwar has continued to comment generally positively on 
Senator Obama's victory in the U.S. presidential election. 
Time Magazine highlighted Anwar's remarks on President-elect 
Obama as the first among those of only 11 prominent world 
personalities.  Anwar wrote that, "In Obama's victory are 
sown the seeds of great expectations that a truly new chapter 
will be written in the history of the world."  Anwar publicly 
claimed he had been in contact with Senator Obama. 
 
Ambassador Calls on Razaleigh 
----------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) The Ambassador met on October 30 with Tengku 
Razaleigh, who, as the only challenger to DPM Najib for the 
UMNO presidency, had yet to garner a single UMNO division 
nomination (he now has one).  Casting himself as a reformer, 
Razaleigh said that he wished to bring greater democracy and 
transparency to UMNO, but that he could not compete in the 
current nomination race in the face of engrained corruption 
and money-politics.  Razaleigh said that Najib's coming to 
power would allow former Prime Minister Mahathir to regain 
substantial influence within the government.  Razaleigh 
indicated his relations with Mahathir, his former political 
rival, remained strained. 
 
11.  (C) While Razaleigh conceded that Najib would win the 
UMNO contest, he stressed several times to the Ambassador 
that the next UMNO president would not necessarily become the 
next Prime Minister, but did not further explain this remark. 
 Razaleigh speculated that there now existed grounds for PM 
Abdullah and Anwar Ibrahim to work together, for example on 
reform measures.  Razaleigh thought that Khairy Jamaluddin 
currently acted as the go-between for Abdullah and Anwar. 
Razaleigh acknowledged, as he has publicly, that he continues 
contact with opposition politicians, but he did not otherwise 
signal he planned to leave UMNO. 

KEITH

SECRET//NOFORN: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY

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NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PREL SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA:  DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY 

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

1.  (S/NF) Summary:  As the U.S. continues its re-engagement
with Syria, it may help us achieve our goals if we understand
how SARG officials pursue diplomatic goals. Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his
father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a
level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any
direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his
judgment.  Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel:
the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to
some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting.
The SARG foreign policy apparatus suffers from apparent
dysfunctionality and weaknesses in terms of depth and
resources but the SARG punches above its weight because of
the talents of key individuals.  SARG officials generally
have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are
sufficiently professional to translate those instructions
into recognizable diplomatic practice.  But in a diplomatic
world that is generally oiled by courtesy and euphemism, the
Syrians don't hesitate to be nasty in order to achieve their
objectives.  The behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.
End Summary. 

-------------------
Gaming Out the SARG
------------------- 

2.  (S/NF) As the U.S. moves forward to re-engage Syria, we
are well aware that Syrian officials have long been famous
for their abilities as tough negotiators.  The late President
Hafiz al-Asad could wear down his interlocutors through sheer
staying power in 10-hour meetings without breaks; the wealth
of detail and historical perspective he brought to those
discussions also tested the mettle of those who were
attempting to persuade him to a course of action he
questioned.  His son Bashar is neither as shrewd nor as
long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage
diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed
to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by
extension, his judgment.  Bashar's presentations on world
affairs suggest that he would prefer to see himself as a sort
of philosopher-king, the Pericles of Damascus.  Playing to
Bashar's intellectual pretentions is one stratagem for
gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be
time-consuming but could well produce results.  Bashar's
vanity represents another Achilles heel:  the degree to which
USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects
the prospects for achieving our goals.  Every interaction we
have with the SARG is, in fact, a transaction and the better
equipped we are to understand the dynamics of our
negotiations the better able we will be to achieve our
objectives.  Post has assembled the compendium below in an
attempt to reflect our experience in dealing with the SARG in
the hope that Washington-based interlocutors will find it
useful. 

------------------------------------
A Compendium of Diplomatic Behaviors
------------------------------------ 

3. (S/NF) Capacity:  SARG scope of action is limited the
President's span of control.  He is generally able to monitor
 the activities of his foreign minister, political/media
advisor, intelligence chiefs, and brother Maher.  At various
times, his vice president and national security advisor are
also active and therefore under his direct supervision.
While communication flows between him and his subordinates,
it appears not to be formalized and information is highly
compartmented.  Subordinates' portfolios are not clearly
delineated; overlapping areas create tension and competition.
 There is no "interagency" policy development process that
lays out advantages and disadvantages of policy choices.
There are, as far as we know, no briefing or decision memos.
The bench is not deep; beyond the principals lie only a few
trusted staffers.  Bashar and his team also find it difficult
to juggle more than one major foreign policy issue at a time. 

4. (S/NF) Protocol:  SARG officials are sticklers for
diplomatic protocol, although they are not experts on the
international conventions from which it is derived.   The
SARG places a high value on protocolary forms that ensure
respectful treatment of state officials (despite bilateral
differences) because such forms guarantee that the President
and his representatives are shown proper courtesies by a
world that is often at odds with Syria.  (This focus on
protocol underlies the continuing Syrian unhappiness over the
absence of a U.S. ambassador.)  Protocol conventions also
reinforce the notion of equal relations between sovereign
states and the SARG insists that communications between it
and foreign embassies comply with traditional diplomatic
practice.  The MFA receives a flood of diplomatic notes from
Damascus-based foreign missions daily which are apportioned
out to various offices for action.  The diplomatic notes,
translated into Arabic by the senders, become the paper trail
for SARG decisions.  The MFA bureaucracy does not appear to
generate cover memoranda that provide background to requests
or recommendations for decisions.  Many such notes, possibly
all notes from the U.S. Embassy, are sent to the Minister
himself for review.  The MFA does not have internal email,
only fax and phone.  Instructions to Syrian missions abroad
are often sent by fax; sometimes the MFA fails to provide
instructions at all. 

5. (S/NF) The Suq:  In dealing with the U.S., the Syrians see
every encounter as a transaction.  The level and composition
of the Syrian side of any meeting is carefully calculated in
terms of protocol and the political message being sent; a
lunch invitation must be interpreted as more than just the
Arab compulsion to hospitality ) who hosts the lunch is as
important as who attends the meetings.  When it comes to
content, the Syrians seek to gain the highest value
deliverable for the lowest price or no price at all.  During
the re-engagement process, the SARG has attempted to extract
high profile USG gestures in exchange for relief of
operational constraints on the Embassy.  The SARG has been
uncharacteristically forward-leaning in allowing discussions
on a New Embassy Compound site to develop as far as they
have; actual closure on a land deal, however, is probably
contingent on U.S. delivery of a SARG desirable, e.g., the
announcement that a U.S. ambassador will be sent to Damascus.
 The SARG's focus on embassy operations is in part rooted in
their paranoia over USG intelligence collection and
penetration of Syrian society but the imposition of
constraints on mission activities has also conveniently
created an embassy list of desiderata that the SARG seeks to
use as cost-free concessions.  FM Muallim candidly
acknowledged this approach when he commented in February to
Charge that he had not yet decided what he needed in exchange
for permission to reopen the American School in Damascus. 

6.  (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation:  The President's
self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy
formulation and diplomatic activity.   Meetings, visits,
trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are
pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or
difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates.
The President responds with anger if he finds himself
challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting.  He
seems to avoid direct confrontation.  When engaged in summit
diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his
confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008,
Riyadh Summit in April 2009).   His foreign policy
subordinates are all "employees" without constituencies or
influence independent of the President's favor.  Their
overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the
appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions.
They are particularly cautious in the presence of other
Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more
expansive and candid responses. 

7. (S/NF) Deceit:  SARG officials at every level lie.  They
persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the
contrary.  They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie.
While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential
punitive action from their own government, senior level
officials generally lie when they deem a topic too
"dangerous" to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they
have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN,
Hezbollah arms supplies, etc).  When a senior SARG official
is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating  the lack of
veracity but discovering the true reasons for it. 

8. (S/NF) Passivity:  SARG foreign policy is formulated in
response to external developments (changes in regional
leadership, initiatives from the West, etc).  The SARG does
not launch initiatives and generally seeks cover from allies
when exploring new courses of action.  The SARG is much more
confident on the Arab level than on the international level.
SARG policy responses are generally tactical and operational,
exploratory rather than decisive, oblique instead of direct.
Strategy, to the extent it exists, emerges from a series of
tactical choices.  The lack of initiative appears rooted in
an underlying sense of diplomatic powerlessness.  Every
foreign policy embarrassment in Syria's history lies under
the surface of a generally false projection of assertiveness.
 That assertiveness is sometimes read as arrogance. 

9.  (S/NF) Antagonism:  Every Syrian diplomatic relationship
contains an element of friction.  There is some current
friction, for example, in the Syrians' relations with the
Turks and the French.  The Syrians are not troubled by
discord; they seek an upper hand in any relationship by
relying on foreign diplomats' instinctive desire to resolve
problems. By withholding a solution, the SARG seeks to
control the pace and temperature of the relationship.  SARG
officials artificially restrict their availability  and can
engage in harsh verbal attacks to intimidate and rattle
foreign diplomats.  SARG officials delight in disparaging
their interlocutors behind their backs for allowing
themselves to be cowed.  On the international level, the
President has indulged in personal criticisms of foreign
leaders; unlike his father, he deliberately makes enemies
when he doesn't necessarily have to.  FM Muallim can behave
similarly but he probably does so on the President's
instructions. 

10. (S/NF) Complacency:  SARG leadership genuinely believes
that SARG foreign policy has been, is being, and will be
vindicated by events.  They also genuinely believe their
foreign policy is based on morally defensible and
intellectually solid principles, although it is usually
reactive and opportunistic.  Existing policy choices are
immutable unless the President decides to change them, in
which case, his new policies, despite any appearances to the
contrary, are consistent with "traditional" principles.
Baathism infuses foreign policy principles (Pan-Arabism) but
pragmatism is more important.  More recently, Bashar's like
or dislike of other leaders plays a role in policy
formulation. 

11. (S/NF) The Non Sequitur:  When Syrian officials don't
like a point that has been made to them, they frequently
resort to an awkward changes in subject to deflect perceived
criticism.  Syrian officials seem to think they've scored a
verbal hit by employing a facile non sequitur, usually in the
form of a counter-accusation.  When the SARG's human rights
record is raised with Muallim, for example, he often raises
Israel's December-January Gaza operation or, more recently,
asks if the U.S. will accept the 1300 Al Qaeda sympathizers
in Syrian jails.   The non sequitur is intended to stop
discussion of the unwelcome topic while subtly intimidating
the interlocutor with the threat of raising a subject that is
putatively embarrassing to him or her.  When the non sequitur
is deployed, it is clear that the SARG official is on the
defensive. 

12.  (S/NF) Comment:  Given the apparent dysfunctionality of
the SARG foreign policy apparatus and its weaknesses in terms
of depth and resources, the SARG's ability to punch above its
weight internationally is noteworthy.  Much of its strength
appears to lie in the talents of key individuals and their
ability to collaborate with each other, despite tensions and
rivalries.  SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical,
guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional
to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic
practice.  But the behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.  At
the end of the day, there are few who really like to deal
with the Syrians.  The SARG, well aware of its reputation,
however,  spends much of its energy ensuring that we have to. 

CONNELLY

SECRET: CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION RATTLES BUSINESS COMMUNITY

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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000274 

SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT; PARIS FOR
WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: ETRD EFIN ETTC PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION RATTLES BUSINESS COMMUNITY 

REF: A. DAMASCUS 168
     B. DAMASCUS 218
     C. 08 DAMASCUS 541 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4(b,d) 

-------
Summary
------- 

1. (S) The recent imprisonment of a prominent businessman
thought to be close to President Asad has rattled the Syrian
business community.  Although the high-profile arrest was not
reported by Syrian media, Prime Minister Utri made a veiled
reference to it in a daily newspaper, saying, "we will cut
off the hand of any who dare to abuse the public funds."
Business contacts report that two other business elites are
currently under investigation for corruption charges linked
to the February arrest of Customs Directorate Chief Brigadier
General Hasan Makhlouf, including the current Chairman of the
Damascus Chamber of Industry.  Adding to their concern, a
popular local business magazine recently published profiles
of "The Top 100 Syrian Businessmen," which many feared would
raise their profile to the regime.  Conspicuously absent from
the article was Syria's most famous tycoon, Rami Makhlouf.
End summary. 

---------------------------
Computer Magnate Imprisoned
--------------------------- 

2. (C) Syrian business elites are abuzz with the news that
SARG security officials jailed Engineer Firas Bakour (DOB:
01/30/1966) in late March, along with former Minister of
Communication and Technology Amro Salem and two unnamed
employees of Syria Telecommunications Establishment (STE).
Contacts report that Bakour's arrest stemmed from a USD 65
million SARG tender that he was awarded to provide a Voice
Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) service to STE.  According to
the reports, SARG officials were angered at the slow pace of
Bakour's progress in fulfilling the contract -- particularly
when his "winning" bid for the tender had been over twice as
high as those of several foreign companies.  A close friend
of Bakour's offered a different take, claiming that the Sunni
Bakour's Alawi enemies had grown jealous of the virtual
monopoly his company enjoyed over IT in Syria and the USD 10
million that he was reportedly earning each month. 

3. (C) The President and CEO of INANA Group -- an umbrella of
eight subsidiary companies that offer a variety of
information technology, telecommunications, marketing,
entertainment and business development lines -- Bakour was
close to President Bashar al-Asad in the mid-1990s when Asad
headed the then-nascent Syrian Computer Society (SCS).  A
longtime Embassy contact with a sister living in Florida,
Bakour's presence at Embassy rep events in 2007 had a
chilling effect on other guests due to his alleged ties to
SARG security services.  While Syrian media has not reported
the high-profile arrest, Prime Minister Utri made a
thinly-veiled reference to it in the March 31 edition of
daily Tishreen, saying, "we will cut off the hand of any who
dare to abuse the public funds." 

4. (C) In 2008, former Minister of Communications and
Technology Amro Salem told us that he was asked to resign
from his ministerial post in December 2007 because he had
launched an investigation into Bakour's suspicious business
activities.  He claimed then that President Asad had
personally cleared him of any wrongdoing and had ordered the
investigation of Bakour to proceed.  (Note: It would not be
unusual for Syrian security forces to arrest all suspects
while sorting out individual stories.  End note.) 

------------------------
Known By the Company You Keep
------------------------ 

5. (C) Adding to the business community's case of the
jitters, the locally popular Syrian business magazine
al-Iqtissadi (the Economist) dedicated this week's edition to
profiling "The Top 100 Syrian Businessmen."  Listing the
businessmen alphabetically, the 55-page article contained
photographs and 3-5 paragraph corporate biographies of each
prominent businessman and his family.  Firas Bakour was
featured in the magazine, as was one-time SyriaTel Chief
Operating Officer Nader Qa'lai, who is reportedly himself
under investigation for embezzlement.  Syria's most infamous
tycoon -- Rami Makhlouf -- was conspicuously absent, as were
Muhammad and Abdulsalam al-Haykal, who own the media company
that publishes al-Iqtissadi.  The website "Syrian Informer,"
which is blocked in Syria, commented disparagingly on the
list as largely comprising nouveaux riches who have acquired
wealth through opportunism and corruption, presumably in
contrast to the more "virtuous" Damascenes who inherited
their fortunes. 

6. (C) Embassy contacts who were listed in the article
expressed nervousness at having their profiles publicly
elevated, while others were relieved to have not been
mentioned.  The head of one featured family lamented that the
article was probably already in the hands of the SARG's
equivalent to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which he
claimed would be examining the tax returns of each listed
family over the last several years.  (Note: The only Syrians
who consistently pay the correct amount of income tax seem to
be public servants, whose taxes are withheld automatically
from their government salaries.  End note.) 

-----------------------------
Wider SARG Campaign Underway?
----------------------------- 

7. (S) Bakour's arrest is the latest event in what contacts
report is a wide-ranging SARG crackdown on "corruption" that
began with the January sacking of Political Security
Department Chief Major General Muhammad Mansurah and
mid-February arrest of Chief Customs official Brigadier
General Hasan Makhlouf (refs A,B).  (Note: By all accounts,
Hasan is not close to his more famous cousins Muhammad, Rami
and Hafiz Makhlouf.  End note.)  The oft-heard rumor on the
Damascus streets is that Hasan Makhlouf attracted the ire of
Maher Asad after the President's brother learned from a real
estate agent that the Customs Director's driver had tried to
purchase a multi-million dollar property in Lattakia.
Investigators allegedly discovered some USD 50 million hidden
in the driver's home, which -- according to the story --
enraged Maher and prompted the Palace to act. 

8. (S) The rumor of Hasan Makhlouf's millions is strikingly
similar to another story that circulated around Damascus
following the August 2008 assassination of Brigadier General
Muhammad Sulayman (ref C).  Sulayman, who was Asad's top
security aide and reportedly managed several sensitive
military projects, was killed by sniper fire in the coastal
city of Tartous while Asad was visiting Tehran.  The
subsequent investigation into Sulayman's slaying reportedly
uncovered USD 80 million cash in a basement room of the
general's home in the mountains between Damascus and the
Lebanese border.  Asad was said to be devastated by the
discovery, and, fearing Sulayman had betrayed him, redirected
the investigation from solving his murder to finding out how
the general had acquired so much money. 

-------------------
Car Importers Under Suspicion
------------------- 

9. (S) Embassy contacts report that two prominent businessmen
are under suspicion in the Makhlouf/Mansurah investigation --
Ammar Karkour and Chairman of the Damascus Chamber of
Industry Imad Ghreiwati.  Karkour, the Syrian agent for
Audi/VW, and Ghreiwati, who owns the Ford dealership and
represents LG electronics, are both suspected of bribing the
Customs Director to accept grossly reduced invoices on their
imported cars and electronics in order to avoid paying
customs duties on the goods' actual value.  The Ghreiwati
family may have had a falling out with the Asad clan in fall
2008, as Imad's brother Issam then complained bitterly to us
about the President, the SARG's decision to close Damascus
Community School -- where the Ghreiwati children studied --
and revealed that the entire family was considering
emigrating to the U.S.  (Note: Ghreiwati's fall from grace
would be cheered by many of his class-conscious peers, who
resent his family's meteoric ascent to social prominence and
his once-favored status among the Alawis.  End note.) 

-------
Comment
------- 

10. (S) While there does not yet appear to be a direct link
between Bakour's arrest and the Makhlouf/Mansurah
investigation, our contacts believe that his incarceration is
part of a broader "anti-corruption" campaign ordered by the
Palace to re-assert Asad's authority and to shake-up the
status quo.  The Palace has probably already chosen the
eventual winners and losers in this investigation, the timing
of which may coincide with a long-anticipated cabinet
reshuffle.  Regardless of the SARG's motivation, the business
community's concern is illustrative of their tenuous
relationship with the Syrian government. While Bakour's and
Ghreiwati's situations demonstrate that proximity to the
regime is no guarantee of long-term security, other
businessmen equate Syria's byzantine legal and tax codes --
and not their lack of compliance to them -- to a sword of
Damocles the regime dangles over their heads to keep them in
line. 

CONNELLY

SECRET: FRENCH BELIEVE THAT ASSASSINATION OF SYRIAN GENERAL WAS AN INSIDE JOB

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #1717 2561757
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121757Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4295
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T PARIS 001717 

NOFORN 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PINR FR SY LE
SUBJECT: FRENCH BELIEVE THAT ASSASSINATION OF SYRIAN
GENERAL SLEIMAN WAS AN INSIDE JOB 

REF: PARIS 1703 

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kathy Allegrone
for reasons 1.4. (b), (d). 

1.  (S/NF)  As Washington readers and others ponder French
policy toward Syria, and as an expansion of para 3 in reftel,
we pass along the previously unreported views of two of our
GOF interlocutors from meetings in late August on the
mysterious assassination earlier in the month of Syrian
brigadier general Muhammad Sleiman and its potential
significance for the regime of Syrian President Asad.  NEA
adviser at the French presidency Boris Boillon, on August 20,
asserted that the killing seemed to be some sort of inside
job.  He flatly rejected the notion that the Israelis had
taken out Sleiman, particularly the theory that a sniper had
shot him on a boat situated somewhere off the coast of the
Syrian coastal city of Tartus.  Boillon claimed that French
information was that the hit was more "classic" and
"mafia-like" with police stopping traffic in the immediate
vicinity, bodyguards looking the other way, and the assailant
pumping a slug into Sleiman's head. 

2.  (S/NF)  When asked how he interpreted the killing,
Boillon said that several theories presented themselves, the
only common denominator of which was internecine rivalry in
the entourage close to Bashar al-Asad.  Although Bashar's
disgruntled brother-in-law and sidelined head of Syrian
Military Intelligence 'Asif Shawkat seems to have the most
compelling motive for knocking off someone he might have
regarded as a rival and source of his reputed downfall in
recent months, Boillon thought Bashar's brother Mahir was a
more likely suspect.  Boillon described Mahir as ambitious, a
bit of a wild man, and determined to increase his power and
influence within the inner circle.  Inasmuch as Mahir might
have contrived to bring down Shawkat, he might also have
decided to take out his next key rival, Sleiman, in a more
permanent way. 

3.  (S/NF)  Boillon further referred  the related possibility
that Mahir had rubbed out Sleiman in the same way he might
have rubbed out Hizballah leader 'Imad Mughniyah ) possibly
even on Bashar's orders.  The latter explanation would tie in
with the notion of cleaning house as Syria needed to present
a more respectable image while it pursued its rapprochement
with France and/or needed to remove those who "knew too much"
(in the case of Sleiman, about the clandestine nuclear
program).  Of course, Boillon added, one could never rule out
the notion that Sleiman's death was related to a bloody
struggle over control of lucrative criminal activities. 

4.  (S/NF)  Pouille on August 28, meanwhile, was less
forthcoming than Boillon in terms of offering interpretations
of Sleiman's death, but he was equally categorical in
disputing the theory that the Israelis were responsible.  He
cited the French ambassador in Damascus as his source for the
contention that the killing was an inside job to "settle old
scores" as well as conveniently get rid of someone who might
have information of value to the UNIIIC on Lebanon or to the
IAEA on Syria's nuclear program. 

5.  (S/NF)  Comment:  We offer these insights, some of which
have appeared in abridged form in the French press, less for
the light they may shed on Sleiman's assassination than they
do about the French perception of the Asad regime.  Indeed,
Boillon's rundown of the various theories sounded like he had
recently read a finished French intelligence assessment of
the situation.  Both Boillon and Pouille sought, in these
conversations, to stress that France does not judge the Asad
regime dangerously unstable or Asad's grip on power slipping.
 Nonetheless, they believe that the internal situation is
fragile enough to warrant concern and a nuanced approach.  We
believe this could partly account for Sarkozy's decision to
move so quickly to cultivate his personal relationship with
Bashar and to "gamble" (as the French media have put it) on
Bashar's willingness to change course on Lebanon, peace with
Israel, and even Syria's relationship with Iran.  For what it
may be worth, former Lebanese military intelligence chief
Johnny Abdo recently contended the assassination was an
inside job and pointed to the absence of the sort of mass
arrests inside Syria that would normally accompany this type
of killing by criminal or non-regime elements.  End comment 

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce 

STAPLETON

SECRET: PREMATURE RUMORS OF ASIF SHAWKAT’S DEMISE

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000251 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

PARIS FOR JORDAN; LONDON FOR TSOU 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IZ
SUBJECT: PREMATURE RUMORS OF ASIF SHAWKAT'S DEMISE 

REF: DAMASCUS 142 

Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. 

1.  (S) Summary:  Widespread reports that Syrian Military
Intelligence Chief Asif Shawkat is under house arrest and
that Shawkat's wife (and Bashar Asad's sister) Bushra al-Asad
is trying to flee the country likely reflect Bashar's
successful moves to limit Shawkat's influence.  While our
sources suspect both stories are untrue and blame the
external opposition for stirring the rumor mill to weaken
Bashar, Shawkat's star definitely appears to be on the wane.
End Summary 

-------------------------------
The Rumor Mill Working Overtime
------------------------------- 

2.  (SBU)  Many Embassy contacts point to a report published
by opposition website "Free Syria"  as the original source of
a number of news stories reporting Shawkat's house arrest.
Sources here also contend that former Syrian VP (and now
leader of the expat opposition group National Salvation
Front) Abdel Halim Khaddam has attempted to weaken Bashar by
repeating this rumor during recent anti-SARG interviews on
SkyTV and Lebanese TV station al Moustaqbal in which he
alleged Shawkat's house arrest and predicted Shawkat would
suffer the same fate as now deceased head of Syrian
intelligence operations in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan. 

3.  (SBU)  Opposition website "al Haqiqa" published an April
6 story reporting that President Asad would replace Shawkat
with SMI deputy Ali Yunis, a story similar to a "Debka"
website report on Bashar's decision to fire Shawkat.  Saudi
daily "Sharq al Awsaat" reported Shawkat's house arrest;
according to this version, Shawkat overstepped his authority
in negotiating (via the Turks) with the USG about withdrawing
Syria's support for Hizballah in exchange for agreement that
the International Tribunal would not indict senior Syrian
officials.  Another version reported by the French-based
opposition website "Ihraar Suriya" (the Free People of Syria)
alleged that Shawkat had been implicated in the assassination
plot against Hizballah leader Imad Mugniyah and that
Hizballah and Iran were demanding his prosecution. 

4.  (C) Another rumor circulating in diplomatic circles
(perhaps reflecting wishful thinking) is that Bashar has
decided to turn Shawkat over to the International Tribunal
for the murder for former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri in
exchange for immunity. 

-----------------------------------
Bushra al-Asad to Flee the Country?
----------------------------------- 

5.  (C)  Different stories regarding Shawkat's arrest also
allege that his wife (and Bashar older sister) has or is
attempting to leave the country and seek political asylum in
possibly France or a Gulf country such as the UAE.  The
Kuwaiti daily "al-Siyasiya," for example,  reported that
Shawkat allegedly told his wife, Busra, to leave Syria with
the couple's children, and she had applied for asylum in
France (later denied by the French government, according to
an April 13 story in "al Hayat.")  According to a few
contacts here, however, Bushra remains in Syria and her
children are still attending school.  A French Embassy
contact told us that Bushra had been to Paris earlier in the
year on a routine shopping excursion but there was no truth
to stories that she had sought political asylum. 

----------------------
Rumors Discounted Here
---------------------- 

6.  (SBU)  In what many are viewing as a SARG response to the
growing wave of rumors, an April 10 Syrian TV evening
newscast showed footage of Shawkat attending a military
academy graduation ceremony. The footage highlighted Shawkat
wearing his military uniform and appearing with Minister of
Defense Hasan Turkumani, who delivered the key note address.
Meanwhile, pro-government Syrian website "Shafaf al-Sham" ran
a story describing Shawkat as the "most powerful man in
Syria" and reporting government plans to appoint Shawkat as
Vice President for National Security Affairs.  (Note:  This
position was a job briefly held by Bashar's paternal uncle
Rifa't al-Asad before being exiled by the late Hafez al
Asad.) 

7.  (S)  Most of our contacts heavily discount reports of
Shawkat's dismissal and house arrest.  Well connected
As-Safir correspondent Ziad Haydar called the reports
"rubbish."   Ihsan Sanker, a longtime Embassy contact who
claims occassional access to Asad family members, reported
April 10 seeing Shawkat at the funeral of a mutual friend a
week earlier.  According to Sanker, mutual acquaintances say
they have seen Shawkat "regularly" over the last month. 

-----------------------------
Shawkat's Star on the Decline?
----------------------------- 

8.  (S) Describing Shawkat as "dejected and withdrawn,"
Sanker said Shawkat was "not even trying to hide" his
unhappiness over his continuing loss of influence.  The
assassination of Hizballah luminary Imad Mugniyeh led to a
series of accusations between SMI and GID, with the outcome
coming out in GID's favor, Sanker reported.  Additionally,
Sanker said he had heard Shawkat's portfolio had been pared
down to military issues, while Bashar's cousin Hafez Makhluf
had all but taken over the national security portfolio.
As-Safir correspondent Haydar reported he had heard the same
thing, saying Bashar had recently further marginalized
Shawkat's national security role. 

9.  (S)  Orient Center Director and MFA Advisor Samir al-Taki
told us recently that Shawkat and  GID chief Ali Mamluk had
exchanged mutual recriminations of blame and negligence in
the wake of the Mugniyeh assassination (reftel).  In an
attempt to discredit GID, Shawkat ordered SMI to question a
number of Syrians with ties to France and the U.S. (including
al-Taki) under possible suspicion of involvement in the
Mugniyeh affair.  In the meantime, al-Taqi added, the GID had
assumed primary responsibility for investigating the Mugniyeh
killing, under the overall direction of Bashar's cousin,
Hafez Makhluf, a prominent GID officer.  Against the backdrop
of these recent events, an ongoing reorganization of security
organizations has made it difficult to determine who was up
and who was down, al-Taqi explained.  Separate reporting and
diplomatic circles point to Mamluk's rise and Shawkat's
relative retreat. But Al-Taqi cast doubt on reports of
Shawkat's removal, saying "we've heard such reports before,"
only to see Shawkat maintain his position as a key insider. 

-------------------------
Shawkat in the Dog House?
------------------------- 

10.  (S)  A UK-Syrian business contact with low level regime
ties told us April 13 that Shawkat's problems with Bashar had
come to head before the Arab League Summit.  According to
this source, SMI arrested a Saudi national suspected of
involvement in the Mugniyeh assassination.  This Saudi died
in SMI custody, complicating Bashar's already strained
relations with the Saudi royal family.  A variant of this
rumor which has appeared in the press was that the deceased
Saudi was a diplomat working in the Saudi Embassy.  Our
contact discounted this rumor because "not even Shawkat would
be stupid enough" to apprehend someone with diplomatic
immunity. 

11.  (S)  Comment:  It seems highly unlikely that Bashar
would arrest Shawkat unless he perceived a direct challenge
to his authority, especially at a time when Syrians are
openly talking about the possibility of war with Israel and
worsening economic conditions that require greater regime
cohesion.  Moreover, we strongly doubt Bashar feels pressured
enough on Lebanon to be preparing to turn over Shawkat to the
Tribunal.  Rather, we believe Bashar's continuing efforts to
erode Shawkat's influence reflect his perception of Shawkat
as a potential threat that must be managed.  Separately, we
assess that Bashar is most comfortable with Bushra here in
Syria under his thumb and that he would not cause her to
flee.  We also believe that unless family matters worsen,
Bushra prefers to reside in Syria, particularly given her
desire to stay close to her elderly mother. 

CORBIN

SECRET: HIZBALLAH’S IMAD MUGNIYAH KILLED BY CAR BOMB

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SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER SY LE
SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH'S IMAD MUGNIYAH KILLED BY CAR BOMB IN
DAMASCUS 

Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, reasons 1.5 b and d. 

1.  (SBU)  Syria's tightly controlled press remained silent
on reports of Imad Mugniyah's death in a car bomb that
exploded near Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) headquarters
in the neighborhood of Kafr Sousa at approximately 10:00 pm
local February 12.  According to contacts who were on the
scene, SMI secured and cleared the area and kept other police
services away.  Tow trucks removed several vehicles within 45
minutes after the explosion which jarred surrounding
buildings and could be felt at the American Ambassador's
residence three miles away.  Syrian officials reported the
blast had been the result of a butane gas leak and that one
unidentified person (later two) had been killed. 

2.  (C) Media and other contacts reported mid-morning
February 13 that unknown assailants had launched a car bomb
attack against notorious Hizballah military operative Imad
Mugniyah.  The story broke simultaneously on wire services
and Arab satellite television stations al Jazeera, al
Arabyia, and al Manar.  Western press was also reporting that
the second victim was Hizballah MP al Hajj Hussein, although
Hizballah denied this.  As of COB local, Syrian authorities
had yet to provide any further comment on the incident.  (A
Fox News affiliate told us MFA officials seemed "shocked" by
reports of Mugniyah's death but offered no comment.) 

3.  (C)  The most frequent theory suggested by media and
diplomatic contacts was that Israel conducted the attack to
embarrass Syria on the eve of a previously scheduled visit by
Iranian FM Manuchehr Mottaki.  Going to the other extreme,
others were unwilling to rule out that Hizballah itself had
conducted the assassination to neutralize Mugniyah's
challenge to Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
One contact even suggested that Syria could have undertaken
the operation as a sign of its desire to engage Israel and
the West. 

4.  (S)  Saudi XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect)
told us Mugniyah's presence in Damascus might have been
related to a possible February 13 meeting in Damascus among
Lebanese March 8 MPs with SARG officials.  He also noted that
SMI Director Assaf Shawkat's offices were close to where the
explosion occurred, and Mugniyah could have been going to or
coming from the meeting.  British and Egyptian Embassy
sources suggested Iranian FM Mottaki planned to meet with
Hizballah and March 8 representatives during his February
13-14 visit to Damascus as a counter to March 14's planned
public demonstration to mark the third anniversary of the
February 14 assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri. 

5.  (C)  Comment: This apparent targeted assassination of one
of Hizballah's most notorious operatives coincides with a
busy week of official visits meant to refute suggestions that
Syria's Lebanon policy is resulting in a new period of
Western and Arab diplomatic isolation.  Syria's ongoing
silence regarding the attack is a characteristic regime
response, most recently observed (and still in effect) after
Israel's September 6 air strike near Deir az-Zur.  This
silence likely reflects a deep sense of regime embarrassment
from the acknowledged assassination of a wanted-terrorist
whose presence in Syria it denied for years.  The event also
impacts Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah cooperation on the eve of FM
Mottaki's visit likely meant to bolster Syria's position in
the face of escalating March 14 rhetoric and growing Western
impatience with Syria's Lebanon policy.
CORBIN

SECRET: MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF RAMI’S DESIGNATION

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000070 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR NEA/ELA, EEB/TFS; TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY; NSC FOR
ABRAMS/SINGH 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: ECON EINV EPET ETTC PGOV PINR KCOR SY
SUBJECT: MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF RAMI'S DESIGNATION 

REF: A. DAMASCUS 54
     B. 05 DAMASCUS 2364
     C. 06 DAMASCUS 03 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4(b,d) 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

1. (S/NF) As Washington moves towards designating Rami
Makhlouf, Embassy Damascus recommends that the Department's
roll-out strategy focus on linking his corrupt activities to
consequences suffered by the Syrian people (see para 11).  In
some of the largest economic sectors -- electricity,
petroleum, and telecommunications -- Makhlouf has used
government instruments to squeeze out legitimate businessmen,
receive lucrative public contracts, establish cash cows and
then milk them with impunity from oversight or competition.
Significantly, several of his ventures exploit weaknesses in
the Syrian economy and undermine reform efforts while
increasing the burden on Syria's lower classes.  Embassy
contacts report that Makhlouf is anticipating his eventual
designation, and that he has taken steps to lower his profile
and mitigate risk to his personal fortune.  End summary. 

------------------
MAKING THE CASE...
------------------ 

2. (C) In one well-known example, Makhlouf used his regime
ties to muscle-out the local agent for Iberdrola, just before
the Spanish company was awarded a 430 million-euro contract
to build a new power plant.  Having previously obtained
exclusive rights to represent Siemens, Rami profited again
when additional power infrastructure projects were awarded to
the German company.  Currently, both the Iberdrola (Iberinco)
and Siemens projects are behind schedule and over-budget.
Over the same period, the Syrian public suffered from rolling
blackouts and increased electrical bills.  During last
summer's August heatwave, poorer neighborhoods went without
power up to ten hours per day while Prime Minister Utri
blamed Syria's electrical woes on "international pressure"
rather than insufficient SARG investment in infrastructure.
Blackouts have recently returned to Syria and Rami's avarice
(reportedly demanding a USD 30 million "commission" in
Iberdrola's case) is a key contributing factor. 

3. (U) Rami is suspected of delaying the SARG's anticipated
licensing of a third GSM service provider in Syria until he
closes a deal to sell SyriaTel, which reportedly earned USD
692 million in 2007 alone.  Since GSM service was first
introduced in 2000, Syrians have been forced to choose
between two providers, Makhlouf's SyriaTel and Areeba (now
MTN), which was reportedly owned by First Lady Asma
al-Akhras' family.  Syrians widely resent the duopoly's
ability to set prices for the entire country.  With market
forces unable to compete, regime corruption elevated the
price of basic GSM service on which the average Syrian relies
as his primary means of communication. (There are six million
mobile subscribers to roughly three million land-line
connections.) 

4. (C) At a time when Syria's petroleum exports are
contracting and the Syrian people are increasingly suffering
from fuel shortages, Rami's presence in the petroleum sector
is exacerbating the problem.  The French company Total
proposed a venture that would have brought additional Syrian
gas reserves on-line in time to avert recent shortages, but
the deal has inexplicably floundered facing SARG bureaucratic
inaction.  Similarly, a Shell offer to upgrade and increase
capacity of Syrian refineries remains mired in SARG
bureaucracy at a time of acute shortages in refined product.
Interestingly, the only petroleum project currently
proceeding at full-speed in Syria is the Gulfsands (35
percent) "strategic partnership" with the Rami-led Cham
Holding Company (65 percent) to develop the recent oil and
gas discovery in the Khurbet East region (Northeastern
Syria).  According to a Gulfsands' statement, the joint
venture soon expects to bring 10,000 bpd of new oil
production on-line. 

5. (U) In a particularly brazen venture, Makhlouf also seems
intent on profiting from the impact of US sanctions on Syrian
Arab Airlines.  Rami's Cham Holding Company (40 percent) has
joined with Syrian Air (25 percent) and the Kuwaiti company
Al Aqeelah (35 percent) to create the first "private airline"
in Syria, dubbed the Cham Pearl.  The Kuwaiti company's
subsidiary, Aqeeq Aviation Holding, is apparently exploring
ways to circumvent US sanctions and provide commercial
aircraft.  Once operational, Cham Pearl intends to take over
Syrian Air's most profitable routes of three hours or less --
75 percent of Syrian Air's business -- from Damascus to major
regional airports, leaving Syrian Air with the less
profitable long-haul routes. (See "Syria: Opening Skies,"
Oxford Business Group, January 29, 2008) 

6. (U) Makhlouf remains unabashed about employing SARG muscle
when necessary.  In one oft-repeated example on the Damascus
street in 2007, a Syrian businessman purchased a prime piece
of real estate along the Mezzeh autostrade and received a
permit from the city to construct a large apartment building.
 As the project progressed, the SARG security services
informed the building's owner that he could not complete his
project as it would allow future occupants to have direct
line-of-sight to the Damascus airport.  Rami's agents then
visited the distraught owner and offered to buy the
unfinished building for a fraction of the property's actual
value.  Rebuffing Makhlouf's initial offer, the owner sought
recourse in the local courts for weeks to no avail.  In late
2007, Cham Holding announced that it had acquired the
property and would be developing a five-star Marriott hotel
on the site at a cost of USD 70 million. 

7. (C) Note: A hospitality-industry contact told Econoff that
Rami and Nabil Kuzbari (ref A) had traveled to the US and met
with senior Marriott executives in December to present a
potential business proposal and discuss design options for
the site.  According to the contact, the Syrians left the US
believing they had closed the deal and upon returning,
prematurely leaked their success to the local media.  In late
December, Marriott reportedly informed Cham Holding that it
was no longer interested in the proposal due to "political
reasons." End note. 

8. (U) Although difficult to prove, various internet-based
newsletters claim that Makhlouf is the political patron of
many high-ranking public SARG officials, including Minister
of Construction Hamud al-Hussein, Minister of Petroleum
Sufian Allaw, Minister of Electricity Ahmad Khalid al-Ali,
Central Bank Governor Adib Mayaleh and former Minister of
Telecommunications Amro Salem.  As officials with these
portfolios would be in position to wield substantial
influence over industry regulation and lucrative tenders, it
is doubtful that Rami would have enjoyed such uncanny
business successes without government collusion. 

------------------------
DIFFUSING RESPONSIBILITY
------------------------ 

9. (U) Since returning from his brief exile in Dubai (ref B),
Rami has taken several measures to try to both lower his
profile and insulate his personal fortune.  In 2006, Makhlouf
founded the Al Mashrek Fund, a holding company with a
reported capitalization of SYP 4 billion (USD 80 million),
including SYP 1 billion (USD 20 million) in cash deposited
with Banque Bemo Saudi Fransi.  Later that year, Makhlouf and
69 prominent Syrian businessmen formed the Cham Holding
Company with an initial capitalization of USD 200 million,
now estimated to be worth USD 350 million.  Representing
Makhlouf, the Al Mashrek Fund is the majority shareholder in
Cham Holding, which currently has 65 partners and a
ten-member board of directors.  By mid-2007, Cham Holding was
pursuing six "landmark" development projects valued at USD
1.3 billion, primarily in energy, transportation and real
estate.  (See The Syria Report, April 30 and Sept 12, 2007) 

-----------------------------------------
USING CUT-OUTS AND PRIVATE BANKING SECTOR
----------------------------------------- 

10. (S/NF) In addition to his public financial activities,
Makhlouf has undertaken several behind-the-scenes
machinations to mitigate his financial risk.  Possibly
concerned by the vulnerability of UAE banks to US pressure --
or frustrated by Emirati laws limiting foreign investment to
real estate and the stock market -- Rami reportedly brought a
part of his fortune back into Syria in 2006.  According to a
well-informed contact, Rami befriended then-expatriate Syrian
Morthada al-Dandashi in Dubai and hired him to manage many of
Makhlouf's "parallel" financial activities in Syria.  The
contact said that Rami paid Dandashi's USD 2 million "ante"
to become a partner in Cham Holding, and deposited
significant sums under Dandashi's name in the Damascus branch
of the Lebanese Byblos Bank -- where Dandashi subsequently
became a partner.  Syrian-Austrian citizen and Cham Holding
director Nabil Kuzbari is also reported to have deposited
money for Rami in Austrian banks.  Finally, contacts say
Makhlouf has also opened accounts under different names in
Lebanon, Greece, Turkey, and possibly Cyprus -- where Post
has learned that Rami once explored obtaining citizenship. 

-------------------------
SUGGESTED ROLL-OUT THEMES
------------------------- 

11. (U) Post recommends the following themes for public
statements regarding the designation of Rami Makhlouf: 

-- Electricity: Rami Makhlouf used his influence with the
regime to gain lucrative contracts in the power sector.
Yet, as the Syrian people continue to suffer from chronic
power outages and higher electrical bills, Rami has already
been paid for projects that are behind schedule and well
over-budget. 

-- Petroleum: Although several Western petroleum companies
are interested in helping Syria develop its gas and oil
sector, the only new project to be proceeding without SARG
impediment is Rami's.  As a result, Syria has become a net
importer of petroleum products.  In the midst of an unusually
severe winter, severe fuel shortages are forcing the Syrian
public to wait in long lines for, and frequently go without,
heating fuel for their homes. 

-- GSM service: Rami Makhlouf has made millions of dollars
from his ownership of SyriaTel, one of only two GSM service
providers in Syria.  Currently, Rami is said to be blocking
the licensing of a third GSM provider until he completes a
deal to sell SyriaTel.  Until free market forces are allowed
to compete, Makhlouf will continue to subject the Syrian
public to artificially elevated prices for basic
telecommunications services. 

-- Aviation: The Syrian national air carrier, Syrian Arab
Airlines (Syrian Air), has an aging fleet that is in need of
replacement.  Rather than addressing any of Syrian Air's
needs, the Assad regime instead awarded Rami Makhlouf a
license to operate a private airline that intends to assume
the most profitable of Syrian Air's routes. 

-- Tourism/Hospitality: The Syrian people are known for their
hospitality and entrepreneurial expertise.  Unfortunately,
legitimate Syrian businessmen hoping to invest in the
emerging tourism sector have again been muscled-out by Rami
Makhlouf and regime thugs who wish to monopolize every
opening in the Syrian economy for their own profit, rather
than share the country's potential with the hard-working
Syrian people. 

-------
COMMENT
------- 

12. (S/NF) Makhlouf's efforts to divest and diversify suggest
that he is expecting eventual USG action against him,
particularly since the November 2007 designation of his
brother, Hafiz.  Although his countermeasures will likely
mitigate the impact of his designation, we believe that it
will still send a strong signal to the regime and to his
current and potential future business partners.  Corruption
is a theme that resonates here, as every Syrian has been a
victim of it.  Rami has long been Syria's poster-boy for
corruption, so making the charge stick is not difficult.
Citing examples that impact the daily lives of Syrians should
help to amplify the designation's roll-out and ensure that it
receives the widest possible coverage.
HOLMSTROM

SECRET: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON

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INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000269 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA;TREASURY FOR LEBENSON/GLASER/SZUBIN; NSC FOR
MARCHESE 

EO 12958 DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS EFIN, ECON, ETTC, SY, SANC
SUBJECT: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON
FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 0108  B. 05 DAMASCUS 6224

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michael Corbin, reasons 1.4 b/d

1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury representatives recently visited Post to discuss options for using financial sanctions to apply pressure to the Syrian regime. We discussed:
-- Treasury’s requirements for finalizing the pending designations of Mohammad Sulayman and Ali Mamluk, and Treasury’s information requirements for a public statement;
-- Treasury’s need to maintain the legal thread between the classified designation packet and the public statement announcing the designation;
-- Post’s support for designating Mohammad Nassif Kheirbek, SARG pointman for its relationship with Iran;
-- How designating regime financiers like Rami and Mohammad Mahlouf could be problematic without a new Executive Order on corruption. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) PENDING DESIGNATIONS: Post understands the designations for Mohammad Sulieman, Syrian Special Presidential Advisor for Arms Procurement and Strategic Weapons and Ali Mamluk, Chief of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, are pending due to a lack of unclassified material necessary for Treasury’s public
SIPDIS designation statement. In post’s estimate, Mohammad Sulayman is a relatively low-payoff target. His activities are not widely known, which will make it difficult to obtain unclassified information for a public statement and,
SIPDIS likewise, make it unlikely that his designation would resonate inside Syria. Ali Mamluk, on the other hand, is more well-known within Syria, especially for involvement in his objectionable activities regarding Lebanon, and his suppressing Syrian civil society and the internal opposition.  Therefore, Mamluk’s designation will likely have a larger impact with local and regional audiences if the public statement announcing his designation also discusses his oppression of Syrian society.

3. (S/NF) We understood from our visit with Treasury representatives that although we are limited to designating regime members under the existing Executive Orders, there is some flexibility in Treasury,s public statement announcing the designation. Post has advocated that no matter the legal basis of the designation, any public designation should focus on themes that resonate inside Syria: corruption, suppression of civil society, and denial of basic human rights (ref A). The need to maintain the “legal thread” between the designation packet and the public announcement could be challenging on cases like Mohamad Sulieman whose links to corruption are less clear. In cases like Ali Mamluk, however, the role of the organization he heads in suppressing internal dissent is publicly known in Syria and stating as much in our statement would resonate well here.

4. (S/NF) Post also supports moving forward with the designation packet on Mohammad Nasif Kheirbek, Syrian Deputy Vice-President for Security and lead Syrian liaison to Iran. Keirbek’s designation could play to a SARG vulnerability, in this case, the SARG’s relationship with Iran, which worries the Sunni majority. Designation of regime pillars involved with the SARG’s partnership with Iran could heighten Syrian and regional concerns about the SARG’s willingness to accomodate an expansionary Iranian agenda.

5. (S/NF) REGIEME FINANCIERS: We also discussed the possibility of targeting high-profile inner circle members and regime financiers like Rami Mahklouf (Asad’s first cousin) and Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami’s father) in the next phase of targeted financial sanctions. Based on our consultation with the Treasury representatives, it seemed apparent that without an Executive Order on corruption it would be difficult to compile enough information to designate this group under the current executive orders. The other option for pursuing this group would be to show how these individuals provided financial support to previously designated individuals such as Asif Shawkat. This course of action could prove highly problematic given the regime’s proficiency at obfuscating its financial transactions (ref B).
DAMASCUS 00000269 002 OF 002

6. (S) Comment. Post thanks Treasury for its team’s February 25-27 visit and welcomes any additional feedback that Washington agencies may have on our recommendations covered in ref A. Post continues to believe targeted financial sanctions are a tool appropriate for the Syrian setting but this tool requires further work to fully develop. ROEBUCK

SECRET: ATTACKING BASHAR’S MONEY

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SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SINGH
TREASURY FOR GLASER 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2027
TAGS: EFIN ETTC PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: ATTACKING BASHAR'S MONEY 

REF: A. 07 DAMASCUS 2066
     B. 07 DAMASCUS 1926
     C. 07 DAMASCUS 68 

Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d 

1.  (S) Summary. As Washington policy makers consider ways to
pressure the regime, one possibility would be to go after
President Asad's money-men.  Four individuals Asad uses to
make and move money are Zuhair Sahloul, Nabil Kuzbari, Asad's
uncle Mohammad Makhlouf, and his father-in-law, Fawas Akhras.
 Each is important to Asad and each plays a somewhat
different role in facilitating regime graft.  End summary. 

2.  (S) Sahloul (AKA Abu Shafic) is the most important
black-market money changer in Syria.  When the Syrian Pound
(SYP) devalued precipitously in the fall of 2005, the SARG
gave Sahloul an office in the Central Bank and access to its
hard currency reserves so he could intervene in the black
market to stabilize the currency.  (Note.  Sahloul was
surprisingly effective and within weeks the SYP appreciated
20 percent, allowing Sahloul in the process a handsome profit
for both himself and a handful of regime-insiders.  End
note.)  Sahloul moves Asad's money using his own network and
his access to Hawalis worldwide.  A Sahloul intimate bragged
to us recently that Sahloul could move ten million dollars
anywhere in the world in 24-hours. 

3.  (S) In addition to being the father of Syria's poster-boy
for corruption, Rami Makhlouf, Mohammad Makhlouf has long
served as a financial advisor to the Asad family.  If Rami is
the face of corruption, Mohammad is the brain.  When Asad
agreed to open the telecom sector to cellphone providers, it
was Mohammad that some credit with conceptualizing the deal
whereby Rami took over the first provider, SyriaTel, (long
Rami's biggest cash-cow), and the second license (originally
to SpaceTel, then Areeba 94, and now MTN) went to the
first-lady's family (see para five below).  Long held in
check by his brother-in-law, the late president Hafiz Asad,
under Bashar Asad, Mohammad's avarice reportedly has no
bounds.  As a result, the Makhloufs have had an at-times
problematic relationship with Bashar and were forced to leave
the country for a number of months in 2005 following one
particularly heated exchange. 

4.  (S) Because of the Makhlouf's excesses and Asad's
inherited propensity to limit the power and influence of his
family members, Nabil Kuzbari has played an increasingly
important role for the first-family. Known locally as "the
Paper King," Kuzbari's base of operations has long been in
Vienna.  In the last two years, however, he has developed an
increasingly collaborative relationship with Rami and
Mohammed Makhlouf.  Last year he served as Rami's frontman in
establishing his holding company, Sham Holding, which brought
together 70 of Syria's most-important business families to
fund a number of Rami's most ambitious entrepreneurial
projects.  In addition to lobbying European politicians to
engage the Asad regime, Kuzbari reportedly uses his contacts
in the Austrian business and banking circles to move regime
assets abroad. 

5.  (S) In addition to being Asad's father-in-law, Fawas
Akhras has been increasingly active in business here in
Syria.  Akhras is the force behind the Syrian-British
Business Council and recently put together a visit to London
by a large group of Syrian businessmen.  Coming only lately
to business, Akhras has stepped on a number of established
business families who increasingly resent his assertiveness
and willingness to use his son-in-law's position to advance
his nascent Syria-based businesses.  Contacts in the banking
sector have commented on the large amount of funds that have
begun to move recently through his accounts.  A long-time
resident of London, he is suspected of being another avenue
used by Asad to stash funds abroad. 

6.  (S) Comment. Post has long advocated moving against
individuals, like those listed above, who are intregal to
allowing the regime to profit from its corruption.  Taking
action against those linked to corruption is a win-win
proposition: not only does it bring pressure on the regime
where it hurts most - its pocketbook, but such a move would
also be popular with the average Syrian who is the most
common victim of the regime's avarice. 

CORBIN

CONFIDENTIAL: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 005399 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA
NSC FOR MARCHESE
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006 

Classified By: CDA William Roebuck, for reasons 1.5 b/d 

1.  (S) Summary.  The SARG ends 2006 in a much stronger
position domestically and internationally than it did 2005.
While there may be additional bilateral or multilateral
pressure that can impact Syria, the regime is based on a
small clique that is largely immune to such pressure.
However, Bashar Asad's growing self-confidence )- and
reliance on this small clique -- could lead him to make
mistakes and ill-judged policy decisions through trademark
emotional reactions to challenges, providing us with new
opportunities.  For example, Bashar,s reaction to the
prospect of Hariri tribunal and to publicity for Khaddam and
the National Salvation Front borders on the irrational.
Additionally, Bashar,s reported preoccupation with his image
and how he is perceived internationally is a potential
liability in his decision making process.  We believe
Bashar,s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to
looming issues, both perceived and real, such as a the
conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and
entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the
potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence
of transiting Islamist extremists.  This cable summarizes our
assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there
may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send
that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities
arising.  These proposals will need to be fleshed out and
converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move
quickly to take advantage of such opportunities.  Many of our
suggestions underline using Public Diplomacy and more
indirect means to send messages that influence the inner
circle.   End Summary. 

2.  (S) As the end of 2006 approaches, Bashar appears in some
ways stronger than he has in two years.  The country is
economically stable (at least for the short term), internal
opposition the regime faces is weak and intimidated, and
regional issues seem to be going Syria,s way, from
Damascus, perspective.  Nonetheless, there are some
long-standing vulnerabilities and looming issues that may
provide opportunities to up the pressure on Bashar and his
inner circle.  Regime decision-making is limited to Bashar
and an inner circle that often produces poorly thought-out
tactical decisions and sometimes emotional approaches, such
as Bashar,s universally derided August 15 speech.  Some of
these vulnerabilities, such as the regime,s near-irrational
views on Lebanon, can be exploited to put pressure on the
regime.  Actions that cause Bashar to lose balance and
increase his insecurity are in our interest because his
inexperience and his regime,s extremely small
decision-making circle make him prone to diplomatic stumbles
that can weaken him domestically and regionally.  While the
consequences of his mistakes are hard to predict and the
benefits may vary, if we are prepared to move quickly to take
advantage of the opportunities that may open up, we may
directly impact regime behavior where it matters--Bashar and
his inner circle. 

3.  (S) The following provides our summary of potential
vulnerabilities and possible means to exploit them: 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE HARIRI INVESTIGATION AND THE TRIBUNAL:  The Hariri
investigation ) and the prospect of a Lebanon Tribunal --
has provoked powerful SARG reactions, primarily because of
the embarrassment the investigation causes.  Rationally, the
regime should calculate that it can deal with any summons of
Syrian officials by refusing to turn any suspects over, or,
in extreme cases by engineering "suicides.8  But it seems
the real issue for Bashar is that Syria,s dignity and its
international reputation are put in question.  Fiercely-held
sentiments that Syria should continue to exercise dominant
control in Lebanon play into these sensitivities.   We should
seek to exploit this raw nerve, without waiting for formation
of the tribunal. 

-- Possible action: 

-- PUBLICITY:  Publicly highlighting the consequences of the
ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal
angst and may lead him to act irrationally.  The regime has
deep-seated fears about the international scrutiny that a
tribunal -- or Brammertz accusations even against
lower-echelon figures -- would prompt.  The Mehlis
accusations of October 2005 caused the most serious strains
in Bashar's inner circle.  While the family got back
together, these splits may lie just below the surface. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE ALLIANCE WITH TEHRAN: Bashar is walking a fine line in
his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking
necessary support while not completely alienating Syria,s
moderate Sunni Arab neighbors by being perceived as aiding
Persian and fundamentalist Shia interests.  Bashar's decision
to not attend the Talabani ) Ahmadinejad summit in Tehran
following FM Moallem,s trip to Iraq can be seen as a
manifestation of Bashar's sensitivity to the Arab optic on
his Iranian alliance. 

-- Possible action: 

-- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE:  There are fears
in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia
proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis.  Though
often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni
community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused
on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through
activities ranging from mosque construction to business.
Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as
prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving
increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate
more closely with their governments on ways to better
publicize and focus regional attention on the issue. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE INNER CIRCLE:  At the end of the day, the regime is
dominated by the Asad family and to a lesser degree by Bashar
Asad,s maternal family, the Makhlufs, with many family
members believe to be increasingly corrupt. The family, and
hangers on, as well as the larger Alawite sect, are not
immune to feuds and anti-regime conspiracies, as was evident
last year when intimates of various regime pillars (including
the Makhloufs) approached us about post-Bashar possibilities.
 Corruption is a great divider and Bashar's inner circle is
subject to the usual feuds and squabbles related to graft and
corruption.  For example, it is generally known that Maher
Asad is particularly corrupt and incorrigible.  He has no
scruples in his feuds with family members or others.  There
is also tremendous fear in the Alawite community about
retribution if the Sunni majority ever regains power. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Targeted sanctions against regime
members and their intimates are generally welcomed by most
elements of Syrian society.  But the way designations are
applied must exploit fissures and render the inner circle
weaker rather than drive its members closer together.  The
designation of Shawkat caused him some personal irritation
and was the subject of considerable discussion in the
business community here. While the public reaction to
corruption tends to be muted, continued reminders of
corruption in the inner circle have resonance.  We should
look for ways to remind the public of our previous
designations. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE KHADDAM FACTOR:  Khaddam knows where the regime
skeletons are hidden, which provokes enormous irritation from
Bashar, vastly disproportionate to any support Khaddam has
within Syria.  Bashar Asad personally, and his regime in
general, follow every news item involving Khaddam with
tremendous emotional interest.  The regime reacts with
self-defeating anger whenever another Arab country hosts
Khaddam or allows him to make a public statement through any
of its media outlets. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to
allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him
with venues for airing the SARG,s dirty laundry.  We should
anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its
isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors. 

Vulnerability: 

  -- DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY SERVICES:  Bashar
constantly guards against challenges from those with ties
inside the military and security services.  He is also
nervous about any loyalties senior officers (or former senior
officers) feel toward disaffected former regime elements like
Rif,at Asad and Khaddam.  The inner circle focuses
continuously on who gets what piece of the corruption action.
 Some moves by Bashar in narrowing the circle of those who
benefit from high-level graft has increased those with ties
to the security services who have axes to grind. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING:
The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about
coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and
military.  Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should
be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rif,at
Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate
leaking of the meetings afterwards.  This again touches on
this insular regime,s paranoia and increases the possibility
of a self-defeating over-reaction. 

Vulnerability: 

-- REFORM FORCES VERSUS BAATHISTS-OTHER CORRUPT ELITES:
Bashar keeps unveiling a steady stream of initiatives on
economic reform and it is certainly possible he believes this
issue is his legacy to Syria.  While limited and ineffectual,
these steps have brought back Syrian expats to invest and
have created at least the illusion of increasing openness.
Finding ways to publicly call into question Bashar,s reform
efforts )- pointing, for example to the use of reform to
disguise cronyism -- would embarrass Bashar and undercut
these efforts to shore up his legitimacy.  Revealing Asad
family/inner circle corruption would have a similar effect. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- HIGHLIGHTING FAILURES OF REFORM:  Highlighting failures of
reform, especially in the run-up to the 2007 Presidential
elections, is a move that Bashar would find highly
embarrassing and de-legitimizing.  Comparing and contrasting
puny Syrian reform efforts with the rest of the Middle East
would also embarrass and irritate Bashar. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE ECONOMY: Perpetually under-performing, the Syrian
economy creates jobs for less than 50 percent of the
country,s university graduates.  Oil accounts for 70 percent
of exports and 30 percent of government revenue, but
production is in steady decline.  By 2010 Syria is expected
to become a net importer of oil.  Few experts believe the
SARG is capable of managing successfully the expected
economic dislocations. 

-- DISCOURAGE FDI, ESPECIALLY FROM THE GULF:  Syria has
enjoyed a considerable up-tick in foreign direct investment
(FDI) in the last two years that appears to be picking up
steam.  The most important new FDI is undoubtedly from the
Gulf. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE KURDS:  The most organized and daring political
opposition and civil society groups are among the ethnic
minority Kurds, concentrated in Syria,s northeast, as well
as in communities in Damascus and Aleppo.  This group has
been willing to protest violently in its home territory when
others would dare not.  There are few threats that loom
larger in Bashar,s mind than unrest with the Kurds.  In what
is a rare occurrence, our DATT was convoked by Syrian
Military Intelligence in May of 2006 to protest what the
Syrians believed were US efforts to provide military training
and equipment to the Kurds in Syria. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish
complaints in public statements, including publicizing human
rights abuses will exacerbate regime,s concerns about the
Kurdish population.  Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish
areas and the SARG,s long-standing refusal to offer
citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds.  This issue
would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong
kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a
liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given
Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society,s skepticism of Kurdish
objectives. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- Extremist elements increasingly use Syria as a base, while
the SARG has taken some actions against groups stating links
to Al-Qaeda.  With the killing of the al-Qaida leader on the
border with Lebanon in early December and the increasing
terrorist attacks inside Syria culminating in the September
12 attack against the US embassy, the SARG,s policies in
Iraq and support for terrorists elsewhere as well can be seen
to be coming home to roost. 

-- Possible Actions: 

-- Publicize presence of transiting (or externally focused)
extremist groups in Syria, not limited to mention of Hamas
and PIJ.  Publicize Syrian efforts against extremist groups
in a way that suggests weakness, signs of instability, and
uncontrolled blowback.  The SARG,s argument (usually used
after terror attacks in Syria) that it too is a victim of
terrorism should be used against it to give greater
prominence to increasing signs of instability within Syria. 

4.  (S) CONCLUSION:  This analysis leaves out the anti-regime
Syrian Islamists because it is difficult to get an accurate
picture of the threat within Syria that such groups pose.
They are certainly a long-term threat.  While it alludes to
the vulnerabilities that Syria faces because of its alliance
with Iran, it does not elaborate fully on this topic.  The
bottom line is that Bashar is entering the new year in a
stronger position than he has been in several years, but
those strengths also carry with them -- or sometimes mask )
vulnerabilities.  If we are ready to capitalize, they will
offer us opportunities to disrupt his decision-making, keep
him off-balance, and make him pay a premium for his mistakes. 

ROEBUCK

CONFIDENTIAL: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000068 

SIPDIS 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETTC SY SANC
SUBJECT: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA 

REF: A. A: DAMASCUS 5567
     B. REF B: DAMASCUS 6224 

Classified By: CDA: Stephen Seche for Reasons 1.5 

1.  (C) Summary.  As post has reported previously, the
average Syrian would welcome targeted sanctions that focus on
regressive elements within the Asad regime.  The best mix in
our judgement would be sanctions that are phased,
multi-lateral, and widely publicized.  Most of our Syrian
interlocutors concur that if done correctly, these sanctions
would delegitimize those elements within the SARG perceived
to be obstacles to change, strengthen progressive elements
both within the regime and the wider society, and increase
pressure on the SARG to substantively change its
destabilizing behavior.  End summary. 

2.  (C) Financial and travel sanctions that target
individuals remain popular with the majority of our Syrian
interlocutors (ref A, B).  They argue that targeting
individuals would make clear for the average Syrian that the
international community opposes the regime and its policies,
but does not wish to punish the Syrian people.  At the same
time, targeted sanctions would also help delegitimize those
individuals who pose the greatest internal and external
threat to progress.  Additionally, if designated individuals
could neither travel nor conduct legitimate business, they
would become an increasing liability for President Bashar
al-Asad,s regime.  Popular resentment against the sanctioned
individuals would add to the pressure to change. 

3.  (C) Syrians we speak with argue that future designations
should be multi-lateral.  Some tools for doing so already
exist.  UNSCR 1636 makes provision for designation of
individuals named under the Hariri investigation.  A case
should be made for additional designations under existing or
new UNSC resolutions.  The USG designated Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh and Asif Issa as-Shalesh, cousins of President
Asad, under E.O. 13315 ) a derivative of UNSCR 1483 - for
their role in procuring defense-related items for Saddam
Hussein.  We should lobby our allies to pursue similar
designations, under the umbrella of new or existing UNSC
resolutions of both the Shaleeshes and any new Syrians we
designate concerning Lebanon, Iraq, WMD, and the peace
process.  Though it is unlikely that any significant
financial resources would be frozen by these designations
(ref B), the naming and shaming of the most recalcitrant
elements within the regime would delegitimize them
internationally, which in turn, would work to undermine the
hardliners domestically. 

4.  (C) Pursuing multilateral designations would greatly
multiply the effectiveness of targeted sanctions, but a
carefully timed campaign to widely publicize the designations
is equally important.  Without media coverage and publicity
to raise the profile of designations, the effort would lose
its most effective element - &name and shame.8  The
Shaleesh case mentioned above is a case in point.  Despite
the Shaleesh family having a high profile within Syria, very
few Syrians at any level are aware the USG imposed financial
sanctions on them.  The head of one of the leading Sunni
business families in Damascus approached us recently to ask
why the USG did not aggressively pursue sanctioning criminal
elements within the regime.  When asked for examples of who
should be sanctioned, our contact pointed to Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh who, he asserted, took much of the 580 million
USD in Iraqi funds the Commercial Bank of Syria illegally
paid out in 2003 and has yet to reconcile with the Iraqis.
Needless to say, our contact was surprised to find out Dhu al
Himma as well as his nephew, Asif Issa Shaleesh, were already
sanctioned. 

5.  (C) Phasing in future targeted sanctions can maximize
their impact.  The first phase could start with those most
clearly the architects of objectionable SARG policies
relating to Iraq, Lebanon, WMD, and support for the
Palestinian rejectionist groups, and then extend to those
continuing to support the original group in an ever widening
circle.  In addition to all of the Mehlis suspects, the first
batch of new designees might include a core group of eight to
ten, such as Asif Shawkat (Asad,s brother-in-law and head of
Syrian Military Intelligence), Maher Asad (President Asad,s
brother and commander of the Republican Guard), Rami Makhlouf
(Asad,s first cousin and Syria,s poster boy for
corruption), Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami,s father), Riyad Issa
Shaleesh (principal director of SES International ) an
entity already designated under E.O. 13315; in addition, we
should push our allies to sanction the other two Shaleeshes
mentioned above), Hisham Ikhtiyar (chairman of the Regional
Command's National Security Bureau), Abdel Fatah Qudsia
(Presidential advisor on Palestinian issues), and Mohammad
Suleiman (Presidential advisor responsible for procurement).
A second tranch of designations could then move on to this
group's lieutenants and business partners. 

6.  (C) Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Asad
still represents their best hope for change without
instability.  It is their fear of instability that stops the
majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change.
For this reason, they argue that sanctions focusing on
individuals would help empower Asad to scuttle the regime,s
pariahs.  According to this school of thought, Bashar himself
should not be designated at this point as it would limit our
options and signal that the USG is intent on regime change,
greatly limiting the number of Syrians willing to join us in
pressuring the SARG for change. 

7.  (C) Comment.  Pursuing targeted sanctions would send a
powerful message to the regime and those associated with it:
"if you are perceived to be proponents of the policies
causing regional instability, you will be designated.  If you
provide aid and assistance to those designated, you risk
designation yourself."  Both internal and external pressure
on the regime to change would likewise increase incrementally
as the number of designations increased.  If conventional
Syrian wisdom is correct, the obstacles stopping Bashar from
doing the right thing would proportionally decrease as
targeted sanctions progressed.  Even if that view is wrong,
the same result will occur, as the supports of Bashar,s
failed policies are eroded.  In the end, the USG will advance
its policy objectives by undermining the regime,s ability to
pursue policies at odds with regional stability.
SECHE

CABLEGATE: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY- COCALEROS USE CONGRESS TO PUSH PRO-COCA/ANTI-U.S. MESSAGE

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #3823/01 2701742
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271742Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2453
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3931
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6989
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9791
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ SEP QUITO 0705
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0866
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
UNCLAS LIMA 003823 

SIPDIS 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SNAR PE
SUBJECT: COCALEROS USE CONGRESS TO PUSH PRO-COCA/ANTI-U.S. MESSAGE

REF: A. LIMA 3677 B. 05LIMA 4441 C. 03LIMA 983

Sensitive But Unclassified, Please Handle Accordingly. 

1. (SBU) Summary: Pro-cocalero congressional representatives
ranted about the benefits of coca and the costs of U.S.
imperialism disguised as counternarcotics policy at a recent
"Coca and Biodiversity" conference held in a Congressional
annex.  Cocalero leader Nelson Palomino also participated.
The well-attended event highlighted that cocaleros now have a
foothold in Congress, and are using coca as a banner for a
larger anti-system, anti-U.S. message.  End Summary. 

2. (U) On September 16 Poloff attended a "Coca and
Biodiversity" conference (9/16), at the Congressional annex
building in downtown Lima.  Huanuco Congresswoman Yaneth
Cajahuanca of the Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) organized
the event, which was co-sponsored by a natural medicine and
nutrition organization and the Kuska Peru political group led
by cocalero leader Nelson Palomino.  Approximately 150 people
of diverse age and gender filled the auditorium.  A handful
of people were chewing coca leaf - a rare sight in Lima. 

3. (U) Two themes dominated the discussion: the clear
difference between coca producers and narcotraffickers
(though 90 percent of coca production goes to
narcotrafficking) and coca's historical, cultural, and
nutritional value.  Vendors selling "coca flour" and coca
baked goods at the conference received much positive
attention.  (Note: The "flour" is a nutritional supplement to
be mixed with water or milk that includes 9-10 healthy
additives (e.g., soy, rice, whole wheat, etc.) in addition to
coca. End Note.) 

4. (U) Ricardo Soberon, staffer for cocalero Congresswoman
Nancy Obregon, said coca was Peru's biggest renewable natural
resource, but was a "sequestered plant" made taboo by "a dark
force" (the U.S.).  Soberon told the crowd that the U.S. uses
the drug war as a pretext for its presence in Peru to steal
the country's natural resources.  He added that the U.S. is
"like an octopus with tentacles spreading misinformation in
all the press," and that the GOP Ministries obey the orders
of the U.S. Embassy.  Soberon closed his diatribe with a
commitment by Congresswoman Obregon to present new coca
legislation recognizing coca's historical, traditional, and
cultural significance, regionalizing management of the licit
market, and protecting coca producers and including them in a
dialogue.  His speech got strong applause.  (Note: On
September 19, Obregon and other pro-coca Congressmembers
submitted a draft bill to declare coca and its traditional
use as natural patrimony. End Note.) 

5. (U) In a subsequent presentation, cocalero Congresswoman
Yaneth Cajahuanca said she, like farmers in the field, chews
coca because it energizes her and helps her work.  She said
farmers in her district have no alternative to coca for cash
income and claimed fumigation had dried up coca crops in
Huanuco. 

6. (SBU) Radical cocalero leader Nelson Palomino closed out
the event.  His discourse reportedly united indigenous rights
and pride with coca as a cultural element.  Palomino was
released from jail in June on parole after completing a third
of his 10-year sentence for kidnapping, burglary, aggravated
theft, public disturbance, and support of crime and coercion
(Refs B, C).  Since his release he has criticized the GOP's
drug policies and formed a regional pro-coca political
movement called "Kuska Peru" (Quechua for "Together for
Peru.")  Palomino's stature as a political leader has been
strengthened through the cocalero dialogue with the
government, meetings with senior GOP officials including
President Garcia, and in conferences such as this. 

7. (SBU) Comment: The conference highlights the emergence of a newly empowered leadership of pro-coca political leaders inside and outside of Congress. Some observers believe Palomino's and other cocalero leader's political stars are rising, enabled by the government's decisions to elevate them to the status of valid interlocutors. These pro-coca leaders are attempting to shape the GOP's policy through the on-going government dialogue and legislative proposals. It further suggests the consolidation of the coca leaf, and its cultivation free from the interference of outside powers, as the banner of a larger anti-systemic, anti-U.S. political movement that now has a foothold in Congress. End Comment.

STRUBLE

SECRET: CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN’S JANUARY 17 MEETING

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DE RUEHBO #0337/01 0281705
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INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 0512
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RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8006
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 2122
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RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 2134
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 8270
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 2930
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0387
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 1138
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RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0168
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS// PRIORITY
S E C R E T BOGOTA 000337 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR MOPS VZ AR BH BR CI CS
CU, ES, HO, MX, NU, PM, PA, PE, UY, CO
SUBJECT: CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN'S JANUARY 17 MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT URIBE 

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 

-------
Summary
------- 

1. (S) President Uribe's overwhelming concern during a
January 17 meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS) Admiral Michael Mullen, was Hugo Chavez' aggressive
remarks and proposal to grant belligerent status to the FARC.
 Uribe insisted the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) must keep their
terrorist designation, and the USG and GOC should work
together to convince Latin American countries that Chavez'
approach would harm Colombia and regional democracy.  Uribe
said Chavez has committed to bring down Uribe and his
government by using the FARC as his militia inside Colombia.
The GOC's current plan of action on hostages consists of
locating them, securing areas near the hostage groups, and
calling on the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to negotiate their release.  Uribe would authorize
Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela to arrest FARC
leaders and bring them to justice in Colombia.  End Summary. 

2. (U) Participants 

UNITED STATES 

CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen
Ambassador William Brownfield
CJCS/EA CAPT James Foggo
Defense Attach COL Mark Wilkins (notetaker) 

COLOMBIA 

President Alvaro Uribe
Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos
Armed Forces Commander General Freddy Padilla
MFA U.S. and Canada Desk Officer Patricia Cortes 

-------------------------------
Uribe Obsessed By Chavez Blasts
------------------------------- 

3. (C) President Alvaro Uribe arrived late to the meeting,
directly from a discussion with his cabinet on how to respond
to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' latest inflammatory
remarks, and the show of solidarity by the Venezuelan
Congress on granting "belligerent" status to the FARC.  It
was clear that he was still focused on Chavez and the GOC
response. 

-------------------------
GOC Progress, USG Support
------------------------- 

4. (C) Uribe thanked the United States for its continued
support, stressing its decisiveness in helping Colombia pull
back from the brink of becoming a failed state.  While much
work remains, Colombia has made great progress against
terrorists and the GOC feels certain they can win this
battle.  Uribe attributed a great portion of the credit for
Colombia's success to the permanent assistance of the USG and 

its armed forces.  Chairman Mullen reaffirmed the strength of
the bilateral relationship and assured Uribe of continuing
USG commitment to defeating our common adversaries.  He
admired Colombians' determination and leadership.  The
Colombian military had transformed itself remarkably and
performed the highest calling possible -- returning Colombia
to its citizens. 

---------------------------
Chavez' Endorsement of FARC
--------------------------- 

5. (C) Turning to Venezuela, Uribe said his neighbor's
actions cause Colombia great difficulty.  The FARC and ELN
must keep their terrorist designation, Uribe insisted, and
there should be negative consequences for any country
granting them belligerent status.  It was important to
counter and challenge Chavez' rhetoric, especially on this
point.  When France and Mexico granted that status to the
Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels in El Salvador
in 1981, Uribe commented, they fought an unelected and brutal
dictatorship.  By contrast, the FARC waged war on a duly
elected democracy, they had no public support, and they
financed themselves through narcotrafficking and extortion. 

6. (S) Asked by the Chairman how much help Chavez gave the
FARC, Uribe replied that Chavez has a five to seven year plan
to advance his Bolivarian agenda in Colombia.  He has created
popular militias inside Venezuela (apart from the Armed
Forces) to sustain his revolution.  The GOC believes Chavez
thinks he could use the FARC as his militia inside Colombia
to combat its democratic government.  Chavez remains
committed to bring down both Uribe and his government, as the
primary obstacles to his Bolivarian expansionist dreams.
With no clear Colombian presidential successor, a well
financed candidate favoring Chavez might find space in 2010.
The best counter to Chavez, in Uribe's view, remains action
-- including use of the military. 

----------------
Regional Support
---------------- 

7. (S) Uribe urged the GOC and USG to work together to
convince Latin American countries that Chavez' approach to
the FARC was wrong and would harm Colombia and regional
democracy.  The USG, he said, ought to lead a public campaign
against Venezuela and counter Chavez' progress through
preferential oil offers.  The U.S. and Mexico, supported by
Honduras, Panama, Belize, and Costa Rica (especially Oscar
Arias in the latter) were natural leaders to counter Chavez.
Even Cuba, which felt Chavez had crossed into dangerous
territory, has exercised a restraining influence.  When the
GOC asked the Cuban government their views on Chavez' call to
roll back the FARC's terrorist designation, the Cubans stated
that it was "a difficult proposal." 

8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause.

-----------------
Hostages and HVTs
----------------- 

9. (S) Uribe listed rescue of hostages held by the FARC as
one of his main goals for 2008.  He outlined a plan whereby
the military would establish a "cordon sanitaire" around
areas where hostages were held.  Then the GOC would
temporarily open the area to outside interlocutors such as
the ICRC to offer an international medical mission and
conduct negotiations.  Under this umbrella, the GOC would
focus on the 44 hostages the FARC had identified as
"exchangeable."  Chairman Mullen assured USG support for
GOC's efforts, but he cautioned that the USG wanted the
hostages returned alive.  Uribe responded with his conviction
that the FARC would not kill hostages at this stage.  The
best course of action, he advocated, remains to locate the
hostages, secure the positions, and then call in the ICRC to
negotiate their release. 

10. (S) Uribe said the GOC also placed a priority on high
value targets and that they had achieved great results in
late 2007.  Finally, he said he was prepared to authorize
Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela, arrest FARC
leaders, and bring them to justice in Colombia. 

11. (U) CJCS Admiral Mullen cleared this cable. 

Brownfield

SECRET: GERMANY WARNS THE USG ABOUT A BRAZILIAN PROCUREMENT ATTEMPT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN

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DE RUEHRL #0921/01 2121541
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4817
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
RUCNWSN/THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0315
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000921 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER 
STATE FOR ISN 
STATE FOR EUR/PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE PREL PINR MNUC ETTC KSCA KNNP IR BR GM
SUBJECT: (S) GERMANY WARNS THE USG ABOUT A BRAZILIAN 
PROCUREMENT ATTEMPT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN 
 
Classified By: Acting Global Affairs Unit Chief David L. Fisher 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) On July 31, MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer 
Nancy Reck provided EconOff with a German-language non-paper 
warning US export control authorities about a potential 
Brazilian procurement attempt of proliferation concern for 
"Automatic High-Precision Heavy-Duty Necking-In-Machines with 
CNC Control" from a US vendor.  German authorities received 
an application from a German firm for the export of four 
Necking-In-Machines to Brazil, which they plan on rejecting 
for fears that these machines would be diverted to the Middle 
East -- probably Iran.  (COMMENT: The German producer of 
these machines was not mentioned or listed in the non-paper. 
END COMMENT)  The Germans based their conclusions on their 
own research and information from an unnamed "reliable 
source" (NFI).  Reck shared that Germany is confident in the 
strength of their legal position should the German producer 
challenge the rejection in court. 
 
2.  (S) Begin text of informal Embassy translation of 
German-language non-paper: 
 
In regards to our partnership in the area of 
non-proliferation and our excellent partnership in export 
control affairs, we would like to bring the following 
information to the attention of your government: 
 
A German firm placed an export application for four 
"Automatic High-Precision Heavy-Duty Necking-In-Machines with 
CNC Control" (Einziehmaschinen) with a total value of 
7,700,000 euro.  The machines are controlled by both the 
Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 
The stated recipient is the firm Export Business & Consult 
located in Brazil.  This firm's address is as follows: 
 
Export Business & Consult 
Av. Osmar Cunha 183-712A 
Florianopolis, Santa Catarina, 88015-100 
Brazil 
 
The end-user is listed as Export Business & Consult, Rua Ivo 
Luchi s/n Bairro Industrial, Palhoca, Santa Catarina, Brazil. 
 (COMMENT:  Reck said the term "s/n" in this sentence refers 
to "street name."  END COMMENT)  The stated end-use 
description is for the production of gas cylinders, pressure 
containers, and CNG-cylinders for automobiles. 
 
From a reliable "source", we have obtained the following 
information: 
 
-- The Brazilian authorities are investigating the receiver 
because of suspicion connecting the firm with procurement of 
dual-use goods, listed under the Wassenaar Arrangement, for 
diversion to the Middle-East. 
 
-- The firm has already tried to procure machine tools in 
numerous European countries 
 
-- The existence of a declared end-user could not be proven 
 
-- The declared receiver has neither the physical facilities 
nor the financial means or the technical possibilities to use 
the Necking-In-Machines for themselves. 
 
-- The previous activities of both firms give cause for the 
presumption, that it has to do with a front company without 
financial movement or registered business capital. 
 
-- According to the source's assessment, this case could be 
connected with the proliferation of critical goods to the 
Middle East (presumably Iran). 
 
We will reject this application.  Due to the long 
investigation time, the export applicant's legal 
representative shared that the Brazilian end-user could 
possibly make an effort to procure the machines from the USA. 
 
 
We look forward to the continuation of our excellent 
cooperation in the affairs of non-proliferation and export 
control. 
 
BERLIN 00000921  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
End text of informal Embassy translation. 
Bradtke

CONFIDENTIAL: GERMAN SATELLITE START-UP RAPIDEYE GATHERING

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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4489
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1032
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0310
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0531
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0238
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC 0127
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCUSTR/USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000788 

SENSITIVE 

SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR ISN/MDSP DICK BUENNEKE 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TSPA EINV ETRD PGOV PREL PINR CH BR FR LH GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN SATELLITE START-UP RAPIDEYE GATHERING
CUSTOMERS; EMPHASIS ON CHINESE AND USG MARKETS 

REF: 08 BERLIN 1537 

1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  German satellite imagery provider
RapidEye AG, which began selling its imagery products in
January of this year (see ref A), has established its first
contracts with France and Lithuania.  In the next few years,
RapidEye is confident that its customer base will expand by
ten, with an eye toward markets in China, the US, and Brazil.
 Although the firm originally sought to become a niche
provider of value-added imagery products and analysis, it is
finding that its customers are only interested in raw imagery
data.  This has caused RapidEye to re-focus its business
model to be a provider of data that offers direct satellite
downlink services.  Please see ref A for previous reporting
on RapidEye AG.  END SUMMARY 

FRANCE AND LITHUANIA ARE RAPIDEYE'S FIRST CUSTOMERS
--------------------------------------------- ------ 

2.  (SBU) On June 15, 2009, Econoff and NGAoff met with
RapidEye CEO Wolfgang Biedermann and discussed RapidEye's
current and future business developments.  Biedermann said
that RapidEye had contracts with its first customers, France
and Lithuania, totaling one million euros.  Biedermann
boasted that RapidEye had beat the competing French
commercial satellite imagery system, SPOT, on a crop
monitoring project in France.  (COMMENT:  SPOT is a
high-resolution, optical imaging satellite system run by Spot
Image in Toulouse, France.  The SPOT system has been
operational since 1986 with its most recent launch in 2002.
END COMMENT)  Biedermann explained that the main reason why
RapidEye won over SPOT was that RapidEye has a superior
imagery revisit rate, a feature valued by the French customer. 

CUSTOMERS IN THE FOLD: CHINA, BRAZIL AND THE US LEAD THE PACK
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 

3.  (SBU) Biedermann said RapidEye has 10 more customers in
its sights, led by China, Brazil, and the United States.  He
estimated these would bring RapidEye's revenue up to around
10 million euro.  He emphasized that the customers would be
"operational" and not simply "pilot users."  RapidEye views
the sale of land cover data (including purchases by NGA) to
US defense and intelligence agencies to be a key component of
business success in the US market.  To support this goal,
RapidEye plans to set up a small office in Northern Virginia
to serve as a liaison to USG customers.  RapidEye views
Brazil as a large scale potential customer due to its size,
rapid development, and well-organized national use of remote
sensing data. 

CHINA MAY HAVE THE MOST POTENTIAL FOR RAPIDEYE
--------------------------------------------- - 

4.  (SBU) China appears to be the focal point of RapidEye's
current marketing strategy, with principal target areas
identified as the Chinese Ministry of Land Management (MLM)
and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).  Biedermann said
"other" Chinese ministries might require similar coverage,
but that RapidEye will approach each sale independently.
Noting that some Chinese ministries do not coordinate well
with each other, RapidEye envisions selling change-detection
data products to MLM on a nation-wide basis.  Biedermann said
China has three tiered priority areas related to acquiring
remote sensing data for land management: 1) China's rapidly
developing coastal region, 2) Central China, and 3) the
desert and semi-desert terrain of Western China.  For these
areas, Biedermann estimated the average cost per square
kilometer would be between 0.70 and 0.90 euro. 

5.  (SBU) RapidEye's primary competition in the Chinese
market is the French SPOT satellite system. Biedermann is
eager to demonstrate the superiority of RapidEye's products
and services to the Chinese customer.  Simply put, RapidEye's 

BERLIN 00000788  002 OF 002 

goal is to supplant SPOT as the vendor of choice in the
Chinese market. 

RAPID EYE PLUGGED INTO WORLD MARKETS; WAITING FOR CUSTOMERS
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 

6.  (SBU) As RapidEye strives to expand its worldwide
customer base, it has already established distribution
contracts covering the US, China, Russia/Eastern Europe, and
Mexico/Central America.  In January 2009, RapidEye announced
an agreement with China's Beijing Earth Observation, Inc.
(BEO) (a subsidiary of Eastdawn Group Inc.) as its Chinese
distributor.  Eastdawn Group CEO, Mr. Bing Sun said RapidEye
has great potential in the Chinese market, especially in the
agricultural, environmental, insurance, and government
sectors.  In February 2009, RapidEye announced an agreement
with the Mexican company Bufete de Ingenieria en
Telecomunicaciones y Sistemas (B.I.T.S.) to be RapidEye's
sole distributor in Mexico and Central America.  In April
2009, RapidEye announced an agreement with the Moscow-based
company Sovzond as its sole distributor for markets in
Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic
of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Krygystan, and
Turkmenistan. 

7.  (SBU) Also in April, RapidEye announced an agreement with
the US company MakaLani LLC of Honolulu, Hawaii as its sole
distributor to the US market.  MakaLani LLC, a Native
Hawaiian Organization (NHO), will focus on distribution to
the US Government market, particularly defense, the
intelligence community, and homeland security.  (COMMENT:
RapidEye may have chosen MakaLani LLC based on an earlier USG
recommendation to establish US distribution ties with a
minority-owned or disadvantaged US company in order to be
better positioned to compete for US Government contracts.
END COMMENT) 

RAPID EYE TO OFFER DIRECT DOWNLINK SERVICES
------------------------------------------- 

8.  (SBU) RapidEye signed a contract with the Canadian firm,
MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA), in April
2009, designating MDA as the sole supplier of direct downlink
solutions for RapidEye's international customers seeking
ground segments.  The contract allows international ground
station customers the ability to task, acquire, and process
RapidEye imagery in near real-time.
Koenig

CONFIDENTIAL: THE U.S.-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, WORKING

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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002104 

SIPDIS 

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2033
TAGS: PHUM PREL KOLY NK BR CH
SUBJECT: THE U.S.-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, WORKING
LUNCH, MAY 26, 2008: UNHRC, ICCPR, NORTH KOREA, BURMA 

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR AUBREY CARLSON. REASONS 1.4
 (B) AND (D). 

1. (U) May 26, 2008; 1:30 p.m.; Beijing, Diaoyutai State
Guesthouse 

2. (U) Participants: 

U.S.
David J. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Rights, and Labor
John V. Hanford, Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom
Thomas Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Dan Picutta, Charge d'Affairs, a.i., Embassy Beijing
Robert K. Harris, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of State
Richard W. Behrend, PRM Advisor, Department of State
Susan O'Sullivan, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Democracy,
Rights, and Labor, Department of State
Dan Kritenbrink, Internal Unit Chief, Political Section,
Embassy Beijing
Emilie L. Kao, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Democracy
Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom,
Department of State
Jeannette M. Windon, Special Assistant, Office of Democracy
and Global Affairs, Department of State
Andrea Goodman, Political Officer, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Steve Goldrup, Second Secretary, Embassy Beijing
Gregory May, Second Secretary, Embassy Beijing (notetaker)
James Brown, Interpreter 

PRC
Wu Hailong, Director General, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Shen Yongxiang, Deputy Director General, International
Organizations and Conferences Department, MFA
Yao Maochen, Deputy Inspector of United Front Work
Department, CPC Central Committee
Teng Wei, Deputy Director General, Criminal Division,
Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee
Wan Yonghai, Presiding Judge, Second Criminal Division,
Supreme People's Court
Sun Maoli, Deputy Director General, Legal Affairs Department,
Ministry of Public Security
Liu Guoyu, Deputy Director General, Prison Administration
Department, Ministry of Justice
Guo Wei, Director General, Foreign Affairs Department, State
Administration for Religious Affairs
Liu Zhengrong, Director General (acting), Internet
Department, State Council Information Office
Suolang Renzeng, Deputy Chief, Administration for Ethnic and
Religious Affairs, Tibetan Autonomous Region
Zhao Yubin, Director, North American and Oceanian Affairs
Department, MFA
Yan Jiarong, Director, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Yao Shaojun, Deputy Director, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Xu Jing, Deputy Director, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA Zheng Zeguang, Director General,
North American and Oceanian Affairs
Zu Yanwei, Attache, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Liu Lingxiao, Attache, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Fang Qiang, Interpreter, MFA 

Summary
------- 

3. (C) China and the United States should cooperate more on
human rights issues in the United Nations, Shen Yongxiang,
Deputy Director General of the MFA's Department of
International Organizations, said during a May 26 working
lunch.  DDG Shen said the United States should reengage with
the Council in order to improve it.  DDG Shen said China
intends to invite the new UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights to visit, saying there was not enough time left in
current Commissioner Louise Arbour's term for this.  DRL
Assistant Secretary Kramer countered that Arbour would
welcome a chance to visit China.  DDG Shen said China will
continue to host visits by UN Special Rapporteurs at a rate
of one per year.  China is working toward ratification of the 

BEIJING 00002104  002 OF 004 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
but must still accomplish further legal reforms, including a
review of China's Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) system, in
order to comply with the Covenant.  On North Korean refugees,
Director General Wu Hailong repeated standard points that
North Koreans in China are "economic migrants."  However,
China has been cooperative with the UNHCR and will allow the
remaining five North Koreans under UNHCR care to depart for
third countries by the end of June.  EAP DAS Christensen
urged China to press Burma to grant access to foreign
disaster relief experts.  DG Wu said Burma continues to be
suspicious of the United States, yet the Burmese regime is
taking positive steps, including accepting U.S. material
assistance.  End Summary. 

UN Human Rights Council
----------------------- 

4. (C) DDG Shen Yongxiang began the May 26 working lunch with
an appeal that the United States and China work more closely
in the UN Human Rights Council.  Shen argued that more
cooperation in the UN between the United States and China in
the area of human rights would improve the international
image of both countries.  China is ready to work with the
United States to promote a UN body that is "fair, objective
and non-selective."  DDG Shen complained that, following the
"serious crimes" carried out by rioters in Lhasa March 14,
the United States "violated the proceedings" of the UN Human
Rights Council by unfairly accusing China of rights
violations in Tibet.  China hopes the United States will
participate in a "more productive way" in the Human Rights
Council.  China supports the current process of universal
periodic review in the Human Rights Council, and the United
States should take the review process seriously.  DDG Shen
encouraged the United States to participate in the upcoming
Durban UN World Conference Against Racism. 

5. (C) A/S Kramer responded that the United States is
extremely disappointed in the UN Human Rights Council.  The
periodic review process is a possible positive mechanism, but
it is too early to tell how successful that mechanism will
be.  On Durban, A/S Kramer said that while it will ultimately
be up to the next administration to decide whether the United
States participates, this would be "extremely difficult"
unless there is a major overhaul of the approaches to be
taken at the conference.  A/S Kramer noted that Canada has
already announced it will skip the Durban conference and
Israel has serious reservations.  DDG Shen said that while
China "respects" the views of the United States and its
disappointment with the Human Rights Council, some current
deficiencies could have been avoided had the United States
been more engaged at the start of the reform process.  DDG
Shen said the United States and other Western countries
backed the idea that the support of one-third of Human Rights
Council members is enough to hold a special session, whereas
China believes a 50-percent threshold would have been fairer.
 Assistant Legal Advisor Harris said that the United States
agreed that the Council should not have double standards or
be politicized.  The Council should be willing to address
fairly the most serious human rights abuses wherever they
occur.  However, the United States believes it is a double
standard for the Council to hold many special sessions and
adopt one-sided resolutions concerning Israel while failing
to hold special sessions on the most serious human rights
problems (for example Zimbabwe).  Meanwhile, the Council in
its first year issued only two special mechanisms mandates,
which involved Cuba and Belarus.  As a practical matter,
China's earlier proposal to require a 50-percent majority for
calling special sessions would not prevent special sessions
involving Israel.  However, a 50-percent threshold might have
proven to be a barrier to convening special sessions
regarding other countries with profound human rights problems. 

Visits by UN Commissioners, Special Rapporteurs
--------------------------------------------- -- 

6. (C) A/S Kramer urged China to host more Special
Rapporteurs and to invite UN Human Rights Commissioner Louise
Arbour to visit Tibet.  DDG Shen said China is "open and
positive" about receiving a visit by the Commissioner.
However, her term will expire this year.  China thus will
extend an invitation to the new Commissioner.  Kramer replied
that Arbour would welcome the chance to visit China before
her term expires and could easily find time on her schedule.
Harris added that the possibility of visiting Tibet is the
reason Arbour wants to make a visit during the last months of 

BEIJING 00002104  003 OF 004 

her tenure.  China, DDG Shen said, also welcomes visits by
various UN Special Rapporteurs and already has extended
invitations to the Rapporteurs on religious freedom and
education, among others.  China's goal is to host a visit by
one Special Rapporteur per year.  However, China has not
hosted such visits in the last two years while the UN Human
Rights Council structure has been under review.  Once the
review is complete, China will resume issuing invitations.
However, DDG Shen added, China must balance the timing and
sequencing of Special Rapporteur visits between the
political, cultural and social realms.  Harris commented that
the United States hosts on average three Special Rapporteurs
per year and has had several visits in the past two years. 

ICCPR
----- 

7. (C) China is "positive" about the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), DDG Shen asserted, and
since signing the Covenant has been making efforts to prepare
for ratification.  Since 2003, China has engaged in a series
of judicial reforms that will help smooth eventual
ratification.  However, China still must make additional
reforms to its criminal justice system in order to comply
with the ICCPR, and is currently reviewing its Reform Through
Labor (RTL) system.  All of these changes will create
favorable conditions for ratification of the ICCPR.  Finally,
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working with the
United Nations to resolve "inconsistencies" that have been
identified in the Chinese translation of the ICCPR.  China,
DDG Shen averred, is even more "eager" to ratify the ICCPR
than the United States is to ratify the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Harris noted that the United States has not yet announced an
intention to ratify the ICESCR because, like China, the
United States wants to be absolutely sure that it can
implement all the Covenant's provisions. 

North Korea
----------- 

8. (C) PRM Advisor Behrend urged China to stop repatriating
North Korean refugees against their will, particularly those
seeking protection from the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) office i China.  China should improve access for
Nort Korean refugees to UNHCR and grant Chinese iizenship
to children of mixed Chinese-North Korean parentage, which
would allow them access to schools and other social services.
 Director General Wu Hailong responded that North Koreans in
China are not "refugees" but rather economic migrants who
have entered the country illegally.  Nevertheless, China has
cooperated in the cases of 30 North Koreans under UNHCR care.
 By June, China will approve the departure to third countries
of the remaining five North Koreans still under UNHCR care in
China.  DG Wu urged the United States not to allow U.S.
nationals to break Chinese law by becoming involved with
North Korean illegal migrants.  DG Wu noted that illegal
migrants from North Korea had in the past violated Chinese
law by storming diplomatic compounds and international
schools.  The ultimate solution to the North Korean problem
is to work toward peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula.  Once the DPRK economy develops, DG Wu predicted,
the number of illegal border crossers from North Korea will
decline. 

Burma Humanitarian Relief
------------------------- 

9. (C) EAP DAS Christensen expressed appreciation for China's
help in convincing Burma to accept U.S. cyclone relief
assistance.  Christensen urged China to push Burma to allow
foreign relief workers into the country.  Though Burma has
accepted supplies from the United States, the Burmese regime
should also agree to accept technical experts from around the
world.  Such experts are needed on the ground to ensure an
effective aid operation.  DG Wu said China appreciates the
help the USG has given to Burma.  Any international
assistance effort, however, must respect the needs and wishes
of Burma.  The United States has been hostile to Burma's
development, and this, DG Wu said, has led to suspicion on
the Burmese side.  Despite this, DG Wu continued, Burma is
now accepting U.S. aid and recently allowed a visit by U.S.
Pacific Command's Admiral Keating.  DG Wu observed that Burma
remains hesitant to admit aid workers and has not granted
entry to a team of Chinese rescue workers.  After the
devastating earthquake in Sichuan, China has been very open 

BEIJING 00002104  004 OF 004 

to offers of international assistance, DG Wu said, and
China's attitude has affected Burma.  A/S Kramer praised
China's response to the earthquake and openness to outside
help.  DG Wu said China's openness shows the progress China
has made in many areas.
PICCUTA

SECRET: TIBET: MFA ORGANIZES TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TRIP

VZCZCXRO8966
OO RUEHAG RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHROV RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1210/01 0911303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311303Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6186
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0368
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8974
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 9347
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 BEIJING 001210 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2028
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KIRF NP IN JA BR GM CA IT
SP, SI, SL, TZ, UK, AU, FR, RS, CH
SUBJECT: TIBET: MFA ORGANIZES TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TRIP TO
LHASA FOR DIPLOMATS, MARCH 28-29 

REF: BEIJING 975 

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Dan Piccuta.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

Summary
------- 

1. (C) With less than 24-hours notice to participating
Embassies, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
together with the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)
Government, organized an overnight trip to Lhasa March
28 to 29.  Fifteen Beijing-based diplomats, including
PolOff, participated.  Diplomats were shown destroyed
shops, a burnt school building and two hospitals
treating wounded security officers and civilians.  The
trip was tightly controlled and Chinese journalists
were present at nearly all meetings.  PolOff observed
extensive damage to shops starting two to three blocks
east of the Potala Palace and increasing in areas
closer to the Tibetan quarter.  TAR officials sought
to demonstrate that both Han and Tibetans had suffered
as a result of the violence and rioting.  While PolOff
saw a significant presence of regular police, there
was a noticeable absence of military vehicles or anti-
riot equipment.  The delegation met with TAR Chairman
Qiangba Puncog.  At the meeting with Qiangba Puncog,
diplomats pressed for details about the number of dead
and the charges against those currently under
detention.  PolOff urged China to exercise restraint
and engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai
Lama's representatives.  PolOff also repeated to the
TAR Chairman the USG's request for unfettered access
for diplomats to all Tibetan areas. 

2. (C) Summary continued. In response to the
diplomatic delegation's collective request to visit
the Jokhang Temple and speak with monks involved in a
March 27 demonstration in front of an MFA-led group of
foreign journalists, MFA and TAR officials arranged a
hasty visit to Barkhor Square and the Jokhang on the
morning of March 29.  Diplomats met with a single
monk, who said all of his colleagues were "sleeping"
and thus "unavailable" to meet with the delegation.
The Barkhor area was almost devoid of people, save for
security attached to the delegation.  Organizers
denied PolOff's requests to venture into the city to
meet with Amcits, but PolOff was given the opportunity
to meet with one Amcit at the delegation's hotel.
Government organizers also arranged for foreign
residents of Lhasa, including two American NGO
workers, to attend a briefing with Tibetan scholars
and Buddhist figures, where PolOff was able to speak
with them.  The foreign residents were mainly chosen
by the TAR Government, however, not the participating
diplomats.  Comment:  Although some of the events on
this trip were crudely stage-managed, it is clear that
Lhasa has suffered widespread ethnic-based violence
and rioting.  A large percentage of the population,
Han and Tibetan, have suffered great economic loss,
both from the rioting itself and the cancellation of
tour groups.  Interlocutors' complete lack of candor
about the underlying social factors contributing to
the riots, while not unexpected, was disturbing
nonetheless.  End Summary. 

"We Leave For Lhasa Tomorrow"
----------------------------- 

3. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs U.S. Affairs
Division Director An Gang told PolOff March 27 that
the MFA's Department of External Security Affairs, in
cooperation with the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
Foreign Affairs Office (FAO), was organizing a trip for
foreign diplomats to Lhasa, leaving the next morning,
March 28.  Embassy Beijing was given one hour by the
MFA to register a participant for the trip, which
would involve a total of 25 hours on the ground in
Lhasa.  In addition to U.S. Embassy Beijing, the
Beijing Embassies/Missions of Brazil, Japan, Germany,
Canada, the European Commission, Italy, Spain,
Slovenia (as EU President), Singapore, Tanzania (as
Africa Union President), the United Kingdom,
Australia, France and Russia also sent 

BEIJING 00001210  002 OF 008 

representatives.  At 17:00 on March 27, participating
diplomats were called to a briefing presided over by
Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) Wu Dawei.  VFM Wu told the
group that the MFA was organizing the trip so that
diplomats could provide "more correct reports" on the
situation in Lhasa and Tibet to their respective
capitals.  VFM Wu offered no details about the
itinerary, other than the TAR FAO would provide the
schedule to the delegation upon arrival in Lhasa.  VFM
Wu also said that, although the situation in Lhasa was
"generally stable," for safety reasons everyone must
abide by the "arrangements" set by the MFA and the TAR
Government.  PolOff told VFM Wu that AmEmbassy Beijing
viewed the trip, and a similar trip organized the same
week for foreign journalists, as a "first step" but
reiterated the USG's request that diplomats and
journalists have free and unfettered access to all
Tibetan areas affected by recent unrest. 

Chinese Media Presence
---------------------- 

4. (C) In addition to numerous minders from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plain-clothes security
personnel and the TAR FAO, at least two Xinhua print
journalists and a China Central Television (CCTV)
journalist and cameraman accompanied the delegation.
CCTV crews filmed most events on the trip, including
the arrival and departure at Lhasa airport.  Xinhua
News Agency quoted accurately, though selectively,
some delegation member's positive comments about the
trip, particularly a statement by Tanzanian Minister
George Manongi (representing the African Union) that
"no government would tolerate" violent protests. 

Security Presence Observed in Lhasa
----------------------------------- 

5. (C) The delegation's motorcade included both police
and People's Armed Police (PAP) escorts. (Plate
numbers for PAP vehicles seen by PolOff, including
those attached to the motorcade, all started with WJ
23.)  The airport road appeared to be open to other
traffic during the delegation's arrival and departure
from Lhasa.  PolOff saw at least two groups of
Tibetans picnicking very close to the road.  As the
motorcade neared Lhasa proper, PolOff saw numerous PRC
flags flying over Tibetan-style homes.  At nearly
every intersection where village roads met the main
airport road, a single officer was stationed with his
or her back to the motorcade, looking down the
approaching roadway.  PolOff observed no checkpoints
at any point on the trip except for one on the airport
road that appeared little different from a normal
traffic police checkpoint. 

6. (C) The security presence in Lhasa was noticeable
and significantly larger than that observed by PolOff
during a visit to Lhasa with ConGen Chengdu officers
February 26-29, 2008.  At least one police vehicle
(mainly sedans and SUVs) and one to three officers
were seen at most intersections. Police officers were
mainly sitting in, or standing next to, their vehicles
rather than walking the streets.  At one point, PolOff
saw several police poke their heads out of a police
station doorway to watch the motorcade pass by.
PolOff saw only scattered PAP vehicles other than
those attached to the delegation.  PolOff observed no
officers in riot gear, nor did he see any heavier
police vehicles such as water cannon trucks.  During a
visit to the Jokhang Temple March 29, some diplomats
reported seeing a few helmeted police in side streets
leading off Barkhor Square.  Over the course of the
trip, PolOff saw three canvas-covered military
transport trucks; one had its plates covered, the
other two were without plates entirely.  (Note: An
Amcit resident (protect) told PolOff that a large
number of security forces remained in Lhasa but they
had been confined to compounds during the Government-
organized visits that week by foreign journalists and
diplomats.  A TAR FAO minder told delegation members
that no PLA assets were used to suppress the March 14
riots.) 

BEIJING 00001210  003 OF 008 

Fewer People onStreets
----------------------- 

7. (C) At est, PolOff observed pedestrian traffic at
a tir of the level it was in late February, thoug
in some areas it was much less.  During te late
afternoon of March 28, PolOff observedfewer than ten
Tibetan pilgrims with prayer weels walking in front
of the Potala Palace.  Te next day, March 29, PolOff
observed well over a hundred pilgrims walking on the
Potala circumambulation route.  During this second
drive-by, a TAR FAO minder highlighted the presence of
the pilgrims to PolOff.  In contrast to February, when
pilgrims of various ages and dress could be seen in
Lhasa, the pilgrims observed during this visit, in
addition to being fewer in number, also appeared to be
primarily elderly Tibetans.  Also, areas in the
Tibetan quarter that were packed with pilgrims in
February looked nearly abandoned.  One street near the
Ramoche Temple was blocked by a police cordon, and
behind this barrier, PolOff could see few, if any,
people.  From the motorcade on Beijing East Road
looking into the Barkhor area, PolOff also saw streets
that were nearly devoid of people.  Diplomats who
participated in a March 29 stop at the Jokhang Temple
reported that the streets in the Barkhor district were
practically abandoned. 

Arrival and Visit to Affected Areas
----------------------------------- 

8. (C) Immediately upon arrival in Lhasa on March 28,
organizers took the delegation to a clothing store on
Beijing Middle Road where four Han and one Tibetan
shopkeeper had been killed.  As the delegation pulled
up to the store, the Han Chinese owner and a surviving
Tibetan shop assistant were kneeling before a memorial
altar set up in the burnt-out shop.  Shortly after the
delegation's arrival, they emerged to speak with
diplomats as television cameras rolled.  Next, the
delegation was led on a driving tour of Beijing Road,
Qingnian Road, and North and East Linkuo Road to view
damaged businesses and homes.  TAR FAO interpreters
pointed out damage to Xinhua News Agency offices, the
Tibet Daily and a Bank of China branch.  An FAO minder
also pointed out that a local television station and
stores carrying mobile phones, foreign-branded goods
and precious gems had been specifically target by
rioters/looters. 

Visit to Damaged School
----------------------- 

9. (C) The delegation was then taken to Lhasa Second
Middle School where an entire classroom building had
been gutted by fire.  The Tibetan principal of the
school described the efforts of staff to protect the
children on March 14 and how rioters had allegedly set
fire to the building and then blocked fire trucks from
arriving on the scene.  The fire also consumed many of
the schools' textbooks, she said.  According to the
principal, 80 percent of the school's 839 students are
ethnic Tibetan, in keeping with the population of the
surrounding neighborhood. The teaching staff was 90
percent Tibetan.  In addition to standard Mandarin
Chinese curriculum taught in China, students at Lhasa
Second Middle School receive 280 minutes of Tibetan
and 200 minutes of English instruction per week.
Diplomats then observed primary school students taking
a history lesson in a science lab that had been
converted into an ordinary classroom since the March
14 fire.  At the back of the classroom was a display
condemning the March 14 riots.  An FAO handler
remarked to a delegation member that the "lawbreakers
do not want to see good schools and the development of
society." 

Extent of Damage
---------------- 

10. (C) Judging by the very limited tour given to the
diplomats, the area of Lhasa west of the Potala Palace
seemed unaffected by the rioting.  Individual burned
out stores could be seen starting two to three blocks 

BEIJING 00001210  004 OF 008 

east of the Potala, with the ratio of damaged to
undamaged shops increasing as one neared the Ramoche
Temple/Barkhor area.  At some points along Beijing
East and Lingkhor North and East Roads, entire rows of
shops had been burned or damaged.  On Beijing East
Road, PolOff saw that the (Nepali/Tibetan operated)
Kyichu Hotel had only a single broken window while the
neighboring six shops, by contrast, including a Han-
run sunglass store visited by PolOff in February, had
been completely burned out.  Despite extensive damage
to stores, all roads were clean, and PolOff saw little
debris on sidewalks.  In the areas east of the Potala
Palace, about a third of stores remained shuttered,
making it difficult to assess whether shops were
damaged or just closed.  For every store that was
burned out, at least ten others showed signs of damage
to the metal rolling shutter or broken windows.  All
over Lhasa, PolOff saw white katas (Tibetan greeting
scarves) affixed to storefronts, an indication that
the store is Tibetan-owned (reftel). 

Meeting with TAR Chairman
------------------------- 

11. (SBU) Following the tour and check-in at the Lhasa
Hotel (in a largely unaffected area of west Lhasa) on
the evening of March 28, the delegation arrived at the
TAR Government compound for a meeting with TAR
Chairman Qiangba Puncog and a large contingent of
high-level TAR officials, including the Mayor of Lhasa
Doje Cezhug.  (Note:  As TAR Chairman, Qiangba Puncog
is equivalent to a provincial governor and is ranked
behind the top PRC official in Tibet, TAR Party
Chairman Zhang Qingli.)  After introductions and
before Qiangba Puncog could read his prepared report,
the Slovenian Counselor, Bernard Srajner asked the TAR
Chairman a series of questions prepared in advance by
the EU participants.  A summary of the EU questions
and Qiangba Puncog's answers (both in his prepared
remarks and response to follow up questions) follows: 

--What is the fate of 13 people arrested in a
demonstration on March 10?  The TAR Chairman said 15
people (13 monks and 2 lay people) had participated in
the March 10 demonstration in Lhasa, which included
raising the "snow mountain flag."  The thirteen monks
are among 303 total people detained, but Qiangba
Puncog gave no additional information on what the 13
monks were charged with.  (Note:  The figure of 303
detained appeared to be a figure for detainees related
to demonstrations prior to March 14.) 

--What happened in the first 24 hours of March 14?
Why did security forces "hold back" at first?
Qiangba Puncog repeated a standard Government version
of events, saying the March 14 "beating, smashing,
looting, and burning" incident had been "masterminded"
by the Dalai Lama clique in an attempt to sabotage the
Olypics.  Police and PAP officers had exercised
estraint.  Government forces had not used fireams,
though authorities confiscated some "lead bullet" guns
from some rioters.  (Comment:  The term "lead bullet"
guns seemed to indicate non-police, makeshift
firearms.)  The TAR Chairman said the TAR Government
had failed to protect civilians, and he apologized to
victims in the hospitals. 

--How many people were killed and injured?  The TAR
Chairman repeated published casualty figures.  He said
382 innocent civilians had been injured, 58 seriously.
Eighteen "innocent civilians" had been killed,
including an infant below the age of one.  In
addition, one police officer and three rioters were
killed.  Seven schools, 5 hospitals, 908 shops and 120
private residences had been damaged with total losses
amounting to RMB 250 million ($36 million). 

--What is the nature of charges against detainees?
Will independent observers be allowed at trials?  As a
result of the March 14 riot, 414 people had been
detained.  An additional 289 had turned themselves in,
although 111 of these people had already been released
because their crimes were "minor."  Qiangba Puncog
said PRC law prohibits splittism.  Defendants will be 

BEIJING 00001210  005 OF 008 

charged not for their views, but for their "public
actions."  All cases will be dealt with according to
law.  Some who committed "small crimes" will be
released but the more "serious" cases will go to
trial.  All defendants will have access to legal
counsel, including legal aid for those who have no
money to afford a defense attorney.  (Note:  While
Qiangba Puncog did not directly answer the question
about outside observers, the Canadian participant said
the head of the TAR Justice Department (si fa ting)
later told her at a banquet immediately afterward that
outside observers would not be possible.) 

--What has happened to monks who demonstrated at the
Jokhang Temple in front of visiting journalists?
Qiangba Puncog characterized the incident as an
example of "Government tolerance."  It was "natural"
for some people to have different views, and the monks
will not be punished, he said.  The Australian
participant, in a follow-up question, asked for a
visit to the Jokhang Temple to speak with the monks
involved in the incident.  The Chairman said TAR
authorities would consider adding a Jokhang visit to
the schedule.  (Note:  A hastily arranged visit to the
Jokhang was arranged the next morning, as reported
below.) 

"We Are Already Restrained and Non-Violent"
------------------------------------------- 

12. (C) During the meeting with the TAR Chairman,
PolOff stated USG points regarding the need for China
to exercise restraint and for all sides to refrain
from violence.  China should respect the legal rights
of peaceful protestors and enter substantive dialogue
with representatives of the Dalai Lama.  PolOff ended
by saying, while the current trip was a positive step
in the right direction, the USG still seeks unfettered
access for diplomats to all Tibetan areas, inside and
outside the TAR.  More and better access was in the
interests of all sides, PolOff said.  Qiangba Puncog
responded that he already understood the U.S. position
and that Chinese President Hu Jintao had already
discussed the Tibet situation directly with President
Bush.  China is "already exercising restraint and
refraining from violence," so such calls are unnecessary.
It was because of this restraint, including no use of
lethal weapons by security forces, that the riot took
so long to get under control.  The TAR Government places
great importance on the visit by diplomats, Qiangba
Puncog said, urging delegation members to report the
"real situation" to their respective "highest leaders." 

13. (SBU) Qiangba Puncog also defended China's economic
and religious policies in Tibet.  The TAR Governor
highlighted a string of new measures, announced the
following day in TAR newspapers, designed to provide
economic relief to victims of the rioting.  He noted
that Tibet was experiencing high growth rates and
rising income, thanks in no small part to Central
Government support.  Prices were stable in the TAR
following the unrest, he asserted.  There was no need
to adjust Government policies regarding religion, he
said.  After the meeting, Qiangba Puncog hosted a
banquet for the delegation, followed by the screening
of a documentary film on the March 14 riots. 

Meeting with U.S. Citizens
-------------------------- 

14. (C) PolOff requested that, instead of watching the
documentary on March 28, he be allowed to go out on
his own to visit with American citizens in Lhasa.
Several other diplomats also requested time to meet
with their citizens in lieu of the film.  The TAR FAO
agreed to excuse PolOff and other diplomats from the
film, but only on condition that meetings with
citizens take place at the Lhasa Hotel.  PolOff was
told he could not venture outside of the hotel "for
safety reasons."  PolOff contacted three Amcits.  Two
noted that foreigners were still instructed to stay
indoors at night, making a 21:00 meeting at the hotel
impractical.  One Amcit, a long-term Lhasa resident
who lives close to the hotel, agreed to visit with 

BEIJING 00001210  006 OF 008 

PolOff in the hotel lobby.  (Note:  The Amcit reported
that he was fine, though some money had been looted
from one of his downtown Lhasa shops, which had also
been sprayed by gunfire.  The Amcit also noted that
tension in the city between ethnic Tibetans and Han
remains.) 

15. (C) Delegation members were given a second chance
to meet with their respective citizens, though trip
organizers, not the diplomats, controlled who was
invited.  During the pre-trip briefing with VFM Wu
Dawei, several diplomats requested that they be given
a chance to meet with their respective citizens in
Lhasa.  VFM Wu said such meetings would likely be
possible but had to take place at the delegation's
hotel.  Some Embassies, but not the United States,
provided contact information for their citizens in
Lhasa to the MFA to facilitate meetings.  The TAR FAO,
in response to this request, then apparently invited
about ten foreign residents to attend the final
meeting of the trip March 29, a briefing by TAR
scholars and official religious figures.  The
delegation was not provided with any name list prior
to the meeting.  Upon arrival, PolOff learned that two
Amcit NGO workers, one of whom had declined an
invitation to meet PolOff at the hotel the previous
evening, were present.  The foreign residents mainly
sat and listened as the Tibetan scholars denounced the
Dalai Lama.  PolOff asked that the meeting be cut
short to allow time for individual discussions with
citizens.  One of the Amcits told PolOff his
organization's "local partner" had encouraged him to
attend the meeting, which he did for the sake of
maintaining cooperative relations.  The other, the
Tibet director for a multi-national environmental NGO,
indicated that his boss at the NGO had requested that
he attend.  PolOff told both that they were under no
obligation to meet with USG officials.  However, both
voluntarily met with PolOff for about 15 minutes each.
(Note:  Both Amcits reported that they were fine and
that, after being unable to venture outside for four
days following the March 14 riots, things in Lhasa
were now beginning to return to normal.)  Other
diplomats later complained that citizens whom they had
requested that the MFA/TAR FAO invite were not
contacted. 

Visit to Jokhang Temple, "Monks are Sleeping"
--------------------------------------------- 

16. (C) Around 01:00 March 29, all delegation members,
except PolOff, received calls in their hotel rooms
that the start time for the next morning had been
moved up from 08:30 to 08:00.  According to the
Australian participant, when delegation members
boarded the vans just before 08:00, organizers told
them there had been a "change in the schedule" but
offered no details.  As the motorcade departed just
prior to 08:00, several delegation members noted the
absence of some of the diplomats and requested that
the motorcade wait.  MFA/TAR FAO handlers refused.
(Note:  Three other diplomats who, unlike PolOff, knew
about the time change but arrived at the motorcade
just at 08:00, were left behind and also missed the
trip to the Jokhang.)  PolOff's request that he be
allowed to catch up to the motorcade by taxi was
refused.  The Government minders, according to those
who made it on the bus, were extremely nervous and
appeared desperate to complete the visit to Jokhang as
rapidly as possible.  The diplomats only realized that
they were being taken to the Jokhang Temple as they
pulled into Barkhor Square. 

17. (C) Upon arrival, the diplomats noticed a much
larger security contingent than at other events on the
trip.  Officials were "extremely nervous" during the
visit, several diplomats later told PolOff.  Other
than the delegation and the escorts/security, Barkhor
Square and the surrounding streets were abandoned.
Little, if any, damage to shops in the Barkhor was
noticeable, according to U.K. Political Counselor
Peter Wilson.  The MFA/TAR FAO officials escorted the
group into the temple where they met with a single
monk who is a member of the Jokhang's Democratic 

BEIJING 00001210  007 OF 008 

Management Committee.  When the group asked to see the
monks involved in the March 27 demonstration in front
of foreign journalists, the monk said they and the
other monks were all in their dorm "sleeping."  The
monk said that his colleagues who had participated in
the incident were "young and lacked understanding,"
but they would not be punished.  Wilson noted that the
Jokhang is usually packed with pilgrims.  The monk
said that the temple was closed for the day but would
reopen tomorrow.  Several diplomats left the Temple
early in disgust and then staged a mini-protest,
refusing to get back on the bus while they debated
whether to continue with the visit.  They eventually
decided to proceed with the schedule.  Australian
Political Officer Eleanor Lawson, who had requested to
TAR Chairman Qiangba Puncog that the Jokhang be added
to the schedule and later was outspokenly critical of
the poor handling of the Temple visit, told PolOff
that MFA Director General for External Security
Affairs Wang Min later pulled her aside and demanded
that she "stop causing trouble."  (Comment: PolOff's
requests on March 28 to venture out alone, as well as
his delivery of USG points on Tibet to both TAR
Chairman Qiangba and MFA VFM Wu, may have prompted
organizers to exclude PolOff from the sensitive
Jokhang trip.  While a simple administrative oversight
cannot be ruled out, when PolOff complained about
being excluded, TAR FAO officials merely insisted that
"everyone was called.") 

More Visits with Victims, Hospitals
----------------------------------- 

18. (C) Following the Jokhang Temple stop (after which
PolOff and others who had missed the Jokhang visit
rejoined the main group), the diplomats visited the
offices of the Chengguan District Government.  While
there, four Tibetans and one Han resident described
the events of March 14.  Several told of having their
stores and homes destroyed, saying they were living on
Government assistance.  Chen Xiaoxiong (a Han Chinese)
told of how her shop was destroyed, causing RMB 2.6
million ($370,000) in damage, and how ethnic Tibetans
had protected her and provided her with shelter. "With
the support of the Party and my friends, I am
confident I can start my life again," Chen said. 

19. (C) This meeting produced the most unscripted
moment of the entire trip:  In response to a question
regarding the composition of the rioters, a Tibetan
resident offered that most were "unemployed."  A
Chengguan District Government official then chimed in
saying that, actually, the rioters were "lazy" people
who refused to work despite abundant opportunities to
participate in Government job-training programs.  The
same official, in contradiction to the TAR Chairman's
comments that prices are stable, said inflation is a
problem and that the Government is providing extra
support for victims to cope with rising costs.  The
group then visited a People's Armed Police hospital
and saw injured PAP officers (both Han and Tibetan),
including some in intensive care beds.  The delegation
then proceeded to Lhasa's Regional People's Hospital.
Outside the second hospital, ambulances with smashed
windows were on display.  Hospital officials relayed a
story that a mob had attacked one ambulance, which was
carrying a small child at the time.  Diplomats later
met with a (Tibetan) doctor injured during the attack
on the ambulance. 

Living Buddhas Denounce "Splittist" Dalai Lama
--------------------------------------------- -- 

20. (C) At the final meeting of the trip (the one
mentioned above that included foreign residents),
diplomats heard a briefing by Tibetan scholars and
religious figures.   The briefing was heavy on
propaganda with an emphasis on Tibet's social and
economic progress since the "peaceful liberation" of
1951.   The primary speaker was Drubkang, the Chairman
of the Tibetan Buddhist Association.  Drupkang, in
response to a question on whether he considered the
Dalai Lama a real living Buddha, gave a lengthy
denunciation of the "unpatriotic" 14th Dalai Lama but 

BEIJING 00001210  008 OF 008 

fell short of denouncing the Dalai Lama's legitimacy
as a reincarnate.  The Dalai Lama's use of violence
runs counter to the key tenets of Buddhism, he said.
Drubkang added that the participation of monks in the
unrest shows that monasteries need to increase their
legal education of young monks.  Another living Buddha
asserted that Western countries should do more to
educate their young people about the "real" situation
in Tibet and counter widespread "prejudice" against
Tibet outside China.  The Government has spent huge
sums rebuilding monasteries and providing medical care
and other benefits to monks, he said, adding that the
only "conflict" in Tibet was the long-standing
struggle between separatists and anti-separatists.
Following this meeting, the delegation departed for
the airport and returned to Beijing. 

Comment
------- 

21. (C) Although some of the events on this trip were
crudely stage managed, it is clear that Lhasa has
suffered widespread ethnic-based violence and rioting.
A large percentage of the population, Han and Tibetan,
have suffered great economic loss, both from the
rioting itself and the cancellation of tour groups.
Despite our hosts' efforts to portray Lhasa as a city
quickly bouncing back, the frantic visit to the
Barkhor/Jokhang Temple, with its heavy security
presence, appeared to indicate that tensions remain
high in the Tibetan quarter of the city. 

22. (C) Comment continued:  Interlocutors' complete
lack of candor regarding the underlying social factors
contributing to the riots, while not unexpected, was
disturbing nonetheless.  Even the "average people"
diplomats met with resorted to stock propaganda
phrases (e.g., "Dalai Lama clique" and "beating,
smashing, looting, burning") while denying Tibetan
society had any problems other than the lingering
presence of a few "separatists."  One Amcit resident
of Lhasa (protect), however, told PolOff during the
trip that he believes the city's Tibetan youths are
becoming "radicalized."  An increasing number of young
Tibetans in Lhasa, he said, become angry when they are
addressed in Mandarin Chinese and refuse to speak
China's official language.  Nevertheless, he and the
other long-term foreign residents PolOff spoke with
appeared to believe that, even if ethnic tensions
remain, tourists will return, NGO projects will go
forward and Lhasa will continue its current path of
rapid, albeit increasingly Han-dominated, development.
RANDIT

CONFIDENTIAL: CHANCELLOR ANGELA “TEFLON” MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT

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RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001106

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
TAGS: GM PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON" MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
AS FDP WAITS IN THE WINGS

Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO
R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

SUMMARY
-------

1. (C) Less than two weeks after her party suffered losses
in two state elections, CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel found
her fighting spirit before 8,000 party faithful at a
September 6 election rally in Duesseldorf launching the "hot
phase" of the CDU/CSU electoral campaign. The CDU has been
shifting party tactics after its losses in the August 30
elections in Saarland and Thuringia, where the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) may now be in a position to form
coalitions with the Left Party. Merkel -- to great applause
-- focused in on the specter of a so-called red-red
government composed of the SPD and The Left Party. She
described the SPD as suffering from an "identity crisis," and
needing a vacation from political decision-making and time in
opposition. Along with the entire CDU leadership and
incumbent CDU/CSU Ministers-president, Merkel made her case
for a CDU/CSU coalition with the pro-business but socially
liberal FDP. She repeated the CDU/CSU's election mantra: "we
have the strength" throughout her speech, aiming to convince
the German electorate that a strong CDU/CSU is required for
Germany to emerge from its worst economic recession in
post-war history. CDU views on whether the issue of
Germany's role in Afghanistan would become a more prominent
campaign theme were mixed.

2. (C) With three weeks to go before the parliamentary
elections, all signs point to Chancellor Merkel returning to
office, although she and her party recognize that they face a
difficult campaign. It remains uncertain whether the CDU and
the FDP will gain enough support to form a majority
coalition. If not, another Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) is
very likely; other options require a three-party
constellation that would force the ill-suited Greens and FDP
to work together. But, there seems to be an almost one
hundred percent certainty -- given the SPD's chronic slump in
the polls and limited coalition options -- that SPD Foreign
Minister and Chancellor-candidate Frank Walter Steinmeier
will not become Chancellor. End summary.

MERKEL CASTS ASIDE SPD, EMBRACES FDP
------------------------------------

3. (C) Chancellor Merkel -- to rapturous cries of "Angie,
Angie" and a standing ovation -- took to the floor at her
party's September 6 rally before some 8,000 supporters
affirming that the CDU/CSU "have the best chance to win the
parliamentary elections" but also cautioning that "the
election's outcome has not yet been decided." On the one
hand, she praised her Grand Coalition government's record,
noting its success in countering Germany's economic and
financial crisis. On the other hand, she called for a new
CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP after the upcoming elections--
casting aside the SPD. She asserted that such a coalition
would anchor Germany in the "middle" of the political
spectrum and take the country out of its current economic
crisis faster. Merkel said: "Our country needs a government
that will support growth, security and work for everyone."
In a swipe at the SPD (COMMENT: Merkel never mentioned
Steinmeier by name. END COMMENT.), she said the party is
currently plagued by an "identity crisis," adding that, "The
SPD is devoid of any reality and is distraught." She asked,
"How can a party that achieved 10, 18, and 24 percent at the
recent state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saarland be
taken seriously?" Dismissing SPD warnings against a
so-called "black-yellow" (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition, Merkel said
that the country should be more worried about the SPD's plans
to form coalitions with The Left Party on the state and
federal levels. (Note: The SPD has warned that a
black-yellow coalition would represent wealthy Germany and
business interest at the expense of the middle and lower
classes.)

4. (U) CDU leaders also tried to cast the CDU at the state
level in a positive light after its poor showing in the
Saarland and Thuringia state elections on August, causing the
Minister President of the latter state to resign. Lower
Saxony's CDU Minister President Christian Wulff asserted that
the most prosperous and successful "Laender" (states) in
Germany are those ruled by the CDU/CSU and FDP. He cited
Berlin, governed by SPD Mayor Klaus Wowereit's Berlin (NOTE:
in Berlin the SPD rules with The Left Party. END NOTE), as
being the worst case. Hesse's Minister President Roland Koch
-- to great applause -- noted that he could not understand
how the SPD could possibly cooperate on a state or national
level with a Left Party that is "anti-American and
anti-European." (Note: In Saarland and Thuringia the option

BERLIN 00001106 002 OF 003 

exists for the SPD to form a governing coalition with the
Left Party. END NOTE.)

CSU Truce with FDP?
-------------------

5. (C) CSU Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer threw
his party's support behind a CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP,
despite his well-publicized doubts about the FDP's real
coalition intentions after the parliamentary elections. Even
as Seehofer pronounced his support for the FDP in
Duesseldorf, however, media reports from Munich confirmed
that the CSU had decided to continue attacking the FDP. The
CSU has been buffing its economic bona fides by attacking the
FDP on its own themes while basking in the reflected glory
from popular Economics Minister zu Guttenberg, the new CSU
champion. Seehofer has publicly suspected that FDP Chairman
Guido Westerwelle -- in an attempt to enter government at all
costs -- might support a "traffic light" coalition with the
SPD and the Greens, although this political constellation
appears unlikely at present. In addition, Bavarian politics
trump national politics, especially during a time when the
CSU longs for the days when their party alone wielded
political power in Munich, rather than as it does today, in a
coalition with the FDP. Seehofer is also aware that the CSU
needs to be strong and the FDP proportionally more weak for
the CSU to win more and better ministerial posts in a
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. He did not use his appearance in
Duesseldorf to chide the FDP, to the great delight of those
pleading that recent CDU/CSU-FDP bickering had been harmful
and counter-productive during the campaign.

AFGHANISTAN - A DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN ISSUE?
----------------------------------------

6. (C) The September 4 air strike against two fuel tankers
near Kunduz, Afghanistan hit the press right before the
CDU/CSU rally. In light of the German media's frenzy, PolOff
asked the CDU's Head of International Relations Klemens
Moemkes whether Germany's ISAF commitment might emerge as a
potential domestic campaign issue. Moemkes noted that the
SPD could make Afghanistan an issue but this would be very
odd given Foreign Minister Steinmeier's support for Germany's
military role in ISAF. However, the prospect of Afghanistan
becoming a major theme clearly had the CDU's xxxxx
spooked. He told PolOff that it would be very difficult for
the Chancellor not to address Germany's role in Afghanistan
in the coming weeks. Given the German public's overwhelming
support for a withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan,
this was not an issue the Chancellor wanted to address in the
run-up to the parliamentary elections.

COMMENT
-------

7. (C) While it is all but certain that Chancellor Merkel
will return to office as Chancellor after the next
parliamentary elections on September 27, it is too close to
call whether she will achieve a coalition with the FDP.
Bavarian MP Seehofer's attacks on the FDP in Bavaria could
weaken that party there and further undermine the chances of
a coalition. The FDP wants the same but political bickering
over future ministerial positions and CSU attacks on the FDP
in Bavaria and on FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle suggest that
a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will not be a marriage made
in heaven. Some FDP contacts admit that they harbor doubts
about the Chancellor's promise to form a coalition with the
FDP. They insinuate that in reality she may prefer another
Grand Coalition with the SPD, although Chancellor Merkel has
used every public opportunity to advertise for a CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition. Backing down on this pledge would call into
question her reputation.

8. (C) Paradoxically, however, it is the CDU/CSU's relative
weakness in the polls (35-36 percent) that threatens a
possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The FDP is clearly riding on
a high with double-digit successes in the state elections of
Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia, but this may not be enough.
The CDU refuses to engage in any self-introspection after its
defeats in Saarland and Thuringia and the party can really
only take comfort from the SPD's perennial weakness. The
fear in the CDU is acute that the Chancellor's high
popularity ratings may not be enough to ensure a comfortable
win for the CDU/CSU at the parliamentary elections.

9. (C) Merkel, once again, vehemently denies any intention
to form a Grand Coalition with the SPD but the electoral math
on September 27 may force her -- despite intense CDU/CSU
reservations, not to mention those of the German public -- to
look at the SPD as a partner. As for the SPD, Steinmeier is

BERLIN 00001106 003 OF 003 

looking desperate. The SPD has failed to reach over 25
percent in the last six elections and Steinmeier's unlikely
path to the chancellorship is only possible if he reneges on
a campaign promise not to form a coalition with The Left
Party. This will not happen in 2009 but the CDU/CSU will not
tire of raising the fear of a red-red coalition in 2009 or in
2013. The Chancellor appears to be in a win-win situation
but three weeks on the campaign trail can be an eternity.
End comment.
Murphy

TOP-SECRET: German Response U.S. National Intelligence

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INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0314
S e c r e t <> 002157

Sipdis

Noforn

Sipdis, state for p,t, nea/ir, isn, eur/ags

E.o. 12958: decl: 12/03/2017
Tags: knnp, mnuc, parm, gm, ir
Subject: german response u.s. National intelligence
estimate on iran's nuclear program

Ref: secstate 162558

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Jeff Rathke for reasons 1.4
(b)/(d)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Post delivered demarches to senior
Chancellery and MFA officials on December 3. Both National
Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen and MFA State Secretary
Reinhard Silberberg considered the assessment to be
potentially "good news." Heusgen added that the Chancellery
will seek additional assessments from its intelligence
agency, and noted that the international community still had
reason for concern about Iranian intentions, its
unwillingness to disclose details of its nuclear programs and
its continued enrichment. Heusgen also noted some concern
about potential domestic political backlash, given the
Chancellor's recent work to persuade German companies to
withdraw from their Iran business dealings. Silberberg
detailed German agreement to EU <> against Bank Melli,
to be implemented by late January, calling the "new" policy a
signal of German willingness to go beyond
proliferation-related issues in application of <>,
coupled with continued reticence at more wide-reaching
measures for fear of harming the Iranian people. END SUMMARY.

-----------------------------
chancellery response
-----------------------------

2. (S/NF) Ambassador delivered reftel points and nonpapers
to National Security Advisor-equivalent Christoph Heusgen on
December 3. Also present was Chancellery Senior
Director-equivalent for Security Policy and Disarmament Geza
von Geyr. Heusgen noted that he had just completed a telcon
on the same subject with APNSA Hadley. (NOTE: Heusgen
appeared still to be digesting his conversation with Hadley.
He was initially negative, but his thinking became more
positive and operationally focused during the conversation.
END NOTE) Heusgen noted that German intelligence he had seen
indicated a continued weaponization program; he has asked the
BND chief for a new assessment. The BND will also conduct
its weekly briefing on December 4 and will present their
latest assessment. He added that Germany will not publicly
react to the NIE.

3. (S/NF) Heusgen expressed concern about the timing of the
information and potential political fallout, particularly in
light of Chancellor Merkel's efforts to use moral suasion to
convince German companies to end investment in Iran. In this
regard, he noted that Chancellery Chief of Staff Thomas de
Maziere is scheduled to meet on Wednesday with German
Federation of Industry (BDI) chief Juergen Thumann and
leaders of German energy giant E.ON regarding their interest
in LNG in Iran. He added that DNI McConnell's scheduled
visit to <> on December 4 is timely.

4. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that we still need to be alarmed
about the Iranian intent and unwillingness to disclose their
program, particularly given their continued enrichment and
ballistic missile programs, evidenced by Iran's unveiling of
the Ashura ballistic missile last week. He noted that the
Chancellery will have to see to it that the public reaction
to the NIE is a moderate one and to ensure that the focus is
not only on the information on the Iranian nuclear weapons
program, but also emphasizes that the IAEA sees many open
points and that Iran has not abided by IAEA requests on
enrichment and coming clean on its activities thus far.

5. (S/NF) In terms of further UNSCR <>, von Geyr
added that in light of this information it will be harder to
get Russia and China on board; Heusgen indicated that
Kislyak's absence from the P5 1 Political Directors meeting
on December 1 meant that Russia's intentions regarding a new
UNSCR remain unclear. He once again repeated that he would be
seeking assessments from other foreign intelligence agencies
(naming the French) in addition to the NIE. It is necessary
to remain vigilant on Iran because of Iran's continued
failure to meet IAEA requirements, he said, as well as
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad's public threats
against Israel. In terms of <>, Heusgen added that
with this acknowledgment from the U.S., perhaps Iran would be
willing to suspend briefly. If this information is verified,
why don't the Iranians suspend enrichment as they do not need
it, he posited, having neither a weapons program nor power
plants that could use enriched uranium.

6. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that the Chancellery would work

with the MFA to develop a joint press line. Heusgen noted
that President Bush and Chancellor Merkel are scheduled to
discuss the topic tomorrow following Merkel's return from the
CDU Party Convention being held in Hannover. Heusgen
continued by repeating the German view on potential public
statements: The Chancellery does not comment publicly on
intelligence matters. If the news is confirmed it is good
news about this aspect of the Iranian program, but it is also
another reason to urge Iran to stop enrichment. Von Geyr
added that much must still be clarified by the Iranians; the
IAEA report shows many open points.

----------------------------
foreign ministry response
----------------------------

7. (S/NF) DCM conveyed reftel points to MFA State Secretary
Silberberg, and left them as non-papers. Silberberg said it
was "good news" the US intelligence community had concluded
that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program due to
international scrutiny and <> as of fall 2003 and had
not resumed the program as of mid-2007.

8. (S/NF) With regard to further steps against Tehran's
defiance of the Security Council, Silberberg went on, the
German government has agreed to move ahead with designation
of Bank Melli, though not immediately. Germany, France, and
the UK, he said, have agreed to work now toward a quick
resolution in the Security Council, and detect some positive
signs from the Russian side. If the UNSCR effort succeeds,
the <> it contains will nonetheless be weak, and the
EU-3 will seek to supplement them with EU measures by the end
of December, including the designation of Bank Melli. Asked
about the timeline for EU autonomous <>, including
designation of Bank Melli, should the Security Council fail
to pass a third <> resolution, Silberberg said this
could come at the end of January. He described his own role,
and that of the MFA, as "active" in securing agreement to
this approach from the ministries of finance and economy and
the Chancellery. Key elements of this "new" German policy
were (1) willingness to go beyond proliferation-related
issues in application of <> and (2) judgment that it
is "not yet" time for total economic and financial isolation
of Iran, as this would harm the Iranian people
disproportionately. Silberberg noted that debate continued
in the EU on possible designation of Bank Saderat, but
Germany believed that to do so now, in conjunction with
designating Bank Melli, would move too far in the direction
of a total embargo.
Timken jr

SECRET: GERMAN RESPONSE CONCERNING EXPORT OF WELDING

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DE RUEHRL #1784 2631530
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INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0198
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0078
S E C R E T BERLIN 001784 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/MTR AND EUR 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MTCRE KSCA GM IR EI
SUBJECT: (S) GERMAN RESPONSE CONCERNING EXPORT OF WELDING
MACHINE TO IRANIAN MISSILE PROCUREMENT AGENT 

REF: A. BERLIN 1468
     B. STATE 99879 

Classified By: Global Affairs Counselor Donald R. Shemanski
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (S) German MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer Wiebke
Wacker delivered a German-language nonpaper to Global Affairs
officer September 19.  The nonpaper responds to ref B
demarche informing German authorities that the German firm
Trumpf GmbH & Co., working with Ireland's Mac Aviation Group,
offered a model TLC-1005 five-axis laser cutting and welding
machine to Iran's Ariasa AG.  Wacker said officials from the
German Federal Office of Economics and Export Controls (BAFA)
had sensitized Trumpf representatives to the case.  She
stated the firm subsequently stopped processing the order. 

2. (S) Begin text of informal Embassy translation of German
nonpaper: 

With reference to your nonpaper of July 19, 2007 concerning
the export of a five-axis laser cutting and welding machine
by the German firm Trumpf from Germany via Ireland and
Malaysia to Iran, we take this opportunity to bring the
following information to the attention of the U.S.
authorities: 

-- We thank you for the information in connection with the
proposed delivery of a welding machine by the German firm
Trumpf via Ireland and Malaysia to the Iranian firm Ariasa AG. 

-- The Trumpf firm was sensitized by BAFA officials.  The
firm confirmed the existence of a related inquiry, which came
from the firm IIT Trading Group, probably acting on behalf of
Mac Aviation Group.  The inquiry was presented to TGB, an
Irish subsidiary of Trumpf.  According to information
provided to Trumpf, the machine was intended for use by Mac
Aviation in Malaysia. 

-- German authorities' communication and contact records
indicate that the Trumpf firm has not to date communicated
with Iranian entities. 

-- Trumpf has stopped processing the order and assured BAFA
it will apply for an export license in the event the firm
pursues the matter further. 

We look forward to continuing our excellent cooperation in
the field of export controls. 

End text of informal Embassy translation of German nonpaper.
TIMKEN JR

CONFIDENTIAL: VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1542/01 3191825 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 141825Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2636 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001542 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF RS GG UP GM SUBJECT: GERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL TROOPS FOR AFGHANISTAN Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Top German government officials emphasized to visiting USNATO Ambassador Kurt Volker November 10-11 that Germany remains strongly opposed to granting Ukraine and Georgia member action plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. While open to giving the applicant countries a “navigation aid” or action plan to help guide their reforms, Germany is not ready at this point to substitute this “navigation aid” for MAP — it wants to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. Volker warned that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and capitulating to Russian pressure. German officials also stressed that over the next year, they had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. In response to MFAs view that the April 2009 NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit should be primarily an anniversary meeting and avoid “confrontational issues,” Volker emphasized the need to address key questions like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east. The Germans are disdainful of Medvedevs European security proposal, but they believe they have to “deal with it” and are hopeful that discussing it can “improve the atmosphere” with Russia. While warning against “cornering” Russia in regards to MAP and the conflict with Georgia, Germans have been very critical of Medvedevs announcement about stationing short-range missiles in Kaliningrad. END SUMMARY. INTERLOCUTORS ¶2. (U) During his November 10-11 visit to Berlin, USNATO Ambassador Volker met separately with National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen, MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg and MOD Parliamentary Secretary Christian Schmidt. He also met with a number of key parliamentarians, including Christian Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden, Christian Social Union (CSU) Secretary General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Social Democratic Party (SPD) defense policy spokesman Rainer Arnold, Greens defense policy spokesman Winfried Nachtwei, Free Democratic Party (FDP) foreign policy spokesman Werner Hoyer and Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD). MAP FOR GEORGIA/UKRAINE ¶3. (C) Both Heusgen and Silberberg reiterated Germanys strong opposition to granting Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. Silberberg said flatly that “no decision can be taken” in December, making reference to the Bucharest Summit declaration that this should be only a “first review.” Noting that both countries have “lots of deficits,” Heusgen said that Ukraine was “a nightmare” because of ongoing political turmoil and that Georgia lacked a multiparty system and was not truly a pluralistic society. Silberberg said that because of its role in the August conflict with Russia, Germany considered Georgia to be “further from MAP” than it was before. However, both agreed with Volker that the Alliance could not be seen backing away from its Bucharest commitment that both countries would one day become members of NATO. They also conceded that NATO had to avoid giving the perception that Russia, in using force against Georgia, had successfully drawn a new line across Europe and had achieved an unchallenged sphere of influence. They proposed repeating the Bucharest language at the December ministerial and “coming back to this later.” ¶4. (C) Heusgen also favored giving the two applicant countries a “clear idea” of what they needed to do. Heusgen said that when Chancellor Merkel visited Kyiv in July, she had proposed setting up a “navigation aid” or action plan to help guide Ukraine in making the necessary reforms, but had never received a response. Heusgen emphasized, however, that Germany was not ready at this point to substitute this “navigation aid” for MAP — it wanted to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. He expressed concern that the applicant countries, especially Ukraine, could start clamoring immediately for membership after satisfying the technical requirements in an action plan. Along the same lines, Silberberg said the Alliance had to make clear to the applicants that the final decision on membership was political, not technical, and not automatic based on fulfilling a checklist. Volker welcomed creative thinking on the way forward, but said that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and could allow Russia to claim “victory.” ¶5. (C) In separate meetings with leading parliamentarians from all the major parties, no one expressed support for moving forward with MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. Most had extremely negative opinions of Georgian President Saakashvili, variously describing him as “crazy,” “a hot head,” and “dangerous.” The general opinion was that Saakashvili was as much at fault for the outbreak of the August war as Russia. Volker challenged this view and reminded them that Russias provocative acts and pressure had set the stage for the conflict. The parliamentarians also worried that pursuing MAP would “corner the Russians” and make them less cooperative on important questions like Afghanistan, Iran, energy, etc. AFGHANISTAN ¶6. (C) Every government interlocutor, including Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt, emphasized that over the next year, through the Bundestag election in September 2009, Germany had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. Silberberg said flatly: “Were in the north and were staying there.” With regard to getting Germany to send combat troops to the south, he advised: “Dont try it. It wont happen.” Heusgen was relaxed about possible U.S. requests to do more, asserting that when Obama visited Berlin in July, he had indicated that he was “perfectly happy” with the German contribution. Silberberg claimed that the SPD-controlled MFA was more receptive than the CDU-controlled MOD about deploying German forces outside the north. He said, for example, that the MFA had pushed for embedded German trainers (OMLTs) to be allowed to deploy outside the north with their assigned Afghan National Army (ANA) units, but that MOD had refused. ¶7. (C) While generally ruling out new military contributions to Afghanistan, Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt confirmed that Germany planned to support and participate in the proposed deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to Afghanistan, which will require the government to seek a stand-alone mandate from the Bundestag. In separate meetings, parliamentarians confirmed that there was broad support for the AWACS mission. Silberberg warned, however, that any connection made between the AWACS and the controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan could be a “problem” in obtaining Bundestag approval. He indicated that he had already passed this concern on to SACEUR GEN Craddock. ¶8. (C) Volker noted that new CENTCOM Commander GEN Patreus was currently conducting a strategic review of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. It was possible the review might recommend to the incoming Administration the deployment of significantly more troops and other resources to meet the current challenges. In that event, the U.S. would almost certainly turn to its European Allies to help shoulder the burden and to get behind a single, unified effort. If additional combat troops were out of the question, Volker encouraged German officials to think creatively about what other military contributions Germany could make, such as deploying additional helicopters and MEDEVAC assets on a country-wide basis, or widening its deployment area by erasing the dividing line between regional commands north and west. ¶9. (C) SPD Defense Policy Spokesman Rainer Arnold gave the standard line that Germany had no more armored helicopters to deploy and probably would not have any until the next generation of NH-90 and Tiger helicopters was delivered. Schmidt revealed, however, that Germany had recently launched a program to armor eight additional C-53 helicopters. (Comment: Germany has some 80 CH-53 helicopters, but only 20 of them are armored and suitable for operating in a combat environment. Germany currently has six armored C-53s in Afghanistan and claims that it cannot afford to deploy additional ones until the inventory of armored helicopters is increased. End Comment.) Schmidt also noted that he planned to talk to the Bavarian interior minister about sending Bavarian policemen to Afghanistan to serve as trainers for the Afghan National Police. (Comment: Up to now, Bavaria has been one of the few German states that has declined to let its police officers serve in Afghanistan. End Comment.) ¶10. (C) Parliamentarians generally welcomed the prospect of greater U.S. attention and commitment to Afghanistan and agreed that Germany should increase its own efforts, especially in reconstruction and development and in the training of the Afghan national security forces. However, they echoed the view that there was little political maneuver room for Germany to increase its military contributions to Afghanistan over the next year, given the electoral season and low popular support for the mission. FDP foreign policy spokesman Hoyer pointed out that mistrust between the two Grand Coalition parties complicated matters. He thought Chancellor Merkel (CDU) would be very wary about taking an initiative to increase Germanys military contribution to Afghanistan before the Bundestag election, for fear of playing into the hands of her electoral rival, FM Steinmeier (SPD). SPD defense policy spokesman Arnold argued that deployment of German soldiers to the south and the likely resulting increase in German soldiers “killing and being killed” could put the whole deployment at risk. NATO SUMMIT ¶11. (C) Silberberg said Germany viewed next years Strasbourg/Kehl Summit as primarily a “family” anniversary meeting, largely without partners. There were no plans to invite Russian president Medvedev or to deal with “confrontational issues.” While Volker agreed that the summit offered an excellent opportunity to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Alliance and to recognize its role in Franco-German reconciliation, it could not just be a celebration. There had to be real substance. Key issues like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east had to be addressed. Silberberg expressed some surprise that Russia would be on the agenda, but took the point. ¶12. (C) Volker also noted that some in Washington remained to be convinced about the wisdom of launching work on a new strategic concept at the summit, believing the exercise could prove divisive and distract the Alliance from more practical cooperation. Silberberg responded that there was too much momentum behind the idea of a new strategic concept to stop it now. He said Germany favored releasing a “short, political” Declaration on Alliance Security at the Summit to launch the strategic concept review. MEDVEDEVS PROPOSAL ON A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ¶13. (C) While acknowledging that Medvedevs proposal for a new European security architecture was hypocritical and did nothing to address current problems (like CFE and Georgia), Silberberg said that “we have to deal with it.” He noted that the proposal had come as a surprise to the Russian MFA, which had to scramble after the fact to propose some ideas for fleshing out the concept. He was disdainful of the content, but hopeful that discussing the proposal would “improve the atmosphere” with Russia. He complained that the current EU troika dialogue with Russia, where each side reads prepared statements, was not very useful. He also pressed for resumption of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and for the NRC to be improved as a political forum. He suggested that the Alliance pre-coordinate in advance of NRC meetings and not hold internal political debates in front of the Russians. ¶14. (C) On Medvedevs proposal, Volker said there was already a pan-European security organization (the OSCE), so the Russians had to answer the question: where was the value-added? From the U.S. point of view, the Medvedev proposal appeared to be nothing more than the OSCE minus the Helsinki Accords, the Paris Charter, and the United States. The Russians should be forced to be specific on the substance of their proposal, and the forum for discussing this should be the OSCE in Vienna. Regarding the NRC, Volker noted the original intention had been to treat Russia as an equal partner. Given its aggression against Georgia, the U.S. would have trouble going back to that format for now, but agreed that dialogue with Russia should continue in some form. MISSILE DEFENSE ¶15. (C) Silberberg called Medvedevs November 5 announcement about deploying short-range rockets in Kaliningrad in response to U.S. MD plans as “simply stupid.” He noted that FM Steinmeier had immediately issued a public statement criticizing the announcement. It was clear that the timing, coming right after the U.S. presidential election, was deliberate and not a mistake. Silberberg noted that while his counterparts at the Russian MFA “seem very reasonable” on this issue, they are obviously “very far” from the locus of Russian decision-making. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ¶16. (U) Volker also participated in several public diplomacy events during his November 10-11 visit. On November 10, on the margins of the opening ceremony of the annual conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), he did separate interviews with Germanys two main public broadcasters, ARD and ZDF, responding to questions on NATO enlargement and the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Also on November 10, he participated in an hour-long panel discussion hosted by Deutschland Radio Kultur on the future of U.S. foreign policy following the U.S. elections. The roundtable, which included Luxembourg FM Jean Asselborn and German Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD), was broadcast live over radio and was recorded for broadcast by Phoenix television on November 15. ¶17. (U) On November 11, Volker participated in a panel discussion on NATO and the challenges of the eastern dimension, hosted by the U.S. Embassy before a audience of ¶180. The panel was one of six held simultaneously in various embassies in Berlin as part of the ATA annual conference. The other panelists included former Polish NATO Ambassador Jerzy Nowak and German foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden (CDU). In a press conference in the U.S. Embassy at the conclusion of his visit, Volker took questions from six print journalists on Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, Georgia, and the NATO C-17 strategic airlift consortium. ¶18. (U) Ambassador Volker has reviewed and cleared this cable. TIMKEN JRGERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL

VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1542/01 3191825
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141825Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2636
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001542
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF RS GG UP GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL
TROOPS FOR AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).

1. (C) SUMMARY. Top German government officials emphasized
to visiting USNATO Ambassador Kurt Volker November 10-11 that
Germany remains strongly opposed to granting Ukraine and
Georgia member action plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3
meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. While open to giving the
applicant countries a "navigation aid" or action plan to help
guide their reforms, Germany is not ready at this point to
substitute this "navigation aid" for MAP -- it wants to keep
open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date
before membership. Volker warned that adding an additional
hurdle to the accession process would give the impression
that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest
commitment and capitulating to Russian pressure. German
officials also stressed that over the next year, they had
little political flexibility for increasing the number of
German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of
deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF
parliamentary mandate approved last month. In response to
MFAs view that the April 2009 NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit
should be primarily an anniversary meeting and avoid
"confrontational issues," Volker emphasized the need to
address key questions like Afghanistan and NATOs relations
with Russia and the east. The Germans are disdainful of
Medvedevs European security proposal, but they believe they
have to "deal with it" and are hopeful that discussing it can
"improve the atmosphere" with Russia. While warning against
"cornering" Russia in regards to MAP and the conflict with
Georgia, Germans have been very critical of Medvedevs
announcement about stationing short-range missiles in
Kaliningrad. END SUMMARY.

INTERLOCUTORS

2. (U) During his November 10-11 visit to Berlin, USNATO
Ambassador Volker met separately with National Security
Advisor Christoph Heusgen, MFA State Secretary Reinhard
Silberberg and MOD Parliamentary Secretary Christian Schmidt.
He also met with a number of key parliamentarians, including
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokesman
Eckart Von Klaeden, Christian Social Union (CSU) Secretary
General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Social Democratic Party
(SPD) defense policy spokesman Rainer Arnold, Greens defense
policy spokesman Winfried Nachtwei, Free Democratic Party
(FDP) foreign policy spokesman Werner Hoyer and Deputy
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD).

MAP FOR GEORGIA/UKRAINE

3. (C) Both Heusgen and Silberberg reiterated Germanys
strong opposition to granting Ukraine and Georgia Membership
Action Plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO
Foreign Ministers. Silberberg said flatly that "no decision
can be taken" in December, making reference to the Bucharest
Summit declaration that this should be only a "first review."
Noting that both countries have "lots of deficits," Heusgen
said that Ukraine was "a nightmare" because of ongoing
political turmoil and that Georgia lacked a multiparty system
and was not truly a pluralistic society. Silberberg said
that because of its role in the August conflict with Russia,
Germany considered Georgia to be "further from MAP" than it
was before. However, both agreed with Volker that the
Alliance could not be seen backing away from its Bucharest
commitment that both countries would one day become members
of NATO. They also conceded that NATO had to avoid giving
the perception that Russia, in using force against Georgia,
had successfully drawn a new line across Europe and had
achieved an unchallenged sphere of influence. They proposed
repeating the Bucharest language at the December ministerial
and "coming back to this later."

4. (C) Heusgen also favored giving the two applicant
countries a "clear idea" of what they needed to do. Heusgen
said that when Chancellor Merkel visited Kyiv in July, she
had proposed setting up a "navigation aid" or action plan to
help guide Ukraine in making the necessary reforms, but had
never received a response. Heusgen emphasized, however, that
Germany was not ready at this point to substitute this
"navigation aid" for MAP -- it wanted to keep open the option
of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership.
He expressed concern that the applicant countries, especially
Ukraine, could start clamoring immediately for membership
after satisfying the technical requirements in an action
plan. Along the same lines, Silberberg said the Alliance had
to make clear to the applicants that the final decision on
membership was political, not technical, and not automatic
based on fulfilling a checklist. Volker welcomed creative
thinking on the way forward, but said that adding an
additional hurdle to the accession process would give the
impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its
Bucharest commitment and could allow Russia to claim
"victory."

5. (C) In separate meetings with leading parliamentarians
from all the major parties, no one expressed support for
moving forward with MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. Most had
extremely negative opinions of Georgian President
Saakashvili, variously describing him as "crazy," "a hot
head," and "dangerous." The general opinion was that
Saakashvili was as much at fault for the outbreak of the
August war as Russia. Volker challenged this view and
reminded them that Russias provocative acts and pressure had
set the stage for the conflict. The parliamentarians also
worried that pursuing MAP would "corner the Russians" and
make them less cooperative on important questions like
Afghanistan, Iran, energy, etc.

AFGHANISTAN

6. (C) Every government interlocutor, including Heusgen,
Silberberg and Schmidt, emphasized that over the next year,
through the Bundestag election in September 2009, Germany had
little political flexibility for increasing the number of
German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of
deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF
parliamentary mandate approved last month. Silberberg said
flatly: "Were in the north and were staying there." With
regard to getting Germany to send combat troops to the south,
he advised: "Dont try it. It wont happen." Heusgen was
relaxed about possible U.S. requests to do more, asserting
that when Obama visited Berlin in July, he had indicated that
he was "perfectly happy" with the German contribution.
Silberberg claimed that the SPD-controlled MFA was more
receptive than the CDU-controlled MOD about deploying German
forces outside the north. He said, for example, that the MFA
had pushed for embedded German trainers (OMLTs) to be allowed
to deploy outside the north with their assigned Afghan
National Army (ANA) units, but that MOD had refused.

7. (C) While generally ruling out new military contributions
to Afghanistan, Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt confirmed
that Germany planned to support and participate in the
proposed deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to Afghanistan,
which will require the government to seek a stand-alone
mandate from the Bundestag. In separate meetings,
parliamentarians confirmed that there was broad support for
the AWACS mission. Silberberg warned, however, that any
connection made between the AWACS and the controversial
cross-border operations into Pakistan could be a "problem" in
obtaining Bundestag approval. He indicated that he had
already passed this concern on to SACEUR GEN Craddock.

8. (C) Volker noted that new CENTCOM Commander GEN Patreus
was currently conducting a strategic review of the U.S.
engagement in Afghanistan. It was possible the review might
recommend to the incoming Administration the deployment of
significantly more troops and other resources to meet the
current challenges. In that event, the U.S. would almost
certainly turn to its European Allies to help shoulder the
burden and to get behind a single, unified effort. If
additional combat troops were out of the question, Volker
encouraged German officials to think creatively about what
other military contributions Germany could make, such as
deploying additional helicopters and MEDEVAC assets on a
country-wide basis, or widening its deployment area by
erasing the dividing line between regional commands north and
west.

9. (C) SPD Defense Policy Spokesman Rainer Arnold gave the
standard line that Germany had no more armored helicopters to
deploy and probably would not have any until the next
generation of NH-90 and Tiger helicopters was delivered.
Schmidt revealed, however, that Germany had recently launched
a program to armor eight additional C-53 helicopters.
(Comment: Germany has some 80 CH-53 helicopters, but only 20
of them are armored and suitable for operating in a combat
environment. Germany currently has six armored C-53s in
Afghanistan and claims that it cannot afford to deploy
additional ones until the inventory of armored helicopters is
increased. End Comment.) Schmidt also noted that he
planned to talk to the Bavarian interior minister about
sending Bavarian policemen to Afghanistan to serve as
trainers for the Afghan National Police. (Comment: Up to
now, Bavaria has been one of the few German states that has
declined to let its police officers serve in Afghanistan.
End Comment.)

10. (C) Parliamentarians generally welcomed the prospect of
greater U.S. attention and commitment to Afghanistan and
agreed that Germany should increase its own efforts,
especially in reconstruction and development and in the
training of the Afghan national security forces. However,
they echoed the view that there was little political maneuver
room for Germany to increase its military contributions to
Afghanistan over the next year, given the electoral season
and low popular support for the mission. FDP foreign policy
spokesman Hoyer pointed out that mistrust between the two
Grand Coalition parties complicated matters. He thought
Chancellor Merkel (CDU) would be very wary about taking an
initiative to increase Germanys military contribution to
Afghanistan before the Bundestag election, for fear of
playing into the hands of her electoral rival, FM Steinmeier
(SPD). SPD defense policy spokesman Arnold argued that
deployment of German soldiers to the south and the likely
resulting increase in German soldiers "killing and being
killed" could put the whole deployment at risk.

NATO SUMMIT

11. (C) Silberberg said Germany viewed next years
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit as primarily a "family" anniversary
meeting, largely without partners. There were no plans to
invite Russian president Medvedev or to deal with
"confrontational issues." While Volker agreed that the
summit offered an excellent opportunity to celebrate the 60th
anniversary of the Alliance and to recognize its role in
Franco-German reconciliation, it could not just be a
celebration. There had to be real substance. Key issues
like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the
east had to be addressed. Silberberg expressed some surprise
that Russia would be on the agenda, but took the point.

12. (C) Volker also noted that some in Washington remained to
be convinced about the wisdom of launching work on a new
strategic concept at the summit, believing the exercise could
prove divisive and distract the Alliance from more practical
cooperation. Silberberg responded that there was too much
momentum behind the idea of a new strategic concept to stop
it now. He said Germany favored releasing a "short,
political" Declaration on Alliance Security at the Summit to
launch the strategic concept review.

MEDVEDEVS PROPOSAL ON A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

13. (C) While acknowledging that Medvedevs proposal for a
new European security architecture was hypocritical and did
nothing to address current problems (like CFE and Georgia),
Silberberg said that "we have to deal with it." He noted
that the proposal had come as a surprise to the Russian MFA,
which had to scramble after the fact to propose some ideas
for fleshing out the concept. He was disdainful of the
content, but hopeful that discussing the proposal would
"improve the atmosphere" with Russia. He complained that the
current EU troika dialogue with Russia, where each side reads
prepared statements, was not very useful. He also pressed
for resumption of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)
and for the NRC to be improved as a political forum. He
suggested that the Alliance pre-coordinate in advance of NRC
meetings and not hold internal political debates in front of
the Russians.

14. (C) On Medvedevs proposal, Volker said there was already
a pan-European security organization (the OSCE), so the
Russians had to answer the question: where was the
value-added? From the U.S. point of view, the Medvedev
proposal appeared to be nothing more than the OSCE minus the
Helsinki Accords, the Paris Charter, and the United States.
The Russians should be forced to be specific on the substance
of their proposal, and the forum for discussing this should
be the OSCE in Vienna. Regarding the NRC, Volker noted the
original intention had been to treat Russia as an equal
partner. Given its aggression against Georgia, the U.S.
would have trouble going back to that format for now, but
agreed that dialogue with Russia should continue in some form.

MISSILE DEFENSE

15. (C) Silberberg called Medvedevs November 5 announcement
about deploying short-range rockets in Kaliningrad in
response to U.S. MD plans as "simply stupid." He noted that
FM Steinmeier had immediately issued a public statement
criticizing the announcement. It was clear that the timing,
coming right after the U.S. presidential election, was
deliberate and not a mistake. Silberberg noted that while
his counterparts at the Russian MFA "seem very reasonable" on
this issue, they are obviously "very far" from the locus of
Russian decision-making.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

16. (U) Volker also participated in several public diplomacy
events during his November 10-11 visit. On November 10, on
the margins of the opening ceremony of the annual conference
of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), he did separate
interviews with Germanys two main public broadcasters, ARD
and ZDF, responding to questions on NATO enlargement and the
NATO mission in Afghanistan. Also on November 10, he
participated in an hour-long panel discussion hosted by
Deutschland Radio Kultur on the future of U.S. foreign policy
following the U.S. elections. The roundtable, which included
Luxembourg FM Jean Asselborn and German Deputy Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD), was
broadcast live over radio and was recorded for broadcast by
Phoenix television on November 15.

17. (U) On November 11, Volker participated in a panel
discussion on NATO and the challenges of the eastern
dimension, hosted by the U.S. Embassy before a audience of
180. The panel was one of six held simultaneously in various
embassies in Berlin as part of the ATA annual conference.
The other panelists included former Polish NATO Ambassador
Jerzy Nowak and German foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von
Klaeden (CDU). In a press conference in the U.S. Embassy at
the conclusion of his visit, Volker took questions from six
print journalists on Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, Georgia,
and the NATO C-17 strategic airlift consortium.

18. (U) Ambassador Volker has reviewed and cleared this cable.
TIMKEN JR

TOP-SECRET: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE

P 041421Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1740
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 000478 

NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034
TAGS: PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE 

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (S/NF) Summary: Rival Pakistani Taliban leaders Baitullah
Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur formed a new
militant alliance on February 23. The new alliance
recognizes Taliban leader Mullah Omar as its leader, and its
goal is to fight the planned U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani militant leaders will maintain their
independent militants groups but will now facilitate
cooperation in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan. It is
too early to say how effective this new alliance will be in
launching cross-border attacks against U.S./NATO forces in
Afghanistan, but it does give the largest and most powerful
Pakistani Taliban leaders unfettered access across North and
South Waziristan. Formation of the alliance demonstrates
that the GOP's tribal "divide and conquer" strategy is not
working, at least not to our advantage. Civilian leaders are
concerned about the continuing loss of government writ in the
Waziristans after this agreement, but Pakistan's security
forces may see few downsides to an alliance that focuses its
attacks outside of Pakistan. End summary. 

2. (SBU) On February 23, Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) leader
Baitullah Mehsud signed a deal with two powerful rival
Taliban commanders Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan and Hafiz
Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan. The three, according to
press reports, have formed a new group called Shura
Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Unity Council), that they
claim will unite them against external forces trying to
divide the multiple Taliban groups based in Pakistan. They
have formed a 13-member shura to run the affairs of the new
alliance. The militants named Mullah Omar as their supreme
leader, but the group did not choose a leader of its
operational shura. According to a joint public statement,
the militant leaders praised Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar
as defenders of Islam and Muslims. The spokesman for
Baitullah Mehsud, Mufti Waliullah, said that the three
Taliban commanders would now operate from a single platform
under the new alliance. Currently Baitullah Mehsud controls
the eastern portion of South Waziristan, which is populated
largely by Mehsud tribesmen. Maulvi Nazir is based out of
the Ahmedzai Wazir area of South Waziristan on the agency's
western border with Afghanistan. Hafiz Gul Bahadur leads his
Utmanzai Wazir militants from Miram Shah, North Waziristan. 

3. (C) The formation of the new alliance follows Baitullah
Mehsud's December 2007 formation of TTP as an umbrella group
to better coordinate pro-Taliban activities. The creation of
the TTP was the merger of various Pakistani militant groups
operating under disparate commands in different tribal
agencies. The TTP alliance runs as a loose federation rather
than a strictly controlled organization. Each of the
militant leaders maintains a degree of autonomy and Baitullah
Mehsud, as the strongest leader of Pakistani Taliban, lends
his support and coordination to the various TTP subcommanders
in places such as Bajaur and Swat. Nazir, who broke openly
with Mehsud in the spring of 2007 (see para 6), was not a
part of TTP. Bahadur, who had jockeyed with Mehsud for the
title of pre-eminent local militant leader in the
Waziristans, had maintained some distance from the TTP label
before now. 

4. (C) The new Mujahideen Unity Council will likely be
another loose federation with each Taliban commander
maintaining his own authority. Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) Secretariat Additional Chief Secretary
Habibullah Khan expressed concern to Peshawar Principal
Officer in a February 24 meeting that this new body provides
all three militant leaders with unfettered access to all of
South and North Waziristan. Baitullah Mehsud will be a main
beneficiary of this new access, giving his fighters easier
entry to the Afghanistan border through Maulvi Nazir's
Wazir-held territory. Before the deal, Mehsud had limited
access to the border from his portion of South Waziristan
because he was blocked either by Maulvi Nazir or Gul Bahadur.
While the alliance will not work as a tight top-down
militant organization, it will facilitate access and
coordination of various Pakistani Taliban as they cross into
Afghanistan. 

5. (C) While Khan had no hard facts, he detected the hand of
the Haqqani network in bringing these rival commanders
together. The new coordination, he feared, will allow the
Taliban to focus on sending militants across the border into
Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani also claimed in the press
that he had convinced the three rival Taliban leaders to
meet. Sirajuddin and his father Jalaluddin Haqqani lead much
of the Taliban militancy in eastern Afghanistan. Sirajuddin
often travels to the tribal areas of Pakistan, North
Waziristan in particular, and has served as a mediator
between these rival Taliban leaders. 

6. (S/NF) In the past, the Pakistani government has supported
Maulvi Nazir in an attempt to counter Baitullah Mehsud in
South Waziristan. In the spring of 2007, an open break
between Nazir and Mehsud took place over the presence of
"Uzbek" fighters in South Waziristan. The disagreement
culminated in an operation in which Pakistani security forces
fought alongside Nazir's followers to oust Uzbeks from the
area. While Nazir appeared to draw on genuine local anger
and desire to remove "Uzbeks," his activities as an al-Qaida
facilitator and promoter of cross-border attacks have always
complicated Pakistani efforts to sell this episode as a
"success" story. A South Waziristan-based contact told
Principal Officer Peshawar on February 24 that Mehsud and
Nazir are showing signs of getting past old disagreements and
that "Uzbeks" are re-appearing in growing numbers in the
area. 

7. (SBU) According to Pakistani newspapers, Ahmedzai Wazir
elders of South Waziristan, who are concerned about the new
alliance and the possibility of "Uzbeks" coming back into
their territory, questioned Maulvi Nazir about the deal with
rival Mehsud. At a meeting in Wana, South Waziristan Maulvi
Nazir assured the elders that each militant group will
continue to have its own independent status and remain
sovereign in their own territory. Nazir explained that the
alliance was formed "only to act together against the United
States" because the Taliban was concerned about the troop
surge in Afghanistan, according to Pakistan press reports.
The elders publicly cautioned Nazir that they would turn
against him if this new deal brought any harm to their areas. 

8. (C) While he did not touch on a possible ISI role in
brokering this new alliance, Habibullah Khan noted that
pressure has been building on the Pakistani military in the
Waziristans. The Pakistani military and then Northwest
Frontier Province Governor Orakzai quietly entered peace
deals with North Waziristan commanders in December 2007 and
with Baitullah Mehsud in February 2008 in order to achieve
relative peace. Those agreements came after a series of high
profile attacks on the military in the Waziristans, including
the kidnapping of over 250 security forces by Baitullah
Mehsud and Jan 2008 fighting at Ladha Fort in South
Waziristan. While violence directed at the military in the
Waziristans has been minor in the last few months, Peshawar
observers regularly note that the military remains concerned
with its ability to keep a lid on trouble in these two
agencies. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani believes the
respite offered by this latest agreement is necessary for his
stretched forces to continue fighting in Bajaur and Mohmand
agencies. However, the relative quiet in South and North
Waziristan has allowed Baitullah Mehsud to increasingly send
his fighters in other parts of the FATA and Northwest
Frontier Province, including Swat. 

9. (C) Khan also noted with deep dismay that this
announcement demonstrates that these militant commanders see
themselves in a strong enough position to form an alliance
that takes them one step closer to a formal territorial
takeover of the Waziristan as an "Islamic Emirate." South
Waziristan contacts also commented that there is an
increasing presence of Punjabi militants from Jaish-e
Muhammad in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. (Comment:
A development if accurate that is almost certainly of concern
to the Pakistani military. It is significant that Baitullah
Mehsud's strength and open militancy are drawing fighters
from places such as southern Punjab.) 

10. (C) As this new alliance formed, Mullah Omar ordered
militants in North and South Waziristan to immediately stop
their attacks on Pakistani security forces, according to
press reports. Omar said in a letter to the militants, "If
anybody really wants to wage jihad, they must fight the U.S.
and NATO troops inside Afghanistan." The letter also stated
that Omar was responsible for the agreement between Mehsud,
Nazir, and Bahadur, and that after this agreement "the
attacks on Pakistani security forces by the local Taliban
will decrease if not end completely." Mullah Omar continues
to exert considerable influence on the militants in South and
North Waziristan. Halting attacks against Pakistani forces
may increase the militants' safe haven space in Pakistan,
allowing the militants to cross the border to attack NATO
forces in Afghanistan. 

11. (C) Comment: It is too early to predict how effective
this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks
on U.S./NATO forces, but its formation will provide the group
with unfettered access to Afghanistan across North and South
Waziristan. It is another indication that the GOP's tribal
divide and conquer strategy against militants is not working,
at least not to our advantage. Pakistan's security forces,
however, may see limited downsides to an arrangement that
focuses militant attacks outside of Pakistan.

SECRET: GERMANY’S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER FACES STEEP

VZCZCXYZ0005
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RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
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RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC
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RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC
RUKAAKA/USAREUR ACE DARMSTADT GE
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T BERLIN 001393 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

STATE FOR EUR, S/CT, L
DHS FOR OIA SCARDAVILLE 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KHLS KJUS GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER FACES STEEP
LEARNING CURVE 

REF: A. BERLIN 1377
     B. BERLIN 1167
     C. BERLIN 988
     D. 2008 BERLIN 1455
     E. 2008 BERLIN 504 

Classified By: Robert A. Pollard, Minister-Counselor for Economic Affai
rs for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 

1. (C) SUMMARY: Germany's new federal interior minister,
Thomas de Maiziere, is known for being a competent
administrator who performed effectively over the past four
years as the Chancellery Chief of Staff.  De Maiziere is a
close confidant of Chancellor Merkel, their professional
relationship dates back to 1990, and he developed a
reputation as a reliable crisis manager and interagency
master over the past four years.  Although de Maiziere
previously served as a state interior minister in Saxony, he
has less direct experience dealing with the international
security issues - most prominently counterterrorism - that he
will face as federal interior minister.  Furthermore, de
Maiziere is not known for being ideological or outspoken.  In
this respect, de Maiziere represents a marked change from his
predecessor, powerhouse Wolfgang Schaeuble, who had strong
views on security policy and was willing to endure
considerable criticism to achieve his policy goals.  We do
not expect de Maiziere to push for further expanding law
enforcement powers of police and/or security services.  De
Maiziere indicates that he intends to focus on integration of
foreigners into German society and will continue the
Ministry's Islam Conference, a controversial Schaeuble
initiative that had advanced the country's discussion on
immigration and discrimination issues.  He also intends to
promote the further integration of former east and west
Germany.  END SUMMARY 

An Aristocratic Westerner Makes His Name in the East
--------------------------------------------- ------- 

2. (U) De Maiziere, 55, is a lawyer by training who was born
and raised in Bonn, but has spent nearly the last two decades
in the eastern states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony.
He is a descendent of the noble Maiziere-les-Metz family who,
as Huguenots, fled France for asylum in Prussia in the late
seventeenth century.  De Maiziere's father, Ulrich, was
Inspector General of the German Armed Forces.  His cousin,
Lothar, was the last, and only democratically elected,
Premier of the German Democratic Republic, who later served
as a minister in the Kohl government.  As a staffer in the
offices of Berlin Governing Mayor Richard von Weizsacker, and
later Eberhard Diepgen, de Maiziere participated in the
negotiations on German reunification.  After 1990, de
Maiziere worked to re-establish democratic structures in
eastern states starting first in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
From 1998 through 2005, de Maiziere served in Saxony as head
of the State Chancery, and as Finance, Justice and Interior
Minister.  De Maiziere joined the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) as a student in 1972.  De Maiziere won a direct mandate
in the September 27 national parliamentary election and is
now a member of the Bundestag representing the district of
Meissen in Saxony. 

3. (C) De Maiziere first met Angela Merkel in 1990 and his
recommendation of her to his cousin Lothar de Maiziere is
said to have facilitated her entry into CDU politics.
Chancellor Merkel and de Maiziere are known to have a very
close professional relationship and to share a similar sober
and analytical approach to governing.  De Maiziere is
reported to have performed well throughout his tenure as
Merkel's Chancellery Chief and Minister for Special Duties.
As Chancellery Chief of Staff, de Maiziere was known as a
consensus builder who understands and effectively works the 

interagency process, sometimes requiring competing ministers
to resolve disputes among themselves.  The Chancellor no
doubt appreciated de Maiziere's efforts to shield her from
these policy battles given her general propensity to stay
above the fray and to express an opinion on an issue only
when consensus has been reached at the cabinet level. 

De Maiziere Faces a Steep Learning Curve
---------------------------------------- 

4. (C) De Maiziere's experience in eastern Germany helped him
gain new responsibilities for the Federal Interior Ministry:
the entire Department of Eastern German affairs has been
moved from the Transportation and Urban Affairs Ministry to
the Interior Ministry.  In his remarks to ministry employees
on his first day in office, de Maiziere said that with this
move the interior ministry is now responsible for not only
immigrant integration, but also the integration of Eastern
and Western Germany and the cohesion of German society.  De
Maiziere will continue the German Islam Conference, an
initiative started by his predecessor, which seeks to improve
the integration of Germany's Muslim population and open a
dialogue between the government and Germany's Muslim
community.  The Islam Conference has met with some
controversy and came under scrutiny earlier this year when it
was discovered that some Muslim representatives were alleged
to have links with extremist groups. 

5. (S/NF) De Maiziere has some familiarity with security
issues given that his duties in the Chancellery included
overall coordination of Germany's intelligence services.  De
Maiziere was helpful in promoting cooperation between German
ministries and security services with USG counterparts both
during the 2007 Sauerland Islamic Jihad Union terrorist cell
case and following extremist threats surrounding the recent
national elections.  De Maiziere's predecessor Wolfgang
Schaeuble spent considerable time dealing with the issue of
terrorism and working to update Germany's legal frameworks
and expand the mandates of law enforcement agencies to ensure
they had the capabilities to address the phenomena.  In
contrast, de Maiziere said virtually nothing in public on the
issue of terrorism during his time in the Chancellery, and he
has not emphasized the topic since moving to Interior.
Therefore, there is some question concerning the depth of his
knowledge of the transnational character of terrorism,
radicalization pathways, and terrorists' increasing use of
the Internet and related technology to recruit, train and
organize, aspects of the issue that most affect Germany today. 

6. (C) During his first day remarks to employees, de Maiziere
made the peculiar statement that "the Interior Ministry is
responsible for internal matters, and the Foreign Ministry is
responsible for issues external to Germany."  This
characterization of the MoI's tasks contrasts sharply with EU
law enforcement integration initiatives under Schaeuble such
as the Pruem data sharing agreement.  Observers are concerned
that de Maiziere's limited perspective could result in
diminished bilateral cooperation and mark a significant
departure from former minister Schaeuble, who placed a heavy
emphasis throughout his tenure on increasing security
cooperation with European and other international partners.
De Maiziere would benefit from learning about the benefits of
international cooperation first hand from his counterparts at
the G6 meeting in London this week, which DHS Secretary
Napolitano and senior DoJ representatives will attend.
(Note: The G6 is an informal grouping of the interior
ministers of Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the
UK.  Schaeuble made a point of inviting the USG to G6
meetings that he hosted, a custom that UK Minister Jacqui
Smith is following for this week's London meeting.  Ref D.) 

Will de Maiziere be a Strong Security Partner?
--------------------------------------------- - 

7. (C) We do not expect de Maiziere to be aggressive in
pushing for expanded security powers.  However, there is less
need for this as two recent legislative packages have already
strengthened Germany's counterterrorism legal framework (Refs
C and E).  More relevant is whether de Maiziere will build on
Schaeuble's record of deepening U.S.-German security
cooperation, such as the successful negotiations of a
bilateral "Pruem-like" agreement to exchange information on
terrorism and serious crime suspects, as well as establish an
automated fingerprint checking system.  Final implementation
of our agreement is awaiting resolution of some concerns
raised by a Green Party Justice Senator from Hamburg.  We
will likely need support from de Maiziere to break this
impasse, but it is unclear whether de Maiziere is willing to
make the effort on an initiative that his predecessor
initiated and for which he received heavy criticism due to
data privacy concerns.  On the issue of resettlement of
Guantanamo detainees, de Maiziere has yet to express a
viewpoint one way or the other. 

8. (C) We anticipate that data protection and domestic
security issues will be a continuing theme that the new
coalition government of the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU)
and Free Democrats (FDP) will struggle with.  During the
previous administration, the FDP regularly criticized former
interior minister Schaeuble for policies which the FDP
believed trampled on citizens' privacy rights (Ref B).
Germany's new Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger
(FDP) believes that Schaeuble went too far in giving police
new powers of investigation, and she was successful in
committing the new government to modify a number of these
powers and introducing added data protection measures in the
recently completed coalition agreement (Ref A).  The FDP has
found it politically expedient to cast personal freedoms and
security policy as mutually exclusive.  In this debate, de
Maiziere's greatest advantage is that he is not Schaeuble.
As Interior Minister, de Maiziere is expected to support
existing laws and practices initiated by his predecessor, and
his reputation for reasonableness and consensus-building
should serve him well in these discussions.
MURPHY

TOP-SECRET: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD’S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?

VZCZCXRO3166
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RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0475
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000316 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/3/2019
TAGS: PREL PROP PGOV PINR IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD? 

DUBAI 00000316  001.2 OF 003 

CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (U) This is a joint cable by the Iran Regional Presence
Office and the Dubai Regional Media Hub. 

2. (S/NF) Summary: Since Iran's June 12 presidential elections,
Arab media have intensely focused their coverage on the
demonstrations in Iran and the international community's
response to the government crackdown.  Whereas in recent years
the Arab media have limited their commentary to Iran's external
relations -- particularly its regional ambitions and the
international implications of its nuclear program -- during the
post-election crisis Arab commentators have, for the first time,
poked a hole in the veneer of the Islamic Republic's internal
political system and explored its underpinnings more closely,
often challenging the system's very legitimacy in on-air
commentary.  A number of these commentators have opined that
Ahmadinejad has, at least in the near term, lost standing among
some moderate Arabs, who have come to view Ahmadinejad's
administration as oppressive, unpopular, and undemocratic, much
as they criticize many Arab governments.  However, all of the
Arab media figures we spoke to emphasized that Arab criticism of
Ahmadinejad has not necessarily led to increased support for
U.S. policy in the region.  On the contrary, closer analysis
suggests that Ahmadinejad's eroding popularity in the Arab world
has created a scenario in which any U.S. effort to engage the
current Iranian government will be perceived by a wide spectrum
of Arabs as accommodation with Ahmadinejad. 

ALL EYES ON IRAN 

---------------- 

3. (S/NF) Iran's post-election crisis has dominated the Arab
media's news coverage for the past seven weeks.  The
demonstrations have garnered special coverage on Al-Arabiya and
have consistently been among the top headlines on Al-Jazeera.
The marketing director of the Middle East Broadcasting Company
(MBC), parent company of Al-Arabiya, told IRPO/DRMH that
Al-Arabiya's viewership has skyrocketed since the June 12
election.  Al-Arabiya's news website has also experienced a
dramatic increase in visits from users living in the region
between Tripoli and Amman, which the marketing director, a
native of Lebanon, attributed to the tremendous interest Sunni
Arabs have in watching the drama in Iran unfold.  Coverage of
Iran's election aftermath is not limited to straightforward news
reporting; editorial pages, media commentaries, and the Arab
blogosphere have also been abuzz with debate over the
demonstrations, the international community's response, and the
implications of these events for the Arab world.  While Iran's
elections may no longer command daily headlines in the Western
media, nearly all the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke
recognized that the Arab street remains firmly focused on the
recent unrest and continuing political drama playing out in Iran. 

THE BENEVOLENT DICTATOR'S FALL FROM GRACE? 

------------------------------------------ 

4. (S/NF) A Syrian journalist and blogger, who owns a media
consultancy firm in Dubai, believes that many in the Arab street
initially viewed Ahmadinejad when he came to power in 2005 as a
"benevolent dictator."  Citing the tradition of the Mahdi, the
media consultant argued that both Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are
taught from early childhood to await the arrival of a strong and
unimpeachable figure who will lead the Muslim world.  The media
consultant maintained that even secular Arabs view the world,
albeit unintentionally, with this ingrained mindset.  Our
contact argued that Ahmadinejad played in to this narrative, and
when Ahmadinejad arrived on the international stage many Arabs
saw him, in contrast to their own flawed leaders, as a humble
and pious man who was brave enough to stand up for his people
and the greater Muslim world by confronting Israel and the West
head on.  However,  both the intensely competitive campaign
period and the forceful reaction by the Iranian people to the
official election results have led some moderate Arabs to
rethink Ahmadinejad's  true disposition. The election, the media
consultant said, led some Arabs to understand that despite his
astutely crafted and well-marketed image in the Arab world, 

DUBAI 00000316  002.2 OF 003 

Ahmadinejad is resented by many Iranians for domestic
mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption.  Because of this
public fall from grace, so the media consultant told us,
Ahmadinejad is no longer the "untouchable, holy figure" in the
Arab world he once was -- his flaws have brought him down to the
level of the Arab world's own imperfect leaders. An Al-Arabiya
executive, speaking at a recent conference, said that the
election aftermath had destroyed the image many Arabs had of the
Islamic Revolution, and Ahmadinejad's legitimacy as a leader was
now open to question. [NOTE: The media consultant attributed
Iran's perceived "victories" over the U.S. and the West to
Ahmadinejad, as opposed to Supreme Leader Khamenei.  While
conventional wisdom in the West is that Khamenei has the final
say over Iran's most vital interests, including the nuclear
program, the consultant's comments suggest that the Arab street
views Ahmadinejad as much more influential in the Islamic
Republic's decision-making system.] 

POST-ELECTION CRISIS NOT A SILVER BULLET FOR ARAB REGIMES 

--------------------------------------------- ------------ 

5. (S/NF) Ahmadinejad's fall from grace notwithstanding, most of
the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke agreed that Arab
governments have a limited ability to capitalize on
Ahmadinejad's missteps because of the skeletons in their own
closets.   Al-Arabiya's former Tehran bureau chief observed that
Arab regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who no doubt
would like to exploit Ahmadinejad's current vulnerabilities,
have remained noticeably silent.  In his view, they realize that
any statement condemning Tehran's crackdown on peaceful
dissidents would appear untenably hypocritical in the eyes of
their own citizens.  He considers this public silence yet
another "missed opportunity" for Arab leaders to take a stand to
counter Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and further detract from his
popularity with the Arab street. 

NEW SPACE TO DISAGREE WITH AHMADINEJAD AND THE U.S. 

--------------------------------------------- ------ 

6. (S/NF)  All of the Arab commentators and news media figures
we spoke to agreed that the U.S. "played it right" throughout
the post-election crisis by staying away from detailed public
comments that could be perceived as interventionist.  However,
the Arab commentators were quick to distinguish between
criticism of Ahmadinejad in the Arab street and support for U.S.
policies.  The Syrian media consultant said that the heated
debates before the election, in which the three challengers --
Mousavi, Karroubi, and Reza'i -- publicly criticized Ahmadinejad
for corruption and economic mismanagement, made it clear to
Arabs that this election was about Iran, not the U.S.  This
distinction, coupled with the U.S.' restraint in commenting on
the election, provided an unprecedented window for Arab
commentators to criticize Ahmadinejad without appearing to side
with the U.S. 

7. (S/NF) Examples of this played out during two separate
appearances by the Dubai Regional Media Hub Acting Director on
live panel discussions on Abu Dhabi TV and Lebanese New TV
regarding regional issues, including events in Iran.  Whereas
fellow Arab panelist resolutely disagreed with her comments in
support of U.S. policy in the region, in particular the peace
process, they felt free to openly criticize Ahmadinejad's
government, which they refrained from doing in the past, for its
internal crackdown and regional ambitions.  One Saudi
commentator contrasted Turkish regional mediation, which he
described as a positive force in the region, with Iranian
regional intervention, which he called pernicious and
destabilizing.  A Lebanese commentator noted the irony of Iran
accusing outsiders of interfering in its internal affairs when
there is not "one corner of the Arab world" where Iran does not
intervene behind the scenes. 

AHMADINEJAD DOWN BUT NOT OUT 

DUBAI 00000316  003.2 OF 003 

---------------------------- 

8. (S/NF) As Al-Arabiya's Tehran bureau chief noted, while
Ahmadinejad's image may have taken a hit in the Arab street as a
result of the government's handling of domestic dissent, the
damage is not necessarily permanent.  In his view, the Arab
street is notoriously emotional and "could easily be turned to
support Ahmadinejad once again" with some trumped up slogans and
public bravado.  The bureau chief believed that, in the
perceived leadership void left by Arab leaders on regional
issues, Ahmadinejad could rally public opinion by capitalizing
on any number of sensitive issues for the Arab street, most
prominent among them Israel, at upcoming international fora.
The Syrian media consultant, too, cautioned the U.S. not to
overestimate any erosion in Ahmadinejad's popularity with Arabs.
 In his opinion, Ahmadinejad has only lost standing with a
segment of moderates in the Arab street; he believes that most
Arabs are so polarized, either for or against Ahmadinejad, that
the allegations of voter fraud and the violent post-election
crackdown on protesters will not permanently sway their
positions one way or the other. 

ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN: NO PLEASING THE ARAB STREET 

--------------------------------------------- ---- 

9. (S/NF) Comment:  Once the dust settles on Iran's
post-election crisis, Arabs will look to see if the U.S. deals
with Ahmadinejad as it pursues its nuclear nonproliferation
agenda despite the lingering questions over the legitimacy of
his election.  If the U.S. enters negotiations with
Ahmadinejad's government, moderate Arab observers may argue that
the U.S., for the sake of its own national interest, has cut a
deal at the expense of pro-democracy advocates -- just as many
in the Arab street believe the U.S. has done with a number of
Arab regimes.  Those Arabs who continue to support Ahmadinejad,
on the other hand, may perceive negotiations as a personal
victory for a humble leader who brought the U.S. to its knees
through steadfast resistance.  Thus, Ahmadinejad's "fall from
grace" in the Arab world may have created yet another obstacle
to improved Arab perceptions of the U.S. -- in which engagement
with an Ahmadinejad-led government is now a potentially
lose-lose scenario in which Arabs at both ends of the pro- and
anti-Ahmadinejad spectrum will consider negotiations with
Teheran an accommodation with the Iranian president.
RICHARDSON

CONFIDENTIAL: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE

VZCZCXRO3042
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1348/01 2591418
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151418Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3034
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2905
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001348 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, IO/FO-HOOK, WARLICK,
IO/UNP-AMORRISON, L/FO-JBELLINGER, JTHESSIN,
L/AN-LJACOBSON, L/UNA-TBUCHWALD, INR/GGI-MARGULIES,
CIA/CNC-JFINKEL, JBRODERERICK, CIA/CTC-JBEAN, DOJ-JEVY,
USUN-KHALILZAD, WOLFF, SCHEDLBAUER, NSC FOR
ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINR UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE
THAN HE HAS SEEN 

REF: THE HAGUE 744 

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 

SUMMARY
------- 

1. (S/NF)  In a September 12 meeting with the Ambassador,
Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent
International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) made three
specific requests for USG assistance and additional requests
for USG action.  First, he asked that the USG provide
intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested.
Second, that the USG loan UNIIIC two criminal investigators
TDY.  UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness"
to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may
have some relevant information.  Third, that the USG urge the
UK to do more to help UNIIIC, particularly with intelligence
information (the UK has provided loaned personnel). 

2. (S/NF)  In addition, Bellemare asked for USG support when
the Management Committee considers the Tribunal operating
budget on September 25 -- the same day that Lebanese
President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington.  He
also raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a
new resolution to clarify some legal issues.  Finally he
repeated earlier requests for a USG reaction to 26 sketches
of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG and asked
about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors
reportedly in the U.S. 

3. (S/NF)  On other matters, Bellemare said that the GOL has
not asked that UNIIIC investigate the latest political
assassination (the September 10 attack on opposition Druze
member Saleh Aridi).  He is concerned about a new
Telecommunication Ministry directive that may impede his
plans for using wiretaps.  End Summary. 

GOL HAS NOT ASKED THAT UNIIIC
INVESTIGATE LATEST ASSASSINATION
-------------------------------- 

4. (S/NF)  The Ambassador and DCM met on September 12 with
Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent
International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), in his
office in Monteverde.  The Ambassador asked if UNIIIC would
investigate the case of Saleh Aridi, a Druze political
official assassinated in a car bomb attack near Beirut on
September 10.  Bellemare explained that for UNIIIC to take on
a case, first the GOL must ask the UN SYG, then the SYG and
Security Council must approve.  He said that the GOL had
shown no indication that it would request that UNIIIC
investigate the Aridi killing.  UNIIIC is interested in
finding out more about the Aridi attack, since details are
similar to other cases it is investigating.  If it is not
invited to investigate but wants information about a case,
UNIIIC must submit a request to the Lebanese chief
prosecutor.  The criteria the GOL uses to decide on
requesting UNIIIC assistance is "a mystery to me" Bellemare
said.  (NOTE:  The Aridi assassination is the first of a
pro-Syrian politician.  END NOTE.) 

WIRETAPPING
----------- 

5. (S/NF)  Bellemare was concerned about something he had
learned the day before that might affect wiretapping.  The
Telecommunications Ministry had directed two private telecom
companies in Lebanon to inform the Ministry about any
requests for wiretapping.  He noted that it is well known
that the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the national police,
conduct wiretapping even though the legal basis for their
authority to do so is weak.  The Telecom Ministry's move may
have been directed against the ISF.  The order, however, also
could limit the ability of UNIIIC to conduct wiretaps if the
phone companies fear that they will have to report those
efforts to the Telecommunications Ministry. 

6. (S/NF)  The Ambassador asked if Bellemare believed the
action was targeted at UNIIIC, noting that the new
Telecommunications Minister is from the opposition.
Bellemare replied that he was not in a position to say.  At
his meeting with PM Fouad Siniora earlier in the week, on
September 8, Siniora told Bellemare to inform him if he runs
into any problems with cooperation from government officials.
 He said he might discuss this with the PM if it looks as if
this new telecom directive will be a problem, but first he
will meet with officials of the two telecom companies next
week.  The Ambassador offered to support his efforts at
resolving this issue. 

7. (S/NF)  Bellemare noted that at his August 14 meeting in
The Hague with the USG Interagency Working Group (IWG), he
had asked for USG help with wiretapping capability.  He said
that trying to work wiretapping through the Lebanese ISF or
military intelligence would be like "putting the names (of
targets) in the paper".  He explained that UN legal experts
were currently looking into the possibility that UNIIIC has
legal authority to carry out wiretaps.  Beyond legal
authority for wiretapping, though, Bellemare said he needs
technical capability. 

ASSISTANCE FROM THE USG
----------------------- 

8. (S/NF)  Bellemare expressed frustration that USG has not
provided more in response to his requests for assistance, and
noted that he has discussed this with State Department
officials.  He outlined three requests for USG assistance for
his investigation. 

-- One, provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has
formally requested, or inform him that it cannot be provided,
so that he knows not to pursue the requests. 

-- Two, provide two loaned criminal analysts on TDY.  UNIIIC
needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview
some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some
relevant informtion. 

-- Three, using USG influence, urge the U government to
provide more to UNIIIC, particulaly regarding intelligence
information.  Bellemare said he has requests in to MI-6, but
has not received much.  On personnel, Scotland Yard has
provided a loaned investigator. 

9. (S/NF)  Bellemare showed a good understanding of the
problems associated with complying with the first two
requests from his several meetings with USG officials, but
his frustration was nonetheless evident.  "You are the key
player.  If the U.S. doesn't help me, who will?"  The USG has
"a big investment in the Tribunal" and being more forthcoming
on UNIIIC's requests is a way of making that investment pay
off, he said. 

10. (S/NF)  During the meeting, Bellemare made several other
requests for USG action: 

-- USG support when the Committee considers the Tribunal
operating budget, scheduled for September 25, the same day
that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in
Washington.  He warned that the budget includes high travel
costs, but that these are necessary because of the need for
frequent travel between the Hague and Lebanon. Bellemare
thanked the USG for what he said was a much improved attitude
on the part of the Tribunal Management Committee.  His
requests have been more favorably received than was the case
previously. 

-- He raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a
new resolution to clarify some legal issues.  He mused about
the possibility of getting Chapter VII authority for the
Tribunal via such a new resolution, but seemed to think that
was not doable in the Council. 

-- He asked for a reaction to the 26 sketches of possible
suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG. 

-- Finally, he asked about getting access to alleged
Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S., or a definitive
negative response to the request.  The answers the USG has
given him so far on this subject, he said, have been not
sufficiently definitive. 

INTERVIEWS IN SYRIA
------------------- 

11. (S/NF)  On this issue, Bellemare repeated what he said in
the IWG meeting (reftel): that he did not want to go to Syria
until the USG or other sources had provided names of leads he
should ask to interview and other information.  If Syria
denied his request to interview these people, then he would
have evidence of Syrian non-cooperation.  Just asking would
give some indication to others in Syria where his
investigation might be headed, which could provoke more
cooperation "if I hit the right person." 

12. (S/NF)  Bellemare emphasized the urgency for responding
to his request related to Syria, first, because UNIIIC's
mandate and with it Chapter VII authority expires at the end
of the year, and second, the importance of conducting the
interviews before the interviewees disappear by being killed
or other means. 

OTHER ISSUES: NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE,
UNIIIC PRESS SPOKESPERSON
------------------------------ 

13. (C )  Bellemare said he had a very positive impression of
new GOL Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar, who had told
Bellemare he wanted to be helpful.  Najjar's predecessor,
Charles Rizk, was a vocal supporter of the Tribunal but also
known for public criticisms of Bellemare and the previous
Commissioner, Serge Brammertz.  Bellemare, a Canadian, noted
that Najjar had taught at McGill University in Montreal and
they had some mutual acquaintances. 

14. (SBU)  UNIIIC now has a press spokesperson who started
work the week before, Bellemare reported. The official had
good relevant experience as the spokesperson for the
Yugoslavia Tribunal and most recently for the UN Legal
Affairs office.  The new spokesperson is currently working up
a strategy for UNIIIC's press interaction. 

15. (C)  Bellemare said he had been advised by several
persons to not make statements in public that might be seen
as disrupting the current relative calm in Lebanon.  He
planned to follow that advice,  (NOTE: Bellemare traveled to
Saudi Arabia September 15, we understand.  We will seek
further information from UNIIIC contacts.  END NOTE.)
SISON

SECRET: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001510 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014
TAGS: PARM PHUM PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT
STEPS FOR U.S. 

REF: A. USEU TODAY 04/06/04
     B. BRUSSELS 1464
     C. STATE 68263
     D. PRAGUE 390 

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

1. (S/NF) The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC)
discussed the EU arms embargo on China during a heated 90
minute exchange on April 2.  PSC Ambassadors generally agreed
that the issue -- of whether, when and how to lift the
embargo -- should be sent back down to working groups for
further study before being presented to political groups for
a decision.  France objected, however, and succeeded in
getting agreement to discuss the issue at the April 26 FMs
meeting (GAERC) -- but failed in its campaign to secure an
early decision.  The debate will likely continue well into
the Dutch EU Presidency.  This cable draws on a detailed
readout and a sensitive internal report provided to Poloff by
UK and Hungarian contacts (please protect accordingly), as
well as background provided in recent days by other
interlocutors.  It also offers a strategy for continuing US
engagement. 

--------------------------------------
PSC Reacts Badly to Latest US Demarche
-------------------------------------- 

2. (S/NF) PSC Ambassadors reportedly arrived at the April 2
meeting to find copies of ref C demarche sitting on their
otherwise empty desks.  The demarche was received badly
because it gave the impression that "big brother was
watching," and because it appeared timed as a heavyhanded and
hubristic attempt to influence the PSC, according to our UK
contact.  Some reps, led by Greek Ambassador
Paraskevoupoulos, objected to the Council Secretariat's
distribution of the demarche under Council Secretariat cover
and with a Secretariat identifying number.  He argued that
the document had no business being circulated by the
Secretariat, and insisted that it be stricken from EU 

SIPDIS
records.  Ambassadors also reacted against what they
perceived as the threatening tone of our demarche. 

3. (S/NF) The Financial Times' front page article on April 2
about the US demarche campaign also enflamed the Ambassadors
because it appeared directly aimed at Friday's PSC
discussion.  Irish Ambassador Kelleher reportedly opened the
meeting by waving the article in the air and imploring his
colleagues to protect the confidentiality of internal EU
deliberations.  Poloff pointed out that the timing of the
latest US demarche was a coincidence, as we were previously
unaware that the PSC was scheduled to discuss the issue on
that day.  (COMMENT: Our demarche was received badly not so
much because of its substance, but because of the way it was
presented.  Our UK contact faulted the Irish and the Council
Secretariat for the way the demarche was handled in the PSC, 

SIPDIS
and also the awkward timing that made it seem, along with the
FT article, tailor-made to influence the April 2 discussion.
END COMMENT). 

-----------------------------------------
National Positions: France versus Denmark
----------------------------------------- 

4. (S/NF) According to our UK contact, France staked out a
"zero flexibility" position on lifting the embargo, and is
opposed to any talk of applying conditionality (i.e. by
insisting on further human rights progress by China and/or
strengthening the Code of Conduct prior to lifting the
embargo).  The Danes are reportedly still leading the
opposition, and have circulated to EU partners a list of ten
human rights conditions that they believe China should meet
before the embargo is lifted (we have not yet obtained a copy
of this list).  Other EU Member States are lining up
somewhere in between, although "all agree in principle" that
the embargo should be lifted if certain conditions are met.
The debate from now on will focus on defining conditions and
timing. 

5. (S/NF) Following is a summary of national interventions
made at the April 2 PSC: 

-- France: The embargo is anachronistic and must go; willing
to discuss timing but not conditionality because China would
not accept human rights conditionality; likewise would be
contradictory to enhance the Code of Conduct specifically for
China while also lifting the embargo; opposed also to making
Code of Conduct legally binding; wants issue to remain
political; opposed to sending it down to working groups. 

-- Denmark: Any decision to lift the embargo must be linked
to specific Chinese steps on human rights; EU also needs to
review Code of Conduct to ensure that lifting the embargo
does not result in increased arms sales to China. 

-- Germany: EU must consider regional impact of lifting the
embargo; now is not a good time to lift embargo (COMMENT: The
Germans appear to have moved closer to the Danes in recent
weeks, and are now the largest EU member state with serious
reservations about lifting the embargo.  One report of the
discussion suggests that "the tough German position, coupled
with the strength of US views, might be tempering French
enthusiasm."  END COMMENT). 

-- UK: Should be further study by working groups to identify
implications for human rights and regional stability, and to
examine options for strengthening Code of Conduct (COMMENT:
Our Hungarian contact reports that the UK is fundamentally
closer to the French end of the spectrum than the Danish.
The UK, like France, does not favor making the Code of
Conduct legally binding.  END COMMENT). 

-- Greece: Should explore gestures China could make on human
rights without explicitly linking them to lifting the
embargo; should not link regional stability to lifting
embargo; "provocatively" proposed that the Code of Conduct be
made legally binding.  (COMMENT: Our contacts report that the
Greek position on lifting the embargo is closer to France
than any other Member State.  END COMMENT). 

-- Ireland: Supports sending the issue back to working groups
(in part to keep the EU from making any decision during its
Presidency). 

-- Netherlands: Central consideration should be possible
release of political prisoners from the 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown. 

-- Czech Republic: Supports French position that issue should
remain political; silent on other points (COMMENT: Our UK
contact said that the Czech position is generally understood
to be informed by that country's interest in selling radar
equipment to China, as described ref D.  END COMMENT). 

-- Sweden: Working groups should further study issues of
human rights, regional stability, and enhancing the Code of
Conduct. 

-- Austria: Should explore gestures on human rights that
China could make but avoid linkage to lifting the embargo;
should conduct a general (i.e. non China-specific) review of
Code of Conduct. 

-- Italy: Intervened with same points as Austria. 

-- Belgium: More discussion needed of implications, including
on human rights, of any decision to lift embargo. 

-- Commission: Took no position on lifting embargo but said
EU should remain focused on human rights. 

Other member states did not intervene in the PSC discussion. 

-------------------------------------
Timeline: Back to the Working Groups?
------------------------------------- 

6. (S/NF) The PSC will meet again on this issue on April 7,
when it is expected to approve an "issues paper" which will
then be sent through COREPER to FMs for discussion at the
April 26 GAERC.  According to our UK and Hungarian contacts,
the paper is intended as a tour d'horizon for the GAERC
discussion.  It will not contain recommendations, and FMs are
not expected to take a decision.  Instead, they will likely
send the paper back down to the PSC for re-examination.  Most
PSC Ambassadors, having satisfied the French desire for a
ministerial discussion in April, will then press France to
accept the majority preference for sending the issue back to
the working groups.  The working groups would need two to
three months, minimum, to complete their assessments and
submit their papers to the PSC (EU working groups are
comprised of capital-based experts who rarely meet more than
once per month).  The relevant working groups are COHUM
(human rights), COASI (Asia Directors), and COARM
(conventional arms exports). 

7. (S/NF) What all this means is that the debate will likely
continue well into the Dutch Presidency.  Already, Member
States are beginning to look toward the December EU-China
Summit as a possible timeframe for any decision to lift the
embargo.  We have heard they are also looking at the US
electoral calendar and quietly wondering whether it would be
worth holding off their decision until November or December
in the hopes of sneaking it past the US radar.  They have not
and will not discuss such issues openly, even amongst each
other in the PSC, but our UK contact confirms that quiet
conversations and suggestive comments are going on in the
wings. 

---------------------
Next Steps for the US
--------------------- 

8. (S/NF) Our efforts have managed to slow down the momentum
in favor of removing the arms embargo, but have not killed
this idea outright.  In addition to the ongoing diplomatic
dialogue on this issue, we recommend the following steps to
help us keep the pressure on European governments: 

-- We should coordinate closely with Japan, and perhaps also
the ROK.  According to numerous EU interlocutors, the
Japanese have become increasingly active on this issue, but
their efforts appear so far uncoordinated with our own.
While this may have served our interests in the sense that it
gave the Europeans the impression that Japan's concerns were
genuine and not dictated by Washington, it is now time to
begin coordinating our efforts, so that Europeans recognize
that other key players in the region share our regional
stability concerns. 

-- We should engage the European Parliament, and particularly
members of its Human Rights Committee.  The EP is already on
record opposing an end to the embargo.  By calling attention
to EU deliberations and ongoing Chinese human rights abuses,
the EP could increase the political heat on member state
governments against any decision to lift the embargo. 

-- We should consider increasing our public statements and
press briefings for European audiences, on the assumption
that more scrutiny by European publics would help our views
on this issue, especially as regards human rights. 

-- We should increase our engagement with institutional and
member state representatives to the COHUM, COASI and COARM
working groups.  In this way we could ensure that our views
on human rights, regional stability and the Code of Conduct
are fully understood by those experts who will be supplying
recommendations to the political groups for discussion. 

-- Additionally, as suggested ref B, we recommend the USG
begin considering options for how the EU might strengthen
controls on arms exports to China in a post-embargo scenario.
 The worst case for us would be for the EU to lift its
embargo without having in place some sort of new mechanism
for controlling the transfer of arms and sensitive
technologies to China. 

Schnabel

SECRET: VLADIVOSTOK11, RUSSKIY ISLAND — THEY WILL BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME, THEN

INFO  LOG-00   EEB-00   AID-00   AMAD-00  CA-00    CIAE-00  COME-00
      INL-00   DODE-00  DOEE-00  DOTE-00  DS-00    FAAE-00  FBIE-00
      UTED-00  VCI-00   H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01
      L-00     MOFM-00  MOF-00   VCIE-00  NSAE-00  ISN-00   OES-00
      NIMA-00  EPAU-00  MA-00    ISNE-00  SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00
      TRSE-00  NCTC-00  FMP-00   R-00     EPAE-00  SHEM-00  DSCC-00
      PRM-00   DRL-00   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   FA-00    SWCI-00
      SNKP-00  SEEE-00  SANA-00    /001W

P 160724Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1260
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
UNCLAS VLADIVOSTOK 000011

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV ECON SENV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSKIY ISLAND -- THEY WILL BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME, THEN WHAT?

REF: 2009 Vladivostok 0087

1. Summary: Many were surprised when in 2007, then President Vladimir Putin announced that the 2012 APEC summit would be held on Russkiy Island, an empty, undeveloped island just South of Vladivostok. On February 5, 2010, Consular Officer and USAID Representative visited the island, taking the ferry from Vladivostok. Construction has commenced, and due to the work we saw, and the construction standards they are building to, we believe that the construction on the island will be completed in time for the APEC summit in autumn 2012 (Note that there is discussion about moving up the date of the summit two months from November to September due to the harsh winter weather).

They Will Build It and They Will Come

2. Russkiy Island was a closed, military island, little more than a place for camping or a good picnic in summer or ice fishing in winter. When it was announced that the 2012 APEC summit would be held on Russkiy Island, there was a lot of concern about the cost of the project, especially since Russkiy Island had no infrastructure. Everything for APEC would have had to have been built from scratch. The island lacked water and power, and the roads were only gravel. Actually, the roads were so treacherous and impassable at places that we were forced to turn around at one point and even assisted another car stuck in the snow.

3. On our drive around the island we were struck by the enduring aesthetic beauty of the well constructed brick and stone buildings dating from the czarist times. The island is also home to several distinctly unattractive Soviet era officers' residential apartment buildings that are the common concrete panel construction. There are two old forts and large artillery batteries that attest to the significant defensive role the island played in protecting Vladivostok during WWII. Governor Darkin maintains an impressive dacha on the island as does the President of Russia. There are no stores, gas stations, restaurants, or other amenities on the island. The few year-round residents rely on the ferry to the mainland for all their shopping needs.

4. Even though the weather was below freezing (-20 C), the construction was ongoing and a great deal of progress has already been made. The site preparations are being accomplished quickly as hundreds of hectares of forests are being or have already been clear-cut. The felled trees are being pushed aside into enormous piles by bulldozers. As there are no remaining obstacles to land leveling for foundation slabs, massive earth moving equipment is able to rapidly carve and reshape the natural rolling hills to accelerate construction. We did not see any evidence of erosion mitigation barriers in place, raising doubts about how well protected the marine environment will be around the island. Roads to and from the work sites from the dock yards have been constructed and several have already been paved with asphalt. The road substrates are typical for Russia - a mixture of course, ungraded, slate, rock, and dirt. No compression is applied to the substrates and only a thin layer of gravel is spread prior to paving.

5. The contractor is using relatively simple construction techniques for the buildings. The superstructure of all the buildings is steel I-beams with floors being poured in place on galvanized steel. Exterior walls are concrete blocks and mortar. The use of drop ceilings will permit the quick interior fit outs with ventilation and electrical wiring. This is essentially the construction form used for parking garages and shopping centers and is typical of the Tvoi Dom and Crokus City, and the Crocus-Expo International Exposition Center; Moscow facilities built, owned and operated by the billionaire Aras Agalarov, President of the Crokus Group and the general contractor for the Russkiy Island development project. This construction facades will be formed from glass, tile, metal or glass panels providing architectural detail and variety to the otherwise uninspired uniform rectangular blocks.

6. The water and sewage infrastructure seems to be being built to a higher standard than many other facets of the project. The contractor is using advanced double walled PVC pipes (not steel) and poured-in-place juncture housing for manhole access. Vladivostok itself has no sewage treatment facilities. We noticed that of the several manufacturers of excavation and land moving equipment are represented at the site; the vast majority of the equipment was Hitachi. We saw only one Caterpillar bulldozer and no Liebherr equipment so common on Sakhalin. A very large and elaborate "oceanarium" (ocean aquarium) is also under construction and should become an attractive tourist destination. Unfortunately, access to the aquarium construction site is restricted so we were unable to inspect it or get a close-up view.

7. Most of the thousands of construction workers appeared to be from Central Asia, although we heard that many nationalities are represented, including laborers from Mexico. There are several large camps for the laborers who are bussed to and from the construction sites on busses with Moscow license plates series `199 RUS', presumably because they are registered to Crocus, the Moscow based general contractor.

8. While we took a ferry, construction on the two large bridges that will connect the island to the mainland appears to be proceeding apace. Since the bridge is the most important part of the project (and at US$1.5 billion, the most expensive), the public believes that it is being constructed to international standards. As safety and quality are being taken into consideration for the bridge, this part of the project will likely pose the greatest challenge in meeting the deadline for the APEC summit. The general contractor for the bridge construction is a local company from Ussurisk that has no previous experience building bridges. We learned that the sand for the bridge's massive concrete trusses is being shipped by barges from North Korea.

9. While impressive progress is being made on the island's construction projects, it is apparent that speed is the top priority and environmental concerns, aesthetics, and perhaps quality are all to be sacrificed in order to ensure that the ambitious deadline is met.

Then What?

10. The 2012 APEC summit is meant to be the core of the greater Far East Development Program that will help develop the Russian Far East (RFE). Federal funding for numerous projects associated with APEC preparations is estimated to be $10 billion. One optimistic economist, specializing in municipal and regional strategic planning, expressed the opinion that that figure will be matched by private investment. However, a random survey of Vladivostok's taxi drivers reflected a more pessimistic belief that the project will attract no private investment and that at least half of the $10 billion from the GOR will be stolen. It is said that seven percent of all contracts will be given to the President's Office and the consensus seems to be that the entire project was conceived to facilitate the misappropriation of "budget" funds.

11. The plan is to locate a new Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU), a combination of all universities in the Vladivostok area, at the APEC site on Russkiy Island. The inconvenient location is creating a lot of concern among university students. FEFU will create a strong knowledge base and there is talk about creating an investment zone on Russkiy Island complete with business incubators for high-tech start-ups. However, while the recently adopted federal strategic plan for the development of the RFE through the year 2025 emphasizes the need to diversify the region's economy through the commercialization of innovative technologies, doubts remain about the ability of the region to compete in the technology sphere with its Asian neighbors.

12. If all goes well, preparations for the 2012 APEC summit will leave the Vladivostok area with a developed island, new bridges, an updated transportation system, renovated airport, opera house, "oceanarium", sports stadium, and many improvements to the city itself. There will be a residual effect for the citizens of Vladivostok as the city is expected to receive a new sewage treatment facility, installation of natural gas connections to residents throughout the city, and moving oil tanks from the downtown area. But the real test is whether Russia decides, and makes clear to its neighbors, that it is indeed open for business and welcomes new investment and joint ventures. That "improvement" could account for more foreign investment than all the shiny new projects combined.
ARMBRUSTER

CONFIDENTIAL: COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME: ROUND ONE

VZCZCXRO0687
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0103/01 0411705
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101705Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6700
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000103 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV KCRM KCOR BU
SUBJECT: COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME: ROUND ONE GOES TO THE
NEW GOVERNMENT 

REF: A. 09 SOFIA 508
     B. 09 SOFIA 548
     C. 09 SOFIA 642 

Classified By: AMB JAMES WARLICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

1.  (C) Summary: Elected on an anti-corruption and organized
crime platform, the GERB government has made good on its
campaign promises and taken some positive steps.  Important
reforms, bolstered by political will from the top, have
ratcheted up the pressure against previously untouchable
organized crime figures and enabled marquee busts of a few
large well-equipped organized crime groups.  At the same
time, these arrests have highlighted weaknesses in the
judicial system as judges allow members of these groups to
make bail and delay proceedings despite prosecutors'
assurances of airtight evidence against them.  In private
meetings with the Ambassador, the government has confirmed
its commitment to fight organized crime, but this may be a
losing battle if it is unable to convince the judiciary to
make the reforms necessary to allow prosecutors to do their
jobs and keep dangerous criminals in prison.  End Summary. 

PROGRESS ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION
----------------------------------------- 

2.  (C) In its short time in office, the government has
completed difficult reforms and personnel changes necessary
to make law enforcement more effective.   It has revamped law
enforcement by removing 26 of the 28  regional police chiefs,
many of whom were corrupt or incompetent, established
embassy-recommended interagency counter organized crime task
forces, and passed new laws to resolve jurisdictional
conflicts between the State Agency for National Security
(DANS) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI).  As a result,
coordination between law enforcement and the prosecutor's
office has dramatically improved.  Chief Prosecutor Boris
Velchev, a Socialist appointee, confided to the Ambassador
during a February 1 meeting that he has the complete support
of the PM and the government to "declare war" on the 200 to
300 most dangerous organized crime figures, including the 20
to 50 bosses who are household names (ref A). 

3.  (C) Structural reforms and clear political will have
brought some quick and convincing results, including
impressive operations in December against two notorious
organized crime gangs known as "the Impudents" and "the
Crocodiles."  The government arrested 30 members of the
Impudent gang believed to have carried out 19 high profile
ransom kidnappings over the past several years.  Breaking up
this group was a priority from day one for the new government
due to this group's use of sophisticated technology and
techniques along with the psychological effect the
kidnappings had on the population.  Similarly, the Crocodile
gang, composed mainly of car thieves and highway robbers,
terrorized mostly Turkish citizens driving through Bulgaria
to Germany. 

4.  (C) Most recently, the police launched operation
"Octopus" in which they arrested 12 people on February 10
believed to be involved in a powerful organized crime group
that has operated for the last 10 years.  These busts were a
public relations coup for the government in that they
targeted well-known groups that previous governments had been
powerless to stop.  The government has had even more success
arresting former government officials for corruption.  To
date, two former ministers have been indicted and five other
ministers from the previous two governments will likely face
corruption-related charges.  This is on top of at least 10
high-level arrests of mayors, judges, agency heads, and MPs
for corruption since last summer. 

JUDICIAL REFORM LAGS BEHIND
--------------------------- 

5.  (C) Despite successes on the organized crime and
corruption front, the powerful "big fish" mostly remain at
large due to the serious flaws in the overly formalistic
judicial system (ref B).  No case illustrates this better
than the Marinov brothers and the January 5 assassination of
Boris "Bobby" Tsankov.  Tsankov, a self-styled journalist and
entertainment figure with extensive underworld ties, was
gunned down in typical gangland fashion in downtown Sofia.
This unsolved murder is reminiscent of the approximately 140
other Mafia hits that have taken place in Bulgaria from 1993
to 2010.  It is widely believed that Krassimir "Big Margin"
Marinov and his brother Nikolay "Small Margin" Marinov
ordered the hit to prevent Tsankov from providing evidence to
the chief prosecutor's office.  The Marinovs have been
embroiled in serious organized crime and murder cases dating
back to 2005 (ref A), but were free on bail at the time of
the shooting thanks to legal loopholes that allow the
perpetual postponement of serious cases.  After the Tsankov
killing, Little Margin's whereabouts are unknown and Big
Margin was briefly detained for the killing before being
released due to a lack of evidence (he was later arrested
again on drug-related charges). 

6.  (C) Even the successful operation against the Impudent
gang has not been brought to a satisfactory conclusion.  Of
the 30 members initially arrested, 21 have been released from
jail, including one of the ringleaders, Anton "the Hamster"
Petrov.  Petrov was released on BGN 20,000 (USD 15,000) bail
after the Appeals Court determined that the MOI and
prosecutors had failed to provide new and convincing evidence
against him.  Since Petrov's release, two witnesses who were
cooperating with the police have reneged on promises to
testify against the kidnapping group. This is a familiar
pattern that has repeated itself in many other important
organized crime cases. 

REFORM EFFORTS FACE DIFFICULT HURDLES
------------------------------------- 

7.  (C) Chief Prosecutor Velchev and Minister of Justice
Popova told the Ambassador in separate meetings that reform
of the criminal procedure code had run into fierce opposition
from the "old guard" (politicians and judges) allied with
defense lawyers and NGOs using the language of human rights
to sink necessary reform.  Changes to the criminal procedure
code would close legal loopholes and likely speed up
organized crime and corruption cases, which drag on for years
in the current system (ref A).  Reforming the code is widely
viewed as essential to shift the balance from a system overly
favorable to defendants to a more just and effective system.
Among other things, the proposed changes to the criminal
procedure code would allow police to testify in court,
provide a back-up defense lawyer and increase fines if the
defendant's attorney fails to show up at court (a common
tactic for postponements), and simplify evidence collection
procedures.  Without radical reform, Minister Popova told the
Ambassador that Bulgaria's judiciary could not cope with its
entrenched organized crime problem.  Radical reforms such as
significantly changing how judges and prosecutors are
appointed, disciplined, and promoted (ref C) would require
constitutional amendments that need 161 of the 240 votes in
parliament to pass.  GERB is a minority government with 114
MPs, making constitutional reform difficult. 

8.  (C) Comment: The GERB government has set ambitious goals
in combating organized crime and has shown it has the
political will to fight established criminal enterprises and
entrenched interests.  Still, this will not be an easy fight,
and it will be difficult to achieve convictions and
reasonable sentencing of "big fish" if the judicial system is
not recalibrated to confront Bulgaria's organized crime
problem.  Radical judicial reform advocated by the Minister
of Justice will not happen overnight given the highly
independent and conservative judicial system and the daunting
constitutional barriers preventing rapid reform.  Despite
these challenges, incremental reform is possible with the
government's strong support.  In the end, the government will
be judged not on high profile arrests, but on its ability to
speed up corruption cases, close legal loop holes, and
successfully lock up previously untouchable organized crime
figures.  End Comment. 

WARLICK

SECRET//NOFORN: DAMASCUS384, RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY

VZCZCXRO9472
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0384/01 1541323
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031323Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6431
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000384 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PREL SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA:  DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY 

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

1.  (S/NF) Summary:  As the U.S. continues its re-engagement
with Syria, it may help us achieve our goals if we understand
how SARG officials pursue diplomatic goals. Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his
father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a
level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any
direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his
judgment.  Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel:
the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to
some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting.
The SARG foreign policy apparatus suffers from apparent
dysfunctionality and weaknesses in terms of depth and
resources but the SARG punches above its weight because of
the talents of key individuals.  SARG officials generally
have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are
sufficiently professional to translate those instructions
into recognizable diplomatic practice.  But in a diplomatic
world that is generally oiled by courtesy and euphemism, the
Syrians don't hesitate to be nasty in order to achieve their
objectives.  The behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.
End Summary. 

-------------------
Gaming Out the SARG
------------------- 

2.  (S/NF) As the U.S. moves forward to re-engage Syria, we
are well aware that Syrian officials have long been famous
for their abilities as tough negotiators.  The late President
Hafiz al-Asad could wear down his interlocutors through sheer
staying power in 10-hour meetings without breaks; the wealth
of detail and historical perspective he brought to those
discussions also tested the mettle of those who were
attempting to persuade him to a course of action he
questioned.  His son Bashar is neither as shrewd nor as
long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage
diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed
to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by
extension, his judgment.  Bashar's presentations on world
affairs suggest that he would prefer to see himself as a sort
of philosopher-king, the Pericles of Damascus.  Playing to
Bashar's intellectual pretentions is one stratagem for
gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be
time-consuming but could well produce results.  Bashar's
vanity represents another Achilles heel:  the degree to which
USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects
the prospects for achieving our goals.  Every interaction we
have with the SARG is, in fact, a transaction and the better
equipped we are to understand the dynamics of our
negotiations the better able we will be to achieve our
objectives.  Post has assembled the compendium below in an
attempt to reflect our experience in dealing with the SARG in
the hope that Washington-based interlocutors will find it
useful. 

------------------------------------
A Compendium of Diplomatic Behaviors
------------------------------------ 

3. (S/NF) Capacity:  SARG scope of action is limited the
President's span of control.  He is generally able to monitor
 the activities of his foreign minister, political/media
advisor, intelligence chiefs, and brother Maher.  At various
times, his vice president and national security advisor are
also active and therefore under his direct supervision.
While communication flows between him and his subordinates,
it appears not to be formalized and information is highly
compartmented.  Subordinates' portfolios are not clearly
delineated; overlapping areas create tension and competition.
 There is no "interagency" policy development process that
lays out advantages and disadvantages of policy choices.
There are, as far as we know, no briefing or decision memos.
The bench is not deep; beyond the principals lie only a few
trusted staffers.  Bashar and his team also find it difficult
to juggle more than one major foreign policy issue at a time. 

4. (S/NF) Protocol:  SARG officials are sticklers for
diplomatic protocol, although they are not experts on the
international conventions from which it is derived.   The
SARG places a high value on protocolary forms that ensure
respectful treatment of state officials (despite bilateral
differences) because such forms guarantee that the President
and his representatives are shown proper courtesies by a
world that is often at odds with Syria.  (This focus on
protocol underlies the continuing Syrian unhappiness over the
absence of a U.S. ambassador.)  Protocol conventions also
reinforce the notion of equal relations between sovereign
states and the SARG insists that communications between it
and foreign embassies comply with traditional diplomatic
practice.  The MFA receives a flood of diplomatic notes from
Damascus-based foreign missions daily which are apportioned
out to various offices for action.  The diplomatic notes,
translated into Arabic by the senders, become the paper trail
for SARG decisions.  The MFA bureaucracy does not appear to
generate cover memoranda that provide background to requests
or recommendations for decisions.  Many such notes, possibly
all notes from the U.S. Embassy, are sent to the Minister
himself for review.  The MFA does not have internal email,
only fax and phone.  Instructions to Syrian missions abroad
are often sent by fax; sometimes the MFA fails to provide
instructions at all. 

5. (S/NF) The Suq:  In dealing with the U.S., the Syrians see
every encounter as a transaction.  The level and composition
of the Syrian side of any meeting is carefully calculated in
terms of protocol and the political message being sent; a
lunch invitation must be interpreted as more than just the
Arab compulsion to hospitality ) who hosts the lunch is as
important as who attends the meetings.  When it comes to
content, the Syrians seek to gain the highest value
deliverable for the lowest price or no price at all.  During
the re-engagement process, the SARG has attempted to extract
high profile USG gestures in exchange for relief of
operational constraints on the Embassy.  The SARG has been
uncharacteristically forward-leaning in allowing discussions
on a New Embassy Compound site to develop as far as they
have; actual closure on a land deal, however, is probably
contingent on U.S. delivery of a SARG desirable, e.g., the
announcement that a U.S. ambassador will be sent to Damascus.
 The SARG's focus on embassy operations is in part rooted in
their paranoia over USG intelligence collection and
penetration of Syrian society but the imposition of
constraints on mission activities has also conveniently
created an embassy list of desiderata that the SARG seeks to
use as cost-free concessions.  FM Muallim candidly
acknowledged this approach when he commented in February to
Charge that he had not yet decided what he needed in exchange
for permission to reopen the American School in Damascus. 

6.  (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation:  The President's
self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy
formulation and diplomatic activity.   Meetings, visits,
trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are
pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or
difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates.
The President responds with anger if he finds himself
challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting.  He
seems to avoid direct confrontation.  When engaged in summit
diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his
confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008,
Riyadh Summit in April 2009).   His foreign policy
subordinates are all "employees" without constituencies or
influence independent of the President's favor.  Their
overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the
appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions.
They are particularly cautious in the presence of other
Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more
expansive and candid responses. 

7. (S/NF) Deceit:  SARG officials at every level lie.  They
persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the
contrary.  They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie.
While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential
punitive action from their own government, senior level
officials generally lie when they deem a topic too
"dangerous" to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they
have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN,
Hezbollah arms supplies, etc).  When a senior SARG official
is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating  the lack of
veracity but discovering the true reasons for it. 

8. (S/NF) Passivity:  SARG foreign policy is formulated in
response to external developments (changes in regional
leadership, initiatives from the West, etc).  The SARG does
not launch initiatives and generally seeks cover from allies
when exploring new courses of action.  The SARG is much more
confident on the Arab level than on the international level.
SARG policy responses are generally tactical and operational,
exploratory rather than decisive, oblique instead of direct.
Strategy, to the extent it exists, emerges from a series of
tactical choices.  The lack of initiative appears rooted in
an underlying sense of diplomatic powerlessness.  Every
foreign policy embarrassment in Syria's history lies under
the surface of a generally false projection of assertiveness.
 That assertiveness is sometimes read as arrogance. 

9.  (S/NF) Antagonism:  Every Syrian diplomatic relationship
contains an element of friction.  There is some current
friction, for example, in the Syrians' relations with the
Turks and the French.  The Syrians are not troubled by
discord; they seek an upper hand in any relationship by
relying on foreign diplomats' instinctive desire to resolve
problems. By withholding a solution, the SARG seeks to
control the pace and temperature of the relationship.  SARG
officials artificially restrict their availability  and can
engage in harsh verbal attacks to intimidate and rattle
foreign diplomats.  SARG officials delight in disparaging
their interlocutors behind their backs for allowing
themselves to be cowed.  On the international level, the
President has indulged in personal criticisms of foreign
leaders; unlike his father, he deliberately makes enemies
when he doesn't necessarily have to.  FM Muallim can behave
similarly but he probably does so on the President's
instructions. 

10. (S/NF) Complacency:  SARG leadership genuinely believes
that SARG foreign policy has been, is being, and will be
vindicated by events.  They also genuinely believe their
foreign policy is based on morally defensible and
intellectually solid principles, although it is usually
reactive and opportunistic.  Existing policy choices are
immutable unless the President decides to change them, in
which case, his new policies, despite any appearances to the
contrary, are consistent with "traditional" principles.
Baathism infuses foreign policy principles (Pan-Arabism) but
pragmatism is more important.  More recently, Bashar's like
or dislike of other leaders plays a role in policy
formulation. 

11. (S/NF) The Non Sequitur:  When Syrian officials don't
like a point that has been made to them, they frequently
resort to an awkward changes in subject to deflect perceived
criticism.  Syrian officials seem to think they've scored a
verbal hit by employing a facile non sequitur, usually in the
form of a counter-accusation.  When the SARG's human rights
record is raised with Muallim, for example, he often raises
Israel's December-January Gaza operation or, more recently,
asks if the U.S. will accept the 1300 Al Qaeda sympathizers
in Syrian jails.   The non sequitur is intended to stop
discussion of the unwelcome topic while subtly intimidating
the interlocutor with the threat of raising a subject that is
putatively embarrassing to him or her.  When the non sequitur
is deployed, it is clear that the SARG official is on the
defensive. 

12.  (S/NF) Comment:  Given the apparent dysfunctionality of
the SARG foreign policy apparatus and its weaknesses in terms
of depth and resources, the SARG's ability to punch above its
weight internationally is noteworthy.  Much of its strength
appears to lie in the talents of key individuals and their
ability to collaborate with each other, despite tensions and
rivalries.  SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical,
guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional
to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic
practice.  But the behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.  At
the end of the day, there are few who really like to deal
with the Syrians.  The SARG, well aware of its reputation,
however,  spends much of its energy ensuring that we have to. 

CONNELLY

SECRET: THE BRAZILIAN CONNECTION WITH IRAN AND

R 121450Z DEC 86
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1591
INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE POUCH
AMCONSUL RECIFE POUCH
AMCONSUL SALVADOR DA BAHIA POUCH
BELO HORIZONTE POUCH
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 13835 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

E.O.12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL BR IR HO NU CE
SUBJECT:  THE BRAZILIAN CONNECTION WITH IRAN AND
THE CONTRAS 

REFS: (A)BRASILIA 13511, (B)BRASILIA 4799 

1.  (U) WITH THE UNRAVELING OF THE IRANIAN
ARMS/CONTRA AID SCANDAL, THE BRAZILIAN PRESS
CONTINUES TO POINT TO A SO-CALLED "BRAZILIAN
CONNECTION".  WEEKLY NEWS MAGAZINE "VEJA" AND
CONSERVATIVE "O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO" RAN STORIES
IN THE LAST FEW DAYS ON THE SUPPOSED BRAZILIAN
INVOLVEMENT. 

2.  "ESTADO'S" DEFENSE EDITOR ROBERTO GODOY WROTE
ABOUT ALLEGED U.S. ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN HAWK
MISSILES FROM BRAZIL IN 1986, AN UNUSUAL REQUEST,
ACCORDING TO GODOY, FOR BRAZIL DOES NOT HAVE SUCH
SYSTEM IN ITS INVENTORY.  THE FIRST CONTACT, GODOY
SAID, WAS MADE IN EARLY 1986 BY AN "ADVISOR" TO H.
ROSS PEROT TO A LOCAL ARMS PRODUCER, AND THE
SECOND IN MAY, TO A FORMER MEMBER OF THE BRAZILIAN
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVED WITH THE ARMS
INDUSTRY.  GODOY EXPLAINED THAT THE AMERICAN
PROPOSED TO TRADE HAWKS FOR THE MORE ADVANCED
SPARROW, NOT SPECIFYING WHERE THE WEAPONS WOULD
GO.  IN BOTH INSTANCES, HE CONTINUED, THE AMERICAN
WAS TURNED DOWN BECAUSE THE BRAZILIANS SUSPECTED
THE CONTRAS OR IRAN AS RECIPIENTS AND SAID
GOVERNMENT RULES WOULD NOT ALLOW SUCH "NEBULOUS"
TRANSFERS OR SALES TO A NATION AT WAR.  GODOY ALSO
REFERRED TO JAIRO IWAMASSA GUINOZA'S CONNECTION
(SEE REFTEL A) RESTATING THAT GUINOZA WAS NEVER
ABLE TO PURCHASE ANY ARMS FROM BRAZILIAN
MANUFACTURERS. 

3.  "VEJA'S" STORY CLAIMS TO PRESENT "PROOF" OF
BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CONTRAS AND IRAN,
BUT IT IS SHORT ON EVIDENCE AND SOURCES.  ONE OF
THE "PROOFS" IS A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH OF FIVE BOXES
OF HAND GRENADES MADE BY COMPANHIA DE EXPLOSIVOS
VALPARAIBA IN SAO PAULO.  ACCORDING TO THE
ARTICLE, THE GRENADES WERE SHIPPED TO SRI LANKA IN
1984 AND IT SPECULATES THAT SOME OF THEM WERE
DIVERTED TO HONDURAS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, A PORT
STOP ALONG THE WAY.  "VEJA" DOES NOT KNOW HOW MANY
CONTRABAND WEAPONS ENDED UP IN THE CONTRA'S
TRAINING CAMP, NOR THE SIZE OF THE ORIGINAL
SHIPMENT TO COLOMBO, BUT SUGGESTS THAT THE
TRANSFER WAS MADE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE BUYER,
FOR SRI LANKA DID NOT PROTEST THE INCOMPLETE
SHIPMENT.  ANOTHER "PROOF" WAS FINDING TWO
HONDURAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS TRAINING AT EMBRAER
ALSO IN 1984.  HONDURAS HAD SIGNED A US DOLS 10
MILLION CONTRACT "FINANCED BY RONALD REAGAN'S
GOVERNMENT" FOR THE PURCHASE OF TUCANOS.  IN
"VEJA'S" OPINION, NICARAGUA NOW HAS EVIDENCE TO
MAKE A CLAIM FROM ITAMARATY ON BRAZIL'S SUPPORT TO
NICARAGUA'S FOES. 

4. (U) "VEJA" ALSO REHASHES THE STORY OF U.S.
CITIZEN GEORGE PERRY'S DEATH IN 1983 IN NEW YORK.
SUPPOSEDLY PERRY WAS KILLED BECAUSE HE DIDN'T
FULFILL HIS PART ON A US DOLS 20 MILLION DEAL TO
DELIVER ARMS TO IRAN, AND THE GOB'S VISA REFUSAL
FOR THE U.S. INVESTIGATOR OF THE CRIME.  IN
ADDITION, VARIOUS ATTEMPTS AT SHADY SALES TO
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE EARLY 80'S ARE
DESCRIBED. THE STORY ENDS WITH THE UNDOCUMENTED
ASSERTION THAT IRAN PURCHASED IN 1983 US DOLS 500
MILLION WORTH OF "EXPLOSIVES" AND THAT SINCE THEN
THE GOB HAS "TENDED TO IRAN'S REQUESTS" INCLUDING
SENDING A "PLANE LOAD OF ARMS" LAST WEEK. 

5.  (LOU) COMMENT:  THE BRAZILIAN PRESS IS
SEARCHING FOR BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE
US/IRAN/CONTRA ARMS TRAFFIC BUT SO FAR THE
EVIDENCE IS NOT CONVINCING.  MOST OF THE INSTANCES
CITED BY THE PRESS OCCURRED A FEW YEARS BEFORE THE
U.S. BEGAN ITS SECRET CONTACTS.  ATTEMPTS AT SALES
MUST HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN MADE INDEPENDENT OF U.S.
EFFORTS.  IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, "JORNAL DO
BRASIL" REPORTED IN JUNE 1984 NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE
SALE OF ONE MILLION GRENADES TO A SUBSIDIARY OF
THE VALPARAIBA COMPANY MENTIONED ABOVE.  ENOUGH
TALES OF INTRIGUE AND POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING
SHADY ARMS DEALS MIGHT MAKE THE GOB CONSIDER THE
ADVANTAGES OF REQUIRING A NON-TRANSFER TO THIRD
PARTIES CLAUSE IN THEIR ARMS SALES CONTRACTS, A
REQUIREMENT NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR CURRENT ARMS
SALES POLICY GUIDELINES (SEE REFTEL B). 

SHLAUDEMAN

CONFIDENTIAL: DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL’S DREAM COALITION

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN ECON GM
SUBJECT: DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL'S DREAM COALITION
AFTER FIRST 100 DAYS

REF: 2009 BERLIN 1528 

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Greg Delawie for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

1. (C) Summary: One hundred days after Germany's black-yellow coalition took office, a strong, unified government led by Chancellor Merkel has yet to materialize. The much anticipated “dream coalition” comprised of Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister the Christian Social Union (CSU), and Free Democratic Party (FDP) which promised a unified conservative approach to the economy and “like minded” thinking on social welfare, the environment, and foreign policy has become bogged down in party politics with no end in sight. Recent polls show that the bickering may be at least partly to blame for the FDP's 5.6 percent fall in the polls, with it now down to 9 percent from its historic 14.6 percent election results (see septel) and the CSU plummet to an historic low of 41 percent. Indeed one minister is now threatening resignation. Sources from the three coalition parties have admitted to problems, blaming the other coalition parties, and downplaying their significance. Merkel has come under criticism within her own party for not taking strong public stands and reining in her coalition partners, instead staying above the political fray. The opposition, particularly the Social Democratic Party (SPD), is trying to capitalize on this “divided we rule” coalition with an eye toward unseating a teetering CDU-FDP coalition in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) in May elections, thereby tipping the CDU-FDP Bundesrat majority in its favor. Merkel is counting on better economic and political indicators after the NRW election followed by the release of the annual tax forecasts to congeal the coalition. If the CDU/FDP coalition fails in NRW, coalition divisions are likely to become more pronounced. End Summary.

Off to a Rocky Start
---------------------

2. (C) Concluding a coalition agreement in only three weeks, prior to her November 2 departure for Washington to address Congress and in time for the 9 November 20 year anniversary of German unity may have been Chancellor Merkel's first and only major success to date in marshaling coalition unity. But the feat may have had consequences. The haste to sign has left half-resolved differences on tax cuts, economic policy, Afghanistan, Turkey, health care, data protection (see reftel) and other issues that continue to gurgle to the surface. Important to recognize is that each party is operating under its own political pressures from different voting constituencies. The FDP's main goal is to deliver on campaign promises – particularly tax relief – and shore up its base, the CSU is desperate to regain its dominance in Bavaria, and the CDU is seeking to rebuild its eroded voter base. All three parties and the opposition are now gearing up for May 9 elections in NRW. This election in Germany's most populous state, referred to as a “small national election,” is regarded as a partial vote of confidence on the national coalition, and will determine the Bundesrat majority. If the NRW CDU-FDP coalition fails to return to government, the national CDU-FDP coalition will fall by six seats in the Bundesrat – from 37 to 31 seats – it will lose its majority. Such a loss could well hamper the government's ability to pass major financial or economic legislation.

3. (C) Each of the three coalition parties have pointed to the others for instigating tension. CDU party contact xxxxx accused the FDP of functioning as if it were still in the opposition. Senior SPD parliamentarian Hans-Ulrich Klose attributed the coalition strains to the FDP adjusting to being in government after 11 years in the opposition. FDP contact xxxxx accused the CDU/CSU of reacting to their own internal problems: for the CDU, its controversy over the Kunduz airstrike, and for the CSU, its involvement in a major bank scandal. The FDP also points to the CSU's strong rivalry with the FDP, with which it now governs in Bavaria. The CSU is still trying to recover from its historic low voting results in the September 2008 state elections, which forced it for the first time in 46 years to govern within a coalition. All parties, however, have downplayed the significance of the feuds, with senior CDU party operative xxxxx explaining in January that the party leaderships are just now settling in after an exhausting election campaign and intense coalition negotiations. He hoped (more than predicted) that the parties would soon settle into a more cooperative relationship. In January, Merkel called a small summit for coalition leadership with Westerwelle and Seehofer to smooth things over and commit to a new beginning. While the coalition's political edginess receded for a time, policy divisions continue to surface.

CDU/CSU vs FDP – the Economy
-----------------------------

4. (C) While CDU/CSU and FDP voters may be the most likely to cross over to the other party, their mainstay voter bases are different, with the CDU/CSU appealing to economically conservative voters who also support the social market economy, but are socially conservative. The FDP base is composed of free-market advocates, who are socially liberal and strong advocates of civil liberties. The FDP's campaign and continuing mantra has been for much larger tax cuts in 2011, worth 20-24 billion euros, apparently at the expense of both coalition unity and the better judgment of economic experts. The cuts would make getting the deficit back under the EU ceiling of 3 percent of GDP by 2013 nearly impossible. National debt will rise from 66 percent of GDP to 80 percent. There are growing public concerns over rising debt, but also about perceived disarray in the coalition's tax and budget policies. Merkel insists that a decision regarding the tax reduction plans will not be taken before May, when the overall tax revenue forecast is due. Waiting until May also means the coalition will not have to go public with unpopular consolidation measures until after the NRW elections. Finance Minister Schaeuble (CDU) appears unenthusiastic at best about further tax cuts. He has already said deficit reduction measures would have to start in 2011. The CSU has also called the FDP's call for speedy tax relief measures “unrealistic” despite the fact that it had included such a demand during its election campaign. The most recent squabble between the FDP and CSU is over FDP Health Minister Roesler's plans for health care reform which foresees more care options and the introduction of competition. Seehofer has rejected the proposal, holding fast against radical changes to the system. Roesler has indicated he might resign over this issue.

Foreign Policy
--------------

5. (C) Coalition feuding over economic and tax policy has trumped coalition divisions over foreign policy, although FM Westerwelle has managed a few disruptions in the latter. As a harbinger of hard times to come, as one of his first actions, Westerwelle opposed the naming of CDU Bundestag member Erika Steinbach to the foundation “Flight Expulsion and Reconciliation” citing possible damage to relations with Poland. As President of Germany's Federation of Expellees, Steinbach is disliked in Poland. While the numbers are disputed, the expellee community, which mainly votes CSU or CDU, has exerted influence on the issue. National and State CDU and CSU politicians came out in support of Steinbach with only Merkel keeping mum. The controversy continues, despite ongoing attempts to reach a compromise, threatening to drain coalition attention and good-will.

6. (C) Coalition strains have also surfaced on the issue of overseas deployments. Regarding a troop increase in Afghanistan, Westerwelle's position was at first muddled, as he tried to reflect his party's general negativity toward overseas military deployments while at the same time tending to his role as Germany's chief diplomat in the run-up to the London Conference. In the end, he (together with the opposition) likely played a role in achieving a lower-than-expected troop increase. Westerwelle also convinced the CDU to agree on gradually reducing German participation in UNIFIL. The CSU also rocked the coalition boat on Afghanistan, with Seehofer expressing general skepticism on a troop increase, although he later came around. In addition, CSU Secretary General Dobrindt has ridiculed the federal government's reconciliation concept in Afghanistan as a “cash for clunkers version for the Taliban.”

Comment
---------

7. (C) Chancellor Merkel may have ironically cast off the yoke of the Grand Coalition only now to be encumbered with a new FDP-CSU double yoke, restrained by an FDP bent on delivering on campaign promises and a CSU distracted over its rivalry with the FDP and internal problems. High expectations for the “dream coalition” are certainly in part to blame for the current polls, with popularity numbers for Merkel and Westerwelle both having suffered. Worried most, however, are the CDU and FDP politicians in NRW, who fear that the national coalition's squabbling could negatively impact their own chances in the May 9 elections. The leadership threesome – Merkel, Westerwelle, and Seehofer – may make an extra effort to get along, or at least appear to get along, as the NRW elections near. It is not clear that Westerwelle and the FDP, however, believe that it is the squabbling that is unhelpful, or rather its own inability to

deliver as yet on certain campaign promises. If it is the latter, more coalition tensions could ensue as Westerwelle begins to expend more energy as FDP Chairman and less as Foreign Minister, gearing up his party for its NRW campaign. Berlin is once again becoming bogged down in political squabbles as the NRW elections near.

8. (U) Consulate Munich contributed to this cable.

Murphy

CONFIDENTIAL: FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000157 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE
WITH FM WESTERWELLE ON TROOP INCREASE FOR AFGHANISTAN 

REF: A. BERLIN 138
     B. BERLIN 112 

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Defense Minister zu Guttenberg revealed in
a February 3 meeting with Ambassador Murphy that coalition
partner FM Westerwelle -- not the opposition Social
Democratic Party (SPD) -- had been the single biggest
obstacle
to the government seeking a bigger increase in German
troops for Afghanistan.  But even with the modest planned
troop increase of 500 (with 350 more in reserve), zu
Guttenberg said a restructuring of the current Bundeswehr
presence would allow Germany to increase the number of
soldiers involved in the training of Afghan National Army
(ANA) by more than 1,000.  While Westerwelle has portrayed
his skepticism about additional troops as principled, it
was also motivated by a desire to put zu Guttenberg "in his
place."  While the size of the troop increase is settled,
the length of the new ISAF mandate remains open.  The
government is hoping to have the new mandate approved by
the Bundestag before the end of February, with significant
(if not majority) support from the opposition SPD and
Greens.  END SUMMARY. 

WESTERWELLE: BIGGEST OBSTACLE 

2. (C) In explaining the lower-than-expected planned
increase in the number of German troops for Afghanistan, zu
Guttenberg told the Ambassador that Westerwelle's opening
position in the coalition negotiations on the new mandate
had been "not one additional soldier."  In that context, it
had been difficult to get agreement on any increase at
all.  (Comment: Zu Guttenberg proposed 1,500 additional
troops at the initial January 4 mini-cabinet meeting on
this issue.  End Comment.) 

DOING A LOT MORE WITH A LITTLE MORE 

3. (C) To help justify the need for more troops, zu
Guttenberg said he had forced the Bundeswehr to do a
complete review of all the existing positions in
Afghanistan, which had confirmed that some could be
eliminated in light of the new ISAF counterinsurgency
strategy.  He said a restructuring of the current
Bundeswehr presence, combined with the troop increase,
would boost the number of soldiers involved in the training
of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 280 to 1,400.  The
restructuring includes turning the battalion-size quick
reaction force based in Mazar into a "protection and
training" battalion.  A second such battalion will be
created in Kunduz by augmenting the existing infantry
company there with new troops.  Zu Guttenberg reiterated
that Germany strongly supports COMISAF's focus on
protection of the population and partnering with the Afghan
national security forces (ANSF), and that the German
"trainers" (i.e., the two new maneuver battalions) will
operate in the field with the ANSF. 

PUTTING ZU GUTTENBERG IN HIS PLACE 

4. (C) While zu Guttenberg said he is avoiding public
comment on whether the outcome of the coalition talks on
the new mandate is a "victory" for him or Westerwelle, FDP
Defense Policy Spokesman Elke Hoff told poloff separately
that Westerwelle's hard line against additional troops had
been motivated in part to "teach zu Guttenberg a lesson."
She claimed that zu Guttenberg had been too presumptuous
last fall in making speeches in Canada and the U.S. about
how Germany would significantly increase its troop
contribution to ISAF.  He might have been able to get
agreement on a higher ceiling had he engaged
parliamentarians first and showed "greater respect for the
political process." 

OPEN QUESTION: LENGTH OF THE MANDATE 

5. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that the cabinet would
formally agree on the proposed new ISAF mandate February 9
and that the first reading in the Bundestag would be
February 10.  FM Westerwelle is scheduled to speak on
behalf of the government in introducing the proposed
mandate.  The government is aiming to hold the final
Bundestag vote on the mandate -- following two weeks of
committee hearings -- on February 26.  Zu Guttenberg was 

BERLIN 00000157  002 OF 002 

confident that a large number (if not a majority) of
opposition politicians from the SPD and Greens would vote
in favor of the new mandate. 

6. (C) A February 2 meeting of state secretaries
tentatively agreed that the new mandate should run, as is
the custom, for one year, expiring in February 2011.  Zu
Guttenberg indicated, however, that it might be preferable to
stick to the length of the current mandate, which expires
in December 2010.  He expressed concern that having the
mandate lap over into early 2011 could lead to a premature
debate on withdrawal, before the new strategy really had a
chance to work.  (Comment: Another option under
consideration -- and favored by some in the Chancellery --
is a 18-month mandate, so that any debate on the future of
the troop presence would be put off until the fall of
2011.  But the MFA objects that this would only raise the
ire of the opposition and give them an excuse to oppose the
mandate.  End Comment.) 

REASSURING THE GERMANS ON COMMAND OF THE NORTH 

7. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that Germany very much
welcomed the planned inflow of U.S. forces into the north,
especially the helicopter assets, which filled a
long-standing shortfall.  He noted, however, that many in
Germany question whether the U.S. will be willing to accept
continued German leadership of RC-North in view of the
increased U.S. presence.  Ambassador Murphy assured him
that the U.S. had no issues working for the German command in
the North.
Murphy

CONFIDENTIAL: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000164 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020
TAGS: OTRA MARR NATO PARM PINS PREL PGOV GM AF IR
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES 

Classified By: Classified by Political M-C George Glass for reasons 1.4
 (b,d). 

1.  (C) German FM Westerwelle told Amb February 5 that it was
important to refocus Afghanistan efforts on civilian
reconstruction; that we needed to avoid suggesting German
troops engaged in less risk than other countries; that he did
not invite Iranian FM Mottaki to Germany or seek a meeting
with him; that any discussion of non-strategic nuclear
weapons needed to be conducted at 28 at NATO; and that he
could not influence any decision by the European Parliament
on the SWIFT agreement.  END SUMMARY.
2.  (C) The Ambassador asked about Westerwelle's first 100
days in office.  Though in an ebullient mood, Westerwelle
said things were very difficult (FDP slipped another
percentage point in the polls hours before the meeting).  He
said he had been in France February 4 for a joint cabinet
meeting, but that nothing substantive came of it.  He
observed that one never really knew what was going to happen
with Sarkozy involved. 

--------------
AFGHANISTAN
------------- 

3.  (C) The Ambassador reviewed his own recent trip to
Afghanistan.  He shared his impression that the Germans were
doing a superb job at all levels from the RC-North commander
on down.  He learned how critical mentoring and partnering
with Afghan security forces had become.  He noted that the
U.S. was sending substantial forces to RC-North, where they
would conduct training and be under German command.
Westerwelle responded that this was important for Germany and
for international cooperation.  The Ambassador added that the
U.S. was sending substantial helicopter support as well.  He
said that Germans could be proud of their troops in
Afghanistan.  Westerwelle responded that this was good news.
He said that the London Conference bore an excellent
conclusion, and was particularly useful for its focus on
civilian progress.  He emphasized the importance of
underscoring civilian reconstruction.
4.  (C) With a request for confidentiality, Westerwelle
referred to the January 20 "Bild Zeitung" interview with
General McChrystal, in which the general is quoted as urging
the Germans to take more risks.  Westerwelle recounted that
he himself had had to answer questions about this article for
ten days, explaining that the Germans were not "peace
soldiers" while  other countries provided the combat troops.
He said it was important that German troops not be
"relativized" and cast as second-class troops.  He observed
that Germany had originally deployed 3,500 troops, increased
that mandate to 4,500, and was now planning an increase of
another 500 plus a reserve.  He emphasized that this was a
major contribution compared with other European countries.
5.  (C) The Ambassador noted that he had gained the
impression in Afghanistan that police training was more
challenging than he had originally understood.  Troops were
usually required to provide force protection.  But German
police training was the best.
6.  (C) The Ambassador asked how the prospective February 26
Bundestag debate to extend the Bundeswehr mandate in
Afghanistan would play out.  Westerwelle said the question
was how large a majority would approve the new mandate.  He
said that SPD caucus chief Steinmeier displayed good will on
this issue.  However, SPD chairman Gabriel wanted to
politicize the issue for domestic political gain.
Nevertheless, he thought some in the SPD would support the
new mandate.  However, Westerwelle expected no support from
the Greens.  Westerwelle noted that the May NRW state
elections were also affecting the issue in a negative way.
That said, he said he could not see Steinmeier opposing the
larger mandate.  He hoped the Ambassador would speak with
Steinmeier. 

------
IRAN
------ 

7.  (C) Asked about the February 5 visit of Iranian FM
Mottaki to the Munich Security Conference, Westerwelle
emphasized that he (Westerwelle) had not invited Mottaki to
come to Germany, and Westerwelle had also not requested a
meeting with Mottaki.  Rather, it was Mottaki who was asking
to see Westerwelle.  Westerwelle said he had still not
decided whether he would talk to Mottaki or not.  He
reflected concern that Tehran might try to exploit Mottaki's
visit to Germany as a distraction, and continue executing
people during the visit.  In any case, Westerwelle said his
position was exactly the same as the U.S. on Iran, and he
would share the results of any meeting with Mottaki, if it
took place. 

BERLIN 00000164  002 OF 002 

8.  (C) Westerwelle said he would meet Russian FM Lavrov and
(separately) Chinese FM Yang February 5.  He suggested that
Moscow had been changing course on Iran sanctions since the
Qom revelations.  The Russians now saw Iran as playing games
on the nuclear issue.  However, he observed that China was
"hesitant," or even in opposition to sanctions.  Reflecting
on his recent visit to China, Westerwelle said he had not
perceived any "good will" there at present.  He said he would
ask Yang again about Iran and then share the results with the
U.S.  Westerwelle opined that it was important also to focus
on Brazil as an opinion leader in the Third World.  He noted
that President Lula had received Ahmadinejad warmly several
months ago.  He added that he was uncertain what the Saudis
thought, but that the other Persian Gulf countries seemed to
be in an existential panic about the Iranian nuclear program. 

-----------
TAC NUKES
----------- 

9.  (C) Touching briefly on arms control, Westerwelle stated
unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons was an issue for
NATO.  He said that when he had received Kissinger, Schulz,
Perry and Nunn on February 3 to talk about their global zero
proposal, tactical nuclear weapons was not discussed.  He
said that the four statesmen were very supportive of
President Obama. 

----------
TFTP
--------- 

10.  (C) The Ambassador raised the challenge of getting the
European Parliament to approve an agreement to share data
with the U.S. on tracking terrorist finance.  The Ambassador
noted the extensive efforts of the Treasury Department and
other U.S. agencies to explain the importance of the program
to our common security.  He asked how one could get better
support for the program.  Westerwelle replied that the German
government had been able to come up with a solution for
itself a few months ago when the issue first surfaced.
(Comment: In fact, German Interior Minister de Maziere's vote
to abstain in the EU Council vote on TFTP on November 30
reflected the complete deadlock within the Coalition
Government between TFTP advocates in the CDU-controlled
Interior Ministry and TFTP opponents in the FDP-controlled
Justice Ministery. End Comment.) However, Westerwelle said
that now that the issue was in the European Parliament, he
had no ability to influence it.  He said that he was very,
very aware of the Secretary's interest in this issue.
Nevertheless, he had a sense that almost all groups in the
European Parliament had concerns with the proposed agreement.
 He emphasized that this was not an issue that only concerned
his party, the FDP, but rather many others as well.
11. (C) Westerwelle shared that he had not yet appointed a
new Coordinator for German-American cooperation. 

----------
COMMENT
--------- 

12.  (C) Westerwelle (who spoke with ease in English) was in
a buoyant mood and more confident on his issues than we have
seen him so far.  He seemed ready to defend any intimation
that he was less than supportive of a troop surge (Defense
Minister zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador two days ago that
Westerwelle had worked for no increase of German troops for
Afghanistan, see Berlin 157) with invocations of the
importance of civilian reconstruction.  On Iran, he leapt at
the chance to tell us he had not invited Mottaki.  His dodges
on both tactical nuclear weapons and terrorist finance were
all but practiced.  His comment that he was unable to affect
the vote in the EU Parliament on TFTP was a bit disingenuous;
on February 4, an MFA official acknowledged to visiting
Treasury officials in Berlin that German MEPs were in fact
leading the charge against TFTP in the EU Parliament with the
tacit support of the FDP, if not of specialists in the
Justice Ministry and MFA themselves. Westerwelle still cuts a
good image in meetings and in the press here, even though his
party continues a bout of free fall in the polls.  His
ministry, though, still wonders (privately to us) where he
gets his policy direction from.  END COMMENT.
13.  (U) The Ambassador did not have the chance to clear this
cable before departing Berlin. 

Murphy

STRENG VERTRAULICH: DAS SCHILY-EL-MASRI-DOSSIER

schily-el-masri_schily-el-masri-antworten-11-10-2006

schily-el-masri_schily-el-masri-befragung-12-10-sta-m-03-11-2006

schily-el-masri_schily-el-masri-sta-m-nachforderung

schily-el-masri_schily-el-masri-sta-m-fragen-18-05-2006

SECRET: THE SAUDI SHI’A: WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE?

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SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SA
SUBJECT: THE SAUDI SHI'A:  WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE? 

REF: A. RIYADH 3301
     B. RIYADH 1196
     C. RIYADH 888 

Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d). 

-------
Summary
------- 

1.  (S) Some Sunni Arab leaders, including Egypt's President
Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah, have recently publicly
questioned the loyalties of Arab Shi'a populations in the
Middle East.  Privately, senior Saudi officials raise similar
concerns.  Given the ongoing sectarian conflict in Iraq,
increasing regional tensions vis-a-vis Shi'a Iran, and the
tenuous status of Saudi Shi'a within their own country, the
question of whether Saudi Shi'a loyalties belong primarily
with Saudi Arabia - or, alternatively, to their
coreligionists elsewhere in the Gulf - is a timely one.  It
is also of central concern to U.S. strategic interests in the
region, given the concentration of Saudi Arabia's Shi'a
population in its oil producing areas. 

2.  (S) Our conclusion, based on discussions with a broad
spectrum of Saudi Shi'a contacts over the past eight months,
is that most Saudi Shi'a remain committed to the agreement
reached between the Saudi Shi'a leadership and King Fahd in
1993-4, whereby Shi'a leaders agreed to pursue their goals
within the Kingdom's political system in return for the
King's promise to improve their situation.  Saudi Shi'a have
deep religious ties to Iraq and Iran and are inspired by the
newfound religious freedom and political power of the Iraqi
Shi'a; they also have a lengthy history of persecution by the
Al-Saud and face continuing discrimination (ref B).
Nonetheless, their leaders still appear committed to working
for reform from within, a strategy that, thanks to King
Abdullah, is slowly bearing fruit.  In our view, it would
require a major internal or external stimulus to move the
Saudi Shi'a toward confrontation with Riyadh.  Such stimuli
could include a major shift in SAG policy or leadership, the
spread of uncontained sectarian violence to the Kingdom, or a
major change in regional security arrangements, especially
escalating regional conflict involving Shi'a (ref C).  Absent
these circumstances, the vast majority of Saudi Shi'a are not
likely to demonstrate significant external political
loyalties, either to Iran or to any inchoate notion of a
"Shi'a crescent."  End summary. 

--------------------------------------------- --------
A Tactical Choice:  Advocating for Rights from Within
--------------------------------------------- -------- 

3.  (SBU) At 1.5 to 2 million strong, the Shi'a comprise 10
to 15 percent of Saudi citizens.  They are concentrated in
the Eastern Province (EP), particularly the oasis areas of
Qatif (where the population is overwhelmingly Shi'a) and
Al-Ahsa (a mixed Sunni-Shi'a area).  Saudi Shi'a do not have
the breadth of tribal and clan ties to Iraq and Iran as do
the Shi'a of Kuwait and Bahrain, though at least one major
Shi'a tribal confederation, the Al-Tamim, are present in
Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. 

4.  (SBU) The Wahhabi Saudi state has a long record of brutal
persecution of both Saudi Shi'a and Shi'a living elsewhere in
the region.  During the military raids of the first and
second Saudi states in the 18th and 19th centuries, Shi'a
were a frequent target of Wahhabi Saudi violence, including
an all-out attack on major Shi'a cities in southern Iraq and
the desecration of holy sites there.  When the founder of
modern Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz, conquered what is now
the EP, his fanatical Ikhwan army went on a murderous
anti-Shi'a rampage.  A watershed moment in this troubled
history came in 1979 when thousands of Shi'a, angry at the
state, inspired by the Iranian revolution, and organized by a
young group of leaders, most notably Hassan Al-Saffar, took
to the streets of Qatif in protest.  The SAG cracked down,
killing a number of the protesters and arresting many
activists.  Hundreds of Shi'a, including Al-Saffar, went into
exile, initially to Iran but later leaving Iran for Syria,
Lebanon, the UK, the U.S., and other western countries.
Al-Saffar and many of his political allies returned to Saudi
Arabia in the mid 1990s after reaching a deal with King Fahd
in 1993-4.  The King agreed to allow the exiles to return, to
release Shi'a detained in the Kingdom, and to take steps to
improve the situation of the Shi'a; for their part, the
returning Shi'a agreed to cease their opposition activities
and pursue their goals within the Saudi system. 

5.  (C) Why did the exiled Shi'a return?  According to
Mohammed Al-Mahfooth, one of their number and now
editor-in-chief of a journal on contemporary Islamic issues,
"There were two main reasons.  First, we realized that, as a
minority in Saudi Arabia, we could never hope to change the
regime by revolution, as we might have thought in 1979.
Second, we felt we were losing touch with our communities
here, and we were not effective at helping them to develop
from abroad.  So we decided to come back and work for our own
rights from within."  We have heard similar explanations from
other Shi'a who were part of the exile movement.  As a group,
exiled and indigenous leaders made an important tactical
decision in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Realizing that
they could not wrest control over their destiny from the SAG
by opposition and confrontation, they changed their goal to
realizing their civil rights as Saudi citizens and their
tactics to pushing for reform from within.  The same tactical
calculus remains relevant today. 

6.  (C) Shi'a activists have consistently emphasized to us
their continued commitment to pushing for civil rights and
reform within the system; in the words of one of their
leaders, "Any place there is room, we are trying to use it."
We see considerable evidence that the Shi'a are indeed taking
full advantage of every opportunity, especially with the
ascension of King Abdullah, whom the Shi'a view as friendly
to their aspirations.  They were active participants in the
petition movement in the last years of King Fahd's reign,
signing petitions calling for reform both as a community and,
as individuals, in conjunction with other (Sunni) reformers.
The Shi'a successfully organized to win all the municipal
council seats in EP areas where they enjoyed demographic
predominance.  The Qatif municipal council, with Jafar
Al-Shayeb as its president, will likely prove to be the most
organized and active of any in the EP. 

7. (C) The Shi'a are also pushing the boundaries of what the
SAG allows in terms of civil society (ref A), organizing
unregistered but tolerated activities ranging from regular
cultural and political forums to computer and astronomy clubs
to underground film showings.  Of the five people appointed
to the Dammam branch of the National Society for Human Rights
(NSHR), at least four are Shi'a activists, including
Al-Shayeb.  The Shi'a are pushing for greater religious
freedom and a reduction in discrimination through the NSHR
and via direct appeal to senior SAG leaders, albeit with
limited success.  Pointing to these activities and to their
vision of a Saudi Arabia where all citizens enjoy civil
rights, some of our contacts argue that the Shi'a are the
true Saudi nationalists and reformers. 

8.  (C) Another indication that the Shi'a are, at least for
now, committed to working within the system is that Shi'a
leaders and activists from a variety of backgrounds are
gravitating toward this tactic and that they are actively
building bridges with other reform elements in Saudi society.
 The returned exiles are the most politically active Saudi
Shi'a, were the major force in brokering the 1993-4 deal with
King Fahd, and are in the forefront of most of the
initiatives mentioned above.  (Note: While they do not form a
single political block, they are sometimes referred to as
"Shirazis" because at the time of their exile many of them
followed the late Ayatollah Mohammed Al-Shirazi, who
advocated that clerics should play a greater political role
in demanding Shi'a rights, although Shirazi opposed the
concept of wilayat al-faqih.  End note.)  Other Shi'a
activists, both secular and religious, have also adopted the
tactic of pushing for reform from within, although they do
not have the same broad organizational networks of the
Shirazis.  These activists include former leftists like Najib
Al-Khunaizi, who hosts one of the regular cultural forums in
Qatif, and purported Saudi Hezbollah leader Hassan Al-Nimr,
who participated in the most recent National Dialogue in
Abha.  The Shirazis, Al-Khunaizi, Al-Nimr, and other Shi'a
leaders are also making efforts to reach out to secular and
religious reformers from Sunni society, trading visits to
each other's forums and majlises and seeking other means for
dialogue. 

--------------------------------------------- ----
Iran:  Religious Ties but Few Political Loyalties
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

9.  (S) While there are strong religious ties between the
Saudi Shi'a and Iran and the potential for Iranian influence
in the EP is a legitimate concern, especially given the
increasing bellicosity of Iranian rhetoric and policy, our
best assessment is that, under prevailing conditions, the
Shi'a are not looking to Tehran for political guidance. 

10.  (S) As argued in ref C, given the importance of the EP
to Saudi Arabia's oil industry, Iran has a strategic
rationale for laying the groundwork to exert its influence.
It also has a history of doing so.  The Iranian revolution
inspired the Saudi Shi'a to rise up in opposition in 1979,
and the Iranians played a role in organizing Saudi Hezbollah
in the 1980s.  Most Saudi Shi'a clerics have studied
extensively in Iran, especially Qom, and many politically
active Shi'a spent time in Iran in the early and mid 1980s.
A militant Saudi Shi'a group, at least inspired if not
directed by Iran, carried out the attack on the Al-Khobar
military barracks in the summer of 1996.  More recently, a
few of our Shi'a contacts have claimed that there are active
pro-Iranian networks in the Qatif area and alleged other
signs of Iranian activity, although a much larger number of
others discount these claims.  (Note:  Recent sensitive
reports from other channels also suggest possible Shi'a links
with militant Shi'a in Iran, Iraq, and/or Lebanon.  One
report suggests that Iranian-affliated Iraqi militias may
have begun low-key efforts to establish contacts in the EP,
and another report suggests that one Saudi Shi'a may have
visited a Lebanese Shi'a leader to seek financial support.
End note.) 

11.  (S) The vast majority of our Shi'a contacts, however,
have told ConOffs that they see no evidence of current
Iranian efforts to exert political influence in the EP.  Our
contacts, who include community activists, political leaders,
journalists, businessmen, cultural figures, academics, and
sheikhs, many of whom studied in Iran, are also generally
skeptical of Iranian motives as they pertain to Saudi Arabia.
 We heard over and over variants of the following statement:
"We were used by Iran before, and we won't let it happen
again.  Their interests are completely different than ours."
Indeed, the exiled Shirazis appear to have left Iran in the
mid 1980s because it became clear they were being used:
several contacts independently told us that the group left
because they refused Iranian pressure to organize or take
credit for sabotage operations against Saudi oil
installations. 

12.  (C) Time and time again, Shi'a sheikhs have explained
that the Saudi Shi'a prefer to study in Najaf or Karbala
(where Arabic is spoken everywhere, including outside the
religious community), have much stronger historical ties to
religious institutions in Iraq, and studied in Qom only
because Saddam Hussein's regime made it impossible for them
to study in Iraq.  They also caution that a Shi'a who has
studied at a hawza in Qom would not necessarily share a
pro-Iranian religious or political perspective and note that
all the important ayatollahs, including those from Najaf,
have hawzas in Qom.  All of our contacts concur that among
Saudi Shi'a who emulate a marja' or mujtahid, the large
majority of Saudi Shi'a follow Iranian-born but Iraq-based
Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, with the rest divided among a
number of other ayatollahs. 

13. (S) The current role and activity of Saudi Hezbollah
remains a question mark about which we have been able to
develop only limited information.  Some contacts claims the
group no longer exists, but prevailing evidence suggests that
it encompasses a small group of religious figures who believe
in the concept of wilayat al-faqih, emulate Iran's Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i as their marja', but have few
current followers.  Our contacts report that its leaders are
not very active politically, do not take their cue from the
Iranian regime, and do not espouse violence (at least not
currently, in all three cases).  While we continue to seek
additional information on Saudi Hezbollah, what limited
knowledge we have supports the views espoused by our
contacts.  We do not know of any anti-SAG or anti-American
violence ascribed to any Saudi Shi'a group since the Khobar
Towers bombing in 1996; at least one of Saudi Hezbollah's
purported leaders has participated in the National Dialogue
(suggesting that the SAG does not consider the movement or
the individual as much of a threat and that he supports the
Dialogue's concept); and we have heard that other Shi'a
leaders have, over time, convinced Saudi Hezbollah's leaders
that violence would not help the Shi'a cause.  We cannot rule
out the possibility that Iran or its proxies could recruit
and train small Saudi Shi'a cells to carry out disruptive or
terrorist activities.  However, we cannot see such cells
developing a broad following given the present Shi'a
leadership and their strategy unless there are major changes
in the regional political landscape. 

------------------
The Impact of Iraq
------------------ 

14.  (C) The Saudi Shi'a follow events in Iraq with intense
interest.  In stark contrast to non-Shi'a Saudis, most Shi'a
express support for the U.S. intervention in Iraq despite the
current strife and violence.  Many Shi'a contacts have
explicitly thanked ConOffs for the U.S. role in freeing their
coreligionists in Iraq from Saddam Hussein's oppressive
regime and helping them obtain political power commensurate
with their numbers.  Saudi Shi'a feel deep emotional and
religious ties to Iraq and look forward to visiting Shi'a
holy sites and participating in religious festivals there as
soon as the security situation permits.  The expanded
political and religious freedoms for Shi'a in Iraq have
empowered Saudi Shi'a to push further than they previously
dared against SAG restrictions on religious freedom and civil
society.  For example, contacts have linked expanded Ashura
celebrations in Qatif, as well as more cautious expressions
of Shi'a identity elsewhere in the Kingdom, directly to the
new situation in Iraq. 

15.  (S) However, although Saudi Shi'a are certainly aware
that Shi'a form a significant part of the population on the
Arab side of the gulf, to date we have seen no indication
that the Saudi Shi'a have any realistic vision of a pan-Arab
Shi'a political block.  Any such realization of an Arab
"Shi'a crescent" would have to be led by Iraqi Shi'a, and at
this point, as several contacts have noted to us, domestic
challenges occupy their full attention.  Saudi Shi'a are not
currently traveling to Iraq in significant numbers, and
political and religious contacts between Saudi and Iraqi
Shi'a post-Iraqi liberation, while they have occurred, appear
to have been limited to date. 

--------------------------------------------- ---
The Future of the Shi'a Strategy and U.S. Policy
--------------------------------------------- --- 

16.  (S) Will the Shi'a strategy of seeking to realize their
rights as Saudi citizens by engaging the SAG hold firm over
the next several years?  We believe that it will, as long as
the SAG does not backtrack on reform through a change in
policy or leadership and/or as long as there are not
compelling external pressures or influences that change their
calculus of interests.  Although Shi'a leaders have
frequently expressed to us their frustration with the slow
pace of reform and with the continued discrimination against
the Shi'a community, they have invested a great deal in the
strategy of engagement and it is slowly bearing fruit in the
form of some advances in religious freedom (in Qatif at
least) and civil society.  If the SAG does backtrack, e.g. by
clamping down harshly on unlicensed civil society
organizations or undoing the limited measure of religious
freedom recently gained by the Shi'a, or if other elements of
the current equilibrium change, the strategic calculations of
the Shi'a leadership could change as well.  While we have not
seen any signs of radical young Shi'a leaders who disagree
with the goals or tactics of the current leadership, such
leaders could emerge if sectarian violence initiated by Sunni
extremists spreads uncontained to Saudi Arabia, if the
employment situation for young Shi'a worsens, if Ayatollah
Sistani is succeeded by a more radical cleric as marja' to
most Saudi Shi'a, or if conflict breaks out with Iran. 

17.  (S) The argument outlined above, that the Saudi Shi'a
remain committed to a strategic choice to push for
realization of their rights as citizens from within the Saudi
system and, under current conditions, do not entertain any
serious external political loyalties, has several important
implications for U.S. policymakers.  Most Saudi Shi'a
currently see their interests as directly aligned with U.S.
interests in key respects, particularly with the U.S.
interest in promoting participatory governance and human
rights in the Middle East as an antidote to extremism.  They
appreciate any pressure the U.S. puts on the Saudi government
to reform, although they wish the U.S. would increase this
pressure and worry that other interests, such as regional
stability and security of the oil supply, cause the U.S. to
draw back from urging greater steps toward political reform. 

18.  (S) The most important implication of this argument is
therefore that it is unlikely that the vast majority of Saudi
Shi'a would support Iranian or Iranian-proxy interference in
Saudi Arabia as long as the current equilibrium holds,
particularly the promise for gradual reform.  King Abdullah
embodies this promise of reform, particularly for the Shi'a,
and with good cause:  no less a figure than Prince Talal bin
Abdulaziz told the Ambassador that King Abdullah has decided
to give Saudi more religious freedom as part of an effort to
better incorporate them into Saudi national life.  By
supporting the reform process, the U.S. is also playing a
role, an important one in Shi'a eyes, in maintaining the
current equilibrium.  (Comment:  As suggested in ref C, the
USG can certainly use SAG concern about potential Iranian
influence as one means of urging the SAG to grant fuller
rights to its Shi'a citizens.  End comment.)  A secondary,
more tactical implication is that the Saudi Shi'a currently
make natural allies in U.S. efforts to promote political
reform and human rights in Saudi Arabia.  Post is already
directing some programmatic resources in this direction and
will explore this potential further in a later cable. 

-------
Sources
------- 

19.  (SBU) This cable draws on hundreds of conversations over
the past eight months between CG, PolOff, and PAO and a
diverse group of Saudi Shi'a contacts, as well as on related
observations and on publicly available sources such as Saudi
Shi'a websites and other reports.  We have reported many of
these conversations and observations in previous cables
(NOTAL), including RIYADH 964, RIYADH 179, RIYADH 42, 2005
RIYADH 9142 (reform, Iran, Iraq); RIYADH 3306, RIYADH 1741,
RIYADH 1380, 2005 RIYADH 7589, 2003 RIYADH 2698 (reform);
RIYADH 1706, RIYADH 1377, RIYADH 1252 (civil society); RIYADH
1461, RIYADH 280, RIYADH 275 (Shi'a leadership); 2005 RIYADH
9048, 2005 RIYADH 8565 (Iraq, Iran); RIYADH 1053 (Iraq); 2005
RIYADH 8741 (Iran); RIYADH 2840 (reactions to Mubarak); and
2005 RIYADH 8323 (EP governance). 

(APPROVED:  KINCANNON)
GFOELLER

CONFIDENTIAL: OKINAWAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE CHINA THREAT OR LACK THEREOF

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 NAHA 000103 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/26/2031
TAGS: MARR PINS JA CH TW
SUBJECT: OKINAWAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE CHINA THREAT OR LACK THEREOF 

REF: A. A.  TOKYO 1301
     B. B.  TOKYO 1153
     C. C.  EMBASSY TOKYO TRANSLATION OF FEBRUARY 24 SANKEI SHIMBUN ARTICLE.
     D. D.  FUKUOKA 17
     E. E.  NAGOYA 11
     F. F.  TOKYO 822 

NAHA 00000103  001.2 OF 008 

CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas G. Reich, Consul General, Consulate
General Naha, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d) 

1.     (C) Summary: Despite China's rapidly expanding economic
and military activities, including in waters near Okinawa,
Okinawans claim they do not share America's or Japan's sense of
threat from China.  While many mainland Japanese officials and
influentials say they recognize China as a potential threat to
regional security and stability, even most conservative
Okinawans do not believe a Chinese threat to Japan (or
elsewhere) necessarily means a threat to Okinawa.  Many
Okinawans identify with China culturally and believe China sees
them as a separate people from the Japanese.  Some also say
Okinawa, over the centuries, has received better treatment from
China than from Japan or the United States.  These attitudes
combine to produce an Okinawan perspective that is markedly
different from that of mainland Japan, and which is a factor in
local attitudes toward U.S. military bases in Okinawa.  End
summary. 

------------------
China Rising
------------------ 

2. (SBU) In recent years, China's economic expansion and growing
military capabilities have attracted a great deal of attention
in Japan, although somewhat less in Okinawa.  The two leading
Okinawan newspapers generally appear reluctant to feature
articles about the potential negative impacts on regional
security associated with China's rise, mostly because the
newspapers fear this line of thought will serve as an implicit
justification for the continued existence of U.S. military bases
on the island. 

3. (SBU) Nevertheless, Okinawans who make the effort to read
mainland Japanese newspapers can find ample coverage of Japan's
concerns.  Some widely reported Chinese activities have a very
direct connection to Okinawa.  For example, Japan, China and
Taiwan have competing claims to an island chain 250 miles west
of Okinawa, known as the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China.
The governments of Japan and China have disputed the islands'
sovereignty for years and more recently have both made moves to
develop undersea resources near them (see, e.g., refs. A, B).
The media have reported China has erected drilling platforms in
the disputed territory. 

4. (SBU) China has also stepped up military air and sea
activities in the area, prompting Japanese Self Defense Forces
to respond.  According to national broadcaster NHK, Japan Air
Self Defense Forces scrambled to intercept Chinese military
aircraft above or near the East China Sea 30 times between April
and September 2005, more than twice as often as they did in all
of 2004.  Chinese maritime activity also occasionally makes the
news.  The November 2004 Chinese submarine incursion into
Japanese waters within Okinawa Prefecture drew a rare Chinese
apology for a ""technical error.""  The mainland Japanese media
have suggested this was not the only Chinese submarine intrusion
near Okinawa. 

--------------------------------------------- --------------
------------------------------
Different Perspectives of ""Mainland"" Japanese and Okinawans
--------------------------------------------- --------------
------------------------------ 

5. (C) In mainland Japan, concern over China's military buildup
is frequently aired.  For example, in January the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) General Affairs Chairman Akio Kuma noted
that if China chose to swallow up Taiwan, it would be easy
enough for it to swallow up Okinawa, too, in the absence of U.S.
forces.  In February the opposition Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) issued a statement that it was ""inevitable that China's
military buildup and its moves to line up marine interests from
the viewpoint of the Japanese people are recognized as an actual
threat to Japan"" (ref. C). 

6. (U) Typical of many Japanese academics' views was a February
9 article by (Japan's) National Defense University Professor
Tomohide Murai stating that the most efficient way for the
United States to project power throughout the world was to link
with regional partners, and that Japan, by its very location,
was a key partner in the Pacific.  Murai noted the Chinese
recognized the strategic importance of Okinawa, calling it (as
does the United States) the ""keystone of the Pacific."" 

7. (SBU) In Okinawa, however, many - probably most -residents
have a substantially different assessment of China.  In general,
Okinawans perceive little potential threat from China; many
people here note China and the Ryukyu Kingdom had peaceful
relations for centuries prior to the 19th Century Meiji
Restoration in Japan.  To be sure, there are Okinawans who are
as concerned about China's destabilizing possibilities as are
many mainlanders, but this is not the prevailing view on the
island. 

8. (C) As vignettes of Okinawa's relaxed attitude toward China,
we note the following conversations.  During a September 2005
office call, reformist Ginowan City Mayor Yoichi Iha told us he
believed China posed no threat to Okinawa.  In October 2005 Kin
Town Mayor Gibu underscored his support for the U.S.-Japan
alliance but complained the GOJ had never explained what threat,
exactly, the alliance deterred.  In March, former Socialist
Party Diet Member and candidate for Okinawa City mayor Mitsuko
Tomon made the same complaint. 

9.  (C) We asked why a look at a map of the region surrounding
Okinawa and current stories regarding China's expansion didn't
provide Okinawans enough information for them to judge for
themselves.  Tomon replied the GOJ and USG were like the boy who
cried wolf, pointing to China and claiming that something awful
might happen, but nothing ever did.  Okinawans were undisturbed,
Tomon claimed, by Chinese incursions.  Chinese fishing boats
crossing the sea boundary did not affect Okinawan fisheries as
Okinawans worked only in its inner seas.  In a separate
conversation, he Okinawan Federation of Fisheries echoed Tomon's
claim, but added that their members avoided the Senkakus because
they were ""politically difficult.""  The Chinese might be
drilling near the Senkakus, and claim the Senkakus for
themselves, Tomon noted, but these were essentially peaceful
activities for the GOJ to settle.  Because of Okinawa's history
as the Ryukyu Kingdom, it had a very different view of China
than did the Japanese mainland.  Historically speaking, Tomon
commented, Japan and the United States had been more harmful to
Okinawa than China had ever been. 

----------------------------------------
A Ryukyuan History Primer
---------------------------------------- 

10. (U) By entering into close trading relationships with both
China and Japan in the 14th and 15th centuries, the Ryukyu
Kingdom enjoyed a lengthy period of prosperity in the years
before 1609.  As George Kerr notes in his book Okinawa: The
History of an Island People, ""the islands were independent.
They were in constant communication and at peace with
neighboring states.  Okinawans were in the happy position of
freedom to adopt what they wanted, and to remain indifferent -
or at best mildly curious - about foreign artifacts and
institutions for which they felt no pressing need.  China loomed
as the neighbor of unquestioned superiority, and Okinawans were
in close and constant communication with Japan, but were
overwhelmed by neither.""  Many Okinawans today regard this
period as the Golden Age of their history, and view it as a
basis for their belief that China sees Okinawa a place entirely
separate from Japan. 

11. (U) The Golden Age ended in 1609, when the southernmost clan
in mainland Japan (the Satsumas of southern Kyushu) sent an army
to assert control over Okinawa and extracted increasingly
burdensome tributes.  The Satsumas then took over the lucrative
trade with China through Okinawa, continuing it despite the
Tokugawa Shogunate's closed country (sakoku) policy. 

12. (U) After Commodore Perry and his black ships helped trigger
the Meiji Restoration, Japan began vigorously securing and
expanding its borders.  In 1872 Japan formally abolished the
Ryukyu Kingdom and annexed Okinawa, over Chinese protests.
Okinawa pleaded with China and the United States to intervene.
Four-party discussions dragged on for decades until the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, which settled the issue in Japan's
favor as far as the western powers were concerned. 

13. (U) Japan instituted a top-down assimilation program for
Okinawa that gained momentum when met by a bottom-up
assimilation movement following Japan's success in the
Sino-Japanese War.  Practical-minded Okinawans became convinced
they would benefit from closer identification with Japan.  Early
editorials of the Ryukyu Shimpo, dating as far back as 1893,
asserted that Okinawa could develop only by fully assimilating
with Japan. 

14. (U) Over the following 50 years, many Okinawans saw military
service, including during the battle for Okinawa, as a chance to
prove they were true Japanese.  However, the battle, which
killed perhaps a third of the Okinawan population, came as a
shock to most of the survivors, who experienced or heard stories
of atrocities against Okinawans by Japanese troops.  In the
years after the war, a home-grown historical interpretation of
the battle took solid root in Okinawa, which holds that Tokyo
had always intended to sacrifice Okinawa in a battle designed to
consume as many U.S. forces as possible, to stall and weaken an
eventual attack on the mainland. 

15. (U) The United States directly governed Okinawa through a
military high commissioner from 1945 to 1972, 20 years longer
than the rest of Japan.  During this period, U.S. forces
forcibly seized land for bases.  By the early 1960s, a movement
advocating reversion to Japan began among Okinawans, leading to
large-scale demonstrations against the U.S. administration in
the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Okinawa reverted to Japan May
15, 1972. 

16. (SBU) The reunion was a victory for all Okinawans (though
many were dismayed at the remaining numbers of U.S. facilities
and forces), and anti-U.S. protests were dramatically reduced
following reversion.  With reversion, the GOJ sharply increased
infrastructure development, and the general standard of living
greatly improved.  However, in the years since 1972, many
Okinawans have called for lessening the island's economic
dependence on GOJ transfer payments.  Okinawa remains the
poorest prefecture in Japan, with the highest unemployment rate
in Japan, and many argue that Okinawa needs to become more
economically independent. 

--------------------------------------------- --------------
-----------------
Okinawan Analysis: Split Identity, Affinity with China
--------------------------------------------- --------------
----------------- 

17. (SBU) The above history still shapes Okinawans' world views,
including their sense of identity.  In December 2005 the
University of the Ryukyus announced the results of a telephone
survey of Okinawans, in which 40% of respondents, when asked how
they identified themselves, said they were Okinawan.  A smaller
percentage said they were both Okinawan and Japanese (36%), and
just over one in five identified themselves as Japanese (21%). 

18. (SBU) This history also shapes how Okinawans view the GOJ
and actions that are presented in the world press as
provocations to China, most notably visits by the Prime Minister
to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine.  While many mainland Japanese are
reportedly uncomfortable with the visits, if push comes to shove
between China and Japan, opinion polls show that most side with
Japan's right to do as it pleases.  We believe most Okinawans
side with China.  Typical of this attitude is Masaru Yamada,
treasurer of Okinawa City, who recently criticized Koizumi's
visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He told us he doubted China would
ever accept Koizumi's explanations of the visits, any more than
he himself did.  Okinawans and Chinese held similar views of the
visits, he explained, because they shared the experience of
having been ""prisoners of war"" of the Japanese. 

19.  (U) Local newspaper editorials have also pointed to the
Yasukuni visits as unnecessary barriers to bilateral and
regional cooperation that the GOJ could, and should, remove.
Although an exaggeration, a recent Ryukyu Shimpo article
reporting on the study of Okinawan identity concluded with a
warning that GOJ policies, particularly as they related to bases
and transformation, could influence Okinawans' opinions on
whether to remain part of Japan. 

20. (SBU) Many Okinawans believe that China sees them
differently, and more warmly, than it sees the rest of Japan.
They point out that Taipei International Airport, when posting
place names in Chinese characters, lists flights to/from
""Ryukyu,"" not Okinawa.  A May 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo report claimed
that, because of Okinawa's history, it could become an
intermediary peacefully linking China and Taiwan.  By offering
an independent, international contribution, Okinawa could
renounce its title of ""(strategic) keystone of the Pacific"" and
become a ""keystone of goodwill.""  A June 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo
opinion piece contrasted the hospitality the Chinese granted
Okinawa Governor Inamine and his party when they visited Beijing
with Beijing's snubbing of PM Koizumi.  ""The extreme attention
provided Okinawa, with its deep historical connection to China,
was conspicuous in its contrast.  To look at it the other way
around, it was an intense dig at the GOJ,"" commented the Shimpo. 

21.  (SBU)  Chinese Ambassador to Japan Ki Ou (phonetic from
Japanese pronunciation) visited Okinawa April 24, on a trip
sponsored by the OPG, Okinawa Economic Association, and Okinawa
Visitors and Convention Bureau.  Ou masterfully played to
Okinawans' sense of exceptionalism and desire for a new golden
era of lucrative Sino-Okinawan relations.  Ou cited the
historical and cultural links between China and the Ryukyus and
said he immediately felt comfortable on this first visit to
Okinawa.  Over the past 25 years China's economic expansion had
far outpaced its military expansion, Ou claimed, and its defense
capabilities were reasonable for a country of China's area and
population.  China alone, of the five original nuclear powers,
had offered to eliminate all nuclear weapons if the others would
only agree to do the same.  Okinawa and China should again
travel together the path of peaceful development, Ou stressed,
and tens of thousands of Chinese tourists annually were sure to
follow. 

-----------
Caveats
----------- 

22. (SBU) Okinawa's exceptionalism is not based entirely on
history and feeling; it is used to practical effect.  Okinawans
claiming to feel no threat from China often use this to bolster
arguments that bases should be eliminated from Okinawa.  For
example, when asked specifically about Chinese military
activities near Okinawa, such as the November 2004 submarine
incursion, former Diet member Tomon grudgingly admitted that the
incident was regrettable.  She hastened to add, however, that it
alone did not justify the concentration of U.S. forces and
facilities in Okinawa. 

23. (SBU) The claim of exceptionalism is useful even for
conservatives who support the alliance and those who profit from
our base presence.  Conservative Okinawans could be seen as
playing good cop to reformists' bad cop, in order to squeeze the
maximum concessions from the GOJ and USG. A number of Okinawan
leaders probably assert this exceptionalism because they believe
it useful in leveraging concessions from the USG and GOJ in
return for Okinawan shouldering the burden of U.S. military
bases. 

24.  (SBU) Economic self-interest also helps explain Okinawa's
keenness to engage China.  In this, Okinawan governments and
businesses have motives similar to those of other provinces now
scrambling to find new sources of income as Koizumi's reforms
reduce the outward flow of GOJ largess.  The former Secretary
General of the LDP in Okinawa, Kenjiro Nishida, told us his main
motivation for founding the Okinawa-China Friendship Exchange
Association was to boost the number of Chinese tourists to
Okinawa.  He noted his Chinese counterparts met him more than
halfway, being well funded by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 ConGen Fukuoka and Consulate Nagoya have identified identical
local motives to engage China, as well as signs of China's
welcoming this engagement (Refs. F, G).  The Chinese leadership
may remember Sun Tzu's maxim, ""when he is united, divide him.""
Regardless of how cool relations are between Tokyo and Beijing,
there is no evidence this has had an effect on Okinawa's ties
with China. 

25. (SBU) That being said, Okinawan businesspeople whose
interests directly conflict with China are not as relaxed about
Chinese expansion.  Local developer Tadashi Zayasu told us he
owned part of an interest in a drilling application in the East
China Sea near the Senkaku Islands.  Zayasu said the GOJ had
approved a drilling application filed by the partnership, d.b.a.
Teikoku Oil.  The application was filed in 1970, but the GOJ did
not approve it until July 2005.  Zayasu mused that the GOJ
seemed bent on helping the Chinese at the expense of Okinawans.
Why else, he asked, would the GOJ have funded a Chinese pipeline
to support their exploitation of the fields while sitting on a
Japanese company's application for over thirty years? 

-------------------------------
Comment/Conclusion
------------------------------- 

26. (SBU) The above caveats notwithstanding, Okinawa's sense of
affinity with China and feeling of distance from Japanese
interests give this place a unique perspective on Sino-Japanese
relations, and it shapes the local environment for U.S. military
bases.  Due in part to this, many Okinawans are unconvinced that
our bases in Okinawa are needed to defend Japan -- or at least
not to defend Okinawa.  Some in the GOJ leadership may value the
domestic political benefits of appealing to Japanese nationalism
over the benefits of improved Sino-Japanese relations (ref. F).
The Yasukuni visits, and Chinese reactions to them, are having
the opposite effect on attitudes in Okinawa.  Such acts
strengthen the sense in Okinawa that the LDP leadership, and the
GOJ more broadly, ignore the victims of militarism.  Okinawans'
cultural identification with China, combined with a sense of
serial betrayal by the GOJ, fuels local suspicion of GOJ motives
on current political-military issues.
REICH

CONFIDENTIAL: CUBA: NUN COMMENTS ON FIDEL’S HEALTH

VZCZCXRO6508
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHSR RUEHTM
RUEHVC
DE RUEHROV #0262 3491610
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151610Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0591
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0619
C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 000262 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/15/2016
TAGS: PREL CU VT
SUBJECT: CUBA:  NUN COMMENTS ON FIDEL'S HEALTH 

REF: 04 Vatican 1401 

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Sandrolini, Deputy Chief of Mission,
EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d) 

1. (C) Summary.  A prominent abbess in Rome described her recent
visit to Havana and commented on the state of Castro's health in
a December 12 meeting with Ambassador; she also suggested some
possible contacts for the USG.  The abbess has been
controversial in the past.  End summary. 

2. (C) Ambassador Rooney called on Mother Tekla Famiglietti,
Abbess General of the Brigittine Order of the Most Holy Savior,
on December 12.  Mother Tekla -- in charge of the Brigittines
for some 25 years and sometimes called ""the most powerful woman
in Rome"" -- had just returned from a visit to Cuba.  She had
hoped to meet Fidel Castro, whom she had befriended some years
earlier (reftel) at the inauguration of Mexican President
Vicente Fox. 

3. (C)  Mother Tekla said that during this trip she found a
different attitude among priests, nuns, and government contacts;
there is a feeling of impending change resulting from the coming
end of the Fidel era.  People want change, though some of those
close to Fidel are threatened by it.  Mother Tekla commented
that Cubans would be less agitated in Cuba itself than in Miami
when the changes begin.  She hoped the USG would not wait for
Castro's death to begin opening up, but would instead act now to
relax the embargo and help people; this would also steal a march
on others, such as China, who are already on the ground. 

4. (C) Mother Tekla said she had been to Fidel's house many
times before, typically meeting first with his private secretary
Carlos Valenciaga Diaz.  She had intended to do so this time,
but then felt that Castro was now too weak and ill.  Diaz told
her that Fidel has lost 20 kilos and is a shadow of his former
self; he does not have cancer but is bleeding from the stomach.
A room in Castro's house has been converted into a hospital room. 

5. (C) Mother Tekla said she works with Licencia Caridad, head
of the ministry for religious affairs, and Eusebio Leal Spencer,
whom Castro put in charge of getting a new facility built for
Mother Tekla.  She thinks Spencer may know some people who might
be of interest to the USG as potential leaders once a government
change has occurred. 

Comment
-------------- 

6. (C)   Mother Tekla is well known in Rome (if sometimes
controversial), and we have reported on meeting her in the past.
 Reftel describes a flap over her 2004 visit to Havana with
Cardinal Sepe for the opening of the Brigittines' house there,
which Castro used as a propaganda opportunity to the
embarrassment of the Holy See.  We report this conversation for
its possible interest in terms of news about Fidel's health, and
the suggested contacts. 

ROONEY

CONFIDENTIAL: COURT ACQUITS NAJIB’S EX-ADVISOR IN MURDER TRIAL

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1839
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2672
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0510
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0082
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000959 

SIPDIS 

FOR EAP/MTS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2028
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM MY
SUBJECT: COURT ACQUITS NAJIB'S EX-ADVISOR IN MURDER TRIAL 

Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and
 d). 

Summary and Comment
-------------------
1.  (SBU) High Court Justice Mohamad Zaki on October 31
acquitted Political Analyst Abdul Razak Baginda, former
advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, of the
charge of abetting the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya
Shaariibuu in October 2006, but ordered the continuation of
the murder trial for two policemen.  Defense lawyers
announced they sought to call to the stand two men who have
linked DPM Najib to the case:  Razak's former private
investigator Balasubramaniam, who has disappeared from
public, and controversial blogger Raja Petra who is detained
under the Internal Security Act.  The trial of the two police
defendants is set to continue November 10.  In immediate
commentary, political opposition leaders, including Anwar
Ibrahim, did not focus on Razak's guilt or innocence, but
called into question the conduct of the proceedings and
suggested a cover-up to protect DPM Najib. 

2.  (C) Comment:  Many observers anticipated Razak's
acquittal given the prosecution's poor performance, Razak's
connections to DPM Najib, and the alleged and
widely-perceived political manipulation in the case.  The
Razak verdict momentarily attracts more attention to the
allegations of Najib's linkages to the case; so too would the
testimony of either Balasubramaniam or Raja Petra, though it
is not clear either man will be able to take the stand.
Allegations stemming from the Altantuya case, however, have
not prevented Najib from securing all the nominations so far
for the UMNO party elections.  Absent dramatic and compelling
new evidence prejudicial to the DPM, the Altantuya case will
not slow down Najib's drive to become Malaysia's next Prime
Minister.  End Summary and Comment. 

Razak Acquitted, Trial for Policemen Continues
--------------------------------------------- -
3.  (U) High Court Justice Mohamad Zaki on October 31
acquitted Political Analyst Abdul Razak Baginda, former
advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, of charges
of abetting the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya
Shaariibuu in October 2006, but ordered the continuation of
the murder trial for two policemen.  Embassy FSN Political
Assistant attended the judgment hearing.  The ruling came
roughly two years after Razak's arrest, and followed a
lengthy 17-month trial involving the presentation of 84
witnesses.  The prosecution had argued that Razak had asked
the policemen to murder Altantuya, Razak's former lover who
had harassed Razak for money.  The judge ruled that the
prosecution team failed to prove a prima facie case against
Razak, and ordered his release.  The judge found a
sufficiently strong prosecution case against the two police
defendants, Chief Inspector Azilah Hadri and Corporal Sirul
Azha Umar, charged with carrying out Altantuya's murder.  At
the time of the crime, Azilah and Azha were members of the
protection detail for DPM Najib. 

Defense to Call Controversial Witnesses
--------------------------------------- 

4.  (U) The Justice requested the defense to begin their
arguments later on the afternoon of October 31, but the
defense requested and was granted a continuance as their
witnesses were not available.  In the day's most surprising
turn, Kamarul Hisham, lead defense counsel for one of the
accused police officers, stated he wished to place on the
witness chair Razak's private investigator P. Balasubramaniam
and Malaysia Today editor Raja Petra Kamaruddin.  Both
witnesses have previously made sworn statements linking DPM
Najib to the murdered Altantuya, and in the case of Raja
Petra, implicating Najib's wife in the murder.
Balasubramaniam, who was an early witness for the
prosecution, has not been seen publicly since he issued a
sworn statement in July on DPM Najib's links to the Altantuya
case, and then retracted the statement the next day,
allegedly under duress according to some accounts.  Raja
Petra is currently detained under the Internal Security Act
(ISA).  (Note: Although the court may order Raja Petra's
presence as a witness, Section 18 of the ISA gives the Home
Minister discretion to ignore the court order.  End note.)
The Judge set November 10 for the defense to begin its
presentation. 

5.  (SBU) For the October 31 judgment hearing, a crowd of
approximately 200 waited outside the courthouse while some
100 (primarily family members of the defendants and
journalists) filled the packed courtroom.  Razak's family
appeared confident and remained calm throughout the whole
hearing and showed no sign of surprise in Razak's acquittal.
The verdict also appeared to come as no surprise to the
attending crowd.  The victim's father, Setev Shaariibuu,
attended the judgment and afterward through an interpreter
expressed his disappointment to reporters:  "I am not
satisfied.  My daughter (knew) only one Malaysian and that is
Razak Baginda.  Now my daughter is dead and Baginda is freed.
 The country (Malaysia) has lost credibility..." 

Opposition Suggests Cover-Up
----------------------------
6.  (U) In immediate comments, political opposition figures,
who have suggested repeatedly that the government had engaged
in a cover-up to protect DPM Najib, did not focus on Razak's
guilt or innocence, but called into question the conduct of
the proceedings.  Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim noted, "On
a personal level, I wish Razak Baginda well, but the issue
here resolves around the court procedure and investigations.
There is a general and growing perception that the
investigation was not done professionally, that there is a
clear motive to cover up."  Anwar also drew attention to
recent Internet revelations of an SMS exchange between Najib
and Razak Baginda's former lawyer in which Najib reportedly
wrote that Razak "will face a tentative charge but all is not
lost." 

KEITH

AMBASSADOR ADVOCATES FOR BOEING AND CBP WITH AER

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INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0373
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000493 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/ROBERT MCLAUGHLIN
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/ADVOCACY CENTER OR PAT NUGENT
DHS FOR CBP/JENNIFER SAVA 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD EI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ADVOCATES FOR BOEING AND CBP WITH AER
LINGUS CEO 

REF: DUBLIN 361 AND PREVIOUS 

DUBLIN 00000493  001.2 OF 002 

1.  Summary: In a May 2 meeting with Aer Lingus CEO Dermot
Mannion, the Ambassador advocated Boeing aircraft for the
carrier's long-haul needs and sought Mannion's help in
pushing the Dublin Airport Authority (DAA) to upgrade U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operations in Ireland.
Mannion said that the Boeing offer was attractive, and he
noted that Aer Lingus would decide between Boeing and Airbus
at roughly the same time as the carrier's likely stock
flotation in September.  He also observed that Aer Lingus
could enjoy the full benefits of trans-Atlantic Open Skies
only if Dublin's new terminal were sized to accommodate
rising passenger volume and to enable CBP to conduct full
pre-clearance (adding agricultural and customs checks to
passport screening.)  Mannion added that Aer Lingus needed
clarity on the prospects for the U.S.-EU aviation agreement,
including the phase-out of the Shannon Stop requirement, in
order to start planning for the 2007-2008 winter travel
season.  Post will continue efforts to press the case for
both Boeing and CBP in our regular discussions with industry,
the Irish parliament, and the GOI.  End summary. 

Advocacy for Boeing
------------------- 

2.  In a May 2 meeting with Aer Lingus CEO Dermot Mannion,
the Ambassador strongly advocated Boeing's 787 Dreamliner for
the carrier's long-haul needs.  Mannion replied that Aer
Lingus would probably decide between Boeing and Airbus at
roughly the same time as the carrier's stock flotation,
expected in September.  He added, however, that aircraft
orders might also have to await the Dublin Airport
Authority's decision on the size of Dublin's planned second
terminal, which would determine the number of gates available
to Aer Lingus planes (see para 4).  He noted that "the door
remains very open to Boeing," and he observed that Aer Lingus
would take advantage of Ex-Im Bank financing options if
Boeing were to win the aircraft bid.  Mannion also recounted
his efforts to quash press reports that Airbus had secured
Aer Lingus' long-haul aircraft orders, following on the
carrier's deal to acquire four Airbus A-330s in 2006-2007 for
intra-European service.  Noting recent reports on the Airbus
A-350's design flaws, the Ambassador stressed Post's
intention to continue advocacy for Boeing.  Mannion
recommended that emboffs speak with members of the airline's
newly formed aircraft purchases evaluation team. 

Needed Clarity on U.S.-EU Open Skies
------------------------------------ 

3.  Aer Lingus needs clarity on prospects for the U.S.-EU
aviation agreement, including the U.S.-Ireland annex, to plan
future trans-Atlantic service, said Mannion.  He explained
that Aer Lingus sold seats 300 days in advance and was
already preparing its tentative schedule for the 2007 summer
season.  A delay until October 2006 in the signing of the
U.S.-EU agreement would only give Aer Lingus enough time to
plan for the 2007-2008 winter season.  Mannion expected,
however, that Aer Lingus would launch service to San
Francisco in 2007 as the first of the three additional U.S.
points that Aer Lingus would be permitted to serve under the
U.S.-Ireland annex to the U.S.-EU agreement.  He also
remarked that, due to the uncertain timing of the U.S.-EU
agreement, the Irish Department of Transport intended to
re-engage with USG negotiators on the U.S.-Ireland annex
during U.S.-EU aviation discussions the week of May 8.
(Under the annex, October 29, 2006, is the start date for the
phase-out of the current "Shannon Stop" requirement, by which
U.S. and Irish carriers may operate one non-stop flight
to/from Dublin for each non-stop flight to/from Shannon.) 

Right-sizing Dublin Airport for Aer Lingus and CBP
--------------------------------------------- ----- 

4.  With the April 5 Irish Cabinet decision to privatize Aer
Lingus through a stock flotation, the carrier's next goal was
to ensure that Dublin Airport's planned second terminal would
meet the carrier's needs, observed Mannion.  He noted that
the Dublin Airport Authority (DAA) had aimed to submit the
planning application for the new terminal this month, a
target that now would not be met.  Mannion cautioned that
further delay with the planning application would seriously
jeopardize the terminal's scheduled opening in 2009.  On the 

DUBLIN 00000493  002.2 OF 002 

upside, the delay had allowed Aer Lingus more time to consult
with the DAA on the terminal size required to accommodate the
carrier's rising passenger volume projections.  The
Ambassador cited an April 28 Irish Times report that Aer
Lingus and Ryanair had convinced the DAA on the need to
expand the planned terminal, at a possible extra cost of euro
100 million.  Mannion responded that whereas Aer Lingus had
had regular contact with working-level DAA officials on the
terminal, the DAA Board of Directors had refused to consider
expansion until this past week. 

5.  Aer Lingus could enjoy the full benefits of
trans-Atlantic Open Skies only if the new terminal were also
configured to enable U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
to conduct full pre-clearance, adding agricultural and
customs checks to passport screening, remarked Mannion.  The
Ambassador said that he was focused not only on the DAA's
plans to accommodate CBP in the new terminal, but also on
dealing with mounting passenger congestion in CBP's current
facilities over the next two summers, especially with the
likely onset of bilateral Open Skies.  Mannion pointed out
that a delay in the terminal's opening till 2010 would
exacerbate pressures on CBP staff.  He added that CBP would
be key to Aer Lingus' plans to link its new Dublin-Dubai
service with established Dublin-U.S. flights in 2007, since
Middle Eastern passengers would prefer to be pre-cleared
outside the United States.  Mannion and the Ambassador agreed
to continue coordinated approaches to the DAA on CBP's needs,
with emboffs noting the possibility of moving sooner to full
pre-clearance in the more spacious Shannon Airport. 

Comment: Pressing the cases for Boeing and CBP
--------------------------------------------- - 

6.  This was the Ambassador's third meeting with Mannion
since he assumed his Aer Lingus post last summer, and in each
discussion the Ambassador has urged Aer Lingus to choose
Boeing and to choose quickly, with orders for the 787
Dreamliner now backed up to roughly 2011.  In previous
discussions, Mannion noted difficulties in placing orders
during ongoing negotiations with labor about the stock
flotation, lest he create doubts about his commitment to
reduce the carrier's reported euro 340 million pension
deficit with the flotation proceeds.  The Irish Cabinet's
April 5 decision to proceed with the stock flotation has lent
certainty to Aer Lingus' ability to raise equity for the
aircraft orders.  We are concerned, however, that the Dublin
Airport sizing issue might become another reason for delay in
Aer Lingus' aircraft purchase decisions. 

7.  Post will continue to press the case for upgrading CBP
operations at Dublin and Shannon Airports.  In a recent
dinner with Irish Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, the
Ambassador described the potential advantages of full
pre-clearance for Dublin as a trans-Atlantic hub, leading one
committee member to raise the issue in Parliament the next
day.  Shannon Airport has also hired a U.S. consultant to do
a feasibility study on Shannon's ability to move to full
pre-clearance.  We look forward to receiving from CBP
headquarters an updated standards document that outlines for
airports the logistical requirements for CBP to provide full
pre-clearance.
BENTON

CONFIDENTIAL: OECD: REPORT OF MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 003181 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR EB/IFD/OMA, EUR/ERA, INL/C, L/LEI AND L/EB
DOC FOR ITA/MAC/MTA/KOZLOWICKI, OGC/NICKERSON/MANSEAU
DOJ FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION/FRAUD SECTION/MMENDELSOHN/JACOBSON
USEU FOR MRICHARDS
PASS TO US SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISION/ENFORCEMENT/RGRIME,
INTL.AFFAIRS/TBEATTY 

FROM USOECD 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2012
TAGS: KCOR ECON EINV ETRD PREL OECD
SUBJECT: OECD: REPORT OF MARCH 12-14, 2007 MEETING OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY 

Classified By: A/DCM CURTIS STONE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D) 

1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  At its March 12-14 meeting, the OECD Working
Group on Bribery (WGB) conducted Phase 2 peer-review evaluations
of Portugal and Ireland's implementation of the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention ("Convention").  The WGB called on
Portugal to raise awareness of foreign bribery in both the
public and private sector, to be more proactive in detecting,
investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery offenses, and to
take measures to disallow undocumented, confidential expenses.
Lead examiners advised that the GOI's poor participation in the
original on-site visit left them with little basis to assess
Ireland's implementation and enforcement efforts.  Ireland
acknowledged this problem and agreed to an additional on-site
visit within one year.  The WGB assessed UK efforts to implement
the Convention in context of a Phase 2 written follow-up review,
continued discussions on the UK's discontinuation of the
BAE/Saudi Arabia investigation, and released a public statement
expressing serious concerns.  The WGB also announced its
decision to conduct a supplemental, Phase 2 bis examination of
the UK.  Japan reported on results of its self-assessment of
obstacles to effective enforcement.  The WGB completed Phase 2
follow-up reviews of Japan and Switzerland and established
mandates for two sub-groups to review anti-bribery instruments
as part of the possible revision of the 1997 Revised
Recommendation, which outlined best practices in areas such as
accounting, auditing and public procurement, non-tax
deductibility of bribes and other measures to combat foreign
bribery.  END SUMMARY. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Portugal Phase 2 Evaluation - paras 2-3
Ireland Phase 2 Evaluation - paras 4-6
Japan Self-Assessment - paras 7-10
Phase 2 Follow-up Reports - para 11
-- Japan Written Follow-up - paras 12-13
-- UK Written Follow-up - paras 14-19
-- UK:  BAE/Saudi Arabia - paras 20-24
-- Switzerland Written Follow-up - paras 25-26
-- Revision of Anti-Bribery Instruments- para 27
-- Deferral of Tour de Table - para 28
-- Outreach Activities - para 29
-- 2006 Annual Report- para 30
-- Other Items - paras 31-34 

PORTUGAL PHASE 2 EXAMINATION 

2. (U) Lead examiners Brazil and the Netherlands briefed on
results of the Phase 2 on-site visit to Portugal, identifying
key deficiencies in Portuguese enforcement efforts.  Although
Portugal had made significant legislative efforts to implement
the Convention, it has had no foreign bribery prosecutions or
serious investigations.  While many government actors are
involved in anti-corruption efforts, they are not active.  More
vigorous action by the private sector is also required.  The
Portugal delegation reported that the on-visit had made a very
positive contribution to Portugal's revision of its criminal
code.  Since the visit, the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of
Economy and the Export Promotion Agency had carried out a major
dissemination campaign to inform all Portuguese missions abroad,
major business associations and the largest Portuguese companies
about foreign bribery obligations. 

3. (U) WGB members called on Portugal to take measures to
disallow undocumented, confidential expenses; establish an
autonomous definition of foreign public officials; clarify
reporting obligations and procedures within the public service
and accounting and auditing professions; provide additional
resources and training to law enforcement authorities to
proactively detect, investigate and prosecute foreign bribery;
E 

raise awareness among public officials on preventing, detecting,
reporting and investigating foreign bribery, including raising
awareness among law enforcement authorities about special rules
to establish nationality and extra-territorial jurisdiction in
foreign bribery cases, specifically the absence of a dual
criminality requirement; and to work more closely with the
private sector and civil society to raise awareness and to
develop effective prevention strategies. 

IRELAND PHASE 2 EXAMINATION 

4. (SBU) Lead examiners New Zealand and Estonia reported on a
wholly unsatisfactory on-site visit to Ireland in October.
Inadequate preparation and participation by the GOI left them
with little basis to assess Ireland's implementation and
enforcement efforts.  They advised that the total absence of
awareness raising activities on foreign bribery in Ireland had
demonstrated the low priority given to Ireland's application of
the Convention.  There have been no prosecutions of foreign
bribery in Ireland.  No law required public officials to report
foreign bribery allegations, no whistle-blowing legislation was
in place for the private sector, and overlapping statutes
prohibiting foreign bribery contained differing elements which
could impede enforcement efforts. 

5. (U) Lead examiners reported that since the visit, Ireland had
recognized the serious problems with the evaluation and
demonstrated that it intended to give higher priority to
implementing the Convention.  Senior Irish officials announced
that a Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) bill had been
approved by the government, which intended to move quickly to
introduce it to Parliament.  The Irish delegation advised that
the bill will broaden the definitions for bribery and foreign
public officials and introduce extraterritorial jurisdiction.
They also reported that Ireland would consider including
whistle-blower protection in the new bill.  The Irish del said
the peer-review examination had been valuable and Ireland wanted
to adopt best anti-bribery practices.  A group of senior Irish
officials would be convened to review and implement WGB
recommendations. 

6. (U) The WGB concluded that Ireland had not fully met its
Phase 2 monitoring obligations, but accepted Ireland's
invitation to carry out a Phase 2 bis examination with another
on-site visit within one year.  The WGB recommended that Ireland
strengthen its foreign bribery legislation; consolidate or
harmonize the foreign bribery offense under the two overlapping
statutes to remove inconsistencies; expand corporate liability
for foreign bribery; clarify the scope of the relevant
legislation for companies; amend its laws to confirm that bribe
payments are not tax deductible; and ensure that Irish citizens
and corporations can always be effectively prosecuted for
foreign bribery offenses committed outside Ireland by promptly
establishing nationality jurisdiction under the Prevention of
Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001. 

JAPAN SELF-ASSESSMENT 

7. (SBU) The Chairman noted that the main difficulty with
Japan's Phase 2 examination was whether the system was geared to
generate cases and whether one could effectively initiate an
investigation.  Japan conducted a self-assessment to determine
legal and procedural impediments to the effective investigation
and prosecution of foreign bribery.  Japan had established an
inter-agency task force, which met 12 times, and held
consultations with experts, prosecutors and police.  The GOJ
concluded the greatest obstacles were inadequate investigative
leads, the lack of reliable whistle-blowing information,
insufficient responses from Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)
requests, limited information on investigative methods used by
other countries and insufficient foreign language abilities. 

The Japanese del noted authorities needed to disseminate
information about the foreign bribery offense more widely, more
fully grasp the state of internal auditing and internal control
systems, and raise awareness regarding the Japanese
whistle-blower law that went into effect in June 2005. 

8. (SBU) The Japanese delegation committed to raise awareness of
whistle-blower protection, utilize MLA requests early and
actively, conclude bilateral MLA agreements, actively use
voluntary investigative measures at the earliest possible stage
and exchange information among police, prosecutors, experts and
civil society.  The Japanese del suggested greater focus on the
prevention of foreign bribery is appropriate, commenting that
cases and convictions were not the only criteria of success.
The Japanese del noted that a potential foreign bribery case
involving Japanese firm Kyudenko's activities in the Philippines
was under investigation. 

9. (SBU) Lead examiners United States and Italy applauded Japan
for completing the self-assessment.  The US noted that Japan's
passive approach to investigation and emphasis on maintaining
secrecy at the sacrifice of advancing cases needed to be
addressed.  Not only did the placement of the foreign bribery
offense in the Unfair Competition Prevention Law (UCPL) rather
than in the Criminal Code appear to reduce awareness, but the
entities responsible for pursuing investigations (Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Justice
(MOJ)) provided conflicting guidance.  The U.S. also highlighted
that the whistle-blower law did not apply to employees of
Japanese companies based overseas.  The principal recommendation
of lead examiners was on-going consultation and monitoring of
Japan's enforcement efforts.  The Italian lead examiner echoed
US comments, and urged Japan to bring a case and build
experience in how to start prosecutions.  He also noted that the
GOJ had shared no information about the Kyudenko case until
reports had appeared in the press. 

10. (SBU) The Japanese del responded that the GOJ has been
proactive in ordering Japanese representations abroad to report
foreign bribery allegations, that prosecutors are trying to
identify evidence and have added enhanced MLA efforts, and
defended the Japanese emphasis on secrecy to avoid destruction
of evidence by suspects.  In the 6 months since the
whistle-blowing law had been enacted, 2,000 reports had been
made, but the Japanese del conceded it needed to raise awareness
about the protection offered.  The Chairman commented that the
key issue appeared to be how Japan can develop an allegation
into a filed case. 

PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORTS 

11. (U) Within one year of the WGB's approval of the Report of
Phase 2 Examination, countries must, at a minimum, provide an
oral report on steps they have taken or plan to take to
implement the WGB's priority recommendations.  A detailed
written follow-up report must be provided within two years. 

JAPAN WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP 

12. (SBU) Lead examiners U.S. and Italy reported that Japan had
complied with many Phase 2 recommendations.  Japan reported it
had reformed the UCPL to extend statutes of limitation,
requested MLA on two occasions, raised awareness of foreign
bribery, including of amendments to the corporate tax law and
income tax law expressly denying tax deductibility of bribes to
foreign public officials, and distributed amended 2007
Guidelines to prevent foreign bribery.  The WGB found that Japan
had not implemented: 

- Rec. 1(iv) to raise awareness of foreign bribery among the
legal profession; and 

- Rec. 5(c) to clarify that UCPL prohibits all cases where a
foreign public official directs transmission of benefit to a
third party. 

The WGB found that Japan had partially implemented a number of
recommendations, including: 

- recommendation in preamble to Phase 2 recommendations re:
assessing impediments to effective investigation and
prosecution, make use of MLA at non-"filed" investigative stage,
increase law enforcement coordination and address difficulties
encountered in establishing and enforcing territorial
jurisdiction; 

- Rec. 2(b) for METI to establish a formal system to effectively
process allegations of foreign bribery 

- Rec. 2(d) on improving whistle-blower protection for those
reporting directly to law enforcement authorities; 

- Rec. 3(a) to ensure all activities under article 8.1 of the
Convention are prohibited, including off-the-books accounts. 

 - Rec. 5(b) to ensure METI guidelines on facilitation payments
conform to the Convention and Commentaries. 

The WGB found that Japan had satisfactorily implemented other
specific recommendations, but some follow-up recommendations had
not been the subject of sufficient practice and required
continued follow-up. 

13. (SBU) The WGB agreed that, in order to continue moving this
positive process forward, Japan should provide a Phase 2 bis
follow-up report in one year.  This will allow Japan and lead
examiners to consult and exchange views on progress being made
and for a brief report to the WGB.  The WGB agreed that both the
written follow-up and the self-assessment would be published,
along with a summary of the discussion. 

U.K. WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP 

14. (SBU) The WGB found that the UK had implemented a number of
the WGB Phase 2 recommendations, but failed to enact
comprehensive foreign bribery legislation.  The U.K. had no
foreign bribery prosecutions and its decision to drop the BAE
Systems plc investigation relating to Saudi Arabia highlighted
WGB concerns.  The WGB found that the UK had made progress since
its March 2005 Phase 2 examination in raising awareness (e.g.
appointment of a UK anti-corruption coordinator); in continuing
to encourage Overseas Territories to adopt anti-bribery
legislation (UK verified compliance of Guernsey's legislation
with the Convention and Jersey's enactment of a foreign bribery
statute, but not yet extended the Convention to either island);
in providing additional resources to facilitate MLA and in
increasing capacity to investigate allegations of foreign
bribery (e.g. new Metropolitan Police/City of London Police unit
investigating foreign corruption allegations).  Since March
2005, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) had launched 6 new
investigations and had worked on 23 vetting files in an attempt
to develop enough information to open a case file.  The UK del
expressed its optimism that its first foreign bribery
prosecution could be launched in 2007. 

15. (C) The UK del claimed its existing law implemented the
obligations of the Convention, but noted the UK remains
committed to fundamental reform of its bribery laws.  A Home
Office consultation report had concluded that no consensus
existed for moving forward a draft 2003 bill to enact
comprehensive corruption legislation.  The issue has been
referred to the Law Commission, which was expected to prepare a 

new draft bill within 18 months.  WGB lead examiners France and
Canada underscored that 6 years had passed since the Phase 1
examination recommended the UK enact comprehensive foreign
bribery legislation.  France noted this delay sent a negative
message regarding the UK's commitment to implement the
Convention as a whole. 

16. (C) US del said the UK position that current legislation is
adequate to effectively implement the Convention was rebutted by
concrete evidence that it was not.  US del also noted that the
WGB should ask the UK to do what it had asked Japan to do:
identify the structural problems that have prevented cases from
moving to indictment.  The Chairman commented that the WGB had
long been doubtful regarding the UK's reliance on its
principal-agent element of bribery.  The UK del noted that
evidentiary problems raised by some UK officials regarding the
BAE/Saudi investigation gave a distorted view of the
deficiencies of UK law, calling the Saudi case "wholly unusual,
if not exceptional" given the involvement of an absolute
monarchy. 

17. (U) The WGB found that the UK had failed to implement: 

- the recommendation in the preamble to the Phase 2 to enact at
the earliest possible date comprehensive foreign bribery
legislation; 

- Rec. 3(a) to proceed with adoption of reforms clarifying and
unifying UK accounting legislation with IAS to ensure fraudulent
accounting offense is in full conformity with Article 8 of the
Convention; 

- Rec. 5(a) to amend where appropriate the Code for Crown
Prosecutors, the Crown Prosecution Manual and other documents to
ensure investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery is not
influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the
potential effect upon relations with another state or the
identity of the natural or legal persons involved (Article 5 of
Convention); and 

- Rec. 5(c) to broaden the level of persons engaging the
criminal liability of legal persons for foreign bribery. 

The WGB also concluded that the UK had partially implemented 9
recommendations and satisfactorily implemented 8
recommendations. 

18. (U) Following a further discussion of the BAE/Saudi
investigation (see below), the WGB agreed that it would conduct
a Phase 2 bis review of the UK focused on progress in enacting a
new foreign bribery law and in broadening liability of legal
persons for foreign bribery, examining whether systemic problems
explain the lack of foreign bribery cases brought to prosecution
and addressing other issues raised by the discontinuance of the
BAE/Saudi Arabia investigation.  The review will include an
on-site visit to be conducted by March 2008. 

19. (C) An extensive discussion of how the WGB would make public
this decision followed.  The UK stridently objected to any
engagement with the media by the Chair regarding the review and
asked that only a WGB press release be issued.  The Secretariat
argued that OECD practice is to be as open as possible with the
media, while respecting the confidential nature of the
discussions.  After many delegations expressed confidence in the
Chair, the WGB agreed to allow the Chair to brief the press,
accompanied by OECD Legal staff and the director of the
Financial and Enterprise Affairs Directorate.  Bilateral
interview requests made in the following several days would be
referred to the Secretariat. 

TERMINATION OF BAE/SAUDI ARABIA INVESTIGATION 

20. (C) Lead examiner France noted a number of issues were still
outstanding regarding the BAE/Saudi Arabia investigation,
including the materiality of the UK's national security
rationale.  Lead examiner Canada said it accepted the
explanations given by the UK for reasons for discontinuing the
investigation, but had serious concerns about the UK's legal
framework and adequacy of its corporate criminal liability
legislation.  US del asked whether the UK could provide any
assurances that BAE was not continuing to make corrupt payments
to Saudi officials and that MOD officials were not continuing to
participate in the alleged corrupt payments.  The U.S. also
asked about evidence preservation and whether UK national
security concerns would pose an impediment to providing MLA to
other states. 

21. (C) The UK del, which included Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, SFO, Ministry of Defense Police, Department for
International Development, Metropolitan Police and office of the
Attorney General (AG) officials, reported that the SFO was
reviewing the aftermath of the decision to discontinue in light
of its duty to ensure that the MOD Police, Export Credit
Guarantee Department (ECGD) and other bodies received all
relevant information to help them carry out their public duties.
 The UK del advised that since no one has been charged and found
guilty, there are limitations on actions the UK government can
take and other fora must accept their responsibilities in
considering the case.  The UK del advised that no evidentiary
material would be returned until the judicial review has run its
course.  The SFO did not see a reason why national or
international security would prevent the UK from responding to a
request for MLA. 

22. (C) The Chairman inquired further into the reasons for
discontinuance and asked whether the WGB should not deplore a
threat by a sovereign state to stop fundamental cooperation, if
Saudi threats to stop counter-terrorism cooperation were the
basis of the national security interests involved.  He inquired
about how precise Parties must be in identifying risks and the
immediacy of danger posed before invoking national security.
The UK del advised that the SFO Director had considered only
national and international security grounds in reaching his
decision to discontinue the investigation.  The judicial review
would address whether the decision-making process was valid and
whether the decision was in conformity with Article 5 of the
Convention.  The Swiss del noted that it continued to be very
concerned about the effect of the UK decision, that it implied
that the UK would not prosecute allegations of foreign bribery
by its firms in Saudi Arabia, depriving other parties of a level
playing field there and possibly in other countries. 

23. (C) In response to an OECD legal advisor's inquiries whether
the UK recognized international public policy and public
interest factors in favor of prosecution, the UK del (AG rep)
confirmed that the UK recognized that bribery was contrary to
international public policy and that the nature of bribery as an
offense was a powerful factor for prosecuting the act.  In the
BAE/Saudi matter, however, he advised that the SFO Director had
considered protecting national security an even more important
factor.  The UK AG shared this view, and also considered that
the case was unlikely to lead to successful prosecution.
Regarding the basis for identifying the national security risk,
the UK del said the UK ambassador to Saudi Arabia had considered
the risk that Saudi Arabia would withdraw counter-terrorism
cooperation to be real and that all who expressed views had
shared that assessment, including the UK's security services.
In response to an OECD legal advisor's query about whether the
ECGD had the right to refuse to provide official support to BAE
Systems in the future in light of the allegations in this case,
the UK del said it could not speak for the ECGD, which had its
own duties to implement anti-corruption policies and the right 

to insist that BAE Systems provide due diligence information. 

24. (C) US del stressed the difficulty in assessing from the
outside the factors taken into account in the UK's decision.
While concerns remained about the particular case, more critical
was what the case had revealed regarding the UK's legal
framework for preventing foreign bribery.  As the Convention
approaches its tenth anniversary, the WGB must demand that all
parties meet their obligations and maintain high standards.  The
French del spoke of the need to convey a clear message to the
business community and civil society that payment of bribes to
foreign public officials was no longer an acceptable competitive
advantage.  The Canadian del agreed that abandonment of the
investigation created a problem for the Convention.  Following a
discussion which frequently underscored the need to defend the
Convention, and which weighed the merits of various next steps,
France, Italy, New Zealand Greece, Chile, Germany, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, and the US del
all expressed continuing serious concerns about the UK's
decision and spoke in favor of the WGB (1) issuing a strong
statement to the public relaying those concerns and (2)
conducting a Phase 2 bis review of the UK focused on Convention
implementation.  Although Germany and Canada expressed a
preference for waiting until the results of the UK domestic
judicial review, a position strongly favored by the UK, WGB
consensus ultimately opposed such a delay. 

SWITZERLAND WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP 

25. (SBU) Switzerland reported that its Phase 2 examination had
contributed to greater awareness of its obligations under the
Convention and had spurred long-term cooperation among federal
and cantonal-level authorities, the Swiss business community and
civil society.  Switzerland reported that 23 foreign bribery
cases were initiated in 2005 and 2006, of which 17 were in
connection with the UN Oil for Food program.  A total of 19
cases were still in the investigative stage and four were
closed.  No charges were pressed nor rulings handed down during
the period.  Informed by comments from lead examiners Hungary
and Belgium, the WGB found that Switzerland had taken efforts to
raise awareness, but further measures targeted at small and
medium-sized enterprises and cantonal-level authorities were
required to fully implement WGB recommendations.  Switzerland
had fully implemented: 

- Rec. 3(a) to consider establishing a formal obligation for any
federal authority, civil servant or public official to report
indications of possible bribery to authorities and 

- Rec. 3(d) to consider extending mandatory reporting
obligations for auditors to report to prosecutorial authorities
evidence of possible corrupt practices by those whose accounts
they audit if executive bodies refrain from taking action. 

26. (U) Discussion of Switzerland's follow-up report revealed
certain difficulties encountered by the WGB in distinguishing
between full and partial implementation of recommendations and
highlighted the need for precision in recommendation text.  In
several instances Switzerland had taken action in response to
recommendations, but measures had not yet been finalized.
Switzerland contended it had nonetheless fully implemented the
recommendations.  The WGB ultimately found that Switzerland had
only partially implemented the remaining 8 recommendations. 

REVISION OF ANTI-BRIBERY INSTRUMENTS: DRAFT MANDATE FOR
SUB-GROUPS 

27. (U) The WGB agreed that Chairman Pieth and Vice-Chair
Gavouneli would serve as chairs of two ad hoc sub-groups on (1)
criminalization and (2) prevention issues, involving areas such
as export credit, official development assistance, public 

procurement, auditing and non-tax deductibility.  The sub-groups
are to be open and informal and their task will be to assist the
WGB in completing proposed revisions to anti-bribery instruments
by December 2007.  This would include likely revision of the
1997 Revised Recommendation (requiring approval by the OECD
Council) and possible clarification in Commentaries regarding
interpretations of the Convention. 

TOUR DE TABLE DEFERRED 

28.  (U) The WGB deferred reviewing country enforcement actions
on foreign bribery and UN Oil-for-Food cases to June, given the
press of other agenda items. 

OUTREACH ACTIVITIES 

29. (U) The Secretariat briefed on outreach activities,
including the anticipated signature in April of a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Organization of American States to
strengthen the fight against corruption in the Americas.  The
Secretariat also agreed to provide suggestions on next steps for 

SIPDIS
WGB outreach to China. 

ANNUAL REPORT 

30. (U) The WGB approved the 2006 draft annual report, after
agreeing to a UK request to delete a reference to the BAE/Saudi
investigation.  US del noted that there was nothing
inappropriate with the proposed reference, but did not object to
its deletion.  The French del noted that reference should be
included in the 2007 Annual Report. 

OTHER ITEMS 

31. (U) The Italian delegation briefed on the invitation by the
Government of Italy to hold a Prosecutors' Meeting in Rome in
November as part of an event marking the 10th anniversary of the
Convention in November or December 2007, which may involve
ministerial participation. 

32. (U) The Netherlands del noted that differences in WGB
Parties' positions regarding UNCAC issues have complicated UNCAC
implementation.  They proposed including an agenda item for the
October WGB plenary meeting to exchange ideas about how to
organize in preparation for the second UNCAC Conference of State
Parties. 

33. (U) The US del suggested, with support of Dutch and Swiss
colleagues, that prosecutors plan to meet on the margins of the
June plenary for a brainstorming session to discuss the
usefulness of a prosecutors' forum.  The UK requested that this
be scheduled for the same day as the Tour de Table to facilitate
attendance.  The Chair suggested that the prosecutors also
provide guidance to the Italian delegation regarding the agenda
for the 10th anniversary event. 

34. (U) The June WGB plenary meeting will take place June 19-21,
2007.  (Ad hoc sub-groups were subsequently scheduled to meet on
June 18.)
MORELLA

CONFIDENTIAL: TERRORIST FINANCE: IARA AND FIVE OFFICIALS, JTJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBLIN 001598 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS (BSTEPHENSON), S/CT (TKUSHNER),
EUR/UBI, IO/PHO (APEREZ),
NSC FOR MRUPPERT,
TREASURY FOR JZARATE,
AND OFAC DIRECTOR (RWERNER) 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2014
TAGS: ETTC KTFN EFIN PTER PREL CVIS ECON LVPR
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: IARA AND FIVE OFFICIALS, JTJ
DESIGNATION (LISTS 62 & 63) 

REF: A. STATE 222164 

     B. STATE 222244
     C. STATE 219924 

Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR
REASONS 1.4.(B) AND (D) 

1.(C) Summary. Emboff, drawing on reftel points, spoke on
October 19 to Maurice Biggar, Deputy Director for
International Terrorism & Illicit Drugs and his colleague,
Eoin Duggan, at the DFA.  According to Biggar and Duggan the
USG domestic designation of IARA is an issue of concern as it
targets an Irish citizen, Ibrahim Buisir.  The GOI has no
information on JTJ operations within Ireland.  The IARA
designation came as a surprise, but not an unwelcome one.
Ireland does not currently have legal recourse to freeze
assets of suspected terrorism financiers.  The GOI also does
not have far-reaching intelligence capabilities, so greatly
appreciates information-sharing and cooperation with the USG.
 If both such designations are approved through the UN 1267
Sanctions Committee, the EU will follow suit, thereby
requiring legal action in Ireland and allowing Irish
authorities to freeze assets of Buisir.  The Irish are likely
to welcome such action.  End Summary. 

--------------------------------------------- -------------
List 62: The Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), Ibrahim
Buisir
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 

2.(C) Biggar had no new information to report regarding the
IARA; however, Ibrahim Buisir, who was named last week as
having ties to Al-Qaeda, is certainly of interest as a dual
Irish-Libyan with links to terrorist financing.  Buisir's
designation on the US domestic list came as a surprise to the
Irish, and the Irish government would have appreciated a
heads up.  That said, the Irish also consider Buisir to be a
problem.  Recently, they tried to prosecute him for credit
card fraud but he was released on a technicality.  He is now
living on welfare. 

3.(C) The USG domestic designation of Buisir does not change
his status.  As an Irish citizen, he is free to move his
assets and to travel, both within country and abroad.
Current Irish law does not allow for the arrest of an
individual suspected of terrorism financing unless the EU has
designated the person.  (Note: A criminal and terrorism law
is pending ratification this fall.)  If the USG designation
is pursued and approved by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee,
the EU will automatically adopt it, allowing Ireland's
Central Bank legal means to freeze his assets.  The process
from the EU approval to Irish application usually takes a
matter of days.  The Irish are likely to welcome this
designation. 

4.(C) Buisir has successfully used the press to gain sympathy
in the past.  The DFA has concerns that he may do so again,
claiming persecution by the USG.  To date, though, only one
article has made it in the press regarding the designation
and Buisir has refrained from public comments. 

--------------------------------------------
List 63: Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad (JTJ)
-------------------------------------------- 

5.(U) The GOI has no information on current activities of
Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad (JTJ) in Ireland.  The DFA
welcomes this designation and information sharing on
terrorism financing.  Biggar emphasized that, as with Buisir,
the Irish government cannot act until the UN and EU have
acted. 

----------------
Working Together
---------------- 

6. For the purposes of better understanding the GOI, it is
important to highlight the eagerness and willingness the DFA
expressed regarding the fight against terrorism.  Biggar
mentioned that the DFA and the Gardai (Irish national police)
do not have as close a working relationship as they would
like. As a result, information sharing is limited and rare.
Thus, the USG briefings with the DFA are well received and
appreciated.  The free flow of information is always welcome.
KENNY

CONFIDENTIAL: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part II – Community Reaction

VZCZCXRO2713
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS
RUEHTM
DE RUEHMU #0013/01 0071743
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071743Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0368
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0004
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000013 

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/07
TAGS: SNAR SOCI ASEC PGOV PHUM PREL KCOR NU
SUBJECT: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part II - Community Reaction
Divided, FSLN Blames U.S. for Crisis 

REF: A) 2009 MANAGUA 1149 (LORDS OF NARCO-COAST PART I)
B) 2009 MANAGUA 1051 (PRIMER ON MISKITO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT)
C) 2009 MANAGUA 1047 (MISKITO INDEPENDENCE RALLY TURNS DEADLY)
D) 2008 MANAGUA 1517 AND PREVIOUS (FRAUD IN RAAN ELECTIONS)
E) 2008 MANAGUA 419 AND PREVIOUS (GON SUSPENDS RAAN MUNICIPAL
ELECTIONS) 

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(A), (B),
(D) 

SUMMARY 

1. (C): On December 8, after a plane laden with cocaine and cash
crash-landed in the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN), a deadly confrontation
took place between Nicaraguan anti-drug units and drug smugglers
allied with some number of local residents.  This message is the
second in a series that reports on the Walpa Siksa incident and its
immediate aftermath, and explores what these events have revealed
about the actual state of organized trafficking operations in
Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. 

2.  (C) In the aftermath of the incident, public reactions have
been divided.  Some regional politicians and leaders of the
indigenous Yatama political party have called the incident and
subsequent government operations in the region a new "Red Christmas
Massacre" - a reference to the Sandinistas' deadly attacks on
indigenous Miskitos in the 1980s, assertions the military contests
are false.  Religious leaders have denounced these same political
leaders for turning a blind eye to the increased drug activity.
Former Vice President (and ex-Sandinista), Sergio Ramirez, has
decried the presence of trafficking organizations as a national
security threat, while a senior current FSLN official accused the
United States, specifically the CIA, of "promoting" the drug trade
to destabilize the country.  Underneath all lies a subtext of the
perennial rivalry and racial conflict between Nicaragua's Pacific
(Hispanic) and Atlantic (Afro-Caribbean and Amerindian) cultures.
Yet, also through the dissonance, the Walpa Siksa incident and its
aftermath seem to indicate stronger linkages between drug smugglers
and local communities in Nicaragua's Atlantic region than
previously believed.  END SUMMARY 

REGIONAL POLITICIANS BLAME THE MILITARY - SEEK A NEW CRISIS  

3. (C) The Walpa Siksa village, where the December 8 incident
occurred, is in a region historically controlled by Yatama; the
regional, indigenous Miskito political party.  Much of Yatama's
leadership itself has been co-opted by the ruling Sandinista Party
(REF D) over the last few years.  Even so, regional politicians and
several Yatama leaders have taken to the airwaves, primarily on
their new Yatama radio station (reportedly funded by the
government), to condemn the Nicaraguan military for its continuing
operations in the vicinity of Walpa Siksa and Prinzapolka.  These
leaders, including Brooklyn Rivera, a Yatama National Assembly
Deputy; Reynoldo Francis, Governor of the North Atlantic Autonomous
Region (RAAN); Roberto Wilson, the RAAN Vice Governor; and
Elizabeth Enriquez Francis, former mayor of RAAN capital Bilwi (and
ex-wife of Governor Francis), have used Miskito-language radio
broadcasts from the new station to claim that the Nicaraguan
anti-drug unit had violated human rights in pursuing its
investigation and by detaining suspects from Walpa Siksa.  These
leaders vehemently denied that these coastal communities support,
house and abet drug smugglers, as had been charged by some critics.
Rivera told national media that "the soldiers are all from the
Pacific coast.  There has been racism, robberies and looting of
indigenous people's homes."  Other Miskito leaders claim that the
soldiers have killed livestock and stolen food donated to the
community by the World Food Program. 

4. (C) Rivera, Francis, Wilson, and Enriquez have all called for
and even led several protests against police and navy forces
stationed in Bilwi, creating a new crisis in the region.  They have
denounced the "human rights violations" by the anti-drug unit
against the "innocent" indigenous people and claim that the
military "occupation" of Walpa Siksa is rife with abuses.  This
racially-charged agitation led some in the Miskito community to set
up illegal road blocks at the town of Sinsin, preventing traffic on
the only road between Bilwi and Managua.  There were also attempts
to take over the Bilwi International Airport and the capital's main
wharf.  These Yatama leaders and radicalized supporters have
demanded that the Navy cease all operations on the Atlantic Coast,
withdraw from the region, and immediately release the roughly two
dozen suspects detained in Walpa Siksa and Prinzapolka.  (see
SEPTEL).  Rivera also told reporters that the Walpa Siksa community
elders had decided to abandon their community if the military did
not depart or carried out its plan to establish a permanent
presence in the area. 

MORAVIAN CHURCH LEADER CONDEMNS GOVERNMENT COLLUSION 

5. (U) The Moravian Church is the largest denomination on the
Atlantic Coast and a large majority of indigenous Miskitos belong
to it, making the church the moral authority in the region; even
more so than the Catholic Church.  On Friday, December 13, Moravian
Church Superintendant Cora Antonio issued a grave statement against
the local Walpa Siksa community leaders, police officials and
military officials in the Atlantic, whom she claimed knew about the
narco-trafficking base in Walpa Siksa, but took no action until the
recent plane crash.  Antonio, who will finish her two-year term in
January 2010, complained that drug smugglers had established their
networks unchallenged by the GON and exploited the extreme poverty
on the Coast.  She also claimed that elected officials, including
Francis, Wilson, and Lidia Coleman, the mayor of nearby
Prinzapolka, as well as police and military authorities, "knew from
the beginning of the installation of this narco-traffickers' base,
but never did anything about it."   She also stated that in certain
Caribbean communities the narco-traffickers exercised the highest
authority, above that of the community judge, the village elders,
even the pastor or "sindico," and that they frequently commanded
the "last word" on community decisions.  Antonio also said the
Moravian Church had recently removed a reverend from the Walpa
Siksa village out of fear that he would be physically attacked for
preaching against drugs from the pulpit. 

WIHTA TARA ALSO SAYS MILITARY SHOULD LEAVE 

6. (U) Other non-FSLN-aligned indigenous leaders took aim at the
President Ortega and at the military's recent actions.  The Wihta
Tara of the Miskito Nation, aka the Rev. Hector Williams, who
denounced the Managua government and called for Miskito
independence, told the media that Columbian drug traffickers had
already left, so the military should leave as well.  NOTE: The
Wihta Tara (Miskito for "great judge"), was elected by the Council
of Elders of the Miskito Nation and leads Miskito separatist
movement that mounted protests which were violently suppressed this
past October (REF E)  END NOTE.   Williams stated that "the army is
after the money that they think is hidden in the community."
Building on the racial inequality theme, another separatist leader,
Steady Alvarado, publicly questioned why the military felt it could
take actions in the indigenous communities that it would never
attempt on the Pacific Coast.  The Miskito Council of Elders itself
issued a statement on December 12 blaming President Ortega directly
for the "tortures, persecutions and death of our community members
in Walpa Siksa."  It also accused Ortega of being "incapable of
neutralizing" drug trafficking activity on the Atlantic Coast, and
for again "bearing a grudge" against the Coastal peoples, "like he
did during the Navidad Roja (Red Christmas Massacre)."  NOTE: The
Red Christmas Massacre occurred in 1981, when Sandinista military
operations in the Atlantic Coast killed dozens and forcibly
relocated hundreds of Miskitos thought to be collaborating with the
Contras. END NOTE. 

ARMY CHIEF DENIES RIGHTS VIOLATIONS - YIELD "NOT ONE INCH TO
NARCOS" 

7. (U) General Omar Halleslevens, Commander of the Nicaraguan
military, told reporters that the Army would not leave Walpa Siksa,
nor would it stop searching neighboring communities for drug
traffickers.  He insisted that the Army would remain and would take
appropriate measures to protect the area from again becoming a
haven for drug trafficking.  Halleslevens denied accusations that
the military had violated human rights, saying "our line has been
from the very beginning to respect life, human rights, private
property and the law ... as we are completing our duty to support
the police in applying the law."  He further declared that the
military would "not give a rock, nor even an inch of the national
territory, to narco-traffickers" and called on government
institutions and the population to support law enforcement in its
fight.  NOTE: Thus far, Post has no/no credible evidence of human
rights violations by law enforcement related to this operation.  We
continue to monitor the situation closely and will report relevant
developments if they occur.  END NOTE. 

FORMER FSLN VICE PRESIDENT CONDEMNS NARCOS, BLAMES GOVERNMENT 

8. (U) Adding to the chorus of concern about the absentee national
government was author and former Nicaraguan/FSLN vice president,
Sergio Ramirez, who said in an op-ed that the strong
narco-traffickers presence on the Caribbean Coast threatened
Nicaragua's sovereignty and territorial integrity.  He believed
that the "narco-traffickers will promote the separation of the
Caribbean Coast (REF E) and already have the social base to do it"
because of the significant resources drug smugglers enjoy and the
rampant political corruption in the region.  Ramirez also said the
confrontation between the anti-drug units and the Walpa Siksa
community demonstrated that criminal organizations had achieved
enormous influence on the Atlantic Coast while the "government does
not do anything to stop the problem." 

FSLN LEADER BLAMES THE U.S., CIA FOR THE CRISIS, MAY CANCEL
ELECTIONS 

9. (U) In contrast, during December 16 interviews, Steadman Fagoth,
a Miskito indigenous leader, former Contra commander, and now
ardent Ortega supporter, told FSLN-controlled media that United
States had created the Walpa Siksa crisis.  Fagoth, who is also
president of the Government's Fishing Authority (INPESCA), spoke to
Multinoticias Channel 4, owned and operated by the Ortega-Murillo
family, and to "El 19," the official on-line newspaper of the
Sandinista Government.  He claimed that the United States, through
the CIA, was trying to provoke an uprising in the Atlantic Coast
against the government by supporting narco-criminals.  He added
that Alberto Luis Cano, the fugitive Colombian drug leader and
passenger of the crashed drug airplane (see SEPTEL-Part I) had been
hired by the CIA to promote an uprising among the native
population, by playing on the racial animosity between Nicaragua's
Pacific and Atlantic populations.  Perhaps Fagoth's most troubling
comment was that because of the current unrest, the government
might delay regional elections scheduled for March 2010.  

COMMENT 

10. (C) In the cacophony following the Walpa Siksa incident,
statements of FSLN official Steadman Fagoth are perhaps the most
politically ominous.  Fagoth is a regular proxy for Ortega's
Atlantic policy.  His remarks frequently represent test balloons
for how Ortega perceives the situation and how the President seeks
to position himself against any fallout.  Fagoth's anti-U.S.
accusations are outrageous, but not unexpected -- that the United
States and CIA employed a drug trafficker to created this crisis,
destabilize the region and overthrow the government.  He made
similar accusations about the United States and CIA when the Wihta
Tara announced the separatist movement several months ago.  In
2008, the GON delayed RAAN municipal elections (REF E) on dubious
grounds.  Thus Fagoth's comment about delaying the March 2010
regional elections may indicate Ortega's true intent: freeze
everyone in place. 

11. (C) The Walpa Siksa incident and its aftermath aggravated
underlying tensions and divisions that persist in the Atlantic, and
may have exposed new evidence about the nature and extend of
narco-trafficking activity.  Serious concerns about threats to
national security and sovereignty have been raised by critics of
the government.  Some community leaders, such as Moravian
Superintendent Cora Antonio, have spoken out about what they see as
rampant drug corruption and political collusion by RAAN political
leaders.  We find it odd that these same political leaders, such as
Rivera, Francis, Wilson and Enriquez agitated against military
counter-drug operations, and virtually denied the existence of any
narco-trafficking activity.  At a minimum, their efforts to fan
latent racial resentments seem self-serving re-election efforts in
the run-up to regional elections.  For its part, the military
denies any human rights abuses in this, its largest anti-drug land
operation in the Caribbean in years.  In a subsequent message we
will provide more detail about the figures caught up in the Walpa
Siksa incident and outline some of the networks and relationships
that we believe traffickers may have been able to establish.
CALLAHAN

CONFIDENTIAL: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part I – Deadly Confrontation

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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/21
TAGS: SNAR SOCI PGOV PHUM PREL KCOR ASEC NU
SUBJECT: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part I - Deadly Confrontation at
Walpa Siksa 

REF: MANAGUA 1051 (MOSQUITO COAST INDEPENDENCE) 

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador, State, Embassy
Managua; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D) 

1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 8, after a plane laden with cocaine and
cash crash landed in the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in
the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN), a deadly confrontation
took place between Nicaraguan anti-drug units and drug smugglers
allied with a some number of local residents.  Stories of how the
clash came to pass on December 8 are divergent, but the Walpa Siksa
incident,  the ensuing actions of regional leaders and local
residents, as well as the enhanced posture of security forces seems
to indicate there are stronger linkages between drug smugglers and
local communities than previously believed.  This message is the
first in a series that reports on the Walpa Siksa incident and its
immediate aftermath, and explores what these events have revealed
about the actual state of organized trafficking operations in
Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast.  END SUMMARY 

WALPA SIKA: THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT 

2. (C) On Tuesday, December 8, a Nicaraguan anti-drug unit clashed
with suspected drug traffickers, leaving two sailors dead and five
other government security forces wounded.  The following account of
events is based on Government of Nicaragua (GON) official briefings
and conversations between senior GON law enforcement/military
officials and Embassy personnel.  On Tuesday, December 8, a
Nicaraguan anti-drug unit combined force of navy and national
police traveled to the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) to investigate reports of a
plane crash linked to drug smugglers.  The joint patrol arrived in
the evening and was ambushed by civilians from the remote village,
who were allegedly defending the drug traffickers.  In the melee,
two sailors were killed, and three other military personnel and one
police officer were severely wounded.  One villager from Walpa
Siksa was also killed.  On Wednesday, December 9, a joint
Nicaraguan navy-army patrol returned to Walpa Siksa to detain those
suspected of involvement in the ambush, only to find the community
abandoned of all males.  On Thursday, December 10, anti-drug forces
from the Navy confronted an additional group of drug smugglers near
the community of Prinzapolka, in which one suspect was killed and
another wounded.  Two more were detained, and the fifth suspect
escaped.  Subsequent missions by the anti-drug unit over several
days resulted in 20 suspects arrested (18 in connection with the
first clash), and confiscation of a powerboat, several guns,
ammunition, small quantities of drugs and $177,960 in cash.
Nicaraguan security forces have seized and are now operating out of
several homes in the Walpa Siksa community that are believed to
have housed drug smugglers.  The military has announced plans to
establish a permanent presence in the area to discourage drug
traffickers from using it as a base of operations any longer. 

3. (U) Capt. Roger Gonzalez, newly-installed chief of the
Nicaraguan naval forces, told the press that "we understand there
is a Colombian criminal, suspected drug trafficker, [Alberto Ruiz
Cano] who has $500,000 and has armed certain area individuals, and
we are searching for him."  Police investigators revealed that Ruiz
Cano, whose real name is Amauri Pau, was illegally issued a
Nicaraguan national identity card (cedula) and owns several
properties and businesses in Managua believed to be involved in
money laundering (see SEPTEL).  Ruiz Cano is also believed to have
been on the crashed plane and is suspected of leading the December
8 attack against the anti-drug unit.  Officials detained two
Colombians -- Ruiz Cano's father [Fernando Melendez Paudd known as
"el Patron"] and his cousin [Catalina del Carmen Ruiz] -- but
neither has been willing to talk to police about Ruiz Cano or his
whereabouts.  Ruiz Cano's associates have hired attorney Julian
Holmes Arguello to defend them.  The presence of Holmes Arguello, a
well-known and expensive attorney, has reinforced official
suspicions about Holmes own possible drug connections. 

WALPA SIKSA: EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS -- EARLY "WHITE" CHRISTMAS OR
FAILED DRUG RESCUE? 

4. (U) The national daily newspaper El Nuevo Diario "END"
(left-of-center) has provided continuous coverage of the Walpa
Siksa incident, since it came to light on the evening of December
8th.  According to the paper's accounts, events leading up to the
deadly December 8 firefight differ somewhat from the official
account.  The paper's sources, who requested anonymity for fear of
possible reprisals from traffickers, other residents and the
government, stated that the plane crash-landed in the Walpa Siksa
cemetery on Sunday, December 6 at 11 a.m.  The impact killed the
pilot and co-pilot instantly, and broke the plane into several
pieces scattering packets of cocaine and bundles of dollars in the
debris.  Walpa Siksa residents quickly discovered the dead pilots
and one crash survivor, to whom they gave medical attention.  They
were also surprised at the large quantity of cocaine the plane was
carrying.  According to the paper's sources, some community elders
wanted to immediately contact the police and navy about the plane
crash and drugs, but others argued that it would be better to
divide the cash and drugs within the community and then burn the
plane to hide the evidence.  According to the media reports, the
latter group prevailed and armed themselves with weapons (pistols,
AK-47 rifles) that had been stored since the 1980's.  According to
the eye-witness accounts, on December 7 at 2 p.m. two boats with
approximately 40 Colombian narco-traffickers, who were "armed to
the teeth," arrived in Walpa Siksa to rescue the pilots and the
third passenger (known as "el Jefe" or "the boss," believed to be
Alberto Ruiz Cano), and to recover the plane's lost "merchandise."
The Colombians spent the night of December 7 and all day December 8
trying to convince the community to return the missing drugs and
cash.  According to END reports, when the narco-traffickers learned
that a government anti-drug unit was coming from Bilwi to
investigate the plane crash, they armed the community in order to
repel the Navy.  As soon as the two Navy boats arrived, the
narco-traffickers opened fire on the sailors, who also shot back,
killing four community members [NOTE: only one death in the
community has been confirmed. END NOTE].  The navy boats returned
to Bilwi at 7 p.m. with their dead and wounded.  On December 9, the
wounded civilians from Walpa Siksa were taken to a nearby village
and, by the afternoon, the Walpa Siksa village was evacuated
because villagers feared reprisals by the Government. 

5. (C) Our Embassy contacts on the ground in the RAAN have relayed
an account similar to that reported in the newspaper, but that
differs on some important details.  According to our sources, on
Friday, December 4, an airplane carrying hundreds of pounds of
cocaine and sacks of cash ran out of fuel on its way to a
clandestine runway in the RAAN and was forced to make an emergency
landing on the beach near Walpa Siksa.  The plane's pilot and two
passengers, allegedly Colombians, suffered minor injuries and were
sheltered by the local community.  Members of the community quickly
emptied the airplane of its cargo, estimated to be approximately a
half-ton of cocaine separated into individual one kilo packets.
Our contacts told us that word of the plane crash quickly spread
throughout the coastal communities and on Saturday morning,
December 5, several local merchants left Bilwi with their boats
full of commercial goods and food to sell to the community with its
sudden new windfall.  By Saturday evening narco-trafficker "rescue
boats" carrying approximately 40 Colombians and Hondurans
(reportedly from Honduras and San Andres) arrived in the community
to save the pilot/passengers and recover the drugs and cash.  Over
the ensuing three days, village elders urged by the narco "recovery
team" tried to persuade the community to sell the cocaine packets
back at a price of $3,000 a kilo.  According to our contacts, the
major sticking point was that the $3,000 price was only half the
$6,000 per kilo price that locals knew they could get by taking
their windfall slightly up the coast to Honduras.  When one group
of Walpa Siksa residents ultimately refused to sell back their
stash to the narco-traffickers, they were attacked and robbed of
their "windfall."  This group subsequently traveled to Bilwi on the
morning of Tuesday, December 8, and filed a formal complaint with
the police there, which confirmed rumors of a drug-plane crash.
Our contacts told us that it was this formal complaint that lead to
the government dispatching the counter-drug unit to investigate at
Walpa Siksa.  The anti-drug unit arrived in two boats to Walpa
Siksa at approximately 6 p.m.  Our contacts told us that there had
been no ambush when they arrived, but rather an "amicable" meeting
between law enforcement and village elders.  However, things turned
sour after one of the Colombians from the "rescue team," who was
drunk and under the impression they were under attack, shot his
automatic weapon into the group of uniformed sailors, killing one
and seriously wounding several other counter-drug unit members.
Our contacts told us that the "ambush" story was fabricated later
by authorities to account for their dead and wounded. 

COMMENT 

6. (C) Walpa Siksa has obliged us to revise our views about the
nature and extent of trafficking activity on the Atlantic.
Previously, our assessment had been that the majority of the local
indigenous Miskito villages were too xenophobic to actively support
outsiders (even Nicaraguans from the Pacific side of Hispanic
descent) in transporting drugs (or, frankly, any other activity)
for extended periods.  We had also believed that local interaction
with traffickers had been intermittent, and normally took place
upon the instruction or advice of a small number of corrupt
political and indigenous leaders in the region.  We maintain our
basic assessment is still valid; however, all three versions of the
Walpa Siksa incident reveal evidence that there is likely a much
higher degree of cooperation and support than we previously
believed between foreign drug trafficking organization and, at
least, the more remote local communities of Nicaragua's Atlantic
Coast.  In some cases there may be persistent and pervasive
relationships within an entire community.  We fear that it now
appears that organized criminal elements may have made major
inroads within some remote coastal communities, convincing them to
join forces by offering perhaps the only secure and steady
employment opportunity on the Coast - maintaining drug trafficking
supply routes.  Nicaragua's Atlantic is a key mid-point for an
increasingly busy transit corridor of South American drug shipments
bound for the United States.  It is also the most underdeveloped
and economically backward region of the country and has been
generally ignored by the current and previous central governments
in Managua.  This combination of political neglect, limited
economic opportunity and daily shipments of drugs creates
conditions for a possible "perfect storm" where Nicaragua's
Atlantic Coast could degenerate into an ungoverned "Narco-Coast,"
with serious repercussions for Nicaragua's political stability and
U.S. counternarcotics cooperation.  In subsequent messages we will
address reaction to Walpa Siksa by local, regional and national
figures.  We will also provide more detailed reporting about the
key figures caught up in the Walpa Siksa incident and outline some
of the networks and relationships that we believe traffickers have
been able to establish.
CALLAHAN

CONFIDENTIAL: BULGARIA AND THE ENERGY KNOT: SCENESETTER FOR OCT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000641 

SIPDIS 

FOR SPECIAL ENVOY BOYDEN GRAY 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: ECON ENRG PGOV BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA AND THE ENERGY KNOT: SCENESETTER FOR OCT
7 VISIT OF SPE GRAY 

Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d)
. 

1.  (C)  Summary:  The quandary over energy facing all our
European partners is particularly acute here in Bulgaria.
With few hydrocarbons of its own, Bulgaria relies on Russia
for seventy percent of its total energy needs and over ninety
percent of its gas.  Though previously a net exporter of
electricity, the EU's decision to force closure of blocks 3
and 4 of the communist-era nuclear plant Kozluduy cost the
Bulgarian economy over USD 1.4 billion and put a squeeze on
Serbia, Macedonia and Greece, who had purchased the bulk of
the exports.  The hard reality of today's energy picture is
that Russia is not only the dominant supplier, it is also the
dominant player -- your visit here is the first by a senior
U.S. energy official in a year, whereas Putin has personally
engaged both the President and Prime Minister on energy
issues in multiple sessions over the past ten months.  But
the cartoon strip portraying a passionately eager Bulgaria in
bed with the muscle bound duo of Gazprom and Lukoil is only
partially true -- it is a tryst driven less by passion and
more by a perceived lack of options.  Prime Minister
Stanishev recently described Russian tactics on South Stream
as blackmail and Energy Minister Dimitrov complains openly of
psychological warfare.  At the same time, the Bulgarians are
deeply worried about the prospects for Nabucco and are
convinced that Azeri gas supplies will be held up by Turkey.
Their bid to hold an energy summit in the spring, the
ostensible focus of your visit, is designed to catalyze
greater coordination -- and negotiating leverage -- amongst
transit countries while also getting the United States more
actively engaged.  Background on specific issues likely to
arise in your discussions with President Parvanov, Prime
Minister Stanishev, Foreign Minister Kalfin and Energy
Minister Dimitrov follows below.  End Summary. 

TIMING
------ 

2.  (C)  Your visit to Sofia comes when Bulgaria is striving
to sell itself as a European energy center.  With six active
or potential pipelines transiting the country, the creation
of a new energy mega-holding company, and the construction of
a new nuclear plant, Bulgaria is setting itself up to be an
important regional energy player, despite being overly
dependent on Russian energy sources.  The proposal to host a
major gas summit in April 2009 -- which Putin has already
promised to attend -- is the latest attempt to put Bulgaria
on the energy map.  Your visit will guide the Bulgarians as
they formulate an agenda and goals for this summit.  It will
also focus Bulgarian policy makers on U.S. views on Russian
energy strategy and South Stream, answer growing skepticism
about Nabucco's prospects, and give solid counter-arguments
to those who say there is no real alternative to dependence
on Russian energy. 

THE SUMMIT
---------- 

3.  (C)  At the January 19 signing of the South Stream
Intergovernmental Agreement, President Parvanov, with Putin
at his side, announced Bulgaria would host an energy summit
intended as a follow-on to the June 2007 Zagreb energy
conference.  Upon Putin's departure, Sofia fell under heavy
criticism both at home and abroad for hastily joining South
Stream, and the energy summit idea lost steam.  Ambassador
for Energy Security Peter Poptchev told us the Bulgarians
resented perceived Russian pressure to hold such a summit.
In July the Bulgarians independently resurrected the summit
idea as a way to show Bulgarian support for Nabucco and
diversification, as well to balance European, U.S. and
Russian interests in the Caspian and Black Sea regions.  With
the potential for six pipelines passing through its
territory, the Bulgarians also have high hopes to become a
regional energy hub.  The summit, they believe, will help put
Sofia on the map not only as an energy center, but as a place
that brokers discussions between the West, Russia and
Eurasia. 

4.  (C)  The Bulgarians requested your visit to advise on the
summit.  They envision a spring conference (tentatively April
24-25) that would bring together heads of state from Eurasian
and European producer, transit and consumer countries.  PM
Stanishev told Ambassador September 19 that Putin has agreed
to attend.  The summit will be gas-focused and will attempt
to put "real solutions" on sources, routes and quantities on
the table.  Well-aware of the potential for East European
energy conference fatigue in the first half of 2009, the
Bulgarians are proposing that all key participants, including
the EU, the United States and Russia, view the proposed
Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech conferences as a linked
continuum.  The April Sofia conference would take care of any
unfinished business left from the January Hungary Conference
and the proposed Czech conference would take up where the
Sofia conference leaves off.  To distinguish the Bulgarian
summit, Sofia is considering including an as-yet undeveloped
"industry component." 

5.  (C)  The Bulgarians will seek U.S. views and your advice
on the proposed agenda of the summit and whether it will
advance U.S. goals in the region.  They want recommendations
on how to coordinate the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech
conferences and may seek advice on the proposed industry
component of the Sofia summit.  They are interested in, but
may not ask directly about, U.S. views on whether Sofia has a
future as an intermediary between Europe, the United States
and Russia on energy and other issues affecting the Black Sea
region.  They are interested in your analysis of recent Azeri
and Turkish energy moves.  They will also request high level
U.S. attendance at the summit. 

BULGARIAN ENERGY PROJECTS
-------------------------- 

6.  (C)  SOUTH STREAM:  The Bulgarians signed the South
Stream intergovernmental agreement in January and Parliament
ratified the agreement in July.  Negotiations between
Bulgargaz and Gazprom resumed in September to work out a
pre-shareholders agreement.  At our recommendation, and at
the direction of the Government, state-owned Bulgargaz
reluctantly hired outside legal counsel (the U.S. law firm
Paul Hastings) to represent it in South Stream negotiations.
With the creation of a new, state-owned energy mega-holding
in September, Bulgargaz has lost much of its
previously-considerable independence.  The acting head of the
Bulgarian Energy Holding is Deputy Energy Minister Galina
Tosheva, previously lead South Stream negotiator for the
Bulgarian Government.  Tosheva has a healthy suspicion of
Russia's intentions in Bulgaria and has directed Bulgargaz to
rely on its legal counsel for expert advice.  Tosheva told us
that Gazprom negotiators are taking a hard line now that
negotiations have resumed.  They are proposing to re-route
gas currently transiting Bulgaria (for which Bulgartransgas
makes a healthy profit) to South Stream, meaning South Stream
would not represent 31 bcm of new gas for Europe, but
something significantly lower.  The Bulgarians state that
this is contrary to the spirit of the IGA and are preparing
to fight the Russian proposal. 

7.  (C)  NABUCCO:  Despite the strong public support they
have shown Nabucco this year, the Bulgarians are turning into
Nabucco-skeptics.  In March, Sofia signed what it thought was
an agreement for Azerbaijan to supply 1 bcm of gas that
Bulgaria would eventually take as its Nabucco quota.  In
advance of Nabucco, Bulgaria planned to access the gas via a
potential hook-up to the Turkey-Greece-Italy interconnector.
Realizing now that the agreement was not, in fact, a
commitment on Azerbaijan's part, the Bulgarians feel burned.
The government is now in dire need of a pep talk on the
Nabucco.  They state firmly that both South Stream and
Nabucco are critical and that one cannot be allowed to
preclude the other.  At the same time, they are nervous about
both Azerbaijani willingness to supply Nabucco and Turkish
willingness to support the project.  They will be interested
in your view of Nabucco's prospects. 

8.  (C)  TGI HOOK-UP:  The Bulgarians are in negotiations
with Greece about this possible interconnector.  Energy
Holding CEO Tosheva said this is Bulgaria's most immediate
source of diversification and energy security.  The Greeks
apparently are cool to the idea, saying there is insufficient
gas.  In response, the Bulgarians have proposed the purchase
of LNG to be delivered to Greece in exchange for either TGI
access or gas currently going through the export pipeline
from Russia and transiting Bulgarian territory.  Your
Bulgarian interlocutors may ask for U.S. support for these
schemes in our discussions with the Greeks and Turks. 

9.  (C)  BURGAS-ALEXANDROUPOLIS (BAP) and AMBO:  The
Bulgarians, Russians and Greeks signed a shareholders
agreement for the BAP oil pipeline in January during the
Putin visit.  Since then, the project company has been
registered, but little more progress has been made.  The
Bulgarians are still confident the pipeline will be built,
and seem surprisingly uninterested in the dynamics
surrounding CPC expansion.  With BAP's relative progress, the
AMBO (Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria) oil pipeline project has
lost momentum.  Still, Bulgaria remains committed to AMBO and
is ready to move forward if and when AMBO attracts supply and
financing. 

10.  (C)  BELENE:  In 2006 the GOB selected Russian
AtomstroyExport as the contractor for the new Belene nuclear
plant.  Bulgaria is keeping majority ownership of the plant,
but is in the process of selecting a strategic investor for
the other 49 percent.  RWE and the Belgian Electrabel are in
the running.  We have stated repeatedly that the choice of a
Russian contractor for Belene decreased Bulgaria's bid for
greater independence from Russian energy sources.  The lack
of transparency surrounding the tender has led to the
inescapable conclusion that the decision to choose Russia as
the Belene contractor was linked to the re-negotiation of
Bulgaria's long-term gas transit contract with Gazprom in
December 2006. 

YOUR MEETINGS
------------- 

11.  (C)  President Parvanov began his second five-year term
in 2007.  Parvanov's desire to exercise behind-the-scenes
influence over the government has led to tensions with his
former protege, Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev.  Parvanov
has close ties to Russian politicians and held no less than
eight meetings with Vladimir Putin in the last seven years.
The energy summit will be under his aegis. 

--Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev is a 42-year-old
progressive Socialist.  He is pro-west and eager to have
Bulgaria viewed as a good friend and partner of the United
States.  He returned September 30 from a week-long visit to
the United States where he met with U/S Burns, spoke at the
Harvard Business School and held an investment forum.  He
understands that Bulgaria is overly dependent on Russian
energy sources, but sees Bulgaria as having few options for
greater energy independence. 

--Foreign Minister Kalfin is close to both Stanishev and
Parvanov and as Deputy Prime Minister oversees the Economy
and Energy Ministry.  He is a strong supporter of close
Bulgarian-U.S. relations and is highly conversant on energy
issues. 

--Economy and Energy Minister Petar Dimitrov is a relative
new-comer to energy issues.  He is largely seen as taking
direction on energy matters from former Energy Minister Rumen
Ovcharov, who is linked with Russian energy interests and
left office in June 2007 after a corruption scandal. 

12.  (C)  Your visit will also highlight, though meetings and
press outreach, the need for Bulgaria to focus on a long-term
energy strategy not solely based on the transit of
hydrocarbons or the production of Russian-based nuclear
energy, but on the development of renewables, clean coal and
greater energy efficiency.  Bulgaria will always be dependent
on Russian energy to one extent or another. But as the most
energy inefficient economy in Europe, it can make meaningful
strides toward greater diversity away from Russian energy
sources.  With the price of energy at near record highs,
Russia's hydrocarbon-generated wealth is increasingly
circulating through the Bulgarian economy, making Bulgaria
all the more susceptible to Russian leverage.  An energy
strategy that focuses on renewables and efficiency is one
tool Bulgaria can use to put a noticeable dent in negative
Russian influence.  The other tool is transparency.  Hub
status in any industry is bestowed only on places which offer
transparent, efficient service.  To achieve its goal of
becoming a true energy center, we should recommend that
Bulgaria present itself not as the place with closest ties to
Russia, but as the most transparent place to do energy deals. 

McEldowney

CONFIDENTIAL: VATICAN WARY OF LEFTIST LATINOS

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INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0232
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF PREL VT MX VE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VATICAN 000562 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR EUR/WE LARREA 

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF PREL VT MX VE
SUBJECT: VATICAN WARY OF LEFTIST LATINOS
 REF: A. REFS: A) LARREA-MARTIN EMAIL; B) CARACAS 3757; C) VATICAN 551 ET AL.; D) VATICAN 552 

     B. A) LARREA - MARTIN 12/9 EMAIL; B) CARACAS 3757; C) VATICAN 551 ET AL.;
D) VATICAN 552 

VATICAN 00000562  001.2 OF 002 

CLASSIFIED BY: Peter Martin, Pol/Econ Chief, Vatican, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 

-----------
Summary
----------- 

1.  (C)  The Ambassador shared ref (a) points on Venezuela's
nefarious influence in the region with Holy See internal affairs
chief (Vatican number three) Archbishop Leonardo Sandri December
17.  Some points were news to Sandri, but he was not surprised
and said he shared U.S. concerns about Chavez and other leftist
leaders in Latin America.  An interlocutor from the Vatican MFA
as well told the Ambassador that he and his superiors were wary
of connections among these leaders.  Neither prelate thought the
Vatican would become more aggressive in speaking out against
these figures, both because of recent history and the potential
for a backlash against the Church.  The Ambassador will see FM
Lajolo after the holidays to continue this dialogue.  End
Summary. 

-------------------------------
Sandri Under No Illusions
------------------------------- 

2.  (C)  The Ambassador met with Archbishop Leonardo Sandri
December 17 for a wide-ranging conversation on the Church in
Latin America.  Sandri, an Argentine and former nuncio to
Venezuela, is the chief of Vatican internal operations and
generally regarded as the Holy See's number three behind the
pope and Secretary of State.  Ambassador discussed ref (a)
points, emphasizing the danger Chavez poses to the governments
around him.  Sandri was aware of some points, but others came as
news to him.  In any case, he was not surprised. Sandri said he
was convinced that Chavez was dangerous from the time he took
office and Sandri was stationed in Caracas.  The archbishop said
he had taken a harder line than the U.S. Embassy at the time,
who told him to "wait and see" what Chavez did in office. 

-------------------------
Holy See Concerned
------------------------- 

3.  (C)  According to Sandri, who said he knew the pope's
thinking on the subject, the Holy See is concerned about a
general leftward shift in Latin America.  He mentioned concerns
about several figures who seemed to be looking to Castro and
Chavez, including Mexico's Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador.  Holy
See MFA Country Director for the U.S. and Mexico Monsignor Paolo
Gualtieri told the Ambassador in a separate meeting December 15
that his superiors in the MFA were of a similar mindset.  They
see the connections between Chavez, Castro, and other leftist
politicians in Latin America, and are concerned about the
dangers they present on many levels. 

---------------
What to Do?
--------------- 

4.   (C)  While the Vatican agrees that these figures are
dangerous, it sees the question of how to deal with them as more
complicated.  The Ambassador's conversation with Sandri tracked
closely with the description of the pope's concern on Venezuela
noted in ref (b).  However, Sandri stuck to the previous Vatican
line on engagement there; he did not see the Holy See changing
its non-confrontational approach to Chavez given the recent
history between Venezuela and the Holy See (ref c).  He
responded favorably to the idea that direct aid from the U.S.
Catholic Church to the Venezuelan Church to help the latter
build up its social programs could help counteract Chavez's
appeal and blunt his attacks on the Church.  Gualtieri noted
that in the case of someone like Lopez Obrador, the Church had
to be careful not to overstep its bounds into politics, no
matter how it felt. He said Masonic groups and some segments of
Mexican society were ready to pounce on bishops or clergy who
strayed into the political realm (ref d). 

------------
Comment
----------- 

5. (C)   The Holy See continues to feel that a
non-confrontational approach to Chavez is the right strategy for
the time being, but the Vatican hierarchy is under no illusions
about the danger of Chavez and kindred souls - and the
connections between them.  Sandri has great influence in the
Vatican and as a former nuncio to Venezuela his views on that
country carry particular weight.  But his formal competency is
the internal affairs of the Church.  The Ambassador will see
Gualtieri's boss, FM Lajolo, after the holidays to continue this
dialogue, as Lajolo has the lead on all questions of foreign
policy.
ROONEY

CONFIDENTIAL: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES USG OVERTURES ON AVIATION

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C O N F 1 D E N TIA L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000269
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HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD TREASURY FOR MMALLOY COMMERCE FOR 4431/MAC/WH/JLAO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2019
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ETRD EINV EAIR VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES USG OVERTURES ON AVIATION
REF: 2008 CARACAS 647
CARACAS 00000269 001.2 OF 002 

Classified By: Economic Counselor Damall Steuart for reasons 1.4 (b)and(d). 

1. (C) SUMMARY: A Venezuelan private sector organization advocated strongly for the Venezuelan civil aviation
authority (INAC) to support the issuance of visas for F AA inspectors and to meet with the Embassy to discuss visa
matters. The Venezuelan govemment (GBRV) has not acceded to either request. While five intemational airlines recent1y
received a disbursement of dollars from Venezuelan exchange control agency (CADIVI), no US carriers were inc1uded.
Charge Caulfield's request to meet with CAD IVI to discuss US company requests for dollars has also gone unanswered. END SUMMARY.
LOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE USG HAS NOT BUDGED THE GBRV 

2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Econoffs in January that
INAC wanted a solution to its US visa issues with an emphasis on obtaining visas for Venezuelan military pilots. On February 11, the AlDCM called
INAC and offered to discuss visa matters with INAC President
Jose Martinez. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX met with Martinez and encouraged him to meet with the AlDCM, INAC has yet to
respond to the Embassy's offer. 

3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was also a strong proponent of an FAA visit. Two of Venezuela's three FAA-certified aircraft maintenance facilities have lost their certifications as F AA inspectors have been unable to obtain visas. The third
facility will lose its certification in June 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that this situation is extremely detrimental for
Venezuelan businesses in the aviation sector, but that he and
his association members have been unsuccessful in convincing
the Venezuelan govemment to issue FAA visas. (Note: After
failing in their second attempt to obtain visas, F AA
inspectors withdrew their passports from the Venezuelan
Embassy in early February.) 

FOREIGN EXCHANGE PAIN 

4. (C) On February 10, the Charge requested a meeting with CADIVI to discuss the outstanding dollar requests by US businesses in all sectors. CAD IVI has not responded to the Charge's request to date. All three US carriers with
operations in Venezuela strongly support a meeting between
the Embassy and CAD IVI and would be willing to provide whatever documentation Post might need for their sector.
(Note: CADIVI is the agency that administers the GBRV's currency controls. To receive US dollars at the official
exchange rate for transactions such as dividend repatriation
and operating costs, a company must obtain CAD IVI approval. There are no reliable figures for how much money US companies as a whole have requested from CADIVI, but most believe the number is in the billions. See reftel for more information on CADIVI.) 

5. (C) On February 17, Econoffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX
And XXXXXXXXXXXX. Both said they would encourage CAD IVI President Manuel Barroso to respond to the Embassy's request. However, neither was optimistic. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that
the Vice President ofIATA had come to Venezuela twice for appointments with CADIVI but Barroso "stood him up" both times. 

6. (C) Three months ago when it became c1ear that Venezuela's
supply of dollars would dwindle, XXXXXXXXXXXX said,
Barroso started approving all dollar authorizations personally. The approvals are "completely arbitrary" according to XXXXXXXXXXXX who argued that Barroso is a military man and a "mini Chavez" who
"wants all the power in his own hands." XXXXXXXXXXXX said Barroso recent1y asked Chavez for another year as the head of CADIVI and Chavez agreed as Barroso used to be a member of Chavez' personal security detachment and remains his "good
friend." Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that CADIVI was not discriminating against US airlines when it recent1y disbursed
dollars to five non-U S carriers. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that there are simply not enough dollars to go around. American Airlines,
the largest operator in the Venezuelan market, is awaiting
the most substantial dollar disbursement of any airline. 

COMMENT 

7. (C) While there is strong private sector support for increased bilateral cooperation on aviation issues, the GBRV
chooses not to respond to USG overtures. Sources in the sector report that sorne in INAC want to accept the Embassy's repeated offers to begin a dialogue on technical issues. However, INAC officials current1y answer direct1y to the Venezuelan Vice President who does not seem disposed to increasing cooperation with the USG. (A more detailed discussion of intemal INAC operations will follow septel.) US airlines, and indeed the intemational business community, are increasingly concemed with the difficulty in obtaining dollars from CAD IVI in part due to the rumored possibility that the GBRV may devalue in the near future. The GBRV unfortunately seems uninterested in their concems.
GENNA TIEMPO

SECRET: ITALY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-PIRACY

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DE RUEHRO #0433/01 1061348
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INFO RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0273
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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S E C R E T ROME 000433 

SIPDIS 

OSD FOR MAGGIE SADOWSKA
EUR/RPM FOR CHRIS DAVY AND PETER CHISHOLM
EUR/WE FOR CHRIS JESTER AND PAMELA SPRATLEN
AF/RSA FOR MIKE BITTRICK AND JUN BANDO 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019
TAGS: MASS MARR EWWT KCRM PBTS PGOV PHSA PREL AORC

SUBJECT: PIRACY: ITALY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-PIRACY
OPERATION 

REF: WASLEY-JESTER-SADOWSKA EMAILS 4-15-09 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Elizabeth Dibble for
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 

1. (S)  The Government of Italy sent U.S. Embassy Rome an
unclassified Note Verbale on April 16 thanking the USG for
assistance provided thus far in the deployment of Italian
Special Forces to Djibouti for possible use in an anti-piracy
mission and requesting continuing assistance as needed.  The
note, sent in unclassified channels to speed up the process,
was generated in response to our requirement that any further
USG assistance in support of the Italian anti-piracy mission
be requested via Diplomatic Note. 

2. (S) Background: The Italian-owned and flagged tugboat
Buccaneer was taken by pirates in the Gulf of Aden on April
11.  The ship has 16 crew members on board: 10 Italian, 5
Romanian, and 1 Croatian, and is currently about one nautical
mile from the coast of Somalia.  The Italian military has
requested permission from the Government of Djibouti and
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to use
Camp Lemonier in Djibouti as a logistical staging area in
preparation for a possible rescue mission.  The GOI assures
us that it has obtained all the necessary landing permits
from the Government of Djibouti.  It has already landed one
aircraft in Djibouti with approximately 29 logistical support
staff, currently housed at Camp Lemonier, to prepare for the
staging.  The mission, if it happens, will not/not be
launched from Djiboutian soil, and the GOI is currently
considering other options that do not entail a rescue
mission.  Italy may use its Frigate MAESTRALE, currently
deployed to the region as part of EU operation ATALANTA, and
which is currently shadowing the pirates, to launch the
operation, or may make use of other vessels.  Italy may
request helicopter, intel, and other logistical support from
the U.S. as the need arises, but currently its request is
limited to logistical support to house units at Camp
Lemonier. 

3. (S) Post has stressed to the GOI the need to provide as
many details as possible about the potential operation in a
timely manner, as well as the need to coordinate fully with
the Government of Djibouti.  The Defense Attache is in
contact with the Italian Military and Poloffs are in contact
with the MFA Operations Center as the situation evolves, and
will provide additional operational details as they become
available. 

4. (SBU) The translated text of the Note is as follows
(Italian original will be emailed to EUR/WE): 

BEGIN TEXT 

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Rome, 4/16/2009
Prot. 0129432 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy
presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States
of America and, in consideration of our shared efforts in the
fight against terrorism and piracy, has the honor to express
its full appreciation for the assistance provided to the
"Training Mission" sent to Djibouti. 

The sending of the mission, as well as the deployment of the
Italian Frigate "MAESTRALE," forms part of the efforts
undertaken by the Government of Italy in the struggle against
piracy. 

While noting that the Authorities of Djibouti have provided
the necessary visas and aircraft landing authorizations, the
Italian Government is particularly grateful to the Government
of the United States of America for having hosted this
mission at Camp Lemonier.  The Italian Government, in
addition, is grateful to the Government of the United States
of America henceforth for any further assistance that it
might provide in the future. 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in expressing its full
gratitude for the collaboration, takes the opportunity to
extend to the Embassy of the United States of America
reassurances of its highest consideration."

END TEXT 

DIBBLE

CONFIDENTIAL: ITALY: PIRATES RELEASE BUCCANEER CREW WITHOUT

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RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0185
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 3961
RUEHFR/UNESCO PARIS FR PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3032
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4853
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000944 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PHSA SO IT

SUBJECT: ITALY: PIRATES RELEASE BUCCANEER CREW WITHOUT
RANSOM PAYMENT 

REF: ROME 00930 

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d). 

1. (C) Summary: On August 11, Poloff met with Massimiliano
D'Antuono, Deputy Head of the MFA Crisis Unit, to discuss the
details of the release of the MV Buccaneer crew which was
taken hostage by pirates off the coast of Somalia. A Somali
pirate is quoted in the press as saying that a four million
euro ransom had been paid.  This conflicts with Foreign
Minister Frattini's statement that "Strong political work
with local authorities as well as an Italian warship that was
standing by with Special Forces finally made the pirates
understand there was no other solution than to release the
ship."  D'Antuono affirmed that the hostage release was the
result of diplomatic, military and intelligence efforts.  He
asserted that the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) of Somalia was instrumental in the
negotiations with the pirates because of his
family/clan/tribal links.  End summary. 

Background
- - - - - 

2. (C) On April 11, the deep water tugboat MV Buccaneer was
slowly towing two large barges at 4-5 knots in the Gulf of
Aden. Because it was moving too slowly to join a convoy, and
because its rear deck was designed to be low to the water
line, the crew of 10 Italians, 5 Romanians and 1 Croat was an
easy target for Somali pirates.  According to D'Antuono, a
couple of hours after the ship was commandeered, one crew
member was able to push a distress button calling for help.
The ship's owner received an email from the Buccaneer with
its location coordinates, but he correctly identified the
message as a ruse because ""the English used was better than
anything the crew was capable of.""  The pirates were able to
anchor the ship in a cove on the Somali coast.  After 2-3
weeks, the Italian Navy ship San Giorgio arrived in the
vicinity to take up a position approximately eight miles off
the shore.  Italian Special Forces, who arrived on the San
Giorgio, routinely positioned themselves and their small
boats in close proximity to the Buccaneer so that they could
react within 20-30 seconds to an assault by the pirates on
the hostages.  D'Antuono implied the pirates knew the Special
Forces had positioned themselves within striking distance
even if they were not able to visibly locate them. 

3. (C) The Crisis Unit worked under the direct supervision of
the "highest levels" of the MFA to negotiate the hostages'
release.  D'Antuono described a "three-pillar approach using
diplomatic, military and intelligence resources."  He
traveled to Somalia with Margherita Boniver, FM Frattini's
Special Envoy for Humanitarian Emergencies, to leverage
Italy's "special relationship" with Somalia and the GOI's
current support for the TFG.  Meetings with the TFG Prime
Minister Sharmarke served to exert pressure on the pirates by
virtue of family/clan/tribal relations.  Asked for specifics,
he demurred that "the Prime Minister was the one who made the
release happen." 

4. (C) D'Antuono emphasized that under Italian law, no ransom
could be paid to release the sailors.  He stated that the
owner of one of the barges offered to pay a ransom, but was
informed that proceeding with that course of action would
result in prosecution by the Italian courts.  In contrast to
the barge owner's interactions with the GOI, he described the
governments of Romania and Croatia, whose nationals were also
being held captive, as being completely supportive of the
GOI's lead role in the negotiations. 

5. (C) Without discussing details, D'Antuono stated that at a
certain point, the Special Forces from the San Giorgio were
cleared to board the Buccaneer after all of the pirates had
vacated the ship.  The Special Forces took control of the
ship and set sail with the crew to Djibouti.  After a medical
assessment in Djibouti, the crew flew to Italy where they
will brief the prosecutor's office in Rome responsible for
handling such cases for possible future action.  D'Antuono
believed the crew was treated reasonably well with the
exception of a "beating of one of the Romanians" by the
pirates.  He mentioned that, at least once, the crew was
taken ashore to offer relief from the cramped quarters of the
ship. 

6. (C) D'Antuono emphasized the GOI's aversion to resorting
to a military operation because of the negative Italian
public opinion that would likely follow any loss of life.  He
suggested that headlines describing fatherless children would
have been a public relations disaster for the GOI, especially
as the world focused its attention on Italy as the host of
the G8 Summit in June. 

Ransom Paid?
- - - - - - - 

7. (C) Andrew Mwangura, of the Mombasa-based East African
Seafarer's Assistance Programme was quoted in the press as
saying that the pirates received a four million euro ransom.
Sometimes described as an intermediary between pirates and
those who pay ransom, his role, if any, in the release of the
Buccaneer crew is not clear.  D'Antuono stated that the MFA
is "familiar with" Mwangura, but dismissed his claims of a
paid ransom as "a marketing technique."  He reasoned that
releasing a crew without receiving a ransom would set an
unprofitable precedent.  He assessed claims of having
received a ransom as a necessary strategy to protect the
economic value of the pirates' illicit activities. 

8. (SBU) In terms of what the GOI did offer the TFG, if not
the pirates, an MFA statement describes financial support in
2009 dedicated to ""Somali institutions and to the peace
process"" totaling 13 million euros.  Additional money has
been disbursed through the Italian Development Cooperation.
(see reftel) 

Comment
- - - - 

9. (C) The official line on the Buccaneer release is a
substantial but incomplete accounting of factors that brought
this situation to a peaceful conclusion.  Gaining the release
of the Italian vessel and hostages was a top priority, albeit
low profile effort, for the Italian government.  Prime
Minister Berlusconi himself reportedly made many of the early
critical decisions.  Italy, with U.S. assistance, moved
quickly to ensure that it had a full range of options
available to resolve the issue, including the strategic
positioning of elite forces ready to engage in an
extraction/rescue operation if necessary.  These efforts were
buttressed by Italy's re-energizing its relations with
Somalia and engaging in a high profile ""embrace"" of its
former colony.  In spite of Italy's slashed overseas budget,
it has dedicated significant development and humanitarian
assistance to the TFG and announced its commitment to re-open
an embassy in Mogadishu at the June 2009 International
Contact Group on Somalia meeting held in Rome.  A logical
quid pro quo for Italy's new engagement was TFG action to
resolve the hostage crisis.  Adamant denials that Italy paid
ransom, directly or otherwise, have been accompanied by
claims of ignorance of TFG initiatives to liberate the
hostages.  The GOI was acutely aware of the strong USG
opposition to the payment of ransom in this case and we
believe that resulted in Italy relying heavily on the TFG to
deliver its citizens.
DIBBLE

CONFIDENTIAL: BAHAMAS UNLIKELY TO PRESSURE ARISTIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000766 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF HA BF
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS UNLIKELY TO PRESSURE ARISTIDE 

Classified By: DCM Robert M. Witajewski, Reasons 1.5(b) and (d) 

Summary 

1.  (C) After returning from the OAS/CARICOM meeting on Haiti
in Miami, Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell dismissed the
possibility of invoking the democracy provision of the OAS
Charter in the case of Haiti.  He acknowledged problems with
democracy in Haiti, but made it clear that the Bahamian
government preferred continued engagement with President
Aristide to any type of public confrontation.  He also
announced a decision to provide $500,000 in economic
assistance to Haiti, while admitting that it would not do
much good if the political situation did not improve.
Mitchell's main concern is doing whatever he can to slow down
illegal immigration from Haiti - a key domestic political
imperative - and he has been fruitlessly pursuing an
immigration accord with the Government of Haiti for several
months.  A high official at the Foreign Ministry, although he
proclaimed himself "not competent" to comment on Haiti policy
(or much of anything else), confirmed that Haiti believes it
must stay engaged with the Aristide government to prevent a
mass migration.  End Summary. 

Democracy in Crisis... 

2.  (U) Upon his return from Miami, Foreign Minister Mitchell
discussed the situation there with the press.  He admitted
that the CARICOM Foreign Ministers were "frustrated with the
situation in Haiti, and said that Aristide had put the
international community "in a difficult position" by not
living up to his commitments.  He spoke frankly about Haiti's
failure to: select an appropriate police commissioner, arrest
an important fugitive involved in political violence, and
plan for elections.  While he placed some of the blame for
the lack of progress toward a political solution on the
opposition, he acknowledged the government's greater share of
blame and discussed the reasons why the opposition might feel
threatened and unwilling to make concessions. 

... But Need to Give Aristide Another Chance 

3.  (U) However, Mitchell went on to say that he thought it
was "likely that the deadline will be extended," and Aristide
should be given yet another chance to meet his commitments.
He pointed out that The Bahamas, in his opinion has no
choice: "We cannot afford to disengage from Haiti because
disengaging for us is not an option."  According to Mitchell,
the issue of Haitian migrants and the potential for mass
migration is the key issue for The Bahamas.  Such a mass
migration must be prevented at all costs, and Mitchell made
it clear that he believed the best way to do that was
continued engagement with the Aristide government in an
attempt to improve Haiti's political and economic situation. 

4.  (U) Mitchell was dismissive of the possibility of
invoking the democracy provisions of the OAS Charter, saying
that although "Some people argue that's the case in Haiti ...
I think that is taking it a little bit too far."  He
described the U.S. position on Haiti as "hard-minded", and
called for continued dialogue.  Mitchell also announced a
$500,000 economic assistance package for Haiti.  In
announcing it, he acknowledged that the assistance would
likely not do much good unless the political impasse were
resolved.  Mitchell defended the package, however, by
reiterating that the Government of the Bahamas must do
whatever it can to improve the economic situation in Haiti
because of the impact The Bahamas would likely feel if
further economic and political crisis resulted in a mass
migration.  He made it very clear that this is the paramount
issue for The Bahamas. 

Who Is Competent Then? 

5.  (C) DCM and POL/ECON section chief raised the issue of
Haiti with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary for
Political Affairs Marco Rolle in an April 15 meeting
requested by Rolle to go over the list of pending items
between the Embassy and the MFA.  Rolle, despite being the
number three official at the Ministry of Embassy (he is the
Bahamian equivalent of Undersecretary Grossman) and having
accompanied Mitchell to both Miami and the press conference,
told us that he "was not competent" to talk about Haiti
policy with us.  He couldn't even confirm any details about
the aid package the Minister had announced in his presence.
Nor could he comment on progress made toward an immigration
accord with Haiti or the upcoming visit by Mitchell to Haiti
in late March beyond confirming the dates (May 22-23).  The
one specific response we received to a question was whether
or not Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell planned to make any
trips or telephone calls to Haitian counterparts prior to the
April 30 OAS meeting in Washington.  The answer is: No. 

Consistently Not Competent 

6.  (C) Inability to provide specific responses to queries
was a consistent theme of our conversation with Rolle.  Of
the fifteen pending items on our agenda, he was unable to
comment meaningfully on any single one of them, and could not
point to MFA progress in resolving any of the issues which
have been pending anywhere from 2-3 weeks (dip notes
regarding a trade dispute, RBDF training and a proposal to
form an anti-alien-smuggling task force) to 6 years (request
for a bilateral work agreement).  Rolle, a career civil
servant with no background in foreign affairs, has only been
with the ministry for about seven months, so it can be
understood that he might not be familiar with every issue,
but we would think he could do better than 0 for 15.  The
Bahamian civil service has honed sloth and delay disguised as
deliberation and consensus-building to a fine art.
Comment 

7.   (C) We believe the bottom line for The Bahamas on Haiti
is their fear of mass migration and doing anything that might
trigger an outflow.  Mitchell in particular has made
conclusion of an immigration agreement his top foreign policy
priority.  Our sources in the Immigration Department tell us
the negotiations are not going well, stalled over Haitian
insistence on an amnesty for the 30,000 - 100,000 Haitians
already in The Bahamas (most illegally).  Such a concession
would be suicide for Mitchell in the xenophobic Bahamian
political landscape.  Pursuit of this agreement and any other
means to slow down migration will continue to push any
concerns for democracy and human rights into the backseat.
While The Bahamas will remain engaged on Haiti, the Christie
government will resist any effort to put real teeth into any
diplomatic effort to pressure President Aristide, preferring
(endless) conversation and dialogue to the alternative. 

BLANKENSHIP

CONFIDENTIA: HAITI: HOLY SEE WORRIED ABOUT VIOLENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L  VATICAN 005164 

SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR EUR/WE LEVIN; WHA/CAR 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2013
TAGS: PHUM PINR PREL VT HA
SUBJECT: HAITI: HOLY SEE WORRIED ABOUT VIOLENCE, SEEKS
BALANCE AMIDST DIVIDED CHURCH 

REF: A. A) PORT AU PRINCE 2208 

     B. B) PORT AU PRINCE 2249
     C. C) PORT AU PRINCE 2188
     D. D) PORT AU PRINCE 2344
     E. E) PORT AU PRINCE 2345 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Brent Hardt for reason 1.5 (b) and (d)
. 

-------
Summary
------- 

1. (C) Vatican MFA Caribbean Affairs Office Director Giorgio
Lingua said November 7 that the Holy See is "very worried"
about the situation in Haiti.  He expressed concern about the
disruption of an October 16 mass (ref a and b), and noted the
potential for violence in the coming weeks (ref d).  Acting
Foreign Minister Pietro Parolin emphasized in a November 13
meeting the difficult balancing act that Vatican and
Episcopal leadership in Haiti must perform in pressing for
reform while avoiding instigating further violence.  He noted
in this regard that the Haitian Episcopal Conference had
signed on to the protest letter to the Haitian Government
sent by the papal nuncio after the October 16 disturbance
(ref b).  According to Lingua, the Haitian Catholic Church is
struggling in general, with many people leaving the Church
due to disillusionment with its handling of the Aristide
crisis.  Though he acknowledged the challenges Aristide
presented to those seeking reform, Lingua thought that
pressure for increased democratic expression might be
effective if it did not threaten Aristide's legitimacy.  End
summary. 

---------------------
The Vatican's Concern
--------------------- 

2. (C) MFA Caribbean Affairs Office Director Giorgio Lingua
told poloff November 7 that the Holy See is "very worried"
about the situation in Haiti, following the disruption of the
October 16 papal anniversary mass (ref a, b) and continuing
violent incidents.  Lingua told us a Haitian MFA
representative had called Papal Nuncio Luigi Bonazzi to
express his regret for the incident at mass, but said that to
his knowledge Aristide himself had not contacted any Vatican
representative to comment on the incident.  Lingua expressed
some satisfaction with news that Aristide had spoken to
opposition leader Evans Paul after the incident, as the
post-mass mugging of Evans Paul was also troubling to the
Vatican.  The Holy See remains concerned about the potential
for more violence in the lead-up to the bicentennial
anniversary of the Battle of Vertieres on November 18 (ref d). 

---------------------------
A Church Balancing, Divided
--------------------------- 

3. (C) According to Lingua, Aristide,s exploitation of some
clergy members for propaganda purposes was taking its toll on
the Haitian population.  Lingua said Haitians see "a Church
divided," with some clergy supporting the Lavalas party and
others against it.  Lingua claimed this lack of solidarity
fostered disillusionment to the point where people were
leaving the Church in increasing numbers. 

4. (C) When asked if the October 16 incident might prompt the
Holy See to raise its voice more forcefully against
Aristide's abuses, Lingua was noncommittal, saying the
Vatican needed to balance pressure on Aristide against a
delicate security situation on the ground.  Similarly, he
said the Haitian bishops needed to tread lightly, as
Aristide's unpredictable nature made such expression 

dangerous.  Holy See Acting Foreign Minister Pietro Parolin
reiterated this point in a November 13 meeting with the
Charge, while also noting that the bishops had signed on to
Nuncio Bonazzi's protest letter to the GOH.  According to
Lingua, the bishops "realize they should speak louder," but
have to pick their spots carefully. 

--------------------
Episcopal Leadership
-------------------- 

5. (C) Lingua told us the newly-appointed archbishop of Cap
Haitien, Hubert Constant, was similarly in a difficult
position.  Lingua said (protect) Constant had a "good spirit
and pastoral character, but is conditioned by the presence --
in fact the omnipresence -- of Aristide."  Deputy FM Parolin
was somewhat more positive on Constant, noting his role in
protesting the October 16 incident.  On leadership in
Port-au-Prince, Parolin confirmed that Coadjutor Bishop Serge
Miot would succeed Archbishop Ligonde as head of the
archdiocese when Archbishop Ligonde retires formally.  He
also denied that Miot was too close to the Aristide camp,
asserting that Miot, too, had played a role the post-October
16 protest. 

---------------------
Comment: Where to go?
--------------------- 

6. (C) Despite Lingua's rather somber assessment of the
situation, he said the Holy See believes there are some
glimmers of hope for progress Haiti.  He said the Vatican had
noticed signs of increased discontent within the Lavalas
party that could contribute to prospects for future reform.
The best bet, he believed, was for further international
pressure, especially from the United States, for increased
democratic expression within the country -- without directly
challenging Aristide's legitimacy.  This tracks with the
conservative approach we have seen from the Holy See in such
situations.  The Vatican is far more likely to take the
long-term view than to invite confrontation -- or encourage
local bishops to do so. 

7. (C) When looking at the big picture, Lingua said,
effecting change in Haiti should be easier than in Cuba.
Unlike Castro, Lingua observed, Aristide is not ideologically
motivated.  "This is one person -- not a system," he added.
Citing the effects on the U.S. of Haitian drug trafficking
and illegal immigration, Lingua acknowledged the USG interest
in Haiti, even beyond its humanitarian concerns.  Lingua
noted with interest the arrival of Ambassador Foley in
Port-au-Prince; consequently we passed him a copy of the
Ambassador's ref E press statement. 

HARDT

CONFIDENTIAL: HAITIAN AMBASSADOR TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RESIGNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANTO DOMINGO 007536 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USOAS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR DR HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN AMBASSADOR TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RESIGNS:
ANOTHER BLOW TO ARISTIDE 

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 2540
     B. SANTO DOMINGO 4930 

Classified By: ACTING DCM MARY B. MARSHALL FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D 

SUMMARY 

1. (C) On December 18 the Haitian Ambassador to the Dominican
Republic Guy Alexandre called on the Ambassador and Acting
DCM to confirm his resignation.  The sudden news (prompted by
the violent December 5 crackdown on student demonstrators in
Haiti) was widely covered December 16 while Ambassador
Alexandre was out of the country visiting his wife in Puerto
Rico.  Ambassdor Alexandre's resignation is due to what he
described as "incompatible principles" with Arisitide's
government.  Composed but staunch in his resolve, Alexandre
assured the Ambassador that he has no plans to seek asylum in
the United States for now.  Requesting asylum, he explained,
would "further complicate Dominican-Haitian bilateral
relations" and would not be in his nor Haiti's best
interests.  Instead, Alexandre said he would seek residency
in the Dominican Republic and teach at a university.  End
Summary. 

ALEXANDRE RESIGNS AS AMBASSADOR TO THE DR 

2. (C) Ambassador Guy Alexandre met with the Ambassador and
Acting DCM on December 18 to discuss his recent resignation.
He said that he had planned to leave his post in January 2004
after Haiti's independence bicentennial celebrations, which
would have also marked two years in his assignment.  However,
he could not ignore the recent violence against students in
Haiti because of his strong links to the academic community
there.  According to Alexandre, police officers broke both
knees of one of his friends, a vice-rector at a university
(Ref A).  The December 5 violence, he lamented, "produced an
irrevocable situation that cannot be easily fixed,"
following months of extreme polarization and resulting chaos. 

3. (C) According to Ambassador Alexandre's contacts in Haiti,
there are daily protests or preemptive crackdowns by police
on potential protests.  He warned of an upsurge in armed
civilians looking for trouble.  Alexandre expressed his
concern that the environment in Haiti is ripe for
confrontation, which might subside briefly during Christmas
but is sure to resume in January.  He commented that Haiti
has minimal capacity to maintain order and that "none of the
Haitian politicians realize that the country is a ticking
time bomb." 

REMOVE ARISTIDE...THEN WHAT? 

4. (C) Ambassador Alexandre criticized opposition groups'
preoccupation with forcing Aristide's departure without
considering the consequences.  He emphasized that Aristide's
exit will not solve Haiti's socio-economic problems.
Alexandre also criticized his countrymen for their focus on
grabbing power rather than tackling the difficult problems of
health, education and infrastructure.  The Ambassador asked
Alexandre whether there are clandestine movements in the
Dominican Republic working to overthrow Aristide, to which
Alexandre responded that he does not know of any such
activity.  He acknowledged that some disgruntled former
Haitian military officers reside in the Dominican Republic,
but said most of the pressure on Aristide originates in
Haiti.  He recalled the 1991-94 period when many Haitians
fled the country, but claimed there was no no mass migration.
 During that time Alexandre personally assisted 30 Haitians,
including a former Army chief. 

DOMINICAN-HAITIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS 

5. (C) Less than three weeks before his resignation,
Ambassador Alexandre met with the Ambassador on December 1 to
discuss concerns about Dominican-Haitian bilateral relations.
 He was disturbed about the GODR's apparent nonchalant
investigations regarding the Haitian bodies discovered along
the border in September (Ref B).  Alexandre also said the
GODR is not doing enough to document Haitians.  He complained
that the GODR often uses Article 11 of the Dominican
Constitution (providing that anyone born on Dominican soil is
Dominican except offspring of diplomats or foreigners in
transit) to deny citizenship to Haitians for being
"foreigners in transit."  Ambassador Alexandre also blamed
the failure of the 2001 OAS initiative on a lack of OAS
impartiality (Note: This argument was reiterated at the
follow-up meeting on December 18.  End note). 

ALEXANDRE'S ONWARD PLANS 

6. (C) Alexandre said he currently plans to reside in the
Dominican Republic, not flee to the United States.  He was
traveling to Puerto Rico when his resignation hit the press
and returned quickly thereafter.  He emphasized his desire to
get involved in academia and denied having strong ties to
successful Haitian expats in the United States.  Alexandre
did ask the Acting DCM (Consul General) that his B1/B2
nonimmigrant visa be transferred to his tourist passport.
Alexandre said the GOH had not yet accepted his resignation.
He claimed to have no interest in politics because he "knows
too well what Haiti needs."
HERTELL

CONFIDENTIAL: ANXIOUS PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS MEETING ON HAITI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NASSAU 000364 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL SMIG BF HA
SUBJECT: ANXIOUS PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS MEETING ON HAITI 

REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D)
     NASSAU 322 

Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

- - - -
Summary
- - - - 

1  (C)  At a special luncheon function to honor Junior
Achievement on February 19, Prime Minister Christie twice
came to the Charge's table to request an "urgent" meeting the
morning of February 20, later set for 12:30 in the PM's
office.  As events in Haiti continue to deteriorate, the
sense of vulnerability by the Government of the Commonwealth
of The Bahamas (GCOB) at being overwhelmed by mass Haitian
migration continues to grow.  In this light, both the PM and
Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell have exerted considerable time
and energy in recent weeks to mediate peace talks between
President Aristide and the opposition (reported reftels A, B
and C).  Increasing deterioration in conditions in Haiti are
also reinforcing the Bahamian Government's sense of
dependence on the United States in the event uncontrolled
Haitian migrant outflows occur.  At the 60 minute meeting on
February 20 in his private office, PM Christie updated Charge
on recent developments on Haiti from his Government's
perspective.
END SUMMARY 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -
FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFS THE UN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 

2. (C)  Christie initiated the discussion with a report on
Foreign Minister Mitchell's just-concluded presentation at
the United Nations General Assembly that morning.  The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs later faxed the Embassy a copy of
Mitchell's speech, which focused on the CARICOM proposal,
including a constitutional role for a Prime Minister, rules
governing protests and demonstrations by the opposition, the
professionalization of the Haitian National Police, and
additional security and economic support.  FM Mitchell also
called for the international community to "provide immediate
security assistance to bring stability to Haiti, including
helping the legitimate authority of Haiti to restore law and
order and disarm the elements that now seek to violently
overthrow the government, and who have interrupted
humanitarian assistance."  Mitchell continued using -- for
him -- unusually strong language: "Those armed gangs who seek
now to overthrow the constitutional order should be urged to
lay down their arms and if not they should be disarmed." 

3. (C)  Christie related to Charge that in New York Mitchell
had sought out and obtained additional support, particularly
from Central and South American countries, for the CARICOM
approach.  Christie was particularly proud that Bahamian
efforts had resulted in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina
agreeing to send police or military to Haiti as he observed,
wryly, that these three countries did not normally agree with
the U.S. of late.  Christie also announced that FM Mitchell
and Assistant Secretary Roger Noriega would fly to Haiti
Saturday to continue to work all sides of the issue.
Christie spoke authoritatively about conversations between FM
Mitchell and A/S. Noriega and between Mitchell and NSC
Western Hemisphere Director Tom Shannon. He also indicated
that he had been in contact with members of the U.S.
Congressional Black Caucus to allay their "deep concerns"
about the "good faith" of the U.S. and others in seeking a
resolution to Haiti's crisis. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
A RELUCTANT ROLE IN HAITI FOR MITCHELL?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

4. (C)  The Prime Minister described his week of frantic
conference calls on the Haitian crisis and a U.S. preference
for the Bahamian Foreign Minister to play a new, and
significant on-going role in Haiti as the third member in a
tripartite committee that, Christie seemed to believe would
effectively serve as a kind of "Council of Wise Men" in
governing the country.  Christie said that as he understood
current plans, the council would be composed of three
members: a representative from the Haitian Opposition, an
independent Haitian Prime Minister, and Bahamian FM Mitchell
representing Caricom and others.  According to the Prime
Minister, however, President Aristide had expressed
reservations about the constitutionality of formally creating
such a body.  However, Christie continued, he believed from
his conversations with him that President Aristide would
accept an arrangement in which the same group would
"informally" advise him on matters. 

5. (C)  Continuing his exposition, Christie then went on to
say that his preferred solution would be for the United
States or the French to assume the leadership of this body
and supply the "third member" rather than The Bahamas. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -
PRIME MINISTER WORKS THE PHONES IN NASSAU -- DEFERS TO U.S.
AS "TOP DOG"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 

6. (C)  The Bahamian Prime Minister appeared comfortable in
his newly-assumed role of international mediator. He noted
that he had spoken "at least a dozen times" with Haitian
President Aristide of late, and this week alone reported that
he had spoken with the Haitian President at least once each
day.  Explaining his frequent telephone conversations, PM
Christie declared that, given the urgency of the situation,
he did not want to risk having his message diluted or
distorted "by leaving (the resolution of the crisis) to
ambassadors." 

7. (C)  Noting that President Aristide had claimed that
"bandits" were responsible for attacking the Opposition, not
government forces, PM Christie said that each time he spoke
with Aristide he had stressed the importance of Aristide
appealing directly to the U.S., France, or Canada for
assistance in re-equipping Haitian police so that law and
order could be restored.  Christie indicated some sympathy
for Aristide's claimed plight, telling Charge that "there is
simply no way that a demoralized police force of less than
5,000 can maintain law in order in a country of more than 7
million."  Christie seemed hopeful that the U.S. would
reconsider its position against supplying the Haitian police
with lethal weapons, and at a minimum do more to support the
Haitian police with non-lethal support. 

8. (C)  Christie indicated his preference for continued
direct high-level involvement in Haiti.  He felt that it was
important that he and others at the head of state level
continue to involve themselves in the situation and interact
directly with Aristide in order to reinforce the urgency of
the situation. Christie said that it had been his idea to
contact South African President Thabo Mbeki to try to involve
him in Haiti.  It would be appropriate, he said, for the
world's "newest black nation" to help the world's "oldest
black nation."   At regular intervals during the one-hour
meeting, Christie reiterated the pleas for assistance to
restore law and order in Haiti made by himself and others to
Secretary Powell, President Bush, Secretary General Annan,
and the O.A.S. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SYMPATHIZES WITH ARISTIDE'S CONCERNS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

9. (C)  Christie stressed his agreement with his Foreign
Minister that the best resolution would be an agreement that
conferred some "dignity" to Aristide.  Christie specifically
sympathized with Aristide's complaint that he (Aristide) was
being asked to take unconstitutional actions.  The Bahamian
Prime Minister indicated that based on his conversations with
Aristide, he believed that Aristide was not opposed to
working with the opposition on the joint appointment  of a
new Prime Minister and subsequently a new cabinet, but is
objecting to being left out of the process or becoming a
figurehead for the remainder of his term in office.  Christie
also made clear his position that President Aristide is
Haiti's legitimately elected constitutional leader.  But
Christie then coupled this principled stand with an
evaluation of the state of the Haitian opposition from his
position as a practicing politician.  "Even with a year to
organize," he said, "the opposition will not match Aristide's
level of support, and would lose if Aristide decided to run
again, which he will not." 

10. (C)  In this vein, Christie volunteered what he thought
might be the outcome of the February 21 talks in Port au
Prince, Christie said that he assumed that the United States
had the power to achieve a solution.  Christie said that he
was confident that A/S Noriega "had the clout" to bring
Haitian Opposition leader Apaid around, and that once Apaid
signed on to an agreement, the rest of the Opposition "would
follow" in permitting President Aristide to serve his term
out since they couldn't organize themselves to win an
election now. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TURNING TO THE U.S. IN EVENT OF AN OUTFLOW FROM HAITI
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

11. (C)  Turning from the crisis in Haiti to the consequences
for The Bahamas if that country's political instability
results in a migrant outflow, PM Perry Christie went on at
great length to reiterate his determination to build a deep
water port at Great Inagua that would serve as his country's
strategic southern base.  As he lamented: "The Haitian
problem isn't going to go away for years to come."  Given
this reality, he was convinced that the Royal Bahamian
Defence Force (RBDF) will always need to patrol the country's
vast southern waters.  Moreover, he continued, the drug
problem will always be there, and The Bahamas faces a
consistent problem of fish poaching in by neighboring
countries.  According to Christie, "Last year the Dominican
Republic exported $2 million in conch, and their ain't no
conch in Dominican waters!"  Clearly, he declared, it is in
the best interests of The Bahamas to have a deep water port
and refueling station at its southern tip.  Christie
reiterated the common interests of the United States in
having access to a similarly-situated facility and again
asked for the Charge's help in obtaining U.S. funding for
construction of a harbor and breakwater at Great Inagua. 

12. (C)  Charge responded that the U.S. would like to support
the Bahamian plan, but that it had been extremely difficult
to get RBDF and National Security officials to go beyond
global declarations and obtain specific plans regarding GCOB
intentions on Great Inagua.  Given budgetary constraints in
the United States, Charge explained that until specific plans
were forthcoming, backed up by a GCOB actually committing its
own funds, U.S. agencies would be reluctant to even consider
blocking off possible funding.  Noting that the U.S. was
already looking at FY 06 budgets, Charge urged the Prime
Minister to accelerate internal GCOB decision-making on Great
Inagua.  The Prime Minister agreed, indicating that his
government is willing to work out the details immediately. 

13. (C)  In addition to construction of a southern strategic
base in Great Inagua, the Prime Minister also revealed that
he was in negotiations to conclude an agreement with Royal
Caribbean Cruise Line to build a deep water port at Great
Inagua.  Though the island is currently barren, it is home to
more than 50,000 pink flamingos, a huge Morton Salt plant,
and at least one nice beach.  He was hoping that the flamingo
national park would provide cruise ship passengers with an
interesting diversion to the normal Caribbean port of call.
Christie took on board Charge's suggestion that costs of
constructing a base on Great Inagua could effectively be
reduced if any Royal Caribbean construction were to be made
part of the GCOB's plans. 

- - - - -
NO ASYLUM
- - - - - 

14. (C)  Regarding what The Bahamas would do in the event
that large numbers of Haitians started appearing on Bahamian
territory, the Prime Minister indicated that he would turn to
the United States to effect repatriation.  The Bahamas, he
said, simply had no capacity to maintain large numbers of
migrants for any period of time.  Declaring that he had no
concert with "those liberals" on this issue, he declared that
there would never be asylum in The Bahamas for Haitians.  The
total population of The Bahamas was, he said, "less than that
of a small town in the United States.  We simply cannot do
what Amnesty International and other groups would insist on
us." 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
OPERATION COMPASSION HAS A NEW RELEVANCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

15. (C)  Christie was surprisingly well versed on the
proposed latest iteration of Operation Compassion, a joint
patrolling exercise that involves enhanced communication and
coordination between the RBDF and the U.S. Coast Guard.  PM
Christie reported that the Cabinet had discussed
participation in "Op Compassion" the previous day and had
approved Bahamian involvement.  As the Haitian crisis has
evolved, the GCOB has deliberately taken steps in its public
comments to publicize an increased RBDF presence in southern
Bahamian waters.  Charge indicated that we believed that the
USCG would be prepared to engage in planning discussions for
this iteration of Op Compassion as early as March 3-4. 

16. (C)  However, as Ref D reports, only four of the eight
RBDF vessels capable of long range patrolling are
operational.  Charge queried the Prime Minister on the return
to service date of the HMBS Bahamas noting that effective
Bahamian participation in this six-month extended "Op
Compassion" required that there be at least three functioning
RBDF vessels (the HMBS Bahamas, Nassau, and Yellow Elder) so
that one would be on station 24/7 throughout the exercise.
Similarly, Charge noted that the logistics of keeping a
Bahamian vessel on site 24/7 also presumed that the RBDF
vessels would re-fuel and re-provision at Guantanamo Naval
Base rather than make extended return trips to its home port
of Coral Harbour in New Providence.  Finally,  Charge noted
that we would need assurances of the commitment and
cooperation of RBDF Commodore Rolle to commit the necessary
assets to the operation.  PM Christie responded that the
repairs have started and completing them is a government
priority.  He also acknowledged Commodore Rolle's reluctance
to commit the necessary assets by explaining that Rolle
claims he needs to keep some ships in reserve in the event of
other problems in other areas of the country.  The Prime
Minister said that he overrode the Commodore's objections by
asking him rhetorically, "What other crisis could impact on
The Bahamas right now that is more critical than preventing a
migrant outflow from Haiti?" 

17. (C)  Closing this part of the discussion,  the Prime
Minister also urged the U.S. to simplify matters by providing
fuel to RBDF vessels at no cost, as the relative costs are a
mere "drop in the bucket" for the U.S.  As Charge responded
that refueling costs to the GCOB would probably be much lower
at Guantanamo than in Nassau, the Prime Minister jokingly
accused Charge of "trying to nickel and dime me!" while
thanking him for not yet pressuring him for an Article 98
agreement in the meeting. 

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - - 

18.  (C)  The fact that the over-programmed Prime Minister
would budget more than one hour for a meeting on one day's
notice speaks to the overriding importance Haiti has in local
politics.  PM Christie is clearly committed to remaining
engaged on finding a solution to the Haitian problem, and
accepts that this is currently the dominating project of his
Foreign Minister, who is also the Minister of Public Service.
 While his decision-making style may be protracted and
indecisive, Bahamian Prime Minister Perry Christie is also an
impressive, dynamic, charismatic  and ebullient presence and
an indefatigable seeker of consensus.  For the purpose of
promoting peace in Haiti, his personality compliments that of
Foreign Minister Mitchell, which is steadier, stealthier, and
more methodical.  Given The Bahamas' proximity to Haiti, both
feel The Bahamas has no choice except engagement.
WITAJEWSKI

CONFIDENTIAL: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000384 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014
TAGS: BF HA PGOV PREL SMIG
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON HAITI 

REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D)
     NASSAU 322 E) NASSAU 364 

Classified By: Charge Abdelnour Zaiback for reasons 1.5 (B) and 1.5 (D) 

- - - -
SUMMARY
- - - - 

1) (C) On February 24, Acting Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary Marilyn Zonicle separately demarched each
UN Security Council member with representation in The Bahamas
for support for a possible UN Security Council meeting on
Haiti that may be requested by Jamaica Prime Minister
Patterson as early as Thursday.  The original plan was to
request the Security Council to meet on February 25 on Haiti,
however, President Aristide asked that the meeting be
deferred for 24 hours while he pursued the ongoing
negotiations.  For its part, The Bahamas seeks the active
support of the U.S. as the "most important" member of the
Security Council as it engages on a full scale diplomatic
press to achieve peace in Haiti.  If diplomacy fails, The
Bahamas believes that military assistance will be essential,
and is willing to contribute troops to a multinational effort
to maintain law and order.  END SUMMARY 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FOREIGN MINISTER MITCHELL ON STAND BY TO NEW YORK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

2) (C) Anticipating that Prime Minister Patterson would make
the request for the Security Council to hold a special
session on Haiti tomorrow, FM Mitchell had already packed his
bags and made plans to fly to New York tonight.  Patterson
and CARICOM delayed making the request for the session only
because Aristide convinced them that the opposition and
rebels could still agree to CARICOM's peace plan.  However,
as the situation on the ground in Haiti continues to
deteriorate, Zonicle anticipates that Mitchell will fly to
New York tomorrow for a requested Security Council special
session on Thursday. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SIX TALKING POINTS FOR PROJECTED SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

3) (C) Follows are the six talking points presented to Charge. 

i) (C) Pending the outcome of the OAS/CARICOM-sponsored
negotiations between the Government and the Opposition in
Haiti, the CARICOM countries may request the convening of an
emergency meeting of the Security Council to address the
matter, considering the deteriorating situation in that
country and the inability of the Haitian National Police
(HNP) to deal with the insurgency. 

ii) (C) An open debate in the Security Council would allow it
to pronounce on the matter and would provide Haiti with the
opportunity to request military/police assistance,  and,
perhaps, increased humanitarian assistance, as may be
necessary.  Haiti is reluctant to take the matter to the
Security Council before the current political negotiations
have been exhausted and wishes to avoid the matter being
dealt with on "parallel tracks" by OAS/CARICOM and the UN. 

iii) (C) While France has indicated a willingness to send
military assistance to Haiti, the specter of French troops in
Haiti at this time is a very sensitive issue, particularly as
France is the former colonizer and Haiti is currently
"celebrating" the 200th anniversary of discarding that yoke.
A joint dispatch under the UN banner would be more palatable. 

iv) (C) With the United Nations, CARICOM Ambassadors are
seeking the support of the Group of Latin America and the
Caribbean (GRULAC) for the initiative and a meeting of the
GRULAC to discuss the matter is being convened Wednesday
afternoon.  Brazil and Chile, the two members of GRULAC on
the Security Council have indicated their support for the
initiative.  Other member of the GRULAC that have voiced
strong support are Mexico and Venezuela. 

v) (C) Beyond the GRULAC, CARICOM Ambassadors are in touch
with Canada and France, as well as with President of the GA,
Ambassador Colin Granderson of the CARICOM Secretariat, and
the other Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in
seeking to garner support for the initiative and move it
forward, as appropriate. 

vi) (C) It has been said, although not officially announced
that, Ambassador Reggie Dumas, of Trinidad and Tobago, has
been appointed as the Special Advisor on Haiti by the UN
Secretary-general.  Perhaps, the stigma of a direct request
from Haitian authorities for military assistance could be
alleviated by having the request channeled through the
Special Advisor. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BAHAMAS VIEW ON OUTSIDE INTERVENTION CLARIFIED
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

4) (C) Charge and Political Chief sought clarification on
Mitchell's vision for outside intervention.  In recent days
Mitchell has made several statements that international
support for Haiti's police was crucial, including "to disarm
the rebels if they did not disarm themselves."  Zonicle
relayed that the first priority of The Bahamas is the
principles in the CARICOM proposal, most notably reinforcing
the ability of the Haitian police to maintain law and order.
However, if this fails, Zonicle reiterated Mitchell's oft
stated plea of late, that "law and order must be restored."
Zonicle volunteered that The Bahamas was prepared to
contribute troops, "perhaps as many as 100."  While the
preferred mechanism is the United Nations, Zonicle confirmed
Mitchell's view that any outside intervention would be
preferable to continued and increased chaos. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BAHAMIAN AMBASSADOR TO CARICOM SEEKS INSIGHTS ON RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN OPPOSITION AND REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

5) (C) Ambassador to CARICOM Leonard Archer sought Charge's
insight on the relationship between the rebels and the
opposition, but in the exchange of views it became clear that
all sides knew about the same.  Several rebel leaders have
connections with the former military.  While the opposition
may currently feel that they are the beneficiaries of rebel
activity, they may soon learn that "the enemy of my enemy is
not always my friend."  Archer is an experienced diplomat who
has studied Haiti at length. 

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - - 

6) (C) As reported reftels, The Bahamas is seized on the
Haitian crisis.  It is certainly Foreign Minister Mitchell's
dominant preoccupation.  It is also clear that The Bahamas
regards U.S. leadership and engagement on Haiti as crucial to
any peaceful outcome.  As has also become increasingly
explicit in Mitchell's recent statements, while The Bahamas
and CARICOM lobby for peace, they have concluded that a
peaceful outcome without international intervention is
increasingly unlikely.
WITAJEWSKI

HOLY SEE COMMITTED TO STABILITY FOR HAITI

UNCLAS VATICAN 000882 

SIPDIS 

SENSITIVE 

DEPT FOR EUR/WE (LEVIN); WHA/CAR 

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PHUM HA VT
SUBJECT: HOLY SEE COMMITTED TO STABILITY FOR HAITI 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

1.  (SBU) FOLLOWING ARISTIDE'S RESIGNATION AND DEPARTURE
FROM HAITI, THE HOLY SEE TOLD US THAT THE HAITIAN BISHOPS
    WERE READY TO WORK ACTIVELY WITH A PROVISIONAL
ADMINISTRATION TO HELP ENSURE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF
POWER.  THE SECRETARIAT OF STATE IS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH
THE HAITIAN BISHOPS AND PAPAL NUNCIO IN PORT-AU-PRINCE, AND
HAS URGED THEM TO EXERT A CALMING INFLUENCE ON THE
POPULACE.  END SUMMARY. 

-----------------------------------------
BISHOPS READY TO WORK WITH NEW GOVERNMENT
----------------------------------------- 

2. (SBU) THE HOLY SEE'S DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PIETRO
PAROLIN TOLD THE DCM MARCH 4 THAT THE HAITIAN BISHOPS AND
THE VATICAN NUNCIO WERE READY TO WORK WITH A NEW
TRANSITIONAL HAITIAN ADMINISTRATION TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL
RESTORATION OF ORDER.  PAROLIN SAID THE PAPAL NUNCIO TO
HAITI HAD BEEN IN ROME DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS BUT
HAD NOW RETURNED TO PORT-AU-PRINCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
HELP FACILITATE THE TRANSITION AND WORK WITH THE BISHOPS TO
ENCOURAGE CALM AND PATIENCE AMONG THE HAITIAN PEOPLE.  THE
DFM EXPRESSED INTEREST IN LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE
GROUND, AND ASKED ABOUT THE NEWS REPORTS ABOUT ARISTIDE'S
CLAIMS OF BEING FORCED TO RESIGN, WHICH DCM EMPHASIZED HAD
NO BASIS IN FACT.  PAROLIN VOICED NO REGRET AT ARISTIDE'S
DEPARTURE, NOTING THAT THE FORMER PRIEST HAD BEEN AN ACTIVE
PROPONENT OF VOODOO. 

-------------------------
IT WAS TIME FOR HIM TO GO
------------------------- 

    3.  (SBU) EVEN BEFORE ARISTIDE'S DEPARTURE, POPE JOHN PAUL
II HAD APPEALED TO HAITIANS "TO MAKE THE COURAGEOUS
DECISIONS THEIR COUNTRY REQUIRED," AND HAD URGED THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND AID ORGANIZATIONS TO DO WHAT
THEY COULD TO AVERT A GREATER CRISIS.  THIS WAS SEEN AS A
VEILED REFERENCE TO ARISTIDE'S LEAVING POWER.  SINCE
FEBRUARY 29, THE VATICAN HAS HAD NO OFFICIAL PUBLIC COMMENT
ON ARISTIDE'S RESIGNATION; HOWEVER, THE VATICAN'S CARIBBEAN
AFFAIRS DIRECTOR MONSIGNOR GIORGIO LINGUA SAID THAT THE
HOLY SEE SAW NO OTHER WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS AND THOUGHT THE
FORMER PRIEST HAD TO GO.  LINGUA SAID MARCH 3 THAT IT WAS
IMPORTANT THAT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE QUICKLY RESTORE ORDER
IN HAITI SO THAT A PEACEFUL GOVERNMENTAL TRANSITION COULD
TAKE PLACE.  HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION
SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE.  LINGUA SAID HE SAW
SEVERAL HOPEFUL SIGNS THAT THE TRANSITION COULD OCCUR
WITHOUT A BLOOD BATH, POINTING OUT THAT REBEL LEADER GUY
PHILIPPE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN CONVINCED TO STAND DOWN AND
ESCHEW POLITICAL POWER IN LINE WITH HIS INITIAL PROMISE
THAT HIS SOLDIERS WOULD COOPERATE WITH INTERNATIONAL
FORCES. 

-----------------------
CATHOLIC RELIEF AT RISK
----------------------- 

4.  (U) ROME-BASED MEDIA HAVE REPORTED THAT CATHOLIC CHURCH
RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING U.S.-BASED CATHOLIC RELIEF
SERVICES (CRS) HAVE SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE LOSSES OF FOOD
STOCKS AND VEHICLES BECAUSE OF LOOTING -- WHICH CRS
OFFICIALS REPORT IS CONTINUING.  DFM PAROLIN NOTED THAT THE
    HOLY SEE WOULD APPRECIATE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO RESTART
THE RELIEF PIPELINES AND GET THE NEEDED FOOD AND SUPPLIES
OUT TO THE PEOPLE IN NEED. 

NICHOLSON

CONFIDENTIAL: CARICOM SURPRISED, UPSET, BUT NOT ANGRY BEING LEFT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000487 

SIPDIS 

NSC FOR TOM SHANNON 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV SMIG HA BF
SUBJECT: CARICOM SURPRISED, UPSET, BUT NOT ANGRY BEING LEFT
OUT OF ARISTIDE'S DEPARTURE 

Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

SUMMARY
- - - - 

1.  (C) Charge and Political Officer met with the Bahamian
Ambassador to Haiti, Dr. Eugene Newry, and the Under
Secretary in the Consular Section at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Bahamian-Haitian expert, Mr. Carlton Wright, on
March 8, 2004 to discuss Bahamian views of the current
situation in Haiti.  Ambassador Newry claimed that Caricom is
not "angry" with the U.S. involvement in the departure of
Aristide, but rather was "surprised" by the abrupt
decision-making, and Caricom's lack of involvement.  Newry
downplayed incendiary phrases in Caricom's statement on Haiti
such as expressing "alarm and dismay" as matter-of-fact
descriptions of members' disappointment, but on a positive
note he was quick to say that Caricom will be satisfied as
long as their 10-point action plan remains the basis for
post-Aristide Haiti and is implemented "as quickly and
painlessly as possible." Only history, declared Newry, can
determine whether or not ex-President Aristide left
voluntarily, because neither he (i.e., The Bahamas) nor his
regional colleagues were involved in that process. Bahamian
officials were extremely complimentary and positive about
joint U.S.-Bahamian efforts to deter or interdict intending
Haitian immigrants.
END SUMMARY. 

"LIKE A RIVER, THINGS MUST MOVE ON"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

2.  (C) At a meeting with the Charge, Bahamian Ambassador to
Haiti, Dr. Eugene Newry, characterized Caricom's harshly
worded "Statement on the Situation in Haiti" as "frank," but
was not a message of "anger."  In fact, he said he and fellow
Bahamian officials were quite pleased that changes being
implemented now in Haiti, such as the Tripartite Council and
the Council of Eminent Persons, come straight from the
10-Point Caricom Plan for Haiti.  In Newry's opinion, the
only place in which Caricom has disagreed with the Opposition
was in its desire for the Democratic Platform to be the only
political group. 

3.  (C) Although Ambassador Newry suggested that Caricom's
members were irritated with the lack of consultation and the
abruptness by which Aristide left office, he also indicated
that Caricom is pleased, nonetheless, that its plan is
apparently still being implemented.  As he put it, "a rose by
any other name is still a rose."  He said he will leave it to
the historians to determine what exactly happened on the
night Aristide fled Haiti.  However, he concluded, Caricom
needs to get over its pique because "like a river, things
must move on", and he understood that Haiti cannot advance
without the help that only the United States with the
ancillary support of other "major powers" such as Canada and
France could deliver. 

WHEN WILL CARICOM RE-ENGAGE?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

4.  (C)  When asked at what The Bahamas would "re-engage" in
Haiti, Ambassador Newry ardently argued that neither Caricom
nor The Bahamas has ever "disengaged" from Haiti.  He
stressed that he only left Haiti for "consultations" with the
Bahamian Government, and that as the only Caricom ambassador
actually resident in Haiti, he plans to return "shortly."
When pressed, however, Ambassador Newry acknowledged that he
couldn't define a time frame.  But, he hastened to add, from
Nassau he was in "daily contact" with Ambassador Foley and
both pro-Aristide and opposition figures in Haiti. 

5.  (C)  From a personnel standpoint, Ambassador Newry
admitted that Caricom would not be involved in the initial
multinational interim force in Haiti, but said that Caricom
would be willing to participate -- if only symbolically -- in
the follow-on stabilization UN presence.  He thinks that this
stabilization phase could start as early as the next 60 days. 

INTERIM HAITIAN GOVERNMENT - NOT TOO SHABBY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

6.  (C)  Ambassador Newry told Charge and political officer
that he was pleasantly surprised with the transition now
occurring.  He indicated that it was a good sign that the
Haitian people overall had focused their mistrust and dislike
on the ex-President.  He said that his contacts with the
opposition has assured him that they would continue to work
with the Lavalas party and that the party itself had not been
tainted by the same image of corruption as was ex-President
Aristide.  Newry also found to be positive the fact that the
interim government retained some of the people closely
associated with ex-President Aristide in positions of power.
Ambassador Newry took this as a sign of good faith on the
part of the opposition. 

7.  (C) Discussing the composition of the interim authority,
Ambassador Newry was optimistic.  He knew personally and
professionally many of the members of the Tripartite
Committee as well as the Council of Eminent Persons and
considered them of high calibre.  He also considered it an
asset that these individuals were not predominantly
attorneys, but rather surgeons, sociologists, and other
professionals. 

8. (C)  The Bahamian representative in Haiti believed that it
would be premature to try to hold elections in the near
future.  In his view, he thought that it would take at least
90 days for the interim government to re-establish itself.
Newry did not believe that the country's political parties
would be prepared to hold meaningful elections for at least
twelve to eighteen months, at best. 

9.  (C)  Asked about the danger of the interim authority
using the period until elections to consolidate its power and
thereby arrange to win the forthcoming elections, Ambassador
Newry said that this had been anticipated by Caricom in its
action plan.  As a consequence, one of the key elements in
Caricom's action plan was a stipulation that no one in the
transitional government in Haiti can run for office once the
permanent government is established.  Ambassador Newry saw
this provision as a "sign of maturity" and a way to  prevent
innumerable problems. 

U.S.- BAHAMIAN COOPERATION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

10. (C)  Turning to U.S.-Bahamian cooperation to prevent an
outflow of Haitian migrants to either The Bahamas or to the
United States, the Bahamian Foreign Ministry officials were
effusive in their praise of the current effort. The U.S., and
Bahamian, presence in the Windward Passage had "never been so
successful" in deterring an outflow of illegal migrants,
Newry declared.  While noting the costs of such an on-going
operation, both Newry and Wright acknowledged that it was
still much less expensive for The Bahamas that would be the
total costs of detaining, maintaining, and then re-patriating
illegal Haitian migrants once they reached The Bahamas. 

COMMENT
- - - - 

10.  (C)  Ambassador Newry was perhaps overreaching in trying
to put a positive spin on Caricom's March 3 statement on
Haiti and reflecting more of the real politik position that
The Bahamas takes regarding Haitian migration than the more
ideological position of some of the other, less affected,
Caricom members. Newry has also briefed both the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet en banc on the situation in Haiti
and his effusive praise of U.S.-Bahamian cooperation in the
Windward Passage reflects the realism of Prime Minister Perry
Christie and Deputy Prime Minister Cynthia Pratt than Foreign
Minister Fred Mitchell.  Surprisingly, Newry downplayed
ex-President Aristide's attempt to remain engaged from afar.
He did not think that Aristide's attempts to regain support
via press encounters in the Central African Republic would
impact on future Haiti developments.  His one caveat was that
Aristide's Lavalas Party is still extremely organized,
especially relative to the loose coalition of opposition
"parties" united only by a negative...their opposition to
Aristide.  His fear was that Aristide's support network would
re-group in time for the next set of elections while the
Opposition coalition would fall apart fall once the "negative
force," i.e., Aristide, disappeared from the scene as an
effective player.
WITAJEWSKI

NIGERIA OFFERS ARISTIDE A “STAGING POST”

UNCLAS ABUJA 000506 

SIPDIS 

SENSITIVE 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL HA NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA OFFERS ARISTIDE A "STAGING POST" FOR A FEW
WEEKS 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, NOT FOR PUBLICATION ON THE
INTERNET OR INTRANET. 

1. (SBU) In response to what it said was a request from the
Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM), on March 22 the GON
offered Haitian ex-president Aristide refuge in Nigeria for a
few weeks before moving on to another destination.  President
Obasanjo's press spokesman, Oluremi ("Remi") Oyo, issued a
press release (text below) to that effect and said much the
same thing in interviews carried by BBC radio and other
outlets. 

2. (SBU) The press release says the GON agreed after
consultations with African leaders, the African Union
leadership, the USG and "other concerned authorities."  Staff
at the Foreign Ministry and at the office of the National
Security Advisor told us March 23 they learned of the offer
from the press, and know nothing about such consultations.
The Presidency told us Aristide has not yet responded to the
offer (as of noon March 23), and said it had no information
on the USG and other consultations mentioned in the press
release. 

3. (SBU) COMMENT:  Two items seem important:  Will Aristide
come, and if so under what terms?  Confusion over what was
agreed when Charles Taylor came to Nigeria has long been a
problem.  Taylor is not the only political exile in Nigeria,
which has a history of offering asylum to fleeing leaders.
Post requests guidance from the Department on discussing
Aristide with the GON, and talking points for the public on
whatever USG role there may or may not have been in the
Nigerian offer to Aristide. 

4. (U) Begin text of the Nigerian Presidency press release: 

NIGERIA GRANTS CARICOM REQUEST ON FORMER HAITIAN LEADER 

The Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM) under the
leadership of Prime Minister P.J. Patterson of Jamaica, has
requested Nigeria to consider giving former President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti "a staging post" for a few
weeks until his movement to another destination. 

After receiving the CARICOM request, Nigeria undertook
widespread consultations with African leaders, the leadership
of the African Union, the U.S. Government and other concerned
authorities. 

Following the concurrence received after those consultations,
Nigeria has agreed to grant the request from CARICOM. 

Oluremi Oyo (Mrs.)
SSA to the President 

end text.
ROBERTS

CONFIDENTIAL:BAHAMIAN PERSPECTIVE ON CARICOM AND HAITI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NASSAU 000733 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHSA HA BF CARICOM
SUBJECT: BAHAMIAN PERSPECTIVE ON CARICOM AND HAITI 

REF: SECSTATE 71329 

Classified By: Charge Robert M. Witajewski for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

SUMMARY
- - - - - - - - - 

1.    (C) Charge hosted a lunch for the Bahamian Foreign
Minister Fred Mitchell, and Foreign Ministry Permanent
Secretary, Ms. Patricia Rodgers on March 29.  A/DCM and
Consular Section Head also participated.  The discussion
covered a number of topics: The dynamics of
recently-completed Caricom heads of government
inter-sessional meeting, Caricom-U.S. relations, status of
Bahamian ratification of the bilateral Comprehensive Maritime
Agreement (CMA), the status of ex-Haitian President Jean
Bertrand Aristide, and Caricom,s request of UN investigation
of the events related to Aristide,s resignation and
departure from Haiti.
End of Summary 

CARICOM INTER-SESSIONAL MEETING IN ST. KITTS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 

2.     (C) The Charge began the discussion by asking Foreign
Minister Mitchell "How did the meeting go in St. Kitts?"
Mitchell responded that Caricom,s statement reflected the
aggregate view of Caricom members, however he continued, the
Bahamas maintains its own views on these matters.  Mitchell
revealed a bit of internal Caricom dynamics in his response.
According to FM Mitchell, there was a definite "north-south"
division within Caricom on Haiti.  In contrast to the more
categorical positions taken by Grenada, Guyana, Surinam, and
Trinidad and Tobago, he claimed, the "northern Caribbean
countries"  who have more concrete interests  took  more
"considered" positions regarding Haiti because of their
geographic proximity.  The northern Caribbean countries, he
continued, are obliged to deal with the realities and are
also cognizant of the importance of their relations with the
United States and thus are more careful in balancing their
interests with Caricom and the U.S.  The southern Caribbean
members are more detached from the practical issues and are
guided by political agendas, according to the Bahamian
Foreign Minister. 

3.    (C) Continuing on the Haiti theme, Foreign Minister
Mitchell expressed the view that the United States
overreacted to Jamaica,s offer to let ex-President Aristide
reside in the country and to Caricom,s declarations.  He
appeared to be arguing that Caricom was entitled to express
its views and not necessarily be held accountable for them.
Mitchell also claimed that despite Caricom,s verbal shots at
the United States over recent events in Haiti, there would be
little net impact on overall U.S.-Caricom relations...as long
as the United States didn't "overreact." 

4.    (C) Expressing irritation at Caricom,s cumbersome
decision-making style, Mitchell complained that too much time
was wasted by the ceremonial opening and closing of the
sessions as each successive host felt compelled to spend time
and money on needless pomp and circumstance.  He also
expressed annoyance at the prolixity of his colleagues,
noting that had not each government head not insisted on
"getting their own paragraph" into the final declaration,
they might have both accomplished more and not have been
forced to hold their closing press conference at 2 a.m. in
the morning. 

CARICOM,S SPECIAL ENVOY AND CALLS FOR AN INVESTIGATION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

5.         (C) Regarding the naming of Caricom,s "special
envoy" to address the Haiti issue, Mitchell indicated that
Caricom had been unable to reach consensus on who this person
should be by the end of the inter-sessional and that this
would be subject to continued intra-Caricom negotiations.  He
said that personally hoped that it would be an individual who
both had prior diplomatic experience and someone closer to
The Bahamas, position on Haiti than that of some eastern
Caribbean states.  He discounted the prospect of anyone from
The Bahamas being selected for this role. 

6.    (C) Asked to clarify Caircom,s call for an
investigation into the circumstances of Aristide,s
resignation, Mitchell sought to downplay its significance.
He said that he personally envisioned the "investigation" as
equivalent to resolution of a "routine credentials challenge"
to a government such as occurs at the UNGA or another
committee.  If the LaTortue government is seen to be
exercising effective control in the country then, thought
Mitchell, it ought to be seated in Haiti,s chair at the UN
without controversy, Mitchell claimed.  He  explicitly sought
to minimize the scope, the impact, and the significance of
the Caricom-requested investigation -- but without indicating
whether his views reflected a broader Caricom view, those of
the Bahamian Cabinet, or his own personal view of an exit
strategy out of Caricom's dilemma. 

7.    (C) Questioned about recognition of the LaTortue
government, FM Mitchell reiterated his previous statements
that most Caricom members, as does The Bahamas, follow the
"Estrada Doctrine" when it comes to recognition and rather
than making value or moral judgments about a government, will
recognize whomever exercises effective control in Haiti as
that country's legitimate government.  He assured the Charge
that The Bahamas would not break with its long-held policy of
dealing with any government in control in Haiti, pointing out
that bilateral relations between The Bahamas and Haiti had
never been suspended during the transition from Aristide to
LaTortue  Foreign Minister Mitchell complained that the press
has exaggerated the recognition controversy and that matters
were not as bad as they appeared to be.  He noted that
Haitian Prime Minister LaTortue had called him personally and
assured him that press reports on Haiti refusing to permit
the return of the Bahamian Ambassador to Haiti were totally
untrue.  Mitchell also cited repeated phone conversations
between LaTortue and Jamaica's Prime Minister P.J. Patterson,
who apparently had a close working relationship in the past,
as evidence that Caricom and the new Haitian government could
work together.  He said that he expected the Haitian
Ambassador to return to The Bahamas in the near future as
well. 

Ex-President Jean Aristide in Jamaica
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

8.    (C) The Foreign Minister insisted that the United
States should not be concerned with, or opposed to,
Aristide,s presence in the Caribbean.  He argued that a
perceived "Banishing Policy" has racial and historical
overtones in the Caribbean that reminds inhabitants of the
region of slavery and past abuse.  The Charge inquired on
what would happen if Aristide were to meddle with Haitian
internal affairs and give his supporters the impression that
he is still a player in the future of Haiti.  Foreign
Minister Mitchell was emphatic that Jamaica will not allow
Aristide to play such an intrusive role and would "deal" with
Aristide if such a situation were to arise. 

COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME AGREEMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - 

9.    (C) Queried about the status of ratification of the
comprehensive maritime agreement (CMA) that has now been
negotiated over the last 18 months, FM Mitchell reported that
due to the document,s significance and complexity it had
been decided to prepare a formal briefing to the entire
Cabinet.  Optimistically, Mitchell thought that this could
completed in two cabinet sessions over a two-week period.
Questioned about the need for such a time-consuming review of
what is essentially a codification and rationalization of
existing agreements, Mitchell again wistfully muse about how
the Bahamian cabinet decision-making process might be
improved.  He related that he had learned as a result of his
Caricom attendance that in other Commonwealth countries,
debate and intervention on issues in the cabinet is
restricted to their ministers whose portfolios are directly
impacted by the issue, or ministers that assert fundamental
issues of principle.  In contrast, Mitchell intimated, in the
Christie Cabinet of the Bahamas operates much less
efficiently since any minister can intervene and express a
view on any issue before the government. 

JOINT TASK FORCE MEETING
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

10.   (C) Queried about his preferences for a date for the
next session of the Joint Task Force on Illegal Drug
Interdiction (JTF), Mitchell expressed agreement for an early
summer meeting in late May/early June.  He agreed with
Charge,s suggestion that the JTF would best be held
following ratification of the CMA and successful
implementation of a major anti-drug round-up that is being
planned for the near future so that participants could review
both past successes since the last JTF meeting and consider
specific goals to be accomplished for the coming year. 

COMMENT
 - - - - - - - - - - 

11.   (C) Foreign Minister Mitchell was his usual
business-like self during lunch as he pursued his agenda of
downplaying the consequences of a division between Caricom
and the United States on Haiti.  Underlying many of
Mitchell's arguments was the premise that Caricom/The Bahamas
as small countries take (and are entitled to take) principled
stands while the United States necessarily engages in real
politik. 

12.  (C)  Despite a life-long career as a politician in a
country were politics is personalized to the extreme, neither
kissing babies nor making small talk comes naturally to Fred
Mitchell.  He prefers to deal with agendas expeditiously and
then engage in philosophical discussions or reviews of
international relations drawing on his seminars at Harvard,s
Kennedy School.  Holding two time-consuming portfolio,s
(managing the civil service and foreign policy) is also
taking its toll on Mitchell,s private time.  Mitchell told
Charge a year ago that he hoped to write a twelve-chapter
(one chapter for each month of the year) book combining
policy, history, and personal ideology to be published on his
fifty-first birthday.  Ruefully, he admitted that he hasn,t
progress beyond chapter four.
WITAJEWSKI

CONFIDENTIAL: DOMINICAN POLITICS #8: FERNANDEZ, THE RIO GROUP

Viewing cable 04SANTODOMINGO6213, DOMINICAN POLITICS #8: FERNANDEZ, THE RIO GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTO DOMINGO 006213 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC, INL;
NSC FOR SHANNON AND MADISON;LABOR FOR ILAB; USCINCSO ALSO
FOR POLAD;TREASURY FOR OASIA-LCARTER;
USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/WH/CARIBBEAN BASIN DIVISION
USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USFCS/RD/WH; DHS FOR CIS-CARLOS ITURREGUI 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014
TAGS: DR ENRG HA PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN POLITICS #8: FERNANDEZ, THE RIO GROUP
AND HAITI 

REF: STATE 243180 

Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1.  (C) Summary.  When the Rio Group summit of November 4 got
to the agenda item on
Haiti, Dominican President Leonel Fernandez asked for
hemispheric help in
re-instilling democracy in that &narco-state,8 but he put a
big front wrong in
advocating the inclusion in the process of former president
Jean Bertrand
Aristide.  Following a November 6 conversation with the
Ambassador, Fernandez agreed that Aristide was distinct from
Lavalas, and said he meant to say that groups with broad
popular support needed to be included in the process.  The
Ambassador and several other ambassadors see President
Fernandez November 16 to discuss Haiti further, per reftel. 

2.  (C)  Dominicans are continually worried about the other
half of Hispaniola,
and with good reason -- perhaps a million Haitians reside in
the Dominican
Republic already, many of them undocumented.  The February
2004 hostilities in
Haiti did not cause any significant cross-border movements
but the Dominican
military temporarily reinforced the border and the Dominican
Congress
precipitately voiced its opposition to any eventual proposal
to establish
refugee camps on national territory. 

3. (C)   The official press release from the presidency
offers an account of the Dominican positions at the meeting.
(See para 4 below.)  It includes two
elements of concern two us:  a calculated reference to
Aristide and a quote
from Hugo Chavez blaming &a large part of the disorder in
that brother country8
on the United States.  Chief of staff Danilo Medina said that
the press release
was not cleared elsewhere in the palace.  See septel for
discussion of the Dominican-Venezuelan questions. 

4. (U)  Following is our informal translation of the release,
which played
extensively in the Dominican press: 

- - - - - - - - - - - 

(begin text) 

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  The presidents of Latin America
declared their
determination to provide concrete help to Haiti in
establishing a true
democratic order where institutions function and all
participants may be
brought together for a dialogue on the future of the country. 

Responding to a proposal by President Leonel Fernandez, the
heads of state and
government meeting at the XVIII Rio Group Summit agreed in
the need for the
re-establishment in Haiti of peaceful coexistence and
institutional order, so
that in the future a constitutional convention may be
assembled. 

President Fernandez, who offered an analysis of the
historical roots of Haiti,s
ingovernability, stated that in that Caribbean nation there
exists a power
vacuum and a great scarcity as a clandestine economy
functions based on
narcotics trafficking. 

&Haiti, a theme of discussion of the Latin American leaders
participating in
this summit, is a narco-state subjugated to poverty and human
degradation, such
that we the countries of Latin America have the historical
responsibility of
going to its aid,8 he emphasized. 

He said that within a democracy there should be participation
of all sectors,
and that in Haiti there is a political leader with great
popular support, Jean
Bertrand Aristide, who should be involved in the process for
a democratic
solution and establishment of stability and democracy. 

The Dominican leader called on the Rio Group to make a
profound analysis of the
Haitian situation, given this immense undertaking, so that
the presence of the
MINUSTAH can be transformed in a clear and decisive manner to
cooperate in
building a true state of laws. 

The Dominican president,s analysis of the Haitian crisis was
seconded and
approved by 11 of the presidents present, who in their
remarks expressed
support to the Dominican initiative seeking immediate support
for Haiti. 

President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, who will visit the
Dominican republic this
Saturday, said, &We should go to the aid of Haiti, but a
great deal of the
fault for the disorder in that brother country lies with the
United States.8 

The president of Paraguay Nicanor Duarte said that countries
meeting here
should offer support for building a true democracy in haiti,
with sovereignty
and with respect for its cultural roots. 

The president of Panama Martin Torrijos backed the position
of the Dominican
leader and said that he was ready to offer cooperation in
elections, welcoming
the position of President Fernandez. 

At the same time, the Vice President of El Salvador, Ana
Vilma de Escobar,
spoke of the need to restore order and to organize a
constitutional convention
in which all participants can find consensus and will respect
the rules of the
game. 

&We should carry out a crusade to recover multi-lateralism,
so that we can work
at establishing order in Haiti, and then work in favor of a
civilized
co-existence where conversations about the future can
begin,8 commented the
president of Bolivia, Carlos Mesa.
When his turn came, the president of Guatemala, Eduardo Stein
Braillas,
affirmed that the efforts to assist the Caribbean nation
should be carried out
jointly with the United Nations, but added the self-criticism
that the
countries of Latin America did not take decisions concerning
that nation when
they faced the need to do so. 

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, November 4, 2004.  Office of
Information, Press, and
Public Relations. 

(end text) 

- - - - - - - - - - - 

5. (C)  The Aristide comment appeared to come out of nowhere.
 Fernandez had
not previously discussed Aristide by name in conversations
with us, or with our French and Canadian counterparts. 

6. (C) Perhaps the greatest surprise for us was the palace's
presumption that
there would be no downside.  The next-day in-house press
analysis by
Fernandez's strategy unit concluded that there was "no risk"
associated with
his comments and that Fernandez was "presenting himself as an
element of
international cooperation." 

Fernandez Backtracks
- - - - - - - - - - 

7. (C) On November 6, during a pull-aside at a social event,
the Ambassador admonished Fernandez that his reference to
Aristide was a serious mistake, one
that had the potential of further inflaming a situation
already dangerous for
the Haitian people and for the international peacekeeping
force.  Fernandez
replied that given popular support for Lavalas, it would have
to be part of the
situation.  The Ambassador was direct: Aristide had led a
violent gang involved
in narcotics trafficking and had squandered any credibility
he formerly may
have had.  "Nobody has given me any information about that,"
Fernandez
replied.  The Ambassador insisted that no supporter of human
rights and
democracy could in good conscience allow Aristide and his
close supporters back
into the situation in Haiti.  Fernandez listened and
eventually agreed to
distinguish between Aristide and Lavalas.  He asked for any
information on
Aristide that the United States might be able to share with
him. 

7. (C) On November 9 the Ambassador, DCM and EcoPol chief
questioned
presidential chief of staff Danilo Medina about the reference
to Aristide.
Medina suggested that the President hadn't meant Aristide,
but rather the
Lavalas political movement; the Ambassador questioned that
interpretation.
Emboffs pointed out that Aristide had been named in the press
release and
questioned the inclusion in a Dominican press release of the
anti-U.S. remark
by Chavez.  Medina professed not to have seen or cleared the
release, which had
been drafted by the press office. He said that in future,
press texts would be
routed through his office before release. 

8.  (C)  The Ambassador meets with President Fernandez  to
discuss Haiti (using reftel talking points) on the evening of
November 16, accompanied by the French, Canadian, British and
Spanish ambassadors.  We will report septel on the results of
that discussion.
HERTELL

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CONFIDENTIAL: GUATEMALA ON HAITI DEMARCHE

Viewing cable 04GUATEMALA2948, GUATEMALA ON HAITI DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L GUATEMALA 002948 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2014
TAGS: PREL HA GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALA ON HAITI DEMARCHE 

REF: STATE 246188 

Classified By: Ambassador John Hamilton for reasons 1.5 (b) & (d). 

(C) Polcouns delivered reftel demarche to Guatemalan Acting
FM Marta Altolaguirre, who agreed wholeheartedly with U.S.
assessment.  She said Guatemala's troop contribution to
MINUSTAH was just one indicator of Guatemala's commitment to
the "long-term efforts" that would be required of the
international community in Haiti.  Altolaguirre volunteered
that her personal view was that Aristide had been a
"disaster" and could play no useful role in Haiti's future.
She said she would forward to Guatemala's delegation to the
Ibero-American Summit, already in San Jose, our concerns
about Haiti and the need to express support for Latortue and
the Interim Government of Haiti.
HAMILTON

CONFIDENTIAL: LAVALAS TORN BETWEEN BOYCOTTING ELECTIONS AND

Viewing cable 05PORTAUPRINCE776, LAVALAS TORN BETWEEN BOYCOTTING ELECTIONS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 000776 

SIPDIS 

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
WHA ALSO FOR USOAS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL HA
SUBJECT: LAVALAS TORN BETWEEN BOYCOTTING ELECTIONS AND
MOVING FORWARD 

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 

1. (C) Summary:  The Lavalas movement remains divided between
leaders who argue for moving beyond Aristide and
participating in elections this fall, and those who continue
to call for Aristide's return and threaten a boycott of
elections if their hard-line conditions are not met.  The
division is not clear-cut.  There are indications that some
of the principal hard-liners are in fact interested in
participating in elections; this is especially true of Father
Gerard Jean-Juste, who has emerged as a hard-line leader.  A
group of Lavalas moderates around former PM Cherestal
continues to lay the groundwork for a new party that would
attempt to capture the Lavalas vote, but some of them still
hope to unite both factions under one umbrella.  The many
U.S.-based Lavalas members and "solidarity" activists
complicate the picture; they are pushing a tough boycott
position, but their distance from the process on the ground
is likely to limit their influence.  Aristide's shadow
continues to hang over the movement, with most people
defining their positions in relation to him and many trying
to use his name to rally for their position.  We anticipate
it will not be clear for several more months how and whether
the Lavalas movement -- either as Fanmi Lavalas or another
party, or both -- will be represented in the elections.  End
summary. 

2. (C) In the wake of Aristide's departure, the movement and
party he led are still trying to figure out their future.
The internal debates and public arguments have now begun to
focus on the concrete question of whether Lavalas should
participate in this fall's elections or boycott them
entirely.  The degree to which the Lavalas constituency
participates in the election will be a large factor in the
legitimacy of the elections, and we are therefore following
developments inside the movement closely.  Over the past
three weeks, we have spoken with a number of contacts --
Lavalas leaders, politicians from other parties, local
analysts, U.S.-based activists, and others -- to put together
a picture of the movement seven months ahead of the first
(local) elections. 

Elections yes, elections no
-------------------------- 

3. (C) The two main factions inside Lavalas can be outlined
fairly simply.  Broadly speaking, hard-liners reject the
legitimacy of the IGOH and electoral process and insist that
elections cannot take place until Aristide is returned to
power.  They focus on Fanmi Lavalas (FL) the registered
political party and insist that only FL represents the
legitimate Lavalas voice.  Father Gerard Jean-Juste, a
longtime Lavalas activist and priest, has emerged in recent
weeks as the most significant hard-line leader (spurred by
his imprisonment last fall and his visit earlier this year to
Aristide in South Africa).  He outlined his position at a
March 5-6 conference of Haitian political parties (reftel):
FL would boycott elections unless Aristide is returned to
power, political prisoners are released, "persecution" of
Lavalas partisans stops, and several other conditions are
fulfilled.  He reiterated these in a March 10 conversation
with PolCounselor, arguing that it was not only illegitimate
to participate in elections, it was also impossible, since FL
members could not meet or campaign safely.  The hard-line
position is shared, at least publicly, by the leadership of
the National Reflection Cell of Lavalas Popular
Organizations, by pro-Aristide activists in Bel-Air and other
neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, and by pro-Aristide
activists in other parts of Haiti (e.g. Milot mayor
Jean-Charles Moise).  Some of these people are suspected of
being involved in the pro-Aristide violence that has occurred
in the capital since last fall. 

4. (C) Those in the moderate faction, more diverse and less
vocal, insist they want to participate in the elections, that
they represent the original spirit of the Lavalas movement,
and that FL itself has been discredited by Aristide and his
misgovernance.  The most significant group is coalescing
around former Prime Minister Jean-Marie Cherestal, who has
been quietly and cautiously preparing the groundwork to
launch a new "Lavalas Renewed" party (ref B).  Cherestal told
PolCounselor March 13 that he was satisfied with his progress
in building support and said he was not worried that
elections were only seven months away.  The party's basic
message to Haiti's poor majority would be that Aristide's
power had been a deceit; he was able to speak their language
and raise their expectations, but he had not been able to
deliver any true benefits to them.  Initial reactions to the
draft Lavalas Renewed manifest had been positive, and
Cherestal said he would soon "widen the circle" to bring more
in, including former Lavalas Senators and Deputies like
Gerald Gilles, Yvon Feuille, Rudy Heriveaux and others.  He
said he was still hesitant about some of the these since he
was not convinced they had fully distanced themselves from
Aristide, but he knew it was important to bring them in if
possible. 

5. (C) For their part, Feuille, Gilles, Heriveaux, and former
Chamber of Deputies President Yves Cristallin told us March
17 that they were still uncertain whether a new party was the
right direction.  Feuille was the most convinced, saying he
was committed to working with Cherestal, but he noted that
financial resources were extremely limited for building a new
party (a complaint not shared by Cherestal).  Gilles and
Heriveaux said they worried about violent reactions from
Aristide supporters, and also about the lack of funds.  All
noted with some pain that Cherestal had not kept them very
well informed about his activities. 

Hidden agendas make clarity difficult
------------------------------------- 

6. (C) This being Haiti, the division between hard-liners and
moderates is not precise.  In a political culture where
hidden agendas are the norm, several appear to be at work
inside the Lavalas movement; the most important of these may
be Jean-Juste's.  Despite his hard-line rhetoric, nearly
everyone we speak with is convinced that Jean-Juste in fact
wants to participate in the elections and sees himself as a
strong Presidential candidate.  MIDH President Marc Bazin
told us he came away from an early March meeting with
Jean-Juste convinced the priest was waiting until closer to
the elections to declare his candidacy.  Voltaire, who has
met frequently with Jean-Juste, also told us he believes
Jean-Juste is interested in running for President or, failing
that, in playing a power-broker role. 

7. (C) Whether all the "moderates" are really committed to
participating in elections is another question.  Cherestal's
suspicion of Gilles and Heriveaux is not without reason; both
have acknowledged publicly and privately their continuing
attachment to Aristide even as they portray themselves as
ready to move on, and Heriveaux told us he would rather
campaign with FL than with anybody else, even if Jean-Juste
were the standard-bearer. Voltaire says he supports
Cherestal, but he also describes himself as working to avoid
a split in the movement over elections and to bring the two
factions together.  Many in the movement see this as
fence-straddling and dismiss him as an opportunist who has
managed to hold Ministerial positions nearly uninterruptedly
since 1990.  (Note:  We understand that Voltaire, an
architect by profession, has been considering an offer to
oversee the construction of the new airport in Caracas,
Venezuela. End note).  Another professed moderate (and
would-be presidential candidate), Jean-Claude Desgranges, was
Aristide's last chief of staff and is married to a reportedly
hard-line pro-Aristide FL activist who resides in Florida;
Cherestal, among others, questions his "moderate"
credentials. 

Electoral strategies for the post-Aristide era
-------------------------------------------- 

8. (C) For most of the 1990's, the Lavalas movement
represented the (poor) majority of Haitian voters, and
Lavalas/FL could run on its own.  Defections from the
movement and disillusionment with Aristide's record have
diminished the electoral appeal of Fanmi Lavalas, but to a
degree that is unclear.  Polling data from August 2004 showed
that 8% of Haitians support FL, more than any other single
party but a far cry from the 20-40% (or even 80%) that many
Lavalas politicians insist the party enjoyed.  (That same
poll, however, showed that Aristide was still the only figure
in Haiti with a favorability rating above 50%.)  Thus it is
not surprising that all of our contacts acknowledge the need
for electoral alliances. 

9.  (C) Marc Bazin's MIDH party is most often cited as a
likely partner.  Voltaire called Bazin "one of Haiti's most
modern politicians" and said MIDH would give Lavalas
technical credibility that it currently lacked.  Cherestal,
too, said he hoped Bazin would join forces with his new
party, but worried that he would make common cause with the
hard-line faction instead.   Even Jean-Juste said that Bazin
had become very popular within the Lavalas base because of
his insistence on true reconciliation and his criticism of
the IGOH's perceived harsh approach to Lavalas.  Bazin
himself told PolCounselor in early March that he was very
interested in an alliance with Jean-Juste because of the
support it would bring him from the Lavalas base.  He
dismissed the possibility of an alliance with Cherestal's
party-in-formation, calling it "dead in the water."  (Note:
Bazin frankly acknowledged to the Ambassador that he hopes to
capitalize on the exclusion of Lavalas, especially the
moderates.  He would be highly unlikley to step aside in
favor of a Lavalas candidate.  End note.) Both MODEREH, the
party of former Lavalas Senators Dany Toussaint and Pierre
Sonson Prince, and KOMBA, the movement of former Lavalas
official Evans Lescouflair and peasant leader Chavannes
Jean-Baptiste, would appear to be potential allies of either
FL or a Cherestal-led moderate Lavalas party.  Each has
baggage though: Dany Toussaint is clouded by drug trafficking
allegations and Chavannes Jean-Baptiste is seen by many
hard-liners as a traitor to Lavalas. 

The U.S. faction
----------------- 

10. (C) In addition to the hard-line and moderate Lavalas
factions here in Haiti, there is in effect a third "faction"
with agendas and influence that play a significant role: the
U.S.-based community of staunchly pro-Aristide FL
members-in-exile and "solidarity" activists.  The former are
grouped together in the "FL Communications Commission"
(www.hayti.net) that asserts the exclusive right to speak on
behalf of the party.  Members include former FL interim
chairman Jonas Petit, former Interior Ministry Angelot Bell,
former government spokesman Mario Dupuy, former Aristide
advisor Maryse Narcisse, and former deputy Gilvert Angervil
(Yvon Feuille and Rudy Heriveaux are also members, but have
effectively been ostracized by the others).  The solidarity
activists come from a wide variety of organizations, many of
them with connections to the former Aristide government.
Many are grouped under the Let Haiti Live coalition
(www.lethaitilive.org) and have been sharply critical of the
IGOH and U.S. policy in Haiti.  We believe that some of them
are in regular contact with Aristide. 

11. (C) According to a well-placed contact inside this group,
there are regular consultations among key leaders of both
groups, leading hard-line figures in Haiti, including
Jean-Juste and OP leaders such as Lesly Farreau and Lesly
Gustave, and members of Aristide's entourage in South Africa.
 According to this same contact, the U.S.-based members
recently "decided" that Lavalas should boycott the elections
this fall and should be prepared for a long-term campaign to
destabilize and delegitimize the IGOH and the government
installed next February.  This group's distance from the
process on the ground, however, constricts its influence.  We
have seen clear indications, for example, that Jean-Juste has
refused to accept this "decision" and has insisted that
decisions be made by the people on the ground.  Nonetheless,
the U.S.-based activists will play an important role in
determining how and whether Lavalas participates in the
elections. 

The Aristide Shadow
--------------------- 

12. (C) Hanging over all of this is the shadow of Aristide,
who remains popular among much of the Lavalas popular base
and remains the legal head of the Fanmi Lavalas party.  Many
see Jean-Juste as Aristide's designate ("clone" according to
one businessman), and Jean-Juste has not shied away from
playing the "Titid" card with the faithful.  Even those who
say they are committed to moving beyond Aristide fear his
reach; Gilles, for example, makes no bones about his fear for
his physical safety if he is seen as "betraying" Aristide.
But overall we believe Aristide's influence is waning and it
is not clear he can influence events on the ground from South
Africa as much as many think.  Jean-Juste's relationship with
Aristide was never close and he gives the distinct impression
of someone looking for his own path.  Typically, Aristide has
not made his views on electoral participation known publicly,
leaving his options open for a decision either way. Clearly
his preferred outcome would be to disrupt the electoral
process; second-best would be to delegitimze the process and
the electoral results.  However, if it appears that a
successful and legitimate process is underway and cannot be
stopped, participation-by-proxy may become the course he
chooses, especially if he thinks a loyal Lavalas slate of
candidate could win. 

Comment
---------- 

13. (C) It will take several months for the differing
divisions and agendas within Lavalas to sort themselves out,
and the results could vary widely depending on a few key
variables.  First and foremost is what Aristide decides to
push and the degree to which he is successful.  Second is
what Jean-Juste does.  If he holds to the hard-line and calls
for a boycott, especially if he does it in the name of
Aristide, then many pro-Lavalas voters will likely heed his
call.   If this happens in the context of credible claims of
anti-Lavalas bias by election authorities and/or anti-Lavalas
violence by ex-FADH or other elements, this could call into
question the legitimacy of the election results.  A third
variable is how successful Cherestal and his group are in
formulating a compelling message for former Aristide voters.
(Related to this is whether corruption charges will be
brought against him that could take him entirely out of the
running; in the past ten days there have been murmurs in the
press of a series corruption-related arrest warrants being
prepared, including against Cherestal.)  Finally, there is
the possibility (which we cannot really judge at this point)
that former Lavalas President Rene Preval could enter the
fray.  Preval has been out of the political scene since he
left the Presidency in 2001, but of late has started meeting
with some political leaders.  At least a few observers
believe he is interested in getting involved and many tell us
he would be a more formidable Presidential candidate than
either Jean-Juste or Cherestal  For what it is worth,
Desgranges told us after meeting with Preval recently that
Preval said he is not going to run. 

14. (C) U.S. interests argue for encouraging the maximum
possible voter participation and the active involvement by
the full political spectrum, including the Lavalas sector.
We have made clear to all factions that we will support the
development of a democratic, modern Lavalas political
vehicle, whatever the name, as long as there is a clear break
with Aristide's legacy of violence and misrule.
FOLEY

SECRET: FRENCH SHARE CONCERNS ON POSSIBLE ARISTIDE RETURN

S E C R E T PARIS 004660 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015
TAGS: PREL FR HA SF
SUBJECT: FRENCH SHARE CONCERNS ON POSSIBLE ARISTIDE RETURN
TO HAITI 

REF: STATE 121144 

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d). 

1.  (C) Poloff and Embassy Africa Watcher delivered reftel
demarche July 1 to both MFA DAS-equivalent for Central
America and the Caribbean Gilles Bienvenu and MFA AF
PDAS-equivalent Elisabeth Barbier.  Bienvenu stated that the
GOF shared our analysis of the implications of an Aristide
return to Haiti, terming the likely repercussions
"catastrophic."  Bienvenu actively sought our thoughts on
next steps to prevent Aristide from returning.  Initially
expressing caution when asked about France demarching the
SARG, Bienvenu noted that Aristide was not a prisoner in
South Africa and that such an action could "create
difficulties."  However, Bienvenu later offered to express
our shared concerns in Pretoria, perhaps under the pretext
that as a country desiring to secure a seat on the UN
Security Council, South Africa could not afford to be
involved in any way with the destabilization of another
country.  Barbier, speaking on behalf of the AF bureau,
however, did not foresee any problems at all in delivering a
demarche in Pretoria. 

2.  (S) Bienvenu speculated on exactly how Aristide might
return, seeing a possible opportunity to hinder him in the
logistics of reaching Haiti.  If Aristide traveled
commercially, Bienvenu reasoned, he would likely need to
transit certain countries in order to reach Haiti.  Bienvenu
suggested a demarche to CARICOM countries by the U.S. and EU
to warn them against facilitating any travel or other plans
Aristide might have.  He specifically recommended speaking to
the Dominican Republic, which could be directly implicated in
a return attempt.  Both Bienvenu and Barbier confided that
South African mercenaries could be heading towards Haiti,
with Bienvenu revealing the GOF had documented evidence that
10 South African citizens had come to Paris and requested
Dominican visas between February and the present. 

3.  (C) Comment: France seems to share our analysis and
concerns regarding any attempt by Aristide to return to
Haiti.  They appear eager to prevent such an occurrence and
could be valuable, both bilaterally and within the EU, in
convincing other countries to avoid involvement in any plans
by Aristide.  End Comment.
STAPLETON

CONFIDENTIAL: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN

Magister Bernd Pulch

Viewing cable 04NASSAU384, BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000384 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014
TAGS: BF HA PGOV PREL SMIG
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON HAITI 

REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D)
     NASSAU 322 E) NASSAU 364 

Classified By: Charge Abdelnour Zaiback for reasons 1.5 (B) and 1.5 (D) 

- - - -
SUMMARY
- - - - 

1) (C) On February 24, Acting Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary Marilyn Zonicle separately demarched each
UN Security Council member with representation in The Bahamas
for support for a possible UN Security Council meeting on
Haiti that may be requested by Jamaica Prime Minister
Patterson as early as Thursday.  The original plan was to
request the Security Council to meet on February 25 on Haiti,
however, President Aristide asked that the meeting be
deferred for 24 hours while he pursued the ongoing
negotiations.  For its part, The Bahamas seeks the active
support of the U.S. as the "most important" member of the
Security Council as it engages on a full scale diplomatic
press to achieve peace in Haiti.  If diplomacy fails, The
Bahamas believes that military assistance will be essential,
and is willing to contribute troops to a multinational effort
to maintain law and order.  END SUMMARY 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FOREIGN MINISTER MITCHELL ON STAND BY TO NEW YORK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

2) (C) Anticipating that Prime Minister Patterson would make
the request for the Security Council to hold a special
session on Haiti tomorrow, FM Mitchell had already packed his
bags and made plans to fly to New York tonight.  Patterson
and CARICOM delayed making the request for the session only
because Aristide convinced them that the opposition and
rebels could still agree to CARICOM's peace plan.  However,
as the situation on the ground in Haiti continues to
deteriorate, Zonicle anticipates that Mitchell will fly to
New York tomorrow for a requested Security Council special
session on Thursday. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SIX TALKING POINTS FOR PROJECTED SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

3) (C) Follows are the six talking points presented to Charge. 

i) (C) Pending the outcome of the OAS/CARICOM-sponsored
negotiations between the Government and the Opposition in
Haiti, the CARICOM countries may request the convening of an
emergency meeting of the Security Council to address the
matter, considering the deteriorating situation in that
country and the inability of the Haitian National Police
(HNP) to deal with the insurgency. 

ii) (C) An open debate in the Security Council would allow it
to pronounce on the matter and would provide Haiti with the
opportunity to request military/police assistance,  and,
perhaps, increased humanitarian assistance, as may be
necessary.  Haiti is reluctant to take the matter to the
Security Council before the current political negotiations
have been exhausted and wishes to avoid the matter being
dealt with on "parallel tracks" by OAS/CARICOM and the UN. 

iii) (C) While France has indicated a willingness to send
military assistance to Haiti, the specter of French troops in
Haiti at this time is a very sensitive issue, particularly as
France is the former colonizer and Haiti is currently
"celebrating" the 200th anniversary of discarding that yoke.
A joint dispatch under the UN banner would be more palatable. 

iv) (C) With the United Nations, CARICOM Ambassadors are
seeking the support of the Group of Latin America and the
Caribbean (GRULAC) for the initiative and a meeting of the
GRULAC to discuss the matter is being convened Wednesday
afternoon.  Brazil and Chile, the two members of GRULAC on
the Security Council have indicated their support for the
initiative.  Other member of the GRULAC that have voiced
strong support are Mexico and Venezuela. 

v) (C) Beyond the GRULAC, CARICOM Ambassadors are in touch
with Canada and France, as well as with President of the GA,
Ambassador Colin Granderson of the CARICOM Secretariat, and
the other Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in
seeking to garner support for the initiative and move it
forward, as appropriate. 

vi) (C) It has been said, although not officially announced
that, Ambassador Reggie Dumas, of Trinidad and Tobago, has
been appointed as the Special Advisor on Haiti by the UN
Secretary-general.  Perhaps, the stigma of a direct request
from Haitian authorities for military assistance could be
alleviated by having the request channeled through the
Special Advisor. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BAHAMAS VIEW ON OUTSIDE INTERVENTION CLARIFIED
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

4) (C) Charge and Political Chief sought clarification on
Mitchell's vision for outside intervention.  In recent days
Mitchell has made several statements that international
support for Haiti's police was crucial, including "to disarm
the rebels if they did not disarm themselves."  Zonicle
relayed that the first priority of The Bahamas is the
principles in the CARICOM proposal, most notably reinforcing
the ability of the Haitian police to maintain law and order.
However, if this fails, Zonicle reiterated Mitchell's oft
stated plea of late, that "law and order must be restored."
Zonicle volunteered that The Bahamas was prepared to
contribute troops, "perhaps as many as 100."  While the
preferred mechanism is the United Nations, Zonicle confirmed
Mitchell's view that any outside intervention would be
preferable to continued and increased chaos. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BAHAMIAN AMBASSADOR TO CARICOM SEEKS INSIGHTS ON RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN OPPOSITION AND REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

5) (C) Ambassador to CARICOM Leonard Archer sought Charge's
insight on the relationship between the rebels and the
opposition, but in the exchange of views it became clear that
all sides knew about the same.  Several rebel leaders have
connections with the former military.  While the opposition
may currently feel that they are the beneficiaries of rebel
activity, they may soon learn that "the enemy of my enemy is
not always my friend."  Archer is an experienced diplomat who
has studied Haiti at length. 

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - - 

6) (C) As reported reftels, The Bahamas is seized on the
Haitian crisis.  It is certainly Foreign Minister Mitchell's
dominant preoccupation.  It is also clear that The Bahamas
regards U.S. leadership and engagement on Haiti as crucial to
any peaceful outcome.  As has also become increasingly
explicit in Mitchell's recent statements, while The Bahamas
and CARICOM lobby for peace, they have concluded that a
peaceful outcome without international intervention is
increasingly unlikely.
WITAJEWSKI

CONFIDENTIAL: CANADA ON RUMORS OF ARISTIDE’S DESIRE TO RETURN

Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium (MA)

Viewing cable 05OTTAWA2023, CANADA ON RUMORS OF ARISTIDE’S DESIRE TO RETURN

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 002023 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2010
TAGS: BR HA PREL UNSC
SUBJECT: CANADA ON RUMORS OF ARISTIDE'S DESIRE TO RETURN TO
HAITI 

REF: SECSTATE 121144 

1. (C) DCM and PolOff shared reftel talking points with FAC
Director General for Latin America and the Caribbean Jamal
Khokhar and Caribbean and Central America Director Christian
Lapointe.  Khokhar said "we are on the same sheet" with
regards to Aristide, and Canada's consistent message has been
that "he is of the past and Haiti needs to move forward."
Khokhar said the GOC understands there is a plan by his
followers to bring Aristide back to Haiti on July 15th, but
does not have any clear signals of how it will be done.  Desk
Officer Caroline Ouellet clarified that the date is based on
rumors and there are no more signs than usual that it is
reality.  Still, they have heard the date from enough sources
to consider it credible.  Even before these recent rumors,
she said, Canada had a clear position in opposition to the
return of Aristide. 

2. (C) Khokhar said Canada has been conveying this message to
all parties, stressing the need for the international
community (especially the Caricom countries), to invest in
the future for Haiti and not remain stuck in the past.
Canadian officials note the call by SYG Annan for
reinforcements to provide security for the election and are
in agreement that the UN mission must be reinforced to be
effective. 

3. (C) Lapointe said that Canada has discussed the return of
Aristide with South African officials during consultations in
May.  The South Africans reportedly questioned whether it is
fair to encourage Lavalas to participate in the elections
without their most important leader being on the ground.
They are not convinced of the good will of those who would
exclude him being there.  The GOC reportedly urged the South
Africans to encourage Lavalas to move beyond Aristide, and
stressed the importance of finding a new leader in Haiti that
can unite the country rather than divide it.  Lapointe said
there may be an opportunity for FM Pettigrew to meet on the
margins of the G-8 meeting with the South African FM and
further stress these points. 

Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 

WILKINS

SECRET: VATICAN ON HAITI: CHURCH LOSSES AND RESPONSES

Magister Bernd Pulch

Viewing cable 10VATICAN11, VATICAN ON HAITI: CHURCH LOSSES AND RESPONSES

VZCZCXRO3140
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHSL
DE RUEHROV #0011/01 0201644
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 201644Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1239
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE IMMEDIATE 0010
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0011
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0032
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0042
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0126
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0090
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 1278
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 VATICAN 000011 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/20/2035
TAGS: EAID PREL SOCI PHUM KIRF VT HA
SUBJECT: VATICAN ON HAITI: CHURCH LOSSES AND RESPONSES 

REF: A. A) STATE 4807
     B. B) STATE 4854
     C. C) VATICAN 10
     D. D) KELLY-NOYES EMAILS 1/16-19/10
     E. E) STATE 5277 

VATICAN 00000011  001.2 OF 002 

CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, DCM, EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.  (S) Summary:  While devastating, the Church suffered fewer
losses in the Haiti earthquake than initially reported in the
media.  The death of the Archbishop and many seminarians were
especially painful but the Vatican is already reviewing how to
regroup: Bishop Pierre Dumas, President of Caritas Haiti, could
become the new Archbishop.  Meanwhile, the Nuncio in PAP is
working with Haitian bishops, and with international missionary
and other Catholic organizations, to provide humanitarian aid
and pastoral care to the victims (see also ref c).  Catholic aid
organizations have already pledged over $50 million in aid and
raised over $13 million in donations; these numbers will
increase.  On a related note, the Vatican is concerned about
future operating funds for the Haitian embassy accredited to the
Holy See.  On the political front, the Vatican believes the
return of deposed Haitian leader (and former priest) Aristide
would be disastrous and is trying to get a quiet message to him
and/or his confidantes to this effect.  Holy See officials have
repeatedly thanked Embassy Vatican for USG response to the
earthquake and for coordination with the Church on relief
efforts.  End summary. 

(SBU) Church Suffers Tragic but not Incapacitating Losses
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 

2. (U) According to FIDES, the media arm of the Holy See's
Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (which oversees
the Church's work in Haiti), while Catholic congregations and
organizations in Haiti suffered deeply tragic losses during the
earthquake, these were not as overwhelming as initial media
reports indicated.  Specifically, the known losses to date
include: 

-- Archbishop Serge Miot
-- Monfort Missionaries:  11 dead; infrastructure damaged
-- Salesians: 3 dead priests plus 500 students or seminarians
killed; infrastructure destroyed or damaged
-- Daughters of Wisdom: 3 dead, 3 missing and presumed dead
-- Spiritan Fathers: 1 dead
-- Oblates: 1 dead; damage to buildings and centers
-- Holy Cross Fathers: 1 dead
-- Dominicans: no deaths, 1 nun injured
-- Franciscans: no known deaths or injuries; convent and schools
destroyed 

However, the Council of Latin American Bishops Conferences
reports over 100 members of religious orders still missing and
presumed dead.  The good news is that the Christian Brothers and
Camillan order had no losses, and the Jesuits also lost no-one
and suffered no damage to their buildings.  (Note:  For context,
the Vatican has informed the Embassy that before the earthquake,
the Haitian Church had eighteen bishops in ten dioceses, 486
diocesan priests, 306 religious orders priests, 332 non-priest
male religious (monks and friars), 1,851 female religious
(nuns), and 421 seminarians.) 

3. (SBU) The Vatican's Secretariat of State official in charge
of Central America, Monsignor Francisco Frojan, told polchief on
January 19 that the death of the Archbishop of PAP had been a
hard blow to the Church.   Embassy understands that Bishop
Pierre Dumas, President of Caritas Haiti, could become the new
Archbishop. 

4. (C) The earthquake also killed the sister of the Cardinal
Archbishop of Sao Paolo: she was in PAP giving a conference when
the earthquake hit.  (Some seminarians and other religious
personnel at that event were also killed.)  At the same time,
Frojan added that the Vatican was fortunate the Nunciature had
not been damaged, and thus has become a shelter and meeting
point for bishops, clergy and missionaries.  No Vatican official
other than the Nuncio himself were in PAP at the time of the
earthquake. 

(U) Vatican Is Responding to Crisis
----------------------------------- 

5. (U) Polchief delivered refs A and B points to Frojan on
January 19 and offered USG support should the Vatican require
assistance in getting humanitarian supplies to Haiti.  While the
Vatican does not own any planes, Frojan had received questions
about flights to Haiti from organizations wishing to assist, and
thanked polchief for the information.  Frojan said Cor Unum --
the Vatican's umbrella organization for humanitarian work -- and
Caritas Internationalis have the lead on relief efforts (ref C),
and are coordinating donations from a wide range of Catholic
charities.  For example, U.S.-based Catholic Relief Services (a
Caritas organization) has already pledged $25 million and raised
over $13 million in donations for Haiti, and Caritas
Internationalis is contributing an additional $25 million.
These numbers will go up. 

6. (SBU) Beyond the influx of new aid, Frojan noted that before
the earthquake the Catholic Church throughout Haiti had managed
26 hospitals, 213 health dispensaries, 4 leprosy health centers,
23 homes for the elderly and the chronically ill and 39
orphanages.  Many of these institutions are still functional in
the affected areas and are providing assistance.  The Camillan
priests and nuns, for example, ran a hospital in PAP that was
undamaged and they are now treating the injured.  Operating
information on other institutions is trickling in to the
Vatican, but it is still incomplete.  (Note: According to the
Vatican, there are about 7 million Catholics in Haiti - 70% of
the population.  Another 23% of the population adheres to other
Christian denominations.  End Note) 

7. (C) The Vatican's Chief of Protocol, Msgr. Fortunatus
Nwachuku, raised another concern with Ambassador Diaz regarding
Haiti.  The Haitian Embassy to the Holy See, probably like those
elsewhere, has a very tight budget and cannot sustain operations
for long without renewed funding from Port au Prince.  Moreover,
the Haitian Ambassador has confided to his Canadian colleague
here that the embassy can get by for a little longer, but the
embassy's situation is unsustainable for long.  Nwachuku asked
whether any aid programs currently included funding for Haitian
embassies. 

(S) Aristide's Return Would be Disastrous
----------------------------------------- 

8. (S) In discussions with DCM over the past few days (ref d),
senior Vatican officials said they were dismayed about media
reports that deposed Haitian leader -- and former priest -- Jean
Bertrand Aristide wished to return to Haiti.  (Aristide now
lives in South Africa.)  The Vatican's Assesor (deputy chief of
staff equivalent), Msgr. Peter Wells, said Aristide's presence
would distract from the relief efforts and could become
destabilizing.  Following a conversation with DCM, the
Undersecretary for Relations with States (deputy foreign
minister equivalent), Msgr. Ettore Balestrero, conferred with
the Vatican nuncio in Haiti.  Archbishop Auza agreed
emphatically that Aristide's return would be a disaster.  He
said he would ask local bishops if any of them still had
positive enough relations with Aristide to persuade him to stay
away.  Balestrero then conveyed Auza's views to Archbishop
Greene in South Africa, and asked him also to look for ways to
get this message convincingly to Aristide.  DCM suggested that
Greene also convey this message to the SAG.  Embassy will report
the results of this Vatican outreach once they are available. 

(U) Comment: The Church is On the Case
-------------------------------------- 

9. (C) Normally contemplative and deliberately slow to act in
political crises, the Vatican and Church-related organizations
are responsive and effective when dealing with humanitarian
disasters.  Its global network of aid organizations and local
Church entities provide a well-organized and reasonably
well-funded structure to deliver assistance.  Moreover, despite
concerns elsewhere (ref e), the Vatican is very appreciative of
USG aid to Haiti.  Holy See officials have thanked Embassy
Vatican officials repeatedly this week for USG assistance to
Haiti and for the Embassy's close coordination with the Holy See
and Church organizations on relief efforts.  They say on-the
ground liaison with Caritas and with the nuncio would also be
useful.  Embassy Vatican will continue outreach at all levels to
continue to get out the message about USG efforts. 

10.  (C) PORT-AU-PRINCE MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
DIAZ

Unvealed – the Full STASI -Agents Lists – ENDLICH ENDHÜLLT. 100.000 STASI-MITARBEITER IM NETZ. KLARNAMEN.

Dear Sirs,

on this website you will find the list of the STASI Agents waiting for their call to action in Western Europe and the lists of all STASI Agents from A-Z with their real names.

We have also published on this website new documents about Stratfor and their internal discussions about the STASI.

This is part of our cooperation with Wikileaks.

The Stratfor files were provided by Wikileaks.

This is part of our Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Global Intelligence Files were obtained by WikiLeaks.

The STASI lists stem from the STASI itself. It is the so called “Fipro” list which was made to secure the pensions of the STASI Agents in Germany after the Reunification.

Below you find an explanation in German Language:

here are the lists of all STASI- Agents ready from A-Z and also the STASI sleeper list of secret agents waiting for the order to operate in Western Europe:

https://berndpulch.org/a-z-2-000-stasi-offiziere-im-besonderen-einsatz-oibe-schlaferliste-der-stasi-in-westdeutschland-stasi-sleeper-list-a-z/

and here you find all STASI Agents by name from A-Z

https://berndpulch.org/stasi-namen-alphabetisch-buchstabe-a-ba-stasi-names-in-alphabetical-order-a-ba/

These lists continue on this website and contain all names A- Z.

The source of these lists is the so called “Fipro-list – made by the STASI itself. The reason: These agents were trying to get pensions from the German State after the reunification…

The explanation is in German Language:

see more info at http://www.victims-opfer.com

Die Liste wurde bereits früher hier publiziert:

http://stasiopfer.de/component/option,com_simpleboard/Itemid,/func,view/id,993815828/catid,4/

Vom “Stasiopfer”-Angebot führt ein Link zu einer Website in den USA (www.jya.com), die sich auch mit den Praktiken von Geheimdiensten beschäftigt. Dort findet sich die “Fipro-Liste”, das detaillierte “Finanzprojekt” der Stasi, angefertigt in den letzten Tagen der DDR, um die Rentenansprüche der rund 100 000 hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter des MfS auch nach dem Zusammenbruch des Systems belegen zu können. Die “Fipro-Liste” ist seit langem bekannt und diente Anfang der neunziger Jahre etwa zur Identifizierung der so genannten OibE – Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz. Diese  Liste „Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz“im Jahre 1991 erschien  in der “taz. Die Echtheit kann beim BStU überprüft werden.

Siehe u.a. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-22539439.html

Auf Druck ehemaliger STASI-Leute und Ihrer Genossen wurde die Liste aus dem Verkehr gezogen.

Hier ist sie wieder:

Wir stellten eine  Textdatei mit den Namen, Geburtsdaten und früheren Gehältern von 100.000 ehemaligen Stasi-Agenten ins Internet. Teilweise ist sogar die Anschrift mit Postleitzahl, Strassenname und Hausnummer angegeben. Vermutlich wurde die Datei mit dBase oder dem dBase-Klon der DDR REDABAS (Relationales Datenbanksystem), erstellt.

Beispielhafte Datensätze sehen so aus:

210729430048;96;15;00;3665/60/1, U:;BERTSCH-HERZOG, HERBERT;1080;LEIPZIGER STR. 48;

oder:

050454401546;94;30;00;;SCHROEDER, BURGHARDT:;;;23040,00

// <!–
document.write(”);
//–>

 

Aus Leserreaktionen   ist der Aufbau des ersten Ziffernblocks bekannt. Der erste Ziffernblock ist die sogenannte Personenkennzahl (PKZ). Mit ihr wurde jeder DDR-Bürger registriert. Die ersten sechs Ziffern sind das Geburtsdatum (im Beispiel 21.7.29), es folgt eine Kennzahl für das Geschlecht (4 für männlich, 5 für weiblich), für die Registrierstelle beziehungsweise das Ordnungsamt (im Beispiel 300) und schließlich eine Prüfkennziffer (im Beispiel 48). Danach folgt eine Nummer, die die Position der Person innerhalb der Organisationshierarchie der Stasi benennt (im Beispiel 3665/60/1). Danach der Name und Vorname, die Postleitzahl der DDR sowie die Straße. Die letzte Zahl gibt das Gehalt an. Unklar ist nach wie vor, was die Zahlen “96;15;00” nach der PKZ bezeichnen.

In der im Internet publizierten Liste sind einige wenige Angaben mit Straße ohne Gehalt, die meisten Angaben aber ohne Straße mit Gehalt versehen. Dabei handelt es sich teils um Jahresgehälter, teils um einmalige Zahlungen für Sondereinsätze. Rund 1100 Datensätze ohne Namensangaben sehen folgendermaßen aus:

291132529720;99;99;99;;::;;;9000,00
oder
251250514718;96;15;00;;4040/88, F:;;;19387,74

Aufgrund dieser unterschiedlichen Datensätze ist zu vermuten, dass die im Internet publizierte Liste aus verschiedenen bereits im Umlauf befindlichen Listen kompiliert wurde. Ein Abgleich mit einer Liste mit rund 1200 “Offizieren im besonderen Einsatz” (OBE) ergab Übereinstimmungen in der Personenkennzahl. Daraus könnte man folgern, dass es sich bei den nicht genannten Personen um diese Offiziere handelt. Ansonsten handelt es sich um die sogenannten hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Stasi. Besonders auffallend ist, dass der Frauenteil sehr niedrig liegt.

Frühere Spitzel sind jetzt wieder in höchsten Positionen tätig. Nur das Internet kann helfen, die Demokratie wieder auf die Füße zu bringen.

Hier der Link:

http://www.berndpulch.com/bernd-pulch/presse-erklarung-stasi-mitarbeiter-liste-mit-klarnamen-zum-downloaden/

auf ma stasi klicken und der Download startet

Diese Liste beinhaltet die Namen von 90.598 Mitarbeitern des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der DDR. Die Liste ist nicht vollständig. Insbesondere Mitarbeiter der Führungsebene sind nicht enthalten.

This is a list of 90.598 members of the secret police of East Germany (Ministry for State Security), the list isn’t complete, because the most of the high Officiers lieke Colonel and higher have destroyed the personal Informations in the last days of Eastern Germany.

Listen der Stasimitarbeiter-hier findest Du sie! Was bedeuten die Zahlen?
1.Listen der Stasi-Diensteinheiten!
Bem.:hier kannst du die Nr.(6-stellig) der Dienststellen heraussuchen.
2.Liste der Stasi-Mitarbeiter (Hauptamtlich)
Bem.:Hoffentlich hast Du einen guten Rechner, denn die Liste ist erschreckend lang. Die ersten 6 Ziffern sind das Geburtsdatum + die nächsten 6 Ziffern = Dienstausweisnummer! Die zwei Ziffern hinter dem Geburtsdatum geben das Geschlecht an: 41 und 42 = Männlich, 51 und 52 = Weiblich! Wichtig für suchen und finden, sind die sechs Ziffern in den Semikolon vor den Namen: z.B. ;07;00;44; ! Das ist die Nummer der Dienststelle !
Also du suchst in der Liste der Dienststellen, die Nummer der Dienststelle, die Dich interessiert. Damit gehst Du in die Liste der Mitarbeiter und suchst Dir alle Mitarbeiter der entsprechenden Dienststelle heraus. Ich habe das für mein Wohnort getan und so alle Mitarbeiter gefunden. Ob die Liste Vollständig ist kann ich nicht einschätzen, aber zumindest er/kannte ich einige Exverräter vom Namen her.
3.Liste der OibE (Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz)

Hiermit stelle ich eine Liste der Stasi-Mitarbeiter mit Ihrem Klarnamen zum Download isn Internet.

Die Liste ist ab sofort auch auf vielen anderen Webseiten zu finden unter anderem.

http://stasiliste.50g.com/

http://www.http://mfs-outsider.de/

http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com

http://www.bennewirtz-opfer.com

Ein Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter (kurz IM, oft auch als Informeller Mitarbeiter[1] oder Geheimer Informant bezeichnet) war in der DDR eine Person, die verdeckt Informationen an das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS oder „Stasi“) lieferte, ohne formal für diese Behörde zu arbeiten. Mit seinen zuletzt rund 189.000 Angehörigen deckte das Netz aus Inoffiziellen Mitarbeitern nahezu alle gesellschaftlichen Bereiche der DDR ab und bildete somit eines der wichtigsten Repressionsinstrumente der SED-Diktatur.

Die Begriffe Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter bzw. Geheimer Informator wurden vom MfS absichtvoll gewählt, um sich vom früheren deutschen Polizeivokabular und dem Begriff V-Mann abzusetzen.[2]

Mit der Öffnung der Archive des MfS im Zuge der Deutschen Wiedervereinigung gelangten die Berichte und die Identität zahlreicher IM ans Tageslicht, was zur Aufklärung etlicher menschlicher Tragödien führte. Gleichzeitig zerbrachen viele Freundes- und Paarbeziehungen, nachdem die Spitzeltätigkeit einer der Personen gegen die andere bekannt wurde.

Seit der Wiedervereinigung wird dieser Begriff gelegentlich auch für Personen verwendet, die für andere Geheimdienste arbeiten.

Zahl der inoffiziellen Mitarbeiter

IM-Entwicklung des MfS 1950-1989

Das MfS verfügte über ein Netz aus IMs in allen Bevölkerungsgruppen der DDR. Das Netzwerk der Inoffiziellen Mitarbeiter war ein tragendes Element des Überwachungssystems der DDR, da so auch eine Überwachung von Personenkreisen möglich war, zu denen offen als solche zu erkennende Mitarbeiter der Stasi keinen Zugang gehabt hätten. So gab es IMs in vielen regimekritischen Gruppen und Organisationen, wie etwa in Künstler- und in Kirchenkreisen, so dass der Staat über die meisten Aktivitäten so genannter „feindlich-negativer Personen“ (Stasi-Fachausdruck) informiert war.

Im Laufe seiner Existenz führte das MfS rund 624.000 Menschen als Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter.[3] Ihre Zahl stieg im Kontext innergesellschaftlicher Krisen wie dem 17. Juni 1953, dem Mauerbau oder der deutsch-deutschen Entspannungspolitik sprunghaft an. Mitte der 1970er Jahre erreichte das IM-Netz mit über 200.000 Mitarbeitern seine größte Ausdehnung.[3] Das Einführen einer veränderten IM-Richtlinie zum Ziel einer weiteren Professionalisierung führte Ende der 1970er Jahre zu einer leicht sinkenden Anzahl von Inoffiziellen Mitarbeitern. Zuletzt beschäftigte das MfS noch 173.081 IMs (Stand: 31. Dezember 1988, ohne HV A).[4] 2010 errechnete eine Studie von Helmut Müller-Enbergs für das Jahr 1989 die Zahl von 189.000 inoffiziellen Mitarbeitern.[5] Somit kam auf 89 DDR-Bürger ein IM. Die Verteilung der IM fiel regional unterschiedlich aus. Die größte IM-Dichte wiesen die Bezirke Cottbus, Schwerin und Magdeburg auf, die geringsten Berlin, Halle und Leipzig.[6]

Der überwiegende Teil der Inoffiziellen Mitarbeiter war im Inland tätig. Über den Umfang des IM-Netzes im Ausland liegen nur Einzeldaten vor. So wird geschätzt, dass das MfS (einschließlich der HV A) zuletzt rund 3.000 Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter im „Operationsgebiet“ Bundesrepublik sowie 300 bis 400 IMs im westlichen Ausland beschäftigte.[3] Insgesamt wird die Zahl der Bundesbürger, die im Laufe seines Bestehens im Dienst des MfS standen, auf rund 12.000 geschätzt[3]. Von diesen waren viele ehemalige Bürger der DDR, die im Auftrag der Stasi in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland übersiedelten. Der Großteil dieser IMs war jedoch in der Bundesrepublik geboren und arbeitete aus Sympathie mit der DDR für das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit.[7]

Die IM waren überwiegend männlich (83% der IM in der DDR, 72% der IM in der Bundesrepublik) und gehörten mehrheitlich der SED an (rund jedes 20. Parteimitglied war IM). Besonders stark vertreten war die Gruppe der 25- bis 40-Jährigen (Anteil zwischen 30 und 40%, gegenüber 24% in der gesamten DDR-Bevölkerung), die Zahl der Rentner bzw. unter 25-jährigen war vergleichsweise gering.[8]

Tätigkeit

Bei den Informationen handelte es sich in der Regel um Berichte über das Verhalten von Personen aus dem persönlichen oder beruflichen Umfeld des Inoffiziellen Mitarbeiters. Häufig wurden von Inoffiziellen Mitarbeitern auch engste Freunde und Familienangehörige bespitzelt. Nach der Wende wurden diese Fälle oft enthüllt und führten zur Beendung von Freundschaft oder Ehe. Ein Teil der Inoffiziellen Mitarbeiter handelte aus politischer Überzeugung, andere versprachen sich davon Vergünstigungen, oder sie wurden unter Druck gesetzt. Die Kooperationszeit währte durchschnittlich 6 bis 10 Jahre, konnte in Einzelfällen aber auch wesentlich länger dauern.[9]

Die Binnendifferenzierung zwischen den einzelnen Inoffiziellen Mitarbeitern war wichtig. Zwischen GMS (gesellschaftlicher Mitarbeiter Sicherheit, also dem öffentlich bekannten staatsloyalen Bürger), dem IMB (Informeller Mitarbeiter Beobachtung, für ausländische Nachrichtendienste) und dem IMS (Informeller Mitarbeiter Sicherheit) bestanden große Unterschiede. Unter dem Decknamen eines IM wurden auch Sammelakten geführt, die Berichte und Befragungen von Personen enthielten, die selbst keine IM waren. Dies konnten beispielsweise Nachbarn von sicherheitsrelevanten Objekten sein. Menschen, die vom MfS als hartnäckige politische Gegner eingestuft waren (Feindlich-negative Personen), wurden je nach ihrer Bedeutung mit mehreren angeworbenen IM aus ihrem persönlichen Umfeld überwacht.

IM-Kategorien

In der von 1980 bis 1989 gültigen Richtlinie 1/79 des Ministers für Staatssicherheit, Erich Mielke, wurde die Arbeit der IM geregelt und folgende Kategorien festgelegt:

Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter mit besonderen Aufgaben (IMA)

IMA wurden für „offensive“ Maßnahmen im „Operationsgebiet“ (also der Bundesrepublik) eingesetzt. Vorrangig betraf dies Kontakte zu bundesdeutschen Journalisten, um Informationen in die dortigen Medien zu lancieren. Diese Aufgaben konnten vom IMA dauerhaft, zeitweise oder einmalig durchgeführt werden. Zuletzt verfügte das MfS über 16 bundesdeutsche IMA.[10]

Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter der Abwehr mit Feindverbindung bzw. zur unmittelbaren Bearbeitung im Verdacht der Feindtätigkeit stehender Personen (IMB)

IMB waren besonders bedeutsame IM, die in direktem Kontakt zu vom MfS als feindlich eingestuften Personen standen und deren Vertrauen besaßen. Sie wurden direkt zur Arbeit an Operativen Vorgängen (OV) eingesetzt. Einzelne IMB konnten hierfür auch in die NSW-Staaten reisen, um dort Personen oder Objekte zu beobachten oder auszukundschaften. Zu diesem Zweck wurden sie mit Geheimdienstmaterialien und Devisen ausgestattet. Von besonderem Interesse für das MfS waren hierbei Personen, die oppositionellen Gruppen angehörten oder kirchliche Funktionen bekleideten. Als IMB wurden auch solche Bürger geworben, die für das MfS interessante Beziehungen zu Personen im NSW hatten. Das konnten Mitarbeiter von Vereinen, Organisationen, aber auch von Parteien sein. Interessant waren hierbei Personen, die verwandtschaftliche Beziehungen zu Mitarbeitern der Sicherheitsorgane der Bundesrepublik (beispielsweise in der Polizei, sowie dem Verfassungsschutz oder Bundesnachrichtendienst) hatten. Waren dem MfS solche Verbindungen bekannt, wurde versucht, die Person – ggf. auch mit Druckmitteln – in der DDR anzuwerben. Diese IM-Kategorie entstand 1980 aus der Zusammenlegung der IMF (Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter der inneren Abwehr mit Feindverbindungen zum Operationsgebiet) und IMV (Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter, der unmittelbar an der Bearbeitung und Entlarvung im Verdacht der Feindtätigkeit stehender Personen mitarbeitet). Bis 1968 wurden sie lediglich als Geheime Mitarbeiter (GM) bezeichnet. Zuletzt verfügte das MfS über rund 3.900 IMB.[11]

Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter im besonderen Einsatz (IME)

IME waren IM, die vom MfS für spezielle Aufgaben eingesetzt wurden. Sie besaßen besondere Kenntnisse (beispielsweise Experten-IM für Handschriftenerkennung oder Toxikologen), waren auf Beobachtungen und Ermittlungen spezialisiert oder in Schlüsselpositionen beschäftigt. Bis 1968 wurden sie auch als Geheime Mitarbeiter im besonderen Einsatz (GME) bezeichnet. 1988 beschäftigte das MfS 7.167 IME.[12]

Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter zur Sicherung der Konspiration und des Verbindungswesens (IMK)

IMK wurden vom MfS für verschiedene logistische Aufgaben eingesetzt. Je nach erbrachter Leistung erhielten sie ein zusätzliches Kürzel, welches die Art der Unterstützung näher angab. So erhielten Personen, die dem MfS Konspirative Wohnungen, Zimmer oder Objekte bereitstellten das Kürzel KW bzw. KO. Solche, die dem MfS Deckadressen oder Decktelefone lieferten, wurden als IMK/DA bzw. IMK/DT bezeichnet. Personen, die durch sonstige Sicherheitsleistungen die Konspiration gewährleisteten, erhielten die Bezeichnung IMK/S. 1989 verfügte das MfS über insgesamt 30.500 IMK.[13]

Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter zur politisch-operativen Durchdringung und Sicherung des Verantwortungsbereiches (IMS)

IMS waren in sicherheitsrelevanten Bereichen (Betrieben, gesellschaftliche Einrichtungen, Forschungs- und Bildungsstätten sowie staatliche Institutionen) beschäftigte Personen, die ohne besonderen Anlass über das Verhalten von Personen berichteten. Sie sollten Verdachtsmomenten frühzeitig erkennen, vorbeugend und schadensverhütend wirken und wesentliche Beiträge zur Gewährleistung der inneren Sicherheit in ihrem Verantwortungsbereich leisten. Bis 1968 wurden sie überwiegend unter der Bezeichnung Geheimer Informator (GI) geführt. Mit ihren zuletzt 93.600 Angehörigen bildeten die IMS die größte Kategorie inoffizieller Informanten.[14]

Gesellschaftliche Mitarbeiter für Sicherheit (GMS)

Die GMS waren in leitenden Positionen in der Wirtschaft und Verwaltung tätig und sollten offen „parteilich“ und „staatsbewusst“ auftreten. Sie wurden in der Informationsbeschaffung eingesetzt und sollten die anderen inoffiziellen Mitarbeiter entlasten. In der Regel wurden sie nicht zur direkten „Bearbeitung“ von „feindlich-negativen Personen“ eingesetzt. Gegen Ende des MfS gab es etwa 33.000 GMS.[15]

Führungs-IM (FIM)

Zuverlässige, zur Menschenführung geeignete IM mit „Erfahrung in der operativen Arbeit“ konnten „im Auftrag des MfS … unter Anleitung und Kontrolle eines operativen Mitarbeiters“ IM oder GMS führen. Bei der Auftragsvergabe und Verbindungshaltung konnten sie weitgehend selbstständig operieren. Bis 1968 wurden sie als Geheime Hauptinformatoren (GHI) bezeichnet. Zuletzt existierten 4.591 FIM. Zusätzlich setzte die Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung 26 FIM im Bundesgebiet ein.[16]

IM-Kandidat/IM-Vorlauf

Personen, mit denen zwar Anbahnungsgespräche geführt, die aber noch nicht „aktiviert“ waren, wurden in den Akten als Vorlauf-IM (VL-IM oder V-IM) geführt.[17] Hierzu wurde ein IM-Vorlauf-Vorgang angelegt und zentral erfasst. Oftmals wurden die zu werbenden Personen zuvor einer operativen Personenkontrolle unterzogen. Wenn eine Werbung erfolgsversprechend war, setzte die eigentliche Rekrutierungsphase ein und der IM-Vorlauf in einen regulären IM-Vorgang umgewandelt. Andernfalls wurde der Vorgang abgebrochen und archiviert.[18]

Bei der historischen Aufarbeitung der DDR-Geschichte ist es wiederholt zu Prozessen gegen Autoren gekommen, die ehemalige Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter beim Namen genannt haben. Die deutschen Gerichte haben in diesen Fällen zum Teil widersprüchliche Urteile gefällt. Zuletzt ist im Dezember 2010 „ein ehemaliger Stasi-Spitzel aus Erfurt in zweiter Instanz mit dem Versuch gescheitert, seine namentliche Nennung auf einer Internet-Seite zu unterbinden“.[19]