congress night1
The Senate passed the FY2013 intelligence authorization act on December 28
after most of the controversial provisions intended to combat leaks had
been removed.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
said the bill was revised in order to expedite its passage.

"Since the bill was reported out," she said, "the Committee has received
thoughtful comments from our colleagues, media organizations, and from
organizations that advocate for greater governmental transparency. As a
result of these comments, and technical suggestions received from the
Executive Branch, we have decided to remove ten of the twelve sections in
the title of the original bill that addressed unauthorized disclosures of
classified information so that we might ensure enactment this year of the
important other provisions of the bill."

More precisely, the revision of the bill could be attributed to the
intervention of Sen. Ron Wyden, who all but single-handedly blocked its
enactment after it was approved in Committee last July by a vote of 14-1,
with only Wyden dissenting.  Its passage by the full Congress seemed to be
assured, but in November, Sen. Wyden placed a hold on the bill to prevent
its adoption by unanimous consent.

The provisions that were removed from the final bill included restrictions
on background briefings for the press, limits on media commentary by former
government officials, and authority for the DNI to unilaterally revoke the
pension of a suspected leaker. ("Anti-Leak Measures in Senate Bill Target
Press, Public," Secrecy News, July 31, 2012).

Sen. Wyden opposed most of the anti-leak measures, he explained on
December 21, "because, in my view, they would have harmed first amendment
rights, led to less informed public debate about national security issues,
and undermined the due process rights of intelligence agency employees,
without actually enhancing national security."

He supported the revised intelligence bill, which passed the Senate Friday
on a voice vote.

One of the anti-leak provisions that did remain in the bill (sect. 504)
will require government officials to notify Congress whenever classified
intelligence is disclosed to the press in an authorized manner, other than
through FOIA or other routine processes.  Thus, Congress must be advised
whenever classified intelligence is declassified specifically for the
purpose of disclosure to the media or -- more remarkably -- if it is
disclosed to the press on an authorized basis while still classified.

This is an unprecedented legislative definition (or recognition) of a
category of information that has no explicit basis in executive branch
policy-- namely, authorized disclosures of classified information to an
uncleared member of the press or the public.  ("Can Disclosures of
Classified Information Be Authorized?", Secrecy News, December 19, 2012). 
While disclosures of classified information to the press obviously occur,
the official authorization for such disclosures, if it exists at all, has
always remained tacit.  (There is an exception for life-threatening
emergencies, in which classified information may be disclosed to
first-responders and the like.)

The new provision notably applies to all "government officials," including
White House officials.  It may oblige the Administration either to abstain
from authorized disclosures of classified intelligence to the press, or to
revise its policies to more clearly permit such disclosures, or to somehow
evade the new reporting requirement, perhaps by defining it away.  Thus,
for example, Vice President Dick Cheney stated in 2004 that classified
information could be used "to shape and inform what one says publicly"
without violating prohibitions on disclosure of classified information.

In any case, it will be interesting to see whether the executive branch
notifies Congress of even a single such authorized disclosure to the media
of classified intelligence over the coming year, after which the provision
will sunset (or expire).

"Unfortunately," said Sen. Feinstein, "I am certain that damaging leaks of
classified information will continue, and so the Committee will need to
continue to look for acceptable ways to address this problem."

The revised intelligence bill also backs off from a move to repeal the
requirement for an annual report on security clearances.  The most recent
such annual report provided significant new transparency and insight into
the security clearance system, including the unexpectedly large number of
cleared persons.  ("Security-Cleared Population Tops 4.8 Million," Secrecy
News, July 23, 2012).

The Director of National Intelligence had asked Congress to eliminate this
reporting requirement, and the Committee markup of the bill initially
complied in July.  But in response to concerns expressed by public interest
groups, the final legislation did not include the repeal of the security
clearance reporting requirement.

"I believe we have addressed all of the concerns that have been brought to
our attention by our colleagues and the public," said Sen. Feinstein.


A forthcoming Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule on the physical
protection of radioactive "byproduct materials" -- not including uranium or
plutonium -- is discussed in a new report from the Congressional Research

"The rule will have broad impacts across the country and across most if
not all aspects of industries that use radioactive material, including
hospital and blood bank irradiators, industrial radiography equipment,
massive facilities for irradiating certain foods and medical supplies,
laboratory equipment for research into radiation and its effects, state
regulators, and manufacturers, distributors, and transporters of
radioactive sources. NRC anticipates that the rule will be published in the
Federal Register in early 2013."

See "Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 C.F.R. 37, A New Rule to Protect
Radioactive Material: Background, Summary, Views from the Field," December
14, 2012:

Congress has directed CRS not to make its reports directly available to
the public.

Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

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Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

SECRET-U.S. Army Operation Enduring Freedom Embedded Training Team Handbook



  • 84 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • August 2008


This handbook is written for you, the embedded training team (ETT) member. Traditionally, this mission was reserved for Special Forces’ units or teams. With the revision of Army Field Manual 3.0, Operations, this is now a mission for general purpose forces. The Army has not yet officially designated one organization or agency as the ETT proponent; therefore, information concerning TTs circulates at all levels. This handbook has been vetted by the Joint Center for International Security Forces Assistance, 1st Infantry Division, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned Integration Network.

There are two key facts ETT members must consider:

• Your first 100 days in theater will set the tone for the rest of your tour.
• You will not have much time for professional reading while at the predeployment site. So, if you only read one handbook, we think it should be this one.

The subjects in this handbook are a compilation of the most important topics raised by your predecessors during in theater interviews and redeployment surveys.

Advising and Mentoring

As an embedded training team (ETT) member, you can count on playing the roles of advisor and mentor. Some of you may also be trainers.


• Military advisor: Soldier sent to foreign nations to aid that nation with its military training, organization, and other military tasks.
• Mentor: A trusted friend, counselor, or teacher; usually a more experienced person.

Doctrinally, ETT members conduct an advisory mission; however, within Afghanistan, the use of the term mentor is more readily used by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (e.g., Afghan National Army [ANA], Afghan National Police [ANP], etc.). An effective advisor performs not only the advisory role, but will be a mentor to his counterpart.

Mentor basics

The ANSF unit has much to gain from coalition advisors:

• Coalition funding and equipment (lethal and nonlethal)
• Coalition intelligence
• Coalition effects (lethal and nonlethal)
• Coalition training
• Operational and tactical advice

A great advisor can:

• See solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems.
• Work from the commander’s intent and guidance.
• Orchestrate events to ensure success from behind the scenes (focus on the mission versus seeking personal credit).

A great advisor must:

• Be part diplomat and part warrior.
• Stay aware of local power struggles and how they will affect his organization.
• Attempt to influence ANSF according to long-term interests rather than short-term gains.

A mediocre advisor:

• Does not understand the dynamics of rapport, credibility, and value.
• Is often reduced to liaison roles with counterparts, while liaison officers who understand these dynamics often achieve status similar to advisors or confidantes with counterparts.

Key Skill Areas for Mentoring

The ANA are skillful in:

• Dismounted patrolling
• Combined arms
• Branch-specific skills

The ANP are skillful in:

• Community-oriented policing
• Problem-oriented policing
• Evidence procedures
• Arrests

The Afghan Border Police (ABP) are skillful in:

• Search
• Border rules
• Border checkpoints

Everyone should be skillful in:

• Ethical training
• Combat lifesaver
• Targeting
• Communications
• Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
• Human intelligence
• Planning
• Orders
• Leadership
• De-escalation of force
• Systems
• Civil-military operations

Missions of an ANA Advisor/PMT

Primary missions

Mentor ANA in:

• Leadership, staff, and support functions.
• Planning, assessing, supporting, and executing operations and training.
• Doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Provide ANA access to combat enablers such as:

• Close air support/fires.
• Medical evacuation.
• Quick reaction force (QRF).
• Redundant command and control capability.

Sustain ANA units:

• Monitor ANA pay operations and personnel
• Contract or cash purchase ANA support/sustainment
• Assist ANA forces in forecasting requirements
• Assist ANA forces in planning, developing, and executing sustainment

Other ANA support missions

School house and doctrine (Training and Doctrine Command):

• Develop and execute institutional training programs.
• Synchronize Soldier, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and officer course programs of instruction.
• Update and translate doctrinal and training publications.

Logistical support (logistics task force): Maintain and sustain ANA forces (ANA depot-level support).

Partnership program: Participants with Combined Joint Task Force-101, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, and International Security Assistance Force.

Police mentor team missions

Afghan Uniformed Police PMT:

• Assist and mentor the provincial Community of Police (CoP) in operating, manning, and equipping the Joint Police Command Center.
• Mentor, coordinate, monitor, and support the assigned provincial CoP efforts to conduct authorized Afghan National Auxiliary Police training, sustainment training, and opportunity training.
• Establish close coordination with the provincial reconstruction team/police technical assistance team within your area of responsibility.

Afghan Border Police PMT missions:

• Mentor ABP element in participating in the Joint Regional Command Center (JRCC) process for that headquarters (HQ).
• Mentor, coordinate, monitor, and support the assigned battalion or brigade commander efforts to conduct sustainment training and opportunity training.

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) PMT missions:

• Mentor ANCOP element in participating in the JRCC process for that HQ.
• Provide coordination support to the ANCOP element during cross-boundary/QRF operations.

Other missions for advisor/mentors:

• Presence patrol (day and night)
• Village assessment
• Humanitarian aid
• Traffic checkpoint
• Eradication of suspected or known enemy positions
• Drug eradication
• Cordon and search for weapon cache
• High value target force protection and security escort
• Route/area security
• Joint operation
• Route/area reconnaissance
• Threat investigation

CONFIDENTIAL-NATO Technical Report: Measuring the Effectiveness of Activities


How to Improve your Aim: Measuring the Effectiveness of Activities that Influence Attitudes and Behaviors

  • 100 pages
  • This document should be announced and supplied only to NATO, Government Agencies of NATO nations and their bona fide contractors, and to other recipients approved by the RTO National Coordinators.
  • August 2011


The emphasis of military operations is shifting more and more towards non-kinetic activities, such as Psychological Operations and Information Operations, which are geared towards influencing attitudes and behaviors of specific target audiences. Though many such activities are undertaken, there is little systematic evaluation of the effects they bring about and their effectiveness. As a result, it is not well known what these operations contribute to the overall operation and to what degree they are achieving their goals. The purpose of the Task Group HFM-160 was to develop a systematic approach to the Measurement Of Effectiveness (MOE) of influence operations.

In our approach, we consider MOE to be a process rather than a “thing”; there is no definitive list of MOE or even an overview of best practices. All MOE are custom made for a specific situation. Our approach is a way of thinking about how to assess the effects of what you have done and how effective you have been. MOE is most intuitively suited to influence operations, such as PSYOPS. However, any operation will affect attitudes and behaviors – especially kinetic operations. For this reason, our approach generalizes across the whole operations spectrum: from PSYOPS and CIMIC to the most assertive kinetic activity. Our work takes NATO PSYOPS doctrine (AJP 3.10.1) as a starting point and augments it specifically for MOE. There where we feel existing definitions and procedures are insufficient, we take the liberty to develop our own. Our approach should be seen as a starting point. It is not possible to become an MOE expert in a couple of days after reading about our approach. Furthermore, some activities in the approach, such as statistical analysis, should be supported by knowledgeable individuals; just knowing that something should be done is not the same as being able to do it. The approach was designed for operational and tactical levels working with, commissioning, developing or interpreting MOE for any type of influence activity. They should gain an understanding of the complexity of attitudinal and behavioral MOE, the basics of how to embed MOE in operations and the basics of how to develop MOE such that it yields the desired – or at least useful – information.

The most important key concepts in the HFM-160 approach to MOE are: effects and effectiveness. Effects refer to changes in the environment, potentially brought about by your actions, though other forces may lead to the observed effects. Effectiveness refers to the degree to which your actions are responsible for bringing about the desired effects. Effects can be seen as a goal in and of themselves; what causes the effects is relatively unimportant as long as the effects are manifested. In terms of effectiveness, how the change comes about is key. It is not enough that change has occurred; you must gain insight into the cause of this change: either your actions or something else.

2.2.1 Effects

Every operation conducted is geared towards realizing a particular effect. In terms of kinetic activities, this may be to diminish the adversary’s fire power or limit their mobility. In operations geared towards attitudinal and behavioral change, it may be to create support within the local population or something more tangible such as collecting firearms in civilians’ possession. In all cases, the goal is to change something through your actions. Any change resulting from any operation may be identified as an effect. Though hopefully the effect you want is what changes, an effect may also be unwanted or unintended. Effects may be positive or negative. They may also be material, attitudinal or behavioral.