MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN ERICH HONECKER AND KIM IL SUNG

North Korea cables reveal East Germany′s deep-rooted suspicion of Kim  regime | In Depth | DW | 08.02.2018

May 31, 1984
Memorandum of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung

E. Honecker used the meeting to address some issues that could not be addressed in greater detail during the official talks on 30 May 1984 due to time constraints.

He stated that the GDR is currently preoccupied with its 35th anniversary. The Party, which has 2.2 million members, is making thorough preparations for the 35th anniversary. The centerpiece is the ideological work, which has led to intense talks with practically every citizen of the GDR.

He said that, as Kim Il Sung could see for himself, the Party is bound to the masses, and there is a good trusting relationship between the Party and the masses. The alliance policy is very important, that is, cooperation with allied Parties, the role of organizations of the masses such as the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions, with 9 million members, the Free German Youth, with 2.3 million members, and the whole range of other organizations of the masses.

He said that the election results of 6 May 1984 could be considered the best in the history of the GDR, both in terms of the election itself and in terms of voter turnout, and attests to the successful policies of the Party and government in carrying out the resolutions of the X Party Congress.

He stated that the Socialist competition in honor of the 35th Anniversary of the GDR is very important. The workers have established as their goal for this to increase productivity by one percent above what is planned. Given the results thus far it can be expected that they will surpass this goal in the competition. Thus net industrial production in the first 5 months of 1984 increased by 7.9 percent. Productivity in the field of industrial ministries increased by 7 percent during the same period. This demonstrates the excellent initiative of the citizens of [line cut off].

He stated that the fact that 6 million citizens received new apartments between 1971 and 1983 alone was very positive for consolidating trust between the Party and the masses. Now the goal is to improve the residential conditions of an additional 4.3 million citizens between 1984 and 1990. Then the issue of apartments in the GDR as a social problem would be resolved in 1990. In addition, there are a number of other measures in the realm of social policy, e.g., the recent resolutions on improving material conditions for families with more than 3 children and the third increase in minimum pensions since 1971.

E. Honecker detailed the activities of organizations of the masses such as the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions, the Free German Youth, the Association of Gardeners and Animal Breeders, the reinvigorated Association for Mutual Farmers Assistance, the scientific institutes of the GDR, the academies and schools of higher education, the development of the general polytechnical school, the activities of artists unions, and much more.

All of this, he said, is going on in our country under conditions that are open to the world, as he had already expressed in 1977, that is, under the immediate observation of the Western adversary’s electronic media. Naturally there are a few people who listen to these broadcasters and their daily lies, but it should not be overlooked that the vast majority of citizens of the GDR, one could even say, the people, stand fast and unalterably with the Party and government, with their republic.

E. Honecker then asked Kim Il Sung his assessment of the situation in China and of the current leadership of the Communist Party of China based on his own experience. For the USSR and also for the GDR and other socialist countries that do not have Party relations with China, China is a country about whose future course there are still many unresolved questions, for instance, as a result of the Reagan visit.

Kim Il Sung responded as follows. When Hu Yaobang visited our country in May, I also told him about my upcoming trip to the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries. He welcomed it. I had not known Hu Yaobang before this. On the other hand, I have been friends with Deng Xiaoping for a long time. As you know, he was exiled three times during the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping paid me an unofficial visit for my 70th birthday in April 1982 to introduce Hu Yaobang to me as the new Secretary General of the Communist Party of China. He made a good impression on me from the beginning.

Hu Yaobang told me that he wants to improve governmental relations with the Soviet Union. He asked me to convey this to the leadership of the Soviet Union. Hu Yaobang assured me many times during our lengthy discussion that China is truly interested in improving relations with the Soviet Union. He confirmed this to me again this year. The leadership of the Communist Party of China is of one mind on this issue. He asked me to convey my thoughts on this to our Soviet comrades.

During his visit to the DPRK, he received news that Comrade Arkhipov’s planned visit to the People’s Republic of China would be pushed back. Comrade Hu Yaobang told me that he had very much been looking forward to this visit. Our Chinese comrades also think highly of Comrade Arkhipov. He used to be an economic advisor in China. Comrade Hu Yaobang said that he very much regretted that Comrade Arkhipov’s trip would be pushed back.

I told Comrade Chernenko about this during my meetings with him. I told our Soviet comrades my thoughts both in a personal meeting with Comrade Chernenko and in official negotiations — that the Chinese really want to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The Chinese do not want war. Overcoming the consequences of the Cultural Revolution in the economy and in the standard of living of the population requires a lot of time and effort. All resources must be devoted to this. The Chinese are not developing relations with the US and Japan with the goal of working against another country.

Given the complex world situation, I hope that the Soviet Union and China work things out. I believe that the development of relations with the US is not targeted against the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai already told me that when they established relations with the US. They told us every time they met with Japan and the US. The only objective of these relations is to obtain developed technology and credit from Japan and the US. Deng Xiaoping is said to have stated in the US that the arms build-up in the US is good for peace. I don’t know if that’s so. This is the first time I have heard of Deng Xiaoping expressing a sentiment like that.

It is a fact that the Chinese have improved governmental relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The number of delegations exchanged has grown, as well. All of this can help to reduce the mistrust between the Soviet Union and China. Naturally, I was not able to tell Comrade Chernenko that I think it is a mistake to push back Comrade Arkhipov’s visit to China. I just told him that the Chinese regret it. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Com-munist Party of China has 5 members. Two of them—Wu Xueqian and Li Xiannian— used to be friends with Comrade Arkhipov. Today they are both powerful. Comrade Arkhipov could build trust in meetings with these two men.

Hu Yaobang told me the following: We sent the Deputy Prime Minister to Comrade Andropov’s funeral. During the welcoming meeting, his escort told him that he could meet with anyone he wanted. As is customary with East Asians, he said that he would accommodate himself to whatever his host had arranged. Our Soviet comrades did not understand this correctly. There were meetings with just anyone. Only the Foreign Minister attended Brezhnev’s burial. They were sending a message to the Soviet Union by sending the deputy prime minister. But this was not understood.

Kim Il Sung said that he believed that all socialist nations should work toward creating trust between the Soviet Union and China. No new mistrust must be permitted to arise. I have told our Soviet comrades that I believe that the goal of our Chinese comrades is to put Socialism in China in order. They don’t want a conflict. I think it is important that China wants to open the gate to socialist nations in the interest of socialist modernization. We should not oppose that. Why should we leave the important Chinese market to the capitalists?

The old generation of leadership in China is dying out. We should show the new generation an opening. If we leave China to the capitalists, there is the risk that China will become a quasi-colony again. We should not close the door in China’s face.

Because of our position—the length of our border with China, confrontation with the US and Japan—what we are most afraid of is that China will not stick with socialism. There are 1 billion people in China. We have to make sure that they follow the socialist path rather than some other path. We have to focus on drawing them toward us. In the past there were major anti-Soviet campaigns in China. This is not the case anymore. During the Cultural Revolution there were major propaganda actions against us on the Yalu. There were provocations in North Korea at the time of the Chinese/Soviet conflicts on the Ussuri in 1969. While I was recuperating in the country, I received a call from our Minister of State Security that Chinese troops were crossing the Tumen [River] onto our territory. I gave the order not to shoot, but to let them come ahead so that we could take them on our territory, if necessary. We sent a group of soldiers there. Then the Chinese withdrew. The Chinese have castigated the Soviet Union and even us as revisionists. It lasted about 5 years in our case, and we had to keep our peace because of our situation. We had to be patient.

China has new leadership now. They don’t want any conflict with the Soviet Union. They want peaceful co-existence with the US, Japan, India, and even the Soviet Union. There are still no Party relations between the Soviet Union and China. We should all try to use our governmental relations to create an atmosphere that promotes the restoration of Party relations, even between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. I ask that you, Comrade Honecker, recommend to our Soviet comrades that they send Comrade Arkhipov to China and furthermore that they begin exchanging delegations. I am convinced that China would never put herself on the side of the US against the Soviet Union. All socialist countries should develop economic ties to China, and should even invest in China. The Chinese wanted to speak to Comrade Arkhipov about opportunities to cooperate in modernizing the numerous plants built by the Soviet Union. I told Hu Yaobang that I would ask the Soviet Union about building a nuclear power plant. Hu Yaobang welcomed this, because it would be better than purchasing one from a capitalist country.

Regarding the incidents on the Chinese/Vietnamese border that you mentioned, which you do not approve of, which you regret, I have only the Chinese press accounts to go by. I know nothing of what actually happened. I consider it very regrettable, because these incidents help neither the Vietnamese nor the Chinese. They do damage to our common tasks, above all bringing the Chinese closer to us. All socialist countries should urge the two great powers to hold out their hands to one another.

Hu Yaobang has gathered a lot of new people around him. Hu Qili, who in the past was with the World Federation of Democratic Youth—he knows many people from the past, including you, Comrade Honecker. The current Foreign Minister was also involved in the youth organization in the past. There are many other people around Hu Yaobang who used to work in the youth organization. Hu Yaobang himself is still very healthy; he is smart, his theoretical knowledge is good, and he has also made a thorough study of Marxism. Deng Xiaoping works more from behind the scene, but he also believes that they have to develop relations with the Soviet Union. He is the only one of the old functionaries who is still there. I am his friend. In the past the Chinese castigated the Soviet Union as social imperialists. They don’t do that any more.

I met Comrade Chernenko for the first time [line cut off]

… I knew him well. He has been to Korea three times. He sent me a personal letter immediately after he was elected. I promised him that I would come to the Soviet Union quickly so that I could travel to the GDR immediately afterwards. But that had to be postponed due to Comrade Andropov’s illness. Since I have just gotten to known Comrade Chernenko, I did not know how far I could go with him during our talks. I ask you, Comrade Honecker, to discuss all of these issues with him when you meet. How good it would be for all of us if the Soviet Union and China would reconcile. Japanese journalists have frequently asked my opinion on Sino-Soviet relations. I always said that they are both socialist countries and they therefore belong together. Both the Soviet Union and China are our comrades-in-arms.

To E. Honecker’s inquiry about the nature of the group of Koreans living in Japan, Kim Il Sung stated that this was a group formed by the DPRK. We support relations between this group and socialist countries, including the GDR.

Hu Yaobang, Kim Il Sung continued, had me briefed in great detail on his trip to Japan. I support normalization of relations between China and Japan. There are those in Japan who aspire to reviving militarism and the alliance with the US. But Japan in general can have no interest in re-militarization for economic reasons. All of Japan’s mass organizations oppose militarization. Much depends on which people are in power. I asked Hu Yaobang about his talks with Nakasone. He told me that Nakasone said that Japan will not become cannon fodder for the Americans. It can’t dissociate itself from the US, but does not want to become a lackey of the US. We should all think about that. For the future it could be important whether Nakasone remains prime minister or whether Abe becomes prime minister. In China the Chinese have been courting Abe because they think he would be the better choice. We have to work with the Japanese in a way that ensures that militarism does not recur. I sometimes make harsh statements against Japanese militarism, but we have to work with them anyway. Above all we oppose the US/Japan/South Korea trilateral military alliance. The Japanese have promised the Chinese $2 billion in credit. This is good for the Chinese economy.

I would like to address the socialist market, but today we have no more time.

North Koreas Dictator Kim Jong-un Possibly Dead

What Happens If North Korea Collapses?

Reports of North Korean tyrant Kim Jong Un’s demise or perpetual weakening might be enormously overstated, yet the secret of his whereabouts and condition powers the world to think about what as a North Korean progression emergency would resemble. All things considered, the Kim family system seems unassailable, yet whatever is going on to the pioneer raises the phantom of a questionable exchange of intensity with not a single clear beneficiary to be found. In the event that groups go head to head, an awful inside clash is sure, and a common war not incomprehensible. With North Korea’s atomic and ballistic rocket destinations conceivably falling under the control of whoever acts most rapidly, Asia could confront an uncommon atomic emergency.

Of these known questions, one stands apart most importantly: Could any shortcoming in the Kim system initiate China to attempt to affirm authority over Pyongyang? In the event that emergency rises to circumstance, at that point it is just reasonable to consider how Chinese President Xi Jinping may see making an intense move to reshape the provincial level of influence. An effective intercession by Beijing would forever change the geopolitical guide of East Asia, detaching Japan and diminishing U.S. power in the district.

This is the most risky second for the three-age Kim system in decades. A few reports guarantee that Kim Jong Un either had crisis heart medical procedure or is in a vegetative state, and that Beijing has just sent a group of clinical specialists to help. The tyrant has not been found out in the open for quite a long time and missed a few prominent occasions, including the nation’s primary national occasion, which commends the introduction of his granddad and author of the system, Kim Il Sung.

Kim Jong-un: North Korea investigates fake 'death' video | NT News

Kim is just 36 years of age, however has barely been the image of good wellbeing. Hefty, frequently captured smoking cigarettes, and prone to appreciate the equivalent sensual way of life of his dad, he has been a prime possibility for a wellbeing emergency. And keeping in mind that the North Korean state media demands the nation has no coronavirus cases, it can’t be precluded that the incomparable pioneer is a survivor of the pandemic.

Coming to control in late 2011 after the passing of his dad, Kim Jong Il, Kim heartlessly united his position. Named beneficiary just the year prior to the senior Kim passed on, the little-realized replacement executed his amazing master Beijing uncle, Jang Song Thaek, and later apparently had a relative killed in Malaysia. His own kids are as yet youthful, leaving a hole in who might take over as ruler or official. In the event that he is undoubtedly crippled, it might be taking a long time for the system to recognize the reality decisively as a result of off camera plots.

A force battle is in this manner a totally conceivable situation, regardless of whether Kim is dead or debilitated. His sister, Kim Yo Jong, has been brought to approach second-up in order status, however she is just 32 years of age—and whether North Korea’s man centric framework would acknowledge a lady as incomparable pioneer is obscure. Top military officials may choose to introduce a manikin or battle among themselves for predominance. Outcasts’ absence of information about the elements of intensity in North Korea makes surveying any of this troublesome.

Kim’s obvious clinical emergency offers Beijing the first genuine open door in quite a while to reinforce its hand over Pyongyang.

Kim’s clear clinical emergency offers Beijing the first genuine open door in quite a while to reinforce its hand over Pyongyang.

Regardless of whether Kim returns tomorrow, the inquiries over his wellbeing and the system’s attachment will unquestionably cause the Chinese Communist Party to consider in the event that it may be a perfect time to move in.

Kim has had a full connection with Xi, purportedly rejecting numerous solicitations to meet until acquiescing in March 2018, a couple of months before his pathbreaking highest point with U.S. President Donald Trump. Pyongyang’s freedom is unbelievable; its fruitful atomic and ballistic rocket programs make the maverick state significantly progressively impervious to outside weight.

The chance to tie North Korea all the more firmly to China and keep up it as a cushion state confronting U.S. partners South Korea and Japan would be a geopolitical blessing to Xi. Recovering the impact Beijing lost in Pyongyang with the execution of Jang would be another motivation to make a move. Also, South Korea’s political left is ascendant after administrative triumphs this month, and President Moon Jae-in has developed his nation’s ties with Beijing. To put it plainly, the patterns have been increasingly propitious for a sensational development of Chinese force on the Korean Peninsula.

Applying political control through financial force is one course for Beijing. Another, increasingly troublesome way would be a real physical move into North Korea. In a world diverted by the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing may well take a strong risk to mediate in North Korea for the sake of harmony and request, as far as anyone knows to forestall an administration breakdown and helpful emergency. Suborning North Korean military pioneers based close to the Chinese outskirt would ease entry toward Pyongyang, alongside making manages system insiders previously. Making sure about atomic and rocket destinations, apparently to guarantee soundness, would solidify Beijing’s command over the Kim system. A flexible customer state, maybe even headed by Kim’s sister, would normally follow.

The geopolitical ramifications of Beijing’s power over North Korea would be huge. Given the probability that Chinese maritime and aviation based armed forces units could be available in North Korea, Chinese and American powers would confront each other over the Demilitarized Zone. That would make the U.S. partnership with South Korea substantially more troublesome. With both weight and incitements from Beijing, Seoul could even choose to put its support behind China.With both weight and promptings from Beijing, Seoul could even choose to put its support behind China; given Moon’s leanings and an endemic enemy of Americanism in South Korea, that ought not be incomprehensible. Beijing could kill any Southern resistance to diminished or disavowed Washington by promising to assist Seoul with implementing its power over the Liancourt Rocks, a gathering of little islets held by South Korea, which alludes to them as Dokdo, and furthermore asserted by Japan, which alludes to them as Takeshima. The Chinese naval force would along these lines access the vital Korea Strait, which associates the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea, helping Beijing overwhelm Asia’s indispensable internal waters.

That, thusly, would leave Japan separated in Northeast Asia, confronting a Chinese-overwhelmed Korean Peninsula and with minimal decision yet to drastically expand its military spending plan, maybe including the atomic choice. Tokyo would likewise squeeze Washington to keep up a dependable military ability in the district.

Understand More

This image, taken on July 4, 2017, and discharged by North Korea’s legitimate Korean Central News Agency, shows North Korean pioneer Kim Jong Un (focus) commending the fruitful test fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 at an undisclosed area.

3 Scenarios for Kim Jong Un’s Mysterious Absence

The United States and South Korea ought to be prepared to participate whether Kim is dead, wiped out, or going to return.

With U.S. what’s more, Chinese maritime and aviation based armed forces immeasurably nearer to one another, the potential for a mishap or an erroneous conclusion prompting a furnished experience would increment exponentially. Washington would either need to acknowledge a lot more serious hazard or choose to decrease its quality. Calls would develop at home to diminish strains with Beijing, which would be cultivated most effectively by receiving a supposed seaward adjusting technique, which would keeping up availability however pull back U.S. powers in the district.

None of this may happen this time. Be that as it may, political life in Pyongyang will stay unsure regardless of whether Kim returns. In the event that a progression emergency occurred, alternatives for the United States would be restricted, however Washington will in any case need an arrangement to counter any potential moves by China into North Korea.

Upgraded knowledge is required to give early notification of China’s military movement or political intrigues in Pyongyang; working with South Korean insight will be crucial. Close political discussion with Seoul is likewise expected to keep Moon focused on the U.S.- South Korean union, just like a battle focused on general conclusion in the South, which is as worried about Chinese force for what it’s worth about the United States’. Not to no end do the South Koreans frequently portray themselves as “minnows among whales.”

Past the promontory, more profound arranging with Japan for resistance and prevention is similarly as significant, so as to console Tokyo about the United States’ proceeding with nearness. Guaranteeing there is no drawdown of battle prepared U.S. powers in the district, and that they are outfitted with the most developed U.S. weapons frameworks, is an essential. Most importantly, U.S. ambassadors must clarify to their Chinese partners that the United States’ purpose to guarantee a free and open Indo-Pacific stays unaltered, regardless of whether Kim were to run for another 50 years.

Kid’s shows, Erotica And Other Odd Diversions Of History’s Most Ruthless Men – Kim Jong-il Was A Fanboy For Michael Jordan

Kim Jong-il is listed (or ranked) 4 on the list Cartoons, Erotica And Other Bizarre Hobbies Of History's Most Brutal Leaders

Legendary golfer and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il was something of a human rights violation virtuoso. The ham-shaped leader oversaw plenty of atrocities in his time at the helm in Pyongyang, including ethnic cleansing and mass starvation.

But he also adored basketball. His favorite player, naturally, was Michael Jordan, who appeared in the Warner Brothers film Space Jam, which featured several cartoons he also obsessed over like a very normal person. Kim Jong-il was in fact such a fan of His Royal Airness that he had VHS recordings of every one of Jordan’s games. The Great Leader, sadly, never got to meet his hero, but his son sort of came close with Dennis Rodman’s famed trip to North Korea.

U.S. Army Report About North Korea – TOP SECRET

Executive Summary

A North Korean regular infantry division is the most likely type of division a US unit would face on the Korean peninsula. While the Korean People’s Army (KPA) fields armor and mechanized units, the number of regular infantry units far exceeds the other types (pg 3).
KPA offensive operations include the heavy use of artillery with chemical munitions; a primary focus of attacks on combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), and command and control (C2) units; and deep operations conducted by KPA special-purpose forces (SPF) (pgs 3–4, 11–16, 21–23).
KPA defensive operations focus on the elimination of enemy armor through the heavy use of artillery; battalion, regiment, and division antitank kill zones; and the use of counterattack forces at all levels above battalion-sized units (pgs 16–19, 23–26).
While US forces will face KPA conventional infantry to their front, KPA SPF will initiate offensive operations in the US/South Korean rear areas to create a “second front” (pgs 15–16).
KPA regular forces and SPF will remain in place to conduct stay-behind annihilation ambushes on CS, CSS, and C2 units passing through the passed unit’s area of operations (pg 25).
The KPA divisions are already prepared to fight US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces today. The vehicles and equipment may be different in the future, but their tactics and techniques will be similar to those used today (pgs 10–26).
Since 2003, the KPA has created seven divisions that are specialized to operate in urban and mountain terrain using irregular warfare techniques. It is expected that the KPA will use several techniques deemed successful in Afghanistan and Iraq against US/ROK forces (pg 20).
TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) is the source of the threat tactics series of products. The Threat Tactics Report: North Korea versus the United States (US) and the other similar products serve to describe the foreign nation’s most common combat division with an order of battle, its offensive and defensive doctrine as articulated in its manuals or recent military actions, and an analysis of how this actor would fight if facing the US in the future.

This document is intended primarily for US Army training organizations, but will be applicable across the wider community of US Army Combatant Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and allied partners.

North Korean Infantry Division Major Weapon Systems

The KPA uses a variety of primarily Tier 2, 3, and 4 equipment in its units, as it rarely disposes of any weapons. The best units receive new(er) weapons and their systems are then cascaded through the lower-quality units. Some of the KPA’s weapons and vehicles date back to World War II. Units will attempt to field the same type of weapon systems to reduce logistical issues. The following are some of the major weapons found in a KPA infantry division or infantry regiment.

The KPA prefers the offense over the defense and will stay on the defensive only until it can gather the strength to attack again. The KPA will attempt to avoid US/ROK combat units and will attempt to attack CS, CSS, and C2 units and vulnerable high-value targets in the rear areas in order to reduce the effectiveness of the US/ROK combat units. With assistance in creating a second front via the KPA SPF making these attacks in the US/ROK rear areas, the KPA believes the US/ROK combat units will become combat ineffective, making them vulnerable to KPA follow-on forces.

When forced to go on the defensive the KPA will concentrate its efforts in eliminating its enemy’s tanks. Any units bypassed by enemy forces are directed to continue to fight as a unit or, if the unit becomes combat ineffective, the soldiers are expected by their leaders to continue resistance by conducting irregular warfare operations against any enemy units in their area. Prepared UGFs exist throughout North Korea, especially within 50 miles of the DMZ. If forced on the defensive in these areas, the KPA will fight from these previously prepared positions.

US/ROK units will face intense indirect fire including chemical munitions, conventional KPA units to their front, and SPF elements in their rear areas. US/ROK units will need to simultaneously defeat the KPA divisions attacking their combat units, while defending all units from KPA SPF or stay-behind forces in their rear areas.

TOP SECRET – U.S. Army Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

TOP SECRET – U.S. Army Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

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The Korean peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the US in the Pacific Command (PACOM), and many observers note that North Korea is an unpredictable and potentially volatile actor. According to the Department of Defense in its report to Congress and the intelligence community, the DPRK “remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” Some of the latest evidence of irrational behavior is the elevation of Kim Jong Un’s 26-year old sister to a high governmental post late in 2014, the computer hacking of the Sony Corporation supposedly by North Korea during late 2014 over the possible release of a film that mocked Kim Jong Un, and the April 2015 execution of a defense chief for allegedly nodding off during a meeting. Over the past 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its enemies, especially South Korea. These actions included attacks on South Korean naval vessels, the capturing of a US ship and holding American hostages for 11 months, the hijacking of a South Korean airline jet, electronic warfare against South Korean signals including global positioning satellites (GPS), and assassinations or attempted assassinations on South Korean officials including the ROK president. The attempted 1968 Blue House Raid by North Korean elite military personnel resulted in the death or capture of all 31 infiltrators involved in the assassination attempt as well as the death of 71 personnel, including three Americans, and the injury of 66 others as the North Korean SPF personnel attempted to escape back to DPRK territory.

The purpose of this North Korean Threat Tactics Report (TTR) is to explain to the Army training community how North Korea fights including its doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, and the warfighting functions. A TTR also identifies where the conditions specific to the actor are present in Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues.

Executive Summary

  • North Korea is an oligarchy with Kim Jong Un as its supreme leader.
  • The DPRK is a militaristic society with about 1.2 million active duty personnel in uniform out of a population of 24 million with another 7.7 million in the reserve forces.
  • All military personnel serve under the umbrella of the Korean People’s Army (KPA); the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) and Korean People’s Navy (KPN) primarily support the KPA ground forces.
  • The KPAF focuses on homeland defense and close air support to the KPA.
  • The KPN’s primary mission is to protect the North Korean coastline and support the KPA special purpose forces (SPF) in mission execution.
  • Much of the equipment in all military branches is old and obsolete, but the KPA has concentrated its modernization efforts on missile technology that may provide the means to successfully launch a nuclear warhead.
  • North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon and is modernizing its missile fleet in order to increase the attack range for its nuclear arsenal.
  • North Korea possesses both chemical and biological weapons.
  • The KPA practices both passive and active camouflage to hide its units, headquarters, and other important resources from the air.

Weaknesses

Although the North Korean military may feature some positive attributes as a fighting force, the KPA also suffers from many weaknesses as well. Much of the military’s equipment is old and obsolete. The North Korean military consciously refuses to rid itself of any equipment and still operate tanks that date back to World War II. This wide range of military hardware from many generations of warfare also generates logistical issues. The KPA’s supply personnel must not only find the spare parts for a large variety of equipment, the KPA maintenance personnel must be well-versed in the repair of a great assortment of vehicles and weapons. In addition, the DPRK lacks the logistical capability to support the KPA beyond a few months. Due to the shortage of fuel and the cost to operate vehicles for a cash-strapped country, many of the KPA soldiers find themselves involved in public works projects or helping farmers bring in their rice crops. Any time spent in non-military support is less time that the KPA soldiers can spend training for combat. Even the mechanized and armor forces, due to resource restraints, spend much of their training time doing light infantry training instead of mounted operations. While KPA soldiers may be well trained in individual skills or small unit tactics, the amount of time spent on larger exercises pales in comparison to most Western militaries. Without adequate time and resources to practice large scale military operations, the KPA will always face a steep learning curve when the KPA is forced to perform them in actual combat for the first time.

The DPRK’s unorthodox use of provocation in order to obtain concessions from its enemies—especially the US, South Korea, and Japan—is a danger. One never knows what North Korea will do next as, in the past, the DPRK has sanctioned assassination attempts on South Korean political leaders and conducted bombings when South Korean contingents are in another country, unannounced attacks on ships by submarines, unprovoked artillery attacks, or has tunneled underground into another country. US military personnel stationed in South Korea must be prepared for the unexpected from the DPRK.

One of these incidents could ignite the Korean peninsula back into a full-blown war. While an armistice has been in place since 1953, an armistice is just a ceasefire waiting for a peace treaty to be signed or for the resumption of hostilities. Any conflict between North and South Korea would inevitably bring the US into the conflict as the ROK has been an ally for over six decades.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and the missiles to transport it up to 9,650 km makes it a threat to US forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Alaska, or even the west coast of the continental United States. Even more concerning was the DPRK’s first successful test launch of a KN-11 missile from a submarine on 23 January 2015 since, in the near future, the North Korean submarines could silently move closer to their targets before launching a nuclear missile that would give the US less warning time. If the DPRK thought that the survival of its country or the Kim regime was at stake, North Korea might use any nuclear weapons at its disposal. The KPA also possesses chemical weapons and its doctrine calls for their employment. The DPRK is also involved in biological weapons research and would likely use those with offensive capabilities. US military personnel training for deployment to South Korea must be prepared to fight in a chemical, biological, or nuclear environment.

EXPOSED – U.S. Army Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

EXPOSED – U.S. Army Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

The Korean peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the US in the Pacific Command (PACOM), and many observers note that North Korea is an unpredictable and potentially volatile actor. According to the Department of Defense in its report to Congress and the intelligence community, the DPRK “remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” Some of the latest evidence of irrational behavior is the elevation of Kim Jong Un’s 26-year old sister to a high governmental post late in 2014, the computer hacking of the Sony Corporation supposedly by North Korea during late 2014 over the possible release of a film that mocked Kim Jong Un, and the April 2015 execution of a defense chief for allegedly nodding off during a meeting. Over the past 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its enemies, especially South Korea. These actions included attacks on South Korean naval vessels, the capturing of a US ship and holding American hostages for 11 months, the hijacking of a South Korean airline jet, electronic warfare against South Korean signals including global positioning satellites (GPS), and assassinations or attempted assassinations on South Korean officials including the ROK president. The attempted 1968 Blue House Raid by North Korean elite military personnel resulted in the death or capture of all 31 infiltrators involved in the assassination attempt as well as the death of 71 personnel, including three Americans, and the injury of 66 others as the North Korean SPF personnel attempted to escape back to DPRK territory.

The purpose of this North Korean Threat Tactics Report (TTR) is to explain to the Army training community how North Korea fights including its doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, and the warfighting functions. A TTR also identifies where the conditions specific to the actor are present in Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues.

Executive Summary

North Korea is an oligarchy with Kim Jong Un as its supreme leader.
The DPRK is a militaristic society with about 1.2 million active duty personnel in uniform out of a population of 24 million with another 7.7 million in the reserve forces.
All military personnel serve under the umbrella of the Korean People’s Army (KPA); the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) and Korean People’s Navy (KPN) primarily support the KPA ground forces.
The KPAF focuses on homeland defense and close air support to the KPA.
The KPN’s primary mission is to protect the North Korean coastline and support the KPA special purpose forces (SPF) in mission execution.
Much of the equipment in all military branches is old and obsolete, but the KPA has concentrated its modernization efforts on missile technology that may provide the means to successfully launch a nuclear warhead.
North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon and is modernizing its missile fleet in order to increase the attack range for its nuclear arsenal.
North Korea possesses both chemical and biological weapons.
The KPA practices both passive and active camouflage to hide its units, headquarters, and other important resources from the air.

Weaknesses

Although the North Korean military may feature some positive attributes as a fighting force, the KPA also suffers from many weaknesses as well. Much of the military’s equipment is old and obsolete. The North Korean military consciously refuses to rid itself of any equipment and still operate tanks that date back to World War II. This wide range of military hardware from many generations of warfare also generates logistical issues. The KPA’s supply personnel must not only find the spare parts for a large variety of equipment, the KPA maintenance personnel must be well-versed in the repair of a great assortment of vehicles and weapons. In addition, the DPRK lacks the logistical capability to support the KPA beyond a few months. Due to the shortage of fuel and the cost to operate vehicles for a cash-strapped country, many of the KPA soldiers find themselves involved in public works projects or helping farmers bring in their rice crops. Any time spent in non-military support is less time that the KPA soldiers can spend training for combat. Even the mechanized and armor forces, due to resource restraints, spend much of their training time doing light infantry training instead of mounted operations. While KPA soldiers may be well trained in individual skills or small unit tactics, the amount of time spent on larger exercises pales in comparison to most Western militaries. Without adequate time and resources to practice large scale military operations, the KPA will always face a steep learning curve when the KPA is forced to perform them in actual combat for the first time.

The DPRK’s unorthodox use of provocation in order to obtain concessions from its enemies—especially the US, South Korea, and Japan—is a danger. One never knows what North Korea will do next as, in the past, the DPRK has sanctioned assassination attempts on South Korean political leaders and conducted bombings when South Korean contingents are in another country, unannounced attacks on ships by submarines, unprovoked artillery attacks, or has tunneled underground into another country. US military personnel stationed in South Korea must be prepared for the unexpected from the DPRK.

One of these incidents could ignite the Korean peninsula back into a full-blown war. While an armistice has been in place since 1953, an armistice is just a ceasefire waiting for a peace treaty to be signed or for the resumption of hostilities. Any conflict between North and South Korea would inevitably bring the US into the conflict as the ROK has been an ally for over six decades.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and the missiles to transport it up to 9,650 km makes it a threat to US forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Alaska, or even the west coast of the continental United States. Even more concerning was the DPRK’s first successful test launch of a KN-11 missile from a submarine on 23 January 2015 since, in the near future, the North Korean submarines could silently move closer to their targets before launching a nuclear missile that would give the US less warning time. If the DPRK thought that the survival of its country or the Kim regime was at stake, North Korea might use any nuclear weapons at its disposal. The KPA also possesses chemical weapons and its doctrine calls for their employment. The DPRK is also involved in biological weapons research and would likely use those with offensive capabilities. US military personnel training for deployment to South Korea must be prepared to fight in a chemical, biological, or nuclear environment.

 

World War 3 threat: Hawaii ‘prepares for North Korea nuclear attack’ |

World War 3 threat: Hawaii ‘prepares for North Korea nuclear attack’ |

Authorities held a secret meeting last week to discuss contingency plans in the event of Pyongyang launching a deadly missile at the US islands.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has threatened to drop a hydrogen bomb over the Pacific Ocean amid fears Pyongyang has developed a nuclear missile capable of reaching Hawaii.

A document shared at the private talks, and obtained by local paper Honolulu Civil Beat, featured chapter headings such as “Enhance missile launch notification process between U.S. Pacific Command and the State Warning Point.”

The US state, in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, will also begin testing a warning siren system in November, giving residents between 12 and 15 minutes to take refuge.

Resident wil then be advised to stay indoors for 72 hours after an attack.

State representative Gene Ward told the Washington Post: “Now it’s time to take it seriously.”

He said the plan was “not to be an alarmist but to be informing people.”

Mr Ward said the meeting last week was held in private because officials did not want to worry residents.

He also said talk of bunkers and fallout shelters was “probably more surreal for younger generations” with no experience of a realistic nuclear threat.

But Hawaiians are apparently taking the news in their stride, and carrying on with their daily lives.

Residents are used to disaster warnings, living in an area prone to hurricanes and tsunamis.

Survival guidelines for those scenarios are similar to the ones being issued for a nuclear attack – instead of seven days worth of food, water and medical supplies, residents are advised to double it.

The document distrubted at last week’s meeting suggested that around 90 per cent of the Hawaiian population would survive a nuclear attack by North Korea, based on the estimated yield of North Korea’s missile capability, which suggests an explosion less than eight miles in diameter.

It comes as America’s top military officer said despite an escalation in rhetoric between the US and North Korea, he had not seen Pyongyang change it’s military posture.

Marine General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing for his reappointment: “While the political space is clearly very charged right now, we haven’t seen a change in the posture of North Korean forces and we watch that very closely.

“What we haven’t seen is military activity that would be reflective of the charged political environment.”

North Korea has boosted defences on its east coast, a South Korean lawmaker said on Tuesday, after Pyongyang said US President Donald Trump had declared war and that it would shoot down US bombers flying near the peninsula.

Tensions have escalated since reclusive North Korea conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear test on Sept. 3. Bellicose rhetoric has reached a new level in recent days with leaders on both sides exchanging threats and insults.

North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho said on Monday that Mr Trump’s Twitter comments that leader Kim Jong Un and Ri “won’t be around much longer” if they acted on their threats amounted to a declaration of war and that Pyongyang had the right to take countermeasures.

Exposed – WW3 ALERT ~ North Korea war about to break out triggering military invasion

Exposed – WW3 ALERT ~ North Korea war about to break out triggering military invasion

The highest tensions have been in decades. North Korea and the United States are at an entirely new level of conflict. At any minute something could trigger an all out invasion of North Korea and multiple nuclear missile launches at the United States, South Korea and Japan.

Shocking – California Preparing for Nuclear War Attack

Shocking – California Preparing for Nuclear War Attack

 

[ATS] Last month a bulletin was issued by the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, regarding preparing California for a nuclear attack from N. Korea. I know Kim would be insane to start a war with the U.S. and unfortunately we all know he is insane.

Things have ramped up since this was issued, and I’m concerned that our President is pushing Kims buttons. Kim has painted himself in a corner on this, and saving face could cause him to do something radically stupid.

It contains some advice that I think everyone might want to know. Readers are encouraged to familiarize themselves with nuclear response emergency procedures. How to lessen the exposure to nuclear radiation, and what to expect from the Govt.

According to foreignpolicy.com:

With U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un trading insults and threatening war, California officials are taking the threat of nuclear exchange seriously.

Noting the heightened North Korean threat, the Los Angeles-area Joint Regional Intelligence Center issued a bulletin last month warning that a nuclear attack on Southern California would be “catastrophic” and urged officials in the region to shore up their nuclear attack response plans.

The report cites North Korea’s late July test of an intercontinental ballistic missile that could, in theory, reach the West Coast of the United States. “North Korea’s propaganda videos feature ruins of San Francisco and Washington,” the document says.“North Korea’s propaganda videos feature ruins of San Francisco and Washington,” the document says.

The 16-page “Nuclear Attack Response Considerations” bulletin is dated Aug. 16 and marked for “official use only.” It was circulated last month to Los Angeles-area local, state, and federal agency personnel and also throughout the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies across the country.

The idea behind the unclassified report was to share planning and guidance with as wide a distribution as possible, according to two officials involved in responding to a nuclear strike and who received the bulletin. Many agencies are involved in responding to an attack and are often staffed with personnel without access to classified information.

DHS did not respond to requests for comment.

Much of the information in the report is based on well-known facts about the effects of a nuclear blast, including the effects of radiation, the possibly of an electromagnetic pulse disabling communications, and the destructive effects of the initial blast on human life and infrastructure.

Citing figures from the Rand Corp., the report says a nuclear blast at the Long Beach Port could cause more than $1 trillion in damage, including loss of life and destruction of homes and infrastructure.

In a section on “radiation protection basics,” the report offers a primer on what to do during a nuclear attack. “Lie face down and place hands under the body to protect exposed skin,” it recommends. “Remain flat until the heat and shock waves have passed.”

There are also sections explaining the basic mechanisms of a nuclear blast as it occurs and discussion of specific things expected to happen in the event of a nuclear attack that should be considered and prepared for in advance.

It also warns of the difficulties government authorities would likely encounter in dealing with the aftermath of a blast. The public will need to evacuate, the report says, but with “limited understanding of radiation risks, they will experience high anxiety and may be non-compliant.”

Challenges with contamination spread by pets and through clothing are among the many public health and logistical coordination issues spelled out for potential emergency responders.

“The consequences of a nuclear attack in Southern California would be catastrophic,” the report says. “Nonetheless, government entities and first responders are expected to remain operational to preserve human life, maintain order, and aid in the recovery process.”

The report, which is largely directed at local, state, and federal agencies and first responders located in the Los Angeles region, notes that the federal government will likely be of limited help immediately after a nuclear blast.

“[T]here will be no significant federal assistance at the scene for 24-72 hours following the attack,” the bulletin says.

China’s hold over ‘Rocket Man’ is key to avoiding nuclear war in East Asia

China’s hold over ‘Rocket Man’ is key to avoiding nuclear war in East Asia

 

US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un are playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship while also trading personal insults.

 

Most recently, Trump blasted the “Rocket Man” in his inaugural speech to the United Nations, promising to “totally destroy” North Korea if it threatens the U.S. or its allies. The Trump Administration also added new sanctions aimed at strangling its ability to work with banks.

Kim, for his part, resorted to calling Trump “mentally deranged” and a “dotard,” while his foreign minister threatened to test a hydrogen bomb in the Pacific.

 

With tensions escalating, it is important to be realistic about how we can get out of this mess.

 

In short, any nonmilitary solution will rely on China choosing to apply its massive economic leverage over the North Korean regime. In a positive sign, China’s central bank recently told Chinese financial companies to stop doing business with North Korea.

 

Overall, however, it appears that China has increased its trade with North Korea in recent years while doing fairly little to forestall North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. China’s foremost objective seems to be promoting greater stability from its volatile neighbor, in part because it fears being faced with a massive humanitarian crisis should the regime collapse.

 

But while the poor quality of the data hinders a detailed analysis, a quick look shows just how much leverage China has, if it wishes to use it.

 

 

North Korea’s primary patron

 

In general, exports from one country to another can be mostly explained by the distance between them and the sizes of their markets, a pattern that holds for China and North Korea.

 

Geographically, they share a long border, which makes China a natural, though not inevitable, partner for trade. As a case in point, North Korea also shares a long border with South Korea, but these countries have almost no trade between them. In addition, North Korea shares a small border with Russia, with whom it has little, though ever-increasing, trade.

 

China’s large market, proximity and – most importantly – willingness to trade with North Korea has led to a situation in which North Korea has become highly dependent on trade with what has become its primary patron. About half of North Korean exports and imports go directly to and from China and most of the rest of its trade is handled indirectly by Chinese middlemen.

 

North Korea’s dependence on its neighbor has grown alongside China’s increasing economic dominance of East Asia, which gained momentum 15 years ago when China joined the World Trade Organization. Since then, both Chinese gross domestic product as well as its annual trade with North Korea have increased nearly tenfold, to around US$11 trillion and $6 billion, respectively.

 

North Korea imports nearly everything from China, from rubber tires to refined petroleum to pears, with no single category dominating. Meanwhile, coal constitutes about 40 percent of North Korean exports to China.

 

Time to use that leverage?

 

However, recent events – such as the use of front companies by Chinese firms to evade sanctions imposed on North Korea and China’s reluctance to cut off energy supplies to the country – have led to some uncertainty about the extent to which China is willing to use this economic leverage to rein in North Korea’s military ambitions.

 

On one hand, China previously claimed to have stopped coal imports from North Korea as part of recent efforts to punish the regime for missile tests and the suspected assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the estranged half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. This was an important signal of China’s willingness to support U.S. concerns about the missile program since oil represents about a third ($930 million) of North Korea’s import revenue.

 

On the other hand, there is evidence that coal shipments in fact never ceased. And, in any case, China may have increased its imports of iron ore from North Korea to offset the lost coal revenues.

 

This is consistent with the idea that China carefully considers the resources and revenue that are available to the North Korean regime at any moment, and uses trade as a lever to control them. In this way, China walks a fine line between providing too many resources, and thus allowing the regime to prosper, and not enough resources, such that North Korea is in danger of collapsing. Ultimately, trade may be used as a lever to do some light scolding, but China’s overwhelming concern is preventing North Korea’s collapse.

 

Further evidence that China has tight control over the North Korean economy comes from a recent report from C4ADS. The research group found close, and often common, ownership ties between most of the major Chinese companies who do business with North Korea. This suggests that trade with North Korea is highly centralized and thus easily controlled.

 

Russia: North Korea’s other ‘friend’

 

China is not the only country that North Korea trades with, though the others currently pale in comparison. Other top export destinations include India ($97.8 million), Pakistan ($43.1 million) and Burkina Faso ($32.8 million). In terms of imports, India ($108 million), Russia ($78.3 million) and Thailand ($73.8 million) currently sell the most to North Korea.

 

Russia in particular may soon complicate U.S. efforts to isolate the regime. While still small, Russian trade with North Korea increased 73 percent over the first two months of 2017 compared with the same period of the previous year.

 

But whereas China is legitimately worried that an economic crisis in North Korea could lead to a flood of refugees or all-out war, Russia likely sees engagement with North Korea in much simpler terms, namely as an additional way to gain geopolitical advantage relative to the U.S.

 

A way out?

 

Nearly all experts agree that there is no easy way to “solve” the North Korea problem. However, one plausible approach is to encourage South Korea and Japan to begin to develop nuclear weapons programs of their own, and to only discontinue these programs if China takes meaningful steps to use its trade with North Korea to reign in the regime.

 

Threatening to introduce new nuclear powers to the world is clearly risky, however stable and peaceful South Korea and Japan currently are. But China is highly averse to having these economic and political rivals acquire nuclear capabilities, as it would threaten China’s ongoing pursuit of regional control. In short, this is a sensitive pressure point that could be used to sway the Chinese leadership.

 

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One way or another, China must become convinced that the costs of propping up the North Korean regime through trade are higher than the costs of an increased probability that the regime will collapse.

 


This is an updated version of an article originally published on July 6, 2017.

 

Greg Wright, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Merced

 

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.