Month: July 2012

Unveiled – Russia Article 31 Protest Photos Moscow and St Petersburg

   Moscow

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Interior Ministry officers detain an opposition activist during a protest rally to defend Article 31 of the Russian constitution, which guarantees the right of assembly, in Moscow March 31, 2012. Reuters

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A detained participant displays a sign from the window of a police van during a protest to defend Article 31 of the Russian constitution in Moscow July 31, 2012. Activists gather on the 31st day of the month to support Article 31 of the Russian constitution — the right to free assembly. Reuters

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Police officers detain a protester during an unsanctioned opposition rally in downtown Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, July 31, 2012. Reuters

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Police officers detain opposition leader Eduard Limonov, third from left, during an unsanctioned opposition rally in downtown Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, July 31, 2012.  AP

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Eduard Limonov, long time radical activist, former leader of banned National Bolshevik Party speaks to The Associated Press in Moscow on Tuesday, July 31, 2012.  AP

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An opposition protester shout slogans from the police van during an unsanctioned opposition rally in downtown Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, July 31, 2012. AP

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A participant shouts slogans in front of a police cordon during a protest to defend Article 31 of the Russian constitution in Moscow July 31, 2012. Reuters

St Petersburg

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A participant shouts as he is detained by police during a protest to defend Article 31 of the Russian constitution in St. Petersburg July 31, 2012. Activists gather on the 31st day of the month to support Article 31 of the Russian constitution — the right to free assembly. Reuters

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Participants sit during a protest to defend Article 31 of the Russian constitution in St. Petersburg July 31, 2012. Activists gather on the 31st day of the month to support Article 31 of the Russian constitution — the right to free assembly. The placard reads “I don’t care about your fines.” Reuters

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Russian riot policemen detain an opposition supporter in central St.Petersburg on May 31, 2012 during unauthorized rally to defend Article 31 of the Russian constitution which guarantees freedom of assembly. Getty

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A participant is detained by the police during a protest to defend Article 31 of the Russian constitution in St. Petersburg July 31, 2012. Reuters

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Police officers detain Olga Kurnosova, the leader of the St. Petersburg branch of Garry Kasparov’s United Civil Front movement, during a protest to defend Article 31 of the Russian constitution in St.Petersburg, August 31, 2011. Reuters

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Police officers detain activists during a protest to defend Article 31 of the Russian constitution in St.Petersburg August 31, 2011. Article 31 guarantees the right of assembly.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Two Men Arrested for Fraud and Aggravated Identity Theft

SAN FRANCISCO—A federal grand jury in San Francisco indicted Ngoc Duong, a/k/a Danny Duong, of Fountain Valley, California, and Hong Lee Wong, a/k/a William Wong, of Torrance, California, on July 19, 2012, with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft, United States Attorney Melinda Haag announced.

According to the indictment, which was unsealed Friday, Duong, 60, a partner in Incom Trading Corporation Inc.; and Wong, 44, a principal in Powell Trading Inc. and Powell Commodity Inc., allegedly defrauded three companies: Cheery Way Inc. (Cheery Way), of Brisbane, California; as well as two Chinese companies, Zheijang Metals and Materials and Zheijang Concentrating (Zheijang), by falsely claiming to have an agreement with the city of New Orleans to recycle scrap metal from a Six Flags amusement park damaged by Hurricane Katrina. To carry out the fraud, Duong and Wong created and sent false documents to Cheery Way and Zheijang in which the defendants fraudulently used names and e-mail addresses of New Orleans city officials.

Duong was arrested on July 26, 2012, at the Houston International Airport. He made his initial appearance in federal court in Houston on July 27, 2012. Today, following a bail hearing held in federal court in Houston, Duong was released on a $100,000 bond. Wong was arrested on July 27, 2012, at his residence in Torrance. He made his initial appearance in federal court in Los Angeles on July 27, 2012, and was released on $25,000 bond and electronic monitoring. Both defendants are scheduled to appear before the Magistrate Judge in federal court in San Francisco, on August 6, 2012.

The maximum statutory penalty for each count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and 1343, respectively, is 20 years in prison and a fine of $250,000 or twice the amount of the fraud. The statutory penalty for each count of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A is a mandatory two-year term in prison, to be imposed consecutive to any sentence imposed for other charges, and a $250,000 fine. However, any sentence following conviction would be imposed by the court after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the federal statute governing the imposition of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553. The case has been assigned to United States District Court Judge Susan Illston.

Denise Marie Barton is the Assistant U.S. Attorney who is prosecuting the case with the assistance of Elizabeth Garcia. The prosecution is the result of an approximately eight-month investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Please note, an indictment contains only allegations against an individual and, as with all defendants, Duong and Wong must be presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

Serial Killers ~ The Bourgoin Tapes – Full Movie

In thirty-year career, the criminology expert Stephane Bourgoin has studied thousands of cases of serial killers. In this documentary series, it delivers the results of its investigation and reveals the deadly path of each assassin presented: childhood, the first passage to the act, arrest and criminal career. Sexual predators to couples through evil women killer and backpackers crime, Stephane Bourgoin gives us his personal archives and analyzes in detail the psychology, rituals and procedures of these serial killers.

TOP-SECRET – Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet WikiLeaks Talking Points

The following documents were publicly released on July 11, 2012 in response to a Freedom of Information request to the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet for:

“All documents (including electronic documents) that have been sent by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to the Prime Minister between 1 January 2011 and 4 June 2012 that relate to WikiLeaks, Mr Julian Paul Assange and/or United States Army private Bradley Manning.”

Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet WikiLeaks Talking Points

DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:

 

AU-DPMC-WikiLeaks

Networth of Julian Assange

Julian Assange is an Australian publisher, journalist, computer programmer and Internet activist, with a net worth of $300 thousand. Julian Assange has earned his net worth as the editor in chief of WikiLeaks, which is a whistleblower website to create open governments, by exposing private, secret, and classified media from anonymous news sources, news leaks, and whistleblowers. Assange was born in Townsville, Queensland, Australia, on July 3, 1971. He is well-known for his public appearances in many parts of the world, to speak out about freedom of the press, censorship and investigative journalism.

Some topics that have been published on his WikiLeaks site include; extrajudicial killings in Kenya, toxic waste dumping in Cote d’Ivoire, and procedures at Guantanamo Bay. WikiLeaks has five international print media partners, which include; Der Spiegel, e Monde, The Guardian, El Pais and The New York Times. In November, of 2010 WikiLeaks and its five media partners began publishing detailed correspondence between the U.S State Department and its diplomatic missions around the world, (also known as Cablegate).

How much is Julian Assange worth?

Julian Assange Net Worth

Assange has won many awards and nominations, including the 2009 Amnesty International Media Award and Readers’ Choice for TIME magazine’s 2010 Person of the Year. In his youth he was referred to as “Australia’s most famous, ethical, computer hacker” by the Personal Democracy Forum. As a youth, he was charged with 31 counts of hacking and related crimes. It took three years for the case to make it to court where Julian pled guilty to 25 charges of hacking. The other six charges were dropped. He was released on bond for good conduct, after being fined AUD $2,100. Assange has never been married, however, he does have one son with an ex-girlfriend. After a custody battle that lasted for years, the couple formed an activist group, referred to as, “Parent Inquiry Into Child Protection,” which created a “central databank” for otherwise inaccessible legal records, related to child custody issues in Australia.

Cryptome – CIA’s Historical Review Panel Public Statement

Public Statement from the CIA’s Historical Review Panel

 

Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 10:49:16 -0400
To: intelforum[at]lists101.his.com
From: IntelForum Mailing List <intelforum[at]lists101.his.com>
Subject: [Intelforum] Public Statement from the CIA’s Historical Review Panel

Date: Wed, July 18, 2012 8:52 am

Public Statement from the CIA’s Historical Review Panel

Professor Robert Jervis (Chair)
Department of Political Science
Columbia University

Professor Melvyn Leffler
Department of History
University of Virginia

Professor Thomas Newcomb
Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice
Heidelberg College

Professor Jeffrey Taliaferro
Department of Political Science
Tufts University

Professor Ruth Wedgwood
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

The Director, Central Intelligence Agency’s Historical Review Panel (HRP) was formed in 1995, replacing a panel that was less formally organized and that had met only episodically. Since then, the HRP has met twice a year, with the mandate to:

Advise the Central Intelligence Agency on systematic and automatic declassification review under the provisions of Executive Order 12958 as amended.Assist in developing subjects of historical and scholarly interest for the Intelligence Community declassification review program.

Advise CIA and the Intelligence Community on declassification issues in which the protection of intelligence sources and methods potentially conflicts with mandated declassification priorities.

Provide guidance for the historical research and writing programs of the CIA History Staff, and when appropriate, review draft products.

Advise Information Management Services on its mandatory and voluntary declassification review initiatives and the Center for the Study of Intelligence on its academic outreach programs.

At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, advise on other matters of relevance to the intelligence and academic communities.

Advise Information Management Services on archival and records management issues.

The HRP, like the other DCIA panels, is convened by the Director to provide him with confidential advice and assessments. Because the HRP’s advice to the DCIA must be completely frank and candid, we are not reporting Panel recommendations. But because this panel’s primary concern is the program of declassification and the release of information to the public, the DCIA and the Panel concluded that it should inform the interested public of the subjects and problems that the Panel is discussing.

The HRP met on June 4-5, 2012, with Robert Jervis, Melvyn Leffler, Thomas Newcomb, and Jeffrey Taliaferro being in attendance.

As has often been the case, we spent much of our time discussing the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, including specific volumes at various stages of compilation and declassification and the general processes involved. We had a long session with the State Department’s Historical Advisory Committee and the Historical Office staff. A great deal of progress has been made in reducing delays and coming to grips with difficult issues. We agreed on the value of continuing communication between the two advisory panels and of course in developing even further the working-level relations between CIA and the State Department, which will have to be expanded to include representatives of the National Security Council staff.

We also discussed the projects of the Historical Collections Division (HCD) and how these can be developed to meet the needs of multiple audiences and to produce material of most interest to scholars, journalists, and members of the interested public.

We continued our discussion of the 25-Year Program, the wider dissemination of material on the CREST system (the CIA Records Search Tool), and the need to get all agencies to devote attention to material from Presidential libraries.

We also discussed options for reviewing Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs).

We will meet again in December 2012 or January 2013.

Robert Jervis
Columbia University

_______________________________________________

IntelForum mailing list
IntelForum[at]lists101.his.com
http://lists101.his.com/mailman/listinfo/intelforum

 

 



 


 


 




 























	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Serial Killer Charles Sobhraj ~ The Serpent – Full Movie
		
	
	

		


Hotchand Bhaonani Gurumukh Charles Sobhraj (born April 6, 1944), better known as Charles Sobhraj, is a serial killer of Indian and Vietnamese origin, who preyed on Western tourists throughout Southeast Asia during the 1970s. Nicknamed “the Serpent” and “the Bikini killer” for his skill at deception and evasion, he allegedly committed at least 12 murders. He was convicted and jailed in India from 1976 to 1997, but managed to live a life of leisure even in prison. After his release, he retired as a celebrity in Paris; he unexpectedly returned to Nepal, where he was arrested, tried and sentenced to life imprisonment on August 12, 2004. The Supreme Court of Nepal has finally convicted him and ordered the life imprisonment, this decision was made on 30 July 2010.[1]

While Sobhraj is widely believed to be a psychopath, his motives for killing differed from those of most serial killers. Sobhraj was not driven to murder by deep-seated, violent impulses, but as a means to sustain his lifestyle of adventure. That, as well as his cunning and cultured personality, made him a celebrity long before his release from prison. Sobhraj enjoyed the attention, charging large amounts of money for interviews and film rights; he has been the subject of four books and three documentaries. His search for attention and his overconfidence in his own intelligence are believed responsible for his return to a country where authorities were still eager to arrest him.

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Last of Seven Defendants Sentenced in AmeriFirst Securities Fraud Case
		
	
	

		


DALLAS—The final sentencing was held today in the massive AmeriFirst securities fraud case, prosecuted in the Northern District of Texas, that has resulted in a total of seven felony convictions and prison sentences up to 25 years, announced U.S. Attorney Sarah R. Saldaña of the Northern District of Texas. Today, John Porter Priest was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn to one year in federal prison.


Priest, 43, of Ocala, Florida, was sentenced by Judge Lynn to one year in federal prison and ordered to pay $4,742,946 in restitution. He pleaded guilty in September 2010 to one count of securities fraud based on his role in the Secured Capital Trust scheme.


“The AmeriFirst investment fraud came to light just over five years ago. Since that time, a coalition of public agencies, including the FBI, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Texas State Securities Board, and the Florida Office of Financial Regulation, have worked tirelessly, alongside court-appointed receivers in Florida and Texas, to bring the perpetrators of the fraud to justice,” said U.S. Attorney Saldaña. “The sentencings this week close a five-year chapter in the authorities’ work on this matter. All seven of the most culpable participants in the AmeriFirst scheme have been convicted of felonies and sentenced. We have pursued this matter for the last five years because investment fraud, particularly when it victimizes seniors as the AmeriFirst fraud did, is intolerable and must be redressed.”


Dennis Woods Bowden, 59, of Farmers Branch, Texas, was sentenced last Friday by Judge Lynn to serve 192 months in federal prison and ordered to pay more than $23 million in restitution. Bowden was the owner and chief operating officer of the now-defunct Dallas-based AmeriFirst Funding Corp. and AmeriFirst Acceptance Corp. Bowden was also a manager and owner of American Eagle Acceptance Corp., a Dallas-based company that bought and sold used automobiles, financed purchases of used automobiles, and bought and serviced used car notes. In December 2011, a jury convicted Bowden on four counts of securities fraud and five counts of mail fraud related to his role in a scheme to defraud investors in connection with the sale of securities. AmeriFirst has been under control of a court-appointed receiver since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an emergency action to halt the fraud in July 2007.


In connection with the same scheme, in 2010 a jury convicted Jeffrey Charles Bruteyn, 42, of Dallas, on nine counts of securities fraud. Bruteyn is currently serving a 25-year federal prison sentence. Bruteyn is the former managing director of AmeriFirst. On June 29, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Bruteyn’s conviction and sentence.


According to evidence presented at the trials, Bowden and Bruteyn orchestrated offerings of promissory notes called secured debt obligations (SDOs) that raised more than $50 million from more than 500 investors living in Texas and Florida, many of whom were retired and all of whom were looking for safe and secure investments.


Bowden paid Bruteyn and brokers working under Bruteyn’s direction to sell the securities, but Bowden also signed documents that went directly to investors. Through the brokers and through documents that he signed, Bowden misled, deceived, and defrauded investors by misrepresenting, and by failing to disclose, material facts concerning the safety of the securities. Among other things, Bowden falsely represented to investors that their investments were guaranteed by a commercial bank, that the investors’ principal was secured by an interest in certain types of collateral, that insurance purchased by AmeriFirst companies insured the investors against loss of their money, and that the issuers of the SDOs were acting as the investors’ fiduciaries. In fact, none of these representations was true. Bowden, supposedly acting as the investors’ fiduciary, spent investors’ money on things investors did not approve or even know about, including an airplane, sports cars, a condominium, real estate for used car lots, and his own personal living expenses.


Another defendant convicted in the scheme, Vincent John Bazemore Jr., 37, of Denton, Texas, a broker who sold SDOs, pleaded guilty in October 2007 and is currently serving a 60-month federal prison sentence. Bazemore was also ordered to pay nearly $16 million in restitution.


Gerald Kingston, 47, of Dallas, pleaded guilty in December 2007 to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, stemming from his role in helping Bruteyn manipulate the stock price of Interfinancial Holdings Corporation (IFCH). Acting at the direction of Bruteyn, Kingston bought and sold hundreds of thousands of shares of IFCH and affected matched trades to create the false impression of widespread interest in the stock. Kingston admitted that he derived more than $1.6 million in proceeds from his fraudulent sales of IFCH in the course of the conspiracy. Judge Lynn sentenced him in January 2012 to a two-year term of probation and fined him $50,000.


Eric Hall, 40, of Fort Myers, Florida, pleaded guilty in June 2008 to one count of securities fraud, based on his role in a scheme to defraud investors in an entity called Secured Capital Trust. He was sentenced by Judge Lynn in April 2012 to a two-year term of probation and ordered to pay approximately $4,742,946 in restitution.


Fred Howard, 64, of Tarpon Springs, Florida, was sentenced by Judge Lynn two weeks ago to five years in federal prison and ordered to pay approximately $4,742,946 in restitution. He pleaded guilty in February 2012 to one count of securities fraud for his role in the Secured Capital Trust scheme.


Today’s announcement is part of efforts underway by President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) which was created in November 2009 to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. With more than 20 federal agencies, 94 U.S. attorneys’ offices, and state and local partners, it is the broadest coalition of law enforcement, investigatory, and regulatory agencies ever assembled to combat fraud. Since its formation, the task force has made great strides in facilitating increased investigation and prosecution of financial crimes; enhancing coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities; addressing discrimination in the lending and financial markets; and conducting outreach to the public, victims, financial institutions and other organizations. Over the past three fiscal years, the Justice Department has filed more than 10,000 financial fraud cases against nearly 15,000 defendants, including more than 2,700 mortgage fraud defendants. For more information on the task force, visit http://www.stopfraud.gov.


Assistant U.S. Attorneys Alan Buie and Christopher Stokes and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephanie Tourk were in charge of the prosecutions.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – FBI – Serious Health Risks to Law Enforcement
		
	
	

		
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U//FOUO) The FBI assesses with high confidence, based on multiple incident reports from a collaborative source with direct access to the information, that counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries pose a serious health and safety risk to consumers, specifically law enforcement officers, emergency medical services providers, and military personnel who use these batteries extensively. The FBI has received numerous reports of such batteries, which are not manufactured with the safety mechanisms of legitimate US branded-batteries, spontaneously combusting while being used, transported, or stored, resulting in serious injuries to consumers and damage to tactical equipment and property.


(U) Law Enforcement, Military, and Emergency Responders at Risk From Counterfeit or Substandard Lithium Batteries in Tactical Equipment


(U//FOUO) Lithium batteries, primarily CR123A cell batteries, are used by the public in electronic devices; however, they are more frequently used by law enforcement officers, emergency medical services providers, and military personnel in tactical equipment such as flashlights, weapon lights, headlamps, and helmet lights and cameras. Counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries have caused numerous incidents involving serious injury to law enforcement personnel, as well as damage to equipment and property.


…


(U) How to Avoid Purchasing or Using Counterfeit and Substandard Lithium Batteries


(U//FOUO) Several indicators are associated with counterfeit or substandard lithium batteries; awareness of these indicators can decrease the chances of purchasing inferior batteries that can put users at risk.


• (U) Common exterior indicators of counterfeit batteries include label misspellings, missing label information, blurred fonts, altered logos or seals, different label dimensions, altered or substandard packaging, crimp seal differences, material differences, and differences in the vent perforation of the anode.


• (U) Counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries are often sold at a reduced price on the Internet and at swap meets, store fronts, gun shows, and electronics and technical shows. Although not all batteries sold at these locations are counterfeit or substandard, such sellers are often sources of counterfeit or substandard batteries produced in China and the chance of purchasing a counterfeit or substandard battery is higher at these locations.


…


(U) Outlook and Implications


(U//FOUO) The FBI assesses that counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries will continue to pose a health and safety risk to law enforcement officers, military personnel, and emergency medical services personnel, as well as unwitting consumers in the general public, as long as they are available for purchase. Taking the following precautions, however, can reduce the likelihood of user injury or property damage from either the purchase of counterfeit and substandard batteries or the improper use of legitimate lithium batteries.


• (U) Law enforcement, military and emergency personnel should use caution when purchasing batteries from online auction sites, online vendors, store fronts, gun shows, electronic and technical shows and swap meets. Individuals purchasing batteries on the secondary market should seek quality assurance and scrutinize labels, packaging and contents; seek authorized retailers; watch for missing sales tax charges; and insist on secure transactions, according to the International Trade Commission.


• (U) To prevent a catastrophic event when using legitimate lithium batteries, individuals should refrain from improperly mixing different types and brands of batteries; using a combination of batteries with different depletion levels (that is, mixing old and new batteries); and removing lithium batteries from one product and placing them into another product in which they are not intended to be used (such as removing a lithium battery from a flashlight and placing it in a camera).


(U//FOUO) The FBI assesses that in addition to the safety risks, the sale of counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries has a negative economic impact on both users and US manufacturers of legitimate lithium batteries. The widespread use of tactical equipment and electronic devices requiring lithium batteries among law enforcement, emergency medical services providers, and military personnel can lead to significant costs for these agencies if they purchase and then must replace defective batteries, tactical gear and property, or pay for emergency care. US manufacturers lose potential revenue when producers in China and other countries profit from the fraudulent use of US brand holders’ trademarks. In addition, when incidents occur involving what appear to be legitimate US batteries, the brand holder often faces costs in terms of both money spent on testing to determine the cause of the incident and potential erosion in brand confidence among consumers.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Unveiled by Wikileaks – BULGARIA – Stasi mayor unacceptable
		
	
	

		
Date 2011-07-12 13:27:06 From ben.preisler@stratfor.com

To eurasia@stratfor.com

Others Listname: mailto:eurasia@stratfor.com

MessageId: <4E1C2F8A.8000705@stratfor.com>

InReplyTo: 4E1B2BD5.9000703@stratfor.com

Text Glasove – Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s governing party Gerb is putting

up a former State Security officer as its candidate for mayor

of Bulgaria’s fifth largest city Russe in the Bulgarian local

elections scheduled for October. The opposition online

newspaper Glasove is disgusted: “Stoilov was a permanent

employee of the State Security who openly admits that he

recruited soldiers for military counter-espionage and is proud

of it to boot. In an interview last year he said that many

things in Bulgaria would have turned out differently had the

State Security been reformed in the right way. … You must

have a screw loose if you can’t find anyone better than a guy

with a Stasi past after four years on the city council.”

(11/07/2011) +++

http://www.glasove.com/gerb-mozhe-da-specheli-mestnite-izbori-samo-ako-gi-falshifitsira-14877


—


Benjamin Preisler

+216 22 73 23 19


Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – European Central Bank Paper: Shadow Banking in the Euro Area
		
	
	

		
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Shadow banking, as one of the main sources of financial stability concerns, is the subject of much international debate. In broad terms, shadow banking refers to activities related to credit intermediation and liquidity and maturity transformation that take place outside the regulated banking system.


This paper presents a first investigation of the size and the structure of shadow banking within the euro area, using the statistical data sources available to the ECB/Eurosystem.


Although overall shadow banking activity in the euro area is smaller than in the United States, it is significant, at least in some euro area countries. This is also broadly true for some of the components of shadow banking, particularly securitisation activity, money market funds and the repo markets.


This paper also addresses the interconnection between the regulated and the non-bank-regulated segments of the financial sector. Over the recent past, this interconnection has increased, likely resulting in a higher risk of contagion across sectors and countries. Euro area banks now rely more on funding from the financial sector than in the past, in particular from other financial intermediaries (OFIs), which cover shadow banking entities, including securitisation vehicles. This source of funding is mainly shortterm and therefore more susceptible to runs and to the drying-up of liquidity. This finding confirms that macro-prudential authorities and supervisors should carefully monitor the growing interlinkages between the regulated banking sector and the shadow banking system. However, an in-depth assessment of the activities of shadow banking and of the interconnection with the regulated banking system would require further improvements in the availability of data and other sources of information.


…


This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the size and the structure of shadow banking in the euro area, as a contribution to the international and European debate on this issue. In broad terms, shadow banking refers to activities related to credit intermediation, liquidity and maturity transformation that take place outside the regulated banking system. There is widespread international agreement on the need to better understand the activities of shadow banking and the related financial stability risks. Moreover, the forthcoming implementation of Basel III, with the introduction of more stringent capital and liquidity requirements for credit institutions, and the provisions to be applied to insurers may provide further incentives for banks to shift part of their activities outside of the regulated environment and therefore increase shadow banking activities.


Evaluating the size of the shadow banking system in the euro area is not straightforward. A quantitative assessment of the activities of the shadow banking sector can only be based on data sources that unfortunately were not designed specifically for this purpose (i.e. flow-of-funds data and monetary and financial statistics). Moreover, for some activities and markets there are no official data available.


The analysis shows that shadow banking activity in the euro area is smaller than in the United States. In the United States the size of the shadow banking system, measured as the total amount of its assets, was comparable to the size of the banking system in the second quarter of 2011, while in the euro area it represented less than half of the total assets of banking sector. However, the size of assets held by financial

intermediaries that are not regulated as banks is still important in the euro area, especially in some countries.


A proxy for the activities of shadow banking in the euro area can be derived from the analysis of the balance sheets of OFIs, a sector which excludes insurance corporations and pension funds but covers most of the agents engaging in shadow banking. Regarding the dynamics of shadow-banking activities, assets of OFIs grew rapidly in the run-up to the crisis, in the period 2005-07. Starting at the end of 2007, OFI intermediation declined sharply in the context of the general deleveraging triggered by the financial crisis.


The paper investigates some key components of shadow banking. In particular, it looks at financial entities other than banks involved in credit intermediation, such as securitisation vehicles, and at the financial intermediaries and markets providing funding to the banks, such as money market funds (MMFs) and the repo market. The data suggests the following.


(i) Securitisation issuance was smaller in volume in the euro area than in the United States before the crisis (around 5% and 12% of GDP respectively) and remains less developed.


(ii) Assets under management by MMFs amounted to €1.83 trillion and €1.1 trillion in the United States and in the euro area respectively by the second quarter of 2011. However, it should be pointed out that in the euro area MMFs are a somewhat heterogeneous group (even if the CESR, i.e. the predecessor of the European Securities and Markets Authority, published in 2010 guidelines on a Common Definition of European Money Market Funds).


(iii) The repo market is a key source of funding in both the United States and the euro area.


The paper also addresses the interconnection between regulated and non-regulated segments of the financial sector undertaking banking activities. Over the recent past this interconnection has been increasing, likely resulting in higher risk of contagion across sectors and countries. Euro area banks rely more than in the past on funding from the financial sector and in particular from the OFI sector, which covers shadow banking entities including securitisation vehicles. This source of funding is mainly short-term and therefore more susceptible to runs and to the drying-up of liquidity. The relative size and relevance of shadow banking intermediation differs significantly across euro area countries.


A more in-depth assessment of the activities of shadow banking and of the interconnection with the regulated banking system would require an improvement in the availability of data and other related information. More than 60% of the assets that are considered part of shadow banking activities in the euro area are linked to financial institutions for which high frequency statistical information is not available. Similarly, very scarce and non-standardised information is available on repo markets. Moreover, the aggregate data collected for the euro area are not detailed enough to allow a full understanding of key elements such as the presence of maturity transformation and leverage and the possible channels for contagion, which are of particular importance when evaluating possible regulatory measures. The paper concludes with some preliminary considerations regarding possible measures to address data gaps and regulatory options.


…




 


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:


ECB-ShadowBanking



	


	



			
				


			

			
Video – Former FBI Serial Killer Expert John Douglas
		
	
	

		


 


Former FBI Serial Crime Expert, John Douglas’ book is called “Mindhunter”. In it, Douglas recounts some of his cases involving several of the most notable serial killers of our time. He talks about the science behind criminal profiling and the patterns of behaviour adopted by perpetrators. Douglas was the model for Jack Crawford in “The Silence of the Lambs,” and later acted as consultant of the movie “Mindhunter”. (Originally aired February 1996).

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – European Commission Green Paper on Shadow Banking
		
	
	

		
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The 2008 crisis was global and financial services were at its heart, revealing inadequacies including regulatory gaps, ineffective supervision, opaque markets and overly-complex products. The response has been international and coordinated through the G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).


The European Union has shown global leadership in implementing its G20 commitments. In line with EU’s Roadmap for Financial Reform, the Union is very advanced in implementing the reforms linked to the G20 commitments. Most of the reforms are now going through the legislative process. In particular, a major achievement has been the recent adoption by the Council and the Parliament of landmark legislation on over-the-counter derivatives. Negotiations are also well developed on measures to revamp capital requirements for the banking sector. Overall, the reforms will equip the EU with the tools designed to ensure that the financial system, its institutions and markets are properly supervised. More stable and responsible financial markets are a pre-condition for growth and for the creation of a business environment that allows companies to thrive, innovate and expand their activities. This in turn enhances the confidence and trust of citizens.


However, there is an increasing area of non-bank credit activity, or shadow banking, which has not been the prime focus of prudential regulation and supervision. Shadow banking performs important functions in the financial system. For example, it creates additional sources of funding and offers investors alternatives to bank deposits. But it can also pose potential threats to long-term financial stability.


In response to the invitations by G20 in Seoul in 2010 and in Cannes in 2011, the FSB is therefore in the process of developing recommendations on the oversight and regulation of this activity.


The FSB’s work has highlighted that the disorderly failure of shadow bank entities can carry systemic risk, both directly and through their interconnectedness with the regular banking system. The FSB has also suggested that as long as such activities and entities remain subject to a lower level of regulation and supervision than the rest of the financial sector, reinforced banking regulation could drive a substantial part of banking activities beyond the boundaries of traditional banking and towards shadow banking.


Against this background, the Commission considers it a priority to examine in detail the issues posed by shadow banking activities and entities. The objective is actively to respond and further contribute to the global debate; continue to increase the resilience of the Union’s financial system; and, ensure all financial activities are contributing to the economic growth. The purpose of this Green Paper is therefore to take stock of current development, and to present on-going reflections on the subject to allow for a wide-ranging consultation of stakeholders.


…


3. WHAT IS SHADOW BANKING?


The October 2011 FSB report represents the first comprehensive international effort to deal with shadow banking. It focuses on (i) the definition of principles for the monitoring and regulation of the shadow banking system; (ii) the initiation of a mapping process to identify and assess systemic risks involved in shadow banking; and, (iii) the identification of the scope of possible regulatory measures.


In this report, the FSB defined the shadow banking system as “the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system”. This definition implies the shadow banking system is based on two intertwined pillars.


First, entities operating outside the regular banking system engaged in one of the following activities:


• accepting funding with deposit-like characteristics;

• performing maturity and/or liquidity transformation;

• undergoing credit risk transfer; and,

• using direct or indirect financial leverage.


Second, activities that could act as important sources of funding of non-bank entities. These activities include securitisation, securities lending and repurchase transactions (“repo”).


Against this background, the Commission is at this stage focussing its analysis on the following possible shadow banking entities and activities. This should not be viewed as exhaustive, as shadow banking entities and activities can evolve very rapidly.


Possible shadow banking entities and activities on which the Commission is currently focussing its analysis


Entities:


– Special purpose entities which perform liquidity and/or maturity transformation; for example, securitization vehicles such as ABCP conduits, Special Investment Vehicles (SIV) and other Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV);

– Money Market Funds (MMFs) and other types of investment funds or products with deposit-like characteristics, which make them vulnerable to massive redemptions (“runs”);

– Investment funds, including Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), that provide credit or are leveraged;

– Finance companies and securities entities providing credit or credit guarantees, or performing liquidity and/or maturity transformation without being regulated like a bank;

and

– Insurance and reinsurance undertakings which issue or guarantee credit products.


Activities:

– Securitisation; and

– Securities lending and repo.


…


The FSB has roughly estimated the size of the global shadow banking system at around € 46 trillion in 2010, having grown from € 21 trillion in 2002. This represents 25-30% of the total financial system and half the size of bank assets. In the United States, this proportion is even more significant, with an estimated figure of between 35% and 40%. However, according to the FSB estimates, the share of the assets of financial intermediaries other than banks located in Europe as a percentage of the global size of shadow banking system has strongly increased from 2005 to 2010, while the share of US located assets has decreased. On a global scale, the share of those assets held by European jurisdictions has increased from 10 to 13% for UK intermediaries, from 6 to 8% for NL intermediaries, from 4% to 5% for DE intermediaries and from 2% to 3% for ES intermediaries. FR and IT intermediaries maintained their previous shares in the global shadow banks assets of 6% and 2% respectively.


 


DOWNLO)AD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


ECB-ShadowBanking-1

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – NSA Cybercom Running Anonymous Operations
		
	
	

		
NSA Cybercom Running Anonymous Operations


 




http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/us/cyberattacks-are-up-national-security-chief-says.html


General Alexander, who rarely speaks publicly, did not say how many attacks had occurred in that period. But he said that he thought the increase was unrelated to the release two years ago of a computer worm known as Stuxet, which was aimed at taking down Iran’s uranium enrichment plant at Natanz.


When the worm inadvertently became public, many United States officials and outside experts expressed concern that it could be reverse-engineered and used against American targets. General Alexander said he saw no evidence of that.


General Alexander, as head of the N.S.A., was a crucial player in a covert American program called Olympic Games that targeted the Iranian program. But under questioning from Pete Williams of NBC News at a security conference here, he declined to say whether Stuxnet was American in origin; the Obama administration has never acknowledged using cyberweapons. …


General Alexander spoke in a 75-minute interview at the Aspen Security Forum at the Aspen Institute here. The New York Times is a media sponsor of the four-day conference.


http://aspensecurityforum.org/


—–


Cryptome: Alexander, contrary to previous DIRNSAs, is speaking quite often to gin cyber-aggression as dual-use head of NSA and Cybercom, first for defense second for offense, both now ordered to expound open cyber-threat propaganda to parallel long-standing covert information operations.


Among a slew of commercial initiatives drumming cyber conflict, the Aspen Security Forum aims to be the premier war-bloviation platform, heavily empaneled by former USG officials now shilling for the national security industry. NY Times sponsorship is indicative of the perdurable wartime financial benefits for the media in conjunction with financial markets. Bloviation blows ill winds, the storm front gaining force during presidential campaigns.


Cyber attacks on the US, do not forget them, they are legion, expect them, thanks to NSA/Cyber Command Anonymous operations.


 




 




 


 


 



	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/USArmy-SoldierSurveillance.png


 


This publication establishes the Army’s doctrine in support of the Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) initiative. The need for Soldiers to be aware that basic observations are an important part of operations has led to the development of this manual.


This manual expands on the information contained in ST 2-91.6 and provides a foundation for developing tactical questioning and reporting and supersedes all other tactical questioning handbooks produced by the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), specifically the Tactical Questioning Soldier’s Handbook and ST 2-91.6. This manual––


• Provides the doctrinal framework for Soldiers and leaders at all echelons and forms the foundation for ES2 curricula within the Army Education System. Its audience is broad, from military Soldiers and leaders to civilians. It is essential that all Soldiers and civilians understand how their daily observations feed into the bigger intelligence process and help create a more favorable environment for US success in a region.

• Is a compilation of tools to help all Soldiers collect information through tactical questioning, detainee handling, and document and equipment handling in offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support operations.

• Is not intended to make the Soldier an expert on intelligence collection. It is not intended to train Soldiers as intelligence collectors nor authorize Soldiers to conduct interrogation and source operations.

• Introduces the basics of questioning and reporting and provides some tools for patrols and S-2s.

• Applies to the Full Spectrum Operations. Principles outlined are valid under conditions involving use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE).


This manual is a compilation of tools to help all Soldiers collect information through surveillance, reconnaissance, patrolling, interacting with the local populace, tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning and detainee handling, briefing, debriefing, and reporting in offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support operations. Most of the text was developed specifically for patrols and to conduct traffic control points (TCPs) or roadblocks, and other missions where Soldiers will interact with the local populace including site exploitation and tactical questioning after a planned or hasty raid. The term “patrol” could reflect a platoon, section, fire team, or other special-purpose group given a mission as listed above.


This manual applies to Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. Although this is Army doctrine, other services will make necessary adaptations based on each of their organizations and service-specific doctrine.


…


…


3-35. When conducting tactical questioning, it is imperative that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions (FM 27-10) be followed at all times. When possible, obtain as much information as needed through tactical questioning in order to exploit perishable information (for example, another insurgent operation occurring at the same time, the current location of a known HVT). Personnel talked to are not to be mistreated in any way:


DO NOT––


    

  • Pay money or compensate for information.
    • 

  • Attempt to force or scare information from noncombatants.
    • 

  • Attempt to recruit or task someone to go seek out information.
    • 

  • Issue government equipment or identification in exchange for information.
    • 

  • Refer to personnel questioned as “sources.”
    • 

  • Establish a “source network.”
    • 

  • Ask questions of noncombatants in an area where the questioning puts the noncombatant in danger. Be discreet, but not so discreet that you attract attention.
    • 

  • Ask questions that make your unit’s mission or information requirements obvious.
    • 

  • Take notes in front of the person after asking the question.
    • 

  • Ask leading questions. Leading questions are phrased in a way to invoke a particular answer, not simply a yes or no answer. Leading questions allow the individual to answer with a response he or she thinks you want to hear, not necessarily the facts. For example, “Is Group XYZ responsible?”
    • 

  • Ask negative questions. Negative questions are questions that contain a negative word in the question itself such as “Didn’t you go to the warehouse?”
    • 

  • Ask compound questions. Compound questions consist of two questions asked at the same time; for example, “Where were you going after work and who were you to meet there?”
    • 

  • Ask vague questions. Vague questions do not have enough information for the person to understand exactly what you are asking. They may be incomplete, general, or otherwise nonspecific and create doubt in the person’s mind.
    • 

  • Mention that they may be interrogated later or try any other “scare tactic.”
    • 

  • Give comfort items to EPWs/detainees. . . they are not your guests.
    • 

  • Inform them of their rights; someone else will handle that task.
    • 



DO—


    

  • Ask only basic questions as described in this section.
    • 

  • Move detainees to a detention facility as quickly as possible.
    • 



…


INTERVIEW PREPARATION


B-25. Soldiers should cover the following in preparing for interviews:


    

  • Select an appropriate site for interviews. Position and arrange the physical setup of the area. When conducting interviews with important people or individuals from different cultures, this arrangement can be significant.
    • 

  • Instruct interpreters to mirror the Soldier’s tone and personality of speech. Instruct interpreters not to interject their own questions or personality. Also instruct interpreters to inform them if they notice any inconsistencies or peculiarities from those being interviewed.
    • 

  • When possible, identify cultural restrictions before interviewing, instructing, or conferring with particular foreign nationals. For instance, Soldiers should know when is it proper to stand, sit, or cross one’s legs. Gestures, being learned behavior, vary from culture to culture. Interpreters should be able to relate a number of these cultural restrictions, which, whenever possible, should be observed in working with particular groups or individuals.
    • 

  • Rehearse with the interpreter using maps, key words or phrases, diagrams, or models that may facilitate a discussion. The interpreter may be able to explain to the Soldier the significance of symbols or gestures commonly used in a conversation to emphasize a point that may not be verbalized.
    • 



CONDUCTING AN INTERVIEW

B-26. Soldiers should cover the following when conducting an interview or presenting a lesson:


    

  • Avoid simultaneous translations; that is, both the Soldier and the interpreter talking at the same time. This can be disrupting unless the Soldier and interpreter work very well together.
    • 

  • Speak for a minute or less in a neutral, relaxed manner, directly to the individual or audience. The interpreter should watch the Soldier carefully and, during the translation, mimic the Soldier’s body language as well as interpret his or her verbal meaning. Observe interpreters closely to detect any inconsistencies between an interpreter’s and a Soldier’s manners. Be careful not to force an interpreter into a literal translation by being too brief. Present one major thought in its entirety and allow the interpreter to reconstruct it in his language and culture.
    • 

  • Although interpreters perform some editing as a function of the interpreting process, it is imperative that they transmit the exact meaning without additions or deletions. Insist that interpreters always ask for clarification, prior to interpreting, whenever they are not absolutely certain of the Soldier’s meaning. However, be aware that a good interpreter, especially one who is local, can be invaluable in translating subtleties and hidden meanings.
    • 

  • During an interview or lesson, if questions are asked, interpreters should immediately relay them for an answer. Interpreters should never attempt to answer questions even though they may know the correct answer. Additionally, neither Soldiers nor interpreters should correct each other in front of an interviewee or class; all differences should be settled away from the subject or audience.
    • 

  • Just as establishing rapport with the interpreter is vitally important, establishing rapport with interview subjects or the target audience is equally important. Soldiers and interpreters should concentrate on rapport. To establish rapport, subjects or audiences should be treated as mature, important human beings who are capable and worthy.
    • 




	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI –  $ 97 Million Medicare Fraud Scheme
		
	
	

		


WASHINGTON—A superseding indictment was unsealed today charging two owners of a Houston mental health care company, Spectrum Care P.A., some of its employees, and the owners of Houston group care homes for their alleged participation in a $97 million Medicare fraud scheme, announced the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the FBI.


Mansour Sanjar, 79; Cyrus Sajadi, 64; and Chandra Nunn, 34, were originally charged in December 2011 and are expected to make their initial appearances on the superseding indictment in the coming days. The indictment was originally retuned on July 24, 2012, and was unsealed today.


Adam Main, 31; Shokoufeh Hakimi, 65; Sharonda Holmes, 38; and Shawn Manney, 50, all from the Houston area, were arrested today and are expected to make their initial appearances in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Houston either today or tomorrow.


The superseding indictment charges Sanjar, Sajadi, Main, Terry Wade Moore, 51, Hakimi, and Nunn each with one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud; Sanjar, Sajadi, Main, and Moore are charged with various counts of health care fraud; Sanjar, Sajadi, Hakimi, Nunn, Holmes, and Manney each are charged with one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and to pay health care kickbacks; and Sanjar, Sajadi, Hakimi, Nunn, Holmes, and Manney are charged with various counts of payment and receipt of healthcare kickbacks. The superseding indictment also seeks forfeiture.


According to the indictment, Sanjar and Sajadi orchestrated and executed a scheme to defraud Medicare beginning in 2006 and continuing until their arrest in December 2011. Sanjar and Sajadi owned Spectrum, which purportedly provided partial hospitalization program (PHP) services. A PHP is a form of intensive outpatient treatment for severe mental illness. The Medicare beneficiaries for whom Spectrum billed Medicare for PHP services did not qualify for or need PHP services. Sanjar, Sajadi, Main, and Moore signed admission documents and progress notes certifying that patients qualified for PHP services, when, in fact, the patients did not qualify for or need PHP services. Sanjar and Sajadi also billed Medicare for PHP services when the beneficiaries were actually watching movies, coloring, and playing games—activities that are not covered by Medicare.


Sanjar, Sajadi, and Hakimi paid kickbacks to Nunn, Holmes, Manney, and other group care home operators and patient recruiters in exchange for delivering ineligible Medicare beneficiaries to Spectrum, according to the indictment. In some cases, the patients received a portion of those kickbacks. The indictment alleges that Spectrum billed Medicare for approximately $97 million in services that were not medically necessary and, in some cases, not provided.


Today’s charges were announced by Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney Kenneth Magidson of the Southern District of Texas; Special Agent in Charge Stephen L. Morris of the FBI’s Houston Field Office; Special Agent in Charge Mike Fields of the Dallas Regional Office of HHS’s Office of the Inspector General (HHS-OIG); the Texas Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU); Joseph J. Del Favero, Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Field Office of the Railroad Retirement Board, Office of Inspector General (RRB-OIG); and Scott Rezendes, Special Agent in Charge of Field Operations of the Office of Personnel Management, Office of Inspector General (OPM-OIG).


An indictment is merely a formal accusation. Defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.


The case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorneys Laura M.K. Cordova and Allan J. Medina and Deputy Chief Sam S. Sheldon of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section with assistance from Trial Attorneys Jennifer Ambuehl and Aixa Maldonado-Quinones of the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section. The case was investigated by the FBI, HHS-OIG, MFCU, RRB-OIG, and OPM-OIG and was brought as part of the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, supervised by the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas.


Since its inception in March 2007, the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, now operating in nine cities across the country, has charged more than 1,330 defendants who have collectively billed the Medicare program for more than $4 billion. In addition, HHS’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, working in conjunction with HHS-OIG, is taking steps to increase accountability and decrease the presence of fraudulent providers.


To learn more about the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT), go to http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
The FBI – Former Carmel Real Estate Developer Pleads Guilty to $16 Million Golf Course Investment Fraud Scheme
		
	
	

		


SAN JOSE, CA—A former Carmel, California real estate developer pleaded guilty today to wire fraud and money laundering arising out of his golf course investment fraud scheme in which he defrauded more than 50 victims, U.S. Attorney Melinda Haag announced.


Thomas Joseph O’Meara, III, 65, formerly a Carmel resident now living in Palm Desert, California, admitted in his plea agreement that he carried out an investment fraud scheme from 2004 to 2007. O’Meara recruited individuals to invest more than $16 million in a 18-hole golf course and gated housing development in Fresno, California, that he named the Running Horse Golf and Country Club.


According to the indictment, O’Meara retained professional golfer Jack Nicklaus’ firm Nicklaus Design to design the Running Horse golf course and convinced the PGA Tour to publically schedule a PGA Tour event at the golf course. O’Meara admitted in the plea agreement that in an effort to recruit investors and secure money for the planned golf course, he lied about Nicklaus Design’s and the PGA Tour’s confidence in the development. O’Meara also admitted that he lied to investors about the progress and financial condition of the development. The Running Horse Development ultimately failed, investors lost their money, no PGA Tour golf event took place, and the 450 Fresno-area acres on which the golf course and gated community was to have been located remain largely undeveloped.


O’Meara has been on home detention and electronic monitoring, secured by a bond, since his August 3, 2010, arrest in Palm Desert.


O’Meara’s sentencing is scheduled for November 14, 2012, before United States District Judge Lucy H. Koh in San Jose.


In pleading guilty, O’Meara admitted to wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (count 15) and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (count 30). The maximum statutory penalty for wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 is 20 years in prison and a fine of $250,000, plus restitution. The maximum statutory penalty for money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 is 10 years in prison and a fine of $250,000, plus restitution. O’Meara agreed in his plea agreement to pay at least $7 million in restitution to victims. However, any sentence following conviction would be imposed by the court after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the federal status governing the imposition of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553.


Joseph Fazioli is the Assistant U.S. Attorney who is prosecuting the case with the assistance of Legal Assistant Kamille Singh. The prosecution is the result of a multi-year investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service. The United States Attorney’s Office recognizes the substantial and valuable assistance of the Monterey County District Attorney’s Office in this matter.



	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome reports Getty Recycles bin Laden Operation Photos
		
	
	

		


Getty Recycles bin Laden Operation Photos




[Image]


Getty Images 23 minutes ago (downloaded 25 July 2012, 17:05)


WASHINGTON, DC – MAY 1: In this photo provided by The White House, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (L), President Barack Obama (2nd-R) and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon (R) attenda a meeting in the Situation Room on May 1, 2012 in Washington, DC. President Barack Obama’s national security team held a series of meeting to discusss Osama bin Laden.


[Image]


Getty Images 23 minutes ago (downloaded 25 July 2012, 17:05)


WASHINGTON, DC – MAY 1: In this photo provided by The White House, (L-R) Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough, John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Tony Blinken, National Security Advisor to the Vice President and President Barack Obama attend a meeting in the Situation Room on May 1, 2012 in Washington, DC. President Barack Obama’s national security team held a series of meeting to discusss Osama bin Laden.


[Image]


Getty Images 38 minutes ago (downloaded 25 July 2012, 17:09)


WASHINGTON, DC – MAY 1: In this photo provided by The White House, (L-R) National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper listen as Leon Panetta, Director of the CIA speaks during a meeting in the Situation Room on May 1, 2012 in Washington, DC. President Barack Obama’s national security team held a series of meeting to discusss Osama bin Laden.


[Image]


Getty Images 38 minutes ago (downloaded 25 July 2012, 17:10)


WASHINGTON, DC – MAY 1: In this photo provided by The White House, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates attend a meeting in the Situation Room on May 1, 2012 in Washington, DC. President Barack Obama’s national security team held a series of meeting to discusss Osama bin Laden.


[Image]


Getty Images 38 minutes ago (downloaded 25 July 2012, 17:11) [Earlier White House release]


WASHINGTON, DC – MAY 1: In this photo provided by The White House, (L-R) President Barack Obama,National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Leon Panetta, Director of the CIA, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and Vice President Joe Biden attend a meeting in the Situation Room on May 1, 2012 in Washington, DC. President Barack Obama’s national security team held a series of meeting to discusss Osama bin Laden. [Man between James Clapper and Leon Panetta is unidentified CIA officer who tracked bin Laden.]


[Image]


Getty Images 38 minutes ago (downloaded 25 July 2012, 17:12)


WASHINGTON, DC – MAY 1: In this photo provided by The White House, (L-R) Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Leon Panetta, Director of the CIA and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon attend a meeting in the Situation Room on May 1, 2012 in Washington, DC. President Barack Obama’s national security team held a series of meeting to discusss Osama bin Laden. [Man at upper left behind James Clapper is unidentified CIA officer who tracked bin Laden.]


[Image]


Getty Images 43 minutes ago (downloaded 25 July 2012, 17:14)


WASHINGTON, DC – MAY 1: In this photo provided by The White House, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff speaks during a meeting in the Situation Room on May 1, 2012 in Washington, DC. President Barack Obama’s national security team held a series of meeting to discusss Osama bin Laden.


[Image]


Getty Images 9 minutes ago (downloaded 25 July 2012, 17:15)


WASHINGTON, DC – MAY 1: In this photo provided by The White House, Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough chats during a meeting in the Situation Room on May 1, 2012 in Washington, DC. President Barack Obama’s national security team held a series of meeting to discusss Osama bin Laden.

	


	



			
				


			

			
The Internet’s First Serial Killer – Full Movie
		
	
	

		


John Edward Robinson (born December 27, 1943) is a convicted serial killer, con man, embezzler, kidnapper, and forger. Because he made contact with most of his post-1993 victims via on-line chat rooms, he is sometimes referred to as “the Internet’s first serial killer”.

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Sworn Declaration of Whistleblower William Binney on NSA Domestic Surveillance Capabilities
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NSA-WilliamBinneyDeclaration.png


The following sworn declaration of William Binney, a former employee of the NSA and specialist in traffic analysis, was filed July 2, 2012 in support of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s case against the National Security Agency (Jewel v. NSA) regarding their illegal domestic surveillance programs which, according to Binney “are consistent, as a mathematical matter, with seizing both the routing information and the contents of all electronic communications” inside the U.S.  Thanks to Jacob Appelbaum for originally drawing attention to the declaration.


I, William Binney, declare:


1. I am a former employee of the National Security Agency (“NSA”), the signals intelligence agency within the Department of Defense. Unless otherwise indicated, I have personal knowledge of each and every fact set forth below and can competently testify thereto.


2. A true and correct copy of my resume is attached hereto as Exhibit A.


3. In the late 1990′s, the increasing use of the Internet for communications presented the NSA with a special kind of problem: The NSA could not collect and smartly select from the large volume of data traversing the Internet the nuggets of needed information about “Entities of Interest” or “Communities of Interest,” while protecting the privacy of U.S. persons. Human analysts had to manually identify the groups and entities associated with activities that the NSA sought to monitor. That process was so laborious that it significantly hampered the NSA’s ability to do large scale data analysis.


4. One of my roles at the NSA was to find a means of automating the work of human analysts. I supervised and participated in the development of a program called “Thin Thread” within the NSA. Thin Thread was designed to identify networks of connections between individuals from their electronic communications over the Internet in an automated fashion in real time. The concept was for devices running Thin Thread to monitor international communications traffic passing over the Internet. Where one side of an international communication was domestic, the NSA had to comply with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). With Thin Thread, the data would be encrypted (and the privacy of U.S. citizens protected) until such time as a warrant could be obtained from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Comi.


5. The advent of the September 11 attacks brought a complete change in the approach 18 of the NSA toward doing its job. FISA ceased to be an operative concern, and the individual liberties preserved in the U.S. Constitution were no longer a consideration. It was at that time that the NSA began to implement the group of intelligence activities now known as the President’s Surveillance Program (“PSP”). While I was not personally read into the PSP, various members of my Thin Thread team were given the task of implementing various aspects of the PSP. They confided in me and told me that the PSP involved the collection of domestic electronic communications traffic without any of the privacy protections built into Thin Thread.


6. I resigned from the NSA in late 2001. I could not stay after the NSA began purposefully violating the Constitution.


7. The NSA chose not to implement Thin Thread. To the best of my knowledge, the NSA does not have a means of analyzing Internet data for the purpose of identifying Entities or Communities of Interest in real time. The NSA has the capability to do individualized searches, similar to Google, for particular electronic communications in real time through such criteria as target addresses, locations, countries and phone numbers, as well as watch-listed names, keywords, and phrases in email. The NSA also has the capability to seize and store most electronic communications passing through its U.S. intercept centers. The wholesale collection of data allows the NSA to identify and analyze Entities or Communities of interest later in a static database. Based on my proximity to the PSP and my years of experience at the NSA, I can draw informed conclusions from the available facts. Those facts indicate that the NSA is doing both.


8. The NSA could have installed its intercept equipment at the nation’s fiber-optic cable landing stations. See Greg’s Cable Map, cablemap.info. There are more than two dozen such sites on the U.S. coasts where fiber-optic cables come ashore. If the NSA had taken that route, it would have been able to limit its interception of electronic communications to international/international and international/domestic communications and exclude domestic/domestic communications. Instead the NSA chose to put its intercept equipment at key junction points (for example Folsom Street) and probably throughout the nation, thereby giving itself access to purely domestic communications. The conclusion of J. Scott Marcus in his declaration that the “collection of infrastructure … has all the capability necessary to conduct large scale covert gathering of IP-based communications information, not only for communications to overseas locations, but .for purely domestic communications as well,” is correct.


9. I estimate that the NSA installed no fewer than ten and possibly in excess of twenty intercept centers within the United States. I am familiar with the contents of Mark Klein’s declaration. The AT&T center on Folsom Street in San Francisco is one of the NSA intercept centers. Mr. Klein indicated that the NSA’s equipment intercepted Internet traffic on AT&T’s peering network. It makes sense for the NSA to intercept traffic on AT &T’s peering network. The idea would be to avoid having to install interception equipment on each of the thousands of parallel data lines that eventually lead into and out of peering networks. By focusing on peering networks, the NSA intercepts data at the choke point in the system through which all data must pass in order to move from one party’s network to another’s. This is particularly important because a block data is often broken up into many smaller packets for transmission. These packets may traverse different routes before reaching the destination computer which gathers them and reassembles the original block.


10. One of the most notable pieces of equipment identified in Mr. Klein’s declaration is the NARUS Semantic Traffic Analyzer. According to the NARUS website, each NARUS device collects telecommunications data at the rate of ten gigabits per second and organizes the data into coherent streams based on the protocol associated with a specific type of collected data. A protocol is an agreed-upon way for data to be broken down into packets for transmission over the Internet, for the packets to be routed over the Internet to a designated destination and for the packets to be re-assembled at its destination. Protocols exist at each layer of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) 7-layer telecommunications model and are used for a wide variety of data, not just electronic communications. That means that NARUS can reconstruct all information transmitted through the peering network and forward all of the electronic communications to a database for analysis. The NARUS device can also select predetermined data from that path and forward the data to organizations having interest in the data. As I indicated above, the predetermined data would involve target addresses, locations, countries, and phone numbers, as well as watch-listed names, keywords, and phrases.


11. A further notable development has been the NSA’s public announcement in October 2009 that it was building a massive, $1.2 billion digital storage facility in Ft. Williams, Utah. According to some reports, the Utah facility will eventually have a data storage capacity measured in yottabytes (1024 bytes). Even if the Utah facility were to have no more than the amount of data storage that is presently commercially available, then one would expect the data storage to be in the range of multiples often exebytes (1018 bytes). See http://www.cleversafe.com. (According to Cleversafe, its ten exebyte storage solution fills no more than two hundred square feet). In April 2011, the NSA also announced that it would build a new supercomputing center at its Ft. Meade, Maryland headquarters.


12. The amount of data that each NARUS device can process per second is large (10 gigabits is 10 billion bits). To illustrate the sheer size of the data storage capacity ofthe Utah facility, one could assume the installation of twenty-five NARUS devices in the U.S. and that all of 2 the NARUS-processed data is sent via fiber-optic cable to Utah. That means that the NARUS processing rate of 10 billion bits per second means that one machine can produce approximately 4 x 1016 bytes per year. That in turn means that it would take twenty-five devices one year to fill an exebyte or ten years to fill ten exebytes.


13. The sheer size of that capacity indicates that the NSA is not filtering personal electronic communications such as email before storage but is, in fact, storing all that they are collecting. The capacity of NSA’s planned infrastructure far exceeds the capacity necessary for the storage of discreet, targeted communications or even for the storage of the routing information from all electronic communications. The capacity of NSA’s planned infrastructure is consistent, as a mathematical matter, with seizing both the routing information and the contents of all electronic communications.


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:


NSA-WilliamBinneyDeclaration

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Two TSA Screeners Agree to Plead Guilty to Conspiracy Charges
		
	
	

		


LOS ANGELES—Two people who were employed as transportation security officers at Los Angeles International Airport—and a third person who allegedly smuggled marijuana to Boston—were charged today with conspiring to pay bribes to the employees of the Transportation Security Administration.


The three defendants have agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy charges in plea agreements that were also filed this morning in United States District Court. Two other drug couriers previously agreed to plead guilty in this case, meaning that five defendants have now been charged and agreed to plead guilty in this investigation.


The three defendants charged today are:


    

  • Dianna Perez, 28, of Inglewood, who was terminated as a TSA employee last October;
    • 

  • Randy Littlefield, 29, of Paramount, who resigned from TSA last October; and
    • 

  • Millage Peaks, 24, of Los Angeles, who initiated the bribery scheme when he offered Perez money to allow narcotics-laden luggage to be passed through security checkpoints.
    • 



The other two defendants who agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy charges in plea agreements filed July 2 are:


    

  • Charles Hicks, also known as “Smoke,” 24, of Culver City; and
    • 

  • Andrew Russel Welter, also known as “Drew,” 25, of Fontana.
    • 



All five defendants are scheduled to make their initial appearances in federal court on August 14.


According to court documents, the conspiracy between the drug couriers and the TSA employees began November 2010. “Peaks offered to pay coconspirator Perez a bribe fee of approximately $500 for each bag containing marijuana that coconspirator Perez cleared through airport security for the drug couriers,” according to the statement of facts contained in the five plea agreements.


“Over the course of the next year, conspirator Perez used her position with TSA to help the drug couriers circumvent airport security on approximately nine occasions,” the statement of facts continues. “She did this a number of ways. First, she would instruct the drug couriers how to pack the marijuana so it would not trigger alarms on TSA’s explosive detection system. Coconspirator Perez would also personally screen the bags using TSA’s explosive detection system. Finally, if a bag did alarm, co-conspirator Perez would manually screen the bag and then clear it.”


Littlefield “cleared” bags on at least two occasions in exchange for $200 that was to be paid by Perez, according to the plea agreements.


The charge of conspiracy carries a statutory maximum penalty of five years in federal prison.


The case against Perez, Littlefield, and the drug couriers is the result of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which received assistance from the Los Angeles Airport Police and the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General.


In an unrelated case filed by the United States Attorney’s Office in April, two then-TSA screeners who worked at LAX, two former TSA screeners and three alleged drug couriers were indicted on narcotics trafficking and bribery charges for allegedly taking cash payments to allow large shipments of cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana to pass through the X-ray machines at security checkpoints (see: http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/2012/051.html). The seven defendants in this case are currently scheduled to go on trial on February 12, 2013.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
The Baton Rouge Serial Killer – Full Movie
		
	
	

		


Derrick Todd Lee (born November 5, 1968 in St. Francisville, Louisiana, USA) is a convicted serial killer, nicknamed the Baton Rouge Serial Killer.[1]

He was linked by DNA to the deaths of seven women in the Baton Rouge and Lafayette areas in Louisiana, and in 2004 was convicted of the murders of Geralyn DeSoto and Charlotte Murray Pace. Newspapers have suggested Lee can be linked to other unsolved murders in the area, but the police lack DNA evidence to prove these connections. After Lee’s arrest, it was discovered that another serial killer, Sean Vincent Gillis, was also operating in the Baton Rouge area during the same time as Lee.

Lee’s methods varied with nearly each murder. Similarities between the crimes included the removal of cell phones from the victim’s belongings, and a lack of any visible signs of forced entry into the location where the victim was attacked. Most of the murders were committed in the area around Louisiana State University (LSU). Two of the victims’ bodies were discovered at the Whiskey Bay boat launch, approximately 30 miles west of Baton Rouge, just off of Interstate 10.

	


	



			
				


			

			
“GoMoPa” – Cyberattacken – Graumarktinfo – Gerlach
		
	
	

		


Liebe Leser,


gibt es eigentlich noch etwas absurders als die “GoMoPa”-Cyber-Rufmorde ?


“Nein”, werden Sie sagen.


Ich sage: “Ja !”


Die “GoMoPa”-Lebensläufe” und die Behauptung,  “Opfer” von Cyberattacken geworden zu sein wegen “kritischen Journalismus.”


Und das “GoMoPa”-Kinderportal mit Sexualerziehung für Kinder… Wobei NUR absurd hier nicht zutrifft…




Typisch “GoMoPa”: Die Tatsachen umdrehen und mit Fälschungen arbeiten:


Fakt ist, dass Info-Portal der Journalistin Renate Daum von Gruner & Jahr wurde mit Cyber-Attacken angegriffen, ebenso wie seinerseits die Gerlach-Webseite kurz vor Gerlachs äusserst mysteriösen Tod, einem mutmasslichen Mord durch Dioxin, um dies zu verschleiern ist jetzt “GoMoPa”  “Opfer”.


Ein durchsichtiges Spiel mit immer denselben Tricks (siehe auch die Meridan Capital-Fälschungen).


Ich weiß, wovon ich rede, denn auch unsere Webseiten werden ständig angegriffen. Mutmasslich von “GoMoPa”-Hackern, mutmasslich koordiniert von Sven Schmidt und Thomas Promny.


Wie gesagt: “Die Schweine erkennt der Bauer am Gang!”


Herzlichst Ihr


Bernd Pulch, MA


PS: Offensichtlich kundschaftet “GoMoPa” auch das Privatleben von Frau Daum aus und infiltriert ihre Umgebung (“GoMoPa”-Bemerkung über ihren Lebensgefährten) – auch diese STASI-Methoden kenne ich seit Jahren. Auch bei Heinz Gerlach wurde so verfahren. Hier die Belege:


  

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Activation Order – ADM Cyberstalker Client
		
	
	

		
Activation Order –ADM Cyberstalker


Client – ADM Corporate Security Division


Overview – The client has requested a new cyberstalker report regarding their CEO, Patricia A. Woertz and her immediate family.


Deliverable – Stratfor will provide a written report detailing the available public information regarding the Woertz family. The report will include only information obtained from publicly available sources.


ACTIVATION ORDER – Cyberstalker Report






Date
2007-10-01 18:32:44




From
alfano@stratfor.com




To
howerton@stratfor.com

mfriedman@stratfor.com

gfriedman@stratfor.com

stewart@stratfor.com

McCullar@stratfor.com

greg.sikes@stratfor.com

briefers@stratfor.com		




Others
MessageId: <00df01c80448$b27a6020$8ead1cac@stratfor.com>

InReplyTo: 000c01c7fabf$b265ebf0$ae01a8c0@stratfor.com		






The report will contain two primary sections.  The first section will be prose detailing our findings—this section will be approximately four to five pages long.  The second section will be appendices that will provide a copy and paste view of the actual information that we were able to obtain.


The final report should be delivered in PDF format.


Timeline – Anya will write this report.  Following comments from Stick, I’ll send the report to Mike McCullar for edit before COB on Thursday, October 4.  Mike will return the finished product to me by COB on Wednesday, October 10.


Comments –   Client is making decision about whether to conduct full re-investigations on other members of the family.


Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
Unternehmen wehren sich – “Life Forestry warnt Unternehmen vor Cyber Mobbing und Erpressung”
		
	
	

		
Life Forestry Switzerland AG: Wie seriös ist Gomopa? Life Forestry warnt Unternehmen vor Cyber Mobbing und Erpressung


EquityStory AG-News: Life Forestry Switzerland AG / Schlagwort(e): Marktbericht/Stellungnahme Life Forestry Switzerland AG: Wie seriös ist Gomopa? Life Forestry warnt Unternehmen vor Cyber Mobbing und Erpressung


23.07.2012 / 11:42


———————————————————————


Life Forestry warnt Unternehmen vor Cyber Mobbing und Erpressung


Stans, CH, 23. Juli 2012: In Deutschland werden jährlich Tausende von Unternehmen Opfer von Online-Verleumdung und Erpressung. Viele Unternehmen zahlen im Stillen das geforderte ‘Schutzgeld’, um größere Image-Schäden abzuwehren. Das Unternehmen Life Forestry wehrt sich – und macht anderen Unternehmen Mut, seinem Beispiel zu folgen.


Die Life Forestry Switzerland AG aus dem eidgenössischen Stans zählt zu den führenden Anbietern von Direktinvestments in Teakholz und betreut seit 2006 in Zentralamerika Aufforstungsprojekte der höchsten Qualitätsstufe. Seit einigen Wochen ist das Mittelstandsunternehmen Opfer einer gezielten Verleumdungskampagne des vermeintlichen Online-Nachrichtendienstes ‘Gomopa’.


Wie Berichte in der FAZ, dem Handelsblatt, Börse-Online, der Süddeutsche Zeitung und der Financial Times aufzeigen, steckt hinter Gomopa ein Netzwerk von Anwälten, Wirtschaftsdetektiven und Investmentprofis, die seit einigen Jahren in Deutschland immer wieder wegen fragwürdiger Geschäftspraktiken aufgefallen sind. Der Gomopa-Gründer und Unternehmenskopf Klaus Maurischat wurde bereits 2006 wegen Betrugs verurteilt, 2009 wurden Mitarbeiter von Gomopa wegen Insiderhandels und Aktienkursmanipulation im Zusammenhang mit dem Unternehmen WireCard angeklagt. Heute benutzt Gomopa sein gleichnamiges Nachrichtenportal dazu, um Unternehmen mit falschen Fakten und Anschuldigungen anzugreifen und zu erpressen. Zu ihren ‘Opfern’ zählen neben der Life Forestry AG die Immovation AG aus Kassel, die CPA Capital Partners AG und andere Mittelstandsunternehmen.


Die Life Forestry hat bereits vor Wochen Maßnahmen ergriffen, die zur Abwehr von Cyber Mobbing-Attacken beitragen: Zum Beispiel wurde beim Landgericht Frankfurt a.M. eine Unterlassungsverfügung erwirkt, die es Gomopa untersagt, seine ungerechtfertigten Anschuldigungen weiter im Internet zu verbreiten. Auch der Internet-Konzern Google wurde kontaktiert und gebeten, die betreffenden Aussagen aus den Suchmaschinen zu entfernen. Lambert Liesenberg, Geschäftsführer bei der Life Forestry AG, kommentiert die Abwehrmaßnahmen seines Unternehmens: ‘Wir tun, was wir können, um den Schaden zu minimieren. Aber die Cyber Mobber von Gomopa brauchen lediglich neue Anschuldigungen zu erfinden oder auf einen anderen Blog auszuweichen, und schon fängt der Kreislauf von vorne an.’


Aus diesem Grund hält es die Life Forestry AG für immens wichtig, die Öffentlichkeit und vor allem andere Unternehmen über Gomopas rufschädigende Methoden zu informieren. ‘Mafiöse Organisationen wie Gomopa leben davon, dass Unternehmen aus Angst vor Imageschäden ihren Forderungen nachgeben. Wenn bekannter wäre, wie Gomopa arbeitet, dann würde der Einfluss dieser Organisation sehr schnell schrumpfen,’ glaubt Lambert Liesenberg.


Auch im Hinblick auf ihre Kunden hält Life Forestry es für unverzichtbar, über die geschäftsschädigenden Praktiken der Cyber Mobber und ihre Anschuldigungen aufzuklären. Seit der Gründung gehört es zur Unternehmensphilosophie der Life Forestry Switzerland AG, das Vertrauen ihrer Kunden mit maximaler Qualität und – Transparenz – zu verdienen. Geschäftsführer Lambert Liesenberg: ‘Vom Geschäftsmodell über die präzise GPS-Erfassung aller Teakbaumbestände bis zur Herleitung unserer Ertragsprognosen verfolgen wir ein Ziel: für unsere Kunden ein Höchstmaß an Sicherheit und Nachvollziehbarkeit herauszuholen. Wenn Sie Fragen haben, dann zögern Sie nicht uns jederzeit zu kontaktieren.’


Die Life Forestry Switzerland AG bewirtschaftet Teakholz-Pflanzungen der höchsten Qualitätsstufe in Costa Rica und Ecuador. Die Kunden erwerben Eigentum an den Baumbeständen , die nach 20-jähriger Pflege geerntet und verkauft werden. Durch strengste professionelle Standards bei der Auswahl der Anbaugebiete und dem forstwirtschaftlichen Anbau wird eine Holzqualität erreicht, die sich im internationalen Holzmarkt mit Teakholz aus Naturwäldern messen kann. Jeder Teak-Forst wird vom FSC (Forest Stewardship Council) zertifiziert und die Bäume individuell gekennzeichnet. Über eine GPS-Vermessung aller Plantagen und der einzelnen Parzellen kann der Standort der Bäume jederzeit bestimmt und nachgeprüft werden. Teakholzinvestments von Life Forestry stehen für eine hohe finanzielle Performance in Verbindung mit einem messbaren ökologischen und sozialen Mehrwert.


Life Forestry Switzerland AG Mühlebachstrasse 3 CH – 6370 Stans NW


Carl-Lambert Liesenberg Geschäftsführer/CEO


Tel: +41 (0) 41 632 63 00 Fax: +41 (0) 41 632 63 01


info@lifeforestry.com http://www.lifeforestry.com


Ende der Medienmitteilung


———————————————————————


23.07.2012 Veröffentlichung einer Pressemitteilung, übermittelt durch EQS CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS. http://www.eqs.com – Medienarchiv unter http://www.eqs.com/ch/pressemappen


Für den Inhalt der Mitteilung ist der Herausgeber verantwortlich.

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission Official Report
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/FukushimaAccidentReport.png


A “manmade” disaster


The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties. They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents. Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly “manmade.” We believe that the root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions, rather than issues relating to the competency of any specific individual. (see Recommendation 1)


The direct causes of the accident were all foreseeable prior to March 11, 2011. But the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was incapable of withstanding the earthquake and tsunami that hit on that day. The operator (TEPCO), the regulatory bodies (NISA and NSC) and the government body promoting the nuclear power industry (METI), all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirements—such as assessing the probability of damage, preparing for containing collateral damage from such a disaster, and developing evacuation plans for the public in the case of a serious radiation release.


TEPCO and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) were aware of the need for structural reinforcement in order to conform to new guidelines, but rather than demanding their implementation, NISA stated that action should be taken autonomously by the operator. The Commission has discovered that no part of the required reinforcements had been implemented on Units 1 through 3 by the time of the accident. This was the result of tacit consent by NISA for a significant delay by the operators in completing the reinforcement. In addition, although NISA and the operators were aware of the risk of core damage from tsunami, no regulations were created, nor did TEPCO take any protective steps against such an occurrence.


Since 2006, the regulators and TEPCO were aware of the risk that a total outage of electricity at the Fukushima Daiichi plant might occur if a tsunami were to reach the level of the site. They were also aware of the risk of reactor core damage from the loss of seawater pumps in the case of a tsunami larger than assumed in the Japan Society of Civil Engineers estimation. NISA knew that TEPCO had not prepared any measures to lessen or eliminate the risk, but failed to provide specific instructions to remedy the situation.


We found evidence that the regulatory agencies would explicitly ask about the operators’ intentions whenever a new regulation was to be implemented. For example, NSC informed the operators that they did not need to consider a possible station blackout (SBO) because the probability was small and other measures were in place. It then asked the operators to write a report that would give the appropriate rationale for why this consideration was unnecessary. It then asked the operators to write a report that would give the appropriate rationale for why this consideration was unnecessary.


The regulators also had a negative attitude toward the importation of new advances in knowledge and technology from overseas. If NISA had passed on to TEPCO measures that were included in the B.5.b subsection of the U.S. security order that followed the 9/11 terrorist action, and if TEPCO had put the measures in place, the accident may have been preventable.


There were many opportunities for taking preventive measures prior to March 11. The accident occurred because TEPCO did not take these measures, and NISA and the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) went along. They either intentionally postponed putting safety measures in place, or made decisions based on their organization’s self interest, and not in the interest of public safety.


From TEPCO’s perspective, new regulations would have interfered with plant operations and weakened their stance in potential lawsuits. That was enough motivation for TEPCO to aggressively oppose new safety regulations and draw out negotiations with regulators via the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC). The regulators should have taken a strong position on behalf of the public, but failed to do so. As they had firmly committed themselves to the idea that nuclear power plants were safe, they were reluctant to actively create new regulations. Further exacerbating the problem was the fact that NISA was created as part of the Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry (METI), an organization that has been actively promoting nuclear power.


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


FukushimaAccidentReport

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Confidential – Cryptome publishes Masquerade Protests
		
	
	

		














Masquerade Protests








[Image]A man wearing a mask of Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy protest during a demonstration organized by Unions on July 19, 2012 in Barcelona, against the government’s welfare cuts. In the latest measures to lower Spain’s deficit, conservative Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy announced 65 billion euros’ ($80 billion) worth of savings measures. Getty




[Image]A street performer dressed as an character from the science fiction film Avatar walks among the crowds near Mexico City’s main plaza, the Zocalo, Friday, July 13, 2012. Street performers, many dressed in costumes, gathered to protest in the historic downtown area where once they were allowed to perform but are now run off by police. AP




[Image]An anti-government demonstrator holds a molotov cocktail during clashes in the village of Sitra, south of Manama, Bahrain July 13, 2012. Dozens of demonstrators marched in an attempt to protest under the slogan ”Challenge Friday”, challenging the authorities after the government banned the protest. On Thursday, the Ministry of Interior issued a statement saying that the ministry is looking into venues where protests can be held. Reuters




[Image]An animal rights activist wearing an elephant-shaped headpiece arrives holding a placard for a protest in front of the Staples Center in Los Angeles, on July 11, 2012 in California, on the opening day of the Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus. Representatives of PETA, Animal Defenders International, In Defense of Animals, Last Chance for Animals, and the Animal Protection and Rescue League participated with a message for prospective circusgoers: Don’t go. Getty




[Image]A member of the Sikh community takes part in a protest against the Pakistani government in New Delhi on July 15, 2012. Sikh protesters demanded the immediate release of Indian national Sarabjit Singh who is currently held in a Pakistani prison. Sarabjit Singh is a high-profile prisoner who has spent two decades in solitary confinement on death row in Lahore after being convicted for his role in a string of bombings. Getty




[Image]An Israeli protester wearing a Guy Fawkes mask and Pharaoh headpiece chains his hand as he holds a slogan which reads in Hebrew ‘The justice is like Pharaoh’ during a demonstration in the Mediterranean coastal city of Tel Aviv on July 14, 2012 to mark the first anniversary of last summer’s social justice demonstrations that swept the country to protest the spiralling cost of living. Getty




[Image]Demonstrators march against student tuition hikes and Bill 78 in downtown Montreal, Quebec July 22, 2012. The mass demonstration, which is quickly becoming a monthly protest in Montreal since it started around six months ago, has drawn tens of thousands of people to protest in the city. Reuters




[Image]A woman wears an old police helmet during a protest by firefighters and police officers against government austerity measures in Valencia July 23, 2012. Reuters




[Image]A member of the movement ‘YoSoy#132’ takes part in a protest against the election results at Reforma avenue, in Mexico City, on July 22, 2012. The movement is protesting against Enrique Pena Nieto, candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), who declared victory in the presidential election, after the first official results showed him with 38 percent of the vote. The candidate for the leftist coalition Progressive Movement of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, the winner’s nearest rival, refused to concede the race to Pena Nieto until the official final results be released, claiming to have data showing different results. Getty


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[Image]Juan Antonio Torres, 42, a social worker and member of the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO), lies in a coffin while wearing a mask of Spain’s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy during a protest march against austerity measures in Malaga, southern Spain, July 19, 2012. Hundreds of thousands of Spaniards marched against the centre-right government’s latest austerity measures on Thursday evening, following more than a week of demonstrations across the country. Reuters




[Image]Firemen shouts slogans as they march during a protest against government austerity measures in Madrid July 19, 2012. A protest movement against the centre-right Spanish government’s latest austerity measures swelled on Thursday as public sector workers stepped up demonstrations in Madrid and around the country after more than a week of spontaneous action. The placard reads, “Our cut will be with a guillotine”. Reuters


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[Image]A demonstrator dresses as an skeleton during a protest against government austerity measures in Madrid July 19, 2012. A protest movement against the centre-right Spanish government’s latest austerity measures swelled on Thursday as public sector workers stepped up demonstrations in Madrid and around the country after more than a week of spontaneous action. The placard reads, “Market, money management thieves”. Reuters




[Image]A woman performs during a protest against the health care system in Bogota, Colombia, on July 19, 2012, requiring the dismantling of the Health Promotion Companies (EPS). Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced Thursday a package of drastic measures to save the health sector, threatened with bankruptcy because of debts incurred by the EPS. Getty


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[Image]A woman carries a gallows rope with the pictures Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh (R), nephew of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Saleh’s son Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, during a protest outside the home of Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, to demand the dismissal of the rest of the Saleh’s family members, in Sanaa July 19, 2012. Reuters




[Image]Hungarian rescue workers remove Greenpeace activists from the roof of a local petrol station in Budapest on July 19, 2012, during an action of Greenpeace’s Hungarian and foreign activists to protest against the Shell Oil Company’s plans to drill in the Arctic. Getty


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[Image]A Filipino woman protester gives vegetables to an activist wearing a mask of Uncle Sam while another with a mask of Philippine President Benigno Aquino III joins a symbolic protest outside the gates of the Malacanang Presidential Palace in Manila, Philippines on Tuesday, July 17, 2012. The protest aims to symbolize President Aquino and the U.S. of depriving and cheating Filipinos. AP




[Image]Firefighters and other government employees take part in a demonstration against the Spanish government’s latest austerity measures, in front of the Spanish Parliament (Las Cortes) in Madrid, on July 16, 2012. Several hundreds government workers, including police officers, firefighters, and healthcare workers, joined the spontaneous protest after conservative Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy announced, on July 13, the latest measures to lower Spain’s deficit, a 65-billion-euro (80 billion USD) austerity package involving among other things an increase in the VAT (TVA) tax and cuts in unemployment benefits. Getty




[Image]A demonstrator holds up a sign during a protest in Tel Aviv July 15, 2012, against the economic policies of Israel’s conservative government and to show solidarity with Moshe Silman, who sustained serious burns after he poured flammable liquid on himself and lit it at another protest on Saturday. The sign reads in Hebrew “Bibi you burned me too”, referring to Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by his nickname. Reuters




[Image]Israelis block a highway as they march through the streets to protest rising housing costs on July 15, 2012 in Tel Aviv, Israel. Growing discontent among Israelis over housing prices and other social inequalities have spurred marches, boycotts and labor strikes in the Jewish state. An Israeli man set himself on fire during the march for social justice protest yesterday. Getty




[Image]In this Sunday, July 15, 2012 photo, Lebanese women sit at a protest camp set up by Sheik Ahmad Assir, a harline Sunni cleric, in the southern port city of Sidon, Lebanon. Assir has set up the camp in the middle of a key road in Sidon, declaring it an uprising against Hezbollah’s weapons. Assir is taking aim at Hezbollah at a vulnerable time for the group when it faces the possible downfall of its crucial ally, President Bashar Assad in Syria. Assir may not be a direct threat to Hezbollah, but the willingness to publicly confront it underlines the dangers the group faces as it tries to retain the power and influence it has built up over the past 30 years in the face of the Syria crisis. AP




[Image]A protester stands in front of Malaysia Islamic Party flag (PAS) during a protest march to the National Palace to to hand out a memorandum in protest of the listing of Malaysia’s Felda Global in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Saturday, July 14, 2012. The Malaysian palm oil firm Felda Global surged 20 percent in its trading debut on June 28, as investors cheered on the world’s second largest Initial Public Offering (IPO) after Facebook. Felda’s listing plans were initially met with resistance from the farmers who partly owned the firm and feared the loss of control of an asset they had invested in for generations. AP




[Image]A street performer dressed as a Minotaur walks among the crowds near Mexico City’s main plaza, the Zocalo, Friday, July 13, 2012. Street performers, many dressed in costumes, gathered to protest in the historic downtown area where once they were allowed to perform but are now run off by police. AP




[Image]A worker in a mask marches holding a sign which reads, “No to Conga, no to mine,” in solidarity with the anti-mining protest in Cajamarca, Lima July 12, 2012. More than 1,000 members of the General Confederation of Workers of Peru (CGTP), who marched in solidarity with the anti-mining protest, also protested against Peru’s President Ollanta Humala’s government and demanded better pay conditions. The Cajamarca region is still under state of emergency a week after five people died and 21 were injured in clashes between police and protesters against Newmont’s $5 billion gold mine project, known as Conga. Reuters











 







































	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – St. Michael Man Arrested on First-Degree Murder Charges
		
	
	

		


FARGO—U.S. Attorney Timothy Q. Purdon announced that a St. Michael, North Dakota man has been arrested and charged with the May 2011 killings of Destiny Jane Shaw and Travis Lee DuBois, Jr. on the Spirit Lake Reservation. Valentino James Bagola, 19, faces four counts of first-degree murder in connection with the deaths of the two children.


In Bismarck, United States Attorney Purdon said, “The indictment unsealed today is the result of months of careful police work by the FBI and the BIA. This investigation included the thorough examination of a great deal of forensic evidence and law enforcement interviews of many, many individuals. The resources and effort brought to bear on this investigation by the federal law enforcement agents and the Assistant United States Attorneys who are involved should leave no doubt as to the Department of Justice’s commitment to ensuring justice for child victims in Indian country.”


The indictment charges Bagola with:


    

  • Count one: the unlawful killing of Destiny Jane Shaw;
    • 

  • Count two: the unlawful killing of Destiny Jane Shaw while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the crimes of aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, and child abuse against Destiny Jane Shaw;
    • 

  • Count three: the unlawful killing of Travis Lee DuBois, Jr.; and
    • 

  • Count four: the unlawful killing of Travis Lee DuBois, Jr. while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the crime of child abuse against Travis Lee DuBois, Jr.
    • 



The indictment alleges that Bagola killed the two children by “striking and stabbing” them “numerous times.”


The maximum penalty for all charges is life imprisonment.


The charges contained in the indictment are only allegations. A person is presumed innocent unless and until he or she is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.


This case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Scott Schneider, Janice Morley, and Chris Myers. The case is being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Indian Affairs Office of Justice Services.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
City of Missing Girls – Full Movie
		
	
	

		


Following a series of mysterious disappearances of young girls, dancer Thalia Arnold is found murdered. Police-detective Captain McVeigh believes that King Peterson, a nightclub operator and owner of the Crescent School of Fine Arts, knows something about the case. Meanwhile, reporter Nora is waging a newspaper crusade against the district attorney’s office for failing to trace the girls. Pauline Randolph disappears next, but not before Nora sees her leaving her grandmother’s home in a car driven by a blonde woman. An interview with the girl’s grandmother provides the first real clues…

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – B4/G4 – GERMANY/RUSSIA – STASI Allegations Haunt German Gazprom Executive
		
	
	

		


 


B4/G4 – GERMANY/RUSSIA – Stasi Allegations Haunt German Gazprom Executive






Date
2008-05-07 17:05:55




From
goodrich@stratfor.com




To
os@stratfor.com

gvalerts@stratfor.com		




Others
InReplyTo: 4EE0BAE9.9020601@stratfor.com




Text




Stasi Allegations Haunt German Gazprom Executive


07.05.2008


An investigation has been launched into the alleged Stasi involvement of a

senior executive at the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom.


Felix Strehober, chief financial officer of Gazprom Germania, was under

investigation for his work as an undercover officer of the Stasi,

according to a Wednesday report in the German newspaper Die Welt.


Die Welt said Strehober, who was born in East Berlin, could be charged in

Cologne with perjury. Stehober had made a statutory declaration last year

declaring that he had never “been a salaried employee of the Ministry of

State Security (Stasi) or the equivalent.”


The prosecutor’s office in Cologne confirmed that Strehober is under

investigation.


More than 100 pages in official German archives showed that Strehober had

been an undercover officer for the Stasi, the hated East German police

notorious for its surveillance and imprisonment of ordinary Germans.


Gazprom not taking action


The German subsidiary of Gazprom, the world’s biggest gas company, said

the case was “an employee’s private matter.” A company spokesman said

Gazprom did not see any reason to take action, and added that Strehober

had placed the matter in the hands of a lawyer.


A statutory declaration is a legal affirmation equivalent to a statement

under a religious oath.


http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3317092,00.html?maca=en-rss-en-all-1573-rdf


—


Lauren Goodrich

Director of Analysis

Senior Eurasia Analyst

Stratfor

Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

T: 512.744.4311

F: 512.744.4334

lauren.goodrich@stratfor.com

http://www.stratfor.com


 







 


Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Confidential – Fukushima Daiichi NPS February-May 2012
		
	
	

		


Fukushima Daiichi NPS February-May 2012




[Image]


The combination of two photos shows the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station in Fukushima Prefecture before, top, and nearly one year after a devastating earthquake and tsunami hit Japan’s northeast on March 11, 2011 and sent three of its reactors into meltdown. The top photo was taken in October, 2008 while the bottom photo was taken on Feb. 26, 2012. (Kyodo News)


[Image]


Tsunami-crippled four reactors, from left, Unit 1 to Unit 4, are seen at Fukushima Dadi-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan Sunday, March 11, 2012. Japan on Sunday was remembering the massive earthquake and tsunami that struck the nation a year ago, killing just over 19,000 people and unleashing the world’s worst nuclear crisis in a quarter century. The photo was taken about three kilometers (1.9 miles) away from the plant. (Kyodo News)


[Image]


Cranes stand around tsunami-crippled four reactors, from left, Unit 1 to Unit 4, at Fukushima Dadi-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan Sunday, March 11, 2012. Japan on Sunday was remembering the massive earthquake and tsunami that struck the nation a year ago, killing just over 19,000 people and unleashing the world’s worst nuclear crisis in a quarter century. The photo was taken about three kilometers (1.9 miles) away from the plant. (Kyodo News)


[Image]


Severely damaged reactor Unit 3 is seen at the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Sunday, March 11, 2012. Japan on Sunday was remembering the massive earthquake and tsunami that struck the nation a year ago, killing just over 19,000 people and unleashing the world’s worst nuclear crisis in a quarter century. (Kyodo News)


[Image]


Reactor Unit 2 stands at the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Sunday, March 11, 2012. Japan on Sunday was remembering the massive earthquake and tsunami that struck the nation a year ago, killing just over 19,000 people and unleashing the world’s worst nuclear crisis in a quarter century. (Kyodo News)


[Image]


Severely damaged ducts, fences and buildings are seen in the seaside compound of the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Sunday, March 11, 2012. Japan on Sunday was remembering the massive earthquake and tsunami that struck the nation a year ago, killing just over 19,000 people and unleashing the world’s worst nuclear crisis in a quarter century. (Kyodo News)


[Image]


In this aerial photo taken from the Asahi Shimbun helicopter, cranes surround the tsunami-damaged Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant reactors, from right, Unit 2, covered by light blue walls, Unit 3, center, and Unit 4, in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, northeastern Japan, Monday, May 28, 2012. The prime minister during Japan’s nuclear crisis last year said Monday he had to use an emergency law that never anticipated major radiation leaks and lacked experts capable of giving him guidance. (Tom Curley)


[Image]


In this aerial photo taken from the Asahi Shimbun helicopter, reactors of the tsunami-damaged Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant stand in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, northeastern Japan, Monday, May 28, 2012. Reactors are, from right, Unit 1, covered with a beige cover, Unit 2, covered with a square white cover, Unit 3 and Unit 4, showing their damaged frames at the bottom of cranes. (Tom Curley)


[Image]


In this aerial photo taken from the Asahi Shimbun helicopter, the tsunami-damaged Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant is seen in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, northeastern Japan, Monday, May 28, 2012. The prime minister during Japan’s nuclear crisis last year said Monday he had to use an emergency law that never anticipated major radiation leaks and lacked experts capable of giving him guidance. (Tom Curley)

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Shocking – Top 10 Infamous Serial Killers in America: Part 1
		
	
	

		


Whatever their motive, serial killers terrify entire communities with their brutal crimes. http://www.WatchMojo.com counts down the top 10 most chilling, real-life serial killers in American history. In this video, numbers 10 through 6. WARNING: Mature themes.

	


	



			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL – California Fusion Center Tests an Inspire Magazine Ember Bomb
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/STAC-EmberBombTest.png


 


(U//FOUO) On May 9, 2012 the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) conducted a practical evaluation of the Ember Bomb incendiary device as described in the ninth issue of lnspre, a magazine published by al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).


(U) Background


(U//FOUO) The eighth and ninth issues of Inspire, published on May 2, 2012, are the first issues of the magazine published since the deaths of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan in September 2o11. Al-Awlaki will likely be best remembered for his role In actively promoting the targeting of western assets via AQAP propaganda, to include Inspire magazine and video interviews. Similarly, Samir Khan will have a legacy as the Inspire editor who implemented production values on par with many commercial publications.


(U//FOUO) Each issue of inspire features the ongoing series “Open Source Jihad.” The series, which be8an with the first issue in 2010, includes articles describing the practical application of terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures. One of the first articles, entitled “Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom,’ provided step-by-step instructions for constructing a pipe bomb. Other topics have included the proper methods or employing an AK-47 type weapon, operational planning consideration, and how to establish secure electronic communications.


(U//FOUO) The latest article in the series is entitled “It is of your freedom to ignite a firebomb,’ which provides a selected history of wildland fires, planning considerations for setting wildland fires, detailed instructions for building a device to initiate a wildland fire, and some of the anticipated societal consequences to a wildland fire.


…


 


https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ember-bomb-1.png


 


https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ember-bomb-2.png


 


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


STAC-EmberBombTest

	


	



			
				


			

			
Editorial – Our Investigative Partnership with Wikileaks
		
	
	

		


Dear Readers,


it is a pleasure for me to inform you that we have been invited by Wikileaks to join their investigative partnership.


Here is what it means – defined by Wikileaks:




LONDON—WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files – more than five million emails from the Texas-headquartered “global intelligence” company Stratfor. The emails date from between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal’s Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defense Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor’s web of informers, pay-off structure, payment-laundering techniques and psychological methods, for example :


“[Y]ou have to take control of him. Control means financial, sexual or psychological control… This is intended to start our conversation on your next phase” – CEO George Friedman to Stratfor analyst Reva Bhalla on 6 December 2011, on how to exploit an Israeli intelligence informant providing information on the medical condition of the President of Venezuala, Hugo Chavez.


The material contains privileged information about the US government’s attacks against Julian Assange and WikiLeaks and Stratfor’s own attempts to subvert WikiLeaks. There are more than 4,000 emails mentioning WikiLeaks or Julian Assange. The emails also expose the revolving door that operates in private intelligence companies in the United States. Government and diplomatic sources from around the world give Stratfor advance knowledge of global politics and events in exchange for money. The Global Intelligence Files exposes how Stratfor has recruited a global network of informants who are paid via Swiss banks accounts and pre-paid credit cards. Stratfor has a mix of covert and overt informants, which includes government employees, embassy staff and journalists around the world.


The material shows how a private intelligence agency works, and how they target individuals for their corporate and government clients. For example, Stratfor monitored and analysed the online activities of Bhopal activists, including the “Yes Men”, for the US chemical giant Dow Chemical. The activists seek redress for the 1984 Dow Chemical/Union Carbide gas disaster in Bhopal, India. The disaster led to thousands of deaths, injuries in more than half a million people, and lasting environmental damage.


Stratfor has realised that its routine use of secret cash bribes to get information from insiders is risky. In August 2011, Stratfor CEO George Friedman confidentially told his employees : “We are retaining a law firm to create a policy for Stratfor on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I don’t plan to do the perp walk and I don’t want anyone here doing it either.”


Stratfor’s use of insiders for intelligence soon turned into a money-making scheme of questionable legality. The emails show that in 2009 then-Goldman Sachs Managing Director Shea Morenz and Stratfor CEO George Friedman hatched an idea to “utilise the intelligence” it was pulling in from its insider network to start up a captive strategic investment fund. CEO George Friedman explained in a confidential August 2011 document, marked DO NOT SHARE OR DISCUSS : “What StratCap will do is use our Stratfor’s intelligence and analysis to trade in a range of geopolitical instruments, particularly government bonds, currencies and the like”. The emails show that in 2011 Goldman Sach’s Morenz invested “substantially” more than $4million and joined Stratfor’s board of directors. Throughout 2011, a complex offshore share structure extending as far as South Africa was erected, designed to make StratCap appear to be legally independent. But, confidentially, Friedman told StratFor staff : “Do not think of StratCap as an outside organisation. It will be integral… It will be useful to you if, for the sake of convenience, you think of it as another aspect of Stratfor and Shea as another executive in Stratfor… we are already working on mock portfolios and trades”. StratCap is due to launch in 2012.


The Stratfor emails reveal a company that cultivates close ties with US government agencies and employs former US government staff. It is preparing the 3-year Forecast for the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, and it trains US marines and “other government intelligence agencies” in “becoming government Stratfors”. Stratfor’s Vice-President for Intelligence, Fred Burton, was formerly a special agent with the US State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service and was their Deputy Chief of the counterterrorism division. Despite the governmental ties, Stratfor and similar companies operate in complete secrecy with no political oversight or accountability. Stratfor claims that it operates “without ideology, agenda or national bias”, yet the emails reveal private intelligence staff who align themselves closely with US government policies and channel tips to the Mossad – including through an information mule in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Yossi Melman, who conspired with Guardian journalist David Leigh to secretly, and in violation of WikiLeaks’ contract with the Guardian, move WikiLeaks US diplomatic cables to Israel.


Ironically, considering the present circumstances, Stratfor was trying to get into what it called the leak-focused “gravy train” that sprung up after WikiLeaks’ Afghanistan disclosures :


“[Is it] possible for us to get some of that ’leak-focused’ gravy train ? This is an obvious fear sale, so that’s a good thing. And we have something to offer that the IT security companies don’t, mainly our focus on counter-intelligence and surveillance that Fred and Stick know better than anyone on the planet… Could we develop some ideas and procedures on the idea of ´leak-focused’ network security that focuses on preventing one’s own employees from leaking sensitive information… In fact, I’m not so sure this is an IT problem that requires an IT solution.”


Like WikiLeaks’ diplomatic cables, much of the significance of the emails will be revealed over the coming weeks, as our coalition and the public search through them and discover connections. Readers will find that whereas large numbers of Stratfor’s subscribers and clients work in the US military and intelligence agencies, Stratfor gave a complimentary membership to the controversial Pakistan general Hamid Gul, former head of Pakistan’s ISI intelligence service, who, according to US diplomatic cables, planned an IED attack on international forces in Afghanistan in 2006. Readers will discover Stratfor’s internal email classification system that codes correspondence according to categories such as ’alpha’, ’tactical’ and ’secure’. The correspondence also contains code names for people of particular interest such as ’Hizzies’ (members of Hezbollah), or ’Adogg’ (Mahmoud Ahmedinejad).


Stratfor did secret deals with dozens of media organisations and journalists – from Reuters to the Kiev Post. The list of Stratfor’s “Confederation Partners”, whom Stratfor internally referred to as its “Confed Fuck House” are included in the release. While it is acceptable for journalists to swap information or be paid by other media organisations, because Stratfor is a private intelligence organisation that services governments and private clients these relationships are corrupt or corrupting.


WikiLeaks has also obtained Stratfor’s list of informants and, in many cases, records of its payoffs, including $1,200 a month paid to the informant “Geronimo” , handled by Stratfor’s Former State Department agent Fred Burton.


WikiLeaks has built an investigative partnership with more than 25 media organisations and activists to inform the public about this huge body of documents. The organisations were provided access to a sophisticated investigative database developed by WikiLeaks and together with WikiLeaks are conducting journalistic evaluations of these emails. Important revelations discovered using this system will appear in the media in the coming weeks, together with the gradual release of the source documents.


End of Wikileaks Press Release


We are convinced that this cooperation will generate many benefits for all persons and the media involved and of course for our readers and users.


Sincerely yours


Bernd Pulch, MA

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Stratfor – Re: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded STASI files
		
	
	

		




Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.


Re: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded Stasi files






Date
2007-05-11 21:46:04




From
goodrich@stratfor.com




To
analysts@stratfor.com

davison@stratfor.com

aaric.eisenstein@stratfor.com		




Others
MessageId: <4644C7FC.5000007@stratfor.com>

InReplyTo: 0e6f01c79404$f1f258c0$8a01a8c0@stratfor.com		




Text




OMG… you can tell you have a kid!Aaric Eisenstein wrote:Get this to The King right away. There may yet be time to save Humpty

Dumpty!


Aaric S. Eisenstein


Stratfor


VP Publishing


700 Lavaca St., Suite 900


Austin, TX 78701


512-744-4308


512-744-4334 fax


———————————————————————-


From: os@stratfor.com [mailto:os@stratfor.com]

Sent: Friday, May 11, 2007 2:38 PM

To: analysts@stratfor.com

Subject: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded Stasi

files

New Computer Program to Reassemble Shredded Stasi Files

Millions of files consigned to paper shredders in the late days of the

East German regime will be pieced together by computer. The massive job

of reassembling this puzzle from the late Cold War was performed, until

now, by hand.


It’s been years in the making, but finally software designed to

electronically piece together some 45 million shredded documents from

the East German secret police went into service in Berlin on Wednesday.

Now, a puzzle that would take 30 diligent Germans 600 to 800 years to

finish by hand, according to one estimate, might be solved by computer

in seven.


Photo Gallery: Reconstructing the Cold War

Click on a picture to launch the image gallery (4 Photos)


“It’s very exciting to decode Stasi papers,” said Jan Schneider, head

engineer on the project at the Fraunhofer Institute for Production

Systems and Design Technology located in the German capital. “You have

the feeling you are making history.”


Or at least putting it back together again. In 1989, with the looming

collapse of the Communist regime becoming increasingly evident, agents

of the East German Staatssicherheitsdienst or Stasi feverishly plowed

millions of active files through paper shredders, or just tore them up

by hand.


Rights activists interrupted the project and rescued a total of 16,250

garbage bags full of scraps. But rescuing the history on those sheets of

paper amounted to an absurdly difficult jigsaw puzzle. By 2000, no more

than 323 sacks were legible again — reconstructed by a team of 15

people working in Nuremburg — leaving 15,927 to go. So the German

government promised money to any group that could plausibly deal with

the remaining tons of paper.


The Fraunhofer Institute won the contract in 2003, and began a pilot

phase of the project on Wednesday. Four hundred sacks of scraps will be

scanned, front and back, and newly-refined software will try to arrange

the digitized fragments according to shape, texture, ink color,

handwriting style and recognizable official stamps.


NEWSLETTER

Sign up for Spiegel Online’s daily newsletter and get the best of Der

Spiegel’s and Spiegel Online’s international coverage in your In- Box

everyday.


Gu:nter Bormann, from the agency that oversees old Stasi documents (the

Federal Commission for the Records of the national Security Service of

the Former German Democratic Republic), says most of the paper probably

dates from the years 1988 and 1989. “This is what Stasi officers had on

their desks at the end,” he says. “It’s not material from dusty

archives.”


Still-unknown Stasi informants — ordinary East Germans who spied on

other East Germans — stand to be uncovered. International espionage

files are reportedly not among the thousands of sacks; most of those

having been more conclusively destroyed.


The Fraunhofer Institute’s computers will start with documents torn by

hand, because large irregular fragments lend themselves to shape

recognition more readily than uniform strips from shredding machines.

The institute received a promise of EUR6.3 million ($8.53 million) in

April from the German parliament for this phase, which is expected to

take about two years.


If it’s deemed successful, the rest of the job would take four to five

years, according to project chief Bertram Nickolay. The final cost will

be up to EUR30 million.


msm/ap

















Re: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded Stasi files






Date
2007-05-11 21:46:04




From
goodrich@stratfor.com




To
analysts@stratfor.com

davison@stratfor.com

aaric.eisenstein@stratfor.com		




Others
MessageId: <4644C7FC.5000007@stratfor.com>

InReplyTo: 0e6f01c79404$f1f258c0$8a01a8c0@stratfor.com		




Text




OMG… you can tell you have a kid!Aaric Eisenstein wrote:


Get this to The King right away. There may yet be time to save Humpty

Dumpty!


Aaric S. Eisenstein


Stratfor


VP Publishing


700 Lavaca St., Suite 900


Austin, TX 78701


512-744-4308


512-744-4334 fax


———————————————————————-


From: os@stratfor.com [mailto:os@stratfor.com]

Sent: Friday, May 11, 2007 2:38 PM

To: analysts@stratfor.com

Subject: [OS] GERMANY – computer to reassemble 45 million shredded Stasi

files

New Computer Program to Reassemble Shredded Stasi Files

Millions of files consigned to paper shredders in the late days of the

East German regime will be pieced together by computer. The massive job

of reassembling this puzzle from the late Cold War was performed, until

now, by hand.


It’s been years in the making, but finally software designed to

electronically piece together some 45 million shredded documents from

the East German secret police went into service in Berlin on Wednesday.

Now, a puzzle that would take 30 diligent Germans 600 to 800 years to

finish by hand, according to one estimate, might be solved by computer

in seven.


Photo Gallery: Reconstructing the Cold War

Click on a picture to launch the image gallery (4 Photos)


“It’s very exciting to decode Stasi papers,” said Jan Schneider, head

engineer on the project at the Fraunhofer Institute for Production

Systems and Design Technology located in the German capital. “You have

the feeling you are making history.”


Or at least putting it back together again. In 1989, with the looming

collapse of the Communist regime becoming increasingly evident, agents

of the East German Staatssicherheitsdienst or Stasi feverishly plowed

millions of active files through paper shredders, or just tore them up

by hand.


Rights activists interrupted the project and rescued a total of 16,250

garbage bags full of scraps. But rescuing the history on those sheets of

paper amounted to an absurdly difficult jigsaw puzzle. By 2000, no more

than 323 sacks were legible again — reconstructed by a team of 15

people working in Nuremburg — leaving 15,927 to go. So the German

government promised money to any group that could plausibly deal with

the remaining tons of paper.


The Fraunhofer Institute won the contract in 2003, and began a pilot

phase of the project on Wednesday. Four hundred sacks of scraps will be

scanned, front and back, and newly-refined software will try to arrange

the digitized fragments according to shape, texture, ink color,

handwriting style and recognizable official stamps.


NEWSLETTER

Sign up for Spiegel Online’s daily newsletter and get the best of Der

Spiegel’s and Spiegel Online’s international coverage in your In- Box

everyday.


Gu:nter Bormann, from the agency that oversees old Stasi documents (the

Federal Commission for the Records of the national Security Service of

the Former German Democratic Republic), says most of the paper probably

dates from the years 1988 and 1989. “This is what Stasi officers had on

their desks at the end,” he says. “It’s not material from dusty

archives.”


Still-unknown Stasi informants — ordinary East Germans who spied on

other East Germans — stand to be uncovered. International espionage

files are reportedly not among the thousands of sacks; most of those

having been more conclusively destroyed.


The Fraunhofer Institute’s computers will start with documents torn by

hand, because large irregular fragments lend themselves to shape

recognition more readily than uniform strips from shredding machines.

The institute received a promise of EUR6.3 million ($8.53 million) in

April from the German parliament for this phase, which is expected to

take about two years.


If it’s deemed successful, the rest of the job would take four to five

years, according to project chief Bertram Nickolay. The final cost will

be up to EUR30 million.


msm/ap
















Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.










	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Stratfor about Gemany and the STASI
		
	
	

		




Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.


Re: east german stasi






Date
2010-10-05 00:41:28




From
marko.papic@stratfor.com




To
sean.noonan@stratfor.com




Others
InReplyTo: 4CAA55EA.2070401@stratfor.com




Text




Interesting thing is that George talked about how in Southern Europe

people trust the “clan” over the society/government. So in Serbia shit

like this never went to this extreme. A husband spying on his wife?

Unheard off…But Germans are so freaking orderly and loyal. They are a society where

family links are not more important than those between a citizen and a

state.Would hate to have married a German.Sean Noonan wrote:man this is fucked up. still can’t imagine what it would’ve been like.The Spy in My Bed


by Bob Jamieson Info

Bob Jamieson

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-10-02/the-spy-in-my-bed/full/


Vera Lengsfeld was arrested and tortured by the East German government.

Only years later, did she discover it was her husband who informed on

her. Bob Jamieson reports.


Hohenschoenhausen Prison in Berlin is the sinister reminder that even

now, on the 20th anniversary this Sunday, the work to reunify Germany is

still unfinished.


The complex of drab buildings was the secret detention jail for East

Germany’s Ministry of State Security-Stasi-the vast and brutal internal

army used to control the population. And Hohenschoenhausen, left

untouched since Stasi agents fled when the wall came down, was the

center of interrogation and torture.


“This was my cell,” said Vera Lengsfeld, who spent a month there

awaiting trial as Stasi agents tried to force a confession to opposing

the state. She did not know then that the man who betrayed her was her

husband.


In the 1980s Vera Lengsfeld was a modest civil-rights activist in the

Communist state, with three children and, friends say, very much in love

with her husband, a poet. Today she is a trim 58-year-old with a blond

bob who has become an influential member of the German Parliament, often

at odds with Chancellor Angela Merkel (also a former East German) over

individual liberty. She is no longer married.


Walking in what is now a museum, under harsh fluorescent light on

long-faded brown linoleum, Lengsfeld stops outside another door. “This

was where they did the water torture that made you think you were

drowning,” she says without emotion. “And the one next to it was for the

Chinese water torture.”


“Doesn’t being a guide here revive bitter memories?” I ask. “No, it

doesn’t,” she says. “I give the tours to teach the truth about East

Germany, especially to the young.”


In East Germany, there was nowhere Stasi agents or their informers

weren’t watching or listening and reporting back to headquarters. Homes

were bugged, telephones tapped, mail opened, neighbors spied on

neighbors. According to German federal records, there were almost

100,000 Stasi agents and an estimated 500,000 informers under contract

to the ministry in a country of 16 million people. Some informed to

curry favor with the regime and others were induced with threats.


Article – Jamieson Stasi Vera Lengsfeld was arrested and tortured by the

East German government. Only years later, did she discover it was her

husband who informed on her. (Jockel Finck / AP Photo)


In Hitler’s Germany, there was one Gestapo agent for every 2,000

citizens. In East Germany, there was one Stasi agent or informer for

every 63 citizens, records show.


Lengsfeld was under constant surveillance and harassment. She was

expelled from the science academy where she worked and then made her

living as a beekeeper and translator.


Finally, in 1988, she was arrested for carrying a sign in a government

parade. It quoted the first line of the East German constitution: “Every

citizen has the right to express his opinion freely and openly.” The

charge was riotous behavior. She remembers that on her arrival at

Hohenschoenhausen. “I was fingerprinted and then had to sit on a piece

of fabric. That was then placed in a jar to collect my smell.”

(Thousands of such jars were found after the wall came down but there

has never been an explanation of forensic value, bizarre or

otherwise.)


Convicted by a Communist court she was later thrown out of the country,

leaving her husband, and her three children behind.


But the worst for Vera Lengsfeld was yet to come.


Tens of thousands of Stasi victims, whose lives were destroyed; who were

beaten, tortured, kidnapped or killed, have never seen anyone who was

responsible punished.


Thomas Habicht, a leading German journalist who was a target of Stasi

agents in West Berlin, says that still casts a shadow over

reunification. “The generation of Stasi criminals is still alive,

behaves aggressively, and in some cases even has gained influential

positions again.” Many of the former agents and officials, Habicht says,

still live in the privileged housing built for them by the East German

government “which adds insult to serious injury.”


On this subject, Lengfeld’s eyes flash for the first time this day. “I’m

angry,” she snaps. While the first and only freely elected East German

parliament moved to punish the Stasi agents, she and others believe that

to speed reunification, the West German government of Helmut Kohl swept

the issue under the rug and subsequent governments have kept it there.

“Just look at pensions,” she says. “Because (the Stasi agents’) wages

were two or three times higher than the average East German, their

pensions now are two or three times higher” than most of the retirees.

“East Germany,” she says, “had both victims and perpetrators and we

cannot forget that.”


In November, 1989, as chaotic protests against the repressive regime

grew, Lengsfeld wanted to return from her exile in Britain to be with

her family. On November 9 she arrived in West Berlin and through

confusion at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint, she was able to slip back

into East Berlin. Her timing was exquisite: that night the Berlin Wall

fell.


The Stasi learned from her husband not only about her opposition to the

government but intimate details of dinner table conversations, pillow

talk, even their sex life.


In the aftermath, six million files on East German citizens were

discovered in Stasi archives. Laid end to end they would be 125 miles

long. In 1991, the files were opened for the Stasi victims. It was then

that Vera Lengsfeld learned that that the Stasi informer code named

“Donald” was her husband, Knud Wollenberger.


In 1984, Wollenberger signed a Stasi contract agreeing to inform on

Lengsfeld and her son from a previous marriage. The Stasi learned from

her husband not only about her opposition to the government but intimate

details of dinner table conversations, pillow talk, even their sex life.

She divorced “Donald” in 1992.


Today, she says, “I will never again talk about this.” But those who saw

her then described a shattered woman, someone who felt violated in a way

she could not at first fully comprehend like, say adultery.


Wollenberger, who suffers from advanced Parkinson’s disease, does not

give interviews. But a decade ago when a television interviewer asked

why he agreed to spy on his wife he said, “I didn’t think you could say

no.” Was he forced to do it? “No.” Well, asked the interviewer, was it

voluntary? Wollenberger answered with a question. “What is

voluntary?”


There are certain echoes to this story in The Lives of Others, the Oscar

winning movie about the Stasi and its victims. In the film-the only

serious one on the subject-a playwright’s lover is induced to spy on him

with tragic consequences. The playwright has long made his accommodation

with the regime, but then turns against it.


Sebastian Koch, who portrayed the playwright, believes many in Germany,

like his character, find the Stasi excesses too easy to ignore. “He

refused to see it because things were too perfect and he was too

productive,” Koch says, “but it will always be there, underneath the

surface.”


At the end of the film Koch’s character meets the former minister of

state security, still smug and arrogant. “And to think,” the playwright

says, “that people like you once ruled a country.”


Habicht, the journalist, says, so far, that question has not been fully

answered. “We still have thousands of Stasi victims who, 20 years after

reunification, want to learn the truth from their files.”


According to Germany’s Federal Commission, which manages the Stasi

archives, two and a half million people have read their personal files.

Another six thousand are applying each month to gain access to theirs.

Many former East Germans still do not know who spied on them, what was

reported and the consequences.


At the same time, Sebastian Koch says Germans should never forget people

like Vera Lengsfeld. “There is a larger truth here. You have to commit

yourself and face the consequences. You have this moment when you have

to react or surrender.”


Bob Jamieson has worked as a correspondent for NBC News and ABC News,

reporting from all seven continents during his 40-year career. He has

received five national Emmys as well as DuPont and Peabody awards.

—


Sean Noonan


Tactical Analyst


Office: +1 512-279-9479


Mobile: +1 512-758-5967


Strategic Forecasting, Inc.


http://www.stratfor.com


—


– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –


Marko Papic


Geopol Analyst – Eurasia


STRATFOR


700 Lavaca Street – 900


Austin, Texas


78701 USA


P: + 1-512-744-4094


marko.papic@stratfor.com















Re: east german stasi






Date
2010-10-05 00:47:04




From
marko.papic@stratfor.com




To
sean.noonan@stratfor.com




Others
InReplyTo: 4CAA5876.1040705@stratfor.com




Text




I was both joking and serious…In Yugoslavia there were a lot of people who you knew were informing on

you. Lots of school teachers would do that, inform on what the kids said

about the parents. But again, the end result would be nuissance, not

imprisonment and torture.You might get fired… but in truth everyone knew somoeone so you could

always work the networks to get off.Serbia/Yugoslavia is an inherently corrupt, family oriented system.The danger with these authoritarian regimes is when they rule an ordered,

technocratic and bureaucratized society like the Germans… When you can’t

work your connections to alleviate the harm. That is what is so dangerous

about the Germans.


Sean Noonan wrote:


is that serious or a joke? I have no idea why they’d do that. Reminds

me of the nazi science experiments you always hear about.


Obviously my experience in China is nothing compared to actually living

it—but I think general surveillance is a bit different than this

complete infiltration of informants. In China, at least, you can get a

bit of an idea of who’s watching. Not sure how Yugoslavia/Serbia

compares, but constantly wondering who around you, including your

family, is informing on you! Fuck!


Marko Papic wrote:


“I was fingerprinted and then had to sit on a piece of fabric. That

was then placed in a jar to collect my smell.” (Thousands of such jars

were found after the wall came down but there has never been an

explanation of forensic value, bizarre or otherwise


K-9 death squads?


Sean Noonan wrote:


man this is fucked up. still can’t imagine what it would’ve been

like.


The Spy in My Bed


by Bob Jamieson Info

Bob Jamieson

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-10-02/the-spy-in-my-bed/full/


Vera Lengsfeld was arrested and tortured by the East German

government. Only years later, did she discover it was her husband

who informed on her. Bob Jamieson reports.


Hohenschoenhausen Prison in Berlin is the sinister reminder that

even now, on the 20th anniversary this Sunday, the work to reunify

Germany is still unfinished.


The complex of drab buildings was the secret detention jail for East

Germany’s Ministry of State Security-Stasi-the vast and brutal

internal army used to control the population. And

Hohenschoenhausen, left untouched since Stasi agents fled when the

wall came down, was the center of interrogation and torture.


“This was my cell,” said Vera Lengsfeld, who spent a month there

awaiting trial as Stasi agents tried to force a confession to

opposing the state. She did not know then that the man who betrayed

her was her husband.


In the 1980s Vera Lengsfeld was a modest civil-rights activist in

the Communist state, with three children and, friends say, very much

in love with her husband, a poet. Today she is a trim 58-year-old

with a blond bob who has become an influential member of the German

Parliament, often at odds with Chancellor Angela Merkel (also a

former East German) over individual liberty. She is no longer

married.


Walking in what is now a museum, under harsh fluorescent light on

long-faded brown linoleum, Lengsfeld stops outside another door.

“This was where they did the water torture that made you think you

were drowning,” she says without emotion. “And the one next to it

was for the Chinese water torture.”


“Doesn’t being a guide here revive bitter memories?” I ask. “No, it

doesn’t,” she says. “I give the tours to teach the truth about East

Germany, especially to the young.”


In East Germany, there was nowhere Stasi agents or their informers

weren’t watching or listening and reporting back to headquarters.

Homes were bugged, telephones tapped, mail opened, neighbors spied

on neighbors. According to German federal records, there were almost

100,000 Stasi agents and an estimated 500,000 informers under

contract to the ministry in a country of 16 million people. Some

informed to curry favor with the regime and others were induced with

threats.


Article – Jamieson Stasi Vera Lengsfeld was arrested and tortured by

the East German government. Only years later, did she discover it

was her husband who informed on her. (Jockel Finck / AP Photo)


In Hitler’s Germany, there was one Gestapo agent for every 2,000

citizens. In East Germany, there was one Stasi agent or informer for

every 63 citizens, records show.


Lengsfeld was under constant surveillance and harassment. She was

expelled from the science academy where she worked and then made her

living as a beekeeper and translator.


Finally, in 1988, she was arrested for carrying a sign in a

government parade. It quoted the first line of the East German

constitution: “Every citizen has the right to express his opinion

freely and openly.” The charge was riotous behavior. She remembers

that on her arrival at Hohenschoenhausen. “I was fingerprinted and

then had to sit on a piece of fabric. That was then placed in a jar

to collect my smell.” (Thousands of such jars were found after the

wall came down but there has never been an explanation of forensic

value, bizarre or otherwise.)


Convicted by a Communist court she was later thrown out of the

country, leaving her husband, and her three children behind.


But the worst for Vera Lengsfeld was yet to come.


Tens of thousands of Stasi victims, whose lives were destroyed; who

were beaten, tortured, kidnapped or killed, have never seen anyone

who was responsible punished.


Thomas Habicht, a leading German journalist who was a target of

Stasi agents in West Berlin, says that still casts a shadow over

reunification. “The generation of Stasi criminals is still alive,

behaves aggressively, and in some cases even has gained influential

positions again.” Many of the former agents and officials, Habicht

says, still live in the privileged housing built for them by the

East German government “which adds insult to serious injury.”


On this subject, Lengfeld’s eyes flash for the first time this day.

“I’m angry,” she snaps. While the first and only freely elected

East German parliament moved to punish the Stasi agents, she and

others believe that to speed reunification, the West German

government of Helmut Kohl swept the issue under the rug and

subsequent governments have kept it there. “Just look at pensions,”

she says. “Because (the Stasi agents’) wages were two or three times

higher than the average East German, their pensions now are two or

three times higher” than most of the retirees. “East Germany,” she

says, “had both victims and perpetrators and we cannot forget that.”


In November, 1989, as chaotic protests against the repressive regime

grew, Lengsfeld wanted to return from her exile in Britain to be

with her family. On November 9 she arrived in West Berlin and

through confusion at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint, she was able

to slip back into East Berlin. Her timing was exquisite: that night

the Berlin Wall fell.


The Stasi learned from her husband not only about her opposition to

the government but intimate details of dinner table conversations,

pillow talk, even their sex life.


In the aftermath, six million files on East German citizens were

discovered in Stasi archives. Laid end to end they would be 125

miles long. In 1991, the files were opened for the Stasi victims. It

was then that Vera Lengsfeld learned that that the Stasi informer

code named “Donald” was her husband, Knud Wollenberger.


In 1984, Wollenberger signed a Stasi contract agreeing to inform on

Lengsfeld and her son from a previous marriage. The Stasi learned

from her husband not only about her opposition to the government but

intimate details of dinner table conversations, pillow talk, even

their sex life. She divorced “Donald” in 1992.


Today, she says, “I will never again talk about this.” But those who

saw her then described a shattered woman, someone who felt violated

in a way she could not at first fully comprehend like, say adultery.


Wollenberger, who suffers from advanced Parkinson’s disease, does

not give interviews. But a decade ago when a television interviewer

asked why he agreed to spy on his wife he said, “I didn’t think you

could say no.” Was he forced to do it? “No.” Well, asked the

interviewer, was it voluntary? Wollenberger answered with a

question. “What is voluntary?”


There are certain echoes to this story in The Lives of Others, the

Oscar winning movie about the Stasi and its victims. In the

film-the only serious one on the subject-a playwright’s lover is

induced to spy on him with tragic consequences. The playwright has

long made his accommodation with the regime, but then turns against

it.


Sebastian Koch, who portrayed the playwright, believes many in

Germany, like his character, find the Stasi excesses too easy to

ignore. “He refused to see it because things were too perfect and

he was too productive,” Koch says, “but it will always be there,

underneath the surface.”


At the end of the film Koch’s character meets the former minister of

state security, still smug and arrogant. “And to think,” the

playwright says, “that people like you once ruled a country.”


Habicht, the journalist, says, so far, that question has not been

fully answered. “We still have thousands of Stasi victims who, 20

years after reunification, want to learn the truth from their

files.”


According to Germany’s Federal Commission, which manages the Stasi

archives, two and a half million people have read their personal

files. Another six thousand are applying each month to gain access

to theirs. Many former East Germans still do not know who spied on

them, what was reported and the consequences.


At the same time, Sebastian Koch says Germans should never forget

people like Vera Lengsfeld. “There is a larger truth here. You have

to commit yourself and face the consequences. You have this moment

when you have to react or surrender.”


Bob Jamieson has worked as a correspondent for NBC News and ABC

News, reporting from all seven continents during his 40-year career.

He has received five national Emmys as well as DuPont and Peabody

awards.

—


Sean Noonan


Tactical Analyst


Office: +1 512-279-9479


Mobile: +1 512-758-5967


Strategic Forecasting, Inc.


http://www.stratfor.com


—


– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –


Marko Papic


Geopol Analyst – Eurasia


STRATFOR


700 Lavaca Street – 900


Austin, Texas


78701 USA


P: + 1-512-744-4094


marko.papic@stratfor.com


—


Sean Noonan


Tactical Analyst


Office: +1 512-279-9479


Mobile: +1 512-758-5967


Strategic Forecasting, Inc.


http://www.stratfor.com


—


– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –


Marko Papic


Geopol Analyst – Eurasia


STRATFOR


700 Lavaca Street – 900


Austin, Texas


78701 USA


P: + 1-512-744-4094


marko.papic@stratfor.com




















	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Former STASI Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO]
		
	
	

		





Investigative Partnership organised by WikiLeaks – the Data was obtained by WikiLeaks.








[Eurasia] [Fwd: Re: Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO]






Date
2010-09-27 20:24:23




From
lena.bell@stratfor.com




To
eurasia@stratfor.com




Others
Listname: mailto:eurasia@stratfor.com

MessageId: <4CA0E157.50106@stratfor.com>

InReplyTo: 263969146.2106108.1285610199486.JavaMail.root@core.stratfor.com		




Text




——– Original Message ——–Subject: Re: Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for

NATO

Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2010 13:21:39 -0500

From: Marko Papic <marko.papic@stratfor.com>

To: Lena Bell <lena.bell@stratfor.com>

References: <4CA0DEFD.2020800@stratfor.com>Feel free to send these to eurasia@stratfor.comVery interesting articles. I’m a big fan of Spiegel.Lena Bell wrote:thpught you’d find this interesting Marko


Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO


http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,719726,00.html


09/27/2010


After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West Germans were desperate to

prevent the Stasi’s top codebreakers from falling into the wrong hands

and set up a company to hire the East German cryptographers. Now the

former Stasi scientists develop technology used by Angela Merkel and

NATO.


Every morning, while going to his office in Berlin’s Adlershof district,

Ralph W. passes a reminder of his own past, a small museum that occupies

a room on the ground floor of the building. The museum could easily

double as a command center run by the class enemy in an old James Bond

film. A display of coding devices from various decades includes the

T-310, a green metal machine roughly the size of a huge refrigerator,

which East German officials used to encode their telex messages.


The device was the pride of the Stasi, the feared East German secret

police, which was W.’s former employer. Today he works as a cryptologist

with Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH (SIT), a subsidiary of Rohde & Schwarz, a

Munich-based company specializing in testing equipment, broadcasting and

secure communications. W. and his colleagues encode sensitive

information to ensure that it can only be read or heard by authorized

individuals. Their most important customers are NATO and the German

government.


Rohde & Schwarz is something of an unofficial supplier of choice to the

German government. Among other things, the company develops bugproof

mobile phones for official use. Since 2004, its Berlin-based subsidiary

SIT, which specializes in encryption solutions, has been classified as a

“security partner” to the German Interior Ministry, which recently

ordered a few thousand encoding devices for mobile phones, at about

EUR1,250 ($1,675) apiece. Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel has used

phones equipped with SIT’s encryption technology. In other words, the

Stasi’s former cryptographers are now Merkel’s cryptographers.


Secret Operation


The transfer of Ralph W. and other cryptologists from the East German

Ministry for State Security, as the Stasi was officially known, to West

Germany was handled both seamlessly and discreetly. West German

officials were determined to make sure that no one would find out about

the integration of East Germany’s top cryptologists into the west. The

operation was so secret, in fact, that it has remained unknown to this

day.


Only a handful of officials were involved in the operation, which was

planned at the West German Interior Ministry in Bonn. In January 1991,

Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH was founded. The company was established

primarily to provide employment for particularly talented Stasi

cryptologists that the Bonn government wanted to keep in key positions.


Ralph W. is one of those specialists. W., who holds a doctorate in

mathematics, signed a declaration of commitment to the Stasi on Sept. 1,

1982. By the end of his time with the Stasi, he was making 22,550 East

German marks a year — an excellent salary by East German standards. And

when he was promoted to the rank of captain in June 1987, his superior

characterized W. as one of the “most capable comrades in the

collective.” While with the Stasi, W. worked in Department XI, which

also boasted the name “Central Cryptology Agency” (ZCO).


Looking for the Top Performers


The story begins during the heady days of the East German revolution in

1990. Officially, the East German government, under its last communist

premier, Hans Modrow, had established a government committee to dissolve

the Ministry for State Security which reported to the new East German

interior minister, Peter-Michael Diestel. In reality, the West German

government was already playing a key role in particularly sensitive

matters. Then-West German Interior Minister Wolfgang Scha:uble (who is

the current German finance minister) had instructed two senior Interior

Ministry officials, Hans Neusel and Eckart Werthebach, to take care of

the most politically sensitive remnants of the 40-year intelligence war

between the two Germanys.


The government of then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl was interested in more

than just the politically explosive material contained in some of the

Stasi’s files. It also had its eye on the top performers in the former

East German spy agency. The cryptologists were of particular interest to

the Kohl government, which recognized that experts capable of developing

good codes would also be adept at breaking them. The Stasi cryptologists

were proven experts in both fields.


Documents from the Stasi records department indicate that the one of the

Stasi cryptologists’ achievements was to break Vericrypt and Cryptophon

standards that had been used until the 1980s. This meant that they were

capable of decoding encrypted radio transmissions by the two main West

German intelligence agencies — the Office for the Protection of the

Constitution and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) — and the West

German border police. The East Germans even managed to decode the BND’s

orders to members of the clandestine “Gladio” group, which was intended

to continue anti-communist operations in the event of a Warsaw Pact

invasion of Western Europe.


The West German government was determined to prevent these highly

trained East German experts from entering the free market. The idea that

specialists who had spent decades working with West German encryption

methods and had successfully cracked West German intelligence’s codes

could defect to Middle Eastern countries like Syria was a nightmare.

Until then, the BND had had no difficulties listening in on intelligence

communications in the Middle East, an ability the potential defection of

Stasi experts would likely have compromised. Bonn also hoped to use

their skills to break into regions where its own agents were making no

headway. All of this meant that the Stasi experts had to be brought on

board in the West — even if it involved unconventional methods.


: Cherrypicking the Stasi’s Top Brains


The government officials in Bonn turned to an expert for advice: Otto

Leiberich, a cryptologist and mathematician who had headed the Central

Office for Cryptology, the equivalent of the Stasi’s ZCO at the West

German BND, until the mid-1970s. Leiberich’s task, after he was brought

in as a member of the secret operation, was to evaluate the professional

abilities of the Stasi experts.


Leiberich still has vivid memories of his first official trip to the

town of Hoppegarten, next to Berlin. One of the East German

cryptologists at the meeting greeted the members of the West German

delegation as “comrades,” Leiberich recalls. He was impressed by the

East Germans’ expertise, says Leiberich. “They were excellent

mathematicians who were not personally guilty of any misconduct.”


Leiberich says he would have liked to hire them, particularly the

Stasi’s then “chief decoder,” the ZCO department head, Horst M. A gaunt

chain-smoker who wore horn-rimmed glasses, M. was born in 1937 and had

earned a degree in mathematics at East Berlin’s Humboldt University. But

the West was also interested in younger people, in the expectation that

they would be of greater value in the nascent computer age.


A Free-Market Solution


Leiberich could have used the extra manpower, especially after 1990,

when the West German Central Office for Cryptology was spun off from the

BND and a law was enacted to form the new Federal Office for Information

Security (BSI). Leiberich, who was named the BSI’s first president,

headed a team consisting mainly of former intelligence colleagues.


But Neusel, the senior official from the West German Interior Ministry,

dismissed the idea as too precarious. Firstly, the government had

decided not to integrate former Stasi officials, because of their past

activities, into the bureaucracy of a unified Germany. Additionally, as

one person involved in the operation recalls, concerns about potential

traitors gave rise to a “sacred principle,” namely that “no one from the

Stasi was to be transferred to the West German intelligence agencies.”


It also didn’t help that the Stasi’s Central Cryptology Agency had been

hastily spun off into the East German Interior Ministry, because the

West German cabinet had decided not to allow any members of the East

German Interior Ministry to work in federal agencies.


But the free market was not restricted by any government resolutions. A

creative solution was needed, and no one was better suited for coming up

with the necessary fix than Hermann Schwarz, one of the two founders of

Rohde & Schwarz.


A Soft Spot for the East


Founded in 1933, the company, a provider of radio, measuring and

security technology, was dependent on government contracts and was a

reliable supplier to the West German intelligence agencies. Besides,

Schwarz had a soft spot for the East. He had earned his doctorate in

1931 in the eastern city of Jena, where he had also met his eventual

business partner, Lothar Rohde.


But to Schwarz, who was already elderly at the time and has since died,

allowing his company’s name to be used as a cover for a Stasi connection

seemed too risky. According to someone familiar with the operation, the

West Germans must have applied a bit of soft pressure on Schwarz, who

was “extremely worried that it would be made public one day.”


But the officials eventually did manage to convince Schwarz to play

along. His change of heart was probably due in part to the prospect of

additional research and federal contracts, which were in fact showered

on his company.


In the end, BSI head Leiberich and a senior Interior Ministry official

decided which former Stasi experts were to be transferred to the front

company. Former Stasi department head Horst M. was seamlessly integrated

into the market economy at SIT, where his wife also began working as a

secretary. Ralph W., who was in his 30s at the time and had been with

the Stasi for eight years, also fitted the desired profile, as did his

colleagues Wolfgang K. and Volker S. In total, about a dozen former

Stasi employees, most of them mathematicians, were given the chance to

embark on a second cryptology career in post-reunification Germany.


The federal government provided whatever assistance it could, but only

with the utmost discretion. SIT was initially headquartered in the town

of Gru:nheide in the eastern state of Brandenburg, in a former Stasi

children’s home.


‘Cosmic Top Secret’


An episode from the 1990s shows how conspiratorially the operation was

handled, even within the West German intelligence community. When the

BND needed a “D-channel filter” — a precursor to today’s firewalls —

to protect communications networks, it contacted the Federal Office for

Information Security (BSI). But BND officials pricked up their ears when

they discovered that the work was being done by SIT. A private company

protecting the computers of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency?

Nevertheless, the BND officials were told that it was “totally OK,” and

that the BSI would take responsibility for SIT.


For the parent company Rohde & Schwarz, the former problem child in

Brandenburg soon became a success story. SIT took over the cryptology

division of German engineering giant Siemens, and the company now

employs about 150 mathematicians, engineers and computer scientists at

its three locations. SIT, which proudly refers to itself as the

“preferred supplier of high-security cryptography” for NATO, even

includes in its product line devices classified as “Cosmic Top Secret,”

NATO’s highest secrecy level. SIT’s Elcrodat solution, standard

equipment on NATO submarines, frigates and military helicopters, has

provided the company with orders worth millions for years.


When approached by SPIEGEL, Rohde & Schwarz declined to comment on this

previously unknown part of its company history.


To show its gratitude for the company’s efforts, the federal government

did more than just provide it with lucrative contracts. Eckart

Werthebach, the Interior Ministry official, awarded the former managing

director of SIT, a senior Rohde & Schwarz executive originally from West

Germany, the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany for his

services. The executive received the decoration in a formal ceremony at

Villa Hammerschmidt in Bonn, the former official residence of the German

president.


—


– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –


Marko Papic


Geopol Analyst – Eurasia


STRATFOR


700 Lavaca Street – 900


Austin, Texas


78701 USA


P: + 1-512-744-4094


marko.papic@stratfor.com



















	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL – Revised Es)mates of Private Banking Assets Under Management and Total Client Assets – Top 50 Global Private Banks, 2005-­‐2010
		
	
	

		
Revised Es)mates of Private Banking Assets Under Management and Total Client Assets – Top 50 Global Private Banks, 2005-­‐2010


 


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


Private Banking 2012

	


	



			
				


			

			
FBI – Man Sentenced to 18 Months in Prison for Acting as Unregistered Agent for Syrian Government
		
	
	

		


WASHINGTON—Mohamad Anas Haitham Soueid, 48, a resident of Leesburg, Virginia, was sentenced today to 18 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, for collecting video and audio recordings and other information about individuals in the United States and Syria who were protesting the government of Syria and to providing these materials to Syrian intelligence agencies in order to silence, intimidate, and potentially harm the protestors.


Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Neil MacBride, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; and James McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Washington Field Office, made the announcement following sentencing by United States District Judge Claude M. Hilton.


Soueid, aka “Alex Soueid” or “Anas Alswaid,” a Syrian-born naturalized U.S. citizen, was charged by a federal grand jury on October 5, 2011, in a six-count indictment in the Eastern District of Virginia. He was convicted of unlawfully acting as an agent of a foreign government on March 26, 2012.


“Mohamad Soueid acted as an unregistered agent of the Syrian government as part of an effort to collect information on people in this country protesting the Syrian government crack-down. I applaud the many agents, analysts, and prosecutors who helped bring about this important case,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco.


“Mr. Soueid betrayed this country to work on behalf of a state sponsor of terror,” said U.S. Attorney MacBride. “While the autocratic Syrian regime killed, kidnapped, intimidated, and silenced thousands of its own citizens, Mr. Soueid spearheaded efforts to identify and intimidate those protesting against the Syrian government in the United States.”


“By illegally acting as an agent of Syria, Mr. Souied deceived his adopted country of the United States in support of a violent and repressive despotic government,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “Through today’s sentencing, he will now be held accountable for his actions.”


According to court records, from March to October 2011, Soueid acted in the United States as an agent of the Syrian Mukhabarat, which refers to the intelligence agencies for the government of Syria, including the Syrian Military Intelligence and General Intelligence Directorate. At no time while acting as an agent of the government of Syria in this country did Soueid provide prior notification to the Attorney General as required by law. The U.S. government has designated the Syrian government a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979.


Under the direction and control of Syrian officials, Soueid recruited individuals living in the United States to make dozens of audio and video recordings of protests against the Syrian regime—including recordings of conversations with individual protestors—in the United States and Syria, which he provided to the Syrian government. He also supplied the Syrian government with contact information for key dissident figures in the United States, details about the financiers of the dissident movement, logistics for protests and meetings, internal conflicts within the movement, and the movement’s future plans.


In a handwritten letter to a Syrian official in April 2011, Soueid outlined his support for the Syrian government’s repressions of its citizens, stating that disposing of dissension must be decisive and prompt and that violence, home invasions, and arrests against dissidents is justified.


The Syrian government provided Soueid with a laptop to further their ability to surreptitiously communicate, which he later destroyed. In late June 2011, the Syrian government paid for Soueid to travel to Syria, where he met with intelligence officials and spoke with President Bashar al-Assad in private.


To thwart detection of his activities by U.S. law enforcement, Soueid lied to a Customs and Border Patrol agent upon his return from meeting with President al-Assad in Syria, and he also lied repeatedly to FBI agents when they questioned him in August 2011. Following the FBI interview, Soueid destroyed documents in his backyard and informed the Mukhbarat about his FBI interview.


This investigation is being conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office with assistance from the Loudon County, Virginia Sheriff’s Office. The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Dennis Fitzpatrick and Neil Hammerstrom of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia and Trial Attorney Brandon L. Van Grack of the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.



	


	



			
				


			

			
Der Beweis: Der geheime radioaktive STASI-Mordplan gegen Dissidenten – damals wie heute
		
	
	

		










© JUNGE FREIHEIT Verlag GmbH & Co.  www.jungefreiheit.de    16/00 14. April 2000 










Tödliche Strahlung

Die Staatssicherheit der DDR steht im Verdacht, Regimegegner radioaktiv verseucht zu haben

Paul LeonhardWas die wohl mit dem Zeug wollen? Vielleicht hat sich der Mann diese Frage einmal gestellt, sie aber dann als einen lästigen Gedanken beiseite gewischt. Schließlich war er als Gesellschaftlicher Mitarbeiter (GMS) auf das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit eingeschworen. Regelmäßig empfing Karl J., Leiter der Hauptabteilung Radioaktive Präparate des Zentralinstituts für Kernforschung Rossendorf, die Mielke-Männer und händigte ihnen die gewünschten radioaktiven Stoffe aus. Das war schließlich rechtens, in einem Vertrag geregelt, den die Stasi 1971 mit dem bei Dresden ansässigen Forschungszentrum geschlossen hatte. Es sei für ihn noch heute undenkbar, daß radioaktive Stoffe entgegen den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen an Menschen eingesetzt werden, sagt der inzwischen als Fachbereichsleiter in Rossendorf tätige J.Bereits im Mai 1999 war das Kernforschungsinstitut in die Schlagzeilen geraten. Damals berichtete eine Boulevard-Zeitung über geheime Lieferungen. Wir haben Flüssigkeitspräparate-Kobalt 58, Scandium 46 in Zehn-Milliliter-Ampullen an die Stasi geliefert, bestätigte J. am 21. Mai gegenüber der Bild-Zeitung. Da stand der ungeheuerliche Verdacht bereits im Raum: Waren DDR-Dissidenten durch die Staatssicherheit heimlich verstrahlt worden? Der Spiegel hatte über entsprechende Hinweise berichtet und der Jenaer Maler Frank Rub Strafanzeige bei der Berliner Staatsanwaltschaft gestellt. Auslöser war der Tod seines Freundes, des Regimegegners und Schriftstellers Jürgen Fuchs. Dieser war Anfang Mai 1999 im Alter von 48 Jahren einem Plasmozytom erlegen, einer seltenen Blutkrebsart, die durch Strahlung verursacht werden kann.Bürgerrechtler fordern seit Jahren Aufklärung


Jürgen Fuchs hegte die Vermutung, daß seine tödliche Krankheit nicht gottgewollt war, sondern menschengemacht, erinnerte sein Freund Wolf Biermann. Ein Mord auf Raten? Den Verdacht, Fuchs und andere Dissidenten seien im berüchtigten Stasi-Knast Berlin-Hohenschönhausen mit Röntgenstrahlen traktiert worden, äußerten mehrere ehemalige Bürgerrechtler. Seit einem Jahr fordern sie rückhaltlose Aufklärung.


Zu den bald ermittelten Spuren gehörte ein unorthodox konstruiertes Röntgengerät, das Mitglieder eines Bürgerkomitees Ende Dezember 1989 im Stasi-Untersuchungsgefängnis Gera entdeckt hatten. Die Strahlenkanone stand hinter einem Vorhang versteckt im Fotoraum der Anstalt. Der Strahler habe sich etwa in Kopfhöhe des davor sitzenden Gefangenen befinden, erinnern sich Zeugen. Ähnliche Geräte gab es auch im Magdeburger, Chemnitzer und Bautzner Stasi-Knast. In Hohenschönhausen wurde 1990 im Fotoraum ein verstecktes Lehrbuch für Strahlenkunde entdeckt.


In seinem Schlüsselroman “Magdalena” hatte Jürgen Fuchs aus einer Veröffentlichung der Stasi-nahen Sektion Kriminalistik der Humboldt-Universität Berlin zitiert. Da ging es um radioaktive Gifte und darum, wie man diese spurlos gegen Menschen einsetzen kann. Nach Fuchs’ Tod gewann das Thema auch deswegen Brisanz, weil bereits im Mai 1998 Gerulf Pannach (48), früherer Liedermacher und Texter der DDR-Rockband Renft, an Nierenkrebs, und ein Jahr zuvor der Regimegegner Rudolf Bahro (61), Verfasser des Buches “Die Alternative”, an einem Non-Hodgkin-Lymphom gestorben waren. Alle drei hatten 1976/77 in Hohenschönhausen gesessen.


Wurden mißliebige Häftlinge im Rahmen von MfS-Zersetzungsmaßnahmen mittels Strahlenkanone unbemerkt verseucht, um ihnen langfristig Schaden zuzufügen? Es gibt zwar keine Beweise, dafür aber genug Indizien.


Mielkes Männer experimentierten nachweislich seit den siebziger Jahren mit strahlenden Substanzen. Akten beweisen, daß sie im Umgang mit Radionukliden und nichtmedizinischer Röntgentechnik ausgebildet wurden. Eine ganze Liste besonders gefährlicher Substanzen ist beispielsweise im Jahresplan 1979 des Dienstbereiches 2 unter der Rubrik “Schädigung durch Beibringen radioaktiver Stoffe” aufgelistet. Auch an der Anwendung radioaktiver Isotope arbeiteten die Stasi-Experten.


Eine über 900 Seiten starke Studie der Humboldt-Universität unter dem Titel “Toxdat” führt jede erdenkliche Art auf, wie Menschen mit Gift umgebracht werden können. Die für die Stasi entstandene Ausarbeitung aus dem Jahr 1988 nennt mehr als 200 toxische und strahlende Substanzen und beschreibt detailliert, wie diese eingesetzt werden könnten. Im Kapitel “Schädigung durch Beibringung radioaktiver Stoffe” werden besonders gefährliche Radionuklide genannt: von Strontium-90 bis Plutonium-238, aber auch Mikromengen abgebrannter Brennstäbe aus Kernkraftwerken.


Aus den Papieren erfuhren die Geheimdienstler, welche Wirkung ein Einsatz dieser Stoffe beim Menschen hätte. Von einer kombinierten Schädigung war die Rede. Der biologische Effekt resultiere aus einem chemischen Gift und einer physikalischen Wirkung. Beigebracht in Speisen und Getränken könnten sie zu Siechtum führende Blut-/Knochenmarkschäden und Krebs bewirken. Das sei natürlich abhängig gewesen von der psycho-physischen Reaktion der Einzelperson, sagte Fuchs in einem Interview, in dem er die Möglichkeit einschloß, daß durch Strahlung gesundheitliche Schäden verursacht werden können, nicht bei allen Gefangenen, aber bei denen, von denen man glaubt, es machen zu müssen, zu sollen, zu dürfen, auf Befehl. Die Wissenschaftler der Humboldt-Uni nannten das eine Liquidationsmethode mit hohem Verschleierungspotential durch spät einsetzende unspezifische Initialsymptomatik.


Mielke-Ministerium wollte Strahlenunfälle herbeiführen


Fuchs selbst waren Dokumente in die Hände gefallen, in denen ein handliches Gamma-Gert polnischer Herkunft eine Rolle spielte, das punktförmig Neutronenstrahlen aussendet. Sein Einsatz, bei dem das biologische Gewebe beschädigt wurde, hinterließ keine Spuren, später würde es diffuse, aber bedrohliche Erkrankungen erzeugen. Experten bestätigen inzwischen, daß die Strahlendosis der Röntgengeräte in den Stasi-Gefängnissen bei einstündiger Bestrahlung 1,1 Gray betragen haben könnte. Damit wären die Geräte zwar viel zu schwach, um einen Menschen zu töten, aber die möglichen Strahlendosen hätten ausgereicht, um nach einigen Jahren bei den Opfern Blutkrebs auszulösen.


Die Stasi beschäftigte sich ebenfalls mit Möglichkeiten, kleine Atomminen in Westdeutschland einzusetzen und Kernkraftwerke zu beschädigen, um Strahlenunfälle herbeizuführen. Erst im vergangenen Jahr stieß die Gauck-Behörde auf Unterlagen der Stasi-Abteilung Operativ-Technischer Sektor. Damit war der Beweis erbracht, daß das Mielke-Ministerium mit dem Einsatz radioaktiven Materials experimentierte, um alles mögliche zu überwachen.


Grundlage dafür bot die Kooperation mit den Kernforschern in Rossendorf. Hier fanden die Bestrahlungen im Reaktor statt. Hier wurden Stoffe aktiviert wie Stecknadeln, die später Regimegegnern an die Kleidung geheftet wurden. Einem der Stasi verdächtigen Physiker im Kombinat Carl Zeiss Jena wurden 1978 radioaktiv präparierte Dokumente untergeschoben. Manuskripte von Bürgerrechtlern wurden mit flüssigem nuklearen Material beschichtet. Auch wurden Autos markiert, indem per Luftgewehr radioaktive Munition auf die Reifen geschossen wurde. Man überlegte, wie man Personen bespritzen könnte, um sie später wiederzufinden, beschrieb Joachim Gauck, Leiter der Stasi-Akten-Behörde, in einem Interview die Methoden. Fest steht, daß das Manuskript von Bahros “Alternative” radioaktiv markiert wurde. Die Stasi wollte so den Versandwegen nachspüren und Adressaten ausfindig machen.


Aber nicht nur gegen Dissidenten wurden radioaktive Stoffe eingesetzt. So verschickte die Stasi in einem Fall radioaktiv-markiertes Westgeld, um herauszufinden, wer in einem Postamt aus Briefen Geldscheine stiehlt. Wenn jemand drei dieser Scheine einsteckte, konnte das durchaus gesundheitliche Folgen haben, schätzt Gauck ein.


Insgesamt hat es in den siebziger Jahren hundert Markierungsfälle jährlich gegeben. In den achtziger Jahren sind es 50. Die Stasi benutzte 21 verschiedene Substanzen von Caesium-137 bis zu Kobalt-59 oder Silber-110. Erschreckend sei, daß beteiligte Wissenschaftler bis heute schweigen würden und einen guten Ruf hätten, sagte Gauck im März. Diese Spezialisten hätten aber der Stasi in Kenntnis möglicher Gesundheitsgefahren geholfen. Zwar gibt es bisher nach Aussage Gaucks keinen Beweis, der den schlimmen Verdacht bewußter radioaktiver Bestrahlung in Haftanstalten bestätigt, aber unter dem Decknamen “Wolke” setzten die Mielke-Leute radioaktive Substanzen zur Markierung von Personen und Gegenständen ein. Gesundheitliche Schäden wurden dabei billigend in Kauf genommen. Ein Markierungseinsatz konnte den heute geltenden Grenzwert um das 267fache überschreiten, ermittelte ein im Auftrag der Gauck-Behörde tätiger Gutachter.


Vorwürfe von Fuchs an die bundesdeutsche Justiz


Die Aktionen überschritten selbst die Sicherheitsnormen der DDR. Auch im Fall des Geraer Röntgengerätes, das zumindest zwischen 1976 und 1983 im Stasi-Knast eingesetzt wurde und nach der Wende spurlos verschwand. Es verstieß schon dadurch gegen die DDR-Gesetze, daß es nicht beim Amt für Strahlenschutz gemeldet war.


Man habe die Bedeutung von Zersetzung nicht begriffen, warf Fuchs kurz vor seinem Tod der BRD-Justiz vor. Es werde nicht wahrgenommen, daß ein System wie das der DDR mit einer historischen Mission in Andersdenkenden ideologische Feinde sah, bei deren Ausschaltung jedes Mittel vom Zweck geheiligt ist. Ein Betroffener ist vielleicht in der Lage, die letzten, die allerletzten Beweise zu bringen, wenn er gestorben ist und eine Knochenanalyse vorgenommen wird, sagte er bezüglich der Nachforschungen für den Einsatz radioaktiver Stoffe in den Haftanstalten.


Wie vor den Kopf geschlagen zeigt sich angesichts der jüngsten Enthüllungen auch der Rossendorfer Kernforscher J.: Eine Anwendung an Menschen, die nicht der medizinischen Diagnose oder Therapie dient, verurteile er mit aller Schärfe.


DDR-Regimegegner Rudolf Bahro: Das Manuskript seines Buches “Die Alternative” wurde von der Stasi radioaktiv verstrahlt




















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SECRET from the FBI – Judge Webster Delivers Webster Commission Report on Fort Hood
		
	
	

		


Judge William H. Webster has delivered to the FBI the Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009. An unclassified version of the report can be found here (pdf). A copy of Judge Webster’s transmission letter can be found here (pdf).


The FBI requested a full investigation of the manner in which the FBI and its Joint Terrorism Task Forces handled and acted on counterterrorism intelligence before and after the Fort Hood shootings, as well as a review and assessment of the FBI’s governing authorities and the FBI’s remedial measures after the Fort Hood shootings. The investigation did not probe the shootings, which are the subject of a U.S. Army-led inquiry and military criminal proceeding against Major Nidal Hasan. The FBI and Department of Justice provided the commission with more than 100 formal and informal interviews, meetings, and briefings, and more than 10,000 pages of documents. The commission also consulted with outside experts on counterterrorism and intelligence operations, information technology, and violent extremism; public interest groups; and staff from congressional committees with responsibility for oversight of the FBI.


The commission found shortcomings in FBI policy guidance, technology, information review protocols, and training, and made 18 important recommendations for corrective and enhancing measures in those areas. The FBI concurs with the principles underlying all the recommendations and has already taken action to implement them based on a combination of the commission’s work, the FBI’s own internal review of the Fort Hood shootings, and the report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.


The commission also found that, working in the context of the FBI’s pre-Fort Hood authorities, policies, operational capabilities, and technology, personnel who handled counterintelligence information made mistakes. The final report concludes, however: “We do not find, and do not suggest, that these mistakes resulted from intentional misconduct or the disregard of duties. Indeed, we find that each special agent, intelligence analyst, and task force officer who handled the [intelligence] information acted with good intent.”


Judge Webster appointed five seasoned investigators and legal specialists from the private sector to serve as commissioners. “Their contributions of time and energy were substantial and an act of selfless patriotism,” Judge Webster said. The final report contains the names and biographies of commission members.


“As a former FBI Director, Director of Central Intelligence, and federal judge, Judge Webster was uniquely qualified to undertake this task and look at the procedures and actions involved in this matter. I want to thank Judge Webster and his team for their thorough investigation of the FBI’s handling of its responsibilities related to the Ft. Hood shootings of November 5, 2009,” said Director Robert S. Mueller, III. “We constantly strive to improve our policies and procedures, and I appreciate the final report’s acknowledgement of the actions that the FBI has taken since the shootings. Some of these actions were taken in response to our internal review, and others were part of the FBI’s ongoing commitment to improving its effectiveness.”


Below is the FBI’s response to each of the Webster Commission’s 18 recommendations.


 


Press inquiries concerning the Webster Commission and its final report should be directed to the National Press Office at (202) 324-3691.


FBI Response to the Final Report of the Judge William H. Webster Commission on The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009


The Webster Commission makes 18 recommendations for corrective and enhancing measures regarding FBI policy and operations, information technology, and training. The FBI concurs with the principles underlying all the recommendations and has already taken action to implement them based on the commission’s work, the FBI’s own internal review of the Fort Hood shootings, and the report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.


Policies: The Webster Commission recommended that the FBI promulgate formal written policies related to the command-and-control of counterterrorism operations between FBI Headquarters and its field offices, the responsibility for investigative leads set from one field office to another, the resolution of inter-office disputes, and assignment and completion of leads. Most of these recommendations focus on the formalization of existing and longstanding FBI practices and procedures. The FBI recognizes the value of written policy and agrees with the recommendations. The FBI also expects its agents, analysts, and other personnel to use sound judgment in conducting thorough investigations, and to take responsibility for bringing issues to resolution. The organizational structure of the FBI also achieves in large part the objectives of the recommended written policies.


Webster Commission Recommendation on Counterterrorism Command-and Control Hierarchy


    

  • The FBI has undergone many changes since September 11 to prevent terrorist attacks, and key among those changes was centralizing command-and-control of counterterrorism operations in the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) at FBI Headquarters. The CTD assistant director provides direction for all counterterrorism matters, including counterterrorism operations.
    • 

  • The FBI has issued guidance to all offices on national management and oversight of counterterrorism matters that identifies CTD entities with responsibility for specific counterterrorism mission areas.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation on Ownership of Counterterrorism Leads


    

  • As noted by the commission, FBI practice has long been that offices assigned counterterrorism leads have ultimate responsibility for their timely and diligent completion.
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  • The FBI has issued formal written policy that requires offices to complete all leads within specific timeframes. The office assigned the lead is responsible for its resolution.
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  • In addition, more than two years ago, the FBI simplified lead categories. The FBI eliminated “discretionary leads,” such that leads may only be “information only” or action leads.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation on Inter-Office Disagreements in the Counterterrorism Context


    

  • The FBI has issued guidance on the resolution of inter-office disagreements.
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  • Offices must work to resolve disagreements through the chain-of-command. As necessary, the assistant director in charge of the Counterterrorism Division is the official responsible for final decisions.
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Webster Commission Recommendation on Completion of Routine Counterterrorism Leads


    

  • The FBI has issued formal written policy that requires offices to complete all leads within specific timeframes.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation on Leads for Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) Task Force Officers


    

  • The FBI agrees that there may be situations in which the assignment of a JTTF task force officer as lead investigator may not be in the best interest of the investigation.
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  • The FBI also recognizes and values the unique contributions of its task force officers, including their specialized knowledge and familiarity with their home agency’s systems and procedures, and will assess the proper assignment for each investigation based on the circumstances of each case.
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Webster Commission Recommendations on Counterterrorism Assessments of Law Enforcement and Other Government Personnel


    

  • As the commission notes, the FBI implemented, within weeks of the Fort Hood attacks, an information-sharing agreement with the Department of Defense regarding counterterrorism investigations of military personnel. The Webster Commission described this information-sharing agreement as important, noting that it “assures that, as a matter of written policy, the FBI will provide timely and consistent notice of counterterrorism assessments and investigations” of Defense Department personnel.
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  • Consistent with the commission’s recommendation, the FBI is pursuing similar arrangements regarding other federal, state, and local government employees.
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Integrating Intelligence and Operations: The Webster Commission reported that it was impressed with the quality and commitment of the FBI’s intelligence analysts and the integration of analysts into the FBI’s work.


Webster Commission Recommendation on Continued Integration of Intelligence Analysts into Operations


    

  • As the report recognized, the FBI has already taken significant steps to strengthen its integration of intelligence and operations.
    • 

  • The Counterterrorism Division has created a strategic analytical and operational branch that includes multiple threat-based fusion cells, responsible for ensuring counterterrorism operations and collection are focused on priority threats. The deputy assistant director who leads this branch is an intelligence analyst.
    • 

  • The FBI continues to examine innovative ways to integrate intelligence and operations throughout the organization.
    • 



Information Technology: The commission recommended that the FBI employ various enterprise data management and data integration applications designed to aid the FBI in reviewing, analyzing, managing, and acting on information and implement protocols for reviewing such information. In many cases, the FBI has already addressed the commission’s recommendations, including by implementing data management and integration projects and policies designed to help agents, analysts, task force officers, and other personnel more effectively review, evaluate, and exploit information. Due in part to the rapidly evolving nature of information technology, and the FBI’s numerous initiatives to upgrade its technology, much of the technology and tools in place at the time of the attack and reviewed by the Webster Commission have been replaced with more advanced technology over the span of a year or more. As recognized by the Webster Commission, many of these crucial technologies will require additional funding.


Webster Commission Recommendation on Expediting Enterprise Data Management


    

  • The FBI—like the rest of the U.S. intelligence community—has focused enterprise data management projects on eliminating “stove-piped” database architecture in order to move toward our goal of collecting and storing data as a service.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation on Expanding and Enhancing the Data Integration and Visualization System


    

  • Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS) is one important step in the FBI’s broader Enterprise Data Aggregation Plan. DIVS evolves as technology improves and as new data is received. Today’s DIVS is beginning to use technology that existed only in concept at the time of the Fort Hood shootings.
    • 

  • DIVS enables FBI personnel today to use a single logon and user interface to conduct complex searches across the FBI’s most critical data holdings, triage and visualize the results, and integrate the data into analytical tools—all capabilities that did not exist at the time of the Fort Hood shootings. Since the commission’s initial review of DIVS, the number of FBI and non-FBI data sets accessible to DIVS has grown considerably.
    • 

  • The FBI is working to implement a majority of DIVS’ planned analytical capabilities by this fall. As the technology industry continues to develop electronic means to extract and understand concepts from data, the FBI must focus on and invest in these technologies.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation on DWS-EDMS


    

  • In 2009, the FBI initiated a multi-phased modernization effort to enhance the Data Warehouse System/Electronic-Surveillance Data Management System (DWS-EDMS). The FBI has adopted a new and more effective search engine for DWS-EDMS.
    • 

  • The FBI has already invested in hardware necessary for a technical refresh and to enable a disaster recovery capability for DWS-EDMS. As stated in the report, further investment is necessary to implement an automated live recovery capability.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation on Acquisition of Advanced Information Search, Filtering, Retrieval, and Management Technologies


    

  • The FBI has begun implementing an enterprise knowledge-management application that will provide advanced search and analytic tools to review and manage a wide variety of data. Among other things, these tools will help FBI personnel organize intelligence and discover non-obvious connections.
    • 

  • The FBI is also deploying the next generation of tools to process content within DWS-EDMS; these tools will enable advanced search and other capabilities.
    • 

  • As the technology industry continues to develop electronic means to extract and understand concepts from data, the FBI must focus on and invest in these technologies.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation on Review Protocols for Large Strategic Collections of Data


    

  • The FBI is in the process of finalizing protocols to manage the review of large strategic collections of data.
    • 



Governing Authorities: The Webster Commission conducted a broad review of the FBI’s governing authorities and procedures as they relate to counterterrorism operations. The commission reports these authorities and procedures strike an appropriate balance between detecting and disrupting threats and respecting civil rights and civil liberties. The commission also made recommendations regarding the need for the FBI Office of Integrity and Compliance and Inspection Division to conduct internal compliance reviews and audits to ensure compliance with all policies and procedures that protect civil liberties and individual privacy. The FBI supports these recommendations and has taken action to implement them.


Webster Commission Recommendation on Compliance Reviews and Audits


    

  • The FBI regularly conducts reviews to ensure FBI compliance with its policies and procedures and will conduct the reviews and audits identified by the commission.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation on Adherence to Information Security Policies


    

  • The FBI regularly conducts reviews to ensure FBI compliance with its policies and procedures and will conduct the reviews identified by the commission.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation for FBI Authorities to Remain in Effect


    

  • The FBI agrees that FBI’s authorities for national security letters, FISA Section 215 business records, roving wiretaps, and FISA “lone wolf” orders are essential tools for protecting national security and should remain in effect.
    • 



Webster Commission Recommendation on Updating Attorney General Guidelines Affecting Extra-Territorial Operations


    

  • Since 2011, the FBI and Department of Justice have been engaged in a joint-effort to update the Attorney General Guidelines.
    • 



Training: Following the shootings, the FBI immediately instituted additional training for all task force officers related to FBI databases and Joint Terrorism Task Force operations. The Webster Commission concluded that the “FBI’s post-Fort Hood enhancements of counterterrorism and JTTF training represent significant improvements.”


Webster Commission Recommendation on Training Task Force Officers


    

  • The FBI has substantially expanded its task force officer training, including: a mandatory nine-day orientation course, mandatory FBI database training, and mandatory introductory training prior to a task force officer receiving his or her first duty assignment.
    • 

  • All mandatory courses must be completed within the first 90 days of assignment to the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
    • 



Administrative and Disciplinary Action: At the request of the FBI, the commission considered whether any administrative or disciplinary action should be taken against any FBI personnel. The commission determined that it would not recommend any such action against FBI personnel.


Resources:

– Final Report of the Judge William H. Webster Commission on The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009 (unclassified version) (pdf)

– Transmission Letter from Judge William H. Webster (pdf)



	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – European Central Bank Paper: Shadow Banking in the Euro Area
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ECB-ShadowBanking.png


 


Shadow banking, as one of the main sources of financial stability concerns, is the subject of much international debate. In broad terms, shadow banking refers to activities related to credit intermediation and liquidity and maturity transformation that take place outside the regulated banking system.


This paper presents a first investigation of the size and the structure of shadow banking within the euro area, using the statistical data sources available to the ECB/Eurosystem.


Although overall shadow banking activity in the euro area is smaller than in the United States, it is significant, at least in some euro area countries. This is also broadly true for some of the components of shadow banking, particularly securitisation activity, money market funds and the repo markets.


This paper also addresses the interconnection between the regulated and the non-bank-regulated segments of the financial sector. Over the recent past, this interconnection has increased, likely resulting in a higher risk of contagion across sectors and countries. Euro area banks now rely more on funding from the financial sector than in the past, in particular from other financial intermediaries (OFIs), which cover shadow banking entities, including securitisation vehicles. This source of funding is mainly shortterm and therefore more susceptible to runs and to the drying-up of liquidity. This finding confirms that macro-prudential authorities and supervisors should carefully monitor the growing interlinkages between the regulated banking sector and the shadow banking system. However, an in-depth assessment of the activities of shadow banking and of the interconnection with the regulated banking system would require further improvements in the availability of data and other sources of information.


…


This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the size and the structure of shadow banking in the euro area, as a contribution to the international and European debate on this issue. In broad terms, shadow banking refers to activities related to credit intermediation, liquidity and maturity transformation that take place outside the regulated banking system. There is widespread international agreement on the need to better understand the activities of shadow banking and the related financial stability risks. Moreover, the forthcoming implementation of Basel III, with the introduction of more stringent capital and liquidity requirements for credit institutions, and the provisions to be applied to insurers may provide further incentives for banks to shift part of their activities outside of the regulated environment and therefore increase shadow banking activities.


Evaluating the size of the shadow banking system in the euro area is not straightforward. A quantitative assessment of the activities of the shadow banking sector can only be based on data sources that unfortunately were not designed specifically for this purpose (i.e. flow-of-funds data and monetary and financial statistics). Moreover, for some activities and markets there are no official data available.


The analysis shows that shadow banking activity in the euro area is smaller than in the United States. In the United States the size of the shadow banking system, measured as the total amount of its assets, was comparable to the size of the banking system in the second quarter of 2011, while in the euro area it represented less than half of the total assets of banking sector. However, the size of assets held by financial

intermediaries that are not regulated as banks is still important in the euro area, especially in some countries.


A proxy for the activities of shadow banking in the euro area can be derived from the analysis of the balance sheets of OFIs, a sector which excludes insurance corporations and pension funds but covers most of the agents engaging in shadow banking. Regarding the dynamics of shadow-banking activities, assets of OFIs grew rapidly in the run-up to the crisis, in the period 2005-07. Starting at the end of 2007, OFI intermediation declined sharply in the context of the general deleveraging triggered by the financial crisis.


The paper investigates some key components of shadow banking. In particular, it looks at financial entities other than banks involved in credit intermediation, such as securitisation vehicles, and at the financial intermediaries and markets providing funding to the banks, such as money market funds (MMFs) and the repo market. The data suggests the following.


(i) Securitisation issuance was smaller in volume in the euro area than in the United States before the crisis (around 5% and 12% of GDP respectively) and remains less developed.


(ii) Assets under management by MMFs amounted to €1.83 trillion and €1.1 trillion in the United States and in the euro area respectively by the second quarter of 2011. However, it should be pointed out that in the euro area MMFs are a somewhat heterogeneous group (even if the CESR, i.e. the predecessor of the European Securities and Markets Authority, published in 2010 guidelines on a Common Definition of European Money Market Funds).


(iii) The repo market is a key source of funding in both the United States and the euro area.


The paper also addresses the interconnection between regulated and non-regulated segments of the financial sector undertaking banking activities. Over the recent past this interconnection has been increasing, likely resulting in higher risk of contagion across sectors and countries. Euro area banks rely more than in the past on funding from the financial sector and in particular from the OFI sector, which covers shadow banking entities including securitisation vehicles. This source of funding is mainly short-term and therefore more susceptible to runs and to the drying-up of liquidity. The relative size and relevance of shadow banking intermediation differs significantly across euro area countries.


A more in-depth assessment of the activities of shadow banking and of the interconnection with the regulated banking system would require an improvement in the availability of data and other related information. More than 60% of the assets that are considered part of shadow banking activities in the euro area are linked to financial institutions for which high frequency statistical information is not available. Similarly, very scarce and non-standardised information is available on repo markets. Moreover, the aggregate data collected for the euro area are not detailed enough to allow a full understanding of key elements such as the presence of maturity transformation and leverage and the possible channels for contagion, which are of particular importance when evaluating possible regulatory measures. The paper concludes with some preliminary considerations regarding possible measures to address data gaps and regulatory options.


…


 


https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/us-shadow-banking.png


 


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


ECB-ShadowBanking-1

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
Crytome – Global Politics: Anonymous, Pirate Parties, P2P
		
	
	

		
Subject: <nettime> Pirate Assemblages: The Global Politics of Anonymous, the Pirate Parties and Radical P2P Communities


CALL FOR CHAPTER PROPOSALS


Pirate Assemblages: The Global Politics of Anonymous, the Pirate Parties and Radical P2P Communities


A book edited by


Marco Deseriis, Northeastern University

Carolin Wiedemann, University of Hamburg


Proposal Submission Deadline: August 31, 2012


In May 2006, the Swedish police raided and seized The Pirate Bay’s servers in Stockholm for copyright infringement. As a result, the newborn Swedish Pirate Party saw a membership surge, received 7% of the vote in the European Parliament election of 2009, and spearheaded the Pirate Parties International, a network of political parties that fight for copyright reform, open source governance, and the civil right to privacy in the information society. Recently, the German Pirate Party has dubbed the success of its Swedish counterpart in four different German state elections.


In October 2010, the hacktivist network Anonymous launched Operation Payback, a series of distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against anti-piracy organizations and government agencies that were held responsible for the outage of The Pirate Bay. In an open letter to Anonymous, the US and UK Pirate Parties invited the hacktivist movement to cease the attacks and “choose a more moderate and legal way” to pursue the struggle for copyright reform. Although Anonymous, the Pirate Parties, and other social movements for direct democracy may not always agree on their tactics they all consider the peer-to-peer exchange of information amongst all human beings as fundamental to the communal organization of a free and open society.


The struggles against intellectual property and for a democratic access to information have thus entered a new phase. In particular, the rise of Wikileaks, Anonymous and the Pirate Parties as well as the mobilizations against laws such as SOPA, PIPA and ACTA signal that Internet users are no longer willing to delegate the representation of their interests to third parties. The refusal of representation is also a common feature of the recent movements against autocracy in the Middle East and austerity measures in Europe and North America. For example, Michel Bawuens has compared Occupy to an open API with modules, such as “protest camping”? and “general assemblies,” which can be used as templates and modified by all, without the need of a centralized leadership.


Yet while on a general level the new P2P and pirate movements seem to share common ideals and goals significant differences remain on how to pursue these objectives. Pirate Assemblages takes this debate as a departure point to explore a set of pressing issues on the social composition and global politics of the new P2P movements. In particular we are interested in articles that pose and try to answer questions such as:


* The hacker ethos that informs the open source community and the new pirate movements assumes that traditional institutions are inherently flawed because of their hierarchical and centralized structure. How are decisions made within these movements? Is technical knowledge the primary way to gain status? What other competences are mobilized? Is there a leadership within these movements? If so, how is it selected?


* It is generally assumed that the core organizers of the IPP, Anonymous, and file-sharing networks are predominantly white middle-class men. If this is true, what are the consequences of such limited composition on the politics of these formations? And what are the examples that may challenge this assumption?


* How do these movements differ from each other due to their regional backgrounds? To what extent is the idea of freedom associated with digital rights and P2P still linked to the Enlightenment project and Western rationality? Are there other notions of freedom that can inspire the politics of these movements?


* The IPP, Anonymous, and Occupy often exhibit the coexistence of a liberal or libertarian wing and an anti-capitalist wing. Is the dialectic between these components an impediment or a stimulus to the growth of these movements? How are conflicts mediated internally? How are they represented on the outside?


* In which way is the autonomous organization of cognitive workers that make up the global pirate movement affecting the organizational forms of wider social movements such as the Arab Spring, Occupy and the Spanish Indignados?


* What are the mid-term campaigns and objectives that can lead these movements to articulate a global politics without denying their regional and cultural differences? Are there viable examples that show how this process may already be underway?


We are interested in articles that focus on specific case studies as well as broader comparative analyses. Submissions about non-European and non-U.S. case studies are encouraged. Please send a 300-400 words abstract to Carolin Wiedemann <carolin.wiedemann[at]wiso.uni-hamburg.de> and Marco Deseriis <m.deseriis[at]neu.edu> no later than August 31, 2012. You will receive an answer by September 15, 2012. Complete chapters are due on December 5, 2012. The editors aim at publishing the book in multiple languages including English and German.


—


Marco Deseriis, Assistant Professor

Screen and Media Studies

Northeastern University

204 Lake Hall

360 Huntington Ave

Boston, MA 02115

Office phone number: +1 617-373-5517

Email:m.deseriis[at]neu.edu


# distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission

# <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism,

# collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets

# more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l

# archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime[at]kein.org

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – U.S. Northern Command Homeland Defense/Civil Support Capabilities Assessment Study Plan
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/DoD-HDCS-CBA.png


 


During the April 5, 2007, Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG) meeting. the DepSecDef directed completion of a capability based analysis (CBA) based on the Homeland Defense/Civil Support (HD/CS) Defense Planning Scenarios. The emphasis of this CBA will be on identification of gaps within the HD/CS mission which only DOD can supply. On May 30, 2007, a memo from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Amaicas’ Security Affairs (ASD/HD&ASA) requested the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Commander lead this HD/CS CBA. Finally, the DepSecDef’s August 7, 2007, brief to President of the United States identified the HD/CS CBA as one of DOD’s top 25 Transformational Priorities with an objective of advancing to a major milestone by Dec 08. For the HD/CS CBA, submission of the Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) to the JROC for approval is this major milestone.


This Study Plan outlines the background, scope, strategic assumptions, study objectives, analysis methodology, scenario considerations, timeline, and management responsibilities in conducting the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-based Assessment (HD/CS CBA) to include production of the Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and a Joint Capabilities Document (JCD). This CBA, through the execution of the FAA, FNA. And JCD; identifies, describes, documents, and prioritizes DOD’s capability gaps and excesses in the HD/CS mission areas (to include the Mission Assurance (MA) function).


The objective of this HD/CS CBA is to assess DOD’s ability to conduct HD and support CS missions across air, space, maritime, land, and cyber domains while simultaneously achieving MA objectives. While the HD/CS Joint Operating Concept (JOC) is the primary document describing how DOD will operate to achieve national unity of effort, this CBA will assist in identifying, and prioritizing, the capabilities which DOD will provide to defend the homeland and provide support to the lead federal agency for civil support.


The HD/CS CBA focuses on military problems facing DOD in the 2012-2025 timefiame with an emphasis on 2014-2016, i.e., “how” DOD will fulfill its responsibilities required to lead, support and enable HD/CS missions. The HD/CS CBA will leverage previous and ongoing Service. Combatant Command, Agency, and Interagency analytical efforts to the maximum extent possible to prevent duplicative efforts and help define required HD/CS tasks, capabilities, capability gaps, and potential trade space. Significant collaboration with Interagency stakeholders is essential to the success of the CBA.


Finally, this paper puts forward three scenarios for use in the HD/CS CBA analysis. These scenarios provide the conditions against which the HD/CS capabilities will be measured in the CBA and help define the capabilities needed for HD/CS. The scenarios are drawn from the National Planning Scenarios (NPSs), the Defense Planning Scenario (DPS), and the Steady State Security Posture scenarios (SSSPs ). In addition, other key Analytic Agenda efforts to include the CS Analytic Baseline (CSAB) and the HD Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) studies will also be considered in the analysis as much as practical to help ensure consistency.


…


3. Objectives. The HD/CS CBA will assess DOD2′s ability to conduct HD and CS missions across air, space. maritime, land, and cyber domains while simultaneously achieving MA objectives. Specifically, NORAD-USNORTHCOM will lead a comprehensive HD/CS CBA to:


3.1. Establish assumptions, informed by interagency partners, on DOD and interagency roles and responsibilities for HD/CS missions and mission assurance function.


3.2. Through a cascading mission-to-capability, capability-to-task, task-to-characteristic, characteristic-to-attribute linkage, determine the core capabilities required to execute DOD’s HD/CS missions and mission assurance functions (CJCSI 3170.01F).


3.3. Systematically and comprehensively identify, integrate, and assess existing and planned HD, CS, and MA capabilities for the specified timeframe. As a key facet of this determination, in conjunction with Department of Homeland Security (DHS), identify current interagency HD/CS capabilities.


3.4. Identify and prioritize critical HD, CS, and MA capability gaps, overlaps, and redundancies while considering and characterizing mission risk.


3.S. Conduct a risk assessment and recommend a prioritized plan for future DOD HD, CS, and MA capability development which effectively leverages interagency investment.


3.6. Deliver a Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) with a prioritized list of HD, CS, and MA capability gaps.


4. Background.


4.1. The DOD is charged with fighting and winning the nation’s wars, a responsibility traditionally executed overseas. However, today the DOD operates in a changing, uncertain security environment facing a range of threats, extending into all domains and the homeland. Whereas the enemies of yesterday were relatively predictable, homogenous, hierarchical, and resistant to change, today’s adversaries are unpredictable, diverse, increasingly networked, and dynamic. These adversaries benefit from technologies and materials readily accessible on world markets, to include disruptive systems or the ingredients required 10 fabricate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This potential availability of WMD to terrorist groups is of vital concern, especially as terrorists thrive in the “seam” of ambiguity where threats are neither clearly military wartime threats nor clearly criminal type threats. Current trends indicate a future security environment which includes:


4.1.1. Certain nation-states pursuing traditional, but constantly improving, capabilities including manned or unmanned systems (air, ground and maritime), kinetic weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles.


4.1.2. Emerging threats presenting greater challenges through an increased use of asymmetric approaches which avoid US strengths and attack US vulnerabilities in lieu of more traditional military means and methods.


4.1.3. Globalization creating opportunities for economic growth and an impetus for expanding political freedoms, but also accelerating corruption, the spread of disease, WMD technology, extremist ideologies, and terrorism.


4.1.4. Terrorism and terror tactics which are increasingly lethal, unpredictable, a-edible, well-organized, and well-financed.


4.1.5. Kinetic and non-kinetic attacks on information, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCAD A) and space systems.


4.1.6. Increase in the speed and scale of the proliferation of missile technology and the spread of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons and their means of delivery, posing a fast-growing challenge to land, maritime, air, cyber, and space capabilities in the homeland and abroad.


4.1. 7. Requirements for unified action across DOD, USG Interagency, InterGovernmental organizations (IGO), non-governmental organization (NGO) and multinational partners.


4.1.8. Reassessment of DOD capabilities in domestic situations, specifically for the use of U.S. Coast Guard in Title 14 status and the National Guard in Title 32 Slatus.

within the roles of disaster response and border control support.


4.2. The Homeland is confronted with a wide spectrum of threats ranging from traditional national security threats (ballistic missile attack) to law enforcement threats (drug smuggling). Between the two ends of this spectrum, there is a set of missions where an overlap of roles, responsibilities, authorities and capabilities exist amongst DOD, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department Health and Human Services (DHHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and other Interagency (IA) stakeholders in securing the United States (US). These areas of overlap present an opportunity to take advantage of increased US Government capacity, and should not be viewed as detrimental. In order to take advantage of these areas of overlap, it is vital that appropriate interagency pre-event planning occur and that stakeholders come together in a “unity of effort” through operational coordination and collaboration during the threat response. Noting the importance of this need for “unity of effort,” the President has directed specific coordination requirements in the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan and the Aviation Operational Threat Response (AOTR) Plan, as well in other planning and operational documents. While the HD/CS Joint Operating Concept is the primary document describing how DOD will operate to achieve National unity of effort, this CBA will assist in identifying, and prioritizing the capabilities which DOD will use to contribute to the Nation’s security activities.


4.3. In parallel with the Homeland Defense mission, DOD must remain prepared to support its Federal, State, and local partners in responding to natural and manmade disasters or accidents when directed. Natural disasters such as major hurricanes, earthquakes, or pandemics can overwhelm local responders and involve significant allocation of defense resources to help mitigate the effects and support relief and recovery efforts. Likewise, a successful terrorist attack, particularly one involving WMD, can cause catastrophic losses requiring substantial Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). DOD must be trained, equipped. and ready to provide the capabilities needed to assist civil authorities when required.


4.4. Finally, DOD must sustain the nation’s freedom of action during and despite any of the events described above. This effort includes Emergency Preparedness, Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection, Continuity of Government and Continuity of Operations as well as ensuring and assessing the protection of the Defense Industrial Base.


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
The world’s worst serial killer – Full Movie
		
	
	

		


Some serial killers are very well known although the number of murders are not so many. Here is the other way around. Not so well known, but has murdered an incredible number of people. Here is the story of Garavito who has killed at least 140 children in Columbia in the 90´s.

Those of you who do not speak Swedish have to put up with the Swedish texting.

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Superseding Indictment Charges 11 People in $19 Million Tax Fraud and Identity Theft Conspiracy
		
	
	

		


ANCHORAGE—U.S. Attorney Karen L. Loeffler and Assistant Attorney General Kathryn Keneally of the Justice Department’s Tax Division announced that 11 defendants were charged in a 90-count superseding indictment returned today in connection with their alleged roles in a scheme to use stolen Puerto Rican identities to file tax returns and obtain fraudulent income tax refunds. This second superseding indictment adds tax fraud, identity theft, and other financial counts to previous charges, including conspiracy to distribute cocaine, cocaine distribution, and international money laundering.


“Today’s indictment is a clear warning that anyone who steals the identities of innocent taxpayers and uses the information for personal profit will be aggressively pursued, investigated, and prosecuted in Alaska or throughout the United States,” Ms. Loeffler said. “This case is an example of how interagency cooperation and teamwork can successfully bring down an entire organized criminal conspiracy.”


The indictment charges that between January 2010, and March 2012, the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by filing false tax returns and claiming millions of dollars in tax refunds to which they were not entitled.


To accomplish their tax refund scheme, the indictment alleges that the conspirators obtained the names and Social Security numbers of individuals from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. They then fabricated individual income tax returns in those names claiming that they were owed thousands of dollars in refunds to which they were not entitled.


To facilitate the submission of false tax returns, the indictment alleges that three of the defendants obtained laptop computers that were loaded with individual names, Social Security numbers, and other identity information. Altogether, the three laptop computers contained over 2,600 stolen identities and identified approximately $19 million in fraudulent refund claims. The indictment further alleges that, in some cases, one or more of the defendants obtained the physical addresses used on the tax returns by stealing mail from mailboxes in and around the Anchorage area.


In other cases, it is alleged that one or more of the defendants contacted conspirators in locations such as New Jersey and Puerto Rico and requested that fraudulently obtained tax refund checks be sent to Anchorage under false names.


The indictment also alleges that the defendants negotiated the refund checks at banks in Anchorage. The indictment further charges one bank employee with assisting other defendants in opening bank accounts in false names and negotiating forged U.S. Treasury checks.


In order to negotiate the tax refund checks, the defendants allegedly used false identification documents. They allegedly obtained these documents by using the names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers of other individuals in applications made to the Alaska Department of Motor Vehicles. The defendants are charged with opening numerous bank accounts in the various stolen identities. The defendants involved in the tax scheme, all of whom were citizens of either the Dominican Republic or Mexico, are alleged to have falsely claimed to be United States citizens on their applications for these false documents.


The indictment also charges various defendants with submitting false claims for refund, possessing stolen mail, making false claims of U.S. citizenship, committing passport fraud, making false statements to banks and credit unions, and passing forged U.S. Treasury checks, as well as aggravated identity theft. The fraud charges each carry maximum penalties of between two and 30 years of imprisonment, in addition to the five-year mandatory minimum prison term required upon conviction on the drug charges.


“The charges brought forth today against these 11 individuals serve as another reminder that IRS-Criminal Investigation is aggressively pursuing those who choose to defraud the government and disrupt the lives of innocent taxpayers,” stated Richard Weber, Chief, IRS-Criminal Investigation.


“These criminals illegally posed as U.S. citizens and exploited our financial system for personal gain,” said Brad Bench, Special Agent in Charge of HSI Seattle, who oversees investigations in Alaska. “By pooling our unique resources, legal authorities, and expertise, HSI and the IRS were able to dismantle a significant scheme to defraud the people of the United States.”


“Drug traffickers’ greed clearly has no limits, as evidenced by this investigation,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Douglas James of the Drug Enforcement Administration. “The DEA is proud of its partnership with the Anchorage Police Department, who brought this case to their federal counterparts, exposing this multi-faceted criminal organization.”


The case is being jointly prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Thomas C. Bradley and James Barkeley of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Alaska and Trial Attorney Stephanie Carowan Courter of the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division. The initial charges arose out of an investigation begun by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Anchorage Police Department (APD). The new charges were further investigated by the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), and the U.S. State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service. Additional assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the District of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Southern District of New York.


Anyone who believes that they have been a victim of identity theft, or wants information about preventing identity theft, may obtain helpful information and complaint forms on various government websites, including the Federal Trade Commission, Justice Department, Social Security Administration, and IRS.


This case was investigated and prosecuted under the purview of the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force, which is made up of personnel from the U.S. Attorney’s Office; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; ICE-Homeland Security Investigations; Internal Revenue Service–Criminal Investigations; U.S. Marshals Service; U.S. Postal Inspection Service; U.S. Coast Guard; and the Anchorage Police Department.


An indictment is merely a formal accusation. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
Unveiled – An Israeli – Iranian War: The Iranian Perspective
		
	
	

		
What are Tehran’s goals in a confrontation with Israel? Why have the Iranians been prepared to fight for so many years? A special analysis by Colonel (Res.) Ronen Cohen




https://i0.wp.com/www.israeldefense.com/_Uploads/dbsarticles/_cut/SA0000_0244x0240x0072_000xFFFFFF_ahmadinejad@jpg.jpg


Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Photo: AP)


“The IDF is ready to move against Iran the minute it receives the green light,” declared IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz in an interview broadcast on Israel’s 64th Independence Day. “The Iranians are determined to build a nuclear weapon while they continue to dupe the international community,” Minister of Defense Ehud Barak added the following day.


Israel’s leaders face a series of existential questions: should Israel attack Iran or pursue the diplomatic track? When, if ever, is the right time to launch an attack? How should it be executed? How will Iran’s leaders react to an attack on their nuclear facilities?


The day after


The most likely day-after scenario, as the international media sees it, is a devastating Iranian response based mainly, though not entirely, on its long-range missile arsenal. This attack would be coupled with terrorist strikes against Jewish and Israeli targets abroad, and backed by Hezbollah – Iran’s proxy in Lebanon.

On the international front, Iran could wreak havoc on the global economy through fluctuations in oil prices, even though this could also ultimately harm Iran (it is unclear whether Iran or the West would suffer more in an oil war).


Iran could respond with a four-way campaign with long-ranged counter-fire against Israel, terror activity on Israel’s borders, attacks on Israelis and Jews overseas, and a limited conflict in the north of Israel.


Israel is fully aware of the implications of the day after, but senior political-security figures have increasingly alleged that Iran’s response capabilities are limited due to international constraints and its distance from Israel. From our perspective, Israel could withstand an Iranian retaliation, just as it has withstood missile attacks in the past.


In his Independence Day speech, the chief of staff threw the proverbial ball into the political decision-makers’ court, taking careful aim at the prime minister and minister of defense. The question is whether Israel is up to the challenge of a day-after scenario that is different from the one the media projects.


If Israel initiates a military strike and Iran responds, Israel will face a security challenge of a magnitude that it has never experienced. It will be the first time in history that Israel faces a non-Arab state with an entirely different culture, mentality, and historical legacy. The same is true for the Iranians – for the first time they will be confronting Israel and the West.


Furthermore, Israel has never carried out a military attack against a state on the brink of nuclear capability. An attack against Iran would be far different than the bombing of the nuclear reactor in Iraq or the air strike against the reactor in Syria (attributed to Israel). For Israel, the element of surprise is already gone, which in effect, has already enabled the enemy to carry out a series of steps. These steps range from instilling a state of awareness into their nation, political-strategic maneuvering, and preparations for both an offensive and defensive military response.


Presenting a regional objective 


When we examine the rationale behind an Iranian response, we should assume that the regime in Tehran will make every effort to cause the “Zionist entity” such severe damage that it would restore the Islamic Republic to the lofty position of a regional superpower. Iran’s choice of targets and its method of attack will be a regional and international display of Iranian strategy and military might. Iran cannot allow the campaign to end with it appearing ruined and humiliated. Another Iranian goal will be to safeguard its nuclear project so that it can quickly resume operations if damaged.


An Iranian strike would probably be directed against Israel’s population centers, since the Iranians believe that Israel would be hard-pressed to cope with a protracted campaign of attrition that weakens the home front.


Upon examining these goals against the scenario established by the media, we can see that the scenario the media portrays would not attain Iran’s objectives. What then is the modus operandi that Iran will choose to meet its goals?


A different kind of society 


To understand how the Iranian leadership operates, we must go back to the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Despite the extreme differences between that war and a possible Israeli-Iranian confrontation, it would be worthwhile to look at the way the Ayatollah regime, still in its infancy, waged its first war.


At the time, following a break in relations with the US, the Iranian regime was isolated and bereft of superpower backing. Iraq received lavish military assistance from the Soviet Union, while Europe exerted pressure on Iran for disrupting the flow of oil caused by the war. During the long and bitter conflict, Iran’s Republican Guards displayed a high degree of patience, endurance, and determination. The nation proved that it could weather massive attacks from unconventional weapons (poisonous gas) and retain its trust in its leadership. This is the heritage that Khomeini bequeathed to the Iranian people: fighting and winning against all odds.


Those that believe Iran’s geographical distance from Israel will limit the Iranian response (the Iranians will mainly engage in long-range counter fire) fail to take into account the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis that enables Iran to bridge great distances. Republican Guard ground forces could be deployed along Israel’s northern border and even engage the IDF in a protracted guerilla campaign.


On the frontlines 


Israel must also take into account Hezbollah’s role in such a scenario, since Israel could be tested in an unprecedented event.


For the first time, Hezbollah would be completely subordinate to Tehran’s leadership and the Iranian military command even though it is a Lebanese organization supported by the country’s Shiite population. In an Israeli-Iranian war, Hezbollah would take orders from Iran in its first and perhaps only real opportunity to repay the enormous debt that it owes to Iran for building up its military strength.


Another possibility is that Iran could launch a preemptive strike and place responsibility on Hezbollah, since Tehran has no interest in becoming entangled in hostilities prior to an Israeli attack.


After an Israeli strike, the scope of Hezbollah’s rocket fire into Israel’s depth could parallel the developments in the fighting between Israel and Iran. Israel should not be surprised if this time the rocket and missile fire is entirely different from the past. Instead of gradual escalation at the outset, Hezbollah could unleash a massive missile barrage into the heart of Tel Aviv.


Not today or in a few days 


Israel has to proceed with great caution in light of Iran’s policy and culture. A long and bitter guerilla struggle may ensue, one that could last for a year or a number of years against Iranian combat units on Israel’s northern border.


These scenarios are not the product of an imagination run wild, but logical directions that Iran could take as it aspires to realize its goal to become a regional superpower.


 


***

The article was published in IsraelDefense Issue #8

	


	



			
				


			

			
Clip – Hot Lady Tournament!; Esquire Magazine
		
	
	

		


 


Add the NEW Sourcefed Facebook page: http://on.fb.me/xQDV8M


This year Esquire held their first HOTTEST WOMEN TOURNAMENT!


Click the annotation or go to SourceFed.com for the 5 videos we post daily or anything we’ve ever made.

Watch more of today’s news http://youtube.com/sourcefed


Here’s our Sources:

http://bit.ly/yiCaqS


Philly D OFFICIAL APP: http://bit.ly/aIyY0w


Hosts:

@joebereta @elliottcmorgan


Music:

@hagemeister

	


	



			
				


			

			
Israel Defense – Bulgarian PM: “Assailant was a suicide bomber with a US passport”
		
	
	

		
Bulgaria: Hospitalized Israelis Being Evacuated, Number of casualties rises to 8


Terror attack in Bulgaria: the number of casualties in yesterday’s terror attack against the tourist bus in the airport in Burgas, Bulgaria, has risen to eight. One of the wounded persons died of his wounds at the hospital in the early hours of the morning. Six of the casualties are Israelis. Hercules helicopters belonging to the Israeli Air Force (IAF) have begun the operation to evacuate the wounded for hospitalization in Israel.


A team of Israeli doctors departed to Bulgaria over the night, in order to assist local medical teams in dealing with the large number of wounded persons, which currently stands on more than 30. Some of the wounded are suffering from burns and injuries that are characteristic of terror attacks.


The investigation of the event is continuing. Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov told local media that despite previous assessments, the attack was carried out by a suicide bomber, and not a remotely-operated explosive charge. According to Borisov, a US passport was found on the terrorist’s body, apparently forged. Representatives of the CIA and FBI US intelligence agencies are involved in  investigation of the attack.


Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu blamed Iran yesterday as being behind the terror attack. Israel’s Minister of Defense clarified that “we will do everything to reach the perpetrators and those that sent them.” The White House published an announcement by US President Barack Obama that stated that the US will cooperate with Israel in investigating the attack, and expressed his condolences over the attack.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Four Members and Associates of Newburgh Latin Kings Convicted
		
	
	

		


Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that Nelson Calderon and Angelo Deleon, members of the Latin Kings gang in Newburgh, New York (the “Newburgh Latin Kings”), and Wilfredo Sanchez and Eva Cardoza, associates of the Newburgh Latin Kings, were each found guilty yesterday in White Plains federal court of crimes committed during their association with the gang. Calderon, Deleon, Sanchez, and Cardoza were convicted after a five-week jury trial before U.S. District Judge Cathy Seibel. They are four of 35 members and associates of the Newburgh Latin Kings charged in connection with the case, 28 of whom have now been convicted, and seven others await trial.


According to the evidence presented at trial:


Beginning in 2007, the Newburgh Latin Kings and their associates sold cocaine, crack heroin, and marijuana at drug spots in Newburgh, including the areas of Benkard Avenue and William Street and of South Miller Street and Broadway. Gang members and associates protected the gang’s drug turf, drugs, and drug money using guns and violence. The violence included frequent shootings, stabbings, and assaults of rival drug dealers, including members of another gang in Newburgh known as the Bloods, as well as members of their gang who either were cooperating with law enforcement or whom they suspected were cooperating with law enforcement.


Cardoza was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to the murder of John Maldonado, an aspiring member of the Newburgh Latin Kings whom the gang’s leaders had suspected betrayed them. Cardoza drove the getaway car following the murder of Maldonado. The jury also convicted Cardoza of racketeering conspiracy and conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine on the Newburgh Latin Kings’ drug turf. Cardoza was found not guilty of murdering and conspiring to murder Maldonado. She faces a maximum sentence of 95 years in prison and a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison. Cardoza is scheduled to be sentenced on December 5, 2012.


Calderon was second-in-command of the Newburgh Latin Kings. He led meetings of the gang and directed others in their drug dealing and violent activities. Subsequent to his arrest in this case, Calderon assaulted an informant who later testified about his role in the gang. Following trial, the jury convicted Calderon of racketeering conspiracy and of attempting to tamper with a witness. Calderon faces a maximum sentence of 50 years in prison and is scheduled to be sentenced on December 6, 2012.


Deleon was fifth-in-command of the Newburgh Latin Kings and also led meetings of the gang during which he and other gang members plotted to shoot, stab, and assault enemies of the Newburgh Latin Kings. Deleon also distributed marijuana, including from his home on Liberty Street, along with other members of the Newburgh Latin Kings. The jury convicted Deleon of participating in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana with other members of the Newburgh Latin Kings. Deleon faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison and is scheduled to be sentenced on December 14, 2012.


Sanchez was an associate of the Newburgh Latin Kings who sold crack with members of the gang on William Street in Newburgh. Following trial, the jury convicted him of distributing crack. Sanchez faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and is scheduled to be sentenced December 4, 2012.


The jury found all four defendants not guilty of possessing firearms in connection with the Newburgh Latin Kings narcotics conspiracy and found Cardoza not guilty of possessing a firearm in connection with the murder of John Maldonado. The jury also found Calderon and Sanchez not guilty of narcotics conspiracy charges.


***


The trial of Calderon, Deleon, Sanchez, and Cardoza was the second of three trials scheduled in the case. Seven other defendants, who are charged with murder, racketeering, drug, firearms, witness tampering, and other crimes, are scheduled for trial before Judge Seibel on January 23, 2013. Twenty-four other defendants have pled guilty to murder, racketeering, narcotics conspiracy, gun possession charges, and other offenses.


The investigation resulting in the prosecution of members and associates of the Newburgh Latin Kings was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Hudson Valley Safe Streets Task Force, which combined the efforts of dozens of law enforcement officers from federal, state, and local agencies and departments, including agents and officers with the FBI; the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the City of Newburgh Police Department; Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations; the Middletown Police Department; the Orange County Sheriff’s Office; and the New York State Police. Mr. Bharara thanked the member agencies of the task force for their work in the investigation.


The prosecution is being handled by the Office’s White Plains Division. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Benjamin Allee, Daniel Chung, Abigail Kurland, and Nicholas McQuaid are in charge of the prosecution.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Public Intelligence – U.S. Army Military Police School Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee Policy and Operations Courses
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/USAMPS-EPW-CI-Ops.png


The following self-learning courses from the U.S. Army Military Police School at Fort McClellan describe procedures for military police involvement in internment operations related to enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees.


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS HERE


USAMPS-EPW-CI-Ops


USAMPS-EPW-CI-Policy

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
SECRET – Official Cause of RU Killer Flood Challenged
		
	
	

		
 Official Cause of Russian Killer Flood Challenged


 




A sends:


Date: Sun, 08 Jul 2012 16:50:18 +0300

Subject: Weird flood in southern Russia, over 150 dead


Some interesting counterweight from Russia:


These links:


http://www.newsru.com/russia/08jul2012/skrflood.html


and


http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3Ahttp%3A%2F%2Fvk.com%2Fwall160960523_52


are describing the standpoint little bit differing from the official (Russian) opinion, claiming the flood was technogenic, as of the choice for officials was either Krymsk will be flooded or a much more bigger city – Novorossisk – will


The key sentence in the cached doc is:


[Russian omitted.]


The approximate translation: Everybody is silent now, but my father was on duty that night and the commission met in a hurry to decide whether or not to open the gates of the Neberdzhajev Dam.


While the official standpoint is that the dam does not have “such type” of gates.


 




 


 


 


 


 


 



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
SECRET – Disclosures Anonymous
		
	
	

		
Disclosures Anonymous


 




Step 1


Anybody — individual, government or institution can and should disclose — there are no requirements, no restrictions, using true or false identity, press officers or all the iterations of anonymous sources — commonplace or never before used.


Step 2


Call it what you like, The Truth, disclosure, leak, whistleblow, propaganda, lies, spy operation, official secrets, false flag, taking the king’s coin — best to create new, alluring and mesmerizing locutions.


Step 3


Disclose quietly with inscrutable understatement to be impossibly noticed then dramatically discovered through a strategic disclosure to select outlets, or with maximum exaggeration, publicity stunts, hired agencies, sock puppets, spookily covert or ostenatiously overt.


Step 4


Disclose from the inside or the outside or offside the rules of the game; don’t hesitate to preach, fabricate, prevaricate, embellish, distort, bombast, editorialize, repeat, hector, condemn, laud, headline, blare, bumper sticker, or stupefyingly frank and earnest.


Step 5


Calibrate with the topical or risk being overlooked; board bandwagons; ridicule and pretend to ignore competitors; declare highest and mightiest of principles with deepest grievance; advertise your pain and threats from gargantuan opposition; be ever ready to give media interviews with easy to understand quotes; offer pity to those who fail to grasp the importance of your disclosures; rue those who misquote you; say you forgive the ignorant who misunderstand you.


Step 6


Conspire, co-conspire, multi-conspire, mega-conspire; mimic the master conspiracists in major sources of public disclosure of invaluable information required to save nations and faiths against barbarous atheism — hyperbole without restraint.


Step 7


Join with those who bestow awards and recognition on the best of the disclosure championship breed, and condemn the mongrels, the nobodies, the fakers, the publicists, the apostates, with highest scorn for those who mock noble, selfless, high-risk disclosure.


Step 8


Form splinters to attack, demean and debunk main stream disclosers, in particular the recipients and grantors of awards for disclosure.


Step 9


Disclose insider secrets of disclosers, splinters, other insiders, leaders and spies, covert and overt funders, boosters and informants, their neglected families and jilted lovers.


Step 10


Originate a group (declare confidentiality for security its funding source, leaders or membership) to console former disclosers and those who believe they have been exploited by trusted, high-profile disclosers — target families, lovers and investors — invite and flatter documentarians and media profilers to get inside early to record the casualties’ disclosures.


Step 11


Disclose that the originated console group was a fraudulent sting to ensnare the disaffected as evidence disclosure is forever corrupt, dishonest, self-serving and under the sway and in the pay of sinister, unknown, powerful, ancient and new-ly camouflaged fronts for amoral manipulators. Up ratchet the disclosure deception, critique and historicize it with other confidence exploits ancient and modern.


Step 12


Prepare and distribute a prospectus and contract terms for a Disclosures Anonymous series for the bottomless pocketed NGOs and vulture capitalists; for entertainment and cyberwar industries; for the UN, foreign ministries, spy agencies, foreign and military aid agencies, and propagandists; the educational and conferencing industries; for aggregators, siphons and SM; for persistant advertising attackers; for hacktivists, FOI and cellphone warriors; above all for the flocks of all ages and places being educated, intimidated and counseled to be law abiding, keep quiet, be obedient. patriotic and trust authority. Tip Disclosures Anonymous to the grandiloquizers and anonymous sources combine.


Expect a brief publicity spark but no overt takers of the prospectus with a few of the usual criminally covert,  but that the series will be stolen, plagiarized, given away or blackmarketed until expropriated for authoritarian makeover and certified as officially tax-worthy.


Within the amply fertilized Disclosures Anonymous series plant a sub-rosa disclosure exploit to bare secrets of disclosure manipulations.


Like this: Unauthorized disclosures of secrets are essential for democracy.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
SECRET – U.S. Army Military Police School Detainee Policy, Procedures, and Operations Course
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/USAMPS-DetaineePolicy.png


 


This lesson describes detainees captured or detained by the US Armed Forces and provides key definitions. These definitions explain the different personnel categories that a Military Police (MP) commander may be required to handle, protect, account for, and ensure are treated according to established laws, regulations, and international agreements. For the purpose of this lesson, the broader use of the word “detainee” applies to Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs), Civilian Internees (CIs), Retained Persons (RPs), and other classification terms for US-controlled persons unless otherwise specified. Use of specific detainee classifications does not preclude protections granted according to Geneva Conventions I through IV (1949), Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5100.77, or protections promulgated under paragraph 1-5 of Army Regulation (AR) 190-8. MP leaders and Soldiers conducting Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations must maintain task proficiency for each category. For the purposes of this subcourse, detainee operations are defined as operations that take or keep selected individuals in custody as a result of military operations to control their movement and activity and/or gain intelligence.


…


PART – A – Detainee Key Definitions.


1. Captured personnel are initially all classified as detainees until their legal status has been determined. AR 190-8 is a publication that provides more information regarding the classification of individuals. The terms defined in the following paragraphs encompass all captured personnel and are classified as follows:


a. Detainees. The overarching term detainee is defined as any person captured, detained, held, or otherwise under the control of DoD personnel (military, civilian, or contractor employee). It does not include personnel being held for law enforcement purposes. Detainees may also include enemy combatants, EPWs, CIs, or RPs.


b. Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs). EPWs are persons defined in Geneva Convention III (1949) as members of enemy armed forces and members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps (including those of organized resistance movements) belonging to an enemy power and operating in or outside their own territory (even if the territory is occupied) provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:


(1) They are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

(2) They have fixed distinctive signs that are recognizable at a distance.

(3) They carry arms openly.

(4) They conduct operations according to the laws and customs of war.

(5) Members of the enemy, regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power (the United States).

(6) Persons who accompany the armed forces of the enemy without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units, or individuals responsible for the welfare of the enemy armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces that they are accompanying.

(7) Members of crews, including masters, pilots, and apprentices of the merchant marine and the crews of civilian aircraft of the enemy, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international laws.

(8) Inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory who, on the approach of the US Armed Forces, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces without having time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided that they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.


c. Civilian Internees (CI). A civilian may be interned during an international armed conflict or belligerent occupation for imperative reasons of security as a safety measure and for protection, or he may be interned because he has committed an offense (generally a minor offense intended to harm the occupying force) subject to internment or simple imprisonment under Article 68 of Geneva Convention IV (1949). The final status of the CI may not be determined until his arrival at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF). Until such time, all CIs should be treated as EPWs. CIs are especially protected against all acts of violence, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, reprisals of any kind, sexual attack (such as rape and forced prostitution), or any form of indecent assault or improper sexual conduct.


d. Retained Person (RP). RPs are enemy personnel who fall within any of the following categories, thus becoming eligible to be certified as RPs:


(1) Medical personnel who are members of the medical service of their armed forces

(2) Medical personnel exclusively engaged in—

(a) The search for, collection, transport, or treatment of the wounded or sick

(b) The prevention of disease

(c) The administration of medical units and establishments

(3) Chaplains attached to enemy forces

(4) Staff of the Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies and other voluntary aid organizations


Note: These organizations must be duly recognized and authorized by their governments. The staffs of these organizations may be employed in the same duties as mentioned above if such organizations are subject to military laws and regulations.


(5) An RP is a special category for medical personnel and chaplains because of their special skills and training. They may be retained by the detaining power (see FM 27-10) to aid detainees, preferably those of the armed forces to which the RPs belong. According to the Geneva Conventions, RPs receive, at a minimum, the benefits and protection enjoyed by EPWs. The Geneva Conventions require that they be granted the facilities necessary to provide medical care and religious ministration to detainees. For a complete discussion on RPs, see AR 190-8. Privileges and considerations extended to RPs because of their profession include—


(a) Additional correspondence privileges for chaplains and the senior retained medical personnel

(b) All facilities necessary to provide detainees with medical care, spiritual assistance, and welfare services

(c) The authority and means of transportation for periodic visits to I/R facilities and to hospitals outside the detainee’s I/R facility to carry out his medical, spiritual, or welfare duties

(d) The restriction of work assignments to only those medical or religious duties that they are qualified to perform

(e) The assignment to quarters separate from those of detainees (when practicable)


e. Enemy Combatants. The term “detainee” may also refer to enemy combatants. The term “enemy combatant” is further divided as follows:


(1) Lawful Enemy Combatants. Lawful enemy combatants include those who qualify for EPW status, as described on page 1-7, paragraph (2) of this lesson, and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.

(2) Unlawful Enemy Combatants. Unlawful enemy combatants are persons who are not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States of its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during armed conflict. Spies and saboteurs are traditional examples of unlawful enemy combatants. For the purposes of the GWOT, the term “unlawful enemy combatant” is defined, but is not limited to an individual who is or was part of supporting Taliban of Al Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.


f. Dislocated Civilians (DC). DCs are civilians who leave their homes for various reasons. Their movement and physical presence can hinder military operations. They most likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, or clothing. DCs may not be native to the area or to the country in which they reside. DC is a generic term that is further subdivided into five categories. These subcategories are defined by

legal and political considerations as follows:


(1) Displaced Person. A displaced person is a person who has been dislocated because of war, a natural disaster, or political/economic turmoil. Consequently, the civilians’ motivation to flee and their status under international and domestic laws vary as do the degree of assistance required and the location of relief operations. The political, geographical, environmental, and threat conditions also vary in each situation.

(2) Refugee. Geneva Convention (1951) states that a refugee is a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”

(3) Evacuee. An evacuee is a civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or other requirements of the military situation.

(4) Stateless Person. A stateless person is a civilian who has been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish his right to the nationality he claims.

(5) War Victim. War victim is a classification that was created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of family members, or damage to or destruction of their homes because of war.

(6) Migrant. A migrant is a worker who moves from one region to another by chance, instinct, or plan.

(7) Internally Displaced Person. An internally displaced person may have been forced to flee his home for the same reason as a refugee, but he has not crossed an internationally recognized border.

(8) Expellee. A civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or a third country for political or other purposes.


2. Persons Treated as Prisoners of War. All Soldiers must be able to understand the term “treatment” versus “status.” To treat a detainee as an EPW does not mean that the detainee has the actual status of an EPW, as set forth in the Geneva Conventions. Any time there is a question as to the actual status of a detainee, US Soldiers treat the detainee as an EPW until his status is determined. A detainee’s behavior while inside a facility may be a contributing factor in determining status. The following persons are also treated as EPWs:


a. Personnel who would qualify for EPW status, as described on page 1-4, paragraph (2) of this lesson, but enter the custody of the United States as a neutral or nonbelligerent power.


b. Persons belonging to or having belonged to the armed forces of a country occupied by the United States, if the United States considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them. Particular attention is paid to those persons who have made an unsuccessful attempt to join the armed forces and are engaged in combat or have failed to comply with a summons made to them.


3. Determination of Enemy Prisoner of War Status. Captured enemy personnel may be presumed to be EPWs immediately on capture if the circumstances are unmistakable (such as an armed, uniformed enemy). If there is any doubt whether enemy personnel captured by the US Armed Forces belong to any of the categories described above, such personnel receive the same treatment to which EPWs are entitled until their status has been determined by a competent military tribunal according to AR 190-8. This tribunal is commonly referred to as an Article 5 Tribunal and originates in Geneva Convention III. This tribunal is simply a hearing typically controlled by an officer or board of officers who make a determination as to the actual status of a detainee. This tribunal can take place anywhere, but it most commonly takes place echelons above the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). In learning step 2, we will cover the Geneva Conventions, understanding that only the EPWs meet qualification under the Geneva Conventions. All others will be treated under the principles of the Geneva Conventions.


…


l. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Officer. The officer in charge of the EPW/CI PSYOP team supporting I/R operations serves as the special staff officer responsible for PSYOP. The PSYOP staff officer advises the MP commander on the psychological impact of MP or Military Intelligence (MI) actions to prevent misunderstandings and disturbances by the detainees. The supporting I/R PSYOP team has two missions that reduce the need to divert MP assets to maintain security in the I/R facility. The team—


(1) Assists the MP force in controlling detainees

(2) Exposes detainees to US and allied policy.


m. PSYOP Officer. The PSYOP team also supports the MP custodial mission in the I/R facility. Their tasks include—


(1) Developing PSYOP products designed to pacify and acclimate detainees to accept US facility authority and regulations.

(2) Gaining the cooperation of detainees to reduce the need for guards.

(3) Identifying malcontents, trained agitators, and political officers within the facility who may try to organize a resistance or create disturbances.

(4) Developing and executing indoctrination programs to reduce or remove pro-enemy attitudes.

(5) Recognizing political activists.

(6) Providing loudspeaker support when necessary, such as in providing administrative announcements and facility instructions.

(7) Helping the MP commander control the detainee populace during emergencies.

(8) Planning and executing a PSYOP program that produces an understanding and appreciation of US policies and actions. PSYOP personnel use comprehensive information, reorientation, and educational and vocational programs to prepare detainees for repatriation.


n. PSYOP Officer. The PSYOP officer is an integral part of the I/R structure. The I/R facility commander may designate a location in which PSYOP personnel can conduct interviews of the various categories of people associated with I/R. This location must be separate and away from the interrogation areas.


o. Civil Affairs (CA) Personnel. CA personnel primarily support CMO. They conduct DC operations in support of I/R across the full spectrum of operations. Other related activities they conduct include—


(1) Populace and Resource Control (PRC)

(2) Foreign internal defense

(3) Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

(4) Unconventional warfare


p. Intelligence Officer. The intelligence officer is responsible for advising the commander on matters pertaining to MI, operations, and training. He produces and disseminates intelligence products throughout the

command.


q. Operations Officer. The operations officer is responsible for the operational planning, organizing, directing, supervising, training, coordinating, and reporting of activities when conducting confinement or detainee operations. When operating as part of an MP I/R battalion, the operations officer and his section are responsible for operating the confinement and/or detention cells for—


(1) Detainees that are belligerent, uncooperative, or charged with Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) violations

(2) DCs that will be turned over to civilian authorities


r. The Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG). The OPMG is DoD’s executive agent for EPW/CI operations and long-term confinement of US military prisoners. Within the OPMG and through the combatant commander, MP personnel are tasked with coordination, protection, accountability, and sustainment for detainees and US prisoners.


s. Provost Marshal (PM). The PM advises the Commander, Detainee Operations (CDO) on MP capabilities and abilities. He coordinates daily with the commander and staff officers on the employment of MP assets and support, ensures that MP planning is practical and flexible, and ensures that plans reflect manpower and resources needed by the MP. The PM advises the CDO on the Command and Control (C2) relationship of MP and MI assets. MI Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collectors never assume command of an I/R facility. When required, the PM coordinates transportation assets to evacuate detainees. In the absence of specific directions or orders, he plans the use of assets.


t. Logistics Officer. The logistics officer is of great importance to the I/R facility commander. He is responsible for the acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel. He is also responsible for the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel. Additionally, the logistics officer must ensure acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.


 


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


USAMPS-DetaineePolicy

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against 48 Individuals in Massive Medicaid Fraud Scheme
		
	
	

		
Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York; Janice K. Fedarcyk, the Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Raymond W. Kelly, the Police Commissioner of the City of New York (NYPD); and Robert Doar, the Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA), announced today the unsealing of charges against 48 defendants for their participation in a massive fraud scheme involving the unlawful diversion and trafficking of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of prescription drugs that had previously been dispensed to Medicaid recipients in the New York City area (“second-hand” drugs), in a national underground market. As a result of the fraud, Medicaid lost more than an estimated $500 million in reimbursements for pills that were diverted into this second-hand black market. Forty-two of the defendants were charged in a superseding indictment, and six more were charged in a complaint.


Thirty-four of the defendants were arrested this morning in connection with today’s charges. Fifteen defendants were taken into custody in New York and New Jersey, and an additional defendant from the area will surrender today. These 16 defendants will be presented and arraigned in Manhattan federal court before U.S. Magistrate Judge Frank Maas later this afternoon. Nineteen other defendants were arrested in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Florida, and Texas and are expected to appear today and tomorrow in federal courts in those states. The remaining defendants charged are at large.


Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said, “As alleged, these defendants ran a black market in prescription pills involving a double-dip fraud of gigantic proportions. It worked a fraud on Medicaid—in some cases, two times over—a fraud on pharmaceutical companies, a fraud on legitimate pharmacies, a fraud on patients who unwittingly bought second-hand drugs, and ultimately, a fraud on the entire health care system. With the dozens of arrests we made today, we have taken a significant step toward exposing and shutting down the black market for second-hand drugs, and our investigation is very much ongoing.”


FBI Assistant Director in Charge Janice K. Fedarcyk said, “The scheme to collect, aggregate, and resell costly prescription drugs was bad medicine in three ways: profiting so obscenely by breaking the law is the very definition of unjust enrichment. The scheme was theft, plain and simple, from a program funded by taxpayers. And the scheme posed serious health risks at both the collection and distribution ends. People with real ailments were induced to sell their medications on the cheap rather than take them as prescribed, while end-users of the diverted drugs were getting second-hand medicine that may have been mishandled, adulterated, improperly stored, repackaged, and expired.”


NYPD Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly said, “It’s one thing when people sell their blood for money; it’s another when they sell their drugs, especially when the diversion compromises the pharmaceutical supply with tainted and outdated drugs.”


HRA Commissioner Robert Doar said, “This case is an egregious example of individuals preying on our most vulnerable population. The diversion, repackaging, and reselling of HIV/AIDS medications, in some cases expired, is a danger to our public health. The integrity of the Medicaid Program has been threatened by these criminals who have used taxpayer dollars for the opposite reasons for which they are intended. But make no mistake, together with our law enforcement partners, we will continue to pursue these types of criminals and prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law.”


The following allegations are based on the superseding indictment, the complaint, and other documents unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:


The prescription drugs involved in this scheme were drugs designed to treat various illnesses, including HIV, schizophrenia, and asthma, and were non-controlled substances that did not lend themselves to abuse. These second-hand drugs were originally dispensed to Medicaid recipients in the New York City area who then sold them into collection and distribution channels that ultimately ended at pharmacies for resale to unsuspecting consumers. The defendants and their co-conspirators profited by exploiting the difference between the cost to the patient of obtaining the prescription drugs through Medicaid, which was usually nothing, and the hundreds of dollars per bottle that pharmacies paid to purchase those drugs to sell to their customers. In order to maximize their profits, the defendants and their co-conspirators targeted the most expensive drugs, which often cost more than $1,000 per bottle.


The Fraudulent Distribution and Trafficking Scheme


The lowest level participants in the scheme (the “Medicaid beneficiaries”) were typically AIDS patients or individuals who suffered from other illnesses that required expensive drug therapies. Using their Medicaid benefits to cover the costs, the Medicaid beneficiaries filled prescriptions for month-long supplies of drugs at pharmacies throughout the New York City area and then sold them to “collectors” for cash instead of using them for treatment. These transactions occurred at street corners and bodegas in and around New York City, including in the Washington Heights neighborhood of Manhattan and in the Bronx. Collectors then sold the second-hand bottles to higher level participants in the scheme (“aggregators”), who typically bought large quantities of second-hand drugs from multiple collectors. These transactions repeated themselves at increasingly higher levels of aggregators who purchased the drugs from multiple, lower level aggregators. The pills were ultimately sold to wholesale prescription drug distribution companies (“corrupt distribution companies”), which then sold them to pharmacies and to other wholesale prescription distribution drug companies across the United States. Ultimately, these pharmacies then dispensed the second-hand drugs to unsuspecting customers, some of whom likely were Medicaid beneficiaries. Therefore, in some cases, Medicaid would have reimbursed patients for the same drugs twice—the second time for drugs that were misbranded, adulterated, and possibly expired—and would thereby have been defrauded twice.


The defendants charged in the superseding indictment and the complaint include collectors, aggregators, and owners and operators of the corrupt distribution companies who were carrying out this scheme in states including New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Florida, Texas, Massachusetts, Utah, Nevada, Louisiana, and Alabama.


In addition, several defendants were also charged with narcotics trafficking offenses for buying and reselling drugs including Oxycodone and Oxymorphone.


The Fraudulent Labeling Scheme


Because the prescription drugs involved in the scheme were not drugs of abuse and were ultimately going to be resold in the legal drug distribution chain, it was essential that they be packaged in bottles that appeared to contain new drugs that came directly from the manufacturer via authorized and licensed wholesale distributors. Therefore, the defendants and their co-conspirators had to restore the previously dispensed bottles to their original appearance, with the manufacturer’s label still intact but without the patient labels that pharmacies affix when dispensing drugs to a patient. After purchasing the second-hand bottles originally dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries, the defendants and their co-conspirators used lighter fluid and other means to dissolve the adhesive on the patient labels so that they could be removed. During the process, the manufacturers’ labels sometimes became damaged, and/or the second-hand drugs were close to their expiration dates or had already expired. When the bottles were not resaleable because of damaged manufacturers’ labels or expiration date problems, some of the defendants replaced the original manufacturers’ labels with counterfeit labels and/or altered the labels to backdate their expiration dates. Some of these counterfeit prescription drug manufacturers’ labels were obtained by two of the defendants from the Dominican Republic. In other instances, the defendants and their co-conspirators removed the drugs from the bottles and trafficked in loose pills, which were then completely untraceable.


E-mails obtained by search warrant revealed that a certain subset of the defendants bought and sold more than $62 million worth of second-hand prescription drugs during an approximately 12-month time period during the conspiracy, which they meticulously documented in a business-like manner through purchase orders and receipts scanned onto their computers and uploaded into e-mail accounts.


The Second-Hand Pills


The second-hand pills that found their way back into the legal drug distribution stream were potentially dangerous to the unwitting consumers who purchased them for several reasons. For example, the defendants and their co-conspirators stored the drugs in uncontrolled conditions, such as car trunks, residences, and rented storage facilities, which would have compromised the medical efficacy of the drugs over time.


During the investigation, the FBI seized more than $16 million worth of second-hand prescription drugs, comprised of more than 33,000 bottles and more than 250,000 loose pills, kept in uncontrolled and sometimes egregious conditions by various defendants and their co-conspirators.


* * *


Charts identifying each defendant, the charges, and the maximum penalties are below. The indicted case is assigned to U.S. District Judge Denise L. Cote.


Mr. Bharara praised the efforts of the FBI’s Health Care Fraud Task Force and thanked FBI, NYPD, and HRA for their work on the case. The New York FBI Health Care Fraud Task Force was formed in 2007 in an effort to combat health care fraud in the greater New York City area. The task force is comprised of agents, officers, and investigators from the FBI, NYPD, the New York State Insurance Fraud Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Office of Personnel Management Inspector General, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, New York State Attorney General’s Office, New York State Office of Medicaid Inspector General, New York State Health and Hospitals Inspector General, and the National Insurance Crime Bureau.


Mr. Bharara thanked the Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations, and the New York State Office of the Medicaid Inspector General for their assistance. He also thanked the FBI’s Boston, Houston, Miami, Newark, Philadelphia, and Salt Lake City Field Offices, as well as the U.S. Attorney’s offices in New Jersey, Massachusetts, Texas (Southern), Florida (Southern), Pennsylvania (Eastern), and Utah for their assistance in the investigation.


If you think you may have purchased second-hand prescription drugs or were otherwise victimized by this scheme, you can call the FBI Hotline at 212-384-3555.


The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Organized Crime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jason A. Masimore and Russell Capone are in charge of the prosecution. Assistant U.S. Attorney Alexander Wilson of the Office’s Asset Forfeiture Unit is responsible for the forfeiture of assets.


The charges contained in the indictment and the complaint are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.


* * *


U.S. v. Viera, et al.






Count
Charge
Defendants
Maximum Penalties




1
Conspiracy to commit wire fraud, mail fraud, and healthcare fraud
Juan Carlos Viera

Jose Manuel Dominguez

Julio Dominguez

Carlos Alberto Padron

Juan Manuel Tavarez Padilla

Juan Tavarez

Aura Catalina Tavarez

Edwin M. Tavarez

Israel Tacher

Roberto Tacher

Vanessa Rosario

Eligio Armas

Eduardo Diaz

Carlos Peralta

Joselito Peralta

Juan Carlos Peralta

Hanser Olivo Liranzo

Kelvin Manuel Martinez Taveras

Glenn Luis Cabrera

Fary R. Caba Padilla Miguel Padilla

Americo Luis Garcia Dominguez

Wilfred Rodriguez

Jose Ramon Gonzalez Alex Justo

Yoel Fernandez Rivero

Amauris A. Rosario

Jacqueline Jimenez

Luis Santana

Bayohan Diaz

Paulino Cayetano

Armando Garcia

Sergio Novo

Lazaro Ospina		
0 years in prison




2
Conspiracy to commit adulteration and misbranding offenses and the unlawful wholesale distribution of prescription drugs
Juan Carlos Viera

Jose Manuel Dominguez

Julio Dominguez

Carlos Alberto Padron

Juan Manuel Tavarez Padilla

Juan Tavarez

Aura Catalina Tavarez

Edwin M. Tavarez

Israel Tacher

Roberto Tacher

Vanessa Rosario

Eligio Armas

Eduardo Diaz

Carlos Pera

Joselito Peralta

Juan Carlos Peralta

Hanser Olivo Liranzo

Kelvin Manuel Martinez Taveras

Glenn Luis Cabrera

Fary R. Caba Padilla

Miguel Padilla

Americo Luis Garcia Dominguez

Wilfred Rodriguez

Jose Ramon Gonzalez

Alex Justo

Yoel Fernandez Rivero

Amauris A. Rosario

Jacqueline Jimenez

Luis Santana

Bayohan Diaz

Paulino Cayetano

Armando Garcia

Sergio Novo

Lazaro Ospina		
Five years in prison




3
Conspiracy to commit trafficking in counterfeit goods
Vanessa Rosario

Joselito Peralta		
10 years in prison




4
Narcotics conspiracy
Juan Manuel Tavarez Padilla

Juan Tavarez

Aura Catalina Tavarez

Vanessa Rosario

Joselito Peralta

Hanser Olivo Liranzo

Amauris A. Rosario

Brenda Santos

Ira Karp

Joel Gabriel Casado		
20 years in prison




5
Narcotics conspiracy
Luis Santana

Bayohan Diaz

Luis Abreu

Paulino Cayetano

Jose Felipe

Benito Duran

Arelis Lee

Milagros Acevedo		
20 years in prison






U.S. v. Oria, et al.






Count
Charge
Defendants
Maximum Penalties




1
Conspiracy to commit mail fraud and healthcare fraud
Alex Oria

Joe H. Nelson

Kenneth Nelson

Conrado Vazquez

Efren Ruiz

Abel Gonzalez		
20 years in prison




2
Conspiracy to commit money laundering
Alex Oria

Joe H. Nelson

Kenneth Nelson		
20 years in prison






Defendants’ Ages and Residencies






Defendant
Residence
Age




Juan Carlos Vier
Hialeah, Florida


49






Jose Manuel Dominguez
Miami, Florida


62






Julio Dominguez
Miami, Florida


60






Carlos Alberto Padron
Miami, Florida


54






Juan Manuel Tavarez Padilla
Cliffside Park, New Jersey


30






Juan Tavarez
New York, New York


58






Aura Catalina Tavarez
New York, New York


36






Edwin M. Tavarez
Cliffside Park, New Jersey


26






Israel Tacher
Miami, Florida


62






Robert Tacher
Miami, Florida


37






Vanessa Rosario
Cutler Bay, Florida


28






Eligio Armas
North Bergen, New Jersey


54






Eduardo Diaz
Cliffside Park, New Jersey


58






Carlos Peralta
West New York, New Jersey


49






Joselito Peralta
Ridgefield Park, New Jersey


37






Juan Carlos Peralta
Ridgefield Park, New Jersey


24






Hanser Olivo LIRANZO
Fairview, New Jersey


32






Kelvin Manuel Martinez Taveras
Bronx, New York


33






Glenn Luis Cabrera
Ridgefield Park, New Jersey


22






Fary R. Caba Padilla
Bronx, New York


21






Miguel Padilla
Bronx, New York


62






Americo Luis Garcia Dominguez
Miami, Florida


29






Wilfred Rodriguez
Brooklyn, New York


49






Jose Ramon Gonzalez
New York, New York


48






Alex Justo
New York, New York


37






Yoel Fernandez Rivero
Miami, Florida


32






Amauris A. Rosario
Bronx, New York


31






Jacqueline Jimenez
New York, New York


37






Luis Santana
Richmond Hill, New York


39






Bayohan Diaz
Richmond Hill, New York


27






Paulino Cayetano
Bronx, New York


36






Armando Garcia
Guttenberg, New Jersey


40






Sergio Novo
North Arlington, New Jersey


74






Lazaro Ospina
Bloomfield, New Jersey


71






Brenda Santos
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania


34






Ira Karp
New York, New York


77






Luis Abreu
Worcester, Massachusetts


32






Joel Gabril Casado Gabriel
Bronx, New York


27






Jose Felipe
Brooklyn, New York


47






Benito Duran
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania


38






Arelis Lee
Brooklyn, New York


56






Milagros Acevedo
Brooklyn, New York


48






Alex Oria
Missouri City, Texas


55






Joseph Nelson
Sugar Land, Texas


75






Kenneth Nelson
Sugar Land, Texas


52






Conrado Vazquez
Miami, Florida


40






Efren Ruiz
Hialeah, Florida


42






Abel Gonzalez
Miami, Florida


36










 




 




 


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – TOP-SECRET – Obama Protection 47
		
	
	

		














Obama Protection 47








[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama greets people gathered on the sidewalk after stopping for food at Skyline Chili in Cincinnati, July 16, 2012. Obama flew on Monday to Cincinnati for election campaign events. Reuters




[Image]US President Barack Obama greets wellwishers upon arrival on Air Force One at Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International Airport in Boone, Kentucky, July 16, 2012, enroute to attend campaign events in Cincinnati, Ohio. Getty




[Image]President Barack Obama passes his jacket to White House Trip Director Marvin Nicholson before heading over to greet people after arriving at Northern Kentucky International Airport in Boone, Ky. , Monday, July 16, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Cincinnati. AP




[Image]U.S. Secret Service members use a golf cart while providing protection for President Barack Obama while he golfs at the Army installation’s course July 15, 2012 in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Obama also campaigned in Virginia, a state he won in 2008, on Saturday, holding events in Fairfax and Glen Allen. Getty




[Image]US President Barack Obama greets supporters are he arrives at a campaign event on July 14, 2012 at Centreville High School in Clifton, Virginia. Getty




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama arrives at a campaign rally at Centreville High School in Clifton, Virginia, July 14, 2012. Obama travelled to Virginia on Saturday for campaign events. Reuters




[Image]President Barack Obama walks up a set of stairs during a campaign rally at Centreville High School in Clifton, Va. , a Washington suburb, on Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP




[Image]People hold signs protesting against U.S. President Barack Obama along Obama’s motorcade route on his way to a campaign rally at Centreville High School in Clifton, Virginia, July 14, 2012. Obama travelled to Virginia on Saturday for campaign events. Reuters




[Image]President Barack Obama laughs while campaigning under the pouring rain at the historic Walkerton Tavern & Gardens in Glen Allen, Va. , near Richmond Saturday, July 14, 2012. It is in the Congressional district represented by House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va. , a key county in a crucial swing state of the presidential election. AP




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama greets supporters at the end of his ”A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class” campaign event July 14, 2012 at Walkerton Tavern in Glen Allen, Virginia. On the last day of his two-day campaign across Virginia, Obama continue to discuss his plan to restore middle class security and urged Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty




[Image]President Barack Obama campaigns during the pouring rain at the historic Walkerton Tavern & Gardens in Glen Allen, Va. , near Richmond, Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP




[Image]Protesters line an entrance route to a campaign event where President Barack Obama is scheduled to speak at the historic Walkerton Tavern & Gardens in Glen Allen, Va. , near Richmond Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP




[Image]Conservative local residents protest prior to U.S. President Barack Obama’s ”A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class” campaign event July 14, 2012 at Walkerton Tavern in Glen Allen, Virginia. On the last day of his two-day campaign across Virginia, Obama continue to discuss his plan to restore middle class security and urged the Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty




[Image]President Barack Obama removes his jacket upon his arrival at Washington Dulles International Airport in Chantilly, Va. , Saturday, July 14, 2012, for a campaign event in the vicinity. AP




[Image]US President Barack Obama boards his limousine after greeting well-wishers upon arrival July 14, 2012 at Richmond International Airport in Richmond, Virginia. Obama is in Virginia to attend campaign events. Getty




[Image]Secret Service members keep watch in front of Air Force One shortly before US President Barack Obama’s departure on July 14, 2012 at Richmond International Airport in Richmond, Virginia. Obama is in Virginia to attend campaign events. Getty




[Image]US President Barack Obama hold up a tomato during a stop at Berry’s Produce on July 14, 2012 in Mechanicsville, Virginia. Obama is campaigning in Virginia ahead of the November presidential election. Getty




[Image]President Barack Obama shakes hands as he arrives at the Richmond International Airport in Richmond, Va. , Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets the crowd after a campaign stop at the historic Fire Station No.1, in downtown Roanoke, Virginia, Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama traveled to southwest Virginia to discuss choice in this election between two fundamentally different visions on how to grow the economy, create middle-class jobs and pay down the debt. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets the crowd during a campaign stop at the historic Fire Station No.1, in downtown Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama traveled to southwest Virginia to discuss choice in this election between two fundamentally different visions on how to grow the economy, create middle-class jobs and pay down the debt. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets people after arriving at Roanoke Regional Airport in Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Virginia. AP


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama greets people after arriving at Roanoke Regional Airport in Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Virginia. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama arrives at the Roanoke Airport on Air Force One on the campaign trail, Friday, July 13, 2012 in Roanoke, Va. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets people after arriving at Roanoke Regional Airport in Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Virginia. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets the crowd after speaking at a campaign event at Phoebus High School in Hampton, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets the crowd after speaking at a campaign event at Phoebus High School in Hampton, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama arrives to speak at a campaign event at Phoebus High School in Hampton, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama (C) greets supporters at the end of his ‘A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class’ campaign event July 13, 2012 at Green Run High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Obama discussed his plan to restore middle class security and urged the Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama (R) greets supporters at the end of his ‘A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class’ campaign event July 13, 2012 at Green Run High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Obama discussed his plan to restore middle class security and urged the Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty [Two Secret Service in “hands ready” position.




[Image]President Barack Obama reaches out to shake hands at a campaign event at Green Run High School in Virginia Beach, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama heads to his car after greeting people after arriving at Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama is surrounded by secret service as he greets people after arriving at Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama heads to his car after greeting people after arriving at Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama meets with supporters after arriving aboard Air Force One at the Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama meets with supporters after arriving aboard Air Force One at the Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama walks to Air Force One at Andrews Air Force Base in Md. , Friday, July 13, 2012, enroute to Virginia for a series of campaign events. AP




[Image]Members of the media exit a house alongside US President Barack Obama’s SUV holding in the driveway as Obama meets with Jason McLaughlin, principal of Center Point-Urbana High School, his wife, Ali, an account manager for a document scanning company, and their 4-year-old son Cooper, on middle class tax cuts at their home in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, July 10, 2012. Getty




[Image]Secret Service agents guard the door of the home of Jason and Ali McLaughlin while President Barack Obama visits with them in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Tuesday, July 10, 2012. AP




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama arrives in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, July 10, 2012. Obama flew to Iowa for an event pushing for the extension of Bush-era tax cuts due to expire at the end of 2012. Reuters




[Image]President Barack Obama heads to his car after getting ice cream at Deb’s Ice Cream & Deli in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Tuesday, July 10, 2012. AP



























	


	



			
				


			

			
Rachel Weisz – Esquire Magazine Behind the Scenes – “Woman We Love” – Clip
		
	
	

		


Rachel did another sexy photoshoot for the latest Esquire issue UK February 2010

This is the Behind the Scenes from the photo-shoot.


****Rachel Weisz has been voted as the “Most Marriable Woman”.****


The star of The Mummy and The Lovely Bones beat Keira Knightley into second place, while Kate Winslet was third. Jordan, the pneumatic glamour model, received just one vote in the poll by Esquire magazine.


Dawn French, the comedian and actress, topped the list of the best women to go for a drink with, while Cheryl Cole was named the woman who men would most like to sleep with.


Weisz, 39, professed herself thrilled with the accolade.


Oh my God! Really? Thats so funny. Im marriable. But Im not married! she said, joking: I was getting worried that the men didnt like me any more, but your readers poll puts my mind at rest.


The actress is engaged to Darren Aronofsky, director of The Wrestler, and they have a three-year-old son, Henry (May, 2006).


The full results of the Women We Love survey are in the February issue of Esquire.

	


	



			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL – Wikileaks Central/Guantanamo/Khadr Interviews
		
	
	

		




Wikileaks Central/Guantanamo/Khadr Interviews


Cryptome mirrors provided if the files at the EX.UA site are removed.


 




http://www.ex.ua/view_storage/919793642447













Object of temporary storage with access key “919793642447“:Wikileaks Central/Guantanamo/Khadr interviews

22:51, 3 July 2012, 23:14, 3 July 2012


These are two interviews which were unpublished by the Wikileaks news site Wikileaks Central. Editor in chief Heather Marsh (@georgiebc) interviewed Canadian defence attorney Dennis Edney re Guantanamo child detainee Omar Khadr. In [recording] ed017 Edney explains that Omar was ordered to sign his plea deal without having it explained to him by a lawyer or anyone. In [recording] ed023 Edney speaks of witness intimidation and blackmail threats by the FBI. These interviews were suppressed (according to the audio) due to concerns of legal repercussions to the defence attorney.






Files:

Amount: 2, total size: 65,778,403		






1.

http://cryptome.org/2012/07/ed017.MP3.m4a (31MB)		

 


22:32, 3 July 2012

b0f2e07bb7746ba3842f22702c93e8dc


 


 






2.

http://cryptome.org/2012/07/ed023.MP3.m4a (35MB)		

 


20:56, 3 July 2012

fe72db5b1298bc23ccf53e3dcd345c97


 







 













 



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Iranian First VP Rahimi’s Comments on Drugs
		
	
	

		













Iranian First Vice-President Rahimi’s Anti-Semitic Comments at the International Day Against Abuse Conference in Tehran


Press Statement

Victoria Nuland

Department Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

July 3, 2012


We strongly condemn Iranian First Vice-President Mohammad Reza Rahimi’s vile anti-Semitic and racist comments on June 26 at the International Day Against Drug Abuse conference in Tehran. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has confirmed that the conference was not held under UN auspices, nor did officials in attendance have any idea that Rahimi would level such offensive charges. Both UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon and UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov registered their dismay and serious concern over Rahimi’s anti-Semitic speech and issued a statement July 3 calling on Iranian officials to refrain from these kinds of anti-Semitic statements.


The United States supports meetings that address the very real crisis of drug abuse and drug trafficking around the world. We trust that parties interested in combating the scourge of drug abuse and drug trafficking will focus their efforts on legitimate international meetings, and will join us in condemning such attempts to take advantage of them to promote hateful, racist speech.


 




http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/in-iran-anti-semitic-outbursts-r.html


Which links to this Persian account, translated by Google (better translation welcome: cryptome[at]earthlink.net)


http://www.aftabir.com/news/view/2012/jun/26/c1_1340705604.php/


Tuesday, Jun 26, 2012 – 02:43:24


The Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA).


Mohammad Reza Rahimi said at the celebration of the global fight against drugs: the development of drugs and glass are rooted in the Talmudic teachings of Zionists.


Rahimi asserted: The Talmud teaches against Christianity and also against Muslims. Judaism considers itself to be served by others.


He continued: what happened in Russia as well as labor unrest resulted from the actions of all the Jews and their leaders, but later research showed that among the Jews not one of them was killed.


First Vice President stated: Wherever there Muslim blood is spilled Yahoods [Jews?] are behind it.


They destroy not only with drugs but also with cultural biases, biases issues they promote to their children, their parents realize that no boy and girl can resist. Rahimi said: Jews dominate the media world’s thinking and work to increase their cultural wealth and resources from plundered countries.


Rahimi said that when Iranian forces entered Afghanistan they found opium cultivation has increased by 60%, otherwise Iran would buy all the drug produced in Afghanistan and convert it into morphine and medical use. We can also reveal that money could taken the Afghan narcotics transit route to Europe and to open the way to earn income for our country, but this is contrary to morality, and contrary to our education.


He pointed out: 13% of opium addicts are in Europe and elsewhere they are common as wine. Despite that we have respect for the followers of Moses, but we are opposed to the Zionists. Zionists are promoting and developing drugs, but they avoid addiction to them.


The First Vice President said: 210 million people worldwide are suffering drug addiction and 27 million people in Asian countries. Rahimi said: According to the rules and regulations of the Iranian leader drug deaths will be publicized. Our question to you based on our few deaths because we do not promote drugs, then what is the fuss.


Rahimi said the spread of drugs in Asian countries and in Africa has not occurred because there is no money to buy drugs.


He also pointed out: 10 percent of Americans are addicted to drugs, but the story behind all these are Shyvnyyst [?]. First Vice President also stated that three million immigrants a year from Afghanistan have been imposed on our country and said on Iran is the greatest nation of immigrants. Our unemployment numbers in the country approches zero because of the low number of unemployed in our country.


Elsewhere in his remarks he noted America’s claims about certain events based on satellite images of prison camps, so he said why not see all fields of opium in Afghanistan? Kvryd?[?]


He said threats to Iran’s independence and freedom is everywhere seen as manifestations of global arrogance and Zionism is the source. Why should Iran give Chharhzar [?] martyr for the anti-drug but not the blood from the nose, decide on one of them.


First vice president said, the Secretary General Staff Drug Head accused importation of opium from Iran but did not go to the Prayer Wall for industrial materials. Who organized importation of this material. Who is behind this.


Rahimi said: Senator, America has sold us poisoned cigarettes to bring down the people and our schools have to say that these are a threat.


He emphasized that the Zionists are behind all the adventures of the drug, said Iran is willing to pay this price for all countries in the world to know that Zionism is the main drug. He said the Iranian people are standing firm and are content with the severe sanctions.


Report: ISNA (www.isna.ir)


 






 




























	


	



			
				


			

			
Clip – Kim Kardashian 2012 Esquire Magazine Photoshoot [HD]
		
	
	

		


Kim Kardashian 2012 Esquire Magazine Photoshoot [HD]


http://pubstargaming.com

http://rulethenation.com

http://dawnofsuperheroes.com


PubstarGaMinG (Best in Gaming News)

RuleTheNation (Latest Music News x Downloads)

[DawnofSuperheroes] (Coolest Media x Pop Culture)

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Albert DeSalvo – Full Movie
		
	
	

		


From June 1962 to January 1964 a mysterious murderer known held the women residents of Boston in fear for their lives as he claimed 13 victims in a nineteen-month reign of terror. He would talk or break his way into his female victims apartment then strangle the victim to death usually with something from her own clothes, this would then be knotted up into a bow to mark his deadly signature.


Albert DeSalvo, dubbed the ‘Boston Strangler’ admitted to 13 murders, but some people believe his confession was false

	


	



			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL – U.S. Army Military Police School Civil Disturbance Operations Course
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/USAMPS-CivilDisturbanceOps.png


 


This lesson is designed to describe the nature and causes of disaffection and social unrest; define the potential for social unrest in the United States; identify the types of confrontations; define crowd behavioral and psychological influences; identify patterns of disorder.


…


2. Application of Force.


a. General.


(1) Civil disturbance operations by federal forces will not be authorized until the President is advised by the highest officials of the state that the situation cannot be controlled with nonfederal resources available. The mission of the control force is to help restore law and order and to help maintain it until such time as state and local forces can control the situation without federal help. In performing this mission, the control force may have to actively participate, not only in subduing the disturbance, but also in helping to detain those responsible for it. Control force commanders are authorized and directed to provide such active participation, subject to restraints on the use of force.


(2) Prior to committing any federal forces in the quailing of civil disturbance whether in CONUS or OCONUS commanders should train and continually brief the control force on the rule of engagement (ROE). The commander is responsible for drafting, interpreting, disseminating, and training the control force on the ROE. The staff Judge Advocate (SJA) should be included in the ROE development to ensure that it will not improperly constrain actions, but still will remain consistent with domestic and international laws, polices, and orders of the chain of command.


(3) If non lethal weapon and munitions are to be utilized, they should be addressed within the ROE and disseminated to the lowest level, preferable to platoon and squad levels. This requires that all personnel have a clear understanding of the ROE and the commander’s intent.


(4) While serving with a multinational operation under the preview of the United Nations (UN) charter or customary international law the UN will may mandate certain restrictions on the use of force. By the use of overwhelming force during a civil disturbance under the UN may compromise diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful solution. Commanders must beware that any confrontation of the ROE made by soldiers can have strategic political implications on current and future operations.


(5) The primary rule which governs the actions of federal forces in helping state and local authorities to restore law and order is that the control force use only the minimum force required fulfilling the mission. This chief principle should control both the selection of appropriate operational techniques and the choice of options for arming the control force. In carrying out this principle, the use of deadly force is authorized only under extreme circumstances where certain specific standards are met. To emphasize limitations on use of firepower and to restrict automatic fire, rifles with only a safe or semiautomatic selection capability or modified to such a capability will be used as a basic weapon for Soldiers in a civil disturbance area.


…


b. Use of Deadly and Non-deadly Force.


(1) Commanders are authorized to use non-deadly force to control the disturbance, to prevent crimes, and to detain persons who have committed crimes; but the degree of force used must be not greater than that reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The use of deadly force, in effect, invokes the power of summary execution and can, therefore, be justified only by extreme circumstances. Accordingly, its use is not authorized for the purpose of preventing activities which do not pose a significant risk of death or serious bodily harm. If a mission cannot be accomplished without the use of deadly force, but deadly force is not permitted under the guidelines authorizing its use, accomplishment of the mission must be delayed until sufficient non-deadly force can be brought to bear. All the requirements of paragraph (b), below, must be met in every case in which deadly force is employed.


(2) The use of deadly force is authorized only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably be employed. Deadly force is justified under one or more of the following circumstances:


(a) Self- defense and defense of others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to protect law enforcement or security personnel who reasonably believe themselves or others to be in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.


(b) Assets involving national security. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of assets vital to national security. DoD assets shall be specifically designated as “vital to national security” only when their loss, damage, or compromise would seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission. Examples include nuclear weapons; nuclear command, control, and communications facilities; and designated restricted area as containing strategic operational assets, sensitive codes, or special access programs.


(c) Assets no involving national security but inherently dangerous to others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of resources, such as operable weapons or ammunition, that are inherently dangerous to others; i.e., assets that, in the hands of an unauthorized individual, present a substantial potential danger of death or serious bodily harm to others. Examples include high risk portable and lethal missiles, rockets, arms, ammunition, explosives, chemical agents, and special nuclear material.


(d) Serious offenses against persons. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent the commission of a serious offense involving violence and threatening death or serious bodily harm. Examples include murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault.


(e) Arrest or apprehension. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to arrest, apprehend, or prevent the escape of a person who, there is probably cause to believe, has committed an offense of the nature in (2) through (4) above.


(f) Escapes. When deadly force has been specifically authorized by the Heads of the DoD Components and reasonable appears to be necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner, provided law enforcement or security personnel have probable cause to believe that the escaping prisoner poses a threat of serious bodily harm either to security personnel or others.


(3) Every Soldier has the right under the law to use reasonably necessary force to defend himself against violent and dangerous personal attack. The limitations of this paragraph are not intended to infringe on this right, but to prevent the unauthorized or random use of other types of deadly force.


(4) In addition, the following policies regarding the use of deadly force will be observed:


(a) Give an order to halt.


(b) Warning shot will not be fired.


(c) When a firearm is discharged it will be fired with the intent of rendering the person(s) at whom it is discharged incapable of continuing that activity or course of behavior prompting the individual to shoot.


(d) Shot will be fired only with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders.


(e) In the case of holstered weapons, a weapon should not be removed from the holster unless there is reasonable expectation that use of the weapon may be necessary.


(5) Even when its use is authorized, deadly force must be used only with great selectivity and precision against the particular threat which justifies its use. For example, the receipt of sniper fire, however deadly, from an unknown location can never justify “returning the fire” against any or all persons who may be visible on the street or in nearby buildings. Such random response is far too likely to result in accidents among innocent bystanders or fellow law enforcement personnel; the appropriate response is to take cover and try to locate the source of the fire so that the threat can be neutralized.


…


f. Army Detention Facilities.


(1) The Army will not operate facilities for confinement, custody, or detention of civilian personnel apprehended for violation of local or state laws as long as civil confinement facilities, operated by the Department of Justice, state, or local agencies are sufficient to accommodate the number of persons apprehended.


(2) When it appears that available local facilities are insufficient, due to the large number of persons apprehended or detained, and this fact can be verified by the person or agency responsible for the facilities, temporary confinement/detention facilities may be operated with prior approval from DA, specifically, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. These facilities will be operated only until custody of the persons detained can be transferred to and assumed by civil authorities. They will not be used for the confinement of persons charged or convicted under civil jurisdiction.


(3) Temporary confinement/detention facilities can be developed from local federal facilities provided they are adaptable to the requirements of custody and control. Such facilities should be established, if possible, within the affected area; this will conserve time, transportation, and escort personnel. However, if no suitable federal property is available within the affected area, they can be located elsewhere on any property under federal control as long as the persons to be detained are apprehended in the affected area. Whenever such temporary facilities are established during civil disturbance control operations, the Army is responsible for providing those personnel, facilities, and supplies necessary for the custody, control, health, comfort, and sustenance of persons detained.


(4) Officers and key NCOs specifically trained and experienced in confinement operations are required to operate such facilities. Guards and support function personnel operating under the direct control of such officers and NCOs need not be specifically trained or experienced in confinement operations as long as they are under close and continuing supervision of trained responsible personnel. Whenever females are detained, they must be held in physically separate detention facilities and under the control of selected female guards operating under the supervision of trained and experienced confinement personnel.


(5) Temporary detention facilities should be constructed and arranged to provide for adequate custody, control, and safety of detainees. It is advisable to use existing permanent-type buildings. Where sufficient permanent structures are not available, only that amount of new construction required for temporary custody, control, and administration of prisoners should be accomplished. Temporary fieldtype facilities provide compartments to assure effective control.


(6) The same operational procedures that apply to the operation of installation confinement facilities and treatment of detainees apply to these temporary facilities except that those policies and procedures establishing training, employment, mail and correspondence, and administrative discipline requirements will not apply. Detailed guidance in procedures for confinement of detainees is contained in EPW Operations, FM 3-19.40.


 


DOWNLOAD THE ORGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


USAMPS-CivilDisturbanceOps

	


	



			
				


			

			
The Red House – Full Movie
		
	
	

		


Pete and Ellen have raised Meg as their own since she was abandoned by her parents as a baby. Now a teenager, Meg convinces her friend Nath to come help with chores on the farm: Pete isn’t getting around on his wooden leg like he used to. When Nath insists on using a short cut home through the woods, Pete warns him of screams in the night near the red house. Meg and Nath ignore his warnings. Now they are all in danger.

	


	



			
				


			

			
Revealed – Reign of the Sechors
		
	
	

		
Reign of the Sechors


 




Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. — Eric Hughes, 1992, at the formation of cypherpunks. From, among other sources this in June 2012.


Security, privacy and anonymity specialists — governmental, commercial, religious, NGO, and individal — will be here called the security cohorts, in short, “sechors”.


Security may be seen as including privacy and anonymity and consideration of its limitations and distortions may suffice.


While national security may be seen as the greatest and longest-lived offender, blessed by religious doctrine, the rise in popularity of online culture has fostered an increase in the call for for privacy, anonymity and security.


Privacy, anonymity and security are at best approximations, at worst totally misleading. Proponents and opponents engage in sophisticated distortions, usually to advance their offerings rather than the interests of their consumers/citizens.


Private security experts, among them, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, observe that security is never absolute and the challenge is to determine how much and what type of security is needed, rather than expecting total security. Zimmermann’s “Pretty Good Privacy” modestly names the paradigmatic disclosure of the limitations of communications security — “pretty good” is all there is.


Schneirer, among others, candidly states the struggle over communications security is endless, for every offense a defense is invented, and vice versa.


Security of personal communications does not require measures, some claim, required for national defense. Following this, however, are assertions about the need for personal security against over-reaching national defenses, which, the argument goes, all too often violate the personal rights of citizens by exaggerating national security threats combined with increasingly militarized law enforcement as the military and intelligence apparatuses conjoin with domestic police in times of, allegedly, unduly prolonged national distress.


Thus, the welter of Fusion Centers, cascading information sharing, subsumed under Homeland Security and the Directorate of National Intelligence — or by whatever names all other nations use. The rigging of privacy polices to allow “lawful access” to private data, the insertion of government spies in public and private fora, the pervasive secret siphoning and public subpoenaing of private communications data by agencies of national and domestic security.


This has led to increased public opposition to sechors and greater calls for more privacy and anonymity, thereby for enhanced personal security.


A prong of personal security demands is for individuals to learn how to secure their own privacy and anonymity to offset the likelihood of misleading, and quite often, lucrative offers by specialists — governmental, commercial, NGO and individals (here called the security cohorts, “sechors”).


But a characteristic of this prong, is for the individal user to be warned by the sechors that security usually fails due to implementation of the user and that it is prudent to have specialists assess any security system. Unfortunately, this allows entry to those more wisely seen as trojans, sechors.


Sechors sell round-the-clock, around-the-world security services as necessary, no single product, treaty, armaments-disarmaments sharing will suffice, there must be missionary cathedralization of defense outposts as precondition of survival, falsely-promised personal security the keystone.


Can an individual obtain security without succumbing to the propaganda, spying and legislation of the sechors?


Bearing in mind that false expectations of privacy, anonymity and security are standard deceptions of the sechors, the answer is yes: by avoiding, by disbelieving the sechors.


But it will have to be done solo, not bragged about, certainly not foolishly fully exposed on the treacherous open source testing bed where the pretty good is exchanged, commingled, obscured by the very bad sechors.


Ancient, deeply entrenched and perdurable sechors will warn that this note is an example of very poor advice masquerading very bad, to never believe an individual can obtain personal security, privacy and anonymity without reign of the sechors.


 




Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2012 14:37:13 -0400

Subject: response to Cryptome…..Security Cohorts, self-education…..

From: J

To: cryptome[at]earthlink.net


You raise many valid points about security, and the need for security expertise. But like the Medical Practice, “Security Practice” needs to be applied prudently. A 10-character password on the underside of a keyboard is no good if the “enemy” knows that that password is there. Nor is a password that is “given away”; someone might have bad habits and by observation and overhearing, discloses their “password list” .


Passwords should <<NEVER>> be shared, and yet sometimes that rule is broken — to the owner’s eventual grief.


A director of Information Technology should remember that besides Rijndael, (the US-AES) a few other encryption algorithms using 128-bit Input/Output blocks are strong also.


And I will <<NOT>> disclose my passphrase password for my OpenPGP key.


Adi Shamir has written about “key splitting”.


It is sometimes better to withhold one’s thoughts and comments until a meeting.


A message not sent is a message that cannot be intercepted.


Security is a practical science. It has to be measured and adjusted, over time.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Attack on activist threatens anti-corruption efforts in South Sudan
		
	
	

		
The South Sudanese government must take immediate action to identify and prosecute those responsible for the recent attack on anti-corruption activist, Deng Athuai, said Global Witness today (1).


On 4 July, the Chairperson of the South Sudan Civil Society Alliance (2), Mr. Deng Athuai Mawiir, was kidnapped in front of his hotel in the South Sudanese capital, Juba. He was reportedly held and beaten for three days by unknown assailants and interrogated about his work on corruption issues in the country.


“When civil society’s freedom to operate is threatened, all efforts to fight corruption and impunity are threatened,” said Global Witness campaigner Dana Wilkins. “The South Sudanese government has promised its citizens an open and democratic society. It must now make good on that promise by bringing Deng Athuai’s attackers to justice.”


South Sudan’s government has repeatedly recognised corruption as a major obstacle to stability and development. In a letter published earlier this year, President Salva Kiir Mayardit accused government officials of stealing US$4 billion from government coffers. According to recent budget figures, these stolen funds equate to more than 30% of all oil revenues received by the government since it became semi-autonomous in 2005. This is particularly concerning given that the oil sector alone made up approximately 98% of the national income last year (3).


Natural resource contracts and foreign borrowing primarily backed by future oil revenues are expected to make up more than 57% of the next year’s budget. Contract allocation and oil-backed loans pose corruption risks the world over, making South Sudan’s efforts to be transparent and accountable all the more important (4).


Local civil society groups play a pivotal role in this fight against corruption. They expose wrongdoings, advocate for change, and provide a voice for affected communities and the wider public. But to be effective they must be able to conduct research, publish reports, and campaign on their issues freely and without fear of intimidation. The recent attack on Mr. Athuai undermines that freedom.


“No South Sudanese citizen should live in fear of speaking out,” said Wilkins. “The government must take robust action in response to this attack it so that civil society groups can operate safely and under the full protection of the law.”






	


	



			
				


			

			
Fred West – Full Movie
		
	
	

		


Cromwell Street, Gloucester – an ordinary house in an ordinary street. Number 25 was the home of a local builder and his wife, bustling with children and topped up to the brim with lodgers. The only thing that distinguished number 25 from the others was the amount of people that came and went.


Fred West liked company. He also liked to maim, molest and murder. But was this seemingly ordinary man driven to the slaughter of at least 12 women and children… or was Fred West Born to Kill? Over a period of about twenty years Fred and Rose West abducted, tortured, raped and murdered an unknown number of girls, many of whom lay buried in the garden until the police dug them up.


What motivated West to commit such terrible crimes? Was he born evil or did his upbringing make him this way? Did he do it for sexual kicks? Or, as some allege, did he supply the sacrificial victims to a black magic coven?

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Obama Protection 47
		
	
	

		






















[Image]US President Barack Obama greets supporters are he arrives at a campaign event on July 14, 2012 at Centreville High School in Clifton, Virginia. Getty




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama arrives at a campaign rally at Centreville High School in Clifton, Virginia, July 14, 2012. Obama travelled to Virginia on Saturday for campaign events. Reuters




[Image]President Barack Obama walks up a set of stairs during a campaign rally at Centreville High School in Clifton, Va. , a Washington suburb, on Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP




[Image]People hold signs protesting against U.S. President Barack Obama along Obama’s motorcade route on his way to a campaign rally at Centreville High School in Clifton, Virginia, July 14, 2012. Obama travelled to Virginia on Saturday for campaign events. Reuters




[Image]President Barack Obama laughs while campaigning under the pouring rain at the historic Walkerton Tavern & Gardens in Glen Allen, Va. , near Richmond Saturday, July 14, 2012. It is in the Congressional district represented by House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va. , a key county in a crucial swing state of the presidential election. AP




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama greets supporters at the end of his ”A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class” campaign event July 14, 2012 at Walkerton Tavern in Glen Allen, Virginia. On the last day of his two-day campaign across Virginia, Obama continue to discuss his plan to restore middle class security and urged Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty




[Image]President Barack Obama campaigns during the pouring rain at the historic Walkerton Tavern & Gardens in Glen Allen, Va. , near Richmond, Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP




[Image]Protesters line an entrance route to a campaign event where President Barack Obama is scheduled to speak at the historic Walkerton Tavern & Gardens in Glen Allen, Va. , near Richmond Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP




[Image]Conservative local residents protest prior to U.S. President Barack Obama’s ”A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class” campaign event July 14, 2012 at Walkerton Tavern in Glen Allen, Virginia. On the last day of his two-day campaign across Virginia, Obama continue to discuss his plan to restore middle class security and urged the Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty




[Image]President Barack Obama removes his jacket upon his arrival at Washington Dulles International Airport in Chantilly, Va. , Saturday, July 14, 2012, for a campaign event in the vicinity. AP




[Image]US President Barack Obama boards his limousine after greeting well-wishers upon arrival July 14, 2012 at Richmond International Airport in Richmond, Virginia. Obama is in Virginia to attend campaign events. Getty




[Image]Secret Service members keep watch in front of Air Force One shortly before US President Barack Obama’s departure on July 14, 2012 at Richmond International Airport in Richmond, Virginia. Obama is in Virginia to attend campaign events. Getty




[Image]US President Barack Obama hold up a tomato during a stop at Berry’s Produce on July 14, 2012 in Mechanicsville, Virginia. Obama is campaigning in Virginia ahead of the November presidential election. Getty




[Image]President Barack Obama shakes hands as he arrives at the Richmond International Airport in Richmond, Va. , Saturday, July 14, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets the crowd after a campaign stop at the historic Fire Station No.1, in downtown Roanoke, Virginia, Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama traveled to southwest Virginia to discuss choice in this election between two fundamentally different visions on how to grow the economy, create middle-class jobs and pay down the debt. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets the crowd during a campaign stop at the historic Fire Station No.1, in downtown Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama traveled to southwest Virginia to discuss choice in this election between two fundamentally different visions on how to grow the economy, create middle-class jobs and pay down the debt. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets people after arriving at Roanoke Regional Airport in Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Virginia. AP


[Image]





[Image]President Barack Obama greets people after arriving at Roanoke Regional Airport in Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Virginia. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama arrives at the Roanoke Airport on Air Force One on the campaign trail, Friday, July 13, 2012 in Roanoke, Va. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets people after arriving at Roanoke Regional Airport in Roanoke, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day campaigning in Virginia. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets the crowd after speaking at a campaign event at Phoebus High School in Hampton, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama greets the crowd after speaking at a campaign event at Phoebus High School in Hampton, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama arrives to speak at a campaign event at Phoebus High School in Hampton, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama (C) greets supporters at the end of his ‘A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class’ campaign event July 13, 2012 at Green Run High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Obama discussed his plan to restore middle class security and urged the Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama (R) greets supporters at the end of his ‘A Vision for Virginia’s Middle Class’ campaign event July 13, 2012 at Green Run High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Obama discussed his plan to restore middle class security and urged the Congress to act on extending tax cuts to middle class families. Getty [Two Secret Service in “hands ready” position.




[Image]President Barack Obama reaches out to shake hands at a campaign event at Green Run High School in Virginia Beach, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. Obama is spending the day in Virginia campaigning. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama heads to his car after greeting people after arriving at Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama is surrounded by secret service as he greets people after arriving at Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama heads to his car after greeting people after arriving at Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama meets with supporters after arriving aboard Air Force One at the Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama meets with supporters after arriving aboard Air Force One at the Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Va. , Friday, July 13, 2012. AP




[Image]President Barack Obama walks to Air Force One at Andrews Air Force Base in Md. , Friday, July 13, 2012, enroute to Virginia for a series of campaign events. AP




[Image]Members of the media exit a house alongside US President Barack Obama’s SUV holding in the driveway as Obama meets with Jason McLaughlin, principal of Center Point-Urbana High School, his wife, Ali, an account manager for a document scanning company, and their 4-year-old son Cooper, on middle class tax cuts at their home in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, July 10, 2012. Getty




[Image]Secret Service agents guard the door of the home of Jason and Ali McLaughlin while President Barack Obama visits with them in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Tuesday, July 10, 2012. AP




[Image]U.S. President Barack Obama arrives in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, July 10, 2012. Obama flew to Iowa for an event pushing for the extension of Bush-era tax cuts due to expire at the end of 2012. Reuters




[Image]President Barack Obama heads to his car after getting ice cream at Deb’s Ice Cream & Deli in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Tuesday, July 10, 2012. AP



























	


	



			
				


			

			
Esquire – Ana de la Reguera, Part 2: The Impossibly Beautiful Woman
		
	
	

		


 


A Woman We Love shows us a little more of what we’re not supposed to see.


Watch Esquire TV:

http://www.esquire.com/esquiretv/?src=syn&mag=esq&dom=youtube&cha…


Esquire Magazine:

http://www.esquire.com/?src=syn&mag=esq&dom=youtube&chan=home&…


Subscribe to Esquire:

http://subscribe.hearstmags.com/subscribe/splits/esquire/esq_sub_nav_link

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – DARPA Fog Computing Leak Prevention Software Design Report
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/DARPA-ADAMS.png


 


This is the design documents for the Allure Defender system. This document is a high level design and API of the components that make up the Allure Defender system. We outline all the high-level pieces and then the individual components, their behaviors, expected input/outputs, and relationships. We will discuss specific implementation and design choices and languages and libraries that will be used. In addition we will cover specific user cases and illustrate some running examples. Last we refer to a running system which implements many of the components we cover in the document.


The goal of the document is for a designer to create a working system and or verify a working system conforms to the specifications outlined in the document.


…


The document generation component will create documents (henceforth referred to as Decoy Documents, or DD for short) in various formats (e.g., Word, Excel, PDF, Powerpoint, email messages, Instant Messaging logs, … ) that contain one of several features :


• a “mark” allowing Allure Defender to determine whether a file is a DD, and possibly allow legitimate users to avoid accessing/triggering the DD;

• one or more “beacons”, which will cause the application processing the DD to emit some sort of discernible signal;

• Enticing Information (henceforth referred to as EI) which, if acted upon by the adversary, will allow detection. Such information includes URLs (for various protocols), account information (e.g., username/password), and others that may be developed in the future; and

• Enticing Content (henceforth referred to as EC) that will attract t he adversary to the DD (e.g., if they are using a search function) without raising suspicion, will support the presence of the EI in the document, and will allow the DDs to “fit in” with the rest of the environment on which t hey have been deployed.


DDs may be deployed on servers, databases, user desktops and laptop, mobile devices, honeypots, or other locations. It is desirable t hat all of these seeding techniques be supported.


The EC may be generated based on templates, synthesized from private sources (e.g., by mining existing documents at the directory /account/system/server to be seeded), synthesized from public sources (e.g., documents acquired through search engines) based on high-level templates, or synthesized from public sources using information mined from existing documents at the directory/account/system/server to be seeded. Any combination of these techniques may be used to generate DDs, and a specific DD may be t he result of several such techniques being used simultaneously.


The misbehavior detection component consists of a variety of subcomponents, some of which are specific to the beacon techniques used:


• honeypot servers, pointed to by URLs and similar information;

• intrusion detection systems combined with legitimate servers/services, when the lat ter can be used for detection purposes without compromising primary functionality (e.g., invalid username password login attempts, specific directories in a filesystem or web server hierarchy, DNS server queries, and so on) ;

• Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) subsystems, which may operate at various points in the system, e.g. , network, filesystem, memory, and others. The DLP may be a priori aware of the identity and location of the DDs, or it may be able to identify them on the fly via the “mark “.


The design of the architecture (see Figure 1) attempts to cleanly divide the functionality of the different subsystems into self-managing components allowing maximum flexibility of the system to adopt to changes while allowing all the components to seamlessly work together. The design reflects the facts that (a) documents may be requested via different interfaces (e.g., webserver front-end, client-side logic interacting over the network, client-side application with generation library, and possibly others); (b) the documents may contain a combination of enticing information, marks and beacons, based on the desired configuration, (c) the corresponding detection capabilities can vary (and should be extensible so that we can add further capabilities as future research directs), and (d) the documents, and specifically the enticing content, may be generated through a variety of means.


…


 


https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/darpa-adams-1.png


 


https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/darpa-adams-2.png

	


	



			
				


			

			
Myra Hindley – Full Movie
		
	
	

		


For many years, Myra Hindley was depicted by the tabloid press as “the most hated woman in Britain”.The crimes committed by Hindley and her lover, Ian Brady, shocked the nation and became the benchmark by which other acts of evil came to be measured. Until she met Brady, Hindley had been, by all accounts, a perfectly normal girl, with trong religious feelings. She loved children and animals, and was much in demand as a babysitter, But was she born to kill?

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – National President, National Vice President, and 39 Members and Associates of the Devils Diciples Motorcycle Gang Indicted
		
	
	

		


WASHINGTON—An indictment unsealed today in the Eastern District of Michigan charges 41 members and associates of the Devils Diciples Motorcycle Gang, including National President Jeff Garvin Smith and National Vice President Paul Anthony Darrah, for their alleged participation in a variety of criminal offenses, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Barbara McQuade for the Eastern District of Michigan, and FBI Acting Assistant Director Valerie Parlave.


Thirty-one defendants were arrested today in Michigan and Alabama and five defendants were previously in custody. More than 60 firearms and more than 6,000 rounds of ammunition were seized during this investigation. In addition, eight methamphetamine manufacturing laboratories were dismantled during the investigation.


The indictment alleges that the 41 Devils Diciples members and associates, including Smith and Darrah, participated in various criminal acts, including violent crimes in aid of racketeering, drug trafficking, illegal firearms offenses, obstruction of justice, illegal gambling, and other federal offenses. Eighteen of the defendants, including Smith and Darrah, are charged with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act by conducting their illegal enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity which included murder, robbery, extortion, drug trafficking, obstruction of justice, and other federal and state offenses.


“For years, according to the indictment, the Devils Diciples have spread fear in cities throughout Michigan and around the country,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. “This violent criminal enterprise allegedly profits from drug trafficking and illegal gambling and uses intimidation and violence to silence its adversaries and maintain control over its members. Today’s arrests of the Devils Diciples’ top leaders and 39 of the gang’s members and associates are an important step in our efforts to dismantle violent criminal enterprises across the country.”


“Removing violent criminal organizations from our community is essential to attaining the quality of life we expect and deserve,” said U.S. Attorney McQuade. “Federal law enforcement is using all legal tools available to prosecute violent criminal enterprises like this one.”


“Today’s law enforcement action takes violence off the streets,” said FBI Acting Assistant Director Valerie Parlave. “The FBI appreciates the strong law enforcement partnerships leading to this activity and will continue its commitment to state and local communities to address this violent, and often brutal, criminal threat across the U.S.”


According to the indictment, the Devils Diciples is a criminal enterprise with its national headquarters in Clinton Township, Michigan. The Devils Diciples operates regional chapters located in cities throughout Michigan, Alabama, Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and elsewhere. The Devils Diciples engage in criminal activities for financial gain, including distribution of narcotics, theft, transportation and sale of stolen motorcycles, conducting illegal gambling businesses, robbery, extortion, and acts of violence.


According to the indictment, membership in the Devils Diciples is based in part on successfully completing a probationary period, followed by formal approval by one or more members or leaders. Members are required to own Harley Davidson motorcycles and are commonly referred to as “full patched members.” Full patched members are identified by a club name or nickname for the express purpose of concealing their identity and thwarting identification by law enforcement. Members are required to follow orders from leadership, including orders to assault or use threats and intimidation against others, to transport or distribute drugs, to lie to law enforcement, or to hide or destroy evidence. Members are also required to follow the Devils Diciples by-laws and attend regular meetings referred to as “church.”


The indictment alleges that the Devils Diciples committed acts involving attempted murder, robbery, extortion, assault, and threats of violence to maintain the territory of the organization and to protect the organization and its members from detection and prosecution by law enforcement authorities.


The indictment charges the 41 Devils Diciples members and associates with a variety of criminal offenses including violent crimes in aid of racketeering, drug trafficking, illegal firearms offenses, obstruction of justice, and other federal offenses.


Specifically, the indictment alleges that in August 2003, Vincent John Witort and multiple other Devils Diciples members robbed, kidnapped, and attempted to murder other members of the Arizona Chapter for violating Devils Diciples rules.


The indictment alleges that in 2004, Smith possessed state and federal law enforcement manuals regarding outlaw motorcycle gangs marked “For Official Use Only” and “Law Enforcement Sensitive” and numerous documents related to criminal matters involving members of the Devils Diciples, including police reports, search warrants, affidavits, indictments, and witness interview transcripts.


Smith allegedly assaulted another individual in August 2008 for the purpose of maintaining and increasing position in the Devils Diciples enterprise. The indictment also alleges that in late 2008, Smith, Paul Anthony Darrah, and Cary Dale Vandiver assaulted Scott Thomas Perkins with a metal pipe.


According to the indictment, in February 2009, Ronald Raymond Roberts, Christopher Raymond Cook, and Wayne Russell Werth allegedly assaulted Danny Russell Burby, Jr. with a box cutter and a bottle, after various Devils Diciples members circulated flyers containing a photograph of Burby and stating that Burby was a “snitch.”


The indictment also alleges that in January 2012, David Randy Drozdowski and Smiley Villa assaulted an individual they believed was a member of a rival motorcycle club for being present in Devils Diciples territory.


Sixteen of the members and associates named in the indictment are charged with conspiracy to conduct an illegal gambling business. The defendants operated slot machines located in several Devils Diciples clubhouses in Michigan, Arizona, and Alabama to generate income for the criminal enterprise and its members.


The 41 defendants charged are:


1. Scott William Sutherland, aka “Scotty Z”

2. Ronald Raymond Roberts, aka “Rockin’ Ronnie”

3. David Thomas Roberts, aka “Detroit Dave”

4. Patrick Michael McKeoun, aka “Magoo”

5. Jeff Garvin Smith, aka “Fat Dog”

6. Paul Anthony Darrah, aka “Pauli”

7. Cary Dale Vandiver, aka “Gun Control”

8. Vincent John Witort, aka “Holiday”

9. Michael William Mastromatteo, aka “Iron Mike”

10. Vernon Nelson Rich, aka “Vern”

11. John Renny Riede, aka “Bear”

12. Victor Carlos Castano

13. Gary Lee Nelson

14. Michael Kenneth Rich, aka “Tatu”

15. Raymond Charles Melioli, aka “Romeo”

16. Timothy Paul Downs, aka “Space”

17. David Randy Drozdowski, aka “D”

18. Smiley Villa, aka “SA”

19. Dean Edward Jakiel, aka “Jesus”20. Tony Wayne Kitchens, aka “Trouble”

21. Sylvester Gerard Wesaw, aka “Sly Dog”

22. Ronald Nick Preletz, aka “Polar Bear”

23. Howard Joseph Quant, aka “44”

24. Scott Thomas Perkins, aka “Scotty P”

25. Clifford Chansel Rhodes, II

26. David Roy Delong, aka “Reverend”

27. Christopher Raymond Cook, aka “Damien”

28. Michael John Palazzola, aka “Utica Mike”

29. Danny Russell Burby, Jr., aka “Thumbs”

30. Ronald Leon Lambert, aka “Crow”

31. Jason Joseph Cook, aka “Cookie”

32. Edward Allen Taylor, aka “Big Ed”

33. Salvatore Battaglia, aka Bando”

34. William Scott Lonsby, aka “Buckwheat”

35. Wayne Russell Werth

36. Lauri Ann Ledford

37. Jennifer Lee Cicola

38. Dean Anthony Tagliavia

39. Alexis Catherine May

40. Paula Mileha Friscioni

41. John Charles Scudder


An indictment is only a charge and is not evidence of guilt. Each defendant is entitled to a fair trial in which it will be the government’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.


The case was investigated by the FBI, the Michigan State Police, the Macomb County Sheriff’s Office, and the County of Macomb Enforcement Team (COMET), with assistance from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and the St. Clair County Sheriff’s Office. The case is being prosecuted by the Organized Crime and Gang Section of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Michigan.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
EDITORIAL – Wie kann man die Wirtschaftsmaden loswerden ?!
		
	
	

		


Liebe Leser,


seit mehr als 20 Jahren kämpfe ich und natürlich insbesondere mein Team gegen die Wirtschaftsmaden.


Die Wirtschaftsmade  heutzutage tarnt sich durch fromme Worte und Absichten.


Die Rufmörder der STASI-“GoMoPa” sind ein perfektes Beispiel.


Diese Schädlinge  und ich sage es offen – diese Maden – überleben durch ihre Wirtstechnik, indem sie andere unverdächtige Organisationen und Personen überfallen und infiltrieren. Heimtückisch.Schleichend.Lebensgefährlich.


Konkrete Beispiele sehen Sie jeden Tag – und die mutmasslich unterwanderte Justiz unternimmt nichts !


Da selbst mutmasslich Maden-infiziert !


Viele konkrete Tips und Tricks gegen die Wirtschaftsmaden in Kürze !


Herzlichst Ihr


Bernd Pulch


Magister Artium der Publizisstik, Germanistik und Komparatistik


PS: Befördern wir die Wirtschaftsmaden und ihre Zuträger dahin wohin sie hingehören – in das Maden-Himmelreich !


ICH DANKE UNSER ALLEM HERRN UND GOTT FÜR SEIN VERTRAUEN UND SEINE UNTERSTÜTZUNG UND LIEBE UND BETE FÜR SIE !

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Uzbek National Sentenced to Nearly 16 Years in Prison for Threatening to Kill the President
		
	
	

		


BIRMINGHAM, AL—U.S. District Judge Abdul K. Kallon today sentenced Ulugbek Kodirov, an Uzbek national who has lived in the United States since 2009, to 15 years and eight months in prison for providing material support to terrorism, threatening to kill President Barack Obama, and illegally possessing a weapon.


U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama Joyce White Vance, Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General for National Security Lisa Monaco; FBI Special Agent in Charge Patrick J. Maley; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Glenn N. Anderson; Secret Service SAC Roy Sexton; and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) SAC Raymond R. Parmer, Jr. announced the sentence.


Kodirov, 22, of Uzbekistan, pleaded guilty in February to one count of providing material support to terrorism, one count of threatening to kill the president, and one count of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Kodirov is the first person to be convicted in the Northern District of Alabama for providing material support to terrorism.


U.S. Attorney Vance praised the quick response and careful investigative work by the Joint Terrorism Task Force for the Northern District of Alabama, which led to Kodirov’s arrest before anyone was harmed. “This case is a sobering reminder that terrorist activity can happen anywhere,” said U.S. Attorney Vance. “Our community has the coordinated efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement to thank for the immediacy of their response to this threat. This case has a happy ending—Kodirov is going to prison for more than 15 years, and no one in our community was hurt,” she said.


“This case demonstrates the continuing threat posed by violent extremists in this country and how law enforcement works together to neutralize such plots,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco. “Today, Mr. Kodirov is being held accountable for his actions thanks to the efforts of the many agents, analysts, and prosecutors involved in this matter.”


FBI SAC Maley thanked the members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which includes the Jefferson and Shelby, Alabama County Sheriff’s Offices; Birmingham, Hoover, and the University of Alabama at Birmingham Police Departments; the Transportation Security Agency; Secret Service; ATF; and the Department of Homeland Security. He also thanked the Pelham and Leeds, Alabama Police Departments for their assistance in this case. “The JTTF has been diligently investigating and building partnerships to protect Alabama from terrorists since 9/11, and its efforts put it in the unique position to interdict a violent act of terrorism. This case serves as a reminder of the dangers of the Internet on radicalizing our youth right in our own back yards, and all citizens and organizations need to remain vigilant on the ever-increasing threat from home-grown extremists,” he said.


“Mr. Ulugbek Kodirov came to the United States as a student and a welcomed guest. To date, that has dramatically changed,” said ATF SAC Anderson. “Kodirov will be serving time at the Federal Bureau of Prisons for his threats against President Obama and illegal possession of a firearm. It is shocking that he was willing to arm himself with hand grenades to further his agenda. Thankfully, this recipe for disaster was averted. ATF and our law enforcement partners will continue to work cases like these and other violent crime to keep cities, small and large, across America safe every day,” Anderson said.


“In the fight against domestic terrorism, it is absolutely essential that federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies work closely together to share information and chase down leads,” said HSI SAC Parmer. “In this case, the JTTF worked exactly as it is intended to by identifying and eliminating a serious threat to the president of the United States.”


“The Secret Service values its role as a member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force and our partnerships with task force members representing local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies,” said Secret Service SAC Sexton. “A dangerous situation was thwarted and the person behind it was stopped because of the hard work of our dedicated task force investigators.”


Kodirov acknowledged in his guilty plea that he had been in communication with an individual whom he believed to be a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and that Kodirov interpreted these conversations to mean that he should kill President Obama. Kodirov then took steps to obtain weapons to carry out his plans to kill the president. The IMU is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department. Kodirov also showed jihadist websites and videos on his computer to another individual and told that person that he wanted to assist others in jihad overseas, according to his plea agreement.


Kodirov also acknowledged that he had lengthy conversations in July 2011 with a different individual about Kodirov’s desire to kill President Obama and possible ways to carry out the assassination. That individual traveled to Birmingham to meet Kodirov and introduced him to another individual, an undercover agent, from whom Kodirov intended to obtain weapons he would use to kill the president.


The three men met on July 13, 2011, at a motel in Leeds. In that meeting, the agent presented a fully automatic Sendra Corporation Model M15-A1 machine gun, a sniper rifle with a telescopic sight, and four disassembled hand grenades and asked Kodirov if he would like to use any of them to “carry out his plan to kill the president,” according to the plea agreement. Kodirov chose the M15-A1 machine gun and the hand grenades and left the meeting with the weapons. Agents arrested Kodirov before he left the motel.


Kodirov entered the United States on a student visa in June 2009. His visa was revoked on April 1, 2010, for failing to enroll in school. Thereafter, he was unlawfully present within the United States. He was living in an extended-stay motel in Pelham at the time of his arrest.


The FBI, ATF, HSI, and Secret Service investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael W. Whisonant Sr. and Ryan K. Buchanan prosecuted the case with assistance from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – DHS-FBI Bulletin: Potential Use of Cold Packs in Improvised Explosives
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/DHS-ColdPacks.png


(U//FOUO) Cold packs, packaged and sold commercially, contain chemicals—usually 30 to 85 grams of ammonium nitrate or urea—that, when extracted in sufficient quantity, can be used as precursors for improvised explosives. The chemicals are packaged in prill form, and can be used directly or ground into powder when being used in homemade explosive production. Five hundred packs would yield 30 to 90 pounds of precursor material for use in an improvised explosive device (IED).


— (U//FOUO) In September 2011, German police arrested two individuals with a possible terrorism nexus who accumulated large quantities of urea-based cold packs, following an alert from private industry regarding the suspicious purchase.


— (U//FOUO) In August 2010, a Florida resident pled guilty to a murder-for-hire plot using an IED, which included ammonium nitrate extracted from instant cold packs, following a report from a local citizen regarding his possession of an explosive device.


— (U) In April 2008, an individual pled guilty to a plot to bomb the Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania Courthouse by igniting ammonium nitrate extracted from cold packs. The individual claimed he experimented with the ammonium nitrate to see how it would burn.


(U//FOUO) Indicators of Suspicious Activities


(U//FOUO) Suspicious activities associated with cold packs should be reported to appropriate authorities. Depending on the context—time, location, personal behaviors, and other indicators—the following suspicious activities could alert authorities to the potential use of cold packs for illicit purposes.


— (U//FOUO) Unexplained presence of a large number of cold packs in a location where they are not typically found.


— (U//FOUO) Purchase of cold packs in bulk quantities by individuals who have no apparent need and who evade questions regarding their intended use.


— (U//FOUO) Theft or unexplained absence of cold packs from stocks at fire stations, emergency medical service lockers, fitness facilities, etc.


— (U//FOUO) Presence of empty cold packs, possibly within the vicinity of unidentified chemicals (either prills or powder).


— (U//FOUO) Unexplained smell of ammonia.


DOWNLOAD THE ORGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


DHS-ColdPacks

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Men Indicted in $485 Million Investment Fraud Scheme
		
	
	

		






PLANO, TX—Two Dallas men have been indicted in connection with a $485 million investment fraud scheme in the Eastern District of Texas, announced U.S. Attorney John M. Bales today.


Brendan Coughlin, 46, and Henry Harrison, 47, both of Dallas, have been charged with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and 10 counts of mail fraud. The indictment was returned by a federal grand jury on July 11, 2012.


According to the indictment, Coughlin and Harrison, on behalf of Provident Royalties LLC, conspired with others to defraud investors in an oil and gas scheme that involved over $485 million and 7,700 investors throughout the United States. Specifically, beginning in approximately September 2006, Coughlin, Harrison, and other individuals made materially false representations and failed to disclose material facts to their investors in order to induce the investors into providing payments to Provident. Among these false representations were statements that funds invested would be used only for the oil and gas project for which those funds were raised; among the omissions of material fact were the facts that another of Provident founders, Joseph Blimline, had received millions of dollars of unsecured loans; that Blimline had been previously charged with securities fraud violations by the state of Michigan; and that funds from investors in later oil and gas projects were being used to pay individuals who invested in earlier oil and projects.


If convicted, Coughlin and Harrison face up to 20 years in federal prison.


This law enforcement action is part of President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.


President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.


This case is being investigated by the FBI and prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Shamoil T. Shipchandler.


A grand jury indictment is not evidence of guilt. A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.









	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
The NSA – STOLEN BABIES: Argentina Convicts Two Military Dictators
		
	
	

		











STOLEN BABIES: Argentina Convicts Two Military Dictators


In Unprecedented Testimony, Former US Assistant Secretary of State Confirmed Military Kidnappings of Children of Disappeared Political Prisoners in the 1970’s


Washington, D.C., July 10, 2012 –An Argentine tribunal today convicted two former military leaders for their roles in the kidnapping and theft of dozens of babies of executed and disappeared political prisoners during the dictatorship. Drawing on critical evidence provided from the United States, the court sentenced General Rafael Videla to 50 years and General Reynaldo Bignone to 15 years in prison for crimes that epitomized the vicious human rights abuses during the military regime that governed Argentina between 1976 and 1983.


The “Tribunal Oral Federal N° 6” handed down the verdict after a review of documentation that included a memorandum of conversation, written by former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams, that proved the clandestine program to steal the babies of political prisoners was known at the highest levels of the regime. In his memo, dated December 3, 1982, Abrams recounted a meeting with the military’s ambassador to Washington:  “I raised with the Ambassador the question of children… born to prisoners or children taken from their families during the dirty war… The Ambassador agreed completely and had already made this point to his [Argentine] foreign minister and president…” 


The trial, pursued by the Association of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, was based on the cases of 35 children, now adults, who have been identified through DNA testing as sons and daughters of disappeared victims of the dirty war. The Grandmothers estimate that more than 500 children were captured along with their parents or born in captivity; after their parents were executed, many were raised by security officers’ families who hid their true identities. More than 100 of the children have been identified.


This is not the first time that Videla and Bignone have been put on trial for crimes committed during the dictatorship. Both are currently serving life sentences for human rights abuses. Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP) originally documented 9,089 cases of people disappeared by the regime. Subsequent research using reports from the secret police battalion 601 raises the total of the dead and disappeared to about 22,000. Human rights organizations estimate that this number is closer to 30,000.


The Abrams memorandum of conversation was among thousands of records on human rights in Argentina declassified by the Department of State in 2002, but it had significant sections redacted [See the redacted memo here]. With the National Security Archive’s encouragement, the Grandmothers formally petitioned the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires to declassify a full version of the memcon. In “a remarkable move,” according to Carlos Osorio who directs the Archive’s Southern Cone Documentation project, the Department of State released an un-censored version of the memorandum of conversation last December.


“This is a wonderful example of how declassification serves the purposes of justice,” Osorio said. “We welcome and congratulate the initiative of the U.S. ambassador and Department of State to support the Abuelas de la Plaza De Mayo and provide evidence for this trial.”


The document proved critical in the trial, according to Alan Iud, lead lawyer for the Grandmothers. “The document is key for it demonstrates that the last President  of the military dictatorship General Bignone knew of the military policy to snatch the children and knew of their fate ” he said. “The release of the full document prevented the defense from arguing that the redacted sections of the document may have contained information that diminished the significance of the essence of declassified parts,” he added.


In a virtually unprecedented move, on January 26, 2012, Elliott Abrams provided formal testimony to the court on his meeting with the Argentine ambassador in 1982. He confirmed the authenticity of the document and offered further details about the Argentine military’s policy on the kidnapped children.


Abrams testified that the Department of State was aware that “we were not talking about one or two children, or one or two officers who had taken children. We thought there was a pattern or plan.”


He later went on to say that the kidnapped children were “in one way, the most significant human rights problem, because these children were alive. This was an ongoing problem.” [See clips from his testimony here. Find the transcript here]


As the trial concluded, Osorio called on the CIA, the Defense Department and the FBI to search their secret files for additional documentation related to the disappeared, and their children, in Argentina. The National Security Archive, he said, would press the Obama Administration to declassify such records, to advance the cause of human rights and “the right of the Abuelas to finally know the fates of their children and of their grandchildren.”






DOCUMENTS


Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, December 2, 1982 [redacted version]

By the time Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams met with Argentina’s ambassador to Washington, Lucio Alberto Garcia del Solar, in late 1982, the military regime was completely discredited. Gen. Videla’s successor, Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, had led Argentina into the debacle of the Falklands war—the U.S. had secretly sided with the British. The defeat cost the regime whatever remaining domestic support it had. The call for an accounting of the disappeared was broadly debated among the media, and society at large.  General Reynaldo Bignone had replaced Galtieri as a transitional figure to hand power to civilians. The Department of State had recently received a delegation of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo who presented their case about the hundreds of children stolen from the disappeared and secretly transferred to security officers to raise as their own, “adopted,” children.


This redacted version of the memo of the conversation between Abrams and Garcia del Solar was declassified in 2002 as part of a special declassification of human rights documents on Argentina initiated by the State Department during the Clinton administration. It reveals that Abrams had been briefed on the issue of the disappeared children and explicitly addressed the issue.  “I raised with the Ambassador the question of children… born to prisoners or children taken from their families during the dirty war. While the disappeared were dead, these children were still alive and this was in a sense the gravest humanitarian problem.” According to the memcon, “The Ambassador agreed completely and had already made this point to his foreign minister and president…” but del Solar also stated that the problem is “taking these children from adoptive parents.”


Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, December 2, 1982 [unredacted version]

In preparation for the trial of General Videla and General Bignone as accessories to the kidnapping and theft of the missing children of political prisoners, the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo asked the U.S. ambassador in Buenos Aires, Vilma Socorro Martínez, to obtain the full declassification of the document, in hopes that it would provide further evidence for the prosecution. On December 22, 2011, the State Department released the entire document. The redacted sections turned out not to provide additional information on the disappeared children, but having the full document facilitated its introduction as evidence in the trial.


Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “Forwarding of Spanish Documents,” March 25, 1976.

The day after the Argentine military coup, the U.S. defense attaché in Buenos Aires forwarded to Washington two Spanish language documents entitled “Philosophy” and “Bio of Lieutenant General  Jorge Rafael Videla. ” A leader of the coup, Videla described “The historical justification of the Armed Forces intervention in the national process…” and “[T]he guiding ideas – the Philosophy –  that support this intervention and its operational modalities.…”


In a revealing section, Videla stated that “the current situation in the country is mismanagement, administrative chaos, venality, but also the existence of currents of public opinion or political beliefs which are deeply rooted, with a working class outside the mainstream… with a church alarmed by the process but still willing to report any excess against human dignity…”


Department of State – President Videla: An Alternative View,” November 19, 1977

Although the Carter Administration raised the profile of human rights violations in Latin America, by the end of 1977 U.S. officials decided to  engage General Videla as the “Moderate” within the military dictatorship with whom they could work. In this briefing paper drafted two days before Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s visit to Buenos Aires, however, the Department of State makes the following assessment of the leader the U.S. has engaged: “A common view has been that President Videla would gradually but effectively move to improve the human rights situation in Argentina… If these views appeared probable when general Videla assumed the presidency in March, 1976, a year and a half later, they are increasingly difficult to support.” The assessment continued:


“Videla probably has good instincts on human rights, but several fundamental factors are preventing him from taking effective action:


    

  • He adheres to the ‘clandestine war’ doctrine, which argues that subversion must be countered with illegal measures. He also agrees that this illegal war be waged in a decentralized manner, with local captains and commanders acting largely on their own. This makes it impossible for the top generals, including the junta, to effectively control the security forces – but does provide the junta members with plausible deniability.
    • 

  • Videla fails to make a sharp distinction between terrorism and dissent. The loose application of the term ‘subversive’ to the government’s enemies has encouraged the security forces to strike not just at terrorists but a wide range of civilian opinion. Certainly less than half of the prisoners and disappeared persons (estimated by human rights groups at 15,000) were active terrorists; some estimates place the figure at under 15%.”
    • 




	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
SECRET – Domestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge Advocates 2011
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/DomesticOperationalLaw2011.png


 


The Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates is a product of the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). Its content is derived from statutes, Executive Orders and Directives, national policy, DoD Directives, joint publications, service regulations and field manuals, and lessons learned by judge advocates and other practitioners throughout federal and state government. This edition includes a substantial revision of Chapter 3, it incorporates new guidance as set for forth Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), it provides amplifying information on wildfire response, emergency mutual assistance compacts, the role of the National Guard and Army units such as Army North and Joint Task Force—Civil Support, and it discusses the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill.


The Handbook is designed to serve as a working reference and training tool for judge advocates. However, this Handbook is not a substitute for independent research. With the exception of footnoted doctrinal material, the information contained in this Handbook is not doctrine. Judge Advocates advising in this area of the law should monitor developments in domestic operations closely as the landscape continues to evolve. Further, the information and samples provided in this Handbook are advisory only. Finally, the content and opinions expressed in this Handbook do not represent the official position of the U.S. Army or the other services, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of The Judge Advocate General, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, or any other government agency.


…


G. The Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plans


Formerly, DoD’s Civil Disturbance Operations (CDO) plan was known as “GARDEN PLOT.” Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and USNORTHCOM however, DoD has delegated to geographic combatant commanders responsibility for developing CDO Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). These geographic commanders’ CONPLANs provide guidance and direction for planning, coordinating, and executing military operations during domestic civil disturbances.


1. Civil Disturbance Operations Mission


Broadly stated, the CDO mission assists civil authorities in restoring law and order in the United States and its territories.58 This mission statement, while not duplicating the language in the Insurrection Act allowing for the use of federal forces to “suppress” insurrection, provides wide latitude to the President to use federal forces to assist civil law enforcement in “restoring” law and order.


The restoration of law and order must be distinguished from the preservation of law and order. CDO mission statements do not allow the joint civil disturbance task force commander to undertake preservation missions. It is generally agreed that missions to restore law and order include dispersing unauthorized assemblages, patrolling disturbed areas, maintaining essential transportation and communications systems, setting up roadblocks, and cordoning off areas. Care should be taken before a military commander accepts missions that are routine maintenance of civil order.


2. Combatant Commanders’ CONPLANs


The CONPLANs provide the basis for all preparation, deployment, employment, and redeployment of Department of Defense component forces, including National Guard forces called to active federal service, for use in domestic civil disturbance operations, in support of civil authorities as directed by the President. The concept of a civil disturbance operation is multi-phased: Phase 0, Shape; Phase I, Anticipate; Phase II, Respond (deployment can occur in either Phase I or Phase II); Phase III, Operate; Phase IV, Stabilize; and Phase V, Transition (redeployment). Prior to deployment, military forces maintain five preparedness postures, called Civil Disturbance Conditions (CIDCONS) in order to alert and react to potential civil disturbance operations. Changes in the CIDCON level are directed by the JDOMS.


…


3. The Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces


Civil disturbance operations are conducted in accordance with Appendix L of the Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces (SRUF). Guidance on how and when forces can use force in a CDO mission are detailed in that annex. Although the CJCSI is classified, Annex L is not and can be shared with our mission partners.


a. Custody and Detention


All apprehensions should be made by the civil police force unless they are not available or require assistance. Military forces have the authority to detain rioters, looters, or other civilians committing criminal offenses. Civilians taken into custody should be transferred to civilian law enforcement authorities as soon as possible.


All members of the force must remember that state and federal criminal law and procedure govern apprehension. Apprehension is justified only on the basis of probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person to be apprehended committed the offense. Soldiers should not question detainees beyond basic pedigree such as name and address. If formal questioning of an offender is necessary, civilian police should conduct the interview. If civilian police are not available, CID agents or military police may conduct interviews only if the interview is essential to the civil disturbance mission. Actions taken by Soldiers that do not conform to criminal law constitutional standards could jeopardize future prosecution and subject Soldiers and their Commanders to criminal and/or civil liability.


b. Search and Seizure


CDO CONPLANs anticipate that military forces will generally not be involved in searches unless there is “an immediate danger of violence, destruction of evidence, or escape of violent persons unless the search is conducted without delay.” In all other cases, local authorities should conduct searches. When required to perform searches, federal armed forces may conduct warrantless searches under the same constitutional parameters imposed upon law enforcement officials. Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force forces conducting a warrantless search will fully document the reasons for the search as soon as is reasonably convenient.69 Generally these searches are limited to the following incidents.


(1) Stop and Frisk


If there is a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, that person may be temporarily stopped and questioned about his activities. The stop must be limited in duration to that which is reasonably necessary to investigate the suspicion. If there is a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a person is armed or is carrying instruments of violence and that the individual presents an immediate risk of harm, members of the armed force may conduct a “frisk” (an external “patdown” of the clothing) for weapons. Any weapons found during a frisk may be removed from the individual and seized.


(2) Search Incident to Lawful Apprehension


A person lawfully detained may be searched for weapons or destructible evidence. A search for weapons or destructible evidence may also be conducted in the area where the detained person could reach with a sudden movement to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.


(3) Exigent circumstances


Military forces assisting law enforcement may make a search without a warrant when they have reason to believe (probable cause) that weapons, objects related to criminal activity, or persons believed to have committed an offense, are in the place to be searched; and they have reason to believe that the delay necessary to obtain a search warrant would result in removal of the weapons or destruction of the objects related to criminal activity. For example, Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force forces may stop and search an automobile without a warrant when there is reason to believe that the automobile contains weapons or instruments of violence and/or contains an individual reasonably believed to have committed violence.


(4) Emergency


Military forces in a civil disturbance operation may make an immediate entry into a building when there is reason to believe that entry is necessary to prevent injury to persons, serious damage to property, loss of evidence, to protect public safety, or to render aid to someone who is in danger.


(5) Hot pursuit


Military forces pursuing a person who they have reason to believe has just committed a serious crime, may enter a vehicle or building believed to be entered by the suspect and search the building or vehicle for the person or any weapons that might be used to further his escape.


(6) Plain View


During the course of otherwise lawful activity, military forces may seize any unlawful weapons or objects related to criminal activity which they observe in plain view. When conducting warrantless searches that require a probable cause determination, military forces can obtain advice from a judge advocate; however, the probable cause determination must be made personally by the individual desiring to conduct the search.


If a search warrant is required, local civil authorities should obtain judicially issued search warrants. If local civilian authorities are not available, judge advocates need to be prepared to provide advice on probable cause to military authorities before they approach a local judge or magistrate for a search warrant.


When feasible, all searches conducted by military personnel will be conducted by two personnel with the actual search performed by someone of the same sex.76 A hand receipt or some similar document should be prepared when items of personal property are seized from an individual.


c. Confinement Facilities


The Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force should not operate a detention facility. Any person apprehended should be turned over to the police for detention. Military correctional facilities cannot be used to detain civilians. If available civilian detention facilities cannot accommodate the number of detained persons who are awaiting arraignment, the Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force commander must seek the approval of the SCRAG and Combatant Commander to set up a temporary detention facility.


Should the Task Force be required to operate a detention facility, the detention facility standards and operations should conform, to the maximum extent possible, to current DoD confinement facility operations and will be under the professional supervision and control of Military Police personnel. The establishment and operation of military detention facilities is a temporary expedient and is authorized only until such time as the custody of detained persons can be transferred to civil authorities.


d. Riot Control Agents


Normally, for CDO the deployment and use of riot control agents is allowed as a matter of U.S. policy. However, initial approval authority for its deployment and use may be retained at a level higher than the Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force Commander and may require a specific request.


 


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


DomesticOperationalLaw2011

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Email Hidden Tracking Deceptions
		
	
	

		
1. Government Email Hidden Tracking Deceptions


Many US federal agencies distribute emails and notifications via govdelivery.com (“Made for government”). The service embeds hidden URLs with a lengthy tracking number which logs clicks and identifications of recipients who retrieve cited documents. This is a significant privacy violation by not notifying email recipients of the tracking feature. DHS examples (some alphanumerics changed):


This service is provided to you at no charge by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.http://links.govdelivery.com:80/track?type=click&enid=ZWFzPTEmbWFpbGluZ2lkPTIwMTIwMTIwLjU

xMTA1MjEmbWVzc2FnZWlkPU1EQi1QUkYYYYBBBVVVIwMTIwLjUxMTA1MjEmZGF0YWJhc2Vp

ZD0xMDAxJnNlcmlhbD0xNjg0Nzk1NCZlbWFpbGlkPWp5YUBwaXBlbGluZS5jb20mdXNlcmlkPWp5Y

UBwaXBlbGluZS5jb20mZmw9JmV4dHJhPU11bHRpdmFyaWF0ZUlkPSYmJg==&&&102&&&http://

http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm


Privacy Policy


http://links.govdelivery.com:80/track?type=click&enid=ZWFzPTEmbWFpbGluZ2lkPTIwMTIwMTIwLjUx

MTA1MjEmbWVzc2FnZWlkPU1EQi1QUkQtQlVMLTIwMTIwMTIwLjUxMTA1MjEmZGF0YWJhc2VpZ

D0xMDAxJnNlcmlhbUUUUYYYYVVVZlbWFpbGlkPWp5YUBwaXBlbGluZS5jb20mdXNlcmlkPWp5YU

BwaXBlbGluZS5jb20mZmw9JmV4dHJhPU11bHRpdmFyaWF0ZUlkPSYmJg==&&&103&&&http://www.

dhs.gov/xutil/gc_1157139158971.shtm


GovDelivery is providing this information on behalf of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and may not use the information for any other purposes.


Department of Justice admittedly tracking ID today:


Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Speaks at the Wells Fargo Press Conferencehttp://links.govdelivery.com:80/track?type=click&amp;enid=ZWFzPTEmbWFpbGluZ2lkPTIwMTIwNzEy

Ljg5ODc4MTEmbWVzc2FnZWlkPU1EQi1QUkQtQlVMLTIwMTIwNzEyLjg5ODc4MTEmZGF0YWJhc2

VpZD0xMDAxJnNlcmlhbD0xNzA3MzcyMyZlbWFpbGlkPWp5YUBwaXBlbGluZS5jb20mdXNlcmlkPWp

5YUBwaXBlbGluZS5jb20mZmw9JmV4dHJhPU11bHRpdmFyaWF0ZUlkPSYmJg==&amp;&amp;&amp;

102&amp;&amp;&amp;http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2012/dag-speech-120712.html


The White House admittedly tracks ID minutely too:


Watch the video and get the facts here.http://links.whitehouse.gov/track?type=click&enid=ZWFzPTEmbWFpbGluZ2lkPTIwMTIwNjI4Ljg2NDc2M

zEmbWVzc2FnZWlkPU1EQi1QUkQtQlVMLTIwMTIwNjI4Ljg2NDc2MzEmZGF0YWJhc2VpZD0xMDAxJn

NlcmlhbD0xNjkwNTM2MiZlbWFpbGlkPWp5YUBwaXBlbGluZS5jb20mdXNlcmlkPWp5YUBwaXBlbGlu

ZS5jb20mZmw9JmV4dHJhPU11bHRpdmFyaWF0ZUlkPSYmJg==&&&100&&&http://www.whitehouse.gov/

blog/2012/06/28/supreme-court-upholds-president-obamas-health-care-ref


The hidden codes may be overlooked: They were discovered when our legacy email program could not activate them. Last year Cryptome wrote the government clients of govdelivery.com and the service itself to reveal the tracking but never received an answer from any.


Notable exception to hidden tracking is the GAO which transparently discloses its URLs:


Electronic Warfare: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Oversight. GAO-12-479, July 9.


http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-479


Other USG offices display only a linked title but not the underlying URL, a method often used to deceive about the link. State Department and FBI examples, respectively, without hidden tracking code:


Press Releases: Remarks With Afghan President Hamid Karzai[We see today at the bottom of State Department email it is also sent by govdelivery.com and tracks recipients. “Report problems: <support@govdelivery.com>”]


Alleged Associate of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Charged in New York with Providing Material Support and Receiving Military Training in Yemen 


2. Commercial Email Tracking Deceptions


Commercial email delivery services also hide tracking code. For example, Bluehornet.com sent out an email yesterday for the Stratfor Class Action Settlement which embedded hidden URLs with tracking numbers (original numbers replaced):


http://echo4.bluehornet.com/yu/10987654321:10987654321:k:9:10987654321:109876543211098765

432110987654321:h


Bluehornet violates the privacy of the email recipients by not calling attention to its tracking feature, thus implicating the law firm which sued Stratfor for failing to protect its customer information — presumably the law firm does not know it may be subject to privacy violation suits.


Other services embed URLs which track access to articles with concealed codes that likely also track email recipients without explanation of the codes’s use. New York Times today, egregiously tracking (some alphanumerics changed):


Spend summer vacation at an all-inclusive resort, surrounded by the crystalline waters of the Pacific Oceanhttp://p.nytimes.com/email/re?location=vzewYO/FHLSRA5cTrA4oWdnsb+onKeHxFGl2jINZg1bhIX3P5MN

4T03Fcnswgysn52TggCVcNc5LY2IXAm9BwJ6DmVAwsenGY7ZBBBBBCCCCCBBDbW3WIL+pXZuA&

campaign_id=105&instance_id=16741&segment_id=36060&user_id=5c401f4b636bc9557c9c7a87cab025f8


Amazon (some alphanumerics changed):


The SAGE Handbook of Architectural Theoryhttp://www.amazon.com/gp/r.html?R=1681XH3C5L4XM&C=1071C1INNZ6FT&H=OOEX4ICXELVALRNTX

SY0POCY0TCA&T=C&U=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2Freview%2Fcreate-review%2Fref%3Dpe_

6680_24339240_cm_cr_ec_add_1_h_c24339240%3Fie%3DUTF8%26nodeID%3D%26asin%3D1412946131%

26customerID%BVRFWGHDEW35


This for an article listed in a Dei Zeit newsletter today (alphamumerics changed):


http://newsletterversand.zeit.de/go/4/LMTVGB-2W9MEN8-HBV7G81-VXZM6N.html


3. Honest and Dishonest Email


Honest privacy protection advocates will always use transparent URLs. An EFF example:


For the full motion for partial summary judgment:https://www.eff.org/document/plaintiffs-motion-partial-summary-judgment


Compared to, one of many possible examples, the otherwise admirable Bradley Manning Support Network (code changed):


http://bradleymanning.orghttp://t.ymlp305.net/mybealcccccccccccccccccj/click.php


Tracking is often justified as legitimate automatic data gathering on users, however few, if any, email delivery and tracking services disclose tracking information with each email, offer no tracking opt-out choice, provide no guarantees of anonymity or against misuse of the user data, and seldom point to either the privacy policies of the service or those of the services’ customers (albeit, no privacy policy is believable). This suggests deliberate deception and lack of accountability of both the services and their customers, and in this manner replicate the deceptions of vilified email spammers.


All users of email should use transparent URLs, and those using hidden tracking codes should include with each email an explanation of the hidden URLs, the purpose of the tracking, related privacy policies and a trcking to opt-out choice. Those which do not comply should be blocked, filtered, trashed unread or returned marked “Choice Expletive.”


__________


Related, website links with non-transparent URLs (such as Cryptome uses, and has no delusional privacy policy) should never be clicked until passing a pointer over them to verify the underlying code. Avoid lengthy alphanumeric codes whereever they are hidden.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Cryptome unveils – The Gentleperson’s Guide To Forum Spies
		
	
	

		
A sends:


The Gentleperson’s Guide To Forum Spies (spooks, feds, etc.)


http://pastebin.com/irj4Fyd5


1. COINTELPRO Techniques for dilution, misdirection and control of a internet forum

2. Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation

3. Eight Traits of the Disinformationalist

4. How to Spot a Spy (Cointelpro Agent)

5. Seventeen Techniques for Truth Suppression

______________________________________________________________________________________


COINTELPRO Techniques for dilution, misdirection and control of a internet forum..


There are several techniques for the control and manipulation of a internet forum no matter what, or who is on it. We will go over each technique and demonstrate that only a minimal number of operatives can be used to eventually and effectively gain a control of a ‘uncontrolled forum.’


Technique #1 – ‘FORUM SLIDING’


If a very sensitive posting of a critical nature has been posted on a forum – it can be quickly removed from public view by ‘forum sliding.’ In this technique a number of unrelated posts are quietly prepositioned on the forum and allowed to ‘age.’ Each of these misdirectional forum postings can then be called upon at will to trigger a ‘forum slide.’ The second requirement is that several fake accounts exist, which can be called upon, to ensure that this technique is not exposed to the public. To trigger a ‘forum slide’ and ‘flush’ the critical post out of public view it is simply a matter of logging into each account both real and fake and then ‘replying’ to prepositined postings with a simple 1 or 2 line comment. This brings the unrelated postings to the top of the forum list, and the critical posting ‘slides’ down the front page, and quickly out of public view. Although it is difficult or impossible to censor the posting it is now lost in a sea of unrelated and unuseful postings. By this means it becomes effective to keep the readers of the forum reading unrelated and non-issue items.


Technique #2 – ‘CONSENSUS CRACKING’


A second highly effective technique (which you can see in operation all the time at www.abovetopsecret.com) is ‘consensus cracking.’ To develop a consensus crack, the following technique is used. Under the guise of a fake account a posting is made which looks legitimate and is towards the truth is made – but the critical point is that it has a VERY WEAK PREMISE without substantive proof to back the posting. Once this is done then under alternative fake accounts a very strong position in your favour is slowly introduced over the life of the posting. It is IMPERATIVE that both sides are initially presented, so the uninformed reader cannot determine which side is the truth. As postings and replies are made the stronger ‘evidence’ or disinformation in your favour is slowly ‘seeded in.’ Thus the uninformed reader will most like develop the same position as you, and if their position is against you their opposition to your posting will be most likely dropped. However in some cases where the forum members are highly educated and can counter your disinformation with real facts and linked postings, you can then ‘abort’ the consensus cracking by initiating a ‘forum slide.’


Technique #3 – ‘TOPIC DILUTION’


Topic dilution is not only effective in forum sliding it is also very useful in keeping the forum readers on unrelated and non-productive issues. This is a critical and useful technique to cause a ‘RESOURCE BURN.’ By implementing continual and non-related postings that distract and disrupt (trolling ) the forum readers they are more effectively stopped from anything of any real productivity. If the intensity of gradual dilution is intense enough, the readers will effectively stop researching and simply slip into a ‘gossip mode.’ In this state they can be more easily misdirected away from facts towards uninformed conjecture and opinion. The less informed they are the more effective and easy it becomes to control the entire group in the direction that you would desire the group to go in. It must be stressed that a proper assessment of the psychological capabilities and levels of education is first determined of the group to determine at what level to ‘drive in the wedge.’ By being too far off topic too quickly it may trigger censorship by a forum moderator.


Technique #4 – ‘INFORMATION COLLECTION’


Information collection is also a very effective method to determine the psychological level of the forum members, and to gather intelligence that can be used against them. In this technique in a light and positive environment a ‘show you mine so me yours’ posting is initiated. From the number of replies and the answers that are provided much statistical information can be gathered. An example is to post your ‘favourite weapon’ and then encourage other members of the forum to showcase what they have. In this matter it can be determined by reverse proration what percentage of the forum community owns a firearm, and or a illegal weapon. This same method can be used by posing as one of the form members and posting your favourite ‘technique of operation.’ From the replies various methods that the group utilizes can be studied and effective methods developed to stop them from their activities.


Technique #5 – ‘ANGER TROLLING’


Statistically, there is always a percentage of the forum posters who are more inclined to violence. In order to determine who these individuals are, it is a requirement to present a image to the forum to deliberately incite a strong psychological reaction. From this the most violent in the group can be effectively singled out for reverse IP location and possibly local enforcement tracking. To accomplish this only requires posting a link to a video depicting a local police officer massively abusing his power against a very innocent individual. Statistically of the million or so police officers in America there is always one or two being caught abusing there powers and the taping of the activity can be then used for intelligence gathering purposes – without the requirement to ‘stage’ a fake abuse video. This method is extremely effective, and the more so the more abusive the video can be made to look. Sometimes it is useful to ‘lead’ the forum by replying to your own posting with your own statement of violent intent, and that you ‘do not care what the authorities think!!’ inflammation. By doing this and showing no fear it may be more effective in getting the more silent and self-disciplined violent intent members of the forum to slip and post their real intentions. This can be used later in a court of law during prosecution.


Technique #6 – ‘GAINING FULL CONTROL’


It is important to also be harvesting and continually maneuvering for a forum moderator position. Once this position is obtained, the forum can then be effectively and quietly controlled by deleting unfavourable postings – and one can eventually steer the forum into complete failure and lack of interest by the general public. This is the ‘ultimate victory’ as the forum is no longer participated with by the general public and no longer useful in maintaining their freedoms. Depending on the level of control you can obtain, you can deliberately steer a forum into defeat by censoring postings, deleting memberships, flooding, and or accidentally taking the forum offline. By this method the forum can be quickly killed. However it is not always in the interest to kill a forum as it can be converted into a ‘honey pot’ gathering center to collect and misdirect newcomers and from this point be completely used for your control for your agenda purposes.


CONCLUSION


Remember these techniques are only effective if the forum participants DO NOT KNOW ABOUT THEM. Once they are aware of these techniques the operation can completely fail, and the forum can become uncontrolled. At this point other avenues must be considered such as initiating a false legal precidence to simply have the forum shut down and taken offline. This is not desirable as it then leaves the enforcement agencies unable to track the percentage of those in the population who always resist attempts for control against them. Many other techniques can be utilized and developed by the individual and as you develop further techniques of infiltration and control it is imperative to share then with HQ.

______________________________________________________________________________________


Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation


Note: The first rule and last five (or six, depending on situation) rules are generally not directly within the ability of the traditional disinfo artist to apply. These rules are generally used more directly by those at the leadership, key players, or planning level of the criminal conspiracy or conspiracy to cover up.


1. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil. Regardless of what you know, don’t discuss it — especially if you are a public figure, news anchor, etc. If it’s not reported, it didn’t happen, and you never have to deal with the issues.


2. Become incredulous and indignant. Avoid discussing key issues and instead focus on side issues which can be used show the topic as being critical of some otherwise sacrosanct group or theme. This is also known as the ‘How dare you!’ gambit.


3. Create rumor mongers. Avoid discussing issues by describing all charges, regardless of venue or evidence, as mere rumors and wild accusations. Other derogatory terms mutually exclusive of truth may work as well. This method which works especially well with a silent press, because the only way the public can learn of the facts are through such ‘arguable rumors’. If you can associate the material with the Internet, use this fact to certify it a ‘wild rumor’ from a ‘bunch of kids on the Internet’ which can have no basis in fact.


4. Use a straw man. Find or create a seeming element of your opponent’s argument which you can easily knock down to make yourself look good and the opponent to look bad. Either make up an issue you may safely imply exists based on your interpretation of the opponent/opponent arguments/situation, or select the weakest aspect of the weakest charges. Amplify their significance and destroy them in a way which appears to debunk all the charges, real and fabricated alike, while actually avoiding discussion of the real issues.


5. Sidetrack opponents with name calling and ridicule. This is also known as the primary ‘attack the messenger’ ploy, though other methods qualify as variants of that approach. Associate opponents with unpopular titles such as ‘kooks’, ‘right-wing’, ‘liberal’, ‘left-wing’, ‘terrorists’, ‘conspiracy buffs’, ‘radicals’, ‘militia’, ‘racists’, ‘religious fanatics’, ‘sexual deviates’, and so forth. This makes others shrink from support out of fear of gaining the same label, and you avoid dealing with issues.


6. Hit and Run. In any public forum, make a brief attack of your opponent or the opponent position and then scamper off before an answer can be fielded, or simply ignore any answer. This works extremely well in Internet and letters-to-the-editor environments where a steady stream of new identities can be called upon without having to explain criticism, reasoning — simply make an accusation or other attack, never discussing issues, and never answering any subsequent response, for that would dignify the opponent’s viewpoint.


7. Question motives. Twist or amplify any fact which could be taken to imply that the opponent operates out of a hidden personal agenda or other bias. This avoids discussing issues and forces the accuser on the defensive.


8. Invoke authority. Claim for yourself or associate yourself with authority and present your argument with enough ‘jargon’ and ‘minutia’ to illustrate you are ‘one who knows’, and simply say it isn’t so without discussing issues or demonstrating concretely why or citing sources.


9. Play Dumb. No matter what evidence or logical argument is offered, avoid discussing issues except with denials they have any credibility, make any sense, provide any proof, contain or make a point, have logic, or support a conclusion. Mix well for maximum effect.


10. Associate opponent charges with old news. A derivative of the straw man — usually, in any large-scale matter of high visibility, someone will make charges early on which can be or were already easily dealt with – a kind of investment for the future should the matter not be so easily contained.) Where it can be foreseen, have your own side raise a straw man issue and have it dealt with early on as part of the initial contingency plans. Subsequent charges, regardless of validity or new ground uncovered, can usually then be associated with the original charge and dismissed as simply being a rehash without need to address current issues — so much the better where the opponent is or was involved with the original source.


11. Establish and rely upon fall-back positions. Using a minor matter or element of the facts, take the ‘high road’ and ‘confess’ with candor that some innocent mistake, in hindsight, was made — but that opponents have seized on the opportunity to blow it all out of proportion and imply greater criminalities which, ‘just isn’t so.’ Others can reinforce this on your behalf, later, and even publicly ‘call for an end to the nonsense’ because you have already ‘done the right thing.’ Done properly, this can garner sympathy and respect for ‘coming clean’ and ‘owning up’ to your mistakes without addressing more serious issues.


12. Enigmas have no solution. Drawing upon the overall umbrella of events surrounding the crime and the multitude of players and events, paint the entire affair as too complex to solve. This causes those otherwise following the matter to begin to lose interest more quickly without having to address the actual issues.


13. Alice in Wonderland Logic. Avoid discussion of the issues by reasoning backwards or with an apparent deductive logic which forbears any actual material fact.


14. Demand complete solutions. Avoid the issues by requiring opponents to solve the crime at hand completely, a ploy which works best with issues qualifying for rule 10.


15. Fit the facts to alternate conclusions. This requires creative thinking unless the crime was planned with contingency conclusions in place.


16. Vanish evidence and witnesses. If it does not exist, it is not fact, and you won’t have to address the issue.


17. Change the subject. Usually in connection with one of the other ploys listed here, find a way to side-track the discussion with abrasive or controversial comments in hopes of turning attention to a new, more manageable topic. This works especially well with companions who can ‘argue’ with you over the new topic and polarize the discussion arena in order to avoid discussing more key issues.


18. Emotionalize, Antagonize, and Goad Opponents. If you can’t do anything else, chide and taunt your opponents and draw them into emotional responses which will tend to make them look foolish and overly motivated, and generally render their material somewhat less coherent. Not only will you avoid discussing the issues in the first instance, but even if their emotional response addresses the issue, you can further avoid the issues by then focusing on how ‘sensitive they are to criticism.’


19. Ignore proof presented, demand impossible proofs. This is perhaps a variant of the ‘play dumb’ rule. Regardless of what material may be presented by an opponent in public forums, claim the material irrelevant and demand proof that is impossible for the opponent to come by (it may exist, but not be at his disposal, or it may be something which is known to be safely destroyed or withheld, such as a murder weapon.) In order to completely avoid discussing issues, it may be required that you to categorically deny and be critical of media or books as valid sources, deny that witnesses are acceptable, or even deny that statements made by government or other authorities have any meaning or relevance.


20. False evidence. Whenever possible, introduce new facts or clues designed and manufactured to conflict with opponent presentations — as useful tools to neutralize sensitive issues or impede resolution. This works best when the crime was designed with contingencies for the purpose, and the facts cannot be easily separated from the fabrications.


21. Call a Grand Jury, Special Prosecutor, or other empowered investigative body. Subvert the (process) to your benefit and effectively neutralize all sensitive issues without open discussion. Once convened, the evidence and testimony are required to be secret when properly handled. For instance, if you own the prosecuting attorney, it can insure a Grand Jury hears no useful evidence and that the evidence is sealed and unavailable to subsequent investigators. Once a favorable verdict is achieved, the matter can be considered officially closed. Usually, this technique is applied to find the guilty innocent, but it can also be used to obtain charges when seeking to frame a victim.


22. Manufacture a new truth. Create your own expert(s), group(s), author(s), leader(s) or influence existing ones willing to forge new ground via scientific, investigative, or social research or testimony which concludes favorably. In this way, if you must actually address issues, you can do so authoritatively.


23. Create bigger distractions. If the above does not seem to be working to distract from sensitive issues, or to prevent unwanted media coverage of unstoppable events such as trials, create bigger news stories (or treat them as such) to distract the multitudes.


24. Silence critics. If the above methods do not prevail, consider removing opponents from circulation by some definitive solution so that the need to address issues is removed entirely. This can be by their death, arrest and detention, blackmail or destruction of their character by release of blackmail information, or merely by destroying them financially, emotionally, or severely damaging their health.


25. Vanish. If you are a key holder of secrets or otherwise overly illuminated and you think the heat is getting too hot, to avoid the issues, vacate the kitchen.

______________________________________________________________________________________


Eight Traits of the Disinformationalist


1) Avoidance. They never actually discuss issues head-on or provide constructive input, generally avoiding citation of references or credentials. Rather, they merely imply this, that, and the other. Virtually everything about their presentation implies their authority and expert knowledge in the matter without any further justification for credibility.


2) Selectivity. They tend to pick and choose opponents carefully, either applying the hit-and-run approach against mere commentators supportive of opponents, or focusing heavier attacks on key opponents who are known to directly address issues. Should a commentator become argumentative with any success, the focus will shift to include the commentator as well.


3) Coincidental. They tend to surface suddenly and somewhat coincidentally with a new controversial topic with no clear prior record of participation in general discussions in the particular public arena involved. They likewise tend to vanish once the topic is no longer of general concern. They were likely directed or elected to be there for a reason, and vanish with the reason.


4) Teamwork. They tend to operate in self-congratulatory and complementary packs or teams. Of course, this can happen naturally in any public forum, but there will likely be an ongoing pattern of frequent exchanges of this sort where professionals are involved. Sometimes one of the players will infiltrate the opponent camp to become a source for straw man or other tactics designed to dilute opponent presentation strength.


5) Anti-conspiratorial. They almost always have disdain for ‘conspiracy theorists’ and, usually, for those who in any way believe JFK was not killed by LHO. Ask yourself why, if they hold such disdain for conspiracy theorists, do they focus on defending a single topic discussed in a NG focusing on conspiracies? One might think they would either be trying to make fools of everyone on every topic, or simply ignore the group they hold in such disdain.Or, one might more rightly conclude they have an ulterior motive for their actions in going out of their way to focus as they do.


6) Artificial Emotions. An odd kind of ‘artificial’ emotionalism and an unusually thick skin — an ability to persevere and persist even in the face of overwhelming criticism and unacceptance. This likely stems from intelligence community training that, no matter how condemning the evidence, deny everything, and never become emotionally involved or reactive. The net result for a disinfo artist is that emotions can seem artificial.


Most people, if responding in anger, for instance, will express their animosity throughout their rebuttal. But disinfo types usually have trouble maintaining the ‘image’ and are hot and cold with respect to pretended emotions and their usually more calm or unemotional communications style. It’s just a job, and they often seem unable to ‘act their role in character’ as well in a communications medium as they might be able in a real face-to-face conversation/confrontation. You might have outright rage and indignation one moment, ho-hum the next, and more anger later — an emotional yo-yo.


With respect to being thick-skinned, no amount of criticism will deter them from doing their job, and they will generally continue their old disinfo patterns without any adjustments to criticisms of how obvious it is that they play that game — where a more rational individual who truly cares what others think might seek to improve their communications style, substance, and so forth, or simply give up.


7) Inconsistent. There is also a tendency to make mistakes which betray their true self/motives. This may stem from not really knowing their topic, or it may be somewhat ‘freudian’, so to speak, in that perhaps they really root for the side of truth deep within.


I have noted that often, they will simply cite contradictory information which neutralizes itself and the author. For instance, one such player claimed to be a Navy pilot, but blamed his poor communicating skills (spelling, grammar, incoherent style) on having only a grade-school education. I’m not aware of too many Navy pilots who don’t have a college degree. Another claimed no knowledge of a particular topic/situation but later claimed first-hand knowledge of it.


8) Time Constant. Recently discovered, with respect to News Groups, is the response time factor. There are three ways this can be seen to work, especially when the government or other empowered player is involved in a cover up operation:


a) ANY NG posting by a targeted proponent for truth can result in an IMMEDIATE response. The government and other empowered players can afford to pay people to sit there and watch for an opportunity to do some damage. SINCE DISINFO IN A NG ONLY WORKS IF THE READER SEES IT – FAST RESPONSE IS CALLED FOR, or the visitor may be swayed towards truth.


b) When dealing in more direct ways with a disinformationalist, such as email, DELAY IS CALLED FOR – there will usually be a minimum of a 48-72 hour delay. This allows a sit-down team discussion on response strategy for best effect, and even enough time to ‘get permission’ or instruction from a formal chain of command.


c) In the NG example 1) above, it will often ALSO be seen that bigger guns are drawn and fired after the same 48-72 hours delay – the team approach in play. This is especially true when the targeted truth seeker or their comments are considered more important with respect to potential to reveal truth. Thus, a serious truth sayer will be attacked twice for the same sin.


______________________________________________________________________________________


How to Spot a Spy (Cointelpro Agent)


One way to neutralize a potential activist is to get them to be in a group that does all the wrong things. Why?


1) The message doesn’t get out.

2) A lot of time is wasted

3) The activist is frustrated and discouraged

4) Nothing good is accomplished.


FBI and Police Informers and Infiltrators will infest any group and they have phoney activist organizations established.


Their purpose is to prevent any real movement for justice or eco-peace from developing in this country.


Agents come in small, medium or large. They can be of any ethnic background. They can be male or female.


The actual size of the group or movement being infiltrated is irrelevant. It is the potential the movement has for becoming large which brings on the spies and saboteurs.


This booklet lists tactics agents use to slow things down, foul things up, destroy the movement and keep tabs on activists.


It is the agent’s job to keep the activist from quitting such a group, thus keeping him/her under control.


In some situations, to get control, the agent will tell the activist:


“You’re dividing the movement.”


[Here, I have added the psychological reasons as to WHY this maneuver works to control people]


This invites guilty feelings. Many people can be controlled by guilt. The agents begin relationships with activists behind a well-developed mask of “dedication to the cause.” Because of their often declared dedication, (and actions designed to prove this), when they criticize the activist, he or she – being truly dedicated to the movement – becomes convinced that somehow, any issues are THEIR fault. This is because a truly dedicated person tends to believe that everyone has a conscience and that nobody would dissimulate and lie like that “on purpose.” It’s amazing how far agents can go in manipulating an activist because the activist will constantly make excuses for the agent who regularly declares their dedication to the cause. Even if they do, occasionally, suspect the agent, they will pull the wool over their own eyes by rationalizing: “they did that unconsciously… they didn’t really mean it… I can help them by being forgiving and accepting ” and so on and so forth.


The agent will tell the activist:


“You’re a leader!”


This is designed to enhance the activist’s self-esteem. His or her narcissistic admiration of his/her own activist/altruistic intentions increase as he or she identifies with and consciously admires the altruistic declarations of the agent which are deliberately set up to mirror those of the activist.


This is “malignant pseudoidentification.” It is the process by which the agent consciously imitates or simulates a certain behavior to foster the activist’s identification with him/her, thus increasing the activist’s vulnerability to exploitation. The agent will simulate the more subtle self-concepts of the activist.


Activists and those who have altruistic self-concepts are most vulnerable to malignant pseudoidentification especially during work with the agent when the interaction includes matter relating to their competency, autonomy, or knowledge.


The goal of the agent is to increase the activist’s general empathy for the agent through pseudo-identification with the activist’s self-concepts.


The most common example of this is the agent who will compliment the activist for his competency or knowledge or value to the movement. On a more subtle level, the agent will simulate affects and mannerisms of the activist which promotes identification via mirroring and feelings of “twinship”. It is not unheard of for activists, enamored by the perceived helpfulness and competence of a good agent, to find themselves considering ethical violations and perhaps, even illegal behavior, in the service of their agent/handler.


The activist’s “felt quality of perfection” [self-concept] is enhanced, and a strong empathic bond is developed with the agent through his/her imitation and simulation of the victim’s own narcissistic investments. [self-concepts] That is, if the activist knows, deep inside, their own dedication to the cause, they will project that onto the agent who is “mirroring” them.


The activist will be deluded into thinking that the agent shares this feeling of identification and bonding. In an activist/social movement setting, the adversarial roles that activists naturally play vis a vis the establishment/government, fosters ongoing processes of intrapsychic splitting so that “twinship alliances” between activist and agent may render whole sectors or reality testing unavailable to the activist. They literally “lose touch with reality.”


Activists who deny their own narcissistic investments [do not have a good idea of their own self-concepts and that they ARE concepts] and consciously perceive themselves (accurately, as it were) to be “helpers” endowed with a special amount of altruism are exceedingly vulnerable to the affective (emotional) simulation of the accomplished agent.


Empathy is fostered in the activist through the expression of quite visible affects. The presentation of tearfulness, sadness, longing, fear, remorse, and guilt, may induce in the helper-oriented activist a strong sense of compassion, while unconsciously enhancing the activist’s narcissistic investment in self as the embodiment of goodness.


The agent’s expresssion of such simulated affects may be quite compelling to the observer and difficult to distinguish from deep emotion.


It can usually be identified by two events, however:


First, the activist who has analyzed his/her own narcissistic roots and is aware of his/her own potential for being “emotionally hooked,” will be able to remain cool and unaffected by such emotional outpourings by the agent.


As a result of this unaffected, cool, attitude, the Second event will occur: The agent will recompensate much too quickly following such an affective expression leaving the activist with the impression that “the play has ended, the curtain has fallen,” and the imposture, for the moment, has finished. The agent will then move quickly to another activist/victim.


The fact is, the movement doesn’t need leaders, it needs MOVERS. “Follow the leader” is a waste of time.


A good agent will want to meet as often as possible. He or she will talk a lot and say little. One can expect an onslaught of long, unresolved discussions.


Some agents take on a pushy, arrogant, or defensive manner:


1) To disrupt the agenda

2) To side-track the discussion

3) To interrupt repeatedly

4) To feign ignorance

5) To make an unfounded accusation against a person.


Calling someone a racist, for example. This tactic is used to discredit a person in the eyes of all other group members.


Saboteurs


Some saboteurs pretend to be activists. She or he will ….


1) Write encyclopedic flyers (in the present day, websites)

2) Print flyers in English only.

3) Have demonstrations in places where no one cares.

4) Solicit funding from rich people instead of grass roots support

5) Display banners with too many words that are confusing.

6) Confuse issues.

7) Make the wrong demands.

Cool Compromise the goal.

9) Have endless discussions that waste everyone’s time. The agent may accompany the endless discussions with drinking, pot smoking or other amusement to slow down the activist’s work.


Provocateurs


1) Want to establish “leaders” to set them up for a fall in order to stop the movement.

2) Suggest doing foolish, illegal things to get the activists in trouble.

3) Encourage militancy.

4) Want to taunt the authorities.

5) Attempt to make the activist compromise their values.

6) Attempt to instigate violence. Activisim ought to always be non-violent.

7) Attempt to provoke revolt among people who are ill-prepared to deal with the reaction of the authorities to such violence.


Informants


1) Want everyone to sign up and sing in and sign everything.

2) Ask a lot of questions (gathering data).

3) Want to know what events the activist is planning to attend.

4) Attempt to make the activist defend him or herself to identify his or her beliefs, goals, and level of committment.


Recruiting


Legitimate activists do not subject people to hours of persuasive dialog. Their actions, beliefs, and goals speak for themselves.


Groups that DO recruit are missionaries, military, and fake political parties or movements set up by agents.


Surveillance


ALWAYS assume that you are under surveillance.


At this point, if you are NOT under surveillance, you are not a very good activist!


Scare Tactics


They use them.


Such tactics include slander, defamation, threats, getting close to disaffected or minimally committed fellow activists to persuade them (via psychological tactics described above) to turn against the movement and give false testimony against their former compatriots. They will plant illegal substances on the activist and set up an arrest; they will plant false information and set up “exposure,” they will send incriminating letters [emails] in the name of the activist; and more; they will do whatever society will allow.


This booklet in no way covers all the ways agents use to sabotage the lives of sincere an dedicated activists.


If an agent is “exposed,” he or she will be transferred or replaced.


COINTELPRO is still in operation today under a different code name. It is no longer placed on paper where it can be discovered through the freedom of information act.


The FBI counterintelligence program’s stated purpose: To expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, and otherwise neutralize individuals who the FBI categorize as opposed to the National Interests. “National Security” means the FBI’s security from the people ever finding out the vicious things it does in violation of people’s civil liberties.


______________________________________________________________________________________


Seventeen Techniques for Truth Suppression


Strong, credible allegations of high-level criminal activity can bring down a government. When the government lacks an effective, fact-based defense, other techniques must be employed. The success of these techniques depends heavily upon a cooperative, compliant press and a mere token opposition party.


1. Dummy up. If it’s not reported, if it’s not news, it didn’t happen.


2. Wax indignant. This is also known as the “How dare you?” gambit.


3. Characterize the charges as “rumors” or, better yet, “wild rumors.” If, in spite of the news blackout, the public is still able to learn about the suspicious facts, it can only be through “rumors.” (If they tend to believe the “rumors” it must be because they are simply “paranoid” or “hysterical.”)


4. Knock down straw men. Deal only with the weakest aspects of the weakest charges. Even better, create your own straw men. Make up wild rumors (or plant false stories) and give them lead play when you appear to debunk all the charges, real and fanciful alike.


5. Call the skeptics names like “conspiracy theorist,” “nutcase,” “ranter,” “kook,” “crackpot,” and, of course, “rumor monger.” Be sure, too, to use heavily loaded verbs and adjectives when characterizing their charges and defending the “more reasonable” government and its defenders. You must then carefully avoid fair and open debate with any of the people you have thus maligned. For insurance, set up your own “skeptics” to shoot down.


6. Impugn motives. Attempt to marginalize the critics by suggesting strongly that they are not really interested in the truth but are simply pursuing a partisan political agenda or are out to make money (compared to over-compensated adherents to the government line who, presumably, are not).


7. Invoke authority. Here the controlled press and the sham opposition can be very useful.


8. Dismiss the charges as “old news.”


9. Come half-clean. This is also known as “confession and avoidance” or “taking the limited hangout route.” This way, you create the impression of candor and honesty while you admit only to relatively harmless, less-than-criminal “mistakes.” This stratagem often requires the embrace of a fall-back position quite different from the one originally taken. With effective damage control, the fall-back position need only be peddled by stooge skeptics to carefully limited markets.


10. Characterize the crimes as impossibly complex and the truth as ultimately unknowable.


11. Reason backward, using the deductive method with a vengeance. With thoroughly rigorous deduction, troublesome evidence is irrelevant. E.g. We have a completely free press. If evidence exists that the Vince Foster “suicide” note was forged, they would have reported it. They haven’t reported it so there is no such evidence. Another variation on this theme involves the likelihood of a conspiracy leaker and a press who would report the leak.


12. Require the skeptics to solve the crime completely. E.g. If Foster was murdered, who did it and why?


13. Change the subject. This technique includes creating and/or publicizing distractions.


14. Lightly report incriminating facts, and then make nothing of them. This is sometimes referred to as “bump and run” reporting.


15. Baldly and brazenly lie. A favorite way of doing this is to attribute the “facts” furnished the public to a plausible-sounding, but anonymous, source.


16. Expanding further on numbers 4 and 5, have your own stooges “expose” scandals and champion popular causes. Their job is to pre-empt real opponents and to play 99-yard football. A variation is to pay rich people for the job who will pretend to spend their own money.


17. Flood the Internet with agents. This is the answer to the question, “What could possibly motivate a person to spend hour upon hour on Internet news groups defending the government and/or the press and harassing genuine critics?” Don t the authorities have defenders enough in all the newspapers, magazines, radio, and television? One would think refusing to print critical letters and screening out serious callers or dumping them from radio talk shows would be control enough, but, obviously, it is not.


 




 


 


 


 


 


 



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Fukushima Daiichi NPS Unit 3 Reactor Probe
		
	
	

		


Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 Reactor Building Operating Floor Area Investigation




http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_120711_03-e.pdf


[Image]


Northwest part of the Operating Floor. Photo taken on July 11, 2012 [Captions by TEPCO. Photo striations in the originals.]


[Image]


East part of the Operating Floor. Photo taken on July 11, 2012


[Image]


Fourth floor (Photo taken from the equipment hatch). Photo taken on July 11, 2012


[Image]


Third floor (Photo taken from the equipment hatch). Photo taken on July 11, 2012


[Image]


Operating Floor [No date. Appears to be clip of Tokyo Air Service photo20-21 March, 2011.]


[Image]


Enlarged image of the equipment hatch [Clip of preceding photo.]


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CONFIDENTIAL – Library of Congress Analysis of Military Support to Civil Authorities
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/LOC_MSCA.png


 


This report sets forth the statutes, Executive Branch documents, regulations, and Department of Defense (DoD) internal directives that define and govern Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). The policies and responsibilities of the military departments and staff agencies of DoD are reviewed, as they have evolved from the early 1950s to the present. The events of September 11, 2001, have placed the MSCA function in the larger context of homeland security, and documents setting forth homeland security policy as it defines MSCA have been reviewed as well. This report also discusses DoD civilian and military responsibility for MSCA, and the states’ position regarding the National Guard’s role in support of civil authorities. Finally, this report evaluates the criteria for providing MSCA, and assesses how DoD compares this function with its warfighting mission.


…


The U.S. military has provided support to civil authorities in response to civil emergencies and natural disasters dating back to the Truman era. The terminology applied to this function has varied over the years: military assistance, or military support to civil authorities; military support of civil defense; and employment of military resources in natural disaster emergencies within the United States. As will be illustrated in this report’s discussion of U.S. Defense Department (DoD) regulatory documents, the specific responsibilities of the department and the service branches were initially divided between civil defense (attacks on the United States) and disaster-related civil emergencies, but now are addressed collectively as Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) as a matter of departmental policy and doctrine. In addition, the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent creation of a homeland security infrastructure have resulted in the adoption of MSCA policy in the context of the broader issue of homeland defense. However, both the core regulations and the DoD internal directive that govern MSCA predate the post–9/11 world, because they were adopted in 1993. In addition, the primary statutory authority for these documents is the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, which was repealed in 1994. Consequently, all of the recent policy statements defining MSCA and establishing DoD’s role are found in homeland security directives and strategy documents issued by the White House and the military.


The U.S. Department of Defense, in its 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, defines defense support of civil authorities as “DoD support, including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.” This function is provided when DoD is directed to do so by the president or the secretary of defense. A report on the future of the National Guard and Reserves issued in 2006 defines “civil support” as “an umbrella term that encompasses the support the Department of Defense could provide as part of a response to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, to include an event involving chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, or explosive materials (CBRNE), as well as support DoD could provide for other law enforcement activities.” DoD’s Homeland Security doctrine issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 2005 states “MSCA is the most widely recognized form of DOD Civil Support because it usually consists of support for high-profile emergencies such as natural or manmade disasters that often invoke Presidential or state emergency/disaster declarations. DOD assistance should be requested by an LFA (Lead Federal Agency) only when other local, state and federal capabilities have been exhausted or when a military-unique capability is required.” MSCA is generally provided during natural disasters, special security events, and accidental or intentional manmade disasters that have evoked a presidential or state emergency declaration. Major Robert Preiss, a former strategic analyst in the National Guard Bureau, defined MSCA in 2003 as “assistance to civilian governmental entities – Federal, state, or local – that the services may provide to help manage a crisis, attack, or calamity.” The National Response Plan issued by the Department of Homeland Security in December 2004, which is discussed in greater detail in a separate section of this report, also stipulates that DoD civil support is generally provided only when local, state and other federal resources are “overwhelmed.”


The National Guard is considered a unique state-based military force (although primarily funded by the federal government and trained in accordance with federal standards) that is the “only military force shared by the states and the federal government.” According to National Guard Bureau Chief H. Steven Blum, the Guard’s “unique ability to work in three legal statuses makes the Guard the most versatile DOD force available to the Federal Government for homeland security (HLS), homeland defense (HD), and military assistance to civil authorities (MACA).”8 The three statuses Lt. General Blum refers to are:


• State active duty—States employ their National Guard forces under state control for state purposes and at state expense; command and control rests with the governor.

• Title 32 duty—Under authority of Title 32 of the U.S. Code, the National Guard is federally funded but under the command and control of the state’s governor even though the Guard is employed “in the service of the United States.” The purpose of the service may be either shared state/federal or for a primary federal purpose.

• Title 10 duty—Under authority of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the National Guard is deployed by the President for a federal purpose; command and control rests solely with the President and the federal government.


…


DoD Directive Number 3025.1


DoD Directive No. 3025.1 was first issued on January 24, 1952 as Directive No. 200.04– 1 pursuant to Pub. L. No. 81–920, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. Its purpose was “to establish the responsibilities of the military departments and staff agencies of the Department of Defense for planning and preparations in certain areas of civil defense and related matters.” This directive enumerated the responsibilities of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Each service branch was tasked with the development of civil defense programs and policies specific to its operations, and instructed to coordinate with other service branches as well as with the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), which was authorized by statute to prepare national plans and programs for the civil defense of the United States and delegate civil defense responsibilities to federal departments and agencies. The JCS was given the task of reviewing and coordinating service branch civil defense programs, as well as providing guidance to the FCDA as to “areas which, because of their high importance from the military viewpoint, are considered probable targets for some form of enemy attack and should be given appropriate attention in civil defense planning.” In addition, pursuant to Section 302, Pub.L.No. 81–920, during a time of declared civil defense emergency, the Joint Chiefs are directed to formulate DoD recommendations regarding the department’s military requirements.


…


DoD Directive No. 3025.1, issued January 15, 1993, consolidates the policies and responsibilities contained in all previous directives that addressed both disaster-related civil emergencies and attacks on the United States. It creates a “single system for Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) by which DoD components will plan for and respond to requests from civil government agencies” in times of major disasters or emergencies. The authorities for this directive are the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq) and the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Pub.L.No. 81–920 (which was repealed in 1994).


In accordance with Pub.L.No. 81–920, a national civil defense policy is mandated, under which the “Department of Defense will support civil authorities in civil defense, to include facilitating the use of the National Guard in each State for response in both peacetime disasters and national security emergencies.” The secretary of the army is again designated as the DoD executive agent, in which capacity he develops planning guidance, plans, and procedures for MSCA; tasks DoD components to plan for and commit DoD resources in response to requests from civil authorities; provides guidance (developed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to the commanders of the unified and specified commands for MSCA response; and coordinates MSCA plans and procedures with the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA).


The directive establishes, as MSCA policy, that DoD planning is to recognize the following with regard to Army and Air National Guard forces:


• These forces when not in federal service have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state and local government agencies in civil emergencies.

• Plans and preparedness measures for MSCA must foster close and continuous coordination for efficient employment of DoD resources of the National Guard (under either state or federal authority), as well as resources of the DoD components, in time of peace, war, or transition to war.

• The DoD Components shall augment staffs responsible for MSCA, as appropriate, with personnel from reserve components of all military services who are specifically trained for civil-military planning and emergency liaison duties.

• Military forces employed in MSCA activities shall remain under military command and control of the DoD Executive Agent at all times.


 


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL REPORT HERE


LOC-MSCA-1

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
The FBI – Missing Georgia Bank Director Indicted for Bank Fraud
		
	
	

		


SAVANNAH, GA—Aubrey Lee Price, 46, originally from Lyons, Georgia, was indicted today by a federal grand jury sitting in the Southern District of Georgia on a charge that he defrauded the Montgomery Bank & Trust in Ailey, Georgia, of over $21 million. On July 6, 2012, Georgia regulators closed the Montgomery Bank & Trust and appointed the FDIC as receiver.


According to the allegations in the indictment, in 2010, an investment group controlled by Price invested approximately $10 million in the failing Montgomery Bank & Trust (MB&T). Price was then made a director of MB&T and put in charge of investing the bank’s capital. Over the next 18 months, PRICE stole, misappropriated, and embezzled over $21 million from MB&T. To cover up his fraud, Price provided MB&T officials with bogus account statements that falsely indicated the bank’s capital was safely held in an account at a financial services firm. As a result of Price’s alleged fraud upon MB&T, the bank’s cash assets and reserves were depleted.


U.S. Attorney Edward J. Tarver said, “Montgomery Bank & Trust is the 32nd FDIC-insured bank to fail in the nation this year and the 6th in Georgia. When bank failures are caused by the greed and criminal conduct of others, those responsible will be investigated and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law by our team of federal agents and prosecutors.”


Price has been missing for over three weeks. Anyone with information on Price’s whereabouts is urged to contact the FBI.


Price is charged with one count of bank fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison and a fine of up to $1,000,000. Tarver emphasized that an indictment is only an accusation and is not evidence of guilt. The defendant is entitled to a fair trial, during which it will be the government’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.


The indictment of Price arises out of an ongoing and joint investigation by FDIC-OIG Special Agent John Crawford; Federal Reserve Board OIG Special Agent Amy Whitcomb; and FBI Special Agent Ed Sutcliff. First Assistant United States Attorney James Durham is prosecuting the case for the United States.



	


	



			
				


			

			
The NSA – Great Power Politics and the Korean Security Dilemma during and after the Cold War
		
	
	

		
Washington, D.C., July 11, 2012 – A new book and newly-released documents illuminate the history of U.S. efforts to deal with the Korean security dilemma during and since the Cold War. Among the key “lessons learned” are the limits to the ability of Beijing or Moscow to influence North Korea and persuade it to adopt less provocative and destabilizing behavior and policies, and the challenges facing efforts by the United States, South Korea and Japan to work together to address this critical unresolved legacy of the Cold War.


These and related issues are the focus of the new book edited by National Security Archive Senior Fellow Robert A. Wampler, Trilateralism and Beyond: Great Power Politics and the Korean Security Dilemma During and After the Cold War (Kent State University Press), which will be the subject of a panel discussion at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on July 10, 2012.


The entwined political and security issues confronting Washington and its allies are also underscored in new documents, obtained by the Archive’s Korea Project and posted today. These documents include records of high-level meetings between President George H.W. Bush and Chinese and South Korean leaders, Department of Defense memoranda from the Carter years regarding the contentious issue of North Korea’s military capabilities, and a cable reporting on Secretary of Defense William Perry’s meeting with the South Korean Defense Minister during the 1994 nuclear crisis with North Korea.







Trilateralism and Beyond: Great Power Politics and the Korean Security Dilemma during and after the Cold War


Edited by Robert A. Wampler


Kent State University Press


July 6, 2012


 The National Security Archive is pleased to announce the publication of a new study that sheds light on the history of a critical Cold War flashpoint. 


  “A groundbreaking book on a vital and timely topic, one that gives a valuable historical perspective on the recurrent crisis on the Korean peninsula.” – Charles K. Armstrong, Director, Center for Korean Research, Columbia University   








President George H.W. Bush and President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea shake hands across the table during an expanded bilateral meeting in the Jiphyon Room of the Blue House, Seoul, Korea, January 6, 1992. This meeting took place against the backdrop of encouraging advances on the Korean Peninsula, marked by a more cooperative stance by Pyongyang on relations with South Korea and on opening up its nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. (Courtesy George Bush Presidential Library and Museum)		






The fall of the Berlin Wall more than two decades ago brought an end to the Cold War for most of the world. But the legacy of that era remains unresolved on the divided Korean peninsula, which still presents a clear danger for the United States and its allies. Two triangular alliances-one comprised of the United States, South Korea, and Japan, and the other of Russia, China, and North Korea-lie at the heart of the security challenge and all efforts to pursue a final peace treaty.


Trilateralism and Beyond brings together a collection of essays by leading American, South Korean, and Japanese scholars that probe the historical dynamics formed and driven by the Korean security dilemma. Drawing on newly declassified documents secured by the National Security Archive’s Korea Project, along with new archival resources in China and former Warsaw Pact countries, the contributors examine the critical relationships between the two triangular security relationships that pivot on the Korean peninsula. As Editor Robert A. Wampler says in his introduction:


“Taken together, these chapters provide a multifaceted analysis of the complex historical dynamics at the heart of the Korean security dilemma. The picture they draw is of broadening circles of relationships, starting at the central U.S.-South Korea security relationship and widening out to include Japan, then China and Russia and the perpetually enigmatic and maddening North Korea, whose actions have added several layers of complexity to Churchill’s famous description of Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” With their multiple perspectives on the common history of Korean peninsula diplomacy, the chapters provide what can be seen as a series of overlay maps that, when placed together, illuminate the linkages, goals, and assumptions regarding the two Koreas driving policy in the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. While there can be no real map to the future, a better understanding of the route by which the Korean security dilemma has reached its current state and an appreciation of the lessons to be learned from this history would seem critical, if not essential, for addressing this challenge in the years to come.”


Dr Wampler will host a panel discussion on the book with several of the contributors at the Woodrow Wilson Center International Center for Scholars (see information in “Event” tab).


Below is the Preface to Trilateralism and Beyond by Professor Akira Iriye of Harvard University. A selection of declassified documents that illustrate a number of the themes addressed by the authors in this book can be found at the “Documents” tab.


= = = = = = = = =




Foreword by Akira Iriye


 


[Copyright 2012 The National Security Archive Fund, Inc.]








President Clinton and President Kim Dae Jung, the White House, July 2, 1999. Kim, who owed his life to U.S. intervention with the South Korean government on two occasions, pursued his ‘Sunshine Policy’ of expanded engagement with North Korea while the U.S. sought to build on the 1994 Framework Agreement to end Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, linking the promise of diplomatic and trade relations to North Korea’s commitment to accelerate the dismantling of its nuclear program and to halt its missile program. (Courtesy William J. Clinton Presidential Library)		






The National Security Archive has been a pioneer among scholarly communities in its persistent and successful efforts to gain access to governmental documents and its sponsorship of international research projects in which declassified material forms the basis of historical inquiry. The present volume is a product of such a project, this time focusing on U.S. relations with the two Koreas. The Archive’s Korea Project brought together some of the world’s leading specialists, and their papers have been revised for publication. It is easy to see from the six essays included in this volume how important it is to have access to as much public record-of all countries-as possible and also why a historical perspective is a prerequisite to understanding contemporary issues.


The essays examine how the two Koreas, Japan, the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union (Russia) dealt with one another in the last decades of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first. Of these six countries, North Korea is perhaps unique in that, as Sergey Radchenko notes in his essay, its “policies, grievances, and demands . . . change very little” from decade to decade. This in sharp contrast to the other five countries where constant change would seem to have been their main characteristic, as clearly documented in the essays. What is equally important is that the world itself was significantly transformed in the last three decades of the twentieth century so that the old-fashioned game of geopolitics-the story of “the rise and fall of the great powers”-became less and less relevant. Instead, regional communities, transnational movements, and global networks of goods, capital, labor, and ideas came to provide the context in which nations sought to define, protect, and promote their interests. All countries with strong interests in, or concerns about, North Korea were aware of such changes, while the latter alone seemed to hold to its old ways. While most of the contributions in this volume focus on the security question, in particular the implications of North Korean’s nuclear armament for regional stability, they also touch on many other issues that always complicated the formulation of an appropriate response to that challenge.


In the first chapter, William Stueck traces the development of U.S. policy in the Korean peninsula in the framework of a six-party relationship, including Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. It is a complex story, but the author’s research finds that while most administrations in Washington have been eager to reduce U.S. commitments in Korea, this has proved very difficult because of North Korean’s unwillingness to cooperate. Although examined in the framework of regional security affairs, Stueck also mentions that from around 1989 the United States began to emphasize “the promotion of human rights and democratic values” among its objectives in the Pacific. This is not surprising in view of what appeared to be global democratization at that time, including the Chinese demonstrations at Tiananmen Square; but we can put it in an even larger framework, that of the growing importance of transnational, as against international, issues in the world at the end of the twentieth century, issues such as human rights, refugees, and global warming.


In that context, Seung-young Kim’s chapter on human rights makes a superb addition to the literature, showing that the promotion of democracy became a fundamental aspect of U.S. relations with South Korea during the 1970s and beyond. Particularly revealing is Kim’s discussion of the protest movement in South Korea against President Chun Doo-hwan that persisted throughout the 1980s, in which U.S. officials kept in close touch not only with the Korean military as well as opposition leaders but also with Chinese leaders. There were clearly global political developments in which all these countries became enveloped.


While the third essay in this book, Yasuyo Sakata’s study of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea security cooperation, focuses on geopolitical issues, it also touches on such topics as international aid to North Korea during its periods of food shortage and the alleged abduction of Japanese by North Korean agents, a human rights violation. Perhaps “human security,” the term that the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) began to use in the 1970s, might best describe the trilateral relationship. The next chapter, by Michael Chinworth, Narushige Michshita, and Taeyoung Yoon, brings the story of the sexangular relationship to the present and offers measured optimism about the possibility of renewed cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Even so, the authors stress that “communication . . . remains a problem” among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington.


The final two chapters expand the focus to examine Chinese and Russian diplomacy on the peninsula. Gregg Brazinsky examines China’s approach to North Korea, which, the author shows, became inseparable from the PRC’s overall relationship with the United States. The leadership in Beijing was determined to pursue its policy of modernization and globalization, which any crisis in the Korean peninsula would be sure to frustrate. In South Korea, too, China wanted to encourage political stability and “the country’s evolution toward democracy.” It may seem strange that a dictatorial regime in Beijing should encourage democratic government in South Korea, but it all fits into the theme of economic connections with the outside world. Here again, one sees the intrusion of larger forces on more traditional geopolitical strategies.


Given PRC’s growing involvement with South Korea, Pyongyang’s leaders not surprisingly turned to Moscow for assistance, a story that is presented in Radchenko’s chapter. He notes how isolated politically and intellectually North Korean leaders appeared to be when they visited the Soviet Union during the 1960s and the 1970s. They seemed to follow where their dogmatic ideology took them, and it was up to Soviet and Eastern European officials to disabuse them of some of their excessive ideas. They did succeed to some extent, but, as the essay suggests, the two countries’ paths diverged further in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.


Communication is a critical component of diplomatic efforts to address the security dilemmas on the Korean peninsula. If security were susceptible to “realistic” solutions, lack of communication would not matter. But in today’s interconnected world, mutual understanding is more than ever crucial, and one cannot enhance understanding by merely focusing on national security. We have to think in terms of the hundreds of thousands of Koreans, Japanese, Americans, Chinese, Russians, and many others who come into daily contact with one another all over the globe. It is ultimately they who must build the world of tomorrow.





	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Massachusetts Man Agrees to Plead Guilty to Plotting Attack on Pentagon and U.S. Capitol and Attempting to Provide Material Support to Terrorists
		
	
	

		


BOSTON—In a written agreement filed today in U.S. District Court in Boston, Rezwan Ferdaus, aka Dave Winfield, aka Jon Ramos, has agreed to plead guilty to attempting to damage and destroy a federal building by means of an explosive and attempting to provide material support to terrorists.


He has also agreed to a joint sentencing recommendation of 17 years in prison, followed by 10 years of supervised release. In exchange, the government has agreed to dismiss the remaining charges against Ferdaus at the time of sentencing. The parties have filed a joint motion asking the court to schedule a change-of-plea hearing. The plea agreement filed today is subject to review and acceptance by the district court. A date for the change-of-plea hearing has not yet been set.


In September 2011, Ferdaus, 26, was arrested in connection with his plot to damage or destroy the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol using large remote controlled aircraft filled with C-4 plastic explosives. He was later charged in a six-count indictment with attempting to damage and destroy a federal building by means of an explosive; attempting to damage and destroy national defense premises; receipt of explosive materials; receipt of possession of non-registered firearms (six fully automatic AK-47 assault rifles and three grenades); attempting to provide material support to terrorists; and attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (al Qaeda).


The government has previously alleged that in 2010, and continuing until his arrest, he planned to commit acts of violence against the United States. With the goal of terrorizing the United States, decapitating its “military center,” and killing as many “kafirs” (an Arabic term meaning non-believers) as possible, Ferdaus extensively planned and took substantial steps to bomb the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol using remote controlled aircraft filled with explosives.


On September 28, 2011, Ferdaus requested and instructed the undercover FBI employees (UCE) to deliver explosives and firearms (material represented to Ferdaus to contain 25 pounds of C-4 explosives, including approximately 1.25 pounds of actual C-4 explosives, three grenades, and six fully automatic AK-47 assault rifles) for his attack plan. While inspecting the explosives and firearms in the UCEs’ vehicle and inside his storage unit, Ferdaus placed some of the explosives inside a remote controlled aircraft that he had ordered and obtained for his attack plan. Ferdaus then locked the explosives and firearms in his storage unit, at which time he was placed under arrest.


Ferdaus, a Northeastern University graduate with a bachelor’s degree in physics, began designing and constructing detonation components for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) using mobile phones that were delivered to individuals whom he believed to be al Qaeda operatives. Ferdaus allegedly supplied 12 mobile phones, each of which had been modified to act as an electrical switch for an IED, to FBI undercover employees, who he believed were members of or recruiters for al Qaeda, to be used to kill American soldiers stationed overseas. On September 28, 2011, Ferdaus delivered four more detonation devices to individuals who he believed were al Qaeda operatives.


The public was never in danger from the explosive devices, which were closely monitored by the UCs. The defendant was under surveillance as his alleged plot developed and the UCs were in frequent contact with him. More information about the case, including the indictment, affidavit, and other public documents, can be viewed at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news.html.


First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts Jack Pirozzolo and Richard DesLauriers, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI-Boston Field Division, made the announcement today. Assistance was also provided by the Worcester, Ashland, and Framingham, Massachusetts Police Departments; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys B. Stephanie Siegmann and Donald L. Cabell of the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s Anti-Terrorism and National Security Unit.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Lance Armstrong Complaint Demands Doping Jury – Document
		
	
	

		


AUSTIN, Texas — With Lance Armstrong digging in for a legal fight, the US Anti-Doping Agency issued lifetime sports bans Tuesday to three former staff members and consultants on the cyclist’s winning Tour de France teams for drug violations.


Luis Garcia del Moral was a team doctor; Michele Ferrari was a consulting doctor; and Jose ‘‘Pepe’’ Marti (team trainer) worked for Armstrong’s US Postal Service and Discovery Channel squads. All had been accused by USADA of participating in a vast doping conspiracy on those teams during part or all of Armstrong’s seven Tour victories from 1999-2005.


Armstrong also has been charged and has declared his innocence.


Several hours after USADA announced its sanctions against the others, Armstrong’s attorneys refiled a lawsuit asking a federal judge in Austin to prevent the case against him from going forward.




US District Judge Sam Sparks had thrown out Armstrong’s initial 80-page complaint Monday, but invited him to submit a new one that was shorter, more to the point and less about his career and personal battles with anti-doping officials.


Armstrong’s attorneys refiled a 25-page suit arguing that USADA violates athletes’ constitutional rights, that the agency doesn’t have the jurisdiction to bring the charges and that it may have violated federal law in its investigation.


Armstrong wants the court to rule by Saturday, his deadline to either accept USADA’s charges and sanctions or send his case to arbitration.


An Armstrong spokesman declined immediate comment on the USADA bans issued Tuesday.


Under USADA rules, Moral, Marti and Ferrari had until Monday to challenge the allegations in arbitration or ask for a five-day extension. If they did not respond, USADA could impose sanctions.


Although none lives in the United States, USADA says the ban blocks them from participating in any sport that falls under the World Anti-Doping Agency code.


‘‘The respondents chose not to waste resources by moving forward with the arbitration process, which would only reveal what they already know to be the truth of their doping activity,’’ said Travis Tygart, chief executive of USADA.


There’s been no indication from USADA that any of the three men — who each received the agency’s maximum punishment — is cooperating with investigators.


Armstrong was granted his extension while he files his court case. Also charged and granted an extension was Armstrong’s former team manager, Johan Bruyneel.


Another team doctor, Pedro Celaya, also has been charged and faced the same Monday deadline.


.   .   .


Bradley Wiggins may have a firm grip on the yellow jersey after the first week of the Tour de France, but defending champion Cadel Evans isn’t so sure the British rider can keep up his relentless pace for the entire race without faltering.


Evans is nearly two minutes behind his main rival after losing time in Monday’s long time trial between Arc-et-Senans and Besancon in France’s eastern Doubs region, which Wiggins won to cap a flawless first week of racing.


But the Australian said Wiggins is still relatively untested in major races and is hoping his own experience will make the difference over the next two weeks, before the race ends in Paris on July 22.


‘‘If I was going to convince myself now he was unbeatable and unstoppable, well I might as well decide on second,’’ Evans said Tuesday during the Tour’s first rest day. ‘‘He doesn’t have much of a history over three weeks compared to someone like me.’’


Before triumphing on the Champs-Elysees last year, the 35-year-old Evans had twice finished second overall. Wiggins, achieved his best result on the Tour three years ago when he finished fourth.


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE


armstrong-tygart-018

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
The FBI unveils – Massive Ponzi Scheme Proves Age-Old Adage
		
	
	

		




United Kingdom hotel property




One of the United Kingdom hotel properties that victims of Martin Sigillito’s Ponzi scheme thought they were investing in.






If It’s Too Good to Be True…

Massive Ponzi Scheme Proves Age-Old Adage


07/09/12


If a respected member of your community offered you an investment opportunity, you might consider it. Especially if it’s a man of the cloth.


For nearly a decade, Martin Sigillito—a bishop in the American Anglican Convocation and a St. Louis attorney—convinced 200-plus people to do more than just consider it: they actually entrusted him with their money to invest in a financial venture. But this venture turned out to be an old-fashioned Ponzi scheme, and in April of this year, Sigillito was convicted of leading a conspiracy that swindled $52 million from victim investors.







How to Avoid Investment Fraud


– Don’t believe claims that there is no risk—there is always risk in any investment.


– Be careful of any investment opportunity that makes exaggerated earnings claims.


– Get all details about an investment opportunity in writing.


– Steer clear of “offshore” investments. These are often promoted as a way to avoid taxes, but you may still be liable for taxes, plus the investments can be very risky.


– Consult an unbiased third party, like an unconnected broker or licensed financial advisor, before investing.


– Take the time to check out investment offers by contacting your state’s securities regulator.


– Never put all of your “eggs” (investments) in one basket.








How the scam began. In late 2000, Sigillito opened a law office but didn’t actually practice law—instead, he advertised his “international business consulting services.” One of the “services” he offered was participation in the British Lending Program (BLP), transformed by Sigillito into a Ponzi scheme. Through the BLP, investors could “loan” money to a real estate developer in the United Kingdom for short periods of time, mostly one year, at high rates of return—between 10 and 48 percent.


This real estate developer, according to Sigillito, had a knack for spotting undervalued properties he could flip for a profit, had options on land that would become valuable when re-zoned, and had inside connections with British authorities. It sounded like a win-win for investors.


Unfortunately, this British developer was not the wunderkind Sigillito made him out to be—he was just another link in the criminal conspiracy.


How did Sigillito convince his investors to part with their money? He exploited his personal ties to people and particular groups he was affiliated with—like his church, social clubs, professional acquaintances, family, and neighbors—in a technique known as affinity fraud. He also held himself up as an expert in international law and finance and claimed he was a lecturer at Oxford University in England (when in reality he had simply taken part in a summer legal program at Oxford).






Phony loan agreements




Some of the more than 2,000 phony loan agreements seized after Sigillito’s arrest that were used along with bank records to identify victims and calculate losses.






Sigillito, who also conspired with another American attorney, insisted that his investors’ funds initially be placed into his trust account, from which he would take exorbitant fees for himself and his co-conspirators. Even though he told investors he would then transmit the money to the U.K., Sigillito actually kept most of the funds in one or more American bank accounts he controlled.


For a while, the scam was self-sustaining: Many investors let their interest payments accrue and rolled their loans over every year, plus Sigillito brought in enough new investors to make interest and principal payments to any previous investor who asked for payment. And all the while, he made enough in “fees” to support his affluent lifestyle: exclusive club memberships, expensive vacations, a country home, a chauffeur, private school for his kids, and collections of rare and antique books, maps, prints, coins, jewelry, and liquor.


How the scam ended. Eventually, an increasing number of investors meant increasing payout requirements, which resulted in the BLP making late interest payments or missing interest payments all together. Then investors began clamoring to withdraw their funds. And finally, Sigillito’s own assistant became suspicious of his activities and contacted the FBI.


The takeaway from this case? Fully investigate any investment opportunity before handing over your hard-earned money—see our sidebar for tips on how to avoid being victimized.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan: Key Bases and Figures of the Mujahideen
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/MCIA-MujahedinBases.png


 


Lor Koh and Islam Dara Canyon


Key Terrain and Leadership Data


Afghanistan’s Pashtun rural population has been the source of manpower, funds, shelter, support, and intelligence for the repeated insurgencies that have plagued that unfortunate county since their monarch, Zahir Shah, was overthrown in 1973. In the general unrest that followed, insurgents opposed Mohammad Daoud’s army until he was overthrown by the communists who served in succession – Taraki, Amin, Karmal, and Najibullah. The communist leadership figures, in turn, were deposed by the anti-communist “Seven Party Alliance” that was soon battling among itself for control of Kabul until the Taliban Movement emerged. The Taliban was also faced with resisting insurgent forces, primarily from the non-Pashtun ethnic groups inhabiting Afghanistan’s northern provinces. Afghanistan’s rural insurgents are generally poorly educated, if literate at all, and succeeding generations of insurgents rely upon story-telling from earlier generations of fighters to gain knowledge of tactics that are applicable to their particular culture and terrain. There are no military schools available to them where leadership training can be taught and absorbed, and as a result the lessons learned from far away battlefields are seldom applied in Afghanistan. They commonly use the same tactics, terrain, and base areas that were used successfully by their fathers and grandfathers. Their general tendency to utilize memorization – as they did while studying Islam in madrassas – reinforces their tendency toward repetition.


Consequently, a careful study of the history of insurgent operations in specific regions of Afghanistan may be especially valuable. Base areas, infiltration routes, river fords, hide sites, and ambush locations used successfully against the Soviet Union’s forces and their communist allies may be used by later insurgent generations who learned of these locations’ significance from storytelling by their mujahedin fathers.


Many of Helmand Province’s mujahedin who fought the Soviets are now affiliated with the current insurgents. They have the tendency to use base areas, infiltration routes, safe areas, and even the same ambush sites that were utilized in the past. In the case of the multiple bases they developed in Lor Koh, they are strategically positioned near Bakwa and Golestan districts, the key roads in the area, and the mountain canyons may now be used as base areas by the Taliban forces. The same is highly probable of a base called Islam Dara, situated in the Khakrez District in northern Kandahar Province. Together these two historical mujahedin bases form a historical operational precedent for Afghanistan’s insurgents in the south that cuts across the volatile region of Helmand Province.


Key leaders involved in the anti-Soviet jihad, or their sons and other family members, are probably still living in the region. Individuals currently involved with the Taliban are likely to be utilizing their same base areas, and those former mujahedin leaders now allied with the Government of Afghanistan probably know the locations used by their former colleagues.


Lor Koh in Farah Province A Key Mujahedin Base Area


Lor Koh is a large mountain located approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Farah city at 32° 31′ 29” N/062° 41′ 22” E2 [see map and satellite image on pages 5 and 6]. It was renamed Sharafat Koh, or Honor Mountain, by the mujahedin once they established bases in the mountain’s canyons. The mountain is roughly shaped with a plateau top rising approximately 1,500 meters above the desert floor. Lor Koh has steep slopes and its top is often covered with snow. There are many large and small canyons (kals) cutting into the mountain. Sheikh Razi Baba Canyon penetrates into the mountain’s north side. Kale-e Amani Canyon is located on the mountain’s northwestern side and is adjacent to Sheikh Razi Baba. On the west is Kale-e Kaneske Canyon, and continuing counterclockwise around the mountain, there is Jar-e Ab Canyon on the southwest end of the mountain that connects with the Kale-e Kaneske Canyon. The Tangira Canyon is found in the south and is the widest of the mountain’s canyons. It has the most water but the mujahedin avoided it because it was the only valley wide enough to allow the entry of armored vehicles. To the east and also opening south is the Khwaja Morad Canyon where the Khwaja Morad Shrine is located. All of the canyons are accessible from the mountain’s plateau. Lor Koh is about 12 kilometers from Highway 1 and 20 kilometers from Highway 517.


The mujahedin attacked convoys near Karvangah, Charah, and Shivan and the Soviets maintained posts at Karvangah, Charah, and Velamekh to protect the convoys. The mujahedin established their first base in Lor Koh in Tangira Canyon in 1979, but the organizing tribal groups, consisting of Achakzai, Noorzai, Barakzai, and Alizai tribes, moved to a new base in Jare-e Ab Canyon until the Soviets attacked them in 1980. Following this attack, the mujahedin moved to Kale-e Kaneske Canyon, the strongest base in the mountain.


The opening into Kale-e Kaneske Canyon is only two to three meters wide and is in solid rock. It is deep and requires 35 to 40 minutes to walk from the entrance to its end and the opening section is shielded from observation from above. It contains a stream, a waterfall, and trees and the canyon widens into a three or four hectare opening at the end of the canyon.


In 1985, tribal disputes over leadership and the disposition of spoils resulted in the mujahedin splitting. New insurgent bases occupied by members from various tribes were established in different valleys:


    

  • The Noorzai tribe’s mujahedin under Haji Abdul Kheleq moved into Sheikh Razi Baba Canyon.
    • 

  • The Mujahedin from the Alizai and Barakzai tribes under the leadership of Haji Ghulan Rasul Shiwani Rasul Akhundzada relocated to the Kale-e Amani Canyon.
    • 

  • Mawlawi Mohammad Shah and the mujahedin from the Achakzai tribe remained in the Kale-e Kaneske Canyon. Mohammad Shah’s deputy was Haji Nur Ahmad Khairkhaw.
    • 




	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Sensitive Information Security Sources
		
	
	

		
Sensitive Information Security Sources and Breaches


Unauthorized disclosures of secrets are essential for democracy.


In response to Wikileaks background inquiries Cryptome offers that there are hundreds of online and offline sources of sensitive information security breaches which preceded Wikileaks beginning about 120 years ago. This outline traces the conflict between technological capabilities for sensitive information breaches and control by law enforcement when technical countermeasures are insufficient — a few examples among many others worldwide:


Socrates (c.400BC, Socratic Method): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socrates


Electromagnetic Spying Timeline (Mid-late 1800’s): http://cryptome.org/tempest-time.htm


Peter Zenger Press Freedom Trial (1735): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Peter_Zenger


First Amendment of the US Constitution (1791): http://www.usconstitution.net/const.pdf


Alexander Graham Bell (1876): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Graham_Bell


UK Official Secrets Act (1889): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Official_Secrets_Act


Nikola Tesla (1894): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikola_Tesla


Guglielmo Marconi (1897): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guglielmo_Marconi


John Dewey (1903): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dewey


Ida Tarbell (1904 The History of the Standard Oil Company): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ida_M._Tarbell


US Espionage Act of 1917: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Espionage_Act_of_1917


UK Communications-Electronics Security Group (1919): http://www.cesg.gov.uk/


UK GCHQ: http://www.gchq.gov.uk/


American Civil Liberties Union (1920): http://www.aclu.org


UKUSA Agreement (1940): http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/ukusa.shtml


Echelon: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Echelon_(signals_intelligence)


Nicky Hager (1996): http://www.nickyhager.info/Mike Frost: http://www.converge.org.nz/abc/frostspy.htm


Duncan Campbell: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duncan_Campbell_(journalist)


http://cryptome.org/jya/echelon-dc.htm






Federation of American Scientists (1945): http://www.fas.org


Secrecy News (FAS kid): http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/Global Security (FAS kid): http://www.globalsecurity.org


Les Temps modernes (1945: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Les_Temps_modernes


National Security Act of 1947: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Act_of_1947


Central Intelligence Agency (1947): http://www.cia.gov


Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50IntelCentral Intelligence: Origin and Evolution: http://cryptome.org/cia-origin.htm


Philip Agee (1975; CIA kid): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Agee


CIA FOIA Documents: http://www.foia.cia.gov/


National Security Agency (1952): http://www.nsa.gov


Winslow Peck (1972; NSA kid): http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-elint.htmAnonymous AU (1973): http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-40k.htm


US Senate Church Report (1975): http://cryptome.org/nsa-4th.htm


NIST Information Technology Laboratory: http://www.nist.gov/itl/


US Navy The Onion Router: http://www.torproject.org/


NSA FOIA Documents: http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/index.shtml


Wayne Madsen Report: http://www.waynemadsenreport.com




Simone de Beauvoir (1949, The Second Sex): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Second_Sex


I. F. Stone’s Weekly (1953-67): http://www.ifstone.org/


Ralph Nader (1965): http://www.nader.org/


Noam Chomsky (1960s): http://www.chomsky.info/; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noam_Chomsky


The Internet (1960s): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet


Usenet Newsgroups (1980s): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_groupsWorld Wide Web (1989): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tim_Berners-Lee


Classified Networks: SIPRNet, .smil, .intel, .nsa, .fbi, et al


Hacking (1960s): http://pcworld.about.com/news/Apr102001id45764.htm


2600: http://www.2600.comChaos Computer Club (1985): http://www.ccc.de/


PHRACK: http://www.phrack.org/


Freedom of Information Act (1966): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_Information_Act_(United_States)


National Archives: http://www.archives.gov


Classified National Security Information: http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/eo-12958-amendment.htmlPresidential Libraries: http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/


The Federal Register: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/


Library of Congress: http://www.loc.gov


David Kahn (1967): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Kahn_(writer)


MapQuest (1967): http://www.mapquest.com


Urban Deadline (Cryptome precursor, 1968): http://cryptome.org/0001/cryptome-ud.htm


Seymour Hersh (1969): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seymour_Hersh


FTP (ARPANET, 1971): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_Transfer_Protocol


Email (ARPANET, 1973): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email


Electronic Surveillance 1972-1995: http://cryptome.org/esnoop.htm


Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein (1974): http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/exhibitions/web/woodstein/


Privacy Act (1974): http://www.gpoaccess.gov/privacyact/index.html


Personal Computer Invention (1976): http://www.ideafinder.com/history/inventions/compersonal.htm


Whitfield Diffie (1977): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whitfield_Diffie


Martin Hellman (1977): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Hellman


Ralph Merkle (1977): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ralph_Merkle


Ronald Rivest: http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Adi Shamir: http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/profile/scientists/shamir-profile.html


Len Adleman: http://www.usc.edu/dept/molecular-science/fm-adleman.htm


Philip Zimmerman PGP: http://philzimmermann.com/EN/findpgp/


GnuPG: http://www.gnupg.org/


OpenSSL: http://www.openssl.org/




Progressive Magazine Publishes H-Bomb Design 1979: http://www.progressive.org/images/pdf/1179.pdf


Disk Operating System (1980): http://www.ideafinder.com/history/inventions/compersonal.htm


James Bamford (1983): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Bamford


Forum on Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems (1985): http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks


Jeffrey T. Richelson (1985): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_T._Richelson


National Security Archive (1985): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/


Article 19 (1987): http://www.article19.org/


Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (1989): http://trac.syr.edu/


Public Interest Research (1989): http://www.namebase.org/staffbl.html


Namebase: http://www.namebase.org/Google Watch: http://www.google-watch.org


Wikipedia-Watch: http://www.wikipedia-watch.org


Electronic Frontier Foundation (1990): http://www.eff.org


Gopher (1991): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gopher_(protocol)


Lynx (1992): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lynx_(web_browser)


Cypherpunks Mail List (1992): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypherpunk


Crypto Rebels: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.02/crypto.rebels_pr.html


John Gilmore: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Gilmore_(activist)Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto: http://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html


Timothy C. May: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_C._May


Timothy C. May Cyphernomicon: http://www.cypherpunks.to/faq/cyphernomicron/cyphernomicon.html


Matt Blaze Crypto: http://www.crypto.com/


Marc Briceno: http://blog.pgp.com/index.php/author/mbriceno/


David Wagner: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/


Joel McNamara: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/ also:


Joel McNamara Tempest Page: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempest.html

http://www.kubieziel.de/blog/uploads/complete_unofficial_tempest_page.pdf


Cryptography (Cypherpunks kid): http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/maillist.html


James Dalton Bell (Cypherpunks Kid): Federal Correctional Institution Sheridan also:


Arrest: http://cryptome.org/jya/jimbell.htm

Trial: http://cryptome.org/jya/jdbfiles.htm


Carl Edward Johnson (Bell kid): http://cryptome.org/jya/cejfiles.htm


Cypherpunks Archives 1992-1998 http://cryptome.org/cpunks/cpunks-92-98.zip (83MB)


Cryptome (originally jya.com 1996; Cypherpunks kid): http://www.cryptome.org


Cartome (2001): http://www.cartome.orgEyeball Series (2002): http://cryptome.org/eyeball/index.html


UK Secret Bases: http://www.secret-bases.co.uk/Public Sources for Satellite and Aerial Photos and Maps: http://cryptome.org/gis-sources.htm


Wikileaks (2006; Cryptome “spiritual godkid”): http://www.wikileaks.org


Julian Assange on Cypherpunks 1995-2005: http://cryptome.org/0001/assange-cpunks.htm


Julian Assange Best of Security (1995): http://marc.info/?l=best-of-security&r=1&b=199507&w=2


http://www.cultural.com/web/security/mailing.lists/bos.html










Interesting-People Mail List (1993): http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/


Electronic Privacy Information Center (1994): http://www.epic.org


Quintessenz (1994): http://www.quintessenz.at/cgi-bin/index?funktion=about


AltaVista (1995): http://www.altavista.com


The Internet Archive (1996): http://www.archive.org (Generous links to online libraries)


UK Crypto Mail List (1996): http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/ukcrypto


Ben Laurie (Wikileaks Advisor): http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.htmlRoss Anderson: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/


Marcus Kuhn: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/


Adam Back Cypherspace: http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/


GSM Crypto Cracks (1997-2010): http://cryptome.org/0001/gsm-a5-files.htm


Terraserver USA (1998): http://www.terraserver-usa.com


Bing Maps (2009): http://www.bing.com/maps


Google (1998): http://www.google.com


Google Earth: http://earth.google.com/


Wikipedia (2001): http://www.wikipedia.org


Advanced Encryption Standard (2001): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard


USA PATRIOT Act (2001): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_act


NSA warrant-less surveillance (2001): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_warrantless_surveillance_controversy


Total Information Awareness (2002): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_information_awareness


Daniel Bernstein: http://cr.yp.to/djb.html


Bruce Schneier: http://www.schneier.com/


Cryptography Research: http://www.cryptography.com/


Ciphers by Ritter: http://www.ciphersbyritter.com/ (Generous links)


Cryptography Org: http://www.cryptography.org/ (Generous links)


Scribd: http://www.scribd.com


PGPBoard: http://www.pgpboard.com/


The Memory Hole: http://www.thememoryhole.org [Temporarily down]


ProPublica (June 2008): http://www.propublica.org/


Government Attic (longtime source of FOI to others): http://www.governmentattic.org/


Public Intelligence: http://publicintelligence.net/


Public Intelligence Blog: http://www.phibetaiota.net/ (Handy list of comsec and spy sites)


History Anarchy Blog: http://historyanarchy.blogspot.com/


WikiSpooks: http://www.wikispooks.com


Cryptocomb: http://cryptocomb.org


29 June 2012


Compedium of the ever-growing leak sites: http://leakdirectory.org/index.php/Leak_Site_Directory


7 July 2012


Project PM: Tracking the Spy Industry: http://wiki.echelon2.org/wiki/Main_Page


Anonymous Analytics: http://anonanalytics.com/


Par:AnoIA – Potentially Alarming Research: Anonymous Intelligence Agency: http://www.par-anoia.net/

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Three Defendants Plead Guilty to Disaster Fraud Related to Joplin Tornado Benefits
		
	
	

		






SPRINGFIELD, MO—David M. Ketchmark, Acting United States Attorney for the Western District of Missouri, announced today that three Joplin, Missouri residents have pleaded guilty in federal court, in separate and unrelated cases, to fraudulently receiving federal disaster benefits following the May 22, 2011 tornado.


Wanda Gail McBride, 51, of Joplin, pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Richard E. Dorr today to the charge contained in an April 3, 2012 federal indictment. McBride was taken into custody at the conclusion of her change of plea hearing. Ronald Martell Irby, 30, and Karen Marie Parks, 37, both of Joplin, also pleaded guilty to disaster fraud on Friday, July 6, 2012.


The defendants applied for federal disaster benefits by falsely claiming that their homes and property had been damaged or destroyed in the tornado. By pleading guilty, they admitted that they made materially false and fraudulent statements to FEMA in their applications for disaster benefits.


McBride falsely claimed that she was entitled to temporary rental assistance because she moved out of her home due to damage caused by the tornado and rented another residence. McBride was initially awarded $4,786 by FEMA for repairs to her residence, as well as $938 for rental assistance. McBride later submitted fraudulent documentation in order to receive $5,628 in additional rental assistance. McBride admitted today that she submitted two fabricated rental receipts with her application for FEMA rental assistance in July 2011. Later that month, she submitted a fabricated lease agreement for FEMA rental assistance at another address. McBride admitted that she had never moved to, resided at, signed a lease for, or paid rent at either address; in fact, neither address exists.


Irby listed 1823 W. 23rd St., Joplin, as his primary residence on a FEMA form in which he claimed the residence was damaged by the tornado. Irby received a total of $5,114 in FEMA payments and was provided with a temporary housing unit. However, Irby admitted today that this was never his primary residence. Rather, Irby’s girlfriend had been a one-time resident who was evicted prior to the tornado. Further, Irby himself had been banned from the property.


Parks listed 1502 S. Michigan Ave., Joplin, as her primary residence on a FEMA form in which she claimed the residence was damaged by the tornado. Parks received a payment of $1,368 from FEMA. However, Parks admitted today that she did not live at that address at the time of the disaster. Parks’s rent at another residence was paid through the Economic Security Rental Assistance Program, a state-funded program administered by the Jasper County Public Housing Agency, for individuals who were homeless and/or disabled. Because Parks did not pay her own rent, she was not eligible to receive rental assistance payments from FEMA.


Under federal statutes, each of the defendants is subject to a sentence of up to 30 years in federal prison without parole, plus a fine up to $250,000. A sentencing hearing will be scheduled after the completion of a presentence investigation by the United States Probation Office.


Disaster Fraud Hotline


Anyone with information about disaster fraud related to the Joplin tornado should call the National Center for Disaster Fraud hotline at 866-720-5721, the Joplin Police Department at 417-623-3131, or the FBI’s Joplin Office at 417-206-5700.


These cases are being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Steven M. Mohlhenrich. They were investigated by the FBI, Homeland Security Investigations-Office of Inspector General, and the Joplin, Missouri Police Department.









	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Cryptome Disclosures Anonymous
		
	
	

		
8 July 2012


Disclosures Anonymous


 




Step 1


Anybody — individual, government or institution can and should disclose — there are no requirements, no restrictions, using true or false identity, press officers or all the iterations of anonymous sources — commonplace or never before used.


Step 2


Call it what you like, The Truth, disclosure, leak, whistleblow, propaganda, lies, spy operation, official secrets, false flag, taking the king’s coin — best to create new, alluring and mesmerizing locutions.


Step 3


Disclose quietly with inscrutable understatement to be impossibly noticed then dramatically discovered through a strategic disclosure to select outlets, or with maximum exaggeration, publicity stunts, hired agencies, sock puppets, spookily covert or ostenatiously overt.


Step 4


Disclose from the inside or the outside or offside the rules of the game; don’t hesitate to preach, fabricate, prevaricate, embellish, distort, bombast, editorialize, repeat, hector, condemn, laud, headline, blare, bumper sticker, or stupefyingly frank and earnest.


Step 5


Calibrate with the topical or risk being overlooked; board bandwagons; ridicule and pretend to ignore competitors; declare highest and mightiest of principles with deepest grievance; advertise your pain and threats from gargantuan opposition; be ever ready to give media interviews with easy to understand quotes; offer pity to those who fail to grasp the importance of your disclosures; rue those who misquote you; say you forgive the ignorant who misunderstand you.


Step 6


Conspire, co-conspire, multi-conspire, mega-conspire; mimic the master conspiracists in major sources of public disclosure of invaluable information required to save nations and faiths against barbarous atheism — hyperbole without restraint.


Step 7


Join with those who bestow awards and recognition on the best of the disclosure championship breed, and condemn the mongrels, the nobodies, the fakers, the publicists, the apostates, with highest scorn for those who mock noble, selfless, high-risk disclosure.


Step 8


Form splinters to attack, demean and debunk main stream disclosers, in particular the recipients and grantors of awards for disclosure.


Step 9


Disclose insider secrets of disclosers, splinters, other insiders, leaders and spies, covert and overt funders, boosters and informants, their neglected families and jilted lovers.


Step 10


Originate a group (declare confidentiality for security its funding source, leaders or membership) to console former disclosers and those who believe they have been exploited by trusted, high-profile disclosers — target families, lovers and investors — invite and flatter documentarians and media profilers to get inside early to record the casualties’ disclosures.


Step 11


Disclose that the originated console group was a fraudulent sting to ensnare the disaffected as evidence disclosure is forever corrupt, dishonest, self-serving and under the sway and in the pay of sinister, unknown, powerful, ancient and new-ly camouflaged fronts for amoral manipulators. Up ratchet the disclosure deception, critique and historicize it with other confidence exploits ancient and modern.


Step 12


Prepare and distribute a prospectus and contract terms for a Disclosures Anonymous series for the bottomless pocketed NGOs and vulture capitalists; for entertainment and cyberwar industries; for the UN, foreign ministries, spy agencies, foreign and military aid agencies, and propagandists; the educational and conferencing industries; for aggregators, siphons and SM; for persistant advertising attackers; for hacktivists, FOI and cellphone warriors; above all for the flocks of all ages and places being educated, intimidated and counseled to be law abiding, keep quiet, be obedient. patriotic and trust authority. Tip Disclosures Anonymous to the grandiloquizers and anonymous sources combine.


Expect a brief publicity spark but no overt takers of the prospectus with a few of the usual criminally covert,  but that the series will be stolen, plagiarized, given away or blackmarketed until expropriated for authoritarian makeover and certified as officially tax-worthy.


Within the amply fertilized Disclosures Anonymous series plant a sub-rosa disclosure exploit to bare secrets of disclosure manipulations.


Like this: Unauthorized disclosures of secrets are essential for democracy.

	


	



			
				


			

			
Cryptome- Wikileaks Central/Guantanamo/Khadr Interviews
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/USA-USMC-GRMP.png


 


The PM RS JPO initiated development of an integrated GRMP in response to direction from senior Army and Marine Corps leadership in 2005. The GRMP is intended to provide Army and Marine Corps ground robotic stakeholders a common information resource document, as well as a comprehensive plan that links robotic S&T Projects and Acquisition/Contingency Programs to User Current Capability Gaps, Future Capability Gaps, and S&T Shortfalls. The pressing need for reliable ground robotic systems capable of detecting and warning of the presence of hidden improvised explosive devices (IEDs), chemical and biological agents, and related threats to ground troops employed by insurgents in combat zones greatly increases the importance of making every S&T dollar count toward filling critical User capability gaps. In addition, the GRMP provides decision makers a tool for making critical resource decisions.


The RS JPO has recognized from the beginning that development of the GRMP would be an evolutionary process because of the diversity and complexity of the task. For instance, many stakeholders are involved in Army/Marine Corps ground robotics, including Users, materiel developers, S&T developers, sustainers, and industry. A variety of missions are supported, including mine and area clearance, chemical/biological agent detection, surveillance and reconnaissance, area obscuration, force protection and direct fire/indirect fire, among numerous others. GRMP V3 moves the development process further along the evolutionary path.


Management of the development of and updates to the GRMP utilizes the management framework shown in Figure 2-1. The Maneuver, Maneuver Support and Combat Service Support CIPTs met in work sessions in Huntsville to develop inputs for Version 3 during the March 2007 conference. As was done for Version 2 in June 2006, each CIPT identified the Acquisition/Contingency Programs and S&T Projects that were applicable to User capability gaps within their mission area. The CIPTs then assessed and assigned criticality ratings to Acquisition/Contingency Programs and S&T Projects identified as applicable to User capability gaps. Applicability and criticality assessment data provide the basis for generation of the TATM Process and Tool Suite outputs shown in this updated GRMP V3.


…




 


 

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
Cryptome – Who’s Who at WikiLeaks
		
	
	

		
Who’s Who at WikiLeaks


 




A sends:


See here a story entitled: “Who’s Who at Wikileaks?” where you are quoted as saying:


— Young finally quit the organization on January 7, 2007. His final words: “Wikileaks is a fraud… working for the enemy” —


Is this quotation correct and do you still stand by the statement? Would you like to clarify who is “the enemy”?


The East and associated interests?


Cryptome:


I did not “quit” WikiLeaks, I was unsubscribed from its private mail list for disputing grandiose ambition. And am still disputing that unfortunate promotional aspect of WikiLeaks, a widespread defect of information providers of all stripes. “Who’s Who at WikiLeaks” is itself a promotional gambit of the defective means to garner attention with a grandiose headline and slanted research. That is, the enemy.


This is the full message from which the quote was cobbled:


http://cryptome.org/wikileaks/wikileaks-leak.htm[This message was not distributed by the closed wikileaks list.]


To: Wikileaks <wikileaks[a t]wikileaks.org>

From: John Young <jya[a t]pipeline.com>

Subject: Re: [WL] Funding / who is on this list.

Date: Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2007 11:47:00 -0500


Cryptome is publishing the contents of this list, and how I was induced to serve as US person for registration.


Wikileaks is a fraud:


[This is a restricted internal development mailinglist for w-i-k-i-l-e-a-k-s-.-o-r-g.

Please do not mention that word directly in these discussions; refer instead to ‘WL’.

This list is housed at riseup.net, an activist collective in Seattle with an established lawyer

and plenty of backbone.]


Fuck your cute hustle and disinformation campaign against legitimate dissent. Same old shit, working for the enemy.


The enemy are those who set up and participate in false public interest initiatives to mislead the public, a very ancient practice of power groups who sponsor dissidents to serve as controlled opposition. CIA and most if not all national intelligence agencies (and their host governments) engage in this practice by supporting NGOs, individuals, churches, universities, think tanks, media outlets, including so-called alternative outlets, anti-war initiatives, indeed, it is prudent to consider any long-lived group as having been either set up by authorities or co-opted once successful (usually through favorable tax treatment and funding). It is a difficult task to sort out who is complicit and who is not due to the quick adoption by covert operations of the honest groups means and methods.


Not all members of honest groups know what their organizations are being used for. When they learn the truth they become premier leakers. However, leaks are often deliberate deceptions, so the challenge is to be wary but not crippled by paranoia.


WikiLeaks is not the first nor the last which will be accused of complicity with the authorities. The analysis of “Who’s Who at WikiLeaks” could be applied to hundreds of other public interest groups. Not all have benefited from as many insiders leaking as WikiLeaks, nor have as many had to shift their policy and procedures in response to leaks.


I told the WikiLeaks mail list in December 2006 WL would face leaks itself, smears, attacks, betrayals. That has come to pass, my leaks merely the first and many more will follow.


WikiLeaks has matured sufficiently to exploit opposition, in the manner of the enemy it ostensibly fights.


None of this message is private — but the file headline smells like formulaic propaganda.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
THE FBI – Woodbridge Gang Member Sentenced to 120 Months for Role in Sex Trafficking High School Girls
		
	
	

		


ALEXANDRIA, VA—Michael Tavon Jefferies, aka “Loc,” 21, of Woodbridge, Virginia, was sentenced today to 120 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release, for his role as a bodyguard for a gang-led prostitution business that recruited and trafficked high school girls.


Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of Virginia; Colonel David Rohrer, Fairfax County Chief of Police; and Ronald T. Hosko, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office Criminal Division, made the announcement after sentencing by United States District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.


On April 12, 2012, Jefferies pled guilty to sex trafficking of a juvenile. According to court records, Jefferies was a member of the Underground Gangster Crips (UGC) set based in Fairfax County, Virginia, and he assisted the gang in sex trafficking of juveniles and adults from about November 2011 to January 2012. He served as a bodyguard for the UGC prostitution enterprise and collected the proceeds received from prostitution, providing a portion to another member of UGC and keeping a portion for himself. Jefferies also paid for an advertisement on Backpage.com to solicit customers and paid for hotel rooms for one of the juvenile prostitutes.


This case was investigated by the Fairfax County Police Department and the FBI’s Washington Field Office, with assistance from the Northern Virginia Human Trafficking Task Force. Virginia Assistant Attorney General and Special Assistant United States Attorney Marc Birnbaum and Assistant United States Attorney Inayat Delawala are prosecuting the case on behalf of the United States.


Founded in 2004, the Northern Virginia Human Trafficking Task Force is a collaboration of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies—along with non-governmental organizations—dedicated to combating human trafficking and related crimes.


A copy of this press release may be found on the website of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia at http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director in Charge Announce the Arrest of Full Tilt Poker CEO Raymond Bitar
		
	
	

		


Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Janice K. Fedarcyk, the Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that Raymond Bitar, the chief executive officer of Full Tilt Poker, was arrested this morning at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Bitar was charged last year with gambling, bank fraud, and money laundering offenses in connection with the operation of Full Tilt Poker. Upon Bitar’s return to the United States today, a superseding indictment was unsealed charging Bitar with defrauding poker customers by lying to them about the security of their funds. Also named in the superseding indictment is co-defendant Nelson Burtnick, the head of Full Tilt Poker’s payment processing department, who was originally charged on April 15, 2011. Among other things, Bitar is charged with promising players that their funds would be protected in “segregated” accounts, when the company actually used them to pay for Full Tilt operations and to pay Bitar and other owners over $430 million. As a result of Bitar’s alleged fraud, Full Tilt Poker was unable to pay the approximately $350 million it owed to players in the U.S. and around the world. Bitar appeared before U.S. Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman this afternoon.


Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said, “With today’s arrest and the new charges brought against him, Raymond Bitar will now be held criminally responsible for the alleged fraud he perpetrated on his U.S. customers that cost them hundreds of millions of dollars. The indictment alleges how Bitar bluffed his player-customers and fixed the game against them as part of an international Ponzi scheme that left players empty-handed.”


FBI Assistant Director in Charge Janice K. Fedarcyk said, “Bitar and Full Tilt Poker persisted in soliciting U.S. gamblers long after such conduct was outlawed. As alleged, Bitar has already been charged with defrauding banks to conceal the illegal gambling. Now he stands accused of defrauding Full Tilt’s customers by concealing its cash-poor condition and paying off early creditors with deposits from later customers. The online casino become an Internet Ponzi scheme.”


The following allegations are based on the superseding indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court, the indictment unsealed on April 15, 2011 in which Bitar was initially charged, other documents previously filed in the case, and statements made in court:


In late 2006, Congress enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), making it a crime to “knowingly accept” most forms of payment “in connection with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling.” Notwithstanding the enactment of UIGEA, Full Tilt Poker—a company founded by professional poker players in the U.S. in 2004—continued to offer Internet gambling to U.S. residents and took in an estimated $1 billion from U.S. residents through April 15, 2011. Because U.S. banks were largely unwilling to process payments for illegal Internet gambling, Bitar and co-defendant, Burtnick, relied on fraudulent means designed to trick U.S. banks by disguising payments to Full Tilt Poker as payments unrelated to Internet gambling.


In order to encourage players to deposit money with Full Tilt Poker, Bitar directed Full Tilt Poker employees to falsely assure potential customers that player deposits would be held in segregated accounts that would be kept separate and distinct from the company’s operating accounts. In fact, Full Tilt Poker did not protect player funds in segregated accounts, and instead, used them for whatever purposes Bitar directed, including to pay him and other owners millions of dollars. Because player funds were being used to cover operating expenses, Full Tilt Poker experienced an increasing shortfall between the cash it had in its bank accounts and the money it owed to players. For example, by early November 2010, Full Tilt Poker owed its customers approximately $344 million but had only approximately $145 million in all of its bank accounts. To conceal this financial shortfall, Bitar directed Full Tilt Poker employees to misrepresent how much cash the company had on hand. Among other things, Full Tilt Poker allegedly lied about its finances to its regulator, the Alderney Gambling Control Commission.


Further, to prevent players from learning about Full Tilt Poker’s shaky finances and to induce them to continue gambling with Full Tilt Poker, Bitar allegedly concocted a scheme in which Full Tilt Poker players were led to believe they were gambling real money when, in actuality, they were gambling with “phantom” online credits. As explained in greater detail in the superseding indictment, in the fall of 2010, Full Tilt Poker lost its ability to reliably collect deposits from U.S. bank accounts. Rather than terminate its U.S. operations—an option that would likely have exposed the fact that Full Tilt Poker was not holding player cash in segregated accounts and was holding less than half of the money it owed players—Bitar and Burtnick arranged for Full Tilt Poker to continue approving player deposits and to award credit to depositors even though Full Tilt Poker had not actually collected the money from players and had no ability to do so. As United States players gambled and won or lost these phantom funds—ultimately totaling over $130 million—Full Tilt Poker would list the phantom funds on players’ online account statements, even though the funds were never collected or available to pay the winning players.


Only weeks before U.S. law enforcement took action against Full Tilt Poker in April 2011, Full Tilt Poker’s internal financial statements reported $390 million in debts to players but only $60 million in its bank accounts. Following the law enforcement action, as players around the world began demanding their funds from Full Tilt Poker, rather than suspend operations, Bitar lured players to continue gambling with Full Tilt Poker by continuing to promise them that their funds were safe. In actuality, Bitar was using new customer deposits to pay off some of the backlog of player requests to withdraw funds and to cover the company’s operating expenses, including salary for Burtnick and himself. In effect, Full Tilt Poker operated what was, by then, nothing more than a Ponzi scheme. When the scheme finally collapsed, Full Tilt Poker was unable to pay players the approximately $350 million it owed them.


* * *


The superseding indictment charges Bitar, 40, with nine counts. A chart containing a description of the charges and their maximum penalties is below. If convicted on all counts for which he is charged, Bitar faces a maximum sentence of 145 years in prison.


Mr. Bharara thanked the FBI for its outstanding work in the investigation, which he noted is ongoing. He also thanked Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations New York and New Jersey Offices for their continued assistance in the investigation.


Bitar is the seventh of the 11 defendants charged in connection with the original Internet poker indictment to have been arrested. The others arrested to date—Bradley Franzen, Ryan Lang, Ira Rubin, Brent Beckley, Chad Elie, and John Campos—have each pled guilty and await sentencing with the exception of Campos, who was sentenced in June 2012 to three months in prison. Charges are still pending against the remaining four defendants—Burtnick, Isai Scheinberg, Paul Tate, and Scott Tom—who are at large, and are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.


This matter is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Arlo Devlin-Brown, Nicole Friedlander, and Niketh Velamoor are in charge of the criminal case, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sharon Cohen Levin, Jason Cowley, Andrew Goldstein, and Michael Lockard are in charge of related civil money laundering and forfeiture actions.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE – TOP-SECRET – Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Decade of War
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/JCOA-Decade-of-War.png


The year 2001 began with the inauguration of a United States (US) president deliberately aiming to shift the use of the military away from the numerous humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions of the 1990s toward responding to and defeating conventional threats from nation states. The mood was optimistic, with the new US national security strategy citing widespread financial prosperity and no sense of an imminent threat to the homeland. But this situation proved to be fragile: the events of a single day, September 11, altered the trajectory of the US and the way it used its military over the next decade. A national strategy that had focused on countering regional aggressors and sophisticated attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was now confronted by an enemy that attacked the homeland with low technology in asymmetric and unexpected ways—individuals armed with box-cutters using hijacked civilian aircraft.


In the decade following 9/11, it became evident that the Cold War model that had guided foreign policy for the previous 50 years no longer fit the emerging global environment. Key changes included:


    

  • A shift from US hegemony toward national pluralism
    • 

  • The erosion of sovereignty and the impact of weak states
    • 

  • The empowerment of small groups or individuals
    • 

  • An increasing need to fight and win in the information domain
    • 



In the midst of these changes, the US employed its military in a wide range of operations to address perceived threats from both nation-state and terrorist groups; to strengthen partner nation militaries; to conduct humanitarian assistance operations; and to provide defense support of civil authorities in catastrophic incidents such as Hurricane Katrina. This wide range of operations aimed to promote and protect national interests in the changing global environment.


In general, operations during the first half of the decade were often marked by numerous missteps and challenges as the US government and military applied a strategy and force suited for a different threat and environment. Operations in the second half of the decade often featured successful adaptation to overcome these challenges. From its study of these operations, JCOA identified overarching, enduring lessons for the joint force that present opportunities for the US to learn and improve, best practices that the US can sustain, and emerging risk factors that the US should address. These lessons were derived from JCOA’s 46 studies during this past decade and vetted through the Joint Staff J7-sponsored Decade of War working group in May 2012; input from working group members was consolidated into this report. This initial effort is envisioned to be the first volume in a sustained, multi-phased effort to identify critical, high-level lessons for the joint force.


The Volume I report of the Decade of War study discusses the eleven strategic themes that arose from the study of the enduring lessons and challenges of the last decade:


    

  • Understanding the Environment: A failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals.
    • 

  • Conventional Warfare Paradigm: Conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing leaders to realign the ways and means of achieving effects.
    • 

  • Battle for the Narrative: The US was slow to recognize the importance of information and the battle for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; it was often ineffective in applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states.
    • 

  • Transitions: Failure to adequately plan and resource strategic and operational transitions endangered accomplishment of the overall mission.
    • 

  • Adaptation: Department of Defense (DOD) policies, doctrine, training and equipment were often poorly suited to operations other than major combat, forcing widespread and costly adaptation.
    • 

  • Special Operations Forces (SOF) – General Purpose Forces (GPF) Integration: Multiple, simultaneous, large-scale operations executed in dynamic environments required the integration of general purpose and special operations forces, creating a force-multiplying effect for both.
    • 

  • Interagency Coordination: Interagency coordination was uneven due to inconsistent participation in planning, training, and operations; policy gaps; resources; and differences in organizational culture.
    • 

  • Coalition Operations: Establishing and sustaining coalition unity of effort was a challenge due to competing national interests, cultures, resources, and policies.
    • 

  • Host-Nation Partnering: Partnering was a key enabler and force multiplier, and aided in host-nation capacity building. However, it was not always approached effectively nor adequately prioritized and resourced.
    • 

  • State Use of Surrogates and Proxies: States sponsored and exploited surrogates and proxies to generate asymmetric challenges.
    • 

  • Super-Empowered Threats: Individuals and small groups exploited globalized technology and information to expand influence and approach state-like disruptive capacity.
    • 



In this report, we briefly summarize each of these strategic themes and provide recommendations for the joint force.


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL REPORT HERE


JCOA-Decade-of-War

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Defendant is 22nd Charged in Connection With $1 Billion Scheme
		
	
	

		


Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Martin J. Dickman, Inspector General of the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB-OIG), Janice K. Fedarcyk, the Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Barry L. Kluger, Inspector General of the New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA-OIG), announced charges today against Donald Alevas, the former LIRR director of shop equipment, engineering, and environmental compliance, in connection with his participation in a massive fraud scheme in which Long Island Railroad (LIRR) workers allegedly claimed to be disabled upon early retirement so that they could receive disability benefits to which they were not entitled. Alevas was arrested this morning and will be presented in Manhattan federal court before U.S. Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman this afternoon. He is the 22nd person to be charged in connection with this scheme. Other defendants include two doctors and an office manager for one of the doctors who were allegedly involved in falsely diagnosing retiring LIRR workers as disabled; two “facilitators” who allegedly served as liaisons between retiring workers and the participating doctors; and 18 LIRR retirees, one of whom was also charged as a facilitator.


Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said, “As today’s arrest makes abundantly clear, our investigation of the massive fraud that was allegedly perpetrated on the LIRR and that cost it hundreds of millions of dollars in potentially fraudulent benefits is very much ongoing. It should also make clear that we will prosecute those against whom we believe we have the evidence to prove that they received benefits to which they were not entitled—Donald Alevas makes that number 22, and he will not be the last. We strongly encourage any LIRR retiree who lied to get disability benefits to come forward and participate in the voluntary disclosure program while they still have the chance.”


RRB-OIG Inspector General Martin J. Dickman said, “My office, in partnership with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, remains committed to the investigation and prosecution of individuals who have submitted false information to the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board. The recent arrest is a testament to the tireless commitment of the dedicated professionals assigned to this ongoing investigation. I applaud their outstanding efforts and thank them for their unwavering resolve.”


FBI Assistant Director in Charge Janice K. Fedarcyk said, “Mr. Alevas is the latest LIRR retiree to be charged with engineering a generous but fraudulent disability pension. He joins nearly two dozen others previously charged with serious crimes in connection with the ongoing investigation. We know he will not be the last. We encourage others to take advantage of the voluntary disclosure program rather than end up in handcuffs facing prison time.”


MTA-OIG Inspector General Barry L. Kluger said, “Once again, I wish to thank U.S. Attorney Bharara, his staff, and our other partners in this ongoing investigation and prosecution for their dedication to combating pension fraud. The voluntary disclosure program previously announced by the U.S. Attorney, the Long Island Railroad, and the federal Railroad Retirement Board, and extended today, remains a fair but still limited opportunity, in the public interest, for individuals who fraudulently obtained federal disability pensions to come forward, admit their wrongdoing, and thereby avoid the harsh reality of arrest and criminal prosecution. We again strongly advise all such individuals to do so now before their time runs out.”


The LIRR Disability Fraud Scheme


The following allegations are based on public filings in the LIRR cases, including the complaint against Alevas unsealed today, as well as statements made in open court:


The RRB is an independent U.S. agency that administers benefit programs, including disability benefits, for the nation’s railroad workers and their families. A unique LIRR contract allows employees to retire at the relatively young age of 50 if they have been employed by the LIRR for at least 20 years. It is the only commuter railroad in the United States that offers a retirement pension at that age. Eligible employees are entitled to receive a LIRR pension, which is a portion of the full retirement payment for which they are eligible at 65. At 65, they also receive an RRB pension. If an LIRR worker retires at 50, he or she will receive less than his or her prior salary and substantially lower pension payments than those to which they will be entitled at 65. However, an LIRR employee who retires and claims disability may receive a disability payment from the RRB on top of their LIRR pension, regardless of age. A retiree’s LIRR pension, in combination with RRB disability payments, can be roughly equivalent to the base salary earned during his or her career.


Hundreds of LIRR employees have exploited the overlap between the LIRR pension and the RRB disability program by pre-planning the date on which they would falsely declare themselves disabled so that it would coincide with their projected retirement date. These false statements, made under oath in disability applications, allowed LIRR employees to retire as early as age 50 with an LIRR pension, supplemented by the fraudulently obtained RRB disability annuity. From 2004 through 2008, 61 percent of LIRR employees who claimed an RRB benefit were between the ages of 50 and 55, and each received a disability award. In contrast, only 7 percent of employees at Metro-North who stopped working and received disability benefits during the same time period were between the ages of 50 and 55.


Three New York-area doctors accounted for 86 percent of the LIRR disability applications filed prior to 2008: Peter J. Ajemian, Peter Lesniewski, and a third unnamed doctor (“Disability Doctor-3”), who is recently deceased. Ajemian, his office manager, Maria Rusin, and Lesniewski used their respective medical practices as “disability mills,” preparing fraudulent medical narratives for LIRR retirees well before the employees’ planned retirement dates so that the narratives could be submitted to the RRB upon retirement. These medical narratives were fabricated or grossly exaggerated in order to recommend a set of restrictions that, if legitimate, would render it impossible for the LIRR employees to continue in their occupations. Many of the purportedly “objective” findings from the tests they conducted showed nothing more than normal degenerative changes one would expect to see in patients within the relevant age bracket.


Alevas’s Fraud


Donald Alevas was the director of shop equipment, engineering and environmental compliance at the LIRR. On or about November 1, 2008—roughly one month after his 50th birthday—Alevas retired from the LIRR, claiming that he had an occupational disability and that he had become disabled as of August 30, 2008. In so doing, Alevas ensured that each year he would receive tens of thousands of dollars in additional benefits. For example, in 2010, Alevas received approximately $55,590 in LIRR pension payments and approximately $33,600 in RRB disability payments, for a total of $89,190. Those payments nearly matched the salary he received in his final year working for the LIRR.


Alevas long planned to retire in November 2008, and it was only as that retirement date drew closer that he began seeing doctors or indicating that he had any disability affecting his work. At least as early as January 2007, Alevas asked for pension estimates based on a “planned retirement date” of November 1, 2008. Thereafter, Alevas exchanged e-mails with a co-conspirator about his plan to become disabled as of August 30, 2008, and asked how he should handle telling LIRR that he was disabled. Alevas also began consulting with Dr. Peter Ajemian in December 2007 and paid him to falsely claim that he suffered from a variety of disabilities, including hearing loss and neck and back pain. As further proof of Alevas’s deliberate scheme, the medical notes upon which he ultimately relied to claim his total disability were written in connection with a medical examination by Dr. Ajemian that never even occurred. Specifically, records from Ajemian’s medical practice include “notes” memorializing his examination of Alevas on October 28, 2008, at which time he described Alevas’s need to take disability leave because of “neck and back pain.” However, Ajemian had stopped working at that medical practice in September 2008, so the notes were a fiction that were timed to justify his planned retirement.


At the same time Alevas was developing a record to support his disability claim so that he could receive RRB disability benefits, he was also building a record that would qualify him for private disability insurance. Specifically, in August 2007, he submitted an application to a private insurer in which he stated that he was not disabled. He also informed a different doctor—at the same time he was seeing Ajemian—that he had “started side jobs in his home” including “handy-man and small construction work.” Alevas’s plan was to collect disability benefits from both the RRB and his private insurance policy.


Extension of the Voluntary Disclosure and Disposition Program


On May 22, 2012, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, in partnership with the RRB and the LIRR, announced a voluntary disclosure and disposition program. Under the program, the U.S. Attorney’s Office would agree not to prosecute, or file a civil action against, any LIRR retiree who voluntarily comes forward and admits that he or she obtained RRB disability benefits by making false and/or misleading statements to the RRB, and agrees to give up his or her right to certain RRB disability benefits. In addition, the RRB would agree not to commence any administrative proceedings seeking the repayment of any disability benefits that are the subject of this program, and the LIRR would agree not to seek forfeiture of LIRR Company Pension Plan(s) benefits. Under the Early Version of the program, any participating LIRR retiree would have to give up his or her right to future disability benefits, while under the Standard Version of the program, any participating LIRR retiree would have to give up not only future disability benefits, but 50 percent of the RRB disability benefits he or she has already received.


At the time of the original announcement, the deadline for participation in the Early Program was July 6, 2012. In light of continuing inquiries received by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, as well as the need to ensure that all eligible LIRR retirees have sufficient time to make an informed decision, the deadline for the Early Version of the program will now be September 14, 2012. The deadline for the Standard Version of the program will now be October 15, 2012.


***


Alevas, 53, of Patchogue, New York, faces one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and health care fraud, and one count of mail fraud. Each charge carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.


Manhattan U.S. Attorney Bharara praised the RRB-OIG, the FBI, and the MTA-OIG for their outstanding work in the investigation, which he noted is ongoing. He also acknowledged the previous investigation conducted by the New York State Attorney General’s Office into these pension fraud issues.


The Office’s Complex Frauds Unit is handling the case. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Edward A. Imperatore and Tatiana Martins are in charge of the prosecution.


Peter J. Ajemian, Peter Lesniewski, Maria Rusin, Marie Baran, Joseph Rutigliano, Joseph Rutigliano, Gregory Noone, Regina Walsh, Sharon Falloon, Gary Satin, Steven Gagliano, Richard Ehrlinger, Brian Delgiorno, Philip Pulsonetti, Gregory Bianchini, Franklin Plaia, Michael Stavola, Michael Dasaro, Karl Brittell, Kevin Nugent, Gary Supper, and Thomas Delalla were previously charged in connection with the LIRR disability fraud scheme. The charges against them remain pending and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.



	


	



			
				


			

			
EDITORIAL – STATUS Q2 2012
		
	
	

		


Dear Readers,


I have gotten many requests and mails.


Please understand


– I am in vacation


– I can not trust German Authorities as they do not trust themselves (see NSU – complex and President  Gaucks statement)


– I can not solve German problems and I do not want to do – even to try this because of possible corruption and old corrupt networks


– What I can do is to inform the international business community what is going on in Germany and I sure will do


– As long as the Germans themselves do not fight “GoMoPa”  and their allies – and even some State bureaucrats support them


you will suffer the consequences


Think about it!


Sunny vacations


My best regards


Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium Publiztik, Germanistik, Comparatisk.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
SECRET from the FBI – Father and Son Charged in HSI Agent Shooting
		
	
	

		


MCALLEN, TX—Pedro Alvarado, 41, and Arnoldo Alvarado, 18, have been arrested and charged with the assault of a Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agent, United States Attorney Kenneth Magidson announced today. The Hargill, Texas men are currently in custody and expected to appear before U.S. Magistrate Judge Peter Orsmby this morning at 10:30 a.m.


‪


The criminal complaint was filed just minutes ago in McAllen, Texas. Both are charged with assault of a federal officer and knowingly using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.‬


“The announcement of these arrests related to the shooting of our HSI special agent is a testament to the close cooperation among our law enforcement partners,” said Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director John Morton. “We are encouraged by this action to bring these criminals to justice. We continue to keep the agent and his family in our prayers during his road to recovery.”‬


‪‬


‪On July 3, 2012, HSI special agents were conducting surveillance in anticipation of a narcotics transaction believed to be occurring near Hargill. While parked in his official vehicle near the intersection of Farm to Market 493 and Cemetery Road, an HSI agent was allegedly approached by another vehicle from which shots were fired. According to the criminal complaint, the agent proceeded north, and the second vehicle pursued him and continued shooting. The agent then lost control of his vehicle, at which time additional agents arrived and discovered the agent had been shot one time in the back.‬


‪HSI special agents then conducted a consent search at a residence in Hargill and encountered Pedro Alvarado and his son, Arnoldo Alvarado, who were then taken into federal custody for further questioning. A third person, a minor, was also identified in relation to the crime and was turned over to state authorities.‬


‪The penalty range for assault on federal officer is up to 20 years in prison and a fine up to $250,000, upon conviction. The Alvarados also face a minimum of 10 years and up to life in prison as well as a $250,000 fine for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which must be served consecutively to any other prison term imposed.‬


The case is being investigated by the FBI with the assistance of HSI. Assistant United States Attorneys James Sturgis and Anibal Alaniz are prosecuting the case.‬


‪A criminal complaint is a formal accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence.‬ ‪A defendant is presumed innocent unless convicted through due process of law.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET- Greg Snelgrove Tweets UK Police Emergency Plans
		
	
	

		
From Alan Turnbull, http://www.secret-bases.co.uk


A Secret Bases Exclusive


What immediately springs to mind when I say “Emerald Prism” and “Crossley Star”?


Some new age mumbo jumbo? Crystals? Well-being bracelets, etc?


David Icke?


Nope.


The Emergency Planning Officer for Hampshire Police in the UK, Greg Snelgrove,


http://www.facebook.com/greg.snelgrove.31


http://uk.linkedin.com/in/gregsnelgrove


gives a running commentary via his Twitter account:-


http://twitter.com/gregsnelgrove


regarding his attendance at various terrorism, critical national infrastructure and Olympics security related training exercises.


Sometimes these are just classroom based desktop sessions but others involve, for example, simulated fuel depot disasters at real locations with real equipment.


One of the gems from Greg’s broadcasts includes Exercise Crossley Star at the Health Protection Agency’s Porton Down laboratories. On the same campus is the former chemical weapons establishment and now research centre for bioterrorism countermeasures.


http://www.hpa.org.uk/AboutTheHPA/WhoWeAre/HPAPorton/


http://twitter.com/gregsnelgrove/status/193303835844947969


What about Exercise Emerald Prism? The response to an extended hostage/siege scenario – held at RAF Lyneham.


http://twitter.com/gregsnelgrove/status/197618652084838402


Presumably the 22 SAS’s finest were in attendance. Did they all tweet too? Well no, they’d write a book. But I digress.


Perhaps the most controversial of Greg’s Tweets is one that was deleted soon after posting:-


The same Exercise Emerald Prism, but at SECTU – the South East Counter Terrorism Unit.


http://twitter.com/gregsnelgrove/status/197303144127012865


http://tinyurl.com/c25ez65




The exercise code names, locations and descriptions were not in the public domain before Greg’s announcements. The only mentions across the whole internet were on his Twitter account (and later, assorted aggregators which picked them up).


Thames Valley Police and MI5 can be thankful that chatterbox Greg didn’t actually state the location of his day trip to this extremely sensitive operational facility.


Or else he would have to rely on his fees from his part time work as a Prince William “celebrity look-a-like”.


http://tinyurl.com/c767f4b


 




greg-snelgrove-tweet.jpg 

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
My Special Day – Happy 46th Birthday, Freedom of Information!
		
	
	

		












Lyndon Johnson usually signed bills into law this way, with a crowd — but not the Freedom of Information Act, which he signed at the last minute, grudgingly, alone, at the ranch in Texas. (Credit: Wikimedia Commons).		








Happy 46th Birthday, Freedom of Information!


National Security Archive Compilation of 46 News Stories


Shows Impact of FOIA for Public Health and Government Accountability


LBJ signed FOIA into law July 4, 1966 “kicking and screaming”


For more information contact:

Nate Jones/Tom Blanton – 202/994-7000


 


 


Washington, DC, July 4, 2012 –  Marking the 46th anniversary of President Johnson’s signing the Freedom of Information Act, the National Security Archive today posted a compilation of 46 news headlines from the past year made possible by active and creative use of the FOIA. This representative sample, drawn from hundreds of FOIA stories reported by newspapers, blogs, broadcasters, and researchers, describe FOIA requests that revealed the theft of Jack Daniels whiskey by airport security screeners, the keywords used by homeland security officials to monitor social networking sites, the soil contamination endangering Marines and their families at Camp Lejeune, pre-9/11 attempts to whack Osama bin Laden, and $1.2 trillion of secret Federal Reserve loans to banks, among dozens of other topics that the public has a right and a need to know.


“These freedom of information stories show the paradox of FOIA,” remarked Tom Blanton, director of the Archive, which has made tens of thousands of successful FOIA requests since its founding in 1985. “We requesters always complain about the constant delays, the bureaucratic obstacles, the processing fee harassment, and the excessive government secrecy; yet the FOIA actually produces front-page results every year that make a real difference to citizens and to better government.”


“Agencies are still dragging their heels on fulfilling President Obama’s transparency promises,” said Nate Jones, the Archive’s Freedom of Information Coordinator, citing the Archive’s government-wide audits of FOIA performance. “But persistence and focus and pressure pay off, as these headlines show; and the core principle of FOIA – that government information belongs to the people – is worth fighting for.”


The Archive’s detailed 122-page guide, “Effective FOIA Requesting for Everyone,” is available online at the Archive’s FOIA page, here.


The Archive’s previous postings of documentation from the Johnson, Nixon and Ford presidential libraries show that President Johnson grudgingly signed the FOIA into law 46 years ago today, at the last possible minute, only after pressure from newspaper editors and his own press secretary Bill Moyers, who later said LBJ was “dragged kicking and screaming” into signing the bill. Moyers credited the persistence of longtime California congressman John Moss, lead author of the FOIA bill, for making the law happen.




46 FOIA News Stories for FOIA’s 46th Birthday


 “FBI admits noted Memphis civil rights photographer Ernest Withers was informant,” The Commercial Appeal, Memphis, Tennessee, July 3, 2012, By Marc Perrusquia. 

Documents released under FOIA to the Commercial Appeal confirm that Ernest Withers, who photographed the Civil Rights Movement and Martin Luther King, Jr., worked as an FBI informant for 14 years. U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson ruled that the FBI must release portions of its file on Withers; the US government rarely releases the files of its informants.


“Army ‘investigating’ Bradley Manning Support Network; Admits to ‘Active Investigation,'” Antiwar.com, July 2, 2012, by Jason Ditz.

A U.S. Army response to a FOIA request confirms that The Bradley Manning Support Network is part of “an active investigation.” The group maintains the website of Bradley Manning, who is being charged under the Espionage Act for “aiding the enemy” by improperly disseminating classified information.


 “Probe into soil contamination closes scrap metal lot at Camp Lejeune,” The Daily News, Jacksonville, North Carolina, June 29, 2012, By Lindell Kay. 

A scrap metal yard at Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base may be exposing workers to potentially carcinogenic chemicals. A Freedom of Information Act request shows that the Environmental Protection Agency and state regulators have been attempting to move the scrap yard for years, without avail.


“Group: Gas industry got inside information in N.Y.,” Associated Press, June 29, 2012, By Mary Esch. 

Email exchanges obtained through New York’s Freedom of Information Law show that a natural gas industry lawyers repeatedly requested New York environmental regulators to weaken drilling and fracking regulations in their state.


“Declassified documents shed light on scramble to ‘hit’ bin Laden before 9/11,” CNN, June 21, 2012, By Tim Lister.

Documents released to the National Security Archive in response to a FOIA request show that the US government considered attacks on bin Laden several times before September 11, 2001. The documents also show that CIA and US Air Force drones “observed an individual most likely to be bin Laden” twice in the fall of 2000, but “had no way at the time to react to this information.”


 “US Reveals Years of Accusations against Secret Service: Claims Include Involvement with Prostitutes, Leaks of Sensitive Information, Illegal Wiretaps,” MSNBC, June 15, 2012, By Alicia A. Caldwell. 

Documents released by a Freedom of Information Act request reveal an extensive list of allegations filed against Secret Service agents and officers since 2004. The complaints include allegations of publishing pornography, illegal wiretaps, drunken behavior, and sexual assault.


“Steve Jobs’s Pentagon File: Blackmail Fears, Youthful Arrest and LSD Cubes,” Wired, June 11, 2012, By Kim Zetter. 

Documents obtained through FOIA by Wired Magazine provide insight into Steve Jobs’s personal life after he founded Apple. In a 1988 security clearance interview with the Department of Defense, Jobs revealed that he was concerned about his daughter’s safety, disclosed his past altercations with the law, and chronicled his drug use.


“NOAA Cuts May Weaken Tsunami Mitigation Programs,” Oregon Public Broadcasting News, June 11, 2012, By Kristian Foden-Vencil. 

Documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act show that proposed federal cuts to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program in 2013 would leave hundreds of coastal communities vulnerable to tsunamis.


“The Department of Energy is Under Attack. Cyber Attack,” CNBC, June 8, 2012, By Eamon Javers. 

Documents obtained by CNBC through FOIA show that the DOE is frequently under what it believes to be an aggressive attack by private sector firms to access its website at times when it releases “market-moving” economic data to the public.


“DHS social media monitoring practices revealed under FOIA,” Government Security News, May 29, 2012, By Mark Rockwell. 

Documents attained through FOIA reveal a long, sometimes bizarre, list of trigger words that the Department of Homeland Security monitors social networking sites for, including: “Amtrak,” “swine,” “BART,” and “cops.” The document also advises analysts which news organizations it deems the most credible, including Fox News.


“Secret Service Releases Identity of ‘Spy’ Printer Manufacturers,” The FOIA blog, May 24, 2012, By Scott Hodes. 

Documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request reveal the names of 10 printer manufacturers that released their machine identification codes to the Secret Service, thereby allowing the Secret Service to trace printed materials back to their origin.


 “ACLU raises issue with single-sex education programs,” Augusta Free Press, May 21, 2012. 

Documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act by the ACLU show an alarming trend of unlawful sex-segregation through single-sex programs in Virginia’s public schools.


 “DHS Considers Collecting DNA From Kids; DEA and US Marshals Already Do,” The Electronic Freedom Foundation, May 14, 2012, By Jennifer Lynch. 

Documents obtained through FOIA by the EFF show that the Department of Homeland Security is contemplating collecting DNA from children over the age of 14, and is exploring how to collect DNA from children even younger than that. ICE is the first component of DHS to collect DNA in such cases; the DEA and U.S. Marshals already do.


“National Security Letter Gag Order FOIA,” ACLU, May 9, 2012. 

A FOIA lawsuit by the ACLU has led to the release of the National Security Letter template used by the FBI. National Security Letters force internet service providers, credit card companies, cell phone providers, and others, to hand over information about their customers. It is illegal to inform customers that their information has been turned over to the government.


“TSA Reveals Passenger Complaints … Four Years Later,” ProPublica, May 4, 2012, Friday, by Michael Grabell. 

Documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act reveal – albeit after a four year wait – the litany of complaints travelers filed with the Transportation Security Administration in 2008. Grievances ranged from a complaint of wheelchair-bound passenger being forced to walk through security, to an allegation that a passenger’s bottle of Jack Daniels was surreptitiously emptied by TSA screeners.


“Govt Appeals Court-Ordered Release of Classified Document,” Secrecy News, April 27, 2012, By Steven Aftergood.

A U.S. District Court ruled that the U.S. Trade Representative must release documents concerning the U.S. negotiating position in free trade negotiations that were the subject of a Freedom of Information Act Request. Judge Roberts concluded that the continued classification of the document was not “logical;” the U.S. Department of Justice has decided to appeal the decision.


“Stonington attorney a no-show at Freedom of Information training,” The Day, New London, Conn, April 25, 2012, by Joe Wojtas.

After the Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission ruled that the town of New London had violated state FOIA law in 2011, it ordered town officials to undergo FOI training. A dozen town officials took the two hour training. However, attorney Michael Satti -who mishandled the FOIA cases- did not attend despite the Commission encouraging him, “in the strongest possible terms” to do so.


“City admits to violating Freedom of Information Act,” The Stamford Advocate, Conn, April 22, 2012, By Kate King. 

The Stamford Office of Legal Affairs was forced to pay a $300 fine because it improperly withheld public documents requested under the act. The city wrongly denied a request by state Rep. Sal Gabriele, for documents about theft of scrap metal by city workers and a credit account opened by public workers to fund an annual golf tournament. “Substantially all” of the documents were eventually released to Rep. Gabriele.


“ICE confirms inquiry into freedom of information denial in Dallas case,” The Dallas Morning News, April 17, 2012, By Dianne Solis.

According to a reply to a FOIA request, the Dallas branch of Immigration and Customs Enforcement confirmed that it was investigating its office’s improper “pawning of personal property of immigration detainees.” Several individuals within the senor leadership of the office have been reassigned and an investigation is ongoing.


 “Memo shows US official disagreed with Bush administration’s view on torture; Previously-unreleased document shows state department official thought techniques were ‘cruel’ and ‘degrading’ punishment,” Associated Press, April 2, 2012, By Pete Yost. 

In response to a FOIA request by the National Security Archive, the Department of State released a 2006 internal memo written by the State Department’s legal counselor Philip Zelikow that warned that he believed the Bush administration’s “enhanced interrogation” practices were in fact illegal. Zelikow recounted that the White House “attempted to collect and destroy all copies of my memo.”


 “US feared Falklands war would be ‘close-run thing,’ documents reveal; Declassified cables show US felt Thatcher had not considered diplomatic options, and feared Soviet Union could be drawn in,” The Guardian, April 1, 2012, By Julian Borger. 

U.S. diplomatic cables, released to the National Security Archive under FOIA, show that during the Falklands War, the United States provided the United Kingdom with substantial covert support. As U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig explained to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, “We are not impartial.”


 “Documents show NYPD infiltrated liberal groups,” The Associated Press, March 23, 2012, By Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman. 

Documents attained by a FOIA request show that from at least 2004-2008, undercover NYPD officers infiltrated liberal political organizations’ meetings and kept files on activists planning protests around the country. The use of these counterterrorism tactics likely violated the First Amendment.


“The State Department Tells Us How They Really Felt,” Huffington Post, February 17, 2012, By David Isenberg. 

Documents obtained through a FOIA request shed light on how the Department of State rates, grades, and oversees the work assigned to its contractors. One assessment reported that Blackwater’s poor performance in Iraq caused the Department of State, “to lose confidence in their credibility and management ability.”


“Justices: Release Little Rock police officer’s use-of-force reports,” Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, February 17, 2012, By Alison Sider.

The Arkansas State Supreme Court ruled that a police officer’s “use of force reports” were not exempt under the state FOI law’s protection of employee privacy. The” use of force report” at issue recounts an incident where an officer struck a man “several times in the facial area” for refusing to leave a bar.


“Pentagon Discloses Military Intelligence Budget Request,” Secrecy News, February 14, 2012, By Steven Aftergood.

After refusing to disclose its Military Intelligence Program budget proposal request in response to a 2011 Freedom of Information Act request, the Department of Defense disclosed the amount of its FY2013 budget proposal request for its Military Intelligence Program in 2012. It requested 19.2 billion dollars.


“Congress Left in Dark on DOJ Wiretaps,” Wired Magazine, February 13, 2012, By David Kravetz. 

Documents obtained via the Freedom of Information Act prove that the Department of Justice was illegally withholding material from Congress between 2004 and 2008. Specifically, the DOJ was refusing to turn over documentation on the number of times they used surveillance tools called “pen register” and “trap-and-trace capturing,” which are covert mobile telephone surveillance methods.


 “No Conviction, No Freedom: Immigration Authorities Locked 13,000 In Limbo,” Huffington Post, January 27, 2012, By Elise Foley. 

Documents obtained through the FOIA by the Huffington Post reveal that an alarming 40% of people in immigration detentions are held without being convicted of a crime.


 “Federal Immigration Enforcement is Mandatory, Memo Says,” Los Angeles Times, January 8, 2012, By Paloma Esquivel. 

Documents released through a FOIA request reveals that Secure Communities, the DHS’ controversial immigration enforcement program, will become mandatory by 2012, though states and some counties had initially been told they could opt out.


 “FOIA Documents Show FBI Illegally Collecting Intelligence Under Guise of ‘Community Outreach,'” ACLU, December 1, 2011. 

Documents obtained through FOIA reveal that the FBI has been using community outreach programs to spy on religious and community organizations. These actions have raised concerns that the Bureau may be violating various constitutional protections.


 “Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion Undisclosed to Congress,” Bloomberg, November 27, 2011, By Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun and Phil Kuntz. 

29,000 pages of documents acquired by Bloomberg News FOIA requests reveal that the Federal Reserve loaned major banking institutions more than 1.2 trillion dollars on December 5, 2008, at the crux of the financial crisis. By taking advantage of the Fed’s below market rates, banks were able to make an estimated combined $13 billion in profits, according to Bloomberg’s calculation of data released to it under FOIA.


“Obama Intelligence Panel Identified after Suit,” Security Law Brief, November 12, 2011. 

Documents obtained through a FOIA request provide the names of the members of the panel that oversees reports of illegal and improper spying by the intelligence community, the Intelligence Oversight Board.


“An FBI director with a grudge,” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 2011, By Richard A. Serrano.

Documents obtained by a FOIA request to the FBI reveal that long-time Bureau director J. Edgar Hoover had L.A. Times journalist Jack Nelson kept under close surveillance, as Hoover was concerned that Nelson could out Hoover as a homosexual.


 “FBI releases Russian spy trove,” CNN, October 31, 2011, By Suzanne Kelly.

Documents attained by a FOIA request shed light on “Operation Ghost Stories,” an investigation into the “Anna Chapman” Russian spy ring. The documents reveal information about Russian Foreign Intelligence operatives in the U.S. who were thought to be attempting to access classified documents from undercover FBI agents; they include videos of Russian operatives conducting “brush passes” and other operational espionage.


“What If We Paid Off The Debt? The Secret Government Report,” NPR, October 20, 2011, By David Kestenbaum.

A document obtained through a FOIA request by NPR provides insight on how the government viewed a potential crisis in the year 2000. What was the crisis? How the global financial would suffer if the U.S. government entirely paid off its debt.


“FOIA request elicits declassification processing for NGA budget documents,” Progressive Technology Federal Systems, October 19, 2011.

Documents acquired by a Freedom of Information Act request by the Federation of American Scientists expose the budget considerations of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The documents reveal the NGA’s concern about an upcoming wave of retirements, and the possible loss of valuable institutional knowledge and critical skills that could follow.


“Enviros: TransCanada, State emails ‘cozy,'” PoliticoPro, October 3, 2011, By Bob King. 

Documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act illuminate a startling familiarity between State Department employees and lobbyists for the Canadian oil giant TransCanada, regarding approval for a North American oil pipeline.


“Don’t call us, we’ll call you: Tales of a DHS FOIA,” Federal Times, September 30, 2011, by Andy Medici.

Documents attained through FOIA a reporter for Federal Times show that the Department of Homeland Security redacts the contact information of their public relations employees – in order to prevent “an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”


“Even Those Cleared of Crimes Can Stay on F.B.I.’s Watch List,” The New York Times, September 27, 2011, By Charlie Savage. 

Documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request reveal that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is allowed to keep people on the government’s terrorist watch list – even if they have been acquitted of terrorism-related offenses, or if the charges have been dropped. This revelation brings the FBI’s practices under greater scrutiny.


“Declassified US spy satellites reveal rare look at Cold War space program,” MSNBC, September 18, 2011, by Roger Guillemette. 

For its 50th anniversary, the National Reconnaissance Office declassified and released thousands of pages of documents about its GAMBIT and HEXAGON satellite programs which were active from 1963 until 1986.


“FOIA Victory Will Shed More Light on Warrantless Tracking of Cell Phones,” The Electronic Frontier Foundation, September 10, 2011.

A U.S. District Court ruled in favor of FOIA requesters seeking information on the warrantless tracking of cell phones. The Court case forces the government to turn over information about the cases that federal law enforcement agencies obtained information by tracking cell phones without a warrant.


“Details released on probe of Manchin administration; Subpoena included request for records relating to private airplane, campaign finance, email accounts,” Daily Mail Capitol Reporter, August 25, 2011, By Ry Rivard. 

Subpoenas released in response to a Freedom of Information request show that federal investigators sought flight records, emails, and bids for roads contracts from the administration of former West Virginia governor Joe Manchin, now a U.S. senator. No one was charged as a result of the probe.


 “History Held Hostage; A group’s legal effort to dislodge the CIA’s official history of the Bay of Pigs fiasco shows that prying secrets from the spy agency remains far too difficult,” The Daily Beast, August 13, 2011, By Peter Kornbluh. 

In response to a FOIA lawsuit by the National Security Archive, the Central Intelligence Agency released over 1200 pages of its internal history of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The history includes accounts of CIA personnel shooting at their own aircraft, and new revelations about assassination plots and the use of Americans in combat.


 “Energy Friendships Spur Conflicts of Interest,” Associated Press, July 27, 2011, By Dina Cappiello.

Documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act reveal that relations between offshore oil and gas companies and the federal agency in charge of regulating them – the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and Regulation – were so intertwined that, a year after new ethics rules were enforced, nearly a third of inspectors located in the Gulf of Mexico region have been disqualified.


“Defense Contractors Block Auditor Access to Records, Insiders Say,” TIME Magazine, July 22, 2011, By Nick Schwellenbach.

Documents obtained through the FOIA reveal that the Pentagon frequently disregards requests for access to contractor records. Specifically, documents acquired by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) show that the Pentagon ignored proposals from the Defense Contracting Audit Agency for greater access to contractor information.


 “Court Rules TSA Adopted Body Scanners Improperly: Agency did not Solicit Public Comment before Installing Whole-Body Scanners,” Consumer Affairs, July 16, 2011, By James R. Hood. 

Documents obtained via a FOIA request prove that DHS required body scanners used by TSA to be capable of recording and storing “images of unclothed passengers.”


“Final Space Shuttle Launch Threatened by Bad Weather,” Techland, July 6, 2011, By Matt Peckham.

Documents obtained via the Freedom of Information Act show that NASA’s space shuttle launches are “100 times more dangerous” to launch-site spectators than other types of U.S. rockets, though odds of a spectator actually being killed are “extremely remote.”













Rela







	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Revealed – NSA Tells Former ISOO Director to File a FOIA Request
		
	
	

		
William Leonard, the former director of the Information Security Oversight Office, served as an expert witness for the defense in the misconceived prosecution of Thomas Drake, in which all felony charges against Mr. Drake were dismissed.  (Mr. Drake pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count.)


Now Mr. Leonard is seeking permission from the trial judge in the Drake case to publicly disclose and discuss certain National Security Agency documents cited in the charges against Mr. Drake that he says were classified in violation of national policy.


“I believe the Government’s actions in the Drake case served to undermine the integrity of the classification system and as such, have placed information that genuinely requires protection in the interest of national security at increased risk,” Mr. Leonard wrote in a May affidavit seeking permission from Judge Richard D. Bennett to reveal the now-declassified (but still undisclosed) documents. Attorneys for Mr. Drake asked the court to release Mr. Leonard from the protective order that restricts disclosure of the documents, so that he could publicly pursue his criticism of their original classification by NSA.  See “Former Secrecy Czar Asks Court to Release NSA Document,” Secrecy News, May 23, 2012.


But government attorneys said that Mr. Leonard has no standing to request relief from the protective order that was imposed on the NSA documents.  They added that if he wants the documents to be publicly disclosed he should request them under the Freedom of Information Act.


“The problem with Leonard’s claim is that it relies not on injury to him, but instead on a general desire to complain to the press and the public,” the government said in a June 22 response to Mr. Leonard.  Instead of court-ordered release, “the proper alternative… is for Leonard to file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the National Security Agency (NSA), which is prepared to act expeditiously upon the request.”


As it happens, I requested one of those documents under FOIA last year, and NSA has not acted on it expeditiously, or at all.


But the government said “The NSA has already prepared FOIA-approved versions of the documents at issue” which involve only minimal redactions.


“The government has no animus toward Leonard or his desire to express his opinion about the documents in question — only an interest in appropriately protecting the sensitive nature of the material and to prevent a flood of similar claims by non-parties in other completed cases,” the government response said.


See also “Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents” by Scott Shane, New York Times, August 1, 2011.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
FAS – Prosecutors Dispute Claims of Selective Anti-Leak Prosecution
		
	
	

		
Last month, former CIA officer John Kiriakou, who is accused of unlawfully disclosing classified information to two reporters, said in pre-trial motions that he had been wrongly and unfairly singled out for prosecution, particularly since he had criticized the U.S. practice of waterboarding.  (“Kiriakou Calls Leak Prosecution Selective, Vindictive,” Secrecy News, June 22).


This week, prosecutors unsurprisingly rejected such claims while affirming that they intend to vigorously pursue their case against Mr. Kiriakou.


“The genesis of this prosecution has nothing to do with waterboarding, the national conversation about its wrongness or rightness, the defendant’s opinions, or other public statements he may or may not have made,” the July 2 government response states.


The new government filing presents a series of legal arguments against the defense motions for dismissal, explaining why prosecutors believe the Intelligence Identities Protection Act and the Espionage Act statutes under which Mr. Kiriakou is charged are sufficiently clear and specific to be constitutional.  Beyond that, the new government response makes a couple of noteworthy points.


“The government does not intend to seek the testimony of either journalist to whom Kiriakou made the charged disclosures,” prosecutors wrote.  By refraining from subpoenaing the two unnamed reporters — believed to be Matthew Cole, formerly of ABC News, and Scott Shane of the New York Times — prosecutors will steer clear of the controversies and difficulties facing the prosecution of former CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling, which is currently suspended while the government appeals the right to subpoena New York Times reporter James Risen, to whom Sterling allegedly provided classified information.


Prosecutors also suggest at one point that their obligation to prove at trial that Mr. Kiriakou had specific “reason to believe” his alleged disclosures would damage national security would be satisfied by “the non-disclosure agreements signed by Kiriakou,” since those agreements include boilerplate language affirming that unauthorized disclosures could cause injury to the United States.  This approach seems calculated to enable prosecutors to overcome the otherwise daunting hurdle of demonstrating the defendant’s intent to harm the country.  It is unclear if it would be found legally satisfactory by the court or persuasive to a jury.


In a critical account of the Kiriakou case to date, Dan Froomkin wrote that “The bitterest irony of the case is that if Kiriakou had actually tortured, rather than talked about it, he almost certainly wouldn’t be in trouble.” See “Squelching Secrets: Why Are Obama’s Prosecutors Pursuing John Kiriakou?”, Huffington Post, July 4.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
The FBI reports – Cleveland Man sentenced to 30 years for sex trafficking 16-year-old girl.
		
	
	

		


CLEVELAND—Anthony C. Willoughby was sentenced today to 30 years in prison after a jury previously found him guilty of forcing a 16-year-old girl to engage in commercial sex acts, announced Steven M. Dettelbach, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio, and Stephen D. Anthony, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Cleveland Office.


“The details of this case underscore why it is so important that we continue to work collaboratively and try to eradicate this modern-day slavery,” said U.S. Attorney Dettelbach. “This defendant preyed upon a weak, vulnerable victim and used her suffering as an opportunity for profit.”


Special Agent in Charge Anthony said, “This case is one of the first human trafficking cases to go to trial in Northern Ohio. Investigating and prosecuting those involved in the sexual exploitation of the most vulnerable of victims is a priority of the FBI. The 30-year sentence imposed today represents the seriousness of the offense and should serve as a deterrent to child predators.”


Willoughby, 39, also known as “P.T.” and “Party Time,” last lived in Toledo, Ohio, according to court records.


A jury on December 16, 2011, found Willoughby guilty on one count of sex trafficking of a minor. Willoughby recruited, enticed, harbored, and transported a juvenile, identified in the indictment as “S.W.,” knowing that by means of force, fraud, and coercion the juvenile was caused to engage in a commercial sex act between February 15, 2009, and March 19, 2009, according to court records.


The victim in this case was 16 at the time of the crime. She had run away from foster care in the winter of 2009 when Willoughby, then 36, agreed to take her in, according to court documents. Willoughby convinced the victim they were in a relationship but then began arranging for “dates” for her from his client list, according to court records.


This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys James V. Moroney and Ava Rotell Dustin, following an investigation by the Toledo Resident Agency of the Cleveland FBI and the Northwest Ohio Violent Crimes Against Children Task Force (NWOVCACTF).


The NWOVCACTF, directed by the FBI Toledo Resident Agency, includes special agents of the FBI and agents and officers from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation; Ohio Highway Patrol; Toledo Police Department; Lima, Ohio Police Department; Perrysburg Township, Ohio Police Department; Fulton County, Ohio Sheriff’s Office; and the Ottawa County, Ohio Sheriff’s Office.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Brooklyn Rabbi Sentenced for Money Laundering Conspiracy
		
	
	

		


TRENTON, NJ—Mordchai Fish, the principal rabbi of Congregation Sheves Achim in Brooklyn, New York, was sentenced today to 46 months in prison for conspiring to launder approximately $900,000 he believed was criminal proceeds, U.S. Attorney Paul J. Fishman announced.


Fish, 59, of Brooklyn, New York, previously pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Joel A. Pisano to an information charging him with money laundering conspiracy. Judge Pisano also imposed the sentence today in Trenton federal court.


According to documents filed in this case and statements made in court:


Fish admitted that beginning in early 2008, he met with Solomon Dwek, an individual he now knows was a cooperating witness with the United States. For a fee of approximately 10 percent, Fish agreed to launder and conceal Dwek’s funds through a series of purported charities, also known as “gemachs,” which Fish controlled or to which he had access. Fish admitted that prior to laundering Dwek’s funds, Dwek repeatedly told him the money was the proceeds of illegal activity—including bank fraud, trafficking in counterfeit goods, and bankruptcy fraud.


In order to hide the source of the money, Fish directed Dwek to make the checks payable to several gemachs—including Boyoner Gemilas Chesed, Beth Pinchas, CNE, and Levovous—which were purportedly dedicated to providing charitable donations to needy individuals. Once Dwek gave him the checks, Fish passed them to a co-conspirator who deposited them into bank accounts held in the names of the purported charities. Fish would then arrange to make cash available through an underground money transfer network. Other individuals, including David S. Golhirsh, Naftoly Weber, Avrohom Y. Polack, Binyamin Spira, and Yoely Gertner, would provide Fish and Dwek with the cash.


Fish admitted that he engaged in approximately 15 money laundering transactions with Dwek, helping to convert approximately $900,000 in checks into more than $800,000 in cash, keeping a cut.


In addition to the prison term, Judge Pisano sentenced Fish to three years’ supervised release and ordered him to forfeit $90,000. Fish was ordered to surrender to the Bureau of Prisons on August 14, 2012.U.S. Attorney Fishman credited special agents of the FBI, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Michael B. Ward, and special agents of IRS-Criminal Investigation, under the direction of Acting Special Agent in Charge John R. Tafur, with the investigation.


The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark McCarren of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Special Prosecutions Division in Newark.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Massachusetts Man Pleads Guilty to $6.9 Million Fraud Scheme
		
	
	

		


ALEXANDRIA, VA—James W. Massaro, 70, of Boxford, Massachusetts, pled guilty today to engaging in a fraudulent foreign investment scheme that defrauded at least 20 victims of more than $6.9 million.


Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office; and Daniel Cortez, Inspector in Charge of the Washington Division of the United States Postal Inspection Service, made the announcement after the plea was accepted by United States District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.


Massaro pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. He faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison when he is sentenced on September 21, 2012.


According to a statement of facts filed with his plea agreement, Massaro claimed to be the president of a business called Tracten Corporation, and he admitted that from September 2005 through April 2008, he conspired with others to engage in a fraudulent scheme that required investors to pay a fee that would be used to secure large letters of credit through European financial institutions. Investors were told the initial payment was a commitment fee necessary to secure a multi-million-dollar letter of credit and that they would receive a percentage monthly return on the total amount of the letter of credit. Each investor entered into an escrow agreement with Tracten, which stated that the fee would be wired to an escrow attorney, who would, in turn, disburse the fee to Tracten after the escrow attorney received a commitment letter from the foreign bank on behalf of the investor.


Massaro admitted that in 2005, he and another co-conspirator made multiple trips to Rome, Italy, to meet with bank officials to pitch the letter of credit program. Despite the bank’s refusal to participate, the conspirators secured an Internet domain name to set up an e-mail account that would appear to come from a bank representative and created fraudulent bank letterhead that also appeared to come from the bank. Massaro and others used the e-mail account and letterhead to forge commitment letters purporting to be from bank officials that would be provided to escrow attorneys. Pursuant to the escrow agreement, the escrow attorneys relied on these fraudulent commitment letters to disburse the fees to Massaro.


According to the plea agreement, Massaro defrauded at least 20 investors who had together paid $6,936,985 in fees as part of the letter of commitment investment program.


The investigation was conducted by FBI’s Washington Field Office and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s Washington Division. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Timothy D. Belevetz and Charles F. Connolly are prosecuting the case on behalf of the United States.


A copy of this press release may be found on the website of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia at http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Central Florida Intelligence Exchange Online Jihadist Calls for Arson Attacks
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CFIX-ArsonJihad.png


 


Past statements from al‐Qa’ida Central, as well as their franchise groups, highlight the importance of targeting the U.S. economy as part of their strategy of confronting the West. Most recently, militant propagandists, such as Adam Gadahn, American mouthpiece for Al‐Qa’ida in Pakistan, have made statements advising Muslims in the West to “…undermine the West’s already struggling economies with…targeted attacks on symbols of capitalism which will shake consumer confidence and stifle spending”. Additionally, in November 2010, al‐Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula introduced the “strategy of a thousand cuts”, where they encouraged their mujahideen brothers to “attack the enemy with smaller, but more frequent operations…the aim is to bleed the enemy to death”.


In December 2010, Abu Suleiman al‐Nasser, a prominent member of the Shumukh al‐Islam [Arabic] forum, advised that the U.S. economy is at its weakest and he called on the “Mujahideen Brigades” to attack the “soft underbelly of the enemies”. On 30 May 2011, Abu Suleiman posted another article urging Muslims to carry out arson attacks on buildings, farms and forests. He also advised them not to forget to target gas stations, storage tanks and gas lines as well.


Abu Suleiman goes on to say that setting fires is a simple action and with the summer months coming up the fires will spread easily. He also stated that in order to fight these fires, huge sums of money would have to be spent from the West’s already collapsed economies. He concludes his article by providing simple instructions for manufacturing Molotov cocktails to use in facilitating the arson attacks and he signed the article “Abu Suleiman Al‐Nasser, Support of Global Jihad”.


…


Arsons have the potential to become an appealing tactic for extremists groups and individuals seeking to carry out attacks that would have a major impact on the economy, as well as, furthering their global agenda and long‐term strategic objectives. This type of attack is simple to perform, has relatively no cost and is a very low security risk, but at the same time yields large scale destruction and frequently draws media attention.


The general motivation mentioned by the online jihadists for utilizing arson attacks is to achieve the following objectives:


• Heavy financial impact on the West’s weakened economy

• Potential for human losses

• Creating fear and panic amongst the general population

• Exhausting the resources of first responders and military personnel


As “would be” jihadists, online and in the real world, continue to share potential methods of attack and “lessons learned” with other like‐minded individuals, it will likely become increasingly more difficult for law enforcement and members of the intelligence community to identify those individuals who are who may be in the pre‐operational phase of an attack. Because of the perceived randomness and simplicity of carrying out this type of attack, it could be appealing to those who are inspired by al‐Qa’ida’s ideologies and desire to fulfill their obligation of “individual jihad”.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Japan and the United States from Kennedy to Clinton
		
	
	

		






President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sign the Japan-U.S. Declaration on Security at Akasaka Palace in Tokyo, Japan; Date: April 17th, 1996

Courtesy; William J. Clinton Presidential Library 		








Washington, D.C., July,3, 2012 –The National Security Archive announces the publication of its latest digital compilation of declassified records on U.S. ties with a critically important global partner – Japan. The new collection, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000, includes the most recent U.S. government releases covering a broad spectrum of issues and events in the bilateral relationship, and providing essential content for understanding the current global economic crisis as well as recent geopolitical developments in East Asia and the Pacific Rim.


Japan and the United States is the Archive’s third, fully-indexed anthology on the subject, and is available through the academic publisher ProQuest. Marking its publication, the Archive is today posting a selection of presidential and Cabinet-level records from the set that reflect the key strategic, defense and economic aspects of the relationship. The Archive obtained the documents in the collection through the Freedom of Information Act and original archival research. Among the highlights of the posting:


    

  • Memoranda of conversation between Bush and Kaifu during the opening months of the first Gulf War crisis, as Bush pressed the Japanese leader to consider not just financial support, but an eventual role for Japan’s military. As Bush warned Kaifu, “In Congress there are always people trying to blame Japan, Germany or somebody else. They see us spending large amounts of money and sending fine young people to the Middle East, where they might be in harm’s way.” While he understood this feeling, Bush also stressed that he didn’t “want any scapegoats,” and would make it clear to the American people that “Japan is trying very hard to do its part.” (Documents 3,4,5 and 6)
    • 

  • New documents on wide-ranging secret bilateral security talks at the end of the Carter and Clinton administrations, as the two powers met on a regular basis to trade viewpoints on the full spectrum of common security concerns and the management of the defense alliance, as well as the political situation in both countries. For example, in 1979, Nicholas Platt, the Asia expert on Carter’s National Security Council, candidly observed to his Japanese counterparts (likely with an eye to reassuring them) that he had seen a marked change in the President’s attitude: “He has been through a period of intense introspection. He is much more forceful. In contrasting him to just after he left Seoul, he is more positive, rested, etc.” (Documents 1, 2, 12 and 13)
    • 

  • Briefing memoranda for Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin on the U.S. strategy and goals for tackling the Japanese and Asian economic crisis in the 1990s. These documents detail the ongoing efforts the Clinton administration made to press Japan to adopt the necessary policies to head off what one document called a worst-case “black hole” scenario that could lead to a recession or years of no economic growth in Japan, weaken the world economy, harm U.S. trade interests, increase protectionist pressures and roil financial markets. (Documents 7,8,9 and 10)
    • 



* * * * *


Japan and the United States makes available 902 documents dealing with high-level policy making within the U.S. government and the history of U.S.-Japan relations during the last four decades of the 20th century. These documents, obtained since publication of the second set on U.S.-Japan relations, which covered the years 1977-1996, supplement those found in the first two collections and extend the scope of the set to include the Clinton administration. The compilation includes records of U.S.-Japanese summit meetings; communications between heads of state; top-level internal deliberations; memoranda, cables and studies concerning U.S. diplomatic relations with Japan; records concerning the U.S.-Japan security relationship; documents related to trade and international monetary relations; and intelligence estimates and studies concerning Japan’s foreign policy objectives, military capabilities, economic policies and internal situation.


Among the important topics covered by these documents are:


    

  • U.S.-Japan negotiations over the return of Okinawa and subsequent issues surrounding the U.S. military presence there
    • 

  • Bilateral military relations in the wake of détente, the opening to China and the end of the Cold War
    • 

  • Challenges on the Korean Peninsula, including efforts to promote better relations between Tokyo and Seoul, and the security threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
    • 

  • Trade disputes from the Nixon to Clinton administrations
    • 

  • The Japanese and Asian economic crises of the 1990s.
    • 





DOCUMENTS


Document 1: Briefing Book (S), Eleventh U.S.-Japan Security Subcommittee Meeting (SSC) [Principals’ Book] – Extracts, ca. August 2, 1979


This briefing book provides the schedule of events, background information, objectives, and other materials that were used in preparation for the eleventh Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee meeting, a forum for exchanging views on a regular basis that became increasingly important after the two nations adopted the Guidelines on Defense Cooperation in 1978. The topics covered include briefings for the Japanese on the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), NATO, the Middle East, the security situation in East Asia, joint military planning, the U.S. presence in Asia, defense cost (or burden) sharing, and defense technology cooperation.


Among the key U.S. goals for the meeting were to reassure Japan that the US would remain a Pacific power while encouraging Japan to make a greater effort in the security sphere; to increase Japanese awareness of mutual global security concerns in connection with SALT; the Middle East (centered on access to oil); Southeast Asia; relations with China; and the growth of Soviet conventional, particularly naval, power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.


Document 2: Memorandum of Conversation (S), The 11th SSC–29 July-2 August 1979, ca August 2, 1979 [missing one page after page 50 of the pdf file]


This nearly verbatim account of the Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee meeting illustrates how the U.S. representatives pursued the wide range of issues and goals outlined in the briefing book above. Among the interesting points are the clear signs of continued Japanese concern about a future U.S. military presence in the Pacific/East Asia; the U.S. interest in drawing the Japanese into discussion of possible increased Japanese security spending and commitments, particularly the delicate issue of Japanese contributions to peace-keeping operations (which would become more urgent during first Gulf War, as shown in documents below); and an exchange of views on the possibility of a North Korean attack, with Japanese intelligence assessments indicating that Pyongyang might attack if it could get Soviet or Chinese support. Another topic that would become more pressing in the decade ahead was the different U.S. and Japanese views regarding joint development vs. purchase of military technology, with a particular focus on the next generation of fighter aircraft, in which are visible the seeds of the FSX controversy.


Document 3: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (C) between President George H. W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ca. August 3, 1990


This telephone call marks the start of Bush’s personal diplomatic effort to secure support and a financial contribution from Japan for the nascent coalition against Iraq. In discussing possible sanctions against Iraq and the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, Bush acknowledges the Issue of Japanese dependence on Middle East oil is as a critical factor for Kaifu.


Document 4: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (C) between President George H. W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ca. August 13, 1990


In this telephone call, Bush thanks Kaifu for supporting sanctions against Iraq, and presses a new request – for Japanese support with military operations. Kaifu’s reply underscores the difficult political bind such a request places him in: “With respect to the military side that you have touched upon, because of our constitutional constraints and Diet resolutions, it is almost a national policy in this regard so it would be next to unthinkable to participate directly in the military sphere.” Bush responds: “My bottom line is that when this chapter of history is written, Japan and the U.S. and a handful of other countries will have stood side-by-side.”


Document 5: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (C) between President George H. W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ca. September 13, 1990


In this conversation, Kaifu informs Bush of the economic aid that Japan will deliver to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey as result of the Persian Gulf Crisis. Bush welcomes this news, stressing how it will provide good ammunition against critics in Congress who have been taking America’s allies to task for failing to contribute to the cause.


Document 6: Memorandum of Conversation (S) between President George H. W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, ca. September 29, 1990


After several exchanges by telephone, Bush and Kaifu are finally able to meet in person to discuss the Iraq crisis as well as other issues. The conversation ranges from Tokyo’s support of U.S. troops stationed in Japan, to the Uruguay Round of trade talks, and other topics. Bush continues pressing Kaifu on securing a Japanese contribution to the military effort, as well as on increasing host nation support for U.S. forces in Japan. The talk also turns to relations between Tokyo and Moscow, and Kaifu’s hopes that the upcoming visit by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev visit will create an opening on the Northern Territories issue and the long-postponed peace treaty marking an official end to hostilities between the two countries after World War II.


Document 7: Memorandum (C), Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Lawrence Summers to Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, Subject: Japanese Recession and the Global Economy, June 9, 1995


In this memorandum, Treasury Under Secretary Summers details the signs of an impending economic recession in Japan, including the consequences for the U.S., and makes recommendations for addressing the situation. Summers calls for the U.S. to give more attention to its dialogue with Japan on macroeconomic issues, including a meeting between Treasury Secretary Rubin and Japanese Finance Minister Takemura during an upcoming meeting between President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Murayama at the Halifax G-7 summit. The attached memo discusses fears that a “1930s-type scenario” could unfold in which high interest rates, deflation, rising unemployment and yen appreciation reinforce one another; it further lays out a possible, if not probable, worst-case “black hole” scenario, noted in the introduction. To address the current situation, [tk: according to whom??] the U.S. needs to press Japan to use monetary and fiscal policy more aggressively to reduce the risk of an economic free fall.


Document 8: Memorandum (S). Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Lawrence Summers to Secretary Robert Rubin, Subject: Update on Japan [with cover memorandum from Rubin to Summers dated July 27, 1995], July 26, 1995


In this memorandum, a follow-up to the one noted above, Summers provides Rubin with a detailed report on U.S. efforts to persuade Japan to take effective steps to head off an economic crisis in the country, including a detailed account of Timothy Geithner’s meetings with Finance Ministry and Bank of Japan officials. As an attached memorandum from Geithner summarizes the situation in Japan, there is “deep pessimism” in Tokyo about the economy, and the combination of political constraints and a cautious Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan may continue to work against urgent and aggressive action. Rubin’s final judgment on the effort seems more resigned than optimistic: “we’ve done everything we can do” to affect the situation.


Document 9: Briefing Memorandum (original classification unknown), Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Timothy F. Geithner to Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and Deputy Secretary Lawrence Summers, Subject: Briefing for Your Meeting with Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, Minister of Finance, Japan, ca. April 27, 1997


In this memorandum, Geithner briefs Rubin and Summers on the main issues for the upcoming meeting with Japanese Finance Minister Mitsuzuka. The list of American concerns (which sound oddly familiar in light of more recent and widespread economic and financial woes) includes Japan’s economic future, banking system, financial reform, and anti-corruption efforts. For example, the U.S. fears that Japan’s banking system is being weakened by the overhang of bad loans and so was vulnerable to another economic downturn. Geithner also advises Rubin and Summers to continue pressing Tokyo on financial reform and deregulation to create opportunities for foreign business, while improving transparency and disclosure measures to reduce risk for foreign investors. The U.S. had a clear interest in the success of the “Big Bang” financial reforms, as U.S. firms would benefit from the greater ability to market new products and services in Japan, the relaxation of foreign exchange controls, deregulation of asset management and the expanded use of derivatives (though in hindsight the latter may not have been so wise, given the role of risky derivatives in creating the more recent economic crisis).


Document 10: Briefing Memorandum (U-Sensitive), Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Timothy F. Geithner to Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers, Subject: Briefing for Your Lunch with Eisuke Sakakibara, Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Japan, August 12, 1997


In this memorandum, Geithner briefs Summers for his upcoming meeting with Japanese Vice Minister of Finance Eisuke Sakakibara. The document provides a good overview of U.S. policy goals regarding Japan during Clinton’s first term and for his second term. Echoing points made in the April 1997 memorandum noted above, Geithner notes that recent data reveal problems with Tokyo’s strategy of relying on domestic demand to tackle economic problems. An attached paper says that the U.S. faces two major risks with Japan: a rising current account surplus that could spark political tensions in the face of closed Japanese markets; and spillover to the international financial system if the legal, regulatory and supervisory environment is not properly revised to deal with issues rooted in the “Big Bang” opening of Japanese markets to the world. In a portent of things to come, Thailand’s economic problems indicate the possible spread of economic ills beyond Japan; i.e., signs are emerging of what would become the Asian Economic Crisis of the late 1990s.


Document 11: Cable (C), United States. Department of State to United States Embassy. Korea (South), Subject: Secretary Albright’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Koumura of Japan, August 16, 1999


This cable reports on Secretary Albright’s exchange of views with Japanese Foreign Minister Koumura about the upcoming Group of Eight summit in Okinawa (where Albright hopes Japan will take a strong leadership role) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Auckland; U.S. relations with China; and issues regarding Taiwan and Iran. Albright also discusses U.S. steps to get relations with Beijing back on track after the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999, during Operation Allied Force, when five U.S. bombs hit the embassy, killing three Chinese reporters. Albright refers to efforts to give the Chinese “a means of getting themselves out of a corner.” Towards this end, Albright tells Koumura that the U.S. has provided China with a factual account of what happened, and that CIA Director George Tenet and his agency have taken responsibility for the mistaken targeting.


Document 12: Background Paper (S), Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Franklin Kramer, U.S.-Japan Bilateral Meeting, 2 November 2000; October 30, 2000


This and the following document provide a window into the policy goals and concerns preoccupying the U.S. as the security relationship with Japan headed into a new century after marking the 40th anniversary of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty. As DOD official Franklin Kramer heads into the meetings, the alliance remains the centerpiece of U.S. regional security and Japanese national security strategy. Among the U.S. goals for the meeting are: starting a strategic dialogue looking to the new century; exchanging views on China; and stressing the relationship of trilateral activities (i.e., U.S.-Japan-South Korea) to enhanced regional cooperation. In this connection, Japan-South Korea defense relations are improving, with moves being made towards establishing real security ties, including joint exercises in 1999.


The scope paper for the meeting surveys the political and economic backdrop to the meeting. The political scene is marked by deepening political fragmentation and declining popular support for the current Japanese coalition government, with a forecast for weak coalition governments in the foreseeable future. Economically, recovery from the downturn in the mid-90s remains the key concern, as mixed signals leave the future unclear. Other familiar issues include Japan’s defense budget; continuing legal uncertainties surrounding use of the country’s Self-Defense Forces, including in international peacekeeping operations (an issue that first came to fore in first Gulf war, as noted in earlier documents); the need to keep a close watch on Okinawa politics and their impact on the U.S. presence there; and the related discussions over relocating U.S. forces. There is also little progress on another long-standing issue, as Japan-Russian relations are overshadowed by Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s refusal to accept a December 2000 target for concluding a peace treaty and resolving the Northern Territories issue


Document 13: Background Paper (C), Subject: U.S.-Japan Bilateral Meeting, Renaissance Ilikai Waikiki Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii, November 2, 2000, 1530-1700, October 30, 2000


This document provides more details on the U.S. goals and concerns surrounding the future of U.S.-Japan security cooperation in the 21st century. The broad areas of concern include the long-term dialogue with Tokyo on the future of the alliance, China, and regional cooperation in Asia on security issues. Regarding the future of the alliance, the Pentagon wants to use Japan’s Mid-Term Defense Plan and the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review as the basis for a long-term dialogue. As the brief lays out the overall objective: “This is not about the U.S. asking Japan to do more as has been the case sometimes in the past. Rather it is about asking ourselves what kind of alliance will best serve as the foundation for regional stability for the next forty years.” One specific goal is to push Japan to increase its role in international peacekeeping. While the U.S. believes the region is becoming more accepting of such a Japanese role, Washington recognizes the uncertain public support in Japan for this, being well aware of the ongoing debate over the future course and nature of the country’s strategic role in the world.


Regarding China, the brief notes again the efforts to smooth the waters after the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Longer-term concerns are underscored by the tough political rhetoric in the recent China Defense White Paper, which will more likely feed rather than dampen those who are warning of a rising “China threat,” and the perception that the Chinese military is hawkish and pressing a hard line regarding the U.S., Taiwan and Japan. In part to address these concerns and, if possible, engage Beijing in a more cooperative relationship, the U.S. had launched the Asia Pacific Regional Initiative to support development of a regional defense initiative to promote multinational activities to address nontraditional security threats and contingencies. As the brief emphasizes, political, economic and social transitions in the region will produce new security challenges that cross borders and affect common security. Underscoring that multilateral initiatives will not diminish existing bilateral relationships, but will address the reality that any military action taken in Asia will have to be multilateral in nature, the brief also makes a point of noting that China is not to be excluded, but is a potential partner.


 

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled – Photos of U.S. and Afghan Troops Patrolling Poppy Fields June 2012
		
	
	

		


U.S. Marines with Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, patrol through a poppy field during Operation Lariat in the Lui Tal district, Helmand province, Afghanistan, April 16, 2012. The Marines conducted the operation to disrupt enemy logistics and establish a presence in the area. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Ismael E. Ortega/Released)




U.S. Marines with Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, patrol through a poppy field on their way to Patrol Base (PB) Mohmon in the Lui Tal district, Helmand province, Afghanistan, April 17, 2012. The Marines joined with coalition forces at the PB to begin conducting operations in the area. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Ismael E. Ortega/Released)




U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. John K. Silvernail with Golf Company, 2D Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, takes a knee in a field of poppy during a halt in a security patrol in Musa Qal’eh, Helmand province, Afghanistan, April 16, 2012. Marines conducted the patrol to disrupt enemy tactics in the battle space. (U.S. Marine Corps Photo by Lance Cpl. Chistopher M. Paulton/Released)




An Afghan boy stands watch over his family’s poppy and wheat fields as U.S. Marines with Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6 patrol by in Sangin, Helmand province, Afghanistan April 24, 2012. Marines conducted the patrol to interact with the local populace and gather information on enemy activity in the area.




U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Noel Rodriguez, a team leader with Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, communicates with an adjacent squad while on patrol in Sangin, Helmand province, Afghanistan, May 1, 2012. Marines patrolled to provide security in the area and interact with the local populace.




A field filled with opium poppy plants can be seen April 11, 2012, in Marjah, Afghanistan. Heroin is derived from raw opium gum, which comes from opium poppies. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt Michael P. Snody)




A field filled with opium poppy plants can be seen April 11, 2012, in Marjah, Afghanistan. Heroin is derived from raw opium gum, which comes from opium poppies. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt Michael P. Snody)




U.S. Marines with Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT), Weapons Company, 2D Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 5, conduct a satellite patrol through a poppy field in Marjah, Afghanistan, April 16, 2012. CAAT patrolled over a five day period to erect Patrol Base Sledgehammer Four and disrupt insurgent activity in the area. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. David A. Perez/Released)




Landscape photo of poppy flowers in Habib Abad, Helmand province, Afghanistan, April 4, 2012. U.S. Marines and Afghanistan National Army soldiers conducted a patrol to disrupt insurgency activity.




Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier conducts a satellite patrol, April 17, 2012, Marjah, Afghanistan. The ANA took part of a 5 day operation to erect Patrol Base Sledgehammer 4 to disrupt the insurgence activity in the area. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. David A. Perez/Released)




Scored poppy plants await the final harvest in Sangin, Helmand province, Afghanistan April 24, 2012. The annual poppy harvest yields the largest profit of the year for local Afghan farmers, ultimately resulting in 90 percent of the world’s opium supply.




Scored poppy plants await the final harvest in Sangin, Helmand province, Afghanistan April 24, 2012. The annual poppy harvest yields the largest profit of the year for local Afghan farmers, ultimately resulting in 90 percent of the world’s opium supply.




U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Michael Hanley, right, a machine gunner with 2D Squad, 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, patrols through a field of poppy outside of Patrol Base Fires, Helmand province, Afghanistan April 24, 2012. Marines conducted the patrol to interact with the local populace and gather information on enemy activity in the area.




An Afghan farmer watches from a poppy field as the 288th Sapper Company, a National Guard Unit out of Houston, Miss., performs a dismounted patrol in the Uzugan province in southern Afghanistan, April 2, 2012. Dismounted patrols, in conjunction with their route clearance missions, have lead to a significant decrease in insurgent activity in the Dorifshan and Baluchi valleys and an increase in not only the safety and security of the coalition and Afghan Security Forces, but also helped the unit form a bond with the local Afghan civilians.




An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier provides security during a satellite patrol along a poppy field in Marjah, Afghanistan, April 17, 2012. The ANA took part in a five day partnered operation to erect Patrol Base Sledgehammer Four and disrupt insurgent activity in the area. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. David A. Perez/Released)




A field filled with opium poppy plants can be seen April 11, 2012, in Marjah, Afghanistan. Heroin is derived from raw opium gum, which comes from opium poppies. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt Michael P. Snody)




A U.S. Marine with Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6 walks through a poppy field during a security patrol in Gorazan Valley, Helmand province, Afghanistan, April 17, 2012. Marines conducted the patrol in search of suspected enemy fighters. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Andrew J. Good)




U.S. Marines with Combined Anti-Armor Team, Weapons Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 5, conduct a satellite patrol through a poppy field in Marjah, Afghanistan, April 19, 2012. CAAT conducted a five day partnered operation to erect Patrol Base Sledgehammer Four and disrupt insurgent activity in the area. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. David A. Perez)




U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Nicholas Gonzalez, a machine gunner with 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, patrols through a poppy field in Sangin, Helmand province, Afghanistan, April 27, 2012. Marines conducted the patrol to provide security in the area and interact with the local population.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Indictment in $9.1 Million Mortgage Fraud Scheme
		
	
	

		


CHICAGO—Four defendants, including a licensed realtor and two licensed loan originators, were indicted for allegedly participating in a scheme to fraudulently obtain at least 42 residential mortgage loans totaling approximately $9.1 million from various lenders, federal law enforcement officials announced today. The indictment alleges that the mortgages were obtained to finance the purchase of properties throughout Chicago by buyers who were fraudulently qualified for loans while the defendants allegedly profited. The lenders and their successors incurred losses totaling approximately $4.7 million because the mortgages were not fully recovered through subsequent sales or foreclosures.


All four defendants were charged with various counts of bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud in a five-count indictment that was returned by a federal grand jury last Thursday. The indictment also seeks forfeiture of at least $4.7 million. The charges were announced today by Gary S. Shapiro, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois; Robert D. Grant, Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Thomas P. Brady, Inspector in Charge of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in Chicago.


Jason Dade, 37, of Chicago, a licensed real estate agent and the owner of Round Table Enterprises Inc., was charged with two counts of bank fraud, two counts of mail fraud, and one count of wire fraud. Cheryl Ware, 47, of Shorewood, a licensed loan originator, was charged with one count each of wire fraud and mail fraud. Tiffini Chism, 36, of Glenwood, also a licensed loan originator, was charged with two counts of bank fraud, and Tamika Peters, 34, of Country Club Hills, was charged with one count each of wire fraud and mail fraud.


The defendants will be arraigned on dates yet to be determined in U.S. District Court.


Between August 2004 and June 2008, all four defendants and others allegedly schemed to obtain the fraudulent mortgages by making false representations in loan applications, supporting documents, and HUD-1 settlement statements concerning the buyers’ income, employment, financial condition, source of down payments, and intention to occupy the property.


As part of the scheme, Dade allegedly acted as a real estate agent for prospective home buyers, including Peters and others, knowing that the residences would be financed through fraudulently obtained mortgages. Dade referred Peters and other prospective buyers to Ware and Chism and others to have false loan application packages prepared, the indictment alleges.


All four defendants allegedly received the proceeds of the fraudulent loans that various lenders issued to prospective buyers and to Dade and Peters when the loans closed and used the proceeds to enrich themselves, according to the indictment.


The government is being represented by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kenneth E. Yeadon and Megan Church.


Each count of bank fraud, as well as wire fraud and mail fraud affecting a financial institution, carries a maximum penalty of 30 years in prison and a $1 million fine, and restitution is mandatory. If convicted, the court may impose an alternate fine totaling twice the loss to any victim or twice the gain to the defendant, whichever is greater. The court must impose a reasonable sentence under federal sentencing statutes and the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines.


The public is reminded that an indictment contains only charges and is not evidence of guilt. The defendants are presumed innocent and are entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.


The charges are part of a continuing effort to investigate and prosecute mortgage fraud in northern Illinois and nationwide under the umbrella of the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, which was established to lead an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.


Since 2008, approximately 200 defendants have been charged in federal court in Chicago and Rockford with engaging in various mortgage fraud schemes involving more than 1,000 properties and more than $280 million in potential losses, signifying the high priority that federal law enforcement officials give mortgage fraud in an effort to deter others from engaging in crimes relating to residential and commercial real estate.


The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information on the task force, visit: http://www.StopFraud.gov.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – Seventeen Charged in Cocaine Trafficking Conspiracy
		
	
	

		


PITTSBURGH—Thirteen residents of Pennsylvania and four residents of Ohio have been indicted by a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh on charges of violating federal drug laws, United States Attorney David J. Hickton announced today.


The 18-count indictment, returned on June 12 and unsealed today, named the following individuals:


Kashma Jordan a/k/a Gold, 32, of 3349 Lodwick Drive, Warren, Ohio, 44485;

Robert Harvey a/k/a Bob, 38, of 2692 Brier Street SE, Warren, Ohio, 44484;

Juan Worthey, Jr. a/k/a Bones, 37, of 163 Church Street, Washington, Pennsylvania, 15301;

Mario Rodgers a/k/a Rio, 39, of 527 Washington Street NE, Warren, Ohio, 44483;

Brandon Wise a/k/a B-Wise, 28, of 133 Maple Avenue, Washington, Pennsylvania, 15301;

Allan Williams, 37, of 4475 Berkshire Drive SE, Warren, Ohio, 44485;

Will Levy a/k/a Q, 37, of 28 Central Avenue, Washington, Pennsylvania, 15301;

Keith Malone a/k/a K-Rizz, 36, of 940 Bruce Street, Washington, Pennsylvania, 15301;

Alex Hockett, 25, 311 W. Maiden Street, Washington, Pennsylvania, 15301;

Brent Anderson, 30, of 2920 Taft Street, Washington, Pennsylvania, 15301;

Eric Everett a/k/a Fifty, 27, of 207 S. 20th Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 17104;

Brandon Boone, 29, of 750 Cleveland Road, Washington, Pennsylvania, 15301;

Joshua Williams, 32, 305 Donnan Avenue, Apartment 2, Washington, Pennsylvania, 15301;

Christina Wright, 34, 735 Regent Drive, Washington, Pennsylvania, 15301;

Terrell Percy Williams a/k/a Rel, 33, of 1413 Soles Street, McKeesport, Pennsylvania, 15132;

Michael Porter, 30, of 501 Pirl Street, McKeesport, Pennsylvania, 15132;

and Derrick Knox, 31, of 804 Josephine Street, E. McKeesport, Pennsylvania, 15035.


According to the indictment, from in and around January 2011 and continuing thereafter to in and around June 2012, the 17 defendants and others conspired to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Additionally, Knox, Levy, Terrell Percy Williams, Wise, Malone, and Wright are charged in separate instances of distributing less than 500 grams of cocaine; Worthey is charged with distributing more than 500 grams of cocaine; and Wise also is charged with distributing less than 28 grams of cocaine base in and around Washington, Pennsylvania.


The law provides for a maximum sentence of not less than 10 years and up to life in prison, a fine of $10,000,000, or both. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the actual sentence imposed would be based upon the seriousness of the offenses and the prior criminal history, if any, of the defendant.


Assistant United States Attorney Barbara K. Swartz is prosecuting this case on behalf of the government.


The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Pennsylvania State Police conducted the investigation leading to the indictment in this case.


An indictment is an accusation. A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
CONFIDENTIAL from the FBI – GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion
		
	
	

		


WASHINGTON—Global health care giant GlaxoSmithKline LLC (GSK) agreed to plead guilty and to pay $3 billion to resolve its criminal and civil liability arising from the company’s unlawful promotion of certain prescription drugs, its failure to report certain safety data, and its civil liability for alleged false price reporting practices, the Justice Department announced today. The resolution is the largest health care fraud settlement in U.S. history and the largest payment ever by a drug company.


GSK agreed to plead guilty to a three-count criminal information, including two counts of introducing misbranded drugs, Paxil and Wellbutrin, into interstate commerce; and one count of failing to report safety data about the drug Avandia to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Under the terms of the plea agreement, GSK will pay a total of $1 billion, including a criminal fine of $956,814,400 and forfeiture in the amount of $43,185,600. The criminal plea agreement also includes certain non-monetary compliance commitments and certifications by GSK’s U.S. president and board of directors. GSK’s guilty plea and sentence is not final until accepted by the U.S. District Court.


GSK will also pay $2 billion to resolve its civil liabilities with the federal government under the False Claims Act, as well as the states. The civil settlement resolves claims relating to Paxil, Wellbutrin, and Avandia, as well as additional drugs, and also resolves pricing fraud allegations.


“Today’s multi-billion-dollar settlement is unprecedented in both size and scope. It underscores the administration’s firm commitment to protecting the American people and holding accountable those who commit health care fraud,” said James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General. “At every level, we are determined to stop practices that jeopardize patients’ health, harm taxpayers, and violate the public trust—and this historic action is a clear warning to any company that chooses to break the law.”


“Today’s historic settlement is a major milestone in our efforts to stamp out health care fraud,” said Bill Corr, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). “For a long time, our health care system had been a target for cheaters who thought they could make an easy profit at the expense of public safety, taxpayers, and the millions of Americans who depend on programs like Medicare and Medicaid. But thanks to strong enforcement actions like those we have announced today, that equation is rapidly changing.”


This resolution marks the culmination of an extensive investigation by special agents from HHS-OIG, FDA, and FBI, along with law enforcement partners across the federal government. Moving forward, GSK will be subject to stringent requirements under its corporate integrity agreement with HHS-OIG; this agreement is designed to increase accountability and transparency and prevent future fraud and abuse. Effective law enforcement partnerships and fraud prevention are hallmarks of the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT) initiative, which fosters government collaboration to fight fraud.


Criminal Plea Agreement


Under the provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a company in its application to the FDA must specify each intended use of a drug. After the FDA approves the product as safe and effective for a specified use, a company’s promotional activities must be limited to the intended uses that FDA approved. In fact, promotion by the manufacturer for other uses—known as “off-label uses”—renders the product “misbranded.”


Paxil: In the criminal information, the government alleges that, from April 1998 to August 2003, GSK unlawfully promoted Paxil for treating depression in patients under age 18, even though the FDA has never approved it for pediatric use. The United States alleges that, among other things, GSK participated in preparing, publishing, and distributing a misleading medical journal article that misreported that a clinical trial of Paxil demonstrated efficacy in the treatment of depression in patients under age 18, when the study failed to demonstrate efficacy. At the same time, the United States alleges, GSK did not make available data from two other studies in which Paxil also failed to demonstrate efficacy in treating depression in patients under 18. The United States further alleges that GSK sponsored dinner programs, lunch programs, spa programs and similar activities to promote the use of Paxil in children and adolescents. GSK paid a speaker to talk to an audience of doctors and paid for the meal or spa treatment for the doctors who attended. Since 2004, Paxil, like other antidepressants, included on its label a “black box warning” stating that antidepressants may increase the risk of suicidal thinking and behavior in short-term studies in patients under age 18. GSK agreed to plead guilty to misbranding Paxil in that its labeling was false and misleading regarding the use of Paxil for patients under 18.


Wellbutrin: The United States also alleges that, from January 1999 to December 2003, GSK promoted Wellbutrin, approved at that time only for major depressive disorder, for weight loss, the treatment of sexual dysfunction, substance addictions, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, among other off-label uses. The United States contends that GSK paid millions of dollars to doctors to speak at and attend meetings, sometimes at lavish resorts, at which the off-label uses of Wellbutrin were routinely promoted and also used sales representatives, sham advisory boards, and supposedly independent Continuing Medical Education (CME) programs to promote Wllbutrin for these unapproved uses. GSK has agreed to plead guilty to misbranding Wellbutrin in that its labeling did not bear adequate directions for these off-label uses.


For the Paxil and Wellbutrin misbranding offenses, GSK has agreed to pay a criminal fine and forfeiture of $757,387,200.


Avandia: The United States alleges that, between 2001 and 2007, GSK failed to include certain safety data about Avandia, a diabetes drug, in reports to the FDA that are meant to allow the FDA to determine if a drug continues to be safe for its approved indications and to spot drug safety trends. The missing information included data regarding certain post-marketing studies, as well as data regarding two studies undertaken in response to European regulators’ concerns about the cardiovascular safety of Avandia. Since 2007, the FDA has added two black box warnings to the Avandia label to alert physicians about the potential increased risk of congestive heart failure and myocardial infarction (heart attack). GSK has agreed to plead guilty to failing to report data to the FDA and has agreed to pay a criminal fine in the amount of $242,612,800 for its unlawful conduct concerning Avandia.


“This case demonstrates our continuing commitment to ensuring that the messages provided by drug manufacturers to physicians and patients are true and accurate and that decisions as to what drugs are prescribed to sick patients are based on best medical judgments, not false and misleading claims or improper financial inducements,” said Carmen Ortiz, U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts.


“Patients rely on their physicians to prescribe the drugs they need,” said John Walsh, U.S. Attorney for Colorado. “The pharmaceutical industries’ drive for profits can distort the information provided to physicians concerning drugs. This case will help to ensure that your physician will make prescribing decisions based on good science and not on misinformation, money, or favors provided by the pharmaceutical industry.”


Civil Settlement Agreement


As part of this global resolution, GSK has agreed to resolve its civil liability for the following alleged conduct: (1) promoting the drugs Paxil, Wellbutrin, Advair, Lamictal, and Zofran for off-label, non-covered uses and paying kickbacks to physicians to prescribe those drugs as well as the drugs Imitrex, Lotronex, Flovent, and Valtrex; (2) making false and misleading statements concerning the safety of Avandia; and (3) reporting false best prices and underpaying rebates owed under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program.


Off-Label Promotion and Kickbacks: The civil settlement resolves claims set forth in a complaint filed by the United States alleging that, in addition to promoting the drugs Paxil and Wellbutrin for unapproved, non-covered uses, GSK also promoted its asthma drug, Advair, for first-line therapy for mild asthma patients even though it was not approved or medically appropriate under these circumstances. GSK also promoted Advair for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with misleading claims as to the relevant treatment guidelines. The civil settlement also resolves allegations that GSK promoted Lamictal, an anti-epileptic medication, for off-label, non-covered psychiatric uses, neuropathic pain, and pain management. It further resolves allegations that GSK promoted certain forms of Zofran, approved only for post-operative nausea, for the treatment of morning sickness in pregnant women. It also includes allegations that GSK paid kickbacks to health care professionals to induce them to promote and prescribe these drugs as well as the drugs Imitrex, Lotronex, Flovent, and Valtrex. The United States alleges that this conduct caused false claims to be submitted to federal health care programs.


GSK has agreed to pay $1.043 billion relating to false claims arising from this alleged conduct. The federal share of this settlement is $832 million and the state share is $210 million.


This off-label civil settlement resolves four lawsuits pending in federal court in the District of Massachusetts under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act, which allow private citizens to bring civil actions on behalf of the United States and share in any recovery.


Avandia: In its civil settlement agreement, the United States alleges that GSK promoted Avandia to physicians and other health care providers with false and misleading representations about Avandia’s safety profile, causing false claims to be submitted to federal health care programs. Specifically, the United States alleges that GSK stated that Avandia had a positive cholesterol profile despite having no well-controlled studies to support that message. The United States also alleges that the company sponsored programs suggesting cardiovascular benefits from Avandia therapy despite warnings on the FDA-approved label regarding cardiovascular risks. GSK has agreed to pay $657 million relating to false claims arising from misrepresentations about Avandia. The federal share of this settlement is $508 million and the state share is $149 million.


Price Reporting: GSK is also resolving allegations that, between 1994 and 2003, GSK and its corporate predecessors reported false drug prices, which resulted in GSK’s underpaying rebates owed under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. By law, GSK was required to report the lowest, or “best” price that it charged its customers and to pay quarterly rebates to the states based on those reported prices. When drugs are sold to purchasers in contingent arrangements known as “bundles,” the discounts offered for the bundled drugs must be reallocated across all products in the bundle proportionate to the dollar value of the units sold. The United States alleges that GSK had bundled sales arrangements that included steep discounts known as “nominal” pricing and yet failed to take such contingent arrangements into account when calculating and reporting its best prices to the Department of Health and Human Services. Had it done so, the effective prices on certain drugs would have been different, and, in some instances, triggered a new, lower best price than what GSK reported. As a result, GSK underpaid rebates due to Medicaid and overcharged certain Public Health Service entities for its drugs, the United States contends. GSK has agreed to pay $300 million to resolve these allegations, including $160,972,069 to the federal government, $118,792,931 to the states, and $20,235,000 to certain Public Health Service entities who paid inflated prices for the drugs at issue.


Except to the extent that GSK has agreed to plead guilty to the three-count criminal information, the claims settled by these agreements are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.


“This landmark settlement demonstrates the department’s commitment to protecting the American public against illegal conduct and fraud by pharmaceutical companies,” said Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Doctors need truthful, fair, balanced information when deciding whether the benefits of a drug outweigh its safety risks. By the same token, the FDA needs all necessary safety-related information to identify safety trends and to determine whether a drug is safe and effective. Unlawful promotion of drugs for unapproved uses and failing to report adverse drug experiences to the FDA can tip the balance of those important decisions, and the Justice Department will not tolerate attempts by those who seek to corrupt our health care system in this way.”


Non-Monetary Provisions and Corporate Integrity Agreement


In addition to the criminal and civil resolutions, GSK has executed a five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). The plea agreement and CIA include novel provisions that require that GSK implement and/or maintain major changes to the way it does business, including changing the way its sales force is compensated to remove compensation based on sales goals for territories, one of the driving forces behind much of the conduct at issue in this matter. Under the CIA, GSK is required to change its executive compensation program to permit the company to recoup annual bonuses and long-term incentives from covered executives if they, or their subordinates, engage in significant misconduct. GSK may recoup funds from executives who are current employees and those who have left the company. Among other things, the CIA also requires GSK to implement and maintain transparency in its research practices and publication policies and to follow specified policies in its contracts with various health care payors.


“Our five-year integrity agreement with GlaxoSmithKline requires individual accountability of its board and executives,” said Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. “For example, company executives may have to forfeit annual bonuses if they or their subordinates engage in significant misconduct, and sales agents are now being paid based on quality of service rather than sales targets.”


“The FDA Office of Criminal Investigations will aggressively pursue pharmaceutical companies that choose to put profits before the public’s health,” said Deborah M. Autor, Esq., Deputy Commissioner for Global Regulatory Operations and Policy, U.S. Food and Drug Administration. “We will continue to work with the Justice Department and our law enforcement counterparts to target companies that disregard the protections of the drug approval process by promoting drugs for uses when they have not been proven to be safe and effective for those uses and that fail to report required drug safety information to the FDA.”


“The record settlement obtained by the multi-agency investigative team shows not only the importance of working with our partners but also the importance of the public providing their knowledge of suspect schemes to the government,” said Kevin Perkins, Acting Executive Assistant Director of the FBI’s Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch. “Together, we will continue to bring to justice those engaged in illegal schemes that threaten the safety of prescription drugs and other critical elements of our nation’s healthcare system.”


“Federal employees deserve health care providers and suppliers, including drug manufacturers, that meet the highest standards of ethical and professional behavior,” said Patrick E. McFarland, Inspector General of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. “Today’s settlement reminds the pharmaceutical industry that they must observe those standards and reflects the commitment of federal law enforcement organizations to pursue improper and illegal conduct that places health care consumers at risk.”


“Today’s announcement illustrates the efforts of VA-OIG and its law enforcement partners in ensuring the integrity of the medical care provided our nation’s veterans by the Department of Veterans Affairs,” said George J. Opfer, Inspector General of the Department of Veterans Affairs. “The monetary recoveries realized by VA in this settlement will directly benefit VA healthcare programs that provide for veterans’ continued care.”


“This settlement sends a clear message that taking advantage of federal health care programs has substantial consequences for those who try,” said Rafael A. Medina, Special Agent in Charge of the Northeast Area Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Postal Service. “The U.S. Postal Service pays more than one billion dollars a year in workers’ compensation benefits and our office is committed to pursuing those individuals or entities whose fraudulent acts continue to unfairly add to that cost.”


A Multilateral Effort


The criminal case is being prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts and the Civil Division’s Consumer Protection Branch. The civil settlement was reached by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado, and the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch. Assistance was provided by the HHS Office of Counsel to the Inspector General, Office of the General Counsel-CMS Division, and FDA’s Office of Chief Counsel, as well as the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units.


This matter was investigated by agents from the HHS-OIG; the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations; the Defense Criminal Investigative Service of the Department of Defense; the Office of the Inspector General for the Office of Personnel Management; the Department of Veterans Affairs; the Department of Labor; TRICARE Program Integrity; the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Postal Service; and the FBI.


This resolution is part of the government’s emphasis on combating health care fraud and another step for the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT) initiative, which was announced in May 2009 by Attorney General Eric Holder and Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of HHS. The partnership between the two departments has focused efforts to reduce and prevent Medicare and Medicaid financial fraud through enhanced cooperation. Over the last three years, the department has recovered a total of more than $10.2 billion in settlements, judgments, fines, restitution, and forfeiture in health care fraud matters pursued under the False Claims Act and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.


Court documents related to today’s settlement can be viewed online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/gsk-docs.html.



	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
Cryptome unveils – Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
		
	
	

		












[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 124 (Wednesday, June 27, 2012)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 38248-38266]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-15746]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 239

[Docket No. FRA-2011-0062, Notice No. 1; 2130-AC33]

Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to revise its regulations for passenger train 
emergency preparedness. These proposed revisions would: ensure that 
railroad personnel who communicate and coordinate with first responders 
during emergency situations receive initial and periodic training and 
are subject to operational (efficiency) tests and inspections; clarify 
that railroads must develop procedures in their emergency preparedness 
plans (e-prep plans) addressing the safe evacuation of passengers with 
disabilities during emergency situations; limit the need for FRA to 
formally approve purely administrative changes to approved e-prep 
plans; specify new operational (efficiency) testing and inspection 
requirements for both operating and non-operating employees; and remove 
as unnecessary the section on the preemptive effect of the regulations.

DATES: Comments: Written comments must be received by August 27, 2012. 
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent 
possible without incurring additional expense or delay.
    Hearing: FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking 
without a public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific 
request for a public, oral hearing prior to July 27, 2012, one will be 
scheduled and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal 
Register to inform interested parties of the date, time, and location 
of any such hearing.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2011-0062, 
Notice No. 1, may be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal, 
www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site's online instructions for 
submitting comments.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140, Washington, 
DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department 
of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the 
Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name, docket 
name and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for 
this rulemaking (2130-AC33). Note that all comments received will be 
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any 
personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading in 
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act 
information related to any submitted comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or 
visit the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the Ground 
level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniel Knote, Staff Director, 
Passenger Rail Division, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 
Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Safety, Mail Stop 25, West 
Building 3rd Floor, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 
(telephone: 202-493-6350); or Brian Roberts, Trial Attorney, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office 
of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, West Building 3rd Floor,

[[Page 38249]]

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-
6056).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
    A. 1998 Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Final Rule
    B. 2008 Passenger Train Emergency Systems (PTES I) Final Rule
    C. 2012 Passenger Train Emergency Systems (PTES II) NPRM
    D. The Need for Revisions to Passenger Train Emergency 
Preparedness Regulations
    E. RSAC Overview
    F. Passenger Safety Working Group
    G. General Passenger Safety Task Force
III. Section-by-Section Analysis
IV. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272; Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Assessment
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. International Trade Impact Assessment
    F. Environmental Impact
    G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    H. Energy Impact
    I. Privacy Act

I. Executive Summary

    FRA is issuing this NPRM to revise FRA's passenger train emergency 
preparedness regulations. This NPRM is intended to clarify certain 
requirements and address issues that have arisen since the regulations 
were issued in May 1998. This NPRM is based on language developed by 
the General Passenger Safety Task Force (Task Force), a subgroup of the 
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), to resolve four main issues 
involving the regulations. The Task Force developed recommendations 
principally to: (1) Ensure that railroad personnel who communicate and 
coordinate with first responders during emergency situations receive 
initial and periodic training and are subject to operational 
(efficiency) tests and inspections under part 239; (2) clarify that 
railroads must develop procedures in their e-prep plans addressing the 
safe evacuation of passengers with disabilities during an emergency 
situation; (3) limit the need for FRA to formally approve purely 
administrative changes to approved e-prep plans; and (4) specify new 
operational (efficiency) testing and inspection requirements for both 
operating and non-operating employees for railroads covered by part 
239. The recommendations developed by the Task Force were approved by 
the full RSAC, and they form the basis of this NPRM.
    Among the NPRM's main proposals, the rule would:
     Clarify the types of railroad personnel who are required 
to be trained or be subjected to operational (efficiency) testing and 
inspections under part 239. This would include railroad personnel who 
directly coordinate with emergency responders;
     Clarify that operational (efficiency) testing under part 
239 can be conducted under and considered part of the railroad's 
efficiency testing program under 49 CFR part 217;
     Allow purely administrative changes to railroad e-prep 
plans to be excluded from the formal review and approval process 
required for more substantive amendments to e-prep plans under part 
239;
     Clarify that railroads must include procedures in their e-
prep plans addressing the safe evacuation of persons with disabilities 
during emergency situations as well as full-scale simulations of 
emergency situations; and
     Remove as unnecessary the section on the preemptive effect 
of the regulations.
    In analyzing the economic impacts of this proposed rule, FRA found 
that proposed regulatory changes would enhance the emergency planning 
process currently in place in part 239. FRA has quantified the costs 
associated with this NPRM. Any additional costs associated with 
amending part 239 would be mostly related to the inclusion of 
additional personnel in the testing and training programs required by 
part 239. Railroads would see reduced burdens in the filing and 
approval process of e-prep plans with non-substantive changes. The 
industry, however, would be subject to additional burden from minor new 
requirements for the submission of e-prep plans to make the review and 
approval of e-prep plans more efficient. Total costs over the next 10 
years are estimated to be $1,049,308 (or present value of $734,922 when 
discounted at 7 percent).
    FRA has analyzed the benefits associated with this rule. Benefits 
would accrue from the increased likelihood that the passenger railroads 
would handle external communications more efficiently, expediting the 
arrival of emergency responders to the accident scene, and from the 
ability of the railroad personnel to minimize health and safety risks 
through improved internal and external communications. FRA utilized a 
break-even analysis to quantify the minimum safety benefits necessary 
for the proposed rule to be cost-effective, considering the estimated 
quantified costs. The break-even point was found to be a reduction in 
severity of 3.84 injuries from Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) level 2 
to AIS level 1. Safety benefits are estimated to total $1,091,200 when 
four injuries have their severity mitigated from AIS 2 to AIS 1. Total 
discounted benefits are estimated to be $735,757 (PV 7 percent). The 
benefits for this proposed rule would exceed the estimated costs when 
four injuries are prevented from increasing in severity from an AIS 1 
to an AIS 2. FRA believes the proposed changes in this rulemaking will 
more than exceed the break-even estimate.

II. Background

A. 1998 Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Final Rule

    On May 4, 1998, FRA published a final rule on passenger train 
emergency preparedness that was codified at 49 CFR part 239. See 63 FR 
24629 (May 4, 1998). The rule addresses passenger train emergencies of 
various kinds, including security situations, and sets minimum Federal 
safety standards for the preparation, adoption, and implementation of 
e-prep plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger 
trains. The existing rule requires e-prep plans to include elements 
such as communication, employee training and qualification, joint 
operations, tunnel safety, liaison with emergency responders, on-board 
emergency equipment, and passenger safety information. Under the 
requirements of the rule, each affected railroad is required to 
instruct its employees on the applicable provisions of its plan. In 
addition, the plan adopted by each railroad is subject to formal review 
and approval by FRA. The rule also requires each railroad operating 
passenger train service to conduct emergency simulations to determine 
its capability to execute the e-prep plan under the variety of 
emergency scenarios that could reasonably be expected to occur.
    In promulgating the rule, FRA also established specific 
requirements for passenger train emergency systems. Among these are 
requirements that all emergency window exits and windows intended for 
rescue access by emergency responders be marked accordingly and that 
instructions be provided for their use. In addition, FRA established 
requirements that all door exits intended for egress be lighted or 
marked, all door exits intended for rescue access by emergency 
responders be marked, and that instructions be provided for their use.

[[Page 38250]]

B. 2008 Passenger Train Emergency Systems (PTES I) Final Rule

    In 2008, FRA revisited requirements for emergency systems on 
passenger trains by enhancing existing requirements for emergency 
window exits and establishing new requirements for rescue access 
windows used by emergency responders to evacuate passengers. See 73 FR 
6369 (February 1, 2008). While this final rule did not make any changes 
to the passenger train emergency preparedness regulations, the rule 
expanded existing requirements that were previously only applicable to 
passenger trains operating at speeds in excess of 125 mph but not 
exceeding 150 mph (Tier II passenger trains) to passenger trains 
operating at speeds not exceeding 125 mph (Tier I passenger trains), 
see Sec.  238.5. Specifically, Tier I passenger trains were required to 
be equipped with public address and intercom systems for emergency 
communication, as well as provide emergency roof access for use by 
emergency responders. FRA applied certain requirements to both existing 
and new passenger equipment, while other requirements applied only to 
new passenger equipment.

C. 2012 Passenger Train Emergency Systems (PTES II) NPRM

    On January 3, 2012, FRA published an NPRM proposing to enhance 
existing requirements as well as create new requirements for passenger 
train emergency systems. See 77 FR 154 (January 3, 2012). The NPRM 
proposes to add emergency passage requirements for interior vestibule 
doors as well as enhance emergency egress and rescue access signage 
requirements. The NPRM also proposes requirements for low-location 
emergency exit path markings, the creation of minimum emergency 
lighting standards for existing passenger cars, and enhancements to 
existing requirements for the survivability of emergency lighting 
systems in new passenger cars.
    Additionally, the NPRM proposes changes to FRA's passenger train 
emergency preparedness regulations in part 239. These changes include 
clarifying existing requirements for participation in debriefing and 
critique sessions following both passenger train emergency situations 
and full-scale simulations. Under the current regulation, a debriefing 
and critique session is required after each passenger train emergency 
situation or full-scale simulation to determine the effectiveness of 
the railroad's e-prep plan. See Sec.  239.105. The railroad is then 
required to improve or amend its plan, or both, in accordance with the 
information gathered from the session. Language proposed in the PTES II 
NPRM clarifies that, to the extent practicable, all on-board personnel, 
control center personnel, and any other employee involved in the 
emergency situation or full-scale simulation shall participate in the 
debriefing and critique session. The proposed rule would also clarify 
that employees be provided flexibility to participate in the debrief 
and critique sessions through a variety of different methods.

D. The Need for Revisions to Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness 
Regulations

    Among FRA's reasons for initiating this rulemaking, FRA learned 
that there was confusion regarding certain requirements within FRA's 
passenger train emergency preparedness regulations. For example, FRA 
learned that some passenger railroads were confused as to which types 
of railroad personnel were required to be trained or be subjected to 
operational (efficiency) testing and inspections under part 239. These 
railroads were unclear whether part 239 required certain railroad 
personnel who directly coordinate with emergency responders and other 
outside organizations during emergency situations to be trained or be 
subjected to operational (efficiency) testing and inspections. As a 
result, FRA believes that it is necessary to clarify the regulatory 
language in part 239 to ensure that railroad personnel who directly 
coordinate with emergency responders actually receive the proper 
training and are subject to operational (efficiency) testing and 
inspections. FRA also learned that many railroads were unclear whether 
operational (efficiency) testing under part 239 could be considered for 
purposes of the railroad's efficiency testing program required under 49 
CFR part 217.
    In addition, as a result of FRA's experience in reviewing and 
approving passenger railroads' e-prep plans that are updated 
periodically, FRA realized that a number of the changes were purely 
administrative in nature. While part 239 currently subjects all changes 
to an e-prep plan to a formal review and approval process, FRA believes 
that such purely administrative changes should be excluded from the 
process so that the agency can focus its resources on more substantive 
matters.
    Finally, FRA believed it was necessary to clarify part 239 to 
address the requirements of Executive Order 13347. 69 FR 44573 (July 
26, 2004). Executive Order 13347 requires, among other things, that 
Federal agencies encourage State, local, and tribal governments, 
private organizations, and individuals to consider in their emergency 
preparedness planning the unique needs of individuals with disabilities 
whom they serve. While under part 239 the unique needs of passengers 
with disabilities must already be considered in the railroads' e-prep 
plans, the NPRM would clarify the railroads' responsibilities.

E. RSAC Overview

    In March 1996, FRA established RSAC as a forum for collaborative 
rulemaking and program development. RSAC includes representatives from 
all of the agency's major stakeholder groups, including railroads, 
labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested 
parties. A list of member groups follows:
     American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners 
(AAPRCO);
     American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO);
     American Chemistry Council;
     American Petroleum Institute;
     American Public Transportation Association (APTA);
     American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 
(ASLRRA);
     American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA);
     Association of American Railroads (AAR);
     Association of Railway Museums;
     Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
     Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
     Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division 
(BMWED);
     Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
     Chlorine Institute;
     Federal Transit Administration (FTA);*
     Fertilizer Institute;
     High Speed Ground Transportation Association;
     Institute of Makers of Explosives;
     International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers;
     International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers;
     Labor Council for Latin American Advancement;*
     League of Railway Industry Women;*
     National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
     National Association of Railway Business Women;*
     National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
     National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association 
(NRCMA);

[[Page 38251]]

     National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
     National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);*
     Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
     Safe Travel America (STA);
     Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte;*
     Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
     Tourist Railway Association, Inc.;
     Transport Canada;*
     Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
     Transportation Communications International Union/BRC 
(TCIU/BRC);
     Transportation Security Administration (TSA);* and
     United Transportation Union (UTU).
    *Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after 
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the 
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations 
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more 
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a 
given task. The individual task force then provides that information to 
the working group for consideration. When a working group comes to 
unanimous consensus on recommendations for action, the package is 
presented to the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a 
simple majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. 
FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because 
FRA staff members play an active role at the working group level in 
discussing the issues and options and in drafting the language of the 
consensus proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC 
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the 
recommendation, and the agency exercises its independent judgment on 
whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is 
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal 
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC 
recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal or final 
rule. Any such variations would be noted and explained in the 
rulemaking document issued by FRA. However, to the maximum extent 
practicable, FRA utilizes RSAC to provide consensus recommendations 
with respect to both proposed and final agency action. If RSAC is 
unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, the task is 
withdrawn and FRA determines the best course of action.

F. Passenger Safety Working Group

    The RSAC established the Passenger Safety Working Group (Working 
Group) to handle the task of reviewing passenger equipment safety needs 
and programs and recommending consideration of specific actions that 
could be useful in advancing the safety of rail passenger service and 
develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of the 
Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), 
CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), and Union Pacific Railroad Company 
(UP);
     AAPRCO;
     AASHTO;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., Herzog 
Transit Services, Inc., Interfleet Technology, Inc. (Interfleet, 
formerly LDK Engineering, Inc.), Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), Maryland 
Transit Administration (MTA), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company 
(Metro-North), Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad 
Corporation, Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), 
and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
     ASLRRA;
     BLET;
     BRS;
     FTA;
     NARP;
     NTSB;
     RSI;
     SMWIA;
     STA;
     TCIU/BRC;
     TSA;
     TWU; and
     UTU.
    In 2007, the Working Group tasked the Task Force (General Passenger 
Safety Task Force) to resolve four issues involving FRA's regulations 
related to passenger train emergency preparedness. The issues taken up 
by the Task Force were: (1) Ensure that railroad personnel who 
communicate and coordinate with first responders during emergency 
situations receive initial and periodic training and are subject to 
operational (efficiency) tests and inspections under part 239; (2) 
clarify that railroads must develop procedures in their e-prep plans 
addressing the safe evacuation of passengers with disabilities during 
an emergency situation; (3) limit the need for FRA to formally approve 
purely administrative changes to approved e-prep plans and update FRA 
headquarters' address; and (4) specify new operational (efficiency) 
testing and inspection requirements for both operating and non-
operating employees for railroads covered by part 239.
    While the Task Force was initially charged with updating FRA 
headquarters' address as it appeared in various regulations found in 
part 239, FRA has already amended its regulations to update the address 
of the physical headquarters of FRA and the U.S. Department of 
Transportation in Washington, DC. See 74 FR 25169 (May 27, 2009).

G. General Passenger Safety Task Force

    Members of the Task Force include representatives from various 
organizations that are part of the larger Working Group. Members of the 
Task Force, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR, including members from BNSF, CSXT, Norfolk Southern 
Railway Co., and UP;
     AASHTO;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Alaska Railroad Corporation, 
Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain), LIRR, Massachusetts 
Bay Commuter Railroad Company, Metro-North, MTA, New Jersey Transit 
Corporation, New Mexico Rail Runner Express, Port Authority Trans-
Hudson, SEPTA, Metrolink, and Utah Transit Authority;
     ASLRRA;
     ATDA;
     BLET;
     FTA;
     NARP;
     NRCMA;
     NTSB;
     Transport Canada; and
     UTU.
    The full Task Force met together on the following dates and in the 
following locations to discuss the four e-prep-related issues charged 
to the Task Force:
     July 18-19, 2007, in Chicago, IL;
     December 12-13, 2007, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     April 23-24, 2008, in San Diego, CA; and
     December 3, 2008, in Cambridge, MA.
    Staff from the Volpe Center attended all of the meetings and 
contributed to the technical discussions through their comments and 
presentations. To aid the Task Force in its delegated task, FRA's 
Office of Chief Counsel drafted regulatory text for discussion 
purposes. Task Force members made changes to

[[Page 38252]]

this draft text. Minutes of each of these Task Force meetings are part 
of the docket in this proceeding and are available for public 
inspection. The Task Force reached consensus on all four assigned tasks 
and adopted the draft text created from its meetings as a 
recommendation to the Working Group on December 4, 2008.
    FRA's Office of Chief Counsel revised the Task Force's 
recommendation to conform to technical drafting guidelines and to 
clarify the intent of the recommendation. On June 8, 2009, the Task 
Force presented both its initial consensus language as well as the 
consensus language revised by FRA's Office of Chief Counsel to the 
Working Group. The Working Group approved the Task Force's initial and 
revised consensus language at its June 8, 2009 meeting in Washington, 
DC. The consensus language was then presented before the full RSAC on 
June 25, 2009, where it was approved by unanimous vote. Thus, the 
Working Group's recommendation was adopted by the full RSAC as a 
recommendation to FRA.
    While RSAC's recommendation has provided a strong basis for this 
proposed rule, FRA has varied from the recommendation principally in 
one substantive way: FRA has declined to adopt the RSAC's 
recommendation to add language to Sec.  239.101(a)(2)(ii) that would 
require control center and ERCC personnel to receive initial and 
periodic training only on those portions of the railroad's e-prep plan 
that relate to their specific duties under the plan. FRA explains this 
decision, below. FRA has also made minor changes for purposes of 
clarity and formatting in the Federal Register, but these changes are 
not intended to affect the RSAC's consensus recommendation.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

Subpart A--General

Section 239.5 Preemptive Effect
    FRA is proposing to remove this section on the preemptive effect of 
the regulations. FRA believes that this section is unnecessary because 
it is duplicative of statutory law at 49 U.S.C. 20106 and case law, 
which sufficiently address the preemptive scope of FRA's regulations.
Section 239.7 Definitions
    FRA is proposing that this section be amended to add a definition 
for the new term ``emergency response communications center'' (ERCC) to 
mean a central location designated by a railroad with responsibility 
for establishing, coordinating, or maintaining communication with 
emergency responders, representatives of adjacent modes of 
transportation, and appropriate railroad officials during a passenger 
train emergency. The ERCC may be part of the railroad's ``control 
center.'' The RSAC recommended that such a definition be added to this 
section, and FRA agrees with the RSAC's recommendation for the reasons 
stated below.
    Currently, the requirements of part 239 do not specifically apply 
to ERCC personnel but rather to personnel in a control center, i.e., a 
central location on a railroad with responsibility for directing the 
safe movement of trains. The individuals working in these train 
dispatch centers are subject to emergency preparedness plan training 
and operational (efficiency) tests and inspections. See 49 CFR 239.101. 
However, only requiring control center personnel to receive training on 
a railroad's emergency preparedness plan may be problematic because in 
many railroads' operational structures train dispatchers only notify 
internal railroad officials about an emergency situation and provide 
block protection for the affected train(s) or equipment involved in the 
incident. While an ERCC can be part of a railroad's dispatch center, 
most railroads maintain a separate center within their organizational 
structure that establishes and maintains communications with emergency 
first responders, adjacent modes of transportation, and appropriate 
railroad officials. In addition, ERCCs assist in coordinating the 
actual emergency response with first responders.
    This NPRM proposes to define ERCCs, which provide vital services 
during an emergency situation, and include the definition in various 
provisions of part 239 that address training, testing, and inspection 
requirements. By including this definition in the existing regulation, 
FRA can expressly require that ERCC personnel, who directly interact 
with emergency first responders, receive the proper training, testing, 
and oversight under the regulation to appropriately prepare for and 
respond to an emergency situation.
    The definition of ERCC recommended by the RSAC and that FRA is 
proposing in this rulemaking provides the railroads with maximum 
flexibility in designating what centers or groups of individuals within 
the railroad's organizational structure qualify as ERCCs and are 
responsible for communicating with the emergency first responders and 
other outside entities during an emergency situation on the railroad. 
With this flexibility, each affected railroad can ensure that the 
correct center or group of individuals within the railroad's 
organizational structure receives training on the railroad's e-prep 
plan, and that the center or group of individuals is subject to 
operational (efficiency) tests and inspections regardless of how the 
center or group of individuals is organized within the railroad.

Subpart B--Specific Requirements

Section 239.101 Emergency Preparedness Plan
    Each railroad subject to the regulation is required to establish an 
e-prep plan under this section that is designed to safely manage 
emergencies and minimize subsequent trauma and injury to passengers and 
on-board personnel. FRA is proposing to revise this section in several 
different ways. Additional language is being proposed to the following 
paragraphs of this section: paragraphs (a)(1)(ii), and (a)(2)(ii) 
through (v). Conversely, this NPRM proposes to remove language from 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii). Finally, FRA is proposing to create an entire new 
paragraph (a)(8). Each proposed change to this section is addressed 
below by paragraph.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(ii). As currently written, paragraph (a)(1) 
requires railroad control center or dispatch personnel to notify 
outside emergency responders, adjacent rail modes of transportation, 
and appropriate railroad officials when a passenger train emergency has 
occurred. However, a number of railroads have found it inefficient to 
use the control center or railroad dispatcher to perform these duties 
during an emergency situation because the personnel are likely 
providing block protection for the incident as well as performing their 
usual dispatching duties for other parts of the railroad unaffected by 
the emergency event. Instead, many railroads currently maintain in 
their organizational structure a separate center or desk within, or 
even completely separate from, the railroad dispatch center that 
establishes and maintains communications with internal and external 
organizations during a railroad emergency. See the discussion in Sec.  
239.7, above.
    Consequently, FRA is proposing to add specific language to this 
paragraph that would provide for ERCCs to notify outside emergency 
responders, adjacent rail modes of transportation, and appropriate 
railroad officials, when an emergency occurs under the passenger 
railroad's e-prep plan. Without this proposed language, the regulation 
would continue to place these responsibilities specifically on control

[[Page 38253]]

center personnel working in the railroad dispatch office. Instead, the 
regulation would now clearly recognize that railroads have the 
flexibility to decide which part of railroad operations should handle 
these tasks during an emergency situation.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(ii). Similar to the proposed change to paragraph 
(a)(1)(ii), additional language is being proposed to paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii) that would require ERCC personnel to receive initial and 
periodic training on appropriate courses of action for each potential 
emergency situation. Under this paragraph, initial and periodic 
training is already required for control center personnel. FRA also 
proposes adding language to this paragraph clarifying that control 
center or ERCC personnel can be employees of the railroad, as well as 
contractors, subcontractors, or employees of a contractor or 
subcontractor to the railroad. FRA notes that contractors, 
subcontractors, and employees of a contactor or subcontractor to the 
railroad are already subject to the requirements of part 239 when 
performing functions under this part per the requirements of Sec.  
239.9. Nonetheless, for clarity FRA is revising the rule text in 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii) and the text in various other paragraphs of this 
part to make clear that contractors, subcontractors, and employees of a 
contractor or subcontractor are indeed covered under the requirements 
of this part.
    FRA notes that RSAC reached consensus on adding language that would 
require control center and ERCC personnel to receive initial and 
periodic training only on those portions of the railroad's e-prep plan 
that relate to their specific duties under the plan. However, FRA 
believes that adding this language could create safety concerns and 
therefore declines to propose adding such language to this paragraph in 
this NPRM. Specifically, FRA is concerned that if individuals receive 
only initial and periodic training on the very specific parts of the 
railroad's e-prep plan they are required to perform during an emergency 
situation, a railroad's entire emergency response could be hindered if 
specific individuals happen to be absent during an actual emergency 
situation. For example, if a specific control center or ERCC employee 
is required under the railroad's e-prep plan to notify internal 
railroad personnel during an emergency situation that an emergency 
situation on the railroad has occurred, and that employee is absent or 
incapacitated during an actual emergency, then the railroad's emergency 
response may be hindered. By ensuring that control center and ERCC 
personnel receive broader initial and periodic training on appropriate 
courses of action on potential emergency situations beyond the 
individual's specific duties under the railroad's e-prep plan, these 
individuals will have a more holistic view of the railroad's emergency 
response and therefore be better prepared to respond to an emergency 
situation regardless of the specific circumstances.
    FRA believes that training control center and ERCC personnel on the 
railroad's entire e-prep plan, not just the specific portions of the 
plan that relate to their specific duties, will not add any additional 
cost to the railroads because the railroads are already providing this 
broader level of training to their employees. Many railroads provide 
this holistic training on the railroad's e-prep plan through an 
informational video, which provides useful information to the employees 
on all levels of the railroad's emergency response.
    FRA also proposes to amend paragraphs (a)(2)(ii)(A) through (D). In 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A), FRA proposes to remove the word ``dispatch'' 
before ``territory familiarization.'' The Task Force recommended that 
the word ``dispatch'' be removed from this subsection so that control 
center and ERCC personnel who are not railroad dispatchers would not be 
required to be as familiar with a territory as dispatchers are required 
to be under current railroad operating rules. For example, to conduct 
their duties efficiently and safely, railroad dispatchers are required 
to memorize the physical characteristics of the railroad territory over 
which they control train movements. While this is necessary for a 
railroad dispatcher, the Task Force believed, and FRA agrees, that this 
level of familiarity with railroad territory is not necessary for 
individuals working in a control center or ERCC who are not railroad 
dispatchers.
    Therefore, FRA proposes that the word ``dispatch'' be struck from 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A). Individuals working in control centers or 
ERCCs who are not also railroad dispatchers would not be required to 
have complete dispatch territory familiarization in their capacity to 
assist in emergency situations. If the proposed language is adopted, 
railroads would not have to spend resources training all control center 
and ERCC personnel who are not railroad dispatchers to be as familiar 
with the railroad territory in question. Instead, for the purposes of 
this paragraph, territory familiarization would focus on, but not be 
limited to: access points for emergency responders along the railroad's 
right-of-way; special circumstances (e.g., tunnels); parallel 
operations; and other operating conditions (e.g., elevated structures, 
bridges, and electrified territory) including areas along the 
railroad's right-of-way that are remote and known to present challenges 
for emergency personnel responding to a passenger train emergency.
    To complement the proposed language in paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A), 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) would require initial and periodic training for 
control center and ERCC personnel on their ability to access and 
retrieve information that would aid emergency personnel in responding 
to an emergency situation. (Current paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) would be 
redesignated as proposed paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(C), below). Under the 
proposed regulation, control center and ERCC personnel would be 
required to receive sufficient training to be able to retrieve 
information to assist emergency personnel in their emergency response. 
For example, under a railroad's e-prep plan, a railroad employee 
designated as part of an ERCC might be required to be trained on how to 
electronically retrieve a map of railroad property, read it properly, 
and identify and describe important points of access to emergency 
responders.
    Language is also proposed to be added to paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(C) 
(redesignated from (a)(2)(ii)(B)). This new proposed language would 
require control center and ERCC personnel to receive initial and 
periodic training on the railroad's e-prep plan, including what 
protocols govern internal communications between these two groups when 
an actual emergency situation occurs. The language ``as applicable 
under the plan,'' would also be added to the regulatory text to 
emphasize that due to the variety of possible organizational designs on 
how railroads handle emergency responses, it is ultimately each 
individual railroad's decision on what protocols will be followed to 
govern internal communication between control center and ERCC 
personnel.
    Finally, a new paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(D) is proposed. This new 
paragraph reflects the Task Force's recommendation that initial and 
periodic e-prep plan training should include the protocols for 
establishing and maintaining external communications between the 
railroad's control center or ERCC, or both, and emergency responders. 
The Task Force recommended and FRA agrees that adding this requirement 
will ensure that control center and ERCC personnel receive initial and 
periodic training on what protocols need to be followed to

[[Page 38254]]

establish and maintain communications with external organizations 
assisting in the emergency response. The Task Force and FRA believe 
that it is just as important for control center and ERCC personnel to 
learn the protocols for establishing and maintaining communications 
with external organizations as for the protocols governing internal 
communications between centers being proposed in paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii)(C).
    FRA also realizes that if these proposed changes to part 239's 
emergency preparedness plan requirements are adopted, then railroads 
may have to amend their e-prep plans in order to be in compliance with 
the new requirements. Therefore, FRA intends to provide railroads 
sufficient time to have their amended e-prep plans submitted to FRA for 
review after the final rule making these changes is issued. FRA is 
considering lengthening the effective date of the final rule to do so, 
and invites comment on this issue.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(iii). FRA is proposing to add language to 
paragraph (a)(2)(iii) that would require ERCC personnel to be included 
in the initial training after the e-prep plan is approved under Sec.  
239.201(b)(1). It is important that ERCC personnel be included in this 
training because, depending on the organizational structure of the 
railroad, the actions of ERCC personnel during an emergency response 
situation may be more pivotal to the successful implementation of the 
plan than the actions of control center personnel. Language is also 
proposed to be added to paragraph (a)(2)(iii) so that not only would 
control center and ERCC personnel who are employed by the railroad be 
covered by the regulation, but also control center and ERCC personnel 
who are railroad contractors and subcontractors as well as employees of 
these contractors and subcontractors. The proposed heading of this 
paragraph reflects this change as well.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(iv). Similar to the proposed language in paragraph 
(a)(2)(iii), this NPRM proposes to add language to paragraph (a)(2)(iv) 
to ensure that ERCC personnel hired after the e-prep plan is approved 
by FRA receive initial training within 90 days after the individual's 
initial date of service with the railroad. Currently, this paragraph 
expressly requires that only on-board and control center personnel 
receive initial training within 90 days after their initial date of 
service with the railroad. Depending on how a railroad has chosen to 
organize its response to a specific emergency situation, failure to 
train a new ERCC employee within 90 days of starting his or her service 
on the railroad could create inefficiencies in the railroad's response 
to an emergency situation. Therefore, FRA proposes this modification to 
ensure that the railroads do not delay in providing training to new 
ERCC personnel.
    In addition, FRA is also proposing to add language to paragraph 
(a)(2)(iv) clarifying that not only are railroad employees covered by 
the requirements of this paragraph, but also on-board, control center, 
and ERCC contractors, subcontractors, and employees of contractors or 
subcontractors. A change to the heading of paragraph (a)(2)(iv) is also 
being proposed to reflect the proposed modification of the regulatory 
text.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(v). FRA is proposing to add language to this 
paragraph to clarify that railroads need to develop testing procedures 
not only for employees, but also for contractors and subcontractors, as 
well as employees of contractors and subcontractors who are being 
evaluated for qualification under the railroad's e-prep plan. The 
current regulatory text expressly requires railroads to develop testing 
procedures for railroad employees only. This proposed language, if 
adopted, would clarify that employees, as well as contractors, 
subcontractors, and employees of contractors and subcontractors, are 
required to be evaluated for qualification under the railroad's e-prep 
plan using appropriate testing procedures. Language is also being 
proposed to the heading of this paragraph to reflect the proposed 
change and to clarify that railroads need to develop testing procedures 
for ERCC personnel as well as on-board and control center personnel.
    Finally, paragraph (a)(2)(v)(A) is proposed to be modified to 
require that testing procedures developed by the railroads accurately 
measure an individual's, rather than an individual employee's, 
knowledge of his or her responsibilities under the railroad's e-prep 
plan. Currently, paragraph (a)(2)(v)(A) expressly applies only to 
railroad employees, and this modification would ensure that railroad 
contractors and subcontractor are covered by the provision as well.
    Paragraph (a)(8). Executive Order 13347 (``Individuals with 
Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness'') requires the Federal 
government to appropriately support safety and security for individuals 
with disabilities in all types of emergency situations. 69 FR 44573 
(July 26, 2004). Currently, each railroad subject to part 239 is 
required to provide for the safety of each of its passengers in its 
emergency preparedness planning. Nonetheless, FRA is proposing a new 
paragraph (a)(8) that would clarify that these railroads must include 
procedures in their e-prep plans addressing the safe evacuation of 
persons with disabilities during emergency situations (and full-scale 
simulations of them). FRA expects the railroads to address the 
responsibilities of on-board personnel to carry out these specific 
procedures. For example, if a train has a failure or is involved in an 
incident and an evacuation is deemed necessary, a crewmember in the 
body of the train would need to search for and identify those 
passengers who cannot reasonably be evacuated by stairs or steps.
    This new paragraph would not require a railroad to maintain any 
list of train passengers, whether or not they have a disability. 
However, the railroad must have in place procedures so that the 
locations of persons with disabilities on board its trains are 
generally known to the train crew, and that such persons can be 
evacuated under all potential conditions that require passenger 
evacuation, including those conditions identified under the Special 
Circumstances portion of the railroad's e-prep plan, when applicable, 
as required by paragraph (a)(4) of this section. In this regard, the 
railroad must address those situations requiring immediate passenger 
evacuation with or without the assistance of emergency response 
personnel or railroad personnel not on board its trains. At the same 
time, the railroad must have a process for notifying emergency response 
personnel in an emergency situation about the presence and general 
location of persons with disabilities when the railroad has knowledge 
that such passengers are on board a train.
Section 239.105 Debriefing and Critique
    This section requires railroads operating passenger train service 
to conduct debriefing and critique sessions after each passenger train 
emergency situation or full-scale emergency simulation to determine the 
effectiveness of the railroad's e-prep plan. FRA is proposing to add 
language to paragraph (c)(3) of this section so that the debriefing and 
critique session would be designed to determine whether the ERCC, as 
well as the control center, promptly initiated the required 
notifications. In addition, FRA makes clear that the plan's 
effectiveness in the evacuation of passengers with disabilities must be 
addressed during debrief and critique sessions.

[[Page 38255]]

Subpart C--Review, Approval, and Retention of Emergency Preparedness 
Plans

Section 239.201 Emergency Preparedness Plan; Filing and Approval
    Section 239.201 specifies the process for review and approval by 
FRA of each passenger railroad's e-prep plan. FRA is proposing to 
divide paragraph (a) of this section into paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2). 
As proposed, paragraph (a)(1) contains the regulatory requirements on 
how to file an e-prep plan, while proposed paragraph (a)(2) contains 
the requirements on how to file an amendment to an FRA-approved plan. 
Proposed paragraph (a)(2) is then further subdivided. Proposed 
paragraph (a)(2)(i) describes what procedures a railroad must follow 
when filing amendments to its e-prep plan with FRA. Conversely, 
proposed paragraph (a)(2)(ii) lists the limited circumstances in which 
a railroad could enact an amendment to its approved e-prep plan without 
first getting FRA approval of the amendment. Finally, FRA is also 
proposing to add language to paragraph (b)(3) to clarify that FRA will 
not formally review the limited number of amendments that could be 
enacted without prior FRA approval as described in proposed paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii).
    Specifically, FRA proposes a few small modifications to paragraph 
(a)(1). First, FRA is proposing to update the title of the FRA official 
who receives a railroad's e-prep plan, from Associate Administrator for 
Safety to Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety 
Officer. Additionally, since the time part 239 was enacted, FRA's 
Office of Safety officially became the Office of Railroad Safety. 
Therefore, FRA proposes to update the language in proposed paragraph 
(a)(1) to reflect the name change of this FRA office. The RSAC also 
recommended modification of the time period new-start passenger 
railroads have to submit their e-prep plans to FRA before commencing 
passenger service. Currently, e-prep plans must be submitted by these 
passenger railroads no less than 45 days prior to commencing passenger 
operations. Consistent with this recommendation, FRA proposes that such 
railroads must submit their plans to FRA no less than 60 days prior to 
commencing passenger operations. This proposed change would provide FRA 
safety officials more time to review a railroad's e-prep plan, identify 
any safety concerns, and notify the railroad of any such concerns so 
that changes to the plan could be made before actual passenger 
operations commence. FRA notes that the original filing deadline for 
passenger railroads in operation around the time part 239 went into 
effect was not more than 180 days after May 4, 1998. For those 
passenger railroads then in existence and for those passenger railroads 
that have started-up service since and have already filed and received 
approval on their plans, the rule would make clear that those plans are 
timely filed.
    FRA also proposes to redesignate as paragraph (a)(2)(i) the 
regulatory requirement that all amendments to approved e-prep plans be 
filed with FRA 60 days prior to the effective date of the amendment. 
One exception to this requirement would be the limited number of e-prep 
plan amendments that can be enacted without FRA approval, listed in 
proposed paragraph (a)(2)(ii). These limited types of amendments to 
railroad e-prep plans would continue to be required to be filed with 
FRA, but they would become immediately effective and would not require 
FRA formal approval.
    However, under proposed paragraph (a)(2)(i), e-prep plan amendments 
submitted to FRA that do not qualify for the exception in proposed 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii) must be submitted with a written summary of what 
the proposed amendment would change in the approved e-prep plan and, as 
applicable, a training plan describing how and when current and new 
employees and contractors would be trained on any amendment. For 
example, if the amendment would affect how current and new railroad 
employees and contractors assist emergency responders, then under this 
paragraph the railroad must also submit a training plan with the 
amendment stating how and when these employees and contractors would be 
trained on these changes to the railroad's e-prep plan. As another 
example, if the railroad wants to identify new access roads to railroad 
property in its e-prep plan, then a training plan for employees and 
contractors should be included with the proposed amendment. Having the 
railroads include a summary with their proposed e-prep plan amendments 
that are not exempted by proposed paragraph (a)(2)(ii) is necessary 
because currently railroads have been submitting their entire approved 
e-prep plans with the amendment changes already incorporated in the 
plan without identifying to FRA what changes the railroad is 
specifically seeking to make to its approved e-prep plan. This has 
delayed FRA's ability to review the railroad's proposed amendment and 
respond to the railroad within 45 days as specified in paragraph 
(b)(3)(i). Requiring the railroads to include such summaries will help 
FRA efficiently review the proposed amendments and respond back to the 
railroad normally within 45 days; nevertheless, some reviews may take 
longer.
    As previously stated, FRA is proposing a new paragraph (a)(2)(ii) 
under which qualifying amendments would not be subject to FRA's formal 
approval process as outlined in paragraph (b)(3)(i). Amendments that 
add or amend the name, title, address, or telephone number of the e-
prep plan's primary contact person would qualify under paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii). Railroads filing amendments under this paragraph would be 
permitted to enact the amendment changes upon filing the amendment with 
FRA's Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer. 
Including a summary of the proposed changes caused by the amendment 
would not be required. All other e-prep plan amendments not covered by 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii) would be required to be filed in accordance with 
paragraph (a)(2)(i) and be subject to the formal approval process 
proposed in paragraph (b)(3)(i). FRA believes that paragraph (a)(2)(ii) 
is needed in order to limit the need for FRA to formally approve purely 
administrative changes to previously approved railroad e-prep plans. 
This new paragraph will allow these specific types of amendments to 
become effective immediately upon filing with FRA and thereby help to 
streamline the approval process.
    Additional language is also being proposed to paragraph (b)(3) in 
order to clarify that the limited types of amendments containing only 
administrative changes described in proposed paragraph (a)(2)(ii) would 
be exempt from the formal FRA review that is described in this 
paragraph.


 



















Subpart D--Operational (Efficiency) Tests; Inspection of Records and 
Recordkeeping

Section 239.301 Operational (Efficiency) Tests and Inspections
    Section 239.301 requires railroads to monitor the routine 
performance of their personnel who have individual responsibilities 
under the e-prep plan to verify that they can perform the duties 
required under the plan in a safe and effective manner. FRA is 
proposing to modify this section in several ways. First, FRA is 
proposing to add headings to each main paragraph for clarity. Second, 
FRA proposes to add language to paragraph (a) that clarifies that 
railroads are required to specify in their e-prep plans the specific 
intervals they will periodically conduct operational (efficiency) tests 
and inspections for

[[Page 38256]]

individuals with responsibilities under the e-prep plans. Additionally, 
FRA is proposing to add language to paragraph (a) that will require any 
ERCC personnel, railroad contractors or subcontractors, or employees of 
railroad contractors or subcontractors, to be subject to operational 
(efficiency) tests and inspections. Finally, FRA is proposing to add 
new paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(1)(i) through (vi), (a)(2), (d), and (e). 
The specific requirements proposed in each new paragraph are discussed 
below.
    In paragraph (a), FRA is proposing to add the heading, 
``Requirement to conduct operational (efficiency) tests and 
inspections.'' FRA believes that this heading will help the regulated 
community identify that paragraph (a) of this section specifically 
addresses operational (efficiency) test and inspection requirements. 
Additionally, FRA is proposing to add language to paragraph (a) that 
will require ERCC personnel, railroad contractors or subcontractors, as 
well as employees of railroad contractors to be subject to the same 
periodic operational (efficiency) tests and inspections as on-board and 
control center employees are under the current regulation. Adding this 
language to the regulation is necessary to ensure that all individuals 
who assist in the railroad's emergency response are subject to 
operational (efficiency) tests and inspections. This proposed language 
is intended to help ensure that railroads are prepared to provide an 
appropriate response in the event of an emergency situation. FRA is 
also proposing in paragraph (a)(1) to identify basic elements that must 
be included in the railroad's written program of operational 
(efficiency) tests and inspections.
    FRA proposes six new paragraphs under paragraph (a)(1). Each new 
paragraph includes a required element that must be addressed in every 
railroad's written program of operational (efficiency) tests and 
inspections. RSAC recommended that FRA adopt these requirements, which 
were modeled from regulations found in 49 CFR 217.9, Program of 
operational tests and inspections; recordkeeping. In fact, in several 
instances, language was directly taken from various provisions of Sec.  
217.9--specifically, Sec.  217.9(c)(3) through (5). While part 217 
prescribes processes for railroad operating employees only (e.g., train 
and engine crews), its approach to operational tests and inspections is 
useful for governing individuals covered by FRA's emergency 
preparedness requirements in part 239. However, as proposed, not just 
railroad operating employees but all on-board, control center, and ERCC 
employees, as well as contractors and sub-contractors in these roles, 
would be subject to these tests and inspections as applicable under the 
railroad's e-prep plan. Each of the new proposed paragraphs is 
discussed below.
    For clarification, FRA notes that part 239 operational (efficiency) 
tests and inspections can also qualify as operational tests under Sec.  
217.9 if the employee, contractor or subcontractor being tested is also 
performing functions that are covered by part 217. Likewise, 
operational tests conducted under part 217 can also be accredited as 
operational (efficiency) tests under part 239 as long as the criteria 
for operational (efficiency) tests and inspections in part 239 are met. 
For example, passenger train conductors are subject to operational 
(efficiency) testing under both parts 217 and 239. An operational 
(efficiency) test of a passenger train conductor that involves the 
procedures for passenger train emergency preparedness would satisfy 
requirements under both parts 217 and 239. In contrast, an operational 
(efficiency) test of a passenger train conductor that involves the 
procedures for operating derails would satisfy the requirements under 
part 217 only.
    Operational (efficiency) testing under part 239 can be conducted as 
part of a railroad's efficiency testing program under Sec.  217.9 or in 
an entirely separate program. However, if adopted, the proposed 
operational (efficiency) test and inspections requirements for part 239 
will have a broader applicability than just to the employees covered by 
Sec.  217.9, as noted above. For example, these proposed requirements 
would also cover such individuals as passenger car attendants and ERCC 
employees, who would not be covered under part 217. Therefore, a 
railroad that would prefer to conduct its operational (efficiency) 
testing required by part 239 as part of its efficiency testing program 
under Sec.  217.9 would need to modify its program to ensure that the 
additional tests are included and conducted for all of the employees 
required to be covered under part 239.
    As proposed, paragraph (a)(1)(i) will require railroads to provide 
in their e-prep plans a program of operational (efficiency) tests and 
inspections for railroad employees, railroad contractors or 
subcontractors, and employees of railroad contractors and 
subcontractors addressing the appropriate courses of action in response 
to various potential emergency situations and the responsibilities for 
these individuals under the railroad's e-prep plan. For example, they 
should address how railroad personnel on board a train respond in case 
a fire occurs. They should also address what each on-board employee's, 
contractor's, or subcontractor's individual responsibilities are during 
such an emergency situation. FRA believes that these proposed 
requirements would help to reduce confusion during an actual emergency 
situation and ensure that the railroad's on-board staff undergo 
operational (efficiency) tests and inspections on actions they would be 
performing during an emergency event. Only railroad employees, railroad 
contractor and subcontractors, and employees of railroad contractors 
and subcontractors who are covered by or have responsibilities under 
the railroad's e-prep plan would be subject to operational (efficiency) 
tests and inspections from the railroad. Hired or contracted employees 
working for the railroad who do not have any responsibilities under the 
railroad's e-prep plan would not have to be subject to operational 
(efficiency) tests and inspections.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) proposes that the railroads describe each type 
of operational (efficiency) test and inspection required for passenger 
train emergency preparedness. The description must also specify the 
means and procedures used to carry out these operational (efficiency) 
tests and inspections. For example, an operational (efficiency) test 
intended for an on-board employee may be conducted as a challenge 
question posed by a supervisor. In this example, the supervisor may ask 
the employee what his or her responsibilities are for the evacuation of 
passengers, including passengers with disabilities, in specific 
circumstances such as a passenger car filling with smoke. In another 
instance, a supervisor may ask an ERCC employee to identify a special 
circumstance (e.g., a tunnel or bridge) located in his or her territory 
and demonstrate how the employee would direct emergency responders to 
the location during an actual emergency. Overall, operational 
(efficiency) tests and inspections adopted for passenger train 
emergency preparedness should cover all affected employees and be 
comprehensive.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(1)(iii) will require the railroads to state 
in their e-prep plans the purpose of each type of operational 
(efficiency) test and inspection conducted. For example, an operational 
(efficiency) test intended for on-board employees may be conducted to 
determine if the employees are familiar with passenger evacuation 
procedures. As another example, such tests intended for ERCC employees 
may

[[Page 38257]]

be conducted to determine if the ERCC employees are familiar with 
special circumstances on their territory and if they know how to direct 
emergency responders to these locations. In particular, conducting 
operational (efficiency) tests on ERCC employees to determine their 
knowledge of the railroad's e-prep plan, special circumstances, and 
access points would be necessary to ensure that they are familiar with 
emergency procedures and capable of directing emergency responders to a 
passenger train in the event of an emergency.
    FRA is also proposing to add new paragraph (a)(1)(iv), which will 
clarify that each railroad must specify in its operational testing 
program the specific intervals at which it will periodically conduct 
operational (efficiency) tests and inspections for individuals covered 
by paragraph (a). This information should be listed according to 
operating division where applicable. FRA believes that this additional 
language is necessary after reviewing e-prep plans submitted by various 
railroads to FRA. In reviewing railroad e-prep plans, FRA discovered 
that some railroads would simply state in their plans that they would 
periodically conduct operational (efficiency) tests and inspections 
without specifying by what specific interval these tests or inspections 
would be administered. In some instances, railroads simply copied the 
language directly from Sec.  239.301(a) and placed it into their e-prep 
plans.
    By adding this proposed language, FRA is not mandating any specific 
interval by which the railroad should conduct these tests and 
inspections. FRA believes that the regulated community should have the 
flexibility to decide when individuals covered by paragraph (a) should 
be periodically subject to these tests and inspections based on the 
individual circumstances of each railroad and its e-prep plan and 
operational testing program. The proposed language will not affect the 
railroad's current ability to determine how often these periodic tests 
and inspections should occur. However, FRA will require the railroad to 
provide more information to the agency so that FRA can better verify 
that these types of tests and inspections are in fact occurring as 
planned, and that the railroads are properly carrying out their 
responsibilities in preparing to deal with various emergency 
situations.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(1)(v) will require the railroad to identify 
in its e-prep plan each officer by name, job title, and division or 
system, who is responsible for ensuring that the program of operational 
(efficiency) tests and inspections is properly implemented. Therefore, 
for each railroad division or system there should be a separate contact 
person listed within the e-prep plan who is responsible for 
implementing the details of the plan on that specific division or 
system during an emergency situation. In addition, for railroads that 
have multiple divisions, the proposed regulation would require the 
railroad to identify at least one officer at the railroad's system 
headquarters who is responsible for overseeing the entire railroad's 
program and the e-prep plan implementation. This individual should be 
knowledgeable about the current state of the railroad's operational 
(efficiency) test and inspection requirements as well as the current 
state of the railroad's e-prep program system-wide.
    The final proposal, in paragraph (a)(1)(vi), would require that 
railroad officers conducting operational (efficiency) tests and 
inspections be trained on the elements of the railroad's e-prep plan 
that are relevant to the tests and inspections that the officers will 
be conducting. In addition, the railroad officers conducting the 
operational (efficiency) tests and inspections must be qualified on the 
procedures for administering such tests and inspections in accordance 
with the railroads written program.
    FRA also proposes to add headings to both paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
this section. FRA believes that adding the heading ``Keeping records of 
operational (efficiency) test and inspection records'' to paragraph (b) 
will help clarify that paragraph (b) addresses what types of written 
records need to be created and retained after the performance of an 
operational (efficiency) test or inspection. Similarly, the heading 
``Retention of operational (efficiency) test and inspection records'' 
is proposed to be added to paragraph (c). This proposed heading will 
clarify that paragraph (c) addresses the requirements for how long 
records of operational (efficiency) tests and inspections need to be 
retained by the railroad. FRA believes that these proposed headings 
will be useful guides for the regulated community, especially those who 
are unfamiliar with part 239 and its requirements.
    Proposed paragraph (d) contains a new requirement that each 
railroad retain one copy of its current operational (efficiency) 
testing and inspection program required by paragraph (a) of this 
section and each subsequent amendment to the program. If this proposed 
requirement is adopted, railroads will be required to retain a copy of 
the current program and any subsequent amendment to the program at the 
railroad's system headquarters and at each divisional headquarters for 
three calendar years after the end of the calendar year to which the 
program relates. The records must also be made available for inspection 
and copying during normal business hours by representatives of FRA and 
States participating under 49 CFR part 212.
    Finally, FRA is proposing to add a new paragraph (e) to this 
section. As recommended by RSAC, this proposed paragraph will require 
each railroad subject to this part to retain a written annual summary 
of the number, type and result of each operational (efficiency) test 
and inspection that was conducted in the previous year as required by 
paragraph (a) of this section. When applicable, these summaries 
describing the railroad's operational (efficiency) tests and 
inspections would be required to be organized by operating division. 
These summaries are intended to provide FRA with a clearer 
understanding of how operational (efficiency) tests and inspections are 
being applied and how successful these programs are over different 
railroad divisions. Annual summaries would be required to be completed 
and in the possession of the railroad's division and system 
headquarters by March 1 of the year following the year covered by the 
summary.
    In addition, the annual summary will be required to be retained by 
the railroad for three calendar years after the end of the calendar 
year covered by the summary. For example, a railroad's 2013 annual 
summary of operational (efficiency) tests and inspections would be 
required to be retained through calendar year 2016. Annual summaries 
would be required to be made available for inspection and copying 
during normal business hours by representatives of FRA and States 
participating under 49 CFR part 212.
    FRA specifically invites comment on the appropriateness of proposed 
paragraph (e). Given that the intended purpose of the proposal is to 
provide FRA with a clear understanding of how operational (efficiency) 
tests and inspections are being applied and how successful these 
programs are being implemented from a systems perspective, FRA invites 
comment whether the periodic review and analysis requirements of Sec.  
217.9(e) should be adopted in the final rule to more appropriately 
fulfill the intended purpose. Indeed, under Sec.  217.9(e), railroads 
should already be reviewing and analyzing operational (efficiency) test 
and inspection data conducted for

[[Page 38258]]

passenger train emergency preparedness on individuals subject to part 
217; the requirements of the paragraph could then be broadened to cover 
individuals subject to part 239. FRA also believes that a railroad 
could consolidate such a review and analysis required by part 239 with 
one required under Sec.  217.9(e), and that they could be retained for 
a period of one year after the end of the calendar year to which they 
relate and be made available to representatives of FRA and States 
participating under 49 CFR part 212.

IV. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866s and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures

    This proposed rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing 
policies and procedures under both Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and 
DOT policies and procedures. See 44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979. FRA 
has prepared and placed in the docket (FRA-2011-0062, Notice No. 1) a 
regulatory impact analysis addressing the economic impact of this 
proposed rule.
    As part of the regulatory impact analysis, FRA has assessed 
quantitative measurements of the cost streams expected to result from 
the implementation of this proposed rule. For the 10-year period 
analyzed, the estimated quantified cost that would be imposed on 
industry totals $1,049,308 with a present value (PV, 7 percent) of 
$734,922. The largest burdens that would be expected to be imposed are 
from the new requirements related to the operational (efficiency) tests 
in Sec.  239.301 of the proposed regulation. The table below presents 
the estimated discounted costs associated with the proposed rulemaking.

                10-Year Estimated Costs of Proposed Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Present value  (7-
                                                         percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Preparedness Plan (Sec.   239.101)...                 $219,833
Debriefing and Critique (Sec.   239.105).......                  200,273
Emergency Preparedness Plan; Filing and                           12,006
 Approval (Sec.   239.201).....................
Operational (efficiency) Tests (Sec.   239.301)                  302,810
                                                ------------------------
    Total Costs................................                  734,922
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As part of the regulatory impact analysis, FRA has explained what 
the likely benefits for this proposed rule would be, and provided 
numerical assessments of the potential value of such benefits. The 
proposed regulation would generate safety benefits by preventing 
injuries in passenger rail accidents from becoming more severe. FRA 
uses the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) as a measure of the severity 
for injuries with an AIS 1 injury being defined as minor and an AIS 5 
as the most severe, i.e., critical.\1\ As noted in Appendix A of the 
regulatory impact analysis an AIS 1 would be an injury that is minor 
and may not require professional medical treatment. An AIS 2 injury 
would be an injury that always requires treatment but is not ordinarily 
life-threatening. Benefits would accrue from the increased likelihood 
that the passenger railroads would handle external communications more 
efficiently, expediting the arrival of emergency responders to accident 
scenes, and from the ability of the railroad personnel to minimize 
health and safety risks through improved internal and external 
communications. This proposed regulation would allow for more 
flexibility in passenger train emergency preparedness planning and 
implementation and provides for necessary emergency preparedness 
training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine. 
http://www.aaam1.org/ais/#.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the NPRM would allow passenger railroads to adjust to 
future personnel reorganizations and to incorporate technological 
innovations by affording the railroad's management flexibility in 
determining which part of the organization to designate as the ERCC.
    Given the nature of the proposed regulatory change, FRA believes 
that the ideal methodology to estimate the safety benefits is a break-
even analysis. A break-even analysis quantifies what minimum safety 
benefits are necessary for the proposed rule to be cost-effective, 
considering the estimated quantified costs. For this proposed rule, 
this analysis estimates that the break-even point is met when 3.84 
injuries are prevented from increasing in severity from AIS 1 to AIS 2.
    The table below presents the estimated benefits necessary for this 
proposed rule to break-even with the estimated costs. For the 10-year 
period analyzed the safety benefits would total $1,049,308 with a 
present value (PV, 7 percent) of $735,757.

               10-Year Estimated Benefits of Proposed Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Limitation of injury      Monetary
                                         severity            benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Break-even point (not            3.84 less severe             $1,049,308
 discounted).                     injuries.
Discounted benefits (PV 7        3.84 less severe                735,757
 percent).                        injuries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 38259]]

    The benefits for this proposed rule would exceed the estimated 
costs when 4 injuries are prevented from increasing in severity from an 
AIS 1 to an AIS 2. FRA believes the proposed changes in this rulemaking 
will more than exceed the break-even estimate.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272; Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Assessment

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and 
Executive Order 13272 (67 FR 53461; August 16, 2002) require agency 
review of proposed and final rules to assess their impact on small 
entities. An agency must prepare an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis (IRFA) unless it can determine and certify that a rule, if 
promulgated, would not have a significant impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. FRA has not determined whether this proposed 
rule would have a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. Therefore, FRA is publishing this IRFA to aid the public in 
commenting on the potential small business impacts of the requirements 
in this NPRM. FRA invites all interested parties to submit data and 
information regarding the potential economic impact on small entities 
that would result from adoption of the proposals in this NPRM. FRA will 
consider all comments received in the public comment process when 
making a final determination.
    The proposed rule would apply to all passenger railroads (commuter 
and intercity) and railroads that host passenger rail operations. Based 
on information currently available, FRA estimates that less than 2 
percent of the total costs associated with implementing the proposed 
rule would be borne by small entities. Based on very conservative 
assumptions, FRA estimates that the total non-discounted cost for the 
proposed rule would be approximately $1 million for the railroad 
industry. There are two passenger railroads that would be considered 
small for purposes of this analysis and together they comprise less 
than 5 percent of the railroads impacted directly by this proposed 
regulation. Both of these railroads would have to make some investment 
to meet the proposed requirements. Thus, a substantial number of small 
entities in this sector may be impacted by this proposed rule. These 
small railroads carry out smaller operations than the average passenger 
railroad, allowing them to meet the proposed requirements at lower 
overall costs. Thus, although a substantial number of small entities in 
this sector would likely be impacted, the economic impact on them would 
likely not be significant.
    In order to get a better understanding of the total costs for the 
railroad industry, which forms the basis for the estimates in this 
IRFA, or more cost detail on any specific requirement, please see the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) that FRA has placed in the docket for 
this rulemaking.
    In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, an IRFA must 
contain:
     A description of the reasons why the action by the agency 
is being considered.
     A succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal basis 
for, the proposed rule.
     A description--and, where feasible, an estimate of the 
number--of small entities to which the proposed rule would apply.
     A description of the projected reporting, record keeping, 
and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule, including an 
estimate of the classes of small entities that would be subject to the 
requirements and the types of professional skills necessary for 
preparation of the report or record.
     An identification, to the extent practicable, of all 
relevant Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with 
the proposed rule.
1. Reasons for Considering Agency Action
    FRA initiated this rulemaking through RSAC in part upon learning 
that in the regulated community there was some confusion regarding 
existing requirements on passenger train emergency preparedness (49 CFR 
part 239). As a result, the General Passenger Safety Task Force (Task 
Force), a subgroup of the RSAC, was tasked to resolve these issues. The 
Task Force found that as currently written, part 239 expressly requires 
only the railroad's control center employees to be subject to training 
and operational (efficiency) tests and inspections. However, in many 
instances, control center employees were not found to be the primary 
points of contact for emergency first responders during a passenger 
train emergency. Instead, they were carrying out other important 
duties, such as providing block protection and diverting trains to 
other parts of the railroad's network. The proposed language in this 
NPRM would ensure that all personnel involved in emergency preparedness 
under part 239 are subject to appropriate training as well as 
operational (efficiency) tests and inspections. At the same time, the 
NPRM would relieve personnel not involved in emergency preparedness 
from such requirements. While, the proposed regulation differs slightly 
from the consensus language, the need for this NPRM is backed by the 
RSAC and would improve passenger train emergency preparedness by 
clarifying training and testing requirements.
    In addition, as a result of FRA's experience in the periodic review 
and approval of passenger railroads' e-prep plans, FRA realized that a 
number of the changes submitted were purely administrative in nature. 
While part 239 currently subjects all changes to an e-prep plan to a 
formal review and approval process, FRA believes that purely 
administrative changes should be excluded from the formal approval 
process so that the agency can focus its resources on more substantive 
matters. Accordingly, this NPRM would streamline the approval of e-prep 
plans.
    Further, Executive Order 13347 (``Individuals with Disabilities in 
Emergency Preparedness'') requires the Federal government to 
appropriately support safety and security for individuals with 
disabilities in all types of emergency situations. 69 FR 44573; July 
26, 2004. Currently, each railroad subject to part 239 is required to 
provide for the safety of each of its passengers in its emergency 
preparedness planning. Nonetheless, FRA is proposing to clarify that 
these railroads must include procedures in their e-prep plans 
addressing the safe evacuation of persons with disabilities during 
emergency situations (and full-scale simulations of them).
2. A Succinct Statement of the Objectives of, and Legal Basis for, the 
Proposed Rule
    The purpose of this rulemaking is to further Federal safety 
standards on passenger train emergency preparedness currently in place 
in part 239. As a result of the proposed regulation, passenger 
railroads would have more flexibility to carry out the requirements of 
part 239 and keep their plans current. The NPRM would permit multiple 
parts of the organization to be involved in the emergency preparedness 
process to maintain resiliency while helping to clarify the role of 
various parts of the structure in an emergency situation. Additionally, 
the NPRM would provide flexibility to adjust to future personnel 
reorganizations and to incorporate technological innovations by 
allowing the railroad's management to determine what part of the 
organization is designated to be the ERCC.
    Among FRA's reasons for initiating this rulemaking was that some 
confusion arose regarding certain requirements of FRA's passenger train

[[Page 38260]]

emergency preparedness regulations. For example, FRA learned that some 
passenger railroads were confused as to which types of railroad 
personnel were required to be trained or be subjected to operational 
(efficiency) testing and inspections under part 239. These railroads 
were unclear whether part 239 required certain railroad personnel who 
directly coordinate with emergency responders and other outside 
organizations during emergency situations to be trained or be subjected 
to operational (efficiency) testing and inspections. As a result, FRA 
believes that it is necessary to clarify the regulatory language in 
part 239 to ensure that railroad personnel who directly coordinate with 
emergency responders actually receive the proper training and are 
subject to operational (efficiency) testing and inspections. FRA also 
learned that many railroads were unclear whether operational 
(efficiency) testing under part 239 could be considered for purposes of 
the railroad's efficiency testing program required under 49 CFR part 
217.
    Finally, FRA believed it was necessary to clarify part 239 to 
address the requirements of Executive Order 13347. Executive Order 
13347 requires, among other things, that Federal agencies encourage 
State, local, and tribal governments, private organizations, and 
individuals to consider in their emergency preparedness planning the 
unique needs of individuals with disabilities whom they serve. While 
under part 239 the unique needs of passengers with disabilities must 
already be considered in the railroads' e-prep plans, the NPRM would 
clarify the railroads' responsibilities.
    In order to further FRA's ability to respond effectively to 
contemporary safety problems and hazards as they arise in the railroad 
industry, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 
(Safety Act) (formerly 45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq., now found primarily 
in chapter 201 of title 49). (Until July 5, 1994, the Federal railroad 
safety statutes existed as separate acts found primarily in title 45 of 
the United States Code. On that date, all of the acts were repealed, 
and their provisions were recodified into title 49 of the United States 
Code.) The Safety Act grants the Secretary of Transportation rulemaking 
authority over all areas of railroad safety (49 U.S.C. 20103(a)) and 
confers all powers necessary to detect and penalize violations of any 
rail safety law. This authority was subsequently delegated to the FRA 
Administrator (49 CFR 1.49). Accordingly, FRA is using this authority 
to initiate a rulemaking that would clarify and revise FRA's 
regulations for passenger train emergency preparedness. These standards 
are codified in Part 239, which was originally issued in May 1999 as 
part of FRA's implementation of rail passenger safety regulations 
required by Section 215 of the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization 
Act of 1994, Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 
1994). Section 215 of this Act has been codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133.
3. A Description of, and Where Feasible, an Estimate of Small Entities 
to Which the Proposed Rule Would Apply
    The ``universe'' of the entities to be considered generally 
includes only those small entities that are reasonably expected to be 
directly regulated by this action. This proposed rule would directly 
affect commuter and intercity passenger railroads, and freight 
railroads hosting passenger rail operations.
    ``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601. Section 601(3) defines 
a ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as ``small business 
concern'' under Section 3 of the Small Business Act. This includes any 
small business concern that is independently owned and operated, and is 
not dominant in its field of operation. Section 601(4) likewise 
includes within the definition of ``small entities'' not-for-profit 
enterprises that are independently owned and operated, and are not 
dominant in their field of operation. The U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA) stipulates in its size standards that the largest 
a railroad business firm that is ``for profit'' may be and still be 
classified as a ``small entity'' is 1,500 employees for ``Line Haul 
Operating Railroads'' and 500 employees for ``Switching and Terminal 
Establishments.'' Additionally, 5 U.S.C. 601(5) defines as ``small 
entities'' governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, 
school districts, or special districts with populations less than 
50,000.
    Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small 
entities in consultation with SBA and in conjunction with public 
comment. Pursuant to that authority FRA has published a final statement 
of agency policy that formally establishes ``small entities'' or 
``small businesses'' as being railroads, contractors and hazardous 
materials shippers that meet the revenue requirements of a Class III 
railroad as set forth in 49 CFR 1201.1-1, which is $20 million or less 
in inflation-adjusted annual revenues, and commuter railroads or small 
governmental jurisdictions that serve populations of 50,000 or less. 
See 68 FR 24891, May 9, 2003, codified at appendix C to 49 CFR part 
209. The $20-million limit is based on the Surface Transportation 
Board's revenue threshold for a Class III railroad. Railroad revenue is 
adjusted for inflation by applying a revenue deflator formula in 
accordance with 49 CFR 1201.1-1. FRA is proposing to use this 
definition for this rulemaking. Any comments received pertinent to its 
use will be addressed in the final rule.
Railroads
    There are only two intercity passenger railroads, Amtrak and the 
Alaska Railroad. Neither can be considered a small entity. Amtrak is a 
Class I railroad and the Alaska Railroad is a Class II railroad. The 
Alaska Railroad is owned by the State of Alaska, which has a population 
well in excess of 50,000.
    There are 28 commuter or other short-haul passenger railroad 
operations in the U.S. Most of these railroads are part of larger 
transit organizations that receive Federal funds and serve major 
metropolitan areas with populations greater than 50,000. However, two 
of these railroads do not fall in this category and are considered 
small entities. The impact of the proposed regulation on these two 
railroads is discussed in the following section.
4. A Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements of the Rule, Including an Estimate of the Class 
of Small Entities That Will Be Subject to the Requirements and the Type 
of Professional Skill Necessary for Preparation of the Report or Record
    For a thorough presentation of cost estimates, please refer to the 
RIA, which has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking. FRA also 
notes that this proposed rule was developed in consultation with an 
RSAC working group and task force that included representatives from 
the Association of American Railroads, freight railroads, Amtrak, and 
individual commuter railroads.
    FRA is aware of two passenger railroads that qualify as small 
entities: Saratoga & North Creek Railway (SNC), and the Hawkeye 
Express, which is operated by the Iowa Northern Railway Company (IANR). 
All other passenger railroad operations in the United States are part 
of larger governmental entities whose service jurisdictions exceed 
50,000 in population.
    In 2010 Hawkeye Express transported approximately 5,000 passengers 
per game over a 7-mile round-trip distance to and from University of 
Iowa

[[Page 38261]]

(University) football games. IANR has approximately 100 employees and 
is primarily a freight operation totaling 184,385 freight train miles 
in 2010. The service is on a contractual arrangement with the 
University, a State of Iowa institution. (The population of Iowa City, 
Iowa is approximately 69,000.) Iowa Northern, which is a Class III 
railroad, owns and operates the 6 bi-level passenger cars used for this 
passenger operation which runs on average 7 days over a calendar year. 
FRA expects that any costs imposed on the railroad by this regulation 
will likely be passed on to the University as part of the 
transportation cost, and requests comment on this assumption.
    The SNC began operation in the summer of 2011 and currently 
provides daily rail service over a 57-mile line between Saratoga 
Springs and North Creek, New York. The SNC, a Class III railroad, is a 
limited liability company, wholly owned by San Luis & Rio Grande 
Railroad (SLRG). SLRG is a Class III rail carrier and a subsidiary of 
Permian Basin Railways, Inc. (Permian), which in turn is owned by Iowa 
Pacific Holdings, LLC (IPH). The SNC primarily transports visitors to 
Saratoga Springs, tourists seeking to sightsee along the Hudson River, 
and travelers connecting to and from Amtrak service. The railroad 
operates year round, with standard coach passenger trains. Additional 
service activity includes seasonal ski trains, and specials such as 
``Thomas The Train.'' This railroad operates under a five-year contract 
with the local government, and is restarting freight operations as 
well. The railroad has about 25 employees.
    FRA believes that these two entities would not be impacted 
significantly. While, each of these entities would most likely have to 
file a new e-prep plan, FRA does not expect they would have to change 
how each railroad reacts to an emergency situation due to including 
ERCCs under part 239's requirements. Their operating structure is small 
and it is probable that employees with e-prep duties would continue to 
have the same emergency responsibilities. FRA expects that both 
railroads would see additional burden from inclusion of other 
provisions of the proposed regulation related to recordkeeping, and 
other training and testing requirements. This NPRM would not be a 
significant financial impact on these railroad and their operations. 
They could expect the total regulatory costs for this proposed rule, if 
it is adopted, to be less than $6,500 for each of the railroads over 
the next 10 years. The Hawkeye Express and the SNC currently have e-
prep plans that have been reviewed and approved by the FRA. Although 
this NPRM would change several requirements in part 239, professional 
skills necessary for compliance with existing and new requirements 
would be the same. FRA believes that both entities have the 
professional knowledge to fulfill the requirements in the proposed 
rulemaking.
    In conclusion, FRA believes that there are two small entities and 
that both could be impacted. Thus, a substantial number of small 
entities could be impacted by the proposed regulation. However, FRA has 
found that these entities that are directly burdened by the regulation 
would not be impacted significantly. FRA believes that the costs 
associated with the proposed rule are reasonable and would not cause 
any significant financial impact on their operations.
Market and Competition Considerations
    The small railroad segment of the passenger railroad industry 
essentially faces no intra-modal competition. The two railroads under 
consideration would only be competing with individual automobile 
traffic and serve in large part as a service offering to get drivers 
out of their automobiles and off congested roadways. One of the two 
entities provides service at a sporting event to assist attendees to 
travel to the stadium from distant parking areas. The other entity 
provides passenger train service to tourist and other destinations. FRA 
is not aware of any bus service that currently exists that directly 
competes with either of these railroads. FRA requests comments and 
input on current or planned future existence of any such service or 
competition.
    The railroad industry has several significant barriers to entry, 
such as the need to own the right-of-way and the high capital 
expenditure needed to purchase a fleet, track, and equipment. As such, 
small railroads usually have monopolies over the small and segmented 
markets in which they operate. Thus, while this rule may have an 
economic impact on all passenger railroads, it should not have an 
impact on the intra-modal competitive position of small railroads.
5. An Identification, to the Extent Practicable, of All Relevant 
Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Proposed Rule
    FRA is aware that some railroads are unclear whether operational 
(efficiency) testing under part 239 could be considered for purposes of 
the railroad's efficiency testing program required under 49 CFR part 
217. In the NPRM, FRA clarifies that part 239 operational (efficiency) 
tests and inspections can also qualify as operational tests under Sec.  
217.9 if the employee, contractor, or subcontractor being tested is 
also performing functions that are covered by part 217. Likewise, 
operational tests conducted under part 217 can also be accredited as 
operational (efficiency) tests under part 239 as long as the criteria 
for operational (efficiency) tests and inspections in part 239 are met.
    FRA invites all interested parties to submit data and information 
regarding the potential economic impact that would result from adoption 
of the proposals in this NPRM. FRA will consider all comments received 
in the public comment process when making a determination.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this proposed rule are 
being submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) for review and approval in accordance with the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The sections that 
contain the current and new or revised information collection 
requirements and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement is as 
follows:


—————————————————————————————————————- Total annual Average time per Total annual CFR Section Respondent universe responses response burden hours—————————————————————————————————————-239.13–Waiver Petitions (Current 45 railroads……. 1 petition……… 20 hours……….. 20 requirement).239.107–Marking of Emergency Exits (Current requirements). –Marking of windows and door 45 railroads……. 4,575 decals, 1,950 10 minutes/5 706 exits intended for emergency decals. minutes. egress. –Marking of window and door 45 railroads……. 6,320 decals, 1,300 5 minutes/10 744 exit intended for emergency decals. minutes. access by emergency responders.[[Page 38262]]  –Records of inspection, 45 railroads……. 1,800 tests/records 20 minutes……… 1,000 maintenance, and repair. + 1,200 tests/ records.239.101/201/203–Emergency Preparedness Plans (Revised requirements). –1st Year–Amended plans…. 45 railroads……. 45 plans……….. 20.33 hours…….. 915 –Subsequent years–amended 45 railroads……. 9 plans………… 20.33 hours…….. 183 plans–substantive changes. –Subsequent years–amended 45 railroads……. 4 plans………… 60 minutes……… 4 plans–non-substantive changes. –New RRs–e-prep plans…… 2 railroads…….. 2 plans………… 80 hours……….. 160 –Current employee initial 45 railroads……. 540 trained 60 minutes……… 540 training for train crews, employees. control center & emergency response communications members. –Employee periodic training. 45 railroads……. 27 trained 4 hours………… 108 employees. –Initial training of New 45 railroads……. 110 trained 60 minutes……… 110 Employees. employees.239.101(a)(1)(ii) 3–Designation 45 railroads……. 45 designations…. 5 minutes………. 4 of RR employee to maintain current emergency telephone numbers to notify outside responders, etc. (Current requirement).239.101(a)(1)(ii) 3–Railroads’ 45 railroads……. 2 updated lists…. 1 hour…………. 2 list/record of emergency telephone numbers to notify outside responders, etc. (Current requirement).239.101(a)(3)–Emergency 45 railroads……. 1 plan…………. 16 hours……….. 16 Preparedness Plan–Joint Operation (Current requirement).239.101(a)(5)–RR Training 45 railroads……. 45 updated plans… 40 hours……….. 1,800 Program for on-line emergency responders (Current requirement).239.101(a)(7)–Passenger Safety 2 new railroads…. 1,300 cards/2 5 minutes/16 hours/ 300 Information–Posting emergency programs/2 safety 48 hours/8 hours/ instructions inside all messages + 2 24 hours. passenger cars (Current programs/2 safety requirement). messages.239.105(a)(3)–Debriefing and 45 railroads……. 79 sessions…….. 27 hours……….. 2,133 Critique–Sessions conducted after passenger emergency situation or full scale simulation (Current requirement).239.301(a)–Operational 45 railroads……. 25,000 tests/ 15 minutes……… 6,250 Efficiency Tests (Current inspections. requirements)–RR Tests/ inspections of on-board, control center, and emergency response communications center employees.(b)(c)–Records of operational 45 railroads……. 25,000 records….. 2 minutes………. 833 (efficiency) tests/inspections.(d)–Records of written program 45 railroads……. 90 records……… 3 minutes………. 5 of operational (efficiency) tests (New Requirement).(e) Annual summary of operational 45 railroads……. 45 annual summaries 5 minutes + 1 5 (efficiency) test/inspections + 30 copies. minute. and copy of written summary at system and division headquarters.—————————————————————————————————————-


    All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions; 
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed 
data; and reviewing the information. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits comments concerning: whether these 
information collection requirements are necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of FRA, including whether the information 
has practical utility; the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of 
the information collection requirements; the quality, utility, and 
clarity of the information to be collected; and whether the burden of 
collection of information on those who are to respond, including 
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of 
information technology, may be minimized. For information or a copy of 
the paperwork package submitted to OMB, contact Mr. Robert Brogan, 
Office of Railroad Safety, Information Clearance Officer, at 202-493-
6292, or Ms. Kimberly Toone, Office of Information Technology, at 202-
493-6139.
    Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the 
collection of information requirements should direct them to Mr. Robert 
Brogan or Ms. Kimberly Toone, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20590. Comments may also 
be submitted via email to Mr. Brogan or Ms. Toone at the following 
address: Robert.Brogan@dot.gov; Kimberly.Toone@dot.gov.
    OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of 
information requirements contained in this proposed rule between 30 and 
60 days after publication of this document in the Federal Register. 
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect 
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. The final rule will 
respond to any OMB or public comments on the information collection 
requirements contained in this proposal.
    FRA is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating 
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB 
control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control 
numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from 
this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of the final rule. 
The OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate 
notice in the Federal Register.

[[Page 38263]]


 













D. Federalism Implications

    Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism'' (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), 
requires FRA to develop an accountable process to ensure ``meaningful 
and timely input by State and local officials in the development of 
regulatory policies that have federalism implications.'' ``Policies 
that have federalism implications'' are defined in the Executive Order 
to include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government.'' Under Executive Order 13132, the agency 
may not issue a regulation with federalism implications that imposes 
substantial direct compliance costs and that is not required by 
statute, unless the Federal government provides the funds necessary to 
pay the direct compliance costs incurred by State and local 
governments, or the agency consults with State and local government 
officials early in the process of developing the regulation. Where a 
regulation has federalism implications and preempts State law, the 
agency seeks to consult with State and local officials in the process 
of developing the regulation.
    This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132. This 
proposed rule will not have a substantial effect on the States or their 
political subdivisions, and it will not affect the relationships 
between the Federal government and the States or their political 
subdivisions, or the distribution of power and responsibilities among 
the various levels of government. In addition, FRA has determined that 
this regulatory action will not impose substantial direct compliance 
costs on the States or their political subdivisions. Therefore, the 
consultation and funding requirements of Executive Order 13132 do not 
apply.
    However, this proposed rule could have preemptive effect by 
operation of law under certain provisions of the Federal railroad 
safety statutes, specifically the former Federal Railroad Safety Act of 
1970, repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106. Section 20106 
provides that States may not adopt or continue in effect any law, 
regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security that covers 
the subject matter of a regulation prescribed or order issued by the 
Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) 
or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad 
security matters), except when the State law, regulation, or order 
qualifies under the ``essentially local safety or security hazard'' 
exception to section 20106.
    In sum, FRA has determined that this proposed rule has no 
federalism implications, other than the possible preemption of State 
laws under Federal railroad safety statutes, specifically 49 U.S.C. 
20106. Accordingly, FRA has determined that preparation of a federalism 
summary impact statement for this proposed rule is not required.

E. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39, 19 U.S.C. 2501 et 
seq.) prohibits Federal agencies from engaging in any standards or 
related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 
safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    FRA has assessed the potential effect of this rulemaking on foreign 
commerce and believes that its requirements are consistent with the 
Trade Agreements Act. The requirements are safety standards, which, as 
noted, are not considered unnecessary obstacles to trade. Moreover, FRA 
has sought, to the extent practicable, to state the requirements in 
terms of the performance desired, rather than in more narrow terms 
restricted to a particular design or system.

F. Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this rule in accordance with its ``Procedures for 
Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures) (64 FR 28545, 
May 26, 1999) as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (42 
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes, Executive Orders, 
and related regulatory requirements. FRA has determined that this 
proposed rule is not a major FRA action (requiring the preparation of 
an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment) because 
it is categorically excluded from detailed environmental review 
pursuant to section 4(c)(20) of FRA's Procedures. See 64 FR 28547 (May 
26, 1999).
    In accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA's Procedures, the 
agency has further concluded that no extraordinary circumstances exist 
with respect to this regulation that might trigger the need for a more 
detailed environmental review. As a result, FRA finds that this 
proposed rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.

G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    Pursuant to Section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless 
otherwise prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory 
actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector 
(other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate 
requirements specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act 
(2 U.S.C. 1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general 
notice of proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the 
promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may 
result in expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted 
annually for inflation) in any 1 year, and before promulgating any 
final rule for which a general notice of proposed rulemaking was 
published, the agency shall prepare a written statement'' detailing the 
effect on State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector. 
This proposed rule will not result in the expenditure, in the 
aggregate, of $100,000,000 or more (as adjusted annually for inflation) 
in any one year, and thus preparation of such a statement is not 
required.

H. Energy Impact

    Executive Order 13211 requires Federal agencies to prepare a 
Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' See 
66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001. Under the Executive Order, a ``significant 
energy action'' is defined as any action by an agency (normally 
published in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to 
lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including 
notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices 
of proposed rulemaking: (1)(i) that is a significant regulatory action 
under Executive Order 12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is likely 
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or 
use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the Administrator of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy 
action.
    FRA has evaluated this proposed rule in accordance with Executive 
Order 13211. FRA has determined that this proposed rule is not likely 
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or 
use of energy.

[[Page 38264]]

Consequently, FRA has determined that this regulatory action is not a 
``significant energy action'' within the meaning of the Executive 
Order.

I. Privacy Act

    FRA wishes to inform all potential commenters that anyone is able 
to search the electronic form of all comments received into any agency 
docket by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing 
the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor 
union, etc.). Please visit http://www.regulations.gov/#!privacyNotice. 
You may also review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 
Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit 
http://www.dot.gov/privacy.html.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 239

    Passenger train emergency preparedness, Penalties, Railroad safety, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The Proposed Rule

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA proposes to amend 
part 239 of chapter II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of Federal 
Regulations as follows:

PART 239--[AMENDED]

Subpart A--General

Sec.  239.5  [Removed and Reserved]

    1. Section 239.5 is removed and reserved.
    2. Section 239.7 is amended by adding the definition of ``Emergency 
response communications center'' to read as follows:

Sec.  239.7  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Emergency response communications center means a central location 
designated by a railroad with responsibility for establishing, 
coordinating, or maintaining communication with emergency responders, 
representatives of adjacent modes of transportation, and appropriate 
railroad officials during a passenger train emergency. The emergency 
response communications center may be part of the control center.
* * * * *

Subpart B--Specific Requirements

    3. Section 239.101 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1)(ii) and 
(a)(2)(ii), (a)(2)(iii) introductory text, (a)(2)(iv), (a)(2)(v) 
introductory text, and (a)(2)(v)(A), and by adding paragraph (a)(8) to 
read as follows:

Sec.  239.101  Emergency preparedness plan.

    (a) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (ii) Notification by control center or emergency response 
communications center. The control center or the emergency response 
communications center, as applicable under the plan, shall promptly 
notify outside emergency responders, adjacent rail modes of 
transportation, and appropriate railroad officials that a passenger 
train emergency has occurred. Each railroad shall designate an employee 
responsible for maintaining current emergency telephone numbers for use 
in making such notifications.
    (2) * * *
    (ii) Control center and emergency response communications center 
personnel. The railroad's emergency preparedness plan shall require 
initial training of responsible control center personnel and any 
emergency response communications center personnel employed by the 
railroad, under a contract or subcontract with the railroad, or 
employed by a contractor or subcontractor to the railroad, as well as 
periodic training at least once every two calendar years thereafter, on 
appropriate courses of action for each potential emergency situation 
under the plan. At a minimum, the initial and periodic training shall 
include:
    (A) Territory familiarization;
    (B) Procedures to retrieve and communicate information to aid 
emergency personnel in responding to an emergency situation;
    (C) Protocols governing internal communications between appropriate 
control center and emergency response communications center personnel 
whenever an imminent potential or actual emergency situation exists, as 
applicable under the plan; and
    (D) Protocols for establishing and maintaining external 
communications between the railroad's control center or emergency 
response communications center, or both, and emergency responders and 
adjacent modes of transportation, as applicable under the plan.
    (iii) Initial training schedule for current employees of the 
railroad, current employees of contractors and subcontractors to the 
railroad, and individuals who are contracted or subcontracted by the 
railroad. The railroad's emergency preparedness plan shall provide for 
the completion of initial training of all on-board and control center 
employees, and any emergency response communications center personnel, 
who are employed by the railroad, under a contract or subcontract with 
the railroad, or employed by a contractor or subcontractor to the 
railroad on the date that the plan is conditionally approved under 
Sec.  239.201(b)(1), in accordance with the following schedule:
* * * * *
    (iv) Initial training schedule for new railroad employees, 
contractor and subcontractor employees, and contracted individuals. The 
railroad's emergency preparedness plan shall provide for the completion 
of initial training of all on-board and control center personnel, as 
well as any emergency response communications center personnel, who are 
hired by the railroad, contracted or subcontracted by the railroad, or 
hired by the contractor or subcontractor to the railroad after the date 
on which the plan is conditionally approved under Sec.  239.201(b)(1). 
Each individual shall receive initial training within 90 days after the 
individual's initial date of service.
    (v) Testing of on-board, control center, and emergency response 
communications center railroad employees, contractor or subcontractor 
employees, and contracted individuals. The railroad shall have 
procedures for testing a person being evaluated for qualification under 
the emergency preparedness plan who is employed by the railroad, under 
a contract or subcontract with the railroad, or employed by a 
contractor or subcontractor to the railroad. The types of testing 
selected by the railroad shall be:
    (A) Designed to accurately measure an individual's knowledge of his 
or her responsibilities under the plan;
* * * * *
    (8) Procedures regarding passengers with disabilities. The railroad 
shall have procedures in place to promote the safe evacuation of 
passengers with disabilities under all conditions identified in its 
emergency preparedness plan. These procedures shall include, but not be 
limited to, a process for notifying emergency responders in an 
emergency situation about the presence and general location of each 
such passenger when the railroad has knowledge that the passenger is on 
board the train. This paragraph does not require the railroad to 
maintain any list of train passengers.
* * * * *
    4. Section 239.105 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(3) to read 
as follows:

Sec.  239.105  Debriefing and critique.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) Whether the control center or the emergency response 
communications

[[Page 38265]]

center promptly initiated the required notifications, as applicable 
under the plan:
* * * * *

Subpart C--Review, Approval, and Retention of Emergency 
Preparedness Plans

    5. Section 239.201 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) and 
(b)(3)(i) to read as follows:

Sec.  239.201  Emergency preparedness plan; filing and approval.

    (a) Filing of plan and amendments. (1) Filing of plan. Each 
passenger railroad to which this part applies and all railroads hosting 
its passenger train service (if applicable) shall jointly adopt a 
single emergency preparedness plan for that service, and the passenger 
railroad shall file one copy of that plan with the Associate 
Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, Federal 
Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Mail Stop 25, 
Washington, DC 20590, not less than 60 days prior to commencing 
passenger operations. Any passenger railroad that has an emergency 
preparedness plan approved by FRA as of (the effective date of the 
final rule) is considered to have timely-filed its plan. The emergency 
preparedness plan shall include the name, title, address, and telephone 
number of the primary person on each affected railroad to be contacted 
with regard to review of the plan, and shall include a summary of each 
railroad's analysis supporting each plan element and describing how 
every condition on the railroad's property that is likely to affect 
emergency response is addressed in the plan.
    (2) Filing of amendments to the plan. (i) Except as provided in 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section, each subsequent amendment to a 
railroad's emergency preparedness plan shall be filed with FRA by the 
passenger railroad not less than 60 days prior to the proposed 
effective date. When filing an amendment, the railroad must include a 
written summary of the proposed changes to the previously approved plan 
and, as applicable, a training plan describing how and when current and 
new employees and contractors would be trained on any amendment.
    (ii) If the proposed amendment is limited to adding or changing the 
name, title, address, or telephone number of the primary person to be 
contacted on each affected railroad with regard to the review of the 
plan, approval is not required under the process in paragraph (b)(3)(i) 
of this section. These proposed amendments may be implemented by the 
railroad upon filing with FRA's Associate Administrator for Railroad 
Safety/Chief Safety Officer. All other proposed amendments must comply 
with the formal approval process in paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this 
section.
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (i) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section, FRA 
will normally review each proposed plan amendment within 45 days of 
receipt. FRA will then notify the primary contact person of each 
affected railroad of the results of the review, whether the proposed 
amendment has been approved by FRA, and if not approved, the specific 
points in which the proposed amendment is deficient.
* * * * *

Subpart D--Operational (Efficiency) Tests; Inspection of Records 
and Recordkeeping

    6. Section 239.301 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  239.301  Operational (efficiency) tests and inspections.

    (a) Requirement to conduct operational (efficiency) tests and 
inspections. Each railroad to which this part applies shall 
periodically conduct operational (efficiency) tests and inspections of 
on-board, control center, and, as applicable, emergency response 
communications center personnel employed by the railroad, under a 
contract or subcontract with the railroad, or employed by a contractor 
or subcontractor to the railroad, to determine the extent of compliance 
with its emergency preparedness plan.
    (1) Written program of operational (efficiency) tests and 
inspections. Operational (efficiency) tests and inspections shall be 
conducted pursuant to a written program. New railroads shall adopt such 
a program within 30 days of commencing rail operations. The program 
shall--
    (i) Provide for operational (efficiency) testing and inspection on 
appropriate courses of action in response to various potential 
emergency situations and on the responsibilities of an employee of the 
railroad, of an individual who is a contractor or subcontractor to the 
railroad, or an employee of a contractor of subcontractor to the 
railroad, as they relate to the railroad's emergency preparedness plan.
    (ii) Describe each type of operational (efficiency) test and 
inspection required, including the means and procedures used to carry 
it out.
    (iii) State the purpose of each type of operational (efficiency) 
test and inspection.
    (iv) State, according to operating divisions where applicable, the 
frequency with which each type of operational (efficiency) test and 
inspection is to be conducted.
    (v) Identify the officer(s) by name, job title, and, division or 
system, who shall be responsible for ensuring that the program of 
operational (efficiency) tests and inspections is properly implemented. 
A railroad with operating divisions shall identify at least one officer 
at the system headquarters who is responsible for overseeing the entire 
program and the implementation by each division.
    (vi) Require that each railroad officer who conducts operational 
(efficiency) tests and inspections be trained on those aspects of the 
railroad's emergency preparedness plan that are relevant to the 
operational (efficiency) tests and inspections that the officer 
conducts, and that the officer be qualified on the procedures for 
conducting such operational (efficiency) tests and inspections in 
accordance with the railroad's written program of operational 
(efficiency) tests and inspections and the requirements of this 
section.
    (2) The operational (efficiency) testing program required by 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section may be combined with the written 
program of operational (efficiency) tests and inspections required by 
Sec.  217.9(c) of this chapter.
    (b) Keeping records of operational (efficiency) tests and 
inspections. Each railroad to which this part applies shall maintain a 
written record of the date, time, place, and result of each operational 
(efficiency) test and inspection that was performed in accordance with 
paragraph (a) of this section. Each record shall also specify the name 
of the railroad officer who administered the test or inspection, the 
name of each employee tested, and sufficient information to identify 
the relevant facts relied on for evaluation purposes.
    (c) Retention of operational (efficiency) test and inspection 
records. Each record required by paragraph (a) of this section shall be 
retained at the system headquarters of the railroad and, as applicable, 
at the division headquarters for the division where the test or 
inspection was conducted, for one calendar year after the end of the 
calendar year to which the test or inspection relates. Each such record 
shall be made available to representatives of FRA and States 
participating under part 212 of this chapter for inspection and copying 
during normal business hours.

[[Page 38266]]

    (d) Keeping records of written program of operational (efficiency) 
tests and inspections. Each railroad shall retain one copy of its 
current operational (efficiency) testing and inspection program 
required by paragraph (a) of this section and one copy of each 
subsequent amendment to such program. These records shall be retained 
at the system headquarters, and, as applicable, at each division 
headquarters where the operational (efficiency) tests and inspections 
are conducted, for three calendar years after the end of the calendar 
year to which they relate. These records shall be made available to 
representatives of FRA and States participating under part 212 of this 
chapter for inspection and copying during normal business hours.
    (e) Annual summary of operational (efficiency) tests and 
inspections. Before March 1 of each calendar year, each railroad to 
which this part applies shall retain at the system headquarters of the 
railroad and, as applicable, at each of its division headquarters, one 
copy of a written summary of the following with respect to its previous 
calendar year activities: the number, type, and result of each 
operational (efficiency) test and inspection, stated according to 
operating divisions as applicable, that was conducted as required by 
paragraph (a) of this section. These records shall be retained for 
three calendar years after the end of the calendar year to which they 
relate and shall be made available to representatives of FRA and States 
participating under part 212 of this chapter for inspection and copying 
during normal business hours.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on June 21, 2012.
Joseph C. Szabo,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2012-15746 Filed 6-26-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


 






















	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – U.S. Army Rules of Engagement Vignettes Handbook
		
	
	

		
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Vignettes put the rules of engagement (ROE) into context. Rules can be memorized, but without context, those rules have little meaning or value. There is not a repository of vignettes readily accessible to Soldiers. This handbook addresses that shortcoming for units heading to Afghanistan. Soldiers can use this handbook individually, but its value is greatly increased through group discussion and interaction with leaders and judge advocates.


Key Lessons


•• Soldiers must understand the basic definitions of hostile act, hostile intent, and what constitutes positive identification. Soldiers must be able to apply — not just know — those definitions in a dynamic, confusing, and dangerous environment.


•• Determining what is a threat is dependent upon what you know about your situation. Your knowledge needs to extend beyond your sector of fire to the culture, the patterns of life, and the second- and third-order effects of your actions.


•• The ROE are generally permissive. It is a Soldier’s responsibility to know the ROE and the environment to make the ROE an integral part of accomplishing the mission.


Introduction for Soldiers


The usual instructor for a ROE or escalation of force (EOF) class is the local unit judge advocate or your company commander. These individuals generally have expertise and a solid understanding of the legal and policy underpinnings of the ROE. However, you are a Soldier preparing to deploy and you want the Soldier’s perspective on how these rules apply in the field, in combat. The ability to recite the legal definition of hostile act may be an indication that you understand the concept, but knowing the definition is not the same as being able to apply a measured and proportional response in a dynamic, confusing, and dangerous situation. What you need is street smarts when it comes to applying the ROE. Helping you gain instinctive understanding within the context of the theater of operations is the intent behind this compilation of vignettes.


The vignettes come from the streets. They come from the experiences of Soldiers deployed to combat theaters — primarily Afghanistan. The ROE that are applied here are those for Soldiers operating under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) rules of engagement. If you previously deployed, you may notice some differences under the ISAF rules. If you see those differences in these vignettes, point them out during the discussions.


Highlighting the differences can help others internalize the ISAF rules. Always remember that regardless of subtle differences in terminology or definitions, your right to self-defense remains unchanged. Even if you have a previous deployment as part of ISAF, you may not have heard of the Tactical Directive, the Tactical Driving Directive, or the Commander’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Guidance. These documents contain additional rules, but for the most part, they re-emphasize the importance of protecting the civilian population. Along those lines, you will see many of the discussions turning away from what would be allowed under the ROE to what you really think you should do under a particular set of facts. This is the “can I?/should I?” analysis that should be at the forefront of your discussions.


These vignettes do not work alone. They are intended to be used in group environments and as the spark to ignite further discussions at the fire team and squad levels. In many cases, you will find that a vignette asks a distinct question and gives an exact “right/wrong, yes/no” answer. In other cases, you will find the discussions less concrete. That is the reality of the complexity of the battlefield. Challenge the scenarios as you work through them, but keep the basic concepts of the ROE and COIN doctrine intact. There may be policy or legal constructs with which you disagree, but your goal should be to prepare yourself and your battle buddies to operate in the current legal and policy environment.


This is not a compilation that should necessarily be read cover to cover. It is an interactive compilation. Take your time on each vignette — the value of the training will be directly related to the effort you put forward as an individual and as a member of a fire team or squad. There are no additional resources required, no time limits, and no grades. The real test will come in a combat theater, and success will be measured in human life.


Introduction for Leaders


These vignettes are designed for you. Whether you, your commander, or your unit’s judge advocate initially presents your Soldiers the rules — the law of armed conflict (LOAC), ROE, EOF standing operating procedures (SOP), detainee operations SOP, et al. — you are uniquely situated to incorporate the rules into your unit’s mindset as you develop its discipline and warrior ethos. These vignettes are a tool you can use to help you do just that.


As an artisan can make a tool do far more work than a beginner could, you can make these vignettes more effective as you craft their use. Most of your Soldiers can read them and understand most of the ideas presented. If you read your Soldiers the question and answer and do nothing more, you have added command emphasis and perhaps clarified some ambiguities. But you can maximize the effectiveness of this tool if you use these vignettes as a stepping-off point to further discussion.


How can you best use this tool? Hypothetically, place your tactical unit in the position each vignette describes. Discuss the tactical situation and strategic ramifications of following or violating the rules in the scenario. Ask your Soldiers questions like, “Could you have placed yourself in a better situation?” “How can you best resolve the situation tactically and legally?” “What is likely to follow?” Inject alternative scenarios, such as “What if the man was carrying an AK-47 instead of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) or standing in front of a home instead of an empty field?” After you answer the question “Can you? (do something legally),” ask the question “Should you?”


Walk your Soldiers through the legal analysis. When they get the right answer, ensure they can articulate why — well-reasoned but in their own words. This should sharpen their reaction time as they develop confidence in their responses. Additionally, this training should help them provide more detailed reports and statements during your tour when called upon to do so. Changes to the rules and an evolving area of operations may tweak the best response on one or more of these vignettes. When in doubt as to the correct answer for today, consult your commander or your unit judge advocate. The COIN environment in which we operate today in Afghanistan is complex. Day-to-day success is measured less by mission accomplishment and more by whether our actions have moved the population closer to the Afghan government or closer to the insurgents. How your Soldiers react will shape your area of operations and can contribute significantly to our ultimate success. The rules will help your Soldiers focus on the mission by freeing them from destructive urges and encouraging actions that advance our goal of separating insurgents from the population. These vignettes can help you hone your Soldiers to operate successfully within the rules on today’s complicated battlefield.


Consequently, the success of these vignettes rests upon you, for their success and yours will be measured by how well your Soldiers perform in the heat of battle when unexpected situations arise and they are called upon to decide in an instant how to apply their tactical training and the rules.


Introduction for the Judge Advocate


From a teaching standpoint, bullet comment slides are likely not the preferred method for educating an Army at war on the frustrating complexities of restraining the use of force. Rote memorization of the definitions of hostile act and hostile intent will have little value for a Soldier faced with split-second, life and death decisions. The COIN Soldier needs an in-depth understanding of the political, tactical, strategic, and cultural environments in which he will operate. Situational awareness coupled with an understanding of the ROE requires more than a quarterly 50-minute block of instruction. Accordingly, this collection of vignettes is intended to  pick up where the judge advocate class ends. The key to success is support from the tactical leaders to dedicate time and energy to working through the scenarios. However, continued engagement with the judge advocate is essential to quality control and building a Soldier’s confidence in his ability to implement the ROE on the battlefield.


These vignettes were compiled and the discussions prepared by judge advocates. Where possible, the discussions and answers provide concrete answers to black letter legal issues. In other scenarios, the discussion is meant to go beyond the ROE and LOAC. These may prove to be the most valuable discussions. The ROE are generally permissive. The strategic implications of a single Soldier’s actions require very junior personnel to go beyond the ROE analysis of whether the use of force is authorized. The judge advocate needs to take that additional step as well. These vignettes provide the judge advocate the opportunity to assist Soldiers in problem solving rather than simply giving an answer.


In creating this compilation, the concept was to develop a resource for junior leaders to train their Soldiers wherever and whenever the opportunity arises. Thus, the product is created as a tool for squad-level “hip-pocket” training. Do not let this format prevent you from utilizing the vignettes in other ways. Judge advocate ROE training can often be frustrating for both the Soldier and the instructor. Judge advocates tend to think of the ROE in academic terms — definitions and rules. Soldiers tend to operationalize the materials (i.e., put the rules in terms of something that has happened or a set of facts they can visualize). In other terms, the judge advocate tends to think about the ROE in paragraphs. The Soldier wants to see it in high-definition color. These scenarios can work to bridge that gap for the judge advocate. The discussions and answers are based upon the legal opinions of the authors applying the ISAF ROE, U.S. Standing ROE, and the LOAC as of the publication of this edition. The judgment of the authors should not be substituted for that of another judge advocate. The passage of time will also affect the law and policy upon which the discussions and answers are based. That being said, these scenarios have been carefully researched and compiled. They should be an asset for Soldiers, leaders, and judge advocates.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
SECRET – The FBI about Human Trafficking Prevention
		
	
	

		




Laborer




Human trafficking victims can be found in many job locations and industries.






 


For the young Ukrainians, it was a dream come true—the promise of well-paying jobs and free room and board in the United States. Once they arrived, however, it quickly turned into a nightmare. They were forced to endure 16-plus hour workdays, usually with no pay. Their living conditions were wretched, with up to 10 workers in often-unfurnished apartments or row houses. And they faced intimidation, threats of physical harm, or actual violence to keep them in line.


 







Trafficking victims


Human Trafficking Myths 


Be aware of these enduring myths about human trafficking:


Myth: Trafficking must involve the crossing of borders.

Fact: Despite the use of the word “trafficking,” victims can actually be held within their own country—anti-trafficking laws don’t require that victims must have traveled from somewhere else.


Myth: U.S. citizens can’t be trafficked.

Fact: They can and they are.


Myth: Victims know what they are getting into or have chances to escape.

Fact: They’re actually duped into it and may not even think of escaping because of threats against them or ignorance of the law.


Myth: Victims are never paid.

Fact: Sometimes they are paid, but not very much.


Myth: Victims never have freedom of movement.

Fact: Some victims can move about, but are coerced into always returning, perhaps with a threat against their families back home.


One last note: human trafficking is often confused with alien smuggling, which includes those who consent to smuggling to get across a border illegally.







Members of the organized criminal enterprise responsible for these workers’ misery were ultimately identified and charged in a conspiracy to operate a human trafficking scheme. But, as we observe National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month, we’re reminded that there are still thousands of victims in the U.S.—and millions worldwide—being forced into both legal and illegal activities.


Human trafficking generates billions of dollars of profit each year, making it one of the world’s fastest growing criminal activities. The FBI investigates it as a priority under our civil rights program, but we see human trafficking activities in other investigative areas as well, including organized crime, crimes against children, and gangs.


To address the threat, we work cases with our local, state, federal, and international partners and participate in approximately 70 multi-agency human trafficking task forces. We also offer our counterparts—as well as non-governmental organizations, including non-profits—human trafficking awareness training. And to help get a better handle on human trafficking within the U.S., the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting program plans to start collecting human trafficking data from law enforcement in 2013.


Many of our human trafficking cases are based on information from our partners and from criminal sources, but we also can and do receive tips from the public.


That’s where you come in. Please keep your eyes out for the following indicators that suggest the possibility of human trafficking:


 


    

  • Individuals who have no contact with friends or family and no access to identification documents, bank accounts, or cash;
    • 

  • Workplaces where psychological manipulation and control are used;
    • 

  • Homes or apartments with inhumane living conditions;
    • 

  • People whose communications and movements are always monitored or who have moved or rotated through multiple locations in a short amount of time;
    • 

  • Places where locks and fences are positioned to confine occupants; and
    • 

  • Workers who have excessively long and unusual hours, are unpaid or paid very little, are unable take breaks or days off and have unusual work restrictions, and/or have unexplained work injuries or signs of untreated illness or disease.
    • 



 


Bear in mind: human trafficking victims can be found in many job locations and industries—including factories, restaurants, elder care facilities, hotels, housekeeping, child-rearing, agriculture, construction and landscaping, food processing, meat-packing, cleaning services…as well as the commercial sex industry.


And here’s one more thing to consider: while the majority of human trafficking victims in our investigations are from other countries and may speak little or no English, approximately 33 percent of victims are Americans. They come from a variety of groups that are vulnerable to coercive tactics—like minors, certain immigrant populations, the homeless, substance abusers, the mentally challenged and/or minimally educated, and those who come from cultures that historically distrust law enforcement or who have little or no experience with the legal system.

	


	



			
				


			
				


			

			
SECRET – U.C. Berkeley Police Review Board Report on Occupy Berkeley Protest Response
		
	
	

		
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On the morning of November 9, 2011, thousands of students, faculty, staff, and community members gathered for a noontime rally in Sproul Plaza. Protestors voiced their opposition to a variety of issues including recent tuition increases and state cuts to public education, and their support for the Occupy movement, which began in New York City a few months prior. In the early afternoon, hundreds of protestors convened a “General Assembly,” in which they voted to set up tents near Sproul Hall. The first tents to be erected in the grassy area near Sproul Hall were quickly removed by campus police without incident.


Two later incidents in this same area, however, one in the mid-afternoon and one at night, involved the use of force by police against large numbers of protesters. Around 3 p.m., another set of tents was erected. In an effort to remove the tents, the police used batons and other means of force to move protestors that were locking arms and blocking access to the tents. After tense interaction with protesters, the police removed this second set of tents and withdrew to their command post in the basement of Sproul Hall. During this period, six individuals were arrested and more were injured and in some instances handled roughly.


Later, another set of tents was erected in the same area. Around 9:30 p.m. the police again used batons and other means of force against protesters to obtain access to and remove the tents. During this period, thirty-two individuals were arrested and more were injured or handled roughly. After removing this third set of tents, the police set up a perimeter around the grassy area to prevent further tents from being erected at that site, although a number of protestors stayed on Sproul Plaza throughout the night.


A few days after these incidents, Chancellor Birgeneau asked the Police Review Board (PRB) to review the events of that day, to the best of their ability determine what happened, and to assess whether the conduct of the police was consistent with the norms of the Berkeley campus and established campus policies. While a review of this breadth is not the regular business of the PRB, complying with the Chancellor’s request is within the stated mission of the Board. Given limitations of time and resources, the PRB limited its review of November 9’s events to the two primary confrontations regarding tent encampments summarized above, as well as the communications and actions by protesters, UCPD, and the campus leadership directly associated with those confrontations.


…


Nearly all of the incidents described took place in or near the patch of grass tucked into Sproul Hall’s northwestern elbow (hereinafter “the Corner”) (point A, in Appendix A). At around 3 p.m., the first set of tents was erected to the northwest of Mario Savio Steps, just south of the tree in the Corner. Only one tent is captured on video, but there are conflicting reports about the presence of other tents. It is clear from the video that the tent(s) were taken down by UCPD officers with relatively little resistance from protestors. Three officers approached from the northwest and threaded their way through the crowd. They wore normal uniforms with no helmet or face shield and with their batons sheathed at their sides. As they disassembled the tent, protestors surrounded them and yelled “shame on you.” Two protestors had their hands on the tent as it was being disassembled, perhaps in an effort to recover it after it was taken down, but the police easily removed those hands. The officers walked the tent out the way they came as the protestors booed them. None of the protestors made any threatening gestures towards the police, nor substantially interfered with their actions.


A short while later, a second set of tents was erected just southeast of the tree. The protestors tightly packed the entire grassy area around the tents, making it difficult to gain access to the tents. Video shows that officers, again in normal uniforms, attempted to reach the tents from a position along the north and east sides of the Corner, but there were too many protestors, and the police instead withdrew to UCPD headquarters in the basement of Sproul Hall. The tents soon spread to cover the northeastern portion of the Corner (point B, Appendix A). The protestors filled nearly the entire area around the tents, blocking access along the hedges to the north, from the base of Mario Savio Steps to the south, and Sproul Plaza to the west and south (yellow area, Appendix A).


Around this time, the UCPD issued at least three warnings to the crowd. Two were issued from the north of the protestors, near the tree at the far northwest end Sproul Hall (near point C, Appendix A). One warning was given with a bullhorn, and declared that the gathering was an “unlawful assembly.” The officer said, “I demand all those at this location to immediately disperse.” The same officer also gave the second warning from the north. He first attempted the announcement with a bullhorn, but, because he was drowned out by the crowd, the protestors encouraged the officer to use the “human microphone,” in which his statements would be repeated by the crowd. He agreed and stated the following: “Please be advised that camping on UC property is illegal. Please remove your tents now.” Because this announcement was amplified by the human mic, it is likely that a greater portion of the assembled students heard it. The protestors responded with a loud “No!,” also amplified with the human mic. The officer walked away as the crowd cheered.


The same officer gave the third warning, very similar to the first, from Mario Savio Steps. The officer used a bullhorn and informed the protestors that they were unlawfully assembled and demanded the dispersal of those grouped “at the west side of Sproul Hall.” He then said that those who remained would be “subject to arrest.” In response, the protestors asked the officer what law he was using to declare the assembly unlawful. The officer advised the students that “setting up a campsite like this is considered camping, and camping is unlawful on UC property.” The protestors then responded that they were not camping, but rather standing next to empty tents. They started chanting, “We are standing!” The officer responded that they should tell the people who are putting up the tents to take them down.


There is conflicting evidence regarding whether or not the UCPD effectively communicated its intentions to the crowd. Before the afternoon and evening confrontations, the police made multiple announcements to protestors that the encampments were unlawful and that the police would arrest those who interfered with their efforts to clear the tents. Videos show that, in addition to the police warnings, at least three protestors addressed the crowd in the minutes leading up to the afternoon confrontation and specifically mentioned the possibility of arrest.


At one point another student announced over the human microphone “that even though we know the risks involved, we are standing our ground,” a statement which was followed by cheers. Another video shows a protestor using a bullhorn to state a telephone number for people to call if they are arrested. On the other hand, several protestors stated at the open hearings that they could not hear the dispersal orders of the police, and videos show that protestors may have been confused about exactly what law they were violating. It seems unlikely that the protestors assembled in the Corner were not aware that they were defying police orders in setting up and protecting the tents.


…


The Brazil Report suggested that “when police wear riot gear they raise levels of fear and suspicion in the crowd” and recommended to “try to avoid formations or modes of movement or ways of doing things that seem overly militaristic or rigid” because it may “inflame demonstrators’ emotions and needlessly provoke hostile reactions.” The Brazil Report acknowledged that the UCPD is far more expert in matters of crowd control than outside reviewers. Equipment-related decisions are complex and account for the officers’ safety as well as the crowd’s reaction. Still, the Brazil Report’s judgment about equipment such as types of batons and riot gear deserves careful consideration by the PRT.


The Brazil Report also mentioned that guns that shoot rubber projectiles “look to the untutored eye like machine guns [s]o their visible presence, by itself, can intensify reactive emotions and invite erroneous inferences about the measures to which the police are prepared to resort.” While no such gun was fired on November 9, they were present, prompting changes of “Put the guns down!” from protestors.62 The visual impact of these weapons should concern the PRT, as informed by the Edley-Robinson Report, in the future.


 


 

	


	



			
				


			
				


			
				


			
				


			

			
Unveiled – The Hoover Legacy, 40 Years After Part 1: The End of an Era
		
	
	

		




Hoover’s casket in U.S. Capitol




J. Edgar Hoover’s body lies in state in the U.S. Capitol in 1972—an honor afforded to no other civil servant before or since. Hoover died 40 years ago this week. AP Photo






The Hoover Legacy, 40 Years After

Part 1: The End of an Era


05/04/12


He had led the FBI for nearly a half century and worked for eight different presidents, becoming practically an institution in his own right.


So when J. Edgar Hoover’s body was found by his housekeeper on the morning of May 2, 1972—40 years ago this week—the reaction was swift and far-reaching.


Later that day, President Richard Nixon called a press conference to announce the Director’s death, saying, “Every American, in my opinion, owes J. Edgar Hoover a great debt for building the FBI into the finest law enforcement organization in the entire world.” Nixon ordered that all flags at government buildings be flown at half-staff and spoke at Hoover’s funeral two days later.







J. Edgar Hoover






J. Edgar Hoover







Congress responded quickly as well, ordering Hoover’s body to lie in state in the U.S. Capitol—an honor afforded to no other civil servant before or since. The next day, as rain fell on Washington, thousands processed by his casket in the rotunda to pay their respects, and Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger eulogized the departed Director. Allies and admirers took to the floor of Congress to offer often effusive praise, and a new FBI building on Pennsylvania Avenue, halfway between the Capitol and the White House, was soon named in his honor.


At the same time, as the inevitable obituaries were written and TV specials aired, there was an undercurrent of reservation and some outright criticism. Hoover’s historic 48-year tenure in such a position of profound influence—and during a stretch of time when America was undergoing great social change—was bound to be marked by some mistakes and controversy. Fairly or unfairly, Hoover was criticized for his aggressive use of surveillance, his perceived reluctance to tackle civil rights crimes, his reputation for collecting and using information about U.S. leaders, and his seeming obsession with the threat of communism.


Both feared and beloved within his own organization, Hoover was clearly a complex and often confounding character. He joined the Department of Justice in 1917 at the tender age of 22 and quickly became a rising star. Hoover was tapped by the attorney general to head the Bureau in 1924, when it was a relatively unknown organization mired in political scandal. Hard-working, smart, and a superb bureaucrat, Hoover took a fledgling organization and molded it into an international leader in law enforcement and national security, one solidly grounded in professionalism and the techniques of modern science. As the Bureau put the trigger-happy gangsters of the 1930s out of business and outsmarted the spies and saboteurs of World War II, the FBI—and its newly christened “G-Men”—became a household name. Hoover rode that wave of fame, earning widespread acclaim as the nation’s top lawman.


The country’s honeymoon with Hoover would ultimately come to end, to some degree in the years before his passing and even more so after his death in the wake of greater scrutiny of the FBI and the growing distrust of government leaders that followed Watergate. Over the next several months, FBI.gov will explore various aspects of the directorship of J. Edgar Hoover through a series of stories and other materials, with the goal of shedding light on less well known or even caricatured areas of his actions and broadening the discussion on his complex and enduring legacy.

	


	



			
				


			

			
Unveiled –    The Hoover Legacy, 40 Years After
		
	
	

		




Hoover shown in the yearbook of his George Washington University law school graduating class in 1916




J. Edgar Hoover is seen in a George Washington University law school yearbook picture from 1916.






The Hoover Legacy, 40 Years After

Part 2: His First Job and the FBI Files


06/28/12


J. Edgar Hoover was just 18 years old when he took his first job in government—an entry-level position as a messenger in the orders department of the Library of Congress.


It was October 13, 1913. No one knew it at the time, but an important foundation in Hoover’s future career as FBI Director (and in the Bureau itself) was being laid.







Hoover work abstract






– View Hoover’s early service record







Young Hoover excelled at his work. He impressed his supervisors and was awarded multiple raises. His position in the orders department—which acquired books, manuscripts, and other items for the Library’s collections—included the opportunity to work in the cataloging department and the loan division. The Library was a half-mile from his house and allowed him to attend law school at night, where he was studying hard and learning quickly.


On July 25, 1917, Hoover left the Library, and he took a job the next day as a clerk in the Department of Justice, where his story becomes better known.


Hoover’s experiences with the Library of Congress and its innovative organization of knowledge have often been credited with influencing the creation of the FBI’s own knowledge management system—the FBI Files. The filing system he helped architect became almost legendary for its efficiency and over the years has been fodder for books, news stories, movies, and even conspiracy theories of all sorts that exaggerate the size and scope of the files.


But were the FBI files modeled on the Library of Congress system? Actually, no. The FBI file system is based on the type of case the file covers. Each file is designated by a classification number—for example, kidnapping cases begin with the number 7, espionage cases with the number 65. This is only vaguely similar to the Library’s system. Also, these classifications were already being used by the Department of Justice; Hoover’s Bureau simply adapted them for its own purposes.


What is true, however, is that Hoover’s Library experience did have a significant impact on how the FBI’s filing system was used and adapted. In a 1951 letter referencing his former position, Hoover wrote, “[T]his job …trained me in the value of collating material. It gave me an excellent foundation for my work in the FBI where it has been necessary to collate information and evidence.”


This ability to synthesize information was key. In 1921, as assistant director, Hoover oversaw the reform of the Bureau’s files, which were in disarray after several organizational restructurings. For the reform, Hoover took something old—the Department of Justice system—and something new—indexing the files as they were created. And then he used something borrowed—from the Library of Congress: the idea of extensive cross-references within the card indices that provided access to the content of the FBI files. Each cross-reference pointed back to the original file and allowed for comparison of information across all files. So an agent or clerk could find a person’s name, an event, a location, or any number of other things, even if it was spread across dozens of different files at Headquarters and in the field offices. In a profession that requires intelligence at its fingertips and the ability to know everything that’s available, this system was crucial to the success of Hoover’s Bureau as it grew and adapted to its expanding mission.


In the end, Hoover’s work at the Library helped the Bureau to create a file system that—in comparison to others of the day—was “unique unto itself,” as one records manager noted in 1941 when surveying the state of records across the nation.

	


	



			
				


			

			
TOP-SECRET – DHS Infrastructure Protection Note
		
	
	

		
https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/DHS-PerformanceVenues.png


Performance venues include theaters, concert halls, auditoriums, and amphitheaters, ranging in size and function from small neighborhood movie theaters or community playhouses to high-capacity venues in major metropolitan areas. Performance venues are relatively open-access, limited egress facilities and have been successfully targeted in the past.


Potential Indicators of Violence


Potential attackers have a wide variety of weapons and tactics available to achieve their objectives. Specific threats of most concern to performance venues include:

• Active Shooter / Small arms attack

• Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

• Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)

• Arson/incendiary attack


Indicators are observable anomalies or incidents that may precede an attack. Indicators of an imminent attack requiring immediate action may include the following:

• Persons in crowded areas (e.g., theater or auditorium lobby) wearing unusually bulky clothing that might conceal suicide explosives or weapons

• Suspicious or illegally parked vehicles near a performance venue or where crowds gather prior to or following performances and events

• unauthorized entry to the performance venue or restricted areas of the facility

• Persons or teams of people attempting to

• Unattended packages (e.g., backpacks, briefcases, boxes) that might contain explosives. Packages may be left in open areas or hidden in trash receptacles, lockers, or similar containers

• Evidence of exit doors being in propped open or ajar thus allowing access from the exterior


Indicators of surveillance by potential attackers include:

• Persons using or carrying video/camera/observation equipment in or near the facility over an extended period

• Persons discovered with facility maps, photos, or diagrams with critical assets highlighted or notes regarding infrastructure or listing of personnel

• Persons parking, standing, or loitering in the same area over a multiple-day period with no reasonable explanation

• An increase in threats from unidentified sources by telephone, postal mail, or e-mail and/or an increase in reports of threats from outside known, reliable sources

• Evidence of unauthorized access to the HVAC system or suspicious substances near HVAC intakes


Protective Measures


Protective measures include equipment, personnel, and procedures designed to protect a facility against threats and to mitigate the effects of an attack. Protective measures for performance venues and theatres include:


Communication and Notification

• Develop a communication and notification plan that covers voice, data, and video transfer of information related to security

• Provide the ability to record incoming communications (e.g., telephone calls) to identify potential threats

• Develop a notification protocol that outlines who should be contacted in emergencies

• Conduct outreach to neighboring properties to confirm and discuss emergency procedures


Suspicious Activity Reporting and Emergency Notifications

• Be aware of your surroundings; make sure you are in the safest possible location prior to calling (out of harm’s way)

• Be calm and articulate; talk slowly

• State your name, location, and the nature of the emergency

• Provide high level details of your situation

• Advise if you are injured; provide details

− Suspicious Activity Awareness Video: What’s in Store: Ordinary People | Extraordinary Events available at http://www.dhs.gov/cfsector

• Ensure staff is aware of how to report suspicious activity

• The “If You See Something, Say Something™” campaign and the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative encourage citizens to report suspicious activity to law enforcement

− More information can be found at https://www.dhs.gov/files/reportincidents/see-something-say-something.shtm


Planning and Preparedness

• Conduct regular evacuation drills with facility employees, clearly outlining the evacuation routes and outdoor assembly points

• Designate an employee as security director to develop, implement, and coordinate all security-related activities

• Conduct threat analyses, vulnerability assessments, consequence analyses, risk assessments, and security audits on a regular and continuing basis

• Establish liaison and regular communications with local law enforcement and emergency responders, state and federal law enforcement, public health organizations, and industry organizations to enhance information exchange, clarify emergency responses, track threat conditions, and support investigations

• Institute layers of security measures on the basis of the expected crowd level or performance type


Personnel

• Maintain up-to-date security training with regular refresher courses

− Active Shooter – How to Respond training available at https://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is907.asp

− Active Shooter Situation: Options for Consideration (Video) has been posted to the HSIN-Critical Sector (CS) portal at https://cs.hsin.gov/

• Provide security information and evacuation procedures to patrons before each performance. Advise patrons and staff to be alert to suspicious activity or items and on how to report such incidents


Monitoring, Surveillance, Inspection

• If warranted, evaluate the need to develop a monitoring, surveillance, and inspection program that is consistent with facility operations and security requirements

• Perform security sweeps of the entire facility before each show or performance

− Training Webinar: IED Threat Awareness and Detection available at http://www.dhs.gov/cfsector

• Consider limitations to patrons carrying bags/backpacks/gym bags, etc into the venue

• Consider screening of bags and persons wearing bulky clothing prior to venue entrance

− Training Video: Check It – What’s in the Bag available at http://www.dhs.gov/cfsector

• Confirm that all exit doors leading from venue to the exterior of the facility have operational locks and that they are locked

• Ensure the doors have not been propped open; consider active patrols around the exteriors and emergency exits just prior to the beginning of each show


Infrastructure Interdependencies

• Ensure that the facility has adequate utility service capacity to meet normal and emergency needs


Incident Response

• Review unified incident command procedures for responding to an event with local law enforcement, emergency responders, and government agencies

− Establish evacuation procedures and ensure the evacuation routes are clear of obstruction


DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:


DHS-PerformanceVenues