——– Original Message ——–Subject: Re: Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for
NATO
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2010 13:21:39 -0500
From: Marko Papic <marko.papic@stratfor.com>
To: Lena Bell <lena.bell@stratfor.com>
References: <4CA0DEFD.2020800@stratfor.com>Feel free to send these to eurasia@stratfor.comVery interesting articles. I’m a big fan of Spiegel.Lena Bell wrote:thpught you’d find this interesting Marko
Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,719726,00.html
09/27/2010
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West Germans were desperate to
prevent the Stasi’s top codebreakers from falling into the wrong hands
and set up a company to hire the East German cryptographers. Now the
former Stasi scientists develop technology used by Angela Merkel and
NATO.
Every morning, while going to his office in Berlin’s Adlershof district,
Ralph W. passes a reminder of his own past, a small museum that occupies
a room on the ground floor of the building. The museum could easily
double as a command center run by the class enemy in an old James Bond
film. A display of coding devices from various decades includes the
T-310, a green metal machine roughly the size of a huge refrigerator,
which East German officials used to encode their telex messages.
The device was the pride of the Stasi, the feared East German secret
police, which was W.’s former employer. Today he works as a cryptologist
with Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH (SIT), a subsidiary of Rohde & Schwarz, a
Munich-based company specializing in testing equipment, broadcasting and
secure communications. W. and his colleagues encode sensitive
information to ensure that it can only be read or heard by authorized
individuals. Their most important customers are NATO and the German
government.
Rohde & Schwarz is something of an unofficial supplier of choice to the
German government. Among other things, the company develops bugproof
mobile phones for official use. Since 2004, its Berlin-based subsidiary
SIT, which specializes in encryption solutions, has been classified as a
“security partner” to the German Interior Ministry, which recently
ordered a few thousand encoding devices for mobile phones, at about
EUR1,250 ($1,675) apiece. Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel has used
phones equipped with SIT’s encryption technology. In other words, the
Stasi’s former cryptographers are now Merkel’s cryptographers.
Secret Operation
The transfer of Ralph W. and other cryptologists from the East German
Ministry for State Security, as the Stasi was officially known, to West
Germany was handled both seamlessly and discreetly. West German
officials were determined to make sure that no one would find out about
the integration of East Germany’s top cryptologists into the west. The
operation was so secret, in fact, that it has remained unknown to this
day.
Only a handful of officials were involved in the operation, which was
planned at the West German Interior Ministry in Bonn. In January 1991,
Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH was founded. The company was established
primarily to provide employment for particularly talented Stasi
cryptologists that the Bonn government wanted to keep in key positions.
Ralph W. is one of those specialists. W., who holds a doctorate in
mathematics, signed a declaration of commitment to the Stasi on Sept. 1,
1982. By the end of his time with the Stasi, he was making 22,550 East
German marks a year — an excellent salary by East German standards. And
when he was promoted to the rank of captain in June 1987, his superior
characterized W. as one of the “most capable comrades in the
collective.” While with the Stasi, W. worked in Department XI, which
also boasted the name “Central Cryptology Agency” (ZCO).
Looking for the Top Performers
The story begins during the heady days of the East German revolution in
1990. Officially, the East German government, under its last communist
premier, Hans Modrow, had established a government committee to dissolve
the Ministry for State Security which reported to the new East German
interior minister, Peter-Michael Diestel. In reality, the West German
government was already playing a key role in particularly sensitive
matters. Then-West German Interior Minister Wolfgang Scha:uble (who is
the current German finance minister) had instructed two senior Interior
Ministry officials, Hans Neusel and Eckart Werthebach, to take care of
the most politically sensitive remnants of the 40-year intelligence war
between the two Germanys.
The government of then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl was interested in more
than just the politically explosive material contained in some of the
Stasi’s files. It also had its eye on the top performers in the former
East German spy agency. The cryptologists were of particular interest to
the Kohl government, which recognized that experts capable of developing
good codes would also be adept at breaking them. The Stasi cryptologists
were proven experts in both fields.
Documents from the Stasi records department indicate that the one of the
Stasi cryptologists’ achievements was to break Vericrypt and Cryptophon
standards that had been used until the 1980s. This meant that they were
capable of decoding encrypted radio transmissions by the two main West
German intelligence agencies — the Office for the Protection of the
Constitution and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) — and the West
German border police. The East Germans even managed to decode the BND’s
orders to members of the clandestine “Gladio” group, which was intended
to continue anti-communist operations in the event of a Warsaw Pact
invasion of Western Europe.
The West German government was determined to prevent these highly
trained East German experts from entering the free market. The idea that
specialists who had spent decades working with West German encryption
methods and had successfully cracked West German intelligence’s codes
could defect to Middle Eastern countries like Syria was a nightmare.
Until then, the BND had had no difficulties listening in on intelligence
communications in the Middle East, an ability the potential defection of
Stasi experts would likely have compromised. Bonn also hoped to use
their skills to break into regions where its own agents were making no
headway. All of this meant that the Stasi experts had to be brought on
board in the West — even if it involved unconventional methods.
: Cherrypicking the Stasi’s Top Brains
The government officials in Bonn turned to an expert for advice: Otto
Leiberich, a cryptologist and mathematician who had headed the Central
Office for Cryptology, the equivalent of the Stasi’s ZCO at the West
German BND, until the mid-1970s. Leiberich’s task, after he was brought
in as a member of the secret operation, was to evaluate the professional
abilities of the Stasi experts.
Leiberich still has vivid memories of his first official trip to the
town of Hoppegarten, next to Berlin. One of the East German
cryptologists at the meeting greeted the members of the West German
delegation as “comrades,” Leiberich recalls. He was impressed by the
East Germans’ expertise, says Leiberich. “They were excellent
mathematicians who were not personally guilty of any misconduct.”
Leiberich says he would have liked to hire them, particularly the
Stasi’s then “chief decoder,” the ZCO department head, Horst M. A gaunt
chain-smoker who wore horn-rimmed glasses, M. was born in 1937 and had
earned a degree in mathematics at East Berlin’s Humboldt University. But
the West was also interested in younger people, in the expectation that
they would be of greater value in the nascent computer age.
A Free-Market Solution
Leiberich could have used the extra manpower, especially after 1990,
when the West German Central Office for Cryptology was spun off from the
BND and a law was enacted to form the new Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI). Leiberich, who was named the BSI’s first president,
headed a team consisting mainly of former intelligence colleagues.
But Neusel, the senior official from the West German Interior Ministry,
dismissed the idea as too precarious. Firstly, the government had
decided not to integrate former Stasi officials, because of their past
activities, into the bureaucracy of a unified Germany. Additionally, as
one person involved in the operation recalls, concerns about potential
traitors gave rise to a “sacred principle,” namely that “no one from the
Stasi was to be transferred to the West German intelligence agencies.”
It also didn’t help that the Stasi’s Central Cryptology Agency had been
hastily spun off into the East German Interior Ministry, because the
West German cabinet had decided not to allow any members of the East
German Interior Ministry to work in federal agencies.
But the free market was not restricted by any government resolutions. A
creative solution was needed, and no one was better suited for coming up
with the necessary fix than Hermann Schwarz, one of the two founders of
Rohde & Schwarz.
A Soft Spot for the East
Founded in 1933, the company, a provider of radio, measuring and
security technology, was dependent on government contracts and was a
reliable supplier to the West German intelligence agencies. Besides,
Schwarz had a soft spot for the East. He had earned his doctorate in
1931 in the eastern city of Jena, where he had also met his eventual
business partner, Lothar Rohde.
But to Schwarz, who was already elderly at the time and has since died,
allowing his company’s name to be used as a cover for a Stasi connection
seemed too risky. According to someone familiar with the operation, the
West Germans must have applied a bit of soft pressure on Schwarz, who
was “extremely worried that it would be made public one day.”
But the officials eventually did manage to convince Schwarz to play
along. His change of heart was probably due in part to the prospect of
additional research and federal contracts, which were in fact showered
on his company.
In the end, BSI head Leiberich and a senior Interior Ministry official
decided which former Stasi experts were to be transferred to the front
company. Former Stasi department head Horst M. was seamlessly integrated
into the market economy at SIT, where his wife also began working as a
secretary. Ralph W., who was in his 30s at the time and had been with
the Stasi for eight years, also fitted the desired profile, as did his
colleagues Wolfgang K. and Volker S. In total, about a dozen former
Stasi employees, most of them mathematicians, were given the chance to
embark on a second cryptology career in post-reunification Germany.
The federal government provided whatever assistance it could, but only
with the utmost discretion. SIT was initially headquartered in the town
of Gru:nheide in the eastern state of Brandenburg, in a former Stasi
children’s home.
‘Cosmic Top Secret’
An episode from the 1990s shows how conspiratorially the operation was
handled, even within the West German intelligence community. When the
BND needed a “D-channel filter” — a precursor to today’s firewalls —
to protect communications networks, it contacted the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI). But BND officials pricked up their ears when
they discovered that the work was being done by SIT. A private company
protecting the computers of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency?
Nevertheless, the BND officials were told that it was “totally OK,” and
that the BSI would take responsibility for SIT.
For the parent company Rohde & Schwarz, the former problem child in
Brandenburg soon became a success story. SIT took over the cryptology
division of German engineering giant Siemens, and the company now
employs about 150 mathematicians, engineers and computer scientists at
its three locations. SIT, which proudly refers to itself as the
“preferred supplier of high-security cryptography” for NATO, even
includes in its product line devices classified as “Cosmic Top Secret,”
NATO’s highest secrecy level. SIT’s Elcrodat solution, standard
equipment on NATO submarines, frigates and military helicopters, has
provided the company with orders worth millions for years.
When approached by SPIEGEL, Rohde & Schwarz declined to comment on this
previously unknown part of its company history.
To show its gratitude for the company’s efforts, the federal government
did more than just provide it with lucrative contracts. Eckart
Werthebach, the Interior Ministry official, awarded the former managing
director of SIT, a senior Rohde & Schwarz executive originally from West
Germany, the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany for his
services. The executive received the decoration in a formal ceremony at
Villa Hammerschmidt in Bonn, the former official residence of the German
president.
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Marko Papic
Geopol Analyst – Eurasia
STRATFOR
700 Lavaca Street – 900
Austin, Texas
78701 USA
P: + 1-512-744-4094
marko.papic@stratfor.com |