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[letterhead] General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces


Copy Nº 4


[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]



(as of 0800 2 June 1988)





(as of 0800 2 June 1988)


  1. The BLUES continue to extend a campaign of slander against the REDS, their allies, and supporters. They say that the REDS have upset the balance of forces and are seeking new conquests to distract their peoples’ attention away from economic difficulties. The governments of the REDS are allegedly rejecting all peace proposals and appeals from various organizations and people who enjoy worldwide respect.
  2. Hostile acts against diplomatic representatives of the REDS are increasing in the BLUE countries. In spite of this, diplomatic contacts of the countries united in opposing blocs are characterized by increased activity. Political representatives and leaders say that the purpose of their actions and efforts is to avert war.
  3. At a meeting of the UN Security Council convened on 12 June at their initiative the leaders of the REDS accused some BLUE countries of whipping up tension in Europe, increasing military-political interference in other regions of the world, and putting pressure on the governments of countries which are dependent on them. It was declared that their lying and slanderous propaganda against the REDS had gone far beyond the bounds of good practice in international relations and is evidence of an intent to aggravate relations and a desire to cover their own aggressive intentions and preparations.
  4. The governments of the BLUES are reinforcing the economic blockage of the RED countries. They are announcing or threatening to introduce an air and naval blockade of certain continental and ocean regions of the world. They are trying to subject the ships of some RED countries in these regions to illegal controls.
  5. The propaganda campaign of slander against the sociopolitical system and government leaders of the REDS is increasing. Along with this subversive centers are pursuing activity directed at dividing the public, exciting anti-social forces, and creating a political and subversive underground.
  6. In response to the increasing aggressiveness of the BLUES the leaders of the REDS published a joint statement which noted that “the only sensible outcome of the situation which has developed is the achievement of an agreement between the opposing groups”.


  1. The unfavorable influence of the international situation on the views and the mood of the population is being observed in all regions of the country. A reduction of interest in work is being noted at industrial enterprises. Nervousness, discord, disorganization, and a lowering of labor discipline are increasing among the managers of enterprises. There are increasingly fewer young people in class at higher educational institutions. In spite of appeals from authorities long lines are forming in front of stores, including people who should be working at the time. As regards the shortage of foods in Wroclaw, for example, there appeared calls for workers to “vigorously protest”, including striking. An increased movement of the population by rail and road is being observed. Telephone lines are overloaded. Malicious agitation and undesirable phenomena are increasing in the countryside. Almost all deliveries of agricultural products to purchase points have stopped. Speculation is increasing throughout the entire country.
  2. Subversive propaganda centers and anti-government underground activists are increasing activity directed at subverting the country’s defense policy and also at discrediting its armed forces and the ministry of internal affairs. The increased size of expenditures for defense in comparison with the scale of social needs is cited in radio broadcasts. The capabilities of the weapons and equipment of our Army are doubted and it is called a “hopeless army”. Hostile propaganda is increasing among workers calculated at generating protests against “work, wage, and standard of living” conditions and “the necessity of sticking to utopian solutions of the problem of the political system”.
  3. The hostility of views, moods, and statements of part of the population is increasing throughout the entire country, namely:

a) in some population centers attempts have been made to organize street demonstrations “in defense of freedom and peace”. Handbills are being distributed containing calls for the protection of people refusing to serve in the Army;

b) at some enterprises criticism and dissatisfaction with the supply of raw materials and resources is increasing;

Some of the workers say that “in view of the passivity of the authorities” who are not in control of the situation they ought to make decisions independently and also express the opinion that in the event war begins the authorities would not be able to ensure the normal functioning of the economy and public life;

c) handbills have been distributed in six industrial centers containing instructions to effectively put machines and production equipment out of commission;

d) pessimism is growing in all levels of society with respect to the possibility of a peaceful solution to contentious international problems. Part of the public is under the strong influence of malicious propaganda and does not see the possibility of a victory by the REDS in a possible war. The opinion is also expressed that our territory will be occupied by BLUE troops;

e) in some population centers acts of terrorism and sabotage with the use of small explosive charges have been committed (railroad stations, bus stations [avtostantsiya], stores, post offices). The population is demanding that authorities severely punish the guilty.


  1. The political attitudes, morale, and discipline of servicemen, especially regular army personnel, are good. Dedication and precision in carrying out assignments to maintain combat readiness are increasing. No negative phenomena are being observed in the sentiments in the Army. Individual statements and incidents encounter a vigorous rebuff from commanders.
  2. In spite of some nervousness, the personnel of command organizations exhibit a feeling of responsibility for the timely and meticulous accomplishment of assigned tasks. Increased educational work with soldiers, primarily with reservists, is being done by cadre personnel..
  3. Political organs are stepping up preparations for operations in combat conditions. They are successfully combating hostile influences on the personnel. Requests are coming from formations and units for relevant information about the military and political situation and for propaganda materials.


This document provides a scenario in which the “Blue” governments have engaged in a campaign of increasingly hostile propaganda intended to discredit the “Red” bloc socioeconomic system. Consequently, domestic morale is low. The population has grown pessimistic and, in light of the international situation, feels emboldened to challenge the Red authorities and leaders.

Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization
Eastern Europe


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[letterhead] General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces


Copy Nº 4


[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]


Nº 1



as of 0800 2 June 1988


The fall of 1987 brought a considerable revival of multilateral and bilateral relations between the BLUE and RED countries. The governments of both sides began constructive talks to relax tension and strengthen means of mutual trust. Controversial decisions were made and zones of influence were also identified in areas where oil and natural gas were being intensively exploited.

As a result of the revived political dialog there came a softening of the binding positions about the free exchange of information and the development of private tourism. The magnitude of the influence of the mass media on the population rose in connection with the use of satellite communications. The mass media of the BLUES played a leading role in this.

In the spring of 1988 the policy of détente was not supported by the command staff of the armed forces of the BLUE countries. The senior officers in the leadership of the armed forces began to officially oppose the policy pursued by their governments. Acts of terrorism against active political leaders who supported the policy of détente occurred in the BLUE countries.

The ordinary personnel of the armed forces began to doubt the results of the work of international commissions to monitor the measures being taken within the framework of inspecting the actual implementation of previously concluded agreements. They disputed the trustworthiness of the work being done and vilified the governments of the RED countries, blaming them for trying to upset the military balance in their favor.

Detailed programs for the rapid introduction of arms shipments into the armed forces of these countries were presented in spring briefings with the command staff of the armed forces of the BLUE countries. The program to equip the armed forces with smart weapons was cut to five years. The deadline to complete this program will be 1993. Armored and mechanized divisions have become the main formations of the ground forces. Decisions were made about the intensive training of servicemen for them to master the latest generation of combat equipment. The number of exercises with troops in at the regimental-battalion echelon has increased considerably.

The number of exercises with troops in the first quarter of 1988 doubled in comparison with the same quarter of the previous year. The intensive preparation of alternate local mobilization resources and the deployment of territorial defense units continue.


According to the treaties concluded between the BLUES and REDS by 1 May each side was to dismantle and destroy 50% of the warheads and medium-range ground-launched missiles, 40% of intermediate-range warheads and missiles, and also 25% of strategic nuclear platforms.

A reorganization of formations has been completed in the Ground Forces. The posture and main weaponry is in Appendix Nº 2 to operational assignment Nº 1.

The latest generation equipment has been placed in service in the fighter-bomber and transport aircraft of the Air Forces. Su-25 aircraft have been placed in service in fighter-bomber air divisions, and in some fighter units, Su-27’s and MiG-29’s. Transport aviation has received aircraft with a increased range and greater cargo capacity. In addition, cruise missiles have been placed in service in army aviation air units; each Army has one air squadron of 24 cruise missiles.

A surface ship modernization program is being carried out in the Navy, particularly with missile armament. The first missile frigates have entered service. Sixty percent of submarines have been modernized. They were equipped with automated navigation systems and sonar suites to detect and identify targets. Naval aviation is being modernized. New types of anti-submarine helicopters are coming into service.


Intensive training in garrisons, training grounds, and training areas located near the barracks continues in the armed forces of the BLUE countries. The main effort in the training process has been concentrated on improving the systems of mobilization deployment of the armed forces. The main effort in the formations and units of operational troops has been concentrated on mastering new equipment and organizing coordination with aviation.

[The following] continue within the framework of the spring series of exercises on the territory of BLUE countries:

  • VESNA-88, a multi-stage command staff exercise, continues in the LEIPZIG, HALLE, ERFURT, PLAUEN area,
  • LABENDYN 2/88, a multi-stage command-staff exercise of the formations of the 26th Army, in the area southwest of NEUBRANDENBURG, WAREN, and MIROW,
  • selected units of missile troops and artillery at the front echelon are conducting a tactical exercise with live firing at training areas in the area of LUCKENWALDE, LÜBBEN, and SCHÖNEWALDE,
  • beginning 1 June selected coastal defense units in coordination with territorial defense units began the exercise BEREG in the area of WISMAR Bay in which the planning, organization, and conduct of an anti-amphibious assault landing operation are being worked out.

About 3000 soldiers and sailors and also about 40 ships of various classes are involved in the operation,

  • VOLANT, an opposing-force exercise with units of the 21st md, has been conducted since 26 May in the GRYFINO Training Area. A mobilization deployment of cadre units was conducted in the first stage of the exercise. A total of more than 3000 reservists were involved. The main stage of the exercise will start on 3 June in which munitions will be fired.
  • MAR’YASH-88, an opposing-force exercise with units of the 344th msd, began in the area of the FRANKFURT Training Area on 30 May. The main purpose of the exercise is to conduct a surprise inspection of plans to replenish personnel from the “B” table of organization and improve officers’ and reservists’ knowledge about the planning, organization and conduct of defensive operations in the division in the initial stage of a war,
  • BAR’ER-88, an opposing-force exercise with units of the 35th td, began on 1 June in the region of the COTTBUS Training Area. The main purpose of the exercise is to inspect the state of the division’s combat readiness and its combat effectiveness for use in battle after regrouping to a great distance. The exercise will conclude with an inspected [inspektsionnaya] firing at the Training Area,
  • on 28-29 May the BLUES conducted an inspection of the activation of the troop notification and mobilization deployment system on the territory of the Central TO District.

The inspection was played out and involved 50% of the personnel of the TO units and subunits in the District.


28 May. The VESNA-88 exercise concluded. Units of the 63rd td remained on the territory of the LEIPZIG Training Area to conduct additional firing; the remaining staffs and units were regrouped to permanently deployed locations.

As a result of the pressure brought about by military circles, on 1 June the BLUES halted work on the elimination of medium and intermediate-range missiles because of the alleged continuing modernization of tactical nuclear platforms in the armed forces of the RED countries.


This intelligence summary describes a potential scenario in which the policy of detente in “Blue” countries begins to deteriorate and increased military exercises are conducted.

Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization
Eastern Europe
Warsaw Pact Military Planning


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[letterhead] General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces


Copy Nº 4


[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]


Nº 2




for the period 0800 2 June to 1900 6 June 1988


The actions of the BLUE countries have led to a further aggravation of the military-political situation in Europe. In their official statements the leaders of the BLUE countries accused the governments of the RED countries of violating human rights and also of forcing their citizens to perform military obligations.

Alternative military service is being subjected to sharp criticism, particularly in the Polish armed forces.

The parliaments of the BLUE countries have approved government proposals about granting special credits for the financing of dissident organizations operating in the RED countries. Propaganda directed against political parties and government groups has been stepped up and the number of radio broadcasts in Slavic languages has been increased . Dissident organizations active in RED countries have increased their efforts in order to shake the unity of the [RED] countries and provoke a rebellion.

The diplomatic steps of the RED countries to halt conflict and relax international tension have not brought tangible results. The security services of the BLUE countries have recently taken steps to publicly compromise the most active diplomats from the RED countries. More than 50 diplomats from RED countries had been expelled from BLUE countries by 5 June. The mass media is waging a campaign against other diplomats who have allegedly engaged in espionage.

Taking retaliatory measures, the REDS suggested that 30 diplomats of the BLUE countries leave their countries, accusing [them] of espionage, and did not agree to the accreditation of 20 diplomats of these countries. The BLUES accused the RED countries of whipping up tension in bilateral relations and also of intentionally inflaming international relations in order to lead to an armed confrontation.


Within the framework of a spring series of exercises and preparations for a strategic command-staff exercise, DRUZHBA-88, in which operations groups from the staffs of the Northern, Central, and Southern Fronts, armies and selected divisions are to be involved, the BLUES are continuing to develop measures to inspect the state of combat readiness of the large formations and formations in the ground forces, air forces, and navy. A regrouping of formations and units is being conducted.

During the exercises being conducted up to now measures have being worked out to verify the state of combat and mobilization readiness of the selected formations and units. Officers are improving their knowledge in the area of planning, organizing, and marching to great distances. In addition, an inspection of the level of combat training of the troops involved in the exercise is being conducted.

In addition to the exercises being conducted up to now in the ground forces of the BLUE countries, in recent days the following training measures have begun to be worked out:

  • on 2 June at the CEDYNIA Training Area, a one-sided exercise of units selected from the 28th td under the name RUBIN-88. The primary goal of the exercise is to improve the troops’ planning, organization, and conduct of defensive operations;
  • on 4 June an opposing-force exercise with the troops of the 62nd td under the name CHERNYY KOT began at the [WEISSEWASSER] Training Area. The goal of the exercise is to check the state of combat readiness of division units and improve the officers’ knowledge of the planning, organization, and conduct of defensive operations in the initial period of a war;
  • on the morning of 6 June an inspection of the combat readiness of the 10th and 12th td’s was declared. At 1200 the departure of units of these divisions for areas where troops go on alert was noted;
  • in areas north of NEUBRANDENBURG the operation of the field CP communications center of the 26th Army; 15 km west of NEURUPPIN [that of the] 27th Army; 20 km east of DESSAU -[of] the 35th Army; 18 km north of KARL-MARX-STADT – [of] the 36th Army; and 25 km north of PRAGUE, [of] the 48th Army were noted;
  • intensive training of troops has been noted in training grounds near locations of permanent deployment and in the areas of [LIPSTADT] and SIEGEN. The outfitting of the troops and the technical condition of transport equipment is being checked;
  • the departure of march columns of the 36th td was noted in the area of HALLE at 1800 6 June. Traffic control posts were set up on the streets in an easterly direction;
  • intensified preparations for a march of the 63rd td were noted in the area of the LEIPZIG Training Area;
  • formations and units not involved in the exercise are in permanently deployed locations and are undergoing intensive training.


The number of workers employed in key military industrial enterprises has increased in the BLUE countries. The high rate of production of T-72 tanks and SU-27 and MiG-29 aircraft is being maintained.

The implementation of a program to build and repair ships and submarines has been accelerated. Restrictions have been introduced on the free movement of RED diplomats in the territory of most of the BLUE countries.

The security of important military facilities has been strengthened, new passes introduced, and the operating procedures of the personnel observation and monitoring systems near guarded facilities have been increased.

On 5 June government control over the distribution of fuel and electrical power was introduced in a majority of BLUE countries. Their supply to the civilian population was reduced considerably.

The number of reconnaissance flights along the border with the BLUE countries has increased as well as reconnaissance missions [reysy], especially in the Baltic Sea area. Fishing cutters have been enlisted to conduct reconnaissance in the waters bordering the RED countries. The number of fishing cutters of the BLUE countries in fishing grounds near the territorial waters of RED countries increased sharply last week.

An increase in the tempo of repair work, the installation of air defense equipment on several BLUE ships, technical inspections, and the presence of crews on mothballed ships has been noted in ports and naval bases.

On the night of 5-6 June selected surface ships left the main naval bases for forming-up places within the framework of preparations for the SKAGEN-88 exercise which, according to plan, will be held from 7 June to 6 July in the area of the western BALTIC straits.

On 5 June an inspection of the air defense system was conducted in the BLUE countries. An additional 36 radar stations and 46 AAA battery firing positions were deployed near airfields within the framework of this inspection. Individual air defense regions have reached readiness Nº 2 within the framework of a training exercise.

At 1900 6 June a codeword message to bring formations and units into full combat readiness was intercepted in the warning net of the armed forces of the BLUE countries.


This document provides background information on a hypothetical political/military scenario leading up to the command staff exercise SHICHT-88 [TARCZA-88 in Polish]. In the scenario ‘Blue’ military leaders have begun to oppose the policy of detente pursued by their governments and consequently have raised their level of combat readiness by increasing the frequency of military exercises and pressured ‘Blue’ governments into ending the destruction of intermediate-range nuclear forces as required by the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe. In response the ‘Reds’ have also raised their combat readiness. The increased international tension has affected the situation within Poland, contributing to increased anti-government sentiment.

Warsaw Treaty Organization–Armed Forces
Warsaw Treaty Organization–Military policy
Warsaw Treaty Organization
Anti-communist movements
Press–Western countries
West Germany





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On the order of implementing military technical cooperation of the USSR with foreign countries

1.Decisions on questions of military technical cooperation of the Soviet Union and foreign countries are made by the USSR Council of Ministers after approval by the CPSU Central Committee.

In accordance with Resolution No. 878-210 of the USSR Council of Ministers from July 30, 1987 “On measures to improve military technical cooperation with foreign countries,” consideration of concrete questions in this area is entrusted to the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on Military-Industrial Questions.

2.In accordance with Resolution No. 320 of the USSR Council of Ministers from March 12, 1988 practical implementation of military technical cooperation with foreign countries is entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Connections (MVES). This cooperation is intended to ensure the USSR conducts a unified foreign economic policy and safeguards its interests in foreign arms markets and the effectiveness of cooperation
3.Resolution No. 191 of the USSR Council of Ministers from February 28, 1989 has determined the functions fulfilled by the MVES to implement military technical cooperation together with the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gosplan, and other relevant Ministries and agencies, including:

– Consideration of the manner of foreign countries’ handling of deliveries of special property and provision of technical cooperation in its mastery, operation, and application;

– Implementation of delivery of special and other property from the USSR for the needs of armies, internal affairs agencies, and state safety;

– Provision of technical cooperation to foreign countries in creation of special units;

– Financial and monetary planning in all forms of operations among participants in military technical cooperation with foreign countries;

– Planning and organization of transfers of special property, its insurance, and ensuring the safety of delivery;

– Implementation of activities to secure the state and state secrets in work conducted and other functions;

In relation to the foregoing, the USSR MVES reserves the right:

– To communicate within the framework of its competency with institutions, organizations, and authorities of foreign states in the same way within the USSR as abroad, and to assign them and accept technical materials, samples, and documents from them in established order.

– To conduct talks and sign agreements as ordered by the Soviet government with foreign countries and to provide signatures on contracts with corresponding organizations in other countries;

– To send Soviet specialists abroad in established order in order to carry out their accepted duties and receive foreign delegations.

The USSR MVES implements military technical cooperation through the Main Engineering Administration, the Main Technical Administration, and the Main Administration on Cooperation, which are independent domestic organizations of this Ministry with rights as legal entities.

Reference: The measures by which the state regulates foreign economic activities are determined by Resolution No. 203 of the USSR Council of Ministers from March 7, 1989, and it states that “Enterprises, unions, manufacturing cooperatives, and other Soviet organizations cannot export weapons, firearms, military equipment, explosive substances, nuclear materials… individual types of products and technologies that are used or may be used in the creation of weapons or military equipment, poisons, narcotics, or psychotropic substances… other types of products or services, whose export is forbidden, unless otherwise provided by legislation.”

List of responsibilities allocated to the USSR Council of Ministers, CPSU Central Committee, Ministry of Foreign Economic Connections, and other relevant ministries on issues relating to the implementation of military technical cooperation between the USSR and foreign countries.

Warsaw Treaty Organization
Soviet Union–Military policy
Soviet Union



7 Atrocities Soviet Dictator Joseph Stalin Committed | HowStuffWorksCde. APRESOV!

Sheng Shicai’s letter made a depressing impression on our comrades. Only a provocateur or an hopeless “leftist” having no idea about Marxism could have written it. What could have happened that Sheng, having such an adviser as you, could have written us (me, Molotov, and Voroshilov) such a letter?

We are sending Sheng a suitable letter, but Cde. Svanidze will pass you a copy of our reply.

You should explain to Sheng the meaning of our reply and take steps so that the instructions given in our reply are followed.

I warn that if our instructions are not taken into consideration we will be forced to deny aid to Sheng.

The charter of the Union is not bad, but paragraph five about “equal rights” for women is not suitable for Xinjiang conditions and should be discarded.



27 July 1934

[a handwritten version of the above follows]


Sheng Shicai - Wikiwand

Governor Shicai Sheng expresses his firm belief in Communism, his desire to overthrow the Nanjing Government and construct a Communist state in its place, and the need to establish a Communist Party branch in Xinjiang. Emphasizing his long study of Marxist theory, he requests that Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov allow him to join the Communist Party.

SHENG, SHICAI, 1897-1970

Molotov, Vyacheslav M.
Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953
China–Politics and government–1912-1949
Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu (China)–History
Sheng, Shicai, 1897-1970
Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich, 1881-1969
China (Republic)–Foreign relations–Soviet Union
More …
Soviet Union
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region


I. Stalin

Top Secret

Translation from Chinese


1. In August 1932 I sent letters to the Comintern and Mr. Stalin in which I briefly laid out my world view.

2. In this [letter] I consider it my duty to express deep gratitude for the great assistance you have given in calming Xinjiang and killing the bandit, Ma Zhongying.

3. In spite of the fact that I still am not a member of the Communist Party I have engaged in the study of Marxism and my faith in the triumph of Communism was a consequence of the study of historical materialism, “Das Kapital”, “The Communist Manifesto”, and “Critique of the Gotha Program”, which gives me the ability not to put myself in the ranks of blind imitators or collaborators.

A. The main importance of historical materialism is in the scientific explanation and interpretation of social development, in the evidence for the need to reorganize society, and in pointing out the ways for this reorganization.

B. On the basis of scientific methods and firmly established laws [like] “the law of the fall of profit” “Das Kapital” shows the inevitable demise of the hated capitalistic system at a certain stage of its development and the inevitability of the rise of Communism. Then he reveals a picture of the exploitation of the workers by the capitalists and the perniciousness (harm, malignance) of the surplus value they have created, and which factors are the causes of the appearance of the socialist revolution.


Georgy Malenkov: what “heir” of Stalin went to Church – The Global Domain  News



MAY 18, 1953


Copy No.

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

18 May 1953
pg. 00195

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to Comrade G.M. Malenkov

In accordance with instructions from the CPSU CC, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany presents this report on the reasons for the departure of the population from the German Democratic Republic to West Germany, and also on proposals to end these departures.

In its note to the CPSU CC of 15 March 1953, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany delivered a detailed analysis of the economic and political situation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite the general economic improvements and political strengthening of the GDR, the departure of the population from the GDR to West Germany is growing, as is confirmed by the data furnished below:



4 mo. of 1953

1. In all, number who left the GDR




Left illegally




Moved with permission




2. Arrived in the GDR from West Germany





By their social composition, those who have left the GDR fall into the following categories:



4 mo. of 1953





White-collar workers













No data



Other categories and family members





Detailed data on social and age composition are contained in Appendix No. 1.
Of this number, 320 persons exited across maritime and zonal borders during the [first] four months of 1953; the rest left through Berlin.
The increase in the number of persons moving from the GDR to West Germany can be explained by an intensification of the class struggle in the city and the countryside, and also by the fact that in the practical work of implementing major economic and political measures, administration often is substituted for political mass work, and certain ministries [and] local party and state organs commit gross errors and excesses in regard to different strata of the population.
After the Second Conference of the SED [in 1952], the government of the GDR and the SED CC took a number of important decisions aimed at limiting capitalist elements in industry and trade, as well as the kulak class in the countryside.
The most important measures on limiting capitalist elements in the city are:

– limiting the supply of raw materials, electric power, and fuel to private industrial enterprises, and goods to private commerce, as well as ending the sale of new industrial equipment, freight vehicles, vessels, and transport and fishing fleets to private enterprises;
– liquidating the majority of large private wholesale firms by administrative procedure under the pretext that they were violating the laws of the GDR;
– implementing special measures to combat speculation and [cutting off] links between private entrepreneurs and firms in West Berlin and West Germany, as well as forcibly closing the branches of West German and West Berlin firms in the democratic sector of Berlin and the GDR;
– canceling some tax advantages earlier granted to large private industrial enterprises on the basis of laws enacted before 1945, as well as intensifying the recovery of [tax] arrears;
– transferring the owners of enterprises employing more than five workers, rather than the existing [cut-off point of] 10 workers, from the category of artisans to the category of industrial enterprises, which has led to a significant increase in the tax burden on this group and to their exclusion from membership in the artisan guilds.

The most important measures to limit capitalist elements in the countryside are:

– raising the norms on compulsory supplies of meat as compared to 1952 and sharply increasing measures on forcible collections of all arrears, going as far as criminal indictments and the confiscation of property;
– kulak farms are the last to be given access to MTS vehicles, and tariffs on them are raised to the level of actual cost of the service [uroven’ sebestoimosti], which is twice what is paid by farms of under 20 hectares;
– supplying mineral fertilizers to kulak farms only after the needs of agricultural cooperatives and the working peasantry have been met in full, which in practice has led to a sharp reduction in the supply of phosphorous fertilizer to these farms;
– ending grants of long-term credits to kulaks and limiting grants of short-term credits;
– farms having 20 or more acres of land and two or more full-time workers are not accepted as members of agricultural production cooperatives.

In 1953, the compulsory use through MTSs of kulak farms’ tractors and agricultural machines (after they had finished their work in the fields) on other peasant farms, which has deprived large farms of the opportunity to lease their tractors and agricultural machines on terms that are profitable for them.
Excluding kulaks from the governing board[s] of peasant mutual-aid committees and agriculture trade cooperatives, where they had significant economic and political influence.
The Politburo of the SED CC passed a resolution on accepting land from kulak farmers who wish to give it to the state, while leaving 6-7 hectares at their [i.e. the farmers’] disposal, if these peasants so desire. This resolution, announced by Ulbricht at a congress of peasants at the beginning of February this year, was taken as an indication of increased pressure on the kulak class.
All of this led a portion of the peasantry, chiefly large [peasants], to begin to give up their land. On 1 April 1953, 442,8 thousand ha., or 7.3% of the entire arable agricultural area of all peasant farms, including 393,0 thousand ha. from farms having over 20 ha. land, or 26% of the agricultural area of these sorts of farms, were abandoned and vacant.
It should be noted that the measures to limit capitalist elements in the city and the countryside in many cases are implemented without sufficient political and economic preparation, as a result of which some party and governmental measures have found insufficient support among a significant portion of the populace.


With the general rise in the standard of living of the populace, a disjunction between the growth of the populace’s money income and the growth of commodity circulation developed toward the beginning of 1953. The fund of wages paid out in the first quarter of 1953 was 17.3% greater than that of the first quarter of the previous year; the volume of commodity circulation over this period rose by only 10% at comparable prices, while commodity circulation in the first quarter of 1953 compared with the fourth quarter of 1952 shrank and consisted of 6.030 million marks against 7.361 million marks in the fourth quarter of 1952.
The under-fulfillment of the production plan for consumer goods in the absence of corresponding reserves and the non-fulfillment of the export-import plan, led to an acute shortage of goods in the commercial network. In this way, the elevated requirements of the population were not wholly satisfied.
Data about the fulfillment of the plan by industry in the first quarter is shown in Appendix No.2.
The autumn and winter of 1952-1953, which were difficult for the GDR, and the weak organization of harvest work led to a significant drop in the harvest of sugar beets, oil crops, potatoes and vegetables. Besides this, the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the plan for stockpiles and purchases of agricultural goods in 1952 led to difficulties in the supply of food to the populace.
This made it necessary to halt commercial sales of fats and sugar in the first quarter of 1953, to substitute partially rationed fats and sugar with other goods, to abolish ration cards for private-capitalist elements and persons of free professions (this affected about 500,000 people), to abolish some additional ration cards for the intelligentsia, and also to raise the prices for meat given out through ration cards by 10-15%, and for commercially sold confectioneries by 12-50%.
With the cancellation of ration cards for footwear and for knitted goods, the fixed price level [uroven’ edinykh tsen] was left close to the previously effective commercial prices. Prices were raised on a significant portion of imported consumer goods.
In the course of the entire winter period, interruptions in the supply of coal and electricity to the populace in the republic occurred, as a result of which many schools, residential buildings, and socio-cultural [kul’turno-bytovye] establishments often went unheated.


Recently the government of the GDR made a series of decisions on strengthening punitive policies in the struggle against the theft of people’s property, on criminal sanctions for evading state agricultural quotas and taxes, on limiting the activity of private wholesale firms, and on purging certain regions of dubious elements of questionable class. These decisions are basically correct. However, during the implementation of these decisions manifold excesses are being committed, as is expressed in the intensification of different sorts of repressive measures in relation to the populace. As a result of [these actions] the number of arrests of citizens and convicted persons significantly increased: if in the first half-year of 1952, 11,346 arrests were carried out, [and] in the second half-year 17,471, then during just the first quarter of 1953, 14,348 arrests were carried out.
Detailed data are provided in Appendices No. 3, 4, and 5.
By the directive adopted by the GEC on 23 September 1948, “On punishments for violations of economic order,” which is currently in effect, the police are given the right broadly to carry out arrests and searches on the grounds of only suspicion of economic crimes. On the basis of this directive, in 1952, 16,482 proceedings were instituted and 4,185 persons were arrested. In 1953, in only the first quarter, 5,094 proceedings were instituted and 2,548 persons were arrested.
There are many cases of incorrect arrests, unlawful and groundless searches in apartments and offices, [and] violations of the established arrest and custody procedure.
On 1 April 1953, there were 54,876 persons in the jails of the GDR; of these, up to 13,141 had not yet had their cases reviewed by the courts.


Within the SED CC and in local party organs, there is an underestimation of the political significance of the populace’s departure from the GDR to West Germany. This underestimation has manifested itself, in particular, in the directives of the SED CC. Thus, in letters from 6 January and 30 April of this year, no political evaluation was made of the issue and no measures are planned which would help bring about a fundamental change in the situation. In CC directives, the departure of party members from the GDR is not characterized as a party crime. Meanwhile, 2,718 members and candidates of the SED, and of these, 175 functionaries, were counted among those who left the GDR during the [first] four months of 1953. In addition, over that period, 2,610 members of the Union of Youth [FDJ] left.
Party organs exert almost no influence over the mass democratic organs–labor unions, the Union of Youth, and the Women’s League–in inducing them to carry out work to prevent the departure of the population from the GDR.
The press and radio of the GDR weakly expose the slanderous propaganda emanating from West Germany about the refugees, weakly publicize the measures taken by the government of the GDR to accommodate refugees who have returned to the Republic, by giving them work [and] living quarters, and guaranteeing other rights to them, [and they] rarely organize statements by persons who have returned from West Germany. Newspapers, as a rule, remain silent about the facts of the migration of residents of West Germany to the GDR, and do not use their statements for propaganda purposes.
Party and governmental organs commit serious distortions in the implementation of the SED’s policy with regard to the intelligentsia.
In the second half of 1952, the SED CC and the GDR government undertook a series of economic and political measures aimed at drawing the intelligentsia into active participation in cultural and economic construction. From 1 July 1952, the pay for engineering-technical and scientific workers was significantly increased, and for the most outstanding scientific and technical personnel, high personal salaries of up to 15,000 marks a month were established.
Despite this, the role of the intelligentsia in building the Republic and the necessity of involving the old intelligentsia is still underestimated within the party and the country. In a significant portion of enterprises, a sectarian relationship to the intelligentsia has still not been overcome. The intelligentsia is not drawn into active participation in the productive and social life of the enterprise.
There are serious drawbacks in the way ideological work with the intelligentsia is handled. In a crude and clumsy manner, demands are made for the reconstruction of all scientific work on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Due to this, scholars of the old school consider that, insofar as they are not Marxists, they have no prospects in the GDR.
Little attention is paid by the SED to organizing scientific discussions, to the free exchange of opinions, [and] the discussion of different problems in advanced science and practice, in the intelligentsia’s milieu.
To date, the linking and exchange of scientific activity between scientists of the GDR and scientists of the Soviet Union and social democratic countries is still insufficiently developed.
A feeling of anxiety for their personal safety is evident among broad circles of the intelligentsia and most of all among the technical intelligentsia. The instances of groundless accusations of sabotage constitute the reason for this sort of mood. The absence of the necessary explanatory work on this issue creates favorable conditions for the activity of enemies and the broad dissemination of all sorts of slanders.


West German and Anglo-American authorities are carrying out economic and political diversions aimed at disrupting the five-year plan and at discrediting the policy of the GDR government before the populace. They have worked out a system of measures to entice engineering-technical, scientific and highly-qualified workers from the enterprises and establishments of the GDR.
In West Berlin, a high exchange rate of the Western mark in relation to the Eastern mark is being artificially maintained, making it profitable for the West Berlin population to buy food in the GDR. On the other hand, the acute shortage of high-quality consumer goods in the GDR and their presence in West Berlin attracts a large mass of the residents of the GDR into the Western sector[s] of Berlin. Providing West Berlin with a high level of supply of every imaginable good and lower prices for goods compared to the rest of West Germany has the aim of creating the impression among the population that a high standard of living in West Germany exists in comparison with the GDR.
One of the methods of enemy activity is to dispatch special recruiters to the GDR who entice qualified workers, engineers and technicians, and teachers of secondary and higher schools, to the West.
The West German authorities, the Americans, English, and French, systematically conduct propaganda on the radio in favor of the GDR population’s departure for the West, send large quantities of provocative letters, and give provocative telephone warnings of allegedly imminent arrests of GDR citizens.


The church, especially of late, is displaying an active role in enemy propaganda against the GDR. The leaders of the Protestant and Catholic Churches located in West Germany have taken the path of open struggle against the GDR; in sermons and in multiple letters, the clergy calls upon the populace to flee to the West.
The SED CC is committing some mistakes in its relations with the church.
On 27 January 1953, the SED CC made a decision on exposing the anti-democratic activity of the church youth organization “Junge Gemeinde.” It was proposed not to begin to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” through broad propaganda work among the populace, but through the organization of trials. In connection with this instruction, the organs of the MfS [Stasi] carried out the arrests of some clergymen and members of “Junge Gemeinde” in February and March. Due to the inadequacy and unconvincing character of the material, however, the trials have not yet been held. Then the SED CC gave an order to begin unmasking “Junge Gemeinde” in the youth press. During the implementation of these instructions, the accusation was made across the board that all of the members of “Junge Gemeinde” were members of the terrorist West German youth organization (BDJ). As a result of this the campaign to expose the reactionary activity of “Junge Gemeinde” has currently exacerbated relations between the church and the state.
At one of the meetings with the first secretaries of the SED district committees, W. Ulbricht gave the order that open meetings were to be held in all institutions of higher learning and 12-grade schools of the League of FDJ to expose the “Junge Gemeinde,” in the course of which the expulsion of the leaders and most active members of “Junge Gemeinde” from schools and educational institutions was to be demanded. In certain schools the number of those expelled reaches 20-30 persons, and in each institution of higher education, the number of expelled students ranges from 5 to 20 persons; this in particular, has led to the fact that in March and April of this year alone, 250 people from 39 12-grade schools have fled to the West.


In the interest of halting the departure of the population to West Germany, it seems expedient to recommend the implementation of the following measures to the leadership of the GDR:

On economic issues:

1. To take measures toward the unconditional fulfillment of the industrial production plan for 1953, which is decisive for the fulfillment of the five-year plan. To liquidate the lag which took place from the beginning of the year and especially to devote attention to assuring the fulfillment of the plan for machine-building [industry], the introduction of electric power, and the development of [the] metallurgy [industry].
2. Over the course of a month, to work out measures to increase the 1953 consumer goods production plan and the development of commodity circulation.
For this purpose, the government of the GDR must take additional measures to import necessary raw materials: cotton–15-20,000 tons, wool–3,000 tons, heavy leather—2,500 tons. To increase imports of food stuffs (fats, fruits, and others) and some high-quality manufactured consumer goods. For this purpose, to assign additional output of high-quality production for export, in particular to capitalist countries, having found the necessary raw materials locally, using the free [industrial] capacities at hand, especially in precision mechanics and optics.
The GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade makes insufficient use of the possibilities of trade with capitalist countries. It is desirable to render necessary aid to the GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade through the trade representatives of the USSR and the people’s democracies in capitalist countries.
3. To oblige local organs of power to improve the leadership of local industry significantly. To oblige the GDR Gosplan [State Planning Commission] to re-examine within a month the 1953 production plans for local industry with a view to expanding them significantly.
4. In noting the underestimation of the role of manufacture in supplying the population with consumer goods, it is necessary to take governmental measures in support of crafts production. It is expedient, in keeping with the realization of artisans’ cooperatives, to organize supplies of raw materials for them on a contractual basis on the condition that they hand over their completed products to the state commercial network; to work out measures to offer artisans tax and credit advantages, and also to equip artisans’ cooperatives and individual enterprises with industrial equipment.
5. Considering that one of the reasons for the departure of peasants from the GDR to West Germany is the high norms for quotas of agricultural deliveries to the state, to reduce by 5-10% the differentiated norms in effect in 1953 for compulsory supplies of grain crops and meat by peasant farms.
6. To cancel ration cards for meat, fats and sugar from the autumn of 1953, thereby completing the elimination of the rationing system in the GDR, keeping in mind that the per-capita consumption norms that have been attained furnish the possibility of a transition to free commerce.
7. To work out a three-year plan on mechanizing agriculture, developing the MTS network, and equipping it with tractors and agricultural machinery in order to have the possibility of fulfilling the needs for mechanized cultivation of the land not only of agricultural cooperatives, but also of individual peasant farms.
8. To halt the practice of using tractors and agricultural machines from private cultivators through the MTS for work on other farms.
9. To work out a three-year plan to develop animal husbandry and to create a fodder base, assuming the need for future improvements in supplies to the populace from their own resources.
10. To work out a production plan for fertilizer in quantities that will meet in full the needs of agriculture, including large private farms.
11. To concentrate the attention of state and party organs on the organizational-economic strengthening of the agricultural production cooperatives which have been created in order to ensure, even this year, a harvest in the cooperatives that is larger than that of the best individual agricultural farms, and an income for cooperative members [that] exceeds the incomes of individual peasant farms.
12. In carrying out measures on limiting private-capitalist elements, to differentiate between attitudes toward large and small retailers and other small entrepreneurs (proprietors of small restaurants, hairdressers, bakers, and so on) with regard to taxes, credits, issuing food ration cards, supplying goods to merchants; and to use private commerce in the capacity of a commodity distribution network to serve the population.
13. Considering the populace’s great demand for construction materials, [as well as] agricultural and gardening equipment, to organize a broad trade in them, both in the city and the countryside, having ensured a portion of additional funds for cement, saw-timber, tiles and machine-manufactured articles; to increase the production of agricultural and gardening equipment.

On administrative issues:

1. In the near future, to carry out a broad amnesty both with regard to persons convicted in the first period for Nazi crimes, and, in particular, persons convicted in the most recent period, with the exception of persons convicted for espionage, terrorist acts, diversions, premeditated murder and for large thefts of the people’s property. 15-17,000 persons could be freed from prisons by the amnesty.
2. To take measures quickly toward the introduction of strict order and the observance of lawfulness in procedures for arresting and detaining citizens.
3. To organize expediently social courts [obshchestvennye sudy] in enterprises, in institutions, and at people’s estates [narodnye imeniia] to examine minor economic and administrative violations.
4. To re-examine the current criminal code to remove those articles of criminal law which permit their application to even the most inconsequential violations.
5. To cancel all criminal-legal orders containing the directives and circulars of separate ministries. Henceforward, to establish a procedure by which criminal-legal sanctions can be stipulated only in laws of the People’s Chamber, and in exceptional cases, in a decree by the government of the GDR.
6. To consider it crucial to carry out a reorganization of the communities [obshchiny] in the direction of enlarging and strengthening local authorities.
7. To carry out, in 1953, an exchange of passports for the entire population of the GDR and, first and foremost, for the population of the democratic sector of Berlin and its surrounding districts.
8. To re-examine the GDR government’s decree of 5 March 1953 on mass criminal indictments for the non-fulfillment of supply quotas [postavki] [to the state] and taxes.
9. In view of the fact that the migration of the population from the GDR to the West is taking place through Berlin, to consider it expedient to require GDR citizens to have passes [spravki] and business travel papers [komandirovochnye udostovereniia] from local institutions or organs of power upon entry into Berlin.

On political questions:

1. To end the political underestimation of the significance of the issue surrounding the departure of GDR citizens to West Germany that currently exists in party and state organs and among party workers. To oblige party organs and primary party organizations to analyze with care and to study all cases of departure and to take effective measures to ascertain the reasons influencing the population’s migration to West Germany.
To view the departure of members of the SED as a betrayal of the party. To investigate according to party procedure each case of departure by members of the SED to the West and to discuss [these cases] at general meetings of the party organizations and regional committees of the SED.
2. To commit the party and the mass democratic organizations of the GDR to conduct systematic explanatory work among the GDR populace against leaving for West Germany, exposing with concrete examples the slanderous fabrications, [and] the essence and methods of the subversive work which is being carried out by West German agents.
3. To take concrete measures to strengthen counter-propaganda, organizing it in such ways that the press and radio of the GDR systematically expose the mendacious Western propaganda on the issue of refugees from the GDR. To set aside the necessary resources for this.
4. In the interests of an effective struggle against the reactionary broadcasts of “RIAS,” to ensure the completion in 1953 of the construction of powerful radio stations in Magdeburg, Schwerin, and Dresden. To build 15 medium-wave low-power radio stations with up to 5 kilowatts of power and 10 short wave stations each with up to 2-3 kilowatts of power. To manufacture and deploy 400-600 “Gebor” radio sets.
5. In the interests of strengthening counter-propaganda, to organize through the KPD the systematic collection of information about the refugees’ difficult conditions and the poor material and legal conditions of different strata of the West German populace.
6. In order to expose the reactionary propaganda of the church, to explain in a detailed and systematic way through the press and in oral propaganda that the government of the GDR unswervingly observes freedom of conscience, of religion, and of religious observance, as provided for in the GDR constitution. To explain that the actions of the authorities are directed only against those church officials and leaders of “Junge Gemeinde” who conduct hostile subversive work against the democratic tradition of the GDR.
7. To take measures to correct the excesses which have been committed with regard to students expelled from school and from institutions of higher learning for belonging to the “Junge Gemeinde.”
8. For the SED CC to examine in particular the issue of improving work among the intelligentsia and to correct the mistakes that have been committed.
9. To take measures to improve scientific and cultural links between scholars in the GDR and in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies, as well as to supply the GDR intelligentsia with foreign scientific and technical literature.

V. Chuikov
P. Yudin
I. Il’ichev

18 May 1953.


Appendix No. 1

on the social and age composition and party affiliation of those who left the GDR for West Germany

1. By social composition:

Second half of 1952

Four months of 1953

1. Workers



2. White-collar workers



3. Kulaks



4. Medium peasants



5. Small peasants



6. Scientific workers



7. Workers in the arts


8. Engineering-technical workers



9. Doctors



10. Lawyers

no data


11. Teachers and instructors in secondary and higher institutions of learning



12. Students



13. Church Employees



14. Artisans

no data


15. Owners of a commercial enterprise

no data


16. Owners of a private enterprise

no data


17. Pensioners

no data


18. Persons without definite occupation

no data


19. Housewives

no data


2. By age

Second half-year of 1952

Four months of 1953

Children up to 15



[Persons] from 15 to 18



from 18 to 25



from 25 to 40



from 40 to 50



from 50 to 60



over 60



3. By party affiliation: (only over 4 months of 1953)

Members and candidates of the SED


of them, functionaries


Members of the LDP


of them, functionaries


Members of the CDU


of them, functionaries


Members of the NDP


of them, functionaries


Members of the DKP


of them, functionaries


Members of the SSNM


of them, functionaries


4. By place of work (only over 4 months of 1953).

1. From state institutions and communal enterprises


2. From people’s enterprises


3. From enterprises under wardship


4. From large private enterprises


5. From small private enterprises


6. From “SAO” enterprises


7. From MTS [machine-tractor stations]


8. From agricultural food cooperatives


9. Individual peasants


10. From peasant mutual-aid enterprises, commercial organizations and konzumy


11. From party, union and mass organizations


Of the refugees:

1. Leaders of enterprises


2. Division heads



[Appendix No. II not included in original]


Appendix No. 3

on persons convicted for 1951-1953
by punishment


1951 1st half

2nd half

1952 1st half

2nd half

1953 1st quarter

Death penalty






Life imprisonment






Convict prison [katorzhnaia tur ‘ma] for over 10 years






from 5 to 10 years






up to 5 years






Imprisonment for 3 to 5 years






Imprisonment for 1 to 3 years






Imprisonment for up to 1 year






Short-term arrest






Monetary fine






Educational measures for adolescents






Other sanctions






Total convicted







Appendix No. 4

on arrested persons under investigation
from 1952-1953 by types of crime

Types of crimes

First half of 1952

Second half of 1952

First quarter of 1953

Proceedings instituted

Persons arrested

Proceedings instituted

Persons arrested

Proceedings instituted

Persons arrested

1. Anti-democratic crimes







2. Espionage (Included in 1. above)







3. Possession of weapons







4. Opposition to authorities







5. SVAG Decree No. 160 (sabotage and diversions)







6. Law on preserving internal-German trade







7. Unlawful import and export of goods, as defined by 1948 decree of the NEK







8. Non-fulfillment of state deliveries







9. Crimes against the people’s property







10. Murder and maiming







11. Crimes against morality







12. Theft of private property







13. Violation of borders





13. Others















Appendix No. 5

on arrested persons by their most recent
arrest from 1949-1953

Arrests over the second half of 1949

11,425 persons

Arrests over the first half of 1950

12,911 persons

Arrests over the second half of 1950

13,860 persons

Arrests over the first half of 1951

13,587 persons

Arrests over the second half of 1951

14,689 persons

Arrests over the first half of 1952

11,346 persons

Arrests over the second half of 1952

17,471 persons

Arrests over the first quarter of 1953

14,348 persons

The Soviet Control Commission in Germany reports statistics and a detailed assessment to Malenkov, analyzing the migration of the East German population to West Germany. It also includes proposals for implementing measures to prevent further departure from the GDR.




Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Soviet Union
Germany (East)–Foreign relations–Germany (West)
Germany (East)–History–Uprising, 1953
East Germany
West Germany

2020 Global Terrorism Index: Deaths from psychological oppression arrive at five-year low, however new dangers arise

Global Terrorism Index (GTI) – Arise News

All around the world, passings from psychological warfare succumbed to the fifth successive year in 2019, to 13,826 — a 15 percent decline from the earlier year. In North America, Western Europe and Oceania, extreme right assaults have expanded by 250 percent since 2014 – they are higher now than whenever over the most recent fifty years. 63 nations recorded in any event one demise from psychological oppression, the most reduced number since 2013. The worldwide financial effect of psychological oppression was $16.4 billion of every 2019, an abatement of 25 percent from the earlier year. IS’s focal point of gravity moves to sub-Saharan Africa with absolute passings by IS in the district expanding by 67 percent. IS and their members were likewise liable for assaults in 27 nations in 2019.

The 2020 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) has discovered that passings from psychological warfare succumbed to the fifth sequential year since cresting in 2014. The quantity of passings has now diminished by 59 percent since 2014 to 13,826. Strife remains the essential driver of psychological oppression, with more than 96 percent of passings from illegal intimidation in 2019 happening in nations effectively in clash.

The yearly Global Terrorism Index, presently in its eighth year, is created by driving research organization the Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) and gives the most thorough asset on worldwide illegal intimidation patterns.

The biggest abatements in passings happened in Afghanistan and Nigeria, anyway they are as yet the main two nations to have encountered in excess of 1,000 passings from psychological oppression. The fall in passings was likewise reflected in nation scores, with 103 improving contrasted with 35 that disintegrated. This is the most elevated number of nations to record a year-on-year improvement since the commencement of the file.

In spite of the general fall in the worldwide effect of psychological oppression, it stays a critical and genuine danger in numerous nations. There were 63 nations in 2019 that recorded in any event one demise from a psychological oppressor assault, and the biggest expansion in illegal intimidation happened in Burkina Faso – where passings rose by 590 percent. Different nations to break down considerably are Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Mali and Niger.

A portion of the other key discoveries:

· The ten nations with the most elevated effect from psychological oppression are: Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, India, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Philippines

· For the second year straight South Asia is the district generally affected by psychological warfare, while Central America and the Caribbean area recorded the least effect

· MENA recorded the biggest provincial improvement in psychological warfare for the second back to back year, recording the most reduced number of passings since 2003

Steve Killelea, Executive Chairman of IEP, stated: “As we enter another decade we are seeing new dangers of psychological warfare arise. The ascent of the extreme right in the West and the weakenings in the Sahel are perfect representations. Furthermore, as found in the ongoing assaults in France and Austria, numerous more modest gatherings thoughtful to ISIL methods of reasoning are as yet dynamic. To break these impacts three significant activities are required – to break their media inclusion and online informal organizations, upset their financing and diminish the quantity of supporters.”

The GTI utilizes various variables to figure its score, including the quantity of frequencies, fatalities, wounds and property harm. The Taliban remained the world’s deadliest fear monger bunch in 2019; nonetheless, psychological oppressor passings ascribed to the gathering declined by 18 percent. ISIL’s solidarity and impact likewise kept on declining, unexpectedly since the gathering got dynamic it was answerable for not exactly 1,000 passings in any one year.

In spite of the reduction in action from ISIL in the Middle East and North Africa, ISIL’s associate gatherings stay dynamic over the world, with 27 nations recording an assault by ISIL or its offshoots. Sub-Saharan Africa has been hit the hardest, with seven of the ten nations with the biggest expansions in illegal intimidation passings living in the area. ISIL subsidiaries are predominantly liable for the expansion with 41 percent of all ISIL related passings happening in sub-Saharan Africa.

For North America, Western Europe, and Oceania, the danger of extreme right political psychological warfare has been ascending in the course of recent years. In these locales extreme right occurrences expanded by 250 percent somewhere in the range of 2014 and 2019. There were 89 passings ascribed to extreme right psychological militants in 2019. Over the previous decade proportions of cultural flexibility have been falling in a large number of the monetarily progressed economies. This pattern is probably going to proceed due to the all-inclusive monetary plunge brought about by COVID-19, which is probably going to increment political precariousness and savagery.

Since COVID-19 was announced a worldwide pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) in March 2020, fundamental information proposes a decrease in the two episodes and passings from illegal intimidation in many areas on the planet. Notwithstanding, the COVID-19 pandemic is probably going to introduce new and unmistakable counter-illegal intimidation challenges. It is significant that counter-psychological oppression activities are not diminished as a result of diminishes in government consumption because of the monetary plunge. Decreases in worldwide help for counter-illegal intimidation activities in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa could end up being counter-beneficial.

Thomas Morgan, Senior Research Fellow at IEP, clarifies the discoveries: “Somewhere in the range of 2011 and 2019, riots and fierce showings in the West expanded by 277 percent. There are not kidding worries that the weakening financial conditions will prompt more individuals getting distanced and powerless to fanatic publicity.”

The fall in psychological oppression has additionally been joined by a decrease in the worldwide monetary effect of illegal intimidation, diminishing by 25 percent to $16.4 billion of every 2019. Contrasted with different types of savagery, for example, murder, outfitted clash, and military use, psychological warfare is a little level of the all out worldwide expense of brutality, which was equivalent to $14.5 trillion of every 2019. Notwithstanding, the genuine monetary effect of psychological oppression is a lot higher as these figures don’t represent the roundabout effect on business, speculation, and the expenses related with security offices in countering illegal intimidation.


Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956) - CVCE Website

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 4 November 1956
(Re: Protocol No. 51)

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov,Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov.

On the Operations and Situation in Hungary(1)
Cde. Kaganovich’s ciphered cable from
Cde. Malinin at Cde. Khrushchev (4 XI).(2)

1) Bring back Cdes. Mikoyan and Brezhnev.
2) Provide assistance to Hungary.(3)
3) More actively take part in the assistance to Egypt.(4)

Think through a number of measures (perhaps a demonstration at the English embassy). More widely in the newspapers.

Cde. Molotov—think about Hungary. Exert influence on Kadar so that Hungary does not go the route of Yugoslavia. They made changes in the Declaration—they now condemn the Rakosi-Gero clique—and this might be dangerous.(5) We must convince them that they should refrain from this reference to the Rakosi-Gero clique. Kadar is calling (1 XI) for a condemnation of Stalinism.(6) The title of Hungarian Workers’ Party should be retained. We should come to agreement with them and prevent them from shifting to Yugoslav positions.

Cde. Molotov—reinforce the military victory through political means.

Cde. Khrushchev—I don’t understand Cde. Molotov. He comes up with the most pernicious ideas.

Cde. Molotov—you should keep quiet and stop being so overbearing.

Cde. Bulganin—we should condemn the incorrect line of Rakosi-Gero.

Cde. Khrushchev:The declaration is good —we must act honorably.

Cde. Shepilov—during the editing they added the phrase “the clique of Rakosi and Gero.” We are giving them legal opportunities to denigrate the entire 12-year period of the HWP’s work.

Cde. Shepilov—is it really necessary to disparage cadres? Tomorrow it will be the “clique of Ulbricht.”(7)

Cde. Saburov—if they themselves don’t comprehend their mistakes, we will deal at length with the matter. Reward the military personnel. Take care of the families of those who perished. (8)

V. On Purging the Higher Educational Institutions of Unsavory Elements

(Cdes. Zhukov, Khrushchev, Furtseva, Pervukhin, Voroshilov) Furtseva, Pospelov, Shepilov, and Elyutin are to come up with recommendations for purging the higher educational institutions of unsavory elements.(9)

IV. On the Response to Cde. Kardelj and the Telegram About Imre Nagy

Affirm the text of the response.(10)

On Instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Hungary On the Raising of the Question at the Gen. Assembly’s Session on Hungary

Cde. Kadar is to say that he will withdraw the question from the UN.(11)

Translator’s Notes

1 This topic was not included in the formal protocol for the session (“Protokol No. 51 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 60-61).

2 Most likely, there is a mistake or omission in Malin’s text. These phrases, as given in the original, do not make sense.

3 The reference here is to financial, not military, assistance. A Soviet economic aid package for Hungary was approved on 5 November and announced the following day.

4 These points about the Suez Crisis are intriguing in light of what happened the following day (5 November). During the first several days of the Suez Crisis, Moscow’s response was limited to verbal protestations through the media and at the UN. On 5 November, the day before a ceasefire was arranged, Soviet prime minister Nikolai Bulganin sent letters to the U.S., French, British, and Israeli governments. His letter to President Eisenhower warned that “if this war is not halted, it will be fraught with danger and might escalate into a third world war.” Bulganin proposed that the United States and Soviet Union move jointly to “crush the aggressors,” an action he justified on the grounds that the two superpowers had “all modern types of arms, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and bear particular responsibility for stopping the war.” Not surprisingly, Eisenhower immediately rejected Bulganin’s proposal. Bulganin’s letters to France, Great Britain, and Israel were far more minatory, including thinly-veiled threats to use missiles if necessary to prevent Egypt’s destruction. The letters to France and Britain contained identical passages: “In what position would [Britain and France] have found themselves if they had been attacked by more powerful states possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction? These more powerful states, instead of sending naval or air forces to the shores of [Britain or France], could use other means, such as missile technology.” Bulganin’s letter to Israel declared that “Israel is playing with the fate of peace and the fate of its own people in a criminal and irresponsible manner.” This policy, Bulganin warned, “is raising doubts about the very existence of Israel as a state. We expect that the Government of Israel will come to its senses before it is too late and will halt its military operations against Egypt.” For the texts of the letters and other Soviet statements during the crisis, see D. T. Shepilov, ed., Suetskii krizis (Moscow: Politizdat, 1956). Although the letters represented a much more forceful and conspicuous Soviet stance against the allied incursions, they came so belatedly that they had only a minor impact at best on efforts to achieve a ceasefire.

5 This passage refers to the appeal to the nation that Kadar’s government issued when it was installed in power on 4 November.

6 Molotov is referring to Kadar’s radio address on 1 November, which was published in Nepszabad the following day.

7 This in fact is precisely what Ulbricht himself feared; see the detailed account by the chief of the East German State Security forces in 1956, Ernst Wollweber, in Wilfriede Otto, ed., “Ernst Wollweber: Aus Erinnerungen — Ein Portrait Walter Ulbrichts,” Beitrage zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, No. 3 (1990), esp. pp. 361- 378. For more on the impact of the 1956 crises on the East German communist leadership, see the papers presented by Hope M. Harrison and Christian F. Ostermann at the “Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence,” which took place in Budapest on 25-29 September 1996 and was organized by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the National Security Archive, and the Cold War International History Project. Copies of the papers, both of which draw extensively on the archives of the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), are available from the conference organizers.

8 Saburov is referring to the families of Soviet troops who were killed, not to the much larger number of Hungarians who died in the fighting.

9 This illustrates how concerned CPSU leaders were that the crisis was spilling over into the Soviet Union. Both before and after 4 November, unrest and protests occurred at a number of higher educational institutions in the USSR, including Moscow State University (MGU). At MGU, “protests against Soviet military intervention” were accompanied by “anti-Soviet slogans and posters.” Both students and faculty took part in the actions. The KGB quickly moved in and restored order, but the crackdown was not as vigorous and sweeping as some CPSU officials wanted. See the first-hand account by the longtime deputy director of the KGB, Filipp Bobkov, KGB i vlast’ (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp. 144-145. Bobkov claims that Pyotr Pospelov and some other senior party officials, as well as a number of high-ranking personnel in the KGB, wanted to launch “mass repressions” to deter any further unrest, but their proposals were never formally adopted. Subsequently, a commission headed by Brezhnev issued secret orders and guidelines to all party organizations to tighten political controls.

10 On 4 November, the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, sent a telegram to Moscow with information provided by Kardelj (at Tito’s behest) about the refuge granted to Imre Nagy and his aides in the Yugoslav embassy. The response, as approved by the CPSU Presidium, called on the Yugoslav authorities to turn over the Hungarian officials to Soviet troops. See “Vypiska iz protokola No. P51/IV zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 4 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 103-104.

11 Nagy had appealed to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold on 1 November asking for support of Hungary’s sovereignty and independence. The UN Security Council began considering the matter on 3 November. On 4 November, the UN Security Council took up the question of Soviet military intervention in Hungary, and the UN General Assembly voted to condemn the Soviet invasion. On 5 November, the CPSU newspaper Pravda featured a letter purportedly sent by Kadar and Imre Horvath to Dag Hammarskjold. The letter claimed that Nagy’s submission of the Hungarian question to the UN had been illegal, and requested that all consideration of the issue cease.

At this session of the CPSU CC, Molotov raises concerns over the new Hungarian government’s decision to condemn the “Rakosi-Gero clique” and call for the condemnation of Stalinism. Molotov argues that the CC must exert influence on Kadar to prevent Hungary from going the way of Yugoslavia. The session also discusses recommendations for purging higher educational institutions and Kadar’s withdrawal of appeals to the UN for assistance.



Hungary–History–Revolution, 1956
Soviet Union





Culture | Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Zhdanov,  Beria, Shvernik, Malenkov, Bulgarin,Shcherbakov Shkiryatov,Budyonny,  Loktinov and Mikhailov at the air show in Tushino (August 18, 1939)

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 1956(1)

(Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)(2)
Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov

On the Situation in Hungary
Information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Serov is read aloud.(3)

Cde. Zhukov provides information about the concentration of mil.-transport aircraft in the Vienna region.(4) Nagy is playing a double game (in Malinin’s opinion). Cde. Konev is to be sent to Budapest.(5)

On Discussions with the Chinese comrades. (6)

We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people’s democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based. The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position. One document for the Hungarians, and another for the participants of the Warsaw Pact. On Rokossowski—I said to Gomulka that this matter is for you (the Poles) to decide.(7)

Cde. Bulganin—The Chinese cdes. have an incorrect impression of our relations with the countries of people’s democracy. On our appeal to the Hungarians—we should prepare it. A declaration should be prepared.

Cde. Molotov—Today an appeal must be written to the Hungarian people so that they promptly enter into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops. There is the Warsaw Pact. This must be considered with other countries. On the view of the Chinese comrades—they suggest that relations with the countries of the socialist camp be built on the principles of Pancha Shila.(8) Relations along interstate lines are on one basis and interparty relations on another.

Cde. Voroshilov: We must look ahead. Declarations must be composed so that we aren’t placed into an onerous position. We must criticize ourselves—but justly.

Cde. Kaganovich—Pancha Shila, but I don’t think they should propose that we build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila. Two documents—an appeal to the Hungarians and a Declaration. In this document we don’t need to provide self-criticism. There’s a difference between party and state relations.

Cde. Shepilov—The course of events reveals the crisis in our relations with the countries of people’s democracy. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. The underlying reasons must be revealed. The foundations remain unshakable. Eliminate the elements of diktat, not giving play in this situation to a number of measures to be considered in our relations. The declaration is the first step. There is no need for an appeal to the Hungarians. On the armed forces: We support the principles of non-interference. With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. We’ll have to keep up a struggle with national- Communism for a long time.

Cde. Zhukov—Agrees with what Cde. Shepilov has said. The main thing is to decide in Hungary. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole. This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere.

Cde. Zhukov—With regard to troops in the GDR and in Poland, the question is more serious. It must be considered at the Consultative Council.(9) The Consultative Council is to be convened. To persist further—it is unclear what will come of this. A quick decision, the main thing is to declare it today.

Cde. Furtseva—We should adopt a general declaration, not an appeal to the Hungarians. Not a cumbersome declaration. The second thing is important for the internal situation. We must search for other modes of relations with the countries of people’s democracy.
About meetings with leaders of the people’s democracies (concerning relations). We should convene a CC plenum (for informational purposes).(10)

Cde. Saburov: Agrees about the need for a Declaration and withdrawal of troops. At the XX Congress we did the correct thing, but then did not keep control of the unleashed initiative of the masses. It’s impossible to lead against the will of the people. We failed to stand for genuine Leninist principles of leadership. We might end up lagging behind events. Agrees with Cde. Furtseva. The ministers are asking; so are members of the CC.(11) With regard to Romania—they owe us 5 billion rubles for property created by the people.(12) We must reexamine our relations. Relations must be built on an equal basis.

Cde. Khrushchev: We are unanimous. As a first step we will issue a Declaration.

Cde. Khrushchev—informs the others about his conversation with Cde. Mikoyan. Kadar is behaving well. 5 of the 6 are firmly hanging in there.(13) A struggle is going on inside the [HWP— trans.] Presidium about the withdrawal of troops. The minister of defense will issue a directive about the suppression of insurgents in the cinema, using the armed forces. (Malinin, apparently, became nervous and left the session.) Officers from the state security (Hungarian) are with our troops.(14)

Consideration of the Draft Declaration
(Shepilov, Molotov, Bulganin)

Cde. Bulganin—we should say in what connection the question of a Declaration arose. Page 2, Par. 2, don’t soften the self-criticism. Mistakes were committed. Much use should be made of “Leninist principles.”

Cde. Khrushchev—expresses agreement. We should say we are guided by Leninist principles. Page 2, Par. 5—we should say we are making a statement, not an explanation.
Page 3—we should speak about economic equity, make it the main thing. We should say that no troops are stationed in the majority of countries. We should say that on the territory of the Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian states the stationing of troops is done with the consent of their governments and in the interests of these gov’ts and peoples.(15) We should express our view of the government of Hungary. Measures to support them. About support for the party and HWP CC and for the gov’t. We should refer specifically to Nagy and Kadar.

Cde. Kaganovich, Cde. Molotov, Cde.

Zhukov: We should mention the Potsdam agreement and the treaties with every country. (16)

Cde. Zhukov—We should express sympathy with the people. We should call for an end to the bloodshed. Page 2, Par. 2: We should say the XX Congress condemned the disregard for principles of equality.

Cde. Zhukov—we should speak about economics. Restructuring was thwarted after the XX Congress.

(Cde. Khrushchev)
We are turning to the member-states of the Warsaw Pact to consider the question of our advisers.(17) We are ready to withdraw them. Further editing.(18) Transmitted via high frequency to Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov.

Information from Cde. Yudin on Negotiations with the Chinese Comrades.
What’s the situation: Will Hungary leave our camp? Who is Nagy? Can he be trusted? About the advisers.Those taking part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Saburov, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Brezhnev, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin. Chinese comrades.

On the Situation in Hungary
(Cde. Khrushchev, Cde. Liu Shaoqi)

Cde. Liu Shaoqi indicates on behalf of the CPC CC that troops must remain in Hungary and in Budapest.(19)

Cde. Khrushchev—there are two paths. A military path—one of occupation. A peaceful path—the withdrawal of troops, negotiations.

Cde. Molotov—the political situation has taken clearer shape. An anti-revol. gov’t has been formed, a transitional gov’t.(20) We should issue the Declaration and explain our position. We should clarify our relationship with the new gov’t. We are entering into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops.

Nagy—the prime minister.
Kadar—a state minister.
Tildy Zoltan— “
Kovacs Bela—
Losonczy—a Communist and a supporter of Nagy(21)

Translator’s Notes

1 As with the previous session, the pages in the original file were slightly out of sequence. The order has been corrected in the translation.

2 Protocol No. 49 encompasses both this session and the session on the following day (see Document No. 8) under the rubric “On the Situation in Hungary” (O polozhenii v Vengrii). Point 1 (from 30 October) covers the Soviet declaration on ties with socialist countries, whereas Point 6 (from 31 October) covers the decision to invade. The relevant extracts from Protocol No. 49 are now stored in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 25-30 and APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41, respectively.

3 Presumably, the reference here is to three documents: one that arrived on the morning of 30 October, and two that arrived late at night on 29 October. The item that arrived on the morning of 30 October was a secure, high-frequency telephone message from Mikoyan and Suslov, which gave a bleak portrayal of the latest events. See “TsK KPSS,” 30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F.89, Op.45, D.12, Ll.1-3. Of the two documents that arrived late at night on the 29th, one was a ciphered telegram from Mikoyan and Suslov reporting that they had attended a session of the HWP Presidium earlier that evening. They also commented on the takeover of the Szabad Nep building by a group of unarmed students and writers. Mikoyan and Suslov asserted that the Hungarian “comrades have failed to win over the masses,” and that “the anti-Communist elements are behaving impudently.” In addition, they expressed concern about what would happen to former agents of the Hungarian State Security (AVH) forces in the wake of Nagy’s decision to disband the AVH. See “Shifrtelegramma: TsK KPSS,” 29 October 1956 (Strictly Secret- Urgent), from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, in AVPRF, F.059a, Op.4, P.6, D.5, Ll.13-14. The other document that arrived late on the 29th was a situation report from Ivan Serov, dated 29 October, which Mikoyan and Suslov ordered to be transmitted to Moscow via secure telephone. Serov’s report gave an updated overview of the insurgency and expressed deep concern about the likely repercussions from the dissolution of the AVH. See “Telefonogramma,” 29 October 1956, from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, relaying I. Serov’s memorandum, in APRF, F.3, Op.64, D.484, Ll.158-161.

4 British military transport aircraft were flying into the Vienna airport with supplies of humanitarian aid, which were then being conveyed to Budapest. It is unclear whether Zhukov knew why these planes were concentrated there. It is possible that he believed the aircraft were ferrying in military supplies or were preparing for a military operation.

5 As commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ivan Konev assumed direct command of Soviet military operations in Hungary in November 1956. In a telephone message on the morning of 30 October (see Note 78 supra), Mikoyan and Suslov had urged that Konev be dispatched to Hungary “immediately” as a precautionary step. One of Konev’s top aides during the invasion was General Mikhail Malinin, a first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, who commanded Soviet troops during the initial intervention on 23 October. As indicated in the previous line, Soviet leaders frequently consulted Malinin in the leadup to the invasion.

6 The “Chinese comrades” with whom Khrushchev had discussions were the members of the delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi (see Note 25 supra). Liu Shaoqi was in direct touch with Mao Zedong several times during the delegation’s stay in Moscow, and thus he was able to keep Khrushchev apprised of the Chinese leader’s views of the situation in Poland and Hungary.

7 Rokossowski had been removed from the Polish Politburo on 19 October. On 13 November he was replaced as Polish national defense minister by a Polish officer, Marshal Marian Spychalski. Rokossowski was then recalled to the Soviet Union, where he was appointed a deputy defense minister. Evidently, Khrushchev had spoken with Gomulka by phone that morning.

8 The five principles of Pancha Shila—(1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence—were endorsed in a joint statement by Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The principles were intended to “guide relations between the two countries” as well as “relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world.” For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China’s Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949- 1962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.

9 Zhukov is referring here to the Political Consultative Committee (PKK) of the recently-created Warsaw Treaty Organization. The PKK convened only seven times between 1955 and 1966, despite its statutory requirement to meet at least twice a year.

10 During major international crises in the post- Stalin period, the Soviet Presidium/Politburo occasionally would convene a Central Committee plenum to give the CC members a sense of involvement in decision-making and to ensure that the leadership’s policies would be firmly obeyed at lower levels.

11 Saburov is referring here to Furtseva’s suggestion that a CPSU CC plenum be convened for informational purposes.

12 This presumably refers to Soviet property transferred to Romania during World War II, rather than to Romania’s war reparations, which by 1956 were no longer of great magnitude.

13 Khrushchev is referring here to the six-member HWP Presidium. The only holdout was Nagy.

14 The State Security Department (Allam-Vedelmi Osztaly, or AVO), which was reorganized in 1949 and renamed the State Security Authority (Allam- Vedelmi Hatosag, or AVH), was reincorporated into the Hungarian Internal Affairs Ministry in the autumn of 1953. Formally, the agency was given back its old name of AVO, but it was still almost always known as the AVH. One of the earliest and most vigorous demands of the protesters in October 1956 was for the dissolution of the AVH. On 28 October, Nagy promised to fulfill this demand, and the Hungarian government approved the dissolution of the state security organs the following day. Because the AVH had been instrumental in carrying out repression and terror in the late 1940s and 1950s, some state security agents became the targets of lynchings and other violent reprisals during the 1956 uprising. Hungarian state security officers would have joined up with Soviet troops mainly to seek protection, not to assist in counterinsurgency operations. On this matter, see the documents transmitted by Suslov and Mikoyan on 29 October, cited in Note 78 supra.

15 It is interesting that, when referring to Soviet troops deployed in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev does not mention the Soviet troops in East Germany, implying that they were not necessarily there “with the consent of the [East German] government and in the interests of the [East German] government and people.”

16 The final Declaration noted that “Soviet units are in the Hungarian and Romanian republics in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and governmental agreements. Soviet military units are in the Polish republic on the basis of the Potsdam four-power agreement and the Warsaw Treaty.” The Declaration then claimed that “Soviet military units are not in the other people’s democracies,” omitting any mention of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in East Germany.

17 Khrushchev presumably is referring here to both the military advisers and the state security (KGB) advisers.

18 When this editing was completed, the Presidium formally adopted Resolution No. P49/1 (“Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” 30 October 1956, in APRF, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30) stating that it would “approve the text, with changes made at the CPSU CC Presidium session, of a Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the foundations of development and the further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.” The resolution ordered that the “text of the Declaration be broadcast on radio on 30 October and published in the press on 31 October 1956.” For the published text, see “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya I dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby I sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, p. 1.

19 It is unclear precisely when the Chinese changed their position from non-interventionist to pro-intervention. The statement recorded here, if correctly transcribed, would suggest that the change occurred before the final Soviet decision on 31 October, but almost all other evidence (including subsequent Presidium meetings recorded by Malin) suggests that it came after, not before, the Soviet decision. In any case, if the change did occur before, it did not have any discernible effect on the Soviet decision at this meeting to eschew intervention.

20 Molotov is referring here to major developments in Hungary. On 30 October, at 2:30 p.m. Budapest time, Nagy announced the formal restoration of a multi-party state and the establishment of an “inner cabinet” of the national government. The new cabinet consisted of Nagy, Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Erdei, Janos Kadar, Geza Losonczy, and Anna Kethly (from the Social Democratic Party). That same day, a “revolutionary national defense council” of the Hungarian armed forces was set up, which supported the demands of “the revolutionary councils of the working youth and intellectuals,” and called for the “immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and their withdrawal from the entire territory of Hungary within the shortest possible time.” The new Council also promised to disarm all agents from Hungary’s disbanded state security forces (AVH), who had been notorious agents of repression during the Stalin era. A Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee also was formed on 31 October, and it was empowered by the government to create a new army.

21 These are five of the seven members of Nagy’s new “inner cabinet.” Anna Kethly’s name is not listed here because she had not yet been appointed. (Nagy mentioned in his speech on 30 October that “a person to be nominated by the Social Democratic Party” would be in the inner cabinet, and Kethly later turned out to be that person.) It is unclear why Malin did not list Ferenc Erdei’s name here.

The Presidium decides to promulgate a declaration on Hungary in which Soviet withdrawal and relations with the new government will be addressed. Members discuss the language of the new declaration and the advice of the CPC CC regarding the status of Soviet troops. The declaration is also intended to address the broader crisis in Soviet relations with people’s democracies.


Communist countries–Internal relations
Communist countries
Soviet Union. Army
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Hungary–History–Revolution, 1956
Soviet Union–Foreign policy
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