SECRET – Unveiled by Cryptome – US Bureau of Prisons Location Maps

US Bureau of Prisons Location Maps

 


http://www.bop.gov/locations/locationmap.jsp
Maps of Facilities

 

North Eastern Region Mid Atlantic Region South Eastern Region South Central Region North Central Region Western Region Western Region Western Region Central Office

Please select a region of the map to view facilities in that area; you can then access information specific to an institution or office.

If you would like more information on a facility, contact the facility directly.

Western Region Locations

Legend: Institution Correctional Complex Regional Office
CCM Office   Private Facility

Link to CCM Phoenix Page Link to FCI Phoenix Page Link to FCI Phoenix Page Link to CCM Phoenix Page Link to FCC Tuscon Page Link to FCI Safford Page Link to FCC Victorville Page Link to FCC Victorville Page Link to MCC San Diego Page Link to CCM Long Beach Page Link to Terminal Isl Page Link to MDC Los Angeles Page Link to FCC Lompoc Page Link to CI Taft Page Link to CI Taft Page Link to FDC Seatac Page Link to CCM Seattle Page Link to FCI Sheridan Page Link to CCM Salt Lake City Page Link to FCI Herlong Page Link to CCM Sacramento Page Link to USP Atwater Page Link to FCI Dublin Page Link to FCI Mendota Page Link to Western Regional Office Page Link to FDC Honolulu

 

North Central Region Locations

South Central Region Locations

Northeast Region Locations

Mid-Atlantic Region Locations

Southeast Region Locations

Legend: Institution Correctional Complex Regional Office
CCM Office   Private Facility   Training Center

Link to Southeast Regional Office Page Link to FCI Aliceville Page Link to USP Atlanta Page Link to CCM Atlanta Page Link to FCI Marianna Page Link to FPC Pensacola Page Link to FCI Bennettsville Page Link to FCI Williamsburg Page Link to FCI Edgefield Page Link to FCI Miami Page Link to CCM Miami Page Link to FDC Miami Page Link to CCM Orlando Page Link to MDC Guaynabo Page Link to FCC Coleman Page Link to FCI Tallahassee Page Link to STA Glynco Page Link to FCI Jesup Page Link to FCI Estill Page Link to CI McRae Page Link to FCI Talladega Page Link to CCM Montgomery Page Link to FPC Montgomery Page Link to FCC Yazoo City Page Link to CI Adams County Page Link to CI D. Ray James Page

 

 



PI – IARPA Office of Incisive Analysis Broad Agency Announcement

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/IARPA-IncisiveAnalysis.png

 

Broad Agency Announcement Incisive Analysis

  • IARPA-BAA-13-02
  • 20 pages
  • January 14, 2013

Download

IARPA invests in high-risk, high-payoff research that has the potential to provide our nation with an overwhelming intelligence advantage over future adversaries. This research is parsed among three Offices: Smart Collection, Incisive Analysis, and Safe & Secure Operations. This BAA solicits abstracts/proposals for the Office of Incisive Analysis (IA).

IA focuses on maximizing insights from the massive, disparate, unreliable and dynamic data that are – or could be – available to analysts, in a timely manner. We are pursuing new sources of information from existing and novel data, and developing innovative techniques that can be utilized in the processes of analysis. IA programs are in diverse technical disciplines, but have common features: (a) Create technologies that can earn the trust of the analyst user by providing the reasoning for results; (b) Address data uncertainty and provenance explicitly.

The following topics (in no particular order) are of interest to IA:

  • Methods for developing understanding of how knowledge and ideas are transmitted and change within groups, organizations, and cultures;
  • Methods for analysis of social, cultural, and linguistic data;
  • Multidisciplinary approaches to assessing linguistic data sets;
  • Methods for measuring and improving human judgment and human reasoning;
  • Methods for extraction and representation of the information in the non-textual contents of documents, including figures, diagrams, and tables;
  • Methods for understanding and managing massive, dynamic data;
  • Analysis of massive, unreliable, and diverse data;
  • Methods for assessments of relevancy and reliability of new data;
  • Methods for understanding the process of analysis and potential impacts of technology;
  • Multidisciplinary approaches to processing noisy audio and speech;
  • Development of novel top-down models of visual perception and visual cognition;
  • Methods for analysis of significant societal events;
  • Methods for estimation and communication of uncertainty and risk;
  • Novel approaches for mobile augmented reality applied to analysis and collection;
  • Methods for topological data analysis and inferences of high-dimensional structures from low-dimensional representations;
  • Methods for the study of algorithms stated in terms of geometry (computational geometry);
  • Methods for geolocation of text and social media;
  • Novel approaches to biosurveillance;
  • Methods to make machine learning more useful and automatic;
  • Methods to construct and evaluate speech recognition systems in languages without a formalized orthography; and,
  • Methods and approaches to quantifiable representations of uncertainty simultaneously accounting for multiple types of uncertainty.

This announcement seeks research ideas for topics that are not addressed by emerging or ongoing IARPA programs or other published IARPA solicitations. It is primarily, but not solely, intended for early stage research that may lead to larger, focused programs through a separate BAA in the future, so periods of performance will generally not exceed 12 months.

Offerors should demonstrate that their proposed effort has the potential to make revolutionary, rather than incremental, improvements to intelligence capabilities. Research that primarily results in evolutionary improvement to the existing state of practice is specifically excluded.

PI SECRET – U.S. Army Traffic Control Point Operations Smart Card February 13, 2013 in U.S. Army

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/CALL-TrafficControlPoints.png

 

Center for Army Lessons Learned

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • September 2010
  • 2.93 MB

Download

You may engage the following individuals based on their conduct:

• Persons who are committing hostile acts against Coalition forces (CF).
• Persons who are exhibiting hostile intenttowards CF.

These persons may be engaged subject to the following instructions:

Positive identification (PID) is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target. If no PID, contact your next higher commander for decision.

Use graduated measures of force. When time and circumstance permit, use the following degrees of graduated force when responding to hostile act/intent:

1. Shout verbal warnings to halt.
2. Show your weapon and demonstrate intentto use it.
3. Block access or detain.
4. Warning shots may be permitted in your operating environment (OE)/area of responsibility (AOR).
5. Fire proportional lethal force.

Do not target or strike anyone who has surrendered or is out of combat due to sickness or wounds.

Do not target or strike hospitals, mosques, churches, shrines, schools, museums, national monuments, any other historical and cultural sites, or civilian populated areas or buildings UNLESS the enemy is using them for military purposes or if necessary for your self-defense.

Do not target or strike Local infrastructure (public works, commercial communication facilities , dams), lines of communication (roads, highways, tunnels, bridges, railways), or economic objects (commercial storage facilities, pipelines) UNLESS necessary for self-defense or if ordered by your commander. If you must fire on these objects, fire to disable and disrupt rather than destroy.

ALWAYS minimize incidental injury, loss of life, and collateral damage.

The use of force, including deadly force, is authorized to
protect the following:

• Yourself, your unit, and other friendly forces.
• Detainees
• Civilians from crimes that are likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, such as murder or rape.
• Designated personnel or property, when such actions are necessary to restore order and security.

In general, WARNING SHOTS are authorized ONLY when the use of deadly force would be authorized in that particular situation.

Treat all civilians and their property with respect and dignity. Do not seize civilian property, including vehicles, unless the property presents a security threat. When possible, give a receipt to the property’s owner.

You may DETAIN civilians based upon a reasonable belief that the person:

• Must be detained for purposes of self-defense.
• Is interfering with CF mission accomplishment.
• Is on a list of persons wanted for questioning, arrest, or detention.
• Is or was engaged in criminal activity.
• Must be detained for imperative reasons of security.

Anyone you detain MUST be protected. Force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized to protect detainees in your custody. You MUST fill out a detainee apprehension card for EVERY person you detain.

Looting and the taking of war trophies are prohibited.

All personnel MUST report any suspected violations of the Law of War committed by any US, friendly, or enemy force. Notify your chain of command, Judge Advocate, IG, Chaplain, or appropriate service-related investigative branch.

TMZ – The Lindsay Lohan Porn Casting Call

 

The Lindsay Lohan Porn Casting Call

 

Vivid Entertainment is the porn company that literally caught FIRE this weekend — but they’re also casting for a parody porn of Lindsay Lohan’s new film because Lohan herself won’t do the gig. Just give her a few weeks.

“Mandiant” – Announcing Mandiant Intelligence Center

Organizations routinely struggle to understand which cyber threats pose the greatest
risk to them. New threats appear in the news daily and create fire drills for
security teams who must quickly determine what they can and should do to protect
themselves. 

Our newest offering, the Mandiant Intelligence Center
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=239&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>,
draws on our own proprietary intelligence to equip security teams like yours with
the context required to effectively respond to and defend against the most advanced
threat actors. 

With the Mandiant Intelligence Center your security teams can:
*Use tools embedded in the Center to query the Mandiant intelligence database and
receive detailed information on which group is using particular malware, IPs and
domains
*Access detailed profiles of advanced threat groups including their latest tactics,
techniques and procedures
*Obtain detailed context on high profile threat events with analysis on the
potential impact to your organization
*Monitor emerging threat trends

Read more
<http://www.mandiant.com/assets/Mandiant_Intelligence_Center.pdf?elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f&elqCampaignId=283>
about Mandiant for Security Operations or request a call
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=235&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
to receive a demonstration.

""            

Mandiant In The Headlines

January 30, 2013
Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=236&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
By Nicole Perlroth – The New York Times 
February 7, 2013
Mandiant, the Go- To Security Firm for Cyber-Espionage Attacks
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=238&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
By Brad Stone & Michael Riley – Bloomberg Businessweek 
February 18, 2013
Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S.
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=237&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
By David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth – The New York Times 

Learn More About Mandiant®

Mandiant Website
<http://www.mandiant.com/?elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f&elqCampaignId=283>
www.mandiant.com
M-Unition™
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=9&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
Mandiant's official blog
Mandiant on Twitter
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=10&elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f>
twitter.com/mandiant
Be Part of Something More
<http://www.mandiant.com/company/careers/?elq=99b6edb99b004015923dfbfb964a346f&elqCampaignId=283>
Join the Mandiant Team

SECRECY NEWS – SENATORS ASK SURVEILLANCE COURT TO SUMMARIZE OPINIONS

Several members of the Senate Intelligence Committee wrote to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court this month to ask the Court to prepare
summaries of classified opinions that represent significant interpretations
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in order to facilitate their
declassification and public release.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs challenging the
constitutionality of the FISA Amendments Act lacked the requisite legal
standing to pursue their case, effectively foreclosing public oversight of
intelligence surveillance through the courts.

The Senate letter, the text of which was not released, stems from an
amendment to the FISA Amendments Act that was introduced by Sen. Jeff
Merkley in December to promote declassification of significant Surveillance
Court opinons.  The Merkley amendment was not adopted -- none of the
legislative proposals to increase accountability were approved -- but
Senate Intelligence Committee chair Sen. Dianne Feinstein promised to work
with Sen. Merkley to advance the declassification of FISC opinions.

"An open and democratic society such as ours should not be governed by
secret laws, and judicial interpretations are as much a part of the law as
the words that make up our statute," said Sen. Merkley at that time. "The
opinions of the FISA Court are controlling. They do matter. When a law is
kept secret, public debate, legislative intent, and finding the right
balance between security and privacy all suffer."

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/faa-amend.html

"I wish to address, if I could, what Senator Merkley said in his
comments," said Sen. Feinstein during the December 27 floor debate. "I
listened carefully. What he is saying is opinions of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court should, in some way, shape or form, be made
public, just as opinions of the Supreme Court or any court are made
available to the public. To a great extent, I find myself in agreement with
that. They should be."

"I have offered to Senator Merkley to write a letter requesting
declassification of more FISA Court opinions," Sen. Feinstein continued.
"[...] When possible, the opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court should be made available to the public in declassified form. It can
be done, and I think it should be done more often. If the opinion cannot be
made public, hopefully a summary of the opinion can. And I have agreed with
Senator Merkley to work together on this issue."

That letter, signed by Senators Feinstein, Merkley, Ron Wyden and Mark
Udall, has now been sent to the FISA Court, where it awaits an official
response.

Though the letter itself is a modest step, the willingness of
congressional overseers to assert themselves on behalf of public
accountability takes on new importance in light of yesterday's Supreme
Court decision (by a 5-4 vote) to block a constitutional challenge to the
FISA Amendments Act. That decision all but closes the door to public
oversight of the law's implementation through the courts.

    http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1025_ihdj.pdf

The Court majority insisted that judicial review of government
surveillance activities is alive and well, contrary to the plaintiffs'
assertion.  It is "both legally and factually incorrect" to assert that
surveillance is insulated from judicial review, stated the majority opinion
written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., who cited the role of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court in authorizing surveillance activities.

But ACLU attorney Jameel Jaffer said that view "seems to be based on the
theory that the FISA Court may one day, in some as-yet unimagined case,
subject the law to constitutional review, but that day may never come. And
if it does, the proceeding will take place in a court that meets in secret,
doesn't ordinarily publish its decisions, and has limited authority to
consider constitutional arguments. This theory is foreign to the
Constitution and inconsistent with fundamental democratic values," Jaffer
said.

On Monday, Sen. Feinstein paid tribute to L. Christine Healey, a
professional staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee who is
retiring this week.  For three decades, Ms. Healey has played an
influential role in intelligence oversight as a staffer on the House and
Senate intelligence committees, as well as on the 9/11 Commission.  "She
has been as responsible as anyone for the passage of a string of four
annual intelligence authorization bills, including the fiscal year 2013 act
that was completed in December," said Sen. Feinstein.

Ms. Healey was also credited by Sen. Feinstein as "the principal drafter
of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008."

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_cr/healey.html

A PROFILE OF THE 113TH CONGRESS, AND MORE FROM CRS

"The average age of Members of the 113th Congress is among the highest of
any Congress in recent U.S. history," according to a new report from the
Congressional Research Service.  The average age of Members of the House of
Representatives is 57 years, while the average age of Senators is 62 years.

"The overwhelming majority of Members of Congress have a college
education," the CRS found. "The dominant professions of Members are public
service/politics, business, and law. Most Members identify as Christians,
and Protestants collectively constitute the majority religious affiliation.
Roman Catholics account for the largest single religious denomination, and
numerous other affiliations are represented."

One hundred women (a record number) serve in the 113th Congress. There are
43 African American Members, and 38 Hispanic or Latino Members (a record
number) serving. Thirteen Members are Asian American or Pacific Islanders.
There is one Native American serving in the House.

See Membership of the 113th Congress: A Profile, February 20, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42964.pdf

Other noteworthy new and updated products of the Congressional Research
Service that Congress has not made publicly available include the
following.

Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations, February 19, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41989.pdf

Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations, February 22, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40439.pdf

Bond v. United States: Validity and Construction of the Federal Chemical
Weapons Statute, February 21, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42968.pdf

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements,
February 20, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf

Border Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders, February 21, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42969.pdf

NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects, February 21, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for
Congress, February 22, 2013, with new material on the anticipated impact of
sequestration:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf

Azerbaijan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, February 22, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-522.pdf

U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy
Options, February 20, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32649.pdf

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, February 26, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Whistleblowing on Whistleblowing Oversight – revealed by Cryptome

Whistleblowing on Whistleblowing Oversight

 


[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 38 (Tuesday, February 26, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13101-13102]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-04467]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD

[Notice-PCLOB-2013-01; Docket No. 2013-0004; Sequence No. 1]

No FEAR Act Notice; Notice of Rights and Protections Available 
Under Federal Antidiscrimination and Whistleblower Protection Laws

AGENCY: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the requirements of the Notification and 
Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002, the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is providing notice to its 
employees, former employees, and applicants for Board employment about 
the rights and remedies available to them under the federal anti-
discrimination, whistleblower protection, and retaliation laws.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Claire McKenna, Legal Counsel, at 202-
366-0365 or claire.mckenna.pclob@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 15, 2002, Congress enacted the 
Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation 
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-174, also known as the No FEAR Act. The Act 
requires that federal agencies provide notice to their employees, 
former employees, and applicants for employment to inform them of the 
rights and protections available under federal anti-discrimination, 
whistleblower protection, and retaliation laws.

Anti-Discrimination Laws

    A federal agency cannot discriminate against an employee or 
applicant with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
age, disability, marital status, or political affiliation. 
Discrimination on these bases is prohibited by one or more of the 
following statutes: 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. 206(d), 29 U.S.C. 
631, 29 U.S.C. 633a, 2 U.S.C. 791, and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16.
    If you believe that you have been the victim of unlawful 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, or disability, you must contact an Equal Employment Opportunity 
(EEO) counselor within 45 calendar days of the alleged discriminatory 
action, or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 calendar days of 
the effective date of the action, before you can file a formal 
complaint of discrimination with your agency. This timeline may be 
extended by the Board under the circumstances described in 29 CFR 
1614.105(a)(2). If you believe that you have been the victim of 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of age, you must either contact an 
EEO counselor as noted above or give notice of intent to sue to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 calendar days 
of the alleged discriminatory action. If you are alleging 
discrimination based on marital status or political affiliation, you 
may file a written complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel 
(OSC) (see contact information below). In the alternative (or in some 
cases, in addition), you may pursue a discrimination complaint by 
filing a grievance through the Board's administrative or negotiated 
grievance procedures, if such procedures apply and are available.

Whistleblower Protection Laws

    A federal employee with authority to take, direct others to take, 
recommend, or approve any personnel action must not use that authority 
to take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a 
personnel action against an employee or applicant because of disclosure 
of information by that individual that is reasonably believed to 
evidence violations of law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; 
gross waste of funds; an abuse of authority; or a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety, unless disclosures of such 
information is specifically prohibited by law and such information is 
specifically required by executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.
    Retaliation against an employee or applicant for making a protected 
disclosure is prohibited by 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). If you believe that 
you have been the victim of whistleblower retaliation, you may file a 
written complaint (Form OSC-11) with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel 
at 1730 M Street NW., Suite 218, Washington, DC 20036-4505 or online 
through the OSC Web site, http://www.osc.gov.

Retaliation for Engaging in Protected Activity

    A federal agency cannot retaliate against an employee or applicant 
because that individual exercises his or her rights under any of the 
federal antidiscrimination or whistleblower protection laws listed 
above. If you believe that you are the victim or retaliation for 
engaging in protected activity, you must follow, as appropriate, the 
procedures described in the Antidiscrimination Laws and Whistleblower 
Protection Laws section or, if applicable, the administrative or 
negotiated grievance procedures in order to pursue any legal remedy.

Disciplinary Actions

    Under existing laws, each agency retains the right, where 
appropriate, to discipline a federal employee for conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Federal Antidiscrimination and Whistleblower 
Protection Laws up to and including removal. If OSC has initiated an 
investigation under 5 U.S.C. 1214, however, agencies must seek approval 
from OSC to discipline employees for, among other activities, engaging 
in prohibited retaliation, 5 U.S.C. 1214(f). Nothing in the No FEAR Act 
alters existing laws or permits an agency to take unfounded 
disciplinary action against a federal employee or to

[[Page 13102]]

violate the procedural rights of a federal employee who has been 
accused of discrimination.

Additional Information

    For further information regarding the No FEAR Act regulations, 
refer to 5 CFR 724, as well as the appropriate Board offices. 
Additional information regarding federal antidiscrimination laws can be 
found at the EEOC Web site, http://www.eeoc.gov, and the OSC Web site, 
http://www.osc.gov.

Existing Rights Unchanged

    Pursuant to section 205 of the No FEAR Act, neither the No FEAR Act 
nor this notice creates, expands, or reduces any rights otherwise 
available to any employee, former employee, or applicant under the laws 
of the United States, including the provisions of law specified in 5 
U.S.C. 2302(d).

    Dated: February 21, 2013.
Claire McKenna,
Legal Counsel, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
[FR Doc. 2013-04467 Filed 2-25-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P

“Mandiant” – Announcing Mandiant for Security Operations

Citation: "Organizations spend millions of dollars investing in top-notch security teams and in
building secure networks to keep would-be attackers out of their IT environments.
Despite these investments, determined attackers routinely compromise well-secured
organizations and steal their intellectual property and financial assets.

Our newest product, Mandiant for Security Operations
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=234&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>,
equips security teams to confidently detect, analyze and resolve incidents in a
fraction of the time it takes using conventional approaches. This appliance-based
solution connects the dots between what’s happening on their network and what’s
happening on their endpoints. 

With Mandiant for Security Operations security teams can:
*Search for advanced attackers and the APT
*Integrate endpoint security with your network security
*Accelerate triage of suspected incidents
*Find out what happened, without forensics
*Contain endpoints

Read more
<http://www.mandiant.com/assets/Mandiant_for_Security_Operations.pdf?elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7&elqCampaignId=282>
about Mandiant for Security Operations or request a call
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=235&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>
to receive a demonstration.

""            

Mandiant In The Headlines

January 30, 2013
Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=236&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>
By Nicole Perlroth – The New York Times 
February 7, 2013
Mandiant, the Go- To Security Firm for Cyber-Espionage Attacks
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=238&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>
By Brad Stone & Michael Riley – Bloomberg Businessweek 
February 18, 2013
Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S.
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=237&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>
By David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth – The New York Times 

Learn More About Mandiant®

Mandiant Website
<http://www.mandiant.com/?elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7&elqCampaignId=282>
www.mandiant.com
M-Unition™
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=9&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>
Mandiant's official blog
Mandiant on Twitter
<http://app.connect.mandiant.com/e/er?s=2855&lid=10&elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7>
twitter.com/mandiant
Be Part of Something More
<http://www.mandiant.com/company/careers/?elq=41deab51a75b472c90707e854f48b9e7&elqCampaignId=282>
Join the Mandiant Team

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Unveiled by Public Intelligence – NATO Legal Deskbook

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/NATO-LegalDeskbook.png

 

 

NATO Legal Deskbook Second Edition

  • 348 pages
  • 2010

Download

NATO leads efforts to bring stability in its ongoing missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Legal Advisers serve as key members of a Commander‘s staff in the complex legal and political environment that NATO operates. The challenges NATO Commanders and legal adviser face to fulfil mandates, accomplish missions, and support the rule of law in embryonic and fragile democratic governments requires discussion, understanding and the documentation of practical solutions.

The NATO Legal Deskbook is published by the Office of the Legal Adviser, Allied Command Transformation Staff Element Europe (Mons) with the active support and help of the Office of the Legal Adviser, Headquarters Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT, Norfolk, USA) and the Office of the Legal Adviser, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE, Mons, Belgium), as well as many legal advisers in NATO and in the Member States or in other official or academic positions outside NATO.

Why a NATO Legal Deskbook?

Two re-occurring themes surface in after-action reports from exercises and operations. The first is that NATO Commanders and staffs naturally and increasingly turn to the Legal Advisers to help plan, execute, coordinate, evaluate, and support the assigned mission. The second is that no single doctrinal resource exists in NATO to assist legal practitioners in the fulfilling of this task. Although several Alliance members have produced such guides, before the NATO Legal Deskbook none existed for Legal Advisers and legal personnel assigned to NATO commands.

Whether doctrinally ready or not, the Alliance calls upon NATO Legal Advisers and staffs to advise and, often, help direct the execution of the legal component of a mission or mandate. NATO owes these attorneys, paralegals, and legal personnel, who work under often austere and demanding conditions, practical guidance in the form of a comprehensive resource that provides an overview and insight on the legal regime that forms NATO practice. Fulfilling this need is the genesis, purpose and rational for this practitioner‘s guide.

What this Deskbook is not:

This Deskbook is not NATO policy or military doctrine for legal support to operations.

The Deskbook intends to reflect as closely as possible the policies and practice of NATO in legal matters, however, the Deskbook is not a formally approved NATO document and therefore shall not be deemed as reflection of the official opinion or position of NATO.

The practitioner‘s guide is not intended to offer guidance or advice to other military professionals involved in operations. It was written by Legal Advisers for Legal Advisers and legal staff. Its scope and purpose is limited to providing the military legal subject matter experts assistance in the accomplishment of the mission. While others may find the guide helpful, they should understand it is not a tutorial. Fundamental legal principles, standard practices of interpretation, and basic legal practices are assumed as matters already known by its intended audience: the Legal Adviser, legal assistant, or paralegal.

This practitioner‘s guide does not offer an all-inclusive formula on how to advise a NATO commander on any particular aspect of the law, nor is it intended to supplant national guidance. Instead, the guide pre-supposes that Legal Advisers will continue to find themselves providing legal support to operations and missions in a variety of different circumstances, environments, and locations. The guide and its contents must therefore be flexible and geographically universal in application.

Cryptome – National Security in the Digital Age: Review

National Security in the Digital Age: Review

 


http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/311052-1

Michael Hayden, Ex-CIA and Ex-NSA head, discusses “National Security in the Digital Age” on C-SPAN. Hayden avidly defends use of murderous drones with “we are at war,” and repeats the phrase several times in formulaicly grave tones and glares  — the most beloved mantra of militarists. Then declines to affirm or deny CIA has a drone program, “remember, the CIA has never admitted using drones.”

In one of the few admissions of CIA error, Hayden says the agency has become dominated by OSS-like military operations at the expense of its primary intelligence mission, that the military ops were appropriate to 9/11 but now believes CIA should return to its more important role.

He claims that in a state of war things are done that should not be prolonged, that wartime powers given to the natsec agencies should be balanced with other national requirements. In response to an audience question about why only the US has a drone warfare program, he answers that the American people and US allies seem to not understand the US is currently at war.

Hayden laughs and jokes a lot, a peculiar behavior for an avowedly grave topic. His bizarre twisting, jerking, spastic body language indicates roiling contempt of the naive questions being asked and evaded. Hayden exhibits characteristic, Petraeus-like, attributes of a trypical military careerist kiss-upper, kick-downer, a vain double-speaker masking intellectual incapability, condescending of civilians without access to secrets, a grandstanding surrogate hero relishing being at the top, mingling with and succoring global prominents (who will hire ex-natsecs to advise and promote warfare) — job requirements to military pinnacle.

This behavior may derive from Hayden being among the horde of natsec-exes managed by speaker bureaus and shows the silly mannerisms required to be “appealing” overlaid long-practiced WMD-terrifying. Hayden noted WMD now means Weapons of Mass Disruption to flog and finance terrifying cyberwar threats — both by and against the US. He emphasizes that the US has masterful technology to address cyber threats but is constrained, to his regret, by political and social clamor about using that technology against the homeland and foreign innocents.

Noteably, when Hayden loses a train of thought or fails to dreg a glib answer, he leans toward interlocutor Frank Sesno and blurts as if pre-metronomed by advanced officer school and sales, “we are at war.”

Observe Hayden’s use of three fingers, four fingers, ticking off points as if to a crowd of subordinates, pointed looks at friendlies in the audience, nodding “you know what I mean.” Among us secrets-knowers, he fingers coded signals, “let’s play the game of taunting with tidbits what others cannot be allowed to know we are stealing from them,” as he is quoted in the title of Gibney’s documentary “We Steal Secrets.”

This signature behavior of officials who have been carefully briefed to say little in public while implying much in secret is endemic in the world’s capitals of testimony and public speaking. Banal, numbing, open information to tease about the classified and confidential only to be delivered in “closed sessions” to those willing to keep the secrets. “Closed sessions” refutation of democracy for its seemingly always at risk, at war, top security.

Excessive, vulgar joshing between Hayden and Sesno, alternating with mock gravitas of the drone-slaughter rationale “we are at war” red-phone cliche, exemplifying mutual caressing and pandering of spies and journalists in sessions closed to the public but branded and hyped with “anonymous sources” and “leaks.”

Hayden likes the CIA-propaganda film Zero Dark Thirty, with slight demur about artistic license. Crows “I know the real CIA heroine and bin Laden hunters,” not naming Frances Bikowsky, Stephen Nicgorski and band of assassins. With clips of and comments on Homeland Hayden and Sesno parade consummate failure of public responsibility — inbred NatSec idiocy — of knowing and over-protecting insiders too well, advanced by lurid entertainment and vapid interviews complicity

A word about Hayden’s physical flabbiness, a characteristic of military members of spy agencies — except for Petraeus. Not needing physical prowess for combat, one might wonder if the physical indolence is deliberate, vaunting mind over muscle, as a mark of superiority now newly institutionalized with the Distinguished Warfare Medal for drone pilots and hackers. Certainly that reward for arrogance over drone targets and clueless Internet users vaunts flab as a war winner, sure to flatter fat-headed gastronomes of all ideologies.

The C-SPAN show is a repugnant, vacuous public relations DC faux natsec simpering horror show, watch it, upload to YouTube, crowd source — Hayden touts crowd sourcing for espionage exploitation.

 


 

TMZ – Paulina Gretzky — Knockers, Knockers… Who’s There?

 

Paulina Gretzky — Knockers, Knockers… Who’s There?

Check out this photo of a sexy, hot celeb stepping out of a car so that all you can see is her cleavage. Can you guess who it is? You get one hint: It’s not Bette Midler.

Proven – China ‘aiding hacker attacks on west’

The building in Shanghai that hosts the Chinese military's Unit 61398

The building in Shanghai that hosts the Chinese military’s Unit 61398, which has been accused of involvement in hacking attacks. Photograph: Peter Parks/AFP/Getty Images

The Chinese army has launched hundreds of cyber-attacks against western companies and defence groups from a nondescript office building in Shanghai, according to a report that warns hackers have stolen vast amounts of data from their targets.

Mandiant, a security company that has been investigating attacks against western organisations for over six years, said in a report (PDF)the attacks came from a 12-storey building belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general staff’s department, also known as Unit 61398.

Mandiant said it believed a hacking network named the Comment Crew or the Shanghai Group was based inside the compound, in a rundown residential neighbourhood. Although the report fails directly to place the hackers inside the building, it argues there is no other logical reason why so many attacks have emanated from such a small area.

“It is time to acknowledge the threat is originating in China, and we wanted to do our part to arm and prepare security professionals to combat that threat effectively,” said the report.

The discovery will further raise the temperature in the intergovernmental cyberwars, which have heated up in recent years as the US, IsraelIran, China and UK have all used computer subterfuge to undermine rival state or terrorist organisations. One security expert warned that companies in high-profile fields should assume they will be targeted and hacked, and build systems that will fence sensitive data off from each other.

Rik Ferguson, global vice-president of security research at the data security company Trend Micro, said: “We need to concentrate less on building castles and assuming they will be impervious, and more on building better dungeons so that when people get in they can’t get anything else.” .

Mandiant says Unit 61398 could house “hundreds or thousands” of people and has military-grade, high-speed fibre-optic connections from China Mobile, the world’s largest telecoms carrier. “The nature of Unit 61398’s work is considered by China to be a state secret; however, we believe it engages in harmful computer network operations,” Mandiant said in the report.

It said Unit 61398 had been operating since 2006, and was one of the most prolific hacking groups “in terms of quantity of information stolen”. This it estimated at hundreds of terabytes, enough for thousands of 3D designs and blueprints.

“APT1”, as Mandiant calls it, is only one of 20 groups Mandiant says has carried out scores of hacking attacks against businesses and organisations in the west, including companies that work in strategic industries such as US power and water infrastructure.

A typical attack would leave software that hid its presence from the user or administrator and silently siphon data to a remote server elsewhere on the internet at the instruction of a separate “command and control” (C&C) computer. By analysing the hidden software, the pattern of connections and links from the C&C server, the team at Mandiant said they were confident of the source of the threat.

A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman denied the government was behind the attacks, saying: “Hacking attacks are transnational and anonymous. Determining their origins is extremely difficult. We don’t know how the evidence in this so-called report can be tenable. Arbitrary criticism based on rudimentary data is irresponsible, unprofessional and not helpful in resolving the issue.”

But Ferguson told the Guardian: “This is a pretty compelling report, with evidence collected over a prolonged period of time. It points very strongly to marked Chinese involvement.”

Mandiant, based in Alexandria, Virginia, in the US, investigated the New York Times break-in, for which it suggested Chinese sources could be to blame.

President Barack Obama is already beefing up US security, introducing an executive order in his State of the Union speech this month that would let the government work with the private sector to fend off hacking. But it will take until February 2014 to have a final version ready for implementation.

The revelation comes days after the New York TimesWall Street Journaland Washington Post, as well as the social networks Facebook and Twitter, said they had been subjected to “highly sophisticated” hacks that in some cases focused on correspondents writing about China and its government.

Separate investigations by the computer company Dell, working with the news company Bloombergtracked down another alleged hacker, Zhang Changhe, who has written a number of papers on PC hacking. Zhang works at the PLA’s “information engineering university” in Zhengzhou, Henan province, north-central China.

The allegations will raise the temperature in the continuing cyberwar between the west and China, which has been steadily rising since the Pentagon and MI6 uncovered Titan Rain, a scheme that tried to siphon data from the Pentagon and the House of Commons in 2006, and which one security expert said at the time dated back at least to 2004.

Ferguson suggested that western governments were also carrying out attacks against Chinese targets – “but that’s not a culture which would open up about being hit. I would be surprised and disappointed if most western nations don’t have a cybersecurity force.”

The Stuxnet virus, which hit Iran’s uranium reprocessing plant in 2010, is believed to have been written jointly by the US and Israel, while Iranian sources are believed to have hacked companies that issue email security certificates so that they can crack secure connections used by Iranian dissidents on Google’s Gmail system. China is also reckoned to have been behind the hacking of Google’s email servers in that country in late 2009, in an operation that files from WikiLeaks suggested was inspired by the Beijing government.

A timeline of government-sponsored hacking attacks

 

2004 suspected: Chinese group in Shanghai begins probing US companies and military targets.

 

2005: Titan Rain” pulls data from the Pentagon’s systems, and a specialist says of a December 2005 attack on the House of Commons computer system that “The degree of sophistication was extremely high. They were very clever programmers.”

 

2007: Estonia’s government and other internet services are knocked offline by a coordinated attack from more than a million computers around the world – reckoned to have been run from a group acting at the urging of the Russian government. Nobody is ever arrested over the attack.

 

2008: Russia’s government is suspected of carrying out a cyberattack to knock out government and other websites inside Georgia, with which it is fighting a border skirmish over the territory of Ossetia.

 

December 2009: Google’s email systems in China are hacked by a group which tries to identify and take over the accounts of Chinese dissidents. Google withdraws its search engine from the Chinese mainland in protest at the actions. Wikileaks cables suggest that the Chinese government was aware of the hacking.

 

2010: The Flame virus begins silently infecting computers in Iran. Itincorporates cutting-edge cryptography breakthroughs which would require world-class experts to write. That is then used to infect Windows PCs via the Windows Update mechanism which normally creates a cryptographically secure link to Microsoft. Instead, Flame puts software that watches every keystroke and frame on the PC. Analysts say that only a “wealthy” nation state could have written the virus, which breaks new ground in encryption.

 

The Stuxnet worm is discovered to have been affecting systems inside Iran’s uranium reprocessing establishment, passing from Windows PCs to the industrial systems which control centrifuges that separate out heavier uranium. The worm makes the centrifuges spin out of control, while suggesting on their control panel that they are operating normally – and so break them. Iran denies that the attack has affected its project. The US and Israel are later fingered as being behind the code.

 

September 2011: a new virus that silently captures data from transactions in Middle Eastern online banking is unleashed. The principal targets use Lebanese banks. It is not identified until August 2012, when Russian security company Kaspersky discovers the name “Gauss” embedded inside it. The company says the malware it is “nation state-sponsored” – probably by a western state seeking to trace transactions by specific targets.

 

2012: About 30,000 Windows PCs at Saudi Aramco, the world’s most valuable company, are rendered unusable after a virus called “Shamoon” wipes and corrupts data and the part of the hard drive needed to “bootstrap” the machine when it is turned on. In the US, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta described Shamoon as “one of the most destructive viruses ever” and suggested it could be used to launch an attack as destructive as the 9/11 attacks of 2001.

SECRECY NEWS – SEQUESTER MAY SLOW PENTAGON RESPONSE TO WIKILEAKS

The across-the-board budget cuts known as sequestration that are expected
to take effect on March 1 could impede the government's ability to respond
to WikiLeaks and to rectify the flaws in information security that it
exposed, a Pentagon official told Congress recently.

Zachary J. Lemnios, the assistant secretary of defense for research and
engineering, was asked by Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) to describe the "most
significant" impacts on cybersecurity that could follow from the
anticipated cuts to the Pentagon's budget.

Mr. Lemnios replied that "cuts under sequestration could hurt efforts to
fight cyber threats, including [...] improving the security of our
classified Federal networks and addressing WikiLeaks."

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/fydp-42.pdf

The sequester could also interfere with the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative that began under President Bush, he said, and
could hold up plans to "initiat[e] continuous monitoring of unclassified
networks at all Federal agencies."

Mr. Lemnios' response to Sen. Portman's question for the record (which had
not specifically mentioned WikiLeaks) followed a March 2012 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing on Emerging Threats and Capabilities that was
published in December 2012 (at page 42).

    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/fydp.pdf

Generally speaking, computer security within the military is a daunting
problem, Mr. Lemnios told the Committee, particularly since "The Department
operates over 15,000 networks and 7 million computing devices across
hundreds of installations in dozens of countries around the globe."

The challenge of cybersecurity cannot be fully described in public, said
Dr. Kaigham J. Gabriel of DARPA. "The complete picture requires a
discussion at the special access level."  But he told the Committee last
year that several basic points can be openly acknowledged:

"Attackers can penetrate our networks:  In just 3 days and at a cost of
only $18,000, the Host-Based Security System" -- the Pentagon's baseline
computer security system -- "was penetrated."

"User authentication is a weak link: 53,000 passwords were provided to
teams at Defcon; within 48 hours, 38,000 were cracked."

"The Defense supply chain is at risk: More than two-thirds of electronics
in U.S. advanced fighter aircraft are fabricated in off-shore foundries."

"Physical systems are at risk: A smartphone hundreds of miles away took
control of a car's drive system through an exploit in a wireless
interface."

"The United States continues to spend on cybersecurity with limited
increase in security: The Federal Government expended billions of dollars
in 2010, but the number of malicious cyber intrusions has increased."

Though it was presumably not intentional, the WikiLeaks project galvanized
government information security programs and accelerated efforts to devise
"insider threat" detection mechanisms, along with intensified surveillance
of classified and unclassified government computer networks.

"New classes of anomaly detection methods have been developed and are
based on aggregating events across time and multiple sources to identify
network and host-based behavior that might be malicious," James S. Peery of
Sandia National Laboratories told the Senate Armed Services Committee at
last year's hearing.  "These approaches and behavioral-based methods have
been successful in finding previously undiscovered malware."

"One drawback of this technology, though, is that it has a very high false
positive rate," he said.

OPEN ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ADVANCES

Government-sponsored scientific research published in expensive journals
should become more readily accessible to the public under an initiative
announced by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy on
Friday.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/sciaccess.pdf

Federal agencies that fund at least $100 million per year in scientific
research were directed by White House science advisor John Holdren to
develop plans to make the results of such research publicly available free
of charge within a year of original publication.

"The logic behind enhanced public access is plain," Dr. Holdren wrote in
response to a public petition on the White House web site. "We know that
scientific research supported by the Federal Government spurs scientific
breakthroughs and economic advances when research results are made
available to innovators. Policies that mobilize these intellectual assets
for re-use through broader access can accelerate scientific breakthroughs,
increase innovation, and promote economic growth."

But the benefits of open access are not the sole consideration in the new
policy.  "The Administration also recognizes that publishers provide
valuable services, including the coordination of peer review, that are
essential for ensuring the high quality and integrity of many scholarly
publications. It is critical that these services continue to be made
available."

"We wanted to strike the balance between the extraordinary public benefit
of increasing public access to the results of federally-funded scientific
research and the need to ensure that the valuable contributions that the
scientific publishing industry provides are not lost," Dr. Holdren wrote.

The resulting policy mandating free public access within 12 months of
publication is the result of an attempt to balance those competing
interests, and it too is subject to future modification "based on
experience and evidence."

COMMENTS SOUGHT ON OVERSIGHT OF "DUAL USE" BIO RESEARCH

Members of the public are invited to comment on the feasibility and
desirability of various forms of institutional oversight at
federally-funded institutions that perform research involving certain
pathogens or toxins.

"Certain types of research that are conducted for legitimate purposes may
also be utilized for harmful purposes. Such research is called 'dual use
research'," said a Notice filed in the Federal Register Friday by the
Office of Science and Technology Policy.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/02/ostp-dual.html

"Dual use research of concern (DURC) is a smaller subset of dual use
research defined as life sciences research that, based on current
understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge,
information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to
pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public
health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the
environment, materiel, or national security," the OSTP Notice explained.

The term "dual use research of concern" should not be taken in a
pejorative sense, OSTP said.

"Research that meets the definition of DURC often increases our
understanding of the biology of pathogens and makes critical contributions
to the development of new treatments and diagnostics, improvements in
public health surveillance, and the enhancement of emergency preparedness
and response efforts. Thus, designating research as DURC should not be seen
as a negative categorization, but simply an indication that the research
may warrant additional oversight in order to reduce the risks that the
knowledge, information, products, or technologies generated could be used
in a manner that results in harm. As a general matter, designation of
research as DURC does not mean that the research should not be conducted or
communicated."

In the February 22 Federal Register Notice, OSTP posed a series of
questions concerning potential oversight arrangements for dual use research
of concern and solicited feedback from interested members of the public.

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
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_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

TOP-SECRET – New Jersey Fusion Center Phone Kidnapping Scams Report

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/NJROIC-PhoneScam.png

 

New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center Situational Awareness Report

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • February 8, 2013

Download

(U//FOUO) During recent weeks, various sources in law enforcement and media outlets have been reporting phone kidnapping scams occurring in Central and Northern New Jersey and New York. In most incidents, scammers have alleged that a member of the phone scam victim’s family had been involved in a car accident and claimed to have taken the victim’s family member hostage. The scammers then claim they will drop their hostage at a hospital after a certain amount of money (usually $1500‐2000) is wired via Western Union to the scammers, as restitution for damage to the scammer’s vehicle. In addition, the scammers state that they have the hostage’s cell phone and any attempts to call the cell phone or disengage from the conversation will result in the murder or beating of the hostage. The scammers try to hold the victim on the phone as long as possible while attempting to persuade them to wire the money; however, reports from some victims indicate the scammers will hang up and not call back under certain circumstances. For instance, when the victim questions the scammers about the hostage’s name, the scammers end the call when they are unable to provide the hostage’s name. According to Officer Kelly Denham, Coral Gables Police Department (Florida), this scam has been tracked back to 1998, when it started in Puerto Rico. She adds that this scam resurfaces every few years. Over the past few months, the NJ ROIC has seen increased reporting of this scam along the east coast.

Comparisons with Similar Scam Incidents

(U//FOUO) In January 2013, reports indicated a similar scam targeting the elderly. In this scam, elderly grandparents were informed their grandchildren were in prison and that the grandparents needed to wire money immediately to ensure their relative’s release. Reports indicate that the scammers may be garnishing information about their victims from Facebook and other social media websites. Several instances of this scam have been reported to local authorities and an alert has been issued throughout the tri‐state area. Although there are commonalities among these incidents, the NJ ROIC has received no information indicating that the incidents are connected.

Common Trends

(U//FOUO) Since 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigations Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has received similar complaints which focus on some common trends for these types of scams throughout the United States.

These include:

• (U//FOUO) The caller/suspect claims to be a relative (usually a young person) who is out of the country and in trouble with the police or a criminal element and needs money wired to him/her to get out of trouble.
• (U//FOUO) The caller/suspect calls back several times demanding additional money be sent in increments of $3000‐$4000.
• (U//FOUO) The caller/suspect instructs the victim to go to a Walmart or Money Gram location and wire the money to a person whose name is not the so‐called relative.
• (U//FOUO) Sometimes, the caller/suspect will instruct the person to stay on the phone throughout the entire wire transaction Other times the caller/suspect will instruct the victim not to call the relative’s parents because they will worry or be angry.
• (U//FOUO) In another instance, the caller/suspect calls the grandparent/parent and asks for them by name, claiming to be a police officer in another country and instructs the parent on how to get a debit card (amounts are usually under $2000.00) and where to send it for the bail.

How to Prevent the Scam

• (U//FOUO) When family members are going to work, school, and/or out for the day, know their itinerary, who they will be with, where they are traveling to, and what their final destination will be.
• (U//FOUO) Know the cellular telephone numbers of your family members and the subscriber to the respective cellular telephone numbers.
• (U//FOUO) Know the service provider and how to contact the service provider for the respective family members cellular telephone number. This will aid the police with the investigation and further assist with locating the cellular telephone of the family member by “pinging” the respective cellular telephone off various cell sites to determine where the cellular telephone is located.
• (U//FOUO) Constantly update and query your privacy settings on social media profile sites.
• (U//FOUO) Do not provide unknown individuals with your personal information via social media sites and only provide your private information to those you know and/or wish to have that information.
• (U//FOUO) Check to see what privacy information is readily available to the public via the respective social media sites that you and your family are linked to.

What To Do If You Receive Such a Call

• (U//FOUO) Attempt to verify the validity of the number the scammer is calling from.
• (U//FOUO) Attempt to verify the authenticity of the caller of the scam.
• (U//FOUO) Attempt to identify the location of the person and/or family member potentially being kidnapped.
• (U//FOUO) Notify your local police immediately.
• (U//FOUO) Refrain from accepting any subsequent calls from the number associated with the scam.
• (U//FOUO) Ensure you ask specific questions if you are contacted by the party in association with the scam about the suspected “hostage.” If there is a lack of specific information furnished by the scammer, this may prompt the scammer to end the conversation.
• (U//FOUO) If you cannot speak with the person and/or family member suspected of being kidnapped and you are unable to locate the person and/or family member suspected of being kidnapped, then call the service provider of the cellular telephone associated with the person and/or family member suspected of being kidnapped. In these emergency situations, the service provided could “ping” the respective cellular telephone in an attempt to locate the person’s and/or family member’s cellular telephone.
• (U//FOUO) Record the telephone number the suspected kidnapper and/or suspected scammer is calling from.
• (U//FOUO) Save any text messages and/or photographs the suspected kidnapper and/or scammer sends to you.
• (U//FOUO) Lastly, do not panic, think with a clear head, and provide the proper information to your local police assist with the investigation of the incident and/or scam.

Note: (U//FOUO) Be aware of phone “Spoofing,” in which a suspected scammer calls from his/her telephone, however has spoofed and/or has masked his/her real telephone number with another telephone number that appears as such on the other party’s (victim’s) telephone.

TMZ – Colin Kaepernick — BODY SHOTS Before Super Bowl !

 

TMZ – Colin Kaepernick — BODY SHOTS Before Super Bowl !

Photos have surfaced of San Francisco 49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick in Mexico getting BODY SHOTS from hot chicks in bikinis. That’s one less teammate for Chris Culliver to worry about…

SECRET from PI – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Recruiting

DHS-FBI-Recruiting

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists are attempting to recruit new members in the United States and overseas to support their operations, obtain funding, and conduct terrorist attacks.  For example, in May 2012, Maryland-based Mohammad Hassan Khalid pled guilty to attempting to use the Internet to recruit individuals who had the ability to travel to and around Europe to conduct terrorist acts, in addition to providing logistical and financial support to terrorists.  In prior cases of recruitment, individuals who were willing to participate in terrorist acts became involved with known and suspected terrorists, participated in paramilitary training abroad, or tried to acquire small arms and build explosives.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incident from the NSI shared space is an example of an individual being recruited to commit violence.  The example is provided for situational awareness and training:

— (U//FOUO) An individual contacted the police to report being approached by two subjects about supplying firearms and participating in an attack on a military installation.  The subjects were arrested and charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the US Government after being observed conducting surveillance of targets, testing security, and acquiring weapons for the attack.  One of the subjects pled guilty to the charges and is awaiting sentencing.

(U) Past Activities Observed in Individuals Recruited to Participate in Terrorism

(U//FOUO) Studies of terrorist actors have identified particular behaviors that have been observed in individuals vulnerable to recruitment or who have been recruited, and were ready to commit acts of violence.  Any one of these activities may be insignificant on its own, but when observed in combination with other prior observed behaviors—particularly advocacy of violence—may constitute a basis for reporting.

— (U//FOUO) Acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political activity, expressed willingness to commit acts of violence, or close association with individuals or groups suspected of violent extremism.

— (U//FOUO) Communication with violent extremists, either through direct contact or virtually, or active participation in violent extremist blogs, chat rooms, and password-protected websites.

— (U//FOUO) Interest in paramilitary and explosives training or reconnaissance and surveillance activities in a manner reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning.

— (U//FOUO) Possession of literature written by and for violent extremist groups on terrorist techniques, including use of explosives, poisons, firearms and heavy weapons (when combined with other prior observed behaviors).

— (U//FOUO) Involvement by individuals—who otherwise never committed a crime—in theft, fraud, and illegal activities to fund terrorist causes.

(U//FOUO) In addition, individuals or groups attempting to enlist others to participate in acts of violence or terrorism should be reported to authorities.

(U//FOUO) These identified activities have been observed in cases of mobilization to violence, but are not a concrete formula for predicting illegal activity.  First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).  DHS and FBI are not advocating interference with the rights of law-abiding individuals.  There may be a legitimate reason why some of the observed behaviors are present; it is up to you to determine when that is not the case.

S & K – angeblicher Finanzskandal Teil 2 – Wer zieht die Fäden und wer profitiert ?

Honi soit qui mal y pense
ZITAT AUS DEN MEDIEN-

Es geht um einen Schaden in dreistelliger Millionenhöhe. Die Wirtschaftswoche hatte Ende Januar vor den Aktivitäten gewarnt.

Die Staatsanwaltschaft geht von der Annahme aus, dass Schöneich ihre Zeitschrift zum Zwecke der persönlichen Bereicherung als Werbebroschüre von der S&K-Gruppe missbrauchen ließ. So habe sie sie für die Unterstützung der Hauptbeschuldigten Schäfer und Köller allein 6000 Euro monatlich als „Beraterhonorar“ erhalten.

Wenn der S&K durch ihre Tätigkeit Anlegergelder zuflossen, habe sie zudem ein Prozent der Umsätze vereinnahmt. Darüber hinaus habe Schöneich von Schäfer und Köller teure Geschenke wie Handtaschen und Schmuck angenommen. Schöneich reagierte bis zum Redaktionsschluss gestern nicht auf Anfragen des Handelsblatts.

Anlagetipps: Finger weg von Finanzprodukten, wenn…

  • Tipp 1

    … Renditen von über acht Prozent pro Jahr versprochen werden, gleichzeitig aber ein Drittel der eingeworbenen Summe für Kosten wie Werbung oder Vertrieb draufgeht

  • Tipp 2
  • Tipp 3
  • Tipp 4
  • Tipp 5

Die Finanzwelt ist nach eigenen Angaben mit 100 000 Lesern eine der führenden Publikationen für den erfolgsorientierten, qualifizierten Finanzberater im deutschsprachigen Raum. In der Selbstdarstellung heißt es: „Finanzwelt greift wichtige Themen der Finanzbranche auf, setzt Impulse und berichtet hierüber zum Wohle der Branche.“

Nach der bundesweiten Großrazzia gegen mutmaßliche Anlagebetrüger vom Dienstag waren eine Reihe von Hauptverdächtigen in Untersuchungshaft genommen worden. Die Personen stehen im Verdacht, ein betrügerisches Schneeballsystem aufgebaut und Anleger um mehr als 100 Millionen Euro geprellt zu haben. Die Wirtschaftswoche hatte Ende Januar vor den Aktivitäten gewarnt.

TOP-SECRET – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Recruiting

 

sara-eisen

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists are attempting to recruit new members in the United States and overseas to support their operations, obtain funding, and conduct terrorist attacks.  For example, in May 2012, Maryland-based Mohammad Hassan Khalid pled guilty to attempting to use the Internet to recruit individuals who had the ability to travel to and around Europe to conduct terrorist acts, in addition to providing logistical and financial support to terrorists.  In prior cases of recruitment, individuals who were willing to participate in terrorist acts became involved with known and suspected terrorists, participated in paramilitary training abroad, or tried to acquire small arms and build explosives.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incident from the NSI shared space is an example of an individual being recruited to commit violence.  The example is provided for situational awareness and training:

— (U//FOUO) An individual contacted the police to report being approached by two subjects about supplying firearms and participating in an attack on a military installation.  The subjects were arrested and charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the US Government after being observed conducting surveillance of targets, testing security, and acquiring weapons for the attack.  One of the subjects pled guilty to the charges and is awaiting sentencing.

(U) Past Activities Observed in Individuals Recruited to Participate in Terrorism

(U//FOUO) Studies of terrorist actors have identified particular behaviors that have been observed in individuals vulnerable to recruitment or who have been recruited, and were ready to commit acts of violence.  Any one of these activities may be insignificant on its own, but when observed in combination with other prior observed behaviors—particularly advocacy of violence—may constitute a basis for reporting.

— (U//FOUO) Acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political activity, expressed willingness to commit acts of violence, or close association with individuals or groups suspected of violent extremism.

— (U//FOUO) Communication with violent extremists, either through direct contact or virtually, or active participation in violent extremist blogs, chat rooms, and password-protected websites.

— (U//FOUO) Interest in paramilitary and explosives training or reconnaissance and surveillance activities in a manner reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning.

— (U//FOUO) Possession of literature written by and for violent extremist groups on terrorist techniques, including use of explosives, poisons, firearms and heavy weapons (when combined with other prior observed behaviors).

— (U//FOUO) Involvement by individuals—who otherwise never committed a crime—in theft, fraud, and illegal activities to fund terrorist causes.

(U//FOUO) In addition, individuals or groups attempting to enlist others to participate in acts of violence or terrorism should be reported to authorities.

(U//FOUO) These identified activities have been observed in cases of mobilization to violence, but are not a concrete formula for predicting illegal activity.  First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).  DHS and FBI are not advocating interference with the rights of law-abiding individuals.  There may be a legitimate reason why some of the observed behaviors are present; it is up to you to determine when that is not the case.

TMZ – ‘Real Housewives of Miami’ — Time to Play with Boobs !

 

TMZ – ‘Real Housewives of Miami’ — Time to Play with Boobs!

We gotta give “The Real Housewives of Miami” credit… they know how to turn a boring video into a friggin AWESOME one… just start playing with each other’s boobs!

SECRET from Public Intelligence – Restricted U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations Manual

 

USArmy-AirMissileDefense

 

FM 3-01 U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations

  • 146 pages
  • Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information for official use.
  • November 25, 2009
  • 8.08 MB

Download

FM 3-01 is the Army Air Defense Artillery’s (ADA) capstone doctrinal publication. The seven chapters that make up this edition of Air and Missile Defense Operations constitute the Army ADA’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. FM 3-01 also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons.

• Chapter 1 provides a general overview of Army Air and Missile Defense (AMD) operations and the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) mission. The strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war are discussed and AMD operations are defined in terms of their contribution to the Army Operational Concept of Full Spectrum Operations and the Joint Counterair mission.
• Chapter 2 describes the basic concepts inherent in air and missile defense operations which have been developed and improved through many years of operations, both combat and real world deployments. This includes employment principles and guidelines, and engagement operations principles.
• Chapter 3 addresses Command and Control in AMD operations and conforms to Joint Air and Missile Defense doctrine as updated with the lessons learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
• Chapter 4 describes Army Air Defense participation in offensive and defensive operations. Offensive operations aim is to defeat the enemy decisively by using overwhelming, aggressive force. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy back time, economize forces, and/or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Air defense elements protect friendly forces and geopolitical assets and accomplish other missions assigned by the JFC. At the Strategic level of war ADA forces protect high visibility JIIM and national assets, as a layer within the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) and supports homeland defense operations. At the Operational level of war, ADA forces protect the theater assets based on the JFCs critical asset list (CAL) like, seaports of embarkation, air ports of embarkation, cities, logistic centers, religious centers, and lines of communications (LOC). At the tactical level of war, Army ADA forces support the Land Component Commanders (LCC)/ARFOR scheme of maneuver while protecting Theater, Corps, Division, and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) forces according to the JFC’s defended asset list (DAL) priorities.
• Chapter 5 describes the participation of ADA forces in stability operations and civil support operations. Stability operations are conducted outside the U.S. and its territories to promote and protect U.S. national interests. Civil support operations are conducted to address the consequences of natural or manmade disasters, accidents, and incidents within the U.S. and its territories. This chapter describes ADA participation in support of Homeland Security, Homeland Air Security, and counter-drug operations. ADA units may be tasked to provide soldiers and ADA equipment for civil support operations.
• Chapter 6 describes the Army ADA contribution to and benefit from achieving information superiority. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. Information superiority is the product of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), information management (IM), and information operations (IO). Information superiority enables ADA forces to see first, understand the situation more quickly and accurately, and act faster than their adversaries.
• Chapter 7 discusses the sustainment of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) organizations and the unique challenges to the commanders and staffs of these organizations.

Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is in Appendix A. Air and missile threats facing Army ADA forces and systems are in Appendix B. Air and missile defense planning is in Appendix C. A discussion of the impact of technology on ADA forces is in Appendix D.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

5-25. Civil support is Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities (JP 1-02). Civil support includes operations that address the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in the United States and its territories. Army forces conduct civil support operations when the size and scope of events exceed the capabilities or capacities of domestic civilian agencies. Civil support operations are usually noncontiguous. Leaders tailor the application of the operational framework, elements of operational design, and METT-TC to fit each situation. Commanders designate the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations necessary for mission success. However, identifying centers of gravity, decisive points and even the desired end state can be more complex and unorthodox than in offensive and defensive operations. When visualizing a support operation, commanders recognize that they may have to define the enemy differently. In support operations, the adversary is often disease, hunger, or the consequences of disaster.

5-26. The homeland defense mission for ADA is to prevent, deter, or interdict foreign and domestic aerial threats that are directed towards the United States and its citizens or specified area of operations (AO), such as the National Capitol Region. Nations, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations are increasingly likely to attack the U.S. and its territories using missiles and aircraft.

5-27. The homeland air security (HAS) air and missile threat spectrum Figure 5-1 ranges from traditional military threats to terrorist threats, from medium and long range ballistic missiles, bombers to land attack cruise missiles, terrorist-controlled aircraft, and radio-controlled sub-scale aircraft. The use of an air vehicle as a terrorist weapon is the most stressing HAS threat. State-sponsored military threats are addressed by war plans, operational concepts, and our military’s capabilities. The HAS threat spectrum is depicted
below.

5-28. Government agencies other than the Army will often have the lead in civil support operations. ADA commanders may answer to a civilian chief or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Command arrangements may often be only loosely defined, causing commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation. ADA commanders consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic, and psychological in nature.

5-29. The U.S. Constitution allows the use of Army forces to protect the states against invasion and, upon request of a state, to protect it against domestic violence. Army forces, under joint command, provide the nation with critical capabilities, such as missile defense, necessary to secure and defend the homeland.

5-30. The amended Posse Comitatus Act significantly restricts using federal military forces in law enforcement. The Stafford Act defines and clarifies the role of U.S. military forces in support of domestic civil authorities. Since the law may prohibit certain types of activities, commanders need a detailed analysis of their legal authorities for each mission. Generally, ADA troops and systems performing civil support operations, by the nature of their missions, are in compliance with the law and need only be aware of the limitations of their authority.

 

Resignation of Pope Benedict XVI – Gay “Network” in the Vatican – Blackmail – Plot to kill Benedict

Papst2-DW-Kultur-vatican-city-state

The resignation of Pope Benedict XVI has been linked to the discovery of a gay “network” in the Vatican that led to some prelates being blackmailed by outsiders.

The potentially explosive claim was made Thursday by the Rome daily La Repubblica. The newspaper said the network was described in a 300-page report presented to the Pope by three cardinals assigned to investigate a series of embarrassing internal leaks that rocked the Vatican last year.

The cardinals interviewed dozens of prelates and lay people in Italy and abroad. Their report describes a Roman Catholic church divided by factions, including a “cross-party network united by sexual orientation,” La Repubblica said.

“For the first time, the word homosexual was pronounced,” the newspaper said, referring to a meeting when the cardinals reported their findings to Pope Benedict.

The Pope was handed the report Dec. 17. He shocked the Catholic world by resigning less than two months later — the first Pope to abdicate in more than 600 years.

Apparently using words found in the report, the newspaper said it contained evidence of “external influence” on Vatican officials from laymen with whom they had links of a “worldly nature.”

“We would call it blackmail,” La Repubblica added.

The Vatican’s spokesperson, Rev. Federico Lombardi, said reporters should not expect anyone from the Vatican to confirm or deny the allegations.

“We’re not going to run after all the speculation, the fantasies or the opinions that will be expressed on this issue,” he added. “And don’t expect the three cardinals to give you interviews, either, because they have agreed not to answer (questions) or give information on this issue.”

The three cardinals who investigated are Spanish cardinal Julian Herranz, Italian cardinal Salvatore De Giorgi, and the Slovak cardinal, Jozef Tomko.

The Pope asked them to investigate after his papacy was undermined in early 2012 by the leaking of a series of Vatican documents. They included private letters to the Pope complaining of corruption and cronyism in the awarding of Vatican contracts. Allegations of money-laundering at the Vatican’s bank were reignited.

A confidential letter from a Vatican official described a presumed plot to kill Benedict and discussed his potential successor. Other leaks linked the murder-suicide of two Vatican Swiss guards in the 1980s to the kidnapping of a 15-year-old Vatican resident, the attempted murder of Pope John Paul II and the controversial burial in a Roman Catholic basilica of Enrico De Pedis, one of Italy’s most notorious gangsters.

The Pope’s butler was eventually convicted of stealing the documents.

The FBI – Crooked CEO Gets 50 Years for Stealing $215 Million

Peregrine headquarters building
The $20 million headquarters of the now-bankrupt Peregrine Financial Group in Cedar Falls, Iowa.

 

 

He was a successful CEO of his own futures brokerage firm and a respected member of his community, creating jobs and supporting local charities.

 

Or so it seemed. For years, Russell Wasendorf, Sr.—as Acting U.S. Attorney Sean R. Berry of the Northern District of Iowa recently put it—was really a “con man who built a business on smoke and mirrors.”

 

It all fell apart in July 2012 when Wasendorf—after an unsuccessful suicide attempt—admitted stealing millions from more than 13,000 investors who had entrusted their hard-earned money to him and his company, the now bankrupt Peregrine Financial Group (PFG), based in Cedar Falls, Iowa. Last month, Wasendorf was sentenced by a federal judge to 50 years in prison—the maximum sentence allowed by law—and ordered to pay restitution to his victims.

 

Hefty Federal Sentences
for Financial Fraudsters

Russell Wasendorf, Sr.’s 50-year sentence was based on a variety of factors, including the amount of financial loss, the sophisticated means used to execute the fraud, and the large number of victims. But he’s not the only subject of an FBI financial fraud case to end up with an extraordinarily lengthy prison sentence. Here are a few more examples:

– Bernard Madoff—150 Years: Founder of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC, he engineered a Ponzi scheme that resulted in billions of dollars of losses to thousands of investors. The federal judge who sentenced him said that Madoff’s “fraud was staggering.” New York press release

– Allen Stanford—110 Years: Chairman of the board of Stanford International Bank, he orchestrated a 20-year investment fraud scheme that helped him steal $7 billion to finance his personal businesses. Speaking at his sentencing on behalf of those he defrauded, a woman told Stanford that “many of the victims had lived the proverbial American dream, only to have it snatched away from them in the name of greed.” Houston press release

– Thomas Petters—50 Years: Petters stole billions of dollars in money and property by inducing investors to provide his company with funds to purchase merchandise that was to be resold to retailers at a profit. Of course, no such purchases were made. Then-Minneapolis Special Agent in Charge Ralph Boelter said he hoped that Petters’ “appropriate” 50-year sentence “will serve as an effective deterrent to those similarly inclined.” Minneapolis press release

How it started. In the early 1990s, Wasendorf’s Peregrine partner pulled his money out of the operation, and Wasendorf didn’t have the funds to keep the company going. So he helped himself to at least $250,000 of Peregrine’s customer funds in accounts at an outside bank. To conceal the theft, he used a copy machine to fabricate a phony bank statement.

 

For the next 20 or so years, Wasendorf continued to steal from customer funds while his company incurred tens of millions of dollars in losses. He carried out this scheme through a series of complex actions designed to conceal his activities and the deteriorating state of the company. For instance:

 

  • He maintained exclusive control of monthly bank statements by instructing PFG personnel to make sure they were delivered to him unopened. He then used a copy machine—and later, computer software—to create phony monthly statements in place of the real statements.
  • He sent the phony statements to PFG’s accounting department, knowing they’d be used in various reports required by oversight bodies—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the National Futures Association (NFA).
  • He intercepted account verification forms from NFA and CFTC auditors mailed to the bank used by PFG. Wasendorf changed the address of the bank to a post office box that only he had access to; once the forms came into that post office box, he would mail back to the auditors a forged form—supposedly from the bank—that contained an inflated dollar amount of what was in the corresponding bank account.

 

What did Wasendorf do with the misappropriated funds? He created the appearance that PFG was legitimate and successful in order to ward off the suspicions of regulators and auditors. He also funded his own outside business interests—for example, he opened two restaurants in Cedar Falls. And finally, he lived quite luxuriously—he owned a private jet and a huge estate that included a million dollar indoor swimming pool and a 1,000-bottle wine cellar.

 

The case began when the Blackhawk County Sheriff’s Office, first on the scene of Wasendorf’s attempted suicide, contacted the FBI after discovering notes left by the executive admitting his illegal deeds. The ensuing federal investigation—which involved multiple searches, reviews of thousands of electronic and paper documents, and numerous interviews—culminated in September 2012 with Wasendorf’s guilty plea.

 

Special thanks as well to our partners at the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Iowa for their assistance in this case.

Unveiled by Cryptome – Iran Zelzaal Rocket Probable 1-Day Attack on US

 

 

Iran Zelzaal Rocket Probable 1-Day Attack on US

Ahmadinejad_iran_uran20100209123504


A sends:

Our Persian observer reports that Iran has made its southern missile and rocket launchers and silos ready for a probable 1-day attack. Based on what we hear, there is high chance of a very small scale fire exchange between the two sides and then call it a mistake. It is a common practice in such situations and we think such test must happen before the upcoming Iranian presidential election, to have a added-value score for Americans. It is a military text book fact that such event is going to happen and this article tips off Iranians are concentrating on the south. It also offer thorough details of Zelzaal, a solid fuel rocket that is set to destroy American airplanes before they get the chance to fly off the band [ground].

http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/195032/%D8%AF%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%82%E2%80%8E%
D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%
B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%
D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%87%D8%
A7-%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%
DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3

TOP-SECRET from PI – U.S. Northern Command CONPLAN 3501-08 Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/USNORTHCOM-DSCA.png

CDRUSNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08 DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

  • 570 pages
  • May 16, 2008
  • 40.9 MB

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1. Purpose. Natural or man-made disasters and special events can be so demanding that local, tribal) state and non-military federal responders are temporarily overwhelmed by the situation. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) will respond quickly and effectively to the requests of civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 2008 (JSCP) directs CDRUSNORTHCOM to prepare a plan to support the employment of Title 10 DOD forces providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in accordance with (IAW) the National Response Framework (NRF), applicable federal law, DOD Directives (DODD), and other policy guidance including those hazards defined by the National Planning Scenarios that are not addressed by other JSCP tasked plans. DSCA is a subset of DOD civil support that is performed within the parameters of the NRF.

2. Conditions for Implementation

a. Politico-Military Situation

(1) USNORTHCOM was established in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. USNORTHCOM’s dual mission is to conduct Homeland Defense (HD) and civil support operations. When directed by the President or the SecDef, USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations IAW the NRF by responding to Requests for Assistance (RFA) from civil authorities.

(2) The NRF is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards response. This plan aligns with the NRF coordinating framework and applies to all forms of support that DOD could provide to civil authorities under the NRF. In addition to Large-scale disaster responses) DOD has long provided smaller scale support for wildland firefighting, National Special Security Events (NSSE)t such as political conventions, and special events (SE) such as major sporting events.

b. Statement. This summary provides military decision makers with a brief recapitulation of the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of a specific contingency.

c. Legal Considerations. The NRF provides the coordinating framework for support provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et. seq.). The Stafford Act and the Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) are the primary sources of statutory authority which govern the federal response. Support under these acts range from small-scale efforts to large-scale operations involving thousands of DOD personnel. DODD 3025.dd) Defense Support of Civil Authorities, is currently in draft, but when finalized, will supersede the current DODDs describing DOD support of civil authorities. Civil support under this plan does not include direct support to law enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (Title 18 United States Code Section 1385) and DOD policy place limitations on direct involvement in law enforcement activities by Title 10 military personnel. Direct support to civilian law enforcement authorities requires specific statutory or Constitutional authority to not violate the PCA. While providing DSCA, DOD forces will conform to the CJCS Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) and any supplemental guidance provided by USNORTHCOM.

APPENDIX 22 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

1. Situation

a. State, local, tribal, private-sector, and specific Federal authorities have primary responsibility for public safety and security, and typically are the first line of response and support. Local jurisdictions have primary authority and responsibility for law enforcement activities. As local incidents or events escalate, additional resources will first be obtained through the activation of mutual aid agreements with neighboring localities and/ or State authorities. In the context of State’s resources, the National Guard (NG), while serving under state control for state purposes, is not considered to be part of the Department of Defense (DOD) and executes missions under the command and control (C2) of the Governor in accordance with (IAW) the State’s constitution and statutes.

b. It is DOD policy to cooperate with civilian law enforcement officials to the maximum extent practicable. The implementation of DOD policy shall be consistent with the needs of national security and military preparedness, the historic tradition of limiting direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities, and the requirements of applicable law.

c. It is the intent of this appendix to provide an overview of defense support of law enforcement as it cannot cover all potential requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) that relate to civilian law enforcement. Defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies covers a broad spectrum of potential activities from very small support activities such as training civilian law enforcement, loaning a piece of equipment, or an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or dog team to large-scale incidents or events such as a riot. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) addresses civil disturbance operations as part of public safety. This appendix will not address civil disturbance operations. See USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502, Civil Disturbance Operations, for more information.

d. State level emergency response operations for natural disasters have evolved concerning the use of the NG in a law enforcement role from state to state. Govemor1s use of their powers has set a precedence for the future. Governors may, by use of their state powers and via a state to state memorandum of agreement, authorize the NG of one state to perform law enforcement and security duties within the another state.

e. In accordance with (IAW) reference g. which is still in DRAFT form, DSCA does not apply to the following programs that are related to support to law enforcement agencies:

(1) Sensitive support provided IAW DOD Directive (DODD) S-5210.36.

(2) Inspector General of the DOD, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service:? or the military criminal investigative organizations when they are conducting joint investigations with civilian law enforcement agencies of matters within their respective jurisdictions, using their own forces and equipment.

(3) The non-Federalized National Guard and their activities under the C2 of the Governor.

(4) Counter-narcotic operations conducted under section 124) Title 10, U.S. Code.

(5) Defense Intelligence Components providing intelligence support IAW Executive Orders (EO) 12333 and 13356, the DODD on Intelligence activities (DODD 5240.1) and DODD Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Person (DODD 5240.1-R). Defense Intelligence  components are defined in DOD Directive 5240.1

f. Enemy Forces. See Base plan

g. Friendly Forces. See Base plan

h. Assumptions

(1) DOD law enforcement and security missions/tasks will be in support of a Primary Agency under the NRF or a designated agency for other approved law enforcement activities.

(2) The Posse Comitatus Act will not be modified.

(3) DOD policy and guidance will not change after the formal release of references g and i.

(4) Civilian law enforcement agencies will continue to request training support for Jaw enforcement activities, loan/lease of DOD equipment) support for National Special Security Events (NSSEs), and other law enforcement activities.

2. Mission. See Base plan

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies in response to a natural or man-made disaster, emergency, incident, or event will be processed IAW reference i above and executed at the direction of the President or approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) IAW the Base plan.

(2) Release of information to the public concerning law enforcement operations is the primary responsibility of the civilian agency that is performing the law enforcement function. When defense support is provided under reference j above, assistance provided and information released by DOD PAO agencies to the public shall be approved by the Secretaries of the Military Departments or the Directors of the Defense Agencies and such assistance may be conditioned upon control by the Secretaries of  the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies before information is released to the public.

(3) Use of Information Collected During DSCA Operations. Military Departments and Defense Agencies are encouraged to provide to federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement officials any information collected during the normal course of DSCA operations that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or state law within the jurisdiction of such officials.

(4) USNORTHCOM will initiate coordination for defense support with the designated law enforcement agency upon SecDef approval of a RFA.

(5) Training Civilian Law Enforcement. Military Departments and Defense Agencies may provide training to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials. Such assistance may include training in the operations and maintenance of equipment made available under the military equipment loan/lease program. This does not permit large scale or elaborate training, and does not permit regular or direct involvement of military personnel in activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations, except as otherwise approved and authorized.

b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Coordination regarding legality of support will be staffed through the chain of command and USNORTHCOM Judge Advocate (JA) to the SecDef.

(2) The SecDef is the approval authority for all RFAs made by law enforcement agencies. This includes:

(a) Requests for potentially lethal support (i.e.) lethal to the public, a member of law enforcement, a military member or DOD employee).

(b) Loans of equipment, facilities, or personnel to law enforcement.

(c) Lethal support includes: loans of arms; combat and tactical vehicles, vessels or aircraft, or ammunition.

(d) All requests for support under 10 USC 382 and 18 USC 831; all support to counterterrorism operations; and all support to law enforcement when there is a potential for confrontation between law enforcement and specifically identified civilian individuals or groups.

(3) Immediate response authority. When requested, local military commanders and DOD officials may provide defense support to civil law enforcement agencies under this authority in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. This authority does not authorize DOD forces to perform law enforcement functions in support of civil law enforcement agencies unless consistent with an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC) Section 1385) and IAW the guidance provided in the Basic plan.

(4) Restrictions on direct assistance to civilian law enforcement. Except as otherwise provided, the prohibition on the use of military personnel “as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws” prohibits the following forms of direct assistance:

(a) Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

(b) A search or seizure.

(c) An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

(d) Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

(5) The SecDef is the approval authority for all assistance with the potential for confrontation between DOD personnel and civilian individuals or groups.

(6) If a DOD Component has a question on the appropriateness or legality of providing requested support, such request shall be forwarded through the military chain of corrunand to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD(HD/ ASA)).

4. Administration and Logistics. See Base plan

5. Command and Control. See Base plan

 

Die wahren Hintergründe zu S & K – Teil 1

Bernd Pulch lachend

Liebe Leser,

umfangreiche Ermittlungen der Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main – Schwerpunktstaatsanwaltschaft für Wirtschaftsstrafsachen – und dem Fachkommissariat für Wirtschaftskriminalität beim Polizeipräsidium Frankfurt am Main seit dem Jahre 2012 haben zu einer groß angelegten Razzia in sieben Bundesländern unter Einbeziehung von 1.200 Ermittlungsbeamten und 15 Staatsanwälten geführt. Es wurden sechs Personen festgenommen, weitere Beschuldigte sind vorläufig festgenommen wurden. Gegen ca. 50 weitere Personen wird darüber hinaus ermittelt, so heisst es.

Die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main wirft den Verantwortlichen banden- und gewerbsmäßigen Betrug mit Kapitalanlagen, Untreue und weitere Straftaten vor. Die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main spricht in ihrer Pressemitteilung von einem Schneeballsystem und einem sich abzeichnenden Schaden im dreistelligen Millionen-Euro-Bereich. Gegenstand der Ermittlungen sind nach Mitteilung der Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main mehrere Anlagefonds im neunstelligen Euro-Bereich.

Es wurden Vermögenswerte im Gesamtvolumen von über 100 Millionen EUR gesichert.

Stellungnahme der Kanzlei Göddecke

Es war nur eine Frage der Zeit, dass sich staatliche Behörden mit den Geschäften der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe beschäftigen. Bereits seit November letzten Jahres standen die Geschäfte der S&K-Unternehmen unter kritischer Beobachtung durch die Medien.

Dass staatliche Ermittlungsbehörden in diesem massivem Umfang tätig werden, zeigt, dass die gegen die S&K-Unternehmensgruppe und deren Verantwortlichen erhobenen Vorwürfe zumindest den dringenden Tatverdacht strafbarer Handlungen rechtfertigen.

Verhaftet wurden Jonas Köller, Stefan Schäfer, die Spitzen der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe sowie Haucke Bruhn und Thomas Gloy von United Investors, dem Vertrieb in Hamburg sowie zwei weitere angebliche Mittäter.

Allerdings sind unter Umständen nicht nur Anleger der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe von den Festnahmen betroffen. So hatte die S&K-Unternehmensgruppe auf verschiedenen Wegen umfangreiche geschäftliche Beziehungen zu anderen Fonds namhafter Anbieter aufgenommen, so zu den MIDAS-Fonds (Private-Equity Fonds) und einigen Immobilienfonds der DCM-Gruppe. Auch bei den Fonds der SHB-Gruppe sollten wichtige Posten mit Personen besetzt werden, die dem Umfeld der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe zuzuordnen waren. In Anbetracht des Umstandes, dass nach vorliegenden Informationen und Unterlagen Zweifel an der Werthaltigkeit einiger Immobilien der S&K-Unternehmensgruppe bestanden haben, haben wir diese Entwicklung stets kritisch beobachtet.

Erfreulich ist, dass die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main nach eigenen Angaben umfangreiche Vermögenssicherungen vorgenommen hat. Hierdurch erhöhen sich die Chancen für Anleger, wenigstens einen Teil ihres Geldes zurückzuerhalten, jedenfalls wenn sie rechtzeitig aktiv werden.

Die Ermittlungsergebnisse der Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main und anderer Staatsanwaltschaften könnten die Durchsetzung von Ansprüchen gegen die S&K-Unternehmensgruppe erheblich erhöhen. Dies betrifft Anleger der Fonds S&K Real Estate Value Added Fondsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Deutsche S&K Sachwerte GmbH & Co. KG, Deutsche S&K Sachwerte Nr. 2 GmbH & Co. KG und S&K Investment Plan GmbH & Co. KG. Aber auch Anleger, die in den Jahren 2010 bzw. zuvor Lebensversicherungen und/oder Bausparverträge an Unternehmen der S&K-Gruppe verkauft haben und deren Forderungen gestundet oder bisher regelmäßig ausgezahlt wurden, können betroffen sein. Auch aktuell hat die S&K-Unternehmensgruppe über die Asset Trust AG Lebensversicherungen und ähnliches aufgekauft. Hier drohen den Anlegern erhebliche finanzielle Verluste.

Wie es mit den Fonds der MIDAS-Gruppe und verschiedenen Fonds der DCM weitergeht, wird sich zeigen, wenn feststeht, ob diese Fonds überhaupt noch handlungsfähig sind. Für Anleger der SHB-Fonds könnte die aktuelle Entwicklung die Frage der Abstimmung bei den laufenden Gesellschafterabstimmungen erheblichen Einfluss haben.

Experten kommen zu der Auffassung, dass die Aktion – unabhängig von ihrer Berechtigung – die vorhandenen Fonds schwer beschädigen wird sowie das Vertrauen in die gesamte Immobilienbranche für Jahre untergraben wird. Eine ganz spezielle Rolle spielte hierbei auch der selbsternannte „Nachrichtendienst“ „GoMoPa“ und deren Zuträger und V-Leute in der Branche, den Medien und in den Behörden. Erfahrene Experten verweisen auf den Zusammenhang zwischen den mutmasslichen STASI Täter: „GoMoPa“, „Anlegeranwalt Resch, Beate P****n, Staatsanwältin, Wiesbaden/Rhein Main, ihren Gatten, den Gesellschafter der Immobilienzeitung GmbH, Thomas P*****n sowie den Druck auf die Frankfurter Staatsanwaltschaft in der Finanzkrise „abzuliefern.“

Natürlich haben die Beschuldigten – es gilt die Unschuldsvermutung – und auch die Branche nach dem medialen Donnergewitter keine Chance mehr, meinen wohl Rechtsexperten…

Warum Banken, die Milliarden zerstört haben und mit Milliarden Steuergeldern willfähriger Politiker subventiniert werden , gänzlich ungeschoren davonkommen, und deren Manager Millionengehälter kassieren, erschliesst sich unserer Redaktion nicht.

BANKEN MÄSSIGES – EH PARDON BANDENMÄSSIGES VERBRECHEN ? !

Durch die Aktion wird das Vertrauen in die deutsche Immobilienbranche auf Jahre zerstört.  Die Fonds werden mutmasslich insolvent. Die Gewinner sind dubiose Aktienhaie, “Anlegeranwälte” und damit verbandelte “Juristen” und   “Journalisten”  in den Behörden.”

Die Verlierer sind die Immobilienbranche und deren Angehörige.

Und wer immer noch nicht kapiert hat, mit wem er oder sie es bei bei “GoMoPa” und deren V-Leuten in der Justiz und in der in Rhein/ Main ansässigen V-Leuten/Medien  zu tun hat.

Und warum ehemalige STASI-Leute, die eine Kampagne mit ihren V-Leuten in der Justiz und sogenannten “Fachzeitungen” aus dem Rhein-Main-Gebiet (Wiesbaden ! sic !) unter der Ägide bestimmter “Familienangehöriger” anzetteln können, mutmasslich im Auftrag von Immobilien-Wettbewerbern , damit immer diese weiter erfolgreich sind, erschliesst sich auch nicht – auf den ersten Moment.

Jahrzehntelange Intrigen ! Oder was P*****n ? Oder was M***a ?

Und: Warum gilt in Deutschland – gerade nach den NAZIs und nach der STASI – Terrorr-Willkür keine Unschuldsvermutung wie im Rest der Welt ?

Wie verkommen ist diese deutsche Gesellschaft und deren “Organe” – instrumentalisiert durch durchschaubare Interessen seit dem Fall der Mauer 1989 ?

Nie wude ein TOP-STASI-Mann oder TOP – Gestapo- Mann verurteilt !

Trotz aller Massenverbrechen !

Berichten hierüber die gleichgeschalteteten deutschen Main-Stream-Medien ? Nein !

Und bei den Milliarden – Verlusten – kein einziger Banker wurde verurteilt  !

Gab es Berichte in den gleichgeschalteten, anzeigenabhängigen Medien oder in der “Immobilienzeitung” oder in “GoMoPa” oder in “Das Investment” etc pp ?

WAS GIBT ES NUR FUER ZUFAELLE  ?!

Zum Thema: Es wurde kein Banken-Opfer gefunden ( Gab es den keine ????)….

Stattdessen wurde ein dankbares Justiz- und Medien-Opfer gefunden – und am ersten Tag gleich richtig fertiggemacht.  Woher  haben die Medien all  die schönen Photos und Infos von der Razzia ?

Die Anleger interessieren eh keinen und bei den Immobilien verstehen die Bürokraten eh nix !

Damit ist der Immobilien-Miliarden-Schaden JETZT vorprogrammiert.

ZUDEM – Welche globalen Investoren sollen JETZT investieren nach diesem  §JUSTIT§- KO ?

Wer PROFITIERT denn davon ?

Bei weiterem Nachdenken, denke ich werden Sie alles verstehen !

Herzlichst

Bernd Pulch

(Magister Artium)

Unveiled – Mandiant Report on Chinese Hackers

Chinese Hackers Screen-Shot-2013-02-19-at-2.17.49-AM

When Mandiant, the company that investigated the recent cyber attacks on the New York Times, released its report yesterday, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, the media grabbed it. They zinged off one news story after another about how this company had exposed the cybercriminals that the Chinese government claimed to know nothing about.

News? No. It was simply another layer of evidence that cyber activists/hackers/criminals/agents/whatever have been stealthily conducting cyber reconnaissance missions, infecting computers with malware, exfiltrating data, and in general, being bad guys. In 2011, Dmitri Alperovitch, then vice president of Threat Research for McAfee, authored a report about Shady RAT (Remote Access Tool), the malware that had been used by Chinese cybercriminals to exfiltrate data from a broad cross-section of organizations over a 2-5 year period — undetected. Alperovitch broke new ground when he included a table of more than 70 companies, organizations, and government agencies from around the globe that had been compromised. It included the U.N., the International Olympic Committee, and numerous U.S. entities. Now, that was news.

Mandiant’s report gave the world more of the same about Chinese cyber bad guys. In fact, it was the same Chinese bad guys. Mandiant acknowledges that the group behind the attacks in their investigation is the same group that Alperovitch identified in Shady RAT.

What is news in the Mandiant report is how they conducted their forensic investigation. Mandiant actually tracked the attackers’ communications back to a compromised “hop point” (middle man computer), obtained the cooperation of the compromised middle organization, and captured the keystrokes of the criminals as they were conducting their “work.”

Mandiant and its client companies turned the tactics of the criminals against them and carefully compiled evidence over several years. They observed this particular group of cyber hackers attack more than 141 companies in 20 industries since 2006. Mandiant courageously published its findings, including a video of screenshots captured as the criminals engaged in their acts, and acknowledged that they “expect reprisals from China.”

A lot of credit goes to the unsung heroes: the companies that made Mandiant’s work possible:
the victim organizations that were determined to track the criminals and funded substantial forensic investigations, and
the “middle-man” organizations that accepted Mandiant’s help when notified of their role and cooperated to advance the investigations.

This does not happen because forensic and computer geeks decide to chase cybercriminals. It happens because senior management understands both the importance of what is happening and their fiduciary duty to protect the assets of the organization.

Alperovitch, who is now co-founder and CTO of forensic firm CrowdStrike, notes that “Mandiant’s report is important and makes it starkly clear that it is becoming harder and harder for the Chinese government to deny that they know nothing about this.” Nevertheless, according to Alperovitch, “the identified group is just one of two dozen in China that are engaged in similar activities, many of them linked to units in the People’s Liberation Army.”

So, here is the bottom line for corporate America: unlike traditional crimes, companies cannot just call the cops and let them chase the cyber criminals. Affected organizations play a leading role in every investigation because it is their systems and data that are being stolen or leveraged. The lesson from Mandiant is that we must all come together and collectively fight cybercrime, irrespective of whether the criminal is a rogue hacker or a nation state.

A few tips to get started: Be on the alert for malicious code on your system and, when detected, don’t shirk from funding a proper forensic investigation. If your company is approached by a reputable firm or law enforcement agency with evidence that your corporate systems are being used as a hop point, cooperate as fully as possible. Stay engaged and ensure the investigation stays within the rule of law. Understand these are hard problems and take time.

 

Download the original document here:

PDF_MTrends_2012

TMZ – Kim Kardashian – Khloe Was NOT Fired from ‘X Factor’

 

TMZ – Kim Kardashian – Khloe Was NOT Fired from ‘X Factor’

 

Khloe Kardashian did not go the way of Paula Abdul … and Nicole Scherzinger … and Cheryl Cole … and Steve Jones … and NOT been 86’d from “X Factor” … this according to Kim Kardashian.

SECRECY NEWS – A NEW JUDGE FOR THE FISA COURT

Judge Claire V. Eagan of the Northern District of Oklahoma was appointed
this month to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court by the Chief
Justice of the United States.

Her term on the FIS Court began on February 13, 2013 and will extend until
May 18, 2019.  She replaces Judge Jennifer B. Coffman, who retired on
January 8 before the end of her term.  Another appointment, to replace
outgoing Judge John D. Bates, whose term ends tomorrow, is imminent, said
Sheldon Snook, spokesman for the Court.

The FIS Court authorizes electronic surveillance and physical searches for
intelligence and counterterrorism purposes. The current membership of the
Court is listed here:

        http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/court2013.html

Judge Eagan was appointed to the federal bench by President George W. Bush
in 2001.

The FIS Court has been discussed lately as a potential model for some form
of judicial review of the use of drones in lethal strikes against suspected
terrorists. Speaking at the February 7 confirmation hearing of John Brennan
to be CIA Director, Senate Intelligence Committee chair Sen. Dianne
Feinstein said her Committee would examine "the proposal to create an
analogue of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review the
conduct of such strikes."

But the application of the FISA model for authorizing intelligence
surveillance to the substantially different issue of lethal targeting would
not be straightforward, and may not be appropriate at all.

The notion "that federal judges ought to be assigned the task of
monitoring, mediating and approving the killer instincts of our government
[...] is a very bad idea," wrote Judge James Robertson, a former FIS Court
member, in the Washington Post ("Judges shouldn't decide about drone
strikes," February 15).

UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
Congress has chosen not to make available to the public include the
following.

Federal Reserve: Unconventional Monetary Policy Options, February 19,
2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42962.pdf

Federal Assault Weapons Ban: Legal Issues, February 14, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42957.pdf

Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Issues in Innovation and
Competitiveness, February 15, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42960.pdf

Unauthorized Aliens: Policy Options for Providing Targeted Immigration
Relief, February 13, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42958.pdf

Cars, Trucks, and Climate: EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gases from Mobile
Sources, February 14, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40506.pdf

Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, February 15, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf

Exemptions for Firearms in Bankruptcy, February 15, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41799.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Revealed – Iran Zelzaal Rocket Probable 1-Day Attack on US

Iran Zelzaal Rocket Probable 1-Day Attack on US

 


A sends:

Our Persian observer reports that Iran has made its southern missile and rocket launchers and silos ready for a probable 1-day attack. Based on what we hear, there is high chance of a very small scale fire exchange between the two sides and then call it a mistake. It is a common practice in such situations and we think such test must happen before the upcoming Iranian presidential election, to have a added-value score for Americans. It is a military text book fact that such event is going to happen and this article tips off Iranians are concentrating on the south. It also offer thorough details of Zelzaal, a solid fuel rocket that is set to destroy American airplanes before they get the chance to fly off the band [ground].

http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/195032/%D8%AF%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%82%E2%80%8E%
D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%
B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%
D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%87%D8%
A7-%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%
DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3

Der Beweis: Hackerangriff auf sparkasse.de

hacker

THE INVESTMENT MAGAZINE – THE ORIGINAL – DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN – DAS ORIGINAL – Hackeralarm bei den Sparkassen: Unbekannte haben am Montag eine Schadsoftware auf einzelnen Internet-Seiten von sparkasse.de platziert, wie der Deutsche Sparkassen- und Giroverband (DSGV) mitteilte.

“Kunden, die ohne aktuellen und aktiven Virenscanner auf sparkasse.de waren, könnten sich diese Schadsoftware auf den eigenen Rechner geladen haben.” Betroffene Kunden sollten ihren Rechner mit einem gängigen Virenschutzprogramm durchsuchen und die Schadsoftware beseitigen, empfahl der DSGV am Dienstag.

Am Montag sei zwischen 12.45 Uhr und 17.05 ein seit Anfang des Jahres im Internet kursierender Trojaner auf der Sparkassen-Seite aktiv gewesen, erklärte ein DSGV-Sprecher. In dieser Zeit hätten rund 30.000 Besucher die Homepage besucht, auf der diverse Angebote der Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe beworben werden. Einzelne Sparkassen-Filialen oder Online-Banking-Angebote seien nicht betroffen gewesen. “Auch Angriffe auf Homebanking-Programme von Kunden wurden nicht beobachtet.”

Die IT-Experten der Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe nahmen die Seiten am Montag umgehend vom Netz, als sie den Trojaner entdeckten. Die Angebote seien erst nach eingehender Prüfung wieder online gestellt worden, erklärte der DSGV. “Dadurch konnte der Angriffsversuch schnell unterbunden werden.”

TMZ – Porn Star Alexis Texas: No Black Guys for Me, Please!

 

TMZ – Porn Star Alexis Texas: No Black Guys for Me, Please!

Alexis Texas, one of the most famous porn stars in the world, takes issue against bangin’ black dudes! Is this horribly racist — or just part of her BRILLIANT master plan?

Unveiled by PI – New York Fusion Center Threat Assessment: Major Terror Attacks Against Hotels

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NYSIC-HotelAttacks.png

New York State Intelligence Center Threat Assessment: Major Terror Attacks against Hotels, 2002-2011

  • 12 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • March 29, 2012

Download

This product analyzes major terror attacks on hotels and provides a strategic-level assessment of the groups, tactics, and frequency of global terror attacks against hotels from 2002 – 2011. Additionally, the product identifies the deadliest types of attacks, comparing casualty counts and attack methods. The product was derived from media reporting and unclassified, for official use only sources.

Key Assumptions

Radical Islamic groups, including al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda linked groups continue to plan attacks against the West, including the United States (US). These groups view civilians as potential targets and will continue to use a variety of attack methods. Lack of information pertaining to a certain category in this report does not necessarily represent the absence of a threat. However, the frequency and tactic of attack analyzed in this report may indicate the most common vulnerabilities to an attack on the hotel sector.

Executive Summary

Since 2002 there have been 18 major terrorist attacks against hotels worldwide; a major attack is defined as an attack resulting in at least 10 casualties. During this time period there were no attacks against US homeland-based hotels. Groups with a connection to al-Qaeda carried out all but one of these major attacks.

  • An attack on a hotel within New York State or the US would most likely follow the current predominant worldwide trend and utilize explosives or small arms.
    • Major attacks against hotels were primarily carried out using a military grade explosive; however, an explosive device constructed within the US would most likely use homemade explosives, such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP).
    • The use of small arms to attack a US-based hotel may be seen as a more viable option than trying to assemble a homemade explosive. Al Qaeda and their affiliates have encouraged Western-based radicals to use small arms to carry out attacks because of their ease of use and availability in comparison to building an explosive device.
  • The likelihood of an al-Qaeda-inspired lone actor successfully attacking a hotel is low. However, lone actors in the US have shown an interest in targeting hotels previously. For example, Farooque Ahmed, arrested in April 2010, conducted pre-operational surveillance at a Washington, D.C. area hotel.
  • A key leader or high-profile event/mass casualty opportunity was targeted in nearly 50% of the attacks, and represents a possible motivating factor for targeting.
  • The most common tactic used against hotels is a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), accounting for 43% of the attacks analyzed in this report.

Unveiled – TEPCO Handouts on Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Handouts at Press Conferences

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/index-e.html

Samples:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130204_01-e.pdf

[Image]

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130206_01-e.pdf

[Image]

 


TOP-SECRET – Moynihan Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy Report

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/MoynihanReportGovernmentSecrecy.png

 

 

 

Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy

  • Senate Document 105-2
  • 275 pages
  • December 31, 1997

Download

It is time for a new way of thinking about secrecy.

Secrecy is a form of government regulation. Americans are familiar with the tendency to overregulate in other areas. What is different with secrecy is that the public cannot know the extent or the content of the regulation.

Excessive secrecy has significant consequences for the national interest when, as a result, policymakers are not fully informed, government is not held accountable for its actions, and the public cannot engage in informed debate. This remains a dangerous world; some secrecy is vital to save lives, bring miscreants to justice, protect national security, and engage in effective diplomacy. Yet as Justice Potter Stewart noted in his opinion in the Pentagon Papers case, when everything is secret, nothing is secret. Even as billions of dollars are spent each year on government secrecy, the classification and personnel security systems have not always succeeded at their core task of protecting those secrets most critical to the national security. The classification system, for example, is used too often to deny the public an understanding of the policymaking process, rather than for the necessary protection of intelligence activities and other highly sensitive matters.

The classification and personnel security systems are no longer trusted by many inside and outside the Government. It is now almost routine for American officials of unquestioned loyalty to reveal classified information as part of ongoing policy disputes—with one camp “leaking” information in support of a particular view, or to the detriment of another—or in support of settled administration policy. In the process, this degrades public service by giving a huge advantage to the least scrupulous players.

The best way to ensure that secrecy is respected, and that the most important secrets remain secret, is for secrecy to be returned to its limited but necessary role. Secrets can be protected more effectively if secrecy is reduced overall.

Benefits can flow from moving information that no longer needs protection out of the classification system and, in appropriate cases, from not classifying at all. We live in an information-rich society, one in which more than ever before open sources—rather than covert means of collection—can provide the information necessary to permit well-informed decisions. Too often, our secrecy system proceeds as if this information revolution has not happened, imposing costs by compartmentalizing information and limiting access.

Greater openness permits more public understanding of the Government’s actions and also makes it more possible for the Government to respond to criticism and justify those actions. It makes free exchange of scientific information possible and encourages discoveries that foster economic growth. In addition, by allowing for a fuller understanding of the past, it provides opportunities to learn lessons from what has gone before—making it easier to resolve issues concerning the Government’s past actions and helping prepare for the future.

This does not mean that we believe the public should be privy to all government information. Certain types of information—for example, the identity of sources whose exposure would jeopardize human life, signals or imagery intelligence the loss of which would profoundly hinder the capability to collect critical data, or information that could aid terrorists—must be assiduously protected. There must be zero tolerance for permitting such information to be released through unauthorized means, including through deliberate or inadvertent leaks. But when the business of government requires secrecy, it should be employed in a manner that takes risks into account and attempts to control costs.

It is time to reexamine the long-standing tension between secrecy and openness, and develop a new way of thinking about government secrecy as we move into the next century. It is to that end that we direct our recommendations.

Ours is the first analysis authorized by statute of the workings of secrecy in the United States Government in 40 years, and only the second ever. We started our work with the knowledge that many commissions and reports on government secrecy have preceded us, with little impact on the problems we still see and on the new ones we have found.

In undertaking our mission to look at government secrecy, we have observed when the secrecy system works well, and when it does not. We have looked at the consequences of the lack of adequate protection. We have sought to diagnose the current system, and to identify what works and ways the system can work better. Above all, we have sought to understand how best to achieve both better protection and greater openness.

That the secrecy system that evolved and grew over the course of the 20th century would remain essentially unchanged and unexamined by the public was predictable. It is to be expected of a regulatory system essentially hidden from view. Some two million Federal officials, civil and military, and another one million persons in industry, have the ability to classify information. Categories of administrative markings also have proliferated over time, and the secrecy system has become ever more complex. The system will perpetuate itself absent outside intervention, and in doing so maintain not only its many positive features, but also those elements that are detrimental to both our democracy and our security.

It is time for legislation. There needs to be some check on the unrestrained discretion to create secrets. There needs to be an effective mode of declassification.

To improve the functioning of the secrecy system and the implementation of established rules, we recommend a statute that sets forth the principles for what may be
declared secret.

Apart from aspects of nuclear energy subject to the Atomic Energy Act, secrets in the Federal Government are whatever anyone with a stamp decides to stamp secret. There is no statutory base and never has been; classification and declassification have been governed for nearly five decades by a series of executive orders, but none has created a stable and reliable system that ensures we protect well what needs protecting but nothing more. What has been consistently lacking is the discipline of a legal framework to clearly define and enforce the proper uses of secrecy. Such a system inevitably degrades.

We therefore propose the following as the framework for a statute that establishes the principles on which classification and declassification should be based:

Sec. 1 Information shall be classified only if there is a demonstrable need to protect the information in the interests of national security, with the goal of ensuring that classification is kept to an absolute minimum consistent with these interests.

Sec. 2 The President shall, as needed, establish procedures and structures for classification of information. Procedures and structures shall be established and resources allocated for declassification as a parallel program to classification. Details of these programs and any revisions to them shall be published in the Federal Register and subject to notice and comment procedures.

Sec. 3 In establishing the standards and categories to apply in determining whether information should be or remain classified, such standards and categories shall include consideration of the benefit from public disclosure of the information and weigh it against the need for initial or continued protection under the classification system. If there is significant doubt whether information requires protection, it shall not be classified.

Sec. 4 Information shall remain classified for no longer than ten years, unless the agency specifically recertifies that the particular information requires continued protection based on current risk assessments. All information shall be declassified after 30 years, unless it is shown that demonstrable harm to an individual or to ongoing government activities will result from release. Systematic declassification schedules shall be established. Agencies shall submit annual reports on their classification and declassification programs to the Congress.

Sec. 5 This statute shall not be construed as authority to withhold information from the Congress.

Sec. 6 There shall be established a National Declassification Center to coordinate, implement, and oversee the declassification policies and practices of the Federal Government. The Center shall report annually to the Congress and the President on its activities and on the status of declassification practices by all Federal agencies that use, hold, or create classified information.

Unveiled by Cryptome – Saudi Arabian Drone Base Under Construction

UM ALMALH AIRPORT

Cost of more than 86 million ..

To approve the creation of airport or salt to guard the southern border of the Empty Quarter

[Image]

Design proposal for the airport or salt to guard the southern border of the Empty Quarter.

Issued approval of the High Commissioner on an airport or salt to guard the southern border of the Empty Quarter near from [Asha] province at a total cost estimated at 86.318.104 million riyals and this covers airports, border guards full limits of the Empty Quarter to serve the citizens living in those remote areas.

This was stated by Director General of Border Guard, Maj. Gen. / Zmim bin Joiber whipper noting that it comes within the framework of the keenness and rulers may Allah to provide all that would serve the people of the nation and overcome difficulties and said that the issuance of this approval Commissioner to an airport or salt in the south of the Empty Quarter near from [Asha] province aims to provide support and transport, surveillance and medical evacuation in addition to the service of the citizens living in those remote areas.

And between General Zmim whipper that because of the difficulty of terrain Empty Quarter desert and what it represents challenges to the work of border guards, the State has guard God in an earlier period represented by the Ministry of Interior established a number four airports to border guards in the Empty Quarter, namely, (Batha – Shebeita – Ardh – Zabhloten) [see bases] so as to facilitate work transport and logistical support and evacuation centers for border guards.

Major General Sawat: airport offers support and medical evacuation of citizens living in remote areas

Whipper stressed that this project is one of the main pillars in the development of system and border guards supported by the Second Deputy Prime Minister and the Deputy Minister of the Interior and the direct supervision by HRH assistant interior minister for security affairs God keeps them all.

On the other hand, Director of Border Guard Aviation Affairs Brigadier Pilot / Khalid bin Abdullah Alersahan that the Department of Border Guard Aviation has prepared specifications required the assistance of local specialized consultancy offices and external to ensure matching international standards and safety requirements used in the establishment of international airports.

[Image]

Aerial photography of the airport. [The complex shown without the fabric hangars which would be at top center.]

The Brigadier Alersahan that the airport, which was awarded the total amount of (86.318.104) million includes a runway length of 3 km and a width of 60 meters capable of accommodating various types of civilian and military aircraft of different sizes including the aircraft Boeing 747 in addition to the parking planes were designed to accommodate up to four planes of the same size, the project also includes support services and communications system and advanced navigational devices and approved by international aviation authorities to ensure aviation safety and to the highest international standards and that would qualify the airport for use in various weather conditions.

It is worth mentioning that the border guards occurred several months before the contract with the CEO of Flight School at the University of North Dakota, United States of America to train 30 pilots of the employees of border guards within the strategy of the Ministry of Interior to develop security capabilities and strengthen the infrastructure of the security services.

[Owen Boswarva notes that the University of North Dakota has a drone pilot training program.]

_____

9 February 2013. This base appears to be a Saudi Arabian border guard facility located at Umm Al Melh. It may also serve as a CIA drone base but no evidence has been found for that use. Owen Boswarva discovered the metadata of the Wired Bing image of the site, below, giving the date of February 17, 2012, several months after the drone killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.

Entering the coordinates of the Bing image discovered by Wire, 19.102438,50.120902, in Google Maps produces:

[Image]

A Google search on Umm Al Melh produces several items about the facility contractor and staff (not excluding the possibility the work was contracted through Blackwater/Xe/Academia — the initial date of the contract is close to the reports of when Blackwater was engaged to build a drone base):

http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c0/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A-ewIE8TIwN_
D38LA09vV7NQP8cQQ_dgE_3g1Dz9gmxHRQDvjvPB/?x=1&ANNOUNCEMENT_NO=22694

Abdullah A. M. Al-Khodari Sons Company announces the signing of a contract with the Ministry of Interior (Border Guard)

2011-09-20 (1432-10-22 ) 08:26:54

With reference to the earlier announcement of 06/09/1432H corresponding to 06/08/2011G, Abdullah A. M. Al-Khodari Sons Company announces the completion of the signing of a contract with the Ministry of Interior (Border Guard) for the construction of the second phase of Border Guard Airport in Umm Almelh (South of the Kingdom Empty Quarter) within a period of 720 days from the date of contract signing on 23/08/2011. The contract is valued at SAR 120,665,267 as per the contract copy which was received by the company on 19/09/2011. The financial impact of this project is expected to be in the fourth quarter of the current financial year. [This suggests the airport is to be completed by August 2013.]

[Image]

[Image]

 


8 February 2013

 


Wired’s discovery of a drone base in Saudi Arabia is exemplary spotting.

No date for the facility has been provided, although there are reports construction was authorized in 2010 and the construction contract given to Blackwater/Xe/Academia.

Add 9 February 2013:

Owen Boswarva discovered the metadata of the Wired Bing image of the site, below, giving the date of February 17, 2012, several months after the drone killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.

Close examination of the base shows that it is under construction and far from ready for drone flights.

If it was used to launch the drone that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011 that means the photos show it well before that time.

It might be estimated that the stage of construction shown could be about 6-8 months after start, and about that amount of time to completion.

[Image]

The main runway is being cast in concrete flags, square in shape, probably atop compacted gravel, and is far from complete. Checkboard casting patterns are conventional: Cast the first flag in steel formwork, after the concrete sets remove the formwork, then cast concrete flags in the the voids created. Leave gaps for expansion joint segments.

[Image]

[Image]

[Image]

[Image]

[Image]

[Image]

A concrete mixing plant is some distance away.

[Image]

A secondary dirt runway has piles of material on it, thus not usable.

[Image]

In front of the clamshell structures which will house the drones there is amply packed construction trailers, sheds and materials where drones will be readied for flight. There appears to be security fencing and/or bollards around this area (the only on the whole site) which may indicate need for protection of sensitive apparatus and personnel. Close-by construction trailers here are separated from those for the rest of the facility, some located within the security fencing, others not.

[Image]

[Image]

Ribs of a fabric structure lie flat before erection.

[Image]

Foundation excavated for a future structure adjoining the apron.

[Image]

The construction workers camp, with little or no security surrounding it. Two sewage pits. Circular driving track is peculiar, perhaps to train truck drivers for the many open-top tractor-trailers shown. Many trucks were needed to haul in materials over 240 miles from the nearest main Saudi town.

[Image]

Foundation excavations for flight lines or support structures.

[Image]

[Image]

 


 

 


 

TMZ – Beyonce’s ‘Life Is But a Dream’ — Is She WORSE than Gwyneth Paltrow?

 

TMZ – Beyonce’s ‘Life Is But a Dream’ — Is She WORSE than Gwyneth Paltrow?

Beyonce has been leading a rather highfalutin lifestyle as of late… but has she become more hoighty-toighty than Gwyneth Paltrow? One man dared to ask the question…

PI – New Jersey Fusion Center School Shootings Commonalities Analysis

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NJROIC-SchoolShootings.png

 

New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center School Shootings Commonalities

  • 5 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 15, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) This report attempts to analyze the indicators and commonalities of recent school shootings in an effort to inform public safety officials and assist in the detection and prevention of potential school shooter plots or attacks. All incidents included in this assessment occurred in the United States while classes were in session. Domestic violence shootings and gang violence were not included in an effort to differentiate between “active shooter” incidents and other acts of violence. DHS defines an “active shooter” as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.

(U//FOUO) Recently several school shooting plots and attacks have occurred throughout the United States, which has resulted in the deaths and injuries of their victims. These incidents included:

  • January 2011 (Utah) – Law enforcement officers arrested two teenagers after discovering that they planned to bomb their high school. The two suspects had blueprints of the school and planned to escape after their attack by stealing a plane at a nearby airport.
  • February 2011 (Ohio) – A student killed three classmates and injured two others at a high school when he opened fire in the cafeteria.
  • April 2012 (California) – A school shooting left seven people dead and three others wounded when a nursing student opened fire at a small Christian college.
  • October 2012 (Maryland) – A 15-year old high school student shot and critically injured a classmate on the first day of school.

(U//FOUO) One or more plots or shootings have occurred in each of the last 10 years in the United States, resulting in the deaths of students and school administrators. These attacks have occurred at all types of schools, including elementary, high school, college, and other educational institutions. In every instance of a school shooting attack in the United States during this period, the attacker has used small arms or homemade explosives.

Use of Social Media

(U//FOUO) In the past several years, the majority of students who have conducted plots or attacks against their schools have publicized their anger or intentions through the use of social media. Not every instance of expression of anger will necessarily result in violence, but when school shootings have occurred, the perpetrators have often previously expressed a fixation with death or inflicting pain on others.

(U//FOUO) While students have used social media to express their anger and intentions to attack their schools, this type of action is neither new nor limited to online activity. Even without the use of online media, students have expressed their frustration and intentions through other outlets by using handwritten journals, notes, and drawings. These documents can indicate pre-operational planning, as illustrated in the 1999 Columbine shooting. Diary entries of the Columbine shooters, released in 2006, not only contained their anger but also reminders to fill ammunition clips and acquire bomb-making materials, including nails, propane, and fuses.

(U//FOUO) Recent examples of students publicizing their intentions to plot or attack their schools include the following:

January 2011 (Nebraska) – A high school student who shot one administrator and killed another posted ominous messages on his Facebook page that read., “You’re gonna hear about the evil [expletive] I did but that [expletive] school drove me to this. I want you guys to remember me for who I was before this. I greatly affected the lives of the families ruined but I’m sorry. Goodbye.”  These attacks occurred despite the existence of these postings because friends or family were unaware of these writings until law enforcement investigated the shootings and searched the students’ computers.

February 2012 (Ohio) – Authorities discovered several Facebook postings by a high school student attending Chardon High School after he killed three classmates. One of his Facebook postings read, “He longed for only one thing, the world to bow at his feet,” and ended ominously, “Die, all of you.”

In 2012 law enforcement officers arrested several students after they posted threatening language online. In one instance, in January 2012, two students were arrested for planning to bomb their school after one of them shared their plans with another student, who then informed school officials. When questioned by law enforcement, one of the students stated that not only was the 1999 Columbine High School shooting their inspiration, but also that they hoped to surpass its death toll. This instance and several others in which a concerned student or parent informed the local police department, preventing the attack, demonstrate the importance of reporting suspicious activities.

(U//FOUO) While social media has provided students with a venue to post their anger and intent, the Internet can also provide them with access to violent web sites. Violent online material has the potential to influence an already emotionally troubled student producing sometimes negative and deadly consequences. In 2005 a 16-year old, who posed messages on a neo-Nazi website calling himself the Angel of Death, killed nine people and wounded seven before committing suicide. Some online material can also provide instructions on weapons use and bomb construction.

Who are the shooters?

(U//FOUO) In the last 10 years, male students have been responsible for the majority of school shootings nationwide. Students who perpetrated attacks were also more likely to know their intended targets rather than to attack their victims randomly. When students targeted an administrator, they believed that either the school failed to protect them from bullies, or the student felt school officials unfairly reprimanded them.

(U//FOUO) The remaining attackers were outsiders with no relationship to the school or school employees who attacked their supervisors because of employment disputes. One instance of a school employee attacking a school occurred in March 2012, when hours after a teacher was fired, he returned to school and shot dead a school administrator prior to committing suicide. Outsider shooters with no relation to the school, on the other hand, are more likely to attack their victims randomly because these attackers had no discernible association with the school and had no grievances with any potential victims.

(U//FOUO) In 2006, two separate outsider attackers shared similar tactics, one at Platte Canyon High School in Colorado in September, and another at an Amish school at Nickel Mines, PA, in October. In both incidents, the gunmen attacked the schools, took several female students hostage, and killed one or more students, before taking their own lives moments before law enforcement officers broke into the classrooms. The threat from outside attackers is not, however, limited to a gunman entering a school. Shooters have also targeted students by waiting outside the school or near the perimeter during recess or at dismissal.

Cryptome unveils Homeland Security TSWG Controlled Items

Homeland Security TSWG Controlled Items

Links go to the GPO bookstore.

 


http://newbookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/homeland-security-
tswg-controlled-items?sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC&items_per_page=60

Homeland Security TSWG Controlled Items

Combined CBTool/PCW Building Protection Design Tool (TSWG Controlled Item) (CD-ROM)

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Workinfg Group and United Technologies Research CenterGPO Stock # 008-001-00213-1 ISBN: 9780160888649

This is a controlled item. To order, please send an e-mail request to the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) at PUBS@TSWG.GOV and provide the publication title, quantity, contact and organization name, mailing address and phone number. Security contractors must provide the name of the sponsoring Government agency and its contact information. TSWG will approve your order via e-mail and furnish an approval number. You may then place your order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $32.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00203-3 ISBN: 9780160856655

Book says “Dari” on the back cover. This document is not for public use, but for military, Federal, State, and local agencies as a reference for training and operations in preparing for and responding to a terrorist threat. Publication is general and may not reflect the most recent threats. Issued with spiral binding. sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00205-0 ISBN: 9780160856679

Contains images and Urdu-language text describing the indicators and warnings pertaining to homemade explosives. This booklet provides a quick reference to establish an awareness level so that responders can visually recognize the materials, chemicals, and equipment associated with the manufacture of homemade explosives. The Guide will help all on-scene personnel visually assess the possibility that a situation involves the manufacture of homemade explosives. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00201-7 ISBN: 9780160854330

This document is not for public use, but for military, Federal, State, and local agencies as a reference for training and operations by emergency personnel in preparing for and responding to a terrorist incident. Information in this publication is general and may not reflect the most recent threats.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00202-5 ISBN: 9780160856648

Contains images and Farsi-language text describing the indicators and warnings pertaining to homemade explosives. This booklet provides a quick reference to establish an awareness level so that responders can visually recognize the materials, chemicals, and equipment associated with the manufacture of homemade explosives. The guide will help all on-scene personnel visually assess the possibility that a situation involves the manufacture of homemade explosives. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept.GPO Stock # 008-001-00204-1 ISBN: 9780160856662

Contains images and Pashto-language text describing the indicators and warnings pertaining to homemade explosives. This booklet provides a quick reference to establish an awareness level so that responders can visually recognize the materials, chemicals, and equipment associated with the manufacture of homemade explosives. The Guide will help all on-scene personnel visually assess the possibility that a situation involves the manufacture of homemade explosives. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $75.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00187-8 ISBN: 9780160799297

The Explosive Breaching Characterization Handbook is a technical reference guide for use during explosive breaching training and operations. The Handbook includes information on Target Intelligence, Explosive Breaching Safety, Breaching Charge construction, and other technical data. The guide is for use by civilian law enforcement operators who have been professionally trained in explosive breaching. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral bound, and suitable for operational use in the field.

Price: $57.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00186-0 ISBN: 9780160796821

Prepared in cooperation with St. Petersburg College, National Terrorism Preparedness Institute. Helps train personnel who may be involved with the inspection of merchant vessels to determine various indicators of suspect hidden Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on a range of vessel types. The MVIG Training Support Package binder contains the 520-page instructor manual, a CD-ROM containing all course materials, and a DVD containing the classroom support materials. On cover: “Security Warning: For Official Use Only. Law Enforcement Sensitive.”

Price: $242.00

By: Defense Dept., Technial Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00176-2 ISBN: 0-16-075921-8

The MVIG is a 188-page guide for determining various indicators of suspect hidden Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on a range of vessel types, recognition of typical representative IED types, and has a training section for recognition of explosives and IED types, HAZMAT markings and WMD devices. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral-bound, and suitable for operational use in the maritime environment. Prepared especially for police and fire departments. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $76.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00175-4 ISBN:

The SSEG provides professionals across the Department of Defense conducting SSE missions with a ready reference and operational guideline for SSE operations in the presence of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) materials. This guidebook serves as a job aid in the pre-incident, incident, and post-incident management of SSE reconnaissance and mitigation. The 94-page SSEG contains elements related to force protection, SSE planning, execution and operations, as well as decontamination procedures, U.S., International, and United Nations (UN) Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) labels, service component information, reference list, and website links. Sold in packages of 10 copies only.

Price: $97.50

By: Defense Dept., TSWGGPO Stock # 008-001-00157-6 ISBN:

This is a controlled item. To order, please send an e-mail request to the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) at PUBS@TSWG.GOV and provide the publication title, quantity, contact and organization name, mailing address and phone number. Security contractors must provide the name of the sponsoring Government agency and its contact information. TSWG will approve your order via e-mail and furnish an approval number. You may then place your order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $145.00

By: Defense Dept., Army, Corps of Engineers and Interagency Technical Support Working CroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00158-4 ISBN: 0-16-051074-0

WINDAS is a database query program for the existing data on glass response to blast loads. In addition, WINDAS contains a graphical British Hazard Guide calculator for predicting window debris hazard levels to personnel from blast events. HAZL is a robust model for calculating window response and personnel hazard. It uses a Single Degree of Freedom model for window response up to failure and a debris transport model for predicting fragment trajectory. WINDAS and HAZL are available on one CD-ROM.

Price: $21.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, Combating Terrorism Technology Support OfficeGPO Stock # 008-001-00159-2 ISBN: 0-16-051073-2

The SWIG is a guide for determining various indicators of suspect hidden Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on a range of vessel types, recognition of typical representative IED types, and has a training section for recognition of explosives and IED types. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral-bound, and suitable for field use.

Price: $9.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00161-4 ISBN:

CMUDS was developed for use by civil engineers and architects in the design of buildings and structures to better withstand terrorist bomb blasts. CMUDS is provided on a CD-ROM and supports the rapid search and retrieval of charge, applied load, damage level, and deflection data applicable to CMU structures. The user specifies the search conditions used to obtain the database records. Retrieved records may contain drawings, photographs, plots, as well as tabulated text and numeric information, all of which can be displayed in the various windows of the CMUDS graphical user interface (GUI).

Price: $21.00

By: Defense Dept., TSWGGPO Stock # 008-001-00162-2 ISBN:

This is a controlled item. To order, please send an e-mail request to the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) at PUBS@TSWG.GOV and provide the publication title, quantity, contact and organization name, mailing address and phone number. Security contractors must provide the name of the sponsoring Government agency and its contact information. TSWG will approve your order via e-mail and furnish an approval number. You may then place your order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $123.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)GPO Stock # 008-001-00164-9 ISBN: 0-16-068073-5

This guide presents ready reference material associated with planning and executing programs and operations for protecting personnel and assets against the threat of vehicle bombs. The 143-page guide is available in a waterproof flip chart format, and contains information on the threat, trends and forecast, explosives detection methods, blast and fragment mitigation methods and key points for incident commanders. The approach is to provide best practices for conducting vehicle searches and using blast and fragment mitigation devices. Was sold in packages of 10 copies only.

Price: $178.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, Combating Terrorism Technology Support OfficeGPO Stock # 008-001-00165-7 ISBN: 0-16-073076-7

The SWIG TSP consists of a three-ring binder containing printed instructor guidance, a student manual, and PowerPoint slides for instructional use.. Included with the shrink- wrapped binder are two VHS Video Tapes, one containing Train the Trainer Video, and the other containing classroom support video clips and the final exam. Also included in the package is a CD-ROM with Train the Trainer Video clips and the printable documentation, PowerPoint presentations, and Classroom Video Clips.

Price: $105.00

 

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00167-3 ISBN: 0-16-072457-0

A CD-ROM version of the printed Railcar Inspection Guide (RIG) available for Windows-based computers. Provides guidelines to assess and screen railcars for improvised explosive devices, weapons of mass destruction, and other contraband. Provides a standardized railcar inspection process with an illustrated walk-through. Highlights important design features that affect the car’s use as a large bomb, provides indications of the typical uses, and states conditions that may indicate an enhanced threat.

Price: $23.00

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00169-0 ISBN: 0-16-073200-X

Provides guidelines to assess and screen railcars for improvised explosive devices, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and other contraband. The RIG provides a standardized railcar inspection process with an illustrated walk-through. This field guide highlights important design features that affect the car’s use as a large bomb, provides indications of the typical uses, and states conditions that may indicate an enhanced threat. Sold in packages of 10 copies only.

Price: $181.50

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00170-3 ISBN: 0-16-073201-8

Spiral bound. provides guidelines to security personnel assigned the responsibility of assessing and screening personnel for concealed/improvised weapons, explosive devices, and other contraband. The information is meant to be applied in conjunction with previous training, experience, and standard procedures and policies. The guide has a training section for recognition of improvised and commercial weapon types; specialty firearms and handguns; explosive materials and devices; and WMD materials and devices. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral-bound, and suitable for field use. Sold in packages of 10 copies only.

Price: $268.00

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00171-1 ISBN: 0-16-073225-5

Consists of a three-ring binder containing printed instructor guidance, a student manual, and PowerPoint slides for instructional use. Included with the shrink-wrapped binder are two VHS video tapes; one containing a Train-the-Trainer video, and the other containing classroom support video clip scenarios. Also included in the package are three CD-ROMs and one DVD containing, in a digitized format, all information in the manuals, PowerPoint slides, and video clips.

Price: $128.00

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00172-0 ISBN: 0-16-073237-9

Looseleaf. The RIG TSP consists of a three-ring binder containing printed instructor guidance, a student manual, and PowerPoint slides for instructional use. Included with the shrink-wrapped binder are two VHS video tapes; one containing a Train-the-Trainer video, and the other containing classroom support video clip scenarios. Also included in the package is a CD-ROM containing, in a digitized format, all information in the manuals, PowerPoint slides, and videoclips.

Price: $93.50

By: Defense Dept. and the National Terrorism Preparedness InstituteGPO Stock # 008-001-00173-8 ISBN: 0-16-073238-7

Looseleaf. The PSG TSP consists of a three-ring binder containing printed instructor guidance, a student manual, and PowerPoint slides for instructional use. Included with the shrink-wrapped binder are two VHS video tapes; one containing a Train-the-Trainer video, and the other containing classroom support video clip scenarios. Also included in the package is a CD-ROM containing, in a digitized format, all information in the manuals, PowerPoint slides, and video clips.

Price: $81.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00174-6 ISBN: 0-16-075653-7

The RFWG, also known as the Security Procedures and Protocols for Mitigating Radio Frequency Threats, is for use by Government agencies and Industry dealing with protection of infrastructure facilities against RFW threats. This includes government facilities, electric power generation facilities, petroleum industry, communication networks, transportation industry, and banking systems. The RFWG is a 128-page field guide that includes guidelines, definitions of the RFW threat; identification of threat devices and how they are employed; defensive tactics, techniques, and procedures; establishing controlled areas, and how to respond to an RFW attack.

Price: $55.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00178-9 ISBN:

The BPG Bridges is a 74-page guide that focuses on identifying vulnerabilities of different bridge types. The BPG Bridges is printed on waterproof paper, spiral-bound, and suitable for operational use in the maritime environment.

Price: $39.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, Investigative Support and Forensics SubgroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00179-7 ISBN: 9780160778728

The DCCTV Guide includes best practices, guidelines, and recommendations intended to provide personnel responsible for the collection of DCCTV evidence guidance in securing and collecting video data to maintain its integrity. Topics include native/proprietary file format, retrieval methods, media, legal concerns, and more. The 80-page DCCTV guide is printed on waterproof paper sized (4.5×6″) to fit into a pocket for field use.

Price: $34.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00180-1 ISBN:

A spiral-bound, pocket-sized (4.5″ x 7″), booklet printed on waterproof paper. Its purpose is to provide quick reference information about general indicators and warnings, production setups, and end products that are representative of plausible improvised chemical and biological agent production methods found in openly available literature. The handbook contains mock-up photographs and diagrams to assist security and response personnel in recognizing the telltale signs of improvised chemical or biological agent production, including the crude reagents and equipment used. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $13.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00181-9 ISBN:

The ISCS TSP is an eight hour course that combines WMD threat identification and current policies and regulations regarding inter-modal containers and security. This TSP is for training law enforcement and security personnel to an awareness level on the subject of Intermodal Supply Chain Security by utilizing an instructor and student manual, as well as PowerPoint presentations and video. The ISCS TSP is contained in a three-inch, three-ring binder, and includes 300 pages of Instructor Manual and Student Manuals and two CD-ROMs containing a Train-the-Trainer Video, PowerPoint Presentations and Classroom Videos.

Price: $215.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00182-7 ISBN:

Three-inch, three-ring binder, consisting of an instructor and student manuals, CD-ROM (s) with PowerPoint presentations and manuals, and classroom videos (DVD and VHS). The IED Awareness for First Responders TSP is a complete training package to train state and local Law Enforcement and Security Personnel to an awareness level on the subject of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The TSP focuses on information pertaining to current IED threats and countermeasures to train emergency responders to recognize IEDs, IED components, potential targets, and methods employed by terrorists using IEDs.

Price: $151.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00183-5 ISBN:

The SHBG is a 5″ X 7″ pocket guide providing performance and best practices focused on operational lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for Law Enforcement and Security Personnel on the subject of Preparation for the Suicide/Homicide Bomber. The guide book, based on the content of the related Preparation for the Suicide/Homicide Bomber Training Support Package (TSP) is a reference for reviewing the training provided in the TSP. The guide is a succinct, compact, handy reference guide produced in an accessible and durable form. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $131.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00184-3 ISBN:

The VIG is a 5X7″ spiral bound 184 page booklet printed on waterproof paper. It is intended for determining various indicators of suspect hidden Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on a range of vehicle types, recognition of typical representative IED types, and has a training section for recognition of explosives and IED types. It is printed on waterproof paper, spiral bound, and suitable for field use. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $117.50

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00185-1 ISBN: 9780160795329

Designed as a quick reference guide for military, first responders, Federal, State, and local government personnel. The goal of this guidebook is to provide awareness level information that will allow on-scene personnel to rapidly assess that a situation involves the presence of homemade explosives. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $85.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00188-6 ISBN: 9780160800849

The SEEC Guide is a field guide for use by military and other Federal agencies for overseas evidence collection purposes. This guide provides best practices for conducting a systematic search of a secure location to enable the collection of evidence and information that can be used in the prosecution and conviction of detainees, as well as the development of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence information.

Price: $38.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00190-8 ISBN: 9780160800863

The SEEC TSP is a is a three-ring binder that contains a 392-page instructor manual, a CSI-style introduction to Evidence Collection DVD, and a CD-ROM containing all course materials and printable student materials to be used in classroom instruction principally for military personnel on evidence collection procedures and methodology during site exploitation (SE) operations.

Price: $210.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00191-6 ISBN: 9780160802713

For use by all emergency responders and military personnel confronting the need to decontaminate large groups of people affected by chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) events. Includes pre-incident response procedures for CBR Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incidents. The MPDTSP is a 288 page publication within a 3 ring binder containing an Instructor Guide, Instructor CD containing PowerPoint instructional slides, video files, and Student Guide. Also included are a Train-the-Trainer video and Classroom Support DVDs.

Price: $185.00

By: Defense Dept., Technial Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00192-4 ISBN: 9780160806421

Instructor manual for use in training Federal, State and local responders and law enforcement personnel, who are be involved with inspection of vehicles that may pose a terrorist threat. Covers topics such as Inspection Fundamentals, Interviewing, Passenger Vehicle Inspections, Commercial Vehicle Inspections, and also contains a glossary and student assessment. A COPY OF THE CONFIRMATION E-MAIL AND APPROVAL NUMBER. Issued in spiral binding. Prepared especially for police and fire departments. For Official Use Only. Law Enforcement Sensistive.

Price: $150.00

 

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00193-2 ISBN: 9780160806735

Guide for tunnel owners and operators, which identifies potential threats to tunnels. The best practices guide includes information on: tunnel configurations, tunnel threats and vulnerabilities, and how to assess the need for security upgrades via a risk assessment, and techniques for mitigating potential threats. Prepared in cooperation with St. Petersburg College, National Terrorism Preparedness Institute.

Price: $36.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00194-1 ISBN:

A complete package of training course materials designed for use in promoting understanding and positive interactions between Americans and Indonesians during in-country military operations. Covers definition and comparison of culture, government, economy, major and minor religions, people, social constructs, and language.

Price: $234.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00198-3 ISBN:

Intended to provide first responders from Federal, State and Local government services’ organizations with guidelines for evacuating civilian personnel from potential bomb threats. The booklet can also be used by emergency planners to develop personnel evacuation plans from specific buildings, sites, or facilities based on various bomb threat levels.

Price: $8.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working Group, Combating Terrorism Technology Support OfficeGPO Stock # 008-001-00199-1 ISBN: 9780160841903

Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) databases that catalogue critical infrastructures have been developed over the years by public utility/safety commissions, private corporations, and others. These COTS databases were identified and assessed for potential use with a Geographical Information System. Results of these assessments, including public safety assets, such as fire and police departments; public and private water systems; transportation systems; oil and gas distribution; electrical power grid; telecommunications facilities; and others, have been compiled into a Critical Infrastructure Database (CIDB). The database facilitates Internet access to ensure that databases are the most current.

Price: $9.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00200-9 ISBN: 9780160846090

Contains guidance on Armored Passenger Vehicle (APV) budget and procurement requirements, quality assurance/quality control procedures, vehicle classification specifications, general threat information, inventory control methods, driver training, vehicle maintenance, vehicle replacement, life cycle issues, ballistic and blast protection guidelines and testing protocols, and automotive performance guidelines and testing protocols.

Price: $21.00

By: Defense Dept., Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office; and Office of the Secretary of Defense Human Social Culture Behavior Modeling ProgramGPO Stock # 008-001-00206-8 ISBN: 9780160858710

A training guide that facilitates the development of cultural sensemaking and other critical thinking skills. The guide is organized around seven vignettes describing actual intercultural interactions that have taken place within operational contexts in Afghanistan and provides a typical American as well as a typical Afghan perspective on the situation (i.e., it describes the concerns and motivations driving thinking and decision making within the situation for both sides). Prepared in cooperation with Applied Research Associates. Issued with spiral binding. Sold in packages of 5 copies only.

Price: $89.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00207-6 ISBN: 9780160864476

This guide provides the team leader with the items required for a comprehensive post-blast assessment report. It should be used when taking notes on-scene to ensure all appropriate data is recorded.

Price: $3.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00208-4 ISBN: 9780160864483

This instruction provides the knowledge necessary for EOD personnel to complete accurate and detailed exploitation and reporting of tactical post-blast incidents in accordance with the weapons intelligence lexicon. It presents tne general post-blast assessment processes and procedures required from on-scene arrival to succinct and timely reporting to higher echelons in an effort to prevent and deter future incidents. The goal is to enhance current EOD post-blast assessment classroom training within a highly accessible learning environment. For official use only.

Price: $25.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00209-2 ISBN: 9780160873751

A clear, concise, and easy-to-use Radiological Dispersion Device Recognition Guide for training and operational use by hazardous materials, explosive ordnance disposal/bomb squad, and other public safety personnel. The guidebook is focused on two high-priority sources: Cesium-137 and Iridium-192. copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $52.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00210-6 ISBN:

Intended for in the field use by personnel engaged in the collection of forensic evidence from an improvised explosive device. The card is meant to provide the user with summarized instructions for the collection, packaging and prioritization of forensic evidence.our order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $61.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00211-4 ISBN:

Intended to describe the use of the IDD Evidence Collection Card (GPO Stock Number 008-001-00210-6) to assist in the collection of forensic evidence after an IDD is rendered safe. The guide is meant to provide the user with detailed instructions as to the background, intention, use, and terminology used in the card.

Price: $7.00

By: Defense Dept., Technical Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00212-2 ISBN: 9780160887345

Includes a survey and evaluation of existing blast mitigation technology, identification and assessment of the vulnerability of the US pipeline system, and the results of a test program to verify the performance of pipeline blast mitigation technologies. “Restricted for interagency use.”

Price: $33.00

By:GPO Stock # 008-001-00215-7 ISBN:

Price: $25.00

By: Defense Dept., Technial Support Working GroupGPO Stock # 008-001-00214-9 ISBN:

This is a controlled item. To order, please send an e-mail request to the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) at PUBS@TSWG.GOV and provide the publication title, quantity, contact and organization name, mailing address and phone number. Security contractors must provide the name of the sponsoring Government agency and its contact information. TSWG will approve your order via e-mail and furnish an approval number. You may then place your order, accompanied by a copy of the confirmation e-mail and approval number, to GPO via fax. Our fax number is 202-512-2104. Thank you.

Price: $19.00


 


 

Confidential – New Jersey Fusion Center Mass Shootings Analysis

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New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center Mass Shootings Analysis

  • 9 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 28, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) The mass killing incidents this year at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin and a movie theater in Colorado garnered international attention and focused the efforts of public and private sector security officials on the prevention of and response to mass shootings in the United States. This report examines the 29 deadliest mass shootings in the past 13 years, starting with the shootings at Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999, to identify commonalities and trends. These 29 incidents include shooting incidents in which at least five people were killed.

(U//FOUO) DHS defines an “active shooter” as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. In most cases, active shooters use firearms, and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate further harm to victims. Typically, active shooter situations are over within 10 to 15 minutes.

Key Findings

  • (U//FOUO) An analysis of 29 mass shooting incidents in the United States since 1999 indicates that nearly half were workplace shootings.
  • (U//FOUO) All of the shooters but one were males between the ages of 17 and 48. All but one of the 29 incidents were conducted by single shooters.
  • (U//FOUO) Most of the active shooters took their own lives or were shot by responding police officers.
  • (U//FOUO) Only four of the shooters were current or former members of the military.
  • (U//FOUO) Semiautomatic handguns were the most commonly used type of weapon in the mass shootings.

Analysis of Mass Shootings Since 1999

(U//FOUO) The 29 mass shootings incidents since 1999 – listed in Appendix 1 – were analyzed to identify commonalities and trends. These include the following:

  • Males between the ages of 17 and 48 conducted all of the attacks but one.
  • The largest number of mass shootings – 13 of the 29 – occurred at the workplace and were conducted by either a former employee or relative of an employee.
  • All of the active shooters were single attackers, with the exception of two students who conducted the shootings at Columbine High School.
  • In most of the incidents – 20 of the 29 – the active shooters took their own lives or law enforcement was forced to shoot and kill them, thus leaving their true motives uncertain.
  • In only four of the 29 incidents were the shooters active or former members of the U.S. military.
  • Semiautomatic handguns are the weapon of choice for mass shootings.

Active Shooters: How to Respond

(U//FOUO) Following the tragedy that occurred at Virginia Tech in 2007, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released a document with recommendations on what to do in the event of an active shooter situation. The most critical recommendation is for both law enforcement and the private sector to have training and conduct drills in order to be prepared for an active shooter incident.

(U//FOUO) In many of the case studies discussed, there were indicators of potential violence. The following is a list of warning signs that an employee may exhibit in the workplace:

  • Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs.
  • Unexplained increase in absenteeism; vague physical complaints.
  • Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene.
  • Depression/withdrawal.
  • Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures.
  • Repeated violations of company policies.
  • Increased severe mood swings.
  • Noticeably unstable, emotional responses.
  • Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation.
  • Suicidal; comments about “putting things in order.”
  • Paranoid behavior or utterances (“Everybody is against me”).
  • Increasingly talks of problems at home.
  • Escalation of domestic problems into the workplace; talk of severe financial problems.
  • Talk of previous incidents of violence.
  • Empathy with individuals committing violence.
  • Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons and violent crime.

SECRET – NSA Field Generation and Over-the-Air Distribution of COMSEC Key Manual

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NAG-16F FIELD GENERATION AND OVER-THE-AIR DISTRIBUTION OF COMSEC KEY IN SUPPORT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES

  •  99 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • May 2001

Download

1. (U//FOUO) Where Are We Heading? – A major evolution in communications security (COMSEC) keying technology has begun. Under the Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) program, standards, hardware, and applications are being developed to apply state of the art automation to generate, distribute, load, control, and account for COMSEC key. The program incorporates sufficient backward compatibility to assure that both future, automated key and existing, common electronic key can be handled. EKMS hardware is being fielded, but full development of tailored tactical key generation and distribution programs may take several more years.

2. (U//FOUO) Where Are We Now? – Until EKMS Key Processors (KPs) and local management devices (LMDs) are fully implemented throughout the tactical forces, military commanders must be able to establish secure communications, without needless and/or redundant prepositioning of key or last minute key tape distribution. This document prescribes pre-EKMS techniques to satisfy that requirement, but emphasizes use of available EKMS terminals and other key variable generators (KVGs) to generate tactical key.

3. (U//FOUO) Interoperability – Effective and timely creation of secure tactical nets and circuits requires that communications planners and operators have a common base of understanding regarding applicable COMSEC procedures and equipment operating instructions. This document fulfills that requirement for Joint commands and their Service components. It also has limited applicability in multi-national operations and exercises, when the Allied participants use COMSEC equipment that is capable of over-the-air key distribution (OTAD).

NOTE: (U//FOUO) ACP-132A, Field Generation and Over-the-Air Distribution of Key in Support of Tactical Operations and Exercises, is the equivalent of NAG-16F for use by the military forces of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. U.S. tactical forces do not hold ACP-132A, because its provisions are similar to those of NAG-16F.

NOTE: (U//FOUO) NAG-22A, Over-the-Air Rekeying of Combined Tactical Nets and Circuits, is a partial equivalent of NAG-16F intended to explain over-the-air rekeying (OTAR) to Allied users of “S” nomenclatured (special purpose) COMSEC equipment. When Combined nets/circuits include terminals equipped with “S” equipment, a U.S. station equipped with “K” nomenclatured equipment must serve as the net control station (NCS). U.S. tactical forces do not hold nor need NAG-22A.

NOTE: (U//FOUO) SDIP-14, Operational Doctrine for TSEC/KW-46 Fleet Broadcast, includes doctrine for Over-The-Air Transfer (OTAT) of tactical key via the single-channel North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fleet broadcasts. U.S. Navy (USN) tactical forces having NATO missions should hold SDIP-14.

4. (U//FOUO) Implementation – The principal advantage of the key management procedures presented here is flexibility to create a continuing supply of tactical key for a variety of commonly held COMSEC equipment and to distribute it electronically to potential users. The key generation and distribution routines given are particularly suitable for support of Joint operations and exercises involving forces that do not routinely train together. However, they cannot be relied upon to contribute to joint mission accomplishment, unless required levels of user competency are maintained through incorporation into intra-Service operations and exercises.

b. (U) Purpose – This document is intended as the standard U.S. user’s manual for planning and conducting field key generation and OTAD in support of tactical activities. It is targeted primarily at Joint and Intra-Service Operations and Exercises, particularly those involving forces that do not routinely train or operate together. It also has limited application to Combined operations and exercises involving Allied forces that hold OTAR- and OTAT-capable COMSEC equipment.

1. (U) INTRODUCTION

a. (U//FOUO) Perspective – Field generation and Over-The-Air-Distribution (OTAD) of the COMSEC key needed to support tactical communications offers distinct operational advantages over dependence on centrally produced, physically distributed tape key. Communications efficiency and flexibility can be materially enhanced, if secure tactical nets and circuits are established and rekeyed with field-generated TEK that is distributed via Over-The-Air Rekeying (OTAR). Pending full implementation of the Electronic Key Management System (EKMS), operational flexibility can also be enhanced if TEK for other tactical applications is distributed via Over-the-Air Transfer (OTAT), between Data Transfer Device (DTDs), using STU-III, STU-IIIA, STU-IIB, STE, or KY-68 secured telephone circuits, KW-46 secured broadcasts, or nets/circuits secured by KG-84A/C and KIV-7/7HS equipment. Commanders who generate and electronically distribute needed key have maximum latitude to structure their communications to support mission requirements and to react quickly to fluid tactical situations and potentially serious key compromises.

b. (U) Purpose – This document is intended as the standard U.S. user’s manual for planning and conducting field key generation and OTAD in support of tactical activities. It is targeted primarily at Joint and Intra-Service Operations and Exercises, particularly those involving forces that do not routinely train or operate together. It also has limited application to Combined operations and exercises involving Allied forces that hold OTAR- and OTAT-capable COMSEC equipment.

c. (U) Definitions & Acronyms – Many of the specialized terms used in this document are defined in Annex A. Acronyms that appear in the document are also expanded in Annex A.

d. (U//FOUO) Activation – U.S. commanders at all echelons are authorized and encouraged to direct field generation and OTAD of keys needed to support tactical operations and exercises for which they are responsible.

NOTE: (U//FOUO) The procedures addressed herein are presented as routine communications practices for tactical forces, but exceptions to certain specified COMSEC procedural constraints are authorized during COMSEC emergencies, in which the only viable alternative available to the responsible commander is plain text communications. The distinction between routine communications and COMSEC emergencies must be recognized, so that the emergency easements do not become standard operating practices, when the risks they entail should not be accepted. It is also important to note that the security easements permitted by this manual apply only in tactical applications and may not be extended to fixed-facility or strategic communications.

e. (U//FOUO) Application to TRI-TAC & MSE – The TRI-TAC and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) tactical communications systems have internal procedures for generating and distributing the keys they use; the provisions of this manual do not apply to those keys. However, due to the vital function they can perform in the production of keys intended for other applications, TRI-TAC/MSE KG-83 and KGX-93/93A KVGs and the KT-83 test equipment used to certify them require special safeguards that do not apply to the other TRI-TAC/MSE COMSEC equipment. These are stated in the following subparagraphs.

(1) (U//FOUO) Using KVGs & Fill Devices – Any certified KVG having all of its tamper detection labels intact may generate 128-bit key at any classification level for any purpose, but fill devices into which KVGs load key must be safeguarded at the level of the most highly classified key they contain.

(2) (U//FOUO) Certifying KT-83s & KVGs – All KT-83s, KG-83s, and KGX-93/93As must be certified to the SECRET level at least every 24 months; none of these equipment need be certified to the TOP SECRET level. Each certification must be accomplished with a certified KT-83 and NSA-approved procedures and may be done by one qualified person who must be cleared at least SECRET. Any certified KT-83 with its tamper detection labels intact may be used to certify any other KT-83 or any KG-83 or KGX-93/93A. One result of this authorization is that any command that holds two or more KT-83s may stagger their certification dates and use one to certify the other, indefinitely. In COMSEC emergencies, responsible commanders are authorized to use KVGs with expired certifications, provided field certification is not feasible and certified replacements have been requisitioned.

(3) (U//FOUO) Storing KT-83s & KVGs – Tamper detection labels are required on all operational KVGs and KT-83s. After tamper detection labels have been applied to them, certified but uninstalled KG-83s, KGX-93/93As, and KT-83s may be stored and handled without Two-Person Integrity (TPI) controls. Installed KVGs may be stored in unmanned TRI-TAC and MSE shelters, if the following conditions are met:

(a) (U//FOUO) Physical Safeguards – Responsible commanders must ensure that adequate physical safeguards are provided for non-operational TRI-TAC/MSE shelters to minimize the risk of theft, tampering, or sabotage to all of the COMSEC equipment stored therein.

(b) (U//FOUO) Tamper Detection Labels – At the time of its last certification, NSA-furnished, coyote logo tamper detection labels must have been applied to each KT-83, KG-83, and KGX-93/93A, in accordance with NSA instructions. Certifying activities must record the serial numbers of the labels they apply to each KT-83 or KVG, so that this information may be made available to investigating elements, if tampering with a certified KVG is suspected. Recorded label serial numbers must also be compared with those removed from each KVG that is recertified at the same facility two or more consecutive times. Any unexplained serial number anomalies must be reported as COMSEC incidents.

NOTE: (U//FOUO) To increase the security of the coyote logo tamper detection labels, NSA has classified them SECRET prior to application; upon application, they are declassified. Any UNCLASSIFIED coyote logo labels on hand at using locations must be brought under SECRET protection. Pertinent questions may be referred to the NSA Protective Technologies Division at (301) 688-6816 of DSN 644-6816.

Unveiled by Cryptome – Saudi Arabia Airports and Air Bases

Wired spots a drone base:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/02/secret-drone-base-2/

Bing Maps http://binged.it/YYSsPW

Obscured on Google (2007) http://goo.gl/maps/w9RwJ

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Add Ghafah Airport.

6 February 2013

Saudi Arabia Airports and Air Bases

News reports today claim the US has established a CIA drone base in Saudi Arabia for attacks within Yemen. Previously, there have been reports of drone bases in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Oman and Yemen operating in the US Central Command area of operations.

Some reports may be accurate but more likely these reports are based on disinformation to conceal where the bases are located.

This shows Google Maps airports and air bases in Saudi Arabia. A CIA air base is not likely to be shown by Google which has a history of concealing informaton requested by governments. These locations may be useful to show where the base is not located.

Bing.com/maps, with images by Nokia, often shows sensitive sites censored by Google. However, Google often sites that are out of date or obscured by Bing. A Saudi base search on Bing is underway.

One airport below, at Alkwifriah on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, is not designated on Google maps.

The photos are geographically arranged approximately from north to south, with those in the south closest to Yemen.

 


 

Saudi Arabia Airports and Air Bases

Ghafah AirportBing http://binged.it/YH3mWD

Google (obscured) http://goo.gl/maps/FDNGa

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Guriat AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/Zj1h8

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Turaif AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/Qt9UQ

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Arar AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/4LA9V

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Al Jouf (Al-Jawf) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/HBpy7

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Tabouk (Tabuk) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/2EEIu

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Hail AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/dZll2

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Hafar Al-Batin Airport (King Khalid Military City)Google http://goo.gl/maps/EJg6B

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Qaisumah AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/sIDzC

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Prince Nayef Bin Abdulaziz Airport QassimGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/Wva67

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King Fahd International AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/uYUni

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Ras Khafji AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/NFNNO

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Ras A Mishab AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/sY3jN

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Tanajib AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/KecfI

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Abu Ali AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/OvgXR

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Jubail AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/Kqi50

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King Abdul Aziz Naval BaseGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/cPT1u

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Ras Tanura AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/FW9kw

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King Abdulaziz Air Base (Dahran International Airport)Google http://goo.gl/maps/la99G

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Abqaiq AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/5VSSG

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Al Hasa AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/0tGQp

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Al Hasa Air StripGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/bkFbE

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Al Udayliyah Air StripGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/UQfRi

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Mohammad Bin Adbulaziz International AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/aPlVn

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Yanbu AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/5gk80

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Prince Salman Bin Abdulaziz (Dawadmi) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/YHdum

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King Khalid (Khaled) International AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/ZTf2A

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Air Field Near AlkwifriahGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/qpNEh

[Image]

Ugtah Highway StripGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/d0QEN

[Image]

Riyadh Air BaseGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/wgQ9B

[Image]

KP 718 (Otherwise Unidentified)Google http://goo.gl/maps/zR6FO

[Image]

Saudi Aramco Pump Station 6 Air StripGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/c1rCm

[Image]

Al Lidem AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/k2egz

[Image]

King Abdullah Airport Gizan (Jazan)Google http://goo.gl/maps/nrywZ

[Image]

Abha International AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/zTPWt

[Image]

Wadi al Dawasir (Kumdah) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/QS7Ub

[Image]

Albaha (Al-Aqiq) AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/oUEIy

[Image]

Bisha AirportGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/W4o8B

[Image]

Nejran (Najran) Air BaseGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/wDWsl

[Image]

Sharurah Air BaseGoogle http://goo.gl/maps/7qeUo

[Image]

SECRECY NEWS – ARMY USE OF DRONES IN U.S. IS CONSTRAINED, NOT PROHIBITED

There are significant barriers to the Army's use of unmanned aerial
systems within the United States, according to a new Army manual, but they
are not prohibitive or categorical.

"Legal restrictions on the use of unmanned aircraft systems in domestic
operations are numerous," the manual states.  The question arises
particularly in the context of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),
refering to military assistance to government agencies in disaster response
and other domestic emergencies.

"Use of DOD intelligence capabilities for DSCA missions--such as incident
awareness and assessment, damage assessment, and search and
rescue--requires prior Secretary of Defense approval, together with
approval of both the mission and use of the exact DOD intelligence
community capabilities. Certain missions require not only approval of the
Secretary of Defense, but also coordination, certification, and possibly,
prior approval by the Attorney General of the United States."

As a general rule, "military forces cannot use military systems for
surveillance and pursuit of individuals."  This is precluded by the Posse
Comitatus Act, as reflected in DoD Directive 5525.5.

But there is a possibility that exceptions may arise, the manual
indicates.  "[Unmanned aircraft] operators cannot conduct surveillance on
specifically identified U.S. persons, unless expressly approved by the
Secretary of Defense, consistent with U.S. laws and regulations."

See U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-52, Airspace Control, February 2013
(especially Appendix G):

        http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-52.pdf

"Commanders decide to employ unmanned aircraft systems judiciously. Use of
unmanned aircraft systems requires approval at high levels within the DOD
and the FAA prior to employment in DSCA," the manual states.

"Certain unmanned aircraft systems such as Global Hawk can operate far
above normal commercial traffic while providing situation assessment to
ground commanders. Intermediate systems such as the Predator have supported
recent disaster operations, dramatically increasing situational awareness
at the joint field office level. If available and authorized, these systems
can provide near-real-time surveillance to command posts for extended
periods. The approval process is not automatic."

The Army manual asserts that the perceived risks of drone failure or
accident are out of proportion to the actual documented risks.

"For example, from 2003 to 2010, small, unmanned aircraft systems flew
approximately 250,000 hours with only one incident of a collision with
another airspace user. However, the perception of the risk posed by small,
unmanned aircraft systems was much greater." (page A-1).

WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN EXECUTIVE ORDER AND A DIRECTIVE?

The Obama Administration issued policy statements this week on critical
infrastructure protection and cyber security, including measures to
encourage information sharing with the private sector and other steps to
improve policy coordination.  Curiously, the Administration issued both an
Executive order and a Presidential directive devoted to these topics.

Executive Order 13636 focuses on "Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity" while Presidential Policy Directive 21 deals more broadly
with "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13636.htm

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-21.pdf

But the simultaneous release of the two types of Presidential instruction
on overlapping themes raises the question:  What is the difference between
an Executive Order and a Presidential Directive?

"There are probably two significant differences between an EO and a PD, at
least to my understanding," said Harold Relyea, who served for decades as a
Specialist in American National Government at the Congressional Research
Service.

"First, in almost all cases, for an EO to have legal effect, it must be
published in the Federal Register.  This is a statutory requirement.  A PD
does not have to meet this publication requirement, which means it can more
readily be 'born classified'."

"Second," he added, "is the matter of circulation and accountability.  EOs
are circulated to general counsels or similar agency attorneys, which can
be readily accomplished by FR publication.  Again, a PD may be more
selectively circulated, and this is done through developed routing
procedures.  Ultimately, EOs are captured not only in the FR, but also in
annual volumes (Title 3) of the CFR [Code of Federal Regulations].  PDs are
maintained in the files of the NSC staff and, God knows, if anywhere else! 
I might also add that a form for EOs has been prescribed (in an EO); no
form has been prescribed (as far as I know) for PDs."

A CRS overview of the various types of "Presidential Directives" authored
by Dr. Relyea in 2008 is available here:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-611.pdf

The Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel wrote in a 2000 opinion
that executive orders and directives are equivalent in their force and
impact. "As this Office has consistently advised, it is our opinion that
there is no substantive difference in the legal effectiveness of an
executive order and a presidential directive that is not styled as an
executive order."

        http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/predirective.html

For reasons that are not immediately clear, President Obama has issued
presidential directives much less frequently than his predecessors.  The
latest directive, PDD-21, is only the 21st such Obama directive.  By
comparison, President George W. Bush had issued 42 directives by the first
January of his second term.  President Clinton had issued 53 directives by
the beginning of his second term.

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service obtained
by Secrecy News that have not been made readily available to the public
include the following.

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, February 12, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, February
13, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current
Developments, February 12, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf

Filling U.S. Senate Vacancies: Perspectives and Contemporary Developments,
February 13, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40421.pdf

Child Well-Being and Noncustodial Fathers, February 12, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41431.pdf

Abortion and Family Planning-Related Provisions in U.S. Foreign Assistance
Law and Policy, February 12, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41360.pdf

Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress,
February 8, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42956.pdf

U.S. Manufacturing in International Perspective, February 11, 2013:

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42135.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

101 East : China’s cyber warriors – rising tide of cyber warfare with the West

 

Google, the world’s largest internet company, closed down its search engine facility in China after issues with censorship and hacking. The case has highlighted a growing cyber warfare between the West and China. 101 East looks at the role of the internet in China and the rising tide of cyber warfare with the West.

SECRET – U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Patrolling Handbook

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CALL-COIN-Patrolling.png

 

COUNTERINSURGENCY PATROLLING HANDBOOK

  • 132 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • April 2008

Download

Patrols are one of the most common operations a unit will perform in the counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. A patrol is the basis for many other types of operations. Cordon and search, reconnaissance, demonstration of force, security, and traffic control checkpoints are all activities a unit may perform while on patrol. Patrols are invaluable in the COIN environment because they enable units to interface with the indigenous population and gain human intelligence.

This handbook will assist junior leaders in planning and preparing for, executing, and recovering from patrols. It is not intended to be a single-source document. Rather, it is intended to provide techniques used by others to enhance the unit’s standing operating procedures and orders.

The key lessons for patrol leaders in the COIN environment are:

• Patrol planning: Upon receiving the order, leaders must quickly develop an appropriate, detailed plan.
• Patrol preparation: Leaders must ensure that all patrol members know their individual tasks and provide them the necessary resources to succeed.
• Patrol execution: Leaders will accomplish all patrol tasks to standard and guide the patrol to a successful outcome.
• Recovery: Leaders perform multiple tasks during recovery:
• Assemble the intelligence and other data collected during the patrol and pass it to the appropriate staff sections.
• Conduct a thorough after-action review to gain observations, insights, and lessons.
• Supervise equipment and personnel reset to ensure the unit is ready for subsequent operations.

Because every unit conducts some kind of patrol, this handbook should be distributed to all units.

This chapter provides the patrol leader with an outline of what he needs to accomplish to have a successful patrol in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Because of the uniqueness of the COIN operating environment, patrol leaders must consider many aspects of an operation that they would not consider in a conventional environment.

The patrol leader should learn about the people, topography, economy, history, religion, and culture of the patrol area. He must know the location of villages, roads, fields, and population groups that are in and around the area of his patrol. The patrol leader needs to make sure his map is up to date. He should study the map thoroughly and develop a mental model of the area. This mental model becomes a framework upon which every new piece of information is incorporated into the common operating picture.

Understanding the operational area provides a foundation for analyzing the insurgency:

• Who are the insurgents?
• What drives them?
• What are the agendas of local leaders or power brokers?

An insurgency is a competition among many groups, each seeking to mobilize the local populace in support of its agenda; therefore, COIN operations always have more than two sides.

A COIN patrol leader must understand what motivates the people in his area of operations and use those motivations to support the patrol’s mission. Understanding why and how the insurgents are attracting followers is essential. This understanding requires knowing the primary enemy (insurgents, criminal element, local militia, al-Qaeda). Insurgents are adaptive, resourceful, and probably from the local area. The local populace has known these insurgents since they were young. U.S. forces are the outsiders. Insurgents are not necessarily misled or naive. Much of the insurgency’s success may stem from unpopular central government policies or actions by security forces that alienate the local populace.

The genesis of a patrol is a mission from higher headquarters. Following unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and using normal troop-leading procedures (TLP), the patrol leader may coordinate with the company commander or battalion staff. This coordination should include many of the following items:

• Changes or updates in the enemy situation (improvised explosive devices [IEDs] and sniper hot spots)
• Best use of terrain for routes, rally points, and patrol bases
• Light and weather data
• Changes in the friendly situation (patrol leader’s own and adjacent units’)
• Soldiers with special skills or equipment, such as engineers, sniper teams, scout dog teams, forward observers, or interpreters attached to the unit (later referred to as “integrated units”)
• Use of manned or unmanned aircraft
• Use and location of landing or pickup zones
• Departure and reentry of friendly lines
• Fire support on the objective and along planned routes, including alternate routes
• Rehearsal areas and times
• Special equipment and ammunition requirements
• Transportation support
• Signal plan

PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE – DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Testing of Cybersecurity

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/DHS-FBI-Cybersecurity.png

 

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 20, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists or cyber criminals might try to discover vulnerabilities in computer systems by engaging in unauthorized testing of cybersecurity in order to exploit those vulnerabilities during an attack.  These attempts might include port scanning, phishing, and password cracking.  “Social engineering,” another technique, leverages unwitting insider access by eliciting information about operational and security procedures from employees, personnel, and their associates.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents from the NSI shared space demonstrate types of behavior terrorists or cyber criminals might exhibit during the preoperational stage of attacks. Although none were linked to terrorist or other criminal activity, they are cited as relevant examples for awareness and training purposes.

— (U) An individual sent an e-mail to a state government office requesting information on public access to a local reservoir. The e-mail included a link to a Web site that contained malicious software (malware).

— (U) A review of a first responder’s computer system revealed an attempted hacking incident; several Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with the probes originated from out-of-state and foreign locations, suggesting that the actual IP addresses were being masked and that the probes were malicious.

— (U) In a likely social engineering attempt, a private business received unsolicited telephone calls from a caller attempting to obtain or confirm information regarding names, titles, e-mail addresses, and access badge numbers for its employees.  When asked, the caller provided no contact information and only gave her first name.

(U) Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) Definition of Testing of Security

(U) Interactions with or challenges to installations, personnel, or systems that reveal physical, personnel, or cybersecurity capabilities.
(U) Port Scanning – a process of scanning for open computer port(s), enabling attackers to identify potential targets.
(U) Phishing – type of social engineering; fraudulent e-mail or other electronic communications to deceive computer users into disclosing private information or downloading malware.
(U) Password Cracking – attempting to guess passwords, possibly by synchronizing multi-computer attempts using automated utilities that try every possible password.
(U) Note: The Functional Standard v 1.5 defines SAR as “official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.”

(U) Possible Indicators of Cybersecurity Testing

(U//FOUO) The following activities may indicate efforts to test cybersecurity for potentially malicious purposes.  Depending upon the context—time, location and other indicators—suspicious cyber activity should be reported to the appropriate authorities, particularly if a terrorism or criminal link is suspected.

— (U//FOUO) Unsolicited phone, e-mail, or in-person inquiries asking for employee or organizational information, including official or proprietary information such as organizational structure and networks.

— (U//FOUO) Requests for access to cyber infrastructure physical areas, electronic files, or escalated computer access privileges not required to complete the requestor’s job or task.

— (U//FOUO) Increase in network reconnaissance activity—such as pinging (verification that an IP address exists and accepts requests), port scanning, and intrusion detection system alerts—observed and recognized by IT personnel.

— (U//FOUO) Missing or added computer equipment in the work area, such as laptops, CDs, external hard drives, or thumb drives.

(U) For additional information on cybersecurity best practices, please refer to US-CERT Web page http://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications.

(U//FOUO) First Ammendment activities should not be reported in a SAR or Information Sharing Environment SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).

Unveiled – Chinese Hacker Movie

Unveiled – Chinese Hacker Movie

 

The threat of becoming a victim of Distributed Denial of Service attacks is gaining alarming momentum as of late. With assaults constantly getting cheaper and easier to orchestrate, the focus of the ill-doers is shifting from highly prominent and affluent public and large private sector entities to smaller targets. Today, a criminal can bring your site to a standstill for as little as $5-8 per hour, whereas the financial implications of being forced offline can cost the victim immeasurably more in revenue loss and reputation damage.

SECRET – San Francisco Public Utilities Commission Surveillance

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SFPUC-SurveillanceStreetlights.png

 

Pilot No. CS-264 To Pilot Wireless Control and Communications System for LED Street Lights and Other Devices

  • 18 pages
  • June 8, 2012

Download

The SFPUC owns and maintains approximately 18,500 cobra-head type high pressure sodium (HPS) luminaires, located throughout the City of San Francisco’s forty-nine square miles. The SFPUC anticipates replacing the existing HPS street light luminaires with dimmable LED luminaires in the next two years. The SFPUC also plans to install an integrated wireless communication monitoring and control system (wireless system) to remotely manage the LED street lights. The SFPUC would prefer to install the wireless system as part of the SFPUC LED Streetlight Conversion Project, but will consider purchasing luminaires and installing the wireless system at a later date. Ideally, the wireless system will accommodate other wireless devices, unrelated to street lighting, in a common wireless system mesh network.

The City has multiple needs for the secure wireless transmission of data throughout its various neighborhoods and districts. Future needs for the secure wireless transmission of data throughout the City may include:

• Electric vehicle charging stations data transmission
• Electric meter reading
• Gunshot monitoring
• Street surveillance
• Public information broadcasts
• Street parking monitoring devices
• Traffic monitoring
• Traffic signal control
• Pollution monitoring
• Others

A. General

The purpose of the RFP and subsequent Pilot Project is to identify innovative possibilities unknown to the SFPUC that may be relevant to City agencies in the future. Respondents are invited to define the characteristics and features of an innovative solution for LED street light control, and include this description in their submittal. The information below is provided to help Respondents identify products that meet the SFPUC’s desired performance criteria for LED street light controls, and to guide the submittal as is relates to wireless control of LED luminaires. It is not intended to limit the scope of the SFPUC’s interest in multifunctional wireless systems.

B. Desirable Wireless System Features

1. Endpoint and Gateway Features:

a. UL listing;
b. NEMA and IP rated;
c. ANSI C136.10-2006 compliance;
d. NTCIP 1213 compliance;
e. Solid state and HID lighting compatibility;
f. 120V/240V compatibility;
g. Back-up astronomical clock;
h. Antenna that is less than 4” long;
i. 0-10V dimming capability;
j. Components that can be mounted on or within the luminaire, arm or streetlight pole; and
k. Self-commissioning capability.

2. Network Features:

a. Data encryption per AES 128 or 256; and
b. SFPUC hosting of wireless network and data.
3. Controls and Software Functions:
a. Web portal customization per SFPUC requirements;
b. On/off scheduling;
c. Failure detection;
d. Ability to record events and report historical data;
e. Remote, secure web-based access of monitoring and control functions;
f. Luminaire grouping;
g. Automated detection and reporting of cycling lamps, fault conditions, or malfunctioning equipment and hourly reporting of voltage, current, power factor, and energy consumption data at interval of at least 1 transmission per hour;
h. Lumen depreciation adjustment, defined here as gradually increasing LED drive current over time to compensate for light source depreciation. Adaptive lighting capability, defined here as dimming LED streetlight with wireless controls, based upon scheduled dimming events [AND/OR] pedestrian and traffic motion sensor feedback]; and
i. GPS mapping function that provides a geographical representation of streetlights’ locations and operational status.

C. The following types of systems and/or solutions will not be considered:

1. Systems that do not default lighting controls to “on” in the event of a failure in controls hardware or network communication;
2. Power line carrier communication systems;
3. Systems that are not compatible with solid state lighting;
4. Systems that do not integrate pedestrian and traffic sensors; and
5. Non-dimmable LED street light control systems.

SECRECY NEWS – LEAK OF WHITE PAPER BOOSTS INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

The unauthorized disclosure last week of a Justice Department White Paper
on the legality of targeted killing of senior al Qaida operatives who are
Americans had the collateral effect of strengthening congressional
oversight of intelligence.

The leak not only fulfilled a stalemated congressional effort to provide
information to the public, but it also catalyzed the long-sought disclosure
of classified documents to the intelligence committees themselves.

Although the intelligence committees received the White Paper in June
2012, they proved powerless on their own to gain its broader public
release, or to acquire their own copies of the underlying legal memoranda.

“I have been calling for the public release of the administration’s
legal analysis on the use of lethal force--particularly against U.S.
citizens--for more than a year," said Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the chair of
the Senate Intelligence Committee in a February 5 statement. "That analysis
is now public...."

In other words, what the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee was
unable to accomplish for over a year was achieved by a resourceful reporter
(Michael Isikoff of NBC) along with a cooperative source.  That is a
peculiar fact that ought to prompt some soul-searching on the part of the
Committee, which has been relentlessly critical of intelligence-related
leaks.

But the disclosure did more than just make the White Paper available to
the public and launch a substantial public debate on its contents.  It also
enhanced the ability of the intelligence committees themselves to gain
access to additional classified records on which oversight depends.

Specifically, it was the leak of the White Paper that enabled the belated
disclosure of two classified Office of Legal Counsel memoranda to the
intelligence committees last week.

The causal relationship between the leak and the release of the OLC memos
was made explicit by White House press secretary Jay Carney at a February 7
press gaggle.

"I mean, there has always been some interest, obviously, but there has
been heightened interest.  I think that what you've seen in the -- because
of the public disclosure of the white paper, is that that interest reached
higher levels than in the past, and therefore this decision was made to
make this extraordinary accommodation to provide classified Office of Legal
Counsel advice," Mr. Carney said.

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/02/wh020713.html

This statement neatly illustrates the synergy that can exist among robust
national security reporting, public awareness and effective intelligence
oversight.

Yet the Senate Intelligence Committee in particular seems to have lost
sight of the benefits for its own work of press attention and public
engagement. The February 7 hearing on the nomination of John Brennan to be
Director of CIA marked the end of a period of more than one year -- dating
from January 31, 2012 -- without a public hearing.  This may be an
unprecedented hiatus in the history of the Senate Committee.  (The House
Intelligence Committee has held public hearings more frequently.)  In light
of last week's events, the nearly exclusive emphasis on closed hearings
should perhaps be reconsidered.

DOJ WHITE PAPER RELEASED AS A MATTER OF "DISCRETION"

Late Friday afternoon, the Department of Justice released an official copy
of its White Paper on lethal targeting of Americans to Freedom of
Information Act requesters, including FAS and Truthout.org, several days
after it had been leaked to the press.

    http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf

The official version appears to be identical to the document posted by NBC
News, except that it contains a notation on the first page stating "Draft
November 8, 2011." (It also lacks the heavy-handed NBC watermark.)

"The Department has determined that the document responsive to your
request is appropriate for release as a matter of agency discretion," wrote
Melanie Ann Pustay, director of the Office of Information Policy at the
Department of Justice.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/02/oip-020813.pdf

This is a surprising statement, because as recently as two or three weeks
earlier, the Department had said exactly the opposite.

"The document is protected by the deliberative process privilege, and is
not appropriate for discretionary release at this time," wrote Paul Colborn
of the DoJ Office of Legal Counsel in a January 23, 2013 denial letter to
the New York Times.

   http://documentcloud.org/documents/566817-white-paper-foia-denial.html

What changed in the interim?  Obviously, the fact that the document leaked
-- and had already been read by most people who cared to do so -- altered
DoJ's calculation.  The decision to cease withholding the document in light
of its public availability displays some minimal capacity for
reality-testing.  To continue to insist that the document was protected and
exempt from release would have been too absurd.

But the Freedom of Information Act process is supposed to meet a higher
standard than "not absurd," and in this case it failed to do so.

According to a FOIA policy statement issued by Attorney General Eric
Holder in 2009, "an agency should not withhold information simply because
it may do so legally.  I strongly encourage agencies to make discretionary
disclosures of information. An agency should not withhold records merely
because it can demonstrate, as a technical matter, that the records fall
within the scope of a FOIA exemption."

The Attorney General's policy cited President Obama's own statement on
FOIA which declared that "The Government should not keep information
confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by
disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of
speculative or abstract fears."

The pre-leak withholding of the White Paper on targeted killing appears to
have been inconsistent with both policy statements.  It is now clear that
only "speculative or abstract fears" were at issue, not actual hazards.

Was the release of the memo "a threat to national security"?  A reporter
asked that question at the White House press briefing on February 5. "No.
No," said Press Secretary Jay Carney.  "It wasn't designed for public
release, but it's an unclassified document."

"And since it is out there," he added, "you should read it."

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/02/wh020513.html

Last week, Reps. Darrell Issa and Elijah Cummings of the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform asked the Department of Justice to
explain several apparent inconsistencies between FOIA policy and actual
practice.

"The Committee seeks information about a number of issues including what
many term as outdated FOIA regulations, exorbitant and possibly illegal fee
assessments, FOIA backlogs, the excessive use and abuse of exemptions, and
dispute resolution services," they wrote in a February 4 letter.

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2013/ogr-oip.pdf

_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
     http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
     http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
     http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood@fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

Confirmed – German Left party’s Gysi scrutinised for alleged Stasi ties

 

gysi_HA_Bayern_Berl_132990b

German prosecutors have opened preliminary proceedings against Gregor Gysi, one of the Left party’s key election campaign figures, over allegations he lied about links with the former East German secret police, the politician said on Sunday.

Gysi, who leads the Left party’s parliamentary group, has repeatedly faced allegations in the past two decades that as a lawyer in former East Germany he passed information on clients – some of them known dissidents – to the Stasi secret police.

He said on Sunday he was confident the case would be dropped and saw no reason to reconsider his position in a team of eight that is leading the Left party’s campaign for federal elections in September.

“Of course the suit will be discontinued just like previously because I never gave a false affidavit,” he said in a post on social media site facebook. “That’s why there’s not the least reason to reconsider my candidacy.”

According to Welt am Sonntag newspaper, the case brought by a former judge concerns an affidavit Gysi gave in 2011 to block the airing of a TV documentary. In the statement he said he had never knowingly or intentionally reported to the Stasi on his clients or anyone else.

Gysi, whose parliamentary immunity was lifted for the proceedings to be opened, has always said he did not cooperate with the Stasi.

Left co-party leader Bernd Riexinger said the claims lacked substance and dismissed them as electioneering.

“Gregor Gysi is our best man. It doesn’t surprise us that the others attack him. That’s dirty election campaigning,” Riexinger told the Berliner Zeitung daily to be published on Monday.

SECRET – U.S. Marine Corps Human Intelligence Exploitation Team (HET)

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Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Exploitation Team (HET) Operations in Iraq Quick Look Report

  • 8 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • August 6, 2008

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HET is viewed as a highly valuable and effective intelligence generating asset which, in conjunction with other intelligence sources, provides a significant amount of actionable intelligence during operations in Iraq. “The HET teams produced more reporting … than any other intel asset we have out there.” “HETs have been the pointy tip of the spear in this counterinsurgency fight. Two-thirds of MNF-W operations are directly driven by HET operations.” Key observations from this collection include the following.

• Short dwell times in CONUS between HET personnel deployments required a prioritization of mission oriented training over annual training requirements and professional military education (PME).
• Interviewees stated that the addition of the counterintelligence (CI)/HUMINT SNCO to the TTECG staff has resulted in the insertion of more realistic HUMINT scenarios during Mojave Viper (MV). HETs typically link up with their supported battalions for the first time at MV.
• 1st Intelligence Battalion and CI/HET Company leaders stated that they were manned at 70% of their linguist requirements, and that time for language training was insufficient: “There’s just not enough time for the language piece.”
• Interviewees stated that very little HUMINT is being gathered by Marines from the female portion of the Iraqi population. Without female CI/HUMINT Marines, it is difficult to gain access to Iraqi females in view of cultural norms relating to females being alone with males not related to them. The majority of those interviewed favored allowing women into the CI/HUMINT field.

The remainder of this report contains more detail and recommendations on the above and other topics.

Background

This in-theater collection was conducted in Iraq over a 60 day period from April to June 2008, and was a continuation of the focused collection effort on units participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF), as directed by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and endorsed by the Commanding Generals, I and II Marine Expeditionary Force. The collection sought to examine the mission, scope, successes, shortfalls, equipment, manning and emerging issues associated with human intelligence exploitation teams that deployed to Iraq during OIF 08.1.

The CI mission is to conduct counterintelligence activities to identify and counteract the threat posed by foreign intelligence capabilities and by organizations or individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. The HET mission is to collect and report timely, accurate and mission focused information from human sources in order to fulfill tactical, MEF, theater and national level intelligence requirements.

Key Points:

With a dwell time in CONUS of five months between seven month deployments, completion of pre-deployment training was challenging for the members of CI/HUMINT Company, 1st Intelligence Battalion from which the HETs were sourced. Post-deployment leave and multiple holidays further reduced available training time. To successfully complete mission specific training, annual training and professional military education (PME) were sacrificed. Time available for language and cultural training was viewed as insufficient. The cumulative effect of multiple deployments added to the impact of a short PTP period for CI/HUMINT Marines.

MCCLL note: Commenting on a draft of this report, the lead CI/HUMINT officer at Intelligence Department (IOC), HQMC noted that, “The high operational tempo affects not just CI/HUMINT Marines, but the entire intelligence community. Our SIGINT Marines are currently in a 1:0.9 dwell right now as opposed to a 1:1 for CI/HUMINT.”

Pre-deployment training was viewed as effective in achieving mission specific training goals. Mojave Viper served as a cohesion building experience for HETs and their supported battalions, and provided an opportunity to educate the battalions on HET capabilities. The addition of the CI/HUMINT SNCO to the TTECG staff resulted in the insertion of more realistic HUMINT scenarios during MV. Some HET Marines expressed the opinion that they did not need MV military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and tactical training but rather just the FINEX. Specialized courses provided by private contractors received positive reviews. These courses included the interrogation and source operations course provided by C-HET Solutions; the Reid Associates Detainee Operations Course and the Harris Radio Course.

Interviewees stated that training for Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles, crew-served weapons, language and cultural knowledge was insufficient. Limited training time was most often cited as the problem. The extended length of time needed to develop an effective language capability was a strong concern since this is considered a critical HET skill.

MCCLL note: The Tactical Iraqi Language and Culture Training System (TILTS) is a personal computer based, scenario-oriented software program that can be used for pre-deployment or in-country training to give Marines a usable grasp of Iraqi culture, gestures, and situational language. The goal of TILTS is to shrink language and cultural training time from several months of traditional classroom learning to 80 hours or less of hands on computer based interactive training. This training can be taken in increments, integrated with existing pre-deployment training. Other languages available are Pashtu, Dari and French. Commenting on a draft of this report, the Operations Officer, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL) notes that “CAOCL has developed a multitude of other classroom and distributed learning (DL) training products. TLTS is a DL product designed for use as a tool in-conjunction with other CAOCL sponsored training modules in an overall blended learning environment with respect to the PTP Continuum,” that CAOCL can provide units targeted training, and that language and regional expertise requirements must be identified far enough in advance so that required training and funds can be projected.

HETs in direct support of infantry battalions are dependent on their supported battalion for mobility and security. With Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) assuming increasing responsibility for security, and as USMC infantry units begin to go into an overwatch posture, HETs are faced with the challenge of how to continue to operate in their AO. There is a strong feeling that HETs should be provided with their own organic mobility and security in the future. At the start of the OIF 08.1 deployment, 1st Intelligence Battalion recruited a convoy security element from infantry and reservists who volunteered to deploy for this purpose. This test concept proved effective but is probably not the long term solution needed. Those planning to deploy HETs in upcoming deployments must consider their mobility and security needs in a changing operational environment.