AN OVERVIEW OF THE HEAVY CYBERATTACKS ON OUR WEBSITES TO STOP THE TRUTH DONE BY THE SUSPECTS

These graphs below show the cyberattacks on our website initiated by the suspects we already mentioned and who even announced in an email that tehy would do this illegal internet crime. The email was by Otmar Knoll, Fairvesta, who announced the cybercrime. The suspected hackers are from “GoMoPa” and their thugs.

The graphs show the DDos attacks on our servers.

What is a DDos attack ?

Read here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack

These internet crimes are punished with  longterm jail sentences and financial compensation..

Die untenstehenden Graphiken zeigen die Hackernagriffe auf unsere Webseiten, die seit Jahren durchgeführt werden im Ausschnitt. In einer Email an uns hat Otmar Knoll, Fairvesta, die Hackerangriffe, somit schwere Internetverbrechen angekündigt. Wir haben diese Emails bereits veröffentlicht. Mutmasslich arbeitet Otmar Knoll mit den üblichen Verdächtigen der “GoMoPa”, ihren Informanten und Hackern zusammen:

Die Graphiken zeigen die sogenannten DDos-Angriffe auf unsere Server.

Was ist eine DDos Attacke ?

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial_of_Service

Lesen Sie hier:

Diese Vergehen werden mit langjährigen Freiheitsstrafen und Schadensersatz bestraft.

graph eastern

graph 3graph2graphgraphgraph

DIE ZEIT über das Zitat “ausgeklügelte Schutzgeldsystem von Gomopa”

Artikel Link

http://www.zeit.de/2013/11/Finanznachrichtendienst-Gomopa

FINANZNACHRICHTENDIENST GOMOPA”Jetzt du wieder! Gruß Klaus”

Wie der Finanznachrichtendienst Gomopa gegen Betrüger kämpft und dabei selbst dubiose Geschäfte macht.

Es war an einem Mittwochmittag im September 2012 in Berlin-Kreuzberg, als Klaus Maurischat, ein Eis in der Hand und einen Kollegen neben sich, über eine Brücke spazierte und brutal überfallen wurde. Drei schwarz vermummte Männer griffen ihn an, sie schlugen ihn auf offener Straße nieder und traten ihm ins Gesicht, dann liefen sie davon. Blutend schleppte sich Maurischat in sein Büro am Tempelhofer Ufer und rief die Polizei.

Maurischat, 56, war wohl kein Zufallsopfer. Der Mann lebt gefährlich. Er ist Chef eines Finanznachrichtendienstes namens Gomopa, und er hat es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, Anlagebetrügern und anderen Wirtschaftskriminellen auf die Spur zu kommen und auf seiner Internetseite vor ihnen zu warnen. So schafft man sich Feinde in einem Milieu, in dem es Geld im Überfluss und wenig Skrupel gibt. Wer ihm die Schläger auf den Hals hetzte, ist nicht bekannt.

ANZEIGE

Eine der Firmen, mit denen sich Maurischat und seine Mitarbeiter in den vergangenen Jahren intensiv beschäftigten, ist die Immobiliengruppe S&K mit Sitz in Frankfurt. Die Rechercheure von Gomopa hatten einen guten Riecher, denn auch die Strafverfolgungsbehörden nahmen die Firma ins Visier, und sie holten jüngst zum großen Schlag aus: Am 19. Februar durchsuchten nicht weniger als 1.200 Ermittlungsbeamte und 15 Staatsanwälte eine Frankfurter Jugendstilvilla und mehr als 130 Objekte in sieben Bundesländern.

Die Hauptverdächtigen wurden verhaftet, es sind der 33-jährige Stephan Schäfer und der 31-jährige Jonas Köller, die beiden Chefs von S&K. Sie werden verdächtigt, ein betrügerisches Schneeballsystem aufgebaut und Geldanleger um einen dreistelligen Millionenbetrag betrogen zu haben. Das Geld soll unter anderem für den exzessiven und extrem aufwendigen Lebensstil der Beschuldigten verwendet worden sein. Die Staatsanwaltschaft ermittelt in dem Fall gegen insgesamt 50 Personen, darunter sind auch Anwälte und Sachverständige, die den Hauptverdächtigen zu Diensten waren.

Für Maurischat und seine Truppe könnte der Triumph kaum größer sein. Bereits im März 2010 hatten sie vor S&K gewarnt. Für ihre Berichterstattung waren die Rechercheure von der Frankfurter Firma mit Klagen überzogen worden. Auf der Internetseite des Finanznachrichtendienstes ist zu lesen: “Bis zur vorgestrigen Verhaftung von Schäfer und seines Geschäftspartners Jonas Köller wurden gegen GoMoPa.net insgesamt zwölf Klagen an vier Landgerichten (Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln und Frankfurt am Main) eingereicht und der Streitwert auf drei Millionen Euro hochgetrieben.” Man habe sich davon aber nicht schrecken lassen: “GoMoPa.net hielt stand.” Damit weckt der Fall S&K Sympathien für ein Unternehmen, das sich gerne als eine Art Schutzpolizei für Bürger und Anleger darstellt. “GoMoPa wurde mit dem Ziel gegründet, durch aktive Aufklärung und permanente Transparenz nachhaltig zur Betrugsprävention in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft beizutragen”, heißt es auf der Website.

Das klingt gut, wenn nicht: zu gut, um wahr zu sein. Recherchen der ZEIT legen den Verdacht nahe, dass die selbst erklärten Saubermänner ebenfalls Dreck am Stecken haben könnten. Es gibt Indizien für systematisch betriebene Erpressungen.

Gomopa steht für Goldman, Morgenstern & Partners, der Hauptsitz des Unternehmens ist New York, aber mit der berühmten Investmentbank hat die Firma nichts zu tun. Bei der auf der Website angegebenen Adresse von Gomopa handelt es sich um ein Gebäude an der Madison Avenue in Midtown Manhattan. Dort findet sich ein Business Center, eine Art Gemeinschaftsbüro, wo sich Unternehmen Fax, Kopierer und Konferenzräume teilen. Bei einem Besuch vor Ort war niemand von Gomopa für die ZEIT zu erreichen. Man solle einen Termin machen, sagte die Empfangsdame. Persönlich kenne sie niemanden von der Firma.

Tatsächlich scheint Gomopa maßgeblich von Deutschland aus betrieben zu werden. Am Tempelhofer Ufer in Berlin-Kreuzberg hat eine Gomopa GmbH ihren Sitz, es handelt sich um eine Niederlassung der US-Firma.

Ein ehemaliger freier Mitarbeiter der Firma beschreibt gegenüber der ZEIT den eigentlichen Zweck des Unternehmens als ein “ausgeklügeltes Schutzgeld-Geschäftsmodell”.

Seite 2/3:

“Dann morgen unser abgesteckter positiv Artikel”

Die Sache laufe so: “Entweder die betroffenen Unternehmen zahlen, oder Gomopa zerstört ihren Ruf so gründlich, dass sie keine Geschäfte mehr machen können.”

Das wäre Erpressung. Um das zu kaschieren, zahle die erpresste Firma an Gomopa das Geld für eine angebliche Dienstleistung, so der Exmitarbeiter. Oder sie beteilige sich sogar mit Kapital an Gomopa.

Das Ganze spielt sich vor dem Hintergrund des sogenannten grauen Kapitalmarkts ab. Die dort tätigen Unternehmen werden nicht von Aufsichtsbehörden überwacht. Sie versprechen potenziellen Geldanlegern hohe Renditen, etwa mit Immobiliengeschäften, Unternehmensbeteiligungen oder Edelsteinhandel. Auf die Risiken wird oft nur im Kleingedruckten hingewiesen. Ob die versprochene Rendite fließt, zeigt sich häufig erst nach Jahren. Viele Unternehmen handeln legal, aber Abzocke und Betrügereien kommen häufig vor. Seriöse Anbieter sind von unseriösen schwer zu unterscheiden.

Fachorgane mit kritischen Experten, die in diesem Bereich für Aufklärung sorgen, können Anleger vor Schäden bewahren, sind also eigentlich eine gute Sache. Es gibt aber offenbar auch ein anderes Geschäftsmodell: Erfahrene Szenekenner durchleuchten Anlagefirmen und unterziehen sie einer ständigen kritischen Berichterstattung, sie lassen sich dann aber durch Geldzahlungen der betroffenen Unternehmen ruhigstellen. Dass dieses Geschäftsmodell ganz besonders einträglich sein kann, ergibt sich aus der Tatsache, dass gerade unentdeckte Anlagebetrüger regelmäßig in Geld schwimmen und ein großes Interesse daran haben, ihre Geschäfte so lange wie möglich weiterzubetreiben.

Im Fall S&K ging es damit los, dass dessen Chefs eine Reihe anonymer E-Mails erhielten, wie sie der ZEIT vor ihrer Verhaftung berichteten. “Hallöle ihr milchreisbubis!”, begann eine dieser Nachrichten. “Eure klitsche ist in einem jahr geschichte. was jetzt im internet auf euch traumtänzer und loser zukommt, ahnt ihr nicht. haut ab, solange es noch geht. das ist ein gutgemeinter rat und unsere letzte warnung.”

Stephan Schäfer behauptet, Maurischat habe zugegeben, dass er und ein Mann namens Wolfgang Zimmermann für die anonymen Mails und auch für anonyme Internetseiten gegen S&K verantwortlich seien. “Das ist eine Lüge!”, schreibt Maurischat der ZEIT. Nie habe er derlei getan, nie derlei zugegeben.

Unstrittig ist, dass sich Maurischat und Schäfer im September 2012 in der Gomopa-Niederlassung in Berlin trafen, um Differenzen auszuräumen. Nach Maurischats Darstellung führte er damals mit Schäfer Vergleichsverhandlungen. Der Immobilienunternehmer habe ihn, einen anderen Mann namens Zimmermann und Gomopa verleumdet und nach einer Unterlassungsklage eingewilligt, Schmerzensgeld zu leisten. Überdies habe der S&K-Chef angeboten, sich bei dem Finanznachrichtendienst mit zwei Millionen Euro zu beteiligen.

Obwohl es sich dabei um eine außerordentlich merkwürdige Offerte handelte, war sie für Maurischat durchaus akzeptabel: “Ich schlug ihm vor, wenn er das wolle, dann könne er eine speziell dafür anzufertigende Teilhabererklärung unterzeichnen.”

Das tat Schäfer zwar nicht, aber er zahlte immerhin 200.000 Euro an Maurischat. Der leitete einen Großteil des Geldes an Zimmermann und andere weiter und behielt 30.000 Euro.

Am 22. Oktober schrieb Maurischat eine Mail an Schäfer, in der es zum einen um dieses bereits gezahlte Geld ging und zum anderen um eine noch vorzunehmende Beteiligung Schäfers an Gomopa. Diese Beteiligung hätte auch beeinflusst, wie über S&K auf GoMoPa.net berichtet worden wäre. Das legt jedenfalls die Mail nahe, die der Anlegerschützer schrieb.

“Also, Teilhabervertrag unterschrieben zu mir und entsprechend handeln. Dann morgen unser abgesteckter positiv Artikel und die beiden o.a. Artikel sind auch weg”, so Maurischat an Schäfer. Er bot an: “Meinetwegen schmeiße ich sämtliche Artikel auch sofort und heute raus wenn mir der unterschriebene und in der Anlage befindliche Teilhabervertrag vorliegt und wir das zum Bestandteil unserer Vereinbarung machen!” Der Schluss dieser Mail spricht Bände: “Jetzt du wieder! Gruß Klaus”.

Nach der Zahlung seien Artikel über sein Unternehmen auf der Website von Gomopa zum Teil verschwunden und zum Teil durch positivere Berichte ersetzt worden, sagt Schäfer. Maurischat behauptet heute, dass er einen Einstieg von S&K bei seinem Finanznachrichtendienst nur akzeptiert hätte, wenn sich die Immobilienfirma vorher von einem von ihm ausgewählten Wirtschaftsprüfer hätte begutachten lassen wollen. In der der ZEIT vorliegenden “Beteiligungserklärung” steht davon allerdings nichts. Dafür findet sich dort diese Passage: Gomopa “wird nach Eingang der ersten Zahlung sämtliche S&K betreffenden Artikel vom Netz nehmen und neue Artikel über S&K nicht veröffentlichen ohne diese mit S&K einvernehmlich abzusprechen”.

Seite 3/3:

So ist das in der Szene: Man schlägt sich – und verträgt sich

Klaus Maurischat verhandelte nach Unterlagen, die der ZEIT vorliegen, auch mit einem Finanzunternehmer in Hamburg. Dabei ging es ebenfalls um einen Einstieg bei Gomopa. Und auch über diesen Mann und einen seiner Geschäftspartner waren zuvor auf der Gomopa-Website kritische Beiträge erschienen.

Der Mann ließ sich auf die Sache ein. Der Gomopa-Chef habe ihm in einem mündlichen Gespräch klargemacht, dass die negativen Berichte nur gegen Geld ein Ende nehmen würden, sagt der Hamburger Geschäftsmann: “Zu zahlen erschien mir günstiger, als sich auf einen Internetkrieg einzulassen.”

Auch dieser Unternehmer bekam anonyme Mails. Bei einer stand in der Betreffzeile: “Kurz vor dem Konkurs?” Darunter folgten acht “Überschriften, die auf Internetseiten Sie zukünftig begleiten könnten”.

Der Hamburger schrieb an Maurischat: “Ich (…) bestätige hiermit den verbindlichen Antrag auf Ankauf von 40 Stck./ in Worten vierzig Shares (Aktien)” an der Gomopa Control Inc. Der Sitz dieser Gomopa-Tochter ist Miami im US-Bundesstaat Florida. Vereinbart wurde eine Beteiligung in Höhe von 200000 Euro.

Unstreitig ist, dass Gomopa im April 2012 von dem Hamburger Kaufmann 24750 Euro als erste Rate kassierte. Maurischat bestätigte ihm auch schriftlich den Eingang des Geldes und wies in dem Schreiben ausdrücklich darauf hin, dass diese Beteiligung in keinem Zusammenhang mit der Berichterstattung auf GoMoPa.net stehe, wie “böse Menschen” denken könnten.

Als der Unternehmer dann aber nicht die noch ausstehenden 175250 Euro überwies, bedrohte ihn Maurischat per Mail vom 9. Juli 2012: “Nochmals mache ich Sie darauf aufmerksam, dass ich Ihnen und sämtlichen Unternehmen an denen Sie beteiligt sind eigene Internetseiten widmen und über Ihre Geschäftspraktiken aufklären werde, wenn Sie Ihren Verpflichtungen nicht nachkommen.” Er werde überdies “sämtliche Geschäftsbanken Ihres Hauses informieren und über Ihr Unternehmen mehrfach auf unserer Plattform öffentlich berichten”, drohte Maurischat. “Diese Meldungen gehen sodann an fast 60000 User und Vertriebe aus dem Finanzbereich!” Angeblich schauen jährlich 8,4 Millionen Besucher auf der Gomopa-Website vorbei.

Auch per SMS drohte Maurischat dem Kaufmann: “Bis zum Offenbarungseid oder zur Insolvenz werde ich Sie treiben. Zahlen Sie nicht, bereite ich Ihnen und Ihrer Firma einen Skandal – da denken Sie noch in 20 Jahren dran!”

Maurischat gibt heute zu, diese Mails und Nachrichten “wahrscheinlich” geschrieben zu haben. Er sei “mehr als wütend” gewesen, weil der Hamburger ihm gegenüber sein Kaufmannsehrenwort gebrochen habe. Nicht er habe dem Mann eine Beteiligung angeboten, sondern der habe ihn danach gefragt. Das zugesagte Geld sei für ein neues Projekt seines Unternehmens fest eingeplant gewesen, sein Ausbleiben habe die Firma in ziemliche Schwierigkeiten gebracht.

Der ZEIT sind 14 weitere Firmen bekannt, die behaupten, im Zusammenhang mit Gomopa-Berichten zu Geldzahlungen genötigt worden zu sein. Sie haben Angst, genannt zu werden. “Gegen Gomopa haben Sie keine Chance”, sagt ein Unternehmer. “Auf deren Berichte wird im Internet geklickt. Egal ob die Fakten stimmen oder nicht.”

Maurischat weist alle Anschuldigungen zurück. Gomopa mache die Berichterstattung im Internet nie von Geldzahlungen abhängig. Vielmehr werde er diffamiert von Leuten, “die von uns beim Betrügen und Lügen erwischt wurden”.

Über ihn selbst, der mal eine Lehre als Groß- und Einzelhandelskaufmann gemacht hat, heißt es auf der Gomopa-Website, dass er “die Methoden und Tricks des Marktes wie kaum ein anderer” kenne, und das ist sicher wahr. Dass er einschlägig vorbestraft ist, steht nicht da. Man erfährt auf der Website auch nichts über die Verbindung mit dem 60-jährigen Wolfgang Zimmermann, einer ebenfalls schillernden Figur der Szene.

Zimmermann steht hinter einer Firma namens Confidential Business mit Sitz in Panama. Er taucht oft dann bei Unternehmen auf, wenn diese wegen Artikeln auf GoMoPa.net und anonymen Internetseiten unter Druck stehen. Zimmermann bietet an, das Problem gegen eine Geldzahlung zu lösen. Seine Dienstleistungen hat er in einem Werbebrief an das Frankfurter Immobilienunternehmen S&K (etwas ungelenk) so beschrieben: “Ich gebe meiner Klientel äußerst aggressive, aber legale Waffen und Mittel zu Hand.”

Wie Maurischat und Zimmermann zusammenarbeiten, das geht unter anderem aus einer der ZEIT vorliegenden Mail hervor, die Zimmermann an einen Finanzunternehmer geschrieben hat. Darin droht er: “Wir stellen weitere Anzeigen. Bis Sie am Ende sind.” Gomopa leiste “echt gute Arbeit”, schreibt Zimmermann und fügt hinzu: “Die können Sie nicht abstellen, da haben Sie keine Chance mehr. (…) Sie wollten ja nicht zahlen.”

Zimmermann hat sich zu keinem der Vorwürfe geäußert. Dass mit ihm nicht zu spaßen ist, hat auch Maurischat erfahren. Zwischen ihm und Zimmermann habe es einen jahrelangen Streit und “Internetkrieg” gegeben, schreibt er der ZEIT.“Auf diversen, anonym ins Internet gestellten Webseiten wurden Mitarbeiter und ich unter anderem als Päderasten, Gewohnheitsverbrecher und Kinderschänder bezeichnet.” 2006 habe man den “Krieg” mithilfe eines Anwalts beendet. Dann sei “Ruhe eingekehrt”. So ist das in der Szene: Man schlägt sich – und verträgt sich.

So wollte SJB-Bennewirtz für die fingierte STASI-”GoMoPa” Artikel bei uns löschen – So eng arbeiten SJB und “GoMoPa” zusammen

Subject: Request
From: “P. Schmitz” <p.schmitz@deinguterruf.de>
Date: Fri, July 1, 2011 12:18 pm
To: office@ebizz.tv
Priority: Normal
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Dear madams, dear sirs,

by order of our customer SJB Fonds Skyline OHG we are kindly asking you
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immobilien-vertraulich.com/law/7279-die-killer-bibel-toxdat--die-900-seiten-stasi-mordstudie-von-gomopa-mastermind-ehrenfried-stelzer.html
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INTERESSANT - BENEWIRTZ WOLLTE HIERMIT AUSSCHLIESSLICH "GoMoPa"-KRITISCHE ARTIKEL LÖSCHEN

Unveiled – WikiLeaks Setting Another Trap for Journalists, NGOs

A sends:

I tasted that poison today. It was strange, the feeling of having the privilege to information that was only made available to “a select few” was overwhelming, I don’t have the vocabulary to describe what the poison tastes like, but I can understand how some people could become addicted to it, even if it meant their death.

You are right, WL is setting “Terms and Conditions” to the access to stolen property, and attempting to force Journalists into an “Agreement” to those “Conditions, however unenforceable.

Your thoughts and counsel were welcomed, they snapped me out of that trance that I found myself in.

The only thing to do is, publish everything that I’ve learned over the last many hours about this whole affair.

 


2012-00414 WikiLeaks Partner for Global Intelligence Files June 26, 2012 (copy below) via Google Search

[Image]

Cryptome rejects this proprietary publishing manipulation. Again, WikiLeaks is inducing participation in a crime covered with pseudo-journalistic exculpation. Again excluding open public access in favor of contractual marketing of stolen material and aiding its profitable commercialization.

It’s a trap, don’t do it, don’t encourage others to take the bait.

Don’t send anything to me you don’t want published. This note will be published .

_____

At 06:24 PM 6/26/2012, you wrote:

Please Do Not Post, still working on getting us access.

Below if the terms and conditions that WL is sending to everyone.

 


_Terms and Conditions for access to the Global Intelligence Files

These Terms and Conditions are an agreement between you as an individual (not your organisation) and WikiLeaks with respect to use of the Global Intelligence Files.

1. WikiLeaks will provide access to the data known as Project Rock Guitar through WikiLeaks’ search database. You will use the search database as per instructions on the site and will not use robots on the system.

2. The decision what to publish in news articles and papers will remain at your discretion. You will credit WikiLeaks in the following manner: “investigative partnership organised by WikiLeaks” and refer to the data as having been “obtained by WikiLeaks”.

3. You will refer clearly on your website to the document(s) provided by WikiLeaks that were used in preparation of these news articles or papers and link from your publication to the data on WikiLeaks’ website.

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6. You will treat each of the documents made available to you by WikiLeaks as confidential unless and until a story based on their content is published. You will exercise care in ensuring that the materials will not be vulnerable to hacking or other efforts to discover their content.

7. WikiLeaks journalists, employees, consultants and infrastructure are the subject of State and private intelligence activity and politicised financial blockades. To protect its continued ability to publish effectively, various WikiLeaks methods, people and locations need to be kept confidential. Unless otherwise stated, these include, but are not limited to: identifying details of all WikiLeaks personnel, security methods, communication systems or methods, locations, strategic plans, information on threats against WikiLeaks, the number of WikiLeaks personnel, the number of WikiLeaks personnel in different areas, usernames, passwords, transportation and financial arrangements including financial transportation methods.

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Public Intelligence – Ohio Fusion Center Report: Bath Salts and Officer Safety

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/OHSP-BathSalts.png

(U//FOUO) The Ohio State Highway Patrol Criminal Intelligence Unit recently partnered with the Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) and gathered information regarding bath salts via a survey. The objective of the study was to assist Law Enforcement by creating an officer safety awareness product relating to the dangers of encountering people on bath salts.

(U//FOUO) A survey was distributed to law enforcement and 5 agencies responded back with pertinent information regarding the use and possession of bath salts. The agencies which contributed to this analysis are as follows:

Barberton Police Department, OH; Ohio State Highway Patrol; Powell Police Department, OH; Reynoldsburg Division of Police; and West Virginia State Police – Wheeling Division (Parcel Interdiction).

(U//FOUO) Information was obtained on 161 incidents involving bath salts.

(U//FOUO) OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS:

  • Out of the 161 incidents reported, officers made 77 arrests involving bath salt use/possession. Many of the incidents occurred before legislation was passed; therefore mere possession was not criminal at the time of many of these reports.
  • There were 27 use of force reports involving bath salts.
  • There were 3 incidents that involved fleeing of suspects.
  • 7 suspects were taken to hospital associated with bath salt use.
  • 7 offenders were pinked slipped and taken to mental health facilities.
  • There were 4 reports of deaths associated with bath salt use (Note: cause of death results did NOT find that bath salts use was the sole contributor in any of these deaths).
  • There was 1 report of suicide; 2 suicide attempts; and 1 suicide threat involving bath salt use.
  • Suspects reported paying approximately $20-$25 for bath salts.
  • The offenders reported multiple ways of using bath salts including: snorting, injection with a needle syringe, and drinking the bath salts by mixing it with fluid.
  • Many offenders admitted to combining bath salts with other drugs.
  • When reported, most people said they got the bath salts from independently owned convenient stores and drive-thrus, gas stations or markets. A WV State Police (parcel narcotics interdiction) Officer reported that a prominent internet company is: Southern Burn LLC from South Carolina.

(U//FOUO) OFFICER SAFETY CONCERNS

  • Use of force incidents included: use of Taser (3 incidents), hands on, escorts, restrained by medical professionals, and bean bag use.
  • One “officer in trouble” call was reported, involving an officer fighting with a person on bath salts.
  • Both officers in a Reynoldsburg Police case were surprised after a Taser was used on a suspect. They explained that the Taser was shot and the probes penetrated in the torso of the suspect, however it had minimal effects; the suspect fought through the electric current and rose to his feet.
  • Injuries sustained to suspects included: bruises, cuts, Taser punctures, and minimal injuries from bean bag rounds.
  • Officers sustained injuries including: injury to knee, injury to back, injury to groin, ankles, scrapes and bruises, and multiple injuries from strikes to the face.
  • 2 officers and 7 offenders were taken to the hospital resulting from physical force.
  • One incident involved the use of the SWAT team and another involved escalated use of force involving bean bag rounds.

(U//FOUO) PHYSIOLOGICAL REACTIONS FROM BATH SALT USE

  • Suspects showed the following physical reactions to bath salts: Hyperventilation, cramps, dehydration, vomiting, shaking, loss of memory, pale, emaciated, jittery, lethargy, incoherent speech, rambling, rapid movement, rapid speech, disoriented, itchy skin, and several suspect admitted to a lack of sleep for multiple days.
  • An offender described bath salts as giving him a “cocaine rush” and it being a very “intense” high.
  • Witnesses described bath salt users as:
    • Hostile, violent, unpredictable, out of control, paranoid, and reckless.
  • Additional reports by Law Enforcement involving people on bath salts:
    • Officer described one suspect as having unusual superhuman strength.
    • Officer described suspect as shooting off the ground like a “flash of light.”
    • One suspect bent the hinged handcuffs during the arrest.
  • The following hallucinations were reported:
    • A hit-skip offender said he saw a brick wall, which in turn caused a crash.
    • A male, using bath salts, reported raccoons setting fire inside his home. As a result, he proceeded to destroy his home and used a hatchet to cut up his deck, while attempting to locate the fire-setting raccoons. He also believed the raccoons stole his cell phone.
    • A male, using bath salts, believed he was being followed by police helicopters and police officers were using mirrors, snipers and different types of scopes to look through his walls. He called police requesting to negotiate with them, however there were no police at the residence when the call was made.
    • During the course of speaking to an offender and officer reported, he yelled, “AT&T calling, may I help you, AT&T is calling, a million dollars, two black guys……it’s not a racial thing, it’s not a racial thing.”
    • A bath salt user reported he hears voices; one voice was going to beat him with a ball bat.
    • The domestic violence offender using bath salts reported his mother was practicing demonology & witchcraft and she was poisoning his food. He was arrested for choking her.
    • DOWNLOAD THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HERE:
    • OHSP-BathSalts

Unveiled – Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate and the Euro InterBank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty

WASHINGTON—Barclays Bank PLC, a financial institution headquartered in London, has entered into an agreement with the Department of Justice to pay a $160 million penalty to resolve violations arising from Barclays’ submissions for the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR), which are benchmark interest rates used in financial markets around the world, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and Assistant Director in Charge James W. McJunkin of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

As part of the agreement with the Department of Justice, Barclays has admitted and accepted responsibility for its misconduct set forth in a statement of facts that is incorporated into the agreement. According to the agreement, Barclays provided LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that, at various times, were false because they improperly took into account the trading positions of its derivative traders, or reputational concerns about negative media attention relating to its LIBOR submissions. The Justice Department’s criminal investigation into the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR by other financial institutions and individuals is ongoing. The agreement requires Barclays to continue cooperating with the department in its ongoing investigation.

“LIBOR and EURIBOR are critically important benchmark interest rates,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. “Because mortgages, student loans, financial derivatives, and other financial products rely on LIBOR and EURIBOR as reference rates, the manipulation of submissions used to calculate those rates can have significant negative effects on consumers and financial markets worldwide. For years, traders at Barclays encouraged the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions in order to benefit their financial positions; and, in the midst of the financial crisis, Barclays management directed that U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions be artificially lowered. For this illegal conduct, Barclays is paying a significant price. To the bank’s credit, Barclays also took a significant step toward accepting responsibility for its conduct by being the first institution to provide extensive and meaningful cooperation to the government. Its efforts have substantially assisted the Criminal Division in our ongoing investigation of individuals and other financial institutions in this matter.”

“Barclays Bank’s illegal activity involved manipulating its submissions for benchmark interest rates in order to benefit its trading positions and the media’s perception of the bank’s financial health,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “Today’s announcement is the result of the hard work of the FBI special agents, financial analysts, and forensic accountants as well as the prosecutors who dedicated significant time and resources to investigating this case.”

Barclays was one of the financial institutions that contributed rates used in the calculation of LIBOR and EURIBOR. The contributed rates are generally meant to reflect each bank’s assessment of the rates at which it could borrow unsecured interbank funds. For LIBOR, the highest and lowest 25 percent of contributed rates are excluded from the calculation and the remaining rates are averaged to calculate the fixed rates. For EURIBOR, the highest and lowest 15 percent are excluded, and the remaining 70 percent are averaged to calculate the fixed rates.

Futures, options, swaps, and other derivative financial instruments traded in the over-the-counter market and on exchanges worldwide are settled based on LIBOR. Further, mortgages, credit cards, student loans, and other consumer lending products often use LIBOR as a reference rate. According to the agreement, an individual bank’s LIBOR or EURIBOR submission cannot appropriately be influenced by the financial positions of its derivatives traders or the bank’s concerns about public perception of its financial health due to its LIBOR submissions.

According to the agreement, between 2005 and 2007, and then occasionally thereafter through 2009, certain Barclays traders requested that the Barclays LIBOR and EURIBOR submitters contribute rates that would benefit the financial positions held by those traders. The requests were made by traders in New York and London, via electronic messages, telephone conversations, and in-person conversations. The employees responsible for the LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions accommodated those requests on numerous occasions in submitting the bank’s contributions. On some occasions, Barclays’s submissions affected the fixed rates.

In addition, between August 2005 and May 2008, certain Barclays traders communicated with traders at other financial institutions, including other banks on the LIBOR and EURIBOR panels, to request LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions that would be favorable to their or their counterparts’ trading positions, according to the agreement.

When the requests of traders for favorable LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions were taken into account by the rate submitters, Barclays’ rate submissions were false and misleading.

Further, according to the agreement, between approximately August 2007 and January 2009, in response to initial and ongoing press speculation that Barclays’ high U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions at the time might reflect liquidity problems at Barclays, members of Barclays management directed that Barclays’ dollar LIBOR submissions be lowered. This management instruction often resulted in Barclays’ submission of false rates that did not reflect its perceived cost of obtaining interbank funds. While the purpose of this particular conduct was to influence Barclays’ rate submissions, as opposed to the resulting fixes, there were some occasions when Barclays’ submissions affected the fixed rates.

The agreement and monetary penalty recognize Barclays’ extraordinary cooperation. Barclays made timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of its misconduct. After government authorities began investigating allegations that banks had engaged in manipulation of benchmark interest rates, Barclays was the first bank to cooperate in a meaningful way in disclosing its conduct relating to LIBOR and EURIBOR. Barclays’ disclosure included relevant facts that at the time were not known to the government. Barclays’s cooperation has been extensive, in terms of the quality and type of information and assistance provided, and has been of substantial value in furthering the department’s ongoing criminal investigation. Barclays has made a commitment to future cooperation with the department and other government authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Assistant Attorney General Breuer further stated, “As today’s agreement reflects, we are committed to holding companies accountable for their misconduct while, at the same time, giving meaningful credit to companies that provide full and valuable cooperation in our investigations.”

In addition, Barclays has implemented a series of compliance measures and will implement additional internal controls regarding its submission of LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, as required by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Barclays will also continue to be supervised and monitored by the FSA.

The agreement and monetary penalty further recognize certain mitigating factors to Barclays’ misconduct. At times, Barclays employees raised concerns with the British Bankers’ Association, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in late 2007 and in 2008 that the Dollar LIBOR rates submitted by contributing banks, including Barclays, were too low and did not accurately reflect the market. Further, during this time, notwithstanding Barclays’s improperly low dollar LIBOR submissions, those submissions were often higher than the contributions used in the calculation of the fixed rates.

As a result of Barclays’s admission of its misconduct, its extraordinary cooperation, its remediation efforts and certain mitigating and other factors, the department agreed not to prosecute Barclays for providing false LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions, provided that Barclays satisfies its ongoing obligations under the agreement for a period of two years. The non-prosecution agreement applies only to Barclays and not to any employees or officers of Barclays or any other individuals.

In a related matter, the CFTC brought attempted manipulation and false reporting charges against Barclays, which the bank agreed to settle. The CFTC imposed a $200 million penalty and required Barclays to implement detailed measures designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of its benchmark interest rate submissions.

The FSA issued a final notice regarding its enforcement action against Barclays and has imposed a penalty of £59.5 million against it.

The case is being handled by Deputy Chief Daniel Braun, Assistant Chiefs Rebecca Rohr and Robertson Park, Trial Attorney Alexander Berlin, and Special Trial Attorney Luke Marsh of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section. The investigation is being conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, jointly with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.

The Department acknowledges and expresses its appreciation for the significant assistance provided by the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement, which referred the conduct to the department, as well as the FSA’s Enforcement and Financial Crime Division.

This agreement is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch and, with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task force visit: http://www.stopfraud.gov.

TOP-SECRET from the FBI – Texas Resident Convicted on Charge of Attempted Use of Weapon of Mass Destruction

AMARILLO, TX—Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, 22, a citizen of Saudi Arabia and resident of Lubbock, Texas, was convicted by a federal jury today on an indictment charging one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary to make an improvised explosive device (IED) and his research of potential U.S. targets, including persons and infrastructure.

The verdict, which was reached in the Northern District of Texas, was announced by Sarah R. Saldaña, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Diego G. Rodriguez, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Dallas Field Division.

Sentencing has been scheduled for October 9, 2012, in Amarillo. Aldawsari, who was lawfully admitted into the United States in 2008 on a student visa and was enrolled at South Plains College near Lubbock, faces a maximum sentence of life in prison and a $250,000 fine. He was arrested on February 23, 2011 on a criminal complaint and later charged in a March 9, 2011 federal indictment with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.

According to court documents and evidence presented during trial, at the time of his arrest last year, Aldawsari had been researching online how to construct an IED using several chemicals as ingredients. He had also acquired or taken a substantial step toward acquiring most of the ingredients and equipment necessary to construct an IED, and he had conducted online research of several potential U.S. targets, the affidavit alleges. In addition, he had allegedly described his desire for violent jihad and martyrdom in blog postings and a personal journal.

“While many people are responsible for thwarting Aldawsari’s threat and bringing him to justice, we owe a debt of gratitude to all the members of the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force, and especially to the hundreds of hardworking and dedicated FBI agents, analysts, linguists, and others,” said U.S. Attorney Saldaña. “Their efforts, coupled with the hard work and excellent cooperation from the Lubbock Police Department and the Texas Tech Police Department, are the reason we were able to stop this defendant from carrying out a catastrophic act of terrorism.”

“As this trial demonstrated, Aldawsari purchased ingredients to construct an explosive device and was actively researching potential targets in the United States. Thanks to the efforts of many agents, analysts, and prosecutors, this plot was thwarted before it could advance further,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco. “This case serves as another reminder of the need for continued vigilance both at home and abroad.”

“Today’s guilty verdict shows how individuals in the United States with the intent to do harm can acquire the knowledge and materials necessary to carry out an attack,” said SAC Rodriguez. “Our success in locating and preventing Mr. Aldawsari from carrying out an attack is a result of cooperation within the law enforcement and intelligence communities, particularly, the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Texas Tech Police Department, the Lubbock Police Department, and the Lubbock County Sheriff’s Office, but also a demonstration of information sharing across FBI divisions, as well as assistance from the community. I want to thank the dedicated agents, officers, and analysts; the computer forensics team; and linguists that worked diligently on this investigation, as well as prosecutors serving in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Northern District.”

The government presented evidence that on February 1, 2011, a chemical supplier reported to the FBI a suspicious attempted purchase of concentrated phenol by a man identifying himself as Khalid Aldawsari. Phenol is a toxic chemical with legitimate uses, but it can also be used to make the explosive trinitrophenol, also known as T.N.P., or picric acid. Ingredients typically used with phenol to make picric acid, or T.N.P., are concentrated sulfuric and nitric acids.

Aldawsari attempted to have the phenol order shipped to a freight company so it could be held for him there, but the freight company told Aldawsari that the order had been returned to the supplier and called the police. Later, Aldawsari falsely told the supplier he was associated with a university and wanted the phenol for “off-campus, personal research.” Frustrated by questions being asked over his phenol order, Aldawsari cancelled his order, placed an order with another company, and later e-mailed himself instructions for producing phenol. In December 2010, he had successfully purchased concentrated nitric and sulfuric acids.

Aldawsari used various e-mail accounts in researching explosives and targets and often sent e-mails to himself as part of this process. He e-mailed himself a recipe for picric acid, which was described in the e-mail as a “military explosive” and also e-mailed himself instructions on how to convert a cell phone into a remote detonator and how to prepare a booby-trapped vehicle using household items. Aldawsari also purchased many other items, including a Hazmat suit, a soldering iron kit, glass beakers and flasks, a stun gun, clocks, and a battery tester.

Excerpts from a journal found at Aldawsari’s residence indicated that he had been planning to commit a terrorist attack in the United States for years. One entry describes how Aldawsari sought and obtained a particular scholarship because it allowed him to come directly to the United States and helped him financially, which he said “will help tremendously in providing me with the support I need for Jihad.” The entry continues, “And now, after mastering the English language, learning how to build explosives and continuous planning to target the infidel Americans, it is time for Jihad.”

In another entry, Aldawsari wrote that he was near to reaching his goal and near to getting weapons to use against infidels and their helpers. He also listed a “synopsis of important steps” that included obtaining a forged U.S. birth certificate; renting a car; using different driver’s licenses for each car rented; putting bombs in cars and taking them to different places during rush hour; and leaving the city for a safe place.

Aldawsari conducted research on various targets and e-mailed himself information on these locations and people. One of the documents he sent himself, with the subject line listed as “Targets,” contained the names and home addresses of three American citizens who had previously served in the U.S. military and had been stationed for a time at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In others, Aldawsari sent himself the names of 12 reservoir dams in Colorado and California and listed two categories of targets: hydroelectric dams and nuclear power plants. He also sent himself an e-mail titled “Tyrant’s House,” in which he listed the Dallas address for former President George W. Bush. Aldawsari also conducted research that indicated he considered using infant dolls to conceal explosives and the possible targeting of a nightclub with an explosive concealed in a backpack.

This case was investigated by the FBI’s Dallas Joint Terrorism Task Force, with assistance from the Lubbock Police Department and the Texas Tech Police Department. The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jeffrey R. Haag, Denise Williams, James T. Jacks, and Matthew J. Kacsmaryk and Trial Attorney David Cora from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.