U.S. Military Loses 45 MQ-9 Reaper Drones in Iran War – 25% of Fleet Wiped Out, $1.3 Billion Gone

US Military Loses 45 MQ‑9 Reaper Drones in Iran War – $1.3 Billion Blow to Pentagon

The U.S. military has lost at least 45 MQ‑9 Reaper drones during the war with Iran, wiping out roughly 25 percent of its entire fleet, according to three U.S. officials familiar with Pentagon data. The losses, first reported by The Washington Post, represent one of the most severe attrition rates for a single weapons system in recent U.S. conflicts.



The Numbers

Before the war, the U.S. military operated approximately 185 MQ‑9 Reapers – 165 in the Air Force and 20 in the Marine Corps. Today, that number has fallen to around 135 according to Air Force Lt. Gen. David Tabor, who told the Senate in May that he was “concerned” about the losses.

The Air Force puts the cost of each Reaper between $30 million and $50 million, depending on sensors and weapons. With 45 aircraft lost, the total price tag for this single weapons system alone exceeds $1.3 billion.



Why So Many Were Lost

The Reaper has been heavily used around the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow, high‑threat chokepoint where Iran has concentrated its air defenses.

But the aircraft itself is a vulnerable platform. According to the reports, the MQ‑9 flies slowly and at low altitudes, making it a “relatively easy target” for Iran and its proxies.

“This version of the drone, which flies low and quite slowly, is used for reconnaissance and precision strikes” – TASS

Not all of the lost drones were shot down. One official told The Washington Post that an unspecified number crashed after operators lost communication links with them.



The Broader Context

The Reaper losses are part of a much larger drain on U.S. military resources. The war with Iran has depleted stocks of other critical weapons as well:

· Long‑range missiles (ATACMS and PrSM) – virtually exhausted
· Tomahawk cruise missiles – nearly half of the inventory used
· Patriot interceptors – approximately 65 percent depleted
· THAAD interceptors – nearly 80 percent consumed

In June, the Trump administration asked Congress for roughly $80 billion** to cover operational and replacement expenses tied to the war. Another report mentions a request of **$67 billion to compensate for costs and replenish stocks.



The Replacement Problem

The Pentagon is gradually phasing out the MQ‑9 Reaper, manufactured by General Atomics, and plans to replace them with a fleet of cheaper strike‑reconnaissance drones capable of attacking targets in swarms.

But that transition will take time. Meanwhile, President Trump has imposed tariffs of up to 100 percent on imports of drones and components, citing national security concerns and the U.S.’s reliance on foreign sources for unmanned aircraft systems.



A Quarter of the Fleet – Gone

The loss of 45 MQ‑9 Reapers – a quarter of the entire fleet – is not just a financial blow. It represents a significant degradation of U.S. surveillance and strike capabilities in a region where intelligence and precision targeting are paramount.

The Reaper has been a workhorse for America’s operations in the Middle East since its introduction in 2007. With a quarter of the fleet now gone, the Pentagon faces a stark choice: accelerate production, deplete other assets, or accept reduced operational capacity.

As Lt. Gen. Tabor told the Senate: “I’m concerned”. For U.S. military planners, that concern is now a crisis.



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US-Militär verliert 45 MQ-9-Reaper-Drohnen im Iran-Krieg – 25 % der Flotte vernichtet

Das US-Militär hat während des Krieges mit dem Iran mindestens 45 MQ-9-Reaper-Drohnen verloren – das entspricht etwa 25 Prozent seiner gesamten Flotte. Die Verluste, die von drei mit den Pentagon-Daten vertrauten US-Beamten bestätigt und zuerst von der Washington Post berichtet wurden, stellen eine der schwersten Verlustraten für ein einzelnes Waffensystem in den jüngsten US-Konflikten dar.



Die Zahlen

Vor dem Krieg betrieb das US-Militär etwa 185 MQ-9 Reaper – 165 bei der Air Force und 20 beim Marine Corps. Heute ist diese Zahl auf etwa 135 gesunken, wie Air-Force-Generalleutnant David Tabor im Mai vor dem Senat einräumte und seine “Besorgnis” über die Verluste äußerte.

Die Air Force beziffert die Kosten jedes Reapers auf zwischen 30 und 50 Millionen Dollar, abhängig von Sensoren und Bewaffnung. Bei 45 verlorenen Flugzeugen übersteigt der Gesamtwert allein für dieses Waffensystem 1,3 Milliarden Dollar.



Warum so viele verloren gingen

Der Reaper wurde intensiv rund um die Straße von Hormus eingesetzt – einen engen, hochbedrohlichen Engpass, in dem der Iran seine Luftabwehr konzentriert hat.

Die Drohne selbst ist jedoch eine verwundbare Plattform. Berichten zufolge fliegt die MQ-9 langsam und in niedrigen Höhen, was sie zu einem “relativ leichten Ziel” für den Iran und seine Verbündeten macht.

“Diese Version der Drohne, die niedrig und recht langsam fliegt, wird für Aufklärung und Präzisionsschläge eingesetzt” – TASS

Nicht alle verlorenen Drohnen wurden abgeschossen. Ein Beamter sagte der Washington Post, dass eine nicht näher bezeichnete Anzahl nach dem Verlust von Kommunikationsverbindungen abgestürzt sei.



Der weitere Kontext

Die Reaper-Verluste sind Teil einer viel größeren Belastung der US-Militärressourcen. Der Krieg mit dem Iran hat auch die Bestände anderer kritischer Waffen dezimiert:

· Langstreckenraketen (ATACMS und PrSM) – praktisch aufgebraucht
· Tomahawk-Marschflugkörper – fast die Hälfte des Bestands verbraucht
· Patriot-Abfangraketen – etwa 65 Prozent aufgebraucht
· THAAD-Abfangraketen – fast 80 Prozent verbraucht

Im Juni beantragte die Trump-Administration beim Kongress etwa 80 Milliarden Dollar zur Deckung der Betriebs- und Ersatzkosten im Zusammenhang mit dem Krieg. Ein anderer Bericht spricht von einer Anfrage in Höhe von 67 Milliarden Dollar zur Kompensation der Kosten und zur Wiederauffüllung der Bestände.



Das Ersatzproblem

Das Pentagon stellt die MQ-9 Reaper, hergestellt von General Atomics, schrittweise außer Dienst und plant, sie durch eine Flotte von billigeren Aufklärungs- und Angriffsdrohnen zu ersetzen, die Ziele im Schwarm angreifen können.

Doch dieser Übergang wird Zeit in Anspruch nehmen. Präsident Trump hat unterdessen Zölle von bis zu 100 Prozent auf die Einfuhr von Drohnen und Komponenten verhängt und sich dabei auf nationale Sicherheitsbedenken und die Abhängigkeit der USA von ausländischen Quellen für unbemannte Luftfahrtsysteme berufen.



Ein Viertel der Flotte – weg

Der Verlust von 45 MQ-9-Reaper-Drohnen – einem Viertel der gesamten Flotte – ist nicht nur ein finanzieller Schlag. Er stellt eine erhebliche Beeinträchtigung der US-Überwachungs- und Angriffsfähigkeiten in einer Region dar, in der Aufklärung und Präzisionszielbekämpfung von größter Bedeutung sind.

Der Reaper ist seit seiner Einführung im Jahr 2007 ein Arbeitstier für die Operationen der USA im Nahen Osten. Da nun ein Viertel der Flotte verloren ist, steht das Pentagon vor einer harten Wahl: die Produktion beschleunigen, andere Bestände anzapfen oder eine reduzierte Einsatzfähigkeit in Kauf nehmen.

Wie Generalleutnant Tabor dem Senat sagte: “Ich bin besorgt.” Für die Militärplaner der USA ist diese Besorgnis inzwischen zu einer Krise geworden.



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✌️Leaked: The US Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon Dark Eagle – Congress Original Document✌️

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The US Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Missiles – Congress Original Document

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Revealed – U.S. Army Doctrine Publication: Defense Support of Civil Authorities 2019

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ADP 3-28 clarifies similarities and differences between defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and other elements of decisive action. DSCA and stability operations are similar in many ways. Both revolve around helping partners on the ground within areas of operations. Both require Army forces to provide essential services and work together with civil authorities. However, homeland operational environments differ from those overseas in terms of law, military chain of command, use of force, and inter-organizational coordination among unified action partners. This ADP helps Army leaders understand how operations in the homeland differ from operations by forces deployed forward in other theaters. It illustrates how domestic operational areas are theaters of operations with special requirements. Moreover, this ADP recognizes that DSCA is a joint mission that supports the national homeland security enterprise. The Department of Defense conducts DSCA under civilian control, based on U.S. law and national policy, and in cooperation with numerous civilian partners. National policy, in this context, often uses the word joint to include all cooperating partners, as in a joint field office led by civil authorities. See Introductory Figure, on page viii.

The utilization of military forces during periods of domestic emergency is not undertaken lightly. The military however brings with it unique abilities, in terms of both capability and capacity which provide respondents with the resources needed to respond to an incident. The use of military forces in the responses to hurricanes Andrew in 1992 and Katrina in 2005 illustrate some of the different responses the U.S. military can provide. They also led the government to realize that additional coordination was required before an incident to ensure a successful response. An in-depth look at the tenets of DSCA, authorities, and the national preparedness system framework are discussed in chapter one.

The support the Army provides to civil authorities falls into four main tasks: Provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and provide other designated support. Due to legal limitations such as the Posse Comitatus Act, the purpose for which the military can respond to these incidents is constrained, allowing a military response only to; save lives, restore essential services, maintain or restore law and order, protect infrastructure and property, support maintenance or restoration of local government, or shape the environment for intergovernmental success. Both state and federal laws detail how support is requested, provided and limited in both scope and duration. Further information on the employment of military forces and legal restrictions on doing so are provided in chapter two.

ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE AUTHORITIES

1-78. Isolation refers to the separation and the restriction of movement of people who have an infectious illness from healthy people to stop the spread of that illness. Quarantine refers to the separation and restriction of movement of people who are not yet ill but have been exposed to an infectious agent and are therefore potentially infectious. A geographical quarantine, known as a cordon sanitaire, is a sanitary barrier erected around an area. Both isolation and quarantine may be conducted on a voluntary basis or compelled on a mandatory basis through legal authority.

1-79. The federal government has the authority to prevent the spread of disease into the United States (foreign) or between states and territories (interstate). The Department of Health and Human Services is the lead federal agency for isolation and quarantine. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention determine and enforce any federal government measures to prevent the spread of disease.

1-80. Only one federal statute permits federal military forces to enforce quarantine laws, under very narrow circumstances. Section 97 of Title 42, USC, allows military commanders of any coastal fort or station to support the execution of state quarantines with respect to vessels arriving in or bound for the United States.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE SUPPORT

4-172. A governor may call out the National Guard to quell a civil disturbance when it threatens lives or property. State forces support essential services, establish traffic control posts, cordon off areas, release smoke and obscurants, and serve as security or quick reaction forces. The state National Guard’s joint task force commander provides liaison teams to each affected law enforcement agency and normally positions the joint task force headquarters near civilian law enforcement headquarters. In addition to support for civilian law enforcement agencies, National Guard forces provide security for emergency responders. After review by the state attorney general, the governor approves the RUF.

4-173. A request for direct federal military support to civil disturbance operations is unlikely except in an extreme emergency. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of legal considerations. See DODI 3025.21 regarding DOD responsibilities for civil disturbance.) Federal military support for civil disturbances does not fall under defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies when the Insurrection Act or other exemptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are used. The President may employ the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard, within the United States to restore order or enforce federal law when requested by the state legislature, or when not in session, by the governor, and when the authorities of the state are incapable of controlling the situation. The Attorney General of the United States appoints a senior civilian representative as his or her action agent. Federal military personnel supporting civil disturbance operations remain under military command at all times. Forces deployed to help federal or local authorities in a civil disturbance adhere to the SRUF and RUF approved by the combatant commander.

4-174. USNORTHCOM develops and maintains plans for civil disturbance operations. These plans provide the foundation for federal military civil disturbance support. They standardize most military activities and command relationships. Tasks performed by federal military forces may include joint patrolling with law enforcement officers; securing key buildings, memorials, intersections and bridges; and acting as a quick reaction force.

4-175. Civil disturbance missions require unit training prior to employing crowd control tactics. This normally requires a mobile training team from the military police or trained law enforcement personnel. Even in an urgent situation, commanders need to drill their forces repeatedly until small unit leaders can execute maneuvers under extreme stress. Training should include all arms, emphasizing treatment and evacuation procedures, detention and movement of citizens, and use of authorized nonlethal systems.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE NATIONAL GUARD DOMESTIC CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT

4-176. The military force with primary responsibility for direct law enforcement support is the National Guard, under state authority. The legal authority for National Guard members to support law enforcement is derived from state law, which varies from state to state. A governor of a state may call up National Guard forces to help local and state law enforcement agencies. The National Guard’s authority derives from the governor’s responsibility to enforce the laws of that state. Even with that authority, the governor carefully regulates the amount and nature of the support, consistent with state law. The governor may employ the state National Guard for law enforcement support in state active duty status or in Title 32, USC status. Federal laws (principally the Posse Comitatus Act) restrict federalized National Guard forces (in federal service, under Title 10, USC) from providing law enforcement support unless a specific exemption is applicable.

4-177. State National Guard forces in either Title 32, USC status or state active duty status from another state operating under the EMAC or a memorandum of agreement between the states may only support civilian law enforcement as specified in a memorandum approved by both governors.

4-178. There are 54 state and territory National Guard counterdrug support programs, governed by National Guard regulations. The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Section 112 of Title 32, USC, may provide resources though the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to states with approved National Guard counterdrug support plans. In addition to requiring approval by the Secretary of Defense, the state National Guard counterdrug support plan requires approval from the state’s attorney general and adjutant general. The National Guard Bureau funds a full time Title 32, USC active Guard and Reserve counterdrug coordinator in each state for administration and management of the state counterdrug program. The counterdrug coordinator serves as the focal point for all counter drug mission validations, approval authority, and the prioritization for counterdrug mission tasking under appropriate policies, instructions, and directives.

4-179. State National Guard forces also provide support to DHS border security programs. Under Section 112 of Title 32, USC, National Guard Soldiers support border security by operating surveillance systems, analyzing intelligence, installing fences and vehicle barriers, building roads, and providing training. Although state National Guard units could participate in direct law enforcement activities related to border security, under DOD policy they normally provide indirect support, under the control of their governor.

4-180. State National Guard forces frequently support civilian law enforcement agencies during disaster response. The disruption and confusion associated with a disaster typically cause numerous problems with law enforcement tasks. Commanders should evaluate the potential for law enforcement support as part of their unit’s initial assessment and provide their assessment to their state joint task force headquarters. Commanders must impress upon their subordinates that they must refrain from law enforcement activities except as authorized.

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U.S. Army reveals Defense Support of Civil Authorities

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ADP 3-28 clarifies similarities and differences between defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and other elements of decisive action. DSCA and stability operations are similar in many ways. Both revolve around helping partners on the ground within areas of operations. Both require Army forces to provide essential services and work together with civil authorities. However, homeland operational environments differ from those overseas in terms of law, military chain of command, use of force, and inter-organizational coordination among unified action partners. This ADP helps Army leaders understand how operations in the homeland differ from operations by forces deployed forward in other theaters. It illustrates how domestic operational areas are theaters of operations with special requirements. Moreover, this ADP recognizes that DSCA is a joint mission that supports the national homeland security enterprise. The Department of Defense conducts DSCA under civilian control, based on U.S. law and national policy, and in cooperation with numerous civilian partners. National policy, in this context, often uses the word joint to include all cooperating partners, as in a joint field office led by civil authorities. See Introductory Figure, on page viii.

The utilization of military forces during periods of domestic emergency is not undertaken lightly. The military however brings with it unique abilities, in terms of both capability and capacity which provide respondents with the resources needed to respond to an incident. The use of military forces in the responses to hurricanes Andrew in 1992 and Katrina in 2005 illustrate some of the different responses the U.S. military can provide. They also led the government to realize that additional coordination was required before an incident to ensure a successful response. An in-depth look at the tenets of DSCA, authorities, and the national preparedness system framework are discussed in chapter one.

The support the Army provides to civil authorities falls into four main tasks: Provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and provide other designated support. Due to legal limitations such as the Posse Comitatus Act, the purpose for which the military can respond to these incidents is constrained, allowing a military response only to; save lives, restore essential services, maintain or restore law and order, protect infrastructure and property, support maintenance or restoration of local government, or shape the environment for intergovernmental success. Both state and federal laws detail how support is requested, provided and limited in both scope and duration. Further information on the employment of military forces and legal restrictions on doing so are provided in chapter two.

ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE AUTHORITIES

1-78. Isolation refers to the separation and the restriction of movement of people who have an infectious illness from healthy people to stop the spread of that illness. Quarantine refers to the separation and restriction of movement of people who are not yet ill but have been exposed to an infectious agent and are therefore potentially infectious. A geographical quarantine, known as a cordon sanitaire, is a sanitary barrier erected around an area. Both isolation and quarantine may be conducted on a voluntary basis or compelled on a mandatory basis through legal authority.

1-79. The federal government has the authority to prevent the spread of disease into the United States (foreign) or between states and territories (interstate). The Department of Health and Human Services is the lead federal agency for isolation and quarantine. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention determine and enforce any federal government measures to prevent the spread of disease.

1-80. Only one federal statute permits federal military forces to enforce quarantine laws, under very narrow circumstances. Section 97 of Title 42, USC, allows military commanders of any coastal fort or station to support the execution of state quarantines with respect to vessels arriving in or bound for the United States.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE SUPPORT

4-172. A governor may call out the National Guard to quell a civil disturbance when it threatens lives or property. State forces support essential services, establish traffic control posts, cordon off areas, release smoke and obscurants, and serve as security or quick reaction forces. The state National Guard’s joint task force commander provides liaison teams to each affected law enforcement agency and normally positions the joint task force headquarters near civilian law enforcement headquarters. In addition to support for civilian law enforcement agencies, National Guard forces provide security for emergency responders. After review by the state attorney general, the governor approves the RUF.

4-173. A request for direct federal military support to civil disturbance operations is unlikely except in an extreme emergency. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of legal considerations. See DODI 3025.21 regarding DOD responsibilities for civil disturbance.) Federal military support for civil disturbances does not fall under defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies when the Insurrection Act or other exemptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are used. The President may employ the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard, within the United States to restore order or enforce federal law when requested by the state legislature, or when not in session, by the governor, and when the authorities of the state are incapable of controlling the situation. The Attorney General of the United States appoints a senior civilian representative as his or her action agent. Federal military personnel supporting civil disturbance operations remain under military command at all times. Forces deployed to help federal or local authorities in a civil disturbance adhere to the SRUF and RUF approved by the combatant commander.

4-174. USNORTHCOM develops and maintains plans for civil disturbance operations. These plans provide the foundation for federal military civil disturbance support. They standardize most military activities and command relationships. Tasks performed by federal military forces may include joint patrolling with law enforcement officers; securing key buildings, memorials, intersections and bridges; and acting as a quick reaction force.

4-175. Civil disturbance missions require unit training prior to employing crowd control tactics. This normally requires a mobile training team from the military police or trained law enforcement personnel. Even in an urgent situation, commanders need to drill their forces repeatedly until small unit leaders can execute maneuvers under extreme stress. Training should include all arms, emphasizing treatment and evacuation procedures, detention and movement of citizens, and use of authorized nonlethal systems.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE NATIONAL GUARD DOMESTIC CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT

4-176. The military force with primary responsibility for direct law enforcement support is the National Guard, under state authority. The legal authority for National Guard members to support law enforcement is derived from state law, which varies from state to state. A governor of a state may call up National Guard forces to help local and state law enforcement agencies. The National Guard’s authority derives from the governor’s responsibility to enforce the laws of that state. Even with that authority, the governor carefully regulates the amount and nature of the support, consistent with state law. The governor may employ the state National Guard for law enforcement support in state active duty status or in Title 32, USC status. Federal laws (principally the Posse Comitatus Act) restrict federalized National Guard forces (in federal service, under Title 10, USC) from providing law enforcement support unless a specific exemption is applicable.

4-177. State National Guard forces in either Title 32, USC status or state active duty status from another state operating under the EMAC or a memorandum of agreement between the states may only support civilian law enforcement as specified in a memorandum approved by both governors.

4-178. There are 54 state and territory National Guard counterdrug support programs, governed by National Guard regulations. The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Section 112 of Title 32, USC, may provide resources though the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to states with approved National Guard counterdrug support plans. In addition to requiring approval by the Secretary of Defense, the state National Guard counterdrug support plan requires approval from the state’s attorney general and adjutant general. The National Guard Bureau funds a full time Title 32, USC active Guard and Reserve counterdrug coordinator in each state for administration and management of the state counterdrug program. The counterdrug coordinator serves as the focal point for all counter drug mission validations, approval authority, and the prioritization for counterdrug mission tasking under appropriate policies, instructions, and directives.

4-179. State National Guard forces also provide support to DHS border security programs. Under Section 112 of Title 32, USC, National Guard Soldiers support border security by operating surveillance systems, analyzing intelligence, installing fences and vehicle barriers, building roads, and providing training. Although state National Guard units could participate in direct law enforcement activities related to border security, under DOD policy they normally provide indirect support, under the control of their governor.

4-180. State National Guard forces frequently support civilian law enforcement agencies during disaster response. The disruption and confusion associated with a disaster typically cause numerous problems with law enforcement tasks. Commanders should evaluate the potential for law enforcement support as part of their unit’s initial assessment and provide their assessment to their state joint task force headquarters. Commanders must impress upon their subordinates that they must refrain from law enforcement activities except as authorized.

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U.S. Army Report About Russia – TOP SECRET

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Executive Summary

In the last seven years, Russia has reasserted itself as a military force in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. With the 2008 military incursion into Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, Russia has assumed a more aggressive, interventionist stance in Europe. In the effort to influence events in Ukraine, the Russians have used what the US Army defines as “Hybrid Warfare” to infiltrate, isolate, and dominate eastern Ukraine and Crimea. This is all a part of the strategy of what can be called “Indirect Action”—the belief by the Russians that they reserve the right to protect ethnic Russians and interests in their former states from domination by Western powers and NATO.

It is important to note that the Russians do not use the terms Hybrid Warfare or Indirect Action to describe these tactics. These are terms that the Western media, think tanks, and analysts have developed to define this method of warfare. The Russians have used terms such as indirect, asymmetrical, and non-linear when discussing what is commonly referred to as Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid Warfare is a part of the strategy/policy of what can be called Indirect Action that the Russians believe is essential to protect their interests in their former satellite states (referred to as “the near abroad”). To the Russians, using covert methods, information warfare (INFOWAR), and special operations troops to make up for conventional disadvantages has been the norm for decades. Because the terms Hybrid Warfare and Indirect Action are familiar, they will be used throughout this report in reference to Russian indirect, asymmetrical, and nonlinear tactics.

This Threat Tactics Report (TTR) will focus on three distinct operations—Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and eastern Ukraine in 2014–2015. The TTR will present and analyze the tactics used in these conflicts, the lessons learned, and adjustments made by the Russian Armed Forces.

Executiive Summary

The Russians have employed Hybrid Warfare and Indirect Action to counter NATO and Western influence for over seventy years.Hybrid
Warfare is the use of political, social, criminal, and other non-kinetic means employed to overcome military limitations.1Indirect Action
can be defined as the need for Russia to defend its interests and sphere of influence in its former states and satellites.
Although Western observers characterize the actions of Russian Armed Forces as hybrid warfare, the Russian Army practices its long-established tactics with new attention to advanced developments in many areas such as precision weapons, command and control (C2) and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and electronic warfare (EW), and including direct and indirect application of these. The nature of these tactics is derived from Russia’s focused assessment of specific neighborhood threats and its long-time focus on security superiority in its Near Abroad.
Russia continues to maintain military bases in its former states to exert influence and control.
The Russians used conventional tactics in Georgia in 2008 and used indirect and asymmetric approaches in Crimea in 2014 and eastern Ukraine in 2014-2015.
The Euromaidan protests and overthrow of the Yanukovych government triggered the Russian incursion into Crimea and the seizure of the naval base at Sebastopol.
Russian intelligence operatives and SPF were instrumental in the success of the Crimea operation and are now assisting pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.
Russia may use these tactics in other areas such as Moldova, Transniestra, and the Baltic states.

Crimean Takeover: Operational Overview

Crimea has long sought its independence from Ukraine because of its protracted association with Russia and the people’s desire to rejoin the Russian Federation. Crimea had become the home to a large ethnic Russian population, many of which had served in the Soviet/Russian military. As far back as February 1994, Crimean politicians would make speeches declaring the Crimeans not only sought separation from Ukraine, but also a unification of Crimea with Russia. When Yuriy Meshkov won the first and only independent Crimean presidential election in 1994 with 73% of the votes, he stated, “In spirit, the Crimean people have been and remain part of Russia.” During the next couple of years, Ukrainian marines took possession of a number of naval facilities on Crimea, evicted the pro-Russian political leaders in Crimea, and ended the short-lived independent Crimea on 17 March 1995. With protests from Moscow, this eventually led to the 1997 treaty that divided the Russian naval facilities between the two countries and allowed for the Russians to maintain a military presence in Crimea, primarily to support the Russian navy’s Black Sea Fleet. One of the most overlooked clauses in the agreement which allowed the February/March 2014 events to take place was the section that permitted Russian forces to implement not only security measures at their own permanent bases in Crimea, but to provide security for their own forces during deployment and redeployment movements to and from Russia. In the early stages of the crisis in late February 2014, this very minor clause in the treaty allowed the Russian military to move initially around Crimea without interference by any Ukrainian military personnel under the guise of the movement authorized by the military agreement between the two countries.

The Russian military launched their operation in Crimea less than a week after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych signed an agreement with the opposition political leaders on 21 February 2014 that confirmed early presidential elections would take place by the end of the year, ensured a national unity government would be created within a month, and guaranteed Ukraine would return to its 2004 constitution. Yanukovych then fled Kiev within 24 hours, however, instead of remaining in Ukraine to abide by the agreement. The timing also coincided with the scheduled military maneuvers in the Russian Central and Western Military Districts that obscured the Russian troop movements into the peninsula. The map in Figure 8 indicates the various activities from unclassified sources that took place in Crimea between the night of 27 February 2014 and 25 March 2014, when the Ukrainian government pulled its military forces from Crimea and ceded control of the peninsula to the Crimean “defense forces” backed by Russian military forces.

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Unveiled -TopSecret-U.S. Army Unified Exploitation Concept of Operations 2012-2018

USArmy-UnifiedExploitation

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USArmy-UnifiedExploitation

Development of the Army Exploitation Concept of Operations (AEC) was directed by Headquarters, Department of the Army Execution Order 268-11, dated 23 August 2011. This document is designed to address the Army’s lack of a “systems approach” to effectively integrate multiple organizations, disciplines, functions, and processes that support exploitation through their application of tactical, technical, and scientific capabilities.

This CONOPS describes an overarching concept of operations for the 2012-2018 timeframe that provides a framework for “Unified Exploitation (UE)” operations and the basis to develop supporting capabilities. It establishes linkages to other Army concepts and describes how UE enables decisive action in support of unified land operations. This CONOPS describes the operational context and how commanders integrate supporting UE capabilities through Mission Command to produce an operational advantage. This CONOPS addresses the central military problem: the Army lacks a systematic approach to effectively integrate multiple organizations, disciplines, functions, and processes that support exploitation through their application of tactical, technical, and scientific capabilities. The absence of an organized exploitation framework to develop facts, actionable information or intelligence from collected enemy information, materials, or people, results in a knowledge void. This lack of knowledge may compromise our ability to execute commander directed, follow-on actions and represents tactical and perhaps even strategic opportunities lost.

Unified Exploitation (UE) is the synchronization and integration of unit operations with technical and scientific capabilities to develop facts, actionable information, or intelligence from information, materials, or people collected from an objective, point of occurrence, or event. UE supports tactical, operational, or strategic objectives. This includes support to targeting, criminal prosecution, identification of and engagement with friendly, neutral and threat networks and improving force protection. It is complementary rather than additive in the employment of supporting capabilities from different warfighting functions. UE provides the Army with an enterprise approach. The UE Framework provides commanders and staffs with a technique and basic conceptual structure for visualizing and describing UE operations. The UE Framework consists of the five UE Core Activities: detect, collect, process, analyze, and disseminate.

This CONOPS is consistent with The Army Capstone Concept (ACC), TRADOC Pam 525-3-0. UE supports operational adaptability and enhances the Army’s ability to understand the situation in breadth, depth, and context. It is also consistent with The Army Operating Concept (AOC), TRADOC Pam 525-3-1. UE enhances the Army’s ability to interdict the enemy decision cycle and act faster than the enemy. The Army Functional Concepts (AFC) describe how Army forces, as part of unified action, exercise the six Army warfighting functions. The Army conducts UE, supported by the capabilities resident across the six warfighting functions.

An integrated UE enterprise provides the Joint Force Commander with synchronized and integrated capabilities that support unified land operations as part of unified action. To ensure success, UE is an enduring capability enabled through doctrine, organization, training, material leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and institutionalized with other Army capabilities in the 2012-2018 timeframe. UE is nested within Army capstone guidance and UE capabilities are methodically assessed and developed through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process. Each Army warfighting function implements UE through an enterprise infrastructure that is adaptable to their unique requirements.

Unified Exploitation (UE) is the synchronization and integration of unit operations with technical and scientific capabilities to develop facts, actionable information, or intelligence from information, materials, or people collected from an objective, point of occurrence, or event. UE supports tactical, operational, or strategic objectives. This includes support to targeting, criminal prosecution, identification of and engagement with friendly, neutral and threat networks, and improving force protection.

UE enables friendly forces to interdict the enemy decision cycle. Enabled by Mission Command:

UE supports the understanding of the Operational Environment (OE) required by the commander to successfully execute decisive action
UE achieves synergy across the warfighting functions.
UE is complementary rather than additive in the employment of supporting capabilities.
UE supporting capabilities employ their own set of approved processes, integrated and synchronized through the UE Framework
Each capability enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the shortfalls of the others
UE achieves an effect on the enemy that is greater than if the supporting capabilities are used individually or in sequence

UE Operations enable unified action, the organization, synchronization, coordination, and integration of supporting activities of military and non-military entities, to achieve unity of effort.
1-1 Purpose

This document describes an overarching concept in the 2012-2018 timeframe that provides a framework for UE operations and the basis to develop supporting capabilities. It establishes linkages to other Army concepts and describes how UE is an enabler to decisive action in support of unified land operations. This CONOPS describes the operational context, military problem, and how commanders integrate supporting UE capabilities using Mission Command to produce an operational advantage.

1-2 Background

The term “Sensitive Site Exploitation” (SSE) emerged during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). SSE was associated with the efforts to collect information on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. As OIF matured, the operational force used the term SSE to describe any operation whose purpose was to search for and collect enemy information, material, and people. Army schools and centers developed new training and doctrine to meet the demands of the operational force, but without integration and synchronization, resulting in ambiguous if not conflicting terms such as Site Exploitation (SE), Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE), and Military Search. Army organizations used all of these terms to describe exploitation actions executed in relationship to combating IEDs, targeting insurgent networks, and support to host nation (HN) rule of law.

As Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF progressed, Army, Joint, and Coalition forces established ad hoc capabilities (Task Force Troy, Task Force Paladin, the Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC), etc.) to meet tactical and operational requirements for more sophisticated analysis of collected information, materials, and people. In 2007 the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) observed that the BCT’s ability to effectively understand, visualize, and target irregular forces in complex environments was immature and highly dependent on integrating unique, unfamiliar, and non-organic capabilities/enablers at the BCT level. AWG recognized that pre-deployment training did not adequately develop the agility, responsiveness and proficiency necessary for BCTs to capitalize on fleeting opportunities to attack threat networks or enable friendly networks in a counterinsurgency. In response AWG developed “Focused Operations Training” to partially mitigate capability gaps. In 2010, BCTs deployed to Afghanistan task organized “Focused Targeting Forces” or FTFs from organic and assigned assets. These specialized organizations were composed of maneuver elements, Multi-Functional Teams (MFT), HUMINT and SIGINT assets along with interpreters and Female Engagement Teams (FET). The FTFs were tasked with the planning, preparation and execution of site exploitation operations in the BCT’s prescribed area of operation. In 2010, the Army published ATTP 3-90.15, Site Exploitation Operations, to fill a need for supporting doctrine. Army Schools and Centers of Excellence unilaterally developed related capabilities to support the needs of the deployed force. Although beneficial, these efforts suffered from a lack of a unifying and integrating framework. Furthermore, the lack of a clearly defined military problem resulted in multiple asynchronous DOTMLPF solutions, developed in relative isolation and without complete integration.

In 2011, the Army recognized the need for a central unifying concept to assist commanders in achieving unity of effort for the synchronized application of tactical, technical, and scientific capabilities. The adjective “site” was dropped in an effort to convey that these activities transcended the physical location and an overarching concept known as “Exploitation” emerged. In 2011, the Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center, approved the term “Unified Exploitation” to distinguish it from the offensive task described in FM 3-90, Tactics, and with similar activities containing the word “exploitation”.

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