TOP-SECRET – Iran Making Nuclear Weapons Report

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1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).

G. Possible Military Dimensions

38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these. Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.

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Escalating Tensions Between The United States And Iran Pose Potential Threats To The United States

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The Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is planned to help bureaucratic, state, nearby, innate, and regional counterterrorism, digital, and law implementation authorities, and private segment accomplices, to viably stop, forestall, appropriate, or react to episodes, deadly tasks, or fear based oppressor assaults in the United States that could be led by or for the benefit of the Government of Iran (GOI) if the GOI were to see activities of the United States Government (USG) as demonstrations of war or existential dangers to the Iranian system. The GOI could act straightforwardly or enroll the participation of intermediaries and accomplices, for example, Lebanese Hizballah. The FBI, DHS, and NCTC had evaluated any active retaliatory assault would initially happen abroad. In the occasion the GOI were to decide to direct a Homeland assault, potential targets and strategies for assault in the Homeland could run from digital activities, to focused deaths of people considered dangers to the Iranian system, to damage of open or private foundation, including US army installations, oil and gas offices, and open tourist spots. USG activities may likewise incite vicious radical supporters of the GOI to submit assaults in retaliation, with next to zero notice, against US-based Iranian protesters, Jewish, Israeli, and Saudi people and interests, and USG faculty.

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Website Defacement Activity Indicators Of Compromise And Techniques Used To Disseminate Pro-Iranian Messages

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Following a week ago’s US airstrikes against Iranian military initiative, the FBI watched expanded revealing of site ruination movement spreading Pro-Iranian messages. The FBI accepts a few of the site disfigurement were the consequence of digital on-screen characters misusing realized vulnerabilities in content administration frameworks (CMSs) to transfer ruination documents. The FBI exhorts associations and individuals worried about Iranian digital focusing on be acquainted with the markers, strategies, and procedures gave in this FLASH, just as strategies and methods gave in as of late spread Private Industry Notification “Notice on Iranian Cyber Tactics and Techniques” (20200109-001, 9 January 2020).

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CIA Offers Tips On Preparing A “Go-Bag” For Emergencies In Iran And Elsewhere

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Ask Molly: November 20, 2019


Dear Molly,

I’ve been closely following the news out in California, and the devastation caused by wildfires that continue to burn. Though we don’t live in the area, it got me wondering if my family is prepared to handle a natural disaster like that. What can I do? #AskMollyHale

~Not Your Average Prepper


Dear Not Your Average Prepper,

Great question! Unfortunately, many people don’t think about these types of things until disaster strikes. It’s great that you’re thinking about emergency preparedness now.

GoBag2.jpg
CIA Officer with a Go-Bag

At CIA, we spend a lot of time discussing emergency preparedness and planning with our officers, who often find themselves working in all kinds of remote—and sometimes dangerous—places around the world. Often villages, towns or even cities are ill-equipped to handle major emergencies. What those emergencies might look like (hurricanes, earthquakes, civil unrest, violent uprisings or wildfires, etc.) can be hard to predict, but a well thought-out emergency plan, paired with regular drills and the right equipment, can put you in a better position to weather the storm, whatever form it takes.I asked our Office of Security for tips on developing an emergency action plan, and they had lots of suggestions. They also recommended that everyone learn how to create a “go-bag.” (A go-bag has important items that you may need during an emergency) Hopefully you’ll find these tips useful for you and your family.


Tips for Developing an Emergency Action Plan

An emergency action plan is, simply put, the plan of action for you and your family if a crisis arises. It’s important to discuss (and write down) your plan so you and your family know exactly what to do during an emergency. Remember: Planning shouldn’t be done in isolation. Every member of your family should be included and actively contribute. Here are a few things you should consider discussing when creating your emergency plan:

  • Be aware: What sort of natural disasters are frequent to your area? How might they affect your access to resources, roads or general infrastructure? Does your area have an emergency alert system? Do you know how you might be able to access it? These types of questions can help you shape your family’s planning meeting.
  • Establish a communication plan: The odds of you and your family being in the same location during an emergency are slim, so planning for communications is critical. Who is the primary point of contact for the family? What about a secondary point of contact, if your primary point of contact can’t be reached? What should you do if you don’t have a cell phone or if it isn’t working? Larger families should establish a ‘phone tree’ system in which each person is responsible for establishing contact with a particular person or set of persons.
  • Identify meeting points (primary/secondary/tertiary): If you and your family aren’t able to make contact with one another it’s important that everyone knows the location of designated meeting points. Meeting points should be familiar places around town where you and your family can plan to meet if an emergency were to occur while you were separated. It is best to pick locations that are familiar to your family, such as your home or that of a relative. Other options can include schools or local civic buildings. Be sure to have a few back-up locations just in case you can’t reach the first one. For instance, if the primary location is home but the roads are blocked, everyone should know to make their way to a secondary location, like a school or a grandparent’s house.
  • Consider the specific needs of your household: You can easily find an off-the-shelf emergency action plan on the Internet, but is it going to address the needs of your family in your specific area? Probably not. An emergency action plan should take into account precautions that are unique to you and your family. Perhaps you have a family member in a wheelchair; if so, your designated meeting points should take handicap accessibility into consideration. Do you have pets? Make sure you have food/water, vaccination records, proof of ownership and even a photo of your pet, in case you get separated. Check out the website for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for more information on how to prepare your pets for an emergency.
  • Plan evacuation routes: An emergency could require that you and your family quickly evacuate the area. If so, you need to be aware of all possible evacuation routes, without relying on GPS. Try to memorize these routes. That way you can evacuate an area safely and quickly—even if some roads are blocked and communication networks aren’t working.
  • Practice, practice, practice: An emergency plan is no good if it sits in the kitchen drawer unread and unused. It is important to commit the plan to memory. Our security officers encourage all of us at CIA to not only plan for emergencies, but also to practice them, both at home and at work. When practicing, throw in some curveballs that require you and your family to fall back on secondary plans or even completely unplanned options.

Building the Perfect Go-Bag

GoBag1.JPG
Emergency Kit Go-Bag on CIA Seal

According to FEMA, people should be prepared to take care of themselves and family members for up to 72 hours, or three days, following a disaster. To do this effectively you should collect and consolidate the appropriate materials at a well-known location in your home, work or vehicle ahead of time. We recommend consolidating the items into what we call a “go-bag,” so named because it is a tool that is intended for use in ‘on-the-go’ situations, such as a hasty evacuation.As some of our officers can attest, multiple go-bags scattered throughout the house, vehicles and your workplace might be the best solution. You never know where you’ll be when disaster strikes and having a go-bag within arm’s reach can mean the difference between life and death.

Contents of your go-bag should (at a minimum) include:

  • 1 gallon of water per day (or purification tablets)
  • Spoil-free food (i.e. protein bars)
  • First aid kit (with any prescription medications needed)
  • Light source (flashlight, glow sticks, etc.)
  • Spare batteries- (replenish them regularly)
  • Disaster plan with contact numbers, map and evacuation routes
  • Copies of passports and other critical documents
  • Warm blanket and several space blankets
  • Change of clothes with sturdy shoes
  • Hygiene supplies
  • Multi-tool (i.e., one that includes tools like a knife, screw driver and tweezers)
  • Cash and traveler’s checks
  • Matches or other fire starter in a waterproof case
  • Waterproof storage
  • Paper and pencil
  • Cell phone with emergency contact numbers and charger
  • Portable power bank for cell phones
  • Emergency repair kit (parachute cord, duct tape, safety pins)

This is by no means an exhaustive list, but should serve as a reference as you build a more personalized list based on your needs and those of your family, as well as the specific threats or challenges you are likely to face in your part of the world. If, for instance, you live along the coastline, you may want to put more time/effort into waterproofing your go bag and its contents. Those living or staying in areas of earthquake activity should consider including temporary shelters and focusing on communications, as cellular towers could be impacted.

Hopefully these tips are helpful!

Stay safe,

~ Molly

Continue reading “CIA Offers Tips On Preparing A “Go-Bag” For Emergencies In Iran And Elsewhere”

Unveiled – Terrorists plan attacks on US Power and Science Centers

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Charlie Hebdo #1178-page-001
 

NNSA an Iranian Target

I cannot reveal my source (to keep my VIP access as it is) which is an underground forum known to host many of groups, “the usual suspects”. I observed there is on going arrangement for release the results of an attack to Department of Energy. If the map on the forum thread means something, I presume the national labs were also attacked. I couldn’t realize which one of the players and groups were orchestrating the release though. Among the targets there is NNSA, I have seen other Iranian attack on NNSA before. I am personally curious is this an attempt to mess with the smart grid or just another hit and grab industrial data?

Messages [on drawing] all in Farsi and have slang codes within them to the extent translator is useless.

[Image]

[Image]



The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 73, Iran,

Officers & Master Clients (5)
Ebrahim Kahrobai
HOSSEIN MOVAHEDI ZADEH
Houshang PISHVA AZAD
Mehdi Dadpey Reza
Yaseen Gokal

Listed Addresses (5)
55 Mirzaye Shirazi P.O. Box 15955/443 Tehran – Iran
No 36 Main Street, Ekbatan, Tehran Iran
No. 128 Molasadra Street, Tehran, Iran
No. 142, Merdamad Blvard, Tehran, Iran P.O. Box 16315-571
No. 5 Omar Khayam Street Tehran IRAN

The CIA reports – Iran Expanded its Nuclear Program in 2011

CIA: Iran Expanded its Nuclear Program in 2011

In 2011, Iran expanded its nuclear program, and continued to enrich uranium and develop its nuclear facilities – thus stated a report from the CIA that was presented to the US Congress.

According to the report, Iran has successfully produced approximately 4,900 kg of low-level enriched uranium, and continued its development of the nuclear facilities constructed throughout the country, as well as is heavy water research. The report determined that Iran’s actions were carried out in contrast to the UN decisions that Iran must halt their nuclear activities.

The CIA further determined that Iran has continued the development of the underground facilities in Natanz, and even developed more advanced centrifuges, which were already tested at an unknown destination in the country. Iran’s stockpiles possess approximately 80 kg of enriched uranium at a level approaching 20% (a level suitable for a nuclear bomb).

The report also noted that while the number of centrifuges in Iran’s possession has dropped from 8,900 to 8,000, the number of active centrifuges has skyrocketed from 3,800 in August 2010 to a present figure of 6,200.

In addition, according to the report, one of the most important facilities in Iran’s nuclear program is the Fordo facility near the city of Qom, where Iran is enriching uranium at a level of “nearly 20%.”

The CIA is also stating that while the Bushehr nuclear reactor started producing nuclear fuel last year, it is still not acting at full capacity. However, it should be noted that the report does not deal with the topic of Iran’s military nuclear program. While it provides figures of the country’s uranium stockpiles, it does not associate this stockpile, or any other, with the Islamic Republic’s plans for developing military nuclear capabilities.

The agency also determined that Tehran is continuing the development and expansion of its missile program. They are continuing the development of short and medium-ranged missiles, and focusing on the ability to launch missiles into space as well – so that they can develop missiles with exceptionally long ranges.

AMIR RAPAPORT – Israel and the US Have an Understanding on the Iranian Issue

The repeated declarations are largely a form of psychological warfare; Gal Hirsch returns to the IDF’s top echelons; and the largest tender in IDF history was awarded for the construction of a training base city in the Negev.

All the anonymous statements coming from Israeli and US “senior officials” regarding the question of whether or not Israel will attack Iran (against the US’s advice) should be treated with a measure of suspicion.

It is likely that there is a significant amount of psychological warfare involved in these reports. The goal is clear enough: to increase pressure on Iran, which already exists as a result of more economic sanctions, mysterious explosions, and the assassinations of senior nuclear scientists.

The “senior official” understandings likely emerged from two starting points, which are seemingly contradictory. The first is that Israel cannot commit to the US in any way, especially that the US be notified more than several hours in advance of an air strike. The second is that there is truth to the words recently spoken by US President Barack Obama, claiming that the defense relationship between Israel and the US has never been closer. The issue of the Iranian nuclear program is one of the most central issues discussed in the joint strategic dialogue between Jerusalem and Washington, a dialogue that is the most closely coordinated one ever.

The discussions over this issue began back in the early 1990s, and are now expressed in ongoing intelligence updates regarding the various aspects of the Iranian nuclear program. These updates are conducted by senior officials in the branches of the Israeli defense establishment – the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Mossad, and the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG). This group, which gathers once every quarter, is comprised of diplomats, military and intelligence personnel, and persons who deal with foreign policy. Essentially, it is a think-tank that handles the various aspects of the Iranian project, with the goal of deepening the level of intelligence cooperation in order to determine a basis for joint policy.

Above all else, the discussions concerning the Iranian issue are being carried out continuously in the political stratum. The bottom line is apparent: even if Israel does not commit to announcing an attack in advance, it won’t act as if the US isn’t in the neighborhood (who is increasing their presence in the Persian Gulf region).

By the way, the huge exercise that was planned for this spring, with the participation of US and Israeli forces, was meant to be another expression of the close cooperation between the countries. The exercise was delayed due to a desire to slightly ease the tension against Iran. It is now planned for October. However, it’s not unreasonable to consider that a war might erupt before then.

Eyes to the north

While global attention is focused on the issue of whether or not Israel will attack Iran, the IDF’s eyes are also observing the north – and are closely monitoring the bloodbath in Syria.

Gantz’s words from a few weeks ago, that the IDF is preparing to receive Alawite (the minority in Syria, among which is President Bashar Assad) refugees, reflects one of several possible scenarios. The questions remains, what will happen the day the Assad regime collapses?

A much more worrisome possibility is that the collapse of the Syrian regime will be accompanied by missile fire at Israel, in the sense of “I’m going down and taking you with me.” Another possibility, equally grave, is the transfer of large amounts of qualitative weapons from the Syrian army warehouses to Hezbollah in Lebanon. If Syria were to transfer very advanced antiaircraft systems to Lebanon, it’s quite possible that Israel would choose to operate in the form of a preemptive strike in this scenario as well – before the S125 systems would enter operational use.

Replacements during a sensitive period

Given the tension surrounding Iran and the north, this is not an ideal time to replace prominent IDF positions, as is expected to take place soon in the defense establishment. (The next IAF commander, Major General Amir Eshel, is expected to enter office in April.)

Another problematic element is the fact that the military secretaries of both the prime minister and the minister of defense are expected to be new (both are highly sensitive positions, and their entry is always accompanied by a measure of dissonance – there is no position in the IDF that prepares senior officers on how to conduct themselves in the tumultuous junction between the political and military sectors).

Brigadier General Itzik Turgeman, the new military secretary to the minister of defense, already took office and is now learning how to handle his position. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will need to select a new military secretary soon, as the current one, Major General Yochanan Locker, announced he would conclude his position and retire should he not be nominated the next Air Force Commander – which, as is known, he wasn’t.

Incidentally, the new Depth Command is increasing its activity in light of the preparations for a possible war on all fronts. The person responsible for the command, Major General Shai Avital, who returned from retirement, has already assembled a working team. Soon, they are expected to receive a surprising reinforcement: Brigadier General (Res.) Gal Hirsch, one of the more prominent figures from the Second Lebanon War.

Hirsch served as the commander of the Galilee Formation (the 91st Division) that was responsible for the Lebanese border. Hirsch became one of the symbols of the war due to his criticism, while on the other hand, the former Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, said (rightfully) that he was wronged. Hirsch, who was not among the bad commanders of the war (rather the opposite), resigned from the IDF after the war, and made money as a senior partner at the Israeli company Defensive Shield. The position which is currently intended for him may return him to the top military echelon, for the first time since the war.

CONFIDENTIAL: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000164 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020
TAGS: OTRA MARR NATO PARM PINS PREL PGOV GM AF IR
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES 

Classified By: Classified by Political M-C George Glass for reasons 1.4
 (b,d). 

1.  (C) German FM Westerwelle told Amb February 5 that it was
important to refocus Afghanistan efforts on civilian
reconstruction; that we needed to avoid suggesting German
troops engaged in less risk than other countries; that he did
not invite Iranian FM Mottaki to Germany or seek a meeting
with him; that any discussion of non-strategic nuclear
weapons needed to be conducted at 28 at NATO; and that he
could not influence any decision by the European Parliament
on the SWIFT agreement.  END SUMMARY.
2.  (C) The Ambassador asked about Westerwelle's first 100
days in office.  Though in an ebullient mood, Westerwelle
said things were very difficult (FDP slipped another
percentage point in the polls hours before the meeting).  He
said he had been in France February 4 for a joint cabinet
meeting, but that nothing substantive came of it.  He
observed that one never really knew what was going to happen
with Sarkozy involved. 

--------------
AFGHANISTAN
------------- 

3.  (C) The Ambassador reviewed his own recent trip to
Afghanistan.  He shared his impression that the Germans were
doing a superb job at all levels from the RC-North commander
on down.  He learned how critical mentoring and partnering
with Afghan security forces had become.  He noted that the
U.S. was sending substantial forces to RC-North, where they
would conduct training and be under German command.
Westerwelle responded that this was important for Germany and
for international cooperation.  The Ambassador added that the
U.S. was sending substantial helicopter support as well.  He
said that Germans could be proud of their troops in
Afghanistan.  Westerwelle responded that this was good news.
He said that the London Conference bore an excellent
conclusion, and was particularly useful for its focus on
civilian progress.  He emphasized the importance of
underscoring civilian reconstruction.
4.  (C) With a request for confidentiality, Westerwelle
referred to the January 20 "Bild Zeitung" interview with
General McChrystal, in which the general is quoted as urging
the Germans to take more risks.  Westerwelle recounted that
he himself had had to answer questions about this article for
ten days, explaining that the Germans were not "peace
soldiers" while  other countries provided the combat troops.
He said it was important that German troops not be
"relativized" and cast as second-class troops.  He observed
that Germany had originally deployed 3,500 troops, increased
that mandate to 4,500, and was now planning an increase of
another 500 plus a reserve.  He emphasized that this was a
major contribution compared with other European countries.
5.  (C) The Ambassador noted that he had gained the
impression in Afghanistan that police training was more
challenging than he had originally understood.  Troops were
usually required to provide force protection.  But German
police training was the best.
6.  (C) The Ambassador asked how the prospective February 26
Bundestag debate to extend the Bundeswehr mandate in
Afghanistan would play out.  Westerwelle said the question
was how large a majority would approve the new mandate.  He
said that SPD caucus chief Steinmeier displayed good will on
this issue.  However, SPD chairman Gabriel wanted to
politicize the issue for domestic political gain.
Nevertheless, he thought some in the SPD would support the
new mandate.  However, Westerwelle expected no support from
the Greens.  Westerwelle noted that the May NRW state
elections were also affecting the issue in a negative way.
That said, he said he could not see Steinmeier opposing the
larger mandate.  He hoped the Ambassador would speak with
Steinmeier. 

------
IRAN
------ 

7.  (C) Asked about the February 5 visit of Iranian FM
Mottaki to the Munich Security Conference, Westerwelle
emphasized that he (Westerwelle) had not invited Mottaki to
come to Germany, and Westerwelle had also not requested a
meeting with Mottaki.  Rather, it was Mottaki who was asking
to see Westerwelle.  Westerwelle said he had still not
decided whether he would talk to Mottaki or not.  He
reflected concern that Tehran might try to exploit Mottaki's
visit to Germany as a distraction, and continue executing
people during the visit.  In any case, Westerwelle said his
position was exactly the same as the U.S. on Iran, and he
would share the results of any meeting with Mottaki, if it
took place. 

BERLIN 00000164  002 OF 002 

8.  (C) Westerwelle said he would meet Russian FM Lavrov and
(separately) Chinese FM Yang February 5.  He suggested that
Moscow had been changing course on Iran sanctions since the
Qom revelations.  The Russians now saw Iran as playing games
on the nuclear issue.  However, he observed that China was
"hesitant," or even in opposition to sanctions.  Reflecting
on his recent visit to China, Westerwelle said he had not
perceived any "good will" there at present.  He said he would
ask Yang again about Iran and then share the results with the
U.S.  Westerwelle opined that it was important also to focus
on Brazil as an opinion leader in the Third World.  He noted
that President Lula had received Ahmadinejad warmly several
months ago.  He added that he was uncertain what the Saudis
thought, but that the other Persian Gulf countries seemed to
be in an existential panic about the Iranian nuclear program. 

-----------
TAC NUKES
----------- 

9.  (C) Touching briefly on arms control, Westerwelle stated
unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons was an issue for
NATO.  He said that when he had received Kissinger, Schulz,
Perry and Nunn on February 3 to talk about their global zero
proposal, tactical nuclear weapons was not discussed.  He
said that the four statesmen were very supportive of
President Obama. 

----------
TFTP
--------- 

10.  (C) The Ambassador raised the challenge of getting the
European Parliament to approve an agreement to share data
with the U.S. on tracking terrorist finance.  The Ambassador
noted the extensive efforts of the Treasury Department and
other U.S. agencies to explain the importance of the program
to our common security.  He asked how one could get better
support for the program.  Westerwelle replied that the German
government had been able to come up with a solution for
itself a few months ago when the issue first surfaced.
(Comment: In fact, German Interior Minister de Maziere's vote
to abstain in the EU Council vote on TFTP on November 30
reflected the complete deadlock within the Coalition
Government between TFTP advocates in the CDU-controlled
Interior Ministry and TFTP opponents in the FDP-controlled
Justice Ministery. End Comment.) However, Westerwelle said
that now that the issue was in the European Parliament, he
had no ability to influence it.  He said that he was very,
very aware of the Secretary's interest in this issue.
Nevertheless, he had a sense that almost all groups in the
European Parliament had concerns with the proposed agreement.
 He emphasized that this was not an issue that only concerned
his party, the FDP, but rather many others as well.
11. (C) Westerwelle shared that he had not yet appointed a
new Coordinator for German-American cooperation. 

----------
COMMENT
--------- 

12.  (C) Westerwelle (who spoke with ease in English) was in
a buoyant mood and more confident on his issues than we have
seen him so far.  He seemed ready to defend any intimation
that he was less than supportive of a troop surge (Defense
Minister zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador two days ago that
Westerwelle had worked for no increase of German troops for
Afghanistan, see Berlin 157) with invocations of the
importance of civilian reconstruction.  On Iran, he leapt at
the chance to tell us he had not invited Mottaki.  His dodges
on both tactical nuclear weapons and terrorist finance were
all but practiced.  His comment that he was unable to affect
the vote in the EU Parliament on TFTP was a bit disingenuous;
on February 4, an MFA official acknowledged to visiting
Treasury officials in Berlin that German MEPs were in fact
leading the charge against TFTP in the EU Parliament with the
tacit support of the FDP, if not of specialists in the
Justice Ministry and MFA themselves. Westerwelle still cuts a
good image in meetings and in the press here, even though his
party continues a bout of free fall in the polls.  His
ministry, though, still wonders (privately to us) where he
gets his policy direction from.  END COMMENT.
13.  (U) The Ambassador did not have the chance to clear this
cable before departing Berlin. 

Murphy

WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES – CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF THE US EMBASSY IN BERLIN

 

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BERLIN164.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BERLIN164 2010-02-05 15:32 2010-11-28 18:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXRO7703
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHRL #0164/01 0361532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051532Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6496
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0690
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000164 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020 
TAGS: OTRA MARR NATO PARM PINS PREL PGOV GM AF IR
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES 
 
Classified By: Classified by Political M-C George Glass for reasons 1.4 
 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) German FM Westerwelle told Amb February 5 that it was 
important to refocus Afghanistan efforts on civilian 
reconstruction; that we needed to avoid suggesting German 
troops engaged in less risk than other countries; that he did 
not invite Iranian FM Mottaki to Germany or seek a meeting 
with him; that any discussion of non-strategic nuclear 
weapons needed to be conducted at 28 at NATO; and that he 
could not influence any decision by the European Parliament 
on the SWIFT agreement.  END SUMMARY. 
2.  (C) The Ambassador asked about Westerwelle's first 100 
days in office.  Though in an ebullient mood, Westerwelle 
said things were very difficult (FDP slipped another 
percentage point in the polls hours before the meeting).  He 
said he had been in France February 4 for a joint cabinet 
meeting, but that nothing substantive came of it.  He 
observed that one never really knew what was going to happen 
with Sarkozy involved. 
 
-------------- 
AFGHANISTAN 
------------- 
 
3.  (C) The Ambassador reviewed his own recent trip to 
Afghanistan.  He shared his impression that the Germans were 
doing a superb job at all levels from the RC-North commander 
on down.  He learned how critical mentoring and partnering 
with Afghan security forces had become.  He noted that the 
U.S. was sending substantial forces to RC-North, where they 
would conduct training and be under German command. 
Westerwelle responded that this was important for Germany and 
for international cooperation.  The Ambassador added that the 
U.S. was sending substantial helicopter support as well.  He 
said that Germans could be proud of their troops in 
Afghanistan.  Westerwelle responded that this was good news. 
He said that the London Conference bore an excellent 
conclusion, and was particularly useful for its focus on 
civilian progress.  He emphasized the importance of 
underscoring civilian reconstruction. 
4.  (C) With a request for confidentiality, Westerwelle 
referred to the January 20 "Bild Zeitung" interview with 
General McChrystal, in which the general is quoted as urging 
the Germans to take more risks.  Westerwelle recounted that 
he himself had had to answer questions about this article for 
ten days, explaining that the Germans were not "peace 
soldiers" while  other countries provided the combat troops. 
He said it was important that German troops not be 
"relativized" and cast as second-class troops.  He observed 
that Germany had originally deployed 3,500 troops, increased 
that mandate to 4,500, and was now planning an increase of 
another 500 plus a reserve.  He emphasized that this was a 
major contribution compared with other European countries. 
5.  (C) The Ambassador noted that he had gained the 
impression in Afghanistan that police training was more 
challenging than he had originally understood.  Troops were 
usually required to provide force protection.  But German 
police training was the best. 
6.  (C) The Ambassador asked how the prospective February 26 
Bundestag debate to extend the Bundeswehr mandate in 
Afghanistan would play out.  Westerwelle said the question 
was how large a majority would approve the new mandate.  He 
said that SPD caucus chief Steinmeier displayed good will on 
this issue.  However, SPD chairman Gabriel wanted to 
politicize the issue for domestic political gain. 
Nevertheless, he thought some in the SPD would support the 
new mandate.  However, Westerwelle expected no support from 
the Greens.  Westerwelle noted that the May NRW state 
elections were also affecting the issue in a negative way. 
That said, he said he could not see Steinmeier opposing the 
larger mandate.  He hoped the Ambassador would speak with 
Steinmeier. 
 
------ 
IRAN 
------ 
 
7.  (C) Asked about the February 5 visit of Iranian FM 
Mottaki to the Munich Security Conference, Westerwelle 
emphasized that he (Westerwelle) had not invited Mottaki to 
come to Germany, and Westerwelle had also not requested a 
meeting with Mottaki.  Rather, it was Mottaki who was asking 
to see Westerwelle.  Westerwelle said he had still not 
decided whether he would talk to Mottaki or not.  He 
reflected concern that Tehran might try to exploit Mottaki's 
visit to Germany as a distraction, and continue executing 
people during the visit.  In any case, Westerwelle said his 
position was exactly the same as the U.S. on Iran, and he 
would share the results of any meeting with Mottaki, if it 
took place. 
 
BERLIN 00000164  002 OF 002 
 
 
8.  (C) Westerwelle said he would meet Russian FM Lavrov and 
(separately) Chinese FM Yang February 5.  He suggested that 
Moscow had been changing course on Iran sanctions since the 
Qom revelations.  The Russians now saw Iran as playing games 
on the nuclear issue.  However, he observed that China was 
"hesitant," or even in opposition to sanctions.  Reflecting 
on his recent visit to China, Westerwelle said he had not 
perceived any "good will" there at present.  He said he would 
ask Yang again about Iran and then share the results with the 
U.S.  Westerwelle opined that it was important also to focus 
on Brazil as an opinion leader in the Third World.  He noted 
that President Lula had received Ahmadinejad warmly several 
months ago.  He added that he was uncertain what the Saudis 
thought, but that the other Persian Gulf countries seemed to 
be in an existential panic about the Iranian nuclear program. 
 
----------- 
TAC NUKES 
----------- 
 
9.  (C) Touching briefly on arms control, Westerwelle stated 
unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons was an issue for 
NATO.  He said that when he had received Kissinger, Schulz, 
Perry and Nunn on February 3 to talk about their global zero 
proposal, tactical nuclear weapons was not discussed.  He 
said that the four statesmen were very supportive of 
President Obama. 
 
---------- 
TFTP 
--------- 
 
10.  (C) The Ambassador raised the challenge of getting the 
European Parliament to approve an agreement to share data 
with the U.S. on tracking terrorist finance.  The Ambassador 
noted the extensive efforts of the Treasury Department and 
other U.S. agencies to explain the importance of the program 
to our common security.  He asked how one could get better 
support for the program.  Westerwelle replied that the German 
government had been able to come up with a solution for 
itself a few months ago when the issue first surfaced. 
(Comment: In fact, German Interior Minister de Maziere's vote 
to abstain in the EU Council vote on TFTP on November 30 
reflected the complete deadlock within the Coalition 
Government between TFTP advocates in the CDU-controlled 
Interior Ministry and TFTP opponents in the FDP-controlled 
Justice Ministery. End Comment.) However, Westerwelle said 
that now that the issue was in the European Parliament, he 
had no ability to influence it.  He said that he was very, 
very aware of the Secretary's interest in this issue. 
Nevertheless, he had a sense that almost all groups in the 
European Parliament had concerns with the proposed agreement. 
 He emphasized that this was not an issue that only concerned 
his party, the FDP, but rather many others as well. 
11. (C) Westerwelle shared that he had not yet appointed a 
new Coordinator for German-American cooperation. 
 
---------- 
COMMENT 
--------- 
 
12.  (C) Westerwelle (who spoke with ease in English) was in 
a buoyant mood and more confident on his issues than we have 
seen him so far.  He seemed ready to defend any intimation 
that he was less than supportive of a troop surge (Defense 
Minister zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador two days ago that 
Westerwelle had worked for no increase of German troops for 
Afghanistan, see Berlin 157) with invocations of the 
importance of civilian reconstruction.  On Iran, he leapt at 
the chance to tell us he had not invited Mottaki.  His dodges 
on both tactical nuclear weapons and terrorist finance were 
all but practiced.  His comment that he was unable to affect 
the vote in the EU Parliament on TFTP was a bit disingenuous; 
on February 4, an MFA official acknowledged to visiting 
Treasury officials in Berlin that German MEPs were in fact 
leading the charge against TFTP in the EU Parliament with the 
tacit support of the FDP, if not of specialists in the 
Justice Ministry and MFA themselves. Westerwelle still cuts a 
good image in meetings and in the press here, even though his 
party continues a bout of free fall in the polls.  His 
ministry, though, still wonders (privately to us) where he 
gets his policy direction from.  END COMMENT. 
13.  (U) The Ambassador did not have the chance to clear this 
cable before departing Berlin. 
 
 
 
Murphy