Unveiled – Terrorists plan attacks on US Power and Science Centers

Charlie Hebdo #1178-page-001

NNSA an Iranian Target

I cannot reveal my source (to keep my VIP access as it is) which is an underground forum known to host many of groups, “the usual suspects”. I observed there is on going arrangement for release the results of an attack to Department of Energy. If the map on the forum thread means something, I presume the national labs were also attacked. I couldn’t realize which one of the players and groups were orchestrating the release though. Among the targets there is NNSA, I have seen other Iranian attack on NNSA before. I am personally curious is this an attempt to mess with the smart grid or just another hit and grab industrial data?

Messages [on drawing] all in Farsi and have slang codes within them to the extent translator is useless.



The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 73, Iran,

The Secret List of Off-Shore-Companies, Persons and Adresses, Part 73, Iran,

Officers & Master Clients (5)
Ebrahim Kahrobai
Mehdi Dadpey Reza
Yaseen Gokal

Listed Addresses (5)
55 Mirzaye Shirazi P.O. Box 15955/443 Tehran – Iran
No 36 Main Street, Ekbatan, Tehran Iran
No. 128 Molasadra Street, Tehran, Iran
No. 142, Merdamad Blvard, Tehran, Iran P.O. Box 16315-571
No. 5 Omar Khayam Street Tehran IRAN

The CIA reports – Iran Expanded its Nuclear Program in 2011

CIA: Iran Expanded its Nuclear Program in 2011

In 2011, Iran expanded its nuclear program, and continued to enrich uranium and develop its nuclear facilities – thus stated a report from the CIA that was presented to the US Congress.

According to the report, Iran has successfully produced approximately 4,900 kg of low-level enriched uranium, and continued its development of the nuclear facilities constructed throughout the country, as well as is heavy water research. The report determined that Iran’s actions were carried out in contrast to the UN decisions that Iran must halt their nuclear activities.

The CIA further determined that Iran has continued the development of the underground facilities in Natanz, and even developed more advanced centrifuges, which were already tested at an unknown destination in the country. Iran’s stockpiles possess approximately 80 kg of enriched uranium at a level approaching 20% (a level suitable for a nuclear bomb).

The report also noted that while the number of centrifuges in Iran’s possession has dropped from 8,900 to 8,000, the number of active centrifuges has skyrocketed from 3,800 in August 2010 to a present figure of 6,200.

In addition, according to the report, one of the most important facilities in Iran’s nuclear program is the Fordo facility near the city of Qom, where Iran is enriching uranium at a level of “nearly 20%.”

The CIA is also stating that while the Bushehr nuclear reactor started producing nuclear fuel last year, it is still not acting at full capacity. However, it should be noted that the report does not deal with the topic of Iran’s military nuclear program. While it provides figures of the country’s uranium stockpiles, it does not associate this stockpile, or any other, with the Islamic Republic’s plans for developing military nuclear capabilities.

The agency also determined that Tehran is continuing the development and expansion of its missile program. They are continuing the development of short and medium-ranged missiles, and focusing on the ability to launch missiles into space as well – so that they can develop missiles with exceptionally long ranges.

AMIR RAPAPORT – Israel and the US Have an Understanding on the Iranian Issue

The repeated declarations are largely a form of psychological warfare; Gal Hirsch returns to the IDF’s top echelons; and the largest tender in IDF history was awarded for the construction of a training base city in the Negev.

All the anonymous statements coming from Israeli and US “senior officials” regarding the question of whether or not Israel will attack Iran (against the US’s advice) should be treated with a measure of suspicion.

It is likely that there is a significant amount of psychological warfare involved in these reports. The goal is clear enough: to increase pressure on Iran, which already exists as a result of more economic sanctions, mysterious explosions, and the assassinations of senior nuclear scientists.

The “senior official” understandings likely emerged from two starting points, which are seemingly contradictory. The first is that Israel cannot commit to the US in any way, especially that the US be notified more than several hours in advance of an air strike. The second is that there is truth to the words recently spoken by US President Barack Obama, claiming that the defense relationship between Israel and the US has never been closer. The issue of the Iranian nuclear program is one of the most central issues discussed in the joint strategic dialogue between Jerusalem and Washington, a dialogue that is the most closely coordinated one ever.

The discussions over this issue began back in the early 1990s, and are now expressed in ongoing intelligence updates regarding the various aspects of the Iranian nuclear program. These updates are conducted by senior officials in the branches of the Israeli defense establishment – the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Mossad, and the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG). This group, which gathers once every quarter, is comprised of diplomats, military and intelligence personnel, and persons who deal with foreign policy. Essentially, it is a think-tank that handles the various aspects of the Iranian project, with the goal of deepening the level of intelligence cooperation in order to determine a basis for joint policy.

Above all else, the discussions concerning the Iranian issue are being carried out continuously in the political stratum. The bottom line is apparent: even if Israel does not commit to announcing an attack in advance, it won’t act as if the US isn’t in the neighborhood (who is increasing their presence in the Persian Gulf region).

By the way, the huge exercise that was planned for this spring, with the participation of US and Israeli forces, was meant to be another expression of the close cooperation between the countries. The exercise was delayed due to a desire to slightly ease the tension against Iran. It is now planned for October. However, it’s not unreasonable to consider that a war might erupt before then.

Eyes to the north

While global attention is focused on the issue of whether or not Israel will attack Iran, the IDF’s eyes are also observing the north – and are closely monitoring the bloodbath in Syria.

Gantz’s words from a few weeks ago, that the IDF is preparing to receive Alawite (the minority in Syria, among which is President Bashar Assad) refugees, reflects one of several possible scenarios. The questions remains, what will happen the day the Assad regime collapses?

A much more worrisome possibility is that the collapse of the Syrian regime will be accompanied by missile fire at Israel, in the sense of “I’m going down and taking you with me.” Another possibility, equally grave, is the transfer of large amounts of qualitative weapons from the Syrian army warehouses to Hezbollah in Lebanon. If Syria were to transfer very advanced antiaircraft systems to Lebanon, it’s quite possible that Israel would choose to operate in the form of a preemptive strike in this scenario as well – before the S125 systems would enter operational use.

Replacements during a sensitive period

Given the tension surrounding Iran and the north, this is not an ideal time to replace prominent IDF positions, as is expected to take place soon in the defense establishment. (The next IAF commander, Major General Amir Eshel, is expected to enter office in April.)

Another problematic element is the fact that the military secretaries of both the prime minister and the minister of defense are expected to be new (both are highly sensitive positions, and their entry is always accompanied by a measure of dissonance – there is no position in the IDF that prepares senior officers on how to conduct themselves in the tumultuous junction between the political and military sectors).

Brigadier General Itzik Turgeman, the new military secretary to the minister of defense, already took office and is now learning how to handle his position. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will need to select a new military secretary soon, as the current one, Major General Yochanan Locker, announced he would conclude his position and retire should he not be nominated the next Air Force Commander – which, as is known, he wasn’t.

Incidentally, the new Depth Command is increasing its activity in light of the preparations for a possible war on all fronts. The person responsible for the command, Major General Shai Avital, who returned from retirement, has already assembled a working team. Soon, they are expected to receive a surprising reinforcement: Brigadier General (Res.) Gal Hirsch, one of the more prominent figures from the Second Lebanon War.

Hirsch served as the commander of the Galilee Formation (the 91st Division) that was responsible for the Lebanese border. Hirsch became one of the symbols of the war due to his criticism, while on the other hand, the former Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, said (rightfully) that he was wronged. Hirsch, who was not among the bad commanders of the war (rather the opposite), resigned from the IDF after the war, and made money as a senior partner at the Israeli company Defensive Shield. The position which is currently intended for him may return him to the top military echelon, for the first time since the war.


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000164 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020

Classified By: Classified by Political M-C George Glass for reasons 1.4

1.  (C) German FM Westerwelle told Amb February 5 that it was
important to refocus Afghanistan efforts on civilian
reconstruction; that we needed to avoid suggesting German
troops engaged in less risk than other countries; that he did
not invite Iranian FM Mottaki to Germany or seek a meeting
with him; that any discussion of non-strategic nuclear
weapons needed to be conducted at 28 at NATO; and that he
could not influence any decision by the European Parliament
on the SWIFT agreement.  END SUMMARY.
2.  (C) The Ambassador asked about Westerwelle's first 100
days in office.  Though in an ebullient mood, Westerwelle
said things were very difficult (FDP slipped another
percentage point in the polls hours before the meeting).  He
said he had been in France February 4 for a joint cabinet
meeting, but that nothing substantive came of it.  He
observed that one never really knew what was going to happen
with Sarkozy involved. 


3.  (C) The Ambassador reviewed his own recent trip to
Afghanistan.  He shared his impression that the Germans were
doing a superb job at all levels from the RC-North commander
on down.  He learned how critical mentoring and partnering
with Afghan security forces had become.  He noted that the
U.S. was sending substantial forces to RC-North, where they
would conduct training and be under German command.
Westerwelle responded that this was important for Germany and
for international cooperation.  The Ambassador added that the
U.S. was sending substantial helicopter support as well.  He
said that Germans could be proud of their troops in
Afghanistan.  Westerwelle responded that this was good news.
He said that the London Conference bore an excellent
conclusion, and was particularly useful for its focus on
civilian progress.  He emphasized the importance of
underscoring civilian reconstruction.
4.  (C) With a request for confidentiality, Westerwelle
referred to the January 20 "Bild Zeitung" interview with
General McChrystal, in which the general is quoted as urging
the Germans to take more risks.  Westerwelle recounted that
he himself had had to answer questions about this article for
ten days, explaining that the Germans were not "peace
soldiers" while  other countries provided the combat troops.
He said it was important that German troops not be
"relativized" and cast as second-class troops.  He observed
that Germany had originally deployed 3,500 troops, increased
that mandate to 4,500, and was now planning an increase of
another 500 plus a reserve.  He emphasized that this was a
major contribution compared with other European countries.
5.  (C) The Ambassador noted that he had gained the
impression in Afghanistan that police training was more
challenging than he had originally understood.  Troops were
usually required to provide force protection.  But German
police training was the best.
6.  (C) The Ambassador asked how the prospective February 26
Bundestag debate to extend the Bundeswehr mandate in
Afghanistan would play out.  Westerwelle said the question
was how large a majority would approve the new mandate.  He
said that SPD caucus chief Steinmeier displayed good will on
this issue.  However, SPD chairman Gabriel wanted to
politicize the issue for domestic political gain.
Nevertheless, he thought some in the SPD would support the
new mandate.  However, Westerwelle expected no support from
the Greens.  Westerwelle noted that the May NRW state
elections were also affecting the issue in a negative way.
That said, he said he could not see Steinmeier opposing the
larger mandate.  He hoped the Ambassador would speak with


7.  (C) Asked about the February 5 visit of Iranian FM
Mottaki to the Munich Security Conference, Westerwelle
emphasized that he (Westerwelle) had not invited Mottaki to
come to Germany, and Westerwelle had also not requested a
meeting with Mottaki.  Rather, it was Mottaki who was asking
to see Westerwelle.  Westerwelle said he had still not
decided whether he would talk to Mottaki or not.  He
reflected concern that Tehran might try to exploit Mottaki's
visit to Germany as a distraction, and continue executing
people during the visit.  In any case, Westerwelle said his
position was exactly the same as the U.S. on Iran, and he
would share the results of any meeting with Mottaki, if it
took place. 

BERLIN 00000164  002 OF 002 

8.  (C) Westerwelle said he would meet Russian FM Lavrov and
(separately) Chinese FM Yang February 5.  He suggested that
Moscow had been changing course on Iran sanctions since the
Qom revelations.  The Russians now saw Iran as playing games
on the nuclear issue.  However, he observed that China was
"hesitant," or even in opposition to sanctions.  Reflecting
on his recent visit to China, Westerwelle said he had not
perceived any "good will" there at present.  He said he would
ask Yang again about Iran and then share the results with the
U.S.  Westerwelle opined that it was important also to focus
on Brazil as an opinion leader in the Third World.  He noted
that President Lula had received Ahmadinejad warmly several
months ago.  He added that he was uncertain what the Saudis
thought, but that the other Persian Gulf countries seemed to
be in an existential panic about the Iranian nuclear program. 


9.  (C) Touching briefly on arms control, Westerwelle stated
unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons was an issue for
NATO.  He said that when he had received Kissinger, Schulz,
Perry and Nunn on February 3 to talk about their global zero
proposal, tactical nuclear weapons was not discussed.  He
said that the four statesmen were very supportive of
President Obama. 


10.  (C) The Ambassador raised the challenge of getting the
European Parliament to approve an agreement to share data
with the U.S. on tracking terrorist finance.  The Ambassador
noted the extensive efforts of the Treasury Department and
other U.S. agencies to explain the importance of the program
to our common security.  He asked how one could get better
support for the program.  Westerwelle replied that the German
government had been able to come up with a solution for
itself a few months ago when the issue first surfaced.
(Comment: In fact, German Interior Minister de Maziere's vote
to abstain in the EU Council vote on TFTP on November 30
reflected the complete deadlock within the Coalition
Government between TFTP advocates in the CDU-controlled
Interior Ministry and TFTP opponents in the FDP-controlled
Justice Ministery. End Comment.) However, Westerwelle said
that now that the issue was in the European Parliament, he
had no ability to influence it.  He said that he was very,
very aware of the Secretary's interest in this issue.
Nevertheless, he had a sense that almost all groups in the
European Parliament had concerns with the proposed agreement.
 He emphasized that this was not an issue that only concerned
his party, the FDP, but rather many others as well.
11. (C) Westerwelle shared that he had not yet appointed a
new Coordinator for German-American cooperation. 


12.  (C) Westerwelle (who spoke with ease in English) was in
a buoyant mood and more confident on his issues than we have
seen him so far.  He seemed ready to defend any intimation
that he was less than supportive of a troop surge (Defense
Minister zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador two days ago that
Westerwelle had worked for no increase of German troops for
Afghanistan, see Berlin 157) with invocations of the
importance of civilian reconstruction.  On Iran, he leapt at
the chance to tell us he had not invited Mottaki.  His dodges
on both tactical nuclear weapons and terrorist finance were
all but practiced.  His comment that he was unable to affect
the vote in the EU Parliament on TFTP was a bit disingenuous;
on February 4, an MFA official acknowledged to visiting
Treasury officials in Berlin that German MEPs were in fact
leading the charge against TFTP in the EU Parliament with the
tacit support of the FDP, if not of specialists in the
Justice Ministry and MFA themselves. Westerwelle still cuts a
good image in meetings and in the press here, even though his
party continues a bout of free fall in the polls.  His
ministry, though, still wonders (privately to us) where he
gets his policy direction from.  END COMMENT.
13.  (U) The Ambassador did not have the chance to clear this
cable before departing Berlin.